

Islamist Radicalization in France Since the Algerian War

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Abstract

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Despite France's history as a victim of violent extremism, France is the largest source of Western fighters to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, which signals the presence of a disproportionately large radicalized population within France. The French government's attempts to address this dilemma through the establishment of deradicalization programs have been widely critiqued as ineffective. This suggests a misunderstanding of the motivations and causes of Islamist radicalization in France. This study aims to determine the primary roots of violent radicalization in France through identifying and analyzing the social conditions conducive to Islamist radicalization. The results of this study show a relatively high concentration of radicalization in migrant communities, especially those of north African descent, which I demonstrate derives from the systemic socio-economic exclusion and discontent that resulted from France's notoriously poor integration policies following the Algerian War.

Keywords: France, radicalization, terrorism, colonization, exclusion, Algerian War

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States significantly altered the way states perceive threats. There is rising concern worldwide regarding terrorism, Islamist radicalization, and especially lone-wolf attacks. Subsequently, the topics have gained much public and scholarly attention. While these issues are largely perceived as a global phenomenon, the substantial variation in policies, economies, social structure, history and demography even within the European region implores a national level approach to terrorism and radicalization. According to the 2015 Global Terrorism Index published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the factors that drive terrorism are specific to characteristics of countries and individuals, which supports the need for country-specific analyses.¹

France is an interesting case for several reasons. France has been a target of extremist groups since the 1950s, and is now one of the largest Western targets of terrorism.² While there was a 10% decrease in terrorism-related deaths globally in 2016, France experienced a deterioration of over 10% in its Global Terrorism Index score with the highest impact of terrorism of any Western state. Though this was primarily due to a single incident, the Paris attacks of November 2015, the series of large attacks in France since 2015 show that terrorism and radicalization within the country is following an upward trend. Currently, the main terrorist threat in France comes from Salafist jihadist networks like al Qaeda and ISIL, whose intent is to impose a totalitarian Islamist ideology through the use of violence, the engenderment of fear, and behavioral change. Actors who may be considered to be within this category include radicalized

¹“Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.” *Institute for Economics & Peace*. Accessed January 5, 2018.

²“Global Terrorism Index 2016: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.” *Institute for Economics & Peace*. Accessed December 7, 2018.

individuals (whether ‘lone wolves’ or members of small, self-sponsored cells), people returning from the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq, or people in contact with Francophone or French-speaking jihadists from Syria and Iraq. Of European Union countries, France is the largest producer of foreign jihadist fighters to Iraq and Syria. As of October 2015, French authorities estimated that 1,700 French nationals had left France to support ISIS or other Syrian jihadist groups.³ Lastly, executors from the Middle East who currently reside in Europe to plan attacks also fall within this category of Salafi terrorism.⁴

The French government has undertaken many efforts to mitigate radicalization in France and has developed some understanding of the motivations of Islamist sympathizers. The state recognizes that most radicalized French nationals – foreign fighters and lone wolves – were driven to radicalize out of nihilism rather than idealism. This is to say that, while many contemporary terrorists invoke God while committing their acts of terror, the decision to pick up arms is led more by a feeling of emptiness than by a religious belief. The majority of ISIS recruits are recent converts to Islam, not people who have been knowledgeable of Islam and sympathetic to the extreme forms manifested by Salafist terrorist groups. The extremist ideologies supported by terrorist organizations like ISIS can be adopted over time throughout the radicalization process, but is typically not a factor of a person’s decision to radicalize. Rather, it is perceived injustice, a lack of self-identity, and a need for a sense of belonging that are common vulnerabilities of those who fall victim to ISIS recruiters.⁵

Similarly, the state is aware that the phenomenon of radicalization most often affects adolescents and young adults who feel isolated from society. An anthropologist who has advised

³ “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq.” *The Soufran Group*, December 2015.

⁴ “Comprendre le terrorisme.” *Gouvernement.fr*. Accessed April 14, 2018.

⁵ Borum, Randy. “Psychology of Terrorism.” *Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications*, no. 571 (2004): 80.

both the White House and the United Nations on terrorism, Scott Atran, explains that youth are especially vulnerable to Islamist radicalization because they are more likely to be attracted by ISIS recruitment propaganda, which gives youth who are searching for meaning in their lives a promise of purpose, glory, and a sense of adventure.⁶ This vulnerable population of lonely youth can be persuaded that ISIS is fighting large problems, which essentially trickle down into the smaller problems youth identify in their daily lives.⁷

Since 2012, the French Parliament has passed several laws concerning counter-terrorism policy, intelligence techniques, and organized crime to combat terrorism. These measures aimed to improve the immediate security of French citizens by creating thousands of posts responsible for overseeing and monitoring terrorist reports, providing support to families, and responding to concerned citizens through the establishment of a national free phone number dedicated to issues of terrorism or radicalization. In 2016, the Action Plan Against Radicalization and Terrorism (PART) was established to expand upon the Plan of Fight Against Terrorism (PLAT) to combat terrorism and prevent radicalization under the government's new Prevent to Protect plan. The PART refocuses France's prevention plan through understanding and anticipating the evolution of radicalization, training local counter-terrorism actors and evaluating their practices, detecting early signs of radicalization, working with people faced with radicalization to protect them through deradicalization practices, and being prepared to react to any attack.⁸ This begs the question: Why, notwithstanding the French government's effort to prevent radicalization, do we see an upward trend of radicalization in France?

⁶ Atran, Scott. *Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists*. 1st ed. New York: Ecco Press, 2010.

⁷ Vidino, Lorenzo, and Seamus Hughes. "ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa." *George Washington University's (GWU) Program on Extremism*, December 2015.

⁸ France. Premier Ministre. Comité Interministériel De Prévention De La Délinquance Et De La Radicalisation. « *Prévenir Pour Protéger* » *Plan National De Prévention De La Radicalisation*. Paris: Le Gouvernement, 2018. 1-32.

This thesis posits that the French government's efforts to address the issue were not effective because they misapprehend the problem. While the government appropriately identifies isolation as a frequent condition of radicalization, and recognizes that youth are disproportionately more vulnerable than adults, it provides no other insight into motivations leading to radicalization. The state does not acknowledge, at least explicitly, a link between the social conditions that induce isolation and the very policies it promotes to specifically mediate these same social conditions. As a result, radicalization is perceived to be a chance occurrence to which the state may react, but which the state can do little to prevent isolated individuals from desiring. I argue that, to best explain France's relatively high level of radicalization, and therefore to address the problem, it is necessary to unpack the socio-historical conditions that contribute to radicalization.

Explanations of the French case of radicalization tend to over-simplify and generalize the complex trajectories of migrants to France and the construction of French society since the Algerian War. For example, the *Front National* attributes the phenomenon of radicalization in France to migration and the presence of young, Maghreb males, who are viewed as primordially unable to assimilate to French society.⁹ Gilles Kepel, a prominent French scholar of Islam and primary advocate of the view that Islamist terrorism in France is the result of the "radicalization of Islam."¹⁰ He argues that a "third generation of jihad," or a generation of French-born Muslims, have been driven to extreme forms of Islam because of discrimination and racism from political elites and the greater French public. He stresses that Salafism, the conservative version of Islam which some of these youths are pushed to, cannot be separated from violent jihadism. This view,

⁹ Hargreaves, Alec G. *Immigration, "race" and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*. London ; New York: Routledge, 1995.

¹⁰ Kepel, Gilles. *Terreur dans l'Hexagone: Genèse du djihad français*. Paris: Gallimard, 2015, 18-22.

despite some merit for its recognition of the effects of racism and discrimination, over-emphasizes the role played by religion in radicalization. This is argued most by Olivier Roy, who rejects the notion that extremism is perpetrated by Salafism. He disputes Kepel by pointing to the perpetrators who do not fit the classification of Salafis, as well as the number of white European converts who join the Islamic State. In rejection of the “radicalization of Islam,” Roy instead argues that Kepel and his supporters support an “Islamisation of radicalism,” in that they wrongly attribute radicalization to Islam. Roy finds that radicalization in France is more of a generational revolt, in which nihilist youth are using Islamist terrorism to rebel against society.¹¹

I approach the problem of radicalization as something that was historically informed by the impact of the Algerian Independence on collective French identity. This is not to say that radicalization in France is attributed to immigrants or the presence of Muslim culture in France, but rather that the aftermath of the Algerian War influenced the development of French policies aimed to unify the public and remove features of difference, but which had adverse effects. These policies affected the way that citizens who did not align with the traditional French way of life or aesthetic, for example Muslim citizens, have been viewed and treated by the state. Radicalization may be read as symptomatic of a historically entrenched but unarticulated political logic of French Republicanism. When an individual becomes an adherent to the French political community, she is recognized as autonomous, rational, and capable of freeing oneself from social, religious, and cultural determinisms. The pervasive Republican logic that underpins this claim assumes that the institutionalization, through legalization, of categories of difference in fact provokes discrimination, as it divides the homogenous citizenry of the Republic. I argue that this logic accounts for policies that promote social cleavages and intolerance, and effectively

¹¹ Roy, Olivier. *Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 41-74.

cause a portion of society to feel excluded, if not rejected, and purposeless. In addition to the steps the French government has already taken to mitigate the immediate risk of terrorist or lone-wolf attacks, to significantly reduce instances of radicalization, the government must refocus on the social conditions that either create vulnerable individuals or act as motivation for radicalizing individuals.

Chapter 2. Historical Legacy of Muslim Social Exclusion

Following World War II, the French government sought to reform the country's immigration policy to address its need for laborers to aid in post-war reconstruction. Despite strong preference throughout France for European immigrants rather than Africans and Asians, the government chose not to impose ethnic quotas due to the immediate concern for labor, and opted instead to differentiate between residence and work permits.¹² As standards of living within Western European countries began to converge following 1946 and de-incentivize migration within Western Europe, the substantial gap between French and Maghreb standards of living caused France to be a desirable destination for people from France's Third World colonies and protectorates. Between 1946 and 1982, the Maghreb portion of France's foreign population grew from 2% to 39%.¹³ Algerians technically experienced formal equality as French subjects, and in 1947 France introduced reforms through the Statute of Algeria which established full citizenship in mainland France for Algerian men, as well as unregulated movement between Algeria and mainland France. This right lasted for several years beyond Algerian independence in 1962, and resulted in massive movement from Algeria to France as Algerians sought famine relief and economic and social opportunity. By 1965 Algerian nationals represented the largest national group within the foreign population of France, exceeding 800,000 migrants.¹⁴

The pattern has continued over the past few decades. Pew Research Center estimates that France has the largest Muslim population in Europe, making up nearly 10% of the French population. The estimated size of the Muslim population in France in 2016, excluding asylum

¹² Hargreaves, *Immigration, "race" and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*.

¹³ Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)1992a: Table R6, as referenced in Hargreaves, *Immigration, "race" and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*.

¹⁴ Viet, Vincent. *La France immigrée: construction d'une politique, 1914-1997*. Paris: Fayard, 1998.

seekers, was 5,720,000. Germany has the second largest Muslim population, then the United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain.¹⁵ A large portion of this Muslim population migrated to France following the Algerian War, and it was estimated that in 2008 France was home to about 1.8 million descendants of Maghreb migrants.¹⁶ However, throughout these decades of migration to and settlement in France, Algerians have experienced discrimination and socio-economic exclusion while being the scapegoat of French societal qualms.

The initial influx of these migrants presented economic and social challenges, which damaged the way these descendants were perceived. Part of this was likely a timing issue, as France was still affected by the challenges of economic reconstruction from WWII, the First Indochina War, and then the Algerian War of Independence. The De Gaulle government, which felt oppressive to average citizens due to its complete focus on rebuilding its economy, overlooked necessary social reforms to lower tensions. This can be shown through the May 1968 period of civil unrest when a mass general strike, stemming from a student revolt, took place to rebel against the French government's policies and lack of social reform. The French public was upset about the old, conservative social system that lacked any sort of cohesion. The revolts of 1968 represented the instability and discontent within traditional French society. With such severe tensions between the government and its citizens, there was little focus on integrating the new migrants from the Maghreb states. If anything, public perception linked the new presence of these migrants with enhanced social and economic instability.

Another factor of the migrants' newness was their religion. Even before Algerian independence, Arab-Berber Algerians were categorized separately from the French or from other

¹⁵ "Europe's Growing Muslim Population: Muslims Are Projected to Increase as a Share of Europe's Population - Even with No Future Migration." *Pew Research Center*, 2017.

¹⁶ Rabasa, Angel, and Cheryl Benard. *Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe*. 2015.

Algerians, and were officially called “French-Algerian Muslims,” or *Français-musulmans d’Algérie*. An analysis of French media and political discourse from 1975 to 2005 found that Muslim immigrants became a televised subject mid 1970s and that the view of Islam as a problem was shared in the public sphere by 1979.¹⁷ Official and media discourse over-simplified and distorted migrant trajectories to assume the initial ‘first wave’ of male laborers as the standardized first generation within migrant families. The large population of Maghreb immigrants whose families moved to France following the end of the Franco-Algerian War in 1962 are “still routinely (and unrealistically) imagined as ‘first’ generation.”¹⁸ The children and grandchildren of these immigrants are unconsciously grouped together as the ‘second generation,’ while no labelling of a ‘second generation’ emerged following the Polish, Italian and Spanish immigrants of the early 1900s. Though France maintains a “color-blind” public policy which does not direct policies at specific racial or ethnic groups, the contemporary political situation in France continues to conflate ‘Frenchness’ with ‘whiteness.’¹⁹ As many migrants since WWII have gained French citizenship and have either been joined by their families or have had children since arriving to France, the country has become multi-ethnic while at the same time perceiving non-whites as permanent ‘guests’ regardless of their citizenship.²⁰

This societal fissure between Maghreb descendants and the greater French state is worsened by the lack of reconciliation following the Algerian War. Notwithstanding France’s record of using historical references to shape the nation’s policies and development, French collective memory of the Algerian War has been repressed due to its divisive nature and

¹⁷ Deltombe, Thomas. *L’Islam Imaginaire: la construction médiatique de l’islamophobie en France, 1975-2005*. La Découverte, 2005.

¹⁸ Rosello, Mireille. *Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001, 89.

¹⁹ Bleich, Erik. “Race Policy in France.” *Brookings*, November 30, 2001.

²⁰ Rosello, *Postcolonial Hospitality*.

resulting trauma, shame, and bitterness. *Harkis*, or Algerians who served either voluntarily or by force in defense of colonial France in the Algerian War, fought against their own countrymen. In 1962, when French forces were driven out of Algeria, General Charles de Gaulle's army disarmed and abandoned tens of thousands of Harkis in Algeria to be tortured or massacred.²¹ Harkis who managed to flee Algeria to seek refuge in France were taken to internment camps. Since, they have often experienced discrimination and many have lived in shantytown *bidonvilles*, in which they tensely live among migrants who had advocated for Algerian independence.²² Essentially, the children and grand-children of Algerian migrants have involuntarily become inheritors of the Algerian War, as the French state refused to apologize for this atrocity until September 2016 when Francois Hollande muttered an apology that was largely perceived as a desperate attempt to build his approval rating for potential re-election in 2017.

Jean-Pierre Rioux explains the consequences of such aversion to apologizing for the war when he suggests in *Trous de mémoire* that "what is at stake in discussing the Algerian War in contemporary French society hinders remembering the conflict, and consequently there is no national memory, rather a set of mutually antagonistic group memories."²³ The French government has repressed this memory to encourage unity throughout France. The backlash to that decision is displayed through the slow migration of memories from individual, private memory carriers into the public sphere. Another consequence, the subsequent ignoring of the social fractures caused by the Algerian War, have also come to light through the 2005 riots.

²¹ Karel, Serge. 50 Years After the Algerian War, Harkis Still Wait for French Apology. Interview by Gerry Hadden. *Public Radio International*, July 19, 2012.

²² Charbit, Tom. *Les harkis*. Paris: La Découverte, 2006.

²³ McCormack, Jo. *Collective Memory: France and the Algerian War (1954-1962)*. After the Empire. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007, 11.

McCormack argues that to integrate ethnic minorities in France, the nation must come to terms with its colonial past and form one collective memory of the war.

Chapter 3. Impact of Social and Political Amnesia

The experience of Maghreb descendants following the end of the Algerian War in 1962 has had a continuing impact on both the functioning of the French state with respect to integration and the formation of societal norms, as well as on the formation of immigrant communities and identities within France. The repression of the memory of the Algerian War not only creates divides in society, but also shapes the cultural identity formation processes among Maghreb descendants.²⁴ The French state's efforts to inhibit overt expressions of religious identity mirrors denial of the problematic aspects of the Algerian War in that it contributes to Maghreb marginalization, and ultimately questions the validity of France as a truly secular state.

The 1905 law that established the separation of church and state in France begins by asserting that the French Republic guarantees free exercise of religions, which included free exercise within public institutions such as schools, colleges, hospitals, asylums and prisons. French secularism is strict and distinct from other forms of western secularism. It supports French recognition of individuals rather than groups, emphasizing that French citizens owe allegiance to the nation and have no sanctioned ethnic or religious identity.²⁵

In theory, French secularism would make French society more welcoming to a diverse population and serving to all its citizens. However, others view French secularism as attacking Islam, despite its application to all faiths, and creating religious conflict.²⁶ Does this problem stem

²⁴ Lyons-Padilla, Sarah, Michele Gelfand, Hedieh Mirahmadi, Mehreen Farooq, and Marieke Egmond. "Belonging Nowhere: Marginalization & Radicalization Risk among Muslim Immigrants." *Behavioral Science & Policy* 1, no. 2 (2015): 1–12.

²⁵ Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

²⁶ Mubarak, Ahmed. "Prison Radicalisation in Europe." *Tony Blair Institute for Global Change*. August 17, 2015.

from the secularism established by the law of 1905 or from the way *laïcité* has evolved within French society? The literature, along with the path of history, seems to advocate for the latter.

The Global Terrorism Index also cites secularism as being a motivating factor of radicalization. This could stem from the interpretation that the goal of secularism, at least in practice, appears to have shifted from protecting religious freedom to attempting to require the concealment of traditionally foreign religion as a way of forcing integration. Anthony Marx argues that “despite denials and formal commitments to liberal secularism, the glue of religious exclusion as a basis for domestic national unity has still not been fully abandoned.” Within the French case it appears this usage of secularism has not only not been fully abandoned, but has been increasingly re-adopted.

A weakness in French laicism is that it still allows the government to pass laws that pertain to religion. For example, in 2004 France passed a law that banned students from wearing any attire that could be interpreted as a religious symbol, including headscarves, veils, Jewish skullcaps and crosses. Despite the French government’s defending of the law as having a purpose of strengthening religious neutrality within public schools, the public viewed the law as attacking Islam because the banned attire was predominantly related to Islam.²⁷ It seems that the temporary ‘Burkini Ban’ was an even clearer example of this view. If all religions had customary daily attire, then this law would seem to be fair and ‘neutral.’ However, because many religions, like Christianity or Buddhism, do not have customary attire for daily life, this law inherently targets those that do. In the France, it seems obvious that the religion being targeted is Islam because of the law’s focus on veils and burkas.

²⁷ Marx, Anthony W. *Faith in Nation : Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 200.

In addition, it seems possible that the presence of strict secularism could also allow more fluidity in changing religion, allowing those who are discontent with the government or political system to convert to Islam more easily to become a foreign fighter. Analysis of the development of laic trajectory of secularism shows that contemporary *laïcité* was formed based on interactions with, and frequent misunderstandings of, Islam that has resulted in its distorted representation.²⁸ French secularism, though strict in some ways, has failed in its impossible intended goal of the separation of religion and politics. Hurd argues that “authoritative forms of secularism that dominate modern politics are themselves contingent social constructions influenced by so-called secular and religious assumptions about ethics, metaphysics, and politics. From this perspective, not only is religion on its way back into international relations – it never really departed.”²⁹

Most Muslims in France are of African descent. Of the 7.5 million people, or 11% of the total population, born in France to at least one immigrant parent in 2015, 42% are of African background and 4% are Turkish. Both groups are presumed to be Muslim, meaning that about 46% of descendants of immigrants in France are Muslim.³⁰ The fact that France’s secular laws tend to target Islam suggests that African or Muslim immigrants to France tend to face more exclusion or isolation than immigrants from other European countries, East Asia, or the Americas. French secularism, accompanied with the government’s contradictory ability to still pass laws pertaining to religion, allows the government to have differentiated policies toward North African descendants despite French citizenship’s implicit denial of race, religion, skin color, or other markers of difference.

²⁸ Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁰ Brutel, Chantal. “Être né en France d’un parent immigré : Une population diverse reflétant l’histoire des flux migratoires.” *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)*.

A study by the liberal Montaigne Institute approximates that of the 10% of the French population that is Muslim, 46% viewed themselves as being secular despite Islam playing a significant role in their life. Twenty five percent viewed themselves as being “proudly Muslim” while still being accepting of secular French laws. Meanwhile, 28% identify themselves as being proponents of more ‘fundamentalist’ Islam, and are against French secular laws.³¹ Though this is certainly not to say that 28% of Muslims in France are at risk of becoming radicalized (as radical Islam represents a minute fringe of the Muslim population), it is logical that this portion of the community would find ISIL’s offering of an “authentic” spiritual life, with a caliphate that is “all-inclusive and allows Muslims to practice their religion without discrimination” more appealing.³² Members of the other sectors of the Muslim population would be more likely to be attracted by ISIL’s advertisement of jobs, salary, purpose, and satisfaction of basic needs.

The rejection or false construction of collective memory and misunderstanding of Islam informs the way both state and society responds to new waves of immigration. Carmel references the high rates of migration in France in the last decade, which she argues has led to anti-immigrant narratives that promote discrimination and marginalization.³³ Such anti-immigration movements are in response not to the regular presence of migration over many decades but to the recent rising rates of immigration coupled with the presence of instability and insecurity. Right-wing, anti-immigration parties have made efforts to capitalize on the rising public perception of security threats to strengthen their parties and gain influence. Leaders of right-wing political

³¹ El Karoui, Hakim. “A French Islam Is Possible.” *Institut Montaigne*, September 2016.

³² “Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.” *Institute for Economics & Peace*.

³³ Carmel, Emma. *Migration and Welfare in the New Europe: Social Protection and the Challenges of Integration*. Policy Press, 2012.

movements exploit the existing security fears of citizens, exaggerate them and gain further support, which only contributes to discrimination.³⁴

Other scholars also show connectedness in public perception between immigration and terrorism. The 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris contributed to anti-immigrant sentiment and discrimination. The proximity of the migrant crisis to the terrorism crisis caused migrants and foreigners to be seen as potential terrorists and threats to the European Union, partially due to the fact that public discourse was straddling both crises and made linkages between them.³⁵ The perceived correlation between terrorism and immigration have worsened on a global basis since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York. The French journalist and essayist Thomas Deltombe explains that, following the attacks, French media sources appeared to construct a continuum that fluidly connected Islam, Islamism and terrorism. The prevalence of the depiction within Europe of all immigrants as threats, or the criminalization of immigrants, and subsequent exclusionist sentiment is supported Bogusz's *Irregular Migration and Human Rights*.³⁶ This is especially the case for male immigrants from and even descendants of Maghreb states throughout the post-colonial era. This population is often stereotyped as criminals, *banlieues* which primarily house Algerians are seen as being a source of problems, and male Algerians struggle with institutional discrimination, especially from the police and judicial system.

³⁴ Bashline, Paul, Gatch, Loren, Furmanski, Louis, and Hardt, Jan. *EU and Immigration: Case Studies of Anti-Immigration Parties*, 2012, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses.

³⁵ Nail, Thomas. "A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism after the Paris Attacks." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 16, no. 1 (2016): 158–167.

³⁶ Deltombe, L'islam Imaginaire; Bogusz, Barbara. *Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European, and International Perspectives*. Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy in Europe ; v. 7. Leiden ; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004.

In more cases still, decolonization not only led French citizens to view Algerian descendants, regardless of citizenship, as permanent “guests” in society, but also impacted the evolution of French national identity following the Algerian War.³⁷ In *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies*, Kristin Ross explains France in the 1950s and 1960s was both actively trying to modernize while failing to maintain its colonial empire. While narratives of decolonization and modernization are typically separated in French discourse, Ross displays how refusal to acknowledge the implications of decolonization on French modernization form the basis for today’s racism and “logic of segregation and expulsion that governs questions of immigration, and attitudes toward immigrants, in France.”³⁸ Decolonization acted as a catalyst for the French hygiene craze of the decade, juxtaposing the cleanliness of the modernizing French to the unclean ‘other,’ and restructured French national identity in a way that supported Americanization of French society. In short, that France’s efforts to modernize inflamed neoracism and encouraged denial of history.

³⁷ Rosello, *Postcolonial Hospitality*.

³⁸ Ross, Kristin. *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995, 196.

Chapter 4. Systematic Social Exclusion in France as a Contributing Factor to Radicalization

The policies and narratives the French government has developed to protect ‘Frenchness’ and homogeneity within society discourage connectedness between Maghreb descendants and society. People within these disconnected communities are more likely to show discontent with the state or even sympathy for extremist views and contempt toward western values, and are therefore more vulnerable to radicalization.

The meaning of radicalization in contemporary discourse is dependent upon its context. This paper adopts the definition shared by Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard in *Eurojihad: Patterns of Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe*:

Patterns of Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe:

Radicalization is defined as the rejection of the key dimensions of modern democratic culture that are at the center of the European value system. The values include support for democracy and internationally recognized human rights, gender equality and freedom of worship, respect for diversity, acceptance of nonsectarian sources of law, and opposition to violence as a means to attain political ends.³⁹

Islamist radicalization describes the tendencies for radicalization to be skewed toward extreme Salafist ideology, for example advocating for a worldwide Muslim community, cleansed of infidels. For the purpose of this study, *Islamist radicalization* is used to describe a stark transition in behavior that signals the rejection of democratic values and the adoption of support for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Such behavior may include seeking out new religious authority through radical Islam, communication and immersion with people affiliated with ISIS, criticism of other religions and of non-radical Muslims, and a desire to take action to promote radical Salafist goals.

³⁹ Rabasa, *Eurojihad*, 3.

In *The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe*, Maha Azzam attempts to explain why some Muslims who view Western policies as being targeting of Islam are non-violent, while others resort to violence. Azzam argues that radicalism in Europe is a factor of current societal trends, and that there is a causal link between Western policies toward the Muslim world and terrorism.⁴⁰ She, like Deltombe, highlights the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks as motivating the minority of Muslim youth in Europe who hold anti-Western views and sympathize with ISIS.

Another linkage between migration and security is caused by the fact that migrants often face *and* are blamed for security concerns in their destination countries through the possibility of discrimination, and citizens within destination countries often experience heightened perceptions of insecurity that cultivate that discrimination.⁴¹ Marginalization of minority communities is represented as a significant issue in France that contributes to violent radicalization, because it both causes feelings of isolation and creates an environment among victims of marginalization which may be sympathetic to extremist views. While the vast majority of Muslims in France are supportive of democratic principles regardless of their own integration into French society, there is a very small fringe of both Muslims and converts who do radicalize. Western European intelligence agencies find that under one percent of Muslims in the region are at risk of adopting radical Islam, and that over thirty percent of those who radicalize in France were converts to Islam. These groups still total an extremely small portion of society, and the common trend among their routes to radicalization is that they were fueled by feelings of alienation.⁴²

⁴⁰ Azzam, Maha. "The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe: Local and Global Dimensions." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 123–134.

⁴¹ Burgess, Peter., Gutwirth, Serge, Koloriet, Leefdaal, Crius Group, Hulshout, Basaran, Tugba, and Carling, Jrgen. *A Threat against Europe? : Security, Migration and Integration*. Institute for European Studies. Brussels, Belgium: VUBPress, 2011.

⁴² Ibid.

Radical Islamist recruiters promise an identity, a community, and significance to those who feel isolated and desperate. Moreover, when government authorities and Muslim communities are disconnected, Muslim communities may provide a safe haven where extremists experience sympathy, indifference, or even support for acts of violence or terrorism. Rabasa and Benard give the example of the assassinated Dutch film maker Theo Van Gogh. After his death, it was discovered that members of the Muslim community knew of the assassin's plans but did not warn authorities. Tolerance on the part of divisions of Muslim communities are a critical variable in explaining the surge of Islamist extremism in Europe.

A marginalized community that is especially prone to radicalization is the prison community. In *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS*, Joby Warrick describes the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in considerable detail and looks back at its more formative years in which imprisonment allowed jihadists to be “bound together by their privations and by the daily struggle to persevere as religious purists among drug dealers, thieves, and killers.”⁴³ For example, the prison environment played an especially large role in the development of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from juvenile street criminal to internationally known terrorist leader – the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Warrick describes some of the most formative years of Zarqawi's radicalization as his time in prison acting as the second-in-command to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. It was in prison that Zarqawi developed great skill as a leader under Maqdisi's supervision, and Zarqawi developed skill to “command with only his eyes” and run the band of prisoners “as a military unit, with clear chains of authority and unquestioned obedience.”⁴⁴ This theme of radicalization in prisons is arguably present in all regions of the world. Prisons allow

⁴³ Warrick, Joby. *Black Flags : The Rise of ISIS*. First ed. New York: Doubleday, 2015, 19.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

for rapid proliferation of extremist views due to isolation, victimization, vulnerability, and exposure to activists of violent radical views.⁴⁵

As mentioned previously, Maghreb descendants are somewhat likely to face discrimination by the police and judicial system. Of France's 70,000 prisoners, it is estimated that 60% are Muslim. This statistic is shocking considering the minority status of Muslims in France, and highlights the potential influence of discrimination in imprisonment. Because of the Muslim origins of the 60%, they are very attractive to radicalizers in prisons.⁴⁶ Mubaraz Ahmed, in his article "Prison Radicalisation in Europe," cites a former prisoner who shares that those who have become radicalized or are at risk of becoming radicalized often have easily observable attitudes: they resent French society, feel as though they have been abandoned by the authorities, and do not feel any repentance for their crimes.

Basra and Neumann provide an alternative explanation for the prevalence of the connection between former prisoners and radicalized extremists. Through their analysis of 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts, they found that the social networks, qualities they look for, and therefore the pools of people they recruit from all overlap.⁴⁷ The authors explain that the jihadist narrative experiences success in attracting criminals because it offers redemption and justification for crime. This, in combination with the prison's role as a location for networking marginalized, vulnerable minorities with low prospects of future re-integration into society, and knowledge sharing presents a convincing explanation of the phenomenon.

Another concept that helps to explain how isolation and lack of self-worth can contribute to radicalization is Significance Quest Theory, in which an underlying motivator of most

⁴⁵ Mubaraz, "Prison Radicalisation in Europe."

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Basra, Rajan, and Peter R. Neumann. "Criminal Past, Terrorist Future: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus." *Terrorism Research Initiative*, Perspectives on Terrorism, 10, no. 6 (December 20, 2016).

instances of radicalization is the opportunity to achieve meaning and recognition.⁴⁸ In this theory and context, the community is the mechanism that legitimizes feelings of significance or lack thereof through both the narratives of the marginalizing community and the narratives of the extremist community. Society perpetuates the worthless feeling of insignificance and identifies which actions are significant or worth pursuing. Individuals who have an overwhelming sense of worthlessness, who have experienced the loss of self-significance within their community or are afraid of becoming insignificant, are likely to look for opportunities that society dictates would allow them to gain significance. Jerard and Nasir argue, then, that the “Road to Radicalization” requires that the goal of significance be present, that terrorism or violent extremism be identified within their collective ideology as a means to significance, and that the goal of significance via terrorism or violent extremism be of higher priority than alternative goals.

Significance Quest Theory is also advocated in *Belonging Nowhere: Marginalization & radicalization risk among Muslim immigrants*. Here, the authors contribute to the literature in their explanation of the impact of cultural identity on sentiments of marginalization, worth, and discrimination.⁴⁹ First, for marginalized migrants, largely from Maghreb states in the French case, cultural identity is largely lost. Marginalization causes them not to share the French cultural identity, and their removal from their ethnic origins typically result in an eventual loss of their previous identity, especially for 2nd or 3rd generation migrants. Most immigrants arrive in the destination country as adults whose cultural attachments were already formed in their country of origin. The children of these migrants then spend their formative years in part naturally adopting

⁴⁸ Jerard, Jolene, and Nasir, Salim Mohamed. *Resilience and Resolve : Communities against Terrorism*. Imperial College Press Insurgency and Terrorism Series ; v. 8. London ; Hackensack, NJ: Imperial College Press, 2015.

⁴⁹ Lyons-Padilla, Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq, and Egmond, “Belonging Nowhere.”

the cultural norms of the majority, while often their parents attempt to pass along the cultural norms from their country of origin and distance them from the culture of their adopted country.⁵⁰

The lack of cultural identity leads people to be more vulnerable to narratives of violent extremism that offer a sense of community, belonging, purpose, and a promise of recognition and status to terrorists. ISIL recruiters communicate with such vulnerable people, act as friends to those who feel isolated, and promise opportunity and belonging. For example, Canadian foreign fighter Abu Muslim al-Canadi, also known as André Poulin, stated in a propaganda video that “there’s a role for everybody. Every person can contribute something to the Islamic State... If you cannot fight, then you can give money, if you cannot give money then you can assist in technology, and if you can’t assist in technology you can use some other skills.”⁵¹ No matter the person, despite any troubled past, the Islamic State claims to offer a way to gain self-worth and carries a narrative that assumes that all can contribute to their greater cause. In addition, the authors explain that marginalized migrants are more likely to be sensitive or reactionary to acts of discrimination, because they are external reminders of their lack of identity with society.

Overall, the literature overwhelmingly suggests that the conditions for radicalization are shaped by colonial legacy, and the failure of the French state and society to formulate inclusive social policies that would treat the descendants of Maghreb migrants as the French nationals that they are. France has been a multi-ethnic society for several decades, with a long history of serving as an area of refuge and recipient of migrants, yet those who do not look European continue to be perceived in a different category. To address the phenomenon of Islamist radicalization in France, the French government must put effort into social and economic reforms

⁵⁰ Hargreaves, *Immigration, “race” and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*.

⁵¹ Atwan, Abdel Bari. *Islamic State : The Digital Caliphate*. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2015, 178.

to promote inclusion and provide a pathway for members of marginalized communities to be and feel productive within society.

Chapter 5. Methodology

Data pertaining to radicalization in France is extremely limited, and studies involving ethnic background and religion are particularly difficult to conduct due to French laws, which ban the collection of data pertaining to these topics. Therefore, this study relies heavily on a single data set published by the Interior Minister of France, which shows the number of people who have been reported to be suspected of radicalizing to support ISIL. The French government collected this data through several avenues, including the *numéro vert*, which is an anonymous national phone line for reporting such concerns, through an internet form for concerned citizens, by the police prefects of each municipality, and by the national French law and intelligence agencies. Rather than explaining why radicalization takes place (which does not seem possible with the data that is publicly available), I aim to gain insight into the conditions that are conducive to radicalization. To do this, I focused my methodology on trying to find commonalities between the French departments with the highest number of reported radicalized individuals, which could point to the social conditions common to these areas.

I chose to represent the data sets I gathered visually, using ESRI ArcMAP software. By mapping data by department, I was able to layer multiple data sets to render them more meaningful and digestible. To do so, I created an Excel table out of the dataset of reported radicalized persons and joined it by department field to a layer map of France.⁵² I then joined each of my other data sets and used the ArcMAP symbology options to create meaningful displays of data.

⁵² Jardillier, Sophie. "Departements." *ArcGIS Feature Service*, November 28, 2017.

To examine socioeconomic commonalities between departments with high radicalization rates, I overlapped the radicalization data with population data, average home prices, standards of living, and share of welfare benefits to get a picture of the economic conditions across France. I chose to analyze the number of mosques and shantytowns together because, in the absence of data about ethnic background, the presence of mosques is the strongest indicator of the presence of Muslim communities in France, the majority of which are north-African migrants or their descendants. Similarly, if shantytowns are common in the communities with higher numbers of mosques, that may suggest economic inequality and social separation of first-, second-, and/or third-generation migrants from society. If the correlation between the presence of mosques and inhabitants of shantytowns is weak, then that could support that the government has sufficiently addressed the integration of migrants into civil society. However, strong correlation between inhabitants of shantytowns, who frequently feel ignored or overlooked by the government, and radicalization rates would provide support to the common argument that isolation is the most meaningful motivator of radicalization.

Chapter 6. Data Analysis

6.1 Radicalization Alerts

The foundational data of this study is the numbers of reported radicalized people in France, which was collected and published by the Co-ordination Unit of the Fight Against Terrorism (UCLAT) through the Ministry of the Interior. This data includes reports to the National Assistance and Radicalization Prevention Center (CNAPR), gathered through a national “numéro vert” hotline from its establishment in April 2014 until November 2015. The number of reported persons has risen quickly since 2014, as knowledge of the hotline and its use expanded throughout the public. According to a report from France’s National Assembly in June 2016, the hotline typically receives 60 to 80 calls per day.⁵³ The data collected by UCLAT also includes persons signaled through local prefectures. Both types of these alerts are then processed by the CNAPR or police prefectures, which investigate the reported persons and add those who are deemed to be potentially dangerous to a watch-list that continues to be monitored by UCLAT.

I mapped this data (as shown in Figure 1) to allow for initial spatial analysis between France’s 96 departments to see if reported incidents are equally common across France, or if there are noticeable patterns or regions where alerts were more concentrated. I found that the issue of radicalization is scattered throughout the country, though departments in the metropolitan areas of Paris and Lyon have higher numbers of reported individuals, as well as the departments along the Mediterranean coastline. Moreover, overall, the eastern half of the country has more reported individuals than the western half. The scattered nature of the occurrence of

⁵³ France. Assemblée Nationale. La Commission D'Enquête. *Rapport: Relative Aux Moyens Mis En œuvre Par L'État Pour Lutter Contre Le Terrorisme Depuis Le 7 Janvier 2015*. By Georges Fenech and Sébastien Pietrasanta. Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 2016.

radicalization supports the need to examine conditions and policies throughout France, because radicalization is not isolated to certain cities or regions.

To find geographic similarities between regions with higher perceived rates of radicalization, I chose to concentrate on the 20 departments with the most UCLAT alerts. The goal of this was to give an idea of where these alerts are most common, or where there appears to be the greatest risk of radicalization.

Between April 2014 and November 2015, UCLAT received 4119 alerts of potentially radicalized or radicalizing persons. The average number of reported persons was 42.91 per department, though these numbers ranged from 0 in the department of Creuse to 160 in Seine-Saint-Denis. Of the 20 departments with the highest number of reported individuals, 8 departments are in the metropolitan Île-de-France region. Of the remaining 12 departments on the list, the easternmost is Haute-Garonne, which is located at the center of the stretch of the Franco-Spanish border. Four departments are along the Mediterranean coast, spanning the major port cities of Montpellier, Marseille, and Nice. Two departments are in the region where the French border converges with Italy and Switzerland, two are along the French border with Germany, and one is along the French border with Belgium. The final two departments of the 20 with the most alerts are the department of Loiret, which is immediately south of the Île-de-France, and Rhône, which includes the city of Lyon.




Figure 1. Persons Reported to be Radicalized in France from April 2014 – November 2015⁵⁴

⁵⁴ France. Assemblée Nationale. La Commission D'Enquête. *Rapport: Sur La Surveillance Des Filières Et Des Individus Djihadistes*. Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 2015.

6.2 Population

A clear challenge to meaningful analysis of the prevalence of radicalization across France is the great variety of variables which influence it. First, I found it important to consider population, as it is sensible that areas with larger populations would have more reported individuals. I overlapped a map of the 20 departments with the most reported radicalized individuals with a map of the population by department as of January 2018⁵⁵ to see if population explains the varied presence across France, or in other words, if the number of reported individuals rise in proportion to population. As I noted in the previous section, 8 of the top 20 high-risk departments are in the Paris metropolitan area with a 9th department just bordering it, another encompasses the large city of Lyon, and 4 others span the major port cities along France's southern coast.

By analyzing this information (as displayed in Figure 2), I found that most the 20 highest-risk departments have large populations of at least 750,000 people, which could support an argument of proportionality between population size and reported individuals. It is logical to assume that the higher volume of people would contribute to the higher volume of alerts. However, this analysis shows population to be one factor of radicalization rates in France, but not the only factor. There is no 'standard' radicalization rate that we may expect within any given population, but rather radicalization is influenced by a combination of multiple conditions and motivators.

Rather, some departments had disproportionately small populations for their high volume of alerts. The most persuasive example is the department of Savoie, which has a

⁵⁵ "Estimation de la population au 1^{er} janvier 2018." *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)*, January 16, 2018.

population of under 500,000 people, despite being one of the 20 highest-risk departments.

Conversely, some departments like Gironde, have over 1,500,000 people but have fewer reported radicalized people than Savoie. This illustrates that population size alone is an insufficient explanation of why some departments appear to have more radicalization than others.

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


Figure 2. Relative Population Size and Location of the 20 Departments with the Most Radicalized People

To address the issue of population and neutralize its effect on the representation of the data, I reorganized the data in terms of reported suspected radicalization-to-population ratios, which are represented in Figure 3. I focused again on the departments with the highest rates, and found that the 10 departments with the highest perceived radicalization rates included several of the same departments as the list of the 20 highest-risk departments. These include Savoie, Alpes-Maritimes, and Seine-et-Marne. The departments with the highest perceived radicalization rates appear to be primarily in the outskirts of major cities. For example, Seine-et-Marne, Loiret, and Eure-et-Loire are all surrounding the greater Île de France region of Paris and Versailles, Alpes-de-Haute-Provence and Alpes-Maritimes border the department of the posh cities of St. Tropez and Cannes, though Alpes-Maritimes contains the city of Nice. Savoie borders the department of Grenoble, as well as the department that is home to the resort towns of the Alps.

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



Figure 3. Departments with the Highest Reported Radicalization-Population Ratios

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Figure 4. French Population Under Age 20⁵⁶

Interestingly, there is clear support for the assertion that youth are more vulnerable to radicalization. Figure 4 shows that, of the 20 departments with the most reported radicalized persons, 19 have larger than average populations under 20 years of age. While not all of the

⁵⁶ Ibid.

departments with large youth populations have high radicalization rates, it does appear to make radicalization more likely. This supports claims made by the French government and scholars like Olivier Roy and Scott Atran, among others.

While the overlap of population and reported radicalization helps to illustrate the quantity of potential radicalized persons and the perceived radicalization rate, or radicalization-population ratio, of various departments of France, other factors must be considered to further connect correlation or causation between societal conditions and radicalization. The next portions of my data analysis will examine the average house prices, income, and unemployment rates between these departments to look for similarities that may point to the socio-economic conditions that are conducive to radicalization.

6.3 Migrant Communities

This study argues that France's relatively high radicalization rates, compared to other Western states, are influenced by the socio-historical conditions of its population since the Algerian War, after which France experienced an influx of migrants from Maghreb states. The cornerstone of this theory regards the integration of these migrants and their descendants into French society, as feelings of isolation and exclusion are widely regarded as primary motivators of Islamist radicalization. While the French government identifies that the population most vulnerable to radicalization are youth who feel isolated or disconnected, the state fails to connect this finding with its integrative policies and efforts to prevent radicalization. This section seeks to demonstrate that to form a more effective anti-radicalization strategy (rather than its current counter-radicalization policies), the government should incorporate policies that enable and promote integration, inclusivity and hopefulness.

Due to the historical context of migration from the Maghreb region to France, and to France's unique, strict form of secularism, the Muslim population in France is likely to be more vulnerable to radicalization than others within the country. Sefen Guez-Guez, a Nice-based Muslim civil rights lawyer, describes the potentially dangerous effects of France's extreme laicity by saying that "If you're a Muslim, [it] makes you ask: Do I really have a place in France? It means some Muslims find it difficult to be French and Muslim at the same time. It means young people, especially, begin to feel that France doesn't want us. It gives them a sense of being rejected... it leads to radicalization."⁵⁷ As we have seen in the literature and given that the clear majority of the Muslim population in France is of Algerian, Moroccan, or Tunisian descent, it is logical that this divergence began to originate during the aftermath of the Algerian War.

Unfortunately, finding data that enables the examination of this topic is challenging, because it is illegal in France to collect census data measuring race, religion, or ethnicity. In an effort to locate Muslim populations and traditionally migrant communities in France, we may instead look at the concentration of mosques (indicative of Muslim populations, and therefore those of Maghreb descent) and *bidonvilles*, or shantytowns, which were typically the first areas of residence for migrants into France.

The term *bidonville* was used in mainland France beginning in the 1950s to label areas in which police could supervise and monitor the "French Muslims from Algeria" (FMA), as Franco-Algerians were legally described. *Bidonvilles* had previously been recognized in the French empire's colonies, and prior to World War II, the term *bidonville* was used to designate the areas of colonial 'European' cities to which "indigenous Algerians" intruded.⁵⁸ The term

⁵⁷ McManus, Doyle. "France's Toxic Mix of Demographics, Terrorism and a Presidential Election." *Los Angeles Times*. July 1, 2015.

⁵⁸ House, Jim. "Shantytowns and Rehousing in Late Colonial Algiers and Casablanca." *France's Modernising Mission*, 133–63. St Antony's Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018.

therefore symbolized a need to control the Algerian population and create “Muslim dwellings” that would lead to a distribution of “Europeans” and “Muslims” that the French empire deemed appropriate.⁵⁹ When the term *bidonvilles* was introduced in mainland France, it was understood to represent typical housing of Algerian migrants and other disadvantaged populations. The term connotes the most severely dilapidated housing, often resembling camps.⁶⁰ The continued use of the term *bidonville* to label shantytowns in mainland France signifies some continuation of the French imperialist view that Algerian Muslims are separated from society, or in need of monitoring.

While the data collected on shantytowns displays estimated numbers of inhabitants in 2016, for this study the location of the shantytowns is of greater importance than their current size. This is because much of the most vulnerable population to radicalization, as identified above, would likely be second- or third-generation migrants from Maghreb states, rather than recent immigrants. As such, this population would likely still reside near migrant communities, but typically not within the shantytowns themselves, due to the time that has passed since the major influx of migrants.

By looking at Figure 5, which displays the presence of mosques in 2018 and inhabitants of shantytowns in 2016 by department, we may see that the presence of mosques follows the same general trends as the map of reported radicalized people in that they are more concentrated in the eastern half of the country, particularly in urban areas and along the northern and southern coasts. This depiction of the location of populations of Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan descent are also supported by data collected by INSEE, which found that 96.2% of Algerian-born

⁵⁹ Descloitres, Robert. *L'Algérie des bidonvilles; le tiers monde dans la cité*. Monde d'outre-mer, passé et présent. Deuxième série, Documents ; 6. Paris: Mouton, 1961.

⁶⁰ De Barros, Françoise. “Les municipalités face aux Algériens: méconnaissances et usages des catégories coloniales en métropole avant et après la Seconde Guerre mondiale.” *Genèses* 53, no. 4 (2003): 69–92.

immigrants and 96.7% of Tunisian-born immigrants live in urban areas.⁶¹ Moreover, INSEE found that over half of immigrants from these countries settled where industrialism was strongest at the time of their immigration, in the major urban centers of Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. The study found that Moroccan immigrants, who arrived more recently to France, reside also in the urban areas of Montpellier, Avignon, Lille, and Toulouse.

While these migrants live near urban areas, they typically reside in the *banlieues*, which are communities in the outskirts of cities. In the Parisian case, many of these are located in the outer edges of the department of Paris, as well as in the departments of Hauts-de-Seine, Val-de-Marne, and Seine-Saint-Denis.

⁶¹ “La Localisation Géographique Des Immigrés.” *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)*, April 19, 2016.




Figure 5. Presence of Mosques (2018)⁶² and Life in Shantytowns (2016)⁶³

An interesting common characteristic of the areas of the Parisian region as well as the North and South-East, with relatively large Muslim population and high numbers of reported

⁶² “Mosquées de France.” *Trouve Ta Mosque*. Accessed May 17, 2018.

⁶³ “Un meilleur suivi des implantations de campements et bidonvilles pour une politique plus efficace.” *Gouvernement.fr*, June 11, 2016.

persons, is that these regions experience the highest poverty rates in metropolitan France. They have broad inequalities in living standards, particularly the regions of Hauts-de-Seine and Haute-Savoie.⁶⁴ These regions, along with Seine-et-Marne, Seine-Saint-Denis, Paris, Val-de-Marne, are also present in the list of the 20 departments with the highest number of reported radicalized persons. These 20 departments are identified on the map with thick, deep brown outlines. The data for these regions is also shown in Table 1, in order of decreasing numbers of reported radicalized persons:

Table 1. Maghreb Migrant Community Indicators in the 20 Departments with the Most Reported Radicalization

Department	# Reported Persons	Shantytown Populations	# Mosques
Seine-Saint-Denis	160	2859	160
Rhone	156	201	92
Seine-et-Marne	156	514	67
Alpes-Maritimes	151	180	45
Paris	145	547	62
Val-de-Marne	130	225	91
Yvelines	128	231	72
Val-d'Oise	125	851	76
Hauts-de-Seine	124	231	56
Nord	114	1446	109
Essonne	95	1156	51
Bouches-du-Rhone	94	1336	107
Haute-Garonne	93	1260	27
Bas-Rhin	81	66	48
Gard	79		36
Loiret	79	171	35
Herault	78	676	44
Haute-Savoie	77	93	38
Haut-Rhin	76		36
Savoie	72		22

⁶⁴ “Aerts, Anne-Thérèse, Sandra Chirazi, and Lucile Cros. “Poverty Very Prominent in the City Centres of Large Urban Hubs.” *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)*, February 6, 2015.

All but three of the top 20 departments for radicalized persons have government-recognized shantytown populations, and 11 of these departments also have over 50 mosques in the department. There are similarly significant shantytown populations, as well as mosques, scattered in several of France's western half. A similarity between these departments, the departments with higher concentrations of mosques and the presence of shantytowns in the east, with higher radicalization rates, and those in the west, is that they have relatively high costs of living.

In Figure 6, all departments in the third and fourth quartiles, depicted in orange and red, have above-average home prices. All except one of the 20 departments with the highest radicalization rates have above average home prices. The map does exclude the metropolitan Ile-de-France region of around Paris, because for this region home prices were listed by square meter rather than by building or unit.⁶⁵ However, Table 2 clearly shows that the departments in this region have high costs of living. Additionally, INSEE recognizes these regions to have large inequalities in standards of living, due to the large presence of both wealthy populations and poverty.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ "House Prices in France 2014-2016." *French Property*, June 13, 2017.

⁶⁶ "Poverty Very Prominent in the City Centres of Large Urban Hubs," *INSEE*.

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


Figure 6. Home Prices by Department 2016

Table 2. Home Price per Square Meter in the Ile-de-France

Ile-de-France department	Price per square meter
Seine-Saint-Denis	5,300.00 €
Seine-et-Marne	2,590.00 €
Paris	8,340.00 €
Val-de-Marne	3,210.00 €
Yvelines	3,700.00 €
Val-d'Oise	2,670.00 €
Hauts-de-Seine	4,350.00 €
Essonne	2,580.00 €

6.4 Socio-Economic Factors

The previous section focused primarily on the connections between the presence of Maghreb migrant communities and radicalization due to a lack of social inclusivity. These migrant communities, or communities where migrants following the Algerian War chose to establish themselves, are still French communities. It is important to recognize that the main wave of migration from Algeria to France was from the end of the War, in 1962, until 1965. The Évian Accord allowed for much freedom of movement between Algeria and France during this period, while the statute of 1945 continued to grant Algerian migrants French citizenship.⁶⁷ In 1965, France began to enforce restrictions on economic migrants, but many Algerians continued to migrate through family reunification. There were approximately one million people of Algerian descent living in France by the mid-1980s, when the total population of France was at about 55 million people.⁶⁸ The common informal practice of viewing *pied-noirs* as the “other,” rather than recognizing them as French citizens, as well as France’s strict secularism, led Franco-

⁶⁷ “The Colonial and Post-Colonial Dimensions of Algerian Migration to France.” *Institute of Historical Research*, no. 11 (2006).

⁶⁸ Zerdoumi, Amir Jalal. “For French-Algerians and Algerian-French, No Place to Truly Call Home.” *The New York Times*, December 21, 2017, sec. World.

Algerian communities to be socially excluded. The result of this, as discussed in the literature, is that some members of the 2nd and 3rd generations of Franco-Algerians feel disconnected from both Algeria and France, leading to feelings of near statelessness and isolation. Such social isolation is commonly recognized as a condition conducive to radicalization, as particularly exemplified in studies of prison radicalization.

As identified previously, a commonality between departments with high radicalization rates, large migrant populations, and shantytowns is that they have relatively high home prices. This section shifts focus from the social inclusivity to economic inclusivity. High home prices and high standards of living make it difficult for new migrants to establish themselves within French communities, and have historically led to the presence of the shantytowns, or *bidonvilles*, examined previously. Without improved social policies and accommodation, access to economic opportunity is limited for migrants, and while the economic situation of migrants typically improves over time, it is reasonable to expect that areas with migrant communities will experience more economic exclusion. This, paired with high home costs, can be particularly detrimental to the integration of Franco-Algerian communities into the greater French society and may contribute to feelings of hopelessness. Figure 7 shows that all except four of these departments also have above-average standards of living (shown in orange and red). The second map shows the average share of social benefits in disposable income, with those above average also depicted in orange and red.

Created March 16, 2018




Figure 7. Median Standard of Living 2004




Figure 8. Share of Social Benefits in Disposable Income, 2004

Figure 8 shows that the majority of the departments in the region of metropolitan Paris, Île de France, as well as the region containing Lyon have lower than average shares of welfare benefits. This is to be expected because of the wealth of professional and technical positions, and the large educated populations, within the region. These large affluent populations in these areas

may overshadow the evidence of poverty displayed in the shantytown data. However, in the southernmost and northernmost departments, we see high shares of welfare benefits, signaling a larger portion of the population receiving benefits. Overall, the share of social benefits data aligns with higher radicalization rates along the northern and southern coastlines, but not in the typically wealthier departments near Paris, Lyon, or Strasbourg. The continued presence of shantytown populations in regions with higher shares of welfare benefits raises questions as to the effectiveness and reach of welfare.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to answer why France is the largest western contributor of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria, despite the French government's efforts to address Islamist radicalization and terrorism within its borders. Ultimately, the logic behind this study is that the unique socio-historical conditions of the French people following the Algerian War, combined with uniquely French secularism and a traditional vision of 'Frenchness,' created conditions in which French citizens who are descendants of Maghreb migrants feel isolated and disconnected or rejected from society. This hypothesis was informed by social exclusion theory, and the common identification of feelings of isolation as a principal motivator of Islamist radicalization.

The first phase of this research sought to check the validity of two common arguments that dismiss this issue. The first claims that radicalization in France is mostly limited to the Parisian *banlieues* and to prisons, rather than being a problem on the national level. The second claims that the differences in radicalization rates between locations can be explained by population size. Mapping the number of people reported to the government for concerns of radicalization by department clearly showed that radicalization is an issue scattered throughout France, not concentrated particular regions or departments. There tend to be more reported individuals in departments around major cities or industrial centers, including Paris, Lyon, Lille, Marseille, and Nice. Overall, the eastern half of the country had more reported individuals than the west, while both the northern and southern coasts had departments with relatively high radicalization rates.

To address the second claim, I mapped population census data and layered it with the radicalization data for the 20 departments with the most radicalized people. This way, I was able

to compare population sizes between departments with high and low radicalization rates. I also mapped radicalization-population ratios and focused on identifying the ten departments with the highest ratios. If the claim that differences in radicalization rates between departments could be explained by population size were true, I would expect to find that the ratio had little variance and that the ten departments with the highest ratios would most likely not overlap the departments with the most reported radicalized people. However, I found that there was some overlap, showing that population size, while doubtlessly a factor, is not enough to explain why some areas experience more radicalization than others. This supports my hypothesis by showing that there is a need to examine other factors to understand motivations of radicalization in France, and therefore to be able to create effective policies to mitigate it.

Based on literature on the topic, I expected to find that France's unique history of colonialism, stringent secularism, and wavering views toward immigration and integration led to societal conditions that may create feelings of isolation and rejection, which are commonly identified motivators behind radicalization. The majority of France's Muslim population is of Maghreb descent, largely originating from the immigration flows into France following the Algerian War. Because of France's particularly strict form of secularism, which is commonly viewed as targeting Islam, the Muslim population in France is likely to feel more excluded and therefore to be more vulnerable to radicalization than the Roman Catholic majority.

By mapping the presence of mosques in 2018 and inhabitants of shantytowns in 2016 by department, I found that the presence of mosques follows similar trends to the map of reported radicalized people: they are more concentrated in urban centers, along the northern and southern coasts, and in the eastern half of the country. While it is challenging to determine populations of

various ethnic backgrounds or religions by department due to France's 'color blind' policies, this representation of populations from Maghreb states is supported by data published by INSEE.

Another commonality between the trends of reported radicalized persons and the Muslim population is that the regions where they overlap, particularly in the greater Paris, e-de-France region and along the northern and southern coasts, are also the departments with the highest poverty rates in France and with strong inequalities in living standards. Inequalities in living standards and poverty are particularly evident viewing data on shantytown populations.

Shantytowns are essentially the lowest quality housing, often resembling communities of tents, and have historically been connected to Muslim and migrant populations, and the use of the term was adopted in metropolitan France from its use in French colonies. Of the 20 departments with the most reported radicalized persons, 17 have government-recognized shantytown populations. Additionally, many of these departments have above average costs of living with high home prices. In some cases, this poverty is also evident through looking at average shares of welfare benefits by department, but in other wealthier departments, the income of the majority of the population is high enough that it appears overall that little welfare is collected throughout the department. For example, despite a significant amount of poverty and homelessness in the departments of Paris and Lyon, the large populations of highly skilled and well-paid workers overshadows the population either receiving or in need of welfare benefits.

The combination of these factors suggests that, in departments with more reported radicalized persons, there are populations of people who feel excluded from society or hopeless, unable to afford the high costs of living in their area. In *Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest*, Mireille Rosello explains that second- and third-generation migrants in such situations may feel disconnected to both their country of residence and the country their families originated

from. Following colonialism, migrants commonly made an effort to integrate into society and abandoned old traditions, though a denial of social or economic opportunity can cause these migrants and their descendants to feel as if in limbo. All of these factors can make the significance, money, and sense of belonging promised by Islamist recruiters seem more tempting.

I suggest several implications of this research. First, on a practical level, this research could help inform French policy makers and security officials of the conditions that are conducive to radicalization in France. Based on the support this research shows for the argument of isolation as a motivator of radicalization, the government's next steps (beyond the efforts it has already made to address immediate risks of terrorism) should be to implement social reforms to create more inclusive societies to help thwart people from ever showing temptation or vulnerability to radicalize in the first place. Additional housing support and job creation should occur for those living in *bidonvilles*. The desperation intrinsic to life in shantytowns means that people living in or passing through them are more vulnerable to ISIL propaganda and recruiters, due to the promise of money and greatness. Moreover, French secularism must be addressed and modified to suit the modern culture of the country. The combination of France's history of colonialism and its strict form of secularism creates a divided society where significant portions of citizens feel alienated or rejected. Reforming French secular laws to allow religious garments to be worn in schools would be a good first step in showing that France accepts diversity of religion, rather than represses it.

These efforts, aimed to make life more comfortable and form a united collective French identity, should be included in French counter-radicalization strategy and be publicized to promote inclusive policies and rhetoric. Creating an inclusive narrative in French society would

show isolated individuals and communities that they belong. A further step to promote these changes would be to include members of typically excluded communities to be a part of the process in creating and promoting social reform.

Lastly, I have several suggestions to improve this research to make it more conclusive and meaningful. The ‘scattered’ nature of the severity of radicalization throughout France, rather than being evenly distributed across the country or concentrated in a select few regions, raises the question of the impact of local policies. The role of local policies in France and their impact on collective identity and security could be an interesting subject of future study. This project set out to find suggestions of counter-radicalization policies for the federal government to try, but differentiated policies at the local level may prove to be more meaningful and in the greatest need of reform. Further analysis with data that does not seem to be available to the public, particularly more detailed reporting of the radicalization reports, for instance specific date ranges, and percentages of reported persons remaining on the watch list, could lead this research to be more conclusive. Nonetheless, the findings from this study strongly support the need to examine historical context and to address social conditions to form an effective strategy to prevent Islamist radicalization in France.

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