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Rational Choice and Collective Action in an Andean Community

by

Steven John Froemming

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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
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


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
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Abstract

Rational Choice and Collective Action
in an Andean Community

by Steven John Froemming

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This thesis explores the value of rational choice theory in the explanation of social action in an Andean village in rural Cusco, Peru. The research on which it is based has been motivated by the question, "How do agropastoralists resolve collective action problems in securing access to productive resources and in producing public works?" I collected my data in a 225-household Quechua village in the Urubamba range of Peru from 1989-1991. I identify collective action situations and problems in the community, consider the motivations and beliefs underlying individual action, describe the group decision-making processes, leadership structure, sanctioning system, and other conventions and institutions governing community relations, record the pattern of interaction between community members in agropastoral production and public works, and document the outcomes of these interactions. I discuss a variety of collective action situations, including communal work parties, household assessments and taxation, gifts of animals to nonkin, service in civil-religious offices, boundary maintenance rituals, theft, and mutual aid. I present data on the level of participation in communal projects, the factors that contribute to decisions to participate in and avoid collective action, the role that theft plays in limiting productive investments, and the role of opportunity, information, and enforcement costs in determining the success of collective projects. Among my findings is that participation in community assemblies, communal work parties, and village tax assessments is neither universal nor optimal even when it is obligatory, and that this can be partially related a failure to solve collective action problems in sanctioning. I provide the framework, data, and analysis to show that a rational choice perspective can make a solid contribution to

sorting out the issues and explaining a variety of behaviors and cultural features in the Andes. Rational choice theory is inherently incomplete, and a variety of mechanisms operating on different dimensions and at proximate and ultimate levels of explanation are required to understand social phenomena. I hope that this study inspires further work on how intentional, causal, and functional explanation can be fit into a broader theoretical framework.

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Given the constraints of my research topic, I have not been able to adequately portray the range and richness of day-in-and-day-out interactions I had with people while I was conducting my doctoral research, and any redress here at the outset remains insufficient. Still, I would like to recall a few faces and experiences.

Not having any children of my own (a fact taken by villagers in Ccachín to be an oddity, though not altogether unexpected of a gringo), I took delight in the company of the village children. I marveled at how rapidly they learned, easily outpacing me in learning Quechua, in recognizing faces, places, and plants, and in acquiring the home-making and farmwork skills needed to survive and be successful in Ccachín. A grandson of my hosts was born while I was in the village, and I had the privilege of watching him grow and pass through his first major rite of passage — his ritual first haircut — a few years later. I was around to cheer on his first steps and record his first words: "*Achakáw*!" "*mamitáy*!" "*may?*" "*paw*!" and "*wak*[*a*]" ('ouch!' 'mom!', 'where?' 'all gone!' and 'cow'). I was present to witness his first bumps and bruises, as when, still swaddled, he fell out of his mother's carrying cloth as the family hiked to Lares to vote in national elections. I remember his aunt and grandmother sparing him the gorier facts of life when he was young by diverting his attention as his mother butchered some day-old pigs for a family birthday celebration. I recall how he wanted to go up to the family's old

kitchen after it had been destroyed by a house fire because he remembered it's coziness; it was cold where we had set up a temporary hearth to cook under the eaves of a second building on the compound. After he learned to walk, he often came to visit me in my room and sat in my lap as I wrote up my field notes. Two years ago, when I returned for a visit for the first time in six years, he was shy with me. He no longer remembered me, of course, though through hearing stories about his *padrino*, he had learned to treat me as someone important in his life. I found him living with his mother in Calca, the provincial capital, adapting to a life quite different from that of Ccachín.

Among others, I owe much to a *hatun compadre* who shared his knowledge with me on many occasions, but who I failed one June day by not showing up early enough in the morning to help haul corn from his *sara chakra* in a downpour. When I caught up with him heading out with the horses for a second load, I excused myself and teased him that with the rain, I had assumed that he would stay in bed. Feigning incredulity, he explained, "*Pero esto es mi trabajo*!" ('But this is my work!'). When I told him that I owed him one, everyone present laughed (because my labor was extra, without any expectation of labor reciprocation in *ayni*), and he protested that this was not true. We hauled another dozen horse loads, leaving the rest for a sunnier day, and then settled in for a work party feast of chicken, boiled potatoes, corn beer, and alcohol-spiked hot chocolate prepared by his wife in their home. On top of it all, he gave me five kilograms of corn in appreciation for three hours work, more than I deserved. I owed him then, and I still do. This is *my* work, and the *wanlla* is of a different kind.

I would like to thank the young girl in Ccachín who snuck me food and emptied my bedpan while I was hidden away in an attic for a day when the *Tupaqamaristas* came to the village in 1991. It's a humbling experience to have to retreat from one's abode and one's studies in this way, more humbling still to have others take responsibility for one's bodily wastes. I have chosen to keep the names of all of my friends and collaborators in Ccachín confidential in this thesis, partly because of this and other experiences, and the scores who merit personal acknowledgment will thereby remain anonymous. I thank all

for taking my well-being to heart and for making my stay in the village such a profound and pleasurable one.

I maintained a residence in both Ccachín and Cusco during my research, and I would like to thank several people in Cusco and the outlying provincial capitals who helped me at various points in my field work. Marco Flórez Aréstegui was first my Quechua instructor at Cornell and then provided advice, helped with logistics, and shared his knowledge of local institutions and the Cusco environs throughout my time in Cusco. Elena Candia and Federico Letona furnished a room in Cusco where I could wash off the dust and recompose myself after the long truck trip back to Cusco from Ccachín, as well as provided a great atmosphere and some wonderful dinners around their home. Madrina Denig was a source of ongoing friendship, advice, and emotional support. Robert Randall was the first to suggest Ccachín as a potential field site. Tragically, not long thereafter he was bitten by the family puppy and died of rabies. The best tribute I can pay to him here is to point readers to his research on Andean traditions, accessible in such works as Randall (1987) and (1990), and to the posthumous eulogies of him in the Boletín de Lima (1991) and the Journal of Latin American Studies (1991). Tamara Prevost and Phil Reilly, who worked at the AMAUTA women's center at the time and had visited Ccachín, provided a letter of introduction to carry to the village. Thomas Hendrickson and Nilda Callañaupa of Peruvian Andean Treks shared there knowledge of the Lares region and helped with logistics.

A variety of professionals working in the Andes provided information and counsel at various points in my research, including Gordon Prain and Charles Chrissman of the International Potato Center, José Lorini of the *Instituto de Ecología* (La Paz), Alfredo Rivera and Eliseo Barazorda of FAO-Holanda, Jorge Casanova of TAMBO, Tomás Camilo Cevallos Valencia of the Ministerio de Agricultura, Marco Aurelio Ugarte Ochoa of La Universidad de San Antonio Abad del Cusco, Manuel Nicolas Jara of Herrandina, Roger Valencia of Pacha, José Sayer of the Salesian Order in Calca, Marianne Eyde of Kusi Films, Agustín Legarreta of Centro Guaman Poma, Blanca Vial Qero and Carlota Cruz Mesa of CEARAS Kallpanchis, and Roberto Caceres and Martha Rios Arzubialde

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Because of the political situation in Peru in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the threat of terrorism, the community of visiting researchers in Cusco — a natural affinity group for me — was reduced, but my stay there was enriched by contact and conversations with fellow researchers John Cohen, Jean Jacque DeCoster, Jane Henrici, Cheyney Johansen, Zoila Mendoza, Rita Prochaska, Gonzalo Ramírez de Haro, Gail Silverman, Michael Thomas, and Charles Walker. Dan and Becky Young and Sandra White and her daughters, Presbyterian and Baha'i missionaries in Cusco respectively, deserve mention for their friendship and for providing perspectives on the Cusco area and living abroad to which I might otherwise have not been exposed.

I began this project with the personal and professional partnership of Barbara Knox-Seith, a fellow graduate student in anthropology at the University of Washington, and my field work experience and this thesis would have been much poorer without her. Although our research focuses were different, we lived and worked closely together through the first year-and-a-half of research, and we were accepted and integrated into community life in Ccachín as a couple. Much of our data either came to us together or was shared between us, and being part of a couple conditioned the kind of information we were able to gather independently. After Barbara returned to the States and I stayed on in Ccachín, villagers continued to speak laudably and affectionately of her, and her most intimate friends were reminded of her in the minutia of daily life, as when one of the daughters in our host family momentarily mistook the flapping of pigs ears for the distinctive sound of her jean skirt as she walked and gleefully reckoned that she had returned. People identify each other from great distances in Ccachín by their clothing and gait, and Barbara's field attire distinguished her from both the campesinos and the teachers, so it was natural that they would identify her in this way. The same family member once told me about a dream she had had in which Barbara picked the lice our of her hair, not a lucky dream according to her on account of the lice, but certainly an

indication of her sense of the familiarity and tenderness between the two. Mutual grooming of this sort is more common between sisters and mothers and daughters than between anthropologists and their subjects.

Back in Seattle, I have the members of my doctoral committee — Eric Smith, Eugene Hunn, and Edgar Winans — to thank for preparing me with a good foundation in anthropological theory, pointing me to many of the conceptual tools on which this thesis is based, and for their many years of guidance, critique, dialogue, and support. In return, I piled on pages to read and more work for them. I appreciate their careful reading of my thesis, and I'm pleased that they stuck with me to the end. I benefitted from the counsel of Lee Roy Beach, a former member of my committee, before he took a position at the University of Arizona, and I continue to be influenced by his ideas. Michael Taylor first inspired my thinking about collective action in one of his political science seminars, and I am honored that he agreed to serve on the reading committee for my dissertation defense. Above all, I want to thank Eric Smith, my committee chair, for his guidance, inspiration, patience, and friendship.

Things happen in one's youth that in retrospect, at least, foreshadow one's future life. One of my first memories is of hiding out from my mother in the garden potato patch at the age of three. Little did we know then that I would hang out in some even bigger and better potato patches some thirty-some odd years later. I remember being intrigued in my youth by a monstrous old tractor used for threshing grain owned by my grandfather in partnership with several other farmers. I had my first exposure to labor reciprocity watching relatives and neighbors work together on farms in the Midwest. Many of my most relevant memories are church-related. Soon after the second Vatican Council, our parish priest announced that tithing was to replace ice cream socials and bingo (the end of *kermesses* as we knew them). To encourage contributions to the church, families' annual contributions were published in the church bulletin. The voluntary labor of parishioners was used to roof a new house for the nuns (a rural Midwest version of the Andean *wasichakuy*). I later went on to work for a number of years in the consumer co-op movement, and there, many of the questions that have since

prompted me to explore the bases of decision making and collective action were formed. I have mixed feelings about one predictor though. In response to a fifth-grade class assignment to write a paragraph on the history of, Hutchinson (MN), my home town, I wrote page after page, with my teacher, a Benedictine nun, putting up with my daily appeals for a continuation. I finished two weeks later, turning in a weighty composition that was eventually serialized in the local newspaper. Those who knew me then will smile knowingly now.

I have the great fortune at this time in my life to have families on three continents: my family of origin in Hutchinson, my wife's family in Idiazabal (in the Basque Country, Spain), and my host family in Ccachín. Having lived so far from home for so long, I owe it to my experience in Peru to bring me back in touch with the virtues of family life. Despite the distance that separates the three families, they are quite similar, and the likenesses smooth the road between three distinct societies and cultures. I am indebted to my parents for providing me a nurturing childhood that gave me the freedom and courage to explore other worlds, and an appreciation for people and a sense of place to take with me. My parents-in-law, recently deceased, contributed to this project by making me feel readily at home in their home during the write-up, and by, over the course of our meal-time conversations, sharing personal experiences and practical knowledge about farming and rural life. It is fortuitous that our paths came together, and given the historical connection between Latin America and Spain, the information they shared has heightened my understanding of the similarities between the two.

I met my wife Axun in my last year of fieldwork in Peru, and hardly a day has since passed in which she has not seen me behind the computer writing on this thesis. I can finally prove to her that there is life hereafter. She has contributed to this document in too many ways to enumerate, from helping me with translations to accompanying me on my return to the field, and above all, with her love, patience, and moral support.

Upon returning to Seattle for my dissertation defense, our friends Kerry Johnson and Judy Perry, Christine Martin and Pedro Valdes Crespo, and Jennifer Page and David McDonald graciously put us up in their homes and helped assure that our days had the

proper balance of work and play. Kerry, Chris, and Jen have followed the progress of this project from start to finish. My life is all the richer for them, and for my many other friends in the Midwest and other distant parts who have kept me going through the years.

My doctoral research has been generously supported by a National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant, an Organization of American States Training Grant, a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship from the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, a W.W. Stout Fellowship from the University of Washington, a Travel Grant from the Graduate School of the University of Washington, and a National Resource Fellowship from the Quechua Institute at Cornell University. The Centro de Estudios Regionales "Bartolomé de las Casas" provided me with a research affiliation while in Cusco. I owe my work to all of these sponsors.

Understanding something well enough to write about it takes time, and this thesis has taken me longer than it takes most. There is a saying that "the more one talks, the more one errs," and the sheer length of this work exposes me to that possibility. I have tried to be as clear and careful in thought and prose as I am able, but I recognize that there are many areas where oversight might creep in. Many people have contributed to making this document what it is, but I am solely accountable for its failings.

While in Peru, my wife and I paid a visit to the *bruja* of Yanawara in the Sacred Valley of the Incas to see what she had to say about our future. Astutely enough, she read in her cards that I would someday write a book. She didn't say how long it would take, but happily, time and effort have proven her right.

Dedication

To the people of Ccachín, who made all of this possible

Part I

Ccachín: The People and the Place

Introduction

The focus of this thesis is rational choice and collective action in an Andean community. It's based on twenty-eight months of field work in a highland village north of Cusco, Peru, in the province of Calca, conducted between May 1989 and January 1992. I have organized my writing around three goals, 1) to provide ethnographic documentation of the community, 2) to establish the place of rationality in Andean social life, and 3) to examine collective action problems and solutions therein. I draw a portrait of Ccachín as I found it in the late 1980s and early 1990s, separate out the influence of rational, nonrational, and irrational motivations and thought processes in the carrying out of characteristic practices, and determine how and to what extent community residents are able to overcome collective action problems in the management of communal resources and the production of collective goods. I attempt to create an account that is both personal and analytical. Some of the cultural features I discuss, such as the annual door-to-door inspection of households by new officeholders ("*residencia*"), have been little described in the Andean literature, while others, such as the collective rounds of community boundaries ("*deslinde*") and the giving of animals as gifts during fertility rituals for the herds ("*suñay*"), provide comparative perspective.

I approach the explanation of specific acts and practices in the Andes from the perspective of rational choice theory, but my application of the theory is not doctrinaire. While I take the elementary unit of social life to be individual human action and consider rational choice theory to currently be the best-grounded model for explaining such action, I see no reason to believe that rational choice is paramount in all instances of individual action, nor that most practices can be explained in terms of a single process or motivation. As Elster (1989:9) points out, the social sciences can isolate tendencies, propensi-

ties, and mechanisms that have implications for behavior, but they more rarely are able to state the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the various mechanisms are switched on. Identifying, isolating, and weighing the mechanisms that have implications for behavior in specific contexts is no small task, and the bulk of my work here is taken up in trying to do it well. I'm perhaps a bit more sanguine than Elster about the prospects of identifying patterns in switching between different mechanisms, especially along the continuum of information costs, and when possible, I indicate what these patterns are.

The majority of decision making contexts that I concern myself with involve interdependent choices, in the sense that the outcomes for each individual depend on the choices of all, and each has to make decisions based on his or her expectations of what others will do. Among these contexts are communal regulation of sectoral fallow, theft, altruism among herders, holding of public office in the civil-religious hierarchy, fund-raising, sanctioning, the construction of public works, defending territorial boundaries, and social security and mutual aid. I consider the role that conditional cooperation, decentralized sanctions, institutional constraints, political entrepreneurs, and cooperative ideologies and values played in determining the outcome of such strategic interactions.

The data I provide on the nature and success of the sanctioning system used to ensure compliance with collective decisions and community norms is especially important, both because sanctioning itself is a second order public good on which the success of first order projects largely depend, and because too often in the Andean literature, the success of collective endeavors is attributed simply to communal values, or sanctions, when acknowledged, are treated as following automatically and unproblematically upon transgressions. The biggest collective action problem in the Andean community under study, the one that underlies all others, is the failure, despite widely-shared values and goals, to maintain a credible sanction system. Nevertheless, a remarkable amount of energy is expended in collective contexts and a lot of public work gets done. Accordingly, I seek to provide a convincing explanation for how collective action is actually achieved in Ccachín, and by extension, similar communities in the Andes and elsewhere.

Choosing a Field Site

My entry into the field was a cooperative endeavor with Barbara Knox-Seith, a fellow doctoral candidate in Anthropology at the University of Washington and my partner at the time (see Knox-Seith 1995). Barbara and I formulated several criteria to meet our respective needs in choosing a field site. Some of these criteria were dictated by our research proposals — she wanted to find a community along a new road, for example, and I wanted to find a community with communally regulated sectoral-fallow — some were practical, and some were discretionary, anticipating topics for future research. Taken together, our criteria included the following:

Security. We sought a population having some familiarity with outsiders in a region free from terrorist activity. This was both for our personal safety and to satisfy the concerns of granting agencies. Barbara was in Peru on a Fulbright fellowship, and from her experience with Fulbright, we knew that the agencies in Lima viewed the *campo* ('countryside') as dangerous, without differentiating between regions. Barbara not only had difficulty getting clearance to go to Cusco, once there she had trouble getting clearance to set foot outside the city, even to travel well-worn tourist routes, such as the *Valle Sagrado de los Incas*. Research activity in Peru had dwindled because of the political situation, and an anthropologist with the International Potato Center in Lima suggested that I switch my work to Ecuador, which the Center was also doing. I briefly considered relocating my work to the Charazani area of Bolivia, but once in Cusco, it became clear from our discussions with the staffs of local development and tourist agencies and other foreign researchers, that there was no need to look beyond the Cusco area.

Accessibility. In light of the above, and for communication purposes, we sought a community within a day's journey by truck to Cusco, accessible to a provincial capital by no more than a day's hike.

Population. We sought a village large enough to exhibit considerable organizational complexity, but small enough to be manageable in terms of individual research (i.e., from 100-300 families).

Language. We preferred a community with Quechua-Spanish bilingualism, but where Quechua was the language of people in their homes. Language is related to cultural identity in Peru, and we wanted to work in a culturally-Quechua village within our language abilities and without the mediation of hired translators.

Cultural Contact. We tried to find a village only recently linked to urban centers by a road. We wanted to work in a comparatively traditional community that was in the midst of transformation.

Organizational History. I wanted to work in an independent community that had bordered an *hacienda* before the agrarian reform of the 1960s-1970s, or one that was situated near an agricultural cooperative.

Communal Management. I needed a community with a communally-managed sectoral-fallow system, communal pastures, and ongoing public works projects. Secondarily, if possible, I was looking for a village with irrigation works, reforestation projects, or other opportunities to observe community-wide collective action.

Vertical Ecology. I wanted a community with direct access to *qheshwa*, *suni*, and *puna* zones — ecological levels ranging from the temperate valley to the high cold grasslands — and with a variety of different production zones.

A number of people in Cusco advised us that the eastern cordillera of the Urubamba range was a good zone within which to concentrate our search. During a visit to Ollantaytambo, Robert Randall suggested that Ccachín (in the province of Calca) fit the above criteria. He had *compadres* ('ritual co-parents') in the outlying villages above Ollantaytambo, including a few in Ccachín, and knew the area well. He anticipated that we would find the people there friendly and open to outsiders. Staff at Peruvian Andean Treks confirmed the choice as a good one. They occasionally led tours through the area, and had working relationships with some residents of the village. Two friends working with Amauta, a development project for women in the *pueblos jovenes* ('new communities', 'settlements') of Cusco, knew a Ccachín woman and her family through the woman's stint as a housekeeper in Cusco, and prepared a letter of introduction for us.

Overview of the Community

Location

Ccachín is located about forty-three kilometers north of Cusco, at approximately 13° S latitude and 72° W longitude on the eastern side of the Urubamba range of the *Cordillera Oriental* of the Peruvian Sierra. The trip is more than triple that distance by road. It is fifty-three kilometers by bus from Cusco to Calca, seventy-six kilometers by truck over unimproved road from Calca to Ccachín's *anexo* of Yerbabuenayoq, and a four-kilometer hike to Ccachín thereafter (Figure P1.1; Figure P1.2).

The village is located in the District of Lares, Province of Calca, Department of Cusco, Inca Region, Peru. Until recently, the District of Lares extended from the mountain passes of Chayñapunku (4420 meters m.s.l.) and Willkapunku (4293 meters m.s.l.) connecting Calca with Amparaes and Lares, to the village of Q'ellu Unu (1280 meters m.s.l.) to the north. In 1982, a new district —Yanatile — was cut from the old, dividing the Lares Valley into upper and lower political units Figure P1.3). The southern boundary of the new district is a line parallel to the confluence of the Amparaes and Lares Rivers at Mant'o, bordering Ccachín on the north. The Lares River drains the entire area, changing its name as it flows northward: Wasamayu at its source, Lares Mayu as it passes Ccachín, Yanatile through the heart of the valley.

The province of Calca is often conceived of in three parts: the *sierra*, the cold highlands extending from glacial peaks to the confluence of the Lares and Amparaes rivers, the *ceja de la selva* ('eyebrow of the jungle'), the temperate midsection extending from Mant'o to Quebrada, and the *selva*, the tropical jungle extending from Quebrada to Q'ellu Unu (Chacón Chacón 1984). The province encompasses six of the eight ecological zones of Peru identified by Pulgar Vidal (1987): *janca* (4800+ meters m.s.l.), *puna* (4000-4800 meters m.s.l.), *suni* (3500-4000 meters m.s.l.), *qheswa* (2800-3500 meters m.s.l.), *yunka* (2000-2800 meters m.s.l.), and *rupa rupa* (below 2000 meters m.s.l.). Ccachín has territory in all but the last of these zones. The village nucleus is in the *qheswa* ('*quech-ua*') zone, at 3250 meters above sea level.[1]

Village Profile

Figure P1.4 provides a view of Ccachín from a nearby hillside, and Table P1.1 provides a quick socioeconomic overview of the village. Records indicate that the village has existed since at least the eighteenth century. Politically, it has been recognized as a *comunidad campesina* (formal 'peasant community') since 1966. The *comunidad campesina* consists of three settlements and a market annex. Estimates vary on total population, but by my calculations, roughly 1250 residents (some 250 families) is a credible figure. About 70% of the population lives in Ccachín, the nuclear center, and the rest reside in the *anexos* ('annexes') of Qochayoq and Rayankancha. A third *anexo*, Yerbabuenayoq, along the Lares-Yanatile road, is a small group of storefronts run by residents of Ccachín, residents of Choquecancha, and nonlocal merchants. I lived in the main village, Ccachín, during my research stay, and the bulk of my data comes from there. Rayankancha is at the same ecological level as Ccachín and people there have the same subsistence base and cultural identity as people in the village center; villagers of Qochayoq live higher up in the hills, depend more on pastoralism, have less urban contact, and have a separate history and degree of institutional autonomy from the main village.

Ccachín fit my criteria for a field site nicely. It was in a secure area, undisturbed by the political violence that wracked other areas of Peru at the time. Near the end of my fieldwork, there was some guerrilla activity in the Lares-Yanatile area and the government reclassified the districts as military emergency zones, but I was able to continue my research with little problem.[2] The village is located reasonably near population centers, being one valley north and within a twelve-hour hike of Calca or Urubamba in case of emergency. Truck access to the area is relatively recent, with the road through Amparaes completed around 1960 and the road through Lares in the late 1980s. With greater accessibility, there has been increasing cultural, economic, and political contact with the provincial and departmental capitals, and the pace of change had quickened over the last thirty years.

Territorially, Ccachín ranges over several ecological and production zones, and given its privileged position at the nexus of highlands and cloud forest, villagers have access to even more. While ostensibly all land within territorial boundaries belongs to the community as a whole, land tenure effectively varies by sector depending on the nearness of fields to the settlements and the degree of agricultural intensification they are subject to. Communal control and management of the *maway* ('early planting') and main potato sectors is strong, and despite population growth and market pressures, there continue to be long fallow periods between crops. There are no major irrigation works and no community-built terraces. Except for village gardens, all sectors are dry-farmed.

The community has a tractor gained through political patronage, but given the topography and level of economic and technological development, neither the tractor nor any other mechanized equipment are used in agricultural production. Traction power is limited to the occasional use of oxen for plowing in the corn sector. Foot plows and various kinds of hoes, shovels, and hand-held cutting instruments are the principal tools. Horses and mules are the primary beasts of burden. Cattle, sheep, and pigs are the principal producers of meat, wool, and hides (alpaca and llama are more common in Qochayoq), chickens and ducks are common around the settlements, and almost all families raise guinea pigs in their homes. Potatoes and corn are the principal crops, with other native tubers, beans, and squash playing a supporting role. A variety of other crops are grown in small amounts. Foraged greens, herbs, and dyes are also used. Fishing and hunting contribute negligible amounts to subsistence. Wood is the primary source of fuel, and clay, stone, bunch grass, wood, vines, and water are the principal building materials.

The first language of everyone in Ccachín is *Runasimi*, the Quechua term for the indigenous language of the highlands, meaning 'language of the people'. *Castellano*, as Spanish is referred to in Peru, is taught at the school (see Appendix 1 for a note on my use of Quechua and Spanish terms in this thesis). A significant amount of Quechua is used by the teachers for giving instructions and explaining concepts through the second grade, but little or none is spoken thereafter (most all of the teachers are bilingual, so there's little question of their ability to speak Quechua as there is in other areas, it is more

a question of preference and principle). A few families in the village have a Bible or catechism in *Runasimi*, but few have ever been exposed to their first language as written word. *Runasimi* is the primary language of adult men and women in both private and public contexts, though it is spoken with an increasing number of Spanish loan words. People vary in fluency in Spanish, with younger villagers (under forty or so) being more conversant than older villagers, those who have studied, worked, or performed military service outside the village more fluent than those who have never left, and men of all age groups more fluent than their female counterparts. I conducted research in both Quechua and Spanish, but given my greater competence in the latter, I relied on Spanish when I needed to discuss issues in greater depth than my Quechua skills would allow, and for confirming my understanding of Quechua conversations and addresses at which I was present.

As for the name of the village itself, Angles Vargas (1992) suggests that *Qachin* (with its Quechua spelling) signifies "*él esparce*" ('it scatters, spreads'). Few villagers in Ccachín have any idea where the name came from or what it means. A few suggested to me that it is related to the Quechua "*qachiy*" ('to stir'). Accordingly, it suggests for them the image of stirring *hank'a* ('toasted corn'). Cusihuamán (1976) includes the phrase "*hu :k'ata qachiy, rupharunmantaq*!" in his dictionary, suggesting this sense of the term. Others recounted hearing their parents or grandparents make the association with "*runtu qachina*" or "*runtu qachisqa*" ('egg scatterer' or 'scattered eggs'). This may be a nick-name of sorts, as mention of the term sometimes led to a discussion of the nicknames for other villages in the area. The Lareños, for example, are referred to as *chiwanku*, a robin-like thrush [*Turdus chihuanco*]) whose habit of discharging excrement allows for pejorative scatological associations.[3] The supposition of investigators and villagers alike is that "*Ccachín*" is a Quechua term, as it has no meaning in Spanish. In its hispanicized pronunciation and spelling, it has no meaning in Quechua either. In Quechua the accent falls on the first syllable, but younger members of the community rarely say it in this way.

Research and Tourist Contacts

For some, the *runa* ('indigenous people') of the Andes have the reputation of being closed to outsiders, and one hears stories of travelers being driven away by stones upon entering a community's territory. That was not our experience in Ccachín, where people invited us into their homes from the first day that we were in the village. Beyond the *comuneros* themselves, we have the outsiders who visited the village before us to thank for the level of openness and trust that we encountered.

A half dozen treks pass through Ccachín each year. These treks provide varying degrees of culture contact with communities in route, depending on their focus. There is a buzz of excitement in Ccachín whenever a tourist group arrives, but beyond the few dozen *comuneros* that visit the tourist camps with the hope of selling a textile or two, only a few families have any sustained contact with the tourists. Many villagers can name the gringo tourist group operators that have been active in the region — Tom Henrickson, Peter Robertson, Robert Randall, Alberto Miori, and Andrés Holland — and some have or would like to establish *compadrazgo* relationships with them (see Robertson 1984 for an analysis of tourism in the area). The tourists that pass through the area are primarily from England, France, and the United States. However, foreign tourism in the Cusco area declined 40% between 1988 and 1990 due to travel warnings about terrorism and theft, and there was a corresponding drop in visitors to Ccachín (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Información* and *CBC* 1991).

A few gringos have stayed in Ccachín for short periods of time. They continue to be well-thought of by the *comuneros*. Catherine McConnell and Máximo Burges spent two weeks in the village in 1986 as part of the Intercultural Action Learning Project (INTERALP) organized by anthropologists Christine and Ed Franquemont (see Appendix 2 for acronyms and organizations mentioned in this thesis). The first studied plant dyeing and the second studied weaving and Quechua in the *anexo* of Qochaycq (McConnell 1986, 1987). Nancy Boardman spent some time in the village studying weaving in the 1980s. Richard Wharton visited Ccachín from time to time in the mid-1980s and

introduced a new variety of *tarwi* ('lupine') to villagers. All of these visitors stayed with local families and many entered into *compadrazgo* relations with residents.

While there have been no previous anthropological studies of Ccachín, two U.S. anthropologists conducted doctoral fieldwork in neighboring Choquecancha just before our arrival in the area in the late 1980s. Katherine Seibold investigated Choquecancha's textiles (Seibold 1990, 1992), and Michael Thomas studied myth. Neither spent any time in Ccachín, but given the proximity and similarity of the two communities, their work is relevant to both.

Several Peruvian investigators and development specialists have also visited the community. Agronomists from Cusco conducted eight days of fieldwork on the agro-forestry of the village in 1986 (Venero et. al. 1987). One of them has maintained contact with the community as a promoter of the Proyecto Amparaes-Lares's potato marketing association (Jorge A. Casanova, personal communication). Angel Callañawpa spent a few weeks in Ccachín in 1990 studying people's knowledge of plant dyeing. Agricultural professionals and government agents visit the community on an occasional basis, staying with local families. None of the agencies they represent have an outlet in Ccachín and their visits are infrequent. The Salesian priests in Calca — mostly Europeans — visit Ccachín to say mass three or four times a year.

In sum, there has been a modest level of contact between the *comuneros* of Ccachín and foreign tourists and national, urban professionals over the last fifteen years. A handful of children had *gringo* godparents before our arrival, and most school-aged children have performed for foreign visitors in school assemblies. Most villagers have only had the opportunity to know such outsiders at a distance, but a good portion of the younger bilingual villagers have had firsthand contact. All relations have been at the individual level; there are no community institutions for receiving visitors or marketing textiles as one finds, for example, in the communities of Amantani and Taquile on Lake Titicaca (Healy and Zorn 1983; Zorn 1987). The presence of *gringos* in Ccachín is novel, but readily accepted by most. Whenever tourists passed through while I was in Ccachín, I was informed by villagers that my "*paisanos*" ('compatriots') had arrived. The low-

levels of tourism in the area have not caused significant competition or conflict between the *comuneros*, and if *turistas* are viewed partly in terms of opportunity, they are also treated as honored guests.

Research Objectives and Methodology

I organized my work around two topics while in the field: peasant rationality and collective action. My reasoning was that it is hard to explain collective outcomes without reference to the action and interaction of individuals, and that the ends and meanings that shape people's actions determine the possibilities of achieving cooperation. The overall thrust of my research has been to view collective outcomes in terms of the goals and actions of individuals, with the hope of contributing to the effort to establish coherent microfoundations in the explanation of cooperation in the Andes. My working hypothesis is that peasant rationality is primarily instrumental: that actions are not valued and chosen for themselves, but as more or less efficient means to further ends. Whenever the data indicate otherwise, then alternative (non-instrumental) explanations must likewise be tested.

I have focused my research on exploring the limits of instrumental rationality in decision making in general, and determining the role that such features as conditional cooperation, decentralized sanctions, institutional constraints, political entrepreneurs, and cooperative ideologies and values played in determining the outcome in strategic situations in particular. To achieve these goals, I structured my work in Ccachín around four objectives: 1) to identify collective action situations and problems in the village, 2) to describe the group decision making processes, leadership structure, sanctions, and other conventions and institutions that govern relations in the community, 3) to record the pattern of interaction between community members in agropastoral and public works production, and 4) to describe the consequences and outcomes of these social interactions.

My primary research method in the field was participant observation. I lived with a family, became part of extended family networks through *compadrazgo* ('ritual co-

parenthood'), attended private and public festivals, worked in the fields and at house-raisings in household and interhousehold teams, participated in communal labor parties, attended village assemblies, contributed to fund-raisers, accepted minor committee positions when nominated, and tried to fit into village life as best and inconspicuously as I could. I supplemented participant observation with an informal agricultural survey based on the methodology and questions suggested by Rhoades (1982) from his experience at the International Potato Center.

Living with one family over the entire research period, I was able to collect information on a single household's consumption and production activities, labor scheduling and recruitment, social interactions, spatial movement, and overall decision making. Any lack of representativeness in becoming involved with one household in this way was compensated for by the gain in depth and detail. For further representativeness, I spent time with eighteen families on a regular basis, and visited the homes or worked in the fields of three times that many. Frequent visits took place through the give and take of *compadrazgo* or friendship; one-time visits took place in a variety of contexts, including invitations to work, appeals for medical aid, requests for photographs, festival participation, and hospitality. Accordingly, the subjects of the informal interviews and observations I made during these engagements were not randomly chosen, but determined through a mutual selection process. They also developed over time. This proved to be the least disruptive way to gather information, and allowed for more intimate conversation and relations.

Rhoades (1982) provides various suggestions on collecting data in farm communities, and I found it advantageous to follow them :

> It is best to keep as low a profile in the rural setting as possible. . . . Walk as much as possible. Do not go in large numbers. . . . Try to blend into the local context . . . without "going native." Be sensitive to the fact that people may be suspicious of you. . . . be aware of the daily work schedule, seasonal activity, work habits, climate, and how these affect farmers' willingness to talk. . . . If appropriate, lend a helping hand without getting in the way. . . . Don't fall into the "Joe Friday syndrome." . . . Don't ask questions that are too abstract or sensitive . . . . remember that what people say and do may be two different things. [Rhoades 1982:15-17]

I presented myself in Ccachín as someone who would like to learn local customs and ways of doing things from the ground up so that I could write and tell people back home about them. Since I have a rural Midwestern U.S. farm background, I was able to reciprocate by responding to their many questions about how similar things are done back home. Other roles for myself gradually developed through the give-and-take of participation in village life. Barbara and I intentionally tried to keep our presence distinct from that of the teachers, development workers, and tourists who lived in or passed through the community at the time.

At the time, there were eleven teachers and two *porteros* ('doorkeepers' or 'janitors') in Ccachín for the eight months — May through December — that school was in session. Along with the *sanitario* ('health official') they were the only Spanish-as-first-language speakers in the village. While culturally distinct from the permanent residents, they were usually referred to in the village in terms of address and reference by their role — *profesores* — rather than in ethnic terms. Most of the teachers were from Calca, the district capital. While in Ccachín, the teachers rented rooms from the *comuneros*. Except for one instance where both a husband and wife taught in the village and had their children with them, the *profesores* were separated from their families for extended periods of time. This separation, combined with their self-perceived isolation and the low status that teaching in the rural areas carries, promoted considerable absenteeism. With the numerous strikes called by SUTEP (the teachers' union), teachers on contract that never showed up, leaves-of-absence, monthly trips to Calca to collect paychecks (payments which were often delayed), and occasional weekend trips to visit their families, the teachers were outside of the village for a good share of the time that they were ostensibly teaching.

Since the teachers were the most prominent outsiders in Ccachín, our goal in presenting ourselves in the village was to maintain cordial relations with them while simultaneously establishing a separate identity. On our first few exploratory visits to the village, we received valuable help from a teacher that lived with our host, but as we

established relations with our host family, we soon weaned ourselves of it. I found it easiest to describe myself as a teacher in my own country as it was a readily understandable status, but at the same time I tried to maintain a friendly distance from the teachers, visiting the school primarily on those official occasions when the entire community could attend, and maintaining relatively infrequent and low-key social relations with them. While neither Barbara nor I ever adopted the full complement of *campesino* clothing for daily wear, Barbara's skirt distinguished her from the female teachers, who wore pants, and my *sombrero*, *usut'a* ('tire sandals'), and occasional donning of village ponchos distinguished me from the male teachers, who rarely if ever wore them.[4]

Inge Bolin, who did her doctoral research in 1984-85 in Chichubamba and Chillihuani, villages not far from Ccachín in the Urubamba range, writes that when she returned to Peru in August of 1990 when it was experiencing its worst economic disaster in living memory, she would have felt uncomfortable if the sole reason for her presence in the communities had been the study of ancient rituals, while the people were desperately trying to survive (Bolin 1992:14). Accordingly, she was gratified to have the opportunity to participate in a couple of development projects for the communities, describing her role as that of a mediator between the indigenous people and development organizations. Long-term research in an area provides anthropologists with the first-hand knowledge, organizational contacts, and personal credibility to play such roles, and it is appropriate for those with the experience to do so. I often felt the same as Bolin about wanting to contribute more to my host community in troubled times, but being my first experience in the field, I recognized that I was limited in how much I could contribute, and felt that it would be presumptuous and perhaps counterproductive to take on a more applied role. In any case, the credibility needed to do so must be slowly earned. While doing my doctoral research, I did not wish to be confined by the expectations and status associated with development work, and as with the teachers, I took care to distinguish my presence from that of various development specialists who passed through the community during my stay.

Overview of the Thesis

I have organized the thesis into five parts, with a short introduction to each. In Part I, I provide background information about the community history, cultural identity, spatial organization, and modes of production in Ccachín, and an overview of community life from the perspective of my participation in it. In Part II, I move on to discuss rational choice theory in general and its application to the Andes in particular. I explore the topics of health, theft, and gift-giving in an attempt to outline fundamental explanatory principles and to separate out the rational, nonrational, and irrational mechanisms that appear to be at play in each. In Part III, I discuss the institutional arrangements of Ccachín, with an emphasis on the decision-making forums, roles and rules that establish the *comunidad campesina* as a collective actor and common property regime. In Part IV, I build on this discussion to explore a variety of domains in which the campesinos work together collectively for their common good. Finally, in Part V, I sum up my findings and bring the study to a conclusion.

Objectives of Part I

Part I provides an introduction and overview of my research site. It contains background information about the history, cultural identity, geography, spatial organization, production cycle, and social relations in Ccachín.

In Chapter 1, I discuss Ccachín's history as gleaned from oral tradition and pieced together from the wider historical context, census data, and written documents. I locate Ccachín in terms of social time and space, and discuss people's sense of class and ethnic identity.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the spatial organization and production cycle in Ccachín. This includes a discussion of the geography and climate, settlement pattern, production zones, communal regulation of sectoral fallow, and exchange networks.

In Chapter 3, I provide several profiles of social life in the community from the perspective of how villagers dealt with my presence and assigned me a social identity. A review of recent anthropological writing suggests that opening a window on the ethnogra-

pher's dialogue with the *Other*, a dialogue involving ethnographers' passion as well as their reason, their identity as well as that of their subjects, is an essential part of writing ethnography. The face-to-face aspect of participating in another culture comes across in Allen (1988) and Meyerson (1990), for example, and in Knox-Seith (1995), especially in her discussion of how people in Ccachín viewed our relationship and related to us as a couple. The dialogue between self and subjects provides important data in its own right, and the negotiation and transformation of meaning involved in interpersonal relationships affects the validity and reliability of research. One of my goals in Chapter 3 is to offer a series of snapshots on social life in Ccachín in order to provide a more personal, varied, and expansive background of the community than contained in the geographical, historical, and socioeconomic data provided in the first two chapters. A second goal is to situate myself at the center of my relationships in Ccachín to calibrate my ethnographic self as an instrument in the description and analysis of village life. In so doing, I hope to go beyond the temptation to relate my subjects to an Andean logic unbroken in geographical space and time. Writing oneself at center, acknowledging oneself as a condensed and locally-recognized symbol of a distant and powerful culture — inevitably points to those aspects and those people in a village that are in the process of change as well, and faces one with the reflection of oneself in the global culture that has preceded us. While I chose Ccachín as a field site, the villagers I had most contact with were the ones who took an interest in me and sought me out. My description of life in Ccachín in Chapter 3 draws freely from personal anecdote, but in looking out from an ego-centered network, it complements the somewhat more detached view of later chapters.

Preview of Parts II-V

For the most part, my focus in this thesis is on strategic decision making contexts. After providing background information about Ccachín in the first three chapters, I discuss theft in Chapter 5, altruistic gift-giving of animals by haves to have nots in Chapter 6, participation in the civil-religious hierarchy in Chapter 7, communal management in Chapter 8, rule enforcement in Chapter 9, taxation and fund-raising in Chapter

10, participation in communal work parties in Chapter 11, territorial defense in Chapter 12, communal self-help in Chapter 13, and social security and mutual aid in Chapter 14 — all important domains for interdependent choice in Andean villages. The exception is Chapter 4, where I discuss ethnomedical decision making. I have chosen the healthcare decisions I focus on there because they provide examples of decision making with incomplete information in situations of uncertainty and risk, and in order to explore the extent that the belief mechanisms underlying them hold sway in strategic contexts as well.

Notes to Part I

1. The local geographic ordering corresponds more to the Colonial than to the Republican or the post-modern images identified by Orlove (1993), but this may be because his study takes the entire Peruvian territory as its field of view. Orlove argues that there are three distinct impulses at work in these orderings: disciplinary, administrative, and hegemonic. His point, that the distinct images of order in each historical period have a lot to do with the specific sociopolitical contexts in which these geographies developed, is an important one. The Chacón Chacón (1984) work cited here is a good example of the Republican impulse to colonize the jungle by pushing roads through the mountains. The visionaries Chacón admires must surmount malaria, local jealousies and conflict, and geological catastrophe to achieve their goals. His chapter titled "*Muchas Vidas por un Ideal Noble*" ('Many Lives for a Noble Idea') captures the spirit of the age.

2. When we started our research in the Cusco area in 1989, there were sporadic bombings in Cusco, death threats against professors at the Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad del Cusco and against area mayors. There was *Senderista* and *Tupaq-amarista* agitation and graffiti at the university, in the prison, in the *pueblos jovenes*, and in the plazas and streets of Cusco and the Sacred Valley. *Sendero Luminoso*'s major activity the Department of Cusco was located from Sicuani south to the *provincias altas* and Lake Titicaca region, while *El Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaq Amaru* operated to the north, in the Quillabamba area. While this held throughout 1989-1992, during my final year of research, parts of the district of Lares, including my field site of Ccachín came under martial law. A group of *Tupaq-amaristas* occupied Ccachín for two days during that period, and government troops passed through the village several times. The morning I said my final goodbyes, two soldiers among a troop of thirty-some had invited themselves to breakfast with my family, occupying my normal seat. I make brief mention of these events in this dissertation, and full accounting awaits the passage of time and change in the political situation in Peru.

3. I am not sure how widespread the phenomenon of village nicknames is in the Andes, where I've found little reference to it in the literature, and have not pursued the issue as I might. Such nicknaming is commonplace in Spain, however, and deserves further study in the Andes. By way of cross-cultural comparison, villagers in my wife's hometown of Idiazabal in the Basque Country are referred to by their neighbors as *azerik* ('fox'), having lost the title *otsoak* ('wolves') centuries ago to their neighbors in Ataun. The folks of Segura, historically the local administrative center, are referred to as "*oliak*" ('chickens'), or more pejoratively, as "*luma zopa jaleak*" ('eaters of [chicken] feather soup'). The people of Beasain are known as *bareak* ('slugs'); their neighbors in Ordizia as *bersa* ('cabbage'). Most of these totemic

images invoke plant and animal associations, and, as with the contrast fox-chicken and slug-cabbage, they often reflect local rivalries between communities. Despite Ccachín's rivalry with neighboring Choquecancha, I am not aware of any nicknames applied to residents there. There may not be one, or I may have missed it.

4. Our first three visits to Ccachín were short so as not to wear out our stay, to confirm the suitability of the community for our research, to seek permission from community officials to live in the village, and to find housing. We carried a letter of introduction for a family with which friends in Cusco had had previous contact, and upon arrival, our first hosts put us up in a bed alongside theirs in the second story of their house. On one occasion, the teacher who rented from the family shared his space with us. One night during dinner we discussed with the family and the teacher where we could find more permanent housing. The family cautioned that many in the village would take advantage of us, and that it would be best to stay with them. Other *gringos* had stayed with the family for short periods of time, and the family had had good experiences with them. Our presence, however, meant that the teacher would have to find alternative housing, and all the best places were already taken. He eventually found new accommodations, but not without briefly entertaining the hope that we could all live together in his small room. We helped him wall up the holes in his new home, a clammy, tin-roofed structure nearer the school, and we were his guests for the housewarming. We are indebted to the family for so graciously offering us room, board, and hospitality for the length of our stay, and to the teacher, in those early days, for giving up his relatively comfortable housing, by Ccachín standards, on our behalf.




Figure P1.1: Location of Field Site in Cusco Region




Figure P1.2: District of Lares and Vicinity




Figure P1.3: Province of Calca by Districts



Figure P1.4: Village of Ccachín

Table P1.1: Ccachín at a Glance

Political and Territorial Status	
Organizational Status	*Comunidad Campesina*
Date Established	November 28, 1966
Status Until 1966	*Parcialidad* of Lares
First Historical Record	1785
Location	Lares District, Calca Province, Cusco Department
Population (1990)	1250 (including annexes)
Area (1988)	98 sq. km. (38 sq. miles)
Annexes	Qochayoq, Rayankancha, Yerbabuenayoq
Altitude	Village Center: 3248 m. (10,656 ft.); Range: 2250-5380 m. (7,382-17,651 ft.)
Number of Former Haciendas in Territory	3
Language:	Quechua; Spanish taught in school
Animals, Crops, and Land Tenure	
Sectoral Fallow Rotation in Main Potato Sector	Fields planted approximately 1 year of 7
Principle Crops	Potatoes, Corn, Broad Beans, Squash
Principle Animals	Cattle, Horses, Sheep, Pigs, Llama, Alpaca
Individual Parcels	Yes
Sharecropping	Yes
Wage Labor Used in Agricultural Production	No
Communal Property	Yes
Divide Land Among Community Members	Yes
Community Cooperative	No
Community Business (*Empresa Comunal*)	No
Technology of Agricultural Production	
Oxen-drawn plow	Corn Sector (every 3-5 yrs.)
Foot plow	Potato Sector
Mechanized Equipment	No
Commercial Fungicides and Insecticides	Yes, less than half the community; mostly in early potato sector
Commercial Fertilizers	No
Improved Seeds	Yes, but limited
Financing and Credit	
Community Loans to Member Households	No
Use Private Bank Loans for Production	Yes
Water Resources	
Potable Water for Human Consumption	Yes
Irrigated Fields	No
Fish Hatchery	No
Hydroelectric	No

Table P1.1 (Continued)

Non-Agropastoral Production	
Blacksmiths	None
Carpenters	3
Hat Makers	None
Miners	None
Shoemakers	None
Storekeepers	Ccachín 2-3 house front; Yerbabuenayoq 5 storefront)
Tailors	1
Weavers	Most women sell used textiles to tourists
Community Organization	
Frequency of Community Assemblies	Monthly
Special Committees	6
Relation of Civil-Religious Cargos to Election of Community Officers	No Formal Requirements
Community Records	Records maintained by Community Assembly (Book of Acts), Lieutenant Governor, Municipal Council (*Consejo*), Judges, Church Committee
Communal Labor	Required of All
Reciprocal Labor for Agricultural Production	Used by All Households
Land Conflicts	
With Neighboring Communities	Yes, with Chupani
With CAP or SAIS Cooperative	Not applicable
With Non-community Individuals	No
With Community Members	Yes
Clubs and Associations	
Mother's Club	Yes
Parents' Associations for Schools	Yes
Dance Clubs	Yes
Migrant Associations in Urban Areas (Cusco, Arequipa, Lima, or Quillabamba)	No
Development Projects	
Reforestation Program	Yes
Adult Literacy Program	Yes
Supplementary Food Program for Children	Yes
Infrastructure and Services	
Community Assembly Hall	Yes
Church	Yes, with chapels in each annex
Corral, Comunal	Yes
Generator of Electricity	No
Health Post	Constructed c. 1986
Jail	No (room below *Consejo* used for temporarily holding prisoners)

Table P1.1 (Continued)

Infrastructure and Services	
Library, Public	No
Mill	Yes (Small unit with electric motor, purchased 1991 but never used)
Office for Municipal Council	1 room used for civil marriages, etc.
Radio Station	No
Road to Village Center	No, nearest road is half-hour hike away
Outhouses (Public or Private)	No
Oven (Communal or Private)	1, Private
Post Office	No
School Buildings	
Preschool	In construction
Grade School	Yes, 6 rooms
High School	In construction (presently sharing school facilities)
Sewer System	No
Sports Field	Yes
Telegraph System	No
Telephone System	No
Vehicles (Communal or private ownership)	
Bus	No
Truck or Pickup	No
Tractor	Yes (1), Communal (never used and trying to rent in Lares Valley)
Water System (Piped to Households)	Constructed 1986-1988

Chapter 1

Community History and Cultural Identity

> In times past, *machula* lived in Ccachín. The Inca lived out front in Choquecancha. When the Inca and *machula* fought, the Inca hurled *hiwaya* [a precious stone] at the *machula*. The *machula* hurled fox *lisa* [a wild tuber] at the Inca. The Inca were foolish. They thought that the *hiwaya* would squash the *machula*, but the *machula* were stronger. The Inca never occupied the lands of Ccachín. There is hardly any black soil in Choquecancha like there is in Ccachín. The land there is colored and rocky. People say that the *machula* carried away the soil from the other side with sacks in the dark. In this way they sabotaged the Inca, they robbed them. It was in the time before the sun, and the *machula* did all their work by the light of the moon. When the sun appeared, they were burned up. Now they don't exist, but their bones remain, and they cause damage to animals and people. People say that the Inca now live in a city called Paytiti, but perhaps they exist and perhaps they have died, no?
>
> Story told by a young woman in Ccachín

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss Ccachín's history from the Inca to the present as represented by oral tradition and as can be pieced together from the wider historical context, from census data, and from written documents. I follow up on this history to locate Ccachín in terms of social time and space — especially, people's sense of class and ethnic identity.

History of the Region

Ñawpa Timpu: The Age of the *Machula*

Apu Pinkuyllunka is a knoll rising above the southeast corner of the residential center of Ccachín. The *pinkuyllu* is an Andean wind instrument, and as one stands atop Pinkuyllunka the up swell of air from the gorge below suggests its name. From this lookout, one can keep vigil over the Lares Valley as it narrows toward the "*ceja de la*

selva," the cloud forest to the north. Facing east, one sees an Inca trail climbing northward from the neighboring village of Choquecancha before dropping over the opposite ridge on its way to the town of Laq'o, and from there, by local legend, to Paytiti. To the south, toward Cusco, the valley rises to the district capital of Lares, a two hour walk away. Beyond stands the glacial peak Sawasiray, the mountain lord of the Antisuyo region of the Inca empire (Figure 1.1). The major concentration of *machula* ruins, circular stone structures said to have been built by the pre-Incaic peoples mentioned in the young woman's story above, are found on *Pinkuyllunka*. Although villagers don't directly trace their descent to these "ancient ones," the *machula* figure prominently in the myths that give the contemporary residents their sense of time and place.

Oral Traditions

Visitors to the area often comment on the rivalry between the two neighboring villages that feeds these myths. Gutiérrez, for instance, offers the following view of Ccachín from across the valley in Choquecancha:

> From this mysterious place of the vigilant condors, emporium of secretive pumas, adorned by the magical protection of mummies . . . one sees the antagonistic population of Ccachín, that like a fine veiled rooster before its unmistakable rival, puffs up defiantly, showing its arrogant pride. Such is the rancor that the inhabitants of these two populations have for each other that at times they insult each other from hill to hill, knowing that to meet they have to travel five to six hours. [Gutiérrez Pareja 1979]

Geo-religious forces, Pre-Columbian peoples, and contemporary populations maintain the same adversarial relations in these accounts. Two large boulders in the Lares River between Ccachín and Choquecancha are said to have come to rest there when launched in a battle between Apu Pinkuyllunka and Apu Wanakawri, the mountain lords of Ccachín and Choquecancha respectively. Sometimes, people in Ccachín recount that the Inca threw their best land at the *machula* during their skirmishes, offering this as explanation why the people on the facing ridge are hemmed in by steep slopes, while residents of Ccachín enjoy a bit of *pampa,* relatively gentle terrain as Andean geography goes.

People are not of one mind about the stories handed down to them by tradition, and attempts are made to sort out the contradictions. One *comunero* told me that those who tell stories of the *machula* stealing land and fighting with the Inca are "*ignorantes y mentirosos*." He said that *machula* lived during the time of the moon and had been burned up by the sun before the Inca entered the region. He reasoned that the Inca never lived in Ccachín because they were only interested in gold; since there is no gold in Ccachín, they stayed on the other side. The soil is now poor in Choquecancha because it was overworked by the Inca, not because it was pitched or carried away in battle..

Another *comunero,* noting the existence of rock paintings attributed to the Inca in Ccachín's pastures at *Inti Pintasqa*, had no doubt that the Inca entered Ccachín. With "*la ayuda de Dios*" the Inca were more powerful than the *machula*.[1] For this fellow, the contemporary inhabitants of Ccachín are the grandchildren of the Inca, but they are poor, and they lack the Inca's power.

Many villagers assume that the *machula* lived exactly where they themselves do today, because they occasionally find bones and artifacts while working their gardens or building houses. This leads some to conclude that the circular structures on Pinkuyllunka were not permanent dwellings, but built in a cool airy place in an attempt to escape the destructive heat of the sun.[2] As one *comunero* told me, the *machula* were like those now trying to escape the end of the world, but ultimately it was in vain, as no one can escape "the will of God." One hears the *machula* described both as the "great-great grandfathers" ('*tatarabuelos*') of current residents and as a "different kind of people" ('*otra clase de gente*') having little to do with them. Villagers concur that the *machula* lived in an age very unlike the present and raised their crops by the light of the moon.

Villagers have ambivalent feelings about the *machula*: they are both awed by and fearful of their power. The *machula* have both benevolent and malevolent facets. Allen (1984) notes the beneficent role of the *machula* in helping with the potato crop in their night wanderings. Villagers in Ccachín point to *siwula siwula*, a bitter wild lily and noxious weed in their corn fields, as the onion of the *machula,* and say that it can be eaten

in an emergency today. In general, however, people are more impressed with the invidiousness of the *machula* and the role they play in causing misfortune.

The *machula* are thought to live on through their bones, but reports of encounters are increasingly rare. People say that blood pours from the bones of the *machula*. A *comunero* recalls coming across several such bones in Ccachín's Qochapata potato sector as a child. Curious, he and his friends broke open one of the bones. He says that blood flowed out, the *machula* chased after the children, and they fled. Older people report that in the past, the *machula* pursued women, frightening them with their screams, but that now this rarely happens. People report that the *machula* bones have been eaten by goats and are rarely seen anymore, but no one seems to find it ironic that the race that is said to have kept the Inca at bay is vulnerable to their own growing herds.[3]

The *machula* are associated with deformities in children, such as when a child is born without an arm or leg. People fear that if a child falls asleep beside *machula* bones, the *machula* may reach out and grab it, causing it to become sick or die. They say that one can recognize the work of a *machula*, the *soq'a machu* ('evil spirit'), by the mark it leaves on the child's body. During my stay in Ccachín, a 2-week-old infant was supposedly killed by a *machula* one night while asleep in the neighboring village of Aqotanka. The child was said to have been found with a green mark on its cheek and blood dripping from its nose. Relatives explained that a *machula* had grabbed it by the face, causing it to grow cold in its mother's arms. Tragedy likewise struck in Ccachín when goats grazing among the ruins on the slopes of Pinkuyllunka dislodged a rock, which rolled down and killed the four-year-old daughter of the head judge while she was herding.[4]

Archeological and Ethnohistorical Evidence

To what extent do these local myths correspond with archeological and ethnohistorical evidence about pre-Incan cultures in the area? Little work has been done, but there are a few pertinent references in Spanish chronicles and archeological reports to provide further context. According to chroniclers, when Manco Qhapaq entered the Cusco valley and founded the Inca empire, the area was populated by several ethnic

groups. Murúa (1962) refers to the Laris, Pokes, and Wallas and Sarmiento de Gamboa (1998) to the Sawasiras, Antasayaq, and Wallas. All are said to have entered the Cusco Valley from established territory to the north and east, to which they retreated as the Inca consolidated their foothold. The ruins of the earliest settlements observed in Calca, the provincial capital and market center for Ccachín, are often associated with one or more of these groups, and their names continue on in the place names of the area: *Sawasiray*, the dominant glacial peak overlooking Calca, and *Lares*, the district capital. The range of what some archeologists refer to as the "Lares culture" encompassed what is now the district of Lares. Dating from 1250-1400 AD, its apparent center was Antawala, on the ridge above the present day town of Lares. Some speculate that the Lares culture emerged from the expansion of the Late Horizon Chachapoyas culture (Valencia Espinoza and Nuñez Zamalloa 1989).

There have been no archaeological excavations in the district of Lares and descriptions of the principal ruins are limited to a few exploratory accounts.[5] The Pinkuyllunka ruins at Ccachín are not mentioned in any of these reports, perhaps because of their advanced state of decomposition, but there are descriptions of similar pre-Inca ruins to the immediate west near the village of Qelkanka, to the east at Llukumarka and Qoriwayrachina above Choquecancha, and to the north in the hills above San Pedro.

The Pinkuyllunka ruins seem to be related to those at Ankasmarka, a complex perched above Calca on the route to Ccachín, and to Antawala, centered between the two (Kendall 1976; Gutiérrez Pareja 1979). All are strategically located on hilltops overlooking the confluence of two river valleys. The ruins of some 70 circular structures to the west of Ccachín on a hill overlooking the Qelkanka and Quiyoq valleys have likewise been related to those of the Lares culture. Ann Kendall, a British archeologist, has identified ceramics and other artifacts from this site as showing Killke influence, the Killke culture dating from roughly 1000-1400 AD. Killke and Killke-related pottery styles are widely distributed throughout the Cusco region, but this distribution has been little explored. There's considerable local variation in style (Bauer 1992).

The Llukumarka and Qoriwayrachina sites are more extensive than those of Pinkuyllunka and include both pre-Incan and Incan occupations. These sites appear to have been densely populated, with estimates ranging as high as several thousand people (Valencia Espinoza and Nuñez Zamalloa 1989). The Lares and Hamp'ara cultures have been associated with these ruins. Gutiérrez Pareja (1979) suggests that the center of the Lares complex may have eventually shifted from Antawala to this area. The ceramics likewise show Killke influence. More circular ruins are found to the near north, in the pasture lands of Ccachín above the valley towns of San Pedro, Ichhu, and Luyluy.

Some scholars follow the ethnohistory closely in arguing the importance of a determinative conflict and emphasizing the key roles played by powerful individuals in Inca state formation in the wider Cusco area (Rowe 1946). Others take these as components or triggering events in the development process, but emphasize the role played by more general transformation processes: alliances through the manipulation of exchange relations (Rostworowski de Diez Canseco 1988), class conflict (Lumbreras 1990), redistribution systems based on the vertical integration of ecological zones (Murra 1980), and the split inheritance system of the Inca (Conrad 1981). Others have suggested that the oral traditions recorded in the chronicles have been distorted by the prejudices of their Spanish authors and by the self-interested representations of history of their indigenous informants (Zuidema 1986; Urton 1990). Based on work at Pacariqtambo south of Cusco, Bauer (1992) suggests that the formative processes of the Inca empire in the Cusco area were more gradual and unbroken than hitherto thought, and that the processes involved were not localized in the imperial city itself but spread throughout the region. As he notes, the development of a compelling model of early state formation for the Inca still awaits a more systematic regional survey of the archeological evidence. Local legends offer intrigue, but the archaeological remains of the Lares culture remain almost entirely unexplored. Given its perch on the jungle-edge frontier of Inca occupation, an investigation of the so-called Lares Culture may yet yield clues on the early processes of empire formation.

Time of the Inca: *Antisuyo* and *Paytiti* Tales

The Andes takes its name from the warm, moist, eastern slope, home of one of the Inca's perennial enemies: the *Anti*. In the four-part division of Tawantinsuyo, the Inca empire, the area that includes Ccachín and the jungle reaches beyond was part of *Antisuyu* ('region of the Anti').

The trip from Cusco to Ccachín provides hints of the past in the legends of the landscape. As one descends the sweeping switchbacks on the highway from Cusco to the Sacred Valley by bus, one passes below a monolith opposite the Inca fortress at P'isaq that locals point to as having the form of an Inca princess. Legend has it that *Ñust'a Inkilchumpi*, attempting to reach Cusco to advise the Inca that the Anti were attacking the area, was caught by the invaders and turned to stone. Continuing on by truck, on the road to Ccachín, north of Calca, at a cascade near Totora just below the pre-Incan citadel of Ankasmarka, one comes upon a site called Puma Punku ('Door of the Puma'), where there is a naturally-formed monolith resembling a puma. The Anti enter into legend here as well. As Gutiérrez Pareja tells it:

> The inhabitants of the eastern jungle came in an avalanche toward the region of the mountains and the Incas; they had defeated the settlers at Ankasmarka and were coming to Calca, but in the plains of Totora, the god Puma appeared and destroyed the savage armies, placing itself afterwards on the foothills of Kimpa P'alqa, as guardian of the Sacred Valley of the Incas. [Gutiérrez Pareja 1984:82]

The legend is suggestive of possible resistance offered by local ethnic groups, allies of the Inca, to Anti intrusions.[6]

The area was apparently important in later Inca resistance to the Spanish conquest as well. Two Inca trails led directly from Cusco to the north, one passing through P'isaq on its way to Paucartambo, the other crossing the Sacred Valley at Calca and continuing on to Ankasmarka, where it divided in two. One branch headed northeast to join the route to Paucartambo, another turned northwestward toward Choquecancha. Ccachín foot travelers to Cusco have traditionally followed this latter, passing through Calca and the ruins of Huch'uy Qosqo. Today, those that lack the truck fare still use this route, a strenuous two-day hike. Besides the principal roads out of Cusco, Inca trails originated in

the Sacred Valley at Ollantaytambo, Urubamba, and Huarán, with all but the last converging at Choquecancha before headed northward to Laq'o. Several secondary roads joined the principal routes. As Ccachín villagers point out, none of these routes pass directly through Ccachín, but they recognize the well-beaten sign of Inca roadways all around them. The road originating in Ollantaytambo passed a few kilometers to the south of Ccachín at Rosaspata before rising to Choquecancha, crossing the Lares River over a bridge built on the stones reputedly hurled there by Apus Pinkuyllunka y Wanakawri. The convergence of so many routes at Choquecancha before continuing on to the jungle suggests the strategic importance of the area.

When Manco Inca rose up against the Spanish in 1536, he held his final pre-rebellion meeting of chiefs and military leaders somewhere in the Lares area. Encountered by some Spaniards in the hills on the trail leading toward Lares, Manco told them that he was going to the hills to fetch gold, a story found plausible when reported to the lieutenant governor of Cusco, Hernando Pizarro (Hemming 1970). Local tradition has it that upon fleeing Cusco the Inca spent several months in Choquecancha before continuing on to the Laq'o Valley. The name Choquecancha means "corral of gold," and there is a plethora of legends about gold in the area.[7]

Along with Choquecancha, Mant'o, located at the convergence of the two main rivers valleys in the area, is said to have been one of the staging grounds for the Inca before continuing on to Laq'o. Mant'o is a small settlement bordering Ccachín to the northeast, and some *comuneros* maintain gardens in the area. A rock cliff there bears paintings of two llama caravans facing northeastward toward the Laq'o Valley. The figures appear to be superimposed over earlier, undecipherable ones. Polentini Wester speculates that these served as trail markers for the Inca in their exodus from Cusco:

> We have to take into account that it wasn't only one great expedition that left for the jungle with the Inca out front. This exodus lasted many months and years, and many groups, large and small, went in search for their emperor and god. To guide them toward their new destination, the Inca left signs on the roads that would orient his faithful subjects to the place where he was to be found. . . . At the site called Mant'o . . . there was a sign so that the faithful would not make a mistake and get lost . . . Without an indication very clear and visible, the fugitives would

> have had doubts about recognizing the true path, and many would have been lead astray into the Lares Valley and Yanatile. [Polentini Wester 1979:79]

Many dismiss such accounts as "pure imagination" (Angles Vargas 1992). The convergence of the Lares and Amparaes rivers to form the Yanatile to enter the *ceja de la selva* makes Mant'o strategically important, but its importance does not depend on whether Paytiti ever existed or not. Pictographs of pack animals are as likely to suggest the areas importance as a trade route as anything else.

As suggested by the narrative opening this chapter, there is a tradition of Paytiti stories in the area. Paytiti is a mythic place to the east, in the jungle, where legend has it that the Inca still exist. They are said to live beneath the ground, from where they will someday return to overturn the present and reestablish their empire. Noting the similarity between the name *Paytiti* and the Quechua *pay kikin*, several investigators have taken *Paytiti* to mean "like *it*" or "the same," inferring that the city is a replica of Cusco (Flores Galindo 1988; Gutiérrez Pareja 1979). This translation is rather tenuous, however, and the toponym may not be Quechua at all (Angles Vargas 1992).[8] The Paytiti myth, as Burga and Flores Galindo (1982) note, is but one of a number of millenarian concepts in the Andes linking a glorious past with a mythic future, anticipating an age in which the Inca will again reign. It's related to the idea of *pachakuti*, a reversal of time, and to the myths of *Inkarri*, foretelling the eventual return of the Inca. Fascination with the search for Paytiti continues to highlight this panoply of revivalist ideas in Cusco.

Father Polentini Wester has carried out extensive explorations for Paytiti, and his expeditions have been followed with great interest in Ccachín, where he served as itinerant priest from 1970-1977. Father Polentini posits that Paytiti was not only a jungle city but a kingdom whose existence predates the Inca empire. He locates it in the Laq'o valley north of the Mapacho-Paucartambo-Yavero river. His interest grew out of stories he heard while serving as parish priest of Lares, stories no doubt fueled by the earlier expeditions of Tomás E. Payne, a Calca notable, who claimed to have discovered *Paytiti* near Laq'o in the 1940s (Zúñiga Barbachán 1948; Heredia 1951). By the time I arrived in Ccachín, the Paytiti stories themselves were almost footnotes to the stories told about

Father Polentini and his *search* for Paytiti.[9] Angles Vargas reports that "the contemporary *campesinos* of the place, modest farmers, have not received information about the migration of the Inca toward Paytiti to save their treasures from the greediness of the longbeards; those that know some 'history' received it from contemporary foreigners" (1992:170). It's probably more accurate to say that over the last 50 years, with discussion of the Payne and Polentini expeditions in the air, its now difficult to distinguish centuries-old oral traditions from the new narrative influences. Villagers from Ccachín have accompanied Polentini on his expeditions and have brought back stories of their own. Beyond any investigative merits, the search for Paytiti is locally associated with the search for gold and Inca treasure, and out of concern that these riches may be taken from them, many of the activities of the priest have raised suspicions and criticism in the area.

Colonial and Republican Eras

Haciendas to Agrarian Reform

The historical role of Lares and its associated indigenous communities in the regional economy corresponds to opportunities and constraints conditioned by their location at the nexus of jungle and highlands. As district capital, Lares has played an administrative role, while the outlying communities have provided labor and transport services for local and jungle haciendas.

The Inca appear to have had copper and silver mines in the area, and with the Conquest, mineral wealth drew Spanish and Portuguese settlers and fortune-seekers to the district. During the colonial era, there were several small mines in the Lares-Amparaes area. These included Spanish smelters in Lares and Pampa Fundición (Choquecancha), two Portuguese smelters in Amparaes, a cobalt mine at Kiswarani, a copper mine at Mask'a, and silver mines at Qolqemarka (Choquecancha), Lares, and Amparaes (*Corregimiento de Cusco* 1653; *Corregimiento de Cusco* 1671; Zúñiga Barbachán 1948; Gutiérrez Pareja 1979; Polentini Wester 1979; Estrada 1992). While all that remains of most of these mines are the faint ruins of past construction and excavation, one of the

Amparaes copper mines was worked into this century, and some in Ccachín still recall *Tomás*, the "gringo" owner or manager.

The La Convención-Lares microregion as a whole has experienced periods of growth and stagnation in immigration, agriculture, and mining since the Spanish began exploiting the area after the defeat of the Incas at Villcabamba in the mid-16th century (Encinas Martín 1986). Production in the region has been characterized, however, by large haciendas, the monocropping of sugar cane, coca, and coffee, and feudal labor. Development has been limited by the difficulty of transporting goods to Cusco, and by the dangers of malaria in the jungle. It's estimated that 10,000 people died of malaria in the outbreak of 1932-1940 (Chacón Chacón 1984). Given their dependence on cheap human labor, outbreaks of malaria decapitalized the haciendas and caused a drop in their value, leading to waves of sale and resale (Flórez Muñiz 1946).

At the end of 19th century, Cusqueños began looking toward the conquest of the jungle to revitalize the city's prosperity, and a train between Cusco and Santa Ana was eventually constructed (begun in 1914, it didn't reach Quillabamba until 1977). Migration to La Convención grew with the penetration of the railroad, from 27,000 inhabitants in 1940 to 61,000 by 1961 (Encinas Martín 1986).

With the principal route to the Cusco market following the Urubamba Valley, the development of that area overshadowed that of the Lares Valley. Transport from the Lares Valley has until recently been by mule train along established footpaths. Perched on the frontier of the highlands and the cloud forest, villagers in Ccachín and Choquecancha played an important role in the transport of hacienda goods to market by horse and mule (Gutiérrez Pareja 1979). Trucks have now replaced pack animals along all of the principal routes, with the majority of the truckers residing in Calca (the historical importance of horses and mules to villagers continues to be represented in a popular local textile motif as illustrated in Figure 1.2).

The best lands of the Lares Valley, from Mant'o north, were taken up by the haciendas. The organization of the haciendas in Lares was based on the contraction of *arrendires* ('renters') who had to meet certain *condiciones* or obligations in exchange for

the use of undeveloped hacienda land. The *arrendires* could not meet these obligations and develop their parcels simultaneously, leading them to contract with other campesinos, referred to as *allegados* ('relatives'), who provided goods and services to the *arrendire* in exchange for use of part of the *arriendo* land. The relationship between the *arrendire* and his *allegados* replicated the relations between the *hacendado* ('hacienda owner') or *patrón* and his *arrendires*; so much so that when asked to name the local *hacendados*, most in Ccachín name *hacendados* and *arrendires* without distinction. The *allegados* sometimes brought in *suballegados*, extending the hierarchy a step further. Along with the *hacendado* and his family at the top, the haciendas were administered by *mayordomos* ('head stewards') and their staffs. On the whole, hacienda employees had a reputation of making up for their meager salaries through theft and exploitation of the tenants.

The *condiciones* ('rental obligations') most frequently contracted on the haciendas were: 1) the *makipura* or *condición de turno*, a set number of workers or work days that the *arrendire* had to provide to the *hacendado* every month; 2) the *wata phayna*, annual labor for infrastructural improvements and maintenance such as road building and repair or irrigation works; 3) the *palla*, days provided by women and children for the picking of coca leaves and coffee beans; 4) the *canon* or *arriendo*, a direct payment from *arrendire* to *hacendado* in cash or goods, and 5) the *semanero*, *pongo*, or *mit'ani*, a domestic servant for the hacienda, rotated on a weekly basis. In addition, the *arrendires* were often expected to serve as messengers, transport the produce from the hacienda to market with their own animals, and comply with restrictions on crops grown, use of firewood, permanent building construction, purchase of consumer goods outside the hacienda, and where they could send their children to school (Flórez Muñiz 1946; Encinas Martín 1986).[10] Wage compensation in *makipura* averaged a fourth of that contracted through free labor. The daily rate for *palla* labor was about half that of *makipura*, reflecting differences in gender, age, and length of the work day. Those who worked the *wata phayna* were compensated with food and drink as in *mink'a*. *Semaneros* received a small wage and bottle of *trago* from the *arrendire* in whose name they worked, plus a nominal tip from the *hacendado*. The *semaneros*, as the term implies, rotated every week or two.

In general, the same techniques used for labor organization and management by the *campesinos* off the haciendas were used on. *Arrendires* took advantage of kinship relations, *compadrazgo*, and the *mayordomos* and *varayoq* (traditional community officials) in their villages to recruit and discipline labor. The pace was set for work teams by a *capitán* or *qollana* ('first-in-command') and *qaywa* ('second-in-command'), as it continues to be at *papa yapuy*, *phayna*, and other formal work parties in Ccachín today. Bottles of *trago* were the fine of choice for latecomers and for slovenly work. At the end of their term of service, *semaneros* passed on the tools and animals that they had used in their work for the *hacendado*. A careful accounting was made of any damage or loss, and this would be charged to the account of the *arrendire* on whose behalf the labor worked. A similar accounting still takes place in the *inventarios*, the passing on of responsibility for the saints from one *mayordomo* to another (see Chapter 10).

According to *Don TV*, who was active in the political struggle against the local *hacendados* and served as the first president of Ccachín as a *comunidad campesina* (1966-1968), the *campesinos* suffered severely at the hands of the *hacendados*. He reports that people in Ccachín worked for *hacendados* in the Lares Valley at Yanatile and Quebrada. They worked sugar cane for the production of *trago*, and the little recompense they received was paid in money printed by and for each hacienda, so that the workers would have to spend it on goods marketed by the *hacendado*. *Don TV* says that the *campesinos* had to transport products to Calca from the Valley haciendas "*gratislla*" (for 'free'), or in exchange for a little coca or *trago*. Many died of malaria and other lowland diseases.

The *hacendados* were not only the owners of their haciendas, collectively, they controlled the local economy and political system. They were influential in naming and maintaining the various governors, mayors, judges, and other authorities of the district and province. The police carried out their orders, and they had the last word in disputes. Gustavo Flórez, who lived on Hacienda Riobamba in the Lares Valley for many years, puts it this way:

> Justice was also carried out on this hacienda in particular and on all of the haciendas in these valleys according to the hierarchy *patrón*, *arrendire*, and *allegado*. First the *allegado*, when he has a case, almost always with other *allegados*, airs it before his *arrendire*; but when the *arrendire* makes a bad decision, or when the case is between *allegado* and *arrendire*, or between *arrendires*, then they appeal to the *patrón* or *hacendado* as the supreme authority, and he makes the final judgement. We will note that in the Lares Valley the naming of judges, governors, mayors, etc., all of the pertinent authorities of district, is required, but these people are only the pretty ornaments of justice, because no tenant is going to waste his time appealing before a judge, as he knows that the verdict of the *patrón* is the principal one, and after that, one doesn't obey any other. [Flórez Muñiz 1946:14]

The village of Ccachín itself was never an hacienda. In this sense, and despite the wider political-economic structure, the community has always been, as villagers say, "*libre*" ('free'). There were distinct differences between the campesinos of the region depending on whether they were born on hacienda land or in one of the *parcialidades* of Lares:

> The Indians that had the misfortune of being born on land that belonged to the large *latifundios*, 75% of their labor and time are dedicated to the service and profit of the masters. . . . The aborigines that had the fortune of living since their ancestors in communities are those that enjoy all the time in their lives. . . . The Indians of these *parcialidades*, outside of their agropastoral labors, dedicate themselves entirely to the life of muleteers, because all have horses and mules for this, being the richest Indians, economically of all the aborigines . . . [Gutiérrez Pareja 1949:4-5]

Ccachín was virtually surrounded by haciendas, however, and most villagers pastured their cattle on hacienda land. The power dynamics of the adjacent haciendas had a significant influence on village life. Various tracts of hacienda land have since been incorporated into Ccachín, expanding the boundaries of the community substantially. Other tracts of the ex-haciendas are now in the hands of the State, but they have been colonized and are being worked by families from Ccachín. Table 1.1, gathered from tribute and census data, gives an idea of the number of haciendas in the area by the mid-1850s. Both the parish church of Lares and the Monastery of Santo Domingo of Cusco maintained haciendas in the area. Some of the owners had title to two tracts, one in the

fertile Lares Valley for coca, coffee, and sugar cane, and another in the sierra for the pasturing of sheep, llama, and alpaca (e.g., Ambrocio Bargas's holdings in Yanatile and Quehuepay, and Juana Villagarcia's ownership of Barrial y Mofon and Quishuarani). In addition to those listed here, some of the haciendas of the district of Ocobamba in the Province of La Convención — Haciendas Tiriqway and Versailles y Media Luna, for example, just to the northwest of Ccachín — were likewise important. I have yet to put together a comprehensive list of the haciendas for the district of Lares through the colonial and republican periods, a task made difficult by the fragmentary and scattered nature of the documentation and by the changes in ownership, changes in estate titles, and the joining and partitioning of holdings over the centuries, but Table 1.7 indicates the population and administrative status of the hamlets and villages immediately surrounding Ccachín in 1940, twenty to thirty years before agrarian reform.

Until the agrarian reform, Ccachín was bordered to the north by Hacienda Rayankancha. A sector of Rayankancha is still referred to as *hacienda* today. With the addition of Rayankancha, village land now extends to the northeast as far as Mant'o. Mant'o was an hacienda owned by the parish of Lares. It is now part of Choquecancha, through while I was in the field some of the comuneros of Choquecancha were struggling with the *comunidad campesina* to gain ownership. Residents of Rayankancha report that Hacienda Rayankancha produced *maway papa* ('early-season potatoes') and cattle. The last *hacendado* is also said to have owned Hacienda Kiswarani ('*Quishuarani*' in Table 1.1), located higher up on the puna on the road between Calca and Lares, which he used as a grazing area for sheep and alpaca. Three families lived at Rayankancha and worked for the *arrendire*. The land gained by Ccachín from this hacienda after the agrarian reform is very important for the community, as it includes the Qochapata and P'alqa potato sectors and some prime grazing land in the highlands of San Carlos.

The Hacienda Sisay-Mask'abamba was located to the north and west of Rayankancha. A substantial portion of the land was adjudicated to Ccachín with the agrarian reform, but the community still lacks title. The hacienda was purchased in the early 1700s by Don Diego Ignacio Lapero Guanca. The hacienda is referred to in a 1738

lawsuit brought by the prioress of the *Convento de Santa Catalina* on behalf of two nuns, apparently family members, against the hacienda's *arrendires* for nonpayment of rent (*Corregimiento de Cusco* 1738; see Table 1.4). The hacienda was subsequently donated to the *Convento de Santo Domingo del Cusco* in 1780, with the condition that the priests there say several masses each year for the souls of deceased family members. The hacienda remained in the hands of the priests at Santo Domingo for almost two hundred years, until they lost it to the agrarian reform. At the time of the agrarian reform, over sixty heads of household in Ccachín were *feudatarios* ('feudal tenants') at the hacienda, and they and their descendants continue to pasture their animals there.

Further to the north and northwest were Hacienda Ichhu and Hacienda Palanganayoq. In the late 1700s, Ichhu was owned by Ambrocio Bargas and appears to have pertained to Hacienda Yanatile back then. The land was owned by Pascual Rosales at the time of agrarian reform, and had relatively few *feudatarios*. A few of them had kinship and *compadrazgo* links to Ccachín, however, and given the location, the pasture lands are of continuing interest to the community. Palanganayoq is immediately to the west of Ichhu. Owned by Julian Soto, the Palanganayoq hacienda produced cattle (an "improved" breed, so he tells me, not the *criollo* variety found there now) and a few potatoes. It's now the principal *wakería* ('cattle pasture') for the descendants of the Ccachín *arrendires* and *allegados* that worked the land, a politically important segment of Ccachín's population. The hacienda included the pasture areas known as Pan de Azucar, Palanganayoq, and Temblorayoq, 10-12 hours from Ccachín by foot. The *hacendado* also had land in the Lares Valley for the production of agricultural goods.

Don MZ was Soto's *arrendire* at Pan de Azucar, and many *comuneros* report that he acted like an *hacendado* in Ccachín: he had extensive herds and land holdings, people had to work for him, and he was always seated in the position of honor at the head table at community festivals and events. In the words of Julian Soto, *Don MZ* was "like the boss of Ccachín . . . he commanded the people" ("*como jefe de Ccachín . . . él mandó a la gente*," from interview with Julian Soto, 1991). He's said to have bought Yerbabuenayoq, now an *anexo* of Ccachín but listed in the 1940 census (Table 1.7) as a *fundo* ('small

estate'), for the price of four horse teams. Until *Don TV* moved to Ccachín from Paucartambo, *Don MZ* was the only one in the village who knew how to read, helping to ensure his monopoly on local power. Another Ccachín man, *Don ZA*, was an *arrendire* for Soto's hacienda lands at Palanganayoq, and a third, *Don VC* from Qochayoq, was the *arrendire* of Temblorayoq.

There were several other haciendas in the hills west of Ccachín, encompassing most of the pasture lands on the puna between Qochayoq, Wakawasi, Patakancha, and Plateriayoq. The hacienda at Qochayoq was divided up after the agrarian reform, one part becoming the *comunidad campesina* of Rosaspata bordering Ccachín on the south, the other part, the village of Qochayoq, becoming an *anexo* of Ccachín. Owned by Martín Puma, his heirs became *comuneros* of Rosaspata after the agrarian reform. West and southwest of Qochayoq were huge haciendas owned by four Corasawa brothers. Hacienda Compone extended as far north as Plateriayoq and included the communities of Qelkanka, Patakancha, and Willoq. Hacienda Yanawara included the neighboring communities of Kunkani, Wakawasi and Chupani. Led by Melquíades Huamán, a native of Patakancha and contemporary of Hugo Blanco, the tenants formed peasant unions in both of these haciendas in 1959-61, leading to the eventual ouster of the *hacendados* from the area (Phuturi Suni and Espinoza M. 1997).

The obligations of those who worked hacienda land in the puna areas were demanding, but also depended on the character of the local *hacendado* and his administrators. Some land owners and their staff were socially and culturally closer to and more respected by their tenants than others. The conditions at the haciendas of Compone and Yanawara appear to have been especially severe. According to Gutiérrez Pareja (1949), the subjects of Hacienda Compone had to work the corn fields of the hacienda from planting to harvest in rotating teams of 100-150 men. They had to provide an *arroba* or two of alpaca wool, a similar amount of sheep's wool, a *carga* of potatoes, a *carga* of firewood, and the manure from their animals for fertilizer to the *hacendado* annually. In addition, each had to serve as *pongo* for a fifteen-day period each year. In an oral history collected by Dario Espinoza, Phuturi Suni, one of the *feudatarios* of Compone, recalls

having to provide the hacienda with as many as twenty-four llama loads of firewood and twenty-four lama loads of fertilizer for rental of a *tupu* of land (about 2705 m^2) . But despite the burdens of the *condiciones*, from his perspective, suffering the abuses of the hacienda staff was worse:

> Perhaps because it suited their purposes, the employees made us suffer more, not the police or anyone, not the lieutenant governor nor the governor, it was the employees, no one else, that made us suffer, the employees of the boss of the hacienda Compone. One could or one couldn't do, . . . 'a fine' they said, grabbing our good clothes. If for some reason we couldn't respond to them to do domestic labor, or what they call the *semanero*, at the moment, or if we couldn't do a little emergency task, then *Yastá carajo, . . . multa*! ['expletive . . . a fine!'], they would say. [Phuturi Suni and Espinoza M. 1997:127]

According to *Don TV*, one of the elders of Ccachín, the campesinos on the puna around Ccachín were expected to provide a *quintal* of wool and a bull to the *hacendado* each year, as well as provide labor service. Sometimes a family would have their herds in more than one area, with the added burden of payments and service to each of the *hacendados* accordingly.

From ex-hacendado Julian Soto's perspective, the obligations of the campesinos at his hacienda were not excessive. According to him, the *condiciones* for each of his *arrendires* at his highland hacienda were that they provide ten workers for a six-day period in July-August for the round-up and branding of cattle, trail maintenance, and other needs of the hacienda. If the *arrendires* did not meet their quotas, they had to make a payment to the *hacendado*. Branding time was the only time the *hacendado* visited the hacienda, and he describes the event as a "*fiesta.*" A few families of *wakeros* ('cow-hands') lived at the hacienda and cared for the herds year-round.

Hugo Blanco's "*Tierra or Muerte*" ('Land or Death') movement, centered in the La Convención-Lares Valley between 1958-1964, did not directly involve the communities and haciendas in the highlands, but its consciousness-raising effect was far reaching, and even relatively wealthy families in Ccachín speak of Hugo Blanco with admiration (Blanco 1972; Brass 1989). The 1960s and early 1970s were periods of radical ferment for *campesino* federations in the Lares Valley. At the national level, this period was

marked by the agrarian reforms of Belaúnde in 1964 and Velasco in 1973. Major changes began to take place in the Lares countryside. As Julian Soto described it to me, "agitators" ("*agitadores*") came into the area and told the *campesinos* that they didn't have to work for the *hacendados*, so they didn't meet the *condiciones*, and didn't work with the same "spirit" ("*ánimo*") as before.[11] With the agrarian reform, *Don* Julian was able to hold on to some of the land by partitioning it among his children, and the family maintains herds at Palanganayoq and Phalchayoq. The rest of the hacienda passed into the hands of the Peruvian government, and in 1991-1992 title was given to the *campesinos* from Ccachín and the Lares Valley who had pastured their animals there.[12]

Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provide excerpts from appeals submitted to the Sub-Director of the Office of Agrarian Reform between 1969-1971. They show how the local power structure was in the process of change, and give good examples of the tactics and discourse used by the peasants and landowners to frame their interests. The selection in Table 1.2 is from an appeal written in 1969 by three feudal tenants from Ccachín petitioning that the Hacienda Sisay-Mask'abamba be expropriated from the Monastery of Santo Domingo. In an attempt to hold on to their land, the *hacendados* of the area responded to the expropriation proceedings with statements of their own, and Table 1.3 presents excerpts from a letter by Pascual Rosales, owner of Hacienda Ichhu, explaining that contrary to appearances, he had not abandoned the land, and petitioning that the land he claimed to work not be taken from him.

The history of community-hacienda relations that I have picked up from people in Ccachín is sketchy, but it helps make sense of the economic differentiation and resultant politics of the village: who has pastures and cattle and who does not, who gets elected to community offices, and even, who has sheet-metal-roofed houses. The largest cattle herd in Ccachín belongs to a nephew of one of the *arrendires* — a nephew raised like a son. The son of the "*jefe of Ccachín*," with the backing of the *Pan de Azucar Comité*, has run for the presidency of the community three times and lost. When I first arrived in Ccachín, the only two families with sheet-metal roofs were descendants of the *arrendires* at Palanganayoq and *Pan de Azucar*. Remnants of the hacienda system can also be found in

compadrazgo relations. *Don VZ*, a Calca resident with family origins in Ccachín and a *padrino-compadre* to a host of people in the village, used to be one of the *arrendires* at Hacienda Ichhu in the Lares Valley.

With the demise of the haciendas, the role of truckers and traders in the local economy has come to the fore. The first road linking the Lares Valley to the provincial capital of Calca, routed through Amparaes and over Chayñapunku pass, was not completed until 1960 (Chacón Chacón 1984). A branch of this from Mant'o to Lares served Choquecancha, Ccachín, Lares, and the puna communities above, with weekly markets at Wakáy (later moved to Yerbabuenayoq) and Lares.[13] In 1988, this branch was joined with the other at Q'ellup'uytu, providing a direct route from Lares to Calca over the Willkapunku pass. As Chacón Chacón (1984:86) remarks, it appears that Peruvian President Belaúnde Terry was motivated to start construction of this alternative route to the Lares Valley through the district capital in 1963 to quiet the political unrest in the area led by Hugo Blanco, Claudio Hancco, and others. Many truckers now favor this route from the Lares Valley to Calca during the dry season, but the road is subject to closure by landslides and erosion, and the Amparaes route continues to be the more heavily traveled.

As Encinas Martín (1986) points out, with the opening of roads to the Valley, merchants became a growing force. The *campesinos* saw the presence of these traders in the region as an opportunity to free themselves from their dependence on the *hacendados*. However, the interests of the *campesinos* and *comerciantes* were not identical, and as the latter came to replace the *hacendados*, new relations of dependence were formed. Indicative of the change, the truck that usually carried me from Calca to Yerbabuenayoq originally belonged to the hacienda at Mant'o, bought cheap by the trucker from the *hacendado* who had hidden it in Calca to keep it from agrarian reform authorities.[14]

Anexo to *Comunidad Campesina*

Ccachín appears on maps made by Pablo José Oricaín in 1786 for the *Intendencia de Cusco* — the archdiocese (Figures 1.3 and 1.4). At that time, Oricaín showed the *curato* ('parish') of Lares as having three annexes with churches, one of them being

Ccachín. Until its recognition as a *comunidad campesina* on November 28, 1966, Ccachín was administered as an *anexo* ('annex') or *parcialidad* ('part of the whole') of the district capital, Lares.[15]

Table 1.4 provides a brief outline of some of the key dates and events in the political history of the Calca-Lares region. The first records we have of Lares date back to the mid-1570s, when Diego de Trujillo, an ex-soldier in Pizarro's army, was granted Lares as a *repartamiento* or *encomienda* by *Virrey Toledo* (*Archivo Nacional del Perú* 1575; Porras Barrenchea 1940). At that time, the area was part of the *corregimiento* of Yucay. Later, in the 17th century, Yucay was divided into the provinces Calca y Lares and Urubamba. Provincial jurisdiction over Lares has changed hands for brief periods, but through most of it's history it has been a part of Calca.

It's likely that Lares's early history was similar to that of the *reducciones* (resettlement centers for natives) mandated in the Cusco region in the 16th Century. The *reducciones*, as such, were subject to a rapid structural erosion, as locals dispersed to their original hamlets (Gade and Escobar 1982). As late as 1785, however, the parish census for Lares lists three *caciques*, *nobles de sangre* ('indigenous nobles'), in the village itself (Table 1.5). Despite exclusion of non-indigenous immigrants, outsiders became established in most of the *reducciones* and emerged at the head of the local power structure. This is the case of Lares as well. Outsiders were drawn to Lares by the prospect of mining, agriculture, and stock-raising. As agricultural production increased in the *ceja de la selva* and jungle areas, the district capital became a rest stop for mule trains coming out of the lower Lares Valley. Given ready access to good highland pastures, and situated a day's journey from the market center and provincial capital of Calca, muleteering became one of the primary occupations of local residents. Surrounded by haciendas, Ccachín and Choquecancha became *parcialidades* of a *mestizo* dominated district capital by the 17th century, and remained so until the later part of the 20th.

Drastic declines in the indigenous population after the Spanish conquest and slow population growth thereafter meant that for most of the colonial and republican eras, there was relatively little pressure on the land. According to parish records, there were 139

people in Ccachín in 1785 (Table 1.5). The census of 1876 records only fifty, but this number is no doubt distorted by the unusually high number reported at the adjacent hacienda of Rayankancha, and the two figures should be combined to give 178 as a more accurate count (Table 1.6). The population grew twenty-eight percent over this hundred year period. In the 1940 census, Ccachín had a population of seventy-three families and 486 inhabitants, almost three times the population of sixty-four years earlier, but still only about a third of what it has today (Table 1.7). By my estimate, at the time of my field-work in 1990-91, Ccachín had about 240 families and 1172 residents, including all of its *anexos*. Around the same time, Seibold (1990) cites the health worker in Choquecancha as reporting a population of 1900 for Ccachín, and FAO-Holanda reports a population of 3000. A few years later, Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) report 249 families and about 1250 residents in Ccachín, 71% living in the village nucleus, 12% in Qochayoq, and 17% in Rayankancha. Whatever the exact figure, over the last 125 years, the population of Ccachín has doubled about every 40-45 years. Most of this appears to be due to changes in fertility or mortality rates rather than in-migration, but given the opportunities to be found along a trade route, there has been a bit of the latter as well. As Table 1.8 indicates, neighboring Choquecancha has experienced a similar pattern of population growth, as have the rural areas of the district as a whole. The lower Lares Valley has had more in-migration, and due to outbreaks of malaria, more fluctuation in population, than the communities in the sierra.

The town of Lares itself is hemmed in by a hill and two gorges, making it hard for the population to expand. While Lares has long been the district capital, until relatively recently, it appears to have been nominally so. Fifty years ago, Salustio Gutiérrez observed that:

> Lares has a municipal-district government presided by a Mayor and composed of several councilors, who are separated from each other by three or four leagues and dispersed through all the valley, so in the district capital there is only the *Agente Municipal*. The mayor lives on Hacienda Quebrada, sixteen leagues from the town of Lares and the other councilors live on their respective *latifundios*, so it happens that these men hardly know each other as authorities and never get together for meetings .... If ever they have met together in all the history of the

> Municipality of Lares it's because they wanted to have a day or two of diversion, and this with a letter of convocation that they prepare two months before, using as pretext some matter of public interest, but in not so many words are days of bohemia authorized by the District Mayor in one of the haciendas of a councilor or that of the Mayor himself. This is the reason why the District Council of Lares depends entirely on the Provincial Council of Calca, and the positions that they have are pure window-dressing, as the one who does and undoes the affairs of the district is the Municipality of Calca. [Cutiérrez Pareja 1949:18]

Most of the real action, it seems, took place in Calca or the Lares Valley rather than in Lares itself.

At present, Lares is a minor market and administrative center. It has several store-fronts, traders, and craftspeople. People from the *comunidades campesinas* have access there to trades and services that don't exist in the outlying villages, including tailors and a blacksmith. There is a weekly market, but villagers from Ccachín and Choquecancha have their own weekly market at Yerbabuenayoq and don't attend. Until around 1980, when Ccachín became the home of its own judges and *teniente gobernador* ('lieutenant governor'), new community officials had to go to Lares to be sworn in. While this is no longer the case, many administrative functions continue to be carried out in Lares, including the registration of births, deaths, and marriages, the making of civil and criminal complains, and polling in local, regional, and national elections. The military post in Lares was moved to Amparaes in the 1980s. The Lares church dates from the colonial era, and there is a parish house, though due to recent run-ins the priests are said to have had with the locals, it is now only occasionally occupied. The high school in Ccachín dates from the mid-1980s, and until that time, families desiring a secondary education for their children sent them to Lares or Calca. Attempts have been made to develop the local hot spring as a tourist attraction, but given its distance from Calca, it draws relatively few outsiders (the naturalist Antonio Raimondi [1965:214] provides a description). Locals, including villagers from Ccachín, occasionally take advantage of the baths for their reputed medicinal value.

Commercially, Lares is eclipsed within the district by Amparaes, and regionally, by the provincial capital Calca. Amparaes has long overshadowed Lares as a commercial

center. The principal route to the Lares Valley from Calca passed through Amparaes when transport was by way of mule trains, and like Lares, it served as a convenient resting place at the end of the first day of travel for the mule drivers out of Calca. The completion of the road through Amparaes in the 1960s, more than two decades before Lares had its own, further enhanced its growth, and most trucks out of the Lares Valley continue to pass through there, assuring Lares's marginal position as a trade center. There is a rivalry between the two towns, and during the construction of the road, there were occasional outbreaks of violence (see 1946-1960, Table 1.4). While some in the area say that the first road passed through Amparaes rather than Lares because the Lareños feared that the opening of a road would lead to their exploitation by Calca businessmen (Seibold 1990), it's also likely that the power base established with the mule trade favored Amparaes in competition for the road. With the opening of the valley to truck traffic, however, Calca lost part of its function as a land port — the endpoint of the mule trains. As the trucks began to pass through Calca carrying valley produce directly to Cusco, the provincial capital fell into decline (Flores Ochoa 1985). It's since made a gradual recovery, however, and some of the most successful townspeople of Lares have emigrated to Calca, a dream of many in Ccachín as well. Travel in the reverse direction tends to be more temporary. Most school teachers serving Ccachín and the other *comunidades campesinas* in the district come from Calca, and the mayor of Lares while I was doing fieldwork was a native of Calca who had married a Lareño and ran a truck route between the two towns to carry passengers and deliver goods.

Over the years, Lares has not only had conflicts with Amparaes — a town parallel to itself in many ways, and as such, a natural rival — but also with its dependencies, its *anexos*, now turned *comunidades campesinas*. People in Ccachín enjoy telling the story of their female patron saint, the *Mamacha* Guadalupe, who is said to have fled Lares to reside in Ccachín. It's said that in the days of a priest named Pizarro — probably in the 19th century — a statue of the Virgin of Guadalupe was found along the trail between Lares and Ccachín, at a place known as T'ankarq'asa. Villagers from Choquecancha tried to carry it to their community, but the Virgin made herself so heavy that they could not

move her. The Lareños then tried successfully to take the Virgin to Lares, where they placed the image in the parish church. Soon after, however, the Virgin disappeared, and was found as before at T'ankarq'asa. She was carried back to Lares, and again escaped, and this series of events repeated itself several times, until at last the villagers of Ccachín carried the Mamacha to their church, where she stayed put, and retains the central place of honor above the altar to this day. Years after this occurred, during the time of Father Aimón Ferrer (1900-1933), the people of Lares attempted to reclaim the Virgin, legitimatizing their claim to her by citing their status as district capital and parish center. The people of Ccachín refused to surrender their *patrona*, but in the ensuing negotiations, had to cede their corn fields at Umpalla — immediately below and south of the village — to Lares. This state of affairs did not last. Located two hours by foot from Lares, the land was difficult for the Lareños to defend from land encroachments. As Ccachín grew, Umpalla was reclaimed by invasion and by land purchase. As one Ccachín woman told me, people in the village would work their own plots, and then push bit-by-bit into an adjoining plot left vacant, until they gradually reclaimed the lands that they had lost. At least half the families in Ccachín now have corn fields in this area.[16]

As more-and-more administrative, ceremonial, educational, health, and market functions have been assumed by the *comunidades campesinas*, and as truck traffic makes the provincial capital of Calca more accessible to these outlying communities, the importance of Lares as a capital center in the everyday lives of villagers in Ccachín has declined. Both of Lares's former *anexos* — Ccachín and Choquecancha — now have larger populations than the capital itself, and these communities appear to be more economically and socially dynamic. The outlying communities have taken advantage of their organizational status as *comunidades campesinas* to obtain resources directly from rural-development oriented NGOs and from State agencies. At the same time, however, there is a countervailing force at play that makes the district-municipality more important politically for the *campesinos* than it was during the reign of the *hacendados*. Over the last forty years, and especially over the last twenty, municipalities have taken on more functions and have become the conduit of more State resources destined for infrastruct-

ural improvements than ever (Marcos 1994). Whoever controls municipal government in Lares controls significant development resources, and the villages in the district are in competition with each other and with the residents of the capital for their use. At the village level, this means that municipal government in Ccachín, principal nexus between the village and the capital, has an institutional importance independent of and potentially rivaling that of the *comunidad campesina* (see Chapter 9, the *Consejo Menor*). At the district level, it means that the *municipio* in Lares has become contested political space like never before.

Cultural Identity

Ethnicity and Class

It is tempting to categorize all the villagers of Ccachín as *runa* (i.e., culturally indigenous Andeans), and the Lareños and other bearers of national culture — truckers, traders, teachers, health officials, and government workers — as *misti* ('*mestizos*'), and leave it at that. Certainly, there is considerable precedent among Andean scholars to do so. Given the complexity of ethnicity and ethnic change in the Andes, however, it would be to draw, at best, a caricature.

As Van den Berghe (1974) reminds us, twenty-five years ago a standard ethnographic description of social stratification in an Andean community would read something like, "about 10 percent of the town's population is *mestizo*. The rest of the inhabitants are *cholo*. The surrounding rural population is predominantly *indio*." In the late 1960s and 1970s, emphasis on class and stratification led to the substitution of the term *campesino* for *indio* and *indígena* in the social science literature and in Peruvian government policy. A number of recent ethnographic works have returned to ethnicity as a frame of reference, with a preference for using the Quechua terms *runa* ('human being, person') and *misti* (from the Spanish *mestizo*, 'mixed parentage') to discuss cultural identity, ethnic conflict, and accommodation and resistance to colonial and modernizing influences (Skar 1982; Allen 1988; Poole 1990; Sallnow 1991). As Allen (1988:238) puts it, "I prefer to use the Sonqueños own term rather than refer to them as Indians or

peasants. . . . The word *campesino* has acquired the same derogatory connotations that were previously associated with the word *Indio*. I think it preferable to use a term that recognizes ethnic differences and to work on changing the negative connotations associated with these differences."[17]

The struggle over terms of identity in the Andes tends to confirm Urla's (1993) observation that social science concepts themselves provide important tools of persuasion for groups trying to define their cultural identity. In the late 1960s, the reformist government in Peru adopted class terminology current in the social sciences (especially dependency theory, see Quijano 1982). The law of the *comunidad indigena* became the law of the *comunidad campesina* in 1969, but despite this conceptual and terminological change, ethnic criteria remained embedded in granting groups separate legal status in the rural areas. The intent of the change in terminology was to downplay the cultural and linguistic aspects of the ethnic distinctions, and to emphasize the rural residence, subordinate class position, and dependence on the urban center of the designated groups. The change served the interests of those seeking to promote national Peruvian identity, and it provided rhetorical support for those trying to break down the power of the landed aristocracy. Van den Berghe (1974) observes, however, that by failing to take sufficient account of ethnic processes, this emphasis on class at the policy level left the structure of ethnic domination in the Andes largely intact. It remains to be seen if the 1990s emphasis on identity as a means to political autonomy and cultural survival in the face of an expanding global culture and world economic system will correct this.[18]

Descriptively, ethnic definition in the Andes must be seen as fuzzy, prototypic and context-bound. Coca-chewing may be used as a marker in some areas but not in others, Quechua monolingualism or bilingualism may or may not be a marker, and in some areas the sharpness of the ethnic boundary is related to pronounced variation in cultural differences over a broad range of traits, while in others, there may be little such variation. The ethnic terms used for classificatory purposes in the social science literature are often those used by the people themselves to comment on the social position of others, rather than as ethnic categories to which people have a sense of belonging. Often, the terms

can't be elicited spontaneously from the people they identify. In Ccachín, I rarely heard ethnic terms used at all. Ethnographers frequently assume more uniformity of perception and unanimity at local or regional levels than in fact exists, overlooking class, age and sex differences in usage (Van den Berghe 1974).[19]

From my perspective, the traditional ethnic terms do not help us make sense of the complex dynamics of identity change in the Andes. Class, ethnicity, rural-urban provenance, and age identities tend to be conflated, with the underlying mechanisms of change obscured. As Fuenzalida and Mayer (1974) suggest, much of the dynamic of change may come not from hegemonic processes of *mestizaje*, but from young people of all social and ethnic groups rejecting the status quo. To the extent that this is true, the process of modernization taking place in the Andes is not that different from that discussed by Abu-Lughod, who shows the implications of being caught in multiple overlapping and intersecting webs of power. Her observations about generational conflict in a distant and vastly different society ring surprisingly true for Ccachín (and if representative, for the Andes) as well:

> The young . . . do not seem to feel the ways in which their forms of rebellion against their elders are backing them into wider and different sets of authority structures or the ways their desires for commodities and separation from kin and gender groups might be producing a kind of conformity to a different range of demands. [Abu-Lughod 1990:331]

As Van den Berghe (1974) emphasizes, the relative salience of class and ethnicity as explanatory concepts is an empirical question. The general pattern in the Cusco area has been that the closer one comes to the urban center of Cusco and to the main interconnecting roads, the more the processes of *mestizaje* and bilingualism tend to blur ethnic distinctions, and the more class differences become salient. Additionally, education in State schools, radio communication, and travel for labor migration, military service, religious pilgrimage, and trade have intensified the processes of assimilation while further blurring the salience of ethnic distinctions.

Identity, Status, and Stratification in Lares

Whatever the intricacies of class and ethnic distinctions, stereotypes and prejudice by their nature leave little to ambiguity. Despite the background of all that has been written about social stratification in the Andes, it's ever shocking to see it expressed in personal relations and the characterizations people make of each other. Take, for example, the following description of the "*indios*" of Lares, written by a second-year university student of the Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad del Cusco doing a research project in the region 50 years ago:

> I take a negative view [of the Indian] since I have lived with him and rubbed up close; in my opinion the existence of the indigenous school is a weakness and disease, as in maintaining its ideas in defense of the Indian, it prejudices the progress of the Peruvian soil. . . .
>
> It's true that no one can doubt the folklore of the Indian . . . [and] we know from history that the regime of our Indian ancestors was an insuperable organization among the rest of the civilizations of the world. . . .
>
> But from this we have now arrived at its decadence, which is demonstrated in the retrogressive Indian of today, in the hard-hearted type, in the hypocrite, in the listless, in the lazy, in the one who is content with his ignorance, in the one for whom nothing matters; its been our fate to contend with the Indian, with the firm current that he bears to remain eternally illiterate, depriving his children or offspring of their education or enculturation only to make them help in the cultivation of his field; it's thus that the Indian is declared the drone of the State, he lives in immense territories called ayllus, without any obligation, such as the payment of assessments, land taxes, and other duties of the State. The attention of the Indian today is on being clandestine criminals, assailants, great cattle rustlers, and one especially notes the treasonous types, under the cloak of flattery. . . . Now with these bad qualities don't believe that the Indian can be the only farmer in our sierra region, or the only one that can cultivate the fields and the like; we're already seeing, without going far, that on our coasts and in our advanced areas, people are working who are already educated and civilized, who can very well work in our region, given that all of us accept the theory that *man makes the environment*. [Zúñiga Barbachán 1948:9-10, emphasis in the original]

While such brutal assessments may have become unfashionable or unacceptable in the intervening years, at least in print, more subtle versions are common in daily discourse, and can even be found in professional social scientific reports. The following description

of villagers in Choquecancha was written just a few years ago by a well-known historian at the same university:

> The Choquecanchans of today dwell in their houses and parcels with a languid spirit, following the rhythm of life of their parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents; they don't have the enterprising character that must have animated those of pre-Pizarro times, who made terraces, aqueducts, admirable roads, large populations, and important constructions; and this situation is not only true in this area, but it's a general social phenomenon in the sierra . . . . A great many of the residents of the hamlets in the sierra spill into the important cities, especially the capital, Lima, looking for better perspectives of life and work, so that, for example, there are more Choquecanchans in Lima than there are in Choquecancha; something logical and justifiable. [Angles Vargas 1992:167-168][20]

The hallmark of such stereotyping is that all the perceived ills in the countryside reduce to character, the only difference being in how the supposed degeneration of character is explained.

Ethnicity in the Andes is relatively uncontaminated by somatic criteria, and labels such as *indio*, *mestizo*, and *blanco*, while once racial, have been redefined in sociocultural terms in both popular and social science discourse (van den Berghe 1974). Angles Vargas (1992:167), for example, notes that the "*indios*" of Choquecancha often have a lighter complexion than the mestizos that dominate them. Dress, language, education, and wealth are more prominent ethnic markers than physical ones. This is not to say that physical appearance in general, or color in particular, is not noted, or doesn't matter to locals. People are often nicknamed *flaco* ('skinny'), *gordo* ('fatty'), or *chinito* (diminutive of 'Chinese') among Spanish speakers, the latter, because of their eyes. In Ccachín, one of my *comadres* addressed her youngest daughter as *samba* because of her dark skin color, and the label is applied to other children in the village as well. When I asked villagers if color mattered, their typical response was that "white is better." Some investigators have paid attention to color as well, noting that people in the Lares area have a lighter complexion and taller stature than the typical indigene (Valencia and Nuñez 1989; Gutiérrez Pareja 1979).

Apparently there is a local tradition that claims that residents of the area are of partial English or French descent, but I never encountered the tale. Many researchers

emphasize local residents' Spanish and Portuguese ancestries, the latter coming not only through Portuguese miners who entered the area during colonial times, but also perhaps, more speculatively, through muleteers of Portuguese heritage from the province of Acomayo who settled in the region (see Flórez Muñiz 1946 for evidence in this regard). There are also families with Basque surnames in Lares and the puna communities west of Ccachín. Villagers in Ccachín don't trace their genealogies back more than three or four generations, and it tends to be the more hispanicized Peruvian social scientists that emphasize the processes of *mestizaje* (racial or cultural mixing) in the area, not residents themselves. Commentators agree that the population of Lares is primarily mestizo or white, but whether one characterizes Ccachín or Choquecancha as an "*aldea mestiza*" ('mestizo village') as Angles Vargas (1992:163) does, or treats them as "*runa*" communities, as Seibold (1990) does, depends on the perspective of the beholder. Heritage is something that its holders can choose to invoke or ignore, and Seibold tells of how when she asked who constructed some terraces of obviously very recent construction above Choquecancha, her native informant replied "the Last Incas." Pressing to find out who these Incas were, the informant replied, "We built them. We are the Last Incas."

Ccachín and Choquecancha have a similar class and ethnic makeup, and I treat them almost interchangeably here, but that is not to deny distinct histories and fine and locally meaningful differences. Knox-Seith (1995:45) notes that just as she was able to recognize an unknown individual in Ccachín as a member of a particular village family by his or her family resemblance, so she was able to recognize visitors from Choquecancha as outsiders by their faces. Both physical features and the limited overlap in surnames (a pattern that goes back at least two centuries) suggests that there has been little intermarriage between the two communities. While this is surprising given their geographic proximity, it makes sense ecologically, and I suspect that when both communities were smaller, their residents were more likely to choose partners from different ecological levels — the puna and the cloud forest — than from their own level. Taking the *comunidad campesina* as a whole, Ccachín is now predominately endogamous, but as Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996) indicate, one of the strategies for securing

wider access rights to agricultural land and pastures is for a young person to marry someone from one of the other *anexos* within community boundaries; a man from Ccachín may pair with a woman from Qochayoq, for example. It may be — and this is just a hypothesis — that Gutiérrez Pareja's metaphoric reference to Ccachín as "a fine veiled rooster" is more incisive than it first seems, and that part of the historical rivalry between people in the two villages has been for mates.

Information gleaned from 19th century tax-lists for the district of Lares suggests that Ccachín has experienced periods of settlement from outside. The roll of contributors for 1851 lists fifty native households ("*originarios*") and resident outsiders ("*forasteros*") with land and thirty-six *forastero* families without land (Provincia de Calca 1851). A full 42% of residents at that time were thus immigrants or descendants of immigrants without land, a situation favoring the owners of adjacent haciendas.

The pattern of change in surnames over time gives an idea of the rise and fall of family lines, and hints at when the ancestors of present community members first arrived. While I lack the genealogical data to confirm it, it appears that the Guaman, Crúz, and Quispe families are the oldest in the community, the first two going back over 200 years (Table 1.9). A few of my informants reported that Crúz was one of the oldest families in the community, and the census data validates their collective memory. The Guamans have historically held land in the center of the community just above the church, but by 1990 only 3% of villagers had Guaman as their paternal surname. The Zúñiga family, on the other hand, has had remarkable success since first appearing in the village sometime after 1851. From the late 19th to the mid-20th century, ancestors of most of the present day Zúñigas were *arrendire* at Hacienda Palanganayoq, and they appears to have been relatively wealthy and powerful by community standards.

Surprisingly, while 57% of the surnames that appear in the 1836 tax roll were not present in the community fifty years earlier, none of them have survived till present. On the other hand, a significant number of family lines that are now well represented in the community first appear on the 1886 tax list. There's no significant difference between the percentages of men and women with Quechua surnames in the 1786, 1836, and 1851

censuses. Over time, the percentage of community members with a Quechua surname has declined, but it is important to note that at present, names play no role in the region in determining ethnic identity, and they don't enter into people's sense of ethnic pride, as in some parts of the world.

Relations Between Villagers in Ccachín and Lares

The classic ethnographic description in the Andes documents a bilingual *mestizo* minority in the district capital — the lowest rung of a ruling class — dominating the monolingual Quechua majority in the hinterlands. While once the case of Lares as well, this picture has been complicated by the breakdown of the hacienda system, the formation of independent *comunidades campesinas*, and the changes brought by increasing mobility. Perhaps this is best symbolized by the fact that, for the most part now, when people dress up and go to town, they get on a truck and pass right through Lares on their way to Calca or Cusco.

With recent changes, the differences between Lares and Ccachín are not as pronounced as they once were. There has probably always been considerable overlap in the mix of strategies used to make a living in Ccachín and Lares — a mix that includes small-scale subsistence agriculture and stock raising, and commercial and artisanal specialization. There are various degrees of bilingualism. In both communities, everyone can speak Quechua, but not everyone is fluent in Spanish. Quechua is the language used at home by everyone in Ccachín, but Spanish is far more common in the home and in the street in Lares. Styles of dress differ for women more than men, with some shopkeepers in Lares adopt the "*chola*" dress of the Qosqo market. Impressionistically, the language, lifestyle, and living standard differences between the *runa* of the *puna* communities of Chupani and Wakawasi that attend the weekly market in Lares and the *runa* of Ccachín and Choquecancha, as well as the differences between individuals within both Ccachín and Choquecancha, are as great as the difference between the Lareños and the members of these latter *comunidades campesinas*. Whatever the emic reality of local distinctions, the nature of local differentiation creates a problem for broader classification: whatever

the ethnic marker, the difference between those said to be *runa* or *misti* and those who are not is no greater than the difference between members of each of these identity groups themselves. It's relatively easy to find individuals from the two cultural categories that, excluding territorial affinities (i.e., whether they live in a town or in a *comunidad campesina*), have more in common with each other than either of them do with others of their identity group.

In the position that the Lareños are in — the lower middle rungs of a status hierarchy — they are subject to negative stereotyping from all sides. The following description of the male youth of Lares was written from the perspective of a student from the Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad del Cusco in 1949:

> [With] reference to the psychology of the young men of Lares. These men with ponchos to their heels . . . are the most irreverent and formidable because their only occupation is to cultivate a few potatoes in the communal lands on the puna and a bit of corn in the valleys; muleteers by profession and cattle rustlers by heritage, they are the laziest people that I have known; if they have cattle it is because they are left alone in Hacienda Rayankancha or Ranrayoq which are renowned for their good pastures, and only their mules are within eyesight, be they on the hillsides of Alaqpay or Cruzmoqo or in the small pastures around the thermal bath, and I don't know if it is out of desperation that the town casts them out from its breast or for some other reason, but they are hardly ever in town; more often, they are engaged in their muleteering or in their rustling. They are formidable then, as I say, because they exercise absolute freedom with frightening logic; they are the most rebellious people; for them there is no God, there is no authority or respect for their superiors, so that they are the people, I repeat, most rebellious, amoral, and degenerate; their only aspiration is to be soldiers in service of the Fatherland, and once this mission is completed they consider themselves citizens, with all of the rights and with none of the obligations except to themselves; it's for this reason that all of the youth of Lares are licentious, cunning and audacious cholos, party-makers like no other, and rascals that don't find anything in women but suitable prey for their animal instincts and in private property a collective product. [Gutiérrez Pareja 1949:20; not to lose anything in translation, the original ends as follows: "*todos los jovenes de Lares son lisenciados* (sic), *cholos lisos i atrevidos, charangueros como ellos solos i tunantes extremados que no encuentran en las mujeres otra cosa que una presa satisfactoria de sus animales instintos i en la propiedad privada un producto colectivo*"]

Beyond the ethnographic detail to be gleaned (Ranrayoq, for example, is now one of the potato sectors in Ccachín), such descriptions no doubt tell us more about the character of class-ethnic relations — between an educated, urban youth and his small-town country counterpart — than they do about the character of the people described.

In Ccachín, the Lareños likewise have the reputation of being "*malo*" ('mean, malicious'). Villagers in Ccachín say that the people of Lares are "*abusivo*" ('abusive') and full of "*tonterías*" ('nonsense'). Lareños are thought to be uncooperative, obstinate, and given to theft. As evidence, *comuneros* cite the problems that the Salesian priests have had with the Lareños — theft from the parish house and failure to cooperate with church and public works — and note that because they are always fighting with the priests, the latter have withdrawn from their outpost there. People likewise cite the refusal of the Virgin of Guadalupe to stay in Lares, and her preference for Ccachín. They also refer to their own experiences with the Lareños. A member of my host family told me, for instance, that the Lareños continue to call people in Ccachín "*indios*," and scoff that "with their radios and aluminum pots and pans, we can hardly recognize these *cholos* anymore."[21]

The negative image that *comuneros* have of the Lareños as a whole is tempered by admiration and esteem in specific cases, especially those based on the strength of long-term *compadrazgo* relations (often honored into the second generation). With reduced dependence on the district capital, the choice of Lares townsfolk for *compadrazgo* relationships appears to be in decline. For all of the complaints about their relations with Lareños, however, the people in Ccachín that I talked to rarely if ever refer to them in ethnic terms, either as individuals, or as a group. Their behavior was generally deferential to them, reflecting asymmetrical relations in terms of status and power, but it would be hard for an outsider to construct a model of ethnicity based on this observed deference alone.

On the strength of history, many of the Lareños think of themselves as superior to the *runa* of the outlying *comunidades*, and they behave accordingly. Likewise, many people in Ccachín consider themselves superior to the people living in the highland

communities above. Many referred to the people of the neighboring *puna* communities of Qelkanka, Chupani, Wakawasi (and even those in the Ccachín *anexo* of Qochayoq) as uncivilized and *salvaje* ('wild'), decidedly unlike themselves. According to one informant, the people of the puna "*no son gente*" — "they're not people" — at least in the sense that they are not like the people of Ccachín).[22] Given the range of what is considered proper within the community itself, stresses emerge generationally and according to the distance one lives from the nuclear center, differences marked by the same traditional-modern continuum that exists with regard to their highland neighbors.

As people move between Ccachín and Qelkanka, Chupani, Wakawasi and the other neighboring communities on the puna, between Ccachín and Ocobamba, Quillabamba, and Yavero in the La Convención-Lares Valley, or between Ccachín and the urban centers of Calca, Cusco, and Lima, they shuttle between points of different identity reference, alternating between situations where ethnic distinctions and class distinctions predominate. Some people travel more, some less. Some of the older women in Ccachín have never been as far away as Cusco, some of the younger men go to Calca almost weekly on business. For those that travel, and particularly for the young, identity and status is constantly being negotiated and redefined in the context of the local social make-up. While the group — whether identified as *runa*, *indio* or *campesino* — stays at the bottom of the social pyramid, the way is open for considerable individual mobility. It's long been noted that ethnicity in the Andes can be mapped spatially, highlands to valley, rural to urban. The latter contrast is so important that one wonders whether if ethnic prejudice were not at issue, the map of social stratification wouldn't be much the same.

Twenty-five years after the agrarian reform, the reformist language has become a part of the way that people in Ccachín identify and project themselves. The terms *compañero* ('comrade'), *compañerokuna* (*kuna*, as a suffix, marks the plural in Quechua.), *comunero*, and *campesinos* have become common forms of address and reference in public discourse, both in the village, and regionwide. It is the language of identity expressed at the village assemblies and in the public announcements made by town criers, heralding their advance with conch shells. If *campesino* continues to carry a sense of a

poor and dependent social position, it also is the language of community and regional action in a way that *runa* is not. As members of *comunidades campesinos* they engage in joint action organized by the *campesino* federations (*Federación Departamental de Campesinos de Cusco* (*FDCC*), *Federación Agraria Revolucionaria Túpac Amaru* (*FARTAC*). United as *campesinos* they join together with other communities to march in Lares, in Calca, and in Cusco, and as *campesinos* they block the main transportation arteries during strikes. Their participation in these campaigns is always organized according to *comunidades*, with each community led by its *varayoqs*, *pututeros*, and a banner identifying its presence. In organizational terms, these are affinity groups, territorially-identified rather than distinguished by a common characteristic or interest as they often are in protests in contemporary industrial states.[23]

To a considerable extent, people's identity seems to be defined by their ties to the land and membership in a local corporate territorial entity. This identity is expressed whenever people speak of belonging to a particular *llaqta* ('community, town, nation, country') or *ayllu* ('community, clan'). The smallest corporate unit of identification seems to be the settlement. Ccachín has three *anexos* — Rayankancha, Qochayoq, and Yerbabuenayoq — and one settlement seeking *anexo* status, Pampallaqta, besides the nuclear community. Each of these settlements has its own history and sense of dependence on or independence from the nuclear village of Ccachín. Qochayoq, the oldest and largest of these settlements, distant from Ccachín and located at a higher ecological level, seems to have the strongest independent identity. Culturally, it is more associated with the herding communities of the *puna* than the agricultural settlements below. Clothing is typical of the Urubamba range, but can be generally distinguished from that of Ccachín. In recent times, it has switched from being administered by Rosaspata to being an *anexo* of Ccachín. Yerbabuenayoq, the smallest and most transient settlement, has the least independent identity. Its population is composed of shopkeepers from Ccachín and Choquecancha who maintain their ties to their home settlements, and outsiders from Calca and Sicuani who are not members of the *comunidades campesinas*. Each of the *anexos* have their own assemblies, and they vary in the extent that they attend the

assemblies in Ccachín as well. As a settlement of merchants, some of whom are not members of (and not eligible for membership in) the *comunidad campesina*, Yerbabuenayoq is organized by the Asociación de Comerciantes de Yerbabuenayoq.

For most people, identity seems to reside with the village: Ccachín. There are no moiety divisions as there are in some Andean communities. As a *comunidad campesina*, it has its own decision making structure, and for all but those in the *anexos*, it is the first formal level of membership in a corporate group. At this level, people distinguish themselves from the neighboring *comunidades campesinas* of Choquecancha and Rosaspata, and from the district capital of Lares. They have stereotypes about what people in each of these neighboring communities are like. There are slight, but noticeable, differences in clothing between Ccachín and Choquecancha (and between those two and Lares), making it possible to distinguish origin. Those who marry into Ccachín continue to be perceived as having one leg outside, a perception of betwixt- and-between that is only overcome in the next generation. At this level, the community constitutes a *nación* when it sends its dancers on pilgrimage to Qoyllur Rit'i, or when it participates in political demonstrations in the capitals. When people from the region migrate to Arequipa or Lima, they activate networks based on their community of origin. In a nesting hierarchy of territorial identities, we might hypothesize that *comunidad campesina* membership is the basic level of identity in the region.

That identity, however, is defined by the context of similarities and contrasts with adjacent neighbors.[24] The immediate reference point is the greater Lares area. Ccachín, Choquecancha, Rosaspata, and Lares are bound by a shared ecology and history. As one looks out over the valley, they all fall within the sweep of land that the eye can see. All are at the same ecological level, and all have equal access to the road. People are familiar with the place-names — with the spirits and history of the land — throughout this zone. Cross-culturally, this seems to be an often salient level of cultural identity, and I note that in this sense, the Andes are not that different from Iberia, where the *comarca* ('district') has been an important level of identification (Tax Freeman 1989).[25] For some reason, the term does not seem to be used much in social science discourse in the Andes, but it

reminds us that geographic identities are often felt as strongly, if not more so, than class and ethnic ones.

Generally, in most contexts that people find themselves, these local-level territorial sentiments outweigh linguistic ties, so that in common use, the term *runa* does not represent a pan-Andean indigenous identity based on widely-shared cultural traits or the Quechua language. Certainly, the symbols exist for the construction of such an identity, but the manipulation of this symbolic material has been most pronounced, not in the countryside among the *comuneros*, but among the more Westernized urban population of Cusco, as it tries to define its own identity. As early as 1967, Bourricaud talked about the cultural synthesis between *indio* and *mestizo* brought about by social and geographical mobility. Out of this process, he suggested, would emerge a new national Peruvian culture which is neither Indian nor Spanish. While it is still not clear that such an outcome is ordained, the shape of the synthesis is being contested at regional and national levels (e.g., as a cultural component of the political movement toward decentralization, as through the *Región Inca*,).

Along with their other identities, identification as *peruanos* appears to be of growing importance in Ccachín. This identification is relatively recent, but the signs are near ubiquitous. National symbols — the Peruvian shield, the Peruvian flag, Túpac Amaru (a rebellious indigenous leader appropriated to some extent into the national identity) — have become a part of women's weavings in the village in the last 20 years, picking up on images and themes first seen in school texts. During *caballo ch'allay*, the blessing of the horses associated with the festival of Santiago, ribbons flying the colors of the Peruvian flag are tied to the horse's tails. The same ribbons are sometimes tied to the scissors used in ritual first-haircuttings. As Ccachín men collectively check the community's boundaries in the annual *deslinde*, they are led by *pututeros* and the Peruvian flag. The State grants *comunidad campesina* status and legitimates land claims, and the flag is an important symbol used to stake claim to contested territory. Young men from the village who have performed State military service are exempted from serving the lower-level offices of Ccachín's civil-religious hierarchy (*cargo* system). Peruvian identity is

reinforced through the carrying of national identity cards, and through identification with the national party symbols of parties courting the *campesino* vote in presidential elections. Such symbols — the *frijol* ('bean', *Izquierda Socialista*), *estrella* ('star', *Partido Aprista Peruano*), *escalera* ('stairway', *FREDEMO*) — now make it possible for a rural population with varying degrees of literacy to vote in national elections; prior to the Velasco regime they were effectively disenfranchised by the literacy requirement. The radio provides a daily reminder for the *comuneros* of Ccachín of their membership in the Nation. It establishes their interest and stake in otherwise seemingly distant events.

Authenticity

Indigenous Andean culture is a synthesis of pre-Columbian and Spanish traits, and in this sense it's not so different from *mestizo* culture. Perhaps this seems a truism, but it sometimes bears repeating by those of us, who, for our own identity reasons, are fascinated by cultures that seem more original and pure than our own. As Gade (1992) points out, exaltation of the indigenous leads us to emphasize present-day continuities with the Incan past. Our sympathies for the oppressed lead us to portray Western influence as an entirely negative force. Scholarly discussion of Spanish impact has most often focused on its disadvantages and its disintegrative effects, overshadowing the ingenuity with which Andean peasants have selected among introduced elements, adapting some, eliminating others, to incorporate them into their lives. To cite but one example, sheep, the most important introduced species in the Andes, are often treated as intrinsically inferior to the autochthonous alpaca they largely replaced. It often seems that the vehemence with which they are dismissed owes more to their taint by Old World origins than to legitimate ecological concerns. As Bernardo Fulcrand, points out, however, "There are no bad animals, there are only badly-managed animals" (Fulcrand 1989).[26]

Indigenous communities in the Andes have always faced the issue of what is authentic to the community and how to authenticate synthetic elements whose origins lie outside of it (Dover 1992). Many of the Old World plants and animals in the hybrid Andean cultural complex are viewed by villagers in Ccachín as autochthonous, or

"*criollo*," which when contrasted with "improved" varieties, means much the same thing. For practical people in an oral culture, authenticity tends to be a matter of family tradition — of what ones parents and grandparents did — rather than of ancient cultural origins. Like peasants everywhere, many Andeans have been initially distrustful of innovation and slow to embrace them (the same can be said of European peasants who were slow to adopt the Andean potato). It's hard to determine what role authenticity plays in advancing or retarding innovation. It may be or may not be at stake in a given context, and it may dominate or be subordinate to other considerations. What's more, it's hard to determine exactly what "identity" means in such domains, and how, if at all, it differs from frequency-dependent and vertical cultural transmission rules.

Authenticity seems to be more clearly at stake in the realm of dance, dress, and ritual, and it's most transparent as one considers the difference in ceremonial contexts. Again, there is a question of audience here, of how one identifies oneself and who one identifies with as participant and observer. Poole (1990:118) notes that in contemporary concepts of "folklore," dance and other ritual activities seek "to 'represent,' 'reassert,' or otherwise totalize a collective 'ethnic' identity." In an enlightening essay, she discusses the different meanings of dance for the *runa*, *mestizo*, *cholo*, and *gringo* pilgrims that attend the festival of Qoyllur Rit'i. *Runa* pilgrims understand the pilgrimage as an offering to the miraculous Christ of Qoyllur Rit'i and to their *Apu*, the snow-capped mountain, and they are motivated by the reciprocal relations they maintain with these spirit entities and by the opportunity to advance rank in the local *cargo* system (a hierarchy of prestigious positions and political offices). For more urban Peruvian nationals and foreigners, the pilgrimage is often a quest that "provides them access not only to a timeless nature, but to an ancient, 'authentic' culture whose non-Western, precolonial roots . . . [they] have come to idealize as a less complex, less coercive, less historically compromising way of life" (Poole 1990:98). The pilgrimage may provide a liminal experience for both, but for the former, unlike the latter, the liminality does not derive from its representational quality.

In Ccachín, there are both religious and secular contexts for dance. Take the *ch'unchu* dance, for example, a dance that portrays the "savages" of the jungle and includes the killing of a very important figure in Andean mythology, the Andean bear. The *ch'unchu* dance is performed in the Ccachín church before the image of Santiago, under the sponsorship of a *carguyoq* ('festival sponsor'). It is also performed by dance troupes representing various community organizations in a dance competition for Ccachín's anniversary. And *ch'unchu* can be danced by students in programs organized by the teachers on secular holidays such as Mother's Day and Independence Day and on moment's notice for visiting tourists. Each of these contexts is very different. Qualitatively, dancing for Santiago is similar to dancing for the *Taytacha* at Qoyllur Rit'i as described above. The dances for the anniversary celebration and school contexts, however, are purely representational, or "folkloric" in the sense identified by Poole, in that they are performed outside of their traditional religious and ritual context, and they are intended exclusively for the outside observer. In most cases, the "outside" observers are the community members themselves. In a few cases, the viewers may be community members who have migrated to Cusco, Arequipa, or Lima and have returned to their natal village for the holidays. Occasionally the intended audience is foreign tourists, who are indeed outsiders. Qualitatively, these secular feasts are like the numerous folk festivals that are sponsored by State institutions and the schools in which highland dances play a role. Often, dances that play no role in the religious and religious activity of Ccachín, but that are danced somewhere in the highlands and enter in the wider repertoire of Peruvian folk dance, are performed. The paradox of such folkloric dance is that while in motivation and meaning they are less "authentic" than in their religious manifestations, their primary purpose is to convey authenticity: reaffirm the village's formal status as a *comunidad campesina*, to assure mothers and fathers that their children have not been lost to them, and to define membership in the Peruvian Nation. Poole (1990:122, n. 19) suggests that in this last respect, the modern day politics of folklore have much in common with the cultural surveillance of dance in the Inca state, when dances were

presented in Cusco to control and confine the ethnic identities of the groups subject to Inca hegemony.

People have a sense of what it means to be a *comunero* via-a-vis other social groups, not only in terms of primary symbols — their language *runasimi*, the use of coca, indigenous dress — but also in terms of behavior. This is the meaning of *runa* in its normative rather than membership sense, and there is individual variation and social evolution in the ideal. The use of the term in this sense — who and what is *runa* — indicates the degree of consensus about what is appropriate, a consensus that with the passage of time is shifting, constantly tested, and apparently negotiable. Individual behavior often differs widely from the ideal, even as diverging individuals continue to idealize stereotypic traits. Often, the ideal finds expression in ritual more than in everyday behavior, although the ritualistic expression of identity likewise differs widely, even on special occasions. In this as in other things, some people are more religious than others. Caught up in our own issues of identity in the field, it is understandable when anthropologists fix their sights on central traits. The core is denser and better defined than the boundaries, and helps serve as an anchor for those of us who enter as professional strangers. Understanding local identity issues, however, requires that we keep our eyes moving between cultural center and periphery.

Ccachín youth move back and forth between city and country without ceasing to be *runa*, and more permanent emigrants to Calca and Cusco maintain animals, fields and family ties in the country. The stresses of culture change get expressed in rural-urban and generational terms more often than in explicitly ethnic ones. Parents complain that their urbanized children don't work as hard as they. Young people say that they want to move to the city so that they don't have to work as hard as their parents. With the current level of movement, and using traditional sociocultural criteria of class and ethnicity, individual families may best be characterized as multiclass and multiethnic in their membership. To say that families are multiclass is to speak of structural positions and leads to no major problems. To say that a family is multiethnic, however, appears to be a contradiction in terms: it challenges the primordial nature of ethnic identifications (Keyes 1981). A

rupture in the family may come in succeeding generations. Whether there is a rupture or not, however, depends on the entire field of ethnic definitions in the larger society, and the extent that these allow for nesting and inclusion. People in the Cusco area are living at a time when these cultural boundaries are being contested and rewritten.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. Here we can see one of the ironies of Andean syncretism, that in contemporary storytelling, the historical Inca were aided in turn by the god of their Spanish conquerors.

2. Because of the cool breezes, Pre-Colombian storage facilities ("*qolqa*") were often located in such places, and similar ruins at Ankasmarka have been hypothesized to be storage facilities (Angles Vargas 1992).

3. The bones are said to walk, harm livestock, and seduce drunken men. The following remedy was suggested by one young woman to prevent the *machula* from doing damage:

> You have to bring the little bone, then you have to burn it with kerosene. Afterward . . . you bring together from the year all that we have chewed from the stalks of corn, that which we throw away . . . . Then that and corn, all of the things of corn, *ch'uñu*, and potatoes, everything...that they call *wata mikhuy* . . . like . . . the coca, when it is chewed . . . . With this you select the *despacho* ['ritual offering']. Then, you take it to the *machula* . . . and burn it . . . near the home of the *ñawpa machula*, no? There is a tree called *llanku*, and it is burnt with this . . . but you don't cook food with it because it wrecks the pot. . . . After this, it makes their feet [the *machula*], they say, so they can't walk. [This is done] when the *machula* does damage. [Reported by a young woman in Ccachín]

4. The *machula* are just one of a number of malevolent spirit classes in Ccachín. Another important class is the *condenados* — the souls of the condemned. While my host family reports that one hardly encounters *condenados* anymore — they have retreated to the more isolated Tiriqway-Qolqe Cruz mountain areas because of the population growth in Ccachín — I heard of several supposed sightings of *condenados* in Ccachín during my stay there. A third class of beings capable of harm are the *apu*, mountain spirits who sometimes take on human form. I have also recorded several reports of rainbows, lightning and condors causing damage through spiritual means in Ccachín.

5. These include Kendall (1976), the Glenal Mond Peru Expedition of 1985, Valencia Espinoza and Nuñez Zamalloa (1989), and Gutiérrez Pareja (1979).

6. Mountains and monoliths play an important role in Andean religion and myth, and on the truck trip from Calca to Ccachín one passes several rock formations explained by ancient stories. To cite a second example, as one ascends the road along the Qochoq river, one can make out a pair of rock formations to the northwest known as Pitusiray. Martín de Muruá, in his chronicles, tells the story of an illicit love affair

between a young Lares herder, keeper of the Inca herds for sacrifice to the sun, and an Inca princess. Discovered by attendants of the "daughter of the sun" and fearing that a death penalty would be executed against the young man, the couple fled towards the mountain, where they stopped to rest and were converted to stone. Toro Montalvo (1991, Vol. II:720) tells of a competition between Sawasiray and Rit'isiray for the hand of the goddess Pitusiray. Whichever of the two who were able to make water flow to Urqo Waranka would take her as bride. Sawasiray triumphed and married the maiden, but she escaped to the hills with her true love Rit'isiray and the two were converted to stone. Pitusiray is a twin peak and Sawasiray an adjacent one above Calca. Both are visible from great distances in the southern Peruvian Andes, and according to Valderrama and Escalante (1975), they are widely regarded as the spiritual source and guardians of corn. In some areas, they are also taken to represent the paired concepts of yellow corn/white corn, cob/corn, and form/energy ("*alma*"/"*ánimo*") (Gose 1994).

7. The Lares area again appears in history associated with revolt during the campaign of Tupaq Amaru II two centuries later, in the 1780s. Fisher (1966:112, 212) provides the detail that "The Indians of Lares constructed wooden guns and lined them with hides, but they were clumsy to use, requiring two men to fire them," and notes that the Spanish assigned two detachments of men to take the posts of Urubamba, Calca, and Lares to cut off Tupaq Amaru's retreat in that direction.

8. Flores Galindo (1988) notes that along with the relatively rigorous attempts the Spanish made to map their conquered territories, there emerged an "imaginary geography" charting an "imaginary space." Probably the most famous of these is "*El Dorado*," situated as with Paytiti, in the jungle (Hemming 1978). Paytiti was thought to be another Cusco, a jungle kingdom founded by an Incan leader during the reign of the Inca Pachakutec. According to Flores Galindo, the Paytiti myth grows out of the convergence of three cultural traditions: the importance of dualism in Andean thought, as exhibited by Inca and contemporary moiety organization, the Tupiwarani myths of a "land without evil" to the east, and the wishful thinking of Spanish explorers.

   Local tradition has it that Choquecancha is on the route followed by the Inca to Paytiti. It's but one of a number of communities along the eastern flank of the Andes that claim the same. Allen (1988), for example, notes that in Sonqo, her research community, people believe that the Inca crossed Wanakawri, the mountain pass linking Paucartambo with the Vilcanota Valley, and passed through Qolquepata on their way to Paytiti. The ridge above Choquecancha is likewise named "Wanakawri" and falls along one of the proposed routes. In making sense of these myths, it's important to note that a pass named Wanakawri overlooking Cusco and has an important place in the origin myths of Cusco (Urton 1990), and that both the Inca and the Spanish who followed them had a habit of replicating the divisions of Cusco in the place names they used to divide outlying geographic and political space.

9. One of the more memorable events for people in the area is the day Father Polentini made an exploratory survey over the villages in a helicopter. Shawls in Ccachín and Choquecancha sometimes depict a helicopter (see Gisbert et. al. 1987; Seibold 1990) and while I have not been able to identify who first incorporated this image into their weaving, it may well record memories of this flight.

10. As an example, the *hacendados* prohibited sheet-metal roofing on cabins constructed by their *feudatarios* on hacienda land. Cross-culturally, the prohibition of such roofing is a widespread way of limiting the development of ownership rights to land through the building of permanent structures. The proscription can be compared, for example, with the one prohibiting metal roofing on cabins built on communal lands in the Basque Country of Northern Spain (Echegaray 1928).

11. One such person was *Don MN* of Calca. As a representative of the Ministerio de Agricultura during the agrarian reform of the early 1970s, he was active in helping the people of Rayankancha and Ccachín organize to be free of the hacienda in Rayankancha. He reports that the *hacendado* threatened his life, but that at that time, he was still "young and fearless" ("*joven y sin miedo*").

12. A group of twenty-seven families from Ccachín have title to Pan de Azucar (the *Pan de Azucar Comité*), a single Ccachín household has title to the upper part of Palanganayoq, and a group from the community of Santa Elena in the Lares Valley (the *Santa Elena Comité*) has rights to Temblorayoq.

13. The market may have been held at Wakáy because it is located along the road between the haciendas of Rayankancha and Matinga. One of my *compadres* reported that the Rayankancha *hacendado* had constructed a *casa* ('house'; perhaps also a storefront) there. With the end of the haciendas, the market is held at Yerbabuenayoq, a convenient point on the road between the *comunidades campesinas* of Ccachín and Choquecancha.

14. It would be a mistake to assume that all of the *hacendados* or the truckers who have replaced them as significant powers in the region are viewed badly by the *campesinos* in the area. Most people I talked to said that the *hacendados* of Rayankancha and Palanganayoq were good people ("*buena gente*") who did not abuse their positions. My host family continues to maintain a close relationship with the Julian Soto family, the *patrones* of Palanganayoq. They spoke affectionately of Don Julian as *hacendado*, and he in turn spoke highly of them. My host family in Ccachín had a room in Calca in the house of the Sotos, and their relationship is marked by the kind of reciprocity and affection that one might expect between *compadres*, though it is not cemented by *compadrazgo*. Likewise, the truckers I rode with have many *compadres* in Ccachín and Choquecancha and are considered to be fair in their dealings and *humilde* (humility being an important measure for assessing character in the Andes).

15. According to Seibold (1990), most Choquecanchans say that Ccachín was once a satellite *ayllu* of Choquecancha. I have found no archival evidence for that, nor has anyone in Ccachín ever suggested that such a relationship ever existed. If true, it must predate the colonial era. As far back as the 1700s and as recently as the 1960s, Choquecancha and Ccachín were *anexos* of Lares. Choquecancha achieved *comunidad campesina* status four years before Ccachín, on August 18, 1962. While the substantial similarity in costume might suggest a common heritage, the fluorescence of weaving in the two communities and their divergence from a wider regional style observable from Lares to Ollantaytambo has taken place since they achieved independent status. The present textile production is a poor indicator of past associations. The correspondence is more likely explained by proximity, market competition, and similarity in class and ethnic position.

16. Storytellers in Ccachín relate the exchange of the Virgin Guadalupe for land to the character of the Lareños: from their standpoint the Lareños are always wanting things from them, always asking for things. Polentini reports that Umpalla was still a part of Lares in the late 1970s, but I have not found the records to verify that; it appears to have been effectively reclaimed for use by villagers in Ccachín long before that, and as far as I can tell, it has been included on community maps ever since becoming a *comunidad campesina.*

17. While *runa* is a term used by people in the Quechua-speaking communities to refer to themselves, *misti* or *mestizo* is a term of reference used by the *runa* to refer to their Spanish-speaking, hispanicized neighbors. It is not normally used by the *misti* themselves, and does not meet the test of self-reference that *runa* does. I agree with Bodley (1994), that anthropologists should favor non-pejorative terms acceptable to the people themselves. The term *campesino* does have pejorative connotations for some segments of Peruvian society, but it is a self-referential term, and unlike *runa* which focuses on primordial qualities, it plays a role in emphasizing the collective and organizational force of community identity.

18. Dover (1992) provides examples from the *III Congreso de la Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia* of how *authenticity* has become an important part of the new indigenous rhetoric in the Andes. While the issue of authenticity has long been embedded in the syncretic processes typical of the Andes (i.e., in the preservation of what is authentic to the community through accommodation by disguised resistance [Poole 1990], or by subsuming under Andean ideology cultural practices and traits whose origins lie outside it), a self-conscious rhetoric of identity does not presently exist in most rural areas of Cusco to challenge the processes of *mestizaje* and political incorporation.

19. The word *indio* has pejorative connotations in the Andes, and I did not hear it often. When I did hear it used self-referentially, it was in a familiar, playful or ironic sense. Once, for example, in a relaxed moment after lunch during the corn harvest, a

comadre engaged one of my god children in a sing-song follow-along word game, the refrain of which went "*indio, indio, cholo, cholo.*" My godchild repeated it with delight, laughing with every round. The head catechist of Ccachín once introduced me to a visiting priest jokingly by saying, "*entre los indios, aquí encuentras gringos*" ('here among the Indians you find gringos'). There was irony in the comment, since the priest himself was German and likewise a gringo, but whether the irony was part of the joke, or priests are put into an "ethnic" category of their own and the irony was missed, I don't know. As used by outsiders to describe villagers, *indio* was a pejorative. I was once surprised to hear the term used by one of the *porteros* ('janitors, doorkeepers') of the Ccachín school, of all the school personnel, the one with the closest friendships with the *comuneros* (the *porteros* are perceived as intermediate between the *comuneros* and *profesores* in status and prestige). The *portero*, traveling in the company of the *profesores* on the truck to Calca, responded to an impasse of a small landslide blocking the path by saying, "*déjadles hacerlo los indios*" ('let the Indians do it'; i.e., 'let the Indians get down off the truck and clear the road'). The status implications of the term could have been no more clear.

Cholo is a term with multiple connotations, perhaps best exemplified by the term used to refer to tetherball in Ccachín: *matacholo* ('*cholo*-killer'). The game was brought to Ccachín by itinerant traders near the end of my stay there in late 1991. *Cholo* may refer to young people in general, and the traders well as the Ccachín lad who set up a tetherball pole in the courtyard of his newly-established store, were in their early 20s. *Cholo* also may refer to peasants that have to some extent acculturated to national, urban culture, who are bilingual, or who have migrated to urban areas. It carries the sense of being in a state of transition between Indian and mestizo status, and this too describes these youth. Any male under the age of 40 in Ccachín fits the description, as well as the women who have spent time outside of the village as housekeepers in Cusco or in other income-producing activities. In this neutral sense, the term *cholofícación* is sometimes used to describe the process of social change and social mobility whereby the population acquires a syncretic culture that is neither indigenous nor European (Van den Berghe 1974). Most often, however, *cholo* is used as a *pejorative*, expressing a suspicion that someone who is actually an "Indian" does not know his or her place. The term *matacholo* plays on this sense as well, even as used by those who fall within the category itself. Because of the negative connotations, I do not adopt the term *cholo* here.

The meaning of *misti* in Ccachín is publicly expressed in the *yunsa* dance on Carnival Sunday. The dance, known in Kiswarani and other highland areas of Lares as *mullkiwut'uy* ('tree-cutting') (Valencia and Nuñez 1989), is called *misti carnaval* in Ccachín. Pairs of young men and women dance around a decorated tree erected in the village plaza, alternately chopping at its trunk with an ax. The dancers dress in their going-to-Cusco finery, stone-washed jeans a favorite among the men, and brightly-colored factory-made skirts and blouses among the women. In contrast to

all the other festivals in the village — and in contrast to all the other dances and rituals associated with carnival — where brightly-colored ponchos are worn by the men and their best *pullira* and *llikllas* by the women, for the dancers of *misti carnaval*, Western dress is preferred. The dance is accompanied by colored flour, balloons, and water play as in Cusco. If *misti carnaval* in Ccachín recalls Poole's observation that Andean dance emphasizes the portrayal of "ethnic, cultural, historical, ancestral, or normative ('wild') outsiders" (1991:334), the idea of *misti* clearly merges with that of *cholo* here, and serves as a social commentary on changes taking place inside the community among their own: Ccachín's youth.

20. I don't know whether the author has precise data to back up his figure on emigration to Lima, but allowing for the fact that even residents of Ccachín comment on the high rates of out-migration from Choquecancha, it strikes me as an exaggeration. By my count, the number of people in Ccachín that have gone to Lima pales by comparison with the number that have gone to Cusco, to the Lares Valley, or that continue to live in the village.

21. I recognize that by reporting these grievances of the people of Ccachín against those of Lares, I am opening myself up to the same kind of criticism voiced against Margaret Mead in the film "Anthropology on Trial" (Gullahorn-Holecek 1983), that she painted an unfair image of certain groups based on the reports of rival neighbors. That there are both class and ethnic antagonisms here only complicates the picture. I have not had extensive contact with people in Lares, and all I can say is that I was treated well whenever I stopped through there on my trips to Ccachín. Unfortunately, I do not have data on the Lareños images of the people of Ccachín, or their complaints. While it's common for anthropologists to become emotionally-attached to the particular group of people they are living and working with, there is a decided imbalance in our choice of communities to study, so that the perspective of indigenous communities over more nationally-acculturated ones and the perspective of the relatively powerless over the powerful in the Andes and elsewhere is adopted *a priori*. While the power differential may in itself be good reason to choose as we do, both interpersonal understanding and research opportunities are lost. I am uncomfortable with that — for what is gained in advocacy may be lost in partiality — and I apologize to those in Lares who might suffer from the incomplete picture given here.

22. The Quechua word *ch'unchu* is used to talk about the "wild" jungle people of Yavero and beyond, the Machigenga, but locals usually use the Spanish "salvajes" to talk about their neighbors in the adjacent highlands.

23. In these terms, the community's pilgrimage to Qoyllur Rit'i is subdivided into interest-groups, although these groups do not cross community boundaries (more accurately, a few of the musicians accompanying the troupe in 1989 were from the neighboring community of Rosaspata, but they attended high school in Ccachín). In 1989, the first year I attended (Ccachín's third year of attendance at the Sinakara

Sanctuary), only one dance group from the village was represented — the Qhapaq Qolla — so that Ccachín's presence was as one unified *nación*. In 1991, however, Ccachín sent three groups — *Qhapaq Qolla*, *K'achampa*, and *Sargento* (the latter representing the Qochayoq contingent), each with its own *carguyoq* ('sponsor') and *láminas* (images of *El Señor de Qoyllur Rit'i*), each traveling in a separate truck, and each camping at different locations in the Sanctuary. There is a certain amount of competitiveness between these groups, but the competition, perhaps because of the newness of their participation, has not been resolved through institutionalization in a symmetrical or hierarchical structure as it has in other areas (see Sallnow 1991). The Ccachín groups arrive late and leave early in order to be able to participate in the Corpus Christi celebrations back in the village, content to pay their respects to the shrine and leave, not participating in the full fiesta complex. In integrating into the existing moiety structure (since 1980, a tripartite structure of Paucartambo, Quispicanchis, and Canchis), the *ukuku* ('bear dancers') from all three Ccachín groups join the Paucartambo contingent in climbing the central glacier in the morning hours of the Tuesday after Trinity.

24. When President Garcia presented a gift of fifty Italian-made tractors to select communities in anticipation of the 1990 elections, leaders from the recipient *comunidades campesinas* were invited to Lima for the presentation. The *teniente gobernador* of Choquecancha was able to travel to the Capital for the occasion, but Ccachín could not afford to send a representative. When the presentation was made before the cameras, *Don NQ* first appeared in a jacket to accept the endowment in the name of Choquecancha, and then disappeared to slip on a *pallay poncho* ('patterned poncho') from Ccachín to accept a tractor in the latter's name. *Don NQ* normally dresses in western clothing in Choquecancha, and he can frequently be seen wearing a jacket. There is a rivalry between the neighboring communities, ranging from the marketing of textiles to receipt of development aid, and the change of clothes perhaps allowed *Don NQ* the opportunity to use clothing to make a subtle comparison of the modernity of the two communities on a national stage.

    Several people in Cusco told me that Choquecancha is the more "traditional" of the two communities, based on rituals they maintain. However, Choquecancha has had a road leading to its central plaza since 1968 — something that Ccachín lacks — facilitating contact with the outside world and making it the more attractive site for traders and for development aid. In socioeconomic terms, Choquecancha is no more traditional than Ccachín. Measured in the number of storefronts and in the number of houses with sheet-metal roofs, the reverse is arguably true. The judgement of "traditionality" is too broadly-painted and impressionistic to be useful, except as a study in how people represent and contrast themselves and their neighbors. Locals, to some extent, are offended by the designation of "traditional" (though proud of their customs). Anthropologists gain professional status by studying in such settings. In this sense, the status positions of the two worlds, given their respective spheres of prestige, are reversed.

25. The *comarca* concept takes diverse geographic, historical, and socioeconomic factors into account to distinguish a zone from neighboring ones. *Comarcas* do not necessarily have the same boundaries as political divisions. Unfortunately, outside observers often differ in their identifications of *comarcas*, and their schemes do not necessarily map the local sense of shared identity. Gipuzkoa, my current home province in the Basque Country of northern Spain, for example, has been divided into as few as three and as many as nine *comarcas* by geographers. These mappings reflect not only differing ways of envisioning the same space, but changing visions through time. River valleys in the Andes, as in Spain, play an important role in defining similarities and divisions. The upper Lares Valley geographically confines and defines the social boundaries, so that the people of Ccachín, Choquecancha, Rosaspata, and Lares recognize a common, if sometimes antagonistic, identity.

26. As Fulcrand (1989) points out, there has been a tendency by those who find sheep to be out of place in the Andes to explain their ubiquity in terms of colonial imposition and historical contingency rather than to peasant choice and agrotechnological factors. The fact that there was a time when tribute had to be paid in sheep's wool, llama meat was looked down upon as "*carne de Indio*," and the haciendas of the 19th century were open to the English wool market all played a part, but nutritional and reproductive factors that give ovines certain comparative advantages over native camelids should not be overlooked. It's important here, as elsewhere, to separate social goals from explanatory ones, so that the former do not constrain the latter.



Figure 1.1: *Apus* Sawasiray and Pitusiray as Depicted by Guaman Poma de Ayala (1980)




Figure 1.2: Horse, Rider, and Bird Motif on a Textile from Ccachín




Figure 1.3: Province of Calca-Urubamba in 1786 as Mapped by Pablo José Oricaín (Aparacio 1970)



Figure 1.4: The Archdiocese of Cusco in 1786 as Mapped by Pablo José Oricaín (Aparacio 1970)

Table 1.1: Haciendas in the Area Around Ccachín, 1785-1851

Hacienda	Owner	Census*
Date: 1785	**Source: Provincia de Calca (1785)**	
Acchaguara	Andrés de Lizarraga	7
Barrial y Mofon		
Huacahuasi (Wakawasi)	Andrés Arredondo	4
Mant'o	Bernardo Bargas	11
Pampacorral		14
Quehuipay	Ambrocio Bargas	4
Sisay	*Convento de Santo Domingo*	6
Yanatile	Ambrocio Bargas	

Date: 1845 and 1851	**Source: Provincia de Calca (1845, 1851)**	
Auccallachi	Manuel Quintanilla	
Barranca	Juan Bautista Vargas	
Barrial de Mofon	Juana Villagarcia, Mauricio Vargas	12
Ccollcca	Tomasa Carasas	22
Ccolluna	Casimiro Montalbo, Casimira Echarri	
Ccorimayo	Narciso Zúñiga, María Montalvo	13
Chancamayo	Pedro Valdes, María Cobos	44
Cuncani	Macsimo Justiani	
Hipal	Heirs of Fr. Juan de Dios Vargas	10
Huacahuasi (Wakawasi)	Heirs of Narcisa Justiniani	48
Huachibamba, Paltaybamba, Ppacchapata, y Santa Ana	Casimiro Montalbo	14

Huayraccpata, Llaullipata	Heirs of Francisco Vargas	12
Huyhuy	Manuel Tthupa	
Lachacc	Melchor Soto, María Soto Carrillo	
Lafa y Cuguipata	Mariano Zúñiga	
Leche Leche y Naranjapata	Pedro Sande, José Berreño	13
Luyluy, Yuthu, y Paucarbamba	Mariano Vargas	
Mant'o, San Pedro Grande y Chico	Fr. Mariano Vargas, Faustino Salazar	
Pampacorral	José Antonio Córdova	42
Pantorvilla y Chintabamba	Pedro Avellano	4
Paucarpata	Catalina Valdes	
Quebrada Honda	Tomasa Carasas	6
Quehuipay		5
Quishuarani	Juana Villagarcia	
Rayankancha y Chillau	Mariano Loayza	
San Antonio de Suyo, Pilispata, Tinccac	*La Iglesia de la Doctrina de Lares* (Fr. Pablo Justiniani)	34
Santa Clara de Paytabamba-Torreblanca	Juan Piroto, Clara Azero	
Saugui	José Vargas	17
Sisay	*Convento de Santo Domingo*	4
Tiobamba	Gaspar Gavancho	4
Villcabamba	Francisco Loayza	9
Yanatile	Hifinio Ordoñes, Casimira Benaridea	5

* Census of *tributarios* ('taxpayers, household heads') rather than all residents.

Table 1.2: Excerpt of a Letter from *Feudatarios* of Hacienda Sisay-Mask'abamba to the Office of Agrarian Reform, Cusco

. . . In spite of the decisive dispositions, both the old Law 15037 as well as the new legal disposition Decree 17716, which completely prohibit the owners of the estates from charging the feudatories rent on the parcels that they usufruct, it happens, señor Sub-Director, that the representatives of the Convent of Santo Domingo, trampling over these dispositions, are charging us rent, and taking advantage of our condition as humble peasants, oblige us to pay the rent in produce, which we have to transport to the city of Cusco prejudicing our modest economies. But as there is now an office responsible for looking out for the future of the peasants, that is, the Office of Agrarian Reform, we look to you, señor Sub-Director, to procure that the competent authorities will intervene to secure our legitimate rights, making it so that they don't continue charging us for the parcels that we occupy, and in addition, that the hacienda be expropriated in its entirety, since the fathers of the Convent of Santo Domingo don't work the estate, and therefore don't meet the essential spirit of the Law of Agrarian Reform, which is THE LAND IS FOR THOSE WHO WORK IT, being we, the feudatories, who, giving up the last drop of our sacrifice, are making the estate produce. In consequence, we implore you to expedite a ruling stating that we are the conductors of the existing parcels at the estate Marco-Sisay, and that they will be opportunely adjudicated to us in application of the Law of Agrarian Reform.

Therefore: we petition and implore you señor Sub-Director, that taking into account our modest condition as humble peasants, you make our dreams of being owners of the parcels that we occupy a reality, expropriating the before-mentioned estate as soon as possible.

In the justice that we hope to achieve,

(Signed)

Quillabamba, July 31, 1969

Translated from Spanish. The original document is located in the Hacienda Sisay-Mask'abamba file of the archives of the Ministerio de Agricultura, Región Inca, Cusco.

Table 1.3: Excerpt of a Letter from the Owner of Hacienda Ichhu to the Office of Agrarian Reform, Cusco

[Continuation of a list of reasons why certain land should not be appropriated]

2. Besides, in reality there are not any abandoned fields on the said estate, because after the planting of maize, the land has to rest some eight years, and it's not possible to cultivate plantations of coffee or coca there either, because it's cloud forest ['*ceja de la montaña*']; as well, with the construction of the Calca-Lares road, the coffee groves that existed and are still visible have been destroyed, that is, the coffee and coca plantations have been covered by the rocks and earth.

3. That a year ago, actually, I had more than 30 cattle between calves, bulls, cows, and old ones, but since, the wild animals have devoured them, and there was also a landslide in the steep slopes, and the rest have been used for the sustenance of my family, because many of my children are pursuing their studies in primary and secondary school.

4. . . . for the reasons mentioned, I currently only have 15 cattle . . .

5. I should explicitly say that I occupy a fraction of the land of the estate Ichhu, with set boundaries, and there are seven feudatories, with whom I have no labor problems, nor with the neighbors bordering me, who are others who share the said estate.

With these considerations: I request that they give me the parcel that I am working on the said estate, and the rest can be disposed of in the form that the General Direction of the Agrarian Reform sees appropriate.

[Signed by the proprietor of Hacienda Ichhu]

August 24, 1971

Translated from Spanish. The original document is located in the Hacienda Ichhu file of the archives of the Ministerio de Agricultura, Región Inca, Cusco.

Table 1.4: History of the Calca-Lares Region

Date	Event	Source
1536	Calca was the base of operations and Lares was the site of the final pre-rebellion meeting when Manco II led his drive to restore the Inca empire.	Hemming 1970; Estrada 1992
1575	The *repartamiento de los Indios Lares o Laris* was the commission of the *encomendero* Diego de Trujillo y Páez.[1] 240 people were assessed a tribute of 960 *pesos* after the *visita general* of *virrey* Toledo.[2]	Wachtel 1973
1583	The villages of St. Cosme, St. Damian, Santiago de la Fuente, and Nuestra Señora de los Hitos in Lares had 332 tributary Indians and 1625 people of different *encomenderos*. The *repartamiento* of *don* Luis de Escobar in Amparaes had 187 tributary Indians and 1197 *personas reducidas* in the villages of Guacanga, Osedios, and Timor.[3]	Archivo de Indias 1924-1926
16th C.	Calca was founded by *don* Pedro de Zamora with the name *Villa de Zamora*. In 1583, the *repartamiento* of Catea commissioned by Melchor Maldonado in the Villa de Zamora had 612 tributary Indians and 3134 personas reducidas.	Estrada 1992; Archivo de Indias 1924-1926
16th C.	Calca and Lares were part of the *corregimiento del valle de Yucay*. Amparaes was part of the *corregimiento de los Andes*.	Archivo de Indias 1924-1926
16th C.	Portuguese operated silver mines at Qolqemarka below Choquecancha and at the *Mina del Gallo* in Amparaes (these areas were previously mined by the Incas).	Estrada 1992; Gutiérrez 1979
1653	Claim made for a silver mine on a hill named Chuychi two leagues from Amparaes by Andrés de Morillas and others.	Corregimiento de Cusco 1653

1671	Claim made for a silver mine on a hill named Paculay near Lares by Antonio de Chaves y Mendoza.	Corregimiento de Cusco 1671
1684-1784	The *corregimiento* of Calca-Lares had jurisdiction over the *corregimiento* of Villcabamba, including Machu Pikchu in the contemporary province of La Convención.	Estrada 1992
1738	Complaint made by Martina Jara de la Cerda, Prioress of the Convent of Santa Catalina de Sera in Cusco, on behalf of Sisters Luisa de Santo Tomás and Bernarda de San Antonio, against various tenants on Hacienda Sisay of Lares (including the lands Chaguarpata, Mask'abamba, Pacchac, Quilca, and Sisay), for nonpayment of rent.	Corregimiento de Cusco 1738
1779	Until this date, Ollantaytambo was part of the province of Calca-Lares.	Mörner 1978
1780-1783	Rebellion of Tupaq Amaru was supported by the Indians of Calca and Lares.	Estrada 1992; Fisher 1966
1851-1861	The district of Lares was annexed to the province of La Convención for a period and then reincorporated into Calca.	Estrada 1992
1865	The geographer Antonio Raimondi visited the Lares area and analyzed the mineral composition of the thermal springs at Lares before continuing north along the Lares-Yanatile river to the Lares Valley.	Raimondi 1965
1916	The first of a number of decrees was issued designating that the income from taxes on coca and other products from the La Convención-Lares Valley would be used for the construction of roads to the area.	Chacón 1984
1920	The village of Amparaes in the province of Paucartambo was annexed to the district of Lares in the province of Calca (with the exception of the *parcialidades* of Chimor, Bombón, and Parubamba).	Estrada 1992; Mörner 1978
1946	Construction of a road from Calca to Amparaes began.	Chacón 1984

1946-1960	Disputes between Amparaes and Lares over land boundaries, land occupations, damages, and the route of the Calca-Lares Valley road required police intervention.	Chacón 1984; Estrada 1992
1958-1964	Hugo Blanco led the *Tierra o Muerte* ("Land or Death") peasant movement in the La Convención-Lares Valley. Melquíades Huamán of Patakancha lead a similar movement against Hacienda Compone on the puna west of Ccachín.	Encinas 1986; Phuturi Suni and Espinoza 1997
1960	The Calca-Amparaes road was inaugurated on September 30th, 14 years after it was first begun.	Chacón 1984
1962	Choquecancha was officially recognized as a *comunidad campesina* on August 18th.	Seibold 1990
1964	Passage of an agrarian reform law (D.L 15037) during the first administration of President Belaúnde Terry was a step toward the elimination of the *hacienda* system and the consolidation of *minifundios* in the La Convención-Lares Valley.	Encinas 1986
1966	Ccachín was officially recognized as a *comunidad campesina* on November 28th.	Ccachín documents
1972	Agrarian reform law D.L. 19977 effectively eliminated the *hacienda* system that dominated the area.	Encinas 1986
1978	A government monopoly in coca — ENACO — was created, placing stringent control over the production, pricing, and transport of coca leaves in the La Convención-Lares Valley.	Chacón 1984; Encinas 1986
1982	The district of Lares was divided into two districts: Lares and Yanatile. The villages of Quebrada Honda (the new capital), Colca, Yanatile, Muyupay, Laqo, Santiago de Chaquimayo, and Chunchusmayo were included in district of Yanatile, with its southern boundary parallel to the confluence of the Amparaes and Lares Rivers bordering Ccachín.	Estrada 1992

1987	The new road from Calca to the district capital of Lares was inaugurated, though it did not become passable until mid-1988.	Seibold 1990

Notes

1. Diego de Trujillo (c. 1505-1575) was one of the soldiers that entered Cusco with Francisco Pizarro in 1533. Afterward he returned to Spain, but settled in Peru permanently in 1547. He served a time as an alderman in the *cabildo* in Cusco, and enjoyed some of the veneration and respect for the "*primeros conquistadores*." He is said to have complained of being slighted in the distribution of the spoils of the conquest and Virrey Toledo granted him the *encomienda* of Lares in his twilight years. At Toledo's urging, he wrote the chronicle "*Relación del Descubrimiento del Reyno del Perú*" (1571) (Angles Vargas 1988, Glave and Remy 1983, Hemming 1970, Porras Barrenechea 1940).

2. In a document dated 1581, Trujillo's name is associated with the *repartamiento* of Lares in a listing of the tributes assessed for the Indian hospital in Cusco. The Laris had to pay 240 *tomines* (a silver coin in use at the time) and give the Indian hospital 60 *tomines*: "*Laris de Trujillo que an de pagar duzientos y quarenta tomines an de dar al dho ospital sesenta tomines*" (Archivo de Indias 1924-1926).

3. Unfortunately, I do not know which present-day villages these names correspond to in the Lares area. A *comunero* in Ccachín told me that he once saw a document suggesting that the village of Ccachín was formerly called "Santiago," but I have not found any records that collaborate that.

Table 1.5: 1785 Census

1785 Census: Ccachín and Neighboring Communities					
Category	**Villages**			**Haciendas**	
	Ccachín	**Choquecancha**	**Lares**	**Mant'o**	**Sisay**
Tribute Exempt	6 [a]	9	15	2	2
Girls	19	10	28	4	3
Widows	12	3	9	0	0
Young Women	8	4	7	4	0
Married Women	32	32	46	12	7
Tribute-paying Men	26	23	29	11	7
Absentees	0	0	0	0	0
Young Men	11	0	2	1	0
Boys	25	16	29	5	4
Caciques	0	0	3 [b]	0	0
Total Females	**71**	**49**	**90**	**20**	**10**
Total Males	**68**	**48**	**78**	**19**	**13**
Total	**139**	**97**	**168**	**39**	**23**

a. The heads of household exempt from paying tribute in Ccachín were the mayor, sacristan, a man with an unspecified position in the church, and four men without children.

b. The caciques in Lares were Josep Apaza, Gregorio Apaza, and Fernando Tupayupanqui.

Source: Provincia de Calca (1785)

Table 1.6: 1876 Census

1876 Census: Ccachín and Neighboring Communities		
Village	**Population**	**Status**
Ccachín	50 [a]	Pueblo
Ccochayoq	[b]	Caserio
Choquecancha	250	Pueblo
Lares	300	Pueblo
Lawkay	[b]	Caserio
Rayankancha	128	Hacienda
Sisay	[b]	Caserio

a. The figure for Ccachín probably should be combined with that of Rayankancha for a more accurate picture of the population at the site of the present day community.

b. Ccochayoq, Lawkay (Loaccay) and Sisay (probably includes Mascca) were listed in the census, but no population was given as the inhabitants had yet to be counted.

Source: República del Perú (1878)

Table 1.7: 1940 Census

1940 Census of Ccachín and Neighboring Communities			
Village	**Families**	**Population**	**Status**
Aqatanka	4	36	Comunidad
Ccachín	73	486	Parcialidad
Ccochayoq	8	49	Hacienda
Choquecancha	133	525	Parcialidad
Lares	136	581	Pueblo
Lawkay	1	6	Fundo
Mant'o	13	71	Hacienda
Mascca	2	6	Fundo
Matinga	9	34	Fundo
Qolqemarka	9	37	Caserío
Qollutayoq	10	58	Caserío
Rayancancha	5	26	Hacienda
Yerbabuenayoq	3	8	Fundo

Source: República del Perú (1944)

Table 1.8: Population Growth in Lares, 1785-1996

Census Data for the District of Lares					
Year	District of Lares			Ccachín	Choquecancha
	Capital	Urban	Rural		
1785	168			139	97
1876	300	1191	1545	50 (178)*	250
1940	581	581	9085	486 (569)*	525 (630)*
1988 to 1996	(Froemming)			1172	
	(FAO-Holanda)			3000	
	(Seibold 1990)			1920	3200
	(Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996)			1250	

* Includes the *fundo* of Yerbabuenayoq and haciendas of Qochayoq and Rayankancha in Ccachín and the *fundo* of Matinga and the hacienda of Mant'o in Choquecancha

Sources: Provincia de Calca (1785); República del Perú (1878, 1944); Seibold (1990); Estrada (1992); Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996)

Table 1.9: Pattern of Surname Change in Ccachín

	1785	1836	1886	1990 [a]
Adults with Quechua Surnames [b]	62%	52%	43% [c]	34% [d]
% of Surnames that Disappear	—	41%	28%	32%
% of Surnames that Appear	—	57%	66%	39%
4 Most Common Surnames	Guaman (11%) Cagua y Tapa (9%) Cisa (6%) [e] Crúz (5%)	Quispe (13%) Guaman (11%) Mesa (10%) Crúz (7%)	Crúz (11%) Guaman (8%) Quispe (7%) Zúñiga (6%)	Zúñiga (20%) Crúz (12%) Pfuro (10%) Quispe (5%)
First Appearance of Contemporary Surnames in the Historical Record	Apaza Crúz Guaman Huillcanina Quispe Silva Yupanki [f]	—	Arias Cáceres Candenas Espinoza Fuentes Loaiza Mayo Morales Oblitas Pfocco Pfuro Sihuin Tacac Zúñiga	Bonilla Chasin Garcia Mamani

a. The figures for 1990 are based on my own list of community members and should be taken as approximate.
b. Two surnames are generally used In Peruvian society, the first that of the father, the second that of the mother. The documents on which this table is based only listed paternal surnames, however, and the figures are drawn from those.
c. Only male heads of household are recorded in the 1886 tax list.
d. The figure for 1990 includes men, women, and children.
e. All six *Cisas* listed in the census were women. Seven of the eight *Guamans* were men.
f. Although all of these surnames exist in Ccachín at the present time, I do not have sufficient genealogical information to determine if the villagers currently bearing these surnames have descended from these.

Source: Provincia de Calca (1785, 1836, 1887)

Chapter 2

Spatial Organization and Production Cycle

Introduction

In this chapter, I describe the geographical setting, use of territorial resources and space, agropastoral production activities, and regional exchange networks of people in Ccachín. I introduce readers to each of the production zones and to the settlement and land intensification patterns. The *comunidad campesina* consists of a nuclear settlement and three annexes; I lived in the main village, conducted the bulk of my research there, and write with that emphasis and from that perspective. I particularly focus on the communal regulation of sectoral fallow, the primary activity of the *comunidad campesina* as a common property regime and as a collective entity, as in so doing, I provide the necessary background for several chapters in Parts III and IV. In conclusion, I discuss some methodological problems in gathering information on sectoral fallow systems, evaluate various explanations for the persistence of communal regulation of land use in the Andes from the perspective of Ccachín, and explore the extent to which villagers have been able to avoid overuse of common resources through communal management.

Geography and Climate

The primary agricultural zone in Ccachín varies from 2733 m. above sea level (8966 ft.) at Yerbabuenayoq to 3973 m. (13,036 ft.) at P'alqa Q'asa, one of Ccachín's mountain passes, with the village nucleus located near the southern boundary at 3250 m. (10,660 ft.). At the extremes, Mant'o along the Lares River near the northeast edge is an estimate 2250 m. above sea level, while Apu Tiriqway near the western boundary reaches 5380 m. (17,651 ft.). Ccachín's 9,807 hectares are thus marked by nearly a 3100 meter (10,000 ft.) elevation gain from cloud forest to glacier peak. The territory is drained from west to east by the Pachawala, Pikimayu, P'alqa and Chanchiyoq rivers, and from north to

south by Lares Mayu. Mt. Sawasiray lords majestically to the south, between Lares and Calca, offering a breathtaking view. Rather surprisingly, however, the peak has less ritual significance than others to the north and west that can't be seen, and most people identify it as Willkapunku, the name of its pass, if they are able to identify it at all.

Given its perch at the edge of the cloud forest ("*ceja de la selva*"), Ccachín is swept by masses of air rising up the gorge along the Lares River out of the Amazon. As the warmer jungle air meets the cold air of the eastern slopes of the *cordillera*, it releases its moisture. It's estimated that the area receives 1500 mm. (50 inches) of rain each year, about twice the average of Cusco (767.25 mm.), and three times that of Calca (493.92 mm.) (Venero et. al. 1987). Rainfall varies according to altitude, with areas below 3,300 m. averaging about 1000 mm. and those above receiving as much as twice that amount (Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996). Much of this moisture comes in the form of fog or mist ("*pacha phuyu*") which regularly blankets the village in the mid-afternoon and early evening, even during the dry season. About half of the total volume of moisture falls during January, February and March but the ground fog allows for the planting of an early season potato crop ("*maway*") without irrigation in late July, during the heart of the winter. Unlike the *provincias altas* and other areas of Cusco, drought is rarely a problem in the area.

Average temperature is an estimated 12°C. (54° F.). Again, this varies by altitude, with the hillside below 3,300 m. (village level) averaging 12-14° C., that between 3300 and 3800 m. (most of the communally-regulated fallow zone) averaging 6-12° C., and the areas above that averaging 3-6° C. (Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996). There are night frosts at village level from mid-June to mid-September, arriving in May and extending into October in the sectoral-fallow potato fields above.

Settlement Pattern

Population Centers

Ccachín is composed of four population centers: Ccachín, Qochayoq, Rayan-kancha, and Yerbabuenayoq (Figure 2.1). Settlement is nuclear rather than dispersed.

Almost every family maintains its primary home in either the main village or in one of its annexes. In addition, each family has two to four smaller cabins located in other production zones. The primary residential center is concentrated in the lower portion of the community near the best land, an arrangement that is widespread in the Andes (Cotlear 1989).

The secondary cabins in the cornfields, communally-regulated fallow sectors, and cattle pastures are small and rustic. Those in the pasture areas have a corral for the collection of night soil, and in rare instances, a small garden. Less than half of the families have a cabin in the cornfields, and those that do occupy them primarily during the harvest. Most families have at least one cabin in the sectoral fallow, and some family members, especially older women and young girls, may spend the majority of the year herding from one of these. The cabins are private property on communal lands, and if they contain any valuables, they are maintained under lock and key. Herding cabins are constructed on parcels to which families have received use rights, but the herds themselves roam widely. Each family has designated plots in more than a dozen communally-regulated fallow sectors, but they only maintain cabins in a few, constructing more temporary shelters as needed. Since cabins are abandoned during the time that a sector is in production to avoid animal damage, it is preferable to have at least two. Those families that live permanently in houses constructed in *maway* sectors on the fringes of the nuclear settlements likewise transfer to second houses in the village when those sectors come under production. The cabins in the sectoral fallow and outlying herding areas are widely dispersed, but for reasons of conviviality, mutual aid, and security, there is a tendency for bunching to occur. The main house in the village is rarely left unattended, and even when most of the family relocates to the corn or potato fields for the harvest, someone will be left behind to watch over the house in the village unless there are not enough family members to do so.

The main settlement — Ccachín — has approximately 175 households and a population of 850 people. Neighborhoods are loosely identified by place names according to where people live, but there is no significant neighborhood organization in the

community (the village is not divided into upper and lower parts as in many Andean communities). The principal public buildings of the *comunidad campesina* are located in Ccachín: the church, community hall, school, medical post, and rustic municipal building. There's also a meeting room for the *Club de Madres* ('Mothers Club'), a makeshift jail, a corral to hold stray animals, and a cemetery (see Knox-Seith 1995, chapter 3 for more detailed description). All of the major public facilities except the church have been - constructed since Ccachín achieved *comunidad campesina* status, most within the last ten years. The church has likewise seen major renovation. There is a public water system (dating from about 1987), but no electricity, latrines, mail delivery, sewage system, or telephone service.

Two relatively level streets ("*calles*") cross the length of the village from east to west, but they are little more than foot trails, as are the customary paths that climb and descend from them. Unlike the district capital Lares, which has streets laid out in a grid pattern, there appears to be no overall plan. The nearest road passes four kilometers away in the *anexo* of Yerbabuenayoq. Without door-to-door truck traffic to supply and sustain them, there are no full-time storefronts in Ccachín as in Yerbabuenayoq. However, three or four families offer consumer goods out of their homes to supplement their incomes (alcohol, sugar, laundry detergent, bread, etc.). The families who do so are constantly changing, and only a small percentage of the total purchases of community members are made in such stores.

The school has a full complement of grades (a kindergarten, six primary grades, and six secondary grades). Along with students from the village, children from the *anexos* also attend the grade school, especially at the upper levels. From 220 to 280 children were registered for grades one through six during the years of my research, depending on year, with daily attendance averaging about 55%. The high school is a *colegio agropecuario* ('agropastoral high school'), and serves students from the neighboring *comunidad campesina* of Rosaspata as well (see Knox-Seith 1995, chapter 7 for further detail on the schools).

Ccachín has three *anexos*, the largest of which is Qochayoq. Qochayoq is located two hours west of Ccachín by foot and is about 500 meters above sea level higher than Ccachín. The village has about forty households or 200 people and encompasses 3,384 hectares. Before agrarian reform, the village was on hacienda land belonging to the Puma family, the Corasawa family, or both. The 1940 census shows Hacienda Qochayoq as having a population of forty-nine people (Table 1.7), so it has grown substantially in the last fifty years. After agrarian reform, part of the hacienda became the *comunidad campesina* of Rayankancha, while the rest joined Ccachín. Given the village's location, people's animals used to cross over into the pastures of Ccachín, causing conflicts and resulting in fines. One of the prime motivations for annexing their community to Ccachín was to resolve this problem. Located at higher ecological levels than Ccachín (*suni* and *puna*), Qochayoq is characterized by sheep and alpaca herding and *ch'uñu* production. The altitude is too high for growing corn, and this staple is obtained through barter and labor exchange with relatives and *compadres* in Ccachín.

Qochayoq has a new cistern and piped water system, a chapel, and a primary school. There is one kindergarten instructor and one primary school teacher. Qochayoq has its own community assembly and its own cargo system, with one *alcalde* ('mayor'), two *alcaldes de barrio* ('neighborhood mayors') and two *regidores* ('alder members') (see Chapter 8). Ccachín is the primary political-administrative center for people in Qochayoq, however, and decisions affecting the *comunidad campesina* as a whole need be taken to the Ccachín assembly. The swearing in of Qochayoq's officials and other political and judicial affairs fall within the jurisdiction of community officials in Ccachín.

The *anexo* of Rayankancha is about a forty-five minute hike from Ccachín, on the eastern edge of the community territory, overlooking the Lares Valley. At 3568 meters above sea level, it is slightly higher than Ccachín, but it has access to the same production zones. Rayankancha has about thirty families, a population of 140 people, and 2,769 hectares. It has a school, established in 1989, offering grades 1-3, with about thirty students. It has a chapel and cemetery. It also has a new piped water system. The *cargo* system is less-developed than that of Qochayoq, perhaps because it lacks a long tradition.

Rayankancha does not have its own *alcalde*. It has two *alguaciles* ('constables') within the civil-religious hierarchy of Ccachín. The villagers of Rayankancha attend the assemblies in Ccachín, though they also have their own assembly system for organizing community work projects and meeting local decision making needs. Rayankancha is a relatively new settlement that has experienced rapid growth. Until the agrarian reform, it was an hacienda with but a handful of resident families. The 1940 census shows a population of only twenty-six people (Table 1.7). After agrarian reform, the *comuneros* in Rayankancha agreed to annex their territory to Ccachín in a joint effort to obtain title to former hacienda lands that had reverted to the State. While the communally-regulated fallow sectors of Ccachín and Qochayoq remain independent, several of the sectors that fall within the territory of Rayankancha are now shared with Ccachín.

The third *anexo*, Yerbabuenayoq, is a roadside marketing center along the Lares River. On the border of Ccachín and Choquecancha, it meets the major marketing needs of both. It is made up of store owners from Ccachín, as well as outsiders from Calca and Sicuani. It's a small satellite community of about ten families, but only a few of them make it their first home. Pressed between the river and the canyon walls, there is no significant gardening or herding around the houses as in the other *anexos*, only a few pigs, chickens, and goats. Those that are members of the *comunidad campesina* of Ccachín continue to maintain houses and fields in the nucleus, while those from outside are in constant motion between Yerbabuenayoq and Calca. The outside merchants are not enrolled as members of Ccachín, and do not have land there. The principal decision making body in Yerbabuenayoq is the Merchants Association (*Asociación de Comerciantes de Yerbabuenayoq*). As of 1991, there was no piped water system, but the Merchants' Association has held fund-raisers to install one. The hamlet has a small roadside chapel, but no other public buildings. Children must make the long daily climb to Ccachín to attend school.

The emergence of Yerbabuenayoq as a marketing and transport center postdates the agrarian reform, and in 1988, many of the storefronts had to be rebuilt to widen the road. An open market is held one day a week, with truckers from the *yunka* bringing

fruit, and those from Calca bringing processed foods and consumer goods. Smaller quantities of goods are often exchanged by barter, but the truckers also pay cash for animals and agricultural products. Seibold (1990) likens the atmosphere in Yerbabuenayoq on market day to "a wild west frontier town," but on most days, it is more like a ghost town. Several trucks pass through Yerbabuenayoq on their way between Calca and the lower Lares Valley weekly during the dry season, but the trucks that are the lifeblood for the settlement are those that arrive for the weekly market. The one that carries most passengers makes two trips between Calca and Yerbabuenayoq weekly.

Institutional Change

Each of Ccachín's *anexos* has a distinct history, but they can be seen as part of a larger process of settlement and jurisdictional change in rural areas of the Andes. Until relatively recently, the local *comunidades campesinas* were *anexos* of Lares, and their residents were administratively-dependent on the district capital in the same way that residents of their *anexos* are now dependent on them.

Under colonial rule, the two principal agricultural institutions of the Andes emerged: the indigenous community and the hacienda. For centuries, Ccachín was formally independent of but in practice subordinate to surrounding haciendas, both through land tenancy ties and *hacendado* control of district government. With the agrarian reform of the 1960s and early 1970s, Ccachín received *comunidad campesina* status, and this has provided a degree of organizational independence from the district capital and de facto liberation from dominance by an hacienda-empowered *cacique* elite within the village itself. Just as important, community territory has expanded with the addition of ex-hacienda lands. The annexation of Qochayoq nearly doubled community land holdings (increasing titled lands from 3,654 h. to 7,038 h.). The 2,769 hectares of Rayankancha have been adjudicated to Ccachín, but the title process is still on-going. As noted above, villagers in both Qochayoq and Rayankancha found it convenient to join forces with their larger neighbor, the first to avoid border conflicts, the second to secure their title to the land itself. The uncultivated pasture lands of ex-hacienda Sisay-Mask'a-

bamba have likewise been adjudicated to Ccachín, but the community still does not have title (local rivalries and administrative mismanagement through the years have occasionally jeopardized the prospects of obtaining title to both). The processes of territorial expansion continue, as the community seeks title to the State-held pasture lands of Ichhu, Platería, and other ex-haciendas to the north and east. There are no hamlets or villages in any of these other pasture areas, so there's no prospect of annexing any other settlements as occurred in the cases of Qochayoq and Rayankancha.

Population growth in the area only appears to have become a significant factor in the 20th century. Since 1940, the village of Ccachín has doubled in size, while the populations of the *anexos* of Qochayoq and Rayankancha have quadrupled and quintupled respectively. Yerbabuenayoq's days, on the other hand, are numbered. Geographically-squeezed in a steep gorge, it lacks the land base for expansion. While its status as a market outpost creates the possibility for some of its residents to increase their wealth and influence, it depends on the *anexo* remaining the sole access point to the road. The weekly market once relocated to Yerbabuenayoq from Lawkay, suggesting that market location is ephemeral. Once a road is built to Ccachín, there will be no reason to maintain their storefronts in Yerbabuenayoq.

With population growth, there is the possibility that other *anexos* will form. Residents of Pampallaqta, for example, an important communally-regulated fallow sector less than an hour from the community, are presently in the process of defining themselves as a community and seeking recognition as Ccachín's fourth *anexo*. A half dozen households have fenced in their plots in this sector and intensified production on them, living there more-or-less year round. These households are predominantly composed of younger members of Ccachín families who have specialized in taking care of the family herds. As already noted, each of the existing *anexos* has a chapel, and the construction of a chapel is seen by locals as the first step in making claim to *anexo* status. The residents of Pampallaqta have begun to build a chapel there as part of their efforts to gain formal recognition from the community, but it has not yet been completed.

Cotlear notes that establishment of new hamlets in the high zones of a community where cultivation is less intense is a common form of *anexo* expansion. As he puts it,

> These new populations originate, often, from provisional residences of families in the principal community that, during some months of the year, take the livestock to the most remote zones. When the population increases in these settlements, they often become more permanent. Generally, the families that make up these new settlements are the families with less land in the community, those that initially specialize as pastors in the care of the flocks of the *comuneros* of the lower lands. The agriculture in the *anexos* is initially confined to gardens close to the cabins. In many cases, these farms increase in size and conflict develops between the residents of the high zones and those of the low, in which the first want to exclude the second from use of the resources in their zones, in so much as the last continue to demand access to the pastures and rights to the land of the sectoral-fallow in which the new residents have established themselves. [Cotlear 1989:59-60]

Because of overgrazing, infestation of endoparasites, and conflicts over animal damage close to large settlements, as herd sizes grow, families tend to go further from the main village to find quality natural pastures. Living seasonally in their cabins at first, crowding in the village of origin and a desire to reduce the cost of transport to remote zones can lead to more permanent settlement and the intensification of agricultural production around their new homes. Once there are established homesteads in an area, others tend to join them. While a few other nascent settlements appear to be forming within Ccachín's territory along these lines, Pampallaqta is the most developed. Whether any of these herding outposts eventually become satellite communities with the community organization and public works found in the other *anexos* remains to be seen. *Anexo* formation is not the only way of dealing with population growth in the area, nor is it presently the most important. Colonization of the jungle and migration to the cities are more attractive alternatives to many. Further growth within Ccachín itself depends on the economic viability of an agropastoral lifestyle vis-à-vis the alternatives.

If growth does continue, however, it raises the possibility of the larger *anexos* — Qochayoq and Rayankancha — seeking more autonomy. As noted, both of these communities had their own reasons for formalizing their relationship with Ccachín in the first place, but their residents' satisfaction with this state of affairs depends on the ongoing

realization of a wider range of collective goals, particularly those related to economic development and public works. None of the *anexos* are well-represented in the primary decision-making bodies and positions of the municipality or the *comunidad campesina* of Ccachín itself, and without sufficient political weight, there is the danger that their aspirations will always be secondary to those of the center. Over the last twenty years, the number of *comunidades campesinas* in the sierras has continued to increase as unregistered peasant communities have sought to formalize their institutional status, as *anexos* have sought to become *comunidades campesinas*, and as certain interest groups without any collective history form "fictional communities" to take advantage of the institutional advantages that *comunidad campesina* status offers (Marcos 1994).

While there have been conflicts between interest groups within Ccachín composed of the heirs of ex-hacienda tenants and the *comunidad campesina* itself over title to State-held pasture lands to the north, there are no immediate examples of the last. In nearby Paucarpata, however, an annex of Choquecancha one valley over from Ccachín on the Amparaes River, land disputes have been marked by processes quite similar. Though only a settlement of fifteen households, one of the store owners in Paucarpata has led a succession movement from the *comunidad campesina* of Choquecancha in order to bypass the larger community in gaining direct government aid ("*entregas*") and to take over still untitled land that once belonged to the Mant'o hacienda, especially the productive agricultural lands found along the eastern slope of Choquecancha adjacent to Paucarpata. As in the case of most "fictitious communities," the effort seems motivated by an interest in dividing up and privatizing the land and its resources rather than achieving community autonomy. The dispute touched Ccachín only tangentially (though the *compadrazgo* alliances of a few families) and was still unresolved when I left the area.

Land Use

Settlement pattern is dependent on land use, so I now turn to describe Ccachín in terms of the latter. I draw upon two models. The first, Cotlear's (1989) general model of

comunidades campesinas, relates settlement pattern to land intensification, property rights, and institutional structure. The second, Mayer's (1985) model of production zones, combines these same cultural features with micro-ecological ones to describe land use patterns. Together these models provide a means for conceptualizing the local landscape as modified by agropastoral activities.

Pattern of Agricultural Intensification

Cotlear (1989) presents a simplified model of a "typical" Andean community based on its physical structure, system of property rights, and decision making structure. The prototypical community can be described in terms of three concentric circles surrounding a nuclear settlement. In the first circle, closest to the village, the land is worked intensively, with high labor and material inputs and seasonal fallow. In the second circle, usually a couple of hours by foot from the village in the surrounding hillsides, one finds the fields of communally-regulated fallow. This zone is divided into as many as a dozen more-or-less similarly-sized sectors, with each sector fenced to control access by livestock when it comes into production. Every year, one or more of these sectors is cultivated, with the rest used for extensive pasture. Use of the sectors is rotated, so that one of the sectors is activated for agricultural production and one is returned to fallow each year. The third circle is even more distant from the community and is used exclusively for pasture. Usually, it is made up of the highest lands (4000 meters above sea level and more), or lands that because of poor drainage, rocky terrain, or steepness, are not easily brought into agricultural production.

The land in the innermost circle of Cotlear's model has the most private property rights and decision making, while the land in the outermost circle has the most communal. Adjacent to people's homes, one can find small vegetable gardens where families have the greatest freedom to make individual decisions. Commercial transactions involving the exchange of plots of land among *comuneros* are restricted to the innermost circle. Legal title to individual plots is rare, but when titles exist, they usually involve this zone. Land in the intermediate zone alternates between household and communal

access. The land is privately cultivated, but after the harvest, the property rights of a family are held in suspense so that all in the community can use the stubble and fallow pasture. The community assembly partitions and assigns use rights to plots in each sector and determines which sectors may be used, when planting can begin, and when animals will be allowed back in to pasture. In practice, this limits individual families' choices of crops to be grown and the amount of investment they will put into their plots, and it leads to a relative homogeneity in production. In the outermost circle of communal pastures, all members of the community have a right to pasture their herds. While families may construct cabins and even pass them on to their descendants, access to the land they sit on is not restricted.

Generally, the inner circle is much smaller than the intermediate circle, but whenever there are pressures for intensification of land use, the former tends to expand into the latter. The size of the outermost circle with respect to the inner two depends on the amount of appropriate land available. The role of the communally-regulated fallow zone is such that, as Cotlear suggests, "the degree of influence of the community over the productive decisions of families depends principally on the existence of the system of communally-regulated fallow (CRF) in the cultivated land and meeting the associated rules regarding the use of communal resources" (Cotlear 1989:35). In many communities in the Andes, this three-level concentric model no longer serves, so that the inner circle has extended to cover the intermediate one.

As first approximation, Cotlear's model provides a reasonably accurate bird's-eye-view of Ccachín. In Figure 2.2, I fine-tune it to fit the peculiarities of the agro-pastoral regime in the community. I have divided the area corresponding to Cotlear's inner circle — intensive annual cultivation with seasonal fallow — into two parts, the small garden plots adjacent to people's homes, and the cornfields located some distance below. The former are subject to fewer collective decisions than the latter, but both are marked by significantly wider spheres of private decision making than the other zones. The intermediate circle — communally-regulated sectoral fallow — can likewise be divided into two, each with a separate rotation system. The rotation nearest the commu-

nity is intended for early planting ("*maway*"), and includes a mix of crops, chief among them potatoes. It is sometimes referred to as *lisas chakra* in Ccachín because it is the rotation where *lisas* are grown (*Ullucus tuberosus*; also see Appendix 3 for scientific names of plants and animals mentioned in this thesis). The second rotation, more distant and at a higher altitude, is intended for the main potato harvest. The closest of these fields are a forty-five minute hike from the community, while the furthest are two hours away.

All but the village gardens are used for pasture when fallow, and distinct rules apply to the use of each of these areas. Some areas that fall within circles one and two are too rocky or steep for cultivation, and they are used for herding year-round. Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) report that only 182 of the 708 hectares situated within the cornfield zone in Ccachín are cultivable. In this sense, the cultivated zones must be thought of in a more patchwork fashion that the simplified model here suggests. Generally-speaking, the pasture areas closest to the village are used for sheep and goats. Horses and mules are left to graze there only when they are immediately needed as beasts of burden, and they are returned to more distant pastures when the task is done. Pigs, sheep, alpaca, and llamas are generally pastured in circle two, while horses and cattle are grazed in circle three (alpacas and llama, as well, in Qochayoq).

As the diagram suggests, Ccachín families also have access to pasture land outside of the community boundaries. These are their *wakerías* or cattle lands. Most are former hacienda lands to which particular families have traditional use rights or title as former *arrendires* or *allegados*. Title rights are held by single families and by groups of families, so property rights and decision making structures vary from private to collective depending on the location. The largest of the *wakería comités* ('cattle land committees') makes up less than 10% of the total village population. Many families use pastures on open rangeland to which neither they nor the community have title. Efforts are being made by the community to obtain title to these areas from the State. Some families also graze their herds in the autochthonous woodlands and swampy areas below the community.

Cotlear's model does not consider forestry resources, but they are an important collectively-held resource in the village and I have included them in the diagram. While Cotlear's model when pictured in three dimensions is concave, with the village nucleus at base, the particular topography of Ccachín and the location of the village with respect to it allows us to roughly assume that altitude increases from bottom to top of the circle as pictured in Figure 2.2.

Production Zones

Background

Mayer (1985) notes that in each village in the Andes one finds clearly-bounded "production zones" in which the farmers manage specific resources, with specifically associated technologies, systems of rationing resources (such as irrigation water and natural pastures), and forms of social organization of production. Particular types of crops occupy spaces conforming to micro ecological divisions, but these micro environments are modified by human action. Production zones are usually bounded by natural features and by fences constructed by the community, giving them a territorial boundedness that the concept of ecological levels ("*pisos ecológicos*") lack. As Kervyn and CEDEP Ayllu indicate,

> A production zone is as much a human construction as a state of nature and, in this sense, the zones change with time: new zones can be created or expanded while others are reduced or disappear. The concept, then, is neither static nor totally exogenous (determined by the ecology) as it reflects human effort to change nature, a fundamental aspect of agricultural development. [Kervyn and CEDEP Ayllu 1989:19-20]

In practice, the production zones identified by Mayer, Kervyn, and others generally concentrate on agropastoral production to the neglect of gathering. This is largely because one of the principal variables considered is the intensity of agriculture, and one of the principal goals is to explain variations in intensity as they are manifest in space and time. In cases such as Ccachín where women are more closely associated with the gathering of firewood and wild herbaceous plants than men, this has the potential to

undervalue women's contribution to production and underestimate the effect of their activities in modifying the environment. Expanding the concept of production zone to include both agricultural and nonagricultural plant and animal resources enables us to address the interrelations and transformation of harvesting activities over time, whatever the source of the resources. It also provides us with a more complete mapping of the spheres of collective action in resource use.

Production Zones in Ccachín

Venero et. al. (1987) conceive of Ccachín in terms of five zones: 1) the banks of the Lares river and beginning of the hillside, 2) a transitional "rustic corral" zone, 3) a livestock zone, 4) the central settlement gardens, and 5) highland potato fields and pasture. As one hikes the trail ascending to the village from Yerbabuenayoq, this is a reasonable approximation of what one encounters in order (Figure 2.3).

Within this expanded framework, I identify eight production zones in Ccachín, as well as one outside the territorial limits of the community proper, the cattle pastures on the former hacienda lands.[1] The colonized *yunka* ('cloud forest') areas will be introduced later in this chapter, in my discussion of settlements and patterns of exchange. The production zone concept traditionally focuses on land-based agropastoral resources to the exclusion of riverine and mineral ones. To make this summary of Ccachín's geography and productive resources more complete, I will consider the latter at the end of this section.

Cloud Forest Gardens

The Lares river from Yerbabuenayoq to Mant'o marks Ccachín's eastern boundary, and the road paralleling it can be hiked in about four hours. Altitude along this stretch drops from 2750 meters above sea level to about 2300 m., taking one progressively into the high jungle ("*yunka*"). Vegetation in this area is denser than that at higher altitudes, but the original forest has been replaced by bush through burning and the cutting of trees for firewood. Orchids from the genus *Odontoglossum*, *Epidendrum*, and

Spiranthes can be seen along the route (Valencia and Nuñez 1989). A handful of Ccachín households maintain small garden plots in the Mant'o area, where they grow early-season potatoes, peppers ("*roqoto*"), and squash ("*calabaza*"). A few others have gardens in Matinga gained through intermarriage with people from Choquecancha (Seibold 1990). Given the distance from the village nucleus, these areas are not worked intensively, but rather used to supplement production, especially with produce that does not grow at higher elevations. Production decisions in this zone are mostly private.

Autochthonous Woodlands

This zone is usually referred to as the *monte* ('forest, woodland') in Ccachín. The most extensive woodlands are found below 2900 m. in the gorge of the Lares River, but small patches can be found up to 3900 m. along the east-west river valleys feeding into the Lares, and along the streams that in turn feed into them. Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) estimate that there are about 540 hectares of forest in all. As mentioned above, the woodlands in the Lares River gorge has been transformed to dense bush by burning and cutting. This is the principal area for the harvesting of firewood by Ccachín residents. Some families pasture cattle in the flatter, open, swampy areas of these woodlands, and they face the temptation to burn off the trees and brush to create more natural pasture. The community has sanctions against the wanton destruction of its woodland resources by fire, but controlled fire is sometimes communally-approved to open a sector for firewood collection.

Approximately once every six weeks, usually working in *ayni* pairs (especially father-sons, brothers, brothers-in-law) to meet the needs of related households, but sometimes working in groups of up to twenty for a single sponsor, men cut firewood in the *monte*, and retrieve it by packhorse. The average family burns 30-40 horse loads of firewood a year, approximately two to three tons. In addition, women and children gather dry kindling in their carrying cloths daily from areas near the village as they return from herding and men carry home larger roots and logs as they encounter them. Such makeshift gathering may add another ton or two to the total.

Comparatively speaking, Ccachín is blessed with firewood, but *comuneros* need to travel ever increasing distances to harvest it. Some puna communities in the Urubamba range have special trade relationships with their neighbors to secure access to firewood. The villagers of Cuncani, for example, trade *ch'uñu* ('dried potatoes'), *charki* ('jerky'), and other products to villagers from Suttoc for firewood. Likewise, people from Wakawasi, which is firewood-poor, trade with residents of Patakancha for this resource (Valencia, personal conversation). At Chupani, an anexo of Wakawasi, peat is harvested during the July and August dry season to be burned in January and February. The puna community of Qochayoq has gained access to forest resources by becoming an *anexo* of Ccachín, and villagers in Ccachín comment on the additional stress this has placed on their wood supply. Apparently, the villagers of Qochayoq have never had a special firewood-trading relationship with Ccachín, traditionally gathering their firewood at Yanaqocha at the base of Apu Tiriqway. People in Ccachín complain that in the old days people from Qochayoq stole firewood and bunch grass by secretly harvesting from Ccachín lands. Today, households in Qochayoq harvest their firewood at Kuyu and Chanchiyoq and their bunch grass at Ankawachana, the Ccachín sectors that are most readily accessible and that have become available to them through *anexo* status.

Eucalyptus and Pine Plantations

On the slope immediately above Yerbabuenayoq, from 2750 m. to 3030 meters above sea level, there is a eucalyptus plantation of approximately twenty hectares. Further north along the hillside overlooking the Lares River, below the *anexo* of Rayan-kancha, there is another eucalyptus grove. The first planting of these trees on a major scale took place in 1980, with the encouragement and technical assistance of the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture. Eucalyptus is exotic to the Cusco region. Its appearance in the Lares Valley on any scale is recent, though as early as the 1950s Marin (1953) noted that it did not grow well there. Its introduction in the immediate area has generally not yielded the results desired. The hillside above Yerbabuenayoq is too steep for cultivation and pasture; until planted in eucalyptus, it was covered with thicket. After over a decade

of growth, the eucalyptus trees are spindly and bowed by the wind. The wood is poor-quality, and contrary to the original hopes of villagers, they are unmarketable. In the words of Venero et. al. (1987:81), "The reforestation with eucalyptus can be interpreted as a decision born of desperation" in Ccachín. They suggest that "the plantation of *Eucalyptus globulus* in this zone is unfortunate outside of concave sites" and that it "represents a waste of human effort." The trees are primarily used for rafter poles for construction within the village. They grow best along the Lares-Pachawala river flats and in hillside depressions, where there is a better base of soil for moisture retention and where they are protected from the winds. Eucalyptus impoverishes the soil, however, so it's not desirable to plant it in such areas on a grand scale.

Since 1988, reforestation efforts under the direction of FAO-Holanda have focused on autochthonous species, but none of the plantings have been on a large scale, and the reforestation focus has changed away from plantation planting to the use of trees for soil conservation in a more comprehensive agropastoral management plan (Rivera, FAO-Holanda, personal communication). Dreams of generating local industry, however, have not died. One of the native plants being promoted is *rayan* or *sawku* (elderberry; *Sambucus peruviana*), and extension agents in the area are working with women of the *Club de Madres* ('Mothers' Club') to teach them how to make jams from elderberry, with the hope of creating a local cottage industry.[2]

Cornfields

Ccachín's cornfields are located in two sectors, one on the east slope and the other on the south slope below the village, about 182 hectares total. Rayankancha has its own corn sector below the village to the east, another seventy-three hectares. Because of its altitude, Qochayoq does not have a separate corn sector, and residents of this *anexo* gain access to Ccachín's corn through intermarriage, labor exchange, and barter. The corn sectors are situated at an altitude of 2750-3100 meters above sea level, within a fifteen to forty-five minute hike from the village center. Each sector is surrounded by a stone wall, supplemented with thorn barriers at stress points to keep out sheep and goats. Individual

plots are not fenced, but are differentiated by boundary plants, natural features, and terrace divisions. Terraces are rustic and underdeveloped. Ccachín does not have any significant irrigation works, and as in the rest of its agricultural production, the cornfields are not irrigated.

The corn sector is referred to as the *sara chakra* ('cornfield') in Ccachín. Two main types of corn are grown, *paraqay*, primarily used as *hank'a* ('toasted corn'), and *uwina*, used for *mot'e* ('boiled corn') and *aqha* ('corn beer'). A few families grow *ch'ullpi*, a specialty corn for toasting and *chicha*, in small amounts. Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) estimate average yield to be 950 kg. per hectare (fifteen bushels per acre). This works out to about 1150 kg. of corn per household per year (my sample of households in 1991 indicated that the average family harvested about fifteen sacks or 850-1050 kg. of corn, a slightly lower amount).[3]

Every family intersperses *habas* ('lima beans'; *Phaseolus lunatus*) and *lakawiti* ('squash'; *Cucurbita spp.*) with the corn. The lima beans of Ccachín are recognized in Cusco as among the largest and best in the region, but almost all production is for subsistence use (lima beans may have been domesticated on the humid eastern slopes of the Andean highlands, where Ccachín lies [National Research Council 1989]). Every family likewise harvests two wild plants that grow in the cornfields, *yuyu* ('wild turnip'; *Brassica campestris*), and *wakatáy* ('mint'; *Tagetes mandoni*). The first provides the principal green used in Ccachín and is available from November to February, the second is used as a condiment for roasted meats. Many families do not plant more than these three crops in the cornfields. Others plant one or more of the following interspersed or in association with the corn: *purutu* ('beans'; *Phaseolus vulgaris*), *tarwi* ('lupine'; *Lupinus mutabilis*), *kinuwa* ('quinoa'; *Chenopodium quinoa*), linseed, and wheat. The first three are native to the Andes, the last two are introduced crops. Of the crops produced in this sector, corn is the principal crop marketed and exchanged in barter, the rest are intended primarily for subsistence use.

The cornfields are planted in November and harvested in June each year, with only four-months of seasonal fallow. Dry farming techniques are used; the zone is not

irrigated. Traditional inputs are likewise used; hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides are not. The soil is not plowed annually; it is usually only worked with a *lanza* (a heavy hoe) at the time of planting. When the ground becomes too hard, individual plots are plowed using oxen (the activity is known as "*kuskiy*") if a household has access to them or can afford the high cost of hiring the work done. The cornfields are the only fields in Ccachín where plowing is ever done using animal traction, but plowing is not done on an annual basis. It is undertaken by individual households no more often than once every four or five years. *Comuneros* consider corn production to be the most labor intensive of all crops in Ccachín as it requires more weeding than potatoes. This impression is confirmed by Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996, table 4), but for a different reason: while corn requires only about 60% of the labor needed per hectare for potato production, corn requires almost three times the labor of potatoes to produce the same monetary value.

Corn plots are inherited by both men and women, so that most households have access to at least two separate plots. Corn plots can also be bought or exchanged among members of the community. While there are no land titles, such exchanges are registered with community officials. While I was in the village, one family traded their colonized jungle lands in Yavero for a large corn plot in Umpalla (the corn sector previously mentioned as having been lost to Lares and regained in the dispute over the statue of the Virgin Guadalupe).

Most households have a cabin in the cornfields, which some family members will occupy continuously for the month of the corn harvest. Most are constructed of stone, with straw grass roofs. One has a sheet-metal roof (added in the last year of my stay, in the field of a Yerbabuenayoq shopkeeper). The major communal decisions regarding the corn sector concern its use for stubble and pasture: the community sets the date when animals will no longer be allowed to enter the sector in the fall, and the date when it will again be opened to *daño* ('animal damage') in the spring. These dates in turn determine the earliest that individual households can plant and the latest that they can harvest in the sector.[4] After the harvest, the corn sector is open to grazing. Many families take

advantage of the brief opportunity of high-quality forage close-at-hand to bring a few cattle from their *wakería* for milking and cheesemaking. Others pasture their goats and sheep on the stubble. While families first graze their animals on the stubble and uncultivated areas on or near their own plots, this appears to be because of the convenience of shelter rather than any rules privatizing the stubble. Once open, the cornfields are treated as a commons. Within a few weeks, the stubble and boundary forage are nearly exhausted and most animals are returned to distant pastures. Because of its accessibility, however, it serves as a pasture area for horses when they are needed close at hand and for the sheep and goats of families with small herds throughout the fallow period.

Communally-Regulated Fallow for Early Tuber Planting

Immediately above the corn zone, surrounding the village nucleus at 3100-3600 meters above sea level, there is a communally-regulated sectoral fallow zone dedicated to the production of early potatoes ("*maway papa*"), *lisas* (*Ullucus tuberosus*), and *oqa* (*Oxalis tuberosa*). Some families also plant beans, corn, *tarwi*, and squash in this zone. The sector ("*laymi*" or "*turno*") dedicated to *maway* production each year is smaller than either the corn sector or the sector of the major potato planting (about 15%, 35%, and 50% of the total area cultivated respectively). Unlike the sectors used for the main potato planting, which are rotated annually, the *maway* sectors may be used up to four years in succession (see Table 2.1). There are five principal *laymi* in this zone, and several minor ones, so while the land is worked more intensively than in the main potato zone, the fallow period is also longer.

While the rotation schedule between sectors is relatively fixed, the community assembly reconsiders the rotation each year, taking into account the size of a sector, the productivity of the sector through successive years, the number of years of fallow, the extent that plant cover has regenerated during the fallow period, the distance between sectors (spacing where possible to reduce contagion by blight and insects from nearby plots), and the changing demands of the population as it experiences population growth and market integration. All families have customary use rights to given plots, and new

plots are found or new sectors are added to the rotation to meet new demand. Individual households make their own production decisions, with all but a handful of families relying exclusively on household labor and labor exchange, but individual decision-making is constrained by communal decisions regarding the rotation, the dates for opening and closing the sectors to animals, and community maintenance of the fences and walls around the sectors. Individual plots are marked by stone boundaries, terraces lines, and scattered brush. The *maway* sectors are not irrigated, and the rustic terraces that exist seem to have emerged more as a byproduct of the pattern of cultivation maintained over centuries rather than by earnest labor investment and design.

Potatoes are the principal crop grown in the *maway* sector, with material costs about 22% higher per hectare and yield about 35% higher per hectare than in the main potato zone (extrapolated from figures provided by Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996, *cuadro* 4). Potatoes are preferred because of their high yield and commercial value; the rest of the crops grown in this zone are used primarily for subsistence. The percentage of potatoes relative to associated crops planted in a given *laymi* declines from one year to the next, and by the third or fourth year a new sector may be opened for potatoes, with the old sector worked less intensively with *lisas*, lima beans, and the other associated crops. This was the case in cultivating both Pachawala and Chanchiyoq in 1990-91, the latter being a newly opened sector, four hours from the community, surrounded by natural pastures. Unfortunately, Chanchiyoq was poorly fenced and difficult to monitor, and stray cattle and horses caused significant loss in the potato crop. The high labor costs of travel likewise made Chanchiyoq problematic, leading some families to decide to not plant there at all.

Poqoy yapuy ('rainy season plowing') in the *maway* sector is conducted for *maway* in March while the soil is wet and workable. *Poqoy yapuy* are not as ritually developed as the *hatun yapuy* ('big plowing') in the main potato zone nor as much as *sara tarpuy* ('corn planting'). The *maway* sectors around the settlement are overrun by *grama*, an exotic grass (*Pennisetum clandestinum*), making the land difficult to plow. Animal traction, however, is not used, as it occasionally is in the corn zone. Because of

the extensive root mass of *grama*, the soil usually has to be opened with picks and foot plows in combination (in contrast, *hatun yapuy* in the main potato zone can be done exclusively with foot plows). The soil is said to be harder to work than in either the corn or main potato zones. Older men, boys, and sometimes women have the task of gathering up the rock strewn about the area by grazing animals during the years of fallow. The land used for *maway* is characterized by more weeds and shrubs than the main potato zone, and they have to be burned before planting proceeds, helping to fertilize the soil. Most all families fertilize exclusively with sheep manure, but a few also use chemical fertilizers. Use of fungicides to deal with *rancha* ('blight'; *Phytophotera infestans*) is on the rise in the zone, both because the problem is spreading and because credit for agricultural inputs is increasingly available. The use of high-producing hybrid seeds and chemical fertilizers, fungicides, and insecticides is more prevalent in *maway* than in any other production zone except the enclosed settlement gardens.

Once a *maway* sector is opened, *poqoy yapuy* is not required in succeeding years and the soil is turned with picks in July, immediately before planting. I had the opportunity to observe the opening of Manzanayoq, a sector on the east slope between the cornfields and village nucleus, for *maway* in 1991 after production in Pachawala was terminated. The sector had reportedly not been cultivated in fourteen years. Before the 1991 planting began, there was no existing wall around the sector to prevent animal damage at Manzanayoq, so the community had to construct one in a community-wide *phayna* ('work party'). Villagers anticipated that the sector would be used during the 1991-92 and 1992-93 seasons. People also anticipated that the *maway chakras* would move to Urpituyoq in 1993-94, the sector immediately adjacent to and south of Manzanayoq. I've since learned that the sector was actually opened one year later, for the season 1994-1995. Qachupata was opened up tc plant potatoes in 1993-94, the third year of cultivation in Manzanayoq, and I suspect that it was for the same reason that Chanchiyoq was cultivated three years earlier — declining potato yields with each successive year in a sector — although I was not present to confirm it. The result was also much the same, as livestock again caused considerable damage in the fields (Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996).

Since the *comuneros* say that by the third year, it's not worth planting potatoes in a *maway* sector, I'm not sure why they so often use a sector for three years before rotating to another (Table 2.1).

During the fallow years, the *maway* sectors are favored by families with small herds of sheep and goats and with child herders, since it is so close to the settlement (much of it is in the "livestock zone" described by Venero et. al.). Larger herds also pass through the area regularly as they move between village corrals and distant pastures, and mules and horses are left here when they are needed at hand as beasts of burden. Without the investment of labor to maintain soil quality that one sees in the corn zone, parts of the *maway* zone suffers considerable environmental stress. While the complementarity of agricultural and pastoral production in the Andes is often emphasized (Yamamoto 1985), nowhere is there better evidence of the conflict between the two than in this production zone, a mere ten to twenty minute walk from the village center.

Enclosed Gardens in the Settlements

The village center is the most intensively worked agricultural zone, and exhibits the greatest diversity of crops. Plots are small and generally unirrigated, but the network of canals running through the village, used for domestic needs until the mid-1980s when a *convenio* ('pact') between the Peruvian Ministerio de Salud and AID, a German development agency, brought spring-fed cisterns and piped water to Ccachín, is occasionally used by some to irrigate their plots. There are no rotations or other rules regulating the use of this canal water for gardening, and the organizational structure, work parties, and ritual associated with the canals have largely disappeared. Most garden plots are adjacent to people's houses, and are enclosed by well-constructed stone fences to keep out animals. It is the only zone in the village where individual plots are so enclosed. Along with the garden plots, every family also has a corral for the sheltering of the sheep and goats when they return to the village at night. The manure collected from these corrals — some sixty *cargas* (3500 kg.) or more from the larger herds — provides the principal fertilizer used in corn and potato production. Pigs, chickens, and to a lesser

extent ducks roam the streets and yards, guinea pigs are kept inside the houses, and most homes are defended by a dog.

Garden plots have the shortest fallow period of all agricultural zones. Some produce is found there year round. Many plants are perennials, and the gardens are not opened to foraging. The weeds and border grasses are harvested year-round to feed the guinea pigs. Some families plant cereals on these plots and harvest them green during the dry season to feed the guinea pigs, when fodder is otherwise at a premium. The gardens are also used to experiment with new crops. The greatest latitude for decision making in crop selection exists in this zone, and unlike other areas, there is considerable heterogeneity in plant selection. Early potatoes and corn predominate, but all of the following may be found in one field or another in the village: *lisas*, *oqa*, lima beans, *tarwi*, barley, oats, quinoa, lettuce, cabbage, *roqoto* ('peppers'; *Capsicum pubescens*) onions, radishes, beets, *achoqcha* (*Cyclanthera pedata*, a soft, green, spiny Andean vegetable), strawberries, herbs (peppermint, spearmint, rosemary, chamomile, pennyroyal, cilantro), flowers (roses, daisies, carnations, gladiolus), and tobacco (for medicinal purposes) (see National Research Council 1989 for a description of the native Andean vegetables). While the list is relatively extensive, most families cultivate small quantities of these products if at all, so that except for seasonally-available wild turnip greens from the cornfields, there is a general lack of greens in the diet. The potato varieties favored in the village gardens, as in *maway* production in general, are high yield varieties such as *yungay* and *wayruru*. Some of the potato crop may be marketed commercially. Potato blight is widespread in this zone, and the commercial fungicide Redomil is often used to control it. Those with a specialty crop, such as cabbage, may sell or trade some of it within the village. All families plant an assortment of herbs and flowers, the first used for condiments and medicines, and the second for rituals and adornment. Much of this produce is not found in any other zone.

Property bounds within this sector are marked not only by stone fences, often capped with thorny or spiny plants to further discourage the intrusion of animals or people, but also by an impressive array of well-conserved native and exotic tree species.

Given, their location on private plots, these trees are considered private property, and damage caused to neighbor's trees must be reimbursed. Many of these plants have utilitarian uses in tool making, ritual adornment, and medicine. The berries of the *choqlloillmanka* bush (*Phytolacca bogotensis*) have a high content of saponin and are used as a natural soap. Though now largely replaced by commercial detergents and soaps, some families continue to favor *choqlloillmanka* for washing their handmade woolens, observing that it does not cause the colors to run like the purchased products do. The hollow branches of elder trees are used as *phukuna*, a blowing tool to manage hearth fires, while the branches of *thiri* (*Brachyotum quinquinerve*) are used for makeshift brooms. *Mut'uy* (*Cassia hookeriana*) is one of the most versatile of the medicinal plants found in this zone; it is considered to be *chiri* or *fresco* (cold) in Andean hot-cold ethnopharmacological classification and thus good for hot illnesses such as stomach-aches, headaches, toothaches, and the flu. A small number of families still fry the high-protein *wayt'ampu* (*Metardaris cosinga*) larvae that are found on certain shrubs amongst the hedgerows as a delicacy (cf., Venero et. al. 1985), but the taste for this appears to be waning. The garden zone is notable not only for its intensity of agricultural production, but also for the most sophisticated conservation of natural resources of all of Ccachín's production zones. As Venero et al. put it,

> In the "field zone" [settlement plots] . . . the *comunidad campesina* of Ccachín showed an ancient mastery of various systems of agro-forestry that are highly viable. These produce a wide gamut of products for use in daily life and at the same time conserve the soils. One can estimate that these systems have functioned for more than 400 years, apparently without the soils losing their fertility . . . it would be advisable to reinforce the decision of the *comuneros* to return to practice these systems and perhaps expand them to other areas . . . . [1987:80-81]

Property in this zone is transferred through inheritance and barter. The typical price paid for a plot of land to construct a house in the nucleus while I was there was one *toro* ('bull'). There is little land available to start a new household at village center, and new construction is at the periphery, extending into areas that were once part of the zone 5 sectoral fallow. The size of plots vary, but with house, corral, and garden, they are rarely larger than 0.2 hectares.

Communally-Regulated Fallow for Main Potato Planting

The primary potato planting is called *hatun tarpuy* ('big, great planting') in Ccachín. A multiplicity of varieties of potatoes are planted, with an emphasis on indigenous varieties for boiling (*wayk'u*) and freeze drying (*ch'uñu*). Smaller quantities of *añu* (*Tropaeolum tuberosum*) are interspersed among the potatoes The fields for these crops are located forty-five minutes to two hours above the village by foot, between 3500 and 4000 meters above sea level (and even higher in Qochayoq). This communally-regulated fallow zone accounts for 50-60% of the cultivated land in Ccachín. Most families have inheritable use rights to one or two plots in each sector, and a *raymi* ('land division') is held as needed to distribute plots to new households and others in need.[5] Households work quarter acre to half acre plots (when asked, people often estimate that they have a *tupu*, which is somewhat more). In distributing plots, smaller parcels are assigned in the lower areas of a sector and larger ones in the higher areas to compensate for differences in productivity. A small portion of the land cultivated in any given year is reserved for the *comité* ('committee') — the community — and is worked communally. The communal plots are usually a half hectare to hectare in size and constitute one percent or less of the land cultivated in the sector. The proceeds of the sale of the produce from these fields go into the community fund. The community assembly, the grade school, and the *Club de Madres* all work plots to generate funds for their operating costs and special projects.

Many people in Ccachín say that the *hatun tarpuy* is on a seven-year cycle, that is, that each of the *laymi* is planted for one year and then left fallow for the six following. Table 2.1 provides some evidence that this is the basic pattern. The sector called P'alqa, for example, has been cultivated four times since Rayankancha became an *anexo* of Ccachín in 1976, with plantings in c. 1977-78, c. 1984-85, 1991-92, and 1998-99. The cycle is more fluid than this suggests, however, and the *comuneros* point out that it often varies, and that ultimately it is the community assembly that decides. The same factors that enter into decision making in the *maway* sector enter here, except that a sector is rarely cultivated two years in a row. Qochayoq has a separate rotation schedule and its own *maway* and *hatun tarpuy* zones, while Rayankancha's rotation partially overlaps

with that of Ccachín. Both of the *anexos* take advantage of nearby land for their potato rotations. Two of the Rayankancha sectors are shared with Ccachín.

The rotation system in Ccachín appears to be evolving in the number of sectors, the number of years a sector is left fallow, and the expansion or subdivision of the sectors. Some *comuneros* report that there used to be an eight-year rotation, but that it has shortened. This despite the addition of sectors Qochapata and P'alqa, both on ex-hacienda lands in Rayankancha. Change has also come by redesignating *hatun tarpuy* sectors as *maway* ones. *Comuneros* report that population pressures have pushed the *hatun tarpuy* into the higher and more distant areas of the community. At one time, the main potato planting took place in the *maway* zone and in Pampallaqta, the lowest and closest of the present *hatun tarpuy* sectors. At that time, I am told, there was no separate *maway* planting. The sectors closer the village are generally smaller than the more distant ones, and were not able to support the additional demand with the given technology.

Natural barriers and rustic fences of stone, sod, and adobe enclose each of the sectors. They deteriorate during the fallow period and need to be repaired by the community whenever a sector is brought back into production. The newest sectors have the most rudimentary fences and are the most susceptible to animal damage. Individual plots are distinguished by stone outlines and pilings, but are not fenced. The stones tend to get scattered by animals and erosion during fallow periods, but the traces of previous furrows likewise help mark property borders. Individual households maintain cabins in as many as three these sectors, but not in all. Herding is widely distributed over the fallow sectors, with each family herding in a radius from their cabin. During the harvest, temporary straw grass huts are built in the sector being cultivated if a family does not have a cabin nearby.

The community assembly decides when a cultivated sector will be closed to pasturing animals after planting, and when it will be opened to animals again after harvest. The owners of animals that stray into the sector while there are crops are assessed a fine according to the number of offending head. One zone — Qochapata — has a corral left over from its hacienda days that can be used to detain animals captured

during the harvest, otherwise the animals are held in a corral for that purpose in the village. The closing of the gates to a sector coincides with the *papa yapuy* ('potato plowing') of the community plot, and this usually takes place after most households have held their *papa yapuy*. The gates are not opened to animals again until most people have completed the harvest and sorted their tubers, at which time they will enter with their horses to transport the produce back to the village.

There is not much stubble remaining after the potato harvest, so there is no rush to herd grazing animals into the area as after the corn harvest. Some families move their flocks into the area to take advantage of forage along boundary lines and in uncultivated patches. The harvested fields make excellent gleaning for pigs, which grow to sizes unattainable at village-level, and many families take their pigs there after the harvest. Many *comuneros* think that the rooting of pigs spreads *rancha*, the potato blight, however, and efforts are sometimes made to restrict pigs from the harvested sectors, usually with little success. Whether or not there's a causal relationship between pigs and the spread of *rancha*, the rooting activity inhibits the regeneration of pasture (Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996). For the first few years after harvest, there isn't sufficient plant cover to support much herding, but as the pasture regenerates, sheep, goats, and alpaca are herded in the fallow sectors. Cattle and horses roam the higher and more distant sectors closest to the natural pasture zone. Once the pasture has regenerated enough to sustain their herds, families move back into their cabins in the sector.

Potatoes are planted in the main potato zone using a pick to punch holes in the turf and place the seeds directly, without previously tilling of the soil. *Papa yapuy* ('potato plowings') are held a month to six weeks later to turn sod over the potatoes and to leave furrows for drainage (Figure 2.4). The slope in these areas is typically fifteen to fifty degrees, and furrows run vertically following the fall of the hillside. *Papa yapuy* is the most physically taxing and labor intensive of any single agricultural task in Ccachín. *Papa yapuy* are conducted in teams organized through reciprocal labor exchange (*ayni* or *mink'a*), organized by individual households. The primary tool employed is the foot plow ("*q'orona*" or "*chakitaklla*"). *Yapuy* involve the largest labor teams — twelve to forty

men, with an average of about twenty — and are accompanied by the most ritual and feasting of all the agricultural tasks. The *yapuy* take place over the course of six weeks during October and November, as each household organizes a work team for their plot. The *yapuy* for a single plot is normally completed in a day, but the field owner ("*chakra-yoq*") must reciprocate the labor received, so that an individual may participate in a couple dozen *yapuy* over this period. It's been estimated that *papa yapuy* in the Cusco area constitute 20-25% of the total labor required for potato production in this sector, or about fifty to sixty workdays per hectare (Kervyn and CEDEP Ayllu 1989).

Material inputs are modest. A handful or two of sheep or guinea pig manure is added directly to each hill of potatoes before plowing to supplement the natural fertility of the soil, which has been reconditioned by the extended fallow period. Two main pests affect potato production in Ccachín: potato late blight (*Phytophotera infestans*) and exotic weeds. The *laymi* in the main potato zone differ from each other in the extent that these nemeses are present. Generally, the lower the sector or the lower in a sector a field is located, the more these problems are present. Both are said to be relatively new to the area and expanding their range. The potato blight attacks potato leaves and stalks and is treated in two ways: by hand removal of affected leaves, and by the use of fungicides. Use of the latter is increasingly common in this sector, but is limited to less than half of the households. A half kilogram of Redomil, enough fungicide for the average-sized plot in this zone, cost about $22.75 (225 kilos of potatoes would have to be sold to cover its cost). It is not only costly, it is a risky investment, as success depends on having twenty-four hours without rain after fumigating. For many households, its cost is prohibitive. The principal weed affecting this zone is *muchuyqora* (*Rumex acetosella*). Its effects are spotty, but appears to significantly reduce yield in some fields. Herbicides are not used. *Muchuyqora* is pulled by hand. Insects and their larvae are likewise generally removed by hand. Overall, hybrid seed, insecticides, and fungicides ane less commonly used in the main potato planting than they are in *maway*. Infrastructural improvements such as terraces and fencing are minimum at this level. As noted by Kervyn and CEDEP Ayllu, "It's not easy to improve soil fertility in the highlands, not easily accessible, with a very

contrastive climate and at times with steep slopes. Therefore the system of rotations is a production process that transforms nature very little: the *comuneros* adapt themselves to the natural conditions for lack of alternatives" (Kervyn and CEDEP Ayllu 1989:53, n. 32).

This zone is subject to early and harsh frosts, constraining the growing season. The frosts, however, play an important role in food storage, and the zone is ideal for making *ch'uñu* ('freeze-dried potatoes'). Relatively flat areas or depressions are favored for spreading potatoes out for freezing, and each household has customary freezing grounds on one or more of its plots. Sometimes people transfer the bitter potatoes favored for this purpose from one sector to another for freezing. *Ch'uñu* production normally takes place a month or two after the potato harvest, and many families have pits on their plots for the storage of their *ch'uñu* potatoes during the interim. Given the potential for theft, storage is usually in an area where they can remain vigilant. Three consecutive nights of hard frost are needed to make *ch'uñu* or the potatoes may be ruined. This introduces risk in the process, and *ch'uñu* production is always done in the upper-most fields of the main sectoral fallow zone in the heart of the dry season, when and where frost is more predictable. Clear nights are needed, and given the possibility of rain, people have to anticipate the weather. If the freezing process gets cut short, it is sometimes possible to salvage the potatoes as *muraya* ('white *ch'*uñu') by soaking them in a spring or sinkhole before drying. *Khaya* ('freeze-dried oca') is also made. After freezing, *ch'uñu*, *muraya*, and *khaya* are brought to village-level to dry.

Uncultivated Natural Highland Pastures

Beyond the communally-regulated sectoral fallow, at altitudes of 3500 meters and above, in distant valleys and highlands three hours or more by foot from the village, one finds the communal pastures of Ccachín. This zone is not cultivated. There are few herding cabins in this high natural pasture zone compared to the number found in the dual-purpose sectoral fallow. A few families live in this zone on a more-or-less permanent basis, dedicated to cattle-raising. Because of the isolation and exposure to theft the

zone is thought by many to be dangerous (in 1987, for example, there was a double murder at Chanchiyoq committed by cattle rustlers). Most people pasture their horses in this zone and must go there regularly to check on them. A significant number of labor hours are spent on trips to carry salt to, check up on, and fetch the horses. Many families also pasture their cattle in this zone. Alpaca and llama predominate in the pasture zones above Qochayoq.

The common pastures are know as the "*pajonal*." The grasses *ichhu* (*Calamagrostis amoena*) and *paja* (*puna ichu*) predominate. These and associated plants are the climax vegetation at the highest elevations of the village, and according to Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996), the upper areas of the main potato zone would revert to this state if left fallow for twenty to twenty-five years. The hillsides are thick and moist with mosses. A number of small highland lagoons serve as watering holes for the animals. Two wild flowers found in the zone are important in the Carnival fertility rites for the sheep and alpaca (on *Día de Compadres*) and for the cattle (*Día de Comadres*): *phallcha* (*Gentiana sp.*) and *phuña* (*Culcitium rufescens*). Small-scale, controlled burns are occasionally used to improve the pastures, but more commonly, frequent, uncontrolled burns cause problems and reduce the quality of the pastures.

The high grasslands can be further subdivided into two zones: one reserved for the production of straw grass for construction purposes, the other open to herding. Straw grass in the primary roofing material used in home construction in Ccachín. Until 1989, the church was roofed with straw grass, further heightening the demand. Straw grass is also used in the construction of temporary shelters in the upper sectoral-fallow zone during the harvest, as an insulator to protect the harvested potatoes from frost while being separated and selected in the field, and as binder in the fabrication of *adobe*. Straw grass is not normally sold or traded, but when someone is not able to collect it themselves, the price of a horse load (60 kg.) was about $3.00. Twenty to twenty-five such *cargas* are needed to roof a normal-sized house, and the roofing needs to be supplemented about every four years. Given this, the best straw grass areas are managed much like the firewood collecting areas are. The grazing of animals in such areas is seasonally man-

aged or prohibited altogether, with fines assessed for transgressions. As elsewhere, unauthorized fires are prohibited.

Extraterritorial Cattle Pastures

Some of the principal cattle pastures of Ccachín's *comuneros* are not within the territory of the *comunidad campesina*. They are on the private or State-owned ex-hacienda lands of Sisay, Ichhu, Pan de Azucar, Palanganayoq, and Platería. Many of these pastures are an eight to twelve hour hike from Ccachín, a trip that, with animals, can take two days. Families often maintain a cabin in these pasture lands, and they may have an enclosed garden for potatoes consumed on site. Unlike the cabins in the communally-regulated sectoral fallow, where women may maintain residence for months at a time while herding, these cabins are primarily used for overnight trips and short-term work parties by the men. In a few cases, a *wakero* ('cowhand') lives permanently at the site and serves as a caretaker for the herds of several families, living primarily on dairy products.

Property rights and decision making structures in this zone differ from those of Ccachín's common pastures, justifying its separate treatment here. Geographically, the sectors in this zone are similar to the common pastures within the territory in that they are predominantly high grass lands. The ex-hacienda lands at Palanganayoq are used as cattle pasture by the *hacendado* (who lives in Calca and no longer visits the site), by his children, and by one family in Ccachín. The male head of household of the family in Ccachín is the nephew of the former *arrendire*. He has private title to the upper part of Palanganayoq. The family has eighty to one hundred head of cattle at Palanganayoq, making it the largest single cattle owner in Ccachín. A *wakero* family takes care of the herd, and an annual roundup and work party is conducted as in the days of the hacienda, supported by household and cooperative labor rather than the onerous *condiciones* of the hacienda era.

The ex-hacienda lands of Pan de Azucar are now managed by the descendants of the *Arrendire* and *allegados* who used to pasture their animals there. This involves

twenty-seven families in Ccachín, who are organized in a collective administrative body known as the *Pan de Azucar Comité*. During my stay in Ccachín, there was a struggle between this group and the community-at-large over the title of the Pan de Azucar lands. The Ministry of Agriculture decided in favor of the *comité* in late 1991, but they still did not have title to the land when I left in 1992. The *comité* families pooled resources to cover the legal costs and other paperwork associated with gaining the land title. Each was expected to contribute $5.00 per head of cattle pastured there toward these costs. The *comunidad campesina* had to pay an undetermined amount to bring the Ministry officials to the area to resolve the issue. The largest individual household holdings at Pan de Azucar are about forty head. The Pan de Azucar *comité* organizes its own *phayna* ('work parties'). In 1990, for example, the members spent five days repairing the trail between Ccachín and Pan de Azucar.

A third important pasture area is found in Platería. This area is likewise an ex-hacienda. Title to the pastures is being disputed by Ccachín, Qelkanka, Ocobamba, and a household in Qochayoq that would like private title to part of the valley. The dispute between the latter and some villagers from Qelkanka turned violent during my time in the area, and near the end of my stay, the Qochayoq claimant appeared to have had a change of heart and decided to proceed with his claims under the umbrella of Ccachín to increase legitimacy and support for his position. Ccachín spent at least $430 in 1991 alone on its attempts to gain title to the land. There is no separate committee administering the pasture, and at present, it is open range land held by the State.

Ccachín families also pasture their cattle on the other ex-haciendas mentioned, and the community is trying to gain title to these lands as well. These pastures are apparently areas of traditional use and there are no collective management associations as in the case of Pan de Azucar.

Miscellaneous Resources

There are few well-defined institutional rules governing non-agricultural harvesting activities in Ccachín. The collection of wild plants for textile dyes, medicinal use,

construction. alimentation and other uses is not regulated, although there's significant gathering activity and resources are limited. Sometimes, however, as with the harvesting of firewood and of straw grass for construction, sectors for the harvesting of non-agricultural resources are specified and rules governing their use are defined.

Some of these resources play a minor but salient role in the local subsistence economy and bear mentioning here. I have include the Lares riverbank in the autochthonous woodland zone because the trees around the river are used for firewood. Perhaps the river itself should be regarded as a separate production zone if the full gamut of local resources available to the *campesinos* is taken into account. Some villagers see the river as a potential opportunity for the specialized production of fish.

The two rivers closest to the village, Lares Mayu and Pachawala Mayu, both contain trout. A number of the younger men fish for trout both for home meals, and to sell for cash in the village. A dozen fifteen to twenty centimeter (six to eight inch) trout sell for about $1.25 in Ccachín. Fishing, however, is limited, and the amount of fish the villagers consume is insignificant compared to the amount of meat that they consume, meat consumption itself being comparatively low. The per capita consumption of trout in the village probably does not exceed a fish or two per year. Trout is primarily a special food for birthday parties and fund-raisers. The teachers in Ccachín fish on a regular basis, and without domestic stock of their own, trout plays a greater role in their total protein consumption. A number of the teachers commented to me that the river immediately below Ccachín is ideal for a trout farm.

According to people in Ccachín, the quality of fishing has declined in the last 20-25 years. They say that while in the past, trout of twelve inches and more were common, they rarely now reach eight inches in length. They blame over fishing on population growth, and on outsiders who come into the Lares Valley and fish with dynamite. The Ministry of Agriculture seeded twelve lakes above Qochayoq with fingerlings in 1988, but there was no significant increase in trout downstream while I was in the village.

One *comunero* has taken some preliminary steps toward constructing a trout farm. He moved from Ccachín to Cusco when he was nine years old, and in mid-1991, at age

forty, returned to the village to construct a *granja* ('farm') along the Lares River to raise trout, chickens, turkeys, guinea pigs, and pigs for *quintas* ('restaurants') in Cusco. He told me that he got the idea for trout production from a television program about a woman in Cusco who raised trout in her backyard, charging people per trout caught to fish in her pond. The *comunero*'s project was still in the early stages when I left the village, and he had run into problems. He had constructed the walls of his house, but someone had stolen his rafter poles, setting back the roofing. More importantly, he had gone forward with construction without received permission from the community assembly for use of the land near the river, and the assembly did not want him to proceed without resolution of the property rights.[6]

Other than fish, little wildlife is harvested in Ccachín. *Taruka* ('deer') are found at all ecological levels, and are a particular nuisance in the cornfields. People will kill them with rocks if they come upon them resting, but such fortune is rare. The meat is sun-dried into jerky. Young fox, when found, are captured and sold. A few families had parrots (*Aratinga mitrata*) hopping among the guinea pigs in their houses, and one family had a pair of *wallata* (Andean goose; *Chloephaga melanoptera*) that they captured young and raised as exotic pets. Some women are adept at snaring *hak'achu* (Andean flicker; *Colaptes rupicola*), which they dry, grind, and mix with toasted corn and salt to give to the cows. The concoction is said to be good for increasing milk production, and is not only used as a supplement for the cattle, but sometimes given to nursing mothers (see Chapter 4).

Beyond the timber harvested in zones 2 and 3, and the bunch grass harvested in zone 8, the other important construction resources are stones and clay. There are no explicit rules regulating their use, although people only use clay from their own plots or from marginal public areas. The extensive demand for clay at village level and anarchic planning are leaving the settlement hillsides pockmarked, unstable, and eroded. In some cases, people dig too close to the trails, making them dangerous. The clay used in the making of *q'oncha* ('hearths') is a special grey clay that is found at only a few sites within easy reach of the village; in contrast to the rest of house construction, which falls on the

men, women are responsible for building their cooking hearths, and they know exactly where these veins of hearth clay can be found.

Dung is commonly used along with kindling at higher elevations where firewood is scarce, especially in the cabins and huts located in distant pastures. It's used at lower elevations when the cattle are feeding on the stubble in the corn sector. Corncobs are also burned. Seibold (1990) reports that some in Choquecancha now use kerosene stoves, but I am not aware of any households in Ccachín that do so.[7]

Regional Exchange Networks

Direct Access to Other Ecological Floors

Andean agropastoralism is known for the articulation of complementary production zones along a vertical gradient Matsuda et. al. 1985; Murra 1985; Salomon 1985). While Ccachín ranges from *yunka* to *puna*, not everyone in the community exploits each of these *ecological pisos* ('ecological floors') equally. Most households in Ccachín and Rayankancha have primary access to *qheshwa* and *suni* levels, while those in Qochayoq have direct access to the *suni* and *puna*.

The principal mechanisms of complementarity linking households to additional ecological floors are direct access, home-based reciprocity, and free-lance trading (see Salomon 1985 for typology). These are all based on decentralized forms of reciprocity involving individual households, rather than communal-level organization. Central-place marketing is taking on a growing role, but despite increasing mobility by motorized transport, there's still significant truth in the following description of the area by Flores Ochoa:

> For the peasants complementarity and interaction are effected through direct relationships with neighboring communities. . . . The market as a place and as a system is peripheral; it is not the customary medium for the acquisition of agricultural products of consumption. Markets are used to sell part of their production in order to buy products complementary to their economy. . . . Even now the circulation of complementary goods is not yet predominant. Indigenous peasant communities still follow very Andean lines of verticality. [Flores Ochoa 1985:274-275]

Such direct exchange relations along geographically-vertical lines are facilitated by the close proximity of ecological floors.

Many families in Ccachín have direct access to different ecological levels through marriage, or by the dispersion of expanded families among different ecological levels. Intra-family specialization and exchange are particularly important between the residents of Ccachín and Qochayoq, extending the access of each to another level. The primary goods going from the higher ecological level to the lower are alpaca wool, *chuñu*, and meat, while the primary goods moving upward are corn, lima beans and associated products from the cornfields.

Several Ccachín families have direct access to the *yunka* ('cloud forest') as well. Ccachín residents have colonized the *yunka* in two areas: Ocobamba and Yavero (Ocobamba is at about 2250 meters above sea level, Yavero is lower). These communities are multi-origin villages in the *ceja de la selva* outside of Ccachín's territory, and their colonization provides Ccachín households with direct access to an important production zone. Ocobamba is reachable by a two-day hike to the northwest across Ccachín pasture areas (via Platería). It is accessible by truck, but foot travel is still the predominant form of travel to the area. Yavero is in the Paucartambo Valley, reachable only by road travel. In both areas, Ccachín families are homesteading; a few have title and the rest are attempting to gain title to their plots.

Some Ccachín residents have permanently emigrated to Ocobamba or Yavero, and other family members join them on a seasonal basis, particularly at the coffee harvest, a time of high labor demand. In a handful of cases, dual households are maintained, with husbands and wives living separately much of the year. Generally, only a small number of hectares are cultivated, but continuing efforts are made to expand the cultivated area. Property rights and production decisions are largely private. The settlement pattern is dispersed.

The principal agricultural products of the *yunka* plots are corn, squash, fruit, coffee, coca, *achira* (*Canna edulis*), *yucca*, peanuts, and hot peppers. All but the first two are brought back to the village by Ccachín natives for household use and trade. Coffee

and coca are used in quantity and are staples in Ccachín. Peanuts and hot peppers are used in small quantity as condiments for boiled potatoes ("*wayk'u*") and *achira* is used in soups. Fruit is obtained through cash or barter in the Yerbabuenayoq market as a treat for festival and ritual occasions. It also plays an important role in decorating saints and in wakes for the dead.

Home-Based and Itinerant Trade

Because of the close links between Ccachín and the *yunka*, many in Ccachín make short trips to the Lares Valley for seasonal labor and trade. Animals of European origin — cattle, horses, pigs, chickens, guinea pigs, dogs — are important trade items moving from Ccachín to the *yunka* region. Cattle and pigs will often be butchered once there and sold to multiple buyers for cash (or IOUs, if money is scarce). Smaller animals are frequently exchanged in barter. When Ccachín residents return from the *yunka*, they bring coca, coffee, and other produce that can be sold or bartered to others in Ccachín. As well, many will carry *yunka* goods to the *puna* communities above Ccachín in the Urubamba Range, as itinerant traders. No one dedicates themselves to such trade — they are primarily agropastoralists, not traders — but most households look for opportunities to generate more income and this is a common strategy.

Professional traveling merchants — *wasaq'epi* ('back-carriers') or *ambulantes* ('traveling salespeople') — from outside of the area visit Ccachín on a regular basis. Several types can be distinguished according to their specialties and points of origin. The *sicuaneños* from the *provincias altas* ('high provinces') of Cusco — Canchis, Yauri, and Espinar — have historically been associated with the selling of *bayeta*, coarse-woven sheep's wool cloth used for making clothing, and with *ch'utuku*, the traditional felt hat for men in the area. With the increasing desirability of commercially-made clothing and with ready access to the wholesale market in Juliaca, many of these sellers have expanded their inventory to reflect changing needs and tastes. One of the two full-time storekeepers in Yerbabuenayoq is a *Sicuaneño* who settled in.[8]

The distinctive women's *monteras* ('hats') used in Ccachín come from Chinchero (Province of Urubamba), fifteen kilometers west of Cusco. The *montera* used in Ccachín is similar to the *montera* in Chinchero, but it is distinguished by its smaller diameter. A few times a year the makers of these hats come to Ccachín on trading expeditions. Sometimes, the *monteras* are exchanged for textiles, which are then sold in the bi-weekly Chinchero tourist market. A number of the weaving designs originating in Ccachín and Choquecancha in recent years have found their way into the patterns used in belts produced for the Chinchero and Cusco tourist markets by Chinchero women, suggesting that both materials and ideas pass between the two communities.

The term *wasaq'epi* originally referred to itinerant traders from the province of Acomayo (Flores Ochoa 1985). Such traders now come from a variety of areas and distribute general urban consumer goods — cookware, flashlight batteries, radios, scales, sandals, synthetic yarns, and children's clothing — in exchange for corn, potatoes, lima beans, textiles, and cash. Nearly all of these itinerant traders are men. Their presence is most notable after the corn and potato harvests and during major community festivals. They go door-to-door through the village. Any given individual may make one to several trips a year to the village.

Another type of trader is the cattle and horse buyer. They come from several places, but especially from Urubamba, Lares, and the lower Lares Valley. People in Ccachín say that they can't get as good a price in Calca as they can in Urubamba for their cattle. Horses and mules are traded within the area for use as beasts of burden, while cattle are driven to Urubamba or the Lares Valley to sell as meat. The *comuneros* usually seek cash from sale of their animals and the buyers usually accommodate, but it is not uncommon for buyers to enter the area offering high-priced (and often low-quality) manufactured items such as sewing machines and record players in trade. Several *comuneros* in Ccachín participate in this trade, buying cattle to drive to the Lares Valley or Urubamba market.

A final group of traders is composed of Cusco textile buyers. Both Ccachín and Choquecancha are important and well-recognized centers of production of indigenous

clothing textiles (Gisbert 1987; Seibold 1990). A few Cusco buyers have established *compadrazgo* relations in the area and make buying expeditions as needed to replenish their storefront stock. They generally pay in cash. They are not the only buyers of textiles, however, as most other merchants will accept textiles in trade, and villagers also take their textiles to the annual markets in Calca (August 15th), Qoyllur Rit'i (May or June), and Huanca (September 14th). Given the movement of textiles through these intermediaries, most textile retailers in the tourist centers of P'isaq, Chinchero, Ollantay-tambo, and Cusco need never set foot in the Lares region. A few of the textile shops, however, have established direct trade relations with the producers. Sales are arranged on an individual basis, as the women of Ccachín are not cooperatively organized for textile sales as they are in Taquile on Lake Titicaca (Healy and Zorn 1983; Prochaska 1988; see also Seibold's 1990 proposal for the same in Choquecancha 1990).

Figure 2.5 summarizes the flow of produce between ecological floors and from Ccachín to urban centers. Trade has been facilitated by the road to Yerbabuenayoq, but all goods need to be carried on one's back or by horseback the four kilometers from there to the village. While in the village, traders stay in the homes of friends, acquaintances, or *compadres*. Most outside traders now travel by way of the trucks, and pay to have the produce received as barter shipped to Calca. The two principal markets used by Ccachín residents are those of Yerbabuenayoq and Calca. The Yerbabuenayoq market is an important source of such staples as sugar, salt, kerosene, and alcohol, and it provides the bread, rice, noodles, and other processed foods used for special meals, work parties, and ritual occasions. Bulk agricultural products are sold there for cash, and then shipped to Calca and the Lares Valley. The Calca market is distant and most go there infrequently, but it is an important market for the purchase of bulk sugar, salt, and cooking oil, clothing, and tools (prices are lower than in Yerbabuenayoq, even after accounting for shipping). People stock up on these goods when they make a trip into the provincial capital. Car batteries, used to run record players for festivals, need to be sent to Calca for recharging. A growing number of *comuneros* also have savings accounts and seek agricultural bank loans in Calca.

Labor Migration and Emigration

People leave Ccachín for various lengths of time to engage in salaried labor activities. Other than for those with specialized skills such as carpentry, there are no significant wage-labor activities within the village itself.[9] Labor migration may be seasonal or long-term and directed to areas within the micro-region or outside of it. Figure 2.6 and Table 2.2 indicate the principal destinations and labor opportunities for those who seek work outside of the village.

In Baca Tupayani's (1985) study of five Cusco provinces, 37% of *campesino* families had a family member engaged in seasonal labor migration, working an average of thirty-three days per year away from the community. While I did not collect statistically representative information on labor migration, my notes on the movements of residents during the time that I was in the community suggest that labor migration in Ccachín falls somewhat below this average, both in number of families involved, and days spent in wage labor.

The principal labor migrants in Ccachín are young, unmarried men and women. Perhaps the majority of young people now leave the community at least once between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five for wage labor, but a small minority of the total population of that age group is outside of the community at any one time.

Baca Tupayani's study suggests that about half of the migrants in the region go to the La Convención-Lares Valley to work, and given Ccachín's proximity to this area, this is the most common destination for residents as well. Most seasonal migration in this direction is toward Ocobamba or Yavero, where there are colonies of settlers from Ccachín. Migrants participate principally in the coffee harvest, which takes place from February to June. March and April are generally light labor months within the agro-pastoral calender of Ccachín, so that migratory labor at this time has a relatively low opportunity cost (see Table 2.3). Most of this work is for relatives, or for their neighbors and acquaintances in these communities.

The labor opportunities for women are limited, and directed primarily toward Cusco or Lima, where they serve as housekeepers. Some also help their *patrones* ('sponsors') at stands and stalls in the markets.

Summary and Conclusion

Compared with many Andean communities, Ccachín is favored by its location on the eastern cordillera of the Andes, which assures both adequate rainfall and access to multiple ecological levels, and by further room for expansion onto former hacienda lands.

Property rights vary from individual to communal by production zone. Accordingly, it's a mistake to define the Andean ethos in terms of one or the other, and explanatory frameworks that account for both are needed.

Despite rapid population growth and increasing market integration, communally-regulated sectoral fallow has not disappeared, and one of the principal, but not exclusive, roles of the *comunidad campesina* continues to be the management of common property. Agriculture and pastoralism complement and conflict with each other at both the household and inter-household levels, and community institutions facilitate complementarity and reduces antagonisms. Reliance on long-standing conventions integrated with and legitimatized by religious belief helps reduce the overall costs of collective decision making and seasonal scheduling.

Three outstanding issues remain to be considered regarding the communally-regulated sectoral fallow system in Ccachín: a) methodological problems in gathering data and describing the system, b) the reasons for the continuance of communally-regulated sectoral fallow itself, and c) the efficiency and success of communal management in Ccachín, as measured by the maintenance of environmental quality in the regulated zones. I will close this chapter by discussing each in turn.

Methodological Problems

It is not easy to construct an accurate map of communally-regulated sectors, nor to track crop rotation between them through time. I want to stress that Figure 2.1, Table 2.1,

and my discussion based on them is provisional, and can be improved by more detailed and specialized study.

One encounters a number of problems in studying sectoral fallow systems in the Andes. Some grow out of the fluidity of the systems themselves, while others grow out of the limited local geographic knowledge held by most outside investigators, myself included, and the memory limitations of informants.

Over time, the number and shape of *laymi* change in response to population pressure, market opportunities, and the changing borders of a community. Sometimes *laymi* may be designated for mixed use, with early-season tubers planted at lower levels and the main potato planting taking place at upper levels (this depends, it would seem, on individual households having access to both). Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) indicate that Cruz Orqo, Loqchanka, and Pachawala are sectors of this sort. Sometimes too, the main potato sectors closest to the community are converted to *maway* sectors. This may be the case with the three sectors listed above (I am not sure about this, but they are the most likely to have changed, as they are at a higher altitude than the village itself). There has been discussion of converting Pampallaqta into a sector for the production of barley and other cereal grains, but it has not yet been acted upon. There is even indication that as community territory has expanded, some particularly steep *maway* sectors below the community have been permanently taken out of production to meet the need for pasture areas close to the village (some of this is in the "rustic corral zone" identified by Venero et. al. [1987]).

Laymi typically expand through time as the community assembly grants unused plots within existing sectors and partitions bordering pastures for the use of new families. Sometimes, the decision is made to plant two or more adjacent *laymi* during the same year, effectively combining them. The unification of sectors usually is in response to growing demand, but it may also be undertaken to limit intrusions by animal from adjacent pastures. With the agrarian reform and the addition of the ex-hacienda lands of Rayankancha, the community of Ccachín has been able to expand into new sectors. Several *laymi* in these newly-added territories are now jointly used by *comuneros* in both

Ccachín and Rayankancha. These include both *maway* sectors (e.g., Tintinniyoq), and main potato sectors (e.g., Qochapata and P'alqa). Within this decade, new lands have been opened up at Chanchiyoq and Qachupata, both a considerable distance from the community. Such additions sacrifice natural pastures to agriculture. Until impenetrable fences can be built (after a couple of planting cycles), they tend to be marked by a lot of animal damage, and the community must weather an attending increase in conflict between farmers and herders in the area. Expansion of agriculture into former pasture areas also tends to have a negative ecological impact on the soil (Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996).

Investigators also face the problem of mapping how changing functional divisions of the local landscape overlay enduring toponymic ones. Each *laymi* unifies several tracts of land referred to by their own place names. In reporting the names of a *laymi*, informants often give the name of the place where their particular plot is located rather than a name of the sector as a whole. *Comuneros* have a clear idea which places are included in each *laymi*, so that to name any place within a sector is to identify it for all, but it's not clear that there is a single umbrella term for each *laymi* itself. Places have unique names, but *laymi* may not. The *maway* sector Urpituyoq, for example, is often identified by informants as Awqachinka, the *maway* sector Kiswarkancha as Muyuqocha, and the *hatun tarpuy* sector Toqllanka as Tankarumiyoq. To locate and determine the extent of a *laymi*, an outside researcher needs the extensive knowledge of local places and place names that natives have, or needs to physically walk the boundaries of each with informants. Given the number of place names people identify as *laymi* in casual conversation and informal interviews, it is difficult to determine the total number of *laymi* in use or in reserve in the community. and to tract the changes through time. The *anexo* of Qochayoq has a relatively predictable, sequential rotation, but the situation in Ccachín is more complex. One frequently arrives at different numbers from the same informant when one asks how many years there are in one full cycle through the system and when one asks for a listing of *laymi*. In addition, the answers differ between informants.

In the "Book of Acts" ("*Libro de Actas*") of the communal assembly, *laymi* are usually referred to as "*turnos*" and subsections within *laymi* are referred to as "*sectores*." It's revealing to note, however, that in Hurtado Huamán et. al.'s (1996) study of the communally-regulated fallow system in Ccachín, the names of the *turnos* that appear in extracts taken from the Book of Acts regarding inheritance only partially correspond to the names given the *laymi* in their listing of them. Such *turnos* as "Corosurco" and "Caunes" that appear in community records do not appear in the listing of *laymi*. Perhaps they are subsumed under the *laymi* listed, perhaps not. In a seven-person interdisciplinary study such as theirs, different ways of soliciting the information may yield different results, and there is a need to integrate and cross-reference them. To get around the above problems, it would be useful to have a detailed listing of every plot of land that a household has use rights to within community territory, and a schedule of when it was last used, but collecting such information is time intensive, and I have not done it.

A final problem in describing a community's sectoral fallow system is the memory limitations of informants. When the *maway* sector Manzanayoq came into production in 1991, many told me that it was last cultivated fourteen years earlier, to them, it seems, an exceptionally long time. Others, however, reported that it had been cultivated eight to nine years earlier. Even over shorter, more immediate periods, memories sometimes differ. The few people who I have had opportunity to ask about the period after I left the community, from 1992 to present, have reported a different sequence of *laymi* use than appears in Hurtado Huamán's listing of the same. What's more, for the period when I was in the community and am sure that I have accurate data because I worked alongside people in the fields, my data differs from Hurtado Huamán's for Qochapata (they report 1987-1988, I report 1989-90) and P'alqa (they report 1989-90, I report 1991-92), in both cases, a two-year difference. This leads me to conclude that we need to bracket our data by indicating our level of certainty in it. I assume that the best data exist for the periods 1988-1992 and 1994-1999, when either Barbara and I or Hurtado Huamán's team were in the field. I am much less certain about the other years.

Accordingly, in Table 2.1, I have noted the source of the information for each year, and where discrepancies exist.

Despite these problems, much can be said in qualitative and comparative terms about the communally-regulated sectoral fallow in Ccachín. The detail, though, needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

Communal Regulation of Sectoral Fallow

Various explanations have been offered for the existence of communally-regulated sectoral fallow in the Andes:

Regeneration of the Soil. An extended fallow period provides time to rebuild soil fertility before the next planting. The soil is rejuvenated through such mechanisms as the fixation of nitrogen from cover plants, the recuperation of minerals from rain water, green manure, and the manuring of fields by grazing animals. The rotation schedule of potatoes-*oqa*-lima beans likewise contributes to the restoration of certain nutrients in the *maway* zone (Blanco 1983). Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) point out that with a relatively predictable rotation, *comuneros* in Ccachín often relocate their herds to a sector which will be planted within the next year or two, facilitating the recycling of nutrients. Orlove et. al. (1996) note, however, that given herding practices in the Andes, there is no direct transfer of fertility by the daily movement of animals from one area to another as in other parts of the world; rather, the animals only transform vegetable matter already present on site. Despite the increased labor that fields covered by *grama* require to reopen, especially in the *maway* zone, *comuneros* in Ccachín recognize it as "*abono*" ('fertilizer'). Although a noxious weed that crowds out autochthonous cover, with its extensive root mass, it also plays an important role in stabilizing the soil and preventing erosion.

Elimination of Disease and Parasites. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, one of the ways that the community assembly deals with the problem of the potato fungus *rancha* is to choose a sector for the following year distant from that year's planting. Several varieties of cyst nematodes also parasitize potatoes (*Globodera rostochiensis* and *G. pallida*, among others), and leaving a five to six year interval between potato plantings

dramatically reduces the presence and viability of their eggs in the soil (Blanco 1983). The seven-year (plus) cycle in the main potato zone of Ccachín is noteworthy in this regard, and the fallow period in Qochayoq is even longer. A seven-year cycle is common in the Andes (see Caparó 1994, for example), and the period between potato plantings is over four years in more than 90% of Andean communities (Orlove et. al. 1996). Wormy potatoes do not seem to be as big a problem in Ccachín as other wormy tubers (wormy *lisas*, for example), and in the *maway* sectors, potatoes are planted in consecutive years (albeit in reduced quantities) and the subsequent fallow period is much longer. Different varieties of potatoes and different tubers are parasitized by different nematodes, and I don't know whether the parasites that infest the *lisa* and *oqa* in the *maway* zone can be eliminated with a longer, shorter, or similar period of fallow, if at all.

Labor Efficiency. Cooperation among all farmers to plant in contiguous fields at the same time reduces the amount of time everyone must spend fencing and watching over their animals to avoid crop damage. In areas where a potato crop is followed by a cereal crop, the sequence potatoes-cereals is more efficient than the reverse, as the techniques used in plowing and harvesting potatoes prepare the ground for grains, but ground worked for cereals is not yet prepared for potatoes (Orlove et. al. 1996). While both of these factors may explain aspects of the communally-regulated fallow systems, they do not explain the rotation of sectors as such. The potato-cereal sequence is not found in Ccachín, but similar reasoning probably holds true for such crops as *tarwi*, beans, and squash found in the *maway* zone.

Territorial Defense. Large communal plots worked by large numbers of households are easier to defend from incursions than small, isolated individual plots. Regularly rotating planting zones over vast extensions of territory serves to mark a community's use rights to the area, whether the interest is primarily agricultural, pastoral, or both. As indicated in Chapter 1, a widely-held principle in the Andes is that "the land belongs to those who work it" (recall Table 1.3). Within communities, unworked fields revert to the community for redistribution. Between communities, land that is not worked is easily lost.

Conformity to the Cultural Ideal. A variety of other institutions and practices in the Andes are based on an equal division between all, with a sequential rotation through the system to implement it. The rotation between plots in irrigation systems, the rotation between holders of civil and religious offices, and even the rotation between musicians and dancers in the orchestration and choreography of music and dance have much in common. Andeans have models and experience from other domains that they can apply to communal land management, and there is a consensus that they are right and reasonable.

Some of the explanations above address some aspects of communally-regulated fallow more than others, and none are mutually exclusive. The ecological explanations address not only the reasons for communally-regulated fallow, but also the patterning of the rotation systems: the number of sectors and the length of the cycle. From this perspective, it appears that:

> The division of the rotation zone into seven sectors must respond to a calculus based on the interrelationship of several variables (altitude, quality of the soil, rainfall, etc.) . . . . That is to say, the number of sectors is not arbitrary, and it does not depend on the amount of land dedicated to the rotation zone nor the number of users of it. [Caparó 1994:131-132]

In a study of the soil fertility of eight of the 35-plus sectors of the communally-regulated fallow zones of Ccachín, Hurtado Huamán et. al. conclude that the amount of organic material, phosphorous, and potassium present is independent of the number of years a sector has been left in fallow (nitrogen levels covaried with organic material). They suggest that these results "are exceptionally important because they put in doubt the utility of the fallow. If the fallow doesn't adequately restore the fertility of the soils, then what is the real objective of fallow?" (1996:70). In answering the question, they lean toward the elimination of disease and parasites explanation, based on informant reports about the spacing of plantings to avoid *rancha*, rather than on any analysis of pathogens in the soil.

I am not competent to judge the sampling procedure or soil analysis, and leave it to specialists in the field. *Rancha* can not be the original, nor the only, explanation

however, as villagers say that *rancha* is a relatively new problem, while the sectoral fallow system has been in existence for centuries. It's informative, therefore, to consider what else the *comuneros* say about their rotation system. In one form or another, I have heard comments pointing to all of the explanations above.

The most common explanation I received from villagers for why they need to rotate their fields is that "the soil gets tired out." It's possible that this response is often motivated more by the metaphorical oppositions of "being tired" and "resting" ("*sayk'usqa*"/ "*samay*"; "*cansada*"/"*descansando*") used to describe the cultivation/fallow cycle than it is by agronomic observation, but sufficient detail is often added to lend credence to the latter.

Most of my questions have been with reference to the *maway* zone, because this is the area that has a multi-year cultivation cycle, and where the rotations have undergone the most change. Many villagers report that they plant mostly potatoes the first year a *maway* sector is opened because potatoes can be sold. The second year, they say, potatoes do less well, so they plant more *lisa*, *oqa*, and associated subsistence crops. By the third year "*la tierra está cansada*" and it hardly pays to plant potatoes at all.

"Being tired" is an ambiguous term, more symptom than cause, but sometimes informants are more specific. People commonly say that with repeated workings, the soil becomes "hard" ("*dura*"). This suggests changes in soil quality (compactness), but it suggests the labor efficiency explanation as well. As indicated earlier, the ground gets "hard" after three or four years in the cornfields as well, and oxen teams are brought in to rework it when plot size, slope, and availability permit. The same solution, however, is not used in the *maway* sectors. Animal traction would not serve to open up new sectors in the *maway* zone because the cover of *grama* is usually too thick, and oxen-drawn plows would not turn over and mix the soil to the depth that foot plows do (see Morlon et. al 1996 for a discussion of factors that enter into decision making about the use of each in the different production zones). *Chakitaklla* ('foot plows') are not used in the cornfields in Ccachín (Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996:15 to the contrary), but are used in both the early and main potato zones (replaced by a pick when there is a lot of *grama*).[10]

There is a close link between the use of *chakitaklla* and communally-regulated fallow throughout the Andes — a one-to one correspondence in the geographic limits of each — and the reigning hypothesis is that this has to do with the organization and productivity of labor (Orlove et. al. 1996). To the extent that labor efficiency is an issue, it may be — and this is my hypothesis — that fields are rotated in the *maway* sector when they would otherwise have to be turned over in depth again.

Some *comuneros* offer another productivity-based explanation for crop rotation, one that does not usually appear in the literature and which I have not yet listed. Rather than saying that the land becomes tired, they say that the seed becomes tired. They say that if they plant potato seed in the same place every year, it loses its energy and they have to bring in new seed from elsewhere. By rotating their fields every year, they can use their native varieties of seeds indefinitely without buying or trading for new. This explanation may blur into the pest control one, as rotation helps maintain seed stock disease and parasite free, but I understand them to mean something more: that the vigor of the seed itself is maintained by rotating sectors.

While the three explanations above are offered directly by villagers to explain their rotation system, the territorial defense explanation can be inferred from what they say in other contexts. After the boundary marking ("*deslinde*") of Qochayoq's disputed southern boundary with Chupani in 1990, for example, an event that ended in a hostile confrontation between the villagers in Ccachín and Chupani, community officials in Ccachín complained privately that their compatriots in Qochayoq deserved much of the blame, because they hadn't asserted their rights earlier by using the land (see Chapter 13). I took them to mean "using" or "working" the land in the agricultural sense, as none of Qochayoq's potato fields are in the Chupani sector, and while there is some herding in the zone (precarious because of the conflict), there is little visible evidence of Qochayoq's stake in the area.

Finally, a cultural explanation of the rotation system is indicated by such reasons given by the *comuneros* for its existence as "*por costumbre*" ('by custom') and "*por gusto no más*" ('taste, nothing more'). Gose (1991) notes that the former expression is most

often used in the Andes to explain an act that cannot be appropriately discussed at length in articulated speech, so it cannot be assumed to refer to custom as such (though clearly, simply following the pattern of what has been done before or is done in other domains may be one of the unarticulated proximate explanations subsumed within). The latter, "*por gusto*," is a less equivocal response, and the one time I heard it used with reference to *maway* rotation, the *comunero* pointed out that the *grama* in this sector makes good fertilizer, animal manure is always used to supplement the natural fertility of the soil anyway, and that in comparison, the village gardens, found at the same altitude, are cropped annually. The implication was that they could work the *maway* sectors more intensively if they wanted to.

The tendency in the Andes in general is toward reduction in the fallow period and expanded privatization as population increases and as greater market opportunities emerge (Campbell and Godoy 1986; Orlove and Godoy 1986; Orlove et. al. 1996). Due to the agrarian reform and an increased land base, this tendency has not been as sharp in Ccachín as it has in many areas of the Andes, but intensification of production can be seen in the sectors closest to the community (the *maway zone*), when contrasted with the higher and more distant sectors (the *hatun tarpuy* zones). The former are planted 20-25% of the time (measured in years), while the latter remain at more historic levels of 10-15%. Since change has occurred in most all the relevant social and cultural domains, it is difficult to separate out the individual effects of these changes on the system as a whole. The use of fungicides, insecticides, and hybrid and treated seeds are becoming increasingly common, providing alternative solutions to the use of sectoral fallow to control disease and parasites and to maintain quality seed stock. Territorial disputes are increasingly arbitrated by the State, reducing the role of collective boundary markings and plowing the land to legitimatize property rights. Private, individuated styles and solutions are gaining over collective, participatory ones in a host of cultural domains due to changing circumstances, changing opportunities, or changes in cultural ideals brought about by Westernization, reducing the hold of traditional models and patterns. Mechanical technology and regeneration of the soil are the two areas where there has been the

least change, with the former marked by the relatively recent substitution of metal for wood in the cutting edges of foot plows, hoes, and other hand tools but by no change in the type of traction. The latter continues to be based on the direct application of animal manures at the time of planting. Were inexpensive, high-quality fertilizer to become available, the link between agriculture and pastoralism could be weakened, inducing further changes in the system (Guillet 1984).

The sectoral fallow system in Ccachín is premised on and conditioned by the complementarity and competition that exists between agriculture and pastoralism in a particular ecological context, with a particular level of technology, and a mode of production based on both. Rather than identify the most critical factor for the system in a world where so much is changing, it is sufficient here to emphasize that changes in any of these factors can modify the system, and changes in all of them can lead to its dismantlement. Change affects the production zones differentially, however, and given increasing agricultural demand, we are likely to see continued expansion of the system into the higher and more distant zones, with the opening of former pasture for agriculture in the short and medium term, and further intensification of the lower sectoral fallow areas close to the community. Given their distance and ecological precariousness, it is unlikely that communally-regulated sectoral fallow in the higher outlying areas will disappear anytime soon.

Resource Use and Tragedy of the Commons Effects

"Tragedy of the Commons" refers to the crowding and overuse of common property when there is no regulation on use; where individuals have an interest in increasing their use of a public sector, whatever others do. It is an example of how the sum total of rational individual decisions can sometimes lead to collective irrationality, when all would be better off if agreements could be made and enforced to limit such increases. The paradigm case is that of overstocking on unrestricted grazing lands by herders, but excessive agricultural use, depletion of fishing grounds, and other natural resource problems offer examples as well (Hardin and Baden 1977).

A number of investigators have addressed the issue of tragedy of the commons outcomes in the Andes. Orlove (1976) concludes that centuries of cultivation and grazing with traditional organization and technologies have not caused serious erosion, landslides, or declining yields in the southern Peruvian Andes. He attributes this to natural mortality checks on animal populations, especially drought and heavy frosts, that keep herds below maximum sustainable yield, to the communally-regulated fallow system, that discourages individuals from shortening the fallow cycle on their designated plots, and to adaptive furrowing practices that retain soil by reducing runoff and create pseudo-terraces.

Around the same time, however, Whitaker and Wennergren (1976) report serious overgrazing, erosion, and productivity declines in the highlands of Bolivia. They attribute this to a misallocation of forage resources on communal lands resulting from the breakdown of indigenous institutions by Spanish colonization and modern economic growth. They recommend a system of community-regulated private property grazing permits to reduce grazing intensity to renewable limits.

LeBaron et. al. (1979) find overgrazing to be a problem, and suggest that it is not free competition for a common property resource as the tragedy of the commons model suggests, but pressure to maintain large flocks of sheep for mutton and manure and lack of awareness of erosion as a problem, that lead to nonoptimal collective decision making. Careful monitoring and communal management exists, but there is little incentive to voluntarily reduce grazing at the community level.

Guillet (1984) notes that overgrazing most often occurs at intermediate altitudes close to nucleated settlements. Quality pasture gives way to noxious weeds in these areas, and the sheep and goats grazed in these zones have a greater ground-trampling effect than autochthonous llama and alpaca grazed at upper altitudes. In general, he finds greater evidence for overgrazing than for excessive agricultural use. Guillet notes that endemic risks such as hail, frost, and drought and very low returns to capital in the upper agro-pastoral zones in comparison to the coast and highland valleys make it unlikely that peasants will shift to private control and intensified production in the sectoral fallow zones anytime soon.

In a more recent study, Gascón (1996) finds that 25% of the cultivated land on the Island of Amantani in Lake Titicaca has been eroded to the point of being uncultivable. He attributes this to overexploitation — particularly overgrazing during fallow periods — that has come about with population growth in a context where opportunities for labor migration are limited. He does not find fault with communal tenure and land management in Amantani, since communally-managed fishing resources in Amantani are not similarly over-exploited, and suggests that the efficient use of resources does not depend on the system of property rights as such — at least not exclusively so — but on the full spectrum of interests and opportunities that condition individual and collective decision making.

How effective has communal-management been in maintaining environmental quality in Ccachín? As indicated in Chapter 1, the community has likewise experienced rapid population growth in the last century. Do we see the kind of resulting degradation reported by Gascón for Amantani? If there are differences between the two communities, what might explain them?

According to informant reports and visual inspection, it appears that the land at intermediate altitudes around the village nucleus suffers the greatest stress. Some of the sectors closest to the village have long been left to pasture, although the scars of the land bear evidence that they were once cultivated. The former *maway* sector on the south slope between Umpalla and the village has not been worked for decades. People say that population growth and the increased need for nearby pasture led to the abandonment of cultivation in the area. One might expect population pressure to increase the intensity of agricultural exploitation close to the village, but the diminished use of the steepest of these areas for agriculture has to be considered with reference to the potato lands gained from the former Rayankancha hacienda, which have expanded Ccachín's land base and eased some of the pressure for further intensification around the village.

The fields immediately below the village to the east and south have suffered the greatest degradation. The slope in this zone is steep, 30-40% inclination on average, but not prohibitive for agriculture. The dominant grass is an exotic that has invaded the area,

"*grama*" (*Pennisetum clandestinum*). Cutting, burning, and domestic animals have destroyed the bushes and trees that used to anchor the rustic terraces maintaining the integrity of the land when it was cultivated, and the embankments that used to contain the soil are largely in ruin, their stones littering the surface. A wood lot of autochthonous species immediately west of the village has disappeared within memory of older villagers. The *grama* that now predominates helps to stem erosion, but it provides low quality forage, and according to Venero et. al. (1987:79), it constitutes "an almost insurmountable barrier if the *comuneros* try to cultivate this land anew." As one of my *compadres* forlornly put it, "before there were a lot of trees [in this zone]. Now, with this growth of population, of animals . . . there is no going back."

In their more detailed study, Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) do not find any appreciable carving or furrowing of the soil by erosion in their study of the environmental effects of herding in the communally-regulated fallow zones of Ccachín. The erosion that exists is by layers, reducing the depth of topsoil, of which there is little to spare (soil depths vary between 15 cm. and 40 cm., usually with slate below). Taking the comunidad campesina as a whole, they classify 85% of the cultivated land as slightly eroded, 8% as moderately eroded, and 7% as severely eroded. The most severely eroded areas are found where the slope is steepest; consequently, nearly all of this land is in the main potato planting zone rather than the *maway* zone. This is not to say that erosion is not tightly linked to agricultural activity, however. Almost 85% of the severe erosion is found in Qochayoq, which has no possibility of expanding agriculture into adjacent pasture areas because of its altitude. In this sense it is like Amantani, an agricultural island. Rayankancha, on the other hand, a relatively new *anexo* with considerable room for agricultural expansion, has no severe erosion. Only 2% of the cultivated land in Ccachín, which has expanded its communally-regulated fallow into Rayankancha since the agrarian reform, is severely eroded. In contrast, 30% of Qochayoq's cultivated land falls into this category. Hurtado Huamán et. al. report that, overall, the soil in the communally-regulated fallow zones has a high humus content and can be classified as "good." In relation to many Andean communities, Ccachín has a comparative advantage

in this regard, as it is favored by a moist climate that favors the recuperation of plant cover during fallow periods.

Hurtado Huamán et. al. consider that Ccachín's pastures are slightly underused rather than over-exploited territory-wide. They calculate existing demand to be 22,072 sheep units and carrying capacity to be 23,548 sheep units. While I suspect that the measurement instruments they used have a margin of error as great as the excess found (about 7%), in rough, qualitative terms, it suggests that the community is not presently suffering severe overstocking of its communal pasture when averaged over the whole. For the most part, however, this state of affairs appears to be the result of factors unrelated to communal management, as the community has no customary or statutory limits on household herd size or on the number of animals that can be in a sector, and when animals are excluded from or rotated between sectors, it is to protect agricultural production or building materials, not to improve pasture quality. Climatological constraints, theft, predation, and disease play a role in keeping herd sizes down (some of these have density-dependent components, others not), and environmental risk, declining family size, and alternative labor, market, and investment opportunities all affect individual decision making about whether or not to increase one's herd. In this sense, Orlove is right that natural mortality checks unrelated to nutrition help keep herd sizes below sustainable yield, and Gascón is right that more attractive investment opportunities can limit demand and forestall the crowding of a commons.[11]

Herding intensity is not evenly distributed throughout Ccachín, so aggregate supply and demand figures may be useful for rational collective management of the village pastures, but they tell us little about the quality of the pastures that are most used. The highest quality pastures are the ones most distant from village settlements, while pasture quality declines the closer the pastures are to village settlements. As one would expect, this corresponds to the pattern of herding intensity as well. With the exception of the land immediately adjacent to the corn zone, which is generally vacated to avoid animal damage while the crop is in the fields, the pastures closest to the community are the ones most used. One sign of overcrowding, with resultant degradation of the pastures,

is the invasion of exotic and unpalatable plants, a process documented by Venero et. al. (1987) and Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996). The *grama* that has taken root in the maway zone appears to be a partial exception to this because it is resistant to trampling, prevents erosion, and serves as forage, but it also crowds out higher quality pasture, and is less than ideal.

Another sign of overcrowding is in the health of the animals themselves. The weavers that pass though the village on tourist treks are horrified by the quality of the sheep wool that Ccachín women have to work with. It is difficult to spin, if snapped, it breaks, and would be unacceptable for sale in the world market. One weaver that I talked to, a sheep raiser from the State of Washington, attributed this to the lack of selective breeding and regular pasture rotation (Carol Etchemendy, personal communication). Since sheep eat new growth first, pastures that are constantly occupied never have a chance to rejuvenate themselves (the optimal cycle of entry and exclusion of animals for agriculture is not necessarily optimal for pastoralism). More importantly, rotation of pastures limits fecal buildup in an area and reduces the animals' contact with worms and other parasites. One of the reasons that herders give for taking their animals to pastures distant from the community is to avoid disease, so I assume that disease and parasites, especially of sheep, are a problem the closer one comes to the settlements.

One of the most frequent criticisms of the "tragedy of the commons" model is that it confuses "common property" with "open access" (National Research Council 1986; Runge 1986; McCay and Acheson 1987). Common property does not imply unrestricted entry and unregulated use as open access does, so the strict dominance of the free rider strategy cannot be assumed to apply as it does in the open access model, which treats the structure of the commons as a prisoner's dilemma. Runge goes so far to suggest that the communal management is more like a coordination problem or assurance game, where achieving Pareto-superior outcomes requires building a critical mass of shared expectations assuring that resource conserving norms will be followed. In addition to the theoretical critique, many have also made the empirical observation that privatization often exacerbates overuse, and that as a negative byproduct, it contributes to inequality in

resource distribution (Recasens 1993 provides an example from the Andes). Given the high transaction and enforcement costs of private property and the randomness of natural events threatening highland agropastoralists, common property institutions may have a comparative advantage, and, in the main, continue to be popularly supported by *comuneros* in Ccachín and other Andean communities.[12]

The assurance model suggests that free-rider problems can be avoided in a common property system; it does not say that they will be avoided. A village can get locked into an equilibrium in which the range is over-exploited if conventions are not adopted that reinforce mutual expectations of cooperation. Homogeneity appears to be an important factor in achieving optimal outcomes, as does the fairness of the convention (Runge 1986). The problem of overgrazing in pastures close to the settlement in Ccachín appears to be more intractable than, say, the problems of rotating agricultural sectors or of protecting straw grass in distant sectors for construction, because it differs from the latter on both counts.

One possible solution would be to restrict entry to particular sectors at particular times so that improved forage could be planted or so that natural forage could regenerate (Hurtado Huamán et. al. 1996). Not everyone herds in the same area, however, and those that have herding cabins in an area set to be closed would be more prejudiced by the closure than those who use it only as a day area (as one might expect, such cabins are common in Pampallaqta, Toqllana, and other sectors where overgrazing is greatest). The sectors close to the community are thoroughfares for passage to more distant areas, making them even harder to close. While not insurmountable, these factors complicate achieving agreement at a community assembly, and any such decision increases overall enforcement costs. The more sectors closed, the more vigilance required to detect naturally roaming animals. In addition, many may ignore the norm unless there is wide-spread agreement about its fairness and utility. The limited utility of the restriction on pigs in certain sectors is a case in point (see discussion in Chapter 10).

Heterogeneity in herd size further complicates collective management of communal pastures. Herding strategies vary with herd size, especially of sheep. The households

with large flocks use the most distant pastures and operate from herding cabins, while households with small flocks tend to herd closer to the village and return nightly to the village center. As Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) notes, the households with the largest herds consequently use the best pastures and cause the least environmental impact, while the vast number of households with smaller herds cause the greatest environmental impact both through aggregate overgrazing, and from the erosion caused by the daily movements of their animals to and from the village. Given this situation, a limitation on absolute number of animals any one family can have will not solve the environmental problem, and any restrictions on herding close to the village are potentially perceived as unfair. Perhaps for this reason, technical solutions to the problem of low body weight of animals — solutions under the control of individual households, such as improved veterinary practices — tend to be favored over regulatory ones, and consensus is more easily reached to use community institutions to facilitate technical change than it is to make organizational changes.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. My breakdown of production zones can be most directly compared with that of Kervyn and CEDEP Ayllu (1989), who use the concept in a sample of fourteen communities within fifty kilometers of Cusco. They identify five such zones: 1) an irrigated fenced zone, 2) an irrigated unfenced "corn" zone, 3) an unirrigated "wheat" zone without sectoral fallow, 4) an unirrigated sectoral fallow zone, and a nonagricultural zone of woodlands and pasture lands. Ccachín has zones partially equivalent to the first two of these zones, but they are not irrigated. There is no equivalent to zone 3, but some outside development specialists have suggested that they create one (see discussion of grain mill project, Chapter 10). Kervyn and CEDEP Ayllu note that some communities in their sample subdivide zone 4 into high and low zones with different patterns of rotation, and as there is a salient difference in the way people think of and talk about these zones in Ccachín, I have separated them in my scheme. I have likewise divided zone 5, the nonagricultural areas into three separate zones to better reflect local perceptions and to make it less of a catch-all category. As Mayer (1989) notes in his review of Kervyn and CEDEP Ayllu's paper, we need to become a bit more "cattle-centric"("*ganadocéntricos*") in our use of the production zone concept (i.e., a little less "agro-centric"), and my divisions here are in this spirit. I have attempted to be true to perceptually significant divisions at the emic level, and I provide the accompanying local names where possible. The zones as thus titled are not designed for cross-cultural comparison, but I hope that I have provided enough accompanying information about the characteristics of each zone that the information can be used for comparative analysis.

2. People have experimented with jam production using elderberry and native blueberries, but the large quantities of sugar used in jam make it unlikely that it will become anything more than a novelty. Some *Club de Madres* in communities and *pueblo jovenes* closer to Cusco with better capitalization, production, and marketing opportunities have produced elderberry jam for the commercial market.

3. These are my extrapolations from Hurtado Huamán et. al (1996, *cuadro* 4). They estimated total corn production in Ccachín during the season 1995-96 to be 242,250 kg. That is to say, about 200 families produced a total of 9537 bushels of corn on 630 acres, a yield of fifteen bushels per acre per year. During the years that I was conducting fieldwork in the village, my family, hobby farmers in the upper Midwest United States, averaged 54,750 bushels a year on 438 acres, a yield of 125 bushels per acre. The high yields came from the use of hybrid seeds and chemical inputs. If one goes back to the time of my grandparents, however, when less than one percent of the farmers in the U.S. used corn hybrids (0.1% in 1931), corn yields averaged 1,538 kg./ha. or 24.5 bu./acre, figures still larger than, but much closer to, the figures in Ccachín (Grolier 1995).

4. Among the other factors that affect how early a household will plant and harvest is the presence of *k'aylla* ('parrots'; *Aratinga mitrata*), which descend on the upper Lares Valley in huge flocks as the corn matures. They do considerable damage to the corn crop in the lowest-lying fields in the sector, and the owners of these fields harvest earlier than the rest to minimize the damage of predation. Deer also do considerable damage in some of the lower-lying cornfields.

5. The term *raymi* more broadly means "festival" or "rite." The similarity and association of the terms *laymi* and *raymi* is curious. "L"s and "r"s are sometimes interchanged in Quechua, as with the potato type *runtu* or *luntu*. I don't know if the term *raymi* as used to refer to land distribution events originally derived from *laymi*, or if the association is happenstance.

6. Apparently he had received, or thought that he had received, the permission of the assembly to use three hectares in the site known as Challwanka). However, there were only twenty-three *comuneros* remaining at the end of the meeting when the decision was made. At a subsequent assembly it was determined that his petition was improperly made and that he would have to present a new petition to the community. My impression was that he was running into problems with the assembly because a) he had lived away from the community most of his life and did not have an extensive network of allies, b) the community had ongoing land disputes with his father and uncle (unrelated to his petition) that gave his family a bad name, c) having lived in Cusco for so long, he was unfamiliar with community procedures, and d) he felt himself to be better educated, and more modern and forward looking than the people who had lived in Ccachín all of their lives, and this came out in his presentation of self to the assembly. As an indication of the latter, he complained to me that people in Ccachín aren't interested in bettering themselves, that they go on living their customary lives, and that they don't know how to plan community projects. He projected that he would be able to produce 500 guinea pigs a year for Cusco restaurants using improved forage. He said that he planned to feed the trout rotten meat, viscera, and blood. He had the idea of hanging meat over the holding ponds, so that the *gusanos* ('worms') that are secreted would fall into the tanks and feed the fish. (I was pleased to find that I was sufficiently acculturated to know what he was talking about, as I had made the acquaintance of these "worms," as they rained down into my room through the ceiling from the jerky stored in the second story above.)

7. Based on the reports of key informants, Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) estimate that the average family in Ccachín burns four kilograms of dung per day as cooking fuel, 364 tons community-wide annually. If accurate, this represents about six percent of the total amount of dung produced by all domestic stock. From my experience, these are surprisingly high estimates. I can't identify a single household that I was familiar with that may have burned so much, and I saw little circumstantial evidence (people gathering, carrying, and stockpiling dung, etc.) to substantiate it. People who live in

herding cabins on treeless hillsides, however, do burn a substantial amount.

8. They are sometimes called *qolla*, the name given to natives of the *altiplano* of the *provincias altas*. There is an important contrast in the Andes between the agricultural communities of the north and the herding communities of the south, and it may be significant that the oldest dance group and one of the principal dances of the community is *qhapaq qolla* (*qhapaq* 'rich, powerful'; *qolla* 'person from the altiplano'), reflecting the importance of these outsiders in the local economy.

9. Occasionally someone will hire helpers to drive cattle to market, or some other special project that yields an immediate economic return to the sponsor. They then pay the day's wage ("*jornal*") current in the Lares Valley. Labor for agropastoral activities within the village is almost entirely secured through reciprocal labor or by payment in agricultural products. Hurtado Huamán (1996) report that only 4% of Ccachín households paid day wages for agricultural labor in 1995-96, and the percentage was most certainly less when I was conducted my research.

10. When picks are used, it is because the entire surface needs to be worked. As Morlon et. al. (1996) note, because of the amount of labor required, such complete plowings are only used on land which will be cropped in consecutive years, so that the extra investment will be compensated by a longer production cycle.

11. Left unexplained in this analysis is why so many households pasture their cattle outside of community territory in Ichhu, Pan de Azucar, Palanganayoq, and Platería when there is still room for expansion within the community. Measured in travel time, the costs of maintaining distant herds is much greater. One possibility is that the underused areas within the community are at altitudes unsuitable for cattle. Another possibility is the *comuneros* have hopes of establishing private property rights to land outside of community territory. A third possibility is that the *comuneros* do not perceive any surplus.

12. Whether once in place, communal institutions brake technological change, or permit and facilitate it, is a hot topic in Andean research, but goes beyond the "tragedy of the commons" debate itself. See Gonzales de Olarte et. al. (1987), Kervyn (1988), and Cotlear (1989) for an overview of the debate.




Figure 2.1: The *Comunidad Campesina* of Ccachín




Figure 2.2: Tenure and Intensity of Land Use in Ccachín




Figure 2.3: Agropastoral Zones in Ccachín (Following Venero et. al. 1987)



Figure 2.4: Men Using Foot Plows at a *Papa Yapuy*




Figure 2.5: Ccachín's Trade Networks




Figure 2.6: Labor Migration and Emigration from Ccachín

Table 2.1: Communally-Regulated Sectoral Fallow Cycle





Table 2.2: Labor Migration Opportunities in Ccachín

Destination	Type of Work	Time	Gender
La Convención — Lares Valley	agricultural	two months or less	primarily male
Ollantaytambo — Inka Trail	tourism: porter service	five-day trips	male
Madre de Díos	gold mining	three-month contracts	male
Urban areas: Calca, Cusco, Arequipa, Lima	housekeeping, cooking, bakery, construction, factory, trucking aid	indefinite (typically six months to three years); sometimes permanently	female and male

Table 2.3: Ccachín's Agricultural Calendar



Chapter 3

The Web of Expectations

Introduction

In the first two chapters I focused on the history, ethnic composition, spatial organization, and modes of production in Ccachín. In this chapter, I offer a more personal overview, providing a variety of short profiles of social life in the community organized around the topic of how villagers dealt with my presence and assigned me a social identity. The chapter has three parts. First, I discuss a variety of specific roles that I played and expectations that I tried to meet during my time in the village. Second, I discuss *compadrazgo* ('ritual co-parenthood'), the framework within which many of these roles were activated. *Compadrazgo* is sometimes said to be the principal organizer of social life in the Andes (Montes de Castillo 1989). Finally, I discuss some suppositions and expectations that some villagers had of me that I tried to dissuade them from having because they interfered with my sense of self, my well-being, and my fieldwork.

Playing Roles

People addressed me in various ways in Ccachín, most often using a term of relationship rather than my name or an honorific. The terms used were *hijo* ('son'), *wayqe* and *hermano* ('brother' of a man in Quechua, 'brother' in Spanish), *tio* ('uncle'), *papá* ('father'), *compadre* ('co-parent'), *compañero* ('comrade', 'companion'), *wasimasi* ('neighbor'), *paisano* ('fellow citizen'), *hijo de Ccachín* ('son of Ccachín'), *Don* Esteban, and *wiraqocha*. *Don* is a Spanish term of respect most often used in Ccachín with reference to male heads of household, and *wiraqocha* is used as a general term of respect for men in Quechua (*wiraqocha* literally means 'lake of fat'), though given the subordinate social position of Quechua speakers, in recognizing status it incidently reflects the structure of stratification in the Andes. Men who had a brother or uncle with the same

name as mine — *Esteban* — often used the corresponding relationship term for me as well. *Wasimasi* was used by some next-door-neighbors without the wider sense of townsperson that *vecino* carries in Spanish (*llaqtamasi*, while not normally heard, would be the Quechua equivalent of the latter). *Papáy* was mostly used by children and as a term of familiarity within my family. The traditional Quechua equivalent *tayta* is heard in Qochayoq and higher up on the *puna*, but it is not now common in Ccachín. As time went on and I entered into *compadrazgo* relations with people, I was called *compadre* by increasing numbers. The network extended out widely, as parents, children, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, and cousins of my actual *compadres* freely adopted the term. Although I eventually established *compadrazgo* relations with the family I lived with, neither they nor I ever used the term among ourselves.

Taking Pictures

There is no clear distinction made between *gringos* and *turistas* in Ccachín, and while it may have done my ethnographic ego good to protest that I was the former but not the latter, there were worse statuses that I could have worn.[1] Tourists are associated with cameras, and my anthropological lens belied my protests. Community photographer was but one of the more-or-less mutually-acceptable statuses I was called on to play in Ccachín, a status growing directly out of their classification of me as a *turista*. I took many photographs in Ccachín and I was informally recognized as community photographer. When it came time to leave, villagers said, "you can't leave, who will take our photos for us?"

There are places in the Andes where photographs are thought to steal a person's soul (Meisch 1984), so I proceeded with caution in learning the local norms. There were times when due to the solemnity of an occasion, fear that it was inappropriate, or a desire not to disrupt, such as at wakes in people's homes, burials in the cemetery, and ceremonies in the church, that I did not take photos unless specifically asked by someone with authority. I was sometimes dissuaded from taking a photograph by the frowns of elders, but I was also sometimes chastised by the elders for having too cautiously refrained.

Taking photos was a matter of constant negotiation, not because photos were not generally desired, but because the photos they wanted me to take and the photos I wanted to take usually differed. I wanted naturalistic photos — people captured in the acts, contexts, and settings that they would occupy were the camera not there. They wanted portraits, with attitude, costume, relationships, and setting carefully portrayed, replicating the ideal of Calca and Cusco church-step photographers and retouched Spanish-style wedding portraits that they were familiar with. I took to carrying two cameras to meet the needs of both, and came to understand that I could learn as much from their way of framing things as from my own. Young people often wanted two pictures taken, one in *pallay poncho*, the other in *mestizo* dress. The requested compositions that most surprised me were those of older men seated at the grave site of their mother or father embracing the headstone, images with no equivalent in Western society.

Many families have a handful of photographs carefully guarded in plastic bags on shelves in their homes, going back as many as fifteen years. These were generally taken while in the military, on pilgrimage to Qoyllur Rit'i or Huanca, while working in Cusco or Lima, or by tourists. During the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of Ccachín as a *comunidad campesina*, a Calca photographer, native of Lares, appeared for the festivities. I realized then that I was not only playing someone else's already established role, but affecting his livelihood. The photographer charged 1,800,000 *intis* per photo, 800,000 *intis* beyond his costs of production. The ten photos that he took would have yielded him four million *intis* net for the day ($4.00), about twice the local day's wage rate, once travel costs were discounted. In contrast, I provided photos as gifts, in barter for corn or potatoes, or at token cost.

Several young people in Ccachín have purchased cameras at the Calca or Cusco markets. Like many cheap black-market consumer goods that attract *campesino* youth (watches, radios, cassette players), these purchases have high operating costs or are of such poor quality that they aren't used more than a few times. While the status of photographer was mutually beneficial, I was uncomfortable with the unintended but foreseeable byproduct of influencing people's tastes and wants. I was concerned that I was

engendering dependency. The answer to the question "who will take our photographs?" should be that they should be able to take their own.

The motives people in the village have for wanting photographs are personal, but cameras have the potential to allow campesinos to represent their thoughts and experiences to a wider world. *Los Talleres de Fotografía Social* (TAFOS) puts cameras directly into the hands of campesinos and residents of the *pueblos jovenes* and provides the technical assistance and forum needed to present their work. TAFOS not only facilitates the expression of indigenous ways of seeing, communities who have received cameras have been able to use them to support land claims and document human rights abuses (TAFOS 1991). There are technical and organizational problems to surmount in making such tools available, and Ccachín is not among the communities in the TAFOS network, but a first step would be to place the camera alongside the typewriter in the inventory of goods under the safekeeping of the officers of the *comunidad campesina.*

Interpreter of the Outside World

In many parts of the world, people have the Peace Corps worker as a category in which to place the outsider. People in Ccachín don't have such a model because the Peace Corps is not active in the area.[2] The questions asked of me, however, indicated that I was taken as a representative of the U.S., and more generally of the "outside" world. I had been to places the *comuneros* hadn't, and I was associated with a world they knew only by radio. People often turned to me as an interpreter of that world.

The most frequently asked questions about the U.S. were agricultural: what kinds of crops we grew, what kinds of animals we raised. Villagers were fascinated by the technology (the tractors my father had), and the immensity of the corn fields. Sometimes, however, the questions were more existential. Allen (1988) reports that she was asked, "Do you have the same sun in your country?" and notes, "With time I came to realize that they were, in effect, asking whether I was a human being. Did I belong to this world or was I, like the *Machulakuna*, a visitor from another *timpu* existing in the light of another sun?" I heard similar questions. In the cemetery, honoring the ancestors on *Almakunaq*

P'unchay, the Day of the Dead, an old man once asked, "Do people die in your country?" Later, I heard him telling others of his question, reporting my answer that "yes, we die too," and playing the brunt of his joke on his naivete.

The majority of households in Ccachín have radios, and people listen to Radio Tawantinsuyo (Cusco) or Radio Quillabamba over breakfast and in the late afternoon. *Comuneros* are aware of global events to a degree that belies the image of the closed and isolated peasant life. Ethnographers sometimes have their ears tuned to stories about the *machula* ('ancients') who lived by the light of the moon, but fail to note their subjects fascination that humans have walked on the moon. With someone who looks like they might know about such things in their midst, villagers in Ccachín want to know "the truth" of what they have heard of this wider world.

I was sometimes surprised by the cosmopolitan knowledge I encountered in our conversations. One day, talking with a group of men at a fiesta, someone reported hearing on the radio that the U.S. expected to put a person on Mars in the 21st Century. This led to a discussion of the first moon landing, which my informants were able to accurately date to the late 1960s. How do people in Ccachín make sense of these facts? What meaning do they have for their lives? While people are out in the fields wielding foot plows, airplanes pass overhead. I once bought a dance costume from a *compadre* as a favor to help him pay for a trip to Arequipa to talk to his wife who had recently separated from him. Arequipa is a day's trip from Cusco by bus, the standard way for campesinos to go there. I was surprised upon his return to find out that he had used the money to go by plane. He said that he did it because he wanted to know what it was like. People constantly asked about my plane trips to Lima and the U.S., and I can't help but wonder about my role in modeling behavior in the village, especially among those I was closest to.

I was struck by the fascination with power that many questions revealed. While I was in Ccachín, momentous events took place in world politics, not least of which was the transformation of the Soviet Union in 1989. The questions directed at me most often took the form of comparisons of the great powers: "Who is more powerful, the United

States or Russia?" "Who is more powerful, the United States or China?" "Who is more powerful, the United States or Japan?" The countries most often mentioned were the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and Cuba, in that order.[3] While we think of the weight that the prospect of nuclear winter has on the psyche of Westerners, people in Ccachín likewise expressed concern to me that a war between the superpowers could destroy the entire world. I suspect that in part this being in awe of power made Fujimori's electoral success in the countryside possible: his Japanese heritage was interpreted as an emblem of success.

During the time that I conducted my research, the United States was directly involved in two wars: in Panama, and with Iraq. The invasion of Panama occurred while I was in the United States for a few months. People in the village were aware of the mounting tensions when I left in late 1989. When I returned in February 1990, my adopted family was relieved to see me, telling me that they had been worried that Bush had sent me to Panama to fight and that I had been killed.

I was again in the States on a brief trip when the Gulf War started. When I returned to Ccachín, people were abuzz with talk and questions about the war. A number reported to me where they were and what they were doing when they heard the news. Villagers feared another *guerra mundial* ('world war'). When news reached the village that the war had started, many young men of draft age fled to their herding huts in the hills because they feared that the *guardia civil* (the State police) would come and haul them off to war. The former partner of one of the school teachers had been in the United States for military training, and the radio reported that another thousand Peruvian soldiers were being sent to the U.S., lending credence to their concern. A *compadre*, one of the few men in the village who had served in the military, told me that people were saying that even those who had already served wouldn't be exempt. He risked it, however, and did not leave. Military service for males is obligatory, but unless a young man goes to high school in the provincial or department capital, they are usually able to avoid it.

Along with the concern about a *guerra mundial* came a fear that chemical bombs would contaminate the air in the village. There was considerable discussion and specu-

lation on the matter. One community official expressed his hope that the altitude and the geography of the Lares Valley would protect the community from chemical fallout. The outbreak of cholera in Peru coincided with the Gulf War, and many made the association between the chemical weapons and the epidemic, the former believed to cause the latter.

Whenever I was with a group of men, they asked me who was winning the war. There were strategic aspects that caught people's fancy, and several commented on a particular case of cunning in which the Iraqis constructed tanks out of cardboard to decoy the U.S. planes. They were impressed with the ingenuity of the Iraqis and gullibility of the gringos. People in the village wanted the United States to win, no doubt because their relationship was with a North American rather than with Iraqis. The Peruvian news media supported the Western war effort, so the information people received on the radio reinforced this preference. One *comunero* expressed it in more religious terms, "The Iraqi's don't honor the same God as we do; they are not Christians."

Sponsorship of Community Events

While *compadrazgo* helps create a network that binds one to a community through its individual members and helps establish membership identity, its selective nature also creates jealousies and resentments. I had to say "no" to requests more often than I said "yes." Another kind of ritual sponsorship in the village is more inclusive and community-oriented. The sponsorship of recurring community events is institutionalized through the *cargo* system, but there are many one-time ceremonies and needs where pledges from patrons are sought. The patron's responsibilities are event specific and end with the fulfillment of the pledge. Such patrons are likewise called *padrinos*, and the existence of this role provided me an opportunity to reciprocate the official approval and community-wide tolerance of our stay.

During our fieldwork, Barbara and I were named *padrino* for several events and fundraisers for the church and the school. On each occasion, we were presented with a letter of invitation by the committee organizing the event. The most prestigious of these events was the inauguration of the newly-roofed church in 1990. A letter was sent to the

archbishop of Cusco inviting him to be first *padrino*. Villagers hoped that he would donate a statue of a saint, but he did not respond. Left with the "dignitaries" at hand, I was named first *padrino*, Barbara second, a teacher from Choquecancha third, and a Yerbabuenayoq storekeeper fourth (ranking, ostensibly done for honor, also heightens the competition and the expectations). During the ceremony, each of the *padrinos* broke a bottle of champagne against the church and was asked to make a speech. When it came time to announce our contributions, Barbara and I huddled with members of the organizing committee to determine what was appropriate. They listed the needs: wood flooring, a balcony, bells, and *turnos* ('hand-carved display cases') for the various saints. We decided upon new cases for the Virgin of Guadalupe and St. Isidore, but due to difficulties in integrating the first into the existing structure, we later changed the Guadalupe project to flooring. It took a year and-a-half to get the *turno* for San Isidro made by a Calca furniture-builder, and during that time, many villagers wondered aloud if we would ever meet our promises. Delivery of the flooring also proved problematic. The floor in the church was laid, but remaining funds were to be used for the floor in the community hall, and there are reports that the official in charge embezzled the money.

Besides the *comunidad campesina*, graduating classes at the school and soccer teams often seek benefactors, and elite individuals from Lares or Calca often respond. On a smaller scale, any kind of private inaugural event, such as the opening of a storefront, is also an occasion for naming *padrinos*, if only for the buying of a round of drinks for all. The role is open to abuse by people hoping to trade honor for material goods. I was once named *padrino* of someone's birthday party, but it is not a customary role, and I declined to accommodate. It was later said of the individual that "*él sabe engañar*" ('he knows how to take advantage'), and misuse of the custom is looked upon with the same disfavor as abuse of *compadrazgo*.

Message Carrier

Few people leave Ccachín permanently to live in urban centers. However, it's common for young people between the ages of 15 and 25 to work in Calca, Cusco, or

Lima for varying lengths of time, and some, particularly women, marry and stay. Schooling at the public high school or at the Salesian boarding school in Calca and military service take young people out of the community. With the limited long-distance communication networks in Peru, Ccachín parents may not hear from their children for extended periods of time. In some cases, when years have passed, they no longer know where their children are, nor if they are dead or alive. Young men are worse than young women in keeping their parents informed. They are more mobile, and the opportunities available to them are often more distant and dangerous.

There is no mail or telephone service to Ccachín. While there is ostensibly mail service in Calca, the nearest dependable service is in Cusco. The postal service is only used for official correspondence, such as with Ccachín's sister parish in Germany, and letters are sent and received through the Salesian parish house in Calca. The most common form of sending messages back and forth between city and country is by word-of-mouth, through travelers from the village. However, there is sometimes a reticence to send important messages dealing with intimate family matters and financial arrangements in such a manner. Oral messages can also be sent through Radio Tawantinsuyo in Cusco. Such messages are read in both Quechua and Spanish and invariably end with encouragement to "pass the word." They are effective. Friends, relatives, and neighbors hear the news and pass it on. The messages commonly sent are about arrivals and departures ("Meet me with five horses in Yerbabuenayoq"), where one can be found ("I'm on my way to Puerto Maldonado to work"), public invitations to community events ("the *comunidad campesina* of Ccachín invites you to its kermess to raise funds for the school"), or requests for relatives to send money. They go in one direction only and are not cheap, costing almost as much as the truck trip to Ccachín. Truckers and passengers traveling between Yerbabuenayoq and Calca carry written messages, which are then passed from hand to hand until they reach the addressee. A limited number of people can write — many older people have to sign their name with a thumb print — but virtually

every family has a younger member that can serve as scribe. Reading and writing come easy to few, and those that can write, unless they hold an office that requires it, are not in the habit of doing so. "Writing" in this context, means Spanish, as no one has learned how to write Quechua, and most believe that it is only an oral language.

Given the limitations of the existing systems of communication, one of my roles became that of messenger between parents in Ccachín and their teenage and adult children in Cusco and Lima. It was a service that I provided for my adopted family and *compadres* within the context of reciprocal exchange, and they often sent along a gift pack of potatoes, beans, or jerky for the recipient as well. Others who knew that I would be traveling also sent messages. I carried messages between Cusco and Ccachín for a half-dozen families on a regular basis, to Arequipa and Lima the few times I went, and for many others on request.

Skar (1994) notes that letters in the Andes are not usually conversational. The messages I carried, however, were taped, allowing people to go beyond the constraints of writing. People spoke naturally and unselfconsciously into the recorder, going on at length. The tape recorder had the advantage of offering people the opportunity to express themselves in Quechua, and allowed everyone in the family to participate. People spoke emotionally and in intimate detail about family problems, giving advice on employment and instructions on how to deal with financial and legal matters that needed to be taken care of in the city. They also received such messages in kind, establishing a dialog, with relatively rapid feedback on their requests and concerns. Children in the city often sent money for their parents, and notebooks and school supplies for their brothers and sisters. People's trust and confidence in me as a messenger was surprising given their frequent efforts to conceal the same information from their own relatives. Seibold (1990) records that she judged her incorporation into Choquecancha by her control of information, so that she arrived at the point of knowing details that others didn't. Van Gennep (1960, as cited in Skar 1994) describes the letter as a kind of sign that wins recognition for the traveler, automatically incorporating the carrier into the receiving group. However, I doubt that if I had been completely incorporated into the community, I would have been

so privy to such details, or would have been able to play my messenger role to the extent and with the received trust that I did. As an outsider, I may have been able to cross household boundaries more easily than the *comuneros* could themselves.

Giving Gifts and Lending Money

Sharing is one of the spheres in which, as ethnographers, we bring the most cultural baggage with us to the field, and one in which we least recognize that we are doing so. In our efforts to become part of the ebb and flow of the daily life of a village, sharing is a centrifuge that continually spins to the surface all the differences in class, wealth and status that stand us apart. It brings to the surface gut feelings about equity and reciprocity; it prompts us to raise our social antennas to protect us from being taken advantage of out of cultural ignorance. In doing fieldwork, ethnographers tend to be generous for emotional and practical reasons, but we want to be generous on our own terms.

Nicolas Peterson (1993) points out that despite the great attention that anthropologists pay to sharing, giving, and exchanging, commonplace behaviors are neglected ethnographically because of the particular ethical construction that Westerners place on generosity — that of unsolicited and altruistic giving.[4] Specifically, he challenges the underreporting of demand sharing by anthropologists. If we so often miss it, it may be because of our own preconceptions and emotional investment in the issue. Yet we negotiate our place in our field community by wading through a stream of such demands. Membership and relatedness are constantly produced and maintained through such social exchange.

Gift Exchange

Our relationship with our *compadres* was marked by the constant exchange of gifts in both directions. Most were in the form of food. We gave scarce and prized processed foods — sugar, rice, noodles, bread — and our *compadres* favored us by serving prestigious high-protein foods — a piece of meat or fried eggs — along with the

staples. On mornings when we were to be invited to a family celebration, on special feasts, or to say goodbye before we traveled, *compadres* would also come to our room with a pot of tea or coffee to serve us, and we were regularly inundated with gifts of corn, potatoes, beans, and eggs. Because of this generosity, I probably ate more protein than anyone else in the village while I was there. Since I attended so many private and public festivals, I also ate more of the most prestigious meat of all: guinea pig ("*qowi*"). The head of the *qowi* is the most prestigious part, and it is passed among the men to share according to rank. The highest ranking men, however, are typically the oldest, and since they usually had the fewest and poorest teeth, they would offer their share to me.

We did not usually give food items to people outside of our *compadrazgo* network, except for gifts of bread to some old women, who especially appreciated the gift because of their lack of teeth. We were invariably served food or a hot drink of coffee or herbal tea while visiting, and we were usually presented with a kilo or two of potatoes or corn to take to our room on leaving. Photographs took the place of food items as our reciprocal gift in non-*compadrazgo* gift exchanges. While in the home we were associated with prestigious nontraditional goods, in the fields, men associated me with a traditional good that was in short supply: coca. While most men found a plastic bag a convenient container for coca when they had some, I carried mine in a *wachala* (traditional carrying cloth for coca), inspiring approval. Even more than coca, people knew that I could be counted on to have a *llipht'a* ('compressed ash') to accompany it, a scarce item in the village (most coca is chewed without the *llipht'a*, but it helps release the stimulating alkaloids). The *llipht'a* endeared me to older men, who likewise enjoyed smoking pulverized coca leaves rolled in a page torn from my field notebook.

Colored ribbons and beads were popular gifts for *comadres*, but sometimes our western tastes conflicted with the local aesthetic and we later found with some embarrassment that a gift was redeployed to uses that we had not intended. In one instance, a striking black ribbon with a center band of colorful floral designs, purchased in the U.S. and given to adorn a *comadre*'s *montera* ('hat'), was last seen tied to a horse's tail in *gallut'ipiy*, a mounted rooster-grabbing contest. Other gifts proved more practical: when

we left the village, we divided up our pots, pans, kerosene stove, tools, and other items to distribute among our *compadres*.

Our gift-giving was always in the context of reciprocity, whether based on family relations, *compadrazgo*, friendship, or the courtesy of visiting. Some people tried to make demands on us outside of such situations. Usually, an appeal to equity was used: "you have helped others, but you haven't done anything for us." There were differences in the humility of people's approaches, but there were limits to how persistent they were willing to be, and except in the case of a few children, gift-seekers didn't express indignation if refused. Ccachín contrasted with the anonymous demands of Cusco in this regard, where, with a substantial tourist industry, begging is more aggressive and common.

All of my work in the fields was in *yanapakuy* ('helping'), without any explicit expectation of reciprocation with labor or products, which contrasted with the norms operative among the *comuneros* themselves. To spread myself around, I lent my unskilled hand to many families, though I most often worked with *compadres* within the generalized reciprocity of *compadrazgo*. During the harvests, I would be rewarded with produce at the end of each day. This is also standard practice among the *comuneros* themselves, and was not unique treatment for me. A portion of the day's harvest is distributed by the field owner to all that have helped that day who are not part of the immediate family, no matter how their labor has been recruited. This portion is referred to in Ccachín as *wanlla*, which means the "largest and well-formed produce" (Hornberger and Hornberger 1978). Ballón Aguirre et. al. (1992:75) suggest a second meaning of the term, "an overpayment" or "increase in the compensation to the workers with food products," and both definitions appear to be operative in Ccachín. Without being privy to individual agreements, it is hard to distinguish "overpayments" from "expected return," and it could be that in many if not most cases, the *wanlla* is essentially a *mink'a* payment ('remuneration of labor in products' rather than in labor or cash).

Apparently, *wanlla* is given both to repay labor and as a gesture that goes above and beyond any reciprocal labor that the participants can expect in return. It is curious,

however, that if *wanlla* signifies something extra, it is not referred to as "*yapa*," the little bonus that is given to favored customers in barter or commercial exchange and which can refer to any extra gift or benefit. While Gose (1994) questions whether *ayni* is ever used to recruit labor during the harvest, my understanding is that it is among the modes that are used in Ccachín. In such cases, both labor and products are exchanged, and the practice may have practical effects is redistributing seed stock and maintaining diet variety, even though unlike *mink'a*, it does not increase the receiver's overall consumption of the good. In a typical cornfield the *wanlla* is about an *arroba* ('twenty-five pounds') of the day's harvest, and in the potato fields it is about two *arrobas*, just the right amount to carry back to the village in a *q'epina* cloth. Specific piles are prepared by the sponsor for specific workers rather than assigned at random, and there is variation in the amount, suggesting that there may also be contract, productivity, and status factors at play. When production is bountiful or meager, the amount is adjusted accordingly, but care appears to be taken to prepare a quality bundle.[5]

In contrast to Gose's (1991) experience, and despite the fact that I did not need labor in exchange, I was never singled out to be the only one who received a bundle of goods as compensation for my work. Gose suggests that because he did not have any land in his research village and therefore could not work on a truly reciprocal basis in *ayni*, the most plausible motive that villagers could construct for his presence in the fields was that he was looking for a woman . Thus, he writes,

> Only well into my fieldwork did I discover . . . that young men actually do show up uninvited to work in the fields of the parents of a woman they might be interested in. Apparently this is how my actions were being interpreted. . . . [And] in several work parties I, alone among the participants, was offered a packet of consumables identical to that which defines the "son-in-law." . . . The extra food and drink was probably intended to short-circuit any claims I might have been about to make on people's daughters. [Gose 1991:52]

I was in the field with my partner, and it's unlikely that I was seen as a claimant on anyone's daughters (see Knox-Seith 1995 for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of doing fieldwork as a couple). Perhaps this explains the difference, but I

doubt it. There's more than one reason why young men show up at work parties uninvited, I doubt that sexual interest is the first motive most villagers would suspect for an ethnographer's visit to their fields, and the need to create a favorable impression and maintain a good reputation alone could explain why an outsider's work is reciprocated in goods. If a meal was not provided by a field owner during the work, I was usually invited to their home for a meal or drink after, effectively repaying any debt that they may have felt that they had incurred.

Money-Lending

In a telling account, "Lessons from the Field: Gullibility and the Hazards of Money Lending" Cindy Hull (1992) talks about the admonitions she received from her advisors before doing fieldwork in Mexico, "Don't drink the water, always soak the beans . . . and never, ever loan money" (1992:130). She goes on to tell a story of escalated demands, brought on by her compassion and sympathy for a family that seemed poorer than most. First she and her husband provided a fellow blankets to buffer the winter cold, and then tarpaulins to block the wind pouring through holes in the walls of his house. Finally, as she puts it,

> When Don Gustavo asked for a [third] small loan, thirty pesos, for some thatch, we gladly loaned it to him. With that first loan we fell headfirst into the trap. . . . After the second small loan, we began to feel uncomfortable. I recalled the warnings about loaning money, though I had forgotten who had made them, revered faculty with many years in the field or embittered returning graduate students who had one negative experience. Yet, something began to eat at me. Something had gone awry. We had crossed an invisible line between friendship and patronism. [Hull 1992:133]

Patron-client relations are firmly established in Latin America, institutionalizing a model for asking and giving that often obscures the line between the positive and negative meanings of "patronization." Contreras Hernandez (1984) speaks of two kinds of *compadrazgo*, one horizontal, between *campesinos*, especially of the same community, and one vertical, between *campesinos* and non-*campesinos*, the latter including teachers, traders, *hacendados*, and government agents. He observes that the flow of benefits in

horizontal relations is most often characterized by symmetry, while the exchange in vertical relations is more often asymmetrical. These are analytical categories, and the judgement of asymmetry (with its implication of "exploitation") does not necessarily reflect the judgements of those involved, leading some anthropologists to speak of the "smokescreen of ideology" in *compadrazgo* relations. By definition, my relationship with people in Ccachín was "vertical," and in sheer economic terms, it was most often asymmetric in the reverse direction of the general pattern identified by Contreras, from the top-down rather than from the bottom up. Many of the benefits of the relation were nonfungible, however, and investments viewed as extravagant by rural Peruvian standards would be viewed as cheap by North American ones, complicating the assessment of where they fall on a scale of symmetry-asymmetry. I tried to be "fair" in my dealings, but realized that people in Ccachín had insufficient information about my global economic status to judge what was fair. In the material domain, I knew more about them than they knew about me.

Because the difference in economic resources seemed profound, I was a potential target for the kind of situations and petitions discussed by Hull, and I was concerned about not being taken advantage of by individuals, preventing a collective run on my resources, and avoiding the fostering of relations of dependency. Requests for outright gifts were rare, but some people made it known which of my possessions they most fancied and that they would like them when I left.

Most petitions that Barbara and I received came as requests for loans, since the resource that distinguished us most from the *comuneros* was ready cash, a scarce good in the village. Most often, the borrowers were *compadres*. In a rather idealized model of *compadrazgo*, Pitt-Rivers writes:

> The self-esteem of each person is compromised in this relationship, so that each is in the power of the other. For this reason, the *compadre* is the person par excellence from whom one asks to borrow money. One cannot refuse to loan it, nor to return it. Thus, *compadrazgo* imposes the debt of cooperation in a way that kinship does not. It imposes a courtesy in conduct, in words, and in sentiments, that are not given in any other relation. [Pitt-Rivers 1975:108]

I found it hard to deny *compadres*. Their intended use of the money varied. Most often, they needed to buy sugar or travel. Occasionally, one would want a short-term loan as capital to purchase goods for resale in Calca or the Lares Valley (e.g., cowhide, wool). Requests were more common in some seasons than others. Villagers are especially short of cash in the months preceding the potato and corn harvests of May and June. They have exhausted all but their subsistence crops, and animals don't bring a good price at this time. Cattle prices rise when the coffee harvest in the Lares Valley comes in, as traders from the Valley then have money to spend. At year's end, I was petitioned for loans to pay off other loans. Many families take out bank loans for agricultural inputs, and these come due at that time. If people do not pay off their bank loans, they are not able to secure another for the coming year.

Our *compadres* generally preferred to sell off crops or animals if the price was right rather than ask us for a loan, but when the price was low, they would come to us. In seeking our help, *compadres* preferred to sell a textile rather than ask for a loan. However, this depended on the intended use of the loan. Since the earnings of husbands and wives are not fully pooled, the income from textiles made by women is often not available to pay off agricultural expenses or other costs incurred by men.[6] Once, with one debt outstanding but in need of another, a *compadre* brought me a *lliklla* ('woman's shawl') made by his wife as a *prenda* ('pawn'). Months later, unable to generate the cash to repay me, he asked to substitute his *poncho*, because the *lliklla* was his wife's and not his to give. Despite the ideal described by Pitt-Rivers, I did not respond to all loan requests from *compadres*. My resources were limited, I decided not to give loans to pay off bank loans, and in some instances, repayment was a bad bet. But I did provide at least one loan to every *compadre* that asked. Some *compadres* received several loans because they established a trustworthy reputation in repayment.

During the early years of Alan Garcia's term as president, bank loans to *campesinos* were interest free. Villagers are familiar with interest payments, and bank loans to the community during my time there carried high monthly interest rates, but interest is not considered in repayment of debts between *comuneros*. Likewise, Barbara and I made all

our loans interest-free. Given the high levels of inflation in Peru, this usually meant that in terms of actual value, a substantial part of the loan was effectively forgiven. For example, one of the first loans we made was to a *compadre* for 200,000 *intis* to buy sugar. When he finally repaid us eight months later, the value of those *intis* had declined from $17.30 to $0.45 (forty-five cents). Given inflation and the steady increase in the *inti*-value of the dollar (Appendix 5), even loans that were quickly repaid lost value. In a sense, the no-interest mechanism allowed us to frame the transactions as loans rather than as gifts. It also made repayment, whose value lie in the good faith keeping of a commitment, possible.

Pitt-Rivers distinguishes the "debt of cooperation" involved in *compadrazgo* from that of kinship. The "debt of cooperation" of *compadrazgo* may better be stated in terms of the "expectation of balanced reciprocity," using Sahlins's typology (1972).[7] Pitt-Rivers also frames the giving and repaying of loans in terms of self-esteem, but it is difficult to differentiate the psychic and material rewards of self-identity. Self-esteem, like reputation, has both a backward and forward-looking sense: it projects expectations of one's behavior into the future, based on past experience. People have an interest in maintaining good reputations in *compadrazgo* relationships because the continuance of the relationship depends on it.[8]

On rare occasion, Barbara and I were approached for loans by people who were not *compadres* during our fieldwork. Sometimes it was for small amounts not worth the hassle of refusal, and some borrowers repaid, others did not. In other cases, they were for more substantive amounts. In one case, we loaned money to a woman fleeing the village from an abusive husband. In another, we were asked for a loan to help cover the costs of a festival sponsorship ("*cargo*"), but we declined. Another involved a case of *calumnia* ('calumny', 'slander'), in which a fellow from Ccachín was accused of stealing a cow by someone in another village, though the cow had originally belonged to and been stolen from him (or so we were told). The money was needed to meet costs associated with the *comunero*'s appearance before a judge. Given the immediacy and importance of the need

and the good reputation of the *comunero*, we made the loan, and he eventually repaid half of it.

Trading

At first, many *comuneros* assumed that I was in Ccachín to buy or sell something, and I had to make it clear that I was not in the village on business. The most common visitors to Ccachín are traders, many making annual or semi-annual rounds, some visiting the community more often. Traders typically go door-to-door through the village during major feasts and harvests: a Chinchero hatmaker who trades for textiles to sell in the Chinchero market, an Urubamba man trading sewing machines for cattle, *q'epiri* ('merchants carrying their goods on their back') selling pots and pans, children's clothes, batteries, synthetic yarn, beads and ribbons, radios — the manufactured consumer goods that villagers want and need. Most traders accept cash or barter for corn, potatoes, animals, and textiles.

Barbara and I rarely needed to buy local produce, because we were showered with plenty as gifts, in exchange for photos, and for our work during the harvests. Occasionally, and with some guilt, we would buy a few eggs from a child who stopped by our door to offer us some. Eggs were for sale because families needed money. Eggs were scarce because of a chronic chicken disease in the village, so they fetched a relatively high price, but protein consumption is limited, and the money was most often used to buy a kilo of sugar. The children needed the protein more than we. We ate more than half of our meals with others, and when it came time to cook for ourselves, we had more potatoes, corn, beans, and other foodstuffs than we needed.

Teachers in Ccachín complain about the high prices that villagers charge them for their agricultural products, and Seibold (1990) records that in Choquecancha, the people refused to sell the teachers food. The problem is one of establishing a fair price: teachers feel entitled to low prices as part of their compensation for their service to the community (a kind of supplementary payment to make up for the inadequate salaries they receive from the State), while the *campesinos* need to get a good price for the limited production

a family has available for sale. The teachers are a public good for the community, but receiving any price below the market one for their produce is a private cost that would have to be born by individual *comuneros*.

The one major food purchase we made was a pig for Barbara's *kacharpari* ('farewell'), and it turned into a major incident, with conflict between all parties to the sale.. We were warned by our host family that people would try to over-charge us, and they suggested that we have a *compadre* buy it for us, which we did. Within hours of the purchase, our family learned from a neighbor, daughter of the seller, that the purchase price had been 5,200,000 *intis*, not the 7,500,000 *intis* that our *compadre* had told us and that we had paid. This only confirmed our family's suspicion that people were out to take advantage of us and that nearly everyone else in the village was a thief. Our hosts proceeded to list all the times that they had been robbed by their own *compadres*, some of these *compadrazgo* relationships overlapping our own. Soon, the next door neighbor of the seller reported to another of our *compadres* that the selling price had been even less, 4,800,000 *intis*. With talk and accusations spreading through the village, the *compadre* that purchased the pig for us did not show up to help us butcher it as he promised that he would, nor did he later attend the party (his wife, our *comadre*, prepared *qowi kanka*, roast guinea pig, for Barbara and made a visit to our room before the party, but likewise did not attend). Meanwhile, the wife of the seller paid us a visit, complaining that our *compadre* had just visited her to collect 300,000 *intis*, the amount due in return change. She had heard from her neighbor that our *compadre* had already pocketed 2,000,000 *intis* in the deal, and she did not consider it fair that she return the change so that his share of the total sale would be even more.

When I caught up with our *compadre* and confronted him with what we had heard, he said that neither the seller's wife nor his neighbor were present for the sale and that they did not know the negotiated price. He suggested that we go together to talk with the seller the next morning. The morning came and he was not home (he was reportedly off checking that his burro was not in someone's cornfield), so I went to the seller alone. The seller confirmed that he had been given 5,500,000 *intis* for the pig, and that our

compadre had pocketed the rest. He said that this was not right and asked, "How could anyone charge two million *intis* to walk a pig that short distance?" (four day's wages to walk the pig a couple of hundred yards). Back home, one of the daughters in our host family agreed. She said that if our *compadre* had taken 500,000 *intis* for his help, it would have been different, but that he had gone beyond what was fair (we had given our *compadre* a t-shirt and a bag of squash seeds for his effort before finding out about the overcharge, so we felt that he had been adequately compensated). The consensus among our family, other *compadres*, and friends and acquaintances who knew about the incident was that our *compadre* had behaved improperly, and that we should ask him to return the difference.

Over the following weeks I approached my *compadre* on the matter several times. He maintained his innocence of any wrongdoing, but he was evasive about meeting with his accusers to clear things up. One day, without prompting, he brought the issue up for the last time. He said that his name had suffered. Rumors had reached his sister in Cusco, who was questioning him about the affair, and it had caused problems with his wife. He offered to pay me the difference to put an end to it. He gave me half on the spot, promising the rest when he had it. He never admitted guilt, and never gave me the rest, but with that, I took the issue to be resolved and our relationship returned to normal (by this time, Barbara was in the States). The amount of money was not large, but the principle seemed to span our respective cultures. Ideas about a fair return for labor, the respective stake of primary producers and middlemen, and reciprocal relations between *compadres* were all involved. I probably would not have pursued the matter to the extent that I did if my reputation had not been at stake. Likewise, my *compadre* was pushed to resolved the issue to preserve his.

The only other major items I purchased in Ccachín were textiles. As a rule, I bought only from my host family and my *compadres*, so that it was a natural part of *compadrazgo* exchange, and so I didn't get a reputation as a textile buyer in the village. I couldn't buy from everybody, and I didn't want to show favoritism outside of the cultural framework provided. Buying textiles within the context of *compadrazgo* provided an

acceptable reason to say no to people, and it kept the sales relatively private. My *compadres*, perhaps to avoid the envy of others, were reserved about discussing our relations with their neighbors.

Having made the decision to buy, the next task was to determine a just price for the textiles. Cusco textile buyers who came through the village in early 1991 reported paying between twenty and thirty dollars for a good quality *lliklla*. As most tourists in Cusco weren't willing to pay much more than that for a *lliklla*, they stored the best ones away in their homes for special customers and in hope of better times. This was on the high end of what the general traders were paying; the *comuneros* themselves reported that they typically received the *inti* equivalent of only fifteen dollars for a *lliklla*. Tourists on the weaving tours that came to the village during my stay paid from twenty to thirty-five dollars for *lliklla*. I did not negotiate with my *compadres* and host family when they wanted to sell a weaving I was interested in, unless I considered the price they asked to be too low. The villagers peg the value of their weavings to what they can buy with the money rather than to a cash value as such. The standard reference is to the price of a quintal of sugar (the dollar value of a *quintal* of sugar varied from about twenty to forty dollars in 1989-1992). Villagers reported that in the past, they could always buy at least one *quintal* ('one hundred pounds') of sugar by selling a *lliklla*. In early 1991, they reported that they needed to sell as many as four *lliklla* to buy the same amount of sugar that they could once buy with one. Given these expectations, the current value of a *quintal* of sugar was the minimum I was willing to pay for a weaving, whatever the market price in Cusco. The prices I ended up paying were generally higher than retail prices for Ccachín and Choquecancha textiles in Cusco and Ollantaytambo at the time, though lower than prices in the most expensive of the retail shops.

In her recommendations to Choquecancha women on selling *lliklla* to the international market, Seibold (1990) recommends that weavers charge about a hundred dollars for a good quality *lliklla*. A good quality *lliklla* represents 150-250 hours of work (spinning is done simultaneous with other activities, but weaving only overlaps with childcare). At a hundred dollars, the compensation to the woman for her labor is still

below that of a man, using the daily wage rate ("*jornal*") as a comparison.[9] Though one must also consider that the sellers have benefitted from the use of their weavings before they are sold, a hundred dollars is at best a compromise between "fair local market value" and a "just price" based on minimal considerations of equity. I tried to be fair in my dealings with my *compadres* by reaching agreements that were happy for both, but the prices I paid would probably be considered by some outside observers to exemplify exploitive class relations camouflaged by the ideology of *compadrazgo*. Voluntarism goes only so far and readily leads to contradictions; it cannot replace the fact that the villagers need better global terms of trade.

Place in the Status Hierarchy

A number of factors affect the status ranking of an ethnographer in an Andean village. These include gender, age, marital status, field methods, length of stay in the community, and the personality characteristics of the fieldworker. In discussing the etiquette of coca exchange, Allen (1988) reports that she was differentially ranked in status in Sonqo (Paucartambo, Cusco), according to context and the age and sex of those around her. Her status varied from the person with highest status in the group, to the woman with highest status (i.e., "on the border between men and women"), to occasionally, the person with lowest status. If she adopted a woman's traditional black skirt, she was automatically ranked as a woman, usually a young, low-ranking woman.

Allen notes that the lower status was, "in its way, a compliment and a mark of acceptance" (1988:129). Both one's outsider status (not only as outsider to the community, but as an outsider to the various levels of social identity that *comuneros* share, extending to the Nation) and one's high status ranking are mixed blessings. As outsiders, fieldworkers are often accorded more behavioral freedom than community members, and our conformity with villagers' expectations for their neighbors is appreciated, but voluntary. Deviance from the norm is more likely to be tolerated. As high-status outsiders, we have access to more social contexts than insiders. Status literally opens doors. But it also closes us to experiencing many activities from the perspective of

participants. Beyond the ascription of gender, a fundamental fact of life for insiders in a Quechua community is that status must be earned.

In contrast to most other professionals visiting the village (teachers, priests, government agents, development workers, tourist guides, and even a film maker), I did not present myself to the community as an authority on anything. I did not try to lead or be an agent of change. I presented myself as someone who wanted only to learn. Consequently, my status varied more than that of most other outsiders. For *runa* men, status in community-wide situations is determined by success in passing through the civil-religious *cargo* hierarchy, and by the holding of community offices. In private work parties and festivals, status is determined by skill and experience, which largely corresponds to age. Personality characteristics also play a part, so that dynamic individuals and gifted speakers are favored. The ranking of outsiders reflects their status as guests, and is consonant with their class position. As an outsider, I was unique in the length of time I was in the community and in the multiplicity of contexts I could be found. Outsiders are rarely a part of day-to-day labor activities, and take leadership or advisory roles in special projects, but I didn't fit the pattern. Consequently, I was ranked from junior to high-ranking male, depending on the context.

High status has its negative side for research: always on stage, it is impossible to stand back and take in the whole. I generally sought discrete, unobtrusive, social positions appropriate to my gender, but I was often pressured to join in at the center of activities. Status is represented by the assigning of titles. On several occasions, I was given the title of *capitán*, which, given my limited work skills, was an honor, but not the leadership position that the term traditionally implies. Once, I was named *capitán* of the men sent to dig the grave of an old woman who was a mother of a *comadre*. The rest of the gravediggers made the decisions of where to dig and how deep to go, and I did no more than take my turn digging and serving *trago*. When the funeral party was set to arrive, my coworkers made sure that I had the bottle in hand for show. Another time, named *capitán* of a work party to roof a schoolroom, I was given the first rafter pole, and asked to lead the procession of men carrying materials to the school. There seemed to be

both a measure of seriousness and playfulness in giving me these positions, and I interpret them as attempts to integrate me into circles of activity while recognizing my differentness.

Status is represented in seating arrangements and sequential ordering, and I had to constantly negotiate my social position in spatial terms. *Papa yapuy* ('potato plowing', provides a good example (recall Figure 2.4).

The plowing of the potato fields is done with a foot plow ("*q'orana*" or "*chakitaklla*") in teams of multiple pairs or threesomes of men ("*wiri*"), one wielding the foot plow ("*hayt'aq*"), the others turning over the clods with their hands ("*rap'aq*"). The *yapuy* is the most physically demanding of the tasks related to the potato crop, and the handling of the foot plow is an activity that separates men in their physical prime (twenty to forty years old) from older men, younger men, and from women. More than once during the plowing someone turned to me to say, "it's hard to be a man, isn't it?" My role in the plowing was always that of turning over the clods by hand, or, if there was a shortage of men with foot plows to pair up with, that of breaking up the clods with a wood club ("*q'asoq*").[10]

A *papa yayuy* has several roles. The sponsor of the event, the *chakrayoq* or *patrón* directs the operation, monitors the quality of the work, advises younger team members, and serves *chicha* and *coca*. Sometimes he is aided by a *bandón*, an older man well-experienced in *yapuy* who serves as his field boss. The lead *hayt'aq*, selected for his skills with the foot plow and ability to set the pace, is referred to as the *qollana* or *capitán*, the last, who follows behind the rest to urge them on and to assure quality work, is referred to as the *qaywa*. The rest of the team members are referred to as *wachu runa* ('furrow people'). The most common form of address between participants at the *yapuy* is *niñucha*, or *niñuchakuna* ('little boys'), suggesting the strong ethic of fraternity associated with the event.

The *wiri* work from bottom to top of the fields, one each to a furrow, and directly behind each other on the diagonal. When they stop for the noon meal — the *mirinda* (Sp. *merienda*) — there is a hierarchical seating arrangement set according to the roles

played in the field. Typically, the men form a semicircle or open rectangle, with the downhill side left open (see Figure 3.1). The tools are grouped together to one side of this opening. The women who have brought the food take a position to the other side, where they dish out the food. The boiled corn, potatoes, and *ch'uñu* are set on carrying cloths on the ground before the *chakrayoq*, at the center of the uphill side. He is accompanied in this position of honor by the oldest men present, and by those with the special roles described above. Two younger men play the role of *servicios* ('food-servers'). They are stationed before the *chakrayoq*, on the opposite side of the cloth *misa* (from Spanish *mesa*, 'table'), but their roles require them to be mobile, going between the women who dish out the food and the men. The *misa* is equivalent to an altar in its sacredness (*misa* is 'mass' in Spanish), and the parallel with altar boys comes to mind when observing the *servicios* at the *yapuy*. They kneel before the *misa* as the food is blessed by the oldest man present. Extending out from either side of the center, the *wachu runa* position themselves, grouped roughly according to age, oldest to youngest. The youngest men and boys at the wings sit together tightly, one between the legs of the next immediately above. This formation is maintained until the meal is done and final prayers are said, at which time the younger men scatter to stretch out and nap, while the older continue to converse, drink and chew *coca* before returning to work. The spirit is festive, the conversation is lighthearted, and sometimes the younger men play pranks on each other or on their elders, most of whom are their uncles. As Flórez Muñiz (1946) notes, the serious work at such events takes place in the morning, because by afternoon, the men have had too much to drink to do their best, but it seems that the sponsor and his assistants control distribution of alcohol sufficiently so that the work gets done, and the biggest bout of drinking comes at the end.

The closer one sits to the center at these events, the harder it becomes to refuse a drink, so my preference was to sit at one of the ends with the younger men. Sometimes I was successful in this, sometimes the sponsor or elders would reseated me near the middle. I was never formally asked to serve as *servicio*, so I never had opportunity to serve the food or kneel before the cloth table for prayers, but I was often drafted into

serving rounds of alcohol on behalf of my *compadres* and other sponsors of plowings, corn plantings, house-raisings, first-haircuttings, and wakes. The role of serving drinks is more demanding than it first sounds, first, because one needs to know the etiquette and status hierarchy of who comes first, and second, because out of politeness, and because the choice tactic to delay or avoid accepting a drink is to invite the server to drink first, *servicios* usually end up consuming more than everyone else. On one occasion, a poorly attended corn planting where I was the oldest present, I was asked to say the prayer to bless the food, but the sponsor was someone who treated such rites as perfunctory anyway. Most villagers considered me to be too green for such tasks. Too unskilled to be a common worker, at most events I was assigned tasks befitting a teenage boy, but shown more respect and given more praise than a village teenager for participating.

Ritual Co-Parenthood

Compadrazgo is usually defined as a relationship of spiritual co-parenting and godparenting, a bond of fictive kinship (Mintz and Wolf 1967, Gudeman 1975, Pitt-Rivers 1975). There are five rituals in which *compadrazgo* relations are normally established in Ccachín: *unuchakuy* ('lay baptism'), *chukcha rutuy* ('first-haircutting'), *bautismo* ('baptism'), *comunión* ('communion'), and *matrimonio* ('marriage'). Some of these ceremonies involve more responsibilities on the part of the *padrinos* ('godparents') and are marked by more permanent ties than others. In this section, I will discuss the contexts in which such relations are formed, and my involvement in them. I will also discuss the use of *compadrazgo* in Ccachín as an alliance strategy used by households for attaining economic and political objectives, and reflect on changing patterns in selection of alliance partners.

Compadrazgo Rituals

Unuchakuy

This ceremony, literally meaning 'doing-a-little-water-together' in Quechua, is a lay baptism that takes place in the home anytime after the child is born (while formally an

"emergency baptism," most children are so baptized in Ccachín, emergency or not). The *padrino* ('godparent') baptizes the child with a carnation dipped in holy water while saying the Quechua formula specified in the *Almanaque del Qosqo* (MASK S.A. 1991). Children in Ccachín are generally baptized in the church between the ages of one-and-a-half and three years old, sometime after their first-haircutting. Not all children receive *unuchakuy*. On the other hand, one of our godchildren is said to have received *unuchakuy* on four occasions, with different *padrinos* each time. This is generally considered to be a violation of community standards. As one person in the village put it, this turns *compadrazgo* into "a game, a joke . . . a business" ("*un juego, una broma . . . un negocio*").[11] The performance of *unuchakuy* by the *padrinos* may represent a commitment to later serve as sponsors for the official baptism, but not necessarily so. Of the seven *unuchakuy* I performed, I went on to sponsor a child's baptism once, a first haircutting once, and both the first haircutting and baptism for a third. I discouraged repeat sponsorships for a single child, arguing that it was in my godchild's interest to have a number of *padrinos*, since my stay in the community was limited, but some of my *compadres* were insistent. The *padrinos*' long-term responsibility after the *unuchakuy* is limited, suggesting a reason why some would want to cement the relationship through more important rituals. Most people formally approached me about being an *unuchakuy* sponsor, but in one instance it was a case of entrapment, the carnation and water presented to me after I was served breakfast in someone's home. While I refused many requests to sponsor first-haircuttings and church baptisms, I felt that it was inappropriate not to do a lay baptism, even when I had not been properly approached. While *compadrazgo* is formally established in *unuchakuy*, the responsibility can end there, or one can build upon the bonds established. I was less willing to put energy into a relationship where I felt coerced than into one in which I was formally approached and where there was mutual interest in continued reciprocation.

First-Haircutting

Chukcha rutuy ('haircut') — is the ritual of a child's first haircut (Figure 3.2). I served as *padrino* for nine ritual first haircuts in Ccachín, and attended five more. Most of the ceremonies I attended were small, private affairs, involving a dozen or so adults: *compadres*, parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles. On a few occasions, the number grew to forty people or more. The larger *chukcha rutuy* ceremonies usually coincide with major festivals in the village and with *cargo* sponsorship. The ceremony lasts two days. The major activity, with feasting, visitors, and most of the cutting, take place on the first day. The second day — called the *kacharpari* ('farewell') — is primarily a day of socializing between the new *compadres*. While the ideal in some Andean communities is for the new *compadres* to perform a second haircutting several months after the first to reinforce the relationship (Allen 1988), this is not the norm in Ccachín. Nor is it normal to do a second haircutting with different *compadres*. As with *unuchakuy*, rumor has it that some couples have held the ritual more than once for a child, with different *compadres* each time, but this is frowned upon. It's easy to take advantage of outsiders, as they do not have the comprehensive memories of a family's activities that fellow villagers have. In such cases, the ceremony is kept low-key to avoid attention, and the *compadrazgo* ties tend to be weaker and less permanent.

As with many activities in the village, *chukcha rutuy* is rich in metaphor. It is metaphorically linked to chopping wood. People refer to the ritual as *monte chakuy* or *corte monte* ('cutting the woods'), and the scissors are called the *sierra* ('saw'), *hacha* ('ax'), or *acero* ('steel'). An association is also made with *papa yapuy* ('potato plowing'), saying that the event is "*para hacer crecer el niño*" ('to make the child grow'). Replicating the organization of the *yapuy*, the father of the child is called the *chakrayoq* ('owner of the field') and the ceremony has its *capitán* or *qollana* ('leader', the first person to cut after the *compadres*), *qaywa* ('second-in-command', the last person to cut), *servicio* ('server' of food, coca, drinks, etc.), and *wachu runa* ('furrow-people', the rest of the participants in the first haircutting). With each cut, a monetary gift is placed in a bowl or a material promise is made on behalf of the child by the person doing the cutting. The

ceremony is divided into parts, as in fieldwork, by the *hallpa* ('coca chewing', associated with the rest break), and the receipts of each round of cutting and giving is recorded in a notebook according to round: first *hallpa*, second *hallpa*, and so on. After each round, a small amount of money is left with the scissors in the bowl at center table; this is known as the *muhu* or *semilla* ('seed'). The money and animals given are likewise thought of as *muhu*, indicating a desire that all three — child, animals, and money — grow and multiply.[12]

Barbara and I were approached by many families to do ritual first-haircuttings, and we accepted some requests, while declining others. We relied on our own character assessments, on those of our host family, and on our reading of community opinion on the character of the potential *compadres* and of their relationship with each other (Did the father recognize paternity? Was the relationship stable? Did they drink excessively? Did the husband treat his wife well? Were they suspected of being thieves? etc.). We had to balance our desire to spread our *compadrazgo* relations widely with our desire to keep our commitments within our ability to be good *compadres* and *padrinos*. We also considered the form in which the request was made. Requests varied in intensity of interest, sincerity, opportunism, politeness, formality, and pressure. Humility and reciprocity are important aspects of being *buena gente* ('good people') for villagers, and we took these characteristics as a guide. While many of these personal and interpersonal variables are subjective, they are less open to cross-cultural misinterpretation than one might imagine. Requests took place in many contexts, from casual conversation at public events and in people's homes, to formal visits by people to our room. Except in one instance where the alleged father of the child did not recognize paternity, requests were always made by men, often with the anxious glance (interpretable as "Did you ask yet?" or "When are you going to ask?") of their partners.

Early in our stay in the village, just after accepting our first commitment to do a ritual haircut, we attended the *velakuy* ('vigil', 'wake') for the deceased father of our future *comadre*. Somewhere among the sexual teasing about swapping partners, jokes about how frequently I went out the door to urinate (cane alcohol was abundant, drinking

ritually required, and the night long), and sundry smalltalk, I promised to do consecutive *chukcha rutuy* on the same day for four other families in attendance. With all the alcohol, I didn't remember anything by morning, and Barbara admonished me for my loose tongue. Few others remembered either, or recognizing my vulnerability, they didn't hold me to my word; perhaps they were joking all along. No one approached me later about keeping my commitment. I suspect that many *compadrazgo* agreements are made under the influence of alcohol. The president of the village once came to me in desperation, requesting that I take his place as *padrino* in a ritual first-haircutting for the daughter of his next-door neighbor. He had likewise made the commitment while drunk, but wanted out of it because, he said, neighbors don't make good *compadres*. Ever present, they are too demanding. I declined to bail him out, and he honored the commitment.

As with *unuchakuy*, *chukcha rutuy* sponsorship is sometimes more a case of entanglement than consent. Once, on the Saturday after *Día de Comadres*, I was invited to a *compadre*'s house to drink *chicha* by his brother, visiting from his home in the hills. When his brother disappeared to buy beer, my *compadre* asked me to be the *padrino* for his brother's child's first haircutting, which was about to begin. I refused, citing multiple reasons, and my *compadre* did not persist (as in this case, it's both common for an older brother to ask on behalf of a younger brother, and for a *compadre* to ask a *compadre*, the latter because *compadres* are hard to refuse). When his brother returned, he pressured another of his brother's *compadres* to be his child's *padrino*, and the fellow eventually accepted. The cutting was an impromptu affair, facilitated by the leftover *chicha* from *Día de Comadres*. Instead of the traditional meal served at the outset to the *padrino*, a chicken was slaughtered and rice served after the cutting in the evening. The mother of the child was not present. After several rounds of cutting, through which the *padrino* had put in but a small amount of cash, pressure was placed on him to announce what he was going to give. He talked profusely about guaranteeing the education of his *ahijada*, equal to his two sons. Ultimately, after considerable coaxing, he promised a young alpaca from his family's herd in his natal village, some two day's journey by truck in the *provincias altas* of Espinar, as he had no animals in Ccachín. In all, the child received

two male alpaca, one from the *padrino* and one from the paternal grandmother, two lambs, one from the father and one from the father's uncle, a quintal of coffee from the child's uncle, a half *quintal* of coffee from a visiting companion of the uncle, a guinea pig from a destitute old woman who lived with the father's parents, and 8,650,000 *intis* ($15.87, a third contributed by the *padrino*, and a third contributed by me). The standard amount put in by the *wachu runa* on any one cut was 100,000 *intis* (18¢), a typical amount for such an affair. The total contribution was larger than at other *chukcha rutuy* I attended. How many of the promises were met, however, is an open question. The *padrino* soon left the village under social pressure caused by an extra-marital liaison, and died in a mine at Tintaya. The pledge of yet unharvested coffee by the child's uncle and his friend appeared to be more drunken bravado than commitment. All pledges were carefully recorded in a notebook by the *padrino* during the cutting, but individual circumstances constantly change, and such promises are sometimes hard to make good. At the final reckoning of accounts, the *padrino* made a speech that all was *por voluntad* ('voluntary') and that he could hold no one to their promises. All present reconfirmed their commitment.

Baptism

Children in Ccachín are baptized sometime after they have had their ritual haircut, usually when they are between one-and-a-half and three years old. Baptism requires that both the parents and the *padrinos* receive religious preparation from the village catechists, but if the latter are from outside of the village and of higher socioeconomic status, the requirement is often waived. Villagers recall that one *comunero* failing the quiz by the priest twice before finally gaining approval to baptize his daughter, and they sometimes put off baptizing their children because of exam anxiety. During the course organized by Ccachín's catechists, the future *compadres* review how to make the sign of the cross, recite the Lord's Prayer, Hail Mary, Apostle's Creed, and list the ten commandments, the seven sacraments, and the five laws of the church. It's acceptable for women to recite in Quechua; men are expected to know everything in Spanish. Since only a few masses are

held in Ccachín each year, many families take their children to Calca to be baptized. There, they present a letter affirming that they have studied with the village catechists, or they attend the course presented by one of Calca's priests before mass.

Godparents are expected to provide the clothing that the godchild is baptized in. The parents, in turn, feast their new *compadres* with a meal. People in Ccachín expect the *padrino* to toss animal crackers to those assembled outside the church after the baptism mass. As with other types of *compadrazgo*, these original exchanges are just the beginning of long-term reciprocal relations. People in the village often speak endearingly of their first haircutting and baptism *padrinos* twenty to thirty years and more after the fact. A few *madrinas* in the village have raised godchildren that became orphaned, and next to care by grandparents and aunts-uncles, it is the most common form of fostering. *Compadres* help each other with fieldwork, and godchildren help their godparents when they are old enough. More distant godparents provide clothing, educational supplies, loans, special services, and travel housing for their *compadres* and godchild.

Communion

In contrast to Cusco, where the cost to the *padrino* of buying a first communion outfit for a child can be major and the status pressures are mounting, it's a minor ceremony in Ccachín. The *padrino* provides a candle wrapped in a ribbon to the first communicant and stands with him or her during the service, but nothing more is expected. The sacrament provides the opportunity to form *compadrazgo* relations, but the relationship does not have the significance that first haircutting and baptism sponsorship does. Children wishing to receive their first communion must first study with the catechists, and the latter organize training only sporadically. I witnessed four first communions, all at the same mass, during my stay in the village. I sponsored one.[13]

While first communion itself is not ritually elaborate, the issue of who can and cannot receive communion at mass is a controversial one. At the first masses I attended in Ccachín, few people received communion. Villagers who had not gone to confession within the year and couples living in *sirvinakuy* ('cohabitation', 'common-law marriage')

were denied the right to receive communion. Later, when Padre José Sayer, a German priest, began visiting the Lares area in the summer of 1990, he emphasized that "God is not a police officer" ("*Dios no es policía*"), and encouragement all adults to receive communion. Most did. The catechists in Ccachín, however, had picked up on the formalist interpretation of Catholicism of the other Salesian priests and were scandalized by Father Sayer's practice of letting "*borrachos, cualquier persona*" ('drunks, anybody', including unmarried couples) receive communion (see Marzal 1983 for a discussion of popular Catholicism, beliefs about the ethics of cohabitation, etc.).

At the mass in which my godchild made his first communion, Father Sayer, using as one *comunero* put it, "the language of the peasant" ("*el idioma del campesino*"), distributed coca leaves as part of the mass (a first in the village, and to my knowledge, not common anywhere). Along with the first communions, there were a wedding and several baptisms. After these sacraments, coca leaves were shared among the baptism, communion, and wedding parties, and the priest. After the Lord's Prayer, coca was distributed to all at the mass. Allen (1988:132) notes that "coca itself is a sacred substance with a powerful *sami* [animating essence], whose consumption creates communion among human beings and between humans and deities. . . . Coca is the quintessential Andean sacrament; they call it *hostia*, the host, in an explicit analogy with the Catholic communion service." Rather than replacing the host in communion, however, the priest's intention was to use the exchange of coca leaves as the "sign of peace."[14]

Marriage

Most couples in Ccachín live together for several years in *sirvinakuy* ('cohabitation') before getting married in the church. While the male's parents may formally approach the female's parents to initiate *sirvinakuy*, the relationship is not supported by *compadrazgo* bonds (see Price 1965; Dalle 1983; Marzal 1988 for a discussion of *sirvinakuy*, which is variously interpreted as 'trial' marriage, 'common-law' marriage, or as a stage in the marriage process in the Andean literature). *Sirvinakuy* is discouraged by the Salesian priests, who rarely fail to suggest marriage when inquiring into individual

circumstances. While I was in the village, the priests promoted the idea of mass wedding ceremonies to decrease the cost and encourage cohabiting couples to marry, but without success. It is not uncommon for a couple to have two or three children before getting married. Little stigma is attached to ending a *sirvinakuy* relationship if the couple is childless or if they have a child and their relationship is dysfunctional, as when a man's drinking interferes with his productivity or he beats his wife. Normally, however, *sirvinakuy* leads to lifelong bonds. By the time a couple has two or more children, there is strong economic and social pressure to stay together. Couples that find that they cannot live together establish separate residences in different ecological zones or span rural and urban divides.

The normal pattern is to move from *sirvinakuy* to a legally-sanctioned marriage within five years. There are two kinds of godparents for a wedding: the *hatun padrino* and *madrina*, and the *arras padrino* and *madrina*. The former play the primary role, providing the clothing for the marrying couple, economic resources, and help with the feast; the latter serve as attendants (the *arras* are the coins given by the groom to the bride to seal the commitment after taking the vows). The *hatun* ('big', 'great') *padrinos* for one's marriage are the most important *compadrazgo* partners a couple will have, and their selection is made with deliberation by the families involved. The typical wedding festival lasts three days, with the groom's family, the bride's family, and the *hatun padrinos* each sponsoring a day. While a dozen weddings involving Ccachín couples took place during my fieldwork, I was never asked to be *hatun padrino*. I was once asked to be *arras padrino* by a couple that were already my *compadres* through the first haircutting of their son, but they didn't follow up on it, and at the wedding, they assigned the role to one of their close friends and neighbors instead.

People from Calca and Cusco with substantial economic resources are particularly favored as marriage sponsors in Ccachín. Wedding *padrinos* are selected with an eye to long-term advantage and commitment. In the case above, the *hatun padrino* was an important landholder in the area. The groom's family has one of the largest herds of cattle in Ccachín, and the choice of *padrinos* was made with one of the family's cattle

pastures in mind, an area in the hills above Condición, an *anexo* of Choquecancha. The *hatun padrino* also has land in the area, and the father of the groom promoted the alliance. As he noted to me, the *padrino* was young for the role, but wealthy.

In this case, the *padrino* chosen was a controversial figure in the region, and controversy accompanied him to the wedding festival as well. Although Choquecanchan, he lead an effort to separate the *anexo* of Paucarpata from the main community, and he was in litigation with the *comunidad campesina* over the title to ex-hacienda land on the Paucarpata side of the ridge. Viewed with admiration and awe by some, he had a reputation for being ambitious and unscrupulous with others, who claimed that he had gained land and power in the region through intimidation, bribes, and the manipulation of previous Choquecancha presidents and local authorities (see Seibold 1990:81, Note 11, for discussion of the land dispute in Choquecancha). One of his *compadres* worked for the Ministry of Agriculture in Cusco and is said to have promoted his case. Three men imprisoned for a 1990 murder in Condición were associated with him (including his brother), and there were rumors that he arranged the murder and manipulated authorities to cover up evidence. Two of the *padrino*'s friends at the wedding party reportedly carried pistols and harassed Choquecancha visitors to Ccachín, checking their documents, and getting involved in fights. Two medical emergencies arose in Ccachín during the three days of wedding festivities: a boy's leg was broken by a horse during the Festival of Santiago, and a nineteen-year-old Choquecancha woman, living in the village with a Ccachín man, died soon after giving birth. The *sanitario* of Choquecancha did not go to Ccachín to attend to either of them, because, with the *padrino*'s presence in the community, he feared for his safety.[15]

For the wedding itself, the *hatun padrino* and *madrina* provide clothes for the marrying couple, stand as witnesses, and sponsor a feast. Over the long term, they are expected to provide housing when the couple visits their town or city, emergency loans or financial help, professional services, and counsel to help the couple survive adulterous relations and other motives for separation. In turn, the godchildren provide agricultural

products, meat, and labor for their *padrinos*. Sometimes, as in the case above, *compadrazgo* also creates political allegiances that benefit the *padrino* in their local dealings.

Compadrazgo Responsibilities

When people talk about children fathered out of wedlock in Ccachín (which is taken to mean, where *sirvinakuy* has not been entered into either before or after the child's birth), emphasis is placed on whether the father and his family provide the child with clothes and sugar or not. Sugar plays an important role in the expression of affection toward children, and people likewise comment on the goodness of *padrinos* and *madrinas* in terms of their provision of sugar. Sugar also plays a practical role for a child; people rarely drink crude water. Water is served after the meal in the form of heavily-sugared herbal infusions and coffee. If a family lacks sugar, children may not be served any drink. We carried a kilo of sugar, rice, noodles, or other foodstuffs when we visited our *compadres* and provided clothing to our godchildren on their birthdays and special occasions.[16] As the child grows older, focus is placed on the child's education. Bilingual *padrinos* typically stress their commitment to the child's schooling. Families that choose gringos as *padrinos* for their children also appear to place more value on a formal education than most.

At the close of a first-haircutting, a *padrino* gives an advisory speech to his new *compadres* on how to look out for the best interests of the child and how to save the resources that have been collected in the name of the child. Following local norms, Barbara and I generally suggested investing the money in animals, but one *compadre* chose instead to open up an account in our godchild's name in a Calca bank. The advisory responsibilities extend to the relationship between the couple itself. This is especially true for marriage *padrinos*, but as a rocky relationship has implications for the children, people expect that the first-haircutting and baptism *padrinos* will represent the interests of their godchildren as well. Thus, for example, when one *comunero* was allegedly found in bed with another woman, his wife went to their marriage *padrino*, who had

a talk with him. And one day, another *comunero*, *compadre* of his next door neighbor, went over to his house, grabbed him by the ear, and scolded him for beating his wife.

Twice, we were called upon to play a similar role. Once, one of our *comadres* was rumored to be having an affair with a married man, and the wife of our *compadre*'s cousin urged us to go have a talk with them. She told us to go to their home at four in the morning for privacy, when no one would be passing in the street. She rehearsed with us exactly what we should say, first I as *compadre*, and then Barbara as *comadre*, beginning "*Comadre*, don't you respect your children, your husband?" ("*Comadre, ¿manachu respetanki wawaykita, qosaykita*?" see Knox-Seith 1995 for discussion). We did not follow up on the suggestion, in part because it was based on unconfirmed gossip, in part because of our ambiguous role as inside-outsiders, but apparently the woman who counseled us did, or her husband at her urging, because from that point on relations were strained between the two women.

It's difficult in our own culture to know when to cross the bounds of privacy, and when something needs to be said. In the Andes, *compadres* and *padrinos* are expected to be lay family counselors, but it is a role that is difficult to play without having an intimate knowledge of the cultural expectations and norms. It may be that some have turned to us as outsiders in *compadrazgo* in part to avoid such meddling. In spite of wanting to adopt insider roles, we did not want to lose the benefit of neutrality and distance from family and political division that outsider status brings, or to participate in the *envidia* ('envy') or hearsay of close community life.

In the second instance where people in the community expected us to intervene, our *compadres* had separated. Our *comadre* moved to Arequipa to live with brothers and sisters, our *compadre* moved to Ocobamba to establish a farmstead in the jungle. Our *comadre* had a reputation for being irresponsible (people said that she failed to care for her parents, failed to herd her family's sheep, wore short and ornate skirts and danced in a manner inappropriate for a married woman), and was rumored to be sleeping with another man. Her husband spent much of the time away from Ccachín, in part to avoid the gossip. When our *compadres* separated, the oldest son joined his father in the jungle, a

daughter went with her mother to Arequipa, and our godchild, the youngest, was left in the village with his paternal grandmother. People felt sorry for the abandoned boy and so did we. Both *compadres* felt bad about leaving their youngest child behind, but neither of them was in a situation to take him with them. Again, *compadrazgo* relations came into play. Our *compadre* suspected that his wife would try to leave Ccachín, and kept her *libreta electoral* (her national identity papers) with him so that she could not travel. Once in Calca, however, she enlisted the aid of their marriage *padrino*, and he signed the proper documents so that she could get a new one. Our *compadre* complained that although he was the fellow's first *ahijado*, his *padrino* wasn't being very helpful in solving the problem. "The *padrino* is supposed to help keep the relationship together, so why did he help her get way?" he asked. When we talked to the wedding *padrino* and *madrina*, they expressed concern about the relationship, and later provided financial help to our *compadre* so that he could visit his wife in Arequipa. We too played our part, traveling to Arequipa to talk with our *comadre* and her family, and providing travel funds to our *compadre* so that he could go to Arequipa and talk with his wife. He talked of moving to Arequipa to keep the family together, and ultimately abandoned his project in the Ocobamba Valley to return to Ccachín. After a difficult year away, our *comadre* returned to the village and the family was reunited again (except for the daughter, who stayed in Arequipa). The substantial difficulties in subsisting apart, the limited prospects for the future, and social pressures in the village and by family members seem to have been the primary reasons for our *compadres* getting back together.[17]

Explanation of the Practice

General Features

Montes de Castillo takes investigators to task for defining *compadrazgo* as "fictive kinship." As he puts it,

> This mode of characterizing it is inadequate, not only because *compadrazgo* is not kinship, but because *compadrazgo* relations are not a fiction of anything. They are very real relations, but different from those of kinship. [A certain author] speaks of fictive kinship because he studies *Padrinazgo* more than *Compadrazgo*,

> the ritual more than the social relations than it generates, the Catholic orthodoxy more than the social practice of Christians. [He], like other authors, falls in the trap of the Catholic ideology about spiritual rebirth, the co-responsibility or sponsorship of the godparent, and spiritual affinity, . . . and the effects of the same on kinship through the rule of exogamy required between spiritual relatives. [Montes de Castillo 1989:171]

I noted in my description of first hair-cutting ceremonies that Andeans have a zest for metaphor, and the terminological problem can be largely resolved if we take *compadrazgo* and the terms of address associated with it to be metaphorical. If we say that "carrion beetles are whitemen" (Basso 1976:100, to take a well-known example), no one is about to confuse carrion beetles with whitemen, nor to consider one a fiction of the other. No one among the Apache, nor the Quechua, nor interpreters of them.

There are many frames of reference to look at *compadrazgo* — as an identity and role within rites of passage, as a set of rules and norms, as a network of relations, as an interchange of goods and services — and the kinship metaphor is rapidly exhausted as one moves from the ideological domain to the economic. If I have focused on ideational and normative aspects of *compadrazgo* above, it is in large part because, as a participant-observer, and a novice participant at that, I had a compelling need to learn the norms of conduct befitting relations between *compadres* and *padrinos-ahijados* while I was in the field. Most ethnographers are in a similar position, and like other participants, have an interest in emphasizing emotional or spiritual bonds rather than any more pragmatic motives they may have for maintaining the relationships.

I agree with Montes de Castillo, however, that

> What's specific to *Compadrazgo* is not the system of ideas on which it rests, nor the spiritual kinship produced in the Catholic tradition. What is characteristic is the ritual origin of a relationship. A ritual and symbolic context gives origin to a series of social relations. . . . The mutual duties and obligations between *compadres* are not only ritual but social, demanding interchanges of goods and services. These relations exist in the society with or without *Compadrazgo*, they are social relations of a specific social formation that exist before the ritual fact. What's new about *Compadrazgo* is that relations that are habitual in the society are generated from a ritual. The ritual is the context that offers the opportunity to establish social relations, that from this moment on acquire consistency, obligatoriness, and reciprocity. [Montes de Castillo 1989:183-184]

The formulas, language, and procedures used in particular rites are drawn from a widely-used cultural repertoire and provide models of appropriate behavior and facilitate the strengthening of emotional bonds. But from my perspective, the most significant aspect of the ritual and symbolic context for fostering social relations is not its cultural content, but its publicness.

First, the public nature of the relationship makes it more enforceable. Prestige is involved, reputations are at stake, witnesses to agreements are obtained, social pressure is marshaled. The issue of privacy-publicity in *compadrazgo* is more complex than this, as depending on the situation, one or both parties may find it advantageous to keep the initiating event or subsequent contacts and exchanges out of the public eye, and privacy itself becomes a leveraging resource. But it is rare that there are not at least a few witnesses to the originating ritual. Second, *compadrazgo* relations are not exclusive, but plural. While Foster (1967b) emphasizes the dyadic nature of *compadrazgo* alliances, Dávila (1971) observes that *compadrazgo* relations are dyadic or polyadic depending on whether individuals or corporate groups exercise control over land and other resources, and Montes de Castillo (1989) emphasizes that *compadrazgo* in the Andes is characterized by plural alliances. Mintz and Wolf (1967) note that the network of ritual bonds often extend to link the majority of the inhabitants of a village. In Ccachín the parents, grandparents, brothers and sisters, and sometimes even the aunts and uncles all refer to a child's *padrinos* as *compadres*. This is consistent with the more general preference and etiquette of using roles rather than names for terms of address, and it not only indicates the extent that affinal and consanguineal alliance networks back specific *compadrazgo* relations, it is sometimes used as a starting point for non-principals to make claims on and establish their own relationships with secondary *compadres*.

It's worth highlighting the following features of *compadrazgo* in Ccachín: a) *compadrazgo* relationships are generally interfamilial, b) *compadrazgo* is used both to extend social networks and to intensify and reinforce existing relationships, c) unique godparents are chosen for each child within a family, d) the relationship between *com-*

padres is more important than the relation between godparents and their godchildren, except for ties established though marriage sponsorship, e) *compadrazgo* may be either horizontal among social equals or vertical between people of different social status, and f) when the latter, individuals of lower status select *padrinos* for their children among individuals of a higher class but not vice-versa, and the reciprocal obligations and the goods and services exchanged between the *compadres* are not the same.[18]

In addition to these, it's useful to note the variability in *compadrazgo* practices identified by Gudeman (1972): a) the range of ceremonies used to form *compadrazgo* alliances can be limited or extended (ritual first cutting of a child's fingernails is not customary in Ccachín, as in some areas of the Andes, for example, and *compadrazgo* for communion and confirmation is existent but rudimentary), b) the number of *padrinos* for a single child in a single ceremony can increase, c) the extent that active relations extend to non-principals, especially relatives, varies, and d) the same *madrina* or *padrino* may sponsor the same child in successive ceremonies. The same godparents may sponsor *unuchakuy*, first-haircutting, and baptism for a child in Ccachín, but repetition of the same ceremony with the same godparents does not occur. Also, as mentioned, parents sometimes repeat certain ceremonies for their children in Ccachín and select a different *compadre* each time, but this does not conform to community standards. There are slight differences between households in Ccachín along all of these dimensions, there's variation between Andean communities in general, and there are differences between the *compadrazgo* practiced in the Andes and that practiced elsewhere. The rules of structural transformation provided by Gudeman help identify the variation but do not explain it.

Benefits

Until recently, group-functionalist explanations have dominated the literature on *compadrazgo*. On one hand, it has been interpreted as a cohesive and integrative social force: a continuation and development of successful pre-Columbian forms of ritual alliance (Rojas González 1973), a substitute for collapsed social institutions and a safety net that buffered indigenous populations against the catastrophe of the conquest (Foster

1959), a redistribution mechanism limiting differences between households and social groups (Foster 1967b), a mechanism facilitating within-group cooperation and reducing interethnic conflict through the ideology of respect (Martínez 1953; Ravicz 1967), reinforcement for the institution of kinship (Brownrigg 1977), and a factor in cultural identity (Osorio 1966-1969). On the other hand, the ideology of *compadrazgo* has been interpreted as a mechanism for domination, reinforcing the power of the dominant class (Gutiérrez Galvis 1978).[19]

While any or all of the integrative effects of *compadrazgo* relations may pertain in specific contexts as a byproduct of the practice, these group-level advantages have for the most part been overemphasized, and to restore perspective, I note that the processes of social and economic decline set in process by the conquest continued for several centuries despite the existence of *compadrazgo*, that *compadrazgo* relations are marked by both affection and hostility, by both cooperation and conflict, and are more precarious than kinship ties (Sayres 1956), that none of the purported functions of *compadrazgo* taken alone or together distinguish it from other social institutions in the Andes that reputedly do the same (Montes de Castillo 1989), and that the functionalist accounts fail to specify the feedback mechanism that links group-level benefits to individual-level motivations (see my discussion of functionalism in Chapter 6).

More actor-centered approaches offer a better possibility of explaining the variability of *compadrazgo* relations and linking specific features to distinct social and environmental contexts. The key features of such approaches are recognition a) that *compadrazgo* involves an extended series of decisions, selections, negotiations, and agreements by all of the parties involved, b) that these are motivated by the desire of the decision makers to better their socioeconomic positions and those of their families, c) that *compadrazgo* facilitates reciprocal relations and exchanges between particular people, but it does not determine the equality or tenseness of the exchange, and d) that the reciprocity of *compadrazgo* is not automatic, but is conditioned on the fulfillment of mutual expectations over time.

Compadrazgo rituals in the Andes are malleable and provide room for decision making about the timing of the event, the selection of exchange partners, and the degree of commitment.

Unuchakuy is an optional and flexible ritual usually performed within the first year of a child's life. First-haircutting and baptism usually take place between a child's first and fourth year, but I have heard reports of children as old as eight being baptized in the village. Father Sayer told me that two of his baptism godchildren in Maras (Urubamba, Cusco) were twelve and fifteen years old respectively when he baptized them (José Sayer, personal communication). The parents told him that they had waited so long because they could not find a suitable *padrino*. Sometimes villagers reach an agreement with a person or couple to serve as godparents for a first-haircut or baptism at an unspecified future date and then hold the ceremony with another because a new and more immediate opportunity presents itself. For the household, childhood rites of passage are a limited resource to be managed wisely, but it sometimes happens that more spontaneous and erratic decisions are made by a husband during a drinking bout without consulting his wife or overriding previous decisions made by the both of them. Except for marriage rites, most *compadrazgo* relations are formed when a couple is still establishing a household and does not yet have older children to help meet its labor needs. This is one of the reasons why *compadrazgo* so often helps organize *ayni* and other forms of reciprocal labor exchange. While I do not have specific data on this, I suspect that variation in family size and birth order may be correlated with both timing and the qualities sought in a *padrino*.

The two primary variables in the selection of *compadrazgo* partners are whether they are among one's group of relatives or not, and whether they are within one's own socioeconomic level or from a superior level (i.e., whether the relations are horizontal or vertical). The first appears to depend, in part, on the strength of existing kinship ties (the stronger the ties, the more likely *compadrazgo* will be interfamilial [Stavenhagen 1959]); the second depends on the need that those seeking *compadres* have for access to reciprocal labor, on their strategies of labor migration and social advancement, and on the

availability of *compadres* of superior status, among other things. While vertical relations are usually defined in terms of cross-ethnic and cross-class distinctions, it's important to note that most often, *compadres* are chosen among older and wealthier community members in Ccachín (i.e., within the same ethnic group and class), because aid is nearer at hand, the social distance is less, and the costs of reciprocating labor and products are more manageable. However, this is less true of marriage *padrinos*, who are more likely to be chosen from among well-placed individuals outside of the community.

In choosing *compadres*, households face the task of maximizing material and relational resources while minimizing the costs of maintaining ritual kin (Michaud 1977; Montes de Castillo 1989). They must do so within their household labor and material possibilities and with reference to the totality of *compadrazgo* relations that they are involved in. This is as true of those selecting godparents for their children as those accepting the roles they are invited to fill. Most families in Ccachín follow a mixed strategy of securing *compadrazgo* partners, so that each family has some relationships that are horizontal and others that are vertical. This is consistent with the mixed strategies that characterize household production in general, and helps to undergird them.

Villagers have several strategies for keeping the costs of their *compadrazgo* relations in check. When the same godparents are selected to perform multiple rituals for the same child in Ccachín, it is sometimes to secure and deepen existing relations, but sometimes to avoid the costs of assuming a costly new *compadrazgo* relationship. The latter is probably one of the reasons why Barbara's and my preference for performing only one ritual per godchild came up against so much resistance in Ccachín; our assumptions about the best interests of our godchildren did not take into consideration the capacity of their families to support multiple *compadrazgo* ties. Our attractiveness as *compadres* itself was likely premised on expectations that we would not be as demanding as others in labor and social exchange. Michaud (1977) and Belote and Belote (1979) note that in the Andean communities they studied, a common strategy for minimizing *compadrazgo* costs was to choose *compadres* from among foreigners or urban dwellers who rarely visited the community, and who did not have the same expectations about the

rights and obligations of *compadrazgo* that *compadres* more immersed in the indigenous world did. While most *compadres* are in fact drawn from the community in Ccachín, I was told by several villagers that it was better to choose outsiders because their neighbors were too demanding. Probably the most common and general strategy for minimizing costs is to not call upon all of one's *compadres*, thereby gradually letting established relations slide.

Compadrazgo relationships vary in the level of investment, the length of time that the relationship is expected to last, and the relative weight the initial exchange has compared to the total stream of exchanges. While the paradigmatic case when horizontal relations are involved is one in which *compadrazgo* becomes intertwined with *ayni* and *mink'a* and reciprocal exchanges and mutual aid continue for years or decades, I am not aware of any studies that provide data on the continuity, intensity, or stability of specific *compadrazgo* relationships, or a composite of the pattern of *compadrazgo* relations over time. We should be careful not to confuse the cultural ideal with actual behavior in this regard. A couple with four children will have from four to twelve sets of *compadres*, but I suspect that they interact on a regular basis with very few, and that these few change over time as household circumstances change. After a flurry of initial activity, the majority of relationships probably become dormant, or latent, existing as a possible resource in case of emergency, but in danger of de facto dissolution for lack of attention. The reciprocal exchange of goods and services can reinforce affection between the parties, but it is also a ready source of misunderstanding, and in extreme cases, can lead to the rupture of relations.

As in other forms of reciprocity in Andean society, the wider socioeconomic context determines whether exchange is unequal or equal, conflictive or tension-free. As Montes de Castillo notes,

> *Compadrazgo* is a relationship strategy to maximize resources, but it is the wider social context that determines the final form of the relation. What characterizes *Compadrazgo* is not that it is a mechanism of domination nor for promoting unequal exchange, but that it generates relationship and exchange strategies susceptible to assuming different forms. Interchange is symmetric or asymmetric depending upon context, on social relations in their entirety, on social stratifica-

> tion, that is to say, in function of the power relations surrounding land tenancy, the interchange of agricultural products, trade, loans, the exercise of authority, control of symbols and festivals, differential access to culture, etc. [Montes de Castillo 1989:191]

Other than my relationship with Barbara and my host family, my *compadres* and godchildren were the principal subjects of my social and emotional life in Ccachín. The sincerity of such relations is in no way compromised by the strategic analysis I offer here. At the same time that my *compadres* were my principal friends, they were my main informants. I accepted requests to sponsor childhood rites of passage in the village not only for the personal qualities of the solicitors, but with an interest in distributing my relations among several family groups to maximizing my research opportunities and expand my own alliance network, and with an eye on my fieldwork budget. Often, investigators emphasize the affective and the strategic aspects of *compadrazgo* for one party only, for those doing the choosing, or for those doing the accepting. The first is usually framed in terms of "respect," the second as "strategies of power." The analysis suffers accordingly. I've tried to consider both.

Downplaying Suspicions

Before going to the field, one of my professors cautioned that in order to overcome a natural tendency for ethnographers to romanticize their subjects, one should be sure to find someone that one doesn't like (Marc Miller, personal communication). I didn't find that I had to go out of my way in this regard; many in this category are marginalized in their own community and welcome newcomers. I took pains to avoid making enemies, however. My disposition is to avoid conflict in whatever context, but my concern was heightened in doing fieldwork in a different society, where my position was tentative and insecure, and where it was more difficult to predict what people who didn't have my interests at heart would do.

I had a nagging fear, especially at first, that Barbara and I would be the easy scapegoats for whatever went wrong in the village, in part because we were outsiders, and

in part because in our ignorance we were more prone to do the things believed to cause misfortune. I learned not to set my hat on the table because it heralds death and not to use my left hand to toss corn beer over the sheep during *Día de Comadres* fertility rituals though I am left-handed, as I learned most everything, by trial, error, and correction. Terrible things happened while we were in the village: crops failed, people suffered injuries, houses burned down, terrorists and soldiers passed through, children died. People consulted diviners who read coca leaves and tarot cards to determine the cause of their misfortune. People searched the corners of their houses for the leavings of witches they feared were hexing them. The world that I entered extended notions of causality and culpability beyond my limits of knowing how to be a responsible participant or to defend myself from false accusation. Largely, I relied on the tolerance, graciousness, and the wisdom of others to navigate situations where technical, social, or spiritual competence were critical. Remarkably, such accusations rarely materialized. While interest in Barbara and I ranged from indifference to heart warming, there was little hostility, and we were everywhere courteously received.

As people tried to make sense of us and what we were doing among them, some associated us with characters or roles that, because of their negative stigma in Quechua society or our own, we sought to avoid. As well, there were otherwise acceptable statuses that for one reason or another were not appropriate to us, and from which we wished to distance ourselves. I will elaborate on some of these.

Fear of Strangers

Gose (1986:297) comments that, "virtually every ethnographer of the Andes . . . has been identified as a *nak'aq*," himself included. The *nak'aq* has been a legendary figure in the Andes since at least the colonial era, and translates as 'throat-slitter', 'sacrificer', or 'slaughterer'. Although, as will be seen below, I physically matched the classic description of a *nak'aq* while in the field, as far as I know, I was never identified as such. I'm not sure that female ethnographers are as likely to be included in the group as male ethnographers are, but I doubt that Barbara was either. Parents would sometimes

make reference to me in disciplining their children, and I don't know what they told them. While many adults, particularly women, were at first cautious and perhaps fearful of me, I don't think their fear ever reached mythic proportions.

The day that Barbara and I first arrived in Peru in late 1988, a story was going through Lima that some gringos dressed as doctors and armed with machine guns had entered a school in the *pueblo joven* Villa El Salvador and had kidnaped some children to cut out their eyes and sell them to organ banks in Europe and the United States (Zapata 1989). The story was one of many about *sacaojos* ('eye-snatchers') that had appeared in poor areas of Lima during the previous month. While many took the stories seriously, the government and press stressed that there was no cause for alarm. Politicians blamed each other for the reports. The left suspecting that the ruling APRA party sowed the rumor to upset the following day's national strike, APRA blamed the leftist mayor of Villa El Salvador for inviting the gringos in through cooperative aid agreements in the first place, and others blamed Sendero Luminoso, which had an interest in expelling foreigners and destroying alternative bases of power in the barrios.[20]

Anthropologists emphasize the historical continuity between the *sacaojos* of today's *pueblos jovenes* and the *nak'aq* of the Andes. In traditional belief, the *nak'aq* is motivated by the desire to extract fat from its victims, and attacks solitary travelers on dark nights in the countryside. In the colonial era, the fat was said to be used in making candles, in the casting of church bells, and as grease in the lubrication of machines. In contemporary accounts from Ayacucho, where a resurgence of such stories has corresponded to Sendero and military violence in the region, the *nak'aq* are said to have the backing of the Peruvian government, with the fat sold in the United States and other foreign countries to pay off the national debt. Across the Andes, the purported sale of human fat has been associated with the manufacture of military arms and modern medicines (in turn sold by the industrialized counties back to Peru), the fueling of airplanes and Electroperu's generating stations, the lubrication of mining machinery, and the construction of roads and bridges. The *nak'aq* are frequently described as tall, white,

blond, and bearded; they speak with a gringo accent, they wear boots and a long coat, and in recent versions they are dressed in blue jeans (Degregori 1989).[21]

Unlike other mythic beings with dangerous and supernatural powers that roam the Andean hills (*apu*, *machula*, *condenados*, etc.), the *nak'aq* is a worldly figure that represents the non-indigenous other. It's often interpreted as a crystallization of the relations of domination imposed on the Andean world from the outside. According to Ansión,

> It's one of the most expressive symbols of the permanent relation of subordination and violence that the people of the countryside suffer with respect to the Spanish and the whites. It's the manner in which the inhabitants of the Andes ponder the profound rupture between the two worlds. [Ansión 1989:62][22]

In the early colonial era, all Spanish men were viewed as potential *nak'aq*, a suspicion that by the 18th century fell hardest on certain religious orders, doctors, and *hacendados*. In the 20th century, nearly every type of non-indigenous intermediary between the city and countryside, doctors, engineers, police, soldiers, government workers, and gringos, have been suspect. At times, certain groups have allegedly manipulated this image of the stranger for their own purposes; it's said that during the Agrarian Reform, the *hacendados*, themselves suspected of being *nak'aq*, attempted to turn the focus on government agents going into the countryside to carry out the reform (Ansión 1989).

Until the outbreak of reports in Ayacucho and Lima in the late 1980s, the *nak'aq* appears to have largely been "a myth buried by modernity" (Degregori 1989:109). During the time I was in Cusco, I did not hear of any stories about *sacaojos* in the city, despite reports of and concern about the kidnaping of children for adoption. Cusco differed from Lima in this regard, and perhaps the local tourist market and the extensive relations between nationals and foreigners in the city did not provide fertile ground for such stories. Similarly, I never heard talk in Ccachín that I or anyone else was suspected of being a *nak'aq*. My host family would have been quick to inform me otherwise. In contrast, there were several reports of appearances by *condenados* ('souls of the damned'), encountered on in the village proper or while traveling along the road. There

is now scepticism, especially among the young, of the existence of any of these frightening figures. Older sceptics are less likely to question their existence, and more likely to note their absence: "there's now too much traffic along the road for them to appear" or "They don't come here anymore."

The *nak'aq* figure maintains its potential for representing powerful and fearsome outsiders, and it's recent reappearance in areas suffering the greatest economic and political stress has demonstrated how it can be adapted to modern realities by means of new symbolic forms. It draws from some of the same emotional and symbolic resources as other characters, some quasi-cannibalistic and supernatural such as the *condenados*, others mundane and worldly, such as *rateros* and *bandoleros* ('thieves' and 'highway bandits'), and is invested with suspicion and fear of the other. If in some areas it has largely disappeared, it is because new experiences have brought new fears and concerns, schooling has rendered the old images unfashionable, and modern communications have provided a new repertoire of images to encapsulate traditional concerns.

Gold Seekers

Gold captures the interest of the *comuneros* and mestizos alike. I was in Ccachín only a few days before I was approached by a young man wanting to know if I had a metal detector for gold. I received a number of such inquiries during my stay in the village, including several requests that I bring a gold detector back on my next return from the States. The teachers were particularly keen on exploration, and they sometimes came to me soliciting financial help in assaying a particular find. All of these requests were made in strict privacy (as indeed were requests of any nature in the village), and they were most often made by people who did not know me well. If the topic of gold prospecting came up in group conversation, it was to speculate about the activity of others; no one ever told me that they were engaged in it. Clearly, however, it took on larger than life proportions in people's dreams.

Gold prospecting is generally clandestine and is associated with mystical dangers. As Sallnow notes from his research in Qamawara (San Salvador), "The Qamawaran in

pursuit of gold temporarily alienates himself from his network of moral cooperators, prospecting in secret at night, either alone or accompanied only by a close kinsman or — appropriately enough — an alien." (Sallnow 1989:217). The "aliens" — in this case ethnographers — are not only approached for their imagined access to technological resources, their position outside the network of the "moral community" makes them a potential confidant in this private adventure.

There are several stories about gold in Ccachín that help us appreciate the basis for this interest. The *hacendado* of Compone, one of the Corasawa brothers, for example, is said to have once led an expedition for gold to Tiriqway, the glacial peak on Ccachín's western border. He located a cave that dropped down several meters below the surface and extended well into the mountain. His assistants lowered him into the cave tied to a rope so that they could pull him out again. He's said to have made it halfway through the cave before his progress was blocked. He saw an inner chamber with walls lined with gold, but the treasure was guarded by lions, tigers, and *condenados* and he could not proceed. Similar stories, invariably ending with the treasure being guarded by lions, elegantly-dressed Indians (Inca), and other phantoms are commonplace throughout the Andes (Zúñiga Barbachán 1948:15 provides another local example), and if there is anything unique about this account it is the specificity of name. It's hardly surprising, but worth emphasizing, that it was not a humble *campesino* that made the discovery, as the story goes, but one of the notables of the region.

There is a widespread belief in the Andes that gold and silver buried themselves, turning to stone, or disappeared the moment that Inkarrí was killed by the Spanish. Accounts by the conquistadors reflect a belief that large amounts of gold and silver were carried to isolated areas and buried by Inca porters, after which they were led away and hanged by Inca nobles who in turn committed suicide (Sallnow 1989). Stories of hidden gold are easily elicited from contemporary villagers, given their belief that the area was along the path of the Inca retreat. As at the cave of *Tiriqway*, this gold is protected by natural and supernatural forces. I was repeatedly told that gold was buried at *Qoriwayrachina* and other sites on the ridge above Choquecancha, but that it was unapproachable,

because as one drew closer fierce winds would drive one back or the area would be shrouded in fog, protecting the Inca's treasure (*Qoriwayrachina* translates as 'gold-wind-make-thing' or more graphically, a 'winnow for gold' [Gutiérrez Pareja 1979]).

Comuneros in Ccachín believe that some people are finding buried treasures in the region and living handsomely from it. They believe that many in the neighboring community of Choquecancha have found gold, and that this explains why so many people from there have sheet-metal roofs and have migrated out of the area to Cusco, Quillabamba, or Lima. While no one in Ccachín ever told me that they or anyone else in the village have had such fortune, a few offered to sell me rocks they were sure contained gold. No one ever named a *comunero* who was digging for gold. People from outside of the community, however, are often suspected to be engaging in such activity. Several shallow excavations appeared over the Ccachín landscape while I was in the community. I was told that a *brujo* ('diviner') from San Salvador, who made frequent visits to the community, dug these holes in search for gold. No one knew whether he found any or not, but no one seemed particularly concerned about his endeavors.

In contrast, there is considerable resentment of Juan Carlos Polentini's activities in the area. The *comuneros* allege that *Padre* Polentini — an Argentinian priest who served the area during the 1970s as pastor of Lares — is "stealing the riches of Peru" and carrying them away to his own country. Many believe that he has plundered the Inca gold presumed to be buried beneath the plaza in Choquecancha and along the ridge at Llullumarka to the north. He is also said to have drained two lakes north of Choquecancha on the trail to Laq'o in his search for Inca treasure. The first, Lake Alaqway, is said to be the resting place of the gold chain of the Inca Huascar. The chain is said to have been paraded around the central plaza in Cusco and brought to the region by porters of the Inca, and now lies at the base of a mud islet at the lake's center. Alternatively, some in Ccachín identify the hidden wealth in Alaqway as two gold *toros* ('bulls'), an indication of how in Andean thought, the Inca era and the present Hispanic one are often represented as one continuous *timpu* or era (the bull being introduced by the Spanish). The second lake, Pumaqocha, is reputed to be a site bearing the remains of great quantities of *ch'uñu* and

moraya (freeze-dried potatoes), which according to tradition were dumped there by the Inca to lighten their load and ensure that their foodstuffs wouldn't fall into enemy hands as the Inca fled toward Paytiti. Villagers say that if one reaches into the lake for the *ch'uñu* to pull it out, one is left holding a handful of foam ("*phosoqo*"). Many assume that Polentini is financing his search for Paytiti with the gold he has taken from the area. For this reason, and out of discontent with his ministry and administration of ex-hacienda Montesalvaje in the Lares Valley, opinions about his tenure in the region are not altogether favorable.

There are other stories about people who have made off with local riches. One is said to have been a "poor *campesino*" from Amparaes. He learned of Inca riches in the Mant'o area from his *compadres* in Ccachín and Choquecancha, and he proceeded to extract gold and artifacts in the area, going on to become owner of an important commercial center in Cusco and of a large house in an exclusive neighborhood of the city. Closer to my own experience, I was one day offered a *pututu* ('conch shell trumpet') by the truckers that made bi-weekly delivers to Ccachín and Choquecancha. The shell was said to have been used by the Incas. No price was mentioned, as I was quick to decline the purchase, both to discourage the idea that I was in the market for artifacts, and because purchase of such antiquities is illegal. I later sat in on a discussion among a high school teacher and his students in Ccachín in which it was reported that the shell was one of three that had recently been found by the trucker's assistant by rappelling down a cliff near Qolqemarka (only one of the shells — this, the smallest — could be reached). The teacher estimated that the shell weighted four kilograms, and took its extraordinary weight as evidence that it was filled with gold. The truckers were considering the purchase of a new Mitsubishi truck at the time (they had approached me for a loan, but I had declined), and the teacher and students assumed that the gold would provide the means to purchase the new truck.

All of these accounts are about the fortune of somebody from somewhere else, *hacendados*, *brujos*, priests, truckers, traders, and tourists. Those who share the same relative background, those of Choquecancha and the fellow from Amparaes that are

reputed to have found gold, are insiders-turned-outsiders, people who have used their fortune to leave their status as poor peasants and migrate to the city. Whenever approached on the topic of gold detectors and subterranean treasures, I showed disinterest, the better to avoid unwarranted suspicions. Similarly, in Choquecancha, Michael Thomas, whose research more explicitly focused on local legends about subterranean Inca tunnels and buried treasures than my own, refrained from approaching the ruins of Llullumarka, sensitive to his informants' fears that visitors to the site were taking out gold (Michael Thomas, personal communication). Sallnow writes that he never accepted offers to go prospecting in Qamawara in order to discourage the rumors, and consequently he lacked data on it. In this way, "the innuendo and conspiratorial offers of assistance abated, though they never disappeared completely" (Sallnow 1989:213). My experience is the same.

Dispelling Fears About Drugs

Foreigners are sometimes associated with illegal drugs, both marijuana and cocaine ("*oro verde*" 'green gold') in the Andean countryside. This is hardly surprising, given the news people hear on the radio about *narcotraficantes* and their interdiction. Villagers in Ccachín also had personal experience with a gringo who preceded us to the village who occasionally smoked marijuana. Villagers report that he shared joints with them during rest breaks in the field work, and the effect made them *machasqa* ('drunk'). These memories were still fresh when we arrived, and we were asked by a number of young men to bring them marijuana seeds, which they hoped to plant for cash. We politely explained that we could not, for to do so was illegal in our country and their own.

The Lares Valley north of Ccachín is a government-approved zone for the production of coca leaves for traditional use by the *campesinos*. Although the amount of illegal production and marketing in the area for the international drug trade is hard to determine, it is not among the most notorious of such zones (Guillén 1989). The commercialization of coca is controlled by the government marketing monopoly ENACO (*Empresa Nacional de la Coca*), but their is an active underground market.

The Ccachín families that maintain households in the Lares Valley plant coca as a part of a mixed strategy of subsistence and cash crops. New production by recent migrants is illegal, but on a modest scale the activity is widespread. Villagers who move back and forth between the village and the outposts in the Lares Valley market coca leaves on a small scale in the village and the puna communities above, by barter, or surreptitiously transport the leaves by mule to Calca for cash sale. Ccachín's position along a road between the Lares Valley and Calca/Cusco favors it in this regard. The transport of coca was controlled during Inca times as well, where it was a prestige good restricted to the nobility, and the trail that it followed at that time likewise passed through Amparaes and Totora before turning toward P'isaq (Ossio et. al. 1989).

The exchange of coca leaves between highland communities has been constrained in recent years by measures taken by the *guardia civil* to restrict its transport. A cargo of coca beyond one's immediate needs is subject to confiscation. This does not prevent travelers to the valley from returning with coca to barter or sell on a small scale, and some take bigger risks.

While I witnessed the seizure of coca several times from bus travelers at the P'isaq control station on the road from Calca to Cusco, the truck I rode in between Calca and Ccachín was never stopped and searched by the *guardia civil*. Rarely did anyone carry large quantities of coca, but on one occasion, a traveler from the Lares Valley made the truck stop before reaching Calca so that she could hide her contraband at a farmstead until she could move it into the city by other means. She was carrying four *arrobas* (100 lbs.) of coca worth about fifty dollars, a significant loss if she would have been discovered. She carried the cargo on the floor beneath her among other goods, but with the collaboration of the trucker, coca leaves may be wrapped in the tarp used to cover passengers and cargo during rain or hidden beneath the cargo bed. I am told that people know their business and few are caught.

Villagers in Ccachín generally believe that cocaine is bad and that *narcotraficantes* are unsavory people. They are aware that there is a healthy cocaine market in the United States, and that the U.S. government is taking efforts to eliminate production

of the coca leaf in their country. However, they do not perceive the coca leaves they chew to be dangerous, and they do not understand why the U.S. government says otherwise. The tight controls affect people throughout the Andes. As Allen (1988:22 5) describes it,

> They carry on without coca . . . compensating with alcohol and cigarettes. . . . But the cultural balance has been thrown off, and the ritual frame that gives life coherence and meaning is being pulled away from them. Of course, the ritual frame is being pulled away from them anyway; and they are turning away from it. The forced deprivation of coca only complicates an already complex and confusing situation. It forces on *Runakuna* what should be one of the most significant choices they make about themselves: whether or not to chew coca. This choice expresses — and expresses consciously — who the *Runakuna* are, or at least which of their available cultural skins they are wearing at the moment. [Allen 1988:225]

With the radio heightening awareness that drug trafficking has a major effect on the Peruvian economy, the *narcotraficante* has become a category to measure and distrust outsiders. In the fall of 1990, after having spent a year in Ccachín, I found suspicion circulating about me. A *compadre*, one of the most enterprising men in the village in exploiting opportunities to make a bit of cash, had purchased sixteen *arrobas* (400 lbs.) of coca leaves in the Lares Valley and had transported them to Ccachín hidden beneath the bed of a truck. I was familiar with the purchase, as he had told me that he made money by buying and reselling coca for *Kawsasqanchis P'unchay* ('All Saint's Day'), when it was needed by most everyone for their rituals for the dead. It was not the first time that he had made such purchases, and he gave me a detailed account of the routes he used to carry coca to Calca by mule to escape detection. One day a *comadre* of my host family came to report that at the potato plowing she had attended the day before, the teenage son of the sponsor of the event had reported to all gathered that I was carrying cocaine to Cusco to sell it for my *compadre*. As the story goes, while drunk, my *compadre* had boasted at another plowing that he was making cocaine in the hills. My host family believed that my *compadre* — their nephew and neighbor — could be making cocaine, because they knew about his purchase of coca leaves, and they had seen him go to the hills with two others from the village carrying large pots (presumably for manufactur-

ing). My hosts urged me to go to my *compadre* and tell him that true or not, he should not drink so much and keep his mouth shut. The instructed me to go to the father of the teenage boy spreading rumors about me and tell him to stop slandering my name.

I was disturbed by the accusation, but not sure how to respond to it given my unfamiliarity with Andean ways of truth-seeking. Would denial be taken as admission of guilt, or would silence? I did not believe the accusations against my *compadre* true, and I had seen time and time again in the village how scant and misinterpreted evidence could be turned into exaggerated assessments of someone's activities and character. I knew that if the rumors persisted, I would have to drop our *compadrazgo* relations lest I be further tainted by guilt of association. I approached my *compadre* about the accusations and he denied them, saying that he was only trading the coca leaves, buying when they were cheap, and selling when the price rose. He warned me that the family spreading the rumor was *muy mala* ('very bad'), and cited problems that the community was having with them. Indeed, I knew the reputation of the family well. They had been *desempadronado* (i.e., some of their rights as community members were suspended) for a period of five years for fighting to reclaim land that their ancestors had donated to the school, and for disruptive behavior at community assemblies. Additionally, the parents and brother of the teenager had recently assaulted someone in the village, resulting in his hospitalization for head injuries. The family had a reputation as troublemakers, a reputation fresh on people's minds, and I judged that I could ride out the rumors about me on the strength of my reputation and weakness of theirs. I decided not to say anything to them, or to make any public defense, and I never heard anything more of the matter.

Conclusion

While I have organized this chapter around my participation in social relations in Ccachín, my intent has been to open a window on community life, not on my own. I have attempted to give equal weight to both participant and observation here. It would be deceptive to remove myself from the picture, or to misrepresent the process by which I learned much of what I learned. I have tried to make clear that my presence in Ccachín

was not neutral, and that while I did not go there to change anything, things changed on my account.

I went to the Andes to do ethnography, not make friends, but in setting up residence, carrying out the tasks of daily living, going from door to door and field to field, joining in family celebrations and community activities, I ended up forming deep emotional bonds. Most, but not all, of these bonds involved *compadrazgo* relations. It is noteworthy that Pitt-Rivers (1975) has described *compadrazgo* as a kind of "ritualized friendship." But we need to be careful about uncritically transferring concepts from one culture to another, and Montes de Castillo suggests that our Western notion of friendship is not readily applicable in the Andes:

> To classify *compadrazgo* as ritualized friendship is incorrect, at least in the case of the Andes. The term *friendship* has some very precise connotations in industrialized societies, where social relations based on rituals have deteriorated, and refers to distinct grades of interpersonal communication. But I have the impression that this type or category of relationship between people is alien to Andean society. Andean people distinguish between the insider and the outsider. And the insider is either relative, consanguine, affine, or *compadre*. There are no friends on the altiplano, there are only *compadres*. [Montes de Castillo 1989:163-164]

He may overstate the case somewhat, because not everyone who works and plays together falls neatly into one of these categories, but the point is well-made, and it is important to remember that personal networks are structured in a different way than they are in most areas of Europe or the United States.

I conclude with two final points, one about my public presence in the community and the other about how I was received.

First, while I attended community assemblies and even served as the treasurer of a festival committee on one occasion, I did not express my opinions either in public or private about the issues under consideration. For the most part, they did not concern me, and I was not asked. More importantly, the decision making process in general and many of the specific issues discussed were of direct interest for my research on rational choice and collective action, and it was improper for me to take a stand.

The only exception to this rule was in the case of the film "*La Vida Es Una Sola*" shot on location in the village in 1992 (Eyde and Taipe 1992). While presented to the community as a love story, the plot revolved around the guerrilla war waged by Sendero Luminoso against the Peruvian government (the featured romance was between a male guerrilla fighter and a peasant woman). At the time, Ccachín was in a Military Emergency Zone. MRTA (*Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaq Amaru*) guerrillas were active in the area and had visited the community a few months earlier. Peruvian soldiers were stationed in Amparaes, and occasionally passed through the village on sorties. Under these circumstances, I feel that the film put community leaders and villagers who acted in the film at risk. Still in the production stages, there was no knowing how the argument would be developed or the film would be interpreted. No matter how well-balanced the portrayal, there was no knowing whether one armed group or another might take offence. Villagers were to serve as actors, but had no control over political content. Bastien (1985) notes that after the filming of "*Yawar Mallku*"/"Blood of the Condor" (Sanjinés 1969) in his research village of Kaata, Bolivia in 1967, the film caused family problems for the lead village actor and political problems for the community. The *campesino* actor was married to a beautiful Chilean actress in the film, and his real-life wife found it difficult to distinguish between roleplaying and romance. She became distrustful of her husband and of outsiders based on her experience from the film. The Bolivian government likewise had trouble distinguishing between the revolutionary political message of the film and the political beliefs of villagers, and accused the Kaatans of being communists. The community suffered a loss of support and prestige, and Kaatans blamed succeeding crop failures on the bad luck brought by the film makers. I feared that similar problems could befall Ccachín.

Other than a question put to the film maker by one *comunero* at a community assembly about whether she worked for the CIA, there was little discussion of the political aspects of the film. Most discussion, both public and private, centered on the terms of the contract and on organizational matters. I did not express my misgivings in public, but decided to share them in private with those that asked. I also talked with the

film maker directly about my concerns. She attempted to assure me that proper precautions were being taken and that if anyone were put in danger by the film, it would be her, and not community members. Finally, I expressed my concerns to an official at the Ministry of Culture, though it later became unclear if the Ministry had jurisdiction over the case.

Ultimately, the community assembly of Ccachín overwhelmingly approved the project. There were just five votes against. 450 villagers signed up for tryouts. The actual filming took place in early 1992, a few months after I had left the village. With the imprisoning of Abimael Guzmán, the leader of Sendero Luminoso in September of 1992, the political situation in Peru changed dramatically, rendering the worst of my fears moot. Lares was removed from the list of districts in the Emergency Zone soon after. None of this could be foreseen a year earlier when the film project was under consideration, and I'll leave it to others to consider the professional ethics of the case and consider if I did too much or not enough.

As for how I was received in the community, I have the entire community to thank for harboring me when a troop of MRTA guerrillas spent two days in the village in the spring of 1991. Within ten minutes of their arrival, I was notified by villagers and advised to flee to the hills. There, I shared a long, rainy day with some pigs and my thoughts in an abandoned thatch hut in a recently harvested potato field. The guerrillas sealed off all exits-entrances to the community moments after I left. They held several community assemblies over the two days, which in retrospect, I regret having missed. MRTA is not known for the human rights abuses that Sendero Luminoso is given to, and it may be that both I and the *comuneros* overestimated the risk (many men, like I, made themselves scarce during MRTA's stay). With the heavy rains, the *tupaqamaristas* remained longer than anyone expected, and when I slipped back into the village under the cover of darkness the first night, they were still there. A family hid me away in their *marka* ('second story room'), brought me food, emptied my bedpan, and notified me when the coast was clear.

It's inappropriate to go into greater detail here, but the important point is this: not once during any of the assemblies did any of the *comuneros* mention that I was living in the village, not that I was there at the present time. Partly, they were being prudent, as the MRTA leaders warned villagers against taking any foreigners or outsiders into their midst, and my presence could have caused problems if discovered. In part, though, I take it as a sign of cover, an act of solidarity in which everyone in the community took part. Several told me later that if my name had come up, I would have been in no danger, the community would have put in a good word for me, as "everyone is your friend." No one put it to the test.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. The term *gringo* is used in a neutral sense in the Andes. The term *yanqui*, however, is associated with U.S. imperialism in Peru and is used pejoratively. I heard the term *yanqui* used in this sense in Cusco, and saw it written in graffiti on walls, but never heard it in Ccachín.

2. The Peace Corps had a rather short-lived history in Peru, 1962-1968, before it was expelled by the Velasco government (Sheffield 1992). In the Cusco area, Peace Corps workers are remembered for their work in developing ceramic craft production for the tourist trade in P'isaq. No one in Ccachín, however, reported having had contact with Peace Corps personnel. The Bolivian film "*Yawar Mallku*" ("Blood of the Condor") gives a feel for the anti-Peace Corps passions in the Andes in the late 1960s (Sanjinés 1969).

3. People in the village showed a marked preference for "Americans" in spite of the fact that their campesino federation and their voting patterns tended toward the far left. As far as I am aware, no one in the village had any contact or experience with anyone from the Soviet Union. The rather extensive military and trade contacts between the Soviet Union and Peru — next to Cuba, Peru was the Soviet Union's major trade partner in Latin America throughout the 70s — primarily affected Lima and the coast. Other than North Americans, the few tourists that passed through the village were English or French, not Russian. The outside food aid received by the community was from the U.S., and the sacks and cans were so marked, enhancing their propagandistic effect.

4. Michael Walzer sums up our views about a gift this way:

> In the United States today, the gift is determined by the commodity. If I can own this object and exchange it for something else . . . then surely I can give it to whomever I please. If I can shape my identity through my possessions, then I can do so through my dispossessions. . . The unilateral gift is a phenomenon unique to the sphere of money and commodities as it has taken shape in our own society. . . It is severely constrained, if not ruled out entirely, whenever ownership is invested in the family or the lineage. It is a special feature of our own culture, opening the way to special sorts of generosity and public-spiritedness (and special sorts of whimsy and meanness, too). [Walzer 1983:123-128]

5. Gose (1994) likewise finds that the payment for a day's work in the harvest is measured by the carrying capacity of the *q'epina*. It's interesting to note that when I worked for my host family, I would be given a more token amount, a couple of kilograms of corn rather than an *arroba*, for example, presumably because I ate most meals with them. In this case, the *wanlla* was more transparently a "little extra" gift.

An *arroba* of corn or a couple *arrobas* of potatoes was a better return for one's labor than the equivalent wage rate in the Lares Valley at this time (wage labor is not used during the harvest in Ccachín). While I recorded many cases of reciprocal labor during the harvests, I agree with Gose that it is not as common a form of labor recruitment as during planting and weeding. There are several reasons for this. First, it's easier to carry out the harvest with family labor, because women, men, and children can readily do the same tasks (all things being equal, households prefer to use family labor rather than recruit labor through *ayni* or *mink'a*). Second, there are fewer efficiency gains to teamwork than in planting, plowing, and weeding. Third, if labor needs to be recruited, there are many people interested in working in exchange for produce (this is true of both the corn and potato harvests, but for different reasons; the former because villagers in Qochayoq do not have cornfields of their own, and the latter because there are more random environmental risks at the high altitudes where potatoes are grown). Finally, the hurried time frame makes reciprocal labor scheduling difficult. In part because food stocks are low at this time, in part because women participate in the harvest and don't have time to cook, and in part because there is little competition to recruit labor, corn beer and elaborate feasts are not associated with the harvest as they are with other agricultural tasks.

6. In one case, a *comadre* wished to sell me a *lliklla* to pay off a bank loan. In this case, however, it was for lands that she managed and worked in Yavero, in the *ceja de la selva*. Her husband had nothing to do with these lands, and it was appropriate within the family's division of labor for her to apply the earnings from her textile sale to the agricultural loan.

7. The *compadrazgo* relationship involves more delayed and less strictly-accounted relations than *ayni* partnerships (one-to-one labor exchange), for example, where people keep careful track of their labor repayment debts (although many of these *ayni* debts are incurred to *compadres*). But *compadrazgo* is not marked by generalized reciprocity to the extent that family relations are. Fictive kinship is not the same as kinship. In this regard, it is interesting to make a comparison with the U.S., where godparenting relationships are generally weak or nonexistent. In interpersonal relationships (rather than institutional ones) it appears that loan repayment depends on degree of consanguinity. In the U.S., apparently, 50% of loans to family members are repaid, while 75% of loans to friends are (National Public Radio, date and source unrecorded). As with *compadrazgo*, friendship relations require more balance to survive.

8. Self-esteem in this sense also stabilizes behavior, in the sense that it removes it from the vagaries of future cost and benefit calculations to render it consistent with a stream of past choices. Recall Heath's discussion of the difference between social exchange theory and economic exchange theory:

> The economic theory is *forward-looking*. Bygones are bygones for the economist.

> Goods or services are handed over with an eye to the future, not to the past. If I reciprocate it is because I want your help in the future, not because I feel grateful for past favors. In contrast, the sociological theory is *backward-looking*. Bygones are of crucial importance. Services are given and judgements made in recognition of past favors, not in expectation of future ones. [Heath 1976:59-60]

While obviously a caricature of both, as presently practiced, Heath's comments suggest the extent that identity, which is ultimately backward looking (focusing on the *essence* of who I am and what I have done) adds another level to rational calculation.

9. The daily rate for wage labor in the area represents the opportunity cost of labor for men, not for women. The opportunity costs for women are even lower (the primary wage opportunity is as an *empleada* in Cusco). I use the rate for men here because it is readily available, and because the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is a widely accepted, if rarely implemented, principle of equity in the United States.

10. While in many areas the *masa* or *wiri* includes or consists mainly of women *rap'aq*, I have never seen a woman playing a similar role during *papa yapuy* in Ccachin. The task is performed by teenagers and older men. I have seen women working as *rap'aq* in the Lares area, however, above Lares at Pampacorral and Kiswarani. In these instances, the work teams were always much smaller, consisting of just a couple of *wiri*.

11. The family did not admit to having multiple *unuchakuy compadres* and the suspicions of others are often mistaken. However, the low-key, private nature of the ceremony lends itself to multiple, spur-of-the-moment *compadrazgo* relations. Little preparation is needed. *Trago* ('low-grade cane alcohol') is served, but *chicha* or *aqha* ('corn beer') need not be prepared (people with *aqha* made for another purpose often decide that the time is opportune for *unuchakuy*). Meals are special, but need not include guinea pig or chicken. In the case of the family said to have conducted four *unuchakuy* for their first child, the other *padrinos* reportedly were the director of the high school (who eventually became the child's first haircutting *padrino*) and a visiting USE (school district) representative.

12. This "seed money" is also called "*capital*." The *mesa* ('table') that serves as the center of the *chukcha rutuy* ceremony is pronounced *misa* in Quechua, and as in *papa yapuy*, is a constant reminder of the relationship between the table and the altar at a mass (Sp., *misa*, 'altar'). *Chicha* or *trago* is spilled on the four corners of this table, on the scissors, hair, and accumulated money each time someone drinks, emphasizing the sacredness of the ceremony. Many metaphors heard at first haircuttings refer to special foods. The *qowi* ('guinea pig'), a prestige food served, ideally, to the *compadres* whole (alternatively, half a chicken may be served to the *comadre*), is referred to as *Santa Monica*, patron saint of *qowi*. The *yuyu* ('turnip

greens') served in season are often referred to as *torillo*, playing on the story of a *campesino* without cattle who grew fat on turnip greens to the wonderment of the local *hacendado*. Coca is referred to as *t'anta* ('bread') or *pastillas* ('pills'). The *llipt'a* ('compressed ash') chewed with coca to release the alkaloids, is referred to as *azúcar* ('sugar'), *queso* ('cheese'), *qowikanka ñusq'on* ('roast guinea pig brain'), *machu* ('ancestor'), *taytacha hombre* ('elder'), and *subprefecto* ('subprefect'). All of these items and metaphoric references play a role in the *papa yapuy* as well. Outside of the ceremony itself, the condor is sometimes referred to as *compadre*. I was told that this is because it feeds on young sheep on the *loma*. On *Día de Comadres*, an important fertility ritual for the sheep, goats, llama, and alpaca conducted the second Thursday before Carnival Sunday, some families give a young animal from their herd to their *compadres*, and this custom is probably the source of the metaphor. The condor is associated with the *apu* (Bastien 1985), and the condor's taking of young animals from the herd is viewed in terms of a reciprocal relation between the *apu* and the *runa*, just as reciprocity is maintained between *compadres*.

13. The parents of the child I sponsored wanted their son to receive his first communion because, playing with matches, he had carelessly started a fire that destroyed several hectares of communal pastureland and wiped out the family's sheep herd. The communion was motivated in this case by the desire for purification and expiation, the church equivalent of the misfortune rituals discussed by Bastien (1980).

14. Later, Father Sayer told me that the "sign of peace" comes too late in the mass and that the exchange of coca leaves should be done earlier. He also used coca in hearing confession in Ccachín a sign of reintegration and membership into the community (i.e., in anthropological terms, the *incorporation stage* of a rite of passage). He had not integrated *chicha* into the mass, but believed that it should be there, including the *ch'allasqa* ('pouring of libations') on the four corners of the altar.

15. One of the fellows reportedly carrying a pistol introduced himself to me as a *compadre* of the *hatun padrino* and as a police investigator. I did not see any weapons at the wedding party, but another of my *compadres* reported that there were two *tiruku* ('terrorists') with guns there. He assumed that they were with the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaq Amaru* (*MRTA*). The Ccachín sanitario was not in the village to attend to the emergencies at the time. The Choquecancha *sanitario* was reportedly pressured by the *padrino* and Amparaes police with regard to the autopsy papers and burial site for the murdered Condición man (who showed signs of being tortured). Through his involvement with the case, and on the side of the community in the land disputes, he had reason to feel threatened. He sent medicines to the dying woman through intermediaries. Barbara and I checked in on the injured boy and provided painkillers, but the owner of the horse had primary responsibility for his care, and he was treated with natural medicines.

16. Speaking of Choquecancha, Seibold (1990:69), says that "*Runa* do not like the spotlight. After a child's first haircutting, there are no ceremonies that focus on the individual. Everyone tries to merge with the crowd." However, birthdays are celebrated in the area. On almost any given day, one can find a group of men in a yard drinking with the *santuyoq* ('birthday-holder'). On any given night, one can hear *waynu* (traditional Andean country music) blasting from a portable loudspeaker hooked to a tree near some celebrant's home. People say that they are *santuyoq* ('saint-owners') on their birthdays; typically, they are named for one of the saints commemorated on that day. Birthday parties are more elaborate for adults than for children and more of a break from daily activities for men than for women. However, our *compadres* typically invited us to visit their homes on our godchildren's birthdays.

17. There are not many economic and social alternatives for people with children, and limited resources hinder spousal independence. Still, with the prospects of greater mobility to urban areas and the jungle, I heard others discuss the possibility of separation when family problems became particularly acute. The sexual division of labor in Andean agropastoralist families conceivably provides a safety valve for relationships in distress. Husbands and wives need not see each other for extended periods because the demands of herding and fieldwork disperse the family to separate areas of the community. Such dispersion, however, can create family problems of their own, and extra-marital relations are most often reported during these periods of physical separation.

18. These are the predominant patterns, but there are exceptions. When a *padrino* for a child is hard to secure, as in the case of a single mother, kin are called upon. The relationship between the parents and godparents of newly-weds is also important, and the parents of the groom may play a decisive role in the selection of their *compadres*, but the relationship between godparents and godchildren is stronger than in other forms of *compadrazgo*. I am aware of a case in Ccachín where a mestizo shopowner in Yerbabuenayoq chose a well-off couple from the *comunidad campesina* as godparents for his child, the reverse of the normal pattern of *comunero-mestizo* ties. In this case, however, economic and social differences were not pronounced, and the *compadres* had something important that the shopkeeper lacked — lands and community membership.

19. While the preponderance of research on *compadrazgo* has had a functionalist bent, there have been attempts to explain the ideological framework of *compadrazgo* from more structuralist and culturalist approaches, as for example, in terms of an opposition between nature/culture (Coy 1974; Gudeman 1975). Other authors do a good job of discussing these (see Montes de Castillo 1989, for one), and it is beyond my scope to provide a more complete review of the literature here.

20. Stories of organ theft have since become widespread in Latin America. Occasionally, there are also reports of vigilante action against foreign tourists suspected of being organ thieves. Some investigators classify the stories as urban legend, while others include them in their list of human rights abuses in the Third World.

21. Ansión (1989) traces the origin of *nak'aq* back to pre-Hispanic times, where the demand of the Inca for children for human sacrifice would have seemed oppressive to many subject ethnic groups. The figure has its counterpart in Iberia, though few studies address its possible diffusion in one direction or the other (Wachtel 1994 is an exception). My mother-in-law, a Basque woman born in 1920, recalled that as a young girl, she was warned about the *sacamantecas* ('lard-snatchers') that roamed the Basque countryside. Here too the figure was associated with Spanish outsiders, reflecting the Basques subordinate position in local power relations. There are differences between the contemporary *nak'aq* stories and colonial ones — presence in the city rather than the countryside, the victimization of youth rather than travelers, the magical properties attributed to technology, and the shift in emphasis from body fat, a traditional symbol of vitality and power in the Andes, to the eyes. In contemporary Quechua, *ñawiyoq* ('having eyes') is associated with literacy, and some have suggested that the fear of losing one's eyes indicates the importance that schooling has taken on in the modern era (Ansión 1989).

22. Gose, on the other hand, building on an analysis of the logic of sacrifice in Andean culture, argues that "The *ñak'aq* is no more a representation of the evils of capitalism than are the apus, but like them make the amoral assertion that production, power and riches demand organic tribute, the transcendental assimilation of the ruled." He goes on to suggest that the *ñak'aq* articulates an erotic-religious desire for transcendence in the face of power more than an economic analysis of it, or an ideology of political resistance to it" (1986:309).




Figure 3.1: Diagram of a *Papa Yapuy* Feast




Figure 3.2: A First-Haircutting Ceremony

Part II

Explanation, Rationality, and "*Lo Andino*"

> I don't believe that one has to look for new theoretical models of individual behavior for the Andean peasantry, as their rationality would be similar to that of peasants of other regions of the world. Nevertheless, a collection of historical, organizational, and geographic factors oblige us to admit that at the macroeconomic level, the Andean peasantry certainly does represent a specific case.
>
> Bruno Kervyn, *La Economía Campesina en el Perú* (1988:73)

> To separate macro and micro aspects in this way doesn't seem very fertile. With this position one runs the risk of forgetting the peasant himself, and of creating rules of development for him, but also and once again without and outside of him. The articulation of the different rationalities of his behavior and basic orientations may be a more adequate and more Andean point of departure.
>
> Laurens van Vroonhoven, *Cultura Andina y Ciencia* (1990:16)

Introduction

In Part II, I discuss rational choice theory in general and its application to the Andes in particular. I explore the topics of health, theft, and gift-giving in an attempt to outline fundamental explanatory principles and to separate out the rational, nonrational, and irrational mechanisms that appear to be at play in each. In my introductory comments here, I lay out the principles of my research orientation. The position I adopt is methodologically individualist and informed by evolutionary, coevolutionary, and rational choice theory. While the extent that rational choice is operative at proximate levels of causation for human behavior is an empirical issue that remains to be settled, rational choice theory provides a convenient starting point for analysis, as it yields deductively-derived hypotheses about what behavioral options are expected to dominate in specific contexts, and observed outcomes can be used to judge the adequacy of the hypotheses' given premises.

Potentially, there are many mechanisms that explain human behavior, and ultimately, I am interested in how they can be put together to make a more synthetic model.

Methodological Individualism

Methodological individualism is an analytical orientation that posits that the properties of groups (institutions, societies, etc.) are in principle explicable in terms of the properties, goals, beliefs, and actions of individuals (Elster 1982). "Property of groups" means formal rules, informal conventions, taboos, traditions, kinship networks, moiety divisions, ritual calendars, and the like. Action can be intended or unintended, conscious or unconscious, as long as it is ascribed to individuals. The point is that only individuals have agency — individuals make decisions and take actions.

With an emphasis in anthropology in recent years on action (praxis, experience, performance) and on the actor (agent, self, individual, subject), methodological individualism may seem unproblematic. As Elster (1989) points out, the principle that individual human action is the elementary unit of social life is not violated by showing that the choices of individuals are often irrational, that they take the welfare of others to heart, that their beliefs and preferences are shaped by their cultural milieu, that their feelings about groups can't be reduced to their feelings about individuals within them, that what one does depends on what others do, or that many properties of individuals are irreducibly relational. The approach also accepts supraindividual actors — households, firms, classes, governments — as analytical shorthand. One need not describe all levels with the same detail at the same time.

What is ruled out then? Methodological individualism stands out against descriptions of supraindividual entities — "cultural logic," "development of the forces of production," "societal homeostasis" and "ecological equilibrium" — as the prime movers of structure and history. It cautions us that it is not enough to explain social facts in terms of social facts, not enough to simply posit a causal relationship between macro-variables without establishing how they affect each other via individual actors. Explanation of social phenomena requires both intentional explanation of individual action and causal

explanation of interaction between individuals. It requires an understanding of the goals motivating actors to act as they do given the social facts, as well as an understanding of how these actions combine to maintain or transform that structure.[1]

Linguistic shorthand, self-identity, and feelings of solidarity often lead us to speak of groups thinking, wanting, deciding, and doing as if they were individuals. As participants in social life, we all are given to reification. As Kertzer (1990:218) notes, "no organization . . . can exist without symbolic representation, for organizations can be 'seen' only though their associated symbols." People establish their own self-images through identification with these symbols, and use them as resources to assert and defend their interests. In Inca cosmology, direct metaphorical links were made between the social body — the empire — and the body of the emperor. The four quarters of Tawantinsuyo corresponding to the four quarters of the body, and the health of the Inca was explicitly tied to the health of the empire (Classen 1993). Bastien (1978) details how the people of Kaata (Bolivia) look to their own bodies to understand and explain the organic wholeness of their community. In the social sciences, the image of the social body is generally not so graphic, but it underlies much functionalist explanation, and has left a deep mark.

Beliefs and Desires

A promising body of theory for linking the macroscopic patterns of societies with the microscopic details of individual lives focuses on culture as a system of inheritance (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd 1992). Culture, as defined here, is information capable of affecting individuals' behavior or morphology that is acquired from others by teaching or imitation. Culture is comprised of "patterns for behavior" rather than "patterns of behavior" (Keesing 1974), and pertains to individuals rather than institutions, that is, to individuals rather than the interstices between them. Defined in this way, culture is similar to genes in that information affecting an individual's behavior is acquired in a patterned way from others in the population. This leads us to the analogy that culture is to behavior as genotype is to phenotype (Hunn 1984). The analogy is so

useful that the population-level consequences of cultural transmission can be modeled in much the same way and with many of the same tools as genetic inheritance is modeled within the synthetic theory of organic evolution. In some ways cultural and genetic transmission are similar and in others quite different, with the main work of those exploring the analogy being to understand the implications of the differences.[2]

Most anthropologists hold that cultural transmission is an important part of the adaptive repertoire of humans. The possibility of nonparental cultural transmission, along with other differences between cultural and genetic evolution, add new forces affecting the rate of change and distribution of traits through a population. One of the best accounts of the forces or mechanisms of cultural transmission has been provided by Boyd and Richerson (1985). They include the following processes: a) "guided variation," whereby through trial-and-error-learning and rational calculation, individuals adjust their behavior to their immediate environments according to some guiding criteria (e.g., satisfaction, power, prestige, the-greatest-good-for-the-greatest number, any criteria external to the process itself), which is then transmitted to subsequent generations, b) "direct biases," whereby an individual adopts a trait based on some property of the trait itself, c) "frequency-dependent biases," whereby an individual is influenced by how common a trait is among his or her models (e.g., adopting the majority opinion even when it contradicts one's own experience), d) "indirect biases," in which people tend to acquire traits not because of some intrinsic property of the trait has in itself, but because it is possessed by prestigious, powerful, wealthy, or otherwise successful or outstanding individuals, who make attractive models. Note here that rational choice is a kind of "guided variation."

Conceptually, following Durham (1991), there are at least five distinct modes of relationship between genes and culture: a) "cultural mediation," whereby culture has the effect of altering or changing the direction and rate of genetic evolution, b) "genetic mediation," whereby epigenetic decision making processes contribute to the comparative analysis of the set of available cultural variants, c) "enhancement," by which the cultural beliefs and values of a population select for other cultural variants that have the highest

genetic fitness value, d) "neutrality," cultural selection among variants that are adaptively neutral, and e) "opposition," cultural selection where variants with suboptimal genetic fitness consequences have high potential for replicability. The first two identify ways that genes and culture interact more or less directly. The second three identify ways that cultural systems may influence the direction and rates of their own evolutionary change. These five modes offer us a complete if sketchy mapping of the interaction of two information systems: genes and culture. Cultural fitness — a variant's potential for replication within the cultural system of a given population — can be defined and its transmission studied at the population level in a manner directly analogous to that of genetic fitness. Along with the three classes of cultural evolution identified by Richerson and Boyd (1985) — random forces, decision making forces, and natural selection — they provide us a basic conceptual framework for analyzing cultural variation.

All decisions require rules for making them, and these rules may be acquired by earlier episodes of cultural transmission or by genetically-controlled biases in our neurophysiology. If we conceive of explanation as filling in the missing links of a causal chain, I see few grounds to disagree with Richerson and Boyd's (1992:64) proposition that "A chain of cultural rules will often end in genetically-acquired traits of some kind." Given this, it's plausible that genes and culture are tightly linked in interactive modes, constrained by individual learning and the forces of guided variation and directly-biased transmission.

Then again, it is also plausible that they are not. Most anthropologists assume that the "comparative modes of interaction" between genes and culture — those in which culture changes through secondary value selection (i.e., "enhancement," "neutrality", and "opposition") — are more common than "cultural mediation" and "genetic mediation" (using Durham's terms). The supposition is that the spread of at least some kinds of beliefs must be weakly affected by evolved predispositions. This is possible if the environment is not too variable, if information about the environment is costly, and if particular mechanisms of cultural inheritance can provide less-costly adaptive shortcuts to individual learning (Boyd and Richerson 1985). There's considerable difference among

anthropologists as to whether we see enhancement, neutrality, or opposition as the dominant modes of gene-culture interaction. To the extent that it is the latter, it's most readily explained by the novel effects of frequency-dependent and indirect biases, and the effects of differential power and imposition. Once the logical relationships between genes and culture are established, generalization about the relative weight of one mechanism or another in particular contexts is an empirical issue.

Taking the diversity of mechanisms in the abstract, it may seem that "there's no reason to expect that any particular human trait in any particular society should conform to the predictions of ordinary Darwinian theory" (Richerson and Boyd 1989:124). Any particular trait chosen for study at random may be adaptive, neutral, or maladaptive. Richerson and Boyd have modeled how it is possible for particular cultural traits to spread even though they reduce the genetic fitness of their carriers or are neutral in this regard (in Chapter 6, I explore whether such models can be successfully applied to the giving of animals to nonkin at animal marking ceremonies in the Andes). But Richerson and Boyd don't mean, and there is no reason to suppose, that on average, traits aren't adaptive. Further, if we assume, as they do, that, there are genetic modifiers that control the relative importance of individual and social learning in different kinds of behavioral situations, we should be able to make some deductions based on the costs of learning in different contexts, and empirically, we should see patterns emerge. Any trait chosen at random may be adaptive, neutral, or maladaptive, but not necessarily with the same probability.

Human Action

Rational Choice Theory

The idea behind rational choice theory is intuitively simple: when faced with alternative courses of action, people do what they believe to be best for realizing their desires (Elster 1989). Rational choice is instrumental in the sense that it is concerned with outcomes. Actions are not valued in themselves, but as means to further ends. In contrast, emotions predispose us to behave in certain ways, committing us to courses of

action without carefully weighing the alternatives (Frank 1988). Social norms are likewise unconcerned with tradeoffs between outcomes and costs (Elster 1989).

As soon as one moves beyond guiding principles, rational choice theory becomes complex and controversial. The most general theories say nothing about the content of people's desires and beliefs. They assume only that desires and beliefs are "consistent," that they give reason to action, and that they directly cause the action they give reason to. The first involves transitivity (if *a* is preferred to *b* and *b* to *c*, *a* should be preferred to *c*), the second points to the sufficiency of an action for realizing ones goals, and the third rules out coincidental causes and effects (Elster 1983). The way that beliefs give reason to action is probably the most controversial of the three conditions. An action may be the best way to realize one's desires, or it may be one way among many. This distinction lies behind debates about the appropriateness of optimization theory in economic and ecological anthropology.

Beyond consistency, theorists often require preferences to be complete and continuous. Completeness assumes perfect knowledge, so that for any pair of options, an actor should be able to express a preference for one of them. Continuity means that preferences will not be reversed if one of the options undergoes a small-and-just-noticeable change. The inclusion of these two assumptions lend power to economists' models by allowing them to convert all preferences to an abstract currency called "utility," and to represent a person's preferences orderings through "utility-functions." The power of the gambit lies in the model's generalizability.

More substantive theories of rationality add the condition that beliefs and desires themselves are rationally adopted. The rationality of beliefs concerns the relation between belief and the evidence available about the world. As I use the term here, rationality is a relation between a belief and the grounds on which it is held, not a relation between belief and the true state of the world. As Elster puts it, "Not only is it human to err: it may even be rational to do so, if all the evidence happens to point in the wrong direction" (Elster 1989:25). Once the assumption of perfect knowledge is relaxed, the question of how much evidence one should collect becomes relevant. The more informa-

tion the better, but only to a point: the costs of collecting information and deliberating can exceed the benefits.

Some situations are so transitory that the opportunity to act can pass by if one does not move quickly. Given less than perfect knowledge and decision making under uncertainty, the amount of evidence collected must be optimal. For single actors in radically new situations, the optimal amount of information is unknowable, giving force to those who propose "satisficing" as an alternative to optimization (satisficers choose from alternatives on the basis of sufficiency or "what's good enough"). This puts the explanatory burden on how the satisfaction threshold is set, taking us outside the mechanism of rational choice. The most promising direction to turn would be toward explanation in terms of cultural processes — toward the norms, metaphors, and proverbs that people might use to supplement rational choice when uncertainty is high — but this seriously limits the generalizability of a given satisficing model. At a more fundamental level, even satisficing needs to be explained in terms of optimization analysis.[3]

Decision makers must deal not only with uncertainty, but with recurrent, estimable risk. Andean farmers, for example, vary the directions they lay the mounds and furrows in their fields depending not only on givens such as soil quality and slope, but on the amount of rainfall they expect during the current growing season (Rengifo Vasquez 1987). Farmers pay close attention to the behavior and movement of animals — toads, partridge, deer, and fox — and atmospheric conditions during certain days in August to predict the weather for the coming year (Rivero Luque 1987). Some of these methods may predict future conditions better than others, and some not at all. Beyond attempting to gather information about environmental variability, Andeans have a practical strategy for dealing with known risks: they give priority to reducing the variance in production over maximizing expected income (Kervyn 1988).

In applying the concept of rational beliefs cross-culturally, care must be taken to consider the technological and institutional capacities for information gathering, as well as the degree of access to this information, of the people in question. Since the costs of collecting information are crucial, the socioeconomic context and the accumulated

cultural history of information gathering are important. One person's or society's belief may be seen as "superstitious" or as a "false belief" by another, but as indicated above, rationality is not a question of "God's truth," and the reasonableness of holding a belief depends on the optimal use of the information-gathering tools available.

Finally, a full theory of rational choice makes some assumptions about desires. Models of rational choice only become operational by positing something substantive about preferences. Preference rankings are derived inductively, by asking actors about their choices and observing what they chose, or deductively, from additional assumptions about the cultural or biological determinants of preferences. We can distinguish between "present-aim theory" and "self-interest theory," for example (Frank 1988). In the first, rationality is taken to be the efficient pursuit of whatever aims one has at the moment of action. In the second, rationality is taken to be the efficient pursuit of one's own interests. Most any act, including expressive and altruistic behavior, may be considered rational by the first, as long as it can be established that one has done what one prefers. Self-interest theory makes rationality more substantive by restricting the domain, albeit at the cost of throwing out such things as moral sentiments that it may be reasonable to have.

While rational choice theorists are able to derive second-order preferences from more basic ones, the latter are taken as given. Except for desires that are self-defeating, that over-value the present, that accept externally-imposed constraints on opportunities, or that would be rejected by someone if they became conscious of them as irrational, the ends that people seek are not normally assumed to be rational in any sense (Elster 1989). There is no way to anchor fundamental preferences within the framework of intentional explanation itself, and some kind of functional or causal explanation of preference formation is required to ground and complement the approach.[4] As Smith and Winterhalder (1992) suggest, one of the most promising directions to turn for this is evolutionary theory, as it not only offers explicit predictions about the form and content of self-interest in different environmental contexts, it also predicts when it is in an individual's self-interest to be self-sacrificing.

The term "rational choice theory" is most often associated with action that is instrumental, self-interested, based on empirically-informed beliefs, and limited to material and social incentives by advocates and critiques alike, and from here on, when I speak of rationality, it will be in this sense (cf., Taylor 1988). This rules out action motivated by emotions, adherence to norms, altruism, the pleasure of doing, and expressions of self. It also rules out cognitive fallacies, wishful thinking, and other processes where beliefs are subverted by cognitive limitations and the desires they serve. With these restrictions, how much the theory explains becomes an empirical issue.

Sometimes the term "rational" is applied by investigators to speak not only of proximate causes but to relate such causes to more ultimate levels of explanation as well. Thus, as Boyd and Richerson write,

> The fact that individual human beings are not very good at solving novel problems, or ones requiring statistical evaluation, suggests that complex cultural adaptations are unlikely to be the result of individual learning alone. Many of the most interesting human adaptations have advantages that are only of a statistical nature. . . . For a broad class of behavioral alternatives, individual decision makers are unable or unwilling to make costly choice efforts. Rather, they combine low-cost bias and guided variation with a considerable reliance on culturally transmitted anchors of behavior. In theory, and apparently in practice, this is the rational way to take advantage of a cultural system of inheritance. [Boyd and Richerson 1985:170]

In appealing to the possible rationality of following cultural rules, we should be careful not to conflate effectiveness at achieving some outcome, such as survival or reproductive success, with rational choice. As Eric Smith suggested upon reading an earlier draft of this thesis, some behavior may not be rational, but it may be "better than rational" in achieving these outcomes (Eric A. Smith, personal communication).

Alternative Conceptions of Rationality

While some rational choice theorists call all that is not instrumentally rational "irrational," this goes counter to our everyday usage of the term, and puts us in the awkward position of calling action based on altruism and other cherished values irratio-

nal.[5] There seems to be precedent for grouping all of the other motivations above into a single category called "personal," "expressive," or "communicative rationality."

Shweder (1984) provides a useful typology in which he contrasts rationality with irrationality and nonrationality. By this, irrationality is limited to cases where a person has failed to apply a standard that he or she recognizes as authoritative and correct, or where a person has failed to use a valid standard of reasoning, judgement, or choice. The nonrational, on the other hand, involves "cases where rationality, validity, truth, and efficiency are simply beside the point — irrelevant" (Shweder 1984:38), where arbitrary, symbolic, expressive, and semiotic processes come to the fore. Such cases may come about where multiple optima arise and rational choice is indeterminate (Elster 1989), or where it's possible to determine what action is instrumentally optimal but nonrational processes guide action in an alternative direction. I find this to be a convenient way of talking, and unless otherwise specified, I use "expressive rationality" and "nonrationality" interchangeably in the pages that follow.

Among those of us working in the Andes, the framework that I adopt here can be contrasted with that of Vroonhoven (1990). Vroonhoven identifies four kinds of rationalities that motivate human action. He presents them on a two-by-two matrix in which material and expressive motivations are found at both individual and collective levels. Thus he distinguishes between individual-material rationality, collective-material rationality, individual-expressive rationality, and collective-expressive rationality, which he calls "instrumental rationality," "magical rationality," "personal rationality," and "ritual rationality" respectively. Instrumental rationality is guided by the outcome of action; actions are not valued in and of themselves, but as more or less efficient means to an end. Magical rationality is likewise goal-directed, but the relation between means and ends is collectively defined and not subject to empirical refutation. In personal rationality, actions are valued in and of themselves for what they express about the individual, so that ends and means coincide. Ritual rationality is also expressive in this sense, but the meaning of the action is collectively defined, and actions are prescribed so that they hardly permit room for individual variation.

From my perspective, Vroonhoven's framework is not only methodologically collectivist, it mixes too much together. A complete theory of social action must include three elements: explanation of individual action in terms of individual desires and beliefs, explanation of macrostates (structures, "social facts") in terms of these actions, and explanation of desires and beliefs in terms of these macrostates (Elster 1983). Vroonhoven's definition of collective rationality effectively compresses the first and third of these analytic tasks into one, making it all the harder to distinguish the underlying psychological and social processes involved. In applying his typology, Vroonhoven does not argue that the rationality of indigenous Andeans is unique, but that it includes more than instrumental rationality. He makes an exception, however, for Western culture, where he finds instrumental rationality dominating the rest. I'm not sure that Vroonhoven has searched very hard for evidence of multiple rationalities in Western culture, but I know of no clear or reliable way to cross-culturally measure the weight of different modes of thought in such sweeping terms.

Explanation in Andean Research

Writing from experience gained elsewhere in Latin America, Cancian observes that:

> An understandably . . . common view seizes on the label "peasant" as a full description of the people who bear it. My impression is that researchers (and many others) presently give too much weight to "peasantness" as an explanation of human behavior, both in the sense that they treat peasant societies as relatively homogenous and in the sense that they see peasants as substantially different from other people. I hope that more research viewing peasants in terms of general theories of human behavior will help to correct this imbalance. [Cancian 1972:158]

As suggested by Kervyn in the opening quote to Part II, even if basic human decision-making mechanisms are the same, a unique conjunction of historical, organizational, and geographic factors lends specificity to the Andean case. General causes are capable of producing diverse aggregate consequences, depending on the circumstances.

Vroonhoven's counter argument that it is infertile to separate "macro and micro aspects in this way" is a bit misdirected. Some processes operate within the mind. Others operate at the level of social interaction and interference. We must explain both intentional individual action and its often unintended aggregate results. The more serious challenge he offers to rational choice theorists is his suggestion that we haven't gotten the facts right about the Andean — and more broadly, human — mind, and that we would be better served by modeling the articulation of various rationalities underlying our subjects behavior. This, he describes as not only a more adequate, but a more Andean point of departure.

What exactly constitutes an Andean point of departure? Andeanists sometimes refer to "*lo Andino*," a configuration of ideas and institutions that pervade Andean history, action, and identity (Salomon 1985). The complex is usually considered to include infrastructural components such as "ecological complementarity" (Masuda et. al. 1985), structural elements that emphasize bilateral kinship, reciprocity networks, and moiety division (e.g., *ayllu*, *ayni*, and *hanansaya-urinsaya*) (Alberti and Mayer 1974; Skar 1982), and superstructural elements such as the human-mountain metaphor (Bastien 1985), *yanatin* (the opposition of symmetrical complements) (Platt 1986), and *pachakuti* (a unified image of space-time and apocalyptic vision of Andean cultural history) (Allen 1988). These features are found to be — or assumed to be — correlated. Assertions about correlation, however, do not constitute causal explanation. The causal relation between infrastructural, structural, and superstructural components of the complex remains to be explained.

While generality, realism, and precision are all clear virtues in scientific explanation, it's not easy to pursue them at once with equal fervor (Levins 1966). It depends on the questions asked and on the stages of work involved in developing particular models through time. There's no reason to condemn models solely because they emphasize one or another of these values; on the other hand, there's good reason to reconcile what we can within an integrated whole.

A model that fits many cases rarely fits a particular case well. Realism has a high priority in policy making. Given the Andean experience of development projects gone awry for lack of an understanding of local conditions, we must be wary of "'development' plans, xeroxed from alien models," to use Murra's phrase (1986). From the Conquest to the present, people in the Andes have faced macro schemes that have run roughshod over local realities. Vroonhoven's counsel not to forget the concrete realities and logic of Andean peasants is key to development. To say that development must be culturally compatible, respond to locally-perceived needs, involve people in planning and carrying out the changes that affect them, and work through traditional organizations — the cumulative wisdom of anthropology, according to Kottak (1985) — is one thing; but to ground policy in accurate causal, functional, and intentional analysis is another. Development doesn't fail because a model has been conceived elsewhere by others, it fails because the analysis it is based on fails to map reality.

To argue too strenuously for an exclusively Andean point of departure not only limits theory building, it denies the possibility of cross-cultural communication and cooperation in praxis as well. Ideas originating outside a community but perceived to be beneficial within it are not long alien, they soon become authenticated as both natural and native. As Dover (1992:2) puts it, "non-Andean cultural features become other symbols to be manipulated in the structure of Andean cosmology and non-Andean cultural systems become other modes of thought to be subsumed in an Andean cosmology." Whatever else it may be, "*lo Andino*" is opportunist and eclectic (cf., Urbano 1991).

The postmodern critique of "modernization" strategies in Latin America is that they tend to privilege instrumental rationality over expressive rationality (Hopenhayn 1993; Leschner 1993), a concern voiced in the opening quote from Vroonhoven as well. It's said that as instrumental rationality comes to dominate expressive rationality, Andeans replace meanings with consumer goods. Poole (cited in Burga 1991) has argued, for example, that the mercantilization of daily life has contaminated the religious consciousness of campesinos in Southern Peru.

Why one should interpret this as a change in rationalities rather than a change in desires brought about by changing opportunities (leading to a change in people's actions, and from that to a change in expectations Andeans have about their own and others' behavior, and so on) is beyond me. I'm willing to entertain the notion that the relative mix of instrumental and expressive rationalities exhibited can change (Hardin 1982 and Taylor 1988 in fact suggest that the pattern is the opposite of that proposed here, that expressive rationality increases with modernization), but a change in consciousness can not be assumed from a change in outcomes, and to date, little independent evidence of a changing motivational calculus has been offered to back up these claims in the Andes or elsewhere.

Further, I see no reason to associate techno-instrumental political policies that take neither the desires nor the beliefs of Andean peasants to heart with rational choice theory as an explanatory framework. It's better viewed as a question of conflicting interests and power politics. Finally, there is no necessary or logical relationship between the way instrumental and expressive rationality causally influence behavior and the ethical implications of that behavior. There is no reason to associate rational choice theory with one or another pole of the political spectrum in either principle or practice. There are rational choice theorists and methodological individualists to both the left and the right of the political spectrum, just as there are postmodernists to the left and right as well.[6] Exploring the reach of rational choice does not negate or prejudge the moral content of social values and norms. In testing specific propositions about what values are being maximized, a distinction remains between what is and what ought to be.

Overview of the Chapters

In Chapter 4, I consider a variety of ethnomedical examples drawn from my research in Ccachín and from other Andeanists to explore the ways in which rational, irrational, and nonrational processes may sometimes come together. Simon (1982) uses the term "bounded rationality" to emphasize various limitations on time, resources, knowledge and other factors in the decision-making processes of human agents, and I

borrow the term for the chapter title. The kind of decisions I am concerned with in Chapter 4 are nonrelational and nonstrategic ones made under conditions of incomplete information with attending uncertainty or risk. Some of the examples I discuss are instances where propositions about language appear to be confused with propositions about the world, examples of "magical thinking" in the sense given the term by Shweder (1977, 1984). Others are instances where nonrational cultural mechanisms appear to dominate. My goals are to identify the underlying processes and to show how complex the relation between rational belief formation and evidence about the state of the environment actually is.

While Chapter 4 considers the limits of instrumental rationality in an Andean population, I take such limits to be a human universal, and I make no claim that my everyday thinking or that of my compatriots is any better in the complex industrial world that we inhabit. Magical thinking is found alongside of, interspersed with, and overlaid on rational decisions and adaptive processes in the Andes, and the limited informational opportunities available to rural Andeans makes their accumulated knowledge and repertoire of effective ethnomedical practices all the more impressive.

In Chapter 5, I explore the rationality of theft. While on the face of it, theft would seem to be an instance where self-interest and instrumental rationality predominate, I think that a good case can be made that normative considerations, particularly those related to justice, also play a role in the Andes. Gose (1994) argues that the conceptual underpinnings of social order in the Andes are ultimately nonrational, and that the pattern of crop theft one finds in Andean villages suggests that theft, like many other practices, is a symbolic expression of these nonrational choices. This approach is a good example of the application of Vroonhoven's category "ritual rationality" to the explanation of theft, and I evaluate its merits. The title of the chapter plays off of Gose's contention that the pattern of crop theft is explained by "seasonal dispositions" organizing self-appropriation and cooperation. Gose suggests that these dispositions underpin such disparate practices as theft and house thatching, and I draw on the example of the theft, burning, and subsequent rethatching of my host family's house in Ccachín to develop and evaluate his

argument. These domains provide an excellent vantage point to explore the extent that macromeanings constrain, condition, and give form to micromotives in the Andes.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I consider Flannery, Marcus, and Reynold's (1989) contention that individual irrationality, in the sense of acting altruistically and counter to one's immediate self-interests, can sometimes lead to collective rationality in Andean pastoralism. Flannery et. al. offer the practice of *suñay* — the giving of animals to nonkin at marking ceremonies — as an example. Like many anthropologists, Barbara and I were direct beneficiaries of this practice at one *Día de Compadres* ceremony in Ccachín, and I draw on personal experience and comparative examples to evaluate the argument. This chapter adds additional complexity to my exploration of rationality by exploring behavior that is interactive, strategic, and marked by beneficial consequences that are so long-term that they would not be apparent to individual actors.

Social scientists, Andeanists included, seem no less given than everyone else to assume that all social and psychological phenomena have "meaning," and that their meanings — especially, their beneficial consequences for someone or something - - explain them. The principle of methodological individualism that I adopt here suggests that we treat with caution any explanation in which a) latent social functions explain their causes, b) the beneficial consequences of an action if all take it are assumed to be the underlying motivation for the action though there is no particular incentive for any particular individual, and c) any explanation where conspiratorial design is invoked on the basis of beneficial consequences alone.

Flannery et. al.'s approach is a good example of the second, explaining a trait by virtue of its unintended beneficial consequences. To be convincing, such approaches must specify the particular causal feedback loop between the benefit and the trait it supposedly sustains. Not only is the feedback mechanism rarely identified in such social-functional analysis, but there are often problems in the definition of the benefit and the beneficiaries as well, so that the explanation usually fails (see Froemming 1986, for example, for a critique of functionalist analysis in the explanation of civil-religious hierarchies). The kinds of structural explanation that avoid the sins of functionalism

generally do so by providing some causal explanation of the desires and beliefs relevant to individual action in terms of the actors location in a socio-politico-economic structure. Following up on the clues provided by Flannery et. al., my search for such a mechanism is far-ranging, but I ultimately conclude that their explanation of *suñay* in terms of its group-level consequences fails.

Conclusion

I take rationality, which is a particular kind of relationship between intentions and actions, to be about explaining individual action in terms of individual desires and beliefs. Rational choice explanation does not provide a complete explanation of social phenomena, and it must be supplemented by turning to causal and functional mechanisms to explain social facts in terms of these actions, and desires and beliefs in terms of ecological and social states.

Further, analytical approaches invoking rational, irrational, and nonrational (or "expressively rational") motivations all have a place in explaining individual action in the Andes. The work of Bates and Weingast (1995) on identity politics in Africa and Eastern Europe is suggestive in this regard, as it applies rational choice theory in a way that is compatible with a culturalist understanding of events as expressively rational and shows how the two perspectives in combination are more powerful than either alone. Beyond particular cases, however, we need a synthetic theory that not only accounts for their interaction, but identifies which is likely to be relevant in a particular context and explains why. As Elster suggests,

> The greatest obstacle to planning arises from the lack of reliable theories of society. What we have is a toolbox of mechanisms, not a set of laws. We cannot predict how rational people behave under conditions of uncertainty or multiple equilibria, nor whether their behavior will be governed by rationality or by social norms. Even more fundamentally, we cannot predict how preferences and norms might themselves come to change as a result of policy reforms. We cannot predict technical change. [Elster 1989:169]

Coevolutionary theory is the most promising framework to build a general theory upon at the moment, but is still in it's infancy. Awaiting its development, the least we can do is be more clear about the mechanisms involved in concrete instances. "Mechanisms," following Elster, are descriptions of continuous and contiguous causal chains. Mechanisms do two things: they go from a higher level of aggregation to a lower, and they reduce the time lag between cause and effect, between the explanation and what is being explained.[7] Elster contrasts them with "black boxes" — the missing links in our causal descriptions — and emphasizes that they are relative to the questions asked. Perhaps we might think of explanation by way of mechanisms as "thick description" applied to the question "why?": the "winks upon winks upon winks" of Geertz (1973:9) replaced by "links upon links upon links." In narrative writing, including most interpretive analyses in the social sciences, causally-relevant features are suggested without being explicit about mechanisms. Gose's (1994) interpretation of crop theft in terms of "cultural contradictions" is a case in point, as I develop at length in Chapter 5. To cite the cause is not enough, the causal mechanism also needs to be suggested (Elster 1989). The approach that I favor seeks to take causal descriptions painted with broad strokes and overlay them with chains of shorter space-time links (cf., Elster 1983; Taylor 1988). While the approach seeks to explain society in terms of individual human action, individual action is likewise in need of explanation. What we need are reciprocally-linked models describing the effects of large-scale social processes on small-scale phenomena and vice-versa.

Notes to Part II

1. "Prime movers" are not necessarily ruled out by methodological individualism. Certain ecological, economic, and social outcomes such as material success, prestige, and power, for example, may be consistently sought by individuals and thus shape their actions. Ecological, economic, and social outcomes could tend to accumulate or intensify as a result of recurrent actions and in turn elicit predictable reactions, as with population pressure (Eric A. Smith, personal communication).

2. Three of the most important differences are that a) cultural transmission, unlike genetic transmission, is Lamarckian in that behavior modified by trial and error learning can be inherited (inheritance of acquired variation), b) either the mother or father may play a disproportionate role as "cultural parents" (as distinct from their biological parenthood, and preferences, beliefs, etc. can be transmitted not only vertically, but horizontally and obliquely from peers, teachers, adult relatives, prestigious and powerful individuals, or other models, and c) culture is transmitted sequentially over a lifetime rather than as a single event, so that previously-acquired items can affect the adoption of subsequent ones, and the individual can be a more or less active decision maker in the transmission process (Boyd and Richerson 1985).

3. Any alternative mechanism we are likely to turn to explain the "satisfaction threshold" or "aspiration level" should, like rational choice, be explainable in terms of natural selection for optimal phenotypic design. Interaction between mechanisms should likewise be subject to optimization analysis, although analysis of such "whole-organism" adaptations is not possible given the current state of the art. Optimization analysis is usually restricted to one problem at a time. Whatever it's role in individual decision making, satisficing has no meaning in the evolutionary context. As Smith and Winterhalder put it,

   A "satisfaction threshold" is irrelevant to selection, which in parametric contexts favors the best (fitness-maximizing) alternative among those available in a population. And in strategic contexts, satisficing can never be an ESS [Evolutionarily Stable Strategy], because a strategy that is closer to the optimum will invade and outcompete the satisficing strategy. There is no "good enough" in the eyes of selection, only "better than." [Smith and Winterhalder 1992:54]

4. Some will disagree with this. Hollis (1979) defines rationality as acting in accord with ultimate interests that an individual autonomously chooses and which thereby define his or her identity. Actions are rational if they express this autonomous self. Hollis not only offers a conception of rational desires, he defines them in such a way that they can't be causally explained. His approach is an ambitious and novel attempt to establish the foundations of expressive rationality, but lacks a substantive

theory of identity formation. No matter how much explanatory weight one assigns to expressive rationality, one needs to account for its evolutionary origin in causal and functional processes.

5. Frank (1988) notes that by restricting rationality to action that efficiently promotes the material and social self-interests of the person who performs it rather than the efficient pursuit of whatever aims one has at the moment of deliberation and action, one avoids considering everything rational simply by asserting that a person prefers it, but at the price of considering moral sentiments and other precommitments that might solve collective action problems to be "irrational." As he puts it,

> Ironically, however, the self-interested version allows us to say that a self-interested person may very well *want* to be motivated by precisely such moral sentiments (provided . . . that their presence is recognizable my others). He may even take purposeful steps to enhance the likelihood that he will develop these sentiments. . . . Once he acquires the sentiments, of course, the behavior they promote will still be officially categorized as irrational by the self-interest standard. [Frank 1988:68]

Despite these complications, the ultimate goal is to explain specific behaviors, whether rational or not, and we are better served in this if we distinguish actions by their benefits and beneficiaries than if we lump them all together.

6. According to Beverley and Oviedo (1993), the presidential campaigns of Vargas Llosa and Fujimori and the neoliberal economic manifesto "The Other Path" of Hernando de Soto (1986), among other things, suggest that a "postmodernism of the right" is flourishing in the Andes (also see Sarlo 1993).

7. The former is sometimes referred to as "hierarchical reductionism" (Dawkins 1986) and represents a weak form of "explanatory reductionism" (Winterhalder and Smith 1992). It is consistent with "constitutive reductionism," which holds that the lower-level phenomena events and processes that constitute higher-level phenomena preserve their integrity whatever the context (ibid.). The high-low spatial metaphor associated with reductionism in general conjures up so many other associations in our culture that it's useful to adopt the more neutral perspective of space-time chains. The concept of mechanisms does not treat aggregate phenomena solely as the sum of their parts, which would be to invoke "theory reductionism," the assumption that theories formulated for higher aggregate levels can be reduced to lower ones. The latter confuses processes operating across levels with concepts that do not (ibid.).

Chapter 4

Bounded Rationality and Ethnomedical Decision Making

Introduction

In this chapter, I turn to ethnomedical practices in Ccachín to explore indeterminacy and the limits of rational decision making. As Stein (1981:50) notes, ethnomedicine is a domain in which "hope is better than despair, and some action is better than none." Experiential learning and cultural knowledge about treatments are freely shared in Ccachín, and community experts are recognized and sought out. From the perspective of Western biomedical science, the cultural logic, however, often seems arbitrary and ineffective.

Consider the following. The infant son of one of my *comadres* could not sleep at night after he was born. My *comadre* blamed his insomnia on the radio of the school janitor, who lived above the room where she wove textiles. The radio was constantly on while she was pregnant. She said that the baby had listened to the radio while in the womb. She referred to his nighttime restlessness as "*radio uriwa.*" Exasperated, and after trying various things to calm him, she resorted to a ritual cure. She cradled the child in her arms, turned on a radio, and passed him counterclockwise in a circular motion over the radio three times. As far as she could tell, the treatment worked.

Radios are relatively new to Ccachín, so this could hardly be a traditional treatment. Where did it come from? The clue is in the name. *Uriwa* is the Quechua term for a variety of congenital pediatric abnormalities believed to result from the mother's exposure to certain phenomena during gestation (Lira 1985). The problem may be physical, psychological, or pathological, and the typology, origins, and treatments are usually based on relations of resemblance. Many, if not most, associate symptoms with features of animals. In Lira's listing, for example, one finds *alqo uriwa*, *k'ussillu uriwa*, *khuchi uriwa*, *loro uriwa*, *llama uriwa*, *taruka uriwa*, *urpi uriwa*, *wallpa uriwa*, and

lluthu uriwa, among others ('dog', 'pig', 'parrot', 'llama', 'deer', 'dove', 'chicken', and 'tinamou disorders').

A woman's contact while pregnant with the entity for which a malady is named is considered to cause the infant's disorder. It's believed that a woman who lives too close to cows, for example, may give birth to a child with *waka uriwa* ('cow disorder'). Such offspring will be fearless, and it's said that when they grow up, males will be sopranos like cows and females tenors like bulls.[8] If a woman comes in contact with a cadaver in advanced stages of pregnancy ("*aya uriwa*"), the child may be born gaunt and moribund. Many of the same symptoms pertain when a mother continues to nurse an infant while unknowingly pregnant with another ("*eqo uriwa*"). Some disorders have no recognized cure. With *machaq'way uriwa* ("drunken disorder"), the infant is born with an enlarged head and extended tongue, and survives only a few years. Most disorders, however, are treatable. Infants born with a cloudy-yellow film over their eyes are treated with an unfertilized chicken egg ("*runtu uriwa*"; 'egg disorder'). Infants too attached to their mothers are treated with the eggshell of a dove ("*urpi uriwa*"; 'dove disorder'). Infants who aren't able to retain milk after nursing are passed over a wide-mouthed *chicha* jug ("*urpu uriwa*"; '*chicha* jug disorder'). Infants who persistently wake and cry before dawn are treated with a rooster ("*wallpa*" or "*k'anka uriwa*"; 'chicken' or 'rooster disorder'). Infants who cry all the time are cradled in the arms and passed over a river ("*mayu uriwa*"; 'river disorder') or held up in the wind ("*wayra uriwa*"; 'wind disorder'), depending on what the source is judged to be. The basic pattern of treatment is "*kutisqa*" ('returning', 'going back'). The infant is passed over the cause of the affliction three times and a prayer or formula is recited. Lira places the origin of these beliefs in pre-Columbian medical science, but several features — including that the ritual should be conducted on Tuesday or Friday and the creed should be recited — suggest that treatment practices have also been influenced by 16th-century European sorcery beliefs.

Identification of a childhood malady as *radio uriwa* is not unique to Ccachín, but I have found few references to it in the literature on Andean ethnomedicine and can say little about the origin and spread of the belief. A survey of 300 women in Huancayo in

the 1970s discovered a similar belief; there it was referred to as *mipa de radio* (Cornejo 1980:755). In the Junin-Huanca dialect of Quechua, the verb *mipay* refers to the action of imitation or contagion by which the newborn acquires the trait during gestation (Cerrón-Palomino 1976). Whatever the source of the belief, what's important is that a traditional etiology has served as a model for treating a new problem, brought about by technological change. The idea of the mother coming into contact with a risky source during gestation is here, as well as the treatment mode of bringing the infant back into contact with the source in an opposing way to undo what has been done. *Kutisqa*, the name for the practice of passing the infant counterclockwise over the source of the trouble, translates as 'reversal', 'return', and in this context, 'undoing'. Shweder (1977) makes the point that reversibility, in contrast to correlation, is a relatively intuitive concept, and that normal adults in all cultures act on the understanding that for any event there is an intellectual operation that compensates for it, cancels it, or undoes it. *Kutisqa* provides a stark example of this, with symbolic and meaningful connections substituting for co-occurrence likelihood. Even in the case of something like *machaq'way uriwa*, where there is no cure to undo the naturalistic causes, ritual emphasis may be put on reversing the social and supernatural transgressions behind it.

From a Western point of view, the identified causes and cure for *uriwa* would appear to have little to do with the actual causes-and-effects involved, although in more general terms, we might appreciate and learn from the indigenous awareness of the importance of prenatal care that it displays. At the extremes, one can find two perspectives on ethnomedicine in the Andes. They disagree on the efficacy of Andean ethnomedicine. Stein, for example, writes,

> If we remove Vicos disease ideology from the folkloric context of anthropological exotica . . . it is easier to see this belief system as inadequate, confused, and distorted, a false awareness of reality that arises from real social conditions rather than from the cultural repertory of exotic folk disease entities, or nonentities, which explain the world with illusion and change the world with imagination. [Stein 1981:64][9]

From this perspective, illness is as often as not a matter of uncertainty as it is of rational action. Stein adopts Western biomedicine as an etic grid for comparing disease categories and physiological standards for measuring effectiveness.

Other researchers interpret efficacy in more holistic terms. From their perspective, cultural beliefs alter the experience of illness and entail wider symbolic associations that reflect the symbolic structure of Andean society. Andeans have traditionally associated illness with bodily disintegration and have looked for its causes in imbalances in nature, social cleavages, and violations of customs and rituals, especially failure to attend to their gods and ancestors (Urioste 1981; Classen 1993). People in the Andes today continue to make causal connections between illness and social and ecological disorders. Bastien (1981) notes, for example, that the Qollahuaya of Bolivia associate sickness with social disturbances and land disputes, and their diviners identify the conflict and remedy it through ritual. Self, society, and ecosystem may be simultaneously healed. The "function" of healing rituals is thus not limited to the immediate biopsychological symptoms; the goal is to set underlying social and environmental relations right. Metaphorically feeding the mountain restores health to a sick person as well. The pragmatic efficacy of ritual events is emphasized by such researchers, as rituals address social and ecological maladies that have causal effects on well-being.[10]

The two perspectives are closer than they first appear in understanding the etiology of disease. Both recognize that biological, psychological, social, and cultural realms "intrude on one another and affect each other, so that something we think of as a cause at one moment becomes an effect, caused by something that was an effect at another moment" (Stein 1981:51). The two approaches differ in focus and application, each suggesting a development model for health care in the Andes. One emphasizes the limitations of traditional ethnomedical knowledge. The other emphasizes its blessings. Each offers a corrective to the over-generalizations of the other.

The question "What caused this disease?" is distinct from "Why did it happen to me?" (Evans-Pritchard 1937). But both concerns are often implicit in the definition of an illness. Andeans distinguish natural causes from witchcraft, but allow that the latter work

through the former. Among natural causes, one can distinguish thermal imbalances from overexposure to heat or cold, contact with animist forces such as mountain spirits, rainbows, *machula*, and evil winds, and emotional unrest such as *cólera* ('anger') and *susto* ('fear'). Diagnosis is not arbitrary: it depends on the gravity of the problem. Often the gravity is not immediately clear, and as an illness lingers the diagnosis is progressively changed. Thermal imbalances are the simplest and most ubiquitous form of explanation, and require the least amount of behavioral change. Any illness can be explained in terms of a complex causal chain, but day-to-day treatment in the Andes usually focuses on immediate, naturalistic causes. Most health problems in Ccachín are neither explained nor treated as sociological or religious ones. Most symptoms are interpreted in terms of hot-cold imbalances. Most problems are short-lived and treated within the household. Sufferers are more likely to resort to home remedy than elaborate ritual. Given the immediacy of symptoms, most energy goes into treating them. Extra-household diviners and other medical specialists are costly and are not the first line of defense against illness.

In *Genes, Culture, and Human Diversity*, William Durham argues that symbolic reasoning is a fundamental organizing principle of cultural systems, but that the sphere where such reason has free and arbitrary play in relatively limited. As he puts it,

> I would expect cultural reason to be truly arbitrary and nonpractical only to the degree that the variation on which it acts is, or is perceived to be adaptively neutral. Among neutral variants in language, meat-cut preferences, art or fashion, arbitrariness may well be the general rule . . . . But there is certainly nowhere near the same degree of arbitrariness in the marriage principles of Tibet, the milk-use customs of Europeans, and the incest taboos of the world probability sample. [Durham 1991:367-368]

In this passage, Durham is concerned with the cultural selection among variants that are adaptively neutral, a point of contrast with behavioral domains where there is some degree of gene-culture interaction. His discussion of adaptive "neutrality" can be related to Elster's (1989) discussion of "indeterminacy" in rational choice theory. At the level of action, neutrality is a special case of indeterminacy; neutrality prevails when one faces several courses of action that are equally and optimally good. In such cases, as

Elster (1989) notes, "peripheral considerations" often move to the center. Rational-choice theory can fail to explain, or requires a supplementary level of explanation, when indeterminacy prevails. This kind of indifference in making a decision is not the only kind of indeterminacy in action. It can be contrasted with "incommensurability," where one is not even able to say whether two or more options are equally good. Decision making in such instances similarly involves passing the choices through some kind of supplementary filter.

Disagreements on the role of symbolic logic in the explanation of human behavior often hinge on the extent that rational courses of action, defined in terms of physical well-being, an optimal use of economic resources, or some other criteria, are indeterminant in the sense above. There's another sense that the rational choice can be indeterminant, however. Rational choice theory can be indeterminant at the level of belief: the available evidence may be insufficient to justify a judgement about the likelihood of different outcomes of action.

Llulla Hak'achu: An Andean Flicker's Tale

As indicated above, metaphorical associations enters into Andean health practices in the diagnosis of illnesses and remedies. Metaphor goes deeper in subjective experience to the assessment of the probability of hoped for outcomes itself. The use of a bird called *hak'achu* in Ccachín as a galactogogue — an agent to increase a female's milk supply — provides an intriguing example.

Hak'achu is the Quechua name for the Andean flicker (*Colaptes rupicola*).[11] It's a yellow-shafted flicker found primarily in the high, rocky *loma* and *puna* pasture zones of Ccachín. It's noted for the nest holes it bores in cliffs and abandoned adobe walls. It's commonly referred to as *llulla hak'achu*, the "lying flicker," because of local lore surrounding it's haughty call and red nape. Villagers say that the *hak'achu* has the red patch on the back of its neck because it lied to Jesus and had its tongue ripped out in punishment. Along with the *chiwanku* (Chiguanco thrush, *Turdus chiguanco*), the *hak'achu* frequently appears in Andean stories of ingenuity, deception, and corruption of

God's creation (Morote Best 1988).[12] Perhaps because of this association, *hak'achu* feathers are thought to provide protection from envious people ("*gente envidiosa*"), and they are used by people in Ccachín to protect their cattle herds from theft.

The feathers and flesh of the *hak'achu* are believed to stimulate milk production. The birds are snared and their carcasses are dried and set aside for later use in ethnoveterinary and ethnomedical treatments. When available, as the bird is neither found nor caught in great numbers, the dried *charki* is toasted, powdered, mixed with toasted cornmeal, mint, and fennel, and served with salt to the herds. The concoction was often used by my host family in treating their cows. *Hak'achu* is likewise toasted, ground, and served in a broth to women who have problems nursing their infants, and it is given to sheep, goats, and dogs for the same purpose in Ccachín. While both feathers and flesh may be used as a galactogogue, the flesh is considered to be the more effective. Women gather single feathers as they find them along village trails, and some women trap the birds in the rocky slopes near their herding cabins.[13]

Galactogogues

Hak'achu carcasses are one of several treatments used in Ccachín to attempt to increase the milk flow of nursing women and animals. *Apanqora* ('crayfish'; *Astacus fluvialis*) are sometimes brought back from the lower Lares Valley and mixed with ground corn and salt for the cows in place of *hak'achu*. Commercial fishmeal is a more costly and less used alternative. Women who have just given birth are served a broth of quinoa if they have problems with their milk. Given the choice between *hak'achu* and quinoa, villagers say that *hak'achu* is the best. A broth of *askantuy*, a white larvae found in the central spike of *achupalla* (*Puya herrerae*), is used in many parts of the Andes for the same effect (Valdizán and Maldonado 1922; Avendaño 1988). *Askantuy* is used to treat anemia in Ccachín. My informants on its use were male and they did not mention its use as a galactogogue, but they did point out the "milk-like" appearance of the broth, suggesting the metaphorical basis of its use as such. Nutritional anemia is a problem for both sexes and for all ages, but given that it is especially prevalent among pregnant and

nursing women in developing countries (Institute of Medicine 1992), its use for anemia and milk production suggests that it is prescribed in overlapping contexts. Fennel ("*hinojo*"; *Foeniculum vulgare*) is served in a tea to women and added to the salt mixture for cows in Ccachín. Fennel is widely associated with enhanced milk production throughout the Andes. In other areas of the Andes, sesame seeds ("*ajonjilí*"; *Sesamum indicum*), heath ("*brezo*"; *Erica vulgaris*), and a broth of beef lung may be served to help a woman's milk comes in. The eyes of sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas*) may be ground, soaked in wine, and plastered on a woman's breasts. Just as crayfish is used to augment the milk production of cows in Ccachín, a broth of *yukra* ('river shrimp'; *Bithynis caementarius*) is used as a galactogogue for women in Arequipa (Valdizán and Maldonado 1922; Lira 1985; Avendaño 1988). North of Ccachín, in the valley of Quebrada, a chicken-like bird, the *manaqaraku* (*Ortalis guttata Spix*), is served in tea or broth to nursing women (*Equipo Coordinador en Medicina Natural Popular* 1983). Table 4.1 indicates the variety of substances used as galactogogues in one area or another of Peru.

Some of the remedies used in the Andes appear to be indigenous, others introduced. In the 16th century, Phayer, writing in Europe, recommended in his "Remedie appropriate to ye encreasing of Mylke the Brestes"

> Parsneppe roots, fenelle roots sodden in broth of chicken and afterwards eaten with a little freshe butter rice soaked in cows milk, powder of earthworms dry and dronken in the broth of a neates tonge, the broth of an old cocke, with myntes, cynanon, and maces. [Phayer 1976, cited in Baumslag 1986]

Fennel, powdered earthworms, beef organs, and the broth of certain birds were all used as galactogogues in Europe at the time of Conquest, and it seems that many of these beliefs first took hold in the Andes through a process of diffusion. On the other hand, Cobo (1979), one of the early Spanish chroniclers of the Andes, notes that the flesh of the *hak'achu* was held in esteem by the Inca for stimulating milk production. The use of *hak'achu* appears to be a native practice that has continued unbroken for at least five hundred years.

Likeness and Likelihood

Both metaphorical and causal associations underlie the galactogogues used in the Andes, and sometimes the two may coincide. Jelliffe and Jelliffe (1978) have noted that many of the techniques, preparations and rituals used throughout the world seem to be based on "sympathetic magic," the principle that "like affects like" (cf., Hunn 1977). The use of milk-like substances, the administration of fluids to produce a fluid secretion, and the use of charms depicting large breasts are commonplace. The use of *hak'achu* feathers to protect one's cattle from envious neighbors can readily be seen to be based on the principle that "like affects like," but the same can't be said of their use for enhancing milk production. It is much harder to determine if traditional galactogogues in the Andes have as yet unrecognized pharmacological effects. Does metaphor underlie the use of *hak'achu* broth and other treatments for nursing females as well, or are such practices functionally explainable in terms of their beneficial consequences? The answer may be one or the other or both.

Some young women in Ccachín express doubt about *hak'achu* feathers' effectiveness in protecting their herds from envy. "My mother believes it" one said, "but I do not." The younger generation doesn't seem to question the value of *hak'achu* in enhancing milk production, however. As villagers are schooled and come to doubt traditional supernatural beliefs in this and other realms, belief in sociomagical and supernatural cause-effects is eroded. Metaphorical cause-effect relations associated with natural processes, however, appear to be much more resilient.

The assumption that people in all societies seek to acquire empirical knowledge about what causes what, what influences what, and what goes with what in their environment is empirically justified and theoretically unproblematic. Shweder (1977), however, has persuasively argued that correlation and contingency are relatively difficult and nonintuitive concepts, and that there is a universal inclination to substitute propositions about language for propositions about the world. According to Shweder, people everywhere have difficulty drawing correlational lessons from their experience in some contexts, and substitute meaningful, symbolic connections among objects and events —

similarity, synonymy, part-whole relations, function, and origin, collectively referred to as "likeness" or "resemblance" — in their place.

What are these contexts? When is it difficult to make correlation assessments? The information-processing system that has evolved for humans to cope with the complex and probabilistic causal relations of the environments in which we find ourselves is characterized by sequential processing, limited memory, selective perception, and simplifying heuristics. Feedback is central. Action induces feedback, and the monitoring of incremental judgement-action-feedback loops is relied on more than commitment to a priori judgements of the best course of action (Hogarth 1981). The nature of cue-criterion relations is crucial. Women in Ccachín use onion heels and lemon peels to cut grease on pots and pans, for example. Appreciation of the relationship is inductively simple and straightforward. This contrasts sharply with the difficulties of controlling for all of the factors affecting milk production. In complex environments, humans do best when feedback is immediate and frequent, when there is a lot of redundancy between cues, and when parameters are "well-behaved," that is, when observations don't increase or decrease linearly over time, exhibit random fluctuations, or change their characteristics.

Table 4.2 lists some of the beliefs in Ccachín where metaphoric relations appear to substitute for correlational ones. The substitution of "likeness" for co-occurrence likelihood is striking in traditional indigenous Andean knowledge systems. This is not to say that it is more common than not, nor that it is more common and ubiquitous than in everyday thinking in our own society. Rather, it's to say that it is salient from the standpoint of an observer who comes from a society with elaborate and expensive institutional and technical structures for investigating the correlational likelihood of many of the same phenomena, and a formal educational system to disseminate the assessments of "experts" among the general public.

The substitution of conceptual relations for correlational ones may be universal in certain contexts, but it is frustratingly "ill-behaved" in a deductive and explanatory sense. Selection of particular class inclusion and metaphoric relations as a point of focus seems arbitrary, and reconstruction of the historical origin and evolution of the beliefs is as

subject to the telling of "just-so stories" as is evolutionary-biological theorizing, if not more so.

Metaphorical Associations

If there is a "cultural logic" at play in the use of such things as *hak'achu*, quinoa, and *askantuy* for low milk production, what might it be? Metaphoric values are specific to the salient features of the associated items, but taken together, there may be patterns.

One possibility is suggested by the milk-white brew made from *askantuy* larvae. Quinoa broth likewise has a white, creamy appearance. Color enters into humor classification (as discussed later in this chapter), and it may be metaphorically important in this context as well. Turner (1975:151) suggests that the colors red, white, and black universally signify blood, milk or semen, and feces respectively, with perception of the world referenced to what we subjectively know best — the human body. Color alone, however, would not seem to sufficiently narrow the range of available alternatives. The milky secretions of *pampa llank'u* ('milkweed'), *kiska qhana* ('sow thistle'), and *wach'anka* (*Euphorbia huachangana*) are also put to medical use in Ccachín, but none of them are believed to enhance a woman's milk production.[14]

A second possibility suggested by the use of a broth of dried *hak'achu* remains is that the qualities of wet and dry are salient. Drying and rehydration are commonplace operations in the Andes. The Inca mummified their deceased rulers, and pre-Incan *machula* are believed to exist through their mummified remains. Dried llama fetuses ("*sullun*") are "purified by the sun" and served to the mountain spirits (Bastien 1985; Girault 1988). Potatoes are frozen and sun-dried as *ch'uñu*, where they are conceived as having an ambiguous "life-in-death" state of being (Allen 1988:237). Meat is sun-dried as *charki*, and both *ch'uñu* and *charki* are reconstituted in water before serving. Villagers in Ccachín say that one should not throw corncobs out the door because the person who throws them out may swell up in the rain and dry out in the sun as the cobs do.[15] The act of transforming *hak'achu*, quinoa and other galactogogues from a dry liminal state to a hydrated, life-giving one may be sympathetically linked to the hoped for pattern in the

breast. In the same way, when a woman needs to suspend lactation, a bit of milk from her breasts is swabbed in a wad of cotton and set out in the sun to dry (Lira 1985). The logic of dehydration and reconstitution doesn't explain why *hak'achu* carcasses are used as galactogogues rather than those of the *chiwanku* (*Turdus chiguanco*, a local thrush), however, or why quinoa is used instead of wheat or corn, so it cannot provide a full explanation of the practice.

The *hak'achu* is not the only bird dried and used for medicinal purposes in the Ccachín. The Andean condor ("*kuntur*") scavenges carrion and soars on the winds sweeping up the east flank of the Andes. Correspondingly, it is associated with illnesses and death caused by the malevolent *machu wayra* or *soq'a wayra* winds (see Table 4.2). Condor feathers are toasted, ground, and brewed in the same manner as *hak'achu*. The broth or tea is used to treat respiratory diseases. One of my *comadres* made just such a tea from a single condor feather for her aging mother when the latter was gravely ill, but her mother soon died. *Q'enti* ('hummingbird') carcasses are also dried and used in the Cusco area. With its rapid, blurry movement, the *q'enti* is considered to be a messenger bird, usually an omen of death. Allen (1988:60), for example, recounts an encounter with a hummingbird that was interpreted by her informants as portending the death of her grandmother. A soul may leave the body to visit spatially distant relatives through the medium of a hummingbird, especially during the eight days that the spirit stays near the family after a person's death. The roasted carcass of the hummingbird is used in treating fright in children and soul loss, and it may be substituted for condor in some treatments when the latter is unavailable (Lira 1985:114). The flesh of the *chiwanku* is used in the Department of Huánuco for jaundice and other liver ailments. A metaphorical association between illness and treatment is suggested in this instance by the frequency with which this bird discharges excrement (Valdizán and Maldanondo 1922:258).

Given these and other associations based on the perceived traits of birds (in Table 4.2, for example, I note that *anka*, black-bodied hawks, are valued for their hunting skill), it seems likely that there is some unarticulated trait of the Andean flicker that establishes a metaphorical association with cows, with milk, or with both. *Hak'achu* flesh is used as

a meat in soups and stews in the Cusco area (Lira 1985). *Hak'achu* blood is mixed with wine to treat heart problems, dropped in the ear to counter hearing loss caused by the wind, and taken as a drink to combat tuberculosis (Valdizán and Maldonado 1922; Lira 1985; Morote Best 1988). The feathers are used for cleaning teeth, and are reputed to be better for the gums and enamel than toothpicks (Lira 1985). In some areas of Cusco, a *hak'achu*'s tongue is carried as a charm to help one find love (Morote Best 1988). In Andean lore, the *hak'achu* carries the leaf of a secret plant in its beak to soften rock while boring its nest (Lira 1985; Morote Best 1988). Perhaps because of this tenderizing effect, it's said that a woman pecked by the beak of a flicker will thereby become an adept and appreciated cook.[16] While there are several kinds of woodpeckers in the Andes, they have enough in common that beliefs seem to pass readily across species boundaries. Elsewhere in Peru, the heart of a woodpecker is added to wine to treat epilepsy, and the feathers are used in treatments to prevent spontaneous abortion and facilitate delivery (Valdizán and Maldonado 1922). The association between woodpeckers and childbirth is notable, and the metaphoric connection is clear.

The logic of the association between *hak'achu* and milk production was not explained by my informants (I did not ask explicitly about it during my fieldwork), and the logic is not obvious to an outside observer from the characteristics of the bird. The widespread association of woodpeckers with thunder in woodland areas from Eurasia to the Northwest Coast of North America is more readily understandable (Armstrong 1970). The Andean flicker doesn't have the woodpecker's habit of using dead trees as resonators, however. It is neither a "thunderbird" nor "rain bird" in Andean mythology. Perhaps it's significant that the *hak'achu* has conspicuous spots on its breast, but its tongue, red nape, brown back, association with rocky terrain, audible call, and habit of making holes are the features highlighted in stories about the bird. The *hak'achu* favors the high puna grasslands where people pasture their cattle, although it's not the only bird to do so. The association with cattle, however, extends as far south as Argentina, where the *carpintero* ('carpenter bird') is likewise considered to be the enemy of cattle rustlers.

There may be a good practical reason: it's said that when thieves move among the herds, it alarms the birds and their calls warn the herders (Moya 1958).

Practical Effects

Metaphorical associations aside, the question remains whether the techniques used in Ccachín to stimulate the flow of breast milk have the consequences ascribed to them, and if so, whether they are more likely to lead to the desired outcome than available alternatives. Do the broths from the desiccated skins of *hak'achu*, *askantuy* larvae, and quinoa really work?

While there is no good data on the incidence of lactation failure in humans, it is considered to be rare, especially relative to the amount of cultural concern given to it in many societies (Jelliffe and Jelliffe 1978; Lawrence 1986). The critical importance of successful breast-feeding through human history has apparently selected against poor milk producers, as it has in other mammals (Jelliffe and Jelliffe 1978). The lactation process involves mother-infant interaction, and failure may be caused at either end. The infant's sucking affects the quantity of milk produced, and a variety of sucking and swallowing disorders (prematurity, cleft palate, etc.) can affect milk production. Given the importance of sucking, some have suggested that the spread of bottle-feeding and widely-spaced, scheduled breast feedings has led to an increased incidence of "insufficient milk syndrome" — real or perceived milk insufficiency (Gussler and Briesemeister 1980). This pattern is most common in industrialized, urban areas, and would not apply to Ccachín, where the single case of bottle-feeding I witnessed was for an infant whose mother had died soon after childbirth. There are anatomical, hormonal, nutritional, and pharmacological causes that can affect both the production and release of milk, but the literature has predominantly emphasized psychosocial interference with the release of milk, the so-called "let-down reflex" (Lawrence 1986).

While unknown pharmacological effects of the galactogogues used in Ccachín can't be discounted, the effects of *hak'achu* broths, quinoa broths, and others as fluid

supplements, as nutrient supplements, and as reassurance on the let-down reflex are the most probable and the best understood.[17]

A positive relationship between milk production and drinking fluids is often hypothesized. It's also backed by anecdotal evidence, as the woman I rented a room from in Cusco reported noticing a difference in her own milk flow depending on her fluid intake. Various investigators, however, have found that variation in water intake within wide limits has no physiological effect on the volume of milk produced, and this is consistent with the anti-diuretic effects of prolactin, one of the principal controlling pituitary hormones (Jelliffe and Jelliffe 1978). The widespread belief that fluid intake affects milk yields emerged either as a response to extreme conditions (severe enough to affect health in general), or is another instance of likeness substituting for correlational likelihood (fluid in, fluid out). As Orlove (1987) notes, the rural Andean practice of serving boiled soups and stews in the early morning and late afternoon has the adaptive benefit of providing sufficient water to avoid the risks of dehydration in the dry season, while reducing the danger of ingesting parasites from contaminated water sources. These preferences seem generally sufficient in themselves to ensure that a lactating mother would have sufficient fluid intake. In any case, the belief in the importance of increased fluid intake while lactating does not explain why particular broths are considered more effective in stimulating milk production than others.

A common thread linking many of the galactogogues in Ccachín is their high protein content. Quinoa averages 16% protein by weight, compared to 8-12% for corn, the staple cereal in Ccachín. Its protein quality is close to the FAO standard, comparing well with milk and meat. Quinoa is high in such essential amino acids as lysine and tryptophan (National Research Council 1989). Corn, on the other hand, is notably deficient in these limiting amino acids. *Hak'achu* has been hunted for its meat since the Inca, if not before, though its place within the preference order of game and tastes for game of rural Andeans is not clear. *Askantuy* larvae are used medicinally rather than as a high-protein food source, but another larvae, *wayt'ampu* is recognized for its nutritional

value and is said to be a brain food (Hornberger and Hornberger 1983; Venero et. al. 1985).

Neither the maternal causes of lactation failure nor the effect of dietary supplements on a mother's diet are well understood. Studies of the lactation performance of both well-nourished and malnourished women in recent years have found a surprising consistency in daily milk volumes, and it appears that physiological mechanisms exist to compensate for inadequate maternal nutrient intake, with cumulative long-term nutritional cost born by the mother (Lönnerdal 1986). The threshold level below which a woman is unable to produce a normal quantity of milk appears to be quite low. One study in Gambia found that there was no significant decrease in milk volume when caloric intake fell to 1200 kcal/day, 70% of the women's average consumption. One of the best studies we have of the seasonal fluctuation in caloric intake in the Andes, conducted in Nuñoa (Puno) in 1985, shows a fluctuation of between 1250 calories pre-harvest and 1900 calories post-harvest for women in their childbearing years, above the 1200 kcal/day threshold (Leonard 1991a). On the other hand, studies in Nigeria and India have shown significant increases in milk output when women are given a protein supplement increasing their protein intake from 50-60 grams/day to 100 grams/day (Lönnerdal 1986). According to one of the most comprehensive nutritional studies we have for the Southern and Central Andes, the *Encuesta Nacional de Consumo de Alimientos* of 1971-1972, annual per capita calorie and protein consumption for households that consumed primarily traditional foods varied from 2045 calories and 56 grams of protein/person/day for low income households to 2716 calories and 83 grams of protein/person/day for high income households (Orlove 1987). However, these statistics are for adults of both sexes combined, and valuable as they are, a one-year study does not adequately capture the susceptibility of highland populations to environmental fluctuations.

As with the quantity of protein, the quality of protein and non-protein nitrogen compounds in the milk may be affected by maternal nutrition under threshold conditions, but the affect seems to be minor in magnitude. Most studies show that the protein content

of human milk is relatively constant regardless of maternal nutrition (Lönnerdal 1986). Overall then, existing research on the effect of maternal nutrition on milk volume is inconclusive, with limited evidence that substantial protein supplements can affect milk production and supplements of protein and vitamins can affect milk quality under certain conditions. Given our current knowledge, it seems unlikely that traditional high-protein food supplements for nursing mothers in the Andes can be related to any observed increases in milk production, except perhaps at certain undetermined threshold conditions. Such supplements, of course, promote good nutrition, and in so doing, prevent illness, fatigue, and general states of unwellness that can stress and strain long-term nursing. The cumulative deterioration of nutritional status through maternal depletion can shorten the lactation period (Jelliffe and Jelliffe 1978).

Unlike areas of the world where dietary taboos during lactation severely limit a woman's protein intake, dietary practices in the Andes contribute to a mother's general health.[18] Except for quinoa, the local grain with the highest protein content, however, it's hard to explain the specificity of the local galactogogues used as protein supplements. Any domestic or game animal protein should do, and unlike *hak'achu* and *askantuy*, many of the alternatives are available in significant quantities. On the other hand, neither *hak'achu* nor *askantuy* are consumed under normal conditions, and the beliefs about their value as galactogogues may have emerged under conditions of stress, combining their value as survival foods with the principle of women and children first.

Under normal conditions, the probable explanation for the positive effect of most milk-producing treatments in the Andes is psychophysiological. Indeed, among health domains, lactation is a sphere where social and psychological factors play an exceptional role. Emotional responses appear to play a key role in the success and failure of lactation in both nursing mothers and dairy animals; so much so that lactation has sometimes been termed a "confidence trick" (Jelliffe and Jelliffe 1978). Apprehension and anxiety inhibit milk secretion by interfering with the let-down reflex. Sufficient milk is available, but it doesn't reach the infant. Emotional upset triggers a vicious cycle as lactation failure increases anxiety and doubt during subsequent feedings. At the same time, breast

engorgement interferes with an infant's ability to suckle and poor milk drainage increases the probability of bacterial infection, all further contributing to lactation failure. The consensus of contemporary Western medical opinion seems to be that most galactogogues work as confidence inducers, reinforcing the let-down complex.

High-protein animal products are coveted in Ccachín, and the etiquette of their meal-time distribution can influence one's self-esteem and emotional well-being, beyond their positive nutritional effects. People often talk about who gets the most and the best portions of meat in Ccachín. *Hak'achu* flesh and other local galactogogues have an advantage over more mundane protein sources for emotional impact in their exceptional character. Their specialness and rarity single them out. These sociocultural characteristics might help explain any psychophysiological effectiveness that they have for human populations.

Sociocultural characteristics, however, do not explain the use of some of the same galactogogues with livestock. Not that dairy animals are not subject to some of the same emotional variability that humans are. Much of what we know about the psychophysiology of lactation comes from the folk experience of dairy farmers and from modern dairy science. Around the world, herders have recognized the affect that individual temperaments, responses to other members of the herd, being spooked by predators, being milked by strangers, and changes in daily patterns can have on the milk production of their animals. But there's no reason to suppose that adding a bit of *hak'achu* flesh, crayfish, or fishmeal in the monthly salt ration has any let-down effect. If these ethnoveterinary practices have the effect they are believed to have, it is because of their nutritional value, not because of an effect on the psychological well-being of the animals.

Because of the distance of the pastures in Ccachín, salt is given to the cows about every four to six weeks, while for the sheep, it can be as often as every two weeks. As noted earlier, about an *arroba* (twenty-five pounds) of corn is toasted, ground, and added to this mixture, sometimes with a few herbs. When asked why the corn and herbs are added, people invariably respond "*mihunapaq*" or "*para alimentacion*" ('for food', 'for nutrition'), although the nutritional value of such small quantities of corn, in contrast to

the salt, would seem relatively minor. More likely, it serves as a medium for distributing the salt. Insufficient salt can itself lead to decreased milk production (National Research Council 1988).[19] Supplements with animal protein are infrequent, and the small quantity (no more than a kilogram or two), is distributed throughout the herd. My host family usually prepared two piles of the salt-corn mixture, one for the cows, the other for the bulls, but I don't know how common this practice is, nor how the portions differed.

While ruminants are better able to take advantage of most plant protein than humans, protein supplements from animal sources — fishmeal, bloodmeal, feathermeal — are used in the dairy industry in industrialized societies as well (United Nations 1982; National Research Council 1988).[20] Indeed, it seems likely that the occasional use of fishmeal in Ccachín, a product that must be purchased, may have been originally learned from the *hacendados* or from extension agents from the Ministry of Agriculture. Cattle are not indigenous to the Andes, and one would expect that many husbandry practices accompanied their introduction. The practice of giving such a supplement could be explainable in terms of the modeling of the western husbandry practices of local elites, with economic differentiation accounting for the near homeopathic quantities given. On the other hand, there seems to be a strong element of sympathetic caring for the herd, with relations patterned, as with the local landscape and other living creatures, along the lines of human social relations. In *aqhata uhuchiy*, herders in Q'eros and other highland communities ritually bottle-feed *aqha* (*chicha*, corn beer) to their llama soon after transporting corn from fields in the lower valley, sharing with them the prestigious product of their joint labor (Cohen 1979; Flores Ochoa and Fries 1989). In Ccachín, corn beer is considered to be *hampi* ('medicine') for the llama and alpaca, and my host family sets aside surplus *chicha* from social and ritual festivals to be given to their herd. In the same way, coca leaves are placed in the mouth of sheep, goats, and certain other animals in Ccachín that are about to be butchered. Whatever the origins of the practice, once associated with milk production, the serving of *hak'achu* to both humans and domestic animals fits well with this general tendency to replicate human relations in the treatment of valuable livestock.

In sum, it's unclear whether most galactogogues in the Andes are adaptively-neutral or represent adaptations to the natural environment. It's likewise unclear whether they are inspired by metaphorical associations, empirical observation and trial-and-error learning, or indirect biases in cultural transmission, and whether under extreme conditions natural selection has acted directly on variation in these cultural traits. If these are in fact adaptations, their benefits are of a statistical nature and difficult to determine though individual observation, and it's hard to explain them in terms of rational choice alone. In the human case, the example is intriguing in that the very belief that a given treatment is effective makes it effective, whatever the original reason for it's adoption. Although wishful thinking, the wish causes it's own fulfillment. One is hard-pressed to describe accurate beliefs about correlation as irrational, unless one adds the requirement that one must use scientific controls in rational, everyday belief formation. Not all that is rational is good science. Finally, metaphorical associations may often subvert the collection of the evidence so that action results from improperly formed beliefs, but just as often, when galactogogues have the effects imputed to them, reference to metaphorical likenesses may be ethnoscientific attempts to explain the correlation rather than beliefs that themselves motivate. The proximate cause of action may be some kind of frequency-dependent or indirect bias — following tradition, following the crowd, or following the lead of prestigious individuals — rather than some property intrinsic to the action itself. Andeans, like the rest of us, form theories — some right and some wrong — about the cause of their own actions.

Hot-Cold Classification in Disease Treatment

Humoral Theory in the Andes

More often than not, people in Ccachín classify foods, illnesses of natural origin, and herbal medicines according to their inferred thermal qualities. The goal is to maintain a balance between hot and cold. At equilibrium, individuals are healthy; when out of balance, they become ill. This classification system is found throughout Latin America, especially in the mountain regions, and probably has its origins in the

Hippocratic-Galenic-Arab humoral theory of the Old World, where it was the proto-scientific doctrine of the medical establishment at the time of the Spanish conquest (Bastien 1987; Hahold 1988; Foster 1994).

The compatibility of humoral theory with pre-Hispanic and contemporary Andean notions of balance and complementarity is one of several factors researchers offer to explain its adoption and persistence in Andean worldview. Others included a) the choice of cultural models according to status, so that an elite Spanish medical system was transmitted socioeconomically downward to commoners, b) the structural openness of indigenous populations as they reconstituted their belief systems following the imposition of Spanish rule, and c) the theory's parsimony, consistency, flexibility, and completeness, making it attractive vis-a-vis other cultural frameworks for people seeking order, explanation, and applicability (Foster 1994). Classical humoral theory in the Old World classified ethnomedical remedies according to both a hot-cold and wet-dry continuum, but the latter is absent from New World versions. Some argue that this is evidence of its indigenous origin in the New World, others that the wet-dry dimension has been lost as nonliterate populations simplified the complex to an accessible, learnable, and workable core (Foster 1994). Wet-dry associations are made in some contexts, but they are neither systematically nor comprehensively applied in Andean ethnomedicine. The issue of whether humoral theory in the New World is a matter of diffusion from the Old World, autochthonous invention, or syncretic union is not entirely solved, but there's little question that it still has a firm place in contemporary Andean thought.

There are at least seven criteria used by Andeans in classifying medical treatments as hot-cold: a) whether the illnesses they're used to treat are classified as hot or cold (given the logic that opposites balance, hot treatments will be used for cold illnesses and vice versa), b) subjective sensation (eucalyptus warms the body, ice burns), c) the season, altitude, habitat, and climate where something is grown or found, d) the method of preparation (pork is "cool" but fried pork is not, sun-dried *charki* is "hotter" than fresh beef), e) the method of application (an herb prepared in tea may be "cooler" than when it is applied directly to the skin), f) color (white sugar is "cool," but unrefined sugar is less

so; white and yellow corn are "cool" relative to purple corn), and g) the presumed sex of a particular specimen (male specimens are stronger and "hotter" than female ones). Of these, the first is the most important, while the rest are invoked other-things-being equal. Taken together, these principles lend complexity and variation in classifying given treatments in given contexts (Hahold 1988). These criteria reflect both thermal temperatures and metaphoric values. Thermal temperatures change according to environmental conditions and how objects are prepared. Metaphoric temperatures are relatively fixed. The distinction means that thermal and metaphoric values will sometimes be in opposition, and that people focus and select between them in making diagnoses and treatment decisions (Foster 1994).

Among the symptoms and causes classified as *cálido* ('hot') in Ccachín one finds skin infections, headaches, toothaches, and fevers associated with the sun, burns and eye infections with fire, and heart, kidney, and liver ailments associated with over-consumption of alcohol or spicy foods and with anger, envy, fright, and other emotional excitements. For women, complications from pregnancy and postpartum are likewise "hot." Among the effects and causes classified as *fresco* ('cool') are colds, coughs, flu and bronchitis, associated with the frigid mountain winds and with bathing and laundering in cold water, and *empacho* ('indigestion') related to eating pork, milk, vegetables, and other "cold" foods. The same classifications hold throughout the Andes.

Examples from Ccachín

Table 4.3 lists the hot-cold classifications of several plants in Ccachín. It's a simplification. Hot and cold are a matter of degree and a continuum could be drawn between them. However, villagers themselves often make such simplifications. Hahold (1988) found that people in Espinar (Cusco, Peru) often respond in terms of an intermediate category — *templado* — and that many plants can't be clearly classified because of differences of opinion between respondents and instability of responses over time. Comparing my list here with those of Hahold (1988), Roersch and Hoogte (1988), and Foster (1994), there's general agreement on all but *kisa* ('nettles') and *kanser* (*Stachys*

spp.). While 88% of Foster's Mexican sample listed nettles as *cálido*, only 45% of Hahold's sample considered it hot (of fifty-six respondents, the breakdown was *cálido* 45%, *templado* 30%, and *fresco* 25%). Likewise, *kanser* is rated as *fresco* by 65% of Foster's respondents, but *templado* by Roersch and Hoogte's sample. In part, this is a reflection of multiple uses. Hahold notes that nettles are rated as hot when applied to the skin, but cold when prepared as a tea. This suggests the care that needs to be taken in eliciting such information. I documented distinct medicinal uses for five varieties of nettles in Ccachín, but I didn't elicit information on whether some are considered hotter than others or how their humoral value varies by application context.

Tetanus and Treating Wounds

Hot and cold remedies are sometimes combined. The son of my hosts once sustained a blow ("*golpe*") to the leg while driving cattle to the jungle for market. His mother washed the infected and festering wound with sulfur soap. She then applied a sulfur cream from the family medicine kit directly to the wound itself. Around this, she placed a circle of coca leaves, moistened with warm water. Within this she laid a second circle of *kanser*.[21] Bruises and inflammations in general are considered to be *cálido*. Soap is generally classified as *fresco*, sulphur as *cálido*. Kanser is *fresco*, and coca is *cálida*. Only the qualities of the herbal remedies were reported in this instance, so it's not clear whether the hot-cold values of the pharmaceuticals were salient for the preparer. Further complicating matters is that while a "principle of balancing opposites" normally applies, a "principle of avoidance of opposites" may apply in certain circumstances, such as the maintenance of heat in self-healing injuries like broken bones, strains and blows to the body (Foster 1994).

Diagnoses may change if the desired result is not forthcoming, and a variety of treatments, both hot and cold, may be applied over time, as a person seeks relief. This is illustrated by one Ccachín woman's self-treatment for a splinter. One day the woman pointed out to me a painful infection from a splinter in her leg. She reported that the dung of a cow, a "hot" substance, is the best treatment to draw the splinter out, but

lacking that, she had applied 3-in-1 machine oil to the wound. Later that morning, a cow passed by and she was able to collect fresh dung. She applied the dung to her wound and covered it with a wrap. By the next day, neither the pain nor the infection had gone away and the splinter remained. She decided to visit the *sanitario* ('public health official') for advice. The *sanitario* gave her a stern scolding. He was horrified by her cow dung plaster. He told her that it could cause tetanus. "Why didn't that *gringo* tell you not to do it?" he asked. The *sanitario*, however, was unable to remove the splinter. The woman returned home and decided to place something *fresco* on the wound: *raki raki* (a generic term for ferns), *lisas* (*Ullucus tuberosus*), or *wañu papa* (bitter potatoes used in the making of *moraya*). The infection eventually went away, and I don't know if the woman, now warned about the danger of tetanus, has ever resorted to dung as a treatment again.

My role as the naive gringo in this story reveals the limitations of both my own ethnomedical model and a culturally-relative approach. My background taught me to be careful around rusty nails and barbed wire, but I did not learn to associate tetanus with manure. The *sanitario*'s assumption that I would know these things was overly generous. In addition, I assumed, as Kloppenburg (1991:15) puts it, that "indigenous people possess an enormous reservoir of cultural information that can provide useful guidance as to which pieces of the natural world are worth a closer look." For self-care in the field, I used the medicines with which I was familiar, and I shared them when asked. I also accepted the local treatments given to me. I was out of my element, and I assumed that the locals were the experts, not I. I observed the frequent use of urine in home remedies in Ccachín, and bent over backwards to control any prejudices I had about my own and others' bodily fluids. When the young woman told me that she planned to treat her leg with dung, I noted it with curiosity rather than concern. I tried to be open-minded, and by training, I was disposed to accord an alternative cultural system the same weight as my own. Cultural relativity, however, may sometimes be an occupational hazard for ethnographers, and thereby for their subjects. Stein (1981:52) argues that "If cultural relativism would accord the same dignity to human lives that it does to human cultures, it could not possibly consider all medical systems as equal . . . if every medical system had

attained an equal degree of perfection, there would be no such thing as the history of medicine."

I don't know whether the practice of using animal manure for drawing out infections in Ccachín is indigenous to the Andes, or adopted by diffusion from the Spanish along with the introduction of cattle. The use of animal manure in home remedies was once relatively common in Europe. Jaundice, for example, was still treated with doses of beer laced with horse manure as late as the 17th century (Aubrey 1881). Guinea pig, pig, chicken, and dog manure are all used in home remedies in parts of the Andes, as are the droppings of certain birds. Cow manure has a variety of ethnomedical uses elsewhere in the Andes, including as an analgesic and anti-inflammatory plaster for burns (Valdizán and Maldonado 1922).[22]

Durham (1991) suggests that the persistence of folk beliefs that incur substantial health risks is a likely domain for encountering cases of gene-culture opposition, but notes that we generally don't have sufficient information to determine in each case that a) the cultural beliefs lead to lower genetic fitness values than available alternatives, b) that these beliefs have been nevertheless maintained by cultural evolutionary forces, and c) that they have been shaped by choice rather than imposition. The third, imposition, doesn't seem to be a plausible force in this case, so we are left with some kind of explanation in terms of indigenous knowledge systems.

Assuming that the *sanitario*'s concern about tetanus is well-founded in medical science, this example is a candidate case of gene-culture opposition rather than neutrality. Even if it were to have the desired effect in expelling the foreign substance, some of the time it would have deadly consequences. Unfortunately, I don't have any comparative information about genetic fitness values, about how wide-spread this medical treatment is, or about its particular cultural history. So the evidence is not as fine-grained as we should expect and as I would like. The incidence of tetanus appears to decline with altitude (although it's not clear whether the decline is related to absence or to under-reporting), complicating any generalization about the consequences of the practice in associated ethnomedical beliefs (Bastien 1995).

I think, however, that Durham underestimates both how much can be said about such cases of opposition and their ubiquity in qualitative terms. Take a related case from the Andes, this one having to do with neonate tetanus (Bastien 1995). Quechua has no specific term for tetanus, and people refer to it with the same terms used to designate many other diseases. Unless they consult Westernized health practitioners, they do not associate the symptoms of tetanus with the causes. Given the severity of the symptoms, they are most often ascribed to social and supernatural causes. Quechua women do not relate neonatal tetanus with contaminated umbilical cords. The Quechua associate neonatal tetanus with natural causes such as *wayra* ('wind'), *susto* ('fright'), and with sorcery.

A full analysis of the genetic fitness value of these beliefs would have to include all of the effects. Bastien, for example, suggests that attributing disease to the wind may generally be adaptive, encouraging one to avoid cold risks in high mountain environments with great fluctuation between day and night temperatures. On the other hand, the practice found in many parts of the Andes of scrubbing the newborn infant clean can both remove oils that protect the child from infections and expose the child to hands contaminated with the tetanus bacillus. Swaddling appears to stabilize the microenvironment around Quechua newborns, creating a warm, humid pouch that buffers infants from environmental stress and helps to conserve energy for growth (Baker 1976; Tronick et. al. 1994). But the practice of covering the umbilical cord with rags and swaddling infants with wide, woven belts itself makes it more difficult to detect the symptoms of infection and rigidity associated with tetanus. The practice may also lead to stimulus deprivation and delayed motor development, but because of fuel availability and mode of production factors, the alternative solution of spending the day in a heated home is not available.

Curing neonatal tetanus is complicated by cultural beliefs discouraging vaccination. Proscription against vaccination may have an indigenous element, but it also has been promoted by Marxists and conservative Catholics who associate vaccinations with forced sterilization (see Sanjinés 1969). Conceptually, the proscription against vaccination is separate from the beliefs associated with neonate tetanus and infant care, but as

suggested by the fear of sterility and the life-and-death stakes of contracting tetanus, the belief, well-founded or not, has a fitness value of its own.

Analysis of the adaptive value of a trait is complicated by how we define the trait (broadly, for example, as in attributing disease to the wind, or narrowly, as in attributing tetanus to the wind) and by the need for completeness in identifying the domain of all relevant effects. Analytically, the case of applying cow dung to wounds seems relatively straightforward in comparison to the childcare practices associated with neonate tetanus; it's possible to imagine a host of alternative treatments that would be neutral or beneficial in their effect. Besides raising questions about the origin and persistence of beliefs that are ineffective or counter effective to the goal of maintaining one's health, the example suggests the extent to which people in Ccachín are practical effectiveness-seekers when attempting to collect evidence about alternative courses of action. The young woman's exchange with me can be seen in this light, though I may have let her down. Telling others what one plans to do in advance of doing it invites feedback, and people in the village are constantly collecting suggestions and recommendations based on the experience of others. The example also points out the extent that people follow community norms or expert advice in making many, if not most, decisions. Individuals have limited experience, and sample a wider range of experience vicariously. The cost of collecting such information is low, and readily combines with other activities.

Methodological Issues

The complexity of the hot-cold classification system creates methodological problems for investigators attempting to determine the beliefs of individual informants. This is likewise true for natives trying to learn and apply the system, and accordingly, we can expect variation in application of the theory. One of my informants specified that white sugar is better than brown sugar for mixing with corn and nettles in the treatment of stomachaches. She added that if the former is unavailable, the latter will do. Presumably, she had differences in metaphoric humoral values based on color in mind. Another villager noted that mangos — a hot food — are dangerously hot in December when they

sit around in the sun and absorb heat (a conjunction of metaphorical and thermal heat), but they are safe during Carnival season. He likewise avoids eating the cherries of the *kapuli* at certain times of the year because they become so "hot" they can cause rabies, according to local belief. Given that metaphorical and thermal qualities differ, the season that one elicits the information can affect the response. Unfortunately, while I first learned of these elicitation problems in the field, and I was not able to collect most of the information in well-structured situations where I could control for them. The information emerged in natural situations where illness had befallen members of my host family, *compadres*, friends, or myself. My data is suggestive, but not sufficiently controlled for intrinsic classificatory differences or extrinsic methodological influences — the contextual differences in thermal and metaphorical qualities of an item, for example, or how my elicitation technique might affect ranking of items relative to each other.

Informants may apply hot-cold classifications to given items by rote learning or by reasoning from sensory effects and environmental criteria. Foster (1994) explains the high degree of intersubject uniformity in classifying certain items according to the former — an unbroken process of cultural inheritance since their initial classification by the Spanish in the Old or New World — and explains variation in terms of the latter as a process of secondary modification "to make them consistent with local conditions." In instances where reasoning holds sway, Foster suggests that determination of the humoral value of the remedy is often read directly from the illness it is used to treat ("cold" for a hot cause or "hot" for a cold based on the principle of opposites) rather than derived from a judgement of a plant or other material's intrinsic qualities. In a sense, this is the path of least resistance and requires the least amount of cognitive effort, but it's not always the case.

When I asked about the humoral quality of *sasawi* (see Table 4.4), one informant told me that she did not know because it did not grow in Ccachín and she had to obtain it by trading with outsiders. She knew that it was good for *gripe* ('flu') caused by heat, and that it was a good veterinary medicine for chickens, guinea pigs, sheep, and cattle. But she neither determined the humoral value by referring to what she used it to treat, nor by

considering its thermal or metaphoric properties. She confessed ignorance because the plant is not native. She may have been reluctant to say because she has never been told, supporting the importance of rote learning, or alternately, familiarity with the habitat in which *sasawi* is grown may have been an important criterion for her in making the determination. All else being equal, it's believed that hot plants grow in cool dry areas and cool plants in hot wet areas. *Sasawi* grows in the cold, windy environment above 4500 m. in the *provincias altas* of the southern part of Cusco Department. It's classified as "hot" by the people there because it thrives in such a harsh environment (Hahold 1988). There are enough exceptions that one can't readily predict the hot-cold value assigned to a plant by knowing where it grows, but this criterion sometimes comes to the fore when related species or varieties are compared.

The Rationality of Humoral Beliefs

I now turn my attention to three questions related to the rationality of the hot-cold classification system underlying ethnomedical practices in Ccachín.

1) Does humoral theory work? That is, does adherence to the principles produce positive treatment outcomes?

2) When the guiding principles produce the right outcome, is it by chance, is it because it models the relationship between cause and effect in a realistic way? Models that accurately represent the world do so within a determinate range, and the rationality of holding beliefs needs to be defined relative to people's experiences within this range. As Eric Smith points out, for example, flat-earth theory misconstrues reality in global terms, but it works fine and may even be the most efficient simplifying assumption for making navigational calculations for short trips (Eric A. Smith, personal communication). Is humoral theory a useful simplifying assumption for rural Andeans?

3) Is there a direct relation between underlying hot-cold beliefs and action? As Foster (1994) asks, "is the model *prescriptive* or *validating*?" This is

> another way of phrasing the question put forward by Harris more generally when he asks, "is it something that's actually in the behavior stream, or is it a belief about the behavior stream that exists only inside of the heads of . . . farmers?" (Harris 1979:38).

Does Hot-Cold Theory Work?

Natural Causes

Generalizing on his work in Tzintzuntzan (Mexico), Foster suggests that the majority of humoral beliefs, wherever found, are harmless. Among the rest, some beliefs are beneficial, others are dangerous. "Harmless," "beneficial," and "dangerous" correspond to Durham's categories of "neutrality," "enhancement," and "opposition" in gene-culture interactions.

The domain of all potential treatments for a given illness is huge. In any society, finding the agents that have a beneficial effect in the treatment of an illness is a daunting task. There may be hundreds, perhaps thousands, of plants, minerals, and other agents to chose from. The subset of potentially beneficial treatments may be large or small. Some remedies may be probabilistically better than others. At the extreme, there may be no treatment that has a biomedically beneficial effect. The rest of the treatment options will be neutral or harmful in their effects on the health of someone treated with them. Alone or in combination, trial-and-error learning, cultural transmission, and natural selection operating on cultural beliefs could lead people to draw their treatments from the effective subset.

Over this, hot-cold theory acts as a kind of filter. Modern biomedicine offers no reason to assume that the subset of effective treatments will be either all "hot" or all "cold" in humoral terms. If people use their empirical knowledge, they will choose the treatments they find most effective, regardless of their humoral value. If Foster is right, this is, to a large extent, what people who subscribe to humoral theory actually do, as he suggests that despite the prescriptive guidelines, a great deal of actual therapy shows little relationship to the theory. In addition, some of the apparent accuracy of the theory comes

from the ad hoc manner that humoral qualities are assigned to remedies according to the presumed causes and characteristics of illnesses they effectively treat rather than from qualities inherent in the substances themselves.

If people follow the "principle of opposites" strictly, they will restrict themselves to using "hot" substances for treating "cold" illnesses and "cold" substances for treating "hot" illnesses. Some of these remedies may be beneficial, the rest not. Most, as Foster suggests, are probably harmless, but some may be dangerous. If people combine both humoral theory and their empirical knowledge, they will restrict themselves to only those "hot" or "cold" substances that appear to be effective, further restricting the subset of treatments used. In so doing, they selectively draw from those treatments that confirm the theory, furthering their belief in it, but at the cost of ignoring any more effective treatments that fall outside of the humoral value prescribed. Whenever people restrict themselves to a subset of the "hot" or "cold" remedies available for treating an illness, something more than humoral theory is needed to explain why people do not draw from the entire set of humorally prescribed remedies. Also, we have grounds to wonder why people would not sample the entire set of effective treatments, regardless of their humoral value. To the extent that humoral theory restricts one's options in this way, the belief appears to be maladaptive. From my experience in Ccachín, however, humoral theory is not generally applied in such a rigid way.

Kloppenburg (1988) notes that there are 121 plant-derived prescription drugs now in Western medical use, and that the medicinal effects of 90-95% of the total number of plant species has yet to be explored. Farnsworth (1988) compared the use of 119 plant compounds by medical science and traditional medicine and found that 66% of them were used in the two systems for the same purpose, with another 9% indirectly related. 25% of the medically-important biological resources are not recognized by indigenous people, or not recognized to have the effects observed by medical science. Taken as a whole, these data suggest that indigenous peoples are quite successful but not foolproof in matching local resources to the medical problems at hand. I'm not aware of any attempt to determine the proportion of traditional medical practices that do not have the effect

imputed to them. Over 3000 plant species are used by indigenous people worldwide to try to control fertility alone (Kloppenburg 1988), but it's not clear how many actually do so.

Various investigators have argued that specific humoral practices are adaptive. To cite three Latin American examples, researchers have suggested that adding a pinch of salt to drinking water for humoral balance may help one avoid heat cramps, that frequent bathing to prevent heat-buildup promotes cleanliness, that pellagra is avoided by humorally balancing corn with chilies, peanuts, and beans. Other investigators have cited the practical benefits of the hot-cold classification system in general for coding nutritional information and avoiding allergic reactions (reviewed in Foster 1994).

To the extent that such practices are beneficial, their long-term persistence may be either intentionally or functionally explained rather than explained as a consequence of the application of humoral theory itself, in the first instance by recognition of positive effects, in the second, by coevolutionary processes. A third possibility — coincidence — can't be ruled out, but is less likely where the practice predates humoral theory and has been made to fit, or when the practice has existed for several centuries. Theoretically, humoral theory could act as both a mechanism to generate novel patterns for behavior and as a filter to eliminate certain possibilities — adaptive and maladaptive alike — from the behavior stream. The former suggests the value of metaphor in generating variety for selection to act upon, the latter presupposes a consistency in humoral classification that probably does not exist.

Psychological and Social Benefits

In addition to hypothesized medical and nutritional benefits, the psychological value of humoral theory is often invoked, working through the therapeutic value of hope and through the beneficial consequences of maintaining traditional identity as an anchor for stability and for reducing stress in a time of rapid cultural change. The prescriptive or explanatory logic of humoral theory is not directly related to the beneficial consequences in such instances — any theory would do as long as it is positive and traditional — but

both could explain the persistence of the theory in the face of more empirically robust ones for a limited time in specific cultural contexts.

Most investigators have emphasized the social and supernatural aspects of pre-Columbian Andean ethnomedicine, so we don't know what natural paradigm if any humoral theory has replaced. Coca, *molle*, *chillka*, quinoa, tobacco, urine, saltpeter and a host of other remedies used today date back at least to Inca times (Kendall 1973), but we don't know to what extent they were organized according to some prescriptive or explanatory theory. Even today, there is no attempt to relate many practices to the humoral perspective. On occasion, for example, one of my hosts in Ccachín uses a pressure point technique to cure headaches. She learned it from her godmother, who raised her, and has taught it to her daughters, who refer to it as "*tratamiento Incaico*." First, she moistens the scalp with a mixture of *mut'uy* and urine or *mut'uy* and hot water, a traditional humoral practice. Then she feels for "hot" spots and areas where the skin is tight against the skull, massaging with her fingers. When she identifies these spots, she takes a snatch of attached hair, pulls it taut, and snaps it upward and outward with a flick of the wrist. She proceeds through the scalp in this way, locating the spots, snapping the hair, and prompting her patient to spit after each pull. It's possible to have a prescriptive toolkit of empirically-based practices such as this that relates treatments to illnesses on a one-to-one basis without a unified theory.

Some have argued that hot-cold theory in the Andes has an indigenous origin, making it well-suited for syncretic blending and popularization of the protoscientific medicine of the Spanish colonial period. Evidence for this is scant, but the two most important aspects of humoral theory — binary oppositions and an equilibrium model of natural and social relations — are widely held to be central to Andean thought. Such systematic models are not universal in small-scale societies, however, and to the extent that the introduction of humoral theory marked a change in ethnomedical beliefs in the Andes, we might ask why it provided a more "highly satisfying explanatory whole" than what came before.

Precolonial Quechua views on illness and curing were primarily personalistic, with sickness believed to be caused by moral and ritual transgressions of the social and natural order (Urioste 1981). Unlike the Christian conception of sin, the Andean notion of *hucha* ('sin', 'guilt') requires neither awareness nor intentional infringement of moral imperatives. Humoral theory, in contrast, is naturalistic, and the causal agents are intrinsic properties of natural objects and phenomena, rather than the will and action of spirits and deities. To the extent that religion is animistic, or where the causal chain can include intermediary agents as in Quechua worldview, the two in tandem may offer a more complete response to the questions "what's wrong?" "why me?" and "what can I do about it?" than either alone.

Does Humoral Theory Work in the Right Way?

If humoral theory is so often violated in actual practice, one wonders what sustains it. The answer seems to be partly structural. It is not a static system, as traditional remedies are continually reevaluated and new remedies added. One villager in Ccachín, for example, was told by one of the school teachers that an infusion of *tunya tunya* (*Solanum luteo album*) was good for her baby's diarrhea. She tried it, but soon stopped using it because it appeared to make her child's diarrhea worse. Villagers are sensitive to experience.

Beyond immediate results, however, the underlying principles of humoral theory remain relatively immune to disconfirmation. Humoral theory consists of a package of mutually reinforcing ideas. These include the following:

1) Both the "principle of opposites" and the "principle of avoidance of opposites" may be invoked for the same illness, sometimes, in conjunction. In Table 4.4, we find *gripe* — a "hot" fever — treated first by a hot remedy (a concoction of *kapuli*, eucalyptus and *markhu*) to draw it out, and then by a cold (*mut'uy* or another plant) for balance.
2) Many symptoms can have both hot and cold causes. In Table 4.4 we find both *qoñi impachu* and *chiri impachu* ("hot" and "cold" indigestion). Most com-

mon maladies — stomachaches, toothaches, headaches, diarrhea — can have both hot and cold sources. If an illness doesn't respond to one treatment, people often assume that their original diagnosis of the problem has been wrong, rethink what could have caused their exposure, and reclassify it as the opposite.

3) The body can be upset by exposure to thermal or metaphoric heat both while in a state of equilibrium and while out of equilibrium and at special risk (Foster 1994). Activities and exposures that do not cause illness for a body in balance might do so when out of balance. If one has been put at risk by drinking *trago*, for example, a hot source, one may be more vulnerable to both a "hot" sun and drinking "cold" water. In effect then, people must sort through hot-cold causal chains in making their diagnoses.
4) The same substance can vary situationally in its humoral qualities, according to the criteria discussed earlier. In her context-sensitive explanation of variation in hot-cold classification by single observers and within communities, Mathews (1983) notes that the same item may be called upon to perform multiple tasks, with different humoral requirements. The recognition of both sensate and metaphorical criteria allow for considerable flexibility in satisfying the principle of opposites in any instance.

Given these, one can often note circular reasoning in the application of the theory as the humoral qualities of an illness are inferred from the qualities of the remedy it appears to respond to, while the qualities of illnesses are used to deduce which remedies should be used.

While coincidence between humoral categories and efficacious practices likely plays a part, the resilience of the system is in its flexibility. As Anderson (1987:334) notes, "ingenious minds can expand the system or encode more data within it." At the same time it's simple and intuitive enough to be accessible to all. The result is a complex of beliefs that Foster (1994:141-142) describes as "a logical theoretical base, a simple

framework on which both New World and popular Spanish curing practices could be hung . . . to form a reasonably unified and highly satisfying explanatory whole."

Prescription and Validation

The majority of researchers who have investigated hot-cold theory in Latin America have assumed that the assessment of humoral values, "principle of opposites," and other tenets of the theory provide rules that guide daily behavior. In contrast, Foster (1994) argues that since the theory conveniently allows one to pick and choose the facts necessary for the desired outcome, it serves more to provide *ex post facto* justification of particular practices than it does to prescribe and proscribe them. If so, hot-cold beliefs do not really explain behavior at all.

Among the evidence, he cites the following:

1) There's significant amount of intracommunity and intercommunity disagreement about the humoral values of specific foods and remedies.
2) The same individuals classify the same food or medicinal herb differently on different occasions.
3) The principle of opposites is often not followed in choosing treatments for causes and illness characteristics that would call for it.
4) For some illnesses both the "principle of opposites" and the "principle of avoidance of opposites" may be invoked, depending on how one frames the illness.

It's useful to reframe the question of humoral theory's relationship to behavior in terms of Hunn's (1984) discussion of "Image" and "Plan." Hunn contrasts two ways of organizing cultural information: a) by similarity, focusing on the intrinsic features relevant to the identification of things, and b) by contiguity, referring to the extrinsic features relevant to using things in action. The first type of model he calls the "Image," and includes such things as mental maps, folk taxonomies, theories, and paradigms. The second type of model he calls the "Plan," and includes such things as rules, scripts, and recipes. As Hunn puts it, "the Image is a model of how the welter of sense impressions

received from the environment is made to cohere. The Plan is a model of how cognitive order is imposed upon behavior in the environment." He notes that what we lack in explanatory terms is a model of the internal integration of Image with Plan.

This is exactly the problem we face in relating humoral theory to action. The assessment of the humoral qualities of illnesses and remedies in hot-cold theory is an aspect of the Image. It focuses on the intrinsic qualities of things in these respective domains and organizes ethnomedical knowledge according to similarities and differences. The various rules of thumb underlying the "principle of opposites," (and correlate "avoidance of opposites," etc.) — extracting heat or cold by bathing, cupping, plasters, and poultices, neutralizing through herbal medicines, expelling by purges and induced sweating, applying heat to injuries to promote self-healing — are aspects of the Plan. It may be that various aspects of the Image are themselves not well-integrated in people's minds, something that in different words, Foster seems to contend. Or it may be that they are well-integrated, but that we have not adequately identified the relevant images, or constructed an adequate model of their relation to each other and to action.

The fact that different answers are given by different individuals and by the same individuals at different points in time does not in itself rule out humoral beliefs as the proximate causes of action. Often, it may point to problems with the survey technique, and indicate that interviewers have not been sufficiently sensitive to context. On the other hand, there could be a unitary cultural model, with deviations from consensus patterned according to the sexual division of labor, kin groupings, or individual expertise (Boster 1985).

Even if it were wholly prescriptive, hot-cold theory is underdeterminative in explaining the vast variety of herbal remedies and ethnomedical practices found in villages such as Ccachín. It may suggest a general toolkit and some general principles, but it cannot readily explain why people routinely associate particular remedies with particular illnesses. It may act as a filter, eliminating many possibilities, but it isn't uniquely prescriptive in specifying any. The recipes, scripts, and plans for home treatment in Ccachín are much more discrete than humoral theory implies. This suggests that

a great deal of empiricism is at work — that choices are made on the basis of previous consequences — or that some other principle is involved — the assessment of the sympathetic qualities of illness and remedies for example ("like affects like") — that further specify the choices.

Hot-cold beliefs are not the only aspect of Image or Plan in Andean ethnomedicine. Lira's (1985) encyclopedic pharmacopeia of ethnomedical remedies and rituals in the Cusco region emphasizes a mixture of empirically-based home recipes, numerology, color symbolism, sympathetic and contagious magic, and prayer formulas without placing any of the practices under the structure of humoral theory. Foster's contention that actual health practices are generally based on habit, custom, and culturally-transmitted "standard" remedies rather than on conscientious application of the principles of humoral theory is not a problem for explaining behavior in terms of the theory as long as there is consistency between the multiple beliefs that make up Image and Plan. Particular "recipes" for action are readily noted and learned. General principles are higher order constructs, and learning them takes more training and time.

Inconsistencies between experience and theory appear to have gradually led to modification of the latter. The modifications have made the theory comprehensive and immune to empirical refutation. Thus it's validating role. The direct cultural transmission and application of most treatment plans without explicit reference to hot-cold theory keep inconsistencies out of most peoples' focus. For the most part they are ignored, or can be rationalized away. This does not suggest, however, that in nonroutine situations — when treating unfamiliar illnesses, when the treatment of choice in routine instances fails, or when substituting and experimenting with combinations of herbs, humoral logic does not play an integral part. It's one of a number of "logics" that enter into ethnomedical decision making in the Andes. It "prescribes" and "validates" both efficacious outcomes and practices where the probability of success can't be readily ascertained through individual experience. Whatever the probabilities of success, both humoral theory and the supernatural beliefs that Andeans hold are not fatalistic. Illness is a condition that can be reversed.

Foster (1994) has emphasized the validating role of Latin American humoral theory over its prescriptive role, partly as a corrective to those who focus on culture only as a "guide," a "plan," a "pattern," or a "set of rules" for behavior. As he puts it, "Cultural institutions and belief systems very often *are* prescriptive; there can be no argument about that. Yet 'often' is not the same as 'always'" (Foster 1994:143). We need to be cautious about taking reported beliefs as the proximate cause of action rather than as hypotheses about action's causes. At the same time, it appears that hot-cold beliefs often do guide people's behavior, and one would be equally mistaken to draw a sharp line between prescription and validation.

Besides prescription and validation, humoral theory is used for "exploration." In drawing upon the biodiversity of their environment, indigenous people are faced with the same problem in filling out their medicine chest as medical science is, that is, "Of the vast and bewildering variety of organisms available, which ones should be collected and analyzed?" (Kloppenburg 1991). One solution to the problem is to follow the lead of others. This is the approach that "genetic prospectors" from the industrialized world use when they turn to the reservoir of knowledge of indigenous peoples for guidance about which pieces of the bewildering botanical variety are worth taking a closer look at.

For the most part, this is also what villagers in Ccachín do. Patterns for behavior may be transmitted from one generation to another with or without elaboration of the underlying logic. The stock answer I received to my questions about why a particular treatment was used in a given context in Ccachín did not make reference to the principle of opposites nor to any underlying principle or metaphorical connection; it was invariably a reference to authority: "*mi madre sabe como . . .*" ("my mother knows how to . . ."), "*los viejitos saben . . .*" ("the elders know . . ."), "*los machulas lo usaron . . .*" ("the ancestors used it . . ."). The most common reason for doing something in ceremonial and ritual contexts — "*por costumbre*" ("by custom") was not invoked to explain ethno-medical practices. Tradition alone may be taken as sufficient reason for doing some things, but not when life and death matters are at stake.

What do people in Ccachín do when nothing works? What do they do when faced with a new and exotic illness? They experiment. Theories, models, metaphors — right or wrong — are ways of probing uncertainty. Their rightness or wrongness are not used, or at most are only retrospectively used, to determine whether they are scientific.

Villagers don't try cures randomly, they borrow the treatment principles used for the illness it is most like. And here's where humoral theory comes in. A plant such as *mut'uy* (*Cassia hookeriana*) has multiple uses and is the most commonly used herbal treatment for ailments perceived as having a hot source. It's mixed with urine and used as a paste or wash to treat headaches, it's plastered or pasted on the cheeks for toothaches, it's served in coffee or added to a bath to treat diarrhea, it's served as a tea to treat fevers and vomiting. For a stomach upset, *mut'uy* leaves are rubbed vigorously in one's palms to crush them and get the juices flowing and then rubbed over the stomach and lower back. Once when I had a stomachache from drinking too much alcohol, a *compadre* stuffed fistfuls of *mut'uy* leaves under my shirt and under my belt. *Mut'uy* is ready at hand, and its usage seems to be extendible through experimentation according to the principle of opposites. Villagers report that *mut'uy* growing lower down in the cornfields is more powerful than *mut'uy* found at village level, and while this likewise fits the assumptions of humoral theory, I don't know if the altitude difference corresponds to any chemical differences in plants collected at the different levels as well.

Conclusion

This chapter raises questions about the rationality, origins, and reproduction of certain Andean ethnomedical beliefs. In our substantive and normative connotations of rational action, we want to exclude action based on irrational beliefs from the domain. We maintain an ideal of informed rationality that excludes superstition and false beliefs about the consequences of action, even when these beliefs may be reasonably held by the people in question given the means of gathering evidence available to them. Following Frazer (1959), we put many traditional beliefs in the category "magical thinking."

Not only how rationality is defined but how the question is framed — which beliefs and what evidence are included — has much to do with whether belief formation is considered rational or not. The problem for rational choice theorists is coming up with a theory of belief formation that is cross-culturally generalizable and neither so restrictive that rationality is unattainable by mere mortals nor so general that it includes everything. As Elster puts it, "between the thin theory of the rational and the full theory of the true and the good there is room and need for a broad theory of the rational" (Elster 1983:15).

The rationality of belief concerns the relation between the belief and available evidence. How much time one should put into expanding the set of available information is not easily defined nor measured. To complicate things further, belief may be grounded in the available evidence — the belief that *hak'achu* causes increased milk production may be reinforced because psychophysiologically it does — and yet the belief may misinterpret the evidence. Magical thinking may lead people to do things that are coincidently useful or right. There's an important but limited realm where the belief that something works is the reason that it does so.

The relationship between rationality and a selectionist point of view raises yet another complication. Whether beliefs are factually correct or related to the evidence in the right way is not so much the issue as whether they produce adaptive or evolutionarily stable outcomes. While the ideal may be "to be able to notice all the reasons that concern us . . . to be completely and perfectly informed guardians of our own interests" (Dennett 1984:24-25), this is obviously too strong a requirement for rationality.

Beliefs about the relationship between action and outcomes may or may not be correct. A number of the examples in this chapter appear to be instances where people find beneficial consequences where none exist. The more theoretically interesting instances, however, are those in which people are the beneficiaries of unintended beneficial consequences. Beliefs do not always have to be correct to produce behavior that is adaptive or that allows people to successfully achieve their goals.

Often, the mechanism by which a beneficial consequence is beneficial will not be recognized, but the beneficial consequence will. It will depend on how we define the

consequence as to whether we view these consequences as "unintended" or not. Women in Ccachín say that one must bathe children and pigs "so that they will grow." Their goal is defined so generally that they do not need to have developed a germ theory of disease to motivate practices that promote good health. Somewhat more complicated from the standpoint of means-ends relations, villagers say that one should not feed peanuts to young children because they will grow up speaking *tonterías* ('nonsense'). Whether or not this is true, it may be good advice to prevent children from choking. Practice may often be determined through experience to be beneficial, but not exactly for the reasons nor goals described.

Choice of Treatment Options

Young (1980) outlines a model of treatment choice for a Mexican community, and both the treatment options — self-care, traditional curers, Western medicine — and the variables he identifies — the seriousness of the illness, the knowledge of a home remedy, faith in the treatment delivery system, and the accessibility and cost of Western medical facilities — fit medical decision making in Ccachín as well. Young's model is an inductive approach to understanding ethnomedical decision making, but like many optimization approaches, it regards individuals as rational actors operating under intrinsic cognitive information constraints. His emphasis is on the heuristics and rules of thumb that individuals use to make rational health care decisions in natural settings. The model distinguishes strategies of first resort for illness of varying gravity from those that are turned to if a problem doesn't respond to the original treatment. When the severity changes or a remedy fails, people have ordering strategies based on cost and the likelihood of a cure to simplify decision making.

Young adopts the term "faith" to refer to the subjective probabilities of cure associated with each form of treatment. He doesn't elaborate on how such good faith assessments are made, leaving this question open with the "as if" assumption of normative theorists that however the calculations are actually made, they maximize subjective probabilities of cure.[23] Mathews (1982) goes further to identify simplifying strategies that

are actually used in medical decision making, suggesting that people only calculate probabilities of outcomes when all else fails. These heuristics include 1) fixed strategies, whereby disease categories are linked to a single well-defined action, 2) ordered sequences, whereby illnesses are matched with fixed sequences of alternatives to follow in the event that a condition worsens or does not respond to treatment, 3) delegation of diagnosis and decision to others — family members or outside experts — who make the decision on one's behalf, 4) treatment by analogy, treating an unknown condition like the illness it most closely resembles, 5) treatment by precedent, referring back to how the illness was last cured in the household and applying the past treatment to the current problem, and 6) simultaneous use, adopting several treatments at the same time in the hope that at least one will work.

Mathews emphasizes three things: that in general, people do not directly assess either the costs or probabilities of cure but rely on these rules of thumb, that given these heuristics, little independent decision making actually occurs in the course of dealing with most illnesses, and most importantly, a great deal of work needs to be done before we are able to specify the contexts and conditions under which one type of heuristic is used instead of another. The first two should not be taken to imply, however, that cost of treatment and probability of cure are not considered in a rational way, nor that they are not optimized. Standardized individual treatment sequences may be ordered according to these criteria. Mathews's discussion pushes the decision making *moment* back to the metadecision (and *metaheuristic*) about choice of heuristics. It's conceivable that the adoption of one heuristic or another and the sequence of their adoption is likewise optimally ordered according to the amount of information that one has on hand, projected costs, and probable benefits. Fixed strategies and ordered sequences may prevail for illnesses that are common and routine, while the more general heuristics of analogy and precedence may be adopted when illnesses are novel and unfamiliar. The understanding and prediction of when people seek outside help — a social heuristic — may be complicated by individual differences in both psychological and social preferences that go beyond the more limited list of criteria here, but are especially sensitive to cost.

The routinization of rational choice in ethnomedical decision making does not imply its absence any more than the adoption of complex decision aids by doctors in our best hospitals. Both rely on heuristics that are culturally learned and transmitted. Implementation of the first is on the low end of the cost spectrum (and effectively reduces cost by routinizing the decision), the second is on the high end. Rational choice as motivationally conceived depends on whether options are chosen as means to a further end (and whether choice among options is modified with experience), or instead, valued in themselves (as a form of expression, to maintain an identity, etc.). It's not the only mechanism, however, that can lead to an optimal relation between means and ends. Rational choice and cultural transmission are intertwined in most real life examples, and not always easy to tease apart. Often, it's only on the boundaries of rationality that distinctions clearly emerge.

Decisions can be conceived and described at various levels of generality. There are both decisions and meta-decisions: choices of strategies for making decisions. Under conditions of uncertainty (in contrast to known risks), the probabilities of a successful outcome can not be effectively compared. In the most extreme case, there may be no solution given available resources, and there's no way of knowing how much energy to invest to know it. People develop strategies for making decisions under uncertainty, and at this meta-level there is more information to base one's decision on. At one time, for example, there was no known cure for *uta* ('leishmaniasis') in the Andes, a devastating disease marked by skin lesions and collapse of the nasal cartilage, but we'd hardly consider it irrational to experiment with alternative treatments, consult experts, and try several things simultaneously; the investment in hope, within limits, is worth the price.[24]

Rationality of Ethnomedical Beliefs

There are three paradigms organizing ethnomedical belief in the Andes. The first is pre-naturalistic and personalistic in relating the cause of illness to supernatural forces and their treatment to overcoming *hucha* ('sin'), defined as the lack of something necessary, an imperfection or imbalance in ecological, social, or supernatural relation-

ships (Urioste 1981). Thus, Bastien (1981:129) reports that in his research community (Kaata, Bolivia), "sickness is usually linked with either a social disturbance or a land dispute." The second is naturalistic and impersonalistic in restricting the causal chains in sickness and healing to imbalances in sensually and metaphorically-perceived natural qualities. This is the paradigm underlying beliefs in Ccachín about *uriwa*, the efficacy of *hak'achu* as a galactogogue, and myriad hot-cold imbalances, and it is probably the most dominant paradigm in Ccachín. Foster (1994) notes that the people of Tzintzuntzan, Mexico that he has worked with place little concern on the social dimensions of causality in medical treatment, and in most health contexts, the same can be said about Ccachín. The third, modern Western biomedicine, is likewise naturalistic and impersonalistic, but it rejects the metaphorical elements of the first two and replaces them with a bio-psycho-physical theory of disease.

Since each of these theories is comprehensive, they are potentially competing diagnostic systems. It is tempting to resort to some kind of stage theory to explain the evolution of ethnomedical belief, with one stage eventually replacing the other, but this does not seem to have happened even in industrial societies where biomedicine is the most institutionalized. Though proximate causes are increasingly diagnosed in naturalistic terms, ultimate causes often continue to be viewed in supernatural and personalistic ones. They are able to coexist within a relatively unitary system as long as they address causality at different levels.

Foster (1994:198) writes that "as an explanatory device, the model [humoral theory] is unsatisfactory, and it cannot provide a rational basis for either preventative or curative medicine." He goes on to say that "for most of its 2,000 years plus [humoral theory] reigned only because it was the 'best available,' closer to physiological reality than disease explanations based on witchcraft, breach of taboo, spirit intrusion, and the like" (1994:198). It's hard to put one's finger on exactly what "the best available" means. Does it refer to internal consistency or adaptive consequence? We don't have enough evidence to judge if humoral theory is superior by either criterion. Individual treatment practices validated under one or the other or both may be adaptive, but as general

diagnostic systems it is hard to determine if one is more efficacious or more adaptive than another.

Many investigators explain traditional Andean ethnomedical beliefs in terms of their unintended physical, psychological, and social benefits. Indirect physical and psychological benefits are not only understandable from the vantage point of Western science, they are often promoted by Western health practitioners. As my discussion of neonate tetanus should make clear, many health practices have a variety of unintended and unrecognized effects, some healthful and some harmful, and if the balance of these is positive, they may be selected for through natural processes. Also, given the subjectivity of pain, traditional beliefs often provide a measure of relief for people afflicted with illnesses of undetermined natural causes for the very reason that they are believed to have pharmacological effect. Hope may be a result of wishful thinking rather than a correct assessment of one's situation, but it may useful to have, with the unintended consequence of improving one's possibilities vis-à-vis one who does not have it. On the other hand, ethnomedical explanations in terms of beneficial social functions suffer the problem of socio-functionalist explanation generally: they fail to specify a plausible mechanism that would complete the feedback loop between social consequences and individuals' practices. The functionalism of individual-level benefit must ultimately be explained with reference to natural selection of specific beliefs or of the psychobiological structures underlying belief. When two or more competing belief systems are equally beneficial, further explanation in terms of cultural history is necessary. Greater attention needs to be paid to negative social consequences as well. Conceiving natural causes as social ones can create new social problems or deepen existing ones rather than solving them.

As naturalistic systems, humoral theory and biomedicine compete more directly. The general trend in the Andes is the one identified by Foster to be taking place world-wide: "beliefs and practices gradually leech out of humoral medical systems, while those of modern biomedicine take over" (Foster 1994:204). The situation in Ccachín, however, is presently one where personalistic, humoral, and biomedical models all have their

followers. Traditional and modern health practitioners complement and compete with each other, and the models are applied in both unique and overlapping domains.

Magical Thinking

There are different ways of defining "magical thinking." Vroonhoven treats it as a kind of collective rationality. Like instrumental rationality, action is valued as a means to a further end, but in "magical rationality," as he puts it:

> [The action] is prescribed and defined not by the individual but by a supra-individual instance. That carrying a mascot or amulet protects one from misfortune is a defined and preestablished conviction. Carrying it is the means, and protection is the goal. Whether this protection is really given can only be determined afterwards. The sense of the action can not be deduced from the fact that the objective has been realized or not. If the protection is not given, it's supposed that higher powers are acting that don't fall under control of the mascot-amulet. The next time the objective may be realized. The action continues to be rational. It's sense doesn't depend on the actor, nor its attribution, nor its validity defined in terms of its effectiveness. [Vroonhoven 1990:12]

There are some problems with this definition. First, there's no reason to treat magical action as an expression of collective rationality simply because individuals' beliefs are largely determined by their position in groups. To say that beliefs are collective in this sense is simply to say that culture matters (i.e., information that is acquired from others by imitation or training affects behavior) and that the beliefs may be widely shared. Other than requiring that beliefs be consistent, give reason to action, and be based on the available evidence, rational choice theory is moot about the content of beliefs. Preferences and beliefs require explanation in terms of environmental and social states. Given this, I doubt that there is any useful sense in which magical thinking can be categorized as a property of groups rather than individuals in a way that distinguishes it from other kinds of rationality. Second, the sense of any action resides in the relation between means and ends, not in the action's objective success, which is always probabilistic; so this can not be what distinguishes "magical rationality" from "instrumental rationality." Third, the definition says nothing about what I take to be the principal characteristic of magical thinking: the symbolic connection between the magical object or

act and the purported power. Despite these failings, the definition provides insight into the wider processes of belief formation associated with magical thinking, and a good clue as to why magically beliefs are so persistently maintained.

The clue I refer to is the nonfalsifiability of the belief. The world of mascots and amulets is not unique in this regard. It's one of the principle characteristics of all matters sustained by faith. Dawkins suggests that in the evolution of ideas, coagulations of ideas that mutually support each other and flourish in each other's presence appear, just as they do with genes, the replicators that first caught his attention. A special characteristic of faith and its fellow travelers, as Dennett (1991) notes, is that they have phenotypic expressions that make their own propagation via cultural transmission more likely by disabling or preempting the environmental forces that would otherwise tend to extinguish them. Taken as a whole, the packet of ideas becomes impossible to empirically disconfirm.

Qonopa, *enqa*, *illa*, and such are the Andean equivalent of the mascots and amulets Vroonhoven mentions above. Divination with coca-leaves provides another example (see Table 4.2 for both). The reading of coca leaves abounds with metaphorical associations. The shape, condition, and position of coca leaves relative to each other are used in divination to represent age, sex, relationship, emotional states, illnesses and health, and activities according to likeness. Fright is represented by jagged edges, death by a tip broken away from the rest of the leaf, good and bad emotional states by whether leaves fall face up or face down, witchcraft by two leaves lying opposed to each other (Ossio Acuña et. al. 1989; Hahold and Kroeger 1990). From a Western perspective, "the reading of coca is a symbolic means for *curanderos* to express their own observation and analysis of the patient" (Irarrázaval 1983). Its effectiveness depends on the sensitivity of the ritual specialist to other diagnostic criteria and on any psychosomatic effects the reading might have. Included in the constellation of traditional beliefs that support faith in the technique is the idea that coca leaves can only inform when the conditions are right — when the gods permit. These conditions include a sincere and profound trust in the tradition, and good relations between the diviner and the mountain spirits. If the reading

fails to predict, the assumption is that conditions were not right, not that the system itself is inadequate.

I have discussed several examples from Ccachín where likeness is substituted for likelihood when correlations are experientially difficult to ascertain. This is not an exclusively Andean trait; it appears to be a human universal (Shweder 1977). The particular likenesses that are salient to people depends both on sensory experience and on their social and symbolic systems, but color values, body metaphors and other associations that are emphasized in the configuration of beliefs that constitute *lo Andino* seem to be widely shared cross-culturally.

Belief formation can go wrong because beliefs are influenced by our desires, as in wishful thinking, or when rather than collecting an optimal amount of evidence, we dedicate less energy to the search as soon as our findings confirm what we have hoped. Belief formation can also go wrong because of a variety of cognitive illusions and fallacies that we are subject to when making statistical inferences (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). We may have trouble understanding the notion of randomness, for example, and attach excessive importance to personal experience and salient events. If we tend to substitute likeness for likelihood, it's in part because we are better metaphorical thinkers than correlational ones.

In addition, our propensity to find meaning everywhere can distort belief. As Elster (1993) hypothesizes it, a universal desire for meaning predisposes us to find purpose in everything, justice in the universe, and sufficient reasons for what we do. Ethnomedicine is an opportune area to examine these biases. The Andean notion that all illness comes from natural, social, and supernatural imbalances can be related to the first. The translation of misfortune into blame and guilt, even when of random or unknown origin, relates to the second. According to ancient belief, illness and death were believed to be the consequence of the infringement of custom and law, either in symbolic expression or actual act. The transgressions need not have been perpetrated by the person who <got sick, illness could be prompted by the actions of close relatives instead (Urioste 1981). Current accusations of witchcraft likewise fall into this category. The third relates

to the tendency to form beliefs upon which to ground or explain actions even when there's not enough information to do so, an intolerance of ignorance and uncertainty that abhors a vacuum.

Some of the perceived cultural distance between ourselves and others arises from the questionable assumption that they think magically whereas we do not (Shweder 1977). Such an assumption can be seen, for example, in Vroonhoven's discussion of four kinds of rationalities in Andean thought — instrumental, magical, expressive, and ritual — when he adds that:

> These different variants of social action and rationality normally aren't present in an isolated and pure form, but they are interwoven one with another in concrete situations. Western culture constitutes an exception to this rule, forming a special case. [Vroonhoven 1990:12]

Shweder argues that magical thinking is no less characteristic of our own mundane intellectual activities than they are in such beliefs as I have listed in Table 4.2. He offers an example from ethnopsychology. We assume that such traits as "shy with strangers" and "prefers to work alone" go together as characteristics of an "introverted" personality because they resemble each other, rather than because we have any evidence that they are correlated in people's behavior, whereas he finds that the evidence that one predicts the other is relatively weak. Examples abound, not only in the widespread popular acceptance of "pseudoscience," but in various spheres where our correlational experience is ill-behaved: our assessments of risk and responsibility, our consumer purchases, and our political action. If we pride ourselves in being "more rational" it is probably not because there has been a radical transformation in our everyday ways of thought, but because particular areas of our experience are now dominated by institutions capable of organizing information into a format that lends itself to correlational manipulation, and because we put trust in these institutions. Outside of these limits, we are not so different from nonliterate Quechua peasants or the many others whose reasoning sometimes seems rather strange to us. Despite our scientific ideals, in everyday practice we are as magical as anyone. As Shweder puts it, "Anthropologists interested in thought may have mistaken a difference in the content of thought for a difference in the mode of

thought. Magical thinking does not distinguish one culture from another. Resemblance, not co-occurrence likelihood, is a fundamental conceptual tool of the everyday ('savage'?) mind. Most of us have a 'savage' mentality much of the time."

Notes to Chapter 4

1. Curiously, when I asked villagers about homosexuality in Ccachín, a *wakero* ('cattle herder') who lived in isolation with the cows in a distant pasture was the only man said to be *china kunka*, that is, to have the voice and mannerisms of a woman, in Ccachín. I don't know if this was attributed to *waka uriwa* or not.

2. The "real social conditions" Stein is concerned about here are poverty, political powerlessness, low social status, and linguistic isolation. The village to which he refers, Vicos, is a rural community in the Peruvian Andes, and was extensively studied by the Cornell-Peru Project, an anthropological experiment in participant-intervention. According to Stein, delivery of Western medical services in Vicos was the most difficult and least successful of the project's development activities.

3. An emphasis on cultural relativism often underlies such approaches, as well as an admiration and respect for indigenous knowledge systems. To the extent development, in health or any other sphere, should build on existing knowledge and institutional structures, there is much to be said for this. Likewise, the recognition that cultural beliefs and social relations contribute to the form of an illness is an important one.

4. Other Quechua names for this species in the southern Andes are *lachu*, *akakllu*, *hak'akllu* and *pitu*. In Aymara, it is referred to as *yarakaka*. Fjeldså and Krabbe's (1990) field guide provides a description and illustration of the bird.

5. Both *chiwanku* and *hak'achu* stories are used in the Cusco area to explain various imperfections of the world. In these accounts, the *hak'achu* was sent by God to the Quechua people to announce the creation. But whereas God intended a variety of fruits to be found in both the valley and the puna, the *hak'achu* lied and told the people that the fruit was to grow only in the hot valley regions, and this came to be. Likewise, God wanted sheep to be any of twelve colors so that the poor would not have to buy dye, but the *hak'achu* reported to the people that there would only be four colors of sheep, and this too came to pass. God planned that humans need only eat twice a day, but the *hak'achu* lied about the number, and since then people have had to eat three meals a day. This latter deception is often attributed to the *chiwanku* as well, a bird that is condemned to go forever hungry (Morote Best 1988:101-109).

6. The snaring of *hak'achu* is based on local knowledge of the behavior of the birds and on an inventive and economical application of the resources at hand. The knowledge is passed down through the generations and the skill is fine-tuned through individual trial and error. The *toqlla* ('trap', 'snare') is similar to that used in the Calca-Urubamba area for trapping *lluthu* ('tinamou') as illustrated by Zans Candia (1984), with some improvisations. The ones I saw in Ccachín were made from plastic thread

removed from an old grain sack, spun to make it finer and stronger. The snare is placed at the entry of a bird's den, so that a bird will be trapped as it enters at night. Once the adult is caught, the young may be taken as well. During the time I lived with my host family, they had as many as four dried carcasses stored away at any time. While I am only aware of women doing the trapping in Ccachín, Venero Gonzales (1987) reports that when a woman is at the point of giving birth in some communities, her husband goes out to capture a flicker to prepare the soup.

7. *Pampa llank'u* is rubbed on one's legs and other extremities when they hurt from the cold, *kiska qhana* is used as a tea for heart pain, and the milky liquid obtained from *wach'anka* makes a purgative used to treat drunkenness, a poison against thieves, and a pesticide for rats and mice. Curiously, however, thistle tea is used as a folk remedy for stimulating milk production in the U.S. (Baumslag 1986).

8. There are good practical reasons not to throw out corncobs in Ccachín. They are used as scrub brushes, knife handles, and fuel for fires. The sympathetic associations have the effect of reinforcing a practical injunction, but I'm not sure whether they are taken seriously by adults or are intended rather to answer the "whys" of children. In either case, the logic is the same.

9. Tradition has it that the Inca learned the secret of this herb from watching the *hak'achu*, and applied it in their monumental architecture (Morote Best 1988:103). In the 17th century, Padre Antonio de la Calancha wrote that thieves and delinquents at Potosí (Bolivia) used the herb to dissolve stone and metal bars to escape from the jails (ibid.). Venero Gonzales (1987) reports that the plant is often said to be *manka p'aki* (*Eupatorium peregrinum, Eupatorium sternberginianum*), which translates as "broken pot," further extending the metaphorical connections. I suspect that this association of the bird with a magic herb traveled with the Spanish from Europe, where certain woodpeckers were believed to dissolve nails and other obstructions people used to plug their nests with moonwort (a fern) or with "springwort," an herb unknown to humans. The springwort legend appears to originate even further east, where it appears in the Arabian Nights, the Koran, and the Talmud (Armstrong 1970). The association could have been reinvented in various cultures many times, however, from watching the behavior of the birds.

10. I am indebted to one of my students, Liza Perpuse, for pointing me to the relevant medical literature in this regard (Perpuse 1995).

11. According to Baumslag (1986), many of the dietary restrictions on lactating mothers in developing countries around the world are counter to the recommendations of scientific medical practice. Either the scientific community is wrong about the particulars in these instances, or the area of maternal health is one where there is greater gene-culture opposition than one might expect.

12. This raises the question of why in some areas of Peru such galactogogues as beef lung are considered best prepared without salt. Flores Ochoa (1979) reports that in Paratía, Puno women who have recently given birth are urged not to use salt in their food.

13. Protein metabolism in dairy cows is complex and the mechanisms not well understood. While undegraded feed protein is important for milk production, the effect of animal-based supplements with a naturally low protein degradation rate is still not well understood (United Nations 1982). It's important to note that most studies have been conducted on high-yielding commercial cattle breeds rather than on the *criollo* varieties used in peasant production, creating problems of comparability.

14. There are two types of *kanser* in Ccachín, *yuraq kanser* and *puka kanser* (white and red varieties), but I'm not sure whether these correspond to the two kinds of *kanser* in the Cusco area identified by Roersch and Hoogte (1988), *Stachys herrerae* and *Stachys bogotensis*. *Yuraq kanser* was the one used here, and is said by the same informant to be the better of the two for treating liver problems as well. In the Cusco area generally, *kanser* has been reportedly used in the treatment of bruises, scabies, gallstones, inflamation of the uterus, as a disinfectant, antiseptic, and coagulant, to stop hemorrhaging after childbirth, for boils, for skin fungus, and for leishmaniasis.

15. Closer to home, my father reports that when he was growing up on the farm in rural Minnesota in the 1930s and 1940s, his family would apply fresh cow or horse manure to cuts and other wounds that these animals had to draw out infections.

16. Elster suggests that while some decision theorists argue that since we always have some knowledge about the choice situation, it is better to use it to form subjective probability estimates than not to use it at all, the probabilities that are elicited from subjects are unreliable and it's not "rational" to use them as the basis of action (Elster 1989:34). The argument here, however, is not that people form subjective probabilities, but that they chose heuristics that have the best objective probabilities. Dawkins, explains the reasoning this way:

> Fortunately, it is not necessary to assume that survival machines do the sums consciously in their heads. Just as we may use a slide rule without appreciating that we are, in effect, using logarithms, so an animal may be pre-programmed in such a way that it behaves *as if* it had made a complicated calculation.
> This is not so difficult to imagine as it appears. When a man throws a ball high in the air and catches it again, he behaves as if he had solved a set of differential equations in predicting the trajectory of the ball. He may neither know nor care what a differential equation is, but this does not affect his skill with the ball. At some subconscious level, something functionally equivalent to the mathematical equations is going on. Similarly, when a man takes a difficult decision, after

> weighing up the pros and cons, and all the consequences of the decision that he can imagine, he is doing the functional equivalent of a large "weighted sum" calculation, such as a computer might perform. [Dawkins 1989:96]

The heuristics can be quite simple. Dawkins uses the example of genetic relatedness. Such heuristics as "be nice to any member of your species you might meet" (in cases where the probability of being related to an individual in a random encounter is high), or "defend the troop" (where the probability that the degree of genetic relatedness among troop members is high) are plausible. He goes on to makes two other important points. First, there's no end to the progressive refinements that could be made to consider all of the variables relevant to individual instances, but in the real world (where there is a cost to such refinements) we can't expect decision makers to take every last detail into account in coming to an optimal decision. Second, given the generality of the heuristics, "mistakes" may happen outside of normal contexts. In normal settings and averaged over all effects, the mistakes may not be so common as to handicap the heuristic vis-a-vis others. Outsiders, however, may sometimes take advantage of an individual's reliance on the heuristic to manipulate and exploit them against their interests.

17. *Uta* is borne by rodents and marsupials and spread by a sandfly of the *Phlebotomus* family. It is not usually found above 2400 m. (7848 ft.) in the Andes (Gade 1979). Lowland Amazonian forest groups appear to have developed a genetic resistance or immunity to the disease, but the highland Quechua are susceptible. It is contracted when highland villagers migrate to lowland areas. The Inca used purification rites and the bark of the molle tree (*Schinus molle*), but their primary strategy for dealing with it was preventative, based on minimizing disease contact by limiting and managing entry into lowland areas. These avoidance mechanisms were disrupted by the forced labor demands of the Spanish. During the colonial era, mercuric chloride and cauterization of lesions were used to treat the disease, with probable negative effect. In some areas of Latin America, a variety of heated metals, acids, and caustics are still used to treat the disease (Vasquez 1988), but the preferred treatment mode in Ccachín is through the antimonials and antibiotics provided by Western medicine.

Table 4.1: Galactogogues in Peru

Preparation	Ingredients	Location
Amulet	Stone or ceramic representation of cheese	Abancay[6]
Beverage	Beer (dark or malted)	Callao, Lima, Libertad, Lambayeque[1]
Beverage	Donkey's milk	Huáncayo[1]
Beverage	Honey	Cusco[1]
Beverage	Water used to boil corn	Arequipa, Lima[1]
Broth	*Askantuy* larvae (toasted)	Cusco[1,4]
Broth	Earthworms (toasted)	Southern Peru[1]
Broth	Beef lung	Cusco, Huanuco[1,3,5]
Broth	Cow or pig entrails	Callao, Lima, Ica, Libertad[1]
Broth	*Ch'uñu*	Puno[2]
Broth	*Hak'achu* (Andean Flicker)	Cusco, Puno[1,3,5]
Broth	*Pijuayo* (a palm)	Loreto[1]
Broth	Quinoa	Cusco, Huánuco, Puno[1,2,3]
Broth	Quinoa with beef lung	Cusco[3]
Broth	Quinoa with fennel	Arequipa[1]
Broth	Rice	Puno[2]
Broth	Shrimp	Arequipa[1]
Broth	Soybean	(Quebrada) Cusco[3]
Broth	Vegetables	Cusco[3]
Chicha	Corn	Cusco, Huánuco, Junín, Arequipa[1]
Chicha	Corn with mouse excrement	Huancayo, Junín[1]
Chicha	Barley	South and Central Peru[1]

Preparation	Ingredients	Location
Chicha	Peanuts	South and Central Peru[1]
Chicha	Quinoa	South and Central Peru[1]
Cooked	*Arracacha* greens	Huánuco[1]
Cooked	Fennel	Huánuco[1,4]
Cooked	*Manka p'aki* (plant)	Arequipa[1]
Cooked	Quinoa with milk	Yanatile (Cusco)[3]
Cooked	Quinoa with mouse excrement	Junín[1]
Cooked	Rice, chocolate and *chufla*	Northern Peru[1]
Cooked	*Sanandaja* (plant)	Northern Peru[1]
Massage	Quinoa (cooked)	Cusco[1]
Plaster	Sweet potato eyes and wine	
Roasted	Guinea pig excrement and incense	Cusco[1]
Tea	Anise	Cusco, Cajamarca[1,3,4]
Tea	Cotton seed (toasted, ground)	Quebrada (Cusco)[3]
Tea	Fennel seed and roots with honey, celery, and *valeriana*	Cajamarca[3]
Tea	*Manaqaraku* (a jungle bird)	Quebrada (Cusco)[3]
Tea	Milk and toasted sesame	Lima[1]
Tea	Sesame seed	Jauja, Junín[1]
Tea	Sweet potato leaf or tuber	Lima, Quebrada (Cusco)[1,3]
Tea	Wheat (toasted)	Lima[1]
Toasted	Peanuts	Ica[1]

References: 1. Valdizán and Maldonado (1922), 2. Flores Ochoa (1978), 3. *Equipo Coordinador en Medicina Natural Popular* (1983), 4. Avendaño (1988), 5. Lira (1985), 6. Gose (1994).

Table 4.2: Sympathetic and Contagious Magic in Ccachín

Item	Association and Practice
Miniature Representations	A variety of small stone carvings and naturally-formed stones — *qonopa*, *enqa*, *illa*, *khuya* — are used in rituals in Ccachín to represent animals and crops, to communication with the spirits, and to promote fertility and abundance. The *t'anta wawa* ('bread babies') associated with All Souls Day fit into this category as well. During the pilgrimage of Qoyllur Rit'i, pilgrims construct miniature representations of their dreams with stones — corrals, herds, buildings, fields — and purchase miniature trucks, houses, foodstuffs, etc. to be blessed by the priests. Monumental architecture and reshaped landscapes have long been used by ruling elites in the Andes to appropriate space, organize social relations, and signal their capacity for control and power (De Marrais et. al. 1996). Miniatures representations are accessible to commoners and are an important and ubiquitous means for attempting to materialize their goals (see also Flores Ochoa 1977).
Left-Spun Yarn	*Lloq'e* (S-twist, clockwise, left-spun yarn) is believed to protect one from witchcraft and evil winds in Ccachín. Left-spun yarn is both associated and used as an antidote to sorcery (*lloq'e* means 'left'; the verb *lloq'ey* means 'to hex'). Most women incorporate a small bit of *lloq'e* into all of their weavings. It's considered essential in the clothing woven for the inauguration of new community officials.
Andean Condor	There's a belief that if a condor (*Vultur gryphus*) flies over the village cemetery, someone will soon die. Condor feathers are ground and used in a tea to treat chronic coughs and other respiratory illnesses thought to be caused by evil winds ("*soq'a wayra*").
Blowing Air	*Phukuy* means 'to blow'. People sometimes blow against the rain when it threatens important agricultural labor parties (*ayni* and *mink'a*). People also blow over their coca to direct its *sami* (essence) to the mountain spirits (see Allen 1988 for discussion).
House Flies	Tradition has it that when *chiririnqa* (flies that lay eggs in meat) enter a house where there is no meat, it's a sign that one of the family's horses or other animals has died, or that someone will soon die.
Black-Chested Buzzard Eagle	The talons of the *anka* (*Geranoaetus melanoleucus*) are sometimes braided into the ropes that men make to lasso cattle to improve their aim. The ropes are braided on the "good days" of Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Saturday for success. The *anka* hunts animals up to the size of a *viscacha*.

Coca Reading	The shape, condition, and relation of coca leaves relative to each other where they fall are used in divination to represent age, sex, relationship, emotional states, illnesses and health, and activities according to metaphoric likenesses. Fright, for example, is represented by serrated edges, and death, is represented by the tip broken away from the rest of the leaf as the soul separates from the body (Ossio Acuña et. al. 1989).
Twelve Yarns with the Colors of the Rainbow	The rainbows that form around waterfalls, cascades, and springs are believed to cause *k'uychi onqoy* ('rainbow sickness') in Ccachín. The rainbow enters a woman's body while she is urinating, and cause her abdomen to swell as if she were pregnant. A diagnostic feature is that the urine takes on the colors of the rainbow. To treat it, twelve colors of wool yarn are toasted and ground together (according to my informants, synthetic yarn doesn't work) . A tea or broth is made of the powder, and this is given to the patient. Lira (1985) reports that a) the yarns are combined with a palm blessed on Palm Sunday before burning, b) old fragments of clothing from the images of the saints are added if possible, c) the tea or broth is made with water blessed in the church, and d) the remedy should be taken on Tuesdays and Fridays. He refers to the treatment as "*santo remedio*." The twelve yarns are also associated with distinct illnesses arising out of human passions, and are tied around various parts of the body to counteract sorcery.
Extraordinary Products from the Earth	*Wanlla*, specimens of agricultural products, minerals, and precious metals with outstanding quality or unusual characteristics, are wrapped with coca leaves and set aside for veneration. They are associated with the *pachamama* ('earth mother') and referred to by their specific forms: *saramama* ('corn mother'), *cocamama* ('coca mother'), etc. They have the power to engender themselves in abundance (see Silverblatt 1987 for discussion).
Burning Hair	To prevent hair from being used in malicious magic by sorcerers, the hair combed out of one's head and the hair cut from children at their first-haircutting is thrown into the hearth fire.
Coca Wads	*Hach'u*, the wads of chewed coca in *hallpa*, are associated with animal manure, and are buried during fertility rituals and first-haircutting ceremonies to enhance the fertility of the herds.
Trapping Mice	Villagers say that one will catch more mice if one sets the mousetraps in the morning, when one is hungry.

Table 4.3: Hot and Cold Classification in Ccachín

Quechua Name	Scientific Name	Hot-Cold	Medicinal Use
ch'ikllur	*Vallea stipularis*	hot	sore throat, ear infection, itchy skin
ch'illka	*Baccharis* spp.	hot	
chachak'uma	*Escallonia resinosa*	hot	
chanchi		cold	bruise, sore throat, stomach ache, tooth ache
eucalyptus	*Eucalyptus globulus*	hot	
kanser	*Stachys* spp.	cold	wounds, liver
kapuli	*Prunus serotina*; *Prunus salicifolia*	hot	diarrhea, vomiting, fever, flu
kisa		hot	
kuka (*coca*)	*Erythroxylon coca*	hot	toothache, wounds
linaza	*Linum usitatissimun*	cold	
lisas		cold	
llantén	*Plantago hirtella*	cold	
mullak'a	*Malenbeckia volcanica*	cold	inflammations, bodily aches and pains, headaches, alcohol consumption
muña	*Minthostachys spicata*	hot	
mut'uy	*Casseria hookeriana*	cold	diarrhea, vomiting, head aches, toothaches
oqa oqa	*Oxalis* spp.	cold	inflammation
pinku pinku	*Ephredea* spp.	cold	cough
raki raki	*Dryopteris* spp.	cold	splinters, wounds
salvia		hot	
taruka ninri		cold	pneumonia
yerbabuena		hot	stomach ache

Table 4.4: Humoral Medicine in Ccachín

Principle of Opposites

Hot Sources/Cold Remedies

Illness	Description	Source of Illness	Treatment	Notes
Colerina		Anger	Tea of orange seeds or lemon seeds	
Dolor de barriga	Stomachache	Sun-dried beef jerky or chocolate	Brew of ground *mut'uy* leaves	
Dolor de barriga			Soup of *yana*, *mora*, and *mari kisa* (nettles), *paraqay* (corn) and white sugar.	White sugar is best, but brown sugar will do if white is unavailable.
Dolor de barriga			Chew *chanchi* leaves	
Dolor de barriga		Too much alcohol	Brew of *chillurumay* or *sano sano*	
Dolor de cabeza	Headache	Anger	Tea of citrus fruit, papaya, and parsley	
Dolor de cabeza			Egg white, wine, and/or orange slices applied to forehead and back of neck	Chicken eggs work best. Duck eggs provide "less nutrition"
Gripe	Flu with fever, vomiting, diarrhea	Heat ("*Calormanta*")	Paste of white-tipped cabbage leaves applied over stomach area	
Gripe	Cough		Brew of *pinku pinku*, *qomu qomu*, broad beans, and alcohol	
Inflamación	Inflamed heart		Parsley tea	
Riñones	Back problems	Carrying heavy weight	Linseed or *paqpa* tea	
Rasca Rasca	Skin fungus/rash	Sun	Bath of *chillurumay*	

Qoñi impachu	Stomachache ("hot indigestion")		Tea of *mut'uy* or *verbena*, or rub of *mut'uy* leaves	

Cold Sources/Hot Remedies

Illness	Description	Source of Illness	Treatment	Notes
	Diarrhea		*Payqo* tea	
	Diarrhea		*Verbena* juice	
Dolor de barriga	Stomachache	*Chicha* (corn beer)	Chew coca or smoke cigarette	
Chiri impachu	Stomachache	*chicharrón* (fried pork)	Tea of *salvia* or *yerbabuena* (mint)	Some people have "cold stomachs" and can't handle cold foods.
	Sore throat		*Gargle with coca tea*	
	Muscle pain	Wind ("*Wayramanta*")	Body rub with nettles, or with heated mixture of aloe vera and tobacco juice	
	Muscle pain	Wind ("*Wayramanta*")	Cupping with a shot glass or heated pig hooves. Container or aching area flash heated with burning alcohol	Alcohol sometimes mixed with herbs (unknown herbs).
	Toothache		Paste of siwulla siwulla (wild onion) applied to outside of cheek	

Principle of Avoidance of Opposites

Hot Sources/Hot Remedies

Illness	Description	Source of Illness	Treatment	Notes
Gripe		Heat ("*Calormanta*")	Hot bath of *kapuli*, eucalyptus, and *markhu* to draw out the fever, followed by a tea of *mut'uy*, wheat, *qhana* or *yuraq patayoq kuli*s (cabbage)	Coffee and *trago* are hot and should not be taken when one has a flu from a hot source, however, when *mut'uy* is added to the coffee, it is then OK to drink.
Gripe			Brew of balsam, rosemary, salt, and alcohol	Urine can be substituted for alcohol to treat children.

Mixed Hot-Cold Treatments

Illness	Description	Source of Illness	Treatment	Notes
Dolor de barriga	Stomachache		Tea of *mut'uy* and *salvia*	
Golpe de pie	Bruise on the leg	Fall	Paste of *chanchi*, ground wheat, and alcohol	
Gripe	Flu	Heat ("*Calormanta*")	Brew of toasted and ground peanuts, cacao, and beans	All ingredients except beans are hot
Gripe	Flu	Heat ("*Calormanta*")	*Sasawi*	Informant not sure of hot-cold value of *sasawi*.
Gripe	Flu with fever and vomiting		Body rub of *yuraq añaypunku*, *mut'uy*, and chicha	
	Sore throat		Tea of *chanchi*, lemon, and alcohol	

Chapter 5

Seasonal Dispositions in Theft and Thatch

Introduction

Crop and animal theft are serious problems in Ccachín. Animal theft is the most worrisome of the two for villagers because of the high values at stake, but crop theft is more common. The problem of theft goes beyond animals and crops, however. Clothing, household equipment, stores of food and seeds, personal documents, and fences, corral gates, and doors are stolen. Ccachín is neither alone nor unusual among Andean communities in this regard.

Research on theft is important for what it can tell us about rational choice and the moral economy of Andean peasants. Theft is of central concern to rural Andeans and creates problems for economic development. Practical solutions to problems must follow from adequate explanation.

My goals in this chapter are to 1) present my data on theft and the efforts made to secure and defend one's belongings from theft in Ccachín, 2) identify the patterns that theft in the village takes, the underlying motivations, and the reasons why theft is so prevalent with particular goods in certain areas at specific times of the year, and 3) explore the extent that these patterns can be explained by rational choice theory, or alternatively, some theory of nonrational processes. In particular, I evaluate Gose's (1994) suggestion that theft may be better understood as an outgrowth of seasonal oppositions in Andean cultural logic rather than a confluence of desire and opportunity. I conclude that while emotion, expressive motivations, and normative expectations are clearly involved, practical reason predominates.

Theft

Theft as an Institution

Researchers who have addressed the topic of theft in the Andes tend to fall into one of two camps. On the one hand, there are those who emphasize the functional or integrative aspects of theft in Andean society or culture. On the other, there are those who emphasize its dysfunctional aspects. The first take the perspective that theft is an aspect of social organization, the second take theft to be a sign of disorganization or institutional breakdown.

As an example of the first perspective, Stein writes that:

> Stealing, as long as it remains anonymous, is an accepted and socially patterned method of aggression in relations outside the immediate family in a society where most nonanonymous and overt expressions of hostility (except at festive drinking bouts) are inhibited by fear of retaliation. [Stein 1961:166]

The key words here are "accepted" and "socially-patterned." Gose goes further to say that:

> Once the crops become officially consumable after Carnival, they undergo a radical change in status from an object of interhousehold cooperation to an object of private appropriation by individual households. In many parts of the Andes, this is vividly expressed during Easter, which corresponds approximately to the onset of the killing frosts. Andean people say that both the earth and God die during Holy Week, and that it is permissible to steal crops from their neighbors at this time because God does not see. While such theft may become particularly intensive and almost ritualized during Holy Week, it in fact continues right up until the harvest. Indeed, institutionalized crop theft at this time of year has been reported widely throughout the Andes, and is (paradoxically) every bit as much a social fact as is the intensive cooperation that precedes it. [Gose 1991:46]

The terms to note here are "institutionalized," "ritualized," and "social fact."

As an example of the second perspective, we have Gade's (1970:3) description of theft as a "form of social disorganization." Further, he suggests that:

> Theft is a symptom rather than a cause of a malfunctioning land-use system. The reduction of serious food theft in Sierra communities ultimately becomes a matter of changing the peasants' assessment of their resources and those of their neighbors. An essential first step in the alteration of peasant perception would be to provide a significant agricultural surplus and thus banish the specter of hunger, a

task that would involve a major reorganization of the prevailing economy. [Gade 1970:14]

By Gade's account, theft is a form of social disorganization that is symptomatic of a malfunctioning system.

I think that we are better off not applying the terms "ritualized" and "institutionalized" to crop theft, as they cover too much semantic space, and give free reign to the temptation to imply more than the evidence can support. A description of theft as a "social fact," given the pedigree of the term, is equally ambiguous. In everyday language, a "ritual" may be "*any* practice or pattern of behavior regularly performed in a set manner," or it may be "a prescribed *code of behavior* regulating social conduct." An "institution" may be "*any* familiar, long-established person, thing, or practice," or it may be "a well-established and structured pattern of behavior or of relationships that *is accepted as a fundamental part of a culture*, as marriage: the institution of the family" (Random House 1996, emphasis added).[1] If these terms are to have any theoretical significance, then the narrow meanings are the applicable ones, and I take the authors above to be saying as much.

I have no problem with Stein's description of theft in the Andes as "socially-patterned," as the term doesn't imply anything more than that there is an interdependency of decisions between two or more parties in such situations. The challenge is to specify what these interdependencies are. I also see no problem with Stein's description of stealing as an "accepted" pattern of aggression as long as it remains anonymous. The observation may be right or wrong, but it is sufficiently precise to be testable, and it tells us about one of the interdependencies referred to above. It is not hard to imagine situations where a suspected behavior will be tolerated as long as it covert, but once revealed, people feel compelled by social pressure to respond, and their response sets a whole chain of sanctions and countersanctions in motion. It should be noted, however, that in terms of "social acceptability," the observation that stealing that remains anonymous is accepted concedes a lot, as it suggests that stealing is a violation of some social

norm. Also, separating "acceptance" from "uncertainty" about the facts can be a significant methodological problem. For rational actors, the costs of detecting or punishing thieves are sometimes higher than the benefits received, and we should not confuse reticence to bear these costs with "acceptance."

Theft is rarely acceptable to the *comuneros* in their role as potential or actual victims, and most everyone takes special steps to avoid it at exactly those times, such as Holy Week, during which some ethnographers say it is most socially acceptable. Presumably many thieves, especially repeat offenders, consider their own actions acceptable, though their personal norms may differ from their sense of community norms and from what they expect of others. For some, however, personal and community norms may coincide and their actions may be more a case of weakness of will. If caught, thieves typically justify their actions to others by individuating circumstances that exempt them from the wider norms, and we might suspect that they justify their actions in the same way to themselves. When Stein talks about the acceptability of theft, I assume that he means that there are individuating circumstances that are convincing to the majority of *comuneros* in the position of disinterested bystanders, people who are neither victims nor agents of such acts, nor their immediate relatives.

Gade offers a couple of salient reasons that exempt: equity — "anyone can feel morally justified if they rob those who have more land and agricultural production," and reciprocity — "Theft is an important form to express hostility against members of the same community or between communities. Frequently, it closes a cycle because those that have been victimized feel justified to steal the crops of the supposed thief" (Gade 1970:6). I note, however, that when I asked *comuneros* in Ccachín why fellow villagers stole, the most common responses were laziness ("*pereza*"), maliciousness ("*mala gente*"), and capriciousness ("*una prueba*," 'a test', 'an experiment'). The first two were used in reference to recidivists and malfeasants — people who had a reputation as thieves in the community — while the third was most often used in reference to the young, who were said to steal to see what they could get away with. *Pereza* is considered a serious failing by villagers. It is cited by the better off to explain economic inequities as well,

and the same act that might be justified as "taking from the haves" by the takers is usually explained as "laziness" by their victims. Seeing what one can get away with, on the other hand, though troubling to the victims, is partially excused by the inexperience of youth.[2] The virtues of equity and reciprocity are most often cited when push comes to shove, when thieves are detected and feel called upon to justify their behavior. The rest of the community does not naturally provide the justification for them.

The penalties for theft depended on the motivations of the thief and the status of the victim during the reign of the Inca (Gade 1970). If crops were taken for immediate consumption while traveling, there was no penalty. If the theft was more substantial, but the thief was indigent, they would be forgiven, while the authorities responsible for their condition would be sanctioned. If the thief was judged to be motivated by malice or laziness, more severe penalties were applied, ranging from beating to death. If the theft was in one of the fields set aside for the Inca or the Cult of the Sun, the penalty was almost certain death. The Inca welfare and sanctioning systems broke down after the Conquest, but it seems to me that the conditions that mitigate and exempt a thief from the wrath and retribution of the victims and fellow villagers codified during Inca rule generally continue to hold true. It goes beyond my data to conclude from this, however, that theft is socially acceptable, even at certain times of the year. It's more accurate to say, as Gade (1970:6) prudently does, that theft is "socially expectable."

Because theft is expected whatever the season, people expend time and material resources to avoid becoming victims. The extent to which they will defend their goods and pursue and castigate thieves depends first on the costs and benefits of doing so, and second, on the outrage they feel. To the extent that it is the latter, they may violate the strict canons of rationality defined in Part 2. And to the extent that they let emotion rather than reason sway them, their willingness to punish may contribute to the public good (Frank 1988). I saw no indication that indignation and outrage in the face of theft was seasonally circumscribed in Ccachín. Rather, as thefts increase, tensions between households and fights in the fields increase as well. I would replace the idea that theft is socially acceptable with the idea that it is often "tolerated" in practice. Bound together in

multistranded relationships, people have to consider the costs of responding to theft not only in terms of the costs of their relationship to the thief when he or she is known, but with reference to the wider social costs as well. Following Blurton Jones (1984, 1987), we can say that there is a lot of tolerated theft in Ccachín.[3]

The Seasonality of Theft

Earlier in this chapter, I cited a quote from Gose indicating that Andeans believe that God dies during Holy Week. Much is made, by natives and social scientists alike, of the belief that there exists a window of opportunity during Holy Week during which a thief can escape supernatural detection. As Gade describes it,

> In accord with popular Quechua belief, one that is also held by the Aymara, God is literally dead on Good Friday. Since according to folk logic punishment can't be imposed by a dead person, free reign was given to their thieving impulses by many people. Peasant families were exceptionally vigilant during this period. [Gade 1970:4]

From a cognitive standpoint, this belief provides clues about how people attempt to follow beliefs to their logical consequences and attempt to harmonize them in their minds. In terms of decision making, the belief can be framed in turns of rational choice: while the consequences of stealing are always probabilistic, for a limited time, the subjective probability of supernatural punishment for thievery is believed to approach zero. On the other hand, Gose suggests that the belief is not so much about instrumental rationality as about symbolic order:

> With the 'crucifixion' of the maize by the frost, the moral order of cooperative Christianity based on relations of *ayni* and *compadrazgo* seems to die as well, and is replaced by an opposed social value that has already been on the rise: that of the individual household as an autonomous unit of private appropriation. [Gose 1991:46]

Accordingly, Gose draws a metaphor between supernatural, natural, and social crucifixions, and finds that the belief that God is not looking during Holy Week marks a seasonal change in Andean's focus from collective production to private appropriation. From his

perspective, the belief is part of a cyclical-calendrical system that regulates cooperative dispositions.

As various ethnographers have noted, from Carnival onwards, Andean households become increasingly concerned with protecting the crops in their fields from theft and damage by wild animals and domestic stock. They have good reason: as the crops mature, their produce is increasingly attractive to animals and thieves, and increasingly susceptible to appropriation by both. In Ccachín, Holy Week generally falls in the midst of the *maway* harvest. The fields are conveniently close to the community and contain *lisa*, *oqa*, squash, and other crops that are particularly valued by both their owners and thieves. There is a considerable amount of petty theft at this time. Crop theft, however, reaches a crescendo after Easter, in May, in the corn fields, when the potato harvest is in full swing, leaving the ripening corn, the most attractive crop for thieves, relatively unprotected.

While the idea that there is a time when "God does not see" might seem to be a case of what Edgerton (1985) calls "occasions that exempt," a class of cyclical-calendrical rites that include "rules about exceptions to rules," I have already argued that theft is never socially approved. Supernatural punishment may be held in suspense, but human-made rules continue in vigor, and their violation continues to exact a social penalty. It is neither a time where ordinary rules about property are held in abeyance, nor a period of general license. It's hard to say whether this apparent loophole in religious proscription during Holy Week has any motivational role in theft at harvest-time, or is a kind of "just-so story" told by Andeans to explain the seasonal rise of theft among themselves. I heard little reference to the belief in Ccachín, but it's possible that it was more salient in the past, and has been largely lost in the course of religious change. It's also possible that the belief continues to be held by those who most act in accord with and benefit from it, but that it's difficult to elicit the information. Most thieves deny wrong-doing; they don't explain their motivations.

Going to more tangible evidence, some wire fencing was stolen on one Good Friday while I was in Ccachín, prompting community officials to go door-to-door looking

for it (Case 29, Table 5.1). But I found no indication that theft was more prevalent or households more vigilant over the three-day period from Good Friday to Easter than at any other time during the harvest season. Since ethnographic reports from other communities indicate that whatever breakdown there is in supernatural constraint is countered by an increase in physical vigilance, I see no reason to expect an increase in theft during Holy Week. Given the belief, theft would increase if all other things were equal, but not all other things are equal. With increased vigilance, there may be an actual reduction in theft, or the two effects may cancel each other out.

In considering the motivational effects of the belief that God literally dies on Good Friday and therefore cannot hold people accountable for their actions, we should be careful not to assign the religious proscription "thou shall not steal" and the corresponding threat of eternal damnation more weight than it is due. As Gade (1970:4) points out, "In spite of Catholicism's success in religious conversion, and with supernatural sanctions at hand, the Spanish weren't able to inculcate a strong ethic against the illicit appropriation of private property." Momentary suspension of the religious injunction will have little impact on those who are not significantly persuaded by the fear of divine sanctions in the first place.

We should not lose sight of the other sanctions — both social and supernatural — and the ethical beliefs that continue in full vigor during Holy Week (Catholicism is but one aspect of Andean religion). These continue to serve as a constraint on people's impulses. It could be that the threat of supernatural sanctions constrains little, or not at all. The belief may or may not be functional in the social sense. While one can imagine scenarios by which it could be functionally explained, it could just as readily emerge from wishful thinking or a craving for justice, a justice rarely found in a material world. It should be noted, however, that to the extent that supernatural sanctions constrain behavior, they do so because people act instrumentally. It's not evidence of expressive behavior nor of normative motivations. It's simply evidence that Andeans do not conceive of well-defined limits to the material world. While a religious argument, it's not a moral one. The calculus of afterlife costs and benefits is readily assumed under rational

choice explanation, with the stream of material payoffs extended indefinitely. We can expect that the fear of supernatural punishment will be subject to some of the same predispositions — in particular, the tendency to discount for the future — that have been identified by psychologists as general judgement mechanisms affecting decision making in general. One might inquire into the origin and rationality of the underlying beliefs about supernatural cause and effect, but formed as they are under conditions of utmost uncertainty, once these beliefs are given, the means-ends relation that follows is that of rational action.

Theft Prevention

Theft is a covert activity and difficult to study directly. Theft prevention, on the other hand, is overt and ubiquitous; the openness, in fact, contributes to the efforts to dissuade. Researchers of Andean culture and society offer various explanations for theft, both rational and nonrational, but they usually take for granted that the prevention of theft is instrumentally rational, that the risks of theft are accurately accessed, and that the costs borne and energy that goes into preventing theft are proportional to expected levels of theft. Just as investigators take the absence of doors on houses as a sign of a low rate of theft during the Inca era (Kendall 1973), contemporary security measures are taken to indicate the breakdown of a preexisting moral and institutional order.

Given the visibility of security measures and their value as an indicator of people's concern about theft, a good place to start talking about theft in Ccachín is with the measures taken to prevent it. Gade (1970) lists a variety of practices adopted to prevent theft in Andean communities, and I have summarized them in Table 5.2. All of these practices can be observed in Ccachín, and my conversations with villagers suggest that all but the fifth one — selection of small seed potatoes — are consciously intended to avert theft.

Locks are used on doors and windows of people's principal residences in Ccachín, and they are often used to secure the doors of their outlying cabins as well. This latter contrasts, for example, with the custom in the Basque region of Northern Spain, where

one of the rules of the commons was that people could neither lock nor improve (for example, with the addition of tile roofs) their herding cabins. Such cabins needed to be open to others for emergency shelter (Echegaray 1928). Crops are not only stored in locked rooms in Ccachín, they are stored in the attic or second floor of the buildings where families sleep, facilitating vigilance. When tubers and grain need to be dried in the sun, they're left in a discrete but exposed space — an adjoining corral, an unfinished building, a dilapidated structure — to avoid the inconvenience of spreading them out in the sun and retrieving them each day, but people worry about the increased risk. In Table 5.1, I list a variety of cases of theft that occurred while I was in the village. The corn in Case 7 and the linseed in Case 19 of Table 5.1 disappeared from an unroofed house and a second story balcony respectively while drying. During the week or two after harvest when corn is spread out to dry in the fields, a family member spends the nights with it. Just as fences are capped off with cactus or thorny plants, thorns are also spread over drying produce to impede animals and thieves. All of these measures are deterrents rather than guarantees. The linseed in Case 19 was taken from the balcony in broad daylight despite being covered with thorns, and the items in Cases 8 and 24 were taken from locked but unattended homes.

Not only prized varieties of corn, but grains and garden produce may be planted in a cornfield to hide them from thieves. As one *comunero* described the dilemma to me, if one plants strawberries, cabbages, lettuce, and other uncommon crops in one's garden, the risk of theft is great, because everyone in the village can see what one has planted. If one hides such crops amidst the corn in a distant cornfield, the probability that they will be found is less, but if they are discovered, the loss is more likely to be complete. My informant, who liked to experiment, solved the problem by planting exotics in a plot of corn that few others knew was his rather than in the plot that everyone was familiar with.

The fifth item in Table 5.2 — selection of relatively small seed potatoes — is standard practice in Ccachín, but I have no indication that avoidance of theft during the planting season enters into people's decision making about seed selection. Gade's association of tuber size with fear of theft in potato planting is based on the testimony of

his informants, specifically that of three informants south of Sicuani who felt that the possibility of theft of newly seeded potatoes was very real (Gade 1998, personal communication). It's unclear how widespread the conditions are in which the task of disinterring planted potatoes is economically rational, but it's plausible that under the right circumstances, such theft takes place. Even when not economically rational, some cases could be motivated by mischievousness or spite. This is another decision making domain where several factors are likely at play, and there may be geographic and temporal variation. Zosimo Huamán, of the International Potato Center, suggests that the primary reason that *campesinos* plant small tubers is that they use the larger ones for subsistence and market purposes (Huamán, personal communication 1998).[4]

The majority of families in Ccachín have rustic cabins in the corn and potato sectors where they can spend the nights during the harvests. These cabins are multipurpose: they reduce travel time to the fields during labor peaks, they double as herding cabins when a field is in fallow, and they serve to monitor and deter theft. While some agricultural produce is left at these cabins for on-site consumption, they are generally not used as storehouses; they are unattended through much of the year and therefore more susceptible to theft. Since the potato sector rotates from year to year and no one has a permanent structure in every sector, temporary huts are constructed of sticks and bunch grass a few weeks prior to the harvest by those in need of temporary housing. Usually, most families will spend the month of May in the potato sector and June in the corn sector, leaving someone in the village residence to look after the house. The distance between corn and potato sectors, in combination with the overlap in ripening times, makes it difficult to effectively monitor both crops at once. Theft of corn is highest during the potato harvest, when most of the community has relocated to the highlands, as it is easier to escape detection.

Unlike in some Andean communities, there are no full-time communally-appointed field guardians in Ccachín. In Q'ero, for example, *arariwa* are expected to live in the field during their term of office. To ease the burden, they have a number of helpers, the position is rotated annually, and they are compensated with bounty from the harvest

by all who have crops in the area (Flores Ochoa and Fries 1989). In Ccachín, the *varayoq* ('staff-of-office-holders') have a part-time role in monitoring crop damage and capturing thieves. In exceptional situations — in response to a complaint, when a cow or horse dies in the hills, or when the potential for theft is otherwise high — the *varayoq* sometimes spend the night watching over crops or animals. The *arariwa* of Q'ero are responsible for protecting the harvest from animal and human predators and from the forces of nature, and the role of the *varayoq* in Ccachín is much more limited. With regard to human predation, they have a similar, though correspondingly reduced, deterrent effect.

Theft influences residence decisions in Ccachín, but it is difficult to determine the overall weight people assign to it. The need to live in a central location to reduce travel time to several ecological levels, a desire to be close to the school so that the children can receive a formal education, the herding requirements of a mix of domestic stock (the mix itself partially determined by the extent and character of theft), family size, and other factors all played a role. The dangers associated with theft push residence in two directions. On the one hand, fear of crop and animal theft tends to spread family members over the village landscape so that a nightly vigil can be maintained over dispersed crops and herds. On the other hand, wherever there is a significant risk of violence, people seek safety in numbers and retreat from isolated cabins. Residence in the hills is associated with both physical and spiritual dangers. During my fieldwork and immediately preceding it, several people living in outlying cabins in Ccachín and neighboring communities were attacked by thieves. A few were killed. People tend to locate their herding cabins within sight of each other for safety.

There are other practices that could be added to Gade's list. One of the most important is dog ownership. Dogs in Ccachín are not trained to herd, but their barks are important in warning of the presence of predators and prowlers. The dogs are generally mean and unpredictable, adding one more obstacle for would-be-thieves to contend with. Virtually all dogs in Ccachín are undernourished. There is a cost in maintaining them, a cost that if not born could be readily invested in pigs. As village scavengers and consumers of low-quality potatoes and table scraps, the ecological niches of dogs and pigs

overlap. People cook for both, consuming scarce firewood in so doing, but not with equal cheer. Dogs may play an important deterrent role, but their value is indirect and not readily measurable. Pigs, on the other hand, have recognizable and easily calculable economic, nutritional, and festive value (they bring a good price when sold, and roast pig is an important food on All Saints Day and at certain other ritual occasions). This difference is not lost on some women, who complain about how much work it is to cook for the family dog — which they can't eat — in contrast to the satisfaction they get from cooking for the pigs.

It is hard to determine the extent to which people forego productive activities, investments, and agropastoral experimentation out of fear that the results of their efforts will be taken from them, but some *comuneros* told me that it wasn't worth it to plant certain crops because they had tried in the past and had lost everything to thieves. *Comuneros* who have a reputation for innovation are the most likely to have such problems, suggesting that theft can depress any tendency for innovation. Seibold (1990) talks of the Quechua cultural ideal of not drawing attention to oneself, and in some domains this behavior may be not so much etiquette as security. If one has two special hybrid pigs, for example, as the director of the school had, one is in constant fear that they will be taken. If one has common creole pigs, they are the same as everyone else's, and one assumes that they will be less likely to be singled out as targets. The principle holds whether talking about crops, animals, or technologies. There is a safety in numbers, security in doing what others do.

It is hard to determine the opportunity cost of the time invested in monitoring for theft, because other things can be done at the same time. If someone stays behind to keep an eye on the house in the village while others are in the corn fields, they may use the time for weaving, cleaning, or tool production. While a productive use of time, the time could be more productively used if theft were not a concern. Also, the production resulting from this time often enters into the household budget in a different way. In many families, for example, crops and weaving enter into different mental accounts and are not directly comparable, as the money earned for them are earmarked for different

things. Accordingly, the alternative uses of time may be a source of intrafamily conflict. Travel time expended for the purpose of protecting dispersed holdings is simply lost. Theft tends to be highest when labor demands in the fields are also highest, and villagers would allocate household labor in different ways if the threat of theft could be reduced.

It is hard to estimate the amount of interhousehold cooperation that takes place in detecting and deterring theft. Large-scale societies have developed formal neighborhood associations and block groups to share the monitoring responsibilities that take place at an informal level in small-scale ones. Most monitoring exchange takes place among close relatives in Ccachín. Neighbors and *compadres* may also be asked to keep an eye on one's place while one is away. They are less likely than family members to be given a key or asked to stay, but they are often well-situated to keep a look out. In general, people report suspicious activities and frighten off thieves by their presence and vigilance. There may be some free-riding in this regard (some may fail to act for fear of the costs and consequences of getting involved), but many do. Case 12 of Table 5.1 was an instance in which thieves abandoned the goods because they were disrupted in flight, and I documented several attempted thefts that do not appear in the table because the thieves were frightened before they were able to carry out their plans.

Reasons for Theft

Economic, psychological, and cultural factors are cited by investigators to explain theft in the Andes. The first include subsistence needs and market opportunities, the second includes a preoccupation with scarcity, the expression of hostility, and revenge, and the third includes normative considerations, exceptions, and contradictions in beliefs. I will consider each in turn.

Economic Motives

Long ago, Marcus Aurelius observed that "poverty is the mother of crime." There are limits to the generalization, but if the Andes can be taken as our guide, there's

considerable truth to it too. Necessity is the most frequently mentioned economic motive for theft cited by researchers working on this issue in the Andes.

Stein (1961) finds that subsistence needs play an important role in motivating theft. Such needs may even be exacerbated by the consequences of theft itself, as in a case he cites of a villager who stole some goods to repay what he owed for a previous theft after he had been caught. Since the identity of the thieves is so rarely determined in cases of crop theft, I have insufficient supporting evidence to establish that those poor in land and produce are most likely to steal from those with more resources than they, or that many of those that steal do so to make up for shortfalls in their subsistence production. I expect, however, that both are true. To some extent, this is implicit in the *comuneros*' explanation of theft as "*pereza*," as villagers associate being "lazy" with producing less. In many cases, it also follows from the types and quantities of crops taken, as these more closely fit the pattern of meeting subsistence shortfalls than they do the economics of marketing.

The two kinds of crops subject to theft in Ccachín are the principal staples/cash crops — corn and potatoes — which are large and easily harvested, and special garden crops such as strawberries, cabbage, and onions, which are uncommon in the village, require a lot of labor to produce, and are highly prized. It's clear that instrumental concerns enter into the kinds of produce and the location of fields targeted. Cereal crops such as wheat and quinoa, which require more labor upon harvest, are rarely stolen in the field, and are thus subject to less vigilance (Gade 1970). However, their compactness makes them prime targets for theft from balconies and storehouses once harvested.

Corn ranks above potatoes as the crop of choice for thieves in Ccachín. Corn is valued by all for daily subsistence, for alcoholic consumption during rituals, and for its market value. Unlike the potato fields, which are located in the common property sectors and which can be augmented by land grants from the community when a household has a subsistence need, new corn land is hard to come by, and there is pronounced variation in the size of holdings. Residents of the *anexo* of Qochayoq have no plots in the corn sectors at all. Corn then, is in high demand, and with the cover the stalks provide to

anyone seeking to avoid detection while stealing and the ease with which it is harvested even at night, theft of corn is common.

From an economic perspective, whose fields are targeted should depend on the ease of harvesting and escaping detection, rather than on the characteristics of the field owners per se. This contrasts with the social reasons for theft, which should specify targets based on the personal characteristics and relations rather than environmental and material opportunity. To the extent that theft is economically motivated, it's not whose field one steals from that matters, but that one can pilfer there risk free. The size and location of fields, nearness to outlying structures, and absence of a field's owner are important factors in avoiding detection. With an eye to avoiding punishment, crop theft has advantages over other kinds of theft. Crops stolen from the fields are not easily identifiable and recoverable, because, in contrast to manufactured objects, they lack marks to identify ownership (Gade 1970).

Explanation in terms of economic necessity is implicit in Gade's suggestion that the first step toward reducing theft is to reorganize the rural economy to provide a significant agricultural surplus and eliminate the specter of hunger, thereby changing people's assessment of their resources relative to their neighbors. While economic necessity may be an important motive for theft in the Andes, it is not the only economic motive, and the extent to which theft could be reduced if people's subsistence needs were met is an open question. There is more to changing the peasants' assessment of their resources relative to those of their neighbors than banishing the specter of hunger, and in any case, social referents are but one aspect of theft. Without countervailing moral or material incentives, an incentive to steal exists whatever one's social position vis-à-vis one's neighbors.

When Gade first wrote about theft in 1970, the cash economy was not as consequential in the Andean countryside as it is today. The expansion of markets has affected theft in at least three ways: agricultural products and other goods have become more readily convertible into cash, evidence has become more easily concealed as the stolen goods go through multiple hands and are transferred out of the community, and with

increasing opportunities and wider social referents, new wants have been created and prevailing notions of necessity have been transformed. Victims of theft and the community officials who receive their complaints in Ccachín are rarely sanguine about the prospects of recovering stolen property. Their first assumption is usually not that the goods have been hidden or eaten, but that they has been sold. Likewise, the *comuneros* most often characterized by others as thieves in Ccachín are not among the poorest households, but rather, among those most attracted to modern consumer goods (western clothing, radios, car batteries, musical instruments, and the like), items that if not stolen directly (as exemplified by Cases 1 and 26 of Table 5.1), must be purchased with cash.

Crop theft is common in the Andes because agricultural goods are valued either in themselves or for their resale value, because crop theft is a relatively low risk activity, and because the combination of self constraint and informal and organizational sanctions are not sufficient to reduce it. If any of these variables change, so that the benefits of stealing agricultural produce relative to engaging in other income-producing activities declines, or the costs to thieves increase — the incidence of crop theft will correspondingly decline. However, it's possible to conceive of a reduction in crop theft without an overall reduction — measured in number of incidents or in monetary value — of theft in rural Andean communities. With changing economic conditions, theft may be merely displaced to more lucrative targets. The production of a significant agricultural surplus in the countryside may reduce field theft but create new opportunities for theft at other points in the production and delivery system. The *campesinos*' assessment of their own wealth relative to others is an arguably important determinant in rural theft, but it is one among many interrelated factors. All other things being equal, I expect that increases in equity reduce the incidence of theft when they are accompanied by increases in individual households' well-being. At the same time, a predictable security against theft may be among the preconditions for generating agricultural surpluses to improve well-being.

Psychological Motives

Psychological motives are often proposed to explain theft in the Andes. Perhaps the most important of these is the expression of aggression. As Bolton puts it, "In a community where interpersonal hostility is not manifested freely, stealing is one undercover method of aggression" (1974:55).

Many Andeanists have noted the surreptitious quality of hostility in Quechua culture. As Allen writes:

> It is striking how few channels there are in Quechua culture for the direct expression of negative emotions. Even the briefest interactions among *Runakuna* are framed with lavish (and to many Western sensibilities, syrupy and obsequious) expressions of mutual esteem. . . The social obligation to shower others with constant endearment and reassurance creates an atmosphere in which it is virtually impossible to express negative feelings directly. As a result, the opportunity to express negative feelings indirectly, by manipulating the etiquette itself, assume great importance. [Allen 1988:146]

We need to be careful not to exaggerate this characterization and overlook the directness that exists. We should likewise be cautious in how much we distinguish the Quechua from others in this regard (a considerable degree of indirectness is the rule in many, if not most societies). While Bolton (1974) notes that stealing was a common occurrence in the village where he conducted his research, he found that it ranked third behind physical assault and verbal assault, suggesting that Andeans have an arsenal of tools available, both covert and overt, for expressing negative emotions. I did not collect data on verbal assault in Ccachín, but reports of physical assaults outside of the immediate household were almost as common as theft.

While interpersonal hostility may motivate and in turn be a response to all kinds of theft, crop theft receives the most theoretical attention. Gade (1970:14) notes that "Anxiety over possible food removal is great," and this may be explained in large part by the precariousness of agricultural production in a mountain environment. Stein (1961:166) goes further to suggest that "Stealing food uniquely combines symbolically overcoming a deficit with powerfully inflicting a hurt. . . The act of taking a person's food supply from his field recapitulates for him an earlier experience." As he sees it, the

change in childhood from an ethic of "from each according to ability, to each according to need" to an ethic of "to each according to his contribution" leads to preoccupation with food deprivation. William Leonard's (1991a, 1991b) research in Nunoa shows that children ages 12 years and under experience smaller seasonal fluctuations in energy intake and have a more adequate pre-harvest diet than adults, so we can't discount that there is a time during maturation where the change in nutritional status is acutely felt.

While any threat to their livelihood is taken with indignation, crop theft does not appear to be either the most intensely felt or salient kind of theft for people in Ccachín. For the most part crop theft is anonymous, and like the losses to mice, deer, and parrots, somewhat predictable. These characteristics, along with the fact that agricultural products are continuous rather than lumpy goods, make crop theft one of the least likely forms of theft to be recalled when citing specific instances. In comparison, the anxiety over animal theft seems much higher. Less than half of all reported animal thefts in Ccachín turn out to be verified thefts. Most animals presumably stolen are in fact lost and later found. The presumption that an animal has been stolen rather than lost is a telling indication of people's concern, as it reflects an overestimation of the odds. The theft of household and personal items is likewise more salient than crop theft. My host family, for example, has held a grudge against a fellow for years for allegedly stealing a hat at one of their fiestas. I see no reason to assume that their strong reaction relates to any specific childhood experiences they may have had. The salience of the act more likely has to do with the importance of the social situation and the intimacy of the object stolen. Given the above, I doubt that the symbolic importance of food in overcoming a deficit and inflicting a hurt explains why food rather than something else is stolen. Crop theft may often involve an expression of hostility, but it does not do so uniquely. The advantage it has is over other ways of expressing hostility is that it is one of the least risky ways of doing so.

To the extent that there are noneconomic motivations involved in theft in Ccachín, they usually revolve around the idea of reciprocity. Given it's hostile nature, I am tempted to call this "negative reciprocity," but Sahlins (1972) has already established a

different referent for this term. We might note, however, that it in both principle and effect, it may be much the same as "tit for tat," or where revenge is involved, "tit-tit for tat."[5] Cases 9 and 21 of Table 5.1 provide examples, and it's worth noting that both involve paternity disputes, as such instances are almost paradigmatic in motivating some settling of accounts. In Case 9, money fell out of a *comunero*'s pocket during a fight and he presumed that it was "stolen" by his attackers. The *comuneros* that allegedly recovered the money beat up the fellow to force him to pay support for a child of their sister that he refused to recognize as his own. Any money they fortuitously recovered was probably considered their just due rather than theft. In Case 21, a crop theft, the primary suspects were likewise family of a woman who was trying to get the victim to provide economic support for an unrecognized child (see Chapter 14 for further description of these cases). In both cases, theft is part of settling scores.

Retribution may explain the direction of theft (who is victimized), the motivation for theft, or both. While I can't offer any examples from Ccachín, Stein notes that suspected thieves are often themselves victims of theft in the Andes, and I have no reason to doubt that this is the case. Whoever is victimized has a tendency to suspect preexisting adversaries, but feud-like reaction chains are for the most part held in check.[6] Litigation, rather than direct action, is the most common line of redress for most households unless a thief is caught in the act, with supernatural solutions sought as uncertainty about the identity of the aggressors increases.

A combination of interests, passions, and norms are the proximate causes of retribution, and I can't pretend to be able to sort out their complex interaction in everyday life in Ccachín. It's important to emphasize, though, that as far as a notion of reciprocal treatment lies behind such behavior, it leaves considerable room for individual interpretation. As Miller (1990), writing about feuding behavior in Medieval Iceland, observed:

> The notion of balance was innately ambiguous, since it was not mathematical, but socially contingent on a host of shifting variables, some of which were subject to conscious manipulation by the parties. . . The practical process of feud . . . was less a matter of models than of manipulation. . . . So much of taking revenge was simply the ideological gloss of taking pure and simple. [cited by Elster 1990:879]

While the Icelandic and Andean contexts are quite different, the ambiguity of the point of balance is much the same.

Cultural Contradictions

The economic and psychological explanations of theft discussed above do not exhaust the possibilities, and I would like to turn now to a cultural explanation put forward by Gose (1991, 1994). Gose offers one of the most comprehensive analyses of the cultural logic of theft in the Andes that we have, and as I read him, he goes beyond the methodological individualism of the explanations already outlined. Ultimately, I find his analysis provocative but arbitrary, and I conclude that micromotivational values and opportunity taken together are sufficient to explain identified patterns of theft.

Gose does not attempt to explain all kinds of theft in the Andes, but only crop theft. The starting point of his explanation is the seasonality of the latter:

> During April and May, property consciousness rises to a crescendo, and households even send one of their members to sleep in the fields at night in order to maintain constant vigilance over the crops. People who short weeks ago had been linked in a harmonious productive effort now greet one another with suspicion on the paths to the fields, and acrimonious accusations of theft abound. Evidence such as this suggests that there may be opposed moralities at work in the annual cycle of Huaquirca, such that the social relations and attitudes appropriate to one phase of the year are highly inappropriate to the other. [Gose 1991: 46]

As I have already indicated, crop theft is probably the most common, but not the only, kind of theft in rural Andean communities, and it's appropriate to ask if there is anything that separates it from the rest in analytical terms. Gose suggests that the seasonality, predictability, and frequency of crop theft provide grounds for giving it special treatment:

> Of course, livestock rustling and theft from houses are also common, but they can take place at any time of the year, and they do not have the same predictability or massive incidence as crop theft. [Gose 1991:185]

This way of dividing the research domain is both a strength and weakness of Gose's approach: a strength, because it allows him to link the seasonality of crop theft to other seasonal patterns in the annual cycle, a weakness, because by so doing, he surren-

ders any possibility of explaining other kinds of theft in the Andes, and the associations he makes are so particularistic that it is hard to extend the analysis to crop theft anywhere else in the world, especially those societies where crop theft is seasonal, but where collective production is less common.

According to Gose, the pattern of crop theft we see in the Andes is not best explained in terms of material scarcity, psychological need, or institutional failure, but rather, in terms of a seasonally-mediated cultural contradiction between collective production and private appropriation. As he puts it,

> As a first approximation, generalized crop theft results neither from unmeditated biological need nor some inexplicable social pathology. Rather, it is an outcome of conflict and transition between two incompatible ways of asserting property rights in Andean culture, which are embodied in two seasonal regimes of social practice. [Gose 1994:185-186]

More specifically,

> Previous explanations of crop theft have focused on scarcity and treat it as a symptom of improper land use (e.g., Gade 1970:5-6, 12-13). Lacking any absolute standard to decide what is and is not proper land use in the Andes, I suggest that crop theft is best evaluated against the patterns of legitimate appropriation it violates. Here, an interesting tension emerges. While the crops are not consumable and exist only as an object of labour, the generalized exchange of *ayni* labour creates an implicit social recognition of individual property rights. Once the crops become consumable, individual property rights require the exclusion of other people, and a retreat from collectivity. However, it is impossible to suppress the previous period of collective production entirely, and theft is one way of asserting it during the emergent phase of private appropriation. [Gose 1994:185]

As I read it, Gose's argument is that there is an incompatibility between viewing the crops as an object of interhousehold cooperation and as an object of private appropriation (coinciding with two ways of defining property rights, collective and individual), that these views correspond to two seasons, the growing and harvest/post-harvest seasons respectively, that there is a transitional period of conflict between the two patterns rather than a smooth alteration, and that this conflict explains the intensity of crop theft after Carnival. I'm not sure if he sees the conflict as residing in the general cultural system, in individual minds, between individuals who differ in their interpretation of their rights and

what is morally right at a given time, or all three. But if I read him right, he posits that the period of collective production gives rise to expectations that conflict with and are not readily contained by the later period of private appropriation. Gose prefers to speak of "dispositions" rather than "interests" and "motivations," and this is my best attempt to put his proposal into a language that both does him justice and that I can understand.

To evaluate his argument, however, I must clarify two more things. First, he uses the term "contradiction" to refer to cultural rather than psychological or institutional oppositions:

> The sort of contradiction I will discuss here is therefore not the kind we are familiar with from the transactionalist literature, namely that between the ideal and real, social structure and social organization, and so on. By contradiction I do not mean mere hypocrisy (in the service of maximization) or incoherence (as in various rationalist traditions), but a generative cultural dynamic, one which I suspect is rather more common than we have been led to believe, and is worthy of our analytical attention. [Gose 1991:42]

What exactly does he mean?

> The annual cycle of Huaquirca separates collective production and private appropriation seasonally, according to the growth and maturation of the crops. These phases of the year are contradictory, first, because they involve such oppositions as *ayni* and *mink'a*, egalitarianism and hierarchy, interhousehold cooperation and household autonomy, the wild and the domestic, the dispersal of seed in the ground and its concentration in the roof of the house. But there is more to contradiction than mere opposition or differentiation in a structuralist sense: the term also implies the incompatibility or struggle of these opposites within a unity. The unity of course is the annual cycle as a whole, but we see the same contradictory forces at work in microcosm when we turn to certain pivotal practices . . . [Gose 1991:49]

Second, the cultural contradiction Gose posits is not necessarily recognized by the *campesinos* themselves. He makes this clear in his interpretation of the symbolism of house thatching, another aspect of village life that becomes seasonally important after the harvest:

> I acknowledge that the contradiction I propose between the framework of private appropriation and that of collective production in the house rethatchings of Huaquirca is not articulated by people there, nor is it implicit in the seasonal vocabulary

> of their variant of the Quechua language. But again, what is important here is not so much what anyone thinks or says, as how people's dispositions toward one another change as the crops become ripe, on the one hand, and the seeds are planted in the ground, on the other. [Gose 1991:42]

Rather than consciously articulated, the contradiction between private appropriation and collective production lies in what Gose refers to as "embodied dispositions." He follows Bourdieu here in assuming that the social order is the outcome of people following ingrained and largely unreflective sensibilities, rather than the result of people consciously following articulate rules.

I am in general agreement with Gose's portrayal of decision making as habitual or routine, but I have trouble seeing what he means by a generative "contradiction." I see no constructive sense, for example, in which we can speak of a struggle between *ayni* and *mink'a* (two forms of labor recruitment which are by no means opposites) or between seeds dispersed in the ground and seeds concentrated in the rooftops (a contrast generated by pragmatics and only secondarily articulated symbolically, if at all). I'd like to focus here, however, on what Gose seems to identify as the overarching opposition: that between collective production and private appropriation. In order to better understand his argument, I have set it in a matrix in Figure 5.1, with the x-axis contrasting private and collective appropriation, and the y-axis contrasts contrasting private and collective production.

The first thing to note is that these are ideal types, and that the labor and consumption rules that apply in the Andes largely fall on the continuum between them. In this sense, a four-square grid is rather arbitrary, and for descriptive purposes, it might be better to recognize intermediate positions. The relevant "collectivity" for both production and consumption, for example, could be allowed to vary quantitatively and qualitatively between individual, household, interhousehold work group, *ayllu*, and village community.

Second, whether a particular instance is to be considered "private" or "collective" depends on which of any number of variables we focus on. *Ayni* may be "collective" in the sense that it involves interhousehold cooperation, but it is private to the extent that it takes place on individual plots where field owners have a right to determine the use of the

fruits of the production, and private in the sense that decision making is not collective. While *ayni* involve cooperative labor, labor management resides with the *ayni* sponsor.

Third, while it may be theoretically possible to separate production and appropriation rules, they are linked together by actual conventions. For example, as cited above, Gose says that *ayni* labor creates an implicit social recognition of individual property rights, and we should note that it is because control of the harvest is never part of the exchange. *Ayni* involves direct one-for-one labor exchange, not the recruitment of labor with the promise of a share of the crop.[7] It contrasts with working "*a medias*," for example, where land and seed, on the first partner's part, and labor, on the part of the second, are recruited with the promise of an equal division of the product. *Ayni*, *mink'a*, *yanapakuy*, *a medias*, *phayna*, and other forms of labor recruitment in the Andes differ from each other in production and appropriation rules. *Mink'a* typically differs from *ayni* in two asymmetries — asymmetry in the content of the goods exchanged and asymmetry in the resources available to participants in the exchange — but it is no less collective on this account (the first asymmetry is true by definition, the second is commonly, but not necessarily the case). Collective production and collective appropriation come together in their purest form in *phayna*, where the site of activity is most often communal, labor is large-scale, collective and democratically-organized, and the benefits are typically "collective goods" produced by the common effort and characterized by some degree of jointness of supply.

Finally, another contrast is relevant here in determining collective production and appropriation rules: that between "private goods" and "public goods." Public goods are defined by two properties: jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion, Here too we are dealing with ideal types, but if we consider all of the goods produced in Andean communities, we can see that they differ along these two dimensions, and that these differences correlate with differences in production and appropriation rules as well. In terms of jointness of supply, agricultural products are strictly "private goods," where one person's consumption reduces the amount available to everyone else. Total consumption is the sum of individuals' consumption. In this sense, all appropriation of the crops is

"private appropriation," and the issue is one of who gets what from a particular field. Opportunities for theft relate to the second dimension — the possibilities of exclusion — which vary for private goods depending on the resources at hand. Not surprisingly, the "disposition" towards self-appropriation of other people's crops is highest in Andean communities at the times and in the places in which the possibility of exclusion is weakest.

I am not sure where any contradiction — particularly one that provides a "generative cultural dynamic" worthy of being considered a causal mechanism — lies in all of this. I follow Elster (1994) in thinking that contradictions may be of two types: individual and social. At the individual level, one can find contradictions in desires and beliefs (i.e., a person may think, hope, wish, intend that contrary things are simultaneously true). At the societal level, contradictions arise in certain situations from falsely assuming that what could be true for any individual could also be true for all individuals taken simultaneously (the "fallacy of composition"), and from the negative secondary effects to each when all act for their own intended benefit (tragedies of the commons etc.). Gose rejects this way of thinking about contradiction as rationalist, but his alternative definition is vague and incoherent. I find it prudent to follow the caution of Elster (1994) when he says,

> The term "contradiction" is basically a logical one, and should not be extended in a way that is totally divorced from the primary meaning. If by "contradiction" we mean only opposition, conflict or struggle, then we should *say* opposition, conflict or struggle. We should firmly resist the temptation to play upon the logical connotation in order to make our opinions seem interesting, and then fall back upon the non-logical connotations in order to make them look plausible. [Elster 1978:3]

I see no logical opposition between collective production and private appropriation, nor for that matter, between private production and collective appropriation. Andean morality is sufficiently complex to separate legitimate and illegitimate private appropriation, legitimate and illegitimate collective appropriation, legitimate and illegitimate private production, and legitimate and illegitimate collective production into distinct domains. As I understand it, Gose's framework implies that there is an opposi-

tion between legitimate private consumption and legitimate collective production, mediated by illegitimate private appropriation. As far as I can tell, if there is a moral logic underlying this, it is the logic of reciprocity — and the argument would be better phrased to say that illegitimate private appropriation of collective production is taken to balance illegitimate private appropriation of collective production. Any seasonal change in crop theft is incidental, the result of temporal variations in material opportunity.

Hacendado-feudatario relations provide a potential example. Theft was so rampant on the haciendas that Gade (1970) estimates that 10% of labor costs on many haciendas before the agrarian reform went into the prevention of theft. A good part of hacienda theft may be explained in terms of opportunity, but it is not hard to imagine it being motivated by and justified as a legitimate redress of exploitive relations as well. Behind people's production and appropriation decisions lies a complex of expectations about the distribution of labor and compensation for labor. If there has been "adequate" compensation, the circle is closed. If there is a conflict, it is in these normative expectations, and in the definition of what is "adequate." It is hard to see why we should call this conflict "contradiction." We're better served calling it a conflict of interests or values.

Another problem with Gose's approach is that he confuses surface appearances with human dispositions: *ayni* involves "harmonious productive effort" (by definition), but it can be motivated by either self-interest or by cooperative values. We should be careful not to confuse a "disposition to cooperate" with a "cooperative disposition." Along the same lines, theft may require cooperation between individuals to pull it off (as in the original story of the prisoner's dilemma), so it would be a mistake to identify it as a purely noncooperative disposition. Analytically, we must keep cooperative and noncooperative acts separate from the immediate motivations — altruism, self-interest, envy, spite, jealousy — compelling them. Treating theft as the incursion of "collective" values into a temporal domain of private ones as Gose does misrepresents the dispositions and reifies the relevant collectivities: we're not talking about Robin Hood here — stealing is not justified in the name of the community — and crop theft is more accurately viewed as the clash of private interests.

In the final analysis, Gose presents us with a cultural determinism divorced from a consideration of people's interests. He offers no mechanism linking moral classification to motivation, or the reconciliation of opposing moralities to people's behavior. I'm not averse to the idea that altruism, generosity, suspicion, envy, distrust, and other emotions may have a seasonal component. I expect as much, since the *comuneros* respond to both environmental stimuli and social feedback. The combination of material interest and increased opportunity explains a good deal of the increase in theft during the harvest season, but the increase in theft itself triggers *comuneros* motivated by these and other reasons to do the same. For thieves and for those who must defend against them, there is safety in numbers. As the number of thieves grow, the odds that any particular individual will be detected and sanctioned decreases, further modifying the incentive structure. With restitution hard to come by and few other alternatives for recouping the loses, victims of theft may be increasingly likely to turn to theft in turn. Add to their number those who respond with tit-for-tat, those who are motivated by retributive justice, those who emulate influential models or act according to some simple conformity rule, and there can be a snowball effect that only terminates once the crops are safely in the storehouses and opportunities dramatically diminish again. With such a chain of clear, identifiable, and cross-culturally demonstrable mechanisms, there is little need to invoke vague and particularistic cultural contradictions as the driving force.

From Theft to Thatch

A House Fire

A house burned down while I was in Ccachín. The assumption of the victims was that it was a case of theft concealed by arson. I'm intimately familiar with what happened because I lived with the victims and the house burned during my watch. The case offers the opportunity here to follow from theft to thatch, the latter being as much a part of the cultural logic Gose sees at play as the former. The case also serves to emphasize that it is hard to talk about private appropriation in Ccachín without reference to households and

houses. The house is both physically and psychologically central, and to trespass on one domain is to trespass against the other.

The exact cause of the house fire is shrouded in mystery. It could have been an accident, with blame assigned elsewhere for responsibility that no one in the household was willing to admit, a case of some neighbor's envy exceeding normal bounds, or an act of vengeance. The report prepared by community officials simply says that the fire started under suspicious circumstances.[8]

After a brief trip to the States in January 1991, I returned to Ccachín two days before *Día de Comadres,* the fertility ritual for the cattle held on the Thursday before Carnival. I found my host family scattered over the countryside. My hosts were in route to their cattle pasture two days distant. One of their daughters was staying in a cabin on the *loma*, watching her parent's alpaca and sheep along with her own. Her husband had gone to the cattle pastures to give ground corn and salt to the family herd and perform the appropriate *Comadre* rituals. One of the younger daughters stayed home, and spent the day weaving. She was glad that I had arrived, because she could then spend the night looking after her sister's house, otherwise in the care of her ten-year-old nephew. Everyone in Ccachín locks their doors when they go out, but no one likes to leave their house unattended at night. People are concerned that thieves will enter their house and gardens while they are away. During dinner, the young woman asked me to keep an eye on the house, so she could do the same for her sister. I agreed.

After eating, I went out visiting and my host cleaned up the dishes, smothered the fire, and went to her sister's house. I was home and in bed within an hour. A little before midnight I was awakened by a soft but persistent crackle. I assumed that mice were rustling around in my papers or a plastic bag as they often did and paid little heed, until I noticed a glow through the cracks around my door. Roused now by the pound of my heart, I sifted through the possibilities. "Is there a full moon?" "No, we're nearing the waning quarter." The light flickered. "Something's burning." I recalled the time my hosts thought that a *bruja* ('witch') had buried something in a hole outside of my door, and my mind flashed to sorcery. "But who? And why?" Then I hit upon my worst fear:

"the *tiruku* ('terrorists') have arrived and were flushing me out." Shakily, but with few other options, I went to the door and peered through a crack. The kitchen, fifty meters away in a separate building, was engulfed in flame. On my watch! My heart sank.[9]

I first checked to see that no one was in the burning building. The door appeared locked. I ran to a nearby house to wake a neighbor, but no one appeared to be home. I then ran to another house and awoke a startled *comadre*. My *comadre* spread the alarm while I went off to summon the daughter of my hosts. There is no volunteer fire department in the village, but neighbors responded with a bucket brigade.[10] After a week of clear weather in the heart of the rainy season, the heat was intense. The flames rapidly consumed the thatch. We hopelessly waited for the ceiling to collapse so that we could water down the remains. Everything within was lost except for eight guinea pig that found refuge below the smoldering woodpile. After three hours of exhausting effort, the fire was put out, it began to rain, and people returned to their homes.

At sunrise, people gathered to recall and retell the events of the night, and speculate on how it happened. A messenger was sent to notify my hosts. A judge and the *alcalde de menores* ('mayor of the municipality') arrived to write the *denuncio*, a registered statement of how the fire was discovered, who helped put it out, and what damage was done. The *teniente gobernador* ('lieutenant governor') prepared a separate deposition describing the dimensions and physical structure of the house. The daughter of my hosts signed for the family, and a few others and I signed as witnesses. Much was made of the fact that the nearest neighbor never appeared during the fire, though I and others had tried to awake him. The fellow is a baptism *compadre* of my host family — my hosts are the *padrinos* of his daughter — but he was the prime suspect in the mind of the victims and his absence during the night was criticized by the rest. After the community officials finished their work, the fellow invited me to his home for breakfast. He told me that he had attended a party earlier in the evening, and that he was so tired he never heard the knocks on his door or the people calling his name. He described it as being "as if a sorcerer had splashed magical water" in his eyes to make him sleepy.

During the course of the following year, my host family sought the aid of various diviners to identity the arsonist. The divinations confirmed their suspicions. En route to the community to inspect the damage, my hosts consulted a coca reader who told them that the arsonist would be the first person to visit them on their return. That person turned out in fact to be the sleepy *compadre*-neighbor. A second consultation suggested that a man and a woman, both neighbors of the family, were the culprits. The *bruja* in Yanawara (Urubamba), a tarot card reader, confirmed that two people were involved, and identified the man as the suspected *compadre* and the woman as the "envious" wife of one of my host's cousins. The *bruja* said that the two stole some textiles and set fire to the house while drunk, later selling the textiles in Cusco. Without tangible evidence, there was no legal recourse, but existing tensions between the families were exacerbated by the divinations, and relations were severed.

A few days after my hosts returned from their cattle lands, a village judge, the *alcalde de menores*, and a member of the *consejo* ('municipal council') met with them to prepare a *denuncio* of the fire damage for the subprefect in Calca. The total loss, excluding the costs of rebuilding, was set at $1520. I determined from those in attendance that reconstruction would require at least ninety to a hundred days of labor and $80 in direct costs (Tables 5.3). Most homes in Ccachín are one room buildings, and while the losses above are indicative of what one would find in a typical kitchen area, my family was fortunate that the bulk of their valuables — the harvest and their beds and clothing, sewing machine, tools, documents, and cash savings — were stored in the larger, tin-roofed structure where we all slept below. While my hosts were among the wealthiest in the village, most families would have lost more had they been so victimized. The family sold two bulls to cover the costs of rebuilding.

All of the fires that the *comuneros* described to me were caused by human error or malfeasance. Most villagers found it inconceivable that someone in the village would deliberately burn down another's house. It had never happened before. But people accepted that it was the most likely explanation in this case. The closest association that people could make was with a house fire in the mid-1980s at Mawkáw, a small village in

the puna above Lares on the route to Calca. There, villagers decided to eliminate a habitual village thief by burning down his house. While the thief and his family were asleep, the perpetrators locked the door from the outside and set the roof afire. The wife and a child of the thief escaped through a window, but they were caught, beaten, and thrown back. The entire family died in the blaze. The arsonists were imprisoned in Calca, and were still in jail while I was in Ccachín.

A few months after the my host family's house fire, MRTA (*Movimiento Revolucionario "Tupaq Amaru")* guerrillas came to Ccachín and offered to resolve problems in the community. The house fire was discussed at the assemblies called by the guerrillas, but no suspects were named at the meetings. Unwilling to finger anyone in public, my hosts privately expressed the hope that the *tiruku* ('terrorists') would identify the arsonists and kill them.

House Rethatching

Given the urgency of rebuilding, the *wasichakuy* ('house thatching') of my host family took place out of season — in early March — two months after the fire that destroyed their kitchen. *Wasichakuy* are more commonly held from June to September, when the weather is drier and people have more time to devote to construction work (Figure 5.2).[11] Twenty-five men and eight women participated in the *wasichakuy* of my host family, the men fetching the construction materials and doing the building, the women preparing the food. My understanding from the sponsor was that some of the labor was in return for previous favors or would be reciprocated, but whether this represented *ayni* in the strict sense, with labor service expected at future *wasichakuy* of others in kind, or a shorter-term and more flexible notion of returning the favor, I am not clear.[12] Wealthy in cattle but short on male labor to offer, my host family often substituted cow hooves — a scarce delicacy and important food at certain agricultural *ayni* — for repayment of labor. Cow hooves were served at the *wasichakuy* meal, both highlighting the importance of the consumptive feast in recruiting labor at such events, and displaying the resources available to the sponsor. In the Andes, *wasichakuy* may be

sponsored using a variety of labor recruitment strategies, including *mink'a*, *ayni*, *yanapay*, and the activation of more open-ended pressures and notions of social obligation. Although Gose attributes some of this flexibility to the transitional position of *wasi-chakuy* between periods of private appropriation and collective production, I think it more likely has to do with the infrequent character of *wasichakuy* itself. From the standpoint of individual households, *wasichakuy* is neither a unique event nor a repetitive task. Long-term calculations of labor debts over periods of ten years and more are required for a system of reciprocation in kind, and while such strict accounting apparently takes place in some areas (Mayer 1977:74), any tendency people have toward discounting future returns would push preference toward shorter-term exchange.

As with other collective work situations in the Andes, there is an important ceremonial element to *wasichakuy*. Many of the festive and ritual features common in *wasichakuy* are found in agricultural rituals as well, particularly *papa yapuy* ('potato plowing'). The cows hooves mentioned above are a feature of *papa yayuy* meals, and the nonseasonal foods on the menu — guinea pig, lamb, egg and corn tortillas — are also the same. The spatial arrangements, gender divisions, and organizational roles are nearly identical.

The most solemn moments at the *wasichakuy* of my host family were the placing of crosses on the roof and the *ch'allay* of the tools. As the last straw was being placed on the roof, one of the oldest participants made three wood crosses and decorated them with flowers. He made two crosses for the roof, and a third for the wall niche inside of the house. The bases of the crosses for the roof were set in ceramic jugs filled with *chicha* and taken to the peak by two young men. There, they removed the crosses from the jugs and planted them on the peak, with careful guidance by the sponsor from the ground below. The two men then knelt and said a prayer.[13]

As in *papa yapuy*, the tools used in *wasichakuy* receive special ritual treatment. After the crosses had been placed, all of the participants in the *wasichakuy* of my host family seated themselves around the *mesa* ('table') composed of mantas spread out upon the ground, with the *lluku* ('net') used for transporting the straw placed upon it. The men

sat in a U-shape around the *mesa*, the women sat huddled together downslope of them, and the *chicha* from the jugs used for the crosses was served one-by one. Each first poured a bit of *chicha* on the *lluku*, or flicked some with their fingers toward the new house. Upon drinking, each person said a prayer. Further rounds of *chicha*, *trago*, and *coca* ensued. After a collective prayer, the two servers, carrying two *lluku* each, presented them to each of the participants. Both sets of *lluku* were first presented to the female head of household. She kissed them — three times each — and everyone else followed suit. The *lluku* were then put away and a final prayer was said. With this, the exterior, public stage of the *wasichakuy* concluded. A scoop of glowing embers was brought up from the makeshift hearth that had been used for cooking the last two months, and they were placed in the corner of the new kitchen where the old hearth had been (a new one had yet to be constructed). The party continued — a dinner, drinking, music, joking, and conversation — with only the immediate family and their more intimate friends and relatives present.[14]

I attended various *wasichakuy* during my time in Ccachín, including one where sheet-metal was used in place of thatch, and the organization, sequence of activities, and ritual aspects were much the same in each. Gose (1991) has written extensively about the symbolic aspects of house rethatching, and he provides a wealth of comparative detail. It's not my purpose to add more here. It's important to note, however, that when it comes to interpreting the symbolic value of the features exhibited in *wasichakuy*, Gose relates them to the seasonal contradictions between collective production and private appropriation already described. From his perspective,

> Because the source of these contradictions lies beyond the act itself, house rethatching must be understood as a moment in a larger seasonal process, not a self-contained "text." Although the rite has a spatial and sequential structure that is at least partly independent of the annual cycle, it still reproduces the same contradictions, and transmits them faithfully to each of its constituent symbols. [Gose 1991:58-59]

Thus,

> If work on the roof is in some sense a development and completion of the part of the year dedicated to private appropriation, then we must also recognize that it . . . anticipates the period of interhousehold cooperation that will commence with the maize sowing in mid-September and continue throughout the growing season. . . . In the process, that part of the privately appropriated harvest which remains behind in the peak of the roof as the domestic food supply also becomes subject to a collective claim . . . . In a sense then, the removal of the old roof in house rethatching represents something of a negation of the household as a unit of private appropriation, and a recognition of the need to pass back into a phrase of collective production. [Gose 1991:48]

There would be little reason to question this interpretation if it were based on associations that Andeans themselves make, but it is not. Everything hinges on the validity of the assumption that a seasonal contradiction between collective production and private appropriation exists at some level of Andean thought. I have questioned that assumption in my discussion of theft, and the same reservations hold true here. There is a difference, however. In the case of theft, it's unclear whether Gose offers the contradiction to explain the existence of theft, the timing of theft, or the way theft is carried out. The ambiguity leaves room to conclude that it is all three. In the case of house rethatching, he takes the practical need of periodic rethatching of roofs for granted, and uses the contradiction to explain the coherence and meaning of certain features associated with the event (the implication being that expressive intent explains why some features are present and others are not). Whether he takes the seasonal morality of property rights to explain the timing of *wasichakuy*, the timing to explain the expressive features, or both is unclear. There are a host of ecological, economic, and social reasons why house rethatchings are normally scheduled during the dry season, but they are not limited to late August and early September in Ccachín as they are in some communities. I suspect that the timing explains the presence of certain expressive features, but not necessarily in the way proposed by Gose.[15]

Theft and Sorcery

In the house fire recounted above, my host family went beyond conventional investigative techniques to employ diviners to determine the identity of the arsonists.

They were eclectic in their choice of ritual experts, seeking the services first of traditional coca-readers, and then of a new age tarot-card reader. Taken alone, both techniques yield arbitrary results, but in practice, the feedback received from the diviners tends to be a mixture of chance, counsel, and lay criminology. As I have indicated, both *brujos* confirmed the suspicions of my host family, reflecting the information they were provided back with added authority. A witch or shaman attempting to collect an optimal amount of evidence on which to base a reading may do well to assume that the parties involved know the most about a case, but to do so leads to a vicious circle in which counsel and client each turn to the other for expert witness.[16] In the introduction to Part II I noted that among the requirements of rational belief formation, a person must collect an optimal amount of evidence, neither too much nor too little. In this case, it's not so much the amount of information at issue, but the kind.

As noted by Stein (1961), the identity of most thieves is never discovered through conventional investigative techniques (of the cases that I list in Table 5.1, for example, only 33% had a firm suspect, and of those, fewer than half received any kind of sanction). Given this, Andean peasants frequently rely on such magical and supernatural devices as divination, prayer and offerings, oaths, and sorcery in their search for justice. As Bolton (1974) notes, theft and sorcery are sequentially-linked behaviors, with sorcery serving as an appropriate response to theft under certain conditions. The *campesinos* are likely to use physical force when a thief is caught red-handed. They rely on strategy (appeals to authorities, attempts to expose or entrap the thief) when detection is less immediate and the identity of the offender is less clear. They resort to supernatural detection and sanction when it appears that neither physical skill nor strategy have a high probability of satisfying their desire for justice. The greater the uncertainty about who the culprits are, the greater the likelihood that techniques based on chance will be used to reveal their identity and punish them.

In the last chapter, I cited an observation by Stein (1981:50) that healthcare is a domain where people in the Andes prefer hope to despair and some action to none in the face of uncertainty. The same can be said of the way that they cope with theft and other

varieties of malfeasance. It may well be that the type of heuristics employed in dealing with uncertainty in these two domains are much the same, so that a detailed analysis of how people cope with wrongdoing would find "fixed strategies" (whereby certain kinds of assaults mandate a unique and particularly well-defined response; for example, sorcery), "ordered sequences" (as in the pattern discussed above, where alternatives are sought when higher-ordered options fail or are unavailable), "delegation" of detection and sanctioning to others (older family members, community officials, diviners and sorcerers), and "simultaneous use" (adopting several measures at the same time in the hope that one of them will bear fruit), following Mathews (1982), as in Chapter 4. Here, as in medical decision making, people appear to rely on rules of thumb rather than on directly assessing the costs and probabilities of success, though choice among these rules of thumb may be roughly ordered by cost and effectiveness.[17]

Like disease, victimization by thieves and thugs causes pain. Bolton emphasizes that sorcery rituals provide catharsis for victims, reducing their anxieties and frustrations, and that perhaps as associated social benefit, they reduce interpersonal tensions. The existence and strength of any social benefits is unclear to me, as the remedy for one party's anxieties and frustrations in a dispute may exacerbate a second party's anxieties and frustrations, and the idea that social tensions are reduced does not necessarily follow from the reduction of one side's individual ones (it may just as well further an indefinite action-reaction-action chain). The benefit to individuals is sufficient in itself to explain both the practice and the institution of sorcery. To this end, as with supernatural healing, diviners and sorcerers both address the naturalistic causes and treat the social and psychological conditions of their clients.

I suggested in Chapter 4 that coca-reading and other randomizing processes, while failing to contribute to their ostensible purpose of identifying natural causes, help ritual experts legitimatize the decisions delegated to them with a shared supernatural idiom. To this extent, I'm in agreement with Vroonhoven when he says that "action characterized as magic action is directed towards the realization of a metaobjective that does not coincide with the action itself" (1990:12). But this can't be the whole story, as it does not explain

why people put their faith in such randomizing processes in the first place. Making a decision with the flip of a coin may be legitimatized in some instances by fairness or urgency, but neither of these are a factor when random processes are used to detect and sanction (I allow that the latter may enter in, however, to the extent that even misdirected sanctions can deter). The answer seems to be, as is usually the case with faith, that the structure of the belief makes it hard to dismiss through empirical information-gathering processes. The probability of sorcery having a successful outcome is high because of the vague and general nature in which it tends to list potential suspects and specify the time period in which justice will take effect (Bolton 1974:214). In terms of detection, for example, Stein (1961:214) cites the case of a mass said to admonish an unknown thief, after which, 'they [the villagers] knew who was the thief because he was the one who died after mass." In the case of sanctions, the high rates of misfortune, morbidity, and mortality in Andean villages increase the odds that cosmic justice will be done.

In reviewing the steps taken by my host family to respond to and cope with their house fire, it appears that physical force against the arsonists was ruled out by the absence of the victims from the community at the time of the event, and by the corresponding failure to identify and catch the arsonists in the act. Discovering the theft and arson as a fait accompli, they resorted to strategy, documenting their losses with community and regional officials with an inventory of their losses, and making a formal *denuncio* against the yet-to-be-determined aggressors. Intent on discovering the identity of the arsonists, they talked to everyone in the community that they could think of, and kept an ear out for every clue, hoping that someone would be caught red-handed with the missing textiles, or that witnesses would be forthcoming. They heard rumors of suspicious unravelings and sales of textiles, and of confessions made by people when drunk, but these were accepted or dismissed by the family to the extent that they confirmed already-formed suspicions (as justification for one dismissal, I was told that a certain person was not malicious enough to do it, and that "you can't trust what people say when drunk").

As time went on, without a modicum of evidence against the people who were suspect, it became increasingly unlikely that my host family would be able to obtain

justice through official channels. They raised the issue at the assemblies called by MRTA when they came through the village, but without evidence, the only relief they could obtain was by expressing their pain. Over the course of a year, they employed the services of four coca-readers from four separate communities to determine the identity of the arsonists. Their consultation with the *bruja* of Yanawara took place a full ten months after the house fire at a time when other leads had gone cold. They cut off relations with the prime suspects to the extent that this was possible, but as far as I am aware, they did not employ any sorcerers in retribution (their appeals for supernatural justice where channeled through the saints). It's worth noting that one of the principal suspects suffered the loss of their herd of sheep in a grass fire a few months later, and with it, a certain sense of divine justice was thought to be achieved.

Without formal resolution though either official or unofficial channels, the frustrations were dampened but not extinguished, a year later, when I left the village. Besides doing most everything within their means to detect and sanction the perpetrators, its important to mention the steps taken to provide supernatural protection of the reconstructed building: the placement of a wood cross on the ridge,[18] the reading of the "prayer for houses" from *San Ciprián* in a ritual blessing conducted by a *brujo*, and a blessing of the house by a Catholic priest.

Conclusion

Instrumental and Expressive Action

In the introduction to Part II, I followed up on Vroonhoven's work to distinguish between instrumental rationality and expressive rationality, or alternatively, between rational, irrational, and nonrational action. Not everyone accepts such distinctions. Among Andeanists, Gose (1991, 1994) forcefully argues that it is not only deceptive, it is bourgeois to make such distinctions. In critiquing Bourdieu, with whom he otherwise has affinities, Gose writes that:

> In isolating practice as a theoretical object, Bourdieu has implicitly relied on the hierarchical distinction between "communicative action" and "instrumental

> action" characteristic of structural anthropology and Weberian sociology. These dualist orientations consistently quash the "communicative" pretensions of any activities that they have classified as instrumental. . . . I will argue that practice and meaning must be understood in a unified sense of praxis, self-directed activity, and not separated into "instrumental" and "communicative" types (or aspects) of social action. [Gose 1991:41-42]

Further, Gose suggests that whether one makes this conceptual separation or not depends on one's social position. He offers Andeans' use of space as an example. Rural villagers in the Andes typically live in multipurpose one-room houses where they cook, sleep, socialize, store tools, and raise guinea pigs together, while wealthier and more Westernized Andeans have larger spaces divided up into several rooms separating instrumental and expressive activities (cooking, storage, and other routine tasks, on the one hand, and intimate, recreational, and "cultured" activities on the other). He concludes that "This hierarchical organization of living space reflects the dualist separation of the expressive from the instrumental that notables, like most professional intellectuals and politicians, attempt to live by" (Gose 1991:43).

I'll leave the question open whether compartmentalization of living space has anything to do with compartmentalization of the mind, or whether it is another example of confusing likeness with likelihood as discussed in Chapter 4. Even if Gose has got the facts right in this case and does not, for example, underestimate the extent that activities in Quechua houses are effectively separated without walls or overestimate the extent that Western minds separate instrumental and expressive aspects (a la Vroonhoven), there's a long way to go before the asserted correlation can be linked by causal explanation. I have no problem with the idea that acts may be both expressive and instrumental at the same time. I do have a problem with the idea that we should not attempt to distinguish between the two, and that it is wrong or futile to separate nonconsequentialist from consequentialist processes of decision making, expressive from material and social benefits of action, and altruistic motivations from self-interested ones for analytical purposes. Human behavior is multicausal, and whatever the relative importance of each cause, study

of the factors separately is necessary to understand their consequences taken together (Winterhalder and Smith 1992).

Rational choice requires that we distinguish between means and ends. Expressive action implies that means and ends cannot always be neatly separated in this way (Vroonhoven 1990). Gose (1994) emphasizes the expressive nature of Andean ritual, contrasting his work to those who take ritual to have only an instrumental function. But the contrast is not unique to ritual, and can apply to labor and other activities as well. Shweder, in an illuminating example, distinguishes between the instrumental and the expressive functions of sleep. As he describes it, "Sleeping is an instrumental activity. Sleeping alone in a room of one's own with the door firmly shut is an expressive activity communicating a good deal about our culture's nonrational commitment to individuality, autonomy, and privacy" (Shweder 1984:46). Applying the same framework to theft in the Andes, one might propose that theft is an instrumental activity, but the particular form that it takes expresses something about Andeans' preoccupation with private appropriation and property at certain times of the year, the implication being that the form is intentionally explained by this expression.

Shweder's description of sleep sells instrumentality short, as he doesn't mention the influence of central heat on spatial organization, the extent that family size, wealth, and other factors determine opportunity and the possibilities of sleeping one to a bed, potential conflicts of interest between parents and children, the effects of peer pressure and status, and the instrumentality underlying individuality, autonomy, and privacy or their opposites in a given society. To the extent that sleeping alone indicates something about our culture's commitment to individuality, autonomy, and privacy, it is because we can imagine these values to be the motivations and messages of the individuals involved, whether they be parents or children. Without an assumption about or reference to underlying intentions, causes, or functions, it's not clear how a particular description is relevant to any interpretation, instrumentally or expressively construed. To see why, consider sleeping arrangements in the Andes. Thanks to the practice of *hurq'a*, in which festival sponsors and their entourage go out in the middle of the night to solicit help with

an event, I have had the opportunity to make the rounds of people's homes in Ccachín and wake them from bed, so I have a representative sample of how people in the village sleep. For the most part, there are no separate rooms nor doors between them, and entire families are huddled together in one or two beds, with older people sometimes on the floor. I see no reason to assume that this is one of the ways that Quechua people communicate their commitment to collectivity, dependence, and inclusiveness. To assume that sleeping together "goes with" working together in the fields, for example, is every bit as magical — is just as much to confuse propositions about language for propositions about the world — as to assume (falsely, according to Shweder 1984) that criticizing and disagreeing are correlated activities. Not everything that has a likeness has common origins or functions. And without determining the intentions of the speaker, it's not possible to distinguish expression from misunderstanding.

Just as Shweder finds that such disparate activities as sleeping with one's door shut and asking a three-year-old what they would like to eat are expressive acts communicating a good deal about our culture's nonrational commitment to individuality, autonomy, and privacy, Gose finds that such disparate activities as theft, house thatching, and fertility rituals for the herds are expressive acts developing the seasonally circumscribed theme of private appropriation. Not only do the first and last of these develop the same themes, on first reading, they appear to be instrumental and ritual means respectively to the same end. As Gose describes it,

> The same preoccupation with property and theft comes to the fore in the *t'inka* rites, which . . . correspond to the period in which the crops come to maturity and are appropriated. Individual households sponsor these rites, whose goal is to promote the health and increase of their livestock. Toward this end, ritualists invoke the spirits of particular grazing territories where the animals in question are particularly abundant, and attempt to fix them to the territory of the sponsoring household with words, libations and other offerings . . . . Each household that owns animals will sponsor a similar *t'inka*, and as a result, everyone is trying to invoke the spirit of everyone else's grazing territory, in what could almost be seen as a magical form of livestock rustling. [Gose 1991:46]

Elsewhere Gose takes pains to emphasize that labor and ritual are not alternative technical means to the same ends, and that "labour and ritual can be connected as means

are to ends, without having to fall back on the idea of 'magic'" (Gose 1994:7), so this cannot be the all of it.[19] But what is important is that:

> These rites appear to be informed by the vision of limited good, in which one household's gain automatically implies another's loss and therefore amounts to something like theft. The *t'inkas* thus express in ritual form precisely what is taking place in everyday life at this time of year: the disintegration of a cooperative productive effort into a myriad of exclusive and competing property interests. [Gose 1991:47]

Presumably, the underlying assumption here is that what is being expressed has something to do with explanation of the existence and timing of the ritual. It's one thing to say that such activities have shared symbolic content, quite another to say, as Gose does, that:

> Ritual shapes the social practices that accompany and support it in the annual cycle. They provide the cues that frame and orchestrate the seasonal unfolding of social life. Still, these rituals stop short of overtly directing the labour process, since their meaning is itself dependent upon and supported by the thrust of the practical acts they shape. There can be no absolute distinction between means and ends here, or what is instrumental and what is expressive, precisely because the two are so intertwined and interdependent. [Gose 1994:6]

How such dynamic verbs as "shapes," "frame," orchestrate," and "direct"can be translated into causal mechanisms is never made clear. Likeness is no substitute for correlation, and assertions about correlation are no substitute for causal explanation.

Implicit Intentions

What should ethnographers do when faced with the implicit and unarticulated nature of many of the intentions behind action in the Andes? Often, our explanations of our subjects actions do not match their own. As Gose observes,

> When I tried to engage commoners in this sort of discussion [about the meaning of house rethatching rituals], both during and after the event, their initial (and often final) response was to classify the house rethatching as a "*costumbre*" (custom), the native term for an act that cannot be appropriately discussed at length in articulate speech. For Huaquirquinos, this is an act that speaks for itself, if it speaks at all. For the rest of us, however, the matter is not quite so simple. Without denying its resolutely implicit nature, we must assume that some form of

> understanding nonetheless exists here, and make an interpretive effort to find out what it is. The alternative is to assume that there is nothing to be discovered, which entails the grave risk of mistaking our own ignorance for the "practical sense" of Andean people, and makes it impossible to explain why they should continue to practice and take pleasure in this *costumbre*. [Gose 1991:50]

My experience in Ccachín was much the same. While there is no reason to assume that all or most intentionality is conscious, I don't think it desirable to escape the orbit of what Andeans tell us. An alternative to treating the explanation of "*costumbre*" as a global term for deep and inarticulate dispositions is to treat it as the starting point toward active listening. In psychological counseling, one allows the meaning to emerge from the subjects, drawing out patterns and engaging people to the point of self-recognition (Tamminen and Smaby 1979). The same should take place in ethnography. In this, I agree with Garmendia Larrañaga, the Basque ethnographer, who in response to the question "Isn't being an ethnographer a bit like being a psychologist?" replied:

> Yes, yes. One has to know how to listen to people, to soak in what they tell you. In this manner, little by little, you get to know them. You can make mistakes, but you always know to what point you have to raise the ribbon. Sometimes, you know people so well that you know that with them, you have nothing more to do. [Goñi 1998:68]

If we are receptive to what our subjects tell us, it may very well turn out that "*por costumbre*" is an honest reason why great numbers of people take pleasure in particular activities and wish to see them continued. Reference to transmission processes alone does not explain why one activity and not another is adopted, but it helps move us away from the "acute totalization of meaning" postulated by Gose and others and requires us to analytically separate the origin, selection, correlation, and prevalence of beliefs. Besides the risk of "confusing our ignorance for the 'practical sense' of Andean people," there is the equally grave one of assuming more coherence at the individual and collective levels than we have evidence for. Incongruities and contradictions exist at both the individual level and collective levels, though the processes of resolving them differ. I am skeptical of efforts to tie together the shreds and patches of belief that exist and that have existed across the Andes into a logical and coherent whole.

Further Questions

I wish I could better specify what people's personal norms regarding theft in Ccachín are. It would be enlightening, for instance, to know if people feel justified in taking from those who have more than they. It would be helpful to know if moral self-restraint stops at community boundaries or applies to relations with people in neighboring communities as well. It would be useful to know if some objects are exempt from moral proscription as nicely summed in the Japanese proverb, "stealing flowers isn't stealing." The value of the objects stolen play a role in determining the amount of restitution and severity of punishment, and it probably plays a role in people's assessments of the wrongness of stealing them as well.

Admittedly, it is often difficult to separate normative from instrumental considerations. It appears, as Gade (1970) indicates, that *campesinos* feel morally justified if they rob those who have more land and crops than they. But other things being equal, there are more opportunities to steal from those who have more as well, and often, less possibility of detection and sanction. We must distinguish between the motivations and the direction of theft, although in certain instances, as when people are seeking restitution or retribution, they are effectively joined. Do principles of equity motivate people to steal from those with more than they? If people steal from economic necessity, does it determine who they will steal and not steal from? Or does it do neither, and serves merely to justify what has been done if thieves are caught and held socially accountable? Here, as elsewhere, it is often hard to distinguish motivation from justification. Unfortunately, I do not know whether wealthier individuals in Ccachín are subject to more incidents of theft or spend relatively more to defend themselves from theft than the average. Gose indicates that while theft may be differentially directed toward wealthy *mestizos* and *comuneros* in the Andes, everyone is vulnerable (Gose 1994). It's clear that the poorest households are not immune to victimization in Ccachín. Case 24 in Table 5.1 is one example. Notably, such instances tend to generate more widespread pity than when the rich are victims.

There's some reason to believe that people are more likely to steal from outsiders, whatever the social class of the latter. When speaking in general terms. for example, villagers most often blame outsiders for theft of their domestic stock. If true, community solidarity could play a part in this, but so could the reduced possibilities of detection and sanction. I'm not certain that intercommunity theft is more common than intracommunity theft in Ccachín. I assume that it varies according to the object of the theft, crop theft more likely to be an insider activity than animal theft. If one distinguishes individual instances from general statements about thieves, most animal theft is attributed to community members. Increasingly, however, with the market becoming the ultimate destination of stolen goods, livestock theft is taking on a degree of specialization and organization requiring both insiders and outsiders to be involved.

At the familial level, I do not have enough data to say whether thieves are more or less likely to steal from their kin and *compadres* than from other villagers. Intrafamilial theft does happen. The alleged thief in Cases 11 and 19 of Table 5.1, for example, was the son-in-law and *compadre* of the victims respectively. The same individual was the principal suspected in the kitchen theft/house fire of my host family, and he was related to the victims through *compadrazgo*. As a matter of minimizing risks, a thief may have greater opportunity (greater proximity of fields, and knowledge of the targeted field and escape routes), a higher chance of avoiding detection (more knowledge of the field owner's whereabouts and less likelihood of raising suspicions by his or her presence), and a greater chance of avoiding formal sanctions if discovered (the crime is more likely to be kept within the family) if they steal from relatives rather than from unrelated others.

Along with Gose, I do not think that crop theft in the Andes results either from unmeditated biological need or some inexplicable social pathology, but then, he sets these up as straw men easily knocked down. I do, however, think that most crop theft is instrumentally rational, and that its seasonality is explained by a combination of opportunity and frequency-dependent decision making rather than the opposed moralities of property rights that he identifies. Theft, self-restraint on thieving impulses, private defense of one's animals, crops, and household goods in the Andes are largely explain-

able in terms of the people's interests in material gain and social acceptance. Communal institutions sanctioning thieves are likewise motivated by these interests and designed to modify the costs and benefits of theft in terms of them, though the same interests create special problems in achieving collective action in sanctioning that I will address in Part III of this thesis.

Emotional, moral, and expressive factors play a minor role in motivating theft, and arguably, a significant though not dominant role in constraining it. The expressive aspects of theft, counter-theft and defense against thieves in the Andes seem to me to be straightforward ones, expressions about need, fairness, and power. Desires and beliefs are expressed, and underlying cultural assumptions revealed, but these assumptions have little to do with any global image of limited good. The burning of a house can pragmatically destroy evidence of a theft, express a norm of retribution or a passion of vengeance, and reveal assumptions shared by perpetrator and victim about the value of home and hearth. In identifying and associating relevant features, we need to be clear about what is being explained.

Theft and measures taken against thieves reveal underlying expectations about property rights. However, they do not necessarily indicate that there are two different ways of conceiving property rights, nor that they alternate seasonally (property rights in specific sectors alternate seasonally, but not the principles behind them), nor that one conception has transgressed upon the temporal terrain of another. I suspect that there are different moralities involved — or at least differences between people's ideals, the expectations they have of each other, and the standards by which they judge their own behavior, but I see no indication that any of these expectations vary from one phase of the year to another. The seasonal rise and fall of property consciousness that Gose identifies in the Andes is a byproduct of the incidence of theft, not a determinant.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. I adopt a third meaning of "institution" in Chapter 9, where I follow Elster (1989) in treating it as a "rule enforcement mechanism." I think that a good argument can be made that some types of theft in some areas of the Andes are "institutionalized" in this way, but the degree of social organization implied by the term is more readily found in cattle rustling than it is in crop theft.

2. Stein (1961) suggests that satisfaction of immediate desires — someone has a hankering to eat *oqa*, or someone gets hungry while traveling — is one of the reasons for crop theft, and I take this kind of petty theft to be included in what my informants are referring to here.

3. While the term "tolerated theft" is most often associated with demand sharing, the same payoff structure applies here. The tolerated theft model focuses on the differences in value that the same amount of the same resource have for different consumers. Goods that are divisible, that display a payoff curve of diminishing returns, and that are asynchronously acquired will come to be distributed so that each individual keeps no more than he or she can economically defend. Whenever anyone has more than others, the extra portion will be worth more to those who do not have it (Blurton Jones 1984, 1987; Hawkes 1992).

4. While walking through the potato sector one day, a *compadre* pointed out to me where a skunk ("*añas*"), had dug up a row of planted tubers the night before. Because of the particular features of planting in the higher hillside sectors, there is usually a two to six week period after the planting and before the potatoes are plowed under in which the seeds are susceptible to animal and human predators. Presumably, where theft is a factor, the risk could be reduced by moving up the *yapuy* as well as by reducing tuber size, but I know of no instances where this is the case. The Andes is not the only area of the world where small seed potatoes are selected, and the risk of theft is not a plausible explanation in all areas. In the Basque region of Northern Spain, for example, my mother-in-law always selected egg-sized potatoes for planting, because, on her account, neither smaller ones nor the larger ones (once cut up) were sufficiently robust. Seed potatoes are typically buried quite deep in the Basque Country, making fear of theft an unlikely explanation of the small sizes of seed tubers selected there.

5. Reciprocity implies one-for-one justice, vengeance more-than-one-for-one. Vengeance is given freer play in the Andes when people resort to supernatural settlements (Bolton 1974), but my impression is that the general social norm is that of balance.

6. As Elster (1990) notes, honor is a triadic rather than dyadic relation. Without the social support for feuding in Andean communities, individual quests for revenge do not reach public proportion.

7. Gose may disagree with my portrayal of *ayni* as primarily a labor exchange here, as he writes that,

> Ayni tends to be represented as an exchange of working days, particularly male working days . . ., even though it is arguably the prospect of consuming corn beer made by women that is key to recruiting a work party at this time of year, and not the accumulation of "credits" in a labor exchange system. [Gose 1991:46]

More than labor is exchanged at *ayni*. There is an important festive element as well, and all other things being equal (particularly the capacity to provide an equivalent return of time and energy in work), one's capacity to put on a good feast may be decisive in recruiting labor in a competitive recruiting environment. Corn beer is one of, but not the only, ceremonial food esteemed on these occasions. Meat is of equal or greater importance, and this tends to be expressed in field banter in Ccachín by the number of guinea pigs expected to be sacrificed for the occasion. All of this consumption comes out of past production, and does not alter the fact that a share of the future harvest — the fruits of one's labor — are not part the exchange.

8. There were two house fires in Ccachín while I was doing fieldwork, but people reported that such fires were extremely rare. Besides the one reported on here, the other started from the sparks of a trash fire set by a child. People recalled that twenty years earlier a house burned when a girl accidently set fire to the roof with her *mechero* ('kerosene lamp') when she went to the attic for food. Most houses in Ccachín are thatched, but there are no chimneys. Firewood is placed on top of the hearth to dry at night and there is a slight chance that a spark could ignite it, as embers are insulated with ashes so that they can be revived in the morning, but no one could recall a case where a spark from a hearth had set a house on fire. However, it occasionally happens in the small straw huts that people build in the potato fields during harvest. Gade (1983) notes that the combination of thatched roofs and intense lightning storms in higher mountain areas is a leading cause of house fires in rural areas of the Andes. No one recalled an instance of fire resulting from lightning in Ccachín. Scattered huts on open hillsides are more susceptible to lightning strikes than low buildings clustered together, and there is a good possibility that destruction of outlying herding cabins is underreported.

9. Villagers suspect a few of their own to be *brujas*. On occasion, someone will allege that a rival has contracted the services of a sorcerer to do them harm. Such accusations are more frequent in times of conflict, and the tension carries over to people's dreams. One woman told me that upon dreaming that a sorcerer had buried something in her house, she awoke the next morning to find the suspected objects: a

small bundle containing a black thread, a cross of thorns wrapped in black thread, and animal teeth, the latter associated with family quarrels. Another woman reported that a male sorcerer came to visit under the pretext of selling coca, and sat in the doorway "like a woman" ("*warmihina*"), waiting for the opportunity to hide a bundle under the doorsill. Witchcraft was suspected because the woman began to grow weak, and her mother cured her with a special tea and holy water. Among the accepted cures for witchcraft are the sprinkling of blessed water, the burning of the witchcraft items with kerosene, and the reading of *San Ciprián*, a pseudoChristian book of witchcraft liturgy. Each of the cures is intended to return the curse to the person who has contracted it. The second woman above reported that this was what happened in her case, as the woman who contracted the witch took sick a day later and almost died of vomiting. Ever fearful of contagious magic, when people comb their hair they throw it into the hearth to keep it from falling into the hands of "envious neighbors" who might do them harm, and many weavings, especially those worn by community officials on ritual occasions, bear a bit of *lloq'e* ('left-handed, counter-clockwise, S-spun yarn') as protection against witchcraft and other hazards.

10. While the volunteer fire department is part of small town lore in the U.S., to understand the situation in Ccachín, we need think back to a time in our own history when firefighting lacked formal organization. In the early 17th century, Boston became the first town to pass regulations against the use of thatched roofs and wood chimneys, and New York followed suit with the appointment of fire wardens to inspect homes for compliance, and the appointment of night patrols. Our modern fire departments developed out of the mutual fire societies and private firefighting clubs first established among the colonists in North America (McChesney 1986).

11. Gose (1991:48) finds a more truncated period for *wasichakuy* in his research community of Huaquirca — from the end of August to mid-September. This period fits well with his image of house thatching as intersected by the opposing seasonal moralities of private appropriation and collective production. In contrast, I have recorded *wasichakuy* as taking place in Ccachín in several months.

12. In terms of the composition of the group, five men were relatives, one was a *compadre*, one was a godchild, one was a renter, two were neighbors (exclusive of the neighbors counted as relatives), five were friends of the family (most of whom were involved in ongoing *ayni* exchanges with the family), and ten were, as far as I am aware, none of the above. Three of the women were members of the immediate family, one was a more distant relative, one was a *comadre*, and the relationship of the two oldest women to the family is unknown.

13. There are differences between communities in who prepares the cross for the roof, and in the symbolic understandings about the cross that are ritually highlighted and expressed. The old man who prepared the crosses at this *wasichakuy* appears to have taken on the task because of his elderly status (the elders typically are the ones who

lead the rest in prayer and are considered to have the greatest religious expertise), and because it was the best way for him to be useful, most other tasks requiring a great degree of physical agility. He led the other prayers as well. Gose (1991) reports that in Huaquirca, a "son-in-law" — not necessarily an actual son-in-law of the sponsor but someone who has been designated as such after finding a bundle of goods hidden in the field where the straw is cut — is the one who makes the crosses for the roof. In some areas, the crosses are made by *compadres*. Gose attributes both of these assignments to the role of the cross as a mitigating force against incest. As far as I am aware, none of these features or symbolic associations are part of thatching parties in Ccachín.

14. Gose (1991) reports that in Huaquirca, a mock remarriage of each member of the sponsoring couple to someone spontaneously chosen from the opposite sex often takes place at this time, but such was not the case here. The banter was not even filled with sexual innuendo as is common at vigils, wakes and other late night gatherings, but I suspect that this was because of the particularly upright character of the hosts rather than because of any cultural rule.

15. Gose (1991), for example, makes much of the fact that during the drinking session that follows *wasichakuy*, a few of the men present may make a figure of a fox out of the remaining hay and straw rope. He concludes that the fox carries a heavy symbolic load in this context. As a creature of gluttony it "transfers these qualities to the roof, as a repository of the privately appropriate harvest, and . . . the two share a common opposition to the productive order" (1991:54). As a symbol of the origin of agriculture, the presence of the fox in rethatching rites reenacts the origin of the crops on an annual bases. "In both cases, gluttonous concentration and consumption of the crops must give way to a productive dispersal marked by death" (1991:55). As a symbol of the "parent-in-law" or sponsors of the thatching, it represents "those unruly and exploitative proprietor/consumers who also resist unto death their incorporation into the productive order" (1991:55). Provocative as these interpretations are, they are totally dependent on the opposition between collective production and private accumulation already described. As a simple matter of timing, all I wish to add is that the season for house rethatching coincides with the mating season of the fox.

16. It's probable that my presence influenced my host family here, as the female head made the trip to Yanawara to visit the tarot-card reader after hearing of my experiences with the same. Among the highlights of my reading, I was told that I would move to Spain, that I would write a book, that I needed to guard against theft, and that I would have trouble with my lower back. When I returned to Ccachín, my hosts took particular interest in the latter (perhaps because it was the one thing that they felt that they could help me with), and immediately set about preparing herbal teas to treat the problem, which they attributed to my heavy pack. A week after my trip to Yanawara, my host made a special trip to visit the *bruja* there. Besides

fingering the two neighbors that she already suspected as the true arsonists, the *bruja* told her that they had set the house afire while drunk, that the shawls that they stole in the process had been sold, that they destroyed the unfinished poncho that they stole, that her son had fallen into bad company with friends who were not good for him, that he had spent the money missing from the sale of the family's cattle on a school field trip, and that steps needed to be taken to improve the health of the rest of the family's cattle.

17. Among the observations made by Bolton is that as uncertainty increases, so does the severity of the punishment:

> It is interesting to note, though, that a subtle but important escalation takes place with respect to the punishment inflicted . . . If caught, the suspect is merely beaten; a beating is not considered to be terribly serious by the Qolla. As uncertainty increases, however, the retribution becomes harsher. In situations of extreme uncertainty, when sorcery is applied, the penalty is death. [Bolton 1974:213]

Bolton speculates that the reason may be that only a dramatic punishment such as death can reduce the uncertainty felt by the aggrieved in these cases. Despite the conformance of this theory with the literature on the rationality of deterrence (for example, Becker 1976), I suspect that the actual reason has more to do with the constraints of social life in contrast to the dream and spirit world. The desire to inflict harm may well be the same in both instances, but the consequences of doing so vary dramatically. In the latter, in fact, uncertainty provides cover, allowing those who seek retribution with the assistance of the sorcerer to themselves avoid detection.

18. Gade (1983) associates these crosses with protection against lightning and hail. Gose (1991) interprets them as a sign of agricultural abundance (a sign of the crops stored beneath the roof) and a means of protection against "flying heads" (because of the symbolic connections, he considers it possibly an effort to prevent incest). Here, I take it that for many if not most people in Ccachín, they signify supernatural protection of the household in a general sense.

19. The problem with "falling back on magic" for Gose (1994), is that it offers little explanation other than uncertainty as to why labor and ritual should coincide and interact in the annual cycle. But to say this is to conflate magic and ritual just as much as do the theorists of rationality he criticizes. I think it better to recognize that rituals are complex phenomena sustained by rational, nonrational, and irrational choices, and that the explanation of one feature does not necessarily apply to another.




Figure 5.1: Private Appropriation, Collective Production Matrix



Figure 5.2: *Wasichakuy*, a House-Raising Party

Table 5.1: Cases of Theft in Ccachín

#	Item Stolen	Location	Time of Year	Provenance of Suspect	Notes
1	Camera	Village nucleus	July	Ccachín	*Denuncio* made to *Teniente Gobernador*, camera located and returned by suspect
2	Carpentry tools, rafter poles	House under construction	November	Unknown	House located along river in an isolated site
3	Cattle (1)	High Pastures	Unknown	Ccachín	
4	Cattle (1)	High Pastures	September	Lares Valley	Counter-claim made by suspect alleging that the victim originally stole the animal from him
5	Cattle (1)	High Pastures	Unknown	Rayankancha	
6	*chuñu*	High *chuñu* freezing area	July	Rayankancha	Thief apprehended and detained in Ccachín jail
7	Corn, onions	Unlocked building near house	August	Same person as #1	Harvested produce was being stored at the site
8	Corn, agricultural products	Village nucleus	December	Unknown	Produce stolen from *marka* of victim's home
9	Corn	Cornfield	June	Unknown	A 350 m^2 section of field was partially harvested
10	Corn	Village nucleus	December	Unknown	6 sacks of corn stolen from house on Christmas eve
11	Corn (Several sacks)	Cornfield	May	Ccachín, son-in-law of claimant	Harvested in field by suspect, who was hiding out there from authorities after beating a brother-in-law; suspect claimed that the corn was given to him on loan

12	Cow	Close to village	November	Ccachín, including suspect in #11	Thieves interrupted in flight and animal recovered
13	Cow and calf	High Pastures	Unknown	Ccachín	The brand was tampered with
14	Firewood	River Woodland	March	Unknown	6 horse loads of firewood were stolen from site where it was cut before they could be retrieved by the owner
15	Flowers	Village gardens	February	Carnival Dancers	Plants torn up by roots, destroying them
16	Horse (1)	Post-harvest *maway* field	May	Ccachín	Thief apprehended and detained in Ccachín jail
17	Horse (1)	Pastures	August	Unknown	Animal recovered but the thief escaped
18	Horses (3)	High pastures	August	Ccachín	Horses recovered near Qochayoq, thief escaped
19	Linseed	Village nucleus	June	Same suspect as #11, *compadre* of victim	Linseed had been left to dry on deck of house
20	Meat (lamb)	High herding cabin	February	Same suspect as #1	Carcass was removed from victim's cabin while family was herding; complaint was made to the suspect's mother
21	Money	Potato field	October	Maternal uncles of victim's unrecognized child	Lost and allegedly stolen in a fight after a *papa yapuy*
22	Money	School	June	A teacher	
23	Pot and cup	Cornfield	July	Ccachín	Utensils used for milking cows had been hidden in brush
24	Pots and pans	Village nucleus	May	Unknown	House of poor bachelor on outskirts of the village nucleus was broken into

25	Sacks of milk, flour, soy, bread	School	December	Ccachín	Food belonged to the "*Vaso de Leche*" Program
26	Sacks of food, donated clothing	*Club de Madres* building	November	Officers of Club	Food belonged to the "*Vaso de Leche*" Program
27	Sheep (1)	School yard	August	Unknown	Carcass left to look like the work of predators
28	Sheep (several)	Herding hut in high pasture	August	Unknown	Thieves entered cabin at night and stripped herder of her clothes
29	Wire fence roll, 2 sacks, 2 ropes	Village nucleus	April	Unknown	*Varayoq* conducted a house-to-house search but items were not found
30	Wood	Village nucleus	Unknown	Neighbor of victim	Pines trees chopped down and taken

Table 5.2: Theft Prevention in the Andes

1. Metal locks are used on house and cabin doors and are considered by the *campesinos* to be indispensable.
2. Crops are stored in a room or second story inside the house ("*marka*") rather than in a separate structure.
3. High walls are constructed around the household gardens and topped off with cactus or thorny plants to inhibit entry by animals and humans.
4. Especially-prized crops are interspersed or hidden amidst more common varieties, so that they will be harder for thieves to discover and harvest.
5. Small seed potatoes are used instead of large to prevent them from being disinterred (it makes it less economically advantageous to do so), even though this leads to less production than if large seed potatoes would be used.
6. Huts ("*ch'uklla*") are constructed in the maize and potato fields for observation. They are situated in central or elevated locations, and sometimes constructed on posts to provide a better view. The huts are often occupied at night, especially preceding and during the harvest, but their mere presence helps discourage theft by increasing the uncertainty among prospective thieves of whether they are being watched or not.
7. Communally-appointed field guardians ("*arariwa*") are designated by the community to watch over the communally-regulated potato sectors. This practice has pre-European roots, and was codified by law in 1575 under Viceroy Toledo.
8. Whether people live in dispersed or nucleated settlements may depend, among other things, on the character and extent of theft in the area.

Source: Gade (1970)

Table 5.3: Inventory of a House Fire

List of Items Destroyed

Physical Structure: 7 meters by 4.6 meters, normal one story height with loft, 2 rooms, adobe walls, thatched roof with wood beams and root binding, 1 wood door and 1 wood window.

Tools: 1 foot plow (*q'orona*), 3 recurved hoes (*lanzas*), 1 recurved shovel (*lampa*), 1 sickle, 1 ax, 1 pick, 1 hoof cutter, 2 knives, 1 sharpening stone.

Kitchen Utensils: Several various-sized aluminum cook pots, several ceramic pots, metal plates, cups, and spoons, 2 fry pans, coffee pot, tea pot, several large *chicha* carrying gourds, 4 *raki* (large ceramic *chicha*-making pots), 3 gallons of kerosene and plastic container, a number of ½ and 1 gallon containers, 24 beer bottles.

Produce and Medicine: 25 lbs. of Maras salt, 500 lbs. of "3rd grade" corn for pig food, 1½ kg. of Redomil fungicide for potatoes, 1 liter of alpaca medicine, insecticide for treating cattle, iron vitamin tablets, various spices.

Animals: 20 guinea pigs, 1 chicken.

Factory-Made Clothing: 3 pairs of baby pants, 3 baby shirts.

Hand-Made Textiles: several carrying cloths, 1 complete and 1 partially completed woman's shawl, 1 panel of a man's *pallay poncho*, 1 woven potato sack, 2 belts, 20 balls of spun horsehair.

Estimated Monetary Costs of Reroofing

Construction Item	**Estimated Cost**
Punku (door, by village carpenter)	12,000,000 intis ($24 US)
Candado (lock)	3,000,000 intis ($ 6 US)
Ventana (window, by carpenter)	8,000,000 intis ($16 US)
Mikhuy (Food for *Wasichakuy*) (2 liters alcohol, 3 kilos rice, etc.)	15,000,000 intis ($30 US)
Total Direct Costs	**38,000,000 intis ($76 US)**

Estimated Resources and Labor for Reroofing

Construction Item	Days of Labor (*Jornales*)	
Ichhu (straw grass) for roofing	8	(24 cargas @ 8 people cutting 3/day)
	4	(transport of *ichhu* by horse from *loma*)
Palos (rafter poles)	10	(50 poles, cut and hand delivered)
Mora (roots for binding the poles)	4	(3 cargas, cut and delivered)
Chaqlla (sticks for roofing)	8	(with *palos* and *mora*, from the *monte*)
Cleaning, replacement of *punku chaka* (door headers)	8	
Perqa (Repair of gabled walls)	12	(Manufacture and laying of adobe)
Wasichakuy (Roofing party)	25	(Not including 3-4 *jornales* of food preparation by the women)
	79	**Estimated Days of Labor for Roofing**

Note: While all of the necessary labor would be obtained through reciprocal labor exchange and contribution by family and friends, for comparison, the *jornal* (day's wage) rate in Ccachín is generally the same as in the Lares Valley. The *jornal* was reportedly 500,000 *intis* (about $1 US) at the time.

Chapter 6

The *Suñay* Puzzle: Explaining Gifts to Non-Kin

Introduction

In this chapter, I consider *suñay*, the donation of live animals to kin and non-kin during annual rituals for the herds, in order to explore behavior that is marked by beneficial consequences that are so long-term that they would not be apparent to the actors that practice it, and thus not among their motives for giving. *Suñay* gifts are a feature of *t'inkay*, a fertility ritual conducted for livestock in pastoral and agropastoral communities throughout the Andes. The ceremony goes by a couple of names in Ccachín. It is usually referred to as *t'inkay* ('libation'), highlighting the practice of splashing beverages over the herds during the ceremony. It's also referred to as *ch'uyay*, emphasizing its significance in clarification and purification. In Q'ero, the same ritual is known as *phallchay*, taking its name from *phallcha* (*Gentiana scarlatina*), the red puna flowers sprinkled over the animals (Flores Ochoa and Fries 1989). The ceremony is referred to as *haywarisqa* in some areas of Cusco, underscoring that it is an offering (Flores Ochoa 1977; Lira 1985), and as *waytakuy* ('to decorate with flowers'), *señalakuy* ('to mark'), and *herranza* ('to brand') in other regions of the Andes.

In the last chapter, I mentioned Gose's contention that *t'inkay* ritually express the image of limited good and ethic of private accumulation that Andean peasants have at certain times of the year. Whatever its meaning to participants, any ethnographic description of the ceremony in similar terms would be partial, as the ceremony has both accumulative and redistributive elements. The latter provides a significant puzzle for researchers seeking to explain cooperative behavior, and I take this puzzle as my theme here.

At first glance, it might appear that there is nothing unusual or surprising about *suñay*. Norms of reciprocity and reciprocal exchanges are ubiquitous in Andean culture

and society, as they are in much of the world. The striking thing about *suñay*, however, is that individuals sometimes give unreciprocated gifts of animals to nonrelatives. In so doing, they not only relinquish control over a valuable resource, they reduce the size of their holdings, thereby exposing their herds and household to greater risk, as all herds are vulnerable to depredation and possible extinction through predation, disease, and theft. Such examples of altruism are hard to explain from the perspective of rational choice theory and behavioral ecology, as both assume self-interested actors, and the two principle models used to explain cooperation — reciprocity and kin selection — do not seem relevant in this case. Should we conclude then that *suñay* giving is nonrational or irrational? Flannery, Marcus, and Reynolds (1989) discuss the question at considerable length in their work "The Flocks of Wamani." They conclude that *suñay* is best explained in terms of its group-level benefits. In this chapter, I evaluate their explanation to determine if it is logical, consistent, and testable, and if it matches the available evidence. I am sympathetic to their modeling efforts, but group selection requires very special conditions to be viable, and after considering their argument, I am not convinced that those conditions hold in this case. At issue is whether the values and intentions which underpin *suñay* giving can be explained purely as instrumental actions in pursuit of short-term interests, or whether they require feedback via their long-term unintended benefits. After reviewing the data that we have on *suñay* as practiced throughout the Andes, I point to individual- and household level processes that may help solve the *suñay* puzzle.

Description of the Practice

Suñay in Ccachín

Two of the most important rituals that households conduct for their flocks and herds in Ccachín occur in the weeks immediately leading up to Carnival. *Compadres P'unchay* is a moveable feast held on the second Thursday before Ash Wednesday. A marking ceremony is conducted for the sheep, goats, llamas, and alpacas. A week later on *Comadres P'unchay* the cattle are similarly feted. Elaboration of these ceremonies varies from household to household and from year to year depending on the economic

resources, composition, and religiosity of the families involved, but the ceremony generally includes providing salt to the animals, sprinkling them or decorating them with flowers, throwing *chicha* and other alcoholic beverages over the animals and the pastures, prayers to the *apu* ('mountain lords'), coca chewing, and ritual drinking.[1] In the case of the cattle, often pastured a day or more walk from the community, a family may send someone with a salt-corn mixture to give to the animals and carry out the rest of their *Comadres P'unchay* ceremony together at home. Elaborate *uywa t'inkay* ('animal marking ceremonies') are accompanied by music and dance, the burning of incense and a ritual offering "*despacho*"), ceremonial bundles containing *enqaychu*, *illa*, and other ritual objects, blessing of the children responsible for herding, the "*casamiento*" ('wedding') of pairs of young male and female animals, and the distribution of live animals to family members, *compadres*, or others in attendance (Figure 6.3).

Barbara and I received a young male goat as a gift from some *compadres* at a *t'inkay* ceremony during the 1990 Carnival season. The *t'inkay* ceremony was held in a level clearing surrounded by bushes on a hillside near the village, the general area where the family pastured their herd. Our *compadres* had few animals by Ccachín standards — six sheep and nine goats — and with the small herd, predominance of goats, and reliance on their youngest son to herd them, they pastured their animals closer to the village than most. The ceremony was simpler than others we attended. The site was swept clear of dung and debris and three rows of salt were laid out. The salt was served directly, without the typical base of toasted-and-ground corn. We threw pebbles at the family's two horses to drive them away from the salt. The eldest son brought his radio, which he played through the ceremony. Sitting together around a manta, we prepared necklaces of *phallcha* flowers (*Gentiana scarlatina*) and *phuña* leaves (*Culcitium rufescens*) for the sheep and goats. After sufficient collars were made, the remainder of the flowers were torn into bits and mixed together. A separate collar was made of scarlet *ñukch'u* flowers (*Salvia* spp.). We exchanged *k'intu* and chewed coca. From time to time the chewed coca wads ("*hach'u*") were collected with a prayer in a carrying cloth. Our *compadres* had not prepared *chicha* for the occasion, but we drank rounds of *trago*, occasionally

flavored with the Tang we had brought as our contribution. After we were finished preparing the necklaces, our *comadre* drank a number of *tragos* in succession, naming a child and saying a prayer with each drink. Next, first year animals were caught two-by-two, and we placed the floral collars around their necks. While doing this, our *compadre* announced that they were going to give us a young male goat. They fit the goat with the *ñukch'u* collar. The gift was given without the speech and fanfare that we were accustomed to at public events and first haircuttings. After placing the collars, each of us gathered a pile of the mixed flowers and threw them over the animals. The animals scattered, and we chewed more coca and drank more *trago*. At the end of the ceremony, our *compadre* buried some oranges and the chewed coca wads on the hillside above the site.

Since we were in no position to take care of our kid goat on our own, our *compadres* agreed that they would keep it with their herd and watch over it. We gave their youngest son, the family's herder, a new set of clothing and some notebooks for school for his help. Nine months later, right before Barbara was scheduled to leave for the States, our *compadre* determined that it was time to butcher the animal and did so for us. We butchered the animal on a Saturday, a propitious day for doing so. We chewed coca leaves in preparation, and our *compadre* stuffed a handful of coca leaves into the goat's mouth before slitting its throat.[2] By mutual agreement we divided up the carcass *a medias* ('by halves'). We took home the head, hide, and a side of meat, leaving the blood, internal organs, and the other side with our *compadres*.

The practice of *suñay* among ritual kin is customary in Ccachín, although I can't say how frequent it is. Animals are likewise given as gifts to one's children and *compadres* attending the *t'inkay* ceremony on *Compadres P'unchay* in Chinchero (Angel Callañaupa, personal communication). The pattern appears widespread throughout the Andes, and we are not the only anthropologists that have been so honored. Kent Flannery reports that he received a young llama through *suñay* while attending a marking ceremony in Toqtoqasa, Ayacucho in 1971 (Flannery et. al. 1989). Since he could not take his gift back to the States with him, Flannery likewise arranged to leave his llama with the parent

herd, agreeing to repay the family for the care it would receive. Flannery apparently did not have *compadrazgo* relations with the sponsors of the ceremony that he attended, but he contributed seven or eight dollars worth of local supplies and a bottle of Jack Daniel's bourbon to the event, so a degree of reciprocity was involved. He reports that in a year where the family was suffering through hard times, it made the difference between their holding the ceremony or not.

Features of *Suñay*

The features that define *suñay* are the following: the practice is part of a traditional animal-decorating ceremony, a live animal is given as a gift, and anyone who assists the herd owner or contributes to the ritual offering can potentially receive an animal, whether or not they are a relative. The season in which the ceremonies occur depends on which animals are involved (llamas and alpacas, sheep and goats, cows, or horses) and on regional traditions, but they're typically held during the Carnival season and in late July-August.[3] With the mix of New and Old World livestock and syncretism of indigenous and Spanish practices, distinctions between branding, notching ears, cutting tails, sewing ribbons into ears and tails, and fitting animals with floral necklaces has become blurred, with a corresponding interweaving of terminology and practices. Marking may be for ownership, identification, or decoration.

Suñay is associated with marking ceremonies, but it is not a defining feature of them, as for example, gifts of animals are at first haircuttings. Flannery et. al. (1989) liken marking ceremonies to "epideictic displays" that let everyone know how many animals the owner has. Although this implies that communicating such information is one of the intents or functions of the ceremonies, it could just as well be a negative or neutral byproduct. Since information on herd size alters the expectations of potential recipients about an owner's capacity to give an animal in *suñay*, an incentive is created for herd owners to downplay their holdings to avoid envy and unwanted pressures. The risk of theft furthers this tendency. Herd size is hard to conceal in relative terms, especially for animals pastured on communal lands, as daily herding activity allows for

estimation by one's peers. However, there is considerable reluctance among villagers in Ccachín to divulge precise information about their animal holdings to outsiders and to each other, and Flannery et. al. make a similar observation about herders in Ayacucho. Although prestige display and the need to reinforce territorial claims may create counter pressures, reference to marking ceremonies as "epideictic displays," with all the connotations that the term implies, adds unnecessary baggage to the analysis.[4]

Flannery et. al. note that in the Ayacucho area, a ceremonial trumpet is blown at the start and end of the ceremony. They interpret this as a de facto invitation to all willing to contribute to come to the ceremony in the hope of receiving an animal through *suñay*. But such may be an effect without being the intent. If the custom emerged, for example, to reaffirm a herder's use rights to pasture animals in a given territory, its role in attracting additional participants would be fortuitous.[5] Trumpeting does not accompany *t'inkay* in Ccachín. One generally knows where and when someone is conducting a *t'inkay* ceremony in the village by the accompanying music and dance, but unlike *papa yapuy*, where there is competition to secure sufficient workers, there is no open invitation to participate. *T'inkay* are primarily private affairs restricted to kin, *compadres*, and other invited guests. Most take place on the same day, further limiting the number who are able to attend.

Beyond the features that define *suñay* throughout the Andes, Flannery et. al. (1989) identify a number of features that are specific to the practice in Ayacucho. These are a) that selection of the animal given in *suñay* is left up to the recipient with no attempt by the host to protect a prime animal, b) the animal chosen is almost always a young female, c) the exchange value of the animal given is greater than the recipient's contribution to the ceremony, often by a factor of ten or more, and d) there is no expectation that the gift will ever be equaled or reciprocated.

The first three of these features are relatively easy for an outside investigator to determine by observation. The last is harder to ascertain. It may be true of the *suñay* ideal in Ayacucho, but it is hard to say much more about expectations of reciprocity without following specific relationships and practices over time. Flannery et. al. report

that while the norm of giving in Ayacucho is such that *suñay* is supposed to be spontaneous and not prearranged, in practice, intermediaries often suggested the name of a needy herd owner. Judging by the ethnographic record, most *suñay* recipients in most communities are relatives or *compadres* where the expectation of generalized reciprocity holds sway. We need to know more about the relationship history and social characteristics of unrelated hosts and recipients before concluding that there are no expectations of them involved.

Explaining *Suñay*

Models of kin-selection and reciprocal altruism explain cooperative behavior in terms of individual self-interest. Most *suñay* animals are given by herders to their children, kin, and *compadres*, so that the majority of instances are explainable in principle in terms of one or the other of these mechanisms. The feature that makes *suñay* interesting for rational choice and evolutionary theory is that animals are sometimes given to widows and needy younger men without formal kinship or reciprocal ties.

Some have suggested that a heuristic for discriminating between kin and non-kin was not necessary in ancient family-level societies, and that the generosity and other acts of altruism toward nonrelatives that we see today is a vestige of a very general trait favored in small foraging groups through most of human evolution. However, the substantial variation in genetic relatedness among members of the smallest foraging groups and the human capacity and propensity to make much finer classificatory discriminations makes it unlikely that the forces of kin-selection have produced indiscriminately altruistic behavior (Frank 1988; Dawkins 1989). The kin-selection model is limited in application; genetic relatedness declines rapidly outsides the confines of the nuclear family. For most intents-and-purposes, second cousins are much like strangers where payoffs for helping behavior are concerned. The use of kinship as a metaphor and model for inclusion of nonrelatives into one's cooperative network is an impressive feature of social relations in the Andes, and helps express social expectations. *Compadrazgo*, in particular, is marked by the use of familial terms to expand and consolidate reciprocal

relations between households. Kinship distinctions are maintained, however, and these networks are not indiscriminate.

Reciprocity can explain cooperation among unrelated individuals, whether or not such reciprocity is framed in terms of kinship. In large groups with repeated interactions, voluntary cooperation can arise as people act benevolently toward each other with the expectation of being recognized and rewarded in turn in the future. Indeed, as long as a few key requisites are fulfilled — that at least some individuals are prepared to reciprocate, that reciprocators can be discriminated from nonreciprocators, and that the "shadow of the future" is sufficiently large enough — cooperation can emerge, thrive, and be maintained among unrelated individuals in a variety of settings under fairly nonrestrictive conditions. The potential cooperators need not be making conscious or intentional choices, they need not exchange messages or commitments, they need not trust each other, they need not take each others' welfare into consideration, the rewards of their cooperation need not be comparable, symmetric, or absolute (Axelrod 1984).

Flannery et. al. (1989) view *suñay* as an outgrowth of *ayni*, reciprocal assistance that is delayed in return, comparable in value, and symmetrical in power. *Suñay*, however, is not characterized by comparable exchange or symmetrical power. In return for a relatively small contribution to a ceremony's success, the recipient of a *suñay* gift typically receives a young animal of considerably greater value, without expectation that it will be equaled or reciprocated in the future. Quechua has a term for noncomparable asymmetrical reciprocal relations — *mink'a* — which refers to festive labor where the host provides food, drink, music, and other goods and services in return for help, without any obligation to directly reciprocate the labor recruited. Sometimes, the host is expected to attend the *mink'a* of others in the group, so an indirect form of balanced reciprocity takes place, and the same could be the case with *suñay*, with receivers becoming givers when they are in the position to do so. Alexander (1988) proposes that human cooperation may be uniquely supported by complex chains of indirect reciprocity, made possible by our sophisticated cognitive capacities. Boyd and Richerson (1988) have established,

however, that beyond relatively small groups of six-ten individuals, indirect reciprocity is much harder to get started in a population than pairwise reciprocity.

Both *ayni* and *mink'a* were important pre-Hispanic Andean institutions. Among herders, *ayllu* members would assist each other in managing the communal herds ("*ayni*"), and people that helped the *kuraka* ('local leader', 'chief', or 'headman') often were paid in animals ("*mink'a*"). Destitute individuals sometimes received animals from the *kuraka*'s herd as well. Whether *suñay* was a pre-Hispanic practice or not is unknown, but it seems likely, given the Quechua rather than Spanish etymology of the term. Flannery et. al. (1989) suggest that it may have been practiced among the *wakchallama* ('commoners', literally, 'llama poor'), but they emphasize that given the managerial structure of the Inca state, the practice was largely unnecessary. With central organization, the pre-Hispanic herding system was much less vulnerable to sex-ratio imbalances and the demographic collapse of local herds, and there were alternative sources for new breeding stock. Whether of pre-Hispanic or post-Hispanic origin, *suñay* could have first emerged as a variant of *ayni*, *mink'a*, or the alms-giving of *kuraka*.

Assuming that this is the case, why *suñay* became more generalized in the post-Conquest period, and why reciprocal practices among relatives and *ayllu* members came to include unreciprocated gifts must still be explained. The answer Flannery et al. (1989) propose revolves around the effects of long run ecological processes on cultural transmission. The long term group benefit they identify is not in the immediate interests of *suñay* givers, nor is it recognized by the herders themselves. Their explanation is functionalist and grounded in the dual inheritance models of Boyd and Richerson (1985). I will explore it here at some length, as it helps draw out the distinctions and relationships between rational, cultural, and functional explanation.

Redistributive Benefits

Flannery et al.'s (1989) explanation for *suñay* goes as follows: In agropastoral and herding societies, the destinies of human populations and domesticated animal herds are linked, so that a herder's subsistence base and bequest to future generations depends

on the growth and stability of his or her herds, while the reproductive success of the animals depends as much on human action as on natural selection. All herds have a minimum sustainable size. Quantitative information and computer simulations on llama-herd dynamics, for example, indicates that contemporary herds are oscillating populations of less than fifty individuals, doomed to reach equilibrium at zero within a hundred years unless new breeding stock can be added whenever a minimum reproductive core of two males and four females is threatened. The sources of new breeding stock have changed through time. During the early stages of domestication, wild stock could have been added to domestic herds. Under Inca rule, large community herds provided a reservoir of breeding stock. The power of the Inca state likewise made it easier to control thieves and predators and pool large numbers of small herds, reducing the risk factors. These options are not available to contemporary herders, but some solution to the problem is still necessary, and *suñay* fits the bill. Flannery et. al.'s computer simulations suggest that the redistributive effect of *suñay* makes a significant improvement in the size and stability of the local llama population. The more universally it is carried out, the better chance every herd has. In populations where individuals respond to rational, short-term self-interests by not giving animals away or giving them only to kinfolk, everyone's herd, large or small, is in the long term vulnerable to collapse, and with it, the reproductive success and cultural lifeways of the herders themselves.

Flannery et. al. do not claim that this beneficial effect is recognized by the participants of marking ceremonies. It hardly could be, given that it's only noticeable over generations and only from the perspective of an entire local population. They acknowledge that the proximate cause or motivation behind *suñay* is essentially religious, a desire to maintain right relations with the *wamani* (or *apu*, as they are referred to in Ccachín), the mountain spirits, the true owners of the herds. They dwell less on the social motivations *suñay* givers might have, but as in the case of the *suñay* gift Flannery received, they imply that it could be pure gratitude for their guests' contributions to this critical religious event.

Unintended Consequences

It's important to be clear about what the unintended and unrecognized consequences of *suñay* are. As Flannery et. al. suggest, any individual herder is only likely to witness thirty to forty years of the life-history of the herd they manage, but the beneficial redistributive effect of *suñay* only becomes visible from a time frame three times as long. Flannery et. al. note that if during a herder's lifetime their herd falls on hard times, they are likely to blame themselves for not executing the proper rituals and will attribute their misfortune to the displeasure of the mountain spirits. They emphasize this to answer a different question: why is it that the gift-giving of animals is associated with marking ceremonies rather than with something else? — but it's important to note, as my experience in Ccachín suggests, that herders also recognize more proximate causes of herd decline — predation, disease, theft, overgrazing — and have a repertoire of practical techniques and strategies to attempt to correct the immediate problem. Various personal failings may be identified in the casual chain of herd decline — alcoholism, adultery, neglect — and the culpability of others may be invoked, especially with concern for witchcraft and theft. To deal with the ultimate source of their problems, however, some sort of ritual to set their relationship right with supernatural forces is the norm, both on a customary basis during the annual calendar and as an aspect of crisis management.

Suñay gifts involve givers and receivers, and there is little need to go beyond the self-interests of the receivers to explain why animal-poor individuals might attend and contribute to a wealthier herd owner's marking ceremony in the hope of receiving an animal in turn. That is not to say that self-interest is the only motivation in attending, but it does point out that the custom of *suñay* creates incentives and strategic opportunities for people seeking to expand their herds. The benefit of the gift to a receiver is readily recognizable. The problem from a rational choice or evolutionary perspective is identifying corresponding social or material incentives on the part of the giver. Given its customary nature, givers are aware that if their herds become decimated, one of the ways to obtain new breeding stock is through *suñay*, and to this extent, the option benefits them as well. Herders can try to forestall this possibility, however, by holding onto the animals

they have. Universal *suñay* as described by Flannery et. al. functions as a regionwide insurance system, but there's no indication it is recognized as such, nor that the intent of *suñay* givers is to contribute to a system of social (rather than divine) insurance.

Whether, when, and how unintended consequences can enter into the explanation of the actions that caused them has long perplexed social scientists, and the use of such explanation continues to be extremely controversial. Dransart, for example, has taken Flannery et. al. to task for their approach to *suñay*:

> Although the authors have attempted to describe the cultural side of the equation, at the end of the day, the social has been reduced to the ideological and the study tells us little about the value systems of the llama herders. They are seen as carrying out a series of activities according to an underlying combination of cultural and genetic impulses. In 1971, Flannery was offered a live llama by a family for his participation in an important ritual in the herding cycle. Sadly, this book denigrates the force of the gift and the character of the social relationship which the family attempted to establish with the visitor to their community. [Dransart 1991:156]

My own treatment of the subject could conceivably be characterized as denigrating as well, but by and large, the interpersonal meanings of the *suñay* gift that Barbara and I received can remain private. While the character of my social relationship with my *compadres* is important and elaborating on it in the appropriate contexts could be useful, it is separable from the issues raised by Flannery et. al. that I wish to evaluate here. To separate the issues and link them to larger contexts is not the same as to denigrate the character of the relationship or the acts of giving and receiving. We need to be careful not to confuse "ultimate causation" with "ulterior motives," or assume that a search for the first implies the second. Dransart's criticism strikes me as ad hominem and unfair, and Flannery et. al. deserve credit for their challenging analysis.

Group-Selection

Figure 6.1 summarizes Flannery et. al.'s explanation of *suñay*. Whenever unintended consequences are invoked to explain behavior, it's necessary to specify the causal feedback loop linking the characteristic of interest and the beneficial effect

beginning and ending with the bearer (Elster 1983). Most attempts at functional explanation in the social sciences suffer from a lack of clarity about the beneficial consequences involved, specification of the beneficiaries, and identification of the causal feedback mechanism maintaining the behavior. Flannery et. al. are sensitive to these problems. They recognize the need to specify the mechanism. They're aware of the theoretical debate about the units upon which natural selection acts. It's less clear, however, that they effectively establish that group-selection is a strong causal force in explaining *suñay*.

In general, evolutionary biologists are skeptical of claims that because a given trait is beneficial to the well-being of a group, it has or will be favored by natural selection. As Williams puts it, "an effect [should] be called a function only when chance can be ruled out as a possible explanation. . . . In groups of organisms, an effect should be ascribed completely, if possible, as the fortuitous summation of individual activities unless there is coordinated teamwork . . . or mechanisms for producing group benefit by individual sacrifice" (1966:261-262). Any identifiable group benefits are viewed as byproducts of individual ones, to be causally rather than functionally explained, unless a mechanism can be found sustaining the group benefit. While in theory at least group selection processes operating on genes could lead individuals to sacrifice their interests for those of the group, even small amounts of gene flow create enough heterogeneity within populations to drastically undercut the potential force of group selection, and individuals usually reproduce and perish at higher rates than the groups of which they are members, making group selection a relatively weak evolutionary force.

Since the early 1960s, group advantage has often been adopted uncritically by anthropologists to explain a variety of phenomena, with and without reference to the underlying mechanism of differential extinction of groups. Some investigators have posited that our capacity for warfare has made intergroup competition an especially potent force in human history, accounting for the higher levels of cooperation found among unrelated individuals in the species (Hamilton 1975), but this seems unlikely given contemporary evidence that small-scale societies are open genetic systems, with dispersal of individuals from defeated groups. It's probable that group selection in this

sense can not explain the evolution of altruistic behavior in general. Recent, more sophisticated models of group selection suggest that the development of altruistic "trait groups" — transient subgroups of individuals within breeding populations — with subsequent dispersion and differential propagation throughout the population, could be an evolutionary force in certain instances. These models substantially overlap kin-selection models of the evolution of cooperation and their range of applicability has yet to be determined (see Smith and Winterhalder 1992:29-32).

The theoretical arguments against group selection are usually directed toward models of genetic inheritance. Because of the particular ways in which culturally-inherited variation differs from genetically-inherited information, group selection based on cultural variation offers a potentially potent explanation of the evolution of human cooperation, and Flannery et. al. turn to Boyd and Richerson (1985) for the feedback mechanism that grounds and legitimatizes their explanation of *suñay*. Frequency-dependent bias may maintain enough cultural variation between groups for group selection to be important.

In frequency-dependent bias, an individual does not directly evaluate the value of adopting a trait, but instead uses the frequency of the trait among his or her cultural models as an indirect measure of its merit. Starting with a large population subdivided into many smaller, partially isolated groups, and assuming that a) individuals have a tendency to acquire the variant that is most common among their cultural models, b) a particular cooperative variant — in this case the tendency to extend *suñay* to non-kin — is present but at first rare in the population, c) the cooperative trait is not favored by natural selection within any subpopulation, d) occasionally one of the subpopulations becomes socially extinct in the sense that the group breaks up as a coherent social unit and its members disperse, and e) the proportion of noncooperators in a subpopulation increases the probability that the subpopulation becomes extinct, the cooperative variant can increase in the population if the ratio of the extinction rate of cooperative subpopulations to noncooperative subpopulations is less than the probability that colonizers in recently vacated habitats are drawn from a single subpopulation. As long as the conform-

ist effect is substantially stronger than the effects of selection and migration and the mode of colonization is favorable, group selection on culturally-transmitted traits can increase the frequency of *suñay* and other cooperative practices among large populations of unrelated individuals.

Like the newer genetic models of group selection alluded to above, this mechanism does not require the extinction of groups with too few altruists, only their disruption and the dispersal of their members. The conformist effect of adopting variants based on their frequency in the population assures that as long as less altruistic variants are in a minority, they will not be able to increase despite the immediate advantage they have for their holders within the group. Without conformist transmission, individual-level selection and migration constantly erode the variation between subpopulations, making it unlikely that group-level processes could overcome the direct biases favoring noncooperation. With strong conformist transmission, subpopulations with a high frequency of cooperators can be maintained indefinitely. As long as most dispersal events don't tip altruistic populations over the threshold, group selection can be a potent force.

Boyd and Richerson's identification of a tenable mechanism of group selection on cultural variation is an important advance, and it's to Flannery et. al.'s credit that they hinge their explanation of *suñay* upon it. Their argument would be strengthened if they could specify the social extinction rate of populations during the evolution of *suñay* in quantitative or qualitative terms, but they do not. They hypothesize that the spread of the practice took place in the 450 years after the Spanish conquest and breakdown of the indigenous pre-Hispanic Inca state, the period following the demographic collapse in the sierras, with populations falling to a sixth of their preconquest size. As Cotlear (1989) emphasizes, this period was marked by an abundance of land and a relative scarcity of labor. Consequently, the constraints on herding during the time that *suñay* is said to have evolved may have differed dramatically from those that have pertained since the repopulation of those areas.[6]

Origin and Spread of the Practice

While Flannery et. al. link their explanation of *suñay* to the dual-inheritance models of Boyd and Richerson, their actual description of the group-selection feedback mechanism underpinning their argument is somewhat cursory and misleading. The table they reprint from Boyd and Richerson (1985:208-210) and the formula they take as a mathematical description of the conditions under which cooperation may increase with conformist transmission and group selection do not accomplish what they intend. These tables only establish that the direction of frequency-dependent transmission depends on both the sign of the frequency-dependent parameter (i.e., whether individuals are biased toward conformity or nonconformity) and on the frequency of the trait of interest before its transmission in the population. In their attempt to keep the model as simple as possible, their account short-circuits the feedback mechanism sustaining *suñay*. Fortunately, the appropriate mathematical expression and a qualitative interpretation of the correct model can be found elsewhere in Boyd and Richerson's work (1985:230-238, especially formula 7.21 and 7.23 on page 234), so the plausibility of Flannery et. al.'s argument is not necessarily lost on the basis of this mistake.

The exercise in computer simulation presented by Flannery et. al. is interesting in itself, but their energy goes toward identifying the group benefit without comparable effort to address the feedback mechanism. Without careful attention to the latter, we're left to wonder if their elegant simulations have been wasted on an epiphenomenon. Pinning their work to Boyd and Richerson's dual-inheritance theory to solve this problem is appealing, but the linkage comes across as an afterthought. Flannery et. al.'s treatment of *suñay* exemplifies the danger that the new models of group selection based on cultural variation will be picked up and used as casually as group selection models of old were used to ground functional analysis. The conditions under which the long-term positive, unintended, and unrecognizable consequences of a phenomenon explain it when its short term consequences are negative are limited, and it would be a shame if we return uncritically to a research strategy of postulating purpose without a purposeful actor.

More than passing attention to the feedback mechanism maintaining a purported social function continues to be critically important for functional analysis in the social sciences.

Since Flannery et. al.'s argument is an evolutionary one placed in the post-conquest era, historical data on the development of *suñay* would provide the strongest supporting evidence. Such data are not available, and given that the practice emerged among politically-marginalized populations, is it unlikely to lend itself readily to ethnohistorical analysis. Consequently, Flannery et. al. make their argument by establishing the necessity of the practice for sustainable production, showing that there are no available alternatives, and assuming a pattern of diffusion matching the mechanism of group selection delineated in Boyd and Richerson's dual-inheritance theory.

Flannery et. al. model five hypothetical variations on *suñay*. In the first model, gift-giving is not practiced. Herders are not able to obtain additional breeding stock from other herds when their own herd falls below a minimum size. They determine that an initial herd size of two male and four female llamas of breeding age would be necessary to give a herd a 75% chance of growing to fifteen to sixteen animals. They define this as the "minimum herd size." In the second model, a single large benefactor gives an animal of the appropriate age and sex whenever a herd falls below the minimum size. In the third model, appropriate animals must come from one of the other herds in the regional system if a herd falls below the minimum. However, animals will only be given if they are available. If unavailable, animals of the same sex but past their reproductive prime will be given, or lacking that, no animal at all. In the fourth model, donors always respond to requests, but they do not necessarily give the best animals available. In the last model, donors give the best animal available when they give, but they don't always give. They call these models the "Oliver Twist model," "Santa Claus model," "Surf City model," "cheating model," and "noncooperation model" respectfully.

According to Flannery et. al., the computer simulations suggest that without *suñay* or a functional equivalent, all herds are inherently unstable populations oscillating between growth and decline. Given enough time, without any redistribution of breeding stock (the Oliver Twist model), the average herd size for a regional population would

eventually reach equilibrium at zero. If there were a single unlimited source of new breeding stock so that a single animal of the appropriate age and sex could be obtained whenever one's herd had shrunk to the minimum reproductive core (the Santa Claus model) — a situation much like that presumed to exist under Inca organization — the equilibrium population size could be raised to 22 ± 5. Unfortunately, as Flannery et. al. emphasize, this scenario is empirically unrealistic for the post-conquest period. The third simulation the Surf City model), however, suggests that with universal gift-giving between herders in a regional four-herd system in which one of the herds is established and the rest are new, the system would stabilize within forty years at 15 ± 3 animals per herd. The standard deviation in herd size is less in this case than in the previous one, so that universal gift-giving produces the greatest uniformity in herd size over time. Flannery et. al. suggest that the practice of *suñay* in Ayacucho is just such an example of universal gift-giving, making the case that this simulation is more realistic. The last two simulations test what would happen if donors did not always give their best animals, and what would happen if they sometimes declined to give at all. This latter, for instance, would be the case if they only responded to requests from relatives, not to those from non-kin, or if *suñay* giving were optional. In the first case, where the best animals were not always given (the cheating model), the system bifurcated into "haves" and "have nots," with the former fluctuating around a mean of 27 animals, the latter around a mean of 17. The variability in herd size within the system increased, making the whole system less stable. 20% of the herds failed. In contrast, no herds failed in the universal gift-giving model. While the herd average flattens out to around 10-15 animals with less than 100% cooperation, the biggest effect of noncooperation was seen in the percentage of herds that survived to 100 years with their minimum reproductive core intact. At 0% cooperation, no herds survive, between 25% and 75% cooperation, about half the herds survive. At 100% cooperation, all herds survive. Flannery et. al.'s conclusion:

> Universal adherence to *suñay* — even if it includes giving good breeding stock to non-kin — can make it possible for one's children to pass on more animals to one's grandchildren. It does that by ensuring that there will be lots of other herds around from which the children and grandchildren can get *suñay* when they need

> it. . . . Our largest system included only four herds. It is likely that systems of eight herds, sixteen herds, or more would be even more stable; and, of course, those are the kinds of systems one sees in the real world of the Ayacucho herder. However, even as such larger systems increase the likelihood of getting an animal when one needs it, they also increase the likelihood that not everyone in the system is genetically related. [Flannery et. al. 1989:202]

The patterns identified by Flannery et. al. emerge from simulations of 100 years. Individual anthropologists only spend a small fraction of that observing herd dynamics in a given area in the Andes, and the herds that we see are only snapshots — time-slices of momentary fluctuations in herd size on an ever-changing curve. Given the lack of longitudinal data, Flannery et. al. relies heavily on the general fit between their model of universal gift-giving and the empirical reality of herding in Ayacucho in the early 1970s to establish its plausibility. The empirical reality, as they describe it, is as follows:

a) Ayacucho herders practice a form of universal *suñay* that closely matches the 100% cooperative model. The massing of herds in ritual corrals "left no doubt whether or not the owner could afford *suñay*, and the ethic of generosity to 'those who love me' was so pervasive as to be virtually inescapable" (p. 184). There's "no expectation of reciprocation from the same person or his family, even at a later date" (p. 216). "Cheating is impossible because it is standard practice for the owner to invite the recipient to pick the llama he wants" (p. 197). Furthermore, the normal conditions of exchange among kin and *ayllu* members are suspended, so that "everyone who assists the herd owner, or enriches his offerings to the *wamani*, is treated as a member of the owner's *ayllu* and can potentially receive a gift, whether or not he is an actual relative. Even the visiting gringo who makes a substantial contribution becomes *kuyaq* — 'one who loves me' — and can receive *suñay* during the peak of alcoholic euphoria" (p. 178-179).

b) The frequency of *suñay* giving in Ayacucho is consistent with that needed for long-term herd stability. For a four herd system, "All it requires is a gift

somewhere in the system about once every two years, a frequency not out of line with our observations in Ayacucho" (p. 191).

c) Llama herds in Ayacucho typically reach fifteen to forty animals, with an average size around twenty-five. Herders regarded fifteen animals on the small side, twenty-five animals as a good herd, and thirty-five to forty as excellent. Since the animals are used for burden carrying, they are not eaten until their productive years are behind them. The herds are mature populations, with no more than 25% newborn or yearlings. .

d) While Ayacucho herders say that two animals, "a male and a female," are enough to start a herd, young men will not split their herds off from their fathers' herds until they have several more. Should something happen to reduce their herd later, tiny herds are quickly combined with one of a close relative.

Flannery et. al. argue that observation "c" would not be possible without observation "a" at rates at least equivalent to observation "b." They take observation "d" as evidence that there is indeed a minimal herd size. Along with observation "c," it confirms for them that the figures used for the simulations on birth rate, morbidity, and mortality are realistic.

There are two meanings of "universal *suñay*" implied here. In the first, "universal" refers to the normative ideal. Anyone who contributes to a ceremony is eligible. In the second, "universal" refers to what people do: everyone follows the ideal. It's important to keep the two meanings distinct, but it's easy to slip between them. The evidence offered for the first is based on informant reports and extrapolation from behavior: even *gringos* receive gifts. The evidence given for the second is impressionistic: some families are documented to have practiced *suñay* with strangers, and given the apparent long-term stability of the regional herd, it appears that enough families follow the norm to have this effect. "Enough" here means virtually everyone in a position to give, but Flannery et. al. do not offer any direct evidence of 100% cooperation.[7] Nor do they offer systematic evidence of the frequency of giving animals to non-kin. What

percentage of the animals given at marking ceremonies in a given year are given to family members, *compadres-ahijados*, and "others" respectively? What is the ratio of extra-familial exchanges to the total number of households-herds in the system? We don't know.

The evidence given for the long-term stability of the herds relies heavily on the observation that the equilibrium population has not fallen to zero, and average herd size roughly fits the simulation of universal gift-giving. No systematic data are presented, however, on the range in herd sizes, and what we are given is too sparse to compare the empirical reality to that predicted by their simulations of universal *suñay*, cheating, and noncooperation. As noted above, the "cheating" model predicts a bifurcated population of "haves" and "have nots," each fluctuating around different means. It would be nice to have some ethnographic documentation that this has not occurred.[8]

The predictions of the universal *suñay* model are dramatic: 100% cooperation leads to 100% herd survival. Given the symbiotic relationship between animals and people, it also implies 100% survival of family lines whenever herding is the principal subsistence activity. The claim that llama herders in Ayacucho practice universal *suñay* thus implies that herds and families never die out. This implication is counterintuitive enough to expect some effort to seek corresponding data on actual herd and family survival. Villagers in Ccachín recall and talk about the decline and failure of village families and their herds, so it clearly happens. There may be extrinsic factors that explain why herds sometimes fail and families die out, so the claim that universal *suñay* is practiced in a given area need not necessarily be abandoned when herd survival is found to be less than 100% (the benefits of *suñay* must be compared to the effect of not having it). Flannery et. al.'s simulations of noncooperation, however, suggest that we should see different rates of herd survival depending on the extent that *suñay* is practiced, and as long as other factors can be identified and controlled for, any data that we can collect on actual herd survival rates should help us compare reality with the model.

Functional Equivalents

Given Flannery et. al.'s resort to group-level functionalism, it's important to consider functional equivalents to *suñay*. The notion of functional equivalence suggests that there may be a range of alternatives that would provide solutions to the same problem. Many argue that the analysis of the function of a trait can be separated from analysis of its origins. Focus is on the beneficial effects of a trait, not on why it and not some other trait that would have the same effect occurs (Berger and Offe 1982). As Cohen puts it:

> An anthropologist may find it interesting that some or other ceremonial is performed at all, and having functionally explained that, he may proceed to investigate its specific character without pretense that it too is functionally explained. Given that they perform the ritual, there may be no *functional* explanation why it is this ritual rather than that, and yet that they perform a ritual may be functionally explained. [Cohen 1978:276]

In discussing the problem of maintaining a minimum reproductive core of animals, Flannery et. al. address why *suñay* rather than some other trait with the same beneficial effect emerged. Their concern is to establish the relative importance of *suñay*, recognizing that if there are several other functional equivalents being practiced, their scenario for the origin of *suñay* becomes harder to sustain. Accordingly, they suggest that while there are probably several ways additional breeding animals could be provided, the options available to contemporary herders in Ayacucho are quite limited. As mentioned earlier, continual inputs of wild camelids into domestic herds would have been possible in the early periods of prehistoric domestication, but this has ceased to be an option. Management techniques under the Inca changed mortality factors, pooled small herds into larger ones, and provided a reservoir of breeding stock, but government management came to an end with the Spanish conquest. According to Flannery et. al., there is no evidence in the three communities they studied that marriages were arranged to consolidate one's shrinking herd with a spouse's larger herd, a strategy used, for example, by Chukchi reindeer herders (Leeds 1965).[9] Likewise, exchange of animals in brideprice does not occur in the Andes.

Herd Dynamics

Is seeking an animal through *suñay* the only option Andean herders have for maintaining a minimum reproductive core? What exactly are we referring to when we speak of a "herd"? A review of the areas in the Andes where *suñay* is practiced suggests that people use a variety of strategies to expand and manage their livestock.

There are various ways of pooling herds. I've already mentioned the most ubiquitous above: nonviable units are combined with those of a relative. A close look at most any herd of any domestic species will reveal that the animals of several family members are combined. The cow herd of my host family, for example, includes animals belonging to both parents and their unmarried children. While the total herd includes more than eighty head, the holdings of each of the children is relatively small — from a single animal belonging to the youngest daughter to five head belonging to a son. The one married daughter pastured her animals with her husband's. I have no data on when in a relationship a new couple transfers their animals from their parent's herd to their own, but it's typical in the Andes for married couples to wait a few years to assure that the partnership is secure.[10] Among the Aymara studied by West (1988), young couples are leaving their animals with their parent's herd longer than in the past. Given the widespread unattractiveness of herding — it's lonely, isolated, and low prestige by native standards — and the growing range of alternatives to it, this is likely to hold true region-wide. In addition, long-term migrants to urban areas typically leave their animals in the care of their parents or a sibling.

Beyond the pooling of household resources, there are various forms of informal interhousehold arrangements among community members for exchanging and recruiting labor, sharing corrals, and procuring tools and specialized services. These informal associations involve two or three households, and may be kin, *compadrazgo*, or non-kin-based (the latter usually between neighbors). Reciprocal herding relations are usually referred to as *yanapakuy* ('to help together') or *ayninakuy* ('to work reciprocally'). In a agropastoral community such as Ccachín, where several species of domestic stock are owned, a single household is usually involved in several such arrangements. My host

family was involved in three: a three-way reciprocal labor exchange with their married daughter and a *comadre* to herd the sheep, a non-kin exchange relationship with a woman to herd the alpaca, and a relationship with a specialized full-time *wakero* ('cow herder') to care for the cattle. Cattle are the most valuable of all herd animals in the Andes, but the least well-adapted to the mountain environment, and separate pastures and specialization of labor are commonly used with them. A head of cattle is worth roughly ten times the value of sheep and three to six times that of an alpaca or llama, depending on the age and sex of the animals being compared (my calculations, coinciding with those of McCorkle 1992). Of all the domestic stock, cattle are the most likely to involve full-time collective partnerships ("*comités*" or "*compañias*") and recruitment of herding specialists. My hosts began raising alpaca four to five years before I arrived in the community, and they considered themselves inexperienced with the animals. Because of this, as well as the limited family labor supply and the different needs of sheep, alpaca and cattle, their eight alpaca were usually left in the care of a woman with sixteen alpaca of her own.

Although the degree of herding specialization differs from species to species, all these herding arrangements are based on mutual agreement and trust rather than enforcement by outside authority. They are reinforced with additional social exchanges — attending and contributing to each other's ceremonies for the herds, helping with agricultural chores, sharing of the harvest, and giving small gifts — and can be terminated at any time. The pooling of small herds for labor efficiency is not the same as redistributing the productive resources on which every household depends, but it affects the ratio of male to female animals needed for a sustainable herd, and it makes it difficult for observers to determine individual household holdings from observation of the herds themselves. Herds are complex aggregates of individual and multi-family holdings, and one can not readily determine the ownership of individual households at any point in time without reference to the social relations of herding. Availability of household labor affects not only the mixed-household composition of herds, but is an important factor in determining the assortment of species a family maintains and the herd sizes of each. In a complex production system, agropastoralists must confront a variety of seasonal, spatial,

and organizational tensions in allocating scarce household labor between cropping and herding, and it is difficult to intensify pastoral production without considering the effects on agriculture and vice versa.

Flannery et. al. (1989) report that communal herds, state management, and full-time herding specialists under the Inca led to a golden era of pastoral production. Such intensification of production is uncommon in the Andes today, except where alpaca are industrially managed for the wool export trade (Orlove 1977a). A number of observers have commented on the potential of communal herding to reduce the conflicts between agriculture and pastoralism (Jamtgaard 1984; Guillet 1987; McCorkle 1992). Herding partnerships and herding specialists can introduce efficiencies into the system, allowing herds to more closely reach optimal sizes. At the same time, such practices help overcome some of the same problems in herd dynamics that *suñay* supposedly resolves. In general, however, communal herds and full-time herding specialists have not been widely adopted by small-scale herders to overcome the incongruencies of agropastoral production. As McCorkle notes, there are no traditional Andean equivalents to the Swiss sheep, Galician cattle, or Finnish reindeer associations, nor are there the symbiotic farmer-herder relationships that one finds in Africa. Given the potential benefits of these associations, their absence in the Andes is notable.[11]

Obtaining Breeding Stock

At times Flannery et. al. (1989) leave the impression that all that poor herders can do to expand their herds is solicit and hope for *suñay* gifts. This is not generally the case, and *suñay* needs to be considered in context with the alternatives.

Suñay is first and foremost a family affair in most parts of the Andes, and the marking ceremony is an opportunity for the transmission of animals from parents to children, grandparents to grandchildren, and spouses to each other. As Palacios (1988:184) notes, there are three times during the lifecycle where intergenerational transmission of animal ownership takes place: "in childhood, when the newborn begins its career as a person, at marriage, when one acquires the character of *comunero* and

comes in possession of all the legal and political rights of a citizen, and at the death of one's parents, the moment that signifies the complete maturity of an individual as a social person." There are thus at least three periods during the lifecycle where one receives gifts of animals from kin and ritual kin. The first occasion is *Chukcha rutuy* ('ritual first haircutting'). The second is with the formation of a new household: when a match is first agreed upon, when a couple's first child is born, or at marriage, depending on local customs. The final division of a herd takes place at the death of the parents or by decision of a surviving parent if very old.

While *suñay* is a distribution ritual outside of these rites of passage, it generally takes place in the formative stages of herd development. References to *suñay* in the ethnographic literature emphasize how these gifts are timed to train and encourage responsibility among the young, how they help build the nucleus of an incipient herd, and how they enter into reciprocal relations between godparents and godchildren. Table 6.1 provides a representative sample. It appears that such gifts are marked by the same attention to equality of opportunity that characterizes division of inheritance among one's children in general. West (1988), for example, reports that among the Aymara of Pampa Aullagas, a woman's dowry may be reduced or dispensed with if her parents feel that she already has a sufficient nucleus of animals. On the other hand, while children normally receive live animals as a gift only once, an exception is made if these animals die before reproducing. This establishes that the existing holdings of *suñay* recipients enters into distributive decisions, but the role of *suñay* (or *lakacha*, the equivalent in Bolivian Aymara) as part of a general safety net is much less clear. West emphasizes that whether given by parents or godparents, a gift is generally made only once, and from there, everything is up to luck: "Luck is considered a crucial factor in the growth of the herds and it's not uncommon that during fiestas, drunken spouses interchange insults with respect to each other's, and thereby the animals', lack of luck" (West 1988:200). In a *suñay* gift from uncle to nephew recorded by Quispe in Ayacucho (Quispe 1969:32), the gift-maker likewise emphasizes the role of luck in the ultimate outcome, saying "*hijo, a ti*

te estoy dando este caballo, si tienes fortuna habrá y si no, no" ("son, I'm giving you this horse, if you are lucky, it will be, if not, no").

The majority of *suñay* gifts at marking ceremonies in Ccachín, the Cusco region, and in most areas of the Andes appear to be among relatives or within the context of *compadrazgo*. Flannery et. al.'s focus on *suñay* among nonrelatives goes hand-in-hand with their definition of *kuyaq*, as "in the context of a ritual, it converts non-kin into kin and makes possible the universal extension of *suñay*" (1989:203). I'll say more about *kuyaq* relations below, but here I would like to note that *compadrazgo* is likewise a form of ritual kinship that makes the universal extension of *suñay* possible. We know more about the history of *compadrazgo* than of *kuyaq* relations. As the etymology of the words suggest, the former is a Spanish introduction while the latter is indigenous and probably pre-Hispanic. Since Flannery et. al.'s scenario is that *suñay* is a largely a post-conquest development, the difference in the origin and time depth of the two concepts does not play a major role in their explanation of it. The different origins, however, may have played a subtle role in their choice to focus on *suñay* gifts to *kuyaq* rather than to *compadres* or *ahijados*.

Compadrazgo relations are as important as *kuyaq* relations in regional animal exchanges. Flannery et. al. recognize the importance of *compadrazgo* in their ethnography, but ignore it in their computer simulations and explanatory framework. There's a reason. It's implausible to argue that gifts between *compadres* or from *padrinos* and *madrinas* to their *ahijados* are explained by the unintended benefit of the gifts, as a) *compadrazgo* is based on long-term relations marked by an expectation of generalized reciprocity and a strategic component is apparent in the choice of partners and intensification and phasing out of specific relations, b) the *compadrazgo* relations that make kin of strangers extend far beyond the particulars of herding, and c) while the argument could potentially explain why *compadrazgo* might be adopted to resolve the minimal herd size problem in the Andes (no such claim is made), the practice is a European institution, and its development would remain unexplained at its point of origin. To the extent that fictive kin relations are marked by reciprocity, a group selection explanation is not

necessary; and to the extent that such relationships are found in several domains, an explanation of them in terms of the particulars of herding would appear ad hoc: *suñay* is not the only instance where fictive kinship is extended to "appropriate strangers" in the Andes. At times it appears that Flannery et. al. are attempting to explain fictive kinship itself by their model. As they put it, "we are curious about the way that gift giving to unrelated individuals who are ritually supportive might have arisen out of a preexisting pattern of cooperating largely with one's own kin" (1989:208). They probably do not want to be put in the position, however, of supporting a group-advantage explanation of fictive kinship for every domain in the Andes where these relationships are drawn upon.

Flannery et. al. note that the definition of *kuyaq* that they use differs from that of Isbell (1977, 1978). Isbell talks about the way that definitions of "my group" versus the "other group" varies among the Quechua depending on context. "For marriage exchanges, 'my group' is defined as *ayllu*, a bilateral kindred with sexual bifurcation and genealogical distance as principles of organization. For reciprocal exchanges, 'my group' encompasses a wide network of consanguineal, affinal, and spiritual relatives known as the *kuyaq*, 'those who love me'" (Isbell 1978:13). Her definition of *kuyaq* includes kin, in-laws, *compadres*, and others included in an individual's network of reciprocal exchange. Her accompanying ethnography indicates that there is attention given to proportionality in *kuyaq* relations. When one needs to fulfill a ritual obligation, one calls on one's *kuyaq* to help with the burden. After the ceremony, the recipient of *kuyaq* aid holds a private celebration to repay people for their contribution of goods and services. A *compadre* keeps account of the donations, and *kuyaq* are served in proportion to their generosity. The following, from Isbell's report on a feast for the *kuyaq* in Chuschi (Ayacucho), is typical: "he [the *compadre*] read aloud each contribution, and the donor was served according to his generosity. The person who had given one bottle of trago was served soup, but the man who had contributed cash or four or five bottles of trago was served a large portion of meat as well" (Isbell 1978:171). Successful fulfillment of ritual obligations brings prestige to the ceremony's sponsor and to contributing *kuyaq*.

An extensive *kuyaq* network is central to both social and economic success, and people have an incentive to expand and cultivate their *kuyaq* relations.[12]

The definition of *kuyaq* used by Flannery et. al. differs from Isbell's in restricting *kuyaq* to those guests at a ceremony who contribute goods or services but who are not members of the sponsor's kin, affines, *ayllu* or network of *compadres*. The difference is ethnographically rooted in the difference in usage of the term in the Ayacucho communities studies by Flannery and Isbell and it defines the puzzle Flannery et. al. seek to solve. Instead of ego-centered networks and ongoing relationships, Flannery et. al. discuss *kuyaq* in the context of one-time interactions. Instead of reciprocity and proportionality, Flannery et. al. are concerned with *suñay* gift-giving as unbalanced exchange. Unfortunately, they do not explore the ques. "to what extent do *kuyaq* relations in this restricted sense make up a significant proportion of *suñay* events?" If they are not ethnographically significant, the enigma is only artificial.

It's relatively easy to understand why the term *kuyaq* might be used in some areas in this residual way: it identifies significant others that do not fit under any other relationship term.[13] The character of such relations, however, can not be readily determined from the term. There may be a relationship history. Sometimes the relationship may lead to more formal *compadrazgo* ties. I attended one *Día de Compadres t'inkay* in which another outsider — someone who would fit either definition of *kuyaq* — participated. A native of Chinchero, he was in Ccachín for the week to study the use of natural textile dyes as part of a *programa de capacitación* ('training program'). The sponsors of the *t'inkay* moved the ceremony up a day to make it possible for him to attend. He contributed a jar of Tang to the event, offered an eloquent and much appreciated prayer to the *apu*, and led the group with music from his harmonica on the descent back to the village. His contact with this family was occasional and limited, but his father had once owned land in the village and his sister led one or two tours of weavers through the community each year for Peruvian Andean Treks, so the relationship was both multifaceted and time-tested. In this case, there was no *suñay* gift involved, but there were a series of other exchanges as the family provided room and board, shared their knowledge of plant dyes,

and wove samplers on commission (for a description of the ceremony itself, see the first case in Table 6.2). Over the long run, this complex of associated relationships had been lucrative for the family. These kinds of contacts with well-positioned outsiders are scarce and there is competition in the village for them.

The *suñay* goat that Barbara and I received likewise needs to be understood in terms of our social position. The extension of *suñay* to an anthropologist is atypical in the sense that the gift is directed toward the wealthier, higher-status individual in the dyad. *Suñay* animals are generally given by older, relatively well-endowed individuals to younger, animal-poor ones. From the standpoint of establishing and maintaining reciprocal networks, adapting the practice of *suñay* to this new context makes strategic sense, and it's paralleled by such gifts in other domains. Its contribution to the stabilization of the regional herd, however, is nil. One might argue that the criteria for selecting *suñay* recipients is very general, and that all that is required for regional stability is that once every few years someone with an appropriate animal to give is matched with someone who is in need. Nevertheless, to the extent that appropriate matches are needed for the system to work, the gift appears misdirected.[14] In terms of Flannery et. al.'s proposed evolutionary transmission model, a cultural variant that discriminated according to need (drawing upon an ability that is cognitively realistic and ethnographically documented) could do better and would ultimately be selected for. Van den Berghe (1981) has suggested that cooperation in large-scale societies might be the result of a "cognitive mistake" in translating the rules of thumb for kin selection in small-scale society to a novel environment. In a similar way, from the standpoint of Flannery et. al.'s model, the *suñay* animals that Flannery and Barbara and I received appear to be a cognitive mistake. Following up on Dransart's concern about the denigration of personal relations, I don't feel exactly comfortable in talking this way about heartfelt gifts, but I do think that following out the logic helps highlight the underlying evolutionary conundrum.[15]

Small-herd owners have other options besides *suñay* for obtaining breeding stock. Dransart (1991) makes the point that the buying and selling of animals by herders would

have the same effect as *suñay*, diminishing the necessity of the latter. This would be especially true whenever there are relations between people living at different ecological levels, so that young animals could be traded by herders on the puna to lower-level agropastoralists in exchange for access to such products as corn or firewood, both in short supply at higher altitudes. Where mediated by cash, however, the buying and selling of animals is likely to lead to increased inequality in herd size, as richer herders are able to buy out the poor. Income earned in wage labor can be and is likewise used to purchase breeding stock. It appears from Flannery et. al.'s account that the herders in Ayacucho are sufficiently marginalized and specialized that animal poor herders do not have access to these options, or did not have access to them during the time that the practice of *suñay* spread, but it is not clear that this is the case for the Andes in general. Barter and trade need to be considered as variables. The same holds for labor recruitment. There are a variety of labor recruiting methods used by herders in the Andes that involve the repayment of labor with animals. These include herding specialization, herding *a medias* ('by half shares'), absentee caretaking, and the loaning of child herders in wardship (Guillet 1987; McCorkle 1992).[16] While the purpose of these institutions is to allow herders to more efficiently organize herding labor, they provide opportunities for animal-poor families to exchange their labor for animals. These opportunities differ depending on the domestic species involved, but they are readily found in conjunction with *suñay*.

Finally, in discussing functional equivalents, a word should be said about theft. It appears that under the Inca, banditry was minimized though labor control and severe penalties, so that rustling was not the problem it is in most areas of the Andes today (Flannery et. al. 1989). While Flannery et. al. discuss theft in terms of the depredation of the herds, it is a double-edged sword: the loss of an animal for one is a gain to another. Where there is a market for meat, animals can be sold and butchered or vice-versa, minimizing the risk of detection, but the identity of the thieves can often be safeguarded simply by taking the animals to another community, where they will then become part of the local breeding stock. If there is limited contact between zones, the distance need not be great. My host family in Ccachín, for example, unwittingly purchased a horse that had

been stolen in Qelkanka by someone from Rosaspata, purchased by a trader from Urubamba in Lares, and resold in Ccachín. All are neighboring villages, and the rightful owner eventually found his horse by going from community to community in search of it.

For theft to be a functional equivalent of *suñay*, the net flow of animals needs to be from large-herd owners to small ones. Whether this in fact is the case is unclear. Where rustling is organized and sanctioned by the local power elite, it may not hold (in the *provincias altas* discussed by Poole 1988, for example), but some redistribution to "*peones*" as a reward for participation might be expected even here. To the extent that theft is small-scale, occasional, dispersed, differentially engaged in by the young, and animals are kept rather than sold, a substantial flow of animals to poorer herders becomes a real possibility. Leeds (1965:108-110) discusses the incentives that make it more likely for poor reindeer herders among the Chukchi of Siberia to risk detection and the potential intergroup hostilities that grow out of theft than rich herders, and his insights are relevant to the Andes as well. Given the impact of theft in many Andean communities, it would have been illustrative if Flannery et. al. would have considered a "Robin Hood" model alongside their "Santa Claus" and "Surf City" models.

Theft illustrates why one must be cautious in arguing from effect to function: if theft had the same unrecognized, unintended beneficial consequences as *suñay,* few anthropologists today would argue that theft is thereby functionally explained. If theft is more prevalent in some areas than others, our attention is generally directed toward opportunities and constraints facing individuals. An elaborate web of social and ideological features may be built upon the phenomenon and these will require separate explanation, but where individual-level incentives apply, self-interest obviates the need for group-selectionist explanations of why people steal. Theft has sometimes been purported to play a role in stabilizing regional animal populations to group advantage. In a study of raiding among North Arabian Bedouin camel herders, for example, Sweet finds that "the continual exchange by mutual raids serves . . . to recoup local losses owed to failures of pasturage and water, or disease," and that the "fundamental service of the reciprocal raid is to sustain a general balance of camel pastoral economies spatially through an extended

region" (Sweet 1965:1147-1148). Accordingly, Sweet suggests that "some predatory activities . . . may be more fully understood as ecological adaptations supporting particular subsistence patterns at their widest range, and at maximum advantage for the human societies dependent upon them." The parallels to the argument advanced by Flannery et. al. for *suñay* are striking, with avarice rather than generosity becoming the "integral mechanism" sustaining the society (cf., Sweet 1965:1148). It may be that a particular trait can be functionally explained, though there is no functional explanation of why one trait rather than another is central in a society, but it is disconcerting to find that theft may be the functional equivalent of cooperation in this case.

Given the level of *suñay* exchange among kin and *compadres,* barter and trade, the exchange of animals for labor in the recruitment of herders, theft, and other alternative opportunities and strategies for expanding one's herd, *suñay* gifts to strangers probably plays a relatively minor role in redistribution of breeding stock in most areas where *suñay* is practiced. The primary means for increasing the size of small herds in the Andes are herd aggregation, herd capture, herd acquisition through assistantship, and herd acquisition through courtship and marriage, much as they are in herding societies around the world (Leeds 1965). For convenience and counterpoint, I have referred to these alternatives as "functional equivalents," but it should be clear by now that none of these practices are best explained in terms of their "functions" for the group. They are all individual- or household level strategies for improving well-being.

Variation in *Suñay* Practices

Orlove (1992) argues that Flannery et. al.'s account of the origin and diffusion of *suñay* is not the strong test of evolutionary models that they intend it to be, and that they would be on more solid ground if instead of inventing contrasts between present-day *suñay* givers and putative populations of nongivers in the past, they had been able to identify contemporary *suñay* givers and nongivers and found some difference between them, such as availability of pasture, age, or distance from roads. I'm sympathetic to this argument, as without evolutionary-historical data, there is no direct test, but it may also

help to compare areas where *suñay* is practiced as Flannery et. al. describe with those where it is not.

Unfortunately, it's unclear from Flannery et. al.'s discussion of "universal *suñay*" whether *suñay* is universally practiced in the Ayacucho region (whether there's within-community or between community variation in the habitats and under the conditions of inheritance that they describe) or whether *suñay* gifts are made universally, without regard to the relationship between givers and receivers. They simply say that "Among the herders we studied, cooperation in *suñay* was close to 100%" (1989:203). The implication seems to be that both senses of universal apply. If we consider *suñay* practices over the entire Andes region this implication is open to question, but since the universality of the practice in Ayacucho is what they are trying to explain, once taken as given, it's appropriate and legitimate for them to focus on historical reconstruction instead of synchronic variables.

Even if contemporary differences between groups are established, the use of these data to test the model is complicated by the need to establish that herders in different areas are operating under the same opportunities and constraints. Population density and the availability of pastures can affect the morbidity and mortality of the herds, so that the base rates assumed in the model no longer hold. The availability of alternative sources of breeding stock changes the opportunity set as discussed above. The distance of herders from roads correlates with differences in the rate of social, economic, and ecological change, so that on the one hand, *suñay* may have been abandoned because it is no longer adaptive given the new realities, or on the other, it continues to exist because the rate of cultural change has not kept up with the rate of environmental change. Flannery et. al.'s position is the latter, and they caution that "Further complicating the issue [of *suñay*] is the possibility that some cultural behaviors may have been adaptive at the time that they arose — a century ago, two centuries ago — but cannot be shown to be more than neutral under today's altered conditions" (1989:218). While they imply that there has been sufficient continuity in the environmental conditions facing Ayacucho herders that the conditions under which *suñay* developed continue to hold, this can be taken as their fall-

back position. While the historical absence of *suñay* in a given area with given conditions may tell us something by way of contrast, its current presence or absence will not offer the stronger test of the model that Orlove would like.

Contemporary gift-giving at animal-marking ceremonies in the Andes varies in two important dimensions: the kind of animal given and the kind of person to which a the gift is given. The first involves such issues as whether a male or female animal is given, whether the giver or receiver makes the choice, and whether animals are given dead (in the form of meat) or alive. The second involves such variables as kinship distance and need.

Comparing the *suñay* gifts that Flannery and Barbara/I received, one thing that stands out is that while in the case of the former, the recipient was offered the choice and chose a young female in keeping with local norms, our gift-givers retained the choice, and they selected a young male. There's a difference in economic value involved (female animals are more valuable in trade) that follows from the difference in breeding value, since a shortage of males can be readily remedied through reciprocal herding practices and exchange, while a reduction in females directly limits the reproductive potential of the herd. The destiny of most young males in a herd, as with the destiny of ours, is to be butchered for meat and hide. Animals of both sexes are valuable to recipients, but in different ways. Whenever the gifts are to children and newlyweds — whether it be at first haircuttings or marking ceremonies — young females are given, as emphasis is on helping build the nucleus of a herd. For adults, however, balancing long-term reciprocal relations appears to be an important factor, and it becomes more likely that animals of either sex will be given (for support, see quotes by West in Table 6.1).

Given the role of male animals as a source of meat, the marking ceremony for cattle at Huancasancos in the Rio Pampas district of Ayacucho described by Quispe (1969) takes on importance. While no mention of *suñay* is made, there are substantial gifts of meat to those who help with the ceremony. As Flannery et. al. retell it:

> On the fourth day of the ceremony came the *despedida* or "farewell." The owner of the herd presented the *mayordomo*, his *masa*, all his *compadres*, the three musicians who accompanied the songs and dances, and even some of the *kuyaq*

> who had participated with a *kanka* — a sheep with its throat cut, ready for skinning, roasting, and eating. Given the fact that this act would be repeated by every owner at every *estancia* in the region, a considerable redistribution of meat took place during the month of August. [Flannery et. al. 1989:174]

It's notable that the sheep are given in reciprocation for help received by the ceremony's sponsor, and that such gifts are made to all that have helped: kin, in-laws, *compadres*, *kuyaq*, and contracted musicians. Since the animals are slaughtered, the practice involves giving but not *suñay* as such, and it appears to be an alternative to *suñay* in some areas. While the cumulative value of the gifts can be quite large, the cost and value of each gift is less than it would be if a female in prime breeding condition were given. Meat giving does not redistribute breeding stock, so the functional explanation that Flannery et. al. offer for *suñay* would not seem to apply.[17] Leeds (1965), however, notes that the ceremonial redistribution of meat to poor herders has a positive effect on herd size, since these herders do not then need to butcher animals to feed their households and meet social obligations. The butchered animals are usually males, so this does nothing to stabilize and increase the number of females, and no one argues that such redistributions are sustained by this indirect effect.[18]

Meat redistribution is not irrelevant to Flannery et. al.'s model. From the perspective of the model, meat giving would appear to be a variation on the "cheating" and "non-cooperation" models that Flannery et. al. contrast to universal *suñay*. Flannery et. al.'s argument is that groups practicing universal *suñay* will become more numerous over time than groups who do not. This argument presumably applies when the two cultural variants subject to competitive selection are "giving meat" and "giving the best animal available" as much as it does to other alternatives suggested by Flannery. This takes us beyond the artificial invention of contrasts between contemporary *suñay* givers and imagined populations of nongivers in the past that Orlove is concerned about. Here, we are talking about two variants of cultural behavior whose effects on the regional stability of herds can be directly compared. Such data are not presently available, but if we can collect them, they will put the model to the test.

I think that our energies would be misdirected, however, if we focus on minor differences in these variants. We need a model that can explain both kinds of altruistic behavior — meat-giving and animal giving — and in attempting to explain one, Flannery et. al. sacrifice explanation of the other. Leeds (1965) notes that one of the most important means of reindeer herd reduction among the Chukchi is redistributive sacrifice, and we would do well to compare redistributive variants in the Andes with others worldwide. In doing so, we need to concern ourselves with the payoff structure facing individuals as they add and subtract animals from their herds at both the upper and lower limits of herd size. One could readily identify a group-advantage to keeping the regional herd within range limits — to avoid the "tragedy of the commons" — but I see no more reason to argue that meat redistributions are functionally explained in terms of their benefits to the group than redistribution of live animals are. The explanation of why animals are given in a certain state — prepared as meat or given alive — can be separated from the question of why animals are given at all.

For Flannery et. al., universal *suñay* is sufficiently characterized by "altruistic cooperation among large groups of unrelated individuals" (p. 4) to pose a problem for existing models of kin selection and reciprocal altruism in evolutionary theory. I have indicated that in Ccachín, animal gifts at *t'inkay* ceremonies appear to be primarily exchanged among people with long-term kin or ritual kin relationships. This characterization is based on informant reports rather than direct observation, but it suggests that universality is not a locally salient feature of the practice. The reports on *suñay* from other areas of the Andes collected in Table 6.1 likewise stress the familial nature of the practice. They provide little evidence that *suñay* giving is an indiscriminately altruistic behavior. Given the differences between these characterizations of *suñay* and that of Flannery et. al., it appears that there is a certain amount of interregional variability. Comparison of the normative expectations underlying *suñay* in several communities or regions of the Andes would help us better define the pool of cultural variants subject to selection and offer the opportunity to correlate them with any discoverable variation in herd survivability.[19]

Flannery et. al.'s model of *suñay* is developed with reference to llama herding, but *suñay* is practiced among alpaca, sheep, goat, and cattle herders as well. While the specifics of herd dynamics for each of these species differ, they are all subject to herd extinction if numbers fall too low. This raises the question of whether or not the argument is applicable to all of the domains where *suñay* is practiced. It also raises a question about whether there are differences in the universality and generosity of *suñay* giving depending on the value of the animals involved. Are *suñay* gifts to non-kin, for example, more common during rituals for sheep, llamas, or alpaca than they are at rituals for cattle or horses? Given the ten to one difference in value between cattle and sheep, a gift of the former would be considerably more generous than a gift of the latter. In contrast to meat, which can be shared proportionally, live animals are lumpy goods. In mixed-species marking ceremonies, donors can adjust the value of their gifts by their choice of domestic stock given. The extent to which they do so is unknown. Without such data, the practice of "universal *suñay*" in contrast to the practice of *suñay* in general remains poorly established ethnographically. Here, as always, we need to distinguish between what people say they do and what they do. With *suñay*, we still know little about variation in either of these.

An underlying theme of Flannery et. al.'s work is that domestication links the destinies of humans and herds. The point is illustrated ethnographically but not incorporated into the computer simulations of *suñay*. This is a weakness, as Dransart (1991) points out, but while she has the influence of household labor supply on herd size in mind, I would emphasize network connections as well. Some representation of the social network of the regional herd owners would be realistic and appropriate. Flannery et. al. model four herd systems and conclude that:

> It is likely that systems of eight herds, or sixteen herds, or more would be even more stable; and, of course, those are the kinds of systems one sees in the real world of the Ayacucho herder. However, even as such larger systems increase the likelihood of getting an animal when one needs it, they also increase the likelihood that not everyone in the system is genetically related. [Flannery 1989:202]

What's important for the stability of the system, is not so much whether everyone is related to everyone else, as whether everyone is reachable through direct or indirect connections by links of consanguinity, affinity or *compadrazgo*. Intermediate connections may be as important as direct ones; a *suñay* gift to a stranger may be made as a favor to a family member or friend with whom one does have reciprocal relations. Thus, for example, in one *herranza* described by Flannery et. al., they note that the ceremony's sponsor "had already been informed through a series of intermediaries that one young man in the group wanted a female *malta* ['llama yearling'] very badly" (1989:165). It may be that the character of the host's long-term relationship with these intermediaries is as important or more so than his or her relationship with the recipient of the gift.

What is remarkable, once one considers large systems of a hundred or more herders (a system with only half the number of households of Ccachín), is that, if Flannery et. al.'s models adequately reflect birth and mortality rates for the test case of llama, a herder and descendants need only cooperate directly with three of the same to benefit from the long-term stabilizing effects of *suñay* (herd survival in the four-herd systems simulated was 100%). Any apparent stability of regional systems could be as much the result of linked subsystems of discriminating *suñay* givers as the result of universal *suñay*. This suggests that computer simulation of the relationships between herders is as important for understanding the long-term regional effects of *suñay* as modeling the herds themselves.

Alcohol, Religion, and Altruism

To this point, I have considered *suñay* in isolation from the *t'inkay* ceremony of which it is a part, and I would now like to redress this imbalance. Flannery et. al.'s explanation of *suñay* focuses on the evolution of the cultural norm "cooperate with everyone," but the argument seems to rest on the conjunction of three distinct traits: a) a norm of cooperation, b) the loosening of normal inhibitions with alcohol, and c) supernatural incentives. This is implicit in such remarks as:

> What is needed is a context in which the normal rules of animal transfer are suspended, and here is where the *herranza* comes in. It is a deeply religious event at which everyone who assists the herd owner, or enriches his offerings to the *wamani* is treated as a member of the owner's *ayllu* and can potentially receive a gift, whether or not he is an actual relative . . . during the peak of alcoholic euphoria. [Flannery et. al. 1989:178-179]

> It is probably no accident that *suñay* takes place in the context of a ritual which reestablishes relations between the herders and the *wamani*. Even if we grant the biologist's supposition that individual humans . . . are selfish, religious ritual provides a sacred context in which the arbitrary, unselfish, ideologies of human culture are more likely to be adhered to scrupulously (Rappaport 1971). Wander into a herder's *kancha* in July to ask him for a llama, and you will be out of luck (and possibly even dead). Show up at his *herranza* in August with an arroba of coca and a liter of *cañazo*, and you may even become his *kuyaq*. [Flannery et. al. 1989:216]

It's not clear if their position is that all three traits are necessary or if the cooperative norm alone is sufficient to cause ceremony sponsors to give animals in *suñay* to non-kin.[20] They do not argue that the norm for drinking at marking ceremonies is adaptively explained, nor that the belief that the *wamani* need to be placated is adaptively explained, but it appears that from their perspective, both of these make gifts to non-kin more likely. Their argument seems to be one of timing: the norm of universal cooperation emerged as an innovation upon a preexisting ceremony in which the size of one's herd was displayed to all and *suñay* was granted only to kin, and the religious devotion and ceremonial drinking associated with the event set it apart from daily life and ensures that the normative ideal is translated into practice. There are really three norms here, and they go together. Whatever the historical forces and contingencies that have brought them together, once they have become interwoven, they can't be independently teased apart without having an effect on the rate of *suñay* giving. Dawkins's (1986:169) notes that "a gene has the particular effect that it does only because there is an existing structure upon which to work," and building upon the gene-culture analogy, we might say the same about the basic units of culture. The question is, to what extent must we consider "a co-adapted stable set of mutually-assisting memes" (Dawkins 1989:212) to understand *suñay*?

Ritual Drinking

These three traits operate in different ways and each can be conceptualized as having an independent evolutionary history. The association of alcohol with *suñay* has two components, one physiological, the other normative. Flannery et. al. make several allusions to the first, but to understand *suñay*, I argue that the second is more important.

Generosity and Intoxication

Alcoholic beverages are valued in both indigenous Andean and mestizo society. They are used to provide nutrition, quench thirst, promote digestion, warm the blood, activate energy, release emotions, still fright, produce joy, give courage, and express solidarity (Rodriguez Sandoval 1945; Doughty 1971; Bunker 1987; Allen 1988). Alcohol is a normal part of celebration and plays a central social and symbolic role in both family rituals and relations with the supernatural. The terms used for marking ceremonies in Ccachín — *t'inkay, ch'allay, and ch'uyay*, all referring to libations of alcohol offered to the flocks, herds, and earth — indicate their special role at such events and that the animist world is believed to have much the same tastes that humans do. *Chicha* and *trago* are the primary beverages used for animal fertility ceremonies, but many families in Ccachín also have a bottle of vermouth stored away with their ritual paraphernalia for these occasions (see Table 6.2). Symbolically, alcohol has a strong animating essence ("*samí*") and fits well with a Quechua worldview that assigns value to satiation and that is rich in hydraulic metaphors and beliefs. It's primary ritual significance derives from its capacity to modify behavior. It adds excitement to festive occasions and provides temporary relief from hard work, sorrows, and everyday tensions. People are expected to express their emotions — to sing, dance, and cry — while intoxicated, and it is one of the few contexts where displays of anger and grief are tolerated.

As in societies worldwide, drinking is fundamentally a social act in the Andes, and while there is often ambivalence about the effects of drinking — people bemoan the negative effects when someone falls down a hill or out of their attic and injures himself or herself while drunk, neglects their duties, squanders their cash, fights with others,

commits adultery, or beats their spouse — the act of drinking itself is only condemned when it is solitary, chronic, or self-indulgent. The extensive ceremonial responsibilities of the *varayoq* in Ccachín ensure that they pass a month or more of their year in office in an inebriated state. Such drinking in the context of community *cargos* is accepted with approval. However, if the elected officials of the *comunidad campesina* do the same, they face formal and informal sanctions. One of the community secretaries in Ccachín faced a movement for his recall due to his frequent drunkenness while I was in the village. The high costs and limited opportunities to drink, the scheduling of major ceremonies at slow points in the agropastoral calendar, and the rotation of ceremonial offices for the most part mitigate against alcohol becoming a serious individual or social problem. As Allen puts it, "when the booze runs out, everything returns to normal" (1988:148).

Since *suñay* giving most always takes place in a context of alcoholic euphoria, the question arises as to what extent the occasional *suñay* gift to nonrelatives is explainable by the particular ways that alcohol modifies behavior. A distinctive characteristic of alcohol is that it is difficult to predict what the consequences of its consumption will be. While it may be generally true that people's behavior while intoxicated is an idiosyncratic exaggeration of their normal behavior (as reported for the residents of Vicos by Mangin 1957), it's also clear that people's decision processes are affected and that they sometimes agree to do things that they would not agree to if sober. I've already given examples of this is my discussion of *compadrazgo* (Chapter 3). Many cultures accept drunken behavior that deviates within limits from the usual norms of behavior, and while discussion of this most often emphasizes the expression of pent-up interpersonal hostilities (see, for example, Allen 1988 and MacAndrew and Edgerton 1969), it can also extend to unexpected levels of generosity. Allen (1988) notes that intoxication leads to various kinds of vulnerability, and what is vulnerability but an inability to recognize or defend one's interests? While the decision to drink or not may be rational, both cultural insiders and social theorists find it harder to extend the canons of rationality to decisions made while drunk.

At the same time that alcohol suspends normal judgement, it appears to often have the effect of diminishing social distance. At minimum this is manifested spatially in Andean society, as in Dougherty's (1971:191) observation that when drinking, people "draw close together physically, and it is not uncommon to see persons talking to each other, standing virtually "nose to nose," arms about each others' shoulders" (something I experienced many times in Ccachín). In wider social perspective, it's borne out by Holmberg's (1971) observation that alcohol seems to help break down barriers between the sexes and social classes on ceremonial occasions.[21] Drinking is not only a sign of communion and fellowship, in favorable contexts it enhances the feeling of solidarity.

Anthropologists stress that the meanings, values, and expectations associated with drinking have more to do in determining how behavior under the influence of alcohol is expressed than the sheer quantity of alcohol consumed (Heath 1962, 1987, 1990, 1994). In the Andes, it seems that both festering animosity and ephemeral endearment are expressed. Given the euphoric effects of alcohol in a festive context, it becomes less surprising that the bonds of kinship are temporally extended to non-kin in *suñay*. What we don't know is whether *suñay*-givers have later regrets.

Following Flannery et. al., if what we need is a context where the normal rules of animal transfer are suspended, what we find is that the intoxication itself provides a context where a "time-out" convention appears to be operative (MacAndrew and Edgerton 1978) — people expect and accept behavior that deviates from the usual norms. It's unclear from Flannery et. al.'s discussion whether they consider a state of alcoholic euphoria as a necessary condition for *suñay* giving, but at minimum, they imply that it is facilitative. They leave the question of whether it is a sufficient condition unconsidered. If it turns out that spontaneous gifts to non-kin are a small fraction of total *suñay* giving, the more likely it becomes that such anomalies could be so explained. I don't want to push this argument very far because I think that Flannery et. al.'s frequent references to inebriation muddle their overall argument and that their explanation of the evolution of *suñay* giving is more cleanly considered without them, but given such references, a question remains whether a norm of universal giving or "the state of universal benevo-

lence" that comes from drinking carries more of the explanatory load. If alcoholic euphoria explains some individual instances of *suñay* giving, one would be on shaky ground to go on to argue that the norm of drinking at marking ceremonies is explained by the unintended beneficial consequences of *suñay* giving. Ceremonial drinking is so often explained in terms of some group function in the literature that it is important to be explicit about this.

I think that intoxication is a relatively weak causal factor in *suñay* giving. I have a couple of reasons. First, despite what Flannery et. al. describe as the ideology of spontaneous giving, the giving is usually in response to a request, and intermediaries make sure that a ceremony's sponsor knows about a request in advance. This suggests that the exchange — a contribution to the ceremony for an animal — is usually agreed upon before the drinking is in full swing. Second, aware of the effects of alcohol and the extent that they will be called upon to drink, sponsors delegate the responsibility for keeping track of and balancing the social exchanges. As noted by Isbell, contributions to a fiesta are recorded by a *compadre*, a brother, or other intimate who is instructed "to stay sober." In Ccachín, the role is institutionalized with the *servicio*. In this way, the unpredictable effects of inebriation are contained and controlled. Women appear to play a similar role at many ceremonies. Women are generally expected to drink less than men in the Andes, a pattern that appears to hold in other small-scale societies as well (Douglas 1987). Rodriguez Sandoval (1945) reports that his informants made a direct link between expectations that women will not drink and "the woman's duty to look after their husbands." Whatever the reason women drink less, it leaves the female co-sponsor of a ritual in a less vulnerable position psychologically than her spouse. While I rarely saw much direct coordination between a sponsoring husband and wife at a fiesta with a large number of guests, wives and other senior women paid considerable attention to the reciprocal balance of relations and often consulted with the *servicio* and other helpers on the order of honor and quantity of goods served. Women are well-positioned in this regard at most celebrations since they prepare and dispense the food (women usually take the lead in selecting the *wanlla* to be distributed to each worker at a harvest *ayni* as well).

Marking ceremonies, however, are an exception to the rule that women avoid getting drunk. The sheep and alpaca are especially important for women in Ccachín, and the female cosponsors of such events are expected to drink a lot. They are more likely to become inebriated than on any other occasion. The supernatural significance of drinking at such ceremonies appears to override many women's usual reluctance to drink.

Norms of Drinking

From my perspective, the norms surrounding drinking are far more important that the psychological effects of alcohol itself for understanding relations between *suñay* givers and receivers.

Ritual drinking in the Andes mediates reciprocal work and exchange relations and affirms ties to animals, crops, land, and tools. Ceremonial drinking is always preceded with libations to the earth and mountain spirits. People blow over their drinks ("*phukuy*") and flick the liquid with theirs fingers ("*t'inkay*") to direct its essence ("*samí*") to the sacred places, they pour *chicha* and *trago* on the earth, ritual tables, and other venerable objects ("*ch'uyay*"), and they sometimes break an entire vessel of alcohol against a corral, wall, or the ground as an offering. Corn seeds are blessed with alcohol before planting, foot plows are blessed at plowing, construction tools are blessed at roof-raisings, looms are blessed before weaving, and graves are sprinkled with alcohol as they are dug and when they are revisited. During animal marking ceremonies, *chicha* is flung over the animals with gourd cups to purify the herds (see description of Ccachín *t'inkay* ceremonies in Table 6.2). The sharing of drink expresses, invites, and demands reciprocity, and its ritual use entails a double pact between ceremony participants and between those in attendance and their mountain spirits.

The presentation and acceptance of alcohol is an important way to seal contracts. Drinking is an important part of major commercial transactions, and cattle buyers, truckers, and other itinerant traders often find it difficult to arrange purchases without first drinking. It's unclear to what extent pushing drink to the point of inebriation is used to gain advantage during bargaining itself, but it's role in broaching a request and

obliging cooperation is recognized by informants and institutionalized (Bunker 1987; Allen 1988).[22] While alcohol is not the only kind of gift presented to seek a favor (gifts of food — especially eggs and meat — and the serving of special meals may be used in certain contexts as well), it's probably the most versatile and most prized. According to Allen, "The hierarchical and asymmetrical nature of drinking etiquette makes *trago* especially suited for purposes of requesting a favor. The solicitor, as the one who asks the favor, compensates for his subordinate position through his superior position in the drinking ceremony. The person solicited, as recipient of the *trago*, can only reciprocate by accepting the request" (1988:144-145). She concludes that "To accept a gift of alcohol is to know oneself compromised, and *Runakuna* seldom accept such gifts until they find out what it is they are agreeing to." The expectations surrounding the acceptance of a drink create an opportunity for drinking to be used strategically. Rodriguez Sandoval once put it this way, "a drink is like the bait which the fisherman uses to catch fish" (1945:44). Would-be *compadres* sometimes sought to precommit me to agreement by plying me with alcohol before making their *compadrazgo* request known. Attempts are made to seal agreements with a drink before making it clear what one is seeking agreement to. Many people are ambivalent about the social pressures and complain of being obliged to drink, but nevertheless use the idiom of alcohol to form their own requests.

Allen notes that drinking etiquette is sometimes manipulated and a drinking session can develop into a "game of one-upmanship." The outward guise of showing esteem and honor in the offering of drink can camouflage the indirect expression of aggression. Similarly, status competition can be found at markets when men gather to drink *trago*: once one contributes a bottle, pressure is on others to do the same. While *chicha*, being homemade, is a relatively egalitarian drink, the ability to purchase *trago* is associated with wealth and power. Accordingly, refusal to accept a *trago* from someone who is offering it as a sign of their status may be taken as a rebuff. The variable effects of a drink on the recipient allow *trago* to be used by a giver to both honor and to shame. Just as jalopy-driving teenagers and jousting knights push their competitors to swerve off

course, there is a question of honor and a game of "chicken" involved in Andean drinking bouts as well.

Alcohol plays a role in sanctioning *kuyaq* who fail to meet their commitments to a ceremony's sponsor. Bunker reports that:

> *Cargo* holders distribute the economic weight of the fiesta among friends, *compadres*, and relatives in a *hurq'a*, a ceremony in which the *cargo* holder takes large breads to the people he wants to help him. If these people accept, they are responsible for providing part of the food, drinking, cooking wood, music and the like. The agreement is sealed with drink offered by the person *hurq'ado* and the bread brought by the *cargo* holder . . . In the fiesta itself, people who have not complied with their *hurq'a* obligation may be embarrassed and punished by being obliged to drink especially large quantities of liquor, though the reason for this excessive generosity is not openly stated. By forcing them to drink more, the cargo holder affirms not only his power to punish, but also his disdain for a contribution which his largess shows he didn't need anyway. [Bunker 1987:338-339]

The framing and granting of *suñay* requests needs to be understood within the context of the reciprocal networks sponsors draw upon to supply their ceremonies and the expectations and norms surrounding drinking behavior. It's hardly an accident that the contribution made by a person seeking an animal in *suñay* is one to several bottles of *trago* or other industrially-produced, high-grade alcohol. The success of the ceremony and the status of the *carguyoq* depend on it being available in copious amounts. The *suñay* requests described by Flannery et. al. are inverse to the situation above: instead of failing to provide promised aid, *suñay* seekers provide unsolicited aid; instead of being sanctioned, they are rewarded.

Allen notes that there are three participants to a drinking interaction: the person who serves the drink or their representative, the person who receives the drink, and the members of the group who form an audience. *Trago* is served asymmetrically, and hierarchical relations are expressed in the order in which drinks are served. Much if not most of the *trago* served, however, has been contributed by those in attendance, complicating the composite mapping of ceremonial exchange. The gift of alcohol by someone seeking a *suñay* animal adds additional complexity to the interaction, as the alcohol being

served has been provided through the generosity of someone outside of the server's reciprocal network, someone who unlike the rest has not been approached for a contribution through *hurq'a*. The requestor is typically junior in status to the host, and the unsolicited generosity, once accepted, both honors and compromises the host's own generosity. It does so before all to see. As mentioned earlier, Isbell (1978) reports that a list of contributors and their contributions may be read at the feast of appreciation for the *kuyaq* in Chuschi. In reporting on the *herranza* at Pallqa, Flannery et. al. note that "all the gifts from *compadres* or *kuyaq* were on display" (p. 164). In Ccachín, the obsequious presentation of gifts and lavish thanks are witnessed by all present. The audience is composed primarily of "those who love" the sponsor, individuals who themselves have made contributions to the success of the ceremony. Isbell notes that, 'the 'game of reciprocity' is the focal point around which . . . ego-centered groups function" (1978:176). Contributions from *kuyaq* and generosity in return are part of the prestige system expressing the social hierarchy among *comuneros* in a village. The prestige system is not limited to the confines of the *varayoq* and *cargo* system, but extends to relatively private ceremonies as well, where the reciprocal networks of all households within a village are solidified. *Suñay* is granted within a context where not only herds but a ceremony sponsor's generosity and reputation, are on display.

Suñay and Religion

Religious belief makes up an important part of the cultural context within which *suñay* is granted. I noted above how supernatural belief about the need to revitalize the herds affects drinking behavior at marking ceremonies, with the most notable change in behavior observable among women. At such moments, the welfare of the entire household is considered to be at stake. If religion can affect behavior in this way — with families making significant investments in their "ceremonial fund" — the question arises, can religious belief increase the likelihood of altruistic behavior as well? As indicated by the earlier quotes, Flannery et. al.'s answer is affirmative: it's not just that people culturally inherit a norm of *suñay* giving, the necessity of compliance with the norm is

itself heightened through religious ritual. It's a plausible assumption, but complex and perplexing in its own right.

While there is not unanimity on the point, most of us would probably agree that differences in behavior can come about because of different notions of what the world is like. Following Richerson and Boyd (1989), I think it important to recognize that religious belief can affect behavior even if we assume that people act solely to satisfy goals that have been shaped by natural selection, and evolved psychological predispositions can affect religious behavior even if all act with the same religious conviction. The first would be the case if people extend the effects of their present behavior into an afterlife, if they believe that their transgressions must not only avoid human detection but the watchful eyes of omniscient spirits, or if they believe that social behavior is rewarded or sanctioned in this life not only by others but by supernatural forces.[23] Contemporary Andean belief includes all three elements. The second point — that much variation in religious behavior can be explained in ordinary Darwinian terms if the cultural environment is taken as constant — suggests that social and material variables such as age, health, income, and status affect the costs and benefits of religious activity and influence religious participation. People's decision's about participating in religious activities will depend in part on what else they can gain and what they must give up to do so. As long as time and resources are scarce for achieving multiple goals, tradeoffs are inescapable.

It's important to distinguish religious motivation from religious interpretation. This is essentially the same distinction between prescription and validation discussed in Chapter 4. If illness is usually explained *ex post facto* as a punishment for sin, it does not necessary follow that illness will be counted among the consequences of a norm violation in deciding whether to commit it, although we might expect better than random correlation between the two. The motivational force of religious belief also needs to be distinguished from religious practice. There are practical social reasons why people would want to appear to conform to a widely-held belief, regardless of their own convictions about it.

Different beliefs may be conceptually distinguished for explanatory purposes, though they may come together to form a relatively cohesive whole. It's been suggested, for instance, that both belief in the supernatural and belief in an afterlife may be near universal because of their psychological appeal (see Dawkins 1989 on the former, Richerson and Boyd 1989 on the latter). On the other hand, the idea of supernatural reward for virtue and punishment for vice, whether in this life or in an afterlife, seems more problematical for evolutionary explanation. The religious redefinition of the costs and benefits of action is hard to explain from a self-interested actor perspective. It seems likely that believers would engage in behaviors that lower their fitness on average relative to nonbelievers, making belief evolutionarily unstable.

It's notable that the same group-selection models of culturally-acquired variation adopted by Flannery et. al. for explaining *suñay* were first proposed by Boyd and Richerson (1985; Richerson and Boyd 1989) to explain the spread of religious beliefs. In brief, their argument goes like this: Most religious belief systems include some image of virtue that calls on individuals to forgo personal advantage out of consideration for others. Most also include some theory of reward and sanction by supernatural personalities or forces. The two beliefs together are a potential force for solving problems of cooperation. It seems plausible that believers will be more likely to behave unselfishly, on average, than nonbelievers. To the extent that this helps resolve collective action problems and other social dilemmas at the local level, groups with a greater fraction of believers will be more stable. Because of some special features of culturally-inherited variation, and under certain environmental conditions, the ideas will also spread through time. Accordingly, they find that "it is plausible that religious beliefs may spread because they enhance the stability of groups" (1989:198). Not only that, the antiquity of such beliefs makes it possible that religious beliefs could have influenced the evolution of psychobiological dispositions. As they put it, "perhaps cultural beliefs in supernatural rewards and punishments have been a near universal feature of the social environment of genes for tens of thousands of years. If group selection has commonly acted on such

beliefs over this span of time, humans might well be genetically predisposed to behave altruistically" (1989:204).

I'm not so much interested here in evaluating Richerson and Boyd's group-selection hypothesis for the explanation of beliefs in supernatural rewards and punishment — which I find plausible but unnecessary — as I am in emphasizing the link they make between religion and altruism, and in establishing the parallel between their evolutionary model of religious belief and Flannery et. al.'s model of *suñay*. Of the two, the former has a time depth (tens of thousands of years versus not more than five hundred) and universality (worldwide versus a certain zone in Ayacucho) that make it the more compelling.[24]

Given agreement that religious beliefs about the rewards of virtue and penalties of vice are among the determinants of behavior (whatever evolutionary processes explain them), the question then becomes, what constitutes virtue and vice? The transformation of the payoff structure should be limited to the specific behaviors prescribed and proscribed by religious belief, probably becoming weaker the more general these become.[25] Do we have any ethnographic indication that *suñay*-giving and *suñay*-shirking are among the class of behaviors to which supernatural reward and punishment are believed to be applied? To what extent are *suñay* gifts to non-kin intended to please one's fellows, and to what extent to please the gods?

Unfortunately, there's not as much evidence on this one way or another as one would like. The Andean concept of *hucha* ('sin') includes such items as adultery, quarrelsomeness, and failure to reciprocate help, but as described by Flannery et. al., *suñay* is more an instance of the ethic from each according to their ability, to each according to their need than it is an issue of reciprocity.[26] It appears to be more an optional feature of marking ceremonies rather than a ceremonial necessity. In this, it stands in contrast to alcoholic satiation, to proscriptions against using the left hand for throwing *chicha* over the flocks in the *ch'uyasqa*, and to a host of other ritual acts that need to be executed properly to placate the spirits. In general terms, it appears that generosity pleases the *pachamama* and *apu*. Flannery et. al. recall, for example, a song

from a *herranza* recorded by Quispe (1969) which goes "forgive the sins of your ungenerous shepherds." While it's unclear whether the song is a confession of selfishness in relations with one's peers or of neglect of one's ritual obligations to the gods, it serves to illustrate that the costs of selfishness extend not only to social life — where failure to reciprocate is punishable by withdrawal from the relationship — but also to relations to a personalized earth, whose anger means disaster in the form of illness, hail, and lightning.

Before concluding that religion plays a significant role in *suñay*, some indication that Andeans make a direct link between *suñay* gifts to non-kin and supernatural favor is in order. Without such evidence, I think that we should be cautious about saying that the character of Andean religious belief itself makes *suñay* giving to non-kin more likely. Religious belief may underlie and proximately explain many aspects of marking ceremonies, but its contribution to relations with non-kin at such ceremonies seems relatively weak.

The Role of Strangers

I'd like to consider one final item in the constellation of beliefs that underlies *suñay*: attitudes toward outsiders. While it's possible that gifts to outsiders might be normatively proscribed, in many herding societies, the presence of outsiders on ceremonial occasions is welcome and sought after. Leeds, for example, notes that among Chukchi reindeer herders,

> Rich men invite guests from far and near, sometimes including foreign tribesmen . . . invitations may be sent out, even by personal messenger, so that there is no excuse for the visitor's absence. A fawn is killed for each guest as a gift, with precedence for women and strangers! The first arrival gets two or three, the rest one, unless they ask for more, in which case more are given. It is dangerous to refuse, since the guest may bewitch him who refuses . . . [Leeds 1965:123][27]

Likewise, there is evidence that non-kin from other grazing areas are valued guests and integral to the success of marking ceremonies in the Andes. Gose (1994:201) suggests that within the Andean worldview, the necessity of non-kin at these rites derives from their ability to invoke the spirits of distant places. They are sought out because of

their knowledge of ritual names and the localized spiritual power they can summon on behalf of sponsors. Just as with the Chukchi, however, the presence of outsiders is an uncertain asset that brings potentially non-benevolent forces into one's inner realm, and elaborate procedures are taken during rites to ensure that one's animals are not bewitched (Gose 1994).

At a social level, the presence of non-kin may lend legitimacy to the proprietary claims of the sponsoring household as use rights to pastures are recognized and reaffirmed. In general, private sponsors of public festivals ("*carguyoq*") in Ccachín gain greater approval by contracting dancers and musicians from other villages than they do by contracting local ones. More prestige is attached to contracting the services of native healers and ritual specialists from outside of the community as well. Beyond quality-based reasons people give for why outside dance groups are better and ritual specialists from outside the community more powerful, it's clear that the granting of prestige is associated with the greater investment and wider influence such outside contacts imply.

Annual family rituals provide opportunities to cement relations with outsiders that one wishes to pull into one's inner circle or social network for labor recruitment, arranging marriages, trade, and a variety of other reasons. The imagery of marriage permeates the *t'inkay* ritual, and the leading role played by an actual or fictive "son-in-law" ("*masa*," "*qatay*") in many areas is a reminder that more than the reproduction of the herds is at stake. As Gose puts it, "Just as the sponsors must make offerings to the spirits invoked, so they must also give up a daughter, however figuratively, to ensure the ritual services of non-kin" (p. 223). The common practice at these ceremonies of making public that certain animals will be given to particular offspring when they marry communicates the information to both the children and potential suitors alike. In Ccachín, the primary marking ceremonies are held on days in the annual calendar when *compadres* and *comadres* are honored (the rituals themselves are often referred to as *compadres t'inkay* and *comadres t'inkay*), further highlighting the importance of these ceremonies as a vehicle for redefining non-kin relations though the idiom of kinship.

Cultural beliefs in the importance of having non-kin and village outsiders in attendance at the most important household rites of the annual cycle parallel practical socioeconomic ones. Invitations tend to be targeted to specific individuals and groups rather than open to all. The presence of such extrahousehold "strangers" is a precondition of a group-functionalist explanation of *suñay*. But we should not conclude that the beliefs that necessitate the presence of non-kin at marking ceremonies are themselves functionally explained in terms of their benefit to the regional population. A straightforward mixture of causal and intentional explanation will do.

Discussion and Conclusions

Flannery et. al. draw our attention to how altruistic beliefs and practices could have been shaped by natural selection in the ecological context of Andean pastoralism. They provide a model of both the circumstances and the mechanisms by which gifts to non-kin could have arisen. I have taken several tacks in exploring their proposal.

First, I discussed the practice of *suñay* in Ccachín and elsewhere in the Andes to question the extent to which breeding stock is given to non-kin in the manner identified by Flannery et. al. In the cases of *suñay* animals given in *compadrazgo* and to visiting anthropologists, I have presented explanations for the practice that stay within the confines of the intentions of the actors themselves.

Second, I explored the circumstances of *suñay* among both herders and agropastoralists throughout the Andes, including the full spectrum of livestock — both autochthonous and introduced — that are feted in marking ceremonies and subject to *suñay* giving. I discussed alternative options that a family has to maintain a minimum reproductive core of animals, including the pooling of resources among relatives, shared interhousehold arrangements, payment in animals for services, barter and trade, and theft. While in some sense these are all functional equivalents to *suñay* for assuring that a herd never falls below its reproductive minimum, none require explanation in terms of any potential advantage they have for the regional population of herders, and together with *suñay*, they represent the strategy set of a herder in need.

While all of these practices may have the unintended effect of stabilizing average herd size and avoid the collapse of individual herds, neither Flannery et. al. nor any other researchers have presented any evidence that the pattern of 100% herd survival through succeeding generations as predicted by the cooperative *suñay* model does indeed take place. The importance of labor recruitment raises the question of whether or not Flannery et. al. have identified the key constraint for herders. It may well be that economies of scale in herding labor are of more fundamental importance than assuring a minimum reproductive core of animals.

Third, while I found no intrinsic problems with the mechanism of group selection provided by Flannery et. al. for explaining the origin and spread of *suñay* — and support the search for those features of Andean culture where the mechanism indeed applies — I found their application of the model compromised on several counts. While identification of a plausible mechanism is critical whenever functional analysis is employed, both their delineation of the mechanism and application of it to the history of Andean herding falls below the standard we should be willing to accept for such explanation. Their sketch of the theory underlying the model is cursory and confusing, and can only be saved by reference to Boyd and Richerson's original presentation of it. In addition, they fail to address some of the questions about population migrations, population pressures, and ecological constraints during the 500 years since the Spanish Conquest that the practice of *suñay* purportedly spread to allow us to assess the degree to which the group-level benefits that they identify are causally important.

Explaining Complex Rites

Marking ceremonies are among the most complex rites in the Andes. Indeed, Gose (1994:195) is not too far off the mark when he says that *t'inka* have "a powerful totalizing tendency," and that "It is no exaggeration to say that these are the most important rites in the annual cycle, and in Andean culture as a whole." So much is involved in *t'inkay* that it's important to be clear what is actually being explained. Flannery et. al. address this issue, but with the misleading chapter title "Interpreting the

Herranza: A Roster of Possibilities," they leave the impression that by explaining *suñay* they have put their finger on the function and meaning of the *herranza* itself. They contrast their perspective to various others that have been taken to explain marking ceremonies: a) the role of the ceremony in mediating social, geographic, and symbolic oppositions, b) the cohesiveness of the elements and their logical consistency with other elements of Quechua culture, c) the role it plays in material and energy exchanges between ecological zones, d) the redistribution of high-quality protein, and e) its role in information exchange. Clearly, the relevance of each of these approaches is not precluded by the others. The explanation of marking ceremonies is conceptually separate from the explanation of *suñay*, and the idea that the marking ceremonies exist primarily because they are a vehicle for *suñay* giving is an improbable hypothesis.

In truth, Flannery et. al. do not attempt to explain the function and meaning of marking ceremonies in general. They focus on a single feature of such ceremonies — *suñay* — and not on all cases nor all facets of *suñay* at that. They concentrate only on those cases where live animals are given to non-kin. As I've noted above, it's unclear from their explanation whether the unintended benefits of *suñay* contribute to the persistence of the contextual elements they identify, but it's clear that these benefits do not explain the origin of these other elements. Through a particular cultural history, they have all come to be found in association with each other. The norm "give to everyone," including to non-kin, if it exists, has come to be part of a multidimensional ritual, and as long as a changes in drinking behavior, religious belief, or openness of the ritual to outsiders do not reduce the likelihood of *suñay* giving, changes in these preexisting features will not affect the purported group benefit. If a change in any of these features would reduce the amount of *suñay* giving and destabilize the regional herds, however, their persistence and stability likewise are presumably explainable by the same mechanism. In a functionalist account, it is important to clearly identify the package of interrelated beliefs that is being functionally explained.

Marking ceremonies bring a myriad of practical and expressive elements together in a single ritual event. The interrelationship, interdependence, and degree of coherence

of these elements is an open question that reference to the ceremony's "totalizing tendency" doesn't satisfactorily resolve. *T'inkay* ceremonies share much with agricultural work parties, both in the way that participants help each other and attend each others' ceremonies in *ayni* and *yanapuy* and in the arrangement and pacing of activities. Despite the reciprocal cooperation, Gose (1994) suggests that these rites are among the most developed expressions of private consumption and appropriation in the Andes, and that they are perched at a transitional point in the annual cycle between a phase of private appropriation and a contrasting phase of cooperation and collective production. I evaluated this argument in Chapter 5, and only add here that whatever its merits, it is hard to reconcile with the image of universal cooperation in *suñay* portrayed by Flannery et. al.

I have not discussed the ritual elements of the act of *suñay*-giving itself, since the associated traditions are conceptually distinct from the impulse to give. Symbolism abounds, and many of the same images and metaphors found in other rites are adopted and fit to the context. Gifts to children, for example, are accompanied by ceremonial lashings in the Ayacucho area. Quispe (1969:32-33) describes two such cases. In one, a *patrón* gives his nephew a horse, and while the child kneels, the uncle recites a short prayer and strikes him three times with a horsehair rope. In the other, a *padrino* who has given a *suñay* calf to his year-old godchild holds the girl before the gift animal while her father strikes her with three *cirse* (*Costaderia rudiuscula*) leaves. The same prayer ("*Dios yayaq, Dios Churiq, Dios Espíritu Santoq*"), a Christian blessing, is recited in Ccachín during the lay baptism *unu chakuy* while making a sign of the cross over the child with a flower. In Ayacucho, *cirse* is used to make the cross for the ritual table used in the *herranza*. Along with *trago*, it is also tossed over the animals in the marking ceremony. In Ccachín, lashing children is associated with caring and responsible parenthood, and the *chicote* ('three-pronged whip') is one of the items that every family is expected to produce at *residencia* (see Chapter 7). Lashings in *suñay* are a kind of guidance, and indicate the desire to educate and socialize young recipients into the proper care of their gift. They have both expressive and practical value, but the explanation of

why these rather than other features make up the ritual act of giving requires reference to cultural processes that are distinct from those fostering *suñay* itself.

Grounding Norms

I have argued against premature adoption of a group-selectionist explanation of *suñay* giving to non-relatives without offering an individual-interest alternative in its place. In large part, this is because I do not consider either the normative framework of universal *suñay* nor the prevalence of giving in solitary interactions with outsiders (in the language of game theory, in "single-play games") sufficiently-well documented ethnographically to develop such an explanation. Too many relationship and situational factors remain unknown. The kind of *suñay* gifts that I am familiar with in Ccachín — from parents to their children, between *compadres*, from godparents to godchildren (the latter often reflecting labor recruitment strategies as well) are all readily explainable with reference to the goals and intentions of individual actors. The same goes for gifts to powerful outsiders such as visiting ethnographers.

The norms that are problematic from an individual advantage perspective are those that mandate giving without regard to kinship or balanced exchange. Flannery et. al. describe the norm behind *suñay* in Ayacucho as that of spontaneous gift-giving, without any expectation of reciprocation from the same person or family at a later date. Flannery provides an eye-witness report of just such an exchange. A gift of alcohol is given to the ceremony's sponsor, and pleased by the contribution, the sponsor gives a much more valuable gift — the choice of any young animal in the herd — in return. In this section, I want to suggest an alternative approach to explaining such acts of generosity, taking their ethnographic reality as given.

It's important to distinguish between expectations and beliefs about *suñay* and the behavior of *suñay* giving itself. The term "norm" is ambiguous in this regard. Nowhere has the ethic of giving something without the expectation of equivalent return been better documented than among the !Kung San, (Lee 1979), for example, but while the obligation to share is strong, some people have a reputation for being stingy. Despite a

universal ethic, most sharing takes place among close relatives (Shostak 1981; Konner 1982). Edgerton (1985:232-233) reminds us that "people may cooperate by following the rules without exceptions when their lives are in danger or when their entertainment calls for it, but when self-interest appears to be served by ignoring the rules of cooperation, self-interest may prevail, even at times in the face of third-party rule enforcement." Often, a variety of forces jointly determine behavior in a particular domain, and the existence of a norm does not relieve us of the necessity of considering their interaction.

Most definitions of norms require that a) they be a pattern for behavior with which people actually conform, and that b) people generally approve of conformity and disapprove of deviance (Pettit 1990). If the first holds but not the second, we have what might be called a "statistical norm," an expectation about what people usually do. If the second holds but not the first, we have a "social standard," a shared sense of the mean personal norms in the community that emerges from the experience of individuals about what elicits approval and what arouses resentment in the community (Pettit 1990). While we can distinguish the two aspects, the term "norm" as typically used implies some correspondence between the two. In addition, "personal" norms may be stricter or more lax than the average, and some personal norms are "aspirational" in representing a judgement (often widely shared within the community) about ideal behavior. Sometimes there may be a gap between what is ideal or approved and what is accepted. Unfortunately, we do not have a sufficiently good account of the norms for *suñay* in Ayacucho or anywhere else in the Andes to distinguish whether they are aspirationally, pragmatically, or statistically defined. We do not know if *suñay* is supererogatory — something beyond the bounds of duty — or whether noncooperation elicits disapproval. Flannery et. al. note that conformity to the norm of *suñay* attracts approval, but approving of doing something may or may not be accompanied by disapproval for not doing it. Likewise, we do not know if the norms of *suñay* are strictly held or whether there are conditions, statuses, or occasions that exempt beyond those that are said to relate to herd size. Consequently, any discussion of the causative relation between these norms and the act of *suñay* giving

needs to be tempered with caution. Flannery et. al. imply that *suñay* is normative in both the cultural and behavioral sense, but they offer no direct evidence.

As usually defined, instrumental rationality and social norms are alternative ways of explaining action. While rational choice is instrumental and outcome-oriented, the primary motivations behind norm-guided behavior are not. This is not to say that some norms can't be explained as efficient means to achieving individual or social welfare, that when people obey norms, they don't have the goal of avoiding the disapproval of other people in mind, or that people do not invoke, interpret, and manipulate norms to rationalize self-interest. There are many levels where instrumentality may enter back in. Fundamentally, however, norms represent patterns of behavior that are desirable and obligatory in themselves, and they are typically sustained by emotional conviction. Frank (1988) emphasizes that the motivational significance of norms comes from their capacity to evoke an emotional response, and Elster (1989) provides an articulate defense of this view. While norms are social facts by definition, I see no reason why, in principle at least, they can't be reduced to individual choices, individual preferences and beliefs. The distinction between rationality and social norms does not coincide with the difference between methodological individualism and holism.

Various attempts have been made to develop a theory of social norms within an individualist framework. There are two principal strategies for deriving norms, one behavior-based, the other attitude-based (Pettit 1990). In the behavior-based derivation, an attempt is made to show why it's rational for most people to adopt a behavior, and then explain why it comes to be subject to approval and disapproval once adopted. The most successful examples of this approach are the equilibrium analyses of coordination conventions and tit-for-tat norms (Lewis 1969; Axelrod 1986), and these serve as the prototype for others working in the field. In the attitude-based derivation, an attempt is made to explain why there are attitudes of approval and disapproval for the presence and absence of the behavior at issue, and then explain conformity in terms of a desire for approval. This approach attempts to expand the range of norms that can be derived from rational choice by expanding the incentive structure to included people's attitudes about

an individual. An important difference between the two approaches can be seen in their respective positions on the sanctions associated with norms. Often, a norm to do something is accompanied by a higher-level norm to punish those who violate the first-order norm. The problem, however, is to explain how such norms originate.

While sanctions can make conformity to the first-order norm individually rational, the enforcement of norms is theoretically problematic. The primary obstacle is that enforcement can be costly. As Elster puts it:

> Expressing disapproval is always costly, whatever the targeted behavior. At the very least it requires energy and attention that might be used for other purposes. One may alienate or provoke the target individual, at some cost or risk to oneself. On the other hand, when one moves upward in the chain of actions, beginning with the original violation, the cost of receiving disapproval falls rapidly to zero. People do not frown on others when they fail to sanction people who fail to sanction people who fail to sanction people who fail to sanction a norm violation. [Elster 1989:120]

Both the identification of violators and the application of sanctions involve costs. While a norm might help solve a collective action problem, enforcement of a socially-beneficial norm is itself a public good subject to free-riding (Taylor 1988). The use of norms to resolve collective action problems thus presupposes the resolution of yet another collective action problem.

Once one allows attitude-based rewards, however, the universality of this problem becomes less clear. Pettit (1990:738-741), for example, rejects the contention that enforcing a norm necessarily imposes costs on the enforcers. He argues that it rests on the mistaken notion that the enforcement of norms always involves intentional action or strategic exchange. He suggests that not all the goods that people seek from others are ones that can be intentionally bestowed. From Pettit's perspective, approval and disapproval are attitude-based goods that affect one's reputation. Accordingly, people care about what other's think of them, whether or not these dispositions are ever exercised. While overt reward and censure entail costs, favorable and unfavorable attitudes that are covert or expressed only to others likewise serve to sanction, but they are relatively costless. The sanction is essentially a byproduct that follows automatically from having

the attitude. Pettit makes a similar argument about the costs of detecting norm violations. People do not always have to go out of their way to identify violators, they only need to be around in sufficient numbers that the violators will be noticed.

The behavior-based and attitude-based approaches to explaining norms are not as far apart as it might seem. They are not incompatible, and some norms may lend themselves better to one or the other approaches. Some norms may not be explicable from a rational choice point of view at all, but may nevertheless be amenable to some other actor-based account. If we follow Elster's normative action chain above, we reach a point where some sanctions must be performed for motives other than the fear of being sanctioned. A nonoutcome-oriented action would then be found at the end of every norm-sanction-metasanction chain. Put this way, the rational choice explanation of many if not most norms is inherently incomplete. At minimum, it must be supplemented by some kind of biopsychological explanation of the dispositions to please others and avoid offense (in the case of the attitude-based argument) and to punish violators even when it is not in one's material interests to do so (to follow up on Elster's argument). Just as I suggested in Part II that natural selection is needed to underwrite rational choice theory with a theory of preference formation, my argument here is that intentional explanation is likewise dependent on evolutionary theory to underwrite a theory of emotional incentives. This point has already been underscored by Frank (1988), who suggests that certain emotions enable us to make commitments that would otherwise not be credible. As he notes, "the clear irony here is that this ability, which springs from a failure to pursue self-interest, confers genuine advantages" (1988:5) and "it may well be the logic of self-interest that ultimately sustains these emotions" (1988:12).

I hope that this brief overview of norms helps reorient our ethnographic exploration of *suñay* to the emotional reactions accompanying the exchange and to the approval and disapproval of others in reinforcing it. The starting point for a more actor-oriented approach needs to be the motivations of those involved. This is not to say that an explanation in terms of unintended and unrecognized consequences should be dismissed out of hand. But it is to say that before identifying the unintended consequences, we

should first identify the intended and recognized consequences. These may vary depending on one's position within the ceremony and one's relationship to other participants. We might ask, for instance, if the children and future heirs of the sponsor are as supportive of *suñay* gifts to nonrelatives as more disinterested parties, or whether they harbor resentments. In principle, different generations within a family could have conflicts of interest in this regard. We might ask too if spouses discuss and agree upon the timing and beneficiaries of such gifts, and whether women are as likely to give animals to non-kin as men.

Flannery et. al. note that intermediaries often play a role in putting forward a request. Rather than stop there, the influence that their approval and potential disapproval has in the transaction deserves attention. Likewise, there are many norms associated with animal marking ceremonies and it would be helpful to compare the passions that conformity and nonconformity elicit across the domain. How and how much do people talk about those who give and receive *suñay* animals? Are norms regarding sociality and exchange subject to more or less social pressure than those that deal with ritual formulas and supernatural injunctions? Many norms associated with marking ceremonies are neither materially nor socially useful, but shared expectations and emotional reactions are built upon religious beliefs in the utility of the prescribed act. The norms to use one's right hand rather than left or repeat an activity three times, for example (see Table 6.2 for ethnographic detail), are taught and encouraged, and failure to perform them properly is met with disapproval. We can observe how far gossip about an act extends, and we can determine whether people blame others for not sanctioning more socially distant others.[28]

I suggest that we should not give up on explaining the norms surrounding marking ceremonies — whether group-advantageous ones like *suñay* or relatively neutral ones like the association of left-handedness with sorcery — without first putting energy into identifying all the individual-level mechanisms involved.[29] We cannot do this without first providing a finer-grained description of the perceptions, motivations, alternative strategies, and social network of people involved. Whether or not the resulting explana-

tion is "Rube Goldbergesque" (Flannery et. al. 1989:212) or not remains to be seen, but if that is a risk, we must acknowledge that there are dangers in alternative approaches as well. As Bicchieri (1990) points out, the assumption that the mere presence of a social norm justifies the inference that it is there to accomplish some social function has a long history in the social sciences, but it is rooted in a post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy.

Many social norms are undermined by other mechanisms with respect to the collective good that they purportedly serve, many are socially inefficient in optimally distributing material resources, and the "rigid grip" of some, as Elster (1989:121) puts it, "seems to create a great deal of pointless misery" (cf., Edgerton 1992). We still have some ways to go before putting the functionalist idea that all or most all established beliefs and practices have positive social functions behind us. Even when a plausible argument can be made that a given norm makes everybody better off, there is still a big step to the conclusion that the norm exists because it makes everybody better off. The assertion remains unjustified unless we can specify a plausible mechanism (Peoples 1982; Elster 1989). If we are able to identify a group-level mechanism by which the unintended benefits of a norm-guided behavior are potentially maintained, we still need to establish that selection is stronger at the population level than among individuals. The conditions under which this seems to be the case are relatively restrictive.

Whether or not *suñay* is among the subset of norms explainable in terms of group selection, this mechanism is not likely to prove generalizable to the multitude of cultural beliefs and social facts in the Andes that we want to explain. To make significant advances in this regard, we need to build the foundations for a bottom-up, actor-oriented derivation of norms. To do so, we need to ground the preferences underlying a norm and the expectations establishing that conformity to a norm attracts approval and transgression disapproval in evolved psychobiological predispositions, and improve the optimization analysis of norms through more careful attention to the role that reputation effects and social acceptance play in the incentive structure of individual actors. Ultimately, if we are to explain the emergence of norms of cooperation not only in dyadic and small-group interactions but also in large-group interactions, we need to give further attention

not only to the currency in which the costs and benefits of alternatives are measured, but also to some of the cognitive constraints that determine the strategies of actors. Hardin (1982:196), for example, has suggested that one of the mechanisms sustaining cooperative conventions and norms in large populations is a tendency to generalize from experiences learned in the context of repeated interactions in a small group. While this raises questions of its own, it's important to follow up on the lead.

I have suggested that when one is acting in accordance with a norm, one is not necessarily paying attention to consequences, but I do not mean to imply by this that such action is unconditional. Social norms are clusters of expectations, and conformity is contingent on one's expectations about what others believe and do. Conformity is not motivated by the expectation itself, but by the preference to comply with the norm as long as others do too. By focusing on this conditional aspect of norms rather than on the underlying attitudes of approval and disapproval, we can redefine social norms according to two conditions: a) nearly everyone prefers to conform to a norm on the condition that almost everyone else conforms, and b) nearly everyone believes that nearly everyone else conforms to the norm (Bicchieri 1990).

Put in this way, it becomes clear that social norms emerge in a context of interdependent decision making. In the language of game theory they can be viewed as equilibrium states. Conformity is not a dominant strategy, since this implies that each would have reason to conform no matter what other people are expected to do (e.g., as defection is dominant in prisoner's dilemmas). There are typically several possible equilibria — several configurations of self-sustaining expectations — represented by several possible norms. It's not within the scope of conventional game theory to address how individuals' expectations come to be self-fulfilling in multi-equilibria predicaments, so the theory needs to be supplemented with a description of how interacting individuals learn to recognize and settle upon a pattern, and what kind of behavioral strategy is likely to be sustainable. What's needed is some kind of explanation of how agents come to define a situation in the same way, and how focal points become such. There are several possibilities. One equilibrium may be more salient than the rest given its congruence with other

beliefs in the cultural system. In repeated small-group interactions, the emergence of a common pattern may come about through trial-and-error learning and adjustment to others' moves. The tit-for-tat response in Prisoner's-Dilemma-like situations is so robust because it is easy to recognize and track, and because it protects a cooperator from excessive exploitation by a defector (Axelrod 1984; Bicchieri 1990). The formation and diffusion of norms are separate issues, and may be explainable in terms of separate mechanisms.

Given the limited feedback when an individual changes strategies in large groups (any single individual's choice has an insignificant impact on the collective outcome) and the reduced impact of identity and reputation in such groups, the presence of norms for cooperation are more likely to be explained by the diffusion of small-group norms through an evolutionary process rather than through direct feedback about the effects of one's actions. It's hard to explain normative action in large groups without some kind of evolutionary explanation. We must bear in mind, however, that Andean marking ceremonies are small-group, face-to-face interactions, quite unlike the large, anonymous groups in mass societies where it has been so difficult to explain observed behavior (voting patterns, contributions to public charities, etc.) in terms of rational choice. The regional population of concern to us is made up of overlapping small groups where someone's poor reputation can readily jeopardize future interactions. Trade, mating, and labor provide reasons for repeated interactions with outsiders. Regional fairs, religious pilgrimages, and labor migration provide ongoing contexts. The violation of norms has reputation effects, and given the overlapping character of social networks and the difficulty individuals have in tracking them, they must deal with the uncertainty of how norm violation and detection would affect their relations with those who have not witnessed the transgression.

Social Exchange

To provide microfoundations to the explanation of the extension of *suñay* to non-kin, we need to start with the fact that two goods are offered in exchange. Given the

ecological context, the preference for one of those goods — high-quality breeding animals — is understandable. The other — a desire for alcohol — is harder to explain in terms of adaptive benefit, but the hypothesis that alcohol alters affect in a reinforcing manner and is consumed because of this property appears to be sound (Cox 1990). Cross-culturally, the decision to drink seems to be based more on the emotional effects that people hope to achieve than on simple chemical effects, and people's expectations about drinking both dramatically influence their motivation to drink and the effects that drinking has on their behavior. Andeans expect that alcoholic consumption in ceremonial contexts will heighten the excitement, festiveness, and significance of such occasions, and accordingly, drinking is socially and culturally reinforced. Participants and onlookers judge the attractiveness and success of such ceremonies in good part by the quantity and quality of food and drink available. The immediate problem facing the sponsor of such ceremonies is a problem of provisioning, and by calling on a network of reciprocal relationships, sponsors are more or less able to meet their — and their guest's — expectations. Nearly all in attendance at these ceremonies are intimates who have contributed in some way to the feast with expectation of reciprocation at a later date. Participants consume a variety of public and private goods. Technically, alcohol is not a public good in that it is both exhaustible and excludable (i.e., it's possible to exclude certain people from consuming it), but in practice, it is freely distributed during ritual occasions, and social pressures rather than exclusion are used to induce people to contribute. Exclusion takes place in terms of who is invited and who is not, but to the extent that one can just drop in (as indicated in the ethnography of Flannery et. al.), outsiders can potentially enjoy the feast without contributing to its provision. All present benefit from an increase in collective provisions, and participants approve and disapprove (the later in the form of challenges and teasing) as others contribute or fail to contribute a share. Since most have been approached by the sponsor in advance and have been asked to contribute in some way, sponsors have an interest in signaling that they are willing and able to meet their reciprocal obligations in turn, and in assuring participants of their generosity, or that there will be some commensurability in the exchange. Given this

context, if there are expectations that sponsors will grant *suñay* to outsiders who have contributed to their event, a sensible place to begin the analysis is with the collective provisioning of such events.

Another important step is to give equal attention to both sides of the exchange. There are two gifts involved in *suñay* among "strangers," one given by someone in attendance to signal interest and frame the request, the other given by the sponsor in response. One should not let the apparent inequality of the exchange in material terms obscure its bidirectionality. What kind of an exchange is it? It would be a mistake to recast *suñay* into a generalized version of market exchange, or try to show that what one party yields equals that of the other, as the public nature of the exchange suggests that other parties and incentives are involved. However, I think that we can benefit by comparing the two. In particular, I'm interested in the feature of "discreteness." As an ideal type, market exchange is almost perfectly discrete in time, both in terms of the moment when goods are exchanged and in the independence of the interaction from any other. This is, of course, a caricature of market exchange, where future patronage often matters and where laws of contract enable the two parties to make commitments by subjecting themselves to third party enforcement (Hardin 1982). *Suñay* lacks discreteness in the first sense, because the gift of alcohol to the sponsor not only precedes the return of an animal in time, it is marked by a degree of uncertainty about whether it will elicit the desired response at all. If the first offering is contingent upon the second, we need to determine how this uncertainty is reduced so that the two parties come together at all. Flannery et. al. note that in practice, intermediaries often play an important role, and in this context we can see that one of the effects they have is to reduce the risk for the person who initiates the exchange. Likewise, the risk will be reduced if the requestor can count on the normative expectations behind *suñay*-giving being strong enough, or if the reputation for generosity of the sponsor is good enough.

From the information provided by Flannery et. al. for Ayacucho, it appears that *suñay*-giving is discrete in the second sense: it involves a once-only relationship. Their work does make us privy to the conversations between the two parties, so we do not know

if there is any negotiation or exploration of the other's probable action. While we know that *suñay* is supposed to be spontaneous gift giving with no expectation of reciprocation, we don't know if this is in fact the case. This issue is an extremely important one, as ongoing relationships allow the parties involved to make commitments and create a space for strategic interaction, with the opportunity to apply sanctions in some other part of the relationship rather than at the ceremony itself.

It's often difficult to tease apart the relative role of norms and exchange relations in securing outcomes, and it's often the case that the same motivations underlie each. Participants face these difficulties as much as observers, and an ethnographer cannot take how his or her informants speak about their obligations — either as moral or as sanctioned — as an indication of their relative force (beyond the issue of uncertainty, people may also have strategic reasons for framing their actions in terms of one or the other). Unfortunately, it is easier to explain *suñay* as a behavioral fact than it is to explain the particulars of the associated norms. The latter would probably fall into place if we could take the expectations surrounding *suñay* as a specific case of a general pattern that generosity is socially approved and selfishness discouraged in Andean communities, but as I have noted, we have not yet overcome the problem of explaining how the collective action problems underlying this pattern are overcome.

Reputation and Prestige

At present, we know too little about the definition and scope of expectations surrounding *suñay*-giving to non-kin to determine their influence on the practice. Flannery et. al. make a good start in pointing out that *suñay* appears to be an innovation growing out of the practice of giving animals to kin and fictive kin during marking ceremonies, and *ayni* and *mink'a* exchange, but when it comes to identifying related phenomena, I think that we can be even more specific. The pattern of making a request through the medium of alcohol is widespread throughout the Andes — it's not limited to *suñay*. It's the common medium used to approach someone to buy animals, seek *compadrazgo*, and arrange a marriage. The etiquette is established, hierarchical, asym-

metrical, and subject to manipulation. One incurs a debt by accepting a bottle of alcohol, and there is no other way to reciprocate except by accepting the request. As Allen (1988) emphasizes, this debt has a strong moral character. *Trago* is sometimes used to pressure others into unwelcome and unfavorable contracts. People feel that they have no socially-acceptable way to refuse. It's not clear to what extent *suñay*-giving to non-kin is explainable as a subclass of this wider group of predicaments in which prestige and shame change the calculus of action, but it's premature to rule out this line of inquiry. The public nature of the exchange (in contrast, for example, to approaching someone to serve as a godfather to one's child) heightens the possibility that one's reputation is at stake. Group size is small enough that social pressures can be brought to bear.

Fortunately, while we know little about the norms of *suñay*, we know a lot about the norms invoked in sharing drink, and we can benefit from the overlap in domains. Indeed, while relatively few anthropologists receive an animal in *suñay* while in the field, everyone working in the Andes has had to deal with the strong social pressures to offer and to accept drinks. It's one of the few spheres where the participatory aspect of participant observation yields as much raw data as dispassionate observation. The rational choice literature has generally focused on but a few test cases to explain norms — especially tit-for-tat reciprocity and norms of revenge (the failure to let bygones be bygones, cut losses, and disregard sunk costs that marks the latter provides a significant challenge to the theory). There are a number of features of expectations about sharing alcohol that make the domain well-suited for exploring norms of reciprocity. Such norms a) invoke reciprocity, b) set social boundaries, c) establish alcohol as the medium to ratify other exchanges, d) determine social and economic ranking, and e) create opportunities for strategic use in games of one-upship and showing off. They are strongly but ambivalently held: one's feelings about the social pressures depend largely on whether one is on the giving or receiving end of expectations. These interpersonal dynamics abound at marking ceremonies and are a significant part of the context of *suñay* giving. Finally, there are both significant similarities and a range of variation in the norms of indigenous and mestizo communities in the Andes as well as cross-culturally, and this approach

allows us to isolate the general pattern of *suñay* gift-giving from the particulars of herds and herding, and compare it to parallel phenomena worldwide.

As far as I can tell, *suñay* giving has a pyramid structure, with gifts to non-kin (poor llama herders and rich outsiders, such as anthropologists) being less common than gifts to ritual kin and kin. I summarize this in Figure 6.2. Accordingly, the bulk of *suñay* giving might be explained in terms of kin selection and reciprocity. I conclude that the individual motivations for giving to non-kin most likely have to do with prestige, reputation, and rank. The interpersonal dynamics of actual cases of *suñay* often involve quite complex interplays of kinship, reciprocity, and social expectations. For example, Quispe discusses a case where godparents pressure the paternal grandparents of their godchild to give the child a calf during a marking ceremony. Only after considerable badgering do the grandparents relent:

> In the course of the *herranza* they lay a male calf on its side and the *patrón* sprinkles it with *llampu* and *chakin*; at this moment the *compadres* approach offering him a *trago* and ask that he give them the calf for their godchild, something that the sponsors do not accept. The godparents insist so much that the *patrón* opts to receive the glass of *trago*, accepting in this way, tacitly, the request. Then the *suñay* is done. The godfather holds his godchild and her father simulates beating her with three leaves of *cirse*, in front of the calf that has been given; and then they cut the calf and stamp the mark. In gratitude, the godparents offer a glass of *trago* to the mountain spirits and drink a toast with the *patrón*, to whom they give a bottle to continue drinking. [Quispe 1969:33]

Since *compadrazgo* exists not only between the parents and godparents of a child, but extends to the parents' parents, the godparents of the child and the sponsors of the ceremony were *compadres* as well. In this case, the father and *padrino* of the child were also affines. Still, insistence and coaxing were required to assure the gift, suggesting that we would be remiss to treat the generosity of *suñay* as something that follows automatically from the holding of certain norms. Because of generational conflicts, we cannot assume that biological kinship in itself assures 100% cooperation, any more than we can assume that cultural ideals assure cooperation in cases of non-kin. Multiple interests and pressures come into play. An actor-oriented perspective provides a better theoretical approach to deal with cases of reluctant altruism than a group-oriented one.

The recipients of gifts need to be distinguished according to their relation to the giver and their socio-economic rank, and I see no reason to assume that the motivations are the same in each situation. This is true even in the case of outsiders, who vary in social position vis-à-vis *suñay*-givers. Prestige, reputation, and the desire to expand one's social network all likely play a role. The latter always involves an investment risk.

The explanatory issue that I have dealt with in this chapter is how to explain the motives and intentions involved in *suñay*, and whether the long-term benefits enter into the explanation. While I have concentrated on exposing the weaknesses of a group-selectionist explanation of *suñay* rather than formalizing and testing alternatives to it, I have tried to indicate ways in which we may be able to explain all *suñay* giving — regardless of the relationship and status characteristics of giver and receiver — in terms of individual striving. In particular, I suspect that public generosity in general and *suñay* in particular are prestige-gaining strategies, and in conclusion, I suggest that our energies would be well spent on understanding the evolution of the social environment, especially on how the individual expectations underlying prestige and reputation are acted upon, shared, and met.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. Good descriptions of the Carnival fertility rituals in the Cusco area are provided by Flores Ochoa (1977) and Lira (1985:121-126). However, in focusing on the ideal, Andean ethnographers often misrepresent the range of individual and family approaches to rituals. I was struck by differences in how people carried out rituals in Ccachín. Ritual activity ranged from casual to meticulous and austere to extravagant in everything from prestations of coca leaves to the sponsoring of community festivals. While this applies to the *t'inkay* for the herds as well, the attention and care put into these ceremonies by each household was generally high. This can probably be attributed to the importance of livestock for agropastoralists' well-being.

2. Andeans are not the only ones who make such offerings to an animal at the time of butchering. Nelson (1983:162), for example, reports that when butchering a wolf, the Koyukon Athapaskans of Alaska put a piece of dried fish in the animals mouth "to send it home to its father."

3. There are three times when such ceremonies take place in Ccachín: during the second week before Carnival for the sheep, goats, llama, and alpaca, during the week preceding Carnival for the cows, and around the Feast of St. James the Greater (July 25th) for the horses (see Appendix 4). Timing need not be exact as long as the ceremony is held on a propitious day (Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Saturday), so there is some variation around these dates. The owners of the largest cow herds brand their animals in August, and some of the features of the pre-lenten celebration for the cows may be put off until this time. Decoration of the llama and alpaca herds likewise occurs in August in many areas of the Andes, especially among puna dwellers.

4. "Epideictic" literally means "meant for display," and as long as what is meant is unspecified, the term is innocuous. I have no problem with Flannery et. al.'s use of the term "epideictic" if it is offered with the purely descriptive goal of coming up with a term for synchronized communal displays, but in ethology the term has come to be associated with adaptive explanation at the population level, and because of this, I would caution care in its use here. Wynne-Edwards, who coined the term, regarded epideictic displays as "especially evolved to provide the necessary feedback when the population is about to be restored, or may need to be shifted, either as a seasonal routine or as an emergency measure" (1962:16). Essentially, Wynne-Edwards proposed that territoriality was a population control mechanism, with epideictic displays serving the thermostatic function of regulating the density of animal populations by indicating the point where individual reproductive restraint becomes necessary for the well-being of the group. This has become so linked with the phenomenon that it identifies that is often referred to as the "epideictic function"

of such displays (Lack 1966:311, in a critical review). In applying the concept to human populations, Wynne-Edwards noted that synchronized or collective annual ritual ceremonies are widespread, and "gatherings like these appear to be the only possible source of what knowledge exists regarding changes in numbers in the population, and to be the basis, therefore, on which tribal customs relating to sexual abstinence, infanticide, and other forms of birth control are built up, reinforced or relaxed" (1962:219-220).

Flannery et. al. pick up on the information value of Andean marking ceremonies — a particular kind of annual gathering — and rather than following Wynne-Edwards on focusing on the dispersion and population-regulating effects of such displays, reorient the concept toward comparison of the endowments of participants and consequent redistributive effects. Contra Wynne-Edwards, Maynard Smith (1971) has argued that territorial behavior capable of adjusting the population to the available food supply can evolve by selection acting at the individual rather than group level, and the same can be said for the collective displays described by Flannery et. al. as well. While Flannery et. al.'s likening of animal decorating ceremonies to epideictic displays is provocative and a potentially productive line of inquiry, it's unfortunate that they have not sorted though the functionalist baggage embedded in their usage here.

5. Merlino and Rabey maintain just such an argument in attempting to explain why herders in Jujuy, Argentina (who practice a kind of transhumance) retrieve their animals from high pastures to conduct their August fertility rituals at a lower level, despite the fact that the lowland pastures have been exhausted. As they put it,

> Besides the ritual manifestations laden with symbolic value *within* the family, there exist others whose symbolic value operates *between* families or distinct groups; and what's more, it appears that certain rituals of the first group (like the *challaqo*) possess characteristics that link them to the second. We're going to discuss now the hypothesis that some rituals have the mission of delimiting the territory and affirming the property right over it, so that religion possesses a function of demarcating the family territory. [Merlino and Rabey 1983:161]

Whether or not this idea explains herd movements associated with Juyuy animal marking ceremonies, the hypothesis can be extended in principle to ceremonial trumpeting in Ayacucho as well.

6. Soltis et. al. (1995) attempt to estimate the social extinction rate in highland New Guinea, and their work serves here as an example. In an area ideal for cultural group selection, the rate is such that it would take 500-1,000 years for group selection to bring a new trait to fixation.

7. Cooperation in this case is easier to observe than noncooperation, as potential requesters might be discouraged in advance from attending a ceremony and the interaction would be beyond the view of investigators. Any informants reports about pressures and resentments associated with *suñay*, however, would be significant and relevant. It would be useful, for instance, to know if anyone's contribution to a ceremony was ever judged insufficient, and if anyone who sought help had ever been denied. Without answers to such questions, the conclusion that cooperation approaches 100% seems premature.

8. In the rational choice literature, "cheating" is synonymous with "noncooperation." To avoid confusion, it's important to note that Flannery et. al. distinguish "cheating" from "noncooperation" in building their models. When they speak of "cheating" they are referring to a particular kind of noncooperation where *suñay* is granted, but the gift is less than optimal given the resources of the giver and needs of the receiver.

9. This is not to say though that a prospective mate's wealth in animals or pastures never enters into one's choice (and one's parents' approval) of marriage partners, nor that it doesn't enter into a new couple's residence decisions. In high altitude pastoral communities such as Q'ero (Paucartambo, Cusco) where localized descent groups live in scattered hamlets that allow for little interaction with kin, a married couple generally chooses to join the parental descent group with the most pasture, animals, and other resources (Webster 1977). Animals inherited bilaterally by husband and wife in Q'ero accrue to the descent group with which they establish residence.

10. Specifically, I'm not sure whether the transfer is typically made during *sirvinakuy* ('cohabitation') or after marriage, and in either case, how soon after the change in status has occurred. Webster (1977) notes that in Q'ero, the transfer is not usually made until the new couple has children to herd, and I suspect that this is a consideration for many families in Ccachín as well.

11. I'm referring here to self-help approaches to organizing small-scale producers. Top-down organization has been attempted and has generally failed. Agrarian reform in Peru in the 1970s led to the creation of production cooperatives in which land and livestock were owned communally. The scope of reform was limited however. Focus was on the large estates (the ex-*haciendas*), and less than 25% of pasture lands were incorporated into the government cooperatives and collectives (Browman 1983). In general, agrarian reform replaced *hacendados* with state control with little corresponding change in production organization. The reform movement was saddled with problems of capital and credit, bureaucratic control, market distortions, and herder incentives that hastened the ultimate dissolution of most collective enterprises. Many of the state-run livestock cooperatives disintegrated as the result of *campesino* invasions and takeovers. The proportion of peasant-owned stock to communally-owned stock was high on enterprise land (an ownership pattern that pertained on the *haciendas* as well). Consequently, herders received more income

from and put more energy into their own animals than they did into the communal holdings, limiting the cooperative management gains.

12. This is true in Ccachín as well, though the term *kuyaq* is not used to label ego's reciprocal network. Contributions to an event may or may not be recorded in writing, depending on the number of contributors, private or public character of the event, and group size. A brother, brother-in-law, or *compadre* of the *carguyoq* may be recruited to keep track of contributions. Reading of a list of contributors and their contributions is only done at community fundraisers, inaugurations of community buildings, and other instances where *patrones* or *padrinos* are formally solicited and where there is no *carguyoq* as such. Most often, after such events as private animal marking ceremonies and public sponsorship of festivals, those who have helped the sponsor continue to feast privately, with honor (measured by seating arrangement, order of service, portions of meat, etc.) accorded informally. The wife of the *carguyoq* and the *servicio* ('server') serving *coca*, *chicha*, and *trago* play an important role in assuring proportionality in these festive exchanges.

13. The category "*kuyaq*" tempers the quote from Montes de Castillo (1989) that I cite in Chapter 3, suggesting that there are no friends in the Andes, only *compadres*. *Kuyaq* is a term of reference rather than address. *Sullka* and *sullkakuna* ('younger brother', 'younger brothers') appears to be the terms of endearment used mutually by male sponsors and their guests during important rituals in the Ayacucho region (Flannery et. al. 1989:165). *Niñucha and niñuchakuna* ('little boy', 'little boys') are used in the same situations in Ccachín. In the Cusco region, *wayqe* ('man's brother') is often used as a term of address to emphasize spiritual brotherhood. *Compadre* is frequently extended in both reference and address beyond immediate *compadrazgo* partners to fill some of the same semantic space.

14. In Flannery et. al.'s simulation of *suñay* (specifically, the "Surf City" Model), this matching of haves with have-nots is modeled by a function called "MATCHMAKER." As they describe it's workings,

> At the end of each model year . . . MATCHMAKER finds the one herd in the system with the greatest number of fertile llamas of the sex requested and gives the request to that herd. The donor herd then processes the request, and if it can respond, the donated llama(s) are removed from the donor herd and added to the herd making the request. [Flannery et. al. 1989:185]

This is a very powerful coordination function, but probably not very realistic. Ethnographically, it would be useful to know a) how requesters determine who to approach in the hope of becoming a "recipient," and b) the expectations and preferences of givers vis-á-vis each other. The cost to the requester of choosing wrongly includes not only the material contribution they make to someone else's ceremony but the opportunity forgone, since they will not have another chance to

make a request for another year. It's certainly plausible that requesters could have a preference order of kin-affines > *compadres* > *strangers* in choosing an owner to approach, the better to increase their probability of success. It's also plausible that while any of the large herd owners can provide an appropriate animal when faced with a specific request, there is incentive for each to prefer that someone else does it. Anyone with a sufficient number of animals might be willing to meet the request, however, if no one else will. Whether or not these preferences hold is an empirical matter. For the latter, the situation would be not all that unlike *compadrazgo*, where all recognize that everybody needs a *padrino* and *madrina*, but people respond to requests selectively, or similar to holding a community office, where everyone agrees that community officials are needed, but given the personal costs, many that are chosen by committee attempt to find a graceful way out.

The structure of these preferences is similar to those in a "chicken game," where everyone prefers universal cooperation to universal noncooperation, but everyone also prefers that someone other than they be the ones that cooperate. Everyone prefers not to cooperate if "enough" others cooperate, and to cooperate if "too many" others do not. Each participant has an incentive to precommit to noncooperation (or at least attempt to convince others that they are not able to cooperate), forcing others into cooperation. Among large groups, there's always the danger that the number binding themselves to noncooperation may exceed the maximum number that can do so without negative effect (Taylor and Ward 1982). Such outcomes could become more likely if we relax the assumption that everyone has perfect knowledge about the size of everyone else's herd, and if we suppose larger regional networks than the four-herd systems simulated by Flannery et. al., ones that have multiple haves and have-nots. Given that Flannery et. al. model not only universal *suñay* but several less universal forms as well, these concerns are addressed indirectly through the simulations, but the discussion above points out some of the questions to be answered in relating the simulations to actual practice.

15. I do not like talking about cognitive limitations as "mistakes" because information is costly and it's collection is subject to optimization so that one does not collect too little or too much, and all that is required for a trait to be favored by selection is that it be better than the alternatives on average. What's important is a comparison of the fitness of competing traits in the cultural or genetic pool. There are a variety of reasons why a behavior may diverge from what is optimally adaptive, including evolutionary accident, the effect of changes in one trait on others, a rapidly changing environment, and the possibility that a population may have not yet reached an evolutionary equilibrium (Gould and Lewontin 1979). This being the case, encountering instances where *suñay* does not contribute to the unintended group-level benefit identified by Flannery et. al. does not in itself disprove the model.

16. For example, the hired herder that looked after my host family's cattle herd received most of the dairy products and a cow-per-year in compensation. Guillet (1987) notes

that such arrangements are undergoing modification as herders willing to work for limited compensation become harder to find. In some areas of the Andes, half of the newborn animals must now be given to the herder. Wardship involves the shifting of child labor from one household to another on a more-or-less permanent basis. McCorkle (1992) indicates that child-givers are reluctant to give up all of a child's labor in wardship unless they or the child will be compensated through a substantial future endowment, such as a share in the inheritance of the herd or pastures. Where inheritance is unlikely, formalized, balanced reciprocity pertains.

17. Others have suggested that the timing of these ritual meat redistributions is itself environmentally determined. Most species of domesticated animals in the Andes have seasonal cycles of expansion and contraction. Based on his study of the ecology of guinea pig ("*qowi*") flocks in the province of Canchis (Cusco), Bolton (1978) has argued that the ritual cycle in the Andes optimizes the consumption of protein. Drawing upon this hypothesis and their research on llama, sheep, and goat herders in Jujuy, Argentina, Merlino and Rabey (1983; Rabey and Merlino 1988) suggest that intensification and diminution of the ritual cycle for these animals regulates sacrifice and consumption to avoid falling below minimal sustainable herd size and to adjust herds to the carrying capacity of the pastures during the dry and rainy seasons. From their perspective, the *challaqo* (derived from *ch'allay*) ceremony in Jujuy in August marks the transition from ritual restraints on consumption to its license. In linking environmental fluctuations, protein needs, and ritual cycles, these arguments have much in common with the arguments advanced by Rappaport (1968) with regard to the ritual regulation of pig populations among the Tsembaga of New Guinea.

    The extent that such explanations invoke group-level functions on the one hand or can be grounded in individual advantage on the other varies. Bolton notes that the ritual cycle involving guinea pigs differs from Rappaport's New Guinean pigs in that in contrast to the latter, the Andean rituals are unrelated to problems of degradation of the natural environment. Merlino and Rabey's proposal, however, more closely parallels Rappaport's in positing that a ritual cycle functions to maintain an ecological equilibrium. Much depends on the property rights governing use of the relevant pasture land in determining the extent that their argument is credible (see Peoples 1982 for a seminal contribution on individual-advantage vs. group-advantage explanation with regard to Rappaport's work; the principles he outlines can be applied more generally). Wherever communal pastures or collective goods are involved, explication of the mechanism by which ritual modifies the incentive structure leading to "tragedy of the commons" effects is required.

18. Leeds (1965) makes this point in two different contexts, the first in talking about the effect it has for herding assistants, the second with regard to ceremonial redistributions:

> An assistant is also paid in food by the rich herdsman for whom he works. He therefore has to remove neither does nor bucks from his increasing herd to feed himself and his family, if he has one. Hence the increment rate not only of the does (because of the gift increment), but also of the total herd, is larger than the growth rate for either of the other types of herd [large herds, small independent herds], since no bucks are slaughtered. [Leeds 1965:117-118]
>
> Poor men . . . do not give returns [to the rich sponsors of meat redistributions]: for them it would seem, the redistribution is final; and it spares them a certain amount of killing in their own small herds. [Leeds 1965:123]

While he is referring to the social institutions of reindeer herding among the Chukchi here, the point applies to herders generally, and the ceremonial redistribution of meat should have similar effects in the Andes.

19. Durham (1991) distinguishes between "holomemes" (the entire cultural repertory of variation for a given meme whether acted upon or not) and "allomemes" (the subset of holomemes that are actually used as guides to behavior by at least some members of a population in at least some circumstances). Both are relevant to the discussion here.

20. There are several references to alcohol and *suñay* together in Flannery et. al.'s ethnography. Here are a few more: "Félix gave him an alcoholic embrace and told him to pick the animal he wanted" (p. 165). "After the owner had looked around the crowd, and they had looked over the llamas, and everyone had quite a bit to drink, they might *suñay*, giving away animals to several participants" (p. 170). I'm left with the impression that drinking makes *suñay* giving all the easier. This impression is confirmed when Flannery et. al. write that "Tonight the herders of Pallqa were drunk enough to forget that two people must be four generations removed before they could sleep together" (p. 169). Dransart (1991:156) takes him to task for loose talk about incest, and the same could be said about these references to alcohol, unless their point is that drinking removes normal inhibitions and makes one less selfish.

21. Drinking behavior has long been subject to functional interpretation at both the level of the individual actor and of the sociocultural system. In principle, I have no problem with the former approach — usually some form of biopsychological functionalism in the Malinowskian sense. Heath (1987:39), for example, notes that it has long been axiomatic in anthropology that "the primary function of alcoholic beverages in all societies is the reduction of anxiety." The functions identified, of course, are open to question. Doughty (1971:195) posits a group advantage to drinking. He reports that drinking "serves the highly useful latent function of providing the means by which social barriers to harmonious interpersonal relations are minimized or set aside" in Huaylas (Ancash, Peru). Most recent accounts are usually less explicitly group-functionalist, but it still too easy to move from the

observation that "drinking promotes solidarity" or "alcohol allows the expression of pent-up hostilities" to the assumption that the function of "drinking together" or "letting off steam" is to maintain the integrity of the organization.

22. A contrast is often drawn between drinking within traditional community contexts and drinking outside. Allen (1988) suggests that Quechua men are most vulnerable to being taken advantage of when they go to town and drink with *mestizos*, where the unfamiliar social environment and their subordinate status put them at a disadvantage. Along the same lines, the role that partial payments in drink played in maintaining peon indebtedness during the hacienda era are often cited by investigators (Bunker 1987).

23. Economists have attempted to model the effect of these beliefs in various ways. Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), for example, relax the assumption that the "expected stream of benefits" which an individual expects to receive from an action terminates at the time of their death. The household-allocation-of-time model that they develop allows for afterlife consumption, with the variable being a partial function of the household's investment in religious activities during the lifetimes of its members.

24. The comments of Dawkins (1989:201-215) are apropos. After first cautioning fellow Darwinians about the dangers of looking for the "biological advantages" — for the individual or the group — of every human institution, he takes up the issue of religious belief. Responding directly to the idea that religion functions to promote cooperation and stabilize the group, Dawkins discusses how a "co-adapted stable set of mutually-assisting memes" might come into being and persist:

> To take a particular example, an aspect of doctrine which has been very effective in enforcing religious observance is the threat of hell fire. Many . . . believe that they will suffer ghastly torments after death if they do not obey the priestly rules. . . . It might almost have been planned deliberately by a Machiavellian priesthood. . . . However, I doubt if the priests were that clever. Much more probably, unconscious memes have assured their own survival by virtue of those same qualities of pseudo-ruthlessness which successful genes display. The idea of hell fire is, quite simply, *self-perpetuating*, because of its own deep psychological impact. It has become linked with the god meme because the two reinforce each other, and assist each other's survival in the meme pool. [Dawkins 1989:212]

"Psychological impact" plays a critical role in these speculations, and Dawkins's analysis reminds us that human choices about alternative beliefs and values are shaped by evolved judgement heuristics and biases. The peculiarities and nuances of particular religions have unique histories of cultural inheritance. The idea of "hell fire," for example, arrived relatively late on the Andean scene, but the contemporary syncretic image of the *kukuchi* — the cannibalistic souls of damned sinners that roam the glaciers trapped in their rotting bodies carries at least as much psychological

impact as the *infierno*. But there are fundamental similarities between a hell of fire and a hell of ice, and further investigation of the psychological processes underlying belief formation may prove more productive than positing that such beliefs have become widespread because of their group benefit.

25. Following Edgerton (1985), it's useful to distinguish between "moral rules" and "supernatural injunctions." The latter, more commonly known as "taboos," are fear-invoking rules that may only apply to certain categories of people, but rarely have exceptions. Moral rules may or may not involve supernatural justification, but they always define and reward virtue. While usually categorical, they are often stated in such general terms that they are open to interpretation and subject to conflicts between them, so that violation of one may be excepted and justified in terms of another. Additional interpretive flexibility is inherent in the Andean worldview because both witchcraft beliefs (which can mistake the natural causes of misfortune for social ones) and supernatural injunctions (which can deflect the agency of misfortune from human malevolence to disgruntled ancestors and earth spirits) can be invoked in similar circumstances. Besides being weakened by such ambiguities, I suspect that the judgement heuristic identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1984) as "loss aversion" — aversion to a given loss is stronger than attraction to an equivalent gain — plays a role here as well. The strength of various kinds of rules should vary according to how they are framed.

26. This can readily be seen for animal giving by a quick review of the DONOR and MATCHMAKER functions of Flannery et. al.'s "Surf City" model. Stated in such terms, the Surf City Model seems hardly less utopian than the "Santa Claus" model. The only additional bow to realism is to vary the endowments of givers. Although not included in the simulations, the "from each according to their ability, to each according to their need" ethic presumably applies to animal requesters as well. Requesters seek to be recognized as *kuyaq* (as among the sponsor's favored group) by their contributions to the ceremony. How large of a contribution qualifies one for the honor? Will a single bottle of *trago* be accepted from someone who can give more? (Presumably, this is the requestor's equivalent of "cheating.") One would expect that to qualify among "those who love me," some self-sacrifice would be expected of requesters as well. Since the model assumes that each knows the other's endowments, an argument can be made for modeling the gifts of both donors and requesters with a giving function regulated by ability.

27. At a later date, these guests give dissimilar goods in return, but the time interval and context has not been well-specified in ethnographies on the Chukchi (Leeds 1965).

28. This kind of data is not as hard to gather as it might seem. To take a related example, *compadres* are expected to intercede and reproach their *compadres* in cases where the second are mistreating the first's godchild or where they are engaged in adulterous affairs that endanger the stability of the household. One can document

who approaches the former to ask them to intercede. and one can record people's talk about *compadres* who fail to fulfill this role.

29. The universal adherence to the use of one hand or another in certain situations may solve coordination problems. However, in such situations there are two pure-strategy equilibria and the choice of one or another is essentially arbitrary: the convention sustaining whatever hand is chosen involves exogenous expectations rather than those that can be derived from the assumption of rationality. It is hard to argue that the proscription against using one's left hand in spreading *chicha* over a herd in *t'inkay* ceremonies solves any coordination problem. It seems more likely in this case that a statistical regularity in handedness has come to be perceived as obligatory. To describe how such expectations come to be self-fulfilling is part of the explanation of how norms emerge.




Figure 6.1: Flannery, Marcus, and Reynold's Explanation of *Suñay*




Figure 6.2: Pyramid of *Suñay* Recipients




Figure 6.3: "*Casamiento,*" A Fertility Ritual for the Sheep

Table 6.1: *Suñay* in the Andes

Among the Quechua (Peru)
"One of the first modalities of property that all indigenes experience is *suñay*. This is a form of gift of cattle, be it auchenid, ovine, or bovine, that is given to children as adults when the ceremony of marking livestock takes place. In this case the donor can be any relative of the recipients, their godfather or godmother, or even a friend. The animal that is given is preserved with a lot of diligence, and is not readily sold." [Ossio Acuña 1983:54]

Aymara of Peru (Santa Rosa de Juli, Chucuito, Puno, Peru)
"*Iñawe*. This is the quantity of livestock that's assigned to the children at a very young age with the objective of giving them incentive in the process of socialization, that is to say, in the apprenticeship and knowledge of the techniques for managing the herd. The *iñawe* is presented at two opportunities: in the *marka* (annual rite of fertility that's realized after the campaign of birthing) the parents (man and woman) assign a head or two of livestock to the child. . . . The other opportunity for transmission of *iñawe* is the *ñikuta murañani* or first haircutting ceremony." [Palacios 1988:183]

Aymara of Bolivia (Pampa Aullagas, Oruru, Bolivia)
"It's in the middle of the marking ceremony that one delivers an adult female llama or sheep to one's child. These gift animals can be given by the father, the mother, or both. If the man has more sheep than llamas, he will give a sheep, in so much as his wife will give a llama. The grandparents can also give the grandchild a gift as an expression of care. Normally, a child will receive them only once, the exception being when the animals die before having offspring. The animals given to the child are pastured with the herd of the family and with luck, increase with time to form the nucleus of the herd of an adult. Orphans and illegitimate children can receive a gift animal from their relatives, but if the latter lack sufficient animals, they won't receive any. Consequently, it's common among the adults that lack animals to attribute the fact to their condition as illegitimate children of poor mothers." [West 1988:197-198]

Aymara of Bolivia (Pampa Aullagas, Oruru, Bolivia)
"The year after their animals are united, a couple can give animals to each other during their first ear-marking ceremony. In later years, a woman can give animals to her goddaughter in reciprocity for the help that has been given in the completion of various chores, including tasks with the pasturing of the herd. For the same reason, a man can give a sheep or a llama to his nephew, thus helping the young couple increase their personal herd. In every case, as with the animals for one's children, these are given only once. Thereafter, it's a matter of individual luck. In contrast to the animals given to the children, which are always females, those given to the adults can be of either sex." [West 1988:200]

Table 6.2: *T'inkay* Ceremonies in Ccachín

Ethnographic Notes

Below I describe two *t'inkay* ceremonies that I witnessed in Ccachín, one for the sheep and one for the cows. I keep my interpretive comments to a minimum and describe the ceremonies much as I first experienced them, as a naive observer. In documenting rituals such as this, it is difficult to know which variables and what social, material, and structural "facts" have meaning to those involved. Consequently, I may have missed important features and highlighted inconsequential ones. The fact that the lambs were facing toward the east in the *casamiento* ('wedding') of the sheep in the first *t'inkay* described is a case in point. I tried to be attuned to spatial relations during the ceremony and noted it, not knowing whether it was important or not. When Barbara and my *suñay* goat was sacrificed, it was soon after sunrise and the animal was also pointed east. Since returning from the field, I have come across a report by Rabey and Merlino that according to local beliefs in Jujuy, Argentina, "the animal should be sacrificed always in the morning, with its head oriented toward the east" (1988:117). Casaverde (1970:231) indicates that the ritual *mesas* at *t'inkay* are likewise oriented toward the east, while Gose (1994:197) suggests that it depends on whether one is an agriculturalist or a herder, the latter orienting their *mesas* to the west. Are these orientations ritually significant, and if so, is the orientation meaningful in Ccachín as well? I did not ask anyone in Ccachín about it while doing field work and do not know.

Another example is the recurrence of the number three. A number of times during the first ceremony I was instructed to do something three times — toss the alcohol over the sheep three times, pass out three handfuls of flowers, wave my hand containing a chewed coca wad over a receptacle three times in prayer. I paid careful attention to these ritual formulas so that I could do it right and not bring disgrace on my family's offering. I have since found that other investigators have noted the importance of the number three in the *t'inkay* as well. Gose (1994:202) notes that virtually every offering assembled on the ritual *mesa* at *t'inkay* in a community near Antabamba (Apurímac) where he conducted research stresses the number three, and refers to this as the "Andean Trinity Formula." In Choqe Huarcaya (Ayacucho), the Trinity is directly invoked in the simulated whipping of *suñay* recipients with three leaves and three times (Quispe 1969; also see discussion in this chapter).

The symbolic value of some features is conveyed through metaphor. For example, villagers refer to the mixture of *chicha* and sheep's blood that is drunk at the wedding for the lambs during *t'inkay* as *vino* ('wine'). How far they take the analogy, I do not know, but one can see potential connections to Catholic beliefs and practices.

These and many other features of the *t'inkay* I describe potentially have meaning to the participants, or meaning elsewhere in the Andes, but since they do not bear on whether *suñay* is granted or not, I do not elaborate here. Since most households hold their marking ceremonies on the same day, it is hard for a visiting anthropologist to attend more than a few during his or her time in a community. This contrasts with *papa yapuy* and other agricultural rituals which are held by different families on different days, making it possible to attend dozens during a single season.

The two *t'inkay* ceremonies I describe here are among the most elaborate I witnessed in Ccachín. While the first had relatively little music (there were no tambours or flutes), little ornamentation, and little dancing, the second more closely conformed to the local ideal in this regard. For those interested, Marianne Eyde's film "*La Vida Es Una Vida*" (1992) opens with a segment from a *Día de Compadres t'inkay* in Ccachín and provides a brief glimpse of some of the ritual activities I describe. As far as I am aware, there were no animals given in *suñay* at the *t'inkay* for the sheep that I report on here. In contrast, in the *t'inkay* for the cattle, animals were given to the daughters present. My goal in presenting these cases is to contribute to the ethnographic record of these ceremonies, so that the variability and significance of its myriad features throughout the Andes can be established.

Uwiha T'inkay: Ritual for the Sheep

***T'inkay* of My Host Family, Ccachín, 2/14/90**

The *Día de Compadres t'inkay* in Ccachín is a household feast held for the sheep, llamas, and alpaca. While the ceremony is usually held on the second Thursday before Carnival, my host family decided to move the ceremony up a day to accommodate a guest from Chinchero. Like Thursday, Wednesday is considered to be a propitious day for holding rites for the animals.

The activities started with a noon meal. A soup of potatoes, cabbage, and beef jerky was served, followed by boiled potatoes and a broth with noodles and chunks of cheese. Since the visitor was Baha'i and did not eat red meat, a guinea pig was roast on a spit and served him in place of the jerky.

After lunch, *Don HS* served coca and *trago* outside. He poured a gourdful of liquid on the ground at the threshold of the kitchen door. He tossed another over the entrance to the sheep corral adjoining the kitchen. He served each of the men present three rounds of *trago*. One of the visitors suggested that he serve his wife *Doña VP* a drink, but he responded that "she doesn't drink." Two passersby leading their horses were served a drink as well.

We next hiked to Pampallaqta, forty-five minutes above the community, where the family had a herded cabin. The women had combed their hair and dressed in their best *lliklla* and *monteras* for the occasion. Along the way, *Doña VP* identified several color variations of *qaqa istrilla* ('rock lichen') and discussed their use in treating wind-related illnesses. Meanwhile, her youngest daughter was already above in the pasture rounding up the sheep and alpaca. When we arrived, the sheep were present, but the alpaca were nowhere to be seen, and there was an unhappy discussion between mother and daughter before it was determined that we should proceed without them.

At Pampallaqta, we were joined by the first *compadres* of *Don HS* and *Doña VP*, as well as their three children. They only had a few sheep of their own, and herded them with along with my host family's animals in an *ayninakuy* arrangement. We crowded into the cabin, and the same menu of food we had been served below was shared with the *compadres*. After the meal, the *compadre* and a son went out to round up the animals, which had scattered. *Don HS* served drinks, and this time included *Doña VP*. She poured some of her first drink on the hearth and said a short prayer. Thereafter, she drank whenever it was her turn. With a pronounced grimace, *Comadre VQ* likewise drank when served. *Compadre AZ* returned and we waited for him to catch up with drinks before we went outside for the ceremony.

It was raining steadily, and we donned sheets of blue plastic to cloak us from the rain. We went to the corner of the corral for shelter and sat in a circle, men uphill, women below. The children sat together a short distance from the ring of adults. Assorted *lliklla*, *q'epina* and *unkuña* (varieties of shawls and carrying cloths) were laid down at the center of the circle. All of the ritual paraphernalia was gathered there: bottles of trago, vermouth, and Fanta, a large gourd of *chicha* and four smaller drinking gourds, a couple of sea shells, a small bundle of coca leaves, large bundles of *phuña* and *phallcha* flowers, sewing needles, and a ball of yarn. A large chip of cow dung was placed before us, and this was used as a base for burning incense. A second bit of dung was set several meters distant, and incense was burned there as well. Incense was added at intervals through the ceremony. At one point, *Doña VP* noticed that the incense had nearly burned out and requested that one of the male guests put more on, noting that as a *warmi* ('woman'), she could not do it herself.

We now began chewing coca, and the leaves were served at several intervals during the ceremony. A *llipht'a* (a ball of vegetable ash used to release the coca's alkaloids) was also passed around, and the first time it was passed, each participant prayed over it and bit off a small piece. *Doña VP* kissed the *llipht'a* and said a prayer when her turn came, but she did not bite off a piece, perhaps seeking to avoid the caustic burning sensation it leaves in the mouth. She corrected me in my offering of *k'intu* to the others, demonstrating how the coca leaves need to be presented with the right hand: three leaves, points up, shiny side toward the recipient. Occasionally, *Compadre* AZ, chief assistant to *Don HS*, collected the chewed wads of coca in an *unkuña*. These too, we presented each in turn with a prayer, and *Compadre AZ* thanked us.

Early on, *Compadre AZ* spread a line of white salt on the adjacent pasture for the sheep and called the animals with a "*chuqachuqachuqa*" sound. Subsequently, he spread the salt a couple of times during the ceremony to regather the animals. With *Don HS* pouring the liquids, *Compadre AZ* used the two seashells to fling *chicha*, *trago*, and Fanta over the animals. He also splashed the drinks over the rock wall of the corral. *TS*, the youngest daughter of the hosts and one of the primary herders, likewise took the shells and tossed *chicha* over the corral walls. Meanwhile, the women prepared the flowers. They first separated the stems from the red *phallcha* and tore the rabbit-ear-like *phuña* into pieces. They then used needle and thread to string the flowers into necklaces. The remainder were mixed together in a carrying cloth.

Next, there were round of drinks accompanied by prayer-toasts for the two households, for the herds, and for all present. As each drank and prayed in turn, others would accompany them with their own invocations, so that several would utter their appeals under their breath at once. Appeals were made to the local and regional mountain spirits, *apus* San Carlos, Sombreruyoq, Pinkuyllunka, Qolqe Cruz, Tiriqway, Awsankati, and others. The prayers were punctuated with frequent expressions of gratitude by those that were included in the petitions.

After these prayers, everyone participated in the *ch'uyay*, each in turn tossing *chicha* over the flock of sheep from seashells or gourds. *Qañiwa* seeds were added to the liquid being thrown. Here too I was corrected. The *ch'uyay* needs to be done with the right rather than left hand, and with three tosses rather than one sweeping motion. The one person who did not participate in this part of the ceremony and seemed to remove herself or be excluded from other aspects as well was the twenty-two-year-old daughter of the sponsoring family. Whether it was because she had recently become a nursing mother, because of bad feelings about her relationship with the baby's father (which had been against her parents wishes), or for some other reason was unclear.

The next part of the ceremony was the "*casamiento*" ('wedding'). The two children who herded on a daily basis, one from each household, boy and girl, twelve years and eleven years old respectively, knelt before *Don HS*. Using *taku* (an ochre-colored clay and iron oxide) moistened in *chicha* for painting, *Don HS* drew a cross on the right hand of each of the children. After he finished addressing them, the two children went off and grabbed two lambs, one black, one white, a male and a female. A brightly-colored manta was placed on the ground and the lambs were laid on their sides over it, heads to the east, one facing the other, legs intertwined (Figure 6.3). Another manta was placed over them. *Don HS* marked each of the lambs with a cross from head to toe. Next, he cut a slice from an ear of each of the lambs, and the blood was collected in a gourd with a bit of *chicha*. When he finished, *Comadre VQ* and *Doña VP* tied a flower necklace around the neck of each animal and released them. The *compadres* and children caught more young sheep, and they too were decorated with the floral collars.

After all the collars had been placed, *Doña VP* instructed me to distribute three handfuls of the remaining flowers to each person. Males-female pairs approached and knelt before me to receive their flowers in an outstretched poncho or manta. Each pair then approached the flock, and each tossed their flowers over the back of the sheep just as we had done with the *chicha*.

We reconvened to the circle. *Doña VP* was given the gourd with the lambs' blood and *chicha*. She poured a bit of the liquid into a gourd for another participant and they drank together. Each of us drank with *Doña VP* in turn, Barbara and I going last. She never drained her gourd, and after each drink, more *chicha* was added. She repeated the process of pouring some of her liquid into others' cups and sharing the blood-*chicha* mix with each.

After drinking the blood, we settled into conversing, chewing coca, sharing *k'intu*, and drinking *trago*. Throughout, the ceremony had both serious and joyful moments, but for a moment now, *Doña VP* grew sad as she reflected on her troubles. At dusk, the two child herders were sent off with the mangos and oranges to be buried as an offering to the spirits of the hills. The chewed coca wads ("*hach'u*") that we had saved were

buried as well. *Doña VP* dressed Barbara in a *pullira* ('traditional skirt') and *lliklla*, and gave the other guest and me a *lliklla* to use as a carrying cloth, and we descended toward the village to the accompaniment of a harmonica. We stopped several times on the way down in level clearings to drink *trago*, sing, and dance. The party continued in back in the village, but very drunk, I slipped away and went to bed.

Waka T'inkay: Ritual for the Cattle

***T'inkay* of *Don MC* and *Doña BP* Family, Ccachín, 2/7/91**

Most families in Ccachín celebrate their decorating ritual for the cattle on *Día de Comadres*, the first Thursday before Carnival Sunday. The ceremony of *Don MC* and *Doña BP* that I attended in 1991 was a family affair. I was the only nonrelative present, but one of *Don MC* and *Doña BP*'s grandchildren is my godchild, making them my *hatun compadres*, my ritual kin. *Don MC* was away, celebrating the ceremony with others in a nearby community, but their oldest daughter, who lives in Cusco, returned to Ccachín to participate in her first *comadres t'inkay* in thirteen years, and the rest of their children and sons- and daughters-in-law were present at one stage of the ceremony or another.

The family pastures their cattle in dispersed sites, so early in the morning, a daughter and two sons set out in separate directions with bundles of toasted corn and salt for each herd. After breakfast, I accompanied *Doña BP* and other family members to nearby *Huch'uy Unuta*, where we stopped in a clearing and waited for the others to join us. Along the trail we encountered a family relative. My hosts for the day passed some delicate moments, as, returning inebriated from carrying salt to his herd and lacking tact, he discussed problems in their joint use of the cattle pasture at *Hatun Unuta*, and questioned why they were not holding their *t'inkay* for the herd together. Due to a mix-up between *Doña BP* and one of her sons on where the entire family would gather, we stopped short of reaching the herd at *Hatun Unuta*, so I was unable to witness the rituals with the animals. I understand that they varied at each site, being most elaborate at *Hatun Unuta*. Here the salt was given, a libation of chicha and *ñukch'u* and *phallcha* flowers were tossed over the cattle, and a clipping from the tail of a male and a female animal was cut, bound, and saved. The cattle were then left to roam freely, so they were not present for the rest of the ceremony.

A carrying cloth was placed on the ground as a *misa* ('table') in the upper pasture where the family gathered, and the coca, alcohol, and cow's tails were placed on it. Many of the activities associated with this celebration were similar to those of the *t'inkay* for the sheep. There were frequent libations for the earth and the *apu*, sharing

of coca and collecting of the chewed wads for burial, and rounds of drinks. *Doña BP* blew over her *chicha* in the direction of *Apu* San Carlos, the peak directly overlooking the pasture. The midday meal for *Día de Comadres* is generally more elaborate than that of *Día de Compadres*, probably because, for most families, the herds are distant and the ritual *misa* is set up at home. Our *merienda* included boiled potatoes, boiled *ch'uñu*, and a plate of wheat tortillas, egg tortillas, turnip greens, lamb, chicken, and *qowi*. The drinks included *chicha*, *trago*, and vermouth. The latter is special to animal marking ceremonies and not observed at any other time during the year.

After the meal, everyone gathered together in a circle as *Doña BP*, who is in her late sixties, discussed how she wished to distribute her cattle. I do not know how much of the herd belongs to *Doña BP* and how much to her husband, who boasts of being among the largest cattle owners in the village, so I'm unsure whether she passed on all or only a part of her holdings at this time. She gave an animal to each of her two oldest daughters — one living in the village, the other in Cusco — and they responded by showering her with gratitude. A third daughter, still a teenager and living at home, was away giving salt to the cattle at one of the other pastures and was not included at this time. She did she give anything to the two sons present.

As we prepared to return to the village in the late afternoon, *Doña BP* smeared colored flour over everyone's face and we decorated each other in streamers of colored paper ("*serpentinas*"), both contemporary features of Carnival adornment in Ccachín. Some of the men had fashioned *qena* ('bamboo flutes') while we were assembled, and we proceeded home to the music of *qena*, a tambour, and the singing of the women. At various points along the route we stopped to drink and to dance, the women striking at the legs of the men with *waraka* ('slings') in the manner of Carnival.

For many families in Ccachín, a *t'inkay* for the cattle is a two day affair, with the second day taking place in the home. I did not join *Don MC*'s and *Doña BP*'s family for the second day of their ceremony in 1991, opting to see what others did instead, but I was with them the previous year, and in continuation, I report on what they did in 1990, assuming it to be representative.

Unlike the *t'inkay* of 1991, *Don MC* was present for his family's *waka t'inkay* in 1990. He got so drunk that he could not return home with the others and straggled in late at night, losing a sandal on the trail. He laughed at himself in reporting his travails, but noted that he was obliged to drink for the welfare of the herds ("E*s obligatorio tomar bastante. Si no, se mueren las vacas*" — "Drinking a lot is obligatory. If one doesn't, the cattle die"). *Don MC* stresses the importance of cleaning up the house before the ceremony, and before setting up the ritual table, family members swept the floor, brushed the table clean, and washed the ceramic cattle to be used in the *misa*. A blue *serpentina* was tied around the neck of each of the animal pots, and the ritual objects were set on a table.

The ritual paraphernalia included three ceramic animals (the largest for drinking *chicha*), a plate of fresh meat, two sea shells, two *llipht'a*, two tail clippings from the cows, and a pile of colored streamers Cnce the table was set up, both men and women approached the *misa* and placed carefully selected *k'intu* of coca on the plate of meat. Each person also sprinkled the first drops from their drinks over the plate of meat, on the tail clippings, on the four corners of the table, and on the ground. I was told that the two *llipht'a* represented male and female animals, and that one should take a *llipht'a* bite from each of them with the coca. According to *Don MC*, when one partakes of the *llipht'a*, one takes a bite of the animals themselves, "*las astas de los machos, las tetas de las hembras . . . su cuero, su cola*" ("the horns of the bulls, the teats of the cows, their hides, their tails"). From time to time, the chewed wads of coca were collected, with each waving their *hach'u* over the receptacle and reciting a specified prayer. The chewed coca would then be taken outside for burial.

The second day was taken up with relaxed conversation and feasting. I did not stay to the end of the festivities, but expect that the pattern followed the one I observed throughout Ccachín: in the late afternoon a final prayer would be said, the ritual objects would be wrapped in a cloth and presented to everyone to kiss with the sign of a cross, and finally, the bundle would be handed to *Doña BP* to stow away in the *marka*.

Part III

The *Comunidad Campesina*: Structural Context of Action

In the following three chapters I outline the institutional arrangements in Ccachín, describe the decision making and regulatory mechanisms involved, and analyze the *comunidad campesina* as an indigenous resource management regime or "appropriator organization" (a term advanced by Ostrom 1992). I follow Elster (1989:147) in considering institutions to be "rule-enforcing mechanisms." What's needed is a comprehensive idea of what these rules are about. Ostrom (1986a, 1986b) provides a useful typology when she identifies eight variables that make up the structure of an action situation: 1) the set of participants, 2) the set of positions held by participants, 3) the set of actions available to participants at every moment of decision while an event unfolds, 4) the set of outcomes that participants jointly affect, 5) the set of functions that link actions to outcomes, 6) the amount of information available, 7) the costs and benefits of actions and outcomes, and 8) the number of times a situation is repeated. These, along with a model of the actor (i.e., the resources they bring to the situation, the way they process information, their valuation of given outcomes and actions, and the decision rules they use to select particular course of action) constitute the set of variables that an investigator needs to identify to model decision making when outcomes depend on what every individual involved is doing.

In this section, I focus on the conventions and rules in Ccachín that affect these variables. These rules include 1) boundary rules that determine who participants are, 2) scope rules that set the range of what participants can do and what not, 3) position rules that assign statuses and roles, 4) authority and procedure rules about which positions are authorized to take which actions when, 5) information rules that open and close channels of communication, 6) aggregation rules for weighing individual choices and consolidating them in collective ones, and 7) payoff rules that establish how benefits and costs are to be

distributed to participants in positions given their actions and those of others (Ostrom 1986a). It's worth emphasizing that rules are viewed here as affecting the variables in an action situation rather than directly controlling or constraining behavior.

Bearing this framework in mind, my discussion of institutional arrangements in Ccachín proceeds as follows:

In Chapter 7, I present the traditional authority structure of the community — a system that is commonly referred to in the literature on the Andes and Mesoamerica as the "*cargo* system," "ladder system," or "civil-religious hierarchy." The participants are almost all male, the relevant positions are those of the *varayoq*, *carguyoq*, and *mayordomos*, and those that hold these positions are expected to contribute important collective and public goods to the community. I describe how this service-authority structure works in Ccachín, note the changes it has undergone in the last 30 years, and explore the extent to which it has been integrated into the more formal, statutory authority of the contemporary *comunidad campesina*. One of my findings is that the traditional authority structure has not withered away as government reforms have intended, but continues to play a vital role in community life. I consider why this is the case, and what the prognosis may be for the future.

The explanation of why such systems exist at all appears puzzling from a rational choice perspective, since there are high private costs to many of the positions (indeed, *cargo* means 'burden') and many of the benefits have a conspicuously public nature. Historically, Latin-American *cargo* systems have been treated as "leveling mechanisms" in the anthropological literature, and in the main, analyzed according to their purported (often latent) functions. I would argue that individual-level mechanisms are sufficient to explain the system, however, without resort to such functionalism. The interaction of prestige striving, social sanctions, targeting of benefits, byproduct production, and the performance of necessary and valued services contribute to the continuance of the system.

In Chapter 8, I provide an overview of the formal organization and operating procedures of the *comunidad campesina* of Ccachín. In the previous chapter my focus was on the role of traditional officials in the contemporary structure. In this chapter, I

focus on the statutory authorities of the community: the community assembly ("*asamblea general*"), elected officials, committees, and community groups. My emphasis is on the position, authority, procedure, and aggregation rules of the management regime.

In Chapter 9, I identify the rule-enforcement mechanisms available according to one's position of authority in the *comunidad campesina.* These mechanisms are intended to ensure that the decisions and policies of the nested collectivities that make up the community are efficiently and equitably carried out. Here, my focus is on boundary, scope and payoff rules. At times, it may seem that I pay inordinate attention to the failings of community officials and to when things go wrong. It's important to note that my intent is not to provide a state-of-the-community report, but to identify the control mechanisms underlying the system. I have found that these are most easily discovered and described by concentrating on the boundaries of appropriate behavior. My analytical concern in this chapter is the role of sanctions in maintaining commitment and cooperation, and the effect of small-group consensus-based decision structures on the selection of working rules for common property management and public goods production.

The broad scope with which I identify community organizations in Ccachín in this thesis is an attempt to go beyond the widespread fascination of researchers with "traditional" or "Andean" institutions to provide a more complete picture of the synthetic whole. The complexity and extent of westernization of the overall organization should be an eyeopener for anyone who maintains a simple, untouched image of Andean community life. My thesis is but a snapshot of a community in transition, however, and comparison with other ethnographic accounts of the institutional structure of other Andean communities, past or present, needs to be done with caution. Variables such as population pressure, accessibility to district and provincial commercial and political centers, and mode of production make a considerable difference.

In "The Hold Life Has", Catherine Allen poses the question, "How do things get done in Sonqo?" and concludes that:

> I often had the feeling that the way things were "really" getting done was eluding me — for much of Sonqo's political life is informal in nature and has a sub rosa quality about it. Most decision-making goes on outside the formal assemblies —

> away from the watchful eyes of teachers and government agents. It is carried out by influential members of the community, who call on one another in the evening or before breakfast to chat and chew coca and confer soberly during work parties while the young men labor noisily at the heavier tasks. [1988:118]

The chapters in this section are motivated by a similar question, "How do things get done in Ccachín?" I have sat in on side discussions at *ayni* work parties and eavesdropped on early morning visits and I'm equally impressed by the behind-the-scenes nature of decision-making. My tack in these chapters is to follow an intermediate course. My focus is on the formal political life of the community, but I follow it out of the assembly hall and into the delegations and community groups that make things happen. The answer to the question of how things really get done likewise continues to intrigue and elude me. But I hope that these chapters provide the reader a clue as to what much of the informal gathering and chatter is all about.

Chapter 7

Cargos and Cost-Sharing

Introduction

The simplest way to conceptualize the institutional order of Ccachín, along with many other Andean communities since the agrarian reform of the late 1960s and early 1970s, is as having two branches. The first branch is the traditional service and authority structure. It is based on the passage of men through a hierarchical series of civil and religious *cargos* ('obligations') and offices during their lives, beginning with town crier, climbing a ladder of successive offices culminating with head mayor, and ending with service as steward of the saints. The second branch includes the statutory authority of the general assembly and the elected representatives of the *comunidad campesina.* It nests into and is legitimatized by regional and national political structures. Although the more recent of the two, this branch surpasses the first in size, expanse, and growth. The two branches are effectively if not formally integrated into the community, so that they are part of a single system. The traditional system, however, has had to weather a history of efforts from outside to constrain or replace it, and its continued vitality suggests that it serves interests and needs that are not otherwise easily fulfilled.

In this chapter, I consider the place of Ccachín's traditional authority system within the overall institutional context of the *comunidad campesina.* I provide an ethnographic account of the structure of the system, the activities and responsibilities of the officeholders, the rules of selection and succession, and the rites of inauguration.

Latin-American *cargo* systems have often been treated as "leveling mechanisms" in the anthropological literature, or otherwise analyzed according to hypothesized latent functions. One introductory anthropology text, for example, suggests that:

> In these communities, cargo systems function to siphon off any excess wealth that people may accumulate. . . . Through its system of offices, it ensures that necessary services within the community are performed. Members are also pressured

> into investing their resources in their own community rather than elsewhere. Finally, it keeps goods in circulation, rather than sitting around "gathering dust" somewhere. [Haviland 1994:424-425]

As I indicated in Chapter 6, I am wary of any argument that a system is sustained by its group-level benefits unless the feedback mechanism is adequately specified, and the same holds here. The explanation of *cargo* systems in Latin America can be grounded in the goals and interactions of rational individuals. Prestige striving, social sanctions, differential access to benefits, production of collective goods as byproducts of private family transactions, and the lack of individual and collective alternatives for producing the private and public benefits provided by *varayoq*, *carguyoq*, and *mayordomo* service all contribute to the continuance of the system.

The Civil-Religious Hierarchy

In Ccachín, as in most Andean communities, there is a dual political structure. On the one hand there are the *varayoq*, traditional authorities named for, recognized, and empowered by the staffs of office ("*vara*") that they bear (Table 7.1). On the other hand, there are government-mandated officials that, while locally elected, have their job descriptions defined by and their chain of authority formally integrated with district, regional, and national governments. The *varayoq* have their origins in pre-conquest Andean leadership, prestige, and power structures that were later legalized and reinforced by the Spanish Viceroy Toledo in 1571 (Skar 1982). While most twentieth century legislation in Peru has been designed to undercut or abolish traditional village authority, it has had mixed results, and the current situation is one of a syncretic blend of old and new structures throughout the highlands. In many remote areas, the local power elite and government officials have found it to their advantage to work through the *varayoq* rather than supplant them. Such seems to be the case in Ccachín, where, before agrarian reform, the *arrendire* of the hacienda lands at Pan de Azucar is reported to have acted "like an *hacendado*," taking center position at the swearing in ceremony of the new *varayoq* on January 1st, and using the *varayoq* to organize work parties in his own fields and for the

hacendado. In a formal sense as well, the *varayoq* have never been independent of outside authorities. Until the early 1980s, when Ccachín got its own judges, the *varayoq* had to go to Lares to be sworn in. Some villagers suggest that further back in time, the *varayoq* had to go all the way to Calca. While they may have been selected within the community, their tenure was always ratified by regional officials.

The Four Tiers of the *Varayoq* System

There are four levels to the *varayoq* system in Ccachín. They are hierarchically organized in terms of prestige and status both within and between each level. The highest-ranking official in the system is the *Inca alcalde*. Immediately below him are three sub-mayors, the *alcaldes de barrio*. Below them are several *alguaciles*. The lowest ranking positions in the hierarchy are occupied by three *regidores*. The *anexo* of Rayan-kancha is tied into Ccachín's system with two representatives at the level of *alguacil*. The *anexo* of Qochayoq, however, has its own *varayoq* system, with the levels of the hierarchy replicating those of Ccachín, though the positions are fewer in number. The *anexo* of Yerbabuenayoq does not have designated *varayoq* positions. It is a market annex rather than a residential community, with several outside merchants, and those from Ccachín that have shops and houses there maintain their connections and are listed on the roll of households in the village nucleus.

The *Inca alcalde*, also known as *hatun alcalde*, *alcalde mayor*, or *alcalde de varas*, occupies the most prestigious, time demanding, and expensive *cargo* in Ccachín. As the top-ranking official in the *varayoq* system, he directs and guides those under him, and bears ultimate responsibility for assuring that all of the duties of the *varayoq* are carried out fairly and according to convention. The *Inca alcalde* arrives at his position with accumulated knowledge and experience, having previously served in lower positions in the system. He's typically in his late 50s or 60s, and has sufficient wealth in cattle to meet the demands of office. The *Inca alcalde* butchers a cow and feasts the entire community on two occasions during the year, once on January 1st, the day he is sworn in, and again on Carnival Monday. He also provides the *Sargento* dancers for the festivities

at the beginning of the New Year. In one way or another, the *Inca alcalde* plays an important role in all of the public rituals and ceremonies in the community, and the position is central in assuring that *cargos* are completed and traditions are carried out.

As a group, the *alcaldes de barrio* or *barrio de varayoq* are second in prestige and power to the *Inca alcalde*. They are ranked first, second, and third according to their order of selection. While commonly referred to as *barrios* ('ward mayors'), Ccachín has not been formally divided into *barrios* or *ayllu* in living memory; people say that the title is "*por costumbre*," not an organizational fact. After their inauguration, the *alcaldes de barrio* divide up responsibilities for the various sectors of the village with the *alguaciles* according to the convenience of vicinity, with deference to the *varayoq* with higher rank. While Seibold (1990) indicates that the *subalcaldes* of Choquecancha have distinct thematic roles (*alcalde de municipalidad, alcalde de fiestas y faenas*, etc.), this does not seem to be the case in Ccachín. The responsibilities described to me are quite general, with considerable overlap between the duties of the *alcaldes* and the *alguaciles*. The principal distinctions between the positions appear to be that of age, prestige, and rank.

The *alguaciles* are in an intermediate position between the *alcalde de barrio* and the *regidores*.[1] In the absence of the *regidores*, they serve their superiors as *pututeros* ('conch shell trumpeters'). On the other hand, they share many of the same responsibilities and pleasures as the *alcaldes*. The age grade system insures that there are men of all ages to meet the collective responsibilities of the *varayoq*. The more physically demanding tasks go to the *alguaciles*, both because they are at the most appropriate age to carry them out effectively, and because, as the lowest-ranking adults in the hierarchy, they are assigned them by their superiors.

The *regidores* are the town criers of Ccachín. They are also known as *pututeros* for the conch shells ("*pututu*") that they carry. They use their *pututu* as trumpets to herald the movement of the *Inca alcalde* and other *varayoq* through the community during ceremonial functions, to emphasize key moments of rituals, to signal the commencement of work and rest breaks at general assemblies and communal work parties, and to alert villagers to community announcements. At one time, *regidores* in the Lares area sounded

out the hours 9:00 a.m. and 12:00, 3:00, and 6:00 p.m. daily (Zúñiga Rivero 1955), but their function as a village clock is now limited to pacing public events. Many evenings, the *regidores* pass through the village after the *comuneros* have finished dinner. Working together, the *pututeros* stop at resonant points in the neighborhoods, blow their *pututu* in sequence, and shout out announcements of community assemblies, meetings, work parties, festivals, presentations, and other community affairs.

The *pututeros* are at the command and disposition of the *Inca alcalde* during their year of service, and they are provided beds in his house. Because of these demands, they are young — typically in their mid to late teens — and unmarried. The responsibilities of *Inca alcalde* are time consuming, and the *pututeros* are expected to free up some of his time by helping him work his fields. Perhaps because of their close association with the *Inca alcalde*, the three *pututeros* are referred to as *paña rikra*, *lloq'e rikra*, and *chaki* ('right shoulder', 'left shoulder', and 'foot'). They are hierarchically ordered, generally by age, and their status is marked by the size of the conch shell that they carry. The *pututu* they carry are likewise referred to, from largest to smallest, in terms of this body metaphor. Fifty years ago Gutiérrez Pareja (1949) reported that the smallest of the *pututeros* was known as the *chhullachchhaphchi* ('dew shaker'), because he went ahead of the entourage of *varayoq* with a stick or broom to clear the path and shake off the dust or dew, but I didn't hear the term used while I was doing fieldwork.

Responsibilities of the *Varayoq*

Over the last century, there have been numerous attempts to phase out traditional authorities in indigenous peasant communities and replace them with new governing councils. A law was passed in 1905 formally abolishing traditional local authorities in Peru, but in places such as Ccachín, the *varayoq* system appears to have continued on with little change. Before agrarian reform, the position of *teniente gobernador* ('lieutenant governor') was the principal interface between Ccachín and the outside world, the lowest level of a formal line of administrative authority that included the district *gobernador* ('governor') in Lares, the provincial *subprefecto* in Calca, and the *prefecto* of the

Department of Cusco. Traditional village authorities, to the extent that they were recognized by the system, were subordinate to the *teniente gobernador*. Before Ccachín had it's own *teniente gobernador*, the *varayoq* were subordinate to the *teniente gobernador* and governor in Lares. After Ccachín became a *comunidad campesina* in the late 1960s, it got its first president, and the number of non-traditional offices in the village began to grow. In the 1970s, in conformity with the guidelines of the military government of Velasco, two governing councils were set up, a *Consejo de Administración* and a *Consejo de Vigilancia*. Government planners, and the local *promotores* of SINAMOS, an agency created by the government to carry out its social reforms, hoped that with new forms of community leadership, the *varayoq* system would wither away (Allen 1988). The system has undergone further modifications in recent years, and today there is an array of positions that have variously displaced, modified, and supplemented the power and roles of the *varayoq*. The *presidente* of the community, the *teniente gobernador*, and the *alcalde de menores* all delegate tasks to the *varayoq*, with the latter two most often mentioned by *comuneros* as the official that is superior to ("*él que manda*") the *varayoq*. In this sense, the *varayoq* appear to be less specialized and more versatile than other officials. They carry out conventional activities and back up official policies. Unlike most other community officials, whom the *comuneros* expect to provide new public works for the community, the *Inca alcalde* and his retinue are expected to maintain cultural traditions and social order. Without a formal institutional role, they are able to continue with many customary ones, while filling in the gaps of a continually changing administrative system.

The practical significance of the *varayoq* system is that it provides a body of delegated men to ensure that certain decisions made by the general assembly and other civil officials are carried out. The *varayoq* do much of the legwork — often, literally, going door-to-door to review and marshall the *comuneros* — to get things done. The wider significance of the *varayoq* system is in safekeeping the ethos that provides a sense of purpose, resolve, and collective identity. As Allen (1988) emphasizes, the *varayoq*

serve to validate public functions. They do so with the authority of experience, tradition, and example.

Symbols of Authority

One of the ways the *comuneros* reaffirm and reinforce traditional power and ancestral ties by referring to their head mayor the *Inca alcalde*. The *Inca alcalde* is not a major community decision-maker and his authority does not reside in formal political power. Some *alcaldes* are consulted more and have more influence than others because of their experience, reputation, or charisma, but generally, other community leaders express themselves more often and take more active roles in facilitating public meetings and assemblies. Nevertheless, the principal symbols of traditional power — indigenous clothing, the silver-studded staff of office, and the conch shell trumpet — reside with the *varayoq*, and their presence plays an important role in legitimizing public functions and collective acts. Except for dress, the *varayoq* have a monopoly on these symbols, and statutory officials must go through them to assure their visibility at critical events. The three symbols extend to representing the *comunidad campesina* as a whole, and *campesinos* as a collective force or interest vis-a-vis others. When the *campesino* federations declare strikes in the agricultural sector, block roads, or march through the streets of Calca or Cusco, each of the communities represented is lead by standard-bearers's with traditional dress, *varas*, and *pututu*.

Each *varayoq* wears a new *pallay poncho* ('poncho with designs'), *birrete* ('stocking cap'), *chalina* ('scarf'), and *istalla* ('coca bag') that his wife has specially woven or knitted for his term in office. These items are traditional, and they stand in marked contrast to the western dress favored by other community officials. Only the *varayoq* and other traditional *cargo*-holders wear *chalinas*, and the scarves are woven with a bit of S-spin yarn to protect their bearers from harm.

The staff of office ("*vara*") that each *varayoq* carries is made of *chunta*, a hard, black, jungle palm wood, and it is fitted with a silver handles, tip, and bands. The staffs of office are ancient, and are carefully conserved and passed down by families through

the generations. During the swearing in ceremony for the *varayoq*, these *varas* are referred to as the "*documentos*" ('documents'), reinforcing the idea that they are the source of the *varayoq*'s authority.[2] There are a limited number of *varas* in the community, and they must be leased from their owners. The going rate for a year's rental of a *vara* in Ccachín is one or two days labor, depending on the size and quality of the staff. The *varas* are sacred objects, and their temporary lease to an entering official is accompanied by a careful inventory and feast a few days before the swearing in ceremony on January 1st. After completing their terms, each outgoing *varayoq* serves a *merienda* and *chicha* to the owner of his *vara* upon its return, and an inventory is again taken to establish that the item is handed over in good condition.[3]

The conch shell trumpets ("*pututu*") are likewise ancient and passed from generation to generation. The conch shells need to be rented from their owners (there are few, and one widow owns two), and as with the *varas*, there is a transfer ceremony on December 29th or 30th to obtain them from their owners. The use of such trumpets dates back to the Inca, who used them to lead their troops into battle, among other things. They continue to be so used. One of the most vivid images I have from my fieldwork is of the *varayoq* and other village officials, with *pututu* and Peruvian flag heralding their advance, stepping off the boundaries of community territory to defend it against the encroachments of neighboring villages (see *deslinde*, Chapter 12).

Role in Celebration, Communication, and Control

While the *varayoq* system in Ccachín has been adjusted to the new configuration of leadership and power of a contemporary *comunidad campesina*, the principal roles played by the *varayoq* are roles that they have historically played: sponsoring and authenticating public rituals, resolving agropastoral conflicts, policing the community, and disseminating announcements and other information.

Ceremonial Duties

The two principal festivals sponsored by the *varayoq* each year are *Musoq Wata* ('New Year') and Carnival. Both are major celebrations open to the entire community, and each involves a series of activities that takes the *varayoq* away from subsistence activities for their household for an entire week (see Appendix 4). Organizationally they are somewhat similar, with the *Inca alcalde* serving food and drink to all comers the first day (January 1st and Carnival Monday), and the *barrios* and *alguaciles* serving the community the next (January 2nd and Carnival Tuesday). Meat must be butchered (the *Inca alcalde* is expected to serve beef, while lesser officials may serve lamb), *chicha* prepared, and alcohol, coca, and foodstuffs purchased for each. 150-300 people may attend, and a considerable expense is incurred to satisfy the guests.[4] The *Inca alcalde* hires *Sargento* dancers for *Musoq Wata*, a feast featuring the inauguration of the *varayoq*. The musicians and dancers at Carnival are drawn from within the *varayoq*'s network of relatives, compadres, and neighbors, and each *varayoq* must provide ample amounts of food and drink during the three days of their participation. Tuesday of Carnival is a frenzy of activity, as *varayoq*, musicians, and dancers run from one *merienda* to the next, and the festivities reach a climax in the late afternoon when all the groups come together for a vibrant display of costume, ornamentation, and dance in the central plaza. Carnival ends on Ash Wednesday, and the *varayoq* place ashes on the foreheads of their guests, in lieu of the presence of a priest. It's a day of private feasting and street dancing at each of the *varayoq*'s homes, and to wrap up the fiesta, all of the *varayoq* and their entourages congregate at the home of the *Inca alcalde*, who again provides food and drink.

A third major event that takes place at the home of the *Inca alcalde* is the nomination of new *varayoq* and *mayordomos* on Peruvian Independence Day. While the crowd that assembles is only a third to half the size of that present at New Year's and Carnival, there are plenty of mouths to feed, and the *Inca alcalde* again must provide a *merienda*, *chicha*, and *trago* for all. In material terms, no other public official in the village is expected to provided so much so often for so many.

While *Musoq Wata* and Carnival are the two festivals sponsored by the *varayoq*, the *Inca alcalde* or the *varayoq* collectively are honored with visits by musicians and dancers during many of the major festivals of the year. They are expected to provide food and drink to their visitors, and consequently, must always have a supply of coca leaves, alcohol, and coffee available. On *Día de Compadres* and *Día de Comadres*, the street dancers visit the homes of each of the *envarados*. The duties of visiting also work in reverse: if they do not attend a vigil for a saint in the church, or visit the home of a *carguyoq* during the performance of his *cargo* or the transfer of his office, the sponsors feel slighted and complain. Likewise, the *varayoq* are expected to make an appearance at wakes and burials. In addition to calling on and receiving others, the *varayoq* visit each other often over the course of their year in office. They often go to each other's homes on Sundays, for example, to coordinate coming activities and socializing over alcohol and coca.[5]

In general, fiesta *carguyoq* seek their own replacements, though they may consult the *varayoq* for advice. There is one *cargo*-holder that the *varayoq* themselves select: that of Christmas "*compadre*." Sometime well before daybreak on All Saint's Day, the *varayoq* go together to serve notice to the man that they have selected. They carry *trago* or tea, and are in turn served breakfast upon acceptance. In 1990, the *varayoq* selected a man for the Christmas *cargo* who had been *desempadronado* by the community assembly (i.e., he had his voting rights temporarily suspended), a reminder that whatever else the *cargo* system is and does, it provides a test of one's commitment to cooperate with others in the community. In this case, the successful handling of the challenge would give the *carguyoq* a chance to begin repairing damage to his reputation, while providing the community an opportunity to reassess his attitude and likely intentions.

Agropastoral Duties

An important class of responsibilities assigned the *varayoq* revolve around the agropastoral system. Ccachín does not have a separate *cargo* of *arariwa* ('guardian of the fields') or *agente de daño* ('assessor of crop damage') as some villages have and many of

the duties given these officials in other Andean communities belong to the *varayoq* in Ccachín.[6] They respond to reports of animals causing damage in people's fields and bring the offending animals to the corral, where they assess a fine before releasing the animals to their owners. In the same way, they patrol communal sectors where animals do not belong — horses and cattle in the *ichhu* grass designated for roofing, pigs in the fallowed fields of Pampallaqta, animals trespassing from other communities — and corral the animals until the owners can be found. When an animal is found dead under unusual circumstances or when no one is able to identify or locate the owner, the *Inca alcalde* may send out a *barrio* or *alguacil* to investigate. He may even assign one of the *varayoq* to stay with the corpse and protect it from predators over night.

While the *varayoq* played a more active role in supervision of work parties in the past, most of that responsibility now falls on others. The task of calling and organizing *phayna* is spread out among many in Ccachín, with the *junta directiva* coordinating projects with outside agencies, the *consejo menor* responsible for public works, the *Comité del Templo* responsible for the church, and the various committees of *Padres de Familia* responsible for the schools. The *varayoq* continue to have special responsibility for work parties related to agropastoral management and the territorial integrity of community lands. These include planting and harvesting of potatoes on communal lands (*hatun tarpuy* and *hatun allay*), building and repairing walls and fences around agricultural sectors, putting out wildfires, and surveying boundary markers. The *varayoq* wall up the entrances to agricultural sectors after planting, and they open them again after the harvest. In the past, the *alcalde* was expected to serve food and *chicha* at annual work parties, but this practice appears to be declining in Ccachín. The *varayoq* once had an organizational and ceremonial role in the cleaning of the water canals that run through the village, a *phayna* that corresponded with their inauguration at *Musoq Wata*, but the *unu phayna* ('work party for the water') is not as important as it once was, and a *comunero* is now delegated to organize it by the general assembly. The *Inca alcalde* is responsible for organizing an annual *deslinde* ('inspection of territorial boundary markers'), but in my three years in the community it was done only once, in response to intrusions by Chupani,

and the community president took the lead role. With the aid of the other *varayoq*, the *Inca alcalde* is supposed to provide a *merienda* for the entire community at *deslinde*, but the last few *alcaldes* have not done this. Despite the wane of such practices, the presence of the *varayoq* has an impact on attendance and morale at *phayna*, and the *pututeros* mark the course of work and rest with their conch shells.

Marshals

While formal responsibility for conflict resolution resides with the *teniente gobernador* and judges in Ccachín, there are no village police as such, and the *varayoq* are the officials that come closest to playing this role. Just as they respond to *daños* ('damages') caused by domestic stock, they respond to *daños* caused by men and women in the village. Most of the theft that takes place involves agricultural products and animals, and policing the village overlaps with policing the fields. If a theft is reported, a fight breaks out, or an accident happens, a delegation of *varayoq* may accompany other officials to the scene of the crime, to the home of the aggrieved, or to call upon a suspect. Likewise, if something is stolen, the *varayoq* may be sent door-to-door to warn people and to search for it (e.g., Case 29, Table 5.1). On those rare occasions when a thief is apprehended, they provide the force needed to imprison him or her in the local jail.[7] The *varayoq* respond to the direction of the *teniente gobernador* as needed. They summon people to meet with judicial officials, and may be summoned as intermediaries by relatives and neighbors with problems. When attendance is low at a *phayna* or an assembly, the *varayoq* are sent to the fields to round people up, or collect *prendas* ('pawns') from those absent. At public festivals, serenades, and fundraisers, they serve as marshall for crowd control. Their presence provides the strength in numbers needed to enter conflict situations, and with *vara* in hand, they provide a visual sign that authority has arrived.

Town Criers

The most salient task of the *varayoq* according to many *comuneros* is that they "*avisa la gente*," they pass on information about community assemblies, events, and work parties. These announcements affect the daily scheduling and distribution of household labor, and everyone pauses from what they are doing or goes outside their houses to hear better as the town criers pass. Generally, the *Inca alcalde* sends the *regidores* to deliver a message, and they go to several customary promontories where they stop, sound their *pututu*, and call out the message. If the messages are hard to hear, or if the *pututeros* cut corners and don't get the message to people in the outskirts, the *Inca alcalde* is blamed. Besides the announcements of the town criers, the other *varayoq* go door-to-door on several occasions over the course of the year to deliver messages personally. The *alcaldes de barrio* and *alguaciles* divide up responsibility for delivering messages, responding to troubles, and collecting assessments in the village. *Varayoq* need not live in the zone that they are responsible for, nor do they formally represent them, but each will go door-to-door in the neighborhoods that they have been assigned several times during the year.[8] Sometimes they split up and go to their designated sectors, at other times, they go as a group. Sometimes they accompany other community officials to assist with or emphasize the importance of a visit. The *Inca alcalde* sends the *varayoq* household-to-household to invite the *comuneros* to attend the events that he sponsors. On New Year's Eve, the out-going and in-coming *varayoq* make the rounds separately, first the former, then the latter, to invite people to the *kacharpari* ('farewell') of the *varayoq* and *merienda* ('luncheon') of the *Inca alcalde*. Again on Carnival Tuesday, the *varayoq* go out as a group to invite everyone to the feast put on by the *Inca alcalde*. In these ways, and for lack of a less labor intensive way to get the word out, the *varayoq* continue to serve as the formal communication system of the village.

Passage Through the Hierarchy

While Ccachín has a four-level *varayoq* system, it no longer appears to be a four-step system: one need only serve as *regidor* or *alguacil*, not both, in advance of becoming

an *alcalde de barrio* (Table 7.3). There is pronounced age grading to the hierarchy, with ten to fifteen years between appointments. Each step up the ladder brings greater prestige and respect, and status is expressed in the order of such commonplace activities as entering and leaving buildings, the sequence of serving food, drinks and coca leaves, and in who watches over and carries the *varas* for whom. Lower-level *varayoq* carry out assignments for and attend to those of higher rank. Young men enter the lowest ranking position, that of *regidor*, when they are in their mid to late teens. Unlike some communities, where marriage is a prerequisite for office (see for example, the village reported on by Skar 1982), those that serve at the lowest rung of the hierarchy are unmarried. This frees them to serve as attendants for the *Inca alcalde*. Those who enter at the next level, as *alguaciles*, are typically in their late twenties or early thirties, and are married (according to some informants, the principal difference between *regidores* and *alguaciles* is whether they are married or not). As one goes up the ladder, the costs and responsibilities of the office increase, and a spouse becomes critical for expanding one's economic base (through complementary labor and a widening of one's network of kin) and for providing certain services (weaving ceremonial clothing, preparing *chicha*, cooking, etc.) to meet the requisites of office. *Alcaldes de barrio* are typically in their fifties. The *Inca alcalde* is usually in his early to mid sixties. Those that have served as *Inca alcaldes* go on to become *mayordomos,* so the latter are older still.

Young men who leave Ccachín for a number of years as teens to go to school, to work, or to perform military service are not around to serve when it is "*su temporada*" ('their season', 'their turn') to be *regidores*. Some later enter the system for the first time as *alguaciles*. Others use their advanced education, familiarity with outside institutions, and literacy in Spanish to bypass the lower-level posts altogether. Nontraditional community offices are rapidly taking on greater importance in Ccachín, and as this happens, efforts are made to coordinate the two systems. Service in the army substitutes for and exempts one from serving as a *regidor* or as an *alguacil*. The first position in the *varayoq* system for men who are drafted into the military when young is likely to be *alcalde de barrio*. The same seems to be the case for several of the top elected positions

in the community. Men who have served as *teniente gobernador*, *alcalde de menores*, and *presidente* of the community all expect to receive a bye. Consequently, there are men in their mid-thirties and early forties who anticipate participating in the *varayoq* system, but have not yet assumed a position. Given changes in the demographic profile and administrative structure of the community, new rules of succession do not appear to be hard and fast, and they are open for interpretation and negotiation.

As changes are made in the system, the feature that seems to be preserved is the age grading. The system is made flexible by giving credit for equivalent service. When I asked the outgoing *alcalde de menores* — a man who, in his mid-forties, had also served as *teniente gobernador* — if he expected to become a *barrio* some day, he responded that his first position in the system might even be *alcalde mayor*, "depending on the will of the community." New community leadership positions put a premium on youth and education, while the traditional system of *cargos* assigns prestige and status according to age and experience. Many of the younger leaders outside the hierarchy today expect to serve as *alcaldes* and *mayordomos* (the higher status cultural and religious positions) in their twilight years, when their place in managing civic affairs has been taken over by younger men.

In addition to qualitative changes in the *varayoq* system, there have been quantitative ones over time to adjust for population growth. Until the early 1960s, Ccachín had only five *varayoq*: an *alcalde mayor*, a *barrio*, an *alguacil*, and two *regidores*. The number of *varayoq* then increased to ten, which is where it stood when Barbara and I first arrived in the village in 1989 (as illustrated in Table 7.1). In addition, there was one *alguacil* representing Rayankancha. In 1992, before I left, two additional *alguacil* posts were created in Ccachín, and another in Rayankancha, for a total of seven *alguaciles* (one individual who was selected, however, avoided the swearing-in ceremony and did not serve). I was told that the positions were added because of growing demand for offices by men in their late twenties, the appropriate age set, who might otherwise miss the opportunity to participate in the system. The expressed ideal continues to be that all men advance through the system to someday serve as *Inca alcalde*. Many men never achieve

this status because of death, illness, migration, lack of kin support, or an insufficient number of cattle to bear the burdens of service. Some men are offered the position, but do not wish to serve. If they can provide a convincing justification or make their case vociferously enough, they will be passed over and another chosen. One man was the first candidate approached to be *Inca alcalde* each of the three years I was in the village, but he refused each time. People suggest that he avoids community festivals to maintain a low profile in the hope that he will not be asked again. As documented by Allen (1988), the social pressures to serve can be intense, and it remains to be seen whether he can avoid the post indefinitely. The *cargo* can bring prestige, excitement, and gratification to those who enjoy being in the public eye, but it is costly and time-consuming, and one's actions are constantly subject to public scrutiny and criticism. It's hard to say whether most accept with relish or reluctance. If the *varayoq* system continues to have the support and interest it currently has, however, and barring further structural change, many who wish to serve may never be able to do so. There is a bottleneck at the top of the hierarchy, and competition for the top civil positions has the potential to increase.

Selection and Rotation of the *Varayoq*

In 1571, Viceroy Toledo issued an ordinance designating January 1st as the day for the election of new *varayoq*. The tradition of changing the guard on New Year's Day still stands in Ccachín, as it does in many other Andean communities. The date for the election of new officeholders in Ccachín, however, is July 28th, a day that's both Peruvian Independence Day and the final day of celebration for Santiago, the patron saint of the community. This gives the entering *varayoq*, spouses, and families five months to weave new clothing, enlist help from their relatives for their inauguration, and plan how they will secure the material and economic resources needed for their year of *cargo* service.

The *varayoq* are selected for one-year terms, and they pass the office on when their year is up. Because of the higher expectations one needs to meet to serve at the top of the hierarchy and because of the current age profile of the community, there are more

suitable candidates for lower positions than higher ones. However, with a sizeable population, no one is forced or allowed to hold a position for years in a row as sometimes happens in other communities (Skar 1982). New *varayoq* in Ccachín are selected by an informal nominating committee composed of *teniente gobernador*, the outgoing *varayoq*, and anyone else who shows up at the meeting in which the new slate is determined.[9] In this, the procedure differs from the filling of other positions in Ccachín, which are determined by general election (in the case of the *junta directiva*), by the general assembly (in the case of judges, *teniente gobernador*, *alcalde de menores*, and standing committees), or by leaving the responsibility to choose a replacement with each *cargo*-holder (as in the case of *carguyoq* for the saints). Some of the decision making for the higher positions takes place in advance and out of the public eye. The current *Inca alcalde* and *varayoq* approach their favored candidate before the Independence Day meeting to encourage and assure his acceptance of the position. If the nominee adamantly refuses to serve when approached, they proceed to their second choice. Once a suitable candidate is secured, an open meeting is held at the home of the current *Inca alcalde* on the afternoon of the 28th. While it appears that anyone can attend, it's mostly the *varayoq*, *mayordomos*, *kuraq* ('elders'), and assorted community officials that do, an informal assembly of 50 or more interested men. The *teniente gobernador* leads the discussion, and this group proposes names, offers objections, and puts together the new slate of *varayoq*. Collectively, people's memory of who has already served in each position is quite good, but the first judge and the *teniente gobernador* have records should there be any question. Whether the ultimate slate is determined by an informal consensus of those present, or whether those that attend primarily play an advisory role to the *Inca alcalde* and *varayoq*, I cannot say. It appears that no one other than the *Inca alcalde* is approached in advance about his willingness to serve, but there are usually close relatives of those named present, and they represent their own and their family's interests. Once a slate is agreed upon, the *teniente gobernador* reads the final list to the assembled to assure that it is right, and led by the *varayoq* and *pututeros*, the group goes together to the church to announce the results to

the community. Someone climbs the tower and rings the church bells, and the *teniente gobernador* stands at the door of the church and reads the list.[10]

Swearing in Ceremony for the *Varayoq*

Until Ccachín got its own judges, the *varayoq* had to go to Lares to be sworn in, and they were given a grand sendoff ("*kacharpari*") by the community on New Year's Eve. The farewell party took place in a clearing near the cemetery, the last convenient point along the trail leaving the village toward Lares. People who recall those years say that the *varayoq* headed off to Lares to the accompaniment of *Sargento* dancers, leading 20 horses loaded with containers of *chicha* with them. They returned after being sworn in New Year's Day, and villagers would go out to greet them. Sometime around 1980, the trip to Lares became unnecessary since Ccachín's new judge could now administer the oath of office, but the *kacharpari* continues much as before, with the *varayoq* mounted on horseback and showing off their mounts and their riding skills, with their accompanying entourage seated in family groups and serving copious amounts of *chicha*, and with an *alabado* ('prayer of devotion') by the *varayoq* before a special stone cross. With the fencing in of the clearing near the cemetery as a garden for the *Club de Madres* in 1989, the *kacharpari* now takes place in the plaza near the church, but the cemetery continues to be an important reference point for the horsemen, who ride there on their mounts.[11]

The *juramento* or swearing in of new *varayoq* in Ccachín now takes place in the church on New Year's morning. The entering *varayoq* ("*entrantes*") arrive as a group, carrying their *varas* bundled in a white cloth. They enter the church and pray, then go outside to await the arrival of the *varayoq* of Qochayoq and other community officials. Those present exchange and chew coca leaves, and the *pututu* sound as they wait. Most major community officials in Ccachín attend the swearing in ceremony — the *junta directiva*, *teniente gobernador*, *alcalde de menores*, judges, catechists, and committee heads. *Mayordomos* also attend, as do *Inca alcaldes* from previous years. A special invitation is extended to the elders, whether or not they have retired from active public life. Skar (1982) notes that in the community where he did his research, many of the

burdens of office fall upon the *varayoq*'s wives, and wives accompany their husbands when they receive the *vara*. The demands of their husband's cargos are likewise shared by marriage partners in Ccachín (the wives of the *varayoq* play a much more active and direct role in this regard — and receive more recognition for their service — than the wives of nontraditional officials), but all of the elected officials are men, and no women are present, either inside, or in the environs of, the church.

As the men assemble, they enter the church and seat themselves, the new *varayoq* forming a line on the right as one faces the altar, other community officials, guests, and onlookers on the left. The ceremony starts with a prayer by the lead catechist. Then, the two bundles of *varas* to be received are opened and the staffs are laid out on a table in the order of importance of the officials to receive them, from *Inca alcalde* through *chaki*. The *varas* of highest rank are arranged closest to the presiding judge, the lowest, most distant, and the staffs of office of the *varayoq* from Ccachín and Qochayoq are kept separate. A lot of coordination and checking goes on to make sure that they get the right *vara* matched with the right office holder in the right position on the table. After the *varas* are in place, the head judge takes a roll call of the *entrantes*, each responding "*presente*" as his name is called. The *alcalde* from Qochayoq speaks for all in his party in affirming that they are present.

After the roll call of *entrantes*, several public officials address the *varayoq* and emphasize the seriousness of their undertaking and the importance of serving the community well. This is followed by the oath of office. The *varayoq* are sworn in as a group. The presiding judge holds a wooden cross, and raising their right arms and making a cross with finger and thumb, the *varayoq* take their oath.

The next step is the distribution of the *varas*. Seibold (1990:56) reports that in Choquecancha, the priest blesses the *varas* before they are passed on from old officials to new. Perhaps this is the case in Ccachín as well, but in recent years, the arrival of the priest has been unpredictable, and there was no priest present at the two *juramentos* I attended. In 1991, the swearing-in ceremony was moved up a day, since January 1st fell on a Tuesday, an inauspicious day for such an event. The priest arrived late on New

Year's Day and held mass on January 2nd, blessing the holy water for the coming year. In 1992, the priest didn't show up for New Year's at all.

Most ethnographies on Andean communities report that at the time of transfer, the staffs of office are passed directly from outgoing *varayoq* to incoming ones. This is not the case in Ccachín. The nontraditional officials and other dignitaries at the ceremony act as intermediaries in the transfer. Each of the *varas* is passed out to one of these witnesses to the ceremony, and as their names are called by the judge, they deliver the staff in their charge to a designated *varayoq*. As each person passes out a *vara*, he invokes the aid and blessing of God, the patron saints, and other Christian entities for a successful term in office. The delivery of staffs is made according to the rank of the recipient in the *varayoq* hierarchy, highest to lowest, and an attempt is made to establish a rough correspondence in rank between giver and receiver, the president of the community going first, followed by those of lesser rank. For the transfer of *varas* in 1991, I was asked to deliver a *vara* to the lowest ranking *regidor* of Qochayoq, a lad of about twelve years old. His *vara* was the last on the table to be given out. Following the presentation of the staffs of office, the new *alcaldes mayores* of Ccachín and Qochayoq pass among those assembled, extending their thanks and sprinkling pink *zapatilla* flowers over the head of everyone who participated in the event.

The final act of the ceremony takes place outside of the church. A table is set up in front to the church door, and the new *varayoq* are seated at a bench before it. The outgoing *varayoq* approach and stand before them on the opposite side of the table, facing the church. One by one in rank, they lay their staffs of office on the table, saying a few words and kissing their *varas* as they surrender them. With this, the transfer of traditional offices comes to an end. There is still paperwork to attend to, and the new *varayoq* leave the church grounds with the presiding judge and *teniente gobernador* and go to the judge's office to sign documents related to the transfer.

The *Inca alcalde* sponsors *Sargento* dancers, and after the swearing-in ceremony they begin dancing in earnest. Sometimes their are two groups — the first made up of locals from Qochayoq and Ccachín, the second from Patakancha — sometimes there is

just one, depending on the resources of the *alcalde*. Sponsorship of groups from outside the community confers the greatest prestige. In the evening, the *Inca alcalde* sponsors a *merienda* for the community. There was a time when a butchered cow could easily served all, but with the growing population, this is no longer the case. Still, several hundred people attend, and it's important for the *Inca alcalde* to start off on the right foot: the New Year's Day fiesta is perhaps the most important *cargo* that he will have in his year of service.

Both years that I attended the swearing-in ceremony for the *varayoq*, there were unique circumstances that affected the spirit of the event. In 1991, the father of the *alcalde*-elect from Qochayoq died two days before the swearing in ceremony and was buried the morning of the *kacharpari* for the *varayoq*. People commented on the extra toll and inauspicious beginning this placed on him. In 1992, one of the *alguaciles*-elect from Ccachín failed to show up to take the oath of office. I found him at home latter that day celebrating an "*inauguración de las herramientas*" ('inauguration of his tools'), with all the trappings of a fiesta (albeit a more *mestizo* than indigenous one): beer, champagne, and a loudspeaker blasting *chichas* (a popular music among urban youth) into the plaza. He had recently returned to the village from a stint as a laborer in the gold mines of Madre de Dios, and he was trying to establish himself in the village as a carpenter. His rejection of the *cargo* and the manner in which he did it was not appreciated by other *comuneros*, and the following day, during *hatun residencia*, he was involved in an argument over the matter that escalated into a fist fight.

Residencia: Annual Inspection of Households

On New Year's Day, the new *varayoq* are sworn in at a ceremony in the church. For the next three days, the *varayoq* pass through the village, heralding their tenure and inspecting all of the households in Ccachín. January 2nd is the day of *hatun residencia* ('great residence inspection'). The name of the event derives from the Spanish *residenciar* and translates as "the action of asking an official to account for their conduct." In Ccachín, all households — whether the head of household holds public office or not —

enter into the accounting. Community leaders are first to be called upon, and the adjective *hatun* ('bigger', 'greater') is applied to *residencia* the day the event is conducted at the homes of ranking officials. *Huch'uy residencia* ('little residence inspection') is carried out for the community-at-large on succeeding days (*huch'uy* contrasts with *hatun* and means 'smaller' or 'lesser'). During *hatun residencia*, the *varayoq* visit and inspect each other's homes, as well as those of the *mayordomos* and civil officials. Feasted at each home, it's a time of orgiastic eating, drinking, coca exchange, prayer, and revelry (Figure 7.1). *Huch'uy residencia* is comparatively quieter, but still marked by the sharing of coca and alcohol that is the hallmark of Quechua sociability.

Residencia is one of a number of activities marking the transfer of community positions at the start of the New Year (Appendix 4). Leadership exposes an individual to special risks — envy, heavy drinking, and mediation of conflict among them — and a bit of *lloq'e* ('reverse spin yarn') is woven into each piece of clothing to protect the *cargo*-holder from the malevolent forces that might otherwise interfere with execution of his office. If he has time, a *varayoq* may take the two day trip to Markaqocha around January 6th for the annual festival commemorating the arrival of the Three Kings and Adoration of the *Niño Jesus*. There, he will place a candle before the image and seek a blessing for his year of service. Those who do not go often send representatives.

In anticipation of *residencia*, the occupants of each of the homes that the *varayoq* visit sweep and clean their house and decorate their household shrine niche with a cross and flowers. Men and women wash their hair and change into clean clothing. Men put a chain with a crucifix around their neck, and fill their *ch'uspa* or *wachala* with coca leaves.

During *hatun residencia*, the *varayoq* move from house to house with a large entourage of *Sargento* dancers, helpers, onlookers. As they enter a house, they are greeted by the heads of household, and hosts and guests kiss each others' crucifixes. The guests are served *chicha*, *trago*, and coca, followed by a *merienda* of lamb, guinea pig, corn tortillas, turnip greens, and squash. The *varayoq* leave their staffs of office outside the door when they enter, and these are watched over by the *pututeros*. The trumpeting of

the conch shells of the *pututeros* and the dancing of the *Sargento* dancers marks the movement of the group through the community.

The most salient aspect of *residencia* — the first thing that residents report on when asked to describe the event — is the inspection of households. As they enter, one of the *varayoq* may shake some grass or a tin with corn to see if the guinea pigs, chickens, and ducks are hungry and respond, or are already well-fed. While this appears to be primarily a playful gesture with no tangible consequences, people report that in the past, any animal that responded to the bait would be captured and taken to the home of the *alcalde mayor*, where it would be kept and raised by the *regidor*es who lived with him and served as his attendants. The animals would be slaughtered and eaten by the *varayoq* at Easter. People's homes are expected to be neat and clean for the visit, and if they are not, the *varayoq* may take steps to clean them. Women are expected to have their hair freshly combed. If they do not pass inspection, the *varayoq* may comb it, and not always with the greatest of delicacy: they may take it upon themselves to comb a woman's hair with a horse brush. With both the spot check into the well-being of the animals and the upholding of cleanliness, informants were quick to point out negative consequences, but I didn't hear any reports that the *varayoq* backed up their reproaches with action while I was in the village. When queried about the matter, people indicated that while still applied, negative repercussions were harsher and more frequent in the past.

In addition to the survey of cleanliness and animal husbandry, the *varayoq* may ask to see any of a number of items associated with the material and spiritual well-being of the household. These include gear for the horses and mules ("*montura*"), a *chalina* and *ch'uspa* (a man's scarf and coca bag worn during rituals and by village officials), a comb and a mirror (for personal care), a palm cross, lit candle, and religious calendar (the *Almanaque del Qosqo*, which not only helps people track religious feasts, but doubles as a guide for naming their children), a woman's wedding ring (a sign that a couple is no longer cohabiting and has been married in the church), a doll ("*muñeca*," representing fecundity), a riding whip ("*chicote*," associated with the upbringing and discipline of

children), and alms for widows and orphans ("*montepío*"). During their visit, the *varayoq* often ask couples if they are expecting to have a baby in the coming year.

The day after *hatun residencia*, the *varayoq* go door-to-door throughout the village for *huch'uy residencia*, a general inspection of the homes of all the *comuneros* (the event is also sometimes referred to as *uña residencia*, *uña* likewise meaning "small" but usually applied to baby animals, suggesting the possibility that its use has a double meaning here). People are expected to be at home when the *varayoq* visit them, and most people choose to do tasks around their house or garden rather than to go out to work in the fields on this day. In the past, *yarqha phayna*, a community work party to clean the canals that carry drinking, cleaning, and gardening water to the houses, was conducted, further ensuring that the men could be found close to home. With the construction of the piped water system in the mid-1980s, the canals have become less important community-wide and repair and cleaning of each canal is most often taken on informally by individuals who benefit directly from it. The community assembly still assigns someone to organize *yarqha phayna* each year, but given the reduced importance of the event, they do not always carry through. *Huch'uy residencia* is a scaled-down version of *hatun residencia*. The inspection of the households proceeds as the day before, but the *Sargento* dancers return to their homes, and *merienda* is not served at each stop. If no one is home when the *varayoq* stop by for *huch'uy residencia*, the *varayoq* write "*omiso*" ('negligent', 'careless') with chalk on their door. I do not know if residents are revisited or fined for missing *residencia*, but suspect that there can be consequences for being *omiso*, and that there was more diligence in sanctioning people in the past.

For the first two days, *residencia* takes place in Ccachín proper; on the third day, activity moves to one of the *anexos*. Qochayoq has its own *varayoq* system, complete with *alcalde*, *alguacil*, and *regidores*, and after they are sworn into office in Ccachín, they return to Qochayoq to celebrate *residencia* on their own. Rayankancha is a newer settlement, and its two *alguaciles* are still incorporated into the hierarchy of offices in Ccachín. On the third day of *residencia*, the two Rayankancha officeholders host all of the *varayoq* with a feast in Rayankancha. The *varayoq* call on all of the households of Rayankancha,

visit the chapel there, and spend the rest of the day enjoying the *merienda* and *chicha* prepared for them at the home of one of the Rayankancha *alguaciles*. The *varayoq*'s trip to Rayankancha completes *residencia* and serves as the *kacharpari* ('farewell') of the feast , bringing the New Year inaugural to an end.

I have not come across references to *residencia* in other Andean ethnographies, and I do not know how widespread it is. The origin and original reason for the practice in Ccachín is buried in history. *Residencia* has many aspects — announcement, census, taxation, social control, maintenance of public welfare — and without historical data, there is no way of knowing if one objective or another played a primary role in its emergence. Like many activities, it continues to be conducted *por costumbre*, and the meaning and motivation may have changed through time.

The hierarchical character of the custom leads one to wonder whose interests the inspection originally served: the *mestizo* authorities in Lares, the *hacendado*s and their local representative the *arrendire* (as Encinas Martín [1986:20] notes, the *hacendado*s controlled the "*poder político-represivo*" in the region, with the *varayoq* system an instrument largely serving their needs), the church, under the watchful eye of clergy centered in the district and the provincial capitals, community members in general, who stood to gain from the maintenance of certain standards of sanitation and conduct, or a combination of the above.

The *varayoq* were historically at the whim of regional authorities, and practices that are now perceived as festive or innocuous by the *comuneros* may once have had a more onerous tone. Writing fifty years ago, Gutiérrez reports that,

> The principal mission of the indigenous authorities is to tend to the [regional] authorities when they visit periodically, the priest at religious festivals, the *agente municipal* and the *teniente* for the annual *raymi* division of land, or when the *gobernador* comes . . . they have to provide them foodstuffs for their larder such as chickens, potatoes, sheep, etc., products that they obtain free by collecting them in person with the *regidores*. [Gutiérrez Pareja 1949:6]

Likewise, Zúñiga Rivero writes,

> Usually, when the *Subprefecto* of the province visits these places, men who have had the fortune to carry out this office . . . let their rapacious instincts flow, and in concomitance with the *Gobernador*, oblige the *regidores* to take chickens, sheep, pork, etc. In this way, the faithful servants of justice are converted into instruments of theft and unwitting accomplices of these evil politicians, who . . . capture . . . these posts to exploit them as they can, because it is understood that these posts are temporary. [Zúñiga Rivero 1955:10-11]

The *varayoqs*' practice of making the rounds of the houses is documented in these earlier accounts, as the expectation that they can and will take things. Neither of these authors mention *residencia* as such, but it seems likely that the custom is an outgrowth of such antecedents, refashioned to fit the contemporary context.

Religious *Cargos*

Carguyoq (*Cargo*-Holders)

During the years of "rest" between *varayoq* positions, individuals are called upon to serve a series of religious *cargos* (Table 7.2). These *cargos* vary in cost and prestige. Sponsorship of the *waylla* ("green pasture") dancers at Corpus Christi, for example, involves little outlay and is usually born by younger men. The *galluyoq* ('rooster owners') for the *gallut'ipiy* ('rooster jerking') event during the fiesta of Santiago, on the other hand, have to provide several roosters for the competition and butcher a bull to feed all the riders and community notables, a *cargo* that can only be taken on by someone who is relatively well off. The most expensive *cargo* of all is sponsorship of one of the dance groups that make the pilgrimage to Qoyllur Rit'i. The *carguyoq* of the pilgrimage must not only provide food, alcohol, and coca for their dancers and musicians for an extended trip, they must outfit some of their dancers, pay part of the transportation costs, and provide a donation to the sanctuary. Except for the *galluyoq* of Santiago, all the *carguyoq* for the local saints (San Isidro, Guadalupe, etc.) sponsor dancers. It's considered to be more prestigious to present dancers from other areas, such as Kunkani and Patakancha, or to hire an organized group, but this entails greater expense: besides food, drink, and hospitality, they must be paid in cash, the equivalent of $.33-1.00 per dancer per day for their partici-

pation. To cut costs, most *carguyoq* draw upon their network of kin and fictive kin for dancers.

The number of *cargos* fluctuates over time, with festivals growing and waning in interest and prestige. The number of *galluyoq*, for example, has doubled from two to four in recent years to provide more opportunities for those who wish to participate. Along the same lines, the pilgrimage to Qoyllur Rit'i is a recent addition to the ceremonial calendar and in the first five years the number of dance groups that attend went from one to three. On the other hand, the *cargo* associated with the pilgrimage to Wank'a is on the decline. Besides these long-term changes, there is some unpredictability from year to year as one or another of the *carguyoq* fails to meet his responsibility. After successfully sponsoring the *ch'unchu* dancers for Santiago in 1989, for example, *Don LZ* passed on his *cargo* to *Don JC*, who failed to provide any dancers for the fiesta in 1990. The *cargo* stayed in his hands, and he completed it in 1991, passing it along to another. Likewise, *Don FZ* had a *cargo* for the *Señor de Wank'a* pilgrimage that he failed to complete two years in a row. The *cargo* is a minor one, outside of the rotation of *cargos* for Ccachín's saints (each with a statue in the church), and with sponsorship of a second Wank'a *lámina* ('icon') passing through the village, few noticed. Failed sponsors suffer a loss of face that corresponds to the seriousness of their *cargo*. A failure to provide dancers for the patron saint of the community is more substantial than the failure to follow through on a pilgrimage that is attended by only a few people from the village. Though he failed to do anything for *Señor de Wank'a* in 1990, *Don FZ*'s service as *carguyoq* for *Misti Carnaval* in 1991 was a great success, and he went on to be named second *alguacil* for 1992. He failed to do anything for the Wank'a pilgrimage again in 1991, but by then, with five young children and few resources, all of his energy was going into preparations for his upcoming *varayoq* service.

The festival *cargos* are tied to the *varayoq* system indirectly. Experience, visibility, status, and prestige are gained though such service, and successful sponsorship of religious *cargos* is one of the criteria for advancement through the *varayoq* system. New fiesta *carguyoq* are selected by their predecessors during the latter's actualization of

their *cargo*. In the case of *Misti Carnaval*, they are determined by a combination of luck and desire (the *cargo* goes to the pair of dancers that fells the kapuli tree). Passing on of a *cargo* is celebrated in a private observance of the two parties, usually at the *kacharpari* of the event. There is a rough correlation between the expense of a *cargo* and the sponsor's age, but there is no set order or clear hierarchy of religious *cargos*. Catherine Allen puts it nicely when, speaking of the *cargo* system in Sonqo, she says:

> Passage through the shifting maze of religious sponsorships has creative aspects as an act of self-expression that no two households fulfills identically . . . no one can pass through the system "perfectly," for the number and order of *cargos* is too vaguely defined. Ideally, a man "finishes" sometime in his fifties by "having done everything." But the definition of "everything" is never clear. [Allen 1988:119]

Counting all of the religious *cargos*, steps in the *varayoq* hierarchy, and *mayordomo* positions, there are at least twenty *cargos* in the civil-religious hierarchy that a man could potentially fill. One would have to accept a *cargo* every two to three years to complete them all. One is not likely to become *Inca alcalde* without first taking on several religious *cargos*, but few, if any, nowadays, attempt to take on all. As Allen notes, omissions can be an Achilles heel for ambitious individuals: they can be thrown back in their face. On the other hand, the flexibility and loose integration of religious *cargos* with civil ones has the potential to make recruitment for the former more difficult. One need not do everything, only enough.

Mayordomos (Religious Stewards)

The *mayordomos* ('stewards of the saints') are at the apex of the civil-religious hierarchy in Ccachín. One can only become a *mayordomo* after completing, or after one's spouse completes (in the case of women) all the stages in the *varayoq* system, including that of *Inca alcalde*. Consequently, *mayordomos* are quite old, usually in their sixties and seventies. Men serve as *mayordomos* of the male saints (*San Isidro*, *Corpus Christi*, *Santiago*, *El Señor*), women as *mayordomas* of the female saints (*Mamacha Carmen*, *Mamacha Rosario*, *Mamacha Guadalupe*). If both husband and wife are still alive, they are conceived as jointly serving, but the status derives from the lifelong service of the

male, and he inevitably receives greater recognition and honor. If a couple lives long enough, the pair may be able to serve in every one of the *mayordomo cargos*. If one's partner dies, however, it's unlikely that one will be able to serve in every position. More women outlive their husbands than the reverse, and many widows go on to serve as *mayordomas* of the female saints. If they should die after being selected for a position but before getting a chance to serve, their children will be called upon to serve the *cargo* in their name. Passage through all the *varayoq* and *mayordomo* positions is very rare, and those elders that achieve this feat are much honored. While I was Ccachín, only one living person, *Don MZ*, was reported to have served in all of the *mayordomo* positions. Since he had passed through the entire system, people described him as "*jubilado*" ('retired'). Otherwise, though one may retire from most agricultural work, one cannot rest.

Mayordomos are selected for two-year terms on July 28th at the same time as the *varayoq*. Their principal responsibilities are to care for one of the seven saints and its belongings, furnish a new set of clothing for the statue, and celebrate an all-night vigil in the church on the saint's feast. They ensure that a saint is provided with flowers throughout the year, and create elaborate shrines of boughs, flowers, fruits, and breads for the vigil.[12] *Mayordomos* take turns housing the priest when he visits the community. They serve *merienda* at *hatun residencia*. As elders of the community, they say prayers and are at center table at feasts, and their opinions are sought out on a wide range of ceremonial and practical matters. In the days before agrarian reform, they are said to have served the *hacendados* in organizing labor for the hacienda (along with administrators of the haciendas who were also known as *mayordomos*). The transfer of a *cargo* between outgoing and incoming *mayordomos* takes place in a ceremony known as *chaskichikuy* or *chaskisqa* (the root verb *chaskiy* means 'to receive', *chaskichiy* means 'to give' or 'to entrust'). The event is both serious and festive, with an *inventario* ('inventory') conducted in the church of all of the clothing and ritual objects that pertain to the saint. These objects are stored in a locked box and kept in the home of the *mayordomos* during their term in office. The condition of the clothing, the objects, and the saint is likewise noted,

and everything is duly recorded in notebooks, witnessed, and signed. There is no set date for these inventories, but they take place soon after the new *mayordomos* have been named.

Cargos and Collective Action

Competition and Conscription

Beyond age grading, hierarchical ordering, and credit given for equivalent service, three other features of the *varayoq* system stand out: it is a community-level form of universal service, positions are rotated annually, and only males are eligible — there is no equivalent hierarchy of public service for women.

Whether ethnographers focus on the onerousness of *cargos* or on the competition for power and prestige underlying them seems to depends on who one's informants are, the state of the community at the time, and the eye of the beholder. Allen, for example, provides the following account of the election of one *alcalde* that she witnessed:

> Eustaquio won . . . and the assembly clearly voted as though it were conferring him an honor. . . But Eustaquio was furious . . . . He jumped to his feet, complaining that it was unfair to choose him while there were older men who were eligible and had not served. Don Justino quietly tried to present him with the *alcalde*'s *vara* . . . . Eustaquio refused, and the two struggled for a while as the *alcalde* tried to pass on his office, Eustaquio in tears would not take it, and the staff itself came close to falling on the ground. Finally Justino gave up and retreated, still holding the *vara*. [Allen 1988:113]

On the other hand, Skar writes:

> Through their personal wealth and the support of their core *ayllus*, the *varayoq-kuna* seem to have been able to mobilize virtually all their potential relations. . . In a generally acephalous society, they alone appear as "big men." No particular person has traditionally been destined to become a *varayoq* through inheritance of the office, and although his personal wealth may be a help in starting such a career, lack of support by his *ayllu* can render him totally ineffective at any time. Thus a leadership emerges in which the wealthy, strong, and intelligent outmanoeuvre their opponents and gradually become accepted "big men" as well as leaders of wider *ayllus*. [Skar 1982:229]

On one hand, recruitment of *varayoq* appears to have something in common with a draft. All men are expected to serve, and those who resist doing so are pressured to accept when called upon. In the case of the *alcalde*-elect described by Allen above, most men disapproved of his recalcitrance, but it took a haranguing and public humiliation by his mother in front of the church to eventually get him to serve. In the case of *Don EZ* in Ccachín, who has refused overtures to serve as *Inca alcalde* several times, community members seem to be gambling that persistence will pay off. On the other hand, rights, power, and prestige are bestowed on those who hold the office by the community, and recruitment sometimes has the appearance of a contest between political factions, with well-placed individuals marshaling resources for their own, and their allies' advantage.

Comuneros have a collective interest in the maintenance of the *varayoq* system, or something like it, because it provides important collective and public goods. Other communities in other places, with different economic and institutional conditions, provide the same kinds of goods in different ways, through a system of public taxation, or by patronship, with production of the good conditioned on its publicity value. Thus, for example, in Idiazabal, Spain, a town roughly the size of Ccachín, the municipal government prepares a massive *paella* ('rice and seafood dish') for community members in the central plaza on the feast of San Blas, the patron saint. Likewise, it serves corn tortillas and hard cider to the public for a *merienda* at the same festival. The costs of these collective goods come out of general revenue collected through taxation, not the pockets of the *alcalde* and individual town council members. In contrast, the Fourth of July fireworks displays in Seattle are sponsored by two commercial enterprises in quest of name recognition, and there is competition between them to provide a display that will attract the biggest audience. The *cargo* system in Latin America is best judged with reference to such alternative forms of provisioning. The patron system is closer to a competitive status hierarchy than one based on taxation, with the difference that it takes place in the context of the market and a highly capitalized system, and the actors are corporate rather than individuals or ego-centered networks. Given the limited powers of coercion at the institutional level in an acephalous system, it appears easier to consolidate informal social

pressures around focal individuals, than it is to marshall the same to enforce a general system of taxation.

The universality of the recruitment system brings egalitarian values to bear, which helps to resolve the sanctioning problem discussed in Chapter 6. Appropriate behavior is often framed in terms of identity, thereby rendered it less negotiable. In the case discussed by Allen, Eustaquio's mother effectively challenges him with the question, "*Iman kanki? Runachu kanki?*" ('What are you? Are you a *runa*?' 1988:114). But the system is less identity-based, and behavior more conditional, than this might lead us to believe. Fairness plays an important role. Eustaquio does not argue for either an individual exemption or a general revision of the system, but rather, he frames his argument in terms of following customary rules: it's not yet his time nor his turn.

Norms of fairness are inherently conditional. As Elster (1989:133) notes, people motivated by fairness don't want to take a free ride on the cooperation of others, but they do not want to cooperate when few others do either. Clearly, even if we allow for social motivations, self-interest incentives are not thereby rendered irrelevant. Margolis's (1982, 1990) modeling of rational choice around the observation that people seek to be "neither selfish nor exploited" is relevant here. He suggests that there are two predispositions or rules of thumb that underlie this intuition:

1) Other things being equal, the more good a bit of resources would do if used socially compared to what it would do if used for my private interests, the more likely I would be to use that bit of resources socially.
2) Other things being equal, the more I have already used my resources socially, the more inclined I am to spend the next bit of resources on myself.[13]

While his account of the evolutionary origins of these dispositions is open to question, I take his underlying empirical observations that people 1) compare the private and social payoffs of their resource use, and that 2) people compare their own behavior with that of others at the time of making a decision on how to employ their resources, as accurate. It appears not only that both rules are important in individuals' decisions about participation in the *varayoq* system in Ccachín, but that recognition of these propensities

is collectively accepted and institutionalized. This, along with universality and simple rules of equity, assures that people are willing to participate in the system at all.

Bases of Cooperation

Early explanations of *cargo* systems in Latin America were based on hypothesized group-level functions. As articulated by Wolf,

> Like the thermostat activated by an increase in heat to shut off the furnace, expenditure in religious worship returns the distribution of wealth to a state of balance, wiping out any accumulation of wealth that might upset the existing equilibrium. In engineering parlance, it acts as a feedback, returning a system that is beginning to oscillate to its original course. [Wolf 1959:216]

Much has been written since then pointing out problems with the group-level benefits posited by such analyses (usually "community integration," but also sometimes the benefits of "exploitation" to the exploiters) and the lack of a plausible feedback mechanism that takes into account the desires and interests of the participants. I have reviewed and critiqued this literature elsewhere (Froemming 1986).

What warrants emphasizing here is that despite the considerable material and social costs that go into *cargo* service in Ccachín, and despite a rotation of *cargos* that on the face of it might suggest egalitarianism values and the systematic redistribution of wealth, the *cargo* system does not have any significant leveling effect on households in the intermediate or long term. Some households participate more actively in the system than others, the ones that do tend to have the economic and social resources to do so, and their economic status is not reduced in the process. While not all well-off families actively participate in the system, those that do continue to have high economic status.

A second point worth emphasizing is that while *cargo*-holders produce various collective goods that are accessible to all community members, they also redistribute many private goods, with priority ranking of those who receive and how much they are given. Kin and *compadres* not only contribute materially to the success of a particular household's *cargo*, they are also among the principle beneficiaries, especially in the case of festival sponsorship. Despite the public nature of the ceremony, cargo-holders are able

to pick and choose to a considerable extent among the recipients of their generosity. In this sense, such festivals have a bit in common with wedding celebrations in the village — access is usually open to the community, and there is competition to provide the biggest and best — but they also have many of the trappings of a private party. In fact, as events unfold, they usually alternate between the use of public and private spaces.

In putting together an instrumental alternative to functionalist explanations of Latin American *cargo* systems, and in evaluating the various instrumental motivations that have been proposed in the last forty years, we need to come up with a model that both accounts for why it is in the interests of some people to seek out and invest in public displays of generosity in this way, and why it is in the interests of others to pressure those that are reluctant to do so.

Given the centrality of kin and *compadrazgo* networks to *cargo* celebration, conditional cooperation in reciprocal exchange appears to play an important role in sustaining the system. As Montes de Castillo (1989) suggests, the taking on of *cargos* not only activates existing exchange networks, it builds and reinforces them for future exchanges. Reciprocity cannot account, however, for all features of the *cargo* system, as important collective goods are produced, and in festival sponsorship a lot of generosity is extended to all comers, whether or not they have a relationship with the host. Given these limits to a reciprocity-based account, it is tempting to posit as an alternative that sponsors cooperate and are generous to gain prestige, but the possibility for beneficiaries to free-ride by receiving the benefits without paying the costs of granting prestige creates problems for prestige-based explanations exactly in such situations where there is no ongoing relationship.

In many cases of *cargo* sponsorship there are social pressures to participate, suggesting that reference to the mechanism of tolerated theft may have some explanatory utility. Tolerated theft (Blurton Jones 1984, 1987) or demand sharing (Peterson 1993) allows us to reconsider the old idea of the *cargo* system as a leveling mechanism in a new light, this time with the egalitarian consequence seen as a byproduct of individual-level processes rather than as a group-benefit that can be functionally explained. Tolerated

theft, however, does not account for the many instances where *cargo*-holders seek out their *cargos* rather than participate out of coercion, and in any case, as I have indicated, we need to be cautious not to exaggerate its leveling effect.

Montes de Castillo (1989) suggests that above all, the civil-religious *cargo* system is a ritual strategy of power. As he puts it, "The simple fact of exercising the *cargo* is a way to communicate to the community that one is in possession of sufficient economic and social resources to invest in fiestas (1989:330). I suspect that he is on to something here, and that his observation about *cargos* signaling social power can be further developed by linking it to the newly emerging theories of conspicuous consumption, costly signaling, and status reinforcement behavior in evolutionary ecology to give it broader theoretical power (see Boone 1998; Smith and Bliege Bird In Press). In explicating the theory, Boone (1998) in fact makes specific reference to recurrent rituals in agricultural communities, suggesting that in large groups an individual's resource-holding power and capacity to dispense benefits must be advertised to be effective, and that since the social fortunes of individuals and households in agricultural communities may fluctuate from year to year, it is quite common to schedule festivals where they are called upon to display their current condition.

Following this lead further is beyond my scope here. Suffice it to say that it provides the basis for plausibly arguing that unconditional generosity and collective goods provisioning can be a means by which individuals compete for status, and that it does so without entailing either reciprocal exchange or self-sacrifice for the good of the group. Ultimately, I suspect that cooperation in the civil-reiigious hierarchy is multi-causal, and that several of the forces mentioned above are at play.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. I never saw "*alguacil*" written, so my use of the term is tentative here. The common pronunciation of the term I heard in the village was *alvacer* ("*al-va-cer*" or "*al-wa-sir*"), as also reported by Knox-Seith (1995). The word appears to be of Spanish origin, but there are no contemporary equivalents in the Spanish language, and I know of no other references to *alvacer* in the Andean literature. Notably, however, the Spanish term *alguacil* originally comes from the archaic *al-wazir* ('the visier') which is quite similar to the pronunciation of *alguacil* given by contemporary Quechua speakers.

   The term *alguacil* has long been applied in both Spain and the Americas to certain officials of the town council charged with executing the acts and orders of governors, mayors, and justices. Skar (1982:221) notes that in Matapuquio (Apurímac), the traditional names *alcalde*, *campo*, *regidor*, and *alguacil* have been changed to *teniente gobernador*, *varayoq mayor*, *varayoq menor*, and *varayoq alguacil*, and Allen (1988) reports that in Sonqo (Paucartambo, Cusco), the parallel positions are *alcalde*, *segundo*, *regidor mayor*, and *regidor alguacil*. The titles given the various roles in the *varayoq* hierarchy have been affected by centuries of national legislation and local tradition. The *alguacil* is an assistant to the head mayor, but the exact position in the hierarchy varies from community to community.

2. While *vara* is a Spanish term and the practice of *alcaldes* and *teniente alcaldes* carrying staffs of office as a sign of their authority derives from Old World traditions, one *comunero* told me that *arma* ('weapon', 'arms') is the Spanish translation of *vara* from Quechua. There's probably more historical than linguistic insight in this belief. As Skar (1982:226) emphasizes, in contemporary communities the *vara*s are not like the batons of policemen and are rarely if ever used by *varayoq* to administer physical force.

3. The inventory ("*inventario*") takes place in the home of the owner of the *vara* or *pututu* to be leased. A host of family members and relatives of each party are present to help. Both parties to the transaction inspect the *vara* or *pututu*. Every nick and scratch is carefully noted and registered in two notebooks, one maintained by the borrower, the other by the owner of the object. The procedure for the inventory is similar to that undertaken between outgoing and incoming *mayordomos* at the transfer of responsibility for the clothing and image of a saint. Upon completing the inventory, the recipient sprinkles rose pedals or *zapatilla* flowers over the *vara* or *pututu* he is to receive, then over the head of the owner, and finally over everyone else assembled. Everyone proceeds to sprinkle ("*t'inkay*") *chicha* or *trago* over the four corners of the ritual table, and over the object to be loaned. Prayers are said, gratitude expressed, advice given, and several people in attendance are asked to sign

the record books of the proceeding as witnesses. Usually, a *pututero* stands outside the door and sounds notice of the transaction taking place inside. Drinking, coca exchange, and a meal follows.

4. The organization, precision, and ritual care that go into these feasts are impressive, and there is are always large retinues of assistants working behind the scenes. The following, from my field notes of February 11, 1991, describes the preparation and serving of the meat at the *Inca alcalde*'s Carnival feast. As commonly reported in the Andes, sons-in-law play a special role.

> "When I arrived at the *alcalde*'s home at about 11 a.m., a group of men was engaged in the butchering of meat. A *ganado* ['cattle'; Quechua "*waka*"] had been killed, and its meat chopped into bits. The men were careful to count out the meat into two piles. The first, of 160 pieces, counted out four at a time with all testifying, was referred to as the '*cabeza*' (although it didn't come from the *waka*'s head). The second pile, of 590 pieces, was referred to, I believe, as '*menudo*'. . . . After this was taken to the kitchen, the ribs were brought out, cut up into pieces, and again counted. . . . Two older women came out of the kitchen, knelt before the meat — "*misa*" ['ritual table', in this case the bloody hide of the butchered animal] — and prayed. When all was completed, the *waka*'s skin was carefully folded and presented to each in attendance to kiss 3 times. Next, the chopping block with the ax placed on it was presented to all to be kissed. . . . *Qach 31* [a code name], son-in-law of the *alcalde*, served as gofer between kitchen and butchering site. *Qach 111*, another son-in-law, also played an active role. After the meat was prepared and sent to the kitchen, we were served a soup [of potatoes, beef organs, and yams] and then a broth of beef with a small piece of beef . . .
>
> About the time I arrived, the *envarados* [all except the *Inca alcalde*] headed off running to visit each of the houses in the community and to extend an invitation to all to attend. By the time they arrived back . . ., perhaps five hours later, the oldest of them were at a walk, and waited nearby as the younger raced off to the final houses. . . .
>
> Around 4 p.m., about 150 people assembled for the feast. Bread quarters [an ounce or two each] with a small piece of meat [another couple of ounces] were laid out on the table. *Qach 176*, as the oldest present, was asked to bless the food. After it was blessed, a small piece of boneless meat . . . [and a piece of bread] was distributed to all. After this . . . *Qach 31* and others went around the benches with a pile of meat cupped in the corner of his poncho. He put a piece of meat on a plate and served it to each person in turn . . . replacing it with another. These two servings, the bread and meat and the meat alone, were all that the banquet consisted of . . . . Last year the full community was not invited to the event, and it was said that the *alcalde* did not have a cow to butcher . . .

5. Some villagers say that this happens every Sunday, others that it is the first Sunday of the month. Frequency may depend, in part, on their other responsibilities, and on whether or not it is a time of peak labor demand in the fields. Few things happen as regularly in Ccachín as envisioned.

6. In some communities, the *arariwa* is associated primarily with assessing animal damage (Kervyn and CEDEP Ayllu 1989). In others, such as Q'ero (Paucartambo, Cusco), the *arariwa* relocates his family to the fields during the year of his cargo, and he is responsible not only for assuring that the crops do not suffer animal damage, but that they do not suffer drought, frost, hail, or plague either (Flores Ochoa and Fries 1989). In this, he must work closely with diviners and religious specialists. The *varayoq* of Ccachín serve as guardians of the field in the first, more limited sense. Their role is primarily that of policing animal damage, and since they continue to reside in the village rather than in the fields, their success is limited. While the *Inca alcalde* in Ccachín may at times be consulted for his accumulated agricultural and meteorological knowledge as one might an *arariwa*, the final decision about the sectors to be planted and the dates for planting and harvesting a sector reside with the community assembly and *junta directiva*.

7. The jail ("*carcel carcel*") was used only once during my time in the community. The jailing was less than successful, as someone removed the stones from under the doorway and freed the prisoner under cover of night.

8. The six districts, as listed for me by one of the judges in 1991, were:

   1) Qonchupata, Amayunqa, Wayu Moqo
   2) Mit'ao, T'ankarpata
   3) Qosqo, Qochapata
   4) Pukrupata, Kampachuyoq, Unu Takanu, Qoriwayrachina
   5) Aqomoqo, Cruz Punku
   6) Yerbabuenayoq (not the annex),Warq'a

   These correspond to the northwest, southwest, north-central, south-central, northeast, and southeast sectors of the village respectively. Ccachín does not have a moiety system as do many Andean villages. As far as I can determine, the village is not formally divided into any corporate groups or *ayllu* for purposes of governance. The districts listed here appear to be pragmatically defined for effective communication and to distribute the contact workload between *envarados*. There may be some fluidity in these divisions are from year to year.

9. The decision-making group does not appear to have predetermined boundaries, procedures, or lines of authority, but I only had opportunity to be present at one, and my description here is tentative. As described, the selection of the *varayoq* is similar to that of other small-scale groups, where people volunteer or are informally selected

to be on the nominating committee (the Quakers come to mind, and as in Ccachín, elders and other "weighty" members are usually well-represented). Across the Andes, traditional officials are selected in a variety of ways, from vote of the general assembly, to putting it in the hands of each office holder to find their successor. Likewise, various degrees of influence and imposition by outside officials can be found.

10. Historically, the *teniente gobernador* appeared as an intermediate form between the traditional system of community leadership and the new system pushed during agrarian reform (Skar 1982:223-224). The *teniente gobernador* continues to have the closest formal ties to the *varayoq* in Ccachín, and he plays an important role in facilitating the selection of new officials. The year I witnessed the event, the *teniente gobernador* was celebrating his wedding, and he sent another *comunero* (one with a facility for reading and writing, but without a major office) to fill in as his replacement.

11. At the start of the trail to Lares, just below the plaza and the church, there is a site known as *Cruz Punku* ('Door of the Cross'). There used to be a large stone here, with a cross carved into it, and before leaving for Lares, the *varayoq*-elect would say their prayers before this stone. The carving is said to be very ancient. An undetermined number of years ago the stone broke, and only a part of it remains. Today, the remaining piece is brought to the plaza and placed at the steps to the church on New Year's Eve. A flower cross is attached to it. The entering *varayoq* kneel before the cross and stone and pray their *alabado,* while the retiring *varayoq* stand above them and look on (this order of above and below is reversed the following day, when the latter surrender their *varas*). After the *alabado*, the *varayoq* sit together along the wall of the plaza and drink *chicha* in colonial-era bowls. Meanwhile *ayuda* ('help', small cash donations) are collected as a fund for the *varayoq* and registered by two or three men in notebooks. Twice during the *kacharpari*, once at the beginning and once at the end of the ceremony, the *varayoq* mount their horses and ride down the trail to the cemetery to pray, recreating in abbreviated fashion, the practices of old. The continued importance of the stone cross (see Gonzalez 1989 on the merging of monoliths and crosses in Andean history) and the trip to the cemetery (a place that does not enter into any other public ceremony in Ccachín), suggests that the ancestors play a special role in the symbology of this event, more-so than at any other public function over the course of the year.

12. Along with their *mayordomos*, the two patron saints of the community, Santiago and the Virgin of Guadalupe, each have *alfereces*. In the case of Santiago, a mature man and his sons are selected. For *Mamacha* Guadalupe, an older woman and her daughters are selected. They serve as standard-bearers, accompanying the *mayordomo* with standards or huge fronds on the feast of their saint. The *alfereces* are lieutenants to the *mayordomos*, but unlike the *mayordomos*, they need not serve all

the positions in the *varayoq* system to be chosen.

13. If Margolis is right, his approach would help explain why "there are never many Kantians . . ." as Elster (1989:133) assumes without further explanation.




Figure 7.1: *Residencia*, A New Office-Holder Serving Coca While Visiting

Table 7.1: Traditional Mayor-Council System of Ccachín

Traditional Mayor-Council of Ccachín (1-Year Terms, Carry Staffs of Office)




Table 7.2: *Mayordomos*, *Alfereces*, and *Carguyoq*





Table 7.3: Passage Through the Hierarchy of Civil-Religious Offices



Chapter 8

Communal Organization and Management

Introduction

The administration of Ccachín has changed dramatically since its reorganization as a *comunidad campesina* in 1966. The role of the communal assembly as the maximum decision making body has remained constant, but the division of responsibilities and delegation of authority have changed in response to national legislation and edicts of the Ministry of Agriculture and Office of *Comunidades Campesinas*. While agrarian reform has changed the local power base, providing the *comuneros* greater autonomy and more space for democratic decision making and collective action, at the same time, the community has become more tightly integrated in regional political hierarchies, exchange networks, and communication webs.

In this chapter, I follow up on the discussion of traditional authorities in the last chapter to complete my outline of the principal actors in the institutional arena, focusing on a host of new positions that have emerged in the last thirty years. My emphasis is on the position, authority, procedure, and aggregation rules of the management regime. I discuss the community-wide assembly ("*asamblea general*") — maximum decision-making body of Ccachín — and consider how day-to-day decision making and policy implementation responsibilities are divided among the *junta directiva*, *consejo de menores*, *teniente gobernador*, judges, and various associations and committees. I use case studies and examples to explore how *comuneros* are selected to fill the positions, the expectations members have of those holding community posts, how they make decisions and carry out their duties, what kinds of problems arise, and how they are resolved. I consider the community assembly and the governing boards, councils, offices, special committees, and organized interest groups that make up the *comunidad campesina* of Ccachín.

By focusing on these positions and committees, I explore the intermediate ground between individual actors and households and the community level. This intermediate ground is the primary locus of community decision making and action. Village-wide assemblies are called and decisions-of-the-whole are carried out by subsets of the community that are delegated the responsibility and held accountable for doing so. The *comunidad campesina* can be viewed as a nested set of formal groups, and to the extent that the community can be treated as an individual actor on the institutional level, it is because its constituent groups have effectively resolved their own collective action problems.

Much of the change over the years in communal organization has been in the designation of positions and job descriptions of community authorities, and the current organizational chart has been largely determined by exogenous political forces. The configuration of administrative positions reflects power dynamics, efficiency considerations, checks and balances, and human resource management principles, and the myriad roles can be and have been divided up in different ways over time. In contrast, the primary operating conventions and rules regulating individual behavior and coordinating collective action in the community are motivated by endogenous factors, especially the dependence agropastoralists have on each other for coordinating production and internalizing production externalities and important economies of scale in defending community lands, building and repairing infrastructure, securing credit and technological improvements, and other ancillary activities. Whatever their origin, once set in place, posts within the system become strategic resources for individuals and focal points of group expectation, and the caliber of the officeholders depends on within-community dynamics. For several reasons then, the institutional arrangements of contemporary *comunidades campesinas* are neither a vestige of the past nor held in place by bureaucratic imposition.

Overview of Community Organizations

General Assembly

The *asamblea general* ('general assembly') is the maximum decision making body of the *comunidad campesina.* Meetings of the assembly are generally held on a monthly basis, though during the busiest months — at plantings and harvests — the meetings are typically suspended. When there is urgent business, more than one meeting may be held in a given month. Technically, there are two kinds of meetings, *asambleas ordinarias* and *asambleas extraordinarias*, the first scheduled by law for June and December of each year, the second scheduled as needed. In practice it's usually difficult to distinguish between the two.

The rules governing *asambleas generales* are laid out in the *Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas* (Casa Campesina "Domingo Cabrear Lartaún" 1990a). Rather than review them, I summarize an assembly conducted in Ccachín during my time in the community in Table 8.1. It is a particularly full and revealing example. From the items on the agenda, it can be noted that the *Asamblea* rules on the acceptance and change of status of community members, hears requests by members for usufruct of additional land, concerns itself with the expansion and integrity of territory boundaries, approves the amounts and conditions of loans, determines sanctions for violations of policies set at the meetings, levies taxes in money or goods to meet community needs, delegates tasks to special committees, and schedules work parties. In addition, the *Asamblea* keeps tabs on the work of the teachers and *sanitario* (none of whom are registered community members), and the directors of the schools are frequently present to give special reports. During the second half of 1991, from which the example is drawn, Ccachín was governed by an *estado de emergencia* ('state of emergency', as designated by the national government in Lima), and the community had to send a written request to the commander of the army base in Amparaes whenever it wished to hold a general assembly. The intent of military leaders was to distinguish authorized assemblies from those that the *tiruku* ('terrorists' of MRTA) might call as they passed through the area. A few days before this

meeting, the community secretary typed a letter, and one of the *varayoq* hiked to Amparaes to present the request to the military authorities for approval.[1]

Attendance at the assemblies I attended varied from 87 to 150 people, with the average being around 120, slightly more than half of the number of heads of household in the community. Men typical outnumber women five to sevenfold. The first order of business at an assembly is to select a *director de debates* (also called *presidente de la mesa*) to facilitate the meeting. Three names are placed in nomination, and a vote is taken by a show of hands. Many are not eager to fill the role, and nominees may make a speech on why they can't do it. In one instance, I watched the top vote-getter drag his feet about taking his place at the head table until fetched and escorted by a *barrio de varayoq*. For those interested in someday serving in a higher office, the recurrent elections for *director de debates* give an idea of how they may fare in a general election. Former presidents are often chosen for the role as well, and at one assembly, the director of the school was pressed into service. The *director de debates* recognizes members who desire to speak and otherwise directs the flow of verbal traffic, and some use the position as a platform for forwarding their own opinions more than others.

Most decisions of the assembly are made through a process of informal consensus, with discussion continuing until few have anything to say. The *director de debates* may check for agreement, but there is not usually any formal attempt to check for or draw out opposition before resolving an issue. Frequently, the final decision is never formally stated, but is assumed from whatever remaining proposal is on the floor at the time that the discussion of the topic ends.[2] Many, if not most, decisions fail to get registered or are registered in a cursory way in the *Libro de Actas* ('Book of Acts') kept by the secretary, but anything with immediate impact on community members (the scheduling of *phayna*, need to pay a quota, etc.) is announced by the town criers and becomes public knowledge in an oral rather than written way. Typically, the only voting that occurs at an assembly is to select the *director de debates* and to fill any committees positions that have been created or community positions that need to be filled. Straw votes are likewise taken to decide between proposed dates for meetings, fund-raising events, and work parties. I

never observed a vote on a policy issue, and if there was widespread disagreement on a proposal, the decision was usually deferred.

Elected Officials

Administrative Council

The *junta directiva comunal* ('community administrative council') is the decision making body officially responsible for the direction, execution, and administration of the *comunidad campesina*. Members are selected by secret ballot for two-year terms, and they can stand for reelection. Their responsibilities include 1) convening the general assembly and carrying out its decisions, 2) assuring that decisions and procedures adopted conform to the *Ley de Comunidades Campesinas* ('Law of Peasant Communities'), 3) proposing a plan of development and fiscal budget to the general assembly, 4) represent the community in obtaining outside grants and aid, 5) assure that everyone participates in *phayna* and helps the special committees, 6) contract professional services as needed, and 7) enforce the sanctions determined by the general assembly (*Casa Campesina "Domingo Cabrear Lartaún"* 1990a). The *junta* is composed of nine officials, ranging from president to general committee members (Table 8.2). The responsibilities of the president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer are defined according to contemporary, western organizational practice. Around 1970, the Velasco military regime reorganized governance of the *comunidades campesinas*, creating separate councils of administration and vigilance. The two councils have since been combined in the *junta directiva*, with the *fiscal* (also called *vigilante* in Ccachín) playing the role of ombudsman or watchdog: he's responsible for denouncing abuses of office and dereliction of duty by community officials, arbitrating disputes and maintaining peace at general assemblies, overseeing the sanctioning of community members who fail to attend *phayna*, making sure that the community has its paperwork in order, and auditing financial records. The *vocal* ('committee member') positions appear to be designed to integrate traditional authorities into the *junta directiva* (ibid.:21). In Ccachín, however, the *vocales* are chosen for two-year

terms by popular vote along with the rest of the *junta*; they are different individuals and conceptually distinct from the *varayoq*.

According to a survey of people who have held community office in the Department of Cusco, members of the *junta directiva* should be voting members of the community and should know how to value and help all of the organizations that exist in the community, know how to listen to and interpret the bases, be neither authoritarian nor prepotent, not have a criminal history, and not have been judged for committing acts against the community. In addition, they should be dynamic, bold, and out-going, not love the consumption of alcoholic beverages, be married and have a stably-constituted family, and know how to read and write Spanish (Casa Campesina "Domingo Cabrear Lartaún" 1990b:3). The importance of being able to read and write Spanish, and of having the confidence and skill needed to navigate through mestizo culture, favors younger men with a high-school education and outside work experience. The emphasis on marriage and family ensures that they have a stake in the future of the community. It also means that the men that assume the top positions are usually in their thirties and forties, about the age that they would otherwise be serving as *alguaciles* and *barrios* in the traditional authority system. The expectation that they not drink excessively stands in striking contrast to community approval for drinking among the *varayoq*, who, given their ceremonial responsibilities and the magical-religious significance of alcohol in Quechua culture, pass much of their term of office in an inebriated state.

In contrast to the *varayoq*, who are expected to translate their own wealth into collective goods, elected officials are expected to use their education, language, and organizational skills to secure new public works for the community. The *Inca alcalde* needs to be adept at marshaling his network of kin and *compadres* to sponsor the most impressive community feasts possible, while at the same time maintaining his economic viability for a full agropastoral cycle, a period during which he is able to contribute little to his own household production because of social demands of the office. The president of the community must likewise dedicate a considerable amount of unpaid time to his office. However, he is reimbursed from community funds for most out of pocket

expenses. Except for support in getting elected and weathering controversy, kin resources play a minor role in carrying out the duties of office. While the president is a visible leader at assemblies and work parties, his ceremonial responsibilities are limited to making public speeches at the principal secular feasts of the community (Mother's Day, Independence Day, and the Anniversary), to saying a few words at the swearing in of the *varayoq* (in both instances, as one among many), and to accepting aid from government agencies and NGOs in the name of the community.

Elections

There are two methods for electing officials in Ccachín. The procedure for choosing the *junta directiva* requires a secret ballot. The procedure for selecting all other officials — *teniente gobernador*, judges, *alcalde de menores*, and special committees — is based on a show of hands at the general assembly.[3]

The format for electing the *junta directiva* is outlined by the *Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas* (for a summary, see the *Guía para la Elección de Autoridades Comunales*, Casa Campesina "Domingo Cabrera Lartaún" 1990b). *Comuneros* take the election seriously and diligently follow the *Reglamiento de Elecciones* for *Comunidad Campesinas*. The general election actually involves a series of preliminary elections — for the *Comité Electoral*, for the slates of candidates, and for the supervisors of the voting tables — leading up to the vote for the president of the community and other members of the *junta directiva*. In Ccachín, the first two are done by majority vote at preceding assemblies, the third by informal consensus on the morning of the election.[4]

The *comité electoral* ('electoral committee') is responsible for organizing the voting boxes and tables, assuring that those who vote are registered ("*empadronados*"), counting the votes, preparing the documents that record the election for the community, informing regional authorities of the election results, swearing in new officials, resolving conflicts among members of the junta, and overseeing recall and replacement procedures. Like attendance at work parties, voting is mandatory, and *comuneros* are fined for failure to vote. They are also fined for failure to attend the general assemblies where the *comité*

electoral and the candidates for the *junta directiva* are selected. The penalty for not voting is determined by the general assembly and can be quite steep. In 1990, it was about $2.00 (1,000,000 *intis*) for the general election.[5]

Two slates are presented for voting, one red, one green. The construction of the slates itself is a key step in assuring the representativeness of the process. Candidates are selected in a general assembly a few weeks before the election. They are nominated by the membership-at-large. Three names are put forward for each of the positions on each slate, a vote is taken, and the highest vote-getter is selected. For each of the *vocales* positions, two names are put forward instead of three. A slate can't include close relatives — no fathers-sons, brothers, brothers-in-law, or first cousins — to insure its impartiality. On the day of the general election, *comuneros* vote by placing a piece of colored paper — red or green (or white for blank) — in the voting box according to the slate they favor. *Comuneros* appear to base their vote on the character of a presidential candidate rather than on slate as a whole (even presidential candidates may be unable to list who else is on their slate without referring to the official posting). The support of one's relatives and *compadres* reportedly play a role in getting nominated, but one generally can't be elected without having a good reputation community-wide. While they must select between them, *comuneros* readily point out faults in both candidates. A young woman — voting in 1990 for the first time — described one presidential candidate to me as "*envidioso*" ('envious'), while the other "*No quiere gastar su dinero, no quiere gastar su tiempo*" ('doesn't want to spend his own money, doesn't want to spend his time'). She voted for the latter, perhaps a clue as to her ranking of these traits (envy is held in low regard), and her remarks give a backhanded indication of some of the qualities the ideal president would have. It's hard for someone who misses *phayna* and fails to attend assemblies on a regular basis to get elected.

The first man to serve as president in Ccachín after it was granted *comunidad campesina* status in 1966, *Don TV*, was elected after successfully leading the struggle against the local *hacendados*. It appears that presidential politics since that time has continued to be shaped by historical divisions arising from one's family's position in the

old *hacienda* system. The only son of the *arrendire* that was the dominant power in Ccachín before agrarian reform, one of the largest herd owners in the community, has been a presidential candidate on three or four occasions. He has lost each time. His brother-in-law, however, husband of his sister, served two years as president. Both pasture their cattle at Pan de Azucar, former hacienda land. This pasture has been in the process of litigation for years, with both the *comunidad campesina* of Ccachín and the heirs of the *arrendire* and *allegados* of Pan de Azucar vying for title.

In the community elections of 1990, both presidential candidates were associated with the Pan de Azucar *Comité*, the group seeking independent title. In 1991, engineers of the Ministry of Agriculture visited Ccachín to resolve the title. The engineers ruled in favor of the Pan de Azucar group. Afterwards, I heard complaints that it was unjust that the *comunidad campesina* had to pay the costs of the engineers' visit when their ruling went against the community. The president of the *junta directiva* at the time had a stake in the pastures at Pan de Azucar, but it is unclear what role this played in determining the outcome. Anyone belonging to the Pan de Azucar *Comité* has had a conflict of interest on this issue when serving on the *junta directiva*, and a personal interest in the ex-hacienda pastures appears to have served as an incentive to community office. Elections in themselves do not assure that community officials will not be compromised, and the system lacks further structural safeguards at the local level.[6]

Removal and Replacement

Once the *junta directiva* is installed, its members are expected to serve out their term. All elections cost money, especially in paying the travel expenses and preparing the *oficios* ('official papers') of the *comité electoral*, and new elections are considered too costly. An envelope and a piece of paper don't sound like much in a digital age, but they are a scarce and costly commodity in the eyes of the *campesinos*. Occasionally, someone on the *junta directiva* will submit their resignation. In 1991, the *fiscal* announced that he was moving to Arequipa, and asked to be replaced. Rather than accept his resignation,

the *comité electoral* asked him to designate a stand-in to serve out his term. The *asamblea general* then ratified his replacement.

If a formal *denuncio* of a community official is made, the *comité electoral* brings the issue before the general assembly to hear testimony pro and con, and decides if a new election must be held. In 1991, there was concern among *comuneros* about the habitual public drunkenness of the community secretary. He had to travel frequently on community business (carrying official papers, community money, etc.), and he invariably made a spectacle of himself on the truck and at the stops in route. While I was in the community, the issue never reached the point of a formal denouncement, but pressures to correct the problem proceeded at an informal level. The president of the *comité electoral* was apprised of the problem, and he discussed the matter with other community officials. The first judge talked to the head catechist, brother of the secretary, to try to activate internal family pressures. One of the *compadres* of the secretary, the *sanitario* of Choquecancha, and his marriage *padrino*, another important official in Choquecancha, were informed of people's dissatisfaction, and villagers expected them to straighten out their *compadre-ahijado* in Ccachín.

In 1991, the *junta directiva* of Ccachín was accused of showing favoritism toward family members in the redivision of fields in the primary potato sector. Requests for more land are presented to the *asamblea general* by new *empadronados* (newly registered adults, generally, young adults just starting their own households) and by other *empadronados* who, because of meager inheritance or a growing family need more land to meet their subsistence needs. Land is redistributed in an event referred to locally as *raymi* ('festival'; 'land distribution rite'). Anyone who cares to can attend, but those who are in need of agricultural plots are the ones that primarily do. The president of Ccachín is responsible for overseeing land redistribution. Plots are generally redistributed in sequence, from lower to upper levels, according to the chronological order that individuals have been registered in the list of *empadronados*. Soon after the *raymi* of 1991, community officials were accused of nepotism in the distribution of lands in the sector known as *Chaypurq'o*. According to *comuneros*, the son-in-law of the president was

given a disproportionately large plot in the sector, while the president's son, who was not yet *empadronado*, received a field of his own. Two sons of the vice-president, who lived in Urubamba and who were not *empadronado* in Ccachín received land, and the son of the *fiscal*, who was likewise not *empadronado*, was granted a plot as well (as noted above, the *fiscal* is the official who is supposed to remain vigilant against such abuses of power by the *junta directiva*). Later, the *teniente gobernador* told me that to his mind, the offense of the vice-president — giving land to family members who did not live in the community — was the greatest. When I asked him how all of this could happen, I was told that it was done "*calladito*" ('quietly', 'secretly') behind people's backs. It did not remain secret, and many *comuneros* responded with indignation. It was discussed, debated, and argued outside of official channels, but I'm not aware that any formal *denuncio* was made. Rumors of the unfair division, however, reached engineers of the *Ministerio de Agricultura* while they were visiting the community to investigate brush fires, and they passed word along to the Salesian priests in Calca. When *Padre PS* said mass in Ccachín a month later, he addressed the problem in his sermon, emphasizing that unjust repartition of communal lands by community officials is a sin against God.[7] The episode never came to a climax or conclusion while I was in the community, and the outrage gradually died down. While a few reputations were tarnished, there were no fines, no motions for recall, and the unfair distribution of land in that potato sector was never undone.[8]

A few months later, the president was again implicated in a major controversy. Three of his cattle — a cow and two calves — had been captured and held in the corral for damages they had done in the potato sector. The young men that captured the animals noticed that something seemed amiss with the brand on the cow, and they confronted the president and his wife, who claimed ownership of the animals. After a heated discussion involving the accusers, the accused, and others from the *junta directiva* who happened to be present, the president fetched two branding irons, and the group went to the corral to compare the image on the irons with the brand on the cow. This did not resolve the matter, as the marks did not exactly match. It appeared that a larger brand had been

placed over a smaller one, obscuring the latter. At this point, someone summoned one of the judges, who came to the corral and witnessed the imperfect correspondence of the iron and brand. With suspicion that the animal had been stolen running high, the judge suggested that the head judge be called in and a document prepared. Later, the *fiscal* advised the young men who had discovered the deception to present a *denuncio* to the *teniente gobernador*. This was done, and a copy of the *denuncio* was delivered to the president, in this case as suspect rather than as community official, by one of the *varayoq*. The *teniente gobernador* also sent a copy of the *denuncio* to his counterpart in Choquecancha in case the cow had been stolen from someone there. According to the *teniente gobernador*, the brand was suspicious, but not sufficiently clear to establish that a theft had occurred. He had conducted an inquiry and neither the son nor brother-in-law of the accused recognized the animal, but the president's response was that other family members hadn't payed sufficient attention to the animals. As far as the *teniente* was concerned, if no one stepped forward to claim the animal, there was nothing more that could be done. No one did, and for practical purposes, the case was closed.

There's a second aspect to this story that warrants telling, as it gives an indication of how enforcement of community policies get carried out. To get their animals released from the corral, *comuneros* have to pay a substantial fine based on the number of head of livestock imprisoned. If one fails to retrieve the stock within twenty-four hours, the daily rate triples, since the person in charge of maintaining the corral has to water and feed the animals. After their capture, the president's cattle were in the community corral for eight days before being claimed. For the eight days, he was assessed a fine of 47,000,000 *intis* ($47). The president, however, did not have, or didn't want to pay, that much money to free his animals. He offered 20,000,000 *intis*. The committee representing the corral tried to persuade him to sell one of his calves to pay the full 47,000,000 *intis* (a cattle buyer from Urubamba happened to be visiting the community at the time), but he refused. Unable to get what they wanted, the committee began to negotiate, lowering the fee to 35,000,000 *intis*. The president attempting to further reduce his fine, and eventually, the two parties settled on a penalty of 30,000,000 *intis*. It turned out, however, that this

figure was more token than real, as the president could only produce 19,500,000 *intis*. After further discussion, the committee released the animals to him for this amount, with the agreement that he would pay the rest the following day. Privately, however, committee members didn't expected that once the animals were released, he would ever pay the full fee, and in fact, he never did. After the president left the corral with his cattle, the young men that had cared for the animals for so many days talked among themselves, letting off steam. They faulted the president for everything from robbery and lying to wasting their time. They lamented his unsuitability as president, saying that "he can't talk . . . he hardly can speak Spanish . . . he's a brute." These criticisms, however, weren't entirely — or solely — their own. They indicated that the principal of the high school felt the same way. These young men saw themselves as more educated and worldly than their elders — a new breed of leadership — and this is exactly what they found wanting in the president.

Municipal Council

In another of the structural changes that have taken place in recent years, the functions of the former "*agente municipal*" in Ccachín have been taken over by the *consejo de menores* ('municipal council', Table 8.3). According to *comuneros*, the *alcalde de menores* is responsible for registering births and deaths, officiating the civil ceremony at weddings, and organizing public works.

The *consejo* has the responsibility of maintaining streets, trails, bridges, and walls in the village proper. In 1987, for example, the *consejo* organized the *phayna* that led to the doubling of the size of the village cemetery. The *consejo* also plays a lead role in new construction projects. The reroofing of the temple in 1989 was initiated by the *agente* (predecessor of the *alcalde de menores*) in 1984, after hearing that the parish in Calca had funds available from a sister parish in Germany. The money that is collected from fines for animal damage usually goes into the treasury of the *consejo*. As part of the institutional checks and balances, there are two treasurer positions, the *Síndico de Rentas* ('Income Trustee') and the *Síndico de Gastos* ('Expense Trustee'). The *alcalde de*

menores is the one that commands the *varayoq* in this regard, and he takes the blame if the *varayoq* do not round up vagrant animals regularly. The money generated is generally not sufficient to initiate any projects in itself, it is used to cover travel costs and other incidental expenses of members of the *consejo* as they try to obtain outside funds. When the money is not there, officials must pay there own way or cut back on the activity of the *consejo* itself.

As with the president, a *comunero*'s success in filling the role of *alcalde* is judged by the works that he generates for the community. *Comuneros* talk about what they would do if they were *alcalde de menores*. One would build a dressing room for fiesta dancers in a corner of the plaza. Another would put his energies into flooring the second story of the *salón comunal*. There are lots of expectations among *comuneros*, little extra time, few funds, and frequent complaints that the *alcaldes de menores* don't care enough about their position. Some *alcaldes* are better than others at getting things done. It's often hard to track the lines of responsibility for community projects when the *consejo de menores*, *junta directiva*, and special committees are all involved (the *Club de Madres* — specifically, the husbands of the women in the *Club de Madres* — are said to have constructed the *Posta de Salud*, and the various *Padres de Familia* lead for construction projects for the school). Over the last ten years, however, the face of the village has changed markedly — with a variety of new public structures and infrastructural improvements — and it appears that the *consejo* has been one of the most important groups in bringing this about. When I completed my fieldwork in 1992, there were a number of new projects on the horizon: the parish had agreed to provide funds to build a house for visiting priests alongside the church, the sister parish in Germany had given Ccachín $1140 for a project of the community's choosing (the *asamblea general* decided to spend $140 on medicine for the *posta* and the rest on sheet metal roofing for the new high school), the producer for "*La Vida Es Una Sola*," Kusifilms, had agreed to provide materials for a cement floor for the *salón comunal* and showers for the grade school in exchange for rights to film in the community, and Barbara and I had given the *Consejo de Menores* and *Comité del Templo* money to finish the wood flooring in the church.

Lieutenant Governor

The primary responsibility of the *teniente gobernador* ('lieutenant governor') in Ccachín appears to be the maintenance of internal order. The *teniente* is elected by the *asamblea general* and installed by the district *gobernador* (Table 8.4). The position has undergone significant change in the last thirty years. Fifty years ago, the community did not have its own *teniente* and was under the *teniente gobernador* of Lares. Later, each of the indigenous communities under the jurisdiction of Lares were granted their own *teniente* positions. The *teniente gobernador* was then at the apex of community politics and a go-between for the community with the outside. Today, many of the functions of the position have been taken over by the *junta directiva.*

Tenientes in Ccachín today tend to be young, traveled, and fluent in Spanish. Wealth seems to play little part in their selection. Historically, the *teniente* commanded the *varayoq*, and today, just as the president of the community heads the *junta directiva* and the *consejo de menores* has the rest of the *consejo* as his staff, the *teniente gobernador* executes the office with the help of the traditional authorities.

Formerly, the *teniente gobernador* was responsible for *raymi* (the division of fields in the sectoral fallow areas among the *comuneros*), but that responsibility has been reassigned to the community president. While the *Inca Alcalde* is expected to organize an annual work party to inspect community boundaries, old boundary marker ("*hito*") reports are kept with the *teniente gobernador*, suggesting that at one time at least, responsibility for the defense and usufruct of community property fell with the *teniente*.[9] The *teniente* gobernador is responsible for the certification of meat and verification of the ownership of animals and other goods. Registration of births, deaths, and marriages also fall within his purview.

Conducting research in Matapuquio in the 1970s, Skar (1982) indicates that the *teniente gobernadores* in that community at that time were among the wealthiest land-holders in the community, that they had external village income and external contacts as well, that their wealth made them less dependent on kin, affine, and *compadres* than the *varayoq*, and that in terms of ethnic passing, they were the most *mestizo* of community

members. This pattern held for Ccachín when the only *teniente* in the area resided in Lares, and seems to have been general throughout the Andes during that era.

Fifty years ago, Gutiérrez Pareja portrayed the *teniente* in Lares as a powerful, poorly-educated, rapacious figure:

> Most iniquitous is the conduct of the *Teniente Gobernador*, these men being the kings of the district . . . . The mission of the *Teniente* is essentially to go with community members around the perimeters of the hills in the division of land for the cultivation of potatoes . . . . It's on these rounds where one can note the power of the *Teniente*, who takes and redistributes lands to those he chooses, and knocks to the ground any who oppose the arrangement with lashes, using buckshot that he has in his belt expressly for the purpose. . . . And at nightfall, the *Teniente* chooses the young women that most interest him and . . . and if the *Teniente* has companions, these on their own account do what we crudely call "dragging" ["*arrastres*"], rascals in the night, entering the houses and raping the young women that they find along the way . . . . That's how *Raimi* always ends in the communities, because the next day neither the *Teniente* nor his companions are around, as they return to town [Lares] at midnight, I don't know if out of shame or by custom. [Gutiérrez Pareja 1949:8-9]

Gutiérrez Pareja reports that all of the *varayoq* had to serve as personal servants for the *teniente* in Lares in eight day rotations without recompense, and were required to provide him with potatoes, meat, and firewood on a regular basis. Clearly, fifty years ago, the *varayoq* were subservient to the *Teniente*. While the present system maintains vestiges of some of the same command structure, the position has been rid of its abusive associations by making it a rotating position filled by *comuneros* within the *comunidad campesina*, and by balancing its powers with those of other community offices. Except for the *Inca alcalde*, who has the *regidores* at his command, there are no positions of authority that entitle one to personal attendants. As with other top community positions, there is some potential for corruption among *tenientes*, especially for monetary gain, but the complaints I am familiar with are not as severe as those reported in the past.

Judges

Ccachín has three judges or justices of the peace who swear-in traditional authorities, perform civil weddings, and receive *denuncios* ('complaints', 'denounce-

ments') brought by *comuneros* against each other (Table 8.4). They are elected by the *asamblea general*, and sworn in by regional authorities. People take their complaints to the *teniente gobernador*, to one of the judges, or to both. Cases that go beyond their jurisdiction (i.e., criminal as opposed to civil cases) are referred to higher authorities in Lares and Calca.

When *Don HS* and *Doña VP*'s house burned down under suspicious circumstances, the three officials that showed up the next morning to investigate were the *alcalde de menores*, the *teniente gobernador*, and the third judge. The latter two wrote out *denuncios* in their books of office. While I am not clear about differences in the scope of responsibility between the two, the kind of information that they included in their *denuncios* may be revealing. The report prepared by the *teniente gobernador* was based on physical inspection and and consisted of a measurement of the dimensions of the destroyed house and a description of its composition and structure (materials used in its construction, number of rooms, number of doors and windows, etc.). The judge's report included further dimensions of the case. He summarized all that happened — when and where the fire started, who discovered it, who helped put it out, what was destroyed, and that it may have caused by arson — and had the *denuncio* signed by a family member. A few weeks latter, all three officials again met with the family for the official inquest. A more complete description of the property damage was made at this time, and a single *denuncio* prepared. I am unsure whether this document was registered with the *teniente gobernador* or the judge, but a second copy was prepared and the family was instructed to present it to the subprefect in Calca, leading me to assume that the original was retained by the *teniente* in Ccachín.

Both the judges and the *teniente gobernador* collect fees for their services in preparing *denuncios*. In the instance above, the inquest took eight hours. A lunch, coca, and two bottles of *trago* were served to the authorities. The family paid 1,500,000 *intis* to the judge ($2.80, or three times the going rate for a day's labor in the area at the time), which, if divided up among the attending officials after they left, represented, in local terms, a fair day's wage for a fair day's work.

Not all charges, however, appear to be pegged to the *jornal* ('rate for day labor'). One night, while asleep, thieves broke into the corral of *HZ* and stole a cow that he had purchased with the intent of taking it to Calca to market. *Don MC*, returning home alone late and slightly inebriated from a day's *ayni* labor in the fields, came upon the thieves escaping with the animal along the path. Frightened by the detection, the thieves took off running, and the *comunero* took the cow back to the village. There he identified the two thieves, who were allegedly from the village, by name. While he got the animal back and eventually sold it (in Ccachín, where the price was lower, rather than in Calca, as he had planned), much if not all of his profit from the sale went into *trámites* ('legal proceedings'). The *comunero* who discovered the animal asked for 12,000,000 *intis* as a reward. One of the alleged thieves had a solid alibi — he was in the Lares Valley at the time — and accused *HZ* of *calumnia* ('false accusation', 'slander'). He contended that his wife had miscarried in her distress about the charges, and he asked for 30,000,000 *intis* to cover associated medical and travel expenses. The head judge and the *teniente gobernador* (a different *teniente* and a different judge than those who attended to the house fire discussed above) each charged him 5,000,000 *intis* ($5.00, or 2½ times the current *jornal*) for preparing the original *denuncio*, for time spent in investigation, and for mediating the counterclaims. Through all of this, the original victim was put on the defensive. Each party felt justified to a part of the gains from trade — as recompense for going out of their way to help, for damages to their reputation and their family, for services rendered — and each in fact received compensation. On the other hand, the false identification called into question the testimony of the witness, and the accusation against the other alleged thief (who had a reputation as such) was dropped for lack of evidence.

Committees and Community Groups

Agricultural Committee

One of the ways that funds are raised to cover the administrative expenses of the community is through the sale of potatoes from communal plots. A field is planted in one or both of the potato sectors each year for this purpose. There is no separate committee

overseeing this operation; rather, it is one of the responsibilities of the *junta directiva*. When the *junta directiva* operates in this capacity, it is referred to as "*el comité*" ('the committee').

The principal communal planting each year take place in the main potato sector. There are three major work parties: the *hatun tarpuy* ('great planting'), *hatun yapuy* ('great plowing'), and *hatun allay* ('great harvest'). In many communities the *alcalde mayor* is expected to provide food and drink at these events, but in Ccachín, the members of the *comité* act as hosts. They serve *trago* to the *comuneros* that attend the most ritually important of the three *phayna*, the *yapuy*.

At harvest, seed for the next planting is divided up among the *comuneros* to take home. The amount that each takes — one half to one *arroba* — is registered in a notebook by the community treasurer. At the time of planting, each *comunero* must return an equivalent amount of potato seed from their personal stock. When they arrive for the *phayna*, they pour their seeds into a communal pile, and the treasurer checks off their name. Those that fail to present seed potatoes, or return less than they are listed for, must make up for it with potatoes at the time of harvest. *Comuneros* are likewise expected to provide fertilizer for *papa yapuy*, and when the roll is called, each empties an *arroba* or so of manure from their carrying cloth into a heap before the authorities while their companions look on.

In 1991, the *asamblea general* gave both the *Club de Madres* and the *Padres de Familia de la Escuela* small plots in the potato sector adjacent to *comité* land for their own fund-raising purposes. The *phayna* for these were held at the same time as those of the *comité*, and while separate rolls were taken, those that worked these fields were credited for their attendance along with everyone else by the *comité*. At the *papa yapuy*, the husband of the president of the *Club de Madres* served *trago*. The president of the *Padres de Familia* and the school janitor served *trago* at the *yapuy* of the school. School children took a kilo or two of sheep manure to school, and in this way, they collected four sacks of fertilizer for the potatoes. The school also has a plot in the corn sector, donated by one of the *comuneros*. Under direction of the teachers, the children have their own

work parties to weed and harvest their plot. The revenues generated from selling the corn go directly to the school. The *comité* of the community doesn't have any holdings in the corn sector.

Cattle Committee

The *Comité Ganadería* is in charge of taking care of the cattle that belong to the *comunidad campesina* as a whole. The herd is maintained to market and raise funds for the community. Three committee members share responsibility for caring for the animals as they would their own. Someone has to go and check on them regularly and take them salt. On *Día de Comadres* or thereabouts, the committee performs the requisite fertility rituals for the cattle ("*waka t'inkay*").

During the time of my fieldwork, the size of the herd was small, about five to six head. In comparison, many *comuneros* had private herds of twenty to twenty-five animals, and the largest individual herd totaled eighty to one hundred head. The community herd represents less than one percent of the total population of cattle in Ccachín. The herd began as three animals expropriated from the hacienda at Palanganayoq during the agrarian reform. At one time, through natural reproduction and community investments, it increased to a high of about fifteen animals. In 1988, a couple of *comuneros* attempted to steal cattle pastured at Chanchiyoq, the *wakería* ('cattle lands') of the community at that time. The *wakero* ('cattle herder') and his son were killed by the thieves, and the community had to sell several animals to pay for litigation pertaining to the theft. More animals were sold a few years later to pay for delivery of a tractor donated to the community by the Peruvian government. Along with natural mortality, these sales have reduced the size of the herd to a precarious level.

Mother's Club

The *Club de Madres* ('Mother's Club') is a local chapter of a national organization. It was established in the mid-1980s, with the help of the local *sanitario* and a Catholic priest. At the meetings (which are held on a weekly to monthly basis depending

on the season), health and nutritional information is distributed, homemaking skills are taught and women are organized into work parties for maintaining the club's gardens and for club projects. The women have a club house with furnished kitchen — a stove, pots, pans, and utensils — donated by *Cáritas* ('Care') and the parish in Calca. Among their activities, the women take turns serving the *Vaso de Leche* Program. "*Leche*" ('milk' — actually, a mixture of USAID soy flour, oatmeal, powdered milk, oil, and sugar) and other foodstuffs are used to attract women with their children to the club's meetings as well. The distribution of free food appears to be critical to attendance, and fluctuations in the supply of donated food helps explain who attends club functions and when (Seibold 1990; Knox-Seith 1995). The *sanitario* works closely with the club, using meetings as a forum for outreach on nutritional programs, vaccination schedules, sanitation, and family planning. The extension agent for FAO-Holanda likewise works with the club on issues related to the conservation and use of forest products. In 1991, after failure of the *Comité Forestal* to maintain the existing *vivero* ('tree nursery'), he approached the club about taking over responsibilities for the nursery. The women agreed to do so, contingent on approval of the *asamblea general*, and under his direction, they held a work party to plant cypress and elderberry saplings in the new nursery plot next to the church (Figure 8.1). The *asamblea general* decided to reconstitute the *Comité Forestal* under new leadership rather than delegate the responsibility to the *Club de Madres*, but at the same time, they gave half of the church plot to the club to work. The club thus has two gardens — one near the cemetery and one near the church — for experimental gardening and for providing food at club events, as well as land in the *hatun papa* sector to raise potatoes to sell.

The *Club de Madres* is the only organization in Ccachín entirely headed by women. The president is usually a mature woman with teenage or adult children, while the positions of secretary and treasurer are usually filled by younger women with higher levels of formal education. The woman elected to head the club in 1990 was young, and because of age, inexperience, or lack of leadership skills had trouble holding the respect of the group. She resigned before finishing her term. Frequently, the officers of the club

have husbands who are active in the public life of the community as well. The president of the *Club de Madres* in 1991 was the wife of the head catechist. The president in 1992 was the wife of the last *alcalde de menores*. Not only do these men help and support their spouses, they often overshadow them at meetings of the club. When present — and they are often present when something needs to be decided or when there is an outside guest — the husbands of the officers of the club take over the respective roles of their wives at the meetings. They not only facilitate the meetings, they speak more often and talk longer than the women present. The specialists invited to lead workshops and educational programs for the club are likewise men: the *sanitario*, the community extension agent for FAO-Holanda, and the village catechists. The FAO-Holanda representative works with *Club de Madres* in a number of area villages, and describes the group in Ccachín as well-intentioned, but lacking effective organization. He felt that the women were capable of playing a stronger role, and contrasted the local group to one that he had heard of in Ayacucho, where the club is run entirely by women, and where any men that come through are kicked out.

Like many of the new community institutions, the *Club de Madres* has been designed according to Western models and introduced by outside agents of social change. In its first six years of existence, it has established a public presence for women and provided a structure for organized women's labor in complementary ways for the community, but the activities of the group have not been defined according to member initiatives, and unlike other community organizations, it has not served as a platform for women to seek other public offices.[10]

Theft of Clothing at the Mother's Club

At the time of my research, the *Club de Madres* suffered a crisis of leadership, first with the lack of support given the young president mentioned above, and later with charges of impropriety against the woman who replaced her. Allegations of malfeasance grew out of a distribution of clothing donated to the community. The crisis surfaced at

about the same time that the *junta directiva* for the community was being accused of similar wrong-doings in the distribution of land in the potato sector.

In the summer of 1991, Barbara brought a gift of used clothing to Ccachín from the United States, collected by students and faculty of the Women's Studies Program at the University of Washington. She approached the *Club de Madres* about distributing the clothing to community members, and the husbands of the club's president and treasurer (who as noted above, often acted for their wives, the actual officers) met with her and accepted the donation on the club's behalf. Barbara had to return to the States before the next meeting was to be held, but I attended, and I read the letter that she had prepared, with the FAO-Holanda agent translating to Quechua. Several women spoke up expressing appreciation for the gift, and a discussion ensued faulting the president of the club for not sending any food with Barbara when she left to show their gratitude. The two men who had met with Barbara explained how, in their conversation with her, Barbara had made clear that her government would not let her bring any agricultural products into the U.S. The women decided to give me two *arrobas* of corn, potatoes, beans, and *ch'uñu* from the club's supply as substitute.[11]

To distribute the clothing, the group decided to give one item to each member of the club. The clothes were bundled in a carrying cloth so that individual items could not be seen, and the extension agent from FAO-Holanda — a neutral party — volunteered to randomly pull items out and hand them to the women as their names were called. The husband of the treasurer read the roll of members. The extension agent teased each recipient about the appropriateness of the item for them as the matches were made (women's, men's, and children's clothing were all mixed together), and people were entertained. There were eighty pieces of clothing, and nearly half remained after all present had received their share. As the husband of the treasurer counted the remaining pieces, a discussion arose as to what to do with them. Most of the clothing that had been distributed were shirts, sweaters, and children's clothing, while the bulk that remained included a large number of trousers, the choice item. The leadership decided that the system had been fair, and that at one of the next meetings, the remaining clothing would

be given to members who had not yet received anything. There was arguing, grumbling, and discontentment among the women, as many felt that it was unfair that those who had not come to the meeting would be rewarded with the best stuff.

Two months later, someone anonymously left a *denuncio* ('denouncement letter') under the door of the *Posta de Salud* accusing the president of the Club and two other officers of selecting the best of the remaining clothing, dividing it among themselves, and selling it off. Likewise, half of the food donated to the *Vaso de Leche* program by the parish was allegedly taken and divided up. Rumor had it that some of the booty had been taken to Qochayoq and sold. Community officials were concerned that because of the theft, funding for the *Vaso de Leche* program would be cut off, and considered it a serious offense.[12] The president of the club denied any involvement, saying that she did not know how or when the goods had disappeared from the clubhouse. She disputed the number of items that had remained after the first division, arguing that it was much less than others had suggested. People described the three suspects as "*millay warmi*" ('evil women') and "*aprovechadoras*" ('selfish people'), and speculation in the street went beyond to consider whether their husbands were also involved. "How could their wives do something like this without their husbands knowing?" ("They're sure to ask, where did these clothes come from, where did this food come from . . . where did you get the money?") An emergency session of the *asamblea general* was called to discuss the theft, and the *asamblea* decided that the club should choose new officers. Elections were scheduled to coincide with measles vaccinations for the children, and the *teniente gobernador* went to the *posta* that morning to monitor them. A large number of women gathered, but the officers of the *Club de Madres* never convened the meeting. A few weeks later, however, elections were held, and two months after the *denuncio* of theft was first made, the officers were replaced. There was never sufficient evidence of their involvement to hold the women accountable, and the *teniente gobernador* did not pursue the case further. In the aftermath of the theft, community officials indicated that when the new house for the priest was built, the *Vaso de Leche* program would be taken out of the hands of the *Club de Madres* and relocated there.

At the *asamblea general*, one of the *comuneros* (the next *fiscal*, Barbara's and my *compadre*) chastised the *Club de Madres* for accepting the donation of clothing in the first place. He said that the clothing of gringos could harbor the AIDS virus and infect people in the community. I don't know whether or not his admonition had any effect on people who had received clothing in the give-away. People in the village are generally unfamiliar with the disease, and mention of the term AIDS ("*SIDA*") does not cause the same consternation as in the United States. There is a scene in the Bolivian film "Blood of the Condor" (Sanjinés 1969), that presents a gift of clothing by ugly Americans (caricatures of Peace Corps volunteers) in the worst light. The *campesinos* in the film eventually return the clothes they have been given. Had we seen the movie before going to the field we might have thought twice about the wisdom of the donation and how it might be interpreted. The gift was made, however, and the negative repercussions were unexpected.

Role of Women in Community Leadership

Other than in the *Club de Madres*, the only other women who held public office while I was in Ccachín were elected at the urging of outside officials, and always after the primary positions had been filled:

- When the *Comité de Derechos Humanos* was formed, a woman was chosen as *vocal* ('committee member') at the urging of *Padre PS*, because, as he suggested, women were as likely if not more than anyone else to be victimized by the soldiers.
- A woman serves as *vocal* for the *Vaso de Leche* program. Probably this is because women are the primary cooks for the program, and the men recognize that a liaison is needed to organize the women to take turns in filling the daily shifts. The committee was set up with the help of the parish priest, and all of the rest of the committee members are men.
- In 1990, a woman served as treasurer of the organizing committee for *Día Familiar*, a fund-raising event for the school. The school principal suggested

that two women be nominated for the position (they were nominated by the men), and a vote was taken to decide between them.

As noted earlier, women also serve religious offices as *mayordomas* for the female saints and as *alfereces* for the Virgin of Guadalupe. In both cases, it is an honor dependent on the success of their husbands in rising through the civil-religious hierarchy. There is no equivalent age grade system or hierarchical ranking for women.

Younger women can obtain some measure of influence in the community by completing their secondary education and becoming teachers for PRONOEI (the preschool program) or local *promotores* for government extension programs of NGOs. These are paid positions that provide an opportunity for individual advancement, but they are few in number and set the woman apart culturally (the women who fill these posts adopt the dress of *mestizo* teachers rather than continue with traditional garb). The *promotor* for the *Ministerio de Agricultura* conducted workshops and showed educational videos in the *salón comunal*, giving her more community-wide visibility than the PRONOEI teachers, whose sphere was limited to the world of preschool children and to working with the parents' associations charged with oversight of the preschool programs.

Knox-Seith (1995:138-139) provides an extensive list of the responsibilities of men and women in Ccachín, and establishes that the roles having to do with representation of households in public spheres are almost the exclusive province of men. Silverblatt (1987) argues that the Spanish colonial regime displaced women from traditional positions of community influence and power. The irony is that if western models of appropriate gender roles displaced women, pressure and support for giving women a more formal public role in community life comes from the same source. As noted above, the priest, the director of the school, government and development agencies pushed for the inclusion of women in community positions. The MRTA guerrillas, in the assembly that they held in Ccachín, likewise spoke against domestic violence and emphasized the importance of electing women to the *junta directiva* and other community positions. All these outside positions of authority continue to be dominated by men, so that when women were included, it was a case of men advising men to include women. The only

woman representing such values who came to Ccachín on a regular basis was *Señora ML*, with the *Ministerio de Agricultura*. The *Club de Madres* in Ccachín has not served as a significant beachhead for the advancement of women in the public sphere, and there is no other organized pressure coming from women themselves. In the future, this pressure is likely to come from the young women who are now completing their secondary education in Ccachín, and who are looking for extra-household opportunities to develop and employ their new interests and skills.

Though they have a minor presence at the assembly where the candidates are nominated, women can and do vote for the *junta directiva* in Ccachín. One of the statutory reasons why a local election might be invalidated by regional authorities is if the women of the community don't vote. This, however, has not been a problem. Like the men, women face a fine for failure to vote, and even without this incentive, there seems to be considerable interest in exercising one's right.

Women play a minor role in the *asambleas generales*. Their numbers vary depending on their interest in the agenda items, and they constitute from as little as 3% to as much as 20% of the total attendance. Women sit as a group off to one side in the *salón comunal*, and they do not take the floor during most meetings (typically, men insert themselves in the discussion with the tag "*por mi parte*" ['for my part'], but I have never heard a woman introduce her comments in this way). Except for the few instances where women attend to represent organizational interests such as the *Club de Madres* or PRONOEI that are being directly addressed by the assembly, when women speak individually, it is with regard to issues that directly affect their household. Unlike the men, they do not take the floor to express general opinions about community issues, but they engage in side discussion with each other about issues as they emerge. Women are more likely to attend meetings if they are widowed or if their spouses are not present to do so, and when women speak, it is usually because a male family member is not present to represent family interests.[13] Most of women's influence at assemblies is indirect. Within the household, women make their opinions known, and they have a behind the scenes influence on decisions made at the assemblies. Assemblies frequently last all day,

with a break for lunch, and when their husbands return home during the recess, wives receive a progress report and couples discuss the issues of the day. While women are not present in number or part of the direct give and take of collective decision making, their influence should not be overlooked. As Allen puts it "at least half the action happens offstage, and the anthropologist, government agent, or school teacher who watches only the public drama will inevitably fail to understand how the community functions" (1988:120). This said, however, one needs to be careful not to overestimate this influence either. No one can safely say, I think, that the decisions reached at the *asambleas* would be the same if women had an equal voice in the proceedings.

The women have no equivalent to the large communal work parties of the men where 100-200 people may be in attendance, but there are a few occasions where they are obligated to work on community projects. Women are organized into small work parties of up to a dozen to provide flowers for the saints, to cook for the *Vaso de Leche* program, and to feed visiting government officials and aid workers. When a survey crew came to Ccachín in 1990, for example, to lay out the new road, the *pututeros* passed through the community at sunrise to call out the names of the men who were to help the surveyors and the women who were to cook for them. When few of those named of either sex responded to the call, an emergency assembly to meet with the engineers was called in the evening, with all adults, both men and women expected to attend. With the weight of the assembly behind them, the assignments were remade.

Human Rights Committee

A *Comité de Derechos Humanos* ('Human Rights Committee') was formed at an *asamblea general* in Ccachín in September 1991 at the urging of *Padre* PS. At the time, Ccachín was located in a *zona de emergencia* ('emergency zone') designated by the Peruvian government because of recent MRTA (*Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru*) activity in the area. Government soldiers were stationed nearby at Amparaes, and both MRTA guerrillas and army troops had passed through Ccachín. If anyone suffered abuse at the hands of the military, the committee was to draft a letter, hand carry it to

Cusco, and fax it to the sister parish in Germany from the office of the Salesians. The priest told the assembly that the community could protect itself with international help.

Military Emergency Zone

After relative quiet for the first two years that Barbara and I were in Ccachín, the military situation began to heat up in the spring of 1991. Four police were killed in an attack by *tupaqamaristas* ('members of the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaq Amaru*') in Q'ellu Unu. Another was killed in a raid at Yavero. On May 2nd, three more police were killed when twenty MRTA guerrillas attacked the police station at Ollantaytambo. The activity was now at Ccachín's back door. Government patrols passed through Amparaes on their way to the Lares Valley, and after the attack on Ollantaytambo, searched for the guerrillas in the nearby highlands of the Urubamba range. Many *comuneros* were aware that there were *desconocidos* ('unknowns') roaming the *puna* and wooded slopes to the north, but they did not necessarily relate them to the attacks on police outposts that they heard about on the radio. More than one villager told me that the *tiruku* ('terrorists') would not come to Ccachín because there were [illegible]*lonarios* ('millionaires') there.

On June 7th, however, twenty-two MRTA guerrillas descended on Ccachín and sealed it off from the outside world for the better part of two days. They held a number of community assemblies to gather information about the community and lecture about their revolutionary struggle, and then commandeered *Señora ES*'s truck to call upon Choquecancha and Lares before disappearing to parts unknown. After this surprise visit by the *compañeros* ('comrades', as they were euphemistically called by villagers), suspicions grew that any of a number of outsiders passing through the community were scouts for the MRTA (two unknown men with concealed weapons accompanying a wedding *padrino* at the feast of Santiago were assumed by some to be *tiruku*) or worked for military intelligence (a sub-official of the *Cuartel General* in Cusco showed up to trade sewing machines for cattle and was suspected as such).

After the MRTA visited the community, *comuneros* burned all of the leaflets and flyers they had been given for fear of being discovered with them if and when government soldiers arrived. Families began to weigh the state of emergency in their household decision making. Young men of draft age avoided travel to the Lares Valley for seasonal work because of the military's presence in places like Yavero, and they hid out in outlying huts when soldiers passed through Ccachín. My hosts made plans to send their two youngest daughters to live in Calca or Cusco to protect them from molestation by the soldiers. At the same time, my family started to sell off cattle, saying that it was not good to have too many animals (i.e., it was not good to be too wealthy) with the *tiruku* around.

The creation of a human rights committee in the village was an insurance measure promoted by the priest rather than a counteraction to specific abuses. Besides the structure it provided for rapid reaction to harassment, it offered an opportunity to educate the *comuneros* about their human rights. The *campesinos* had a history of experiences with the military and knew what to expect and what to fear in them, but the *tiruku* were a great unknown. In their single engagement, the guerrillas restricted movement in and out of the village and fired shots into the air in Lares to prevent a truck carrying Ccachín's catechists from going through, but did not threaten or hurt anyone. While I was in Ccachín, the military passed through a number of times. The attitude and activities of the soldiers gave people reason for grievance, but the military did not commit the grievous atrocities reported elsewhere in Peru.

While the human rights committee in Ccachín, as with most such organizations, was formed with violations by government forces in mind (since that is where they have the most leverage), the *campesinos* experienced both soldiers and guerrillas as occupying forces. They treated both respectfully and with a certain amount of curiosity, but the presence of neither was welcomed, and encounters with both were marked by uncertainty, worry, and fear.[14] Those who could remained hidden in their homes or retreated to outlying cabins when either was around. There are a number of similarities in how both forces related to the local population, and from what I could glean, a full account of the comportment of military and guerrillas in the area would at include at least the following:

- One of the principal expectations of both the MRTA and of government soldiers when they came through the village was that they would be housed and fed. The *salón comunal* was used for shelter.[15] The *Club de Madres* in Ccachín was called upon to cook for both. Individual households shared food from their tables when the guerrillas and soldiers dropped in, and they were required to contribute food to resupply the troops. Of the two, *comuneros* said that the guerrillas were the more respectful: they did not enter people's homes unless invited in, and while they asked for a *colaboración* from each family, they were content with a few kilos of corn, potatoes, beans, or quinoa from each.[16] People contrasted this with the attitude of soldiers and government engineers, who demand a lot and carry sackfuls of foodstuff away. People comply with these expectations both out of fear and out of customary hospitality. One woman told me with pride that the soldiers who come to the community say that the people of Ccachín are good because they provide them with food when they pass through. Others reported similar compliments from the MRTA. In contrast, the people of Choquecancha and Lares are said to be unfriendly because they are not so generous.
- Both the MRTA and the Peruvian military established themselves as the ultimate enforcers of public order in the area. The MRTA inquired about the conduct of community officials, the *alcalde* and *teniente gobernador* of Lares, and the truckers that carried goods and traded with the village.[17] They probed the *campesinos* about thieves and malfeasants in their midst, and investigated the complains of locals who took their grievances to them. The MRTA heard a variety of complaints about recent thefts in Ccachín at the assemblies they called. Known thieves in the community were notably absent at these assemblies. Like many other people, they hid out. After learning that one of the *comuneros* was an alleged cattle thief, the guerrillas asked one of my *comadres* — the accused man's cousin — several questions about him when they visited her home. Her husband, my *compadre*, reputed to be light-fingered, remained

hidden in bed. MRTA leaders advised people at the assemblies they called that the first time thieves are caught, they should be punished, but given a chance to mend their ways. The second time, they should be killed. They did not discipline anyone while in the village, but said that they would return to check up on how the community was resolving its problems. Likewise, after the area became an emergency zone, we would hear messages over *Radio Tawantinsuyo* asking so-and-so from such-and-such community to report to the Peruvian military commander in Amparaes to answer for a theft. Whether out of fear or opportunity, all types of problems — big and small — were reported by the *comuneros*. When the soldiers went to the ex-hacienda lands at Temblorayoq, the cattle herder there complained to them that he had worked for years at Palanganayoq for my host family without ever being paid. When they went to Palanganayoq, they questioned *Don HS* about this and were told that not only had he been paid (in goods and use rights, as agreed upon), but that he had lived at Palanganayoq rent-free for several months after his work with the animals was done. A *comunero* from Ccachín's *anexo* Qochayoq went to military authorities in Amparaes with a *denuncio* after he was severely beaten by men from the neighboring village of Qelkanka in a dispute over land in Platería. About twenty soldiers subsequently visited Qochayoq and Qelkanka to gather information and make their presence felt. The *campesinos* were not the only ones to take advantage of the military presence to advance their own interests. At one of the general assemblies, the director of the high school in Ccachín threatened to present military authorities with a list of all the young men eligible to attend school that were not enrolled, suggesting that if they didn't want to get their education in Ccachín, they would get it in the army.

- Military officials used their position to obtain special favors (I know of no parallel with the guerrillas). When one of the *comuneros* from Ccachín was playing music for the fiesta of the Virgin of Rosario in Choquecancha, the soldiers arrived. A lieutenant asked to see his identity card. He then requested

that the musician play for the troops. The *comunero* protested that he was being paid by the *carguyoq* of the Virgin and could not leave the gathering, but the lieutenant threatened him with twenty-four hour detention if he did not. He played for the soldiers, and cautioned me later that it's important to be *humilde* ('humble') in encounters with the military. At the same event, the lieutenant demanded that each of the *carguyoq* of the festival provide roast guinea pig for his troops.

- The soldiers intimidated people with their questioning. If they could do it credibly, *comuneros* feigned ignorance. The soldier's asked people if they had seen the *tiruku* when they passed through the village. People responded by saying "no." The questions were often more leading ("They slept in your house, didn't they?") or attempted to trick the *comuneros* into providing first-hand knowledge ("How many were there?" "How long did they stay in Ccachín?"). To the latter, people would answer that they didn't know any details because they never saw them, their family was living in the corn field at the time (it was the harvest season, and in some cases this was true, and in others not). In a few cases, physical abuse accompanied the questioning. We heard reports of apparently arbitrary detentions of *campesinos* and teachers occurring in nearby communities, especially in the Amparaes area where the soldiers were stationed. While these arrests contributed to the general climate of concern and fear, there were no arrests in Ccachín or its *anexos*.
- Both the military and the MRTA controlled the movement of people and passed judgement on who could and could not be in the area. The former checked official documents: *libretas electorales* ('electoral pass-books') and *libretas militares* ('record of military service'). Young men found without their papers in order were pressed into service as guides and porters by the soldiers. People assumed that those taken off would eventually be conscripted. The MRTA focused on ethnic dress rather than identity cards. They told the *comuneros* that they should not allow foreigners and outsiders into the community. *Comuneros*

dressed in western, *mestizo* dress or ponchos from other regions were asked to explain their presence in the village. Accordingly, a few men who had married into the community borrowed *pallay* ponchos from natives in order to avoid being singled out.

Formation of the Human Rights Committee

Assignment to the Human Rights Committee was not popular, and protests by nominees were stronger than usual when individuals were selected by the assembly. The first fellow named (the previous secretary of the community) said that he couldn't accept because he didn't have the experience or skills for such an important assignment. The second (the previous president) said the same. When the third nominee likewise declined, groans swept through the assembly. The head teacher of the school stood up and said that the committee needed to be better organized, with a president, secretary, etc, and that it needed to include former and present community officials. A fourth nominee was added and the assembly voted to assign them offices, the highest vote-getter becoming president, the next vice-president, and so on down the line. *Vocales* were then added, and the priest suggested that the head catechist be named to the committee to serve as the liaison with the Salesians. He likewise objected, but ultimately was convinced to serve.

About six weeks latter, a representative from one of the *campesino* federations came to Ccachín and asked the *asamblea* to send ten delegates to an upcoming conference on human rights in Calca. Volunteers were called for, but no one stepped forward. Hoping to inspire action through friendly competition, the federation representative then talked about how much better the committee was organized in Choquecancha than in Ccachín (he neglected to mention, however, that the *sanitario* in Choquecancha was secretary of the human rights committee of the Federation of *Campesinos* for the province, which helps explain the difference). He told the assembly that all of the transportation, food, and lodging of the delegates would be paid for by the federation. The director of the high school then spoke up. He said that the issue was so important that he would send three delegates from the school. He said that outsiders were deceiving the commu-

nity and that "They come and take more than they give. They expect to eat pig and guinea pig. . . . They get drunk with community officials and make empty promises." He cited the case of the road to the village, and predicted that it would never materialize. The teacher said that he was speaking from the heart because he was the son of a *campesino* (his speech, however, was in Spanish). Turning his attention specifically to human rights, he reminded *comuneros* of what happened when the soldiers passed through the Qochayoq. After they found some empty rifle shell casings, they threw community leaders into the creek to make them talk. The soldiers took sheep and pigs to eat without paying for them, and before they left, they forced the president of the *anexo* to sign a document saying that the troops had passed through the community without problem and without abuses. Ultimately, seven *comuneros* (members of the human rights committee and *junta directiva*) were selected to accompany the three high school students to the meeting. I found out later, however, that no one went. The president of the human rights committee was never informed that he had been selected as a delegate. The secretary of the committee knew, but from past experience, also knew that the *campesinos* are always told that such trips will be subsidized, and that the promised aid never materializes. He couldn't afford the trip and didn't have the time to go. The meeting was scheduled for the busiest time of the year, with people planting their corn fields and plowing or weeding their potatoes, and no one could spare the time. A list of delegates was put together to satisfy the agenda of an outside official, but nothing more came of it. Perhaps the delegates were named and assented with this tacit understanding. Perhaps other things came up and their intentions changed.

The one act that the committee did contemplate while I was in Ccachín was a fax to the parish in Germany about the lack of agricultural credit for the *campesinos* and about the educational setback for Ccachín's youth caused by the recently concluded teacher's strike. The treasurer of the committee complained to me that the committee president didn't have children and didn't worry sufficiently about the second problem, but the director of the high school was willing to help draft the letter, recommending that the government pay the teachers their due to avoid more lost time.[18] These issues were

beyond the capacity of the German group to affect, but they were of immediate concern in the community, and they were described by the priest as human rights issues. Focusing on "human rights" in this larger sense was undoubtably safer and more comfortable for the committee than addressing grievances with the military, as soldiers were still stationed in the area.[19]

Anniversary Committee

The Anniversary Committee is charged with organizing the festivities for the anniversary of the official recognition of Ccachín as a *comunidad campesina* on November 28th, 1966. The celebration has been an annual event since the early 1980s. Members are selected by the *asamblea general* a month before the anniversary and the committee disbands after the event. The committee organizes a *serenata* ('serenade') on the vigil on the anniversary, and a dance competition, invitational soccer tournament, and community feast on the day of the event (see ritual calendar, Appendix 4 for further description).

As far as I could tell, there is no set criteria for selection, other than the expectation that committee members will do a good job. In 1990, the president of the committee was a man who had been named to serve as a *barrio de varayoq* for the coming year, and other committee members had substantial community service records as well. By oversight, however, the committee neglected to issue a formal invitation to the school, and the head teacher did not organize the school children to participate. He blamed the problem on the president of the committee, who he described as an *analfabeto* ('illiterate'). The high school students, on the other hand, were invited and contributed a lot of energy to the event. The hard feelings of the primary school principal were probably exasperated by competition between the directors of the primary and secondary schools. In 1991, the assembly selected young, schooled, and worldly men who had not yet held community offices. After having *comuneros* tease me for the better part of the year about taking on a *cargo*, the assembly chose me to be treasurer of the committee, saying that it was the easiest job of all — "all you have to do is count the money!"[20]

Considerable expense is involved in purchasing the prizes awarded for the dance competition and soccer tournament and in buying the food served by the committee. The principal income for the festival comes from fines for *daños* in the fields.[21] From my experience as participant-observer, being treasurer wasn't easy. Not only does the treasurer keep track of income and expenses, the treasurer is given the keys to the corral and is responsible for collecting the fines from those whose animals have been caught damaging people's fields — a thankless and conflict-filled task. Management of the corral was beyond my abilities, and the secretary assumed the chore in exchange for my typing all of the letters inviting community clubs and dignitaries to participate. Committee members impressed upon me that we needed to prove out capabilities to the community ("*Tenemos que mostrar*"), and I took it that they considered this to be a test, a showcase, and a catapult to other community positions and honors.

Since the bulk of the committee's time leading up to the anniversary goes into rounding up stray animals, participation on the committee provided me with a good vantage point to observe the collection of damages in the community. The anniversary falls at the start of the rainy season, soon after the planting of the potato and corn sectors, a time of critical importance for the community to have an effective means of controlling damage by the animals. Given the immediacy of their need to raise funds, members of the anniversary committee approach the task of patrolling the fields with a much stronger motivation than the *varayoq*, who normally have responsibility for the task, and their coverage of the community is more comprehensive and persistent. The *varayoq* do not usually patrol the fields but rather respond to individual complaints and receive animals captured and brought to them by irrate *comuneros* who have suffered damage to their crops.

The morning after the committee was constituted, members arose hours before sunrise to drive all of the pigs out of Pampallaqta, a nearby fallow sector from which they had been banned. While the prohibition against pigs in Pampallaqta was long-standing and based on the *comuneros*' fear that the pigs spread potato blight with their rooting (through their "*aire*" — 'air', 'saliva'), the day before we arrived, at least eighty animals

were counted in the sector. There had been even more, but anticipating the formation of the committee at the assembly, people had begun to relocate their animals to other areas. With the benefit of a full moon, the majority of people were able to get their pigs out of the sector before we arrived. At 4:00 AM, I encountered one of my *comadres* in route to retrieve her two pigs, but my companions on the committee beat her to it, resulting in a 5,000,000 *intis* ($5.00) fine. All told, we captured twenty-two pigs in the sector, drove them the forty-five minute walk to the village, and locked them in the corral. Many (including my host family) told me privately that they intended to take their animals to Pampallaqta again when the committee's work was done, aware that the ban was unenforced most of the year. There are few areas where one can legitimately pasture the pigs, and they don't grow well on the scraps, refuse, and excrement they live on when pastured in the streets. The committee discussed strategies for getting the most animals in one fell swoop. While we knew that about thirty cows and horses regularly crossed over into Ccachín's cornfields from Choquecancha, the day we went to capture them, there were only three, leading the committee to decide to leave them alone and return another day, maintaining the element of surprise to bolster revenues. Knowing that people are less careful — or have more constrained labor options — in caring for their herds on days of community work parties and on *Todos los Santos* ('All Saints Day'), the committee scheduled roundups for these days. In this way, the committee aggressively served it's mandate, contributing to a recognized public good (there were at least two involved: the reduction of risk to everyone's crops, and a public celebration) while causing a certain amount of private anguish.

The committee was diligent in its task, but it was not merciless, and it was not all-together even-handed. When I caught *DC* with a pig and four piglets in Pachawala, she begged that I let them go, saying that she was only there for the day, she didn't make a practice of going there, and I could do better by catching the other three troops of pigs she pointed out below. She was clearly upset, and when she started to escape with her pigs, the president of the committee advised me to let her go. One day the twelve-year-old daughter of my hosts came home to report that someone on the committee had captured

one of the sheep she had been herding that had strayed into a corn field, but she cried until he let the animal go. Everyone on the committee encountered excuses and everyone had different ways of dealing with them, but to avoid confrontation, most animals were let go without a penalty if the owners could retrieve them before they could be closed into the corral. One of the biggest complaints was that committee members showed favoritism by providing inside information to family members so that they could avoid a fine. Several *comuneros* grumbled that they had to pay fines when the families of committee members, who grazed their animals in prohibited areas right alongside everyone else's, were tipped off and removed their animals from a sector to be raided while the rest got caught.

Another complaint was that the information about which sectors were closed to *daño* was not known to all. The decisions of the *asamblea general* were not posted, and word of mouth was not always sufficient, so if one missed a meeting, one might not know. Ignorance did not exempt one from the rules, but when the rationale for a rule strayed too far from common knowledge, common sense, or consensus, the rule was more frequently violated and was more difficult to enforce. The *comuneros* made careful assessments of the damage that different animals in cropped sectors could do, but their consensus broke down when it came to pasturing pigs in fallowed areas. There was wide agreement about the damage that animals could do in the corn, *lisa*, and potato fields, but much less about allowing pigs into the sectors nearest the village that were being allowed to rest. *Don AC*, for example, had been grazing his pigs near the cornfields, but when that sector was closed to the animals, he moved them to Pachawala which was uncultivated for fear that they would otherwise break in and destroy someone's corn. Despite his best intentions, he was fined anyway, and he considered it unfair. He argued that the committee should focus on real damages rather than hypothetical ones (he did not consider his pigs to be doing any damage since there were no crops), and considered it unfair that Pachawala was targeted when the day before fifteen cattle were in Ankawachana eating the emerging bunch grass and doing far more damage (to resources reserved for construction) than his pigs.

To organize the festivities, the committee met frequently and reached decisions by informal consensus. Meetings started late, lots of time was spent on trivial details, and important items were overlooked — not unlike many informally structured work-groups in the United States. Still, at critical moments, enough got done that the celebration was later considered to be among the best by community standards.[22] Several small crises, however, emerged during the course of the committee's work. The first was more of a personal crisis for me than a group one, because most of the committee never knew about it. The question was whether to disclose what I knew. When it came time to purchase the awards for the soccer tournament, the person authorized by the committee to do so did a price comparison of soccer balls in all of the stalls in Calca, bought the cheapest, and then persuaded the shop owner to write out the receipt at the highest price offered by his competitors for the same item. The committee member pocketed the difference. The amount was not much, and I suspect that others on the committee would have been tempted to do the same had they been in a similar position (he justified it as a perk for doing all the legwork, and the ease with which the storekeeper agreed to falsify the receipt suggests that it was common practice). But it clearly was a deception, and he was aware that it would have caused an uproar had the rest of the committee found out. I opted for the role of outside observer over inside accountant, and decided not say a thing.[23]

The second crisis occurred at the soccer tournament. Sometime during the event, the secretary of the committee reported that he had lost 5,700,000 *intis* (about 5% of the committee's total income). He said that the money had fallen out of his pocket (the story was believable, because I had heard of it happening to others under less suspicious circumstances). The committee took his word on the matter, but pressured him to make up the loss out of his own funds. He did not have the money (equivalent to about three day's labor) and wanted the committee to absorb the loss. He did not want the news to go beyond the committee, because he feared that if the loss was reported to the *asamblea general*, people would think that he pocketed the money. Since he did not repay the loss, the committee reported it in its final account to the assembly, and he was asked to explain

what happened by the head teacher. The assembly accepted his explanation, and determined that since the money was lost "during service to the community," it need not be repaid (the fact that the committee's accounts were in the black and that the committee turned over the net proceeds of its work to the assembly undoubtedly influenced this decision).

The third crisis was likewise related to money. On one occasion, when the community president needed to travel, there were no funds in the community treasury, and he was given a loan out of the anniversary committee proceeds, with the promise that he would repay. The loan basically represented the movement of money from one community account to another, but since funds are earned by and earmarked for the work of the respective committees, it was taken seriously. In this case, the threat of taking the problem to the community had an effect, and the president repaid the loan on the morning of the *asamblea general.*

The committee was so successful in its fund-raising endeavors in 1991 that it raised $27 more than it spent. Committee members wanted to use the money to buy something for the community and generated several ideas — a flag of Tawantinsuyo, a Peruvian flag with shield (one of the community's two had been lost), a *Petromax* kerosene lantern (they feared, however, that it would break), or a typewriter (it cost too much) — as they felt that it was better to purchase something for the community rather than turn the money over to the *junta directiva.* They didn't want the funds to get used up in administrative functions. However, no one was able to make the purchase before the next *asamblea general,* so ultimately, the committee gave the money to the community. The *teniente gobernador* spoke at the assembly and thanked the committee, saying that in past years the committee didn't operate this way, and that any money that was left simply disappeared. He supposed that if previous committees had any surplus, they drank it up. The assembly thanked me for my service and for my "guidance" of the committee, but other than taking it upon myself to prepare a final income and expense report, other committee members took the initiative, did all the critical tasks, and guided me along the way. The celebration itself was similar to those of other years. The other committee

members were responsible for generating a surplus, not me. The ultimate honor for me would be to say that my presence had no effect whatsoever, that is, that I totally fit in. Such was not the case though, and most likely, the accountability of the committee internally and before the general assembly was heightened by my presence.

Civic and Cultural Associations

In addition to the standing committees and special committees accountable to the *asamblea general*, there are a variety of independent common-interest associations in Ccachín. These include both civic and cultural associations (Table 8.5). Each group serves the interests of its membership and elects its own leadership.

The membership of the Merchants' Association of Yerbabuenayoq includes *comuneros* of Ccachín, *comuneros* of Choquecancha, and immigrants from Calca and other market towns who do not have membership rights in either community. Unlike other *anexos*, Yerbabuenayoq is not formally integrated into Ccachín's political structure, and the merchant's group is the principal organizational force in the neighborhood. Like the *asambleas* in other *anexos*, the association coordinates the activities of its members, resolves conflicts, maintains a chapel, improves the street, and initiates public works. One of its principal goals during my time in the community was the installation of a system of potable water in the neighborhood, and it organized *kermesses* in Yerbabuenayoq to purchase the materials. The association likewise contributes to community projects that benefit its members. When the *Padres de Familia del Colegio* in Ccachín held a *kermesse* to raise funds for the construction of a new high school, the Merchants' Association contributed 11,150,000 *intis* ($35) to the endeavor, about 745,000 *intis* from each of its thirteen members. The donation was solicited by *kermesse* organizers, but the association's contribution was not mandatory (in contrast, *comuneros* were taxed), and may be seen as a pragmatic good-will gesture on the part of the merchants, who are dependent on the *comunidad campesina* for use rights to the land where they have their shops and on community members for clientele, as well as a recognition that their children would benefit.

The dance clubs, musical groups, and soccer teams provide an opportunity for members to pursue participatory interests in dance, music, and sport, while at the same time contributing to the public good — deepening the religious experience on saints' days and providing entertainment at more secular community events. All three types of groups are partially supported by *padrinos* — benefactors they approach for the purchase of equipment or some other collaboration. At a *kermesse*, I and others would be asked to buy a round of *chicha* for a soccer team, the drink going to the players and the money going to the community for whatever particular fund-raising event was being sponsored. There are more costly *cargos*: the director of USE, for example, was invited to serve as a *padrino* for the soccer team sponsored by the high school, and he provided uniforms for all the players. Besides self-financing by individual members and collective sponsorship by benefactors, the services of the dance and music groups are available for hire, and they are contracted by the local *carguyoq* for religious feasts and pilgrimages and by the *carguyoq* of neighboring communities to participate in other area feasts. With the progressive folklorization of traditional music and dance, *concursos* ('contests', 'competitions') are emerging alongside religious expression as a significant motivational factor in the formation of these groups. Trophies and prizes are given to induce participation, refocusing and reinforcing the status competition that to some extent undergirds public performance even in traditional religious contexts.

The expression, identification, and recreation values that these cultural groups provide for the community are not the only public goods generated by them. The institutionalization of the clubs and competition between them for recognition has fostered the production of public works as well. In 1983, the soccer team *Tiriqway* organized the first celebration of the anniversary of the community as a *comunidad campesina*. In 1991, the two principal dance groups, *Qhapaq Qolla* and *K'achampa*, were both engaged in the construction of chapels on opposite hillsides of the village to house the icons ("*láminas*") they carried on the pilgrimage of *Qoyllur Rit'i*. Competition between the groups intensified the energy that members put into construction, as each raced to be the first to inaugurate its chapel. At the same time, competition improved the

quality of the design and increased the investment in materials (especially roofing) as each group vied to produce a more spectacular work than the other. The degree of public access to these works is limited, as they were to serve as much as club houses for the two dance groups as shrines, but it's evident that the joining of private and public interests in this instance facilitated their production.

In any case, the problem of collective goods production in the construction of the chapels was not eliminated but redefined by decreasing the relevant group size from the community level to the club (the dance groups had between fifteen and thirty members each). The large group problem was reduced to a small group problem, but each dance group still had to deal with its own internal challenges of labor recruitment and of an equitable sharing of the work load. Because of their small size, however, the clubs have advantages in ease of exclusion, feedback, and accountability in enforcing collective decisions that the community-as-a-whole does not.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. The district of Lares was added to the list of *zonas de emergencia* in August 1991. The emergency status continued through the rest of year, and was still in vigor when I left the community in early 1992.

2. I refer to this as *informal* consensus, to distinguish it from more formal processes where checks for objections are structured in the discussion and where the final consensus is explicitly stated and agreement affirmed (see Auvine et. al. 1981; Butler and Rothstein 1991 for discussion). Formal procedures are intended to increase participation and reduce ambiguity, but as with formal decision aids of all types (individual or collective), they require skill and intense effort, and they tend to be used as a last resort in resolving problems in decision making.

3. Selection of the leadership of special committees varies in format and formality from committee to committee and from year to year. Candidates may be nominated and majority vote taken for each position, or a single name may be advanced and approved without objection or opposition. In the election of the *Padres de Familia de la Escuela* in 1990, a somewhat intermediate form was used. The first person nominated for president of the committee was already a candidate for secretary on one of the slates for the *junta directiva*, and once this was pointed out, his name was withdrawn. The second person named refused the nomination. Once acceptable nominations were forthcoming, the election proceeded with the loser of the presidential vote automatically becoming vice-president, the loser of the vote for secretary automatically becoming treasurer, and the losers for the positions of *vocal* automatically becoming *tenientes escolares*. Given no organized factions representing differences in how a particular institution should be run, emphasis seems to be on recruiting people to fill the positions, rather than on representing competing interests (we might note, however, that if there were voting blocks, this procedure would assure that they were all represented).

4. On election day, people are nominated to head five electoral tables and their names are accepted until all positions are filled and as long as there is no objection. In 1990, for example, people raised objections to nominees that were candidates for office or who were "*castigado*" ('castigated') by the community. After discussion, these names were thrown out.

5. Those who are not registered as members of the *comunidad campesina* — school teachers, the local health official, businessmen in Yerbabuenayoq — cannot vote and do not appear to influence the results. Nevertheless, their presence is felt. On the morning of the general election in 1990, the principal of the school approached the assembly at the *salón comunal* and lectured the *comuneros* on the importance of choosing good officials. He then requested that elections for the *Padres de Familia*

de la Escuela be done before voting for the *Junta Directiva* begin. Some *comuneros* proposed an alternative date for the election of the school board, but he insisted that it be done at the moment, when there was a large crowd, as he didn't want the new board selected at a poorly attended assembly. The Book of Acts for the school was fetched by another teacher, the elections held, and the teachers left the meeting. Still, they succeeded in pushing their issues to the agenda before that of others, disrupting the flow of the meeting in the process.

6. *Comuneros* from Ccachín are not the only members of the Pan de Azucar *Comité*. The principal of the school until 1991 and thereafter district director, a teacher from Calca, through his association with members of the committee, has also established a herd at Pan de Azucar. It is hard to say what influence, if any, his association with the group had on the entitlement process. When the engineers from the *Ministerio de Agricultura* visited Ccachín, they were supposed to go to accompany community officials to Pan de Azucar itself, but guerrillas of the *Movimiento Revolucionario "Túpac Amaru"* (MRTA) had recently passed through Pan de Azucar and they refused to go.

7. The mass started late because the confessions of the matrimonial pair and their *padrinos*, which preceded the mass, took longer than expected. When asked what sin was, the bride and groom gave the example of "when a man 'looks' at a woman, or when a woman 'looks' at a man." The priest, *Padre PS*, refocused the concept for them to emphasize sins against the community rather than sins of the flesh. Given what he considered to be a general confusion about what sin was, he addressed the topic in the sermon as well. At the mass, he described as sins the failure to participate in community assemblies, work parties, the *Club de Madres*, and the *Padres de Familia*, causing brush fires out of carelessness, or otherwise destroying communal resources, and unjust repartition of agricultural lands by community officials. By doing so, he conjoined the moral authority of the church with local notions of right and wrong. *Padre PS* emphasized that "offenses against the community are offenses against God, they cannot be separated."

8. Not long after the suspect dealings became known, the *fiscal* announced that he was leaving the community to live in Arequipa for a few years. How much the criticism and corresponding erosion of his reputation had to do with his decision I don't know, but temporary or permanent migration away from the community appears to be a common response by *comuneros* to such problems. According to some of his relatives, it was unclear that the fellow would leave the community at all. According to these sources, his resignation had more to do more with the internal problems of the *junta directiva* than it had to do with an intent to travel.

9. A few *comuneros* told me that the president of the community is responsible for the boundary inspection, but the *teniente gobernador* indicated that it is not the president who calls for *deslinde* (as one might expect from the *Ley General de Comunidades*

Campesinas and *Ley de Deslinde and Titulación*), but the *Inca Alcalde*, as it has always been. It appears to be one of those areas where there is some ambiguity about the respective domains of traditional and elected authority.

10. Seibold (1990:57-58) notes that in neighboring Choquecancha, the *Club de Madres* has historically been controlled by the *sanitario* and the director of the school, with officers having little real power. She indicates, however, that there are signs that things are changing, and that women are beginning to use the women's assemblies to organize action in their own interest (it's becoming "a mirror of the men's assemblies," as she puts it). I would not say the same of the group in Ccachín. In general, as Knox-Seith (1995:83) notes, it appears that meetings are sporadic, and that most are poorly attended. The number of members present would not be so important if there were an activist core (the dance groups, for example, are more vital with fewer members), but the club has been largely limited to filling roles and meeting goals assigned by others.

11. I have emphasized the dominant role that men play in this formally female domain, and I'm embarrassed to report that I served as proxy, and accepted the gratitude, for Barbara as well. On both ends of the exchange, the matter was out of the hands of the women directly involved.

12. The food for the *Vaso de Leche* Program comes from three sources: the Catholic parish in Calca, the mayoralty of Lares (which distributes its allotment from the national *Vaso de Leche* program at the district level), and *Cáritas* ('Catholic Relief Services').

13. From a western woman's perspective, Allen describes her experience with the assemblies in another Andean community this way:

> The women regularly sat too far away from the men to hear well, much less participate in the proceedings. My suggestions that we sit closer were met with refusals — the sun was too hot over there, or quite bluntly, they were scared. Women seldom spoke unless the discussion concerned them directly, and then there was an uncomfortable scene. Men did not like having women enter the public forum, and the women did not like entering it. [Allen 1988:120]

By way of comparison, many men in Ccachín are intimidated in a public forum, and rarely if ever speak at the *asambleas* either (over the course of a year, some women speak more than some men). While sheer number assures that men feel more comfortable than women in the assemblies, it's important to emphasize that they don't all participate to the same degree. As Allen puts it, assemblies are the province of "vigorous males."

14. The *comuneros* tended to described both guerrillas and soldiers to me in human rather than political terms. They were struck by how young the *tupaqamaristas* were, how restless, tired, and scared they were, and how sad one looked. Likewise, members of my host family felt sorry for soldiers who stood guard in a hailstorm, or who had to fetch firewood in the rain only to find that it was too wet to light to keep them warm. My host family will long remember that the rain poncho given *Don HS* as a gift by Kathleen McConnell, a visitor from Canada (McConnell 1986), was borrowed by an officer when troops passed through Palanganayoq in 1991, with the unfulfilled promise that it would be returned.

15. Under directive from superiors in Calca, the soldiers were prohibited from going to the school so as not to frighten the students (this went far to ease the fears of the teachers as well). They honored this, and did not use the school for shelter.

16. Women told me that they carried food to the guerrillas at their command station in the central plaza (and after the rains came, at the *salón comunal*) in hope that the guerrillas would refrain from going door-to-door to their homes.

17. The *comuneros* reported that the primary truckers, *Señora ES* and her husband *LM*, were good people. They didn't overcharge for their goods and they paid a fair price for produce. On the other hand, they complained about the mayor of Lares for his absence from the community and for not doing anything for the people, and about his wife for overcharging passengers on their truck.

18. The 1991 teachers' strike lasted 115 days. The teachers didn't arrive in Ccachín until August 26th, although the scheduled school year was from April to December. Thereafter, despite twenty-four hour per week appointments, they worked thirty hour weeks (in principle at least) to make up for lost time. They were prohibited from engaging in extra- curricular activities (e.g., sports and agricultural production), so that their teaching energies would not be deflected. According to the teachers, the government did not keep its side of the bargain in ending the strike. After an August increase, salaries returned to their June level. Likewise, although rural teachers were supposed to receive 50% more than their urban colleagues to cover their additional hardships and expenses, they never received it.

19. A local representative of the *Federación Departmental de Campesinos del Cusco* told me that the human rights committees of the local communities could not function as long as the area was a *zona de emergencia*. I don't know, however, whether he meant this in a practical or a legal sense, or both. He didn't see it as a major problem, as the human rights committee of the federation continued to function at a departmental level, but it's clear that the presence of the military itself constrained *campesinos* from reporting abuses to other authorities. It should also be noted that some members of the committee had been drafted and served as soldiers in their youth.

20. My name had come up one other time during a nomination process — for a fund-raising committee for the school — but villagers laughed at the suggestion and didn't act upon it. On another occasion, a *comunero* — chosen to be the next *carguyoq* for the Virgin of Guadalupe — told me about a dream he had the night he was chosen in which I was named the *carguyoq* instead of him. People who heard him telling the story referred to me as "*recipiente*" ('recipient') for the rest of the festivities, but the cargo was never passed on to me. After being named treasurer of the Anniversary Committee, several men addressed me as "*comunero*," in honor of my finally taking on a community position.

21. For the 25th Anniversary, the committee set a goal of raising 100,000,000 *intis* ($100), and surpassed it. The breakdown of income and expenses was as follows:

Expenses		Income	
Food	40,600,000 *i.*	Collection of fines	102,100,000 *i.*
Alcohol	8,000,000 *i.*	Soccer team entry fees	24,000,000 *i.*
Rental of lantern	2,700,000 *i.*		126,100,000 *i.*
Rental of oven	1,000,000 *i.*		
Music	12,000,000 *i.*	Conversion to dollars:	
Prizes	28,500,000 *i.*	1,000,000 *intis* = $1.00	
	92,800,000 *i.*		

22. The biggest complaints came from visitors from neighboring communities. The soccer team from Lares complained that dance competition started late, that the lines had not yet been chalked to mark the boundaries of the field, and that by the time all of this was done, the soccer championship would be set back (they had a point, as everything was running five hours behind the announced times, and they had a two hour hike to return home). The Lares team likewise recoiled at the team entry fee (about $3.00) that the committee asked for with a soccer ball as trophy, arguing that there should be no entry fee at all as this was an anniversary celebration, not a *kermesse* ('kermis', 'fundraiser'). After a heated discussion, during which the committee was chastised by the visitors for its poor organization, it was decided that the four visiting teams would play first at half the price with a lamb going to the champion, following by a tournament among the home teams for the ball.

23. Besides the ethical dilemma facing me as a participant observer, there was another factor involved in the way I resolved it. As noted in Chapter 6, sanctioning creates a public good, and it is difficult to explain in terms of rational choice when it entails person cost. In this case, the costs to me were both personal and professional. On the personal level, it would have caused bad feelings toward me on the part of the committee president and placed me at the forefront of a conflictive public scene. On the professional level, whatever prestige I might gain in the community from moral

impeccability would be outweighed by serving notice that I could not be trusted with a secret. The latter is not something anyone — much less an anthropologist — can take lightly.



Figure 8.1: The Mothers' Club Planting Seedlings in the Nursery

Table 8.1: Summary of the November 16, 1991 *Asamblea General* of Ccachín

I. Election of a *Director de Debates* to facilitate the meeting
- A. Of the three nominees proposed, a former president was selected

II. Petitions and Reports
- A. Report about missing documents of the *junta directiva* involving three former community presidents
- B. Solicitude from a *comunero* requesting that his son be given power over his affairs while he lived outside the community
  1. **Decision:** Approved
- C. Request for nails and glue for construction of a balcony to the church
  1. **Decision:** The timber already existed, and the labor was privately donated, but the assembly got hung up on the details of the donated labor, and it was not clear that any decision was reached
- D. Treasurer's report on repayment of a bank loan, repayment of the loan with funds borrowed from the school fund, and proposed sale of community thrashing machine to replenish the latter
  1. **Decision:** The *junta directiva* has permission to sell the thrashing machine, but *comuneros* want to keep the grain mill to make *chicha*
- E. Report by a *comunero* about a theft of construction materials on property granted him by the assembly at a previous meeting
  1. **Decision:** Original petition for three hectares was improperly made and there was a misunderstanding by the *comunero* that he had community approval to proceed (at the time he presented the petition, there were only twenty-three *comuneros* at the meeting, so it lacked a quorum). If he wanted to proceed with the building, he would have to submit a new petition to the assembly.
- F. Petition by a *comunero* from Qochayoq for help from the community in resolving a land dispute with Qelkanka in the Platería area
  1. Concern was expressed that this would cause strife between Ccachín and the neighboring community Qelkanka (at the same time that it was involved in a land dispute with Chupani). The original presenter of the petition was not present (his wife and other relatives spoke on his behalf), and action was deferred to a later meeting
- G. Resignations:
  1. Resignation of the *fiscal* to move to Arequipa
  2. Resignation of the second judge because of too many other community responsibilities (Catechist, *Vaso de Leche* Program, Human Rights Committee)
  3. **Decision:** Election of replacements was deferred until next meeting

III. Assessment of Fines and Quotas

A. Proposal to raise the fine for damage by cattle and horses in the *hatun papa* potato sector above current rate of 1,000,000 *intis* ($1.00)
   1. **Decision:** 5,000,000, 2,000,000, and 1,500,000 *intis* proposed, but agreement could not be reached and the rate was left as it was

B. Discussion of quota to be paid by each household for legal fees to gain a land title to the *pastizal* (puna pastures northwest of community).
   1. **Decision:** 10,000,000 *intis* ($10.00) per household rate set in April was left in force
   2. **Decision:** Committee formed to go door-to-door to collect money from those who had not yet contributed

IV. Scheduling of *Phayna*

A. Date set for work party to reinforce the wall around the potato sector so that livestock can't enter
   1. **Decision:** Only those who missed first *phayna* need attend

B. Date set for work party to build a shed alongside the church to protect the tractor from the rain

General Observations:

There were ninety-five men and twenty-five women present at the meeting. Since it took place during the time that Ccachín was in a *zona de emergencia*, permission to hold the meeting was obtained from the commander of the army base in Amparaes. Two votes were taken over the course of the meeting, the first to select a *Director de Debates*, the second to select among proposed dates for the *phayna* for the tractor shed (as it turns out, however, the *pututero* were not sent out the night before to remind people of the work party and it was not held). All of the other decisions made at the assembly were arrived at by consensus. This summary is based on my field notes rather than on the official Book of Acts.

Table 8.2: Administration of the *Comunidad Campesina*





Table 8.3: Municipal Council


Concejo de Indios
Alcalde de Menores
Teniente Alcalde
Secretario
Síndico de Ventas
Síndico de Gastos

Table 8.4: District, Religious, and Development Officials

District Officials in Ccachín



Religious Officials in Ccachín



Local Promotors of Regional Development Programs (Part-Time and Volunteers)





Table 8.5: Civic and Cultural Associations in Ccachín



Chapter 9

Rule-Enforcement Mechanisms

Introduction

A summary of the decision making and control mechanisms used at the institutional level in Ccachín can be found in Table 9.1. I have touched on some of these in previous chapters, and will elaborate on the rest here. In this chapter, I discuss the inclusion and exclusion rules for membership in the *comunidad campesina*, the tools used to enforcement community policies and decisions, and efforts taken by the community assembly to assure the accountability of their elected leaders.

My analytical concern is the role that sanctions play in maintaining commitment and cooperation. Since these sanctions are costly and burdensome to individual village members both from the standpoint of those who must carry them out and those that are on the receiving end, and because they are so often resisted, a question arises as to what extent small consensus-based groups are able to adopt and implement the measures needed to avoid tragedies of the commons and carry out public works.

Control and Enforcement Mechanisms

Membership

The rules for entry, exit, and membership standing in the *comunidad campesina* — "boundary rules" (Ostrom 1986a) — are managed through *empadronamiento* ('registry of community members'). The boundary rules for membership in the *comunidad campesina* are set by the *Ley General de Comunidades*, and the roll of members ("*padrón*") needs to be updated every two years (Casa Campesina "Domingo Cabrear Lartaún" 1990a).

There are two lists of registered members ("*empadronados*") in Ccachín. The first is a census of registered voters and is open to all men and women of voting age (the

padrón general). The second is a list of heads of household — male, except in the case of widows — used in determining communal tax and labor obligations and the usufruct of community lands (this list is referred to in Ccachín as "*la lista*"). Young people eighteen years old and older living at home are typically registered in the first list but not the second. Young unmarried cohabiting couples may or may not be listed as independent households, depending on whether or not they reside with parents, on their family circumstances, and on their preference. Though the obligations of community membership provide some disincentive to register, the opportunity for a newly formed family to receive and manage land is a strong incentive.

Members of the community who are or plan to be absent from the community to work can petition the general assembly to have their rights and obligations temporarily suspended until their return. Usually they will stay on the roll of voting members, but their name will be removed from the list of household heads. If a couple moves their family to Ocobamba or Yavero to homestead, for example, they will continue on the *padrón general* but will petition to have the husband's name removed from the list used to determine attendance at *phayna*. On the other hand, if the husband relocates to the Lares Valley but his wife and family stay in Ccachín, his name will continue on both lists. One of the agenda items for the general assembly in Table 8.1, for example, is a petition by an ex-president of the community to transfer his rights and obligations as household head to his son, with his oldest daughter having guardianship until the boy comes of age. Most of those who fail to vote in the community elections are listed on the *padrón general*, but do not actually live in the community. There is a fine to ensure that people vote, but absence from the community makes it difficult to collect. Similarly, many of the people listed as *faltados* ('absentees') at community work parties do not live in the community at the time, but continue on the work rolls. Other family members, especially older sons, may take their place, but households in such a position often find it hard to meet all their obligations. My impression is that households with the head male absent from the community are not as likely to meet as many of their labor obligations to the community as households with males who maintain a continued presence, and that

community officials are not as persistent in their sanctions of the work absences of the former as the latter.

Sometimes a given individual may have to meet the work requirements of two families. One of my *compadres*, for example, is responsible for two households, living with his wife and child part-time at the home of his widowed mother and part-time at the home of his mother-in-law (his relationship with my *comadre* is by cohabitation rather than marriage). While he is in his mid-twenties and has a family, he is listed as a voting member of the community but not as a head of household. As a widow, his mother is on the list of household heads, and as her youngest son, he must attend the *phayna* to fulfill her work obligations (her other sons are listed as household heads on their own, and have their own work to do). Although his mother-in-law lives in Ccachín, his father-in-law lives in the Lares Valley, and though absent from the community for many years, he continues to be listed as a head of household in Ccachín. All of my *comadre*'s older brothers likewise live outside of the community, so they are not able to work in their father's place. Consequently, my *compadre* must meet not only his mother's obligations to the community but his in-law's obligations as well. After beginning to live together with my *comadre*, my *compadre* considered applying for head of household status, but determined that it would put him in the position of having to provide community service for three households — his own, his mother's, and his mother-in-law's. As an alternative, in consultation with his family, he decided to petition the community to transfer his mother's position as head of household to him. Still, he would continue to do the work of two, while simultaneously attempting to finish high school.

Probation and Loss of Membership

According to Article 14 of the *Ley General de Campesinas*, the *asamblea general* can impose sanctions on those that are "abusive, that start fights and quarrels between *comuneros*, . . . on those that commit robberies, those who damage the crops, those that sell their land to outsiders, on those that appropriate land that doesn't belong to them, on those that don't attend communal work parties, that don't respect community authorities,

that don't fulfill the agreements of the assemblies, etc." (Casa Campesina "Domingo Cabrear Lartaún" 1990a:15). The most common sanction assessed by the General Assembly is a monetary fine. The most extreme sanction available to the Assembly is expulsion from the community.

I'm not aware of any instances where anyone has been permanently banished from Ccachín. Before my fieldwork, two young men were put on probation ("*desempadronado*") for a period of two years. The penalty is generally reserved for extreme cases of fighting and theft. While on probation, village members can continue to live in the community, work their land, and use village resources, but they lose their voting rights, eligibility for public office, and any other benefits to which they might otherwise be entitled. Their activities are scrutinized for good behavior during this period, and their attendance at work parties, fulfillment of special assignments, and public demeanor is expected to be exemplary.

As far as I'm aware, there was only one couple undergoing a probationary period while I was doing fieldwork. They were *desempadronado* by the *asamblea general* for a period of five years, from 1988 to 1992. If after five years the community was still dissatisfied with their behavior, the family could be expelled from Ccachín. The *comunero* and his wife were *desempadronado* for disputing the husband's share of his mother's inheritance, for attempts to appropriate community land, and for quarreling and fighting at community assemblies and *raymi* ('land distributions') over the issue. From the perspective of the majority of the community, the fellow was a malcontent and land grabber, from his own standpoint, a grave injustice had been done to him in the division of his mother's inheritance, and he felt that it had been compounded by the *desempadronamiento*. He continued to appeal both the loss of land and loss of membership rights throughout the probationary period.

The sanctioned *comunero* was a youngest child and half-orphaned. He was raised by a *padrino* in Chinchero. He returned to Ccachín as an adult only to discover that the bulk of his parent's inheritances had gone to his brothers and sisters. The fields in the potato and corn sectors that he felt were his due were donated to the school rather than

given to him. He continued to claim these fields, as well as those of a deceased sister, likewise donated to the school. He managed to become president of the *Padres de Familia del Colegio* despite a potential conflict of interest, but he was eventually replaced after his *desempadronamiento*.

The fields donated to the school were a constant source of conflict for the community, not only with the *comunero* and his family, who were "*en juicio*" ('in a lawsuit') with the community, but between the community, his brothers, and nephews as well. The family contended that the land had been loaned to the school, not given. At one assembly that I attended, a nephew of the *desempadronado*, who had recently returned from Cusco to reestablish himself in Ccachín, presented a petition requesting that the cornfield designated for the school be returned to his family so that he could work it. The assembly declined to accept the petition. The assembly's position was that the school had documents showing title to the land, that it had been granted for perpetuity, and that the community could not change that. If the family wanted to do so, it could present its request to the school. If for some reason some years down the road the school abandoned the land, the fields would revert to the community, and the family could then petition the assembly for their return. Villagers assumed that this was a remote possibility.

In the spring of 1990, word had it that the *comunero* in question had seeded some of the school potato lands. I'm not sure what the sanctioned *comunero*'s exact involvement was if any, but months later — about six weeks before the following potato harvest — the director of the school registered a complaint with community officials and with his superiors in Calca that the school's potato crop was being harvested by the descendants of the donor. The two plots in contention are used by the families involved to graze sheep during the years when the fields lie fallow and have herding cabins on them. Consequently, the plots are well fertilized by their animals, and the descendants maintain a proprietary interest in the land. The director of the school reached an agreement with two of the brothers of the *comunero* that if they provided the seeds and fertilizer, the plots would be worked *a medias* ('by halves'), with half of the crop going to the school and the

other half to the families. The division was to be made after the harvest. On both plots, however, the brothers and their families began to harvest the crop in March, rather than waiting until May when the *Padres de Familia* were to organize a work party to harvest the crop.

After the director of the school denounced the brothers' action, community officials called an emergency *phayna* to equalize the harvest. The *teniente gobernador*, along with all the officers of the *Padres de Familia de la Escuela* carefully measured the length and number of rows already harvested and sampled the average yield per plant for each field. From this, they determined that one of the brothers owed the school six *cargas* ('sackfuls') of potatoes, while the other owed five.[1] The first brother retrieved a few *cargas* from storage in the cabin, and the work party finished harvesting the plants in the corral, restoring four of the six. The brother agreed to repay the additional two *cargas* when the rest of the crop was harvested in May. The work party harvested a plot equivalent to that already taken from the second brother's field and determined that the five *cargas* obtained canceled the brother's debt to the community. The secretary of the *Padres de Familia* recorded the transaction for the archives maintained by the *teniente gobernador*, director of the school, and *Padres de Familia*, and the potatoes were taken to the church, separated according to variety, and offered for sale, with proceeds going to the school.[2]

Incidents such as these kept the conflict over lands deeded to the school before the eyes of everyone in the community, and hardly helped the image of the *comunero* during his probationary period. Nor did the fact that around the feast of Santiago in 1990, the *comunero*, his wife, and one of his sons attacked another man in the community. The victim was widely considered to be a troublemaker and believed to have murdered the cattle herder and his son at the *wakería* in Chanchiyoq in 1988, so many had mixed feelings about the attack (others from Ccachín were imprisoned for the crime). The victim suffered serious head injuries and had to be taken to the hospital in Calca. Ultimately, a provincial court ruled that the man's injuries resulted from his fall from a balcony while trying to avoid his attackers rather than from the attack itself, and the

attackers were not sentenced. The *varayoq* chose the *comunero* to be *compadre* for the Christmas ceremonies in 1990, which I interpret as a further test of character during his probationary period, and a reminder that if there is honor to being a *carguyoq*, there is still a *cargo* — a burden — as well. This double-edged aspect of religious *cargos* makes them handy in this context, both from the standpoint of the community, and for someone who needs to restore his standing in the eyes of his neighbors. The *comunero* and his family performed their *cargo* well, but they had a lot of ground to make up.

Fines

Fines for Shirking Obligations

The formal tool that the community has for enforcing attendance at community meetings and work parties is the application of a fine for those that are *faltado* ('absent').

A fine is applied for failure to vote for community officials in the biannual elections. In the election that I witnessed in 1990, attendance was very high. Most people who didn't vote were living outside the community and had not changed their voting registry. Few fines were collected. So little money was in the community treasury at the time of the election that the president of the electoral committee had to hike to Calca and pay his own way to Cusco to deliver the results.[3]

Generally, there are no penalties for failure to attend the *asamblea general*. A head count is taken, but not a roll call of those present. When attendance at an assembly is obligatory, the list of heads of households is used to assess fines. The election of the *comité electoral* and the selection of candidates to run for office in the *junta directiva* are among the special circumstances under which attendance at the assemblies is mandatory.

Fines are commonly used to assure attendance at work parties. After every *phayna*, the secretary of the *junta directiva*, the secretary of the *consejo de menores*, or the secretary of the committee or work group directing the *phayna* reads the roll call of *comuneros* obligated to attend. People's presence or absence is recorded in a notebook before all assembled, and this list is used to determine who needs to make up work or pay fines. The cost of the fine is set at an *asamblea general* and is usually project specific.

The fine for the major building project in 1989 — reroofing of the church — was 3000 *intis* (89¢) per day missed. At the assembly where the fine was determined, a vote was taken between 1000, 2000, and 3000 *intis*, and the higher amount won. All told, each *comunero* had to contribute fifty adobe block and six work days.

The next year, 1990, the major building project was construction of a new high school. Each *comunero* was expected to contribute one hundred adobe block and work on one of the construction teams. The fine for failure to attend a construction *phayna* for the school was 500,000 *intis* ($1.17). There were eight *phayna* for the school, so a *comunero* who missed all of them owed 8,000,000 *intis*. In some cases, individuals judged their other activities to be more pressing or lucrative than attendance. One of my *compadres* missed four *phayna* working as a porter on the Inca trail, but he earned four times as much per day working as a porter as he lost by his absence. Another missed all of the days because he was in Ocobamba trying to establish a homestead. The head of my host family missed six days because he was tending to his cattle herd.[4] The workers were divided into seven teams, each with a *capitán*, *secretario*, and *vocal*. The teams kept track of their own attendance and collected their own fines. Little money actually appears to have been collected, as absentees could make up their time, teams could decide that those who had worked more could rest to even the workload out, and the project was not completed, so that for most groups, a final reconciliation of accounts was not done. The destination of any money collected from the fines was left up to each team. The one group that talked to me about their intentions said that they planned to buy alcohol with the money as it was windy on the site where the school was being built and they needed it for *ánimo* ('spirit', 'fortitude') and to keep warm. The money was not predestined for the community treasury or for purchasing building materials for the school.

Most often, those that are absent from these work parties are not fined at all. For most ongoing projects, they are able to make the work up on another day. Sometimes, special work parties are called for absentees. Despite a general work party to fence off the *hatun papa* potato sector in P'alqa in 1991, for example, the crops suffered consider-

able animal damage and the general assembly decided that a second *phayna* was needed. Those who had attended the first were exempt from attending the second.

Fines are levied in cash rather than agricultural products, increasing their liquidity, but making them harder to collect. Collection is a difficult and thankless task, and a debt may drag on for months, or be forgiven or forgotten. Debts to the community may give one a bad reputation, but second order sanctioning is more difficult than first, and the community has few options if someone does not pay. If one owes a neighbor a few day's labor in *ayni*, it behooves one to make them up if one wants the cooperation of one's neighbor to continue into the future. The reciprocal nature of ongoing dyadic relationships makes them self-reinforcing. This is not the case with obligations to the community. Sizeable debts in time or money owed can be built up, and no particular individual has a vested interest in collecting them. As an ultimate resort, the assembly can place someone on probation — withdraw their *empadronado* status — but I am not aware of any instances where this sanction has been applied for failure to pay one's fines. Many absences from work parties fell between the cracks of the system. Organized efforts to sanction *faltados* were few, and the listing of absentees at work parties often lacked follow-up.

Fines for Setting Fires

Grass and timber fires are a problem in Ccachín during the dry season. Most of the blazes are the result of carelessness, fires set to cook food or clear land that get out of hand. The community attempts to discourage wildfires and recoup damages to forest resources through the assessment of fines. As with most sanctions, these fines are set by the general assembly. In 1991 the base rate was 500,000 *intis* (62¢) per hectare, with the understanding that this could be adjusted according to the damage done, degree of negligence, and other individual circumstances. After a rash of fires in July and August of 1991, the president of the community traveled to Cusco to inform the *Ministerio de Agricultura*. According to *comuneros*, the Peruvian government was the ultimate owner of the community's forest resources, and the *comunidad campesina* would have to pay a

fine to the Ministry of Agriculture for their destruction. They would also have to pay the costs of having government engineers come to the village to inspect the damage. A month later, two government engineers attended the *asamblea general* in Ccachín to help resolve the fire problem.

A hearing was held at the September assembly and judgements were brought against eighteen people, including one who set a fire eight years earlier. For each case, the person who set the fire was given a chance to explain to the assembly what happened, and testimony was added by others who had knowledge of the event. A tentative fine was calculated at the head table by community officials, and this was put before the defendant and the assembly for discussion, revision and consensus. The worst fire of the year was set by the *Inca Alcalde*-elect for 1992 (less than a month after his selection) in the sector known as Ankawachana. Apparently, he set a small fire to warm his *chicha* and drive away the *ch'uspi* ('small biting insects'), and it smoldered underground for a few days before resurfacing a few meters away. The fire destroyed 125 hectares, including forty-five wooded hectares and a sector of bunch grass set aside for building material. An emergency *phayna* had to be called to beat the fire out.[5] Privately, *comuneros* talked about the severity of the infraction and suggested that he should be fined up to three *toros* ('bulls') for the damage. The FAO-Holanda reforestation agent for the area reported that the *comunero* could receive up to three years imprisonment for the offense. At the assembly, however, perhaps out of solidarity with a native son in proceedings carried out under the watchful eyes of government engineers, perhaps out of recognition of the upcoming expense the fellow would have as *Inca alcalde*, and guided by the charitable penalty schedule that had been worked out (500,000 *intis*/hectare was only half the rate assessed for having one's cow or horse cause damage in the same sector), the *comunero* was fined a single bull for his negligence.

In another case, two boys playing with matches while herding destroyed eighteen to twenty-five hectares along the trail to Qochayoq, three of them wooded. Their parents were held responsible. The parents of one of the boys were *padrino* and *madrina* for a first-haircutting ceremony during the fiesta of Santiago. After a night of celebration and

drinking, they were too tired the next morning to prepare a lunch to send with their son to pasture the family's sheep. Instead, the mother gave her son matches to build a fire and boil some potatoes, which he did. The next day, the two boys returned to pasture their sheep in the same area and discovered that their *qoncha* ('hearth', 'fire pit') was still burning. In play, they decided to make torches from some dried grass, and the fire got away from them. The pasture was consumed by the blaze. Twenty-three of thirty sheep of one boy's flock were destroyed, twenty-four of the other's. The boys themselves almost lost their lives, but a *comunero* and his son were cutting wood nearby and rescued them. The son heard sheep bleating, and the pair went to investigate. The boy couldn't handle the dense smoke and stayed behind as his father entered the blaze. The *comunero* found the two young herders trapped and covered with smoke. He took the boys to the river and washed them up, and together they hiked back to Ccachín to report the incident. At the assembly, the community determined that the parents of one of the boys were not responsible. The family had suffered enough with the loss of their herd. The parents of the boy who had built the cook fire, however, were fined 12,500,000 ($12.50) for negligence. The feeling was that they should have never given the boy the matches. The hero of this affair later complained to me that he had lost a lot of time in the rescue and in the aftermath of paperwork, and that he was never compensated by either of the families for his efforts.[6]

After hearing a number of cases and judging that the penalties assigned by the assembly were inordinately light, the representative from the Ministry of Agriculture stood up and lectured the assembly about the seriousness of the problem. At the time, the community had just agreed to a fine a *comunero* 5,000,000 *intis* ($5.00) for burning about twenty hectares of community land. Using the case as an example, the engineer argued that ten times that amount would be more appropriate. Turning to the *comunero*, he asked him what he thought was fair. Taken aback by the figure suggested by the engineer, the *comunero* replied "15,000,000 *intis*." People laughed, and reminded their compatriot that he was only being assessed a third of that, and that being the case, it was better to keep quiet.

Generally, however, the comments of the government engineers were directed toward settling the cases, rather than toward settling them in any particular way. When all of the cases had been heard, the head engineer asked the assembly to set a time limit for payment of the fines. He suggested fifteen days. There were protests from those who had been fined. One said that he needed at least a month; another needed two. Upon hearing this, others grumbled. The feeling of the majority was that this was too long. Ultimately, the assembly decided to give the assessed families until the next assembly to pay, a period of twenty days. The October *asamblea general* was later canceled, however, because people had too much work to do in their fields, and the next general assembly was held two months later. At that meeting, the *junta directiva* reported that none of the fines had yet been paid. The assembly decided to turn the matter over to the *Ministerio de Agricultura*. When I left Ccachín a few months later, the payments were still pending.[7]

Fines for Animal Damage

Fines for *daño* ('animal damage') are set by the *asamblea general*, and are reconsidered occasionally to adjust for inflation. The readjustments take place when a new sector is closed to animals or when the community has a pressing need for money and the issue becomes critical, but the adjustments are infrequent and fail to keep up with inflation in the short term. Table 9.2 gives an idea of the variance in the severity of fines, as well as a comparison of the relative value of the fines for animal damage, fire damage, and failure to fulfill one's obligations to the community. Typically, the fines are highest when first set by the Assembly. The lowest values were recorded later, as the real value of the fines plummeted due to the declining value of the *inti* (see Variation in Exchange Rate and Consumer Price Index, Appendix 5 to better appreciate the problem). To take a single time slice, the fines for the new agricultural season were as follows when first set in October 1990:

- Cattle, horses — $1.00/day per head
- Pig — $2.50/day in cultivated fields
  $1.00/day for baby pigs and in certain fallowed areas where pigs are not allowed
- Sheep, goats — $.50 each

Immature animals were assessed at half the rate of adults. The rates above were for the first twenty-four hours only. If the *varayoq* or others delegated to manage the corral had to feed and water the animals, the rate was substantially higher. Cattle and horses, for example, were charged at $3.00/day/head, to compensate for the added labor. The money went into the community treasury, not to the individuals doing the work. Grazing animals were taken by day to the cemetery, where they could be locked in to browse between the graves. Ideally, all of the offending animals in a sector are captured and herded to the corral, but if a captor is short of help to drive them, one animal is lassoed and hauled away and the rest counted. In extreme cases, with animals that are repeat offenders, and when their owner makes no attempt to resolve the problem, *comuneros* can petition officials and receive approval to kill the animals when they trespass again.[8] In principle, the owner must pay for the total number of his animals trespassing in the field to get the one released, but insufficient evidence and the lack of animals in hand reduces the bargaining power of the community and makes this hard to enforce. Since enforcement is difficult in any case, people recognize that the community's need to collect money needs to be balanced with the ability of people to pay. If the fines are set too high, people will be less willing and able to pay, and there will be a lot of hard feelings with little additional money collected.

Animals may stray into a sector at any time during the growing season, but the most serious problems arise around the transition points — plantings and harvests — where labor is at a premium, and when established herding patterns are disrupted and adjusted. During a one-month period for which I have records — from mid-October to mid-November 1991 (just after the spring corn and potato plantings and the closing of these respective sectors) — forty *comuneros* were assessed $187 in fines on a total of 120

animals caught damaging the fields. Pigs (40%) and horses (40%) made up the bulk of animals caught, with cattle a distant third (15%). Unlike sheep and goats, all of these animals are left to graze unattended. At harvest, however, the percentage of cattle dramatically increases as people bring their animals from the cattle pastures in anticipation of the opening of the *maway papa* and corn sectors. Of the total amount of fines assessed, 55% were collected in cash and 8% were collected in goods (normally, goods are not accepted, but in this case, corn, meat, and prizes were needed for the community anniversary). In addition, 10% were backed by pawns held for later resale. The remaining 27% was lost in never paid IOUs (animals released without pawns) or reduction in the fines because of lack of funds or unwillingness to pay. 65% of the *comuneros* did not pay their debts immediately, but left pawns to get their animals out of the corral. Most later paid, but 27% never paid and never reclaimed their pawns. These statistics are drawn from the work of the Anniversary Committee, and the committee was more aggressive than the *varayoq* typically are in patrolling the fields and collecting fines.

While I don't have any data on what portion of the total amount of community income generated from animal damage is collected in the month that the anniversary committee is in charge, the corral is empty for most of the year, and based on the number of animals present in monthly spot checks, it seems likely that 50% or more of the total revenue from damage is collected by the committee. The number of animals caught, even under aggressive monitoring, represents but the tip of the iceberg of the total number of animals (or animal × days, a better measure) of animals encroaching on areas where they don't belong. The corral, fines, and delegation of authority to patrol the fields and collect the fines are a collective attempt to resolve incongruities between agriculture and pastoralism in a mixed peasant economy. The lack of capital and labor for extensive fencing necessitates open range foraging, and as McCorkle (1987) points out, the complex and spatially dispersed pattern of resource use and scheduling of cultivation and herding duties exacerbates the difficulties of integrating the two modes of production.

These same factors likewise constrain the community's attempts to limit damage through institutional means. The labor required to minimize animal damage to levels

comparable with stabling or fencing is beyond the capacity of the community to provide. Individual field owners have a strong incentive to patrol their own fields and do so when they are working in a particular sector, but they face the double task of controlling their own animals while guarding widely-scattered crops, and they can't be everywhere at once. A diffuse system of each-for-their-own would require more labor time than any household can employ. There are gains from cooperation. Because of their own subsistence needs, however, those delegated the job can only patrol part-time, and they are not materially compensated for doing so. The responsibility takes time and energy away from their own household production, while the benefits of their labor accrue to all.

The established system balances conflicting needs, but it only reduces — it does not eliminate — the risks. Consequently, at certain times of the year, there is an undercurrent of anger in the community, and accusations and arguments over animal damage break out with the slightest provocation at communal work parties and at assemblies. These public disputes put pressure on the *varayoq* — who otherwise tend to let their obligation to patrol the fields slide — to act. *Comuneros* in turn try to keep a step ahead of the movements of the *varayoq*, or when active, the Anniversary Committee, to avoid having their animals being caught. The control of animal damage is marked by the ebb and flow of energy around these sporadic roundups rather than the steadiness of daily pressure or a sense of public duty.

Pawns for Labor Owed

Prendas ('pawns', 'guarantees') are accepted as temporary substitute for the payment of fines. They are used to reinforce the payment of all kinds of fines. *Prenda* items are sometimes left with authorities in advance by *comuneros* who must be absent from a compulsory gathering but who intend to make their absence up. Generally, however, *prendas* are collected by going door-to-door to the homes of those who have failed to show up for a meeting or work party. Pawns and fines belong to whichever group is sponsoring an event — to the *junta directiva* in the case of a *yapuy* for the communal potato lands, to the *teniente gobernador* for the fencing of a newly-planted

sector, to the school when one misses a work party organized by the *Padres de Familia* — and each group organizes the collection of its own fines and *prendas*. A subcommittee for the task may be formed at a committee meeting or by the general assembly, or the *teniente gobernador* may send the *varayoq*.

Given the shortage of cash, the use of *prendas* to guarantee the payment of fines is ubiquitous. During the month that I served on the Anniversary Committee, for example, the committee received six carrying cloths, four ropes, three picks, three *lampas* ('re-curved, shovel-blade hoes'), three *lanzas* ('recurved, chisel-point hoes'), two machetes, an axe, a bridle, a poncho, and a woman's shawl. Most people pay their fines and retrieve their *prendas* at a later date. Some people, however, never pay off what they owe, and over the course of the year, the community collects a large number of unclaimed tools and textiles. Sporadically — sometimes a couple of times a year, sometimes years later, depending on the leadership — these items are auctioned off at community assemblies to raise funds. The starting bid is usually the original value of the fine an item represents. Most items are commonplace, however, and while the auctions generate conversation and curiosity, the goods do not fetch a good price.[9] Given the immediate need for cash, the Anniversary Committee that I was a part of first decided not to accept *prendas* at all, but within a few days found it pragmatic to take them. The recovery rate from *prendas* proved better than from IOUs and from adjusting fines to match individuals' ability or willingness to pay.

There were two problems with the *prenda* system in practice, one related to internal social dynamics, the other to macroeconomic change. First, individuals had an incentive to offer their oldest and most worn equipment as a guarantee that they would repay their debt, and they had a tendency to overestimate its value. Those collecting the debts were not hard-nosed about collecting high-quality items, perhaps to avoid conflict, perhaps out of good will; the convention seemed to be not to offer and not to seek any items essential to a household's subsistence or welfare. Thus, much of the urgency and some of the necessity of retrieving the items by paying the debt was lost. Second, since the recovery price of *prendas* was not adjusted for inflation, there was an incentive for

debtors to provide *prendas* even if they had the cash. With the high monetary rate of inflation during the period of the study (Appendix 5), the effective cost of fines (and accordingly, the potential community revenue) decreased the longer *comuneros* waited to repay them. A month or two could make a significant difference. Adjustment of the debt for inflation appeared to be beyond community standards of fairness and consensus, if not accounting abilities. Recordkeeping was sufficient to keep track of the ownership of *prendas* and fines over a period of years and the calculations were not insurmountable, but adjusting for inflation would compromise the simplicity and accessability of the system. One fellow who left the community at an early age to live in Cusco told me that the problem of *comuneros* taking advantage of the declining monetary value of fines — while the corresponding use value of their *prendas* continued to maintain itself — goes back at least thirty years. He reported that many who pay their fines with *prendas* have the money on hand to pay, but do not wish to part with it. People have learned to take advantage of the system, and there have not been any significant institutional adjustments to counter the problem.

Inventory to Pass On Responsibilities

There are three principal instances where some kind of inventory is conducted in the passing of responsibilities from one person to another: the examination of the saints and their clothing by the *mayordomos*, the check of the *pututu* and *varas* when they are rented and returned to their owners by the *varayoq*, and the itemizing of documents and equipment when they are passed between outgoing and incoming presidents of the community, judges, and other community officials. In all three situations, strict attention is paid to detail, and lists are maintained by both parties to the transaction. In all three, witnesses play a part. In keeping with the ceremonial character of the first two positions (i.e., in "*chaskichikuy*"), the inventories are ritually elaborate, for the last, however, they are not. I have already described the first two in Chapter 7, and will now give an example of the third.

In 1991, *Don AZ* went through and organized all of his belongings in advance of moving his family to Yavero. In so doing, he discovered that he still had some items dating from five years earlier when he was *teniente gobernador*. The items were lost, and he had forgotten about them. Upon delivery of the materials to the current *teniente gobernador*, it was discovered that three listed items were missing: a registry of the community members at the time, an unspecified fifteen-page document, and a rubber stamp saying "*Parcialidad de Ccachín*" used before Ccachín became a *comunidad campesina*. The items had historical value, but none of them had any current use. Still, the *teniente gobernador* told me that the loss of anything from the archives was a serious matter, and he had reported the loss to the *gobernador* in Calca. He said that if the items did not show up, the *ex-teniente* could face imprisonment for losing them. In this regard, he described the *comunero*'s pending move to the valley as "opportune." Curiously, among the items that were turned in were three *prendas* (two sickles and an unspecified tool) held in pawn for failure of some *comuneros* to complete their collective labor obligations. The *prendas* were collected in 1984, seven years earlier. The *teniente gobernador* was going to give their owners a chance to buy them back, and if they were not interested, he would auction them off in a public sale.[10]

Denouncements

A number of examples of *denuncios* ('denouncements') were given in the previous chapter. An anonymous *denuncio* was made of the theft of food and clothing at the *Club de Madres*. A *denuncio* was made by the Anniversary Committee when it discovered a cow with a suspicious brand. A *denuncio* was made of the unknown assailants who set fire to my host family's house. *Denuncios* are formal complaints and denouncements made by *comuneros* against their fellows: appeals to community authorities for help in investigating and resolving interpersonal problems, abuses of power, and breaches of the law. Most *denuncios* stay local. Other *denuncios* — as with the house fire — are forwarded to the *gobernador* in Lares or go to the *subprefecto* in Calca.

The following two examples further illustrate how *denuncios* work. The first case was initiated by Barbara and me in response to a theft, the second was sought by the *teniente gobernador* of the community after being attacked by his brother-in-law. In the case of the *denuncio* made by Barbara and me, we never signed anything and a written report was never entered into the recordbooks, so in technical terms, a formal *denuncio* was perhaps never made, but this is the case with many complaints brought to community authorities: the first recourse is verbal rather than written, and action is set into motion informally.

Barbara and I spent a year and a half in the community without anyone stealing anything from us. In August 1991, however, Cheyney Johansson, another anthropologist, visited Ccachín to meet a commitment to perform a first haircutting, and we asked one of our *compadres* to carry her bags up with ours by horseback from Yerbabuenayoq. All of our goods arrived intact, but when Cheyney unpacked, she discovered that her camera and some candies were missing. We confronted our *compadre* with the loss, and he blamed the theft on a neighbor boy who he had asked to carry the bags to our door while he took care of the horses. We were skeptical about the story, as from our experience and by reputation the boy was more trustworthy than our *compadre*, but without expressing our suspicions, we asked our *compadre* to look into it and try to get the camera back. At the same time, we talked to our *compadre*'s older brothers, who also happened to be our *compadres*, hoping that family pressures might be brought to bear.

The next day was our *compadre*'s birthday, and we put the incident aside and attended his party without confronting him further about the problem. The boy denied taking anything, and was perplexed and offended that our *compadre* should accuse him. We were at an impasse: time had passed, our distress was known, and the camera had not reappeared. We heard rumors from neighbors that our *compadre* had rummaged through the bags when he reached his house, and we found it suspicious that he did not deliver the bags to us in person, setting up the opportunity to finger another, but the only concrete thing we had to go by was the word of one against another. The next morning, we paid a visit to the *teniente gobernador*, and he offered to convene a hearing. He sent word to

our *compadre* and the boy via one of the *varayoq* that they should appear at a meeting that evening, and we contacted Cheyney so that she could present the complaint. That evening, we all met at the home of one of the *alguaciles*. The *teniente gobernador* officiated, aided by the *alguacil*. After listening to everyone's version of events, and without passing judgement on anyone's guilt or innocence, the *teniente gobernador* determined that the camera disappeared during our *compadre*'s watch, and he gave him twenty-four hours to search for it. If it could not be found, we would reconvene. The strategy worked. An hour before the time was up — in the midst of a first haircutting ceremony — we received the following note that the camera had been found:

> *Compadre Esteban*, I ask that you come urgently because he found the machine that they lost, your *compadre* had to lose his time, bring the owner as well, we'll give you more details of what happened. Thank you, your *comadre*.[11]

The way the *teniente gobernador* handled the case put pressure on our *compadre* to return the camera while giving him the slack to save face. Characteristically, the note from our *comadre* complains of the time lost on the affair, something that, as noted earlier, is typical of how the *comuneros* frame their aggravation with the proceedings in similar disputes with each other. The intermediary role played by our *comadre* in returning the missing item is also notable. Her intervention allowed our *compadre* to avoid facing us in the resolution of the affair.

To further illustrate the role that *denuncios* play in resolving conflict in Ccachín, the second *denuncio* I consider here involved Ccachín's *teniente gobernador* as a complainant rather than arbitrator. The *denuncio* was made in response to a physical attack on the *teniente* by a brother-in-law (his wife's brother, one of the alleged cattle thieves in the theft of *HZ*'s cow described earlier) while he was working in his potato field. Since he was the claimant, he could not handle the case in his capacity as *teniente gobernador*, and he hiked to Lares to present a *denuncio* to the *teniente gobernador* there. He did not want to press charges, nor see his brother-in-law penalized for the offense, for fear of causing problems in his relationship with his in-laws. Consequently, a document was drawn up by the *teniente gobernador* of Lares and served on the assailant warning

him not to do it again, and threatening him with a stiff punishment should he raise his hand to his brother-in-law.

Comuneros make *denuncios* to defend their interests — to go on record as the legitimate claimants, to deter further trespasses, or to seek recompense — when more informal sanctions are exhausted or found wanting. They often appear to be motivated by more expressive motivations as well, especially by wounded pride, outrage, and a desire for revenge. The financial costs, time expenditure, and in some cases, reluctance to intensify the conflict, constrain resort to the medium. In addition, one can run the risk that the tables will be turned and expenses will get out of hand as the accusers become the accused. In Chapter 8, I recounted the woes of a lad in Ccachín who had the fortune to get a stolen animal back, only to spend a fortune dealing with the repercussions. In another instance, Barbara and I loaned a *comunero* forty dollars to hire a lawyer and defend himself from an accusation of theft. By his account, a cattle rustler from the Lares Valley had stolen one of his cows. He made a *denuncio* and was able to recover it, but the alleged thief made a counter-charge against him, accusing the Ccachín man of stealing the cow from him in the first place. He claimed that by taking it, he was only recovering what was rightfully his.

The investigative capacity of local and regional officials is limited, and the outcome of *denuncios* uncertain. I don't know how often *denuncios* lead to the happy resolution of grievances for those that file them. While the *comuneros* have more experience and may be better able to estimate the probabilities of success, it seems likely that they use simplifying strategies in choosing among courses of action rather than directly calculating the subjective probabilities of outcomes. Given the uncertainty of outcome, the various types of grievances, and the costs involved, the decision of whether to use informal methods, to seek assistance and counsel from other family members, to go to ritual specialists (diviners, sorcerers, etc.) or to follow official institutional channels for legal remedy parallels the choices involved in seeking medical remedy, and we might hypothesize that some of the same heuristics are used: fixed strategies, ordered sequences, delegation, treatment by precedent, and the simultaneous use of several ap-

proaches in the hope that at least one will pay off (recall the discussion of Young and Mathews's work in Chapter 4). The interpersonal character of conflict, however, adds factors such as social distance (e.g., it seems that *comuneros* are more likely to seek help from extrahousehold experts the greater the social distance between the parties to the conflict) and the desire for emotional release (e.g., the expression of anger through the means employed) that play little role in medical decision making. As with medical treatment decisions, most such heuristics are grounded in the routinization of rational choice. Likewise, as in medical treatment, we can't discount that some degree of nonrational thinking is involved. I suspect that the readiness with which *comuneros* set their conflicts to paper — signing with a thumbprint, if they can not sign their name — is explainable in part by the fact that there is as much magic in the written word as there is in the *sanitario*'s injections.

Audit of Records

There generally is a strict *ajuste* ('settlement', 'accounting') of community funds in the presence of several people, but disagreements, misunderstandings and problems related to financial resources still arise. Sometimes, a general denouncement at the *Asamblea General* is made in hopes of applying sufficient pressure to resolve a problem. In August of 1990, for example, the community held a *kermesse* to raise funds for the construction of a new high school. The *Asamblea General* selected several *comuneros* to comprise the organizing committee for the event and assessed every household a contribution of 1,300,000 *intis* ($3.87) for the school. The committee was independent of the *Asociación de Padres de Familia del Colegio*, but the money they collected from fundraising was transferred to the *Padres de Familia*. Over a year later — in November of 1991 — the director of the high school complained to the *Asamblea* that he had not yet received all of the funds from the president of the *Padres de Familia* (the lapse in time can be explained in large part by an extended teachers' strike). I'm not sure what the total amount raised or the amount missing were, or if the recordkeeping was sufficient for all parties to agree on the figures; but I do know that at least $300 was collected, and that if

the community had met its fund-raising goals (it fell a significant amount short), it would have raised over $850 from the fundraiser and assessment. No specific action was taken to resolve the issue by the *Asamblea* at the time, and when I left the community three months later, the problem was still not resolved (whatever the amount, it would have lost 66% of its original value in that time).[12] It's clear that the *Asamblea* is an important forum for bringing such cases to public light, however, and that from there, behind the scenes social pressures can begin to hold sway.

Sometimes more formal action is taken. After hearing accusations of irregularities in the purchase of *Herrandina* machinery, for example, the *Asamblea* formed a financial review committee to look into the dealings of its own officers.

One of the principal expectations of the *junta directiva* in general and president of the community in particular is that they will bring in new technologies and initiate development projects for the community. In 1990, the president received a tractor for the community as an election year gift from APRA, the political party in power at the regional and national level (see Chapter 11). Perhaps in part because of this precedent, when technicians from *Herrandina* approached the succeeding *junta directiva* about purchasing a threshing machine and grain mill to increase agricultural productivity in the community, they found the new community leaders receptive to and willing to advocate for the idea.

According to *Herrandina* engineers, the equipment would provide the *campesinos* the ability and incentive to diversify production. As they explained to me, the diet in Ccachín lacked variety, being based almost entirely on potatoes and corn. At the same time, the fact that the community used a given potato sector once every seven years was an indication that the land was underutilized, and that production could be intensified by rotating wheat and other cereals with the potatoes. By their analysis, one of the principal reasons that grains are not grown in quantity is the amount of labor needed to clean the cereal. Their belief was that once community members saw what their machines could do, they would expand their cereal production.

From my perspective, the technicians were right that labor rather than land was the limiting factor, but shortsighted about the labor requirements and coordination problems involved. My informal polling of *comuneros* on why they did not already rotate grains with potatoes indicated that because of the risk of animal damage, they didn't think that it was worth the bother. As one person suggested, all one had to do is look at the amount of damage done by domestic stock in the *lisa chakra* that year to get an idea of the likely outcome. Another *comunero* assured me that yes, he would expand his wheat crop if the community had a threshing machine, but he would do it in the *sara chakra*, where it would be well-fenced in (this *comunero*'s annual harvest of wheat was around two *arrobas* — fifty pounds — already above the community-wide household average). Were he to have done this, his wheat crop would have been in competition with his corn crop for limited space, defeating the whole idea of intensifying production in the potato sector. I will revisit the issue in Chapter 11 for the evidence it reveals about decision making and coordination of tasks and labor in Ccachín. Here, I focus on the financial aspects of the assembly's decision to make the purchase.

The asking price for the threshing machine and mill was 80,000,000 *intis*, about $945 when the community first made the decision to buy them. A committee was formed to help organize a *kermesse* to pay for the equipment. Two *kermesse*'s were in fact held, one in Yerbabuenayoq, where the president of the organizing committee had a storefront, and the other in Ccachín itself.[13] Each household was assessed 5,000,000 *intis* ($5.70) to cover the purchase price and delivery costs. The equipment was brought to the community in time for a working demonstration before the *kermesse*, and then stored under lock and key in the church. *Herrandina* retained the motors until they were paid for in full.

Three weeks after the fundraiser, the *Herrandina* representative returned to Ccachín to collect the money and finalize the sale. The *kermesse* organizers and community officials had not been able to collect enough cash to meet the purchase price. A large, impromptu group of community leaders and concerned *comuneros* gathered with the *Herrandina* representative in the plaza. Meanwhile, the first *barrio de varayoq* and one of the judges went door-to-door to collect the assessment from all the families that

had failed to contribute to the fund the first time around. Some were home, some not, a few could pay, but most could not come up with the money on the spur of the moment. The additional money collected was counted in the plaza, but it still fell far short of what was needed. The *Herrandina* representative told the assembly that the longer they delayed, the more the price of the machines would go up, and that they would also need to cover his additional travel expenses, the gasoline provided with the equipment, and other purchase-related costs. He publicly chastised community officials for failure to collect the money, saying that they "*faltan pantelones*" ('they don't wear pants') and they "*faltan huevos*" ('they lack balls'), emasculating terms. He declined to accept the additional money that had been collected, saying that he did not want to be accused later of *aprovechando* ('gaining personally'), nor did he want to have anyone present claim that he had been paid in full when he had not. He set a deadline for two weeks hence — the day after the feast of *La Asunción* in Calca — for payment of the full amount directly in the offices of *Herrandina*.

With so little time, community officials had little recourse but to take out a bank loan from FINCOOP in Calca to make the deadline. The loan was reportedly for 1,100,000,000 *intis* ($1354.00) at an initial interest rate of 24% per month. Given the high rate of interest, community leaders hoped that they would be able to repay it within a month. The loan was intended to buy time to collect the assessments from community members. Two months latter, however, the *junta directiva* reported to the assembly that the loan had not yet been paid off because there was no money to do so. 144 *empadronados* of 220, or 65% had not paid their assessment. Interest on the loan kept accumulating.

Keen on resolving the problem, the assembly discussed three options. First, it could raise the individual household assessment for the *Herrandina* project to 7,000,000 *intis* ($7.37) and attempt to collect it again. This idea met with vocal opposition, and would have probably been the path of most resistance as well. Many who had paid their assessment the first time had done so with sacrifice. While there was considerable excitement about holding the *kermesse* before hand, money was tight and turnout was

disappointing. The secretary of the *Consejo de Menores*, for example, told me that he butchered and roasted two guinea pigs to sell at the event to meet his quota, *qowi kanka* ('roast guinea pig') at the time selling for about a dollar each. He failed to sell even one and took the meat home to feed his family. Eventually he sold four *arrobas* of corn to pay the assessment. Others had similar woes.

The second alternative discussed by the assembly was to sell the threshing unit and mill to repay the loan. People were not anxious to abandon the project so quickly, and the consensus appeared to be that this was the remedy of last resort.

The third alternative was to use $1140 donated to the community by its sister parish in Germany to pay off the loan rather than to buy sheet-metal roofing for the high school and medicine as decided at a previous assembly. Since this money was already in the bank, the idea generated considerable interest, but it met with immediate opposition from the director of the high school. He argued that it would be a crime to use the money designated for the high school for any other purpose, and that it was just the kind of thing — "misappropriation of funds" — for which Alan Garcia, the ex-president of Peru, was being tried. A visiting representative from the *campesino* federation seconded this, saying that the director is "*bien estricto y celoso*" ('very strict and zealous') about the school and would be angered; he likewise urged the community to honor its agreements. After further discussion, and with some reticence, the director was talked into collaborating, and he agreed to loan the community the money from the roofing fund with the equipment as collateral, setting a deadline of two-months for its repayment.

The *junta directiva* went ahead and paid off as much as it could of the loan with the $1140, but a month later, the treasurer noted in his report to the assembly that 213,000,000 *intis* ($213) remained to be paid. He announced that the *junta* intended to sell the threshing machine — and hopefully recoup what was owed to the school — but intended to keep the mill for milling the *wiñapu* ('germinated corn') to make *chicha* for fiestas (the principal reason most *comuneros* favored the purchase in the first place). Another month later — at an assembly held just five days before the deadline set by the director of the high school — the treasurer reported that with interest, the 213,000,000

intis owed FINCOOP had increased to 280,000,000 *intis* ($280), and that both the thresher and the mill would become property of the school if something wasn't done immediately. The community decided to again make a concerted effort to collect the household assessments, with the vice-president of the community taking charge. At the same time, the *junta* would continue with its efforts to sell the threshing machine. Failing either, the equipment would belong to the school.

Nearly six months after making the original decision to purchase the equipment from *Herrandina*, the community had seen total costs rise 40% or more (the exact amount was unclear from the figures given at the assemblies and reported above, especially since how all the money collected from the *kermesses* and household assessments was dispersed was never explained), had exhausted a $140 account designated for medicine in paying for the thresher and mill, and was less than a week away from losing the whole works to repay their loan from the school, with further obligations to pay what was stilled owed to the bank. There was considerable grumbling and disgruntlement at the assembly about the role played by the *junta directiva* in managing the affair. As one *comunero* put it (a *comunero* who had lost the last election to the reigning president), "*por culpa de algunos todos pagan*" ('for the fault of some everyone pays'). Others at the assembly voiced concerns that the books didn't balance, a tremendous amount of money had been paid, more was owed, and they still didn't own anything. Through all of this time, the machines had remained locked away in the church, unused.

Because of a concern about mismanagement, the assembly decided to form a committee of assessors to review the books and make sure that all the money could be accounted for and was properly spent. The *Asamblea* chose an ex-judge, an ex-*alcalde de menores* (both were in office when I first arrived in Ccachín, and the latter had served as the president of the organizing committee for the Herrandina *kermesse*), the opposition candidate for president quoted above, and the directors of the grade school and of the high school. The results of their investigation — and the final outcome of the purchase and resale of the equipment — was still pending when I left the community. The general outlines, however, are prefigured in what I have described above. The audit by respected

community members and the teachers was an unusual and severe measure as far as I could determine, but coincided with a general breakdown in confidence in the *junta directiva*, due not only to its handling of this, but for general mismanagement and internal dissension.

Notes to Chapter 9

1. In the field of the first brother, thirty-four *wachu* ('rows') of a rope's length each had been harvested. The yield was determined to have averaged about fourteen potatoes or one-and-a-half kilograms per plant. A couple of rows were added as a penalty to arrive at the six *carga* figure. In the field of the second brother, nineteen *wachu* of two rope lengths and an arm length had been harvested. The yield was lower here, about one kilo per plant. A twentieth row was added as a penalty to determine the five *carga* debt.

2. Twenty-eight of the forty-five *comuneros* expected to participate took part in the harvest *phayna*. The rest were listed as *faltados*. At the same time, three other *phayna* were conducted: one to plow the school's *maway papa* field for the coming planting, another to transfer the tree nursery to its new site alongside the church, and a final one to build a wall near the medical post. *Capitanes* were named and *varayoq* were assigned to each group. The 62% participation rate for the harvest team was also approximately the participation rate for the households in the community as a whole. There was some grumbling about the division of assignments when they were first announced, and as it turned out, those fortunate enough to get the *vivero* ('tree nursery') detail were each rewarded by the FAO-Holanda agent with three saplings for their participation. As all four groups gathered for roll at the end of the day, one of the *alguaciles* served *trago* to all of the participants. Two or three names into the roll, someone responded with anger to hearing another's name called, and bedlam followed. An animated discussion ensued about animal damage and thefts in the *lisa chakra* — at its productive peak — with accusations launched one against another from all quarters.

3. The president of the electoral committee asked me for a loan to cover the cost of the bus trip from Calca to Cusco (70¢). He eventually paid me back with money from the fines collected for failure to vote. The *Comité Electoral* must meet a deadline in submitting the election results to the *Ministerio de Agricultura* in Cusco. Communities are subject to a fine for failure to present their election results in proper order by the deadline. Given the late date of the election in 1990, the committee had only five days to do so, subject to a 100,000,000 *inti* ($200) fine.

4. Since the head of my host family was outside of the community tending to his animals, I was given the option of taking his place so that the family would get a work day's credit. Instead, I chose to collaborate without reward on the days that I worked, helping teams that were shorthanded so that I could spread myself around among the teams.

5. The work party was mandatory, and a fine was assessed on those who couldn't attend. One of my *compadres* was out of the community at the time, so his wife (my

comadre) went in his place to avoid paying a fine.

6. According to the women in my host family, the mother was at fault not only for giving her son matches, but for getting so drunk that she could not cook for her son in the first place. They reported that the community assessed the couple with a stiff fine because the woman was argumentative at the assemblies where the incident was discussed. I did not have an opportunity to check out this interpretation with others, but it is certainly plausible. It should be noted, however, that the women held a great deal of animosity toward the mother of the boy: they believed that she was one of two people that had set fire to her house.

7. Unfortunately, it was never clear to me whether the money to be collected from the fines belonged to the *Ministerio de Agricultura* or to the community. The Ministry's allowing the *asamblea general* to determine the nature of the fines and the repayment period implies the former. The community's turning the affair over to the Ministry of Agriculture implies the latter.

8. This right to kill policy was explained to me by an irrate *compadre* who had just discovered that all of the squash he had planted had been rooted out by three pigs. The same three had done damage to his cornfield on several previous occasions. He was not sure who their owner was, and said that he would petition the community to get rid of them. I am not aware of any instance while I was in the village, however, where anyone actually killed an animal that had caused damage to his crops.

9. The item that received the most interest at an auction that I attended was a pick manufactured by Herrandina, an appropriate technology project. It differed from the picks typically used in Ccachín, and several *comuneros* were interested in it. Most items however, generate little interest or demand. There is little ready cash, and people are attracted only if the going price is very low.

10. Community documents are scattered among a variety of officials, and there is no central office where records are kept. The importance of passing on documents depends on the importance of one's position, so that committees heads are not held to the same standards as the *teniente gobernador* or secretary of the *junta directiva*. Which documents need to be forwarded appears to be somewhat open to interpretation, and given the community-wide rotation of positions, many men have papers guarded away in their homes from the time when they served a community office. When the *comunidad campesina* was founded a little over twenty-five years ago, few men could read and write, and the records retained in the community itself were few. Today, a variety of *phayna* lists, letters, nominations, and petitions are recorded on paper, but they are widely dispersed, and it is hard to reconstruct their original context. It's still primarily an oral culture, and most decisions and activities do not get recorded, even in the official "Book of Acts." Because of this perhaps, those papers that exist are treated as quasi-sacred, with little regard to the value of their contents.

11. The original goes as follows:

    Compadre Esteban, te suplico que vengas urgente por que encontró la maquina que perdieron, tu compadre tuvo que perder su tiempo, traele a la dueña más, nosotros ya te daremos más detalles de lo sucedido. Gracias, tu comadre.

12. Problems in collecting the money, a change in the amount of the household assessment, or recordkeeping problems may have led to a misunderstanding about how much was collected. Likewise, for lack of a secure form of safeguarding it, any number of money handling problems could have developed, so that some of the money was lost. The director of the grade school, for example, told me that after the *kermesse* for the school in 1989, he had left the village in a hurry to buy school supplies, and inadvertently left a sizeable sum behind in his room. When he returned, the money was gone. He suspected, but had no proof, that it was taken by another teacher or one of the janitors, the only one's who had access to his house. Given the conditions under which people live and work, I accept such stories as plausible. While they do not negate responsibility, they give reason not to assume corruption or embezzlement as the most likely explanation when — as with the 1990 *kermesse* — a failure to turn over revenues is reported.

13. The representative of *Herrandina* was a former *promotor* in the area for the government during the agrarian reform. The *comunero* who served as president of the organizing committee was a former president of the community, and, as far as I know, the only president who served two consecutive terms in office. The two of them had more than a passing relationship. In his capacity as *promotor*, the first had helped the community start a *tienda comunal* ('communal store') managed by the second. The store later failed (because of poor management, according to the ex-*promotor*), but a working relationship was established between the two. The first worked with the second as intermediary in presenting the proposal to community officials. The *comunero* was the leading advocate for the purchase. Concurrent with the sale of the equipment, the *Herrandina* engineer was also negotiating with the community to stage the film *La Vida Es Una Sola* (Eyde and Taipe 1992). As head of a family theater group in Calca called *Pitusiray*, he had a contract with the director to serve as a liaison with the community and help with the production of the film. He plays the role of president of the fictive community *Rayanpampa* in the film.

Table 9.1: Decision Making, Enforcement, and Control Mechanisms in the *Comunidad Campesina*

Decision Making
Consensus Decision Making on Policies
Majority Rule in Selection of Community Officials
Self-Replacement in *Cargo* Service

Distribution of Power and Authority
Diffusion of Responsibility Among Many
Nomination, Mediation, and Witnessing by Elders
Rotation of Positions on an Annual or Semiannual Basis
Universal Service in Civil-Religious *Cargos*

Motivation and Advancement
Management of Motivating Symbols
Promotion through the Civil-Religious Hierarchy

Inclusion and Exclusion
Control of Entry and Exit to Member Status (*Empadronamiento*)
Temporary or Permanent Revocation of Membership Status (*Desempadronamiento*)

Enforcement
Appeal or Transfer to District and Provincial Authorities
The Village Jail House (*Carcel Carcel*)
The Village Livestock Pound (*Corral*)
Formal Complaints and Denouncements of Misdeeds (*Denuncios*)
Inventory of Kind, Number, and Condition of Items Entrusted (*Inventario*)
Fines and Penalties (*Multas*)
Collection of Pawns to Guarantee Fulfillment of One's Obligations (*Prendas*)

Accountability
Audits of Community Accounts
Door-to-Door Inspections and Collections
Oversight Committees and Ombudsmen

Table 9.2: Fines for Property Damage and Noncooperation

Problem	Fine (Highest)	Fine (Lowest)
Damage to Crops by Pigs (Per Animal)	$ 2.50	$ 0.36
Failure to Attend a *Phayna* Work Party (Per Absence)	1.17	0.89
Damage to Crops by Cows and Horses (Per Animal)	1.00	0.18
Damage Caused by Fires (Per Hectare)	0.62	0.50
Damage to Crops by Sheep and Goats (Per Animal)	0.50	0.09

Inti values have been converted to U.S. dollars.

Chapter 10

Taxation and Fund-Raising

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the principal sources of community income and finance in Ccachín. These include donations and contributions, fund-raising events, household assessments, government services and project support, and nongovernmental development aid.

Table 10.1 lists the various sources of income available to the community. None of the community offices are salaried positions, but officers have expenses in the carrying out of their obligations, especially for travel on community business, and these need to be provided for. In addition, the community spends money on transaction fees, legal services, and office supplies and equipment. Fines of community members, the sale of agricultural products from community lands, and the sale of cattle from the community herd are used for these operating expenses by community officials. Territorial expansion, building construction, and development projects are typically financed through fund-raisers, contributions, household assessments, and governmental and nongovernmental aid. The salaries of the teachers, public health worker, and the local part-time development promoters (for the agricultural extension program, literacy program, etc.) would represent a substantial, if not prohibitive, cost for the community if they were not provided by the State.

For rational choice and collective action theorists, taxation and fund-raising in small-scale communities such as Ccachín raise interesting questions. One is the issue of voluntary contribution. While I provide a few notable examples of such contributions here, the role of festive activities and the promotion of prestige competition in giving appear key to attracting outside funds and getting villagers to contribute. In addition,

more formal and extreme pressures such as household assessments and door-to-door collections are resorted to.

Money is in short supply and collection enforcement efforts are often weak, so the community's efforts to fund projects internally often falls significantly short of the goals agreed upon by members at general assemblies. Whether lack of participation in particular projects is the result of too little money, too little interest, or noncooperation is hard to determine, but a key factor appears to be the material and social costs of collection. Collection efforts themselves are a public good, and the things I have said in previous chapters about the need to explain individuals' participation in sanctioning and enforcement efforts apply here as well. Intended to overcome a collective goods problem, collection efforts to meet project expenses in Ccachín itself is subject to under-provisioning of a collective good.

Donations and Collaborations

Contributions by Community Members

As discussed in Chapter 7, traditional officials in the civil-religious hierarchy invest considerable material and monetary resources in the carrying out of their *cargos*. Virtually all of their investments go into producing ritual and festive events for the community. The collective goods generated by the *varayoq* and *carguyoq* have no other source of funding. In contrast, non-traditional officials are not expected to make major financial investments in carrying out there offices. The revenues that they raise and manage belong to the community-as-a-whole, and the costs they incur while on official business are, in principle at least, paid out of community accounts.

In practice, however, non-traditional officials make financial contributions in the execution of their offices in three ways. The first and most common is to pay for their own travel expenses when they must go to Calca or Cusco on community business. If there is money in the community treasury, their transportation costs are covered out of that. If, as frequently is the case, there is no money, they may hike, reduce the number of officials traveling, or pay their own way. Often, advantageous but non-essential travel is

postponed or canceled for lack of travel funds, reducing management effectiveness. Conscientious officials pay their own way if they can, and to an extent, community members expect that their leaders will be willing to spend not only time but money in the execution of their offices. Trips to the city are still viewed as a luxury and an adventure by most *comuneros*, and they provide private benefit for the officeholders (who tend to their own business at the same time), as well as public good.

A second way that officeholders contribute funds to the community is by making private loans for carrying out community projects. Some of these loans are never repaid. Such contributions are serendipitous rather than by design, but foresightful individuals are presumably aware of and accept the risks. The year before we arrived in the community, for example, one of the *comuneros* look out a personal bank loan to pay a plasterer to stucco some of the classrooms of the school. The loan was for 1,000 *intis* ($31.00), and was made with the understanding that the community would pay him back. He was never reimbursed. In this case, the *comunero* was in a post in which he was expected to generate public works, and he apparently judged achievement in the role and his reputation as worth the private risk. Such failures by the community are remembered and recalled by those involved, and they have an erosive effect on participation. In this instance, the fellow involved was reluctant to carry out other community tasks without having the appropriate funds advanced. For this and other reasons, such loans are relatively uncommon.

A third kind of contribution consists of unsolicited donations by *comuneros*. Such donations are likewise unusual, and seem to arise out of special family circumstances and conflicts. Generally, major donations to the church, school, and other public works are made by individuals after being named and agreeing to serve as *padrinos* rather than given spontaneously. Invariably, those named as *padrinos* are outside *mestizos* (businesspeople, truck drivers, politicians, etc.) rather than *comuneros*.

I'm aware of only two instances where major gifts to the community have been made by community members themselves. In the first, the corn and potato fields that now belong to the school and are sown to raise school funds were donated by one of the

elders of the community. It was before my time there and I do not know the motivations for her gift, but as reported in Chapter 9, the donation caused endless conflict between the community and her heirs.

In the second instance, one of the *comuneros* was assaulted by his cousin while working in the cornfields and suffered cracked ribs in the incident (see Table 8.1). The *comunero* denounced his cousin and was awarded a settlement of $360 for the cost of medicine, lost time, and suffering. He knew, however, that he would never see the money as his assailant didn't have the resources to pay him. The *comunero* decided to accept part of the payment in labor. As treasurer of the Temple Committee, he had an interest in seeing improvements made to the church, and the materials already existed to install a balcony. Given that his cousin was an aspiring carpenter, the *comunero* proposed that the hours be paid off in service to the community, completing the balcony for the church. With the help of one of the judges, they worked out a contract stipulating that $210 of the debt be forgiven in exchange for labor on the church. This was both a creative and practical solution to the problem, and the cost to the *comunero* was only that of transferring his rights to a payment he was not likely to ever receive (collecting the equivalent in agricultural labor would be almost as difficult as collecting in cash).

By presenting the plan to the general assembly for support, the *comunero* assured that wider social pressures would be brought to bear on his cousin to fulfill his labor obligations. The contribution would enhance the *comunero*'s reputation as someone who kept the community's interests in mind and who was able to get things done, and he hoped to piggyback other interests on the project as well. He planned to make the inauguration of the balcony into a prominent public event. He intended to solicit powdered milk from the Salesian priests in Calca, and with this inducement, he hoped to include the children in the community in the inaugural in a special way. In the back of his mind was the hope of involving his oldest son, then a twelve-year-old, in the inaugural, so that he could introduce him to the priests. He was concerned that his son only spoke Quechua among his playmates, and consequently, wasn't learning enough Spanish. His

goal was to make the appropriate connections so that he could send his son to the Salesian high school in Calca.

Donations by Tourists

As many as three donations may be received from tourist groups passing through Ccachín each year, and they typically go to the school, which puts on a welcoming program with readings, music, and dance. Donations usually take the form of school supplies, sports equipment, and a small amount of cash. The group of weavers from the U.S. that passed though the village soon after we first arrived in 1989, for example, contributed two soccer balls and $10 to the school. Their visits to the area were an annual affair. Since tourists pass through several villages on their tour, their contribution to each is small. Occasionally, tourists may make a donation to the community through the general assembly. As noted in Chapter 3, tourists add to the local economy by purchasing textiles, but there is no marketing cooperative in Ccachín, so all of the revenues remain in private hands.

Collaboration in Production of a Film

Occasionally, the community is able to negotiate or take advantage of one-time opportunities. A unique but important example was the filming of *La Vida Es Una Sola* in Ccachín (Eyde and Taipe 1992). Three communities in the Department of Calca were considered as production sites, with Ccachín being first choice provided that agreement with the community could be reached.[1] In exchange for using the village as the site for the film, *Kusi* Films provided materials for the construction of a boys' and a girls' shower for the school, and cement for finishing the floor of the *Salón Comunal*. The first was contracted with the school teachers (through the district office of *USE, Unidad de Servicio Educativo*) in exchange for the use of some classrooms for three months when school was not in session for production headquarters, dressing rooms, and sleeping quarters. The showers were in the interests of all parties, as the professional actors needed a place to clean up while they were in the village and the teachers were

enthusiastic to add comfort to their home-away-from-home. In selling the idea to the community the filmmaker and teachers framed the project in terms of the health, sanitation, and educational value for the students. The showers were solar-powered and of the style installed by *USE* in other schools. They cost about $25 each. The second project — flooring of the *salón comunal* — was contracted directly with the community. The need was identified by community leaders and the rationale for the donation was described by the filmmaker as an exchange for labor services during Carnival. While actors and seconds from the community were paid a daily wage for their participation in the film, the agreement was that they would not be paid during filming of the community's Carnival festival; instead, a donation of twenty sacks of cement (worth about $130, plus transportation costs) would be made to the community.

Both projects were premised on the receipt of in-kind aid from the community. Sand for making the concrete was scarce in the immediate vicinity and had to be hauled in by horseback. Rocks for constructing walls and for strengthening the concrete had to be gathered and carried to the sites. All of the labor for construction would be provided by the community. The first *phayna* for the school showers was poorly attended. Organized by the *Padres de Familia de la Escuela*, not even the president of the committee showed up. Given this unpropitious start, the filmmaker announced at the following assembly that she would not bring the construction materials to the village until the community had all the rocks needed to complete the projects on-site. With this additional impetus, new *phayna* were organized, and within a month one hundred sacks of sand were hauled to Ccachín from Qochayoq and the rocks for construction were gathered.

Marianne Eyde, the filmmaker, told me that the teachers wanted her to paint the school, but she was operating on a shoestring budget (she mortgaged her house, for instance, to finance the film) and did not have the funds for this. Various rumors circulated through the village about her presence there, including that she would bring in food and clothing for the community, but she noted that her goal was to produce a film, not to direct a relief effort, and she could not solve the problems of the community. Nevertheless, she emphasized that the film would have both individual and collective

benefits as byproducts. The *jornal* of 2,000,000 *intis* ($2.00) she paid was the day labor rate prevalent in the area at the time. She noted that paying more would have limited the number of local people involved and increased resentment and jealousy. She estimated that she would spend $2000-$2500 on wages for local actors and stage hands. She expected to pay out another $300 for local meat and produce, $200 in wages to members of the *Club de Madres* for assisting with the meals for the outside actors and production crew, and another $1800 in the rental of horses for transporting supplies, carpenters for construction, and other specialized services. Consequently, as much as $4000-5000 would be spent in the local economy, about $20 per household if evenly distributed.[2] With these expenses included, the budget for public works was about 5% of the total earmarked for the community.

In addition, to the two public improvements, the community was to receive a copy of the film. The filmmaker reported that in some communities where she had worked, community leaders were able to use their copy of a film to obtain running water and other development aid. Whether the community copy was simply archived or used to generate positive publicity would depend on the abilities and initiative of community leaders in Ccachín. Along these lines, Eyde noted that the film committee that the assembly had selected as liaison with community members required more guidance than similar committees she had worked with in the past. In Cajamarca — the last site where she had worked — she was able to delegate responsibilities to the committee in a general sense with confidence that they would be carried out. In Ccachín, on the other hand, she had to do more micromanagement. It's hard to say, however, whether this difference represented language and communication problems (differences in the extent of Spanish-speaking in the two areas), cultural differences (people at the first site perhaps having more exposure to and savvy about the medium than people in Ccachín), or differences in organizational skills. If the latter, it's not clear whether the difference could be attributed to the particular composition of the respective committees, or was generalizable to organizing skills in the community in general.

Contribution from a Sister Parish

Through contacts made by the Salesian priests in Calca, in 1991 Ccachín received a donation of $1140 raised by school children in a parish in Blumberg, Germany. *Padre* José "Pepe" Sayer, a German priest who spent his summers in ministry to the communities in the Lares area, announced the donation at an general assembly, and asked that people talk over what they would like to do with the funds over the lunch break. When the assembly reconvened in the afternoon, the director of the school, who was translating for the priest, was the first to speak up, emphasizing the need of the grade school for windows and floors and the high school, which was still under construction, for sheet metal roofing. He warned that if Ccachín didn't finish building the high school, the students would have to hike to Choquecancha, which had begun construction of a high school of its own. With the urgency of completing the high school in mind, a groundswell arose among the *comuneros* for using the money to buy the roofing. Apparently concerned that the school teacher had an inordinate influence on the direction of the proceedings, *Padre* Sayer reminded people that he had asked them to discuss the issue with their families and friends over the break, and stressed that it was important to put all of the ideas on the table before making a decision. With this, someone mentioned the long-standing need to buy wood flooring to finish the *salón comunal*. No other ideas were presented, and the purchase of roofing for the high school was approved by consensus. The *junta directiva* set aside $140 of the donation for the purchase of medicines for the *Posta de Salud*, and at a later meeting, to resolve a financial crisis, the general assembly approved the use of the donated money to pay off a bank loan (see Chapter 9).

Collaboration by Researchers

As temporary residents, Barbara and I were often asked to contribute to community projects. Rather than negotiating a specific contribution with the community president when we approached him with our research intentions, we contributed to specific projects within the context of *kermesses* and invitations to be *padrinos* of projects and events that took place over the course of our stay. In this way, we were able

to respond to needs identified by the community, and work within established patterns of fund-raising. The projects we contributed to were the school, construction of the high school, the purchase of the threshing machine and mill, flooring of the church, and a shrine for St. Isidore. In total, we contributed $400 to these community projects.[3]

Kermesses

The term "*kermesse*" ('kermis') refers to an outdoor fund-raising festival. *Kermesses* for one good cause or another are held once or twice-a-year in Ccachín. They last three days, beginning in Yerbabuenayoq where they can capture the attention of passing truckers and their passengers, and subsequently moving to the village for the final two days. A typical *kermesse* includes food booths, a soccer tournament, recorded *waynu* music ('Andean country music'), public dances, and a final *ajuste* ('accounting and public announcement of the proceeds').

Kermesses are accompanied by a simultaneous levy on households to raise funds for the same purpose, but the reverse is not true: not all household assessments are accompanied by fund-raising festivals. It depends on the season — *kermesses* are limited to the dry season — and on the purpose to which the funds will be put. *Kermesses* focus community attention and stimulate interest and generosity for a project. They reduce the onerousness and increase the effectiveness of taxation by transforming expenditures into an exchange of money for goods, services, and entertainment. In addition, they attempt to attract outside money to the community, both for the project itself, and to help member households meet their assessed obligations.

Although *kermesses* are organized according to a standard plan, their success depends on the organizational skills of their organizers. Of the four I attended — three in Ccachín and one in Choquecancha — all but one was called for by *Padres de Familia* on behalf of the school in one or the other community. A favored date for school fundraisers is the *Día del Maestro* ('Day of the Teacher', July 6th), but if all the villages in the area hold their *kermesses* on the same day, a coordination problem arises, and the goal of attracting outsiders is defeated. In 1990, the community delayed the fundraiser a week, in

part to leave more time for planning, in part to avoid scheduling conflicts with neighboring villages.

Whether the decision to hold a *kermesse* is made by the general assembly or one of its committees, a separate committee is elected to organize the event. The amount of the household assessment and price of each of the food items sold in the booths is usually set by the assembly, while the organizing committee does the preparatory work. Preparation for a *kermesse* includes signing up a rotation of households to sell food and drink at the stands, sending written invitations to neighboring communities, sending out a general invitation over *Radio Tawantinsuyo* in Cusco, soliciting *padrinos* for the event, purchasing or seeking donations of the trophies and prizes used to attract teams for the soccer tournament, cleaning the plaza, constructing the food booths, organizing the sale of food tickets, and handling the money taken in. Every committee seems to start with the ideal of finding someone willing to donate a *torito* ('little bull') as first prize in the soccer championship (the bigger the prize, the more teams likely to participate, and the higher the entry fee), but while I heard much talk to this effect, the biggest premiums during my time in the village were sheep and soccer balls. Of their various tasks, organizing committees most often fail at communications, so that announcements go out late if at all and the most sought after *padrinos* are never officially contacted (one might think that word of mouth would serve as well, but while the word may be out, a formal invitation is more prestigious, and appears to have greater effect). Most committee tasks fall into place at the last moment.

A variety of techniques are used to motivate contributions at *kermesses*. There are three kinds of *padrinos*: *padrinos* of the overall event ("*padrinos generales*"), *padrinos* of the food booths, and *padrinos* of the soccer teams. There are usually four to eight of the first, wealthy individuals by community standards, who are solicited to make substantial donations to the target project. At the 1990 *kermesse* for the new high school, for example, the director announced that the mayor of Cusco had promised to contribute band equipment and that the president of the *Región Inca* had promised to contribute to the library. Neither visited the community, and as far as I know, neither of these commit-

ments ever materialized. In any case, these pledges were the fruit of a bold and assertive use of connections by the high school director. The *campesinos* themselves generally aspire to less. Most *padrinos* are local and their contributions less grand.[4] To assure that *padrinos* are recognized, an announcement about the nature and amount of their donation is broadcast over the loudspeaker village-wide, they receive handshakes from community officials and the organizing committee, a round of applause is provided by everyone present, and short speeches are made for each contribution, one by someone in the name of the community, the other by the *padrino*. Anonymity is not the hallmark of charitable contribution in Ccachín.

In addition to *padrinos* of the *kermesse*, each operator of a food stand is expected to find a *padrino* to support their efforts. The organizing committee provides each booth operator an *oficio* ('official letter') which they use to name their *padrino* and list their contribution. When complete, these are turned over to the committee. The contributions are small — usually the value of one of the food items — and within the reach of most *comuneros*. The soccer teams likewise seek out *padrino* sponsorship, but with less formality. Unlike the other two categories of *padrinos*, there are no certificates involved, and the going contribution — a round of *chicha* for all — goes into the fund indirectly, through the purchase of the drink from one of the food booth operators.

The proceeds from the sale of food and drink at the food booths are credited against people's household assessments. *Comuneros* sign up to provide any of a number of items — roast guinea pig, roast or fried pork, chicken soup, quinoa, stuffed peppers, chicha, beer, or alcohol — at a set price. As many households as possible are given a chance to meet their assessments, and efforts are made to keep enterprising booth operators from profiting. The organizing committee uses a system of tickets to keep track of and control the flow of money, and patrons of the booths are cajoled to use the tickets rather than pay for their purchases directly with cash. Each of the food booths is provided a sealed and slotted can ("*ánfora*") to deposit the tickets, and announcements are repeated over the loudspeaker requesting that buyers not pay money directly to the food sellers. The system is only partly successful, and much money continues to be exchanged either

under the table or out of obliviousness to or disregard for the rules. The interests of *kermesse* organizers and booth operators are in conflict in this regard, and the success of the system depends on the vigilance and assertiveness of the former. Typically, many more people appear with *chicha* in the stadium or at the nighttime dancing than have signed up, and it is hard for organizers to distinguish *chicha* sold from *chicha* shared as part of normal social relations. The biggest concern for people who sign up to run the stands is to sell enough to meet their quota. There is a coordination problem here, as there may be too much of one item or not enough of another for the demand. Generally, over half of the dozen or so booths in operation at any one time are selling *chicha*. One usually needs to sell a dozen or more cups of *chicha* or plates of *tamales* — the lowest ticket items — to meet one's quota, whereas the sale of two roast guinea pigs ("*qowi kanka*") will bring in the same. Either or both, however, may go without buyers, and people must weigh the risks of losing their investment in time and materials before signing up. The organizing committee uses the loudspeaker to make community-wide calls for people to deliver items when there is a shortage, but that does not solve the problem of surpluses, and after *kermesses*, one hears sob stories of people who failed to sell the goods that they had prepared. Failure to sell one's offerings does not absolve one from the obligation of meeting the household assessment, but it makes it hard to come up with sufficient cash.

The scheduling of a soccer tournament as the principal daytime activity during the *kermesse* helps generate revenue in three ways: directly through team participation fees, indirectly by attracting a crowd of villagers who would otherwise be off working in the fields, and by attracting visitors from neighboring communities. The latter two assure clientele for the food booths, as well as contribute to the festive atmosphere that makes it more likely that people will spend. The setting of team fees does not generate a lot of revenue in itself, as most of the income is balanced out by the expense of trophies and prizes for the winners. If the fee is set too high, it's hard to get teams to participate. Consequently, only about $5.00-6.00 can be expected as surplus, about 25% of the total take from the fees. These figures go up if a few *comuneros* can be found to donate

animals as prizes, but gifts are not always forthcoming, and the animals most often donated are small sheep and pigs. Animals are often accepted to cover someone's household assessment and then used by the organizing committee as a prize.

Community members feel that for a *kermesse* to be a success, they must attract visitors from other communities. This appears to be partly a matter of community pride and prestige, and partly a practical matter. If there are no guests, cash may circulate and be redistributed through the community from those with cash to those without (making it easier for cash-poor families to meet the assessment), but there is no positive balance of trade. The more visitors, the more money comes from outside. In practice, invitations are only sent to Ccachín's *anexos* — Rayankancha and Qochayoq — and to neighboring communities — Choquecancha, Rosaspata, Lares, and Colca — none of them particularly wealthy. Some villagers from Ccachín attend the *kermesses* of these other towns, so that overall, the disposable income available for such events circulates at the level of the *comarca*. Given the lack of ready cash, the prices charged for individual food items at the food booths are relatively low, often less than 50% of that charged in better-traveled areas. At the 1990 *kermesse* for the school, for example, *parrillada* ("grilled lamb") sold for only 25,000 *intis*/plate (22¢), while up the road in Lares, it sold to truckers for 95,000 *intis* (82¢/plate).

Overall, the amount of money brought into the community from outside by a *kermesse* is relatively insignificant compared to the total circulated within, and it represents a small percentage of the total amount of funds raised for a project. If the soccer teams from Lares, Colca, and Choquecancha fail to attend — as often happens — there are few visitors present. *Kermesses* usually begin in Yerbabuenayoq for this reason. It's a small market center, well-integrated into the cash economy, and a magnet for truckers and passersby. A day can go by without a truck passing, but when there is a market, there is a significant volume of traffic. In 1990, Ccachín took in about $190 from a three-day *kermesse* for the school, and this with over 200 households from which to draw. When the Merchant's Association of Yerbabuenayoq held its own *kermesse* in 1991 to buy pipes for a system of running water, it took in $150 for the project, although

there are only a dozen families that live there. With a central location, fluid communications network, and commercial influence, they were able to field more teams for the accompanying soccer tournament than was typical in Ccachín.

Household Assessments

As described above, *kermesses* serve as much a vehicle for collecting obligatory contributions from community members as they do a scheme for encouraging voluntary contributions and generating alternative sources of revenue. Every household is expected to participate in a *kermesse* through the food booths or through the purchase of a ticket to settle their household assessment. The *ajuste* takes place in a central location on the day after the *kermesse* (usually the fourth day, a kind of *kacharpari* to the event) and is a time for people to turn in the cash and tickets that they have collected or come forward to pay off their debt directly. In lieu of cash, many bring corn, potatoes, *ch'uñu* or other agricultural products to meet their obligations. The organizing committee amasses and markets the produce. If someone submits a chicken, it may be butchered on the spot to make soup, with a call going out over the loudspeaker for buyers. Because of their ease and liquidity, cash payments are preferred, but when faced with something or nothing, organizers inevitably accept marketable goods.

Table 10.2 lists the tax levies/cash assessments made on member households in Ccachín in 1990 and 1991 (the list does not include levies decreed by and limited to the *anexos*, such as the one for potable water in Yerbabuenayoq mentioned above). Half of the levies in Ccachín were accompanied by *kermesses*. The assessment for the grade school in 1991 was approved by the general assembly with the understanding that if the money was collected at that the start of the school year, there would not be a *kermesse* for the same purpose held later on. Since the levies are project specific and depend on a consensus of the general assembly, the total amount that households are expected to contribute to community ventures varies from year to year. The average for the two years was $15.60 per household. It's difficult to put this amount into perspective without data on annual household income and expenses in Ccachín over this period, which, unfortu-

nately, I don't have. However, perhaps we can get a rough sense of the magnitude of the expense if we weigh it with the help of figures compiled by Baca Tupayachi (1985) for 1087 families in thirty-seven peasant communities in six microregions of Cusco. While the figures are somewhat dated (c. 1980) the rural economy was stagnant through the decade, and there is little reason to believe that peasant income improved significantly by 1990.

According to Baca's study, the average income from agropastoral activities (including nonmonetarized subsistence income but excluding salaried earnings) was $409 in 1980 (the three Calca communities in his sample closely matched this average). With migratory wage labor added, total average earnings increased to $483. If these figures can be taken at all as representative of Ccachín, the $19/year mandated for community projects would represent 5% of the first figure and 4% of the second. This, however, says little about the income available for extra-household expenses. Including salaried earnings, the average annual income in 1980 was only 71% of the minimum established for the rural sector. Tellingly, 86% of the Calca sample in Baca's study — poor and middle income households — spent an average of $41.40 more on "monetary costs necessary for the functioning of the family unit" than they took in from their agropastoral activities. This represents 12.3% of their agropastoral income overall (including subsistence production), or 30.5% of their cash income from agropastoral activities. The difference — representing the equivalent of forty-seven days of wage labor — was generally made up through seasonal labor migration. To the extent that these figures can be applied to Ccachín — and I believe that in rough and ready terms they can be — it's clear that the levies for community projects represent a significant amount of money for most families, an amount that is not easy to come up with on short notice. The irony is that for many, meeting their community obligations necessitates seasonal employment outside of the community. In 1990-1991, it took the equivalent of eight to sixteen days of wage labor in the Lares Valley to earn the $15.60 needed to meet one's debt to the community. While textile production may play a greater role in Ccachín than in the

communities in Baca's sample, thereby taking up some of the slack, it generally takes more than double that time to earn the same amount through weaving.

How successful is the community in its internal fund-raising efforts? While payment of the assessments is obligatory, it appears that half or less of households actually meet the payment deadline. After that, it becomes harder to generalize about how many eventually comply. Collection proceedings typically drag on for months, with community officials, special committees, and *varayoq* passing door-to-door to call on families in arrears.

The vigor with which collection efforts continue depends on the extent to which the resulting shortfall in funds causes a financial crisis. Some projects, such as the general fund for the school or the building fund for the high school, involve continuous or step goods. Every *inti* raised for the school helps, but the ultimate use of the money depends on how much is available, and its absence is compensated for by the teachers making do with fewer instructional materials, a gradual deterioration of the facilities, and by foregoing supplies and improvements. The same is the case for the new high school, but with the proviso that some minimum level of investment needs to be reached to get it up and operating, though not complete. If roofing cannot be purchased for all classrooms, perhaps enough money can be raised for one or two. If glass cannot be purchased for all windows, perhaps there will be enough to finish one side to protect students from the wind. Payment of the title fees for the pasture land at Platería involved steps in a different sense — a series of sequential payments — so that failure to collect all the first time did not stall the project. It was a "lumpy good," however, in the sense that if enough was not raised, the title would not be forthcoming, and the investment lost. Other projects likewise involved lumpy goods, with serious consequences for failure to meet the funding goal. This was the case for both technological investments listed in Table 10.2, the tractor and the thresher-mill. With the first, the cost of delivery was bankrolled by the government and the community was liable for fines and interest if it could not pay the loan back. In the second, as described in Chapter 9, a bank loan had to be taken out to

cover the shortfall in fund-raising, and accumulating interest sent costs spiraling out of reach of the community's income-generating capacity.

Based on treasurer's reports and discussions at subsequent general assemblies, community officials had trouble collecting all of the assessments listed in Table 10.2. Over a month after the *ajuste* of the 1990 *kermesse* for the school, only seventy of 220 households (32%) had contributed to the project, netting 21,000,000 *intis* ($287), about a quarter of what could be expected with 100% participation. Three months after the purchase of the *Herrandina* threshing machine and mill, 144 households (65%) had failed to pay their assessment, despite both a *kermesse* and a door-to-door effort to collect. Two months later, with the project in crisis from the low return rate and not even the sale of the threshing machine sufficient to cover the purchase-price-plus-bank-interest, the general assembly asked community officials to make one last concerted effort to collect.

Payment of the legal fees for title claim to the *Ichhu Grande*, *Patamarka*, and *Platería* pastures was less problematic, but I was not able to see it through to completion. Crisis appears to have been avoided by the step nature of the expenses and by a generous padding of the funding goal. Given the costliness of the levy and the opportunity for the community to make sequential payments, households were asked for partial payment of the 10,000,000 *inti* household assessment (between 2,000,000 and 10,000,000 *intis*, "*por consciencia*," "according to conscience") during the early stages, with the difference to be made up by the end. Over the course of seven months, 430,000,000 *intis* (20% of the total to be raised) was collected and paid out. Collections were taken with fanfare at assemblies in an attempt to inspire generosity, but no *kermesse* was held. I was not able to track the overall collection success for the project in monetary terms, but did note problems in participation at another level. Ten days before the community's first payment, community officials called a special assembly to discuss the issue. Only 20% of households attended, and although a project committee was tentatively set up, there was not a quorum to reach any decisions. A second call went out with the *pututeros*, and the next day another assembly was held. Discussion began in the morning and went on for about an hour while the *varayoq* went through the community rounding up *comun-*

eros. When it appeared that a quorum was present, the *vocales* took a head count, but it came up short. Someone questioned the count, and with the recount, another twenty-five *comuneros* were found present, the quorum was surpassed, and the meeting was called into session. The community's first payment needed to be made before the harvests, in early April, when cash was scarce, and the *varayoq* were designated to go door-to-door to collect. The average amount that the community needed to collect per household during the first round was about 23% of the lowest suggested contribution, and the amount was successfully raised. In November, the same item was on the assembly's agenda (Table 8.1), but this time the assembly appointed a special committee to go door-to-door for the outstanding funds. Several of the men nominated protested that they could not serve because the job was too hard and they lacked the skill, but their peers were not willing to accept excuses and they were drafted for the role.

Unfortunately, I was not able to determine the overall rate of household participation for any of the levies held while I was in the village. There were too many practical obstacles in collecting the information. In general terms, though, there are three possibilities. First, it may be that the greatest participation occurs with the initial effort when excitement and energy for a project is the highest. Later efforts to collect from those who fail to contribute the first time yield relatively little. If this is the case, the kind of returns reported above for the *kermesses* and original door-to-door collections — in the 30% to 40% range of cooperation — may be the norm for a levy in its entirety as well. We should be cautious though: there's a possibility that the funding events discussed above are not representative in some way, and if so, the original returns would be higher. Second, the reverse may be true and while initial contributions are perhaps low, subsequent collections achieve rates approaching 100% compliance. I didn't find any indication of this (even without access to the contribution lists, there should have been tell-tale signs — collectors passing by in the streets, storehouses of agricultural products as payment in lieu of cash or pawns as guarantees, trips to the bank, mention in financial reports at committee meetings and assemblies, private discussion), but there always remains the possibility that this was a matter of my ethnographic failings rather than a

problem of collective action among community members. Third and finally, the truth may lie somewhere between the two: subsequent collections improve the participation rate, and a majority of households eventually participate, but the total falls short of full participation. Overall, my impression is that unless financial crisis forces the issue, collections flag. Where they fall on average between the low of 32% and the ideal of 100%, I cannot say, but there is little evidence for high marks. It's clear that the collection infrastructure needs to be in place, and that a substantial, concerted, repeated effort needs to be made to increase payment rates on the assessments. As seen above, this is most likely to happen when a set sum is needed and there is no other way to come up with the money. Even then, the collections unfold over a considerable period of time — several months — where the issue can be raised at subsequent assemblies, and energies can be redoubled. Collections for projects with unspecified monetary targets and with less urgency are not likely to receive this kind of attention.

As with the *prendas* discussed in Chapter 9, drawn out collection processes are subject to losses from the declining value of the *inti*. If the monetary value of assessments remain fixed, contributions tend to decline in real value the longer *comuneros* delay in paying them. In the case of the *Herrandina* thresher and mill project, the value of the 5,000,000 *intis* assessment declined from $6.15 to $5.00 over five months. At the same time, the amount to be paid out for the equipment increased dramatically from interest on the bank loan secured to cover the shortfall in collections. In the case of the Platería land title, the dollar value of the assessment declined from $19.06 to $10.00 over a course of eight months (the figure given in Table 10.2 is averaged over that time and understates the cost to those who paid in full at the beginning). Both of these examples are drawn from 1991, when the inflation rate over the course of the year was *only* 50%. The differences were more exaggerated in previous years. Soon after Fujimori took office in 1990, the government sponsored a *paquetazo* ('structural adjustment' or economic shock') that sent prices soaring. The local currency went from 108,000 *intis*/dollar on July 20th, the day that the 1990 assessment for the high school was set, to 350,000 *intis*/dollar on August 26th, the day the tally of revenues from the *kermesse* was

held. In a month's time, the assessment was worth only 31% of its original value (Appendix 5).

Caught by macroeconomic factors beyond its control, the community sometimes responds with adjustments of its own. The assessment for the high school was more than doubled after the *paquetazo* (from 600,000 *intis* to 1,300,000 *intis* per household), but whether the decision to do so was made by the general assembly, the *Padres de Familia*, the organizing committee for the *kermesse*, or the director of the high school on his own accord, I don't know (whichever the case, the director undoubtedly had a hand in it, as he played a leading role in the committee's work). Few *comuneros* were aware of the change, and at the *ajuste* to end the *kermesse*, more than half of those who presented their payments at the collection table fell short, typically by 400,000-800,000 *intis*. Most I talked to paid the original figure and no more, suggesting that the change did not have widespread acceptance or effect. Four months after the *kermesse*, a similar proposal was made at an assembly to raise the assessment for the *Herrandina* machinery from 5,000,000 *intis* to 7,000,000 *intis* (a 40% increase). This would have more than covered the cost of inflation, and if all of the money could have been collected, it would have netted an additional $185 beyond the original goal to help with interest expenses. The assembly, however, did not approve the increase, preferring to sell the thresher instead.

The assessment for the *pastizal* ('pasturelands') stayed the same over the course of the eight months I followed it. While there is some thought given to adjusting for inflation, again, it is usually in a time of crisis — a *paquetazo*, or a project gone awry. The skills and information needed to track inflation in a systematic way are not readily available to community members-at-large, and these are needed to achieve consensus on the fairness of a change. In their absence, the simplest and most trackable system is for each to pay the same *inti* rate. When more than half of the community has failed to pay the original assessment — as in the *Herrandina* case — those that have already paid are hardly in a position to compel those who have failed to pay to give even more. By the same token, those who have already contributed are reluctant to tax themselves again to make up for the failure of the rest.

All of the above raises more questions than answers. It's clear that in many instances, the community's efforts to fund projects internally falls significantly short of the goals agreed upon by members at general assemblies. The principal reason is lack of participation. The extent of this, and the explanation — whether it's the result of no money, no interest, or noncooperation — is harder to determine.

I have already sketched the outlines of the first above. The agropastoral incomes of *campesino* families throughout the Cusco region are insufficient to cover the costs of household reproduction and need to be supplemented through seasonal labor migration, crafts production, and other means. Total average household income is below the Minimum Living Wage ("*Salario Mínimo Vital*") established for the rural sector, which is itself generally regarded as below what is needed to maintain basis welfare standards (Baca Tupayachi 1985). The income of most households barely reaches beyond subsistence. Cash is not only scarce, the high rate of inflation means that it needs to be spent as soon as it is earned.

Intis, however, are not equally scarce throughout the year. The seasonality of cash earnings is determined by the agricultural calendar. While always in short supply, cash is most plentiful from June through August, after the harvest is in and when there is more time to engage in non-agricultural income-producing activities. One way to measure the effect of the lack of ready money (or the lack of agricultural products to sell or substitute) on the return rates of the household assessments would be to compare response rates by seasons or months of the levies. To the extent that people fail to contribute their share for lack of money, participation rates should increase when money is most available. Collections in July should be more successful that collections in December. I don't have such precise data. However, it's important to point out in this regard that most fund-raising efforts take place in July and August, exactly the time when both cash and agricultural products are most abundant. If participation rates are low at these times (as with the three *kermesses* included in Table 10.2), its unlikely that they improve when cash is even scantier.

A second possibility is that participation rates vary according to the extent that fund-raising efforts are perceived as going to a good cause. All of the levies listed in Table 10.2 were approved by the general assembly, but full participation in the assemblies is rare. Participation rarely exceeds 60% of member households. Accordingly, a subset of households typically makes decisions that affect every household. Since decisions are made by consensus, little opposition to the levies surfaced at the assemblies where they were approved. Assemblies are democratic in this sense. A stronger positive statement — that the levies have widespread support — may or may not pertain. For some of the levies, a vote was taken on the amount to be assessed. In this case, the amount determined by the majority often exceeded a lower assessment favored by a percentage of community members (three rates are usually put forward, and the middle — compromise — position typically wins). We can distinguish then, between the valuation of the funding target and valuation of the assessment itself. Some may consider an assessment too steep. The data missing here is whether there is a patterned variance in attendance at assemblies (as I assume there is, based on reports that "so-and-so rarely attends the assemblies), and whether there is a positive correlation between those who attend the assemblies and those who pay their household assessments. What I can say is this. There is a gap between the 32%-35% who contributed to the *kermesses* discussed above and the 50%-plus of community members that constitutes a quorum for reaching decisions at the assembly. A difference also sometimes emerges between the number of households who sell food or drink at a *kermesse* and the number who turn in their proceeds. At the 1990 *kermesse* for the grade school, for example, ninety families participated, but only seventy of them reportedly handed over their receipts.[5]

The projects listed in Table 10.2 varied in the percentage of the community that they directly benefit. The grade school and high school funds had the widest potential impact. In 1991, there were 280 registered students in the grade school alone. Average daily attendance in 1991 was only 150 students (53%), but attendance may have been unusually depressed in the aftermath of a prolonged teacher's strike.[6] Three-quarters of the students in attendance on a given day during the high season of a good year is consid-

ered exceptional, so the overall average probably falls somewhere between. Families differ in the extent that they value formal education or can spare their children's labor by sending them to school. Not only are there differences among the *comuneros* in this regard, the attitudes of individual *comuneros* is often ambivalent. Knox-Seith (1995) elaborates on this point, and discusses how *campesino* attitudes range from perceiving the school as an instrument of oppression to perceiving it as a springboard to a better future. Without conducting a formal survey on the matter, based on informal conversations and public expression, the schools are associated with progress in Ccachín, and appear to have widespread support. With regard to their financing, however, it's important to add one caveat. Families pay a matriculation fee for each child that they have in school (about, $1.90 for the first child in 1991), and some may not understand the need to pay a separate school levy. Accordingly, they may conclude that they have paid their fair share. Unfortunately, I can't say to what extent this confusion affects payment of the subsequent assessment for the school.

Whether it receives a positive valuation or not, the school is a known entity. Both of the technology projects — the tractor and the thresher-mill — generated intrigue and excitement, but their practical utility and impact were much less clear to community members. The tractor was a gift from the government rather than a response to a specific need, and at first, it may have been valued as much for expressive reasons as for its use value. Given the steepness of the terrain, the tractor could not be used in anyone's fields. Both before and after its arrival, people were unclear about what they could do with it. The principal idea that emerged after it was in the village was to use it to generate light for the church, an application that would have underemployed its potential and have very limited impact. Other ideas were to use it to mill grain and to saw wood, but this required supplementary machinery which the community didn't have. The value of having a threshing machine and grain mill for the average family was likewise unknown at the time of the *kermesse* to pay for it (by the time of later collections, it was clear that the money was needed to help the community dig itself out of a hole, rather than secure something of value). While intended to help intensify cereal production, its use by the

average *comunero* was associated with reducing the labor needed to make *chicha* for community festivals, a purpose with very limited impact. The fruits of both technological investments were uncertain at the time the levies to pay for them were made. Both were pushed by the *junta directiva* more than driven by grass-roots support.

The value of gaining land title to Platería, Ichhu Grande, and Patamarka, on the other hand, was transparent to all. In a general sense, everyone in the community favors the expansion and entitlement of community lands. They would rather that the territory belong to Ccachín than to another village or group. These pastures, however, were distant from the community, and only a small number of families had traditional use rights there. The cost to each household was relatively high, but the material benefits would go to relatively few.[7] The levy for this purpose can be contrasted to a simultaneous one organized by the *Pan de Azucar Comité* to gain private title to other distant pastures. Each of the members of the *Pan de Azucar Comité* — likewise households in Ccachín with traditional use rights to these ex-hacienda lands — agreed among themselves to pay 5,000,000 *intis* ($5.00) per head of cattle that they had pastured there to gain independent title. In this case, every member assessed had a tangible interest in the outcome. The assessment had the advantage of being apportioned in a way that accorded with the level of their interest and their ability to pay (as the principal wealth of the families was tied up in their animals pastured there). The community likewise sought title to these lands, but the Ministry of Agriculture ruled in favor of the *Pan de Azucar Comité*. It's not clear to what extent the abilities to generate funds and the respective investments of the two conflicting groups in the title process affected the final outcome, but as with most legal challenges, there's the possibility of significant effect.

Given variation in the valuation of the collective good provided by these projects, one cannot automatically assume that evasion of payment for them constitutes free-riding. As indicated above, there may be a good faith desire to cooperate but no resources to do so, or the "good" may be correctly perceived to have no personal benefit by some, and in extreme cases, constitute a "public bad." Of course, these can also be used as rationalizations, and one might later enjoy the gains without ever paying the costs. The fact remains

for all of these projects that they were obligatory, that they were agreed to democratically, and that everyone was expected to share in the burden. There was little vocal resistance to any of these projects in the community, and little reason to believe that failure to pay cloaked underlying dissent.

I am not able to resolve the issue here, but I would like to make three final points. First, while I have sometimes taken the return rate as a proxy for the participation rate above, we can distinguish between the qualitative and quantitative aspects of participation. Some contribute in a timely manner but do not give the full amount. Others contribute the full amount after considerable time has passed, so that the value of their contribution is no longer the same as those who contributed on time. The incentives for both are much the same as for noncooperation, but the social costs are less. Second, the community does not rely on good will alone to raise funds from among its members. It uses both positive and negative reinforcement (the *kermesse* and various forms of displaying prestige and recognition on the one hand, and sanctions and control mechanisms on the other). Some of these techniques — such as the naming of *padrinos* are traditional, if not indigenous — while others are borrowings that have presumably been adopted for their effectiveness (the entomology of the term *kermesse* indicates the extent of the diffusion). Third, the community does not have effective enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure payment of the assessments. With as many as 65% of households failing to pay on the first go-around, the labor needed to achieve full compliance is considerable.

The task of collection is conflict-ridden and distasteful, requires special skills, and is itself a public good subject to underprovisioning. The community does better in collecting fines for animal damage largely because it has the leverage of animals in hand. Even then community officials are not able to collect all that is due. While agricultural products are accepted in place of cash payments when offered, there appears to be a general reluctance to seize subsistence goods for nonpayment. This may be for welfare reasons, for lack of sufficient force, because of reverse social sanctions, or because at this point, consensus breaks down. All of the goods listed in Table 10.2 are potentially

excludable, but the possibility of exclusion was neither explicit nor implicit in the proceedings. This contrasts to both the matriculation fee collected for the school, and the pact reached by the *Pan de Azucar Comité* to meet their land title costs. Exclusion is easier when a small group is involved rather than a large (in this case the difference between twenty-five households and 220), when there are few noncooperators rather than many, and when the benefits are tangible rather than intangible or potential. In the ultimate instance, villagers collectively hold the right to revoke the membership of noncooperators from the community itself, but as noted in Chapter 9, such measures do not appear to be used in these circumstances. The success of collections depends largely on *kermesses*, example, prestige, persuasion, and informal pressures.

Support from Outside Institutions

Two major sources of public funding remain to be addressed. These are a) the various forms of State assistance, subsidy, and investment that the community receives, and b) aid from Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). Since the latter generally work under *convenio* ('agreement', 'pact', 'contract') with the government — as with the reforestation program of *FAO-Holanda/Ministerio de Agricultura* — these are often not so easy to separate. Tracing the administrative-money trail is not so important as indicating the number and kinds of institutions involved and the extent of their activity. Table 10.3 lists the principal groups operating in the area during this study.

Government Assistance and Services

Education and Health

The money brought in through household assessments, the matriculation fee that parents pay to send their children to school, and the sale of agricultural produce from school lands all go to maintenance and supplies. In total, they pale by comparison to the amount required to pay the annual salaries of the teachers. The teachers in Ccachín are paid by the Peruvian government. Unlike the systems of school finance common to the U.S. and Europe, there are no direct property, income or sales taxes that *comuneros* pay at

local, provincial, departmental, or national levels, so payment of these salaries is not a matter of collected money returned to its point of origin, but rather the redistribution of money generated from other sources to the countryside.

Without going through the records of the Ministry of Education or SUTEP for figures on how much is spent on teachers' salaries in the village, the total is difficult to determine with any exactitude. Such precision would be nice, but it is not needed here, and I only wish to establish the order of magnitude. The task is complicated by high rates of inflation, extended teachers strikes, teacher vacancies, teachers who failed to report for their assignments in the village but who continued to be paid, failure by the government to pay the teachers what they were due, and differences in pay based on differences in qualifications (few instructors, in fact had their teacher's certification). On average, there were twelve teachers in Ccachín in 1989-1991, seven grade school and five high school teachers. According to reports by the teachers themselves, they earned anywhere from $40-$150 per month for their work. The wide range is more indicative of changes in the value of their salaries caused by devaluation of the Peruvian currency than it is of differences between teachers. The low of $40 per month was reported in May of 1991, but was followed by a four-month strike. When the teachers returned to work in late August, their new pay scale varied from $110-150 per month depending on qualifications, but it was unclear that any actually received this much money. Using the minimum figure of $40 for twelve teachers over twelve months, the amount spent on teachers salaries annually would be about $5760. This is the minimum, however, and the actual figure, is likely to be about double this amount.

In addition to the teachers, there were two janitors. Assuming that the janitors earned at least as much as the rate for day labor in the area — about a dollar a day — their salaries represented an additional $720. In addition, the *anexos* of Rayankancha and Qochayoq had one-room schoolhouses with one teacher each, there were three *PRONOEI* preschool teachers distributed between the village and the *anexos*, and a few *comuneros* were paid as *promotores* ('promoters') for educational outreach, one to maintain a literacy program, the other to conduct agricultural extension workshops for the Ministry

of Agriculture. Counting all of these salaries, at least $9000 was spent by one branch of the government or another on education in the community per year (while services were provided, little of this money ended up circulating through the community, as the teachers spent it elsewhere).

The salary of the *sanitario* ('village health worker') raises the overall cost of salaried workers in the village to at least $9500. The one time I asked, the *sanitario* was earning $75/month (as well as a short-term supplement of $75/month for outreach to communities in the Lares Valley), but this was in September of 1991, after settling a strike, and the figure may be higher than the long-term average (as noted above, the teachers reported a monthly income of $110-150 over this time, so the *sanitario* appears to have earned about the same or a bit less). Averaged over the 280 households making up the community and its *anexos*, the minimum figure that each household would have to pay to retain the teachers in the village if the community itself had to pay their salaries would be $34. Again, that's a minimum figure, and a more realistic amount can be obtained by doubling it. Using even the minimum figure, however, it's apparent that a significant amount of money flows from the national government to finance public education in the community, money that the community would be hard-pressed to generate on its own.

Infrastructural and Technological Improvements

While the primary school was established in the 1930s, the present-day school-house was first initiated with funds provided by the government of Belaúnde Terry in 1962. Belaúnde's *Acción Popular* party came to power in good measure on the strength of its promises to the *campesinos*, and Ccachín (which was not yet established as a *comunidad campesina*), was able to take advantage of the short-term swell of investments in the countryside. Four classrooms were built at the time, and while they have deteriorated some in succeeding years for lack of resources for upkeep, they remain the only classrooms with wood floors and glass windows. Work on five more classrooms was begun in 1985. They are usable, and shared with the kindergarten and high school, but

none of them is as close to completion as the original four (see Knox-Seith 1995 for a description of the facilities). The five newer classrooms have sheet metal roofs, an indication that their construction involved considerable expense, but I do not know the source of the funds. The initiation of their construction in 1985 coincides with Alan Garcia taking office as president of Peru, but I have yet to determine whether that is a coincidence, or whether, as when Belaúnde took office, there was a corresponding influx of government money at the time.

The biggest government grant to the community while Barbara and I were present came in the form of a tractor, a Fiat DT 115-90. In this case, the connection of the favor to national politicking was transparent, and recognized by the *comuneros* themselves. The groundwork for the gift was laid in 1985 at the first *Rimanakuy* (literally, 'to speak together', or as we might call it in English, a 'speak-out'), a conference held in Cusco to give voice to *campesino* concerns soon after Garcia took office. The mayor of Calca, Goya Nuñez del Prado, took the lead in advancing the interests of the communities in his jurisdiction. Like Garcia, the mayor of Calca was an *Aprista* — a member of APRA, the populist, social-democratic party that had come to power — and voters in Ccachín had helped to put the party in power. Benefits in Peru tend to flow according to patronage, and the Lares area was an APRA stronghold.

The tractor was one of sixty donated to Peru by the Italian government and distributed in the Cusco area. In Lares, both Ccachín and Choquecancha received one. The tractors arrived in early 1990, just before the first round of national elections in April. A last minute, surprise surge by Fujimori's *Cambio 90* party nationwide, however, had repercussions at the local level as well, and in the district of Lares, *Cambio 90* and *Izquierda Unida* received 40% of the vote each, while APRA came in a distant third with 20%. With APRA's resounding defeat, Goya Nuñez del Prado lost his bid to become a congressional delegate as well. The *comuneros* fretted that with the loss, he would take the tractor away from them, and while the mayor of Calca was said to have retained a copy of the ignition key for the tractor, it never came to pass.

The *comuneros* expended money (as discussed with the household assessments above) and considerable time (eight communal work days, as discussed in Chapter 11) to bring the tractor to the village. Since there was no road to the town, a rough-and-ready one was hacked out of the hillside to get it to the central plaza. A tractor, especially one of its type and size, is inappropriate for the rugged terrain of the village (the same can be said for the one across the way in Choquecancha), and it sat unused for the following year-and-three-quarters that I was in the community. In fact, it was walled in alongside the church, so that it could not be moved more than a couple dozen meters. Without a *tractorista* in the village with the experience and skills to start it regularly, and with no committee designated to maintain it, it was subject to deterioration. After a time, the battery died, and when in the way, it had to be pushed by hand (recall the discussion of the accident during its relocation above).

After a year-and-a-half of weathering the elements, a *phayna* was called to build a shelter for the tractor. The date was set by the assembly, but the event didn't take place as scheduled, nor did it take place during the following two months that I was able to keep track. Soon after receiving the tractor, community officials sent a letter to the mayor of Calca soliciting machinery to use with it, but aid was not forthcoming. A year later, machinery was again solicited. In the absence of machinery, the community proceeded to buy the *Herrandina* thresher and mill, providing an independent means of accomplishing one of the three things that they had envisioned for the tractor — milling grain. The equipment was motorized, and did not require the tractor to run. Neither of the other two uses — lighting the church and milling wood — were tried, the first for problems with keeping the battery charged, the second for lack of equipment and for the fact that one of the *comuneros* had purchased a chain saw, this providing a more appropriate technology, albeit in private hands, for accomplishing much the same thing.

Over the first two years, the one tangible outcome of bringing the tractor to Ccachín was that it created the niche for and inspired a small, private, auxiliary enterprise. Given the battery problem, the *tractorista* contracted by the community to drive the tractor to the village — a fellow from Matinga — determined that there was money to be made

charging batteries.[8] He decided to use his own capital to build a battery charger that worked by means of a water turbine installed along the creek that passed through the center of the village. *Comuneros* often talked about the potential of generating electricity for the church from the creek, but the community did not take on any projects of its own in this regard. The site chosen by the *tractorista* was just across from an area known by some in the village as *Molinuyoq* ('Having a Mill'), suggesting that there may have been a mill there in the distant past. The project suffered some setbacks — animals damaged the rock-lined canal built to channel the water and someone stole one of the connectors for the pipe that he set up — and took longer than originally planned. The *tractorista* planned to build a shed over the unit and bring an electrical engineer in to hook the system up, but he had run out of funds to do so, and the charger was not yet in service when I finished my fieldwork.

Near the end of my stay in the village, community officials received an extensive questionnaire from the government regarding the tractor, the machinery they had for it, and the uses to which it was put, and concern grew among the *comuneros* that if they did not act, the tractor would be taken away from them. At the same time, officials in Choquecancha were negotiating a deal to sell their tractor for $70,000. They intended to buy two trucks with the money, a practical alternative. While Choquecancha had an advantage over Ccachín in having a road that went directly to the community, both communities could readily benefit from ownership of one or more trucks. Ccachín's tractor was larger and more powerful than the one received by Choquecancha, and according to some, the community could receive as much as $80,000 for it if sold. With the encouragement of Choquecancha's experience to go on, focus among community officials in Ccachín shifted from obtaining machinery for the tractor to finding a renter or buyer in the Lares or Urubamba valleys, where a tractor could be more usefully employed.

If successful in their efforts to sell the tractor, the effect would be to turn a white elephant into a gold mine for the community. That amount of money, if divided among the 220 households in Ccachín, would be $363 each, well within the $250-400 range of total annual household income reported by Figueroa (1989) for southern Peru, as well as within

the $311-$500 range of annual household agropastoral earnings in the Cusco area using Baca Tupayachi's (1985) figures. Even amortized over time, such an investment would be out of reach of the community if it were to rely on its own resources. The ultimate value of the tractor for Ccachín from the *comuneros* standpoint — justifying the energy that went into bringing it to the village — is as an item of exchange to obtain something else. From APRA's standpoint, the attempt to gain or maintain patronage cost little, and certainly didn't hurt it's cause, despite the party's poor showing in the elections. Adopting a more global perspective, the *entrega* ('giveaway') failed from the standpoint of rational use of resources for redistribution purposes, since redistribution entailed a considerable waste of resources.

As I prepared to leave the community, the whole process was apparently about to begin again. After the swearing in ceremony of the new *varayoq* in the church on New Year's Day 1992, a small group of *comuneros* who attended the ceremony (among them the ex-president of the community, the ex-*alcalde de menores*, the president of the electoral committee, and the treasurer of the temple committee) lingered in the church plaza and informally discussed the failures of the reigning *junta directiva*. With Choquecancha's success in getting a truck fresh in mind, the possibility of Ccachín doing the same quickly came to the forefront of discussion.[9] Fujimori was about to distribute forty to fifty new trucks to the *comunidades campesinas*, and Ccachín needed to entreat the appropriate government officials quickly if it were to have any hopes of getting one. Brainstorming on how to make a compelling case, those gathered agreed that letters from each of Ccachín's *anexos*, and the *Club de Madres* needed to accompany the appeal. The men gathered, as well as community members in general, expect their *junta directiva* to have the assertiveness and energy to take advantage of such opportunities, and that through their efforts, outside resources will continue to flow into the community.

Nongovernmental Development Aid

FAO-HOLANDA Reforestation Project

During my research, *FAO-Holanda* had reforestation projects in nine communities in the district of Lares, with three full-time extension agents living in the area and responsible for three communities each. The field agent responsible for Ccachín lived in Choquecancha and served Ccachín, Choquecancha, and Tambo Huaylla. Each community had a *plan forestal comunal* ('communal forestry plan') worked out with the respective community assemblies and the forestry committees designated for the task. In principle, decisions were made by the *comuneros*, with the extension agent facilitating organizational arrangements and providing technical assistance, encouragement, and seedlings. In practice, goals tended to be formulated by *FAO-Holanda* at annual planning meetings and presented to the *comuneros* for seconding. Little reforestation work took place in Ccachín without the leadership and motivational support of the extension agent.[10]

Despite the organizational and technical support, reforestation efforts floundered during the time that Barbara and I were in Ccachín. There were a variety of reasons.

First, the extension agent came to the village less than once a month on average, and then only for a short stay. Unlike the other two villages in his territory, Ccachín could not be reached by motorcycle — his preferred means of travel — and this perhaps in good measure explained the amount of time he spent in the different communities. The extension agent himself cited lack of motivation and interest by the *junta directiva* and *comuneros* as the reason for not coming more. *Comuneros* on the other hand cited his failure to spend time in the community as the reason for their low levels of involvement.

Second, the *comité forestal* chosen by the general assembly suffered organizational and motivational problems and failed to maintain the communal nursery. Over the course of two years, the committee effectively disintegrated, was replaced by an informally appointed and equally inattentive *promotor*, and was finally reconstituted by the assembly under the risk of losing the project altogether. The director of the program in Cusco told me that *FAO-Holanda* planned to close down the operation in Ccachín after 1990 for lack of participation by the *comuneros*. A last ditch effort by the local extension agent, how-

ever, kept the program alive. He first reached an agreement with the director of the high school to have the students maintain the nursery as part of their agronomic training. The on-again-off-again presence of an agricultural instructor, four months of summer vacation, and a four month teacher's strike, however, quickly proved this solution unreliable.[11] He next secured agreement from the *Club de Madres* to take on responsibility for the project, but given the Club's own organizational problems (and perhaps out of gender biases), the general assembly was reluctant to delegate it the task. The assembly discussed a proposal to have the *PAL-TAMBO* members in Ccachín take on the project, but near the end of 1991 the assembly decided to reconstitute the Forestry Committee under new leadership.

The third reason for the mediocre state of the program in Ccachín was technical. The original nursery was situated on a plot of land loaned for the purpose by one of the *comuneros*. While it was along a creek that served for irrigation purposes, it was off-the-beaten trail, out of the public eye, and subject to animal damage. In 1991, *phayna* were held to relocate the nursery to a central location alongside the church. The new location kept the project in public focus, protected the seedlings from animals, and provided the convenience of tapping into the piped water system, but the seedlings wilted for lack of a hose. The community was responsible for providing the hose for watering, but the *junta directiva* was slow to obtain one. At root, even the technical problems reduced to financial and organizational ones.

Proyecto Lares-Amparaes/Tambo

The *Proyecto Lares-Amparaes* (*PAL*) is a rural development project for the district of Lares administered by the Salesian priests of the parish of Calca. There is an office in Amparaes, and the project there is known as *Tambo*, a Quechua term that refers to a place along the road that serves as a rest stop and a storehouse for production. *PAL* has two trucks and a pickup that it uses for *Tambo Móvil* ('*Tambo* Mobile'), and visits the outlying communities on an occasional basis.

Tambo is a member-based organization, with thirty-six associates in Ccachín in 1990. Members are eligible to receive treated seeds (seed potato, for example, are treated

against *rancha*, a devastating potato fungus), which they must pay back in kind after the harvest. 350 kg. of seed potatoes were distributed to members in the community in 1989. *Tambo* purchases agricultural produce, paying 25% or more above the local market price. While it pays better than the market, it does not pay immediately, and I'm told by members that this is one of the principal reasons that it doesn't have more members in Ccachín. With few members, *Tambo Móvil* passes through infrequently, limiting services, and accordingly, membership. While in the near past, the only road that went close to Ccachín passed through Amparaes, with the opening of the road to Lares, Amparaes is farther removed from the normal travel patterns of the *comuneros*, and this likewise limits local participation.

Tambo works closely with *Arariwa*, another rural development project in the Cusco region, and together, they have conducted agropastoral extension workshops for the campesinos of the area. *PAL* maintains a pharmacy in Amparaes that stocks both medicines and veterinary supplies. On one occasion while I was in Ccachín, *Tambo Móvil* passed through, vaccinating and administering medicines to the sheep of all who requested it. In addition to the services provided to members of *Tambo*, *PAL* responds to requests for various kinds of aid from the *campesino* communities. The *promotor* of the adult literacy program approached *PAL* for a donation of notebooks for participants, and the director of the school solicited a medical kit for the school and seed potatoes to plant the school's fund-raising fields. On a grander scale, the sheet metal roofing for the remodeling of Ccachín's church was requested in 1986 and received through *PAL* in 1989. In late 1991, there was discussion of building a public oven in Ccachín, with the expectation that any materials that needed to be purchased would be provided by *PAL*. At the time, there was a lack of consensus among *comuneros* about the need for the project (one household already had a large oven that was used for baking bread and roasting pork for public events) and concern that if the oven was used, it would reduce the firewood supply, wood becoming an increasingly scarce resource. One of the principal advocates for the project in the village told me that if the assembly wasn't willing, he would propose that *Qhapaq Qolla*, one of

the dance groups, take the project on. The project was still in the discussion stage when I left the community.

Caritas and *Arariwa*

Food aid for the *Vaso de Leche* Program and for the school lunch program in Ccachín comes from a variety of sources, including *Caritas*, *Arariwa* (the "*La Escuela Defende la Vida*" — "The School Defends Life" program), and *PAL*. While aid was somewhat erratic, Ccachín and its *anexos* received some amount of external food aid for the children of the village during each of the three years of my field work. In November 1990, for example, the school received $575 in food aid from *Arariwa*. The *PRONOEI* instructor in Ccachín received an additional $58.00 in foodstuffs (she reported that with the supply of food to attract students, she had more children attending preschool classes than she had officially enrolled), and the *anexos* of Rayankancha and Qochayoq likewise received separate allotments. At the same time, high school students benefitted from food furnished by *Caritas*. While I don't have an estimate of the total amount of support provided by these programs annually, the above figures establish the minimum, as more than one shipment of food was generally received in a year. In 1990, one public food program or another — either *Vaso de Leche* or *La Escuela Defende la Vida* — was in place for the children from mid-July through the end of the year. When figured on a dollar basis, the amount is substantial, although on a per child basis, outside food aid amounts to a few dollars (my best guess is in the range of $2-$7) each per year.[12]

The receipt of aid was marked by considerable bureaucracy between the funding agencies and the recipients. Food aid was funneled through the mayoralty of Lares, and there were frequent complaints by parents and teachers that anticipated aid was delayed, redirected, or lost. In one instance, the mayor of Lares was said to have botched a funding request. In another, the director of the school failed to prepare the proper reports on the amount of food purchased and number of children, holding up subsequent requests. On one occasion, I was told by a teacher that the *Padres de Familia* of Rayankancha failed to organize a caravan of pack horses needed to retrieve goods from Lares. At the local level,

not everyone eligible to participate in the programs did. Both parents and teachers sometimes alleged that the food was prepared in unsanitary conditions.[13] Accordingly, some children who could have clearly benefited from the additional nutrition, did not take advantage of the programs out of their parents' hygienic concerns. In a few instances, wealthier families did not participate for expressive reasons — out of pride that they did not need to go outside of the household to meet their subsistence needs.

Caritas's involvement in the Calca area was not limited to food relief. As of late 1992, *Caritas* planned to select three communities in the province of Calca for an agricultural development project involving the distribution of seeds. The communities had not yet been chosen when I left Ccachín. Whether Ccachín was chosen or not, it's important to note that such projects exist, there are a limited number so that communities are in competition for them, and that selection depends in part on the promotional skills of community officials and the use of well-placed contacts. In this case, the Calca *Herrandina* representative who brought both the threshing machine and filmmaking projects to Ccachín was interested in securing a role in the *Caritas* project, and depending on his success, he would be in a position to put in a good word for the community as well.

PRAMPECO-Alemán

PRAMPECO-Alemán's involvement in the Lares area was in an early, exploratory, stage when I left the village. In late 1991, the mayor of Lares sent our a questionnaire to the outlying *comunidades campesinas* in an effort to collect information regarding their production of wood, agricultural products, and alpaca wool. Soon after, a meeting was held in Lares, with each of the communities sending representatives. There were two aspects to *PRAMPECO*'s plans. First, they were interested in setting up some kind of local industry — perhaps a factory — using local products. The first meeting including brainstorming about potential products that could be produced, and alcohol from potatoes and starch from corn was discussed. Second, they were interested in electrification of the zone. Discussion on this point included the issue of whether it could be best done on a decentralized or

centralized basis, with each community generating electricity locally, or running lines from a single plant.

A precondition for generating local industry was improving transportation in the area, so that raw materials could be shipped to the factory and finished goods marketed. Efforts were already being taken in this direction, with improvement of the main arterial through the valley and the initiation of work on the projected road to Ccachín, and the project depended on the timely completion of this work.

Other Development Efforts

Besides the above, a number of other NGOs had programs in Ccachín during this study, or during the preceding decade. *PRONOEI*, one of two preschool programs in the community, was started in 1980 and funded by the *Proyecto Integrado de Servicios Básicos para la Infancia* (*PROINSEBI*) or the *Alianza Internacional de Desarrollo*. The first was a project of UNICEF, the second a German development program. The granting agencies provided tables, benches, and curriculum materials for the program. Besides the funds provided by the sister parish in Germany, three German development agencies had programs in the community. *CESPACA* provided technical assistance and training for the improvement of agropastoral practices. A local, part-time *promotor* in the village conducted workshops in the *salón comunal* using videos in Quechua provided by the program. The regional field representative visited the community a few times a year to provide further assistance. The project had solar panels in Choquecancha, Lares, and one other community in the area for charging the batteries used in running the video equipment, and one of these were occasionally brought to Ccachín. The *Alianza Internacional de Desarrollo* (*AID*), along with the *Ministerio de Salud* was responsible for the installation of a system of piped water in Ccachín. The third German group, *COPACA*, at one time had one or more projects in the community, but according to the director of *FAO-Holanda*, who reported this to me, the organization withdrew for what it considered to be a lack of cooperation from the *comuneros*. Along with the above, there were miscellaneous government projects,

including the stocking of twelve lakes around Qochayoq with trout in 1988, an effort carried out by the *Ministerio de Agricultura*.

Notes to Chapter 10

1. Film making was approved by a vote of the general assembly, with just five votes against the project. The filmmaker asked that all of the *empadronados* sign the Book of Acts to confirm the community's approval. 450 people — most of the adult population — signed up for the tryouts for parts.

2. I interviewed Marianne Eyde in December of 1991, a few months before filming began, so these figures represent the budgeted expenses rather than the actual ones. It is a significant amount of money, but privately, I heard various complaints from *comuneros*. These included that the day labor rate was too low, and that while the filmmaker would make good money, the community was receiving little.

3. Our presence in the community also added about $1000 to individual household incomes through gifts and exchange. This amount was primarily distributed between seventeen families with which we had *compadrazgo* relations, an average of $60 per family, though some received more and some less.

4. In the case of the church, working with the Salesian priests in Calca as intermediaries, villagers always have the hope that the inaugural of a project will be attended by the bishop. So far, it has been an unfulfilled dream, and often, the inaugurals take place even without the attendance of a priest.

5. The use of tickets instead of cash is designed to prevent this, but as mentioned earlier, the system is not foolproof. While some people reportedly make off with the money, there is an alternative explanation for this difference. A certain percentage of those who sponsor a booth fail to earn their quota. Which of these two factors weighs more heavily in the explanation of the difference between the two figures is hard to determine.

6. Attendance could have been affected by the strike in several ways. First, given seasonal variation in attendance according to the agricultural calendar, compressing the academic year into a single season — planting season — meant that other agro-pastoral labor demands on students' time were high throughout the period. Second, given the strike's disruption of long-range planning and villagers' uncertainty about if and when the teachers would return, many children were herding animals in the hills when the teachers arrived. It took time for families to readjust their work schedules to send the children to school. Attendance averaged only three students per classroom the first week. The second week, attendance improved to about 30% of those enrolled, and gradually worked upward thereafter. Rumor had it that the teachers were planning to go back on strike in a couple of months, so many parents concluded that the school year was lost, and decided not to send their children at all. Finally, the strike kindled bad feelings toward the teachers and schooling among

some, further discouraging their participation.

7. Unlike the *Pan de Azucar Comité*, the households that benefitted were not organized to gain independent title, and in fact, may have seen advantages to working under the umbrella of the community, as the pastures were contested by other villages, and on their own, difficult to defend.

8. Many families have car batteries that they use to run phonographs, loudspeakers, and the like, and to get them recharged, they carried them by truck to Calca. A battery charger in the village could serve not only to keep the tractor battery charged, but maintain all of these privately-owned batteries as well.

9. According to several *comuneros*, both Choquecancha and Rayankancha were receiving trucks from the government as a reward for having their land titles in order, but I was not able to confirm this. In fact, whether the truck belonged to the community or to a group of private individuals was unclear. The *Herrandina* representative in the area told me that "Rosaspata's truck" or "Choquecancha's truck" actually belonged to a consortium of five people from Choquecancha, Rosaspata, Pampacorral, and Kiswarani. Whichever the case, the subject came up in this context because failure to file some papers and pay the relevant fees involving community lands in a timely manner was one of the failings of the current *junta directiva.*

10. There were actually three separate plant nurseries in Ccachín, one maintained by the Reforestation Committee, another by the *Club de Madres*, and a third by the school. The first two groups worked closely with the FAO-Holanda agent, while the school plot was very small, with seedlings provided by *USE* (*Unidad de Servicio Educativo*) and maintenance carried out by students under the guidance of the teachers.

11. While the high school is officially a *colegio agropecuario*, the agronomy instructor position went unfilled for most of 1989-1991. At one point, a group of *comuneros* stopped people on their way to the fields to have them sign a petition to bring an instructor to the community. An instructor arrived for the last half of the 1991 school year.

12. According to data collected by Barbara Knox-Seith (personal communication), there were 220 children from more than 100 families signed up for the *Vaso de Leche* program in Ccachín in August of 1990. While children up to fifteen years of age could attend, those in the higher age bracket (fourteen to fifteen years old) could only sign up if they were also registered for and attending school. In this way, the program was used as an inducement and a reward for school attendance, just as food aid administered by the *Padres de Familia* was.

13. The sanitation could be improved, but it's not clear that sanitation was worse in the public kitchens than it was in the homes of those who expressed such concerns (giardia was endemic in the village and from my experience, few households

maintained sufficient hygienic standards to avoid it). A certain amount of snobbery might also account for the avoidance. Not only was there a tendency for families to think that they cooked and did other things better than their neighbors, there may have been another dynamic at play: with increased wealth, there is a tendency to substitute private goods for public ones, both to avoid the negative effects of crowding that the latter is subject to, and to signal status.

Table 10.1: Sources of Public Income and Finance

Fines
Fines for Animal Damage and Fires
Fines for Failure to Attend Work Parties and to Vote

Marketing of Communal Production
Sale of Corn, Potatoes, and Cattle

Fundraisers
Kermesses
Naming of *Padrinos*
Inscription Fees for Soccer Tournaments
Fund Raising Can

Household Assessments
Cash Assessments
Receipt of Corn and Potatoes for Marketing in Lieu of Cash

Donations and Collaborations
Contributions by Community Officials
Gifts from Tourists
Collaborations by Filmmaker and Researchers
Donations from the Sister Parish in Germany

Government Assistance and Services
Salaries of the *Sanitario*, Teachers, and *Promotores*
Infrastructural and Technological Investments
Technical Assistance

Nongovernmental Development Aid
FAO-Holanda
Cáritas and USAID
Proyecto Amparaes-Lares (PAL)
PRAMPECO (Germany)
Alianza Internacional de Desarrollo (*AID*-Germany)

Table 10.2: Household Assessments in Ccachín

1990 Purpose of Levy	Amount
Expenses Related to Transport of Tractor to Village	$ 2.72
General Fund for the Grade School*	$ 3.01
Building Fund for the High School*	$ 5.17
Total	**$10.90**

1991	($)
General Fund for the Grade School	$ 1.90
Land Title in *Patamarka, Ichhu Grande, Plateria* Pasture Areas	$12.27
Purchase of Threshing Machine and Mill*	$ 6.15
Total	**$20.32**

* Accompanied by a *kermesse*

Table 10.3: Nongovernmental Development Aid

Organization	Project	Investment
Alianza Internacional de Desarrollo (*AID* — Germany)	*PRONOEI* Water System	
Arariwa	"*La Escuela Defende la Vida*"	$745 in foodstuffs to school and *PRONOEI* for lunch program
Cáritas and USAID	*Vaso de Leche*	
FAO-Holanda/Ministerio de Agricultura	Reforestation	Seedlings, Extension Agent
PRAMPECO (Germany)	Electrification Marketing	
Proyecto Amparaes-Lares (*PAL* — a project of the Catholic Parish of Calca)	Reroofing of Church Pharmaceuticals Seed Distribution Marketing	

Part IV

Spheres of Collective Action

Elster (1989:126) defines collective action problems in straightforward and readily understandable terms:

> Suppose that each member of a group has the choice between engaging in a certain activity and not engaging in it. The group has a collective action problem if it is better for all if some do it than if nobody does, but better for each not to do it. It may or not be better for all if all do it than if nobody does. And it may or may not be best if all do it. To *cooperate* is to act against one's self-interest in a way that benefits all if some, or possibly all, act in the same way. [Elster 1989:126]

There is the potential for collective action problems to arise whenever a collectively provided good is characterized by some degree of indivisibility (i.e., use of a given unit of the good does not prevent other members of a group from similarly enjoying the good over a certain range) or some degree of non-excludability (i.e., it is not possible to prevent others from using the good once it is produced). If either of these conditions pertain, it is possible for an individual to benefit from whatever amount of the good is provided by others without contributing to the production costs. This temptation for a self-interested individual to free-ride is central to the kinds of collective production situations discussed in this thesis. If too many people attempt to free-ride, the collective good will be undersupplied, or the subset of cooperators will have to put in more time to produce the good than would be the case if there were universal cooperation.

Part IV proceeds as follows:

In Chapter 11, I discuss participation in community work parties. The *asamblea general* calls for community-wide participation in projects related to the management of community lands and the construction and maintenance of village facilities. Some of these work parties have been carried out year after year from time immemorial, others provide the sweat equity needed to realize development projects whose material

component has been funded by State agencies and NGOs. Each household in Ccachín is required to contribute several person-days per year to such projects. I discuss how labor is secured, organized, and monitored, the average amount of time expected to be contributed annually, the actual level of participation at community assemblies and work parties, coordination problems in achieving optimal levels of participation, and factors that influence individuals' participation. To illustrate, I discuss the fencing of common agricultural sectors, communal cash-cropping to raise money for community expenses, and construction of roads and schools. The evidence on communal labor participation that I have collected suggests that the *comuneros* fall far short of universal participation in many situations where universal cooperation would be desirable, but also achieve more cooperation than necessary in situations where more selective cooperation would be in order. Average participation rates are on the order of 50-60%. Individuals' participation rates in communal endeavors vary, but all community members participate some of the time, and the sum total of their efforts are sufficient to produce an impressive array of collective goods.

In Chapter 12, I discuss a particular kind of work party — the marking of territorial boundaries. It appears to have been carried out since antiquity in the village and is more ritually elaborate than most events requiring communal labor. The practice has fallen into decline in Ccachín as in many parts of the Andes, and it is now conducted sporadically and with less attendant ritual. I had the fortune of participating in one while I was in the community, however, and I describe its features and the territorial conflict that prompted it. I relate both the origin and decline of boundary marking to its utility in deterrence and territorial defense, but accept the possibility that as other strategies have emerged to defend territorial claims, the custom has taken on new reasons for being. I evaluate Radcliffe's (1989) suggestions that boundary marking ceremonies are intended to teach village youth about the community's territorial limits, and that such collective acts are sustained today more by the need to define social boundaries than physical ones. This latter provides me an opportunity to evaluate arguments invoking social cohesion in

the explanation of cultural features in general, and their applicability to boundary marking ceremonies in particular.

In Chapter 13, I discuss a number of issues that bear directly on the success of collective action in the Andes. Among these are: a) the extent to which communalism as a value motivates cooperative action, b) the role of intermediate-sized organizations in organizing collective action within *comunidad campesinas*, and c) power relations, unequal exchange, social differentiation, and motivational change. The first leads me to consider the role of norms of cooperation and fairness, the second to consider the effects of group size, and the third to consider various asymmetries that factor into collective action, and how these in turn are affected by socioeconomic change. I find that an equal cost-sharing rule is used in most contexts in Ccachín, hypothesize that since access to land is the principle bargaining chip that the community has to assure labor compliance, if either the community's control of the land or members' interest in the land as a resource base diminish, communal labor participation is likely to follow suit, and emphasize the growing role of special interest organizations in collective goods production. Of all the chapters in this thesis, this is the one that provides the most comprehensive overview of the motivational and organizational factors that influence collective action.

Finally, in Chapter 14, I explore the extent to which the *comunidad campesina* and other community organizations in Ccachín provide a safety net for community members in crisis. I consider the situation of orphaned and unacknowledged children, conventions governing liability in the case of injury, and emergency relief in the case of herd loss and house fire. In general, I find that the community does not provide much assistance to members who have suffered accident, family loss, abandonment, or catastrophe in Ccachín. One's ability to weather misfortune depends primarily on the strength of one's kin and *compadrazgo* networks. The role of community officials is mostly limited to assessing liability and determining just compensation when there are allegations of wrongdoing, or alternatively, passing litigation on to higher administrative levels. Since my data on this is limited and the issue has been little discussed in any systematic way in

the Andean literature, I raise it here more to stimulate research and comparative exchange among ethnographers than to reach substantive conclusions.

Chapter 11

Phayna: Participation in Communal Work Projects

Introduction

The *asamblea general* organizes collective labor to meet a variety of tasks related to the management of community lands and the maintenance and improvement of village infrastructure. Governmental and nongovernmental investments are secured with and conditioned on the expectation that labor for development projects will be provided by the community. Every household in Ccachín is required to contribute several person-days per year to collective endeavors mandated by the assembly, and most of this labor is coordinated in community-wide work parties. The Quechua term for these communal work parties is *phayna*, a cognate of the Spanish *faena* ('task', 'labor').

Beyersdorff (1984) defines *phayna* as "work requiring the labor of the men of a community," and in day-to-day use, the term has a strong gender association. As already noted, women are expected to contribute labor to the community for specific projects — especially cooking (for the school lunch program, *Vaso de Leche* program, passing soldiers and guerrillas, and visiting engineers) and decorating the saints — but they preform their duties in small group rotation rather than en masse, and their work groups are not generally referred to as *phayna*.[1] Female heads of households sometimes work in *phayna* alongside men when male representatives for the household are unavailable, so rather than defining *phayna* as exclusively male, it's prudent to treat the gender character of tasks and the communal definition of *phayna* labor as separate, recognizing that in practice, the major tasks undertaken in *phayna* are almost always perceived as male. The requirement to participate in *phayna* is founded on equity among households, with determination of who is eligible to fulfill the household labor requirement subject to a degree of negotiation. Whether women's labor is credited as having equivalent value to men's depends to some extent on the task at hand and the work roles available. The same

can be said of the labor of adolescent males.[2] The *kuraq* or *machula* ('old men') of the community are sometimes assigned a separate mission — repairing a trail or cleaning a canal, for example — that is within their abilities but independent of the *phayna* called for the rest.

In this chapter, I discuss the organization of community work projects, the amount of time household heads are expected to contribute to communal projects annually, the level of participation in those projects, how *phayna* labor is secured and monitored, coordination problems in achieving optimal levels of participation, and the factors that influence *phayna* participation. Participation rates fall far short of universal cooperation in Ccachín, and there appears to be some inequity in total labor contribution between individuals. A substantial number of labor hours are invested, however, and year after year, an impressive amount of work is done. In the concluding section, I explore what it means to recruit and employ labor in optimum amounts and analyze several factors that influence *phayna* participation.

Organization of *Phayna*

Community Projects

Table 11.1 lists the principal recurring *phayna* in Ccachín. Most are agricultural in nature, and most are carried out on an annual basis.

The labor dedicated to the community potato fields is done in name of the *comité*, and the revenues generated from sale of the harvested produce go toward meeting community expenses. In some agricultural work parties such as planting and plowing, everyone works together at once, while in others such as is hilling and weeding, small groups may work in daily rotation. The community fields are not large enough to optimally employ so many workers, and the actual time worked tends to be less than when the same tasks are carried out for household production in *ayni*. Accordingly, it may be that the social aspects of these large-group work parties play as important a role in explaining the form they take as purely economic ones.

In many Andean communities, the *alcalde mayor* is expected to serve food and *chicha* at the work parties for planting ("*tarpuy*"), plowing ("*yapuy*"), and harvesting ("*allay*") of community lands (Allen 1988).[3] While this is no longer the case in Ccachín, the lunch break continues to be a festive occasion. In addition, community officials usually take advantage of these outings to hold informal assemblies to discuss community business. Neither is possible in a rotational system.

It's also possible that equity concerns take priority over efficiency at these gatherings. While fairness may be important for maintaining solidarity and motivating participation, it's hard to say whether it cancels out the potential disincentive to work caused by the declining productivity of each additional worker at the margin. I don't know if the *comuneros* are more likely to attend a work party if they see that a critical mass of others are also likely to attend, or if they know that their participation is essential to completion of the task, this last giving it the characteristics of an assurance game.[4] It's much more straightforward, however, for all participants to detect free-riders when collective labor is simultaneous than when it is rotated. The latter requires greater organization and better systems of record keeping.

The construction and repair of walls and fences around the agricultural sectors, the collective hunt to reduce predation by deer in the corn sector, and the inspection of territorial markers are tasks in which the optimal group size of a work party is probably never exceeded. Given the vast perimeters of the communally-managed sectors, much more time could be invested in fence-building ("*perqay*") than is in fact employed, and no one need get in anyone else's way to carry out their work. The fences around most sectors are rustic and permeable. The corn sectors are the only ones sealed off by stone walls. Even the best fences deteriorate with time. Typically, a *phayna* is held to repair a fence about the time that the sector it encloses is sealed off to the entrance of domestic stock. This is rarely sufficient, and as problem areas are discovered, a second work party will be held to secure them. Depending on the severity of the problem, the second *phayna* may require the participation of all households, or only of those who failed to participate in the first.

The *chakuy taruka* ('communal deer hunt') is an annual event in the *anexo* of Rayankancha. The goal is to reduce the damage to the corn crop caused by deer. While the meat of any deer killed is consumed, the expected return to each individual is small. Presumably, a hunt is organized in Ccachín as well when losses to deer become a widespread problem, but none were held while I was there. Encirclement is used to encounter and entrap the deer. The more participants available, the more likely they are to succeed. Once enclosed, slingshots and machetes are used for the kill. Rayankancha has a relatively small population for attempting to carry out such a hunt. In 1991, twenty-five men participated in the event. At least three deer were encountered, but all broke through the circle and escaped. While the hunt might have a greater probability of success if the women of Rayankancha participated too, they did not. It would also seem that success could be increased by involving the *comuneros* of Ccachín and Qochayoq, but this likewise is not done. I can only speculate as to why not. Since the hunt is conducted in December, after the corn is already planted, there is the risk that outsiders, with less of a stake in the crop than villagers, will trample the plants. With too large of a group, there is the danger that more damage will be done to the crop through human carelessness than is done by the deer. To the extent that meat for consumption is a motivator, the optimal group size for maximizing per capita harvest rate is hard to determine, but there is no reason to assume that it is the same as the optimal size for ridding the cornfields of a pest.

The annual repair and cleaning of the water canals ("*unu phayna*") and the annual inspection of boundary markers ("*deslinde*") are two *phayna* that appear to be in decline in Ccachín. The canal cleaning has traditionally taken place along with the New Year's inauguration of the *varayoq*. The piped water system has reduced reliance on the water canals for the domestic water supply, although the canals continue to play a minor role in irrigating gardens and in making adobes. A *comunero* was chosen by the assembly to organize the New Year's *phayna* during the study period, but none took place for two consecutive years, and the lapse was subject to little criticism. Segments of the canals

were cleaned as needed by households, and small group *phayna* were used to open or reroute canals for community construction projects.

The *varayoq* have traditionally organized and provided a communal feast for *deslinde* as well, but the event was only held once while I was in the village. If inspection of the boundaries was the only purpose of *deslinde*, it would seem that a relatively small group of *comuneros* would be sufficient for the task. The expectation of community-wide participation raises the possibility that the event plays an important role in expressing or defining people's sense of collective identity (Radcliffe 1989). In Chapter 12, I suggest that the large-group nature of the effort is conditioned by the need to show force for effective defensive of communal lands. To the extent that *deslinde* is a signaling device, the more participants the better. Collective identity and solidarity are surely a part, but not so much as an abstract expression of communalism in itself, but as an indication of the group's capacity to carry out common goals.

In addition to the *phayna* held on an annual or reiterative basis, special projects are targeted for completion each year. Table 11.2 lists the principal projects undertaken by the community since 1980. The majority of these discretionary *phayna* take place during August and September when the agropastoral schedule is light and the weather is dry. However, there are about two months during the rainy season — February and March — where household labor demands are sufficiently slack that *phayna* for nonagro-pastoral projects are common as well. The arrival of the road to the Lares area has dramatically increased the pace of construction in the community. Other than the grade school, constructed in the early 1960s, all other major community structures have been build in the last ten years. Later on, I will discuss three of these projects — the building of the two roads and of the high school — in depth.

Role Division in Communal Labor

While leadership, organization, and discipline are essential ingredients to successful work parties, the kinds of projects carried out in *phayna* do not require much labor specialization. Restriction of the eligible labor pool by age and gender assures that

all of the participants have similar qualifications. Within a relatively narrow range, all of the *comuneros* share the same knowledge about the tasks that need to be performed, use of the appropriate tools, and the sequence of activities. All own the tools needed to carry out their *phayna* obligations, and all use their own tools in doing the work. Also, all have the physical capabilities for carrying out the work. In consequence, it is not so important who shows up for a *phayna* as that enough show up. *Phayna* are marked by technological homogeneity, and every participant is replaceable by any other for every specific task.

There are three potential gains from collective labor: a) the gains that result from the effective combination of specialized skills, b) the gains that result from economy of scale, and c) the gains that result from completing a project in the short rather than the long term. As suggested above, the first plays a relatively minor role in *phayna*. Of course, whenever older men and younger men work together, there is the likelihood that knowledge and skills will be passed on from those with more experience to those with less. This is a feature of all cooperative labor, whether it is familial, interhousehold, or community-wide, though not generally formalized into training roles. Physical strength and agility, rather than knowledge, is the major determinant of role divisions at most communal work parties, and this is likewise patterned by age. In plowing, younger men are the *hayt'aq* ('plowmen'), older men the *rap'aq* ('clod-turners'), in roofing, younger men place the rafters on the rooftop while old men feather straw into piles or prepare fiber bindings. In wall building, younger men lay the adobe block while older men stomp the mud to mix the clay. Clearly, all of these arrangements are more efficient than the reverse, but in the course of a lifecycle, everyone will participate in all of the roles, and in this sense, there is no significant specialization.

The second gain — economies of scale — is also of limited importance in *phayna* labor. It is important for particular tasks — as when, on one occasion, twenty men and women struggled for hours with eucalyptus poles to dislodge a huge boulder blocking the road to Lares above Yerbabuenayoq — but in general, few tasks necessitate the group sizes typically achieved in *phayna*. The exceptions to this among all of the *phayna* listed in Tables 11.1 and 11.2 are the *chakuy taruka* deer hunt in Rayankancha, and, given

certain assumptions, *deslinde*. There is motivational value in large-group participation, so that emulation, friendly competition, and the heightened excitement of a crowd can create economies of association in *phayna* activity, but these are potentially canceled out by the time lost coordinating activity, the reduced visibility of each individual's participation, and the greater opportunity for free-riding (the smaller size of reciprocal labor groups leads to differences between *phayna* and *ayni* labor in this regard).

By far the most important benefit of large-group cooperation through *phayna* is in reducing the period of time that it takes to do something. As Gonzáles de Olarte notes:

> In the cleaning of a canal, for example, if a hundred person days were necessary, a *comunero* working a hundred days would obtain the same results as a hundred *comuneros* working only one day, but with the seasonality of irrigation water, the opportunity cost can be rather high, so that given the level of resources and technology of the *comuneros*, the only solution is to work in *faena*. In other words, one cannot wait a hundred days to use the canal. [Gonzáles de Olarte 1984:228]

Most agricultural *phayna* in Ccachín are of this sort. Planting, plowing, hilling, harvesting, and fencing are all seasonal activities with narrow windows of opportunity. Work on the fields used for community fund-raising typically takes place after the majority of *comuneros* finish planting and plowing their own fields, suggesting that within these areas of opportunity, communal labor comes second to household subsistence. Fencing, however, directly affects everyone's subsistence, as the fences jointly enclose everyone's fields, and the pressures to call a *phayna* to repair or improve a fence grow with the emergence of the first corn or potato plants in people's private plots.[5] In some instances, timing may be so critical to the success of a *phayna* than the men will accept the participation of women. This is the case, at least, of one grass fire while I was in the village, at which women's labor was credited equal with that of the men.

Beyond the *phayna* related to land use, the urgency of most construction projects is less severe. Many of these projects are notable for how long they take for completion (Table 11.2). In these cases, it is not so much the immediate need that necessitates communal labor, as the volume of work involved. No single individual or small group has the time available to build a road or construct a high school on their own, even in a

lifetime. However, whether the goal is the transport of one's goods to market or education of one's children, overall costs are reduced and the stream of benefits increased the quicker a project can be completed.

Chuta: Division of Responsibilities by Sections

The Quechua verb *chutay* means "to stretch, to expand, or to pull tight" (Hornberger and Hornberger 1983). Among the domains that this image of stretching or extending something is applied is to cooperative labor. In agricultural fieldwork, a *chuta* is the strip or section of the field assigned to each *ayni* participant. Beyersdorff (1984) give the example of workers in *hallmay*, the cultivating and mounding of potatoes or corn. In some areas, depending on the system being used, laborers work their way down one row and then back up an adjacent one, "extending" their work to meet that already done by their neighbor.

The concept is also applied to the organizing of public labor. In this context, as Urton (1984) notes, *chuta* can take any of three forms: a) physical structures such as walls and buildings may be divided into several segments, each assigned to a specific group; b) a task may be divided into blocks of time, with groups assigned to work specific days; or c) land may be divided into sections, with groups responsible for working given areas. *Chuta* signifies the portion assigned to each. Both spatial and temporal units are covered by the term.

Dividing Space — Building Fences

Probably the most often repeated instance of spatial division of assignments is the construction and maintenance of fences around the corn, *maway*, and potatoes sectors. The fences around the two corn sectors are the best constructed of all of the public fencing, and accordingly, embody the greatest amount of work of any single structure. They consist of stone walls topped with thorn and briar. These fences are the closest to the settlement and surround the most intensively-cultivated lands (i.e., second to the private gardens around people's houses). The nearness of these fences, however, is a

double-edged sword: while their condition is easier to monitor and maintain, they are also subject to the most extensive animal damage. They require annual maintenance. The fences around the communally-regulated fallow sectors, on the other hand, are works in various states of progress. Since there are so many sectors, since they encompass such vast expanses of land, since each sector is cultivated only once every seven years or so, and since most are an hour or two from the village, the fences around them are make-shift and subject to substantial deterioration between repairs.

A *phayna* to repair a particular fence typically follows soon after planting and coincides with the closing of the sector to the pasturing of animals. In 1991, I attended one such *phayna* called to close up the *hatun tarpuy* potato fields in the sector known as P'alqa. A male from every household was expected to participate, but instead of working en masse, community officials assigned each to a work team of twenty-five to thirty members. The teams spread out to work independently in the areas of the preexisting fence most in need of development or repair. This was only the third time that P'alqa had been planted since its incorporation into the community during the agrarian reform, and there were many segments of the perimeter where even a primitive barrier to impede the animals had yet to be built.

While there are various ways that individuals could be assigned to a work team (by order in the *padrón* used for the roll call, by neighborhood, and the like), the assignments were made according to where in the sector individuals had their crops. People were assigned to work in teams at designated sites close to their fields, assuring that they had the greatest personal stake in attending and doing a thorough job. This matching of *chuta* to work groups is typical of *perqay* ('fence-building') *phayna* in general.

Several, if not all, work teams on this occasion were headed by *varayoq*. The first *barrio* led our particular team, accompanied by the *pañay rikra pututero*, his 'right hand man'. Under the first *varayoq*'s direction, the *pututero* served as timekeeper to coordinate the work of all of the teams, sounding the *pututu* to commence work, begin and end lunch, and end for the day. Some of the other *varayoq* were accompanied by *pututeros* as

well, and while we could only see a short distance in the fog, we were assured that others were still out there by their follow-up trumpeting.

During the course of the day, our work group build three kinds of structures. On one steep, rocky slope, we cut away the earth to expose bare rock and create a sheer face that animals could neither climb nor descend. On another slope, we upturned sheets of rock to form a barrier above a natural trench. Finally, in the pass know as P'alqa Q'asa, a natural entrance to the sector, we built a stone wall, capping it off with a layer of sod and clods of bunch grass. This wall expanded upon an existing wall, and closed off the passageway that had been opened after the previous harvest years earlier.

At the end of the *phayna*, the lead *barrio* and his *pututero* rounded up all of the cattle and horses still roaming about. The *Inca alcalde* closed the main gate to the sector after all of the teams had passed. Of the seven horses captured and driven back to the village corral, three were released because they were in the sector for the day to carry fertilizer for a late-season *yapuy*; the owners of the rest had to pay a fine. Despite the best efforts of *phayna* participants, the sector suffered considerable animal damage in subsequent weeks, and a second *phayna* was organized among the absentees from the first.

Dividing Time — Reroofing the Church

Temporal divisions of communal projects are made when a small number of workers are needed over an extended period of time. Again in this case, all the heads of household are assigned to work teams, but rather than having the entire community work together on the same day, each team is assigned a day or days to work in rotation. A leader for each group may be designated by community officials, the groups may select its own, or the groups may remain acephalous, depending on the complexity and skill requirements of the tasks involved. Since most such projects have to do with public works rather than agriculture, the *varayoq* do not play any special role, as in the example of the fencing of the sectoral fallow fields given above.

The biggest project carried out using rotating *phayna* while Barbara and I were in Ccachín was the reroofing of the church. When we first arrived in the village, the roof was thatched with *ichhu* ('straw grass'), but plans were underway to roof it with sheet metal once the dry season came. While the tile-roofed churches in neighboring Choquecancha and Lares are colonial era structures requiring permission from the *Instituto Nacional de Cultura* to remodel, the church in Ccachín is a large, rustic structure that can be remodeled according to the dictates of the community.[6] Ecological pressures seemed to be a primary motivator for the change, along with a desire to reduce the labor costs of upkeep (straw roofs need to be maintained and replaced on a regular basis), community pride (sheet metal being more prestigious than straw grass), and pressure from the priest. Given the size of the building, the church roof tied up huge amounts of straw grass, and with the growing population, demand on the available straw grass reserves for household use has been getting tight. Reportedly, there was one earlier effort to change. In the mid-1970s, there was an attempt to outfit the church with roofing tile made in the school yard, but the roof only lasted three years before it caved in and had to be replaced with straw. For the 1989-90 project, both tile and sheet metal were offered by the parish through *PAL*, but sheet metal was chosen by the community because it involved less work. According to the secretary of the *Comité del Templo*, if the *comuneros* could have been counted on to do the extra work (haul the tile up from Yerbabuenayoq, etc.) the committee would have pushed for roofing tile, but since, as he put it, "the people don't cooperate, don't go to work parties," the committee recommended sheet metal instead.

Converting to sheet metal involved removing the old roof, redoing the top layers of adobe block, setting new rafters, installing the sheeting, refinishing the upper interior walls, touching-up the stairs and entry, and cleaning-up the site. All of the saints were relocated to the homes of their *mayordomos* for the ten months that the project was in progress and returned to the church just before the inauguration. Each household was expected to contribute fifty adobe block and participate in the remodeling *phayna*. Over the course of the project, *comuneros* were expected to work a total of thirty-two days each, an average of about three per month, but the amount that each actually worked

varied (see the sections on labor investment and extent of participation in *phayna* below). *Phayna* were of two types: general *phayna* where everyone was expected to attend, and rotational *phayna*, where small groups of ten to twenty individuals worked each day, extending the work of the previous group. The groups were defined by community officials from the list of households, rather than based on any traditional social groupings. Money collected from fines for failure to meet one's labor obligations was put toward the costs of the inauguration.

Two issues emerge from the above: a) the meanings and contexts for which the concept of *chuta* is applied, and b) the structure of *phayna* organization. I never heard the daily rotations in the roofing of the church referred to as *chuta* in Ccachín, so I don't know if the term is typically used in this context, or if spatial referents are more common and paradigmatic. The third form of *chuta* described by Urton — the division of community lands into units that are planted and harvested each year by specific *ayllu* as part of their public service duties — is not found in Ccachín. Both Rayankancha and Qochayoq, as *anexos*, have separate communal lands that they work for fund-raising purposes, but the concept of *chuta* does not apply, since there is no division of responsibilities as such, and the beneficiaries of the labor are the respective territorial groups rather than the *comunidad campesina* as a whole. (There are cases, however, where Qochayoq constitutes a separate work group for community projects, and can be seen to be extending the work of the whole.) Community groups such as the *Club de Madres* and the *Padres de Familia* likewise work public lands for their own fund-raising purposes, but again, these are not conceived of as divisions of the whole.

In terms of organizational structure, division of the large group into several parallel work groups has advantages from the standpoint of the efficient use of human resources. Large groups can be unwieldy, and in some cases, counterproductive. For example, on Mother's Day 1990, the *consejo de menores* organized a *phayna* to roof a building that had been constructed as a high school classroom in 1982 but never finished. With the potato harvest in full swing, only a quarter of the households participated in the *phayna*. Half as many men again left *prendas* behind before going off to their fields to

indicate their intention to make up their absence at a future date. The high school students had collected vines for binding the poles together prior to the *phayna*, and each *comunero* was expected to contribute an *arroba* or two of straw grass to the project. While there were various roles (tree cutters, rafter builders, straw preparers, vine preparers, etc.), roles were self-selected rather than assigned. Spontaneous divisions of labor emerged according to age, but everyone appeared to possessed the requisite knowledge to carry out all tasks. Even with the reduced work party of sixty men, there was considerable idle time compared to the *wasichakuy* of individuals' houses, where because of the costs of food and reciprocity, sponsors control group sizes to more optimally employ participants for the entire work day. As a subgroup finished one task, *comuneros* had to wait for others to complete theirs before proceeding to find a role for themselves in the next stage.

In most *phayna*, the large number of participants working together on a common goal is conducive to conversation, controversy, and camaraderie. A good deal of good-natured competition also emerges between work groups, especially in tasks where teams working side-by-side can race to see who finishes first. In this particular roofing *phayna*, horizontal slats needed to be laid over the rafters to support the thatch, and six informal teams, three per side, raced each other and the onset of darkness to reach the peak. Unfortunately, it turned out that there were too many men on the roof for it to bear the weight. The adobe walls had been exposed to the elements for the last eight years, and they were soft and corroded. When they gave way, they gave way at their weakest point. First the header over the door went, then the header over the window, then the entire front wall crumbled away. The roof buckled and collapsed, thirty-some men riding the wave to the ground. As the dust settled and people realized that no one was hurt, there was a swell of laughter, recall, and relief. At the start of the day, I had been declared the honorary *capitán*, of the project, and months later, men still teased me about the disaster that occurred on my watch. At the time though, people did not seem the least bit grim. A day's labor had been lost, but the public nature of the good meant that no one present suffered any significant consequences. Within five minutes, the men regrouped them-

selves to disassemble and salvage all of the binding, slats and poles used in the construction. These were set aside in piles for some future project. At the end of the day, the list of items collected as pawns from the absentees was read publicly — felt hats, sweaters, ropes, hatchets, machetes — and a roll of participants was taken. With the collapse of the roof, the attempt to finish the classroom was permanently abandoned.

Breaking tasks into smaller work groups makes the work of each participant more visible, and theoretically, at least, all else being equal, should enhance motivation, allow for more effective monitoring of the quality of individual's work by their peers, and make it easier to apply informal sanctions against shirkers. Unfortunately, there are so many variables to control for that in comparing *phayna* where parallel work teams are used with those that are not, it is difficult to determine whether this is in fact the case, and harder still to determine whether, if they could be established, these benefits are the reason why small groups are commonly used. Most projects lend themselves to working in discrete units naturally, and the optimal number in each group depends on the efficiency gains from cooperation for any given task.

Effective division of *phayna* tasks between small groups also adds the element of flexibility to the employment of community labor. Beyond the division of single projects spatially and temporally, *phayna* are called to deal with several projects in one day. Relatively few projects require the work of 200-275 men, and multiple projects on a single day ensures that all that human energy is used effectively while keeping organizing costs to a minimum. Both *phayna* organizers and *phayna* participants, however, know from experience that full participation is rarely if ever reached, and this in turn affects *phayna* planning and individual *comunero*'s decisions to participate. The inefficient use of individuals' labor can itself depress motivation and impede participation. While it may be a simple truism, both general agreement with the goals of the project and general confidence in the organizational ability of community leadership are essential for keeping *phayna* participation high, whatever other factors may be at play.

Labor Monitoring

To ensure that every household is pulling its fair share, a roll call of participants is taken after every *phayna* and registered in a notebook by the secretary of the *Junta Directiva*, *Consejo de Menores*, or the organizing committee for the *phayna* (*Padres de Familia*, Comité Forestal, etc.). I have already discussed the system of pawns and fines used to improve and enforce *phayna* attendance in Chapter 9, and I'll say a few more things about the extent of attendance below. What's important to note here is the use of a written accounting system to maintain equity. This no doubt relates to group size (>220) and accordingly, to the high cognitive cost and small personal stake each participant has in monitoring participation. In contrast, while equity is equally important in reciprocal labor exchange between households (*ayni* — essentially dyadic exchange), who owes how much time to whom is maintained in memory and rarely written down (the exception being when the work team assembled is exceptionally large, or the attendance of some participants is unsolicited or unexpected).

Unfortunately, I do not know (nor do I recall any ethnographic reference in the Andean literature concerning) how *phayna* participation was recorded and monitored in the past — until say, the 1960s — when the ability to write one's name was not so wide-spread. Other communities in the Lares area use a similar system, but I do not know how generalizable it is (see Chapter 12 for a comparison of the system in Ccachín with another in Calca province).

Household Labor Investment in *Phayna*

The number of days that a household is expected to contribute to communal work projects depends on the intensity of construction activity during a given year. Of this, the amount of time invested in communal agricultural production and in the sectoral fallow system is relatively constant. On the other hand, the amount of labor dedicated to public utilities and buildings varies depending on the organizational abilities of community leaders and the resources available. Subsistence activities place an upper limit on the number of *phayna* that can be called without affecting people's livelihood. Collectively,

the *comuneros* have ultimate say about the number of *phayna* and timing of *phayna* activity at the community assemblies. Individually, people can vote with their feet. Nonparticipation may increase when scheduling conflicts with other activities.

While I found it hard to get a precise overall count of the number of days each household was expected to contribute to community undertakings, I can give a fair — and for comparative purposes sufficient — approximation based on a combination of participant observation, informant recall, and review of a few *phayna* rolls. By my estimate, twenty to twenty-five *phayna* were called on average per year in Ccachín over the study period 1989-1991. This is an average of about two *phayna* per month (disregarding seasonal distribution). Over the three years, *phayna* were held during every month of the year, but in any given year, there were some months where *phayna* were not held. The greatest concentration of communal work parties occurred in August and September. Over thirty *phayna* were called in 1989 (because of my limited presence in the community in 1989, I have to go by the *comuneros*' reports on this rather than by my own observation). Approximately twenty-eight *phayna* were held in 1990. Around twelve *phayna* were held in 1991, the fewest in any of the three years. Of these *phayna*, six to eight each year were related to agropastoral production and land use. Nearly all the rest were called to build or maintain roads and community structures. The largest single project was the remodeling of the church. Between May of 1989 and April of 1990, there were thirty-two *phayna* held for the church, the majority of them falling between June and September of 1989 (according to *comuneros*, because of the church project, the start of the primary potato planting in 1989 was delayed by a few weeks). The other two major projects during my research stay, the construction of a road to bring the tractor to the community and erection of the walls for the new high school — both in 1990 — involved eight *phayna* days each.

In addition to the community-wide *phayna* above, different community groups held an undetermined number of work parties of their own. The *Padres de Familia de la Escuela* held work parties to repair the stone wall around the school yard and to work the corn and potato plots maintained by the school. The *Madres de Familia* maintained their

own gardens and plant nursery, and held a work party to plant seedlings in the community's tree nursery. Both of the two major dance groups, *Qhapaq Qolla* and *K'achampa*, held several work parties each to construct chapels to house their *láminas* ('icons') for the *Qoyllur Rit'i* pilgrimage. Besides public works by the *Club de Madres*, the women worked in rotations to cook for the *Vaso de Leche* Program, for each of the school lunch programs (PRONOEI, *inicial*, the primary school), and for government engineers and troops. They also worked in rotation to decorate the statues of the saints during certain seasons of the religious calendar. The amount that any particular woman worked depended on the number and size of the interest groups they were associated with (whether they had children in PRONOEI and in primary school, whether they were signed up for the *Vaso de Leche* program, etc.). The rotation for the 1989 PRONOEI program in the *anexo* of Qochayoq, for example, was such that the sixteen women with children in the program would be called upon to work once every three weeks during the months that donated foods were available. While these public labor demands averaged over all the women probably never exceeded 10-20% of that expected of the men, in particular instances they could be significant, and the labor invested needs to be included when calculating overall household contributions to community welfare (something that is rarely done in economic analyses of the *economía campesina*).

To get an idea of the relative magnitude of the contribution of household labor to communal activities, it's useful to compare the figures above from Ccachín with those provided by Gonzáles de Olarte (1984) for a sample of communities in Antapampa, Paruro, and Canchis, all in the Department of Cusco. While Gonzáles's work has the advantage of including a wider population sample (649 households in twenty-two communities distributed over three microregions), it is based on household surveys asking people to recall their economic activities over the previous year, a procedure likely to yield data as rough — if not more so — as my own.

Gonzáles's data lumps together all collective activity — *ayni*, *mink'a*, and *phayna* — as communal activity, while my own figures focus on community-wide *phayna* alone. While as noted above, this understates total communal labor by ignoring the communal

activity of women and community groups, for comparative purposes, I think it's prudent to focus on the *phayna* activity, both because my confidence in the data is higher, and because it allows for the most conservative estimate. A novel aspect of Gonzáles's analysis is that he relates all household labor allocation to "the total potential labor force" of the household ("*la fuerza de trabajo potencial total*"). This concept attempts to measure not only the number of persons potentially available to the household work force, but to take account of age and gender differences in productivity, using adult men as the standard. To do so, Gonzáles uses the coefficients: children 6-12 yrs. = 0.25, men and women 12-16 yrs. = 0.5, men 17-50 yrs. = 1.0, women 17-50 yrs. = .75, men and women ≥ 50 yrs. = 0.5. Accordingly, the average number of family members in a household — 5.1 — translates into the work potential of 3.05 adult males, while the average number of potential work days annually per household, assuming 250 potential work days per work year, is 763.[7] While Gonzáles's methodology may raise some eyebrows, it captures the idea that the *campesinos* themselves make discriminations in productivity by age and gender. For my purposes, nothing hinges on the accuracy of these coefficients (they could just as well be 1.0 across the board); their value here is that they provide a fixed point for cross-community comparison of *phayna* labor in relation to the total household labor expended.[8]

In terms of these figures, the twenty to twenty-five *phayna* days per year in Ccachín are 8%-10% of the 250 potential work days of a male head of household (or 5%-7% of a 365 day year). When considered in terms of the household labor potential, it is 3% (22.5/763) of the total labor power available. The *phayna* of the various community associations and the communal service of the women adds, at most, another 25% to this, so total average communal labor contributions probably do not exceed 4%.

It is hard to compare these figures directly with those obtained by Gonzáles because as already indicated, he puts *ayni*, *mink'a*, and *phayna* labor all in the same category, but a general comparison is still suggestive. Including all three categories of collective labor, he found that 2.2% of the total in Canchis, 4.2% of the total in Anta-pampa, and 14.5% of the total potential household labor in Paruro went into communal

activities. Unfortunately, I do not have any numbers on how many person days per year, on average, households in Ccachín work in reciprocal labor relations (*ayni* and *mink'a*). I'm hard-pressed to believe that one can get very accurate information on this through informant recall in survey questions, so I don't have a high degree of confidence in the numbers provided by Gonzáles either.[9] My impression is that the number of days worked in *ayni* in Ccachín is at least two to three times the number of days that the *comuneros* are expected to attend *phayna*. Put another way, I judge that for 20%-33% of the time dedicated to subsistence and household maintenance, at least one member of the household participates in a reciprocal work group. If this is the case — and I want to emphasize that at this point it is at best an informed estimate based on the average size of *yapuy*, *hallmay*, *allay* and other reciprocal work groups that I attended — then at least 12% of total potential household labor in Ccachín is reciprocal or communal in nature. This would put Ccachín closer to the communities of Paruro (14.5%) than to Canchis (2.2%) or Antapampa (4.2%). *Phayna* activity alone in Ccachín probably equals or surpasses the *ayni-mink'a-phayna* activity of the survey communities in these latter two microregions.

There's a pattern to these differences. As Gonzáles notes, the intensity of collective activity varies according to a) the principal subsistence activity in the area, agricultural zones marked by more intense collective activity than pastoral ones (actually, it may be the particular agropastoral mix that is important, as some of the *phayna* in Ccachín come about because of incongruities between the two), and b) the extent of market participation in a community, collective labor declining as the opportunities for wage labor increase. Ccachín and other major communities in the Lares area have a strong agricultural base, and in relative terms, are still weakly integrated into the market. But the latter variable is more complicated than Gonzáles suggests. Reciprocal labor tends to decrease with market penetration, but it's less clear that the same can be said of *phayna* labor. Much of the *phayna* labor in Ccachín is a response to opportunities created by increased access to resources funneled through urban institutions, and communal projects are partially financed by an increased ability to tax community members as their participation in the market grows. On the other hand, the opportunity to migrate outside

of the community to seek wage labor during slack periods in the agropastoral calendar conflicts with the community's need to schedule communal labor during the same periods. As I indicated in Chapter 9, *comuneros* are finding it increasingly advantageous to work elsewhere and meet their communal obligations, if need be, by paying off the resulting fines.[10]

As a percentage of total household labor, the 3%-4% dedicated to *phayna* may appear relatively minor. In aggregate terms, however, it represents a significant investment in the community, the equivalent of twenty people working full-time. The burden on households can also be substantial. Communal labor requirements affect certain household members more than others, and then, more at certain times of the year. While *phayna* tend to be scheduled for times when the opportunity costs of the communal labor are the lowest, the opportunity costs to *phayna* participation increase as access to labor and production markets increase. Because of differentiation within the community, the possibilities of *comuneros* vary in this regard. The opportunity profile of the community likewise not only differs from others, but changes over time.

It's important to remember that *phayna* participation is but one aspect of the total community investment expected of the *comuneros*. In Chapter 7, we saw that a system of universal service is used to rotate men though traditional offices. In Chapter 8, we saw that household heads (again, especially male) are expected to participate in decision making by attending the all-household assemblies. If one household member or another is present at every assembly, assembly attendance adds another ten to twelve days to a household's community-directed time profile. In addition, leadership positions in the *comunidad campesina* are unsalaried, and require the investment of time over and above assembly and *phayna* attendance. These positions generally offer greater personal reward for the individuals who take them on than the duties of common membership, but the work loads are substantially higher, and because they can interfere with subsistence activities, the positions need to be rotated regularly.[11] While there is a public good element involved to leadership and it is possible to free-ride, the direct and indirect benefits accruing to community officials are also substantially greater than those motivat-

ing *phayna* participation. Because of the small number of *comuneros* active in the *junta directiva*, *consejo de menores*, and other major leadership positions at any one time, however, if one averages the time investment over all the households in the community, it is only a small fraction of that invested in the *phayna*.

To all of the above, we must add the amount contributed to public projects through the community assessments. In Chapter 10, I tried to give an approximation of these monetary assessments in terms of the prevailing day wage for contracted labor in the area. In 1990-1991, the assessments were the equivalent of somewhere between eight and sixteen days of wage labor, but probably nearer the higher end of this scale. Adding together all of these various forms of household contribution to the community, the totals approach 7%-8% of total potential household labor as defined by Gonzáles.

Extent of *Phayna* Participation

To this point, I've focused on the level of contribution expected by the community — i.e., what each member expects of the rest — rather than on actual contributions. These expectations are aspirational norms reflected in the decisions of the assembly and the policies of the *Comunidad Campesina*. In fact, no one expects everyone to attend every *phayna*. One can be an upstanding member of the community by achieving somewhat less, and everyone can name upstanding members of the community.[12] There are sometimes extenuating circumstances, so one can miss a few *phayna*, pay the resulting fine, and stay in good stead. Accordingly, the average number of *phayna* held each year is a poor proxy for the average number attended. To close the gap a bit further, I want to turn my attention now to statistical norms, to what is usually done.

Overall, what is the average attendance at communal work parties? My data are not extensive, but what I have are suggestive. Table 11.3 lists a sample of ten work parties that I attended, with the approximate number of participants at each. These were general *phayna*, where every head of household, or their proxy, was expected to attend.[13] The average from these *phayna* is 115 *comuneros*, or 51% of households. For comparative purposes, Table 11.4 gives the average attendance at a sample of assemblies as well.

The two figures are surprisingly similar. The slightly higher percentage for assembly attendance can be attributed to the presence of the women.[14] Unfortunately, I do not have data on the extent that the *comuneros* who attend the assemblies are also the ones that are most likely to attend the *phayna*. My impression is that attendance is not hit and miss for either, and that some people have good overall attendance records and some bad, with the majority participating or not depending on such things as the weather, the day of the week that the communal activity is scheduled, the strength of their feeling about the subject, and the urgency of their other chores. This impression comes from personal observation and the things that the *comuneros* say about each other. It would be nice to have the life history materials — especially individual attendance records — to support it.

Fortunately, I can say a few things about the range between participants. The 1989-1990 reroofing of the church provides the best example, because it required the greatest investment of labor. Of the thirty-two *phayna* days that each head of household was expected to contribute, the number of days that individuals actually worked ranged from about seven to twenty-seven. That is, those that worked little worked about 20% of the time; those that worked a lot worked over 80% of the time. Individual work records vary from project to project, depending on household schedules and the timing of the work parties. The male head of household in my host family attended all but five of the work parties for the church, an excellent record. On the other hand, he made four out of eight of the work parties for the tractor road (my labor was credited for two of those days, so the household was only fined for two of those missed), and only one out of eight for the high school construction (I declined to have my labor credited to avoid favoritism). He was the only adult male in the household, and so there was no one to take his place in many male-oriented activities. Most often, when he missed a *phayna*, it was because he had gone to tend to his cattle, pastured a couple days distant. As the largest herd owner in the community, he was better positioned than any to pay off his absences with a fine, but while I was there, his *phayna* attendance record was slightly above the average, a respectable 60%-70%. One of the other large herd owners, son of the *arrendire* who was once

the *cacique* ('political boss') in Ccachín, was known for his failure to participate in communal labor projects.

The construction of the high school provides a second example of individual variation in *phayna* attendance. Of the eight work days possible, individual attendance records ranged from zero to eight days. The average attendance, based on a thirty-eight person sample, was about 62%.[15]

The levels of community participation that I have recorded for Ccachín may not be unusual in contemporary Andean communities. Urton, for example reports quite similar participation rates in Pacariqtambo (Paruro, Cusco), a comparably-sized town, during the 1980s:

> Taking the three examples of participation in *ayllus* discussed in this essay as the most relevant contexts for discussing this question, I would note the following points concerning the degree of participation in *ayllu* and community affairs. First, in the assembly when the drainage project was at issue, only between one-fourth and one-third of the heads of households (i.e., those individuals who were expected to be at the assembly) were actually in attendance. . . . Second, in the episode of "sitting together" by one of the *ayllus* in the barley fields on T'ankar Q'asa . . . barely one-half of the enrolled members of this ayllu (Nayhua) participated in the work party on that particular day. I have seldom found participation by *ayllu* members in such work parties to be greater than between one-half and three-fourths of the members of any given *ayllu*. It is usually much lower). And third, insofar as the maintenance of the *chhiutas* of the churchyard walls is concerned, usually only a handful of men turn out for the work parties to repair these walls. [Urton 1992:259-260]

He concludes,

> It would be a mistake to think that all (or even a significant majority) of the male members of the *ayllus* participate readily and willingly in communal work parties. In general, participation in *ayllu* work parties by the rank-and-file *ayllu* members seems to be motivated by two principal forces or mechanisms. One is the threat of sanctions imposed for failure to participate; the other is making participation both a means and a condition of receiving community benefits. [Urton 1992:260]

One of the striking things is that even with the threat of sanctions and with the conditioning of benefits on participation, participation rates are so low. I'll discuss possible reasons for this in the concluding section of this chapter. Here I'll only note that whether one sees the glass as half full or half empty is a matter of one's research perspective. The

glass is half empty only if one takes communalism — the expectation that certain pieces of property *should be* collectively owned and that certain tasks *should be* carried out jointly by all members of the community — for granted as a primary motivating force of social action in the Andes. If we start from the other end — with individuals or households — and take their cooperation in communal projects as the feature to be explained, it's as appropriate, if not more so, to ask: "Why are participation rates so high?

Case Studies

Construction of Two Roads

Well-maintained roads are necessary for exploiting multiple ecological levels, for communication, trade, and marketing of goods, and for regional political integration. The Inca constructed and maintained a vast road network throughout their empire using corvée labor, but most of it deteriorated with depopulation and the breakdown of the bureaucracy of the empire after the Spanish conquest (Hyslop 1990). Until well into the 20th century, the principal trails connecting Ccachín with communities in the Lares Valley and with the district and provincial capitals in Lares and Calca were those worn by foot traffic and mule train. In 1960, the Calca-Amparaes road was inaugurated (Chacón 1984). Soon after, a side route up the Lares River from Mant'o connected Lares to this road, allowing truck access to the area. In 1987, a more direct route was inaugurated from Calca to Lares. While the road bordered community territory, there was still a five kilometer hike from the road to the village center of Ccachín, and construction of a feeder route to the settlement itself was a major priority in the majority of *comunero*'s minds. They felt that better access was still needed if they were to expand participation on the market and lure more development aid to the community.

In addition to the major long-distance routes, most travel still takes place on foot-paths within and between villages, and these trails likewise need periodic attention to fill in wet spots, clear brush, repair foot bridges, and rebuild areas destroyed by landslides. These tasks usually require only a couple of dozen men, and they are tended to in *phayna* that target several projects simultaneously, or are scheduled as makeup work for men who

were absent at other *phayna*. Each community cares for the trails within its territory. Where local ownership is undefined, those who most use a trail are those who take it upon themselves to repair it. The *Pan de Azucar Comité*, for example, organized a five-day work party in 1990 to improve the trail between Ccachín and their cattle pastures. The trail was outside of the official boundaries of Ccachín and of any other village, and only used by those who had cattle pastured beyond. Each of the committee members had a direct personal interest in maintaining the road, and the small size of the group made it relatively easy to pressure members to participate.

Communal work parties are held for large-scale and multi-community construction projects as well. In the past, the labor for road construction was secured by using a combination of engineers, government soldiers, and *comuneros* from the villages served by the route. According to Zúñiga Rivero (1955), 300-400 men were needed weekly for construction of the Calca-Yanatile road, and they served without pay. Gutiérrez Pareja (1949) reports that the work teams were organized in five league (fifteen kilometer) segments for construction and road repair. He also recalls that when furniture and equipment needed to be moved from Qellu Unu to the antimalarial Hospital in Huachibamba in 1944-45, the governor ordered all of the men from Ccachín, Choquecancha, and surrounding areas to go to Qellu Uno to help, as the work teams in the Valley weren't sufficient.

Today, earth-moving equipment replaces much of the human labor in road construction within the district, but there are still occasions in which the communities are expected to show up in mass. In 1990, for example, the log bridge crossing the Lares River at Yerbabuenayoq was damaged, enough so that while the truck that carried us there could still go over it, all the male passengers would get out and walk to the other side in order to reduce the carrying weight.[16] *Phayna* were eventually organized to repair the bridge, and all of the communities served by the route — Ccachín, Choquecancha, Rosaspata, and Lares — sent work groups to participate. For smaller repairs, a small group of volunteers — usually those most directly affected — may be all that is needed. Once, I worked two days with a trucker, his wife, and a couple dozen men, women, and

children from Ccachín and Choquecancha to clear a landslide blocking the road above Yerbabuenayoq. In this case, the work group was formed spontaneously from those wanting to travel. The job could have been completed in a couple of hours if either community had sent reinforcements, but the problem was not considered serious enough to ask for or send additional aid.

During the years that I was in Ccachín, there were two major efforts to build a road to the settlement. The first was to pave the way for the arrival of the tractor; the second was to build a permanent road capable of bearing truck traffic to and from the village plaza. Both projects required major investments of community members' time, and provide insight into the organization of Andean work groups. I will describe each in turn.

Phayna for the Tractor

When Barbara and I first set foot in Ccachín, there was only a steep and narrow footpath connecting the main road with the village settlement. With the arrival of the tractor a year later, a road needed to be constructed to transport it to the central plaza. While for me, thereafter, this road was an ugly gash in the hill, it was also a testament to the capacity of the *comuneros* to mobilize collective labor to transform the landscape to suit their needs (Figure 11.1).

The road itself was laid out along the east slope of the village in a way that both bypassed everyone's cornfields and skirted a eucalyptus plantation, minimizing the damage to both private and communal resources. In terms of motivating community participation and support, the gains made by avoiding controversy in this way may have been canceled out by the dubious trajectory: despite the frequent switchbacks, there was widespread doubt that the tractor could negotiate certain areas of the precipitous hillside. The road was surveyed with a single goal in mind — bringing the tractor to the community — rather than to serve the community's long-term transportation needs. Not only was it not accessible to truck traffic, it could not be negotiated with the motorcycle used by the FAO-Holanda extension agent headquartered in Choquecancha.

Over the course of a few weeks, eight *phayna* were held to build the road. The *phayna* were led by the community president and the *alcalde de menores*. One or the other would mark off *chuta* with a pole cut three pick-lengths long, the minimum width needed for the tractor to pass. Three pole lengths made up a *chuta*. The *comuneros* informally divided themselves into work teams of ten men each at the start of each day according to kin, *compadrazgo* and friendship ties and according to the tools that each had brought. Half of each group would work with picks, metal bars, and *wankha* ('eucalyptus poles used as levers'), the other half with shovels and *lampa* ('shovel-faced hoes'). The first broke away the soil and rock and then rested while the second smoothed out the trail, rotating turns in this way so that the workers would stay out of each others' way and remain rested. Each team worked its designated site to completion, and then went to the head of the line to tackle another. The president occasionally passed up the ranks fortifying all with cane alcohol, and the *pututero* signaled lunch breaks and the end of the *phayna*. Every *phayna* began with an informal assembly among those gathered to discuss topics and resolve problems of the day — the work plan, arrival of the tractor, incidents of theft, characteristics of the candidates in the upcoming national elections — and ended with the taking of attendance. Participation rates varied between 25% and 60% of household heads per day, the higher figure achieved the day that the project was completed and the tractor brought up the road.

On the final day, the *tractorista* needed thirteen hours to pilot the tractor the five kilometer, 2000-foot rise to the village. While most crews worked furiously ahead to complete the road, a team including various members of the *junta directiva* and *consejo de menores* accompanied the tractor, guiding the driver and widening curves that the vehicle couldn't negotiate. Once the tractor's capabilities were determined, the final portion of the road was reworked to cut a more direct route to the plaza. Work continued past sundown, until the tractor finally reached the plaza around eleven o'clock. A small celebration was held to culminate the grueling day. The *tractorista* made one loop around the church with the machine, accompanied by a swarm of men and children, and honking the horn all of the while. When the tractor came to rest, the president called for a

cheer (a very western "hip-hip-hurray"), followed by applause. A woman emerged from the crowd and tossed white carnation pedals over the tractor and the driver. A speaker system and record player were set up on the front hood of the tractor and powered off the battery. The president of the community made a short speech, and the secretary called the roll of households. *Waynu* were played, and while most *comuneros* retired to their homes, a small group stayed with the tractor to drink and dance through the night. The next morning, the *Inca alcalde* and first *alguacil* went door-to-door, advising households how much they owed for the transport costs of the tractor, and collecting the 15,000 *inti* (54¢) per day fine for *phayna* missed.

Phayna for the New Road

Despite the labor and financial investments (assuming a 40% participation, rate on average, for the road building, at least 5000 individual labor hours went into its construction), neither the tractor, nor the road built to transport it to the community, had any further use. While the tractor had been driven up the road, there was no guarantee that it could be safely driven back down it. The road was used as a longer and more gentle footpath by those driving pack animals to and from the market in Yerbabuenayoq, and through weathering, was gradually reclaimed by the hillside.

In the months immediately following the project, however, these prospects were unknown. Inspired by their road-building success, community officials redoubled their efforts to bring a new road to the community, one designed to meet the needs of truckers and the demands of the seasons. A few months later the president signed a contract with CORDE-Cusco to do just that. The state was to provide engineers, machinery, and a veteran road crew, while the community would pay for the fuel for the caterpillar, provide communal labor, and feed the government workers. The budget prepared by CORDE-Cusco was based on the assumption that the road would cut through the south-slope corn sector on its climb to Ccachín, the gentlest and least-cost route.

Five months after the tractor *phayna*, a government survey team arrived to mark off the course for the new road. The head engineer expected to complete the task in three

days, and asked the community to provide a group of workers to help. Fifteen men were selected for the *phayna* by community officials, and they were advised by the *pututeros*, who passed through the community at sunrise the first day to call out their names. In addition, six women were summoned to serve as cooks.

The *ingeniero* ('engineer') skillfully assigned roles — ruler holder, mark painter, etcetera — and participants enjoyed the novelty of the work, taking the opportunity to look through the transit and clinometer every chance they had. It did not take long, however, for the first doubts about the project to emerge. Before continuing on with the work after lunch, an impromptu assembly was held among all present. The president expressed his apprehension about the road passing through people's cornfields. Several others joined in to voice similar concerns. The two women who had brought lunch to the fields were as vocal in this as the men. Although people knew that this was the plan and had signed on to it in general terms, the fact didn't take on emotional urgency until the point was reached where specific families were about to be affected. It so happened that neither the president, nor anyone else at the *phayna* was likely to lose any land to the road, but all had relatives and friends who potentially would.

The cornfields are the most valuable of people's land holdings in Ccachín. Use rights are well-defined, and individual plots can be bought and sold within the community. Along with being the most productive fields, the cornfields are the least expendable and least expandable. Most all of the arable land at the low-lying elevations where corn could be grown are already in production. The *assembly* would be hard-pressed to come up with equally-valuable plots to compensate those who lost land to the road. While the engineer was reluctant to depart from the original agreement, he listened to people's concerns and ultimately agreed to try to lay out the route without touching the cornfields. The going was slow on this, however, and making little headway in the afternoon, he dismissed his helpers early.

As the *phayna* ended for the day, the engineer stressed the importance of everyone returning for the next, and the following, until the survey was complete. The roles were somewhat specialized, and he was concerned that time would be lost if he had to train a

new crew everyday. While people seemed to understand the logic in this, it did not fit standard practice for recruiting communal labor, where turns are taken to distribute the burden equitably. A few of the *comuneros* indicated that they already had previous commitments or plans — it was late September, and the potatoes needed to be planted — and with this the engineer modified his original appeal, asking those with the most technical and essential roles to continue.[17]

Despite efforts to get an early start the following morning, when I jointed the group at "marker 6," the last marker placed the day before, the engineers and *phayna* workers were in the midst of another meeting. The president of the community did not return the second day, but the *alcalde de menores* was there to take his place. Discussion centered on the cornfields. This time, the head engineer insisted that the road had to go through the corn sector, as above it, the hillside was too "*accidentado.*" He advised the *comuneros* that he would leave the community that very afternoon if the community could not agree to this. He said that there were many communities that wanted roads but were not in line to have them; here, the community was to receive one, but was opposed to it out of shortsighted concerns about the cornfields. He argued that the road to Ccachín would be more valuable than the one that already existed to Choquecancha, because of the two communities, Ccachín had more goods to market. And what's more, he suggested that people with fields bordering the road would see the value of their land increase five-fold.

The engineer emphasized that consensus was needed to continue, as he didn't want to see anyone sabotage the project with *derrumbes* ('landslides') later on. He said that at this point, no one could say whose fields the road would go through. It could be anyone's, "It could go though yours, or that of your enemy." But people could not wait to make up their minds until the exact route was known. Turning to one *comunero* whose field was located in the sector, he asked him if he was willing to proceed given this uncertainty, and the fellow said "yes." Others agreed. But the decision was not for *phayna* participants alone to make, and the engineer requested that someone fetch the president and vice-president of the community to assure that the agreement had the

backing of the community's highest authorities. Neither community official could be found, however, and after the survey crew became impatient with the wait, the gathering decided to proceed without them. The *alcalde de menores* indicated that an assembly would be called to discuss "*la recompensa*" ('compensation') to be given those whose fields were destroyed by the road. An attempt would be made to find plots in the corn sector on the community's east side for them.

By the end of the day, the resolve of *phayna* participants had again weakened. The survey had reached the cornfields, and the *comuneros* could now see the effects. The switchbacks caused the greatest problem. One of the curves caught both the lower and upper sections of one family's field (one of the *carguyoq* for the pilgrimage to Qoyllur Rit'i the following year), leaving little area left for cultivation. One of the *comuneros*, who the day before complained to me that too many of his peers were thinking too much of the loss and not enough of the gain from the road, now suggested that the *comuneros* should move the markers after the engineers left, before the *tractorista* arrived to do the actual work (one of the others that was part of the discussion, however, pointed out that one of the engineers had written down the location of each survey marker in a notebook, so that the *tractorista* would know that the markers had been moved). There was widespread belief that there was an alternative route that would do considerably less damage to the fields.

The following day, only one *comunero* showed up for the survey. There were bad feelings. Talk of the "*mal trazado*" ('bad lay out') could be heard throughout the community. The president advised the engineers that there was widespread disapproval of the route that they had chosen. The survey crew left the village later in the morning without finishing its work. Many *comuneros* — including but not limited to those with land in the affected area — were not the least distraught to see it go. Others, however, blamed the president. They felt that the president should have smoothed things over with the head engineer, that he should have had him to his home, and served him a special meal. They lamented that the community was about to lose an opportunity that would not come around again for many years, that in the long-run, everyone would suffer.

Like most major ventures in Ccachín, the road project unfolded slowly and haltingly, as different pieces fell into place at different times to make it happen. I was not present to see it through. The president and vice-president of the community managed to assuage the surveyors, and pushed to have the road complete before their term of office ended three months later. The community sold a truckload of corn to purchase fuel for the road-building equipment, and this was taken by CORDE-Cusco as a good-faith commitment to continue with the project. The internal problem of compensating *comuneros* who would lose land to the road, however, remained unresolved. Many *comuneros* remained lukewarm about the project, though there was no organized or public opposition. Others were skeptical about the feasibility of the endeavor. As one *compadre* told me, "Its difficult to build a road here. Where there's pampa, a machine can work, but below, it's pure rock. It can't be done."

Two weeks after leaving Ccachín with an unfinished survey, the head engineer told me that the road crew was set to begin excavating in the village the following week. Soon after, however, the caterpillar broke down while repairing a slide on the main road between Lares and Yerbabuenayoq and was out of action for several weeks. On top of that, the crew lacked the dynamite to finish the project, which it needed to do before moving on. Most *comuneros* were glad for the delay. The community was now well into the planting season, and few were interested in working any *phayna* for the new road until January.

On January 1, 1991 a new *junta directiva* took office, with the dream of outgoing officers of inaugurating the road unfulfilled. During the rainy season, the road crew has its hands full trying to keep existing roads open, so it had no time to start a new project in Ccachín. It withdrew from Lares to work in the Amparaes Valley. The contract with CORDE-Cusco expired with the new year, and it had to be renegotiated. The new community officials, however, organized two general *phayna* in January to begin the project with manual labor, and the community made some headway cutting a path up from the Lares River. In late March, community officials traveled outside the village to sign the new documents needed to bring the road crew to Ccachín. After that, people

expected that the survey crew would have to return to complete the survey, and this would be used by CORDE-Cusco to prepare a new budget for the project. There was little public discussion, and no further construction on the road during the rest of 1991.

The next I heard of the project was at the December assembly, where a *phayna* was announced for mid-January to continue with the work started a year earlier. Community officials seemed to have little interest in going any further in securing government aid. The junta *directiva* expressed a desire to do as much as possible with communal labor in order to save on the costs — particularly for fuel — that they would have to pay to have the *tractorista* do the work. One corn crop had been planted and harvested and another was in tassel in the sixteen months since the surveyors first came in, but the community had yet to resolve the dilemma of how to secure the necessary right of way through people's fields. Unfortunately, I had to leave before this issue was addressed.

Construction of the High School

Construction of the high school also involved siting problems. The initial classrooms were on loan from the grade school, and new ones were needed. The director of the high school at the time favored a site below the grade school, but the *assembly* decided against it, as the terrain was irregular, and the community would have had to spend a tremendous amount of time and energy to level it. Instead, the assembly chose a site above the school in a relatively level area that was part of the *maway* sectoral fallow rotation. According to the director of the grade school, there was considerable opposition to the idea by the owners of the fields affected, resistance comparable to that of those who later stood to lose land to the road. The bulk of the land came from the holdings of a single family; the rest from the community. Once the land was secured, *phayna* were held to set the foundation for the new structure. The foundation was already in place when I arrived in 1989.

Erection of the building itself was begun in September 1990. Blueprints were provided by *USE* and followed a standard pattern used for school construction. The *Padres de Familia del Colegio* served as the organizing committee. *Phayna* workers

were divided into six teams, with each team assigned one of the rooms (another example of how work areas are partitioned by *chuta* in communal construction projects). In addition, work on the *inicial* ('kindergarten') building was started at the same time, so household heads were actually divided into seven teams of thirty-five to forty members each for the construction *phayna*. One of the teams was made up of *comuneros* from the *anexos* of Qochayoq and Rayankancha, but none of the rest were based on any kind of preexisting territorial or interest group. As with most *phayna*, the three widows in the labor pool had to find a male to work for them. The widow in the work group that I collaborated with was represented by her eleven-year-old son, the only instance I am aware of where someone so young was credited for their work.[18]

Each *phayna* group included men of all ages, young men doing the shoveling and adobe block work, old men mixing the clay for mortar with their feet. Each team was independent of the rest, with its own *capitán*, *secretario*, and *vocal*. Each group determined its own work schedule, maintained its own attendance record, collected the fines for members' absences, and decided what to do with the money. Several general *phayna* were called, however, so that most or all of the groups were working at once. Besides creating a more exciting and bustling work atmosphere, this allowed for greater coordination between the groups, and between the groups and the coordinators of the project. It also allowed for the resolution of controversy and conflicts between groups. Group 3, for instance, felt that Group 2 had more windows and thus an easier section, therefore they wanted Group 2 to take over work on the common wall between them. The president of the *Padres de Familia* intervened, blueprints in hand, and the responsibility stayed with Group 3.

In all, there were eight full *phayna* days during September 1990 for construction of the high school. Participation varied between 40% and 60% of households on any given day, and a spot check of the list of absentees maintained by a couple of the groups suggested that *comuneros* missed three to four *phayna* days on average, further confirmation of the percentages obtained by counting. The penalty for *phayna* absences was 500,000 *inti* ($1.17) per day. By the end of September, all of the walls were up. With the

beginning of the planting season, people became too busy in their fields to do any more construction work. Until the end of the year, all subsequent *phayna* would deal with the community's agropastoral needs. Besides, little more could be done without purchasing the requisite materials. While there was discussion about roofing the structure with straw grass until the $4000 needed for sheet metal roofing could be raised, the assembly determined that it would be wasted energy to roof the structure twice, first with thatch, and later with sheet metal. As with the church, it would also be a serious drain on the village's bunch grass supply.

Adobe needs to be protected from the elements to last, but the new walls were exposed to the rain for two months before being capped off. The walls of the two houses that were being constructed in the village at the same time were covered with a protective layer of straw grass by their owners without delay when the rains came. The difference in response time may be a small but telling indication of the distinct incentive structures of the two goods, one public, one private. Finally, in late November, on the anniversary of the community as a *comunidad campesina*, a *phayna* was called to cap off the walls with straw.[19] Each *comunero* was expected to deliver a bundle of straw grass to the building and place it in position. In turn, the director of the high school distributed a bundle of food to each of the participants in gratitude for their help with the project. The food was part of the stock provided to the high school by *Cáritas* and carried the USAID label.[20]

By June of 1991, there was talk among the *comuneros* of abandoning the site above the school and rebuilding the high school from scratch, this time at the site below the school that had been rejected in 1988. The teachers were on strike and out of the community at the time, so while the new site was more convenient for them, they did not seem to play an important role in seeding the doubt; rather Choquecancha initiated the groundwork for building its own high school along the main road to Lares in the *anexo* of Qollotayoq, and there was fear that this would preempt Ccachín's own building efforts. The Choquecancha site was centrally located so that students from both communities could attend (albeit with greater hardship by the Ccachín students), and there were reports that the *Proyecto Amparaes-Lares* (parish of Calca) was willing to fund Choquecancha's

building efforts. Given the competition from the neighboring village, many *comuneros* in Ccachín felt a need to relocate the school, both to get it out of the cold winds of the existing site, as well as to make it accessible to the students of Choquecancha. Supporters of the change noted that the most active proponent of the site above the school had since left the community, so he was not in a position to protest the move.

With the location of the high school again up in the air, no work was done on the project in 1991. The teachers were on strike through most of the academic year, including the dry *phayna* season, and this set all school-related activities back (a bit according to the dictum "out of sight, out of mind," and a bit out of the frustration with the school system caused by the strike). As noted in Chapter 9, the money that had been raised for sheet metal roofing at the 1990 *kermesse* for the high school had to be transferred to the *Herrandina* thresher fund to make the loan repayment, further constraining work on the project even after the high school teachers' return. When I left Ccachín in January of 1992, the issue of whether to proceed with the work already started or start over at a new site was still unsettled. No one wanted to roof the existing structure unless it was going to be used.

According to some, even if the high school was relocated, the work carried out to that point need not go in vain. The building could be roofed with straw and put to use. A few houses had already been constructed on the plain where the building was located, and with population growth, the area was among those most likely to absorb expansion. Once this happened, the building would not be so isolated. With trees planted around the *kancha* ('corrals') of the new houses, the area would not be so cold and windy either. One of the teachers predicted that someday, the pampa would be "*como un pueblo*" ('like a village'). Currently, it was best known as the site where tourist groups set up their tents when they came though town. Given the association, one of the suggestions bandied about in street conversation was to use the structure as a *tambo* ('wayside rest') for *gringos*. The present amount of tourist traffic, however, hardly justified the cost, and with limited time and financial resources, construction of the high school was top priority in most *comunero*'s minds.

Phayna labor must be coordinated with the agropastoral calendar, and major projects tend to proceed in energetic spurts followed by several months of inactivity. During the break, conditions may change, or the alternatives may become clearer. Projects are reevaluated. The consensus may change. Many grumble about the purported failings of community leaders. Many grumble about the collective will — "*la voluntad*" — for communal undertakings. One of the striking things, however, as a walk through the village or a glance at Table 11.2 will attest, is that despite the decision making, organizational, and financial problems that I have described, and despite the project delays, so much gets done.

Participation and Nonparticipation in Communal Projects

Optimal Levels of Cooperation

The problem of achieving mutually beneficial cooperation is one of assuring that an optimal amount of participation takes place to meet collectively-agreed upon goals. For the most part in this chapter, I have been concerned with how successful the community of Ccachín has been at achieving universal participation (the rationale behind presenting Tables 11.3 and 11.4, for example) without regard to whether universal participation is always desirable. This is legitimate in the case of attendance at community assemblies or payment of the household assessments, since these are collective action problems in which it is best for all if all cooperate.[21] The situation is more complicated when it comes to *phayna* participation, because depending on the undertaking, both too little and too much communal labor can lead to the inefficient use of human resources. In extreme cases, the success of a project can be jeopardized. While the whole "tragedy of the commons" literature is about oversupply of labor in some sense, it is less often reported in the case of public works.

The most graphic example of too much labor being employed in a task in Ccachín — too much cooperation, if you will — is the case of the collapsed high school roof described earlier. Only about one fourth of the *comuneros* were present at the *phayna*, so attendance was far short of universal cooperation, but as it turned out, even this number

proved counterproductive. With the *alcalde de menores* (who was ostensibly in charge) occupied with the technical details of construction, and with organization of the participants themselves left to their own self-initiative, the roof caved in from the weight of too many workers. After the calamity, the project was abandoned for good.

A less obvious but more common example in provided by the *papa yapuy* on communal potato lands in 1991. Again only a small fraction — about a third — of the *comuneros* who were expected to attend were in attendance. The field was located an hour-and-a-half hike from the village, three hours travel time round-trip. The seventy-two participants in the *phayna* did all of the work that needed to be done in an hour-and-a-half. Consequently, the ratio of time worked to total time invested (plowing time plus travel time, but excluding waiting time, lunch time, and rest breaks) was 1/3. Had only half the number of participants taken part, the ratio of work time to total time would have been 1/2, assuming no difference in the economies of scale. That is to say, because of the distance from the community involved, thirty-six men working about three hours each (considerably less than for a typical work day in the same sector doing the same task in *ayni* or *mink'a*) would have done the same job in 111 hours less total time than seventy-two men working an hour and a half each. At the other extreme, had all of the men in the community worked, the ratio of work time to total time would have been about 1/7.5, and they would have expended about 687 hours more than thirty-six men doing the same job. One might argue that the social aspects of *papa yapuy* and other agricultural tasks are more important than the economic ones, and that these social aspects — in contrast to the economic ones — are enhanced by the presence of each additional participant, but when 65% or more of the eligible *comuneros* are absent, the argument falls somewhat flat.[22]

Three things stand out in the examples above. First, because of the declining marginal productivity of each additional worker, even if we assume that each *comunero* prefers universal cooperation to universal noncooperation (i.e., each would rather work on the project than see it fail), one can readily imagine that many *comuneros* will prefer to let others do the work, knowing that they are not necessary to the task. When the pool of potential workers is larger than the optimal group-size for carrying out the task, an

incentive is created to excuse oneself, leaving it to others to do the work. Assuming such preferences, such collective action problems have the structure of an *n*-person Chicken game, where each potential participant prefers to "defect" if enough others cooperate, and to cooperate if "too many" others defect.[23] Chicken games are characterized by more than one equilibrium outcome, and the amount of cooperation that will emerge among rational actors depends on whether there are ordered sequences for bowing out or not, the amount of information available, whether potential participants are risk averse, and other extra-game theoretic considerations (Taylor and Ward 1982).

The second point here is that when universal cooperation is undesirable, some collective decision-making mechanism is necessary to single out who will cooperate and who will not. Solutions can be centralized or decentralized, depending on whether there is an institution with the capacity to regulate and enforce selective participation or not. As Elster notes, however,

> When . . . universal cooperation is undesirable, it is difficult to single out by a decentralized solution who will cooperate and who shall not. In such cases, decentralized mechanisms are liable to yield too much cooperation or too little . . . The relation between strikes and trade unions is a good example. Before workers were organized, it was not possible to direct some of them to strike: it had to be all or none. [Elster 1989:131]

The organization of participation at communal work parties in Ccachín is still at this "all or none" stage, and it can be related to the relatively limited degree of centralization of decision making within the *comunidad campesina*. On the continuum between decentralized and centralized solutions, the community is closer to the former for most problems.

While there is no intrinsic reason why the prevailing convention "equal labor contributions from each household" needs to be applied to each work party rather than averaged out over the course of a month, a season, or a year, the *phayna*-specific interpretation has the virtues of simplicity and transparency. It is not easy to come up with a formula that guarantees equity across different kinds of projects and over the breadth of the agropastoral calendar. Recording the number of hours each *comunero* works rather than the number of days could potentially resolve the first problem, but requires a much more substantial community infrastructure for monitoring and accounting. It is harder to

think of a workable solution for the second that does not restrict the time period to narrow limits, since the sequencing of most agricultural tasks makes them time critical, and a day put toward communal labor during the planting or the harvest is not equivalent to one worked during January or August, when the opportunity costs are less. In terms of transparency, there is also hard to imagine a centralized solution that allows the *comuneros* to determine who is working and who is not that is better than the visual reckoning that takes place when everyone works on the same day. Any more selective system buries the information in account books. A more centralized system also introduces the possibility of nepotism and corruption in the selection of who will work on given days and in managing the books. To maintain fairness, a system of checks and balances needs to be established, and there needs to be a high level of trust in elected officials.

The third point to make in this regard is that selective cooperation presupposes a reliable sanctioning system to assure that if, for example, thirty workers are needed to complete a project in a day, thirty workers will show up. As we have seen, the system of fines in place in the community falls far short of ensuring universal compliance, although it presumably increases attendance beyond what it would be without. Not knowing how many *comuneros* will respond to the call for *phayna* labor on any particular occasion, the system in place errs on the side of assuring that there will be more than enough (as already noted, the collective interest differs from individual interests in this regard, and this situation itself creates incentives to free-ride). The techniques used to optimize the employment of communal labor are limited to the distribution of available workers between several smaller projects on the same day (thereby facilitating reassembly and a roll call of attendance at the end of the day), the division of single, extended projects among small, rotating work teams, each which works for a day, and the assignment of absentees from previous *phayna* to projects that do not require universal cooperation.

Factors Influencing *Phayna* Participation

The evidence on *phayna* participation in Ccachín presented in this chapter suggests that the *comuneros* fall far short of universal participation in many situations

where universal cooperation would be desirable, but also achieve more cooperation than necessary or beneficial in situations where more selective cooperation would be in order. The overall picture, however, is not so gloomy as this portrayal suggests: while individual participation in communal endeavors varies, all community members participate some of the time, and the fruit of there efforts is a steady and impressive array of collective goods.

My data are not sufficiently fine-grained to determine the role that self-interest, altruism, and social norms play in explaining the amount of cooperation that exists in the village. The fairly elaborate system of formal sanctions presupposes that people will respond to their self-interests to avoid suffering these imposed costs, but the limited effectiveness of these sanctions in Ccachín suggests that a) these costs are too low to motivate a substantial number of households in the community to cooperate, b) the fines are sufficiently severe but their probability of being imposed is low, or c) some combination of the two.

As I have emphasized, ensuring compliance with the mandates of the *comunidad campesina* is itself a collective action problem, and informal and decentralized solutions to resolving this problem may undergird formal, centralized solutions to first-order collective action problems. It remains an open question whether self-interested individuals potentially subject to sanctions will collectively select a level of sanctions severe enough to ensure cooperation via a system of direct democracy. It seems to me that the answer depends, among other things, on whether the individuals most likely to attend the assemblies are the same individuals as those most likely to attend the *phayna*, whether the level is set through majority vote or by consensus (the severity of fines is one of the few decisions where a vote is typically taken at assemblies in Ccachín), and the extent to which the decision makers are risk averse.[24] Whether it is rational or not for an individual to vote for a severe penalty for noncooperation depends on the perceived likelihood that it will be applied to them. Whether they are willing to go the next step and pay the costs of sanctioning — either by participating in the group responsible for enforcing the sanctions (going door-to-door to collect fines) or by sanctioning others who fail to sanction — is a separate and more critical issue.

As I have indicated, it appears that the collection of fines for failure to participate in communal work parties in Ccachín is no more universal than participation in those work parties itself. While I think that the costs of sanctioning are often over-stressed in the rational choice literature (see Elster 1989:120, and compare with Margolis 1990:826), some sanctions are more costly to impose than others. All things being equal, the cost to sanctioners increases with the probability that their identity will become known to those sanctioned (they may alienate the target individual or provoke retaliation), the more time they need to take from their normal activities to engage in the sanctioning, the more that force is required, the greater the ambiguity about whether a norm has been willfully violated (i.e., whether there are legitimate exceptions and exemptions) and the greater the uncertainty about a person's ability to provide restitution (the collection of information about individual's cash reserves, subsistence needs, etc. is costly). All of these costs are relatively high for fines and other formal sanctions, while the personal rewards to the delegated sanctioners in a nonsalaried administrative system are relatively low. The collection of fines typically takes place away from public view, and neither the collectors nor the fined have a compelling self-interest in making their failure to meet their responsibilities public, as both may be subject to the reproach of their fellows. The greater anonymity (with respect to public knowledge) in the paying of fines for failure to attend a *phayna*, in contrast to the transparency of attendance at the original *phayna* undoubtedly affects enforceability. As Margolis (1990) notes, as behavior becomes more anonymous, the effectiveness of given penalties against noncompliance must fall.[25]

Besides the above, two other factors help explain variation in *phayna* participation rates from one project to the next.

First, projects vary in their level of community support. Nonattendance at *phayna* can represent a kind of passive resistance to outside development schemes that have failed to inspire grassroots support, or more generally, to any project that has been pushed by community officials or passed through the assembly without a firm consensus. The road survey described earlier in this chapter is a good example of this. The *comuneros* wanted a new road, but not at any price. There were enough opposed to routing the road

through the cornfields, that when it came time to survey there, few were willing to proceed. Of the fifteen men scheduled to work with the engineers on the third day of the survey, only one showed up.

Second, the quality of leadership plays a role. Had the *junta directiva* acted quickly in the preceding example, it could have called an emergency assembly to resolve the issue, which hinged on compensating those who would lose agricultural land to the road (presumably though some kind of land redistribution). Lacking that, the only recourse for *phayna* participants was to vote with their feet. Some of the *phayna* scheduled at assemblies while I was in the village were never held. One — to prune trees in the pine plantation — was canceled because people were too busy with potato planting. As far as I know, it was never rescheduled. The other — to build a shed to protect the tractor — apparently just slipped officials' minds, though it was something that should have been done at least a year earlier, as in Choquecancha. The *phayna* to cap off the walls of the new high school with straw to protect them from the elements took place well after the construction of the walls themselves, the delay jeopardizing the work that had been already done. Similar neglect is uncommon in the *comuneros*' treatment of their own goods, and comes about because the potential consequences of such failures to act are collectively absorbed. Urton (1992) offers a like example from Pacariqtambo: despite the fact that a ten-meter stretch of the churchyard wall collapsed, it didn't receive any attention for over a year (had it been one of the walls surrounding the potato sector, however, I imagine that the response would have been almost immediate).

Advance planning and timely announcements can make a difference in *phayna* turnout itself, giving the *comuneros* a chance to schedule for the activity. In some cases, little more may be needed than to send out the *pututeros* to announce the *phayna* the night before, rather than the morning of the event. *Phayna* participation by community officials is likewise important, both because their behavior may serve as a model for a certain number of the rest, and because the assurance that an activity will be well-organized can enter into how people distribute their time between private and public concerns.

Phayna activity is not the only area where private action for the public good may fail to materialize. Early in Barbara's and my stay in the community, the *sanitario* passed from house to house chalking the spot at each where an outhouse was to be built (to that point the dogs and pigs had taken charge of village sanitation). In principle, the outhouses were supposed to be located at least fifty meters from a dwelling, but in fact, the sites he marked out were often substantially less. The distance turned out to be a moot point, however, because when I left Ccachín almost two years later, not a single outhouse had been built. This outcome may be the result of an organizational problem, or this may be a case where individual's indifference curves were too flat for cooperation to emerge. As Taylor and Ward (1982) suggest, if everyone's valuation of a public good is sufficiently low relative to their valuation of their private good, the situation has the structure of a Prisoner's Dilemma, and their optimal response to any level of contribution by the others is zero contribution.

Notes to Chapter 11

1. This is true, at least, for the public domain, where talk is dominated by men. I was not in a position to determine whether women use the term *phayna* with reference to their work groups.

2. The principle applied here is the same one as applied in *ayni* ('reciprocal labor exchange'). The labor of men and women and young and old are equally acceptable for some tasks, as with the harvests, but when it comes to *yapuy* ('plowing') or *hallmay* ('hilling' or 'mounding') the crops, the range for what is considered commensurate labor is much more restricted. If one were to explore the issue of "equal pay for equal work" in Andean terms, local judgements about what constitutes "equal work" in *phayna* and *ayni* labor would be a good starting point.

3. Allen (1988:117) mentions a fourth annual work party in Sonqo for which the *alcalde* is expected to serve food and drink: *Mamachaq Wasin Allichiy*, "Repairing the Little Mother's House," i.e., the church. When Ccachín's church had a thatched roof it was in need of almost yearly attention, but since being roofed with sheet metal in 1989-1990, this is no longer the case. *Phayna* for the church take place intermittently in Ccachín, as financial resources are secured to make improvements.

4. In the past, with a smaller population, it may have been that full participation was essential for completion of these tasks in a single day. These events may owe their community-wide nature to those times, with the persistence of this trait into the present explained by some other mechanism. On the other hand, festive goals may have always been dominant.

5. The relationship between the timing of work on the communal plots and on individual household plots is more complicated than I have described it here. A potato sector is not usually closed until the *yapuy* for the communal plot has been held. *Yapuy* are held over the course of a couple months, some *comuneros* always being among the first to hold them, others having a reputation for being among the last. Since people need to transport fertilizer to their fields for their *yapuy* with pack animals, a sector cannot be closed off until most people have conducted them. Those who are the first to plant are, with good reason, also the first to pressure for the closing of a sector to the animals. This pressure affects the timing of the *yapuy* on community lands, as the *phayna* for fencing off the sector, if not held prior to planting, takes place soon after.

6. The church in Choquecancha is not only colonial era, but built over Inca ruins, double reason why the Peruvian government has a say in what would otherwise seem to be a community domain. Although Ccachín is represented by the symbol of a church in 18th century maps of the area (Figures 1.4 and 1.5), the present structure

does not have major historical significance, reducing the *trámites* involved in carrying out the project.

7. It's standard in the literature to assume 270 work days per year to determine the availability of labor in rural areas, but Gonzáles uses the more conservative figure of 250 days. Either figure is somewhat arbitrary, and should not be taken to imply that campesinos in the Andes maintain a five-day work week as we conceive of it in the industrialized West.

8. As I have already indicated, age and gender distinctions are made in determining who is eligible for participating in *phayna*. These distinctions are made by adult men, and in particular instances they may be challenged by women (as in the case of the 1991 *papa tarpuy phayna* I attended). Below a certain age, male labor is not credited toward communal labor service. Above a certain age, men may be assigned an independent and less taxing *phayna* project. This is especially the case when the *phayna* is held at a considerable distance from the village, so that travel takes up four hours or more of the day. In this case, the old men form an independent work group to take on projects closer to home. Women are excluded from *phayna* participation for most tasks. Differences in productivity according to age are implicit in the division of roles among adult male *phayna* participants as well, but in contrast to the above, all receive equal credit for their work. In part, older men make up for their lack of physical vigor by their possession of information and skills gained through experience, but this lumping of all males in the same category may have as much to do with power as it does with productivity (just as the same might be said about the exclusion of women).

   The principal problem I have with Gonzáles's coefficients is that outside of *phayna* labor — which most often involves tasks primarily assigned to adult men within the household division of labor as well — is that it misses the basic principle underlying the assignment of tasks to specific age-sex groups in the Andes: that of energetic efficiency. Since body weight is highly correlated with the energetic cost of most nonsedentary activities, tasks tend to be assigned to the lightest sex-age group that can effectively perform them (Thomas 1972). In terms of global efficiency, it makes no sense to speak of a six-year-old herder as having a quarter of the work potential of a seventeen to fifty-year-old man. While Gonzáles's scheme may have utility for comparing the potential total household labor force with the potential of the household for outside wage labor ("*la fuerza de trabajo potencialmente asalariable*") given certain assumptions about the job market (he assigns both men and women over seventeen the coefficient of 1.0 in defining this latter category), it can be misleading outside of this context.

9. Some ways of going about it are more valid than others. The most direct questions (How many days did you work in *ayni*? How many *phayna* did you attend?) are probably the least useful. The information is better reconstructed by asking *comun-*

eros how many people attended their *papa yapuy*, how many attended their *sara t'ipiy*, who owes them reciprocal labor, who do they owe, and reconstructing a composite picture of each household in the sample from that. Gonzáles (1984:241-254) is sensitive to the methodological problems, but does not provide a list of the survey questions used.

10. The highest level of *phayna* activity that I have found reported for any community in the Andes occurred in Masaqkancha (Paccha, Jauja) in the Mantaro Valley (Sánchez 1987). There, in 1979-1980, each *comunero* had to work sixty days on communal lands alone (Sánchez does not indicate how many additional *phayna* were called during this time period for non-agricultural tasks), with the earnings from the harvest going into the community's corporate fund . Because of time constraints during the harvest and the fact that community members earned the majority of their income in salaried activities outside of the community, some *comuneros* had to contract wage laborers to help them meet their *phayna* obligations. Masaqkancha is a small community of thirty-four households, and its situation was an exceptional one. Two years earlier, the community staged a land takeover of a bordering hacienda, and by 1979 it had increased the lands worked collectively by eighteen hectares. Sánchez notes that the community corporation achieved near universal participation in the *phayna* and attributes it to two factors: a) title to the land was still being adjudicated and the community needed to present a united front in working the lands to establish its claim, and b) individual access to the pastures obtained in the takeover was conditioned on participation in the agricultural *phayna*. Poor, cattleless members of the community did not have to participate in the work parties, but they were excluded from the benefits of the communal project as well, further sharpening economic differentiation within the community. The first factor heightens the urgency of resolving the collective action problem but does not in itself resolve it; the second, however, provides individual-level incentives for contributing to the public good. Sánchez stresses that the situation of Masaqkancha is unique, and perhaps a temporary one. The possibility remained that once title to the land was gained, pressures would mount to turn the land over for private use.

11. This is above and beyond the democratic intent behind biannual rotation. At the current levels of aggregate production and of socioeconomic differentiation in the community, there does not seem to be the economic base for political specialization.

12. Margolis's (1990) notion of pragmatic norms as qualified, or less demanding versions of aspirational norms fits well here. As defined by Margolis (1990:828), "pragmatic norms . . . allow variability in terms of their range of applicability and their relative weight as against other aspirational norms and also in terms of private costs that are appropriately borne in order to comply." In Chapter 6, I referred to these norms as "social standards."

13. I have only listed the *phayna* here in which every household was expected to participate and I was able to count the participants or consult the roll at the end of the day. I was not able to count the participants at all of the *phayna* that I attended (due to spatial or timing problems), and several *phayna* where I do have a count are excluded because they did not involve the whole community at one time.

14. In a few cases, one household may have two family members present, a father and an older son, or a husband and wife. I'm counting individuals rather than households here, and assuming that the former is a pretty good indicator of the latter.

15. The rolls calls include the names of a few members who have left the community on a long-term but temporary basis without going through the necessary procedures to have their names removed from the list. A blank is left behind their names, but for most, there is little possibility that they will ever make the time up.

16. This was standard practice whenever a truck crossed over a dangerous point: where a segment of the road had been washed away by a landslide, where there was slumping of the hillside, and where a bridge was out. Sometimes the female teachers would get out too, but most women generally stayed put. Most men traveled standing, and most women sitting, and it was easier for the men to scramble over the side walls than it was for the women in their skirts. I'm not sure what's the exact explanation of this gender division. Perhaps time was saved in this way by not having to open the back door of the truck to let the women out. Perhaps women did not want to budge out of concern for losing their seat. Perhaps this was the Andean version of male chivalry. Perhaps all of the above. In any case, I was more than happy to conform to local custom, and never ceased to worry for the safety of the women, who seemed to think that what was good enough for the driver was good enough for them.

17. To develop his argument, the engineer used me as an example, saying that I was there *colaborando* ('helping out', 'collaborating') even though I would return to my own country and would never benefit from the road. He noted that I did not have any goods to market, but I was there because I wanted to see "a well-made road." He concluded that given this, it's all the more important that those who live there, who stay behind, should work for the same goal. This is a simplification of my own motives, of course — which in any case focused more on the process than the product — and I cite it here as a fairly mild, but relatively typical example of the kind of paternalistic discourse directed by *mestizo* development workers toward the *comuneros*. It was not the first time that a priest, teacher or government official used Barbara's name or my own to make a similar point.

18. During the roll call at the end of *phayna*, men call out "*presente*" or some other expression to indicate their presence. In ongoing projects, they also indicate the number of family members that have worked that day. By bringing along one's sons,

one can make up for prior absences. While boys under fifteen years old may work alongside their fathers at *phayna*, they are not usually credited for their work. In the case of the road construction for the tractor, for example, one of my *compadres* was accompanied by an eleven-year-old and a seventeen-year-old son, but the family was credited for two rather than three workers. There appears to be some flexibility on the lower end of the age scale, depending on the project and on the means of the household. Much appears to depend on whether one's coworkers feel that they are being taken advantage of (the roll call is a public forum, open, and often subject, to comment and complaint), rather than on any hard and fast rules.

19. One of the ways that an attempt is made to increase *phayna* attendance for small projects that take place around the village is to schedule them to coincide with festivals, especially civil festivals. With the festive atmosphere, people are less likely to go off to work in their fields on these days and consequently are available for collective labor projects. The *phayna* are worked around the official ceremonies so that people are able to attend both. One might also posit the reverse, that the *phayna* are called on these days to keep people around the village to keep attendance at the ceremonial functions high, but I assume that for most people, the festive aspects of the day provide more incentive for hanging around the village than the labor aspects do. In any case, piggybacking the two keeps the focus of the day on community events, and benefits both activities.

20. In Chapter 9, we saw that the FAO-Holanda extension agent distributed trees from the nursery to participants in *phayna* for the tree nursery, so there seems to be a pattern of distributing goods from the public stock to individual households in appreciation of the *comuneros*' participation in public work projects where a) the project is overseen by an outside agent such as a teacher or development specialist, and b) the agent controls desirable and easily divisible goods that can be so distributed.

21. These are both situations where each additional cooperator increases the amount of good made available — in the first instance, the legitimacy of collective decisions, in the second, cash in the community treasury. There are other kinds of collective action situations where it is not the total amount of a good that goes up as participation increases but the probability that the good will be made available. This second is characteristic, for example, whenever the *comuneros* of Ccachín set off for Lares or Calca to participate in a regional campesino strike. There are also intermediate forms — "step goods" — between the two, as with the construction of a high school (half a classroom is no better than none, but each additional classroom is a gain) and the construction of a road (half a road is better than none if it can reach a convenient transfer point).

22. With travel time, plowing time, waiting-to-start time, lunch time, and rest breaks included, the total amount of time invested in the event per participant varied

between six and seven-and-a-half hours, depending on whether one was early to arrive or a latecomer. There was a much higher turnout for the potato planting in the same fields six weeks earlier (175 participants). The time it took to plant the field on that occasion was slightly less than an hour. The event was preceded by an informal assembly which accounted for another two hours of participants' time. The work day was eight-and-a-half to ten hours from the moment people left home until the moment they returned, again depending on whether they were early or latecomers. Because of the travel distances involved, when a task is less time critical (such as *papa hallmay*, the hilling and weeding of potatoes), the *comuneros* form small groups which rotate daily until the work is done, thereby increasing their labor efficiency.

23. If on the other hand, people's valuation of the time they contribute toward the public good is sufficiently low relative to their valuation of the equivalent amount of time put to securing a private good, then their optimal response to any level of contribution by the others is zero and the situation has the characteristics of a Prisoner's Dilemma.

24. If those who attend communal work parties are the same ones that set the fines, then the penalties are presumably set to try to discourage noncompliance by the rest. There is another possibility however. Given weakness of will, the *comuneros* making the decisions may find it in their interests to make it harder for they themselves to defect. In this case, the fines are intended to be self-binding, to hold themselves to personal or aspirational norms that are subject to erosion by more immediate material interests (for discussion of self-binding behavior, see Elster 1979 and Schelling 1984).

25. Just as the roll call of *phayna* attendance provides a public listing of who is present and who is not, a public listing of those who fail to pay their fines would decrease the anonymity of the latter. However, I am not aware of any instance where those who failed to pay their fines for *phayna* attendance or those who failed to meet their household assessments were ever publicly named.



Figure 11.1: *Phayna* to Build a Road for the Tractor

Table 11.1: Annual and Recurring *Phayna* in Ccachín

Cleaning of Village Water Canals
Construction and Repair of Walls and Fences Around Agricultural Sectors
Fencing of the *Hatun Tarpuy* Potato Sector
Fencing of the *Maway Chakra* Early Tubers Sector
Fencing of the *Sara Chakra* Corn Sector
Deer Hunt in the *Anexo* of Rayankancha (*Chakuy Taruka*)
Extinction of Grass Fires (In the Case of Emergency)
Inspection of Territorial Markers (*Deslinde*)
Planting and Pruning of Trees in Reforested Areas
Tillage of the Community Potato Fields
Planting (*Tarpuy*)
Plowing (*Yapuy*)
Hilling and Weeding (*Hallmay*)
Harvest (*Allay*)
Trail Maintenance

Table 11.2: Chronology of Major Community Projects Requiring Community Labor

Year	Project
1982-1985	Addition of six classrooms to the school
1986	Construction of the *Posta de Salud* (Medical Post)
1986-1988	Installation of *Agua Potable* (Water System)
1987-1988	Construction of the *Salon Comunal* (Community Meeting Hall)
1989-1990	Reroofing of the Church with Sheet Metal
1990	Construction of a Road for the Delivery of the Tractor
1990	Initiation Construction of *Inicial* (Kindergarten) Building
1990	Initial Construction of the New High School (After Foundation Placed in 1988)
1991	None
1992	Construction of Showers for the School Flooring of the *Salon Comunal* Construction of Road to the Village Center (Projected, Surveyed 1990)

The dates of projects before 1989 are based on reports by *comuneros* and are approximate. Most projects extend over a period of a few years. The chronology of projects from 1989 onward is based on my own observations. Construction of the High School and the road to the village were targeted by the *junta directiva* and approved by the Assembly as the two major projects for 1991, but little communal labor was expended and no significant progress made on either.

Table 11.3: Attendance at Work Parties

Date	Phayna	Attendance
3-28-90	5th day of work on tractor road	150
4-5-90	6th day of work on tractor road	72
4-6-90	7th day of work on tractor road	70
4-7-90	8th day of work on tractor road	125
5-13-90	Roofing of old high school building	62
8-20-90	*Deslinde* (Boundary Marking); Digging of water canal for high school construction	110 25
9-24-90	Construction of walls for new high school	120
9-29-90	Construction of walls for new high school	150
9-23-91	*Hatun Tarpuy* (Planting of community potato fields)	175 (15♀)
11-11-91	*Papa Yapuy* (Furrowing of the community potato fields)	75
	Average	114 (51%)

Table 11.4: Attendance at Community Assemblies

Date	Topics	Attendance
8-1-89	Church *phayna*, campesino strike, typewriter repair	108 (100 ♂, 8 ♀)
4-1-90	Assessment for tractor, *phayna* for tractor road	180 (150 ♂, 30
3-16-91	Reforestation, annual assessment for school, campesino strike (note: it was a very rainy day)	200 (180 ♂, 20 ♀)
3-31-91	Land title for pastures	60
4-1-91	Land title for pastures (note: held because a quorum was not reached on the previous day)	123
9-25-91	Fines for fires, reforestation	135
10-23-91	Human rights, school reports, FINCOOP bank loan	100 (82 ♂, 2 ♀)
11-16-91	church balcony, problem of thefts, fine for animal damage, quota for land title	120 (95 ♂, 25♀)
	Average	**126 (56%) (115 ♂, 11♀)**

Chapter 12

Deslinde: Marking Territorial Boundaries

Introduction

Until recently, *deslinde* — the checking and marking of territorial boundaries — was an annual event in Ccachín. The *Inca alcalde* organized the affair, and the men of the community would walk the border and check the placement and condition of the rock cairns ("*hitos*," "*mojones*") used to delimit community territory. The women, children, and old men would meet up with the group near the end of the inspection, and a huge feast — a *merienda* — would be served to all by the *Inca alcalde* and his entourage of *varayoq*. Similar rituals are common in the Andes, though it appears that the practice is not as widespread as it once was. They seem to occur most often in the Carnival season, a time of offerings for the animate landscape, ritual battles between communities, and sexual assertion (Allen 1988; Rasnake 1988; Radcliffe 1989). The practice is in decline in Ccachín. The full set of markers have not been checked in several years, and recent *Inca alcaldes* have not provided the community with a feast.

According to *comuneros*, a bottle is housed in each of the *hitos* ('boundary markers') along the border, and each bottle safeguards a signed and dated record of when the marker was last checked, its location, and its condition. During *deslinde*, the men go as a group from marker to marker. At each *hito*, the old bottle is broken open, the record read, a new record is made, and the bottle replaced with a new one. Old *hito* reports are archived by the *teniente gobernador*.[1]

With the gradual expansion of community lands since becoming a *comunidad campesina*, it has become impossible to walk the perimeter of Ccachín's territory in a single day, necessitating change in protocol of the ceremony. At the same time, more explicit mapping of community boundaries and registration of land title with the *Oficina de Comunidades Campesinas* have provided alternative means for documenting

community claims, and have reduced the necessity for annual inspections. I suspect that both are reasons behind decline of the practice. The *deslinde* takes on renewed urgency, however, whenever a border dispute breaks out with neighboring communities. A few years after Ccachín became a *comunidad campesina* (sometime between 1975 and 1985), a land dispute between Ccachín and Qelkanka reached crisis proportions. One of the *deslindes* conducted during that period revealed that the *hito* marking the boundary between the two had been destroyed, and the bottle with the *hito* report had disappeared. There were some confrontations between the two communities at the site, with an exchange of words, but no violence. Authorities came from Ollantaytambo to back the *campesinos* from Qelkanka (the boundary marks not only two communities, but also two districts and two provinces), but eventually, the issue was resolved in Ccachín's favor.

Disputed Borders, *Deslinde* 1990

In 1990, another border dispute erupted, this time between one of Ccachín's *anexos* — Qochayoq — and Chupani, an *anexo* of Wakawasi. Community officials in Qochayoq asked the mother community — Ccachín — for help, and a *deslinde* was organized to place some *hitos* along the river in the high pastures southwest of Qochayoq in an area known as *Hatun Wayq'o*. A family of herders from Wakawasi lived in the area, and several families from Chupani pastured llamas and alpaca there, but Ccachín held official title to the land. Property rights have traditionally been asserted through use in the Andes (according to the principle of "use it or lose it"), and the *teniente gobernador* of Ccachín confided to me that because people in Qochayoq had failed to use the land, they shared blame for the conflict. Their previous indifference had allowed the herders from Chupani to fill the void and become de facto owners.[2]

Relations between the communities have often been tense anyway. Wakawasi has fame as a cattle-rustling town, and people in Ccachín complain that they are the principal victims. *Comuneros* recall that several years ago, thirty men from Ccachín went to Wakawasi to confront some alleged thieves after their animals disappeared. They were greeted by villagers from Wakawasi bearing sticks and hurling stones. Outnumbered

three to one, they were forced to retreat. As noted in Chapter 1, these conflicts have a certain ethnic cast for people in Ccachín. In contrasting the two conflicts, people say that the dispute with Qelkanka was resolved because the authorities from Ollantaytambo were "well-educated" and knew how to fight with "words instead of stones," whereas the "people of the hills" from Chupani and Wakawasi were *ignorante* ('ignorant'), *viciosa* ('vicious'), and *brava* ('fierce'). The vice-president of the community went so far as to describe them as *terroristas* (on account of their violence, not their politics), applying a term current on the radio and in the regional and national news.[3]

The destination for the 1990 *deslinde* was a point on a ridge overlooking *Hatun Wayq'o*, a 4½-hour hike from Ccachín. There were three *deslinde* groups. One, lead by the *varayoq* of Qochayoq and Ccachín with the *pututeros* trumpeting their movement, took a circular route that ascended quickly to the pass between Qochayoq and Qelkanka, and then followed the territorial boundary southeastward along the ridge. This approach gave them control of the high ground. A second group, including the president of Ccachín and a number of community officials, took a direct route, crossing the valley floor and approaching the site from below. The vice-president of the community served as standard-bearer, leading this group behind the Peruvian flag. A third group, of *comuneros*-at-large, took a route that likewise put it quickly on the ridge, a truncated version of the route taken by the *varayoq*. All three groups reached the site within minutes of each other.

Immediately upon reaching the site, the president oversaw the construction of a *mojón* ('stone marker') to establish the community's claim. Gathered around the marker, flag raised high, community officials discussed strategy, and then passed it on to everyone gathered. Meanwhile a group from Chupani approached from the valley below (Figure 12.1). People were not sure what would happen, but many had brought slings and slingshots, expecting that there might be a fight. The Ccachín contingent numbered about 110 men, the Chupani contingent about seventy-five, a third women, some with children and infants. Upon their arrival, the villagers from Chupani stopped and sat as a group

about 200 meters downhill from those of Ccachín, effectively blocking the placement of another marker along the boundary.

The Ccachín group was next to move, going down to meet the Chupani group for a face-to-face encounter. The leaders of the two communities came together, the president and vice-president negotiating for Ccachín. The flag was rolled up and put away, and the men from both sides gathered around their leaders. The women from Chupani formed a separate group a short distance from the men (Table 12.2). While the men from both sides were relatively calm and quiet during the proceedings, allowing their representatives to do the talking, the women were angry and agitated, providing an outpouring of simultaneous, one-way commentary to the men, well-punctuated with "*¡carajo!*"s (a choice Andean expletive).[4]

During the discussions, the negotiators for Chupani presented their counterparts from Ccachín with two letters supporting their claim to the land from district and provincial authorities; the negotiators for Ccachín displayed the document giving them official title. While restating positions, the meeting did not lead to any new agreements. Upon a signal from the president, the Ccachín group broke for lunch, setting up in a sheltered spot amidst the bunch grass some fifty meters above the conference site. The folks from Chupani did likewise, going further up the hill to a spot that put them near the new boundary marker. Each *comunero* carried *qoqaw* ('traveler's food') — with tamales, boiled corn, and *charki* being typical fare — and we seated ourselves and shared food among small informal groups of relatives and friends (this is typical for a *phayna*, and contrasts with the more centralized arrangements of *ayni* and *mink'a*, where there is a single event sponsor). *Chicha*, *trago*, and coca were also shared within and occasionally across family groups. Near the end of the lunch break, the president of Ccachín approached me to request that I take a photo of the boundary marker that had been placed; soon after, however, he thought better of it, as the participants from Chupani had likewise been drinking, and he feared that taking the photo would incite an incident. As we all stood up to leave, the three negotiators from Chupani came down to see us off, shaking hands and exchanging coca with community officials.

To leave, we descended the ridge. No sooner than we were out of stone's throw range, we heard a commotion above, and turned around to see everyone from Chupani on their feet, hurling a volley of stones in our direction. Given the distance, the offensive was more a warning than an intent to do harm, but a number of the younger men from Ccachín stopped to consider what to do, uncomfortable with retreat in the face of the provocation. Chupani now had the strategic advantage, controlling the ridge, and the president of Ccachín urged everyone to continue on. The goal of placing a series of markers had not been met, but it was clear that it could not be achieved this day without a fight. We learned later that the Chupani group destroyed the boundary marker that we had placed before they left the site.

About half way back to Qochayoq, the group from Ccachín stopped to rest in a gentle pass called *Pilpiq'asa*. The area provided a natural amphitheater, and the group took advantage of the break to hold an impromptu assembly. Such informal assemblies are common after work parties, but notes are not taken, and they are not recorded in the *Libro de Actas*. The roll call of participants was conducted at this time. The roll calls bring everyone together at the end of every *phayna*, creating an opportunity for such assemblies. In terms of group process, it assures that no one leaves early, and provides effective closure to the event.[5] The spatial arrangement of participants in these *phayna* assemblies tends to be mildly hierarchical, with the president of the community, flanked by the *pututeros*, facing the rest. Figure 12.3 illustrates the arrangement at the *deslinde* under discussion. It's representative of spatial relations at such meetings in general.

During the assembly, the *comuneros* discussed the events of the day, and what to do to complete the marking of the contested territory. The president read aloud the letters presented him by the people from Chupani. The gathering decided that it would return on a future date with greater force, this time with all of the men (only about half were present) including those from Rayankancha. They also agreed that next time they would include the women in their expedition as Chupani had done. Finally, they determined that they would approach the *prefect* in Calca about the problem, and solicit the aid of the *guardia civil* ('policemen', 'guardsmen') for the return.

The final stage of *deslinde* took place in Qochayoq. The women from Ccachín hiked to Qochayoq in the afternoon to meet the returning men, and all joined together there for a feast. Before the meal, the president of Ccachín exhibited the land title and a map of the community, reaffirming the community's rights to the pastures in dispute. Qochayoq's grade-school teacher greeted the guests from Ccachín with a short welcoming speech and read the place-names of the land claimed from the map. The vice-president of Ccachín led everyone in a rallying cry — "*Viva los campesinos, Kawsaychu kampisinukuna*" ('Long live the campesinos' repeated in Spanish and Quechua) — and launched into a political speech in support of the FDCC (of which he was the local representative), until quieted by several in the crowd, who suggested that he should save it for another time. The centerpiece of the event was the meal. This was a major outing for people in Ccachín, and except for election day in Lares, the only time that the *comuneros* customarily visit another community en masse. The *alcalde* and *varayoq* of Qochayoq hosted the event and provided food for all. *Ch'uñu*, *moraya*, and a soup of potatoes and mutton were served, along with *chicha*, *trago* and coca. As on election day, the women in each family also prepared a meal to take along. *Tamales*, *chicharones* ('fried pork') and other special foods were shared within and across family groups. Unlike the example of municipal and presidential elections, where people sit in extended family groups, men and women sat separately for the meal. Figure 12.4 diagrams the arrangement, which can be compared with Figures 12.2 and 12.3 to get a sense of the pattern of gender, age, and role hierarchy common to most all formal, public, ceremonial events.[6]

A month after the *deslinde*, the *comuneros* in the *anexo* of Qochayoq decided to take matters into their own hands and went to the disputed territory alone to place the *hitos*. They did so without consulting the president of Ccachín, and without the aid of the mother community. They encountered superior forces at the site and were beaten back by a group from Chupani, suffering four casualties in the process. There seems to have been a difference in the sense of urgency that the two populations — Ccachín and its *anexo* — experienced the problem, a difference that matched their interests in the area. No one in

Ccachín pastured animals in *Hatun Wayq'o*, and there was a limit to how much people wanted to sacrifice for their highland cousins and neighbors.[7]

Ritual and Expressive Aspects of *Deslinde*

As Radcliffe (1989) notes, marking ceremonies in the Andes have something in common with both extra-community pilgrimages and community processions. While I treat them as a kind of organized communal labor here, I appreciate that other parallels can be drawn and that patterns can be discovered by associating them with these other conceptual domains. For descriptive purposes, we should be aware that the terms "ritual," "ceremony," and "work party" all reveal as much about the analytical framework of the observer as they do about the activities they describe. "Action," "event," and "phenomenon" are more neutral in this regard. The most general term used by the villagers themselves — "*un costumbre*" ('a custom') — is well-chosen: it captures the idea that there is enough stability in the series of associated activities that the whole can be treated as a something that repeats itself at regular intervals over time.

Deslindes or *recorreos* (another name for boundary marking ceremonies in the Cusco area) have multiple features and vary from community to community, and I have no pretensions to explain them in their entirety. In the interest of completeness, and as an aid to other researchers, however, it's useful to contrast a few of the features of the *deslinde* in Ccachín with others that have been described in the literature.

Place in Annual Calendar

One aspect is the timing of the event. The *deslinde* I attended took place in August, a month in which the *pachamama* ('Earth Mother') is conceived to be especially alive and animated (Casaverde Rojas 1970:150). I am uncertain whether this is its traditional place in the ritual calendar, a recent change, or a unique occurrence, but in all of my discussions of the ritual cycle with people in Ccachín, no one suggested that it has ever been held at a different time. Elsewhere, boundary inspections are generally a part of Carnival season. The most complete description of such an event in the Cusco area is

by Radcliffe (1989), and the *recorreo* that she attended in Kallarayan (District of Taray, Calca Province) occurred on the Tuesday before Ash Wednesday. I find two things to note in this. First, there is a contrast between a rainy season (Kallarayan) and dry season (Ccachín) scheduling of the event. According to Radcliffe, the first fits well with the "closed and inward-looking" nature of Carnival season, a time of "establishing and sustaining the collective identity of the territorial community" (Sallnow 1987:157, cited by Radcliffe 1989:575). The second makes some practical sense: most communal work projects take place during the dry season (a pattern observed by Vallée 1972:247-248 and confirmed by my own experience). This is not to say that the timing supports one interpretation of the practice over another; only that in terms of labor scheduling, the August date is not surprising. The second aspect to note is that on the Tuesday before Ash Wednesday, there is a public festival in Ccachín as well. Just as the men run from one boundary marker to another on that day in Kallarayan, they run from the home of one *varayoq* or *mayordomo* to another in Ccachín (recall Table 2.4). In so doing, they traverse the village settlement in zigzag fashion. Rather than focusing on territorial boundaries, however, the event highlights authority, abundance, and redistribution, and there is a clear element of prestige competition as each sponsor puts forth food, music, and dance.

Participants

A second aspect relates to the actors and roles involved. In Ccachín, the boundary marking has traditionally been sponsored by the *Inca alcalde*. This may be changing, with the community president taking on an increasingly important leadership role in the *deslinde* itself (indeed, there is a confusion among many *comuneros* as to who is responsible for the failure to organize *deslinde* in recent years, the *Inca alcalde* or the president). The president, however, is not expected to provide food for the event while the *Inca alcalde* is. Radcliffe makes no mention of the *varayoq* at all in her discussion of the boundary markings in Kallarayan. There, the ceremony is sponsored by a *carguyoq* ('chief sponsor'), a *mayordomo* (presumably, a 'religious steward'), and a *sargento* (a

kind of dancer). At the end of the ceremony, there is an informal election to select the *comuneros* who will fill these roles for the following year. In both communities, the *teniente gobernador* appears to be the one that maintains the list of boundary markers. In both of our accounts, the head school teacher also plays a role, but as an outsider, it is more one of validation than organization or sponsorship. In both communities, men and women join together for the feast associated with the event, but only men participate in the boundary walk. Of the latter, participation is expected of every household, a characteristic that distinguishes this event from other community festivals, where attendance is optional.

Roll Call of Participants

A third aspect of *deslinde* is the roll call of participants. In her discussion of the annual *recorreo* in Kallarayan, Radcliffe indicates that a listing of members takes place there but once a year, during the *recorreo*:

> After the third *hito*, the crowd rests on a wide plain . . . . At this point, the president reads out a list of the villagers from the *padrón*, a bi-annual census of male and female comunidad members over 18 years of age. As the male villagers' names are recited one by one by the president, men respond by indicating their presence. or friends and kin explain why certain men are away. The *recorreo* is the only time of the year when all male villagers are named together as part of the whole. [Radcliffe 1989:582]

In all essential features, the description matches the roll call of names at the annual boundary marking event ("*deslinde*") in Ccachín as well, with the difference that in Ccachín, the roll call takes place repeatedly throughout the year, a feature of every *phayna*.

Radcliffe draws symbolic meaning from this naming of all male villagers as a part of the whole, but from my experience, I have no reason to go beyond the straightforward utilitarian explanation — in which the practice is part of an effort to prevent free-riding — as I suggest above. By Radcliffe's interpretation, the reading of the list of community members at the *recorreo* defines the social boundaries of the community in the same way that the naming of the boundary markers and sacred peaks defines the territorial bound-

aries. Further, the exclusive naming of men ritually enhances *communitas* in what's essentially a rite of intensification by denying gender differences:

> Parallels can be drawn between the naming of territorial components of the community at the *hitos*, and the naming of the social community from the *padrón*: throughout the boundary-marking ritual, spatial and social referents to the community are made, with the effect of contrasting and enforcing each other. To say one set of names (of the *apus*) is to require in turn a listing of *runa*, the names of the people who make the landscape into a community. In the reading of the *padrón*, a continuity and equality of members is implied that is analogous to listing *apus* and *hitos*, the landscape features. [Radcliffe 1989:582]

> During the *recorreo* efforts are continuously made to highlight social homogeneity . . . . Gender difference is dealt with by excluding women completely from any visible ritual role in the procession. Gender difference is removed from the ritual by the non-participation of women in the boundary-marking itself, and from their non-appearance in the reading of village members. . . . Although adult women's names are included on the *padrón*, they are not spoken at the reading during the boundary marking, and as such the women are doubly muted by the ritual. By means of these practices, social homogeneity is heightened as gender difference is denied and muted, despite the fact that gender is so crucial in social interaction on a day-to-day basis in the community in non-*recorreo* situations. [Radcliffe 1989: 588-589]

I am not in a position to judge whether the symbolic cohesion and coherence of the roll call in conjunction with the recitation of place-names as described by Radcliffe in any way explains its place in the boundary marking ceremony in Kallarayan. It would be useful to know the extent to which these meanings and messages enter into the intentionality of the participants, either now, or before the ritualization of the practice. Radcliffe doesn't make this clear. I see no reason to deny that the symbolic associations may in some sense explain the origin and persistence of the practice. On the other hand, they may piggyback on the labor monitoring explanation (after all, she doesn't say how many participate, or what the Kallarayans do, if anything, to ensure attendance at the event) or play no role at all. There's no reason to treat them as mutually exclusive. However, once one recognizes that boundary marking is a kind of *phayna*, and the same constellation of features (roll calls, reference to the list of households rather than *padrón general*, etc.) is a common and conscious practice for monitoring *phayna* participation in the Andes, it

becomes clear that they do not always carry such symbolic weight. Without some grounding in intentionality, there is no reason to assume that this particular juxtaposition of traits can be treated like a passage of text from which symbols and meanings which otherwise are kept separate can be read.

Use of Speech, Text, and Key Symbols

The fourth aspect I wish to consider here is the use of speech, text, and symbols in the ceremony. The event combines the use of indigenous symbols — *vara*, *pututu*, and traditional costume — with symbols more commonly associated with the nation-state, the most conspicuous being the Peruvian flag. The first are part of most *phayna* to some extent, while the second are not. The highlands reverberated with the trumpeting of *pututu* throughout the day. The trumpeting conveyed different messages at different points of the *deslinde*, at times intended for internal consumption, at times intended for the community's adversaries as well. The *pututeros* signaled everyone in the pre-dawn hours that it was time to set off for Qochayoq. They marked the advancement of the *varayoq* and the *comuneros* that followed them to the site and along the territorial limits. They sounded the beginning and end of the post-encounter assembly. Given the confrontational context, the sounding of the *pututu* appeared to serve as a call to arms, a sign of authority and strength, a battle cry, and an indication that despite retreat, there would be no backing down.

Radcliffe suggests that the contrast between the written documentation used during marking ceremonies (the lists of *hitos*, *padrones*, etc.) and the oral presentation used to invoke the *tirakuna* and *apu* is central for understanding the *recorreo*. The first is associated with the state and its representatives, the second with indigenous community and the autochthonous power of the landscape. The first is systematic, linear, and codified, the second is elastic, elliptical, and erratic. Juxtaposing and intermingling the two,

> The *recorreo* refers to the regional and national structures within which it is nested. This nesting is conflictual, in the sense that certain dimensions of community identity are perceived to be negated by state actions: the community responds

> by repositioning itself in relation to the state and reaffirming the aspects of identity which are furthest from state interference. Mediation between community and state is worked out by developing ritual forms of speech and practice which are distinct to everyday treatment of, and discourse about, village lands. [Radcliffe 1989:584]

Stated in this way, the *recorreo* is not so much a collective action problem as it is a collective identity problem, an issue that I'll take up below. Many of the same elements employed in the ceremony in Kallarayan — both written and oral, political and religious — are featured in the boundary marking in Ccachín as well. Maps of the community, land titles, *hito* reports, and the *padrón* of community members all play a role, as do traditional objects and invocations of sacred terrain. My own reading of the texts and speech of the ceremony, however, is that they are not so much intended to say "who we are" as they are to say that "this is ours." All are used to document, justify, and legitimize territorial claims, with the hope that they will be accepted as compelling evidence by — or at least dissuade — others making similar claims. Along with tenancy on the land, demonstration of superior numbers (sufficient reason to include the women in an activity where they are normally absent or excluded) and a show of arms (stones as threat and deterrent), they are part of the repertoire of tactics used to achieve the same goal. They go even further, by demonstrating that the community's claims are backed by supra-community and supernatural authority and power.

As indicated in the quote from Radcliffe above, *campesinos* often have mixed feelings about aligning themselves with the state. Allen records, for example, that in the village of Sonqo,

> *Runakuna* say that *Taytanchis* ('Our Father') arrived one day "*documentuyuq*" ('with documents') and dispossessed the Inca of their lands. Confronted with the official papers, there was nothing for the Incas to do but leave. *Runakuna*, the Incas' cultural descendants, cling to what poor land they have and wonder rather skeptically whether the *pachakuti* ('apocalypse') will ever arrive to revalidate their ancestors' prior and unwritten claims. [Allen 1988:110]

Wrapping the flag around oneself can be similarly fraught with ambivalence. On the one hand, the flag is a power symbol. It is carried so that other communities are aware of and made to respect the force of law that defines community boundaries. On the

other hand, there's a point where the power of the state is perceived to be limited: the flag is thought to be unable to exert power over the highest lands of the indigenous communities. Radcliffe's informants in Kallarayan, for example — regardless of their degree of hispanization — felt that it was dangerous to take the flag to the puna. The flag is threatened by the *apu*, and the state's authority is undermined by carrying the flag into the *apu*'s domain. According to Radcliffe, while it is fine to use the Peruvian flag in processions in general (indeed, the flag plays a prominent role in the *recorreo* in Kallarayan), it's use in a procession on the puna is taboo.

Villagers in Ccachín took the Peruvian flag to the puna during the *deslinde* that I attended, so it may be that the proscriptions against doing so are not generalized across all communities, or that the exact point where accompaniment of the flag "goes too far" is open to debate and varying interpretations. One can imagine that villagers in two communities in conflict may have differing opinions in this regard, depending on the extent that they perceive the state to be aligned with their own interests. State intervention rarely favors all sides of a conflict at once, and the same documents that were used to support Ccachín's claims negated those of Chupani. Presumably, from the perspective of the villagers of the latter community, the actions of the state seemed arbitrary and unjust, all the more so because they did not take into account land tenancy. It's important to note, however, that rather than eschewing written evidence altogether, officials in Chupani took advantage of the fact that in most contexts, "the state" is itself more than a single actor, and accordingly, that it is not always nor necessarily univocal. In the face of Ccachín's papers from the Ministry of Agriculture, Chupani presented letters demonstrating the support from provincial officials. To counter Ccachín's map, the negotiators for Chupani presented the president of Ccachín a map showing that the disputed territory belonged to Chupani. The president of Ccachín dismissed this evidence, saying that anyone could make up such a map.

Ambivalence about written texts or the flag pale in comparison with ambivalence about the police and the military (recall the discussion about Ccachín's Human Rights Committee in Chapter 8). As Allen writes,

> The tradition expresses very well their attitude toward the official Hispanic bureaucracy as an intrusive and hostile, but powerful and unavoidable, force in their lives . . . the *guardia civil*'s regular patrols through the countryside leave the *Runakuna* tense and uneasy, for they all know of family or friends who have been arrested, and some have been hauled off to jail themselves, for minor or nonexistent offenses. In the *Runakuna*'s eyes, the agents of the law exercise power arbitrarily, like the mythic *Taytanchis* with his documents. [Allen 1988:110]

Not only are *comunidades campesinas* nested in regional and national hierarchies that give them formal legitimacy, this nesting provides an opening — albeit limited — for turning the tools of that power in their favor. The fact that state power is so often exercised arbitrarily does not seem to dissuade *comuneros* from soliciting it for good cause. It may be that Allen overstates the case for Quechua distrust of the Hispanic bureaucracy, which appears to be tempered by the hope that external authority will help resolve chronic community problems. Alternatively, it may be that while morality is about renouncing choices of action that are effective but culturally repugnant, moral principles prove weak before the seduction of utility.

Less than a week after the 1990 *deslinde* in Ccachín, the *junta directiva* sent a letter to the *prefect* in Calca requesting the assistance of two policemen for a three-day period to finish placing the boundary markers in *Hatun Wayq'o*. Besides soliciting help in resolving the intercommunity problem, the letter sought help in addressing an intracommunity problem as well: people's shirking of their responsibilities to meet financial obligations to the school and to the high school "as agreed upon in an *asamblea general*." The letter was read over the loudspeaker during the counting of proceeds of the *kermesse* for the high school, creating the impression that there was a linkage of the two issues, and the presence of the police would resolve both.[8]

Explanation of the Practice

Territorial Defense

From my perspective, the fundamental purpose of *deslinde* is the signaling and defense of property rights. The event has deterrence value even in the absence of

immediate conflict between neighbors, although such conflict, as in the case described here, can give it special urgency. These goals are public goods, and as such, the event is subject to the same kind of collective action problems (free-riding, underprovisioning, etc.) as any other *phayna*. As indicated above, one of the techniques used to ensure attendance is the roll call of participants, backed up by fines for those who shirk their duty. The feast provided by the *Inca alcalde* at the end of the boundary walk can also be understood in these terms, an abundance of food and music provide an inducement that goes beyond the sanctions. In turn, both the sanctions and the feast are second order public or collective goods, so the explanatory chain for how collective action is achieved in this, as in most instances, does not stop here.

While I do not know the origin or antiquity of the annual boundary inspection *phayna* in the Andes, the practice of marking the boundaries itself is an ancient one. At one time, lineage founders were buried at the boundaries of *ayllu* fields and these sites were marked with monoliths ("*wak'a*," 'cult shrines'), investing them in religious significance (Gonzáles 1989). When the Inca subjugated a village, they marked the boundaries and divided the lands for state, temple, and local community use (Cobo 1979). Territorial units were defined by the *wak'a* for which local groups were responsible. The Inca imposed heavy penalties in an attempt to prevent local boundary disputes, but such conflicts were still common during Inca rule (Moore 1958). As well as indigenous antecedents, *deslinde* was common in the past on the Iberian Peninsula as well. Echegaray (1928), for example, indicates that in the Basque Country, boundary walks were likewise at one time annual community events, with considerable feasting and merriment. It seems that as they began to fade in importance, the length of time between events was extended (while in some communities they were scheduled twice a year, in others they were only held every two, five, or ten years), while the number of participants declined (instead of all of the households being required to participate, a special committee was selected, or members of the governing council would carry it out). Similar practices were common elsewhere on the continent (Redonet y López-Doriga 1928 notes that in some areas of Europe during the Middle Ages, the death penalty was imposed on anyone caught

moving boundary markers), and Echegaray finds antecedents to boundary walks on the peninsula in the Roman *ambarvalia*.[9]

Similar solutions to the same problem no doubt emerged independently in Europe and the Americas, but there are likely to be diffusionist and syncretic processes at work in the development of specific features of the practice in the Andes. The dramatic depopulation of indigenous populations reduced land pressures in the early colonial period, but colonial haciendas filled the vacuum, complicating the delineation and defense of territorial claims by native communities, and introducing new structures for the definition of property rights.

The practice of *deslinde* is now in decline in Ccachín, and it seems to have completely disappeared in many communities in the Cusco area. The most straightforward explanation for this is that state intervention has resulted in clearer territorial boundaries and provided a juridic-enforcement structure for the resolution of border disputes. Just as the annual New Year's *phayna* for cleaning the water canals has virtually disappeared in Ccachín with the introduction of a piped water system, so *deslinde* has given way to maps, registration papers, and appeal to provincial authorities and the *Oficina de Comunidades Campesinas*. It is never easy to get full-scale participation in any community work project, and less so when the reason for amassing large numbers has lost force. The more that participants become expendable, the more they find better things to so with their time. There may be a nucleus that tries to keep the tradition alive: to the extent that their prestige is on the line, those responsible for organizing the event — the *varayoq* in Ccachín and the *carguyoq* in Kallarayan — have an interest in both carrying out their duties in a given year and in assuring that there will be sponsors to replace them for the next — but the event is itself likely to lose prestige as it loses utility. If the boundary inspection was purely that — an annual check to ensure that the boundaries were intact — the task would hardly necessitate a community-wide work party to carry it out. The expectation that all contribute suggests that the event does something more. The change from being a community-wide to delegated event is signifi-

cant in this regard, and I suspect that the decline of the practice in both Europe and the Andes is due to the same cause.

There is always the possibility that through time the reason for a practice will change. Gould (1994) captures the evolutionary idea nicely with his "tires-to-sandals principle," highlighting change by fortuitous side consequences. The metaphor has a special resonance here, since tire sandals are basic footwear in Ccachín, where they are known as *usut'a*, and where people are ingenious in their recycling of manufactured objects in general. As Gould explains,

> In our world of material wealth, where so many items are thrown away because the cost of repair now exceeds the price of replacement, we forget that most of the world fixes everything and discards nothing. . . . sandals are made from tires, bracelets from telephone wire, kerosene lamps from bisected tin cans, containers from scraps of metal, and cooking pots from the tops of oil drums. . . .
>
> Yet the theme of recycling for purposes almost comically different from the original intent not only occupies a central place in the history of life but also completes an argument that I left half-finished in a previous essay. . . . I will argue, in short, that the fundamental principle of quirky and unpredictable success by fortuitous side consequences pervades all scales. . . . I claim that the wheel of quirky and unpredictable functional shift (the tires-to-sandals principle) is the major source of progress at all scales. [Gould 1993:313-317]

While Gould applies the principle to biological evolution, it is applicable to cultural evolution as well, the folklorization of many Andean traditions being a prime example. The question here then, is whether *deslinde* — born of a kind of economic-political necessity — has taken on other purposes or functions that explain its continuation, when its original intent has lost force.

Defining Social Boundaries

Radcliffe (1989) suggests two alternative possibilities: a) that the aim of boundary marking ceremonies is to reinforce local knowledge about village land rights, and b) that while the ceremonies are no longer necessary for establishing territorial boundaries, they are explainable in terms of a need to define social boundaries. I consider each in turn.

The first is less problematic in the sense that it places intentions and reasons clearly within the minds of individual actors. Radcliffe reports that "the explicit aim of the boundary-marking is to teach the young about the territorial limits to the village" (Radcliffe 1989:593). I assume that this is the motivation for holding the *recorreo* most often mentioned by Radcliffe's informants themselves. It's not hard to imagine fathers taking their sons on the hike for this very reason (why they or their wives do not take their daughters remaining a separate issue). Radcliffe questions whether the venture is really necessary on this account alone, since the physical boundaries are known to children from an early age through their experience as herders. But we should be careful about overestimating the knowledge of individuals within the community. While in aggregate, young people and adults may have knowledge of the entire community territory, in large villages such as Ccachín, the first-hand knowledge of most would probably be only partial without such efforts. Teenage boys were not significantly present at the *deslinde* I attended in Ccachín so I can't speak to the point directly, but I can add a bit of comparative data from what I know of northern Spain, where similar *recorreos* were also once common.

Echegaray (1928) reports that there it was not only standard practice to take village youth on the boundary walks, but that various means were institutionalized in the event itself to fix the marker sites in their memories. A combination of carrot and stick were used, based on the enculturation techniques of the era. Adults would tweak the ears of the children at each boundary marker, or have make the children kiss the markers and then give them a slap across the back of the neck as they did so, squashing their noses against the stone. Older children were sometimes given the role of shoving initiates against the markers. There are even instances reported of children being hung upside-down by their feet from the markers to leave them with a lasting impression of the event. In some communities, the adults would make a game of locating the markers, applauding the first youth who won the race to each marker. As in the Andes, these events were always followed by special foods and revelry, providing the opportunity to compensate the youth for the suffering they were put through during the *recorreo* itself and further impressing the events in their memories.[10]

While geographical knowledge is important in all of this, it would be a mistake to focus on it alone, whether we are talking about Spain or the Andes. To the extent that village youth learn the limits by having contact with them, the goal is probably not so much that of placing the markers on a mental map as it is of cultivating emotional associations that facilitate their defense. Ritual contact fosters such attachments in ways that more casual encounters rarely can.

The second explanation is more fundamental, but also more problematic. Radcliffe expresses it in various ways in several passages:

> The ritual reaffirms the social and territorial boundaries of the community in order to emphasize its collective identity. [Radcliffe 1989:576]
>
> The ritual attempts to homogenize the villagers' identity and to emphasize its bounded territoriality, a counterbalance to external spatially-defined groups such as the nation-state and local haciendas. [Radcliffe 1989:577]
>
> Definitions of *comuneros* and Peruvian citizenship offered by the state are no longer (if ever) sufficient in defining the social composition of the community. Social differentiation along the lines of religion, gender, and socio-economic status create differences between villagers. During the *recorreo* efforts are made to highlight social homogeneity. [Radcliffe 1989:588]
>
> The *recorreo* ritual will perhaps decline in importance as social homogeneity and peasant identifications become more complex and contradictory. [Radcliffe 1989:594]

There are two ways of interpreting this argument. The first is that boundary-marking ceremonies have the effect of unifying villagers' identity. The second is that this effect explains the ritual. The second interpretation is the stronger, and from my reading, the intended one, given Radcliffe's use of such phrases as "in order to" and "attempts to." In turn, there are two ways to understand the latter argument. The expression of social homogeneity may be intended by the participants. The phrase "efforts are made" conveys a directedness and deliberateness about the proceedings. Alternatively, we might understand that whatever the ostensive purposes of the ritual, its function is to maintain social homogeneity. Radcliffe never phrases her argument in exactly this way, but her

vagueness about the extent that the significance and meaning she identifies is intended and recognized by the participants opens the door to such an interpretation.

The notion of "collective identity" is elusive. Is the collective identity a compilation (the sum, say, or an average) of all of the individual identities that are a part? If so, are each represented equally? If not, do the identities of some individuals (leaders, representatives, loudmouths, malfeasants, etc.) dominate? Are there differences between identities intended and what is conveyed? Just as we can run into problems saying that institutions "do" this or "intend" that (recall Chapter 6), framing things in terms of social identity readily leads to the problem of treating collectives as individual's writ large, overlooking the fact that they are made up of individuals with divergent interests and beliefs.

Membership in a group implies that people are bound by common interests. Saying that they share a "collective identity" implies that they recognize that interest. What common interests are at stake in boundary marking? Whatever religious, gender, ethnic, and socio-economic differences exist in a *comunidad campesina*, members are held together by their common legal standing: they all have the same rights and responsibilities with regard to access to community lands, rights that distinguish them from non-members, and responsibilities that must be fulfilled if the rights are not to be lost. If this is a least common denominator, it is also a very powerful one.

Radcliffe emphasizes that with growing economic differentiation, the conceptual duality between *runa* and *misti* — between indigenous and Hispanic cultural identifications — is increasingly blurred, making the criteria of *comunero* status difficult to establish. Accordingly, "In a ritual attempt to overcome these differences, the *recorreo* simplifies the opposition between the two social categories and claims homogenous identification for all villagers" (1989:589). It doesn't seem to me that the *recorreo* does this, however (or at least not the *recorreo* alone). The opposition is resolved ("simplified") at the moment of *empadronamiento*. However ambiguous the criteria has become, *comunero* status continues to be assigned, and membership precedes and is independent of the annual boundary marking event. Membership status crosscuts other social

categories. For the purpose of carrying out the *recorreo*, the critical issue is not who identifies more closely with indigenous or Hispanic values, but rather, which of the members are present and which are not.

In positing the boundary marking ceremony as an attempt to foster "collective identity," Radcliffe means much more by the term than part-whole (member-group) affiliation. She takes the concept to imply a substantial degree of overlap between the individual identities of group members. Homogeneity is not necessarily a prerequisite for collective action, however, and where it is asserted to be important, its significance needs to explained rather than assumed. Elster makes the point that:

> It is sometimes argued that [norms] serve the useful function of confirming one's identity or membership in a social group. . . A weakness of the argument is that it does not explain why these rules are as complicated as they often are. To signal or confirm one's membership in a group one sign should be sufficient . . . . Instead, there is often vast redundancy. [Elster 1989:121]

In the same way, it is not clear why collective identity presupposes social homogeneity, a vast redundancy of common interests. Whether or not formal membership status is or is not "ever sufficient in defining the social composition of the community" depends on what the situation is, and the opportunities for organizing alliances around interests that conflict with or jeopardize community ones.

For social identity to be offered as a useful analytic tool, the microfoundations of collective identity are in as much need of attention as the microfoundations of collective action. This requires reference to the preferences and opportunities of individuals, and to the interaction rules that aggregate them. People in general, including the Quechua villagers who concern us here, have preferences about how others see them (which determines the information they disclose and conceal about themselves), preferences about who they associate with and are seen in association with, preferences about what others do and what the group as a whole does, preferences about who represents them and how they are represented. It is one thing to say that these preferences are expressed, contested, or negotiated in ritual action, quite another to say that coordination of these preferences is the reason why a ritual (or any given feature of a ritual) exists.

Radcliffe's argument that the *recorreo* highlights social homogeneity is essentially an argument that it promotes social cohesion. In this sense, it is the offspring of a long tradition in the social sciences that has attempted to explain rituals in terms of their effects on group cohesion and solidarity. As Elster indicates, there are two difficulties, or two challenges, facing those who take this approach:

> To say that the function of a ritual is to maintain social cohesion is to say more than that the ritual has that effect. It is to claim that the effect explains the ritual. Now, it is hard to get the facts right in such cases. Social cohesion is difficult to measure. Yet assuming that we could somehow establish that social cohesion is enhanced by these rituals, how would we go about the next step — explaining ritual in terms of the unintended contribution to social cohesion? [Elster 1989:99]

Given the present state of the art, perceiving social cohesion depends in good part on the eye of the beholder. Two observers looking at the same data set can come away with different conclusions. To illustrate this point, I'll consider three examples drawn from Radcliffe's research, two of them features of the boundary markings in Ccachín as well.

Gender Identity

First is the issue of women's participation. According to Radcliffe, "gender difference is removed from the ritual," or "denied and muted," and "social homogeneity heightened" (1989:589) by means of the non-participation of women in the boundary-marking itself and their non-appearance in the reading of village members. She doesn't say what the women themselves think of their role, or whether they themselves feel excluded. Much depends on how one conceives the ceremony. One can think of the *recorreo* as primarily a procession along the boundaries, or one can think of the procession as a single aspect of a larger and more varied complex of activities. While the men walk the border in Kallaraŷan, the women cook. When the men return, they go to the plaza to join the women who have gathered with food and drink in extended family groups. Drinking and eating is followed by Carnival dancing, where women have small twigs and sticks, decorated with ribbons and flowers, with which they hit at their male partners legs" (1989:583). While the event is not part of Carnival and is not accompanied

by dancing in Ccachín, the day is no less festive, and the women prepare special foods and hike for over two hours to join the men in Qochayoq. Knox-Seith makes two important points in this regard, gained from sitting with the women at various events while the men were off doing other things:

> At the same time that cooking is critical it can easily become hidden. Its importance *is* recognized for the success of many public occasions . . . it is the ample quantities of good food (especially meat) and drink (and the merriment that follows) that makes a successful celebration in Ccachín. On more than one occasion, our hosts showed this preference when they said to me, "Wait here. The dancers are just going to the church for a few minutes . . . . Wait here and they'll be right back. Then we'll eat [a special meal]. Yet from men's perspective, cooking remains the work behind the scenes, incessantly on-going and so unseen. . . . It is the punctuation mark of male, public drama that is important and valued [Knox-Seith 1995:152-153]

> I am reminded of an occasion when I sat in a warm shelter of the sheep *kancha* and peeled bucket-loads of potatoes with about a dozen women. . . . Across the courtyard . . . men sat crowded on a U of benches around something I could not see. Two men served *chicha* and *trago* around the circle in gourds. Men sat and stood; two others knelt. Their voices carried across the courtyard as a murmur the rhythm of prayer. I craned to see, and the woman next to me laughed. "What are they doing?" I asked. "Nothing," she said. "Just getting drunk." She reinforced her words by gesturing the draining of a cup with her right hand. Thus she dismissed the importance that men (and anthropologists) put on the public ritual events. [Knox-Seith 1995:153, n. 11][11]

Whatever one thinks of the ideology of gender complementarity (i.e., whether it increases the status of women or masks inequalities), there is no reason to believe that women who see themselves as having a complementary role to that of the men in rituals are likely to identify themselves as "non-participants." If, on the contrary, any women feel slighted, denied, or muted by their exclusion from the public drama, it is hard to understand how this exclusion fosters collective identity and social cohesion. The role that women play in the *recorreo* is by no means unique to this event; it's the same role that they play in virtually all public ritual. Perhaps gender complementarity has the effect of promoting social harmony, but that does not mean that social harmony is the reason why division of labor according to gender exists in the Andes, whether that division is expressed in the *recorreo* or in other contexts. The same can be said of the listing of households from the

padrón, which is based on local expectations about the division of labor that are constant to all *phayna* activities. Any effort to explain either in terms of the structural necessities of any particular event — in this case, as the ritual resolution of problematic social differences — lacks plausibility.

Religious Identity

The second issue to address is religious differences. In Kallarayan, there is more differentiation along the lines of religion than in Ccachín, with the influence of various Protestant sects growing. According to Radcliffe, the *evangelistas* renounce the consumption of alcohol and guinea pigs on biblical injunction, but otherwise participate in community life — including the *recorreo* — in much the same fashion as other villagers. At a certain point in the boundary marking that she describes,

> A group of 25 to 30 Protestant *evangelistas* stop for *chicha blanca*, a non-alcoholic drink. They sit in a circle, the rest of the villagers stand around and a few ask them half-heartedly "to hurry up and finish, so they can move along," but no-one moves until all have finished drinking. [Radcliffe 1889:582]

Radcliffe suggests that minor differences in Catholic and Protestant behavior are resolved by overlaying them with common practices upholding the notion of community homogeneity. Unlike the resolution of gender differences, where homogeneity is fostered by exclusion, she finds cohesion to be maintained in this instance by downplaying differences and emphasizing similarities. This may well be the case. But it sidesteps the question of why this particular activity is part of the *recorreo* at all. And it sidesteps the apparent tolerance of difference that allows it to remain an element. Toleration of differences might be good for the stability of the community, but it is hardly the same as homogenizing identity.

In identity terms, the round of *chicha blanca* among the *evangelistas* can be seen as an attempt to establish an identity separate from and parallel to the *chicha* drinking of the Catholic majority. According to Radcliffe's account, it doesn't appear to be either appreciated or encouraged by the rest, but they do not actively resist the disruption to

their routine either. Based on this, I'm hard-pressed to see how the *recorreo* in Kallarayan can be interpreted as homogenizing religious identity at all.

Ethnic Identity

The third area where social homogeneity is at issue is class and ethnic identifications. These are as much at issue in Ccachín as they are in Kallarayan. According to Radcliffe, while gender and religious differences are dealt with in the *recorreo*, socio-economic divisions constantly erupt and threaten to undermine the sense of community fostered by the ritual. While efforts are made to keep such divisions in check, she suggests that the *recorreo* may eventually decline if they become too complex and contradictory to contain. In Radcliffe's analysis, the principal way that socio-economic differentiation is overcome is by referring to all participants as *runa*.

Having participated in many *phayna* and public rituals in Ccachín, I can second the fact that the participants use a special language of solidarity in forms of address that crosscuts social differences. Whether that language in fact increases cooperation would be an interesting topic to explore. I entertain the hypothesis that it does, but the evidence required to test this is difficult to obtain in a non-controlled research setting. The issue here is not so much that a language of solidarity is used, but what it conveys about one's class and ethnic status. Because of the membership criteria for *empadronamiento* in the *comunidad campesina*, the terms *comunero* ('community member') and *runa* ('indigenous Quechua person') occupy much of the same semantic space in everyday conversation. While historical products, both identities are subject to transformation as time continues to unfold. It's a mistake to see them as frozen in the past, and it's a mistake to treat them as put in a corner so that with any change, individuals pass out of the group to become *mestizos*.[12] If literacy, enrollment lists, maps and so forth are by definition *mestizo* traits, there is little room for indigenous people to move. While traditionalists in a group may argue otherwise, there is no intrinsic contradiction between calling oneself *runa* and stressing "*misti*" values if what is being negotiated and redefined is the meaning of *runa* itself.[13] Rather than seeing the *recorreo* as simplifying the opposition between

the two social categories to foster a homogenous identity, I think that it is better to see participants using the language of identity to influence the direction of the group.

Surprisingly, there's a second and quite distinct way that people deal with divergent identities. Radcliffe reports that,

> In the *recorreo* ritual, an attempt is made to separate state-Hispanic powers from the autochthonous powers associated with the animate landscape in order to allow for identification with both aspects of the present-day community. In order to do so, the villagers put each power in its (social and territorial) place. [Radcliffe 1989:591]

Granting that the conceptual separation is to some extent made, and granting that evaluations of the power of the state and the *apu* vary along socio-economic and cultural lines (i.e., I think that Radcliffe gets the ethnography right), I restrict my comments to three words: "in order to." The link between the characteristic and the reconciliation of identities escapes me. The separation is not unique to the *recorreo*, but widespread to Andean belief in general (both rural and urban), and there is no intrinsic reason why its expression during the *recorreo* has anything to do with identity, except in the direct and limited sense that people express who they are by what they say and do. Besides that, if instead of finding that Andeans separated State powers and those of the animate landscape, we discovered that they synthesized them, could we not argue much the same thing? The Inca attempted just such a synthesis, using ritual sacrifice to redirect reverence for local landscape shrines toward the imperial center (Silverblatt 1987). The Spanish used a similar technique, placing their crosses and chapels at these same power points (Gonzáles 1989). In the marking ceremony in Kallarayan itself, crosses are placed in each of the *mojones*, an indication that "Hispanic powers" and autochthonous ones can coexist quite happily in people's minds. It may be that the taboo that Radcliffe describes against taking the flag to the highland pastures has less to do with rendering social contradictions intelligible than it does with people's conceptions of the sacred and the profane. In any case, it is hard to draw unambiguous conclusions about collective identity from the belief.

Intended and Unintended Meanings

In all three examples of intracommunity differentiation discussed above — gender-based, religious, and ethnic — social cohesion is not measured directly, but rather, symbolic criteria are used as proxy variables. As I have shown, all are open to alternative interpretations. It's not so much a question of "getting the facts right," as Elster puts it, but of what to make from the facts. The elusiveness of such concepts of collective identity, social homogeneity, and social cohesion open them up to a good deal of ad hoc evidence gathering. Neither the validity nor the reliability of the measures employed to substantiate them is very high.

The assumption that rituals are univocal rather than polyvalent exacerbates the problem. I see no reason to assume a priori that there is the level of coherence, congruity, and logical connection between the various elements of boundary-marking ceremonies or and other Andean rituals imputed to them. This is not to say that such ceremonies do not indicate a good deal about the belief and value systems of the participants, beliefs and values often shared to considerable degree. Nor is it to say that rituals do not follow a pattern, do not reveal local aesthetics about the sequencing of activities and time, or are not structured in ways that make sense for organizing large groups. But I do argue that without establishing who or what the guiding hand is, there are no grounds for assuming that the various elements featured in a ritual have been selected to achieve a particular effect or articulate a particular meaning. The assumption that there is a central theme can lead us to see more order than in warranted, to see juxtaposition of elements where there is simply intermingling. If we find symbols to be juxtaposed, it still remains to be determined whether they are juxtaposed like movements in an opera or pieces in a chess match.

Part of what steers us wrong is language. We don't have good ways of talking about rituals and institutions without anthropomorphizing and reifying them. As Elster (1989:154-155) notes, the notions of "popular will," "collective interest," and "social planning" are chimeric in this sense. If decisions are made by a single individual or require unanimity, one can plausibly say that the institution has a coherent will or

purpose. If there are divergent interests and many have a say, it becomes less clear how the collective will or interest should be defined. Group decision-making does not follow the same canons of rationality that individual decision-making does. The same applies to rituals. There is a tendency to talk about their design without reference to a designer. Phrases such as "the ritual reaffirms," "the ritual attempts to," "the ritual emphasizes," "the ritual simplifies" (all draw from quotes cited from Radcliffe above) are at best shorthand for talking about individual intentionality and the outcomes that emerge as individuals interact with one another and with others outside of the community. It is hard to read such statements without taking them as attempts to explain the event. In everyday explanation and many social science analyses, it is usually assumed that only causally relevant features of an event are used to describe it. To cite the cause, however, is not enough. To actually explain — or if one prefers, "to draw out the significance and meaning" (Radcliffe 1989:574) — a plausible causal mechanism must at least be suggested.

This returns us to the second challenge identified by Elster. Assuming that we could establish that social cohesion is enhanced by the boundary-marking ritual, how would we go about explaining ritual in terms of its contribution to group cohesion? The answer requires exactly this: reference to the causal mechanism.

I'm reluctant to push Radcliffe's analysis further than she would like to take it, and perhaps I have already gone too far. She never explicitly says that the *recorreo* fosters social cohesion. Instead, she says that it emphasizes collective identity and highlights social homogeneity. She never says that the *recorreo* makes it any easier for the *comuneros* to live or work together; as she describes it, the event comes across as a ritual bubble in a world of increasing social differentiation. In this sense, the marking of physical and social boundaries may be an act of pure expression, rather than a means to a further end. If this is the case, much of what I have said would still have relevance, because what is being expressed and who the actors are expressing it remains in need of clarification. Further, to the extent that intentionality is involved, identifying the causal

mechanism involves grounding the impulse to express a common identity in psychological processes.

My hunch, however, is that something more is implied, and that the efforts to highlight common interests are seen as having some positive effect on the cooperation and stability of the group. Both intention-based and causally-based explanations of this are possible. Bear in mind that however much ritual elaboration is involved, the event still has aspects of a work party, and attention needs to be given to how to increase and maintain participation. Also bear in mind that one of the places where we find the techniques of social homogenization most unequivocally applied is in the military (see, for example, the discussion by Zulaika 1989), another instance that deals, ostensibly at least, with communal and territorial defense.

Intentional explanation aside, Elster's question points us in the direction of identifying the mechanisms underlying unintentional and unrecognized contributions to the cohesion of the group. Some version of reinforcement or chance variation with subsequent selection are the two most plausible mechanisms by which unintended consequences could explain the persistence of the behavior that causes them, but Radcliffe offers these nor any other causal mechanisms as underlying the features of the *recorreo* she describes.

It would be nice to have a single explanation of all of the features that make up boundary marking ceremonies wherever they are found in the Andes. Parsimony, however, cuts the other way. An explanation that explains gender complementarity in all situations where it is found is preferable to one that explains it solely in terms of the boundary-marking ritual, an explanation that makes sense of the roll call of participants in all *phayna* is preferable to one tailored to the exegesis of a single event, an explanation that addresses widespread instances of code-switching between oral and written texts (or between Quechua and Spanish, or indigenous symbols and introduced ones) is more useful than a particularistic one, and an explanation that concerns itself with the territorial and social boundaries drawn by every stone marker along a community's border is better than one that centers on a few. One of the lessons of the event in Ccachín is that such

boundaries are drawn not only between *runa* and *misti*, but between *runa* — between *comunidades campesinas* and between *ayllu* — themselves.

For the most part, collective identity, social cohesion, and group solidarity are by-products of group activity. Certain organizational structures, ways of talking, oppositional framing, and symbolic attachments may stimulate feelings of unity and enhance collective action, and they may become part of group routine for independent reasons, because their beneficial effects are recognized and encouraged, or through adaptive change. The social and environmental conditions under which the last is likely are stricter than those for the former. I am in fundamental agreement with Radcliffe that it is impossible to mark territorial boundaries without reference to social ones as well. Where we differ with regard to meaning is in what is fortuitous and what is not.

Notes to Chapter 12

1. Radcliffe (1989) provides a detailed description of boundary marking and walking traditions in another village in Calca. Since the *deslinde* I attended in Ccachín did not concern itself with existing boundary markers, I do not know if such activities as recital of the names of the community's *apu* at each station along the route, the hoisting of the flag from each marker, and the placing of flower-covered crosses on the markers are carried out, as documented by Radcliffe for her research community. While it would be interesting to map the geographical range of specific traits, the ethnographic literature does not provide enough detailed information about enough sites to do so.

2. My history on this is sketchy, and a determination of who first had the land probably depends on which side one talks to. Complicating matters, much of the area around Qochayoq was divided among haciendas, so that neither community may have had free access until after the agrarian reform.

3. The president of Ccachín told me that since villagers in Wakawasi and Chupani make their living by stealing animals rather than by raising them, they are outfitted with steel arms ("*armas blancas*") as tools of the trade, before which the *comuneros* in Ccachín have little match. I do not know if there is a factual basis for the reputation of these villages, or whether this is solely local prejudice. To the extent that there is truth to the allegations, people in Ccachín may be not only victims but beneficiaries of the thievery. When I asked the president where they marketed the stolen goods, he replied that "*hasta a nosotros mismos nos venden*" ('they even sell to us').

4. While the men — "in the inner circle" — struggled to hear their delegated authority, the women, outside, struggled to be heard. I should note that women are typically the herders in the household division of labor, and the most likely to have been familiar with and occupy the terrain. It's not surprising that they had strong feelings on the subject.

5. When the *phayna* takes place a considerable distance from the community, as with the boundary marking reported by Radcliffe (1989) and the one described here, the roll call may occur at an appropriate break in activities, rather than at the end of the activity. For control purposes, distance serves as effectively as timing in keeping the group together. What's important in *deslinde* is that the log of participants is registered before the group returns to the village for the follow-up feast, at which time participants and nonparticipants become indistinguishable within the crowd.

6. While the women do not normally carry food to the men during *phayna* (in contrast with *ayni* and *mink'a*, where the sponsor's wife and her aids carry food to the fields),

deslinde was not the only event I attended where the women showed up with food. The day the tractor was brought to Ccachín, the men worked late into the night to finish the road ahead of the tractor's advance, and the women carried supper to them so that the men could maintain their work momentum. On that occasion, men and women also sat together in family groups. The rule of etiquette seems to be that if the event has a formal sponsor, hierarchical spatial arrangements are maintained. If not, people disperse into family groups. Note that men are the food servers in Figure 12.3. Women always cook, but when an event has a host, men are the one's who carry and distribute the food.

7. Rasnake 1988 (88-89) provides a similar example from Bolivia in which land was effectively occupied and worked by people from one village for a long period of time, while those of another attempted to take it back (on paper at least, the second were the rightful owners). In the case he reports on, a rock battle escalated to the use of dynamite by the squatters. The police were called in to intervene, but at the time of his writing, the land remained in the hands of its unentitled holders.

8. The requested police escort never arrived, and the return trip to *Hatun Wayq'o* to place the markers didn't take place (in fact, no *deslinde* at all was held the following year). The designation of the district as a military emergency zone may have had something to do with this, making such organized movements of *campesinos* more difficult.

9. Echegaray was not the first or only one to note the similarity. In "Leviathan" Hobbes writes that "The Church . . . imitates them [the early Romans] also in their holy days. They had their *bacchanalia*, and we have our *wakes*, answering to them; they their *saturnalia*, and we our *carnivals* . . . . They had their procession called *Ambarvalia*, and we our procession about the fields in the *Rogation week*" (Hobbes 1952:266-267). The Romans held *ambarvalia* in late May. As celebrated by some, the owner of a property in the countryside would walk around the land three times wearing a wreath of oak leaves; in the towns, people crowned with leaves would follow the priest on a round of community territory. A pig, ram, and bull were led by the group. The ritual was accompanied by dance, song, and libations of milk and honeyed wine, and at the end, the animals were sacrificed and a feast was held.

10. While our concern here is with community boundaries, it's relevant to note that transmission of knowledge about the exact limits of one's family's holdings can also be important. Echegaray (1928) reports that on the eve of a son's departure, in Basque communities marked by considerable emigration to the Americas, it was customary for a father to take his departing son and the farm boy contracted to serve with the chores in his place, to walk all of the boundaries of the family's properties. This kind of comparative data, as well as the rest already given, suggests that the educational aspect of boundary walks cannot be taken lightly.

11. In the event that Barbara describes here, both women and men are helping the festival *carguyoq* prepare the feast associated with *gallut'ipiy* for the patron saint Santiago. While the women peeled potatoes, the men cut up and blessed the meat and the tools used to prepare it.

12. There has always been this dynamic, of course, with individuals advancing and the group staying at the bottom of the social ladder, but if ethnicity is defined in relative terms, all groups can be moving at once.

13. It's clear from Radcliffe's account that group norms are defined and negotiated throughout the ritual. Thus she writes, "*Runa* identification . . . is unacceptable to particular villagers, who attempt to stress *misti* values during the ritual, as when the president claims that the most appropriate way to mark boundaries is to have them written on paper" (1989:589). Her mistake comes in conflating two issues a) the best way to mark boundaries, and b) whether one way makes one more *Runa* than another. The fact that the two issues may be conflated in their subjects' discourse does not give ethnographers license to do the same.




Figure 12.1: *Deslinde*, Round of Village Boundaries




Figure 12:2: Diagram of the Encounter Between Ccachín and Chupani




Figure 12.3: *Diagram* of *a Deslinde* Assembly




Figure 12.4: Diagram of a *Deslinde* Feast

Chapter 13

Self-Help, Communal Values, and Social Change

Introduction

Communal labor and reciprocal action have been the focal points of a variety of debates within the Andean literature, and in this chapter I consider a number of issues that bear directly on the explanation of these practices. First, I consider the extent to which a sense of belonging to a community motivates cooperative action above and beyond what might be predicted from the material interests of community members and the structure and ongoing nature of their relations. Second, I consider the role assigned intermediate-sized organizations such as barrios, *ayllu,* and ad hoc work teams in organizing collective action within the *comunidad campesina.* Third, I address collective labor in terms of several factors — power relations, unequal exchange, social differentiation, and motivational change — that grow out of the rapidly changing economic and political situation of the Andean countryside. By so doing, I hope to situate the findings of the previous six chapters in their larger historical, regional, and global context.

Communalism as a Value, the Value of Communalism

Urton (1992) raises the question of whether or not the values and practices informing the cosmology of people in his research site of Pacariqtambo, and by extension, in other communities of the Andes, also represent organizing principles of social organization, and if so, to what degree. He proposes that communalism and differentiation are central values and organizing principles of social life, and provides a rich and provocative discussion of how these values get played out in *phayna* activity. As he puts it, "it is the dialectical relationship between communalism and differentiation which . . . motivates work by everyone in the community on certain tasks, but which at the same time insists that such tasks should be performed by people working in their different *ayllu*

groupings" (Urton 1992:231). Accordingly, he concludes that "These two values are in constant dialectical relationship with each other in the life of the village."

The question raised by Urton is of broad interest, given that all too often in the Andean literature communalism as intent (norm, value, worldview) is confused or conflated with communalism as institution (*ayllu*, *comunidad campesina*) or communalism as action (people working together in *ayni*, etc.). The first presupposes that cooperation is an ethic, a preferred way of doing things. The second includes rule-making and rule-enforcing mechanisms that go beyond moral incentives to ensure cooperation. The third is measurable cooperative behavior, however it arises and is maintained.

In a broad sense, Urton is most certainly right that in the southern Andes of Peru "relations among individuals and groups are premised on both communalistic and individualistic values and motivations, and that the practices through which socioeconomic and political relations are conducted daily and reproduced over time are products of the dialectic . . . between communalism and differentiation" (Urton 1992:233). The challenge is to make sense of what this might mean in terms of individual thought processes, and how they become aggregated among the whole.

Care needs to be taken in how we define communalism as a value. If we make it context specific, as Urton sometimes seems to do, then the issue of why certain pieces of property are owned collectively and certain tasks are participated in jointly become part of the definition — rather than part of what needs to be explained (why the value is held in these but not other instances). The same can be said of differentiation. Indeed, it is unclear in what sense differentiation is a "value" in addition to being a condition or a process. The more obvious meaning of this concept — that people value certain differences and wish to preserve them (they seek to maintain a separate identity) — may make some sense in the case of *ayllu* affiliations, but is less intelligible in the case of class. As the term is normally used, the hallmark of differentiation is not that people value difference (as in a multiculturalist or postmodernist sense), but that they value different things.[1]

The two principal forms of differentiation identified by Urton in Pacariqtambo are *ayllu*-based and class-based. The former are traditional, moiety-linked, sociopolitical landholding groups within which members have inheritance and usufruct rights, while the latter is associated with divergent economic interests, the product of the relations of production in an agropastoral village economy linked to regional, national, and global economic orders.[2] Used in this way, differentiation becomes a catch-all category for several values rather than an identifiable value in itself. It seems to include, but not be limited to, "individualistic values."[3] The fact that the *comuneros* can be differentiated by class or *ayllu* status is an indication that they have separate interests, but saying that the *comuneros* value differentiation does little to explain why individuals cooperate or not to promote these interests in *ayllu* and class groupings. In any case, a focus on values is inherently incomplete. Caught up in the "dialectic," we can easily miss the role played by opportunities and constraints in peasant decision making.[4]

While I think that an analysis of *campesino* behavior in terms of values potentially provides a better descriptive basis for understanding the mechanisms involved in actual choice decisions than the "as if" assumptions typical of most "rational actor" analysis, it seems to me that we are far from the point of understanding how these values are weighed and combined in actual decision making. In particular, much, if not most, of what we call communalism in the Andes requires little reference at all to communal values for its explanation. Communal social organization can just as readily be an outgrowth of enlightened and constrained self-interest as it can be of communal values. As Gonzáles de Olarte puts it,

> The key point with respect to communal resources is to what point is it convenient that these are maintained as communal resources and are worked through *faenas*. As it appears, only those resources whose individual production brings losses or diseconomies are maintained collectively in the communities, so that "*colectivismo*" is an economic solution more than an ideological attitude. [Gonzáles de Olarte 1984:213-214]

What's true for common property and public works appears to be true for reciprocal labor as well:

> According to the initial decision rule, family labor will be utilized in all situations .... During peak periods, family labor is usually not sufficient and other forms must be recruited. If there is available manpower and necessary cash available, the contractual labor paid in cash will be recruited. Otherwise, exchange labor between individuals or households will generally be resorted to. If the manpower need is quite large or involves extremely tedious work . . . then more exchange labor would be needed than an individual or a household could reciprocate. If this is the case, the peasant has two options. The first is to contract labor and pay in kind .... The second option is to invite individuals to a festive work party. This possibility is most feasible for an individual who has a large quantity of food and drink at his disposal together with some cash reserves if entertainment is expected. If sufficient labor cannot be recruited by any of these means then the peasant must cut back on the size of his operations. [Guillet 1980:155-156]

The decision rule that Andean peasants appear to follow in labor recruitment goes **family labor > contractual cash labor > exchange labor** (where ">" means "is preferred to). Guillet concludes that, "the major variable explaining the choice of wage or contractual labor over reciprocal labor is cash."[5] So when we talk about *ayni* or *mink'a*, here too cooperation is more of a practical solution to the problem of making a living than it is an ideological or moral attitude.

As commonly used, the term "values" includes two quite different motivators. We may value an action because of its effects. Or we may value an action in itself, without regard to its effects. The former preferences fall within the domain of rational action, which is always concerned with outcomes. I've followed Elster throughout this thesis in referring to the latter preferences as norms. Given what we know about the constraints under which different forms of property rights and labor recruitment are chosen, it appears that collectivism, communalism, and cooperativism in the Andes are primarily values of the first sort. If we are to understand when these values are applied and when not, it is wiser to follow Gonzáles de Olarte (1984) in focusing on the "*efecto comunidad*" ('community effect'), than to get caught up in positing Andean "isms."

What are the potential effects of extra-household cooperation? Gonzáles de Olarte identifies three: a) more or better production, accompanied by the reduction of average costs, b) higher incomes than those that can be reached independently, and c) the greater well-being of households in the community and the community as a whole (as

measured in health, education, and other locally-determined indicators). Ultimately, the election between individual action and collective action depends upon the continual evaluation and comparison, through experience, of one or another of these forms in terms of these more specific goals.[6]

Despite the impressive range of cooperative action domains in the Andes, the household rather than the community is at the core of most land use and production processes, so we must be careful in speaking of the "centrality" of communalism as a value to not confuse its cross-cultural salience with its relative internal cultural weight within Andean belief systems. Rather than contrasting communalism and differentiation, which leaves us open to conflating preferences and processes, I find it more straightforward to contrast the processes of collectivization and individualization. While this way of framing things perhaps makes it harder to fit intermediate organizational entities such as *ayllu* into the picture as Urton tries to do,[7] it allows us to address changing opportunities and constraints, without detracting from the search for the role played by collectivist and individualist values in these processes.

Once opportunities and constraints are brought into the picture, we are in a position to note that the choice between individual and collective control of property and organization of tasks — and consequently, the tendency toward individualization or collectivization — is closely related to the relative and absolute quantity and quality of resources, and the size of the community (Gonzáles de Olarte 1984).

The first can be readily seen by contrasting the degree of collective decision-making pertaining to different production zones in Ccachín (recall Chapter 2). The pattern, as Cotlear (1989:47) notes, is that privatization proceeds progressively by zones in a community. The best land is the first and most extensively privatized. The observation that there is a "consistent coincidence that reciprocity, family or kin organization, and even the community, in general, have greater force among the poorest and underdeveloped *campesinos*" (Sánchez 1987:197) is commonplace in the Andes. There appears to be a tendency to move away from collective solutions as the value of resources increases. The fact that reciprocal labor in the Andes has persisted despite trends toward

commercialization, monetization, and proletarianization has been related by some investigators to a shortage of cash (Guillet 1980).

Gonzáles de Olarte (1984:238) observes that where the sale of temporary labor outside of the community is the principal source of income, *comuneros* abandon participation in common property regimes as their net income exceeds that reachable with the "*efecto comunidad.*" I've already noted that given the coincidence of temporary labor migration and *phayna* activity in the annual calendar, *comuneros* in Ccachín often find it advantageous to choose the former over the latter and meet their obligations to the community by paying off the resulting fines. When labor for communal projects itself becomes monetized by development agencies that include provisions for the payment of daily wages to workmen hired from within the community, an incentive is created for the *comuneros* to withhold their free *phayna* labor to pressure the agency to come up with the funds to pay wages for work on other projects as well (Urton 1990).[8]

With regard to the second factor noted above — the size of the community — Gonzáles de Olarte (1984:231) notes that "in communities composed of around 100 families, that is, some 500 to 600 people, the efficiency of the collective functions much better than in communities composed of 800 to 1000 families." Unfortunately, the effects of community size on communal labor organization in the Andes have not been carefully studied by anyone as far as I am aware, so this conclusion appears to be based more on theoretical expectations or on sweeping impressions than on comparative data. There is nothing empirically or theoretically exceptional about these numbers, and in fact, they tell us little about communities that consist of between 100 and 800 families, a very wide range, and one in which the villages studied respectively by Urton and me fall.

Gonzáles de Olarte suggests that the inefficiency of large community sizes for communal management and organization in good part explains the dynamic toward dismemberment of large communities and the desire for recognition of a separate corporate status by *comuneros* living in the *anexos* and *parcialidades*, but to my mind, this can just as readily be explained by the tendency for the personal benefits of many communal projects to decline the larger the group is and the further that one is located

from the village center, and by the opportunity to compete for government resources as equals once official status is recognized. The theoretical expectation that larger groups will fail to further their own interests is largely based on two factors a) the individual incentive to free-ride increases with group size, and b) the larger the number of people to be coordinated, the higher the costs of organizing them to an effective level (Olson 1965). Gonzáles de Olarte seems to primarily have the second in mind, but the expectation that smaller groups will do better than large in collective provisioning likewise follows from the first. The affects of increasing group size, however, are sufficiently complex that we cannot assume that increasing the size of a given group increases the probability of its failure. This depends on other factors as well.

Hardin (1982) emphasizes that as size increases, average cost, total cost, level of supply, or individual valuations also change, so that all else is rarely equal, as assumed by such analyses. Many projects may be too costly to yield net benefits for a small group, but are within reach of large. In some cases, participation may even follow an inverted U-shaped curve. In a study of union participation, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956), for example, found that the highest level of average participation occurred when shop size was around 200 members. Above and below that size, participation fell off. While the explanation offered for this — that there may need to be enough people to provide the social context for interlocking friendships to lead to solidarity ties — would hardly seem to apply to Andean peasant communities, where kinship and *compadrazgo* create interlocking networks in groups of all sizes, my point that the overall effects of group size on participation in community activities is context specific still holds. Accordingly, I do not want to stray too far from the empirical record. Ccachín provides a small natural laboratory for studying this, as it offers the potential to compare participation rates in community assemblies, *phayna*, and fund-raising assessments between the mother community (about 225 households) and its two *anexos* (about forty and thirty households respectively). Communities such as Pacariqtambo, with several *ayllu* of varying sizes likewise allow for such comparisons. The research, however, remains to be done.[9]

It's time to bring this discussion back to the question of values. Talking about the dialectic between the values of communalism and differentiation seems to me to be a shorthand way of talking about a process in which values are being traded off against each other. By asking people, or by observing their behavior, we can discover what their preferences are. Rarely are we or our subjects in a position to methodically discuss why they attended a *phayna* or not, or why they chose one form of labor recruitment over another, in a way that would yield candid information. So we mostly rely on proxy indicators. As Urton puts it, "from the point of view of an outsider (such as an anthropologist) — the authentication of the beliefs and practices of a particular society must be constructed by comparison between present-day remembrances, as recounted in oral tradition and enacted in social practices, and accounts contained in historical documents" (1990:230). This takes us some distance away from what goes on in actual people's heads, so that "what is considered to be persistent in a particular sociocultural tradition is an ideological and analytical construct" (ibid.). If public discourse and remembrance tend to be distorted in any systematic way, say toward the expression of aspirational norms, appeals to the common good, or the invocation of social norms to rationalize self-interests, our problems are compounded, but in most cases, it's the best we've got. Our recognition of the centrality of "collectivism" or "communalism" in Andean belief comes about in part through evidence of this sort.

The other way our understanding of communal values comes about is by inferring them from actual behavior. This is a bit more complicated than deducing the values *campesinos* place on consumer goods by the quantities of coca leaves, coffee, and wool exchanged in *truki* ('barter'). It's complicated because we're not so much interested in the value people place on goods or ends, but on the means they choose to their ends. Rather than determining the value they place on roads, running water, and schools (which can't be readily determined either from behavior because of the possibility of free-riding on the goods provided by others), what we are trying to get at is how much people value communal association or cooperation in and of itself, and then, how much this accounts for their propensity to cooperate. Were we to apply the same question to exchange (a

more limited kind of cooperation), we would be trying to determine not how much people value coca, coffee, and wool but how much they value exchange itself.

While this would seem to put us in the realm of expressive rather than outcome-oriented rationality, this is not entirely the case, because as Guillet indicates, the rationality of labor recruitment decisions in the Andes involves the evaluation of social as well as material costs:

> There are two kinds of social costs which enter into the process. The first is the necessity of having met the social obligations at the level of the collectivity . . . . Collective norms emerge here; the norm of reciprocity is an example of such a norm. Other norms reinforce individual identification with the goals and objectives of the collectivity . . . participation in ritual occasions, particularly the ubiquitous fiesta, is required to indicate group membership. Thus, the necessity to participate on these occasions involves costs which must be "paid" if one is to obtain the benefits of group membership. A second type of cost is that which goes into the creation and maintenance of relationships between individuals (as opposed to collective relationships). What we are referring to here are the social and material exchanges of an informal nature made to establish and maintain a personal network of individuals from which partners for reciprocal exchanges can be recruited. [Guillet 1980:156]

Urton is even more precise in describing the costs and mechanisms involved:

> If people use the benefits or services of the community (e.g., if they have children who attend the school, whose operations are partially supported from the *ayllu* barley fields), they will be subject to severe and open criticism if they do not participate in *ayllu* functions that support these benefits or services. If an individual repeatedly fails to turn out for *ayllu* work parties, he will not only be subjected to a fine on each occasion but will begin to lose influence in the decision-making processes within the group; such loss of influence may result, for instance, in his being assigned an undesirable plot of land in the community potato fields when these lands are redistributed. [Urton 1992:260]

In this way, social costs tie back to material ones, and communal values are sustained by informal inducements and sanctions.

There are several lessons in this. First, one must look beyond immediate incentives to explain why members behave as they do (a point made for social institutions generally by Hayek 1973). Second, where others' future choices are contingent on one's own immediate choice, and noncooperators face the threat of subsequent defection by

others in return, cooperation may be the most rational and strategic choice (Hardin 1982). Finally, the overlapping nature of activities and groups in Andean communities allows cooperative conventions to arise, and provides opportunities for low-cost sanctioning of noncooperators.

This last is probably the most interesting point, because while the two citations above focus on the costs to the sanctioned, the more fundamental issue for explaining cooperation is the cost to the sanctioners. It's an issue I took up in Chapter 6 and which bears repeating here: punishment itself is an investment in the production of a public good — the amount of cooperation in the group — and thus raises a second-order collective action problem. It's clear that if enough members of a group choose to punish, rational individuals will be better off if they cooperate. If there are costs to participating in the punishing, the rational, self-interested individual will let others do the punishing. If all face the same choice, no one may punish, and the motivation for defectors to cooperate vanishes. The overlapping nature of activities and groups in peasant communities, however, reduces the costs of sanctioning in at least two ways. First, the *comunidad campesina* creates and manages, though the cooperation of its members, not only collective goods from which exclusion is impossible (roads, improvements to the church, etc.), but also goods for which exclusion from the benefits is possible (redistribution of land in the agricultural sectors, etc.). Second, there can be a spill-over effect as noncooperators in the public sphere are excluded when *comuneros'* choose partners for *ayni*, *mink'a*, and *truki* exchange. The costs of such exclusion need not be high. As Hardin puts it,

> The use of such sanctions need not require conscious intent. One may simply not trust those who do not conform to a convention that evidently serves them well if those same individuals benefit additionally from their nonconformity. Hence, in forming groups to benefit from other conventions, one may have a natural proclivity to exclude those who have not conformed in the past. Furthermore, one may exercise the sanction of exclusion not only with respect to the larger group affected by a Prisoner's Dilemma convention, but also with respect to subgroups or even substantially different groups. [Hardin 1982:179]

The net costs of sanctioning, of course, will vary depending on the relationship distance and the power of the sanctioners relative to the sanctioned, but for the average community member, need not be appreciable. More than once I was told not to attend someone's fiesta or go to their work party because they were *millay runa* or *mala gente* ('a bad person'), and I assume that the *comuneros* that advised me in this way often followed their own advice.

Hopefully, the foregoing has revealed some of the problems in determining the coincidence between the ideological or cosmological aspects of cooperation in the Andes and the institutional or behavioral aspects. The former can't be automatically read from the latter. If the contrast between communalist and individualist values is to have any explanatory clout, the framework must be able to account for the synchronic and diachronic patterns of collective action that one sees in Andean communities, and clearly distinguish the motivations and mechanisms. Unfortunately, the ideational content of communalism remains remarkably under-defined. If the arguments that communalism is a "central value," that it "motivates work by everyone in a community on certain tasks," and that there is a "tension or contradiction between communalism and the self-interested actions that promote socioeconomic differentiation" are to have any theoretical value, then it seems to me that communalism must be defined as a commitment to a set of positive moral codes or norms upholding the value of community. This formulation has the advantage of pointing to a set of mechanisms that are distinct from rational choice, and that go to the essence of communality, "the feeling or spirit of cooperation and belonging arising from common interests and goals" (Random House 1996).[10]

In principle, whether or not communalism in this sense undergirds cooperation in specific contexts or is an important aspect of social life in general in Andean communities is an empirical issue. In practice, it is difficult to sort out the various mechanisms leading people to cooperate. Self-interest, altruism, and norms of cooperation can coexist and reinforce each other at both the individual and population levels, so we need to find ways of teasing them apart for analysis. The most interesting cases for pursuing the question are those where people cooperate despite material or social incentives not to. *Phayna*

participation is a better domain to investigate this than *ayni* or *mink'a*, since typically there is an incentive to free-ride.[11] Exactly, because of this possibility, however, the *comuneros* use a host of methods to detect noncooperators, reduce the opportunity costs of participation, increase the costs of nonparticipation, and provide private benefits for participants, methods that I have described at length in this and previous chapters: attendance lists, pawns, fines, scheduling to avoid time conflicts, token payments of food or seed to attenders, provision of alcohol, chastisement with loathsome tasks, membership probation, and the conditioning of land redistributions and other benefits controlled by the community on participation. Given such methods, it would appear that Urton is not far from the mark when he says that:

> It would be a mistake to think that all (or even a significant majority) of male members o the *ayllus* participate regularly and willingly in communal work parties. In general, participation in *ayllu* work parties by the rank-and-file *ayllu* members seems to be motivated by two principal forces or mechanisms. One is the threat of sanctions imposed for failure to participate; the other is making participation both a means and a condition of receiving community benefits. [Urton 1992:260]

But there is more to it than this. Clearly, if fines are set high enough, cooperators always will do better than noncooperators. But if fines are set too low or inadequately enforced, there are situations where both universal cooperation and universal noncooperation are equilibria, and whether cooperation is achieved or not depends on the extent that people can count on each other's cooperation (Elster 1989:153-154 illustrates the payoff structure for such a situation). Fines in Ccachín, recall, are set by the pool of potential *phayna* participants themselves, and rarely exceed the prevailing day-wage rate at the moment that they are set (as I indicated in Chapter 9, the actual rate faced by a *phayna* participant is usually much less because no adjustments are made over time for inflation). The other point to emphasize here is that sanctioning itself is a second-order public good and equally subject to underprovisioning, but unsupported by the mechanisms listed above. Elster goes so far as to argue that if norm-guided behavior is only sustained by external sanctions, it is not an equilibrium, and therefore, some sanctions must be performed for motives other than the fear of being sanctioned (Elster 1989:120).

So it pays to take another look at communalism, to identify the specific patterns of thought that might be associated with it, and the specific patterns of behavior that follow from these thoughts. There are at least two kinds of norms that follow from a sense of community or a sense of belonging: those that motivate a person to cooperate, and those that motivate a person to reproach others who do not. To the extent that establishing a system of effective sanctions itself requires cooperation, the second is a variety of the first, but the kinds of sentiments they arouse may be different. They are also logically distinct, because what one expects of others may be stricter or more lax than what one expects of oneself.

There's little evidence that the norm "cooperate whenever the community will benefit (as determined by the assembly)" translates into personal action in Ccachín, although it is the statutory convention (the agreed upon aspirational norm), and legitimatizes the assessment of fines. The relatively low average turnout at assemblies and communal work parties belies the effectiveness of this norm, as does the developed system of sanctions intended to assure compliance.[12] In this sense we can say that most people in the village are not Kantians, if Kantian-like beliefs motivate people to do *X*, when *X* is an activity that would benefit all if all engaged in it. This is not to say that no one follows categorical imperatives in Ccachín — something that I don't have the individuating evidence about personal beliefs and behavior to determine — but only that such motivations are not sufficiently strong to compel universal cooperation in any collective endeavors in the village. It's important to note, however, that many who do not have stellar attendance records at *phayna* do appear to pay off all of their fines for absences. It may be that paying off the fines has come to be seen as a fair alternative to *phayna* participation by many *comuneros* rather than as stigmatized. If full *phayna* participation can be seen as an aspirational norm, the pragmatic norm — which the *comuneros* expect each other to obey, and which elicits disapproval if violated — may be to participate a majority of the time, and to always pay one's fines when requested.

To the extent that the *comuneros* are motivated to cooperate by normative considerations, their behavior suggests that they must operate by norms that are conditional

rather than without exception, norms that are sensitive to circumstances. Given the various interdependencies of social life, the most important of these circumstances is what others are doing, and any behavior guided by such norms will tend to be frequency-dependent. There are two distinct kinds of non-selfish norms to consider here, those that are sensitive to outcomes, and those that are not. Knowing that not everyone will participate, people of the first kind feel a sense of duty to contribute more than their "fair" share. Consequently, their behavior will be characterized by the pattern of cooperating more when others give less, and cooperating less when others give more (assuming that some amount of the good can be provided by their participation, and that there is increasing marginal utility to participation after a certain point is reached). Norms of fairness likewise take into consideration what others are doing, but they lead to the opposite pattern of outcomes: people cooperate more when others can be counted on to participate as well, people cooperate less when others participate less.

One can see that norms of fairness are insensitive to outcomes if one considers the example of someone who has the possibility and the material incentive to provide some of the collective good alone but refrains to do because others fail to participate. To the extent that they operate by a norm of fairness, *comuneros* would tend to adjust their participation rates over time to the statistical norm. As Margolis (1990:825) puts it, "If social motivation exists at all, we can expect some behavioral propensity which ordinarily functions to limit the extent to which members of the community are likely to act socially much beyond what is typical of the rest of the community." In this way, norms of fairness involve a balancing act to maintain a personal position of being "neither selfish nor exploited" within a the social field (Margolis 1982, 1990).[13]

If a community is characterized by individuals who have the gamut of non-selfish motivations described above, there can be a dynamic aspect to cooperation: participation by those that want to do what's best for all if all would do it (those insensitive to outcomes and circumstances) could trigger the cooperation of those with the propensity to cooperate as long as each new act of cooperation increases the average benefit (those sensitive to outcomes and circumstances) which in turn could catalyze those who are

motivated by the norm of fairness (those sensitive to circumstances but not outcomes). As Elster (1989:133) notes, "For each of the latter, there is some number of other cooperators who will trigger off his cooperation. Some are easily shamed into cooperating, whereas others come around only when almost everyone has joined. . . . Depending on the constellation of motivations, the chain reaction may go all the way to universal cooperation or stop short of it." Unfortunately, however, as Elster also points out, "Next to nothing is known about the distribution of these motivations in the population and the way in which they interact to produce decentralized cooperation" (1989:134).

The issue is complicated not only by the methodological challenges of documenting micromotivations, but by the fact that the same outcomes can occur whether individuals always follow the same rule with variance between individuals, or all follow each of these rules a certain percentage of time. The closest I can some to identifying such a phenomena in Ccachín is with the dances, parades, serenades, and other public spectacles that take place in the central plaza. Most people are in a position to see how many others have assembled in the plaza from their homes. There is a cost — wasted time (and perhaps lost prestige) — to arriving too early, but events will not start until a sufficient number have arrived. The timing and sequence of arrival, as well as the total number of attenders appears to be determined in good part by what others do. The situation is tailor-made for observing the chain reaction, because an observer can readily see the *comuneros* monitoring who and how many are in the plaza while they continue with their other activities. One can hypothesize that a combination of word of mouth, visual monitoring, and adjustment of one's personal behavior to the attendance of others at previous *phayna* leads to a similar phenomena occurring at assemblies at communal work parties, but if true, it's decentralized nature and time breadth makes it much harder to establish.

Much of the above rests on plausibility, but it points out the importance of investigating micromotivations if we are going to explore Urton's intuition that communalism is a central value in Andean life in a systematic way. To give a bit more idea of the difficulty in determining which, if any norms are operative, let me point out that the behavioral consequences of each of the norms discussed above can come about for other

reasons. A pattern of some giving more when others give less is often characteristic of chicken games, where each participant has a self-interest in providing some of the public good alone, but would prefer not to contribute when enough others do. Those that are able to precommit themselves to noncooperation effectively force the rest to participate (Taylor and Ward 1982). Arguments about fairness in this case could be used to establish precommitments. In some cases, it may not be self-interest in the good itself, nor a spirit of community that prompts individuals to participate, but a sense of superiority or spite. As well, norms of fairness may be hard to distinguish from conformity rules in general. Just as one may conform to the majority, to the leaders, or to the most successful, norms of fairness may likewise pay attention to the same focal individuals. The *comuneros* may be more likely to participate if community officials do (this effect is distinct from any contribution the latter might make in facilitating communication, providing direction, etc.). Conversely, they may be unwilling to participate if they see that the wealthiest members of the community (who often benefit the most from the public good) do not participate. Finally, we should not forget that if someday we are able to sift through all of this and determine the distribution of the various non-selfish norms in a population posited here, the explanation of this distribution becomes a paramount task.

Organizing Households in Intermediate-Sized Groups

While I think there is much to gain by reformulating the discussion of communalism as I have above, there is also something lost, and I wish to address this in turn. Urton's principal aim in putting forward the communalism-differentiation dialectic is to help us understand the persistence ("existence," "activation," and "social reproduction") of the *ayllu* in Pacariqtambo, and I have offered nothing in my discussion of community-interested versus self-interested norms and values that would appear to contribute to this understanding. The individual decision-making processes underlying participation in *ayllu* activities are exactly the same as those underlying participation in the activities of the *comunidad campesina*, but these processes alone do little to explain the *comuneros'*

preference to carry out their community responsibilities within affinity groups organized by *ayllu*. Urton puts it nicely when he says,

> The fact that the constitution guarantees the communal ownership of land does not necessarily mean that this collective ownership will be mediated by an organization of *ayllus*, as it is in Pacariqtambo. Such management could as well be carried out (as it is in communities throughout the Andes . . .) by all the members of the community making collective decisions in assemblies without the intervention of intermediate-level decision-making bodies such as the *ayllus*. Thus, communalism is not, in and of itself, a sufficient explanation for the existence — and persistence — of the *ayllus* in Pacariqtambo. [Urton 1992:232]

Two preliminary points need to be made. First, Urton does not attempt to explain the origin of *ayllu* organization (or their division between and ranking within moieties), and I will not attempt to do so either. A strong current of research into Andean social structure follows Levi-Strauss in deriving dual social forms from universal principles of reciprocity, especially as they are manifested by marriage alliances (Skar 1982; Zuidema 1989). Gelles (1995), on the other hand, suggests that dual organization was the conduit through which first the Inca, and later the Spanish organized and standardized the political geography, social relations, and natural resources of myriad local populations for the extraction of labor, revenues, and surpluses for the State. Accordingly, he suggests that if moiety systems are now in decline, it is because the Peruvian government has other means of taxation, and because dual organization has been eclipsed by the introduction of new bureaucratic forms and state-inspired changes in the authority structure of local communities. Where such systems continue to be vital, it is because they continue to solve organization problems at the local level, or because they have been put to new uses.[14] In what follows, I take the origin of *ayllu* groupings and moieties as given. Whatever the origin of this particular way of composing or dividing up communities, for my purposes it is sufficient to note that it has been used since the time of the Inca as an institutional resource by local populaces and local elites alike to organize such activities as the sponsorship of fiestas, communal work parties, and the collection of taxes and tribute. The second point is that Ccachín is among the communities that Urton refers to that do not have *ayllu* to organize collective decision making and labor. Therefore, I lack

the intimate knowledge of *ayllu* organization that he has, and what I have to say is suggested by the contrast to a community without.

There is little question that the way labor is organized can contribute to the overall success of a collective endeavor. This is true not only in the sense that the social psychology and social structure of smaller intermediate groups may facilitate labor recruitment, but also in the sense that some systems may be better at others in organizing the optimal amount of labor (i.e., neither too little, nor too much). The Inca's capacity for producing large-scale public works, for example, was based on a sophisticated system of labor organization that provided both flexibility and the ability to amass large numbers of workers. On the drawing board at least, the rural population was organized into a formal hierarchy of workers based on nested units of two and five. Five groups of ten formed a unit of fifty, two groups of fifty formed a unit of one hundred, five groups of one hundred formed a unit of 500, two groups of 500 formed a unit of 1000, and so forth, until the highest decimal unit in the system, 10,000 workers, was reached. In combination with a hierarchy of territories and social statuses, craft specialists, corvée laborers, and soldiers could be drafted to meet a range of labor requirements. Down to the *pachaka* ('ruler of one hundred') level, *kuraka* ('Inca administrators who inherited their offices') were in charge of the labor units, below that, commoners were in charge. The extent to which, in practice, the system worked according to this bureaucratic design is unknown, but it is clear that intermediate structures of one sort or another — be they *ayllu* ranked within moiety, work groups in a decimal hierarchy, or a combination of the two — played an important part in labor recruitment and management throughout the empire.

Urton (1992) provides one of the most detailed descriptions of the division of community projects by *ayllu* in a contemporary village, and as we have already seen, his observations of *phayna* activity there provide a useful contrast with my own from Ccachín. The most common way that tasks undertaken for the community as a whole in Pacariqtambo are carried out is by division of the work into shares, each of which is assigned to one or more *ayllu*. Each *ayllu* elects its own headsman to organize *ayllu* work parties and other *ayllu* activities. *Ayllu* differ in size, and their size is taken into consider-

ation by community officials in dividing up public labor: larger *ayllu* are typically assigned a larger share of the work than smaller *ayllu*. While the *ayllu* are the principal units for landholding and for the distribution of communal potato lands, they are not residential units, and not evident in most day-to-day situations. Therefore:

> It is only when the members of the *ayllus* are called together to undertake some communal work project that these groups become manifest as recognizable entities. . . . It is through the successive and continuous activation of the *ayllus* as public work groups in novel circumstances that these groupings, which are central groupings in the cosmology and social organization in Pacariqtambo, are continually reproduced and transformed. [Urton 1992:234-235]

To the extent that *ayllu* are kin-based, they have a comparative advantage in achieving cooperation, and it is hardly surprising that Andean work teams are based on them. In addition, two of the most important features of *ayllu* for community-wide organization are their comprehensiveness (all households are included in the system), and their exclusivity (each male head of household is only affiliated with one *ayllu*).[15] Division of communal labor by residential groups would meet the two conditions as well, but not the kind of common-interest associations (*Club de Madres*, *Padres de Familia*, etc.) that are of growing importance in contemporary Andean communities. The community studied by Gelles (1990, 1995) is interesting in this regard. Historically, Cabanaconde (Colca, Arequipa) was marked by a moiety system with division into *hanansaya* ('upper part') and *urinsaya* ('lower part') as in Pacariqtambo, but in the 1930s a new system of four quarters ("*cuarteles*") was instituted, spatially bisecting the old dividing line between the upper and lower communities. This fourfold division is still used today for organizing communal work projects, though like the moieties before them, the wider importance of the *cuarteles* in village life is declining.

The importance of intermediate units that are mutually exclusive and comprehensive, from the point of view of the *comuneros*, is fairness (this, in addition to and probably stronger than any emotional attachments they have to particular groupings or ways of grouping things due to heritage or wider cultural associations). Urton recalls an episode in Pacariqtambo where an outside engineer attempted to sign *comuneros* up in

the *Libro de Actas* for one day of work each on a drainage project. He met with confusion and little success until finally, the *comuneros* spontaneously organized themselves to sign within their *ayllu* groupings. Eventually, one of the community officials informed the engineer that it was the custom to organize labor by *ayllu*, and that this is how the community wished to proceed. For lack of familiarity with the system, the engineer proceeded to divide the five days of projected work among the five *ayllu* of the upper moiety ("*hanansaya*"), causing immediate pandemonium in the assembly, first, because all of the men in the lower moiety ("*urinsaya*") were going to leave the assembly scot free, and second, because smaller *ayllu* in the upper moiety were assigned the same amount of work as the large. To try to rectify things, the mayor announced that the *ayllu* in the lower moiety would be assigned to perform some task at a future date, but when Urton left the community nine months later, the project remained at a standstill.

In his own interpretation of this event, Urton emphasizes that through the regular formation of their *ayllu* for community projects, the *comuneros* develop "habits and knowledge which establish the formation of these groups as a 'logical' — according to local history and worldview — response to impasses that might arise in the life of the community" (Urton 1992:240), impasses such as the novel circumstances described above. The principal issues of fairness involved in this case — a) that only 25% to 33% of the heads of households were present at the assembly (technically, it didn't constitute a quorum), b) that men from only one of the two moieties were assigned work, and that c) the same amount of work was assigned to each of the *ayllu* regardless of their size — are treated as examples of differentiation. It seems to me that the principal "logic" involved, the reason that the *comuneros* struggled for "the formation of the *ayllus*, especially in the face of the force that was being exerted for individual action" (Urton 1992:240) is one of fairness. I submit that the reason that the *comuneros* pushed for organizing communal labor in this instance in terms of their *ayllu* groupings has to do with the fact that their habitual system, with fines for absentees, inclusiveness of all the *ayllu*, and adjustments for group size effectively resolves all of these problems. I suspect that the *comuneros* would have been more open to change if the organizational structure proposed by the

engineer would have done as well or better at ensuring an equitable distribution of the work load.

About one-half of the residents in the district of Pacariqtambo are affiliated with an *ayllu*. The rest likewise must meet communal labor obligations in the villages in which they live. As Urton puts it, "when communal labor is required in the villages around Pacariqtambo, all of the residents of those villages participate in the work — but they do so as members of the village, not by virtue of an obligation derived from membership in an *ayllu*" (1992:234). To my mind, however, the major difference between those communities that organize labor in terms of *ayllu* and those that do not is not the origin of the obligation, which is the same in either case, but the permanence of the intermediate work groups charged with carrying out the tasks.[16]

As I have indicated, large communities such as Ccachín that lack *ayllu* organization likewise resort to intermediate-sized work groups to divide available workers between different projects, or between different times or sections of the same project. For those that live in Ccachín proper, these divisions are ad hoc, and are determined by community authorities before the start of a project. The community may be divided into teams of anywhere from ten to fifty men, depending on the nature of a project. These teams may be acephalous, have a single designated leader ("*capitán*"), or elect a president, secretary, and treasurer. They exist for the life of the project, be it a single day, or several years. The amount of independent decision-making power that they have — with regard to maintaining their own attendance lists and collecting their own fines — usually depends on the length of the project.[17] The kind of on-going dialogue that emerges as *ayllu* compete with each other to do a superior job — as described by Urton (1992:256-257) in the case of maintenance of the church wall in Pacariqtambo, and in a more ritualized context by Gelles with regard to the moiety "water mayors" in Cabanaconde, often emerges in incipient form in Ccachín when teams work side by side on their respective *chuta*. By the same token, work groups take pains to assure that they have not been assigned more than any other, as illustrated by discussion over who was responsible

for the joining wall between two classrooms in the construction of the high school mentioned earlier.

Within this overall structure, the *anexos* of Ccachín are also expected to contribute labor to community-wide projects that will benefit them, such as the construction of roads and of the schools. This is in addition to the *phayna* that they organize to maintain their own communal lands (in Qochayoq, and to a lesser extent Rayankancha) and their own communal structures and services (in the case of all three *anexos*). While I do not want to debate whether Qochayoq constitutes an *ayllu* or not (across the way in Choquecancha, Seibold [1990] refers to residential groups with far less history as *ayllu*), it is an independent sociopolitical, landholding, and ritual group, with its own *junta directiva* and *varayoq*, and the community as an institution takes responsibility for organizing the participation of its members in community-wide work parties (Rayankancha and Yerbabuenayoq are newer settlements and less independent in this regard). Qochayoq follows its own schedule in meeting its *phayna* obligations, so its members may or may not be present at general *phayna* when the rest of the work groups coordinate their activities on the same day.

If I were to chose one word to describe the techniques used for organizing communal labor in Ccachín, it would be "resourceful." Where existing institutions such as residential groups exist, they are incorporated into the system; where they are not, various kinds of transient groups are used to divide up responsibilities in a reasonably efficient manner. As long as the divisions meet the conditions of universality and exclusivity, they can be considered to be functional equivalents. The fact that *ayllu* are preexisting divisions that meet these criteria (and the facts that they have their own leadership, labor recruitment and enforcement systems, and group identity), is advantageous from a large-group perspective. Hardin's (1982:43) notion of "piggy-backing" seems apropos here: by "piggybacking" community-wide projects on extant organizations, the start-up costs of organizing large-group projects can be reduced. The *ayllu* example suggests that once such organizations take on this new function, they can continue to be activated and persist even after they have lost their original reason for

being. To the extent that they represent independent bases of decision making and power, they may be eliminated as efforts are made (due to pressures from within or without) to centralize. As their persistence becomes conditioned upon their contribution to the whole, they also become vulnerable to organizational changes at the top of the hierarchy.

In concluding his discussion of communalism and differentiation in Pacariqtambo, Urton notes that as long as the community still owns and manages certain resources, the forces promoting self-interested actions will drive people to participate in communal actions. He goes on to suggest that:

> This in turn brings about a certain degree of convergence of the two forms of differentiation discussed here [ayllu-based and class-based]. . . . If participation is organized through the ayllus and if such participation is perceived to be acting in one's own self-interest, then participation in *ayllu*-sponsored affairs is one means for the formation — as well as the representation — of economic (class) differentiation. [Urton 1992:261]

Whether this can be said to "reduce the tension between communalism and the self-interested actions that promote socioeconomic differentiation" (Urton 1992:260), I can't say. But what is striking to me is that the principal idea or "value" that gets replicated across the various ways of dividing up communal work projects — from *ayllu* to one-day-work-teams — is the expectation of equal labor contributions from each household. This expectation is at the heart of "communalism" Andean-style, and one of the principal things threatened by class (as opposed to *ayllu*) differentiation.

Self-Help and Community Development

There's always the danger of missing the forest for the trees, or in this instance, of giving short shrift to macroprocesses out of a narrow focus on micro ones. It's important to conclude this chapter then, with a few words about power and the effects of socioeconomic change on collective action.

Grondín puts his finger on a key issue when he says:

> Collective labor produces a surplus, since the collaboration of several people allows them to produce more than they would have produced in an isolated manner. The history of the Andean community has developed around this surplus and

> the mechanisms put into action to appropriate it. For this reason, power relations have been structured around control of the labor power that produces it. [Grondín 1978:24] [18]

Discussion of this matter among Andeanists has focused on two fronts, that of reciprocal labor, and that of *phayna* labor. With regard to the first, Orlove offers a variety of examples of how generalized reciprocity in joint households, *ayni*, and *mink'a* lend themselves to the creation and support of stratified social structures. He concludes:

> Certain individuals are able to use social forms of reciprocal exchange for their personal advantage. They receive more than they give. In some cases, this disparity acts to maintain an inegalitarian distribution of wealth in the province; in other cases, it increases this inequality. Orlove 1977b:211]

Whether or not reciprocal exchange is symmetric (i.e., whether or not individuals "receive an equivalent of what they give") depends on whether wealth and productive resources are concentrated. For Orlove, disparity comes about because the same good or service can have different values to the individual who gives it and to the one who receives it, depending on their resources and opportunities.[19] Whereas Orlove is concerned with whether cooperative institutions in the Andes promote equality or inequality, Sánchez frames the question in terms of whether such institutions are mechanisms for capital accumulation or for resistance to capitalist development:

> Under conditions of an economically differentiated population and the presence of open channels for the absorption of resources and labor in benefit of the accumulation of wealth, this whole ensemble of traditional patterns can play in favor of the emergence and expansion of the capitalist system. What's more, they can be incorporated in it as mechanisms of legitimization and persist as such as long as the relations of the system require it. Something similar happened in the Inca era when reciprocity was an element of conquest and subjugation of the ethnic groups incorporated in the empire, and in the colonial, as well as the republican era, when Andean institutions were a useful instrument for assuring servile relations between landowners and indigenes. . . . But under contrary conditions, the prevalence of opportunities, appropriate structures, goals of solidarity, defense of broad interests, efforts to recover from unjust situations of exploitation, and the gain of communal benefits through cooperation, Andean patterns constitute instruments of great organizational potential, so much so that the dominant classes have always feared and tried to derail their viability. [Sánchez 1987:196-197]

Similar observations have been applied to communal labor. *Phayna* often do not so much serve the interests of all *comuneros* as they do those of local, regional, or national elites. Gelles (1995), for example, notes that in the past, collective work parties were used to sow the fields of community authorities in Cabanaconde. Much the same was true in Ccachín until the agrarian reform, with the *comuneros* expected to work the fields of the local *gamonal* ("indigenous boss"), a fellow who while not himself an *hacendado* (he was more like the local right-hand man of an absentee *hacendado*), is often referred to as an *hacendado* in the village because of the power and status he held. Grondín (1978) cites the case of a potable water system constructed with *phayna* labor in Muquiyauyo (the village where he did his research) that only served the wealthiest members of the community. Such cases abound in the literature on Andean communities. But the flow of labor and material resources is not only directed by powers within the community. Urton (1992) notes that the *ayllu* of Pacariqtambo have a long history of cultivating cash crops with their "excess" labor in order to meet obligations for a variety of civil and ecclesiastical taxes. He goes on to suggest that:

> If the Peruvian state were not to mandate certain kinds of behavior or policies — such as the burial of the dead in coffins or the construction and maintenance of school buildings — then I have no reason to think that the *ayllus* would be engaged in communal cash cropping today. That is, we are not confronted here with an example of peasants who are using capitalist enterprise and the market system in order to maintain "traditional" collective institutions. Rather, the communal institutions and practices are being reproduced — and therefore maintained and reinforced — as a byproduct of the conscious, collective appropriation of the labor of *ayllu* members as one of the few means available for meeting the community need for cash that arises primarily (although not exclusively) from state demands. [Urton 1990:245]

The need for local action is sometimes expressed by Andeanists in terms the inability of the State to provide for the welfare of its citizens.

> The fact that whatever is done for the community is generally done by the members of the community itself . . . is partially conditioned by the circumstance that in the present weak, highly inflated state of the Peruvian economy, the national government is unable even to provide for the general needs and welfare of its citizens in the large, politically influential cities such as Lima, Arequipa, and Cusco, much less in small communities such as Pacariqtambo. [Urton 1992:235]

It may also be expressed in terms of the resources saved or siphoned off by the State or a dominant class within it. This explanation often parallels the explanation of reciprocal labor as a way of saving on the full reproduction costs of labor. Guillet, for instance writes:

> Since reciprocal labor is a means through which peasants can assume part of their reproduction costs and thus facilitate capital accumulation, it can be expected to inform development strategies in peripheral capitalist countries. . . . Self-help and community development programs in Peru and Bolivia since the 1950s have been based on the reciprocal and custodial [i.e., communal] forms of labor recruitment. In essence, they represent means through which peasants can further overexploit their labor in order to cover the costs of public works and increased agricultural production without scarce capital being expended by the larger society. [Guillet 1980:163]

Sánchez finds both ideological and practical benefits to ruling elites in local-level cooperation:

> In an infinity of cases and conditions, they ["traditional institutions"] have given birth to notorious processes of accumulation of wealth, facilitating the recruitment of cheap labor through the use of social relations, and serving as ideological elements in legitimatizing and covering for relations of exploitation. In this way they act as efficient and dynamic mechanisms in the emergence of capitalized businesses. . . . It's not in vain therefore, that the ancestral values of cooperation, mutual aid, community, etc. are rhetorical resources and practices, as well as fundamental aspects of the programs of those that represent and advance national and external capitalism. [Sánchez 1987:200]

Besides changing the opportunities and constraints faced by Andean peasants, increasing market integration is often said to change the way that people think about collective action, to change the relative weight of private and social motivations in individual decision making.

> The other effect of this "contamination" of the labor force by the market is the progressive introduction of a more individual economic calculus, in detriment to the more or less collectivist calculus of the community. . . . Some campesinos begin to calculate the individual "return rate" of *faena* labor, finding that if their lands are all dry farming, it's not so convenient to do *faenas* to repair the irrigation canal, or in the case of the campesino with greater resources, the opportunity cost of their labor, at a specific moment, is so high that they would prefer to pay a salary to a poor campesino, to replace him in the *faena*. This process leads to a progressive degeneration of the *faena* and its reduction to tasks that are strictly

> favorable to the community: construction of schools, medical posts, potable water. . . . There exists a process of transformation of the communities of the sierra, in some slowly, in others, close to the market, accelerated. . . . To not recognize these different grades of individualization in the communities has the danger of fossilizing them, and above all, to not permit distinctions in policies of rural development. [Gonzáles de Olarte 1984:201-203]

It's important to recognize that the various processes and outcomes described (or something like them) are an important part of what conditions and follows from collective action in Andes communities. I would like to take advantage of the questions raised by these analyses to add a few comments. I'll organize my remarks according to the following topics: unequal exchange, socioeconomic differentiation, legitimization, and motivational change.

Unequal Exchange

In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of investigators began to emphasize that reciprocal exchange in the Andes reflects existing inequalities in the distribution of productive resources, and in fact, often deepens them (Orlove 1977b; Grondín 1978; Sánchez 1987). One of the benefits of the resulting discussion has been to distinguish the differences between symmetrical and asymmetrical exchange. Another has been to highlight the paradox that while Pareto optimal outcomes may make everybody better off in absolute terms, they can make some people worse off in relative terms. Some kind of norm of fairness underlies most of these analyses (i.e., some ideal of distributive justice is applied by the investigators themselves), but few have gone on to investigate what fairness means to the participants of such exchanges. Concern has most often been with why the campesinos do not share the same sense of injustice as the investigators do. Adams, for example, in writing about Grondín's (1978) work, provides the following anecdote:

> As Grondín indicates, this "mass" is not one that clearly recognizes its own condition. In effect, before his departure, he [Grondín] gave a series of lectures to the Muquiyauyinos in the community and later to its residents in Lima, who were surprised by his conclusions. Some of them were conscious of the exploitation of their labor when they had to construct a network to supply potable water without

> having the right to use the same, but this consciousness evidently didn't extend to many other activities that Grondín pointed out. [Adams 1978:XIII]

Such questions are complicated by the fact that the same sanctions in Andean communities may be used to compel the *comuneros* to carry out work in their own interests,[20] in the interests of others, and in instances where everyone benefits, but some benefit more than others. They are also complicated by the potential for bargaining, so that while a particular project might not be in a particular person's interest, one may participate to gain reciprocal aid for a project that is.

The most interesting cases — both in terms of distribution of the fruits of communal labor and in terms of the "mystification" of unequal exchange — are those in which village projects are mutually beneficial to some extent. This condition is usually part of what we mean by "cooperation," and rules out the most obvious cases of "exploitation" mentioned above. As Gonzáles de Olarte (1984) points out, because of economies of association, collective action can have a positive effect for every family in a community even in situations where there are great differences of interests and power based on an unequal distribution of resources. The key question here, however, is how the net gains from cooperation are divided up. According to Gonzáles de Olarte, there are two possibilities: a) in like parts for all families, or b) "as a function of the quality of resources, which is the usual way. . . . In practice, differences not only in the quality but above all in the quantity of resources exist, in which case the 'community effect' is even greater" (1984:234).

The striking thing about this is not so much that cooperative exchange tends to reproduce existing inequalities between *comuneros* — a point that thanks to Gonzáles de Olarte and the others cited above we have now well learned — but that the cost-sharing rule in Andean communities is one of equal contributions from each family, while benefits are distributed according to the material interests that one has in the undertaking. Certainly, different cost-sharing rules and different redistribution rules are possible, at least in principle. The question remains then, as to why this is "the usual way."

Hardin (1982) describes a number of asymmetries that complicate the analysis of collective action. Three of them are relevant here: a) asymmetry between costs and benefits (nonfungibility of costs and benefits), b) asymmetry of demand for group goods, and c) asymmetry in resources available to contribute to collective action. The first relates to whether or not there is a scale of utility with which costs and benefits can be compared. Comparisons are relatively easy to make if both costs and benefits can be measured by participants in money or expected monetary returns. Many collective goods in monetized societies are readily fungible (a union's efforts to increase wages, or an industry efforts to obtain tax concessions, for example), but some important ones are not (education and health care). In peasant societies, even the costs and benefits of subsistence activities may fall into the later category. As Gonzáles de Olarte (1984:232) notes, "the calculations underlying the selection between individual or collective [action] . . . don't have a system of market prices as a global reference point . . . so, the selection does not always correspond to purely market criteria." The importance of money in the context of collective action is not only that it is interpersonally comparable, but that it is a currency that is transferable within the group. This point is well captured in Johnson and Earle's (1987:323) comment that "for the ultimate in abstract symbolism, purified of all taints of individuals and their family or local group affiliations, we need only look at modern money: standing for all things of value, it links everyone within a nation's borders (and even beyond) in its ceaseless flow from hand to anonymous hand."

The second and third asymmetries above are aspects of the growing differentiation and inequality between members of Andean communities highlighted in this section. These asymmetries come together in the concept of "superior goods," goods that are demanded proportionally more by the better-off. One of the interesting things about the asymmetries of capacity and demand are that these asymmetries may enhance or dissipate the prospects for collective action. Consider education, which appears to be a superior good in Ccachín. The intensity of interest in the schools is not the same across all households, but varies according to family composition (one family had three sons attending the high school during the study period, for example, while the majority of

families had none) and wealth. All families potentially benefit from the schools, either indirectly through kinship (one's nieces, nephews, and grandchildren may attend) or directly as their children grow (their interest in these cases may be discounted for relationship and time distances). If all community members felt the need for the schools as intensely as the most intense demanders, the size of the minimal subgroup that would stand to benefit from providing many school-related goods, even without the cooperation of the rest of the community, would be considerably smaller than if all members were no more intense than the average member (Hardin 1982). Because of the possibility of free-riding, however, the situation would have the structure of a chicken game, and a cooperative outcome could not assured (Taylor and Ward 1982). In fact, however, the intense demanders constitute a small subgroup of the whole community. Where the ratio of benefits to costs is large (e.g., organizing a fundraiser for the school), the minimally efficacious subgroup could be relatively small, and the community as a whole might benefit from the political-sociological advantages of small groups in achieving a cooperative outcome. Further, this subgroup could serve as a catalyst to inspire further cooperation, through conformity effects, moral persuasion, and other mechanisms (Hardin 1982).

The growing importance of common-interest associations in Ccachín is relevant in this regard. Many projects that benefit the schools are now carried out exclusively by those who are members of the parent's associations (*Padres de Familia*) for the different school programs (more precisely stated, these projects are carried out by subgroups of the membership in these organizations). In turn, these associations organize the community as a whole to participate in school projects (such as the construction of the high school) where the ratio of benefits to costs is hard to determine, or relatively low (here the collective good to the subgroup of securing the support of the community assembly for a project can be distinguished from the collective good for the community provided by the project itself; the ratio of benefits to costs for the first is higher than for the second). It's hard to imagine that many projects in the community would be carried out without such asymmetry in demand.[21]

Rural schooling likewise provides an example of how asymmetry of demand may reduce the prospects for collective action. One of the principal reasons that Grondín (1978) gives for the failure of the *campesinos* to grasp their exploitation is the possibility of social mobility: some of the children of the poorest families are able to take advantage of their schooling, but upon obtaining an education, they migrate to the cities and never return. Even though the *phayna* labor that *comuneros* are required to put into the production of this superior good benefits the best-off *comuneros* differentially (and, as such, may constitute "exploitation" in at least some senses of this term), it provides an opportunity that is sometimes taken advantage of by poor *comuneros* as well. In this case both "exit" and "voice" are part of individuals' opportunity sets, where the first denotes the market response of selecting among private good substitutes, and the second denotes a political response to try to change the system (Hirschman 1970). As Hardin (1982:73) notes, "whether an acceptable substitute is available will be important in determining whether intense demanders organize a collective effort or opt for a private solution of their problem. In part, therefore, the prospects for collective action will turn on the 'technology' of production of the desired result." The "good" in this instance may be defined in general terms as "personal welfare," and the individual route to it is perceived as less costly than organizing collective action, taking into account the probability of success. While this good is different from the original one under consideration — a community's educational system — one of the effects of the private solution to securing it is that those with the most intense interest in formal education withdraw from making further contributions to the local school. Where such a brain-resource drain is significant, it can lead to a village school's stagnation and decline.[22]

While not usually framed as such, the use of collective work parties and household assessments to provide collective goods desired by members of a *comunidad campesina* are examples of public finance, and should be amenable to analysis from this perspective. The public finance literature deals with two issues that concern us here: the optimum level of supply of collective goods, and the equity of the cost-sharing scheme. As Hardin (1982) notes, collective action problems can emerge even if everyone is

motivated by norms of fairness and cooperate if enough other people do. Success depends upon whether there is a clear, shared, prominent notion of what is fair (Schelling 1960).

The prevailing tax rule in Ccachín is that all households share equally in the costs regardless of any differences in their ability to do so. It's hard to say whether this rule is indicative of Quechua ethical ideals, or is, rather, an example of a practical norm — a compromise — based on people's experience of what is achievable given the composition of the population and local power dynamics. In either case, it is a part of people's expectations, and as such, it is drawn upon as a conceptual resource in persuasion. In non-community contexts some of the same *comuneros* may adopt other schemes for apportioning the costs. The *Pan de Azucar Comité*, for example, financed its pasture title process on a per-head-of-cattle basis, adopting a cost-sharing rule that set individual investments proportional to their expected benefits. When it came to labor contributions, however, the Pan de Azucar association did not use a proportional benefits cost-sharing rule; all members were expected to work an equal number of days on trail maintenance, fencing, and other collective needs. It may be that both asymmetries in herd size and the annual number of days of *phayna* activity required were sufficiently small to make equal cost-sharing the prominent solution for meeting collective labor needs, but this need not always be the case. Grondín (1978) provides an example of a similar kind of cattle-raising association in the Mantaro Valley in which the asymmetry between members and the expected investments of each was greater, and where there was a struggle between rich and poor members over the appropriate cost-sharing rule.

Decentralized group decision making is subject to the constraints of "realizability" (no participant should be worse off after the collective action than before it) and "Pareto optimality" (no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off). Equal cost-sharing yields Pareto-optimal outcomes in symmetric groups, and several alternative distribution options, including proportional benefits cost-sharing and incremental net benefits cost-sharing, reduce to equal cost-sharing in symmetric groups (Hardin 1982). This may go far in explaining why, for historical reasons (the historical

homogeneity of peasant communities —- the same relative homogeneity that makes *phayna* labor viable for the completion of many tasks in the first place), equal cost-sharing has come to be seen as such a prominently fair rule in the Andes. Individual notions of fairness and the corresponding preferences for one cost-sharing rule or another are as subject to self-interest as collective action is, and as asymmetries increase, there is less likely to be any universally-accepted notion of what is fair. When promoted by better-off individuals, an equal-cost sharing rule may be interpreted as a kind of free-riding, in the sense that it allows such individuals to receive the benefits of a collective good without investing in its production to the extent of their interests.

Equal cost-sharing may not only be "prominent" because it constitutes a kind of original position,[23] but also because of its simplicity. Hardin (1982) suggests that outside of tightly-knit friendship groups, workable cost-sharing rules are generally simple, widely accepted in a given culture across countless contexts, and somehow generalizable to the situation at hand. A proportional system depends on the group's ability to define relevantly different classes of members and fair shares of varying intensities. In practice, making such distinctions is costly, both because of the range of relevant variables involved, and because an incentive exists to misrepresent one's position. The nonfungibility of costs and benefits in nonmonetarized economies further exacerbates the problem. Equal cost-sharing is the least-cost alternative.

The pattern in Ccachín is that an equal cost-sharing rule is used in most contexts. *Phayna* labor is the paradigmatic case. Despite some variation in family composition (some households have more males eligible to provide *phayna* service than others), collective labor is the domain in which household endowments are most homogenous. All families are subject to similar time constraints, and the upper limits of what they can contribute to the community without sacrificing household subsistence production are quickly reached. Increased wealth creates the option of hiring laborers to meet one's *phayna* obligations and makes it possible to transcend these limits, but as far as I am aware, no one in Ccachín employed hired laborers to meet their *phayna* obligations while I was in the community. An equal cost-sharing rule is used in the household assessments

as well, despite a much greater disparity in the ability of households to come up with the necessary cash. Beyond the likely resistance of wealthier *comuneros* to a more proportionally-based system, the community has no way of gathering or verifying the information needed to make the discriminations needed for proportional benefits cost-sharing. Since compliance with the existing equal cost-sharing rule falls far short of 100% for both *phayna* participation and the household assessments, it is possible that there is a de facto kind of proportional benefits cost-sharing going on. This would only be the case, however, if poorer households are less likely to meet their community obligations than wealthier ones (one way for this to happen, for example, would be that in collecting fines and assessments, the collectors don't push as hard to collect in the case of the less well off). While this seems plausible, I don't have the data necessary to confirm whether or not it is the case.

Beyond this overall pattern, a rule of proportionality is also used in a few domains. First, as indicated above with the example of the *Pan de Azucar Comité*, in some private small cattle-raising associations, where the individual benefits of collective activity can be readily related to herd size, proportional benefits cost-sharing may be adopted to meet monetary costs (work requirements still are based on equal shares). Second, the emergence of certain membership-based special interest associations, particularly the various *Padres de Familia* groups and the *Vaso de Leche* Program, provides a mechanism for assuring that those that most benefit from these particular programs are the ones that do the most work to maintain them. Third, while equal cost-sharing is used to generate funds for various community projects, the practice of naming *padrinos* for the projects provides a mechanism for gaining additional support from well-off individuals. I note, however, that none of the *padrinos* named in this way while I was in Ccachín were *comuneros*. All were from outside the village, and all but one could be classified as mestizos (the one exception was the *teniente gobernador* of Choquecancha). Finally, in the realm of *varayoq* service, where the ideal is likewise equal cost-sharing, albeit in long-range rotational form, only the most economically-successful individuals have the capacity to bear the burdens of the highest-ranking positions, and they are the ones called

upon to serve. It's largely for this reason that the system has gained notoriety in the literature on Andean and Mesoamerican cultures as a "leveling mechanism." Both of these last two practices are feasible because of a) a certain amount of voluntarism is involved, b) prestige is an inducement, c) broad socioeconomic distinctions are sufficient to identify the handful of individuals called upon to serve at any one time, so that there is no need to establish a comprehensive, graded system for proportionality , and d) it's much easier to apply informal sanctions to motivate compliance from recalcitrant individuals when the social pressures are many-to-one than when they are many-to-many.

These examples suggest that equal cost-sharing and proportional benefits cost-sharing are the two principal conceptions of doing one's "fair share" in Ccachín, and I suspect that this is the case for most Andean communities. As Hardin (1982) notes, while there may be numerous cost-sharing schemes that lead to reachable and Pareto-optimal outcomes, many are quite technical, and it would be surprising if a population happened upon a marginal rate of substitution scheme or proportional incremental benefits cost-sharing spontaneously. A combination of socioeconomic characteristics, information costs, procedural rules for collective decision making, and power dynamics determines which of the two primary cost-sharing schemes will be applied in any given context. If there is any further modification of the cost-sharing rules, it is to recognize conditions, statuses, occasions, or settings that exempt (Edgerton 1985), but officially, at least, there are very few.

Differentiation

I have already indicated some of the effects that differentiation within a given community have on the prospects for collective action. If, as Gonzáles de Olarte argues, increasing economic differentiation leads to the degeneration of the *phayna* in subsistence production and its limitation to certain superior goods — the construction of schools, medical posts, potable water — it is because a) the growing specialization of skills, the growing specialization of tasks, and the changing opportunity costs of labor for male household heads renders the principle of equal labor contributions neither individually

nor collectively rational, and b) technological changes provide private good substitutes to collective action and increase the productivity of the land, creating a tendency toward the privatization of traditionally collective resources.

It is important to recognize that *phayna* labor is not synonymous with collective action, and that monetization provides other ways of contributing to the public good and new possibilities for dividing up the costs and benefits of collective action. Internal differentiation may limit the effectiveness of *phayna* as vehicles for collective action, but it's effect on collective action in general is mixed.

The unevenness of change in the Peruvian sierra means that there is differentiation between communities as well. Transformation depends on the degree of access to regional markets. The kinds of activities carried out through communal work parties, the average number of *phayna* days per year, and the level of participation are all subject to change. The general assumption among Andeanists seems to be that, all else being equal, the range of activities narrows and the ratio of communal to private labor and the level of participation in *phayna* are reduced, but I am not aware of any regional-wide comparisons in this regard. One must control for the relative role that herding and agriculture play in the subsistence base in making cross-community comparisons, and these tend to covary with market access. Since political access likewise covaries with market access, the increased opportunity to take advantage of development resources provided by the State and by NGOs that comes with such access makes it difficult to argue for any unilineal changes. Several forces are at work, and not always in the same direction.

Andean communities can be placed on a continuum from zero to universal member participation in communal decision making and collective goods production respectively. On the lower end of the continuum we can find such communities as Muquiyauyo, studied by Grondín. Reviewing the Book of Acts since the community's founding around the turn of the century, Grondín found that only thirty to fifty people — only 10% of the household heads — attended the community assemblies on average, and of these, the number of regular attenders was even smaller. The extent of *phayna* participation is not normally indicated in the Book of Acts, and Grondín does not give

any corresponding figures on the participation rates in the communal work projects approved by this small group of *comuneros*. Communities such as Ccachín and Pacariqtambo have much higher participation rates in community decision making by comparison, but as I have indicated, with an average attendance of 50-60% of households, they fall far short of universal participation. Presumably, there are communities that fall higher on the continuum, but I can't cite a well-documented example (often, researchers take the ideal of one household-one vote as the behavioral norm, so we need an instance where cultural norms and behavior are clearly distinguished). With temporary labor migration and other reasons for non-attendance, it's also sometimes hard to establish what "full participation" means in a statistical sense.

For *phayna*, the case of Masaqkancha (Paccha, Jauja) documented by Sánchez (1987) approaches universal participation, but it's important to point two contextualizing factors. First, 26.5% of the households in the village are not members of the community enterprise ("*empresa comunal*") either by choice or exclusion and thus do not have to participate in the *phayna* (all are among the poorest 50% of the population, and as such, among those that would have to work the most for the least return). Second, *phayna* participation is assured by linking pasture rights to work contributions. Sánchez himself phrases it in terms of exclusion, saying that "the fact that they don't possess stock excludes them from the *faenas* but also from the benefits. Many of them had to leave the corporation even after participating for some time in the collective action of taking the land, management, and production" (1987:116), but whether they "had to leave" or decided to leave when they determined that no benefits were forthcoming is unclear. It's important to note that since there was no relation between the number of animals owned and the number of days one had to work (all *comuneros* having to work an equal number of days), there were tensions between animal-rich and animal-poor members. These tensions could have been resolved either by establishing a sliding scale for contributions according to animal ownership, or by leveling the number of animals pastured per family, but Sánchez indicates that the poorer members did not have either the power or the organization to institute these changes.

This case reminds us of the importance of control of access to key resources in assuring labor participation. In developing his theory of "calculated exploitation" ("*explotación calculada*"), Grondín puts it like this:

> Since the time of the Incas and the Conquest there have been two fundamental goods that have captured the interest of government administrators and the privileged on the one hand, and of their subjects (Indians and peasants) on the other. The first coveted more than anything the free or cheap labor that gave them access to riches of various types . . . ; the second, the land as a means of subsistence. From that was created a power relation: give land in order to receive free labor and vice versa. [Grondín 1978:22]

This holds true whether we are talking about relations of inequality (such as *campesino-hacendado* relations, or between commoners and elites within a village) or about the peasant community as a democratic institution, and it holds true whether the goods produced are desired by those who produce them or not. The mechanism of labor enforcement is the same: land is the principal bargaining chip to assure labor compliance.

Given this, we can hypothesize that to the extent that either a community's control of land is reduced (as through privatization), or it's members interest in the land declines (as though increasing opportunities for obtaining a non-agricultural income), the community's ability to assure participation in collective work projects — even if they have nothing to do with agriculture or pastoralism and whether they are approved by consensus, a majority, or a ruling elite in the community — will likewise diminish. All other things being equal, communities that have land to redistribute, and in which such redistributions ("*raymi*") are commonplace enough to be salient to their members, can be expected to do better at achieving high levels of *phayna* participation than those that do not. Fines are secondary incentives in this sense, as they rely on some system of enforcement for their collection. The potential to receive more land or the threat of losing access to the use rights that one has back the paying of fines as much as they do labor participation itself. The costs of excluding households from the land, especially land that they have traditionally used, can be much higher than the costs of overlooking them when plots are to be distributed.

Motivational Change

I would like to conclude this chapter by following up on Gonzáles de Olarte's reference to the progressive replacement of a collectivist calculus by a more individualistic one in Andean communities as the *comuneros* become "contaminated" by the market. For if this is the case, the single most important factor explaining the modest levels of *phayna* participation I found in Ccachín may have more to do with a change in ethos and subjective individual desires than with objective opportunities. The argument is similar to those discussed in the introduction to Part 2 of this thesis, where I summarized the judgments of investigators who have asserted that technical-instrumental rationality is replacing communicative rationality and that mercantilist consciousness is replacing religious belief in the Andean countryside. We might call this the "contamination by the market hypothesis."[24] I am not in a position to support or disconfirm it, as I have neither information on changes in the level of cooperation in communal projects in Ccachín (my study does not have the time depth for that) nor on changes in individual consciousness (it's easier to verify the former than latter, and I doubt that anyone else has very good information on the purported motivational changes either). My goal here is to clarify the argument and contrast it with others that assert much the opposite. While I grant the possibility of long-term motivational change, and in particular, that as circumstances change minds may change as well, I think that it is prudent to treat motivations as a relative constant in cross-cultural and cross-temporal analysis unless one has strong evidence to the contrary.

What does it mean to say that the calculus of decision making is becoming less collective and more individualistic? In one sense, it may simply mean that opportunities are changing, so that private good substitutes are replacing collective goods. The weights given to the variables in individual decision making stay the same, but the variables change, so that the outcome is different. If this were all there were to it, the thin theory of rational choice would encompasses such changes (the changes in opportunities requiring separate explanation). The more useful and provocative meaning, therefore, is that the weights people give things are changing, and that they don't weigh material outcomes at

all in deciding upon a course of action. This interpretation points us to the realm of extrarational behavior, of normative constrains, altruistic values, participatory urges (i.e., the desire to participate in history-making events), self-actualization and the expression of personal identity, all of which can enhance the prospects of collective action. The contamination hypothesis assumes that the moral economy rather than rational choice sustains peasant cooperation, and relates the purported decline in cooperation to a rising egoism.

Against this, Taylor (1988) provides the following picture:

> The situation of the poor peasant member of the traditional communities which provided a basis for peasant collective action in . . . the past was just the kind of structured, constrained and stable situation which . . . tends to make the individual act thin-rationally. . . . Scarcity and the coercive potential of the community tend to put the peasant in mind of his narrow self-interest and to leave little scope for such motivations as pleasure, genuine altruism (as opposed to reciprocity) beyond the household, or moral self-expression. The world of the traditional community gave way, as everyone knows, to a world of associations and organizations. It is especially the better off members of such societies that are disproportionately more likely to make donations to, join or participate in voluntary associations of all kinds, and I am suggesting that this is because they tend not to act thin-rationally . . . . It is quite likely that most of the cases of participation in collective action and other kinds of contribution to public goods provision that cannot be explained by the thin theory can be understood, *one by one*, as pleasure-seeking, altruism, or some form of self-expression, but the available theories that include these motivations are a long way from providing a foundation for a testable theory of collective action. . . . The destruction and decay of community in modern societies removes the most important social basis for collective action; it is also part of an historical process which makes non-thin-rational behavior more common and the success of collective action less predictable. [Taylor 1988:45-46].

The thrust of Taylor's argument is that extrarational motivations for collective action are more rather than less likely to have explanatory force as modernization with all of its features — economic differentiation, mobility, rise of special-interest associations — is set in motion. Self-expression, altruism, and moral action from this perspective are all superior goods.

The logic behind Taylor's argument is shared by many theorists. Hardin (1982) emphasizes that while there are grounds for concluding that individuals contribute to

collective actions for moral reasons, their contributions are subject to certain rational restraints, and there are predictable regularities in the ways that they trade off such contributions against their opportunities to acquire private goods and other public goods. One regularity is that the more material goods one has, the more one will be willing to invest resources in furthering one's moral and expressive interests. Hardin summarizes this pattern with a line from the second act of Bertolt Brecht's play, The Three Penny Opera" — "first comes food and then morality." The idea is widely held. According to the Basque philosopher Savater,

> Ethics is in good measure a luxury, something that appears when people have surpassed some terrible and oppressive necessities and can begin to think in something beyond. Like almost everything good, ethics is a refinement that emerges when certain necessities are met. [Savater and Setién 1997]

The same general idea can be found in Maslow's (1959) hierarchy of needs or Marx's idea of self-actualization (Elster 1985). For an anthropological example, we have Turnbull's (1972) description of the Ik of Uganda, people that he portrays as dying out morally as well as physically after being forcibly removed from their homeland and put in a situation where resources were not sufficient to meet subsistence needs. Such examples raise the issue of threshold points, and how they are to be compared cross-culturally.[25] But it is not clear whether the phenomenon is one of attitudinal and behavioral change once certain minimal thresholds are reached, or whether the pattern holds true when comparing any two groups that can be differentiated socioeconomically. Hardin cites evidence that there is a positive correlation between increasing income level and the amount spent on charity — in both absolute and relative terms — in tax return data drawn from contemporary industrial societies, and this suggests that the matter is not simply one of surpassing minimal threshold levels of well-being. In any case, two hypotheses follow. The first, as outlined in the quote from Taylor above, is that other things being equal, the better off members of a community or society are disproportionately more likely to participate in voluntary associations and contribute toward the production of collective goods of all kinds. The second, a corollary, is that collective goods that the well-off want

are more likely to be provided than those collective goods that the poor want whenever extrarational motivations play a role (Hardin 1982).

Impressionistically, both tendencies — for the better-off members of a community to invest more time and wealth in communal projects and for greater energy to be expended in producing collective goods desired by the better-off than those desired by the less well-off — are found in Andean communities. Whether the explanation for this is to be found in extrarational motivations, or in differential interests and power, however, is open to dispute. The tendencies may have multiple causes, making it hard to separate out rational and nonrational motivations given the effects alone.

There are at least two other reasons why we should be cautious about assuming that motivational changes are behind any change in the effectiveness of collective action in the Andes. First, increasing market contact affects the symmetry of people's valuation of collective goods, and these changes alone may account for changes in observed patterns. The effects of monetization on people's ability to weigh the commensurability of costs and benefits (fungibility) are multiple, and hard to characterize in terms of any unilineal scheme. While people may become more "calculating" in the sense of evaluating the costs and benefits of certain (traditionally-important) collective goods in terms of their monetary equivalents, education and healthcare are taking on increasing importance, and the payoffs from these goods are not readily translated into monetary terms in the countryside. On the other hand, the asymmetries in other domains appear to be clearly on the increase: there is increasing asymmetry of demand for specific collective goods (increasing private good alternatives to some, and new demands for others), increasing asymmetry in available resources among members of the community, and increasing asymmetry in the content or heterogeneity in the benefits of certain collective goods. Changes in these multiple symmetries and asymmetries may cancel each other out or may they may enhance each other. Even if it were true that instrumental rationality were replacing expressive motivations to some degree, the sum total of these increasing asymmetries could still enhance the prospects of collective action in some important contexts.

Second, while "modernization" may be accompanied by a breakdown in the "coercive potential of the community" (especially of informal sanctions) as Taylor suggests, we should be careful not to let the salience of these sanctions mask the expressive motivations that may exist in peasant societies. It is one thing to establish that expressive motivations are not widely-acted upon in a population or are unstable through time (all one need do is look at the limited turnout at community events); it is another to suggest that such motivations do little to explain the cooperation that exists. The 40-50% of household heads that don't attend any given *phayna* in Ccachín are apparently not compelled by a sense of duty, fairness, or solidarity to participate, nor are they compelled by the attending formal and informal sanctions. What reason do we have to assume that the threat of sanctions explains the presence of the 50-60% that attend? While decentralized sanctions are especially effective in small-groups or "closed-corporate communities" and much less so in large-groups and large-scale societies, where anonymity and ambiguity increase, the relative effectiveness of sanctions in the two contexts is not necessarily a good indicator of the percentage of the respective populations moved by rational or nonrational motivations. The percentage of people that contribute to the collective good out of moral conviction, pleasure-seeking, or self-expression could be the same in both cases, could vary for reasons unrelated to group size or wealth, or as Taylor suggests, may be sensitive to the latter. Other kinds of evidence are needed to make the determination. Further, if decentralized sanctioning systems themselves are grounded in nonrational motivations as Elster argues, the contrast between small-scale and large-scale societies is substantially weakened, and non-thin-rational motivations become as important for explaining collective action in "traditional" communities as Taylor suggests that they are in "modern" ones.

Notes to Chapter 13

1. As the term is normally used, differentiation refers either to the perception of existing differences, or to a process where entities become unlike or dissimilar (Random House 1996). It should be noted that the first is the polar opposite of an emphasis on likenesses, as this latter is picked up and elaborated upon by Radcliffe in her discussion of ritual attempts to emphasize homogeneity among community members (see Chapter 12). This raises a question in my mind about the difference between communalism and homogeneity on the one hand, and differentiation and heterogeneity on the other (as well as the difference between these features as fact and as ideology). If one were to begin to sort out the distinct and overlapping meanings of these terms, I would add collectivization and individualization to the semantic stew. Some of these values and processes are opposites, some are not. If the terms are to be analytically useful in this context, they need to be clear.

2. It's not clear to me whether Urton considers both self-interested motivations and economic differentiation to be a product of peasant relations of production, or whether he takes the former to be a constant, which under the latter are characterized by conflict. This uncertainty is not critical to the discussion here, but would be so if the two communities were studied diachronically, or were contrasted according to the degree in which they are integrated into capitalist markets. I bring it up here in an effort to be as faithful as possible in summarizing his position.

3. Interestingly, one of the other things it seems to include is the dictionary definition of communalism. The most intriguing for our purposes here is the third definition in Webster's Unabridged, the "strong allegiance to one's own ethnic group rather than to society as a whole", but the first, involving political federation, will do almost as well (Random House 1996). If we take the *comunidad campesina* as a society in microcosm, then allegiance to one's *ayllu* is at once a kind of differentiation and communalism.

4. I'm not quite sure how to interpret Urton's use of the term "dialectical" to describe the relationship between communalism and differentiation. In the most general sense, he may simply mean that they are ideas or forces that are interconnected or juxtaposed. In a more provocative but also more questionable sense, he may be trying to point to some contradiction between the two requiring synthesis. I am also unsure whether Urton places the locus of the dialectic in the minds of the *comuneros* as individuals or in the culture as an abstract whole. There are other ways of talking about essentially the same processes. Margolis (1990), for example, extends the concept of equilibrium analysis of standard economic theory to norms and values to suggest that the social equilibria characteristic of the whole are both contingent upon and influence individual equilibria, the latter which reflect a balance between competing motivations at the personal level. No doubt, the choice of vocabulary and

metaphors we use to describe things depends on our audience, and I have no problem with that. My only concern is that we choose a language that is as precise and unambiguous as possible to describe and distinguish psychological and social processes, and for the most part, I find reference to "dialectical relationships" unhelpful in this regard.

5. The explanation for this preference structure is that wage labor is more convenient than reciprocal labor since it reduces the search costs of finding individuals willing to enter into the exchange, the need to pay back labor at a later date, and the problem of adjusting for differences in the size of land holdings (Guillet 1980).

6. In saying this, I am in agreement with Guillet when he writes that "there is no tendency to cooperation, reciprocity, or association, if by this is meant adherence to practices found in past societies" (1980:159). While what worked in the past may continue to serve as a pattern for action under conditions of uncertainty, and the prior investments made in constructing traditional institutions may be used as resources in the present, to the extent that the *comuneros* are able to anticipate the costs and benefits of their actions, behavioral continuities need to be related to the constraints leading to the recurrent selection of one form of action or another.

7. When contrasted to the *comunidad campesina*, *ayllu* memberships may appear to be a kind of differentiation, but it makes little sense to say that they are likewise a kind of individualization (perhaps this is the reason why Urton prefers to use the former term). Taking individuals as our starting point, however, an *ayllu* can be recognized as a particular kind of collectivity, with a recognizable size and status intermediate between the household and the community. In this sense, the *ayllu* is as much an indication of communalism as the *comunidad campesina* is, and the preference to organize the latter in terms of the former may be best explained in terms of nested units rather than dialectics.

8. Urton cites the case of a drainage system being constructed in Pacariqtambo in the mid-1980s. *PAIT*, a program of employment generation and income transfers instituted while Alan Garcia was in power, paid wages to community members for constructing an addition to the high school and for building a retaining wall around the church, but not for the drainage project. While there may have been other reasons for the lack of community support for the drainage project, Urton suggests that the expectation that wages should be paid for this project too played an important part.

9. Hardin (1982) establishes that the most useful interpretation of the phrase "large groups are more likely to fail than small groups in achieving collective action" is that "If A and B are groups each with a similar common interest, and A is larger than B, then A is more likely to fail than B." When I say that Ccachín (and other Andean communities) provide natural laboratories for studying this, it is not only because the

anexos and *ayllu* are distinct collectivities within a single communal territory, but also because, for comparative purposes, numerous contexts can be found where they meet the condition of having similar common interests.

10. Note that while common interests and goals may enter into the definition of and reason for attachment to the relevant group, once the motivation to cooperate becomes internalized as "spirit" or "sense of belonging," consequences need not be part of the proximate mechanisms of behavior motivated by the expression of this sense or spirit.

11. Given the delayed aspects of reciprocity in *ayni*, there is the possibility to defection at the ultimate point of exchange, so there is the potential for getting a free ride here too, but the problem is not as pervasive as it is in communal work parties.

12. With regard to this second, however, it is important to note that sanctions are not superfluous even where an ideal is internalized. As Elster notes, "Human nature being what it is, external sanctions are a useful counterweight to weakness of will" (1989:119).

13. The "expectation" arises, for Margolis, from the necessity of grounding the evolution of social motivations in a Darwinian account. Interestingly, the two rules of thumb posited by Margolis to account for the desire to be "neither selfish nor exploited,"
    a) the more good a bit of resources would do if used for the common good compared to what it would do if used for one's private interests, the more likely one will be to use that bit of resources socially, and
    b) the more one has already used one's resources socially, the more inclined one will be to spend the next bit of resources on oneself,

    do not say anything about fairness, despite the fact that his concern is with how individuals see their commitment of resources relative to others in a comparable situation. Strictly understood, the relevant circumstance here is what an individual has done in the past, rather than what others have done or are doing. The balancing mechanism between the two, however, lacks an aspiration level, something that reference to the behavior of others provides.

14. Among these new uses, "dual organization is currently a religious and social resource used . . . to oppose the encroachment of dominant *criollo* society. Thus, the 'state' model of yesteryear has become a 'local' model of cultural resistance today" (Gelles 1995:732).

15. Urton reports that upon marriage, a woman usually adopts the *ayllu* affiliation of her husband, so with few exceptions, exclusivity holds at the level of the household as well.

16. The household is also an intermediate unit between the individual members of the community (those listed on the *padrón general*) and the community as a whole (and

between individuals and *ayllu*). I have already mentioned the case of a *compadre* in Ccachín who had to meet the *phayna* obligations for two households — those of his mother and of his mother-in-law — by virtue of being the only adult male available in either. Should we say then that his obligation derives from membership in two households (each required to provide an adult male for *phayna* service), or from membership in the community (where the expectation is that all households will work equally)?

17. *Comuneros* divide into groups for other kinds of activities as well. Among the more important of these are the groups that form to receive bank loans to purchase agricultural inputs. These groups elect their own officers, and their existence, among other things, helps to reduce the transaction costs of securing a loan by minimizing the number of people who need to travel to Calca to deal with the bank.

18. The point that concerns me here is that surplus produced through communal labor is the focus of competing claims. I consider the observation uncontroversial. However, Grondín's discussion requires clarification. It is misleading to imply that a) the economies of scale associated with collective labor necessarily produce a surplus (if "surplus" is taken to refer to the differential between what workers produce and what they need to reproduce themselves, collective labor may produce just enough, or even less, than necessary for such reproduction), or b) that solitary labor does not produce surpluses which are also subject to competing claims (Eric A. Smith, personal communication).

19. Since this is true of all exchange, "unequal" or not, there must be more to it than this. Individuals vary greatly in the number of exchange partners and the number of exchanges. Most households, for example, have only a dozen or so *padrinos*, *compadres*, and *ahijados* to draw upon, while others may have hundreds. Contreras (1984) cites the case of a couple in Chinchero (Urubamba, Cusco) with 400 *ahijados*. The selection of such exchange partners should be amenable to optimization analysis, with the gains from trade with the n + 1 partner declining to zero at the margin. While there is competition for exchange partners, some individuals have almost monopoly control over certain goods (especially political resources), increasing the "price" that they can command.

20. "Their own interests" in terms of the interest of each *comunero* in seeing certain public goods produced, but not in terms of the interest that each also has in free-riding on the production of that good by others.

21. A low and relatively homogenous level of interest, plus a norm of fairness ("it's not my *ayllu*'s responsibility") might help explain why the church wall in Pacariqtambo went without repair for so long, as described and pondered by Urton (1992).

22. It's important to add three additional points to apply these ideas to Ccachín. First, those most interested in formal education in Ccachín opt out of the local school

system to send their children to Calca to Cusco, where they are presumed to get a better education. This can be looked upon as a private good substitute to participating in collective action to improve the village schools, but I do not know if the people who choose this option try to reduce their contribution to the local school system accordingly. Second, in contrast to the dynamic discussed by Grondín, the school system in Ccachín is in a period of expansion, and while some people leave the community, the resource base sustains an expanding population and provides opportunity for accumulation without accumulators having to withdraw permanently from the community. Third, where there are common-interest migrant associations in the cities, migrants may channel some of their wealth back into projects in their home communities, including the schools. There are no such cultural groups among migrants of Ccachín living in Cusco, Arequipa, and Lima, and I know of no financial contributions by such migrants to local community projects.

23. Whether majority-rule or consensus-based, democratic decision-making structures are inherently conservative in that agreement is needed to effect change, but not to maintain the status quo. For whatever reasons a rule is originally in place, the burden of persuasion is on those who want to change it. Thus, while there might be no generally compelling notion of fairness given the current composition of a peasant community, equal cost-sharing can persist simply because of its established position institutionally. As with all things political, change will depend on the balance of power. While a more proportionally-based cost-sharing system might seem to be in the self-interests of the majority, the decisions made at the community assemblies cannot be divorced from the multi-stranded relationships of which the *comuneros* are a part. Patronage relations in particular make it difficult to effect such change. As Contreras (1984:369) notes, "the mestizos use their *compadres* to curb demands [made on them] in the assemblies," and the same can be said of the richer *comuneros* as well.

24. Behind this idea is a concern that there is a growing tendency for every value to have a price, and that this tendency destabilizes communal values.

25. The Ik example reminds us that while self-interested behavior has a bad name, there are many kinds of motivations — envy, spite, and jealousy prominent among them — that can have much more pernicious effects on community welfare. Elster comments that "A depressing fact about many peasant societies is that people who do better than others are often accused of witchcraft and thus pulled down to, or indeed below, the level of others. Against this background, ruthless selfishness can have a liberating effect" (1989:58). Lest we dismiss this characterization of peasant society as the misinformed musings of an arm-chair philosopher, we might consider how close it comes to Seibold's description of envy in Choquecancha, Ccachín's neighbor: "*Runa* see themselves as individuals against a harsh society and a harsher environment. *Envidia*, or envy, makes each man and woman islands unto themselves who must protect their thoughts, dreams and personality against their enemies. . . .

Envidia is one of the major social problems in Choquecancha as well as in most small Andean communities" (1990:69).

Foster (1967a) characterizes this attitude as the "image of limited good," and essentially describes it as a tendency to view social interactions as zero-sum games. While it is possible to turn collective choices into zero-sum games by the sequence in which decisions are made (Hardin 1982:91, for example, notes that if a group first decides on the level of supply of a collective good and then turns to deciding on the divisions of the costs, it will create a situation where people will feel that others gain what they lose), the implication of Foster's argument for collective action is not so much that peasants create zero-sum games through social organization, but that they may misinterpret the structure of variable-sum games and fail to achieve cooperative outcomes. Such descriptions of peasant life raise a question about the accuracy of the idea that the original calculus of small-scale Andean communities is collectivist rather than individualist. Such desires to reduce other's welfare are extrarational, but not in the positive sense assumed by those who argue for the "contamination hypothesis." In such cases, an attitude of enlightened self-interest should enhance the prospects of cooperation.

Chapter 14

Social Security and Mutual Aid

Introduction

For the most part, *phayna* in the Andes are held for the production of collective goods that benefit a substantial segment of the community at once. There may be goods, however, such as security against risk, that are collective in production and coverage but only viable if a small segment of the community directly benefits at any one time. In this chapter, I explore the extent to which the *comunidad campesina* and other community organizations in Ccachín provide a safety net or social insurance to aid community members that are suffering a family crisis or that have special needs.

To suggest the kind of aid that I have in mind, I'd like to draw a few examples from another society, rural Basque society of a century or two ago. The Basque have a verb *lor* which means both "to transport" and "to obtain," and in the past, the two came together in the act of "carrying something to someone" in need. *Zur-lora*, for example, was a gift of a tree or lumber to someone whose house was destroyed by wind, fire, or weather:

> The person who found himself in such a state went round to the houses of the neighbors, owners of a woodlot, in order to ask them for wood, accompanied by a man who carried a wine-skin, bread, and cod, and he gave food and drink to each that he approached with a petition for a tree, going together to mark that which was given him (Echegaray 1928).

The statutes of many mutual security societies ensured the giving of such aid among members under the penalty of fine, half to go to repairs, the other half to the *montaz-queros* responsible for the communal woodlands.

Simaur-lora was a gift of fertilizer to someone in need:

> If a farmer found himself without fertilizer or manure upon establishing a farm-house, or in extraordinary circumstances, he would go to his neighbors, who were obliged to serve him with a cartload each. In such a case, it was common to carry

> a stick, in which a notch was made with a jackknife for each neighbor that accepted the request, until he reached the number of marks equal to the cartloads of fertilizer that he needed. Upon fulfilling their promises, carrying their respective wagons loaded with manure, he would provide them with a luncheon, called *lorra* or *totuena* (from *totoa*), in his home or at the tavern. [Echegaray 1928:37, quoting Costa et. al. 1902][1]

As a final example, *bildots-lora* referred to the practice among neighbors of giving a lamb to someone who was just starting a flock or who was reforming one after a natural disaster (this compares with *suñay* in the Andes as discussed in Chapter 6).

In all of these, *lora* could include the gift of material goods alone, materials plus labor, or simply labor. Of the latter, Echegaray notes that it was customary for neighbors to work the lands of the sick on Sunday afternoons. The parish priest usually organized such works of charity, informing community members when someone was in need of assistance, exhorting people to work, and granting exception to the rule that they couldn't work the fields on Sundays and Holy Days. Funerals were likewise an important occasion for charitable giving, and assistance by villagers at the funerals and burials of their neighbors was mandatory in many Basque communities.

These examples from Basque society provide the background for me to ask whether anything similar exists or has existed among rural Andean communities. My principal aim in this chapter is to identify similar conventions and associations in Ccachín, or indicate the lack thereof. My broader goal is to explore these practices within the framework of rational choice, with an eye to the conditions that facilitate the emergence of mutual aid conventions and mutual security associations.

The domains of the family and the community are defined in different ways in different societies. A full exploration of why this is the case is beyond my scope here, but changes in these definitions seem to depend in part on whether any of the activities in the domestic domain are perceived to have negative externalities (i.e., whether a consensus emerges that they are "public bads"), and the cost of organizing to address them. In Ccachín, the community assembly and delegated community leaders do not intervene in domestic problems, and have not developed structures for targeting aid to the least fortunate households. In particular, the community does not have any fund to deal with

household emergencies or special hardship. To the extent that the problems are resolved within kin and *compadrazgo* networks, one might argue that more collective efforts are unnecessary. However, it is not hard to imagine individual situations being improved by organized community aid.

Communally-managed welfare benefits exist to a limited extent in some Andean villages. Urton (1992) for example, notes that in Pacariqtambo, the repair of houses for widows and the purchase of coffins for people that cannot afford to buy them are paid for out of the cash reserves obtained from the communal barley fields. Care for widows is one of the most commonly-cited forms of charity in the Andean literature, and such generosity appears to be conventional in the sense that it is not dictated by any external authority. Burial of the dead in coffins, on the other hand, is mandated by the Peruvian government, and communities come up with their own fund-raising and share arrangements to comply (ibid.). Not all of the dead are buried in coffins, however, in Ccachín. I attended burials where coffins were used, and burials where they were not. I took the difference to be explained by the relative wealth of the household of the deceased (by my observation, those buried without coffins came from poorer families than those buried in coffins), but I can't discount the possibility that the carpenter who made the caskets was not in the community at the time of some of the deaths. I am unaware of any instances where the coffins used were provided out of community funds.

With few exceptions, the community as a whole does not provide any special assistance to members who have suffered accident, family loss, abandonment, or catastrophe in Ccachín. The burden of recovery falls on the individual who has suffered the misfortune, on other family members, or on the person responsible for causing the problem. To the extent that living in the community provides a kind of social insurance for members, it's primarily due to one's position within family and *compadrazgo* networks. The principal meliorative action at the community level is the redistribution of unclaimed land to those in need. In many emergency situations, however, labor and material inputs are more acute factors than land. The structure that the community has in place for organizing labor for public works is used sparingly to deal with emergencies

among member households. The principal exception is for those who have suffered a house fire, a relatively rare event. While I was in the village, two homes were destroyed by fire, an exceptional number given the short amount of time. A communal *phayna* was called to replace one, while the other was rebuilt through *ayni* and *mink'a*, privately-organized labor arrangements. Below, I discuss the conventions in case of orphanage and paternity dispute, injury, and material loss.

Responding to Adversity

Orphaned and Unacknowledged Children

Case 1: A Motherless Child

One woman died from the complications of childbirth while I was in the village. She was around sixteen years old, it was her first child, and her family lived in Choquecancha. She had moved to Ccachín to live with her *sirvinakuy* partner in the home of his parents. They buried her in Ccachín. Upon her death, her mother-in-law assumed the care of the infant. Whether this was the desire of the husband and his parents, whether the same would have been the case had the couple been living in Choquecancha with the wife's parents at the time, or whether the operative principle was that the woman died while living with her in-laws, so the in-laws were responsible for dealing with the consequences, I cannot say. There were two members of the woman's family at her funeral: her brother and her father. During her wake, a discussion took place regarding the future of the child. The majority of those who expressed their feelings felt that it would be best if the infant died. The woman's older brother was outspoken in wanting the child to live.

There are some community resources to draw upon in such situations. The *sanitario* provides health and sanitation resources courtesy of the State that did not exist in the past. At the time, however, the presence of the *sanitario* in the community was sporadic, his medicine chest poorly equipped, and beyond his advisory role to the *Club de Madres* and *Promotores de Salud*, his relations with the community and interaction with the *comuneros* outside of office hours slight.[2] The *Club de Madres* and *Vaso de Leche* Programs likewise provide new structures for distributing aid to those in need that did not

exist in the past. In this case, milk or infant formula had to be obtained on a regular basis, a significant expense. The mother-in-law who became primary care-giver was a member of the *Club de Madres* and took advantage of the milk provided by the *Vaso de Leche* program to the extent that it was available. By and large, however, the family had to draw upon its own financial resources for care of the child.

While this is the only case of a young child losing its mother that occurred while I was in the village, I talked to several adults who passed their youth in a similar situation. They were generally raised by aunts and uncles or placed under the foster care of their *madrinas*. All reported that the least desirable alternative is to remain with a father that remarries, so that one is raised by a step-mother. In one instance with which I am familiar, a widower began a relationship with a married woman (whose husband lived outside of the community in the Lares Valley). He had two sons, and the *padrino* of one them advised them to hide all of the family's valuables, to keep them out of the hands of their father's lover and her family.[3]

Case 2: Disputed Paternity

Several children have been born out of wedlock in Ccachín in the last ten years ("out of wedlock" here defined as born of parents neither cohabiting in *sirvinakuy* nor married in the church). In most instances, the father has been known and has acknowledged paternal responsibilities. In a few cases, however, the presumed father has not.

The principal role of the community in paternity disputes is in handling litigation between the parties. The judges receive *denuncios* from the aggrieved and try to mediate conflicting claims. Caregiver responsibilities remain at the individual level, and the goal of mediation is to resolve the strife between families and establish stability, security, and a future for the child. If all else fails, one of the parties may seek a permanent solution outside of the community, putting a child up for adoption or placing it in an orphanage in Cusco.

A typical complaint on the part of a woman and her family is that the father of her child and his family, even when they acknowledge their responsibilities, do not do

enough for the child. Child support, in local terms, includes providing sugar and clothing regularly, baptizing the child, and covering the costs of his or her education. Childcare may also be requested. When an unwed daughter in my host family began to wean her son, she sent him to stay with the child's father and his family for a few weeks until he stopped asking for her breasts. Further cementing commitments to the child, the parents of the young woman and the man mutually served as first-haircutting *padrinos* (though I can't discount that the difficulty of securing *compadres* for a single mother also played a role in the arrangement).[4] Various forms of persuasion and pressure are typically used to assure continued support. When paternity is not recognized or help not forthcoming, the more physical means may be used to convince recalcitrant fathers to meet their responsibilities.

Not long before our arrival to the village, a young woman became pregnant after a romantic liaison with one of our future *compadres*. He did not want to settle down with the woman, however, and he refused to recognize the child as his. Soon after, he began to live with another woman, and had a child with her. The first woman and her family made a *denuncio* against him and otherwise tried to get him to provide support for their child, but to no avail. He continued to deny paternity. Rumor had it that in desperation, the woman contracted a *brujo* ('sorcerer') in Ccachín to use witchcraft do harm to our *compadre* and to his new wife. Whether or not this was the case, the brothers of the woman took it into their own hands to bring misfortune upon them. One day while out along the trail, the woman's brothers caught up with our *compadre*, argued with him about his failure to support the child, and beat him up. He lost his hat in the fight (for some reason, the lose of a hat is one on those details in a story that the *campesinos* tend to remember), but worse, he lost 30,000,000 *intis* ($68) that his wife's brother had entrusted him to buy sheep on his behalf (our *compadre* assumed that the money was "stolen" during the fight). The animals were intended to provide meat for the brother-in-law's wife, who was pregnant at the time. To complicate matters, the baby died at birth. Unable to buy the animals or repay this money, tensions grew with his wife and with his in-laws. In order to defuse the situation with the woman by whom he had the child, he admitted that the

child was his, and agreed to provide support. This caused further problems with his wife, who had until then accepted his word that the child wasn't his. When our *comadre*'s and *compadre*'s next child also died a few days after birth, some villagers concluded that it out of stress or in supernatural retribution for these events.

Case 3: Maternal Rejection

One young woman in Ccachín had two children, both allegedly by the same man. The fellow denied being the father of either child. The fellow had two children by his first wife (a *sirvinakuy* relationship). She died, and he continued to raise these children with the help of his in-laws. After his next involvement resulted in disputed paternity, he was rumored to be involved with a married woman. Whether true or not, both the woman and her husband temporarily left the community as a way of dealing with the family tensions and social pressures. They went in opposite directions: he to the Ocobamba Valley as a *colono*, she to the city of Arequipa. During this cooling down period (after a year, the couple got back together and resettled with their children in Ccachín) the individual of interest settled in a cohabitation relationship with the younger sister of his deceased wife.

Being the single mother of two children with no recognized father, the first woman and her parents had trouble securing *padrinos* for the first-haircutting and baptism of her children. She approached Barbara and me about being the *padrinos* for the first haircutting of the oldest daughter, but we were reticent to get involved as advocates for the child in a difficult and volatile situation.[5] The young woman told us that she had been *en juicio* with the children's father over this, and that the case had been resolved in her favor. If the man did not provide child support, he could be put in jail if he ever set foot in Calca (which in fact he passed through regularly without incident). Apparently as a result of these proceedings, the man acknowledged paternity for the oldest child, but not for the second. Despite this concession, child support was not forthcoming, enforcement of the decision by authorities (assuming that she was truthful about it being in her favor)

was slack, and as another year went by, the woman became more desperate for a resolution.

The crisis over paternity came to a head one day when *Padre PS* came to the village to say mass. After the service, the fellow — secretary of the *Comité del Templo* — was leaving the church with the priest, discussing church business, when they were halted by the woman, carrying the younger child. She made a public scene, decrying that the fellow was the father of her son, that he refused to acknowledge responsibility for being the father, that he had failed to baptize the child, and that he did nothing to help with the child's support. With this she *botó* ('threw out', 'cast off') the child (in the words of the priest), abandoning him to the man's care. Upon the priest's questioning, the fellow continued to deny that he was father of the child. The priest suggested that the two of them go to a hospital in Cusco for a blood sample to settle the matter, but for reasons unknown to me (other than my assumption that one of them had no interest in being proven wrong), they never did. With the mediation of the priest, however, the fellow agreed to pay for the child's education (a role that falls on *padrinos* as well as fathers, so not in itself an admission of paternity).

Immediately after the confrontation at the church, the fellow went to the head judge in Ccachín and made a *denuncio*, accusing the woman of abandoning the child, and accusing her family of persistent threats and harassments against him, including the use of *armas blancas* ('knives and other simple weapons').[6] The man now had the child, and he decided to take him to Cusco to put him in an orphanage or children's home. The priest offered suggestions about who to approach, but after going door-to-door for a few days, the fellow could not find a vacancy in any of them. Lacking other alternatives, he returned to Ccachín with the child. After a few days of caring for the child in his home, he took him to live with his mother, a widow in her late sixties or early seventies. He described this to me as a short-term solution — his goal was still to place him in a children's home — but the child was still there a few months later when I left the village. According to the fellow, his children, partner, and in-laws did not understand the situation, and they did not treat the child well. His mother, on the other hand, was more

accepting and willing to help him out (his own house was located in the housing complex of his in-laws, while his mother lived in another part of the village).

The key features of this case are these: a) the strategies used by the mother and her family to secure material support for the child (pressing the paternity issue, seeking *compadres*, etc.), b) the interest and role of the community, as represented by its judges, in assuring that someone recognized paternity, c) the charges and counter-charges waged by means of *denuncios*, d) the appeal to the priest in a quasi-public forum to force resolution of the conflict when village and provincial authorities weren't able, e) the appeal to extra-community institutions for custodial aid after the effective abandonment of the child by both of its parents, f) resort to family support as ultimate recourse, and g) the difference in treatment of the child by the man's consanguineal and affinal kin according to probable genealogical distance from the child. Short of admission of paternity and some cooperative arrangement with the child's mother (and even then), none of the potential solutions portend a rosy future for the child. Typically, children in such situations in the village have a disadvantage vis-a-vis other children in care and attention received, the quality of *padrinos* that can be secured for them, and inheritance (a point also made by West as cited in Table 6.1, suggesting that this pattern may be a general one). While the community could collectively provide resources to help single parents raise their children, appropriate institutions to do so are not in place. All of the local alternatives — the emphasis on establishing paternity, care by one family, the other, or both, and the securing of *compadrazgo* alliances — are solutions on the family level. The community's involvement is limited to mediating household conflict, and that only with the initiative of at least one of the families involved.

Liability for Injuries

I was impressed by the way men in Ccachín tend to those among themselves most at risk from the copious amount of drinking in the fields during agricultural and pastoral rituals. Consider the following excerpt from my field notes, written after attending a corn

planting *ayni* ("*sara tarpuy*") in which the *chakrayoq* ('field owner') had so much to drink that his guidance and labor were worthless after the lunch break:

> [The *chakrayoq*] had to be urged to leave. Some walked with him. Those of us who got too far ahead stopped and waited for him. All together again, I served *chicha* while we rested along the path. . . . [The *chakrayoq*] slept. When we got up and walked again, [the *chakrayoq*] fell off the path and rolled some eight meters down the hill. His companions went to the rescue. He had wanted to stay where we had rested and sleep, but his companions urged him on and delivered him to his home.

Despite the attention and support, falls while inebriated are among the most common accidents suffered by men, and they are a significant cause of lost work days. The victims, of course, have no one to blame but themselves (whether or not they take it out on others), and lamentingly bear the costs.[7]

What are the conventions, however, when others may be subject to blame? I consider three cases: the first of an old man bit by a dog while walking through the village, the second of a boy trampled by a horse during a fiesta, and the third, of a tractor crushing a *comunero*'s foot during a communal work party.

Case 4: Dog Attack

Whenever walking through the village after dark, I would stuff my pockets with stones or carry a walking stick to ward off dogs defending their territories along the trail. Most all of the dogs were unpredictable, but if they posed a significant danger they would be eliminated by their owners, so one could generally count on them being more bark than bite. I was only bitten once, by a puppy, and it hardly broke flesh. I know of only one instance where someone was severely injured by a dog in the village while I was there. The fellow was a *kuraq*, an elder, and was attacked by my host family's dog when he stopped by to visit. The attack left a gaping wound in his leg. He was in no condition to walk, but could have been fetched by his family for treatment if desired. Instead, he was treated by the owners of the dog. They prepared a place for him on the floor in the corner of the kitchen, and he stayed with the family for the better part of a week. The operating principle seemed to be that the owners of the dog were liable and needed to

make amends (the threat of *denuncio* is always available, and by assuming responsibility, the family avoided formal legal proceedings as well). The female head of household was skilled in the use of herbal medicine, and nursed him back to health without resort to specialists. Given the fellow's condition, I suggested that the *sanitario* be fetched, but I was told that the *sanitario* charged for house calls, and that if the man's situation worsened, it would be better to carry him to the health post. To the extent that the culpable party rather than the person who suffers the injury or their family is in control of the medical decision making, there is a potential conflict of interest between the two parties over how much is invested in a person's health. On the other hand, placing care of the injured directly in the hands of those responsible for the problem assures that compensation is immediately forthcoming, and eliminates costs and problems in collecting restitution later.

Case 5: A Boy Trampled by a Horse

The *Fiesta de Santiago* is a time when young men display their masculinity and horsemanship in an event called *gallut'ipiy* (see "The Ceremonial Calendar in Ccachín," Appendix 4). For four days, twenty-five to forty young men race their horses up and down the paths in the village and gathered every afternoon in the plaza for the rooster-grabbing competition. A couple hundred on-lookers typically attend the event, and the combination of large animals, people, competition, and alcohol increases the risk of accidents and fights. In 1991, a young boy was trampled by a horse ridden by one of the young men in the competition. His leg was broken in the accident. Just as in the case described above, he was taken to the home of the owners of the horse — the parents of the young man responsible for the accident — and tended to by them. He stayed with them for several days, watched over as well by members of his own family. When Barbara and I visited him, at least three days after the accident, the father was splinting his son's leg for the first time. The *sanitario* was out of the village, so there were few options to home care. The cost of sending the boy outside of the community would have

been considerable. Here again, we see the pattern of the party responsible for the accident being expected to assume not only liability, but the actual care of the victim.

Case 6: A *Phayna* Injury

The third case differs from the first two in that the injury occurred during a communal work party. The community's tractor, which was parked in front of the church to take advantage of the protection afforded by the eaves, needed to be moved for the festival of *Santiago* (the grassfire in Case 7 below likewise occurred during these four days). After sitting around for months without being started, the battery was dead, and the president of the community asked a number of men who had gathered for the festival to push it out of the way. The project was not well coordinated (the *comuneros* involved having no experience in dealing with such a beast), and in the process, one of the wheels rolled over one of the *comunero*'s feet. Several bones were broken. Among the poorest in the village, the fellow did not have any money to go to the hospital in Cusco to have the foot treated. He contracted another *comunero* to build him a crutch, and he treated his foot with a mixture of herbs that he would rub on before bandaging. The *comunero* was on crutches for a couple of months, and in the meantime, the season for planting his *maway chakra* came and went without him able to do any field work. Consequently, his early-crop potatoes went unplanted. For lack of money he didn't get proper treatment for his injury, and for lack of capacity he was not able to plant his fields (remember that labor recruitment is normally secured through *ayni*, so that without labor power to offer, it's not easy to get assistance in one's own fields). In principle, at least, the community could have been a source of both to help him through hard times, but provided neither. The fact that his injury was sustained during service to the community did not appear to make the community liable in any way. Rather than insuring its members against risk in such circumstances, the convention seems to be "help at your own risk."[8]

Emergency Aid

The six cases I have discussed so far in this section address my interest in two questions: a) what are the conventions for determining responsibility and liability in Ccachín? and b) are there any community-wide institutions that provide member individuals and households help in times of special need (whether they take such liability into account or not)? The sixth case was an example where no one in particular could be held accountable, but an individual suffered a significant loss for contributing to the public good, and his misfortune could have been alleviated by a bit of timely collective action. The next two cases follow along these lines. The losses to the families involved were extensive, and the provision of emergency aid by the community could make a significant difference to their welfare. In the first case such aid was not forthcoming, but in the second it was.

Case 7: Herds Destroyed by a Grassfire

In Chapter 9, while discussing fines for damage to community resources, I mentioned an incident in which two families lost nearly all of their sheep in a brush fire set by their children. In assessing the fines, the community assembly formally appraised their liability. It determined that one of the families was free of responsibility, while the other (the one in which the parents had provided matches to their son) was obliged to pay a substantial penalty. I'd like to revisit that case here from the standpoint of the loss to the respective families.

The destruction of one's herd is a major disaster. Not only are the sheep the most important source of meat and wool for every family in Ccachín, their dung is an essential input in the production of potatoes and corn. One can imagine several possible community-level actions to aid families in such situations. A *kermesse* could be held or a fund established to help the unfortunate families reestablish their herds. A collection of sheep manure could be organized to make-up for any shortfall caused by the loss (precedent exists for such a collection, as the school children already do the same for fertilizing school lands, as described in Chapter 8). Breeding stock from a community herd could be

redistributed to help soften the loss. Either of the first responses could be based on mandatory contributions by community members or they could be voluntary, and they could be spontaneously organized by community groups or by the *asamblea general*. The last is a more costly long-term institutional solution, a way of insuring all members against such risk. In this case, the possibilities stand out by their absence. No collective action was proposed nor taken by community members. I'm not aware of any instances where such aid for individual families was provided in the community during my stay. Outside of kinship and *compadrazgo*, emergency material aid does not appear to be institutionalized in tradition, policy, or practice at the community level.

Case 8: *Phayna* to Rebuild a House

House fires appear to be relatively rare in the Andes. *Comuneros* in Ccachín could recall less than a handful in their memory. Of these, two took place while I was in the village. The first was assumed to have been a case of arson, perhaps to cover a theft, perhaps out of spite. I have discussed the case at length in Chapter 5. Here I only wish to recall that in that case, a fire brigade are spontaneously formed by those with adjoining houses, and that when it came to reconstruction of the damaged building, the non-specialized labor was recruited through a combination of *ayni* and *mink'a*. The *wasi-chakuy* ('roofing party') itself was a *mink'a*, with invitations issued by the homeowners.[9] This case serves as a contrast to the following one, which took place later in the same year.

In July of 1991, the dry season, with the skies hazy from the clearing of brush in Ccachín and in the Lares Valley below, a seven-year old boy in the village burned some refuse collected around the family compound. Inexperienced in such matters and without supervision, he piled up the materials and set the fire against the backside of a neighbor's house. The thatched roof of the building accidently caught fire and was quickly consumed in flame, and while neighbors were able to contain it so that it didn't do any structural damage to the adobe walls and ceiling joists or spread to an attached building, the roof had to be rebuilt. The community's response was rapid. Whether this was due to

the fact the male household head was *mayordomo* of *Corpus Christi* at the time, to a change in community officials since the last fire (the new *teniente gobernador* was a nephew of the victim), or simply because the distraught owner sought the help, I don't know. Two days after the fire, community officials, called a *phayna* to roof the house. The family served boiled corn and wheat soup to those who attended, as well as *coca*, *trago*, and *chicha* (how *chicha* was obtained on such short notice is unclear). Several men provided bottles of *trago* as gifts to the house owner. Attendance was taken, and nearly a third of households were represented, more than needed at such an event. Participation was voluntary, so there were no fines assessed nor *prendas* received. In fact, there was little to distinguish labor recruitment from a *mink'a*, except for the public call for help and the light fare for lunch (since there is no one-to-one labor exchange in *mink'a*, food and drink are usually the principal recompense). As in the case of the other house fire, an inventory of damage was taken and a *denuncio* was prepared by the appropriate authorities. This time, however, since the identity of the boy that started the fire was known, the *denuncio* was made against his mother (a widowed head of household) to recoup the costs of sponsoring the *wasichakuy* and for the material losses incurred.

Discussion of Cases

Liability and Litigation

One of the impressions conveyed by the cases above, as well as others presented in previous chapters, is the litigiousness of village life. I don't have good statistical data on the extent of this, so I'm unable to make historical or cross-cultural comparisons. It would be useful, for example, to know what percentage of households were involved in conflictive legal actions as either complainants or subjects of complaint over the course of a year and how this has changed over time. It's clear from the cases, however, that making a *denuncio* before village judges or the *teniente gobernador* is a locally-accepted and often-used tool for pressing one's grievances in cases of personal injury, property damage, disputed paternity, and theft.

The principal roles of the community and its elected representatives in these instances are to establish who is liable, determine what the parties involved must do to rectify the situation, and lend their authority to enforcing the decision. Rules of thumb for determining liability are encoded in convention and followed by community members and authorities alike. Liability is rarely an all or nothing thing: just as people have a responsibility not to cause accidents, victims have a responsibility to avoid them. The rules, however conditional, invariably simplify. In the two cases involving injuries caused by animals above, it is not clear whether the medical attention provided to the victims by the owners of the animals followed traditional patterns, or was conditioned by the possibility of legal action (i.e, would the care have been the same if the option of making a *denuncio* did not exist?).

The involvement of community authorities is solicited by at least one of the parties and sometimes both (in the case of countercharges) when they cannot reach agreement on their own. It is often part of a more comprehensive strategy for asserting one's interests in a conflict, and may be simultaneous with or sequential to cutting off social and work relations, seeking involvement of relatives, *compadres*, or respected individuals as intermediaries, resort to diviners or sorcerers, threats and violence, and other pressure tactics.

Denuncios not only involve local officials, they provide access to a hierarchy of legal channels extending to the provincial level. Presumably, people use these channels because they have a relatively high probability of getting results, when factored for cost and compared with alternative means, but expressive motivations cannot be discounted. The fees, travel, and other costs associated with *denuncios* generally assure that only major problems are dealt with in this way, and only by families with sufficient means. Presumably, also, the existence of the system has a certain deterrent effect (but it is hard to measure). Cases, however, often drag on for months or years without clear resolution, due, among other things, to the limited investigative and enforcement capacity of local and regional authorities. Unfortunately, I don't have any systematic data on how often *denuncios* lead to the resolution of a problem.

What stands out in these cases is that the institutional machinery for assessing responsibility and guaranteeing restitution of one party by another in the community is fairly well developed compared to the machinery for collectively meliorating the damage done by individuals to self and others, whether accidental or otherwise. Restitution rarely returns things to their previous state, and timely collective action by the community-as-a-whole could often improve life for those who have suffered misfortune or catastrophe. In the cases above, children would receive better care if single parents received community aid, injuries would heal if there were resources available for medical attention, herders could recover more quickly from the loss of their herds if there were a pool to draw from, and houses would be rebuilt more quickly if everyone pitched in.

Insurance and Safety Nets

In short, the community is relatively strong on conflict resolution, but weak on providing its members a safety net. Collective action is taken to provide collective and public goods available to all, but such action is rare to improve the lot of those worst off or those who suffer sudden disaster. This lacuna is not particularly problematic if one starts from the perspective of rational individual actors and takes cooperation as something that needs to be explained whenever it exists. The question is more problematic if we take the moral economy as given. The lack of community action in these instances belies the assumption that local populations readily find mechanisms to redistribute wealth as a form of collective insurance (e.g., *suñay*, discussed in Chapter 6), as a leveling-mechanism (e.g., the *cargo* system, reviewed in Chapter 7), or as an outgrowth of general norms of solidarity. It's curious that latent group functions are invoked to explain so many of these cooperative institutions, when, by contrast, there appears to be a paucity of intentional cooperation among individuals in the same populations to serve the same function. It also bears noting that the redistributive burden in these mechanisms typically falls upon lone individuals (e.g., *suñay*-givers, *carguyoq*, *varayoq*) rather than on collectives (within which the individual contributors may remain relatively anonymous).[10] The principle of justice underlying these institutions appears to place the burden

on those most able to give, contrasting with what we have seen with the systems of household assessments and *phayna* labor, which distribute the burden equally, without regard to capacity.

One possible explanation for the lack of such aid, where and when it is lacking, may be economic. Perhaps, as Urbano writes:

> The ecosystems in which many of these communities settled don't allow them great variation or innovation in the structures of production and sociability. *Ayni* is economic, social, and political coaction in them. Perhaps the most extreme and tragic expression of that is widowerhood. In a *comunidad campesina*, a widower literally dies. He is incapable of maintaining reciprocal ties, and the dependency that he creates is an excessive burden for the community. For this reason, he is abandoned to his luck, something like the Inuit who rid themselves of their old people like dead leaves. Life in the Arctic is so hard that the laws of survival impose the removal and death of their aged. [Urbano 1991:XXXI-XXXII]

Another potential explanation could be that population growth, market penetration, and encroachment of State and regional institutions have lead to rapid changes, disrupting traditional institutions that played this role. The information we have at hand is too scattered and sketchy to determine clear patterns. Accordingly, a thorough review of the institutions that have existed in the Andes for providing aid to widows and widowers, orphans, the sick, the poor, and those caught by disaster needs to be undertaken. Once in hand, we can then look at the structure of these institutions to determine the conditions in which they have emerged and are maintained, to what extent they are collective, what the costs and benefits to the individuals involved are, and how effectively they solve the problems, bearing both efficiency and equity in mind.

One of the problems in establishing a formal redistribution system in a consensual system of this sort is maintaining its legitimacy. The legitimacy rests in its ability to translate local norms of fairness into practice. This assumes that there is a certain consensus about what is fair, and that the goals of equity, equality of opportunity, and equality of contribution are weighed similarly by participants regardless of their social position. Even when consensus is achieved, the information costs of making the system fair may be prohibitive. How does one assess need? Some investigative procedure must be in place. Not everyone who loses a couple of dozen sheep in a fire suffers the same

relative loss. The number that remain may still be greater than the herds of some in the community. Families that are part of extensive kin networks are able to withstand tragedies that small ones can't. And so on. Comparability of cases is hard to measure, and hard to achieve. The issue becomes even more complicated when liability is factored in. In order to discourage the kinds of behavior that lead to problems, negligence needs to be taken into account. Should the family that lost their animals to fire through their own negligence receive the same aid as the family judged not responsible? In small-scale and personal societies, it's easy for resentments to disrupt the system.

The one case where aid was given in those reviewed in this chapter was in repairing a house. The information costs were low in this instance. The value of material goods lost was not replaced by the community. Such losses are hard to ascertain by visual inspection, subject to overstatement, and are left for recovery via legal challenge of the negligent party. However, labor for rebuilding the physical structure was provided. The *comuneros* are relatively equal in this regard. Nearly everyone has a house, and the few that don't rent one. The extent of the loss in a fire is clearly visible. The houses do not vary greatly in the amount of labor needed to roof them.

Notes to Chapter 14

1. The Basque *totoa* refers to the bread and wine given to those who provide aid after a fire or other accident (Ekiten Taldea 1980). While it was customary for the family receiving aid to serve food and drink to those who helped them, Echegaray (1928) notes that the Catholic Church tried to abolish the practice "in order to avoid abuses and to eliminate all lucrative aspects from the work of charity."

2. In the case under discussion here, neither the *sanitario* of Ccachín nor the *sanitario* of Choquecancha was able to provide the attention the young mother needed. Ccachín's *sanitario* was not present in the community at the time. The *sanitario* in Choquecancha sent an injection for her, but did not go to her aid for fear of a local power-lord who was visiting the community at the time.

   In meeting special labor needs, the *Club de Madres* is to the medical post as the *Padres de Familia* is to the school. The lines of communication between the school and the community assembly and the oversight of the former by the latter, however, are more firmly established than they are in the case of the medical post. The school was an agenda item at several community assemblies that I attended. The medical post was never on the agenda and the *sanitario* did not attend any of the meetings. To a large extend, this reflects the style and organizational skills of the *sanitario* at the time rather than anything intrinsic to the position. The *sanitario* in Choquecancha was much better integrated into the community and played a much wider and more active leadership role than the one in Ccachín.

3. As commonly the case in such illicit situations, after carrying on with the affair for several months, the man left the community, taking his boys with him. Flight from the community, if an option, is a typical response to the social pressures attending such norm violations.

4. The parents of the young woman, however, blocked efforts to form a more permanent bond between their daughter and her child's father.

5. While the *comuneros* had similar concerns in mind in not wanting to get involved, the labor recruitment factor likely weighed heavily on their minds. In choice of *ahijados*, the child was disadvantaged in this sense over children with both parents.

6. My field notes record an incident during *Misti Carnival*, a few months after we were approached by the woman to form *compadrazgo* relations, where a fight broke out between the woman and a second, with the intervention of the man to break it up. All three came away from the ruckus with cuts and bruises to the face and head. Whether he was referring to this or to other incidents, I am not sure.

7. The "of course" in this comment is tongue-in-cheek, because anyone who has read Evans-Pritchard's "The Notion of Witchcraft Explains Unfortunate Events" (1937) knows that the buck does not always stop here, whether we are discussing the Azande, the Quechua, or the industrial West. The wealth of potential counterfactuals ("if only such-and-such, this wouldn't have happened") likewise provides plenty of opportunity for blame to be spread around.

8. While the *comunero* noted that the community didn't do anything to help him, the principle probably underlies all work parties. People working in *ayni* don't hold the owner of the field responsible for the injuries they sustain while working. Still, one might offer some voluntary assistance in such situations.

9. In this and the discussion that follows, I use the term *mink'a* to refer to labor recruitment based on the bounty of the attending feast, without reciprocal labor exchange. In Ccachín, the term is typically used in a different sense, to refer to an *ayni* ('reciprocal labor exchange') with music and other fanfare.

10. *Suñay*-givers, *carguyoq*, and *varayoq* typically orchestrate the pooling of resources among family members and ritual kin, so they are not "lone" in this sense. However, they are the focal point of such giving, and whatever prestige gained by the group as a whole as a result of the generosity filters through them.

Summary and Conclusion

Introduction

My research in the Andes was motivated by the question, "How do agropastoralists resolve collective action problems in securing access to resources and producing collective goods?" My working hypotheses were that action in the Andes is primarily instrumental — that actions are not valued and chosen for themselves, but as more or less efficient means to further ends — and that conditional cooperation, decentralized sanctions, and communal partitioning of use rights would solve coordination and collective goods problems whenever high levels of certainty about community members' expected behavior could be maintained. To this end, I collected data in a bilingual Quechua-Spanish speaking, agropastoral village of about 225 households in the southern highlands of Peru from mid-1989 to January of 1992.

I conducted my fieldwork in the village of Ccachín, on the eastern slope of the Urubamba mountain range in the District of Lares, Province of Calca, Department of Cusco, Inca Region, Peru. The village encompasses 9,807 hectares, with the village nucleus at 3250 m. and the primary agricultural land varying in altitude from 2733 m. to 3973 m. above sea level. The *comunidad campesina*, an officially-recognized indigenous peasant community, has four population centers, with the main settlement — Ccachín — having about 175 households and 850 people. The settlement pattern is nucleated, but households maintain secondary cabins in outlying production zones. I carried out the bulk of my research in the main settlement and associated fields.

The principle crops of villagers are corn and potatoes; their principle livestock are sheep, cattle, pigs, and horses. Property rights vary from individual to communal by production zone. Close to the village, the land is worked intensively, with high labor and material inputs and seasonal fallow. Further from the village in the surrounding hillsides, the fields are managed through communally-regulated fallow. Households have their own plots, organized into sectors, with each sector fenced to control access by livestock when it comes into production. Every year, one or more of these sectors is cultivated,

with the rest used for extensive pasture. There are no significant irrigation works, but the *comunidad campesina* plays an important role in organizing the use of agricultural and pasture lands. The most intensely-used land close to the settlement has the most private property rights and decision making, while the land furthest away has the most communal.

I focused my research in Ccachín around two goals, the first to explore the role and limits of instrumental rationality in decision making in general, and the second, as specifically applied to collective decision making, to determine the role that instrumental rationality, or alternatively, cooperative ideologies and values, play in determining the outcome of strategic interactions. To achieve these goals, I identified collective situations and problems in the village, determined the group decision making processes, leadership structure, sanctioning system, and other conventions and institutions governing community relations, recorded the pattern of interaction between community members in agropastoral production and public works, and documented the outcomes of these interactions.

My overall research approach is to view collective outcomes in terms of the goals and actions of individuals, with the hope of contributing to the effort to establish coherent microfoundations in the explanation of cooperation in the Andes and elsewhere. A full theory of cooperation requires us to move smoothly between biological, economic, social, and cultural theory, and to identify not only the benefits of behavior to individuals in specific environments, but to link the benefits to evolutionary processes that generate the behavior. In this way, we may be able to avoid the problems that emerged in functionalist and adaptationist accounts of old. The construction of such a comprehensive theory is still in the rudimentary stages and requires the work and cooperation of many people from a variety of disciplines and perspectives in theoretical, experimental, and descriptive realms. My particular contribution is a case study, or a series of case studies — as the behaviors and traditions discussed in this thesis are varied — that attempt to determine what would constitute successful explanation for the features I discuss. This is a tall order, and one can't do it all, but I believe that I have carried the torch forward

sufficiently for others to run with it, and to lay the groundwork for my further work. I have geared my discussion to other Andeanists, but it should be of interest to all involved in the investigation of rational choice and collective action.

In the summary that follows, I have organized my principle findings and conclusions according to three topics, rational choice, collective action, and ethnographic findings.

Rational Choice

Writing about his research on Maya corn farmers in Zinacantan, Mexico, Cancian stresses that:

> Zinacanteco behavior has been viewed as just one more instance of general human behavior and not as Maya behavior, Indian behavior, or peasant behavior. [Cancian 1972:158]

The same can be said of my work in Ccachín. First and foremost, I am interested in the behavior of my hosts, friends, subjects, and acquaintances in Ccachín as exemplary of general human behavior, not as uniquely Andean, Indian ("*runa*"), or peasant ("*campesino*") behavior. We do well to bear in mind, for example, as Urbano suggests we do, that "*Ayni* is not a unique characteristic of the historical experience of the Andes. It's one more example of a fundamental principle that governs all human societies" (Urbano 1991:XXXI). This perspective may be taken for granted by many social scientists, but it bears emphasis in Andean studies, where a distinctly Andean worldview is often highlighted or granted totalizing effect.

I have phrased my working hypothesis in terms of rational choice, but there are many mechanisms that explain human behavior, and social scientists have discovered a repertoire of ways in which things happen. Elster (1989) notes that one of the greatest obstacles to planning is that we lack a metatheory that predicts when one mechanism or another will dominate and how they will work together. As he puts it, "What we have is a toolbox of mechanisms, not a set of laws" (Elster 1989:168). Given this state of affairs, we need to be circumspect about our explanatory claims but vigorous in our efforts to

improve upon out theories of human societies. I start with one mechanism here, rational choice, to determine the extent that it successfully explains people's actions, particularly collective action, in the Andes. I start with rational choice not because it is in any sense methodologically prior to other individual-level mechanisms in the explanation of human behavior, but because it is the most theoretically developed, it yields clear predictions, and it is in principle at least tractable, grounded as it is in individuals' intentions and consciousness. Once one determines what a rational individual would do under given circumstances, one can proceed to observe whether this is what the individual actually does. In addition, there are some interesting parallels between evolutionary ecology and rational choice theory, so that we are closer here than with many explanatory mechanisms to being able to join the two together into a more synthetic theory. In the context of collective action, evolutionary and rational choice accounts often converge, so that it is a convenient starting point for building a more comprehensive theory.

Rational choice, as I understand it, is associated with action that is instrumental, self-interested, based on empirically-informed beliefs, and limited to material and social incentives. This rules out actions solely motivated by emotions, adherence to norms, altruistic urges, the pleasure of doing, and expressions of self. It also rules out cognitive fallacies, wishful thinking, and other processes where beliefs are subverted by cognitive limitations and the desires they serve. A process can be rational and fail to reach the truth, however, as it is a relation between a belief and the grounds on which it is held; rationality is relative to the evidence available for a decision and its optimal collection. In that sense, it is both a panhuman mechanism and culturally specific. The concept of rational choice is defined for individuals and not collectivities. There are strategic situations in which all would benefit if all acted irrationally, and my interest in rational choice is in its explanatory power, not its normative role. The province of rational choice theory in social scientific analysis is to explain individual action in terms of individual desires and beliefs. It does not provide a complete theory of social phenomena in itself, and we must turn to causal and functional mechanisms to explain social facts in terms of these actions, and desires and beliefs in terms of ecological and social states.

Often, anthropologists try to pass off the beliefs, dispositions, and cultural conflicts that they identify as being explanatorily relevant without being clear about what, or exactly how much, they are trying to explain. Whether or not we are right in our analysis, the least we can do is be clear about the mechanisms we are invoking in concrete circumstances, more exacting in our descriptions of causal chains.

In this thesis, I take a look at a number of behaviors and cultural traditions where other theorists have implied or suggested that rational choice has little explanatory sway, and by exploring the consistency, logic, and reach of their arguments, along with the features of the phenomena, attempt to show how a rational choice approach can add to their explication.

In Chapter 2, I raise the issue of whether the pattern of production zones in general, and the existence of communally-regulated sectoral fallow in particular, can best be explained in terms of ecological, technological, and sociological factors or by an ideological emphasis on communal values, equal division between all, and sequential rotation. Clearly, Andeans have models and experience from other domains that they can apply to communal land management, and this may reduce the costs of collective decision making and coordination, making the difference between success and failure. But two things must be said. First, property rights vary from individual to communal by item and production zone in most communities, and any attempt to define the Andean ethos in general terms as individualist or communal is at best ad hoc. Attempting to solve the problem by adding the notion of a contradiction between the two as is sometimes done is little better. Second, I conclude that while both practical and symbolic reasons may play a role in maintenance of the sectoral fallow system, they do not do so in the same way. Rational choice theory predicts that when new elements are added to an individual's opportunity set, behavior will change if one of them is seen as better than the formerly top-ranked alternative. In aggregate, this creates pressures for change. Theories of cultural choice and social norms, in the most general sense, do not give rise to the expectation that this will happen. Accordingly, they may help explain why behavior does not immediately and automatically adjust to new opportunities, but they are at a

disadvantage in explaining why customary behavior is discarded when new opportunities arise. The communal values model does not do as well at explaining either the pattern or changes in the pattern of property rights and land use in Andean communities as rational-choice and adaptationist explanations do.

In Chapter 5, I discuss theft in the Andes and in Ccachín in particular, and I argue that it is most plausibly explained by rational choice conditioned by seasonal changes in opportunity. This suggestion is not novel, as a host of researchers have recognized that going back at least as far as the Inca era, the chief danger to crops from human theft was in April or May, when the maize was ripe but not ready for harvest. My discussion here shows how explanation can be multidimensional and multicausal, and how the interaction of mechanisms can lead to a situation where theft becomes socially expectable and practically tolerated, though not, as some would say, "institutionalized." At the same time, I do not assign all mechanisms equal weight, nor accept all purported explanations of theft in the Andes as equally plausible. In particular, the culturally-specific but totalizing cultural contradiction between seasonally-patterned dispositions of collective production and private appropriation posited by Gose (1991, 1994) to explain theft and several other features of Andean society is exactly the kind of analysis that troubles me for its lack of specificity about what and how much it is attempting to explain. Crop and animal theft are found in agrarian and pastoral societies throughout the world, and any attempt to explain their prevalence at certain times or places in the Andes in terms of uniquely Andean dispositions or beliefs is noteworthy for its lack of generalizability. The same is true of attempts to explain *ayni* in terms of a uniquely Andean worldview, as suggested above.

As I discuss in Chapter 6, failure to specify what is being explained is also a problem with Flannery et. al.'s (1989) work on the giving of animals to poor nonkin at animal marking ceremonies, but in a different way. Their work is innovative and important in applying one of Boyd and Richerson's models of cultural inheritance to the spread of a cooperative norm among herders in the Ayacucho area of the Andes. Their research is informed by ecological, evolutionary, and rational choice theory, and on the

face of it, appears clear and tenable in identifying the explanatory mechanism involved. However, their effort also points out how difficult it is to adequately delimit the phenomenon to be explained and to model all relevant causal factors when attempting to explain real-life cases. I pick up on one of the suggested but unexplored avenues they leave — the role that alcohol plays in such rituals and exchanges — to explore the role that prestige and status play in the sharing of alcohol in other contexts as well. I suggest that the generosity of herd owners at animal fertility rituals, when it exists, may be better explained in terms of the striving for prestige or the signaling of status. A full explanation of *suñay*-giving, as the term is locally defined in many parts of the Andes, requires reference to kin-selection, tolerated theft, and reciprocal exchange as well, as gifts to nonkin represent a relatively minor proportion of all gifts at such events.

Chapter 6 is likewise important for my discussion of group-level functionalist explanation, as some form of group-selection is often used to explain why a particular behavior does not appear to conform with any of our rational actor models. Most attempts at group-functional explanation in the social sciences have hitherto failed to adequately specify the beneficial consequences involved, the beneficiaries, or the causal feedback mechanism maintaining the behavior at the level of individuals, with the latter proving especially problematic. While conceding Cohen's (1978) point that we may be able to separate functional explanation itself from the more historically contingent explanation of why one of several functional equivalents is the one that actually serves the suggested function, I find that this does little to salvage Flannery et al.'s argument for the group selection of altruistic *suñay* giving, as the same group-level consequences may emerge in this case as incidental byproducts of more instrumental herd building and herd-management behaviors.

As Winterhalder (1997) indicates in his review of the recent history of biologists' and social scientists' thinking on the mechanisms of selection, our ideas about group selection have evolved through the last forty years. First, there was a period of analytical permissiveness, during which nearly any beneficial effect discovered at any level could be posited as the cause of the origin and maintenance of a trait. The period from the mid-

1960s to near-present was much more restrictive in this regard, and the restraint bore fruit with the identification of a variety of mechanisms rendering behaviors that did not previously appear to conform with the assumption of individual self-interest explainable in terms of it. We are now beginning a period in which new biological models of group selection and new sociocultural models of dual inheritance are again expanding the range of mechanisms and circumstances that enable the emergence of social behaviors with group-level benefits, and while I critique Flannery et. al.'s explanation in this particular case, I am inspired by their pioneering work.

In Chapter 12, I turn my focus to boundary marking rituals in the Andes in an effort to sort out the individual interests and collective processes sustaining them. Radcliffe (1989) treats boundary marking as a kind of pilgrimage or procession to express and reinforce collective identity and solidarity. In contrast, I suggest that it arose and has been maintained as a device for signaling group strength and defending property rights. Further, as a kind of collective action, boundary markings are as subject to free-riding as any kind of collective work party, and their gradual disappearance can be linked to the appearance of less costly and more definitive State-sponsored forms of boundary definition and defense. The goal is no longer so much to patrol or capture the land as it is to capture State support for one's territorial claims.

For the most part, I am concerned with strategic action in the Andes. In Chapter 4, however, I consider a domain that is not strategic — ethnomedical decision making — for what it can tell us about decision making under uncertainty and about certain non-rational choice mechanisms. I do this a) to contribute an Andean case study to the heuristics and biases research, b) to emphasize that the causal connections that Andeans make between personal misfortune and social and ecological disorders and their concern with supernatural sanctions are givens that potentially affect their calculations of the rewards of their actions, and, c) to acknowledge that because of the placebo effect, it is particularly hard for professional researchers, let alone lay observers, to collect accurate evidence about cause and effect.

The magnitude of the latter is extremely hard to determine for medical scientists because spontaneous remission of a disease cannot be distinguished from the placebo effect unless there is a control group that hasn't received any treatment at all, and such non-treatment controls are uncommon. Andean peasants, as with non-specialists everywhere, do not have such research tools at their disposal. This makes the choice of medical treatment options considerably more complex than choosing what to plant or what to eat, for example. What's intriguing here is that there's an important but limited realm where the belief that something works is the reason that it does so, and that it's an area where rational choice and nonrational kinds of cultural logic become joined. As Harrington (1977) puts it,

> For me, placebos were a wonderfully subversive phenomenon in the world. . . . They seemed to function [in] narrative, symbols, human relationships, and other things thought about in the humanities and social sciences, but they also happened in the body, and looked a lot like biology. [Harrington 1997]

Uncertainty plays a role not only in the selection of treatment options in health-care, but in the action sequences used in the Andes for such things as response to theft. In the latter arena, physical force tends to be used when a thief is caught red-handed, appeals to authority are made when detection is less immediate, and appeals for supernatural detection and sanction are made when the desire for justice are likely to go otherwise unfulfilled.

Gose (1994) takes some of the great minds of anthropology — Tylor, Frazer, Malinowski, and Evans-Pritchard — to task for conflating ritual with magic, for assuming that ritual-magic tries to do the same things as instrumental action, and for assuming that it only finds expression when people reach the limits of their technical competence. In his words,

> All of these approaches assume that labour and ritual are alternative technical means to the same ends, and offer little explanation (beyond uncertainty) of why the two should coincide and interact in annual cycles. [Gose 1994:7]

Without challenging his overall conclusion, that labor and ritual do not always try to do the same things, and that they often coincide because they are complementary — ritual

serving to formulate or highlight the ends toward which practical action is directed — I think that it is important not to throw out the baby with the bath water. Clearly, uncertainty is not an explanatory mechanism as such, but it is an explanatory condition that helps us predict when the choice among actions to take will be governed by one choice mechanism or another. I think that uncertainty helps us explain a lot, and I attempt to restore it to a more central position in my analysis here.

Collective Action

I agree with Elster that:

> There are two mistakes to be avoided in trying to explain cooperative behavior. The crudest is to believe that there exists one privileged motivation — self-interest, for instance — that explains all instances of cooperation. A more subtle error is to believe that each instance of cooperation can be explained by one motivation. In reality, cooperation occurs when and because different motivations reinforce each other. [Elster 1989:131]

Referring specifically to the Andes, Urton puts it much the same when he cautions that:

> It would be as much a mistake to suppose that peasants willingly subordinate their own individual and household interests to those of the community as it would be to think that those same peasants act solely in their own self interest, or that of their *ayllu*. [Urton 1992:233]

My thesis benefits from and echos these points, and I elaborate in the explanation of a number of practices in the Andes.

The types of social situations I address in Chapters 5 through 14 include spite and revenge (negative rewards to self and others), selfishness (positive rewards to self, negative rewards to others), altruism (positive rewards to others at the expense of oneself), and cooperation (positive rewards to self and others, even when one's dominant strategy might be to free-ride on the cooperation of others). Specifically, I look at the behaviors of theft (+,-), the giving of live animals at animal marking ceremonies ("*suñay*," -,+, at least within individual lifetimes), sponsorship of civil-religious *cargos* and the filling of community positions, taxation and fund raising, communal work parties, the

marking of territorial boundaries, and social security and mutual aid (the five last, arguably, cases of +,+). In addition, I consider informal sanctions in the village in general. Expressing disapproval and carrying out threats is costly, and it may be vengeful, altruistic, or cooperative in outcome depending on the payoff structure and context.

Most studies of peasant rationality in the Andes to the present have focused on ritual kinship ("*compadrazgo*"), festival sponsorship, property rights, risk-reduction, and labor recruitment (one-to-one labor exchange ["*ayni*"] and labor exchange for food, drink, and festivity ["*mink'a*"]). While I touch on many of these issues when relevant to my discussion or when I feel that it would add comparative data to the ethnographic database of Andean communities, my particular focus has been on those social situations where there is a temptation for individuals to free-ride on the contributions of others.

The principle cost-sharing rule for community contribution in Ccachín, be it for labor or material contribution, is equal contribution from each family, while benefits tend to sort out naturally according to the material interests that each has in the undertaking. Perhaps the equal cost-sharing rule emerged historically in a time of greater equality of interests and means, but at present, it is probably maintained because of its salience, simplicity, low cost, and enforceability. The pyramidal structure of the traditional civil-religious *cargo* system insures that while ostensibly all adult men (and through them, their spouses, families, and relations) are equally eligible and expected to participate in the system, only those with sufficient social and economic resources to do so either actively seek or are socially pressured into the most costly positions. This introduces a more progressive element into the system, but it is not the strong leveling-mechanism that some investigators have claimed for other areas of Latin America.

At the same time, the growing importance of common-interest associations in Ccachín assures that such collectively-provided superior goods as education and religious structures, goods that appear to have a proportionally higher demand among the better off in the community, are provided. Such groups not only benefit from their higher than average level of interest and resources, but also from the advantages that smaller group size bring in assuring cooperation among their members in carrying out their aims. Their

presence serve as a catalyst for community-wide cooperation through conformity effects, moral persuasion, political entrepreneurship, and other mechanisms.

An important ethnographic finding of my study, however, is that whether we are talking about attendance at community assemblies, participation in communal work parties, or response to fund-raising campaigns and mandatory payment of household assessments, cooperation appears to be far less than universal. Participation rates rarely exceed 60% for any of these, and are often far less. Most often, full participation in these endeavors is taken as given in Andean research, the fruit of a cooperative ideology. I'm not the first investigator to find less than universal participation, but among the first to do it in such detail, and to elaborate on the consequences.

I also establish that there is an elaborate system of formal sanctions — pawns, fines, suspension of membership rights — to increase the personal costs of noncompliance, and, as I put it in my working hypothesis, to assure high levels of certainty about community members' expected behavior. As Urton (1992) suggests, participation in village projects by rank-and-file community members seems to be motivated more by the threat of sanctions imposed for failure to participate and by making participation a means and condition for receiving certain community benefits — most importantly, access to land — than by communalist values.

Just as importantly, however, the collection of fines for failure to attend assemblies, to participate in communal work parties, or to keep one's animals out of restricted sectors is no more universal than the original actions that they attempt to reinforce. Ensuring compliance with the mandates of the *comunidad campesina* is itself a collective action problem. It is complicated by the relatively high costs of collection — the risks of alienating the target individual or provoking retaliation, the time it takes collecting fines door-to-door, ambiguity about ability to pay, and the low personal rewards to the collectors and sanctioners formally delegated by the community in a nonsalaried governance system. In addition, the greater anonymity of noncooperators with the collection process, in contrast to the visibility of people's presence or lack of presence at the original work parties, probably plays a role. While a role call of attendees at every *phayna* helps

bring informal social pressures to bear on consistent free-riders, there is no equivalent public exposure of individuals who have failed to provide expected material contributions to the community. These factors lead to crisis management, the erosion of public confidence in community leadership, and resignation in the face of widespread noncooperation, all of which can have a snowball effect further reducing the levels of cooperation. While the threat of sanctions has an effect on almost all community members and raises the average level of personal contribution, it has a differential effect on members depending on their interest in their reputation and social position, and it probably influences those pursuing resource-gathering strategies and positions that give them community-wide visibility the most.

In a cash-poor economy such as found in Ccachín, the problem of paying tax assessments and fines in a timely manner is always very real. The problem was exacerbated during the period of my study by the declining real value of the Peruvian currency. Since the amounts set for assessments and fines were rarely adjusted to keep pace with the changing value of the money itself, an incentive was created to withhold payment as long as possible. Those who paid their due on time effectively paid more than those who delayed, introducing inequities into the system.

Despite these problems, a lot gets done. On average, male household heads are expected to contribute twenty to twenty-five days to community work projects a year (roughly 10% of their total labor), and even if participation on average is roughly half that, it's still a lot of labor. As a walk through the village can attest, there are new additions and improvements to the infrastructure each year, and the pride that people take in their accomplishments probably has a positive effect on participation rates, particularly among those who feel the greatest stake and who have the most resources to contribute to the production of a particular good.

Unfortunately, while self-interest, along with features of the particular incentive structure of different collective activities in Ccachín probably goes far to explain why cooperation is less than universal, my data is not fine-grained enough to determine the role that self-interest, expressive interests, altruism, and social norms play in explaining

the amount of cooperation that actually exists in the village. Likewise, since my thesis is based on a short-term study of a single community, I am not able to control for such variables as group size, commercialization of the local economy, access to alternative labor opportunities, organization and leadership, and other factors that could affect the cooperation rate. Presumably, different communities in the Andes differ in the rates of cooperation they are able to achieve in community projects, and comparative study is required to tease apart these factors. My research needs to be matched by others to create a sufficient database for comparative work.

All too often, communalism as a value is conflated with communalism as an institution and with communalism as an effect in the Andes. The relationship between these is more complicated than that. Cooperation can grow out of self-interest, people can cooperate in the carrying out of anti-social tasks, and unkind attitudes like envy and spite can facilitate sanctioning systems that further the collective good.

Given the extent to which mutualism, reciprocity, and solidity are emphasized by researchers as fundamental features of Andean ideology, it is relatively surprising that so few community-level welfare conventions are documented in the Andes, and that while communities such as Ccachín are relatively strong at conflict resolution, they do not do nearly as well at tending to the personal hardships and disasters suffered by its members. Other than the redistribution of unused land, the *comunidad campesina* itself does not provide a safety net or social insurance to aid community members who have suffered a family crisis or who have special needs. The burden falls on the afflicted and their families, and to an extent, as much to avoid litigation, retaliation, or social disapprobation as out of a sense of responsibility, on those who have caused others pain. Kin and *compadrazgo* relations are activated in time of need, but the latter, along with reciprocal relations in general, are harder to establish and maintain for those who have less to offer in exchange.

The lack of community action in these instances belies the assumption that local populations in small-scale societies readily redistribute wealth as a form of collective insurance as an outgrowth of general norms of solidarity. Beyond the limited economic

resources of most *campesino* families, I believe we need to look to the correspondingly limited resources of communal institutions and the high costs of investigation and redistribution that organized social security systems require. However, I present the data I have gathered on the topic in the final chapter to raise the issue rather than to reach any conclusions. I will be content if it inspires others to build upon what I have done here.

As stated at the outset, I think that it is a mistake to assume that one privileged motivation — such as self-interest — can explain all instances of cooperation. By the same token, it is a mistake to assume that each instance of cooperation can be explained by one motivation. Cooperation occurs when and because different motivations reinforce each other. This is as true of the Andes as elsewhere. Diamond (1997) recalls the first line of Tolstoy's novel *Anna Karenina*, that "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." This he calls the "Anna Karenina principle," and goes on to suggest that:

> The principle can be extended to understanding much else about life besides marriage. We tend to see easy, single-factor explanations of success. For most important things though, success actually requires avoiding many separate possible causes of failure. [Diamond 1997:157]

The principle can be extended from families to larger organized social groups, and it captures what I am trying to say here about collective action and other forms of cooperation. Whether we are considering the explanatory role of rational choice, social norms, or emotional commitments in cooperation, or the respective weight of kin selection, tolerated theft, or reciprocal exchange, these mechanisms work together and reinforce each other in complex ways, and ethnographically, it is not always easy to tease them apart. The challenge before us is to build a testable theory that models their interaction.

Ethnography

In this final section, I summarize some findings of a more personal or ethnographic nature that don't fit readily into the previous two.

In his study on impartiality as a theory of justice, Barry (1996) discusses how the idea of "informed agreement" is used by some philosophers to exclude superstition and

false belief from any agreement among abstract actors, even though such beliefs may be reasonable to hold by the people in question given the evidence available to them. He then goes on to argue that one of the problems with this approach is that one person's superstition is another's belief.

The problem for any anthropologist trying to walk in the shoes — or, as in my case, the sandals — of another is to live opposing beliefs at the same time. In Ccachín, I was introduced to a world believed to be inhabited not only by *runa* in the flesh and blood, but ancient peoples and spirits that have a continuing effect on the present. It's a world where the *machula* can harm one's children, the Inca can protect their hidden treasures on inaccessible and fog-enshrouded hillsides, and mountain spirits can bring one success and misfortune. It's a world quite unlike the one I am accustomed to, although I make no claim that rural Andeans, or people in small-scale societies in general, are unique in holding the world so. Though differing in detail, homologically-similar beliefs are common in North American and European societies as well. Such beliefs affect the way people evaluate the consequences of their actions, and I have both practical and theoretical reasons for considering them here.

I don't discuss the psychology of cognitive dissonance reduction in the thesis, but I am interested in the tricks that anthropologists have developed for such while doing participant observation, and in the mechanisms of the mind that reduce dissonance at a more unconscious level. One thing that struck me while doing research is how far the very act of imitation — for example, the blowing of *phukuy* to the *apu* (blowing a prayer over the coca leaves to the mountain spirits) — combined with the desire to fit into a new social setting, the fear of disapproval for doing anything culturally proscribed, and the willful suspension of a skeptical attitude, takes one along the road to internalizing otherwise foreign beliefs.

In the first chapter and again in the fourth, I give readers some glimpses of what this world and these cultural beliefs look like. My discussions of *radio uriwa*, the use of *hak'achu* carcasses, and humoral medicine are intended not only to explore psychological and cultural mechanisms at play when empirical evidence is hard to come by or

ambiguous and ill-behaved, but to understand the origin and nature of beliefs that I came to take for granted. The first two have received little mention or attention in the literature, and my contribution is to give them some thought and exposure here. The last has been widely written about by Andeanists and other Latin Americanists, and beyond offering an additional case study, my contribution is to focus on what it reveals about belief formation under conditions of uncertainty.

Writing about the Lares region, Angles Vargas (1992:36) says, with reference to the Paytiti-hunters, that "The human mind is so influenceable and so inclined to esoteric attitudes, that . . . it gives life to absurd things and acts." Adopting a dismissive and nonempathetic attitude, however, does little to improve our relations with others or enhance our understanding of universal cognitive processes. Following Shweder (1977), I conclude in Chapter 4 that some of the perceived cultural distance between ourselves and others disappears once one abandons the assumption that they think magically while we do not. The same holds true for abandoning the idea that we think scientifically and they do not. The differences within and between societies do not seem to me to be so much in people's everyday thought as in differential access to specialized institutions capable of organizing information into a format that lends itself to correlational manipulation, and in the degree our training and experiences teach us to rely on and trust in these institutions.

Beyond these brief sorties into the cognitive dimensions of doing fieldwork, in Chapter 3 I attempt to provide a first-hand account of village life in Ccachín through my participation in day-to-day social relations. Among the topics I discuss are taking pictures, villagers' reaction to world events, sending messages through intermediaries, gift-giving, money-lending, ritual-coparenthood, fear of strangers, gold fever, and the coca trade. My intent here is not only to give readers an idea of my modus operandi and the effect of my presence in the village, but to contribute to the broader anthropological discussion of ethnographic practice and the nature of the relationship between researchers and their subjects. Many of my experiences while in Ccachín were timely — so, for example, I am able to report on how villagers made sense of and responded to radio

reports on the Iraq war — or unique, such as my role in sounding the alarm for a house fire, living in a military emergency zone, and being present for the staging of a motion picture, and I have provided ethnographic reports of these here. More importantly, given my interest in explaining cooperation, I have tried to be forthright about my own experiences in participating in reciprocal exchange networks and communal work parties — in *compadrazgo*, *ayni* and *mink'a*, and *phayna* — to bring self-reflection to bear on the motivations and social pressures involved. Berger and Kellner (1981) have written that "if the human beings to whom a concept is applied can not 'recognize themselves' in it . . . then . . . [we] will be constrained to construct new concepts that will be adequate to the situation in question." If this is to be the case with our subjects, a good place to start is with ourselves.

Several chapters in this thesis provide data of a general ethnographic nature on Ccachín and the Lares area. These include Chapter 1 on community history and cultural identity, Chapter 2 on spatial organization and production cycle, and all of the chapters in Part III describing the organization of the *comunidad campesina*. Not only does this add additional material from a little-studied region to the corpus of ethnographic studies in the Andes, it will allow other researchers to determine the degree of socioeconomic development in the village and reference it in their comparative works.

There is enough here to pique a variety of interests, and I am anxious to share observations and receive feedback on a variety of features that puzzle me. In Chapter 7 I report on the practice of *residencia* — the annual inspection of households — for example, without being able to say much about its origins or the extent of its dispersion. I have found few reports on it in the ethnographic literature. Kendall (1973:88) reports on what sounds like a similar practice during the Inca era in which "Inspectors saw that the women kept their houses neat, looked after food hygienically, supplied their family with clothing and raised their children properly," but whether the practice is a holdover from such times, emerged during the colonial or republican eras as a feature of *hacendado* rule, or represents a synthesis of the two, I can't say. Here, as with boundary

marking rituals and a number of other cultural features described in this thesis, there are scattered reports, but a lot of systematizing to do.

Conclusion

We have the fortune that two theses have been produced about the same community at the same time, with different focuses, goals, and viewpoints, and readers who have followed me to this point would do well to consult Knox-Seith (1995) if they have not done so already. Reading both works will provide readers with a better-rounded ethnographic perspective.

My focus here has been on rational choice and collective action in an Andean community, and I have tried to provide the framework, data, and analysis to show that a rational choice perspective can make a solid contribution to sorting out many of the issues involved and explaining a variety of behaviors and cultural features in my research community and Andes-wide. It has been said that "Models are to be used, not believed" (H. Theil, source unknown), and I have proceeded with this in mind. Rational choice theory is inherently incomplete, and a variety of mechanisms focusing on different dimensions at proximate and ultimate levels of explanation are required to understand social phenomena. I hope that this study inspires further work on how the intentional, causal, and functional mechanisms that we identify can be fit into a broader theoretical framework.

Epilogue

Introduction

After being away for six years, I returned to Ccachín in July 1998 to find that the pace of change in the village had quickened during my absence. The principal changes can be related to the extension and improvement of roads between Ccachín, Calca, Cusco, and Yanatile. But the road plays a facilitative role and in itself is an insufficient condition for explaining the sociocultural changes. A combination of push-and-pull factors have set a sizeable portion of community members on the move. The coming of age of a generation educated in the Spanish language and exposed to urban values, the end of terrorist activity in the region, the stabilization of the Peruvian economy, and a run of catastrophic weather associated with *El Niño* are among the factors that have provided villagers reason and opportunity to change.

Notable Changes

Travel to the Lares Valley has become easier and safer, especially for young men of draft age, than at the start of the 1990s, when soldiers roamed the area patrolling the military emergency zone. The income of rural highland agriculturalists has not significantly improved with the stabilization of the economy, and the push to establish new primary or supplementary sources of income continues. While an increase in cattle theft makes cattle ownership increasingly risky, reductions in the inflation rate (6% in 1998, compared to 19,657% in 1990), make non-agropastoral investments — selling cattle to buy other capital assets such as tools and vehicles — a reasonable alternative. Climatic changes associated with El Niño have brought on crop failure and whole-scale migration to the Lares Valley in search of more productive terrains.

None of the sociocultural changes are so much changes in kind as in intensity. They follow patterns established over the last thirty years, patterns that quickened in the late 1980s with completion of the Lares road and again in the late 1990s with completion

of the access road to Ccachín. Settlement in both the jungle frontiers and urban areas would be harder now if others had not previously paved the way, and beyond any macropolitical and macroeconomic factors inducing change, there is a certain multiplier effect as founder migrants have become established in the new areas and now serve as resources for the kin that come after them.

The most visible change is that Ccachín now has an access road directly to the central plaza. With completion of the road, Yerbabuenayoq, the former *anexo* where the weekly market for Ccachín and Choquecancha had been held, has become a ghost town, and the outside merchants that lived there have moved on. Ccachín now has four *comunero*-run storefronts of it's own, two of them lining the plaza, where the weekly market is now held. Movement between Yanatile, Lares, and Calca has become easier and more commonplace. Bridges have been built and the road through Lares has been improved. People in Ccachín are more mobile. Truck traffic has increased through the Lares area, and even a few buses now have routes to Yanatile. An enclosed market, which serves as gateway to the region, had been constructed on the outskirts of Calca, and the number of vehicles traveling through the region has increased three or four-fold.

The second prominent change, noticeable from the number of empty houses in the village, is that many people have moved or are on the move. Eleven of my fifteen godchildren from Ccachín now live in Cusco, Calca, Ocobamba, or Yavero. Seven of the fourteen Ccachín families with whom I have *compadrazgo* relations now either live outside the community or have established dual residences, one inside and one outside of Ccachín. My host family in the village likewise has relocated to the Lares Valley.

While no one has precise figures, community officials report that 60-120 families — from a quarter to half of village members — are homesteading or purchasing land in the Lares Valley, especially in Ocobamba and Yavero. Most continue to be registered on community roles in Ccachín, and the majority continue to maintain a residence there, leaving some family members behind, but there is a clear and vigorous movement toward colonization of the cloud forest and jungle areas to the north. The trend existed when I conducted fieldwork at the start of the decade as I report in Chapter 2, but the numbers

have grown dramatically since then. The pace has quickened in the last three years. The potato crop was devastated by potato blight in 1997-1998, an effect of El Niño's warming, and this has not only pushed many more families to the valley for short-term survival, but has convinced others that they have no future in Ccachín.

Only two of my godchildren live in the Lares Valley, the rest having moved to Calca or Cusco, so colonization of the jungle isn't the whole migration story. Despite substantial infrastructural improvements to Ccachín's schools in the last six years, there is a trend to send children outside of the community to get a better education, or at least what the *comuneros* perceive as a better education. In part, this is because the quality of education in Ccachín has not improved as rapidly as the quality of the school buildings, and in part, it is because early schooling in Calca and Cusco is perceived as providing a better foothold for taking advantage of the more varied opportunities of urban life. Some of these children are living with their city relatives, some live with *padrinos*, some with their *patrones* ('employers', 'sponsors') and some with their own families, who are renting or building residences in the city.

The current migratory trends in Ccachín are toward both the urban core and jungle periphery, with some families establishing footholds in each. The *alcalde menor* during my first year in Ccachín has bought a truck and built a new house on the outskirts of Calca. One of his sons is the truck driver and another handles cargo and fares as they make twice weekly trips to Ccachín. Another Ccachín man, one of my *hatun compadres*, had also bought a truck and moved to Calca, from which he makes weekly deliveries to Yavero, where his son and daughter-in-law now live. A third Ccachín family has purchased a pickup for ferrying people and goods short distances around Calca. Some have also moved to Cusco and are building in the *pueblo jovenes* on the outskirts of the city. The son of one of my *compadres* has used the money he saved working in the gold mines of Puerto Maldonado to build a house high in the hills overlooking Cusco, and much of the time his brothers, sisters, and parents accompany him there. A sister sells *maná* ('puffed corn') from a cart in the street, their youngest brother shines shoes in Cusco's Plaza de Armas after school and on weekends. Two sons and a daughter of

another *compadre* work in hardware stores in Cusco. They live in rooms provided by their *patrones* and attend school at night.

Infrastructural and Technical Change

The new six-kilometer side road to Ccachín leads up from the main Lares Valley road and is narrow, steep, and winding. It's dusty in the dry season and slick during the rainy season, but serviceable. The controversial route laid out by government surveyors in 1991 though the cornfields was abandoned by the community, as was the groundbreaking carried out in *phayna* by the *comuneros* themselves to initiate that route in early 1992. The new road improves upon and crisscrosses the makeshift one hacked out of the east hillside by the *comuneros* to bring the tractor to Ccachín in 1990. By following this route, the community avoided internal conflict and gained accessibility without sacrificing any cornfields. Money was obtained to pay the *tractorista* who did the work by the Salesian director of *PAL-Tambo*, but I don't know the original source of the funds.

When I first set foot in Ccachín in 1989, there were only two homes with sheet-metal roofs. The rest were thatched. In 1998, there were at least fifty homes with metal roofs, and one house was roofed with tile. In addition, the style of new construction is changing from one-story houses to two-story houses with balconies.

There's no sign of the small hydroelectric generator that the *tractorista* was constructing to charge batteries when I left, but the village is on the verge of electrification. Poles have been placed for electrical cables from Calca to Lares. Work on the project has been halted, as government funds had to be reallocated in 1998 for emergency reparation of the Machu Pikchu electrical station destroyed by glacial thaw from *El Niño*, but officials in Lares expect the electrification project to resume soon. Less sanguine about the prospects of this project prospering, the *junta directiva* in Ccachín is trying to secure funds for a large-scale generator in the village. In August 1998, Telefónica, the new telephone concession in Peru, placed transmitters in the area, and a transmission tower was set up near the plaza in Ccachín. The village now has its first telephone, a public phone located in one of the storefronts on the plaza.

There has been an impressive number of public works in the last six years. The new high school, which was top priority when I left in 1992, is now in use. A parish house has been constructed with funds provided by the sister parish in Blumberg, Germany. A new preschool has been constructed with funds from Plan International. The school has been completely renovated with a 125,600 *nuevos soles* ($44,070) grant from the government agency *FONCODES* (*Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social*). The medical post has been expanded. A new civic-center/municipal building is being completed with funds from the municipality of Lares.

As described in Chapter 11, construction of the new high school was originally begun in Loqchanka in 1990, the *maway* sector from 1997 to 1999. While waiting to raise money for roofing materials to proceed further, a debate took place about the suitability of the location, and after I left, the community decided to start all over on another site below the village. Now there is no trace of the walls that were constructed at Loqchanka. The adobe blocks that were still usable were dismantled and transported to the church yard for construction of the parish house. The rest returned to earth. Work on the preschool building that was initiated along with the highschool in 1990 was likewise halted, the site relocated, and the blocks reused. The municipal building now stands in its place. Roofing for the high school was obtained through a community assessment. Each household was expected to provide three sheets of roofing material. I don't know how many sheets were obtained in this manner, but the total fell short, and additional funds were obtained from outside of the community. The high school is floored, roofed, stuccoed, and painted, and some of the rooms have glass windows, but as with most projects of this sort, funds are still needed to complete the project, and not all of the rooms are usable.

The tractor that the community received from the government in 1990 has brought little income to the community. Some *comuneros* blame it on poor administration. Others blame it on bad renters. It has been rented out from time to time, but most of the time it has sat unused. In 1998, it rented for twenty-five *nuevos soles*/hour ($8.75/hour). It had been rented in Chinchero for three months during the previous agricultural season,

bringing in 6000 *nuevos soles* ($2100), but with wear and tear, it leaks oil and has a part that needs replacing that costs four times that much. The resale value of the tractor has been estimated to be $36,000, but the general assembly has been reluctant to sell. Some potential buyers offered a used truck and pickup for it in exchange, but the sale was not made. When I visited the community in 1998, the tractor was parked under a sheet-metal canopy outside of a vacant house.

The grain mill and thresher purchased in 1991, causing a substantial payment problem (see Chapter 10), still belonged to the community in 1998. I don't know how the problem with the bank was eventually resolved, but the machinery turned out to be a white elephant. *Comuneros* described them as "*adornos*" ('ornaments') that have never been used. The president of the community wished to construct a garage for both the mill and the tractor so that they would be better maintained and available for use, but his term was coming to an end, and like most *comuneros*, he did not give it his highest priority.

As for other projects discussed in this thesis, the chapels being built by the dance groups *Qhapaq Qolla* and *K'achampa* were completed. The plant nursery that had been relocated to the church yard has been relocated again, this time back near to its original site. The space at the church yard was needed for the parish house. *FAO-Holanda*, which administered the reforestation program in the community in the late 1980s no longer operates in the area, and the reforestation program is now institutionally-supported by *PRONAMACHCS*.

The water supply has been expanded and the delivery system improved, so that there are now two reservoirs of water, and each household has a cement-lined outlet. Circular irrigation heads are now appearing for watering garden spaces, further taxing an already insecure piped water supply during the summer months. Despite the improvements to the water delivery system, the lines to parts of the community go dry daily during the dry season, just as they did when I was living in the village.

In 1990, the *sanitario* marked out the sites for outhouses for many of the households, but nothing came of the project in the next two years. Another attempt was made by later health officials, and many houses now have outhouses of adobe or wood. Change

in toiletry habits, however, has yet to catch up with the new construction. The school also has a row of new outhouses (in the early 1990s the children were still going to the bathroom in the open air). The boys and girls showers constructed on the school grounds by Kusi Films as part of their contribution to the community for film rights to produce *La Vida Es Una Sola* are no longer in use. The shower bags broke long ago and have not been replaced.

The *sanitario* talked of vaccinating the village dogs while I was living in the community, but it never came about, except on a limited basis in Yerbabuenayoq. *Sanitarios* vaccinated the village dogs sometime around 1997-1998, so that collars indicating that a dog had been vaccinated were readily visible when I visited. Unvaccinated dogs were reportedly destroyed.

There is considerably more garbage — glass, plastics, and toilet paper — than six years ago, creating a hazard especially for children. There is more beer drinking and more public drunkenness since the weekly market has moved up from Yerbabuenayoq to the central plaza. Cigarette smoking has changed from a semi-religious practice, most often used as protection from the spirits at wakes and burials, to a social activity, with cigarettes passed around at festivals and work parties. Tobacco is shared with less ritual elaboration than coca leaves are.

The political climate changed dramatically after Abimael Guzman, the head of *Sendero Luminoso* was captured in 1992, and fortunately, my fears about possible negative fallout of filming in the community never came to pass. Collateral concerns, for example, that children would start playing war games or start making toy guns under the influence of the film (a type of child's play completely absent at the time of my research), also proved groundless. Six years ago, there was no political graffiti on the walls of buildings in Ccachín, and upon my return I found a lot, but I don't know if this can be attributed to the influence of the film (a few walls were painted with slogans for the film set), or to a changing political climate, in which villagers' political allegiances are becoming more complex and diverse. Curiously, while political graffiti is less common

now on the streets of Calca and Cusco than it was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is more common in Ccachín.

Among changes in agropastoral practices I observed, there appears to be more use of fungicides for the potato crop than ever before. Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) reported that in the mid-1990s, 60% of families were using fungicides in the *hatun tarpuy* and 75% in the *maway* fields, up from when I did my research. They gathered their figures before El Niño further exacerbated the potato blight problem. A new fungicide is now in use, and the percentage of users may be even higher. The chemical inputs, however, are no guarantee of success. I talked with several families who only harvested about eight *cargas* of potatoes from their *hatun tarpuy*, about a fourth of what could be expected in a normal year. Villagers reported that the *hatun tarpuy* harvest was so bad that some *comuneros* didn't even bother to harvest.

Some families now raise turkeys and some have started beekeeping. These practices were apparently learned in the Lares Valley, where they are more common. There are also more chickens and goats about, the first because the chicken disease ("*wallpa onqoy*") going through the community in the late 1980s has abated, the second, if my impressions can be confirmed, indicating a change in herding patterns, probably related to changes in many households' resident labor supply.

Eucalyptus is now being used for firewood, something that I did not observe six years ago. Cutting rights can be obtained for a fee from the *comunidad campesina.* Instead of transporting wood by horse as in the past, some *comuneros* now pay to have it trucked home after cutting it at sites along the road. Wood can also be purchased in the plaza, going for eighty *nuevos soles* ($27.50) a truckload. The cutting of eucalyptus rafter poles also now requires the payment of a fee to the community, five *nuevos soles*/pole ($1.75/pole, the equivalent of a day's wage) if one is a community member, fifteen *nuevos soles*/pole if one comes to purchase them from outside of the community. Several *comuneros* now have chain saws (none did when I arrived in Ccachín in 1989 and only two did when I left the village in 1992), and along with the truck traffic, their use adds decibels and a mechanical quality to the background noise. There was talk of building a

community oven before I left Ccachín in 1992, but there was also a fear that it would affect the firewood supply, and as of 1998, one still hadn't been constructed.

Organizational and Social Change

Since doing my research, the nuclear center has been divided into four *barrios* for organizational purposes, Mit'ao, Qosqo, Qoriwayrachina, and Yerbabuenayoq. As administrative units, these *barrios* are in nascent form and lack any significant independent leadership structure. I suspect that their existence owes more to exogenously-induced change than to local pressures, perhaps originating as an idea of NGO or government agents for the implementation of development projects in the village. They are patterned after structures found elsewhere in the Andes. The *barrios* exist primarily as a structure for organizing work parties, and then only for work parties such as street cleaning and repair in which the task has a neighborhood component. Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996) report that Ccachín had three *barrios*, Mit'ao, Qosqo, and Qoriwayrachina, at the time of their study. They organize their data on community-regulated fallow according to the households in each (seventy-two, fifty-nine, and forty-six respectively), but as far as I know, the *barrios* play no role in the sectoral fallow system. The *barrios* contrast with the *anexos* in this regard. The *Club de Madres* is now likewise divided into four *barrios*, and each of the *barrios* has its own meetings and its own set of officers. The organization of the *Club de Madres* into *barrios* dates from about 1995 (as one of my informants told me, "*antes, solo existía un barrio*"), and it may be that the community-wide system was established then as well.

As I understand it, the *alcaldes de barrio* continue to be elected at-large, and they divide up responsibility for communication within particular neighborhoods as before. The number of *alcaldes de barrio* has been increased from three to four in the *varayoq* system, but whether the change has been made to conform with the number of *barrios* (or vice versa), or responds to changing population dynamics (more men in the appropriate age grade) is unclear to me. The role of the *pututeros* as town-criers had been much reduced. In 1989, loudspeakers were used primarily to broadcast music at public and

private festivals; by 1992, they were used for Radio Ccachín, a Sunday morning news and entertainment program provided by the students, and for occasional early morning *phayna* announcements. By 1998, loudspeakers had almost entirely replaced the *pututeros* in spreading community announcements.

A *ronda campesina* ('peasant patrol'; 'vigilance committee') has been established in Ccachín with the help of a European medical doctor working in Lares and living at the parish house. Theft of all kinds in the village is said to have increased since the time of my fieldwork. Villagers attribute this to the greater number of outsiders coming to the community now that trucks can carry them to the central plaza, to the number of houses left vacant as people have relocated to the Lares Valley and Calca, and to the subsistence crisis of the last few years caused by failure of the potato crop. Several *comuneros* told me that they have relocated their cattle to pastures closer to the community to keep better watch over them, and others have sold animals to avoid losing them to theft. One of my *compadres*, for example, lost thirteen of his cattle to thieves in Pan de Azucar, and moved the remainder to Soqosniyoq where my *comadre* could watch over them while she herded sheep. Proximity is no guarantee, however. Immediately prior to my 1998 visit thirty cattle were stolen from the pastures at Chanchiyoq-Soqosniyoq (the site of a cattle theft/double murder in 1988 as well). The most spectacular theft to have taken place in Ccachín during my absence was the robbery at the church. Nine armed men went to the homes of four of the *mayordomos* one night while they were asleep. They made the *mayordomos* give them the valuables of the saints that they had charge of, and they then forced them to open the church, where they stole the crown of the *Mamacha* Guadalupe. Some of the thieves, including the ringleader, were reported to be community members, but no one was apprehended or punished for the crime.

Ccachín's *ronda campesina* is based on a pattern that has been gradually extending across the highlands (Gitlitz and Rojas 1982; Starn 1992). As one of the *vocales* ('committee members') explained to me, when the committee gets a report of a theft, the committee goes out to capture the thieves. If they are successful, a community assembly is called, and the villagers judge their prisoners and determine their punishment.

Punishments include lashing with a horse whip ("*chicote*") and dunking in the river. The idea is that by dealing with the problem locally, the punishment is swift and sure, the victims avoid legal expenses, and the community avoids the legal costs of taking the cases before authorities in Calca. As far as I can tell, the *ronda campesina* exists more in name than in action. Some of the committee members are not presently resident in the community, and some villagers are not even aware of the *ronda campesina*'s existence. The *ronda campesina* has had no noteworthy success. Some *comuneros* are adopting a more private solution to theft. Six years ago I was not aware of anyone owning a rifle in Ccachín. Now, a few community members have purchasing rifles to defend themselves against predators and thieves. Armed robbery is becoming more common as well, indicating that the use of weapons is not restricted to defensive purposes.

One of the NGOs now operating in the area is Plan International, an international foster child program headquartered in England that was originally established to provide relief to refugee children during the Spanish Civil War. About seventy-five children participate in the program in Ccachín. Sponsors are sent photos of the children in Ccachín and provide support in their name; the money does not go to individual children or families, but instead funds projects that benefit all of the children in the community. The new preschool building in Ccachín was constructed with funds provided by Plan International. Some of the sponsors send letters to their foster children, and the promotor of the program in the village, a Ccachín woman, answers them on behalf of the children. The development agency plans other projects in the community. In a project jointly sponsored with the Lions Club of Cusco, Plan International plans to provide medical services to eight Lares communities. Plan International will supply the medicines, and the Lions Club send doctors to the area three times a year. The area coordinator of Plan International also reports that the NGO is considering starting a seed program in the Lares area.

Conclusion

The landscape, community, and people are recognizably the same, and most villagers pass through the days and seasons much as before, but a surprising amount has changed in Ccachín in the six years since I did the fieldwork on which this thesis is based. For the most part, the changes follow patterns that have been developing for the last thirty years, intensified by the arrival of a road to the village center and disastrous crop yields associated with El Niño. The village has been marked by rapid population growth throughout this century, however, and I was not prepared to find so many houses empty on my return. Migration toward urban centers and the jungle frontier — opposing but complementary directions — is not new, but the extensive migration I encountered in 1998 is, and whether the current decline in the resident population will be temporary or permanent remains to be seen. The vitality of the community depends on villagers feeling that they have a future in Ccachín.

Leaving one's natal environment for the promises of a new one has potential rewards, but also risks and dangers. This point was driven home to me by the situation of one of my *compadres*, who in the years since I left, has established dual homes in Yavero and Calca. Working together with his oldest son in their fields in the "eyebrow of the jungle," his son was bitten by a snake, and far from medical facilities, my *compadre* looked on helplessly as his firstborn died an agonizing death. Back in Calca, where they rented a room from relatives, my *compadre* and *comadre* were faced with the decision of using their savings to build a house or buy a used pickup to haul passengers and merchandise for hire. At the urging of their second son, who wished to be the driver, they chose the latter, but as of my visit the truck was out of operation due to a broken part, and they didn't have the money to fix it. In retrospect, my *compadre* questioned the decision. Family members who move ahead to a new area are often in a position to help ease the transition for those who come after them, but it is not the same as being able to draw on generations of accumulated experience to weigh the risks and rewards of one's actions in new environments. Neither of these things would have happened if the family had stayed in Ccachín, and it is hard to say whether or not they would have in their new surroundings

had they had more experience. It is hard to trade the familiar against the unknown. As best as possible, most families are hedging their bets and keeping a foot in both worlds, but prior decisions constrain the present, and there comes a point where one can not go home again.

In Ccachín itself, the shiny new public buildings and other infrastructural improvements are impressive, and they provide evidence that community members and their leaders have not stood still. The amount of *phayna* labor that was required to carry out these projects is appreciable. During the two months of my visit, the usual peak of *phayna* activity if there is to be any, there were no major projects requiring community-wide labor in progress, and there were few communal work parties at all. Communal labor requirements fluctuate from year to year depending on the projects targeted, so this is not altogether unusual, and after a period of intense activity, people seemed to appreciate the break. How much of it can be attributed to so many families being out of the village I can't say. In any case, I was unable to gather any additional first-hand data on communal labor in Ccachín.

I was struck by two things that besides labor migration are likely to affect *phayna* participation in the future, however. First, the new buildings being constructed, designed from outside the community, require a greater amount of specialized labor — the services of millers, truckers, carpenters, masons, plasterers, plumbers, and the like. Some of the *comuneros* are learning new skills and investing in the appropriate equipment to carry out these activities, and more and more wage labor is replacing what was once provided without compensation. Second, existing differences between the *comuneros* in wealth, especially as measured in cattle, are now being translated into differences in trade and opportunity. A growing differentiation between *comuneros* along multiple dimensions was noticeable on my return, and with present trends, it will continue. As I noted in Chapter 13, differentiation can be a mixed blessing for collective goods production. On the one hand, asymmetries in demand can increase a group's success in providing such goods as subgroups become interested and able to provide some or all of the good on their own. On the other hand, the growing specialization of skills and trades, along with

the changing opportunity costs of labor, lead to a degeneration of the *phayna* system as we know it. The system has probably continued with relatively little qualitative change for centuries in the village, most changes having been in the amount of labor required, focal projects, and enforcement techniques. The community may soon be on the verge of a change in the way it recruits labor for community projects itself.

People respond to change differently, and Ccachín has both conservative and progressive elements. The divisions tend to fall along wealth and generational lines, although not entirely so, and the same individuals may favor change in some areas and not in others. Visiting anthropologists have feelings about change too. Some of this has to do with familiarity, as returning to one's field site after a long absence is a homecoming of sorts, and after having investing so much energy in finding one's place in a community, there's a temptation to want the people, the place, and one's place in it to remain much as one remembers them. Catching up with personal news — with births and deaths and the ups and downs of people's lives — is emotionally draining enough, without having to assimilate major sociocultural change.

Part of the reason for going back is to document such change, and in so doing, we need to take care not to let our own nostalgia, careers, and cultural goals interfere with the task. Urbano (1991) argues that the backgrounds of many social scientists working in the Andes today betray them; that the disproportionate focus on small-scale, endangered societies, on participating in unique rituals and experiencing strong sensations, on documenting esoteric and exotic practices, is conditioned by current tastes and consumer behavior in the well-off societies that most researchers come from. Among the results are that they provide a distorted image of history and contemporary life in this part of the world, and that "Without being conservative by nature, the majority of these disciplines advance very traditionalist and retrograde positions in the Andes" (1991:XXX).

What is conservative in one society may be radical in another, and my interest in cooperation and collective action in the Andes is not neutral in this regard. Beyond understanding the conditions under which certain forms of cooperation and collective action prosper, I am concerned with how this knowledge can be used for the better in my

own society. Accordingly, I take Urbano's concerns to heart. I have tried to be cautious in this thesis, and to bracket my own desires and beliefs as best as possible so that they do not interfere with accurately describing and analyzing the subjects at hand. This is my first effort, and going back to the field offers the possibility of amplification and correction. Living as I do afar, all I can provide are time slices. I am heartened that with current trends in Ccachín, villagers will soon be in a position to read and react to what I have written, and to go beyond my work by offering data, interpretation, and analysis of their own.

Glossary

This glossary provides a short definition of the Quechua, Spanish, and Aymara terms used in the text. The words are Quechua or Quechua glosses of Spanish except where indicated. The Spanish terms are defined according to their usage in Peru. Quechua definitions are based on the dictionaries of Cusihuamán (1976), Hornberger and Hornberger (1983), Beyersdorff (1984), Ballón Aguirre et al. (1992), *La Academia Mayor de la Lengua Quechua* (1995), on the glossaries of the ethnographies from which they are taken when words are cited, and on my personal experience. Spanish definitions follow Alvarez del Real (1985) and Morínigo (1985). The Aymara follows Deza Galindo (1989).

A

accidentado: (Spanish) abrupt, irregular terrain, especially with large boulders and steep slopes.

agente: (Spanish) agent; former title of the mayor of municipal government in Ccachín.

agente de daño: (Spanish) person who assesses crop damage.

agua bendita: (Spanish) holy water, water blessed by the priest in church.

ahijado: (Spanish) godchild.

ajuste: (Spanish) settlement; reconciliation of a financial account.

alcalde: (Spanish) mayor; *Inca alcalde*, *hatun alcalde*, and *alcalde de vara* are all terms used for the head mayor of the traditional civil-religious hierarchy in Ccachín ('Inca mayor', 'big mayor', 'mayor of the staffs-of-office'); *alcalde de barrio* refers to the secondary mayors that assist him ('neighborhood mayors'); the *alcalde de menores* is not a part of the traditional hierarchy but rather the head of the municipal council ('lesser mayor').

alférez: (Spanish) a cross-bearer in certain religious celebrations

alguacil: (Spanish) constable, a position above the *regidores* and subordinate to the *alcaldes de barrio* in the traditional civil-religious hierarchy in Ccachín (the order of offices varies some from community to community in the Andes).

allay: to dig up tubers; the act or task of digging up tubers; *hatun allay* the 'big tuber digging' event in May to harvest the principal potato crop.

allegado: (Spanish) Subtenants of hacienda land, with obligations to and often relatives of the primary tenant, the *arrendire*.

alma: (Spanish) soul, spirit.

Almakunaq P'unchay: All Souls Day.

Almanaque del Qosqo: (Spanish) 'Almanac of Cusco', an annual calendar containing ecclesiastic, civil, historical, and astronomical information, including the rite of emergency baptism and the feast days of the saints.

altumisayoq: a diviner of the highest order (derived from the Spanish *alto* ['high'] and *misa* ['mass'] or *mesa* ['table'] plus the Quechua possessive suffix *-yoq*).

a medias: (Spanish) 'by halves', a sharecropping arrangement.

analfabeto: (Spanish) someone who doesn't know how to read or write; illiterate.

anexo: (Spanish) annex; dependency.

ánfora: (Spanish) ballot box; collection box, amphora.

ánimo: (Spanish) spirit; fortitude.

Anti: Region to the east of Cusco, the jungle, the land from where the sun rises; the term also refers to the ethnic groups that inhabited this region. *Andes* derives from this term and refers to the vast mountain range.

Antisuyo: the jungle area to the east of Cusco, was one of the four regions of the Inca Empire, *Tawantinsuyo*.

añas: skunk.

apanqora: crayfish.

aprovechar: (Spanish) to take advantage of something or someone, to gain personally.

apu: lord; mountain spirit; usually used to refer to the most sacred places and highest mountain peaks.

aqha: a fermented corn beverage; called *chicha* in Spanish.

aqhata uhuchiy: ritual for the llamas in some Andean communities during August or September; the name comes from the practice of giving corn beer to the animals to drink.

arariwa: a person with special responsibility to guard and care for cultivated fields, an agricultural watchman (also see Appendix 2).

armas blancas: (Spanish) steel arms, especially knives.

arrendire: (Spanish) also *arrendatario*; a peasant that rents land from an *hacendado*, thereby incurring certain repayment obligations. Effectively, the *arrendires* in the Lares area were the managers of the haciendas, organizing the labor of the secondary and tertiary renters of hacienda land, the *allegados*.

arroba: (Spanish) a unit of measure equal to 25 pounds or 11.5 kilograms in Peru (the size may vary in other countries).

Asamblea General: the general assembly of all community members or member households of the *comunidad campesina*; a meeting of the General Assembly; *asambleas ordinarias* and *asambleas extraordinarias* are the two kinds of meetings of the General Assembly, 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary'.

atoq lisa: 'fox *lisa*', a wild, uncultivated *lisa* (*Ullucus* sp.).

awqa: enemy; warrior.

awqa chileno: (Quechua, Spanish) a dance depicting the Chilean soldiers that invaded Peru in a nineteenth century war between the two countries. The *chileno* dancers dress in high leather boots, mesh masks, scarves, and slings, and use the latter two in their dances. The dance is popular throughout the Cusco region.

ayllu: a generic term signifying a distinguishable indigenous group. While typically kinship-based, the identifying link may also be religious, territorial, communal, or work ties.

ayni, ayninakuy: voluntary, balanced reciprocal aid, to be returned in kind at a later date.

B

barrio: (Spanish) barrio, neighborhood; a neighborhood mayor.

barrio de varayoq: (Spanish) a secondary mayor or village councilman in the traditional civil-religious hierarchy in Ccachín.

bayetero: (Spanish) a person who sells *bayeta*, a machine-loomed wool cloth.

birrete: (Spanish) kind of cap; knitted cap worn by men in Ccachín.

bruja: (Spanish) witch, shaman, sorcerer.

C

calumnia: (Spanish) calumny, slander.

campesino: (Spanish) peasant.

canchón: (Spanish) enclosed garden or patio.

canon: (Spanish) a direct payment in cash or goods from a feudatory to an hacienda owner in exchange for use of hacienda land.

cañazo: (Spanish) cane alcohol; also called *aguardiente*.

capitán: (Spanish) the designated leader of a work team in the Andes, usually chosen to set the pace because of their exceptional strength and skill, but also sometimes merely to show honor; called *qollana* in Quechua.

carajo: (Spanish) a choice profanity in Ccachín.

carga: (Spanish) a unit of measure equivalent to one sack (*costal*); about 5 *arroba*, 57.5 kilograms, or 126.5 pounds. In everyday usage, a *carga* in Ccachín can vary from 5-8 *arrobas*, with six being average.

cargo: (Spanish) a civil or religious office or other assignment that one fulfills for the community; also burden or weight.

carguyoq: a person who holds a *cargo* (derived from the Spanish *cargo* and the Quechua possessive suffix *-yoq*).

carpintero: (Spanish) carpenter; carpenter bird, woodpecker; also *pájaro carpintero*.

casamiento: (Spanish) wedding.

casero: (Spanish) special client, preferred customer.

ceja de la selva: (Spanish) 'eyebrow of the jungle', the cloud forest on the eastern slopes of the Andes between 2000 and 9000 feet.

Club de Madres: (Spanish) Mothers' Club.

Cocamama: Mother Coca.

colegio agropecuario: (Spanish) agricultural high school, a special classification within the Peruvian school system. The high school in Ccachín was designated a *colegio agropecuario* in 1989, but in the following years, it was not always assigned an instructor to teach agriculture and animal husbandry as it should have been.

cólera: (Spanish) anger; bile; rage; cholera.

comadre: (Spanish) ritual co-mother, reciprocal term of address between parent and godmother of a child.

comité: (Spanish) committee. There are several committees responsible to the *Asamblea General* in Ccachín, including the *Comité Electoral* ('Election Committee'), *Comité Forestal* ('Forestry Committee'), *Comité Ganadería* ('Cattle-Raising Committee'), and *Comité del Templo* ('Church Committee'). When attached to a place name, the term usually refers to an independent association that owns and manages a cattle pasture, as in the *Pan de Azucar Comité* or *Santa Elena Comité*. People simply say that they are working for *el comité* when they participate in agropastoral work parties on communal land organized by the *junta directiva* of Ccachín itself.

compadrazgo: (Spanish) spiritual co-parenthood, based on bonds of ritual kinship.

compadre: (Spanish) ritual co-father, reciprocal term of address between parent and godfather of a child.

compañía: (Spanish) company; society; partnership.

compañero: (Spanish) companion, comrade, fellow; the term is used as a form of address among male villagers in Ccachín at community assemblies, and more euphemistically, to refer to the guerrilla fighters of *Sendero Luminoso* and MRTA who likewise refer to each other as 'comrades'.

comunero: (Spanish) member of a *comunidad campesina*; commoner. Used as both a form of address and in reference to someone.

comunidad campesina: (Spanish) 'peasant community', an officially-recognized unit of local governance in rural agropastoral villages in the Peruvian sierras. The term emphasizes class relations, and contrasts with the designation of "*comunidades indígenas*"('indigenous communities') applied in the lower Amazon areas.

concurso: (Spanish) contest, competition.

condenados: damned souls that, unable to free themselves from their bodies after death, are condemned to wander as putrid flesh, attacking people at night. They are associated with incest and cannibalism, and said to reside in glacial peaks. In Quechua, they are known as *kukuchi*.

condiciones: (Spanish) The general obligations incurred by a renter of hacienda land to the hacienda owner; also the specific obligation to provide a certain number of workers a certain number of days a month to work for the *hacendado*.

consejo: (Spanish) village council; village councilor.

costumbre: (Spanish) custom, tradition.

cuartel: (Spanish) quarter.

Cuartel General: (Spanish) 'General Quarters'; military barracks.

curandero: (Spanish) folk healer.

CH

chaki: foot, leg; when applied metaphorically to the conch-shell trumpeters (*pututeros*), the term refers to the holder of the smallest *pututu*.

chakin: a kit composed of a black metal known in Quechua as "raw gold" and an old silver coin that is often adorned with ribbons that are attached through a hole in the center. The coin ("*chawa qolqe*") is scraped against the metal ("*chawa qori*"), to release a metallic powder that falls on the animals. The kit is kept in a mollusk shell and used at marking ceremonies in Ayacucho.

chakitaklla: Andean foot plow.

chakra: field.

chakrayoq: field owner.

***chalina*:** scarf.

***challaco*:** a sacrifice for the herds during the dry season (term used in the highlands of Argentina; derived from *ch'allay*).

***charki*:** jerky.

chaskichikuy*:** also ***chaskisqa a ceremony for the transfer of a *cargo* from outgoing to incoming *mayordomos* and other traditional officials. The terms convey the image of passing something from one to another, as indicated by the noun form *chaski*, the Incan relay runners who carried messages throughout the empire. The term *chaskisqa* is also used to refer to 'inheritance', another kind of passing or entrusting.

***chaskiy*:** to receive.

***chaskichiy*:** to give or entrust.

***chicha*:** (Spanish) a fermented corn beverage, *aqha* in Quechua; also the name of a popular music among urban-oriented youth.

***chicha blanca*:** (Spanish) a non-alcoholic corn beverage.

***chicharrón*:** (Spanish) fried pork.

chicote: (Spanish) horse whip.

***china kunka*:** having the voice of a woman.

***chufla*:** (Spanish) a paste made of toasted cereal sweetened with honey or sugar.

***chunta*:** a hardwood jungle tree; the wood of this tree.

***chuta*:** a section of land to be worked by a member of a work team.

CH'

***ch'allay*:** to pour a libation of beverage onto the ground with the idea of giving drink to the earth; the libation itself; a ceremony where the libation is featured.

***ch'uklla*:** hut, rustic cabin.

ch'unchu: native of the jungle (the term is often used derogatorily); a typical dance of the Antisuyo region, with characters that represent certain stereotypes of the natives of the jungle

ch'uñu: dehydrated potatoes, made by a process of alternate freezing and thawing before drying in the sun.

ch'uspa: a small, handwoven cloth bag used to carry coca.

ch'uspi: a small biting fly or gnat.

ch'uyay: to throw a libation of beverage over a recipient, especially an animal during a fertility ritual; the libation thrown; the term is also used to denote marking ceremonies for the herds where such libations are made; also referred to in gerund form as *ch'uyasqa*.

D

daño: (Spanish) damage, especially damage to crops caused by animals.

denuncio: (Spanish) a denouncement or formal complaint made before a judge or governor (used in Ccachín as a local variation of the Spanish *denuncia*).

derrumbre: (Spanish) landslide.

desempadronado: (Spanish) condition of having one's membership status revoked.

desempadronamiento: (Spanish) revocation of membership.

deslinde: (Spanish) demarcation, survey, the act of marking the boundaries the boundary markers of a territory; the term is used to refer to an annual *phayna* in Ccachín in which the perimeter of the community is checked (see *recorreo*).

despacho: (Spanish) bundle of objects used in ritual offerings, usually burnt.

despedida: (Spanish) farewell, good-bye.

Dios Yayaq: God the Father; e.g., "*Noqan bawtisayki Dios Yayaq, Dios Churiq, Dios Espíritu Santoq sutinpi*" ('I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit'); this Trinitarian formula is commonly used at *unu chakuy* and in prayers and benedictions.

Director de Debates: (Spanish) 'Director of Debates', the person elected to facilitate a General Assembly of the *comunidad campesina*. The person is also referred to as *Presidente de la Mesa* ('President of the Table'), since he presides at the head table.

documento: (Spanish) document; also metaphorically used to refer to the staffs-of-office of the *varayoq*.

E

empadronado (Spanish): the condition of having membership status.

empadronamiento: (Spanish) census, enrollment, registration; status.

empresa comunal: (Spanish) communal enterprise; a cooperative business run by a *comunidad campesina.*

enqa: also *enqaychu*, a small stone effigy considered to be the repository of well-being for the animal, activity or phenomena that it represents.

entrante: (Spanish) a person selected for a community office but not yet inaugurated; also *recipiente*, contrasts with *saliente*, an official about to leave a community office.

entrega: (Spanish) give-away, especially by the government.

erqe: toddler, young child; plural *erqekuna.*

envarado: (Spanish) same as *varayoq*.

escuela agropecuaria: (Spanish) a high school with classes to teach agropastoral skills.

estado de emergencia: (Spanish) state of emergency; martial law.

estancia: (Spanish) farm, ranch, estate.

evangelista: (Spanish) a Protestant, usually of a fundamentalist or evangelical denomination.

explotación calculada: (Spanish) 'calculated exploitation', a term used by Grondín 1978 to describe relations of domination in the Andean countryside.

F

faltado: (Spanish) absent, missing; someone who doesn't fulfill their obligations.

feudatario: (Spanish) a feudal tenant, a person who must pay rent in cash, goods, or service on an hacienda.

fiesta: (Spanish) festival, feast.

fiscal: (Spanish) attorney, comptroller; a position of oversight in the *junta directiva* of the *comunidad campesina.*

flauta: (Spanish) flute; a handmade bamboo flute in Ccachín.

frente: (Spanish) front, *al frente,* opposite; used in Ccachín to refer to the village on the opposite side of the valley.

fundo: (Spanish) a private farm or rural estate; *minifundio*: a small rustic farm; *latifundio*: a large farm; when *fundo* is contrasted with *hacienda* in rural censuses, the former is smaller than the latter.

G

gallut'ipiy: the rooster-jerking competition held in Ccachín for the Feast of Santiago. Roosters are tied by their feet, dangled, and jerked in the air between two poles, while young men on horseback try to capture them.

galluyoq: 'rooster-holder'; a *carguyoq* or sponsor of *gallut'ipiy.*

gamonal: (Spanish) indigenous village boss; a rich and influential person.

guardia civil: (Spanish) civil guard, police, a branch of the Peruvian national police.

H

hach'u: wad of chewed coca.

hacendado: (Spanish) owner of an *hacienda.*

hacienda: (Spanish) ranch, estate.

hach'u: wad of chewed coca.

hampi: medicine.

hanansaya: upper part of a community, upper moiety (contrasts with *urinsaya*).

hatun: big, large, long, great.

hatun compadres: 'great *compadres*', the parents of one's *compadres* and grandparents of one's godchild.

Hatun Residencia: see *residencia*.

Hatun Yapuy: the plowing of the principal potato fields in Ccachín

hayt'aq: a person using a foot plow in a *papa yapuy* (contrast with *rapaq*).

haywarisqa: ritual offering.

herranza: (Spanish) branding; a decorating or marking ceremony for livestock.

hito: (Spanish) cairn, boundary marker, landmark, guidepost.

hiwaya: a prized red and black stone used in Andean medicine and rituals.

hucha: sin, fault, offence.

huch'uy: small, little.

Huch'uy Residencia: see *residencia*.

humint'a: a sweet tamale of fresh ground corn steamed in husks.

hurq'a: event in which, accompanied by a band and serving food, drink, and coca, a sponsor of a religious feast goes to the home of potential collaborators, asking for their help.

I

ichhu: straw grass of the Andean puna.

illa: a small stone figure, similar to *enqa*.

infierno: (Spanish) hell.

ingeniero: (Spanish) engineer, a term of address and reference used by the *campesinos* to refer to almost any outside who comes to their community to provide technical assistance.

inicial: (Spanish) kindergarten.

Inkarrí: a mythic, messianic figure in Quechua legends. He is a composite figure, once and future king, revolutionary, Manco Qhapaq, Atawallpa, and Tupaq Amaru I and II rolled into one. According to legend, he is underground and will someday return to reign in a new Anka era. His name derives from the Spanish, "*Inca Rey*."

inti: sun; basic unit of the Peruvian currency.

inventario: (Spanish) inventory.

iñawe: (Aymara) gift of animals to children presented during the first haircutting or at marking ceremonies for the herds (similar to *suñay* in Quechua).

istalla: a large coca leaf bag used on ceremonial occasions.

J

jornal: (Spanish) day-work; day-wages.

jubilado: (Spanish) retired, retired person.

Junta Directiva Comunal: (Spanish) administrative council of the *Comunidad Campesina.*

K

kacharpari: farewell, send off.

kancha: corral, enclosed courtyard or garden; from the Spanish *cancha.*

kanka: roast meat.

kawallu: horse.

Kawsasqanchis P'unchay: All Saints Day; in Spanish *Todos los Santos.*

kermesse: (Spanish) an open-air bazaar, typically with a food fair, music, dancing, and sports. The term originates in the Flamenco *kerk-misse* (church mass). The English equivalent is 'kermis'. In Flanders and the Low Countries, the name is given to parish festivals and annual fairs. In the Andes, the term is associated with fund-raising events.

k'intu: specially chosen coca leaves, often grouped in threes and placed one over the other, exchanged in social situations and offered to the spirits.

kukuchi: cannibalistic soul of the damned (see *condenado*).

kuntur: condor.

kuraka: indigenous chief, representative of the gods, Inca administrator who inherited the office.

kuraq: an elder or old person; elder, older, ancient.

kuyaq: often translated as 'those who love [me]', in some areas of Ayacucho it refers to a wide range of consanguineal, affinal, and spiritual relatives who are part of a sponsor's reciprocal network and who help out at festive events, in others it refers exclusively to those contributors that are not members of the sponsor's kin, affinal kin, or *ayllu*.

Kh

khuya: a stone or metal amulet made in the form of an animal, sacred object, or god.

K'

k'achampa: a warrior's dance of Inca origin that features men competing with each other through whipping. The dancers wear embroidered costumes, carry slings, dance in alternating pairs, and are accompanied by native flutes and drums. The dance is widely distributed in the Cusco region and is sometimes referred to as *qhapaq k'achampa*.

k'intu: an offering of coca leaves, usually three in number, with the leaves carefully arranged one on top of the other.

k'uychi: rainbow.

k'uychi onqoy: rainbow sickness; the rainbow is believed to enter a woman's body while she is urinating, causing her abdomen to swell as if she were pregnant and her urine to take on the colors of the rainbow.

L

lakacha: (Aymara) gift of an animal during a marking ceremony (Quechua *suñay*).

lámina: (Spanish) illustration, image, picture; a religious icon, usually housed in a portable wooden box.

lampa: a shovel-faced hoe.

lechón: (Spanish) roast pork.

libreta electoral: (Spanish) electoral pass-book.

Libro de Actas: (Spanish) the 'Book of Acts' used to record decisions reached by the General Assembly of the *comunidad campesina*.

lista: (Spanish) list; the term is used in Ccachín to refer to the list of heads of household used in determining communal tax and labor obligations and the usufruct of community lands.

loma: (Spanish) hill, hillside; the upper sectoral fallow area in Ccachín.

LL

llampu: a ritual powder composed of a special white or red clay and corn meal that have been ground together; it's said to symbolize the snows of the puna and is used at marking ceremonies in Ayacucho to placate the mountain spirits.

lliklla: manta; shawl, shoulder-wrap.

llipht'a: a ball of vegetable ash, especially quinoa or *qañiwa*, placed in the mouth when chewing coca to release the coca's alkaloids.

lloq'e: left; a left-spun yarn.

lloq'ey: to hex.

lloq'e rikra: left shoulder; the position of the second *pututero*; see also *paña rikra* and *chaki*.

lluku: net used with pack animals for carrying straw; fishing net.

llulla: lie, falsehood, deceit; lying, deceitful.

M

machu: old, ancient.

machula: ancestors; surviving spirits of a pre-Incan race that is said to have lived by the light of the moon and is believed to still inhabit the earth.

madrina: (Spanish) godmother.

makipura: labor provided by renters to hacendados on a monthly basis in exchange for a small wage.

malta: (Ayacucho-Chanca dialect of Quechua) yearling llama of either sex; a general term signifying young or not fully grown.

maná: (Spanish) puffed, lightly-sweetened corn sold as a snack food on the streets of Cusco; called such because of its supposed similarity to manna, the food miraculously supplied to the Israelites in the wilderness.

manaqaraku: a long-tailed chicken-like bird found in the tropical valleys of Peru.

marka: second story of a house; (Spanish) branding or marking of animals.

masa: (Ayacucho-Chanca dialect) son-in-law.

mata: (Spanish) plant.

maway: first or early planting of tubers; potato or any other tuber planted in the first planting.

mayordomo: (Spanish)

mechero: (Spanish) a kerosene lamp made from a pill bottle and wool wick

merienda: (Spanish) luncheon.

mestizo: (Spanish) term used to identify people (especially town and city-dwellers) who speak Spanish and have adopted Western dress and customs.

mihuna: food, meal.

millay: ugly, hideous; disagreeable; *millay runa* a bad or evil person (in Spanish, *mala gente*).

mink'a: a collective work party with music and dancing (Ccachín); a collective work party where labor is rewarded with food, drink, and other goods but where there is no one-for-one reciprocation of aid at a future date.

misa: table; the Quechua pronunciation of Spanish *mesa*; *misa* in Spanish means 'mass', and in ritual events, the term signifies both 'table' and 'altar'.

misti: *mestizo*; plural *mistikuna*.

mojón: (Spanish) cairn, boundary stone, landmark.

moraya: a kind of freeze-dried potato that is processed by soaking in a pool of water before drying.

montepío: (Spanish) money collected among members of an organization for the aid of widows, orphans, and other community members with special needs.

montera: (Spanish) traditional woman's hat.

montura: (Spanish) saddle and harness.

muñeca: (Spanish) doll.

Musoq Wata: New Year's Day.

N

nak'aq: throat-slitter, sacrificer, slaughterer; a legendary tall, white, blond, and bearded figure in the Andes that is said to extract fat from its victims.

niñucha: literally 'little boy', a term of address used to express solidarity between men at work parties and ritual occasions; plural *niñuchakuna*.

nuevo sol: (Spanish) the new Peruvian currency as of 1991. *Sol*, like the Quechua *inti* before it, refers to the sun.

Ñ

***ñawpa paya*:** old woman.

***ñawpa machula*:** old man.

***negro*:** (Spanish) a dance involving two clowning male characters, one dressed as a woman and the other a Peruvian soldier.

***ñikuta murañani*:** (Aymara) first haircutting ceremony (Also *ñik'uta muruña*).

***ñukch'u*:** scarlet, tubular-shaped wild flower; a sacred flower of the Incas, symbolized on ceremonial vases and clothing, and thrown on the path before the passing Inca as he passed through the Empire; today, *ñukch'u* is associated with *Taytacha Temblores*, the Lord of the Earthquakes, and it decorates the cross and is tossed from balconies by the faithful as the image is carried through the streets of Cusco. In Ccachín, *ñukch'u* is used to decorate crosses for New Year's *residencia*.

***ñust'a*:** Incan princess; beautiful young woman.

O

***oclusión intestinal*:** (Spanish) intestinal occlusion, often associated with eating cold potatoes or drinking cold *chicha* in Ccachín.

***oficio*:** (Spanish) official letter.

***omiso*:** (Spanish) neglectful; careless; remiss.

***onqoy*:** sickness, illness, disease.

P

***pacha*:** earth.

***pachaka*:** ruler of one hundred in Inca times.

***pachakuti*:** 'world reversal'; apocalypse.

***Pachamama*:** Mother Earth.

***Padres de Familia*:** (Spanish) Parents' Association of the School.

***padrino*:** (Spanish) godfather; *-s* godparents.

Padrón General: (Spanish) general poll, census, enrollment, or tax-list; official list of all adult members of a *comunidad campesina.*

pajonal: (Spanish) field of straw or bunch grass.

palla: Hand-picking of coca leaves, coffee beans and other crops on the farms and estates of the jungle and cloud forest.

pallay poncho: a poncho with geometric or representational designs, *pallay* conveys the idea of selecting, picking, or gathering, as with threads.

pampa: plain, flat terrain.

paña rikra: right shoulder or side; the position of the first *pututero*.

papa: potato.

paquetazo: (Spanish) government-controlled adjustment of prices or the value of the currency.

parcialidad: (Spanish) a neighborhood or village that is part of a town; at one time, a kind of dependent community status in local Peruvian districts.

parrillada: (Spanish) grilled lamb.

pastizal: (Spanish) pasture land.

patrón: sponsor of a ceremony (esp. the owner of a field or herd in collective work parties and rituals); benefactor.

pinkuyllu: a flute-like musical instrument.

portero: (Spanish) doorkeeper, janitor.

posta, posta de salud: (Spanish) Medical Post.

Prefecto: (Spanish) Prefect.

prenda: (Spanish) pawn, guarantee, security, pledge.

promotor: (Spanish) an organizer or promotor for a development program.

provincias altas: (Spanish) provinces in the altiplano south of Cusco.

pueblo joven: (Spanish) a new community, usually of rural migrants to a city, who build their residences on the outskirts.

pullira: traditional skirt; from the Spanish *pollera*.

pututu: conch shell trumpet (in some Andean communities it is made of wood).

pututero: (Spanish) the person who sounds the *pututu*.

PH

phallchay: to throw *phallchay* flowers over animals; the act of throwing *phallchay* (*Gentiana* spp.); fertility ritual for the llamas and alpacas in *Q'ero* and other communities during carnival season when *phallchay* is in flower.

phayna: communal work party for public works, from the Spanish *faena*.

phukuy: blow.

P'

p'unchay: day.

Q

qañiwa: a cereal in the quinoa family with small seeds.

qaqa istrilla: a lichen that grows on rocks.

qaywa: the second-in-command at a collective work party, this person usually follows behind the rest to urge them on and to assure quality work.

qena: bamboo flute.

qoqaw: traveler's food.

qollana: the designated leader of a collective work party (see *capitán*).

qolqa: silo, granary, storehouse for agricultural goods.

qoncha: hearth.

qonopa: small stone or ceramic figure of an animal, with a hole in the back to place ritual offerings.

qorpachana: room and board, lodging.

Qoyllur Rit'i: a pilgrimage site; a regional pilgrimage that takes place immediately prior to Corpus Christi; literally Star-Snow.

qowi: guinea pig.

quiosco: (Spanish) a stall, stand, kiosk, or booth. In Ccachín, the term refers to a temporary structure of eucalyptus poles and pine boughs used to sell food and drink at fundraisers (*kermesses*). The term originates in the Turkish *kyošk*, meaning 'summer cottage'.

quintal: (Sp.) hundred-weight, equivalent to 4 *arrobas* or 100 pounds.

Q'

q'asoq: a person who beats the earth with a club or mallet to pulverize clods of soil.

q'enti: hummingbird.

q'epina: a large carrying cloth.

q'orana: the cutting blade of a foot plow; also used to refer to the foot plow itself in Ccachín. The foot plow is more widely know in the Andes by the Quechua term *chakitaklla* (*chaki* 'foot'; *taklla* 'plow') (Cook 1920; Gade & Rios 1972). In Ccachín, the name of a part is used to refer to the tool as a whole. As with other words, the etymology is not necessarily recognized. Accordingly, one high school student in Ccachín reported that *q'orana* is the Quechua and *chakitaklla* the Spanish term for the same tool.

QH

qhapaq qolla: a dance portraying the noble *Qolla*, Aymara traders from the altiplano to the southeast who historically were frequent visitors to the Cusco region. The dancers' costume includes a white woolen mask, a flat embroidered hat decorated with beads, ribbons, and coins, a woolen shawl, a rope sling, and an alpaca skin slung over the back.

R

Radio Tawantinsuyo: a Cusco radio station.

rancha: (Spanish) potato blight.

rapaq: a person who turns over the clods of earth cut by the foot plow in the plowing of the soil.

ratero: (Spanish) thief; petty thief.

raymi: a festival or ritual; the term is also used to refer to the event at which agricultural lands are redistributed in Ccachín.

recorreo: (Spanish) a walk around and inspection of boundary markers in the Andes, (the term is a local variation of the Spanish *recorrido*). The event is also referred to as *linderaje* (a term that also refers to the set of boundary markers visited) in some areas. In Ccachín, the ceremony is called *deslinde*.

regidor: (Spanish) council member, alderperson; the lowest ranking members of the traditional council in Ccachín (also called *pututero*).

Rimanakuy: dialogue, talk together, pact; a regional congress of campesinos organized during the years when Alan Garcia was President to discuss peasant concerns.

residencia: (Spanish) an inspection of every household in Ccachín by the new community officials after they have been sworn in for the New Year. The inspection of the homes of community authorities is referred to as *Hatun Residencia*, or 'Great Inspection'; the general inspection of the homes of community members is referred to as *Huch'uy Residencia* or *Uña Residencia*, 'Little Inspection'.

ronda campesina: (Spanish) peasant patrol; a village-based vigilance committee for the capture and punishment of thieves.

royal: (Spanish) generic name for baking powder derived from the most common brand.

runa: human being; in ethnic terms, an indigenous Andean person; plural *runakuna*.

S

salón comunal: (Spanish) community hall, assembly hall.

sami: animating essence; good fortune; happiness.

San Ciprián: (Spanish) a book of prayers, recipes, formulas, and magic used in witchcraft.

sanitario: (Spanish) public health official.

sankhu: a porridge made of ground corn, sugar, and other condiments.

sara: corn.

Saramama: Mother Corn.

sanitario: (Spanish) public health and sanitation official.

santo: (Spanish) saint.

santo remedio: 'holy remedy', a potion made with twelve colored yarns to treat *k'uychi onqoy* ('rainbow sickness') and other ailments.

Sargento: (Spanish) a traditional dance.

Semana Santa: (Spanish) Holy Week; the week preceding Easter Sunday.

señalakuy: to mark animals; an animal marking ritual.

serenata: (Spanish) serenade; an evening program of music and dance held on the vigil of some civil holidays in Ccachín.

serpentina: (Spanish) streamer of colored paper associated with Carnival.

servicio: (Spanish) assistant to the sponsor of a collective work party or ceremony, the person responsible for serving food, drink, and coca to the participants.

sirvinakuy: to cohabit; common law marriage, in most cases followed by a civil-religious ceremony after one or more children have been born.

soq'a machu: a malignant, evil spirit.

soq'a wayra: evil wind.

Subprefecto: (Spanish) Sub-Prefect.

sullka: younger, esp. younger brother; plural *sullkakuna*; used by men as a term of address to express solidarity at work parties and on ritual occasions in Ayacucho (used much like *niñucha* in Ccachín).

sullun: fetus.

suñay: to give a live animal as a gift during a marking ceremony.

susto: (Spanish) fright, scare, shock.

T

taku: an ochre-colored clay and iron oxide.

tamale: (Spanish) ground corn steamed in husks.

tambo: a rest stop or storehouse along a road or trail.

tambor: (Spanish) drum

tatarabuelos: (Spanish) great-great-grandparents.

tarpuy: to plant; planting; *hatun tarpuy* the planting of the primary potato lands in the upper sectoral fallow fields in Ccachín.

taruka: deer.

Taytacha Temblores: 'Lord of Earthquakes', an image of Jesus on the cross in the Cathedral in Cusco that is believed to provide protection from tremors; a procession is conducted for the image through the streets of Cusco on Monday of Holy Week.

Taytanchis: 'Our Father'; Lord.

teniente gobernador: (Spanish) lieutenant governor.

tienda comunal: (Spanish) communal store.

Tirakuna: Sacred Places (from Spanish *tierra* ['earth'] and the Quechua plural *-kuna*).

tiruku: terrorist, guerrilla fighter; the term is used in the Peruvian countryside to refer to members of *Sendero Luminoso* or the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaq Amaru*.

Todos los Santos: (Spanish) All Saints' Day; in Quechua, *Kawsasqanchis P'unchay.*

toro: (Spanish) bull.

tortilla: (Spanish) an omelet or corn griddlecake.

tractorista: (Spanish) tractor driver.

trago: (Spanish) low-grade cane alcohol.

trámite: (Spanish) transaction; paperwork; the term is usually used to refer to the bureaucracy one has to go through when one has business with the government.

tratamiento Incaico: (Spanish) a treatment for headaches consisting of a methodical series of yanks on clumps of the patient's hair.

trazo, trazado: (Spanish) layout, plan, outline, route.

truki: barter-exchange, derived from the Spanish *trueque*.

tupu: a unit of land measurement, technically equivalent to about 37 by 73 meters (44 by 88 Spanish *varas*) or 2705 m^2; a unit of land that allows for the production of a determinate quantity of products; by the latter definition, the measure can vary from 0.1 to 1.0 hectare, leading to conversion errors.

turno: (Sp.) a rotation in the communally-regulated sectoral fallow fields; also a turn in a labor rotation, as on the haciendas.

T'

t'anta: bread.

t'anta wawa: bread doll traditional to All Saints Day.

t'inkay: ***t'inkasqa***

t'impu: a special Carnival food dish with boiled meat and vegetables.

U

unu phayna: a work party to clean the canals; also called *yarqha phayna.*

unkuña: a small carrying cloth.

Uña Residencia: see *residencia*.

urinsaya: lower part of a community, lower moiety (contrasts with *hanansaya*).

uriwa: a congenital pediatric abnormality believed to result from the mother's exposure to certain phenomena during gestation. The problem may be physical, psychological, or pathological. Among the kinds found are *alqo uriwa* ('dog disorder'), *k'ussillu uriwa* ('monkey disorder'), *khuchi uriwa* ('pig disorder'), *loro uriwa* ('parrot disorder'), *llama uriwa* (llama disorder), *taruka uriwa* ('deer disorder'), *urpi uriwa* ('dove disorder'), *wallpa uriwa* ('chicken disorder'), and *lluthu uriwa* ('tinamou disorder'). These disorders are so named because their symptoms resemble the animals and other things they are named after.

V

vara: (Spanish) staff of office.

varayoq: officeholders, those who carry the staff of office.

Vaso de Leche: (Spanish) 'Glass of Milk' Program.

vigilante: (Spanish) ombudsman, institutional watchdog.

vino: (Spanish) wine.

vivero: (Spanish) plant nursery (especially for trees); fish hatchery or pond.

vocal: (Spanish) committee member.

voluntad: (Spanish) will, intention, desire.

W

wachala: a small carrying cloth used for coca leaves.

wachu: furrow, row, file, stripe.

wakcha: poor; orphan.

wakchallama: poor herder, person without llamas.

waka: cow (derive from the Spanish *vaca*).

wak'a: sacred rock or crevice; sanctuary.

wakería: cattle pasture.

wakero: cow herder; a hired hand who lives with and manages the cattle.

wallpa: chicken.

wamani: supernatural beings that live on mountain peaks and in mountain lakes (Ayacucho-Chanca dialect), similar to the *apu* and *tirakuna* of Cusco.

wankha: lever; a pole used for prying.

wanlla: large and well-formed produce, a gift of the best produce given by the owner of a field as a token of appreciation to those who help in *ayni* and *yanapuy* during the harvest.

warmi: female, woman, wife.

waraka: sling.

wasaq'epi: itinerant peddlers; the term is composed of *wasa(q)* back (of the) and *q'epi*, a bundle that is carried on the back, supported by the shoulders, and tied across the chest.

wasichakuy: house-building; the term is usually associated with thatching or rethatching the roof of a house, which represents the completion of the project. The term is also associated with the founding of a new household in marriage..

wata phayna: an annual work party on an hacienda for fence-building, trail maintenance, and other special projects.

wawa: baby, child.

waylla: a green pasture or moist field; a kind of dancer outfitted in bulrush from such a place.

wayna: young male.

waynu: traditional Andean country songs.

wayqe: brother (of a man); spiritual brother.

wayra: wind.

waytakuy: to tie on a bunch of flowers, esp. to decorate image of the saints.

wiñapuy: to artificially germinate kernels of corn as part of the fermentation process in making corn beer; the germinated kernels or mash is called *wiñapu*.

wiri: Beyersdorff (1984) defines the *wiri* as an earlier version of the foot plow, similar to the *chakitaklla* except that its blade is made of wood instead of metal. All *chakitaklla* in Ccachín now have metal blades, and the term *wiri* refers locally to *hayt'aq-rap'aq* pairs of plow team members, the number of pairs limited by the number of foot plows present, suggesting the natural evolution of the term. The Quechua term *masa* is used in some areas to refer to this same work unit.

Ÿ

yanapay: volunteer help

yanapakuy: voluntary labor rewarded with agropastoral products without expectation of reciprocal aid.

yapa: an extra amount, increase, addition; a small gift or extra amount given with a purchase to a valued customer; this Quechua term has come by way of Spanish into the regional English of Southern Louisiana and Southeast Texas as *lagniappe*, and in English it has essentially the same meaning.

yapuy: plowing of the potato fields after the potatoes have been planting, turning soil and sod over them.

yarqha phayna: a work party to clean the canals; also called *unu phayna*.

yukra: river shrimp.

yunsa: a tree decorated with paper streamers, sweets, fruits, and other objects and ceremonially felled during Carnival.

Z

zona de emergencia: (Spanish) a military emergency zone where certain citizen rights are temporarily suspended.

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Appendix 1

A Note on Orthography and Language

I use *Runasimi* (literally, 'the language of the people') to refer to the Quechua language, whenever, in context, its meaning is clear. Unless otherwise specified, Quechua or *Runasimi* without modifiers refers to Cusco Quechua, one of five dialects of the language. I use the official Quechua alphabet established by Peru in 1975 and revised at the First Workshop on Writing Systems of Quechua and Aymara in 1983. When a word has been introduced into Spanish from Quechua, I use the Quechua spelling, when the word has been introduced to Quechua from Spanish, I use the Spanish spelling, unless the Quechua alternative is already well-established in the literature. An example of the first is *qowi* instead of *cuy* ('guinea pig'). An example of the second is *cargo* ('burden', 'responsibility', 'office') instead of *kargu*. An example of a Spanish loan word that is also widely know by its Quechua equivalent is *faena* ('communal work party'). I use the Quechua *phayna* in the text.

In order to avoid confusion, I have made exceptions to the above rules in presenting place names. I use the spelling used by the *Oficina Militar de Geografía* for areas that have been mapped. The spelling on these maps has not yet been rendered consistent with the official orthography. No such maps are available for the Lares district, and I use the spelling for *Ccachín* that is used in community documents. According to contemporary standards, Ccachín should be rendered as *Qachin*, but few sources use this spelling. I use the revised spelling for Ccachín's annexes of *Qochayoq*, *Yerbabuenayoq* and *Rayankancha*, and for place names within the community. In the case of *Cusco*, I have used the spelling established by the city council on March 12, 1971 (Since the 16th century, Cusco has otherwise been spelled with a "z" instead of an "s"). It's important to note, however, that by Municipal Resolution No. 078-A/MC-SG-90 of June 24, 1988, the Quechua spelling *Qosqo* has been officially established. In countries with more than one official language, it is not uncommon for a city to be referred to by two names -- and the

decision to use one over the other often has ethnic or political implications. No such implications are intended here; I merely wish to avoid confusion for non-Andean audiences. Some Peruvian anthropologists are now using *Qosqo* in their published work, and it may soon become the norm.

I pluralize Spanish words in accord with standard practice (with *-s*, or *-es*), since this should cause no problem for English speakers. Pluralization of the Quechua is a bit more complex, and for simplicity and comprehension's sake, I have used singular forms to stand for the plural, thereby avoiding use of the Quechua suffix *-kuna*. As Allen (1988:242, n. 31) notes, the use of the term *-kuna* reflects the Andean understanding of plurality as a set of differentiated parts belonging to a single whole. There is no suffix equivalent to the English or Spanish *-s*, meaning "more than one" in Quechua. Plurality in this latter sense is expressed by using the singular form with plural intent, and I have adopted this convention here, even in instances where *-kuna* might be properly used. Thus, for example, I refer to the *varayoq* rather than the *varayoqkuna* (traditional office-holders), allowing context to determine whether the term is to be taken in singular or plural form.

In general, I have avoided identifying specific individuals in Ccachín altogether, but when I do, I use initials rather than complete names. I am torn by the responsibilities of protecting people's privacy and giving credit to those to whom it is properly due. In most cases, there would be no harm in revealing identity, but with the possibility of cross-reference that published work provides, it is impossible to separate out the two kinds of situations. I apologize in advance and appeal for comprehension from those who suffer the loss of voice that my decision to preserve their privacy may cause.

All translations of citations from Spanish to English in this thesis are my own unless otherwise specified. If a work originally published in Spanish has also been published in English, I have used the published translation. On the other hand, if my reference was a Spanish translation of a work originally published in English, I have subsequently consulted the English original to avoid the distortions that can come from reverse translation.

Appendix 2

Regional and National Organizations

The following is a list of government organizations, political parties, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and other extra-community organizations mentioned in this thesis. Most are best known in abbreviated form, and I have alphabetized them by their acronyms.

A

AID*:** ***Alianza Internacional de Desarrollo, International Development Alliance, a German development agency.

***Amauta*:** A development project for woman in the *pueblos jovenes* of Cusco.

AP*:** ***Acción Popular, a liberal, populist, pro-U.S., political party founded in 1956 by Fernando Belaúnde Terry, president of Peru from 1963-1968 and 1980-1985.

APRA*:** ***Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, American Popular Revolutionary Alliance; a populist, social-democratic political party founded in 1924 by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre; the party of Alan García, president of Peru from 1985-1990.

***Arariwa*:** A development association operating in the provinces of Calca and Urubamba. The organization takes its name from a Quechua word meaning "guard of the fields." The group has four areas of focus: agriculture (promotion of traditional Andean crops, conservation of soil and forest resources), pastoralism (creole sheep, fattening of cattle, corral animals), education, and promotion of women and the family. While not visibly present in the Lares area, where much of the same work is carried out by *PAL*, some of the *comuneros* in Ccachín have attended workshops sponsored by *Arariwa* and have planted seeds received through the program. On a larger scale, Arariwa provided Ccachín's school funds for food-nutrition through its program "*La Escuela Defende la Vida*" ("The School Defends Life").

C

***Cambio 90*:** Change 90, a political party focused on market-oriented economic reform, counterinsurgency, and combating corruption, founded in 1990 by Alberto Fujimori, president of Peru from 1990-present.

***Caritas*:** An international organization sponsored by the Catholic Church to assist the poor and disadvantaged. Caritas of Peru is active in all forty-five dioceses of the country. In the U.S., the agency is known as Catholic Relief Services.

Casa Campesina*:** ***Casa Campesina "Domingo Cabrera Lartaún," a peasant education, leadership training, and advocacy project founded in 1985 by the *Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos "Bartolomé de las Casas."* It provides rural-dwellers technical information about processes that interest them,, training to improve their capacity for organization and collective action, and promotes policies in governmental and private institutions that take into account the needs of rural people.

***Centro de Medicina Andina*:** "Center of Andean Medicine," a research institute dedicated to the study of indigenous knowledge of natural medicines and education about their use.

CBC*:** ***Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos "Bartolomé de las Casas," a social science research institute in Cusco.

***CESPACA*:** A German development agency.

***Club de Madres*:** Mothers' Club.

COPACA*:** ***El Convenio Perú Alemania — Cultivos Andinos, a joint German-Peruvian rural development project.

***CORDE-Cusco*:**

E

ENACO*:** ***Empresa Nacional de la Coca; National Coca Enterprise.

F

***FAO-HOLANDA*:** A reforestation and wood products program sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the *Director General de Forestal y Fauna* (DGFF, formerly INFOR) on the Peruvian government.

FARTAC*:** ***Federación Agraria Revolucionaria Túpac Amaru, Revolutionary Agrarian Federation "*Tupaq Amaru.*"

FDCC*:** ***Federación Departamental de Campesinos de Cusco, Peasant Federation of the Department of Cusco; including the "Federación Provincial de Campesinos de La Convención y Lares," Provincial Peasant Federation of Convención and Lares.

***FINCOOP*:** A cooperative lending institution in Calca.

FONCODES*:** ***Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social, National Fund for Compensation and Social Development.

H

Herrandina: An appropriate technology project, dedicated to the production of agricultural tools.

I

INC*:** ***Instituto Nacional de Cultura, "National Institute of Culture," a government agency.

INTERALP: **Intercultural Action Learning Project**, an educational association headquartered in the United States, specializing in ethnographic tourism.

IU*:** ***Izquierda Unida, Unified Left, a left-wing alliance of the *Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos* (National Front of Workers and Peasants), *Partido Comunista Peruano* (Peruvian Communist Party), and *Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Union of the Revolutionary Left); founded in 1980; fielded Henry Pease as presidential candidate in 1990.

M

***Ministerio de* Agricultura:** Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture.

***Ministerio de Salud*:** Peruvian Ministry of Health.

MRTA*:** ***Movimiento Revolucionario "Tupaq Amaru," a leftist guerrilla group.

P

***Pacha*:** A small development agency working in Cuncani (Calca). In Quechua, "*pacha*" means "earth," "world," or "era."

***PAIT*:** "Temporary Income Support Program," a development program initiated in the mid-1980s by the *Aprista* government to provide temporary wage labor employment, materials, and technical assistance for rural and urban development projects throughout Peru.

PAL-TAMBO*:** ***Proyecto Amparaes-Lares, a rural development project sponsored by the Salesian priests in the parish of Calca.

Plan International: An international foster care program for children. It was founded in 1937 to help refugee children during the Spanish Civil War and has since extended to 42 program countries. In Peru, Plan International is active in the departments of Piura, Cuzco, Loreto, and the Lima. It began work in the Lares area in the mid to late 1990s, and about seventy-five children participate in Ccachín.

***PRAMPECO*:** A German development project in the Lares area, focusing on rural electrification and the creation of local industry.

PRONAMACHCS*:** ***Proyecto Nacional de Manejo de Cuencias Hidrográficas y Conservación de Suelos, a national program dedicated to watershed management and soil conservation.

PRONOEI*:** ***Programa Noescolarado de Educación Inicial, a preschool program in Ccachín and other Andean communities.

PROINSEBI*:** ***Proyecto Integrado de Servicios Básicos para la Infancia, a project of *Convenio Perú, Fondo de las Naciones Unidas Para la Infancia* (UNICEF).

S

***Sendero Luminoso*:** "Shining Path," a Maoist revolutionary group.

SINAMOS*:** ***Sindicato Agrario de Movilización Social, an agency of the Peruvian government created during the Velasco regime to implement its agrarian reform.

SUTEP*:** ***Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores en la Educación de Perú. The Union of Education Workers of Peru.

T

Tafos*:** ***Los Talleres de Fotografía Social, Workshop in Social Photography, a photography project to empower peasants and the urban poor.

***Telefónica*:** The government-contracted telephone monopoly in Peru, with headquarters in Spain.

U

***USAID*:** **United States Agency for International Development.**

USE*:** ***Unidad de Servicio Educativo, the administrative body for Peruvian schools.

V

***Vaso de Leche*:** "Glass of Milk" program, a food distribution program to improve the nutritional status of children.

Appendix 3

Scientific Names

The scientific names used in this study are those found in published works for the common names reported by my informants. They are drawn from *Academia Mayor de la Lengua Quechua* (1995), Hurtado Huamán et. al. (1996), and Valencia Espinoza and Nuñez Zamalloa (1989). Where these sources differ, all names they list are given. I have not commissioned an analysis of specimens of my own, so the scientific names given here are meant to be suggestive rather than definitive. The common names are Quechua except where indicated otherwise. Items that grow in or are native to Ccachín are marked with an asterisk.

Domestic Crops

achoqcha*	*Cyclanthera pedata*
ajonjilí (S.)	*Sesamum indicum*
añu*	*Tropaeolum tuberosum*
arracacha	*Arracacia xanthorrhiza*
coca (S.)	*Erythroxylon coca*
habas* (S.)	*Phaseolus lunatus*
hinojo* (S.)	*Foeniculum vulgare*
kinuwa* (S., ***quinoa***)	*Chenopodium quinoa*
lakawiti* (S., ***calabaza***)	*Cucúrbita pepo, Cucúrbita ficifolia, Cucúrbita moschata Jacq.*
linaza* (S.)	*Linum usitatissimun*
lisas (***papalisas***, ***ulluku***)*	*Ullucus tuberosus*
papa*	*Solanum andigenum*
purutu*	*Phaseolus vulgaris*
qañiwa*	*Chenopodium pallidicaule*
roqoto*	*Capsicum pubescens*
tarwi*	*Lupinus mutabilis*

yerbabuena*	*Mentha spp.*
yuraq patayoq kulis*	*Brassica oleracea*

Wild Plants

achupalla*	*Puya herrerae*
añaypunku	*Puerta de gratitude*
brezo	*Erica vulgaris*
chachak'uma*	*Escallonia resinosa*
chakra kakalaysu*	*Bomarea ovata* (?)
chakra llank'u*	*Asclepias spp.* (?)
chanchi*	Unknown
choqlloillmanka*	*Phytolacca bogotensis*
chunta	Unknown
ch'ikllur, chillurumay*	*Vallea stipularis*
ch'illka*	*Baccharis molina, Bacharis polyantha*
cirse (S.)	*Costaderia rudiuscula*
eucalipto* (S.)	*Eucalyptus globulus*
grama* (S.)	*Pennisetum clandestinum, Distichlis spicata*
ichhu*	*Stipa ichu*
kanser*	*Stachys herrerae, Stachys bogotensis*
kapuli*	*Prunus serotina, Prunus salicifolia*
kikuyu*	*Pennisetum clandestinum*
kisa*	*Urtica urens*
kiska qhana*	*Sonchus spp.* (?)
labrán*	*Alnus jorullensis*
llantén*	*Plantago hirtella*
markhu	*Franseria artemisicides*
molle	*Schinus molle*

manka p'aki*	*Eupatorium peregrinum, Eupatorium sternberginianum, Encelia canescens*
muchuyqora*	*Rumex asetozella*
mullak'a*	*Malenbeckia volcanica*
muña*	*Minthostachys spicata*
mut'uy*	*Cassia hookeriana*
ñukch'u*	*Salvia oppositaflora, Salvia combiy*
oqa oqa*	*Oxalis spp.*
pampa llank'u*	*Asclepias spp.* (?)
panti panti	*Cosmos pseusedanifalius*
paqpa*	*Agave americana*
payqo*	*Chenopodium ambrosiodes*
pijuayo	*Bactris (Guilielma) speciosa*
pinku pinku*	*Ephredea spp.*
phallcha*	*Gentiana scarlatina*
phuña*	*Culcitium rufescens*
qomu qomu*	Unknown
qhana*	Unknown
raki raki*	*Dryopteris spp.*
rayan (sawku)*	*Sambucus peruviana*
salvia (S.)	Unknown
sanandaja (S.)	Unknown
sano sano*	Unknown
sawasi	Unknown
siwula siwula*	Unknown
taruka ninri*	Unknown
thiri*	*Brachyotum quinquinerve*
tunya tunya*	*Solanum luteo album*
valeriana* (S.)	*Valeriana spp.*

verbena* (S.)	*Verbena spp.*
wach'anka*	*Euphorbia huachangana*
wakatáy*	*Tagetes mandoni*
yuyu*	*Brassica campestris*

Birds

anka*	*Geranoaetus melanoleucus*
chiwanku*	*Turdus chiguanco*
hak'achu*	*Colaptes rupicola*
k'aylla* (S., ***loro***)	*Aratinga mitrata*
kuntur*	*Vultur gryphus*
lluthu*	*Nothura darwinii*, *Nothoprocta ornata*, *Tinamotis pentlandii*
manaqaraku	*Ortalis guttata Spix*
q'enti*	*Colibrí spp.*
wallata*	*Chloephaga melanoptera*

Mammals

añas*	*Conepatus inka Thomas*, *Conepatus semistriatus Boddaert*
taruka*	*Hippocamelus antisensis d'Orbigny*
wisk'acha*	*Lagidium peruvianum Meyen*

Insects, Bacteria, Fungi, etc.


askantuy*	Unknown; a white larvae found on *achupalla* plants; also called *k'arwakuru* in some parts of Peru
chiririnqa*	*Diptera sarcophagidae*, *Sarcophaga carnaria Linneo*
rancha*	*Phytophotera infestans*
wayt'ampu*	*Metardaris cosinga*

Others

apanqora	*Astacus fluvialis*
yukra	*Bithynis caementarius*, *Palaemon squilla servatus*

Appendix 4

The Ceremonial Calendar in Ccachín



——— Fixed Feast
– – – Moveable Feast

3/TH Date of Feast
Lares Location of Feast
Wank'a Name of Feast

The Ceremonial Calendar

Date	Event
January 1	***Jurado*** **• Oath;** ***Alcalde Merienda*** **• Mayor's Luncheon.** Transfer of the staffs of office and swearing in ceremony of new officials; Head mayor butchers a bull and serves beef and bread to the community. *Sargento* dancers from the *puna* (also called *Waylaka*) are sponsored by the entering officials and dance throughout the four days of rituals that begin the New Year.
January 2	***Hatun Residencia*** **• Great House Inspection;** ***Yarqha Phayna*** **• Cleaning of Canals.** *Residencia* derives from the verb *residenciar* (Sp.) — asking officials to give an account of their conduct. On this day, the new *varayoq* visit each other, the *mayordomos*, and the *comunidad campesina* officials for a ritual inspection of their households. Traditionally, a community work party was also held on January 2nd or 3rd to clean the canals supplying water to village households and gardens, but with the construction of a piped water system in the late 1980s, this work party is nearly defunct.
January 3	***Huch'uy*** **or** ***Uña Residencia.*** • Little House Inspection. The *varayoq* visit all of the households in the community, carrying out a ritual inspection of cleanliness and conduct.
January 4	***Huch'uy Residencia*** **• Little House Inspection.** Visiting and inspection of households continues in the *anexos*, primarily Rayankancha (Qochayoq's *varayoq* carry on their activities parallel with those of Ccachín). Final day of the *Musoq Wata* (New Year) festivities.
January 6	***Los Reyes*** **• Three Kings (Epiphany);** ***Niño de Markaqocha*** **• Child of Markaqocha.** People caution that one should not work in the fields on Epiphany. According to one informant, the earth can cause an illness similar to malaria — with shakes — on this day. To avoid this, some woman reportedly collect plenty of greens for the guinea pigs on the 5th, so that they don't need to go out and collect any for *Reyes*. Traditionally, new *varayoq* have made a trip or sent a representative to Markaqocha (district of Ollantaytambo), for that community's celebration of Epiphany. There, they burned a candle for the *Niño de Markaqocha*, believed to have miraculous qualities They seek the blessing and protection of the Christ Child for their coming term of office. A few years ago, the image of the *Niño* was stolen. It has since been replaced by

another. In Ollantaytambo, they say it was stolen by someone from Ccachín. In Ccachín, they say it was stolen by one of the *carguyoq* for the fiesta in Markaqocha. With the theft, the trip to Markaqocha is declining in importance in Ccachín.

February 2 — ***Día de la Papa*** • **Potato Day**. This is Candlemas Day, and elsewhere in the Andes, *La Virgen de Candelaria* — the Purification of the Virgin — is celebrated. There is no image of the Virgin nor public feast in Ccachín, but many families reportedly have a tradition of decorating their potato fields with gladioluses and other flowers. The Virgin is known as the "*Santa de Nabo*" ("Saint of Turnips"), and accordingly, *Candelaria* is said to be the last day that one should eat wild turnip greens in Ccachín (there's a pragmatic aspect to this religious injunction, as by this date the greens are in flower and getting bitter anyway). The proscription may be a permutation of taboos associated with Candlemas Day in Europe, as it seems similar to the idea, for example, that it is bad luck to keep Christmas decorations up beyond this day.

February (Moveable, 2nd Thursday before Carnival) — ***Compadres*** • **Co-fathers' Day; *Uwiha/Paqocha T'inkay*** • **Ritual for the Sheep**. Each family conducts a private fertility ritual for its flocks of sheep and alpaca. Sometimes an animal is given to one of the family's *compadres*.

February (Moveable, Thursday before Carnival) — ***Día de Comadres*** • **Co-mothers' Day; *Waka T'inkay*** • **Fertility Ritual for Cattle**. Private rituals are conducted by each family for their herd of cattle.

February (Moveable, Carnival Sunday) — ***Misti Carnaval*** • **Mestizo Carnival.** A *kapulli* ('cherry') or other tree is decorated with fruits, breads, balloons, and ribbons and set up in the central plaza. Pairs of young dancers dance around, chopping at it with an ax until it falls. The pair that succeeds becomes the *cargo* sponsors the following year. This dance is known as the *yunsa* in Cusco and as *mallki wit'uy* on the puna above Ccachín. The event is accompanied by water and flour play as in Cusco.

February (Moveable, Carnival Monday) — ***Alcalde T'impu*** • **Mayor's Feast.** Meal of boiled beef and vegetables provided for the community by the head mayor.

February

(Moveable, Carnival Tuesday)

***Varayoq T'impu* • Officeholder's Feast.** Public, sequential visiting of officeholder's and *mayordomos* homes as food is served by all. Groups engage in street dancing, culminating in a festival in the plaza in the late afternoon. Dancers and other participants decorate their clothing with balloons, flowers, and plant fronds. *Tambors* and *flautas* are used to make music. The annual cycle of nightly street dancing ends for Lent.

February

(Moveable, Ash Wednesday)

***Markasqa* • Marking of Ashes.** Marking of people's foreheads with ashes by the *varayoqs*. Today, it is principally conducted among office-holders and other community leaders.

March-April

(Saturdays during Lent)

***Taytachan Waytakuy* • Decorate the Saints with Flowers.** *Waytakuy* (Qu.) means to place a bouquet of flowers. Every Saturday morning between Carnival and Easter, a group of women meet at the church to decorate the saints with gladioluses, *panti*, and other flowers. The cate-chists then lead them in prayer. This is organized like a *phayna*, so that every female head of household will be expected to contribute over the course of the lenten season.

March-April

(Moveable, Friday before Easter)

***Viernes Santo* • Good Friday.** Fast in many homes, broken later in the day by a sumptuous multi-course meal, Ccachín's version of *doce platos* ('twelve plates'). In times past, the young boys of the village were collectively taken to the local church in the Lares area and horsewhipped (Zúñiga Rivero 1955), and while children continue to be reminded of the practice, it is no longer done in Ccachín.

March-April

(Moveable, Easter)

***Pascua de Resurrección* • Easter.** Easter is not a major feast in Ccachín, but many people take the day off from fieldwork, and the cycle of nightly street dancing start again after pausing for Lent. Mandolin music is used.

May 3

***Cruz Velakuy* • *Santa Cruz* (Finding of the Cross).** Ccachín's *anexos* of Qochayoq, Rayankancha, and Yerbabuenayoq celebrate vigils in their chapels. There is no public celebration in Ccachín, but some families hold private household celebrations. The roadside chapel at *Willka-punku Pass*, the pass on the road between Lares and Calca, is decorated and visited by truckers and their passengers.

May
(2nd Sunday)

***Día de la Madre* • Mother's Day.** Teacher's, students, and the Parent's Association of the School put on a program for the mothers, including a lunch with milk for all participants.

May 15 — ***San Isidro*** • **St. Isidore, the Farmer**. A public vigil is sponsored by the *mayordomo* of St. Isidore. The saint's image is decorated in the church, and the saint's *carguyoq* sponsors *ch'unchu* dancers.

May-June (Moveable, Tuesday after Trinity) — ***Señor de Qoyllur Rit'i*** • **Lord of the Snow Star**. Pilgrimage to the Sanctuary of *Qoyllur Rit'i* in the Department of Quispicanchis. A dance group from Ccachín first attended the event in 1987. In 1991, three dance groups from the community attended: *Qhapaq Qolla*, *K'achampa*, and *Sargento* (the latter representing Qochayoq). Sponsorship of a dance group at *Qoyllur Rit'i* is currently the most expensive *cargo* of any religious celebration in Ccachín.

May-June (Moveable, Thursday after Trinity) — ***Corpus Christi***. Major religious celebration in Ccachín with a *mayordomo* and several dance *carguyoq*. Beyond the dances presented by the groups returning from *Qoyllur Rit'i*, *awqa chileno*, *waylla*, and *negro* are danced, and a brass band from Choquecancha attends. This celebration appears to have gained in importance in recent years, coinciding with the increasing importance of *Qoyllur Rit'i*.

June 29 — ***San Pedro*** • **St Peter**. While there is an image of St. Peter in the church and a *mayordomo* for the saint, as far as I am aware an all night vigil for St. Peter is not held on the saint's day as it is for other saints. Such a vigil, however, is held on July 25th during the fiesta of Santiago, in sequence with other saints. San Pedro is the least well-recognized statue in Ccachín, with many unsure of its identity. It is commonly referred to as *El Señor* ('Lord', 'Master') and occasionally as *El Escolar* (The Scholar), the latter because of the book in its left hand. The image can be identified as St. Peter by the keys by its side for opening the gates of heaven.

July 16 — ***Mamacha Carmen*** • **Virgin of Mt. Carmel (Carmen)**. An image of the Virgin resides in Ccachín's church, and a vigil is sponsored by her *mayordomo* on her feast day.

July 25 — ***Santiago*** • **St James the Greater**; ***Kawallu Ch'allay*** • **Ritual for the Horses**. Santiago is the male patron saint of Ccachín. Beyond a vigil sponsored by the *mayordomo* in the church, four days of *gallut'ipiy* (a rooster-jerking contest) are held (July 24th-27th), each with a separate *carguyoq* (called *galluyoq* — rooster-owner). Each galluyoq butchers a bull to feed the *gallut'ipiy* horseback riders and other participants. A dance *carguyoq* provides *Ch'unchu* dancers for the public ceremonies. *Santiago* also has an *alférez*. Each household holds a private ceremony for its horses and mules. These vary in elaborateness and intensity, but

always include the giving of salt and toasted corn, and decoration of the animals. Vigils are held in the church for Santiago, San Pedro, and the Virgin of Guadalupe respectively on the first three days of the festival.

July 28 — ***Día de Independencia*** • **Peruvian Independence Day**. Independence Day falls during the Ccachín school's two-week break between semesters, but the teachers and students organize an Independence Day program for the community in the central plaza before the teachers leave, around July 23rd. The principal event on Independence Day is the selection of the new *varayoqs* for the following year. A meeting is held at the home of the *hatun alcalde* ('mayor'), and the selection is made by the current officeholders and others active in community affairs, after first seeking the consent of prospective candidates. Afterward, the new list of officeholders is read to the community at the door of the church.

August 1-30 — ***Pachamama*** • **Mother Earth**. During the month of August, the earth is said to open up and become dangerous. People say that it is not safe to travel on August 1st. *A despacho* ('bundle of ritual offerings') is burned for the *pachamama* by many families at some time in August.

August 15 — ***Mamacha Asunta*** • **Assumption of the Virgin**. This manifestation of the Virgin is the patron of Calca, the provincial capital. Some in Ccachín chose to have a child baptized in Calca on this day, particularly if they have chosen godparents for the child from Calca. A major regional market is held during the multi-day festival, providing an opportunity for people in the village to purchase clay cooking pots from vendors who come from Sicuani and the *provincias altas* where the ceramics are produced. For many, it is a once-a-year trip to the capital. *Mamacha Asunta* is also the patron saint of Choquecancha, and some from Ccachín who do not go to Calca may attend the festival in Choquecancha.

August 30 — ***Santa Rosa*** **de Lima** • **St. Rose of Lima**. First held in 1988, this is a local pilgrimage to a site near the communities of Ankallachi and Pumapunku on the Alaqpay ridge between Amparaes and Lares. A campesino is said to have discovered the face of St. Rose formed by lichens in a rock at the site, and the image has since been enhanced by a Cusco artist. With the encouragement of a German priest who spends summers in the area, the festival is emerging as a local indigenous alternative to the mestizo festival celebrated on September 8th in Lares. Several of the Amparaes-area communities, including Bonbon, attend the festival. As of 1991, dancers from Ccachín did not attend the event, but given its proximity, people from Ccachín may attend as the festival becomes more widely known.

September 8 ***Mamacha Natividad*** **• Nativity of the Virgin.** Festival in Lares for the *La Natividad de Nuestra Señora*, the patron of the district capital. Dance groups and musicians from Ccachín attend. There is a regional soccer tournament, involving teams from Ccachín, and a minor market-fair. People take advantage of the festival to visit the Lares hot springs.

September 14 ***Señor de Wank'a*** **• Lord of Wank'a (Exaltation of the Cross).** Pilgrimage to the Sanctuary of Wank'a near San Salvador in the south-eastern corner of Calca province. A major regional market-fair coincides with the religious festival. While for most of its history the shrine has been associated with the traditional form of indigenous Andean pilgrimage marked by local groups carrying their *lámina* (community icon) to the site accompanied by dancers and musicians, dance has been prohibited by the Mercedarian order that oversees the shrine since the 1920s, and the pilgrimage has primarily become a mestizo event. Attendance from Ccachín is now on an individual basis and is not extensive. The establishment of an alternative apparitional shrine on the same day nearby at Oqruru with a more rural character— *El Señor de Westawis* ('Christ the Just Judge') — has not attracted devotees from Ccachín. While Ccachín's participation in Wank'a appears to have been in decline in the latter half of this century, truck access has made Qoyllur Rit'i the pilgrimage of choice since the mid-1980s.

September 21 ***Octavo de Wank'a*** **• Octave of Wank'a and the Exaltation of the Cross.** Sponsorship of the *lámina* of Wank'a in Ccachín continues to be passed on annually. The icon is taken to the Sanctuary of Wank'a during the feast by the cargo holder. A small private feast is then held in the home of the sponsor on the octave of the Exaltation of Christ, during which the *cargo* is passed to the next *carguyoq*.

October 1-2 ***Aniversario de TAMBO*** **• Anniversary of TAMBO.** The Proyecto Amparaes-Lares was founded in 1985 and has its principal office in Amparaes. Associated with the Catholic diocese of Calca, it sells seeds and buys agricultural products from local farmers at a better price than offered by truckers and traders. It also maintains a pharmacy. TAMBO holds dance, tool, and produce contests during its 2-day anniversary celebration. The two organized dance groups in Ccachín — *Qhapaq Qolla* and *K'achampa* — attend, as does the *Club de Madres* ('Mothers' Club').

October 7 ***Mamacha Rosario*** **• Virgin of Rosario.** The *mayordomo* of Rosario sponsors a public service for Rosario on the vigil of her feast day. From Rosario forward, the occasional evening street dancing by young people

accompaniment by a mandolin, increases in frequency and is accompanied by *tambor* and *flauta*.

November 1 ***Kawsasqanchis P'unchay*** **• All Saints Day**. All Saint's Day is a household festival. Compadres visit each other in the morning, delivering a gift of fresh-brewed coffee. Confetti or rose petals are sprinkled over visitors heads. Houses have a niche in one wall with a cross as sacred space to honor the ancestors, and the niche is decorated with flowers for All Saints Day. *Piki piki*, a red trumpet-shaped flower, predominates for All Saints and All Souls. A special meal is shared by the family, with *lechón* ('roast pork') the meat of choice for those who can afford it, and corn *tortillas* or tamales and egg tortillas are served. Part of the food is placed before the niche as an offering to the *almas* ('spirits'). Bread vendors come to the community to sell *t'anta wawa* ('bread babies') for the feast. The varayoq select a sponsor for the Christmas *cargo* (the position is referred to as "*Compadre*." At midnight, they go to the candidate's home to announce his selection, bearing bread and herb tea.

November 2 ***Almakunaq P'unchay*** **• All Souls' Day**. The *ofrenda* — offering — set aside for the souls the day before is shared among all present in the house. Families visit the graves of their ancestors in the cemetery. They tidy the sites, decorate them with *piki piki* and other flowers, pray, and bless the graves with alcohol. Considerable drinking surrounds a trip to the cemetery, both at funerals and on All Souls' Day. Those whose parents and other ancestors have long been deceased often do not go to the cemetery.

November 28 ***Aniversario*** **• Anniversary of the Establishment of Ccachin as a *Comunidad Campesina* in 1968.** This is a civil festival, organized by an anniversary committee, with a *serenata* on the eve — a program including the national anthem, performances by community bands, poetry readings by students, singing of solos, dancing, and skits featuring parody, satire, and slapstick (among those observed: a priest conducting a wedding and a dentist pulling teeth) . On the anniversary itself, there are speeches by community leaders, honor to the elders who helped bring about the change in official status from *parcialidad* to *comunidad*, a dance contest (most dances observed, except Sargento, are not usually danced in religious contexts in the community: *Carnaval de Canchis*, *Chukchu*, *K'usillu*, *Machu Machus*, *Sargento*, *Varayoq*, and *Waka Ch'uyay, and Waka Waka*) an invitational soccer tournament with teams visiting from neighboring communities, a public pig roast, and a *kacharpari*. Secular community organizations such as the *Club de Madres*, Cattle Committee, soccer teams, and High School play an active role, and participate in the dance competition as groups

November 30 ***San Andrés*** **• St. Andrew**. Ccachín does not have an image of St. Andrew. However, this day marks the beginning of three rounds of visits to each household by a son or daughter of the person with the *cargo* of *Compadre*, carrying *El Niño* — an image of the infant Jesus — to which people pay homage and give gifts of flowers, food, and money. There is a belief in Ccachín that one must eat *sankhu* on this day ('corn and sugar porridge'), or one will go hungry for the next year.

December 12 ***Mamacha Guadalupe*** **• Virgin of Guadalupe**. Guadalupe is the female patron of Ccachín. The feast last three days (feasts for lesser saints extend over two), with the *mayordomo* dressing, decorating and displaying the saint in the church and sponsoring the candlelight vigil. The *carguyoq* for Guadalupe sponsors *Qhapaq Qolla* dancers, bidding their farewell with the *kacharpari* on December 13th. Like the other patron Santiago, Guadalupe has her own *alvaceres*.

.December 24 ***Noche Buena*** **• Christmas Eve**. The third round of *El Niño* visiting each home in the community takes place. The *Compadre* of El Niño improvises and decorates a crèche with mosses and flowers and sponsors a candlelight vigil for the Infant Jesus. There are three images of El Niño in Ccachín, one in the church, and two with individual families, and the latter are feasted privately.

December 25 ***Navidad*** **• Christmas;** ***Niño Tusuy*** **• Dance for the Child**. On Christmas Day, *El Niño* is taken from the *Compadre*'s home through the streets to the cemetery, and finally to the church, to be placed with the Virgin of Guadalupe. Sometimes along the way, it is taken to the homes of various *mayordomos*. There is street play by the entourage with a massive carved wood ball called *niñoq papan* or *niñoq uman* (child's potato or child's head), which has a hole for dragging or carrying with a thong or recurved stick. The dance itself apparently does not have a name in Ccachín, but is elsewhere known as *Niño Tusuy* (Villasante Ortiz 1980). The activity is accompanied by *flauta* and *tambor* music.

December 28 ***Inocentes*** **• Day of the Innocents**. While there are no ceremonial or ritual activities, most people say that one should not work in the field on this day, out of danger of making an *inocente* or martyr of the plot and undoing all of one's previous work. Some men acknowledge the belief but do agricultural tasks anyway (it's the season of *papa hallmay* and *sara p'oqroy*, cultivation of the potatoes and 2nd weeding of the corn), but the majority engage stay out of the fields, instead hiking to the pastures to check on their animals, sewing and mending, airing and cleaning of woolen blankets and sacks, and other tasks (e.g., I observed a fellow castrate a horse on this day).

December 31 ***Kacharpari*** **• Farewell.** Public ceremony for retiring and new community officials, who enter the central plaza on horseback. Before Ccachín got it's own lieutenant governor and judges, this ceremony saw off the authorities as they left for Lares (before that, Calca) with their entourage for the transfer of offices. The *kacharpari* begins four days of feasting and ceremony in Ccachín's civil-religious hierarchy.

Appendix 5

Variation in Exchange Rate and Consumer Price Index

The following chart shows the variation in the value of the dollar in Peruvian *intis* in the parallel market of Ocoña (Lima), the variation in the Consumer Price Index, and the real value of the dollar during my fieldwork in Peru. As measured by the Consumer Price Index, inflation averaged 30.1% per month in Cusco in 1989, 47.7% in 1990, and 13% during the first half of 1991, with a cumulative annual variation of 2248%, 19,657.2%, and 100.9% respectively. The price of the dollar in *intis* on the street increased 1210% in 1989, 3940% in 1990, and 150% during the first six months of 1991. Accordingly, the purchasing power of the dollar decreased 85.5% between December 1988 and June 1991. The data from December 1988 to June 1991 is drawn from a publication of the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Información - Cusco* and *Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos "Bartolomé de las Casas"* (1991). The exchange rate figures for the second half of 1991 are based on the exchanges I made in Cusco during this time and are unofficial. I have no quantitative data on variation in the Consumer Price Index for the second half of 1991, but there were no dramatic changes over the pattern set in the first part, and inflation, while in three digits, was a fraction of the year before.

Month/Year	Average Nominal Value of the U.S. Dollar (In *Intis*)	Monthly Variation in Nominal Dollar Value (%)	Cumulative Variation in Nominal Dollar Value (%)	Monthly Variation in Cusco's Consumer Price Index	Cumulative Variation in Cusco's Consumer Price Index	Variation in Average Real Value of the U.S. Dollar (%)
December 1988	1,160	---	---	---	---	100.0
January 1989	1,900	64.6	64.6	54.6	54.6	106.5
February 1989	1,410	-25.8	22.1	30.0	101.0	60.7
March 1989	1,320	-6.2	14.5	33.6	168.6	42.6
April 1989	1,760	33.2	52.6	22.6	229.4	46.3
May 1989	2,820	60.0	144.1	37.8	353.8	53.8
June 1989	3,150	11.8	172.9	14.3	418.8	52.6
July 1989	3,010	-4.5	160.8	27.1	559.3	39.6

Month/Year	Average Nominal Value of the U.S. Dollar (In *Intis*)	Monthly Variation in Nominal Dollar Value (%)	Cumulative Variation in Nominal Dollar Value (%)	Monthly Variation in Cusco's Consumer Price Index	Cumulative Variation in Cusco's Consumer Price Index	Variation in Average Real Value of the U.S. Dollar (%)
August 1989	3,410	13.3	195.5	27.4	740.0	35.2
September 1989	4,880	43.0	322.5	32.4	1,012.1	38.0
October 1989	5,790	18.7	401.5	32.8	1,376.6	34.0
November 1989	9,580	65.3	729.2	26.2	1,763.1	44.5
December 1989	13,930	45.5	1,106.2	26.0	2,248.0	51.4
January 1990	13,000	-6.6	1,020.7	36.8	3,112.3	35.1
February 1990	13,800	6.3	1,089.7	20.5	3,769.5	31.0
March 1990	17,800	28.9	1,434.5	25.8	4,769.8	31.7
April 1990	27,200	52.7	2,244.8	48.9	7,149.6	32.5
May 1990	37,700	38.4	3,150.0	42.9	10,261.6	31.5
June 1990	70,100	86.2	5,943.1	38.7	14,274.0	42.2
July 1990	117,200	67.2	10,003.4	66.8	23,877.0	42.3
August 1990	292,600	149.6	25,124.1	444.2	130,388.4	19.4
September 1990	431,200	47.4	37,072.4	21.6	158,630.3	23.5
October 1990	446,000	3.4	38,348.3	13.8	180,517.1	21.4
November 1990	441,000	1.1	37,917.2	11.4	201,142.0	19.0
December 1990	549,500	24.6	47,270.7	25.5	252,484.6	18.8
January 1991	540,800	-1.6	46,520.7	21.2	305,961.3	15.3
February 1991	544,900	0.8	46,874.1	10.9	339,363.1	13.9
March 1991	562,700	3.3	48,408.6	10.3	374,477.0	13.0
April 1991	631,800	12.3	54,365.5	12.1	419,682.6	13.0
May 1991	794,400	25.7	68,382.8	9.7	460,557.4	14.9
June 1991	848,500	6.8	73,046.6	10.2	507,445.3	14.5
July 1991	875,800	3.2	75,400.0	—	—	—
August 1991	812,280	-7.3	69,924.1	—	—	—

Month/Year	Average Nominal Value of the U.S. Dollar (In *Intis*)	Monthly Variation in Nominal Dollar Value (%)	Cumulative Variation in Nominal Dollar Value (%)	Monthly Variation in Cusco's Consumer Price Index	Cumulative Variation in Cusco's Consumer Price Index	Variation in Average Real Value of the U.S. Dollar (%)
September 1991	806,000	-0.8	69,382.8	---	---	---
October 1991	950,000	17.8	81,796.6	---	---	---
November 1991	1,000,000	5.5	86,106.9	---	---	---
December 1991	1,002,500	2.5	86,322.4	---	---	---

Curriculum Vitae

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Education

1999	**Ph.D.**	**Anthropology**, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.
1988		**Quechua,** Cornell University, Latin American Studies Program, Ithaca, NY.
1986	**M.A.**	**Anthropology**, University of Washington.
1981		**Human Relations**, University of Minnesota/Duluth, MN.
1974	**B.A.**	**Art**, St. John's University, Collegeville, MN.

Research and Teaching Positions

1995-1996	**Researcher Assistant**, Older Pedestrian Study, Harborview Injury Prevention and Research Center, Seattle, WA;
1995	**Instructor**, Anthropology, University of Washington; Spring quarter; Course: Human Nature and Culture.
1995-1996	**Researcher Assistant**, Social Research Institute, Olympia, WA; NSF Project "Social Transitions in the North: Alaska and the Russian Far East."
1994-1996	**Instructor**, Anthropology, Department of Distant Learning, Seattle Central Community College; Course: World Cultures.
1994	**Instructor**, Anthropology, University of Washington; Winter quarter; Course: Sociocultural Anthropology.
1993-1994	**Child Behavior Observer**, Study of the Curriculum "Second Step: A Violence Prevention Curriculum, Grades 1-3," Harborview Injury Prevention and Research Center, Seattle, WA.
1987	**Research Assistant**, Social Science Institute, University of Washington; Fall quarter.
1986-1987	**Teaching Assistant**, Anthropology, University of Washington; Courses: Introductory Anthropology; Sociocultural Anthropology.
1986	**Research Assistant**, Anthropology, University of Washington; Spring Quarter.
1985	**Research Assistant**, Henry Art Gallery Textile Collection, University of Washington.

Fellowships, Awards, and Funded Research

1990-1992	**National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant**, Award No. 9014378: "Collective Action and Common Property in Andean Agro-pastoral Production," Doctoral research; Cusco, Peru.
1990-1991	**Organization of American States Training Grant**, Lima, Peru.
1990-1991	**Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship**, Jackson School of International Studies, field research, Cusco, Peru.
1990	**W.W. Stout Fellowship**, University of Washington, field study, Cusco, Peru.
1989	**Travel Grant (Peru)**, Graduate School, University of Washington.
1988	**National Resource Fellowship**, Latin American Studies Program, Quechua Institute, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
1986	**University Book Store Scholarship**, Seattle, WA.
1984	**Honors**, Core Course; Anthropology, University of Washington.

Additional Work Experience

1997-1999	**EFL Language Instructor**, International Language Services (Interlang), Beasain, Gipuzkoa, Spain.
1983-1986	**Museum Collections Manager and Exhibits Technician**, Henry Art Gallery Textile Collection, University of Washington.
1981-1982	**Workshop Leader** for Training of Boards of Directors and Managers of Cooperatives and Nonprofit Organizations, North American Students of Cooperation, Ann Arbor, MI.
1976-1981	**Co-manager and Communications Coordinator**, Common Health Warehouse Co-op Association, Duluth, MN.
1975-1976	**Regional Organizer**, Atlanta Workshop in Nonviolence, Southeast Regional Office of the War Resisters' League, Atlanta, GA.

Professional Service

1988	**Human Subjects Grant Review Committee**, Anthropology, University of Washington.

Research Affiliations

1990-1991	**Centro de Estudios Regionales "Bartolomé de las Casas"**, Cusco, Peru.

Regional Specialties

Andean Studies, Basque Studies, Rural Studies (United States)

Research Interests

Collective action, mutual aid, and reciprocal exchange
Indigenous technologies and knowledge systems
Sustainable agriculture and rural development
War, peace, and conflict resolution
Comparative ethical systems
Decision making processes
Class and ethnicity
Textiles

Foreign Languages

Spanish, Quechua