

# **MacArthur and Willoughby: Two “Bataan Boys” and a case study of Intelligence Operations in Asia from 1941 – 1951**

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## **Introduction**

Like all historical figures and events, the coverage and opinions surrounding General Douglas MacArthur and his staff during the period spanning World War II and the occupation of Japan are varied and sometimes controversial. While General MacArthur is known in popular history and among much of the American public as a decorated and famous war hero who bravely and selflessly commanded U.S. Army forces in the Pacific to victory against Japan, various long-form historical accounts from academic historians touch on the fact that much of this positive view was in a sense engineered by MacArthur’s staff and public relations team. Not only, historians show, did MacArthur have a bad relationship with most of Washington’s political and military leaders during and after the war, he insisted on always being the star of the show and would not allow anyone else to stand in the limelight.<sup>1</sup>

Several aspects which enrich and deepen the study of this period have only more recently been explored, such as a more detailed and objective look about the dynamics of MacArthur’s team, referred to often as the Bataan Boys. One relationship that seems to be of particular importance is that of MacArthur and members of his intelligence staff, primarily his G-2 (intelligence) chief Major General Charles A. Willoughby, as well as Major General Spencer B. Akin, head of the Signal Corps and (only discovered after the declassification of documents more recently) a key player in Central Bureau, the secret Allied encryption unit that broke Japanese military communications codes. Studies on this unit have shown that MacArthur’s

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)

usage of this intelligence gathered from Japanese military communications was selective; when he saw intelligence that lined up with his personal goals for the war, he unquestioningly used it as justification for his operations, but when encountering intelligence that went against these goals, he would ignore it or even downplay the importance of the intelligence before reporting it to superiors and field commanders.<sup>2</sup> This pattern of selective use of intelligence due to narcissistic reasons and for the achievement of personal goals is echoed in studies of MacArthur's contribution to the breakdown of U.S. intelligence estimates leading up to the Chinese military campaigns during the Korean War.<sup>3</sup>

Willoughby, for his part, is no better, and has his own murky history, which is far less documented. Willoughby's German heritage<sup>4</sup> and strong right-wing anti-communist views accompany a fascination with fascism, and these values lead him to also act in ways sometimes contrary to the goals of the overall Japanese occupation. While working officially as the historian to write MacArthur's official command history for the war and occupation, Willoughby allegedly worked to pull MacArthur's interest away from the interests of more pro-democratic actors in the Tokyo General Headquarters (GHQ), going as far as spying on his adversaries within headquarters, and aligning with high-ranking former leaders of Japanese military intelligence (who ultimately had their own dangerous goals for rearming Japan) to form a new postwar Japanese intelligence operation which would be tasked with rooting out communist and left-wing movements within the country.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Edward J. Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992)

<sup>3</sup> Rose McDermott and Uri Bar-Joseph, *Intelligence Success and Failure: the Human Factor* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), p.174-176

<sup>4</sup> Willoughby was born in Germany, but the identities of his parents are disputed; see *ibid.*, p. 177

<sup>5</sup> Richard Samuels, *Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2019), p. 81-91

As we now approach the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary year of the end of the war with Japan, this paper will examine the significance of the complicated relationship between MacArthur and Willoughby, as well as with related individuals in Pacific intelligence operations during and after World War II. The paper will aim to show that, due to their personal histories, MacArthur and Willoughby had mutual tendencies towards narcissism, cultural superiority, and other problems that led to mistakes in command decisions and a hole in U.S. intelligence that, when overlooked by Washington, grew in significance until the end of MacArthur's time in Asia: the failure to adequately prepare for the Chinese/North Korean offensives of the Korean War. Had these two men not held unchecked control of the U.S. intelligence operations in Asia, and had Washington paid more attention to its Asian operations rather than prioritizing the partition of Europe (which angered MacArthur and Willoughby further and may have caused them to act even more rashly), this period of history may have had different outcomes.

This paper will take the form of a case study, and will analyze the actions of MacArthur and Willoughby in the planning for Operation Olympic, the planned invasion of Japan, as well as treatments of intelligence in the months leading up to communist China's intervention in the Korean War in late 1950. These cases will demonstrate that these men must have deliberately reduced troop estimates, or at least that they ignored any intelligence that was contrary to the military situation they wanted to see at that time, due to their personality traits and biases outlined below. One disclaimer before we enter the analysis is that this paper does not intend to discount the overall military achievements of Douglas MacArthur or Charles Willoughby, as they were both powerful, skilled, and successful military commanders during WWII. Although the paper only focuses on these individuals in a mostly negative light, the purpose is not to discount their other military achievements and decorations. The service of these two men to

America is greatly respected – the paper simply aims to point out some mistakes that were made and also attempt to explain why they happened.

### **MacArthur: The star of the show**

Douglas MacArthur was born in 1880 as the son of U.S. Army officer Arthur MacArthur and Mary Pinckney, and lived the childhood of what we would now call an “Army Brat.” No home was ever really permanent as the MacArthur’s moved together with their father to postings in the American West, Southwest, and later the Philippines. Arthur MacArthur had by then earned his place as one of America’s most skilled military commanders, and Mary Pinckney came from a wealthy family in Virginia, so Douglas grew up in a life of rather high standing despite moving around so much. This probably influenced his unique style of dress (he did not conform to standard army dress code) and sense of entitlement that he began to adopt as a Brigadier General in Germany during World War I.<sup>6</sup>

MacArthur was known to hold his family and loved ones in high importance, even if that was at the expense of his career in the military. After receiving a negative evaluation from a commanding officer in Milwaukee due to spending too much time with his family, an Army connection of Douglas’s father Arthur reassigned Douglas to a different position before more negative reports could be placed on his record. Especially in the early years of his career, Douglas appeared to move up in the ranks and was able to make himself known to the army leadership at the time due to his father’s network rather than his own merit.<sup>7</sup>

Once given command positions, Douglas was able to blossom as a charismatic speaker and effective commander, especially while commanding the “rainbow division” in WWI comprised of

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<sup>6</sup> Schaller, *Far Eastern General*, p. 10

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8

national guard units rather than army soldiers. Here MacArthur begins showing some of his traits we see later in life – a tendency to shun safety equipment, engage in ridiculous acts of bravery by intentionally taking himself and his men into risky situations, protecting his men from outside scrutiny and criticism in exchange for their loyalty, and making a personality of himself by wearing unique caps and uniforms that did not conform to army dress codes.<sup>8</sup> Douglas was said to be “acting out” in the army because he wanted to rise up the ranks as fast as possible, and maybe become chief of staff, because his father had been passed up for the position for political reasons when the family thought he was worthy. Douglas always seemed to want to avenge his father, take the position he had deserved at the top of the army, and maybe even surpass him in terms of public reputation. As a result, however, Douglas’s unique operating methods began to make him enemies in Washington.<sup>9</sup>

After being appointed Army Chief of Staff, some political disagreements with the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration during the New Deal era caused MacArthur to be sent to Manila to be a military advisor for the Philippine Commonwealth. While MacArthur himself didn’t object to this as he saw this as following his father, also an important figure in Philippine history, FDR’s intention was basically to exile Douglas in the Pacific, away from Washington. The Filipino leaders took such a liking to MacArthur that he was appointed Field Marshal of the Philippines and given exorbitant housing and salary on top of his U.S. Army salary, further fueling his ego. Another problem for FDR was that as the geopolitical situation in Asia began to destabilize with the expansion of the Japanese empire as well as the Communist/Nationalist split in China, MacArthur, now with a depth of Asia experience, was positioned to be the foremost military authority on Asia. Therefore, MacArthur was tasked with the defense of the Philippines (at which

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., Ch. 1-2

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, Ch. 2-3

he failed for reasons beyond the scope of this paper), and was subsequently appointed the Army commander of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) at the onset of the war against Japan. SWPA is where we see MacArthur begin to fully establish his command separate from Washington. With a team of loyal staff called the “Bataan Boys” (discussed later), MacArthur cemented his legacy as one of the most well-known military commanders of the era through a powerful public relations office, and also is credited as being the military leader behind the victory against Japan.

From this brief overview and other historical events, there are a few conclusions we can make about Douglas as a person. With a need for all the attention and all the credit, Douglas MacArthur made it clear the successes of the SWPA and later the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan were solely his and his alone, and that he was strictly doing his best to serve American interests as they were presented to him. Having a distrust of Washington, Douglas made sure as soon as the SWPA was formed to distinctly separate its operations from Washington, and monopolized his operations by consolidating power in his team of Bataan Boys. A master of shifting blame for military mistakes away from himself and his staff, MacArthur’s common path was to blame Washington for lack of required resources when things went wrong – we see this from the retreat from the Philippines in 1941 all the way through the Pacific War and even in the Korean War.<sup>10</sup>

### **Willoughby: The longest serving Bataan Boy**

MacArthur’s team of officers – many who stayed with him throughout the whole war – were referred to both in wartime and in historical accounts as “The Bataan Boys” or “The Bataan Gang” due to this core of general staff having been with MacArthur during the escape from the Filipino island of Corregidor in 1942. Bataan refers to the peninsula in Manila Bay where

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<sup>10</sup> This is particularly evident in MacArthur’s *Reminiscences*, his memoirs published in 1964.

American and Filipino forces put up their unsuccessful stand against that Japanese, and apart from MacArthur's affinity with it (he later named his air transport plane after it), the peninsula is also famous for the Bataan Death March after the fall of the Philippines.

Of the Bataan Boys, Major General Charles A. Willoughby was the officer that served longest at MacArthur's headquarters, from 1941 all the way until MacArthur's dismissal from Asia in 1951.<sup>11</sup> Although the consensus for many years was that Willoughby was born in Germany in 1892 as Adolf Tscheppe-Weidenbach to a German baron and his American wife, this is disputed, with allegations that he may have faked his family background as an investigation by a German weekly magazine found no record of the German baron Willoughby is supposed to be the child of.<sup>12</sup>

Professionally, Willoughby became known among MacArthur's staff as "sir Charles" due to his slight European accent and high-class mannerisms. He was also described as "aloof" and a bit of a "prima donna," prone to dramatic and sudden outbursts of emotion.<sup>13</sup> These outbursts of emotion were mainly directed at other members of the Bataan Boys, as Willoughby had frequent conflicts with Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff, as well as Spencer B. Akin, the de facto head of the classified Central Bureau decryption unit which successfully broke Japanese military codes during the war. Sutherland strictly controlled access to MacArthur until his departure in 1945, and Willoughby always thought he should be allowed more direct access due to his important intelligence role. Akin, who had previous experience in intercepting and decoding radio messages, probably looked down on Willoughby as being less competent and

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<sup>11</sup> In contrast to MacArthur and many other Bataan Boys and related staff, Willoughby does not write a memoir about himself, instead he only writes one that focuses on MacArthur in a positive light, entitled MacArthur: 1941-1951

<sup>12</sup> McDermott and Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Success and Failure, p. 178

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, as well as Drea, MacArthur's ULTRA, and Hiroshi Masuda and Reiko Yamamoto. *MacArthur in Asia : The General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea*. (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 2013)

certainly did not respect Willoughby's opinion. Akin routinely bypassed Willoughby, his direct superior as head of intelligence, in favor of sending important information directly to Sutherland or MacArthur – Willoughby would sometimes not receive this information for 24 hours or more after being bypassed, and it likely caused great personal frustration for him.<sup>14</sup>

Despite these conflicts with other staff, MacArthur and Willoughby had a positive personal relationship when they met personally. Both write positively of each other in their post-war memoirs, and it is certain that the two men had a deep bond from their shared experiences on Corregidor and across the decade or so they worked together. During the occupation of Japan, Sutherland's departure made Willoughby the longest serving Bataan Boy at GHQ, and he therefore was afforded greater access to MacArthur. During this time, the two men are known to have talked a lot more, and Willoughby's loyalty to his commander was unwavering.<sup>15</sup> Whether it was due to MacArthur's influence or personally motivated, Willoughby exhibited a similar affinity to monopolize his control over his area of command, consistently refused outside help, and preferred to only believe intelligence generated by his own department. As a result, Washington's intelligence organizations and Willoughby's departments generated completely separate intelligence reports, and there was not one report between the two which was circulated to all relevant officers and decisionmakers.<sup>16</sup>

In addition to the other personal characteristics, Willoughby's well documented right-wing views likely affected his judgement and decision making over the course of his career. An underlying fear of communist incursion into U.S. and Japanese society was brought to the forefront when U.S. officials uncovered the case of the Richard Sorge spy ring discovered by

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<sup>14</sup> Drea, MacArthur's ULTRA

<sup>15</sup> Samuels, Special Duty p. 81-91

<sup>16</sup> Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001) Ch. 13

Japanese officials in 1941. Willoughby, who believed that elements of that spy ring still existed, used the case of expanding communist influence to push for the creation of the Japanese national police and a clandestine intelligence organization – going as far as teaming up with former Japanese Imperial Army intelligence officers and dispatching spies from the newly created national police to conduct surveillance on Americans in GHQ he suspected of communist activity.<sup>17</sup> Willoughby is quoted later in a speech to American anti-communist supporters as saying, *“In time of peace, it [military intelligence] is concerned with security, sabotage, and subversion through a counterintelligence section – a sort of military FBI.”*<sup>18</sup> This idea that Willoughby thought he was essentially the Japanese FBI without as much federal oversight as the real FBI is another piece of evidence showing that Willoughby, like MacArthur, thought rather highly of himself and monopolized power around him.

### **1942 – 1945: MacArthur, G-2, and intelligence during WWII**

During the war, the process of intelligence gathering on paper was that Willoughby would gather and interpret all the collected intelligence, then publishing it as the “Far East Summary” or a report of another name and distributing it to MacArthur and field commanders in the Pacific.<sup>19</sup> However, as mentioned in the previous section, Willoughby was often passed over for sharing the most sensitive intelligence (from coded sources) and would often not have access to it until after chief of staff Sutherland and MacArthur had seen it. This is due to the fact that Akin of Central Bureau would always send the most important information by courier directly to

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<sup>17</sup> Samuels, *Special Duty*, p. 81-91

<sup>18</sup> Charles A. Willoughby, “Soviet Espionage: The American Communist Party.” Transcript of a speech from 1957 to the Annual Convention of American Patriotic Societies.

<sup>19</sup> Frank, *Downfall*, Ch. 13

MacArthur's office.<sup>20</sup> This likely cultivates Willoughby's suspicion that his fellow general staff members are hiding something from him, and contributes to his post-war behaviors which will be discussed in the next section.

For MacArthur, we see obvious examples of him selectively using the intelligence provided him, especially once the Japanese military codes begin to be reliably broken in 1943 by both the SWPA's Central Bureau as well as the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) in Virginia. MacArthur's ultimate goals as the commander of the Southwest Pacific Area Theater command were to: retake the Philippine archipelago and liberate the Philippine people, and then later in the war to make the largest amphibious invasion in history by executing Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu on the Japanese Home Islands.<sup>21</sup> For MacArthur, these are the ONLY ways to win the war against Japan, despite there being other alternatives raised by other service branches and commanders.

In some cases, MacArthur used intelligence to his benefit, such as when he moved up scheduled attacks on Hollandia and the Admiralties (all part of present day Papua New Guinea) due to intelligence indicating it would be beneficial to do so as Japanese forces were retreating or repositioning to defend other locations.<sup>22</sup> These operations and others were likely championed in the armed forces at the time as examples of the power of using good intelligence, and only served to fuel MacArthur's ego. However, MacArthur chose to ignore intelligence on other occasions when he needed to win a certain battle in order to advance to his ultimate goal. In the case of another battle in New Guinea, MacArthur needed to cross to the north side of the island in order to take up a better defensive position against the Japanese, and as a result sent a general,

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<sup>20</sup> Drea, MacArthur's ULTRA

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, and also Schaller, Far Eastern General Ch. 6

<sup>22</sup> Edward J. Drea, "Ultra Intelligence and General Douglas MacArthur's Leap to Hollandia, January-April 1944," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1990), p. 323-349

Robert L. Eichelberger, to “capture Buna or not come back alive.” MacArthur did this even though his intelligence warned of 2,000 Japanese troops which was an underestimation of the 8,000 that Eichelberger eventually faced.<sup>23</sup>

The biggest case of MacArthur ignoring intelligence given to him and confirmed by multiple sources was during the planning for Operation Downfall, the invasion of Japan, and its component operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu. At the outset, the Americans (primarily MacArthur, who most favored a land invasion) made several dangerous assumptions about conditions in Japan. Three of the four are relevant to this paper, and they are: 1) operation Olympic should only encounter three Japanese divisions each on southern and northern Kyushu; 2) no more than ten Japanese divisions would be sent to Kyushu as reinforcements during the invasion; and 3) no more than 2,500 Japanese aircraft would be used to defend against operation Olympic. Richard B. Frank, whose work Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire examines the planning for this operation in depth, notes that these three assumptions were horribly wrong as indicated by allied intelligence by the summer of 1945, where Willoughby and other allied intelligence officers began to witness a huge surge of Japanese defenses on the island.<sup>24</sup> Despite being well aware of that fact, MacArthur continued to assure the Joint Chiefs of Staff until the beginning of August that in this case he did not believe that Japan was really amassing such a defensive force, and that the Imperial Japanese Army was just engaging in an act of deception. This is called a “brazen lie” by Frank, who goes further to say that General Willoughby’s consistent underestimations of Japanese troop numbers in the face of conflicting intelligence from coded communications enables MacArthur to trust his man instead of Central

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<sup>23</sup> Schaller, Far Eastern General, p. 71

<sup>24</sup> Frank, Downfall, Ch. 13

Bureau and the MIS in this case.<sup>25</sup> While we cannot determine the concrete reasons for General Willoughby's consistent underestimations of Japanese military power, this problem of Willoughby's to only believe his own estimates and dismiss other intelligence when convenient plays a big part in the case of the Korean War as well.

### **1945 – 1950: G-2 operations during the Japanese occupation**

After the occupation of Japan begins, chief of staff Sutherland is forced to return to America due to his losing the faith of MacArthur over an alleged affair with a Southeast Asian woman. As a result, Willoughby is able to have more direct access and influence on MacArthur as the senior officer among the remaining Bataan Boys. Willoughby, afraid of communist interventions in Japan and within the American occupational forces, works far too freely with his collaborators and contacts within the former officers of the Japanese military intelligence branch. Rather than cooperate for the sake of American democracy, however, these former officers smartly collaborated with the American occupying force in order to assure their pardoning from being tried of war crimes later. Many of these officers actively engaged in the black market selling information while simultaneously working with the GHQ and Willoughby.<sup>26</sup> Whether it is because of the influence of these officers or just due to his own personal fears, Willoughby hones in on his fear of communism and begins to establish the National Japanese Police Force apart from a regular police force is a paramilitary and spy organization that is tasked with rooting out communist influence within Japan. At one point, Willoughby was so interested in surveilling democratic interests in the GHQ (mainly General Courtney Whitney of the Government Section) that he had Japanese police spy on such officials and hide their reports from all U.S. officials but

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 275-6

<sup>26</sup> Samuels, Special Duty p. 81

himself.<sup>27</sup> Willoughby's collaborations with these Japanese officials not only compromised U.S. intelligence efforts in Asia, the former Japanese officers were successful in "redirecting the occupation's attention" for a time, likely sending Willoughby into projects away from his operational mandate to protect not only Japan but Korea in the later years. This may be a factor as to why Willoughby also ignored intelligence about the Chinese intervention in Korea, which will be our next case.

### **1950: Intelligence failures and the Chinese intervention in Korea**

Five years after their "brazen lies" in defending the operation Olympic plans, MacArthur and Willoughby are key players in the pivotal moment of the conflict: U.S. and U.N. forces' failure to be adequately prepared for the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. In MacArthur's memoirs, he speaks of his hands being tied by Washington and not being allowed to prevent the attack. In reality, MacArthur was deliberately rushing the Yalu river despite having inadequate military strength to face the Chinese because he was certain that the Chinese army could not stand up to superior American power, according to one study in the national security/intelligence literature.<sup>28</sup> By ignoring reports about the new Chinese army under Mao, MacArthur underestimated the power of the Chinese force. In MacArthur's own words, he is convinced that fighting to victory and the surrender of the enemy is "an American Tradition," where in contrast scholars have found that such a concept has only existed since the days of FDR and WWII in Japan.<sup>29</sup> In the face of contrasting orders from Washington, MacArthur brazenly applies his previous mandate of unconditional surrender and knowledge of his previous "victory"

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 82

<sup>28</sup> McDermott and Bar-Joseph, *Intelligence Success and Failure*, p. 175

<sup>29</sup> MacArthur makes reference to this "tradition" on p. 334-5 of *Reminiscences*

against the Japanese in attempting to face the Chinese People's Army head on towards an assured victory.

Willoughby, for his part, is no better. Due to his devotion to his boss, as well as his own belief in the superiority of his own intelligence (which we have shown to be consistently flawed), Willoughby blatantly disregards warnings from allies in Taiwan and South Korea about the strength and numbers of the Chinese forces at the Yalu river. Additionally, Willoughby allegedly prevents CIA agents from interrogating Chinese POWs held in Pyongyang around the same period, due to fear that they will disclose information leading to different troop estimates than his own, loosening his monopoly on intelligence production in Korea and Asia.<sup>30</sup> This action is what prevents the CIA and therefore Washington from having any chance to discover the magnitude of Willoughby's underestimation of Chinese forces in this case. Therefore, both the CIA and Willoughby's Chinese troop estimates stayed low until days before the conflict, when all parties realized they were horribly wrong and attempted to move to correct their mistakes.<sup>31</sup> This case ultimately started the chain of events that led to MacArthur's dismissal from command, and Willoughby's voluntary departure to follow his revered commander.

### **Conclusion: Spreading the blame**

Declassified intelligence histories and reports studied by the likes of Frank, Drea, and scholars in the intelligence strategy literature, coupled with a study of the history and personalities of MacArthur and his intelligence chief Willoughby, show us the risks that delegating broad administrative responsibility without much oversight holds. The U.S. clearly knows this, as in no conflict since this period has a military commander ever had such a broad

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<sup>30</sup> McDermott and Bar-Joseph, *Intelligence Success and Failure*, p. 181

<sup>31</sup> Stanley Sandler, "The CIA, Willoughby, and Military Intelligence in East Asia, 1946-1950," *Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman: Japan, China, and the Two Koreas* (Truman State University Press, 2012)

mandate and scope of power without more oversight from the President, if not through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although it could be argued that the lower level of technology at that time prevented Washington from exerting such oversight even if it wanted to, this does not remove President Truman and the Joint Chiefs from responsibility to make sure things didn't get out of hand in Tokyo. Despite repeated refusals by MacArthur to yield, as well as Willoughby's monopolization of the intelligence operations, it is this author's opinion that Washington could have done more before the Chinese intervention in Korea. It is likely that MacArthur is correct in his memoirs when he states that the U.S. was prioritizing European partitioning too much and was probably under pressure by the U.K. and other Western European nations to do so. In a more neutral sense, it could be said that MacArthur and Washington share equal parts of the blame for these mistakes, but the missteps of each party should not be discounted and should be learned from.

There is also the issue of optics, which even in the 1940s seems to have been a big issue when considering important American decisions. It is mentioned in Schaller's *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* that Washington kept MacArthur in power for all of this period in part due to his public popularity and image of power in Japan. Along that line of reasoning, it's apt to infer that MacArthur was only removed when it was clear that he and Willoughby had grossly underestimated the Chinese threat and disobeyed direct orders from Washington – such a lapse could not be covered by the best of PR departments anywhere, and gave the opportunity Truman needed to remove MacArthur without as much public debate and questions from the Japanese as there could have been.

More broadly, this paper is one example of the influence that personal bias and personality can have in interpreting and choosing what to believe in an intelligence environment. This case

specifically shows the importance of cultivating and accepting diverse sources of intelligence, as well as the importance of oversight by parties not so deeply involved in the day to day operations the intelligence concerns. Intelligence is important work; it keeps both our armed forces and the public safe from harm. Intelligence must be used responsibly, and assessed and appraised from as objective a point of view as possible. Otherwise, mistakes like this may continue to happen. I leave readers with a question to ask themselves: 75 years on from World War II and about 70 years from MacArthur's dismissal from Asia, have we gotten any better?

## Bibliographic Essay

My interest in the topic for this paper grew from an initial interest in intelligence work by Japanese Americans during WWII, as my maternal grandfather served at a radio listening post during the war. As data on MIS is limited and less known, I also learned that Japanese Americans not affiliated with MIS were used as translation staff in MacArthur's Southwest Pacific area command, and that fact led me to the ULTRA program, which is covered extensively in Drea's book MacArthur's ULTRA, a source used extensively for this paper. Drea notes in his conclusion that MacArthur tended to selectively use intelligence for his personal gain, but does not go into why exactly MacArthur behaved that way. Richard B. Frank goes into this in a little more detail in his book, Downfall, The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. However, the coverage still is not deep enough and merits deeper analysis, as Frank only uses Drea's work to support why MacArthur lied about Japanese troop estimates in Kyushu for Operation Olympic.

After further reading of biographies of MacArthur, historical accounts of the end of the war, and some national security/intelligence literature, it was clear that MacArthur's behavior was probably motivated by his personality traits as laid out in the paper. The literature also implicated Willoughby as being a willing accomplice, or at least a loyal officer just following orders, in manipulating intelligence and sending false troop estimates to Washington. Further examination of Willoughby indicates that his biases, fear of communism, and similar tendency to monopolize and consolidate power for his own benefit may have also motivated him to ignore intelligence that did not come from his own department.

Despite an original focus on Japanese Americans, this work turned into quite an interesting study of how not only personal bias and cultural superiority but also a lack of oversight can lead to mistakes and errors in command decisions and the use of intelligence. The project, however, does have its limitations. Despite my desire to do so, I was not able to procure primary materials written during the war by MacArthur, Willoughby, or other staff to corroborate my sources that were written after the fact. A great wealth of information exists in the MacArthur papers and the Willoughby papers, which are archived at the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, VA. At the time this project was due, I had just heard back from the archivist at the memorial, and may be able to build on this work with the primary materials I can borrow from the archive. I feel as if the primary sources (often cited by historians such as Drea and Frank when speaking of these two individuals and the war in general) will allow me to draw my own conclusions about the thoughts and actions of MacArthur and Willoughby, rather than relying on someone else's interpretation.

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