



CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 193d INFANTRY BRIGADE (PANAMA)

APO MIAMI 34004

REPLY TO
 ATTENTION OF:

AFZU-DPT-OR

SUBJECT: Commander's Semi-Annual SITREP, 1 October 1981 - 31 March 1982

THRU: Commander in Chief
 United States Southern Command
 ATTN: SCCS
 Quarry Heights, Panama

TO: Commander in Chief
 United States Southern Command
 ATTN: SCJ3
 Quarry Heights, Panama

1. (U) Personnel:

a. (C) Total military personnel strength (including tenant activities) averaged at 104.5% during the period 1 Oct 81 - 31 Mar 82. During the same period, the personnel strength in the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) roll-up readiness reporting units varied between 88-92%.

b. (C) Currently the Brigade is at 107% of its authorized strength (readiness roll-up units at 85%).

c. (C) During the period covered by this report, enlisted strength fluctuated between 98.9% to 110.5%. Our strength peaked in Nov and we are now projecting a gradual decline through normal attrition, unprogrammed losses, (which average approximately 30 per month) and a tough policy on FST extensions coupled with a liberal policy on curtailments on over-strength MOS. We should be in the management window by the end of the 3d quarter. Aggregate enlisted strength for 3/7th Special Forces has averaged 100.8%. Problems are being experienced due to the lack of language qualified personnel. Although we are conducting language training locally, it is not the same as receiving language qualified personnel trained at the Defense Language Institute. This has an impact on mission accomplishment based on the current/projected unrest in LATAM.

d. (U) During the current calendar year (CY) the Brigade has been operating with a FORSCOM imposed Officer Distribution Plan (ODP) that supports 94.5% of the Brigade's current Commissioned and Warrant Officer authorizations (AUTH 483 - ODP 456). Current total officer operating strength is 449 with a projected operating strength of 454 through the end of this calendar year.

CLASSIFIED BY: Cdr, 193d Inf Bde (Pan) EXTENDED BY: Cdr, 193d Inf Bde (Pan)
 ON: 30 March 1982 REASON: Para 2-30k, DOD 5200.1-R
 DECLASSIFY ON: 29 March 1988

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2. (U) Intelligence:

a. (C/NOFORN) Past Six Months. Overshadowing all other events of the past six months was the 3 Mar "minicoup" (dubbed a real coup by the opposition press) within the Guardia Nacional (GN) in which the GN Commandant, COL Florencio Florez; the G-4, LTC Armando Bellido; and the head of Transportation, LTC Manuel Arauz, were suddenly "retired" and command of the GN assumed by LTC (simultaneously promoted to COL) Ruben Dario Paredes.

(1) (C/NOFORN) Particulars of GN "Minicoup": With none of the three retirees in attendance at the announcement ceremony at the Presidencia, Aristides Royo, on 3 Mar, made known the concurrent promotion to Colonel and Commandant of the GN of former Chief of Staff, COL Ruben Dario Paredes. Also announced in the surprising 3 Mar developments were the ascensions to Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, respectively, of LTC's Armando Contreras (former G-3 and Deputy Chief of Staff) and Manuel A. Noriega (who retains his position as G-2). During the afternoon of 3 Mar, the promotions of four majors to the rank of LTC were announced, along with a list of changes in assignments of those promoted and those moving to positions vacated by retirements and promotions. Also announced were the retirements of a group of eligible majors. The LTC promotions resulted in a net gain of one (there are now 10 LTC's in the GN).

(2) (C/NOFORN) Expected Impact of the "Minicoup" Upon US/GOP/GN Relations: G-2, 193d Inf Bde (Pan) believes that the overall impact of the 3 Mar "minicoup" upon US/GOP/GN relations will result in closer ties and improved combined training cooperation between US Forces stationed in PN and the GN. Anti-Communists public statements made by COL Paredes since assuming command, in particular his 20 Mar speech in Santiago, have been enthusiastically received by business, religious and community leaders in PN. Those statements, coupled with Paredes' concern expressed on 13 Mar to the visiting chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the course of events in Nicaragua (NU), presage a definite move by PM toward closer cooperation with US aims in the area. On this occasion, COL Paredes asked the chairman when the US was going to "do something about Cuba instead of just warning everyone". He (Paredes) chidingly referred to the US as "the little boy who cried wolf". The recently-appointed GN G-3 and Chief of the Security and Defense Commission, LTC Roberto Diaz, advised the chairman that PN would continue to work with Cuba but would make "advance coordination" with the US in PN's dealings with Cuba, Central America, and the Caribbean.

(3) (C/NOFORN) Significance of GN Changes: The most significant aspects of the 3 Mar changes in the GN were the "Banana Republic" style in which they were made and their as-yet-undetermined possible effects upon the scheduled 1984 national elections. The continued absence from the scene of COL Florencio Florez

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(reportedly detained incommunicado at his home), and the widely disbelieved official reasons for the sudden retirements, were the most negative aspects of the reshuffle; they constitute continuing liabilities to the reputations of the GOP, GN and principals involved. COL Florez is universally regarded as the most honest official in the GN, and the one who most sincerely wished to withdraw the GN from political control over the GOP. The official reason given for the retirements - that each individual had reached the required 25-year continuous (or 30 year interrupted) service - disregard the fact that LTC Contreras is already eligible for retirement, as is LTC Pedro Ayala, the new G-5.

b. (C/NOFORN) Outlook for Next Six Months: Of particular interest to Panama watchers will be: the progress of the expected candidacy for President of COL Paredes in the May 84 elections and the expected succession to Command of the GN of LTC Noriega. COL Paredes has already publicly stated that he would not remain in his present post for more than a year. There are two schools of thought on what is to follow his departure. The first is that LTC Contreras will precede Paredes in departing from the GN (some qualified observers believe in the near future). The other school of thought is that Contreras will be allowed to succeed Paredes as a figure-head Commandant with the strings being pulled by LTC Noriega, and to some extent by LTC Diaz. In any case, LTC Noriega is expected to be Commandant of the GN, at least by the time of the 1984 elections, and to remain in that post until the late 1980's. Although the occasion (1 Apr) is ripe for possible displays of excessive chauvinism, as evidenced by several press notices concerning the day, no serious trouble is expected. Overall, in the days ahead, COL Paredes' stronger leadership, his popularly-received anti-Communist public statements, and his private assurances to senior US Military officials, comprise favorable indicators for an improved climate of friendliness and cooperation between US Forces and the GN.

3. (U) Operations:

a. (U) Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Activations:

(1) (U) The TOC and TAC CP were activated 30 Sep 81 - 8 Oct 81 for the Tactical Field Exercise (TFE) for the Brigade Units.

(2) (U) The TAC CP was activated during the period, 15-17 Nov 81 to support 2/75th Ranger's participation in the third week JOTC FTX. The Ranger Battalion was moved from JOTC Fort Sherman to secure a Remote Marshalling Base (REMAB) site on Pacific side. Simultaneously, the Battalion Commander and Staff were given Joint Task Force Operation Orders by staff of 193d Inf Bde (Pan).

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The Search and Rescue Mission Operation order was not given until the units were well into the planning phase of their mission. This was done to test the battalion staff's ability to react to changing situations. Rehearsal sites were built on similar terrain by 518 Engineer Company to resemble actual objective sites. The FTX for 2/75 consisted of three modules: airborne raid against an enemy C³ facility, search and rescue mission, and VIP snatch mission. The 3/7 SFG(A) provided AST Teams and in conjunction with the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) developed target folders for the snatch, raid, and POW liberation missions. The TAC CP was activated 13-15 Dec 81 to support 1/75th Rangers participation in the third week JOTC FTX. The FTX for 1/75 consisted of four modules: raid against C³ facility, search and rescue mission (live fire), VIP snatch mission, and POW liberation. The 3/7 SFG(A) provided AST Teams and in conjunction with the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) developed target folders for the snatch, raid, and POW liberation missions.

(3) (U) 193d Inf Bde (Pan) under the banner of US Army School of the Americas (USARSA) and in conjunction with the Guardia Nacional of the Republic of Panama, hosted a Jungle Operations Conference (JOC) from 16-20 Nov 81. It was conducted at the Jungle Operations Training Center, Fort Sherman, Panama. Its purpose was to establish an interchange of views, concepts, and philosophies on military operations in Latin America with emphasis on jungle operations. The conference far exceeded the most optimistic expectations for success, with 16 of the 20 invited countries attending: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Mexico declined the invitation. Paraguay responded after the fact, in spite of numerous correspondence and the attendance of their military attache to the introductory one-day seminar. Haiti's MILGroup acknowledged receipt of the invitation but did not attend. Trinidad never responded. The total number of foreign guests in attendance was 31. Additionally, the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) CAPSTONE unit, 92d Inf Bde Sep (PR), the Permanent Secretariat of the Inter-American Defense Board and the United States Army Infantry School also sent representatives. In-country personnel in attendance included representatives from USSOUTHCOM's Combined Board and representatives from the 193d Inf Bde (Pan). The total number of participants numbered in excess of 50. Presentations were conducted in Spanish and translated to English. They served to stimulate discussion at the seminars, displayed capabilities of the US Army in Jungle Operations, and demonstrated goodwill toward all the LATAM Armies. All attendees expressed satisfaction and pride in their country's participation. The response from the various delegations was both enthusiastic and complimentary. All expressed a desire to see the conference become an annual event.

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(4) (U) A JTX Kindle Liberty '82 planning conference was held 3-4 Dec 81 with all ARRED participants. Interim coordination was effected and a support site survey was conducted. FORSCOM provided controller/evaluator support from throughout CONUS.

(5) (U) The TOC was activated 18-20 Jan 82 for the Command Post Wargame (CPW) Cutting Edge VI.

(6) (U) An Operations Seminar was conducted 4-5 Feb 1982, just prior to JTX Kindle Liberty '82. The purpose of the seminar was to familiarize commanders and staff on new doctrine found in FM 100-5 (Draft) and its application to the mission of the 193d Inf Bde (Pan). Because of the turnover in battalion commanders and battalion S-3s, a Threat Briefing followed by a OPLAN 6501 briefing was presented to the assembled commanders and staff. The TF 1/502 Inf Commander presented a short briefing on the capabilities of an air assault task force, and was followed with a presentation by MAJ Carey, USMC, on planning considerations for an amphibious assault. Several realistic tactical situations were presented to battalion commanders and staffs for their solution and brief-back. The purpose of these exercises was to enhance commander and staff interaction and get the players' "heads in the ball game". It was an extremely worthwhile and beneficial seminar.

(7) (C) From 10-19 Feb '82 the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) participated in Joint Training Exercise (JTX) Kindle Liberty '82, a JCS coordinated, USSOUTHCOM sponsored joint air, ground, and naval exercise designed to exercise and evaluate existing plans for the defense of the Panama Canal. Selected portions of OPLAN 6501-81, the augmentation force reception plan, and employment of both in place and augmentation forces were tested and evaluated to standard. Army units OPCON to the Brigade for the conduct of the JTX were: TF 1/502 Inf, Ft Campbell; 1/504 Inf, Ft Bragg; staff of the 53d SIB, FLARNG; elements of the 58th ATC, Ft Bragg; and soldiers from the 7th Transportation Group, Ft Eustis. The Panamanian Guardia Nacional participated with one platoon of MPs augmenting LEA and one platoon augmenting the OPFOR. Extensive logistical support operations to include logistics-over-the-shore operations (LOTS) and evaluation of the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) Emergency Evacuation Plan (BEEP) were also conducted. As in the past, live fire lanes were incorporated into exercise play.

(8) (C) Conduct of this year's exercise emphasized operations against both conventional and unconventional forces. Operations emphasized not only security of vital installations and critical facilities, but projected the battle outside the immediate canal operating area into the Brigade area of influence. Extensive use of air cavalry, airmobile forces, and a battalion amphibious assault using US Army assets supported by the Air Force and Navy combined to accomplish this "deep thrust" within the maneuver confines of the exercise.

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(9) (C) The identification and solution of joint operational problems was among the greatest benefits of the exercise. Problems inherent in our current OPLAN in command and control, control of fires within the canal operating area, and the necessity of centralization of command and control of the ground war are being addressed both with the other components and USSOUTHCOM.

(10) (U) Unit training weaknesses have been identified and training to correct these weaknesses was incorporated into future training plans.

(11) (U) The TAC CP was activated 16-25 Mar 82 for a Brigade Tactical Field Exercise (TFE). Units from the Brigade were evaluated to standard during the March TFE.

(12) (C) Brigade continues to support project Royal Duke with personnel and equipment resources.

(13) (C) Twenty-five SM, one CH-47, one OH58, and three UH-1H helicopters deployed to Costa Rica on 8 Mar 82 to conduct annual high altitude training. The training emphasizes pilot development and provides realistic "hands-on" training in the area of high altitude flying. Civic action projects are secondary to the overall training and are supported on each of the three weekends during the training period. Personnel and equipment will redeploy to Panama on 31 March 1982.

b. (U) Contingency and Disaster Relief:

(1) (U) A four man team from 36th EOD deployed to Venezuela on 30 Sep 81 - 4 Oct 81 to provide EOD support for the Vice President's visit.

(2) (U) A six man team from 36th EOD deployed to Colombia 11 Oct 81 for support of the Vice President's visit. Two of the service members returned to Panama on 15 Oct 81 and the remaining four members deployed to Rio de Janeiro to support the Vice President's visit there. They returned to Panama on 18 Oct 81.

(3) (U) A four man team from 36th EOD deployed to Mexico 21-26 Nov 81 for support of the Secretary of State's visit.

(4) (U) A two man team from 36th EOD deployed to St. Lucia, West Indies on 27 Nov 81 - 5 Dec 81. Their mission was to provide support for the Secretary of State's visit.

c. (U) Mobile Training Teams: The following MTTs were provided during the period, 1 Oct 81 - 31 Mar 82:

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(1) (S) El Salvador: Medical MTT deployed 1 Aug 81 - 17 Dec 81, (four SM); MILGroup assistant deployed 1 Jul 81 - 1 Oct 81, (one SM); Staff Assistance MTT deployed 28 Sep 81 - 3 Oct 81, (two SM); UH-1H Production Control MTT deployed 6 Sep 81 - 4 Nov 81, (one SM); UH-1H Engine/Powertrain Instructor MTT deployed 16 Oct 81 - 14 Dec 81, (two SM); Small Unit Training Phase II MTT deployed 16 Oct 81 - 17 Dec 81, (ten SM); Infantry Battalion Individual Training MTT deployed 4 Jan 82, (twenty-six SM); Admin/Log/Medical MTT deployed 4 Jan 82, (one SM); UH-1H Helicopter Maintenance MTT deployed 21 Jan 82, (three SM); (S) Survey Assistance Team deployed 3-18 Feb 82 (four SM); and Helicopter Recovery TAT deployed 8-12 Mar 82, (five SM).

(2) (U) Honduras: Arms Interdiction Phase II Liaison MTT deployed 11 Oct 81 - 19 Dec 81, (two SM); Arms Interdiction Phase II MTT deployed 16 Oct 81 - 19 Dec 81, (twelve SM); Civil Disturbance Survey deployed 22 Oct 81 - 27 Oct 81. Civil Disturbance MTT deployed 1 Nov 81 - 22 Nov 81, (twelve SM); Arms Interdiction Liaison MTT deployed 6 Jan 82, (two SM); Arms Interdiction MTT deployed 6 Jan 82, (twelve SM); and Military Freefall MTT deployed 13 Feb 82 - 28 Mar 82, (three SM).

(3) (U) Dominican Republic: SMUT MTT Survey deployed 10-16 Jan 82, (three SM); and SMUT MTT deployed 3 Feb 82, (eleven SM).

(4) (U) Ecuador: 4.2 in Mortar Maintenance Survey deployed 8-15 Dec 81; 4.2 Mortar Maintenance MTT deployed 26 Jan 82, (three SM); MC3 Parachute and Oxygen Console System Survey deployed 8-12 Mar 82, (one SM).

(5) (U) Barbados: Field Medical MTT deployed 16 Jan-12 Mar 82, (four SM).

(6) (U) Jamaica: Ranger School Establishment MTT deployed 18 Feb - 25 Mar 82, (six SM).

(7) (U) Venezuela: C-123 Operations Survey deployed 16-19 Mar 82, (two SM).

4. (U) Training:

a. (U) Basic Airborne Course commenced 15 Mar 82 with a completion date of 2 Apr 82. The cadre is provided by 3d Special Forces Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). There are 43 students participating in the class.

b. (U) FORSCOM Commanders Company Level Marksmanship Competition (FCCLMC): Second iteration completed 30 Dec 81. Forty company level teams participated. 83.2% of the personnel fired an average score of 33.21. High unit 3-7 SFG(A) with an 82.2%.

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c. (U) Battalion Training Management System (BTMS): The Battalion Training Management System has reached its sustainment phase. The Brigade has gone from one workshop per week to two workshops per week. This has almost doubled the number of BTMS trained individuals. Improvements in the quality of instruction for both initial training and instructor's military training cadre training have been dramatic. A second instructor was added in Nov 81. A total of 1177 SMs have undergone training during CY81.

d. (U) Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC): During the first and second quarter FY82 six Bn and one USMC Battalion trained at JOTC.

5. (U) Communications: The following factors significantly affect the operational readiness of the Brigade:

(1) (U) Lack of Tactical Telecommunications Center: The 396th Signal Company is authorized one terminal, telegraph (AN/TSC-58). This was authorized as of 1978 and has been on order since 1978. Requisition number is 8172-0001. The shortage of the terminal telegraph (AN/TSC-58) authorized to 396th Signal Company reduces the command control C-E capability of the Brigade. The Brigade currently has no tactical communications center capability and must rely totally on a single radio teletype net for all record traffic. This situation is unsatisfactory owing to the volume of traffic and typical percentage of daily reliability with radio teletype.

(2) (U) Shortage of Communications Secure Equipment: The current Brigade fill for secure voice (FM) equipment for vehicles is 84%. This situation coupled with only 20% fill of secure voice (FM) equipment for aircraft impacts on the C-E command and control of the Brigade. Through coordination with Communications Security Logistics Activity, Fort Huachuca, no requisition for the short equipment has been made due to the pending availability of these items.

(3) (U) Shortages of C-E Officer Personnel: The Brigade currently has four C-E officers scheduled to PCS between the May-Jul 82 time frame. The current status of the Brigade includes two vacant C-E officer billets and one warrant officer billet. There are currently three C-E officers and two warrant officer replacements scheduled for the Apr-Sep 82 time frame. Based on the Brigade's mission requirement, three officer billets going unfilled for approximately 3-4 months is unsatisfactory.

(4) (U) Lack of Mobile Long Haul Communications Maintenance Equipment: The arrival of three AN/URC-101 man-pack satellite terminals in

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Nov 81 provides a significant improvement in secure long-haul communications for contingency operations. The lack of mobile communications maintenance test equipment to support the AN/URC-101 satellite terminals and other Brigade communications systems could be corrected by procuring a commercial designed test set. Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell units that have AN/URC-101's are currently considering buying a Motorola communications analyzer model R-2002. The communications analyzer is a lightweight test set designed to convert over twelve individual maintenance tests into one test set. The communications analyzer is also designed to be operated by utilizing AC or battery power and costs approximately \$15,000.00.

6. (U) Logistics:

a. (S) <u>PWRS</u>	<u>DOS</u>	<u>S-RATING</u>
Class I (Subsistence)	50	S-1
Class III (Bulk)		
MOGAS	600	S-1
JP5	100	S-1
DFM	250	S-1
JP4	33	S-1
Class V (Ground)	50	S-1
Class VIII	24	*S-4

*Ratings in Class VIII are hampered by shortages in lines which cannot be stored because they cannot be effectively rotated. Additionally, the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 have required US Army MEDDAC-Panama to move from their warehouse in Curundu. Their new warehouses in Corozal have reduced storage capacity.

b. (S) Operational Project for this command is as follows:

FOR-P-01-81-A (PRJ) - Supports OPLAN 6501-81 and CONPLAN 6100-81.

c. (U) With the exception of the Class VIII status, there are no logistical problem areas which can be expected to deter accomplishment of the assigned mission of the 193d Inf Bde (Pan).

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7. (U) Force Development: During the period 1 Oct 82 - 31 Mar 82 FD actions affecting unit readiness follows:

a. (U) In order to absorb the 256 space civilian manpower reduction assessed by FORSCOM and at the same time avoid unnecessary turbulence, a detailed evaluation was conducted of the overall impact of the reduction on the command. Both controlled and non-controlled accounts as well as treaty and non-treaty allocations were examined. The 256 spaces have been identified and were submitted to FORSCOM for TDA inclusion during the window which closed in mid-Feb 82.

b. (U) The command has assessed the reduction of one TDA warrant officer authorization, which has been identified.


c. (U) The concept plan for the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) Logistics Support Command was resubmitted to FORSCOM on 4 Dec 81. It is currently being staffed.

d. (U) The concept plan to change the name of the command from 193d Inf Bde (Pan) to US Army Forces, Panama was not favorably received by DA. FD is now awaiting DA correspondence on this subject.

e. (U) In response to a FORSCOM request, the command has identified an Engineer Officer position for inclusion in the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). The position identified is a Platoon Leader position in the 518th Engineer Company. An enlisted instructor position in the Jungle Operations Training Center was also identified for PEP consideration.

f. (U) Eleven of the 23 MTOE's underwent changes during the reporting period. In addition, a new augmentation TDA for the Brigade was effective 16 Mar 82. The TDA reflects the manpower survey results but not the further reductions of authorization by FORSCOM. All MTOE changes were minor with two significant changes. They were B Battery, 22d Field Artillery changing from ALO 1 to ALO 2 based on increased requirements and the 193d Military Intelligence Company. The 193d Military Intelligence Company will go under a new MTOE in Sep 82. In the opinion of the unit commander and G2, 193d Inf Bde (Pan) the 193d Military Intelligence Company will suffer a degradation in mission if the MTOE is implemented without some change made necessary by the unique location and missions of the unit. These changes are being staffed and will be forwarded to FORSCOM for consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



E. L. STEVENS
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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