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Folder 16



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



TRANSLATION

|  |  |   |                                     |                   |
|--|--|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| REQUESTER                                | TRANSLATOR'S INITIALS                                    | TRANSLATION NUMBER  | DATE COMPLETED                      | ENCL(S) TO FR NO. |
| (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i); (b)(3):10 USC 424 |  |   | 4 JUN 1985                          |                   |
| LANGUAGE                                 | GEOGRAPHIC AREA (If different from place of publication) |   |                                     |                   |
| SPANISH                                  | EL SALVADOR  |   |                                     |                   |
| ENGLISH TITLE OF TRANSLATION             |  |   | PAGE NOS. TRANSLATED FROM ORIG DOC. |                   |
| MEMORANDUM DOCUMENT NO. 3 THROUGH 230    |  |   | all                                 |                   |
| FOREIGN TITLE OF TRANSLATION             |  |   |                                     |                   |
| MEMORANDUM DOCUMENTO 3 A 230             |  |   |                                     |                   |
| AUTHOR(S)                                |  | FOREIGN TITLE OF DOCUMENT (Complete only, if different from title of translation) |                                     |                   |
|  |  | 21 ju183 EL SALVADOR  |                                     |                   |
| PUBLISHER                                |  | DATE AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION   |                                     |                   |
|  |  |   |                                     |                   |
| COMMENTS                                 |  |   |                                     |                   |
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| TRANSLATION                              |  |   |                                     |                   |
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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 July 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 3

DATE: NO DATE

TITLE: WORK PLAN OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE (SCI)  
PROJECTION OF INTELLIGENCE WORK

ABSTRACT OF CONTENTS:

1. OBJECTIVES

- a) To give information to the FPL.
- b) To obtain political, military, economic and personal information about the high functionaries of the state.
- c) To penetrate high levels in the Capital and others.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL METHODS

- a) To integrate and to structure the SCI. (Reference of responsibilities: Carlos, Ricardo, Tonita and Benjamin).
- b) To form an intelligence team for military affairs (Armed Forces).
- c) To integrate, consolidate and develop the Tracking team.
- d) To coordinate with other leftist groups.
- e) To execute work abroad and to coordinate with the FAPL general staff.

3. METHODS FOR PENETRATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

4. MEASURES FOR PENETRATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

5. TECHNICAL METHODS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

6. METHODS OF WORK

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

7. COMMUNICATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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8. INFRASTRUCTURE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

9. POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

10. MILITARY FORMATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

REFERENCE NOTES: CNSCI-SGI-COCOS-CONAREL-CONAMAS-FAPL

SUBJECTS: Carlos, Ricardo, Tonita (Benjamin).

WORK PLAN OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE (SCI)

PROJECTION OF INTELLIGENCE WORK

I. OBJECTIVES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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424.

## II. ORGANIZATIONAL METHODS


1. To integrate and structure the Sub-commission on Intelligence (SCI), with its respective Party functions, with three associates. Carlos, Ricardo, Tonita (Benjamin).

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1).



## III. METHODS FOR PENETRATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1).



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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IV. MEASURES FOR PENETRATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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
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424

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
V. TECHNICAL MEASURES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)



VI. METHODS OF WORK

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)



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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VII. ABOUT COMMUNICATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VIII. INFRASTRUCTURE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IX. POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

X. MILITARY FORMATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3);10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 9

DATE: July 80

TITLE: WORK PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION TEAM  
(Production of false identification documents)

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

PERSONS IN CHARGE: Claudia, Mario, Jaime, Delegado C.P. Juan Bautista, Pedro,  
Elisa and Alberto.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

WORK PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION TEAM

DATE: August and September.

PLAN OBJECTIVES:

Sec. 1.4(a); Sec. 1.4(b); (b)(1)

ORGANIZATIONAL OUTLINE

1. Create the Sub-committee formed by Claudia, Mario, Jaime and the female comrade named by the C.P. within one and a half months.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC  
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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

## II. OUTLINE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

2. Create the small shop of Stamps and Photoengraving with its own infrastructure within one month.
  - Comrades Jaime and Pedro should present a plan by the 30th of this month.
3. Establish our own site in the Metro Zone for the training program, within 21 days.
  - Comrades Claudia and Elisa should present a proposal by the 30th of this month.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

## III. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC  
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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IV. OBTENTION OF DOCUMENTS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

V. THE WORK DONE ABROAD

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VI. EXTENSION OF DOCUMENTS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC  
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VII. TECHNICAL TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

The following training courses will be given according to the work to be developed.

- Production of documents (from our country and the Central American area and Mexico). Claudia and Elisa are in charge.
- Photography, Drawing and Serigraphy; Jaime and Mario are in charge.
- Reproduction of Stamps and Photoengraving, Jaime and Pedro.
- Offset printing, comrade Alberto.

VIII. POLITICAL-MILITARY PREPARATION OF END AND ITS NETWORK

1. Comrades Mario and Jaime are delegated to present an integral plan for the political and military indoctrination by August 15.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IX. CONTROL MEASURES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION TEAM OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OF THE CENTRAL COMMISSION.

July 1980

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

July 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM

Document No. 17

Date: Aug 80

TITLE: Project for the Special Operations Detachment

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC  
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OUTLINE FOR THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DETACHMENT  
To August 1980.

- I Introduction
- II General Objectives
- III Goals: a. Organizational  
b. Political-Ideological  
c. Technical-Military  
d. Infrastructural  
e. Logistical
- IV Tasks (Plans and programs)
- V Control Mechanisms

I. INTRODUCTION

II GENERAL OBJECTIVES

Sec. 1.4(a); Sec. 1.4(b); (b)(1)

III GOALS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IV TASKS  
PLANS AND PROGRAMS

Organizational:

1. To complete the rifle detachment by the first week of August.
2. Establish the command as follows: Neto, Lito, Felipe and Aparicio, and also Nelson.
3. Prepare for the second week of August all the recruiting cards.
4. Prepare all the militancy cards of the leaders of Platoons and Sections by the third week of August.

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(b)(3):10 USC  
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5. Promote the Political Leader of the Detachment in the first week of August.
6. Establish the Commands of Section 3 in the first week of August. (Oscar, Douglas, Beto).
7. Prepare new Leaders for the other Special Operations units (Detachment 2)
8. Transfer six comrades to other areas by the first week of August and six others by the third week.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

PRINCIPALS:

GATO, VEJIGA, ZANATE, TIGRE, PORCINO, OTRA ENCOMIENDA, NARCISO, SIMIO.

SECONDARY:

Confiscations: cradles, toboggan, weapons, depot.

CHALECO, PAVIAN, INDIO, LA MULAS, MEGAFONO, TECOLOTE, SERENOS, POSTAS.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC  
424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 18

DATE: 15 Sept 1980

TITLE: EMERGENCY PLAN TO EXPEDITE TRAVEL OF FELLOWSHIP RECIPIENTS COMING FROM  
LAGOS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC  
424

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EVALUATION REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF THE FELLOWSHIP RECIPIENTS STRANDED IN LAGOS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

The next 12 pages are withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and are not included.

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 40

DATE: July 1980

TITLE: WAR PLAN

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)



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(b)(3):10 USC  
424

The next nine pages are withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and are not included.

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 42

DATE: NO DATE

TITLE: TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ON THE WAR IN EL SALVADOR

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC  
424

21 JUL 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 44

DATE: No Date

TITLE: DEVELOPMENT OF SOME CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR PLAN

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

1. SYNTHESIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

REFERENCES: Document presented for Discussion in DRU, by Joaquín Villalobos.

MEMORANDUM

Doc. No.

DEVELOPMENT OF SOME CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR PLAN S/F.

SUMMARY

Synthesis of the economic and social bases.  
Creation of the revolutionary force.  
Strategic and tactical conception of the offensive.  
Main movement in the beginning of the strategic offensive.  
Offensive and Counter offensive.  
Some variables in the behavior of the enemy.

REFERENCES: Secure the rear guard. Insurrection of cities. Control of the communication routes.

OBSERVATIONS: 15 pages. Document for discussion in DRU presented by JOAQUIN VILLALOBOS

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

DEVELOPMENT OF SOME CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR PLAN

I. SYNTHESIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

II. CREATION OF THE STRATEGIC REVOLUTIONARY FORCE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC  
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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

III. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CONCEPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

The next three pages are withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and are not included.

IV. THE PRINCIPAL MOVEMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

VI. SOME VARIABLES OF THE ENEMY'S BEHAVIOUR


Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)



DOCUMENT PRESENTED TO THE DRU FOR DISCUSSION BY JOAQUIN VILLALOBOS

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

21 JUL 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO: 50

DATE: No Date

TITLE: PLAN OF THE ORGANIZATION COMMISSION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

II. OBJECTIVES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3): 10 USC 424

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IV. ACTIVITIES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

V. GOALS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VI. MEANS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3).10 USC

21 Jul 85

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 67

DATE: June 1980

TITLE: ORIENTATION AND OPERATIONS PLAN OF THE C.P. -THE COMMITTEES IN  
NEIGHBORHOODS AND DEVELOPMENTS (COLONIAS)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

I HOPE THAT THIS WORK WILL BE CORRECTED AND EXPANDED BY THE E.M.R.  
CRITIQUED AND ACCEPTED

ARMED STRUGGLE TODAY SOCIALISM TOMORROW

JUAN CARLOS ESCOBAR

(Notes: Taken from Campaign Orders of the General Command Headquarters of the  
FARN - 1 to 30 June (illegible))

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983


MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 68

DATE: 14 Jan to 14 Apr 1980

TITLE: WORK PLAN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION OF THE NEW SECTORS:  
AEU - CCVM - MCP

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)



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(b)(3) 10 USC

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21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 76.

DATE: No date

TITLE: PLAN FOR INTERNATIONAL WORK OF THE FMLN - FDR

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC

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**I. GENERAL OBJECTIVES:**

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

**II. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES FOR THE REGION:**

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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
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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

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III. RELATIONSHIPS WORK

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)



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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983.

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 122

DATE: No date

TITLE: PROPOSAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA SECTION  
OF THE GENERAL STAFF

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

I. OBJECTIVES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

II. FUNCTIONS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND REQUIREMENTS

1. Eight comrades are needed for the section (organizational proposal).
2. Coordinators for political work at the fronts: Alfonso, Dina, Juan Pablo, Comrade X and Comrade Y.
3. Chief of Propaganda: Comrade Mario.

IV. OPERATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

V. GOALS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VI. WORK PLAN: (From September 1 to October 30)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

PROPOSAL FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA SECTION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF

1. Objectives
2. Functions
3. Organizational Structure and Requirements
4. Operation
5. Goals
6. Work Plan

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

3. Organizational Structure and Requirements  
The section will have the following working structure:

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(b)(3):10 USC

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Eight comrades are needed for this Section.

Organizational proposals:

Coordinators of the political work in the Fronts: Alfonso, Dina, Juan Pablo, Comrade X and Comrade Y.

Chief of the Propaganda Team Comrade Mario.

Relocation of comrades Juana and Eva is requested.

Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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
(b)(3):10 USC 424

Section Propaganda

b) A pamphlet on the ongoing work of the Chief will be distributed to the zones, as follows:

- b.a Front Felipe Pena: 100 pamphlets
- Front Apolinario Serrano: 150 pamphlets
- Front Roberto Sibrian: 150 pamphlets
- Front Feliciano Ama: 75 pamphlets
- Front Aguilar Flor: 80 pamphlets

Sec. 1.4(b); (b)(1)



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(b)(3): 10 USC 424

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21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 127

DATE: No date

TITLE: PLAN FOR TAKING OVER COMMUNITIES

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

1. OPERATIVE SITUATION OF THE ENEMY AND OUR FORCE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

[Redacted content for Section 1]

2. COMMAND FORMATION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

[Redacted content for Section 2]

3. GROUPS PARTICIPATING AND ITS MISSIONS

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

[Redacted content for Section 3]

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

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21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 146

DATE: 21/11/81

TITLE: PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOL OF FRONT APOLINARIO SERRANO  
(PEOPLE'S HEROES: "NETO" and "SEWBASTIAN")

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 155

DATE: No date

TITLE: WORK PLAN OF THE COMMISSION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FTC (FPL)  
FOR THE REGIONAL DEPARTMENTAL COMMISSIONS OF POLITICAL FORMATION IN THE  
SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

I. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

- 1) Intermediate Leadership and Local Leadership Organizations: Understand what a leadership organization is about; to obtain full knowledge of its functions; to learn methods for: studies, preparation of analysis, preparation of communiqués; to direct and organize meetings, for an operations manual, etc.  
Study subjects: What is a leadership organization, its location, importance and role.  
What should a revolutionary leader be like.
- 2) Women: To elevate their political level for a massive participation of women to be incorporated in the revolutionary process, with small courses given at regional and national levels for women.  
Study Subjects: Six special subjects shall be discussed that will raise the political ideological level of women.
- 3) Children, Youngsters and Elderly: There will be formation plans for children 6 to 12 years old, from 12 to 16 and adults, in order to prepare them politically and ideologically for a massive incorporation to our party; raising their political level and the practical application of the political line so as to contribute to the consolidation of the organization.  
Study Subjects:  
Seven special subjects will be discussed that will develop political and ideological awareness of the participants, in order to have them join our organization conscious of the role they will undertake.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT FOR THE POLITICAL WORK OF UTC

- 1) Zone division:
  - a) Volcan Zone
  - b) Central Zone
  - c) Northern Zone
  - d) Coastal Zone
- a) Bases of the Volcan Zone: The names of 12 bases are mentioned with their respective names of Secretaries of political indoctrination. (One secretary needs to be named. List attached.)
- b) Bases of the Central Zone: The names of 14 bases are mentioned with their respective names of political indoctrination Secretaries. (Two secretaries need to be named. List attached.)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

- c) Bases of the Coastal Zone: Eleven bases are mentioned by name, and only two secretaries of political indoctrination have been named, with nine nominations pending. (See attached list)
- d) Bases of the Northern Zone: Six bases are mentioned by name and only one secretary of political formation has been named, five nominations are pending. (See attached list.)
- 2) A school for political formation has been created for the indoctrination of cadres.
- 3) Work plan to be developed for that school:
  - a) Volcan Zone: A schedule is given of the lectures planned for this zone and the names of the instructors.
  - b) Central Zone: A Schedule is given of the lectures planned for this zone and the name of the instructors.
  - c) Northern Zone: A schedule is given of the lectures planned for this zone and the name of the instructors.
  - d) Coastal zone: A schedule is given of the lectures planned for this zone and the name of the instructors.
- 4) List of instructors
- 5) OBJECTIVES OF THE WORK PLAN: Knowledge of the national reality; to know about the F.U. (United Forces). To consolidate the bases by means of political and ideological development.
- 6) Distribution of Bases per Instructor: A list is given of how many and which bases are the responsibility of each instructor.
- 7) New zones have been organized.

OBSERVATIONS: This document consists of 9 legal size typewritten sheets.

REFERENCES: None

Recorded 15 Apr 1982

WORK PLAN OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FTC (FPL) FOR THE REGIONAL DEPARTMENTAL COMMISSIONS OF POLITICAL FORMATION IN THE SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT

1. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

These shall be determined according to each level:

- a. Intermediate Leadership and Local Leadership Organizations
  - 1) To know what a leadership organization is about within the revolutionary organization whose strategy is of a prolonged nature.
  - 2) To be fully aware of its functions, objectives, location and decision levels. In fact, to handle the Democratic Centralism in its theory and in its practical application.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

- 3) To learn the following:
  - a) Individual and group study methods.
  - b) Method to prepare an analysis of action, to prepare a communique, etc.
  - c) Methods to lead meetings and coordination in general.
  - d) Methods to prepare an operations manual, a work plan, etc.
  - e) Methods to: give, request, sistematize and analyze information.
  
- 4) Women: specific objectives
  - 1) To promote active and massive participation of rural women at all levels.
  - 2) To raise its political level.
  - 3) To have them understand the historical need to join the revolutionary process.
  - 4) Courses shall be given quarterly only to women, at regional as well as national levels.
  - 5) Subjects:
    - a) National Reality
    - b) Reality of the Country Women in the frame of the Dependent Capitalism.
    - c) The role of Women in the Revolutionary Process
    - d) Historical Experiences of Women in the Revolution: Cuban Women, Chinese Women and Vietnamese Women
    - e) How to incorporate the Working Women in our Country
    - f) What is the B.P.R., Its tactics and Strategy.
  
- c. Children, Youngsters, Elderly  
Plan for the political formation of children from 6 to 12 should be included, as well as for youngsters 12 to 16. Also for elderly people. This is so that the former will grow with new values and with a revolutionary orientation, and for the latter to discover their role within the revolution. It will be promoted and guided by the Commission of Political Formation of the FTC for the Regional and Departmental Commissions. The initial important experiences that they will develop will be gathered and analyzed by the CONAPOP (National Propaganda Commission) of the FTC and will be the basis for the preparation of the 1979 Plan.
  
- d. Bases: Specific Objectives
  - 1) To raise their political level.
  - 2) To be able to handle the principles of our political line and its practical application.
  - 3) To contribute to the consolidation of its local organisms, cadres and affiliates.
  - 4) Subjects:
    - 1) National Reality
    - 2) Reality of the rural workers
    - 3) What is an affiliate of FECCAS-UTC. Levels of awareness and participation.
    - 4) What is the BPR, its objectives, tactics, strategies: Worker-peasant Alliance, Popular-Revolutionary Alliance.
    - 5) Political Lines (Handling of the principles)

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- 6) Line of the Masses (Need to hang on to the more backward masses - politically)
- 7) Nature of a Proletarian Cadre

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT FOR THE POLITICAL WORK OF UTC

1. For the political work, the Department has been divided into the following zones:

- a. Volcan Zone
- b. Central Zone
- c. Northern Zone
- d. Coastal Zone

2. In order to reach higher levels of politization, the zones have been organized into BASES and their respective secretaries have been nominated.

a. Volcan Zone:

- |                              |                    |
|------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1) Perical                   | Benjamin Molina    |
| 2) India                     | Raul Hernandez     |
| 3) Burrito                   | Antonia Diaz       |
| 4) Cayetana                  | Daniel Rodriguez   |
| 5) San Luis de la Loma       | Manuel Belloso     |
| 6) Leon de Piedra            | Arsenio (Belloso?) |
| 7) San Rafael                | Inma Merino        |
| 8) Jerez                     | Francisco Argueta  |
| 9) El Mono                   | Luis Gonzalez      |
| 10) Coyolito                 | Saturnino Castillo |
| 11) Volcan Opico o Paz Opico | Tomas Panamenó     |
| 12) Monte Redondo            | .....              |

b)

- |                  |                    |
|------------------|--------------------|
| 1) Haciendita    | Juan Martinez      |
| 2) Llano Grande  | Antonio Ramirez    |
| 3) Calvario      | Tito Rivas         |
| 4) Flores        | Pedro Amaya        |
| 5) Esperanza     | Eugenio Caravantes |
| 6) Achiotes      | Santos Torres      |
| 7) Obrajuelo     | Mauricio Hernandez |
| 8) Angulo        | Carlos Ventura     |
| 9) Lomas         | Jorge Rodriguez    |
| 10) La Pita      | Ramon Martinez     |
| 11) El Carao     | Julio Rodriguez    |
| 12) Quintanilla  | Isaura Garcia      |
| 13) San Fernando | .....              |
| 14) San Bartolo  | .....              |

c) Coastal Zone:

- |                  |                    |
|------------------|--------------------|
| 1) El Jicaro     | Feliz Martinez     |
| 2) San Bartolo   | Jose Miguel Chacon |
| 3) Aceituno      |                    |
| 4) Mora          |                    |
| 5) Colonia       |                    |
| 6) Santa Barbara |                    |

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

- 7) San Carlos
- 8) Ajustada
- 9) Porvenir
- 10) Guayaabo
- 11) Campanario

d. Northern Zone

- 1) Santa Lucia
  - 2) Amatitan Arriba
  - 3) Cerro San Pedro
  - 4) San Lorenzo
  - 5) Playa Piedra
  - 6) Flores
- Humberto Ayala.

Presently, 26 secretaries of political development have been named, with 14 nominations pending, in order to reach a total of 43 secretaries in the department.

3. For the indoctrination of cadres, the Commission of Political Formation organized a school of political development which operates with five teams of instructors, two at "A" level and three at "B" level. The work plan to be developed by the school, between the months of September to December, is as follows:

- a. Sun 24 Sep Jerez Base, lecture given by Chava and Rafael.
- b. Sun 30 Sep. Paz Opico Base, lecture given by Chele (captured)
- c. Sun 30 Sep. San Rafael and Leon Bases, Lecture given by Chava
- d. Sat 07 Oct. Monte Redondo Base, lecture given by Chava. (At this base the committee will meet once a week and the base will meet thrice each week.
- e. Sat 07 Oct. El Perical Base, lecture given by Raul.
- f. Sat 14 Oct. La Cayetana Base, lecture given by Tomas
- g. Sun 22 Oct. San Luis de La Loma base, lecture given by El Chele
- h. Sun 28 Oct. India and Burrito bases. Lecture given by Inma.
- i. Sun 12 Nov Coyolito and Mono bases, lecture given by Inma and Tomas
- j. Sat 18 Nov Jerez Base, lecture given by Inma.
- k. Sat 25 Nov. Paz Opico base, lecture given by Inma
- l. Sun 03 Dec. El Perical Base, lecture given by Tomas.
- ll. Sat 09 Dec. India and Burrito bases, lecture programmed for Chele, but possibly given by someone else.
- m. Sun 17 Dec. La Cayetana base, same case as above.
- n. Sun 17 Dec. San Luis Base, Inma in charge of lecture.
- . Sun 23 Dec. Leon and San Rafael Bases, Tomas in charge of lecture
- o. Sun 23 Dec Monte Redondo Base, Inma in charge of lecture
- p. Sun 31 Dec. Coyolito and Mono Bases, Raul in charge of lecture
- q. The bases committees (will study Line of the Masses)
  - 1) Mon 13 Nov. Coyolito, Mono, Jerez and Paz Opico bases, lecture by Tomas.
  - 2) Mon 27 Nov. Perical, India and Burrito bases, lectures by Chele (captured)
  - 3) Mon 11 Dec. San Luis, Leon, San Rafael, Monte Redondo bases, lectures by Inma.

This entire program encompasses the Volcan Zone.

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Central Zone:

- a. Sat 14 Oct. San Bartolo Base, Lecture by Chava
- b. Sat 14 Oct. Angulo Base, lecture by Inma (The committee meets twice a week and the base meets weekly.)
- c. Sat 14 Oct. Obrajuelo Base, lecture by El Chele. (The committee meets twice a week ;and the base every eight days.)
- d. Sun 22 Oct. Esperanza Base, lecture by Tomas
- e. Sun 22 Oct. La Fita Base, lecture by Inma
- f. Sun 22 Oct. El Campanario base, lecture by Raul (The committee meets once every week).
- g. Sat 28 Oct. Haciendita and Calvario bases, lecture by Tomas (Juan Martinez is the coordinator of the Central Sub-zone and meet with the board every eight days).
- h. Sat 28 Oct. Quintanilla and San Fernando bases, lecture by El Chele.
- i. Sat 28 Oct. Lomas de Angulo Base, lecture by Chava. (Meetings are held twice a week. The sub-zone has been divided into three groups for study purposes and operates since 16 Oct. Work with children will be promoted.)
- j. Sat 04 Nov. Llano Grande Base, lecture by Tomas (The committee meets twice a week, and also the base. Children's work has not been promoted.)
- k. Sat 04 Nov. Achote Base, lecture by Raul.
- l. Sat 04 Nov. El Carao base, lecture by Chava (The base has been divided into three groups for study, meeting every eight days. There is no study or attention given to children.)
- ll. Sat 18 Nov. Llano Grande base, lecture by Raul. (the committee meets twice a week, also the base. No work with children )
- m. Sat 18 Nov. Angulo base, lecture by Tomas (no work with children)
- n. Sat 25 Nov. La Pita base, lecture by Chava.
- . Sat 25 Nov. El Carao base, lecture by Tomas. (The base has been divided in three groups for study, meetings are every eight days, no work is done with children.)
- o. Sun 03 Dec. Lomas de Angulo base, lecture by Inma (Meetings are held twice a week.)
- p. Sun 03 Dec. San Bartolo base, lecture programmed by El Chele.
- q. Sat 09 Dec. Esperanza and Flores bases, lecture by Raul.
- r. Sun 17 Dec. Quintanilla and San Fernando bases, lecture by Raul (In Quintanilla base the committee meets twice a week, and the base every eight days. There is training of girls and boys. In the San Fernando base there are general meetings twice a week, same as the the committee.)
- s. Sat 23 Dec. Achote Base, lecture by Chava.
- t. Sun 31 Dec. Haciendita and Calvario bases, lectures by El Chele.
- u. Sun 31 Dec. Obrajuelo base, lecture by Tomas.
- v. Meetings of the base Committees (Subject: Line of the Masses)
  - 1) Mon 13 Nov. Haciendita, Llano, Angulo and Pita bases, lecture by Raul.
  - 2) Mon 27 Nov. Loma de Angulo, Calvario, Obrajuelo and Campanario bases, lecture by Chava.
  - 3) Mon 11 Dec. Quintanilla, San Fernando, Achote, El Carao, Esperanza and Flores bases, lecture by Chava.

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In the Northern Zone:

- a. Sun 24 Sep. Playa de Piedra and Flores bases, lecture by Inma and Tomas
- b. Sun 30 Sep. Cerro de San Pedro base, lecture by Chava.
- c. Sat 07 Oct. Amatitan Arriba base, lecture by Inma.
- d. Sat 07 Oct. Santa Lucia base, lecture by Raul.
- e. Sun 22 Oct. Flores base, lecture by Tomas
- f. Sun 12 Nov. San Lorenzo base, lecture by Chava.
- g. Sat 25 Nov. San Lorenzo base, lecture programmed by El Chele.
- h. Sun 03 Dec. Cerro de San Pedro base, lecture by Raul.
- i. Sat 09 Dec. Santa Lucia base, lecture by Inma.
- j. Sat 09 Dec. Flores base, lecture by Raul.
- k. Sat 23 Dec. Playa and Flores bases, lecture by Raul.
- l. Meetings of the base Committees.
  - 1) Mon 13 Nov. San Lorenzo, Santa Lucia, Playa de Piedra and Flores bases, lecture by Inma and Chava.
  - 2) Mon 27 Nov. Cerro de San Pedro and Amatitan Arriba bases, lecture by Inma.

In the Coastal Zone:

- a. Sun 30 Sep. Aceituno Base, lecture by Tomas
  - b. Sun 30 Sep. Porvenir Base, lecture by Raul
  - c. Sat 07 Oct. Guayabo Base, lecture by Tomas.
  - d. Sat 07 Oct. San Carlos and Delicia Bases, lecture by El Chele.
  - e. Sat 14 Oct. San Bartolo Base, lecture by Chava (The committee meets twice a week, and the base once weekly). (No work with children).
  - f. Sun 22 Oct. Colonia and San Nicolas bases, lecture by Chava.
  - g. Sat 28 Oct. Santa Barbara bases, lecture by Raul
  - h. Sat 04 Nov. Ajustada and Conejo bases, lecture by Inma.
  - i. Sat 04 Nov. El Jicaro base, lecture programmed by El Chele (General meeting thrice a week and committee meeting twice a week. They work with children three times a week, 20 children attend the class. They also work with women, and have eight participants. It is a very active base).
  - j. Sat 18 Nov. Aceituno Base, lecture by Raul.
  - k. Sat 18 Nov. Ajustada and Conejo bases. lecture programmed by El Chele.
  - l. Sat 25 Nov. Delicia and San Carlos bases, lecture by Raul.
  - m. Sun 03 Dec. Santa Barbara base, lecture by Chava.
  - n. Sun 03 Dec. San Bartolo base, lecture by El Chele.
  - o. Sat 09 Dec. San Nicolas and Colonia bases, lecture by Tomas.
  - p. Sun 17 Dec. El Jicaro base, lecture by Tomas.
  - q. Sat 23 Dec. El Porvenir Base, lecture programmed by El Chele.
  - r. Sun 31 Dec. Guayabo base, lecture by Raul.
  - r. Meetings of the Base Committees (Subject: Lines of the Masses)
    - 1) Mon 13 Nov. Santa Barbara, Aceituno and Colonia bases, lecture by El Chele (Captured)
    - 2) Mon 27 Nov. San Bartolo, Jicaro and El Porvenir bases, lecture by Raul.
    - 3) Mon 11 Dec. Ajustada, Conejo and Guayabo Bases, lecture by Tomas.
4. According to the information obtained, the team of instructors that work in the San Vicente Department is formed by the following:

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Inmach, Raul, Chava (male), Tomas, Chele, Chele Mendes.

5. The FPL have prepared a work program that they will try to implement, through the FTC, at an internal level. Their objectives are as follows:
  - a. To have the bases know what the reality of our country is like.
  - b. To have the bases know in essence what the F.U. is, not only in theory but also in practice.
  - c. To initiate a consolidation process of its bases.
  - d. To ensure that the political ideological formation reaches the bases and to have control over them.
  - e. To have the bases reach a higher degree of knowledge and disposition of the struggle.
  
6. In order to reach these objectives, the work has been distributed as follows:
  - a. Inmach, is responsible for the bases of: Mono, Coyolito, Jerez, San Rafael and Leon de Piedra.
  - b. Raul, is responsible for the bases of: Paz Opico, San Rafael and Leon de Piedra (the latter two together with Inmach).
  - c. El Chave, is responsible for the bases of India and Burrito.
  - d. Tomas, has the responsibility of the Perical base.
  - e. El Chava and Tomas, are responsible for the bases of Monte Redondo and San Luis.
  - f. El Chele and El Chele Mendes, are responsible for the La Cayetana base.
  - g. Chele Mendes is responsible for the El Campanario Base.
  
7. New Zones have been organized, which have not been identified yet, and the people in charge will have the following functions:
  - a. To visit constantly the zone.
  - b. To transmit the commission orientation to the zones.
  - c. To prepare the conditions to form the commissions, regional as well as the base.
  - d. To prepare the people in charge of political formation teams, so that they can nominate their commission and base secretariat.
  - e. To provide orientation in the preparation of plans and programs.
  - f. To work based on plans and programs.

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424

The next two pages are withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c) and are not included.

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 157

DATE: No date

TITLE: PROJECT TO ADAPT THE E.T.C. STRUCTURE TO THAT OF THE FRONT

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

1) INTRODUCTION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

2) PROPOSED STRUCTURE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

3) ADVANTAGES OF THIS STRUCTURE:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

21 JUL 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 160

DATE: No date

TITLE: WORK PLAN OF THE JARAGUA MUNICIPALITY

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

- 1) MEETING SCHEDULE WITH THE MILITARY COMMAND:  
Meetings will be on Tuesdays.
- 2) MEETINGS WITH MUNICIPALS:
  - a) Pineda Base: Wednesday.
  - b) Piedra Grande Base: Thursday.
  - c) Palo Grande Base: Friday
- 3) COMRADE CRUZ: Because he does not have people, will meet by base.
- 4) CITY, COMRADE HERNAN: He will handle it individually by zone location.
- 5) METHOD: Two comrades have been recruited through a militiaman.
- 6) COMRADE BENJAMIN: He has been assigned three bases: Santa Lucia, San Lucas and El Zapote.
- 7) COMRADE JAVIER: Is responsible for political education in the 7 Joyas barracks.
- 8) COMRADE LUIS: He is responsible for the training every morning.
- 9) COMRADE TOMAS: Will meet with Municipals and Brigade Chiefs. Will visit each base weekly, and the troop stationed there.

OBSERVATIONS: This document consists of 2 white, handwritten, notebook size sheets.

Its transcription consists of 2 typewritten sheets (letter size).

REFERENCES: Signed TOMAS

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

TRANSCRIPTION

WORK PLAN OF THE JARAGUA MUNICIPALITY

Meetings with the Military Command will be on Tuesdays. The municipal that handles the Pineda, Piedra Grande and Palo Grande bases, meets with those in charge of the Pineda group (Wednesday), Piedra Grande (Thursday) and Palo Grande (Friday). On Sundays he will meet with the Pineda base and likewise he will meet with the remaining bases.

GRUZ: This comrade will meet by base because he does not have three members in charge of Brigade. The group leaders will meet with their respective collective every six days.

CITY, HERNAN: He handles those in the city individually, by location; since he only talks to the comrades connected, because the city comrades are collaborators. There are only five comrades that do not want to meet in collectives, but have militia status.

METHOD: Through a militiaman two comrades and a collaborator have been recruited, they are from San Vicente and work in the Jiboa.

Comrade Hernan already met with them on Wednesday 18, for the first time.

Because he gives them individual attention, this comrade does not come every 8 days. Sometimes he meets after 12 days, because he informed me that they were controlling his absences from the town. Every 8 days was too soon.

COMRADE BENJAMIN: This comrade was assigned three bases as follows: Santa Lucia, San Lucas and El Zapote, which does not have people, he only had connection with two comrades in Santa Lucia.

IN CHARGE OF THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF 7 JOYAS BARRACKS: JAVIER  
This comrade meets with the troop on Saturdays and Sundays from 10 a.m. on. The bases will be visited on Wednesday (Pineda), Thursday (Piedra Grande) and Friday (Palo Grande).

Meeting with the MPL Municipal Command on Tuesday.

Meeting with the comrade in charge on Monday.

INSTRUCTOR: Gives instruction every morning at 4:45 am and on Thursday afternoon he imparts maneuvers.

COMRADE TOMAS: Meets on Tuesdays with the municipals and on Wednesday with the Brigade Leaders. He will visit each base once a week and will meet once weekly with the troop stationed in the barracks.

REVOLUTION OR DEATH !!! WE SHALL WIN !!!

Signed: TOMAS

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

The next 23 pages are withheld in full under FOIA Exemption (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c) and are not included.

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 163

DATE: No date

TITLE: PROJECT FOR BLASTING BRIDGES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 164

DATE: No date

TITLE: PLAN OF POLITICAL ACTIONS AND COMPOSITION OF THE DIRECTING ORGAN OF THE GDR

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

FIRST PART:

I. TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT

1. DIPLOMATIC LINES: It mentions that for negotiation it is required that the United States withdraw all military and economic aid to the Junta.
2. INTERMEDIARIES:
  - a) The Socialist International, the European Parliament, Kurt Waldium, (UN), OAS and MCI.
3. NEXT MEETING:
  - a) Ana Maria (Melida Anaya Montes)
  - b) Jacinto S. ( )
  - c) Ferman (Cienfuegos)
  - d) Jonas (Jorge Melendez)
  - e) Simon (Handal).
4. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY
  - a) To have a dialogue without having to give up.
  - b) To put pressure for the dismissal of Chavez Mena

II. REGARDING THE INTEGRATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE DIRECTING ORGANISM OF THE GDR

1. The PCS Proposal: was rejected
2. Ferman's proposal: Ungo, Zamora, Majano and Guadalupe.
3. Resolution:
  - a) To create a joint team FMLN/FDR.
  - b) To have it formed by 12 persons whose names are mentioned.

III. OBJECTIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL OFFENSIVE.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IV. REGARDING THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARMED FORCES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

V. ATTITUDE TOWARDS CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

SECOND PART

I. DISCUSSION OF ITEM NO. L

1. Simon:
  - a) Prevent intervention
  - b) Promote national and international propaganda
  - c) Dialogue with other sectors
  - d) Determine the negotiators
  - e) Work on the European Parliament
  - f) Create two organisms when CD is ousted from power
  - g) Create a new peoples armed forces.
2. Vladimir:
  - a) Make a call to the progressive military personnel to join the peoples Forces.

THIRD PART

I. WORK REPORTS OF 8/12/80

Meeting were: Ferman, Simon, Vladimir, Rodriguez Ruiz, Ana Maria and F. Castillo, and the following subjects were discussed:

1. Regarding Majano.
2. Meetings carried out by the High Command of the Armed Forces.
3. Regarding line abroad, \$50,000 are needed.
4. Regarding national and international situation with regards to the FMLN/FDR and the MDC Junta.
5. Aspects to be considered during the offensive.
6. Considerations on Simon's situation.
7. Ferman's concepts and versions regarding the support to the JMDC, the United States.
8. Regarding the formation of a new Army.

II. WORK REPORTS OF 10/12/80

1. Report on the Majano situation.
2. Regarding documents in the hands of the Armed Forces.
3. Ferman's considerations on the Plan being prepared.

III. DISCUSSION OF INFORMATION

Rodriguez Ruiz, Ana Maria, F. Castillo and Ferman meet to plan and discuss propositions regarding the national situation and the priorities or alternatives that are present now.

IV CONCLUSIONS

A series of activities are mentioned geared towards damaging the Junta internationally and the preparation of conditions for the general offensive.

OBSERVATIONS: This document consists of 9 legal size, typewritten, light blue sheets.

REFERENCES: Document found in the Safe House of the FARN in UTILA Colonia of Santa Tecla, on 11/11/80

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

REF C 810 A 6

Plan of Political Actions and Composition of the Directing Organism of the GDR

DOCUMENT FOUND IN THE SAFE HOUSE OF THE FARM IN COLONIA UTILA SANTA TECLA.  
ON 11 DEC 1980.

CONTEXT OF THE DOCUMENT

DIPLOMATIC LINES

U. S. Set forth that in order to negotiate, we require previous signs.  
- Withdrawal of all military aid (withdrawal of advisors, no training, economic aid, materiel)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

INTERMEDIARIES:

- To try to assign this task to the I.S. (Socialist International), European Parliament, Kurt (W) (UN).

Hard intermediary with regard to non intervention.

I.S., COPAL, To work towards making them become fierce defenders of non intervention.

OEA (Organization of American States).- To have them declare against non intervention and to accept a voice from the Org. group of the GDR (UNGO), we should try to have Mexico (or Panama) make an inroad for us.

MCI. (International Communist Movement).- We have to be cautious, not to make ostentation of our military condition.

Relationship with socialist countries have to be tied up.

We have to see that no.....

NEXT MEETING

|         |                                  |                     |                               |
|---------|----------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| EPL     | - Ana Maria, Melida Anaya Montes | Wednesday           | 9:30 with F.C. arrived        |
| P.R.T.C | Jacinto S.                       | 3 P.M. over 27 of   | on foot in order to write     |
| R.N.    | Ferman                           | the rest, canton Ch | communiqué in friendly house. |
| P.R.S.  | Jonas                            | to sea and land.    |                               |
| P.C.    | Simon Handal                     |                     |                               |

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE DC (Christian Democracy)

- Offer them dialogue if they resign.
- Put pressure to abandon Junta.
- Should be stated that dialogue can be had with those elements of the D.C. after they resign.
- Dismissal of Chavez Mena has to be pressured upon

NOTE FOR PROPAGANDA:

Population has to be informed that when the Army was quartered it (incomplete sentence)

REGARDING INTEGRATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE DIRECTING ORGANISM OF THE GDR

Initially the PCS proposed two of the FMLN - 1 favorable to the leftists, and one of the FDR and MAJANO but this was (incomplete sentence)

FERMAN proposes composition by: UNGO, ZAMORA, MAJANO, GUADALUPE

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

Discussion whether the composition should include three of the FP and 5 of FMLN

Consensus is that composition of the "JUNTA" of the GDR does not have to be made now. A loose team has to be formed that would function as the GDR's organizing committee, to which the DRU will publicly delegate full power of authority.

RESOLUTION

1. It is resolved that a joint team FMLN/FDR will be created whose task will be:
  - a) To form and organize the next GDR.
  - b) Function in the political diplomatic offensive.

This team will have full power of authority and will be directed by the Executive Directive of the DRU.

2. It will be formed as follows:

- |                                    |   |
|------------------------------------|---|
| 11) DAGO GUTIERREZ                 | 1) UNGO (as proposed by FMLN to MNR)        |
| 12) ANA MARIA                      | 2) ZAMORA (as proposed by the FMLN to MPSC) |
| 3) AGUINADA                        |   |
| 4) GUADALUPE                       | 1 for each org.                             |
| 5) F CASTILLO                      | + 2 democrat.                               |
| 6) I MIPTES                        |   |
| 7) RODRIGUEZ RUIZ                  | consult each organization                   |
| 8) MAYORGA QUIROZ                  | bring proposal to next meeting              |
| 9) SAUL VILLALTA                   |   |
| 10) RAFAEL MORENO (Priest in N.Y.) |   |

Already defined, a team has to be formed to direct the diplomatic offensive which should include probable members of the Junta.

The role of international organizations has to be defined more specifically.

NOTE: There is ONU (United Nations), European parliament, UMDC, Soc. Int., OEA, Mov. Com. Int. Pacto Andino (International Communist Movement of the Andean Pact), MNA).

Towards D.C. our line must be to unsettle it internally and based on this to charge its attitude at the UMDC level.

DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS OF NON UNANIMOUS SUBJECTS

OBJECTIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL OFFENSIVE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

REGARDING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARMED FORCES in order to announce program of the GDR. add a sixth item to those declared by VLAD)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

ATTITUDE TOWARDS PRIVATE BUSINESSMEN

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

SECOND PART DISCUSSION ITEM 1

SIMON:

- Prevent intervention;
- Propaganda offensive (nat. and internat.) (Make statement and/or press conference touching 2 or 3 well calculated points
- To include in the national politics a dialogue with other non FDR sectors.
- Pinpoint those acting as negotiators - a role has to be played with CURT WAL of the LA ONU.
- The European Parliament is an instrument that should be utilized, without diminishing the role that the Socialist International and the UMDC could play (we have to consider that this does not implicate us much because many forces are converging there, and this is a force that has great possibilities to contain intervention).
- What shall we do with DC once it leaves the Government? Two organizations have to be formed.  
Council of the Democratic Revolutionary Government 6-7  
Consulting Junta.....all forces of the Republic would be included here.  
Nominate a sort of Premier
- Regarding the Armed Forces
  - Has to be defined specifically based on a double criteria.

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(b)(3)-10 USC 424

- Purging of the Armed Forces because it is known that there is a sector carried away by the Fascists.

VLADIMIR:

A (CLEAR) statement on the Armed Forces has to be made. But its specific points have to be used as negotiation points. The intention is not to publicize our position even though we are clear of it. First thing to do is call for the progressive ranks so that it can be incorporated to the peoples stream.

Regarding the concrete formation of the government: I believe it is correct to have an uneven number and to evaluate each person.

DRU

December 8, 1980

1. Reports
2. International Line (political offensive)
3. Decisions on Logistics
4. Military Plan
5. Statement on.....

- MAJANO went to San Francisco, where, it seems, was meeting with EYA, MAYORGA (maybe UNGO) and perhaps Wongler. Went to Mexico from there and also Panama.

- b. - On Wednesday the high command met (14 commanders) to discuss the military crisis. Thursday they met again and also on Friday. The opinion of some progressives is that if Gutierrez remains, there is time still because he is lazy but if Garcia was staying nothing much could be done. It was stated that this was a good opportunity to propose the D.C. to leave the Government. The leaning to the right is evident, there is a great weakness in Majano. what he had to do was to seek assylum and make propaganda.
- f. Expresses that in a meeting with PANCHO, it was set forth that a line abroad is urgent, that the pills should be procured and \$50,000 advanced; it is urgently required to define the composition of the G.D.R.

VLA.-Internally, it is necessary to take measures to deepen the actions of the insurrectionals

- 2.-To look into the exit and incorporation of military personnel.
3. Comply with the logistics supply already planned.
4. Launch in January the large offensive.
5. ;Announce the G.D.R. in January, after previous sounding on this subject.

Regarding International items

- a.-Soundings on G.D.R. (December)

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(b)(3): 10 USC 424

- b. Accomplish the formation of an internal front to repudiate the Junta and attain recognition of the FMLN and FDR (December)
- c. Be open for negotiation with U.S. but should be done thus: show signs in December and make this proposal public at the time of the offensive.
- d. Expound five points the Government will concretize:
  - 1. Self determination and sovereignty (implies non intervention)
  - 2. Just distribution of wealth (implies anti-oligarchy)
  - 3. The G.D.R. will apply internationally a policy of peace and non alignment.
  - 4. Democratic representation of the peoples, democratic and revolutionary sectors that have actively contributed to overthrowing the DC military dictatorship.
  - 5. Democratic and social reforms for the peace and welfare of the people:

DURING THE OFFENSIVE: a.- Launch openly the G.D.R. together with its premier and Chief of Propaganda. b.- make public the international front (accomplish the severing of relations) and c.- Look into negotiations with U.S. with two purposes + gain time ++propaganda and agitation.

NOTE:

Do not negotiate until the offensive has been planned, and try not to accept the participation of the Junta.

S.- States that he thinks the proposal presented by VLA is correct and makes the following observations:

- The negotiation commission should be created in the best possible way from the beginning and should be representative; it is not right that only the FMLN be first and only afterwards to concede.
- A concerted measure should be outlined with the FDR to implement the "unconditional dialogue", but not to close the possibility of accepting the participation of the Junta even when we do not accept it at first.
- Proposing the military to pass to the fronts, should be done, but do not forget that they also might have their own plans.
- In the core of all our negotiating disposition, we should consider the following three items:
  - Non intervention (it is fundamental)
  - Gain time
  - Agitation and propaganda

f.- We agree with the proposal, because it focuses on the problems and it is flexible; it only should be defined better.

- + Since the support of the Junta is the U.S., we should have a clear stance towards this support. We have to consider that there have been changes since the death of the nuns. U.S. has only two options: a) the fascist scheme and b) dialogue with the left.
- + The dialogue with the U.S. must require expenses, this maneuver should be directed straight by the D.R.U.
- + We must not bar the possibility of a dialogue with the D.C. but it should be requested to leave the Government.
- + In any case, it should appear that the MNR and NPSC have taken the

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

initiative and were able to "soften" the FMLN, because it is necessary to negate that these parties are simple instruments of the FMLN.

Here a difference should be pointed out:

The MNR through the Socialist International must sustain the most radical stances: (change the Junta, no intervention, etc.)

- The MPSC must propose the UMDC not to support the Junta que to declare itself favorable to the negotiation.
- Mexico and Panama should be free to act on their own, should not be intermediaries. They should support our FMLN initiatives and reinforce our advances with political measures.
- The composition of the Junta (Zamora, Unge, Majano - of the FD - Fac, Guardado, G. Martinez, Aguinada - of the FR) should be established behind "closed doors".
- The military offensive should be launched with a view towards liberating zones by concentrating forces in:
  - Northeast
  - Para central (Cabanas-Cuscatlan)
  - Insurgency in 4-5 neighborhoods in S.S.

The liberation of the zones should not be done permanently, 15 days would be enough.

Once the Junta has been proclaimed, the alliance FMLN-FDR should be made public.

RR (Rodriguez Ruiz).- The proposal of VLA, is a good starting point we have discussed and we have known the following:

- The phases of the maneuver have to be specified, the measures and objectives of each phase, and a criterion of flexibility should be adopted.
- Political demonstrations have to be given that the MNR/MPSC are not instruments, but are forces recognized as allies - strategically subordinated to the unifying interest - but are not instruments.
- Our severely adopted positions have to be clarified as to how the new Armed Forces will be constituted, inasmuch as this will be a key for negotiating with the U.S.
- The Junta should have an odd number and the weight and character and the commitment of each one of its participants should be studied thoroughly.

10 December 1980

Maj. Report (9 Dec) Said his situation was not too difficult for him because even with the voting they could not pass on to the main offensive. What they attained were +310, the officers being more than 600. The officers were told that Maj. had left, that he was with the comunists. What resulted was that he was withdrawn from the candidate's list. It was decided who the commander would be. The agreement was not to withdraw Majano.

Garcia's proposal that not only the military members of the Junta be included in the election was not accepted.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

A supposedly guerrilla commander was presented at this meeting, who ratified that Maj. was related to the guerrilla. Furthermore, it was stated that Maj. was in Cuba meeting with Fidel.

It is important that a certain conflict with Garcia was made evident, and that they are avoiding referring specifically to the contents of the agreement that would mean the transfer of Majano.

It seems that Majano will be formally dismissed, together with all his general reorganization package.

Majano's idea is to withstand until the ultimate consequences, started by declaring that the present project has already been achieved, and that a new alternative is needed, including even a confrontation.

This plan could compact the J.M.S. and put it in alert, besides it could raise the people's mood.

Maj. states that there are two options: military and political. This seems inconvenient since the U.S. could believe him and we would be questioned.

He declared to the U.S. that this country would not have peace if an agreement is not made with the FDR, and further on with (FMLN). He also assured that he would make a public declaration, and he thought that there were colleagues that would follow him. W. told him that he thought not all the members of the high command were bad, to which Majano asked him what and whom, to mention one.

What was requested of him was not to be put in a defensive situation - not to fall into the alternative choices, Military or Political, and not to imply that he has any relationship with the left.

B.- It is known that the enemy has in its hands the burnt plan (by stages) (it is said that they were taken with T. Handal), a thank-you note to F. Castro, the record with a list of the arms in Z. 5 and where they came from.

F (Ferman).- Informs that the plan being prepared now consists in launching an offensive before the left starts its own. It is planned to be next week in the zones.

The DC proposal is 1). to specify the line of command. 2). To dismiss burnt officers. 3). purge the repressive corps, and 4). purge the Executive. Only the proposal exists but Duarte did not allow to have a date fixed on it.

It is believed that since the nuns' assassination, they have felt greater support from the U.S. The Yankee ambassador is actively supporting the D.C. proposal.

It seems they want to get the CTS and the UCS closer together, taking advantage of their anti-communists positions as a maneuver for the left not to be inclined to talk with them.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

Report from inside the D.C., VIERA said, that the assassination of the nuns and the FDR have isolated them, and that they only need to clarify these crimes and clean up the repressive corps.

Morales Erlich, said that the formula comrades (the military) had arrested them, that it was necessary to think about changing the present members of the Junta.

The Governor of Santa Ana asked why M. Morales Erlich had admitted - that he had participated in the repression and that he categorized him as a doer. He asked why he was saying it up until now, until it was "dirty faced".

It was said in the report that an ultimatum was not given then.

#### DISCUSSION OF THE INFORMATION

B.-We are very doubtful that if Majano stays for a longer period of time, it will be favorable, rather he will weaken them. We think that it has to be proposed that they pass to the FMLN fronts, and the Majano be told the position he will occupy and how he could do more from there.

B.-It is reported that the FMLN directive is deeply worried by the fact that practically all the DRU, including the Executive directive, is in the interior. It was stated that they have chosen to stop aid until the DRU arrives there. It was agreed that the land shipments be stopped.

RR.- States that first of all, according to the information, it is necessary to evaluate our capability to launch an offensive, and since the proposal to the Military depends on it, what is the work that Majano has to do.

AM (Ana Maria).- Says that if the FPL considers to have enough possibilities, materials, to launch an offensive, that we should act with audacity and that the military should be warned that there is a great danger to go ahead because they would be killed. That it should be proposed to those that wish it, to join the fronts, that some could be dismissed and others could be left to seek asylum.

S.- (F. Castillo) Stated that it was reported that the J.M.S. has 80% of San Carlos, that Ticas has great influence in La Union, especially because the Commander is always drunk. In Chalatenango they have a Commander, nothing in armored, very little in the Second Brigade. In Santa Ana there is great personal antagonism between the Commander and Garcia; that they continue to have enough influence in the Air Force to neutralize it. In Morazan it could be overturned due to the critical situation. A unilateral analysis of each part of the Army should not be made, because the military weakness of some are compensated by the political crisis of others. It seems that if they are propositioned to leave now, all of a sudden, very few would be coming to us showing any willingness; that we should have a transition period, there are something like 82 officers in their force.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

F.- We have to examine if today they have overcome ideologically their objective of preserving the institutionality of the Armed Forces.

This is important since it has to be shown that they are weaker than the left. Since their situation is not the same as in May.

The dissident declaration of Majano should be promoted, in the terms initially set forth. Simon, it is understood that we should prepare the conditions to analyze those people. We have to act very calmly, in order to make them see that there is not other choice but the military. What interests us is to incapacitate the Armed Forces, so that it will not launch an offensive against us, or to make it very weak, with a very confused troop.

IT IS CONCLUDED:

1.- That they have to be encouraged to make offensive declarations against the fascists (in the terms they pronounced).

2.- We have to state our worry that practical measures against the fascist offensive have not been specified.

3.- It is required that specifications as to the role they will play and the moment they will act, should conform to each case in particular.

There will be a press conference on Friday, for which each organism should prepare a man that can appear without a hood but with modifications.

Abroad, the DRU should clarify entirely regarding the operational method of the Managua team, on the team measures and the representation of other organizations.

Next meeting on Friday at 7 a.m. at Camino Real westward over Sisimiles.

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(b)(3)-10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 170

DATE: JAN 79

TITLE: CONCERNING THE DISCUSSION AND APPROVAL OF THE PLAN FOR THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC UNITS CARRIED OUT BY THE CENTRAL COMMAND

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

CONCERNING THE BASIC CRITERIA FOR THE FORMATION OF THE CENTRALIZED STRATEGIC FORCES

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

OBSERVATIONS: The document consists of 3 letter-size pages typed on both sides.

REFERENCES: Document elaborated by THE CENTRAL COMMAND OF THE FPL.

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

The next three pages are withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c) and are not included.

CONCERNING THE DISCUSSION AND APPROVAL OF THE PLAN FOR THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC UNITS, CARRIED OUT BY THE CENTRAL COMMAND

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1).

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(b)(3).10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

THE CENTRAL COMMAND OF THE FPL

EL SALVADOR, CENTRAL AMERICA, JANUARY 1979.

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO: 178

Date: No date

TITLE: OPERATIVE PLAN FOR TUESDAY, 13 OCT 1981

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

I. ZONE IN WHICH ACTION WILL BEGIN:  
It will begin in the COSTA zone.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VI. PARTICIPANTS:

They mention that 100 comrades will participate, and they will use the

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

X. ACTION COORDINATORS:

1. First in charge: Commander QUINONES.  
Second in charge: Commander CASTILLO.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

OBSERVATIONS: The original document consists of 1 lined, spiral notebook page

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(b)(3);10 USC 424

handwritten in blue ink. The transcription consists of one typed office-sized sheet.

REFERENCES: Document signed by Commander ALFERES, FPL.

TRANSCRIPTION

OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR TUESDAY, 13 OCT 1981:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Quinones will coordinate this operation as first in command; second in command: Commander Castillo.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

R. O. M. El P. A. V.  
F. P. L.

Signed: Commander Alferes.

Notes: This document was found on the street near San Nicolas Lempa on 15 Oct 81.

This paper was given to the local commander of San Rafael Obrajuela.

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(b)(3), 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 180

DATE: NO DATE

TITLE: PLAN FOR AMBUSH AT RUBI

EXTRACTS OF CONTENTS:

1. NAME OF THE OPERATION:

They mention the name of 4 comrades, supposedly fallen in action.

2. DAY:

They do not mention the day of the operation.

3. TIME:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

4. PLACE OF OPERATION:

The place known as LA CUMBRE.

5. TYPE OF OPERATION:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

6. OBJECTIVES:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

7. PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

8. QUARTERING THE TROOPS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

9. APPROACH:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424

10. FORMATION OF THE TROOP:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

11. COMMUNICATIONS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

12. ORDERS FOR ACTION:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

13. SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

OBSERVATIONS: The original document consists of 4 office-size, copied sheets, handwritten with red and blue ink.  
The transcript consists of 4 office-size, typed sheets.

REFERENCES: NO REFERENCES.

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

TRANSCRIPT

PLAN FOR AMBUSHING RUBI

1. Name of operation: Comrades: Aargelio, Juan, Gabriel and Salvador,  
[Redacted: Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)]
2. Day: [blank]
3. [Redacted: Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)]
4. Place: La Cumbre.
5. Operational meth[Redacted: Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)]
6. Objectives: a) [Redacted]

| <u>Personnel</u>  | <u>Functions</u>                     | [Redacted: Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)] |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|
| Porfirio  | First chief<br>G-CH                  | [Redacted: Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)] |
| Jovani  | Second chief                         |  |
| Ruben<br>Nel  | Group of<br>fusiliers                |  |
| Neto<br>Luis<br>Abraham   |                                      |  |
| Alberto<br>Salvador 1<br>Salvador 2<br>Hugo 1   | Support group                        |  |
| Pepe<br>Edwin<br>Carlos<br>Alvaro   | Mine-operator 1<br>" 2<br>" 3<br>" 4 |  |
| Roberto<br>Ovidio<br>Laura<br>Filomena  | Chief of<br>health group             |  |
| Juan Carlos<br>Quique<br>Roxana<br>Remberto<br>Octavio<br>Chilo<br>Toribio<br>Joaquin | Chief of the<br>transport<br>group   |  |

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(b)(8); 18 USC 424

Hugo 2  
Pentionero  
Tiburcio  
Ramon  
Nelson

Chief of re-  
taining Group 1

Armando  
Hipolito  
Roberto  
Julio  
Amilcar

Chief of  
Group 2.

Mine operator

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

EXPOSITION

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

The formation to be used will be the following:

In front will go one squad of explorers who will be comrades Nel and Luis.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

In the Squad of Explorers there will be a radio transmitter carried by comrade Nel. Nel will communicate with Comrade Porfirio who will carry another radio transmitter, and who will be part of the group of fusiliers. Then comrade Porfirio will communicate with the second chief, who is Jovani, and who is part of the support group. Jovani will communicate with the chief of retaining squad No. 2, who is comrade Armando.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

At 4:00, the chief of the operation will check to see if every member of the troop is present; upon assuring himself that this is the case, he will give the order to the chief of Retaining Squad No. 1, who is Hugo, the squad report to its respective operating post, ordering comrade Jovani along with another soldier to go with the squad to make sure that it remains in its appointed post.

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

The next page is withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c) and not included.

Once Retaining Squad No. 1 has left, Porfirio will give the order to the chief of Retaining Squad No. 2, who is Armando, to move to his appointed operational post, ordering comrade Abraham with another soldier to go with this squad to make sure that it remains in its appointed operational post.

Comrades Abraham and Jovani, after making sure that the Retaining Squads are in their respective posts and that the mines are in place, will return to the principal pre-operational point, which is El Hormiguero, and will report to the Chief of Operations, who is Porfirio, that the retention squads are in position.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

First they will put down the mines; each one of the mine operators will put down his respective mine. Mine operator No. 1, who is Pepe, and mine operator No. 2, who is Edwin, will be together with the Chief of Operations, who is Porfirio.

Mine operator No. 3, who is Carlos, and mine operator No. 4, who is Alvaro, will be together with the second chief, who is Jovani.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Comrades Alberto and Salvador 1, who are part of the support group, will be 25 meters to the north of mine operators No. 1 and 2; the latter will always be posted at the edge of the highway. Soldiers Salvador 2 and Hugo 1, who are also part of the support group, will be posted 15 meters from the street, covered in the cane thicket.

The group of fusiliers, who are the soldiers Ruben, Nel, Luis, Neto and Abraham, will be posted in the cane thicket, 20 meters behind the mines; at the same distance the Health group and the Transport group will be posted.

SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 181

Date: 5 May 81

TITLE: PLAN OF WAR FOR THE CAMPS IN THE NORTH, SUB-ZONE I-A

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

I. CONCERNING THE MASSES AND THE MILITIAS:

1. What to do with our masses in the tasks of the war plan:  
Our basic principle will be to incorporate the entire population in the tasks of our war.
2. Resolutions taken regarding possible retreats by our troops:  
They mention that they will create favorable conditions in the camps where refugees will be received, such as the camps of Canizal and Guajiniquil. The camps of Penas Blancas and La Majada do not lend themselves to such conditions. The groups will be defined as elderly, children, pregnant women, disabled etc., who will be withdrawn first.
3. Comrades who form the organization of Central Management:
  - a) Arturo (Honduras) will organize immediate support.
  - b) Alonzo (Militias) will leave with the last groups to be withdrawn.
  - c) Chevo (masses) will organize the departure of the groups.

II. THE INCORPORATION OF THE ENTIRE POPULATION IN THE TASKS OF THE WAR:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

III. CONCERNING THE TROOPS (EPL):

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3);10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IV. CONCERNING THE TROOPS' TACTIC FOR RETREAT:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

V. CONCLUSION:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

OBSERVATIONS: The document consists of 3 office-size, typed sheets and copies.

REFERENCES: Signed by:

"Sebastian (2nd Chief, Cascajal troop)  
Member of the Tactical Command.

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

SUB-ZONE I.A.) CAMPS IN THE NORTH

WAR PLAN

a) Concerning the masses and the militia:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

2. Concerning the operation criteria in the event of a possible retreat of our positions, the resolutions taken were the following: To create political conditions for agile and immediate support in the refugee camps, principally: Carrizal and Guajiniquil (since Penas Blancas and La Majada do not have favorable conditions), which would be the initial reception points for the groups from the masses which we might have to withdraw if necessary. These conditions would have to be created in the center of all those organisms of a legal nature in the center of the enemy, for example: the COSPUGA, the CEDEN, roving doctors, the Church (priests and Maryknoll nuns), newspaper reporters etc.

To establish immediately available and trustworthy couriers between Carrizal and Guajiniquil, to create agile mechanism for convoking the representatives of the aforementioned organisms for declarations and political support in the face of a cowardly attempt to massacre our defenseless masses. Those responsible are: Asrturo (political work in Honduras) in coordination with Ruperto. This process should have been set in motion the beginning of April; there has been some delay.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3): 10 USC 424

The Operative Command for camp/locality should be the organisms which have immediate control of all these measures.

An organism of central management of all the groups of the masses under a single direction and orientation, in order to avoid negative experiences which sometimes occur when there is not a clear criterion of revolutionary principles regarding difficult situations, both within our masses and with regard to international organizations. The comrades who will constitute this organism will be: Arturo (Honduras), Alonzo (militias) and Chevo (responsible for the work of the masses). Arturo will guarantee immediate support for the work of the masses, immediate reception of the different groups, he will have in to be Honduras immediately in case of emergency and in order to coordinate the representatives of the different organisms, waiting for the first groups and distributing them. Efrain and Chevo will organize the departure of the groups from Chupamiel, in order to avoid too large a concentration of groups in Cupamiel. They will have to direct the leaders of the masses according to locality, and depending, at first on them, will go out with the first groups to carry out orientation programs where Arturo will be located (Honduras). Together with Arturo, they will form the Management Committee of the total of masses. Finally Alonzo (1000) will go down with the last groups of masses and militia to retreat prior to the imminent retreat of all the groups to other positions in order to continue inflicting casualties on the enemy. This will depend on our capacity to dismantle the enemy operation and on the scope of same (directions of attack, number of fighting men, arms, duration of the offensive etc.)

INCORPORATION OF THE ENTIRE POPULATION IN THE TASKS OF THE WAR:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(D)(3) 10 USC 424

b) CONCERNING THE TROOPS (EPL):

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

c) CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE TACTICAL RETREAT OF THE TROOPS:


Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)



5/7/81

Sebastian (2nd Chief, Troop Cascajal)  
Member of the Tactical Command

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 182

DATE: NO DATE

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

I. PREMISE:

They mention that the fighting in El Salvador will not be the same as in Nicaragua, now that the enemy has been informed.

II. FOR THE ELABORATION:

It is necessary to have a broad view of the war process which is going to unfold.

III. FOR THE EXECUTION:

They mention that in order to execute it, it will be necessary to have wide and profound knowledge of all the types of fighting that exist.

IV. STAGES OF FIGHTING:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

V.

VI.

VII

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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

OBSERVATIONS: This document consists of 5 office-sized, typed pages.

REFERENCES: No reference.

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(b)(3)-10 USC 424

The next three pages are withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1)1.4(b)(c) and are not included.

IDEAS OR PREMISES FOR THE STRATEGIC MILITARY PLAN

PREMISE:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(3): 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 200

DATE: NO DATE

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

1. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

They mention the names of the soldiers who will form the tactical command and their point of origin in the organization.

2. CADRE OF EPL PARTICIPANTS:

There is a list of 10 soldiers who will participate in the actions of the present plan.

3. CONCENTRATION PLACES:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

4. DEPARTURE TIME:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

5. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE EPL:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

6. NORMAL RETREAT:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

7. EMERGENCY RETREAT:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

8. POINT OF RESUMING CONTACT:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

9. PASSWORD:

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

10. VARIATIONS IN THE OPERATIONAL PLAN:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

OBSERVATIONS: The document consists of 3 green sheets, cut in half and handwritten in blue ballpoint pen.

REFERENCES: No references.

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

OPERATIONAL PLAN

1. Meeting place.
2. Pre-operational point.
3. Approach.
4. Posting.
5. Normal retreat.
6. Emergency retreat.
7. Variations in the plan.
8. Password.
9. Participants.

OPERATIONAL PLAN:

The tactical command consists of the following:

Of the EPL--Bladimir.  
Of the MPL--Arturo.  
Of the Party--Osmin.

CADRE OF EPL PARTICIPANTS:

|          |          |         |
|----------|----------|---------|
| Bladimir | Roberto  | Jaime   |
| Jenaro   | Moris    | Medrano |
| Pablo    | Domingo  |         |
| Nelson   | Virgilio |         |

MEETING PLACE:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

TIME:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

DEPARTURE FROM HEADQUARTERS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

TIME OF DEPARTURE:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

**THE OBJECTIVES OF THE EPL:**

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

**NORMAL RETREAT:**

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

**EMERGENCY RETREAT:**

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

**POINTS OF CONTACT:**

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

**IN CHARGE OF RETREAT:**

It will be Comrade FITO.

**GENERAL PASSWORD:**

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

**VARIATIONS IN THE OPERATIONAL PLAN:**

Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

**DURATION:**

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 201

DATE: 21 FEB 1981

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

1. INTRODUCTION:

They mention that the present document contains the line that should be followed in the revolutionary process, which is not only approved by the DRU, but also takes into account the coordination and implementation necessary for the entire effort, both of which have caused fundamental changes in our activity up to this moment.

2. EVALUATION OF OUR PREVIOUS SITUATION:


Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)



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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

**OBSERVATIONS:** The document consists of 27 white, letter size, typed pages.

**REFERENCES:** No references.

**NOTE:** The present document was taken from a cassette, and is unfinished because the tape ran out.

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

The next five pages are withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1)1.4(b)(c) and are not included.

INTRODUCTION

Today is Friday 27 Feb 81. Comrades, immediately following we will record for you a message about the exposition received from the exterior with regard to the strategic plan the process should follow.

MESSAGE

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Then, within this context, was decided which of these positions has the greatest weakness--the position in Guazapa because of its proximity to San Salvador, for political reasons also, since because of its position, its annihilation poses a strategic challenge to the enemy. In the same manner we have analyzed that the hills of San Pedro and the position of the Volcan are weak positions and also that the zone of Usulután, near the zone of San Agustín is a weak position because most of the area is flat terrain crossed by roads that pass through cotton fields, by highways, by roads from the haciendas, which facilitates offensive maneuvers on the part of the enemy, and diminish the capacity of our weapons in that terrain. Within that context we have planned to strengthen all these positions and even to create new ones. We proposed then the creation of a new front in the zone of Sesori and San Gerardo or, rather the western part of the zone of the Dpt. of Morazan, on the bases that the forces created there would be allied units under a unified command. ALVARO knows this task well in greater measure. He is the one who would go there with a mission to initiate this work; JKONAS would turn in the report. I am going to elaborate a little more on this point, and ALVARO will be able to explain to us briefly when he arrives how to handle this task in the central zone. For this task it was established that the restructuring would be done on the basis of existing arms, displacing the organizations and the weapons they already have in their power, towards that zone in order to do the work of organizing that front. I would propose the following situation if you see it on the map. With this front practically in the east of the country, the strategic position of the enemy in San Miguel would be surrounded in the following manner: there would be two forces in the central part that would cut off the access routes, there would be two positions in the south of the zone of Conchagua, and the position of GONZALO would remain in control of the coast and the movements of La Unión towards any position to the north or the west of the eastern zone; there would be a third position to the south that would secure the coast and that could even move with the object of controlling displacements on the Pan American Highway. They would set up the situation in the south, with communications to the center cut off by the forces of the central... In the north two big strategic groups would be established, either to work on a defensive maneuver or, having recovered the initiative for the offensive position, they would surround the eastern zone; in short, San Miguel would remain practically isolated. It is important to take this situation into account because it is, in effect, a

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

This question has been considered along with the proposal that it is necessary to cut off communications to the center, even by attacking bridges. This situation, as I have said, has not been completely understood, and they even refuse to understand it is part of a problem which needs to be studied and exposed politically. I am not going to elaborate on how it has been. There is greater detail concerning the actual outline I have spoken to you about, on the cassette of JONAS and ALVARO.

A more peripheral task which our troops are undertaking is the work of breaking down the enemy. CARMELA has already informed me of all the things that have been done. Still, I say, it is necessary to apply greater ingenuity in working, in assembling files and all those things, and in boosting the ideological-political level of our troops, beginning with a series of considerations that have been successful and with which we are all familiar. I am going to make a special commitment on the basis of what the sheet... to prolong the situation of grouping forces, and this is going to require a higher ideological-political awareness on the part of all of our men. Another one of the basic conclusions of this plan, is that we need to break the political and military concentration we have in El Salvador, and that which we are able to have in Santa Ana. For what reason? Beginning with the first evaluation in which we determined that the insurrectional potential of the cities is weakening by the very attitude of the masses. At this time we need to guarantee to the maximum the possibilities of the enemy in the strategic groups we have already mentioned, and we would need, in this sense, to guarantee to the maximum the security of our cadre. For which we need the... and this is confirmed by the report sent by ALEJANDRO, and the reports obtained from other forces, with regard to what is the situation of the people who are in San Salvador.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

need to reduce the number of liabilities, secure our cadres and allow them a greater opportunity for defeating the enemy by indicating to them those points where the war is really going to take place. And in relation to this, if you remember--we have not spoken of this--when we spoke of the third plan, well, this is precisely where we are going to begin. The central idea would be to leave in San Salvador a center of political coordination that would organize supplies, in the case that the zones cannot fill their supply needs through other routes, and at the same time it would have functions at the conspiracy level, and also at the propaganda level. We would leave in San Salvador, as well, also in the south, a small reduced force, I would say of three or four squads--this you must consider over there--which would also have the arms necessary to carry out sabotage plans, specialized operations, some attacks of high importance, propaganda actions etc. The entire force should be professional, the entire infrastructure would be at its service so that it would have better security conditions under which to work. We suggest this force be in the charge of META through his wife, and that there be the smallest possible number of troops, and that they divide their work. And now the process of recruitment: well, this would be mainly to strengthen the actual military fronts, and not a process to structure forces within the same urban areas. Or rather, if we recruit now in a part of the country we must send them to the fronts. This is assuming that these are people of high quality who will not present us with the problems that some of the natural forces of the zone do, with their localism and all that. If so, it would be advisable to continue recruiting with the objective of strengthening the actual fronts.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

So it is, the movements of the Center for Coordination depend on resolving the problems of supplying and political formation by these means. Also, WILLY told me that they are more overwhelmed than before.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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**SECRET**

(b)(3); 10 USC 424

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

With the situation being as it was outlined by DEMETRIO, we agree with DEMETRIO that basically we will try to integrate next redundant exterior forces. We see the necessity of transferring those troops which cannot contribute militarily to the political reserve of strategic squads for other missions. We are looking for ideas or concrete agents where the planks of the organization can be found. This is not going to be possible on all fronts, and we must assume that from the exterior they can help us with political development, and this will give us a strategic guarantee. In this regard even the evaluations that we made of people that... [unclear] we should have taken them out immediately and sent them to the exterior to complete their training as a squad in order to cover the organization militarily. They have a good foundation in the squad which will facilitate their development. Then we have a foundation of political squads which have been tested ideologically and which guarantee us their participation, their security, their loyalty, and even their experience, as in the case of CEPA. We need to secure our powers and not begin with illusory ideas. I have made more than one reference to you in regard to the cases of the candidates and members of the Political Committee, and we have spoken of this, so that I do not need to elaborate. In this regard, the ideas of those departures we proposed because the military squads must go abroad, with the exception of a very few which must remain in the areas of the cities of San Salvador and Santa Ana, basically. San Miguel is a center, but its function is defined as a shared supply point, and the squads must not depart from there, although we have another idea for their placement. But I do believe that we should break up the concentration of squads. Some areas that we have decided on are, basically, that JUAN take charge of the responsibility for Honduras as a supply point, on the basis of all the experience he has gained in all this time here. Now the entire job of packaging and transporting resources will be under the direction of a group abroad. But we maintain that Honduras has few possibilities for general political development, and that the work there is basically the setting up of a difficult operational base or one... with enough initiative, with people with enormous initiative, I believe I could play a basic role in a rear guard, strategic operation, we could say, for our forces north of Morazan. There in particular, if there indeed have been problems of shipping, we must admit that the operational conditions have varied radically. They are not what they used to be. There have been many mistakes, even more than I realize, for I have spoken with BRUNO. What he says gives the impression that there were permanent communications, that these people lied and those people lied, which does not seem to be the situation as I see it. Today we have investigated the report, the situation is not as certain as we thought, and we think measures will have to be taken so that all will turn out well. To reinforce this work with a squad that has the characteristics of JUAN's squad, because now we need a political squad which can direct the tasks of unity, for now the tasks of unity are barely in operation. I do not know if their goal is in the political field, but to me this is the operative problem, and the problem of the action of forces must be faced. We must see if an adequate political line is needed in conveyance; but today, as a result of the same thing which occurred in Honduras, an absorption in regard to... with the gentleman from the tasks carried out in Nicaragua, with a situation in which

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**SECRET**

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(b)(3); 10 USC

ALVARO sent out a communication which was completely prohibited, and the abuse of having to become involved in the mess of the radio that did not work, without being able to see the task men, with a work day exceeding 14 or 16 hours with an investment in each day, and having to initiate a procedure for gathering information to increase the investment of each man in each troop: this is a situation particularly similar to the one which was lost. The enemy began to gain atime, and they left very little time for the means of transportation even to serve notice from the bases; in short, the organizations could apply their plans. What is needed is a squad with the characteristics of when VITO was here—with initiative, with enough audacity to do things and wait for them to develop, to be able to utilize, and to have people like GERARDO, like BRUNO, who have all these characteristics. We do not need, then, a squad with those characteristics whose cost sets forth the considerations, we must compare it with these possibilities, since what we have in our hands, well... squads of Las Ligas the lists that can barely cover their needs at the political level so that they do not let us leave the commission and within all of this would be the establishment of political squads in the commission. This is a discussion we have already had, which was carried to the general convention. With regard to the plan we have followed up to this time, ALVARO is going to go beyond it, then he is going to enter into another political plan with a new series and a political objective; he will be here for some time and during this time the first things will be corrected and then he would be ready during the same time as the CIA. ELISA would come to make some corrections, and this would be the best time for JUAN to be present to take over and to begin to organize something completely.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

It was ALVARO who gave the report in detail at this point. The concrete measures to be taken are related to the distribution of arms. On this point we took the initiative ourselves, because we had amassed the greatest concentration of arms, or rather, we and the EPL. But explaining this situation is qualitatively different. The EPL had the largest amount of arms in terms of collected resources, and in terms of a fraudulent mechanism, we could say, in that they did not inform the interior of the country about the movement of these arms, and all these weapons they captured themselves. The EPL received a quantity of arms slightly greater, proportionately, than ourselves, but if we count weapons, we received more than they did, with the difference that we shared our weapons had they did not share any, with the exception of a few to the PC and others to the PRTC. For our part, we distributed a large percentage of arms, which was not greater than the amount we received, but which did not demonstrate our willingness to distribute.

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(b)(3); 10 USC

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

ALVARO has the concrete plans for the process of the redistribution of arms. The main point from which to distribute arms in San Salvador, where I remember there was a quantity of arms which are being under-utilized at the moment, and which have been stored and are in danger of being discovered by the enemy and totally lost. We would distribute a part of these arms and part of others which we have in the south, and we would distribute or deliver others to the hills of San Pedro. Probably there, there are some 20 of the troops we have in Morazan which would be integrated into the new front.

As I have said, I am going to give you the concrete details regarding this question.

ALVARO has organized it. Part of these arms which we have in San Salvador will serve to place us in a position of encampment in Guazapa under the command of ALEJANDRO. In this position we would leave two platoons, which we would have to coordinate with the people from the RN and the PRTC, or we will lose the strategic command there with those men. The rest of the men in San Salvador we thought would be distributed in the new position in the west of Morazan to the north of San Miguel, others to the south where CHICO, GONZALO and some 20 to 30 others would remain. Taking into account that conditions have changed, they might be sent to the zone to take a course on scholarships. All must carry documentation. The problem we have had with scholarship students has been documentation, because they take away their passports, and for some of them, in the case of AMILCAR, it has been precisely this problem which has delayed them. For those who have not had documentation, we insist that they get a visa. If not, they will never get out. At this point SUSY and four other scholarship students left from U with BALTA. MECA made the plan for communications with them. If it is convenient,

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(b)(3):10 USC

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

It will be ALVARO's job to carry out this distribution. Within this entire plan of distribution of cadres, as I have indicated earlier, exists the possibility that you over there--JUAN and DEMETRIO--have already given the final touches to this. There also exists the possibility that MARIANA will leave in the hands of ELADIO and FILOMENA and perhaps the other intermediate cadres of some quality, a logical plan to assure the tasks of the central zone, and to avoid tasks abroad, within the perspective already indicated. The plan is to pay wages to some of our political cadres in the exterior front, toughen them, and then allow ourselves to have an adequate reserve for future placement at the other levels of all comrades, with a view to a takeover of power. You all know only too well what we have spoken about with regard to the fact that it is preferable to secure the cadres we already have found to be politically and ideologically sound, than to go to the trouble of depending on cadres which have some weakness in their character.

Based on this system, and on the very situation of ELISA and, as I was telling you, even if right now we had in our hands CEMA, CLELIA and MATEO, THE CONSIDERATIONS WOULD BE THE SAME, since they are cadres whose military distributions are not fundamental, but which form part of the small nucleus of cadres which have developed capacities for political organization which are going to be important in the future, and in this phase they are carrying on the war. Preferably, there are many other cadres who can help and even do things better than they.

Here it is fitting to speak of the great experience it was to participate in the military direction of cadres in San Salvador, such as those of CLELIA, MATEO and MARIANA in the operation that took place in San Salvador. I consider that these cadres were there overloading the structure when, had they been placed at another level and within another perspective, they would have played a better strategic role. There were other strategic vacuums to fill that could have been covered by these cadres. In this same sense we arrive at the analysis of the eastern zone where there are many more operative and military cadres with more experience and more capacity, as a result of having done the same work through all these years, without ever reaching the situation which existed in San Salvador for cadres such as LA TITA, VICTOR and, in fact, the entire army. The cadres in San Salvador had a more varied experience and moved on to organized political tasks for the party, and have played their roles in another sense, although they had a good, direct foundation, because we needed other aspects of the fight. In this sense we have organized the restructuring in that same situation in the case of EL CHINO who must also enter into the military question.

EL CHINO can give certain reserves to political cadres that the organization must guide and place on other tasks, on tasks more passive than military ones, depending on what military centers and points need to be activated politically. In this sense, then, we spoke of the help to be offered to captured cadres. ALVARO is going to elaborate the plan in concrete terms, but we will give him an account of the capture of CLELIA and MATEO, who

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**SECRET**

(b)(3); 10 USC

developed the following plan: in the first stage in which the capture must be made, we maintain silence in order to let the person in charge decide what he is going to do; the enemy realizes partially that he has made a capture, in the question of Venezolano and all that, if that is the politics of his decision; it is found in the reports that we receive through the channel which we already know; we continue to remain silent in the face of this until the enemy enters into the stage in which he makes formal recognition and permits us to enter into the political play. I consider that this is now a different moment and that under these conditions we could indeed make a mistake, although in order to make this last decision--and this is basic--I need for you to give the last word, because from out here one cannot make a complete evaluation of the situation. The idea would be the following: LULU would open the game in the political arena with regard to our captured men.. We would do poorly to accept that these cadres remain in such conditions without exploiting the fact that they are in jail and could be converted into cadres of some strategic importance if we reach the point of having the possibility of victory in our hands. The idea would be that on the basis of the conditions that you analyze there, we would openly recognize without going into detail that our comrades who have risen up in arms as commanders of the revolutionary forces, specifically of the ERP, have surrendered. This would involve an open operational problem of displacement, but recognizing the importance they could have, we would launch a campaign among international organizations, calling for respect for life, and guarantees for them as prisoners of war. Overseas we would begin a complete campaign accompanied by posters, propaganda, and contacts. At the same time in the country, on Radio Venceremos, we would place emphasis on guaranteeing these comrades a plan of promotion. With skill, this would put us, or rather our comrades, on a center stage from which, if victory were in the offing, they could exit under legal wraps or mechanisms into an optimum situation for their participation in the political arena.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

not of great interest for you to have a detailed report at this moment concerning loyalty, but that steps be taken to help, including constant monitoring of the correlation of force in what has been an unfavorable situation due to the politics of "irrigation," but little by little the situation is changing. In sum, we could say that the times are against the politics of "irrigation," and that for us in time the situation will be excellent. Little by little the situation in Europe, the situation of the international socialists, even the situation of some Latin American countries such as Mexico and Panama, is changing from one of fear to a situation of having to confront the politics of REAGAN, due to the mistakes of same. You must have already found out in some way about the ALCON NEGRO operation in Panama, of this intention to attack in Spain, of the repercussions this is going to have, and of the case of the famous tests, which various forms of the international press have taken on as their duty to reveal and demonstrate to the governments of the world, without having a satisfactory response. The famous tests are these: the letter from Chafik that came to the house of TONY HANDALL in which were listed countries, to what percentage they had integrated; I believe you are somewhat familiar with this. If you already knew it, we ourselves had been informed earlier only by the public voice. There is also a report about a document of ours which found its way to the GLADIS house, in which there was a rebuke to the Sandinistas for not having sent us arms in October, and because they were sending us more than we could receive after the elections in the United States. This report fell to the enemy, others as well; they are already in public use. They have published extensive articles in the New York Times and a large number of magazines; they are being published in the majority of newspapers throughout the world. Three of the documents are basic: two of the party and one of ours. This has elicited some protests from our allies with regard to confidential operations, and we are waiting to see the reaction of some countries in the socialist camp.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424

This implies that the war mongering policies of REAGAN, unless it be a country that has not experienced a war first hand, do not encounter much support at the international level. This would be a summary... There are, besides the elements at this moment concerning... at the MARIA house there is a situation of closure of loans, failure to send wheat, and, one of the enormous pressures, constant monitoring by very sophisticated means, of all the movements here in the country of air traffic, of marine traffic, internal control. All of this has created a delicate situation, in addition to the concentration of armed Somosistas that are coming over the border, and that is also part of North American pressure (ALVARO can elaborate on this point much more). So you can have an idea of the panorama. We must be comprehensive and take into account that at this time if we had the immediate option of taking over the power, we would have to think about it, taking into account the interventionist factor today, much closer than at any other time. We must therefore adopt our strategy to the possibility of having to defeat two enemies, the external and the internal. For the external enemy we need not only an operation of a military nature, but also of a political one, which implies the accumulation of force in the international arena for this to be possible. As I said, ALVARO can explain, some tasks have been completed in this area. As I said, ALVARO can elaborate much more. As a question of detail, I think it is important--I consider--inside the Mexican Embassy GUSTAVO left a quantity of photographic material which is very important that they send to us. I talked about this last time, but I thought that GUSTAVO had some means of making them send them to us, but he has none. All the photographic material from Morazan that has been used here, and much more of the material that he accumulated from items sent to him afterwards, has been obstructed, which means that there has not been much publication in this regard. For this reason, a good part of our strength has been wasted, and it is important that an attempt be made to extract this information through some mechanism, one of which you are already familiar with. Since he is a political refugee here, it is important to get him out and send him to the exterior or to another area, but he must be sent away immediately.

In relation to the question of the DRU, I have an idea of how it began, in part, at the beginning, and some measures have been taken in this situation, which we can call a political siege of isolation. The hegemonic positions which have been increasing; the fact that there is still a margin for large operations; I was told, for example, what happened with the logistics. ALVARO is going to give you the details of this. It is a piece of shit what GONZALO did by delivering arms to the people of the FPL, when it is the organization that has received the largest amount of weapons. With this delivery of arms that GONZALO made, the FPL had more weapons than we did. At one additional level, we would receive more arms, but having made this delivery, we turned the question around, and they were left with many more arms than we.

In discussing this entire situation with regard to the DRU, I was telling you, criticisms have been made. ALVARO is going to give you a detailed report. I don't know if it is necessary to have it in detail. There have been sharp confrontations; we took measures--as he was saying--as a logistic weapon our concepts at the level of command have been corroborated and confirmed in practice. The criticisms we made of the methods of work which

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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

On the basis of this, and all those considerations, the policy that was adopted, which was resolved, was a decrease in the strength of the command at base five, the adoption of the plan of the Command, and basically, the plan of the DRU. With regard to collective organization, to give the organizations greater possibility for mobility on the basis of their fifteen cadres. For all practical purposes, we would dissolve the command at Base Five, and we would remain at a level of equilibrium of cadres with regard to the fifteen members of the DRU in order to give each organization the possibility of utilizing the cadres or not. Within this context, each organization can consider the possibility of my remaining in the interior with no problem. But given the fact that I have not been outside during all this time, they should take some political steps with regard to unity and to the particulars of the organization, thus taking advantage of the fact that I am here. In terms of the plan, there is a prolongation of the process of war. In this context ALVARO can give you the details; he is considering the possibility of going to Yugoslavia, because there are some sympathetic contacts there of some strength, and it is certain that these discussions are going to be very important for the continuation of the war. We would always determine the direction of various cadres and within this equilibrium which we have established we have decided that at a given time GORDO, ALVARO and I will on the outside, I mean on the inside, and we will maintain another level of cadres abroad, depending on conditions. All this will occur in an optimum situation, but given another situation, we will follow a rotation. At this moment the plan is that ALVARO, within two months, will be here to substitute for me, and under different conditions the same ALVARO would have to come in and we would leave off managing the exterior at another level, but this is another plan.

This plan is already approved as is the situation of the Coordinator General. Conditions are now optimal, and probably the policy of unity will be discussed in the current agenda. Conditions are now favorable for initiating the plan to change that situation, and definitively to leave everyone at the same level in one fell swoop. I feel that this has received support from the chief himself of the Casa Matriz, since he has realized that this question is the "apple of discord," that this question has caused many problems, although

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

MARCIAL and the people of the FPL pretend not to notice. But evidently there are optimal conditions, it is time for the four organizations to vote so that we can eliminate this question and continue onward.

The FPL have followed a policy of trying to win allies. They have had some success, specifically in the case of Dr. UNCO which has created a total situation. They have posed questions with regard to the ideological character of MARIA; this course obliges us... it does not oblige us, but we do consider it important to revitalize MARIA in terms of its internal political presence, and for this reason we feel that MARIA should come into the interior, take on a political plan and then take its decisions here to the exterior. This will have an effect abroad, because we will be left lightly weakened, what with ALVARO and MARIA, and this is probably the best time to divide up into squads so that DEMETRIO comes in and MARIANA goes out, and it is not desirable that we be in this situation. We will follow, in this context, a very cautious political policy, thinking things through very well. There is a situation which has been officially considered, which is the fact that we do not know the number of troops belonging to the FPL. This poses a problem for carrying out the plan in terms of the distribution of men, arms and military force. A certain correlation has been made, which is reliable, which places us and the FPL at the same level, or perhaps we are one level higher. We have the task of being flexible with regard to the political question and making an evaluation which would place one of us at the top of the group of forces, so that we would be a guarantee for the group, in terms of our political and military influence, of preventing the hegemony of the FPL. This would be, in sum, the question. We do not propose to be above the rest of the force, but rather to contribute to maintaining a correlation of forces favorable to the entire group, on the basis of our political and military influence. This assumes an open policy on the part of Radio VENCEREMOS for the rest of the force. The difficulties which GORDON has had, he informed me that they do not want to give him information, must be resolved through our own communications network, through the collaboration of the PRIC, of the Resistance, of the Party, and of the FPL if they want to and even if they do not want to, well, no way, if they do not, they do not. The impression I have is that instructions for some radio station not to collaborate have been given by the FPL themselves, including VLADIMIR I believe--they are not cooperating because they are rallying to strengthen Radio VENCEREMOS. I believe they have opted to centralize communications--since they have the communications, this gives them an advantage, but with the arrival of our radios I believe this question will be resolved, communication from our troops in Guazapa...

(There the cassette ends).

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

TRANSCRIPT

WORK PLAN OF THE EDUCATION TEAM OF THE RANCHO SUB-ZONE

I. INTRODUCTION

Comrades of the Rancho DSZ, please receive fraternal and revolutionary greetings from the Education Team of the Rancho Sub-Zone.

By this means we, the Education Team, set forth for you a Plan of Work; since at the present time in which our zone has been retaken, we feel the necessity to direct more aggressively politico-ideological formation, seeking the following objectives:

II. GENERAL OBJECTIVES:

1. To elevate the fighting morale of all the militants of the Rancho Sub-Zone.
2. To elevate the politico-ideological level of all the squads of the organization.
3. To make known the importance of politico-ideological education in military areas.
4. To make known the situation at the present time and on the basis of this to adjust ourselves to its exigencies.

III. METHODS:

1. Lectures.
2. Politico-cultural acts.

IV. WORK PROGRAM:

From Sunday, 12 Apr, through 20 Apr, 1981.

Sunday 12 Apr 81: Military 6:30 am - Mireya.  
Masses 5:30 pm - Rafael.

Monday 13 Apr 81: EPL, time: 3 pm.  
Talpetate - Mireya.  
Pena - Randu.  
Apante - Rafael.

Tuesday 14 Apr 81: Team meeting. Time: 10 am.  
3 pm, San Jeronimo base - Randu and Mireya.

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Wednesday 15 Apr 81: Military 6:30 am - Mireya.  
Masses 5:30 pm - Randu.  
EPL 3:00 pm - Rafael.

Thursday 16 Apr 81: EPL 3:00 pm  
Talpetate - Rafael.  
Pena - Mireya.  
Apinte - Randu.

Friday 17 Apr 81: Politico-cultural act. 3:00 pm.

Saturday 18 Apr 81: EPL, time: 3:00 pm.  
Talpetate - Randu.  
Pena - Rafael.  
Apinate - Mireya.

Sunday 19 Apr 81: MEETING OF THE EDUCATION TEAM, 10:00 am.  
Military, 6:30 am - Randu.  
Masses, 5:30 pm - Mireya.  
EPL, 3:00 pm - Rafael.

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The next two pages are withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1)1.4(b)(c) and are not included.


21 Jul 1983

TRANSCRIPT

WORK PLAN FOR THE PROPAGANDA TEAM OF THE RANCH SUB-ZONE

(From 15 to 30 Apr 81)

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)



6. For the control of the newspaper mural responsibility will be delegated to Oscar and Mario to revise it daily.

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21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 227

DATE: NO DATE

TITLE: WAR PLAN

EXTRACTS OF THE CONTENTS:

I. INTRODUCTION:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

II. OBSERVATIONS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

III. ANOTHER OPERATIONAL PROGRAM:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IV. OFFENSIVE POSITIONS IN COMBAT:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

V. EXTERIOR FORCES:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VI. LOCAL TROOPS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VII. MILITARY-POLITICAL PREPARATION:

1. POLITICAL ASPECT:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

2. MILITARY ASPECT:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VIII. PROGRAM:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IX. INFORMING THE TROOPS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

X. INFORMING THE ENGINEERS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

XI. WORK SCHEDULE:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

XII. OTHER ASPECTS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424

**OBSERVATIONS:** The document consists of 9 pages, 10 1/2 by 16 1/2 cm in size; handwritten on white paper, of which these are carbon copies. Their transcription consists of 5 white, typewritten, office-size pages.

**REFERENCES:** The present document is signed by the associate LUIS, chief of the High Camp.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

TRANSCRIPT

PLAN OF WAR

I. INTRODUCTION:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

II. OPERATION:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

III. ANOTHER OPERATIONAL PROGRAM:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IV. POSITIONS OF DEFENSE IN A COMBAT:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

EXTERIOR FORCES:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

LOCAL TROOPS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

The next page is withheld in full under FOIA Exemptions (b)(1)1.4(b)(c) and is not included.

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

V. POLITICAL-MILITARY PREPARATION:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

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Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

LUIS

J. C. ALTO.- (14:10 hours).

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 229

DATE: NO DATE

TITLE: WORK PLAN OF THE PROPAGANDA TEAM OF THE RANCH SUB-ZONE  
(From 15 to 30 Apr 81)

EXTRACTS OF CONTENTS:

I. OBJECTIVES:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

II. METHODS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

III. TASKS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IV. PROGRAM:

They will present a daily programming of activities to be carried out, beginning 15 April and ending 30 Apr 81.

V. EQUIPMENT ON HAND:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VI. ESTIMATE OF MATERIALS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

VII. EVALUATION:

They make reference to an evaluation to take place 10 May.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

NOTE: There appears at the end of the present document a note apparently from commander, which orders that the estimate be revised again to fit the amount of 260 colons, which has been allocated for the enactment of the present plan of work.

OBSERVATIONS: The document consists of 2 notebook sheets, white, and hand-written on both sides with ballpoint pen.  
The transcript consists of 3 typed, office-size sheets.

REFERENCES: NO REFERENCES.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

21 Jul 1983

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 230

DATE: NO DATE

TITLE: WORK PLAN OF THE EDUCATION TEAM OF THE RANCHO SUB-ZONE

EXTRACTS OF CONTENTS:

I. INTRODUCTION:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

II. GENERAL OBJECTIVES:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

III. METHODS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

IV. PROGRAMMING:

They present a daily program, beginning with Sunday 12 Apr through 20 Apr '81, where they designate the hour and the cadres that will participate in the lectures, as well as the organisms which will direct them.

OBSERVATIONS: The document consists of 2 notebook pages, white, and hand-written on both sides with blue ballpoint pen.

REFERENCES: NO REFERENCES.

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

21 Jul 1981

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT NO. 235

DATE: NO DATE

EXTRACTS OF CONTENTS:

I. RESERVE PLACEMENT:

They mention that they will put reserves on the roads of Los Ranchos and Los Almendros, with the mission of requesting the watchword to be able to enter or leave the camp.

II. CONTROL GUARDBOUSES:

Comrade WILLIAM will be in the guardhouse, and will be in charge of writing down in a book who enters and leaves the camp, and will also be in charge of receiving and dispatching any correspondence and assuring that it reaches the person to whom it was sent.

III. OFFICER ON DUTY:

Comrade EFRAIN will serve as the officer on duty and his mission will consist in placing all the guards, seeing that they function adequately and inform each group when it is their turn.

IV. SUPPLY PERSONNEL:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

V. MISCELLANEOUS:

Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c); (b)(1)

OBSERVATIONS: The document consists of 2 white, lined notebook pages, handwritten with blue ballpoint pen.

REFERENCES: NO REFERENCES.

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TRANSCRIPT

WORK PLAN FOR PLATOON NO. 1

1. Three comrades will be placed in RESERVE at the entrance to the road that leads to Los Ranchos and Almendros. The comrades who will be in the reserve are the following: Jovani, Marcelo and Luis.

These comrades will not allow anyone to enter who does not carry a permit signed by PANCHO. Anyone who has a permit signed by PANCHO may enter, whoever he may be.

2. A comrade will be in the control guardhouse with his notebook and his pencil or mechanical pencil, so that every person who enters or leaves the camp must report to the guardhouse.

Every person who passes on the street must report in, and if he does not do so he must be called over. The questions are the following:

Where do you come from? This must be written down.

Where are you going?

What are you going to do?

When are you going to return?

How many are you?

The person in the guardhouse must write down all of this, as well as the time of entry and departure, and the number of people who entered.

All reports will be received by the comrade in the guardhouse, who will then send them to whom they are directed. The same procedure will be followed to send a report out of the camp. It will be sent to the guardhouse and from there it will go out to the place indicated. The comrade will be WILLIAM.

3. One comrade will serve as the officer on duty, and will do the following:

Post the night guards and check to make sure they are in their proper places, post the peripheral guards and check them also.

This comrade must have the troops in order, well controlled, and at night this comrade will muster the troops and will see how long each group is on duty. This comrade will be EFRAIN.

4. Three comrades in charge of supplies will see to it that no domestic supplies are lacking. For example, water, a grinder, wood, cornmeal, beans, rice, sugar, salt etc.

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5. Every platoon chief must hand in a daily report at six in the afternoon, and the squad leaders will hand in a daily report to their platoon leaders. All the leaders will do this. This report will be delivered to the camp leader, namely, WILL.

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