

**Diplomatic Practices of the U.S. & China:**  
**A Comparative Analysis of Aid Projects in Angola & Nigeria**  
**(2001 – 2014)**

*Elijah C. Nicholson*

Capstone Advisor: *Dr. Gardner*

Capstone Advisor: *Dr. Nitta*

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*University of Washington Bothell*  
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## **Abstract**

Progressing into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the U.S.-China relationship is under increasing tension. The resulting policies exhibited by the U.S. & China in Angola and Nigeria are reflective of how world powers approach statecraft and political engineering. The current period is framed by accusations of China practicing *debt trap diplomacy* and seeking a reorganization of the geopolitical gameboard through their aid-based economic and infrastructure project injections. This has been contrasted by misjudgments of U.S. acts of engagement today, due to a colonial past and trans-Atlantic slave trade which helped build the U.S. empire. In this mixed methods research study, a dataset of 7,867 U.S. & China aid projects to Angola & Nigeria from 2001 to 2014 were analyzed, identifying differences between foreign aid policy practices of the U.S. & China in Angola & Nigeria. Dedicating this study to determining the differences between U.S. & China aid policy, I seek to clarify and paint a portrait of the policies at play. I will examine the standard belief systems that guide the engagement of both the U.S. & China as well as unpack the generalizations each side seeks to confirm. Ultimately establishing a theory of approach which does not discount or disregard the immense potential the U.S. & China bring to the table instead valuing transparency, the promotion of a moral economy and human rights.

## **Key Phrases**

Political Economy | U.S-China Relations | Development | Nigeria  
Soft & Hard Power | Debt-trap Diplomacy | Resource Curse | Aid  
Angola | Transparency | Neocolonial | Geopolitics | Propaganda Narratives



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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

China's Belt & Road Initiative is a strategic plan developed by policymakers in China to reconceptualize the influential Silk Road trading route by implementing aid focused on economic and infrastructure development projects. A large undertaking for a single nation, the United Nations has stepped in, helping support large-scale development projects linked to the Belt & Road. At the Belt & Road Forum on International Cooperation in 2019, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres' highlighted the United Nations willingness to engage in the Belt & Road,

“United Nations country teams stand ready to support Member States in capacity- and governance-building, and in achieving a harmonious and sustainable integration of the Belt and Road projects in their own economies and societies.” (United Nations, 2019)

The progressive globalization of the world is not a project or responsibility which a single party can bear. Instead, complementary policymaking where institutions, aid recipients and donors equally engage in the design process of policy is a logical approach to instigating change.

This report attempts to pull back a veil of secrecy surrounding the industry of aid to Angola and Nigeria from the U.S. & China. This report analyzes U.S. & China aid projects between 2001 – 2014, presenting a story of U.S. and Chinese aid to Angola and Nigeria. However, the story presented to the public is radically different than what might be politically feasible, advantageous, or played out. The Trump administration has been less vocal than its' predecessors regarding Africa, but the available public information is telling of the administrations' overarching approach to policy engagement with countries across the continent. Prior to a meeting with African heads of state, President Trump said:

“The United States will partner with the countries and organizations, like the African Union, that lead successful efforts to *end violence*, to *prevent the spread of terrorism*, and to *respond to humanitarian crises*. ” (Blake, 2020)

Fulfilling the qualifying factors to be a U.S. partner, whether the desire to end terrorism, violence or respond to humanitarian causes, are relatively easy political missions. However, the absence of anything pertaining to development, diplomacy or global partnerships is striking. In contract, at the 2017 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Chairman Jinping had the following comments:

“China stands ready to work with other international partners to support Africa in pursuing peace and development. China welcomes and supports all initiatives that meet Africa's interests, and believes that it should be the same with the wider international community.” (Xuequan, 2020)

## **1.2 Standard Narratives**

The rhetoric which Chairman Jinping uses to describe Chinas’ goals and partnership approaches is strongly juxtaposed by President Trumps’ objectives and ideals of U.S. foreign policy interests. Heads of state play a critical role in determining present and often future policies, but this study will look back at the aid projects brokered by the U.S. & China from 2001 to 2014 in Angola and Nigeria. To best predict the future or avoid the catastrophes of the past, we must understand how policy has been shaped to where the U.S-China coals are stoked practically daily. Defining the political and diplomatic practices at play in the past in Angola and Nigeria will require framing the policies in digestible terminology and building a groundwork off which to proceed for in depth examination of the various forms of foreign policy engagement utilized in Angola and Nigeria by the U.S. & China.

Beyond the strategies and caveats for partnerships propagated by the U.S. & China, international watchdogs, think-tanks, and countries' constituencies have rallied behind oppositional propagandized perspectives, beliefs, and narratives. U.S. think tanks, politicians and academics often generalize China's methods and means of engagement across Africa, leaning into the demonization of China's policies as predatory lending practices. China inversely has their own counterparts recognizing U.S. policy engagement in Africa as distant and disinterested, deeming U.S. interests as merely militaristic and geopolitical. These perspectives are formative as they forge and ultimately steer foreign policy landscapes and discussions. Therefore, it is vital that the policy approaches of the U.S. & China in Nigeria and Angola are examined and understood to conceptualize these geopolitical relationships and shine a light on potential areas of growth and in doing so, cast aside faulty aid techniques and avoid past and potential pitfalls.

The aid practices of the U.S. & China are radically opposed but not in their overarching goal of political influence, raising quality of life and state policy subversion. The innocuous acts of aid by both sides are cast as treacherous or motivated by greed, when, both world powers are performing similar foreign statecraft to that which they are seeking to destroy. However, this is not to say the foreign policy practices of China and the U.S. are the same, they both seek the end goal of political leverage or preferential policy treatment from the recipient nations.

In this study I found that the U.S. tends to seek small-scale but large volumes of foreign aid project, compared to China's approach of a low volume of projects but at a large economic scale. In peeling back layers of geopolitical strategy, resource interests and flows of aid, this study examines the aid practices and factors for the U.S. & China to invest in Angola and

Nigeria. Section IV on Page 25 features a full expose of the data collected and its' associated findings. The U.S. engaged more than China with Angola and Nigeria from 2001 – 2014, Angola having 127 China-backed aid projects and 2,465 U.S. supported projects. Nigeria had 60 from China and 5,215 from the United States. However, the fiscal amount of aid flows to Angola and Nigeria from the U.S. & China are in radical opposition. This topic will be covered further in the report, but China has provided roughly 1,000% more in the overall fiscal amount of aid than the U.S. has contributed to either Angola or Nigeria.

### **1.3 Third Way**

“When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”, this proverb speaks to the acts the U.S and China practice when operating in less powerful or political connected nations. The U.S. or China do not want to lose political traction to their counterpart but battles over the political sovereignty of nations are no longer fought conventionally. Instead, the forays for friends or allies abroad follows a script of carrot and stick policymaking. Whereby smaller, less-connected nations face the demands and whims of world powers to realize the aid desired. While the concept of incentivizing political action for economic benefits seems rational, in effect, however, it opens Pandora’s box. This is a pitfall both the U.S. & China run into, merely seeking out resources, a geopolitical upper hand or voting power in United Nations instead of seeking to foster the true benefits and uplifting power of aid, world-building in a sense. This is not to say that these countries have no oversight of their aid flows and do not make logic decisions surrounding aid, simply, their approaches and end goals are not that radically opposed. Opening a door for both the U.S. & China to benefit through offering aid, while recipient nations can steer development their own way, with less foreign involvement or oversight.

The U.S. and China have contrasting approaches to facilitating aid, the U.S. reliant on exerting their political influence through large volumes of small-scale aid projects and China opting for few large-scale projects. Unpacking the logic behind these political strategies requires explaining the theories of soft and hard power. Joseph Nye developed the theory of soft & hard power and defined *soft power* as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” (Nye, 2004) While the U.S. has the advantage when it comes to displays of soft power and showing hard power through military geopolitics, China exercises significantly more hard power through their sporadic economic infusions or infrastructure packages facilitated to recipient nations. Noticeably missing from Nyes’ theory of political performances is a middle ground between soft and hard power, but academics have conceived of *smart power*—a potential solution to terminate the often-oversimplified framework of soft and hard power.

Multiple studies have been conducted on the concept of smart power, the most notable coming from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and University of Southern California. Ultimately in exercising smart power, “one requires a firm familiarity of the full repertoire or inventory of the ‘instruments of statecraft.’ Smart Power means knowing the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument.” (Wilson, 2008). The U.S. does not seem to have yet fully grasped that it must occupy different roles in different nations. The U.S. can still stand for pillars of democracy but must be more fluid and functional in its’ policymaking approach. China has put its’ own political righteousness aside in favor of seeing economic prosperity and drastic change. There is no doubt which approach to aid is more effective, but the true meaning of effective is where many stake claims that China is doing aid wrong. I challenge this notion

because China is more effective in stimulating massive aid projects, but the U.S. is effective in small pockets of development, but still visible and available. Turning the page on the strategies of U.S. and Chinese engagement, there must be a concerted effort to step away from existing or expired narratives which no longer serve an effective purpose in promoting rights, well-being and economic benefits to the citizens of Angola and Nigeria.

## **2. Review of Terms, Theories & Literature**

### **2.1 Paradoxical Perspectives**

The buzzword that comes to mind when examining the practices of China's aid engagement in Angola and Nigeria is *Debt-trap Diplomacy*. This is a more complex term than it first appears. The actual definition of *debt-trap diplomacy* rests with an individual's own evaluation of the principles of this practice. Often described as predatory practices, Foreign Policy has a well-rounded description: "The lack of transparency in China's lending obscures its risks to recipient countries." Debt-trap Diplomacy has seriously negative connotations but the practices of offering financing for mega-projects is reasonable--the extent to which China will demand property or economic restitution for a country which has defaulted on an aid project is called into question. In a globalized world, a world power strong arming another sovereign nation into turning over its' infrastructure is impractical. (Green, 2020)

The practices of the U.S. & China are under a microscope and how these nations' handle the COVID-19 pandemic will determine future courses for aid distribution and the methods by which political power is exercised. The potential for a global economic collapse is bubbling to

the surface and the effects would be catastrophic. Angola has petitioned for partial debt-relief of their \$12 billion debt to the G20—of which China holds \$3 billion. Overall, China holds \$22 billion in Angolan debt, but the U.S. avoids brokering public financing in such large amounts. (Hill, 2020). There have been no efforts on behalf of China to seize any aid projects from Angola, but the West dwells on this narrative because it fits the desired perception of China's practices, acts and engagement abroad. Western academics, media, and politicians often bandwagon on politically salient topics as it produces viewers, readers, or voters—even if there is little substance or actual effort to support a policy or rhetorical response.

## **2.2 Neocolonial Pitfalls**

The paradox of the U.S. & China acts of engagements in Nigeria & Angola can be unpacked by asking the question: “*What do the U.S. and China identify as valuable?*” These world powers seek to influence and impress their own political or functionary system, be it economically or socially onto nations. Arguably in a manner like the unsettling practices of the past in which world powers preyed on African resources, both natural and human. Public consciousness regarding the forceful nature of foreign powers influence in African politics is consumed by the phrase *Neocolonialism*. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing in 2018 on the topic: “China in Africa: The New Colonialism”. This hearing began with a description of motivating factors behind China's political engagement and activities in sub-Saharan Africa. The following excerpt provides background knowledge on China's approach to aid disbursements and political strategy in Angola over the past 45 years.

In Angola, for example, in 1975, Soviet-backed communists bested Chinese-backed revolutionary rivals including Jonas Savimbi, who was a Maoist before he was reborn in the 1980s as an anti-communist freedom fighter.

Today, China's one-time Marxist-Leninist-Maoist impulse has been softened to the point of almost—but not quite—disappearing, with revolution replaced by infrastructure projects, trade missions, soft loans, and scholarships for promising African students, all part of the ubiquitous Beijing effort at hegemony.

While on the one hand, Africa needs investment and it needs infrastructure, we see a worrisome trend of African countries sliding into indebtedness to China, accumulating burdens that may be beyond their capacity to meet.  
(Serial No. 115–117, 2018)

The hearing transcript is 88 pages in length, yet debt is mentioned 92 times.

Taking an approach of “Us vs. Them” and holding the perception that either the U.S. succeeds, or China emerges victorious is incredibly erroneous. While international relations and the chessboard of the global economy are in an ultra-precarious state, these world powers are simply peddling aid and political “IOU’s” to countries with economic dependence on resource-based industries. The U.S. has an irrefutably checkered past in the politics of Angola, but the current status quo is not one of critical self-reflection, rather, it is contentious reflexivity where the smallest misalignment with American interests is generally met with a cold shoulder and disregard. Perhaps it is not the aid recipient nations’ fault that aid is squandered, the purpose of larger nations offering aid is akin to an olive branch, but that olive branch only survives if the nation swallows the political preference pill of the aid offering nation. Therefore, the keys to shifting the paradigm around aid being a quid pro quo political scenario rest in understanding the missions behind aid and how development and economic advancement can best be fostered in different societies, cultures, and nations.

## **2.3 Resource Cursed?**

A uniting thread among Angola and Nigeria is that they are subject to a resource curse. A term in which a nation has its' economy based upon a single commodity or resource which leads to a need for economic diversification but a lack to do so efficiently. The concept stems from exporting massive amounts of resources but not properly reinvesting the profits into sectors or industries outside of the golden goose resource. Richard Auty is the forerunner of the resource curse theory and expressed lament towards how it has fragmented fields of development.

The study of resource wealth and development has grown less ideological and more empirical, and the quality of the empirical work has improved sharply. Yet with the ideological stakes lowered, research on this topic has grown lamentably fragmented: economists and political scientists seem to be unaware of each other's contributions, and political scientists are often divided by their area specialties. (Ross, 1999)

To propagate a new approach to aid, development, and economic development there must be an effort to steer political, economic, and auxiliary fields away from ideological tendencies. While a hard idea to conceptualize at initial thought, it is an logical approach to uplifting nations from single-industry economies to instead provide services, vacation destinations and competitive educational systems. World powers entrenched in the economies and political affairs of African nations must give Africans agency. While state sovereignty is now respected in a faux-sense, a complementary approach to aid, policymaking and engagement is necessary to realize the full potential within U.S.-China & Africa partnerships.

## **2.4 Relevant Research**

Professor Deborah Brautigam is a hallmark researcher in China-Africa relations, with the U.S. caught in that research web. *The Dragon's Gift* was published in 2009 and introduces the frameworks of Chinas' aid and trade in sub-Saharan Africa, providing a sound defense of

China's methods of engagement. Brautigam posits that westernized perspectives of China's acts of aid across Africa tend to stick to the following narratives:

- “
1. China is only after resources
  2. Chinese money is only seen as “aid”
  3. China is propping up authoritarian regimes
  4. China hurts efforts to democratize and establish universal human rights
  5. China turns a blind eye to corruption
  6. China relies on unfair subsidies
  7. Chinese business fail to abide by environmental or social standards
  8. Chinese loans just add to unsustainable debt in Africa
- “  
(Brautigam, 2009).

Brautigam goes much further than her counterparts in seeking to critically examine the perspectives so often preached. Brautigam concedes that there is validity in these statements and viewpoints, but they are inherently misguided, misinformed, and misaligned. Spending her career debunking misconceptions, Brautigam founded the John Hopkin's China-Africa Research Initiative and is a keynote researcher in the field--without referencing Brautigam, research into China-Africa relations cannot proceed. Brautigam dismisses simple one-sided narratives and instead proceeds with a rational contrarian viewpoint, indicating there is more to the story than broadcasted by the executive or implemented by the legislative branches. China is complex, as is Africa's politics, why would topics such as China's aid policies in Angola and Nigeria be anything but equally complex?

Brautigam extends her area of focus to include agriculture and food production in: *Will Africa feed China?* Examines China's acquisitions of arable land for food production, manufacturing, and resource extraction. Brautigam's cognizant global perception of the relationship between China, the U.S and African nations, will eventually guide the strategies and outcomes of future political fields. However, center stage is the structure and framework by

which Brautigam dissects the Western media's perception and preferential treatment towards topics covering China's alleged predatory policy practices in Africa in an unflattering way.

“Dismissing Western media as having an inherent anti-Chinese agenda, some Africa-China scholars have described some of the Western journalism as “yellow peril” journalism [in which] some of the international coverage is outright racist as China is accused of many sins on the continent captured in the catchall phrases such as “new scramble for Africa” and “neo-colonialism”” (Wekesa, 2016).

It is outright unfeasible for the continent of Africa to feed China in the conventional sense of agriculture and food production but Brautigam seeks deeper answers surrounding Chinese and African interests, and the Western lens from which these beliefs arise. The phrases *new scramble for Africa* and *neocolonialism* are topical, easily garnering traction among watchdogs in the West, but these are awfully short-sighted approaches and beliefs. The U.S. foreign policy landscape is one of the most developed in the world, and to think we are beating the drums of war, practically calling one of our world competitors a colonizer. Knowing full well our own colonial history and escapades are simply put, gross. Illogical and easy to dispute, instead the term “21<sup>st</sup> century colonialism” is radically more appropriate. (Coleman, 2019) While aspects of colonialism are at hand, we merely find ourselves in a different stage of colonial progression. Neocolonialism is a bit of a jump as it begs the question, what follows neocolonialism, no colonialism, or an extremely altered form? It just is not that simple, countries will continue to usurp and undermine the sovereignty of other nations if there is something to be lost and equivalently, won.

## **2.5 The China-in-Africa Podcast**

The China in Africa Podcast garners a large audience, it is produced by an American and South African, providing a centrist perspective and contrasting viewpoints. The podcast

discusses a large swathe of topics pertaining to China-Africa relations. The China in Africa Podcast is invaluable , since 2008 it has provided weekly shows, and published daily newsletters with need-to-know information about Chinas' policies and practices across Africa and the resulting U.S. implications and reactions. Receiving funding via daily newsletter subscriptions and grants from The Ford Foundation and The European Climate Commission, the China Africa Podcast promotes transparency and began receiving grants in 2018 through the Ford Foundations' Africa-China reporting project. (Olander & Staden, 2020).

The radical centrism that the China in Africa Podcast brings to reporting the policies of the U.S. & China throughout African nations is a breath of fresh air. However, the China in Africa Podcast follows the belief that China is primarily operating in a gray area morally, ethically, and politically. Advocates for eutopia often fall into this stream of rational thought but the idealized logic does not hold up, as a eutopia could not exist since it pedestalized the political practices of those in control, or those with power. Similarly, China cannot be said to outright operate in a neutral gray area, as what appears innocent to one onlooker can be conceived as treacherous to others. To effectively guide this study, statistical analysis and examination is essential to developing rationales to explain the disparities among the aid flows of the U.S. & China to Angola and Nigeria.

## **2.6 U.S. Government Dataset Efforts**

The ability to extract necessary data from organizations promoting transparency was greatly beneficial in developing the datasets for analysis in this report. It was vital that the sources of data were reputable and reliable. The USAID explorer is a U.S. government backed

digital data program, the American Enterprise Institute produced the China-Africa Investment and Loan tracker and the John Hopkin's China-Africa Research Initiative assembled a cumulative dataset of Chinas' aid projects abroad. In July of 2020, a Congressional Research Service Report was published on the topic of "Tracking China's Global Economic Activities".

"A major challenge when researching global investment and construction projects and related loans is the accuracy of the data. While this challenge is not unique to projects involving Chinese players, it is exacerbated by the nature of many Chinese projects and loans, whose terms are not always publicly available or transparent. No comprehensive, standardized, or authoritative data are available on all Chinese overseas economic activities—from either the Chinese government or international organizations. A number of think tanks and private research firms have developed datasets to track investment, loans, and grants by Chinese-owned firms and institutions using commercial databases, news reports, and official government sources, when available"  
(Schwarzenberg, 2020).

The Congressional Research Service is in a difficult position as China's transparency track record and history of engagement abroad is not neatly assembled for the U.S. government. Without comprehensive, standardized or authoritative measures on the topic, this study utilized the USAID Explorer, the American Enterprise Institutes' China-Africa Investment and Loan Tracker, and the John Hopkin's China-Africa Research Initiative dataset to compile an overarching collection of U.S. & Chinas' supported aid projects in Angola and Nigeria.

## 3. Methods & Data

### 3.1 Data Collection

The data assembled for this study have been drawn from three datasets, the USAID Explorer, the American Enterprise Institutes' China-Africa Investment & Loan tracker and the John Hopkin's China-Africa Research Initiative dataset. The data points range from 2001 to 2014 and are divided by recipient nation, Angola, or Nigeria. Angola and Nigeria have differing histories, geopolitics, and demographics but both share a similar future featuring exponential development and population growth.

“Analysts estimate that over the next few decades the proportion of the population living in cities is projected to increase from 40% to more than 60%, with some of the most lucrative markets—such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Angola—are likely to top 80%.” (Signe, 2018)

Angola and Nigeria are on similar paths of rapid industrialization, electrification, and urbanization. Massive infrastructure implementations are revolutionary for citizens' political voices and economic opportunities. This study sought to visualize aid projects to Angola and Nigeria from the U.S. & China, as what is brokered or fostered today will steer future outcomes. Present policies may take precedence but the growth rate the continent of Africa is expected to reach by 2050 is staggering. Currently, the population of Angola is 32.8m and the 44<sup>th</sup> most populated nation, Nigeria has a population of 206.1m and is the 7<sup>th</sup> most populated nation. Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa and Angola the 12<sup>th</sup>. (Worldometer – World Statistics, 2020).


To effectively frame the contrasting narratives and practices implemented by China and the U.S. within Angola and Nigeria pertaining to aid, one must understand where Angola and

Nigeria stand on the worlds’ political stage. The data alone is not enough to understand the strategy behind moves made by the U.S. & China—a solid foundation base on the driving elements of political, social, and economic life in Angola and Nigeria is critical to interpreting this study. Evaluating the economic diversification and demographics of Angola and Nigeria provide templates to conceive how China or the U.S. establish their own policies.

### 3.2 Identifying Case Studies

Angola and Nigeria are the primary case studies for this report not just due to demographics but their strong positions in the political economic landscape of the continent and staggering median ages of 15.9 in Angola and 18.6 in Nigeria. (Median Age – The World Factbook, 2020). The median age of a nation determines the primary age of the workforce and thus the subgroup of a nations’ population which is tasked with paving a path ahead for the nation. Yet to be determined is if population growth estimates will follow their expected scales. On the next page, a graph features the potential population growth in Nigeria through 2050. It is eye-opening to realize that Africa as a continent may soon out populate any other continent, an incentive for an unprecedented paradigm shift for how the continent is considered and policies implemented. (Nigeria Economic Outlook, 2019)

#### Uncertainty around population and population growth rate



The age and population alone do not dictate the course that a nation must take to develop or advance in global economic equity for their citizenry. Rather, the population growth of a nation often predicts economic or per capita GDP growth,

“There appears to be some agreement in the literature that population growth and growth in per capita output are not independent and the most likely nature of the relationship between them seems to be that it depends very much on the particular circumstances, notably the age structure of the population.”  
(Peterson, 2017).

The relationship between a population growing and economic growth is inseparable from the emergence of “new” or previously untapped markets, sectors, or industries. However, prior to this expansion in economic opportunities, there must be dedication to preserving the quality of citizens’ lives and promoting education and economic opportunities. While opportunities abroad may offer a substantial leg up in the domestic job market, citizens should use the knowledge they gain abroad to assist their local communities. In doing so, assistance will be provided where needed and continue to facilitate the involvement of other world powers providing scholarships, research, and career advancement opportunities.

Undoubtedly much of Africa has and will continue to realize its’ potential but the most world has not yet. In the meantime, efforts must be made to conserve the livelihood of constituents. Age is a key component of any developing or developed nation and is of paramount concern as a symbiotic relationship exists between a nations median working age and economic prosperity. Certainly, a case by case theory, but there is gravitas in realizing that most nations venture down this avenue and find themselves reliant on specific generations at specific times. Pertinent to a countries’ development is economic diversification, this includes having a

multitude of importers and diverse economic sector composition. The C.I.A. World Factbook identified Angolas' \$126.5bn GDP breakdown as follows: Agriculture (10.2%), Industry (61.4%) and Services (28.4%). Nigeria, with a GDP of \$376.4bn composed by Agriculture (21.1%), Industry (22.5%) and Services (56.4%). (Africa : The World Factbook - CIA, 2020). Acknowledging that this information provides only a partial picture, discussing stakeholders interested in these countries is the next step in the analysis process.

The U.S. & China are key export partners of Angola and Nigeria but the extent to which they are reliant and reliable partners is valuable to framing this study. The C.I.A. World Factbook identified Angolas' top 3 export partners as China (61.2%), India (13%) and the U.S. (4.2%) and Nigerias' top 3 as India (30.6%), the U.S. (12.1%) and Spain (6.6%), China was in 4<sup>th</sup> with 5.6% of Nigerias' exports. (Africa : The World Factbook - CIA, 2020). Given these statistics could breakdown further onto commodities being exported but it tends' revolve around oil. Therefore, with this knowledge in mind, this study can proceed to explain and educate others on the desires, missions, and actualities of the aid of the U.S. & China in Angola and Nigeria.

### **3.3 Measures**

In this sequential mixed method design I first explain the data measurements, then provide a comparative analysis of U.S. & China flows to Nigeria and Angola, followed by my interpretations and recommendations. There is a poignant focus on quantitative analysis through the examination of the following variables:

1. Year: measured the amount of projects year by year from 2001 – 2014

2. Donor: identified if the nation who facilitated the aid project was the U.S. or China
3. Funding Agency: the U.S. or Chinese agency funding an aid project
4. The Implementing Agency: the U.S. or Chinese agency aid project partner
5. Flow ID: descriptions of the aid projects
6. USD: amount spent on an aid projects by the U.S. & China
7. Sector: identifies and defines the type of sector project aid

Quantitative explanation and exploration of these variables through statistical converged with qualitative analysis of the foreign policy platforms motivating the case studies of U.S. & Chinese involvement in Angola and Nigeria. For this study I had to extract data of the U.S. & China's aid projects in Angola and Nigeria from 3 differing datasets as not a single data set had an all-encompassing collection of the data needed. Therefore, the actual operations and models performed are relatively simple, I have combined these three datasets and will be contrasting the figures of U.S. & China aid project flows to Angola and Nigeria from 2001 to 2014.

The major limitation for this study rest in the issue of transparency surrounding publicly available aid data. The consistency and legitimacy of China aid data is sporadic but to effectively counteract this I utilized multiple datasets to frame and account for any data which a dataset may have missed. In this study I am facilitating the use of someone else's' collected data. As I cannot adequately collect all data from 2001-2014 independently, I had to opt for this route. It does limit my data in the creative scope of this study, the thesis reflects the scope and limitations of my data. The findings are expansive and emphasize frequency reports, graphics, and descriptive statics to contrast the aid and engagement of the U.S. & China in Angola and Nigeria.

### **3.4 Methods & Procedures**

Reliant on the 7 variables previously mentioned to ground and guide this study, I first separated the aid projects by year to depict U.S. & China engagement in Angola and Nigeria. I then advanced into the project aid amounts from 2001 – 2014, as this concisely describes and encapsulates the efforts of the U.S. & China in Angola and Nigeria over this timeframe. Progressing into the project sector analysis, I reveal the number of aid projects by sector, providing an in-depth perspective of motives, strategies and aid projects implemented. The agencies which provided funding are next analyzed as it provides a layer of complexity to understand and disclose.


Additional variables not examined in this study for brevity and lack of resources include the implementing agency, which is the U.S. or China backed agency or institution allocating funding to an aid project. Additionally, the flow id variable detailed the nature of a project and held key information regarding specifics surrounding a project. While these are included in the appendices, with over 7,500 projects, it simple was not feasible to incorporate these elements into this study. A future study will include these measures as they contain the “filling” of what I am merely providing a window view of. That is not to discount the findings of this study, instead it strengthens them as what I found can be likely be supported by additional evidence found directly in a descriptive analysis of the implementing agencies and flow ids.

## 4. Findings

### 4.1 Aid Project Averages

The resulting discoveries of examinations into U.S. & China aid projects to Angola and Nigeria are eye opening. This section guides the reader through the findings by year, amount, sector, funding agency and concludes with interpretations and policy recommendations. In Figure 1 below, the U.S. funded 1940% more projects in Angola than China which supported 127 projects, compared to the U.S. 2,465.


**Figure 1: U.S. & China Aid Projects in Nigeria (2001 – 2014)**



While this statistic may seem somewhat bland and a stereotypical regurgitation of the narrative that the U.S. is more engaged than China is in the continent of Africa, I strive to show a paradoxical case for a new discourse taking hold. Evaluating a variety of data markers allows for this study to examine and present a centrist evaluation of aid data and their effects.

The trend of the U.S. outnumbering China projects is continued in Angola where the U.S had 5,215 projects from 2001 – 2014 and China had 60, a ratio of 8690%, featured in Figure 2.


**Figure 2: U.S. & China Aid Projects in Angola (2001 – 2014)**



A simple comparative analysis of the number of projects on a year by year basis will supports the argument that the U.S. is more active than China in Angola and Nigeria. However, additional analyzes will provide newfound understandings of how exactly the U.S. & China distribute and determine where to allocate aid. Ultimately determining the factors of aid engagement and the building of the foreign policy platforms of the U.S. & China.

In challenging the narratives of U.S. inadequacy in aid and China's objectification of African nations, this study found that China, fiscally, was significantly more engaged with Angola and Nigeria from 2001 to 2014 than the U.S.. In Figure 3: China has provided over \$4,120,000,000 in funding to Angola from 2001 to 2014 whereas the U.S. has only provided \$36,100,000. This data speaks for itself, while the U.S. is obviously more visible from an international perspective for their liberal development approach, China's efforts in terms of volume and impact of aid projects delivered to Angola is far greater than the U.S.


**Figure 3: U.S. & China Aid Amount to Angola (2001 – 2014)**



Analyzing the data, Angola received a mean funding of \$548,950 for each U.S. aid project whereas China provided a mean aid project funding of \$303,849,553. Logically, it makes sense that if the U.S. had more projects at play, China would statistically have a greater amount of aid project funding at stake when compared to the U.S. projects.

In Figure 4, China provided more funding than the U.S. to Nigeria, with \$2,390,000,000 and \$282,000,000 from the U.S. The sheer difference in aid project amounts can be boiled down to China’s development financing approach in which funds are distributed for resource subsidies, stake, or rights. (Elueni, 2020) The U.S. is more reliant on exerting its’ power through soft means, such as social, cultural and political pressures. China utilizes hard power, dependent on providing ample fiscal resources for natural resources, political goodwill, or geopolitical gain.

**Figure 4: U.S. & China Aid Amount to Nigeria (2001 – 2014)**



Analyzing the dataset produced a mean project funding amount of \$922,337 by the U.S. in Nigeria and \$123,053,143 by China. Thus, continuing the tendency for the U.S. to have more projects at hand, but for China to have far more fiscally tied up than the U.S. A notable inconsistency being maintained does not instigate truth, instead this study will proceed into an investigation of the sectors in which the U.S. & China provided aid.

## 4.2 Project Sector Examinations

The project sectors in which the U.S. & China disperse their policies, strategies and political resources are deserving of being unpacked and understood. In Figure 5, the aid projects initiated by the U.S. & China, by sector are displayed. The three largest sectors for the U.S. were **Government and Civil Society** with 897 (34.6%) projects, **Health** with 681 (26.3%) projects and **Emergency Response** with 384 (14.8%). Comparatively, the three sectors with the most focus for China were **Health** with 25 (37%), **Energy Generation** with 22 (32%) and **Transport and Security** with 16 (22%) of China-backed aid projects in Angola. This study does not venture into the nature of projects by sector but, interpretation provides clarity as to why and where the U.S. & China seek to develop sectors or industries within Angola or Nigeria.

**Figure 5: U.S. & China Aid Projects by Sector in Angola Graph**





Figure 6 features the distribution of aid projects by sector in Nigeria. The U.S. was most involved in following sectors, **Health**, 3,095 (35.1%), **Government**, 2,883 (32.7%) and **Agriculture**, 720 (8.2%). China inversely had a significant portion (75%) of its' projects in **Social Infrastructure**, with 65 (51%), 8 projects in **Energy** (6%) and 4 projects identifying as **Multisector** (3%). The composition and makeup of the project sector preferences of the U.S. & China is stark and in your face. The U.S. has vested interest in health, government, and agriculture in Nigeria whereas China seems to look the other way in lieu of social support. Developing a political matrix of the motivating factors behind foreign policy engagement in aid sectors will allow for logical conclusions to be made about the intent and end goals of strategic sector allocations.

**Figure 6: U.S. & China Aid Projects by Sector in Nigeria Graph**



**Figure 7: U.S. & China Projects by Sector in Nigeria Table**

		Health	Debt	Emergency	Govt	Energy	Communct.	Transport	Industry	Other	Agri.	Edu	Water	Social	Total
China	Count	25 <sup>a</sup>	2 <sup>b</sup>	3 <sup>c</sup>	7 <sup>c</sup>	22 <sup>b</sup>	5 <sup>b</sup>	16 <sup>b</sup>	2 <sup>a, c, d</sup>	7 <sup>d, e</sup>	13 <sup>f</sup>	11 <sup>f</sup>	9 <sup>e, f</sup>	5 <sup>a, c</sup>	127
	% of Total	1.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.8%	0.2%	0.6%	0.1%	0.3%	0.5%	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	4.9%
	Standardized Residual	-1.6	6.1	-3.7	-5.6	20.2	9.6	17.2	-7	1.9	6.5	6.2	4.7	-2.3	
United States	Count	681 <sup>a</sup>	0 <sup>b</sup>	384 <sup>c</sup>	897 <sup>c</sup>	0 <sup>b</sup>	0 <sup>b</sup>	0 <sup>b</sup>	66 <sup>a, c, d</sup>	63 <sup>d, e</sup>	39 <sup>f</sup>	31 <sup>f</sup>	35 <sup>e, f</sup>	269 <sup>a, c</sup>	2465
	% of Total	26.3%	0.0%	14.8%	34.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	2.4%	1.5%	1.2%	1.4%	10.4%	95.1%
	Standardized Residual	.4	-1.4	.8	1.3	-4.6	-2.2	-3.9	.2	-4	-1.5	-1.4	-1.1	.5	
Total	Count	706	2	387	904	22	5	16	68	70	52	42	44	274	2592
	% of Total	27.2%	0.1%	14.9%	34.9%	0.8%	0.2%	0.6%	2.6%	2.7%	2.0%	1.6%	1.7%	10.6%	100.0%

**Figure 8: U.S. & China Projects by Sectors in Angola Table**

		Health	Emergency	Government	Energy	Transport	Industry	Other	Agriculture	Edu	Water	Social	Total
China	Count	0 <sup>a</sup>	0 <sup>a, b</sup>	0 <sup>a</sup>	8 <sup>c, d</sup>	3 <sup>d, e</sup>	1 <sup>b, f</sup>	4 <sup>c, f, g</sup>	2 <sup>b</sup>	0 <sup>a, b, f, g</sup>	1 <sup>c, d, e, g</sup>	66 <sup>e</sup>	85
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	1.0%
	Standardized Residual	-5.5	-1.9	-5.3	4.3	5.6	-1.5	.7	-1.9	-1.1	1.0	24.3	
United States	Count	3095 <sup>a</sup>	369 <sup>a, b</sup>	2883 <sup>a</sup>	197 <sup>c, d</sup>	22 <sup>d, e</sup>	420 <sup>b, f</sup>	291 <sup>c, f, g</sup>	720 <sup>b</sup>	136 <sup>a, b, f, g</sup>	39 <sup>c, d, e, g</sup>	565 <sup>e</sup>	8737
	% of Total	35.1%	4.2%	32.7%	2.2%	0.2%	4.8%	3.3%	8.2%	1.5%	0.4%	6.4%	99.0%
	Standardized Residual	.5	.2	.5	-4	-6	.1	-1	.2	.1	-1	-2.4	
Total	Count	3095	369	2883	205	25	421	295	722	136	40	631	8822
	% of Total	35.1%	4.2%	32.7%	2.3%	0.3%	4.8%	3.3%	8.2%	1.5%	0.5%	7.2%	100.0


Figure 7 and Figure 8 are extensions of the efforts to expand and provide a detailed summation of aid projects by sector facilitated by the U.S. & China. In Figure 7, the U.S. has 0 projects relating to debt, energy generation, communication, or transport in Nigeria. In Figure 8, China has 0 projects pertaining to health, emergency response, government, or education. While where resources allocated is valuable information, it is vital to know where they are missing.

### 4.3 Funding Agency Findings

To better understand how aid is brokered and contextualized it is valuable to linger on the means and agencies by which aid is funded. Figure 9 provides the distribution of U.S. & China funding agencies in Angola. China’s most utilized funding agency was the **Export-Import Bank of China** with 1,710 (29.5%) projects funded. Next, **Unspecified Chinese Government Institutions** with 370 (6.4%) projects funded, followed by the **China Development Bank** with 38 (.66%). The U.S. has the majority of its’ projects funded by the **U.S. Agency for International Development** with 1,514 (26.1%) funded projects, then the **Department of State** with 904 (15.6%) projects, then the **Department of Agriculture** with 413 (7.1%) projects in Angola by the U.S. The transparency provided by U.S. is a blessing and trying to understand where the bulk of Chinese funding goes when the reporting agency is Unspecified, or the Export-Import Bank of China is difficult. Extrapolated from this analysis is that the U.S. clearly identifies its’ funding agencies whereas Chinas’ mechanisms and institutions gravitate towards ill-defined state supported structures and systems.


**Figure 9: U.S. &**

#### China Project Funding Agencies in Angola Pie Chart





In Figure 10 the funding agencies of the U.S and China for aid projects in Nigeria are presented and analyzed. China’s primary funding agency was the **Export-Import Bank of China** with 544 (2%) aid projects, then the **China Development Bank** with 106 (.4%) followed by the **China National Petroleum Company** with 97 (.36%) projects funded. The U.S. had the **U.S. Agency for International Development** handling 4,673 (17.6%) projects, the **Department of State** with 4,172 (15.7%) cases and the **Trade and Development Agency** managed 2,686 (10.1%) instances. It is pertinent that the China National Petroleum Company ranked third in funding agencies for China in Nigeria but was not listed on the funding agencies utilized by China in its’ aid project funding in Angola. The U.S. was consistent with use of funding agencies, the Trade and Development agency being the only change from the U.S. aid project funding strategy in Nigeria.

**Figure 10: U.S. & China Project Funding Agencies in Nigeria Pie Chart**



Figures 11 & 12 expand the scope of understanding for financial aid flows. The graphs depict the agencies from the U.S. & China, by which aid distributed and projects financed. The usage of enterprise and non-enterprise institutions means the U.S. identified areas of potential economic gain because of promoting aid. The fact that some U.S. funding agencies are redacted is surprising but nothing new, as it is like the strategy China employs of maintaining organizational secrecy.



## **4.4 Interpretations**

The data assembled and analyzed is not a holistic representation of U.S. & China engagement in Angola or Nigeria by any means. On the contrary, it provides a microcosm of the environment in which the U.S. & China craft their foreign policy platform. In seeking to answer what the differences are between the foreign aid policy practices of the U.S. & China in Angola and Nigeria, this study revealed conflicting approaches to aid on behalf of the U.S. & China. Whereas the U.S. significantly overshadows China in the total number of aid projects supported in Angola and Nigeria, China has more fiscally tied to aid projects in Angola and Nigeria than the U.S. A prime example of a paradox at play, an outside commentator can use either side of this data to present their own preferred perspective regarding the U.S. & Chinas' aid projects in Angola and Nigeria. The next point of contention arises when discussing the sectors in which the U.S. & China allocate aid.

The standards set by the U.S. & China for determining desirable aid sectors is linked to geopolitical interests. In both Angola and Nigeria, the top 2 U.S. aid projects sectors, with at least 25% of projects were Government & Civil Services and Health. China did not follow a similar pattern of consistent aid sector allocations, with only Energy Generation being present in the top 3 aid project sectors to Angola and Nigeria. These facts perfectly encapsulate the situation at hand throughout Africa, where the U.S. seeks to exert soft power through supporting civil society and promoting healthcare, and China strives for energy security. This may have oversimplified things, but it is a reasonable analysis of the facts. The U.S. approach to aid highlights the support of government institutions and promotion of democratic structures whereas China identifies desirable resources and implements a plan to secure those resources effectively and efficiently.

The U.S. & China both emphasized the usage of State-backed institutions for aid project funding, Chinas' Export-Import Bank being the primary operator, supported by Unspecified Chinese Government Institutions. The U.S. relied on the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of State for distributing its' aid funding. In Angola, Chinas' 3<sup>rd</sup> most utilized funding agency was the China Development Bank and for the U.S. it was the Department of Agriculture. In Nigeria, the 3<sup>rd</sup> most utilized funding agency for China was the China National Petroleum Company and for the U.S, the Trade and Development Agency. While most of the aid funding came from the top 2 institutions featured by the U.S. & China, it is valuable to explore the less featured funding agencies. In Angola, the U.S. is promoting sustainable economic livelihoods, health, and sustenance through the Department of Agriculture. China through the China Development Bank identified and traversed paths for development in Angola. The China National Petroleum Company projects in Nigeria are reasonably linked to oil concessions for China. Whereas the U.S. deemed Nigeria as a trading partner, it promoted projects through the Trade and Development Agency.

The strategies of the U.S. & China aid policies in Nigeria and Angola are apparent, the U.S. approached aid distribution through a massive, yet small-scale aid approach whereas China sought to overhaul infrastructure through less frequent but large-scale aid packages. The interests which the U.S. and China have in Angola and Nigeria are resource-focused, ultimately dismissing human capital, instead promoting diplomatic aid missions through social or infrastructure projects. As a massive demographic shift runs' its course and Africa surges in population, there must be global and local efforts to eliminate poverty, treatable diseases, and human rights violations. In doing so, Africa will truly be able to realize its' potential, as multiple nations within Africa will

soon carry the mantle of a world power, it is vital that a collaborative approach to aid and policymaking is established.

## **4.5 Recommendations**

Shifting the approach to aid requires overhauling how policymakers, academics and thinktanks discuss and investigate African affairs. Treading down the same familiar path of aid, development and debt-relief cycles, world powers today *must* deviate from their normal, basic policies, if real change through economic development and progressive politics are to occur. China is effectively doing more to initiate the development of Angola and Nigeria, whereas the U.S. is technically doing more to develop Angola and Nigeria. While the U.S. or China do not make public efforts to engage with locals regarding aid projects, this is a critical next step which both must take. Realizing the full potential of aid offerings rests in strategically working with aid recipients, to learn, understand and best conceptualize aid packages on a local basis.

Changing the aid landscape and thus policy will be groundbreaking but the current state we are in, it is simply unfeasible to think that a country can diversify its' economy when it is practically being encouraged to continue being dependent on the extractive nature of a sector. The U.S. can continue to tout our celebrity status in Africa through Beyonce, Trevor Noah and Obama, but it is a we are speaking loudly and carrying a short stick. Far more effective is developing a country through concentrated infrastructure projects and promoting education operations at home and abroad. China is heavily invested in globalization through their Confucius Institutes, offering mandarin, Chinese culture courses and scholarships. China already holds the upper hand in the realms of soft and hard power, but the U.S. has not realized this yet.

The U.S. does not have the most noticeable impact on Angola or Nigeria, but its influence on these nations is profound. Not seeking large concessions on a public basis, the U.S. has been quietly installing itself as a central pillar of Angola and Nigeria. However, the U.S. does not need to be a central pillar of any country, except our own. Angola and Nigeria can utilize international support, but the U.S. and China should not seek out these countries to strongarm aid onto them. The next step in the rewriting of the approach to international aid rests in you, the reader, consider what you know about Africa and why you know it. Should the power to shape a nations' economic path and destiny, be held in the hands of those with already immense power? I do not believe this narrative will dominant the 21<sup>st</sup> century—a pushback is in place the world will take notice that the script being followed beckons to past scripts of suppression, domination, and control.

## **5. Conclusions**

### **5.1 A Geopolitical Gameboard**

Ultimately, the stage is set for economic revolution throughout Africa but the powers' dictating ascension into the global hegemonic system are less than gung-ho about facilitating rapid economic diversification, stamping out corruption and subjecting their societies to new and different cultural and political normative structures. The standards that the U.S. & China set their aid, development and international relations platforms are in contention but share commonalities. Both the U.S and China long for the allies contained in these sovereign nations, realizing the demographic potential that will soon outnumber all other continents. Uplifting countries through exertion of political power, be it hard or soft, China and the U.S. must seek to change the dynamics and policies that have been played out for decades. This change will result from all stakeholders having their voices validated and concerns cited. The U.S. and China are often seen as sitting in their ivory towers in D.C. and Beijing, simply issuing policies onto smaller world powers. This must change if the discourse surrounding aid is to change, world powers need a reality check and a population shift towards smaller powers will truly ground the world powers.

Efforts to promote transparency, honesty and morality within the aid sector must be improved and spotlighted. China and the U.S. are split when it comes to these central pillars of political operations. Chinas' strategy often seeks the moral high ground but sacrifices transparency for the sake of brevity and pushes ahead expediently with infrastructure projects. The U.S tends to rely on its' transparency but lost its' morality on the course of this reliance, without a true north for an aid strategy, the U.S. is left floundering for direction. Casting a large

net with its' aid project offerings, the U.S. is obtuse with its' intentions, actions, and policy plans. While still ever transparent, few outsiders truly understand the scope and nature of U.S. aid projects in Angola and Nigeria. This should be a point of contention for the U.S. as we claim to be the nation of great democracy but the aid policy at hand seems to disregard democracy in favor of authoritarian, overarching, generalized strategies to implementing aid. Understanding that U.S. aid policy must be altered begs the question, how?

Noticeably absent in the development of aid policies by the U.S. and China are the integration of elements of honesty and clarity. Both world powers struggle with these aspects of aid distribution and allocation, but where the problem is, often so is the solution. In honestly describing the U.S. interests in health and social services sectors in Angola and Nigeria, there is little to go off, except the U.S. cares. However, the same would be said if the U.S. provided aid in *any* sector. While well-defined in aid projects goals and missions, the U.S. struggles with honestly describing why the aid is there and what U.S. interests are at stake. China is honest with the aid it offers recipient nations and internationally but has a serious blind spot regarding the transparency of aid projects flows. China lacks aid clarity and could easily correct this by openly publicizing their aid offerings through Chinese government backed institutions. The race to the become the world's most reliable aid partner will not be won by any countries current policies, it will take transformative, input-driven, self-reflexive rewriting of long held policies to win.

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# 7. Appendices

## China-Angola Implementing Agencies

Implementing Agency	Count
Alcatel-Lucent Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd., State-Owned Company	1
Angola Social and Productive Reintegration Commission for Demobilized and Displaced Persons, Government Agency	1
Angolan Armed Forces, Government Agency	1
Angolan Ministry of Finance, Government Agency	1
CAMCO International, Private Sector	4
China Construction Bank Corporation (CCB), State-Owned Company	1
China Jiangsu International, State-Owned Company	2
China Machine-Building International Corporation (CMIC), State-Owned Company	5
China Machine-Building International Corporation (CMIC), State-Owned Company; Guangxi Hydroelectric Construction Bureau (GHCB), State-Owned Company	1
China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC), State-Owned Company	16
China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC), State-Owned Company;	1
China National Electric Import & Export Corporation, State-Owned Company	3
China Overseas Engineering Group Co., Ltd., Government Agency	1
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec Ltd.), State-Owned Company	1
China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), State-Owned Company	1
China Railway Engineering Group Co., Ltd., State-Owned Company	1
China Road & Bridge Corporation (CRBC), State-Owned Company	2
China Road and Bridge Corporation, State-Owned Company	1
China Road and Bridge Corporation, State-Owned Company; SinoHydro, State-Owned Company	1
China Tiesiju Civil Engineering Group Co., Ltd., State-Owned Company	1
CITIC Construction Group, State-Owned Company	1
CITIC Group Corporation, State-Owned Company	1
Department of Agriculture	28
Department of Defense	31
Department of Health and Human Services	76
Department of Labor	1
Department of State	156
Department of the Interior	3
Department of the Treasury	9
Department of Transportation	1
Lwini Foundation; Angolan Paralympics Committee	1
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Political Party	1
SinoHydro, State-Owned Company	17
SinoHydro Corporation, State-Owned Company	1
SINOMACH - China National Machinery Industry Corporation Ltd. (™_Ô_ñ_cÔôâ_™_Ô_c_ñ_žÔÛëÔ), State-Owned Company	1
Tianjin Machinery Export & Import Corporate; Taivia	1
Trade and Development Agency	19
U.S. Agency for International Development	2141
Zhongxing Technologies (ZTE), State-Owned Company; Mundo Startel, Private Sector	1
(blank)	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>2536</b>

# China-Nigeria Implementing Agencies

Implementing Agency	Count
African Development Foundation	14
Anhui Construction Engineering Group, Private Sector	565
Beijing G&M Engineering Construction Co., Ltd.	1
Brentex	1
BUA	1
China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), State-Owned Company	2
China Geological Survey, National NGO; Nigeria Geological Survey Agency, Government Agency	1
China Gezhoubao Group Company Ltd. (CGGC), State-Owned Company; CGC Overseas Construction Co., Ltd. (CGCOC), State-Owned Company; China National Electric Equipment Corporation (CNEEC), State-Owned Company; SinoHydro, State-Owned Company	1
China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC)	1
China National Electric Equipment Corporation (CNEEC), State-Owned Company; SinoHydro Corporation, State-Owned Company	1
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), State-Owned Company	1
China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), State-Owned Company	1
Chiyoda Corporation, Private Sector; China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), State-Owned Company; China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), State-Owned Company	1
Confucius Institute, Government Agency	2
Dangote	1
Department of Agriculture	12
Department of Commerce	1
Department of Defense	81
Department of Energy	20
Department of Health and Human Services	218
Department of Homeland Security	1
Department of Justice	25
Department of Labor	4
Department of State	515
Department of the Air Force	1
Department of the Army	5
Department of the Interior	34
Department of the Navy	8
Department of the Treasury	26
Department of Transportation	3
Environmental Protection Agency	1
Federal Trade Commission	4
First Bank of Nigeria, State-Owned Company	1
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Multilateral	1
Guangdong Xinguang International Group, State-Owned Company	1
Ibeto Cement	1
Mambilla	1
Ministry of Commerce, Government Agency; Fujian Association for Promotion of Asia-Pacific Economic and Cultural Exchanges, State-Owned Company	1
Ministry of Commerce, Government Agency; Nigerian Ministry of Trade and Investment, Government Agency	1
Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Government Agency	1
Nigcomsat	1
NigComSat, Public Private Partnership; China Great Wall Industry Corporation, State-Owned Company	1
Nigerian Communications Commission, Government Agency; NigComSat, Public Private Partnership; China Great Wall Industry Corporation, State-Owned Company	1
Nigerian Federal Staff Hospital, Government Agency	1
Nnamdi Azikiwe University	1
Opera	1
Reltel Wireless Ltd., Private Sector	1
Sagamu	1
Shandong No. 3 Electric Power Construction Company (SEPCO III), Private Sector	1
Trade and Development Agency	168
Transmission Company of Nigeria, Private Sector; Xi'an Electric Manufacturing Corp (XD), Private Sector	1
U.S. Agency for International Development	7045
Zhongxing Technologies (ZTE), State-Owned Company	1
Zhongxing Technologies (ZTE), State-Owned Company; Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Private Sector; Alcatel-Lucent Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd., State-Owned Company	2
(blank)	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>8788</b>

## U.S. & China Projects in Angola (2001 - 2014)

Count

Sector		Donor		Total
		China	United States	
Unallocated / Unspecified		4	0	4
Health		25	0	25
Action Relating to Debt		2	0	2
Emergency Response		3	0	3
Government and Civil Society		7	0	7
Energy Generation and Supply		22	0	22
Communications		5	0	5
Transport and Storage		16	0	16
Industry, Mining, Construction		2	0	2
Other Multisector		7	0	7
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing		13	0	13
Education		11	0	11
Water Supply and Sanitation		9	0	9
Other Social infrastructure and services		1	0	1
Basic Education		0	31	31
Health, General		0	19	19
Basic Health		0	206	206
Maternal and Child Health, Family Planning		0	98	98
HIV/AIDS		0	358	358
Water Supply and Sanitation		0	35	35
Government and Civil Society		0	393	393
Conflict, Peace, and Security		0	234	234
Other Social Infrastructure and Services		0	94	94
Transport and Storage		0	4	4
Energy		0	7	7
Banking and Financial Services		0	22	22
Business and Other Services		0	53	53
Agriculture		0	39	39
Industry		0	10	10
Construction		0	3	3
Trade Policy and Regulations		0	1	1
General Environmental Protection		0	6	6
Other Multisector		0	35	35
Developmental Food Aid/Food Security Assistance		0	164	164
Emergency Response		0	382	382
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness		0	2	2
Operating Expenses		0	167	167
Program Design and Learning		0	22	22
Administration and		0	80	80

## U.S. & China Projects by Sector in Nigeria (2001 - 2014)

Count

Sector		Donor		Total
		China	United States	
Education		8	0	8
Education, Level Unspecified		0	168	168
Basic Education		0	136	136
Secondary Education		0	30	30
Post-Secondary Education		0	11	11
Health		8	0	8
Health, General		0	84	84
Basic Health		0	446	446
Maternal and Child Health, Family Planning		0	823	823
HIV/AIDS		0	1742	1742
Water Supply and Sanitation		1	39	40
Government and Civil Society		0	1106	1106
Conflict, Peace, and Security		0	259	259
Other Social infrastructure and services		1	304	305
Transport and Storage		3	22	25
Communications		11	18	29
Energy Generation and Supply		8	197	205
Banking and Financial Services		1	87	88
Business and Other Services		1	283	284
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing		2	720	722
Industry, Mining, Construction		3	0	3
Industry		0	137	137
Mineral Resources and Mining		0	26	26
Trade and Tourism		1	0	1
Trade Policy and Regulations		0	40	40
General Environmental Protection		0	53	53
Other Multisector		3	151	154
Developmental Food Aid/Food Security Assistance		0	8	8
Action Relating to Debt		1	0	1
Emergency Response		1	0	1
Emergency Response		0	360	360
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness		0	9	9
Operating Expenses		0	824	824
Program Design and Learning		0	44	44
Administration and Oversight		0	610	610
Unallocated / Unspecified		4	0	4

### Angola Group Aid Statistics

	donor	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
usd_defl_2014	China	65	\$123,053,142.541 0801300000	\$339,718,434.021 54830000000	\$42,136,885.7989 2427000000
	United States	8737	\$901,697.994048 3003000	\$92,233.7203685 4776000	\$68,100.3310096 7348000

### Nigeria Group Aid Statistics

	donor	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
usd_defl_2014	China	110	\$303,849,553.126 7264500000	\$724,172,016.220 33100000000	\$69,047,092.5644 6378000000
	United States	2465	\$548,950.906288 0324000	\$92,233.7203685 4776000	\$28,107.4069066 7191700


### Angola Aid Report

usd_defl_2014			
donor	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
China	\$123,053,142.5 410800600000	65	\$339,718,434.0 2154830000000
United States	\$922,337.20368 54776000	8437	\$92,233.720368 54776000
Total	\$922,337.20368 54776000	8502	\$31,993,909.93 102783300000


### Nigeria Aid Report

usd_defl_2014			
donor	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
China	\$303,849,553.1 267263000000	110	\$724,172,016.2 2033100000000
United States	\$548,950.90628 80317000	2465	\$92,233.720368 54776000
Total	\$13,505,481.48 65786100000	2575	\$161,160,688.7 7069604000000


## U.S.-China Aid Projects in Nigeria 2001-2014




## U.S.-China Aid Projects in Angola 2001-2014



U.S. & China Projects by Sector in Angola (2001 - 2014)



U.S. & China Projects by Sector in Nigeria (2001 - 2014)



## U.S. & China Projects by year in Angola (2000 - 2014)

Year			Donor		Total
			China	United States	
2000	Count	1	0	1	
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
2001	Count	6	145	151	
	% of Total	0.2%	5.6%	5.8%	
2002	Count	9	175	184	
	% of Total	0.3%	6.8%	7.1%	
2003	Count	2	178	180	
	% of Total	0.1%	6.9%	6.9%	
2004	Count	4	179	183	
	% of Total	0.2%	6.9%	7.1%	
2005	Count	34	175	209	
	% of Total	1.3%	6.8%	8.1%	
2006	Count	15	161	176	
	% of Total	0.6%	6.2%	6.8%	
2007	Count	29	142	171	
	% of Total	1.1%	5.5%	6.6%	
2008	Count	5	194	199	
	% of Total	0.2%	7.5%	7.7%	
2009	Count	1	211	212	
	% of Total	0.0%	8.1%	8.2%	
2010	Count	3	200	203	
	% of Total	0.1%	7.7%	7.8%	
2011	Count	4	186	190	
	% of Total	0.2%	7.2%	7.3%	
2012	Count	5	174	179	
	% of Total	0.2%	6.7%	6.9%	
2013	Count	4	175	179	
	% of Total	0.2%	6.8%	6.9%	
2014	Count	5	170	175	
	% of Total	0.2%	6.6%	6.8%	
Total	Count	127	2465	2592	
	% of Total	4.9%	95.1%	100.0%	

## U.S. & China Projects by year in Nigeria (2001 - 2014)

		Donor			
		China	United States	Total	
Year	2001	Count	1	151	152
		% of Total	0.0%	2.9%	2.9%
	2002	Count	8	209	217
		% of Total	0.2%	4.0%	4.1%
	2003	Count	2	220	222
		% of Total	0.0%	4.2%	4.2%
	2004	Count	5	223	228
		% of Total	0.1%	4.2%	4.3%
	2005	Count	2	239	241
		% of Total	0.0%	4.5%	4.6%
	2006	Count	9	264	273
		% of Total	0.2%	5.0%	5.2%
	2007	Count	7	301	308
		% of Total	0.1%	5.7%	5.8%
	2008	Count	3	399	402
		% of Total	0.1%	7.6%	7.6%
	2009	Count	1	557	558
		% of Total	0.0%	10.6%	10.6%
	2010	Count	0	547	547
		% of Total	0.0%	10.4%	10.4%
	2011	Count	0	516	516
		% of Total	0.0%	9.8%	9.8%
	2012	Count	5	512	517
		% of Total	0.1%	9.7%	9.8%
	2013	Count	14	518	532
		% of Total	0.3%	9.8%	10.1%
	2014	Count	3	559	562
		% of Total	0.1%	10.6%	10.7%
Total		Count	60	5215	5275
		% of Total	1.1%	98.9%	100.0%

### U.S. Implementing Agencies in Angola

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Loan (excluding debt rescheduling)	96	3.7	3.7	3.7
	Debt forgiveness	2	.1	.1	3.8
	Grant	23	.9	.9	4.7
	Scholarships/training in the donor country	2	.1	.1	4.7
	Strategic/Supplier Credit	1	.0	.0	4.8
	Free-standing technical assistance	3	.1	.1	4.9
	U.S. Government - U.S. Agency for International Development	278	10.7	10.7	15.6
	U.S. Government - Department of Defense	33	1.3	1.3	16.9
	U.S. Government - Department of State	25	1.0	1.0	17.9
	U.S. Government - Department of Treasury	9	.3	.3	18.2
	U.S. Government - Department of Health and Human Services	59	2.3	2.3	20.5
	U.S. Government - Department of Commerce	11	.4	.4	20.9
	U.S. Government - Department of Interior	2	.1	.1	21.0
	U.S. Government - Department of Transportation	1	.0	.0	21.0
	U.S. Government - Trade and Development Agency	2	.1	.1	21.1
	U.S. Government - General Services Administration	20	.8	.8	21.9
	U.S. Government - Department of the Air Force	1	.0	.0	21.9
	U.S. Government - Other	2	.1	.1	22.0
	Government of Angola	10	.4	.4	22.4

Government of Ecuador	1	.0	.0	22.4
Government - Country Other	3	.1	.1	22.5
NGO - United States Other	15	.6	.6	23.1
NGO - Non United States Other	26	1.0	1.0	24.1
Enterprise - Non United States Other	183	7.1	7.1	31.2
Enterprise - United States Other	115	4.4	4.4	35.6
University/Research Institute - Non United States Other	2	.1	.1	35.7
NGO - International Other	2	.1	.1	35.8
Church and Faith Based - United States Other	1	.0	.0	35.8
Church and Faith Based - Non United States Other	2	.1	.1	35.9
NGO - United States Redacted	18	.7	.7	36.6
Multilateral Organizations - Redacted	4	.2	.2	36.7
NGO - Non United States Redacted	16	.6	.6	37.3
Enterprise - Non United States Redacted	63	2.4	2.4	39.8
Enterprise - United States Redacted	46	1.8	1.8	41.6
NGO - International Redacted	4	.2	.2	41.7
Church and Faith Based - United States Redacted	1	.0	.0	41.7
Multilateral - United Nations Organization Redacted	1	.0	.0	41.8
Unspecified Vendors - South Africa	1	.0	.0	41.8
Adventist Development and Relief Agency International	1	.0	.0	41.9
Africare	12	.5	.5	42.3

Agriculture Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance	2	.1	.1	42.4
Caritas Internationalis	3	.1	.1	42.5
Catholic Relief Services	55	2.1	2.1	44.6
ChildFund International	22	.8	.8	45.5
Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs	5	.2	.2	45.7
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere	99	3.8	3.8	49.5
Doctors Without Borders	2	.1	.1	49.6
Food and Agriculture Organisation	6	.2	.2	49.8
International Committee of the Red Cross	13	.5	.5	50.3
International Fertilizer Development Center	2	.1	.1	50.4
International Medical Corps	14	.5	.5	50.9
International Organisation for Migration	9	.3	.3	51.3
International Rescue Committee	3	.1	.1	51.4
Jesuit Refugee Service	1	.0	.0	51.4
Joint Aid Management	13	.5	.5	51.9
Lutheran World Relief	4	.2	.2	52.1
Mentor Initiative	6	.2	.2	52.3
Mines Advisory Group	12	.5	.5	52.8
National Cooperative Business Association CLUSA	20	.8	.8	53.5
Norwegian People's Aid	13	.5	.5	54.1
Oxfam International	5	.2	.2	54.2
Population Services International	55	2.1	2.1	56.4
Salesian Missions	2	.1	.1	56.4
Samaritan's Purse	4	.2	.2	56.6

Save the Children Federation, Inc.	25	1.0	1.0	57.6
Search for Common Ground	20	.8	.8	58.3
The Humpty Dumpty Institute	2	.1	.1	58.4
United Nations Children's Fund	32	1.2	1.2	59.6
United Nations Development Programme	10	.4	.4	60.0
United Nations Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	4	.2	.2	60.2
United Nations Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	7	.3	.3	60.5
World Food Program	154	5.9	5.9	66.4
World Health Organisation	18	.7	.7	67.1
World Vision	55	2.1	2.1	69.2
Medical Care Development, Inc.	4	.2	.2	69.4
Jhpiego Corporation	10	.4	.4	69.8
RTI International	12	.5	.5	70.2
Academy for Educational Development	28	1.1	1.1	71.3
World Learning, Inc.	96	3.7	3.7	75.0
Creative Associates International	4	.2	.2	75.2
Development Associates International	1	.0	.0	75.2
Macro International	5	.2	.2	75.4
Management Systems International	19	.7	.7	76.1
John Snow International	10	.4	.4	76.5
America's Development Foundation	9	.3	.3	76.9
Personal Services Contractors - USAID	231	8.9	8.9	85.8
East-West Management Institute	1	.0	.0	85.8

International Republican Institute	2	.1	.1	85.9
National Democratic Institute	10	.4	.4	86.3
Pact World	6	.2	.2	86.5
Dell, Inc.	1	.0	.0	86.5
U.S. Energy Association	1	.0	.0	86.6
Chemonics International, Inc.	49	1.9	1.9	88.5
Development Alternatives, Inc.	17	.7	.7	89.1
Invitational Travelers - USAID	4	.2	.2	89.3
Abt Associates, Inc.	10	.4	.4	89.7
Global Environment & Technology Foundation	1	.0	.0	89.7
Columbia University	1	.0	.0	89.7
Halo Trust	21	.8	.8	90.5
Roots of Peace	2	.1	.1	90.6
Spirit of Soccer	1	.0	.0	90.7
Survey Action Center	2	.1	.1	90.7
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation	2	.1	.1	90.8
Harvard University	2	.1	.1	90.9
Julia Burke Foundation	1	.0	.0	90.9
Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening	45	1.7	1.7	92.7
Accao Humana (Human Action)	3	.1	.1	92.8
Alfalit International, Inc.	6	.2	.2	93.0
Concern Worldwide U.S.	2	.1	.1	93.1
AES Corporation	1	.0	.0	93.1
Global Marketing & Communications, Inc.	3	.1	.1	93.2
GOAL	1	.0	.0	93.3
Partnership for Supply Chain Management	1	.0	.0	93.3
ARD, Inc.	10	.4	.4	93.7

Management Sciences for Health	20	.8	.8	94.5
IntraHealth International	2	.1	.1	94.6
Pathfinder International	12	.5	.5	95.0
Cardno Limited	11	.4	.4	95.4
Public Health Institute	2	.1	.1	95.5
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill	5	.2	.2	95.7
QED Group, LLC	1	.0	.0	95.8
Casals and Associates, Inc.	2	.1	.1	95.8
EngenderHealth	4	.2	.2	96.0
United States Pharmacopeial Convention	2	.1	.1	96.1
Social and Scientific Systems Inc.	1	.0	.0	96.1
KED Group, LLC	2	.1	.1	96.2
Partnership International, Inc.	1	.0	.0	96.2
Association dos Naturais e Amigos da Cela	1	.0	.0	96.3
Cooperation o de Iniciativas Locais	1	.0	.0	96.3
Duke University	2	.1	.1	96.4
World Bank Group	1	.0	.0	96.4
Giant Sable Fund, Inc.	1	.0	.0	96.5
Sea Turtle Research Program	1	.0	.0	96.5
Accao de Solidariedade & Desenvolvimento	5	.2	.2	96.7
Association de Jovens para o Desenvolvimento Comunitario	1	.0	.0	96.7
Association for Rural Development and Support	1	.0	.0	96.8
Community Development Assistance Organization	2	.1	.1	96.8
Coordenado da Ajudas Para a Agricultura II	3	.1	.1	97.0

Forum dos Agentes Eleitorais	2	.1	.1	97.0
Horizonte Association	1	.0	.0	97.1
Instituto Angolano de Sistemas Eleitorais e Democracia	1	.0	.0	97.1
Inter-Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola	2	.1	.1	97.2
National Counseling Center	8	.3	.3	97.5
Association Angolana Para O Melhoramento E Apoio Ao Meio Rural	1	.0	.0	97.5
Association de Mulheres das Áreas Rurais	1	.0	.0	97.6
Association para Promotion do Desenvolvimento Endgeno das Comunidades de Base	3	.1	.1	97.7
Maka Angola	6	.2	.2	97.9
CDW Government, Inc.	3	.1	.1	98.0
GovConnection Incorporated	10	.4	.4	98.4
Logenix International	1	.0	.0	98.5
Good Works International, LLC	1	.0	.0	98.5
Solana, Inc.	1	.0	.0	98.5
Transperfect Translations International, Inc.	1	.0	.0	98.6
University of Hawaii	1	.0	.0	98.6
Merklein & Associates, Inc.	1	.0	.0	98.6
International Business Machines Corp.	5	.2	.2	98.8
Social Impact, Inc.	2	.1	.1	98.9
Bar Scan, Inc.	5	.2	.2	99.1
Training Resources Group, Inc.	1	.0	.0	99.2
DPW Training and Associates, LLC	2	.1	.1	99.2
Embassy Products & Logistics	3	.1	.1	99.3

American Hotel Register Company	1	.0	.0	99.4
Chevron Corporation	3	.1	.1	99.5
Missaco de Beneficincia Agropecuria, do Kubango, Inclusaco, Tecnologias e Ambiente	1	.0	.0	99.5
KixiCredito	6	.2	.2	99.8
African Field Epidemiology Network	1	.0	.0	99.8
CounterTrade Products, Inc.	1	.0	.0	99.8
ePlus, Inc.	3	.1	.1	100.0
IRIS Center, University of Maryland	1	.0	.0	100.0
Total	2592	100.0	100.0	