

Connection and Resistance:

Civilian experiences of violence in conflict zones and their impact on civilians' political preferences for violent and nonviolent resistance

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Abstract

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Under what conditions is state use of force successful at containing militancy, and when might it simultaneously, or instead, radicalize members of the civilian population? I present a new theory evaluating social isolation and social connection as mechanisms affecting civilians' political preferences in response to state-sponsored violence. State use of force policies such as checkpoints, curfews, and limits on communication devices are designed to control militancy and increase safety. However, I argue these policies can increase isolation, removing social support networks that enable civilians to cope with the stress, anger, frustration, fear and grief they experience living in a conflict zone. I argue such freedom of movement-restricting policies can fracture communities and lead to increased isolation, aggression and a greater likelihood of civilian preferences for militancy.

Using life-story style qualitative interviews conducted in the West Bank and Israel, I find strong evidence that the disintegration of social structure and social relationships predisposes civilians toward militancy as the appropriate means to address their political grievances. I also find strong evidence that social connection (defined in part by freedom of movement) is critical to civilians' resilience in conflict zones and provides the foundation for nonviolent political participation, including civil resistance. The implications of these findings point to possible

changes in policies adopted by (i) governments and counterinsurgents seeking to avoid civilian militancy and (ii) civil resistance activists and movement entrepreneurs committed to nonviolence. To extend these findings, I create a typology of different types of state violence and a means of quantifying them which, potentially, could be applied to conflicts cross-nationally. I conclude with a plausibility probe evaluating whether social connection is equally important in affecting civilian political preferences in response to *non*-state actor violence, specifically terrorism, and the implications of this research agenda.

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Chapter One: Introduction

When academics evaluate conflict, illucidate we predominantly count battle deaths. But sexual violence, abduction, torture, detention, forced displacement, freedom of movement restrictions, and a host of other violent acts accompany death on its march through modern conflict zones. The academic focus on lethal force is troubling because non-lethal forms of violence greatly exceed battle deaths in the scope of their devastation. Mounting evidence suggests civilians in conflict zones are most likely to suffer these myriad forms of violence. Thus it is civilians, rather than the military, who bear the brunt of the costs of war.

Most of today's wars are civil wars or insurgencies rather than state-to-state conflicts. Whether one views rebels (loosely defined) as freedom fighters or terrorists, the majority of today's conflicts involve a state's fight to suppress non-state actors. In so doing, states employ a wide range of tools to limit potential rebels' access to resources and to their political objectives. In addition to state-conducted airstrikes or ground engagement with rebel forces, non-lethal use of force policies, including checkpoints, curfews, surveillance, detention, and interrogation are often employed to "increase safety," catch militants in the act, and prevent future attacks. When a state designs policy to combat militancy, terrorism, or insurgency, it must at once tackle the existing threat but also seek to avoid radicalization¹ and future recruitment. This dissertation addresses this central question: under what conditions is state use of force successful at containing militancy, and when might it simultaneously, or instead, push members of the civilian population towards militancy?

¹ The term radicalization often supplants the term militancy, particularly in the media. In this dissertation, I use the term militancy – meaning support for violent action, whereas radicalism means favoring extreme changes, but does not connote support for violence.

Leveraging extensive psychological and mental health studies as well as sociological literature, I argue that social connection is critical to civilians' ability to cope with stress and also underlies broader civic engagement, such as political participation. Indeed, social isolation is one of the few factors we know with confidence pushes people toward aggression and, I contend, toward a preference for militancy. *Certain kinds* of state use of force such as checkpoints, physical barriers, extended searches, curfews, and restrictions on phone calls or internet use restrict civilians' ability to engage with their family and friends. Because these restrictive actions directly increase social isolation, I argue they can increase support for militancy more than other, seemingly more egregious acts of violence, such as indiscriminate violence. State use of force policies that destroy community structure may, I argue, press civilians toward militancy.

Understanding how experiences of state use of force affect civilians' political preferences can help explain why and when civilians support militancy as a solution for their political problems. This dissertation has implications not only for the usefulness of state policy designed to counter terrorism (such as curfews and checkpoints), but also for the types of policies that can best facilitate civilian protection and survival in conflict zones. Civilians' political preferences within civil war and asymmetric conflict are critical to understanding broader conflict processes, such as war duration, whether militant groups achieve their aims, and the likelihood of war recurrence. Scholars generally agree civilians' choices play an important role in the trajectory of internal armed conflict (Kilcullen 2009; Zedong 1961; Thompson 1966; Nagl et al. 2008). Civilians can provide information to armed actors (Kalyvas 2006), provide new members and logistical support to armed groups (Parkinson 2013), or initiate nonviolent resistance movements (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Civilians even occasionally take up arms and patrol their communities as civil defense forces, as occurred during the Sendero Luminoso campaign in Peru

(Zech 2016), or in the current criminal conflict in Mexico (Dorff 2015). Thus civilians are woven into the very fabric of today's conflicts, be they civil wars, insurgencies, criminal conflicts, or one-sided violence campaigns; these "wars" *rely* on civilians (Wood 2008). Not surprisingly, civilians have also become the primary victims, even when evaluating battle deaths alone, comprising an average 90% of combat fatalities for wars in the 1990s, compared with just 5% of fatalities for wars around 1900 and 65% of fatalities in World War II (Machel 2013).

Scholars have sought to understand the myriad ways civilians interact with conflicts, yet there are several key shortcomings in existing studies. First, scholars heavily emphasize civilians' choices to join militant or terrorist groups (Silke 2003; Crenshaw 1987), or armed actors' victimization of civilians designed to extract political concessions from the state or force the compliance of militants (Valentino 2014; Kalyvas 2006). Yet state policies of force designed to combat militancy greatly impact civilian society, and the broad political effects of those policies are comparatively under-studied.

While the robust literature on "repression" from comparative politics directly addresses state use of force, it does not evaluate state use of force in conflict settings. Instead, it focuses primarily on why and when states will repress (Hathaway 2002; Henderson 1991; Karatnycky 1999; Krain 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004) or the specific choices of leaders to enact coercive state policies (Moore 2000; Shellman 2007; Simon 1994; Walter 1969). Though some aspects of this puzzle have been examined extensively, types of force beyond direct coercive force, such as curfews or checkpoints, are comparatively less well studied (Davenport 2007, 9).

This is lacuna in conflict studies, because many of the policies used in the West's campaign to stamp out or contain militancy at home and abroad involve state use of force. Any

policy designed to combat militancy must not only address the existing militant threat, but also must not increase the likelihood of increasing civilian support for militancy for other members of society. For example, scholars as of yet have no clear understanding of the impacts of drone strikes on target populations, in part because we don't have clear information about the social and political ramifications of those strikes. This omission provides the first justification for this study.

Second, insights from existing literature provide contradictory explanations of and expectations for the effects of state use of force on civilian militancy – particularly civilians' belief that violence is the appropriate solution to their political problems. Literature from the study of social movements and civil conflict has varyingly found that violent state policies: increase militancy (Muller and Seligson 1987; Gurr 1980); decrease militancy (Opp and Gern 1993); have a curvilinear relationship to militancy (Weede 1987); and have an inverted curvilinear relationship to militancy (Muller 1985). While non-state actor violence or “dissent activity” almost always leads to increasing state use of force or repression, repression does *not* always lead to dissent. Indeed, examining the repression literature, Christian Davenport (2007) writes: “Sometimes the impact of repression on dissent is negative (Hibbs 1973); sometimes it is positive (Francisco 1996, Lichbach & Gurr 1981, Ziegenhagen 1986); sometimes it is represented by an inverted Ushape (Muller 1985); sometimes it is alternatively negative or positive (Gupta & Venieris 1981, Moore 1998, Rasler 1996); and sometimes it is nonexistent (Gurr & Moore 1997)” (8). In this way, the findings from the repression literature dovetail with those from civil conflict – we are not clear on the relationship between state use of force and civilian responses to it. There are theoretical accounts and empirical support to be found in a

number of highly regarded works, but, unless one qualifies them so heavily as to render them almost worthless, their conclusions cannot all simultaneously be true.

Third, the primary focus of violence research more broadly has been on the state's choice to use violence and on the "amount" of violence committed. Each of the above foundational studies, and many that follow, perceive repression or violence as a binary between "lethal" violence or no violence. This is a highly aggregated and limited sense of "violence" with, I argue, the serious analytical consequences noted above – and highly divergent conclusions. However, sexual violence, forced displacement, structural violence, quotidian harassment, and public health threats exacerbated by conflict all deeply affect civilians' lives as well as broader conflict processes (from conflict duration to the roles a state must fill to create stability afterwards). This study therefore investigates the evidence that different types of non-lethal violence, including "structural violence" (state policies which systematically disenfranchise certain groups through unequal resources or rights distribution (Galtung 1969)) and freedom of movement restrictions (e.g., checkpoints), *also* shape civilian preferences toward militancy, though perhaps differently than does lethal violence. In the following chapters, I focus on state policies designed to limit civilian mobilization (e.g., protests) and violent resistance (e.g., terror attacks): checkpoints, curfews, and limits on communication devices such as phones or internet. These policies may indeed reduce planned attacks, but I argue they have the concomitant effect of significantly limiting social connection. If social connection can be shown to inhibit civilian preferences for militancy, further analysis of these non-lethal policies, as well as of socio-psychological aspects of civil conflict (such as social isolation) is warranted.

I focus on civilian preferences rather than behavior as an outcome variable. Many existing studies on conflict and within-conflict behavior begin by saying "assuming a pre-

existing preference for revolution or terrorism,” and then proceed to make predictions for behavior based on those pre-existing preferences. Few, if any, try to understand those preferences. Indeed, many seminal works, from Kuran (1991) to Kalyvas (2006), argue that while preferences are important, we can’t know or predict them. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of what might shift *overall* preferences in favor of militancy across a population. If there are factors that might lower the threshold for militancy across a population, we need to understand what those are. This study approaches the effect of state use of force on civilian preferences in a manner similar to a public health study evaluating the likelihood of cancer in a given population. For example, a likelihood of contracting lung cancer exists in the population, but a given external factor (smoking) may increase lung cancer prevalence at a population level. Social science tends to shy away from these sorts of studies because the likelihood of a preference change for a specific individual cannot be predicted, and indeed this is true. Similarly, that same public health study would not be able to predict whether an individual smoker would contract lung cancer, rather it would predict the likely prevalence of lung cancer in the population. Consequently, if a factor reliably shifts the baseline support for militancy in a population, such a finding would provide much-needed insight – first, for governments genuinely working to combat militancy (rather than governments which encourage militancy to justify repression), and second, for political activists committed to nonviolence who are trying to police their movement and insure their members do not resort to violence.

In the following chapters, I turn attention to the value of social-psychological approaches to civil conflict and evaluate the impact of certain types of state use of force on community ties. I explicate the connection between individuals’ experiences of violence and their political preferences. I demonstrate that policies designed to combat militancy and increase security, such

as checkpoints and curfews, may be successful in containing some attacks, but may also have the resultant effect of predisposing other members of the population toward militancy. I provide strong qualitative evidence that communities where social structure and social relationships have been decimated are more likely to believe militant action is the appropriate means to address their political grievances. Further, I examine the role communities play in moderating personal political behavior, and I find evidence that strong social connections within communities facilitate the likelihood of an alternate shift in preference – toward *nonviolent* political participation (or civil resistance) to achieve political aims. I then turn to two next steps: first, creating a typology of different types of state violence and a means of quantifying them; and second, a plausibility probe evaluating whether social connection is equally important in how civilians respond to *non*-state actor violence.

Background: Civilian Experiences of Conflict

Some studies have problematized civilians’ experiences of violence in conflict (Wood 2008; Petersen 2011; Dorff 2015). This emerging literature delves into the issue of social community and violence, looking beyond the “militants” themselves and beyond the characterization of violence as none, selective, or indiscriminate. These scholars examine the broader social context of political violence, its varied effects on civilians, and the role civilians play in war processes and outcomes. Topics in this research agenda include variation in the violence armed groups commit and their efficacy (Hoover Green 2011; Balcells 2011), the relationship between victimization and civilians’ post-war identities (Balcells 2010), the way quotidian social ties (like marriages and kinship ties) underlie structures within formal militant

movements (Parkinson 2013), and how experiences of violence can affect civilians' likelihood of political participation (Blattman 2009; Punamäki, Qouta, and El Sarraj 1997; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Dorff 2015).

I aim to add to this discussion. I centralize civilian experiences of state use of force and explore their impact on civilian support for militancy, as well as on civilian support for civil resistance. I contend the type of state force used and the way it affects community structure may account, in part, for the divergent findings in previous studies. The theory I present below draws heavily from findings in psychology, public health, social architecture, and sociology, and has implications for studying social processes within conflict more in depth.

Some authors have begun to evaluate psychological and emotional aspects of conflict. Roger Petersen (2011) argues that conflict is a veritable factory of emotions. Elites can manipulate anger, fear, resentment, contempt, and hatred, all resulting from different parts of the conflict, to shape conflict outcomes. Libby Wood (2008, 541) focuses on how “repertoires of violence” shape social processes within conflict. Importantly, violence has different meanings depending on the cultural and social context of a given violent act (Ellis 1995; Ellis 1999). Both the choice to use varied types of violence and the way violence interacts with social context can dramatically affect ongoing social processes, forming new dynamics and enhancing existing cleavages (Wood 2008, 542). These findings provide additional justification for evaluating the socio-psychological aspects of civilian experiences and problematizing how they might affect war outcomes and within-conflict dynamics, including shifts in civilians' preferences for militancy.

While the US and other global powers are fairly effective at killing and constraining known extremists, any successful counterterrorism policy must also “attempt to stem the tide of

new extremists” (Borum 2011, 7). Evaluating individuals in the context of their communities may provide the key to doing just that. Recent empirical evidence provides grounding for this premise: understanding families that produce militants is crucial to understanding patterns in militants themselves (Fair 2007). Others have focused on the role of social networks in recruiting civilians into militant groups in the first place (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Crenshaw 1986; Crenshaw 2000; Horgan 2003; Horgan 2005; Sageman 2011). Max Abrahms (2008) also stresses the importance of social ties and acceptance in individuals’ choices to join and participate in militant networks. These scholars concurrently argue that many of those recruited through social networks are motivated by isolation and the need to find a new identity and strong community with which to align. These studies demonstrate the importance of social connection in militant movements. I take these findings one-step further to understand how social connection affects civilian preferences in conflict zones, and how the disruption or destruction of that social connection can lead to increased aggression and preferences for militancy.

A Social-Psychological Approach: Connection, Isolation, and Militancy

I argue that social connection can mediate the impact state use of force has on individuals, with dramatic results for how civilians form or adjust their preferences. I combine two points – (a) different *types* of violence exposure can have different effects on civilians, and (b) communities provide a key source of resilience to the trauma and stress of all types of violence. State use of force policies, such as checkpoints and curfews, are designed to control militancy and increase safety, but can increase isolation, thereby removing social support networks that enable civilians to cope with the stress, anger, fear and grief they experience. I

argue these movement-restricting policies increase civilians' likelihood of preferences for militancy. Furthermore, if social isolation is a factor in pushing civilians toward militancy, would the corollary prove true – could strong social connections within communities facilitate the likelihood of an alternate shift in preferences – toward *nonviolent* political participation (or civil resistance) to achieve political aims?

Because social connections help individuals process violent experiences, communities with strong ties should exhibit greater resilience to high levels of state use of force. In addition, surviving experiences of violence together (as a community) has been found to lead to increased social trust, both along pre-existing ties and in forming new ties. Because social trust and connection are good predictors of political participation, which I detail in the following chapters, I expect members of communities with strong ties, even in the face of violent state policies, to be more likely to participate in political activity, including *nonviolent* political activity or civil resistance. One important caveat: I believe these conditions to be necessary but not sufficient – as described in the following chapters, the successful translation of tight-knit community ties to vibrant, nonviolent civil resistance efforts required a movement entrepreneur. Nevertheless, this study also has important implications for burgeoning nonviolent activists who hope to keep their constituents from turning towards violent action and focused instead on civil resistance.

My intent is *not* to treat the choice to support militancy as a sort of pathology. Rather, my approach is grounded in psycho-sociological studies which find that social isolation causes people to become more aggressive (DeWall, Anderson, and Bushman 2011; DeWall, Finkel, and Denson 2011; Twenge et al. 2007), similar to how hunger makes people irritable. Individuals will still make choices within their own frame of reference and other factors will influence their preferences, but all else being equal, people who are socially isolated are more likely to support

aggressive and retaliatory practices. The need to find a new identity and a strong community with which to align may motivate such isolated individuals' aggressive attitudes (“preferences”). Other civilians with strong pre-existing social connections are not so motivated – they can rely on family and friends. While not the focus of this dissertation, when coupled with pre-existing theories (Kepel 2004; Khosrokhavar 2005; Crenshaw 1981) regarding how individuals are recruited into militant movements, it is possible that isolated civilians who develop favorable preferences for militancy (as a means to address their political problems) would be prime candidates for recruitment into militant organizations.

In contrast, state use of force that does not inhibit social connection can actually increase social ties due to shared experiences of violence and horror, producing counterintuitive results, including increased social trust and social cohesion (Bauer et al. 2016). Such trust and cohesion within a group foster increased personal efficacy and preferences in favor of compromise and nonviolence. Trust and social cohesion are important factors in predicting behaviors, including political participation. Still, cohesive and connected individuals may nevertheless want to “resist” the state. Preferences favoring nonviolence, when coupled with factors such as movement entrepreneurs or external support, could encourage civilians to engage politically, including joining civil resistance movements.

To understand the relationship between state use of force and civilian preferences toward militancy or nonviolence, this dissertation uses a mixed method approach in Israel and Palestine where state use of force is employed to quell ongoing and growing civil unrest. This dissertation moves to expand on the presented theory, to hypothesis development, empirical testing, and discussion. In chapter two, I expand on the theoretical framework outlined above. Chapter three evaluates Israel's use of force policies in the West Bank, demonstrates a robust relationship

between checkpoints and militancy, and provides in-depth qualitative evidence in support of social isolation as a key mechanism driving this relationship. Given this finding, I examine if the inverse is true: does social connection facilitate nonviolent political participation, such as civil resistance. I find evidence that strong, within-community ties coupled with a movement entrepreneur generate broad scale community support for civil resistance, even in the face of widespread state violence. This research is based on 66 interviews with Palestinian civilians (olive farmers – see research design in chapter two for full discussion) and Palestinian ministry officials conducted in Hebron District of the West Bank; as well as five interviews with former and current Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers conducted in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in the autumn of 2015.

Chapter four's primary contribution is constructing a broadly applicable typology of state use of force which can be quantitatively operationalized across conflicts. Chapter four performs a preliminary quantitative analysis of the effects different sorts of state use of force, including checkpoints, have on civilian militancy, using an original use of force dataset constructed from human rights reports, as well as Palestinian Authority and Israeli government data, coupled with surveys conducted quarterly by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. This quantitative analysis expands on and nests my qualitative findings in the larger context of the conflict and provides a preliminary means to evaluate this typology as an approach for future research, as well as problematizing the type of data required for such an approach, and pitfalls and promises.

Chapter five provides a plausibility probe in thinking about the ways social connection might be useful for studying conflict processes. Chapter five moves beyond state use of force and examines the value of community in explaining civilian political preferences in response to

non-state actor violence. For example, terrorism does not spatially regulate civilian behavior; rather, civilians self-regulate their movement (avoiding public buses or unnecessary travel) based on fear instead of forced confinement. However, if we observe similar dynamics in the relationship between social connection not defined by freedom of movement and experiences of violence, this provides further evidence supporting the theoretical premise that movement-restricting violence may be uniquely positioned to affect civilians' political preferences.

Chapter five investigates plausible theoretical links between non-spatial social connection and non-state actor use of force in evaluating two groups of Israeli disaster relief workers (ZAKA and MDA), both with similarly high levels of violence exposure. Chapter five evaluates both within and across community ties, and whether the relationship between community connection and violence exposure applies beyond state use of force and freedom of movement restrictions. Six "elite" interviews with members of the Head Office of both ZAKA and MDA, as well as primary source internal materials and data from within the two organizations formed the basis for this discussion.

Chapter six assesses the overall strengths and weaknesses of the analysis, and concludes by discussing generalizability and implications for future research.

Chapter Two: Violence, Connection, and Civilian Support for Militancy or Civil Resistance

Introduction

Few regions of the globe are so consistently plagued by political violence as Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. Hebron governorate is the economic hub of the West Bank and a focal point of tension and violence within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The IDF is deployed to protect Israeli citizens (Settlers) who have moved illegally (according to international law) into al-Khalil, the capital of Hebron governorate, and the surrounding area. In response to social unrest in Hebron governorate between Settlers and Palestinians over the past decade, the IDF has increased its presence in the region. Hebron governorate has two primary areas of extreme contention: H2 in al-Khalil and Firing Zone 918 in the South Hebron Hills, though violence permeates most areas of the governorate. Al-Khalil (also called the City of Hebron) is a divided city; the Palestinian Authority governs one zone (H1), and Israel governs the second (H2), but, importantly, H2 is governed under military law. In the South Hebron Hills lies Firing Zone 918. Though Palestinians still live there, this part of the West Bank is used as an active Israeli military training ground. While H2 and Firing Zone 918 experience dramatically different *types* of violence, news sources and aid organizations consider H2 and Firing Zone 918 to be two of the most turbulent and violence-prone areas in the West Bank, with daily life in constant flux. Despite similarly high levels of state use of force in both areas, civilians living in these two

locations have adopted starkly contrasting preferences about the best approach to resisting Israeli state authorities, though both are committed to resistance.

For Palestinians living in the divided city of al-Khalil, violence informs and contextualizes daily life. In the Western world, any single instance of this sort of violence would be the focal point of national news for days, even weeks. But in al-Khalil, though violence is still noted with horror and outrage, it is also circadian. Chronic violence is woven into every part of the social fabric. It is imbedded in the jokes children tell, how mothers buy groceries, the transport civilians' use (or avoid) to travel to work, and what kids do after school. In the midst of violence and uncertainty, life continues. But anger, frustration and fear have become the heartbeat of the place, a constant undercurrent.

In this context, Israeli forces exert control over their H2 territory, using checkpoints, blockades, crowd control measures, and home searches. These state efforts to subdue and control the population and threats to Israeli Settlers are fairly successful in selectively targeting those Palestinians involved in anti-government activity. According to existing literature (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas 2008; Kalyvas 2012; and applied to the West Bank: Bhavnani, Miodownik, and Choi 2011), selective violence against Palestinians, based on reasonable intelligence about which Palestinians might be involved in or supporting militant movements, should incentivize Palestinian collaboration with the IDF and decrease militancy, due to fear and the threat of violent repercussions if they don't "comply." These existing rationalist explanations (e.g., Kalyvas 2006) would expect Palestinians to comply, but instead, Palestinians living in H2 demonstrate some of the highest preferences in favor of militant action against the IDF and Israelis, even militant action with little or no chance of "success," such as recent knife attacks on armed soldiers.

In contrast is Firing Zone 918 to the south, a land so arid every drop of water is precious and a camel is a family's most valuable possession. Israeli-occupied since 1967 and used as a military training zone for the last twenty years, Firing Zone 918 covers most of the South Hebron Hills, an area of constant strife. The Palestinians living in these hills experience violence that is, by definition, "indiscriminate" (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas 2008; Kalyvas 2012; Bhavnani et al. 2011). Since the initiation of Firing Zone 918, Palestinians' lives have been disrupted with "thunder runs," military training operations, violent Settler activity, and even live fire exercises, all affecting their lives and livelihoods at random. Yet in spite of high violence exposure, Firing Zone 918 has engaged in large-scale, civil resistance for more than a decade.² These villagers are incredibly unified and consistently express preferences favoring civil resistance, rather than supporting militancy as existing literature would predict.

These two cases point to a large gap in our understanding of civilian preferences in favor of militancy: in some cases, state use of force designed to limit the reach of militant groups may, instead, lead to civilian support for militancy (here defined as civilian ideological support for use of extra-legal violence to achieve political aims). But that state force doesn't *always* lead to increased support for militancy. What explains this variation?

Despite the attention paid to militancy in policy circles, most scholars agree the theoretical grounding for understanding militancy is weak (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 797; Horgan

² Activists commonly use the term "civil resistance" rather than "nonviolence" because the idea of non-violence or "peace" connotes the idea of seeking peace at any cost, when instead members of these movements are seeking change and using non-violent tactics to achieve it. This is particularly pronounced in communities living in authoritarian contexts or occupation, when seeking "peace" could be considered a kind of normalization of brutal treatment. As well, the translation of "nonviolence" in Arabic (*la'anf*), has a "passive" connotation, while *muqaw'ama mudania* (civil-based resistance) or *muqaw'ama sha'bia* (popular resistance) has a more active connotation, meaning it resonates more fully with the goals of local communities and activists (see Julie Norman 2010, ebook without pages, for full discussion). As Norman points out, this dovetails with the conception of "unarmed insurrections" from Kurt Schock (2005). Additionally, civil resistance in the West Bank is not new. Indeed, civil resistance was a primary part of the response to the Second Intifada, but received comparatively little news coverage (Norman 2015).

2005, 30; Silke 2004, 187; Taylor and Horgan 2006, 589). Indeed, while much of the literature on militancy and terrorism evaluates the efficacy of decapitation strategies (Johnston 2012) or other measures against terrorists or militants (Hoffman 2007), authors generally neglect the impacts of anti-militant measures on civilians. Some existing literature (cited above – Kalyvas 2006 being the seminal work on this point) addresses civilian response to state policies designed to repress militancy – suggesting civilians (such as the Palestinians living in Firing Zone 918) should be more militant than other contingents of Palestinians, because they are exposed to such high levels of indiscriminate violence. Instead, the residents of Firing Zone 918 have constructed a cohesive and powerful civil resistance movement. Conversely, of all the areas across Hebron governorate, the militarily-governed H2 district in Hebron displays the highest (*and increasing*) support for militancy. H2 experiences extremely high levels of discriminate (targeted) violence, which, based on existing rationalist theories, should incentivize collaboration with the IDF/Israel and decrease support for militant resistance. Thus in these two cases, existing theories inaccurately predict civilian responses to state use of force.

This dissertation addresses the critical question: under what conditions does state use of force designed to constrain militant actors increase civilian support for militancy, even if it is successful at suppressing militant attacks? I evaluate how state use of force designed to combat militancy affects civilians' political preferences toward militancy or civil resistance and nonviolent political engagement. This dissertation advances the theory that state use of force which limits social connection (such as checkpoints and curfews), the very sort of force most likely to be used to decrease militancy and designed to increase safety, may in certain conditions increase civilians' support for militancy. Isolation has been repeatedly shown to increase aggression and push individuals toward more extreme behavior (Sandi and Haller 2015; Rosell

and Siever 2015; LaRocco, House, and French Jr. 1980; Cobb 1976; Dodge, Coie, and Brakke 1982; Lesser 1959; Wasik 1987). Checkpoints and other population control measures can limit or destroy individuals' ability to connect with one another in times of extreme stress and can impel people toward aggressive behavior and retaliation rather than "compliance." When state use of force isolates individuals and simultaneously provides ample fodder to distrust or hate the perpetrator, it may likely have the opposite effect from its designed goal to restrict militant activity. Instead, isolation can breed civilian preferences supporting violent retaliation (militancy) against the state.

Conversely, this theory expects that state use of force that does *not* destroy community ties (even though such force may be more violent than checkpoints and curfews) can actually, and counter-intuitively, increase civilians' connection to one another, leading to higher levels of social trust. Social connection plays a critical role in emotional stability, happiness, and the ability to cope with stress. Community structure and the make-up of social networks can build resilience and allow both individuals and communities to adapt to unexpected shocks to their environment (Tompkins and Adger 2004). A preponderance of evidence from public health and sociology studies (Cobb 1976; Janicki-Deverts and Cohen 2011, 76; Cohen and Wills 1985; Luthar 2006) demonstrates that social connection is essential to trust, collective action, and political participation. In post-conflict regions, others (Carneiro 1970; Flannery and Marcus 2003; Tilly 1985; Choi and Bowles 2007; Morris 2014) have found that violence can increase social connection, trust, willingness to work together, and altruism, and even increase political participation (Blattman 2009). I argue that these factors (social connection, trust, and altruism), which increase nonviolent political engagement, are also requisite for engagement in civil resistance movements. In circumstances like those found at Firing Zone 918, I argue violence

that doesn't destroy a community can instead unify it, and that unification may increase the likelihood of civic engagement, including civil resistance.

Certainly, checkpoints are not the only state policy that can shift preferences toward militancy, nor is state action the only reason civilians might adopt militant preferences. But civilians who reach out to violent groups may do so as much to alleviate their isolation and gain a new sense of community as to redress their grievances. In the context of the West Bank, these individuals might be prime targets for recruitment if there are viable organizations to join. However, Israel's success at stamping out large-scale militant movements in the West Bank has left little room for recruitment. Consequently, these isolated civilians may become predisposed to a militancy of desperation: individual acts of violence, such as the knife attacks and car ramming attacks that marked the last year, completely unaffiliated with larger militant organizations, without overt political aims and with little to no hope of "success." This is not to say that these individuals will now always be militant (militancy is not path dependent), or that these civilians are making a rational calculation to commit individual-level violence because they believe such attacks will change their political fortunes. Rather, I'm arguing that people who experience extreme social isolation become more receptive to militancy, and in the absence of community connection or a movement to channel their frustrations, some may consider desperate acts of violence out of a sense of having no alternative.

Theory: Violence, Connection and Political Preferences

When scholars examine civilian experiences of conflict, they have heretofore primarily modeled either individual behavior or community behavior, without evaluating the relationship

between the two. But the nature of a given violent experience and the context in which that event occurs fundamentally shape how those violent experiences affect a given individual and her political views. Examining broad patterns in the experience of violence and nesting those experiences within their broader social context allows greater understanding of: (i) which violent experiences are likely to shift individual preferences toward militancy, and which allow civilians to look toward nonviolent political engagement activities and civil resistance despite the violence they have experienced; and (ii) the relationship between individual and community-level political preferences.

I focus on the social context in which violence occurs in attempt to explain some of the contradictory findings in the repression, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency literature described above. Traditional approaches to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency largely overlook crucial elements of the human experience: the socio-psychological factors which determine civilians' preferences. I examine how state use of force affects social connection, which can bolster an individual's resilience to horrific experiences, or, conversely, lead to social isolation. The social context of violence is germane because individuals do not experience violence alone, but as a part of their larger communities. Communities help shape individual beliefs, preferences, and emotions, provide norms to govern behavior, and are integral to individuals' support systems during times of stress.

Violence, Conflict Zones, and Human Experiences

“What matters in life is not what happens to you but what you remember and how you remember it.”

- Gabriel Garcia Márquez

Violence affects civilians – this is hardly a novel idea, but it is underappreciated and understudied in conflict studies literature. The “logic of survival” frame, reminiscent of the “rational peasant” motif (Popkin 1979) of civil war literature, leaves little room for identity, culture, preferences, emotion, and, indeed, psychological and physiological determinants of civilian experiences inherent to conflict zones.³ State use of force and violent events affect individuals far more than inflicting costs or offering coercive incentives. Violent events are more salient (Norris 1992; Bonanno 2004), and are remembered more clearly and for a longer time than other sorts of events (Gardner 2008, 49). Extensive studies, from public health to psychology, show that individuals’ past violent experiences influence their current behavior, and that variation in the nature of that violence affects how past events affect current behavior (Sternberg et al. 1993; Hughes 1988).

This finding is reflected in a wide array of situations: studies of childhood experiences of violence, including physical and sexual abuse, demonstrate that scars of interpersonal violence continue to shape behavior for years to come, even manifesting physical symptoms.⁴ Studies on combat veterans abound with evidence PTSD and other trauma-related mental health injuries fundamentally alter brain chemistry, disposition, mood, and many aspects of socialization and human interaction (Horowitz 1997; Herman 1992). Studies even demonstrate simply witnessing violence, or seeing it on television, can affect how people think and behave (Rosenthal 1986). War zones, of course, produce these sorts of impacts. As a starting point, the effect of violence on soldiers is well documented (e.g., Tanielian et al. 2008). Because insurgency conflicts are

³ For example, Kalyvas has argued that we ought to “bracket [the] question of individual motives and preferences” (2006, 101) and study only structural determinants of individual behavior.

⁴ For example, “survivors of torture and organized violence commonly complain of symptoms, such as sleeplessness, nightmares, weakness, lethargy, headaches, abdominal pain, and neck and back pains, which do not seem to have a physical basis and may last for up to two years” (Burnett and Peel 2001).

fought without ‘front lines’ and within civilian centers, violence in conflict zones inescapably *also* has a broad impact on civilians (Johnson and Thompson 2008).

Studies from a collection of disciplines have demonstrated that different types of violence exposure lead to different types of psychological, emotional, and behavioral responses. For example, Schwartz and Proctor (2000) find children directly exposed to violence (victims) exhibit social dysfunction, while those who witness violence demonstrate increased aggression, and, critically, that “there are distinct patterns of [behavioral] risk associated with different forms of [violence] exposure” (670). In another study on adolescents with high levels of violence exposure, research showed the “severity and modality” of violence exposure, including how much one heard about, witnessed, or experienced personally, and what sort of violence it was, have been shown to dramatically impact “social-cognitive functioning,” including emotion (aggression, fear), trauma, and subsequent behavior (Shahinfar, Kupersmidt, and Matza 2001, 136). While these studies were not undertaken on adults in conflict zones, the depth and breadth of these findings justify an inquiry into whether variation in the type of violence also has different impacts or can be amplified in conflict conditions.

Recent empirical research indicates an evaluation of the impact of different types of state use of force on civilian support for militancy would be fruitful. Particularly relevant to this project, emerging research from Iraq, Afghanistan, the West Bank, and the Philippines has begun to reveal a relationship between one particular type of state violence – checkpoints – and militancy (Hendawi 2008; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Longo, Canetti, and Hite-Rubin 2014). Each of these studies finds checkpoints increase rather than decrease militancy, standing in direct contrast, for example, to the statements from counterterrorism offices: “checkpoints

prevented hundreds of terrorist attacks against the Israeli population,” Israeli Ministry of Justice 2009, (quoted in Longo, Canetti, and Hite-Rubin 2014, 1).

These scholars propose a variety of possible mechanisms driving the relationship between checkpoints and increased militancy. They argue that checkpoints hinder employment prospects, dampen economic activity, and humiliate members of the civilian population, thereby decreasing civilian trust in the government and their perception of the government as legitimate. While economic and humiliation mechanisms likely play some role in the Palestinian context, they don’t tell the whole story. First, Palestinian civilians are unlikely to have *any* trust in the “Israeli Occupation Forces,” as the IDF is called by Palestinians in the West Bank. Further, most Palestinians consider Israel to be an apartheid state⁵ which has different laws for citizens and residents based on race; indeed many believe Israel is intentionally perpetrating an ethnic cleansing against Palestinian civilians. Thus, while humiliation does occur, decreasing trust in the Israeli government doesn’t pass a “sniff test,” and therefore humiliation likely operates through a different mechanism. Unemployment, while clearly impacting civilians’ daily lives and perceived hope for the future, is also a constant feature of life in the West Bank, and not attributable to checkpoints alone.⁶

Below, I argue checkpoints increase militancy for several reasons; humiliation and underemployment are two of them. However, I draw out a new mechanism: the effect checkpoints have on community, and thus on individuals’ ability to cope with the stresses of life in a conflict zone. I argue checkpoints make in-person connection significantly more difficult, leading to a degradation of social connection. A common presumption about checkpoints and

⁵ For example, one respondent, in likening the Palestinian liberation struggle to the South African fight against Apartheid stated: “We are all Mandela” (Personal interview #63, Dura, November 2015).

⁶ Unemployment in the West Bank skyrocketed following the second Intifada and has fluctuated around the 25% mark for the last 15 years, sometimes dropping down to the low twenties, other times rising to 27%.

their use globally is that they are primarily dividers, designed to keep two groups apart. While some checkpoints serve this function alone, many checkpoints are deployed in areas that not only limit in-groups and out-groups from connecting, but also affect the daily lives of members of a given group. For example, in West Belfast, some walls and checkpoints still separate Catholic communities from Protestant communities, while others are within Catholic communities or outside of central districts, limiting travel and connection more broadly. Further, checkpoints significantly affect movement among less powerful groups within a society.

In the West Bank city of al-Khalil, checkpoints designed to secure travel and safety for Settlers living in the city center concomitantly limit Palestinians' access to significant portions of the city, including access to the main market and to the main religious site (Ibrahimi Mosque, or the Cave of Machpelah). Additionally, in Israel's attempt to contain increasing social unrest and acts of terrorism in the autumn of 2015, checkpoints and blockades were erected on *all* roads leading into the city. Therefore, envisioning checkpoints as a boundary line between two "sides" misunderstands much of their modern use and purpose – control, surveillance, and intimidation, rather than pure "separation."⁷ Checkpoints are thus a strong case study of how this state use of force could cripple social connection, though not the only example. Other non-lethal state use of force policies in the West Bank and elsewhere also affect social connection, including: curfews (limiting possible hours for social connection and requiring travel to be "work related"); home demolitions (forcing residents to move or leave, increasing social instability, creating more refugees); and surveillance (monitoring social media and online activity and limiting access to internet or "3G/LTE" service, resulting in less access to smart technology, computers, and online social connections). Further, surveillance balloons positioned over social areas such as markets

⁷ Personal interviews #67-71 with former and current IDF soldiers confirm this assessment of the use of checkpoints in the West Bank (Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, December 2015).

serve as a constant reminder of being “watched,” affecting civilians’ feelings of safety and security.⁸

Humans are social creatures nested within their communities; they do not respond to events in isolation. Instead, they influence and are influenced by community social norms and beliefs, and rely on others for connections critical to their own mental health (Cohen 1988; Cohen 2004; Janicki-Deverts and Cohen 2011). Psychological evidence shows those in isolation (from children to adults, from mentally ill and “deviants” to normal populations) are more aggressive and more prone to retaliation and violent action (for a full discussion, see the section herein entitled “*Isolation and Militancy*”). From these findings about the psychological effects of isolation, it is reasonable to infer isolated individuals in conflict zones may likewise become more aggressive. Thus, their personal tipping point for believing violent action is justified (and likely to be effective) is closer to the surface than is someone’s whose social connections remain strong. In a similar vein to political psychology approaches such as prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), which finds being in a domain of loss or gain can influence behavior, I argue isolation shifts the range of likely choices an individual might make toward militancy, while social connection shifts the range of likely choices in the opposite direction. Even if civilians never choose to act on militant or aggressive preferences (as is the case for the large majority), the increasing prevalence of militant preferences in a community has important impacts for policy.

Social Connection - Psychological Support in Conflict Zones

⁸ For example, see AP’s “Spy balloons give Jerusalem police an eye in the sky” (November 26, 2014).

Civilians' ability to cope with violence (or stress of any kind) affects their responses. Traditional and modern Western measures for managing stress that many Americans might embrace, from psychotherapy to anti-depressants to mindfulness classes to yoga, are ubiquitously *unavailable*, or at minimum, significantly more difficult to access in conflict zones. This means civilians living in conflict zones are more dependent on social connection as their primary means of "coping" with the stress and violence they experience.

Interpersonal relationships ("social support") are well-documented as a means to process and develop resiliency to stressful life events (Caplan 1974; Cassel 1976; Cobb 1976; Heller 1989; Kaplan, Cassel and Gore 1977; Cohen and McKay 1984). These studies hypothesize that social support structures act as a "buffer," partly shielding individuals from stressful events and providing them communal, loving spaces where healing can occur. Social networks are also a source of "tangible" support, such as assistance with child care or financial support. While not as well-studied by psychologists, social networks are also crucial factors in predicating resilience to stress and trauma (Cohen and McKay 1984) and the ability to bounce back to a healthy mental state and normal levels of happiness rather than suffering increased rates of depression or aggression.

Emotional support from social groups can come in a variety of forms. Some research suggests that a stressful event is viewed as less threatening when one is in the presence of others (LaRocco, House, and French Jr. 1980; Cohen and McKay 1984). Social networks can give individuals perspective as well as emotional comfort (Pearlin and Schooler 1978). Other types of social connection enabling resilience include less tangible effects: social connection increases self-esteem (Cobb 1976), which increases resilience and hopefulness, and the ability and willingness to find new ways to solve problems. Connection also increases feelings of belonging,

which has repeatedly been shown to decrease negative moods such as depression and aggression (Seligman 1975; Cohen and McKay 1984). In summary, social connection can influence how individuals experience and process state use of force and can also influence how civilians mediate their responses to violent events more generally.

Connection and State Use of Force: Explaining Popular Shifts toward Militancy in Conflict Zones

Certainly state use of force can lead to a number of different outcomes for different individuals. However, to make my central claim, I capitalize on research showing social connection is critical to mitigating the effects and stress of violent experiences. I argue that state use of force that impedes social connection is more likely to shift civilian preferences toward militancy than other kinds of state policies, even if those policies may be “more violent.” I also argue the moderating effect of social connection can dramatically affect civilian preference formation, as can its absence.

The conflict I examine in the following chapters is deeply embedded in concerns over control of space. Space, the struggle for each inch of land, is an integral aspect of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Parties on both sides move buildings inches or feet over dividing lines to slowly increase their control over territory, and use ‘sacred-ization’ of different sites to increase justification for control over those areas, including the justification of land seizures (Pullan et al. 2013).

Checkpoint and Curfews: The Role of Physical Space in Social Connection

What state policies, then, are likely to trigger these mechanisms of social isolation and/or cohesion? What policies have disruptive or destructive effects on community ties, and are therefore theoretically most likely to lead to preferences in favor of militancy in the civilian population? Existing theoretical research on the importance of social connection leads me to argue that restrictions on freedom of movement powerfully and negatively impact social structures. Social connection is often strongest when based on face-to-face interaction in physical space. State policies in conflict zones, such as checkpoints and curfews, limit freedom of movement and thereby weaken community ties significantly more than other restrictive and “more violent” state policies.

Despite the rise of social media and alternative means of connection, face-to-face interactions still create the backbone of human-to-human connection. Studies show that social touch, even in the Internet age, is still critical to forming and maintaining human connection, with no significant variation in importance based on culture (Suvilehto et al. 2015). Physical space, including urban geography and topography, can greatly influence individuals’ opportunities for connection (Lefebvre 1991) and physical touch. Physical space (e.g., parks, gathering places) gives meaning to and helps define social relationships and, indeed, shapes social life (Massey 2007). It is easy to see in our own lives that space facilitates comfort, ease, and connection while limitations on space prevents it: for example, lots of windows, trees, or open space can be calming whereas cramped spaces or chaotic living conditions can create stress solely resulting from one’s physical environment. Benedict Anderson, in his seminal work *Imagined Communities* (2006), discusses shared space as foundational for connection, identity, culture, and even to a certain extent, religion.

Human geographers have long recognized the connection between physical space and social connection. Cities today are often designed to facilitate community building (with mixed results) under a genre of city building known as new urbanism (Sarason 1974). This theory is founded on “environmental sociology” and the importance of space to social interaction (drawing on Talcott Parsons, see Krasner 1980 and Gutman 1972). While controversy may exist about which city design induces the most social interaction and connection, restrictions on freedom of movement play an undisputed role in limiting social connections. Social networks are often fairly geographically concentrated, but friends may live in different neighborhoods and families may live in neighboring villages. Freedom of movement is equated with social mobility and social freedom (Roos 2015). Recognized as a fundamental human right⁹ and essential to equality, social justice, and non-discrimination, freedom of movement is crucial to social function and the ability to experience physical, in-person connection. Confinement is one of our primary forms of punishment in civilized societies for a reason: separation from social connection and limits on the ability to make one’s own choices dramatically diminish one’s quality of life (Pallitro and Heyman 2002).

Checkpoints rarely have the simple function of cordoning off one area from another, especially when population centers are intermixed (as in Hebron and Jerusalem). Instead, checkpoints occur on major roadways, within city centers or markets, around malls or movie theaters, around religious sites, and around and within certain neighborhoods. Checkpoints tend to have three primary functions: first, to separate two populations. Second, to control, to remind the population of the presence of armed forces, believing that “reminding civilians” of their presence will increase civilian compliance. Third, ad hoc checkpoints are often erected to

⁹ All major human rights treaties protect freedom of movement as a key fundamental right: the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Article 12, The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.

increase social control (and often justified by claiming they are in response to social unrest – which they may or may not actually be). While these different checkpoints may have slightly different effects due to their placement within population centers, any checkpoint limits the ability to congregate, to quickly access services (even hospitals), and to move items (potentially weapons, but all other goods as well) from place to place. Restrictions on vehicle travel for some groups of people are often implemented in conjunction with checkpoints, and certain groups can be prohibited from driving on designated roads. Curfews also significantly impair social life by limiting the hours during which people can connect socially, intentionally limiting travel hours to within the workday.

To refute the importance of social connection, one might postulate that checkpoints and other freedom of movement restrictions solidify community ties within the confined areas and force people to develop new relationships (replacing long-term ties). As noted above, shared harms can increase trust and social cohesion. Two points address this: first, some checkpoints which cordon off whole regions or communities may indeed strengthen close-by social connection, forcing groups to rely on one another even more than they have in the past. It is checkpoints which fracture access to one's own community that I expect to have the most significant impact, though even communities cordoned-off as a group are likely to feel isolated from friends and loved ones further afield. Second, friendships and social networks are built over lifetimes, and a primary effect of checkpoints is disrupting existing patterns of connection and friendship. Indeed, length of time is one of the most important factors in relationship strength (Louch 2000). In addition, feelings of loss of lifelong connections are persistent, as exemplified by the higher death rate for widowed persons (Parkes, Benjamin and Fitzgerald 1969).¹⁰

¹⁰ Though remarrying – establishing a new social connection – mitigates this risk (Mineau, Smith, and Bean 2002).

While absolute prohibitions on travel are among the most egregious restrictions on freedom of movement, limits or added difficulties of movement also have significant effects. Increasing difficulty in getting from point A to point B, even for a social engagement in which one would genuinely like to participate, influences the likelihood of doing so. Checkpoints and curfews restrict when and how long it takes to get from place to place and thus have direct implications for social life. By making it more difficult to maintain relationships and have important in-person connections with friends and family members, state policies restricting movement tend to degrade social connection. This pushes civilian populations toward the “isolation” pathway outlined below, in which individuals tend to be more aggressive and hostile toward those who have done them harm, and possibly susceptible to outright recruitment by militant groups.

Isolation and Militancy

Social exclusion and isolation have been shown to radicalize and increase aggressive and violent behavior in a wide array of situations. The breadth of these findings lends credence to applying them to the context of violent conflict. Aside from our fundamental need for belonging (Baumeister and Leary 1995), restricting social circles, especially involuntarily, harms individuals’ ability to function and self-regulate and even has implications for survival (Berkman et al. 2000; Holt-Lunstad, Smith, and Layton 2010; Seeman 2000). Studies on adults in the US have found that social connection decreases mortality (Berkman and Syme 1979) as well as other key medical risk factors for morbidity such as high blood pressure (House et al. 1988). “The human brain does not simply respond to stimuli ... in an invariant fashion, but rather it

categorizes, abstracts, interprets, and evaluates incoming stimuli in light of current states ...” (Cacioppo et al. 2015, 734). In other words, individuals process events based on their current context and frame of mind – the context, including social context, in which events occur matters greatly in determining individuals’ likely responses.

Isolation can affect internal behaviors, emotions, and cognition, altering everything from a person’s sense of meaning in life to self-esteem to mood (Leary et al. 1995; Leary et al. 1998; Williams, Cheung, and Choi 2000; Williams and Galliher 2006). In 2003, Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams found social isolation can be physically painful, “registering in the same neural regions as does physical injury,” (quoted in Gaertner and Iuzzini 2005, 307). Indeed, “research indicates that perceived social isolation (i.e., loneliness) is a risk factor for, and may contribute to, poorer overall cognitive performance, faster cognitive decline, poorer executive functioning, more negativity and depressive cognition, [and] heightened sensitivity to social threats,” (Cacioppo and Hawkley 2009, 447).

Exclusion, rejection or social isolation has been consistently associated with *more aggressive* behavior, in studies from mice to children to adults (DeWall, Anderson and Bushman 2011; DeWall, Finkel and Denson 2011; Twenge et al. 2007; Dodge, Coie, and Brakke 1982; Lesser 1959; Wasik 1987; for a review see Coie, Dodge, and Kupersmidt 1990). This finding holds in meta-analyses of US children (Newcomb, Bukowski, and Pattee 1993), including particularly careful analyses and experiments establishing causation by ensuring isolation occurred before a child’s aggressive behavior manifested (Twenge et al. 2001; Twenge, Campbell, and Foster 2003). These findings of aggression are also present in a wide range of other situations on diverse study cohorts: a primary factor in domestic abuse (Stets 1991), school shootings (Harpold and Band 1998), and adult socialization (DeWall, Anderson and Bushman

2011; DeWall, Finkel and Denson 2011; Twenge et al. 2007). The prevalence of social isolation in explaining aggressive and violent behavior more broadly warrants deeper study of the role social isolation plays in conflict situations.

Social isolation is also frequently described as a motivator for terrorism. Sociologists Kepel (2004) and Khosrokhavar (2005) contend militancy in Europe results *not* from broad-based social ills (“grievances,” arguably), but rather from an attempt to reconstruct a lost identity in the wake of extreme feelings of isolation. Martha Crenshaw (1981) describes two effects of isolation: pushing people toward terrorism and allowing terrorist movements to coalesce. This, she argues, is because people within the terrorist movement use one another to overcome their extreme lack of connection within their communities and to face the “hostile environment” in which they find themselves. This finding is particularly relevant when evaluating not just civilian behavior, but also civilian preferences. Civilians may become more sympathetic toward militant movements in order to channel increasing aggression resulting from their isolation and anger/rage at their mistreatment (real or imagined), even if they were not originally interested in joining those movements.

Other studies uncover similar mechanisms. “Socially isolated, disenchanting young men [or women] turn to extremism in their search for identity, acceptance, and purpose” (Bizina and Gray 2014, 72). These studies view radicalization largely as a social process deeply related to community: after feelings of extreme isolation, individuals harbor more aggressive feelings and tendencies. They then seek out more extreme networks to alleviate both their isolation and subsequent aggressive feelings and to regain a lost identity or sense of purpose. Scholars argue that terrorist groups frame events for their members (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004; Sageman 2004), thereby dictating the power and meaning of those events

(Crenshaw 1992; Della Porta 1992). Actual recruitment into radical movements, which is not the focus of this project, likely requires a set of actors or even social entrepreneurs able to manipulate events within conflicts (or globally) into coherent messages. Still, social isolation itself is plausibly a critical pre-condition that can lead to preferences that are more aggressive and receptive to the use of force (militancy) as a means to address political grievances.

These studies on recruitment into militant movements find that militant groups provide an identity-based group response appealing to those hurt and *isolated* as a result of wrongs. Isolation in conjunction with experienced harms is considered a primary prerequisite for a shift toward militancy (Bhui et al. 2012; Bhui, Dinos, and Jones 2012; Bhui, Everitt, and Jones 2014; Allard et al. 2015; Beardsley and Beech 2013). Consequently, understanding how state policies affect individuals' social isolation can help us understand popular shifts toward militancy. In repressive countries, Timur Kuran (1991) argues that individuals have a public preference for either the current regime or revolution, even though this may not accurately reflect the individual's private preference. Individuals engage in preference falsification based on the payoffs for staying with the current regime versus the potential punishment for joining an unsuccessful revolutionary cause. Revolutions are unpredictable because it is impossible to know the private preferences of a nation. A "revolutionary bandwagon" can occur when small changes in individuals' thresholds generate explosive growth in public opposition to the state. The costs of displaying one's support for revolution decrease as more people join, so these movements can escalate very quickly. However, Kuran makes no mention of which factors might influence individuals' private preferences, and states that *we cannot know or predict them*. He therefore finds predicting revolution or preference shifts impossible. However, I believe we can predict social isolation, which I argue renders shifts toward militant preferences among the civilian

population more likely, as noted above, the way smoking might shift the prevalence of lung cancer.

Empirical studies provide support for these theoretical claims. In a study looking at four European countries, the Change Institute finds that the feeling of being targeted, isolated, or treated as hostile is critical to support militancy (2008). Thus, the Change Institute advised European states to avoid counterterrorism policies that added, in any way, to a broader sense of discrimination, since militants are able to effectively exploit discrimination (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 804; Change Institute 2008, 97, 120).

Connection, Civil Resistance and Non-violent Political Action

Stable and pre-existing social ties, on the other hand, are linked to non-militant outcomes, to a belief that change is possible, and to greater willingness to engage in political solutions to address grievances. Social ties can “promote resilience, or positive adaptation in the face of adversity” (Janicki-Deverts and Cohen 2011, 76), and can provide social support, helping individuals cope with trauma (Janicki-Deverts and Cohen 2011, 75; Cohen and Wills 1985; Luthar 2006). Individuals with strong social ties are more compassionate and forgiving (Goetz 2010). The level of an individual’s social integration (rather than isolation) determines how much support an individual can garner from her surrounding community (Janicki-Deverts and Cohen 2011, 77). Social ties have dramatic impacts on individuals: they can increase self-esteem, mental health, and resilience (Cohen and Wills 1985; Luthar 2006), as well as resistance to disease (Janicki-Deverts and Cohen 2011), and even individual-level adaptability to climate change (Jordan 2014). Such integration increases social trust, both among pre-existing ties and in

forming new ties, strengthening social connection more generally, particularly as a result of the collective harms people have experienced.

Furthermore, the factors listed above are good predictors of political participation (Anderson 2010; Verba and Nie 1987; Miller et al. 1981). Therefore, even in the face of violent state policy, I expect members of communities who retain strong community ties in spite of conflict to be more likely to participate in nonviolent political activity, and even engage in civil resistance. Thus, I argue that state use of force that does *not* directly destroy social connection, e.g., indiscriminate violence against civilians, can promote solidarity as a result of shared violent experiences. An enduring example is British solidarity in the face of relentless German bombing during the Battle of Britain. Connection also affects preferences critical to nonviolent political participation. Mary R. Anderson (2010) finds connection to be fundamental to political participation factors such as trust and personal efficacy: “community exerts positive and significant effects on internal and external efficacy and personal and political trust, independent of individual traits such as income, age, gender and education,” (59). Accordingly, communities with strong social ties may be more likely to engage politically because they have the psychological profile to believe the political process has value and the emotional energy to become involved politically.

Social ties have the greatest effect when they are felt and experienced in person. Research comparing the value of online interaction to in-person interaction finds in-person social connection is significantly more valuable and leads to deeper and more meaningful social ties (Cummings, Butler, and Kraut 2002). Thus, in-person connection, the kind prevented by checkpoints and curfews, cannot be entirely replaced by virtual interaction, particularly since cell phone and internet usage is often limited when checkpoints and curfews are in effect.

Importantly, difficult experiences can actually increase social cohesion, if social connections remain intact. Groups suffering a trauma or working in pursuit of a larger goal often unify as a result of those experiences. These findings actualize in conflict. In a meta-analysis of twenty surveys across forty countries, Bauer et al. (2016b) find that communities able to survive violence tend to exhibit higher levels of trust and local social cohesion, community participation, and pro-social behavior toward one another. Many scholars have noted that war occasionally fosters cooperation and strengthens pre-existing communities (Carneiro 1970, Flannery and Marcus 2003, Tilly 1985, Choi and Bowles 2007, Morris 2014). Bellows and Miguel (2009) examined a nationally representative survey dataset drawn from 10,000 Sierra Leone households within five years of the conflict's end. In this study, members of households who directly experienced violence (e.g., having lost a family member) demonstrated higher levels of "civic and political engagement compared to non-victims – they were more likely to report attending community meetings, to vote in elections, to join social and political groups, and to participate in school committees and 'road brushing,' a local infrastructure maintenance activity" (Bellows and Miguel 2009, quoted in Bauer et al., 2016b). Similarly, Bauer et al. (2014) find that altruism can increase post-conflict; war victims are less selfish when compared to non-victims. These findings predominate within groups rather than across groups.

These studies do not delve deeply into which types of violence produce these results, or other factors that might mitigate these outcomes. I hypothesize this increased interest in political participation, and the greater openness to altruism and to community engagement found in these studies, may create a predisposition toward support for civil resistance movements in addition to the increase in civic engagement other authors have found, if a civil resistance movement was already active in the area, or with the addition of movement entrepreneurs. In short, violence that

does not destroy social ties can actually increase cohesion with numerous plausible (though untested) outcomes, particularly increased political participation and/or civil resistance efforts. Thus, even if state use of force (perceived as unjust) creates pressure toward militancy, I expect individuals with strong social ties to demonstrate more acceptance of political engagement and less tendency toward militancy, because they are predisposed, unlike their highly isolated counterparts, to respond in less aggressive ways. I am not treating the choice to support violence as a sort of pathology. Rather, I argue that individuals who are socially isolated will be more likely to support aggressive and retaliatory policies, perhaps seeking out strong new communities sharing their more aggressive views, than will those with strong, pre-existing social connections.

Community Strength

Because I argue that social connection aids in individuals' ability to deal with violence and stress, a reasonable extension is to evaluate (irrespective of state use of force) whether communities with strong social ties are more prone to political participation and whether fractured communities are more prone to militancy. A large body of literature suggests social cohesion¹¹ can affect community-level preferences and outcomes. Sampson et al. (1997) find that a sense of community or collective efficacy, or social cohesion (which they define as willingness to work toward a common community goal) can reduce within-community crime. Anderson (2010) presents compelling evidence that a "sense of community" improves political engagement

¹¹ Social connection is an individual-level part of the larger phenomenon of "social cohesion" which is a group-level construct. This relationship between the individual and group levels is part of what makes social cohesion and connection hard to operationalize and define (Friedkin 2004). But social cohesion and connection are important concepts in thinking about relational behavior because their truly is interplay between individual level social connections and a group level cohesiveness, which can indeed be more than the sum of its respective parts.

and social trust. As such, communities with strong within-community ties should have higher levels of social trust and a stronger sense of unity, making them more likely to engage in political participation.

We know social and network structures can influence individual and community outcomes alike. Mark Granovetter (1973) observes even weak ties to other groups can provide an invaluable source of additional community strength, allowing individuals to integrate into broader communities, to find jobs and enhance their lives, and/or move beyond their current means. Strong ties, in contrast, can sometimes prove fractious *between* communities as people divide along lines of local cohesion. However, strong ties *within* communities can increase collaboration and trust. Civil resistance is generally (and inaccurately) perceived as being less effective (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), because it tends to have lower levels of immediate gratification, and because it requires strict adherence to shared ideals of nonviolence across a group, it seems plausible that a group with strong internal cohesion at the time that group receives violence might facilitate civil resistance than a fragmented group. Of course, this is not a foregone conclusion: these movements usually require a movement entrepreneur to get things started.

Community strength can be measured along four axes: Natural Capital; Produced Economic Capital; Human Capital; and Social and Institutional Capital (Western et al. 2005). The fourth is of greatest interest here. It involves “formal norms, informal norms, formal structures and informal structures ... that embrace the concepts of trust, reciprocity, bonds, bridges, links and networks in the interaction of individuals with their community” (Western et al. 2005, 1095). Thus, I argue strong within-group ties and a strong “sense of community” will facilitate political participation and potentially participation in civil resistance efforts whereas

groups with fractured social connections and weak social ties are more likely to be predisposed toward militancy.

Thus, taken together:

Hypothesis 1: State use of force restricting within-community movement of a certain group will increase civilian support for militancy against the state within that group.

Hypothesis 2: Communities experiencing state use of force with few or no state policies restricting freedom of movement will be more likely predisposed toward nonviolent political engagement, including civil resistance activities, than those communities experiencing freedom of movement restrictions.

Note: while this study will examine individual preferences, it will do so at least in part in aggregate – similar to a public health study that would evaluate the likelihood of cancer in a given population based on their smoking history. However, that same study would not be able to predict whether a single individual smoker would get cancer, rather what the likely prevalence of cancer within the population will be.

Existing Explanations

To evaluate the validity of the hypotheses detailed above, I examine two dominant strands of literature related to civilian responses to violence. The first is civil war approaches to

civilian preferences in conflict. I draw out two competing explanations from “COIN”¹² and from theories of control of territory and civilian victimization. I discuss the relationship of each to the present study.

Within the civil war literature, the question of when and why civilians support or join insurgencies has received a great deal of inquiry. These approaches often conflate preferences and behavior, assume preferences track with behavior, or assume preferences can't be known. My theory contests these assumptions and extrapolates backwards to examine pre-conditions critical to shifts in civilian preferences. The most prominent among these existing approaches are rationalist models explaining civilian support for actors in armed conflict. These explanations assume civilians will side with whoever can best protect, threaten, or incentivize them. Yet they disagree about which cocktail of protections, punishments, and incentives will be most effective: exercising control over territory (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Leites and Wolf 1970), or civilian protection and service provisioning (Akerlof and Yellen 1994; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Crost, Felter and Johnston 2014). These approaches both address the likely outcome when states (or insurgents) limit civilian casualties (Galula 2006; Kilcullen 2010), and when they engage in civilian victimization (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011; Stoll 1993). Indeed, a great deal of policy is premised on the idea that a state or armed actor, using the right tool, can manipulate people into supporting their side. I address both of these approaches – territorial control and service provisioning – in turn.

Territorial Control and Ability to Commit Selective Violence

¹² COIN is the short hand term for the “hearts and minds” approach to counter-insurgency, perhaps best outlined in U.S. Army FM-23 (Nagl et al. 2008).

Stathis Kalyvas (2006; 2008; 2012) evaluates the coercive pressures states and insurgents exercise, focusing on the importance of civilian “denunciations” and their impact on war outcomes; civilians are a resource for insurgents and states alike.¹³ Those with whom civilians share information have the upper hand because battle tactics in these conflicts depend on such information, and because insurgents hide among civilians. Kalyvas contends that civilians will switch sides to stay alive upon the threat of violent repercussions. Violence is used to “shape collaboration” of civilians in areas not specifically under control of a given actor, in an effort to extract extra “denunciations,” and therefore have better information for upcoming battles.¹⁴ Thus, control of a given area and violent repression should be effective in garnering civilian support and decreasing insurgent presence because control helps combatant groups perpetrate selective violence effectively.

In some cases, civilian victimization can convince civilians to comply with the armed group pursuing them (Birtle 2008). Kalyvas (2006; 2008; 2012) disaggregates violence into two categories (selective and indiscriminate) and contends that indiscriminate violence should lead people to feel unsafe with no incentive for compliance, making it more logical to arm and defend themselves. When states or armed groups do not have the intelligence to target individuals accurately, they sometimes commit violence against entire populations. According to this model, civilians faced with indiscriminate violence should support the opposition group because the group committing indiscriminate violence is not able to tell which side civilians take, making it more or less pointless to be on their side. Conversely, selective violence is likely to induce

¹³ Kalyvas uses the terms “defections” (2008), “denunciations” and “compliance” (2006) to describe civilian behavior.

¹⁴ It is worth noting that Kalyvas (2006) focuses on conventional civil conflicts (US Civil War, Greek Civil War, and Spanish Civil War). My study focuses on the Palestinian/Israeli conflict in the West Bank. These types of conflicts are more commonly labeled “insurgencies” or “guerrilla wars,” and exhibit different dynamics. Because insurgencies are fought among the people, regions of territorial control are less well-defined, though still relevant (for example, in modern Syria, ISIL absolutely controls territory and engages in “battles” against the government).

compliance or denunciations (passing information to those threatening violence) because individuals know, due to the credibility of those threats, that they will be punished for passing information to the opposition, as states or armed groups have intelligence to target and kill specific civilians. In this instance, civilians should comply with the group able to commit selective violence in order to avoid execution.

However, recent studies have questioned these findings, providing contradictory evidence as to whether indiscriminate violence against civilians in insurgency can decrease insurgent activity and increase civilian compliance (Lyll 2009; Downes 2007; Downes 2008). Alexander B. Downes (2008) finds that the size of the territory and of the population affects whether indiscriminate violence can subdue a population. Downes (2008) and Condra and Shapiro (2012), among others, also point to the importance of considering “civilian agency” in shaping conflict processes. Many authors (including Kalyvas (2014) see these “alternative” findings not as challenging or overthrowing their primary findings and mechanisms, but rather improving the specificity of scope conditions (Bhavnani, Miodownik, and Choi 2011). Most importantly, while some challenge the utility of indiscriminate violence in extracting compliance from civilians, few, if any, appear to take issue with the presumption that the capacity to reliably commit selective violence against one’s enemies should decrease civilian militancy.

Thus, according to this explanation, territorial control and the ability to extract costs (selective violence) will be most important for determining civilian support (here, both preferences and behavior) for the opposition. Selective violence against those who are actively engaged in militant activities should generally lead to less militant preferences and more compliant (behaviorally) populations. Indiscriminate violence should lead to more pro-militant preferences among civilians because the state cannot control their safety; thus, seeking

alternatives becomes their best course of action. Thus, if measures to increase control over the population (such as checkpoints and curfews and other means of state use of force) instead increase militancy, we would have evidence that alternative mechanisms are in play. These rationalist explanations ignore non-lethal violence, but territorial control and ability to commit selective violence are easy to track. Therefore, if civilian support maps onto patterns of non-lethal violence like checkpoints and opposes territorial control/selective violence, we would have strong evidence in favor of my theory.

COIN

“It's "insurgent math" ... for every innocent person you kill, you create ten new enemies”

- Michael Hastings

COIN (civilian-centric counterinsurgency) argues that in dealing with an insurgency, anti-insurgent repression and violence against civilians can have deleterious effects on war outcomes, whereas aid or pro-social policy can incentivize compliance (Nagl et al. 2008). COIN scholars argue that states that protect civilians, provide services, or engage in other pro-social behaviors can convince civilians in conflict zones that the state is the party most able to redress their grievances, thereby winning the “hearts and minds” of the population (Akerlof and Yellen 1994; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Crost, Felter and Johnston 2014, Gurr 1970). COIN’s suggested mechanisms for “winning the hearts and minds” involve enhanced civilian protection (from insurgents), economic and development programs, and improvement of local governance institutions. As such, COIN pays far more direct attention to civilian preferences than do other

explanations, and directly ties those preferences (“hearts”) to civilians’ likely behavior. Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) argue a “development” based approach – service provisioning for civilians – can make the government more palatable, increase trust in the state, and increase the likelihood of civilians providing valuable tips to the government regarding insurgent locations or arms caches.

This is not an unqualified finding; government policy has to be effective and reliable. For example, Crost, Felter and Johnston (2014) contend some aid programs can exacerbate the conflict because rebels have a strong incentive to derail aid programs, which decreases government credibility and civilian trust in the state. For aid programs to effectively enhance government control, these scholars argue that governments must be able to credibly commit to any agreements reached with civilians before the start of the project and also to ensure aid project completion in the face of rebel actions.

Thus, according to modern COIN theories, service provisioning and “protection,” when credible, should be more effective than coercive mechanisms or threats. Indeed, violence should *decrease* support (preferences) for the armed actor using it, while aid provisioning and protection should *increase* support for those using it effectively. So long as there is a legitimate chance of violence occurring, violence should *decrease* civilian support for the actor perpetrating it, particularly if that actor is the state. If instead we find that violence can occur in large quantities *without* increasing civilian militancy (though it may increase civilian *resistance*, potentially nonviolent resistance), and that maps onto areas in which the right to freedom of movement has remained intact, we would find strong evidence in support of my theory.

Research Design:

To understand the link between an individual's experience with violence and her preferences toward militancy, this research engaged in a multi-site, multi-method approach involving a unique dataset of different types of state use of force and existing opinion data in the West Bank (2006-2011), a micro-level study of olive-farming communities in Hebron governorate in the West Bank, and an in-depth study of disaster relief workers from two organizations in Israel. The first empirical chapter opens with the micro-level study of olive farmers. Micro-level studies of conflict can provide insight into processes not observable at the country-year level (Kalyvas 2012). This approach provides a unique window into civilian experiences of conflict, the role of community in moderating civilian responses to violent experiences, and how those experiences shape civilians' political views regarding militancy and nonviolent political engagement. The complex and varied exposure to state use of force and the wide array of community responses (both violent and nonviolent) in the West Bank allow me to trace how individuals' experiences with violence, mediated by community connection, impact their political preferences.

In the first empirical chapter, I look closely at olive farming in the two communities experiencing the most violence in Hebron governorate in the West Bank (H2 and the South Hebron Hills) in the autumn of 2015. Olive farmers in the West Bank face both high and varied rates of physical and structural violence as they and their families bring in their crops. They are subject to varying levels of physical harassment and brutality as a result of where they live, as well as threats to their livelihood, including the destruction of more than 800,000 olive trees since 1967. Thus, focusing on olive farming in Palestine provides a natural "lab" to examine how people's experiences of conflict interact with their communal experience and support structures.

This research is based on 71 interviews of olive farmers, Palestinian ministry officials, and Israeli Defense Force soldiers conducted in the West Bank during the “intifada of individuals” in the autumn of 2015. I find strong evidence that social connection provides a foundation for civil resistance, and that the disintegration of social life predisposes individuals toward militancy.

The second empirical chapter of this dissertation develops a typology of state use of force that could be applied to different conflicts, and postulates mechanisms by which these different types of force might produce different civilian responses to it. It also provides a quantitative operationalization of Israeli use of force policies and their relationship with civilian preferences in the West Bank. I use data on state use of force and violent incidents from UN archival documents in combination with existing survey data in a first differenced (change on change) OLS regression analysis.

Finally, I use in-person in-depth interviews conducted in Jerusalem in 2015 and 2016 of two disaster relief organizations in Jerusalem along with internal data not previously used for research which the organizations collected themselves as part of a plausibility probe to examine whether community connection (and the strength of that connection) moderates these workers’ exposure to violence in ways that make them more sympathetic to either violent or nonviolent policies toward Palestinians.

Chapter Three: Checkpoints, Connection, and Olive Farming during the 2015 Palestinian Intifada

Introduction

This chapter evaluates how state use of force policies designed to combat militancy affect civilians' political preferences. I argue civilians' experiences of state force influence preferences about how to redress their political grievances: preferences supporting either militancy directed at the state or nonviolent political engagement, including civil resistance activities. This research suggests social connection is critical to civilians' abilities to cope with stress from violence and also underlies broader civic engagement, such as political participation. In some populations, these studies further demonstrate a robust relationship between social isolation and aggression, providing justification to test whether social isolation could increase civilians' support for militancy. Therefore, in this chapter I test whether state use of force policies that destroy community structure press civilians toward aggression and militancy. Specifically, I examine certain *kinds* of state policies, including checkpoints, physical barriers, extended searches, curfews, and restrictions on phone calls or internet use that restrict civilians' engagement with friends and family, thereby directly increasing social isolation. I evaluate whether such restrictive state force policies increase support for militancy, even in comparison with seemingly more egregious acts of violence.

To understand the link between individuals' experiences with violence and preferences toward militancy or nonviolence, I engaged in a multi-site, micro-level study of six olive-

farming communities in Palestine. The complex and varied exposure to state force and the wide array of community responses (both violent and nonviolent) in the West Bank allow me to trace how civilians' experiences with state use of force impact their political preferences.

In this chapter, I conduct an in-depth examination of two of the six olive farming in which I conducted research: H2 and the South Hebron Hills, the two communities experiencing the most violence in Hebron governorate in the West Bank. Olive farmers in the West Bank face both high and varied rates of physical and structural violence. Through the focus on olive farming, I am able to evaluate variation in civilians' experiences of state use of force while nesting these experiences in the larger context of a conflict-affected region. I deemed this evaluation along a single line or trajectory within the conflict more reliable than trying to obtain a "representative sample" of all Palestinians as a single researcher. Treating olive farming as a "lab" in which to evaluate this question provides a rigorous analysis of how state use of force affects political preferences in the context of an informed narrative of civilians' lives. Of course, given that this is a single community, thinking about generalizability will be critical. I address these concerns in chapter four.

These communities experience structural violence through legal limitations on access to their fields as well as limited rights or access to building, planting, water, and fertilizer. The destruction of each olive tree bears a large impact, because olive trees need 30-40 years to grow to maturity. The communities also experience physical and psychological violence from multiple sources: the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), Israeli Settlers,¹⁵ and the Palestinian Authority (PA). I examine the IDF's use of force and choose communities with similar levels of violence from

¹⁵ "Settlers" are Jewish Israeli citizens who have built houses on land designated as Palestinian land under the Oslo Accords – Settlements are considered illegal under international law and a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and have been repeatedly described as the greatest barrier to peace in the region.

both Settlers and the PA.¹⁶ In the West Bank, the South Hebron Hills and H2 of the city of Hebron are known for having two of the most violent and radical Settler communities (described below); not every civilian in the West Bank experiences this level of violence exposure. Thus, while the violence these Settler communities commit against Palestinians may vary slightly, the South Hebron Hills and H2 in Hebron city have similar levels of Settler interaction and intensity of exposure. Second, because the communities are both heavily Fatah (rather than Hamas) supporters, and because they and support the “right” branch of Fatah, they have low or no level of interaction with the PA, whereas Hamas-sympathetic communities have intense levels of interaction/exposure to violence/arrest from the PA. Consequently, IDF troops are the focus of my references to “state use of force.” This research is based on 71 interviews of olive farmers, Palestinian ministry officials, and IDF soldiers conducted in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv during the “intifada of individuals” in the autumn of 2015.

Methodological Approach

Methodological Advantage of Life Story Interviews in Hebron Governorate

In-depth, life story-style interviews (one to three-hour guided discussions of civilians’ lives and formative events, followed by structured questions)¹⁷ provide a window into civilian experiences of violence, particularly how individuals process these experiences with or without

¹⁶ Note: violence against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank from the Palestinian Authority falls sharply along cross-party (Hamas v. Fatah) and within-party cleavages (different factions of Fatah). The two communities I select in this chapter have low to no levels of exposure from PA use of force, though one of my six communities I evaluated during fieldwork experienced extensive force from the PA, and almost no force from the IDF or Settlers.

¹⁷ Based on the model described by Northwestern sociologist Dan McAdams (2008). See: <https://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/foley/instruments/interview/>

support from their community, and how such violent experiences affect civilians' political views. In addressing this particular research question, this approach has numerous advantages over alternative methodologies designed to study preferences, such as survey research. First, individuals "think in story form, speak in story form, and bring meaning to our lives through stories" (Atkinson 1998, 121). Because "it is through story that we gain context and recognize meaning" (Atkinson 1998, 125), allowing individuals to tell the story of how they came to their views provides insights that cannot be captured in a survey or through other methods such as participant observation.

Many scholars in an array of disciplines have used life story-style interviews to understand how individuals and their preferences evolve and fit into a larger societal context. Early on, psychologist Gordon Allport (1942) used personal stories to understand how peoples' personalities develop across time (also Murray 1938; followed more recently by Runyan 1982; McAdams 1993). Sociologists have found that life story approaches help us understand how individuals become integrated into communities (Gergen and Gergen 1993). Anthropologists use their version of life stories (a "life history") to evaluate how cultures are alike and different from one another (Langness and Frank 1981). Robert Atkinson describes how historians (Allen and Montell), literary scholars (Olney) and educators (Witherell and Noddings all use life story methods to gain traction and understand local history via personal truth (1998).

Most relevant to this study, Jerome Bruner (1990; 1991; 2004; 2009) finds life storytelling provides critical insight into how individuals "construct" their own lives and beliefs. Therefore, I determined that this interview methodology is singularly suitable for examining the mechanisms behind preference formation. I spent considerable time in these olive-farming communities, talked to family members of interview respondents, and had families (voluntarily)

document their full histories of violence exposure after interviews by filling out a violence questionnaire.¹⁸ All of these activities enabled me to better understand how violent events actually affect individuals in the context of their personal lives and their communities. Also, in evaluating whether community structure and social connection impact individual responses to violence, open discussion provides greater validity than would closed-ended interview or survey questions. Life story interviews are a valuable research tool because “an individual life and the role it plays in community are best understood through story,” (Atkinson 1998, 125). Thus, these in-depth, personal interviews in the Hebron governorate served as a reliable and authentic tool to evaluate how civilians’ preferences were formed in these communities and how and whether state use of force affected shifts in those preferences.

Further, state use of force is likely to be more prominent in areas where there are greater levels of pre-existing militancy. There is a chicken or the egg problem here as areas under curfew are arguably areas with more militancy to begin with, but life story-style, long form interviews are designed to get around this endogeneity concern by asking civilians to explain how their views evolved over time. Thus, evaluating whether new experiences of state use of force increased or decreased civilians’ support for militancy requires understanding the mechanisms behind preferences toward violence, rather than solely evaluating correlations.¹⁹

The life story interviews I conducted were guided in relation to the issues of interest (violence and political preference formation), but also nested in the context of respondents’ broader lives – respondents told me their life stories and in doing so, described how and whether

¹⁸ This is considered the means by which to do least psychological harm to respondents when studying violence. Indeed, most validated measures of psychological trauma resulting from violence, depression and PTSD as well as whiteness violence are conducted using questioners rather than surveys – for example see the discussion from the Children and War Foundation on their choice of academically validated measures <http://www.childrenandwar.org/measures/>

¹⁹ Long form interviews add insight into correlations that might be observed through survey research and allow for theoretical understanding of these processes.

social connection, isolation and violence impacted their life stories. Rather than asking individuals for a short list of events representing their lives, I asked them to focus on a certain set of defining experiences. First, I asked them to think about the overarching trend of their life, and then asked them to focus on certain key experiences.²⁰ I also asked what events most shaped their political views, and if and when their political views changed. These memories and events, taken in context of civilians' lives overall, allow me to better understand the themes and formations of their preferences than would a "yes" or "no" answer on a survey.

Nevertheless, uniform questions offer standard points for comparison. Consequently, my interviews concluded with a series of structured questions designed to test community connection, emotion, risk acceptance, political efficacy, preferences, and a written form in which respondents, if willing, documented their full exposure to violence. This closed-ended section of each interview included questions about the politics of the West Bank, such as respondents' support for the ongoing *intifada* or launching rockets from Gaza, as well as preferences toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) as opposed to Israel. Preferences toward violence, revenge, and hope were also measured, as well as demographic and educational information. This format allows me to understand if and how civilians' views changed, and whether state use of force was a motivating factor in those changes. The structured questions also exposed, in specific detail, how civilians experienced state use of force and how those experiences did or did not matter relative to others in shaping their political views. Because I also gather factual data on exposure to violence, on support for certain political outcomes, and on preferences for revenge, I am able to use these as anchor points to connect or contrast stories across respondents.

²⁰ These were: a high point, low point, turning point, positive and negative childhood memories, most vivid memory of adulthood, most vivid memory of about the conflict, how their political views formed and if and why they changed, their greatest life challenge and greatest life accomplishment. The full list of interview questions appears in appendix A.

State Use of Force and Civilian Violence Exposure in the West Bank

Civilians in the West Bank may experience violence from a variety of sources (the IDF, the PA, and Israeli Settlers), in different quantities and contexts. As noted, I focus on violence the IDF commits as “state use of force,” and attempt to hold violence committed by Settlers and the PA as more or less “constant” via matching cases in my research design. Different zones of control, determined under the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, provide a quasi-experimental framework in which to evaluate exposure to violence – where one lives dramatically impacts one’s violence exposure. Some areas are more likely to experience certain types of violence and state use of force than others, and some areas experience a greater frequency or volume of violence or state use of force than others. There are nine governorates in the West Bank; I focus on Hebron Governorate because it is the economic hub of the West Bank, and because it has the most complex and varied level of violence exposure. Figure 1 displays a map of Hebron governorate, with Area A (or Palestinian controlled regions) in purple, and with markers for checkpoints and closure obstacles. H2 and Firing Zone 918 are marked.




Figure 1: Location of H2 and Firing Zone 918 in Hebron. *Source:* Land Research Center reports - <http://www.lrcj.org/> (website under construction) – see map reposted here: <http://www.poica.org/details.php?Article=9129> Accessed 2 August 2016

My design leverages geographic variation in state use of force to observe how different experiences of state use of force violence affect civilian support for militancy. For example, the West Bank is divided into three areas. Area A is under full PA control, and residents there have less contact with IDF troops or Israeli Settlers. It is also only about 30% of Hebron governorate (see Figure 1). Residents in Area B are under partial PA control, face more structural violence, and are often closer to Israeli settlements. Area C is entirely under Israeli control, and civilians face a high amount of state use of force and often, being close to Settlements, higher levels of Settler violence, as well as higher rates of contact with IDF soldiers deployed to protect Settlers. Violence by Palestinian Authority is less focused on clear geographic boundaries but rather on the political leanings of individuals and communities.

In addition to the Areas, the governorate capital, al-Khalil (Hebron), is a divided city, with the Palestinian Authority governing one zone (H1), and Israel governing the second (H2) under military law (see Figure 1). The Israeli Defense Force is deployed into H2 to “keep peace” between the several hundred Settlers who live there and the 30,000 Palestinians who have stayed since the Settlers moved into H2. Lastly, Firing Zone 918, in the South Hebron Hills, is used as an Israeli military training ground, though Palestinians still live there. I chose six interview sites from these areas.²¹

Respondent Selection: Olive-Farming Communities in Hebron Governorate

As noted above, rather than trying to obtain a “representative sample” of the Palestinian population in the West Bank, I focus on an in-depth study of two olive-farming communities. The olive tree is an essential part of Palestinian identity and culture (Abufarha 2008; Meneley 2011; Braverman 2009); it serves as the symbol of a free Palestine in literature and politics, it is written into the Quran as *al-shajara al-mubaraka*, a holy tree,²² and the harvest is deeply woven into family and community structure. Irus Braverman (2009) discusses how trees have been

²¹ My sites are: H2 in the Old City of Hebron (under military law and with settlements on three sides), villages in the Firing Zone 918 (Area C, and close to two settlements), Beit Einun just north of Hebron (Area A, medium distance from settlements), Beit Na'im (Area B, medium distance from Settlements), Dura (Area A, no settlements), Al Majd (Area C, medium distance from Settlements), Surif (Area C, close to the Wall, no settlements), and Beit Ummar (Area B, no settlements, close to military base). I initially proposed fewer sites, but because of the increase in violence while I was conducting my interviews, three of my research sites (H2, Beit Einun, and Beit Ummar) became closed “military zones” and I was denied entry and could not continue interviews. Therefore my data, particularly from Beit Ummar and Beit Einun, consist of only three or four interviews. Note that while those interviews informed broader findings, the focus of this chapter is on interviews conducted in H2 and the villages of Firing Zone 918.

²² The olive tree is mentioned as “sacred” in the Quran and other Islamic writings at several points. First, in al-Nur 24:35, which states “Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The example of His light is like a niche within which is a lamp, the lamp is within glass, the glass as if it were a pearly [white] star lit from [the oil of] a blessed olive tree, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil would almost glow even if untouched by fire. Light upon light. Allah guides to His light whom He wills. And Allah presents examples for the people, and Allah is Knowing of all things.” See: <http://quran.com/24/35>. Additionally, “Eat the oil and use it on your hair and skin, for it comes from a blessed tree.” (Tirmidhi) from Saheeh al-Jaami' and al-Tirmidhi (1775).

integrated into the cultural and nationalistic narratives of both Palestinians and Israelis. The Zionist movement in Israel has planted thousands of pine trees, and by planting these pines largely around Settlements, pines become a symbol of (a particular sort of right-leaning) Israeli power in the region (Braverman 2009; Bardenstein 1998; Cohen 1993; Zerubavel 1996). The olive tree, in contrast, has remained the cornerstone of Palestinian identity, not only because of its cultural and economic value, but also in response to Israel's attempt to limit and control this fundamental aspect of Palestinian social and family life.²³

Because land and connections to it lie at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, olives become a symbolic way for communities to establish legitimacy and reify ideals of resistance, perseverance, and legal claims for Palestinians (Abufarha 2008). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about legal rights as much as religious beliefs or physical territory (B'Tselem 2013).²⁴ Braverman (2009) argues that conceptions of how law and space interact to inform and define individuals' lived experiences apply to the olive tree in Palestine (see Blomley 1994; Delaney 2002). Up to 48% of Palestinian land is covered in olive trees (OCHA 2012). Indeed, "olive oil—a staple of the Palestinian diet—is not a neutral commodity unrelated to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank; rather, it is intimately bound up with it, as the planting [by Palestinians] and uprooting [by Israelis] of olive trees is part of the struggle for land and legitimacy" (Meneley 2011, 275). The Israeli government uprooted Palestinian olive trees to build the separation barrier, and framed it as a necessary security precaution for Israel. The effect of the wall, however, was not just the destruction of trees, but also the separation of Palestinians

²³ Lost trees are often truly mourned: "olive trees are spoken of as kin, like children, who will be mourned when damaged or uprooted" (Meneley 2011, 283).

²⁴ Property rights are particularly at issue: "the legal environment of property rights in Palestine reveals two routes to the violence against Palestinian farms and homes. One route is direct in which Palestinians have been separated from their farms and homes by the redrawing of property lines on the landscape. The other route is more subtle in which a changing set of property laws has spawned a culture of hostility to Palestinian presence and circulation with the end result assuming the form of assaults upon the anchors securing Palestinians to the landscape" (Fields 2012, 270).

from their olive groves. Thus, olive farming is a political act in Palestine, an act of civil resistance. Indeed, members of the international community buy Palestinian olive oil as an act of resistance to the state of Israel, some even going so far as to point to olive oil itself as political legitimacy for Palestinians (Meneley 2011).²⁵

The olive tree's meaning has been defined and delimited through court rulings as well as military force, and Palestinian access to their own olive groves has been regulated. Israeli law requires Palestinians to acquire permits to build any structure (or addition) or to make any modifications to land (including fences or wells). Such required permits are almost never granted. For example, rights to build homes without restriction in Area C are allowed under "master plans." Master plans exist in only sixteen West Bank villages in Area C, covering a mere 0.05% of Area C, meaning any other construction is considered illegal and subject to demolition.²⁶ Permits from Israel are also required in Area C for Palestinians to access their own fields, to access water, and to till the land (Weizman 2007). There are heavy restrictions on fertilizer and any other goods Israel has termed "dual use" (steel pipes, for example, are included on this list, as are any lathes or milling equipment) and fines are imposed for violations.²⁷ Penalties for violating these laws are strict, including eviction and home demolition. By imposing these restrictions, the state of Israel has essentially turned Palestinian olive farming into an act of civil resistance; olive farming has become a symbol for the Palestinian "quest for independence" (Braverman 2009).

²⁵ Even Palestinian poetry uses the olive tree as a symbol of resistance. See four examples: 1) Mahmoud Darwish. 1999. "Trees, Forests, and the Shaping of Palestinian and Collective Memory." In *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall and the Present*, eds. Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, and Leo Spitzer, 148-168. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England: 153-154. 2) Tawfiq Zayyad, in *Bardenstein 1998*: 28. 3) Mahmoud Awad Abbas, in *Ashrawi 1978*: 91. 4) As'ad al-As'ad, in *Ashrawi 1978*: 91.

²⁶ For a thorough review of building restrictions see: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/sites/almonitor/contents/afp/2015/05/israel-palestinians-conflict-housing.html> accessed November 7, 2016.

²⁷ See: <http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/qpal/docs/2012Cairo/p2%20jad%20isaac%20e.pdf> Page 5; accessed November 7, 2016.

Olive farmers face physical and structural violence as they and their families attempt to harvest their crops. In addition to limited access to their fields, water, and fertilizer, there is sometimes daily supervision by armed guards while Palestinians pick olives. Further quotidian harassment includes throwing garbage and name calling, as well as crop damage such as spraying fields with skunk water.²⁸ Settlers also inflict physical violence on Palestinians. These daily acts of structural and physical violence in Palestinian olive-farming communities create a natural “lab” to evaluate how civilians’ communal experiences in conflict interact with their personal experiences of conflict, and the role violence plays in framing political preferences. I conducted 66 interviews in the autumn of 2015 with individuals associated with olive farming in the Hebron governorate (as well as five interviews with former and current IDF soldiers for a total of 71 interviews). This included individuals in olive-farming families (57 interviews) as well as Palestinian Authority municipal officials and non-profit workers dealing with olive production, harvest, and violence against olive farmers, and olive press owners (8 interviews).

The autumn of 2015 was known as the “Intifada of Individuals” because of the increase in disaggregated, individual-level Palestinian violence (stabbings/attempted stabbings, car-ramping attacks) against Israeli Settlers and Israeli soldiers, rather than the coordinated, militant group-sponsored violence that marked the Second Intifada.

In this chapter, I focus on my two interview sites in Hebron governorate experiencing the highest rates of Settler violence, and which have almost no PA violence, but importantly, these two sites are subjected to very different types of IDF state use of force policies: H2 in Hebron’s Old City; and the villages of Firing Zone 918 in the South Hebron Hills. I treat PA and Settler violence as a “constant” because both communities experienced comparably extreme and

²⁸ Skunk water is treated sewage the Israeli army uses to disperse protests in the West Bank and Gaza. It is also sometimes sprayed on Palestinian crops. I personally witnessed the spraying of skunk water on olives and other crops in Beit Einun in November 2015.

continuing Settler violence and very little PA violence, and focus on leveraging the variation in state use of force policies between the two cases. These two sites experience similar amounts of overall violence and similar severity of violence, but they experience dramatic variation in the types of state force employed. The state policies designed for population control in H2 involve the kinds of community-fracturing violence –roadblocks, curfews, and checkpoints – that lead to social isolation. In villages of Firing Zone 918, state violence is much more random: military training exercises, including munitions tests and live fire exercises, plus occasional roadblocks between the region and the rest of the West Bank, but not within the villages. While state force policies in Firing Zone 918 and surrounding villages have a large impact on the local population, these policies do not isolate individuals *within* the community to nearly the same degree as do the policies in H2 aimed at restricting freedom of movement and association.

I leverage these differences to demonstrate a relationship between differences in state use of force and the political preferences respondents formed as a result of that variation, informed by the role community plays in that process. I discuss this relationship in the context of civilians' existing political preferences, their beliefs about why and when they might have changed or shifted how they thought about politics, and their own stories and narratives about state use of force itself. This design allows me to evaluate theoretical priors I constructed deductively before going into the field, and further allows me to use civilians' explanations of their experiences to contextualize and refine the theoretical mechanisms drawn or extrapolated from the existing literature.

Violence, Connection, and Resistance for Olive Farmers in Hebron Governorate

Existing studies (though few in number) provide strong support for the relationship between checkpoints or other measures limiting connection and civilian militancy. Several studies have attempted to examine the effect checkpoints have on Palestinian populations but have largely been unable to separate checkpoints from any other method of control (Brown 2004; Bornstein 2008; Kotef and Amir 2011; Naaman 2006). Using a natural experiment of checkpoint reduction, one study was able to effectively isolate a “checkpoint effect” and found that checkpoints increase Palestinian support for *violent* action against Israel (Longo, Canetti, and Hite-Rubin 2014). This study examined the 2009 easing of checkpoints in Jenin – during this time, the number of checkpoints in Jenin decreased whereas outside Jenin checkpoint policies remained the same. Two survey waves within and outside Jenin conducted both before and after checkpoint reduction allowed researchers to evaluate whether the decrease in checkpoints corresponded with a decrease in support for militant groups among the civilian population. They found that a decrease in checkpoints corresponded with a statistically significant decrease in civilian militancy (defined as support for violence against Israel). Further, they found that civilians near the control case, where checkpoints were maintained, demonstrated a statistically significant increase in support for militancy as the checkpoints continued to operate. Building on this finding, I leverage life story-style interviews to understand the process by which movement-restricting violence might increase (or decrease) civilian support for militancy, and how that might relate to other state use of force policies (discussed in depth in chapter four).

In H2 of Hebron’s Old City, state use of force includes specific, targeted attacks against suspected militants and their families (including home demolitions, detention, and killings), severe freedom of movement restrictions (including closed streets, barriers, curfews, checkpoints, and intensive surveillance), and crowd control measures (including tear gas, sound

grenades, so called “skunk water” (treated sewage sprayed to disperse crowds), rubber bullets, and occasionally live rounds). Firing Zone 918, in contrast, is an active Israeli military training ground, meaning the IDF has conducted live fire exercises with tanks, helicopters, and munitions in and amongst Palestinian villages, as well as what could be termed “thunder runs” (or close flyovers/tank runs past villages). The size of Firing Zone 918 means crowd control measures are comparatively uncommon, though all interviewed residents report having been tear gassed, etc. during weekly peaceful demonstrations to protest the Occupation (the Palestinian term for the Israeli control over areas in the West Bank). The main thoroughfare connecting the villages of Firing Zone 918 to the rest of Hebron governorate often has checkpoints, yet these residents face *far* fewer daily restrictions on freedom of movement within and between villages than those living in H2 in Hebron city.

As outlined in chapter two, these two communities have adopted remarkably different responses to state use of force. H2’s residents espouse the most militant preferences of any subjects I interviewed (measured as support for the then-current stabbing and car attacks regardless of their efficacy and support for launching of rockets from Gaza), while civilians in Firing Zone 918 have sustained a civil resistance movement and refuse even to throw stones at tanks, an act considered “nonviolent” in other parts of Palestine. My in-depth interviews asked respondents about these divergent responses to nearly equivalent levels of state use of force (in terms of overall “amount” of violence). Because the state policies limiting freedom of movement were employed predominantly in H2 and not in the villages of Firing Zone 918, these interviews can provide a window into whether and how such state policies and community connection play a critical role in shaping civilians’ preferences in response to state use of force.

H2 – Losing Freedom of Movement

As discussed above, H2 is Israeli-occupied, militarily-controlled and governed under military law. A grove of gnarled and ancient olive trees stands tall above the white buildings of the city, and the quiet there is rare compared to the hubbub below. This area contains some of the oldest olives farms in all of Hebron governorate, with some trees dating back more than a thousand years. But living in H2 is also a daily struggle. Military checkpoints surrounding the area prevent ready access to the main thoroughfares of the city, to markets, and to jobs (more than 18 checkpoints cover an area slightly larger than one square mile). Checkpoints were introduced to H2 only after the expansion of Settlers into H2, in the middle of a Palestinian city. All Settlements in the West Bank have checkpoints on all sides, but because the H2 Settlements are the only ones directly in the middle of a Palestinian city, these checkpoints affect Palestinian daily life more directly than do checkpoints in Settlements elsewhere the West Bank. This situation addresses potential endogeneity concerns: these checkpoints were not erected specifically in response to Palestinian militancy unique to H2, rather checkpoints are one of the measures used by the IDF to protect Settlers in *any* area. The IDF presence does increase in response to local and national events and fluctuating tensions, but the general structure of 18 fixed checkpoints in a one square mile radius results from the interspersion of this Settlement in and among Palestinian homes, not in response to unique levels of Palestinian militancy in H2

There is a high likelihood that residents attempting to return home to H2 will be physically searched, harassed, or denied entry back to their homes. In the past, curfews were frequently enacted, and in 2015 made they made a reappearance, with civilians occasionally told

to stay in their homes for hours or days. This can make access to the area impossible altogether, restrict basic freedom of movement and access to social services, and all but shut down daily social life.²⁹ With Israeli Settlements on three sides, Palestinian olive farmers here face frequent interactions with the Settler community, arguably among the most radical in the West Bank, and also with the IDF soldiers stationed there to protect Settlers.

State Use of Force in H2

Violence in H2 is the most severe throughout the Hebron governorate, except perhaps Firing Zone 918 in the South Hebron Hills. State use of force in H2 involves freedom of movement restrictions, intimidation tactics, and targeted, selective violence. There are strict limits on freedom of movement in Hebron city and particularly in H2, including eighteen military-style checkpoints in less than one square mile, more than 109 permanent barriers (barbed wire closures of thoroughfares), and fifty-three temporary blockades as of the autumn of 2015.³⁰ Many roads are closed to Palestinian foot traffic and the entire zone of H2 is closed to Palestinian cars (though not to Settler cars). Figure 2 shows a map of H2 closures as of November 2015, along with checkpoints and additional obstacles.

²⁹ These restrictions are well documented by Israeli human rights organizations such as B'Tselem and by the UN Mission to the Palestinian Occupied Territories. These descriptions were also corroborated in interviews I conducted with IDF soldiers in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, December 2015; Personal interviews 67, 68, , and 68.

³⁰ See B'Tselem http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/old/copy%20of%20checkpoints




Figure 2. Map from OCHA for the Occupied Territories – *Source:* http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2014_12_11_english.pdf Access 7 Nov 2016

In October 2015, H2 became a closed military zone, requiring residents to register for special permits to pass through any one of the eighteen military checkpoints in the city center.³¹ These checkpoints are a frequent site of arrests and violence; there are extensive stories of civilians pulling out a cell phone at a checkpoint only to be shot because a soldier thought it was a knife.³² Even when not placed in physical danger, an individual may be forced to wait for hours

³¹ This continues; the city has been closed for more than one year. Because the UN definition of ethnic cleansing includes attempts to remove residents of a certain race from a given area “by force or intimidation” (see for example <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog178/abstract>), many rights groups consider the military zone in H2 ethnic cleansing: <https://palsolidarity.org/2016/10/continuing-ethnic-cleansing-in-closed-military-zone-in-hebron/>

³² Whether true or not (and some people have been shot at checkpoints, with Palestinians arguing they are unarmed civilians and Israeli officials stating they are terrorists), these rumours and narratives have an impact on civilian behavior. For example, my interpreter’s mother and father frequently asked her not to meet me because it involved going through four checkpoints and they feared “something would happen.” When we did meet, I tried to meet her at each checkpoint because a US passport has the perceived effect of making passing through a checkpoint easier.

for no discernible reason. The IDF soldiers I interviewed described forced waiting as an intentional IDF tactic designed for “general suppression.”³³ Such forced waiting is designed to increase the difficulty of Palestinians’ lives and to increase their compliance with the IDF by demonstrating IDF presence and control. Road blockades and barriers mean that getting from point A to point B can transform from a one-block trip to a several-mile and multiple-checkpoint journey, or require a great deal more money for cab fare, all significant annoyances and hindrances to basic social life. Over time, these hindrances, along with curfews and surveillance measures, significantly alter patterns of movement and connection.

Because H2 is governed under military law (even when it is not a “closed military zone”), any act termed a “security threat” can confine Palestinian residents to their homes for hours or days; curfews are also common, and home searches can occur at any time. Since home demolitions resumed in 2014, homes are sometimes destroyed both as a result of deemed security threats and as a control measure; the IDF has full right to search and seize property. They can remove civilians from their homes for any “military” reason, and can require families to quarter soldiers in their homes for as long as the soldiers deem appropriate. One family I interviewed stated they had soldiers living with them for nearly one year, without any form of monetary compensation.³⁴ Interviews I conducted with five active duty or former IDF soldiers who operated in Hebron and surrounding areas corroborate my Palestinian respondents’ descriptions of quartering soldiers, restrictions on freedom of movement, and the operation of

³³ Personal interviews 64, 65, 66, and 68, of IDF soldiers in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Israel, December 2015.

³⁴ Personal interview 5, H2, October 2015.

checkpoints. The violence these soldiers described to me that they personally committed closely matches the descriptions of violence described by Palestinian families detailed below.³⁵

Since protests are common in Hebron city, crowd control measures are frequently deployed around checkpoints, including tear gas, sound grenades, rubber bullets, skunk water, and occasionally live rounds. These measures occur so frequently that if one travels near any checkpoints with regularity, one will be exposed to them; they are, in fact, a feature of daily life for many in the city. For example, tear gas wafts over the main market in the Old City near Bab Al-Zawiya regularly. Israeli laws extend to stone throwing: a Palestinian throwing a rock at an Israeli citizen or soldier is considered an act of terrorism and comes with, as of November 2015, a minimum three-year prison sentence for anyone over the age of twelve, as well as the possibility of home demolition for the family of the stone-thrower.³⁶ Intent to cause harm does not have to be established for the law to be enforced, and non-Arab Israeli citizens who throw stones are not subject to the same law.³⁷ Throwing a stone at a moving vehicle results in up to a ten-year sentence.³⁸ Israel is very successful at persecuting violators, and enforcement is heightened due to the extremely high troop presence in H2. This should reasonably be considered a case where Israel has “control over territory” (Kalyvas 2006).

These freedom of movement restrictions are accompanied by an abiding belief among civilians that the IDF is capable of targeted “selective” violence. Most of my Palestinian respondents believe the slightest indication of support for a militant group or for Hamas, for example, will bring either the IDF or the Palestinian Authority (as part of what is known as

³⁵ For example, soldiers described checkpoints as a means of harassment and population control, just to keep civilians aware, based upon the premise that if you make them afraid and aware of you now, they won't fight you later. Personal interviews 67 and 68, Tel Aviv, Dec 2015; personal interview 69, Jerusalem, Dec 2015.

³⁶ See: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/israel-passes-minimum-sentence-stone-throwers-151103141454182.html> accessed November 3, 2016

³⁷ See: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/israel-passes-minimum-sentence-stone-throwers-151103141454182.html> accessed 3 Nov 2016

³⁸ See: <http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=765703> accessed 3 Nov 2016

“security coordination” with Israel) to one’s door and then jail awaits. Because of Israel’s policy of home demolitions of families of terrorists or accused terrorists, this threat not only affects suspected terrorists but their entire families. Given the IDF’s level of control, its extensive surveillance network, and the sheer number of guard towers, checkpoints, and troops, civilians living in H2 believe Israel controls the territory and has the capacity and will to commit selective violence.

It should be noted that Palestinians face two additional sorts of violence from the radical Settler community in H2. First, Palestinians here experience high levels of quotidian harassment. Graffiti on the streets read “Gas the Arabs” in Hebrew and English.³⁹ Access to water is restricted. Many families construct gates, walls, and nets around their houses to protect against the garbage thrown at them. Families have reported being repeatedly called names or spit upon.⁴⁰ There are also a number of cases of olive trees being set afire, which constitutes an attack on a central part of a family’s social and economic sense of self. Second, people in H2 face high rates of fairly random physical violence when picking olives in their fields or tending to their trees. While people in this area reported frequent house and personal physical searches by soldiers, which may include verbal and physical harassment or even beatings, some examples of brutal violence here were perpetrated by Settlers.

State Use of Force and Community Structure in H2

The community structure in H2 has been deeply fractured, despite valiant efforts of some community members to remain connected and to build community. A large part of the

³⁹ See: <http://972mag.com/a-week-in-photos-october-18-24/58438/racist-anti-palestinian-graffiti-hebron-west-bank-22-10-2012/> Accessed 3 Nov 2016.

⁴⁰ Many have youtube videos or personal videos of similar incidents of “quotidian” violence: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdeqXQPW7TM>

community has left; the Palestinian population of H2 has lost nearly a quarter of its number since 1997 and today sits at about 30,000, with only about 400 of those living in the Old City.⁴¹ Those who remain are concentrated in disconnected enclaves. Most families here have relatives and friends outside of H2, and friendship/kinship networks are thus strained by difficulty of travel. Indeed, passing through checkpoints for non-essential reasons is something most strive to avoid (see Figure 3).



Checkpoint in H2



Nets to keep thrown trash out



Checkpoint in H2



Olive Groves in H2

Figure 3: Checkpoints and Olive Groves in H2. All photos taken by Author - October and November 2015

Families describe structural restrictions on movement, constant searches, and curfews as greatly restricting not only their economic activities, but the very fabric of social life and access to basic services. In October, an olive farmer I planned to interview died two days before our

⁴¹ See description in the Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/jun/29/hebron-old-city-west-bank-palestinian-ghost-city-revived-transformation> Accessed 7 November 2016

scheduled interview. His death occurred because he was detained at a checkpoint when seeking to go to the hospital for treatment for teargas inhalation that had complicated a pre-existing heart condition.⁴² Respondents describe being separated from their families and neighbors and the difficulty of maintaining friendship networks. They discuss how when they were young, they felt free to visit friends and family and how they wish that for their children. In the current conditions, they feel isolated.

“In the past, before all the soldiers and checkpoints in H2, relationships were stronger. People could talk to one another and they weren’t so afraid. Now people are separate. Those times [when people could talk to one another] made me happy, those are my best memories, but this is much harder.”⁴³

“When I was young, it was safe then so my mother let me go play outside and in the neighborhood but now I worry when my children go one meter away from me. I feel very sorry for my children because they haven’t had a childhood – they don’t have friends in the same way I did, they can’t go on vacation or travel to see family.”⁴⁴

Respondents mention the stress of living close enough to checkpoints that one can smell tear gas frequently, hear the crack of live rounds or the boom of sound grenades, and feel reverberations from the daily flyovers of the Israeli air force. Intentional violence designed to limit movement (barriers, checkpoints) is more frequent and more intense in H2 than in any other part of Hebron governorate and, indeed, more than in any other part of the West Bank. Yet, while the amount and frequency of physical violence from Settlers is extreme, it is the lack of social connection

⁴² See coverage of his life and death from Al Jazeera at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/west-bank-bids-farewell-veteran-palestinian-activist-151022123036673.html> accessed October 20, 2016

⁴³ Personal interview 1, H2, Palestine, October 2015. Note: While I have attempted to quote directly, each interview was conducted through an interpreter and notes were taken by hand, rather than tape-recorded. This was due to concerns for the safety of respondents. A voice on a tape recorder is identifiable, thereby potentially jeopardizing respondent anonymity should it be seized as I went through a checkpoint. I had no wish to add to the experience of being “surveilled” because these civilians are under constant surveillance, and also believed there would be a significant “treatment effect” to a tape recorder that would decrease trust.

⁴⁴ Personal interview 2, H2, Palestine, October 2015.

that civilians cite as having the greatest impact on their lives. It is not only fear that provides the undercurrent framing these experiences, but isolation:

“The greatest challenge for me is living in this isolated place. Even with people all around we are so alone, because there is no way to get safely to see our neighbors or go home to see my family ... When I was younger I used to feel afraid all the time and now after everything that has happened to me I feel brave – what else can they take? They have taken everything and I am still here. Here, but alone.”⁴⁵

Findings from Qualitative Interviews

My interviews in H2 consistently confirmed (i) the difficulty of maintaining social connections due to state force restrictions on movement and (ii) the resultant influence on civilians’ political preferences. Respondents describe feeling extremely isolated. The decimation of community consistently emerged as a primary source of respondents’ frustration and resentment (84%), and the lack of social connection was woven into responses to nearly every question. When respondents spoke about what they most wished would change about the conflict or their lives, opportunities for connection and family were prevalent, even over their own personal physical safety. For example, one woman I interviewed described how traveling internationally compared with life in the West Bank, and discussed traveling as the turning point in her life. Yet what she emphasized about that experience was not “seeing the world,” but rather observing the freedom of movement in other places. That freedom of movement mattered more to her than even the brutal violence she had experienced:

[What is your most vivid memory?] “Traveling to Europe. It was very different from being here – so much more freedom – especially freedom to get from one place to another. You can go anywhere! That is the thing that I care about the most – the restriction on getting anywhere within al-Khalil and also around

⁴⁵ Personal interview 4, H2, Palestine, October 2015.

Palestine and Israel and internationally make it so hard in every way ... More than the violence ... I'm used to violence by now and it doesn't scare me anymore – no matter what they do I don't feel afraid anymore. They have done all the things to me and now I feel stronger. I know how to stand for myself.”⁴⁶

She linked these experiences directly to her support for militancy, described as violent resistance.

When asked about her reasons for supporting violent resistance, she talked about her mother, how she wanted to be brave for her, and how her family's isolation framed her thinking and choices. She spoke about her experiences of violence too, and fear, but connections to her family and the lack of external connections framed her broader experience of violence:

[Do you support resistance to Israel? Like the boycott?] *“Yes absolutely! I very much support it. We must do this.*

[What about other forms of resistance, like launching rockets from Gaza?] *Yes! They should launch all the rockets! The resistance in Gaza has been very successful.*

[Do you think the situation here could ever get better?] *No. It is impossible. Things might get worse but not better.*

[What about a new peace process?] – *No, that is not possible.*

[What made you think that [violent] resistance was the best solution, more than peace?] *All they have done to us. ... After all of this, I don't want any problems and I don't want anything back, I just want them [Settlers, Israeli Army] to leave. ... Most of the time I try to be brave for my mother. My mother is always scared for her children. Last week, I was here with just my mother and Settlers were outside and I wanted to go out to tell the Settlers to go away but she wouldn't let me. We should be able to tell them to go off our own land. But we are alone here - just us and no one else - we have to be strong. So I try to be brave for her to help her feel less afraid. But inside I am worried too.”⁴⁷*

Another man in H2, when asked about resistance, spoke specifically about social disruption as increasing support for militancy. He said that the way movement is limited and the inability to redress grievances augments the horror of violent events, making more militant solutions appear to be the only possible response:

⁴⁶ Personal interview 5, H2, Palestine, October 2015.

⁴⁷ Personal interview 5, H2, Palestine, October 2015.

[Why do you think people support resistance?] *“We are punished here for being alive. We can’t go anywhere; we have to wait for hours every time ... A boy walking with his father they beat him right in front of their eyes. And he can’t even file a complaint. And if they go to try, they have to wait for hours – they have to wait so long it interferes with their lives so they would rather just go home. That of course leads to a desire for revenge – and it forces people toward violence.”*⁴⁸

86% of my respondents in H2 were extremely supportive of militancy. Even in general terms, they displayed high levels of support for retaliation and revenge, whereas respondents in other areas of H2 with different experiences of violence (either less overall violence or less community-constricting violence) spoke more frequently about forgiveness or giving someone the benefit of the doubt. When asked a question about their preference for retaliation, even in unrelated situations, all male respondents in H2 were vocal (the most vocal of any of my interview subjects) about their desire for revenge. Respondents were given a scenario: “Suppose you have 500 shekels you’ve worked very hard for, and someone steals 250 of those shekels. How much, if any, of your remaining money would you be willing to spend to make sure that person paid for their crime?”⁴⁹ The men invariably said that the amount “stolen” wasn’t very much money, but they would be willing to pay all of their remaining money and more to ensure the thief paid for her crime.⁵⁰ They said that people needed to be made to understand that what they did was wrong, and how if they let them go now they would only become worse. One respondent told a story in response to this question:

⁴⁸ Personal interview 10, H2, Palestine, October 2015.

⁴⁹ Many people asked what “paid for their crime” meant, and I said “faced justice or were held responsible in some way”.

⁵⁰ Women, conversely, sometimes spoke about forgiveness. They would ask what the thief had done and why he had done it, if he was desperate, or if it was for his family, and if so she would let him have it. If there were no such mitigating factors, however, women also said that they would seek justice, whatever form that took.

“Settlers offered me millions of dollars to buy these olives and I said if you gave me billions of dollars I will never give this house or these olives to you. I will stay here until I die and never give anything or any part of it to you.”⁵¹

Whether the amount of money he quoted is accurate, his statement emphasizes the importance of socio-psychological factors rather than material costs in understanding civilian behavior in conflict. This was an extremely poor family, yet they stated with vehemence that they would not consider any level of monetary compensation for their land.

When respondents (both male and female, young and old) in H2 spoke about the conflict more broadly, they consistently expressed very militant preferences. They were strongly in favor of launching rockets from Gaza, the “knife” intifada, and other modes of armed resistance, such as re-arming Hamas and Fatah in the West Bank. When asked about the timeline of their evolution toward militant views, nearly every older respondent replied that before the Occupation, they were happy and harbored no ill feelings toward anyone and had no reason to want to hurt Israelis (respondents volunteered this; it was not one of my questions). But after being cut off from the rest of the West Bank, from family in the Diaspora and from family in Gaza, they came to believe violent retaliation was more than justified, to the point they believe peace is *not* justified:

“Endless restrictions and all this violence only leads to more hate ... The Occupation brings violence ... I could never trust or love an Israeli while they keep doing such things to me and to my family – while they keep me here with nothing I can do about it. Until I see peace from them, and freedom, I wouldn’t support peace at all.”⁵²

Younger respondents expressed similar preferences.

⁵¹ Personal interview 1, H2, Palestine, October 2015. This man owned approximately 50 old, olive trees (some estimated to be nearly 750 years old), making them quite valuable.

⁵² Personal interview 3, H2, Palestine, October 2015.

Two additional findings emerge from evaluating my interviews in H2. First, violence greatly affected civilians' political preferences, but the lethality of violence or the costs extracted were in some senses immaterial compared to the emotional effects of violence. I included an "anchoring vignette" (King et al. 2004) in my interview questions and asked respondents to rank different sorts of violence based on how much they were affected by each. Surprisingly, people ranked "someone saying something nasty about you behind your back" as equivalent to a "beating" or "being shot." One respondent told me saying nasty things was still someone trying to take something from you, trying to make you feel less than you were. In other words, the emotion behind events gave them context and meaning.

Respondents also described being offered great sums of money to sell their houses to Settlers and being encouraged by the army to move out of H2, both with force and money. Yet, the anger and frustration stemming from their experiences of violence, from their frustration with the IDF and Settlers, convinced them to resist and stay. They viewed staying as a source of pride, as resistance itself, and as a modicum of agency in the face of an overwhelming lack of agency and of control over their own lives. Perhaps most importantly, respondents described state policies restricting movement and the very act of living in H2 as changing their political preferences. They had less faith, were angrier and believed more strongly that fighting back with violence was the right course of action, the *ethical* course of action, because they see their own violence as justified.

Taken together, restrictions on social connection were often the primary complaint respondents expressed about the current situation in H2. Respondents were significantly less focused on violence happening to them personally than violence perpetrated on people close to them, further signaling the importance of community connection in the experience of violence.

Indeed, while each member of every family had been exposed to some sort of violence, respondents rarely spoke about events that happened to them personally when asked which events affected them most. Men talked about violence to their wives, and women about violence to their children. They discussed the horror of these deeply personal experiences of violence, the legacy of rage, and the deep, unending sense of injustice they feel as victims. Indeed, in informal conversations in H2 about different NGOs, many described Israeli and Palestinian NGOs working toward “peace” unfavorably, *unless* their proposals for “peace” required complete removal of all Settlers and IDF forces from the West Bank. In the view of these Palestinians, anything less than removal of all Settlers and the IDF only serves to “normalize” the Occupation, and therefore is unjustified.

In summary, material factors and physical threats, while clearly important, appear not to have dictated civilian preferences and behavior. The constant and real threat of selective violence did not deter support for militancy –respondents’ reaction to more or threatened violence elicited an attitude of “what else can they do to me”, of desperation and even support for violence they are certain will bring about no policy changes, rather than one of compliance or fear. Respondents reported that the level of state use of force and control employed by the IDF and Settlers only fueled hate and rage. Isolation emerges as a primary complaint and source of frustration, and is frequently described as among the most objectionable aspects of living in H2. Indeed, respondents listed it as a source of despair and hate, and the aspect individuals would most like to change about their current situation.

Firing Zone 918 – Connection in the Context of Violence

The South Hebron Hills, and particularly Firing Zone 918, is a military-controlled zone, like H2. While H2 is primarily a military occupation of a residential area, Firing Zone 918 is an active military training ground – in essence, the very definition of indiscriminate violence. The several thousand Palestinians who live there are in close proximity to ongoing military exercises, where live rounds, tanks, and choppers appear at random, and where homes can be moved or demolished with little or no provocation or warning. In the 1990s and into the 2000s, these activities included live fire. Several farmers told me a story of a family member “discovering” unexploded ordnance when picking olives, grazing his flock, or plowing his fields with his camel, often resulting in the loss of life or limb.

The existing literature on civilian response to state use of force policies would suggest that the people of Firing Zone 918 should be more militant than other Palestinians, given the extreme indiscriminate violence to which they are exposed. Instead, they have constructed a cohesive and powerful civil resistance movement. I went to the primary village bordering Firing Zone 918, because it has some of the highest levels of violence exposure in the West Bank, and because its rural nature provided a complement to urban olive-farming communities that also had high violence exposure. From there I walked (because there are no roads for cars) into the hills with a local guide and interviewed farmers in the surrounding villages, many of whom still live in caves (because they provide more reliable shelter than tents)⁵³ and farm using primarily camels, and some tractors, to plow. When I arrived in the village bordering Firing Zone 918, I found a resistance and a message of peace that has yet to make headlines in the Western news (or even wider local news), partly because of the daily nature of their resistance and struggle, rather than a single, huge protest event. Villagers in the South Hebron Hills told a story of ongoing

⁵³ See for example: <https://electronicintifada.net/content/photos-defying-israels-demolition-orders-south-hebron-hills/14350>

peaceful civil resistance that has been nominally successful. After more than ten years of weekly marches and actions, legal battles, and campaigns, their victories include: a ten-year stay on home demolitions in the village of al-Tuwani; electricity and water access for al-Tuwani; and, most impressively, having 41km of the “separation barrier” *removed* after it had already been constructed, pursuant to an order from the Israeli High Court of Justice, *Beit HaMishpat HaElyon*.

Violence in the South Hebron Hills

This community of villages in the South Hebron Hills has experienced enormous amounts of indiscriminate violence while living in a military training zone and being surrounded on three sides by radical Settlements. Indeed, these Settlements are what are known as “Outposts.” While all Settlements in the West Bank are considered “illegal” under international law, Israel itself classes a portion of Settlements as legal. However, Israel and the international community both consider the Outposts around Firing Zone 918 illegal. The illegal nature of these Outposts means that only the most radical Settlers inhabit them.

Because levels of Settler violence are similar in H2 and the South Hebron Hills, and because these are two of the most violent Settler communities in the West Bank,⁵⁴ I hold Settler violence as a “constant” between the two cases. However, state use of force in the South Hebron Hills is, in contrast, dramatically different than in H2. While checkpoints are placed somewhat at random between Firing Zone 918 and Yatta, the closest Palestinian city to the South Hebron Hills, they are not present between or within the villages of Firing Zone 918. Consequently,

⁵⁴ See http://www.btselem.org/topic/settler_violence, accessed November 7, 2016

though these small village communities are often blocked via roadblocks or curfews from the rest of the West Bank, they are not disconnected from one another. Because of the communal village structure and the familial connections between villages, many familial ties remain intact. Curfews are not imposed, though crowd control measures are used by the IDF to disperse peaceful demonstrations (no stone throwing in this nonviolent community) at the villagers' weekly assembly. The geography of the South Hebron Hills (disparate villages with desert in between – see Figure 4) is partly responsible for the lack of checkpoints and overall freedom of movement allowed within Firing Zone 918.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Government restrictions do prevent access to the city of Yatta. These restrictions force residents to conduct their lives within this small, local sphere and buy locally without access to Yatta's larger markets (which would provide access to manufactured goods and processed foods, as well as many vegetables). Further, al-Tuwani's residents' access to emergency services or health care is necessarily negatively impacted.



Soldiers on exercises in Firing Zone 918, with Palestinian homes in background/foreground



Home Demolitions (for building without the proper permit; though no permits were awarded).



Olive Farms in Firing Zone 918



Exercises in Tel al Khashaba

Figure 4 – South Hebron Hills. *Source:* CPT Palestine (<https://cptpalestine.wordpress.com/firing-zone-918-background/>), B'Tselem (http://www.btselem.org/south_hebron_hills/20160202_demolitions_in_firing_zone_918), B'Tselem (<http://m.btselem.org/ota?tid=154>), Author 2015, and EAPPI (<https://blog.eappi.org/category/access-to-resources/page/3/>)

State use of force in Firing Zone 918 involves military training exercises and associated property destruction, as well as home demolitions and crowd control measures. Military training exercises disrupt livestock and farming practices, destroy crops, and frequently demolish tents and caves (by bulldozing in the roof). Live rounds were used in Firing Zone 918 until the last few years, placing civilians at risk not only during exercises but in the event of unexploded

ordnance left behind. One interview respondent described his brother along with the family's most valuable possession, their plow camel, being blown up by unexploded munitions left in their fields.⁵⁶ Most families here farm a combination of grains/wheat, livestock, and olives. Olive trees are sometimes bulldozed to make way for military training exercises. Respondents view the military intervention and training that characterizes the South Hebron Hills as incredibly destructive to their lives:

“Soldiers come for exercises or they come and search the house. We don't have electricity and we live a hard life, we are acting for survival – we were born here and we will die here – but then the soldiers come here looking for guns at night. We don't even have electricity, how could we afford guns? Obviously we have none. But they wake everyone up and the children are sleeping and they bring them out and even search the wells – they also put things in the land when they train. [What things?] Bombs, or something. Things that explode in the land and ruin it. They run over our fields with their jeeps and tanks. Do you see how hard the life is here?”⁵⁷

While Israel has control of the land here, the IDF does not exert the same level of surveillance nor the same, persistent and constant troop presence with surveillance balloons and guard towers. Instead violence is completely indiscriminate – it is, by design, unpredictable as a part of military training and weapons testing. The existing literature and rationalist theories reviewed in chapter two would predict that such truly indiscriminate violence would increase militancy. Instead, this community has pursued civil resistance, without resorting to violence, for the last two decades.

Harassment is a frequent occurrence here, both from Settlers and IDF soldiers. There are frequent arrests for indefinite crimes such as walking “too close” to the Settlement, where “too close” has no definition and changes arbitrarily. A civilian might accidentally enter a “closed military zone” or lands that the Settlers claim while they graze their sheep.⁵⁸ Harassment also

⁵⁶ Personal Interview 44, Firing Zone 918 village, November 2015.

⁵⁷ Personal Interview 45, Firing Zone 918 village, November 2015.

⁵⁸ Personal Interview 32, al-Tuwani, November 2015.

comes in the form of name-calling, or spitting on shepherds, children, and farmers.⁵⁹ The most aggressive form of harassment is property destruction, or the common poisoning of livestock and of wells, which in addition to killing people, is among the most severe crimes here, as water is a rare and precious commodity.⁶⁰

There is a great deal of physical violence from the area's Settlers, comparable to H2. To show the strength of the nonviolent response by the residents of Firing Zone 918, I describe the Settler violence briefly below. The most frequently cited forms of physical violence are throwing stones, physical beatings, beatings with chains, and shootings (the Settlers from communities near Firing Zone 918 frequently carry guns). Most of the violence Settlers commit in this region is against children, particularly children walking each day from the outlying villages to school in the primary village, al-Tuwani.⁶¹ Their path to school requires them to pass in close proximity to Settlements. Reports of violence against children are extreme, and documented not only by Palestinians but by numerous Israeli and international human rights organizations.⁶² The Settlers' violence toward children has been so extreme that the civil resistance movement centered in al-Tuwani (described below) was able to win a case with the Israeli High Court of Justice mandating that the IDF provide a "patrol" to protect children from Settlers while they walk to school. This was a remarkable legal victory, particularly because IDF soldiers in the West Bank are deployed to protect Israeli citizens (Settlers) from Palestinians. Respondents from this area (as well as human rights NGOs such as Christian Peacemaker Teams, Operation Dove, and the International Solidarity Movement) report that shepherds out with their flocks also frequently

⁵⁹ For example, see this video compiled by Operation Dove: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4D3K8bNF7Uk>

⁶⁰ For some examples from 2012, see http://www.operationdove.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/OD_report-settlers_violence_in_shh.pdf

⁶¹ This is documented by an Italian non-profit, Operation Dove: <http://www.operationdove.org/>

⁶² B'Tselem and Operation Dove, in particular. For example, see: http://www.btselem.org/topic/south_hebron_hills

receive brutal treatment at the hands of Settlers – many cited incidents of being beaten with fists or rocks, often resulting broken bones and, in some cases, death.⁶³

Community Structure in Firing Zone 918

Each of the villages in Firing Zone 918 is comprised of several extended families (between 75-150 people per village), and social and familial ties between villages are close-knit. Al-Tuwani is the gateway to the region, and almost everyone in the villages has family members in al-Tuwani (see Figure 5). In 1999, the twelve villages within Firing Zone 918 were evicted under military orders, effectively rendering the inhabitants of those villages homeless.⁶⁴ They took refuge in al-Tuwani, which lies just outside the border of Firing Zone 918. This forced consolidation reified and strengthened existing social and community ties both within al-Tuwani and across the remaining villages. Four of the twelve villages were reestablished after the community, aided by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, which petitioned the Israeli High Court of Justice and secured an interim injunction allowing villagers to return to their homes and farm their lands. The dispute between the remaining villages and the Israeli Minister of Defense is ongoing, but provides another decades-long example of the residents of Firing Zone 918's commitment to civil resistance.

Occasionally, travel to and from Yatta (the closest major city) and the rest of Palestine is restricted by roadblocks, which is devastating both socially and in terms of access to emergency and health services (see Figure 5). Partially due to their isolation in the South Hebron Hills and largely due to their shared circumstances of living in Firing Zone 918, connections between

⁶³ Personal Interviews 48 and 64, Firing Zone 918 villages, November 2015.

⁶⁴ See descriptions here: http://www.btselem.org/south_hebron_hills/firing_zone_918; <http://www.acri.org.il/en/feed/?cat=71>

villages and amongst residents of the region remain strong, especially when compared to neighborhoods in a larger metropolitan area. When the villagers moved back and reconstructed their villages in 2000/2001, these tight connections remained. When asked how they cope with the indiscriminate violence and “thunder runs”, one respondent said: *“Together. We are close friends with those in other villages, and together we are strong.”*⁶⁵

People talk about connection and community as integral to their daily lives – that they are as strong as one another, that they rely on one another to get through these “hard times,” and that supporting each village and working together is the only thing that has kept them from being evicted from their land.⁶⁶




Figure 5: Map of Firing Zone 918 and surrounding region. Al-Tuwani is located just outside the border of Firing Zone 918 which is demarcated by yellow lines in the southeast quadrant. *Source:* Israeli Rights Group B'Tselem. http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/library/201301_south_hebron_hills_map_eng.jpg

⁶⁵ Personal Interview 42, Firing Zone 918 village, November 2015.

⁶⁶ Personal Interview 46, Firing Zone 918 village, Palestine, November 2015.

Findings from Qualitative Interviews

In spite of the violence they have experienced, Palestinians in the entire region of the South Hebron Hills have developed, nonviolently, a vibrant civil resistance movement. Not a *single* person in any of the villages of Firing Zone 918 espoused any level of militancy; their preferences were entirely consistent and supportive of the civil resistance effort. The history of civil resistance in Firing Zone 918 runs deep, and it is one of the few successful cases found in the West Bank (though Pearlman 2012 and King 2007 provide others). The movement began in 1999, when the Israelis declared Firing Zone 918 a closed military zone and issued an eviction order to remove every civilian. This included twelve villages and entailed the evacuation of several thousand people. The Israeli army then arrived with bulldozers and destroyed eight of the twelve of the villages; four were spared by an interim injunction. The dispossessed villagers were hosted at the principal village in the area, al-Tuwani, since it is technically outside the Firing Zone. The villagers were dismayed that the eviction didn't even make the news. They started having meetings within each village group and as an entire community, and gradually talked through various ways to resist Occupation.

“We started having meetings when we had lots of despair and we had almost lost hope and some of us almost turned to violence. But the goal of the Occupation is to force Palestinians to use violence to give them an excuse to be a victim. So we decided to stand strong together with nonviolence and civil resistance. We used legal methods, media attention, and organized direct actions. With Israeli nonprofits and international help.”⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Personal Interview 33, Firing Zone 918 village, Palestine, November 2015.

As others have found (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013), movement entrepreneurs were critical to establishing a viable civil resistance movement in this case. One man in particular (for the purpose of this paper he will be referred to as A), was convinced a nonviolent approach was the best and only approach, and was an active advocate for and participant in the discussions that residents of the villages of Firing Zone 918, complemented by the many villagers evicted in 1999, held on the various methods of fighting back. While he was a leader, A describes the nonviolent action plan as something the community conceived of together. From this influence and original community discussion, the seeds of a remarkable civil resistance movement were planted.

Members of the community have found their own ways to practice nonviolence, and cite community connection as the primary factor that makes this possible. For one woman, the solution was a women's cooperative:

[What convinced you that civil resistance was the right path?]

Well it all started in 2000. The main point was that we shouldn't lose people to being shot all the time. Every person matters here – we are a small village and each person matters a lot. We can't lose anyone. We decided this [civil resistance] is a good and effective way not to give any excuse to harm us. The community bond is the most important part of the civil resistance effort.

[Prompt to elaborate – Could you tell me more about that? <Respondent wasn't sure what I mean> Second prompt – Could you please tell me what you think it is about this place that is different from the rest of the West Bank—what makes civil resistance possible here?] *Each place [in the West Bank] has its own situation, its own special challenge. ... For example, women are victims of this whole situation. We have no education - mostly women here are illiterate, but we believe we have to be part [of] the change here, which is why we built the school. Through this we can work together as women. Through the handicrafts cooperative [which we started,] we hope to send our message to the world. Our main goal is to send the message that we are women under oppression but we are alive and we are resisting. So, we started a women's project to support the families of the area. We started the cooperative for handicrafts. There were seven women, and so we started it, now its thirty-six women. And we never forget the rule which is that we need one another. And now CPT and Operation Dove [nonprofits and*

*human rights groups] sometimes bring groups to buy things from us. So we are resisting.*⁶⁸

Every Palestinian in the area has a story of arrest or assault as a result of encounters with Settlers or due to demolition orders carried out by the IDF, and many have videos of their respective incidents, recorded by human rights observers such as Operation Dove and Christian Peacemaker Teams. One respondent described his assault, jail time, and the how the Popular Resistance Committee facilitated his release. This experience encouraged him to stay in his village near Firing Zone 918:

*“They attacked me as a result. They [Operation Dove] filmed it and others came to help but then they [the IDF] arrested me. For three days [they] kept me in the military base and they treated me very badly. They gave me dog food! So I didn’t eat during this time. I said “you have to respect us and accord us the principles of humanity. You have to treat me as a human being.” Then they moved me to Ofer Military Base – then to a jail near Ramallah. They charged me with assault of a policeman even though I had been only digging my well and Operation Dove had a video. How could I have assaulted anyone – there were thirteen soldiers and two policemen and my hands were tied behind my back! How could I have assaulted them?? They fined me 5000 shekels and I would not have gotten home but [for] help from the Resistance Committee. My wife asked me to leave but the Prophet said the holy land will be resisting injustice until the judgment day, and I want to stand strong with the Committee because they [Israel] want to kick us out. This is the goal. To try to make us leave. So I decided to stay.”*⁶⁹

I interviewed A about his decision to suggest civil resistance as the best way to resist the Israeli Occupation. I also asked how he was able to convince community members to adopt such a strategy, considering how much violence they had already experienced. With each response, he pointed to community connection as the key element that made civil resistance possible:

[How did you decide this was the way to resist? How did you make it work?]
“This was very difficult to do, but it is just what made sense about the situation. I realized that it was the goal of the Occupation to make us use force – any kind of force, because then they have a reason to put us down. So then I had to convince

⁶⁸ Personal Interview 42, Firing Zone 918 village, Palestine, November 2015.

⁶⁹ Personal Interview 44, Firing Zone 918 village, Palestine, November 2015.

everyone that I was right. So we had meetings – very deep conversations – over and over and over – where we talked about it ... they [Israel] have all the power, they have all the money, they have all the force – they have control – what good will fighting do? But legal [actions] and protests and civil resistance? This I thought would work. So I convinced people.”

[How did you do convince them?] *It was very hard, very slow. And everyone had to agree. I walked to all the villages around in the area so everyone would agree. At first it was just me but then it was others. Slowly, slowly people agreed. And we have had some success.”*

[Why do you think people listened to you?] *“This is only about how strong the community is. It is about how we are all in it now for one another and about how kinship between the people made it easier to spread the message and keeps us strong. We all convinced and reinforced one another so it was not just me alone. It was all of us together.”⁷⁰*

Inferred in his response are two aspects of social connection – the ability to travel and to communicate freely in order to maintain social ties, and the value of pre-existing community relationships. This connection, in his view, is what made the civil resistance movement possible. Community connection underlies every part of the successes of this region in the South Hebron Hills as well as the Palestinians’ ability to continue with the civil resistance strategy. A said this most clearly when he described interacting with another member of the community:

“This man, he is almost a therapist for me! I go to him for support and guidance and wisdom. He has the whole Quran memorized and he takes much time to think through things. He is someone I can talk to about the hardest things. Without him, I do not know what I would do.”⁷¹

Other members of the community also cite connection, and resulting trust, as the critical component to building this civil resistance movement:

[Why is civil resistance possible here?] *“Unity and trust built between the people here is what makes it possible. Everyone feels a part of this, of one another. And also everyone has full trust in the Committee [the local Popular Resistance Committee] because they know they [the Committee] will run to help when*

⁷⁰ Personal Interview 33, Firing Zone 918 village, Palestine, November 2015.

⁷¹ Personal Interview 33, about Respondent 44, Firing Zone 918 village, Palestine, November 2015.

anyone calls. And because of this people who left before have all come back. The community is the biggest part of the civil resistance.”⁷²

Despite the extreme level of violence these people have experienced, and despite expressing the same amounts of frustration and anger as their counterparts in H2, the community connections among the villages in Firing Zone 918 enabled them to hope and trust in a more peaceful path, and to resist “together.” The *lack* of isolation was striking. When asked about identity, residents in other parts of the West Bank would say they were “Palestinian” or “Muslim” first. When members of the communities in the South Hebron Hills (where al Tuwani is the principal village) were asked about their identity some joked that they were “Tuwani!” and then said, “no no, Palestinian, and Muslim.”⁷³ The sense of community connection and willingness to identify on a local level was palpably stronger here than in other communities.

The situation in the South Hebron Hills expands the conception of what it means to practice nonviolence. For this community, nonviolence goes beyond boycotts, protests, marches, and legal action – though they also engaged in these activities. Nonviolence in Firing Zone 918 means to exist – to continue to live, to graze sheep, and to pick olives.

“Tuwani is the main gateway to all the villages in this region. We have a strong gate. We give strength to all the villages around us. Daily life is a life of resistance, everyone here is resisting all day long. Children resist by going to school, farmers resist by going to their lands because they are arrested if they go to their lands, living here and in the hills is resistance.”⁷⁴

Finally, respondents in the villages of Firing Zone 918 talked about hope. No one else in the West Bank ever mentioned anything akin to hope, nor the possibility or opportunity or the chance for things to get better. When respondents were asked directly whether change was

⁷² Personal Interview 42, Firing Zone 918 village, Palestine, November 2015.

⁷³ Personal Interview 47, Firing Zone 918 village, Palestine, November 2015.

⁷⁴ Personal Interview 33, Firing Zone 918 village, Palestine, November 2015.

possible, outside of Firing Zone 918, all respondents said no, or “only for the worse.” Yet respondents (*all* of them) in Firing Zone 918 villages said yes, “change was possible.”

Conclusions

Using evidence from life story-style interviews in olive-farming Palestinian communities in the West Bank, I provide evidence that in this case, state use of force policies designed to restrict movement and connection within communities was significantly more likely to radicalize populations than even indiscriminant violence. Conversely, I found communities where social ties have been maintained were more willing to participate in political processes, civil resistance activities, and retain hope, whereas fractured communities lose hope for positive change and develop militant preferences. The checkpoints in H2 cause civilians to feel dehumanized, disconnected, and isolated. This evidence supports my hypothesis: the lack of social connection and the inability to relate to (and receive help from) friends and family about these degrading experiences, in conjunction with the horror civilians experience from such violence, push civilians toward more militant positions.

The deeply qualitative nature of this project provides clear evidence of the mechanisms at work and also highlights the value of disaggregating violence as well as considering the role community connection plays in individual-level preference formation. Life story-style interviews enable olive farmers to share their lived experiences. In these interviews, they were able to describe how these different types of violence have influenced their political preferences and the types of tactics they believe are appropriate to achieve their political goals. Importantly, neither in H2 nor in the South Hebron Hills did state-sanctioned violence or population-control measures

decrease “resistance;” rather, the type of violence impacted the form of the resulting resistance. State use of force policies (violence) did not uniformly lead to compliance: the type of state use of force mattered.

In these two cases, militancy increases with higher levels of territorial control/selective violence and decreases in conditions with less territorial control and indiscriminate violence, the opposite of what the dominant literature would expect. I find evidence that freedom of movement restrictions are related to civilian support for militancy in H2, and further, the access to social connection is critical to the successful development of a civil resistance movement in Firing Zone 918. These findings point to social connection and community support as key elements currently missing from our analysis of how civilians respond to state use of force -- and how these elements may contribute to shaping civilians’ political preferences. Additionally, contrary to the expectations of COIN, the villages of Firing Zone 918 provide a compelling case where state violence occurs in large quantities *without* increasing civilian militancy. Thus, these findings also provide support for my theory over a COIN model. But, the Firing Zone 918 villages had strong, pre-existing social ties and freedom of movement within and between villages but still required a movement entrepreneur to create a successful resistance movement.

Can these findings be applied more broadly? Is olive farming in the West Bank unique from a) other activities in the West Bank; and b) from other cultural contexts? While these communities are of course unique, I believe these findings warrant further investigation of the role social connection can play in nonviolent political engagement, including resistance movements. Further, social connection is defined, in part, by individuals’ control over their physical environment including freedom of movement, e.g., checkpoints can delimit social connection. Consequently, further investigation is also warranted into the way physical

restrictions on social connection can, potentially, push individuals and communities toward militancy or enable and indeed facilitate alternative forms of resistance.

Chapter Four: Comparing Types of State Use of Force in the West

Bank

Introduction

Despite the vast literature on mobilization and conflict, relatively few works examine the diversity of state use of force and the varied impacts on civilians. This lack of scholarship is largely due to the generally held belief that the simplest binary approach (violence occurs or it doesn't) is sufficient to explain the majority of effects violence has on civilians. The lack of consensus about the relationship between repressive violence and civilian militancy suggests that different types of violence (lethal violence vs. non-lethal use of force like checkpoints and curfews) produce different results. Indeed, a scale of violence was developed in a more recent work (Dugan and Chenoweth 2012) which helps to elucidate previously murky findings (608). In this chapter, I build directly on this research agenda and evaluate different types of state use of force and whether there is a relationship between those types and civilian political preferences about militancy or civil resistance.

This chapter constructs a typology of state use of force, and uses research from a wide range of disciplines to generate likely predictions of how those different sorts of force might reasonably be expected to affect civilians. I then proceed to evaluate whether and how these categories could be operationalized quantitatively and made applicable to more than one conflict. This typology has the potential for real world applications, both for civil resistance activists hoping to keep their movements nonviolent and for states working to combat terrorism without increasing militancy among their populations. States trying to counter terrorist or militant groups

could avoid use of force policies whose side-effects facilitate civilian support for militancy, and civil resistance activists could focus their work on mitigating the effects of state use of force most likely to impair their commitment to nonviolence.

This chapter also takes the first step in evaluating the role checkpoints play in the broader context of the conflict: are checkpoints uniquely positioned to increase militancy, or are they a minor effect relative to other state use of force policies, such as forced detentions or extrajudicial killings? I combine the strong empirical relationship Longo, Canetti, and Hite-Rubin (2014) discovered in their natural experiment leveraging checkpoint easement in the West Bank with my findings of a robust relationship between checkpoints that fracture community and militancy. While the data presented here cannot fully adjudicate between these mechanisms, this chapter presents a means to do so with deeper, fine-grained data collection efforts from automated coding of UN archival documents. In lieu of such more complete data, I develop an original dataset of different types of state use of force and civilian public opinion in the West Bank. I then evaluate the relationship between changes in different types of state use of force and changes in civilian public opinion regarding militancy and nonviolent political participation in the West Bank. I augment my quantitative findings with evidence from my qualitative interviews in Hebron district from field sites with differing levels and types of violence exposure (outside of H2 and Firing Zone 918).

Theory

As Christian Davenport (2007) notes in his review of state repression: “[t]o date, researchers have paid far more attention to the evils done against governments (and citizens) by

dissidents, rebels, and terrorists than to the evils done by presidents, the police, military, secret service, national guard, and death squads against those within their territorial jurisdiction” (1). I draw on literature from the study of repression and human rights, as well as sociology, to delineate a typology of state use of force that could apply in any conflict, outline how these different types of state use of force might reasonably be expected to affect civilians, and apply these to the experience of civilians in the West Bank. As stated in chapter one, the variety of contradictory findings from the repression and civil war literature about the effect of state violence on civilians’ support for militancy may be due to the aggregation of state use of force into one category – usually deaths.

A few scholars have made progress toward this conclusion with promising results. First, David Snyder (1976) prodded scholars to move toward a "multidimensional" assessment of state use of force, examining both different amounts of force and different types of force, “rather than their aggregates” (Snyder 288-290).⁷⁵ Second, Marwan Khawaja (1993) conducted an in-depth analysis of fourteen different types of state use of force (from tear gas to arrests to shootings) and their relationship to Palestinian protests during the first Intifada. He finds strong evidence some types of violence can increase the likelihood of protests while others seem to act as a deterrent, supporting the idea that examining state use force in the aggregate cannot tell us whether repression will increase or decrease civilian support for militancy. Using dynamic, continuous-time models (a Weibull model), Khawaja finds threats, provocation, and tear gas all dramatically increase the likelihood of protests, while home searches decrease the likelihood of protests. This finding supports further disaggregation of state use of force. Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) also find significant variation in the effects both different types of use of force and different types of state concession (“carrots”) have on civilian responses to those policies in Israel. However,

⁷⁵ Quoted in Khawaja 1993.

neither of these studies attempts to construct a broader typology of state violence that could be quantified and applied cross-nationally.

Findings in public health demonstrate violence is not homogenous: for example, some types of violence are more likely to cause PTSD than other types (Pizarro, Silver, and Prause 2006; Levy and Sidel 2008), even when controlling for “severity” or “amount.” Rape and torture are more likely to result in PTSD than firefights, for example. Additionally, the context in which violence occurs is significant: e.g., killing a member of enemy forces is less likely to cause PTSD than are friendly fire incidents, though the actual act, killing another human being, is the same. Thus, treating all violence as equivalent and evaluating the effects of state violence on civilian populations generally is *unlikely* to analyze civilian experiences accurately.

A telling example occurred during Operation Demetrius in Northern Ireland, when the British used public beatings, verbal abuse, harassment with dogs, and, in an extreme case, tying civilians to the front of British trucks (as human shields) during the process of arrests. This confrontation turned peaceful protesters into sympathizers with the armed resistance, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (English 2005). Even though dissatisfaction was previously present and the material costs of committing violence against British forces had increased, anger and resentment about the brutal treatment provided the catalyst for action. The British had territorial control, the ability to manipulate survival and incentives, the capacity for selective violence, and good intelligence to identify potential PIRA members, making their threats credible. Rather than inducing compliance, as a rationalist model might predict, these British policies fueled the opposition (Bew and Gillespie 1993). Operation Demetrius led to a surge in recruitment for the PIRA and empowered the PIRA to seize control of Derry and erect a blockade that would stand for the next eleven months. This example argues for a broader

understanding of the effects of state use of force on civilians; we cannot only examine “selective” or “indiscriminate” violence, or only killings.

Violent events do not have the same effect on civilians across time – for example, many of the quotes from interviews presented in chapter three allude to civilians becoming “deadened” to state use of force over time; they describe that over time they stop being “afraid” and start becoming angry. These quotes also highlight the importance of emotional responses to violent experiences. Different emotional states affect a subject’s appraisal of a given situation (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001). For example, fear is correlated with uncertainty (Lerner and Keltner 2001) and increased anxiety (Grillon et al. 1991; Grillon et al. 1993; Davis 1992). People who are fearful “value self-preservation above all else,” and fear leads to “attention funneling” (Petersen 2011, 38). People who are afraid are less likely to assess or assign blame to others or to the situation, sometimes even believing that they “deserved” the treatment they received (Petersen 2011). Thus, some types of use of force might induce compliance at first.

In contrast, anger correlates with appraisals of certainty and control (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Smith and Ellsworth 1985), which increases one’s willingness to take a risk (Lerner et al. 2003). Angry individuals become “intuitive prosecutors” (Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999, 781) and “tend to specify a perpetrator and then seek retribution” (Petersen 2011, 35). Anger simplifies decision-making and predisposes people toward retaliatory action. Anger makes people “indiscriminately optimistic” (Litvak et al. 2010, 289) about their possibilities for success in a given action (Fischhoff et al. 2005; Lerner et al. 2003) as well as eager to act (Harmon-Jones 2003; Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000), which might increase their preference for retaliatory or violent actions. However, emotions can have a shorter “half

life” than one might expect –violence that educed fear one day might not have the same effect a year later. Indeed, individuals are “active regulators” of their own emotions (Gross 1998, 2014): people use emotions like anger and fear to better manage a stressful situation. These emotional aspects may tinge the context and reception of different types of state use of force, and thus affect civilians’ responses.

While all of the potential facets of state use of force cannot be addressed here, or their temporal properties, I take a step toward tackling this unwieldy jumble more systematically by dividing state use of force into five primary categories with potential cross-national application. I also provide West Bank-relevant examples of each. In doing so, I hope to create a typology of state use of force that could be applied to other conflicts and allow for more consistent and rigorous cross-country analysis of state violence. These are:

- (1) Extrajudicial killings: killing members of the civilian population believed to be associated with terrorism, either preemptively or in relation to an ongoing attack, without trial. In the West Bank, these are often referred to as “targeted killings;”
- (2) Forced detention: arresting and holding political prisoners or those the state suspects of terrorism but does not have enough evidence to try in a court of law. In the West Bank, this is called “Administrative Detention;”
- (3) Freedom of movement restriction: as discussed at length in chapters two and three. In the West Bank, these include checkpoints, curfews and surveillance;
- (4) Property destruction: any state-ordered or sanctioned destruction of physical structures, land seizures, or destruction of other property, such as livestock, goods for sale, wells or food stores. Home demolitions are the primary example in the West Bank, though land

seizures and targeting of olive trees and livestock are also common, as described in chapter 3; and

- (5) Structural violence: drawn from Johan Galtung's (1969) concept of laws relating to use of force which privilege a certain group over another group (based on ascriptive characteristics about members of that group), which can be considered a structural type of systematic violence against a given group. An example in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict would be: if a Palestinian or an Arab Israeli throws a stone, it is an act of terrorism, whereas if a Jewish Israeli throws a stone, it is not a crime.

Specifying dimensions of state use of force is important for two reasons: it helps make these concepts measurable and thus allows us to compare their relative impacts, and further allows us to apply these concepts across contexts.

Extrajudicial/Targeted Killings

The means by which we distinguish killing in war from murder is twofold: first, it occurs during a conflict fought for a "just cause," and second, it is fought by "just means," in this case, both actors are combatants. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II prohibit killing civilians and equate it with murder, even under wartime conditions. But, due to the fact that most battles today are fought in civilian centers with at least one side comprised of non-state actors, distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants has become increasingly difficult in modern conflict, leading to potentially lethal consequences for those who don't fall under subjective conceptions of "innocence" (Gade 2010). This exacerbates tensions in the West Bank between Palestinians and Israelis, for Palestinians contend many of those killed by Israel in the

name of increased security are civilians, and thus the killings amount to “extrajudicial killings” or murder, while Israel argues that they are legitimate targets as “unlawful combatants,” and killing them is an act of self-defense (Gross 2006).

A wide range of research finds that rather than decreasing the number of insurgent attacks, as states tend to argue, killing insurgents and civilians accused of aiding insurgents either has no impact (Hafez and Hatfield 2006), or even increases proximate insurgent attacks (Eastin and Gade 2016; Kaplan et al. 2005; Kaplan, Mintz and Mishal 2006; Atran 2003; Ganor 2005; Pape 2003). Many of the above studies hypothesize that civilian militancy and a resulting increase in recruitment may partly explain the increase in attacks following violence against civilians. Indeed, the counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) is premised on the idea that killing civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure can radicalize civilians to the point that they consider joining terrorist movements (see Nagl et al. 2008).

Thus, two plausible and competing hypotheses exist for the relationship between state level extrajudicial or targeted killings and civilian support for militancy. Extrajudicial killings could reasonably be expected to increase Palestinian feelings of anger and injustice, which has been argued to increase preferences for violence (e.g., Gurr 1970), and foster support for violent retaliation against the state. For example, it was a sense of injustice that ignited the American Revolution; underlying all of the grievances contained in the US Declaration of Independence is the claim for equal treatment under the law, denied to Americans by the British crown. Similarly, extrajudicial killings could motivate Palestinians to take militant action to address inequality, discrimination, oppression, and targeted killings.

Alternatively, extrajudicial killings, especially targeted killings, could be argued to provide a credible commitment that those who take action against the state will pay the ultimate

price. Some scholars (Kalyvas 2006) argue (as applied to the context of the West Bank) such a credible commitment should decrease civilian support for militancy. Since the efficacy of attacks in civilian centers is linked to the ability to target members of militant groups directly (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003), these scholars argue targeted hits should be effective at subduing the local population.

Another factor, longevity, might come into play in the West Bank.⁷⁶ This Israeli-Palestinian conflict has continued for more than six decades, and civilians have been exposed to extraordinary amounts of violence. Because the threat of violence is ubiquitous and extrajudicial killings are perceived as relatively common, civilians in the West Bank may consider themselves constantly subject to threat. Thus, I expect the extreme exposure to violence over time has limited the daily level of concern about extrajudicial killings. Therefore, it is probable an increase in civilian casualties will only increase resentment for Israel and thus increase support for violent retaliation, rather than achieve the designed coercive incentives.

In Israel, there are conditions under which targeted killings -“hits”- (Kaplan et al. 2005, 227) are deemed acceptable (David 2003; Guiora 2004 – though not acceptable, of course, to Palestinians): the first was during the first and second Intifadas, when Israel targeted members of organized terror groups based on specific intelligence. The second is much more recent: killing “suspected” terrorists in the act of committing an attack, such as a knifing or car ramming attack. In some cases, soldiers claim to have thought a civilian had a knife, but Palestinian civilians dispute these claims. Several studies evaluating the policy of targeted killings during the second Intifada found that it did not give Israel an advantage, and instead served as a recruitment tool for terrorist groups (Kaplan et al. 2005; Kaplan, Mintz, and Mishal 2006).

⁷⁶ Longevity was not a factor in the wars forming the basis for the studies referenced above, such as Kalyvas 2006 (the Greek Civil War).

A plausible hypothesis then might be:

Hypothesis 3: *An increase in “extrajudicial” or “targeted” killings will correspond with a curvilinear increase in civilian preferences in favor of militancy.*

Administrative Detention

“Administrative detention” is a policy allowing Israel to hold prisoners for an indefinite period without accusing them of a specific crime or providing public evidence for their accusation. Addameer, a rights organization focused on administrative detention, states: “since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967, Israeli forces have arrested more than 800,000 Palestinians, constitut[ing] almost 20% of the total Palestinian population in the occupied Palestinian territories” (2015). Many rights organizations argue these detentions are in breach of not only Israeli domestic law but also international law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9 (1-2)) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibit arbitrary detention, direct a right to a fair trial, and instruct that the defendant has a right to be notified of the crimes of which she is accused. Palestinians therefore widely consider Israel’s administrative detention policy to be illegal and regard Palestinians held in administrative detention as political prisoners. Israel contends these individuals are held to increase state security and are held under military law, and thus administrative detention does not violate Palestinians’ rights.

Existing studies about the relationship between forced arrests or detention and civilian support for violent retaliation against the state are limited. However, some scholars have found

prisons can be used as a space to facilitate broader resistance efforts, and prison protests can affect broader political movements (Nelson Mandela's imprisonment in South Africa and Bobby Sand's hunger strike in Northern Ireland are prime examples). In Palestine, Julie Norman (2014) found persons in administrative detention who conducted strikes or protests had a mobilizing effect on civilian support outside the prison system, particularly during the second Intifada. Additionally, larger numbers of persons in administrative detention could increase a sense of injustice among friends and family, potentially increasing support for violent action against the state. However, due to the long history of administrative detention in Israel and the lack of recent unified prison strikes, members of the Palestinian population may have become somewhat immune to the numbers of people in administrative detention over time, or simply are not aware of relatively small increases in numbers. Thus, there may be a logarithmic relationship between administrative detention and civilian support for militancy (*H4*).

For example, the size of the group being arrested and the publicity around that arrest may dictate civilians' likely responses to it: smaller groups of detainees may be less likely to catch civilian attention or shift civilian preferences. Anecdotal evidence from other conflicts supports this premise: Operation Demetrius, during the Troubles in Northern Ireland, generated a huge amount of support for the PIRA, but it seems to be largely because of the sheer number of people arrested and the attention those arrests received. This makes sense, and as a result many states, like Israel, opt to arrest fewer numbers at one time. For nonviolent activists seeking to generate leverage from arrests, generating press attention may be the primary means to do so.

Freedom of Movement Restrictions

This form of state use of force is discussed in detail in both chapters two and three, as well as in the following studies: Brown 2004; Bornstein 2008; Kotef and Amir 2011; Naaman 2006. The same hypotheses from chapter three (Hypotheses 1 and 2) will be evaluated here: freedom of movement restrictions will correlate with an increase in civilian militancy.

Property Destruction

Property destruction, including the destruction of livelihoods (like olive trees), food or water sources, or livestock (described in chapter three) deeply impacts civilians' day to day lives. In addition to the material loss or potential physical harm done from, for example, drinking from a poisoned well is compounded by the emotional and psychological violation of losing ownership, control or privacy over one's most basic needs. Larger scale property destruction is likely to have even deeper impacts.

Israel recently restarted a policy of punitive and precautionary home demolitions. "In punitive house demolitions, the IDF demolishes or seals houses that were home to Palestinian suicide terrorists or to individuals suspected, detained, or convicted of involvement in violent acts against Israelis" (Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2015, 30). In a detailed analysis during the First Intifada, Efrat Silber (2010) found home demolitions, rather than serving as a deterrent, united community residents and neighbors, and increased resistance to the Israeli state. Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2015) have similar findings, though conditioned on the type of home demolition described: targeted demolitions of terrorist houses decrease the number of terrorist attacks while precautionary (or "clearing operations") increase the number of attacks. The authors contend this is because home demolitions constitute an "indiscriminate" sort of

violence against civilians, which can often create a backlash against the state because it fails to provide clear incentives and thus supports insurgent recruitment (Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2008; Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2015). It is worth noting home demolition is a particularly severe punishment for Palestinians, as homes are the most important asset a family has and are symbols of status; a prominent Arab curse is “May your house be destroyed” (Silber 2010).

Because I am examining civilian preferences toward militancy rather than terror attacks, I believe results may differ from the above findings. For example, I believe home demolitions of any sort will increase resentment and anger against the Israeli state, fueling support for retaliation. While the majority of individuals may not, and likely will not, take any action against the state, an increasingly militant population holds a host of advantages for insurgents looking for new recruits or shelter amongst the population. A more cynical view would suggest Israel conducts home demolitions to provoke a violent or militant Palestinian response, giving a reason to confiscate new land and increase restrictions on Palestinian life. There may also be reason to expect that the relationship between property destruction and militancy is curvilinear – property destruction will affect civilians significantly at first, yet with higher frequency it will matter less, and eventually the effect will diminish (though never reverse). The rationale here is the fatigue and shock of home demolitions is highest at the start.

Hypothesis 5: Property destruction will have a curvilinear relationship to civilian militancy.

Structural Violence

The concept of structural violence was born (at least for political science) in Galtung's (1969) deep dive into what constitutes violence. In part four of his analysis, Galtung discusses "whether or not there is a subject who acts" (170-171) and draws a distinction between a specific person who perpetrates harm and a system or structure which does so; the latter he terms "structural violence".

"In both cases individuals may be killed or mutilated, hit or hurt ... But whereas in the first case these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors, in the second case this is no longer meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances" (171).

Galtung references the power to decide the distribution of resources, hunger and life expectancy; but this conception could easily be extended to include the provisioning of legal protections and the way in which rights are distributed and granted to certain groups over others. He points out "in a society where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when one person kills another" (171).

This conception, I argue, takes on a darker role in conflict zones. The systems disenfranchising minority communities in day-to-day life are exacerbated in conflict. When resources become scarce and suspicions abound, more privileged groups are more likely to target and blame minority groups; political tolerance is unlikely. As a result, these structural aspects of violence may be the most critical -- and least measured or accounted for -- when we study violence and its impacts on civilians. But measuring structural violence is tricky. One possibility is to evaluate the increase or decrease in laws privileging certain groups over other groups in conflict spaces where the state maintains control; i.e., do certain groups lose rights or face greater restrictions on travel or other categories irrespective of their personal behavior?

This would constitute structural violence. Where the state does not maintain control, a possible measurement is via a non-state actor group's "targeting policy:" some groups might target only other armed groups, some might kill certain types of civilians and not others. While these measures may be in some ways more "direct" than Galtung's conception of structural violence, the effect of an armed group choosing to privilege certain members of a society over others might follow patterns similar to those envisioned by Galtung.

Data Collection

I construct an original dataset from a combination of existing datasets on Palestinian public opinion (drawn from a quarterly survey of Palestinian Public Opinion administered by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research), and hand coding of documents from the UN and various human rights groups (e.g., B'Tselem, Human Rights Watch, and Addameer). I plan to extend this analysis with automated scrapes of UN archival documents, which are to be release to me in later this year, and also local news sources to capture "issue attention." The unit of analysis is governorate/quarter.

Public Opinion Data

All public opinion data are drawn from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR)'s quarterly polls. I use surveys from 2006 to 2012 because these are the years for which PCPSR has released the district level data (they wait to protect respondents); this results in 11 West Bank Districts with 22 surveys each, for a total of 242 observations. From

these data I generate the dependent variable and several key control variables for this study. The dependent variables, SUPPORT FOR MILITANCY, and SUPPORT FOR PEACE, are coded from two questions that regularly appear on PCPSR's surveys. For SUPPORT FOR PEACE, I used the question: "*Generally, do you see yourself as: a) supportive of the peace process, b) opposed to the peace process, or c) in-between supportive and opposed.*" This is numerically coded as 0, 1, 2, with 2 being support of peace. For SUPPORT FOR MILITANCY, I used the question: "*Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I.... a) strongly support, b) support, c) oppose, or d) strongly oppose.*" This is numerically coded as 1 being support or strongly support and 0 being oppose or strongly opposed.

Each of these variables is operationalized as a change in support: $n - (n - 1)$ where n is the current quarter. In other words, last quarter minus the current quarter's percentage of support. This allows me to measure how much a change in the number of checkpoints affects a change in militancy (an attempt to get at endogeneity concerns).

Because census data in the West Bank is only taken every two years, I use proxies for demographic information from the PCPSR surveys to approximate usual demographic controls. These include: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, operationalized as whether someone plans to vote or not; EDUCATION, operationalized as a scale between illiterate with a value of 1, and BA or higher with a value of 5; RELIGIOSITY, operationalized as how many times per day you pray (0-5); REFUGEE, operationalized as the percent of the population who are refugees; and CITY operationalized as percent of the population who live in cities.

These data are aggregated to the governorate/quarter level as a percent. The militancy question is missing from five surveys that I use, while the peace question is missing from three surveys. I deal with missing data through listwise deletion and linear interpolation (generate

estimates of missing values based on a linear trend between the two closest points) and present the results from interpolation here.

Independent Variables: I use a count of FLYING CHECKPOINTS to measure freedom of movement restrictions. These data come from the UN Mission to the Occupied Territories, which the UN Mission collected from its archives specifically for this project. However, it is important to note this count of checkpoint represents only a fraction of total checkpoints and closure obstacles in the West Bank. The “missing” checkpoints are likely to be permanent checkpoints or closure obstacles. As such, it seems likely those permanent checkpoints would have a much larger impact on civilians’ freedom of movement.⁷⁷ Future work including fixed checkpoints will generate more reliable results than those presented here. These data are collected at the governorate/month level and aggregated to the quarter level.

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, operationalized as a count of persons currently held in detention during that period, is provided by Addameer and B’Tselem reports on administrative detention. However, these only vary across time as they are not divided out into governorate of origin. This variable is therefore space invariant. The UN has these data disaggregated by district. HOME DEMOLITIONS are a count of homes demolished per month in the West Bank and are also space invariant; they are drawn from B’Tselem reports. However, because of a “stay” on home demolitions, B’Tselem reports no homes demolished from 2006-2012 (the full course of my opinions data). UN reports contradict this report, but without full access I’m unable to code this variable and thus it drops out of the models below. EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS are a count of extrajudicial killings from B’Tselem reports, including any persons attacked preventively or killed on the scene of an attack after the threat had been eliminated. Structural violence is not

⁷⁷ The UN Mission has stated they will release to me data on all closure obstacles and permanent checkpoints in the West Bank, but to date I have only received flying checkpoints data.

operationalized here, but could be operationalized as the introduction of new laws that are either more or less restrictive for a specific group.

I use an OLS model to evaluate the effect of a lagged change in checkpoints (and other IVs and controls) on the change in civilian militancy with both GOVERNORATE and TIME FIXED EFFECT (quarter) in some models (see Table 1). This design evaluates the effect of a change in independent variables one period ago on the change in the dependent variable in the current period. This method is designed to mimic experimental methods and resolve endogeneity concerns by examining how a shift in the past affects a shift in the present.

Results and conclusions

Table 1 reports results for three different regressions addressing this question. Model 1 involves regressing simply the lagged values of each independent and control variable on SUPPORT FOR MILITANCY, with both time and space fixed effects. Model 2 models the effect of a lagged change in independent and control variables on a change in militancy, without time or space fixed effects, and Model 3 is equivalent to Model 2, but includes both time and space fixed effects. Model 2 demonstrates the best goodness of fit according to AIC.

Results here are not robust, as expected due to the lack of UN Mission data on the permanent checkpoints. However, this modeling demonstrates the possibility of reliably disaggregating and quantifying violence using this typology of violence, which will make evaluating the relationships between different sorts of violence and civilian responses to it possible in future. In the model below, FLYING CHECKPOINTS have no relationship with militancy according to these models – in Model 2, it achieves statistical significance but it is effectively a

precisely estimated zero (confidence bands cross zero, so we cannot even be sure of the direction of the effect). It does not achieve statistical significance in the other two models, and indeed in those models confidence bands cross zero, meaning we cannot even be sure of the direction of the effect between the two. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION has a positive and statistically significant relationship to militancy in Model 1, but no statistically significant relationship in Models 2 and 3, and indeed given that the confidence bands for those estimates cross zero, we again cannot get a sense of the likely direction of the results. EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS and UNEMPLOYMENT achieve negative and statistically significant relationships in one model each, but not in the others. As well, the direction of the effect changes depending on the model, decreasing confidence in any findings.

Table 1: State use of force and civilian support for militancy

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	0.733***	0.00525	0.0714**
	-0.254	-0.0176	-0.028
Lagged Count of Flying Checkpoints	-2.15e-05		
	(0.000127)		
Lagged Voting	0.0894		
	(0.0856)		
Lagged Support for Peace	-0.101		
	(0.0650)		
Lagged Admin Detention	0.000239***		
	(6.62e-05)		
Lagged Percent Education	-0.0655		
	(0.0920)		
Lagged Percent Refugee	-0.0120		
	(0.0818)		
Lagged Percent Female	-0.483		
	(0.369)		
Lagged Percent Unemployment	-0.00133		
	(0.119)		
Palestinians Killed	8.26e-06	-2.62e-05	-0.000212**
	(3.88e-05)	(3.53e-05)	(9.41e-05)
Lagged Change in Checkpoints		-0.000379*	-0.000218

		(0.000204)	(0.000215)
Lagged Change in Admin Detention		0.000139	0.000367
		(0.000315)	(0.000448)
Lagged Change in Support for Peace		-0.0782	0.0387
		(0.0693)	(0.0759)
Lagged Change in likelihood of Voting		0.0320	0.128
		(0.0944)	(0.0959)
Lagged Change in Education		-0.127	-0.0472
		(0.102)	(0.110)
Lagged Change in Refugees		-0.0487	-0.0332
		(0.0766)	(0.0769)
Lagged Change in Percent Women		0.127	-0.269
		(0.372)	(0.370)
Lagged Change in Unemployment		-0.128*	0.0700
		(0.0684)	(0.129)
Observations	165	132	132
R-squared	0.636	0.094	0.298
Using First Differences	No	Yes	Yes
Time Fixed Effect	Yes	No	Yes
Space Fixed Effect	Yes	No	Yes
AIC	-353.1956	-196.2112	-213.5133
Standard errors in parentheses			
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

Table 1: OLS Regression modeling the relationship between checkpoints and militancy

Table 1 does not include forthcoming data from the UN Mission, so it is not surprising this modeling provides no support for a specific relationship between checkpoints and militancy. However, the purpose of this regression modeling is to demonstrate support for the method, as relationships are observed and they are not the same for different types of violence. It seems likely the lack of a robust relationship here is due to the poor quality of the data presented here. However, here, we cannot distinguish between poor data quality and a null finding or the absence of a relationship. Further data collection efforts are required (and ongoing) to establish with confidence whether there is no relationship, a weak relationship, or a robust relationship between disaggregated types of violence and civilian support for militancy.

As I submit this dissertation, I am working with the UN Mission for permission to use their event-level data on violence levels in the West Bank. This data would resolve many of the issues I believe are obfuscating potential relationships in this model. However, the value in this chapter is the concept to disaggregate violence and establish a means to do so quantitatively and reliably across conflict spaces.

This line of inquiry has important implications for the study of conflict. If the type of violence determines, even in part, civilian responses to it, several ideas about the study of, and policy applications to, conflict need to be corrected. For example, if the type of violence has a relationship to civilian responses to violence, systematically, then different types of actors perpetrating comparable types of violence should be examined together -- e.g., political and criminal conflicts should not be completely divorced from one another. Indeed, the study of state violence should not be divorced from the study of non-state actor violence more generally. By implication, research should include an examination of how violence affects civilians rather than focusing on the actor alone. Potentially, policies should be developed and implemented based on the type of violence as well as the type of actor.

This is not to say the identity of the actor perpetrating the violence has no impact on how violence is experienced. In fact, power relationships between perpetrator and victim are incredibly important for how violence affects its victims. And, certainly the power of a state or non-state actor may vary considerably, for example. Nevertheless, the focus in conflict studies on the actor rather than the type of violence, I argue, has limited our understanding of the effects of violence and the accuracy of predicted civilian responses. Conflict studies and policy formation will benefit from broadening this myopic focus by investigating violence in its varied forms and

exploring how certain types of violence may have more consistent (and predictable) impacts, whoever the perpetrator may be.

Chapter 5: Israeli Disaster Relief Workers and Resilience to Terrorism

Introduction

The preceding chapters focus on how civilians' political preferences -- in response to state sponsored violence -- are affected by their sense of "connectedness," by their community, and by control of their physical space. But, the question remains whether similar mechanisms affect civilians' responses to *non*-state actor violence, such as terrorism, and whether similar impacts are observed when the spatial component (freedom of movement restriction) is less prevalent. While similarities exist between how civilians experience state violence and non-state actor violence, there may be significant differences in both the type of violence each group is likely to perpetrate, and also how violence from state and non-state actors is received by communities based on the power of those actors. In this chapter, I conduct a "plausibility probe" into whether similar mechanisms operate in both these types of violence, which existing scholarship conceives of as disparate.

Unlike state violence, non-state actor violence is comparatively unpredictable, and significantly less structured. Fear is clearly a significant factor in how Palestinians receive Israeli state use of force, but scholars argue terrorism (the type of non-state actor violence discussed in this chapter) is designed to provoke fear more than other type of violence (Roberts 2012, 306). As a result, an Israeli civilian's fear of receiving violence is very high, though the likelihood of receiving violence as an Israeli civilian is significantly less than that of a Palestinian civilian. Indeed, this may be how terrorism affects freedom of movement for Israeli's: civilians facing

any sort of violence are likely to self-regulate their movements to avoid travel and congregation during times and at places they deem unsafe. This self-imposed constraint relates to freedom of movement more generally and also stems from violence, but it is not the same as being forced into immobility because physical passage beyond a given obstacle, e.g., a checkpoint, is proscribed.

In previous chapters, I argue at least one form of Palestinian militancy—militancy akin to desperation and devoid of intentional tactics designed (and believed) to achieve political goals—was the result of social isolation and community fracturing, which led to feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, and increasingly aggressive responses to political questions. This despair driven, disorganized militancy is evident in the 169 stabbing attacks, 128 shootings, and 54 car rammings conducted by Palestinians as of February 10th 2017, resulting in 46 Israelis killed and 649 Israelis wounded.⁷⁸ Palestinians generally view these attacks as resistance to the Occupation, while Jewish Israelis tend to view them as terrorism and as attacks against the core idea of the Israeli state. In this chapter, I evaluate whether the mechanisms (social isolation/social connection) I believe motivated, at least in part, the Palestinians’ responses to Israel’s use of force policies, might also affect Jewish Israelis’ responses to non-state actor use of force, in this case, individual-level acts of terrorism.

To conduct this evaluation and to more fully evaluate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself, I choose an “enriched population” - a community likely to have a higher “rate of exposure” to Palestinian violence: Israeli emergency medical personnel and disaster relief workers. I study two Israel-wide groups: first, the primary emergency medical service in Israel, Magen David Adom (MDA), and second, an organization dedicated to the appropriate treatment

⁷⁸ See full discussion of terror wave at: <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Wave-of-terror-October-2015.aspx>

of the dead (according to Jewish custom) along with rescue and recovery efforts, Disaster Victim Identification (ZAKA). Both organizations are committed to treating victims of violence, and both experience tension between the principle of impartiality in treatment (e.g., triage, even if that means treating terrorists before victims) and the political opinions of their members. For example, retaliatory preferences for civilians supporting Israel, the target of terrorism, may take the form of supporting the removal of rights of the broader subgroup perceived to be perpetrating the terrorism, here, all Palestinians. Triage is a salient example of this tension, because (i) it intersects medical ethics and the impartiality of treatment as part of the foundation of Just War Theory, (ii) medical personnel are justifiably required in these “conflict zones,” i.e., the site of the terror attack, and (iii) triage may, in fact, save the terrorist’s life. Thus, this tension between ZAKA or MDA members’ political preferences and the daily requirements of their disaster relief work make them a good population to study in addressing this question – whether and how social connection affects Jewish Israelis’ responses to terrorism.

I find suggestive evidence that social connection is important in mediating these workers’ experiences of violence. The theory presented previously (the relationship between checkpoints and militancy) is entirely dependent on social connection being important for how violence affects people’s political preferences. Thus, the finding that social connection matters in the workplace and in-group connection too, not just when completely delineated by freedom of movement, supports the generalizability of the impact of checkpoints. Consequently, further research is warranted on the mediating effects of social connection on civilian responses to state sponsored *or* non-state actor violence. In the case of MDA and ZAKA, the social connection and tight-knit nature of the community appears to amplify out-group resentment and increases support for radical or extreme policies against the out-group.

Thus, it appears that there may be curvilinear relationships between social connection, experiences of violence, and political preferences toward others: both extreme isolation and extreme connection can push civilians toward support for more militant policies against the opposition, while social connection among olive farmers leads to more willingness to consider and espouse moderate political responses. Indeed, this difference may be attributed to the spatial components discussed in chapters two and three: there may be an interaction in effect between social connection and freedom of movement that is particularly relevant for understanding the role social connection plays in mediating responses to violence. Additionally, MDA workers provide suggestive evidence that cross-cultural social connection or exposure may lead to more moderate policies toward out groups while simultaneously increasing altruistic or pro-social behavior towards in-groups.

This chapter serves as a “plausibility probe” to determine if further in-depth study is justified. It is designed to evaluate the extent of suggestive evidence of the relationship between non-spatially focused social connection and how these civilians (disaster relief workers) respond to the violence inherent in their work. However, the first step is to demonstrate a pattern in the relationship between non-state actor use of force and civilian responses to such violence. Nationwide studies of the Israeli population in times following periods of particular strife (terrorism) demonstrate an increase in support for militant action against Palestinians and a decrease in “political tolerance” (Peffley, Hutchison and Shamir 2015). In this plausibility probe, I conduct a quantitative examination of the MDA and how its members feel about MDA’s adopted policy to treat first whoever is most severely injured, even if that person is a terrorist.

The MDA and ZAKA place their workers on the front lines of conflict; they are among the first responders to terrorism. They are unique because though their violence exposure is

extreme -- horror hard to imagine -- it is also predominantly “witness” level violence, rather than attacks perpetrated against them personally. It is important to evaluate the structure of and community connection within these organizations, which may be critical to how violent experiences impact these relief workers’ political preferences. In states embroiled in conflict, whether low level and long term or shorter lived and devastating, the conflict itself informs and contextualizes every part of civilians’ lived experiences. Quotidian acts – from olive picking to emergency medical services (EMS) – can take on political qualities because conflict so deeply permeates even the most basic daily acts. Nearly 88% of MDA members in Israel are volunteers. Because they address highly sensitive issues in their EMS work, such as when and how to respond to incidents and the choice about whom to treat and in what order, the act of participating in EMS in Israel is, in a sense, a political act. Indeed, the MDA President’s statement that he would follow international triage conventions and treat the most severely injured person first, even if that person was a terrorist, sparked intense upheaval and discord.⁷⁹

Participation in EMS exemplifies how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict permeates supposedly apolitical activities and spaces, and indeed how these quotidian acts and conversations can define the national discourse (Zelenz and Gade 2017). MDA workers’ job-related interactions with terrorist violence are likely to influence their thinking about the conflict more broadly, yet these sorts of actors are rarely examined in the conflict literature (Zelenz and Gade 2017).

To evaluate these interactions, I first use existing research. I demonstrate that the MDA and ZAKA follow a new pattern in post-conflict studies: they exhibit higher levels of altruism and in-group support than found in their resident societies more generally. Evidence of this

⁷⁹ See full discussion at: <http://www.maariv.co.il/news/israel/Article-502539> and <http://news.nana10.co.il/Article/?ArticleID=1152961>

altruism and in-group support is presented in the form of interviews, but also in the PTSD rates of the MDA and ZAKA (compared with disaster relief workers more generally).

I argue civilians participate in these Israeli disaster-relief activities, at least in part, due to a sense of “linked fate” to the broader state of Israel, and their participation in disaster relief communities shapes their political views of the conflict. Volunteering with disaster relief and EMS organizations provides a way for civilians to work for the good of their country and also find a sense of connection and belonging with others seeking the same goals. This is consistent with other recent studies (e.g., Blattman 2009) which find that violence can actually increase altruistic and pro-social behaviors toward in-group members. In this case, the feeling of being attacked from without is channeled into strength from within. There may also be a concomitant increasing animosity toward those not connected to the group itself – the “other”. This feeling of in-group strength coupled with animosity toward out-groups is consistent both with existing predictions of psychology literature (see discussion below) and also with the findings from chapters three and four.

In December 2015 and December 2016, I conducted ten interviews of elite ZAKA and MDA members and collected original data generated internally by both the ZAKA and MDA. The results of that research are presented herein. An original online survey of 14,000 MDA volunteers and 1500 ZAKA volunteers is currently in process in Israel and will be the focus of subsequent work. My examinations of MDA and ZAKA further support my theory that social connection can indeed increase civilians’ ability to tolerate trauma and violence and can provide a robust means to survive events that, in other contexts, shatter lives. This study also further justifies a more detailed examination between social connection and relationships (defined either

by physical space and proximity or by community space) and the role they play in affecting civilian responses to non-state actor violence.

The following section investigates new theoretical ground, attempting to puzzle out what impact non-spatially defined social connection has on political preferences and if such connections are of significance, specifically for these two groups of disaster relief workers. In doing so, I examine the role that group level forces -- like social cohesion (see below) -- may play in moderating individual-level social connection. In the previous chapters, I argue that freedom of movement delimited, to a certain extent, what sorts of social connections and relationships were possible. Here, where freedom of movement is limited by fear but not by physical restrictions on movement, I evaluate what factors might contribute to defining social connection? Would membership in a specific group, such as disaster relief workers, have an influence comparable (though contrary) to checkpoints? If the influence is similar, what can we learn from both group membership and freedom of movement about social connection, and its importance in affecting preferences and matters in conflict zones more broadly?

Theory and Background

Non-state actor violence, particularly violence that is classed as terrorism, generally increases support for retaliatory policies

Non-state actor violence, particularly terrorism, is likely to predispose civilians to be more hostile toward the perpetrating group. Of course, civilians' understanding of who perpetrated the violence and who actually committed it may be different. Individuals may think about the "other" with little critical evaluation, and those made afraid through terrorism frequently cast a broad and imprecise net in how they attribute blame. This is exemplified by the US response to September 11th: while the number of terrorist attacks on the United States remained unchanged in the years following September 11 from the years preceding it, the general level of fear of attack across the nation was dramatically heightened (Muller 2006). None of the terrorist attacks on US soil since September 11th have been perpetrated by immigrants or refugees fleeing seven Muslim-majority nations on the recent travel ban list. Nevertheless, 38% of Americans believe this ban will increase their safety, according to a recent Pew Research poll.⁸⁰ Non-state violence (when not classified as terrorism) can lead to different policy responses. For example, school shootings in the US are on the rise and have killed hundreds in recent years. In response, groups pressed for broader mental health care and gun restrictions, but unlike responses to September 11th, did not call for surveillance restricting civil liberties.⁸¹

Some members of society are more likely to support retaliation or more "militant" policies toward the perceived "other" in response to a terrorist incident. One possible explanation for this variance is individual responses to terrorism are inherently tied to one's affective state (sad, angry, or afraid). In the Lerner et al. (2003) study, researchers used the September 11th

⁸⁰ See Pew Research Study: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/27/most-white-evangelicals-approve-of-trump-travel-prohibition-and-express-concerns-about-extremism/>

⁸¹ See ABC News: <http://abcnews.go.com/US/school-shootings-columbine-numbers/story?id=36833245>

terrorist attacks as a natural experiment to evaluate the relationship between people's affective responses to the terrorist attack and their preference for retaliatory policies. Those who experienced anger were very likely to support retaliatory policies, while those who experienced other affective states were much less likely to do so. Other scholars (e.g., Huddy et al. 2005) argue that this finding resulted because fear and anxiety are likely to increase risk aversion, while anger is likely to increase risk acceptance. While the relationship between emotion and risk acceptance is well established, I propose that another well-established theory might explain part of this variation: social cohesion and social identity theory.

Social influences on experiences of violence

In the first four chapters I argue social isolation based on restriction of freedom of movement can press people toward support for militancy – potentially toward militant action, even if that action has virtually no hope of achieving political change. Conversely, I argue social connection made possible, in part, by physical freedom of movement is critical to civilians' ability to respond to violence without losing their hope for change. Some call this resilience, or the ability to adapt positively despite serious adversity. The concept of resilience has been questioned in recent years because of heterogeneity in the human experience of adversity as well as adaptive behaviors (Luthar et al. 2000). Up to this point, I have primarily focused on structural barriers such as checkpoints and their effect on communities, and thus on social isolation or connection. But the evidence presented thus far lends itself to additional questions. For example, without the imposition of physical restraints on movement, how might other aspects of social connection affect civilian responses to violence exposure?

Social connection varies dramatically by individual and between communities. A rigorous sociological literature has been developed regarding the value of social connection in every part of individuals' lives, from cultural capital to depression. I capitalize on this literature and evaluate the role of social connection in moderating the relationship between experiences of violence and support for retaliatory or militant policies against the perpetrators of that violence. Existing research expects individuals with broader social networks will have greater resilience to trauma, lower levels of depression – even when partaking in grisly (disaster relief) work -- and lower rates of burnout. But what impact does social connection have on their political preferences? I apply social identity theory here. I hypothesize social connection can actually increase out-group hostility, unless one possesses cross-cultural social ties, which have been shown to diminish out-group hostility. Importantly, I believe this builds upon, rather than supplants, the findings of the previous chapters: respondents in Firing Zone 918, despite their nonviolent efforts, still displayed hostility and resentment towards their “out-group” (in this case, the IDF and Settlers). But, instead of being consumed by that hostility and adopting militancy out of desperation, their social connections seem to have enabled resilience to violence. Such resilience (dependent on hope for the future) afforded a longer time horizon that has actually brought some successes to the villages of Firing Zone 918. By building on those findings, the line of inquiry in this chapter helps ascertain whether findings about the impacts of checkpoints are generalizable. If social connection builds resilience to violence (both state and non-state actor violence), then social connection is playing a much more significant role than scholars have heretofore presumed.

Conflict and group dynamics

Scholars have long examined so-called “in-group” and “out-group” relations, and how the strength of group identity impacts group members’ behavior toward one another (Campbell 1965; Sherif 1988) or toward outsiders (Gneezy and Fessler 2012).⁸² Conflict has dramatic impacts on in-group and out-group relations. For example, experiences of conflict provide a higher elevating goal for groups, and when coupled with trauma, can lead to a renewed commitment to supporting and participating in one’s in-group. Bauer et al. (2013) take significant steps toward establishing a relationship between experiences of conflict and pro-social behavior toward one’s in-group by asking a battery of survey questions to 1,000 children and adults who experienced different levels of conflict exposure in the Republic of Georgia and in Sierra Leone. They find greater conflict exposure increased civilians’ egalitarian behavior toward in-group members, even over long time horizons. Gneezy and Fessler (2012), using evidence collected during Israel’s war with Hezbollah in 2006, found during wartime, individuals are more willing to punish those who violate their ideal norms (termed “non-collaborators”) and support or reward those who “collaborate” with them, even within their own in-group. This evidence supports the theory in-groups consolidate in times of strife, and adds to the conclusion that conflict and strife can increase the vibrancy of one’s in-group.

Researchers have also found conflict can impact political engagement and political participation. For example, Elisabeth Jean Wood (2008) argues “moral outrage” propelled people into political action in El Salvador. Punamäki, Qouta, and El Sarraj (1997) find Palestinians who experienced bombing were able to channel those experiences toward political activism. Christopher Blattman (2009) finds conflict in Uganda actually increased post-conflict political participation, and Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2014) demonstrate that Nepal’s civil war led to increases in both political organization and voting. Thus, here I focus specifically on the

⁸² See Bauer et al. 2013 for further discussion.

relationship between these two literatures, in/out-group dynamics and conflict motivated political participation, and also draw on sociology literature. I use these studies to evaluate if social connection mediates experiences of conflict, whether it impacts one's likelihood of political participation, and whether that participation will most likely take the form of retaliatory or more moderate, nonviolent activities.

Social connection and social cohesion

Love and compassion are necessities, not luxuries. Without them, humanity cannot survive.

—His Holiness the XIVth Dalai Lama (Ramaswamy 2006, 148)

Being unwanted, unloved, uncared for, forgotten by everybody—I think that is a much greater hunger, a much greater poverty than the person who has nothing to eat.

—Mother Theresa (Costello 2008, 14)⁸³

As discussed in depth in chapters two and three, social connection, defined as “a person’s subjective sense of having close and positively experienced relationships with others in the social world” (Seppala, Rossomando, and Doty 2013, 411), influences an extraordinary number of factors of individuals’ lives. Indeed, social connection is critical not only to emotional wellbeing (Cacioppo and Patrick 2008) but also to physical health (Umberson and Montez 2010). Social cohesion, on the other hand, describes the proximity of group members to one another.

⁸³ Both quotes cited in Seppala, Rossomando, Doty, 2013.

Definitions of this concept are complicated because it links group-level and individual-level phenomenon (Friedkin 2004, 410). Groups are considered cohesive when conditions existing at the group level facilitate positive behaviors and opinions among its members, and when the group members and interactions are sufficient to maintain the condition and structure of the group (Friedkin 2004, 410). Social network analysis scholars consider groups with a densely connected network of “ties” or interactions and connections between one another as cohesive (Scott 2012).

Social cohesion, rather than social connection alone, is important when evaluating disaster relief workers, because the cohesion of MDA and ZAKA may influence how individual members think and feel about specific events. In previous chapters, I evaluated the way social connection helped individuals tolerate state-sponsored violence and the way their connection (or isolation) affected their likely range of responses. But there is another layer to that puzzle for people deeply ensconced in a workplace or social group experiencing trauma together, and figuring out how to respond to it. Thus, thinking about social connection *and* social cohesion when evaluating disaster relief workers is likely to help elucidate their responses to violence.

Social cohesion is a major vehicle through which both preferences (attitudes) and behaviors are disseminated through society (Friedkin 2004, 414). Tightly knit social groups are more likely to share the same ideas and serve as an echo chamber for reifying and augmenting specific viewpoints: the idea of homophily or “similarity breeds connection” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001, 415). Social responses surrounding a given event can either justify individual feelings or suppress them. The way a group feels about a violent event can powerfully affect how an individual feels about that same violent event. Individuals look to social groups to affirm their emotions and seek empathy, which solidifies feelings and reaffirms connections to

the group. Conversely, lack of empathy and connection cause individuals to feel excluded and isolated.

Group experiences of trauma augment personal trauma, reifying beliefs and defining a range of acceptable emotions and actions – for better or worse: *e.g.*, September 11th had a dramatic effect on communities, immediately creating a sense of unity among (white) Americans, and constructing an “other” among individuals of Middle-Eastern background. Another aspect of social cohesion is revealed when individuals are members of a comparatively small group in a specific community. Then it becomes more likely those members will use their group as a key part of their own identity (racial minorities in a largely white space, for example) (Mehra, Kilduff and Brass 1998).

Findings from a wide array of studies indicate social connection helps cultivate resilience: DiFulvio (2011) finds social connection increases LGBTQ youth’s ability to tolerate bullying and violence, and Cacioppo, Reis, and Zautra (2011) find similar results in US Army Units regarding resilience to the experience of military service. “Resilience,” generally operationalized as the ability to assert a standard set of coping skills (see Agaibi and Wilson 2005, 196-198 for full discussion), is critical to reducing the effects of exposure to violence and trauma, leading to better mental health and lower rates of PTSD.

The variation in how individuals receive violence is difficult to examine; one possibility is to examine rates of PTSD or other trauma-related conditions. Trauma resulting from violence is endemic to warzones, and PTSD in soldiers is well documented, particularly as violence exposure is nearly impossible to contain. US troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan had high rates of involvement in the conflict itself: “97% had been shot at, 65% had killed an enemy combatant, 28% had killed a civilian” (Levy and Sidel 2008, 58). The National Vietnam

Veterans Readjustment study found the “lifetime prevalence of PTSD to be 30.9% among male theater veterans and 26% among females; lifetime prevalence of partial PTSD was an additional 22.5% and 21.2%” (Weiss et al. 1992). When including civilians, the rates are even higher. For example, in a study of refugees to the US from Southeast Asia who were not exclusively former residents of warzones, 50% were diagnosed with PTSD and 71% had mixed anxiety and depression disorders (Khoun and Lavelle 1987). Social connection and counseling programs can reduce or moderate the effects trauma has on an individual’s psyche.

Social Identity Theory

The relationship between social connection, social cohesion and resilience is hard to explain without an additional component: identity. Some scholars contend identity helps translate social connection into political preferences and actions (see discussion below). Scholars have used Social Identity Theory (SIT) to examine how individuals relate to groups and how groups relate to other groups. SIT, as well as Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) originated in social psychology debates -- as an attempt to understand groups perpetrating horrors against other groups, as in the Holocaust. SIT thus evaluates the pervasive, competitive, inter-group relationships: individuals form strong in-group perceptions with animosity toward other groups even when based on arbitrary criteria (see Hornsey 2008, 206). SIT theorists Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) argue “the mere process of making salient ‘us and them’ distinctions changes the way people see each other,” and that “the motivating principle underlying competitive intergroup behavior was a desire for a positive and secure self-concept” (qtd. in Hornsey 2008, 207). These scholars have challenged understandings of group cohesion (as have the sociologists referred to

above) based on individuals liking or disliking one another. They conclude social cohesion is a function of group dynamics, where an individual establishes a positive self-concept by ascribing positive attributes to herself and her groupmates, while ascribing negative attributes to those conceived of as “other.” Social context and the construction of out-groups help groups define themselves: “Groups are not islands; they become psychologically real only when defined in comparison to other groups” (Hornsey 2008, 207). Social identity theorists contend stereotypes and other negative or generalizing categorizations of others perform important social functions: they help to make past or current actions of the in-group legitimate.

Halevy, Bornstein and Sagiv (2008) exemplify this in a prisoner’s dilemma game in Israel in which they find “in-group solidarity” is a better motivator than “out-group hate” – people were more likely to contribute to the pool which supported their in-group rather than pursue relative gains against the out-group (409). This version of the game (while still in a lab) was designed to counter the assumption that in-group love and out-group hate might be two sides of the same coin – rather, in conflict, in-group solidarity may strengthen in ways not present in other parts of society.

Social Identity Theory was countered in conflict studies by Donald T. Campbell’s “Realistic Group Conflict Theory” (1965) with experimental grouping through Muzafer Sherif’s “Robbers Cave” experiment (1961). In this experiment, a group of 200 boys were found to first fight one another. When divided into groups, the boys stopped attacking members of their own group and focused on competing with the other group. Finally, when a problem arose affecting all the boys, they banded together to solve it as an entire group. Rather than just focusing on identity, this theory applies a “zero sum” approach and asserts that cooperation can only

reemerge after a “super-ordinate goal” (something that affects all parties equally) helps to restore cooperation.

Insko et al. (1992) explain how SIT and Group Conflict Theory can work together: experience with exclusion and group-based categorization will amplify the competitiveness of one group toward another, making it harder to break down cycles of inter-group aggression and violence, potentially prolonging conflict.

This rich body of literature neatly links a group’s sense of in-group and out-group to its likely political views: if a given group considers others an “out-group” and responds with animosity, this will likely translate to the sorts of preferences in-group members might support regarding that out-group. Leonie Huddy (2001, 150) highlights the importance of “real world” identities and the intersection of identities, distinguishing between strong and weak identities, while noting the power of the relationship between an individual’s complex nexus of social identities and her political views. P. G. Klandermans (2014, 3), building on Huddy’s work, argues that strong identities are more likely to influence political preferences and behavior, and demonstrates that membership in groups with people who have similar identities helps transfer the individual implications of a strong social identity (about participation) to group level implications of a collective (or group-wide) identity – such as protest. From there, collective identities can transfer into political preferences and, indeed, to political action. Klandermans (2014) describes this process as follows:

Collective identity politicizes when it becomes the focus of a struggle for power. Social groups are often involved in power struggles in that they try to establish, change, or defend a power structure. Politicized collective identity is not an on/off phenomenon. Instead, politicization of collective identity and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events which gradually transform the group’s relationship to its social environment. Typically, this

process begins with the awareness of shared grievances. Next, a political actor is blamed for the group's predicament, and claims for compensation are leveled against that actor. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues (4).

This literature helps us make a link between a group's self conception and how that might translate into politically focused animosity toward a given out-group.

Applications to conflict

In conflict zones, social identities can harden and solidify over time (Kalyvas 2006, 78; Van Evera 2001, 21). This can increase the "salience" of those identities (Kalyvas 2006, 79). Regarding the 1911-1923 Irish Revolution, Peter Heart (1999) states: "during this time the gap between Us and Them had been steadily widening until in the end it seemed to be quite unbridgeable. They became not only different from us, they were against us" (qtd. in Kalyvas 2006, 79). In a study explaining attitudinal support of competing combatant groups in Afghanistan, Lyall, Blair, and Imai (2013) contend violence affects individuals asymmetrically: an individual who experiences violence at the hands of a member of her in-group is unlikely to attribute that violence to malicious intentions, and is also unlikely to change her support for the in-group as a result. However, when out-group members victimize an individual, that individual is likely to have decreased attitudinal support of that out-group in the future. Because insurgents are more often seen as 'part' of the community than state forces (which are more removed, even segregated from the community), state forces are more often seen as 'out-groups' than are insurgents. Thus, violence committed by insurgents is less likely to affect levels of civilian support for the insurgency, whereas violence committed by incumbent state forces is more likely to have deleterious effect on civilian support for the state.

A 2015 *APSR* study (Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir) evaluates the relationship between Palestinian terrorism and civilian “political tolerance,” measured as statements in favor of freedoms for groups respondents identified as their least liked political group. These scholars found as terror attacks increase, political tolerance among Jewish Israelis decreases, and dramatically. However, the study also finds a remarkable difference: political tolerance among left-leaning Israelis either stays the same or slightly increases (not statistically significant) with terror attacks, while for right-leaning Israelis, political tolerance dramatically decreases following attacks.

Does this relationship between periods of increased terrorism and political tolerance hold in reverse (when applied to increasing militancy rather than decreasing tolerance)? Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir (2015) contend these attacks can cause right-leaning shifts in political preferences and behavior, including more militant policies enacted by Israel. This finding provides evidence for the basic premise that terrorism impacts support for militant or retaliatory policies, and that we should expect a positive relationship between the two.

In sum, violence by members of a perceived out-group makes in-group members more likely to support retaliatory policies against that out-group. Violence can solidify and harden social connection and cohesion among in-group members, even increasing in-group pro-social behavior, altruism and political engagement. Social Identity Theory helps draw the theoretical links between social connection and in-group pro-social behavior as well as out-group animosity. Participation in groups can strengthen such in-group identities and make them more politically salient. Conflict can harden and solidify social identities and political cleavages, thereby affecting political preferences and political behavior. Terrorism in Israel has been shown to decrease support for political tolerance and increase support for removing freedoms from out-

groups, here, Palestinians. All this lends credence to the premise that social connection might mediate civilian experiences of non-state actor violence and affect their resulting political preferences. From this nexus, I draw the follow set of testable implications:

H7: In the wake of non-state actor violence, social connection will increase one's support for the in-group, including an increase in altruistic preferences towards in-group members.

H8. In the wake of non-state actor violence, participation in a cohesive group can increase one's animosity toward out-groups, and can increase support for retaliatory, even militant, preferences toward the out-group.

Militancy is defined as the use of violent methods in support of a political aim (Oxford English Dictionary). Chapters one through four address civilian responses (including militancy) to state sponsored violence. Popular culture tends to assume that all militancy involves support for non-state armed actors. Not so; governments can be militant as well. Consequently, before proceeding, we must add the *support* of a militant government, or support for violent or retaliatory policies by a government-aligned group, to the definition of militancy. Civilian support of state militancy usually means supporting violent policies directed at whomever the state deems the “other”. An example might be a belief that torture or other force-heavy policies are justified, particularly against specific groups. In some conflicts, civilians even take up arms to support the militant state, such as the Protestants in Northern Ireland during The Troubles.

In the case of disaster relief workers, I focus on the issue of triage. Because triage is the international standard—in conflict zones a victim's treatment ought to be entirely divorced from

her participation in conflict — and because ignoring triage may mean someone dies, I argue the choice NOT to triage may be considered a retaliatory or “militant” policy. Such a choice implies the belief a person should be punished for her actions by withholding medical care, and this choice of punishment is made outside a court of law. Thus, in the context of disaster relief work, I argue that the choice to withhold care is in a sense a “violent” policy. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I refer to disaster relief workers’ “militancy” in quotes, because treating support for terrorism and refusal to triage as part of the same concept is deeply fraught on a number of levels. I have no wish to imply that disaster relief workers are anything but deeply caring, deeply committed public servants who daily make a huge difference in so many lives. However, the choice of some workers to support a *more* “militant” policy or action *within* the spectrum of a group’s range of likely actions can relate to the original dependent variable of this study: what will push civilians to support more “militant” preferences, policies or activities than they would have previously supported.

Case selection and methodological approach

To evaluate the relationship between non-state actor use of force and civilian political preferences, I again focus on an “enriched population” – in this case, one with a high level of exposure to terrorism: Israeli emergency medical personnel. I select the two most prominent disaster relief/EMS organizations in Israel: MDA and ZAKA. These two organizations are the front lines of responding to terrorism – MDA for the living, and ZAKA for the dead. They both

have incredibly high rates of approval among the Israeli population as a whole: in both 2014 and 2015, they were ranked the second and third most-liked organizations in Israel, after the Israeli Defense Force.⁸⁴ Amazingly, both organizations are primarily staffed by deeply committed volunteers, ZAKA with approximately 1500 and MDA with some 14,000.⁸⁵ They also have important differences in terms of organizational structure, roles, and membership.

ZAKA is a group of (largely) Orthodox Jews who volunteer to collect and identify body parts after suicide bombings, stabbings, or any unnatural death, so the victims may be buried in accordance with Jewish tradition. They do this grisly work as part of a broader religious belief that serving the dead, who cannot give thanks, is the truest form of virtue. Surprisingly, past studies have shown ZAKA members have extremely low levels of PTSD, in spite of the gruesome nature of their work. Similarly to the olive farmers, since the ZAKA are from a specific and defined community with a common background, I can understand their experiences better than I could a representative sample of all Israelis living in Jerusalem or in Israel. ZAKA members' extensive exposure to terrorist violence as they conduct their work provides unique insight into how such violence affects civilian's political preferences, particularly in the context of a tightly knit organization.

MDA, on the other hand, is an organization with extremely varied membership. A significant portion of MDA members perform military service, whereas almost none of ZAKA members serve in the military. MDA is Israel's official Emergency Medical Service, despite being staffed primarily by volunteers. As the primary EMS service, it is also the primary group to respond to terror attacks. There are a large number of Arab and Druze volunteers in MDA, as well as secular Jews, compared to ZAKA members, who are almost exclusively Orthodox Jews.

⁸⁴ For further information, see ZAKA's website:
<https://www.zaka.us/img/uploads/thankletters/1475752385396572039.pdf>

⁸⁵ Personal interviews #74 and 75, Tel Aviv (Dec 2016); Personal interviews #69-73, Jerusalem (Dec 2015)

Therefore, MDA workers much more closely resemble the demographic makeup of Israel as a whole than do ZAKA members.

For my evaluation, I use a mixture of internal documents and statistics collected by both MDA and ZAKA and “elite” interviews with personnel in both MDA and ZAKA headquarters, along with informal observations, conducted in December 2015 and December 2016. I complement these in-depth interviews with existing survey data on different use-of-force policies and resulting public opinion, and existing studies of MDA and ZAKA members.

I find suggestive evidence that social forces play a significant role in shaping how MDA and ZAKA members respond to violent events, even though their organizations are pledged to nonpartisanship more generally. As a follow up to this study, I plan to evaluate the specific social ties and community structure between different members of the organizations and whether they correlate with members’ political views. A survey on these topics is currently in process in Israel; see “Data” below for details on using the results in subsequent work.

Case Background: MDA

As the primary EMS service in Israel, MDA provides on-scene treatment by paramedics as well as evacuation via ambulance to hospitals (Nirel et al. 2008, 538). MDA was founded in the 1930s in Tel Aviv, but soon became nationwide, was granted national authority, and was divided into eleven local branches by the Knesset in 1950 (Soffer and Klausner 2012). MDA volunteers come from every corner of Israeli society, with many youth volunteers choosing MDA to fulfill their mandated service requirement in the last two years of high school.⁸⁶ MDA is

⁸⁶ Personal interview #75, Tel Aviv, December 2016

primarily funded through donations, with only about 5-7% of funds coming from the national government and the remainder from individuals treated through MDA services.⁸⁷ MDA has the additional function of supporting the army (IDF) in times of war, and has a deeper connection with the military than many EMS services internationally, as many of its members go on to serve in the military or have already served.

MDA has an unusual amount of experience with “MCI” (Mass Casualty Incidents) due to terrorism: “between 2000 and 2009, 3786 victims of terror attacks on Israeli civilians were hospitalized” (Soffer and Klausner 2012). MDA is considered an international model for how to handle such incidents.⁸⁸ MDA follows the American Heart Association Guidelines, including triage based on the severity of the wound,⁸⁹ even if the most severely injured person is a terrorist. The wave of stabbings and car ramming attacks during 2015-2016 prompted MDA’s current CEO to state he would treat a terrorist before his own daughter, if the terrorist were more seriously injured.⁹⁰

A study of EMS workers in Israel, 87% of which were MDA members, found “high rates of burnout” (Nirel et al. 2008, 545). While this study did not specifically measure PTSD, it did evaluate “emotional problems” and whether those problems interfered with work: one third of respondents reported such work interference to some extent (Nirel et al. 2008, 545). However, when compared to EMS workers in the United States, the MDA members’ rates of burnout and PTSD are remarkably low. For example, one US study based on a nationally representative sample, found that more than 37% of EMS workers had contemplated suicide, as opposed to just 3.7% of the general US population (Newland et al. 2015). Another MDA study evaluated only

⁸⁷ Personal interview #75, Tel Aviv, December 2016

⁸⁸ Personal interviews, #74 and 75, Tel Aviv, December 2016

⁸⁹ Personal interview, #75, Tel Aviv, December 2016

⁹⁰ For further information, see: <http://www.maariv.co.il/news/israel/Article-502539> and <http://news.nana10.co.il/Article/?ArticleID=1152961>

the “youth volunteers” (mean age of 17) with approximately one year of service and found virtually none of the youth volunteers demonstrated significant psychiatric disorders, including PTSD (Jaffe et al. 2010, s9), perhaps signaling a longevity component to burnout and PTSD. In fact, the volunteers who displayed the most stress-related symptoms were non-religious volunteers, women, volunteers who had self-centered motives for participating, and volunteers from areas that rarely experience terror attacks (Jaffe et al. 2010, s9).

Case Background: ZAKA

ZAKA was organized in 1995 when the founder, Yehuda Meshi-Zahav, and several friends helped rescue passengers and recover bodies from the 405 bus bombing outside of Jerusalem.⁹¹ Israeli emergency medical services were unprepared for some aspects of the second intifada, particularly how to handle a proper Jewish burial. ZAKA has evolved into a unit dedicated to what members describe as “true virtue” (*Chesed Shel Emet*), or the care of the dead, as the dead can never thank you for your kindness. ZAKA is almost exclusively an ultra-Orthodox, or *Haredi* group, and follows the *Haredi* beliefs about death. In Israel, the *hevra kadishah* (or sacred society) is responsible for assuring all Jewish citizens, whether they are religious or not, receive a Jewish burial (Stadler 2006, 3-6). This means the dead must be buried as quickly as possible and with all of their bodily fluids and parts — thus, a suicide bombing is a particularly horrifying fate for the Jewish people (Stadler 2006, 3-6). As a result, it is not uncommon for Jewish communities to have a group of volunteers committed to observing the practices and rituals surrounding death and burial (Stadler 2006, 3-6).

⁹¹ See ZAKA website: https://www.zaka.us/about/How_ZAKA_began

While it is not surprising the ultra-Orthodox community is particularly suited to “death work” in accordance with Jewish tradition, the extent of participation in ZAKA is unique for several reasons. First, the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel is in many ways a world apart – they attend separate schools devoted to religious texts and the study of the Torah (*yeshiva* and *kollel*), tend not to take part in what would usually be considered mandatory activities (such as serving in the military), tend to be net receivers of state benefits, usually do not speak English because it is not taught in *yeshiva* or *kollel*, and have their own political parties. As an organization, though, ZAKA is very public, involves extensive collaboration with other facets of the Israeli state, and enmeshes ZAKA as an organization and its volunteers in a variety of public functions (Stadler 2006, 3-6). Within Israel, the traditional “death workers,” the *hevra kadishah*, have lost their status and have been staunchly criticized (Stadler 2006, 3-6); ZAKA seems to have filled this gap, particularly in connection with terror attacks.

ZAKA is a comparatively small organization, with about 1500 volunteers. Unlike MDA workers, they do not serve in shifts but instead wear pagers and respond to incidents as needed⁹² ZAKA also has a formalized counseling program that is required after every major incident.⁹³ While MDA has a similar counseling component, it appears to be less institutionalized and does not provide a religious focus (due to the more diverse nature of MDA’s membership).⁹⁴ Because exposure to bodies is one of the factors most likely to induce PTSD (Ursano, Fullerton, and Norwood 1995), one might suspect ZAKA members to have higher rates of PTSD than other disaster workers. One study has found the opposite—only around 2% of ZAKA members demonstrate PTSD, with a further 16% percent demonstrating sub-clinical PTSD symptoms (Solomon and Berger 2005, 594).

⁹² Personal interview #70-72, Jerusalem, December 2015

⁹³ Personal interview #70-72, Jerusalem, December 2015

⁹⁴ Personal interview #75, Tel Aviv, December 2015

Data:

In December 2015 and December 2016, I conducted interviews with “elites” within MDA and ZAKA – high ranking members working in each organization’s main office (interviews #69-75 of this dissertation). I also collected qualitative data on each organization’s policies from primary source materials and documents prepared by MDA and ZAKA, respectively. Finally, I use two internal surveys MDA conducted which have never been published to begin testing the relationships hypothesized above in H7 and H8. As I submit this dissertation, an original survey of 14,000 MDA volunteers and 1,500 ZAKA volunteers is in process in Israel to test these mechanisms more directly. The collected data will be the subject of a follow-up article to further elucidate the relationships tested here. This chapter thus serves as a “plausibility probe” of this theoretical premise.

To begin exploring these relationships, I use an internally conducted survey of MDA workers regarding how responding to terror incidents and treating individuals known to them affects MDA respondents personally, and the role of group support in alleviating symptoms experienced. The survey was conducted as part of MDA’s internal assessment in the later part of 2016. The survey covers 86 respondents from an even more enriched population than MDA itself: volunteers working in Settlements and in Jerusalem. These MDA members are likely to have much higher exposure to terrorism and are more likely to know the victims personally, because Settlement communities are much smaller than cities within Israel. These data are the first available and they offer a start to evaluating the effect of social connection on mediating impacts of terror attacks, and while limited in scope, they begin to test the relationships hypothesized in H7 and H8.

Questions/answers related to the importance of social connection when responding to terror attacks include: *“I prefer not to go on calls related to terrorist attacks since I fear I might meet people I know;”* *“being familiar with the patient affects my ability to stick to protocol”*. Others address the adherence to medical guidelines in the context of social connection: *“when arriving at an emergency scene with multiple patients out of whom one is an acquaintance, I’ll treat them first;”* and *“I believe that one cannot stay objective when treating someone with whom you are familiar.”* Additionally, some questions address how social aspects of medical care are deeply related to the broader social connection structure of the conflict space: *“I am afraid that neighbors might blame [me] in case the treatment wasn’t successful”*. Other questions evaluate whether members participated in a group talk after terror events or events with close personal connections: *“have you participated in a group talk after the emergency event?”* whether that talk helped: *“if yes, was the talk in your opinion beneficial?”* (VALUE OF SOCIAL CONNECTION); and finally, a measure of trauma: *“have you had reoccurring thoughts and memories following the event?”* None of these questions directly tests Hypothesis H7, but they do help examine the importance of social connection in mediating experiences of non-state actor violence (thus indirectly testing H7). The questions about supporting triage protocol (or not) address the out-group animosity motivating retaliatory responses hypothesized in H8.

Of the 86 respondents, 32 participated in post-incident “debriefs” after responding to a terror attack. Table 2 demonstrates that the majority of the 32 respondents who found the “debriefs” at least somewhat helpful (7= “extremely helpful”, 1= “not at all helpful”). The lower number of 32 respondents relates to whether or not they responded to a terrorist incident or an incident with someone they knew; the other 64 respondents did not attend such an incident. The majority of volunteers in this study had fewer than 5 years of MDA service, and

the majority did not feel unsafe on the scene when they responded to terror attacks. Most MDA volunteers do not believe knowing someone affects their ability to adhere to treatment protocol.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Breakdown
Post-attack talk was helpful	32	69% found the talk helpful to very helpful
Length of time as a volunteer	77	53% have been volunteers for more than five years
Chance of being injured at that attack in question	68	27% said they were physically in danger when they responded to a terror attack
Knowing someone affects my ability to stick to protocol	71	Only 21% reported that knowing the victim affected their ability to stick to protocol
Age	85	37% of volunteers responding to this survey were below the age of 26
Marriage	83	59% of respondents were married

The second survey is a study of 60 youth (15 to 18 year old volunteers) conducted in the fall of 2016 after a year of individual-level terror attacks. Table 3 displays descriptive statistics. This study focuses on the beliefs of youth volunteers concerning principles handed down by MDA leadership (e.g., they must abide by principles of triage, etc.). For example, questions include: *“volunteers believe that in the case of a terrorist attack one must treat victims and perpetrators with adherence to medical protocol;”* *“MDA volunteers believe that when arriving to the scene of a terrorist attack, the terrorist should be treated only after guaranteeing that they do not pose a threat”* (SUPPORT FOR “MILITANT” POLICY); *“also after it has been made clear who is the victim and who is the terrorist, then the volunteers will treat people according to medical protocol;”* *“volunteers will head out to the site of a terrorist attack even when it still might be lethally dangerous;”* and *“MDA volunteers are willing to risk their lives for their fellow man”* (IN-GROUP ALTRUISM). As discussed above, since ignoring triage may mean a casualty dies, these questions test preferences about whether someone in their medical care should be punished for their actions outside a court of law. As such, these questions address what

I argue is a “militant” policy (policy in the context of disaster relief work). The first questions listed query volunteer preferences about “militant” disaster relief policy, while the final question directly addresses the feeling of in-group altruism.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Breakdown
Time as a MDA volunteer	58	87% had been volunteering one year or less
Satisfied with volunteering for MDA	59	Only 6% were “not at all satisfied” or “not very satisfied”, with 50% being “extremely satisfied”
During a terrorist attack, MDA members should treat the terrorist by triage protocol	59	Responses here were very evenly distributed: about 45% think protocol should be ignored or altered, about 18% land in the middle, and about 35% think protocol should be followed no matter what
MDA members should only treat the terrorist after she doesn’t pose a threat	59	80% believe they should treat a terrorist only after she doesn’t pose a threat
MDA members should go to the scene even if it is lethally dangerous	59	About 22% believe MDA members should go to the scene even if there is lethal danger
MDA volunteers are willing to risk their lives for their fellow man	59	48% of respondents believe strongly that MDA members will risk their lives for others

I use these data in two ways: first, I use descriptive statistics to evaluate the prevalence of these preferences among MDA members, and second, I run an ordered probit and ordered logit regression analysis to evaluate the relationship between being part of the “in-group” of MDA (which I define in terms of years of MDA service and being Jewish) and the need for social connection in the wake of exposure to terrorism, as well as the relationship between preferences supporting militancy and in-group altruism.

Even though these two studies are limited in scope and did not include questions specifically tailored to H7 and H8, when coupled with interview and observational data, the results help assess a plausibility probe to determine whether this theory warrants exploration in greater depth.

Results and conclusions

Social support – connection and cohesion

Hypotheses H7 and H8 consider the role of social connection in determining how violence affects civilians' political views. Do groups with more social support demonstrate more resilience to terrorism? And if so, does that resilience decrease their hostility toward perpetrators, or does it in fact reify their hostility toward perpetrators, as Social Identity Theory and previous conflict studies literature has found?

Existing studies seem to support the idea that a feeling of connection – including, for ZAKA members, a feeling of connection to a spiritual or religious community—is critical to resilience in the face of their daunting and heart wrenching work. Indeed, because ZAKA members demonstrate a lower rate of PTSD than the Israeli population as a whole (Bleich, Gelkopf, and Solomon 2003) despite the horror to which they are exposed, examining their resilience may provide insight into coping mechanisms for other communities.

ZAKA members' resilience in the face of extreme trauma may be a result of their social/spiritual connection. Solomon and Berger (2005) find “religious coping” (Tix and Frazier, 1998) was the most frequently espoused method of coping for ZAKA members, with 98.9% of respondents saying their “trust in God” helped them cope with these events, and 94.2% reported “asking God for help” (Solomon and Berger 2005, 598). Scholars have argued religious coping is effective, at least in part, because it provides a sense of “belonging with others” as well as the “social support of a tight knit community” (Solomon and Berger 2005, 598). In a study of MDA workers by Nirel et al. (2008), respondents cited lack of time for family and social connection as one of the things that “bothered them most” about paramedic work (544).

Below, I use original survey data from MDA members in Settlements and in Jerusalem to evaluate their stress and trauma. The survey addressed the effects workers experienced when treating people they knew. I use it to evaluate whether there is a difference between MDA members who are part of the “in-group” of MDA (for which I use years of service in MDA, albeit an imprecise proxy) and newer members in terms of their need for post-trauma support. While there are a number of reasons why this is a far from conclusive test of the impact of social connection on this group’s exposure to terrorism, it does help evaluate whether social connection plays a role in these processes. It could be that people with more experience in MDA need less support because they are more hardened to the incidents, rather than because they have stronger social support networks. I use the questions: *“I prefer not to go on calls related to terrorist attacks since I fear I might meet people I know;”* *“being familiar with the patient affects my ability to stick to protocol”* to control for this, based on the premise that a belief they are likely to be pre-affected (knowing the victim) should counter-balance the impact of “hardening” across years of service.

Table 4: Regression Results – Connection and Trauma

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Existing Connection to Group	1.866** (0.852)	2.388*** (0.927)	1.866 (1.769)	1.104** (0.517)	1.373** (0.538)	1.373 (1.056)
Chance of being injured at that attack in question	-0.740 (0.788)	-0.816 (0.845)	- 0.740*** (0.0474)	-0.446 (0.494)	-0.446 (0.519)	- 0.446*** (0.0813)
Affects my ability to stick to protocol	-1.219 (0.957)	-2.231** (1.046)	-1.219 (1.882)	-0.507 (0.552)	-1.281** (0.641)	-1.281** (0.501)
Age	-1.740**	-2.310**	-1.740**	-1.111**	-1.390**	-1.390*

	(0.780)	(1.099)	(0.885)	(0.496)	(0.635)	(0.727)
Married		0.848			0.475	0.475
		(1.552)			(0.813)	(0.441)
Observations	24	23	24	24	23	23
Cluster Robust Errors	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
AIC	100.8	94.6	84.8	101.6	95.5	77.5
Ordered Logit	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Ordered Probit				Yes	Yes	Yes
Standard errors in parentheses						
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1						

Six models presented here use different estimation techniques (including Ordered Logit vs. Probit, and cluster robust standard errors (which won't change the coefficient estimates but do change the standard errors)) and are used to evaluate the robustness of the findings. First, the only result consistently statistically significant is "age" and it is has a negative relationship to the outcome variable of whether or not the respondent found the "debrief" talk helpful: therefore we can be relatively sure that an increase in age makes it more likely the respondent will find the talk less helpful, while controlling for experience, marriage, the level of danger of the attack and whether the respondent feels are able to "stick to protocol" under extreme circumstances (designed as a proxy for being "hardened" to violence). As such, it would appear that maturity and life experience may make coping with this sort of trauma easier; or may make group connection via a group talk less important.

The second factor which most consistently appears to have an impact on whether or not one is likely to find value in social connection and counseling post-traumatic event is one's existing connection to the group, operationalized as years of experience. The consistently positive and statistically significant relationship between these two factors provides preliminary evidence that longer membership in the group (which, I argue, may mean a greater level of

integration into that group) may make one more likely to value further levels of social connection and post-trauma counseling. This would support the basic premise that social connection and integration into a group may continue to build and help members process trauma. Additionally, whether or not one was in danger was highly significant when using cluster robust standard errors (which account for the different areas in which these volunteers were stationed). These results indicate that when controlling for location, exposure to danger actually decreased the efficacy of the post-trauma talk. This finding may be explained, as people in more perilous situations may have more to overcome -- a single post-trauma talk may be insufficient to address such an increased level of trauma. These data provide suggestive evidence in support of the importance of social connection in how disaster relief workers respond to terrorism, which provides indirect support for Hypotheses H7 and H8.

Linked fate and pro-social behavior

Existing literature predicts, and my interviews with MDA and ZAKA “elites” describe, a major factor in volunteer participation. Volunteers in MDA and ZAKA seem to share a sense of “linked fate,” which manifests as pro-social behavior toward in-group members. This finding aligns with the emerging pattern of heightened levels of pro-social behavior for members of one’s own in-group in post-conflict societies (discussed above).

Scholars have found that while “ZAKA work entails repeated exposure to horrific sights...it also gives rise to positive feelings that stem from altruistic and religious extrinsic rewards” (Solomon and Berger 2005, 598). Nurit Stadler (2006) argues that in doing this “death work” publicly, the ZAKA engage in creating sacred spaces in parts of secular Israeli society that

have long been devoid of sanctity – they espouse “an identity of death specialists that is exclusive and heroic” (Stadler 2006, 2), giving them a place in Israeli society where “great respect and gratitude” are afforded them, which goes to “reinforce their self-esteem and may promote resilience” (Solomon and Berger 2005, 598).

ZAKA provides a means through which *Haredis* (ultra Orthodox Jews) and the Israeli state can interact, as well as a sense of “civic accountability” the Israeli public does not usually expect from members of the *Haredi* community (Stadler 2006, 3-6). This feeling was strongly present in my interviews with ZAKA members. One of my interview subjects stated with pride “*People rely on us. No one else has these skills.*”⁹⁵ In the ZAKA main office, many officials spoke about ZAKA as a way to be part of the larger state, while simultaneously reiterating that nothing, including the state of Israel or any nationalist project, should come before devotion to God.⁹⁶ The relationship between ZAKA’s public work and their larger sense of marginalization within Israeli society leads me to contend that ZAKA forms a “replacement” for the roles its members have not taken up within society more generally (participation in the Army, more traditional jobs, or politics).

MDA members also specifically mentioned the idea of linked fate. Respondent #75 stated:

[14,000 Volunteers?! That is incredible! Why do you think you are able to get so many people to volunteer?]

What do you mean?

[Well, in the US, most EMS workers are paid. I think it would be very difficult to get people to volunteer for three several hour shifts each week. Why do you think people are willing to do that here?]

Ah. Well, here, all the people here are guaranteed to look out for one another - we must. We are each have a responsibility to one another and to Israel; it is the only way we can survive. Israelis will always help one another. After the Army,

⁹⁵ Personal Interview #73, Jerusalem, December 2015

⁹⁶ Personal Interviews #69-73, Jerusalem, December 2015

many Israelis go on a “big journey.” When there was an Earthquake in Nepal, and some of the people on a “big journey” were affected, MDA and the Army were there and had all the Israelis evacuated and back in Israel in less than 24 hours – faster than aid was even arriving from other countries.

Respondent #75 reflected MDA members’ view of their work as part of a broader mission, as service to the vision of the state of Israel, even if they might disagree with some of Israel’s politics. As a state born out of extreme trauma, there is a strong sense of unity, of fighting for one another, a unity less pronounced in other states. It is more than nationalism; it is a sense of connection extending throughout Israel. The idea of participating in or supporting that vision of Israel and the ineffable connection appears to motivate remarkable altruistic and pro-social behaviors not so apparent in other parts of the Western world.

Comparing MDA and ZAKA

These two organizations represent opposing trends in how they approach disaster relief responses to conflict. MDA has effectively doubled down on policies exemplifying “political tolerance,” even for terrorists, and even in the face of much consternation and disagreement from many MDA members who are “right wing” in their political views. Conversely, ZAKA members have implemented policies which privilege Jews in both medical care and after death care. For example, as mentioned above, MDA’s CEO has made a clear commitment to following the principles of triage. ZAKA also has some paramedic workers and has made the reverse claim: in December 2015, ZAKA changed its policy on two fronts: first, they decided to treat the terrorist last, no matter the severity of his or her injuries. Second, ZAKA members decided to use only black body bags to remove terrorists from the scene (as opposed to white body bags for victims), clearly demarcating ZAKA’s priorities. This was in direct response to requests from ZAKA

volunteers to change the protocols to use different colored body bags.⁹⁷ Officials in the main office of both organizations spoke about these distinctions in interviews. MDA officials spoke about American Heart Association guidelines as defining their adherence to triage, about medical care as service to the broader state of Israel, and about community.

Do MDA members agree with their CEOs statement, or are they, like ZAKA workers, more likely to support the idea that terrorists should be treated last, despite international principles of triage? Below, I use internal statistics from MDA, never previously published, to descriptively evaluate youth volunteers' views of how terrorists should be treated relative to Jewish victims.

Table 5: Regression Results – in-group altruism and treatment of out-groups

	(1)	(2)
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
Volunteers willing to risk their lives	0.0710	0.0389
	(0.125)	(0.0717)
Experience In MDA	1.027*	0.623*
	(0.618)	(0.368)
Satisfied with MDA	-0.536**	-0.307**
	(0.269)	(0.153)
Observations	58	58
Ordered Logit	Yes	No
Ordered Probit	No	Yes
AIC	229.1435	228.9632
Standard errors in parentheses		
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Table 5 evaluates the relationship between an in-group-altruism belief (that volunteers are willing to risk their lives for others) and a belief that MDA members must treat victims (even terrorists) according to triage protocols. I find no relationship between the two. While this may be a result of relatively small sample size or the limited experience of volunteers (these are youth volunteers) this null finding does provide support for the idea that conflict may exacerbate

⁹⁷ Personal Interview #73, Jerusalem, December 2015

positive feelings towards one's in group but that may not translate into tolerant policies towards perpetrators or out-group members. Being satisfied with MDA and being experienced with MDA both have a negative and statistically significant relationship with the belief that one should treat the terrorist according to triage protocols. This finding is surprising: as experience in MDA and being satisfied with MDA decrease, respondents were more likely to believe that they should treat according to protocol. If this relationship is borne out in subsequent studies, it could plausibly be explained as support for the premise that longer participation in a group and greater exposure to violence can make one more hostile towards an out-group, overcoming the effect of increased training. I hesitate to make claims based on a small and skewed sample (only youth volunteers), but this does provide basic justification for further investigation into this topic.

This chapter provides a “plausibility probe” for thinking about how social connection might mediate experiences of violence in ways that affect political preferences, especially when social connections (and violence exposure) are delimited by membership in a group rather than by access to freedom of movement. This probe considers the relationship between groups experiencing violence/trauma and how that collective experience might impact the way such violence is received. This presents a potential step forward in thinking about the role social connection plays and the mechanisms which might affect how those experiences of violence impact political preferences. While clearly very different from a discussion of checkpoints, the preliminary evidence presented here does provide support for the underlying relationship hypothesized in chapters two and three. The relationship between restrictions on physical space and political preferences hypothesized in chapters 2 and 3 is dependent on social connection as a mechanism. Thus, finding social connection (in the alternative context of disaster relief workers)

is a factor in mediating the effects of violence and may affect political preferences lends support to the premise of the prior chapters.

Additionally, this chapter examines more closely the subtlety of how social connection might affect political preferences. Social connection can and does increase a sense of in-group altruism, which, in addition to providing hope and making people more willing to engage politically in Firing Zone 918, can also increase hostility towards the out-group. Further research is required to understand how that out-group animosity is likely to materialize as more retaliatory policies, as it did with ZAKA, and when it might not, as with MDA. I suspect that it may have to do with cross-cultural social connection: MDA members are significantly more diverse, with Arab Israelis serving in many MDA units. It may be that cross-cultural exposure allows MDA members to channel their in-group altruism without ramping up their out-group hostility. I believe this is fruitful ground for future research, and indeed will be part of the survey of disaster relief workers discussed above.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Framing the Research Agenda

Civilian preferences and subsequent actions can turn the tide in conflict, but our understanding of why civilians form the preferences they do is just beginning. I present a new theory investigating how civilians' experiences of violence at the hands of armed actors may affect their political preferences. I examine social isolation and social connection as mechanisms affecting civilian responses to such violence. I theorize these mechanisms affect civilian preferences for militancy or nonviolent political participation (including civil resistance) as the means civilians deem appropriate to redress their grievances. Existing explanations for civilian side choosing largely assume a logic of survival: civilians will do what they must to stay alive. A logic of survival framework anticipates civilians will modify preferences according to whom they believe will best be able to protect, threaten, or incentivize them. However, in practice, civilians respond differently than structural factors might predict. Ideational influences, such as social connection, emotion and identity, can play a profound role in shaping preferences.

Conflict scholars and policy makers hoping to limit the spread of militancy may be overlooking a crucial piece of the puzzle: social isolation and social connection, delimited in part by freedom of movement and membership in formal groups, can impact civilians' political preferences. Social connection is a little understood aspect of: how conflicts unfold, how civilians experience violence, civilian resilience, and the impact violence has on civilian preferences for militancy or nonviolent political participation. I present a new theoretical

rationale examining the role of social connection in conflict zones, particularly the way physical space (checkpoints) can impact social connection, and the resulting effects on civilian preference formation.

This dissertation addresses how state use of force policies may affect political preferences (a topic the literature has heretofore deemed largely “unknowable” and certainly too difficult to measure). I develop a new theory applying psycho-sociological literature and a typology and proposed means to reliably quantify state use of force across conflicts. I conduct a plausibility probe into the role group membership plays in translating violent experiences for in-group members.

Application

In particular, this research focuses on possible (undesirable) implications of checkpoints, a tool widely used in conflict zones. Using qualitative interviews to establish a causal mechanism, I demonstrate certain state policies designed to combat militancy, like checkpoints, may impede militant activity but simultaneously may increase civilian’s preference for militancy as an approach to solve their political problems. State use of force policies that disrupt community structure (checkpoints, searches, curfews, control over email/phone networks, and surveillance) may press civilian preferences toward militancy, rather than achieving the designed goal of “de-radicalization,” or in the case of less benign governments, submission and compliance. Such state use of force policies (impeding social connection and community ties) can lead to isolation, increased aggression and a preference for more militant approaches toward civilians’ political goals. I argue that at least one form of Palestinian militancy—militancy akin

to desperation, rather than an intentional tactic designed (and believed) to achieve political goals—was the result of social isolation and community fracturing, which led to more aggressive responses to political questions, as well as feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, and ultimately despair.

The years 2015 and 2016, when I conducted my fieldwork, were unique in the type of violence Palestinians perpetrated against Israeli civilians. In the last year and a half, Palestinian violence has taken the form of indiscriminate, individual-level actions unaffiliated with any major terrorist groups. Indeed these actions are perpetrated almost exclusively with no statement about larger political aims. As such, this violence appears to be an act of desperation rather than a rational tactic designed to leverage a specific political position. It is this sort of violence that community connection might mitigate.

Conversely, I argue that communities where social connections remain intact (not disrupted by freedom of movement restrictions) can sustain extreme violence, even indiscriminate violence, and yet remain remarkably resilient. When groups endure shared harms, the experience can build social trust and foster social cohesion. Social connection in the context of violence can increase the strength of social ties as well as within-community altruism, factors which have, in other contexts, been found to increase nonviolent political participation. Another factor resulting from communities with strong social connections is the greater personal efficacy necessary for political and non-violent engagement. These characteristics were present and, according to interview respondents, were the foundation for the successes of a decade long civil resistance movement in the villages of Firing Zone 918 in the South Hebron Hills.

Directions for Future Research

In chapter four, I introduce a typology of state use of force with examples from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. My fieldwork findings about the effects of checkpoints point to the benefits of disaggregating violence. Consequently, my typology establishes a model to disaggregate violence with categories that could be applied across conflicts, and proposes a pathway to quantify each type of violence. Applying this typology would allow for a more rigorous analysis of the relationship between state use of force and civilian preferences, along with other possible outcome variables. I believe this typology could be useful both for counterinsurgents working to mitigate increased militancy as well as for nonviolent resistance activists hoping to understand the relationships between state actions and civilian preferences.

Chapter five uses existing, though scant, survey data to conduct a plausibility probe into the relationship between group membership and violence exposure and the impact these have on civilian political preferences. I found suggestive evidence that the strong social connection and social cohesion found in Israeli disaster relief worker organizations appear to have a significant impact on these workers' resilience in receiving and processing violence; a finding, which if it holds up in subsequent studies, could be used to promote social connections and civilian resilience in conflict zones.

Contributions to the Literature

This dissertation takes important steps in centralizing civilian experiences in conflict: (i) by elucidating a plausible relationship between civilian experiences of state use of force policies

(e.g., checkpoints) and identifying new mechanisms (social isolation/connection) affecting civilian preferences, (ii) by constructing a broad typology of state use of force potentially applicable cross-nationally, and (iii) by evaluating whether similar mechanisms might be at play in how civilians receive terrorist violence and form political preferences in response to that violence. Most importantly, it takes a step forward in contributing to a literature that has traditionally conceived of preferences as “unknowable.” If there are factors that systematically influence civilian preferences one way or another, a whole new line of inquiry is open to us. This research also starts to “fill in” this gap in conflict studies, as well as pointing to the reasons for conflicting conclusions about the impacts of different forms of state use of force. I believe the preliminary evidence presented here provides justification for further study, especially because civilian preferences for militancy keep catching the West off guard in its “war on terror.”

Policy Applications

If checkpoints do not achieve their designed purpose and instead promote militancy, their use must be reassessed. Additionally, it may also be that governments know that checkpoints have this effect, and utilize them anyway to encourage more violent resistance, thereby providing justification for a harsher crack down. If this is the case, then checkpoints may be an early warning signal to human rights activists and should be considered as such.

For Palestinian activists committed to bringing an end to the “Occupation,” these findings point to the success of nonviolent civil resistance over more militant preferences and actions. A wider application of these findings would be the understanding among communities in conflict zones beset by violence that one mechanism to increase resilience is to maintain and improve

social connections and strengthen social ties, particularly in-person connections. This research supports the theory that community trust and social cohesion are foundational to nonviolent political engagement (including civil resistance), especially in conflicts where violence is extreme and pervasive.

Weaknesses: Data Collection, Measurement, and Quality

Despite this promising line of inquiry, there are of course weaknesses in the analysis to be addressed with future research. The primary problems come in the form of data quality in chapters four and five. These chapters were based on existing survey data, so I was unable to develop survey questions directly addressing my theory. Until the results of the survey I have submitted become available, I was forced to adapt my analysis to the either the not-quite-appropriate questions or to the insufficiently fine grained data. This adaptation means I was unable to measure the concepts I had planned, and I used the existing surveys as “proxies” for the more precise data forthcoming. Further, the survey cohort was too small for reliable results, so I can’t be certain of any quantitative findings from those chapters.

I have already taken steps to remedy these deficiencies in data quality and collection as I move forward with this project. I am in conversations with the UN Mission about gaining access to the archival documents mentioned in chapter four, which the UN Mission has stated will be released to me in April. In addition, the survey of 1,500 ZAKA and 14,000 MDA members is online and open for responses, pending approval of both agencies. Though the quantitative data collected to date is not high-quality, the value of this research is in tracing the theoretical mechanisms, and in establishing a measurement tool that can form the basis for future research.

Lessons Learned

There are also significant lessons I learned from this project. I was unprepared for the personal trauma I would experience while engaged in my fieldwork. This trauma is ongoing, diminishing slowly with time, but has affected my ability to use all the data collected. As a result, I used only a fraction of the qualitative interviews I conducted in the West Bank; it was too painful to recall the intimate and devastating details of each interview. I hope to leverage the rest of these interviews in a more comprehensive qualitative data analysis involving inductive and deductive coding of every page of interview transcripts. I hope that deeper qualitative analysis of those transcripts will provide additional insights and rigor to this analysis. As well, I propose a preparation program for graduate students embarking on fieldwork.

Sum and Substance

Understanding the ramifications of different types of violence on civilians' lives is critical to understanding the perseverance of the people of Israel and the West Bank, as well as the chance for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Evaluating understudied aspects of civilian engagement in, and responses to, the conflict, such as Palestinian non-violent resistance and contributions of Israeli disaster relief workers, informs our understanding of political processes in Israel, the West Bank and beyond.

In thinking about the generalizability of this project, I think there is significant promise for cross-national application, as none of these factors is unique to the West Bank or Israel. As

well, nonviolence activists (working as movement entrepreneurs) may inform their activities with this research about the value of social connection and social cohesion. Indeed, it may be that community-building activities are among the most important parts of successful movement participation. The recent January 21st Women's March, for example, has attempted to capitalize on this idea with their "huddles". Nevertheless, the concerns addressed herein about how freedom of movement restrictions (checkpoints) limit access to social connections is not generally discussed in the existing literature. Focusing on how freedom of movement restrictions degrade social connections in conflict zones may yield promising advances – both in constraining militancy and promoting resiliency among civilians trying to maintain their lives under such difficult circumstances.

Appendix A

Table of Interviews:

#	Month /Year	Type	Time of day	Referred by?	Length of interview	Interruptions?	Relation to other interview subjects?	Others present	Location	Translator	Area
1	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon day one, morning day 2	International Contact	1.5 hrs	Yes - Soldiers, conducted on two days; tear gas and two flyovers during interview	Spouse of 2	Wife and children	Olive Fields	Translator 1	H2
2	Oct-15	Olive Family	Morning, afternoon	International Contact	2 hrs	Yes - Soldiers, conducted on two days	Spouse of 1	Husband and children	Olive Fields	Translator 1	H2
3	Oct-15	Olive Family	Morning, afternoon	International Contact	2 hrs	Yes - Soldiers, conducted over three days	Spouse of 4, Parent of 7	Wife and children	Olive Fields	Translator 1	H2
4	Oct-15	Olive Family	Morning, afternoon	International Contact	1 hr	Yes - Soldiers, conducted on two days	Spouse of 3, Parent of 7	Husband and children	Olive Fields	Translator 1	H2
5	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	International Contact	1.5 hrs	Yes, shooting down the street	Parent of 6	Daughter	House	Translator 1	H2
6	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	International Contact	1.5 hrs	Yes, shooting down the street	Child of 5	Mother	House	Translator 1	H2
7	Oct-15	Olive Family	Morning, afternoon	Parents	1 hr	Yes - Soldiers, conducted on two days	Child of 3 and 4	None	House	Translator 1	H2
8	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	International Contact	45 min	Man was sexually inappropriate to me and to my translator so we left before finishing the interview	None	Wife, Daughters	House	Translator 1	H2

X	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	International Contact	NA	Interview subject died - We had arranged the interview in advance, I spoke to his wife briefly but not about the interview material rather about whatever she wanted to tell me about	None	None	House	Translator 1	H2 – At this point H2 became a closed military zone and I was denied further access.
9	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	Spouse of 10	Whole family in and out	House	Translator 2	Beit Omar
10	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	Spouse of 9	Whole family in and out	House	Translator 2	Beit Omar
11	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Approached me and asked to be interviewed	45 min	None	None	None	House	Translator 2	Beit Omar
12	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1.5 hrs	None	Parent of 13	Whole family in and out	House	Translator 2	Beit Omar
13	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	Child of 12	Whole family in and out	House	Translator 2	Beit Omar
14	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	She approached me through local interlocutor	1.5 hrs	None - her son died four days prior in clashes and she wanted to talk to me about that so I listened and took notes about what she wanted to talk about but didn't push her to talk about her son's death	None	Son's three year old daughter	House	Translator 2	Beit Omar
15	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Palestinian AG officials	1 hr	None	None	PA Official	Olive Fields	Translator 2	Surif
16	Oct-15	Olive Press	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	2 hrs	None	Parent with two children interviewed together	Workers and costumers	Olive Press	Translator 1	Dura
17	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Olive Press Owner	45 min	None	None	Olive press workers around but not present	Olive Press	Translator 1	Dura

18	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	2 hrs	None	Spouse of 19	None	House	Translator 1	Beit Anon
19	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	Spouse of 18	None	House	Translator 1	Beit Anon
20	Oct-15	Olive Family	Evening	Local interlocutor	2.5 hrs	None	Parent of 65	None	House	English	Beit Anon
21	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1.5 hrs	None	Friend of 22	None	House	Translator 1	Beit Anon
22	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1.5 hrs	None	Friend of 21	None	House	Translator 1	Beit Anon
23	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1.5 hrs	As we left asked my translator to marry him	Child of 25	None	House	Translator 1	Beit Anon
24	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	2 hrs	None	Friend of 23 and 25	None	House	Translator 1	Beit Anon
25	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	45 min	None	Parent of 23	None	House	Translator 1	Beit Anon
26	Oct-15	Palestinian AG officials	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1 hr	High ranking member of the PA in that area - so interruptions for people coming to talk to him	None	None	Municipality	Translator 2	Surif
27	Oct-15	Municipality	Afternoon	Palestinian AG officials	1.5 hrs	Flyovers	None	None	Olive Fields	Translator 2	Surif
28	Oct-15	Palestinian AG officials	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1.5 hrs	None	None	None	Municipality	Translator 1	Hebron H1
29	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	None	None	Hospital	Translator 1	Hebron H1
30	Oct-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	45 min	Yes, strike ended interview	None	None	Hospital	Translator 1	Hebron H1
31	Oct-15	Municipality	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	45 min	None	None	None	Municipality	Translator 1	Beit nihem
32	Nov-15	Palestinian AG officials	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	None	None	Municipality	Translator 1	Beit nihem
33	Nov-15	Activist	Afternoon	Online Search	4 hrs	Across three days	None	None	House	English	Al Tawani
34	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Activist	5 hrs	Across three days	None	None	House	English	Al Tawani
35	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Online Search	3 hrs	Across two days	Sibling of 36	Brother	House	Translator 2	Al Madj

36	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Online Search	2 hrs	Across two days	Sibling of 35	Sister	House	Translator 2	Al Madj
37	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Number 35	1.5 hrs	None	Friend of 35	35, 36, and 38	House	Translator 2	Al Madj
38	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Number 35	1.5 hrs	None	Friend of 35	35, 36, and 38	House	Translator 2	Al Madj
39	Nov-15	Olive Press	Afternoon	Went to olive press	1.5 hrs	None	None	None	House	Translator 2	Al Madj
40	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Number 35	1 hr	None	Friend of 35	35	Shop	Translator 2	Al Madj
41	Nov-15	Researcher	Afternoon	Municipality in Dura	1.5 hrs	None	None	None	Municipality	Translator 1	Dura
42	Nov-15	Olive Family	Morning	Local interlocutor	1.5 hrs	None	None	None	House	Translator 3	Tuwan i
43	Nov-15	Olive Family	Mid day	Local interlocutor	1.5 hrs	None	None	None	Cave	Translator 3	Tuwan i
44	Nov-15	Olive Family	Evening	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	Parent of 46, Spouse of 45	Son and wife	Tent	Translator 4	Firing Zone 918
45	Nov-15	Olive Family	Evening	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	Parent of 46, Spouse of 44	Son and husband	Tent	Translator 4	Firing Zone 918
46	Nov-15	Olive Family	Evening	Local interlocutor	1.5 hrs	None	Child of 44 and 45	Mother and Father	Tent	Translator 4	Firing Zone 918
47	Nov-15	Olive Family	Morning	Local interlocutor	4 hrs	Across three days	Child of 33	None	Walking in the Firing Zone	English	Firing Zone 918
48	Nov-15	Olive Family	Morning	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	None	Three Sons	In Field	Translator 4	Firing Zone 918
49	Nov-15	Olive Family	Morning	Local interlocutor	2 hrs	None	None	None	Walking in the Firing Zone	English	Firing Zone 918
50	Nov-15	PA Official	Morning	Went to municipality	1 hr	None	None	None	Municipality	Translator 1	Sahir
51	Nov-15	Olive Family	Morning	Municipality in Sahir	2 hr	None	Spouse of 52	3 children, Wife, 6 grand children, municipality workers	In tent	Translator 1	Sahir
52	Nov-15	Olive Family	Morning	Municipality in Sahir	30 min	None	Spouse of 51	3 children, husband 6 grand children, municipality workers	In tent	Translator 1	Sahir

53	Nov-15	Olive Press	Afternoon	Went to olive press	1 hr	None	None	None	In Olive Press	Translator 2	Surif
54	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Went to olive press	30 min	None	None	None	In Olive Press	Translator 2	Surif
55	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Went to olive press	2 hrs	None	None	None	In office	Translator 2	Surif
56	Nov-15	Palestinian AG officials	Afternoon	Municipality in Halhul	1 hr	None	None	None	In office	English	Halhul
57	Nov-15	Olive Family	Morning, afternoon	International Contact	5 hrs	Across three days	Child of 22	None	In Café	English	H1
58	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	International Contact	45 min	None	Child of 59	None	In house	Translator 5	Dura
59	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	International Contact	1.5 hrs	None	Child of 58	Daughter and two sons	In house	Translator 5	Dura
60	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	International Contact	20 min	None	None	Family in house	In house	Translator 5	Dura
61	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	International Contact	30 min	None	None	Family in house	In house	Translator 5	Dura
62	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	International Contact	1 hr	None	None	None	In Field	Translator 5	Dura
63	Nov-15	Olive Family	Afternoon	Local interlocutor	2 hrs	None	None	None	In house	Translator 5	Dura
64	Nov-15	Olive Family	Evening	Local interlocutor	1 hr	None	None	None	On top of demolished Mosque	Translator 4	Firing Zone 918
65	Nov-15	Olive Family	Morning, afternoon	International Contact	4+ hrs	Across four days	Child of 20	None	In Café	English	H2
66	Nov-15	Olive Family	Morning, afternoon	International Contact	4 + hrs	Across four days	None	None	In Café	English	H2
67	Nov-15	Soldier - Retired	Afternoon	International Contact	1 hr	None	None	None	In house	English	Tel Aviv
68	Dec-15	Soldier - Retired	Afternoon	International Contact	1 hr	None	None	None	In house	English	Tel Aviv
69	Dec-15	Soldier - Active	Afternoon	International Contact	2.5 hrs	None	None	None	In house	English	Jerusalem
70	Dec-15	Soldier - Breaking the Silence	Afternoon	Online Search	2 hrs	None	Coworker of 71	None	In Café	English	Tel Aviv
71	Dec-15	Soldier - Breaking the Silence	Afternoon	Online Search	2 hrs	None	Coworker of 70	None	In Café	English	Tel Aviv

72	Dec-15	ZAKA - elite	Morning	Went to head office	2.5 hrs	None	Coworker of 73-75	None	In office	English	Jerusalem
73	Dec-15	ZAKA - elite	Morning	Went to head office	1 hr	None	Coworker of 72, 74-75	None	In office	English	Jerusalem
74	Dec-16	ZAKA - elite	Afternoon	Went to head office	2 hrs	None	Coworker of 72-73, 75	None	In office	Translator 6	Jerusalem
75	Dec-16	ZAKA - elite	Evening	Went to head office	2 hrs	None	Coworker of 72-74	None	In office	Translator 7	Jerusalem
76	Dec-16	MDA - elite	Afternoon	Went to head office	1.5 hrs	None	Coworker of 77	None	In office	English	Tel Aviv
77	Dec-16	MDA - elite	Afternoon	Went to head office	1 hr	None	Coworker of 76	None	In office	English	Tel Aviv

Methodological details:

I applied for and was granted an IRB “exemption” on the grounds that my research was not federally funded. However, I had several concerns about the ethics of my research and thus implemented the following steps on my own to try to ensure that my research had the most minimal impact and no chance for harm to the communities I studied, my interlocutors and my translators.

I used verbal consent procedures to avoid the possibility of identification of my respondents. Rather than asking my respondents to sign any sort of document, I instead made a promise to them, regarding my obligation to keep their data protected and anonymous.

I offered my subjects the opportunity to choose between my taking notes by hand and my tape recording each session. I asked: “Some people prefer interviewers take notes by hand, and some prefer interviewers record sessions. I have no preference. Which would make you most comfortable?” All respondents in the West Bank asked me to take notes by hand, while some in Israel asked me to record. I did not see my research as excessively sensitive; I was not seeking out anyone who had taken part in illicit activities or asking my respondents to admit to anything

“risky.” Nevertheless, I chose to follow the “best practices” for respondent security.⁹⁸ I took notes in English with pen and paper. I did not record names or exact locations of any interviews. To transport paper notes back to the United States, I (being paranoid) prepared 17 different envelopes, each containing every 17th page of my interview transcripts. I taped each envelope shut on all sides. I mailed them by post on different days from 6 locations inside Israel to three different addresses in the United States. All envelopes arrived unopened.

I encrypted my Mac to protect digital field notes when I crossed all borders. I saved all my interview files under folders with different recipes or travel photos. I recorded “metadata” about each interview – the time of day it took place, the number of interviews I conducted that day, area of the interview, who introduced me to the interview respondent, my emotions around each interview, the translator I used and how we got along, as well as any other data that would affect my ability as an “information gathering” instrument for my personal reference.

I used translators for the majority of my interviews, as my knowledge of Arabic and Hebrew are basic at best, and insufficient for fieldwork. This comes with several disadvantages. First, it impairs my ability to develop trust and rapport with my respondents. Second, it dictates to others that I am the sort of foreigner that needs an interpreter.⁹⁹ Third, the use of a translator increases the “performance” aspect of interviews; the idea that there is some sort of “show and tell” happening, or a prescribed story about the conflict, which while “true” and part of their set of experiences, is also choreographed and in that way, inauthentic.¹⁰⁰ Given these limitations, I proceeded with my translator selection.

⁹⁸ I used “Surveillance Self Defense” tutorials (<https://ssd.eff.org/en>), along with deep methodological discussions with Sarah Parkinson. I also referenced Fujii (2010; 2012) and Gilboy (1991).

⁹⁹ I thank Sarah Parkinson for this insight.

¹⁰⁰ I thank Sarah Parkinson for this insight.

I attempted to use hiring practices that supported the people I was interviewing: I hired local students rather than professional translators from Ramallah, as an attempt to combat the common practice of foreigners who “buy access” to local communities – where the interpreter may earn more than a family in the community may earn in a month.¹⁰¹ However, this comes with its own set of drawbacks: there may be a sense of “subtle coercion” in play if a person feels compelled to talk to me because I am employing a friend or family member of theirs.¹⁰² For this reason, I recruited my translators from different circles than those where I was conducting each set of interviews, in an attempt to minimize this sort of coercion. I made my interview appointments as much as possible independently of my translators.

I asked a local friend to “vet” potential translators by discussing any family reputations or concerns, as family name and connection is a big part of local political life. As well, because my interviews took the form of “life story” approaches, I hoped to be able to accurately and honestly say that I wanted to hear and understand people’s true experiences of the world as they see it, rather than tailored for my purposes. My translators in the West Bank were predominantly women (except translators 3 and 4 in Firing Zone 918, due to safety concerns Translators 1 and 2 had about traveling to the Firing Zone). I found this gave me greater access, limited the problem of me “being seen alone” with men in a conservative community, and also allowed for better rapport and trust between my respondents and me. While I weighed the merits of switching translators frequently, I decided to maintain my same translator for all the interviews in a given community, if possible.

¹⁰¹ I thank Sarah Parkinson for this insight.

¹⁰² Sarah Parkinson discussed this with me via Skype and in as yet unpublished methodological appendix of her book project.

I “tested” my translators by bringing them a passage in Arabic which I had had translated in advance and asked them to translate it back for me, so that I could evaluate whether they translated differently from one another and from professional translators.

Interview Questions, West Bank:

(This begins after informed consent discussion which took place when the interview was set up)

This is an interview about the story of your life, with particular reference to the events and experiences – singular or daily – that you believe made you who you are. As a social scientist, I am interested in hearing your story, including parts of the past as you remember them and the future as you imagine it. The story is selective; it does not include everything that has ever happened to you. Instead, I will ask you to focus on a few key things in your life – a few key scenes, characters, and ideas. There are no right or wrong answers to my questions. Specifically, I am here in al Khalil gathering stories about what your daily life is like under the Israeli occupation, and how violence and oppression from Israel and from Settlers affects your perspectives and attitudes about society, government and politics. So, there will be some more specific questions that all respondents will answer including education, income, participation in political activities, your olive groves, and experiences of violence. Everything you say is voluntary, anonymous, and confidential, as we spoke about before. We can stop at any time, so please just let me know if you’d like to discontinue our interview. Do you have any questions?

To start off, lets just get some basic information about you:

How old are you?

In which city were you born?

How many years have you lived here in al Khalil/area?

Are you married?

Do you have any children?

What is your relationship to the head of your household?

How many people live in your household?

Are you able to use electricity in your house most of the day, only part of the day, only a few days a week, or not at all?

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about your olives, is that ok?

How many olive trees do you have?

How long have the olive trees been in your family?

Are the olive groves the central livelihood of your family?

Do you sell your olives? To whom?

Do you find it harder to access your trees and pick your olives now than in the past?

Have you had any confrontations with settlers or the IDF around your olives? Have you had anyone damage to the olive trees? (please describe) When did that happen?

*Life Story Section*¹⁰³

Now, I would like to hear about your life. Because telling a life story is hard, it often helps people to think about their life in chapters, as in a book or novel. I would like you to focus in on a few key scenes that stand out in your life. A key scene would be an event or specific incident that took place at a particular time and place. Consider a key scene to be a moment in your life story that stands out for a particular reason – perhaps because it was especially good or bad, particularly vivid, important, or memorable. Please do change names of people or places – for this research, I am not interested in the specific names of people or organizations themselves, but

¹⁰³ Based on: McAdams, Dan P. "The life story interview." *Evanston, IL: Northwestern University* (1995).

rather the way events in your life have impacted you and the way you think about the world and about politics.

High Point

Please describe a scene, episode, or moment in your life that stands out as an especially positive experience. This might be the high point scene of your entire life, or else an especially happy, joyous, exciting, or wonderful moment in the story. What happened in the event, and what were you thinking and feeling? Please say a word or two about why you think this particular moment was so good and what the scene may say about who you are as a person.

Vivid Memory

Think about an event that stands out as especially vivid or meaningful. This would be an especially memorable, vivid, or important scene, positive or negative. What happened in the event, and what were you thinking and feeling? Please describe this scene in detail, tell what happened, and what you were thinking and feeling. What does this memory say about you or your life?

Low Point

The second scene is the opposite of the first. Thinking back over your entire life, please identify a scene that stands out as a low point, if not the low point in your life story. What happened in the event, and what were you thinking and feeling? Also, please say a word or two about why you think this particular moment was so bad and what the scene may say about you or your life.

Turning Point

In looking back over your life, it may be possible to identify certain key moments that stand out as turning points -- episodes that marked an important change in you or your life story. Please identify a particular episode in your life story that you now see as a turning point in your life. Again, for this event please describe what happened, where and when, who was involved, and what you were thinking and feeling. Also, please say a word or two about what you think this event says about you as a person or about your life.

Life challenge

Looking back over your entire life, please identify and describe what you now consider to be the greatest single challenge you have faced in your life. What is or was the challenge or problem? How did the challenge or problem develop? How did you address or deal with this challenge or problem? What is the significance of this challenge or problem in your own life story?

About the Conflict

Looking back over your life, please identify a scene or period in your life where you or a close family member confronted an experience related to the conflict here. Please describe in detail what the experience is or was and how it developed. If relevant, please discuss any experience you had with the state authorities or other communities regarding this crisis or problem. In addition, please talk about how you coped with the problem and what impact this experience has had on you and your overall life story.

Now I'd like to ask you some standard questions if it's okay?

Speaking generally, do you see change as possible: never, rarely, somewhat possible, absolutely.

Suppose you are given a choice between two options: You can either (1) accept 500 shekels and take it home with you, or (2) play a game. In the game, a person flips a coin. If you correctly predict which side the coin falls on, you will receive 1000 shekels to take home. If you predict incorrectly, you will receive no shekels. Would you rather: 1) Take the 500 shekels, or 2) Play the game.

I'm going to read you a scenario and then ask you about what you'd like to do in response. Say you are paid 1000 shekels for completing a job you worked very hard for, and then 200 shekels of that money is stolen from your pocket. If you knew who had done that, what would you do?

How much, if anything, would you be willing to pay (of your remaining money) to make sure the thief paid for his or her crime?

- Would you do that even if your losses were not recovered?

I'm going to briefly describe a scenario to you, and I want you to tell me how violent you think that event was, on a scale from 1 to 100, where 100 is the most violent thing you can imagine, and 1 is completely non violent.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Anchoring vignette: <http://gking.harvard.edu/vign>

- Verbal harassment?
- Being beaten?
- A soldier or policeman being shot in the leg?
- A civilian being shot in the leg?

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about economic conditions, is that ok?

Do you work or participate in any activities for which you earn income?

What is your main income-generating activity?

Now, I would like to ask a few questions about your fundamental beliefs and values and about questions of meaning and morality in your life. Is that okay?

Consider for a moment the religious or spiritual aspects of your life. Please describe in a nutshell your religious beliefs and values, if indeed these are important to you. Whether you are religious or not, please describe your overall ethical or moral approach to life.

How frequently do you attend mosque? (less than once a month, once per month, once per day, more than once per day?)

Please tell the story of how your religious, moral, and political views and values have developed

over time. Have they changed in any important ways? Please explain.

Some people describe themselves first by their nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, or occupation. How would you describe your identity? How do you see yourself?¹⁰⁵ (e.g. as a Palestinian first, a Muslim second, and then a husband? Or as a husband first...)

Would it be okay to ask you some specific questions about government and politics?

How do you approach political or social issues? Do you have a particular political point of view? Are there particular social issues or causes about which you feel strongly? Please explain.

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: Sometimes, politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on. Do you agree: very strongly, somewhat strongly, not very strongly, or not at all strongly?¹⁰⁶

When there are elections here, do you vote? (Every time, sometimes, rarely or never)

Generally, do you see yourself as: (supportive of the peace process, opposed to the peace process, in between support and opposed, don't know)

¹⁰⁵ (Kuo and Margalit 2012)

¹⁰⁶ Or, the American National Election Survey (ANES) routinely uses the following question to measure personal efficacy

In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian areas in the West Bank these days? (very good, good, so so, bad, very bad, don't know)

Would you support stopping security coordination with Israel? (certainly support, support, oppose, certainly oppose, don't know)

Do you support the campaign to boycott Israeli products? (certainly support, support, oppose, certainly oppose, don't know)

In your view, can people in the West Bank today criticize the authority without fear? (yes, no, don't know)

Do you support or oppose the continuation of launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip on Israeli cities and towns until Israel agree to end the siege and closure on Gaza? (certainly support, support, oppose, certainly oppose, don't know)

Now that negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis have stopped, would you support or oppose a Return to the armed intifada and confrontations? (certainly support, support, oppose, certainly oppose, don't know)

→ Have you always supported the intifada? Was there ever a time where you thought the intifadas were a bad idea?

<What changed your mind?>

The Palestinian society confronts today various problems, like the continuation of occupation and settlements, the spread of unemployment and poverty, the lack of national unity due to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the continuation of the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its border crossings, the spread of corruption in public institutions, and others. Tell me, what in your opinion, is the problem you see as the most fundamental, the one that must be on the top priority of the Palestinian Authority?

I'd like to hear about your personal experience of the occupation, if you are willing to talk about that with me?

To what extent are you worried or not worried that you or a member of your family could be hurt by Israel in your daily life or that your land would be confiscated or home demolished? (very worried, worried, not worried, not worried at all).

People are victims of violence for all types of reasons, and have contact with state actors and occupation forces for all sorts of reasons. Please check which, if any, of these experiences you've had personally, and which, if any, you believe have happened to a close friend or family member?

Please select all that apply. Please take "frequently" to mean once or more per week, "sometimes" to mean every month or so, and "rarely" to mean a few times per year or less.

Violent Experience	Happened to you			Happened to a close friend or family member			Witnessed it happening			Prefer not to say
	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been in a vehicle that was stopped by Israeli occupation forces or police for any reason	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been questioned or arrested by Israeli occupation forces or police for any reason	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been imprisoned/political detention for any reason by Israeli occupation forces or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been physically searched by Israeli occupation forces or the police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been beaten or hit by Israeli occupation forces or the police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been verbally harassed or called names by Israeli occupation forces or the police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been shot at with live fire by Israeli occupation forces or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been near a bomb that exploded	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been hit by any shrapnel or rubble as a result of a bomb exploding	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been shot by Israeli occupation forces or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been shot with rubber bullets/tear gas/other crowd control related measures by Israeli occupation forces or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	

Been physically harassed by Israeli occupation forces or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been verbally harassed or called names by Settlers	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Had trash/rocks/etc. thrown at you by Israeli occupation forces or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Had trash/rocks/etc. thrown at you by Settlers	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Had home violated or destroyed by Settlers	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Had home violated or destroyed by Israeli occupation forces or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been in a vehicle that was stopped by Palestinian officials or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been questioned or arrested by Palestinian state officials or police for any reason	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been imprisoned/political detention for any reason by Palestinian state officials	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been physically searched by Palestinian state officials or the police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been beaten or hit by Palestinian state officials or the police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been verbally harassed or called names by Palestinian state officials or the police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been shot at with live fire by Palestinian State officials or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Been shot with rubber bullets/tear gas/other crowd control related measures by	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	

Palestinian state officials or police										
Been physically harassed by Palestinian state officials or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Had trash/rocks/etc. thrown at you from Palestinian officials or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Had home violated or destroyed by Palestinian officials or police	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	Frequently	Sometimes	Rarely	
Did not experience any of the above										

If you could tell people who don't know anything about this conflict one thing that I have not yet asked, what would it be?

Reflection

Thank you very much for this interview. Many of the stories you have told me are about experiences that stand out from the day-to-day. For example, we talked about a high point, a turning point, etc. Given that most people don't share their life stories in this way on a regular basis, I'm wondering if you might reflect for one last moment about what this interview, here today, has been like for you. What were your thoughts and feelings during the interview? How do you think this interview has affected you? Do you have any other comments about the interview process? Do you have any questions for me?

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