

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

U·M·I

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Order Number 9409325

**The politics of religion in South Korea, 1974–89: The Catholic
Church's political opposition to the authoritarian state**

Kim, Nyung, Ph.D.

University of Washington, 1993

Copyright ©1993 by Kim, Nyung. All rights reserved.

U·M·I
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

The Politics of Religion in South Korea, 1974-89:
The Catholic Church's Political Opposition
to the Authoritarian State

by

Nyung Kim

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

1993

Approved by *Harold G. Swenson*
(Chairperson of Supervisory Committee)
David S. Lee
James Curran
Ruth L. Horowitz

Program Authorized to Offer Degree *Political Science*

Date *7-28-93*

© Copyright by
NYUNG KIM
1993

Doctoral Dissertation

In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctoral Degree at the University of Washington, I agree that the Library shall make its copies freely available for inspection. I further agree that extensive copying of this dissertation is allowable only for scholarly purposes, consistent with "fair use" as prescribed in the U.S. Copyright Law. Requests for copying or reproduction of this dissertation may be referred to University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, to whom the author has granted "the right to reproduce and sell (a) copies of the manuscript in microfilm and/or (b) printed copies of the manuscript made from microform."

Signature 

Date 7 - 28 - 93

University of Washington

Abstract

The Politics of Religion in South Korea, 1974-89:
The Catholic Church's Political Opposition to
the Authoritarian State

by Nyung Kim

Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee:

Professor James R. Townsend

Department of Political Science

What explains the South Korean Catholic Church's increased sociopolitical activity during the 1970s and 1980s after almost two centuries of relative silence and inaction? This study hypothesizes and affirms that the Church's heightened political activity and influence was the result of the interaction of two phenomena: (1) the politicization of the international Church which followed Vatican II and produced a potent external stimulus for increased Catholic activism, especially in Latin America and Asia; and (2) the growing authoritarianism of South Korean regimes which compelled the Church to respond to and oppose the state's oppression.

The study also explores the type of role performed, and the methods used, by the Church in its political activism, and the Church's impact on, and reaction to, the democratization of the South Korean state.

The two-pronged research strategy utilizes (1) extensive secondary sources on the doctrinal history and institutional patterns of Church-state relations, including a comparative study of the Church's political activism from the 1960s through the

1980s, and (2) intensive primary resources on the political activities of the South Korean Church and state, including ten case studies of significant incidents and developments during the 1970s and 1980s.

The combination of the external and internal factors which caused the dramatic politicization of key elements of the South Korean Church in the 1970s and 1980s enabled the Church to perform a "prophetic" role in attacking socioeconomic and political injustices and human rights abuses, sometimes involving its own members, and in pastoring the poor, the disadvantaged and the oppressed. This "prophetic" role was performed under the leadership of activist clergy and laity who exerted political influence by example, symbolic action and moral persuasion. Their primary contribution to sociopolitical change and democratization was not achieved by partisan political involvement, but by the application of religious moral principles to the sociopolitical context.

Although the Church does not contend for political power and its sociopolitical role may diminish as democratization is achieved, it is important to stress that the Church can continue to perform its "prophetic" role and bring its moral influence to bear on the many socioeconomic and political issues which continue to plague modern society.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	vi
LIST OF TABLES	vii
PART ONE: THE CHURCH'S SOCIOPOLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND INFLUENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE	
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S INVOLVEMENT & OPPOSITION; POLITICS OF RELIGION	2
Introduction	2
The Church under Authoritarian Rule	5
The Church and Political Opposition	6
Key Questions	8
Conceptual and Methodological Concerns	10
Scope & Methods	10
Organization of This Study	22
Notes to Chapter One	25
CHAPTER TWO: CATHOLIC APPROACHES TO RELIGION, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND POLITICS: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES IN THE POST-VATICAN II CHURCH	27
Introduction	27
The Church, Politics, and Social Change:	
The Traditional Stance of the Church	28
Changes and Challenges in the Post Vatican II Church: An Overview of Catholic Social Teachings in relation to Sociopolitical Realities	31
From <i>Rerum Novarum</i> (1891) to the 1950s	33
Pope John XXIII (1958-63), Vatican II (1962-65), and Pope Paul VI (1963-78)	38
The Rise of Liberation Theology in the 1960s and 1970s	45
Liberation Theology, The Vatican, and Pope John Paul II (1978-)	51
Notes to Chapter Two	60
CHAPTER THREE: RELIGION, POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: GENERAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES	61
Introduction	61
Religion and Social Change	62
Classical Theories and New Formulations Developed in Latin America	62

Relating Changes in Society to Changes in the Church: The Signs of the Times	67
Religion and Politics	68
Religion and Progress	69
Religion and Politics	75
The Neo-Marxist Concept of the Relative Autonomy of Religion	83
The Church's Involvement in Politics	86
The Church's Relative Autonomy vis-a-vis the State	87
Political Opposition and the Church	91
Political Opposition as a Prophetic Role of the Church	93
Political Involvement of the Church: Three Analytical Steps	96
Notes to Chapter Three	99
 CHAPTER FOUR: CHURCH-STATE CONFLICTS, THEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS OF THE CHURCH	 100
Introduction	100
Church-State Conflicts: Religion and Politics	101
A Review of the Two Hypotheses of This Study: Interaction between Religion and Politics	101
The Church's Ideological Reaction to the Authoritarian State	106
Theological Spectrum: Political Implications	122
Traditional Theology	122
Liberal Theology	124
Political Implications	126
Institutional Strengths of the Church	130
The "Normative" Strengths	130
The "Structural" Strengths	133
The "Behavioral" Strengths	140
Notes to Chapter Four	148
 CHAPTER FIVE: DIVISION IN, AND CONSTRAINTS ON, THE CHURCH: THEORY IN PRACTICE	 151
Introduction	151
Diversity and Division within the Church: A Spectrum of Catholic Elites	153
The Reactionaries	156
The Conservatives	159
The Progressives	163
The Radicals	166
Progressives vs. Radicals: A Comparison	168
Constraints on the Church's Sociopolitical Influence	175
The "Normative" Level	176

The "Structural" Level	190
The "Behavioral" Level	193
Conclusion	195
Notes to Chapter Five	198
PART TWO: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA (1974-89) AND CONCLUSIONS	
CHAPTER SIX: THE HISTORY OF CHURCH AND STATE RELATIONS IN SOUTH KOREA, 1784-1979	
	202
Introduction	202
The Beginnings, the Persecutions, and the Establishment of the Catholic Church in Korea (1784-1910)	205
Japanese Colonial Rule and Silence of the Church (1910-1945)	216
The Awakening of the Church (1945-1968)	221
Sociopolitical Conditions in the late 1960s and early 1970s	227
Economic Development	228
Political Authoritarianism	236
Church-State Relations in the 1960s and 1970s: A Brief Overview	240
Movements for Workers	245
Movements for Farmers	245
Activities to Protect the Church	246
Movements for Democratization and Human Rights	246
Notes to Chapter Six	252
CHAPTER SEVEN: CHURCH-STATE CONFLICTS IN SOUTH KOREA: CHURCH'S POLITICAL OPPOSITION, 1974-79 (CASE STUDIES #1-5)	
	258
Introduction	258
Case Study #1: The Bishop Chi Incident in 1974	259
Case Study #2: The Myongdong Incident on March 1, 1976	267
Case Study #3: The Dongil Textile Incident in 1978	273
Case Study #4: The Oh Won-chun Incident in 1979	281
Case Study #5: Theological-ideological Conflicts and Structural Constraints within the Church during the 1970s	287
Theological-ideological Conflicts within the Church	288
Structural Constraints within the Church: Intra-ecclesiastical Constraints	292
Notes to Chapter Seven	304
CHAPTER EIGHT: CHURCH-STATE CONFLICTS IN SOUTH KOREA:	

CHURCH'S POLITICAL OPPOSITION, 1980-89 (CASE STUDIES #6-10)	306
Introduction	306
Case Study #6: The U.S.I.S. Arson Incident at Pusan (March 18, 1982) after the Kwangju Uprising (May 18-27, 1980)	306
Case Study #7: The Torture Death of Park Chong-chul in January, 1987	312
Case Study #8: The Support of Opposition Candidate Kim Dae-jung in the December, 1987 Presidential Election	318
Case Study #9: The National Reunification Movement: The Fr. Moon Kyu-hyun Incident in 1989	327
Case Study #10: The Issue of Reform within the Church	338
Notes to Chapter Eight	343
CHAPTER NINE: FURTHER REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS	347
BIBLIOGRAPHY	360
APPENDIX A: A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME OF THE CHURCH IN THE POLITICAL WORLD: ILLUSTRATIONS	375
APPENDIX B: REGIMES AND OPPOSITIONS	378
APPENDIX C: SELECTED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE SOUTH KOREAN CATHOLIC CHURCH'S OPPOSITION TO THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE	380
APPENDIX D: CRY OF THE PEOPLE (A POEM BY KIM CHI-HA)	389
APPENDIX E: CATHOLIC CHURCH HIERARCHY AND INSTITUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1981-87	391

LIST OF FIGURES

Number	Page
1. The Religious World and the Political World	375
2. Conflicts within the Religious World	375
3. Church and State in Cooperation	376
4. Church and State in Conflict	376
5. Society's Reactions to Church's Political Involvement and Church's Internal Turmoil	376
6. Theology Affected by Political World Realities and <i>vice versa</i>	377

LIST OF TABLES

Number	Page
1. Catholic Percentage of Total Population in South Korea, 1970-93	25
2. Population of Seoul and Metropolitan Seoul	229
3. Wage Index in Korea	232
4. Summary of Foreign Capital Inflows	235
5. Martial Law and Emergency Decrees under Park regime	239
6. Catholic Church Hierarchy and Institutions in Latin America, 1981-87	391

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would not have been accomplished without the intellectual guidance and spiritual encouragement of many people: Foremost among these people, I thank Professor James R. Townsend, the Chairperson of my Doctoral Supervisory Committee, and Professor Bruce Cumings, now at the University of Chicago, for their steadfast guidance and insightful suggestions throughout my Master's and Doctoral Programs at the University of Washington. I also express my sincerest thanks to the other Committee members, Professor Daniel S. Lev and Professor Ruth L. Horowitz, for their warm-hearted encouragement and kind support. I also give thanks to Professor Charles M. Engel of the Department of Economics, who served as the Graduate Faculty Representative for the Doctoral final defense. In addition, I thank Professor George Modelski, Professor James Palais, and Professor Daniel Chirot for their invaluable teaching, kindness and care.

I also am grateful to many Korean professors. First, I express my deepest gratitude to the professors of the Department of Political Science and the Jesuit priests, who taught me at Sogang University, Seoul, Korea, my Alma Mater. In addition, I benefited from the interviews and discussions with several other professors and Catholic priests, including members of the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice (CPAJ), which were essential for my study of the Church and politics as a student of political science. I also thank several Church related institutes or organizations, including the Catholic Justice and Peace Research Institute and the CPAJ office, for their helpfulness during my fieldwork.

I also thank my good friends within and outside the University with whom I shared my long journey, including Dwight Holloway, Choombhon Lertrathakarn,

Seung-ham Yang, Young-tae Shin, and other Korean, American, and Indonesian friends, for their encouragement and friendship. Additionally, I thank Dwight Holloway for his editing and proof-reading assistance which made this dissertation more readable. I also appreciate many other people for their unrelenting care and prayer for me. I hope that this work gives praise and glory to God.

Finally, I dedicate this Ph. D. dissertation to my parents. I always remember that my father always encouraged me by saying that politics should be inspired by love, not by desire for domination, and that it is possible. I also give my heartfelt love and thanks to my mother.

PART ONE

**THE CHURCH'S SOCIOPOLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
AND INFLUENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE**

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S INVOLVEMENT & OPPOSITION; POLITICS OF RELIGION

Away with your noisy songs! I will not listen to the melodies of your harps. But if you would offer me holocausts, then let justice surge like water, and goodness like an unfailing stream (*Amos 5:23-24*).

Fear not, I am with you; be not dismayed; I am your God. I will strengthen you, and help you, and uphold you with my right hand of justice (*Isaiah 41:10*).

Religion thus became a problem in politics as an institution to be dealt with and controlled, and further, as *a potentially dangerous source of opposition if threatened* (Levine, 1981, p. 23; italics added).

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to analyze the Roman Catholic Church's sociopolitical involvement¹ in South Korea from the early 1970s up to the present. It mainly concerns the Church's influence and participation in political opposition activities and movements under authoritarian regimes. This study seeks to explore and answer the following questions: Is there a relationship between two significant parallel developments that occurred in South Korea from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, namely, (1) the Church's increasing sociopolitical involvement after a long period of relative silence and inaction, and (2) the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule? Did one of these two developments cause or influence the other, and to what extent?

This study is less concerned with *whether or not* the Church is involved in politics, than with *why and how* it is involved. It is inadequate merely to assert that the Church has made a political impact. As Mainwaring (1986) observes in his study

of contemporary Brazilian and Latin American churches, one also must explore the nature of that impact and the relationship between religion and politics (p. xiv).

This study seeks to prove the validity of the following two hypotheses: (1) That the increased sociopolitical involvement of the Church in South Korea can be attributed, externally, to Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings; and (2) That such sociopolitical involvement can be considered as the reaction of the Church, internally, to the increasing repression of the authoritarian state in South Korea. In discussing these two hypotheses, other plausible explanations also will be explored.

This study is primarily concerned with the relationship between religious change, namely, the politicization of the South Korean Church, and political change, namely, the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in South Korean politics. This study not only examines the Church's contributions to sociopolitical change, but also considers the effects of sociopolitical change and other external influences upon the Church. In other words, this study deals with the reciprocal aspects of religious change and political change, i.e., (1) as the Church becomes more open to society, it becomes increasingly vulnerable to sociopolitical conflicts and change; and (2) as the Church becomes more concerned about its social mission, it becomes increasingly involved in influencing sociopolitical change.

Because the study of religious institutions, such as the Catholic Church, is not frequently undertaken by students of political science, it is appropriate to explain briefly why this study has been undertaken. One of the most interesting developments in South Korean politics from the emergence of the Yushin System in 1972 until the late 1980s has been the radical politicization of churches, both Catholic and Protestant,² and their increasing influence on and participation in political opposition movements. This is exemplified by the strong condemnation of social injustice by

bishops and priests, and by their encouragement of and support for social reform movements, as well as by the increased political activism of priests and laity. In fact, the political influence and participation of the churches, both Catholic and Protestant, have been a very important, if not decisive, factor in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule³ in South Korean politics. This transition, or democratization, has come about as the result of the activities of a wide range of social forces, including both (1) opposition political parties operating within the political system, hereafter called "Institutional Opposition" forces, and (2) opposition forces that have no organized or official voice within the system, hereafter called "Extra-Institutional Opposition" forces.

Political observers tend to focus on the political, as opposed to the religious, nature of the changes and events which have occurred in South Korea. However, it is interesting to note that any observable change in the Church, which had been silent and inactive for many years, has been immediately recognized as a political fact. Examples of these changes include numerous acts of public confrontation with the state, which have taken place increasingly since the early 1970s when the Church began to speak out against social injustice and repression.

It will be necessary to examine the Church's perception of its presence and role in the real world and of its relationship with the state, instead of merely engaging in theoretical studies of changes in ethical and theological doctrines conducted in an abstract vacuum. It also will be necessary to examine Church vs. state conflicts in the context of (1) the development and national security policies of authoritarian regimes in South Korea, and (2) the South Korean Church's commitment to social justice and human rights, as dictated and influenced by the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II).

Although the politicization of the South Korean Church from the early 1970s to the late 1980s can be clearly seen, there have been very few, if any, serious studies of this transformation. There mostly has been a sporadic flow of journalistic accounts of events and personalities. This study was undertaken out of both necessity and choice. It was necessary because, as yet, there has been no comprehensive study of this subject in English. It was by choice because of the author's desire to examine the role of the Church from the perspective of a political scientist whose main interest is political change in South Korea. This study does not concern itself solely with broad theological or theoretical propositions. It mainly concerns (1) the changes in one religious institution situated in one country, namely, the Catholic Church in South Korea, and (2) the Church's role in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in that country. It is the author's belief that the results of this study will provide some theoretical considerations for a comparative study of the relationship between religious and political institutions, particularly in Third World countries.

II. THE CHURCH UNDER AUTHORITARIAN RULE

The Catholic Church's role as an important political opposition force is recognized by Linz (1973), who notes that "one of the most independent bases of all shades of dissidence can be a church when it does not identify wholeheartedly with a regime" (p. 200). In other words, "critics, dissidents, and opponents tolerated, supported, or sponsored by a church can represent a formidable resource in case of crisis in an authoritarian regime" (*ibid.*, p. 201).

Cummings (1989) also notes that the case of South Korea, especially during the Park and Chun authoritarian regimes, is comparable to those in Latin America. He

emphasizes the role of churches as "critical sanctuaries for dissidents" and as "often being the only institution relatively immune from regime intrusion" (pp. 7-8). According to Cumings, "the expression of ethical concerns by religious and spiritual groups previously noted for their prudent accommodation to the authorities" is one of the key coordinates in "the explosion of a highly repoliticized and angry society" recently described by O'Donnell and Schmitter which "fits the Korean case perfectly" (*ibid.*; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 49).

Before the politicization of the South Korean Church began in the early 1970s, it almost always had been either apolitical, conservative or "noted for their [its] prudent accommodation to the authorities" (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 49).

The politicization of the Church is not unique to South Korea. It can be observed as a general pattern in many Third World countries during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In addition to the Latin American nations, the Philippines, Portugal and Spain exemplify the Church's expanding political role. This is evidenced by the strong condemnation of social injustice and encouragement of social reform movements by bishops and priests, and by the growing political activism of priests and laity (Choi, 1989_a, p. 104).

III. THE CHURCH AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION

The politicization of the Church and its increasing sociopolitical involvement is seen as a general pattern of change in today's Church by Wiarda and Kline (1990), as follows:

Today the church is changing--especially if by church one means the top levels of the hierarchy that control the religious and political fortunes of the institution. Transformations have been occasioned by the new theologies of the past hundred years, as expressed through various papal encyclicals, Vatican II

(early 1960s), and the conferences of the Latin American bishops at Medellin, Colombia (1968) and Puebla, Mexico (1979). A significant number of bishops (and many more parish priests and members of the various orders) subscribe to what is commonly called "liberation theology," which stresses that the church is of and for this world and should take stands against repression and violence, including the "institutionalized violence"--life-demeaning and life-threatening--experienced by the poor. Liberation theology also stresses the equality of all believers--lay people as well as clerics and bishops--as opposed to the former stress on the hierarchy.

.....
 As a result of the changes, the clergy is no longer uniformly conservative, and its members differ on the role that the church should play in socioeconomic reform and on the nature of hierarchical relations within the church. (pp. 61-62)

Thus, the changes within the South Korean Church could be considered the South Korean version of the general trend in the Church in Third World countries. A distinguishing feature of South Korea is that it does not have a predominantly Catholic population.⁴ A large majority of the populations of most, if not all, Latin American countries is Catholic, and those countries are dominated by the Church (see Appendix E). Nonetheless, this study will show that many of the same aspects of Church vs. state conflicts and of the Church's sociopolitical involvement in Latin American countries are equally applicable to South Korea and other Third World countries.

Because of the unique impact upon the Church in Latin American and Asian countries of the changes in Catholic social teachings before and after Vatican II, this study mainly focuses on the Catholic Church rather than on the Protestant Church. It analyzes the Church's sociopolitical role in opposing authoritarian regimes, and in promoting justice, human rights and democracy, often in alliance with Protestant churches and other opposition groups, movements and coalitions. This study also analyzes both the relationship between religion and politics, and the dynamic interplay between political opposition movements and authoritarian regimes in South Korea.

IV. KEY QUESTIONS

This study seeks to answer the following questions: (1) why has the Church sought to influence and participate in political opposition movements in South Korean politics?; (2) how has the Church been involved, how has it functioned in the various sociopolitical movements, and what are the factors limiting the Church's sociopolitical influence?; (3) what are the implications of the Church's political involvement for the traditional church vs. state relationship?; and (4) what are the implications of the Church's involvement for other countries, especially Third World countries?

As previously stated, this study seeks to validate the following two hypotheses: (1) That the increased sociopolitical involvement of the Church in South Korea can be attributed, externally, to Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings; and (2) That such sociopolitical involvement can be considered as the reaction of the Church, internally, to the increasing repression of the authoritarian state in South Korea.

The first hypothesis is that the unprecedented change in the sociopolitical involvement of the Church since the early 1970s is due to Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings, including Liberation Theology, as experienced in Latin American and other Third World countries. The external influence of Vatican II and post-Vatican II Catholicism is discussed in Chapter Two, which examines, historically, the changes in Catholicism before and after Vatican II.

The second hypothesis is that such increased sociopolitical involvement was the Church's internal reaction to repressive authoritarian rule in South Korea. In other words, the Church was compelled to respond to the repressive regime in order not only to defend and preserve its own integrity, but also to help the oppressed, as

possibly their last or only hope for a defense of human rights. The repression became so extreme that "critics of the regime, including members of the clergy, were routinely branded as Communists or Communist sympathizers and often jailed as threats to the country's national security" (Youngblood, 1990, p. xii). As the regime became more repressive, it became more of a necessity than a choice for the Church to involve itself politically.

This study goes beyond determining why the Church finally responded to the regime's repressive stimuli. According to the saying, "even a worm will turn." What was the Church's role and what was the political impact of the Church's *turn* after its long silence in South Korean politics? What are the ways in which the Church influences the political process? What are the political implications of the interplay between Church and state? As Mainwaring (1986) observes, the Church, as an important institution, can contribute to political change "as it forms the consciousness of the various social classes, as it mobilizes political forces to act, and as it makes alliances with political elites or criticizes them" (p. 13).

In other words, this study will explore whether or not the following observation by Comblin (1979) about the Latin American Church also has been true for the South Korean Church: "The church, as protector of the oppressed, had to respond. At the outset, these responses were improvised, but little by little it became clear they were following a consistent pattern, which soon became the rule. Today there is no longer a need to improvise. The church now knows what lies ahead and what should be done to respond to such situations" (p. 99).

Finally, this study will examine the Church's political involvement as it relates to the doctrine of separation of church and state. The application of this doctrine to the Church raises the following questions: (1) What is the rationale behind the

doctrine of separation of church and state? (2) What are the characteristics of such separation? (3) Is it possible for the Church to exist and function under authoritarian regimes without involving itself politically? (4) How do individual members of the Church, especially bishops and priests, participate in a political opposition movement? (5) How do society and the state regard the Church's sociopolitical involvement? (6) What political role or roles does the Church perform under authoritarian regimes? (7) How does the Church exert political influence? and (8) Are there any limits to the Church's sociopolitical involvement? This study seeks to provide satisfactory answers to these questions.

V. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

A. SCOPE & METHODS

This study tries to treat the Church's sociopolitical role and involvement in contemporary South Korea as a significant development in the relationship and interaction between religion and politics, and between Church and state. This is a study about "how the social sciences fruitfully study the Church and its relationship to politics" (Mainwaring & Wilde, 1989, p. vii). Having spoken and taken seriously the words of the Lord's Prayer that "Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven," the Church has approached the task of democratization *in its own way* by proclaiming and actualizing its religious mission for the evangelization and humanization of society. This study tries *not* to reduce the Church's social mission to politics *but* aims "to understand it *first in religious terms*." Such "*empathy* is not only compatible with critical judgements but indeed necessary to *a full interpretation*" and *understanding of*

the Church and its involvement in politics (*ibid.*, p. vii-viii; italics added). Thus, this study treats "seriously the nature of *religious motivations*, not seeing religion as epiphenomenal," and attempts to understand "*the Church's institutional*ity without treating it simply as another institution, and thereby exorcising the *religious element* out of social scientific analysis" (*ibid.*, p. 34; italics added).

It is important, for the purposes of this study, to properly define the Catholic Church. In *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church* (1974), Bruneau's definition of the Church includes the following four distinct but closely interrelated components: (1) a message, with which the Church is to pursue its goal consisting of two points: "1. to convert men to make them disciples; therefore, evangelization; and 2. to guide the world towards God; therefore, action in the temporal sphere, or civilization," according to Yves Congar, O.P. (1967, p. 307); (2) an institution, for which Canon Law set forth the institutional rules to regulate its operations; (3) the relationship between the national Church and the universal Church centered in the Vatican; and (4) the relationship between the national Church and the state, which share the same territory, constituency and aspiration for men's allegiance (Bruneau, 1974, pp. 1-3).

Theoretical guidance for this study is provided by examining, historically, the theology and traditions of the Church, as well as the experience of the often studied Latin American and Philippine cases. Because the increased sociopolitical involvement of the Church mainly has been seen in Third World countries, especially in Latin America and the Philippines, it follows that a study of those recently politicized Churches may provide the insight needed for a study of the South Korean Church. According to the view of Youngblood (1990) regarding the Philippine case,

the way church leaders, especially Cardinal Sin, participated in ousting Marcos and returning the Philippines to democracy was uniquely Filipino. Yet

many aspects of church-state relations in the Philippines . . . have broader application. The renewed commitment of the Philippine churches to the poor and to social justice, that is, to a more equitable distribution of goods and services, is being duplicated simultaneously by churches in other developing countries, particularly in Latin America, and is resulting in similar conflicts with secular authority. Church-state relations during the Marcos years are thus an important case study for understanding the nature of socioeconomic and political change in the Third World. (pp. xii-xiii)

However, the Latin American cases are not directly comparable to South Korea's case without certain qualifications. It must be pointed out that the Church in Latin America is different from its counterpart in South Korea, based upon the following key variables: (1) the size of the Church in relation to the entire population and to other religious groups; (2) the degree of attachment to papal doctrines and teachings; (3) the degree of attachment to indigenous political elites; and (4) the history of the Church and its relationship with the state, including socioeconomic and political factors.

It is necessary to analyze these variables in order to determine the applicability of the Latin American experience to South Korea. This study seeks to validate the following conclusions regarding these comparative variables: (1) the Latin American cases are similar enough to offer valuable insights for South Korea's case; (2) the degree of adherence to papal doctrines and teachings by the Latin American Churches is comparable, with some minor variations, to the South Korean Church; (3) from the early 1970s the South Korean Church was encouraged and influenced by the social teachings of Vatican II and also by the Latin American Churches' experience with Liberation Theology; (4) the sociopolitical role of the Church and the Church-state relationship in Latin American countries is similar to South Korea because, in both cases, the state was governed by authoritarian regimes using a similar rationale or political dogmata, i.e., national security, anti-Communism and economic

development; and (5) the size of the Church in South Korea, in relation to both population and other religious groups, has increased considerably (see Note #4).

Similar conclusions have been reached regarding the Philippine Church. According to Youngblood (1990),

an investigation of church-state conflict focuses perforce on the prophetic role played by a vocal and committed minority within the Catholic and Protestant churches in sustaining the ideals of democracy while defending human rights, social justice, and freedom in the name of the gospel. Finally, an analysis of church-state relations in the Philippines serves as a context for comparing the activities of the Catholic and Protestant churches in the Third World since Vatican II, for just as the impetus for change within the Philippine churches was externally generated, church involvement in social transformation in the Philippines has influenced other Christian churches in Asia. (pp. 6-7)

This study is an attempt to analyze Church-state conflicts in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s from a general and theoretical perspective. In order to be able to do so, Part One (Chapters 1-5) develops a Politics of Religion Perspective out of general and theoretical considerations based on the Latin American and Philippine experience. Part Two (Chapters 6-9) then deals with the specific case of the South Korean Church and its conflicts with the authoritarian state. In exploring those conflicts, considerable attention will be given to the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice (*Ch'ònjugyo Chòng'ui Kuhyòn Chòn'guk Sajedan* in Korean, hereafter referred to as the CPAJ), an organization of liberal, activist priests within the South Korean Church.

According to the July 31, 1989 issue of the newspaper *Donga Ilbo* (Donga Daily), as of 1989, out of a total of 1,400 Catholic priests in South Korea, 400-500 were members of the CPAJ (Chun, 1992, p. 6). However, the CPAJ is a loose, informal organization open to all priests in South Korea. There is no formal membership enrollment. Priests are able to come and go as they wish. Each diocese has one or more priests who are permanent members of the standing committee of the

CPAJ at any given time. The solidarity of the CPAJ is attributable to the fact that all of its participants also are members of the Catholic priesthood. As will be shown in the case studies of Chapters Seven and Eight when the actions of the CPAJ become controversial, the Church hierarchy tries to discourage its activities by asserting that the CPAJ is a group not officially recognized by the Korean Bishops' Conference. It also is true that when the CPAJ achieves a good result, the hierarchy regards its actions as those of the Church.

The CPAJ has been and still is the most important and controversial group actively working for democratization and human rights within the South Korean Church. The emergence of the CPAJ as a nationwide group of Catholic priests committed to the realization of justice, but whose "evangelic mission" often has been considered "political" by its critics, is an important subject for this study for the reasons discussed below (see Chapter Seven, Case Study #1 for additional details about the CPAJ).

First, the CPAJ often has been viewed as representing the entire priesthood or acting as the Church. Thus, the activities of the CPAJ have generated much interest within and outside the Church, and have revived a longstanding controversy regarding the proper role of the Church. Some maintain that the Church should stay entirely out of politics and should concern itself solely with its religious and spiritual mission. Others assert that the Church also should be concerned with technological, socioeconomic, and political issues. The latter group believes that the Church has an "evangelic mission" to actively promote justice in the real world. As observed by Turner (1971), "at certain times and in certain matters the hierarchy of the Church can intervene legitimately in specific political questions" (p. 92).

Second, as previously mentioned, the CPAJ not only has been the most controversial group, but it also has been the most active group working for sociopolitical change within the Church. The CPAJ has provided decisive momentum both for the democratization and human rights movements and for other sociopolitical movements in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s.

Third, the CPAJ, as a "Religious Extra-Institutional Opposition" group, is not interested in assuming or exercising political power. Also, its institutional status has not been officially approved by the Church hierarchy. The CPAJ best can be described as an informal group of relatively young priests committed to the Church's mission of evangelism, democracy and social justice. It usually has adopted an independent, radical stance in its opposition to authoritarian regimes in South Korea, much like that of some of the Biblical prophets.⁵

Fourth, the emergence of the CPAJ as the advocate of the Church's new sociopolitical role provides a new perspective on the relationship between religion and politics in South Korea. This perspective emphasizes how the religious/theological world of the Church and the political/ideological world of the state have become intertwined and overlapped, resulting in unavoidable conflicts on sociopolitical issues. When an authoritarian state reacts to the actions of activist priests, its political dogmata and absolute power mechanisms come into sharp focus (see Figure #1 of Appendix A).

Fifth, the politicization of the CPAJ has contributed to the Church's involvement in the democratization and human rights movements. However, as pointed out by Comblin (1979), the full extent of the Church's sociopolitical impact, as yet, may not have been felt:

In one sense the work of the church is always mixed in with the work of other movements, including questionable movements. Because the church

works through human agents it is inevitable that there is interaction between what the church does to fulfill its mission of proclaiming the gospel in a given situation and the action of various movements, especially opposition movements in the same situation. This is part of the historical process; it occurs in every country, in every time, though not always with the same intensity. And only many years afterward can history tell which movements were actually helped by the fortuitous encounter with the whole evangelical process, which groups reaped the fruits of the transforming and conscience-raising efforts of the church. (P. 101)

Other important Church groups whose sociopolitical activities need to be examined include the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference (*Han'guk Ch'ònjugyo Chugyo Hoe'ui*), the Justice and Peace Committee (*Ch'òng'ui P'yònghwa Wiwònho*), the Lay Apostolate Council of Korea (*Han'guk P'yòngsindo Sadojik Hyòbuihoe*), and Catholic lay movements such as the Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne (*Kat'ollik Nodong Ch'òngnyònho*, hereafter referred to as the J.O.C.), representing workers, and the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement (*Han'guk Kat'ollik Nongminhoe*, hereafter referred to as the KCFM), representing farmers. These Catholic lay groups mostly have been under the guidance of Catholic priests belonging to the CPAJ.

The Church's influence on and participation in the labor movements, farmers' movements, democratization and human rights movements, and the reunification movement also need to be examined. The various views, strengths, weaknesses and interactions of the significant religious and sociopolitical groups and sectors within and outside the Church also will be examined.

As previously mentioned, this study mainly concerns the period of 1974-89, which includes (1) the emergence and the demise of President Park Chung-hee's Yushin (Revitalizing Reform) System during the Fourth Republic (October, 1972-October, 1979); (2) the short-lived post-Park government of President Choi Kyu-hah (October, 1979-August, 1980); (3) the rule of a Special Committee for National Security Measures led by General Chun Doo-hwan (May, 1980-March 1981); (4) the Kwangju Uprising (May 18-26, 1980); (5) President Chun's Fifth Republic (March,

1981-February, 1988); and (6) the emergence and the early years of the Sixth Republic (February, 1988-February, 1993) led by President Roh Tae-woo, who was elected president in December, 1987, during the first orderly and peaceful transition of political power in the history of South Korea. The second half of the 1980s is especially important because the democratization movement in which the Church played an active role culminated in the direct election of President Rho and in the peaceful transition of regimes, and also because the Church increasingly became involved in the reunification movement during this period.

In the analysis of political opposition movements during the 1974-1989 period, it will be useful to consider three themes of political opposition, namely (1) the Liberal Democracy and Human Rights theme, (2) the Social Justice and Distribution theme, and (3) the Reunification theme. These "themes" also can be considered as "phases" in the development of political opposition movements in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. However, these themes have not been employed by wholly separate and distinct movements. They have co-existed in many, if not all, opposition movements.

The same three themes applicable in political opposition movements also are reflected in the political activities of the Church. In other words, the religious opposition groups, including the CPAJ, have defined their roles according to the three thematic aspects in their political opposition activities under each regime. This demonstrates that the Church has not operated in a political vacuum, but has dealt with the issues of the real world. It has responded to the political realities under each authoritarian regime, and has shared other opposition groups' concerns about socioeconomic justice under the government's growth-oriented economic development

policies, and about the government's violation of basic human rights under the pretext of national security and anti-Communism.

Regarding the theoretical purposes of this study, it will be useful to consider the following three theoretical perspectives: (1) the Political Order and Development Perspective; (2) the Political Opposition and Transition Perspective; and (3) the Politics of Religion Perspective.

The first perspective, the Political Order and Development Perspective, emphasizes "the primacy of political order" for economic and political development, as discussed in Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) and Leonard Binder et al.'s *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (1971). This perspective is a highly modified version of the optimistic paradigm of classical modernization theory which maintains that "democracy is related to the state of economic development; the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset, 1960, p. 31).

Both Huntington and Binder observe that where developing countries have experienced both accelerated socioeconomic change and rapid social mobilization of new groups into the political process, but not a corresponding development of political institutions to meet the surge of demands, the result is political decay instead of development. Thus, they stress the importance of strengthening the abilities of governing elites to rule more effectively. Huntington regards political development as a process of making institutional changes in order to cope with the stresses of political modernization, especially the stresses of social mobilization and political participation. Binder and others emphasize the importance of expanding the governmental capacities of developing countries to deal with five major crises, namely, the crises of legitimacy, identity, participation, penetration and distribution.

Huntington considers that the Political Order and Development Perspective, which makes political order and stability the primary yardstick of political development, is applicable to South Korea. He cites President Park's regime as an example of how military leaders can be effective builders of political authority and institutions, albeit at the expense of democracy (Huntington, 1968, p. 261). His thesis that political stability is an essential pre-requisite for South Korea's two overriding national goals of economic development and national security is a useful rationale for an authoritarian regime. Thus, the Political Order and Development Perspective may be a useful tool for analyzing the rationale behind South Korea's authoritarian regimes.

Another helpful resource regarding the Political Order and Development Perspective is *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (1978) edited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. This work analyzes and explains the collapse of democratic regimes in pre-World War II Europe and in contemporary Latin America. The introductory essay by Linz outlines the concepts and questions that guided their research. His approach was to systematically evaluate the responses of governing elites (among competing political elites and parties) to a variety of political and economic crises. Particular attention is paid to problems of the legitimacy, effectiveness, efficacy, and stability of governments. This approach helps not only in the study of the collapse of democratic regimes and the return to authoritarian rule, but also in the study of the instability of subsequent authoritarian regimes and the regression from authoritarian rule.

The second general perspective, the Political Opposition and Transition Perspective is useful in analyzing the "chronic instability" that all South Korean authoritarian regimes have experienced in coping with opposition forces (Cumings,

1984, p. 789). This perspective mainly focuses on the relationship and interplay between the regime and its opposition, sometimes resulting in a transition away from authoritarian rule. Some useful illustrations of this perspective are found in *Regimes and Opposition* (1973), edited by Robert Dahl. Juan J. Linz's article on Spain and Robert H. Dix's article on Latin America not only define and analyze several types of political opposition, but also recognize the potential role of the Church as an opposition force. The "opposition" part of this perspective is pertinent to the analysis of the role of the Church as an opposition force.

The "transition" part of the perspective is discussed in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (1986), by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, et al. According to those scholars, the possibilities for liberalization (a gradual "softening" of authoritarian rule, characterized by the incremental extension of civil liberties and of individual and sectoral rights of political participation) depend upon the strategic dynamics and "games" within and between the regime and its opposition. In particular, liberalization depends on the interplay between hardliners and softliners of the authoritarian regime, and between moderate and maximalist sectors of the opposition. Where hardliners and maximalists dominate, the chances for liberalization are slim. Where softliners and moderates outweigh extremists on each side, the prospects for liberalization improve.

Another important aspect is that, where, for a variety of reasons, e.g., economic success or failure, quest for legitimacy or expanded bases of support, or achievement of security, the dominant coalition begins to erode, the authoritarian actors eventually look to civil society for alternative bases of support. It depends on the character and objectives of those who respond to this "opening" whether or not liberalization occurs.

This study also offers us several other useful concepts related to "transition," namely (1) "democratization" (the expansion of civil society embracing social relations, economic equity and politics, either at the procedural or formal level, involving party competition, open elections, etc. or at the substantive or societal and economic level, or both); (2) "resurrection of civil society" (O'Donnell's phrase); (3) "soft" dictatorship (*dictablanda*); and (4) "hard" or "limited" democracy (*democradura*).

Another essential aspect is that the transition from authoritarianism ultimately depends on horizontal elite agreements and on the swing votes of the bourgeoisie and military hierarchy. Thus, this study not only deals with the conflictive interplay between the regime and its opposition forces, but also endeavors to find the momentum for democratization by exploring the dynamics within the regime and the sociopolitical context. It also discusses the nature of civil society and its relationship to the process of political change. This kind of discussion is usually unsatisfactory because civil society is considered only in general and abstract terms. Insufficient attention is paid to specific groups and to the relational factors which bind sectors and movements to their leaders, structures, and institutions. The present study concentrates more on specific groups, especially religious opposition groups, and on their involvement in the conflictive interplay between the regime and its opposition.

The third perspective, the Politics of Religion Perspective is the main perspective to be developed and used in this study. This perspective considers the following aspects: (1) religion and social change; (2) church and state relations, including separation of church and state, and the relative autonomy of the Church; (3) the Church's involvement in political opposition movements; and (4) the influence and limitations of the Church. This study will develop and apply this Politics of

Religion Perspective in its analysis of the Church's sociopolitical involvement in South Korea. Thus, it will focus on conflicts between the regime and its opposition, and between religion and politics, and on the dynamic interaction between Church, society, and state. A conceptual scheme for illustrative purposes, mainly based upon the Latin American cases, is provided in Appendix A, A Conceptual Scheme of the Church in the Political World.

Preparation for this study included literary and documentary research and interviews. In addition to newspapers, books, periodicals, unpublished research papers and statistical compilations available in libraries, this study relies upon documentary information, data and publications on the South Korean Catholic Church and the CPAJ obtained when the author was engaged in fieldwork in South Korea. Through his personal interviews with members of the CPAJ, lay workers, and lay people familiar with the activities of the Church and the CPAJ, the author was able to obtain clear perception and more detailed information about the inner workings of the Church and the CPAJ, and about the views of ordinary people concerning the political involvement of the Church, than is available through purely academic (or scholarly) sources.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY

This study is organized as follows:

Part One (Chapters 1-5) is entitled The Church's Sociopolitical Involvement and Influence: Theory and Practice.

Chapter One is an introduction to the subject matter and scope of this study and to some conceptual and methodological concerns.

Chapter Two presents Catholic approaches to religion, social change and politics, beginning with the traditional stance of the Church. Then a historical overview of the evolutionary changes in Catholic social teachings in relation to sociopolitical realities over the last 100 years is presented. This discussion highlights the changes in and challenges to the post-Vatican II Church, which is important background for the later discussion of similar changes and challenges faced by the South Korean Church since the late 1960s.

Chapter Three discusses the general and theoretical considerations needed to develop a Politics of Religion Perspective for this study, under the following three headings: (1) Religion and Social Change; (2) Religion and Politics; and (3) the Church's Involvement in Politics.

Chapter Four discusses Church-state conflicts, the theological spectrum, and the institutional strengths of the Church. It begins with a review of the two stated hypotheses of this study. Then it examines the nature and pattern of conflicts between Church and state and between religion and politics. Lastly it discusses the differences between traditional theology and liberal theology, especially Liberation Theology, and the institutional strengths of the Church and its pattern of influence for sociopolitical change.

Chapter Five examines and discusses diversity and division within the Church and the constraints on the Church's sociopolitical influence.

Part Two (Chapters 6-9) is entitled The Case of South Korea (1974-89) and Conclusions.

Chapter Six discusses Church and state relations in South Korea, 1784-1968. Its overview of South Korean Church history is presented in the following three periods or phases: (1) the beginnings, the persecutions, and the establishment of the

Church in Korea (1784-1910); (2) Japanese colonial rule and silence of the Church (1910-1945); and (3) the awakening of the Church (1945-1968). This chapter concludes with a brief overview of Church-state relations in the 1970s as a prelude to the case studies in Chapters Seven and Eight.

Chapters Seven and Eight provide a detailed description, analysis and evaluation of Church-state conflicts in South Korea during the period of 1974-1989, by presenting ten case studies. Chapter Seven presents and discusses five selected cases of the Church's involvement in the democratization and human rights movements during the 1970s. Chapter Eight examines another five selected cases concerning the Church's sociopolitical involvement during the 1980s. The fourth case study of Chapter Eight (Case Study #9) explores the Church's involvement in the national reunification movement. As will be shown, the movement for reunification which for the Church meant the evangelization of North Korea has become an increasingly important concern of the Church. The last case study (Case Study #10) deals with the issue of reform within the Church.

Finally, Chapter Nine summarizes our findings regarding the two hypotheses proposed in Chapter One, and presents some appropriate conclusions. In addition, the sociopolitical role of the South Korean Church, and its implications for churches in other Third World countries is discussed and summarized.

This study also presents a conceptual scheme by illustrations in Appendix A, A Conceptual Scheme of the Church in the Political World, showing not only the tension and conflicts between Church and state, Church and society, and within the Church, but also the overlap between the political/ ideological world and the religious/theological world.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. This study mainly deals with the Catholic Church's sociopolitical activities and employs the following terms somewhat interchangeably: Catholic political involvement; Church(s) involvement in politics or in political opposition; Church's participation in politics as an opposition or opposition force; politicization or radicalization of the Church; and the Church's sociopolitical involvement or participation.

The term "intervention" is not used in this study because, in contrast to the case of military "intervention," it is inaccurate to say that Catholic churches "intervene" in politics, because that would suggest an intention to take power. It is more accurate to say that the Church responds to requests for help by individuals and groups who oppose the regime. Thus, the Church participates in the political process in order to carry out its "evangelic mission" for justice when segments of society and the Church suffer abuses under authoritarian and repressive regimes. Moreover, the applicable dictionary definitions of "intervene" are (1) to come between, intercede, mediate and (2) to interfere with force or a threat of force. When the Church does (1), other terminology suffices, and the Church doesn't do (2). Perhaps the Church, in concert with state, did (2) in the past, but it didn't do so during the period covered by this study except for silent inaction which is pointed out.

2. In this study, the terms "church" and "churches," unless otherwise qualified or indicated by the context, refer to Catholic churches. "Church" (with a capital C) and "church" (with a small c), unless otherwise qualified or indicated by the context, refer to the Roman Catholic Church as a whole. This study mainly utilizes the examples of Third World national Catholic churches, especially those in Latin America and Asia, and the history, traditions, doctrines and social teachings of pre and post-Vatican II Catholicism, thus conceptually separating the Catholic Church from the Protestant Church.

3. It can be said that the national consensus on liberal democracy among the South Korean people mainly has come about as a result of their *a posteriori* or empirical rejection of authoritarian rule, which they experienced for many years after the Liberation of Korea in 1945, rather than from their *a priori* ideological acceptance of the concept of liberal democracy, which they never have experienced in any substantial way. See *Kyegansasang* [Thought Quarterly] (Seoul: Sahoegwahagwòn, Fall 1990), p. 7.

4. Basically the religions of Korea have been Shamanism, Buddhism (introduced A.D. 372) and Confucianism, which was the official faith from 1392 to 1910. Catholicism was introduced in the 18th century and Protestantism was introduced in the late 19th century. Religious affiliations of the population in 1985 according to Hunter (1992): Buddhism, 27.7%; Protestantism, 18.6%; Roman Catholicism, 5.7%; Confucianism, 1%; others, 1%; no religion, 46% (p. 861).

The following table shows Catholic percentage of total population and its increase in South Korea.

**Table 1. Catholic Percentage of Total Population
in South Korea, 1970-93**

Year	Catholic % of Total Population
1970	2.4
1975	2.4
1976	2.9
1979	2.9
1980	3.0
1981	3.0
1982	3.1
1983	3.3
1984	3.6
1986	4.1
1987	4.1
1988	4.7
1989	5.0
1990	5.3
1991	5.7
1992	6.0
1993	6.3

Source: Felician A. Foy O.F.M. (Ed.). *Catholic Almanac*, 1970, p. 443; 1975, p. 421; 1976, p. 425; 1979, p. 429; 1980, p. 436; 1981, p. 391; 1982, p. 385; 1983, p. 384; 1984, p. 359; 1986, p. 359; 1987, p. 348; 1988, p. 349; 1989, p. 350; 1990, p. 349; 1991, p. 346; 1992, p. 349; 1993, p. 349.

5. In the Bible, there are many prophets, including Isaiah, Jeremiah, Amos, Micah and Hosea, to name only a few. Most of these prophets were deeply aware of and concerned about the sins of their people and said more than just that "God acts in history." They taught that "whatever actually happens is the work of God," thus interpreting calamities as "acts of divine judgment." Being deeply concerned not only with moral ideals, but also with practicality, they constantly referred to historical events, thus injecting an element of realism in their teachings (Donald Senior et al., eds., 1990. *The Catholic Study Bible: The New American Bible*. Oxford University Press, RG 353). As an example, Micah, who was preoccupied with issue of social justice, attacked the rich exploiters of the poor, namely, deceitful merchants, venal judges, corrupt priests and false prophets (*ibid.*, RG 371; also see the Biblical Book of Micah, whose chapters are subtitled Divine Judgment, Social Evils, Downfall of Present Leaders, The People To Be Restored, Restoration through the Messiah, Accusation and Answer, and Condemnation and Prayer).

CHAPTER TWO

CATHOLIC APPROACHES TO RELIGION, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND POLITICS: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES IN THE POST-VATICAN II CHURCH

The Church has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the gospel (*Gaudium et Spes* [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World], no. 4).

She [the Church] also has the right to pass moral judgements, even on matters touching the political order, whenever basic personal rights or the salvation of souls make such judgements necessary (*ibid.*, no. 76).

The spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because the Lord has anointed me; He has sent me to bring glad tidings to the lowly, to heal the brokenhearted, To proclaim liberty to the captives and release to the prisoners (*Isaiah* 61:1).

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout its long history, the Catholic Church has been noted for its conservatism--rigid adherence to its tradition, as well as doctrinal continuity in its social teachings. Therefore, it is not too surprising that, for most of its history, the Church has been aligned with the established political order. What is remarkable is that after so many years of relative stagnation, the Church has suddenly blossomed in the 20th century. It has undergone real and substantial changes, becoming progressive in sociopolitical matters. The nature and implications of these changes are not only matters of historical interest. They also are crucial to our understanding of the present role of the Church in society and politics, especially in Third World countries, including South Korea.

This chapter is an overview of the changes and challenges affecting post-Vatican II Catholicism, including the emergence and development of "Liberation

Theology" in Latin America. Social teachings of the Church over the past 100 years will be briefly examined in order to see how they have contributed to today's post-Vatican II Catholicism which motivates and encourages the Church to play an active sociopolitical role.

II. THE CHURCH, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE: THE TRADITIONAL STANCE OF THE CHURCH

Three centuries of Roman persecution of the early Church ended in the year 313, when the Emperor Constantine, a recent convert to Christianity, issued his Edict of Milan (Lovasik, 1990, p. 29). This edict signaled the beginning of a long period of collaboration between the Church and the state. Thereafter, the Church became inescapably involved in politics by justifying and reinforcing the authority of the state.

Regarding the conservative stance of the Church (and most Protestant churches) through most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Church formed alliances with several authoritarian governments in Europe. It identified with their values and objectives, such as order, social harmony, and suppression of anarchical and radical groups (see Smith, 1982, pp. 283-84). For example, as McGovern (1980) observes, "when the French Revolution ended, and after an uneasy concordat with Napoleon, the Church looked once again to the monarchy for protection. 'The Church had been driven . . . as a fellow sufferer at the hands of the [French] Revolution, into a closer union with the monarchy and the aristocracy'" (pp. 91-92; also see Wallace, 1966, p. 14).

The Church also has sided with the rich and powerful in many Third World countries (Foroohar, 1989, p. 52). For example, the Church in Latin America,

through most of its history, has been a very conservative political actor, working in alliance with the landed aristocracy (McGovern, 1980, p. 117).

In the 1920s and 1930s, Catholic bishops in Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Brazil, and Argentina, did not resist the rise of corporatist and fascist regimes. Facing the rise of Nazism in Germany in the early 1930s, only a few prelates dared to openly oppose Hitler. Neither Catholic bishops in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe nor prelates in Castro's Cuba, as a group, voiced public criticism of systemic violations of human rights by the dictators in power. While the Church hierarchy did not actively welcome the emergence of repressive regimes, neither did they, as a group, voice their opposition to them once they were firmly in power (Smith, 1982, pp. 283-84).¹ What about the Vatican? As Smith observes,

the Vatican also normally has taken a flexible position once totalitarian and authoritarian governments are well established, and has attempted to open or maintain lines of communication with them through papal nuncios or delegates. The strategy of ecclesiastical leaders at both the national and international levels in face of strong rulers, on the Right and the Left, has been to use private negotiations to win government acquiescence for continued religious ministries by the local Church. (*Ibid.*, p. 284)

Thus, the Church's involvement in politics has a long history. Despite its apolitical nature, the Church has never been apolitical. Until quite recently, the Church and the state, for the most part, enjoyed what could now be termed a "co-dependent" relationship. The state depended upon the Church for legitimation. The Church depended upon the state for status, protection and material security. According to many leaders of the Church, this "marriage" reached its zenith during the Middle Ages, when society was viewed, with its hierarchical divisions, as a harmonious, ideal state of affairs, economically, morally, socially, politically, and in all other respects (McGovern, 1990, p. 32).

Regarding the traditional social teachings of the Church, which developed during this "marriage" and continue to be cited right up to the present, McGovern observes that

though the language may change, the elements of continuity in Catholic social teachings can be rather easily discerned; for example: the right and duty of the church to speak out on social issues, a fundamental concern for the human dignity of every person, concern for community or the common good, principles of justice, warnings about false solutions (collectivist socialism, individualistic capitalism), and recognition of the need for state intervention balanced with a concern to limit state control. (*Ibid.*, p. 28)

Some of the foregoing principles are liberal in concept. However, as applied by the Church, the liberal aspects mostly were either ignored or interpreted in such a way as to defend the status quo.

The socioeconomic changes brought about by the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution would seem to have led to corresponding changes in the Church. But the Church mostly resisted any changes until the end of the 19th century when Pope Leo XIII issued his monumental *Rerum Novarum* [On the Condition of the Working Man] (1891), an encyclical on the condition of the workers. Both the spiritual and temporal power of the Church had come under widespread attack in Europe. The First Vatican Council (1869-70) defined papal primacy and papal infallibility as the supreme judge in Church matters (Lovasik, 1990, p. 147). Thus, the Church was engrossed in defending its authority and property rights against the rising tide of nationalism, anticlericalism, and revolution.

The Church also became a major target of socialist and Communist movements. Religion, Church authority, and Church property came under attack. Thus, the Church mainly had to be on the defensive. The Church also reacted adversely to the democratic ideas of Catholic social reformers. Neither the aristocratic

hierarchy nor the peasant-based lower clergy had a good grasp of the problems of the urban proletariat (McGovern, 1980, p. 93).

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask why it took so long for the Church to respond to the vast socioeconomic changes which occurred during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. The writings of Charles Dickens and Victor Hugo, and of many Catholic reformers had certainly exposed the inhumane conditions endured by the working class. It is not entirely accurate to say that the Church's lack of response was due to an insufficient time lag or to the perceived primacy of its spiritual mission.

McGovern (1990) points to a number of other factors in explaining the Church's delay in responding, namely, the following: (1) the excesses of the French Revolution, in which Catholic priests and laity suffered violence and death and loss of property, made Church leaders wary of, and opposed to, any movements for social change; (2) the defense of Church authority over the Papal States in Italy during the 19th century--to be more specific, central and northern parts of Italy, ruled by the pope until 1870--made the popes react against liberal movements, many of which were anti-Church; and (3) contrary to 19th century secular thinkers, who viewed history as an unfolding record of human progress, Church leaders viewed the same history as a steady decline from the glory days of "medieval Catholic Christendom" (p. 29). According to McGovern, the Church's views of recent history were that

the Reformation had challenged church authority; the Enlightenment introduced pernicious secularized values; the French Revolution subordinated the church to the State; capitalism had destroyed the harmony of guild structures; and now socialism seemed bent on carrying these disruptive ideas and tendencies to their radical conclusion--the destruction of all that was sacred, holy, and "natural." (*Ibid.*)

III. CHANGES AND CHALLENGES IN THE POST VATICAN II CHURCH: AN OVERVIEW OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHINGS IN RELATION TO SOCIOPOLITICAL REALITIES

The following overview will examine major Church social teachings over the past 100 years, including the emergence and development of "Liberation Theology" in Latin America. Both for chronological order and for the sake of convenience, these teachings will be examined under the following divisions, namely, (i) From *Rerum Novarum* (1891) to the 1950s, (ii) Pope John XXIII (1958-63), the Vatican II (1962-65), and Pope Paul VI (1963-78), (iii) The Rise of the Liberation Theology in the late 1960s and the 1970s, and (iv) Liberation Theology, the Vatican, and Pope John Paul II (1978-).

In considering this overview, the following points should be kept in mind:

First, as illustrated in Figure #6, Appendix A, the religious world is affected by political world realities. In this regard, the issuance of *Rerum Novarum* (1891) by Leo XIII, the outcome of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), and the rise of the Liberation Theology in the late 1960s and the 1970s are good examples of how the political world impacts the religious world and results in changes in Church teachings and in challenges to the Church. The religious world also impacts the political world, as seen in the Latin American churches' movements for sociopolitical change, influenced by Liberation Theology. This point regarding religion and politics can be further elaborated by Levine (1981) as follows:

Both *religion* and *politics* must be taken seriously *as general sources of motivation and guiding ideas*. Their particular roles, however, are empirical questions: it is necessary to trace out *the sociological links* between religious and political elements *in particular contexts and problems*. *The transformation of religious ideas* poses new problems and dilemmas for politics; at the same time, *the pattern of political change* raises new problems and dilemmas for religion. (pp. 23-24; italics added)

Second, as illustrated in Figure #1, the religious world overlaps the political world. This overlap can be translated as the cooperative or conflicting interaction

between religious theologies and political ideologies. The characteristics of this interaction will be a significant factor in explaining Church-state relations.

Third, as illustrated in Figure #2, it should be assumed that the religious world includes the full spectrum of theological views and attitudes toward sociopolitical issues, and that there also are conflicts and tensions between traditional and liberal theologies in the religious world. The differing views of the Vatican and the national Churches on the meaning and application of Liberation Theology is a good example.

A. FROM RERUM NOVARUM (1891) TO THE 1950s

Catholic social doctrine (which is distinguishable from the social implications of the Gospel) evolved in several stages as "a clearly discernible body of official teachings on the social order, in its economic and political dimensions" (McBrien, 1981, p. 937). It did not exist as such before the end of the 19th century when, by the publication of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (on the condition of the working man) in 1891, the Church began "to articulate in a consciously *systematic* manner a theology of *social justice* and all that this implies" (*ibid.*, p. 938; italics original). This theology of social justice wasn't well *integrated* with the rest of theology until Vatican II forged "a clear link between the social ministry of the Church and the nature and mission of the Church" (*ibid.*). Catholic social doctrine is not a plan to reform the world. It is "a rather broad theological and philosophical framework of social analysis" (*ibid.*).

Catholic social doctrine is concerned with (1) the dignity of the human person as created in the image of God; (2) human rights and duties which protect and enhance this dignity; (3) the radically social value of human existence; (4) the nature of society and of the state; (5) the relationship between society and state (balancing

the principles of subsidiarity and socialization); and (6) voluntary associations, e.g., labor unions, which serve as a buffer and a bridge between state and society (*ibid.*, pp. 937-38).

The first stage in the development of this doctrine represented by Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* (on reconstructing the social order) (1931) concerned "the Church's response to the problems posed by the Industrial Revolution" (*ibid.*, p. 938). The main issues dealt with were (1) the role of government in society and in the economy, (2) the right of laborers to organize, (3) the principle of a just wage, and (4) a Christian critique of both capitalism and socialism (*ibid.*).

In his *Rerum Novarum*, Pope Leo expressed his concern for the wide gap between the large fortunes of a few individuals and the terrible poverty of the masses, resulting in much human conflict and misery. His solution was to return to the morality, life and institutions of medieval Christendom. Leo viewed religion and the Church as the best and most effective means for bringing the rich and the poor together into the kind of harmonious relationship that previously had existed (McGovern, 1990, pp. 30-31). Leo believed that if society returned to Christian morality, employers and workers would treat each other properly, as a matter of Christian duty. Leo's approach was based upon certain traditional assumptions concerning the natural order, hierarchy, priority, and harmony of different spheres of society. Leo also stressed the importance of man's natural right to possess property produced by his own labor and to provide for his family (*ibid.*, p. 31).

Leo attacked socialism for its false ideas that (1) private property should be abolished; (2) inequalities and hardships of work can be eliminated; (3) class conflicts are natural and inevitable; and (4) the state should dominate and control the

individual and his family. On the other hand, Leo also attacked "laissez-faire" capitalism for the "callousness of employers," "the greed of unrestrained competition," and the activities of "avaricious and grasping men" (*ibid.*). Leo stressed that every worker should be receive a "just wage." He recognized the unequal bargaining power of workers, and approved of their right to form unions. He also advocated that the state should intervene to assure justice for all segments of society. He supported the state's right and duty to protect workers against inhuman working conditions, especially women and children (*ibid.*, pp. 31-32).

McGovern summarizes the impact of Pope Leo's *Rerum Novarum* as follows:

The insistence on a just wage made justice, and not simply charity, a focus of church concern. The church's entry challenged socialism as the sole or major defender of the workers' cause. *Rerum novarum* gave great moral support to the working class and made social issues, for the first time, an important part of the church's agenda. (*Ibid.*, p. 32)

From the late 19th and early 20th centuries until the reign of Pope Pius XII (1939-58), the social encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI also influenced Christian lay movements and parties in Germany, Italy, and France, which were linked to working-class organizations and secular reformists. These were the forerunners to the Christian Democratic parties that emerged in the post-World War II era. In addition, the turbulent history of the first half of the 20th century, including two World Wars, and experiences with Nazism, fascism and Communism during the tenure of Pope Pius XII (1939-58) caused the Church to view democracy much more positively.

Rerum Novarum may seem naive and impractical with its emphasis on returning to the past. However, some of Pope Leo's ideas and proposals were a bold departure from traditional teachings, and a precursor of the more liberal teachings which followed.

In the intervening years before Pope Pius XI published his encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*, in 1931, Catholic scholars advanced Pope Leo's teachings on just wages, the right to unionize and the duties of the state. Pius XI not only reaffirmed Leo, but went even further in liberalizing the Church's social teachings. Pius XI insisted that the right to private property be balanced with the common good of all the people (*ibid.*, pp. 32-33).

He renewed the attacks on liberal capitalism and socialism, but made a distinction between "true" and "mitigated" socialism. "True" socialism, "an ideology which subordinated people and human dignity to material gain," was denounced as false and harmful. "Mitigated" socialism, which rejected violence and had moderate views on class conflict and the abolition of private property, was considered to be almost equivalent to Christian social reform (*ibid.*, p. 33).

Pius XI tried to steer a "middle course" between the excesses of individualistic capitalism and collectivist socialism. Unlike his predecessor Leo, who focused on specific labor demands, Pius XI proposed long-range plans for reforming society. He envisaged specialized vocational corporations in which owners and workers would share ownership and management. Owners would have to participate, but would not be able to fully control investment, work conditions, and allocation of wages and profits. The common good, not the profit motive, would guide decisions over such matters as automation, plant location and production goals. The state would not be involved in ownership or operation, but would encourage and protect these corporations. Perhaps as a limitation on corporate society, decentralization of economic functions to achieve efficiency at the lowest possible level was given top priority (*ibid.*, pp. 33-34). As observed by McGovern,

this vision of a corporate society served as a bridge between past and future church teachings on the economic order. By calling for a "reconstruction of

society," Pius XI anticipated the stress on transforming society and changing structures that would characterize much of post-Vatican II social thought. (*Ibid.*, p. 34)

As McGovern also points out, Pius XI's concept of "social justice" contributed even more than the corporate concept to the later emphasis on "changing structures" in society. Social justice was viewed as being more than commutative and distributive justice. Individuals and groups were politically obligated to assist in creating social structures and patterns protective of human dignity and promoting the common good (*ibid.*).

In the following years, Catholic social thought became increasingly focused on the threat of Communism. In his later encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris* (on atheistic Communism) (1937), Pius XI strongly denounced atheistic Bolshevik Communism for (1) its false messianic promises; (2) its materialism; (3) its violence and hatred; (4) its rejection of property rights; (5) its undermining of marriage and the family; and (6) its grant of unlimited power to the state, etc. (*ibid.*). This anti-Communism would continue to be emphasized in Church teachings for many years.

Pius XII's letters and speeches during his 20 year reign served as a bridge between his predecessors and the new era of Pope John XXIII and Vatican II. During World War II and into the postwar reconstruction period, Pius XII reiterated the need for a "new social order" built upon Christian values. Like Pius XI, Pius XII believed that a "corporative" society expressing the "higher unity" of solidarity, cooperation and organic unity would be the best way to obtain the values necessary for a new social order (*ibid.*, pp. 34-35).

Beginning with a 1941 speech recognizing the 50th anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*, Pius XII stressed the importance of these four fundamental values: (1) the natural right of everyone to make "use" of material goods, as distinguished from "ownership"; (2) labor as being necessary for "personal fulfillment" as well as to

produce material goods; (3) society should protect and enhance the social unity of the family, and land ownership by the family provides stability and security; and (4) the bringing of all parts of society into a cooperative, unified whole is the goal to pursue to achieve the other values.

B. POPE JOHN XXIII (1958-63), VATICAN II (1962-65), AND POPE PAUL VI (1963-78)

Vatican II is another good example to show how the sociopolitical world situation impacted the religious world and resulted in changes in Catholic social teachings, as well as challenges to the Church. Vatican II found itself in a world very different from a century before. In Europe, the Church had lost most of its landed interests and political privileges, and was confronted by severe changes in the socioeconomic order to which it belonged. In the Third World, colonial empires collapsed, and society had to face the complex problems of development.

In the pluralistic society of the United States, the Church was functioning without difficulty, Catholic President John F. Kennedy having taken office. While the world now was not openly antagonistic to the Church, the Church was no longer certain of its public importance or mission. The Church needed to redefine its mission and relate it to the world (Smith, 1982, P. 16).

While Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI stressed "restoring the moral order," a dominant theme of Pope John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) during the 1960s can be termed "transforming the world" (McGovern, 1990, pp. 30, 36). As stated by McGovern,

the Catholic church underwent a succession of dramatic changes in the 1960s. Pope John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council adopted new *attitudes* which profoundly affected the Catholic church and its relationship to the world. The changes began with seemingly contained goals. The pope wanted the church to exert positive leadership in addressing world problems, and Vatican II sought

to reexamine the nature of the church and its relation to the world. Both wished to make the church more effective in transmitting the gospel message in modern times. But the changes that ensued proved far greater and more difficult to control than ever were anticipated. (*Ibid.*, p. 36; italics added)

First, let us examine how John XXIII contributed to these new attitudes within the Church. His two major encyclicals, *Mater et Magistra* [Mother and Teacher] (1961) on Christianity and social progress, and *Pacem in Terris* [Peace on Earth] (1963) on establishing universal peace, cited natural law as the source of the Church's social teachings. To that extent, these two pronouncements provided continuity.

But John injected his own personal spirit, causing his encyclicals to be more hopeful, pastoral and future directed than previous papal writings. Little effort was made to attack false ideologies. Emphasis was placed on providing practical, creative solutions to the world's problems. *Pacem in Terris* was addressed to the whole world, not just to Catholics. Where previous encyclicals involved deductive reasoning in deriving social doctrines from general principles, John's approach was more inductive, starting with the actual condition of society. To be more specific, *Mater et Magistra* examined "trends" and characteristics of modern society, and *Pacem in Terris* started with "signs of the times." In these messages, John raised and dealt with two new issues, namely, (1) problems of rural peoples, and (2) problems of the poor of underdeveloped nations of the Third World (*ibid.*, p. 37).

Perhaps Pope John's greatest contribution to the new social teachings was the "extension of the notion of human rights to include socioeconomic rights" (*ibid.*). John asserted that everyone has the right to live with dignity, which includes food, shelter, medical care and needed social services. John affirmed Pius XII's principle that the right to private property is subordinate to the right of everyone to use needed material goods (*ibid.*).

Second, Vatican II carried these new attitudes and ideas even further, producing effects far greater than what was intended. According to McGovern,

quite possibly no document in church history has ever influenced the church's understanding of its role in the world as much as did Vatican II's *Gaudium et spes* ("On the church in the modern world"). (*Ibid.*)

No longer did the Church occupy a spiritual realm separate and apart from the real world. Vatican II "viewed the spiritual and temporal not as separate spheres but as a single unit integrating man's Christian and human natures" (*ibid.*, p. 38). The Church's new perception of the relationship between the spiritual or religious world and the temporal or political world can be described as an overlapping of the respective worlds (see Figure #1, Appendix A). As McGovern observes,

if earlier encyclicals had tended to view the church as "above" the world, *Gaudium et spes* placed the church very much "in" the world. The church, it said, identifies itself with the joys, hopes, griefs, and aspirations of humanity, especially of the poor. The church is "intimately linked" with humanity and its history. (*Ibid.*, pp. 37-38)

Cleary (1985) describes the effect of Vatican II as follows:

The perspective has changed: no longer is it church and world, or the church in the world, but rather the church *for* the world. This is a major shift. Advances in social teaching place the church at the side of the poor, helping them claim what is theirs. . . . It is important to keep these changes in mind when attempting to understand the venture undertaken by Latin American liberation theologians. (pp. 62-63; italics added)

Vatican II committed the Church to an active role in the advancement of justice, human rights and freedom. It also officially put aside the long-established Church preference for a close union between Church and state, stating that the Church "does not lodge her hope in privileges conferred by civil authority" (Smith, 1982, pp. 4-5). It declared that "the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these too are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ" (*Gaudium et Spes*

[Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World], no. 1, Gremillion, 1976, p. 243).

"To carry out such a task," the Council underscored that "the Church has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the gospel" (*Gaudium et Spes* [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World], no. 4, *ibid.*, p. 246). The Council also emphasized the importance of the Church's responsibility to "pass moral judgements, even on matters touching the political order, whenever basic personal rights or the salvation of souls make such judgements necessary" (*Gaudium et Spes* [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World], no. 76, *ibid.*, p. 313).

The result is that since the mid-1960s, a more independent and active role for the Church in secular society has been vigorously pursued by many bishops in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. They have openly condemned political disappearances, torture, economic exploitation, and racism committed by authoritarian regimes in their countries (Smith, 1982, p. 5).

Vatican II made a revolutionary change in defining the mission of the Church in today's world. According to Smith, the Council's *Gaudium et Spes* [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World] provides that the Church in modern society is "to act as a catalytic and prophetic force, using moral rather than temporal power to promote justice at national and international levels" (*ibid.*, p. 18).

The Council Fathers also strongly encouraged closer cooperation among "believers and unbelievers . . . to work for the rightful betterment of this world in which all alike live." Catholics in particular were encouraged to support secular commitments involving justice, and to integrate their "humane, domestic, professional, social and technical enterprises into one vital synthesis with religious

values" (*ibid.*; also see *Gaudium et Spes* [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World], nos. 21, 43, in Abbott, S.J., 1966, pp. 219, 243).

These new normative emphases of Vatican II were bolstered by other encyclicals during the 1960s. As previously mentioned, Pope John XXIII's two major encyclicals on the social order, *Mater et Magistra* [Mother and Teacher] (1961) (esp. nos. 131-40, 163-65) and *Pacem et Terris* [Peace on Earth] (1963) (esp. nos. 11-27), along with Pope Paul VI's *Populorum Progressio* [On the Development of Peoples] (1967) (esp. nos. 24, 51, 61), analyzed the causes of chronic injustice more structurally and globally than previous encyclicals. These three encyclicals all underscored the view that major organizational changes at both national and international levels were needed to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth. They presented, as necessary processes to accomplish this redistribution, the following: "tax and land reform, social insurance, technical cooperation, disarmament, international price regulations, a world fund for development, and guarantees for social, economic, and political rights." They placed the moral weight of the Church behind those processes (Smith, 1982, p. 18; also see Gremillion, 1976, pp. 172-73, 179; 203-06; 394, 403, 405-06).

While suppressing a desire "to interfere in any way in the politics of States," Pope Paul VI, in his encyclical *Populorum Progressio* [On the Development of Peoples] (esp. no. 13), encouraged the Church to offer the world "what she possesses as her characteristic attribute: a global vision . . . of the human race" (Smith, 1982, p. 18; Gremillion, 1976, p. 391).

Several of these foregoing themes were reiterated by the present Pope John Paul II in his first social encyclical, *Redemptor Hominis* [The Redeemer of Man] in 1979, which deals with the Divine and human aspects of redemption and the mission

of the Church to save the world (Smith, 1982, p. 18). All of the foregoing major social encyclicals either contributed to Vatican II or were a further elaboration of Vatican II.

Vatican II also endorsed a new version of the Church differing from the traditional model of a rigidly stratified ahistorical pyramid. The new version of the Church was to be a "pilgrim people of God," a community of equals, whether they be laity, priest, or bishop, going through the historical changes" (Foroohar, 1989, p. 47).

Papal commitments to the Church's prophetic stance for justice resounded in several international meetings of bishops in the late 1960s and 1970s. The most significant ones were those held at Medellín, Colombia (1968), at Rome (1971), and at Puebla, Mexico (1979).

The next step in the progression of Catholic social teachings came with the 1971 Synod of Bishops. In a document entitled "Justice in the World," the bishops made what McGovern terms the Church's "strongest statement of commitment to justice and to transforming the world," as follows:

Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transforming of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel, or, in other words, of the Church's mission for the redemption of the human race and its *liberation* from every oppressive situation. (McGovern, 1990, p. 38; italics added)

This document also provided that it is the "right, indeed the duty" of the Church to "denounce instances of injustice when the fundamental rights of man and his very salvation demand it" (Smith, 1982, pp. 18-19; also see *Justice in the World*, nos. 6, 36, in Gremillion, 1976, pp. 514, 521).

As McGovern observes, perhaps the above synod document provided the impetus needed for the development of "Liberation Theology" (McGovern, 1990, pp.

38-39). At least the liberation theologians could find ample doctrinal support for their "liberation" ideas in that document, which stressed the following points emphasized in Liberation Theology: "(1) violence and oppression caused by 'unjust systems and structures'; (2) the failure of 'development' policies; (3) 'international systems of domination'; (4) 'the obstacles social structures place in the way of conversion of hearts'; (5) the need for self-determination by poor nations; (6) 'the intervention of God's justice on behalf of the needy and the oppressed'; (7) a mission of preaching *and witnessing* to justice as proper to the church's mission; (8) the need for justice 'within' the church itself; (9) education for justice (raising consciousness); and (10) hope in the coming Kingdom and 'the radical transformation of the world'" (*ibid.*, p. 40; italics original; numbers added for clarity).

During the same period, Pope Paul VI's encyclical, *Populorum Progressio* [On the Development of Peoples] (1967), was considered extremely "leftist" by some critics. According to McGovern, "The *Wall Street Journal* called it 'warmed over Marxism,' presumably because of the pope's criticism of rich nations in their relation to poorer developing nations" (*ibid.*, p. 39).

As to the causes of poverty in the poorer nations, Paul VI deemed that colonialism was partly to blame because it led to one-crop economies. He also blamed the great difference in power in trade relations between the two groups of nations. He appealed to rich nations to lend aid to poor nations to restore equity to trade relations. He also attacked the cardinal virtues of capitalism, namely, the profit motive, competition and private ownership.

In his later encyclical, *Octogesima Adveniens* [The Eightieth Anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*] (1971), Paul VI gave a cautious endorsement to social movements and issues which had previously been regarded as dangerous by the Church. But he

drew distinctions between different kinds of socialism and different aspects of Marxism. He noted that when the different aspects of Marxism are combined, they have led to violence and totalitarianism, as dictated by a materialist ideology, class struggle and one-party rule (*ibid.*).

C. THE RISE OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY IN THE 1960S AND 1970S

Although Latin America is different, sociopolitically, from Europe, the Latin American differences are ignored in the documents of Vatican II. The Latin American bishops were quick to respond to this omission (Foroohar, 1986, p. 39). These bishops, who did not actively participate in writing the Vatican II documents, were surprised at their innovations.

The Vatican II council did not expect the Church's sociopolitical involvement in the Western European liberal (and mildly socialist) democracies to be seriously challenged. On the other hand, Latin America was a world of underdevelopment, poverty, and oppression. Thus, the Church would be required to become deeply involved in sociopolitical matters in order to fulfill the new role outlined by John XXIII and Vatican II. Every move in that direction by the Latin American Church was met with strong resistance and repression in the Latin American countries under military rule (*ibid.*, pp. 39-40).

Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s clearly displayed developmental shortcomings, i.e., problems of land concentration, unemployment, marginalization, and mass poverty. Foreign capital and technology did not stimulate industrialization or reinforce the middle class. Instead, they created a dependent industrial system incapable of the national accumulation of capital, reducing a major part of the Latin

American middle class to the status of mere local agents of multinational corporations (Foroohar, 1989, p. 50).

Amidst misery and poverty in most Latin American countries, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 created a great shock wave in Latin American politics. The new alternative of "revolution" attracted considerable attention and support among Latin Americans, especially young intellectuals of middle class origin. The response of the governing elites, seeking to curtail revolutionary sentiment, soon followed.

A trend toward strong military regimes was seen in many Latin American countries during the late 1960s. In 1964, the populist democracies of Brazil and Bolivia were overthrown by military coups. Argentina also experienced a military coup in 1966. Most of Central America already had military regimes in power.

Meanwhile, several other countries adopted the relatively flexible reform program of the Alliance for Progress advocated by American President Kennedy. This program, which was aimed at remedying the underlying social causes of revolution, was the result of anti-Communist sentiments and the fear that Cuba would become a Soviet base for the spread of Communism in the hemisphere, as well as a military threat. After a brief period of political and economic liberalization during the first phase of the Alliance for Progress, the majority of the Latin American dictatorships obtained massive economic and military support from the United States for their internal order and security. The aim was to eradicate any potential elements for another Cuban-style revolution on the continent.

Thus, a strong anti-Communist ideological dimension was injected into many Latin American governments. This reinforced the already existing conservatism of the military regimes, and infused them with a fervent distrust of reformism and

liberalism. Many of these Latin American military regimes then were able to justify the use of military repression under the pretext of curbing Communism. Their well-developed ideological intolerance worked well against the advancement of democracy on the continent (Feroz, 1989, pp. 48-49; 1986, p. 37; also see Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989, p. 12).

The Church also was shaken by the fact that 70% of the Cuban clergy supported the revolution. The Church had to search for an alternative of its own to prevent the spread of Communism to the continent (Feroz, 1986, pp. 37-38). The poor, the working class and portions of the middle class, who suffered poverty and social injustice, no longer found it sufficiently rewarding to pursue eternal salvation and now sought earthly alternatives, including socialism and Communism.

Faced with this situation, the Church felt obliged to assume its role to remedy social ills, as outlined by John XXIII and Vatican II. However, its every move in that direction, such as peasant associations organized by priests, workers' unions, Catholic student organizations, and Christian base communities, was branded as "subversive" and possibly instigated by "Communists," and was harshly suppressed. The military rulers even suppressed religious ceremonies and attacked religious buildings (*ibid.*, pp. 39-40).

This conflictive relationship between religion and politics is illustrated in Figure #4, Appendix A, entitled "Church and State in Conflict." In this situation, the Church opposes the state and the state represses the Church. Liberal theology presumably dominates traditional theology and influences the Church's interaction with the state. The Church influences, supports and/or participates in sociopolitical opposition movements. It also can be interpreted as the Church's theological response to the dominant ideology of the state. The result of these changes and developments

was the increasing politicization of the Church, which in turn led to the 1968 conference of bishops at Medellín, Colombia.

Probably the strongest impetus for the advent of Liberation Theology came from this Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops (CELAM). The Medellín conference related the issue of poverty to the existing socioeconomic structure, and declared that the solution required a profound change in that structure, rather than individual charity (*ibid.*). 150 bishops focused their attention on the poor, and totally committed themselves to their cause. They viewed the misery of the masses as a grave injustice.

They advocated liberation in the political sense of freeing Latin America from its dependence upon the United States and Europe. They blamed this dependence on foreign monopolistic powers. They also viewed liberation in the theological sense of God acting in the world to free people from oppression. This view was based upon God having sent his Son, Jesus Christ, into the world, not only to free people from slavery to sin, but also to free them from sin's consequences, e.g., hunger, misery and oppression.

The bishops, representing all countries of the continent, denounced the "institutional violence" of the status quo dominated by those who "jealously retain their privileges thus provoking 'explosive revolutions of despair'" (Smith, 1982, p. 19). They defined the "Latin American reality" as one of "institutional violence," meaning a state of "tyranny" maintained from within by national oligarchies and from without by "imperialism" (Foroohar, 1989, p. 56).

The bishops declared that the Church is obligated to act as a "catalyst in the temporal realm in an authentic attitude of service." They further committed themselves as pastors "to educate the Christian conscience" in matters of social

responsibilities, "to denounce everything which, opposing justice, destroys peace," "to defend the rights of the poor and oppressed," and "to encourage and favor efforts of the people to create and develop their own grass-roots organizations for the consolidation of their rights" (Smith, 1982, p. 19; also see "Peace," nos. 16, 17, 20-21, 27; "Justice," no. 22; in CELAM, 1970, *The Church in the Present-Day Transformation of Latin America in the Light of the Council*, 2: pp. 67, 78-81).

Thus, Medellín confirmed that, in the absence of peaceful change, violent revolution is acceptable if the "sinful" situation is to be changed (Foroohar, 1989, p. 56), i.e., if humanity is to be liberated from the sinful social and political structure. In this regard, the bishops recognized that defensive violence, in contrast to the institutionalized violence, is legitimate "in the case of evident and prolonged tyranny." This tyranny is not merely a dictatorship, but would include any oppressive structure which "seriously works against the fundamental rights of man, and which damages the common good of the country" (*ibid.*, p. 59; also see CELAM, 1970, p. 63). Therefore, a revolutionary insurrection aimed at the destruction of an existing evil structure would be legitimate. This view was different from the official view of the Vatican.

If Pope Paul VI had given a cautious "yellow light," the bishops at Medellín seemed to give a "green light" to the new Liberation Theology (McGovern, 1990, p. 39). As previously stated, Pope Paul VI was favorable to change and reform, but he rejected class struggle and violent revolution. Instead he proposed the traditional principle of class collaboration, which assumes that legitimate governments, responsible authorities, and the upper classes would initiate the necessary reforms. But, the resulting documents of Medellín rejected that proposition, which was dependent upon the good will of the ruling classes. The bishops asserted that the long

history of Latin America proves that change for the better is possible only if the lower classes demand it forcefully (Foroohar, 1989, pp. 56-57).

The official advent of the systematic study of "Liberation Theology" took place upon the publication of *A Theology of Liberation* by Gustavo Gutierrez in 1971. As previously mentioned, Liberation Theology, to a great extent, was a logical extension of the social teachings of Vatican II, the Medellín Conference (1968), Pope Paul VI, and the 1971 Synod of Bishops. Influenced by their social teachings, Gutierrez was able to lay the foundation for this new theological movement. He emphasized that "theological reflections should be based on 'praxis,' active involvement with and commitment to the poor, based on an understanding of the conditions in which they live and their struggles to overcome these conditions" (McGovern, 1990, p. 40).

From the Bible, he cited (1) the Exodus story as an example of God's acting in the world to free the poor from oppression, (2) attacks on injustice by the Old Testament prophets, and (3) Jesus' closeness to the poor and political conflict arising from his advocacy against oppressors. From the social sciences, Gutierrez utilized dependency theories and certain aspects of Marxism, including (1) its ideas of "praxis," (2) its critique of capitalism, (3) its ideas on class struggle, and (4) its critique of religion. He asserted that the Church must choose to side for and with the poor in their struggles against oppression (*ibid.*).

According to Segundo Galilea (1975), another renowned Latin American liberation theologian,

the theology of liberation starts out with three presuppositions that, for a Christian, sum up the contemporary Latin American scene: the condition of underdevelopment and unjust dependence in which the masses are languishing; a Christian interpretation of that fact as a "situation of sin" and the consequent pressure on the consciences of Christians--and on the Church's pastoral planning--to commit themselves to remedying that situation. (P. 4)

Liberation Theology then draws pastoral guidelines for actions appropriate to present-day situations (Foroohar, 1989, p. 51; also see "Political Involvement of the Church: the Three Analytical Steps" under the heading of "The Church's Involvement in Political Opposition" in Chapter Three).

D. LIBERATION THEOLOGY, THE VATICAN, AND POPE JOHN PAUL II (1978-)

As previously mentioned, and as illustrated in Figure #2, Appendix A, the religious world includes the full spectrum of theological views and attitudes toward sociopolitical issues. There also can be conflicts and tensions between traditional and liberal theologies in the religious world. The Vatican's response to Liberation Theology serves as a good example.

Liberation Theology soon stirred up controversy within the Church. The first main collision with the Church involved a Chilean group called the Christians for Socialism, which derived many of its ideas from Liberation Theology. In 1973, the Chilean bishops criticized this group on the following grounds which later would be directed at the new theology: (1) faith was being reduced to politics; (2) Marxism was being promoted as an "indisputable science"; (3) all social change was deemed class struggle; and (4) the creation of a new church and church hierarchy was being attempted.

In his 1976 letter on evangelization entitled *Evangelii Nuntiandi*, Pope Paul VI voiced similar "reservations" about use of the concept of "liberation." He expressed his concerns that it may not be possible to completely achieve earthly liberation and that liberation theology created the false, simplistic attitude that changing structures, *ipso facto*, would achieve human liberation (McGovern, 1990, pp. 40-41).

Liberation Theology never has become an officially approved doctrine of the Church. It most often is criticized by its opponents as a "justification for political action by the clergy, and a profound diversion of the traditional spiritual role of the Church." Liberation theologians respond by arguing that history and biblical texts prove that Christianity always has been involved in the political realm (Foroohar, 1989, p. 51). As Gustavo Gutierrez (1973) points out,

the liberation of Israel is a political action. It is the breaking away from a situation of despoliation and misery and the beginning of the construction of a just and fraternal society. (P. 228)

It should not be mistakenly assumed that all or even most of the Latin American and South Korean clergy fully accept Liberation Theology and/or the new social teachings of Vatican II. The new theology has caused *division within the Church*. "As a result of the changes, the clergy is no longer uniformly conservative, and its members differ on the role that the church should play in socioeconomic reform and on the nature of hierarchical relations within the church" (Wiarda and Kline, 1990, p. 62).

Many bishops supported the new theology. Many others led by Bishop Alfonso López Trujillo (of Bogotá, Colombia) opposed it. This opposition was well expressed at the conference of Latin American bishops held in 1979 at Puebla, Mexico. The Puebla conference, which was a follow-up to the Medellín meeting, involved 187 Latin American bishops, who reaffirmed that the Church should play a prophetic and activist role in opposing repressive authoritarian states.

The bishops denounced the authoritarian regimes on their continent on the ground that these oppressive regimes use the concept of national security illegitimately to justify "assassinations, disappearances, arbitrary imprisonment, acts of terrorism, kidnappings and acts of torture." The bishops pledged to support those suffering such

human rights abuses with the resources and services of the Church "where public authorities and social organizations are absent or missing" (Smith, 1982, p. 19; also see CELAM, "Evangelization in Latin America's Present and Future," nos. 1262, 1286, in Eagleson and Scharper, pp. 279, 281).

Liberation Theology obviously became an issue of utmost importance to the Vatican. Pope John Paul II has tried to steer a middle course in his official views on social change and Liberation Theology. As noted by McGovern (1990), he "combines the concern first raised by Leo XIII, to 'restore' Christian principles of morality, with Vatican II's stress on transforming society by seeking to integrate more fully the spiritual and the temporal in a 'true' Liberation Theology" (p. 41).

According to McGovern, John Paul II's objectives are (1) "to build social principles and a vision of what society should be, not on any secular basis but on truly authentic Christian doctrines"; and (2) "to make the 'official,' hierarchical church the guiding force in establishing the social mission of the church" (*ibid.*). In pursuing these objectives, John Paul II may appear to be inconsistent, but it is merely an appearance. Although he reaffirms the Church's rejection of Communism and classical Marxist analysis, he utilizes Marxist concepts to criticize Western capitalism.

Although he criticizes Liberation Theology, he identifies with the poor and approves of the theological concept of "liberation." He cautions the Church about political involvement, but his messages are clearly political (*ibid.*). Thus, John Paul II uses what he considers to be valid parts of conflicting doctrines and ideologies, and avoids or rejects the rest. It probably would be accurate to characterize him as a great synthesizer in the history of the Church.

In his encyclical, *Laborem Exercens* [On the Gospel of Work] (1981), published to commemorate the 90th anniversary of Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum*, John

Paul II discusses Marxist subject matter in Christian terms. Agreeing with Marx about the importance of "work" to human society, John Paul II asserted that human work is (1) the essential key to social issues; (2) the main way humans develop their capacities and gain their sense of dignity; (3) not just a useful function, but something tied to human dignity, expressing and enhancing it; and (4) to be judged by its contribution to the dignity of those who perform it. From these principles, he derived the main point of the encyclical--the primacy of labor over capital (*ibid.*, pp. 41-42).

In *Laborem Exercens*, John Paul II recognized that by its exploitation of workers, early 19th century capitalism had reversed the priority of labor over capital. Workers were treated like material goods or merely as a cost factor. This led to historical class conflicts, but the Pope differed with Marx regarding the inevitability of such conflicts. In other words, John Paul II agreed with Marx on the facts, but not on his theories.

According to McGovern, the following aspects make *Laborem Exercens* Christian, rather than Marxist, in its approach: (1) the importance of work and work as self-fulfillment are based upon the biblical view of humans as creative beings like God, and the working class includes all of society, not simply factory workers, i.e., the proletariat; (2) workers are not involved in a class struggle to obtain power over, or at the expense of, other groups in society, but only to meet their own just needs; (3) some socialized forms of ownership, involving shared property rights and decision-making mechanisms, are valid, but not Marxist collectivism, which merely shifts power from one elite group of private owners to another elite group of bureaucrats who run society and the state; (4) centralized planning is necessary to deal with major problems such as unemployment, not by total state control, but by decentralized groups, e.g., unions and intermediate structures; and (5) humans are

creative "subjects" of work, not objects or resultants of a deterministic historical process, and an economic system should be evaluated on the basis of whether humans are treated as subjects or objects (*ibid.*, p. 42).

John Paul II also has been concerned about the situation in Communist countries. Under the rule of Communist and authoritarian regimes, it has been difficult, if not impossible, for any Christian movements for social changes to arise or flourish. In this context, the Solidarity movement in Poland was supported by John Paul II, who defended worker solidarity in *Laborem Exercens* and further emphasized the importance of solidarity in his most recent social encyclical, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*.

In *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* [On Social Concerns], John Paul II made "solidarity" the central ethical theme, citing the following factors: (1) people live interdependent lives; (2) human development entails mutual responsibility and solidarity; (3) nations also are interdependent, and superpower blocs in both the West and the East neglect and hinder the development of the poorer, weaker nations, i.e., the Third World; (4) the arms race diverts funds needed for basic human needs; and (5) Marxist regimes ambitious for power and capitalist regimes driven by the profit motive and consumerism both subvert the common good of all people by serving their own selfish interests.

In the years since *Laborem Exercens*, the Vatican has expressed both critical and supportive views on Liberation Theology, especially as implemented in Latin America. In 1984, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger criticized the doctrine, citing the following errors: (1) the reduction of faith to politics, and the neglect of spiritual matters such as eternal salvation, personal sin and human limitations; (2) the unquestioned use of Marxism as a social science, and class struggle as a historical

law; and (3) the creation of a "popular" church as opposed to the hierarchical church, the discounting of Church teachings, the treatment of clerical opponents as enemies and the indoctrination of the poor with ideas they aren't equipped to handle. Some have questioned the accuracy of the Cardinal's analysis of Liberation Theology, and whether or not the Pope is in agreement. But the Cardinal's criticism contained in his *Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation* (1984) has not been reversed or modified by the Vatican (*ibid.*, pp. 42-43).

In fact, the *Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation* issued by the Vatican in 1986 provides solutions for the Liberation Theology issues dealt with in the previous instruction, without confronting Liberation Theology directly. The 1986 instruction gives the subject of liberation a truly Christian spiritual basis, as follows: (1) Freedom and liberation flow from the truth that comes from God through faith in Jesus Christ; (2) Freedom, which is mainly personal and spiritual, is more basic than any earthly, social liberation; (3) Liberation movements can create better conditions for achieving freedom, but not freedom itself; (4) Spiritual freedom can exist under the worst conditions; (5) Justice flows from obedience to God's laws; (6) Through God's grace and the sacraments of His Church, true freedom results from a release from sin and restored communion with God; (7) The Church's primary mission is evangelization and salvation; (8) The good of mankind is served by man being, first, a member of the city of God and, second, a member of an earthly city; (9) The Church's mission includes the promotion of justice, but should not be reduced to purely secular activities; (10) Personal inner conversion from sin is essential for social changes to be truly human and beneficial; (11) Personal sin is the cause of evil; and (12) Social structures are sinful only in a derived, secondary sense.

The 1986 *Instruction* alters the Medellín and Puebla mandated "option for the poor," making the poor "the object of a love of preference on the part of the Church" (*ibid.*, pp. 43-44). As McGovern points out, this change is a clear departure from *Laborem Exercens* where the poor were viewed not as "objects" of compassion, charity, and relief, but as "subjects" for self-realization. The Vatican obviously does not want to officially authorize the Church's partisan political involvement in a class struggle on behalf of the poor (*ibid.*, p. 44).

However, the *Instruction* does provide some encouragement to the poor and oppressed who are victims of unjust situations and social structures. The *Instruction* states "that those who suffer oppression on the part of the wealthy or the politically powerful should take action, through morally licit means, in order to secure structures and institutions in which their rights will be truly respected" (*ibid.*).

According to McGovern, the *Instruction* even would justify an armed conflict "as a last resort where prolonged tyranny gravely damages basic rights" (*ibid.*, pp. 44-45). While the need for inner conversion of the individual should have priority, the *Instruction* says that this "in no way eliminates the need for unjust structures to be changed" (*ibid.*, p. 44).

As observed by McGovern, a more fruitful attitude has recently developed within the hierarchical Church regarding Liberation Theology. In writing to the bishops of Brazil in 1986, John Paul II said that the theology of liberation "is not only opportune, but useful and necessary" (*ibid.*, p. 45). A spokesman for the Church in Latin America took this to mean that Liberation Theology finally had become acceptable to the Vatican and that a true dialogue now was possible.

In summary, the past 100 years of Church social teachings has provided a valuable resource to Christians concerned with making the changes needed to achieve

freedom and justice in the world. The profound changes in the social teachings and character of the Church advocated by Pope John XXIII and Vatican II encouraged the Church to officially incorporate a greater doctrinal concern for justice and human rights, and to interact with secular society in a more dynamic, positive way.

In addition, Liberation Theology also was a significant influence on post-Vatican II Catholicism. It awakened the Church to the realities of Third World countries. The innovative aspect of both post-Vatican II Catholicism and the Latin American Churches' response to socioeconomic problems was that *for the first time* the Church was being called, *in earnest*, to side with the poor and powerless, and to denounce sociopolitical injustice (Foroohar, 1989, p. 52).

This doctrinal concern for justice and human rights is evident in many Third World countries, where it often has resulted in a head-on clash between the Church and repressive military regimes. Smith (1982), in presenting an overview of many Third World countries, including South Korea, where there have been many such clashes in recent years, observes:

In many third-world countries where the state has systematically violated human rights in recent years, many Church leaders have begun to exercise this *prophetic function of religion*. In the Philippines, South Korea, Uganda, Rhodesia, South Africa, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua there have been clashes in recent years between Church and state over issues of repression. Catholic bishops and Protestant pastors in these countries have spoken out against murder, torture, disappearance of persons, lack of democratic freedoms and free unions, and denial of basic human needs stemming from severe economic measures that place the burden of development on the poor. Bishops have been persecuted and harassed, religious and clergy have been murdered, jailed, or expelled, Church schools have been restricted or contravened, and Church publications and access to the secular media curtailed or denied. (p. 285; italics added)

It is clear from the cases that the politicization of the Latin American Church, resulting mostly from the Medellín conference (1968) and the advent of Liberation

Theology, prompted the post-Vatican II Church to deal with Third World realities and to play an active role in promoting justice and human rights.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. For a more detailed discussion of these views see also: Binchy, 1970, pp. 100-66; Bruneau, 1976, pp. 468-75; Cooper, 1975, pp. 6-13; Diamont, 1960, pp. 256-90; Williams, 1976, pp. 446-48; Lewy, 1964, pp. 8-56; Simon, 1975, pp. 190-221; Dewart, 1963, pp. 116-73; Crahan, 1975, pp. 22-27.

CHAPTER THREE

RELIGION, POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: GENERAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Pastoral action can mean many things, and in Latin America today it is an open question just how far, and in what direction, it extends. Is it limited to the provision of . . . charity? . . . Need it include denunciation of those social conditions which make a fully human and moral life impossible, such as extreme poverty and oppression? (Levine, 1981, p. 25; italics added).

Like pastoral action, "politics" can also be broadened to include denunciations of injustice . . . , or . . . to redress grievances and change the structure of power and opportunity in daily life. Such activities, while not political in a narrowly partisan or official sense, are nonetheless political in essence: they raise basic issues of power, authority, legitimacy, and distribution (*ibid.*, p. 26).

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter attempts to provide the necessary general and theoretical background for development of a Politics of Religion Perspective, which will be completed in Chapter Five. The discussion is presented under three themes.

The first theme, Religion and Social Change, deals with the role of the Church in the process of social change, especially in the Third World. This theme first considers the classic formulations of the Church's sociopolitical role. Then it discusses the new formulations of the Church's role based upon recent developments in Latin America where the Church has actively promoted social change.

The second theme, Religion and Politics, examines the relationship between religion and politics. Several important concepts developed by sociologist Robert N. Bellah, and scholars of the Latin American Churches, including Daniel H. Levine and Brian H. Smith, will be explored and discussed. Then the Neo-Marxist concept of the

relative autonomy of religion will be examined in a discussion of the relationship between religion and politics and between Church and state, which is the main focus of this study.

The third theme is The Church's Involvement in Politics. First, the Church's relative autonomy vis-a-vis the state as observed by scholars of the Latin American Churches, including Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott Mainwaring, will be explored. Next, the Church's political opposition characterized as "Religious Extra-Institutional Opposition" and focusing on its "prophetic" role will be compared with other types of political opposition. Then the Church's involvement in politics will be considered as a three-step process, namely: (1) observation of sociopolitical realities; (2) theological reflection; and (3) pastoral action. These steps often are employed by liberal theologians inspired by the social teachings of Vatican II and Liberation Theology. These three steps also are useful in analyzing the statements and actions of the South Korean Church and the CPAJ.

II. RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

A. CLASSICAL THEORIES AND NEW FORMULATIONS DEVELOPED IN LATIN AMERICA

Classical studies of the impact of religion on society, written in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, emphasize the basically conservative effect of religion. These studies conclude that "religion is predominantly an integrating and legitimizing force for the prevailing values and structures in society and is not a motivating force for social change" (Smith, 1975, p. 4).

Most major classical theorists consider religious institutions as obstacles to change, or merely as functional to the maintenance of society. To summarize their key arguments: Spencer stresses that religion provides "social continuity" for societal values; Malinowski emphasizes that religious rituals and sanctions contribute to the preservation of a "reverence for tradition" and for "law and order;" Durkheim regards the essential characteristic of religion to be its inspirational force, by which a "society sacralizes its basic customs and holds them together;" Marx considers religion as an "opium" which keeps believers from coping with the social forces that actually cause human suffering; and Weber believes that religion makes a unique contribution to individual suffering, tragedy, failure and death (*ibid.* pp. 4-5).¹

Among these classical theorists, Marx and Weber are particularly important. Marx conceived religion to be a dependent variable, conditioned by the established or changing socioeconomic structures of each society (Oh, 1990, pp. 311-12). It was the task of Neo-Marxist scholars to go beyond this rather deterministic concept without totally abandoning Marxist theory. Their approaches to the "relative autonomy" of religion will be dealt with in the following section of this chapter.

Of all the Classical theorists, Weber made the greatest move away from the traditional view of the Church's role in society. Regarding the economic changes in 17th century Europe, Weber realized that religion not only can be affected by social change, but, as in the case of Calvinism, religion or religious ethics also can be an independent variable facilitating social change, e.g., the rise of Capitalism (*ibid.*; also see Smith, 1982, p. 3). In his work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1976), Weber argued that the ascetic and worldly Calvinist virtues of industry, self-denial and thrift demonstrated in one's vocational calling (and required for the assurance of salvation) reinforced the rational and efficient dynamics underlying

rising Capitalism, which enabled the urban commercial classes of England and Holland to challenge the established landed gentry and monarchy. Weber cited Calvinism as the only example he could find where religion actually played an important role in bringing about socioeconomic change (Weber, 1976, pp. 121-22).

These Classical theorists also were influenced by the fact that the European Church always had been linked to the State, and never was an autonomous entity. As Smith (1975) notes, they were influenced by the alignment of European Catholicism with conservative political forces, which enabled the Church to adjust to the decline of its spiritual and temporal power beginning in the 16th century and continuing throughout the Enlightenment, French Revolution, Industrial Revolution, and the rise of Marxism (p. 5).

The assumptions and conclusions of these Classical theorists have been challenged because of what has taken place in various developing societies in the 20th century. By providing their organizational resources and moral support, religious and spiritual groups have played "catalytic" roles in national independence movements in several colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America (*ibid.*).

Similar religiopolitical involvement took place in Gandhi's nonviolence movement and the struggle for Indian independence (1869-1948), in the Sinhalese Buddhist revolution of Ceylon (1956-59), and in several other cases (see Lewy, 1974). Since the 1950s, the Latin American Church has played a prophetic role, as exemplified by its strong criticism of social injustice, the growing political activism of priests, and the development of new pastoral and social reform programs.

There also is the example of the American Baptists' civil rights movement during the 1960s. Thus, it can be said that the Classical theories of religion, including Marxism, have lost much, if not all, of their vitality. Weber's qualification also has

lost some of its validity by the additional examples of Hinduism, Buddhism, Baptist Protestantism and Catholicism, which have been influential in movements for social reform and change (Oh, 1990, p. 313).

In view of these recent developments, several recent scholars of religion in Latin America have challenged the common assumption that "by definition an established church does not serve as a change agent in its society" (Westhues, 1973, p. 106). For example, the late Ivan Vallier recognized the unique transformative role of the Latin American Church which created a socioethical framework for legitimate social change. Houtart and Pin focused on the role of the Church as an inspirational force for social development. Einaudi, Maulin, Stepan, and Fleet emphasized the Church's contribution to the formation of a moral social consciousness. Bruneau concluded that the Brazilian Church has become a powerful prophetic moral force in its opposition to repressive regimes (Smith, 1975, p. 9).

Sanders and deKadt also found that specific sociopolitical movements within the Church have created mutually supportive structural linkages with progressive and radical secular groups, and that these movements served as models or training grounds for new leaders in Latin American society. This view is also shared by Vallier, who believed that pastoral renewal programs in small communities would bring about changes in the attitudes and behavior of Church members, equipping them with a new social conscience and the spiritual resources needed to cope with their toilful responsibilities in complex transitional societies (*ibid.*).²

Because the Church in the Third World has increasingly played an active role in promoting social change, it often has been viewed as a revolutionary and disruptive force by authoritarian regimes (Bruneau, 1974, p. 6).³

As Smith (1975) notes, most of the recent studies on the sociopolitical role of the Church are deficient in that each author mainly focuses on only one aspect or dimension of the Church (p. 9). For example, Landsberger (1970) focuses on recent historical developments and changes in official Church documents and pronouncements. Turner (1971) focuses on goals and attitudes of certain elites. deKadt (1970) and Sanders (1969) both focus on specific programs or activities of clerical and lay elites within the Church, such as basic education programs, pastoral renewal efforts, etc.

Thus, heeding Smith's critique, this study seeks to focus on the multidimensional aspects involved in the transformation of the sociopolitical role of the Church. As Vallier emphasizes, it is necessary to consider the "multiple levels of thought, activity, and organization" when we assess the significance of developments within the Church and their import for society, and we are advised not to make direct causal inferences from formal elements in belief systems to a "religion's obstructive or facilitative roles in social change" (Smith, 1975, p. 9; also see Note #28 on pp. 30-31).

It also should be noted that both Marx and Weber stressed the belief systems of religion, rather than its organizational and structural aspects. To that extent, their theories are deficient. Religion not only is a system of religious beliefs and ideas, but also is the actual practices of individuals and groups. Thus, religion, like other organizations, is subject to external and internal pressures. It also is influenced by changes in perception of reality, as evidenced by the advent of Liberation Theology (Oh, 1990, pp. 315-20). In other words, both Marx and Weber mainly focused on the *soul* part of religion, a constant, rather than on its *body* part, which is affected by changing structural influences, such as changes in the social status of religious

leaders, in the process of decision-making, in the Church's position in society, and in other organizational aspects.

Thus, a comprehensive study of religion and social change not only requires an examination of systems of religious beliefs and ideas, but also the organizational/structural aspects of religion. In this way, it is possible to avoid making direct causal inferences from a religion's belief system to its role in social change.

B. RELATING CHANGES IN SOCIETY TO CHANGES IN THE CHURCH: THE SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Changes in society's interaction with the state are related to changes in the Church. In other words, it must be determined how changes within the Church effected by the new Catholic social teachings and liberal theology are related to the changes in societal interactions with the state.

As previously mentioned, changes within the Church were occasioned by liberal theology and social teachings which developed over the past hundred years and were formulated in major papal messages, as well as by the pronouncements of Vatican II and the bishops' conferences in Latin America. As a result, a significant number of bishops and an even greater number of parish priests in Latin America subscribe to or sympathize with the social teachings of Vatican II and Liberation Theology.

As Gustavo Gutierrez (1973), the author of *A Theology of Liberation*, notes,

Vatican Council II has strongly reaffirmed the idea of a Church of service and not of power. This is a Church which is not centered upon itself and which does not "find itself" except when it "loses itself," when it lives "the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of men of this age" (*Gaudium et spes* [the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World], no. 1).

All of these trends provide a new focus for seeing the presence and activity of the Church in the world as a starting point for theological reflection. (p. 8)

In his further discussion of the new theology, which also has been termed the *signs of the times* theology, Gutierrez states that

what since John XXIII and Vatican Council II began to be called a theology of the *signs of the times* can be characterized along the same lines, although this takes a step beyond narrow ecclesial limits. It must not be forgotten that the *signs of the times* are not only a call to intellectual analysis. They are above all a call to pastoral activity, to commitment, and to service. Studying the *signs of the times* includes both dimensions. Therefore, *Gaudium et spes* [*The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*], no. 44, points out that discerning the *signs of the times* is the responsibility of every Christian, especially pastors and theologians, to hear, distinguish, and interpret the many voices of our age, and to judge them in the light of the divine Word. (*Ibid.*, pp. 8-9; italics original)

Thus, it can be said that the changed approach of the Church has been occasioned by a new theology which focuses on the *signs of the times*. This recalls these words of Jesus:

If the sky is red in the evening, you say the weather will be good. But if the sky is red and gloomy in the morning, you say it is going to rain. You can tell what the weather will be like by looking at the sky. But you don't understand what is happening now [*the signs of the times*]. (*Matthew* 16:2-3; italics added)

The "*signs of the times*" are to be the new basis for the Church's *perception* of its working environment. Thus, it becomes imperative for the Church to discern the signs and demands of the times, and to respond to them by helping people cope with their real needs. In other words, the Church's role increasingly is determined by the sociopolitical realities and changes of everyday life.

III. RELIGION AND POLITICS

This section examines the relationship between religion and politics. Several important concepts developed or presented by Robert N. Bellah and scholars of the Latin American Churches, including Daniel H. Levine and Brian H. Smith, will be

discussed and compared. First, Bellah's ideas concerning religion and social progress will be examined. Then, Levine's perspective on the relationship between religion and politics, and Smith's observations on that subject will be examined. Lastly, the Neo-Marxist concept of the "relative autonomy" of religion will be briefly discussed.

A. RELIGION AND PROGRESS

In an epilogue to *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (1965), its editor, Robert N. Bellah (1965) discusses how, historically, religion has been either favorable or unfavorable to "social progress," which he defines as an increase in learning capacity--"an increasing ability to learn to learn" (pp. 169-70). Borrowing from Karl Deutsch for this definition, Bellah states that this type of learning capacity includes the "capacity for deep rearrangements of inner structure, and thus for the development of radically new functions" (*ibid.*, p. 170; also see Deutsch, 1963, p. 253). He says that "the degree to which the inner structures and values can provide identity, continuity, and coherence while actually encouraging profound structural changes is the degree to which they are conducive to progress (*ibid.*, p. 171).

Bellah also accepts Deutsch's argument that "progress requires some balance between structural continuity and structural change, between memory and receptivity, so that society will become neither rigid nor disorganized" (*ibid.*). Bellah recognizes that "the success or failure of a given society will depend very much on the nature of its inner structure, its deepest values and commitments" (*ibid.*). Bellah believes that because "religion in most societies provides or is closely bound up with core structures and values, it is worthwhile exploring the relationship between religion and progress (*ibid.*).

Bellah views modernization as "an especially rapid increase in progress in recent times" (*ibid.*). Bellah agrees with Cyril Black's definition of "modernization . . . as the totality of the influence of the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge of and control over his environment that has taken place in recent centuries" (*ibid.*; also see Black, 1959, p. 1).

Bellah then proceeds to define religion as "a set of symbols that may be institutionalized, considered as normative, in a society or internalized in a personality" (*ibid.*). However, for his analytical purposes, he broadly redefines religion as "a set of symbols providing the most general level of orientation to reality" (*ibid.*, p. 172). For Bellah, religious symbols define the nature of reality--what it is ultimately, what is the source of order and disorder, what kind of authority is valid and how to characterize the various actions of individuals. "It is... stability, continuity, and coherence provided by commitment to a set of religious symbols (or perhaps better to what they symbolize) that give religion such a prominent place in defining the identity of a group or person" (*ibid.*, p. 173). According to Bellah, religious symbols project a set of "limit images" which regulate social and personal conduct by providing a framework of acceptable behavior (*ibid.*, pp. 173-74). In this sense, he sees religion "as a collective heritage of reality testing on the most general level" (*ibid.*, p. 174).

Religion also provides positive meanings for time and space, which are not only relevant to identity, but also are pre-requisites to the modern idea of progress (*ibid.*, pp. 174-75). Religious concepts of time and space have changed from notions of sacred time and sacred space in primitive societies to modern ideas of progress and nationalism in historic societies. For Bellah, this shows that despite its emphasis on eternity, identity, and continuity, and despite its long history of stability, religion

itself does change (*ibid.*, p. 175). Religious change or evolution involves "the rationalization of religious symbolism," whereby the multitude of ritual acts, sacred images and piecemeal interpretations of primitive, archaic religions have been replaced by the unified, universal, and transcendental concepts of historic, modern religions (*ibid.*, pp. 176-77).

In relating *religion* to *progress*, Bellah discusses how the historic religions (i.e., world religions, such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism; see *ibid.*, 178-79) of the traditional societies up to the modern era contributed to progress. First, differentiations in religious concepts of the transcendental realm and differentiations in social groupings increased the possibility for social conflict and change (*ibid.*, pp. 178-79). Second, within the area of theology, there was a considerable increase in the capacity for rational, organized thought (*ibid.*, pp. 179-80). Third, in the area of motivation, there was an impetus for a more self-disciplined personality who could subordinate his lesser personal interests for greater, common good of society (*ibid.*, p. 180).

Fourth, there was the development of uncompromising ideals and values for the good and/or just society, and the resulting criticism of any existing social structures which didn't measure up (*ibid.*, p. 181). Bellah observes that it was "religious concern" that dictated the model of the "good society" (*ibid.*, p. 182). Although "compromises with social realities were frequent," he notes that "religiously determined social ideas" gradually moved social institutions toward "greater value implementation" (*ibid.*).

Bellah says that "religious pressure" influenced the "characteristic forms" of the great historical societies and justifies the use of religious labels in describing them (*ibid.*). More to the point of this study, Bellah states that (1) "the ability of religious

values to exert long-term pressure on a society is dependent on . . . structural *differentiation* of the religious institutions from other social institutions, especially the political institutions," and (2) "the degree and mode of *the tension between religious and political institutions* had an important bearing on the capacity of *the society for progress* (*ibid.*; italics added).

Fifth, Bellah observes that all of the historic religions provided time conceptions, most of which were pessimistic about the future, especially the near future. Downplaying the future was accompanied by the tendency of glorifying the past, and the desire to return to that golden era. However, because the actual past was forgotten or misunderstood, it was possible for new social ideas to be espoused and justified, based upon their supposed earlier validity (*ibid.*, pp. 182-83).

Sixth, historic religions provided space definitions, which have contributed to the modern idea of one world or a community of nations having social and political commonality (*ibid.*, p. 184). This also provided a basis for social integration, participation and improvement.

Seventh, the structures of historic religions served as effective channels of communication between the ruling elites and the political masses (*ibid.*, p. 186). Most of the foregoing discussion concerns historic societies where, it is assumed, there was a stable marriage between religion and society. Bellah rightly points out that conflict was more often the rule for these societies, especially in the area of religion (*ibid.*).

Regarding the historical pattern of *differentiation*, Bellah notes that "religious and political institutions were relatively well *differentiated* in historic societies, compared to primitive and archaic societies" (*ibid.*; italics added). But Bellah also observes that "it never approached the '*separation of church and state*' found in some modern societies" (*ibid.*; italics added). That was because the political structure had

"an important religious dimension," and because the Church "was closely supervised by the government and was of a public or official nature" (*ibid.*). Bellah explains that "the close *integration of religious and political institutions* in such societies placed important restraints on both of them, restraints that religious or political groups tried from time to time to throw off or reduce, thus generating serious strains between them" (*ibid.*, pp. 186-87; italics added).

Moreover, at times of political change, "vigorous political elites might seek to maximize political power at the expense of the traditional restraints placed upon it, and they would inevitably have to attack or undermine the religious sanctions supporting those restraints" (*ibid.*, p. 187; italics added).

Agreeing with Eisenstadt, Bellah states that "the possibility of structural innovation in either the religious or political field and of the contribution of each to the development of the other is partly at least a function of the degree to which they are *differentiated*. Too close a *fusion* tends to inhibit progress in either" (*ibid.*, p. 188; also see Eisenstadt, 1963, pp. 271-94; italics added). Thus, for Bellah as well as for Eisenstadt, *the degree of differentiation between religious and political institutions* determines the extent to which they contribute to *progress* in each other and in society.

Bellah asserts that "*two conditions* seem especially *unfavorable for* the religious encouragement of *progress: too close a fusion* between religious symbolism and the actual world and *too great a disjunction* between them" (*ibid.*, p. 193; italics added). According to Bellah, in the case of *fusion*, "where religion simply sanctifies a given social-cultural situation, it provides little leverage to change it" (*ibid.*). Moreover, "if the religion lacks a complex theoretical structure" and mostly relies on traditional cultural ideas and "if the ideal of religious action is simply conformity to

social expectations, with little stress on any transcendent goal, then the capacity of the religion to contribute to progress is even smaller" (*ibid.*). Bellah observes that this extreme kind of *fusion* is exemplified by "primitive and archaic religions" (*ibid.*). Bellah points out that although historic religions have broken away from extreme fusions, there is a natural tendency for them to "fall back into such fusions" (*ibid.*).

Regarding the case of *disjunction* at the opposite end of the poles, where religious values are widely divergent from world realities, the capacity to contribute to progress may be equally small. According to Bellah, "religious action consists of avoiding any participation in the normal routine of social existence. . . [and] stresses the attainment of states of emptiness or ecstasy, which are least like normal life" (*ibid.*). He notes that even "elaborate theoretical structures and complex techniques of self-discipline" have a minimal impact on social change in a disjunctive context (*ibid.*).

For Bellah, *the condition most favorable for a religious contribution to progress* is where "*transcendent ideals, in tension with empirical reality*, have a central place in the religious symbol systems, while empirical reality itself is taken very seriously as at least potentially meaningful, valuable, and a valid sphere for religious action" (*ibid.*, p. 194; italics added).

Bellah observes that "most religions have all three tendencies--*fusion, disjunction, and creative tension between religious ideals and the world*--in some sort of combination" (*ibid.*; italics added). He notes that even in religions where creative tension tends to predominate, such as Christianity and Islam, "there may arise many situations that effectively block [their] contributions to progress" (*ibid.*; italics added).

Bellah concludes the foregoing analysis by stating that "only a few religious movements have made major contributions to progress beyond historic society in the

direction of modern society" (*ibid.*). Agreeing with Max Weber, Bellah cites Protestant Christianity as "the first religious movement to make a significant contribution to modernization" and as "a necessary, though not sufficient [by itself], condition for the emergence of modern society in the first place" (*ibid.*; italics added).

B. RELIGION AND POLITICS

1. A Dynamic Relationship

In his discussion of the "dynamic" relationship between religion and politics, Daniel H. Levine (1981) states that "religion and politics grow and change together in all societies and cultures. Common structures of meaning and action knit the two domains into one, as notions of authority, hierarchy, and community (to name only a few points of contact) bring religious and political activists together--often in mutual support, often in conflict" (p. 3). Regarding Latin America, Levine observes that "religion and politics have been closely intertwined since the Conquest, providing ideological, material, and institutional support and legitimation to one another" (*ibid.*). But he also notes that the Church-state relationship has undergone a "profound transformation" in that "changes in both religion and politics have led to a struggle to control the direction and to shape the meaning of an emerging new relation between religious and political beliefs, attitudes, and actions" (*ibid.*).

According to Levine, "religion, like all human institutions, grows and changes, transforming its doctrines, structures, and styles of action in response both to new inner understandings and to challenges and changed conditions in society as a whole" (*ibid.*, p. 4). Thus, his position is opposed to Liberal evolutionism and the

Marxist "stress on economics as somehow more 'real,' more dynamic, [which] together lead to the view that older, supposedly more 'traditional' institutions, and especially religious ones, are survivors--static, unchanging structures held over from the past, whose day is rapidly drawing to a close" (*ibid.*).

2. Overlap between Religion and Politics

How and why are religion and politics related to each other? According to Levine, each, "in a different way, deals with broad questions of the meaning of life, offering symbolic models and organizational structures to articulate and shape it" (*ibid.*, p. 6). Levine further explains this "overlapping" relationship as follows:

Politics, after all, deals at the most general level with the organizing principles and symbols of the entire society, giving *form* to the human community here and now. *Religion*, in turn, provides values and symbols giving *general meaning* to human existence, placing any given set of social or political arrangements in broader frameworks of significance. Religion and politics thus necessarily impinge on one another; their goals and structures *overlap* and run together as a matter of course. (*Ibid.*, p. 6; italics added)

a. The Church, A "Religious" "Institution in the Temporal World

Levine also finds that this "overlap" is a characteristic of the Church itself, as he states:

The Church is made up of people and exists in concrete historical situations. Thus religious positions inevitably have temporal consequences, and temporal problems have an impact on the lives of believers. For this reason it is important to realize that the social impact of religion is carried in vehicles more extensive than a limited attention to preaching, exhortation, or specific positions on public issues alone would indicate. (*Ibid.*, p. 13)

This "overlap" also can be seen in the *motivations and actions of Catholic elites*, including both clergy and laity. As Levine observes, "*religion shapes actions through images of itself*, and of good and proper behavior in general, which are expressed in the daily life of the religious community" (*ibid.*; italics added). He further explains that "Catholic elites (most notably bishops) simply do not consider issues in strictly social or political terms. Instead, their answers are couched in religious concepts and metaphors, which flow from their understanding of the requirements of religious faith, their view of the Church as an institution, and their conclusions about its proper relation to society at large--not from purely social analysis alone" (*ibid.*, p, 10).

Thus, Levine points out that "actions which appear identical when seen from the outside often spring from quite diverse motivations, and hence may be pursued with widely varying styles of action and intensities of commitment" (*ibid.*, p. 13). For example, political opposition by Catholic elites, on the surface, may appear to be identical to political opposition by non-religious groups, but the *motivation* may be different. *The Church's religious motivation for sociopolitical action* arises from its understanding of, and commitment to, the Church's "*proper relation to society and politics as a whole*" in a "*transhistorical perspective*" (*ibid.*, p. 11; italics added).

b. The Church's Pastoral Action and Politics

Levine also describes this "overlap" between religion and politics by his broadly defined concept of "*pastoral action*." According to Levine, a *new definition* of "pastoral action" is needed because

the problem is new and different because the meaning of both "*religion*" and "*politics*" has undergone considerable rethinking in recent years. For religion,

the meaning of *the Church* both as *an institution* and as *a community of believers*, as well as the *implications of religious faith for social action*, have come under consideration. Meanwhile, throughout the region, the scope of actions considered "political" has itself expanded. Once limited to small groups of elites working in narrow institutional settings, "*politics*" is now widely taken to include mass activities (and their repression) in new and hitherto nonpolitical settings. (*Ibid.*, p. 19; italics added)

Levine describes the function of his concept of "pastoral action" as follows:

For our purposes, *a working definition of religion* should help isolate a set of beliefs and motivations and shed light on the way they generate regular patterns of action. We need a concept *linking beliefs to action*. "*Pastoral action*" provides such a concept. . . . even pastoral actions undertaken for the most conventional motives (charity or aid to the sick, for example) can take on political character and consequences, especially in highly divided or repressive situations. (*Ibid.*, p. 25; italics added)

.....

Likewise, Levine believes that the concept of "politics" can be expanded to include

denunciations of injustice . . . , or . . . to redress grievances and change the structure of power and opportunity in daily life. Such activities, while not political in a narrowly partisan or official sense, are nonetheless political in essence: they raise basic issues of power, authority, legitimacy, and distribution. (*Ibid.*, p. 26)

For Levine, the result of these conceptual revisions is that "if both *pastoral action* and *politics* are expanded in this way, they flow easily together, and the distinction between the religious and the political loses much of its presumed sharpness" (*ibid.*; italics added).

Sanders points out that if Levine's definitions are accepted, there is no longer such a thing as "political neutrality." Sanders (1982) discusses this point as follows:

Levine criticizes the inclination of certain church spokesmen to say that their basic responsibilities are "pastoral" in the sense of "nonpolitical" or that the church should be "neutral" in politics. He argues instead that *pastoral or religious activities* in the broadest sense *overlap with* a comprehensive definition of *politics* that includes not only party activities and government but also questions of power, authority, legitimacy, and distribution. *Political neutrality is impossible*, he says, *because it implies a commitment "to work within the status quo"* (p., 27).⁴ As a linking concept between religious thought and political action, he proposes "*pastoral action*."⁵ (p. 247; italics added)

3. Religion and Politics: Fusion, Separation, or a Dynamic and Dialectical Balance

Levine presents three variations of the relationship between religion and politics, namely, *fusion*, *separation*, and *dynamic and dialectical balance*. These concepts are comparable to Bellah's concepts of fusion, disjunction, and creative tension.

a. Fusion of Religion and Politics

Levine observes that the idea of separating religion and politics (and church and state) is a recent historical development. According to Levine (1981),

In most cultural traditions, religion and politics have been closely related. Indeed, as anthropologists and historians often remind us, the very idea that they should (or could) be separated at all is a recent notion, rooted in the development of Western societies since the Protestant Reformation. Before the emergence of the idea of "secular" society and its subsequent spread around the globe, the ultimate goals of religion and politics were generally indistinguishable. Of course, disputes occasionally erupted between the respective authorities in each sphere (kings and priests, emperors and popes), but such conflict was typically joined over the question of who should control and orient the totality of life. Questions of dividing and delimiting two spheres of life, secular and sacred, were not at issue. (p. 20)

Levine describes this close relationship or "*fusion*" of religion and politics as follows:

This pervasive *fusion of religion and politics* can take many forms: it may be expressed in the form and content of law; in the structures of education; in the nature of approved sanctions and mechanisms for resolving social conflict; and, of course, in the accepted processes for legitimating authority. All these manifestations and others are expressions of a belief that the values which orient individuals and inform the structure of institutions cannot be separated from those which relate individuals to the transcendental or divine. The world is thus a seamless web, and religion knits it all together by infusing each act with transcendental meaning. (*Ibid.*; italics added)

.....
Of course, religion and politics were distinguished in institutional terms. This is the source of the famous "two swords doctrine," according to which the Church and political authorities divided tasks of rulership, with the

spiritual sword wielded by bishops and priests, and the temporal sword in the hands of kings and princes. In this arrangement, secular power is separate from, but clearly subordinate to, the Church: temporal power is obliged to serve and protect the Church, and its exercise is subject to ecclesiastical judgement. In any case, the very notion of an ideal society, a notion embodied in the idea of Christendom, required that all social questions be infused with principles of Christian doctrine, as authoritatively laid out by the Church. The very idea of dividing human activity according to its function or sphere was quite foreign to medieval thought. (*Ibid.*, p. 21)

According to Levine, this history explains why "the traditional Catholic position . . . emphasizes the closeness of spiritual and temporal authorities" (*ibid.*).

b. Separation of Religion and Politics

Levine's review of history shows that the division of religion and politics (and of church and state) into two separate spheres didn't occur until the Protestant Reformation, and the resulting increase in secularization of society which followed.

As Levine describes this process,

the general trend of Western societies since the Reformation has been to *separate*, not fuse, religion and politics, and by separating them, to mark off distinct and *relatively autonomous* spheres of competence for each. *Conflict between Church and State* became a continuous thread in Western history, as each institution sought to preserve and extend the scope of its authority. The pattern of *conflict* has been remarkably persistent. Until recently, it has centered on the question of who is to provide the general orientations and socially valid values for the entire society. This pattern of conflict helps explain the continued attention given to issues dealing with control over the key stages in individual and community life cycles: registration of births, education, sanctification of marriages, provision of social assistance, and burial.

As such *conflicts* evolved and became a regular part of the Western scene, religion and politics became problems for one another in fairly predictable ways. In politics, religious institutions often appeared to be fighting a rear-guard action to preserve existing privileges and to revive past understandings. This was especially true in areas where traditional Catholicism was strong, for throughout the nineteenth century (and well into the twentieth in some cases) the Catholic Church continued to reject the validity of the very notion of a secular and religiously neutral State. In Berger's words, "Throughout the nineteenth century, while Protestant liberalism carried on its great love affair with the spirit of the age, the basic temper of Catholicism can be described as

a magnificent defiance" [Berger, *A Rumor of Angels*, p. 15]. (*Ibid.*, pp. 22-23; italics added)

In a footnote to the above commentary, Levine cites Reuther to show the extent of the separation that took place, as follows:

Historically secularization arose in the West as something experienced by the church as a losing rear-guard battle against the rising tide of rebellion that deposed the church from one sphere of influence after another. Economics, politics, education, culture, and finally even the family were secularized by a process of deposing the influence of the ecclesiastical institution and pushing it back step by step until finally it appeared primarily in the privatized form of personal relationship with God that lay in the realm of subjective feeling, having lost contact not only with the social structures that surround the remainder of life but with the larger intellectual world as well. This is what is popularly called churchgoing in modern society (*The Radical Kingdom*, p. 161). (*Ibid.*, p. 22)

Some other results of the separation which even now are affecting modern society and church-state relations are discussed by Levine as follows:

Religion thus became a problem in politics as an institution to be dealt with and controlled, and further, as a *potentially dangerous source of opposition if threatened*. From the point of view of religion, politics posed no less a problem. The most obvious kind of problem came from the intrusion of the State into areas formerly left to the Church, such as registry, education, marriage, and the like. But at a deeper level, politics also posed a challenge to the general authority of the Church. Where once the priest or bishop had been the generally accepted guide in each community, now social and political leaders arose to offer secular alternatives to Church guidance. The challenge was twofold: first, secular groups defined alternative paths of action, independent of the sanction or authority of religious leaders; and second, the groups competed openly with the Church for members. The most notable illustration, of course, is the development of trade unions and of a whole socialist subculture among industrial workers.

As a result of this process of conflict and threat, the Catholic Church withdrew, by the end of the nineteenth century, into a closed and rigid set of ideas and institutional structures. These were intended to deny the validity of recent changes in European society and to insulate the faithful from their influence, so far as possible. The Church thus entered the twentieth century in latent conflict with the structures of European society---*conflict* that erupted from time to time *on issues of normative orientation and the regulation of behavior*. (*Ibid.*, p. 23; italics added)

c. A Dynamic and Dialectical Balance of Religion and Politics

For Levine, the ideal relationship between religion and politics is what he describes as "*a dynamic and dialectical balance*," as follows:

In looking at general and particularly at Latin American developments from this point on [into the 20th century--the modern era], I want to stress again the importance of keeping religion and politics in *a dynamic and dialectical balance*, giving full and equal weight to each. Both religion and politics must be taken seriously as general sources of motivation and guiding ideas. Their particular roles, however, are empirical questions: it is necessary to trace out the *sociological links between religious and political elements in particular contexts and problems*. The transformation of religious ideas poses new problems and dilemmas for politics; at the same time, the pattern of political change raises new problems and dilemmas for religion.

Religion and politics are thus related both analytically and empirically---the two *cannot and should not be separated*. (*Ibid.*, pp. 23-24; italics added)

In further explaining this concept, Levine points out how his approach differs from the approaches taken by other scholars as follows:

This position differs considerably from that taken in much recent work on "*development*," "*modernization*," and the role of religion in these processes. In general, the authors of such writings see *increasing functional specialization and institutionalization* as both inevitable and good. In their view, no single institution can embrace all human activity, or provide a valid framework to explain its significance. Rather, spheres of competence are marked off, and the whole is best represented by the metaphor of a marketplace---an arena in which different interests compete and work out changing codes of mutual coexistence.

This view of society has deep roots in the individualism and rationalism which emerged from the Protestant Reformation, and their aftermath in liberal and utilitarian thought. *The bias toward increasing secularization and differentiation* often leads to the conclusion that religious institutions and leaders should be stripped of most activities and functions not "explicitly religious" (e.g., not concerned with cult, ritual, or salvation). To put it crudely, *in this view preachers should preach, leaving politics and the care of the social order to the "experts."* (*Ibid.*, p. 24; italics added)

Levine concludes his explanation by arguing that a total separation of church and state for analytical purposes is simplistic, if not misleading, as follows:

This perspective [of the secular writers explained above] is a poor guide to any study of religion and politics. In the specific case of Latin America, these authors totally failed to anticipate and understand the *dramatic reemergence of political themes in Catholicism*, especially (although not only) on the "left." By arguing for a neat separation of spheres of action, their approach assumes that a parallel separation is possible in the minds of the actors themselves. But

if *religion really is a source of powerful motivations* and lasting orientations in many areas of life, then the problem for analysis is *to trace out the real links between religion and those actions*---not simply to seek a dividing line. (*Ibid.*; italics added)

Thus, considering Bellah's three concepts describing the relationship between religion and politics, and Levine's three similar concepts, the third concept describes the relationship most favorable to change. In regard to the third concept, the commonly used concept of "the prophetic role of the Church" discussed by many of the scholars of the Latin American Church, including Smith (1982), is comparable to the "creative tension" of Bellah, as well as to the "dynamic and dialectical balance of religion and politics" proposed by Levine (see Smith, 1982, pp. 8, 18, 22, 25-26, 284-85, 302, 304, 312, 346-47).

Smith's description of "the prophetic role of the church," as applied to the Latin American Church, appears to be identical with what he terms "the classical sense of the word---namely, speaking and acting critically in the face of abuses of religious or secular power" (*ibid.*, p. 284). Smith notes that it is unusual for a "church-type religious organization" like the Church to assume a prophetic role, as defined above (*ibid.*). But, that is exactly what Smith saw happening in Latin America (see *ibid.*, pp. 284-85). For a further discussion of this concept, see section IV. C. "Political Opposition as a Prophetic Role of the Church," *infra*.

Thus, there are three separate, but comparable, concepts, which can be used to describe and analyze the relationship between religion and politics most favorable to change.

C. THE NEO-MARXIST CONCEPT OF THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF RELIGION

As previously mentioned, Marx regarded religion as a barrier to socioeconomic change. According to classical Marxist theory, the determinant or independent variable of social action is class interests based on economic relations (Marx, 1959; Marx & Engels, 1973; Yi, 1990, p. 18). Moreover, the relative dominance of ideas also depends on the class structure of the society from which they arise (see Giddens, 1978, p. 209; also see Yi, 1990, p. 19). In other words, "the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness" (Marx, 1970, p. 21; Yi, 1990, pp. 19-20). Ideology is nothing but distorted ideas that legitimize a social system which serves the interests of the dominant class (Marx & Engels, 1970, pp. 64-68; Yi, 1990, p. 20).

Religion is regarded as a false comfort to the proletariat which diverts its attention away from social structural problems. Thus, religion is viewed as "the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, the spirit of a situation deprived of spirit. It is the people's opium" (Marx, 1963; Yi, *ibid.*). In the same vein, "the production of religious systems" is regarded as "part of the general process of the production of ideology" (Birnbaum, 1973, p. 14; Yi, *ibid.*). According to classical Marxist theory, as set forth in *The German Ideology* by Marx and Engels, religion is conceived as being a totally dependent variable, conditioned by the economic class structure of each society.

However, after Marx's death, this simplistic one-sidedness of that approach was challenged by those who transcended it without totally abandoning Marxian theory. Engels is regarded as the pioneer of Neo-Marxism. In a revealing letter to political newspaper editor Joseph Bloch, Engels wrote that

Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due it. We had to emphasize this main principle in opposition to our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights. (Engels, 1890/1972, p. 642; also see Ritzer, 1983, p. 132)

Engels admitted that many aspects of the sociopolitical superstructure can interact with the socioeconomic base to effect change, and that those aspects include "religious views and their further development into systems of dogma, [that] also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their *form*" (Engels, 1890/1972, pp. 640-42; Pottenger, 1989, pp. 90-91; italics original).

Beginning with Engels, Neo-Marxist sociologists in the Marxist tradition have sought to develop "through the concept of the relative autonomy of religion an approach in which religious systems have to be studied in themselves and to be situated within a specific macro-social context in a historical perspective, thus trying to establish the complex mutual influences between social structure and religious systems" (Maduro, 1977, p. 359). The "relative autonomy" is a concept utilized by structural Marxists who concentrate on studying the hidden underlying structures of capitalist society.

Although they aren't basically concerned with "real" structures, they do believe that such structures exist and constrain or determine ideas and actions. Structural Marxists stress the importance of the economy, but also look at other structures, especially political and ideological ones. Although they regard economics as the determining factor, they do not consider other structures as mere reflections of the underlying economic factors. Structural Marxists concede the importance of political structures and ideologies, which they regard as possessing "relative autonomy." These structures may develop independently and "may at any given time

come to be the dominant forces in society" (Ritzer, 1983, p. 129). At the heart of Structural Marxism, as espoused by Althusser, Godelier and Poulantzas, is the view that modern capitalism is composed of three major components, namely, the state, ideology, and the economy.

The Neo-Marxist approach to religion mainly was developed by Antonio Gramsci, a Hegelian Marxist, and by Maurice Godelier, a structural Marxist, and by Latin American Neo-Marxists, such as Otto Maduro (see Maduro, 1977, 1982). In summary, the major Neo-Marxist theorists view religion as a relatively autonomous factor in society--neither a wholly independent variable nor merely a reflection of an underlying economic structure. The following statements are a good summary of their views:

1. Religion is not a mere passive effect of the social relations of production; it is an active element of social dynamics, both conditioning and conditioned by social processes.
2. Religion is not always a subordinate element within social processes; it may often play an important part in the birth and consolidation of a particular social structure.
3. Religion is not necessarily a functional, reproductive or conservative factor in society; it often is one of the main (and sometimes the only) available channel to bring about a social revolution.
4. The scientific study of religion is not an easy task; it requires a many-sided empirical approach whose results cannot be either substituted or anticipated by theoretical constructs. (Maduro, 1977, p. 366)

IV. THE CHURCH'S INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

This section explores Church and state relations, particularly Church-state conflict. First, there is a discussion of how the relative autonomy of the Church vis-a-vis the state developed in practice. Second, there is a discussion of the four levels of

Church autonomy affecting the institutional relationship between Church and state, mostly based on Thomas C. Bruneau's work, *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church* (1974). Third, the Church's political opposition, focusing on its prophetic role, is compared to other types of political opposition. Fourth, the Church's sociopolitical involvement will be considered as a three-step process.

A. THE CHURCH'S RELATIVE AUTONOMY VIS-A-VIS THE STATE

Most observers of the Latin American Church consider that religious changes and events do have political significance, because the Church is totally enmeshed in all sociopolitical aspects of Latin American society, impacting such areas as legitimation, education, charity, and political opposition. The respective national Churches were established simultaneously with their respective societies. These Churches have experienced a parallel unsteady development with their societies and governments for several centuries (see Bruneau, 1974, p. ix).

As Bruneau rightly observes, in those parts of the world where the Church has been established as a national Church closely aligned with the government (although still affiliated with the Vatican), the state prefers to maintain a good relationship with the Church. In order to assure its survival, the Church also must be concerned with its relationship with the state. A national Church shares the same territory, population and desire for men's allegiance as the all-inclusive state. Historically, this relationship has been dynamic and intense, because of the impact of power as well as beliefs. This is especially true of Church-state relations in Latin America, Latin Europe, Holland and Germany, where a majority of the population are members of the Church (*ibid.*, p. 3).

According to Bruneau, *the Church's autonomy* came about and developed *through a process of intense conflict with the state*. In this process, the Church has increasingly assumed the prophetic role of promoting social change (*ibid.*, p. 6). Bruneau considers it useful to recognize *four levels of institutional relationships*, which move from the least to the greatest autonomy for the Church, namely: "(1) *coalition*--the virtual identity of goals and structures; (2) *cooperation*--at times identical goals pursued through separate structures; (3) *competition*--similar goals pursued through separate structures utilizing different strategies; and (4) *conflict*--mutually exclusive or antagonistic goals pursued through distinct structures" (*ibid.*, p. 5; italics added).

However, Bruneau views the Church-state relationship as being even more complex, because in the past the Latin American Church has been identified with, and dependent upon, the state in so many respects, perhaps even more so than upon the Vatican. According to Bruneau, this identity between Church and state is in their having the common goal of influencing all of society and in their common use of the mechanism of "power" to pursue that goal. Bruneau makes an interesting observation concerning the use of "power" by the Church in Latin America and elsewhere where there is or has been a close Church-state relationship. Power involves "positive and negative coercion" and by definition is associated with the state in its regulation of physical (and mental) coercion and in its allocation of values and resources (*ibid.*).

Power is only one "basis for influence, but for these [Latin American] Churches it was always the central one and is still crucial to the way they define influence" (*ibid.*). As Bruneau points out, when influence is sought by means of power, there is no need for other bases of influence (*ibid.*). In changing its role and adapting to changing socioeconomic and political conditions, the Church must not

only maintain an autonomous relationship with the Vatican and the state, but must also build new bases for influence, e.g., "personal commitments, beliefs, faith and mobilization of the layman" (*ibid.*).

Bruneau also sees the Church changing its goal from simply influencing society to also influencing political institutions and the political order, which obviously are matters of political concern (*ibid.*, pp. 5-6).

Another aspect of the autonomy of the Church vis-a-vis the state is that this *autonomy* is virtually compelled by the doctrine of *the separation of church and state*. According to Turner (1971), this doctrine "was officially established in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when Pope Leo XIII . . . formulated the doctrine that the Church is indifferent to particular forms of government so long as they respect the rights of the Church" (p. 90).

This doctrinal position allows the Church to coexist with a wide variety of governments, even hostile and repressive regimes such as Castro's Cuba. According to Turner and his source, Father William Coleman, "an astute observer of the Latin American Church," the doctrine benefits that Church "because it allows the Church to disassociate itself from political regimes that fall or become discredited" (*ibid.*). Moreover, as Turner notes regarding the results of a study of Catholic activists in Chile, "the Church can work more effectively in promoting social change when it not tied to a particular government" (*ibid.*).

Another factor which enables the Church to be autonomous and separate from the state is *financial independence*. As Smith (1982) observes in the negative and positive example of Chile during the Pinochet military regime, the financial dependence of Church-sponsored universities and schools upon the state became "a serious drawback for the Church under a government that is afraid of academic

freedom and insensitive to the poor" (pp. 320-22). As Smith explains, this dependence was "the most significant factor of all that accounted for the hierarchy's relative silence and ineffectual opposition to greater public control over Catholic education" (*ibid.*, p. 322). On the other hand, as Smith states, "other organizational apostolates sponsored by the Church since the coup, such as human rights committees, nutritional and health services, neighborhood self-help programs, and *Mensaje* [Jesuit monthly magazine in Chile], are all financially independent from the Chilean government, and hence far less vulnerable to its control" (*ibid.*).

Another factor supporting the autonomy of religion is the distinct character of its *ideas and values*. According to Sanders (1982), "the emerging position of the church . . . makes clear that *religious values* are more ultimate than political ones and have an *autonomy* of their own" (p. 257; italics added). This view also is shared by Max Weber, who considers that ideas exist separate and apart from the individuals and groups which espouse them.

From Weber's standpoint, systems of ideas are not mere reflections of structural class interests. Social classes or groups can develop an affinity for certain kinds of religious ethics wholly apart from the influence of class interests (see Giddens, 1978, p. 211; also see Yi, 1990, p. 22). Moreover, Weber emphasized the importance of the underlying subjective intent and motivation of individuals in explaining social action. Thus, as Weber points out, the *subjective dimension of individuals, reflected in systems of ideas and religious beliefs, plays an autonomous role* in influencing their social action, including socioeconomic change such as the rise of capitalism.⁶

Lastly, Mainwaring (1986) observes that "a church can *believe* it is above politics and remain aloof from political discussions" (p. 13, footnote; italics added).

As he further elaborates, "all institutions . . . can insulate themselves from conflicts in society at large, especially when they participate only peripherally in the political struggle" (*ibid.*, p. 12). Moreover, Mainwaring believes that "if a church or a religious movement remains outside political debates and *defines* its mission as being above politics, it is possible that the political process will not directly affect the way it *perceives* its mission" (*ibid.*, pp. 12-13; italics added).

Perhaps the Church's involvement in politics, especially in opposition to authoritarian rule, is dictated more by a sense of its Biblical prophetic mission ("above politics") than by the influence of class interests. It appears that *the Church* can maintain *its relative autonomy, not only vis-a-vis politics and the state, but also* with respect to the issue of class struggle. Thus, one must pay more attention to "the *specific ways religious institutions* respond to political conflict and social changes" (*ibid.*, p. 14; italics added). As Levine (1981) observes, *Church leaders' "views of religion and of the nature of the Church have a major, independent impact, not so much on how they see the world, as on the meaning they accord to what they see, and thus on the kinds of imperatives for action they draw from their social analysis"* (p. 11; italics added).

B. POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND THE CHURCH

This study examines the first three of the following four types of political opposition: (1) Secular "Institutional" Political Opposition Parties within the system; (2) Secular "Extra-Institutional" Opposition; (3) Religious "Extra-Institutional" Opposition; and (4) Religious "Institutional" Opposition Parties within the system (not applicable to South Korea; see Appendix B).

The first type includes the political opposition parties in South Korea. The South Korean parties could be more accurately termed "Semiopposition Parties," which, according to Linz, are "those groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group but are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime" (Linz, 1973, p. 191).

The second type mostly includes labor movements, farmer movements, student movements and the "Chaeya" (or "Jaeya"), all of which developed outside of formal, institutional politics. The Chaeya, which name literally means "not in office but in the countryside or in the field," is a broad group of notables with middle class origins who are involved in anti-regime political activities outside the officially sanctioned political arena. This group includes a wide range of occupations---former politicians, university professors, teachers, literary men, journalists, lawyers, clergymen, religious activists, etc. For purposes of this study, Chaeya clergymen and religious activists (both Catholic and Protestant) are included in the third type of opposition discussed below.

The third type includes, in addition to the above Chaeya individuals, active liberal Catholic priests and the Catholic organizations guided by them (a main focus of this study). The Church itself is included in this category because its political opposition has been too sporadic for it to be considered a political institution. It also should be noted that the Church, unlike a political party, has "no strategy for replacing the existing regime with its own leaders" (Wurfel, 1988, p. 211). However, the Church often has been treated like a political institution polarized between the regime and the opposition. Despite its internal problems, this type of opposition has grown dramatically in size and importance as regimes have become more authoritarian and repressive.

These Extra-Institutional Opposition groups [types (2) and (3)], which are not permitted to formally organize or to have a voice in the formal political process, perhaps, also could be classified as "Alegal Opposition" which, unlike Semiopposition, "aims at a basic change in the regime and in its political institutions and to a large extent a basic change in the social and economic structure" (Linz, 1973, p. 119). According to Linz, "the transition from an alegal to an illegal opponent depends fundamentally on the definition by the regime of the actions it will or will not tolerate and the type of sanctions it is willing to use" (*ibid.*, p. 215).

C. POLITICAL OPPOSITION AS A PROPHETIC ROLE OF THE CHURCH

Until the modern era, the Church never was autonomous in its relations with the state, but was noted for its "long ecclesiastical tradition of splendid rhetoric and little action in the interests of the lower strata of society" (Bruneau, 1974, p. 177). However, today's Church, confronted by authoritarian regimes in the Third World, has assumed an autonomous sociopolitical role vis-a-vis the state, influenced by Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings (see Chapter Two), and by a process of intense conflict with the state.

Religiopolitical opposition by the Church must be distinguished from other types of political opposition. The Church's opposition is based on, and motivated by, *its positive understanding of its own prophetic role, and not solely for the purpose of being in opposition.* The priests who are arrested and punished for their anti-government actions are carrying out their perceived social mission of the Church and not politically motivated actions.

In regard to the nature of religiopolitical opposition, consider this homily read in some Brazilian churches on a First Sunday in Advent:

We want to be imprisoned for our fidelity to the Gospel of Christ, and from this comes the obligation which we feel of removing it [the Gospel] from any political sentiment or ideological line. Those who suffer for their political ideas suffer for their motives, and those who are faithful to the Gospel suffer for the Gospel of Christ . . . What we think in political, social and economic matters is very clear. We believe what the Constitution *Gaudium et Spes* states, what *Populorum Progressio* states, and the document of Medellín states. (*Ibid.*, p. 207)

The Church's commitment to its social mission is further defined in the following statement by the Brazilian Church:

Christianity supersedes and transcends systems of government and political regimes. Its mission, however, cannot be indifferent to the concrete situation of the people. If it is not within *the role of the Church* to conduct officially or exclusively the transformation of temporal structures, its role is, however, *to present principles and norms that, in the light of the Gospel*, can promote models and projects of social life. (*Ibid.*, p. 221; italics added)

The Church's prophetic role in Brazil is described by Bruneau as follows:

The Church in Brazil today is living in greater profundity her prophetic mission of denouncing error and of announcing the truth. This mission is not negative nor against any particular individual, but is the Church's contribution in the present situation towards helping the country. The Church had [has] the right and the duty to criticize some aspects of the government and society, and this was [is] founded in its prophetic mission. (*Ibid.*, p. 198)

It also is important to consider Bruneau's discussion of the *prophet* and his *prophetic mission*, as follows:

A prophet is one who receives the word of God and makes clear its meaning and significance in concrete situations. A prophet is first of all a spokesman and moreover he is compelled to speak. He has no choice in the matter, as his mission from God is to carry His message and draw out its applications in the world. *Frequently prophecy assumes a political connotation*, and a revolutionary one at that, *as the prophets call for a break in the established order*. They are not necessarily successful as insurgents and may well be persecuted without ever attaining their goals, for their mission is viewed as a threat. For Max Weber the essential criterion in defining prophecy was whether or not it called for a break with the established order; for him the prophet was the prototype of *charismatic leadership*. The prophet was the agent of a breakthrough to a higher cultural order, particularly at the level of *religious ethics*, but these ethics presupposed *direct significance for all other*

orders as well. Sectors of the Brazilian Church are assuming a prophetic mission; it is essentially revolutionary and they are persecuted for it. (*Ibid.*, pp. 229-30; also see Parsons, 1963; italics added)

In summary, according to Bruneau, the Church's *prophetic mission* is "to shout, speak, insist; that is, to make those who are responsible for politics . . . conscious of the truth in order that they decide in favor of a strategy of indispensable transformation, which is necessary and urgent for establishing a more human and fraternal society" (*ibid.*, pp. 230-31). Moreover, as Wurfel (1988) eloquently explains, "In criticizing the ruling elite, posing alternative goals and policies, and mobilizing people to articulate those alternatives, its [Church's] energy and clear analysis put the old politicians to *shame*" (p. 211; italics added).

Bruneau (1974) also sees the Church leaders carefully avoiding the political arena, as they skillfully "bring together all those who make political options, to reflect with them and to help them see farther and more clearly" (p. 232). Lastly, the Church's opposition "is distinguished from a purely political role by *the scope of its mission*; it is oriented to the City of God and not to that of man, and is *not affected by time, as is an ideology*" (*ibid.*, p. 233; italics added).

Two questions arise in regard to the prophetic role of the Church. First, are there any historical antecedents for the Church's exercise of a prophetic role? The answer to this question is found in the similarity between the sociopolitical conditions of ancient Israel and those of present-day Third World countries. As was true for ancient Israel, Third World countries have experienced such serious economic, social and political problems that the Church cannot blindly defend the status quo. Also, the Church's prophetic role is encouraged, if not commanded, by the Gospel message (*ibid.*, pp. 231-33).

Second, why has the Church found it necessary to assume a prophetic role? The answer to this question also is provided by Bruneau: "If the society was

unconstrained, if channels of social mobility were open, politics democratic and the situation of the masses improving, it is not likely that the prophetic mission would be assumed. However, this is not the case" (*ibid.*, p. 236). To reiterate, the *prophetic mission of the Church* is encouraged by the need to perform a prophetic role *in a particular sociopolitical context* (*ibid.*, p. 236).

D. POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE CHURCH: THREE ANALYTICAL STEPS

According to Edward L. Cleary, O.P., author of the book, *Crisis and Change: The Church in Latin America Today* (1985), "Vatican II was the great event of the Catholic Church in the last four centuries" (p. 60). As Cleary states, "The Church no longer simply emphasized the hierarchical aspects of authority but returned to thinking of itself as 'the people of God,' 'the common priesthood,' a 'royal nation'--all images of shared authority" (*ibid.*). Cleary then proceeds to discuss the new methodology contained in one of the most important documents ever issued by the Church, as follows:

In the longest and most influential document of the [Vatican II] council, *Gaudium et Spes* (The Church in the Modern World), a "new" methodology is introduced. Many theologians now believe that the methodology of *Gaudium et Spes* is every bit as important as its content. The methodology used in the document turns traditional theology on its head. Instead of proceeding in the time-honored fashion, discussing theological or biblical principles and then applying them to a present-day situation, *Gaudium et Spes* reverses the process: it begins with a careful analysis of the de facto situation, then turns to sacred scripture and theology for reflection on that situation, and finally, as a third step, makes pastoral applications. Theological reflection thus becomes the second, not the first, step. (*Ibid.*, pp. 60-61)

Tradition, established theology, and the magisterium of the church had been used as the starting point in previous papal teaching, other Vatican II documents, and in traditional theology. *Gaudium et Spes* plunges right into the current world situation. It was almost the last of the schemata to be developed by the council. It proved to be the bridge into the future. (*Ibid.*, p. 61)

In the description of the church in the world, *Gaudium et Spes* makes use of social and behavioral sciences. Previously philosophy, the preferred "handmaiden," guided the theological enterprise. The church now searches the given socio-cultural situation for the "signs of the times," to hear the voice of God in them. (*Ibid.*)

In *Gaudium et Spes* the church also returns to sacred scripture more directly than it was accustomed to doing. It thereby employs a more thorough hermeneutic--that is, a contemporary search for the meaning of the world and of world events in the light of the scriptures. (*Ibid.*, pp. 60-61)

Cleary is equally convinced that "liberation theology offers Latin American religious leadership groups a new way to do theology" (*ibid.*, p. 63). Although the exact origins of this new methodology may be debatable, it is sufficient for Cleary to conclude that "the conciliar fathers in *Gaudium et Spes*, the architects of Medellín and Puebla, and the liberation theologians themselves consistently follow the same three-step methodology" (*ibid.*).

According to Cleary, this new methodology involves the following three steps:

The *first step* is a *description of the church in the world*. This step involves the use of sociology and economics, and in the case of the Latin Americans at least. . . , their analysis is structural analysis, deriving in part from class and dependency analysis. (*Ibid.*; italics added)

Then as the *second step* comes *biblical and doctrinal reflection on the situation described*. Thus in the case of Latin America, the teaching of the Bible and of the church led the bishops at Medellín and Puebla and the theologians of liberation to reflect on a society in which justice would prevail. This they describe as a society in which human dignity is respected, the legitimate aspiration of the people are satisfied, personal freedom and access to truth are guaranteed. This type of society, which would correspond to Christian principles, conflicts with what the bishops and theologians perceive in Latin America: they find oppression by power groups, elites. "[T]hese groups may give the impression of maintaining peace and order, but in truth it is nothing but the continuous and inevitable seed of rebellion and war." (*Ibid.*, pp. 63-64; italics added)

As a *third stage*, *pastoral conclusions* follow the biblical and doctrinal reflections. Some conclusions that have consistently appeared in CELAM [Latin American Episcopal Council, a transnational entity founded in 1955, headquartered in Bogota] documents and in the writings of theologians of liberation include defense of the rights of the oppressed, a healthy critical sense of the social situation, promotion of grassroots organizations, a halt to the arms race in Latin America and in the world, just prices for raw materials, and a denunciation of the machinations of world powers that work against the self-determination of weaker powers. (*Ibid.*, p. 64; italics added)

The foregoing three analytical steps are useful to evaluate statements made by the South Korean Church and its priests, especially the CPAJ.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. For a more detailed discussion of these views also see *ibid.*, p. 27, note #1, which includes: Herbert Spencer, 1896, vol. 3, pp. 104-06; Bronislaw Malinowski, 1948, pp. 63-69, p. 87; Emile Durkheim, 1947, p. 257; Karl Marx, 1963, pp. 43-44; and Max Weber, 1963, *passim*.

2. For a more detailed discussion of these views also see *ibid.*, p. 29, notes #19-24, which include: Ivan Vallier, 1970, p. 6, pp. 71-76, 87-89, 153-54; F. Houtart and E. Pin, 1965, pp. 256-57; Luigi Einaudi, Richard Maullin, Alfred Stepan, and Michael Fleet, 1969, p. 76; Thomas C. Bruneau, 1973, p. 43; Emanuel deKadt, 1970, pp. 271ff; Thomas G. Sanders, 1969, pt.6, pp. 14-15; and Ivan Vallier, 1972, pp. 24-25.

3. The following are some examples of the growing interest among social scientists regarding the role of religion in political development through the 1960s: Robert Bellah, ed., *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: Free Press, 1965); Kalman Silvert, ed., *Churches and States: The Religious Institution and Modernization* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1967); Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970); Donald E. Smith, ed., *Religion, Politics, and Social Change in the Third World: A Sourcebook* (New York: Free Press, 1971).

4. Although Sanders (1982) agrees with Levine that noninvolvement is implicitly a political position, he questions Levine's contention that "neutrality" means "working within the status quo." According to Sanders, "all positions work within the status quo, even those that want to change it radically. The church does indeed work within the status quo, but its view of neutrality, which refers specifically to nonpartisanship, does not mean defense of the status quo" (p. 248).

Nevertheless, Sanders, gives credit to Levine by observing that (1) "as Levine himself correctly shows, the official position of the church now favors change toward greater justice and the fulfillment of human potential"; and (2) "Levine's approach . . . enables him to formulate the chief issues he wants to consider: first, the self-perception of the religious institution and, second, the impact of the church on changes in the social and political context of Venezuela and Colombia" (*ibid.*, p. 248).

5. Sanders also notes that the term "pastoral" has been used in ordinary discourse to mean precisely the opposite meaning, and cites, as an example, Bruneau, who defines "pastoral duties" as "religious activities with minimal sociopolitical implications" (*ibid.*, p. 248; also see Bruneau, 1982, p. 70).

6. From Weber's perspective, one can say that this study is expected to focus on the role of Liberal Catholicism as an "autonomous" force for social change. Thus, it will be shown that the ideas and religious beliefs of Liberal Catholicism, as embodied in the Church's prophetic messages and actions, have made the Church an "autonomous" force for the realization of socioeconomic justice and democracy in South Korea. A similar view is held by Yi (Yi, 1990, pp. 27-28), who also regards Liberal Protestantism in South Korea as an "autonomous force."

CHAPTER FOUR

CHURCH-STATE CONFLICTS, THEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS OF THE CHURCH

The faithful are gone from the earth, among men the upright are no more! They all lie in wait to shed blood, each one ensnares the other. Their hands succeed at evil; the prince makes demands, The judge is had for a price, the great man speaks as he pleases (*Micah 7: 2-3*).

It [unity amid diversity] is a unity among individuals and groups who retain their distinctive characteristics, who enjoy different spiritual gifts, and are by that very diversity better equipped to serve one another and thus advance the common good (Dulles, 1985, p. 24). . . . Far from tearing the Church apart, the diversity of gifts serves to build up the whole in unity (*ibid.*, p. 46).

I. INTRODUCTION

As previously stated, this study not only concerns the relationship between religion and politics. It also examines the relationship between religious change, namely, increased political involvement by the Church, and political change, namely, the state's transition away from authoritarian rule. These relationships, as will be seen, involve a complex interaction of mutual influence. The Politics of Religion Perspective, whose general and theoretical background was discussed in Chapter Three, will provide a clearer understanding of these dynamic relationships. This perspective will be completed in the next chapter. This chapter is composed of three sections:

The first section is Church-State Conflicts: Religion and Politics. This section begins with a review of the two hypotheses discussed in Chapter One, exploring the possibility of linking them together to explain the interaction between religion and politics. Then, it discusses the ideological aspects of the Church-state conflict, namely

(1) an authoritarian regime's political dogmata, i.e., economic development and anti-Communism under the rationale of national security, (2) the Church's ideological criticism of authoritarian rule, and (3) the doctrine of separation of church and state.

The second section is Theological Spectrum within the Church. The theological world is divided into the traditional sector and the liberal sector (as illustrated in Appendix A). This section first examines and discusses the differences between traditional theology and liberal theology, especially Liberation Theology. Then, the political implications of both sectors are discussed.

The third section is Institutional Strengths of the Church. This section discusses the political role and pattern of influence of the Church.

II. CHURCH-STATE CONFLICTS: RELIGION AND POLITICS

A. A REVIEW OF THE TWO HYPOTHESES OF THIS STUDY: INTERACTION BETWEEN RELIGION AND POLITICS

In order to develop a Politics of Religion theoretical perspective, it is useful to review the two hypotheses discussed in Chapter One which this study seeks to validate or evaluate, namely: (1) that the increased political involvement of the Church in South Korea was influenced externally by Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings and events; and (2) that such increased political involvement was an internal reaction of the Church to the growing authoritarianism of the South Korean state.

Chapter Two was a preliminary attempt to validate the first hypothesis. That discussion indicated that it was because of the influence of the social teachings and events of Vatican II and post-Vatican II Catholicism, that the South Korean Church

"blossomed" into a political opposition force in the 1970s and 1980s. Chapter Six presents additional evidence to validate this hypothesis. There, it is pointed out that the Church remained inactive under the authoritarian regimes of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee during the late 1940s, the 1950s and 1960s. During that same period, Vatican II (1962-65) and post-Vatican II social teachings and events had not yet begun to influence the South Korean Church. It was during the latter part of that period that socioeconomic and political injustices began to occur and increase (and would continue to do so into the 1970s and 1980s).

Regarding the second hypothesis, as will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight, the period of the 1970s through the mid-1980s was quite different not only from the prior period of the 1960s, but also from the most recent period beginning in the late 1980s and continuing up to the present. It will be shown that the Church's involvement in political opposition activities reached its zenith during the period of the 1970s through the mid-1980s. After the democratization of South Korean society and politics gained momentum in 1987 following the June 29th Declaration by Rho Tae-woo,¹ the Church's political involvement diminished. Although Vatican II and post-Vatican II Catholic teachings and events probably were as well or better known within the Church during the most recent period than during the earlier decades, as society and politics became more democratized, the Church tended to withdraw from its politically active role. The Church's disengagement during the most recent period supports the second hypothesis.

The next step will be to further examine hypotheses (1) and (2), as well as any other possible explanations, and to qualify them, if necessary, and to find any possible linkages between them. For those purposes, the following points should be considered.

First, as mentioned in Chapter One, this study mainly focuses on the relational aspects between (1) religious change, namely, the politicization of the South Korean Church, and (2) political change, namely, the transition away from authoritarian to democratic rule by the South Korean state. It is fair to say that, in the case of the South Korean Church and state, religious change and political change are bound up together and dependent on each other. This also was true for the Church and state in Latin America (see Mainwaring & Wilde, 1989, pp. 14-15).

Second, this study also argues that the South Korean Church's political involvement has been influenced by both Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings and events, and Latin American experience with Liberation Theology. Because the Latin American cases and the South Korean case are not identical, some people have dismissed or discounted the Latin American cases by pointing out that "South Korea is not Latin America." In a sense, that is true, but it is not entirely accurate. Although there are distinguishing features, it is more important to examine similarities in determining the extent to which the Latin American experience relates to South Korea. Thus, aspects such as authoritarian repression and Church reactions are much more significant than whether or not 80-90% of the population are baptized Catholics, or whether or not any Catholic clergy have been assassinated.

The distinguishing features of the respective cases include the following: (1) Latin American movements influenced by Liberation Theology originally began in opposition to repression and exploitation of the poor under a dependent capitalistic system. South Korean Catholic opposition in the 1970s and the 1980s originally began as opposition to political repression and human rights violations; (2) perhaps, the South Korean society was more unstable than Latin American societies in the 1970s and 1980s--consider the emergence of Yushin System in 1972, the terrible repression,

President Park's assassination by the chief of KCIA in 1979, the Kwangju Uprising in 1980 (for details concerning this incident, see Chapter Eight, Note #1), the coup by Chun Doo-hwan and the continued terrible repression, and the popular uprising in 1987. It would be hard to find a Latin American country with such an unstable pattern of politics during the same period; (3) although the South Korean economy was similarly dependent, it achieved a remarkable growth led by the state; and (4) unlike Latin American countries, the national division of Korea was constantly utilized by the government as a rationale to justify its suppression of sociopolitical movements, especially the reunification movement.

Third, it is true that the South Korean Church's political involvement cannot be analyzed wholly apart from the influence of Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings. But, it should not be simply assumed that those teachings must have impacted the South Korean Church or any other branch of the Church in the same way as the Latin American Churches without examining the experience of the individual Church.² In other words, there are variations in the acceptance and practice of those teachings by the national Churches in different parts of the world. As for the South Korean Church, it was *not until* its own clergy and lay members were attacked that the Church became involved in political matters and began to take *seriously* Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings and Latin American Liberation Theology.³ Nevertheless, it also is true that the South Korean Church was strongly influenced and energized by such doctrinal support (see Cho, 1989, p. 106; Chun, 1992, p. 48, pp. 50-51; CJPRI, 1990, and CPAJ, 1985). Thus, it is more accurate to say that this doctrinal influence contributed to the Church's political involvement by offering the necessary theological and ideological foundation, rather than by directly igniting the Church.⁴

Fourth, regarding hypothesis (2), it is possible to argue that the socioeconomic and political conditions during the 1970s and 1980s induced the Church to enter the sociopolitical arena, placing the Church and state in direct conflict with each other. However, this hypothesis may not be validated by simply assuming that such conflict was the natural consequence of repressive authoritarian political regimes. It is necessary to specifically examine the South Korean case to find the most decisive factor or factors contributing to the Church's opposition to the authoritarian state. According to Rho (1988), "what made the South Korean Catholic Church speak out about realities was the *repression upon the Church itself* exercised by the state, not the Vatican II spirit. . . it was an *inevitable self-defense measure*" (p. 36; italics added). As will be seen in Chapter Seven, Case Study #1, it was *not until* one of its own bishops was arrested that the South Korean Church *openly and publicly* reacted to political oppression.

This type of *delayed reaction* is not peculiar to the South Korean Church. According to Smith (1986), in his discussion of the Chilean Church, "only after mid-1976, when the repressive apparatus of the state touched the bishops themselves *personally* and the Christian Democratic party, were they [the bishops] *able and willing* as a group to issue clear condemnations of both the underlying *ideology and the behavior* of military leaders" (p. 293; italics added). Smith elaborates on this "pattern of initial caution and gradual evolution towards more prophetic positions by Catholic bishops"⁵ as follows:

Prophetic positions by episcopal conferences do, nevertheless, occur. When they emerge, however, they are not primarily in response to brutality against the populace as a whole but to specific acts of violence or abuse aimed at those *directly engaged in religious work or closely associated with the church*. In Chile it was an attack on bishops personally and the suppression of the Christian Democratic party. In Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and El Salvador it was mistreatment or murder of priests. In Paraguay it was the smashing of church-sponsored peasant leagues and small base communities. In all of these

cases in recent years, *the hierarchies as a group have not taken a united prophetic stance* against their respective governments *until the repression touched the innermost circles of church elites themselves.* (*Ibid.*, pp. 293-94; italics added)

This pattern also is seen in the case of the Philippine Church under the Marcos regime (see Wurfel, 1988, pp. 212-13).

Thus, it appears that the two hypotheses are valid to a certain extent, provided that they are both qualified and supplemented by other explanations. Further analysis of these hypotheses is included in the case studies of Chapters Seven and Eight. Regarding the onset of the Church's political involvement and the state's transition from authoritarian rule in South Korea, *the Church's role and pattern of influence*, as well as *its limitations and internal dilemmas*, are discussed in this and next chapter.

Finally, it is useful to consider the applicability of Bellah's concept of "creative tension," namely, the condition most favorable to sociopolitical change and progress---when there exists "creative tension" between the religious world and the political world, or between church and state. The foregoing discussion, as well as the later case studies, appears to validate Bellah's concept. Thus, using Bellah's terminology, the conflictive relationship between the South Korean Church and state during the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates the "creative tension" that can exist between religion and politics, resulting in religiopolitical change.

B. THE CHURCH'S IDEOLOGICAL REACTION TO THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE

The doctrine of national security is employed by the military regimes of Latin America. It is part of the "authoritarian ideological platform--which provides the armed forces with the necessary rationale for their political activities" (Calvo, 1979,

p. 69). It is the most essential part of the "political dogmata" of military authoritarian regimes, including those of South Korea during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

There are three essential parts of this political dogmata, namely, economic development, national security, and anti-Communism. Although the histories of the various military regimes differ, and the degree to which the national security doctrine has been conceptualized and systematized varies from country to country in Latin America,⁶ this doctrine and its rationale, as developed in Latin America, are pertinent to the study of similar ideological conflicts between Church and state in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, the doctrine of separation of church and state and the Church's approach to that doctrine should be considered in the same manner.

Therefore, the following four subsections discuss (1) the historical background of authoritarian military regimes and the Church's sociopolitical opposition in Latin America; (2) the most important features of the doctrine of national security; (3) the criticism of that doctrine by the Church; and (4) the Church's approach to the doctrine of separation of church and state.

1. The Historical Background of Military Regimes and the Church's Sociopolitical Opposition in Latin America

Traditionally, the Church and military in Latin America have been "old allies" in their mutually shared concerns, antipathies, and internal structural dynamics. Both have preferred order, stability, and social harmony, and both have valued religious legitimation for the state. Each has feared radical political movements, especially those with socialist or Marxist orientations. Each has prized its own internal tradition,

discipline, hierarchical control, and institutional autonomy (Smith, 1986, p. 270). However, since the mid-1960s, they have become "new enemies."

Moreover, the Church and the military used to be marginal and minor participants in the political system. Since the mid-1960s, each has assumed a more active sociopolitical role in most Latin American countries. For example, in discussing the recent history of the Church and military in Chile, Smith (1986) states that "each has been thrust into the center of the public domain since Allende's downfall in 1973--the military as government, the church as its former ally turned into a locus of opposition" (p. 272).

What is the background and what are the reasons for this dramatic change in Latin American Church-state relations?⁷ In discussing the motivations for the recent change in the Church-military alliance, Smith observes that "in some instances this has resulted from an attempt by the church and the military to catch up with rapidly changing events and defend their respective institutional interests," and "in others it has occurred semi-reluctantly, with each institution drawn into the political arena as a surrogate for other social organizations that have been unable to manage severe social disruptions" (*ibid.*, p. 270).

Regarding the reasons for greater sociopolitical involvement by the Church, Smith emphasizes (1) the new social teachings of Vatican II (1962-65), augmented by Liberation Theology as expressed by the bishops at Medellín (1968) and Puebla (1979), which mandated a close identification by the Church with the needs of the poor; (2) the growing attraction of both Marxism and Protestantism among workers and peasants during the 1960s; (3) the major influx of socially committed clergy and religious from abroad; and (4) the inauguration of social and economic reforms by democratic governments (*ibid.*, pp. 270-71). In addition, during the 1970s severe

political and economic repression "forced *the church* (as an agent of *last resort*) to *undertake* a whole series of *humanitarian tasks* previously performed by democratic governments, political parties, and labor unions" (*ibid.*; italics added).

Regarding the reasons for greater sociopolitical involvement by the military since the mid-1960s, in the cases of Brazil and Peru it mainly was due to a new type of training and professionalization which convinced the military that it was better equipped than the civilians to effectively govern. In the cases of Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, it resulted from prolonged social and economic disruptions and domestic violence which persuaded *the armed forces* that they were *the last resort to restore stability*. In Paraguay, prerevolutionary Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala where the military have long played a dominant role in government, growing opposition to authoritarian rule in the 1970s strengthened their control of the state apparatus (*ibid.*; italics added).

The Church's reaction to military regimes in Latin America has included such things as (1) bishops' denunciation of abusive, coercive measures taken against real or imagined dissidents, (2) bishops' public outcry against excessive costs charged peasants and laborers, and (3) human rights assistance given by priests, other religious leaders and laity to many individual opponents of the state.

The military reacted to this involvement by the Church by claiming that "*the hierarchy is meddling in politics*"⁸ and that "*lower church echelons have been infiltrated by Marxists and are acting as havens for dissidents committed to insurrection.*" In addition, the armed forces in several Latin American countries maintain *a close surveillance on Church activities*, and sometimes have placed restrictions on church-sponsored programs *for reasons of national security* (*ibid.*; italics added).

In summary, two former allies, the Church and the military, have been in direct and open conflict with each other. Each has made considerable changes to serve its perceived understanding of its best interests and society's best interests. Each considers itself betrayed by the other and tries to impede the other's new sociopolitical role.

2. The Doctrine of National Security

As previously mentioned, the doctrine of national security was embraced by the military in Latin America. An example of its conceptualization can be found in the Chilean constitution⁹ imposed upon Chile in 1981 by the military government following General Pinochet's *coup d'etat* in 1973. As Loveman (1986-87) observes, the central theme of this constitution was national security. Every citizen was obligated to "honor the fatherland, defend its sovereignty, and contribute to the preservation of national security and the essential values of Chilean tradition" (Art. 22; p. 3). While the concept was not precisely defined, the armed forces were empowered to "guarantee the institutional order of the republic" (Art. 90), a mission which assured that the armed forces would become the dominant force of the new political system (*ibid.*).

What is the meaning of the doctrine of national security? As Calvo characterizes it, the doctrine basically is a military vision of society, the economy, and culture. The basic parts of society are seen through the world view of the professional soldier. According to Calvo (1979), "the doctrine contains concepts derived from the social sciences, especially . . . political science and geopolitics,

which the military believe make it scientific, technical, and therefore neutral" (p. 73).

How does the doctrine characterize and relate its important concepts, such as national security, the role of the state, security, and economic development?¹⁰ First, the concept of national security goes beyond the traditional concept of national defense. As explained by Calvo, national security acts in the national sphere through national power, whether in domestic or foreign affairs, and is administered by the head of state. National defense is a part of national security which acts only in the field of warfare through military power under the direction of the armed forces (*ibid.*, p. 74).

Second, the essential goal and purpose of the state is to assure its survival and self-preservation (*ibid.*, p. 75).

Third, according to Calvo, "security" means protecting the nation from any kind of threats, e.g., war, internal disturbances, natural catastrophes, etc. (*ibid.*, p. 75).

Fourth, economic development is the *sine qua non* of national security. Calvo states that "on the one hand, insufficient development cannot provide the minimum resources needed for . . . adequate . . . security; on the other, development without security cannot be successful in the long run, since insecurity will eventually jeopardize prospective development" (*ibid.*, p. 78). In addition, Calvo notes that "social" development also "influences the national security policy because social and economic disparities create internal tensions which result in increased domestic security measures to prevent possible threats" (*ibid.*, p. 78).

3. The Church's Criticism of the Doctrine of National Security: a Means, not an End

Regarding the Church's criticism of the national security doctrine, the church is critical about societies that attempt to deal with social injustices by authoritarian rather than participatory means (Sanders, 1982, p. 257). In his discussion of the doctrine, Calvo (1979) states that "the excesses of this doctrine have been the object of valid criticism which has come mainly from the Church. . . . The Church reacts strongly against established political power when it becomes evident that there is *a violation of human rights and persecution of both civilians and the clergy*" (p. 79; italics added).¹¹ As described by Calvo, the "excesses of this doctrine" refers to the "exaggerated importance given to the concept of security, to the point of turning it into an end in itself" (*ibid.*, p. 83).

The Church's position is that *national security* is *not an end* in itself, *but* is intended only as "*a means* by which the person can fully realize himself, *a means* which contributes *to attainment of the common good of society*" (*ibid.*; italics added). Brazilian bishops made the following statement regarding the misuse of the doctrine:

The ideology of national security placed above personal security is spreading throughout the Latin American continent, as has happened in the Soviet countries. . . this doctrine leads regimes that rule by force to incur the characteristics and practices of the communist regimes--the abuse of power by the state, arbitrary imprisonment, torture and suppression of freedom of thought. (Episcopal Conference of Brazil, 1977, quoted *ibid.*; italics added)

Also, consider the following statement of Pope John XXIII:

Everyone must act according to his own decision, conviction, and responsibility, and not be moved by coercion or pressures that almost always derive from force, because a society that is based solely on force has to be characterized as inhumane. In such a society, man is, in fact, deprived of his freedom, rather than feeling encouraged to improve his life and perfect himself. (*Ibid.*, pp. 83-84)

Furthermore, when national security is overvalued, it is frequently misused by those who "view *any* change or tendency to change as a threat to basic rules, even calling

these changes *subversive*" (*ibid.*, p. 84; italics added). This view and its consequences are referred to as "the logic of total security" by the Latin American critic Orrego (*ibid.*). The "logic of total security" is an apt description of the strategy of military authoritarian regimes and their rationale for oppressive rule.

What is meant by "the logic of total security"? According to Calvo, this concept is based on the idea that conflict is an omnipresent threat to be avoided. Because there are numerous causes for conflict, security seeks to control all foreseeable situations. Total security is "like a snowball rolling downhill, continually growing in size with those who are '*infiltrated*' by Marxism. Union members and professionals are added to the proscribed parties, and finally the Church itself" (*ibid.*; italics added). In their quest for total security, national security regimes eventually oppress the majority of society. Society never can be secure enough for those in power (*ibid.*; italics added).

Cases parallel to those in Latin America are discussed in the case studies in Chapters Seven and Eight, which explore the relational conflicts between the Church and the authoritarian state in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. As will be seen, the doctrine of national security, as developed in the Latin American countries, is equally relevant to South Korea, which was under martial law during portions of the 1970s and early 1980s.

4. The Doctrine of Separation of Church and State

a. Church's Perspective

As mentioned in Chapter Two, the doctrine of separation of church and state is a relatively recent development in Church-state relations. As Smith (1982) observes,

"until this century the Catholic Church officially opposed the separation of Church and state. From the time of Constantine through the Reformation period, Catholicism was the officially established religion in all of Europe" (p. 67). As Smith elaborates, the "close union between spiritual and temporal authority was legitimized in official Church teaching throughout the Middle Ages as part of God's plan" (*ibid.*). He also finds that "even after the breakdown of unity in Christendom in the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church continued to espouse the doctrine of union as a protection for itself against the antireligious sentiments and objectives of liberal movements" (*ibid.*). He notes that "as late as 1885 Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical, *Immortale Dei*, denounced separationist theory as being primarily an attack on God and the prerogatives of the Church" (*ibid.*).

The Church didn't give up its close union with the state without a long battle. It wasn't until it experienced the actual circumstances of separation, that the Church began to gradually accept, and eventually embrace, the doctrine. In describing the nature of this "close union" of Church and state, Smith points out that prior to the Reformation, even the secular state was under the Church's overriding authority (*ibid.*; footnote). Even after this *close union* disintegrated in the post-Enlightenment period, the Church still tried to preserve its "close tactical alliances in Europe with monarchical governments and aristocratic elites in order to preserve its influence against secular forces bent on drastically curtailing its moral and political power" (*ibid.*). This made the Church vulnerable to manipulation by reactionary elements which used the Church to serve their own interests. Thus, liberal groups became more intent on removing the Church's privileges, and some even wanted to restrict its religious freedoms (*ibid.*).

According to Smith, from the 16th to the 19th centuries Latin American Catholicism followed a progression similar to that of Europe. He finds that prior to independence, the Church, as an integral part of the colonial government, relied heavily on "*imperial protection and finances to carry out its mission of evangelization*" (*ibid.*, p. 68; italics added). He also notes that "after separation from the crown, and as liberal and radical parties began to gain strength in many countries of mid-nineteenth-century Latin America, the Church came to depend very much on *conservative parties to protect its established interests*" (*ibid.*; italics added).

Smith states that "the result of these *close structural alliances in Western Europe and Latin America* during this period was that the Church pursued its objectives *through political coalitions and short-term elite maneuvers*" (*ibid.*; italics added). This reduced "*the Church's moral credibility*" among nominal liberal Catholics who supported liberal movements and values. It also lessened the Church's need to develop more effective ways to strengthen commitments to Catholic values and objectives among rank-and-file members (*ibid.*; italics added).

Increasing secularization during the 18th and 19th centuries hastened the decline in the Church's power and influence. As *governments* used their financial power and the right to participate in the appointment of Church officials and in the creation of new dioceses *to control* or manipulate *the Church*, it remained *organizationally dependent*, and in many countries (especially in Latin America), *structurally underdeveloped* (*ibid.*; italics added).

The process of embodying the separation doctrine in national constitutions strained Church-state relations even more. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries when liberal regimes in many Western countries proposed *constitutions separating Church and state*, both the Vatican and national hierarchies usually opposed those

efforts (*ibid.*, pp. 68-69; italics added). This exacerbated the already serious differences between conservative and liberal parties. In France and Mexico, anticlericalism and religious indifference became so strong that the Church became separated from the state, and "very severe restrictions were imposed on its religious ministries" (*ibid.*).

Smith notes that polarization is still present in France and Mexico and in several other European and Latin American nations where the separation of Church and state occurred amidst severe conflict (*ibid.*). In these nations religion still remains a divisive factor in politics. Smith states that "practicing Catholics in Western Europe overwhelmingly support conservative parties or those favorable to the Church, while the nonpracticing are more prone to back radical or Marxist movements" (*ibid.*). Moreover, he finds that "in contemporary European politics religion accounts for even more variance in voting patterns than social class, and strong anticlerical sentiments continue to characterize various radical and leftist parties [citing authority]" (*ibid.*, p. 69).

Some countries have experienced only a *partial* separation of Church and state. For example, in Germany and Venezuela the Church continues to receive public funds and thus remains dependent on the state for financial support. In Ireland, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Argentina no formal separation yet has occurred. In those nations significant legal and financial privileges are guaranteed to the Church: *in exchange for* continuing government involvement in the process of appointing bishops. Also, in those nations the Church's interests seldom have been threatened. But neither has the Church been moved to develop new religious or social renewal programs. It mostly has remained *a conservative force* in society (see *ibid.*; italics added).

In considering the contemporary Church-state relationship, in order for the Church to expand its sociopolitical influence, and truly perform "a prophetic role," it must be flexible, strong, tolerant and independent. If *the Church* wants to encourage a more just distribution of society's resources, it *must be free from close alliances with conservative movements controlled by upper-class interests*. If it wants to assure its *moral credibility among all of society* and to coexist peacefully with liberal groups, excessive ecclesiastical privileges must be eliminated and Catholics must be able to support any political parties, not just those identified with the Church's interests. If the Church is to be *independent to criticize repressive regimes*, "it must be *financially autonomous and free from state interference* in decisions affecting its internal affairs" (*ibid.*, pp. 69-70; italics added; also see Chapter Three for additional discussion of the Church's relative autonomy vis-a-vis the state).

What is the meaning of the separation doctrine as understood and applied by the South Korean Church? In reviewing the documents of the South Korean Church, Oh (1987) points out that although they do not use the words "separation of church and state," the desirable relationship described in these documents can be characterized as the separation of church and state (p.27). According to Oh, these documents provide that the state is required to guarantee freedom for all types of external religious behaviors by individuals and groups. Moreover, the state cannot force anyone to accept or denounce a religion, and also must protect the freedom of being irreligious. Even if a state religion was to be legally established by constitution, other religions and churches could not be discriminated against and legal measures would assure that no citizen is discriminated against because of his religion. Parents are granted the right of deciding the type of religious education for their children and

any education that is incompatible with the parents' religious convictions cannot be forced on their children (see *ibid.*).

Regarding limitations of the separation doctrine, the Church documents recognize certain limits on religious behaviors. These include religious behaviors "threatening public peace" as well as religious actions "incompatible to social morality." However, the conditions which are subject to state restraint are to be narrowly and cautiously interpreted. Religious actions which threaten public peace and order include religious actions which "violate rights of others or destroy public peace." Religious actions incompatible with social morality include "actions that violate the criminal laws of the country" (*ibid.*).

The foregoing limitations are subject to an important exception. The Church documents consider that "reform activities for justice" are one of the Church's mission activities and part of evangelization. "Reform activities for justice" include criticism of injustice and violations of human rights, in addition to education and conscientization for justice activities. These activities, which are sometimes called the "social involvement" of the Church, also do *not* violate the doctrine of separation of church and state (*ibid.*, pp. 27-28).

On the other side of the coin, the Church and its clergy are prohibited from being involved in party politics. For example, articles 285 and 287 of Canon Law prohibit the clergy from being appointed to high positions in government and from taking leadership positions in political parties and labor unions. Canon Law does *not* prohibit priests from being active in social and reform activities for justice, *as long as* they do *not* become professional politicians (*ibid.*, p. 28; also see Chapter Eight, Case Study #8).

b. Authoritarian Regimes' Perspective

The Latin American authoritarian regimes' perspective on the doctrine of separation of church and state was previously stated as follows: "The military in many Latin American countries have claimed that (1) *the hierarchy is meddling in politics*. They also have charged that (2) *lower church echelons have been infiltrated by Marxists and are acting as havens for dissidents committed to insurrection*" (Smith, 1986, p. 271; numbers and italics added).

As will be seen in the case studies of Chapters Seven and Eight, those were the same two key arguments made by the authoritarian regimes in South Korea concerning the Church's political involvement. In the case of South Korea these arguments are respectively referred to as (1) the policy of "non-intervention in politics by the Church" or the "doctrine of separation of church and state," and (2) the "infiltration issue."

As previously mentioned, *the separation doctrine* often has been *misinterpreted and misused*. The claim that "the hierarchy is meddling in politics" is a typical reaction, not only of an authoritarian state, but also of the dominant social groups. However, it also should be pointed out that the Church mostly is blamed for "meddling in politics" *only when* it has opposed the state, and *not when* it has supported it (Chi, 1984, pp. 28). This anomaly was noted by Gutierrez (1973), the leading theologian of Liberation Theology (see p. 65).

In the case of South Korea, the theological argument for separation also was employed. According to Clark (1986), "the conservative Christian majority in Korea stresses spiritual questions and . . . the church's soothing spirituality is one of its attractions. In the political realm, the mainstream church 'renders unto Caesar the

things that are Caesar's' and heeds the Apostle Paul's advice in Romans 13:1-2: 'He who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed'" (p. 39).

The foregoing Biblical quotations often are cited, not only by Conservative Church elites, but also by political leaders, as a Biblical endorsement of the separation doctrine, and of obedience to civil authority. What is the true meaning of the above quotations and the following related Biblical quotation?:

They sent some Pharisees and Herodians to him to ensnare him in his speech. They came and said to him, "Teacher, . . . Is it lawful to pay the census tax to Caesar or not? Should we pay or should we not pay?" Knowing their hypocrisy he said to them, "Why are you testing me? Bring me a denarius to look at." They brought one to him and he said to them, "Whose image and inscription is this?" They replied to him, "Caesar's." So Jesus said to them, "Repay to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God." They were utterly amazed at him. (*Mark* 12:13-17)

From a theological perspective, the true message of the first quotation, "render unto Caesar, etc." is that the authority of the Emperor is relative, never absolute. He can administer and collect the census tax, but he is subject to an absolute and higher authority which comes from God (Chung et al., 1983, p. 218). These quoted words of Jesus are actually intended as a challenge to the authority of the state. The intended message is that just as the coin which bears Caesar's image belongs to Caesar, every human being, including Caesar, belongs to God (Ham et al., 1989, pp. 273-74). Thus, the part of the message to be emphasized is not "repay to Caesar what belongs to Caesar" but to "[repay] to God what belongs to God."

Concerning the theological meaning of the second quotation, "He who resists, etc.," it also is clear that this admonition is not absolute. When obedience to a political leader would nullify God's prior claim to a believer's moral decision, the Bible commands us that "we must obey God rather than men" (*Acts* 5:29; Ham et al, 1989, p. 275).

What are the implications of the doctrine of separation of Church and state? Even though both *the Church and state* embrace this doctrine, each of them understands it *differently*. The Church understands it as a doctrine which prohibits the state from interfering in religious matters and also prohibits the clergy from taking secular political office. The state understands the doctrine as that which prohibits the Church from meddling in politics and orders the Church to stay politically neutral. However, this characterization of the "separation" between the two realms means no more than a "distinction" between the two based on their peculiar vocations (see Ri, 1987, p. 34; also see Ham et al, 1989, p. 270).

c. The Doctrine and Church-State Conflicts

In theory, at least, some kind of sociopolitical role should be available to the Church. It shouldn't have to necessarily conflict with the state. However, experience has shown that there are contradictions between the goals of the Church as to social change and the perception of these goals by the state. Authoritarian regimes find it seemingly impossible to distinguish between legitimate social action by the Church and "subversion." The Church's actions for social justice and its reaction to an authoritarian regime's response seem to revolve in *a vicious cycle* initially sparked by a governmental attack. A good example is the Brazilian case discussed below.

In Brazil in 1964, military intervention and increasing radicalization of the political right wing were caused mainly by the "fear of subversion," possibly leading to "paranoia and a vicious cycle." This fear of Communism and subversion was probably the motivating force behind the military regime's increasing suppression of all channels of opposition and protest, including urban and rural unions, political parties and the student movement, as well as the Church (Bruneau, pp. 178-79). In

this situation, the Church's inclination and ability to act was compelled as oppression by the authoritarian regime increased. The Church probably was the only institution which then could effectively and impartially speak out and act on behalf of the poor and the oppressed (see Smith, 1982, p. 285). This explains why the Churches are expected to speak out for justice under repressive regimes, not only in Latin America, but in many developing countries of Asia and Africa, where similar examples can be found.

III. THEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

For the purposes of this study, it is useful to characterize Catholic theology as being either (1) traditional or (2) liberal. These same two categories are shown as sector A (traditional theology) and sector B (liberal theology) in the illustrations of the "Theological World" in Appendix A.

A. Traditional Theology

The foundation of traditional theology is Scholasticism, which has been defined as "the system of theological and philosophical teaching predominant in the Middle Ages, based chiefly upon the authority of the church fathers and of Aristotle and his commentators" (*Random House Webster's College Dictionary*, 1992). In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas published his *Summma Theologiae*, which is considered to be the most important medieval theological work. Aquinas not only commented on Aristotle, but converted Aristotelian thought into a brilliant system of philosophy and theology.

This system was later reaffirmed and refined by other philosophers, who are sometimes called neo-Scholastics. As stated by Edward L. Cleary, O.P., in his book, Crisis and Change: The Church in Latin America Today (1985), "until the Vatican II era traditional theology formed the basis for the education of the Latin American clergy and laity. Neo-Scholasticism ruled the Catholic theological world ever since the sixteenth century" (p. 65). According to Cleary, "neo-Scholastics in general believed that Aristotle and Aquinas gave the church an intellectual system that was established in its essentials and needed only to be understood and expanded, mostly in nonessential aspects" (*ibid.*, p. 67).

Traditional theology in the form of Scholasticism stresses tradition, established theology, and the authority and power of the Church. The Church is viewed as "believers organized in a hierarchical, institutional body" (*ibid.*, p. 65). Traditionalists reject the "individualistic, mechanistic model" favored by Enlightenment philosophers, and instead adopt an "organic model of society" (Ramet, 1990, p. 5).

Regarding the authority of the Church, Turner (1971) observes that "traditionalists see a lack of respect for authority as the greatest sin of the modern world. To justify their own influence and hierarchical patterns of authority, they continue to reiterate in public statements that, just as the pope is the direct successor to Saint Peter, so they are the direct successors to the apostles" (p. 103). Regarding the power of the Church, Turner also notes that "they pride themselves on the Church's being an antiegalitarian institution and list in detail the differing degrees of power which the various authorities in the Catholic Church possess" (*ibid.*).

Traditional theology mainly is addressed to other theologians and students of theology. It is an academic pursuit of basic questions, such as those dealing with the

existence and nature of God. The clergy's primary area of concern is *the spiritual realm and the salvation of souls, not the temporal world*, which is assigned to the laity. Other aspects of traditional theology will be seen in its comparison with liberal theology in the following section.

B. Liberal Theology

Liberal theology mainly is Liberation Theology, which gradually evolved during the period of 1891-1971. This evolution was influenced by (1) the liberal views expressed by several popes beginning with Pope Leo XIII, (2) the Vatican II social teachings, (3) the Latin American bishops' conferences, and (4) the socio-economic conditions in the Third World, especially Latin America.

The official birth of Liberation Theology probably occurred upon the publication of A Theology of Liberation by Gustavo Gutierrez in 1971. According to Cleary (1985), "traditional theology and liberation theology mirror many of the cleavages in the old and new Latin American church" (p. 66). Scholasticism differs from Liberation Theology in several respects. As Cleary observes, "Scholasticism is 'eternal,' ahistorical, essentialist (as opposed to existentialist), theocentric, hierarchical, and feudal," whereas Liberation Theology is "evolutionary, historical, existentialist, Christocentric, communitarian, participatory, and egalitarian" (*ibid.*).

Traditional theology and Liberation Theology have different points of departure. Traditional theologians start by studying scripture and traditional Christian teachings. Liberation theologians start by gaining an understanding of the historical experience of the poor "that is at the same time religious and secular, individual and collective, embracing the worlds of consciousness and external forces" (*ibid.*, p. 69).

Cleary further points out that the analytical tools used by liberation theologians to evaluate the experience of the poor and the Church's efforts "do not come primarily from philosophy but from the social sciences" (*ibid.*). In this context, "social science" doesn't mean what is typically taught in American universities. In analyzing Latin America, liberation theologians utilize the sociological concepts of "class analysis" and "dependency theory." As noted by Cleary, liberation theologians begin with the facts of Latin American underdevelopment. The essential facts are that there are many poor persons and "nonpersons" (persons who do not participate fully or at all in the system) and that the poor are getting poorer (*ibid.*, p. 70).

The liberation theologians then look for an explanation of those facts. They find their answers in class analysis and dependency theory, which "go hand in hand." "Dependency theory sees development and underdevelopment as necessarily connected: they are complementary parts of the unity of the capitalist system" (*ibid.*). Underdeveloped countries *always* will be dependent on the developed countries under the existing capitalistic system. Class analysis explains that this dependence is due to the cooperation of small groups of local citizens, i.e., elitist oligarchies. Both the new industrial and old farming and ranching oligarchies are allied with the world capitalistic system. These oligarchies control the national political power to assure that it conforms to their interests. Often the interests of the national oligarchies and the military coincide (*ibid.*, pp. 70-71).

Liberation theologians have been criticized for their use of Marxist or neo-Marxist analysis. Despite this criticism, liberation theologians continue to justify their use of both of these analytical tools. Unlike traditional theology, Liberation Theology is not aimed at theologians, believers and nonbelievers, as much as it is aimed at the poor, the nonpersons, "the 'invisible' persons who have been treated until recently as

if they did not exist: women, blacks, the urban and rural poor" (*ibid.*, p. 72).¹² Liberation Theology poses this question: do Christian lives present false images of God to others? In the words of *Gaudium et Spes*, "to the extent that they are deficient in their religious, moral, or social life, Christians must be said to conceal rather than reveal the authentic face of God and religion" (*ibid.*, p. 74).

C. Political Implications

The breadth of *Catholic theology* has provided *doctrinal support for diverse sociopolitical ideologies*. There is *a correlation between the respective theological positions and their ideologicopolitical counterparts*. The following discussion of the *political implications* of traditional and liberal theology lays a foundation for the next section, which analyzes the spectrum of religiopolitical groups within the Church.

In his book, *Marxism: An American Christian Perspective* (1980), Arthur F. McGovern presents an ideological critique of traditional church doctrine, teachings and attitudes as they relate to socioeconomic and political problems in Latin America. Some examples of how *ideology sneaks into Church doctrine and practices* cited by McGovern are: (1) the omnipresent pervasive God of early Christianity became transcendent and impersonal under Greek and Western thought; (2) the doctrine of the Trinity, stressing God as a community, and pointing to a perfect society, was interpreted to put God in an external world apart from humanity; (3) the Eucharist, symbolizing Church unity, is an escape from the real world of conflict and class antagonisms and reinforces avoidance and denial of the problem; (4) the spirituality of the Church, stressing peace and reconciliation, often offers prayer as the only remedy available to the poor and oppressed; and (5) the pastoral life of the Church, by

stressing the internal life of the Church, reinforces the status quo and does not encourage any sociopolitical changes (McGovern, 1980, p. 187).

McGovern asserts that the Church has created, consciously or not, an "ideological screen" favoring the established order. "Social teachings on 'the natural order' of classes, preaching aimed at teaching the poor to be patient and content with their lot, stress on peace and reconciliation and avoidance of conflict, all have had the effect of legitimizing prevailing systems" (*ibid.*, p. 188).

In addition, according to McGovern, Gutierrez contends that, traditionally, the Church has been more concerned with spiritual, humanistic, personal and conciliatory matters than with political realities, conflicts and scientific analyses (*ibid.*, pp. 185-86). Gutierrez rejects *Jacques Maritain's "New Christendom"* which neatly assigns *spiritual matters to the clergy and temporal, political concerns to the laity*. For Gutierrez, the Church is inescapably involved in politics and "is linked to political power in the world, whether it thinks it is or not" (*ibid.*, p. 186; also see Gutierrez, 1973, p. 49).

Perhaps Juan Luis Segundo provides the most systematic ideological critique. For Segundo, the continuing change in individual and social realities necessitates constant Biblical interpretation and re-interpretation (McGovern, 1980, p. 186).

The conservative orientation of Catholic traditionalists also is shown by Latin American Bishop Castro Mayer's contention that liberal "egalitarian" doctrines are wrong because they oppose "all legitimate superiorities" in the political sphere, just as they fail to recognize "the distinction which Christ allegedly established between the Church hierarchy, the clergy, and the faithful" (Turner, 1971, p. 104).

From the conservative point of view, it also follows that social and political inequalities are natural and "legitimate" and do not result simply from oppression or a

temporary human failure to effectively manage resources. Thus, the Church "should not make common cause with the working class, oppose capitalism and private property, or support majoritarian democracy" (*ibid.*). In addition, bishops who are affected by this orientation of Catholic traditionalists employ "the ethic of Church abstention from political involvement" to oppose the progressive tendencies of the Church (*ibid.*).

A related traditionalist doctrine is the Church's official position of "political neutrality." The following statement issued by the Chilean Church during the 1964 presidential election, is a typical expression of the Church's views:

- (1) The Church is above politics and thus no one can claim its political approval;
- (2) The Church does not favor any specific political candidate, leaving its followers to vote according to their own Christian conscience;
- (3) No one is to try to mix the Church in the electoral struggle--all members of the Church being exhorted to strictly follow this norm;
- (4) The hierarchy reiterates its call to everyone to make every effort to maintain peace and harmony, respecting the thoughts of others and not interfering in the inalienable rights of the individual. (Burnett, 1970, p. 71)

Experience has shown that neutrality is easier to preach than to practice.¹³ For example, item (2) of the above statement seems to encourage the faithful to vote against a candidate antagonistic to the Church. In commenting on the above election, Burnett observes that when the Church admonishes the faithful not to support political parties which violate Church precepts or are hostile toward God, it is opposing parties which adhere to false principles in any form, such as Marxism, doctrinaire liberalism, or antireligious laicism, which are considered to be contrary to the Christian conscience and the common good (*ibid.*, pp. 70-71). Moreover, in the same election, "a few priests encouraged their parishioners to vote 'God's way,'" and "it occurred to some that they [the priests] were questioning the qualification of Julio Duran, a long-

time leader and presidential nominee of the avowedly anticlerical Radical party" (*ibid.*, p. 71).

To clarify the situation, the Church issued the above neutrality statement to restate the Church's official position for those who the Church felt had misread what the priests said (*ibid.*). Did the Church's statement really convey a message of political neutrality? It seems more believable that the Church was cleverly and subtly indicating its opposition to the above candidate. One may conclude that, in this instance, the Church was *not* acting *neutrally, above and apart from politics, but* was inescapably involved *in politics*.

Perhaps Gutierrez is correct when he asserts that the Church "is linked to political power in the world, whether it thinks it is or not" (McGovern, 1980, p. 186; italics original). In other words, the religious and political worlds are inevitably bound up together and intertwined. As Gutierrez (1973) explains, "the *historical presence* of the Church . . . has an inescapable *political* dimension. It has always been so, but because of new circumstances it is more urgent that we come to terms with it. . . It is impossible to think of or live in the Church without taking into account this *political* dimension" (pp. 48-49; italics added). This is another way of describing the *overlap* of the religious world and the political world which is an important point of this study.

However, "overlap" may not accurately describe the relationship between religion and politics. If the Church cannot avoid being involved in politics, then the theological world and the political world exist separately only in theory, not in reality. Because this study involves theoretical considerations, it is useful for analytical purposes to give these worlds separate identities.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS OF THE CHURCH

What are the characteristic strengths of the Church which have made it an effective influence for sociopolitical change? The Church's most important assets include the following *normative* (i.e., the Church functioning as a religious and moral system), *structural* (i.e., the Church functioning as a viable organization or institution) and *behavioral* (i.e., the Church functioning as an influencer of the laity) components. The interplay of these components characterizes the Church's sociopolitical role and influence. These factors observed mostly in the Latin American Church also are applicable, to the same or to a greater or lesser extent, to the South Korean Church, as will be shown in the case studies presented in Chapters Seven and Eight.

A. The "Normative" Strengths

1. Prophetic and Pastoral Callings. According to the dictates of Vatican II, the Church has been called to perform a prophetic role in calling attention to socioeconomic injustices and human and civil rights abuses, and in carrying out pastoral actions to redress those grievous situations and to serve the poor, the disadvantaged and the oppressed. In performing its role to encourage and support sociopolitical change, the church has created "a special public (and political) role for itself." It involves the "denunciation of injustice and exploitation" and the "promotion of a better society" through several methods, as follows: (1) statements analyzing problems and outlining general directions for society, (2) the formation of CEBs (*Comunidades Eclesiales de Base*; Christian Base Communities or Church Base Communities)¹⁴ and other organizations where participants can develop a Christian

social orientation, (3) encouragement of lay political activity, and (4) defense of human rights and the poor under oppressive authoritarian regimes, especially where other institutions cannot function (Sanders, 1982, p. 256; numbers added).

2. Last (or Only) Available Institutional Option. In many instances, the Church may be the institution of last (or only) resort for opponents of a regime. In Latin American countries "where the structural bases of opposition have been systematically destroyed, the Church remains the last institution that can offer any form of resistance to governmental disregard for human rights" (Smith, 1975, p. 26). The Church by itself cannot prevent all repression, but it can keep reporting it, sometimes can soften its effects, and at times can offer material support and protection to opponents of these regimes (*ibid.*). As previously stated, Sanders (1982) agrees that "the Church, to be sure, defines a special public (and political) role for itself. . . . especially where other institutions cannot function" (p. 256).

Why does the Church occupy a special status, making it relatively free of state interference? Is it because the state does not want to offend its traditional ally or because it fears the repercussions of doing so? The answer to the second question is "probably both." That is part of the explanation for the Church "often being the only institution relatively *immune* from regime intrusion" (Cumings, 1989, p. 8; italics added). Even in the worst of times, the state relies on and benefits from the Church's advocacy of law, order and traditional values, and its legitimation function. At those same times, the Church depends on the state for protection and security.

This paradoxical co-dependent relationship between Church and state helps to prevent or limit state persecution of the Church. The informal immunity granted by the state to the Church can bring *credibility* to an opposition movement favored by the Church that would otherwise be repressed by the state. As Hak-kyu Sohn (1988) notes

regarding the South Korean Church's involvement in the opposition movement against the Yushin System (1972-79), "this involvement also had the effect of neutralising the condemnation by the government of the opposition as a Communist-inspired conspiracy to subvert the government" (p. 161).

But probably the main reason for the Church's special immunity from state interference is because the Church's religiosocial function is important for the orderly maintenance of society and because of the *perception by society* that *the Church* has preeminent *moral authority* and greater *credibility and trustworthiness* than other institutions, including the state. The latter aspects are discussed, *infra*, as behavioral strengths of the Church.

3. Provider of Ideology. Through its theology, especially Liberation Theology, and its social teachings, the Church can provide *ideological support* for political groups and movements. In his discussion of the South Korean Church under the Yushin System (1972-79), Hak-kyu Sohn (1988) observes that the *theological background of the Church* greatly influenced the shaping of "the ideological orientation of the dissident movement, which accommodated itself well to the *natural rights-oriented liberal ideology* of the Church" (p. 162; italics added).

4. Spokesman for Human and Civil Rights. The Church, acting through its bishops, priests and lay leaders, has called the public's attention to human and civil rights violations. Even where the Church has sided with an authoritarian regime, it still may be possible for it to point out abuses. A good example is the Philippine Church, which initially collaborated and compromised with the Marcos regime. Shoemith (1985) notes that the Church's "assumption of the role of conscience of the regime has obliged it to be more critic than collaborator" and bishops, individually and collectively, "have spoken out against the violation of human and civil rights, the

treatment of political prisoners, military abuses, the exploitation of the poor, and even against structural injustices built into the authoritarian system" (p. 72).

B. The "Structural" Strengths

1. Longevity and Staying Power. The Church has shown remarkable staying power--the ability to persist and survive over the centuries, despite encountering various attacks and unfavorable conditions. During this time, the Church has experienced "gradual but continual change" which helps to explain its *longevity as an institution* (Smith, 1975, p. 25). Governments and political systems come and go, but the Church continues to exist and maintain itself.

2. Unity Amid Diversity. One may have gained the impression that the Church, as a whole, is too divided to permit it to take any unified action. Another asset of the Church which helps to explain its longevity and relative stability is its "unity amid diversity." In addition, the Church's *unity amid diversity* is both *a goal and* an explanation of the *dynamics of the Church* which enable it to achieve its prophetic role in society. Avery Dulles (1985) describes this seemingly paradoxical concept as follows:

It is a *unity* among individuals and groups who retain their distinctive characteristics, who enjoy different spiritual gifts, and are by that very *diversity* better equipped to serve one another and thus advance the *common good*. Individual Christians and local churches are bound to one another in mutual service and mutual receptivity. This relationship is founded not upon domination but on a free exchange of trust and respect. . . . Thus the Catholic Church is, according to the teaching of Vatican II, "a lasting and sure seed of *unity*, hope, and salvation for the whole human race." (p. 24; italics added)

.....
Far from tearing the Church apart, the *diversity* of gifts serves to build up the whole in *unity*. . . . Authentic love does not dominate and suppress, but rather preserves and develops the gifts of the beloved. To love is to appreciate and cherish the other precisely as other. To the extent that they love, the members

of the Church are able to place their gifts at one another's disposal and thus to build up the *community*. (*Ibid.*, p. 46; italics added)

This recalls these words of Apostle Paul:

The body of Christ has many different parts, just as any other body does. . . . It takes many parts to make a single body. . . . God put our bodies together in such a way that even the parts that seem the least important are valuable. He did this to make all parts of the body work together smoothly, with each part caring about the others. If one part of our body hurts, we hurt all over. If one part of our body is honored, the rest of the body will be honored too. Together you are the body of Christ. (*1 Corinthians* 12: 12-27)

As long as all Church members bear in mind that Church *unity* is an important goal to be achieved, and as long as division within the Church is resolved through the *dynamics of unity amid diversity*, the institutional Church will remain strong. In both the Latin American and South Korean Churches, the conflict between conservative bishops and progressive lower clergy, and between the conservative and progressive sectors did not result in permanent division within the Church. Cohesiveness and unity in the actions taken by the Church ultimately prevailed.

The *diversity of views within the Church* regarding the nature and extent of its sociopolitical involvement has contributed to the emergence of *a new solution rather than to a paralyzing division of the Church*. Generally, the priests eventually fall into line and submit to the hierarchical authority of the bishops. The bishops also try to accommodate rather than to exclude the diverse views of progressive priests. The diversity within the Church and its goal of unity are *not mutually exclusive or contradictory*. Thus, the CPAJ has continued to exist and function as an effective voice of the South Korean Church. As has been well stated by Mainwaring and Wilde (1989) regarding the Church in Latin America,

the progressive sectors of the Latin American Church do not exist in isolation from the rest of the institution. The broader institution sets the framework within which the progressives must define themselves. The Church . . . remains very hierarchical. . . . under the leadership of John Paul II, the Church has reasserted the importance of maintaining clear lines of authority.

.....

In light of the hierarchy's central importance in the Church, its relationship to the progressives fundamentally shapes the overall impact the progressives have in the national Church.

No matter how conflictual their relationship with the institution as a whole may be, progressive Church people generally want to remain part of the institution. . . . Progressive Church leaders almost never go beyond asserting a claim to having rediscovered the true nature of the Church's mission, which illustrates how much they value the institution.

Progressive pastoral agents have discovered time after time that the poor people with whom they work have great respect for bishops and the pope. . . .

The progressive sectors have confronted ongoing dilemmas from being part of the institution. These involve essentially the difficult balance between pushing for change and accepting some limits to avoid being marginalized. The way the progressives have responded to their situation has changed over time; there has been *a process of learning and adaptation*. In the early phases of the progressive Church (1965-1973), the progressives were more hostile and confrontational in their relationship with the institution. What was important was the people and their liberation; the Church's purpose should be to further this process of liberation, which was largely seen in political terms. Over time, these more critical attitudes toward the institution gave rise to a more sympathetic and nuanced understanding of the Church.

Although this change was partly tactical, in a more fundamental way it reflected *a process of religious and political maturation*. The progressives came to a keener awareness of the difficulties of acting out religious ideas in the political sphere. Just as the hierarchy came to understand that its authority is empty when it is not based in society, so the progressives came to realize that they had failed to appreciate certain positive aspects of the Church's tradition, including its tradition of *spirituality*.

Few changes in the progressive sector are so notable or important as the changing evaluation of spirituality. . . . This change was not simply or even primarily "strategic." The progressives, through extensive contact with the poor and learning through the institution, came to value spirituality as an integral part of their own mission.

Of course the dilemmas of the Church are not faced by only one side. All institutions, regardless of how hierarchical, must prove responsive to their cadres if they are to thrive. For this reason, sharp confrontation with the Latin American progressives would be counterproductive to the Vatican. The progressive Church in Latin America has demonstrated vitality and has had considerable success in engaging millions of people in the Church in more active ways. . . . While it is analytically neat to distinguish between the progressives and the Church as a whole, progressives hold key leadership positions at all levels of the Church, including the Vatican. Moreover, the progressive theological agenda has become very prominent in Latin America.

In speaking of the institutional Church, we should not assume the existence of uniformly conservative Church leaders who oppose innovation, and grudgingly cede minor spaces to the progressives simply to appease them. . . . It has been precisely the willingness of the peak leaders of the international Church to accept and encourage an amalgam of innovations and reforms that has made the progressives' initiatives so important. Just as there was *a*

learning process on the progressive side, so, too, has the hierarchy come to *appreciate* some innovations of the progressives. (pp. 15-17; italics added)

The issue of *intraecclesiastical reform* or *democratization of the Church* is closely related to its *unity amid diversity*. As the Church's members, from the laity to the bishops and the pope, become more democratized so that they are more familiar with the necessity of a pluralistic way of thinking, they will grow accustomed to listening more carefully to each other's differing points of view. Then the Church, as a whole, will be better equipped to achieve and internalize its goal of unity amid diversity, thus enhancing its institutional strength to perform an influential sociopolitical role. As previously stated, this has been described as "the process of learning and adaptation" (*ibid.*, p. 16). This is what *Church renewal and reform* are really all about and provides the desirable future direction for structural development of the Church. This process also can be aided by sociopolitical change. As society and the state become more democratized, that in turn could encourage and influence the Church to become more democratized. In other words, sociopolitical change can help to bring about intraecclesiastical change.¹⁵

3. Organizational Breadth. The organizational breadth, extent and depth of the Church, which covers the entire range of human activity, namely, worship, education, health, politics, community organization, collective bargaining, culture, and recreation, provides a "network of mechanisms unparalleled even by the state or the military" (Smith, 1975, pp. 25-26). Smith believes that this strength of the Church, "although at times cumbersome and resistant to rapid change, becomes an important asset in the face of growing oppression" (*ibid.*, p. 26).

4. Wide Range of Influence. A related strength is the range of Church influence, which extends far beyond the pale of its rank-and-file members and its formal parish structures. Smith notes that the Church "maintains predominant control

or influence over schools and universities, trade unions, employees' associations, Catholic family groups, community centers, periodicals, radio and television stations" (*ibid.*). All these entities give the Church "an outreach into society which allows it to express its views and exercise *long-range formative influence over public attitudes and opinions*" (*ibid.*; also see Landsberger, 1970, pp. 5-6; italics added).

5. International Network and High Visibility. Regarding the importance of the Church's *presence in almost the entire world*, and its *extensive communications network*, Smith (1975) points out that many Latin American governments are "sensitive about their *international image*," and the worldwide communications network of the Church offers significant opportunities for the Latin American Church "to influence *international public opinion regarding moral and material support* for these regimes" (p. 26; italics added).

An example of the Church's influence on world public opinion is shown by the South Korean Church's activity in opposition to the Yushin System (1972-79). As noted by observer Hak-kyu Sohn (1988), "the involvement of church leaders drew the attention of world churches, which in turn exerted a substantial influence in focusing international pressure on the Park regime" (p. 161).

A similar example is the role played by the Philippine Church in causing the demise of the Marcos regime. During the period of turmoil following the Aquino assassination, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Archbishop of Manila, was regularly seen and heard on world television, and his words were reported in the international press.

Closer to America is the notable case of the Church in El Salvador. World attention became focused on that country through the words and actions of Archbishop Oscar Romero, who made the ultimate sacrifice in a passionate stand against social injustice and oppression in his country. The Church's influence on

world opinion continued after his assassination at the hands of the military junta in 1980, and probably increased because of it. Sometime before his death, Romero had prophesied that "if they kill me, I shall rise in the Salvadoran people."

A motion picture entitled "Romero" was produced and widely circulated in many countries, including South Korea. It vividly re-enacts the unspeakable events going on around Romero---involving the hierarchy, other clergy, the governing elite, the military, the Contra rebels and ordinary citizens--that compelled him to take the prophetic stand which ultimately led to his assassination. This memorable film also chronicles the transformation of Romero from an apolitical, complacent priest into a courageous, committed leader of the Salvadoran people. The wide circulation of this motion picture (also now a video) assures the long-lasting influence of Romero on public opinion in El Salvador and throughout the world.

In addition to its visibility on the international horizon, perhaps the Church is even more visible at the national and local levels. Its pronouncements and teachings on sociopolitical matters are usually reported on television and by the print media. In addition, Church and Church related publications may be distributed widely-- beyond the clergy and academicians into the hands of the general public.

Also, Church participation in events and ceremonies involving people or issues embraced by the public don't go unnoticed. As an example, consider the aftermath of the Aquino assassination in the Philippines in August, 1983. The Church became highly visible at that time. Cardinal Sin and twelve bishops conducted the funeral Mass, and from September 19 "the bells of Manila's churches tolled every day, calling for five minutes of prayer for Aquino and 'for all who are oppressed because of what they believe or what they are'" (Shoesmith, 1985, p. 73). The Church's *high visibility* makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the state to silence the Church.

6. Material and Human Resources. The Church has acquired and accumulated substantial financial and physical assets in many Latin American and Asian countries. The Church also commands considerable depth in human resources--both clergy and laity. Catholics comprise a large part, sometimes a substantial majority, of their populations. In commenting on the Philippine Church, Shoemith (1985) observes that the church "commands significant physical and moral resources" and "it claims the *spiritual allegiance* of more than 80 percent of the population" (pp. 71-72; italics added). As Hak-kyu Sohn (1988) similarly observed about the South Korean Church's role in the previously mentioned opposition movement, "the Church's considerable resources made it possible for it to bear an increasingly weighty role in the movement" (p. 161).

Furthermore, the Church sometimes has provided its own facilities, personnel and supplies to assist human and civil rights groups and movements. The South Korean Church even went so far as to establish a human rights office (e.g., the CPAJ office). According to Hak-Kyu Sohn (1988), "the maintenance of a regular office to deal with human rights disputes as well as to store and disseminate information ensured a solid base for [sic] human rights movement" (p. 161). Furthermore, throughout the southern part of Latin America, many ecumenical human rights organizations sponsored by Catholics and Protestants (1) provide legal aid to assist prisoners and families of the missing; (2) support self-help cooperatives for the unemployed; and (3) collect accurate data on the extent of human rights violations in these various countries and disseminate them abroad (Smith, 1982, p. 25, p. 285; Smith, 1979).

7. Refuge for Dissidents. The Church has served as a refuge for dissidents and others seeking protection from political persecution. According to Cumings (1989),

"human rights organizations and churches have been critical *sanctuaries for dissidents*, with the former relying on international support and the latter often being the *only institution* relatively *immune* from regime intrusion" (p.8; italics added).¹⁶ Cumings also notes that "the Christian churches of Korea have been remarkable examples of courageous witness, and a Catholic father played a catalytic role in the uprising in June 1987, *refusing to expel--or allow to be expelled--students* who had barricaded themselves in his sanctuary" (*ibid.*; italics added).

8. Provider of Forum. By holding its services open and available to the public, the Church provides a safe venue for speakers and topics that might otherwise not be tolerated. In his discussion of the South Korean case, Hak-Kyu Sohn (1988) notes that "holding prayer services, regularly and on special occasions, was perhaps its [the Church's] most precious non-material contribution to the [opposition] movement, in that it provided an open and official platform for criticisms which might otherwise have been proscribed" (pp. 161-62).

C. The "Behavioral" Strengths

The "behavioral" strengths of *the Church* are related to its *longstanding formative influence on public attitudes and opinions*, which are derived from the foregoing normative and structural strengths of the Church. As has been or will be seen in the cases of the Philippines and South Korea, the following behavioral strengths can even help to ignite or fuel sociopolitical movements in society.

1. Society's Perception of the Church's Preeminent Moral Authority. By definition, "religion" and "church" are concerned with "moral" conduct and "morality." The pertinent definitions are as follows:

Religion: 1. A set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe, especially when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually involving devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a *moral code for the conduct of human affairs*.

Church: 5. *Organized religion* as distinguished from the state.

Moral: 1. Of, pertaining to, or concerned with the *principles of right conduct* or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical: *moral attitudes*. 4. Based on fundamental *principles of right conduct* rather than on law, custom, etc.: *moral obligations*.

Morality: 1. Conformity to the *rules of right conduct*; moral or virtuous conduct. 4. A doctrine or system of *morals*. (*Random House Webster's College Dictionary*, 1992; some italics added)

Since its early beginnings, the Church has considered itself as the divinely ordained guardian of individual and social morality. Jesus Christ is considered as having laid the foundation for the Church (McBrien, 1981, pp. 577-81). As stated by McBrien, "all of the particular [Christian] churches are built on the foundation of the Apostles and prophets, and Christ is always the cornerstone (Ephesians 2:20)" (*ibid.*, p. 580). Regarding moral rules of conduct, the Church has emphasized and reinforced the Old Testament's standard of obedience to God's laws as set forth in the Bible, especially the Ten Commandments, and also the New Testament's standard of love and service to God and to one's fellow human beings.

Society and the state also have recognized the overriding moral authority of the Church, especially in earlier times when there was a "close union" or "fusion" between Church and state. Society's and the state's recognition and acceptance of the Church's moral authority explain why, for many centuries, the state aligned itself with the Church and sought and obtained *legitimation* from the Church.

As Smith (1982) points out, "from the time of Constantine [313] through the Reformation period [16th century], Catholicism was the officially established religion in all of Europe" (p. 67). Moreover, Smith notes that "close union between spiritual and temporal authority was legitimized in official Church teaching throughout the

Middle Ages as part of God's plan" (*ibid.*). In further elaboration of this close relationship between Church and state, Smith adds the following:

The clearest expression of this doctrine was articulated by Pope Boniface VIII in his bull, *Unam Sanctam* (1302). This document stated that both spiritual and temporal authority were in the keeping of the Church, each to be wielded in separate hands like two swords. The first was to be exercised by the pope and bishops, the second by kings and princes but under the direction of clerics. (Anne Fremantle, ed., *The Papal Encyclicals in their Historical Context*, pp. 72-74, cited in *ibid.*, footnote 1)

In more recent times, including the modern era of the 20th century, the Church still is regarded as having higher moral authority than other institutions, especially in societies where the Church is dominant, such as the Latin American countries, or where there has been a strong religious or ethical tradition, such as the Asian countries, including South Korea.

It is commonly understood in most, if not all, modern societies that there is a *qualitative difference between morality and legality*, and that *morality involves a higher ethical standard*. For example, the eradication of the Jews by Nazi Germany was legally sanctioned, but hardly could be considered as morally valid. Laws are man-made, and their content and application are subject to human imperfection. In its long history, even the Church, at times, has engaged in immoral conduct, especially in its strict and excessive enforcement of doctrinal heresy. In those instances, the institutional Church forfeited its claim to the allegiance of society. However, even in those terrible times, there still remained the body of believers in Jesus Christ, "the People of God," who conscientiously and faithfully endeavored to follow Christ according to the dictates of the Bible and collectively constituted the "true" Church. Over the years, many have suffered a martyr's death rather than to renounce their faith. True Christianity requires perseverance in one's faith even unto death. The same thing occurs when society is governed by a repressive authoritarian regime.

The Church's moral authority also can be eroded by the increasing secularization of society, and by society's increasing acceptance of the "secular humanist" ideology which condones relativistic moral standards. However, the Church's ability to make and communicate *moral pronouncements* has survived over many centuries. From a Biblical perspective, God has promised that His Church will survive. Moreover, according to the Bible, political leaders are subject to God's overriding authority and control. For example, in Chapter Eight, Case Study #7, the state was compelled to back down as a result of its confrontation with the Church. This unusual development makes one apt to consider the possibility of divine guidance and intervention.

The Church also is regarded as a "*spiritual*" institution by society. This enhances its *moral authority* in matters perceived as having a spiritual dimension. As previously mentioned by Mainwaring and Wilde, spirituality has become an increasingly important concern of the progressive sectors of the Church, and of the laity, especially the poor. The Church's emphasis on "spiritual" concerns and on the outpourings of the "spirit" is an important aspect of society's perception of its higher moral authority. The following dictionary definitions are pertinent:

Spiritual: 1. Pertaining to the spirit or soul, as distinguished from the physical nature. 2. Of or pertaining to the spirit as *the seat of the moral or religious nature*. 3. Of or pertaining to sacred things or matters; *religious*. 4. Pertaining to or consisting of spirit; incorporeal. 7. Of the church; ecclesiastical: *lords spiritual and temporal*. (*Random House Webster's College Dictionary*, 1992; some italics added)

The Church also can jeopardize its moral authority and the respect of society by adopting a proud "holier than thou" judgmental attitude. This can lead to the Church being isolated or ignored as an anachronism within society.

Shoesmith (1985) finds evidence of the Church's overriding moral authority in the experience of the Philippine Church and the Marcos regime, which he discusses as follows:

Beyond its influence as a social institution, *the church* exercises profound *symbolic power* in the Philippines. It claims, and is widely accepted as possessing, a universal, divinely sanctioned *spiritual and moral authority*. It is the focus of deeply held Filipino values and beliefs. The bishops are not in full control of this symbolic presence but their importance as political actors reflects it. . . . Aquino's significance alive, dead he has been transformed into the folk tradition of national martyrs. Twice before, in 1872 and 1896, *martyrdom* signalled a fundamental shift in the direction of Philippine history.

Symbolically, the church's presence contributed to a change in the national mood which can only be fully understood in terms of Filipino political culture. Perhaps only half consciously, the [Church] hierarchy confirmed in the popular mind that the [Aquino] assassination marked a shift in the moral or even the supernatural order; that the regime had lost all *moral authority*. (P. 73; italics added)

2. Society's Perception of the Church's Greater Credibility and Trustworthiness. The Church has been perceived as having greater credibility and trustworthiness than other institutions when it is respected by society and its words and actions do not detract from that respect.

The Church's *credibility* is strengthened by its *neutrality in partisan politics*. It then is considered more objective in its search and dissemination of moral truths, and in their application to sociopolitical situations. In Chapter Eight, Case Study #8 discusses the negative example of how the CPAJ's support of a certain presidential candidate backfired. Not only was the CPAJ's candidate defeated, but it also suffered a loss of credibility and prestige as a result of its partisan politics. In Case Study #9, the CPAJ's action in dispatching a priest to North Korea created considerable controversy within the Church, society and the state. It also provoked considerable criticism by the Church hierarchy and by conservative sectors of society, partly because of the government's strategy to distort the facts. The direct political and

ideological confrontation between the CPAJ and the state regarding the national reunification issue and national security law, together with the false image created and publicized by the state, misled the public and resulted in confusion and misunderstanding about the Incident.

When the Church exercises its prophetic role in pointing out injustices, in identifying with the plight of the masses, in helping the poor, the disadvantaged and the oppressed, and in championing their cause, as well as the interests of society as a whole, under the dictates of Vatican II and Liberation Theology, its credibility and trustworthiness with the masses, if not all of society, are correspondingly enhanced.

When the Church confronts and challenges the state over the correct depiction and interpretation of sociopolitical events and realities, its greater credibility, objectivity and trustworthiness are clearly demonstrated. For example, in Chapter Eight, Case Study #7 shows that in such a confrontation, the South Korean society believed the Church. The result was that the state had to back down and admit the whole truth, not only about this incident, but also about its behavior in similar incidents in the past. An authoritarian regime is concerned with its self-perpetuation. It regards any strategy to accomplish that goal as proper and justified, even if it involves callous, deliberate lies, evasiveness, omissions, and denials or gross distortions of the truth. These tactics invariably and ultimately engender cynicism, disbelief and distrust on the part of society.

An example of the foregoing was shown in the Philippine Church's relations with the state near the end of the Marcos regime. Shoemith (1985) characterized that Church as "the only national institution which has retained its independence and credibility when political parties, the courts, the military, the bureaucracy and the

media have all been co-opted or discredited by a regime intent on centralizing all power on the president" (p. 72).

When the Church communicates absolute moral truths or eternal verities, it connects with and convicts the *consciences of individuals in society*. Within every human being is a conscience which enables him or her to differentiate between right and wrong, good and bad. According to the dictionary definition, "conscience" means:

1. The inner sense of what is right or wrong in one's conduct or motives, impelling one toward right action: *to follow the dictates of conscience*.
 2. The complex of ethical and moral principles that controls or inhibits the actions or thoughts of an individual.
 3. An inhibiting sense of what is prudent.
 4. Conscientiousness.
- (*Random House Webster's College Dictionary*, 1992)

When the Church speaks the truth, it seeks and finds agreement in the competent, open and unimpaired consciences of individuals which may comprise a majority, if not all, of society. When the Church is able to find or create such a moral consensus in society, its greater credibility and trustworthiness is assured.

In summary, the Church has important assets available to it in performing its sociopolitical role. If in the years ahead the Church can continue to use these assets to (1) "revitalize the communal bases of religious life among all classes," (2) "fulfill some of the primary group [social] needs which no longer can be met in family and occupational settings in modernizing or military-dominated societies," (3) "create moral and structural conditions in which future grassroots leaders of the poor can emerge and survive until their time comes," and (4) "continue to allow within its fold--despite all the tensions and ambiguities--the presence of creatively prophetic and politically controversial groups, then the indirect but long-term impact of the Church

on the direction of Latin American societies may be very significant" (Smith, 1975 p. 26; numbers added).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. As mentioned in the book, *Lost Victory: An Overview of the Korean People's Struggle for Democracy in 1987*, by CISJD [Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development], "the main contents of the June 29th Declaration, as proclaimed by DJP [Democratic Justice Party] chairman Roh [Noh] Tae-woo and accepted by President Chun, can be summarized as the accomplishment of the peaceful political change in February, 1988 through direct presidential elections by the end of 1987, in accordance with the new Constitution to be amended in the Fall of 1987" (CISJD, 1988, p. 114). Also included in the Declaration were 8 agreements (for full text of the Declaration, see *ibid.*, pp. 308-13; for the 8 agreements, see Chapter Eight, Note #2).

2. It is inaccurate to say that most of the South Korean Catholic elites have accepted and practiced Vatican II social teachings and Liberation Theology as legitimate Church doctrine. In truth, the South Korean Church has accepted the new liberal teachings theoretically, but has not yet systematized or routinized them in practice.

3. Liberation Theology was introduced in South Korea in the early 1970s when sociopolitical problems began to cause serious concern to all of society. It is interesting to note that the new theology attracted not only the Church but also the rest of society and the state. According to Ko (1986), as of 1986, more than 50 books and 120 scholarly articles were published in South Korea either to introduce or to criticize Latin American Liberation Theology, and the new theology was discussed by newspapers more than 100 times. However, it also should be noted that, as Ko states in the preface of his book, *Haebang Sinhag-ùi Chaejomyòng* [Re-illumination of the Liberation Theology], almost all of the above publications mainly criticized the theology on the strength of pre-conceived biases, rather than on sound reasons (p. 3). Criticism of Liberation Theology reached a peak during 1983 and 1984. When Brazilian liberation theologian, Rev. Leonardo Boff, was recalled by the Vatican in 1984, it attracted the attention of the South Korean public. As for the government, it regarded the new theology as being related to student and populist movements which it considered as anti-regime pro-Communist movements working for the liberation of people (*ibid.*, p. 349). As for the Church, the new theology began to be seriously examined and discussed, mostly by liberal sectors of the Church after it became seriously involved in political matters (CPAJ, 1985, p. 26).

4. According to Rho (1988), the Vatican II teachings, papal encyclicals, and the activities of the Third World churches were seriously studied only after the Church came into direct conflict with the state. It was then that the Church needed to have a theological and ideological foundation for its involvement in the sociopolitical arena. After the mid-1970s, the Church, equipped with this theoretical background to a certain degree, was energized and propelled into the movements for human rights and social justice, and against the Yushin system (p. 36).

5. According to Smith (1986), *this pattern was repeated in Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Somoza's Nicaragua*. He further points out that "while some individual bishops have been openly critical during early stages of repression in these countries (e.g., Dom Helder Camara in Brazil, Archbishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador), the episcopacies as a group have followed *the same ambiguous pattern* as the Chilean hierarchy *at the start*" (p. 293; italics added).

6. Calvo (1979) sets forth "an elementary classification" of Latin American countries "according to the degree to which this doctrine has been systematized and conceptualized and according to the prevailing national security system," as follows:

In the first place are the countries under military regimes with a high degree of doctrinal systematization and conceptualization (Brazil and Chile); next are the countries under military regimes with doctrines that are not very systematized (Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay) and those with governments controlled by the military (Ecuador, Peru, and some Central American countries); and finally, there are a few countries with formal democracies where their military groups possess the doctrine but without the objective and subjective conditions which exist in the preceding countries.

It should be made clear that this is an elementary classification which does not pretend to cover all the different versions of the national security doctrine. There are other equally relevant variables and criteria, such as the various national goals set by countries and the various forms of alliances, and of social influence entered into by military and civilian groups. (p. 85, note #1)

7. For a further theoretical discussion of the military phenomenon in Latin America, see the subsection entitled "The Historical-Sociological-Political Background of the Military Phenomenon in Latin America" (*ibid.*, pp. 70-72).

8. This claim will be discussed in the next subsection dealing with the doctrine of the separation of church and state.

9. Also see *ibid.*, pp. 72-73 for the Brazilian example of this doctrine.

10. For the definition of basic concepts of the doctrine, see *ibid.*, pp. 74-79. According to Calvo, the two major parts of this doctrine are its conceptual elements and the national security system it proposes (*ibid.*, p. 74). The former includes national security, the state, war, national goals, and the national power (*ibid.*, pp. 74-77), and the latter includes national goals, national security doctrine, national security policies, the organic structure of the system, and national security strategy (*ibid.*, pp. 77-79). For a more detailed and extensive discussion of the national security doctrine, also see Comblin (1979).

11. For a more detailed discussion of the church's criticism of the national security doctrine, see *ibid.*, pp. 80-84. Also see Comblin (1979) for a more extensive discussion of the conflict between the Church and the state in Latin America over this doctrine.

12. In his book, *Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Comparative Analysis* (1990), Lyman Tower Sargent summarizes the agenda of Liberation Theology as follows:

1. The church should be concerned with poverty.
2. The church should be concerned with political repression.
3. The church should be concerned with economic repression.

4. Priests should become actively involved in trying to solve these problems.
5. Priests should move beyond general activity to
 - a. Direct political action, and, possibly,
 - b. Direct involvement in attempts to change political and economic systems, even by actual participation in revolutionary activity.
6. The establishment of base communities or communities including religious (priests and nuns) and lay people in communes or communities that are political and economic units, thus overcoming the division between religious and lay people.

The Roman Catholic Church specifically rejects item five and is not sure about item three. The Pope had previously rejected item six but has accepted it in some circumstances. (P. 236)

13. See also Levine's and Sanders' views on "political neutrality," previously discussed in the section Religion and Politics of Chapter Three.

14. Small, local, grass-roots, lay, Christian groups for discussion/reflection, especially including workers and peasants (15 to 25 people), meeting weekly or fortnightly, organized by local clergy and/or trained lay leaders, known as Church Base Communities or Christian Base Communities (also see Chapter Five, Note #10).

15. On the other hand, as society becomes more democratized and as socioeconomic and political conditions improve and stabilize, the Church may revert to its traditional, conservative role (Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989, pp. 29-32; Mainwaring, 1986, pp. 237-53; also see the concluding chapter of this study).

16. Cumings (1989) also observes that "the circumstances in which the Park and Chun regimes [of South Korea] fell, or entered into crisis, bear remarkable comparison to the Latin American cases--especially Argentina. O'Donnell and Schmitter's recent, eloquent description of 'the explosion of a highly repoliticized and angry society' fits the Korean case perfectly" (p. 7). Note that "the explosion of a highly repoliticized and angry society" also includes "the expression of ethical concerns by religious and spiritual groups previously noted for their prudent accommodation to the authorities" (*ibid.*, pp. 7-8); also see O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 49).

CHAPTER FIVE

DIVISION IN, AND CONSTRAINTS ON, THE CHURCH: THEORY IN PRACTICE

I have come to set the earth on fire, and how I wish it were already blazing! . . . Do you think that I have come to establish peace on the earth? No, I tell you, but rather division. From now on a household of five will be divided, three against two and two against three (*Luke 12: 49, 51-52*).

The Church . . . (is) one of the most *complex* institutions in the world. The same institution that produced Camilo Torres (the Colombian priest-guerrilla) continues to reject birth control, and the same institution that remains closed to ordaining women as priests or to altering formal hierarchical structures has given rise to the most progressive theologians among the major Christian churches (Mainwaring, 1986, p. 242; italics added).

I. INTRODUCTION

From the previous chapter, the impression may have been given that the Church has become a cohesive and formidable oppositional force against authoritarian rule. In fairness, it must be pointed out that "*the Church as a whole* cannot act as a dynamic and consistent leader in the transformation of social structures . . . and that there are *certain limitations and contradictions* within the Church" (Smith, 1975, p. 10; italics added). For example, "in *no* Latin American country did the church *initially* oppose military overthrow of civilian governments in the 1960s and 1970s, and *at the official level* it has *only gradually* (*and sometimes inconsistently*) moved to a position of critical opposition" (Smith, 1986, p. 272; italics added).

Furthermore, "divisions exist within the hierarchy and between different social classes of Catholics concerning the proper stance of the church toward the military" and "its national and international leaders are primarily concerned with keeping the church's energies focused on its religious mission, and will sacrifice other

objectives to keep this viable in all types of societies" (*ibid.*). The foregoing factors limit the Church's political opposition to military regimes.

Bruneau (1974) also notes that defining and carrying out its prophetic role and social mission inevitably has produced conflict and division within the Church (pp. 231-32). Clergy who are motivated by religious concerns in making statements about socioeconomic conditions are objectively acting in a "political" manner. The Church and its members have always been political actors, but only in support of the established regime. Moving away from this traditional role has led to charges by critics that the Church is "acting politically."

On the one hand, any change in the Church's social role must be political simply because of the Church's legitimizing function and because it, like the state, uses power to carry out its mission. On the other hand, the bishops and priests who are the most active in promoting change are the least likely to be involved in political parties. Thus, as noted by Bruneau, "almost anything worth doing in Brazil today can be seen in a political light and those involved will probably be denounced for betraying "their true mission" (*ibid.*) But Bruneau also says that "this does not mean that the individuals concerned are acting for political reasons, or are even deceiving themselves, for they find their directions in their reading of the Gospel" (*ibid.*).

What are the nature and effects of the diversity and division within the Church which limit its sociopolitical influence? First, it is necessary to examine the diversity and division which are manifested in the spectrum of Catholic elites. These elites within the Church deserve detailed study in that they help to explain the various reactions and conflicting views on the Church's sociopolitical role and involvement. In addition, the differences in attitudes and concerns between bishops and lower clergy, and among the laity also are examined. How and why such diversity and

division prevent the Church from effectively acting as a coherent and unified force for sociopolitical change also is explored. This will provide a more realistic appraisal of the Church's sociopolitical role and influence.

II. DIVERSITY AND DIVISION WITHIN THE CHURCH: A SPECTRUM OF CATHOLIC ELITES

As previously mentioned, the Church has taken a more active role in political and social matters, especially in Latin America. The Latin American Church's sociopolitical views have not been uniform and unified, but diverse and divided. This complicates any meaningful study of the political role of that Church. In his 1970 article, Types of Catholic Elites in Latin America, Thomas G. Sanders identifies and describes four types of religious elites, namely, Reactionaries, Conservatives, Progressives and Radicals, which he finds within the Latin American Church, mainly in Brazil and Chile. Sanders' typology is useful, not only for analyzing the political role of the Latin American Church, but also for analyzing the Church's sociopolitical role in other Third World countries, including South Korea.

Analysts agree that the Latin American Church has been politically influential. But its exact role often has been difficult to discern, due to misinterpretations based on erroneous historical generalizations, which don't take into account the diverse and complex modernization that has occurred, especially since World War II (Sanders, 1970, p. 180-81).

According to Sanders, these changes began in the 1930s with the infusion of new ideas growing out of Fascism and, especially, neo-Thomism, a modernized version of the theological and philosophical system of Thomas Aquinas advanced by Jacques Maritain (*ibid.*, p. 181). Sanders claims that neo-Thomism became the

progressive thought of Latin American Catholicism during the period 1930-1960 (*ibid.*)¹ It strongly influenced both the clergy and laity in Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Chile.

In the 1950s and 1960s, and especially after Vatican II, Latin American Catholics adopted even more progressive, if not radical, political ideas and strategies for social change. The resulting diversity in views resulted in a divided Church, which has continued to remain so in varying degrees up to the present. This diversity in views goes against the notions that the Catholic Church is a monolith and that Catholics are rigid conformists. As observed by Sanders, although the Church insists on adherence to certain theological beliefs and ethical principles, Catholics have a high degree of freedom in making practical social decisions, "where many complex factors are involved that can be solved only by the individual conscience" (*ibid.*). Even though the Church "inculcates an interpretation of the nature of society and government, . . . the perspective is vague and claims only to present generalized principles which faithful Catholics then must apply to their own situations" (*ibid.*).

According to Sanders, Vatican II gave impetus to this diversity of views in two ways. First, it stressed the need for individual initiative and responsibility by the laity. This led to an increasing reliance by individual Catholics on their own judgments on social issues. It also broadened the range of social ideas and movements with which conscientious Catholics could become involved. Second, it stressed the need to interact with the modern world. This has enabled the Latin American Church to be at the forefront in trying to deal with social and political problems, especially those of "development, social change, violence and political involvement" (*ibid.*, p. 181-82).

In discussing the relationship between the Latin American Church and politics, Sanders defines the Church in terms of *elites*, which are separate and apart from the masses. In this context, "an individual who participates in an elite has internalized Catholic beliefs and values to a sufficient degree that he justifies his social and political outlook and actions chiefly by his Catholicism rather than by other norms, institutions, or pressures" (*ibid.*, p. 182). Sanders believes that "it is among the elites, then, those who have been trained in and thought about their beliefs and who are trying to apply them to decisions, that a genuine relationship between Catholicism and politics appears" (*ibid.*). Moreover, "elites are usually educated and have participated in Catholic institutions where they absorbed a perspective that modified the unreflective culture religion common to Latin America. Bishops, priests, or laymen can compose elites" (*ibid.*).² However, Sanders points out that "*bishops are more limited* in their capacity to assume unusual political and social positions than priests and laymen, because they symbolize the *unity of the Church* in their dioceses and have *pastoral responsibility for all the Catholics there*" (*ibid.*; italics added).

Sanders describes *the masses* as, "the overwhelming majority of those who call themselves Catholic, though often deeply religious, adhere to forms of culture religion that reflect only a slight, confused understanding of normative Catholic belief and no understanding of the social teachings of the Church" (*ibid.*). Moreover, the political participation of the masses cannot be attributed to Catholic conviction, although sometimes "they may be mobilized for actions, usually defensive, that certain Catholics rationalize as expressions of Church interests" (*ibid.*).

As mentioned above, Sanders defines the Church as comprising four types of elites, each having its own particular outlook and tendencies. From Right to Left on the political spectrum, these elites are the Reactionaries, Conservatives, Progressives

and Radicals. Sanders recognizes that these types are useful for analysis, but are somewhat arbitrary, and not absolute categories. An individual may not exactly fit any given type or may exhibit characteristics of more than one type depending on the issues. As previously mentioned, Sanders' description of these types is derived from his study of the Churches of Brazil and Chile.

A. The Reactionaries

In 1970, both Brazil and Chile had "small, militant, anti-modern Catholic organizations called the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property" (Sanders, 1970, p. 183). During the same period, the Reactionary cause was championed by two books, one of which attacked proposed agrarian reform as "socialist" and "anti-Christian," to be opposed as a matter of conscience. The other attacked the Christian Democratic regime of Chile as being the forerunner to a totally Communist state (*ibid.*, p. 183-84). Most Reactionaries are upper class. Many of the most militant ones are well attired, orally proficient youth, who obtain signatures on the street to petitions against agrarian reform and "Communist" leanings of the Church, and for other Reactionary causes.

As Sanders observes, "the most notable quality of the Reactionaries is a *militancy* in the defense of certain religious and social principles . . . rooted in the Church tradition" (*ibid.*, p. 184). Being opposed to Vatican II's teachings, they mostly have ignored or rationalized them away. Reactionaries embrace all of the phenomena that the reformers find obnoxious, i.e., authoritarianism, clericalism, scholasticism, curial control, Latin liturgy, and defensive preoccupation with heresy.

They relish authoritarianism, exemplified by the structure of the Church, with its descending hierarchical sequence from pope and bishops down to laymen. But ironically "the Reactionaries' estrangement from contemporary trends is forcing them into an ever more sectarian posture at variance with the authorities of the Church" (*ibid.*). The Reactionaries place great emphasis on theology, but are very selective about their authoritative sources. As noted by Sanders, "their interpretations depend heavily on the Council of Trent³ and the formulations in traditional scholastic manuals. With . . . an unwarranted commitment to certain selected periods, they will quote the nineteenth century Pope Pius IX with more enthusiasm than [twentieth century] Popes John XXIII and Paul VI" (*ibid.*).

Sanders finds that the public image of the Reactionaries inaccurately reflects their social status more than their religious views. This image is inaccurate "since the idea of a 'Christian' society dominates their sociopolitical views" (*ibid.*, p. 185). The Reactionaries lament the decline in Christian values which they blame on liberal Catholics.

They espouse "the sacred ways of Christian civilization" emphasizing "a traditional concept of the integrity of the family based on the social prohibition of divorce and birth control" (*ibid.*). They value the Church's practice of confession and traditional conservative political parties. Their campaigns against divorce legislation draw support from more moderate Catholics who agree with them that Christian values will assure a moral, stable society.

The main enemies of the Reactionaries are (1) "Communism," which they detect in both the Church and society, and (2) "socialism," which they find to be repugnant to Christianity, citing earlier papal documents in support of their view. Any effort to reform the Church or society is regarded as either Communistic or

socialistic. They uncompromisingly defend the right of private property, which they regard as being essential to man's dignity and an inalienable, natural right ordained by God. Their opposition to agrarian reform is based upon its effect on property rights. Their vision of society is that it is authoritarian, organized and divided into unequal classes. Differences in function and class also are divinely ordained. They believe that inherent social inequalities should be resolved by charity from the upper classes to the lower ones (*ibid.*, pp. 185-86).

These Reactionary positions are strongly supported by upper class landowners. In Brazil, there also is active support provided by certain bishops, priests and other laymen. In Chile, these positions mainly are supported by laymen. Certain Chilean priests may be sympathetic, but none of any stature have committed themselves publicly. According to Sanders, "the real influence of the Reactionary position is hard to judge, since its organizational strength is slight. Its greatest impact comes on isolated issues such as opposition to divorce and agrarian reform, where it can appeal to innate sympathies in a large segment of the populace" (*ibid.*, p. 186).

Within the Reactionary camp are the Integralists. Some writers discuss the Integralists as a separate group, but their political attitudes and behavior stamp them as Reactionary according to the Sanders typology. However, what has been said about the Integralists helps to provide a better understanding of the Reactionaries and their positions. The Integralists are both similar to, and different from Conservatives. They both place a high value on tradition, institutional structures, and inherited laws.

However, the Integralists differ from the Conservatives in their belief that Vatican II mainly was destructive in practice by stimulating a "headlong flight from the Absolute" and by having settled for a "comfortably this-worldly religion," in which "the religiously tone-deaf, as it were, will come to dominate the life of the

Church" (Ramet, 1990, p. 9; also see Hitchcock, 1979, p. 9). In other words, the Integralists are strongly or totally opposed to Vatican II because they reject "its endorsement of religious liberty, its embrace of lay participation, and its demystification of the hierarchy." They also regard the liberals' advocacy of intraecclesiastical democracy as a form of modern "paganism" (Ramet, 1990, p. 9; Hitchcock, 1979, p. 203).

Scholars on Latin America observe that Catholic Integralism still continues to be attractive to right-wing Catholics and the military. As Cleary (1985) observes, "Brazilian and Argentinean presidents and military commanders make appeals for order and stability on the basis of Catholic integralism" (p. 67). In his observation of the Chilean Church and the military regime during 1973-1980, Smith (1982) similarly finds that "Integralism is still an attractive ideology among a small, but influential, group of Catholic intellectuals who support the military government" (p. 336). (For a detailed discussion of the affinity between Integralism and right-wing military government, see *ibid.*, pp. 337-38.)⁴

B. The Conservatives

The Conservatives occupy many of the same positions as the Reactionaries. The Conservatives lack militancy, and that is the main difference between them and the Reactionaries (Sanders, 1970, p. 186). Sanders observes that the Conservatives do not work "for a return to a traditional Catholic society, but they believe in it" (*ibid.*). They are conventional, relatively unreflective, traditional Catholics "who lack the imagination or energy to move into one of the other groups. They do not consciously

oppose changes in the official teaching of the Church; they simply find it easier to continue as they always have functioned" (*ibid.*).

When Sanders made his observations, the Conservatives were probably the largest group of clergy and laity in Brazil and Chile. "Of them we genuinely can speak of the Church as a cultural force that supports past structures and does not contribute to modernization and development" (*ibid.*).

Conservative bishops are seldom well known to the public because Progressive bishops have become the leading spokesmen for the Church. Many Latin American bishops are known only in their dioceses, because they are not superior leaders. These Conservative bishops accept without qualms traditional theology and practice and do not question the Church's ties with the rich and powerful or its detachment from most of the populace. They give lip service to the innovations of Vatican II out of respect, but they expend little effort to implement them. They usually sign liberal statements issued by regional and national bishops' conferences, because they do not grasp the inconsistencies between those statements and their own views. These bishops, however, frequently insist that such statements "be balanced by warnings against extremism, Marxism, or immorality" (*ibid.*, p. 186-87).

Similarly, there are many Conservative priests in Brazilian and Chilean parishes. These priests, many of whom are over 45 years of age, often wear a cassock, not because they reject modern attire, but because they always have worn one. They have a fatherly detached, but often kindly, rapport with their parishioners. They are not innovative. They teach traditional ideas and pursue traditional pastoral practices, because "they lack the initiative and imagination to criticize and replace them" (*ibid.*, p. 187). Sanders also observes that "they worry about a lot of things:

Communism, secularism, Protestant competition, loss of authority, the restlessness of youth, [and] new things" (*ibid.*).

As Sanders further notes, these priests "often become facile instruments of conservative political and social groups, repeating their slogans, because they honestly fear the consequences of change" (*ibid.*). Conservative members of Catholic orders also populate private schools. They believe that they are rendering a great service by giving Christian, moral, and humanistic training to children of the privileged classes who are able to attend these schools (*ibid.*).

Also, to the extent that the teachings of Catholic Conservatives are effective, they serve the interests of the propertied classes, so it is not surprising that Conservatives obtain their greatest support there (Turner, 1971, p. 106).

The Conservatives, who are influenced by the tradition of the neo-Scholastics, such as Cardinal Ratzinger and French philosopher Jacques Maritain,⁵ are cautious about reform because they believe that "reform" in theological terms may be "revolutionary" in sociological terms. They tend to regard themselves as moderates positioned at the theological "center" between Traditionalists and Liberals, and at the political "center" between Reactionaries and Progressives. They stress continuity with the past. For example, the greatest priority of Pope John Paul II regarding the documents of Vatican II is that they be interpreted "within the context of Catholic tradition," that is, in terms of their continuity with and affirmation of preexisting principles (Ramet, 1990, p. 6).

As Turner (1971) also points out, "Catholic conservatives advocate social justice and renovation just as do other Latin American churchmen, but in doing so they interpret the concepts in terms of the traditional goals and methods of Latin American Catholicism," thus interpreting "social justice" to mean "the expansion of

charitable work within a society that will continue to be stratified and largely closed" (p. 100). What they advocate is an integral social unity. They do *not* accept the fact of *political pluralism*. Instead, they denounce it as factionalism and fight against it (*ibid.*, p. 105).

As Turner further points out, "for their own purposes, diverse Catholic groups use the concept of anticommunism to discredit their opposition. Conservatives are most apt to depend upon anticommunism. . . . The term 'Communist' is now regularly used to discredit the Catholic left. . . . Even United States conservatives denounce progressive Catholicism as being tainted by Marxism" (*ibid.*, pp. 123-24). Therefore, it is understandable that "one reason for the Church's refusal to oppose right-wing dictatorships more openly is their firm stand against communism" (*ibid.*, p. 121).

In addition, the Conservatives stress the infallibility of the Church. This enables Cardinal Ratzinger, on the one hand, to criticize Integralists for their refusal to accept the teachings and decisions of Vatican II, and, on the other hand, to similarly attack Progressives for allegedly refusing to consider everything prior to Vatican II (Ramet, 1990, p. 6). As the head of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, he issued the *Instruction on Certain Aspects of the "Theology of Liberation"* on August 6, 1984.

This document was intended to criticize liberation theologians, especially Rev. Leonardo Boff, who wrote the provocative book *Church: Charism and Power; Liberation Theology and the Institutional Church*.⁶ Cardinal Ratzinger gave the following reasons for his criticism of Liberation Theology: (1) it reduces faith to politics by "giving an overly political reading of the Bible and for shifting priority from liberation from sin--a spiritual task--to liberation from political and economic

injustice--a political task" (*ibid.*, p. 9); (2) it uses Marxism uncritically--regarding it as a science and making class struggle the driving force of history; and (3) it creates a "popular" church in opposition to the hierarchical church, and denounces church authorities who disagree with Liberation Theology as bourgeois enemies (McGovern, 1990, p. 43).⁷

C. The Progressives

As viewed by Sanders (1970), the Progressives and the Radicals are the elites through which the Church can become involved in growth and change in Latin America. Often these elites are considered as one, but they differ on many ideas and issues (p. 188).

The Progressives have digested the official changes in the Church's theology and social teachings since 1960, and believe that the Church is becoming a valuable influence on the modern world. They believe that further changes will be needed and will be made in the future, but think that the Vatican II documents and subsequent encyclicals, together with other major Church statements, provide sufficient guidelines for the present. They try to work within the organizational limits of the Church, and want to follow its lead. Their "intellectual inspiration on social matters tends to be the reasonable, balanced neo-Thomism of Jacques Maritain, which also happens to be reflected in the episcopal documents" (*ibid.*).

The Latin American Bishops' Council (CELAM) and the national bishops' conferences are dominated by Progressive clergy and, therefore, their statements express the Progressive position. The meetings at Mar del Plata (1967) and Medellín (1968) gave the Church's endorsement to the Progressive agenda "for development,

economic integration, and basic reforms" (*ibid.*, p. 189). However, there also were individual bishops representing each of the other elites present at these conferences.

Sanders finds it noteworthy that "for many years the Chilean Church, more than any other, symbolized a unified Progressivism linking bishops, clergy, and laity" (*ibid.*). The Brazilian Church, on the other hand, was divided and included an extreme Radical wing. Sanders also notes that after 1966, "Chile too . . . developed a strong Radical wing, and the division between a more moderate and a more Leftist modernizing position now seems to be the general Latin American pattern" (*ibid.*).

The Progressives argue that the Church should be viewed as a human institution rather than a divine one. They tend to be *pluralists* in both theological and political terms, and regard *diversity* as a fact of life. Also, the possibility of a reinterpretation of Scripture has become a controversial issue within the Church. In the pre-Vatican II era, the Church stressed the "primacy of tradition over Scripture" and the authority of the Church and tradition, thus rejecting any move to reinterpret Scripture. In the post-Vatican II era, *pressures for critical Biblical interpretation* have divided the Church. On one side are the Reactionaries and Conservatives who readily accept the concept of the "primacy of tradition over Scripture." On the other side are the partisans of Liberation Theology, such as Rev. Gustavo Gutierrez and Rev. Leonardo Boff, who, in rejecting the "primacy" concept, assert the right of each individual Christian to study and interpret Scripture for himself or herself, thus encouraging Bible study among Catholics in the base communities of Latin America (Ramet, 1990, p. 10; also see Boff, 1985).

Another difference between Progressives and Conservatives is that Progressives stress the importance of an individual's faith *over* the teachings of the

institutional church whereas Conservatives, such as Ratzinger, regard the institutional church as the paramount authority (Küng, 1987, p. 59; Ramet, 1990, p. 7).

Still another difference between Progressives and Conservatives concerns their views on *the issue of intraecclesiastical democracy*. Because the clergy is no longer exclusively Conservative, its members differ among themselves not only on *the role* the Church should play in socioeconomic reform, but also on *hierarchical relations within the Church*. The Progressives see the need for *intraecclesiastical reform*. Rev. Leonardo Boff (1985) speaks of the "Church as an institution characterized by endurance, stability, and by the rules of the game followed by its members," and suggests a way for "democratization of the Church" (p. 48).

According to Boff, the Church was previously made up of Roman and feudal structures in which the hierarchy was ensconced in a typically authoritarian style of leadership, and was untouchable and not subject to *internal criticism* (*ibid.*, pp. 40-41). The Church now is taking on "structures found in today's civil societies that are more compatible with our growing sense of human rights" especially after Vatican II (*ibid.*, p. 44). The term "democratization of the Church," according to Boff, refers to the *practices and structures of a new type of Church* rather than to the concepts, practices and organizations of the past (*ibid.*).

In his view, "the fundamental nature of the Church remains unchanged . . . but at the same time it favors a free and fraternal community with the participation of the greatest number of people" (*ibid.*). Boff also sees bishops and priests as more like true shepherds, leaders among the faithful, without titles, and acting in a manner "that reveals the gospel model of the diaconate" (*ibid.*) Boff finds that "not only is established power being modified (and humanized) but new ways of being Church are springing forth, especially in Latin America among the *comunidades eclesiales de*

base [Church Base Communities], such that today we are experiencing a true ecclesio genesis" (*ibid.*).

Boff suggests that the Church should be more concerned with its *practices* than with its theoretical concepts based upon (1) Vatican II, which explicitly stressed the need for an ongoing conversation on the issue of reform (*ibid.*, p. 55); and (2) the Synod of Bishops in 1971, which issued the document, *Justice in the World*, which emphasized the need for self-reflection by the Church (*ibid.*, p. 33).

The issue of intraecclesiastical reform and democratization of the church, as advocated by Boff, is very important, not only for Latin American Churches but also for the South Korean Church, which tends to be centralist and authoritarian rather than democratic. As will be seen later in the case of South Korea, the issue of the Church's involvement in politics is closely related to the issue of reform within the Church (see Case Study #10). It also is noteworthy that Boff's recall by the Vatican in 1984 was broadcast worldwide and attracted considerable attention of the public, including many non-Christians, in South Korea. At that time, Liberation Theology was being introduced to the South Korean public. It initially was unfairly denounced, both carelessly and deliberately, as a dangerous ideology (see Chapter Four, Note #3).

D. The Radicals

The Radicals regard themselves as good Catholics, but believe they are more advanced than other Catholics. Radicals believe they are on the leading edge of sociopolitical change, and that the Church should learn from them and follow their

lead in finding innovative solutions to issues such as development, political change and modernization.

The Radicals believe that the Church's new social teachings are a step in the right direction, but don't go far enough. They tend either to liberally interpret Church pronouncements and teachings or to consider them "an anachronism which in time will disappear" (Sanders, 1970, p. 188). Radicals believe that the Church's traditional approach of formulating and applying moral standards and directions is outdated and ineffective. Instead, they stress the "conscientious participation of faithful Christians" in movements for political change (*ibid.*).

Radicals also believe that bishops and other clergy who come from the upper classes cannot really understand and empathize with the needs of the poor. As Sanders notes, for the Radicals, "the voice of the Church on social matters does not lie in the hierarchy, but in the People of God, that is, the Latin American masses who are in process of a critical awakening and will in time participate in the building of a new Latin America" (*ibid.*, p. 188-89). Moreover, as Sanders observes, Radicals believe that "social truth often is not found in the consensus of various interests that episcopal documents represent, but in the extremism undertaken by sensitive and oppressed groups" (*ibid.*, p. 189).

For their doctrinal orientation, Radicals draw not only upon Liberation Theology, but also from "existentialism, Marxism, sociologists like Mannheim and Mills, or psychoanalytic theory" (*ibid.*). Radicals, when armed with modern ideas, are unafraid to face the problems of the modern world. As Sanders also discerns, some Radicals are "strongly influenced by Protestantism and radical New Testament primitivism, with its emphasis on poverty and simplicity" (*ibid.*). Lastly, Radicals

consider Maritain as "an important transitional figure, but now irrelevant and out-of-date" (*ibid.*).

Perhaps the most significant difference between Radicals and Progressives is that the Radicals have a much more worldly orientation. They stress that the Church must make the temporal world its *exclusive* concern. They maintain that the hierarchy has "no special competence" in interpreting the gospel and that "personal judgement and conscience take priority over every form of authority" (Ramet, 1990, p. 7; also see Dulles, 1977, p. 67).

Camilo Torres, a Colombian priest who left the priesthood in June, 1965 to join a guerrilla movement, only to be killed in action in early 1966, was motivated by a similar conviction. According to Torres, "when circumstances impede men from devoting themselves to Christ, the priest's proper duty is to combat these circumstances. . . . The revolutionary struggle is a Christian and priestly struggle" (Levine, 1981, p. 42). It was upon his death in February, 1966 that the ferment within the Latin American Church began to be widely recognized, for the first time, in North America.

Although Conservatives dominate the hierarchical Church, many Radical individuals and organizations openly defy that authority. These Radicals "advocate violent revolution, tactical cooperation with the Communists," as well as radical reform . . . of the Church itself" (Turner, 1971, p. 139). They criticize both United States foreign policy and the missionary efforts of North American Catholics. Turner notes that since the 1960s "the 'radical' reformers of the Latin American Church have grown in number, in self-consciousness, and in militancy" (*ibid.*, p. 140).

E. Progressives vs. Radicals: A Comparison

Sanders solidifies a greater understanding of these elites by comparing their views on the following issues:

1. Nature of the Church in Latin America. The Radicals assert that the Church is a permanent minority in Latin America. This is based upon observation, and the theological belief that the Church always has been an elite. The Radicals also believe that considering the Church as "a structural and hierarchical institution" has resulted in complacency of convictions and disrespect for the faithful masses and for those alienated from the structural entity. The Radicals embrace the concept of the People of God, which extends beyond the elitist Church (Sanders, 1970, pp. 190-91).

The Progressives agree that Christian believers are a minority, and that the institutional Church does not influence the majority of the population. However, they believe this is a temporary situation which can be eliminated if the Church changes its pastoral practices, attracts the masses, and becomes an active voice on social issues. Turner (1971) points out the *paradox* that as the Church increases its efforts "to legitimize constructive forms of social change, splits within its own leadership place it in a poorer position to perform the legitimizing and integrating functions" (p. 47). Also, some outspoken lower clergy have become so frustrated over the slowness of the Church to effect social change that they work for reform outside the Church. Father Torres is an example of how far such impatient clergy may go.

Furthermore, lay attitudes on some social issues are far ahead of the Church's official position, so that the ideas of more conservative Church leaders are questioned. In the 1960s the Church began to promote a much broader concept of freedom. The new ethic strongly encourages political participation and an achievement orientation.

Thus, for Turner, "it [the new ethic] provides new social and economic orientations as well as a new orientation to politics" (*ibid.*, pp. 47-48).

2. Future Organization of the Church. Both Progressives and Radicals favor small groups of dedicated, energetic Catholics, often separate from the parish organization. This is quite a change because, traditionally, Catholic groups are connected to the parish. As described by Sanders, "the Progressive is inclined to think of the new groups as vehicles for reconversion of society" (Sanders, 1970, p. 191). He believes that Christian life as developed in the small groups will result in greater participation in the religious and social life of the Church.

On the other hand, according to Sanders, "the Radical . . . thinks of the groups as a Christian presence, no more, because society will not be reconverted" (*ibid.*). For him, the Christian life exhibited in the groups "is less important than the values of responsibility, love, solidarity, and social concern that Christians (and non-Christians) manifest in their lives" (*ibid.*). In other words, the Radical's view is that although "the cultic life has its permanent significance, one does not judge the depth of religious spirit by participation in it" (*ibid.*).

3. Institutional Approach to Problems. The Progressives have worked through "organizations of Christian inspiration" (*ibid.*). Good examples are labor unions and Christian Democratic Parties. These organizations are founded on principles of natural law, and Catholics have majority control. Participation is justified, in theory, on the basis that secular institutions aren't suitable to accomplish Catholic purposes in society. Some of these organizations are directly involved in public social concerns. Others train leaders according to Christian principles so they can introduce these concepts to secular groups.

The Radicals refuse to participate in these organizations, preferring to join with non-Catholics in secularly oriented organizations free of Church control. Examples include Ação Popular, a non-confessional political group committed to changing Brazilian society, and Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario in Chile. Sanders observes that Radicals often define their function as *conscientizacão*, which means an "awakening of consciousness" among the masses, on the assumption that the lower classes, as the majority, will determine the future course of Latin America. "Catholics and others should engage in non-paternalistic activities which will lead to a critical reflection among the people and a quest for vehicles of participation and revolution. This is *conscientizacão*" (*ibid.* p. 192).

4. Relation to Other Movements. The Progressives who encourage organizations of Christian inspiration believe they are creating a strictly Catholic approach to problem solving. Marxists usually are shunned and Marxism usually is regarded as a contrary doctrine.

The Radicals favor cooperation with popular movements, which may involve Marxists. *Marxism* is viewed as a suitable conceptual partner for effecting social change. "The Radical readily adopts . . . many concepts often employed by Marxists, such as *class conflict, imperialism, and revolution*" (*ibid.*, p. 192-93; italics added).

5. Position on Development. As stated by Sanders, "the Progressive takes an evolutionary and cooperative approach to development . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 193). Thus, he strongly endorses governmental economic, educational and housing programs assisted by North American aid . . . because he regards gradual improvement as a normal road to effective change" (*ibid.*).

The Radical takes a "revolutionary and critical" approach to development (*ibid.*). He believes that only a sudden transformation of political and social power

can bring about development. He also believes that the developed countries, particularly the United States, are more interested in dominating, than helping, Latin America. Revolutionary examples such as Cuba are regarded with admiration and empathy. As also noted by Sanders, "the Radicals vary in their strategic proposals, but they consider the Colombian priest, Camilo Torres, who became a guerrilla fighter, to be a symbol of legitimate Christian response" (*ibid.*).

6. Economic System. The Progressives have the traditional Catholic distrust of capitalism. They propose an alternative to both capitalism and socialism. In Chile, this alternate system is called "communitarianism" (*ibid.*).

The Radicals totally reject capitalism, and embrace socialism. Their socialist doctrines are probably partially derived from the socialist models, from Scandinavia to China. As an example of the Radicals' animosity toward capitalism, Sanders cites part of the "Manifesto of the Bishops of the Third World" (1968), endorsed by eight Brazilian bishops, which reads as follows:

The Third World is still seeking to escape the dominion of the powerful to develop itself freely . . . The Church greets with pride and joy a new humanity in which honor does not belong to money accumulated in the hands of a few, but to workers, urban and peasant . . . If the workers do not become in some way owners of their work, all reforms of structure will be ineffective . . . The government must agree to end that struggle of classes, which, contrary to what is ordinarily contended, the rich have frequently unleashed and continue against the workers, exploiting them with insufficient salaries and inhuman conditions of work. (*Ibid.*, p. 193-94)

Sanders concludes his discussion of the four Catholic elites by making the following points:

(1) Contrary to the traditional view of the Church, Latin American Catholicism has "a political outlook with revolutionary, socialist and anti-North American themes" (*ibid.*, p. 194).

(2) Of the two types of innovative Catholic thought and action present in most Latin American countries, the Radicals seem to be gaining adherents at the Progressives' expense. This probably reflects the frustration of Catholics and other Latin Americans over the slow progress being made to solve the area's problems (*ibid.*).

(3) The outlook and tendencies of all four elites are common to all large institutions, which are composed of individuals of varying socioeconomic and educational attainments. Non-Catholic institutions, including the Protestant Church, in Latin America have the same four types as those found in the Catholic Church. Especially when a demand for change arises, there always are those who resist change, those who ignore it, those who proceed with change prudently, and those who criticize vehemently and advocate radical change.

(4) How Latin American Catholic bishops, priests and laymen interpret and apply Christian principles depends upon many factors. The Catholic teachings and experiences are varied, and to some extent people get out of them what they want to get. All of the elitist positions can find support somewhere in the Catholic tradition and teachings. Individual Catholics also are affected by the biases and prejudices of social classes, peer groups, and educational influences. As noted by Sanders, "it is not surprising that the Reactionaries attract youth from upper class private schools, while priests working in slums, or students subject to Marxist ideas in the universities, incline toward Radicalism" (*ibid.*, p. 195).

(5) The distinctive contribution of Latin American Catholicism is to energize and motivate the faithful to adopt positions and act, and to sanction their "ideas and actions which are shaped in large part by other social and psychological factors" (*ibid.*). Thus, Reactionaries and Conservatives, who fear and resist change, can find

supporting authority at the highest level of the Church. Progressives, who believe in reasonable reforms, can find comfort in recent pronouncements of the Church. Radicals, who are impatient with existing institutions, "manage to find justification in the comprehensive umbrella that is the Church" (*ibid.*).

The effectiveness of these Catholic elites should not be underestimated. According to Sanders, "the motivation generated within the Church has such strength that Catholics constitute some of the decisive elites in Latin America" (*ibid.*, p. 195-96).

(6) Sanders believes that Progressives and Radicals, by their interaction, "both contribute to the Church's policies and influence" (*ibid.*, p. 196). *The Progressives* are closer to the centers of decision making and usually get credit for any changes. *The Radicals*, on the other hand, are "the Innovators, those who live in the future, sometimes wrong but often right, those who discerned the problems first and proposed fresh answers" (*ibid.*; italics added).⁸

(7) The effectiveness of the Progressives and the Radicals, and of the Church, as a whole, also should not be overestimated. Catholics are not simply acting with a Catholic agenda. They are first and foremost Latin Americans, and their positions are Brazilian, Chilean, Mexican, etc. Some countries may choose a Progressive strategy for development. Others may opt for a Radical approach. Sanders believes that "Catholics will participate in good conscience" in either type of solution (*ibid.*). He concludes by stating that "in the modern world Catholicism will not determine the fate of Latin America, nor will it give the region's development a distinctive stamp. Its contribution will come from the support and participation of its spokesmen and faithful in the movements offered by the context" (*ibid.*).

III. CONSTRAINTS ON THE CHURCH'S SOCIOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE

The preceding section of this Chapter has examined the wide diversity of beliefs and attitudes and the corresponding division in the ranks of both clergy and laity within the Church. This diversity and division is reflected in different strategies and practices of the Church, internally, within the Church itself, and externally, in the sociopolitical arena.

This section now focuses on the various factors which constrain and limit the Church's sociopolitical influence. It may seem as if we are dealing with the other side of the same coin. In truth, we are doing precisely that because in every area of human endeavor, each and every different idea, action, method, institution and relationship, etc. has its advantages and disadvantages, positive side and negative side, pros and cons, or pluses and minuses. What may be good for one purpose may be bad for another purpose. For example, the concept of church unity may be important for the maintenance and preservation of the Church, but it may inhibit change and progress within and outside the Church.

According to Smith (1975), these limiting factors or dilemmas can be observed at all three levels of the Latin American Church, namely: (1) the *normative* level, i.e., the Church functioning as a religious and moral system; (2) the *structural* level, i.e., the Church functioning as a viable organization or institution; and (3) the *behavioral* level, i.e., the Church functioning as an influencer of the laity (pp. 4, 10). The interplay of these factors limits the Church's sociopolitical role and influence. These factors observed mostly in the Latin American Church also are applicable, to the same or to a greater or lesser extent, to the South Korean Church, as will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight, in the case studies presented.

A. The "Normative" Level

The limiting factors operating at the "normative" level⁹ include:

1. Generality, Ambiguity and Effect of Pronouncements. Many, if not most, of the official pronouncements of the Church hierarchy on sociopolitical matters, including those of the pope, but especially the bishops, are couched in broad, general language susceptible of varying interpretations. General guidelines for social justice are set forth, but their applicability to actual, specific situations is left up to the individual conscience. The *official* reasons for this approach according to Smith (1975) are (1) that "the bishops do not feel they should provide specific answers binding in conscience in areas where the Church has no competence or expertise," and "we [the bishops] do not have technical solutions or infallible remedies" (p. 10), and "the Church had [has] no competence to offer concrete political or economic solutions for complex social problems" (*ibid.*, p. 12); and (2) that the bishops "recognized that honest differences of opinion can exist among sincere individuals and groups over the choice of the best practical means to realize these values [basic values articulated by the Church]," and "they warned against identifying the gospel too closely with any particular social program or political strategy," because "no one is allowed in the aforementioned situations [where sincere Christians disagree] to appropriate the Church's authority for his opinion" (*ibid.*, p. 11).

Motivated by its desire to *unify*, and not alienate, any of its diverse sectors around the world, the Vatican uses ambiguous language in its social pronouncements. According to Turner (1971), "it is far easier to maintain the facade of Catholic unity when episcopal statements are phrased in ambiguous language and, given the very real

splits in Catholic attitudes, it is also much safer to do so" (p. 211). Vague statements about reform or social justice enable individuals to interpret them according to their own ideas (*ibid.*). This practice has its advantages, but there also are disadvantages. As Turner also observes, "the effects of papal encyclicals should not be exaggerated, because strong forces of popular ignorance of their message, elitist reaction against their message, and a pattern of only partial allegiance to the authority that they represent all militate against them" (*ibid.*, pp. 209-10).

Vagueness and *ambiguity* can result in disrespect for and disregard of clerical statements. Turner cites the example of Ivan Illich and his liberal group, whom Sanders found to be acting on "the assumption that papal social teaching is trivial and irrelevant" (*ibid.*, p. 214). Moreover, a Church pronouncement may be so indefinite that it fails to state any position. As noted by Shoesmith (1985) in discussing the Philippine Church, "the question is not only whether the church has the will and the capacity to effectively intervene but whether the church has any coherent position in the present crisis" (p. 71). In addition, the *vagueness and uncertainty* of clerical pronouncements may reach the point of *ambivalence*--where the Clergy either (1) is unable to make a choice among several conflicting positions or (2) is desirous of saying or doing two opposite things (see *Random House Webster's College Dictionary*, 1992).

A Chilean example illustrates this *ambivalence*. In their 1973 official declaration, the Chilean Cardinal and bishops, in exchange for the government's guarantee of "the church's freedom and flexibility of action . . . rejected the option of clear and specific denunciation of abuses of power" (Smith, 1986, p. 274). However, the following year, because of "continuing repression and mounting pressures on the hierarchy from groups at lower levels of the church working with those being

persecuted, . . . the Episcopal Conference issued its first major criticism of the government" (*ibid.*, pp. 274-75). It expressed the bishops' concerns about "the atmosphere of terror and lies pervading the country and about a range of human rights violations that were becoming institutionalized" (*ibid.*, p. 275). However, this statement also stated that the bishops "had no doubts about the good intentions nor the good will of our government authorities," and praised the junta's recent Declaration of Principles for "its explicitly Christian inspiration" (*ibid.*).

The foregoing example shows that the Chilean hierarchy criticized government policies only after state repression had reached an extremely serious point, and even then its statement was ambivalent and appeasing. The South Korean Church often has followed a similar practice, as will be discussed in subsequent Chapters Seven and Eight, in the sections dealing with Church-state relations and conflicts, and in the case studies presented, especially Case Study #5.

Lastly, Turner observes that there is a difference between being initially influenced by a clerical statement, and merely using the statement to justify a previously adopted position. As Turner (1971) states, "commentators on Latin American Catholicism regularly assume that the persons they favor have gained their insights from papal decrees" . . . but "the broad inclusiveness of papal statements and the ability of men of vastly different political persuasions to justify their positions in terms of the statements indicate that the apparent strength of papal authority is often more a matter of *justification* than of predominant influence" (p. 215; italics added).

2. Disagreement on Operation of Church Hierarchy. As previously discussed, there is a considerable disparity of views among the clergy regarding the mode of operation of the Church hierarchy. As noted by Sanders (1982), one of Smith (1982)'s major themes is the difference in viewpoints between bishops and lower

clergy on key issues (Sanders, p. 251). For example, "over 70% of the bishops and priests he [Smith] interviewed favored a centralist model of authority in which the faithful should offer their opinions to the hierarchy, and afterwards the bishops should make the decisions and the laity obey them" (*ibid.*). However, a majority of nuns and nearly two-thirds of the lay leaders preferred a model of dialogue and democratic decision making" (*ibid.*).

According to Levine (1981), bishops are subject to special constraints because of their leadership position and because they are the Church's "most visible" public leaders (p. 201). For Levine, the issue involves far more than individual beliefs and personal preferences. "Bishops carry an important institutional responsibility: they feel deeply the need to maintain the Church as a unified, open set of structures through which a changing faith can continue to find expression under many circumstances" (*ibid.*). Thus, in truth, "bishops must be all things to all people--a requirement which clearly rules out many activist commitments" (*ibid.*).

Another important aspect, according to Smith, is the bishop's careful, deliberative style, as compared with the impatient style of the activist-inclined lower clergy and laity. The Church hierarchy also is far removed from the conditions faced by the local church. Bishops maintain a broader perspective on the various consequences of pastoral strategies and maintain closer ties with Rome. They also stress the importance of "consultation and collegial decision-making before committing the official Church to public confrontations" (Smith, 1982, p.30). Smith observes that "priests, nuns, and lay leaders involved in the pain and suffering of their relatively homogeneous communities . . . prefer a more decisive and denunciatory position" (*ibid.*, pp. 30-31).

3. Disagreement on Application of Moral Norms. As mentioned above, there is considerable diversity of opinion and division among the clergy--the pope, bishops, priests, and nuns, as well as the laity over the meaning and applicability of the Church's social teachings in concrete situations. *To that extent, the Church's ability to be a strong, unified force* in support of, or in opposition to, particular sociopolitical positions *is impaired*. Smith (1975) notes that "ministry is understood by many . . . priests and nuns as involving mainly personal spiritual dimensions . . . , with no direct reference to, or involvement in, social action" (p. 20).

Regarding the diversity of views among bishops, priests, and laity as to the implications of the Vatican II and Medellín social teachings, Smith observes that "some [of the bishops, priests, and laity] understand the Church's role . . . as providing a voice above the clamor of politics" (*ibid.*, 13-14). Others consider this too conservative and want the Church "to use its influence to support concrete actions and movements for change amid controversy in order to make the gospel message of salvation credible and effective in the real world of suffering and struggle" (*ibid.*, p. 14).

Sanders believes that until the Progressives and Radicals resolve their differences, "there will be no uniformity of opinion as to the operational force of these norms and the Church's moral impact will be diffuse both on its own members and on society at large" (*ibid.*). Sanders (1982) believes that most Chilean bishops still favor "a generalized doctrinal approach to social problems" (p. 251).

Regarding the Latin American Church, Smith (1975) further points out that "many of the more radical, younger clergy are aware of this contradiction between Church teaching and behavior, and strongly urge the hierarchy to be more *specific* in their denunciations" (p. 11; italics added). Moreover, "when clerical and lay groups

have attempted to justify concrete actions in controversial areas on the basis of Medellín's call for justice, the bishops in various countries have often taken public stands against the use of Church pronouncements to support what they consider to be partisan political movements" (*ibid.*).

Regarding the laity, Smith (1982) recognizes that on issues which coincide with the *political interests* of large numbers of the laity, or when *critical social conditions* exist, there probably will be *widespread acquiescence* to the Church's social teachings. On *sensitive issues* affecting the *distribution of wealth and power*, "there are likely to be dramatically *divergent responses* to the Church's position across social classes, thus limiting the impact of its economically progressive norms" (p. 51; italics added). Moreover, when the hierarchy believes sectarian tendencies are moving too far or too fast, the laity are likely "to react defensively on behalf of *formal Church unity* regardless of the political fallout" (*ibid.*; italics added).

4. Disagreement on Role of Church in Society. As previously discussed, there is a wide disparity of views among the clergy, as well as the laity, regarding the proper role of the Church. As noted by Smith (1975), the traditional sectors of the Latin American Church, including bishops and priests, still embrace the view that (1) there is a clear *division* between the Church and the secular world; (2) *the sacred* and *the secular* are *on separate and distinct levels*; and (3) it is essential for the official Church not to interfere in secular matters (see p. 12). According to this view, faith and religious commitment are essentially personal and individualistic. Moreover, the Church is considered to be a "haven or sanctuary for those seeking refuge from the problems and cares of secular society" (*ibid.*, p. 13).

This view isn't only held by the clergy. For as Turner (1971) observes, it also has many adherents among the laity. According to priest-sociologists Houtart and Pin,

"most Latin Americans see religion as protecting them from the potent forces of nature rather than . . . as a guide to their moral action" (Turner, 1971, pp. 222-23). According to their analysis, "this desire for protection may coincide with desires to avoid hell in the afterlife, to conform to the superficial pattern of religious values in one's village or nation, or to enjoy a sense of participation and belonging in a religious community" (*ibid.*). They conclude that "the Catholic religion has thus operated more in terms of the psychological benefit that individuals derive from it than it has as a device to control behavior in the larger context of society" (*ibid.*).

At the other end of the spectrum is the view embraced by the liberal sectors of the Church. Vatican II calls for "all members of the Church to become more involved with the agonies and struggles of modern man so as to make their own faith more credible and real, and thus act as *catalysts* for the full liberation of all men and women in body and soul" (Smith, 1975, p. 12; italics added). According to this view, the Church is viewed as a "communal sign of justice and liberation in the midst of the world" or as a "community of liberation" (*ibid.*, pp. 12-13).

Smith also observes that "there is often an implicit political position already associated with the ecclesiological [theological view of the nature of the Church] option one chooses" (*ibid.*, p. 13). In this regard, Smith notes that "those opting for the [traditional] . . . model are usually closely associated with the established social order and comfortable with the benefits accruing to the Church from this relationship" (*ibid.*).

On the other hand, those proposing the model of the Church as a "community of liberation" are frequently "more directly involved with the problems of the poor and want the Church to present a more critical challenge at every level against the repressive aspects of existing regimes" (*ibid.*).

a. Emphasis of Evangelical and Pastoral Duties. As previously mentioned regarding the *primacy of the Church's spiritual mission*, the Church hierarchy prefers to concentrate on individual conversions and counseling individuals. Smith (1982), in discussing the Chilean Church, notes that the Chilean hierarchy, like Rome, is preoccupied with the Church's religious mission and is fearful that "too close an identification between sacred and secular activities in pastoral programs could lead a *politicization of faith*" (p. 33; italics added).

On the other hand, priests, and especially nuns and lay leaders, who "more closely identify with concrete struggles of their communities are not as concerned with maintaining distinctions between spiritual and temporal responsibilities of the Church" (*ibid.*). Moreover, they believe that "a closer integration between religious values and *social commitment* makes the Church more credible among marginal sectors of the population" (*ibid.*; italics added).

There also is a disparity of views among Church elites concerning whether or not Liberation Theology is a valid approach for the Church's role as a "global pastor" (*ibid.*, p. 31). Almost two-thirds of the bishops Smith interviewed said that "this new style did not represent a valid image of the faith of the Latin American people" (*ibid.*).

On the other hand, nearly one-half of the priests and nuns, and two-fifths of the lay leaders "were fairly comfortable with this new pastoral orientation, although recognizing that many people could not comprehend its implications" (*ibid.*). Smith also found several bishops who believe that Liberation Theology "is insufficiently spiritual" (*ibid.*).

In addition, the primacy of its spiritual mission impedes the Church from opposing repressive military regimes. As Smith (1986) observes regarding the Chilean

case, "in *no* Latin American country did the church *initially* oppose military overthrow of civilian governments in the 1960s and 1970s, and at the official level it has only (and sometimes inconsistently) moved to a position of critical opposition" (p. 272; italics added).

Smith also notes that division exists within the Church hierarchy and between Catholics of different social classes concerning the proper stance of the church toward the military. The Church's national and international leaders stress the primacy of "keeping the church's energies focused on its religious mission, and will sacrifice other objectives to keep this viable in all types of societies" (*ibid.*).

b. Belief that Christianity and Politics are Fundamentally Different. The belief that Christianity and politics are, by their respective natures, separate and distinct areas of human thought and activity is probably related to *the traditional dichotomy between the spiritual and secular realms*. The spiritual realm involves eternal, unchanging verities and moral absolutes, while the secular realm involves temporary, changing circumstances. *Religion* concerns moral imperatives, while *politics* deals with transitory issues in the world of political expediency.

Because of the many uncertainties and variables in the world of politics, and because the Church seeks to avoid political partisanship, many in the clergy now favor a policy of *disengagement*. In order to be effective, the Church cannot avoid making specific commitments on controversial issues or using its institutional weight to favor some secular causes and oppose others. But Smith (1982) notes that the Church has recently stated that "it is prepared to surrender all vestiges of political power, privileges, and alliances in order to *disengage* itself from partisan entanglements that long have vitiated its *moral credibility* and damaged the performance of its *universal religious mission*" (p. 21; italics added).

According to Sanders (1982), a policy of disengagement is supported by the belief that "Christianity differs from and cannot be identified with *limited and morally ambiguous* political positions" (p. 256; italics added). Sanders recognizes that *disengagement* is difficult because the bishops are pressured to support certain political positions. Often, active, conscientious Catholics insist that their political views are the only truly Christian ones. Also, Sanders finds that "governments seek an unconditional legitimation from the church by using Christian symbols, opposing Marxism or capitalism, and claiming that their policies correspond to the teaching of the church" (*ibid.*).

Sanders concludes by saying that, generally, "the bishops now believe that *fidelity to the mission of the church* requires abandoning the role of political partisanship in order to concentrate on forming a renewed Christian community, especially among the poor" (*ibid.*; italics added).

The factors discussed above also have been cited as part of the rationale for the doctrine of separation of church and state.

c. Reluctance to Assume Adversarial Role. As mentioned above, the Church hierarchy often is reluctant or unwilling to assume an adversarial role in its relations with the state, even a repressive regime. This is partly due to the Church's perceived *primacy* of its spiritual mission. If the Church's ability to function in the religious world is impaired because of its intrusion into politics, that would not be justified.

Moreover, the Church cares for the spiritual needs of individuals from *all classes* of society, whose sociopolitical views cover the entire spectrum. If the Church takes a political position favored by some of its members, it would probably alienate other members who hold different or opposing views.

Furthermore, the Church prefers to *counsel* and relies on *gentle persuasion*, rather than to engage in the kind of vigorous argument and debate that goes on in politics. In other words, the Church doesn't want to be battered, bruised and knocked about in the rough world of practical politics. The Church perceives that *the price* to be paid for confrontation is too high. However, when *the very existence of the Church* is threatened by a repressive regime, the Church is compelled *either* to become politically active, as shown in the Latin American cases, *or* to withdraw completely from a confrontation with the state, as shown in the case of Nazi Germany, in order to assure *its own survival*.

5. National Variations in Religiopolitical Context. There is varying opportunity to influence change available to the Church in each country. As Smith (1975) notes regarding the Latin American examples of Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela, where historically there has been a close Church-state relationship, the hierarchy rarely criticizes established social norms and practices (see p. 14). In this context, the Church's influence for change is not great unless the state initiates or approves of the proposed changes. Likewise, at the other extreme where there is hostility between the Church and state, such as in Cuba and Mexico, the influence of the Church is limited because, as also noted by Smith, "the moral leadership in the country has been preempted by secular institutions" (*ibid.*).

Smith cites Brazil and Chile during the 1960s as being the "most dramatic" example of the Church's influence for change (*ibid.*). As Smith explains, "the Chilean experience . . . indicates that when a fairly independent *Church* with a consistent record in favor of social change shares prominently with a progressive *government* in the articulation of the goals of society, the influence of the Church . . . is quite significant" (*ibid.*). However, the Chilean "honeymoon" did not last. In the

early 1970s, Chilean society became increasingly polarized during the relatively progressive Allende regime. As Smith explains, "the Chilean hierarchy tried to mediate differences among opposing factions [including the Catholic Left and the Catholic Right] without endorsing any specific partisan position or political solution to the nation's chronic socioeconomic problems" (*ibid.*, p. 15). However, the polarization of society and politics became so great that the Church's conciliatory influence could not effect a reconciliation and avert the eventual military coup that led to the repressive Pinochet regime.

Smith finds that the Chilean case provides an important lesson concerning the limiting factor of political consensus. As he sees it, "the Chilean experience indicates that the Church by itself can neither create nor maintain a basic *consensus* for change in a country or set the priorities underlying reforms" (*ibid.*, pp. 15-16; italics added). Smith observes that "the Chilean political system independent of Church influence had long been moving in a direction of reform resulting from vigorous public debate and the growing strength of center and leftist parties" (*ibid.*). According to him, "the Church could effectively exercise supportive moral assistance as long as such a context [set of circumstances] was developing and being sustained by a fundamental agreement of all parties as to the rules of the game for change" (*ibid.*). Smith concludes his analysis by stating that "*once this consensus began to break down and polarization along economic and political lines hardened, the Church's voice as conscience of society was no longer heeded*" (*ibid.*; italics added).

Probably the most extreme examples of this limiting factor are found in the military regimes, such as Brazil, Bolivia, Panama, and Chile (after the coup). As pointed out by Smith, most military regimes "are now attempting to define the norms and goals for development unilaterally" (*ibid.*, p. 16). As he observes, the experience

of the above nations indicates that when the Church and an authoritarian regime *compete* to define the normative values and goals for society, with differing interpretations of justice and human rights, *the government* will make every effort to *limit* the Church's public voice (*ibid.*). Where the government monopolizes *coercive power* and the means of *communication*, and is able to achieve *economic advancement* for middle and upper-income echelons, "there will be a *restricted* voice for the Church and an increasing unwillingness among decision-makers to take its message seriously when it is proclaimed" (*ibid.*; italics added).

These military regimes don't even seem to need *legitimation* by the Church anymore. Smith, quoting Bruneau, states that "there is a growing awareness within the government that a *modern* state does not require the legitimation traditionally provided by the Church" and "the Brazilian government can rely on its *ideology of National Security for legitimation* and has been actively promoting public support for it through both the schools and the mass media" (*ibid.*; italics added). Moreover, "the '*economic miracle*' of the past years has so elated the government that *the Church* can almost be *forgotten* in the process" (*ibid.*; italics added).

Furthermore, Smith notes that when the Brazilian Church hierarchy became openly critical of the regime's socioeconomic policies and practices, and more prophetic in its denunciations of injustice, it resulted in "*government surveillance* of sermons, Church publications, and radio programs; *harassment* of local parish leaders; and *even imprisonment, torture, and sometimes murder of several outspoken priests and laymen*" (*ibid.*, pp. 16-17; italics added). He adds that "surrender of all of its major . . . forms of *influence* (such as schools, newspapers, etc.) not only endangers . . . the Church[']s . . . pastoral ministries . . . , but also severely *limits*

what influence it does have in confronting [social] injustices . . . and educating the public conscience" (*ibid.*, p. 17; italics added).

Smith believes that certain sectors of the Church will become more prophetic, defiant and confrontative as the military regimes of Latin America, such as Brazil, become more repressive. These prophetic sectors may emulate the historic, prophetic Judeo-Christian individuals and sects spawned by equally repressive regimes. They, like their predecessors, may be willing to pay dearly for their actions by ostracism and persecution.

As for *the Church as a whole*, Smith observes that "it is not characteristic of an entire institution as large as the Roman Catholic Church to engage in such dangerous activities, particularly when it has a vast institutional network to protect serving the spiritual needs of so many members" (*ibid.*). He believes that "the bishops are not likely to allow constant confrontation with such [repressive] regimes to become the overriding policy of the Church as a whole" (*ibid.*).

Smith quotes Bishop Garcia of Mexico, who in 1973 "described the debilitating effect of repressive government reactions on the prophetic voice of the Church since the Medellin meeting of 1968" (*ibid.*) as follows:

Among the Catholic hierarchy, Medellin's prophetic voice seems to be fading away. Tortures and sheer weariness are stifling, or at least quieting down, some of the bishops' voice. . . . The menace of Brazilianization hangs over the Church in a number of countries: Bolivia and Paraguay have been so threatened for some years, and now Argentina, Panama and Mexico seem likely to go that same route. There is a genuine danger that the Church's prophetic voice and all its social relevance may be neutralized, that the Church may shrink from confrontation, collaborating instead to preserve a misnamed "order" and an unstable "peace." (*Ibid.*, pp. 17-18)

6. Doctrine of Separation of Church and State. This doctrine, which is discussed in the first section of Chapter Four, provides a legally imposed limitation on the sociopolitical influence of the Church.

B. The "Structural" Level

The limiting factors operating at the "structural" level include:

1. Financial Base of the Church. As noted by Smith (1975), "a major reason why the Church cannot long sustain controversial social and political programs in face of government opposition is that it is heavily dependent upon public finances for a variety of its ministries" (p. 18). Because the Separation Doctrine, as formulated in Latin America, does not require total separation, public financing of Church ministries, especially education, is permitted by law (*ibid.*, p. 19). This education exception is used by repressive military regimes to suppress certain education programs it finds objectionable.

In addition, the Latin American Church has relied greatly on foreign financial assistance, and on the help of foreign missionaries. As noted by Smith, "this reliance carries with it serious organizational problems which limit the Latin American Church's independence and sometimes make it vulnerable to accusations of foreign interventionism" (*ibid.*). This is a serious limitation because foreign priests and nuns have been at the forefront of progressive Church programs benefiting the urban and rural poor.

As mentioned by Smith, "foreign-born priests . . . [who constituted] a rather high proportion of the clerical population throughout Latin America--43 percent in Brazil, 60 percent in Chile, 78 percent in Bolivia [in 1970]," perhaps, are more easily radicalized by seeing the "increasing misery and repression of the poor" than are native clergy, who are more accustomed and resigned to such conditions (*ibid.*). Many foreign-born priests have been imprisoned, exiled or deported, or have left on

their own volition due to "direct pressure or because of physical danger" under accusations that they were guilty of "introducing alien and harmful ideas and methods" or "were responsible for bringing Marxism and class struggle into the country" (*ibid.*, pp. 19-20).

2. Clergy Recruitment and Staffing Pattern. Although, according to Smith (1975), "the Church is the oldest institution on the [Latin American] continent," he finds that "vocations to the priesthood and religious life are declining" (p. 20).

Moreover, "new recruits still come *predominantly* from the *middle and upper sectors of society*, many of whom prefer to serve the needs of their own class" (*ibid.*; italics added). The lower classes are discouraged by "financial and educational disadvantages, as well as the disciplinary requirement of celibacy" and the elitist educational theory which holds that "training children of the upper and middle classes is the most effective way to change the major institutions in a nation" (*ibid.*). Thus, perhaps it is understandable why many in the Church hierarchy find it difficult "to side with the poor and confront head on the long-standing injustices of those with wealth and power" (*ibid.*).

In addition, Smith observes that "even for many of those who work among the poor (most of whom are foreign-born), the spiritual and psychological problems of their parishioners are so overwhelming, and the churches . . . so understaffed, that . . . [most] of their work is strictly pastoral and has little immediate bearing on social or political action" (*ibid.*).

3. International Pressures--the Vatican and other National Churches. The Latin American Church and all other national Churches are part of the Roman Catholic Church, an international organization headquartered at the Vatican in Rome. Regarding the Vatican's ability to control the national Churches, Smith (1975) finds

that "despite recent structural reforms since Vatican II, . . . the Vatican can still wield effective authority over the direction of a particular national church through key appointments or removals of bishops, visits by papal emissaries, and directives and warnings" (p. 21). Such warnings often reflect the Vatican's concerns about the politicization of the Church, especially as perceived in "grassroots pastoral and educational programs since Medellin," and in the "implications of liberation theology" (*ibid.*).

Smith notes the irony of the fact that *the Vatican*, whose pronouncements provided impetus for change during the 1950s and 1960s, "has . . . made recent attempts to exert *its authority* and establish *tighter control over the direction* some structural reforms in the Latin American Church have taken" (*ibid.*, pp. 21-22; italics added).

Along with the benefits and detriments which accrue to *the national Churches* from their relationship *with the Vatican*, the national Churches *also* face problems *with their own governments*. As Smith (1982) points out, "the Roman Church is one of the few organizations in the world that can transmit ideological and material resources to every corner of the globe and also command supranational loyalties from its members" (p. 52). These same attributes also make it vulnerable to regimes preoccupied with issues of national sovereignty or committed to maintaining tight control over their nations' internal development. Thus, Smith concludes that "the Church is faced with the problem of managing activities and objectives with transnational dimensions while simultaneously maintaining credibility as an indigenous institution in each society" (*ibid.*).

In an extreme case, a national Church even may be treated as "a foreigner" in its own country. According to Smith (1975), when the Church goes beyond "cultural

boundaries and localized concerns" to serve the common moral interests of humanity, it may subject itself to the same strong criticism directed at other institutions which attempt to effect change beyond their own borders, e.g., the CIA, multinational corporations, Communist parties, international human rights or environmental groups, etc. (p. 22).

In addition to its own international network, the Latin American Church maintains strong ties with other national Churches around the world, especially in the United States and Europe. These Churches provide financial and human resources, but sometimes their assistance is conditioned upon certain program style and format requirements. As Smith observes, "sometimes the bishops in the North Atlantic regions are not willing to maintain projects in Latin America which have controversial social or political effects and thus alienate sectors of the middle and upper classes" (*ibid.*, pp. 20-21).

C. The "Behavioral" Level

The limiting factors operating at the "behavioral" level include:¹⁰

1. Difficulty of Changing Attitudes and Behaviors. As previously mentioned, it is hard to change long held and deeply ingrained attitudes and beliefs. Smith (1975) hopes that for the Latin American Church the recent doctrinal and structural changes, especially the "new pastoral approaches, emphasizing small worship communities and greater lay participation and leadership" will have "a transforming effect" and will produce "the atmosphere and stimulus" for "new religious and, in turn, social attitudes to mature among Catholics" (p. 22). This would necessarily transform the attitudes and behavior of the entire citizenry, "the overwhelming majority of whom

are at least nominal Catholics" (*ibid.*). One great difficulty facing the Church is trying to bring *unity* to the various social classes, many of whom have narrow attitudes and tend toward clannishness.

2. Limited Nature of Religious Practice. The Church's sociopolitical influence also is diminished by the limited impact of Church programs on actual attitudes and behavior--the choices and lifestyles of the laity. Again referring to the Latin American Church, Smith (1975) notes the disturbing fact that, although the great majority is Catholic, "the number of practicing Catholics who have regular contacts with the Church ranges anywhere from 5 to 20 percent of the total population, depending upon geographical area and social class" (p. 22). Thus, according to Smith, the new liberal theology and practices of the Church mainly impact "the relatively small number of Catholics who practice their faith---the great majority of whom are from the upper and middle classes" (*ibid.*, pp. 22-23).

Smith also points out that studies from North America and Europe show that those who "practice" their religion tend to be *more conservative* than others on social and political issues, and do not readily change their views or behavior simply because they hear sociopolitical sermons or participate in religious worship and prayer (see *ibid.*, p. 23). Concerning United States' and European churchgoers, he reveals that their "social and political convictions . . . are influenced *far more by the economic, personal, or family concerns* which impinge most directly and persistently on their daily lives *than* by the fairly general pronouncements of the Church or the guidance of their pastors on social morality" (*ibid.*; italics added).¹¹

Smith believes that, although the Latin American "cultural and religious context" is different, similar research probably would show their middle and upper classes slow to change, "especially since there has been a long-entrenched tradition of

social irresponsibility and narrow class concern among these sectors" (*ibid.*; italics added). In addition, there is the matter of *divided or prior loyalties*. As Sanders (1970) points out, Latin Americans are, first, Brazilian, Chilean, etc., and second, Catholic (p. 196).

These observations seem to suggest that the following subjects need further research: (1) the conservative tendency of the Church faithful; (2) the progressive movements within the Church, including opposition movements, in terms of the participants' religiopolitical "commitment" rather than the "practice" of their religion; and (3) the class composition of Church members.

3. Fear of Change. The Church is not immune from the "fear of change" factor. As Turner (1971) points out, "fear works as one of the prime motivating forces in human affairs and, although its effects are now muted in the material abundance of the developed societies, it continues to underlie change in the Catholic Church" (p. 222). Turner adds that "Catholics fear secularism, Protestantism, and communism; as they become more acutely aware of the forces of the secular world, they fear the population explosion as well" and "each of these forces appears to threaten the Church in both an institutional and an ideological sense" (*ibid.*).

D. Conclusion

In conclusion, the observations of Brian Smith, one of the leading scholars on the Church-state relationship in Latin America, perhaps best summarize the foregoing discussion of the factors limiting the Church's sociopolitical influence and their effects. As Smith (1982) reminds us, the Church is not a "monolithic" institution (p. 62). There are not only "different levels of obligation" in the Church's teachings, but

also a considerable "diversity of action choices" available, based upon those teachings (*ibid.*).

Leadership positions also are diversified, resulting in different attitudes and perspectives, dependent upon the varying degrees of responsibility. There also is considerable variation in the degree of commitment of Church members to sociopolitical ideas and activities, depending upon the extent of their involvement in the Church and in their other interests and activities (*ibid.*).

Basic religious considerations place definite limits on the Church's ability to adapt and change. As observed by Smith, (1) "the transmission of certain immutable doctrines," (2) "the belief that salvation is for all people," and (3) "the importance of formal religious *unity* among members" lead to the following essential attributes of the Church: (1) "specific binding force of a few clearly defined dogmas," (2) "hierarchical structures of authority," (3) "diverse membership patterns," and (4) "transnational organizational linkages" (*ibid.*; italics added). Smith notes that although there have been "variations (and inconsistencies) in the functioning of these components . . . over time," Church history clearly demonstrates "that Rome and the hierarchy will firmly resist developments that in principle challenge or underline any of them" (*ibid.*).

Moreover, since Vatican II, the *perennial disagreements, conflicts and dilemmas within the Church* have intensified because of its "*greater involvement in secular development*" (*ibid.*; italics added). Smith also finds that the Church's increased "willingness to use its national and international capacities *prophetically* in favor of justice and human dignity" and to promote its "values of freedom, participation, and equality" have caused the Church "to experience both *greater*

internal dilemmas and more tension with secular powers that are unavoidable" (*ibid.*, pp. 62-63; italics added).

Finally, Smith concludes that "where *the Church* is a surrogate for other social institutions curtailed by an authoritarian regime, *its capacity to act as a consistent opposition force to the state* will also be determined by the interaction of its key *normative, structural, and behavioral components* with secular forces" (*ibid.*, p. 64; italics added).

If it [the Church] "can articulate norms that are sufficiently forceful to delegitimize public authority, maintain authority flows and protect its structures, preserve basic unity among its formal adherents, and maintain autonomous resource bases, *then* it could be a *crucial factor* in blunting repression" (*ibid.*; italics added).

On the other hand, if the Church's "leadership or membership is seriously divided or if its resources can be curtailed by the State, its *impact* on public policy could be limited and the *willingness* of the hierarchy to risk sustained and open confrontation with the state *[is] diminished*" (*ibid.*; italics added).

Therefore, it is very important to analyze the foregoing *normative, structural, and behavioral* factors limiting the Church's sociopolitical influence in order to gain a realistic assessment of the Church's political role and pattern of influence.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Another observer, Edward L. Cleary, O. P., seems to disagree on this categorization of Jacques Maritain. In his book, *Crisis and Change: The Church in Latin America Today* (1985), Cleary agrees that Maritain "influenced several generations of Latin American intellectuals and Catholic actionists," and "indirectly affected Latin Americans through teachers and writers" (p. 66). Cleary admits that "liberation theology deeply roots itself in neo-scholasticism" (*ibid.*). However, he considers Maritain to be an advocate for traditional Catholic theology and neo-scholasticism. Cleary apparently regards neo-scholasticism as traditional theology, unlike Sanders, who regards it as liberal theology. Consider Cleary's following statements:

Maritain captures well the spirit of traditional Catholic thought (*ibid.*).

.
Maritain represents a frame of mind that has disappeared from most Catholic seminaries and universities in Latin America. But that traditional caste of mind continues a vestigial existence in right-wing Catholics of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Central America . . . And it continues among military men who formed or passed on the doctrine of national security. Brazilian and Argentinean presidents and military commanders regularly make appeals for order and stability on the basis of Catholic integralism (Western Christian civilization vaguely undergirded by Scholasticism) (*ibid.*, p. 67).

According to the above statement by Cleary, Maritain not only influenced conservative elements, but reactionary military men and politicians as well. Maritain would not have intended his ideas to be used as doctrinal support by these latter groups.

2. The differences in attitudes and concerns within these Catholic elites, i.e., between bishops and the lower clergy, and among the laity, will be discussed later in this section, as another factor contributing to division within the Church.

3. The Council of Trent (1545-63) preceded the First Vatican Council (1869-70) and the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). According to McBrien (1981), the Council of Trent was "a major ecumenical council held in northern Italy in the immediate aftermath of the Protestant Reformation and for the purpose of confronting, however belatedly, the crisis created by the Reformation" (p. 42).

4. Also see Chapters 3 and 6 of Smith (1982) for an additional discussion of Catholic Integralists in Chile.

5. For a brief discussion of Maritain, see Cleary, 1985, pp. 65-67. As previously mentioned, Sanders seems to disagree with the categorization of Maritain as a Conservative (also see note #1).

6. The book, *Church: Charism and Power: Liberation Theology and the Institutional Church*, was originally published in Brazil in 1981 under the title *Igreja: Carisma e poder*. Its English translation was published in the United States in 1985. Rev. Leonardo Boff was recalled by the Vatican in 1984 because of this book, and was investigated by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, notable theologian and Cardinal Prefect of

the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (the former Holy Office), which is the most important Vatican curial office working for the preservation and promotion of Catholic orthodoxy. After a long conversation, Boff was ordered not to express his theological views. Boff was released from this prohibition two years later when the *Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation* was issued. While not treating Liberation Theology directly, it seems to have been intended to counter tendencies that the earlier Instruction ascribed to Liberation Theology and to ground any discussion of liberation on a truly Christian basis, guided by the Magisterium of the Church (McGovern, 1990, p. 43).

7. According to McGovern,

some commentators questioned the fairness of Ratzinger's description of liberation theology. At times he seems to "read into" liberation theologians far more than they state (for example, none of them, to my knowledge, equates the Kingdom of God with earthly progress, denies the seriousness of personal sin, or claims that "class struggle is the driving force of history"). Some also questioned how much Cardinal Ratzinger's statements reflect the views of Pope John Paul II, though they certainly share the same concerns The fact that some leading liberation theologians (Gutierrez, Boff) applauded this newer instruction [i.e., *Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation* issued in 1986] suggests, however, that they do not consider it a condemnation of their views. (p. 43)

8. Turner (1971) seems to be more pessimistic than Sanders concerning the effectiveness of the Progressives and Radicals. Consider his following comment:

Because the Church is a source of at least tacit loyalty for so many Latin Americans, groups with very different *political ideologies* try to justify their position in terms of *Church doctrine*. This is *especially* true of the *conservatives* who oppose all social change, and a large part of the thought which is most self-consciously and most vociferously "Catholic" in Latin America represents nothing more than the attempt of *right-wing ideologues* to use the Church in defense of the status quo. *Catholic progressives*, who try to win legitimacy for their approaches to contemporary problems by claiming that the approaches merely apply Christian humanism to modern society, are continually thrown back by these *conservatives* and by the real weight of *tradition* in Latin American Catholicism. Traditionalists and reactionaries stand in positions of authority both inside and outside the Church, and the force of their authority works to circumscribe the new Catholic orientations. (p. 96; italics added)

9. These limitations of the Church at the normative level are also related to the theological spectrum, diversity and division within the Church, and the differences in roles and attitudes between bishops and the lower clergy, and among the laity.

10. Smith (1975) also includes the "Pervasiveness of 'Popular Catholicism'" as another problem facing the Latin American Church at the behavioral level, and discusses the new phenomenon of "Popular Catholicism" in Latin America. He points out the issue regarding the remarkable growth of Christian Base Communities (comunidades de base) outside the official Church--which have vastly spread among

the Latin American urban and rural poor as small-group meetings for prayer and discussion (pp., 23-24); also see Chapter Four, Note #14). This issue seems not or not yet to be applicable to the case of the South Korean Church.

PART TWO

**THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA (1974-89)
AND CONCLUSIONS**

CHAPTER SIX

THE HISTORY OF CHURCH AND STATE RELATIONS IN SOUTH KOREA, 1784-1979

The Catholic Church in Korea is marked by its unique origin, its horrifying persecutions, and its amazingly rapid growth (Chang Myon, Former Prime Minister).

The conservative Christian majority in Korea stresses spiritual questions and tends to avoid conflict over temporal issues. . . . In the political realm, the mainstream church "renders unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" and heeds the Apostle Paul's advice in Romans 25:40: "He who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed." Nevertheless . . . the Christian church has been involved in politics (Clark, 1986, p. 39).

I. INTRODUCTION

The Catholic Church in South Korea celebrated its 200th Anniversary in 1984 and began its 3rd century of evangelization. For those two centuries, the South Korean Church influenced society and the state, and in turn was influenced by sociopolitical realities. The purpose of this section is to present a historical overview of how, on the one hand, Church-state relations influenced sociopolitical realities and how, on the other hand, Church-state relations were influenced by those realities in South Korea. This overview will show that Church-state relations in South Korea are comparable in many ways to the Church-state relations in the other Third World countries studied. The following are important theoretical considerations for an analysis of Church-state relations in South Korea.

First, Church and state relations will be explored by examining the overlapping relationship between the religious world and the political world. Regarding the overlap between these two worlds, it is crucial to analyze the *conflict*

between the theological/social teachings of the Church and the dominant national ideologies of the times, such as Confucianism of the Yi Dynasty (from the late 15th century to the early 20th century), and the political dogmata of authoritarian regimes in the post-liberation era (after 1945), i.e., anti-Communism, national security, and economic development. Similarly, the relationship between religion and politics in each period will be examined in terms of the Church's theological response to the state's ideology. It also should be mentioned that the doctrine of separation of church and state, espoused by both the Church and the state has been an important factor influencing Church-state relations.

Second, as for theoretical considerations concerning the nature of the relationship between religion and politics, the three types of relationship between the religious world and the real world, as presented by Robert N. Bellah, will be helpful. As previously mentioned in Chapter Three, according to Bellah (1965), "most religions have all three tendencies--*fusion*, *disjunction*, and *creative tension* between religious ideals and the world--in some sort of combination" (p. 193; italics added). He further states that "the situation in which progress is most likely to be advanced seems to be that in which transcendent ideals, in tension with empirical reality, have a central place in the religious symbol systems, while empirical reality itself is taken very seriously as at least potentially meaningful, valuable, and a valid sphere for religious action" (*ibid.*, 1965, p. 194). This section will examine and discuss Bellah's concept that the condition which is favorable to sociopolitical change and progress is when "creative tension" exists between the religious world and the real world, or between religion and politics, as represented by Church and state. If Bellah's concept is valid, then a conflictive relationship between religion and politics, or between Church and state, can be the catalyst for sociopolitical change.

This study will show that "creative tension" between religion and politics existed during the early period of the Church in Korea (for this view, see Rho, Kilmyung, 1987, pp. 58-59), and also during the period of the Church's sociopolitical involvement in the 1970s and 1980s, as also will be mentioned later in Chapters Seven and Eight. The long tenure of the traditional Yi Dynasty prior to the introduction of Catholicism can be characterized as a relationship of "fusion" between religion (Confucianism) and politics (the policies of Confucianism as the state religion) or the union of Church and state. Thereafter, the Church and State officially became separated from each other under the doctrine of separation of church and state. Perhaps, the most common type of relationship between religion and sociopolitical realities in the modern era is either "disjunction" or "creative tension." However, it should be noted that even when "disjunction" exists between religion and sociopolitical realities, the Church cannot remain aloof and unaffected by the state. In actuality, either of two types of relationship tends to exist between the Church and state, i.e., either collaboration/support or conflict/opposition. One could that "disjunction" existed between the Church and the sociopolitical and national realities of Korea during the period of Japanese colonial rule because during that period the Church mostly abdicated its role as the *Korean* Church. This period of relative Church silence can be characterized as "disjunction" between religion and politics or the separation of Church and state. It is fair to say that the interim period between the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945 and the early 1970s can be characterized as the Church's gradual "awakening" to sociopolitical realities. It also can be said that during the early 1970s the condition of "creative tension" began to exist between religion and politics. The Church began to stand alone vis-a-vis the state and try to

solve sociopolitical and national problems *from its own perspective*, exemplifying the *relative autonomy of religion vis-a-vis politics*.

The South Korean Church has tended to be politically conservative throughout most of its history. The prophetic role-players of the Church--who have made a difference in the Church history--have been a *minority* of clergy and laymen, rather than the Church as a whole, as often has been observed in the conflict within the Church over sociopolitical issues (CJPRI, 1990, p. 19).

This study proceeds by examining the following three periods: (1) the period of the beginnings, the persecutions, and the establishment of the Catholic Church in Korea (1784-1910); (2) the period of Japanese colonial rule and silence of the Church (1910-1945); and (3) the awakening of the Church (1945-1968). During the first two periods, i.e., from the beginning of Catholicism in Korea until the end of Japanese colonial rule, the Church was not active in the sociopolitical arena. During the next period, i.e., from the Liberation (1945) throughout the 1960s, and continuing into the early 1970s, the Church was gradually "awakened" and became more sociopolitically conscious (CJPRI, 1990, p. 275).

During the 1970s and 1980s, especially under the Yushin System of Park Chung-hee (1972-79) and under the Fifth Republic of Chun Doo-hwan (1981-88), the Church finally "blossomed" into a more sociopolitically active Church, as will be seen in the case studies of Chapters Seven and Eight. This chapter concludes with an overview of sociopolitical conditions during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and of Church-state relations in the 1970s, as a prelude to those case studies.

II. THE BEGINNINGS, THE PERSECUTIONS, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN KOREA (1784-1910)

During the late 17th century and throughout the 18th century, significant socioeconomic and sociopolitical changes began to take place in Korea. It was during 1784, in the midst of these changes, that Catholicism was first introduced to Korea as an alternative to Confucianism. Confucianism served as both the religion and ideology of the Korean state under the then ruling Yi Dynasty.

Confucianism provided an all-inclusive ideological base, as well as an all-encompassing religion, for the dynastic state. It also dictated the integrated structure of all non-religious sociopolitical institutional arrangements, and furnished the basis for education, political recruitment, social status and hierarchical order. Under this "social fusion," where the religious world and the sociopolitical world were not differentiated from each other, any challenge to or deviation from Confucianism was regarded not only as a religious attack upon the Confucian order, but also as political treason against the state (Rho, Kil-myung, 1987, pp. 57-58).

The sociopolitical situation in the 17th and 18th centuries was characterized by the increasing monopoly of political power by a select few lineages of *yangban* (traditional aristocracy of the Yi Dynasty), resulting in the increasing frustration and alienation of the many *yangban* who were excluded from the country's governing process (Lee, 1990, p. 164). The breakdown of the traditional feudalistic status system in Korean society was accelerated by the socioeconomic changes which were occurring at the same time.

For example, in the countryside, peasants were becoming wealthy through "large-scale farming." Due to the advancements in agricultural technology in the early 17th century, including a double-cropping system supported by many newly constructed reservoirs, some peasants became agricultural entrepreneurs. Their produce was enough not only for their own consumption, but also for the market.

These peasants also accumulated wealth through the commercial production of specialized crops such as ginseng, tobacco, and cotton, some of which was exported to China and Japan (*ibid.*, pp. 159-61). Domestic markets throughout the country also prospered. During the 18th century, there were new markets established at over 1,000 locations, in addition to the long established larger ones (*ibid.*, p. 162).

During the same period, urban areas also experienced significant changes. For example, wholesale merchants in Seoul and throughout the country amassed considerable fortunes through their control of trade. These private merchants were actively engaged not only in local Korean business, but also in international trade. Much of their wealth was derived from their trade with China and Japan, involving Korean ginseng, Chinese silver, and Japanese copper (*ibid.*, pp. 161-62). At the same time, artisans and craftsmen, including furriers and knife makers began to produce and sell goods on their own in competition with licensed merchants and exempt from government control (*ibid.*, pp. 163-64). Moreover, the minting of copper coins, which began in 1678, resulted in the wider use of metal currency. As a result, merchants began to lend their monies at high interest, further enhancing their wealth as well as accelerating the commercialization of production (*ibid.*, p. 163).

Unfortunately these newly emerging economic forces were adverse to poor peasants and small merchants, who were forced either to give up their lands or to be ruined financially by soaring prices (*ibid.*, p. 164).

The five-century-old closed-door policy regarding the Western world ended after Prince Regent Taewòn'gun retired from his rulership in 1873. His consistent policy of anti-Western isolationism was replaced by a more realistic policy adopted by Queen Min and the Min family, and continued by King Kojong. Realistically appraising the international situation as its influence increased during its reign, the

Min family opened Korea's doors to Western powers. During the reign of King Kojong, the Korean government finally approved the Korean-Japanese Treaty of Amity at Kang-hwa Island in 1876. Thus, the five-century-old closed-door policy was officially terminated and Korea was opened to foreign trade. As a result, Western civilization was introduced to Korea and further transformed Korean society (Kim and Chung, 1988, p. 340). Following this treaty with Japan, also during the reign of King Kojong, similar treaties were concluded with other great powers as follows: in 1882, Korea concluded treaties with the United States, Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany; in 1884, Korea entered into treaties with Italy and Russia; and in 1886, a treaty with France was concluded. After Korea opened its doors to foreign trade, all of these nations stationed diplomatic representatives in Seoul, and the Kingdom of Korea finally ended its long period of seclusion to become a part of the international community of nations (*ibid.*, pp. 340-41).

It was in this period of socioeconomic upheaval that Catholicism first was introduced to Korea, and eventually accommodated as an alternative to Confucianism. Unlike India and Japan where Catholicism took root through the efforts of Jesuit missionaries, Catholicism arrived in Korea as the result of the independent intellectual efforts of Korean scholars, who were engaged in what is known today as "Practical Learning" (or *Sirhak*) (CJPRI, 1990, pp. 20-21; Lee, 1990, p. 164). As noted by observers of Korean Church history, one of the special facts about the founding of the Church in Korea is that "the Catholic religion was first embraced by our Korean forefathers not in a passive response to the teaching of foreign missionaries but as an active and positive result of their zeal in the search for truth" (Kim and Chung, 1988, p. 18)¹ (for additional details concerning the unique beginnings of Korean Catholicism, see Note #1; also see Baker, 1983).

As serious socioeconomic problems began to arise, some educated members of Korean society, known today as scholars of "Practical Learning" (or *Sirhak*), began to seriously reflect on the inherent contradictions of Confucianism. The chief scholars were members of the Southern (*Namin*) faction who largely had been excluded from the governmental process (Lee, 1990, pp. 164-65).

In the beginning, Catholic converts mostly came from disaffected *yangban* (traditional aristocracy of the Yi Dynasty), and especially from among the *Namin*. The actual birth of the Korean Church is considered to have occurred with the baptism of Yi Sung-hun by a Western Catholic priest at Peking in 1784. Yi had accompanied his father's diplomatic entourage on a trip to China. Following Yi's return from Peking in 1784, and during the next few years under King Chôngjo's reign (1776-1800), the number of converts increased rapidly, especially among the *Namin* and the *Chungin* (technical specialists) (*ibid.*, p. 170).

However, after the Catholic Persecution of 1791, the number of *yangban* converts decreased. Subsequently, the majority of converts came from among the *Chungin*, who generally were people of commoner status, such as peasants, craftsmen, or those engaged in commerce. After the Catholic Persecution of 1801, when even these people of commoner status were martyred, poor people of the lower class made up the majority of the Church (CJPRI, 1990, p. 22). In addition, a substantial number of converts came from among wage laborers. The increase in the number of women adherents also was noteworthy. Most of the faithful were urban dwellers rather than rural villagers (Lew, 1990, p. 183). Thus, it is fair to say that Catholicism mainly attracted the disaffected, disadvantaged and oppressed members of society.

From the beginning, the Church struggled for religious freedom and suffered severe persecution by the state which sought to defend and enforce its dominant ideology, Confucianism (CJPRI, 1990, p. 275). The Catholic creed, in emphasizing the equality of all people as the children of God, attracted Koreans to Catholicism, but angered the state, resulting in severe persecution of the Church. Based upon the tenet that every human being is a child of God, many people of non-aristocratic origin, including women, were attracted to Catholicism as a basis for equality with the *yangban*. These people also were motivated by the Catholic vision of an afterlife, i.e., the Kingdom of God.

Another factor which placed Korean Catholics in jeopardy was the controversy regarding the traditional rites of "Ancestor Worship." In May, 1790, a Korean Catholic was sent to Peking to request that the Church of Peking send a priest to Korea as soon as possible, and to inquire about the traditional rites of ancestor-worship and other controversial and difficult points. The Bishop in Peking responded by promising to send a priest to Korea soon, and by declaring the practice of the traditional rites of ancestor-worship to be heretical (Kim and Chung, 1988, p. 31).

As discussed in the book, *Catholic Korea: Yesterday and Today* (Kim and Chung, 1988), although the young Church was greatly heartened by the promise of a priest in the near future, many Korean Catholics were placed in a difficult position by this prohibition of ancestor-worship. Practice of these rites was an ancient tradition extending back for many generations. Ancestor-worship was indeed the foundation of national morals and state discipline, and any failure to comply with its requirements, or even any criticism of it, was considered as treason and blasphemy for which no punishment could be too severe. Enemies of the Church now had another reason for the persecution of Catholics and, perhaps, even the destruction of the Church. Some

less courageous Catholics were so shocked by this vital issue that they abandoned their faith (*ibid.*).

Therefore, the Church's concepts and practices were regarded by the state and the ruling class as threats to the ideological foundation of society (Lew, 1990, pp. 183-84; CJPRI, 1990, pp. 21-22). The ban on ancestor-worship often was used by Confucian politicians as a pretext for their persecution of Catholics (Kim and Chung, 1988, p. 31). From the Catholic viewpoint, martyrdom not only was a result of the persecution that Catholics had to undergo in order to defend their faith. It also was the strongest weapon available to them to challenge the unequal and unjust Confucian sociopolitical order (CPAJ, 1985, p. 18).

During this period, Catholics suffered severe persecution, especially in 1801, 1839, 1846, and 1866. In 1801, Father Chou Wen-mo and many other Catholics were martyred. Father Chou was the first Catholic missionary to Korea. He came to Korea from Peking in 1795 to pursue his religious activities (Kim and Chung, 1988, pp. 48-93). In 1839, 3 foreign priests and many Korean converts were executed. In 1866, 9 French missionaries and about 8,000 Korean converts were martyred (Lew, 1990, p. 184, p. 195; also see Kim and Chung, 1988, pp. 136-87, 239-316). It also was in this context that the first Korean priest, Kim Tae-gòn, suffered martyrdom in 1846. He secretly had returned to Korea after seminary training in Macao and just had begun to preach (Lew, 1990, p. 184; also see Kim and Chung, 1988, pp. 188-229).

Catholicism slowly was being accepted by the Korean people who were becoming increasingly alienated from the Confucian state of the Yi Dynasty during this period of rapid socioeconomic change. During this period, the leaders of Korean churches sought to reform society by confronting the Confucian social world of social

inequality with Christian values based on social equality (Rho, Kil-myung, 1987, p. 89). According to Rho (1987),

it seems that the early Korean Church tried to maintain "*creative tension*" between "*social fusion*" and "*disjunction*" (Bellah's terms). Neither did the leaders of the early Church try to fuse their religion into the reality, nor did they avoid social participation by pursuing disjunction of religion from the real world. In other words, neither did they pursue a society where religion and politics are integrated based on Catholicism, nor did they immerse themselves in the belief of afterlife aloof from the reality. At least, until the 1801 Persecution, while they regarded the real world as a realm where religious meanings and values work, they also emphasized the transcendent attribute of religion which produces tension with the real world. The early Catholics, on the one hand, emphasized the freedom and equality of human beings and tried to break down the unequal status system of the day, and they also pursued differentiation of politics from religion, on the other. The point is that their Catholic movement tried to maintain *tension between social fusion* based on religious values *and disjunction* based on separation of religion from politics. Thus, they aimed to change the status quo through their pursuit of the *creative tension* between the two. (Rho, Kil-myung, 1987, pp. 58-59; italics added)

How did the "open-door policy" affect religion in Korea? After the signing of the Korean-Japanese Treaty at Kang-hwa in 1876, the government began to abandon its policy of anti-Catholic persecution, even though some persecution still occurred sporadically, mostly by ignorant officials in outlying districts (Kim and Chung, 1988, p. 340). It is true that religious freedom for Catholic believers is attributable indirectly to the Korean-Japanese Treaty, and directly to the Korean-French Treaty in 1886 (CPAJ, 1985, p. 19). Because of the guarantees of treaties entered into under the "open-door policy," the free exercise of religion was encouraged. For example, according to Paragraph Two of Article Four of the treaty with Great Britain and Ireland, "British merchants shall be authorized to build their houses and set up business establishments in the places designed in the foregoing paragraphs. They shall also be permitted to practice their religion in freedom." The treaty with France contained a similar provision for the benefit of its citizens (Kim and Chung, 1988, p. 341). As observed by Catholic scholars of the Korean Church, the French treaty gave

added momentum to the Korean Church because, for the first time, it allowed complete freedom of movement to French missionaries, at least within the specified areas open for trade. The French treaty was exactly 102 years since the establishment of the Korean Church, 55 years since its becoming a Vicariate Apostolic, and 50 years since the arrival of the first French missionary in Korea. During these years, both Korean and French Catholics had carried on their activities to open up Korea to the world in secret. Finally, they saw their desire realized. This marked a great victory for the Church (*ibid.*).

Specifically, freedom of religion for the Korean Church, having been tacitly approved by the Korean-French Treaty of 1886, was affirmed in 1899 by a subsequent treaty entered into between Bishop Mutel, as head of the Vicariate Apostolic of Korea, and a representative of the Korean government. This treaty also approved the doctrine of separation of Church and State, as well as freedom of religion for foreign missionaries and for the Korean people (CJPRI, 1990, p. 25; also see Ch'oe, 1982, pp. 129-33).

One of the most important results of this new freedom was that it then became possible to train "native" clergy, thus enabling the Korean people to carry on the work of their Church by themselves, without the assistance of foreigners. Several Korean seminarians were sent abroad to the seminary in Penang, Malaysia for additional training after the Korean-Japanese Treaty in 1876. They came back to Korea as native clergy. The Church also continued to be aided by foreign missionaries, several more of whom arrived in Korea in due course (Kim and Chung, 1988, pp. 341-42). By 1900, the Church had made great progress. The number of clergy amounted to 52 priests, 12 of whom were Korean and the remaining 40 were

French. In addition, 41 new parishes were formed, and the number of faithful increased to 42,000 (*ibid.*, p. 346).

However, this "great victory for the Church" (*ibid.*, p. 341) also can be approached from a critical perspective, as was done by the CPAJ, as follows: They argue that because the Korean Church's freedom of religion was obtained, indirectly by the Korean-Japanese Treaty of Amity at Kang-hwa Island in 1876, and directly by the Korean-French Treaty on June 4, 1886, the Church's religious freedom was granted by foreign powers instead of by the Korean government. Moreover, this religious freedom was obtained as a by-product of treaties which were primarily intended to guarantee the religious freedom of foreign missionaries, rather than the Korean faithful. As a result, the Korean Church was placed under the guidance of conservative foreign clergies headed by Archbishop Mutel, who were primarily concerned with the Church's continuity and safety. The Korean faithful already had suffered about 100 years of persecution. The Korean Church finally had surfaced from underground and was being transformed into a static church. The Church mostly tended to build and enlarge church buildings and avoid any tension and conflict with the state. This can be interpreted psychologically as a reflex action by the Church after enduring a long period of severe persecution (CPAJ, 1985, p. 19).

These tendencies of the Korean Church during the final stage of the Yi Dynasty were resurrected by the Church during the period of Japanese colonialism (1910-45) (*ibid.*). In its pursuit of the separation of Church and state, the Church tried to be indifferent about political matters, and instead concentrated on inculcating the faithful with the transcendental belief of happiness in the next life (CJPRI, 1990, p. 20). It also is noteworthy that foreign missionaries sought closer ties with the state after the Church was granted freedom of religion. For example, Prince Regent

Taewòn'gun, who was infamous for his severe persecution of the Church, visited French bishop Blanc to ask the bishop's forgiveness for what he had done. Moreover, Bishop Mutel occasionally visited King Kojong to solicit the King's opinions. Because the Church needed to be reconstructed and revitalized after the long period of persecution, it probably was necessary for its leaders to be on good terms with the state.

Another aspect of the close cooperative relationship between the conservative Church and political leaders is that the Church leaders were persuaded to deter Catholic believers from engaging in any kind of religious or political movement aimed at changing the status quo. Thus, it can be said that the doctrine of separation of Church and state and the close relationship between top religious and political leaders worked together to deter the Church from being an influential agent for sociopolitical change. This alienated the Church from the aspirations of the Korean people, and it also caused society to become detached from religion (Rho, 1983, pp. 208-09).

Despite the foregoing problems, the Church continued to pursue its goal of evangelization which stressed human dignity, equality and freedom. The Church began to contribute significantly to the modernization and humanization of society. Because it enjoyed relative freedom of action, the Church began to engage openly in social welfare, e.g., caring for orphans, the aged, and the sick, and educating seminarians and the youth. As a result, modern social welfare institutions for orphans and the elderly were established for the first time in Korea in 1885. The Church also became very active in its medical and publication activities. Even though the foregoing activities were constrained by the social structure at the time and were promoted mainly from the perspective of foreign missionaries who tended to identify

evangelization with Westernization, it still is true that the Church contributed much to the modernization of society (CJPRI, 1990, pp. 23-24).

III. JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE AND SILENCE OF THE CHURCH (1910-1945)

As previously mentioned, from its early beginnings the Church advocated the equality of all people across class lines. This caused tension in the feudalistic Korean society and contributed to its eventual breakdown. The Church's approach could be interpreted simply as another psychological reflex action to the state's persecution (CPAJ, 1985, p. 19). As a result of this persecution, the Church failed to infuse lower class with a sense of autonomous identity which it needed in order for there to be a breakdown of the feudal social structure. Also, because the Korean Church long had been under the guidance of foreign missionaries, it failed to develop an autogenous ability of its own. It also failed to develop any vision for Korean society as a whole, other than westernization based on western ethnocentrism. All of these factors prevented the Church from opposing Japanese colonialism (CJPRI, 1990, pp. 275-76).

In terms of Church-state relations during the period of Japanese colonial rule (1910-45), it generally can be stated that the Church maintained official silence. This official silence requires the following explanation and qualification:

First, some sectors of the Church regarded the Japanese colonial government in Korea as the legitimate and legal Korean state. This included the French bishops and missionaries who were guiding and, in effect, leading the Church during this period, as well as other foreign missionaries. The official attitudes and policies of the

Church during this period were those of its foreign missionaries, rather than of its general Korean membership (Rho, Young-tack, 1987, p. 91, pp. 95-101).

Second, the doctrine of separation of Church and state, embraced by both the Church and the Japanese colonial state, resulted in the Church's implicit and sometimes explicit acceptance of the status quo--domination by the Japanese colonial government. As will be discussed later, the Church used this doctrine to not only officially detach itself from politics in general, but also to avoid participation in the nationalistic campaigns of the Korean people. Perhaps the greatest or only concerns of the Church under the guidance of French bishops were (1) how to maintain religious freedom for the Church, and (2) how to carry on well under Japanese rule. The foreign bishops were not the least bit concerned about who actually was governing Korea. The Church officially simply sought to avoid any conflict or tension with the state.

Third, it should be noted that some Korean priests and believers, who had a national consciousness of their own, did not keep entirely silent during the colonial period. After the end of the Yi Dynasty, they carried on nationalistic campaigns for education and enlightenment. There already were many schools run by Catholic parishes. As of 1900, there were 61 schools run by 40 parishes. As of 1910, the year of the Japanese annexation of Korea, there were 124 schools run by 54 parishes (*Korean Catholic Encyclopedia*, a separate-volume supplement, pp. 63-66). These schools aimed to teach students basic and practical subjects which were useful to Korean society. The schools run by Catholic parishes were an important addition to the large number of private schools, many of them founded by Protestant missionaries, which were established in the latter part of the 19th century. Private schools were founded in even greater numbers after Korea became a Japanese

protectorate in 1905. This suggests the close connection in Korean minds between education and patriotic nationalistic resistance to Japanese colonialism (Lew, 1990, p. 247; also see pp. 247-49). In addition to education and enlightenment, these nationalistic campaigns also included raising and serving in a "righteous army" (*uibyòng*) to fight against the Japanese army. Several Korean Catholic priests encouraged and supported the anti-Japanese movements, including the March First Movement [the March 1, 1919 Independence Movement]. There also were laymen, such as An Chung-gùn, the assassin of Japanese statesman Ito Hirobumi, who actively participated in anti-Japanese nationalistic movements, including the campaign for "Redemption of the National Debt" and the education campaigns (*ibid.*, p. 245). These anti-Japanese nationalistic movements were carried on in opposition to the official policies of the Church and its foreign missionaries (CJPRI, 1990, pp. 25-28; CPAJ, 1985, p. 20).

The Church under French bishop Mutel officially adopted the doctrine of separation of Church and state favored by the Japanese colonial government. The purpose of this policy was twofold: (1) to prevent religious organizations in Korea from participating in political and nationalistic movements; and (2) to deter Korean nationalists from using religious organizations for their nationalistic movements. The Japanese government paid particular attention to the *Cheondo-kyo* (*Ch'òndogyo*) [Religion of the Heavenly Way] and the Protestant leaders who led the March First Movement in 1919. The Japanese did not regard the Catholic Church as a serious obstacle to their rule, because the Church neither had officially engaged in nationalistic campaigns nor had officially participated in the March 1 Independence Movement (Rho, Young-tack, 1987, p. 92). The French bishops of the Korean Church already had recognized the Japanese colonial government (the Government-

General of Korea) as the legal government of Korea. They had aligned themselves with the foreign policy of the French government, which regarded the Japanese colonization of Korea as a legal arrangement approved by the Western powers. They even believed that it was "lucky" for the Koreans, who they considered to be incapable of governing themselves, to be governed by Japan (*ibid.*, p. 93). This attitude led them to criticize and condemn the Korean people for the March First Movement. Bishop Mutel of the Seoul Diocese stated that "we Catholics, by not participating in the Movement, showed an example of loyalty to the existing government," and another French bishop, who was in charge of the Taegu Diocese, stated that "since the Japanese colonial government is a legal government, we Catholics have rendered unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's" (*ibid.*).

Another good example of the Church's official attitude toward Japanese colonial rule is found in the issue of the so-called *Shinto* shrine worship [worshipping *Shinto* at a *Shinto* shrine]. *Shinto* shrine worship already had been such a troublesome issue for the Japanese Church that an inquiry was sent to the Vatican. The Pope's answer, which was received in September, 1932, basically agreed with the earlier decisions by the Japanese bishops (CPAJ, 1985, p. 20). The Pope stated that it was permissible for Catholic believers to attend *Shinto* worship, for the reason that it was a non-religious activity for the Japanese people to express their patriotism and loyalty to the Emperor of Japan. The Vatican also affirmed that Church affairs and state affairs should be separated from each other. The Japanese government officially approved the Japanese Catholic Church in May, 1941, bringing the Church more under its control. These Church-state relations in Japan were transported to Korea. One could say that the Korean Church acted like a branch of the Japanese Church (Rho, Young-tack, 1987, p. 102). In 1936, *Shinto* worship was declared by both the

Japanese government and Japanese bishops to be a non-religious activity for the Japanese people to express their patriotism and loyalty to their Emperor, and the same approach was used in Korea (CPAJ, 1985, p. 20). In the same context, the Korean Church even held Masses in which the faithful were exhorted to pray and contribute for the well-being of the Emperor and victory for the Japanese colonial army. Even though the Church probably was forced to do this by the Japanese colonial government, to some extent the Church collaborated with the Japanese government (Rho, Young-tack, 1987, p. 104). On the other hand, the Korean Church hierarchy regarded Korean Catholic patriot An Chung-gun's assassination of leading Japanese statesman Ito Hirobumi in 1909 (Lew, 1990, p. 239) as the religious sin of a Catholic believer (CPAJ, 1985, p. 20).

Regarding the three types of relationship between religion and politics suggested by Robert N. Bellah, during this period the Church can be said to have been in the condition of *disjunction* with Korean society. The Church officially kept silent about the nationalistic concerns of the Korean people, disjoined itself from the cries of the Korean people, and cooperated directly or indirectly with the Japanese colonial government. Odd as it may seem, the doctrine of separation of Church and state also was a factor in the Church's cooperation with the colonial state. Thus, the Church became alienated from the historical, nationalistic demands of the Korean people. Also, society became alienated from religion, and religion became alienated from society. In other words, the Church lost the *creative tension* that can exist between religion and politics, which it had experienced earlier. However, it should be remembered that, as previously mentioned, several Catholic priests and many believers engaged in nationalistic campaigns and independence movements, motivated by their consciences as Korean Catholic believers, which were contrary to official

Church doctrine. One could say that the religion they sought was one which would create a kind of *creative tension* between the Church and the sociopolitical world, including the state, similar to the Church's earlier reform movement which arose out of the tension between religion and the sociopolitical realities under the Yi Dynasty.

IV. THE AWAKENING OF THE CHURCH (1945-1968)

When Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the Korean Church led by Archbishop Ro (Ro Ki-nam) who in 1942 had become Bishop of the Seoul Diocese, "awakened" to begin a new phase of active involvement in Korean sociopolitical realities.

The sociopolitical involvement of the Church from the late 1940s to the late 1960s can be evaluated both positively and critically. It also is important to contrast the Church's sociopolitical involvement during this period with its involvement during the 1970s and 1980s. In the latter period, the Church began to actively oppose authoritarian rule, influenced internally by the social teachings of Vatican II and also by progressive Cardinal Kim, and influenced externally by the realities of repressive authoritarian rule.

From a positive perspective, it can be said that, during this period, the Church "awakened" by taking clear stands on sociopolitical issues. This "awakening" can be attributed to the Church's deep self-reflection on its past, i.e., its alienation from the Korean people during the period of Japanese colonial rule. It also means that the Church finally had broken away from the "sacred-secular dualism" which it had embraced since the late 19th century (CJPRI, 1990, p. 276). In other words, the Church decided to break away from transcendentalism and pietism, which had caused

it to be indifferent to sociopolitical realities, and to concern itself only with spiritual matters (*ibid.*, p. 29).

However, from a critical perspective, one can find some similarity between the "silent" Church led by foreign bishops during the Japanese colonial period and the "awakened" Church led by Korean bishops during the succeeding period. During the colonial period, the Church, which was dominated by Japanese colonial policy, adapted to and supported the status quo. From the late 1940s to the late 1960s, the Church continued to be mainly adaptive to and supportive of the status quo dominated, first, by the U.S. Occupation (1945-48), then by Syngman Rhee (1948-60), followed by Chang Myòn (1960-61), and after a military coup in 1961, by the Park Chung-hee regimes (1963-79). The common thread during this period was the conservative attitude of the Church regarding changes in the status quo and the pro-Establishment leanings of the Church hierarchy.

What did the "awakened" Church then do? For one thing, the Church resumed the publication of two major Church periodicals, namely, its newspaper, *Kyònghyang-sinmun* and its magazine, *Kyònghyang-japchi*, which had been discontinued during the colonial period. As part of a cultural movement, these publications criticized the corruption and demoralization of society, and tried to point the people in the right direction (CPAJ, 1985, p. 21; CJPRI, 1990, p. 29). The Church also gave relief to victims of the Korean war, including refugees and war orphans (CJPRI, 1990, p. 29).

What did the Church do to become more actively involved in sociopolitical realities?

First, Archbishop Ro, as representative of the Korean Church, adopted a tolerant or supportive attitude toward the U.S. Occupation's rule over Korea (August 15, 1945 to August 15, 1948), taking for granted or accepting the establishment of the

formal United States Army Military Government In Korea (USAMGIK). By way of background, after the American occupation force, the XXIV Corps commanded by General Hodge, entered South Korea on September 8, 1945, it set up the USAMGIK "under orders from Washington." It refused to recognize the KPR (*Chosòn Inmin Konghwaguk* or Korean People's Republic) and eventually outlawed it (Eckert, 1990_a, p. 337). According to one observer,

the American thrust in Korea contrasted sharply with the Soviet political push. Playing Iago to an already suspicious Othello, the Japanese authorities in Seoul had passed the word along to the American command in Okinawa in early September that Korean communist and independence agitators were plotting to subvert Korean peace and order and had warned of possible sabotage and mob violence. Thus even before leaving Japan, the Americans were already distrustful of Korean intentions and inclined to regard the anti-colonial revolution taking place there as a Soviet-inspired communist conspiracy antithetical to American interest. (*Ibid.*)

In a cooperative gesture toward the Americans, Archbishop Ro submitted a list of 60 Koreans, who he believed would be suitable candidates for posts in the USAMGIK, to Brigadier General Nister, who was General Hodge's political advisor. The visit of American Archbishop Spellman to South Korea also encouraged close relations between the South Korean Church and the United States (CPAJ, 1985, p. 21).

Second, when Korean leaders of the Shanghai Provisional Government in exile, including Kim Ku, returned to Korea, Archbishop Ro welcomed them by holding a Mass in Seoul. However, when Syngman Rhee came back to Korea, Archbishop Ro gave him his wholehearted support (*ibid.*). This is a good example of Archbishop Ro's pro-Americanism, anti-Communism, and pro-Syngman Rhee stance which dominated Church-state relations during this period, drawing the Church and state closer together.

Why did Archbishop Ro support Rhee over Kim Ku? First of all, Kim Ku not only was Rhee's "main rival for rightist affection," but he also was a southern

nationalist like Kim Kyu-sik, who "feared a permanent division of the country and still hoped for an accommodation with the north" (Eckert, 1990_a, p. 342-43). Also, Syngman Rhee became the candidate favored by the United States, as indicated by the following:

Although both Kim and Rhee possessed the requisite nationalist credentials that the KDP [the Korean Democratic Party] so desperately needed to make a bid for political power, Kim was less tolerant of the KDP for its collaborationist past [with the Japanese] and willing, if necessary, to strike a deal with the left to insure a unified Korean government. Rhee thus soon became the rightist favorite, and General Hodge, in spite of a growing personal dislike for Rhee, eventually came to acknowledge his importance to those Koreans most favored by the military government. (*Ibid.*, p. 342)

Second, Archbishop Ro's greatest concerns were how to solidify the Church's position in liberated Korea and to increase its social influence. Because of these concerns, he sided with the U.S. Occupation and Syngman Rhee as political forces of promise (Chun, 1992, p. 59). It also was advantageous for the Rhee Regime to maintain close ties with Archbishop Ro. Because of his international ties through the Church, Ro was able to facilitate the United Nations' approval of the Republic of Korea (ROK) as an independent Korean government with Syngman Rhee as its first president (August 15, 1945 to April 19, 1960), as well as the reconstruction of South Korea after the Korean War (CJPRI, 1990, p. 29; CPAJ, 1985, p. 22).

From a critical perspective, it can be said that the "awakening" of the Church to sociopolitical realities mainly was due to Archbishop Ro's pro-American and pro-government stance, and to the Church's inclination to cooperate and avoid conflicts with the state, and to the Church's desire to increase its own social influence. However, even though the Church "awakened" in the sense of wanting to do something for Korean society and politics, it didn't become fully awake because it lacked historical insight regarding the transformation of Korea into an independent, reunited nation. In other words, the Church hierarchy was too nearsighted to grasp the

implications of its collaboration with the American occupation forces and the Rhee regime.

During this period the Church under Archbishop Ro clearly can be blamed both for its uncritical attitude toward the policies of the U.S. Occupation and for its support of the Rhee regime. First, it is evident that the top leaders of the Church hierarchy had the same lack of historical insight on the transformation of Korea as the Church had during the period of Japanese colonial rule (Chun, 1992, p. 58). Second, the Rhee regime utilized the help of many politicians who had collaborated with the Japanese. These politicians, who had gained power and influence in post-liberation Korean politics, not only impeded the development of a national identity and social justice for the people as a whole, but also retarded the development of the Church's critical consciousness of state power (CPAJ, 1985, pp. 21-22).

Third, it must be pointed out that Archbishop Ro and the Church neither actively participated in the April 19, 1960 Revolution, in which university students and citizens succeeded in overthrowing the Rhee regime, nor openly opposed the May 16, 1961 Military Coup by Park Chung-hee. The Church only contributed indirectly to anti-Rhee movements during the latter part of the Rhee regime by its support of democratic leader Chang Myòn, a devout Catholic layman. In other words, the Church continued to show its pro-Establishment bias by favoring the Chang Myòn Regime of the Second Republic (August 12, 1960 to May 16, 1961), which came after Hò Chòng's interim government (April 27, 1960 to August 11, 1960), and by its silence regarding the Military Coup and military rule of Park Chung-hee (May 16, 1961 to December 16, 1963) and regarding the subsequent Park regime of the Third Republic (December 17, 1963 to December 26, 1972). The Park regime continued to rule during the Fourth Republic (December 27, 1972 to October 26, 1979) until Park

was assassinated (for inclusive dates of recent South Korean regimes, see Ahn, 1986, p. 432).

During the latter part of the Rhee regime, Archbishop Ro transferred his political support to Chang Myòn. Archbishop Ro not only encouraged the Church to vote Chang Myòn into the National Assembly, but also persuaded 40 Catholic laymen to join the Democratic Party (CPAJ, 1985, p. 22). Chang Myòn was a political candidate who appealed to the Church as well as to the Korean people, because of his previous election (in 1956) and service as Korea's Vice President. When Chang Myòn was elected Vice-President, the close relationship between Archbishop Ro and the Rhee Regime came to an end. It was in this same context that *Kyònghyang-japchi*, the official magazine of the Church, changed its political tone to anti-Rhee regime (*ibid.*). When the Church expressed its opposition to the Rhee regime, it indirectly, if not directly, contributed to the onset of the April 19, 1960 Revolution (Rho, Kil-myung, 1989, p. 38). The April 19, 1960 Revolution was "an indication of the shifting political mood of South Korea's cities". . . "after twelve years of election rigging and political repression" (Eckert, 1990_b, p. 353).

In short, the Church did almost nothing for the democratization of South Korea under the authoritarian rule of Syngman Rhee, other than transferring its support to its chosen political leader Chang Myòn. The Church maintained close relations, first with Rhee, and then with Chang Myòn. The Church's contribution to the movement for democratization during the late 1950s only went as far as to support one individual, Chang Myòn, who came to power as the result of the April 19, 1960 Revolution. The Church also failed to make any significant, positive contribution to the Revolution. Furthermore, when Park Chung-hee came to power after the May 16, 1961 Military Coup, the Church submitted to his overriding control. For example,

under Park's policy to "split" the Church, Church leaders and political elites of the same provinces tended to unite in their support of the Park regime (CPAJ, 1985, pp. 22-23).

In summary, after the liberation, the Church became more concerned about sociopolitical realities and problems. However, in its more active involvement in sociopolitical realities, the Church still was deeply rooted in its conservative and pro-Establishment attitudes and tendencies, which have continued to be observed even up to the present. Despite the fact that the Church had broken away from both its secular-sacred dualism and the condition of *disjunction* between religion and sociopolitical realities, the Church did nothing more than to closely align itself with the ruling powers, including the American occupational forces in the late 1940s. This failed to create any *creative tension* between the Church and state, i.e., the condition in which the Church stands alone vis-a-vis the state and tries to solve sociopolitical problems *from its own perspective*.

V. SOCIOPOLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE LATE 1960s AND EARLY 1970s

It is necessary to present an overview of the socioeconomic and political conditions in South Korea during the late 1960s and early 1970s before examining Church-state relations during the 1970s. Most of the socioeconomic and political conditions of the late 1960s--which can be characterized as the interplay of economic development and political authoritarianism--continued to a greater or lesser extent into the 1970s and 1980s. These conditions provide the background for an analysis and discussion of Church-state conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s. The following discussion of socioeconomic and political conditions during the late 1960s and early 1970s is

presented under the topical subheadings of economic development and political authoritarianism.

A. Economic Development²

South Korea experienced a tremendous change in socioeconomic conditions in the late 1960s. Implementation of the economic development plans set forth in 1962 not only transformed the structure of South Korean society, but also had a dramatic impact on almost every aspect of the lives and values of the people. This sociopolitical upheaval was termed "modernization," but it more accurately could have been called "western industrialization." Traditionally an agricultural state, South Korea fast became an industrialized country replete with new factories and industrial complexes, new expressways, skyscrapers and luxury hotels (CISJD, 1985, p. 9).

As in other countries, rapid economic change and growth did not occur without serious side effects. These problems, which are discussed separately in detail below, resulted from an inconsistent and inadequate implementation of the economic development plan and policy. The problems began to appear in 1969 when the annual growth rate of the GNP reached its zenith of 15.9% (*ibid.*).

1. Impoverishment of Rural Society, Increasing Migration from Rural Areas, and Growth of the Urban Poor

First, rural areas became impoverished due to the government's emphasis on export-oriented labor-intensive industries. A deepening disparity among industries resulted in an increased migration of farmers into big cities, which magnified the problem of the urban poor. South Korea's policy of emphasizing exports was based

on its comparative advantage of having low wage labor. Due to problems of low productivity and fierce competition in world markets, the Park regime felt it had no choice but to follow a low wage, low price grain policy in its pursuit of export-oriented economic development (*ibid.*, p. 19). In order for businesses to be able to pay low wages, the government chose to keep food prices low. Under its low rice price policy, the price of rice remained below production cost throughout the 1960s. This was made possible only because South Korea was able to import surplus grain from the United States (*ibid.*, p. 20). Because almost all the nation's resources were concentrated on export-oriented industries, agriculture suffered the most. The agricultural and fishing industries could not keep from falling far behind other industries, such as mining and manufacturing. As a result, the agricultural and fishing industries achieved only a 4.4% average annual growth rate during 1962-69, while the mining and manufacturing industries achieved a 17.9% rate during the same period. During the third Five-Year Plan (1972-76) the annual growth rates for those same two groups of industries were 6.2% and 21.2% respectively (*ibid.*, p. 10). This same disparity among industries also was shown in their respective productive contributions to the overall economy. Agricultural and fishing industries supplied 40.3% of the GNP in 1962, but their share decreased to 30.5% in 1969, while the share of mining and manufacturing industries increased from 13.2% to 20.8%, and the share of service industries increased from 46.4% to 48.7% from 1962 to 1969 (*ibid.*).

Regarding migration of the rural population into urban centers during the 1960s, between 350,000 and 400,000 migrated to the big cities each year. The result was an unexpected population explosion in cities such as Seoul, as shown in the table below.

Table 2. Population of Seoul and Metropolitan Seoul

(Unit: 1,000 people)

	1960	1966	1970	1973	1975
Total population of Korea	24,989	29,193	31,466	33,202	34,707
Population of Seoul (Ratio)	2,445 (9.8)	3,803 (13.0)	5,536 (17.6)	6,290 (18.9)	6,889 (19.9)
Population of Metropolitan Seoul (Ratio)	5,194 (20.8)	6,911 (23.7)	8,894 (28.3)	9,960 (30.0)	10,929 (31.5)

Source: KDI (Korea Development Institute), 1976,
cited by CISJD, 1985, p. 11.

The effect of industrialization on the migration of farmers clearly is shown in the above table in that the rate of migration reached its peak at the same time as the rapid economic growth reached its zenith in 1968 and 1969 (*ibid.*, p. 11).

Significant portion of the rural population had no choice but to move out of their rural area searching for a way of survival in the cities where no jobs were waiting for them. In a sense, they were marginalized both in their rural areas and in the cities. As the result of the increasing migration of the rural population into urban areas, almost all of the migratory farmers added to the problems of the urban poor, including overcrowding, subsistence living, and housing. In addition, the government did not take good care of the migratory farmers who came to the big cities. Instead of dealing directly with the economic and social problems, the government wasted its efforts in makeshift programs such as the removal of shacks, construction of jerry-built public apartments and relocating some urban poor to new areas, which lacked the necessary conveniences of life. One such jerry-built apartment building collapsed on April 8, 1970. Also, on August 10, 1971 residents of Kwangju Complex in Kyönggi province, one of the areas occupied by migrators, revolted against the

government because of its deceptive and indifferent attitude toward them (*ibid.*, p. 12).³

2. Increasing Gap between Rich and Poor,
and Inhuman Working Conditions:
Socioeconomic Justice Issue

The rapidly growing South Korean economy raised the income and living standard of the urban upper class, so that its members were able to enjoy luxurious houses, cars, restaurants, etc., no less luxurious than those enjoyed by the affluent classes of developed Western countries. However, it must be pointed out that these luxuries were acquired by the proceeds of foreign loans, not by profits from a thriving internal economy. The newly rich urban class were granted special privileges in the form of foreign loans and exemption from taxes under guarantees and protection from the government. They even were allowed to sell their goods overseas for ridiculously low prices, while at the same time overcharging for them at home. Some of the residential areas of the rich urban class became known as "villages of thieves" (*ibid.*, pp. 12-13).

However, farmers and laborers were excluded from the benefits accorded to the rich under the policy of "growth first, distribution second," which was the government's rationale for the low general wage level and the serious neglect of human welfare. The farmers and laborers were expected to be satisfied with low wages and low grain prices based on this policy, and to endure rising consumer prices during this period of rapid economic growth. As for the farmers, the real income of rural families declined from 136,827 won [South Korean currency] in 1963 to 117,580 won in 1968, while consumer prices rose by 18% every year during the first

Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-66), and by 11.2% every year during the second Plan (1967-71) (*ibid.*, p. 13). As for the laborers, a comparison of the increase in real income with the increase in productivity shows the relative deprivation of laborers. As shown in the table below, except for the base years of 1960 and 1965, in only one year, 1966, did the increase in the laborers' real income exceed the increase in their productivity:

Table 3. Wage Index in Korea

	Nominal wage	Consumer price	Real wage	Labor produc- tivity
1960	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1961	109.7	108.1	101.5	111.7
1962	116.2	115.2	100.9	115.6
1963	128.5	139.0	92.4	122.3
1964	154.9	180.0	86.1	133.0
1965	182.1	204.4	88.1	154.1
1965	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1966	117.8	111.3	105.8	104.1
1967	145.5	123.4	117.9	122.4
1968	181.2	136.7	132.6	144.1
1969	211.7	153.6	137.8	177.3

Source: Korea Productivity Center, 1969,
cited by CISJD, 1985, p. 13.

Another problem related to the unequal treatment accorded to the various socioeconomic classes during the 1960s and early 1970s was the inhumane exploitation of labor. Signs of social unrest began to emerge in late 1970 when a garment worker at a sweatshop committed suicide. This marked the beginning of a new epoch in labor and opposition movements in South Korea. Twenty-three year old Chòn T'ae-il (Chun Tae-il) burned himself to death on November 13, 1970 in protest against sub-standard working conditions in the Peace Market (P'yònghwa Sijang), while demanding the observance of the Labor Standards Law. With a Labor Standards

Law book in his arms, he shouted, "Workers are not machines!" and "Observe the Labor Standards Law!" as he was dying. This incident called the public's attention to the poor working conditions in industry,⁴ to the government's ignorance and neglect of labor problems, and to the concern for social and economic justice expressed by opposition groups, especially students (Sohn, 1988, p. 57). By the mid-1970s, union membership was beginning to boom--topping one million in 1978. Workers, often encouraged and supported by students, intellectuals, and Christian groups like the Young Catholic Organization [J.O.C.] and the Protestant-sponsored Urban Industrial Mission [U.I.M], were becoming more assertive (Eckert, 1990_b, p. 369).

3. Increasing Foreign Debt and Worsening Foreign Dependency

Two of the most important developments in South Korea during the 1960s were (1) the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965, and (2) the influx of foreign capital into South Korea. The drive towards a settlement of issues in the Korea-Japan Talks, which sought to normalize diplomatic relations, began under the Rhee regime. However, because of a long history of antagonism between the two countries, and the arrogant, stubborn attitude of Japan, many issues seemed insurmountable. Nonetheless, because of his need for capital and political support, and because of the strong "recommendation" of the United States, Park entered into a humiliating settlement to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan. This settlement was characterized by inadequate compensation, "grant-type loans" in lieu of compensation, and removal of fishing boundaries, etc. (CISJD, 1988, p. 17). The public outcry over the normalization of relations with Japan caused the Park regime to declare Martial Law on June 3, 1964, and to issue a Garrison Decree shortly before

the conclusion of the "Treaty for the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Korea and Japan," in June, 1965. What were the implications of this normalization? Normalization didn't mean a quantitative increase in Korean-Japanese relations as much as it meant a qualitative redefinition of the relationship. It was part of the long term strategy of the United States, which planned to withdraw its presence and influence from East Asia. According to this strategy, perhaps Japan was to be substituted for the United States' economic influence. (It hasn't happened yet in other ways, such as security, politics, etc.). In order to assume this role, Japan had strengthened its economic influence over Asia during the 1960s. The 1965 treaty was taken by the public to mean that once more Korea would be under the influence of Japan in economic matters. This was confirmed by the "Nixon Doctrine" in July, 1969 and the "Nixon-Sato Joint Communiqué" in November, 1969. Thus, normalization of relations with Japan wasn't popular with the citizenry (*ibid.*, p. 14).

Park's military regime failed to obtain the people's support despite its original goal of achieving economic self-reliance and democracy. Also, when the "grant-type aids" from the United States stopped, the regime had to find other financial sources, not only to implement the Five-Year Economic Development Plans, which were the only positive justification for its political position in the face of increasing social instability, but also to sustain its political structure by illicitly collaborating with domestic big business circles in granting privileged foreign loans and tax exemptions (*ibid.*). In addition, the Park regime acceded to the request of the United States to dispatch the South Korean Army to Vietnam in 1964, ostensibly to repay the United States for the Korean War, but also because of the monetary benefits to be received by South Korea for the services of its army and for the purchase of South Korean goods and services in Vietnam until its departure from Vietnam in 1973 (*ibid.*, 1988,

p. 17; Kihl, 1984, p. 51). Sending the troops also helped the Park regime to improve its international image. As a result, foreign capital inflows, which totalled 351 million dollars during the years 1959-66, increased remarkably, reaching 237 million dollars in the year 1967, 358 million dollars in 1968, 561 million dollars in 1969 and then continued as shown in the table below (CISJD, 1985, p. 14).

Table 4. Summary of Foreign Capital Inflows

Unit: US \$1 million

	1959-77	1978	1979	Total	Ratio(%)
Loans	9,760	2,748	2,708	15,216	
Public	3,945	818	1,086	5,849	31.0
Commercial	5,815	1,930	1,622	9,367	49.6
Direct Investment	773	100	127	1,000	5.3
Bank Loans	921	263	1,484	2,668	14.1
Total	11,454	3,111	4,319	18,884	100.0(%)

Source: The EPB, *Handbook of Korean Economy 1980*, p. 145, cited by Choi, 1989^b, p. 38.

The most remarkable increase in the inflows of foreign capital involved Japanese capital. Compared with the year 1964 when Japanese capital amounted to only 0.4 million dollars out of a total of 99.5 million dollars of foreign investment, including U.S. capital of 36 million dollars, in 1969 Japanese capital inflow reached 515 million dollars out of a total of 2,443 million dollars of foreign investment (*ibid.*). Unfortunately, a large portion of this foreign investment was in the form of foreign loans which were not used properly. Questionable investments produced numerous insolvent enterprises. It is reported that a large part of the Japanese loans was diverted for political uses or invested in non-productive endeavors such as speculation and personal loans (*ibid.*). It also is reported that out of 83 enterprises created by foreign loans 37 became insolvent, and an additional 30 eventually ceased operations (*ibid.*, p. 15).

B. Political Authoritarianism

The political structure of the Park regime (1961-79) has been characterized as being the combination of absolute power and corruption. The Third Republic and its leader, Park Chung-hee, justified absolute political power on the urgent priority of achieving national economic growth and on the equally important objective of combating Communism to assure national security. According to President Park, who regarded national security as the paramount goal of the Yushin System,

if we wish to develop our democracy and to enhance the basic human rights of individuals, while also maintaining freedom and peace, we ought, first of all, to protect all such values from the threat of the North Korean communists. (*Donga Ilbo*, December 5, 1974, quoted by Sohn, 1988, p. 185)

Freedom is a divine right of human beings. But it is an illusion to imagine that consequently people of any country can equally enjoy freedom regardless of the situation of the state and its circumstances. Considering our relationship with the North Korean communists, we are under circumstances in which freedom of survival of the nation as such is threatened. . . . If we indiscreetly pursue freedom we will be deprived totally of the freedom of survival by the North Korean communists. We are doing our best to prevent this tragedy from occurring, and this effort is the very ideology of the Yushin system. (*Donga Ilbo*, October, 9, 1974, quoted by Sohn, 1988, p. 185)

Thus, all other national goals were subordinated to these overriding imperatives. Functions of the legislature, political parties and the media were limited and reduced under the pretexts of economy and efficiency. Student and opposition movements were blamed for interfering with the national goals, and, therefore, were suppressed by the Park regime. The military and the bureaucracy were strengthened for more effective control of the people. The center of power was transferred from the politicians to bureaucrats, namely, the Presidential Secretariat, the KCIA and the Economic Planning Board.

The Park regime had to take firm measures against anti-government protests by students, workers, opposition parties and the media because the regime's legitimacy, competence and credibility were not esteemed by the people. While the Park regime was suppressing criticism of its administration, it solidified its connection with big business by its preferential allocation of foreign loans and by its proffer of political favors for money (*ibid.*, p. 15).

President Park installed the apparatus of political control which also was used, with some minor modifications, by his successor Chun in the 1980s, namely, (1) an internal security force with thousands of uniformed police backed up by a vast network of informers and secret police, who were able to penetrate virtually all of South Korean society; (2) an indirect presidential election system which impeded and distorted the expression of the popular will; (3) an official political party, the Democratic Republican Party (the Democratic Justice Party under the Chun regime) which held an absolute majority in the National Assembly through a distorted electoral system; (4) a system providing for legislation by presidential decree; (5) strict control over the press and mass media; and (6) the subjection of the judiciary to the executive (Palais, 1985, p. vi).

Park's intention to obtain absolute, permanent political power for himself clearly was shown by his unprecedented manipulation of the general election for National Assembly members on June 8, 1967 and by his forced constitutional amendment for a presidential third term on September 14, 1969 (CISJD, 1985, pp. 19-22; CISJD, 1988, pp. 21-22). Perhaps the most dramatic example of Park's quest for absolute, permanent political power was his installation of the Yushin System after political resistance by laborers, the urban poor, students, intellectuals, church circles and politicians out of power finally became unbearable to Park during 1970-71. He

decreed Martial Law throughout the country, dissolved the National Assembly, prohibited political activities, closed universities and began to censor the press in advance of its publication. Under Martial Law, an Emergency Cabinet Meeting passed the Yushin Constitutional Law on October 27, 1972, and had it hurriedly approved by a plebiscite held on November 21. Thus, the Yushin [Revitalizing Reform] System of Park Chung-hee came into effect. Under the Yushin System, the president's powers even became stronger than before. The presidential term was changed from four to six years. The limitation on reelection was abolished so as to assure a lifelong presidency. The president was empowered to appoint judges and one third of the National Assembly as well as to have supreme command over the Korean Army and the dissolution of the National Assembly. At the same time, the National Assembly's power to monitor and inspect the administration of the executive branch was taken away. Also, the Broadcasting Law was made more burdensome and restrictive. Thus, any semblance of a balance or separation of powers was destroyed by the Yushin System (CISJD, 1985, pp. 42).

As discussed above, the prevailing socioeconomic conditions, together with President Park's attempts to solidify and expand his political power, inflamed the people, especially students, workers, and the urban poor. As previously mentioned, the most dramatic events were the Kwangju-Grand-Housing-Complex Uprising, the self-immolation of Chòn T'ae-il, the reaction to the Korea-Japan Talks, and the opposition to and the installation of the Yushin System. These events precipitated the formation of several labor, religious, and student dissident groups. The self-immolation of Chòn T'ae-il provided a special impetus to the development of democratic, economic and human rights movements. Thereafter, new independent labor movements supported by student and religious groups arose (CISJD, 1988, pp.

20-21). Thus, prior to Park's assassination in 1979, increasing numbers of South Korean citizens, including politicians, students, laborers, clergy, and farmers, became involved in political opposition activities. Their anti-government demonstrations expanded in size and frequency. The Park regime responded with police attacks on demonstrators and harsh prison sentences for opposition leaders (Palais, 1985, pp. vi-vii). All of these repressive measures were backed up by so-called Presidential Emergency Decrees and the KCIA. The most notorious of these decrees was Emergency Measure No. 9 of May, 1975, which made any criticism of the president, or even of the decree itself, a "criminal offense" (*ibid.*, p. 18). Under the Yushin System, 1,086 persons were arrested as political offenders under Presidential Emergency Decrees during 1974-79, and many other persons were imprisoned under the Anti-Communist Law, National Security Law and similar laws (CISJD, 1985, p. 43). The following table shows how much the so-called Presidential Declaration of Martial Law, Garrison and Emergency Decree procedure was used and abused by the Park regime, especially under the Yushin System.

**Table 5. Martial Law and Emergency Decrees
under Park regime**

May 16, 1961: Declaration of martial law, nationwide
June 3, 1964: Declaration of martial law in Seoul
Aug. 26, 1965: Declaration of garrison decree in Seoul
Oct. 15, 1971: Declaration of garrison decree in Seoul
Dec. 6, 1971: Declaration of state of national emergency
Oct. 17, 1972: Declaration of martial law, nationwide
Jan. 8, 1974: Declaration of Emergency Decree (ED) 1&2
Jan. 14, 1974: Declaration of ED 3
April 3, 1974: Declaration of ED 4
Aug. 23, 1974: Declaration of ED 5 (removal of the ED 1&4)
Dec. 31, 1974: Declaration of ED 6 (removal of the ED 3)
April 8, 1975: Declaration of ED 7 (closure of Korea University)
May 13, 1975: Declaration of ED 8 (removal of the ED 7)
May 13, 1975: Declaration of ED 9 (included points of the ED's 1, 4, & 7)
Oct. 18, 1979: Declaration of martial law, in Pusan

Oct. 20, 1979: Garrison decree in Masan & Changwon

Source: CISJD, 1988, p. 24.

The foregoing discussion, including examples and tables, provides an overview of the socioeconomic and political conditions in South Korea during the 1960s and 1970s.⁵ Other specific examples are discussed in the case studies in Chapters Seven and Eight. The following is a brief overview of Church-state relations in the 1960s and 1970s. It also will briefly mention some important incidents that cannot be covered by the 10 case studies in Chapters Seven and Eight.

VI. CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE 1960S AND 1970S: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The Church does not exist in a vacuum apart from sociopolitical realities. The South Korean Church felt obliged to respond to the enormous sociopolitical problems which arose in the early 1960s resulting from the Five-Year Economic Development Plans and continuous authoritarian rule of the Park regime (1961-79).

Church-state relations in South Korea became increasingly conflictive in the late 1960s. Vatican II (1962-65) was an encouraging sign for the Church. As previously mentioned, the Church had not yet fully absorbed and put into practice its social teachings, except at the individual level. Nonetheless, the influence of Vatican II gradually affected the Church, as shown by the following:

First, in May, 1966, the Korean Bishops' Conference issued a pastoral letter urging the Church as a whole to accept and practice the Vatican II teachings. The bishops also expressed their concerns about the growing socioeconomic problems in their pastoral letter entitled "Our Social Belief" issued in June, 1967 (CJPRI, 1990, p. 31).

Second, the Shimdo (Simdo) Textile Incident (or Kanghwa Incident) in 1968 marked the first time the Church, through its bishops and the J.O.C.,⁶ became directly involved in a sociopolitical situation (CPAJ, 1985, p. 23): On August 14, 1966, 12 members of J.O.C. (Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne: Young Catholic Workers) of Kanghwa Island Parish of the Diocese of Inch'òn made an oath to fight for workers. A parish priest, Fr. Michael Bransfield, who was a J.O.C. guidance priest, introduced the J.O.C. workers to Vatican II social teachings and encouraged them. On May 14, 1967, some of these J.O.C. workers led an union organizational rally at Shimdo Textile Company with the cooperation of the national textile labor union headquarters. Some 300 out of a total of 1,200 textile workers applied to join the union. Thereafter, the company began a campaign of repression against union activities, which culminated in the firing of a union leader on January 4, 1968. The police arrested 5 Catholic workers from among those union workers who protested this firing. Then, 30 more Catholic workers were arrested and detained for investigation. The company leaders and the police regarded Fr. Bransfield as a Communist instigator. The company decided to refuse to hire J.O.C. members, and to fire some 13 Catholic workers. The Church reacted to the company's repressive measures by organizing a committee to investigate and protest the repression. On February 9, 1968, the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference also issued a statement entitled "A Statement for Social Justice and the Workers' Rights." Finally, on February 12, 1968, the Kanghwa Textile Association issued a letter of explanation and apology, and the fired workers got their jobs back. The union also was exonerated, thus resolving this incident, but not the underlying problem (see CPAJ, 1984, pp. 201-05).

The Church's involvement in this incident was motivated by the new social teachings of Vatican II (Ham, 1988, pp. 268-69). The Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement (KCFM)⁷ is another example of Catholic sociopolitical involvement that began during the late 1960s.

Third, when Bishop Kim Su-hwan became a Cardinal in 1969, the South Korean Church became more visible internationally. His progressive and ecumenical perspective on sociopolitical issues made it possible for Catholic and Protestant social justice leaders, including clergy and laity, to work together. Their activities supporting workers' rights led to the establishment of the Korea Action Organization for Urban Industrial Mission (also known as the Korea Christian Action Organization for Urban and Rural Mission) in September, 1971, spurred by the previously mentioned Chòn T'ae-il (Chun Tae-il) Incident. This is a good example of how the Church, influenced by Vatican II, initiated a close, ecumenical, and cooperative social justice effort with Protestant churches, which Vatican II regards as "brother churches" (CJPRI, 1990, pp. 31-32; CPAJ, 1985, pp. 282-85; Ham, 1988, p. 263).

In addition, on April 21, 1971 Cardinal Kim, acting on the Church's behalf, issued a statement entitled "We will watch attentively the Peaceful Order and the Fair Election," referring to the presidential election on April 27, 1971 (Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 64-65). During the 1970s and 1980s, several times he expressed his concerns about labor issues and democratization in sermons and other official Church messages. For example, Cardinal Kim's sermon on March 20, 1978, which was given immediately after the Dongil (Tongil) Textile Incident (Case Study #3), encouraged and supported the workers' movement led by the J.O.C. (Young Catholic Workers) of the Catholic Church and the U.I.M. (Urban Industrial Mission) of the Protestant churches. In his sermon, Cardinal Kim cited several Vatican II social teachings

regarding workers' rights, which teachings were examined in Chapter Two (for additional details, also see *ibid.*, 1984, pp. 484-91).

Church-state conflicts and the Church's sociopolitical involvement became more visible and intense in the early 1970s. On October 5, 1971, more than 1,500 clergy and lay members of the Church attended a Mass at the Wònju Diocese officiated by Diocesan Bishop Chi together with Wònju Diocesan priests. After the Mass, Bishop Chi and the other participants went out on the streets and waged an illegality-and-corruption-expulsion campaign.⁸ The goals of what became a 3 day sit-in demonstration were (1) to protect human dignity from political injustices; (2) to struggle against institutionalized economic injustices; (3) to inspire the unity and solidarity of alienated people; and (4) to overcome indifference and insensibility by participation and hope (*ibid.*, 1984, pp. 65-67). Their campaign included a denunciation parade which was obstructed by the police.

On October 8, 1971, about 30 priests and ministers belonging to the previously mentioned Korean Christian Action Organization for Urban and Rural Mission held a Mass for social justice at the Catholic Student Building in Seoul. During a march after the Mass to support the righteous acts of Christians at Wònju parish, they spread salt on the streets as a symbolic act of purification and were arrested and taken into police custody (*ibid.*, 1984, pp. 74-75; CISJD, 1985, pp. 38-39).

On October 9, 1971, some 800 Catholic and Protestant leaders conducted a special Mass in Taegu parish to pray for an end to social injustice and corruption. The next day, Christian students wearing head bands reading "Punish elements of injustices, corruption and illicit privilege!" attached ribbons on the breasts of passersby in downtown Seoul. Many other Christian demonstrations for social

purification ensued. Christian involvement in social issues became highly visible in 1971. Moreover, Christian denunciation of structural corruption was common in the 1970s. At the same time, the government increased its surveillance of both Catholic and Protestant churches (CISJD, 1985, pp. 38-39). In support of the above social purification demonstrations, a critical pastoral letter entitled "Let Us Overcome Today's Absurdities" was issued in November, 1971 by the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference (Ham, 1988, pp. 269-70; CJPRI, 1990, pp. 32-33).

All of the above statements and activities shocked both political leaders and society, as well as the Church as a whole, because they were more accustomed to Church's noninvolvement and silence.

1974 was the year when the most serious Church-state conflicts began to occur. It was in 1974 that Bishop Chi was arrested by the police for supporting the students of the National League for Democratic Youth and Students.⁹ His arrest finally "awakened" the Church to the political repression of the Park regime. It also led to the formation of the CPAJ [Catholic Priests' Association for Justice] (*Ch'ònjugyo Chòngùi Kuhyòn Chòn'guk Sajedan*) in September, 1974 at the Wòndong Church in Wònju. The formation of the CPAJ was the Church's institutional reaction to political repression of the Church (Case Study #1). Another institutional reaction of the Church was the establishment of the Justice and Peace Committee (*Chòngùi P'yònghwa Wiwònho*)¹⁰ as an officially recognized organization by the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference in 1975. As will be seen in the case studies of Chapters Seven and Eight, the CPAJ performed a "catalytic" leadership role on behalf of the Church in the movements for democratization and human rights during the 1970s and 1980s. Meanwhile, it also expanded the growing controversy regarding the Church's involvement in politics.

Before considering the case studies, it is important to note that in the 1970s the Korean Church became involved in a variety of movements related to social problems. The major actors were the liberal clergy group (CPAJ), the Justice and Peace Committee (under the Korean Bishops' Conference), the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference (*Han'guk Ch'ònjugyo Chugyo Hoe'ì*), various lay organizations, such as the J.O.C. (*Kat'ollik Nodong Ch'òngnyònhoe*), the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement (*Han'guk Kat'ollik Nongminhoe*), and the Lay Apostolate Council of Korea (*Han'guk P'yòngsindo Sadojik Hyòb'uihoe*), together with joint organizations of Catholics and Protestants. Some of the most important movements, activities, and issues were the following (also see Han, 1987, pp. 107-130; Ham, 1988, pp. 278-82); CPAJ, 1985, *passim*; Myòngdong Catholic Church, 1984, *passim*):

A. MOVEMENTS FOR WORKERS. Ever since the Korean J.O.C. was established in 1958 to advocate and advance workers' rights, its activities have been the Church's sociopolitical involvement to benefit workers (see Note #6). Such involvement during the 1970s can be characterized as the Church's opposition to the state's repression of labor (for details about the Church's activities for workers in the 1960s and 1970s, see CPAJ, 1985, pp. 199-245). One of the most important cases involving the Church's involvement on behalf of workers was the Dongil Textile Incident in 1978 (Case Study #3).

B. MOVEMENTS FOR FARMERS After the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement began in 1964 as an agricultural branch of the J.O.C., it evolved into the full-fledged Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement (KCFM) in 1972 (see Note #7). The KCFM's activities became the Church's sociopolitical involvement for farmers (for details about the Church's activities for farmers in the 1970s, see CPAJ, 1985, pp. 249-76). The most important of the KCFM's activities in the 1970s were its

movement to guarantee the rice production price (from 1975 to the present), its movement to democratize the Agricultural Cooperative Association (1977-83), the Hampyong (Hamp'yòng) Sweet Potato Incident (1976-78)¹¹ (see Han, 1987, pp. 111-12; CPAJ, 1985, pp. 263-66), and its movement related to the Oh Won-chun (Oh Wòn-ch'un) Incident in 1979 (Case Study #4).

C. ACTIVITIES TO PROTECT THE CHURCH. The Church had to protect itself when several priests, who had been under close police surveillance, were unlawfully arrested. For example, the police maintained strict surveillance on all Chònju Diocesan parish priests on or about March 1, 1978, which was the second anniversary of the Myòngdong Incident (Case Study #2). Several priests either were placed under strict surveillance or unlawfully arrested. Again, from June 26 to July 5, Chònju Diocesan priests were shadowed under close surveillance by the police. Then, on July 6, several priests were badly beaten by the police and left unattended on the street. This July 6 incident involving Chònju Diocesan priests is an important example of the state's repression of the Church and the Church's strong reaction.¹² It brings to mind the Bishop Chi Incident in 1974, which not only precipitated the Church's strong reaction and opposition, but also signified the beginning of a new era in Church-state conflicts (Case Study #1).

D. MOVEMENTS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

1. Democratization. The Church's democratization and human rights movements mainly began in the early 1970s, especially after the Bishop Chi Incident in 1974. These movements not only sought to oppose human rights violations and to protect the Church under the Yushin System (1972-79), but also sought to achieve political democracy in South Korea. As previously mentioned, the CPAJ played an important leadership role in these movements. The CPAJ organized a committee to

deal with actual incidents, and also issued statements, held prayer meetings throughout the country, supported sit-down demonstrations, etc. The CPAJ also worked with lay organizations such as the J.O.C. and the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement. The latter groups' guidance priests either belonged to, or were deeply sympathetic with the objectives of, the CPAJ. The CPAJ's statements and prayer meetings supporting the workers' and farmers' movements were an inseparable part of democratization and human rights movements.

The Lay Apostolate Council of Korea, as a lay organization, also actively worked on behalf of the Church in the movements for democratization and human rights by holding prayer meetings, and by issuing statements, declarations, and resolutions regarding the Bishop Chi Incident (1974) (Case Study #1), the Myòngdong Incident (1976) (Case Study #2), the Dongil Textile Incident (1978) (Case Study #3), and other similar incidents (Han, 1987, p. 125).

As already noted, the Church also worked together with Protestant church leaders. The formation of the National Conference for the Restoration of Democracy [*Minju Hoebok Kungmin Hoèui*] on November 27, 1974¹³ and the issuance of the March 1 Declaration for Democratic National Salvation in 1976 (Case Study #2) are good examples of this ecumenical activity.

The Church also worked for the freedom of speech and press. For example, from October, 1974 to March, 1975, the CPAJ and the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement actively supported the Freedom of Speech (and Press) Movement [Movement for the Practice of Freedom of Speech] and strongly reacted in opposition to the government's suppression of the newspaper, *Donga (Tonga) Ilbo* (Ham, 1988, p. 279; Han, 1987, pp. 119-22). This movement was initiated by *Donga Ilbo* (*Donga Daily*) reporters who declared that they "resolutely rejected external interference and

the presence of intelligence agents in newsrooms" (Sohn, 1988, p. 138). Following this declaration, they immediately refused to assist in the production of newspapers and in broadcasts until management agreed with their free speech and press principles. These courageous journalists helped to assure that most of the events involving the democratization movement were reported in *Donga Ilbo*. Other media followed its lead but to a lesser extent.

Thus, the Church's involvement in the democratization movement was reported to the public. For example, a nationwide prayer service on November 12, 1974 organized by the CPAJ was reported in the following day's newspaper at the top of one of the middle pages, instead of being hidden in an inconspicuous two-column article somewhere in the middle of the paper (Sohn, 1988, pp. 138-39; see also CISJD, 1985, pp. 47-48).

However, the government also did not stand still, but proceeded to take repressive measures against the movement. One "indirect and rather eccentric method of repression" was the government's "suppression of advertisements" in *Donga Ilbo* (Sohn, 1988, p. 142). After December 26, 1974, *Donga Ilbo* had to print blank spaces in the spaces reserved for advertisements. Companies which had booked advertising space cancelled their bookings without giving reasons. After that date, there were no major advertisements apart from some classified entries. Undoubtedly, these cancellations were the result of government pressure on businesses not to advertise in *Donga Ilbo* and on Donga Broadcasting System, because of their active reporting of the democratization movement.

However, this suppression of advertisements had quite unexpected repercussions when human rights organizations, such as the CPAJ, bought the unsold advertising space and ran advertisements encouraging freedom of speech. These

became known as "encouragement advertisements" (*ibid.*). For example, the January 1, 1975 issue carried a whole page CPAJ advertisement entitled "An Appeal to the People on the Occasion of the Suppression of Advertisement." The advertisement started with the announcement: "This page was originally reserved for a whole page advertisement by GM-Korea, but was cancelled, and is therefore replaced by this 'encouragement advertisement'" (*ibid.*). It also carried Bishop Chi's "Declaration of Conscience" as well as the CPAJ's own statement (see CPAJ, 1985, p. 136). The "encouragement advertisement" had a two-fold effect: (1) it supported the Donga media financially and helped them to resist government pressure; and (2) it helped promote the opposition movements by "advertising" support for freedom of speech and democratization (Sohn, 1988, pp. 142-43). For example, another advertisement in the January 1, 1975 issue of the *Donga Ilbo* read, "as a citizen who aspires to freedom of speech and the restoration of democracy, I paid for this space in order to keep alight the flame of free speech that had just started to burn" (*ibid.*, p. 143).

The Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement also joined in supporting this movement by paying in rice for an "encouragement advertisement" (CPAJ, 1985, pp. 136-37). The National Conference (Council) for the Restoration of Democracy (see Note #13) also supported this movement (*ibid.*, p. 291). In addition, during late 1974 and early 1975, there were several prayer meetings attended by several thousand believers, including Cardinal Kim, priests, and newspaper reporters. These meetings were held to support the freedom of speech (and press) movement. At some meetings, money was collected for reporters who had been fired (*ibid.*, p. 135-37).

The issue of national reunification also is related to the issue of democratization. In the eyes of the CPAJ, the main purpose of having United States' troops stationed in South Korea was to protect the freedom and basic human rights of

the people, a democratic goal common to both countries. The CPAJ considered that the government's anti-Communist campaign, as applied in suppression of the democratization movement, was entirely unjustifiable. Moreover, the CPAJ viewed the Yushin System, which exploited the South Korean people's hopes for reunification to justify and extend the rule of the Park regime, as being anti-nationalistic and immoral (Ham, 1988, p. 281).

2. Human Rights. The Church also worked to defend the rights of prisoners of conscience. An important case involved the arrest of poet Kim Chi-ha and the Church's efforts to defend him. As previously mentioned, he wrote poems depicting the human rights violations and political corruption prevalent under the Yushin System. His dissident poems caused him to be arrested and imprisoned several times by the Park regime which regarded him as subversive and pro-Communist. The Church's efforts to defend him were led by Bishop Chi and the CPAJ. Prayer meetings and poem readings open to the public were held in 16 cities throughout the country. The Korean Justice and Peace Committee provided a group of attorneys to defend Kim Chi-ha in court. The Church also sent the government an analytical letter attempting to prove that Kim Chi-ha's ideas were not Communistic, but only were the honest expressions of a faithful Catholic. This incident is significant in that it involved repression directed not only against the individual, Kim Chi-ha, but also, in effect, against the Church. The Church's efforts continued until Kim Chi-ha was released in December, 1980 (Han, 1987, pp. 122-23; CPAJ, 1985, pp. 131-133; Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 189-265).

Also, the Church, acting mostly through the CPAJ, investigated several suspicious cases prosecuted by the government, and waged signature campaigns to save the lives of those accused. Important cases include (1) the National League for

Democratic Youth and Students [*Chòn'guk Minju Ch'òngnyòn Haksaeng Ch'ong-yònmaeng*, or *Minch'òng Hangnyòn*, for short] case, (2) the People's Revolutionary Party [*Inmin Hyòngmyòngdang*, or *Inhyòktang*, for short] case (for these incidents, see Note #9 and Case Study #1; also see CPAJ, 1985, pp. 133-35 for the CPAJ's efforts to reveal the truth), (3) the torture of Prof. Choi Jong-kihl (Ch'oe, Chong-gil) of the College of Law, Seoul National University, resulting in his death in 1975 (see CPAJ, 1985, pp. 137), (4) the memorial services for Kim Sang-jin, a student of College of Agriculture, Seoul National University, who killed himself after leaving a declaration of conscience (see CPAJ, 1985, pp. 137-38; also see Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 305-14), and (5) the case of Kim Jae-kyu (Kim Chae-gyu), who killed President Park on October 26, 1979 (see Ham, 1988, p. 279).

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. Korea was unique: from the reign of Sòn-jo (1568-1608) Catholic books were brought back to Korea by members of the annual embassies to the court of the Chinese emperor at Peking, and became the object of great interest and intense study on the part of Korean scholars in their zealous quest for the true religion.

Prominent among them were the Confucianists Huh Kyun (Hò Kyun), Lee Sungwang, Lee Ik and Ahn Chong-bok (An Chòng-bok). Though their conception of the Catholic religion was extremely vague, their understanding of it was enough to lead the more humble and modest of them to accept it.

.....
Despite the suspicion that their way of life drew upon them from non-Christians, they [Lee Pyòk, Kwòn Ch'òl-sin, Chòng Yak-jòn, and Lee Sùng-hun, who followed Hong Yu-han who, as a disciple of Lee Ik, read Catholic books for the first time in 1770 and totally changed his way of life] abandoned all superstitious pagan rites, and preached the Gospel openly. After instructing their converts in the catechism, they gave them Christian Baptism.

This continued for more than ten years, before a regularly ordained priest ever came to Korea. It was in 1794 that Father James Chou Wen-mo (Chu Mun-mo) came to Korea, the first Catholic priest to be invited to enter the country, to find four thousand Catholics already baptized and awaiting his instruction. Such a fact is believed to be unique in the history of Catholic foreign missions, and is a source of pride to Korean believers. (Kim and Chung, 1988, pp. 18-19)

2. The inhuman and unjust socioeconomic conditions dictated by the Park regime's economic development policies also were well described by the poems of Kim Chi-ha, including "Five Bandits" (1970), "Groundless Rumors" (1972), and "Cry of the People" (1974). He was a student dissident and also the Catholic poet who severely indicted the Park regime's "political abuses and obsession with statistical economic growth at the expense of broader social concerns" (Eckert, 1990b, p. 368). For example, "Five Bandits" is a poem about the corrupt life of the privileged class depicting (1) conglomerates or wealthy businessmen, (2) ministers, (3) National Assemblymen, (4) high-ranking government officials, and (5) military generals. The poem depicted these five "Bandits" as beasts (See Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 191-200). The editor of *Sasanggye* [The World of Thought], which was the most prestigious magazine for intellectuals at that time, and Kim Chi-ha were arrested in June 1970 for publishing the poem.

Afterward, corruption became a larger political issue. Kim Chi-ha had a great impact on opposition movements even while imprisoned for seven years during the 1970s (Sohn, 1988, p. 69). He was not only a symbol of the new dissident subculture, but also a living history of the repressive Park regime (see Appendix for "Cry of the People," one of his poems eloquently criticizing economic development plans of the Park regime; also see Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 189-265 for more details about the Kim Chi-ha Incident and the reactions of the Church to defend him).

3. The urban housing problem in the early 1970s was so serious that as of July 1971 roughly 30% (about 170,000) of the houses in Seoul were illegal shacks, and more than 50 per cent of its population were without their own houses. As a solution the

Park government implemented its so-called metropolitan beautification plan, which included moving 350,000 slum dwellers to the Kwangju Estate, a suburb of Seoul.

However, the government did not take care of health, environmental and employment needs of the people in that area. The placards of some 50,000 rioting people read, "Give us land free of charge," "We are starving to death: Give us jobs," "Exploit the people no more," "Stop making facile propaganda, and deliver us from unemployment," etc. In truth the Kwangju Estate was simply a "place to which Seoul City moved people as though it were collecting garbage and throwing it onto barren land," as described by a community leader in the area (Sohn, 1988, pp. 60-61).

4. The following words describe the inhuman working conditions of the Peace Market:

The working conditions of the Peace Market, where some 27,000 workers were employed in about 900 small garment manufacturing factories, were so bad that some apprentices earned as little as 3,000 won (\$9.50) monthly with no days off and a daily load [work load] of 15-16 hours. Of those 27,000 employees, about 13,000 were aged between 13-15. Most factories in the area had no windows, and nearly all workers suffered from eye infections. The ceilings were only 1.5 meters high and there were no ventilation systems. An average of four people toiled in one 'p'yòng' (about three square meters) in the [these] sweatshops. (*Korea Times*, 15 November 1970, cited by Sohn, 1988, pp. 57-58)

5. For a more detailed overview of South Korean political history under the Park regime (1961-1979), see Palais, 1985, pp. 12-25; CISJD, 1988, pp. 15-28; Eckert, 1990_b, pp. 359-72; and Sohn, pp. 30-315. Also see Ham, 1988, pp. 266-68 for an overview by the CPAJ.

6. The J.O.C. (Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne) is a lay Catholic social action group founded by Belgian Cardinal Joseph Cardijn in the early 1920s. After it was approved by the Vatican in 1925, its membership began to spread throughout the world in 1927. As of 1981, there were 7 million members in 125 countries. The South Korean J.O.C. was established in South Korea during Cardinal Joseph Cardijn's visit in November, 1958. Its activities became visible to the South Korean public after the Simdo Textile Incident mentioned above (see *Korean Catholic Encyclopedia*, 1985, p. 16; CJPRI, 1990, p. 31).

7. The Catholic Farmers' Movement was founded as an international league (Mouvement International de la Jeunesse Agricole et Rural Catholiques) by 18 social action groups in 8 European countries and was approved by the Vatican in 1958. The Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement (KCFM) began in 1964 as an agricultural branch of the J.O.C.. It became known as the J.A.C. in 1966. It officially became known as the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement (KCFM) in 1972. Since then, it has been working to solve agricultural problems and to advance farmers' rights. It is a lay organization which was officially recognized by the Korean Bishops' Conference in 1976 (see *Korean Catholic Encyclopedia*, 1985, p. 16; CJPRI, 1990, pp. 31, 33; CPAJ, 1985, pp. 254-56).

8. This incident was initiated by the Wònju Diocese's denunciation of illegal and corrupt practices by Wònju Broadcasting Station. When this station was established in 1970, it was agreed by the May 16 Scholarship Foundation and the Diocese that they would run the station together, based upon their 60:40 investment ratio. However, the Foundation disregarded the Diocese's rights and ran the station to suit its own interests, even evading taxes under the umbrella of political connections and power. The Diocese decided to denounce not only the illegality of the Foundation, but also all similar injustices prevalent in society. The general public interpreted this denunciation to be more of an outcry for social justice in general, instead of simply being a denunciation of the Foundation (for added details, see Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 65-74).

9. The NLDYS stands for the National League for Democratic Youth and Students (*Chòn'guk Minju Ch'òngnyòn Haksaeng Ch'ong-yònmaeng*, or *Minch'òng Hangnyòn* for short). As Palais (1986) observes, probably the most glaring example of tyrannical politics was the sentencing of the defendants in the so-called People's Revolutionary Party case. On April 4, 1974, during the height of the demonstrations against Park's Yushin system, the new National League for Democratic Youth and Students organization issued a declaration opposing the Yushin System.

The Park regime responded by issuing his Emergency Decree No. 4 that banned the student organization, and prohibited any group or person from aiding or abetting it, and prohibited any criticism of the decree itself. The penalties for a violation were five years or life in prison, or death. The government also accused members of the People's Revolutionary Party (*Inmin Hyòngmyòngdang*) and other groups in Korea and Japan of masterminding the League's student demonstrations for the alleged purpose of overthrowing the government. Among the 1,024 persons arrested under this decree were 23 alleged members of the People's Revolutionary Party.

Ten years earlier, in 1964, the Park government brought treason charges against 26 persons allegedly belonging to the same party during similar student demonstrations against Park's normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. 6 of the defendants were undergraduate students of Seoul National University's political science department. This indictment was instigated by Kim Hyòng'uk, the then-chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (K.C.I.A.), who extracted confessions and evidence from the accused by the use of water and electric torture. When the case was ultimately turned over to the regular court prosecutors, they refused to indict the defendants because of insufficient evidence, and resigned their posts as a matter of honor.

However, the Park government would not relent, and found a more compliant prosecutor to sign the indictment. But when the case came to trial, the judge dismissed the charges against 14 and found only 2 of the remaining 12 defendants guilty. Even though the appeals court reversed the lower court's decision and declared 13 guilty, none of the sentences was for more than one year.

This case, perhaps, testifies to the greater independence of both prosecutors and judges in 1964 than at any time after the adoption of the Yushin constitution in 1972. Furthermore, the first People's Revolutionary Party case was so obviously fabricated by the government to discredit the student protest movement, that the government's revived claim regarding this party in 1974 raised doubts in the minds of all.

In the 1974 case, the 23 defendants were accused of reestablishing the party in order to overthrow the government. The prisoners were tortured this time as well, and news of their abuse was leaked to the public in an article written by poet Kim Chi-ha, who had been in jail with the defendants, and was published in *Donga Ilbo* (Donga Daily) on February 26. This time, however, the court system could not offer the protection of a decade before and 8 were sentenced to death.

Most people suspected the charges were completely false, and the government's speed in sentencing and executing the 8 men left little doubt in anyone's mind. One day after the final review of the case by the Supreme Court, they were executed without the allowance of any time for family visits or for an appeal to the president for clemency. The families were not even allowed to retrieve the bodies lest they find evidence of torture. It was one of the most callous acts of the last brutal decade of the Park regime (pp. 20-22).

10. This committee was established as the Korean branch of the Committee for Justice and Peace which previously had been established by the Vatican to promote and realize the spirit of *Populorum Progressio* (On the Development of Peoples) issued by Pope Paul VI in 1967. The purpose of the committee was to help the poor people of the world and to promote international social justice. Pursuant to the Vatican's plan to establish a branch of this committee in national churches throughout the world, Korea's Justice and Peace Committee was formed by the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference, as one of its committees to carry out the Church's social mission for justice (CPAJ, 1985, pp. 157-58).

11. The Sweet Potato Incident took place during 1976 in Hampyong (Hampyong), a noted sweet potato producing village in South Cholla Province in southwestern South Korea. About 20,000 tons of sweet potatoes were produced there every year. When the retail price of sweet potatoes went up 30% in 1976, the local Agricultural Cooperative Association promised the farmers that it would purchase all sweet potatoes they could harvest at a 17.4% increased price. Therefore, the farmers cultivated more land and produced nearly 25,000 tons that year. But the Association wholly failed to keep its promise to purchase the harvested sweet potatoes. In November, 1976, the harvested sweet potatoes lay rotting in the fields.

After the farmers' sporadic protests bore no fruit, they organized a damage compensation countermeasure committee on November 17, and began to protest in an organized manner. While the committee members were investigating the damage, the Association asked the damaged farmers to withdraw from the newly formed committee. On January 31, 1977, after the committee had failed to make any real progress, the local Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement in South Cholla Province took the lead by deciding to appeal to the government and to hold a special prayer meeting. On April 22, a prayer meeting was held in Kwangju. Some 600 people attended this meeting, which was officiated by Archbishop Yun. Five days later, government personnel came to investigate the damage. But no action was taken and no compensation measures were approved.

Finally, on April 24, 1978, the damaged farmers and the Catholic Farmers' Movement again held a special prayer meeting for farmers in Kwangju. Archbishop Yun again officiated at this prayer meeting, attended by 700 believers, including

KCFM priests from throughout South Korea. During the meeting, statements and declarations were issued by the KCFM priests and lay members. Afterward, the farmers and the priests staged a hunger strike. On April 27, Kwangju Diocese priests also joined the strike and issued a statement to all members of the KCFM. This strike continued until April 29, when a meeting was held between representatives of the local police, the KCIA, the Association, the KCFM priests, and the damaged farmers. At this meeting it was decided and agreed that the Association would pay 3,090,000 Won, as compensation for damages, to the farmers. Also, on May 2, the KCFM members who had been arrested because of the prayer meeting were released. This incident not only was an example of the government's indifferent attitude toward farmers. It also was a successful result of the Church's involvement in the farmers' movement (see CPAJ, 1985, pp. 263-66; Han, 1987, p. 111).

12. The repression of priests throughout the country began to increase mostly after March 1, 1977. The government was afraid that another incident might take place around that date (CPAJ, 1985, p. 142). One of the reasons why the Ch'ònju parish priests suffered severe repression was that Fr. Moon Jung-hyun (Mun Ch'òng-hy'òn) of the Ch'ònju Diocese had been arrested for leading the My'òngdong Incident on March 1, 1976. After his release on December 31, 1977, the Ch'ònju parish priests as a whole were placed under police surveillance. Also, there was similar surveillance of priests beginning about March 1, 1978, shortly after the Dongil Textile Incident of February 21, 1978.

Regarding the July 6 Incident, the Justice and Peace Committee and the Lay Apostolate Council of Ch'ònju Diocese issued statements criticizing the government's characterization of religious organizations and priests working for social justice as pro-Communist. In addition, the Committee for Justice and Peace of Korea, the CPAJ, and Cardinal Kim all joined this protest (see My'òngdong, 1984, pp. 492-508).

13. In addition, during the period between the Bishop Chi Incident (1974) and the My'òngdong Incident on March 1, 1976, the Church opposed Park's Yushin regime by forming the National Conference (Council) for the Restoration of Democracy (or the People's Council for the Recovery of Democracy: *Minju Hoebok Kungmin Ho'èi*). This organization can be considered as an *extra-institutional opposition movement at the national level*. The evolution of this organization is discussed below.

Following the banning of individual resistance to the government, an effort soon was made to form a unified organization to represent the various opposition groups. On November 27, 1974, politicians, Catholic and Protestant church leaders, Buddhists, journalists, scholars, lawyers, writers and women leaders (73 persons in all; see CPAJ, 1985, p. 287) assembled at the Christian Building, approved the "People's Declaration," and declared their intention to form the National Conference for the Restoration of Democracy (or the People's Council for the Recovery of Democracy: *Minju hoebok Kungmin Ho'èi*). The Council held its inaugural general meeting on December 25, 1974, and then announced its goal of restoring democracy to Korea. The Council never intended to be a political body, but rather a people's union for the people's movement (CISJD, 1985, pp. 48-49; My'òngdong, 1984, p. 111).

Fr. Yun Hyung-jung (Yun Hy'òng-jung) was selected as its first Standing Representative and Fr. Ham Se-ung, a key member of the CPAJ, was selected as its

official spokesman. Having these priests as its key members, and having the *organizational and financial support of the Catholic Church*, the Council soon acquired considerable *public credibility* (CPAJ, 1985, p. 291). Also, the organization's *solidarity* was further enhanced by the establishment of branch organizations in most of provinces, counties, and cities. Its branches began to spread quickly throughout the country. The Council organized 7 branches and 20 sub-branches by the end of March, 1975. Almost all of these branches were spontaneously organized by CPAJ priests and other influential individuals, indicating the people's strong aspirations for democracy (CISJD, 1985, p. 49; Ham, 1988, p. 279; Sohn, 1988, pp. 137-38)

The Council issued its Charter of Democratic People and Message to the People on March 1, 1975, which declared that it is the right and duty of democratic people to oppose the Yushin System (Han, 1987, p. 126; CPAJ, 1985, p. 290). The Council also initiated the Declaration of Conscience Movement, the National Referendum Boycott Movement in February, 1975, and held prayer meetings and issued several other resolutions and statements (Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 268-69, 273-75; Ham, 1988, p. 279; CPAJ, 1985, pp. 288-90).

As the activity of the Council increased, the government began to suppress its participants in order to hamper its activities. For example, several professors who signed the "People's Declaration" were either received warnings from their universities or dismissed. Also, some lawyers were falsely charged with violating the Anti-Communist Law. However, this repression did not stop the people's resistance against the Park regime (CISJD, 1985, p. 49). After the Council was suppressed in 1975 under the Emergency Decree No. 9, other similar anti-government groups espousing democracy, human rights, and national reunification arose, one after another, to take its place, and the CPAJ played a catalytic role for the formation of these groups (Ham, 1988, p. 279).

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHURCH-STATE CONFLICTS IN SOUTH KOREA: CHURCH'S POLITICAL OPPOSITION, 1974-79 (CASE STUDIES #1-5)

Woe to those who enact unjust statutes and who write oppressive decrees, depriving the needy of judgment and robbing my people's poor of their rights, making widows their plunder, and orphans their prey! (*Isaiah* 10:1-2)

The development of national security and the development of a democratic government are in a state of unseparable union. . . . If the authorities should use the necessity for security to include anti-democratic elements in the new constitution . . . , this will be very dangerous for national security itself. (Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, June 25, 1980)

The Church as a whole and the Church in Korea has a long history of oppression. The Church has survived times even more terrible than today and the Church is being oppressed in other parts of the world even more than we are at present. (Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, August 6, 1979)

I. INTRODUCTION

This and the next chapter examine Church-state conflicts in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s, when the Church became a political opposition force, contributing to the democratization of South Korea. This chapter focuses on the Church's activities from 1974 through 1979 under the Park regime (1961-79). The next chapter covers the Church's actions from 1980 through 1989 under the Chun regime (1980-88) and during the early years of the Roh regime (1988-89).

Each chapter presents case studies selected for the purpose of providing a more thorough understanding of the Church's involvement in the movements for democratization and human rights, for workers and farmers, and for national reunification, which developed during the respective periods.

The following case studies are useful for examining the Church's sociopolitical involvement in a particular historical context. For the sake of convenience, the cases will be presented in chronological order. Each case study is followed by an evaluation which briefly discusses the ideological conflicts between the Church and state, the regime's reaction to the Church, and the normative, structural and behavioral factors involved in the exercise of the Church's sociopolitical role and influence, and in the constraints limiting the Church's effectiveness.

II. CASE STUDY #1: The Bishop Chi Incident in 1974

On July 6, 1974, Bishop Chi [Tji] Hak-sun of Wònju Diocese was arrested and taken to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency [KCIA], where he was charged with suspicion of being connected with the National League for Democratic Youth and Students (NLDYS) [*Chòn'guk Minju Ch'òngnyòn Haksaeng Ch'ongnyònmaeng*, or *Minch'òng Hangnyòn*, for short] (for additional details concerning this organization and incident, see Chapter Six, Note #9). Bishop Chi's arrest was largely due to his support of the NLDYS students. When Cardinal Kim visited him at the KCIA on July 8, Bishop Chi reiterated that the NLDYS had nothing to do with any Communist organizations, and that his support of the students was not a Communist activity (Myòngdong, 1984, p. 115). In his July 15, 1974 statement, Bishop Chi also said that he had given money (through Kim Chi-ha, a Catholic dissident poet) to the students only "as a fund for the protection of democracy" (*ibid.*, p. 118).

After Bishop Chi was arrested, the Church immediately reacted with countermeasures. The following day a prayer meeting calling for the release of Bishop Chi was arranged. On July 9, a meeting of the Permanent Committee of the Korean

Bishops' Conference was convened by Cardinal Kim. On the following day the Bishops' Conference held a meeting and, during an evening Mass, issued a statement entitled "Regarding Bishop Chi" (for details of this statement see *ibid.*, pp. 115-17). On July 23, during his temporary release, Bishop Chi issued his Declaration of Conscience, which criticized the Yushin System as a "violation of the most basic and essential rights of the people, hence of fundamental human dignity." He was arrested again on the same day (see Appendix C for the text of this Declaration; also see *ibid.*, pp. 119-20). Upon the Church learning of this second arrest, large-scale Masses (1,000 to 2,000 participants) were held at Myòngdong Cathedral on July 25, at Wònju Parish on July 30 and at Taejòn Parish on August 5. These Masses were dedicated to people suffering because of their fight for justice and to all those who would have to similarly suffer in the future. Finally, on August 6 the Permanent Committee of the Bishops' Conference officially issued a detailed explanation of Bishop Chi's arrest and directly refuted the government's charges (CISJD, 1985, p. 72; Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 114-22; CPAJ, 1985, p. 106).

However, the Bishops' Conference's formal reaction to Bishop Chi's arrest, as evidenced by its statement entitled "Regarding Bishop Chi" on July 10 and by "An Explanation Letter Concerning Bishop Chi Incident" on August 6 was inadequate. Neither statement gave concrete directions for dealing with this incident (also see Case Study #5, *infra*, for the Bishops' rather ambiguous and somewhat ambivalent attitudes concerning the Incident). The Church needed to do more than to make statements and hold prayer meetings for Bishop Chi. There was an urgent need for a more activist group within the Church to confront the state's repression. Not only Bishop Chi, but many other righteous students, intellectuals, and religious leaders were imprisoned or threatened with imprisonment. Priests of all dioceses agreed that

the current situation demanded that the Church forcefully speak out against these injustices. Thereafter, on August 26, some 60 priests representing all dioceses congregated at Tapdong Church, to pray and declare the "Contention of the praying National Council of the Priests." On September 11, the priests' organization made its first public appearance at the "Prayer Service for Those Who are Suffering" at the Myòngdong Cathedral in Seoul. There they issued a "Resolution" demanding the release of Bishop Chi and other prisoners (Myòngdong, 1984, p. 133). Bishop Chi's message from prison also was read at this prayer service. As previously mentioned, Bishop Chi's "Declaration of Conscience" denouncing the Yushin System, and his "Message from Prison" professing solidarity with the poor and the oppressed, became focal points for Catholic participation in opposition movements.

This organization of priests did not yet have a formal name. On September 23, the group increased in size by the inclusion of some 300 priests at the National Clergymen's Seminar in Wònju. On that date, the priests decided to combine their efforts in fighting for democracy and human rights by agreeing to formally organize their group under the name of Catholic Priests' Association for Justice (CPAJ). The following day, some 1,500 people held a prayer meeting at Wònju parish, after which some 1,000 staged a street demonstration. On September 26, the CPAJ held a prayer meeting at Myòngdong Cathedral attended by some 2,000 priests and believers, where they announced their First Declaration on the Times, followed by a street demonstration of some 2,000 participants (CPAJ, 1985, pp. 107-08). This demonstration was noteworthy for two reasons: first, it was the first street demonstration by a clergy group, including some 20 foreign priests; and second, it signified the beginning of the CPAJ's public political opposition, and was a turning point in the history of the South Korean Church (*ibid.*, p. 108). With the CPAJ

leading the way, at least 54 prayer services were held during 1974. At times, the CPAJ fully utilized the Church's centralized national organization in mobilizing its movement for democratization. For example, prayer services which attracted increasing numbers of participants were held simultaneously in all the major cities on November 11 and 20. These services often were followed by street demonstrations, which led to clashes with police. At Myòngdong Cathedral in Seoul, these special prayer services which involved many thousands of participants took place on the average of more than once per week (Sohn, 1988, p. 134; also see Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 115-89).

During these prayer services, the CPAJ also issued important declarations and statements, including the following noteworthy examples: (1) First Declaration on the Times [or Statement on the Current Situation] (September 26, 1974) (see Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 135-38); (2) Second Declaration on the Times (November 6, 1974) (see *ibid.*, pp. 141-43); (3) an all-night prayer meeting and announcement of Declaration for the Practice [Materialization] of Social Justice (November 20, 1974) (see *ibid.*, pp. 145-48); (4) a prayer meeting with 13 parishes and declaration of a five-point resolution (December 10, 1974); (5) a prayer meeting for the restoration of human rights and democracy at Myòngdong Cathedral with 2,000 participants (January 9, 1975) (see *ibid.*, pp. 275-77); and (6) a prayer meeting for the restoration of democracy along with the announcement of the Third Declaration on the Times (February 6, 1975), etc. (see *ibid.*, pp. 282-84). These are only a few examples of the nationwide activities of the CPAJ. Furthermore, the declarations of the CPAJ demonstrated the progressive (or "radical" by the standards of the day) nature of the group's stance, which enabled it to play a leading role in other opposition movements. For example, Fr. Ham Se-ung, one of the key members of the CPAJ, later became

the spokesman for the National Congress (Council) for Restoration of Democracy (NCRD), an extra-institutional opposition organization at the national level (Sohn, 1988, p. 134; also see Note #14). The CPAJ also provided continuous momentum for the Church's involvement in movements for democratization and social justice throughout the 1980s. However, as will be seen later, its activities raised considerable controversy within the Church regarding the Church's political involvement.

In addition to prompting the formation of the CPAJ, the Bishop Chi Incident awakened the Church. A good example is the National Holy Year Convention held at Catholic College (School of Theology) on October 9, 1974. Some 25,000 believers from all parts of the nation, including priests, nuns, and five bishops, attended this convention, at which the Bishop of Chònju Diocese gave a sermon on the social role and duty of believers, based upon the social teachings of Vatican II. At the end of the convention, some 5,000 participants, including priests and nuns led by the CPAJ, staged a demonstration. Placards and pickets read: (1) "Release Bishop Chi!"; (2) "Restore Constitutional Order!"; (3) "The people's voice is the voice of God!"; and (4) "Listen to the people's voice!," etc. When their progress was blocked by the police, they staged a sit-in demonstration. After the participants were dispersed, 1,000 reconvened and staged another street demonstration despite interference and the use of heavy tear gas by police. It is noteworthy that five bishops joined this sit-in demonstration. It was the first time that bishops had joined a political demonstration (Han, 1987, pp. 114-15; Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 172-79). The movement reached its climax on November 11, when the CPAJ conducted simultaneous prayer meetings calling for the restoration of human rights in twelve major cities. Some of these meetings ended in street demonstrations (CISJD, 1985, pp. 75-76). As a result of the

foregoing efforts made on his behalf, Bishop Chi finally was released from prison on February 15, 1975.

The Bishop Chi Incident also encouraged religious leaders of all faiths to work together. The efforts of both Catholic and Protestant Churches quickly led to large-scale meetings and demonstrations. These joint efforts led to the formation of the previously mentioned National Congress (Council) for Restoration of Democracy (NCRD) on December 25, 1974 (see Chapter Six, Note #13). Also, the Korean Christian Action Organization [the Korea Action Organization for Urban Industrial Mission] (see CPAJ, 1985, pp. 282-85) along with 12 other church groups gathered at Myòngdong Cathedral on September 22 for a "Joint Prayer Meeting for the Arrested" attended by some 1,000 people. At this meeting the following demands were made: (1) repeal of the Yushin Constitution and adoption of a democratic constitution; (2) acknowledgement of the ineffectiveness of Emergency Decrees; (3) guarantee of freedom of speech, assembly, association and press; (4) guarantee of three labor rights; and (5) establishment of a committee for the realization of social justice within the Church. This joint service exemplified the close working relationship between Catholics and Protestants in the movement to restore democracy (CISJD, 1985, pp. 72-73).

As previously mentioned, the CPAJ, the Lay Apostolate Council of Korea, and other organizations within the Church issued critical statements. Cardinal Kim also delivered critical sermons and messages (Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 128-58). This incident also drew attention from abroad. The Justice and Peace Committee in Japan issued an appeal to the world churches (*ibid.*, p. 159). The Vatican's July 6 and 13 broadcasts mentioned the Bishop Chi Incident as a shocking and sad event (*ibid.*, pp. 161, 164).

In summary, the Bishop Chi Incident provided the impetus needed for the formation of the CPAJ, which became the Church's most important and influential participant in the movements for democratization and human rights. This incident and the formation of the CPAJ led to even more intensified Church-state conflicts. In addition, the Incident illustrates why and how the Church as a whole reacted to the political repression of Park's Yushin System. Because this incident was related to the previously mentioned National League for Democratic Youth and Students (NLDYS) case and the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) case, it was quickly politicized. It is a good example of the interaction between religion and politics in a concrete historical context.

The Bishop Chi Incident also is a good illustration of the interplay between the normative, structural and behavioral factors which characterize and limit the Church's sociopolitical role and influence.

Perhaps the most significant normative factor was the Church's willingness and ability, through the CPAJ, to perform a prophetic role in attacking the abuses of the dictatorial Park regime in the face of harsh repressive measures. Bishop Chi's July 23 Declaration of Conscience denouncing the Yushin System and his subsequent "Message from Prison" professing solidarity with the poor and oppressed exemplified a prophetic stance consistent with the teachings of Vatican II and Liberation Theology, as well as courageous resistance to the repressive Park regime. It is probably true that, as Smith also observes regarding the Chilean case, the Church did *not* act *until* one of its own, Bishop Chi, became a victim of the state's repression. Nonetheless, it didn't take long for the Church to respond by holding prayer meetings and demonstrations, and by issuing prophetic declarations and statements, especially through the young priests of the CPAJ. These messages not only demanded the

release of Bishop Chi, but also denounced the Yushin System and made specific political demands. Moreover, the October 9 convention and the demonstration which followed emphasized the social teachings of Vatican II and Liberation Theology, especially the concept of the "people of God."

An equally important behavioral factor which enabled the Church to perform a prophetic role in criticizing and opposing the state was the public's perception of the Church as having an overriding moral authority and greater credibility and trustworthiness than other institutions. This had the effect of limiting the coercive force that otherwise could have been brought to bear upon the Church by the repressive state. The state's repressive tendencies were limited by the force of public opinion and sentiment which supported the Church.¹

Other normative factors include the Park regime attacking the Church for "meddling in politics" and basing its oppressive and repressive measures on its political dogmata of national security and anti-Communism. The Church met these attacks head on, claiming the rights of religious freedom and self-preservation of the Church. Another important normative factor was the combined effort made by Catholics and Protestants, as well as by clergy and laity, to defend and promote religious freedom and human rights. It demonstrates that unity in the pursuit of sociopolitical goals is achievable by the Church under certain circumstances, where diversity and division might otherwise prevail in purely religious concerns.

The most important structural factor was the formation of the CPAJ and the participation of young, liberal priests, nuns and laity with broad, progressive, and sometimes, radical concerns in its prayer meetings, demonstrations and other activities. Of course, this was offset by the limiting factor of the older bishops, whose statements and actions regarding the Incident were critical of the CPAJ, and, as to an

alternative course of action, were generally vague, cautious and indecisive. On the other hand, individual bishops did attend and officiate at the prayer meetings and convention. They even participated in at least one of the demonstrations which followed. Moreover, the CPAJ expanded its influence by having a nationwide network, and by being involved in other movements. The international network of the Church also was a factor in that the Vatican made known its views of the Incident. Finally, the CPAJ's prayful, peaceful persuasion techniques ultimately prevailed over the state's coercive, repressive tactics.

III. CASE STUDY #2: The Myòngdong Incident on March 1, 1976

On March 1, 1976, the 57th anniversary of the March 1, 1919 uprising to declare Korean independence, a joint Catholic-Protestant prayer service was held at Myòngdong Cathedral in Seoul. Some 700 believers, including several Protestant clergymen and out-of-power politicians, such as Yun Po-sòn and Kim Dae-jung, attended the Mass, which was co-officiated by some 20 priests. Afterward, a Declaration for Democratic National Salvation was made and signed by 7 Catholic priests, all of whom were key members of the CPAJ, including Fr. Ham Se-ung, and by other eminent Korean lay leaders and Protestant ministers (see Appendix C for the text of this Declaration; also see Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 350-53). This declaration called for President Park's resignation. Thus, the enforced silence of Emergency Decree No. 9 was broken. Because of this declaration, 20 religious and lay leaders, including 7 Catholic priests, several Protestant pastors, and politicians such as Kim Dae-jung, were arrested (*ibid.*, pp. 350-53).

It is useful in examining the ideological conflicts between the Church and the Park regime, to compare the themes of the Declaration, namely, (1) "this Country must stand on a basis of democracy"; (2) "the design and structure of our country's economic foundations must be fundamentally reexamined"; and (3) "national unification is our compatriots' supreme task today" with the reaction by the Seoul District prosecutor's office, representing the state, to the Declaration, as follows (see Appendix C; also see *ibid.*):

On March 10, 1976, the Seoul District Prosecutor arrested under the provisions of the Presidential Emergency Decree No. 9, twenty persons who took part in the attempt by a group of opposition leaders to use the March 1 Commemorative Mass at Myong Dong [Myongdong] Cathedral, Seoul, to incite a conspiracy *to overthrow the government*.

These persons of the opposition utilized every opportunity to gather anti-government elements. . . , forming illegal organizations, holding various kinds of prayer meetings, training sessions and gatherings, *under the pretense of religious activity*.

.....
The prosecutor's office regards this as a serious matter, not only because it was an agitation of many people to overthrow the government carried out inside the cathedral *by taking advantage of a religious ceremony in an abuse of religious freedom*, but because it was also *an act subversive to the constitutional order*. (For additional details, see Appendix C; also see JCCJP, 1983, pp. 50-52; italics added)

The ideological conflict between the South Korean Church and the Park regime perhaps is more clearly shown in the court testimony of the defendants, especially the CPAJ priests. Some pertinent portions of the testimony that was given in court on June 5, 1976 are as follows:

There are some things which I wish to say at this public court. In August, 1974, Bishop Daniel Hak Soon Tji [Chi, Hak-sun] released a Declaration of Conscience in which he said that he was unable to recognize either the Restoration [Yushin] Constitution or the Emergency Measures (see Appendix C for this Declaration of Conscience). We, the members of the National Priests' Association for the Realization of Justice [the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice, the CPAJ], have resolved to hold to that declaration. Therefore, I am unable to recognize the present court. But, in order to make clear my conscience and my principles, I have appeared in this court.

.....

March 1st Memorial Day is not a Church Holy Day. But since it is a day commemorating those who sacrificed their lives for the independence of the country and individual freedom and for the establishment of human rights, to relay that message would be in accordance with the spirit of Christianity. . . (By Fr. Ham Se-ung; JCCJP, 1983, pp. 65-67)

At present, the government is oversensitive to protest. As a result of the people's mistrust of this kind of government and the government's tendency to overreact stemming from their defeatism, the government is worried the most about the preservation of authority. The laws the government is talking about are just like wartime legislation, but this wartime legislation is for the purpose of maintaining authority. (By Fr. Moon Jung-hyun [Mun Chông-hyòn]; *ibid.*, p. 69)

The meaning of the Church is to aid the faith coming out of the present situation. The Exposition before the Mass was appropriate to the meaning of the Church standing in a prophetic position and acting as the representative of the weak.

The tasks which the Church has to do as a matter of course were included in the contents and were also the things which I myself had conviction in. In addition, the meaning of the true March 1st Memorial and the meaning of why we had to pray for the Restoration of Human Rights and Democracy from the point of view of faith was included. (By Fr. Chang Dok-pil [Chang Tòk-p'il]; *ibid.*, pp. 69-70)

At present, too many people of religion are seeking their own stability and turn their backs on the many problems facing us at present. When Jesus came into the world, he was closest to the outcasts and the poor. Today's clergy must come to a great awakening. They must become the spokesmen for those who are suffering and must do some kind of meaningful work for the exploited. It is my hope to do all in my power to bring some light to this present state of darkness. In the address I gave at the service it said: "The newspapers which were beginning to open their mouths at the time of March 1st have since then kept their mouths shut. At present the contents of the articles in the papers are all exactly the same. If there is any difference between the papers it is only in the comics or the novels which they print." (By Fr. Kim Seung-hun [Kim Sùng-hun]; *ibid.*, p. 70)

As shown by the above testimony, the priests candidly expressed their views concerning the true political situation in South Korea (also see Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 395-408 for additional testimony by these priests).

After the priests were arrested, the Church reacted in a number of ways: On March 7, the Justice and Peace Committee sent a letter to the Bishops' Conference requesting the bishops to take the necessary measures to resolve the crisis. On March 15, the Bishops' Conference issued a statement concerning the Incident (see Case

Study #5, *infra*, for the Bishops' rather ambiguous and somewhat ambivalent attitudes concerning the Incident). On March 26, the Justice and Peace Committee organized an attorneys' group to defend the arrested priests. In the meantime, prayer meetings for those arrested and for the entire nation were held continuously throughout the country for the rest of the year. Several of these prayer meetings were officiated by bishops and the CPAJ. On August 3, Frs. Moon (Mun), Shin, and Ham were sentenced to 7 years in prison and 7 years of religious disqualification. Frs. Kim and Chang were sentenced to 3 years in prison and 3 years of religious disqualification. On December 29, the Supreme Court resented Frs. Ham, Moon and Shin to 3 years in prison and 3 years of religious disqualification, Fr. Kim to 2 years in prison, 2 years of religious disqualification, and 3 years of probation, and Fr. Chang to 1 year in prison, 1 year of religious disqualification, and 2 years of probation.

On March 28, 1977, Cardinal Kim, Archbishop Yoon Kong-hee (Yun Kong-hùi), and 43 priests officiated at a special Mass. Again, on April 18, Cardinal Kim, Archbishop Yoon (Yun), Bishop Choi Jae-sun (Ch'oe Chae-sòn), together with some 120 priests, officiated at a prayer meeting, during which the CPAJ issued a statement on the current situation, including the following seven points: (1) "Political community exists for the common good and can be justified only in it"; (2) "Oppression is attended with injustice and corruption"; (3) "All have the right to confess their faith according to their conscience"; (4) "The land and all the goods within it should be distributed justly and abundantly according to justice based on love"; (5) "Peace and justice are inseparable from each other"; (6) "We should be allowed to think and talk about what we have seen and heard"; (7) "The mission of religion is 'to scatter those who are proud,' 'to drag strong rulers from their thrones,' 'to put humble people in places of power,' and 'to give the hungry good things to eat'

(*Luke 1: 51-53*) (for the full text of this statement, see Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 415-16). Frs. Shin, Ham, and Moon finally were released from prison on August 15, August 24, and December 31, 1977, respectively (see *ibid.*, p. 394; Han, 1987, pp. 115-116; and CPAJ, 1985, pp. 158-61).

The Myòngdong March 1 Incident has several important lessons. First, it shows *how the Church came together to fight against state injustice and repression*.² It was a dedicated and determined Church which challenged the state's notorious Emergency Decree No. 9 designed to totally silence all political opposition. Furthermore, the repercussions from the issuance of the declaration and the treatment of those responsible for it were so harsh and inequitable that the Church was shocked and strongly reacted to the Incident. Thereafter, student demonstrations resurfaced, rekindling the human rights movement, and the Association of the Families of Political Prisoners was reactivated to work for the release of those arrested (CISJD, 1985, p. 88).

Second, the Incident provided the nucleus for the newly developing unofficial, or extra-institutional, opposition movements, in that those arrested in connection with the Incident included the nation's top political leaders as well as key leaders in the democratic and social justice movement of the Catholic and Protestant Churches. This group later became the center of the alliance of movements opposing President Park (Sohn, 1988, p. 175). Moreover, the leaders of these dissident movements played an increasingly influential role as a "Religious Extra-institutional Opposition" near the end of the Yushin System (see Chapter Three).

Third, the declaration and the subsequent debate during and after the trials of the accused gave strong impetus to the movements for the democracy and human rights which already had begun to develop in the anti-Yushin campaign. These

activities were the initial evidence of the progressive, if not radical, trend within the dissident movements. They contributed not only to the movements' liberal democratic ideology, but also to the inclusion of the concepts of economic justice and reunification in this ideology (*ibid.*, pp. 176, 195; also see pp. 176-94 for democratic ideas and arguments).

An important normative factor present in the Myòngdong Incident was the combined effort made by Catholic and Protestant clergy and laity and politicians in the prophetic declaration which broke the silence imposed by the Park regime. This declaration not only called for the president's resignation, but also promoted political democracy, economic change and reunification.

Other normative emphases include (1) the CPAJ priests' court testimony identifying individual freedom and human rights with Christianity, chiding the state for its oversensitivity and overreaction to civil protests, stressing that democracy and human rights are matters of religious conviction, faith and prayer, and associating Jesus with social outcasts, the poor, the suffering and the exploited, and making the Church their spokesman, pursuant to Biblical messages, and (2) the CPAJ's April 18 statement denouncing political oppression, injustice and corruption, and promoting a political community dedicated to the common good, religious freedom, including freedom of conscience, the just distribution of economic resources, and free speech. This statement also identified peace with justice, and asserted that the Christian religion's mission is to reform politics and serve the needy in society.

A negative normative factor was the state prosecutor's efforts to discredit Church leaders, characterizing them as subversives intent on overthrowing the government, and accusing the Church of abusing its religious prerogatives to engage in "unlawful" political activities.

Important structural factors and constraints include the involvement of bishops and CPAJ priests, as well as other clergy and laity in the Church's sociopolitical activities. These activities resulted in state repression in the form of arrests, imprisonments, prosecutions, sentencing, press censorship and other restraints on free speech and religious freedom. Other structural factors include the Church's provision of attorneys to defend the dissident priests, the Church's influence on other groups and movements, including student demonstrations for human rights and a secular organization working for the release of political prisoners, and the Church's efforts in solidifying political opposition forces.

IV. CASE STUDY #3: The Dongil Textile Incident in 1978

For a long time the Dongil (Tongil) Textile Company's women workers had struggled to establish a democratic labor union. In the meantime, they endured considerable injustice and suffering. As of 1972, out of 1,300 employees at Dongil Textile, 1,100 were women. Their work was dangerous and their work hours were long and unpredictable. Also, their wages were miserably low, and it was common for them to have to do overtime work without pay. Furthermore, they were maltreated and even beaten on occasion. The union was run by a few men who were selected and paid by the company. They cared little or not at all about the women workers. Under the guidance of Rev. Cho Wha-soon (Cho Hwa-sun), a woman Methodist minister from the Urban Industrial Mission (U.I.M.), the women workers decided to try to improve working conditions by having women lead the union. After a quiet campaign to persuade the workers to vote for delegates who would support a woman president, a woman worker was elected president of the union. It was the first

time in South Korean history for a woman to be president of a union. Also, all of those elected to the executive committee of the union were all women. After their term of three years ended in 1975, the same thing happened again. The president of the union and all executive committee members were women, despite the company's attempts to threaten and bribe electors in order to replace the legally elected woman president with their trusted male henchman. After the second election, the company began to heavily suppress the union's activities. Some of the union leaders were threatened and even fired. Also, all the workers began to receive warnings that their trusted counselor, Rev. Cho Hwa-sun, might be a Communist. Her arrest and imprisonment for several months by the KCIA made the charge seem credible. On April 22, 1976, at a union members' meeting, the union president was arrested by the police on charges of inciting a riot. This arrest had been arranged by the company with the police. A demonstration by women workers followed. They gathered on company grounds and demanded the release of the president and 8 other women who had been arrested with her. The next morning the police came and violently broke up the demonstration. 72 women were arrested and 14 were injured and sent to the hospital (Ogle, 1990, pp. 84-86; Han, 1987, pp. 108-09).

For nine months after this incident, a struggle for control of the union took place. In April, 1977, for the third time a woman was elected president. She was a J.O.C. member. She began to work closely with the U.I.M. of Inch'õn to activate the union. However, "the end of these heroics was not far away. Both the company and the government had had enough of women's liberation" (Ogle, 1990, p. 86).

February 21, 1978 was the date scheduled for the election of new union delegates. When the women workers entered the union hall, they found that the union office room and its equipment had been smashed with clubs and steel bars, and the

ballot box had been destroyed. Moreover, male workers, who sided with management, distributed leaflets defaming the J.O.C. and the U.I.M. as Communist organizations. They also grabbed women by the hair, and kicked and beat them. The women workers were even doused with excrement. More than 50 workers were injured. The police took no steps to stop the attack or arrest the attackers. This was probably the worst repression of workers in South Korean history (Han, 1987, p 109; Ogle, 1990, p. 86; Sohn, 1988, pp. 238-39; CPAJ, 1985, pp. 230-33).

The attack was organized by the company assisted by the National Union of Textile Workers (hereafter called NUTW). They intended to disrupt the election so that the NUTW could take control of the Dongil Textile Union. According to a NUTW regulation revised on January 23, less than one month before the Incident, a branch union could be labeled a "problem union" by a declaration of the national union, after which the national union was empowered to immediately assume control of the "problem union" (Sohn, 1988, p. 239). As a result, the branch union of Dongil Textile was placed under the control of the NUTW, which worked closely with the company and the government. The company also announced that 124 of the union women had been discharged for causing damage to company property (Ogle, 1990, p. 86).

As previously mentioned, this attack also was intended to suppress Christian labor activities of the J.O.C. and the U.I.M. under the pretext that these groups were Communist organizations. Because Rev. Cho Hwa-sun had experienced a laborer's life for 6 months during 1966, the U.I.M. had had prior contacts with these women workers, and many active union members also were active members of either the Protestant U.I.M. or the Catholic J.O.C. (Sohn, 1988, p. 241). The company had previously launched an anti-U.I.M. campaign in late 1977 with the support of the

NUTW. As a part of that campaign, a book entitled *What is the Urban Industrial Mission Aiming At?* by Hong Ji-young (Hong Chi-yòng), which describes Christian labor union activities as being part of a Communist movement, was distributed free of charge by the company (*ibid.*, pp. 239-40).

After this horrible incident, the women workers sought help from anyone who they thought might hear their appeals, including government agencies, political parties, the mass media., etc. Unfortunately, all of their efforts proved to be fruitless, and their struggle continued (for additional details, see *ibid.*, p. 242). For example, on March 10, some 80 women staged a demonstration at a live broadcast of a government-sponsored Labor Day rally, during which they shouted out what had happened to them. Some 30 demonstrators were arrested, and the rest went to Myòngdong Cathedral to stage a hunger strike for an indefinite period (Han, 1987, p. 109).

Needless to say, this incident already had been protested vigorously and extensively by the churches and dissident groups. Both the Protestant and Catholic churches considered the Incident to involve a church issue because the Protestant U.I.M. and the Catholic J.O.C. were main targets of the attack. The churches put forth a united effort to resolve the problem with Dongil Textile Company and to obtain reinstatement of the dismissed workers, who were unable to find new jobs because of a blacklist circulated by the NUTW. The churches' actions, completely in support of the workers' cause, ranged from prayer services and protest meetings to petitions to governmental authorities and negotiations with the company. The workers also produced reports and petitions and read them at prayer services and Masses (Sohn, 1988, pp. 242-43).

As for the Catholic Church, a protest movement was staged by the J.O.C., the priests of Inch'õn Diocese, the Lay Apostolate Council of Korea, and the Justice and Peace Committee. They either issued statements or otherwise became actively involved in trying to solve the problem (Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 474-84; CPAJ, 1985, pp. 168-71, 233-35). For example, at a prayer meeting at Myòngdong Cathedral on March 20, Cardinal Kim emphasized that the formation and activities of a labor union are basic human rights, citing Vatican II social teachings (Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 484-91). The Korean Bishops' Conference issued a similar statement protesting against the suppression of unions and workers. In their April 4, 1978 statement, the Bishops proposed the following four points as central guidelines: (1) Beginning with Christian workers, all those unjustly fired should be reinstated; (2) Beginning with the labor union at Dongil Textile Company, all official functions of true labor unions should be restored; (3) The propaganda promulgated by certain books and lectures implying that Christian workers are Communist sympathizers should be discontinued; (4) The government should promise to eradicate sub-living standard wage scales and should work for the welfare of workers and these promises should be made concrete and effective as soon as possible (*ibid.*, p. 492).

However, all of the churches' efforts also proved to be fruitless because the churches themselves were the target of a joint operation of suppression by the company, national labor unions and the government. The government's long-term goal was to eradicate active, democratic unions and discourage worker involvement in labor movements. This joint operation employed three types of anti-labor tactics, namely, (1) "the repression of the worker-initiative labor movement, inside or outside the union"; (2) "the repression of union organizing"; and (3) "the suppression of demands for wage increases and improvements in working conditions" (Sohn, 1988,

pp. 244-46). The government's methods also involved violence, dismissal, arrest, imprisonment, and stern legal measures. Moreover, the government used trade unions or civilian agents to launch a propaganda campaign against the democratic labor movement, as was done in the anti-U.I.M. campaign. The government also relied on anti-Communist programs to purge the dissident labor movement.

The churches continued their appeals and protests in support of the labor movement and against the government's ideological attacks upon the churches themselves. The churches played an important role in supporting the labor movement by (1) expressing their comprehensive concern for social justice; (2) engaging in and supporting the investigation of labor dispute cases; (3) participating in labor union activities as key members of the J.O.C. and the U.I.M.; and (4) supporting labor union activities by helping fired workers, etc. (see CPAJ, 1985, pp. 211-45 for other important incidents in which the Church became deeply involved and supported workers' rights in the 1970s).

The significance of the Dongil Textile Incident can be summarized as follows: First, it marked the emergence of an alliance between the labor movement and the dissident movement. Most important activities involved both workers and dissident activists, and Catholics and Protestants. These joint activities were compelled because of the vacuum left by established institutions supposedly responsible for solving labor problems, notably trade unions and the government. The increased control of labor and trade unions under guidelines prescribed by the regime inevitably created a demand for other social institutions to meet the pressing need for counsel and mediation in labor disputes. The U.I.M. and the J.O.C., as well as the churches, played an important part meeting this need (Sohn, 1988, pp. 246-47).

Second, the labor movement itself developed into an anti-government political movement. Prayer services and other meetings, which provided the only opportunities to air labor grievances, prompted the labor movement to become involved in the political struggle. As previously mentioned, the politicization of the labor movement also was induced by the authoritarian regime's failure to accommodate the interests of labor within the established political system (*ibid.*, p. 247).

Third, this incident and other similar incidents greatly affected the democratic movement within the Church and opposition movements as a whole in that labor issues came to be regarded as a central theme within the broader concept of human rights. In other words, issues such as working conditions and wage levels, which many human rights activists had not dealt with or even been aware of, began to be perceived as important issues in the struggle for human rights. These issues also resulted in a greater concern for social justice and for basic social and economic structures. These issues also aided the movement to overthrow the Park regime, and contributed to the emergence of a radical tendency among some sectors of opposition movements after the collapse of the Yushin System (*ibid.*, pp. 247-48).

Fourth, this unique battle was waged for almost six years. Women had struck a decisive blow. They became the leaders of a movement that, in succeeding years, expanded nationwide. From the courage displayed by the women at Dongil Textile, other women in other plants and industries gained the inspiration and strength to try to improve their own work situations. Bando Sangsa (Pando Sangsa), Pangnim (Pangnim), Hankook Mobang (Han'guk Mobang), and Y.H. are the names of a few other companies where, in the 1970s, women workers refused to accept the Yushin system of oppression. When, in the mid-1980s, male workers finally began to assert

their labor rights, they found that they were "standing on the shoulders of women who had been struggling for justice for more than ten years" (Ogle, 1990, p. 86).

Probably the most important normative factor present in the Dongil Textile Incident was the Church's support of the rights of labor, an economic issue as well as a human rights issue. This incident also concerned the rights of women workers who didn't enjoy the same status as men under the traditional Confucian system. The Church had previously stressed the primacy of economic justice and the rights of labor in its papal messages and social teachings beginning with Pope Leo in 1891, well before the renewed emphasis of Vatican II.

Key structural factors include the state's condonation of the violent acts performed by or at the behest of the employer and elements of the local and national unions, as well as the state's own repressive acts. On the positive side, the Church not only held prayer and protest meetings and issued statements, but through the J.O.C. and the Protestant U.I.M., it became directly involved in assisting the fired workers, petitioning the government, and in negotiating with the employer and the national union. Another structural aspect was that the Church's efforts led to an awakening of the labor movement and to its alliance with the dissidents of the human rights movement. On the negative side, the private employer, in collaboration with the state, attacked the Protestant U.I.M. and the Catholic J.O.C. as Communist organizations. However, the Church countered by asserting that it was only exercising its religious freedom in assisting the formation and activities of a labor union, which are basic human rights, citing Vatican II social teachings. The Church also performed a prophetic role in challenging the state's anti-worker-initiated-union and anti-democratic-labor-movement campaigns. The Church, the U.I.M. and J.O.C. were truly the institutions of last resort for the labor dissidents because the government,

allied with the employer and the national union, was so firmly committed to its anti-labor policies. Another structural factor was the unified effort made by Catholic and Protestant participants in addressing this socioeconomic issue. Lastly, this incident marked the emergence of women as a potent socioeconomic force and, perhaps in the future, a political force.

V. CASE STUDY #4: The Oh Won-chun (or Andong) Incident in 1979

Possibly as a result of the Hampyong (Hamp'yòng) Sweet Potato Incident in November, 1976 (see Chapter Six, Note #11), the Church experienced increased repression by the government. On April 23, 1978, Yoo Nam-sun (Yu Nam-sòn), president of Ch'unch'òn Parish and Jung Sung-hun (Chòng Sòng-hòn), Director the KCFM National Headquarter's Cooperative Enterprise Department, both members of the KCFM, were arrested for violating Emergency Decree No. 9. They were charged with anti-government activities by making leaflets and distributing them to farmers in December, 1977. In addition, 10 public officials and teachers who had received and read the KCFM leaflets were fired. The purpose of these leaflets was to introduce farmers to the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement and to openly criticize the government's arbitrary appointment of key officials of the Agricultural Cooperative Association without consulting the farmers. The appointments resulted in the alienation of farmers from the Association.

These events triggered Church inspired protests throughout the nation. On May 15 and 16, prayer meetings were held in Seoul. Park Myung-gun (Pak Myòng-gùn), General Secretary of KCFM of Ch'unch'òn Parish, and others were arrested and charged with violating Emergency Decree No. 9 by reporting the April 23

Incident at one of the prayer meetings. Those arrested were released after President Park's assassination on October 26, 1979.

The Oh Won-chun (Oh Wòn-ch'un) Incident (or Andong Incident) was part of a series of planned suppressive measures by the government, which also included the above Ch'unch'on Parish-KCFM Incident (CISJD, 1985, p. 122; CPAJ, 1985, pp. 272-73). This incident began on May 5, 1979 with the kidnapping of local KCFM leader Oh Won-chun of Andong Parish, South-Kyongsang Province, southeastern South Korea. Oh was taken by two unidentified government intelligence officers to Ullung Island where he was severely beaten and held in isolation for two weeks. When his kidnapping became known to the public, Oh was arrested and charged with violating Emergency Measure No. 9 by disseminating a "false" report that he had been kidnapped and harassed by intelligence officers. The subsequent arrest of Catholic priests and other active members of the KCFM resulted in a confrontation between the government and the Church.

Oh made and gave to some priests his Declaration of Conscience stating the facts of his kidnapping and swearing that his statements were true and that, if they were subsequently altered, it would be the result of external pressure (see Myongdong, 1984, pp. 552-53). Contrary to Oh's declaration, the police alleged that Oh had fabricated the entire story to cover up an alleged trip he had made to get out of an alleged extramarital affair. Relying on the truth of Oh's statements, the Church maintained that government intelligence agents had kidnapped and beaten him. The Church further asserted that Oh's persecution was due to his activities in the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement, particularly his leading role in the successful "Potato Compensation Campaign" earlier that year. Asserting that the kidnapping of Oh was not a made-up story, the Church made a resolution to protest the repression and to

reaffirm the truth about the Incident. The Church's position was clearly expressed in the July 26, 1979 resolution by key members of the Andong Diocese, including the Andong Diocese Justice and Peace Committee, the KCFM and a group of Andong Parish priests. On July 30, a special Mass officiated by Bishop Dupont of the Andong Diocese was held at Moksòng-dong Church in Andong. On August 6 at the same church, Cardinal Kim officiated at a prayer meeting attended by some 1,000 believers, including two bishops, some 150 priests and some 200 KCFM members (*ibid.*, pp. 556-57). During this prayer meeting, Cardinal Kim expressed the Church's position regarding the Oh Won-chun Incident as follows:

Nevertheless, the authorities are announcing it as such and are doing their best to make it appear so. . . . Here, indeed, is a case of "those in power using that power to oppress others." . . . it is a tragedy for our people when *truth becomes falsehood and falsehood becomes truth*. That is not the end of it. If the truth of this affair is not brought to light, it allows those in power to continue to freely oppress the rights of others. We cannot accept such a situation. (JCCJP, 1983^a, p. 291; Myòngdong, 1984, p. 558; italics added)

In his message, Cardinal Kim also strongly denounced the government for not only abusing the dignity of individual human beings, but also harming the institutional Church itself, citing the arrest of another priest, Father Chong Ho-kyong (Chòng Ho-kyòng), as follows:

We also cannot be silent about the arrest of Father Chong Ho-kyong, coordinating priest for the Andong Catholic Farmers' Movement [Association]. . . . At the very least, they should preserve *basic human dignity* in this affair. . . . Father Chong is not a man who would run away. . . . Instead, thirty officers invaded the rectory in broad daylight as if they were pursuing a crazed murderer. . . . According to the Bishop [Bishop Dupont of Andong Diocese], . . . right before his very eyes the police took Father Chong into custody in the way I have just described. He didn't even have time to put on his shoes. A truly shocking incident.

If the police extend such treatment to *a Catholic priest*, how indeed would they treat a lay person? . . .

"The police and the KCIA can do anything they want!" "If the person is under suspicion, handle him any way you like!" How did they ever begin to think like this? This is truly a fearful state of affairs.

.....

It is precisely because of this thinking that incidents like the Oh abduction case occur. (*Ibid.*, p. 291-92; Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 558-59; italics added)

Cardinal Kim also vigorously protested the arrests on the additional grounds that they represented the suppression of the Church's *pastoral mission* for social justice, and were a direct assault on the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement, which he described as "a group which is truly the church at work in the actual world and working without reward for the benefit of the farmers" (*ibid*, p. 293; Myòngdong, 1984, p. 560). He also strongly criticized the Park regime for labelling the Church's movements for workers and farmers as *subversive pro-Communist activities*, as follows:

Why do the politicians in this country despise so much the awakening of the masses (beginning with the workers and farmers), the awakening of the country to their basic rights? (*Ibid.*, p. 293; Myòngdong, 1984, p. 560)

.....
The government continually points out our *special situation of division* into North and South while they continue to make the most of the ensuing *restrictions on human liberties*. . . .

Nevertheless, . . . these restrictions on the people's freedom, supposedly for the sake of our situation, present an even greater danger in themselves. (*Ibid.*, p. 294; Myòngdong, 1984, p. 561; italics added)

.....
Who, indeed, are Communist suspects?. . . . who are the real suspects and sympathizers?

Are those working to protect the rights of the workers and farmers for the benefit of us all really Communist suspects and sympathizers? No, they are not. These are the people who will truly create a strong country based on justice. The people who are calling them "*Communists*" or "*Sympathizers*" are the ones who are truly oppressing the workers and farmers. These people, unaware of their own aiding of the Communist cause, are more dangerous than those who consciously profess Communism. (*Ibid.*, p. 295; Myòngdong, 1984, p. 562; italics added)

In addition to his strong denunciation of the government's misplaced anti-Communist propaganda, Cardinal Kim reemphasized the Church's role as a religious institution as follows:

What is the Church to do? Is our Church in actuality close to the Communist position? What powers has our Church ever tried to seize and what would it try to do with such power? . . .

If the government truly exists for the sake of the people and not merely to preserve its hold on power, then I ask it to fundamentally reaffirm and recognize *the Church's right to participate in society*. Not only this, the government must help to preserve good social movements such as the Catholic Farmers' Movement. It is through such movements that we can achieve the true development of our agricultural society. (*Ibid.*, p. 296; Myòngdong, p. 562; italics added)

This prayer meeting and Cardinal Kim's message also led to several more prayer meetings and some demonstrations. Despite the Church's efforts, the government's repression continued unabated. For example, between August 7 and 9, the KCFM and Andong Parish issued several resolutions and statements protesting (1) the government's repression of the Church's activities supporting the farmers, (2) the government's violation of religious freedom and human rights, and (3) its fabrication of the Oh Won-chun Incident (Myòngdong, 1984, p. 557). Meanwhile, in addition to Father Chong Ho-kyong (Chòng Ho-kyòng), several other priests and KCFM members were arrested for violating Emergency Measure No. 9, because of their efforts to expose the truth of the Oh Won-chun Incident (*ibid.*, pp. 565-68, 572, 575-76, 580-82).

As these protests began to spread nationwide, the government's repression correspondingly grew and widened. The mass media also was mobilized by the government to counterattack the Church's protests. For example, on August 10, the nationwide mass media published a police report stating that Oh himself had fabricated the Incident, and that Father Chong Ho-kyong (Chòng Ho-kyòng) and Mr. Chong (Chòng) of the KCFM had been arrested for publicizing Oh's fabricated report of the Incident. This police report also falsely stated that several other priests and KCFM members were equipped with, and prepared to use, bamboo spears not only in their protest activities, but in fighting the police (*ibid.*, pp. 572, 576). After this media campaign, the Church's protests grew even stronger. For example, during the latter half of August, 1979, the Lay Apostolate Council of Korea, the Permanent

Committee of the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference, the Justice and Peace Committee of Korea, the CPAJ, and the Taejòn Diocese each issued statements protesting the government's fabrication of the truth and its repression of the Church (for the content of these statements, see *ibid.*, pp. 577-78, 578-79, 546-47, 547-49, and p. 580, respectively; also see Appendix C for the statement issued by the Permanent Committee of the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference on August 20, 1979).

Meanwhile, during his trials, it became evident that Oh was being compelled, by extreme external pressure, to make false statements admitting that he was guilty as charged by the police (for more details about his testimony, see *ibid.*, 1984, pp. 582-94). At the final trial held on October 15, 1979, Oh was sentenced to two years in prison and two years of disqualification. Eleven days later, on October 26, President Park was assassinated. Because Emergency Measure No. 9 was lifted after Park's death, Oh, together with Father Chong (Chòng) and Mr. Chong (Chòng) of the KCFM, was released on December 8, 1979 (*ibid.*, 1984, p. 594; CPAJ, 1985, pp. 273-75).

Probably the most important normative factor involved in this incident was the Church's emphasis on its prophetic role to criticize the government for its deliberate lies. The Church displayed great courage in demanding and expressing the truth about the purpose and nature of the Oh Won-chun kidnapping. The Church denounced the state for creating false "pro-Communist" enemies and "paper tigers." The Church also denounced human rights abuses, in asserting the rights of religious freedom and human dignity. The Church also vigorously defended its pastoral mission for social justice, and its movement to help farmers secure their economic rights. Finally, the

Church also defended its basic rights to exist, function and participate in socioeconomic and political activities.

Structural factors included the Church's willingness and ability to hold prayer meetings and demonstrations, and to make strong statements regarding the Incident, which contributed to the eventual downfall of the Park regime. The state's falsehoods and repression didn't prevent the truth from coming out, convicting public opinion and setting men free, mentally and physically.

In summary, this incident became a serious issue of contention between the government and the Church. The Church's "pastoral" mission for farmers, in particular, and for social justice, in general, was attacked. Its basic rights of religious freedom and self-preservation were equally assailed. As set forth in several of its statements, the Church was only practicing what the Bible preaches:

Don't be afraid of anyone! Everything that is hidden will be found out, and every secret will be known. Whatever I say to you in the dark, you must tell in the light. And you must announce from the housetops whatever I have whispered to you (*Matthew 10:26-27*).

VI. CASE STUDY #5: THEOLOGICAL-IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS WITHIN THE CHURCH DURING THE 1970S

As discussed thus far, the 1970s were marked by the Church's unprecedented involvement in politics. This resulted from the Church's awakening and response to the harsh repression of the Park regime. Moreover, the Church's involvement in political opposition activities and movements contributed to the collapse of the Park regime on October 26, 1979. However, it also must be stated that such involvement was highly controversial and raised issues concerning the necessity, limits, and proper methods of the Church's political involvement. This Case Study examines the

theological-ideological conflicts and structural constraints within the Church during the 1970s. This will lead to a more realistic evaluation of the sociopolitical role and influence of the Church, as seen in the first four case studies.

A. Theological-Ideological Conflicts within the Church

As previously mentioned, the Church's sociopolitical involvement became a major issue in the latter half of 1974, especially after the Bishop Chi Incident in July (Case Study #1) and the formation of the National Council for the Restoration of Democracy in December (see Chapter Six, Note #13).

In order to properly discuss the issue of the Church's sociopolitical involvement, it is helpful to consider a highly publicized debate between two Catholic scholar priests concerning this issue, which was reported in the February 16, 1975 issue of the *Kat'ollik Sibô* [Catholic Newspaper], one of the Church's official newspapers. The debate was between Fr. Paik Min-kwan (Paek Min-gwan), a conservative theologian and non-member of the CPAJ, then serving as the Dean of Catholic College (School of Theology) in Seoul, and Fr. Ham Se-ung, a key member of the CPAJ, then serving as the spokesman for the above National Council for the Restoration of Democracy. In the following abridged dialogue (*italics added*), Fr. Paik's cautious, conservative attitude should be compared with Fr. Ham's assertive, progressive attitude:

Fr. Paik:

It is unnecessary to say yes or no to the Church's participation in sociopolitical matters. The Church's participation has been endorsed and emphasized by the Pope. Cardinal Kim also has emphasized it, sometimes too much. It is as inevitable for the Church to become involved in sociopolitical matters as it is for the Church to be involved with the people in society. The issue of the Church's *social participation*, which was raised quite recently,

also has become a political issue. In Europe, there is no social movement such as the movement for the realization of justice in South Korea. Perhaps, European countries don't need it.

In South Vietnam and in the Philippines, the Church's opposition can be interpreted partly as being the Church's psychological defensive reaction to the assertion that the Church always supports the status quo, because the Church has been criticized for being a traditional ally of the regime. In the Philippines, bishops often have issued statements concerning the current sociopolitical situations. They also have issued statements concerning national elections. Their intention is to help the public to discern which candidate will best embrace and practice the Church's ideology.

As for the South Korean Church's younger priests, their active involvement in sociopolitical matters might be a psychological reaction to their guilt complex that the Church did not actively participate in the March 1, 1919 National Independence Movement as much as other churches did. It is true that the Church failed to actively participate in that movement, but that is because at that time the Church was under the control of foreign missionaries.

Fr. Ham:

Many of the Vatican's social encyclicals and teachings have emphasized that the Church should work for workers' rights. The international synod of bishops, which was held last year [1974] to discuss the issue of evangelization, concluded with a discussion of human rights. Many bishops at the synod and Cardinal Kim have pointed out that the Church tends to keep silent unless its own members or interests are attacked or damaged. In other words, *the Church tends to shout only when its members or interests are placed in danger.*

Love, which is the quintessence of the Bible, encourages or requires us to be concerned about orphans and widows who have lost their rights. This is what the Bible says. For example, see *Matthew 25:31-46*. All human beings are created in the image of God. Therefore, the issue of *human rights* is the most basic concern.

.....

During the period of the Roman Empire, Catholic believers suffered persecution for disobeying the Roman law which required them to worship idols. Any laws which violate human rights are contemporary versions of the *Roman idol-worship law*. *The Yushin Constitution* is a good example. Many historians have observed that the Church is to blame for the rise and spread of Marxist-Leninism. For example, the coexistence of the Vatican and the Italian Communist Party in Rome is viewed as signifying the Church hierarchy's disregard of the people's demands for their rights while being preoccupied with preserving their own Church interests. On the other hand, the radical protests by Archbishop Camara and the clergy of Brazil are based on *the Vatican's and Biblical messages for social justice.*

.....

As for South Korea, it is difficult to define *the proper limits and methods of the Church's sociopolitical participation*. It is a more difficult question because older clergy and younger clergy differ in their views on life, the Church, and the current sociopolitical situation. Nonetheless, if all of the clergy should come to recognize that the first priority of the Church is *to*

realize love, then the limits and methods will not matter much *within the boundaries of the Christian principle of love*.

.....
 Also, all of us should be ashamed to reflect on the Church's inaction when the Park regime came to power through the May 16, 1961 Coup. . . . After that, *what has the Church done so far when society and the state as a whole--the objects of the Church's evangelization--have fallen into the mire?* In this situation, the current Church's sociopolitical participation was ignited by the Bishop Chi Incident. It was the Church's urgent and long overdue reaction to the unjust sociopolitical situation, rather than simply the younger priests' psychological reaction to the inferior record of the Church regarding its official noninvolvement in the March 1, 1919 Independence Movement.

Fr. Paik:

The movement for *the realization of justice* is only one part of the Church's evangelization efforts. *There also are various other movements in which the Church should be engaged*, including medical, educational, and social work.

I don't believe that we clergy are divided among ourselves because of differing opinions regarding the Church's movement for the realization of justice. Each of us is doing something for that movement while also doing whatever else he is required to do.

The limit of the clergy's involvement in sociopolitical matters will be determined by what, and to what extent, *is required of them by society*. The clergy should be cautious so as not to go beyond the limit. It will not suffice to go beyond the limit and then later attempt to justify their action by saying that they didn't notice it at the time.

.....
 I know that the CPAJ does not seek political power. Moreover, it is natural for priests to be concerned about the effects of repression on freedom of speech and human rights. Nonetheless, that does *not* mean that *all* of the clergy should be concerned *solely* about those matters. . . . Furthermore, when the Church intends to participate in sociopolitical matters, its criticism should be leveled at *more universal problems* that exist under any regime. If possible, *the Church should avoid giving society the impression that the Church is involved in politics*. As far as the Bishop Chi Incident is concerned, admittedly, the initial protest of the Church eventually became a protest against the government, calling for its resignation.

.....
 Frankly speaking, it seems strange to me that political statements are given during prayer meetings. It does not give a good impression to the public for a priest in a chasuble to make such a statement. The prayer meeting becomes a political meeting. It seems to me that the time has come to reconsider the movement for the realization of justice.

Fr. Ham:

It is inevitable for the Church's criticism first to be leveled against the repressive and inhuman political system, under which all the people in this country are suffering. It also is unavoidable that *any criticism against the political regime has to be concrete and specific*. Otherwise, criticism would be

meaningless. Because criticism is made in a concrete situation, it *inevitably* becomes *political*. . . . *Moreover, in a situation where no one but priests can speak out, priests should speak out.*

In addition, when I speak as the spokesman of the National Council for the Restoration of Democracy, I intend to perform a *prophetic rather than political role*. A prophetic role intends to convey God's will. . . . By the way, you said that it is time to reconsider the CPAJ's movement for the realization of justice. I wonder if you have been influenced by the government's recent manipulative efforts to divide the clergy. In addition, when we talk about truth, justice, and the love of Christ, I don't think it really matters whether or not we are dressed in a chasuble.

Fr. Paik:

Aren't certain concepts and practices being observed when a Mass is held? If some people think to themselves, "the Mass that I was going to attend is not this kind of Mass," then there must be *something wrong* about the Mass. It *creates division* between those who would attend it and those who wouldn't. . . . In addition, why is it necessary for the CPAJ priests to attend the National Council for the Restoration of Democracy? Wouldn't it lead *to a misunderstanding* by some people that the Church is being used by a certain political party? Isn't the CPAJ alone enough? . . .

Again, those who attend prayer meetings and those who don't, and those who join the CPAJ and those who don't, both should feel right about their respective positions. Strangely enough, there is a tendency to regard those who don't attend the meetings as pro-government people. *Something is wrong*. At any rate, it is right for the Church to have the CPAJ to vitalize the Church. *However*, there should be some *limits or boundaries* for the CPAJ's activities.

Fr. Ham:

It already has been agreed among the CPAJ priests that, for the sake of *unity within the Church*, we will not criticize those priests who do not join us. Moreover, we also consult bishops for advice and guidance. In addition, we keep trying to accommodate different opinions among ourselves to keep ourselves within some limits.

Fr. Paik:

Even though there are various opinions concerning *the Church's involvement* in sociopolitical matters, it *should not cause division within the Church*.

As previously discussed in Chapter Four, especially in the section dealing with the theological division within the Church, the above debate is a fairly typical recitation of the theological differences between liberal Progressives and traditional Conservatives. These differences can be analogized as follows: On the one hand, in a situation where a bus driver unexpectedly develops a fit and becomes crazy while

driving, the Progressives would argue that a priest who is among the passengers not only should pray, but also should quickly take steps to remove and replace the driver. To the Progressives' advice, the Conservatives might respond by asking if *all* of the passengers considered the driver to be crazy and dangerous.

On the other hand, in the critical situation of a soccer game, the Conservatives would argue that it is too risky for the goalkeeper to move away from his goalpost for any reason. It would be better and far safer if he stayed in front of his goalpost to defend it. To the Conservatives' advice, the Progressives might respond by saying that if the rules of game were being observed so that fair play was assured, the goalkeeper wouldn't have to join the offense (Kim, 1990, p. 209).

Theological conflicts concerning the Church's sociopolitical involvement have occurred not only in the Latin American Churches but also in the South Korean Church. Among the several points discussed above, the matter of *unity within the Church* merits particular attention. Unity among its membership is one of the fundamental objectives of the Church. It also is regarded as an essential characteristic of the structure and spirit of the Church, as will be discussed below.

B. Structural Constraints within the Church:
Intra-ecclesiastical Constraints

As revealed by the above debate, during the 1970s, especially from 1975 to 1979, there was disagreement and division within the hierarchy concerning the Church's sociopolitical involvement. It usually arose whenever the Church became actively involved. The disagreement mostly was between bishops and the CPAJ, as well as between individual bishops and priests. This disagreement became a structural constraint on the Church's political involvement. In some cases, the disagreement was

related to the differing positions and roles of the bishops and lower clergy. The following examples not only typify the disagreement between the Bishops' Conference and the CPAJ, but also show the extent of the disagreement between individual bishops and priests. They also show the ambiguity or ambivalence sometimes present in clerical statements concerning sociopolitical issues.

1. The Bishops' Conference vs. Individual Bishops. As previously mentioned in Case Study #1, *supra*, after Bishop Chi was arrested for the first time on July 6, 1974, the Korean Bishops' Conference convened and issued a statement entitled "Regarding Bishop Chi." In that statement the Bishops reported Bishop Chi's arrest to all members of the Church, and asked their prayers for him (for additional details, see Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 115-17). After Bishop Chi was arrested again and imprisoned on July 23, 1974, the Bishops issued another message regarding the Incident. However, it was not until their regular general meeting on October 18, 1974 was concluded that the Bishops expressed their *official* attitude concerning the Bishop Chi Incident. It was an extremely late reaction by the Bishops' Conference because by that date, their colleague, Bishop Chi, already had been in prison about three months .

The Bishops' belated reaction should be contrasted with the actions of individual bishops such as Archbishop Yoon Kong-hee (Yun Kong-hùi), Bishop Kim Jae-dok (Kim Chae-dòk), and Bishop Na Kihl-mo (Na Kil-mò), as well as Cardinal Kim, who arranged and held prayer meetings and gave sermons supporting the righteousness of Bishop Chi's activities and denouncing the government for his wrongful arrest and imprisonment (CPAJ, 1985, p. 52).

Moreover, the *official* message issued by the Bishops' Conference on October 18, 1974, not only was *ambiguous*, but also was somewhat *ambivalent*. The message began by stating that "we, the Korean Bishops' Conference, are very sorry and

seriously concerned about the sentence of Bishop Chi (in August, 1974, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison), and send our deep respect and conscientious support to Bishop Chi who was a forerunner in the Church's social participation" (Myòngdong, 1984, p. 180). In the middle of the statement, their support of Bishop Chi becomes even more diluted when it cautions that "the Church's participation in political fields is done by the lay people. . . . the clergy have the mission [only] to provide them with ethical and spiritual help" (*ibid.*, p. 181). The implication is that the Bishops' Conference did not wholeheartedly support Bishop Chi's political dissident activities. Also, near the end of the statement, it reaffirms that

the Church has "the right to pass moral judgments, even on matters touching the political order, whenever basic personal rights or the salvation of souls make such judgments necessary" (*Gaudium et Spes* [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World], No. 76). Therefore, the statements issued by the Korean Bishops' Conference concerning sociopolitical and economic matters, and especially human rights matters, have *no intention to intervene in political field*; they are made *only to elucidate the Catholic Church's view* on the current situation. Thus, we, the Bishops' Conference welcome the removal of Emergency Decrees [the removal of Emergency Decrees No. 1 and No.4 in August, 1974] and believe that those who were arrested under those decrees should be released as soon as possible. (*Ibid.*, p. 182; italics added)

Thus, the Bishops' Conference had an attitude different from that of the CPAJ and the Lay Apostolate Council, both of which actively supported Bishop Chi's July 23, 1974 Declaration of Conscience (for the text of this Declaration, see Appendix C). Unlike Bishop Chi, who, in his Declaration of Conscience, clearly denounced the Yushin System, the Korean Bishops' Conference maintained its vague, ambiguous stand regarding the Yushin System (see CPAJ, 1985, pp. 52-53).

2. The Bishops' Conference vs. the CPAJ. On February 28, 1975, following Bishop Chi's release from prison on February 15, the Korean Bishops' Conference issued another statement. The Bishops' declared intent was "to reflect upon the Church's activities and to strive for *unity within the Church* and to remove room for

misunderstanding by the public" (Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 321-22; italics added). Their statement emphasized the following four points:

(1) Our prayers should be expressed in a humble and evangelic manner, not to criticize or accuse our neighbours.

(2) In order to carry out our mission "to pass moral judgments, even on matters touching the political order" (*Gaudium et Spes* [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World], No. 76), there is the *Justice and Peace Committee* both at the Vatican and under the Bishops' Conference in each country. The clergy and the laity are encouraged to participate in the Korean Justice and Peace Committee, which is officially recognized by the Korean Bishops' Conference, to fulfill *their mission which is strictly distinguished from political activities*.

(3) When *the Church* passes moral judgment on the political order, it *should not work in cooperation with other political forces*. That is because the Church's moral judgment is not limited to any specific regime type or area or era. Therefore, the Church should stand aloof from all political forces.

(4) Any lay organizations which are officially recognized by the Bishops' Conference are *not* allowed to participate in any specific political organizations. (For additional details, see *ibid*, pp. 321-22; italics added)

The above statement is *ambiguous* or *evasive* in the following respects:

First, even though this statement primarily deals with the Bishop Chi Incident, it nevertheless fails to articulate the Bishops' position regarding the Yushin System (CPAJ, 1985, p. 53).

Second, according to its introduction, this statement is intended "to reflect upon the Church's activities and to strive for unity within the Church and to remove room for misunderstanding by the public" (Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 321-22). Apparently, readers are expected to reflect not upon the Church's failure to discern the "signs of the times" and to carry out its social mission, but only upon the involvement of the CPAJ and laity in a political opposition movement. In other words, each of the above points is made in order to constrain and discourage the sociopolitical activities of liberal Church groups, especially the CPAJ (CPAJ, 1985, p. 53). The Bishops' Conference obviously intended to set *structural limits* on the

activities of the CPAJ. The position of the Bishops' Conference is closer to the conservative position of Fr. Paik than to the progressive position of Fr. Ham.

Unlike the CPAJ, which is an informal organization of relatively young courageous priests concerned with democracy and social justice, the Justice and Peace Committee is a formal organization of clergy and laity approved by the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference (for the membership of the Justice and Peace Committee, see Myòngdong, 1984, p. 329). Despite the fact that the CPAJ and this committee each seek to independently carry out the social mission of the Church, the committee is preferred by the Bishops' Conference which wants to have the Church's social mission for justice activities directly under its authority and control. Even though the committee was intended by the Bishops' Conference to be a substitute for the CPAJ, fortunately, the committee's activities have been successful mainly because its members and those of the CPAJ have cooperated and worked together (Ham, 1988, p. 284; CPAJ, 1985, p. 158).

Third, this statement gives the impression that the Bishops' Conference did not consider the CPAJ's efforts as activities in support of the Church's social mission which is to be "strictly distinguished from political activities," because it never does explain how the Church's social mission should be pursued (CPAJ, 1985, p. 53).

On May 5, 1975, the Bishops' Conference issued another statement entitled "The Resolution of the Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference Regarding Communism." This statement was issued after South Vietnam and Khmer were taken over by Communist regimes. In their statement, the Bishops stated that

all of our people are anti-Communist to the bone. Thus, we need a just and strong government that can protect us from Communist forces. The reason why several clergy and lay members cried out for justice and human rights against the government was because they all hoped the present government to be a better government that is trusted and loved by the people. (Myòngdong, 1984, p. 327)

The Bishops then expressed their hope that in the future they would perform the sociopolitical criticism and human rights activities previously performed by the CPAJ priests. The Bishops stated that they would be willing to resolve all problems by direct communications between the Bishops' Conference and the government (*ibid.*). As Fr. Ham points out, by this statement the Bishops actually intended to abate the activities of the CPAJ, rather than to intercede with the government to solve problems. Even though the bishops also may have intended to protect the CPAJ priests and the Church from retaliation by the government, the Church should not turn a deaf ear, under any circumstances, to the outcries of people suffering injustices (Ham, 1988, p. 284).

Another example of an ambiguous message is the statement issued on March 15, 1976 by the Bishops' Conference concerning the March 1, 1976 Myòngdong Incident (Case Study #2). Regarding the 7 CPAJ priests who were involved in this incident, the middle of the statement reads: "We know that *these priests* have maintained critical attitudes against the government . . . , and believe that *as for them*, their activities resulted from their judgment based on Christian faith and patriotism" (for additional details about this statement, see Myòngdong, 1984, p. 354; italics added). Perhaps the Bishops used the expression "these priests" and "as for them," rather than "we" and "the Church," because they intended to withhold their judgment of these priests or because they believed that the activities of these priests did *not* represent the Church as a whole, and the Bishops' Conference wanted to detach itself from the CPAJ priests (CPAJ, 1985, p. 54).

The Bishops' Conference also conveyed vague, ambiguous messages by its inaction and silence. For example, the Bishops kept silent when Emergency Decrees No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4 were cumulatively imposed in early 1974. They also kept

silent when, in November, 1974, Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil (Kim Chong-p'il) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Dong-jo (Kim Tong-jo) denounced the activities of foreign missionaries and the foreign missionaries reacted by protesting. The lack of a strong counterreaction by the Church, especially by the Bishops' Conference, resulted in the deportation of Protestant pastor Ogle because of his alleged political activities as co-director of the Urban Industrial Mission [U.I.M.] at Inch'ŏn from 1960 to 1971, and as professor of Industrial Relations, Seoul National University. In addition, Maryknoll priest, Father Sinott, who worked as a parish priest in social welfare activities from 1960 until 1975, was expelled for being involved in the human rights movement of the People's Revolutionary Party (for additional details about the expulsion of foreign missionaries, see CPAJ, 1985, p. 56; also see Myŏngdong, 1984, pp. 331-36).

3. Elderly Clergy vs. the CPAJ. There also was a movement initiated by elderly priests to check the activities of the CPAJ. On October 21, 1979, the *Kar'ollik Sibo* [Catholic Newspaper] publicized "An Appeal to the Bishops' Conference" by 49 "elderly priests who worry about the reality within the Church." The group included the above mentioned debater, Fr. Paik. For the sake of convenience, these priests were referred to as the "Priests' Corps for National Salvation" by the mass media (Ham, 1988, p. 285; CJPRI, 1990, p. 37). In this appeal, these elderly priests made the following points:

- (1) We deeply realize that the *disunity within the Church*, especially concerning the current sociopolitical situation, has resulted from the disunity within the Bishops' Conference. Therefore, we dare to ask the bishops to show us an example of unity among bishops as the starting point leading to *unity within the Church*.
- (2) First of all, please establish *order and discipline* within the Korean Catholic Church by *solidarity* within the Bishops' Conference. Please eradicate *deviant organizations within the Church* which secularize the holy

temple and holy ceremonies and damage the *unity within the Church*, and all statements that are arbitrarily issued without the sanction of the Magisterium.

(3) Please restore the *spiritual climate* where the Magisterium is respected and obeyed. Please establish the Church climate where the *hierarchical order* is clearly observed and dignified.

(4) Please specify *the Church's limitations on, and its methods of social participation* according to the Magisterium. We hope that bishops only will discuss issues at the national and ethical levels. We hope that the lower clergy will stay on the secondary level to educate the laity. We hope that the laity will work for evangelization on the front lines of society. We also hope that foreign missionaries will conduct themselves more carefully than Korean priests so that they will not be misunderstood as interfering with domestic affairs.

(5) Please take measures to rectify the spiritual climate which makes some people employ any means and methods to fulfill their goals and to counter the *fallacious* thinking of some people who regard their conscience, not God's law, as the only and ultimate ethical standard.

(6) Lastly, we elderly priests are not making these appeals to you as members of any permanent organization. We are making these appeals together only because we share the same opinions. (*Kat'ollik Sibô*, October 21, 1979; italics added)

It should be noted that this appeal was made in October, 1979 while the Church, under the leadership of Cardinal Kim and the CPAJ, was responding to the government's actions near the end of Park's Yushin System and during the Oh Won-chun Incident (Case Study #4). Even though this appeal became moot or irrelevant because of the national consensus that the Yushin System had to be overthrown, and because of the ultimate downfall of the System, the fact that this appeal was even made at all and publicized in the Church's official newspaper is further evidence of the division within the Church during the 1970s. In addition, there was disagreement among dioceses in different regions on how to approach and deal with sociopolitical problems. For example, the CPAJ's activities sometimes were seriously hindered, especially in Kyòngsang Province, southeastern South Korea. This can be contrasted to the CPAJ's more successful efforts in Bishop Chi's and Kim Chi-ha's home diocese, Wònju Diocese in Kangwòn Province (Ham, 1988, p. 285).

Regarding the methods used in, and the limits upon, the Church's participation in sociopolitical matters, there are three generally agreed upon major principles, as follows:

The first principle is that the Church's involvement should not be linked to the regime and ideology of North Korea. Regarding South Korea's relationship with North Korea, any form of close contact or sympathy with the North Korean regime or its society hardly would be appreciated by the general public of South Korea. This point is supported by the fact that the South Korean government has consistently justified its repression of opposition movements, including those involving members of the Church, by falsely labeling them as pro-Communist (for a good example, see Case Study #9).

The second principle is that the Church's participation in sociopolitical matters should be different from that of secular movements. This can be considered as a liberal version of the Doctrine of Separation of Church and State. It means that if "religious" people participate in these movements, they only should do it as "religious" people. In other words, it means that the Church, which does not seek political power, should be motivated by its transcendental religious purposes. However, there still remain the difficult questions of how and to what extent the Church can infuse sociopolitical matters with religious considerations (Kim, 1990, p. 210). There also is the real danger that if progressive religious groups participate in sociopolitical matters without any limits, then those religious forces may become jaded and lose their religious essence, resulting in the alienation of religion from society and society from religion. Even though these questions may be impossible to answer, the questions themselves always should be kept uppermost in mind to prevent the Church from going to either extreme (Kim, 1990, pp. 208, 210).

The third principle is that, in an emergency, one must quickly take whatever action is deemed necessary, based upon the immediate situation, rather than to engage in a debate on the limits on, and methods of, the Church's social participation. As was once stated by Bishop Dupont of Andong Diocese regarding Fr. Sinott's deportation, "now, under the emergency, we cannot waste our time debating over methodological issues. When the fire breaks out, we should extinguish the fire first. If we won't do that, it is just like sitting down waiting for death" (CPAJ, 1985, p. 56).

The normative factors involved in the theological-ideological conflicts within the Church are readily observed in the debate between conservative Fr. Paik and progressive Fr. Ham. Fr. Paik minimizes the importance of the Church's sociopolitical role and views it as primarily a defensive or educational strategy. Moreover, he sees it as a way for younger priests to assuage their guilt for the Church's past inaction in sociopolitical matters. Fr. Paik also believes that the mission for social justice has been overemphasized because everyone believes in justice. He also believes that society will set proper limits on the Church's sociopolitical involvement. He further states that the Church cannot exclusively focus on rights abuses and freedom issues. Fr. Paik believes that the Church should concentrate on universal problems that exist under any regime, and avoid direct involvement in politics. He decries the practice of making sociopolitical statements at prayer meetings. Moreover, he believes that doing more than observing religious rituals at Masses creates division among the Church membership and discourages their attendance and participation. Fr. Paik agrees that the CPAJ has revitalized the Church, but cautions that it should be subjected to some limits, as well as scrutiny, by the Church. Finally, he believes that the Church's sociopolitical involvement should

not cause division within the Church, implying that the Church should retreat if there is any disagreement among the clergy and laity.

On the other hand, Fr. Ham points out that the Church tends to be silent and inactive unless its own members or interests are placed in jeopardy. He asserts that "love," which is the quintessential Biblical teaching, makes the rights of human beings, who are created in the image of God, the highest priority for the Church and believers. Both the Church and state are guilty of idol-worship according to Fr. Ham. Although there are differences in the views of older and younger clergy, if they both make the practical realization of love their top priority, limits on and methods of the Church's sociopolitical activities no longer will be a major concern. Fr. Ham says that the Church's sociopolitical involvement is long overdue and urgent. He also stresses that criticism of a political regime must be specific to relate to actual situations, and that such criticism inevitably becomes political. But he points out that the Church's prophetic role is not to be political, but is to discern and convey the will of God. Regarding the CPAJ and Church rituals, when truth, justice and the love of Christ are being discussed, ritualistic forms and dress are not important. He further notes that the CPAJ seeks to unify, not divide, the Church, and it encourages internal criticism and discussion of limits to its actions.

In short, conservatives are cautious about change, while progressives are willing to take reasonable risks to achieve worthy objectives.

In addition to the theological differences among and between bishops and lower clergy, other normative factors involved in the internal Church conflicts include similar differences between the Bishops' Conference and the CPAJ, the J.O.C, the KCFM and other lay Church organizations. Also significant are the ambiguous, ambivalent, evasive, and appeasing statements of some Church leaders, notably

conservative bishops, reflecting the behavioral factors of cautiousness, indecisiveness, fear of change, narrow authoritarianism and prejudice.

Other normative factors include the traditional dichotomy between the spiritual and temporal worlds reflected in differing clerical views, the policy of political neutrality to avoid being tainted by politics, and the Biblically mandated prophetic role of the Church, which requires the behavioral factors of courage and perseverance. Lastly, practical expediency is more important than intellectual debate in a crisis or emergency.

Structural factors involved in these conflicts include the bishops' strategies and activities to constrain priests and other lower clergy, the power struggle and competition between bishops and priests, and the traditional emphasis on a hierarchical structure of authority and functions.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Regarding the public's perception of the Church's moral authority and credibility, consider the following:

First, as is shown in the table of the Catholic population and increase in South Korea (see Chapter One, Note #4), the fact that the Catholic population increased steadily and considerably during the 1970s and 1980s is some evidence that the Church was perceived as having moral authority and credibility.

Second, historically, the state has sought to gain legitimation from the Church because it believed that it was necessary for its approval by society and it was a necessary step in becoming established in power. Also see Chapter Four for the discussion of "Society's Perception of the Church's Preeminent Moral Authority" as a component of the "Behavioral" Strengths of the Church.

Third, as is clearly shown in Case Studies #4 (The Oh Won-chun Incident) and #7 (The Park Chong-chul Incident, in Chapter Eight), the main reason the truth was revealed was that the Church's moral pressure was effective. The state had to back down because the public believed the Church.

2. It is true that *the Church as a whole* didn't act in an absolutely unified manner when division and conflict existed within the Church. It is undeniable that sociopolitical participation was advocated and practiced by a minority rather than a majority of the Church. *Nonetheless*, as is shown in several of the case studies, *an active minority and Cardinal Kim* effectively acted *on behalf of and as the Church* and were so *perceived* by society and the state.

First, the following pattern can be found in the case studies: it can be said that (1) the more repressive the political situation becomes, and the more directly the Church is affected, the more likely it is that the Church will act in a more concerted manner and (2) the more politically controversial the issue is, the more divisive the Church tends to be. The cases in which the Church acted strongly should be understood from this standpoint.

Second, it can be said that when the CPAJ priests and several other progressive bishops, together with Cardinal Kim and other lay groups, took a common stance, their stance could be and was *regarded as* representing a consensus within *the Church as a whole*. Conservative clergy and laity either agreed, implicitly or explicitly, with their stance or did not voice opposing views publicly or expressed their views ambiguously or ambivalently, so that the progressives' stance came to be regarded as the Church's stance. In this way, the voice of the progressives was strongly heard in society and within the Church.

Third, the "diversity" of views regarding the Church's sociopolitical participation and the principle of "unity" within the Church frequently mentioned by conservatives in the Church have not been contradictory to each other *in practice*. In other words, even though a divisive factor often has existed within the Church, it has never torn the Church apart. The Catholic principle of "unity amid diversity," which can explain the dynamics of the Church, is relevant here. (See Chapter Eight, Case Study #10 for an

illustration of this concept). As long as both the progressive and conservative sectors remain *a part of the Church*, the internal conflict tends to be resolved.

The foregoing discussion is applicable to all of the case studies, and is further elaborated in Chapter Nine, Further Reflections and Conclusions.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CHURCH-STATE CONFLICTS IN SOUTH KOREA: CHURCH'S POLITICAL OPPOSITION, 1980-89 (CASE STUDIES #6-10)

When I behold your heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and the stars which you set in place--What is man that you should be mindful of him, or the son of man that you should care for him? (*Psalm* 8:3-4)

The process of becoming democratic requires the humanization of society and politics more than the establishment of democratic institutions (perennial statement in *The Weekly Bulletin of the Catholic Archdiocese of Seoul*)

I. INTRODUCTION

The first four case studies (#6-9) illustrate the nature and extent of the Church-state conflicts in South Korea during the 1980s. The last case study (#10) deals with the issue of reform within the Church. At the conclusion of each case study there is a brief summary and evaluation of the normative, structural and behavioral factors involved in that study.

II. CASE STUDY #6: THE U.S.I.S. ARSON INCIDENT AT PUSAN (MARCH 18, 1982) AFTER THE KWANGJU UPRISING (MAY 18-27, 1980)

This case study concerns the Church-state conflicts resulting from the arrest of Fr. Choi Kee-sik (Ch'oe Ki-sik), who protected the students responsible for the arson fire at the branch office of the United States Information Service (hereafter called U.S.I.S.) at Pusan. These students committed the arson as a protest of the United States' alleged involvement in the Kwangju Uprising of May, 1980.

The Kwangju Uprising¹ was a profound tragedy not only for Kwangju citizens, but also for all of South Korea. It involved a democratization movement opposed to the illegitimate and brutal Chun Doo-hwan military regime. However, the regime distorted and hid the truth by reporting that the Uprising was a riot aimed at overthrowing the government. Needless to say, any attempts to reveal the truth were severely suppressed and repressed by the government. In this situation, the Church courageously undertook to reveal the truth and inform the nation and the rest of the world about what actually had happened at Kwangju. Several priests who were involved in these efforts were arrested. On July 10, 1980, Frs. Oh Tae-sun (Oh T'ae-sun), Yang Hong, Kim Taek-am (Kim T'aek-am), Ahn Chung-suk (An Ch'ung-sòk), Chang Dok-pil (Chang Tòk-p'il) of the Seoul Diocese, and Sister Chung Yang-suk (Chòng Yang-suk), a labor counselor at the Myòngdong Church, were arrested, questioned and charged with spreading a "false rumor" regarding the Kwangju Uprising (NCCCK, 1987, p. 832). On July 31, the above mentioned Sister Chung and Frs. Oh and Chang were arrested and charged with circulating a leaflet entitled "The Torn and Tattered Flag" which recounted what really happened at Kwangju (for the details of this leaflet, see JCCJP, 1983^b, pp. 3-21). They were released on August 14, 1980 (NCCCK, 1987, p. 835). Greater efforts to publicize the Incident were made by priests of the Kwangju Archdiocese, who released a report entitled "The True Facts Relating to the Incidents at Kwangju" in June, 1980 (for the text of this report, see JCCPJ, 1983^b, pp. 22-28). The CPAJ, representing all of the Korean dioceses, issued a statement declaring that it believed in the truth and validity of this report (see Appendix C for the text of this statement). The Kwangju priests' report had a great impact on the Church and society in revealing the truth concerning the Kwangju Uprising. Also, Cardinal Kim and some bishops sent letters to the government asking

it to resolve the Incident. Many people within and outside the Church formed critical attitudes toward the government, and kept holding meetings to try to obtain a resolution of the Incident (CJPRI, 1990, p. 36).

However, the Kwangju Incident remained unresolved, and as time passed it became harder to resolve. Eventually most people outside of Kwangju began to forget about it. Then, on March 18, 1982, the U.S.I.S. Incident at Pusan occurred. This incident shocked the South Korean people again, and reminded them of the Kwangju Uprising and the responsibility of the U.S. in that incident. As previously mentioned, the arson at the U.S.I.S. building was a strong protest against the U.S. for its responsibility in the Kwangju Uprising. In this incident, 5 persons, including Choi Kee-sik (Ch'oe Ki-sik), a Catholic priest of the Wònju Diocese, were arrested. Two of them, Moon Pu-sik (Mun Pu-sik) and Kim Hyun-jang (Kim Hyòn-jang), were sentenced to death. Their sentences later were commuted to life imprisonment (see CISJD, 1988, p. 38; CJPRI, 1990, pp. 36-37; NCCCK, 1987, p. 933).

The main concern of this case study is the Church-state conflict which resulted from the arrest of Fr. Choi Kee-sik (Ch'oe Ki-sik) on the charge of sheltering 2 of the student arsonists, Moon Pu-sik (Mun Pu-sik) and Kim un-suk (Kim ùn-suk). Both students, who were studying theology at Korea Seminary, had come to Fr. Choi for help, and Fr. Choi sheltered them. On March 30, 1982, Fr. Choi discussed with Fr. Ham Se-ung the possibility of a voluntary surrender of these students. On the following day, Fr. Ham talked with government authorities about it. Cardinal Kim also expressed his views about a possible surrender to President Chun. Chun promised that if the students voluntarily surrendered to the police, they neither would be tortured nor reported to the public, and they would be provided legal assistance. On the following day, the 2 students voluntarily surrendered to the police. However, they

were arrested and detained. The government did not keep its promise. Thereafter, several other students and Fr. Choi also were arrested. Ultimately, a total of 16 people were arrested and charged in the U.S.I.S Incident (see NCKK, 1987, p. 899, p. 932). The government also informed the Vatican's ambassador of its position that the government's investigation of Catholic clergy regarding this alleged violation of Korean national law, i.e., the concealment of offenders, was totally unrelated to the issue of religious freedom (NCKK, 1987, pp. 897-98).

After Fr. Choi's arrest, the Church immediately reacted. In his April 8 sermon, Cardinal Kim stated that (1) the U.S.I.S. Incident was closely connected to the Kwangju Uprising; (2) the government, which failed to recognize this point, was distorting the truth about the Incident; and (3) Fr. Choi's actions under the circumstances were a completely just and proper exercise of his duties as a Catholic priest. Bishop Chi also stated that Fr. Choi's actions were not pro-Communist, and that because a regime is distinguishable from the state, anti-government activities also are distinguishable from anti-state activities (NCKK, 1987, p. 898). Between April 8 and 11, the priests of the Andong, Inch'ŏn, Pusan, and Wŏnju Dioceses issued statements declaring their support for Fr. Choi and his activities. On April 12, the Justice and Peace Committee issued a statement entitled "We Ask the Government Authorities," which set forth the following 6 points: (1) the government and the press used this incident to do harm to the Church, never appreciating the patriotism and pain of the Church; (2) the Church had relied upon the promises of high government officials in arranging for the voluntary surrender of the students, but those officials failed to keep their promises; (3) it should be assured and guaranteed that political dissidents be free from the threat of political retaliation and imprisonment; (4) it was right and proper for Fr. Choi to have sheltered those students who came to the

Church to tell the truth about the Incident and to ask for help; (5) the release of Fr. Choi is a matter for the government's conscience; and (6) the trial of Fr. Choi should be free from any political influence or power (NCCCK, 1987, p. 898). In its message to the laity on April 15, the Permanent Committee of the Korean Bishops' Conference stated that (1) the press has falsely distorted the truth by reporting that Fr. Choi was a key person deeply involved in the arson at the U.S.I.S. building, and, behind the scenes, also was a Communist instigator and consciousness-raiser; and (2) what Fr. Choi did was just and proper according to his religious faith and conscience. On April 26, the Justice and Peace Committee held a special Mass at Myòngdong Cathedral for Fr. Choi and for all those who were suffering similar injustices, and issued a statement entitled "Our Views Regarding the Recent Incident," which emphasized that (1) the arson fire at the U.S.I.S building at Pusan was ultimately caused by the Kwangju Uprising; and (2) the government should reveal the truth regarding the U.S.I.S. Incident to the people and stop doing harm by making false charges against the Church (NCCCK, 1987, p. 898).

On March 8, 1983, at the final appeals court, Fr. Choi was sentenced to 3 years in prison and 2 years of disqualification. 2 of the other 15 people, Kim Hyun-jang (Kim Hyòn-jang) and Moon Pu-sik (Mun Pu-sik), were sentenced to death. The remaining 13 also were sentenced to several years in prison and of disqualification (NCCCK, 1987, p. 932). On March 15, the death sentences of Kim and Moon were commuted to life imprisonment by presidential order, and some of the others also obtained reductions of their sentences (NCCCK, 1987, p. 933). Thereafter, on August 12, Fr. Choi was released as part of a special amnesty celebrating the anniversary of Liberation Day, August 15, 1945. At the same time, 7 students also received reductions of their sentences.

In summary, the Church believed that the only way to heal the national trauma of the Kwangju Uprising and to resolve the U.S.I.S Incident was to reveal the truth to the people. Thus, the Church courageously practiced what the Bible encourages it to do: "There is nothing hidden that will not be found. There is no secret that will not be well known" (*Luke* 8:17); "You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free" (*John* 8:32) (CJPRI, 1990, p. 37). Furthermore, this incident even evoked the sympathies of hardcore Conservatives within the Church, perhaps, for the following reasons: (1) these people became sympathetic when they learned the true facts regarding the Kwangju Uprising and the wrongful actions of the Chun regime; and (2) it was plausible to think of Fr. Choi's action in sheltering those who came to him for shelter, as purely "pastoral" action based upon his religious faith and conscience as a Catholic priest, and not upon political motives (for similar views, see Chun, 1992, pp. 108-09).

The most important normative factor involved in this incident was the Church's performance of a prophetic role in criticizing the Chun regime for its failure to tell the truth to the public regarding the Kwangju Incident and for its distortion of the truth regarding the U.S.I.S. Arson Incident and Fr. Choi's role in that incident. The Church defended its criticism on the basis that it only criticized the regime which was separate and distinct from the state. The Church also asserted its religious freedom and the freedom of conscience of individual clergy. On the other hand, the state contended that Fr. Choi's concealment of offenders violated the law and had nothing to do with religious freedom. The Church countered by asserting that Fr. Choi merely was carrying out his pastoral duties in sheltering the students.

Structural factors included the Church's pastoral action in sheltering the students, who were in desperate straits, and the state's renegeing on its promise to treat the students fairly and engaging in repressive tactics.

III. CASE STUDY #7: THE TORTURE DEATH OF PARK CHONG-CHUL IN JANUARY, 1987

For many years, international human rights groups have been aware of the systematic torture of political prisoners in South Korea. However, the government has steadfastly denied that such abuses have ever occurred. It also has been difficult to prove the charges because the torture was so skillfully performed that few visible signs of torture were left to be seen. Moreover, when people died as a result of such torture, the government always declared that they died of natural causes or by suicide.

On January 13, 1987, a Seoul National University student named Park Chong-chul (Pak Chong-ch'òl) was taken to the "Anti-Communist Annex of the National Police Headquarters" for questioning about the whereabouts of a radical student leader who was his classmate. By the following morning Park had been tortured to death. During Park's interrogation, a policeman repeatedly pushed his head into a tub of water and crushed his throat against the rim until he suffocated to death.

The next day, January 15, Park's death was reported in a newspaper as merely the death of a student during interrogation. The arrest of two policemen involved in the interrogation also was reported. On January 16, a doctor informed the public of his strong belief that Park's death was caused by torture. The people were shocked and angered by this revelation. When Park's death received considerable attention from the press, the head of the National Police Headquarters denied that any torture was used, and claimed that Park had died of shock, saying "uk!" at the sound of

"tak," when a police officer struck a desk with his hand. As mentioned above, the customary statement that "there was no torture, and there could be no torture!" was repeated in the National Assembly by several top government officials, including the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Home Affairs and Justice, in adamant, solemn tones (CISJD, 1988, p. 46; Eckert, 1990_b, pp. 381-82).

This incident immediately attracted the attention of the Church. During Sunday Mass on January 18, Cardinal Kim gave a sermon stating that "we should feel 'righteous anger' when the dignity of human beings is outraged by torture in our society." On January 26, he also officiated at a "Special Mass for a Memorial Service for Park Chong-chul and for Restoration of Human Rights through Eradication of Torture" (Chang, 1987, p. 338). After this Mass, some 2,000 persons participated in a silent demonstration led by some 150 priests and nuns, who were holding a large Cross and a large picture of the late Park Chong-chul. They progressed to the entrance of Myòngdong Cathedral where they were confronted by the police. They then prayed the Rosary and sang a hymn for martyrs for an hour under the guidance of CPAJ priests. Thereafter, the CPAJ played a leading role at a National Memorial Service for Park Chong-chul on February 7, and at a National Peace March for Torture-Expulsion and Democratization on March 3. Both of these rallies, which were supposed to have been held throughout the nation, ended up as sporadic demonstrations due to police interference (Chang, 1987, p. 338). Afterward, some CPAJ priests continued to seek to learn the real truth concerning the death of Park Chong-chul (Kim, 1987, p. 258).

On May 18, which was the seventh anniversary of the Kwangju Uprising, there was a special Mass entitled "Memorial Mass for those who were sacrificed in the May 18 Uprising" held at Myòngdong Cathedral. Cardinal Kim officiated at this

Mass, which was followed by an earthshaking statement regarding the Park Chong-chul Incident. Fr. Kim Seung-hun (Kim Sùng-hun), as representative of the CPAJ and concurrently the vice-chairman of *Mintongryun* (Mint'ongnyòn) [the United Minjung (people's) Movement for Democracy and Unification], announced that "the government authorities [had] thoroughly covered up this incident and deceived the people once again by fabricating the whole account." In a statement entitled "The Publicized Account of Park Chong-chul's Torture and Death was Fabricated," it was announced that "there are real criminals who directly tortured Park Chong-chul to death," and that "whether the government can recover the already violated morality of the public power or not depends upon whether the real truth can be revealed or not, and it will also decide if we can achieve humanization and democratization" (Chang, 1987, p. 320).

This statement revealed that there were three additional policemen who were more directly involved in the torture than the two policemen previously arrested. It also revealed that the first two policemen arrested had been persuaded to accept bribes from other policemen to admit total responsibility for the Incident. Expectedly, the police and the public prosecutor's office immediately denied everything. Three days later, on May 21, the Seoul District Public Prosecutor's Office unexpectedly made an announcement that on the same day the three additional policemen had been arrested and charged with the torture death of Park Chong-chul. According to this announcement, one of the first two arrested policemen was the chief of interrogation and the other was the youngest of the five policemen charged. They had changed their minds and implicated the three additional policemen. In other words, the police and the public prosecutor's office finally admitted that the CPAJ's version of the Incident was true (Kim, 1987, pp. 258-60). As the May 23 edition of the newspaper *Donga*

Ilbo (Donga Daily) reported, the Public Prosecutor's Office, which previously had known that three additional policemen were involved in the torture, had no choice but to make the above announcement and arrests. In other words, the authorities could no longer avoid admitting the truth of the CPAJ's statement (*ibid.*, p. 263).

However, that was not the end of the matter. On the following day, May 22, the *Donga Ilbo* (Donga Daily) reported that there was a behind the scenes instigation of the fabricated account of Park's death. The press revealed that three high-ranking officials of the National Police Headquarters, including Senior Superintendent General Park Cheo-won (Pak Ch'ò-wòn), were directly involved in making up the fabricated account to reduce the number of policemen who were actually involved in the torture death. This report directly contradicted what the Public Prosecutor's Office had announced the previous day. On the same day, May 22, the CPAJ issued another statement asking the government to tell the whole truth regarding its attempted cover-up of this crime and to reinvestigate all other similar torture cases which had occurred in the recent past. In its statement, the CPAJ again emphasized that the Chun regime as a whole were responsible for the Park Chong-chul Incident, including Park's torture death and the fabricated account of the Incident caused by dishonest government officials and police (*ibid.*, p. 262; Chang, 1987, p. 322).

When the CPAJ and the press disclosed that top ranking police officers were directly involved in Park's torture death and in the cover-up which followed, top government officials realized that they were rapidly losing popularity and credibility with the people, and were under increasing pressure to take some action to restore popular support. As a result, the government took the following measures: First, on May 26, there was a reshuffling of key Cabinet members, including Prime Minister Rho Shin-young (Ro Sin-yòng) and Chief of the National Security Planning Agency

(formerly KCIA) Chang Se-dong. Six other members of the cabinet were fired and replaced by moderates (Kim, 1987, pp. 268-69); and second, on May 27, the newly appointed head of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office Lee Chong-nam ordered his office to undertake a reinvestigation of the Incident, which previously had been under the jurisdiction of the Seoul District Public Prosecutor's Office. Then, on May 29, the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office reported on live TV the results of its reinvestigation that three high-ranking police officers had been investigated, charged with fabricating the account of the Incident in concert with the five policemen who had tortured Park to death, and imprisoned (*ibid.*, pp. 270-71).

Thus, it became a proven fact that the government authorities, especially the police and the public prosecutor's office, had told three serious lies about the Incident, namely, (1) the head of the National Police Headquarters' announcement right after Park Chong-chul's death that Park had died of shock and there was no torture, (2) the denial that no additional policemen were involved in the torture, and (3) the denial that high-ranking officials of the police were involved in a behind the scenes cover-up of the Incident.

The significance of the Park Chong-chul Incident can be summarized as follows: First, the government authorities did not volunteer to reveal the truth. It was not until evidence of fabrication was disclosed that the authorities finally admitted that the CPAJ's newly revealed account was true. In fact, this case was "the first time in its history" that "the South Korean government had publicly acknowledged the fact of police torture and thereby called into question all its previous denials" (Eckert, 1990_b, p. 382).

Second, the government's fabrications and lies were a fatal blow to the reputation and credibility of the government, especially as to torture deaths. Even

though all of the policemen and high-ranking officials involved were imprisoned, and several top government officials were fired, "the damage had been done" (Eckert, 1990_b, p. 382). The CPAJ's May 18 disclosure that "the torture-death case of Park Chong-chul was completely distorted" was like pouring fuel on the fire of democratization (CISJD, 1988, pp. 272-73). The torture death of Park Chong-chul played an important and decisive role in South Korean politics. It enraged the people, and ignited an unyielding struggle against the military dictatorship of the Chun regime, forcing it to reveal the truth about the Incident. Ultimately, this forced the Chun regime to accede to the people's demand for a direct presidential election system. Thus, Park Chong-chul's death provided the key ingredient to loosening the Chun regime's dictatorial rule. The public indignation which swept across the nation as a result of this incident provided a rallying cry for the various democratic forces until they achieved the "victory" of the June 29 (1987) Declaration (CISJD, 1988, p. 47; also see Chang, 1987, p. 322; for the Declaration, see Note #2).

Third, this incident proved that the Church was regarded by the public as the most trustworthy social institution. Although the identity of the person or persons who revealed the critical information concerning the fabrication of the Incident to the CPAJ still remains as a secret, the fact that the information was given to the CPAJ, and not to any others, including the opposition party, means that the Church was perceived as being the most honest and trustworthy organization in society, and that it could be relied upon to objectively reveal the truth from a politically independent position. As stated by Fr. Kim Seung-hun (Kim Sung-hun), a key member of the CPAJ, even though the people do not trust the government, they still trust the Church (Yuh, 1987, pp. 302-05).

The most important normative factor involved in this incident was the Church's prophetic role in demanding that the government tell the truth that had been covered up regarding the torture death. The most important structural factor was the effective action of the CPAJ, an informal organization of priests whose activities made it the Church's most important tool for sociopolitical change. It is highly possible, if not probable, that the bishops who were officially critical of the CPAJ, in their hearts were applauding its efforts to apply the Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings and to follow the Biblical mandate. The Church's greater credibility with the public was a powerful behavioral factor which ultimately forced the Chun regime to admit the truth of the facts disclosed by the CPAJ. It also contributed to the eventual downfall of the Chun regime.

IV. CASE STUDY #8: THE SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION CANDIDATE KIM DAE-JUNG IN THE DECEMBER, 1987 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

This case study deals with the CPAJ's decision to openly support Kim Dae-jung, an opposition party leader running for president in the December 16, 1987 election. Because it was a politically sensitive issue for a Church group such as the CPAJ to have chosen to openly support an opposition party leader, it created a controversy within and outside the Church regarding the proper limits and methods of the Church's political involvement.

What caused the CPAJ to choose to support Kim Dae-jung? It was simply because of a division in the electorate concerning two opposition candidates, as related below.

Regarding the ruling Democratic Justice Party, its candidate, Roh Tae-woo, had already been selected on June 10, 1987. His secure candidacy was further

reinforced by the June 29 (1987) Declaration.² However, the success of Roh's candidacy was far from being a sure thing. The popular votes cast for the ruling DJP in national assembly elections were 35.6% in 1981 and 35.3% in 1985. Therefore, Roh's success was not possible without obtaining a split of the anti-government vote which was about two thirds of the total vote. It was because of this political imperative that the decision was made to restore the political rights of Kim Dae-jung as part of Roh's June 29 (1987) Declaration so that he could run in the December 16 election (Im, 1989, pp. 308-09).

Therefore, after June 29, 1987, the main task of the opposition forces, who had been striving for the termination of military dictatorship by opposing its candidate, Roh, was to unite in supporting one of the two main opposition candidates, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. Unless they could unite behind one candidate, the opposition forces' chances of winning the election were practically nil.

Unfortunately, both of the two Kims were even in terms of popularity with the electorate, and neither of them spontaneously withdrew from the race. Also contributing to the division was the longstanding personal rivalry between the two Kims, and the deep-rooted antagonisms among social classes, regions, and social movements. First, manual laborers and urban poor people preferred Kim Dae-jung, while white collar workers favored Kim Young-sam. Second, each Kim had a different regional base--Cholla province favored Kim Dae-jung and Kyongsang province supported Kim Young-sam.³ Third, the respective leaders of students', workers', intellectuals' and religious movements failed to agree on a unified strategy for the election. In short, the delicate balance of electoral strength made it impossible for opposition forces to unite behind one candidate, and neither of the two Kims was

willing to sacrifice his candidacy for the successful election of the other (*ibid.*, p. 309).

In this situation of the two Kims' candidacy, the opposition groups, including the CPAJ, faced a difficult problem. They realized that the two Kims' candidacy virtually assured Roh's electoral victory. When both Kims stubbornly insisted on continuing to run for the presidency, 3 alternative solutions were suggested by the opposition groups, namely, either (1) critically support Kim Dae-jung, (2) unite behind one candidate, or (3) add an independent third candidate (for a further discussion of the three alternatives, see Chun, 1992, pp. 126-27; Im, 1989, pp. 313-15; for additional details about opposition groups mentioned below, also see Im, Chs. 7-9). As previously mentioned, the CPAJ's decision to pursue the first alternative is the key issue of this case study. The three alternatives are further elaborated as follows:

First, the moderate faction, including *Mintongryun* (Mint'ongnyòn) [the United Minjung (People's) Movement for Democracy and Unification], *Chundaehyup* (Chòndaehyòp) [National Council of Student Representatives], and *Minchungryun* (Minch'òngnyòn) [the Democratization Movement Youth League] decided to "critically" support Kim Dae-Jung. Although these groups did not wholeheartedly endorse Kim Dae-jung's candidacy because he was a political conservative, they felt that they had no choice but to support this Kim for the following reasons: (1) Opposition groups as yet were unable to establish their own candidate, and therefore, they had no choice but to support one of the established opposition politicians. Because they were compelled to support an institutional opposition politician, Kim Dae-jung was seen as the more desirable candidate because he held more progressive views on social and economic issues involving workers, peasants and the urban poor

than did Kim Young-sam. In addition, Kim Young-sam's acknowledgment of the military's "veto" power and his conciliatory position regarding the military were unacceptable to these groups. In a face-to-face meeting with Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam argued that he should be the unity candidate because the military, who claimed to have "veto" power, would not accept the election of Kim Dae-jung; and (2) To publicly support Kim Dae-jung's candidacy early in the campaign was a good strategy because it would upset the delicate balance between the two Kims. The support of Kim Dae-jung would force Kim Young-sam to withdraw (for additional details about this strategy, see CISJD, 1987, pp. 41-77).

Second, the conservative pro-Kim Young-sam groups within the opposition movements opposed the strategy of "critically" supporting Kim Dae-jung. They insisted on continuing to try to achieve unity among the divided opposition groups. These groups criticized the first groups' decision to support Kim Dae-jung because the main goal of this election was not "to smash the bourgeois government" but to achieve civilianization of politics by electing a non-military president. They felt that the relative progressiveness of the two candidates should not be the determining factor in choosing a candidate. According to these groups, all efforts should be focused on terminating the military dictatorship and trying to unite behind an opposition candidate (for additional details about this position, see *ibid.*, pp. 79-110).

Finally, radical leftist groups such as *Minmintu* (Minmint'u) [the Struggle Committee for the Nation and Democracy] and the CA (Constitutional Assembly) group, and radical labor organizations such as *Seonoryun* (Sònoryòn) [Seoul Area Labor Movement League] and *Innoryun* (Innoryòn) [Inch'òn Area Labor Movement League] tried to boycott the election because they considered it to be a conspiracy between the United States and the military to maintain a "reactionary" regime in the

form of a "military fascist dictatorship" hidden behind a formal democratic facade. They argued for the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government and called for a constituent assembly to assure popular democracy in the new government. Thus, these radical groups campaigned for a boycott of the national referendum for a new constitution. After the entire nation was absorbed with the upcoming election following the passage of the national referendum for the new constitution on October 27, the voice of these radical groups could not be heard even among the subordinate masses they tried to represent. The voice of the leftist groups was stilled by the campaign uproar.

These radical groups tried to change their tactics from boycott to participation by entering their own candidate in the election. They did not support either of the two Kims, so they drafted Paek Ki-wan (P'aek Ki-wan). At first, Paek drew little attention, but eventually his eloquent speeches at mass rallies and on TV aroused radical sectors of the population and began to attract Kim Dae-jung's supporters. However, sensing that their candidate would not be elected and fearing that they might become a target of repression if Roh was elected, the radical sectors finally agreed to help elect one of the two Kims in return for sharing power in the post-election government. Thus, these groups asked the two Kims to agree on a unified candidacy and on a political pact of a "democratic coalition government" consisting of the two Kims and representatives of the radical groups, in exchange for dropping their candidate, Paek (for additional details about this position, see *ibid.*, pp. 111-47).

However, all of the foregoing efforts of the opposition coalition to agree upon a candidate failed. The energy and enthusiasm of the masses which gained the regime's June 29 concessions was dissipated in the divisive campaigns of the two Kims. The leaders of the various opposition groups failed to agree upon a unified

strategy for an "electoral revolution" to defeat Roh. Because of the regional division, the two Kims, especially Kim Dae-jung, failed to solicit the votes of workers and the urban poor. As regional animosities deepened, the campaign became violent, which was to Roh's advantage. He exploited this campaign violence by launching a massive media campaign to arouse middle class concerns for law and order. Finally, when the first popular presidential election in 16 years was held on December 16, as expected, Roh was elected as the new president (Roh, 36.6%, Kim Young-sam, 28%, Kim Dae-jung, 27%, and Kim Jong-pil, 8.1% of the vote). The headline of a December 18 editorial in *The New York Times* read "Two Kims elect a Roh," succinctly summarizing the whole presidential campaign. Because of the deep divisions within the opposition coalition, victory was handed to yet another ex-military general, Roh Tae-woo, who had been handpicked by former president Chun to be his successor (Im, 1989, pp. 317-18).

Returning to the pre-election situation, as previously stated, the CPAJ tended to favor the first alternative, i.e., to openly "critically support" Kim Dae-jung. This approach came after they had failed to mediate with two Kims behind the scenes. While the CPAJ's decision was still pending, and the issuance of its statement was reserved, a statement was released through the media as if the CPAJ intended to publicize their official decision to support Kim Dae-jung (Chun, 1992, p. 121).

The key issue of this case study is not whether or not the CPAJ priests approved the issuance of the media statement. Rather, it concerns the controversy which resulted from their publicized endorsement of Kim Dae-jung. After their decision to support Kim Dae-jung was prematurely broadcast by the media, the CPAJ came under increasing criticism by the regime, society, and the Church itself. Questions frequently asked were "is it proper or improper for a group of priests to

support a specific candidate for the presidency?" and "What are the limits of the Church's political activity, as shown by the CPAJ priests?" (*ibid.*, p. 122).

The CPAJ's activities appeared to be more like those of a secular political group than of a religious group merely exercising moral leadership for social justice and human rights. There possibly would have been no problem if the CPAJ had issued a general *nonpartisan* statement such as "a clean and upright democratic leader should be elected president." Church history repeatedly has shown that the Church's direct support of a specific candidate or political party is harmful to the moral credibility and unity of the Church. For example, in Europe during the 1960s many people considered the Christian Democratic Party to be a Catholic political party, even though the Church did not officially support that party. Most devout Catholics supported that party. An important side effect was that many people of different political persuasions left the Church (CJPRI, 1990, p. 134).

Learning from the European experience, the South Korean Church now prohibits the clergy from taking political office or being otherwise involved in party politics. Articles #285 and #287 of the new Canon Law (1983 revision), and the Korean Catholic pastoral guiding principle (issued in 1989 based on articles #285 and #287) prohibit the clergy from taking any high positions in government, as well as taking leadership positions in political parties and labor unions. Article #287 appears to allow some flexibility in hinting that a member of the clergy could occupy political office if a leader of the hierarchy having jurisdiction over him rules that such direct political participation is necessary for the protection of the Church's rights and the common good. Even though these articles of Canon Law do not clearly prohibit the clergy's open support, as a non-party member, of a particular political party, they have been construed as prohibiting the clergy from making a speech or engaging in

activities which could be interpreted by outsiders as deep participation by the Church in party politics (*ibid.*, pp. 134-35; also see the Doctrine of Separation of Church and State, previously discussed in Chapter Four). It appears that the South Korean Church has been stricter than the Church in other countries in prohibiting the clergy from taking political office or engaging in party politics. For example, in Germany, Nicaragua, and the United States, some priests have directly participated in politics and have become government officials, even ministers (for the Nicaraguan case, see Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989, p. 20). In Italy, a Catholic priest founded the Christian Democratic Party. In the Philippines, Cardinal Sin recently expressed his opinion regarding a specific presidential candidate. Thus, the Church in each country has operated selectively and case by case in its observance of this prohibition (CJPRI, 1990, p. 134; Chun, 1992, pp. 123-25).

However, the matter becomes even more complicated and difficult to resolve in the situation where all political parties pursue democracy and human rights. The clergy definitely would be criticized if it took a concrete position favoring the presidential candidate of a specific political party. On the other hand, what should the clergy do if a political party, regarded by many people as another dictatorship-oriented party or as a serious threat to the Church's religious freedom, appears likely to win a national election? For example, in about 1975 the Italian Church, fearing that the Communist Party might otherwise gain power, publicly supported the Christian Democratic Party (CJPRI, 1990, pp. 135-36). It could be said that the CPAJ's decision to "critically support" Kim Dae-jung was made in a somewhat comparable sociopolitical context. Furthermore, even though it may not be desirable for the clergy to make concrete statements regarding sociopolitical alternatives, it also is true that abstract statements hardly can be expected to be very influential.

In summary, the CPAJ's support of Kim Dae-jung is a good example to show that the Church's method of political participation should be different from that of secular political forces, even under circumstances that necessitate specific and concrete actions. According to a Church related evaluation of the CPAJ's activities,

their [the CPAJ's] main contribution to the nation was to publicly speak out what the grassroots people were feeling, at a time when there were few other spokesmen. Their prophetic role has been widely appreciated, but their support has diminished recently. They made a major error in publicly supporting a particular candidate, Kim Dae-jung, in the 1987 presidential election. (CJPRI, 1990, pp. 279-80; also see pp. 138-39)

To elaborate, the influence of the Church is derived from its moral leadership in the pursuit of social justice and human rights. Such leadership is weakened if a clergy group associates itself too closely with secular political forces. The following comment of Comblin (1979) regarding the Latin American Church on the proper conduct of the Church's mission of evangelization is equally applicable to the CPAJ:

The new practice and theory of the church naturally include the concepts of both the intention to transform and the action of transforming established society. . . . the church's mission of evangelization is, in some senses, a call to revolution. But by no means does the church want to aid, support, call attention to, or otherwise help any persons, groups, or political movements who seek to become the next leaders of the established order. (p. 101)

Using Bellah's concept, such close association is not a desirable relationship between religion and politics because under those circumstances religion and politics will have lost the "creative tension" which ideally should exist between them. Perhaps it is equally true that "creative tension" is needed between "religious opposition" and "political opposition."

The most significant normative factor in this incident is a negative one---the CPAJ's departure from performing a strictly prophetic role to engage in partisan politics. The CPAJ's motivations may have been proper, and the end may have justified the means. Obviously, the Church has to be willing to suffer criticism and

persecution in carrying out its prophetic role and pastoral mission. But, perhaps the CPAJ went too far in this instance. Its candidate was not elected. It looked as if it had been an unwitting tool of the Roh regime. Did the public resent the CPAJ's intrusion into this area of personal privacy--the right to vote, freely and voluntarily, for the candidate of one's choice? It was predictable that the CPAJ's actions would be misunderstood by the public. It also was inevitable that the CPAJ would suffer a loss of credibility and respect and that Church unity would be harmed.

The most important structural factor is similarly negative--the extreme political involvement of the CPAJ, which was ineffective in the political arena as well as being harmful in the religious context.

V. CASE STUDY #9: THE NATIONAL REUNIFICATION MOVEMENT: THE FR. MOON KYU-HYUN INCIDENT IN 1989

Unlike the previous case studies, and also unlike the Latin American cases, this case study deals with an issue that is peculiar to Korea--the national reunification issue. It examines and discusses the so-called Fr. Moon Kyu-hyun (Mun Kyu-hyòn) Incident that took place when Fr. Moon was dispatched by the CPAJ to North Korea to escort a 20-year old female Catholic university student, Im Su-kyong (Im Su-gyòng), from North Korea across the DMZ into South Korea after her trip to Pyòngyang to participate in the 1989 World Festival of Youth and Students as the representative of the *Chondaehyop* (Chòndaehyòp) [National Association of University Student Representatives], a radical dissident student organization. Their visits to, and activities in, North Korea were in direct defiance of the National Security Law which places a governmental ban on travel to North Korea without the government's specific authorization. From the CPAJ's viewpoint, the dispatch of a

Catholic priest to North Korea to escort Im Su-kyong back to South Korea not only was a pastoral action to protect a South Korean Catholic student, but it also was part of the Church's reunification mission based on the religious faith and conscientious efforts of the Church to heal the longstanding trauma and animosity between the two Koreas. The CPAJ also regarded this action as supporting the movements for democratization and humanization. This incident involving Im Su-kyong and Fr. Moon stirred up a strong controversy and had repercussions in both Koreas, partly because it was a head-on challenge to the political ideology of national security based on anti-Communism.

Before discussing the CPAJ's dispatch of Fr. Moon to North Korea on July 25, 1989, it is necessary to briefly discuss the political situation surrounding it, including the state's repressive tactics under the National Security Law and the background of the *Chondaehyop's* dispatch of Im Su-kyong. Then, the consequences and implications of Fr. Moon's visit to North Korea will be examined and discussed as the key issue of this case study.

The radical student and dissident groups, which were the primary catalyst behind the street demonstrations which resulted in Roh's June 29 (1987) Declaration, continued to be politically active after the democratic reforms began to be implemented. These radical groups, including the *Chondaehyop*, opposed the Seoul Olympics on the ground that the games would help perpetuate the division of two Koreas by excluding the North Koreans, who already had chosen not to participate after their request for a joint hosting of some Olympic events was denied. After the Olympics were held, radical students returned to their previous objective of opposing "American imperialism," insisting on the arrest and prosecution of former president Chun, and opposing the Roh Tae-woo government. They also urged the withdrawal of

all U.S. troops from Korea on the ground that the United States was implicated in the Kwangju massacre and was responsible for the continued division of the country (Lee, 1990, pp. 16-17).

However, as democratic reforms began to be effective, the dissidents lost their most potent platform for protest, so they turned instead to the longstanding issue of national reunification. It was under these circumstances that a dissident Protestant pastor, Moon Ik-hwan (Mun Ik-hwan), visited North Korea in March, 1989, followed by the student activist, Im Su-kyong, in June. Moon's visit was prompted by an invitation from Kim Il-sung, the head of North Korea, to certain individuals in South Korea, including President Roh and several dissidents. Upon his arrival in Pyòngyang, Moon paid tribute to the North Korean president and expressed his basic agreement with the North Korean formula for reunification and with North Korea's position vis-a-vis the South Korean regime. Reverend Moon's and Im's secret and illegal trip to Pyòngyang did little to generate public sympathy for their cause. Instead it led to a government clampdown on the radical student movement. Many people considered their activities likely to retard the progress of North-South Korean talks and to possibly threaten democracy at home by helping rightist groups (*ibid.*, p. 17; also see pp. 48-50).

Regardless of one's attitude about the trips of Reverend Moon and Im Su-kyong to Pyòngyang, it is undeniably true that these events raised the Korean public's consciousness of the reunification issue (*ibid.*, p. 52).

The CPAJ's dispatch of Fr. Moon Kyu-hyun to North Korea made the political situation more complicated by involving the Church in the episode. Upon their return to South Korea, Rev. Moon, Im, and Fr. Moon were imprisoned and charged with violations of the National Security Law. They eventually were released between late

1992 and early 1993. While they were in prison, North Korea often made their release a condition precedent to further progress in North-South Korean talks.

What was the purpose of the National Security Law? This law was enacted in 1958 to control the activities of "anti-state" organizations. Even though its ostensible purpose is to protect national security, it frequently has been applied selectively to punish dissidents (Clark, 1991, p. 200).

This law also is not popular among the people. For example, on August 12, 1989, while Im Su-kyong and Fr. Moon still were in North Korea after their attempt to return to Seoul via P'anmunjòm in the DMZ (since 1953 the primary point of contact between the United Nations' and South Korean representatives and North Korea) was thwarted by the South Korean government, approximately 1,600 members of the South Korean National Council of University Professors for Democratization asserted that the government was utilizing the National Security Law to repress the democratization process and urged the government to stop such "political maneuvering" (Lee, 1991, p. 147).

Among the most controversial provisions of this law is one forbidding travel by South Korean citizens to North Korea. The government's rigid, authoritarian stance on national reunification further reinforced the government's use of the National Security Law. For example, on April 4, 1989, the South Korean Minister of Justice announced that unauthorized contacts by South Koreans with North Korea would be punished as violations of Article 8 "Meeting and Communication" of the National Security Law (*ibid.*, p. 140). On June 12, pursuant to a presidential decree, South Korea's National Unification Board announced "basic guidelines for inter-Korea exchanges and cooperation," which provided that South Koreans wishing to visit North Korea must obtain the approval of the Minister of the Unification Board four

weeks in advance of the proposed visit. As Lee points out, "this decree is the first legislative expression of the government's 'single-channel' logic, which stipulates that any South-North exchange must have government approval" (*ibid.*, pp. 143-44). The government's rigid, authoritarian stance regarding the reunification movement also can be described as "single-channel" logic.

The *Chondaehyop*'s secret dispatch of Im Su-kyong to North Korea (via Europe) for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students at Pyongyang and her 46-day stay in North Korea (from June 30 through August 15, 1989) was done without governmental approval, thus directly defying the "single-channel" logic of the government's National Security Law.

The previous year, President Roh had made a conciliatory overture toward North Korea. In his July 7, 1988 speech, Roh announced that his government wanted to improve its relationship with North Korea by changing from an adversarial to a cooperative attitude. He stated that, in furtherance of this purpose, his government would cooperate with North Korea in its efforts to improve its relationship with the United States and Japan. He also declared that his government would actively promote exchange-visits between the peoples of North and South Korea (*ibid.*, p. 44). On December 7, 1988, a South Korean government spokesman had mentioned the possibility of dispatching students to the festival, but only the *Chondaehyop* was invited by the (North) Korean Student Committee.

On January 20, 1989, the *Chondaehyop* announced its intention to participate in the festival to be held at Pyøngyang in July (*ibid.*, p. 134). Despite the prior favorable indications from the Roh government, on March 16 the police blocked the path of a *Chondaehyop* delegation which was on its way to P'anmunjòm to hold a working-level meeting with the (North) Korean Student Committee. On March 29,

the South Korean government and the ruling Democratic Justice Party decided not to modify the National Security Law (*ibid.*, p. 139). On May 20, the road to P'anmunjòm again was blocked to prevent the radical South Korean students from meeting with representatives of the North Korean student organization to discuss South Korea's participation in the upcoming festival (*ibid.*, p. 142). Then, on June 20, the Roh government announced its final decision that no South Korean university students would be permitted to participate in the festival (*ibid.*, p. 144).

On July 1-18, 1989, the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students (which was first launched in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in July, 1947, with the slogan, "Youth, unite in the struggle for a durable and lasting peace") was held at Pyòngyang, under the current slogan, "For Anti-Imperialist Solidarity, Peace, and Friendship," which had been adopted in 1973 (*ibid.*, pp. 160, 145).

On June 30, Im Su-kyong arrived at Pyòngyang via Europe to attend the festival. Actually, she was the first nondefecting South Korean student to voluntarily enter North Korea since the Korean War. While she was in North Korea, Im Su-kyong was a center of attention. For example, on the opening day of the festival at May Day Stadium, a crowd of 150,000 welcomed her with thunderous applause as she marched alone as the sole "representative" of South Korean college students. This event received extensive coverage by the mass media in North and South Korea. Also, during her stay in North Korea, Im Su-kyong stressed the concept of One Korea and advocated reunification. She charged that the Roh government, in league with "American imperialism," was not interested in reunification and persecuted those who worked for it (*ibid.*, pp. 50-51).

It is noteworthy that the South Korean government and Im Su-kyong almost simultaneously issued widely contrasting statements. On July 4, South Korean

National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo (Lee Hong-gu) announced that the government was postponing various inter-Korea talks for a considerable length of time. On July 7, Im Su-kyong, as the *Chondaehyop* representative at Pyòngyang, issued a joint communiqué with the chair of the (North) Korean Student Committee favoring the independent and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula (Lee, 1991, p. 145).

It was under these circumstances that, on July 25, 1989, the CPAJ dispatched Father Moon Kyu-hyun, who had been studying in the United States, to Pyòngyang to escort *Chondaehyop* representative Im Su-kyong back to South Korea. On August 15 Im Su-kyong, accompanied by Father Moon, returned to South Korea, via P'anmunjòm in the DMZ after a 46-day visit to North Korea (*ibid.*, pp. 143, 147). Immediately following their return, they were arrested and imprisoned for violating the National Security Law. The following year, on June 11, 1990, an appeals court reduced each of their prison terms to five years. Meanwhile, Im Su-kyong's travel diary appeared in the magazine *Sindonga* and was widely read (Clark, 1991, p. 179). On December 24, 1992, after Kim Young-sam was elected President, they received a special pardon and were released from prison.

Fr. Moon had previously visited North Korea the same year. He arrived at Pyòngyang on June 5, 1989 for a 14 day stay pursuant to the CPAJ's request. On June 6, he officiated at a special Mass for reunification with North Korean believers at Changch'ung Cathedral in Pyòngyang. At the same time, a Mass with the same aim was being held by South Korean Catholics at Imjin'gak, south of the DMZ. Approximately 80 priests and 3,000 believers participated in this Mass (Chun, 1992, p. 111). Even though North and South Korean Catholics could not gather together at

the same place, this was a significant event. The CPAJ's decision to again dispatch Fr. Moon to North Korea on July 5 can be better understood in this context.

What were the implications of Fr. Moon's "illegal" visit to North Korea in July? How was it understood by the Church, state, and society? What were the answers to these questions given by the CPAJ priests?

What the CPAJ intended by again dispatching Fr. Moon to North Korea can be seen in its interviews with the press on July 26 and 27, following its announcement of Fr. Moon's dispatch. According to these interviews, the CPAJ had known that it would become a target of criticism for dispatching Fr. Moon to North Korea. However, it maintained that its action was justified by proper motivations and intentions (*ibid.*, p. 114). According to Fr. Nam Kuk-hyun (Nam Kuk-hyòn), representative of the permanent committee of the CPAJ, dispatching Fr. Moon to North Korea was intended by the CPAJ (1) to have a priest to protect Im Su-kyong, a Catholic girl (whose baptismal name was Suzanna), as a pastoral concern, (2) to protest against the National Security Law which regards the North Korean people as an enemy, (3) to give impetus to a proliferation of debates for reunification, and (4) to bodily protest against political repression justified on the basis of national security (Ahn, 1989, p. 377). Moreover, the CPAJ perceived that the Roh regime lacked any sincere desire or intention to resolve the still pending issues of the prior Chun regime, including the Kwangju Incident, and that it really did not want to achieve democratization or reunification. The CPAJ also recognized that the Roh regime was trying to conceal its true intention of polarizing the people by fueling the longstanding conflicts between the Cholla and Kyongsang regions, and between Right and Left ideologies. Therefore, the CPAJ asserted that the Roh regime was committing a "sin"

inconsistent with the Catholic faith which seeks the reconciliation of all people and unity (*ibid.*, p. 380).

On the other hand, why was Fr. Moon so heavily blamed and found guilty for violating the National Security Law? According to South Korean Law, his visit to North Korea was not illegal. Because he enjoyed an American resident's status, Fr. Moon was allowed to visit North Korea, pursuant to President Roh's Declaration of July 7, 1988. In fact, his first visit to North Korea in June to hold a Mass with North Korean believers did not cause a serious problem. Furthermore, he was not the only priest to visit North Korea to hold a religious Mass with North Korean believers. However, for his second visit, he was charged with violating the National Security Law for another reason. Aside from the fact that he was dispatched by the CPAJ to escort Im Su-kyong, who was the representative of the *Chondaehyop*, which was regarded as a pro-Communist group by the government, his speech and other activities in North Korea resulted in a strong public reaction against him. For example, a scene was repeatedly shown on South Korean TV in which Fr. Moon, together with Im Su-kyong, was shouting out against "American Imperialism" and "the Roh Tae-woo government, who was nothing but a henchman of American Imperialism" obstructing national reunification (*ibid.*, pp. 381-82). As several CPAJ priests later observed, the Agency for National Security Planning in South Korea had cleverly edited the film of Fr. Moon's activities to highlight a few selected scenes and words without showing their context. They delivered this brief, misleading film to the media. In this way, Fr. Moon was depicted as a pro-Communist sympathizer with the North Korean people. Fr. Moon was unfairly criticized by public opinion because of this biased and misleading media coverage (Ham et al, 1989, pp. 284-85).

Not surprisingly, the government reacted very harshly in this Incident. The Minister of Culture and Information, Choi Byong-ryul (Ch'oe Pyòng-nyòl), immediately issued a denunciation statement. Public Prosecutor General, Kim Kie-choon (Kim Ki-ch'un), concluded that the activities of the CPAJ were closely related to those of leftist groups in society. Even the Church was not to be a sanctuary untouched by police actions to protect the national political system. As a result, 3 CPAJ priests were arrested, and other related priests were prohibited from leaving the country (Chun, 1992, p. 114).

The CPAJ's actions also were criticized within the Church. Immediately after the CPAJ publicly announced its dispatch of Fr. Moon to Pyòngyang on July 25, the Korean Bishops' Conference issued a statement saying that it regarded the CPAJ's action as an improper one which caused worry to the South Korean people. Several Lay Apostolate Council leaders also issued statements supporting the Bishops' view. Even within the CPAJ, before the final decision was made there had been some disagreement among the priests over the proper methods to be used in the Church's mission for reunification (*ibid.*, pp. 115-17).

All of the foregoing points were summarized by Fr. Kim Seung-hun (Kim Sùng-hun), a key member of the CPAJ, who answered similar questions asked by the monthly magazine, *Wòlganjungang*, during an interview on August 9, 1989, as follows: (1) Even though it is not easy to explain why Fr. Moon made a very radical speech referring to "American Imperialism," his intent must have been that he is opposed to an American foreign policy that supports South Korean dictatorial regimes and pursues the national interests of the United States which are served by the status quo without Korea's reunification; (2) The reason why Fr. Moon did not criticize the regime in North Korea was because he first sought to reconcile the North Korean

people so that they then would be open to change; (3) Im Su-kyong's visit to North Korea to shout "Korea is One" should be praised rather than blamed, and her courageous action puts the older generation to shame; (4) There is nothing wrong with Fr. Moon's and Im Su-kyong's decision to return to South Korea via P'anmunjòm across the DMZ, because it was a symbolic action to break the national division line which had been drawn by foreign powers against the will of Korean people, and it has nothing to do with violating the Armistice Agreement concluded at the end of the Korean War; (5) Even though the visits of one or two priests or pastors to North Korea may not immediately bring about national reunification, their actions are undeniably an important step toward reunification and even if they are persecuted, it can be likened to Christian martyrdom; and (6) the internal conflicts within the Church, if any, are nothing but the usual differences between the cautious attitude of bishops and the progressive, action-oriented attitude of younger clergy regarding how the Church best can contribute to the democratization and reunification of Korea (Kim, 1989, pp. 364-67).

From a positive standpoint, the most important normative factor in this incident was the courageous prophetic role performed by the CPAJ and Fr. Moon in the face of certain state persecution. The power and effectiveness of Fr. Moon's actions is shown by the extreme measures taken by the state to discredit him and to discourage other priests, including the misleading television contrivance. Again, the significant structural factor was the solidarity and determination displayed by the CPAJ--a courageous and effective sociopolitical arm of the Church.

From a negative standpoint, however, this incident showed that regarding South Korea's relationship with North Korea, any form of close contact or sympathy with the North Korean regime or its ideology hardly would be appreciated by the

general public in South Korea. Perhaps, the deep-rooted South Korean ideology of anti-Communism was the main reason why Fr. Moon and the CPAJ were so heavily criticized by the general public. They were strongly denounced even by those who had thought highly of the CPAJ's previous activities in support of human rights and democracy. Perhaps, in the minds of the South Koreans, Fr. Moon's actions of shouting out against "American Imperialism" and denouncing the Roh Tae-woo government as being only "a henchman of American Imperialism" were seen as buying into or parroting the North Korean Communist ideology, regardless of what his true intentions may have been, and that he considered his actions to be nothing more than the "religious" or "pastoral" actions of a priest (for examples of this criticism by South Korean society, see major South Korean newspapers from July 28 to August 5, 1989).

VI. CASE STUDY #10: THE ISSUE OF REFORM WITHIN THE CHURCH

Before concluding this chapter, the internal conflict within the Church needs to be further examined in relation to the issue of internal reform or intraecclesiastical democracy within the South Korean Church. The issue of the Church's internal reform or renewal began to be seriously discussed within the Church a few months after the Fr. Moon Kyu-hyun Incident (Case Study #9). As previously discussed (see Chapter Five, especially pp. 143-49), the issue of intraecclesiastical reform and democratization of the Church, as advocated by Boff, became very important, not only for Latin American Churches, but also for the South Korean Church, which has tended to be centralist and authoritarian rather than democratic. The issue of reform and democratization within the Church originates in Vatican II teachings. As stated by

Cleary (1985), "*Vatican II* was the great event of the Catholic Church in the last four centuries," and "the Church no longer simply emphasized the *hierarchical aspects of authority* but returned to thinking of itself as 'the people of God,' 'the common priesthood, a 'royal nation'--all images of *shared authority*" (p. 60; italics added). The issue of the Church's sociopolitical involvement also is closely related to the issue of reform within the Church.

Perhaps, one of the key objectives of intraecclesiastical democracy is to achieve and enhance "unity amid diversity" within the Church by incorporating a certain degree of pluralism in one's attitudes and ways of thinking at all levels of the Church hierarchy. This is necessary because the clergy is no longer exclusively conservative. Differences among its members exist not only as to the Church's sociopolitical role, but also as to hierarchical relations within the Church. This issue also has been raised to resolve the conflict between Conservatives and Progressives within the Church, including the division between action-oriented younger liberal clergy and conservative bishops who exert considerable pressure on such younger clergy to prevent their active participation in sociopolitical activities.

As previously mentioned, the Fr. Moon Incident created a lively controversy not only in society but also within the Church. For example, the Korean Bishops' Conference and several Lay Apostolate Council leaders strongly criticized the CPAJ's dispatch of Fr. Moon and Fr. Moon's activities in North Korea. Furthermore, the press reported this internal Church conflict as a case of serious division within the Church. The Incident also was criticized by Archbishop Ivan Dias, the papal nuncio to South Korea. During an interview with the *Jungang Ilbo* (Central Daily) on September 26, 1989, Archbishop Dias expressed his view regarding the Fr. Moon Incident, as follows:

(1) A priest should not do anything without the approval of a bishop who has jurisdiction over him, and he should not get involved in any political activities. Fr. Moon disregarded these rules. As his visit to North Korea was a violation of these rules that a priest should observe, the Vatican does not concern itself about the Incident.

(2) Fr. Moon's dispatch to North Korea by the CPAJ may have been intended to pursue a good cause. However, any "practice of love" by a priest should be done through the Church. Fr. Moon, who had neither officially informed bishops of his visit to North Korea nor officially had obtained bishops' approval, cannot be said to have represented the Church. His "good intention" brought about a big mistake and confusion. (*Jungang Ilbo*, September 26, 1989)

In addition, the Archbishop expressed his political views that (1) "the South Korean democracy is merely at a kindergarten level, and the people, however, act like a college student; and (2) 'democracy' in South Korea seems to be 'demo-crazy'" (*ibid.*).

The Archbishop's views were strongly criticized by Progressives within the Church. For example, in his article entitled "Fundamental Reflections for the Church Renewal: Toward Democratization within the Church" (in *Samok* [Pastoral Review], January, 1990 issue), Fr. Ham Se-woong criticized the Archbishop's views as being political instead of pastoral, and siding with the government and ruling party's political view. Fr. Ham further stated that he was very saddened to see a papal nuncio in South Korea view the South Korean people's struggle for democracy in that manner. His criticism was supported by progressive lay groups within the Church who subsequently demanded that the papal nuncio officially explain his views and apologize for his insulting statements regarding the South Korean people (see the *Jungang Ilbo* [Central Daily], February 15, 1990).

Fr. Ham's aforementioned article, which can be regarded as a forerunner of the reform movement within the Church, also stressed several important points concerning the necessity of the intraecclesiastical reform of the South Korean Church. The points relevant to our discussion can be summarized as follows:

(1) The Church should be operated based on the spirit of brotherhood and service rather than by authority and hierarchical order.

(2) It is time for the Church to renew itself by reforming itself, keeping pace with the democratization trend in society.

(3) The CPAJ's denunciation of sociopolitical injustices is prophetic and evangelical, not political. This point, however, has been misunderstood and distorted by elderly generation priests and several bishops who strongly oppose the clergy's political involvement. The Church criticizes Communism for its violation of human dignity and rights. Why, then, do the bishops who criticize Communism, keep silent vis-a-vis right-wing authoritarian dictatorship?

(4) The papal nuncio to South Korea, who represents the Vatican, has been dispatched to South Korea to work for and to be with the South Korean people. Furthermore, he, who is an archbishop, is primarily a pastor, rather than a diplomat. Furthermore, the early and middle age Church history has shown that the prejudices and immaturity of papal nuncios who had been dispatched to Constantinople were responsible for the split of the Church between East and West.

(5) Priests should be able to pool their opinions and to present them to bishops who have jurisdiction over them. In addition, Diocesans should work only a definite term (rather than staying until the age of 75). When the CPAJ was organized in 1974, several bishops reportedly opposed the emergence of the CPAJ. Perhaps, one of the reasons was because some of them were afraid that the CPAJ, which was active for the realization of justice in society, eventually might become a Church reform movement after society becomes democratized. Now the time has come for the Church to renew itself.

(6) Salvation, the Kingdom of God, the realization of ideal community, all of these goals ask us to work incessantly, through trials and errors, and changes and renewals. The Church hierarchy should not impede this movement for *renewal within the Church*. Not only *unity* but also *diversity* is one of the main characteristics of the Church. Moreover, the statement (of Article 312 of the Canon Law) which prohibits the (social action) organizations (including the CPAJ) within the Church that are not officially approved by the Bishops' Conference from using the word "Catholic" in the titles of their groups is nothing but an anachronism. The standard of official approval is Jesus Christ and the Bible. The *Unity amid Diversity* is the *dynamics of the Church*. (Ham, 1990; italics added)

After its publication, this article induced varied reactions within the Church.

The papal nuncio embassy and the Bishops' Conference informally expressed their worries that it was a serious challenge to the basic order of the Church. On the other hand, younger generation laity and the CPAJ priests supported Fr. Ham's position

(the *Jungang Ilbo* [Central Daily], February 15, 1990). This indicates that *intraecclesiastical reform*, together with the issue of the Church's movement for *national reunification*, will become an increasingly important and controversial issue within the Church in the coming years.

In commenting on the past and future role of the Latin American Church, Smith (1975) considers that "the [Church's] indirect impact on social change already has been important, and will continue to be so over the next generation as the Church carries on *its own internal process of renewal*" (p. 26; italics added).

It is worthwhile to recall the following explanation of the seemingly paradoxical "*unity amid diversity*" which is characteristic of the *dynamics of the Church*:

It is a *unity* among individuals and groups who retain their distinctive characteristics, who enjoy different spiritual gifts, and are by that very *diversity* better equipped to serve one another and thus advance the common good. Individual Christians and local churches are bound to one another in mutual service and mutual receptivity. This relationship is *founded not upon domination but on a free exchange of trust and respect*. . . . Thus the Catholic Church is, according to the teaching of Vatican II, "a lasting and sure seed of *unity, hope, and salvation for the whole human race*." (Avery Dulles, 1985, p. 24; italics added)

.....
Far from tearing the Church apart, the diversity of gifts serves to build up the whole in unity. . . . Authentic love does not dominate and suppress, but rather preserves and develops the gifts of the beloved. To love is appreciate and cherish the other precisely as other. To the extent that they love, the members of the Church are able to place their gifts at one another's disposal and thus to build up the community. (*Ibid.*, p. 46; italics added)

The dynamics of the amazing "unity amid diversity" within the Church is well summarized as follows:

The Church . . . (is) one of the most *complex* institutions in the world. The same institution that produced Camilo Torres (the Colombian priest-guerrilla) continues to reject birth control, and the same institution that remains closed to ordaining women as priests or to altering formal hierarchical structures has given rise to the most progressive theologians among the major Christian churches. (Mainwaring, 1986, p. 242; italics added)

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Before considering the U.S.I.S. Arson Incident, it is necessary to understand the events preceding it, mainly the Kwangju Uprising and the new outbreak of anti-Americanism among students, based upon their view of the United States' role in that uprising.

a. The Kwangju Uprising (May 18-27, 1980)

Following President Park's assassination, there was a brief period of enthusiasm and hope for constitutional revision and the establishment of a democratic government. As Professor Palais (1986) notes, "it was a heady time when optimism reigned supreme among intellectuals, the media, opposition politicians, and civilian bureaucrats, but no one knew for sure what the most powerful political organization in the country--the military establishment--would do" (p. 31).

What the military would do soon became apparent. On December 12, 1979, the military's internal power struggle was resolved in favor of Major General Chun Doo-hwan, the head of the Army Security Command. Chun sent troops to Seoul to arrest more than 30 generals, including the Army Chief of Staff, on suspicion of complicity in Park's assassination. Shortly thereafter, Chun became the *de facto* ruler of Korea (*ibid.*, p. vii).

Frustrated by the replacement of one dictator with another, many Koreans took to the streets. On May 17, 1980, General Chun, acting through the Choi Kyu-ha government, proclaimed Martial Law Decree No. 10, which extended the already existing martial law to Cheju Island, dissolved the National Assembly, closed down all colleges and universities, banned labor strikes, and prohibited all political discussion and activity. On the following day, 26 people, including key politicians in both the ruling and opposition parties, were arrested on charges of influence peddling and social disruption (Eckert, 1990_b, p. 374; Palais, 1986, p. vii).

On the evening of May 17, 1980, the Martial Law Command sent squads of police and soldiers to raid the homes of leaders of the democratic movement and of students from Chõnnam National University in Kwangju who demanded Kim Dae-jung's release and an end to martial law. On May 18, about 5,000 students clashed with police in the city. In addition to 30,000 riot police, 3,000 special airborne troops were sent in by Special Forces Commander Chung Ho-yong (Chõng Ho-yong) to quell the demonstrations. Apparently informed by their superiors that Kwangju was being overrun by communists, these paratroopers proceeded to carry out three days of barbarity with the zeal of Nazi stormtroopers. With rifles and fixed bayonets the troops plowed into the demonstrations of students from Chõnnam University indiscriminately beating, kicking, and bayoneting them (Palais, 1986, p. 36; Eckert, 1990_b, p. 374).

On May 19, more trouble started when a crowd estimated at 3,000-5,000 filled the downtown streets and clashed with police. The demonstrators threw stones, Molotov cocktails, and sticks. The police responded with tear and pepper gas. Then at 10:30 in the morning about 1,000 Special Forces troops were brought in. They repeated the same actions of the day before, beating, bayoneting, and mutilating

unarmed civilians, including children, young girls, and aged grandmothers (Palais, 1986, pp. 36-37).

After two days of these atrocities, the students and ordinary citizens began to commandeer weapons wherever they could find them to defend themselves and to try to take control of the city. By May 21, a full-scale insurrection had broken out, forcing the paratroopers to retreat. Anti-government demonstrations also broke out at other cities in the area. Kwangju remained tense, surrounded by a cordon of thousands of troops, while a council of citizens attempted to negotiate a truce with the army and appealed, without success, to the United States for mediation. Finally, on May 27 regular troops from the ROK 20th Division invaded the city and reimposed martial law (Eckert, 1990, pp. 374-75). When it was all over, more than 2,000 civilians were believed to have been killed (Palais, 1986, pp. 41-42).

Although the government still makes the absurd claim that only 191 people lost their lives in this incident, the Kwangju city death statistics show that over 2,600 people died that month, 2,300 over the monthly average (Palais, 1986, p. 41). The estimate of 2,000 dead must be closer to the truth because the figures recorded by minor officials in the city's department of vital statistics simply noted the overall number of deaths for the month. They had no special bias or commission to prove or deny the occurrence of a political massacre (Palais, 1986, p. 42).

What is politically significant about the Kwangju Uprising and its suppression is not only the slaughter of Korean citizens by its own government and army, but the dashing of the last hopes of Korean citizens for a political democracy only seven months after the assassination of Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 (Palais, 1986, p. 25; for additional details about the Kwangju Uprising, see *ibid.*, pp. 36-44).

To this day [early 1993], there has been no official investigation of the atrocities committed at Kwangju, no indictments of the guilty, and no dismissals of men responsible for having given the order to fire.

b. Growing Anti-Americanism of Students

Because most of the nationalist political forces in South Korea had been swept out during the Korean War in the 1950s, the United States thereafter enjoyed the image of the "national liberator and protector" of South Korea. However, after the Kwangju Uprising, this illusion of the United States held by many South Koreans was destroyed as they gained an awareness of the true nature of United States' involvement in Korea. Thereafter, many anti-American demonstrations took place (CISJD, 1988, pp. 37-38).

This new anti-American sentiment was intensified by a widespread feeling among students that the U.S. had played a major role in Chun's seizure of power in 1979-80. This feeling was reinforced by the students' belief that the U.S. shared responsibility for the Kwangju Incident by having approved Chun's dispatch of troops to the city. The 1978 agreement which created the U.S.-R.O.K. Combined Forces Command gave operational control of selected units of the ROK regular army to the commander of the American forces in South Korea.

There is no evidence that the U.S. conspired with or directly supported Chun during this period. Also, the actual dispatch of the paratroopers who carried out the savage attack at Kwangju was outside the operational control of the U.S. forces, a fact generally unknown or ignored by the students. Nonetheless, neither the U.S. State Department nor the American military appears to have made any serious attempt to prevent or stop the coup at any stage.

Moreover, General John A. Wickham, the commander of the American forces in South Korea during this period, did in fact respond positively to a query from the South Korean authorities about deploying elements of the ROK Twentieth Division in Kwangju after the citizens had taken over the city in self-defense. General Wickham stated that he had hoped the use of regular troops, rather than paratroopers, would allow a retaking of the city with a minimum of violence if negotiations between Kwangju's citizens and the ROK military broke down.

In August, 1980, General Wickham further fanned the flames of anti-Americanism by suggesting in an interview with the *Los Angeles Times* that the U.S., in effect, had decided to support Chun as the country's next president and that all the South Korean people were lining up behind Chun like "lemmings." Several months later, on February 2, 1981, President Reagan himself appeared to confirm the students' worst suspicions about the United States' ties with the Chun regime by according Chun the honor of being the first foreign head of state to visit the Reagan White House (Eckert, 1990_b, pp. 379-80).

U.S. responsibility was the key issue in the case of the student arson fire at the U.S.I.S. branch office at Pusan. The first anti-American action took place at Kwangju on December 9, 1980 in the form of an arson fire at the Kwangju branch office of the U.S.I.S. This event was not publicized due to strict press censorship. However, when a visitor was burned to death at the U.S.I.S. branch office at Pusan on March 18, 1982, it became a major sociopolitical issue, causing the people to again consider the role of the U.S. in Korea (Case Study #6).

2. This Declaration by Roh Tae-woo was shocking both to the government and the opposition. In the declaration, the following 8 decisions regarding democratization were announced: (1) constitutional revision for a directly elected president system; (2) revision of the presidential election law, including ending restrictions on campaigning; (3) restoration of the political rights of Kim Dae-jung and the release of political prisoners; (4) the observance of full respect for basic human rights; (5) freedom of the press; (6) local government autonomy and self-regulation of educational institutions; (7) allowance of full political activities; and (8) elimination of crime and corruption.

In short, by this Declaration, Roh announced that he would accept all of the opposition's demands. President Chun finally accepted Roh's proposals. Thus, this Declaration became "the official declaration of independence by reformers within the regime as well as the opposition's victory." It also constituted a foundational document for South Korea's transition to democracy (Im, 1989, p. 292).

3. Since the *Shilla* [Silla] Dynasty (based in the Kyòngsang region) assimilated the *Baekje* [Paekche] Dynasty (based in the Chòlla region) about 1,200 years ago, peoples in the Chòlla region have been discriminated against, politically, socially, and

economically. This regional cleavage became intensified, especially after the military coup of 1961. Park Chung-hee, a native of the Northern Kyongsang region, discriminated against the Cholla region in his recruitment from elites and in his selection of factory sites.

This discriminatory policy also was embraced by the new military. Most of the leaders of the coup, including Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, came from the Kyongsang region. Because the new industrialization was unevenly spread between these two regions--most of it going to the Kyongsang region-- and because most of the power elites were recruited from the Kyongsang region, especially from Taegu and the Northern part of the region, the peoples in the Kyongsang region mainly have sought to solidify and maintain their privileged position, while the people in the Cholla region, who were denied access to such privileges, have tried to change the status quo.

This regional cleavage was further aggravated by the Kwangju Uprising and the suffering inflicted on Kim Dae-jung by Park and Chun. The people in the Cholla region identified the personal sufferings of Kim Dae-jung with the inequities suffered by the Cholla region caused by the Kyongsang region. People in the Cholla region regarded Kim Dae-jung as their "messiah." Thus, the people in the Cholla region diehardly supported Kim Dae-jung's candidacy despite significant cultural, occupational, religious, and class differences among themselves. It also was unfortunate that the opposition coalition's candidate, Kim Dae-jung, had as his main rival, Kim Young-sam, a native of the south Kyongsang region. It was even more difficult to agree upon a unity candidate because the two Kims represented two regions opposed to each other (Im, 1989, pp. 310-11).

CHAPTER NINE

FURTHER REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Thy Kingdom come, thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven (*The Lord's Prayer; Matthew 6:10*).

See, a king will reign justly and princes will rule rightly. Each of them will be a shelter from the wind, a retreat from the rain. They will be like streams of water in a dry country, like a shade of a great rock in a parched land. The eyes of those who see will not be closed; the ears of those who hear will be attentive (*Isaiah 32:1-3*).

This study has examined the South Korean Catholic Church's opposition to the authoritarian state during the period of 1974-89 from both a general and a theoretical perspective, based on the experience of other Third World countries. Thus, Part One mostly dealt with theoretical considerations related to the study of religion and politics. Then, Part Two mainly focused on the case of the South Korean Church.

This has been a study about "how the social sciences fruitfully study the Church and its relationship to politics." As previously mentioned in Chapter One, it tried not to reduce the Church's social mission to politics, but aimed "to understand it first in religious terms." Such "empathy is not only compatible with critical judgements but indeed necessary to a full interpretation" and understanding of the Church and its involvement in politics" (Mainwaring & Wilde, 1989, pp. vii-viii).

This study treated "seriously the nature of religious motivations, not seeing religion as epiphenomenal. Moreover, it attempted to understand the Church's institutionality without treating it simply as another institution, and thereby exorcising the religious element out of social scientific analysis" (*ibid.*, p. 34). It tried to treat the Church's sociopolitical role and involvement in contemporary South Korea as a significant development in the relationship and interaction between religion and politics, and between Church and state.

This study began with two hypotheses regarding the relationship between the political dimension, involving repressive situations under authoritarian regimes, and the religious dimension, involving the effect of doctrinal changes in the international Church which encouraged sociopolitical involvement on the part of the national Churches, especially in Third World countries.

This study has sought to prove the validity of two hypotheses, namely, (1) that the increased sociopolitical involvement of the Church in South Korea can be attributed, externally, to Vatican II and post-Vatican II social teachings, and (2) that such involvement can be considered as the reaction of the Church, internally, to the increased repression of the authoritarian state in South Korea, by the following findings:

First, as also had been true for the Latin American Churches, the experience of authoritarianism was an important factor in bringing about the sociopolitical involvement of the South Korean Church. Although dictatorship was a necessary condition for the South Korean Church's opposition to the state, it was not entirely sufficient, by itself, to cause the Church to act. In many countries dictatorship and injustice have not led to the Church's opposition to the state. The internal process of change within the hierarchical Church also was a crucial factor. Without such change, dictatorship alone would not have had a radicalizing effect on the Church (see *ibid.*, pp. 14, 35).

Second, on the other hand, the added factor of change within the Church also would not have been sufficient, by itself, to achieve the optimal conditions necessary to precipitate the Church's sociopolitical involvement. In the case of the South Korean Church, the international Church's doctrinal changes were very timely and meaningful because of the compelling sociopolitical realities facing the Church,

society and the state. In other words, all of the foregoing factors, taken together, had a catalytic effect on the Church, prompting its sociopolitical involvement.

Third, this study has examined the pattern of reaction by the Church. It was not until members of the Church were directly affected by the state's repression that the Church reacted against the authoritarian state. The delayed reaction Brian H. Smith observed in his study of the Latin American Churches (especially Chile) also was true for the South Korean Church, as shown by the Shimdo Textile Incident (1968) mentioned in Chapter Six and the Bishop Chi Incident (1974) discussed in Chapter Seven (Case Study #1).

This study has analyzed the sometimes static and sometimes dynamic interactive relationship between religion and politics, and between Church and state. It has discussed the important classical theoretical concepts and considerations regarding religion, society and politics developed by Karl Marx and the neo-Marxists, Max Weber, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Bronislaw Malinowski, as well as the more recent formulations of Robert N. Bellah, Daniel H. Levine, Brian H. Smith, Thomas C. Bruneau, and others.

It has presented a historical overview of Catholic theology, which has developed over many centuries, and of the more recent Catholic social teachings, which have developed over the last 100 years, culminating in the important Vatican II and post-Vatican II social doctrine and pastoral practices of the modern Church.

It has discussed the nature and pattern of the conflicts between religion and politics and between Church and state. It has focused on the changes in and challenges to the South Korean Church since the late 1960s. It also has explored the Church-state conflicts experienced by the Church in Latin America and Asia, especially Chile and the Philippines.

It has examined the influence of Traditional Theology and the normative, structural and behavioral factors which limit the Church's ability to contribute to sociopolitical change. It also has discussed the effects of Liberal Theology, especially Liberation Theology, on the sociopolitical involvement and influence of the Church, as well as the normative, structural and behavioral strengths of the Church.

It has examined the history of the South Korean Church and state, especially since the introduction of Catholicism to South Korea in the late 18th century. It then presented, by the case studies of Chapters Seven and Eight, noteworthy examples of the Church-state conflicts which occurred in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. These case studies not only help to validate the foregoing hypotheses, but, together with the Latin American and Philippine cases, also help to define a prophetic role for the Church to perform in modern society--both in the developing countries of the Third World and in the more developed societies of North America and Europe.

Based on the experience of the Latin American and Asian Churches, especially Chile, the Philippines and South Korea, it is possible to theorize that the more dictatorial and repressive the state becomes, the more probable it is that the Church will perform a prophetic role and involve itself more directly in sociopolitical issues. When conditions are favorable so that the Church is able to communicate its message effectively to a receptive society and the state is not too repressive, the Church then can make a profound contribution to sociopolitical change, subject to the normative, structural and behavioral limitations upon its role.

Other behavioral patterns of the Church which can be deduced from the case studies are (1) that the more repressive the political situation becomes and the more directly the Church is affected, the more likely it is that the Church will act in a unified manner, and (2) that the more politically controversial an issue becomes, the

more divisive the Church tends to be (for example, see Chapter Eight, Case Studies #8 and #9).

It has been fruitful to examine the strengths of the Church which contribute to its sociopolitical involvement and influence, as well as the divisive factors which constrain them. Perhaps the Church's most important asset, enabling it to function effectively as a strong force in the midst of internal division and conflict is its "unity amid diversity." This seemingly paradoxical internal dynamic of the Church which has been illustrated by the case studies has enabled the Church as a whole to make a difference in society.

It is true that the South Korean Church as a whole was not absolutely unified when internal division and conflict were present. It is undeniable that its sociopolitical involvement was advocated and practiced by an active minority rather than by a majority of the Church. Nevertheless, as shown by several of the case studies, this active minority acted on behalf of the Church and was so perceived by society and the state. The case studies also show that the progressive stance taken by Cardinal Kim, the head of the South Korean Church, together with the CPAJ, was an important factor in accommodating the progressive clergy within the Church.

Furthermore, it can be said that when the CPAJ priests and several progressive bishops, together with Cardinal Kim and progressive lay groups, took a common stance, their stance could be and was regarded by society as a consensus within the Church which represented the Church as a whole. In those situations, conservative clergy and laity either agreed with or tolerated the progressive stance or did not publicly voice an opposing view or expressed their view ambiguously or ambivalently, so that the progressive stance came to be regarded as the Church's position.

Moreover, the "diversity" of views within the Church regarding the Church's sociopolitical involvement and the "unity" within the Church, the importance of which the conservatives constantly stress, are not mutually contradictory in practice. The division within the Church has never torn the Church apart, except possibly for the Protestant Reformation. However, the Church survived that schism and, perhaps, became even stronger and more united as a result. The Church's "unity amid diversity," which is illustrated in Case Study #10 of Chapter Eight, means that internal conflicts have a way of becoming resolved or at least they don't prevent the Church from presenting a united front to society and the state.

The South Korean Church exercises power by example and by the force of reason and moral persuasion upon the hearts and minds of conscientious believers, as well other members of society. Its prophetic exhortations and social teachings aimed at individuals and groups in society are based on powerful Biblical (Scriptural) truths which convict individual hearts, minds and consciences and set them free. These truths stress the importance of love and respect for human dignity and the sanctity of human life which often tend to be violated under authoritarian rule.

The case studies show the public's perception of the Church as having an overriding moral authority and greater credibility and trustworthiness than other institutions, including the state. As shown by the table on the Catholic population in South Korea (see Chapter One, Note #4), Church membership increased steadily and considerably during the 1970s and 1980s. Because this was a period of significant Church sociopolitical involvement and intense conflict with the state, the fact that individuals continued to join the Church during this period is additional evidence that the Church was considered credible and trustworthy, more so than its main antagonist, the state. It can be equally deduced that the Church's declarations and

statements were considered as having greater moral validity by these Catholic converts, if not by a majority of the general public, than the state's policies and rulings.

As shown by The Oh Won-chun Incident (Chapter Seven, Case Study #4) and The Torture-Death of Park Chong-chul Incident (Chapter Eight, Case Study #7), the main reason the state finally had to admit the truth was that the Church's moral pressure was effective. The state had to stop hiding and distorting the truth, because the public believed the Church.

It also is significant that, historically, the state often has sought legitimation from the Church because it believed that it needed moral legitimacy to justify its ruling status to society and that legitimation was a necessary step in becoming established in power. The state regarded the Church as the only institution which could provide the needed legitimation.

Additional reasons for the Church's greater moral relevance and credibility are given by Mainwaring (1986) as follows:

The Church's political relevance is strengthened by popular attitudes toward religion and politics. The Church enjoys greater legitimacy in popular circles than do most politicians or political movements. The great majority of the people are skeptical about politics and politicians. They tend to view politicians as self-interested and politics as something for the powerful. Religion has a significant capacity to mobilize the popular classes and continues to be a major factor in the daily lives of many people.

In addition, because the Church does not worry about coming to power, it can remain more concerned with pedagogical issues than can popular movements or political parties. Popular movements and parties face complex issues, and even when they are concerned about grass-roots participation and democratic practices, they cannot always provide the same room for discussion that the ecclesial communities do. Furthermore, party politicians often speak a technocratic language, creating a need for an institution committed specifically to grass-roots work. (pp. 241-42)

The authoritarian state exercises its power by the force of fear and mental and physical coercion, by distorting or hiding the truth, and by inventing false or

exaggerated dangers, compelled and justified by its national security and anti-Communism political dogmata.

When socioeconomic and political conditions have stabilized, and society and the state have become democratized, it is probable that the Church will modify its prophetic role to concentrate less on political and religious freedom, and on economic and human rights, and more on universal issues such as basic human needs of the poor and disadvantaged, environmental concerns such as air and water pollution, abortion and other social issues, and in the case of South Korea, reunification. Then the Church also could focus more on intraecclesiastical structural changes and reforms to achieve democratization within the Church. This would result in a greater tolerance for criticism, and a greater respect for differing views on the Church's sociopolitical role within the Church. Changes stressing hierarchical decentralization and greater lay participation could lead to greater and more effective Church sociopolitical involvement and influence.

On the other hand, as society becomes more democratized and as socioeconomic and political conditions improve and stabilize, the Church may revert to its traditional, conservative role (Mainwaring & Wilde, 1989, pp. 29-32; also see Mainwaring, 1986, pp. 237-53). This is precisely what has happened in South Korea where authoritarian military regimes finally have been replaced by democratic rule. According to a recent *The New York Times* article on the current sociopolitical situation in South Korea, the reporter quotes Rev. Park Hong, Jesuit priest and President of Sogang University, Seoul, as follows:

Before, we had a military dictatorship; the legitimacy of the Government was in question The Church's main work was fighting corruption and fighting social injustice. It was easy. But now that target has been removed. It's harder to know where we are going. This is 10 times more difficult than the situation before, when everyone agreed on our goals. . . . The common point we [consensus of conference of different religious groups] agreed on is

that this is a time of transition We're coming out of years of military dictatorship and then democratization. The past is still in our memory. The question is how to bridge the past and the future, to get beyond where we are now as soon as possible. (Sterngold, James (1993, April 7). Without a Barricade, What to Do? *The New York Times*, p. A-4)

There is an answer to Rev. Park's expressed concern regarding the current and future sociopolitical role of the Church. Borrowing Mainwaring and Wilde's term, the Church always can be the "voice for the voiceless" (Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989, p. 26). Throughout human history there have always been the poor, the disadvantaged, the sick, the handicapped, the neglected and the oppressed. In the tumultuous socioeconomic upheaval being experienced by modern society, it is becoming increasingly possible to be rich one day and poor the next. These changes pervade every class of society. The faces may be different, but the experience is the same. The Church continues to have a prophetic role to perform in the exercise of its moral authority and influence. In carrying out its pastoral responsibilities and social leadership, the Church needs to address such universal concerns as human dignity, human rights, and economic and civil justice. Recalling the words at the beginning of Chapter Two:

The Church has always had the *duty* of scrutinizing the *signs of the times* and of interpreting them in the light of the gospel (*Gaudium et Spes* [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World], no. 4; italics added).

She [the Church] also has the *right* to pass moral judgements, even on matters touching the political order, whenever basic personal rights or the salvation of souls make such judgements necessary (*ibid.*, no. 76; italics added).

If its moral authority is properly defined and exercised, and as long as it maintains its autonomy and distance from the state, the Church is worthy of greater credibility, trust and respect than other institutions. The increasing secularization of society can reduce the Church's influence by making its message irrelevant or unheeded. However, even in the worst scenario, the Church could function as a

prophetic catalyst and then withdraw from the political scene. History also has shown that the Church can wield unique power and longlasting influence by martyrdom of the faithful. When Catholics and other Christians are made aware of the Biblical message on the nature and parameters of Christian service, they can engage in sacrificial service to their fellow man to the glory of God without fear of persecution and death.

Obviously, the Church always should fulfill its primary religious and spiritual responsibilities to save souls and pastor its flock. However, as stated in the Lord's Prayer, the Church also is to pursue the realization of "Thy Kingdom on earth as it is in Heaven." The movement for democratization is both religious and political. For the Church, "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven" means that the Kingdom of God should be translated into reality, here and now, on earth. This means a caring, loving, free, yet disciplined and responsible democratic society---a community of equals under God. According to Avery Dulles (1985), Vatican II and the Bible stress that a Christian community also involves *unity amid diversity*, as follows:

It is a *unity* among individuals and groups who retain their distinctive characteristics, who enjoy different spiritual gifts, and are by that very *diversity* better equipped to serve one another and thus advance *the common good*. Individual Christians and local churches are bound to one another in mutual service and mutual receptivity. This relationship is founded not upon domination but on a free exchange of trust and respect. . . . Thus the Catholic Church is, according to the teaching of Vatican II, "a lasting and sure seed of unity, hope, and salvation for the whole human race." (*Ibid.*, p. 24; italics added)

.....
 Far from tearing the Church apart, the *diversity* of gifts serves to build up the whole in *unity*. . . . Authentic love does not dominate and suppress, but rather preserves and develops the gifts of the beloved. To love is to appreciate and cherish the other precisely as other. To the extent that they love, the members of the Church are able to place their gifts at one another's disposal and thus to build up the *community*. (*Ibid.*, p. 46; italics added)

Justice also is both a religious and a political concept. Both the Church and political democracy are regarded as being part of God's plan to bring about justice on earth.

Paradoxically, the Church's most effective influence comes when it is constantly aware and strives to stay within the boundaries set by the limitations upon its sociopolitical role. Perhaps that is the Church's unique strength which enables it to be a "religious" actor in the political arena. The Church clearly cannot become politically partisan without losing its credibility or adherents. It must be careful to exercise its sociopolitical role as a moral and spiritual leader and pastoral servant respected and esteemed by society. Thus, the Church always faces the difficult questions of how and to what extent it can infuse sociopolitical issues with religious, transcendental considerations. Smith (1975), in commenting on the past and future role of the Church, observes that

although the evidence to date does not indicate that *the Church* can be a powerful leader in the transformation of social structures, *the changes* it has undergone result in a profile very different from that of thirty years ago [the 1940s]. The *indirect impact on social change* already has been important, and will continue to be so over the next generation as the Church carries on *its own internal process of renewal*. (p. 26; italics added)

Sanders (1982) points out the often taken-for-granted or overlooked role of the Church to inculcate society with the values essential for its basic functioning and success, as follows:

Conventional political analyses pay insufficient attention to the way in which *unifying values*, like those emphasized by the church, enable societies to function and citizens to live together successfully. The enormous stress on radical change (or the lack of it) in much interpretation of Latin America represents one political option among others and neglects the common values that bind people together and make peaceful change possible: family ties, friendship, neighborliness, civic responsibility, solidarity, the sense of common identity as citizens, and the vision of society within a framework of greater justice.

To uphold these values does *not* imply conservatism, *but* rather a recognition of the essential prerequisites for social systems to function

effectively. *By avoiding* partisan identification, as well as *simple black-and-white political judgements*, the Catholic church can play a role that is not only constructive in the present political context of Latin America but also consistent with its religious mission. (Sanders, 1982, pp. 257-58; italics added)

Finally, the challenge for the Church in South Korea and in all countries, not only those of the Third World, will be to continue to perform a prophetic role even when sociopolitical conditions have stabilized until the democratic, just Kingdom of God has become a reality in every part of the earth. As another paradox, even in affluent, supposedly progressive societies like the United States, there still are the poor, the homeless, the destitute, the handicapped, the incapacitated, the sick, the injured, the forgotten, the non-persons, the oppressed, and the victims, who daily attempt to eke out an existence and survive for another day, amid a materially prosperous but somewhat detached and preoccupied society.

It will take considerable courage and effort to overcome *institutional inertia* and the human tendency to rationalize that "someone else is doing it." This requires a continuous process of *internal renewal and rededication*. It also demands continued efforts toward intraecclesiastical democratization which, hopefully, will lead to greater "unity amid diversity" and continued "learning and adaptation" by the multifaceted Church to keep pace with the general democratic trends of society (Mainwaring & Wilde, 1989, p. 16).

As Bruneau (1974) observes, the Church's "prophetic mission . . . is distinguished from a purely political role by the scope of its mission; it is oriented to the City of God and not that of man and is not affected by time as is an ideology" (p. 233). The Church like other human institutions has not been perfect over the course of its long history. But the Church appears to have learned from its mistakes, and in the future can be expected not to repeat the excesses of the Inquisition and the Crusades, as well as its silence and inaction in the face of extremely brutal regimes

such as Nazi Germany. In recent years it has sought to return to its first century roots and become more a servant of the People of God in their continuing struggle for socioeconomic and political justice and in their pursuit of human and civil rights.

As previously mentioned, the Church's positive strengths are subject to certain constraints which affect its ability to carry out the mandate of Vatican II. How does the Church overcome its limitations so that it can perform a true prophetic role in society? One way is for the Church to continue to rely on its structural strength of unity amid diversity. This means that, in the final analysis, no matter what diversity and division exist at the various levels of the hierarchical Church, bishops, priests and laity will not "abandon the ship," but when it is time to take action, they will come together as Catholics and participate in, support or at least not stand in the way of prophetically inspired *pastoral actions taken on behalf of the Church*, even though, as individuals, they might have preferred a different course of action or no action.

It is worthwhile to recall that *the prophet* spoke and acted critically in the face of abuses not only of secular power, but also of religious power. The "voiceless" always will need the voice that can be provided by the Church---sometimes as the last or only resort. The Church not only must remain the *moral conscience* of society and its preeminent moral teacher, but it also must be its *vigilant sentinel*, on constant alert to the "*signs of the times*." Here lies the *political relevance of the Church*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Journals

- Abbott, Walter M. S.J. (Ed.). (1966). *The Documents of Vatican II*. New York: America Press.
- Ahn, Byung-jun (An, Pyòng-jun). (1986). *Chòngch'i Pyòndong-gwa Chedohwa* [Political Change and Institutionalization]. In *Han'guk Chòngch'i Hakhoe* [The Korean Academy of Political Science] (Ed.), *Hyòndae Han'guk Chòngch'iron* [Korean Politics in the Present Age] (42'i-59). Seoul: Pòmmunsa.
- Ahn, Kie-seok (An, Ki-sòk). (1989). *Kongan Chònggug-e Chòngmyòn Tojòn-han Kat'ollik Kyohoe* [The Catholic Church head-on Challenging the National Security Political Situation]. *Sindonga* (September) (375-91). Seoul: Donga Ilbosa.
- Althusser, Louis. (1971). Ideological and Ideological State Apparatuses. In Louis Althusser (Ed.), *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (127-86). New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Baker, Donald L. (1983). *Confucians Confront Catholicism In Eighteenth-Century Korea*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Washington.
- Bellah, Robert N. (1965). Epilogue: Religion and Progress in Modern Asia. In Robert N. Bellah (Ed.), *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (168-229). New York: The Free Press.
- Berger, Peter L. (1968). *A Rumor of Angels*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.
- _____. (1969). *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
- Binchy, D. A. (1970). *Church and State in Fascist Italy*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Binder, Leonard, et al. (1971). *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Birnbaum, N. (1953). Conflicting Interpretations of the Rise of Capitalism: Marx and Weber. *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 125-41.
- _____. (1973). Beyond Marx in the Sociology of Religion? In C. Y. Glock & P. E. Hammond (Eds.), *Beyond the Classics?* (3-70). New York: Harper & Row.
- Black, Cyril. (1959). Political Modernization in Historical Perspective [mimeographed].
- Boff, Leonardo. (1982). *Saint Francis: A Model for Human Liberation* (John W. Diercksmeier, Trans.). New York: Crossroad Press.
- _____. (1985). *Church: Charism and Power-- Liberation Theology and the Institutional Church* (John W. Diercksmeier, Trans.). New York: Crossroad Press.
- Bruneau, Thomas C. (1973). Power and Influence: Analysis of the Church in Latin America and the Case of Brazil. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2.
- _____. (1974). *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. (1976). Church and State in Portugal: Crises of Cross and Sword. *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 18, 463-90.
- _____. (1982). *The Church in Brazil: The Politics of Religion*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Burnett, Ben G. (1970). *Political Groups in Chile: The Dialogue between Order and Change*. Austin & London: The University of Texas Press.
- Calvo, Roberto. (1979). The Church and the Doctrine of National Security. *Journal of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (February), 69-88.
- CELAM (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano [Latin American Episcopal Council]). (1970). *The Church in the Present-Day Transformation of Latin America in the Light of the Council* (Vol.2). Bogotá: General Secretariat of the Latin American Episcopal Council.
- Chang, Seong-wook (Chang, Sòng-uk). (1987). *Ch'ònjugyo Ch'òngui Kuhyòn Ch'òn'guk Sajedan* [The Catholic Priests'

- Association for Justice]. *Sindonga* (July) (320-42). Seoul: Donga Ilbosa.
- Chi, Hak-sun. (1984). *Chòngùiga Kangmul-ch'òròm* [Goodness Like An Unfailing Stream: Sermons of Bishop Chi]. Seoul: Hyòngsòngsa.
- Cho, Kwang. (1989). *Han'guk Ch'ònjugyo Ibaengnyòn* [The Korean Catholic Church 200 Years]. Seoul: Haetpit Publishing Co.
- Choe, Seok U (Ch'oe, Sòg-u). (1982). *Ch'ònjugyo-ùi Suyong-gwa Chosòn Hugi Chòngch'i Munhwa-ùi Pyònhwa* [The Korean Catholicism and the Transformation of Political Culture in the Late Yi Dynasty]. In Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD). (Ed.). *Kukka Kwòllyòk-kwa Kidokkyo* [The State Power and Christian Church]. Seoul: Minjungsa.
- Choi, Jang-jip (Ch'oe, Chang-jip). (1989_a). *Han'guk Hyòndae Chòngch'i-ùi Kujo-wa Pyònhwa* [The Structure and Change of the Present-age Korean Politics]. Seoul: Kkachi.
- _____. (1989_b). *Labor and the Authoritarian State: Labor Unions in South Korean Manufacturing Industries, 1961-1980*. Seoul: Korea University Press.
- Chun, Sun-young (Ch'òn, Sòn-yòng). (1992). *Han'guk Kat'ollik Kyohoe Sajedùl-ùi Chòngùì Kuhyòn Hwaldong, Kù Nollijòk Kujo-wa Daeanjòk Chònmang* [Action for Social Justice by Priests of the Korean Catholic Church, the Structure of their Logic, and their Vision of an Alternative Future Society]. Unpublished master's thesis, Sogang University, Seoul, Korea.
- Chung, Yang-mo (Chòng, Yang-mo) et al. (1983). *Yesu-wa Kyohoe: Minjung Kuwòn-ùl wihayò* [Jesus and the Church: For the Salvation of the People]. *Samok* [The Pastoral Review] (January), 216-33.
- CISJD [Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development] (Han'guk Kidokkyo Sahoe Munje Yòn'guwòn). (1985). *Democratization Movement and the Christian Church in Korea during the 1970s*. Seoul: CISJD.
- _____. (1987). *Taet'ongnyòng Sòngò T'ujaeng* [Presidential Election Struggle]. Seoul: Minjungsa.
- _____. (Ed.). (1988). *Lost Victory: An Overview of the Korean People's Struggle for Democracy in 1987*. Seoul: Minjungsa.

- CJPRI [Catholic Justice and Peace Research Institute] (Kat'ollik Chòngui P'yònghwa Yònguso). (Ed.). (1990). *Han'guk Kat'ollik Kyohoe-wa Sooech'ung, kùrigo Sahoe Undong* [The Korean Catholic Church, Alienated Groups, and Social Movement]. Seoul: Pitkòul Publishing Co.
- Clark, Donald N. (1986). *Christianity in Modern Korea*. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America.
- _____. (Ed.). (1991). *Korea Briefing, 1991*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Cleary, Edward L. O.P. (1985). *Crisis and Change: The Church in Latin America Today*. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books.
- Comblin, José. (1979). *The Church and the National Security State*. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books.
- Congar, Yves, O.P. (1967). *Priest and Layman* (P.J. Hepburne-Scott, Trans.). London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd.
- Cooper, Norman B. (1975). *Catholicism and the Franco Regime*. Contemporary European Studies Series, No. 90-019. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Coser, L. A. (1977). *Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context* (2nd ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
- CPAJ [Catholic Priests' Association for Justice] (Ch'ònjugyo Chòngui Kuhyòn Chòn'guk Sajedan). (Ed.). (1985). *Han'guk Ch'ònju Kyohoe-ùi Wisang: Ch'ìlsimnyòndae Chòngui Kuhyòn Hwaldong-e taehan Chonghap-kwa P'yòngga* [The Position of the Korean Catholic Church: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Justice-Realization Movements in the 1970s]. Waegwan, Korea: St. Benedict Publishing Co.
- Crahan, Margaret E. (1975). Religious Freedom in Cuba. *Cuba Review*, Vol. 5, 22-27.
- Cumings, Bruce. (1984). Ending the Cold War in Korea. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 3, 769-79.
- _____. (1989). The Abortive Abertura: South Korea in the Light of Latin American Experience. *New Left Review*, Vol. 173 (January/February), 5-32.

- Dahl, Robert A. (Ed.). (1973). *Regimes and Oppositions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- deKadt, Emanuel. (1970). *Catholic Radicals in Brazil*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Deutsch, Karl. (1963). *The Nerves of Government*. New York: The Free Press.
- Dewart, Leslie. (1963). *Christianity and Revolution: The Lesson of Cuba*. New York: Herder and Herder.
- Diamont, Alfred. (1960). *Austrian Catholics and the First Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dix, Robert H. (1973). Latin America: Oppositions and Development. In Robert A. Dahl (Ed.), *Regimes and Oppositions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dulles, Avery, S.J. (1971). *The Survival of Dogma*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- _____. (1977). *The Resilient Church: The Necessity and Limits of Adaptation*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- _____. (1985). *The Catholicity of the Church*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Durkheim, Emile. (1947). *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. New York: Collier.
- Eagleson, John & Philip Scharper. (Eds.). (1979). *Puebla and Beyond: Documentation and Commentary*. Maryknoll, N.Y. : Orbis Books.
- Eckert, Carter J. (1990_a). Liberation, Division, and War, 1945-1953. In Eckert, Carter J. et al. *Korea Old and New: A History* (327-47). Seoul, Korea: Ilchokak, Publishers for Korea Institute, Harvard University.
- _____. (1990_b). Authoritarianism and Protest, 1948-1990. In Eckert, Carter J. et al. *Korea Old and New: A History* (348-88). Seoul, Korea: Ilchokak, Publishers for Korea Institute, Harvard University.
- Einaudi, Luigi, Richard Maullin, Alfred Stepan, & Michael Fleet. (1969). *Latin American Institutional Development: The Changing Catholic Church*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. (1963). Religious Organizations and

- Political Process in Centralized Empires. *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 21, 271-94.
- Engels, Friedrich. (1890/1972). Letter to Joseph Bloch, 21- 22 September 1890. In Robert C. Tucker (Ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (640-42). New York: Norton.
- Foroohar, Manzar. (1986). Liberation Theology: The Response of Latin American Catholics to Socioeconomic Problems. *Latin American Perspectives*, Issue 50, 13 (3), 37-57.
- _____. (1989). *The Catholic Church and Social Change in Nicaragua*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
- Foster-Carter, Aidan G. (1987). Standing up: The Two Korean States and the Dependency Debate: A Bipartisan Approach. In Kyòng-dong Kim (Ed.), *Dependency Issues in Korean Development: Comparative Perspectives* (229-69). Seoul: Seoul National University Press.
- Foy, Felician A., O.F.M. (1970-93). (Ed.). *Catholic Almanac*. Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, Inc.
- Galilea, Segundo. (1975). Liberation theology began with Medellín. *LADOC*, Vol. 5, No. 58, 1-6.
- Garaudy, Roger, & Lauer Quentin, S.J. (1967). *From Anathema to Dialogue: The Challenge of Marxist-Christian Cooperation*. London: Collins.
- Giddens, Anthony. (1978). *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Trans.). New York: International Publishers.
- Gremillion, Joseph. (Ed.). (1976). *The Gospel of Peace and Justice: Catholic Social Teaching since Pope John*. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books.
- Gutierrez, Gustavo. (1973). *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation* (Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson, Trans. and Eds.). Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books.
- Ham, Se-ung. (1988). *Ch'ònjugyo Chònggòi Kuhyòn Chòn'guk Sajedan-ùi Yòksa-wa Chùngòn* [The History and Testimony of the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice]. In *Chonggyo Sinhak Yòngu* [The Study of Religion & Theology]

Vol. 1 (261-89). Seoul: The Institute for Religion and Theology, Sogang University

- _____ et al. (1989). *Kyohoe-wa Kukka* [The Church and State]. *Samok* [The Pastoral Review] (November), 268-94.
- _____. (1990). *Kyohoe Swaesin-ül wihan Künwònjòk Sòngch'al: Kyohoe-nae-ùi Minjuhwa-rül Chihyang-hamyò* [Fundamental Reflections for the Church Renewal: Toward Democratization within the Church]. *Samok* [The Pastoral Review] (January).
- Han, Yong-hee (Han, Yong-hùi). (1987). *Ch'on'gubaekch'ilsimnyòndae-ùi Han'guk Kyohoe-wa Chòngch'i* [The Korean Catholic Church and Politics in the 1970s]. *Kat'ollik Sahoe Kwahak Yòngu* [The Journal of the Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences], No.4 (December) (107-30). Seoul: The Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences.
- Hebblethwaite, Peter. (1977). *The Christian-Marxist Dialogue: Beginnings, Present Status, and Beyond*. Great Britain: Darton, Longman & Todd Ltd.
- Hitchcock, James. (1979). *Catholicism and Modernity: Confrontation or Capitulation?* New York: Seabury Press.
- Houtart, F. & E. Pin. (1965). *The Church and the Latin American Revolution*. New York: Sheed and Ward.
- Hunter, Brian. (Ed.). (1992). *The Statesman's Year-book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1992-1993*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Im, Hyug-baeg (Im, Hyòk-paek). (1989). *Politics of Transition: Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Japanese Catholic Council for Justice and Peace (JCCJP). (Eds.). (1983^a). *"A Declaration of Conscience": The Korean Catholic Church and Human Rights*. Vol.1. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- _____. (Eds.). (1983^b). *"A Declaration of Conscience": The Korean Catholic Church and Human Rights*. Vol.2. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

- Kihl, Young-whan (Kil, Yòng-hwan). (1984). *Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest*. Boulder and London: Westview Press.
- Kim, Chang-mun (Kim, Ch'ang-mun) and Jae-sun Chung (Chae-sòn Chòng). (Comps. and Eds.). (1988). *Catholic Korea: Yesterday and Today*. 2nd Ed. Pusan, Korea: Catholic Korea Publishing Co.
- Kim Cha-woong (Kim, Ch'a-ung). (1987). *Pak Chong-ch'òl-gun Sagòn Ch'ukso Chojag-ùi Chònmal* [The Details of the Fabricated Account of Park Chong-chul Incident]. *Sindonga* (July) (256-73). Seoul: Donga Ilbosa.
- Kim, Jae-myong (Kim, Chae-myòng). (1989). *Chòngüi Kuhyòn Sajedan-ùi Hyònsil Insik* [The CPAJ's Perception of the Reality]. *Wòlganjungang* [Jungang Monthly] (September) (356-69). Seoul: Jungang Ilbosa.
- Kim, Jong-suh (Kim, Chong-sò). (1990). *Chonggyo-ùi Hyònsil Ch'amyo Nonjaeng* [Debates on Religion's Participation in Reality]. In *Kusimnyòndae Han'guk Saho-ùi Chaengjòm* [Debating Points in Korean Society during the 1990s]. *Sahoewa Sasang* [Society and Thought], Special Issue No.2. 201-10.
- Ko, Jae-sik (Ko, Chae-sik). (1986). *Haebang Sinhag-ùi Chaejomyòng* [Re-illumination of the Liberation Theology]. Seoul: Sagyejòl.
- Küng, Hans. (1987). Cardinal Ratzinger, Pope Wojtyla, and Fear at the Vatican: An Open Word after a Long Silence. In Hans Küng and Leonard Swindler (Eds.), *The Church in Anguish: Has the Vatican Betrayed Vatican II?*. San Francisco: Harper and Row.
- Landsberger, Henry A. (Ed.). (1970). *The Church and Social Change in Latin America*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Lee, Chong-sik (Lee, Chòng-sik). (Ed.). (1991). *Korea Briefing, 1990*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Lee, Ki-baik (Lee, Ki-baek). (1990). Economic Advances and Intellectual Ferment. In Eckert, Carter J. et al. *Korea Old and New: A History (155-77)*. Seoul, Korea: Ilchokak, Publishers for Korea Institute, Harvard University.
- Lew, Young-Ick (Ryu, Yòng-ik). (1990). Dynastic Disarray and National Peril. In Eckert, Carter J. et al. *Korea Old and New: A History (178-198)*. Seoul, Korea: Ilchokak,

Publishers for Korea Institute, Harvard University.

Levine, Daniel H. (1981). *Religion and Politics in Latin America: The Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Lewy, Guenter. (1964). *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

_____. (1974). *Religion and Revolution*. New York: University of Oxford Press.

Linz, Juan J. (1973). Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain. In Robert A. Dahl (Ed.), *Regimes and Oppositions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

_____. & Alfred Stepan. (Eds.). (1978). *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1960). *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Lovasik, Lawrence G. (1990). *St. Joseph Church History: The Catholic Church through the Ages*. New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co.

Loveman, Brian. (1986-87). Military Dictatorship and Political Opposition in Chile, 1973-86. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 28, Vol. 4, 1-38.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. (1968). *Marxism and Christianity*. New York: Schocken Books.

McBrien, Richard P. (1981). *Catholicism*. San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

McCool, Gerald A. (1977). *Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Seabury Press.

McGovern, Arthur F., S.J. (1980). *Marxism: An American Christian Perspective*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books.

_____. (1990). Catholic Social Teachings: A Brief History. In Pedro Ramet (Ed.), *Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

McLellan, D. (1987). *Marxism and Religion: A Description and*

- Assessment of the Marxist Critique of Christianity*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Maduro, Otto. (1977). New Marxist Approaches to the Relative Autonomy of Religion. *Sociological Analysis*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 359-67.
- _____. (1982). *Religion and Social Conflicts* (Robert R. Barr, Trans.). Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books.
- Mainwaring, Scott. (1986). *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- _____. & Alexander Wilde. (Eds.). (1989). *The Progressive Church in Latin America*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. (1948). *Magic, Science and Religion*. Garden city: Doubleday.
- Marx, Karl. (1959). A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. In L. S. Feuer (Ed.), *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.
- _____. (1963). Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Introduction). In T. B. Bottomore (Ed.), *Karl Marx: Early Writings*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- _____. (1964). Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law (Introduction). In K. Marx & F. Engels (Eds.), *On Religion*. New York: Schocken.
- _____. (1970). *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. New York: International Publishers.
- _____ and Friedrich Engels. (1970). *German Ideology*. New York: International Publishers.
- _____ and Friedrich Engels. (1973). The Class Struggle. In A. Etzioni (Ed.), *Social Change*. New York: Basic Books.
- Myòngdong [Myòngdong Catholic Church]. (1984). *Han'guk Kar'ollik In'gwon Undongsa* [History of the Catholic Human Rights Movement in South Korea]. Seoul: Myòngdong Catholic Church.
- NCKK [National Council of Churches in Korea: *Han'guk Kidokkyo Kyohoe Hyòbuihoe*]. (Eds.). (1987). *Ch'on'gubaekpalsimnyòndae Minjuhwa Undong*

- [Democratization Movement during the 1980s]. Vol. viii. Seoul: NCCK.
- Niebuhr, H. Richard. (1929). *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*. New York.
- _____. (1951). *Christ and Culture*. New York.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. & Philippe Schmitter (Eds.). (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ogle, George E. (1990). *South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.
- Oh, Kyeng-whan (Oh, Kyòng-hwan). (1987). *Kyohoe Munhòn-esùì Chònggyo Kwangye* [The State-Church Relationship in the Vatican Documents]. *Kat'ollik Saho Kwahak Yòngu* [The Journal of the Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences], No. 4 (December), 7-28.
- _____. *Chonggyo Sahoehak* [Sociology of Religion] (Rev. Ed.). Seoul: Sògwangsa.
- Palais, James. (1985). Human Rights in the Republic of Korea, In The Asia Watch Committee, *Human Rights in Korea: An Asia Watch Report*. New York & Washington D.C.
- Parsons, Talcott. (1964). Introduction. In Max Weber (Ed.), *The Sociology of Religion* (pp. xix-lxvii). Boston: Beacon Press.
- Pottenger, J. R. (1989). *The Political Theory of Liberation Theology: Toward a Reconvergence of Social Values and Social Science*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. (1974). *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*. London: NLB.
- _____. (1975). *Classes and Contemporary Capitalism*. London: NLB.
- Ramet, Pedro. (1990). Catholic Tradition, Hierarchy, and the Politics of Coexistence Under Communism: An Introduction. In Pedro Ramet (Ed.), *Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Reuther, Rosemary. (1970). *The Radical Kingdom: The Western Experience of Messianic Hope*. New York: Paulist Press.

Rho, Kil-myung (Ro, Kil-myòng). (1983). *Kat'ollik-kwa Han'guk Sahoe Paljòn* [Catholicism and Social Development of Korea]. *Kat'ollik Sahoe Kwahak Yòngu* [The Journal of the Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences], No. 2 (June) (195-218). Seoul: The Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences.

. (1987). *Kaehwagi-ùi Han'guk Kat'ollik Kyohoe-wa Kukka-gan-ùi Kwangye* [Relationship between Church and State during the Enlightenment Period in Korea]. *Kat'ollik Sahoe Kwahak Yòngu* [The Journal of the Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences], No. 4 (December) (57-90). Seoul: The Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences.

. (1988). *Han'guk Sahoewa Chonggyo Undong* [Korean Society and Religious Movements]. Seoul: Big Bell Publishing Co.

. (1989). *Minjoksa-e Nat'anan Han'guk Kat'ollik Kyohoe-ùi Wisang* [The Position of the Korean Catholic Church in Korean National History]. *Samok* [The Pastoral Review]. No. 130 (November).

Rho, Young-tack (Ro, Yòng-t'aek). (1987). *Iljeha-ùi Kyohoe-wa Kukka* [The Church and the State under the Japanese Domination]. *Kat'ollik Sahoe Kwahak Yòngu* [The Journal of the Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences], No. 4 (December) (91-106). Seoul: The Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences.

Ri, Tai-jai (Ri, T'ae-jae). (1987). *Kyohoe-wa Kukka* [The Church and State]. *Kat'ollik Sahoe Kwahak Yòngu* [The Journal of the Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences], No. 4 (December) (29-39). Seoul: The Korean Catholic Academy of Social Sciences.

Ritzer, George. (1983). *Contemporary Sociological Theory* (1st ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Sanders, Thomas G. (1969). *Catholic Innovation in a Changing Latin America*. Cuernavaca: CIDOC.

. (1970). The Catholic Church: Types of Catholic Elites in Latin America. In Robert D. Tomasek (Rev. Ed.), *Latin American Politics: Studies of the Contemporary Scene* (180-96). Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor.

- _____. (1982). The Politics of Catholicism in Latin America. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May) (241-58). Sage Publications, Inc.
- Sargent, Lyman Tower. (1990). *Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Comparative Analysis* (8th ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
- Senior, Donald et al. (Eds.). (1990). *The Catholic Study Bible: The New American Bible*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shoosmith, Dennis. (1985). Church. In R. J. May & Francisco Nemenzo. (Eds.), *The Philippines After Marcos* (70-89). New York: St. Martins Press, Inc.
- Simon, Gerhard. (1975). The Catholic Church and the Communist State in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In B. R. Bociurkiw and J. W. Strong (Eds.), *Religion and Atheism in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe* (190-221). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Smith, Brian H. (1975). Religion and Social Change. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 3-34.
- _____. (1979). Churches and Human Rights in Latin America: Recent Trends in the Subcontinent. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 21, 89-128.
- _____. (1982). *The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. (1986). Old Allies, New Enemies: The Catholic Church as Opposition to Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1979. In J. Samuel Valenzuela & Arturo Valenzuela. (Eds.), *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship & Oppositions* (270-303). Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Sohn, Hak-Kyu (Son, Hak-kyu). (1988). *Political Opposition and the Yushin Regime: Radicalisation in South Korea, 1972-79*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford.
- Spencer, Herbert. (1896). *The Principles of Sociology* (Vol. 3). New York: D. Appleton and Co.
- Stepan, Alfred. (1971). *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Troeltsch, Ernst. (1931). *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*. New York.
- Turner, Frederick C. (1971). *Catholicism and Political Development in Latin America*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Vallier, Ivan. (1970). *Catholicism, Social Control, and Modernization in Latin America*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- _____. (1972). Radical Priests and the Revolution. In Douglas Chalmers (Ed.), *Changing Latin America: New Interpretations of Its Politics and Society*. New York: Academy of Political Science.
- Wallace, Lillian P. (1966). *Leo XIII and the Rise of Socialism*. Duke University Press.
- Warwick, Donald. (1967). Personal and Organizational Effectiveness in the Roman Catholic Church. *Cross Currents*, Vol. 17, 401-17.
- Weber, Max. (1946). *From Max Weber* (Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Eds.). New York.
- _____. (1963). *The Sociology of Religion* (Ephraim Fischhoff, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.
- _____. (1964). *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York.
- _____. (1968). *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building* (S. N. Eisenstadt, Ed.). Chicago.
- _____. (1976). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (T. Parsons, Trans.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Westhues, Kenneth. (1973). The Established Church as an Agent of Change. *Sociological Analysis*, Vol. 34, 106-23.
- Wiarda, Howard J. & Harvey F. Kline. (1990). *Latin American Politics and Development* (3rd ed.). Boulder, San Francisco, & Oxford: Westview Press.
- Williams, Margaret Todaro. (1976). Church and State in Vargas's Brazil: The Politics of Cooperation. *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 18, 443-62.
- Wurfel, David. (1988). *Filipino Politics: Development and*

- Decay*. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
- Yi, Young-suk (Yi, Yòng-suk). (1990). *Liberal Protestant Leaders working for Social Change: South Korea, 1957-1984*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon.
- Youngblood, Robert L. (1990). *Marcos against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Yuh, Young-mu (Yò, Yòng-mu). (1987). *Kungmin-i Chòngbu-boda Kyohoe-rùl Midòyo* [People trust the Church rather than the Government]. *Sindonga*, vol. 30, no.7 (July 1987), 292-310.

Periodicals

Donga Ilbo

Gat'ollik Sibò

Jungang Ilbo

Kyegansasang

The New York Times

Samok

Sindonga

Wòlganjungang

APPENDIX A

A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME OF THE CHURCH IN THE POLITICAL WORLD: ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure #1. The Religious World and the Political World




Figure #1 illustrates that the Religious World overlaps with the Political World. This overlap represents the cooperative or conflicting interaction between theologies and political ideologies. The Religious World includes the full spectrum of "A" (traditional theology of the reactionaries and conservatives) and "B" (liberal theology of the progressives and radicals). The Political World includes the political/ideological dogmata of anti-Communism, national security and economic development commonly found in many authoritarian Third World countries. The Church and state are seen as separate and autonomous entities superimposed on society. The Church-state relations mostly are examined in this study by what is termed the Politics of Religion Perspective.

Figure #2. Conflicts within the Religious World




Figure #2 illustrates the tensions and conflicts between the "A" traditional and the "B" liberal theologies in the Religious World. It also represents the structural conflicts between conservative bishops and liberal younger clergy.

Figure #3. Church and State in Cooperation




Figure #3 illustrates the cooperation, mutual support and give-and-take between the Church and the state. The Church supports the state by legitimation and by tranquilization of society. The state supports the Church by providing resources and security. This figure also shows that the "A" traditional theology dominates the "B" liberal theology and influences the Church as well as its interaction with the state.

Figure #4. Church and State in Conflict




Figure #4 illustrates the tension and conflict between the Church and the state. The Church opposes the state and the state represses the Church. This figure also shows that the "B" liberal theology dominates the "A" traditional theology and influences the Church as well as its interaction with the state. It also illustrates society's opposition to the state and the state's repression of society. It also shows the Church's influence, support and/or participation in the opposition movements of society.

Figure #5. Society's Reactions to Church's Political Involvement and Church's Internal Turmoil




Figure #5 illustrates society's reactions to the Church's political involvement by either support or criticism and objection. This figure also shows the tension and conflict between the Church and the state. It also shows society's opposition to the state and the state's repression of society. It also shows the Church's influence, support and/or participation in the opposition movements of society. It also shows the fluctuations in theology where the "A" traditional theology dominates sometimes and the "B" liberal theology dominates other times. Lastly, it illustrates the Church's internal turmoil over both theological issues and its political involvement.

Figure #6. Theology Affected by Political World Realities and vice versa




Figure #6 illustrates that theology is affected and influenced by Political World realities. This figure shows how the Political World affects the Religious World and the relative dominance of "A" traditional theology and "B" liberal theology, and changes in theology. It shows how the state, Church and society in internal and external conflict and turmoil can affect and influence changes in theology. It also shows that changes in theology, in turn, affect and influence the Church, state, and society in the Political World

APPENDIX B

Table 5: Regimes and Oppositions

1. Regimes

Ruling coalition: the Government (President, Ruling Party, Bureaucrats and Technocrats), the Military, and the Bourgeoisie

2. Oppositions

Four Types of Political Oppositions:

The Church as a Third Type Political Opposition

Institutional vs. Extra-Institutional Religious vs. Secular	"Institutional" Opposition <u>within the</u> system	"Extra- Institutional" Opposition <u>outside the</u> system)
Secular Opposition	(i) "Institutional" Political Opposition Parties within the system ("Semi- Opposition" in Linz's term)	(ii) Secular "Extra- Institutional" Political Opposition (‘Chaeya’, students, workers, and so on) ("Alegal Opposition" in Linz's term minus (-) Church)
Religious Opposition	No Religious Political Party in South Korea *	(iii) Religious "Extra- Institutional" Opposition

* It is said that most of the Christian Democratic parties in Latin American countries (especially those of Chile and Venezuela) have expressly sought to strengthen constitutional democracy in authoritarian regimes. Their emergence has clearly contributed to the perceptible advance in the institutionalization of oppositions in Latin America. It could also be said that those "Christian" Democratic parties are "religious" to a certain extent compared to other political parties. Thus, the Christian Democratic parties in Latin America (and more arguably those in Spain, West Germany, and Italy, and so on, in some cases) may be of "Institutional Religious Political Party Opposition," if you will (with some variation).

APPENDIX C

SELECTED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE SOUTH KOREAN CATHOLIC CHURCH'S OPPOSITION TO THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE

(Source: Japanese Catholic Council for
Justice and Peace (1983_a), Eds., (Young Soon
Song, Editor-in-Chief) "A DECLARATION OF
CONSCIENCE": THE KOREAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, VOL. 1. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books)

1. A DECLARATION OF CONSCIENCE

Bishop Tji, Hak Soon [Chi, Hak-sun], July 23rd,
1974 (*ibid*, pp. 1-2)

I have received a subpoena to stand before the so-called Extra-ordinary Court Martial as a criminal defendant. This trial is due to begin on the morning of July 23rd.

But I refuse this subpoena because my conscience and the justice of God do not permit me to accept it. I hereby wish to make clear that if any of the procedures of this so-called Military Court against me come to public knowledge, it will never be by my compliance but only because of naked force. I hereby state that:

1. The so-called Yushin Constitution is invalid and contrary to truth. It has been forged by violence, intimidation, and fraud. It is said to have been passed by a referendum, but in fact it has no true relationship with the opinion of the people. It was imposed on the people shortly after the arbitrary suspension and betrayal of the true Constitution on October 17th, 1972.

2. This so-called Yushin Constitution is in violation of the most basic and essential rights of the people. The so-called Emergency Decree gives all power to one man whenever he wishes to declare such an emergency. This is a law in violation of fundamental human dignity. Under such a law, the sphere of human conscience in the affairs of state is eliminated.

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this so-called Emergency Decree, under which I stand indicted, are in fact a cruel violation of Natural Law. These two paragraphs forbid any petition or expression of opinion to reform the said Yushin Constitution. No communication of opinions on this matter is permitted. Any expression of disagreement or complaint against the Emergency Decree is now punishable by life imprisonment or death.

4. I have given funds in support of the oppressed Christian-minded students. Because of this action, I stand now falsely accused by forged documentation, of instigating a revolt.

5. The so-called Extraordinary Court Martial which now asserts jurisdiction over me is in fact a puppet court which by commonly held opinions on law should not be allowed to judge in matters related to law and conscience. At the present time, many honest citizens are being indicted, tried, and sentenced by the judicial proceedings of this Extraordinary Military Court. These defendants have been reduced to silence and only the Prosecutor's unsupported and unquestioned accusations become public knowledge through the controlled media of newspapers, radio, and television.

Morning, July 23rd, 1974

Bishop Daniel Tji [Chi]
Wõnju Diocese, Korea

2. A CALL FOR THE RESIGNATION OF THE PARK REGIME

3.1 Memorial Declaration for Democratic National Salvation, March 1st, 1976 (*ibid.*, pp. 43-49; also see Myõngdong, 1984, pp. 350-53, for full contents and names of persons who signed; italics added)

Following the Declaration of Catholic and Protestant Clergymen for Democratic National Unification which was issued in Wõnju on January 23, 1976 (See Myõngdong, 1984, pp. 387-90), mainly by members of the Catholic Priests for Social Justice [the CPAJ], eminent Korean lay leaders and Protestant ministers issued the Declaration for Democratic National Salvation on the anniversary of March 1st's uprising for Korean independence.

DECLARATION FOR DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL SALVATION

On this day, March 1, we hear the clear echoes of the events of March 1, 1919, 57 years ago, when the battle cry of this people resounded throughout the world, crying out for independence. We would be overwhelmed by a sense of guilt towards those before us who shed their blood to save the nation if, in the present situation, we did not concentrate our determination by issuing this "Declaration for Democratic National Salvation" to our country and to the world.

Although the division of our country shattered the exultation felt at our liberation on August 15, 1945, and brought us successive ordeals, the people never lost their hope. Arising out of the ruins of the Korean War, the heroic

April 19 students, who toppled the Syngman Rhee dictatorship, restored the people's belief in liberal democracy.

But this only lasted a moment. Once again our people were bound by the iron chains of a dictatorial government, and there was a "separation of powers" only in appearance. *Under the pretext of national security*, the freedoms of belief and conscience withered day by day, and the freedoms of expression and academic independence were choked to death. The R.O.K.-Japan Treaty, concluded under the present regime, resulted in this country's economy becoming entirely controlled by Japan, with all industries and the labor force becoming the victims of Japan's economic invasion.

.....
 . . . , at the hands of a one-man dictatorship, human rights are being trampled and we are being deprived of our freedom.

I. THIS COUNTRY MUST STAND ON A BASIS OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy is the national policy of the Republic of Korea. . . . Although a strong national defense and economic power need to be nurtured as well, when these are not backed by a democratic capacity, they are no more than a castle built on sand.

.....
 What, then, is the way to realize government "from the people"? The freedom of the people to express themselves, without either physical or spiritual intimidation, must be guaranteed.

Therefore, we demand the immediate abolition of the emergency measures. . . . , we demand that the freedoms of speech, assembly, and press be returned to the people.

Next, we insist on the recovery of parliamentary politics, which has been deprived of any substance by the Yushin Constitution. . . .

Thirdly, we demand the right of an independent judiciary. . . .

II. THE DESIGN AND STRUCTURE OF OUR COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS MUST BE FUNDAMENTALLY RE-EXAMINED

. . . . the present regime . . . is sacrificing everything for the sake of singleminded concentration on economic development.

But what are the real results? In the years 1974-75, an alarming trade deficit amounting to four billion dollars has been incurred through the export industry, which is based on exploitation of the people's economy. . . . As of the end of 1975, our country's foreign debt reached a total of 5,780,000,000 dollars. On whose shoulders will the load of this incredible debt be laid--at a time when companies based on loans are becoming insolvent and going bankrupt? The present structure of our nation's economy, based on plans to sell over our workers and farmers to be exploited by lending agencies and foreign capital, with even the rights to organize labor unions and to strike

taken away from the workers, has from the beginning not been in the interests of our country's people.

. . . . The reliance of the economic system solely on foreign loans from the beginning was a large part of the cause of corruption.

. . . . The present regime has long since lost the capacity to save the nation from an economic breakdown. The reason for this is that irrationality and corruption of the economy have originated in the very heart of the power structure itself.

Because the situation has reached this point, there is no other way open than for the Park regime to take the responsibility and to step down. . . .

If this regime does not have the suitable humble courage to do so, then we urge it to thoroughly re-examine the country's economic structure, beginning at its very heart. Stop concealing the real situation and making justifications for it, and instead acknowledge the situation honestly. . . .

If this is done, the absurd situation of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer--a breeding ground for communism--could be corrected; the people's confidence in liberal democracy would be restored; and the initiative for "National Unification" could be grasped vis-a-vis the communist regime in the north.

III. "NATIONAL UNIFICATION"--OUR COMPATRIOTS' SUPREME TASK TODAY

.....
At this time there is a final line which must be defended. The Magna Carta of democracy is that a unified country, and the best system and policies for the people, must "come from among the people." Are we, in predicting that approaching day, fostering a democratic capability? Or are we strangling it? The way to defeat communism, and the shortcut to "National Unification," is surely to strengthen our democratic capability.

This is the task which must involve all 50-million of our people in an aggressive struggle for the creation of a new history.

This is the rekindling of the same Asian signal fire as the March 1st movement and the April 19 Revolution.

This is what can revive our people who have suffered in the confrontation between democracy and communism, and show to all the world the true shape of democracy.

This is the way by which our reunified people, as a peaceful nation in which justice is realized and human rights are guaranteed, may take our rightful place in international society.

Long live Democracy!

March 1, 1976

List of persons who signed

Yun Po-sun (Yun Po-sòn), former President, Rep. of Korea
 Kim Dae-jung, former presidential candidate of the New Democratic Party
 Ham Suk-hun (Ham Sòk-hòn), human rights activist, Quaker patriot, pacifist leader often called Korea's Ghandi, publisher of *Shial ui Sori* [Voice of the People]
 Ham Se-ung, Catholic priest
 Lee Oo-jung (Lee U-jòng), President of the Korean Christian Women's Federation
 Chung Il-hyung (Chòng Il-hyòng), member of the Parliament
 Yun Ban-woong (Yun, Pan-ung), minister, President of the Christian Association for Protection of Democracy
 Kim Seung-hun (Kim Sùng-hun), Catholic priest
 Chang Dok-pil (Chang Tok-p'il), Catholic priest
 Kim Taek-am (Kim T'aek-am), Catholic priest
 Ahn Chung-suk (An Ch'ung-sòk), Catholic priest
 Moon Jung-hyun (Mun Chòng-hyòn), Catholic priest
 Moon Dong-hwan (Mun Tong-hwan), minister, former professor of Han Kuk (Han'guk) Theological Seminary
 Ahn Byung-mu (An Pyòng-mu), former prof. of Han Kuk (Han'guk) Theological Seminary
 Lee Moon-young (Lee Mun-yòng), former prof. of Koryo [Korea] University
 Suh Nam-dong (Sò Nam-dong), minister, former professor of Yonsei University
 Eun Myoung-gi (Ûn Myòng-gi), minister

3. STATEMENT OF SEOUL DISTRICT PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

Issued on March 10, 1976, 5:30 P.M. by
 Suh Chung-gak (Sò Chòng-gak), Chief Prosecutor
 (*ibid.*, pp. 50-52)

On March 10, 1976, the Seoul District Prosecutor arrested under the provisions of the Presidential Emergency Decree No. Nine, twenty persons who took part in the attempt by a group of opposition leaders to use the March

1 Commemorative Mass at Myong Dong (Myòngdong) Cathedral, Seoul, to incite a conspiracy to overthrow the government.

These persons of the opposition utilized every opportunity to gather anti-government elements. Successively they have camouflaged themselves in the "National Council for Restoration of Democracy," "Galilee Church" and other religious or social groups, forming illegal organizations, holding various kinds of prayer meetings, training sessions and gatherings, *under the pretense of religious activity*. They have met together from time to time, plotting and using such illegal slogans as those calling for the "removal of the Emergency Decrees" or demanding the "Resignation of the government" and have agitated for the overthrow of the government.

The most extreme aspect of their efforts to carry out this unconstitutional agitation for the overthrow of the government was their use of foreign influence, carrying out all sorts of slanderous intrigues against Korea. However, the majority of the people, being well aware of the importance of *national security* at the present moment, were not misled by this unlawful agitation, and as it became clear with the passage of time that there was no support from the people, they became impatient. Judging that they could no longer delay, Kim Dae-jung, Moon (Mun) Ik-hwan and Ham Se-ung formed the core, secured the consent of Yun Po-sun (Yun Po-sòn), Chung Il-hyung (Chòng Il-hyòng), Ham Suk-hun (Ham Sòk-hòn) and others, and decided to bring about a mass uprising by means of popular agitation during the spring season.

Believing that March and April, which are chronic times of social unrest in our society, would be a favorable period to strengthen anti-government forces, they decided on the 57th anniversary of the March First movement, to be held March 1, 1976, as the time to bring out into the open their demand for the government's resignation under the banner of "Restoration of Democracy." Under the delusion that by advocating this they could arouse the general public to respond in a nationwide insurrection, they issued the so-called "Declaration for National Democratic Salvation." Scheming, they hoped this declaration would incite a general insurrection that, spreading, would throw society into confusion, so that they could seize the opportunity to overthrow the present administration and capture the government.

These persons, in the process of getting signatures for the so-called "Declaration for National Democratic Salvation" did not even secure the consent or sound out others' intentions, but stealing the use of peoples' names for their own purposes, they shamelessly signed the document. But, because they had no means of their own to mobilize a crowd, they learned that the March First Commemorative Mass was to take place and, when this service was concluded and the audience was about to disperse, they suddenly read the declaration, taking advantage of and abusing this religious event. The prosecutor's office regards this as a serious matter, not only because it was an agitation of many people to overthrow the government carried out inside the cathedral by taking advantage of a religious ceremony in *an abuse of religious freedom*, but because it was also *an act subversive to the constitutional order*.

The prosecutor intends to severely restrict by the law the lawless political activities carried out in the guise of religious activities by this group of persons.

.....
List of Indicted Persons

In Custody

Moon (Mun) Ik-hwan, 58, pastor
 Ham Se-ung, 35, priest
 Kim Dae-jung, 51, unemployed
 Moon Dong-hwan (Mun Tong-hwan), 55, pastor
 Lee Moon-young (Lee Mun Yòng), 49, unemployed
 Suh Nam-dong (Sò Nam-dong), 48, unemployed
 Ahn Byung-moo (An Pyòng-mu), 54, unemployed
 Shin Hyun-bong (Shin, Hyòn-bong), 46, priest
 Lee Hae-dong, 42, pastor
 Yun Ban-woong (Lee Pan-ung), 66, pastor
 Moon Jung-hyun (Mun Chòng-hyòn), 36, priest

Not in Custody

Chung Il-hyung (Chòng Il-hyòng), 72, member, National
 Assembly
 Ham Suk-hun (Ham Sòk-hòn), 75, representative: *Shial
 ui Sori* [Voice of the People]
 Yun Po-sun (Yun Po-sòn), 78, unemployed
 Lee Tae-young (Lee T'ae-yòng), 66, Director, Family
 Legal Counselling Center
 Lee Oo-jung (Lee U-jòng), 53, unemployed
 Kim Seung-hun (Kim Sùng-hun), 37, priest
 Chang Dok-pil (Chang Tòk-p'il), 36, priest
 Kim Taek-am (Kim T'aek-am), 37, priest
 Ahn Chung-suk (An Ch'ung-sòk), 37, priest

4. OUR VIEWS CONCERNING THE OH WON-CHUN AFFAIR

Issued on August 20, 1979, by Permanent
 Committee of the Korean Catholic Bishops'
 Conference (*ibid.*, pp. 308-09; also see
 Myòngdong, 1984, pp. 578-79)

Matters relating to the case of Oh Won Chun [Oh Wòn-ch'un] (Christian name: Alphonse), member of the Andong Catholic Farmers' Association [the Andong Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement], have recently become the center of discussion both in and outside the Church. The reporters of the authorities on this matter and the way the Andong Diocese is handling it

are clearly in contradiction and causing much confusion among concerned individuals within and outside the Church. We deem it necessary, therefore, to make clear the true facts concerning this case. The Permanent Council [Committee] of the Korean Bishops' Conference presents its view as follows:

(1) We confirm our belief in the contents of the investigation by Andong Diocese which states that Oh Won-chun disappeared from Youngyang (Yòng-yang) on May 5th and was abducted to Pohang (P'ohang) where he was violently treated and then taken to Ullung (Ullung) Island, at which point he has held captive for two weeks.

(2) In the report concerning this incident, the investigating authorities stated that the above facts were fabricated. The Church investigation, however, has shown that the authorities have been trying to make Oh Won-chun the object of suspicion. We cannot conceal our astonishment at this.

(3) In order to protect the rights of Oh Won-chun, a fellow Catholic, Bishop Rene Dupont of Andong Diocese and the other clergy and congregation conducted an investigation into the true facts of the case. In response to this, the authorities leveled unjust accusations at all of these people. We realize our common responsibility in responding to this and solemnly make this public.

(4) We are closely scrutinizing the way the authorities are handling this affair. We promise to concentrate the efforts of the entire Church on this incident until the truth is brought to light.

(5) On this occasion, we take the opportunity to make clear once again that the Catholic Farmers' Association [the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement] involved with the present case and the Catholic Working Youth Association [the J.O.C.] which has once again become the object of attention in one sector of society are working for the protection of the just rights of the farmers and workers so that our country as a whole may develop on a just course. We also re-affirm that they are upright organizations with absolutely no questionable elements.

(6) We ask for your prayers that this problem may come to a just and peaceful solution. For in its solution is the common good of our country.

August 20, 1979

Korean Catholic Bishops' Conference,
Permanent Committee

5. STATEMENT (REGARDING "THE TRUE FACTS RELATING TO THE INCIDENTS AT KWANGJU")

Issued in June 1980 by the CPAJ
(JCCJP, 1983_b, p. 29 and p. 66)

In response to the recent events in Kwangju, which amount to a tragedy for the Korean people, we hereby make clear our views, basing them on the truth of the Gospel and in justice.

(1) We believe in the validity of the report: "The True Facts Relating to the Incidents at Kwangju" released by the clergy of the Kwangju Archdiocese.

(2) We demand that the government immediately put a stop to its actions whereby it has twisted the truth found in the above report and sent out false information. We also demand that it immediately restore free speech.

(3) We make it clear that the source of the tragedy in Kwangju was the government and part of the army which engaged in mad murderous actions.

(4) The present situation calls for a healing on the people's level.

We must work to effect as soon as possible the release of imprisoned students, a democratic free people, and the abolishment of Martial Law. We must establish as soon as possible a democratic constitutional government.

Catholic Priests' Association for Justice

Represented by clergy groups from the following dioceses:

Kwangju	Wònju	Andong
Chònju	Inch'òn	Pusan
Masan	Ch'òngju	
Suwòn	Seoul Archdiocese	
Ch'unch'òn		

Together with: a group of representatives made up from individual orders and the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice (the National Catholic Clergy for the Realization of Justice).

APPENDIX D

Cry of the People

by Kim Chi Ha (abridged)

Modernization! Nation-building!
Nicknames for foreign power's yoke...
A privileged few acquire wealth,
Corruption surpassing that of old.
Caeseless progress! The law is scrapped
For a dynasty's perpetuation.
Development's main purpose:
To rationalize dictatorship;
"Abundant Seventies" never found
Except in propaganda's prattle...
"National Harmony," "National Security"
Are now habitual slogans;
But a widening gap between rich and poor
Denies harmonious progress;...
In economic co-operation's name
Our economy is colonized;
Economic independence but a distant vision;
Unification a receding dream...
Favoring aid grains from abroad,
Agriculture was destroyed..
In agriculture development alone
Lies healthy economic growth;
Depending solely on foreign aid
Is to build a castle out of sand...
Industrial zones, exploit centers,
Create only regional gaps;
The logic of capital growth
Favors only big business;
Small businesses go bankrupt;
Monopoly is rampant...
Agriculture needs protection,
Funds and skills must be provided;
Devise a plan
To best cultivate the land.
Relying on imported oil,
Our coal mines left to rot;
Dependent on imports only
Our own resources ignored;
Domestic industry lies desolate,

Dependence on foreign capital complete.
In development's name, collaboration
With foreign capital is wrought...
Jobless, workless,
How does one live?

The squatter's hut means to remain alive
Because you cannot die.
Be diligent! they say--
About what?
Be thrifty! they say--
With what?

Source: Foster-Carter, 1987, pp. 267-69 (Appendix).

APPENDIX E

Table 6.

**Catholic Church Hierarchy and Institutions
in Latin America, 1981-87**

Year	Cardinals	Archbishops	Bishops	Priests	Communists	Brothers	Sisters	Missionary Personnel ¹	Papalical Universities	Catholic % of Total Population
1931	3	10	65	5,460	1,373	1,179	12,446	-	1	92.1
1932	3	10	65	5,482	1,655	1,163	12,532	-	-	92.8
1934	3	14	63	5,493	1,940	1,159	12,709	-	-	92.8
1935	3	14	74	5,466	2,231	1,138	11,497	-	-	93.0
1936	3	13	77	5,572	2,104	1,148	11,678	-	1	93.0
1937	3	12	76	5,616	2,132	1,083	11,545	-	1	92.1
1931	1	4	19	929	167	233	1,682	238	-	93.7
1932	1	5	17	872	168	232	1,680	229	-	94.0
1934	1	7	20	828	176	200	1,732	217	-	94.6
1935	1	7	20	823	282	178	1,693	-	-	94.0
1936	1	7	23	833	313	160	1,694	197	-	93.6
1937	1	6	25	823	381	162	1,571	-	-	93.0
1931	7	37	239	13,169	4,283	2,701	37,024	467	4	90.1
1932	6	35	237	13,463	4,603	2,639	36,983	464	4	90.1
1934	6	47	305	-	5,641	2,339	36,772	463	5	90.1
1935	5	48	303	13,764	5,912	2,570	37,546	-	5	90.6
1936	7	48	309	13,832	6,049	2,478	37,647	410	5	90.0
1937	7	47	320	13,741	5,946	2,493	37,378	-	5	93.1
1931	1	4	24	2,020	663	487	5,003	175	2	95.5
1932	1	3	24	2,046	695	446	5,001	178	2	95.5
1934	1	4	29	2,183	999	466	4,994	173	2	95.0
1935	2	4	29	2,169	910	398	4,465	-	2	95.0
1936	2	6	33	2,192	870	385	4,464	190	2	95.0
1937	2	5	33	2,191	946	428	5,322	-	2	92.4
1931	1	11	49	5,254	1,837	1,028	17,034	-	2	95.5
1932	2	12	49	5,198	2,174	939	16,304	-	2	95.5
1934	2	15	57	5,355	2,443	883	18,171	-	2	94.8
1935	1	16	57	5,482	2,673	882	18,330	-	2	95.0
1936	2	14	65	5,353	2,903	873	18,460	-	2	95.0
1937	2	14	66	5,642	3,424	870	18,744	-	2	94.7
1931	0	1	5	434	160	31	637	-	-	93.5
1932	0	1	5	482	236	29	1,001	-	-	92.7
1934	0	2	5	481	294	46	898	-	-	92.3
1935	0	2	5	478	333	42	845	-	-	93.3
1936	0	1	6	479	363	47	828	-	-	93.5
1937	0	1	5	526	352	57	899	-	-	93.9
1931	0	2	5	700	50	22	214	-	-	41.2
1932	0	2	5	721	47	20	218	-	-	41.2
1934	0	2	6	703	47	29	246	-	-	41.0
1935	0	2	6	700	29	23	247	-	-	41.2
1936	0	2	6	703	29	21	231	-	-	41.2
1937	0	2	5	702	33	22	287	-	-	41.2
1931	1	2	8	503	263	90	1,408	-	-	94.6
1932	1	2	8	580	283	82	1,320	-	-	94.8
1934	1	1	9	494	283	64	1,322	-	-	93.7
1935	1	1	9	524	303	67	1,366	-	-	92.0
1936	1	1	9	539	350	79	1,414	50	-	91.9
1937	1	1	11	531	363	84	1,339	-	-	92.2
1931	1	3	19	1,913	163	367	4,181	-	-	90.2
1932	1	3	18	1,524	160	367	4,133	-	-	91.0
1934	1	3	24	1,537	263	339	4,112	-	-	92.0
1935	1	3	27	1,517	401	381	4,320	-	-	94.5
1936	1	3	27	1,554	427	351	4,011	-	-	93.5
1937	1	5	24	1,657	453	371	3,915	-	-	93.3
1931	0	0	5	351	103	63	633	-	-	90.4
1932	0	1	6	347	110	76	632	-	-	90.9
1934	0	1	6	331	129	60	630	-	-	91.7
1935	0	-	-	323	101	73	1,023	-	-	90.9
1936	0	1	70	379	214	104	1,011	-	-	92.6
1937	0	1	8	432	219	103	1,022	-	-	92.6

COUNTRY	Year	Catholics	Anciently Catholic	Blacks	Priests	Seminarians	Bronzes	Sacres	Missionary Personnel ¹	Parishes Universities	Catholic % of Total Population
K. GUATEMALA	1931	1	0	14	633	264	133	1,197	179	1	83.6
	1932	0	0	12	632	231	124	1,181	169	1	83.3
	1934	0	0	13	633	310	127	1,093	169	1	84.0
	1935	0	1	14	643	462	187	1,231	-	1	83.6
	1936	0	1	14	670	420	169	1,200	218	1	83.4
	1937	0	1	14	650	469	169	1,222	-	1	83.4
L. HAITI	1931	0	1	6	406	139	239	909	43	-	83.4
	1932	0	1	6	420	149	216	917	46	-	83.5
	1934	0	1	6	427	163	203	903	42	-	83.0
	1935	0	1	7	433	177	234	913	-	-	83.5
	1936	0	2	9	453	219	233	893	46	-	83.6
	1937	0	2	9	464	243	233	923	-	-	83.6
M. HONDURAS	1931	0	1	6	736	26	22	359	-	-	96.6
	1932	0	1	7	749	29	16	341	-	-	96.0
	1934	0	1	7	740	46	12	305	-	-	96.0
	1935	0	1	8	742	95	13	331	-	-	95.1
	1936	0	1	9	753	103	23	364	-	-	94.5
	1937	0	1	7	763	133	49	374	-	-	94.6
N. MEXICO	1931	3	10	74	10,037	2,947	1,127	23,563	215	-	92.8
	1932	3	10	74	10,213	3,285	1,156	23,463	212	-	92.4
	1934	3	10	75	10,110	4,217	1,423	24,207	211	-	93.0
	1935	2	10	80	10,253	4,823	1,363	24,450	-	-	93.0
	1936	2	11	77	10,633	4,980	1,271	24,903	259	-	93.1
	1937	2	14	63	10,750	5,253	1,303	24,819	-	-	93.1
O. NICARAGUA	1931	0	1	7	340	40	100	632	-	-	91.6
	1932	0	1	7	341	32	93	701	-	-	90.7
	1934	1	0	9	327	49	61	651	-	-	85.8
	1935	1	0	9	346	59	53	648	-	-	87.0
	1936	0	1	9	347	114	71	594	-	-	88.3
	1937	1	0	10	397	126	59	579	-	-	88.6
P. PANAMA	1931	0	1	6	260	32	46	467	-	1	88.8
	1932	0	1	6	302	103	39	490	-	1	89.0
	1934	0	1	6	299	130	36	464	-	1	83.1
	1935	0	1	6	291	123	38	465	-	1	83.6
	1936	0	1	5	290	103	49	469	-	1	83.7
	1937	0	1	8	291	130	47	467	-	1	87.1
Q. PARAGUAY	1931	0	1	15	543	131	103	932	-	1	91.2
	1932	0	1	14	554	172	93	977	-	1	91.4
	1934	0	1	15	539	249	103	997	-	1	91.9
	1935	0	1	15	570	307	82	1023	-	1	92.3
	1936	0	1	14	597	323	63	1,114	-	1	92.0
	1937	0	1	15	553	329	113	1,103	-	1	91.3
R. PERU	1931	1	6	42	2,233	633	443	4,732	433	1	92.1
	1932	1	5	44	2,163	787	427	4,644	429	1	92.4
	1934	1	6	44	2,293	833	491	4,910	469	1	92.4
	1935	1	6	41	2,378	1,034	464	4,874	-	1	92.3
	1936	1	6	46	2,378	1,032	460	4,716	469	1	92.0
	1937	1	8	45	2,563	1,121	462	5,023	-	1	93.5
S. URUGUAY	1931	0	1	10	597	67	140	1,621	-	-	78.6
	1932	0	1	11	593	69	146	1,593	-	-	78.6
	1934	0	1	11	592	124	143	1,641	-	-	79.0
	1935	0	1	11	543	121	119	1,703	-	1	78.9
	1936	0	1	12	703	81	144	2,029	-	1	78.9
	1937	0	2	12	720	103	141	1,978	-	1	78.6
T. VENEZUELA	1931	1	6	29	1,663	371	323	4,346	-	1	92.2
	1932	2	5	31	2,022	383	229	4,270	-	1	92.4
	1934	2	4	33	1,978	463	234	3,632	-	1	91.0
	1935	2	4	33	2,063	663	270	3,676	-	-	91.5
	1936	2	4	33	2,063	700	263	3,930	-	1	91.7
	1937	2	4	33	2,076	773	269	4,179	-	1	91.7

Source: *Catholic Almanac*, 1982-88, pp. 332-64; 1989, pp. 333-68; 1990, pp. 332-66, cited by *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, Vol. 29, Part 1, pp. 324-25.

Vita

Name: Nyung Kim

Date of Birth: January 6, 1958

Place of Birth: Seoul, Korea

Parentage: son of Se-choong Kim and Namjo Kim

Education: 1976, High School Diploma,
Whimoon High School (Seoul, Korea)
1980, B.A. in Political Science,
Sogang University (Seoul, Korea)
1982-84, Master's Program,
Sogang University
1986, M.A. in Political Science,
The University of Washington
(Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.)
1993, Ph.D. in Political Science,
The University of Washington