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Disentangling Discrimination
The Impact of Political & Societal Discrimination on
Democratic (Dis)Engagement

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2016

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Abstract

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How does discrimination impact the political behaviors of racial and ethnic minority groups in democratic societies? Are all types of discrimination the same? The direct relationship between discrimination and behavior is surprisingly understudied. The few studies that have focused on this topic suggest that discrimination motivates individuals to take action. However, these studies have primarily focused on what I classify as "political" discrimination: how laws, policies, or campaign rhetoric impact behaviors. What is missing from the literature is how interpersonal interactions between rank-and-file members of the society impact people's orientations toward politics. I argue that while political discrimination has the capacity to make politics more salient, motivating individuals to take action for substantive or expressive purposes, the same conclusion can not be drawn for individuals who feel devalued in their communities. Taking an interdisciplinary theoretical approach, I argue that individuals exposed to widespread societal discrimination will become more pessimistic than their counterparts to believe that desired outcomes can be achieved through democratic engagement. Drawing from four nationally representative surveys and an original discrimination experiment, I find support for my hypotheses

across three groups in two different contexts: African-Americans, Muslim-Americans, and Ethnic Minorities in Great Britain. My study contributes to political science scholarship by showing that the source of discrimination plays a powerful role in whether individuals engage or withdraw from politics. As such, it is simply misguided to assume that all types of discrimination lead to similar behavioral outcomes. My study also holds important implications for democratic theory: if citizens are unable or unwilling to participate in politics due to interpersonal experiences with rejection, they may be denied crucial resources and opportunities as their preferences and concerns can be overlooked by policymakers. This spiral of marginalization has a profound impact on the future of race relations in democratic societies.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As a first-generation immigrant I did not envision the possibility of pursuing a PhD in Political Science, let alone write a dissertation on discrimination and get a tenure-track job. There is no question that I would not be in the position that I am today without the tremendous sacrifices that my mother has made. I owe her and my entire family tremendous gratitude. I am also forever indebted to my chair, Matt Barreto, my committee members, and my long-time friend & mentor, Karam Dana. Without their support I would not have been able to achieve my academic aspirations. It goes without saying that throughout this process my wonderful colleagues and friends also played an instrumental role, and I can't thank them enough.

DEDICATION

To Nooshin, Sepeedeh, Kiana, Dali, & Kambiz

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Why Study Discrimination?

Scholars have long recognized the ways in which race has been constructed, contested, and transformed throughout history, including the central role it has and continues to play in shaping identities, life chances, and group relations (Bonilla Silva, 2001; Myrdal, 1944; Haney López, 2000; Hirschman, 2004; Hutchings and Valentino, 2004; Winant and Omi, 1994; Roediger, 1999). In the context of the United States, it is no secret that various minority groups have long been stigmatized and denied equal standing by their peers. Systematic discrimination has been well-documented on issues pertaining to sovereignty, citizenship, representation, civil liberties, immigration, and access to social, legal, and economic resources (Bruyneel, 2007; Gerstle, 2010; Haney López, 2010; Kim, 1999; Matthews and Prothro, 1966; Ngai, 2014; Smith, 1993; Thompson, 2010). Despite tremendous advancements in research on race, and the recognition that discrimination influences a variety of political outcomes such as coalition building (Uhlener, 1991; Garcia, 2000; Kaufmann, 2003; Sanchez, 2008), group attitudes (Tate, 1994; Dawson, 1994), group identity (Uhlener, 1991; Lien et al., 2004; Masuoka, 2006; Maxwell, 2009), linked fate (Dawson, 1994), and group consciousness (Jamal, 2005; Miller et al., 1981; Sanchez, 2006), the direct relationship between discrimination and democratic engagement, however, is still understudied.

This is surprising considering the normative implications that discrimination may pose for democratic governance. Arguably, a key precondition for a strong and vibrant democracy is the broad participation and equal consideration of the welfare and preferences of all citizens in the decision-making processes (Dahl, 1971; Pateman, 1970; Verba, 2003), because democratic systems of governance rely upon citizen action and support to maintain legitimacy and constancy (Almond and Verba, 1963). If some citizens are unable or unwilling to participate in politics due to experiences of stigmatization, they may be denied access to crucial resources and opportunities (Verba et al., 1978), and pose a

significant challenge to the long-term stability of the political system (Muller et al., 1982; Schwartz, 1973; Wright, 1976). As such, the ways that experiences of discrimination influences citizen's sociopolitical behaviors cannot be overlooked.

Beyond normative reasons, four major limitations in existing political science literature underscore why more research on discrimination and sociopolitical behavior is needed. First, there is a lack of research in political science. Discrimination is rarely the focal point of the most comprehensive studies related to the civic and political engagement of racial or ethnic minority groups. While scholars have emphasized the historical and contemporary influence of differential treatment in various social and political domains (Essed, 1991; Jones, 1997; Kinder and Sears, 1981), prominent models of political participation have not considered the role that discrimination may play in the overall puzzle of political engagement. A glance at the most influential models of political behavior aptly demonstrates this point. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's Civic Voluntarism Model (1995) asserts that individuals do not participate in politics because they can't (lack of resources), they don't want to (lack of interest), or nobody asked them to (outside of recruitment networks). This model neglects to take discrimination into account within the calculus of political behavior. In an effort to further clarify why some people are more politically and socially engaged than others, social capital theorists have argued that networks of associations, trust, and norms of reciprocity (Coleman, 1988; La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; Putnam, 2000) play a crucial role in participation, but have neglected experiences of stigmatization on the account of race and ethnicity. Other theories of political participation such as rational choice explanations (Downs, 1957), mobilization models (Kramer, 1970; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993), sociological and contextual accounts (Berelson et al., 1954; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995), psychological factors (Almond and Verba, 1963; Campbell et al., 1960; Galais and Blais, 2014; McCluskey et al., 2004), social pressures (Gerber et al., 2008), peer behavior (Nickerson, 2008), advertising

(Brader, 2005; Gerber et al., 2011), campaigning (Shaw, 1999), and political threat models (Miller and Krosnick, 2004; Campbell, 2003) have also relegated the role of discrimination to the margins. The omission of discrimination as an important explanatory variable in models of political participation is not surprising, namely because the vast majority of theories that have gained traction in political science have predominately focused on explaining majority, rather than minority, group behavior. As a consequence of ignoring discrimination in the overall assessment of political behavior, current scholarship is very limited.

The second shortcoming of existing work concerns the narrow or one-dimensional conceptualization of discrimination in the handful of racial and ethnic politics studies that have paid some attention to this topic. Out of the limited research that exists, nearly all of them have exclusively focused on how racialized policies, laws, or institutional arrangements influence the behaviors of targeted minority groups (Cho et al., 2006; Pantoja et al., 2001; Barreto and Woods, 2005; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramírez, 2007). While this strand of research has advanced our understanding of how institutional barriers and politically hostile contexts could impact the political orientations and behaviors of minorities, it has ignored acts of discrimination perpetuated by rank-and-file members of the society. For instance, research on Latino political incorporation has primarily explored how the introduction of anti-immigration legislation affected levels of turnout and vote choice (Pantoja et al., 2001; Barreto and Woods, 2005; Ramakrishnan, 2005), but failed to consider how every day, informal experiences of peer rejection could have also influenced political behavior. Likewise, Cho and colleagues (2006) investigated whether threatening post-9/11 policies such as the USA PATRIOT Act motivated Arab-Americans to register to vote, but did not account for the hostile, and at times violent, experiences of peer discrimination that many Arabs and other Middle-Easterners, especially those who practiced Islam, have experienced in communities across the United States. Overall, studies that have deemed

discrimination as a relevant variable in the overall calculus of political participation have too narrowly focused on exposure to systematic or institutional marginalization. The lack of attention to the more informal experiences of discrimination that minorities face in their everyday encounters with dominant group members paints only a partial portrait of discrimination and political behavior.

Furthermore, the vague and inconsistent operationalization of discrimination oversimplifies what is in reality a multidimensional construct. Because discrimination is usually an afterthought in the vast majority of research designs, even the most comprehensive surveys of minority political behavior do not contain precise questions that would enable researchers to consider different dimensions of discrimination. As a consequence, the most common approach to measuring discrimination has been to use any available discrimination-related question that exists, regardless of how imprecise that question may be. For example, in an effort to analyze the impact of racial context on political behavior among Asian-Americans, Rim (2009) was only able to utilize a vague measure of discrimination available in the 2011 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey: whether participants had experienced discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, or accent. With questions such as these, researchers are unable to ascertain what type of discrimination the participant is referencing when he/she is answering the question. Some individuals may be recalling their recent experience with the police, while others may be thinking about their strained relationship with their racist neighbor(s). Due to a lack of clear conceptualization of discrimination and the absence of precise survey questions, scholars are left to assume that there are no significant disparities between different sources of discrimination. This assumption is problematic because different types of discrimination lead to distinct political outcomes, which I will document in greater detail in the following chapters.

In addition to utilizing vague survey questions, others have either constructed overar-

ching discrimination scales or utilized more specific questions without any clear theoretical justification (Ayers and Hofstetter, 2008; Hopkins et al., 2016; Maxwell, 2009; Wong et al., 2005, 2011). Furthermore, even when studying the same topic, researchers have used completely different measures of discrimination, tapping into drastically disparate perceptions or experiences of stigmatization. Research on the presence of group consciousness among African-Americans, Latinos, and Muslim-Americans illustrates this point. Miller and colleagues' (1981) influential work on group consciousness among African-Americans measured a discrimination by asking respondents whether they attribute sex and race differences in income, occupational status, and general position in American life to various systematic/institutional arrangements or personal deficiencies. Extending Miller and colleagues' work to Latinos, Sanchez (2006) employed a different proxy of discrimination: whether discrimination against Latinos in society is a significant problem. Studying the factors that shape group consciousness among Muslims-Americans, Jamal (2005) used yet another approach: whether respondents have witnessed any anti-muslim discrimination against individuals, businesses, or religious organizations in their respective communities since September 11.¹ While survey questions should be altered to fit each group's unique experiences with discrimination, the problem extends beyond group-specific modifications. In this example, one study ignores societal causes of marginalization while the others, attempting to measure the same concept, overlook institutional or systematic grounds for inequality. Furthermore, the aforementioned questions do not necessarily measure individual experiences with discrimination. Participants could certainly agree with statements such as "discrimination in society poses a significant problem" without being personally exposed to discriminatory behavior. Depending on the primary goals of a given research project, these difference are consequential, and, as chapters 3 and 4 will illustrate, can severely impact the conclusions that one draws

¹It is important to note that issues of inconsistent operationalization are not bound to research on group consciousness or the specific studies mentioned in this chapter.

about the potential influence of discrimination on political behavior.

Finally, existing literature lacks a theoretical framework that considers multiple sources of discrimination and clearly explains the mechanisms by which a particular source of discrimination may motivate or dissuade individuals' participation in politics. Scholars often point to Miller and colleague's (1981) concept of group consciousness or Dawson's (1994) concept of linked fate as two important theoretical foundations to explain the ways in which discrimination, in general, can become politically consequential. According to Dawson, a legacy of racism has led African-Americans to form opinions through a "black utility heuristic," and feeling that their individual opportunities are bound up with the status of the entire group. This means that perceptions of discrimination can serve as a catalyst for political engagement because unfair treatment in the political system can promote a group orientation towards politics and aid in the adoption of group-centric political attitudes (Chong and Rogers, 2005). While theories of linked fate and group consciousness have been well-received and empirically supported, neither model adequately unpacks discrimination. Additionally, they assume that differential treatment is always a source of motivation rather than alienation. That is, theories of racialization, and the studies that have adopted them, fail to account for the ways in which discrimination may also deter individuals from participating in politics because such studies have primarily focused on "feelings of relative deprivation" attributed only to macro-level, systematic impediments to equality that can, theoretically, be addressed through group action. What is missing from current accounts of discrimination is the perception of marginalization attributed to experiences of micro-level, peer rejection that minorities may also face in their routine interactions with dominant group members. It is certainly possible that experiences of peer discrimination could produce a different reaction, one that is characterized by apathy, powerlessness, and pessimism towards the political system. Since current research does not properly unpack the concept of discrimination, we currently have no

process to assess which path ethnic and racial minorities will follow once they encounter different sources of discrimination.

1.2 Research Puzzle and Contribution


These limitations in the political science literature have produced a specific type of narrative about the role of discrimination in politics that is at odds with research in other disciplines, notably social psychology. The few discrimination-related studies that exist suggest that the heightened awareness of unfair treatment may motivate individuals from various racial and ethnic backgrounds to take part in civic and political life for expressive or substantive purposes (for example, see Cho et al. (2006); Pantoja et al. (2001); Barreto and Woods (2005); Ramakrishnan (2005); Ramírez (2007); Sanchez (2006)). More specifically, studies suggest that discrimination motivates individuals to take political action because violations of democratic norms ignite a sense of discontent or frustration. While this is a plausible explanation, it is a problematic one when contrasted with the large body of public health research conducted on discrimination and psychological well-being. Epidemiological studies over the past three decades problematize the notion that discrimination serves as a source of motivation by showing that exposure to unfair treatment in societal/interpersonal contexts on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation is associated with feelings of inferiority, insecurity, powerlessness, and depression (Branscombe et al., 1999; Dion and Earn, 1975; Finch et al., 2000; Whitbeck et al., 2002). The assertion that discrimination is positively associated with participations comes under further contention considering that emerging research has found that adverse mental health outcomes such as depression are negatively associated with political participation because " ...depressed individuals lack the motivation to partake in politics (Ojeda, 2015). "

To makes sense of this research puzzle (see Figure 1.1), and to address the shortcom-

ings that pervade current research on discrimination and democratic engagement, the primary objective of the present dissertation is to bring the study of discrimination to center stage. Considering that deficiencies and asymmetries in civic and political participation pose a challenge to the long-term well-being of minority groups as well as the overall functioning of a representative democracy, I examine the specific conditions in which discrimination may politically mobilize or demobilize individuals. Departing from existing approaches to studying discrimination and political behavior, I offer a theoretical model that expands the scope of how discrimination is conceptualized and measured. I argue that the behavioral responses to discrimination depend on the qualitative nature of the discrimination perceived. For instance, it makes a difference whether individuals are discriminated against by government officials as opposed to their neighbors. One cannot assume that all types of discrimination lead to similar psychological and behavioral outcomes. In order to accurately understand how discrimination operates in society and politics, research must account for the *various* ways that racial and ethnic minorities face stigmatization. As it stands, current research is limited because it has ignored peer-to-peer, societal experiences with discrimination, namely being discriminated against by one's community members, which some individuals face on a daily basis.

Due to a one-dimensional or broad view of discrimination that conflates different sources of stigmatization, no research to date exists that simultaneously theorizes and systematically analyzes the effect of both societal and political discrimination on behavior. Thus, the present dissertation makes a unique contribution by providing a more nuanced explanation of the effect of discrimination on individual-level behavior. Specifically, I offer a novel interdisciplinary theoretical model—Theory of Societal and Political Discrimination (S&PD)—that explains what types of discrimination might motivate and what types might dissuade individuals from participating in democratic activities. I claim that that the source of discrimination matters greatly because participation in politics is

Figure 1.1: Motivating Research Puzzle



not only prompted by specific political contexts but also rooted in social circumstances. If individuals feel rejected by their peers because of their race or ethnicity, they may not find much value in advancing their interests or expressing their concerns through mainstream channels of political influence. The S&PD theory is not only unique because it crosses disciplinary boundaries to explain the influence of different sources of discrimination; it is also the first theory of its kind that is generalizable across *different groups and contexts*. Drawing from a number of national surveys and an original randomized online experiment, I find support for the S&PD theory among Muslim-Americans, African-Americans, and Ethnic Minorities in the United Kingdom. To date, no single study has accomplished this task—testing a theory of discrimination and democratic engagement across multiple groups and contexts.

1.3 Preview of Argument

The central question of the present study is straightforward: What is the relationship between discrimination and democratic engagement? The answer, however, is more complex. I argue that there are at least two distinct and overarching sources of discrimination that lower status individuals may encounter. The first source of discrimination is what I refer to as "Political Discrimination." This type of discrimination can be understood as laws, policies, symbols, or rhetoric that attempt to interpret, represent, or explain group dynamics with the aim of delegitimizing certain groups based on sociocultural characteristics in order to deprive them of resources or deny equality. Drawing from Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) and the Policy Threat literature, I claim that, on average, acts of political discrimination have the capacity make politics more salient to individuals, motivating them to take action for expressive or substantive purposes, independent of traditional predictors of political behavior. Discriminatory policies, for example, can activate collective orientations toward politics, translating into mobilization against institutions or

actors that violate notions of equality and fairness embedded within democratic regimes.

In contrast to political or "macro-level" discrimination, however, "societal discrimination" has the capacity to undermine participatory inclinations. This "micro-level" discrimination is defined as negative actions taken by individuals in the form of verbal or non-verbal antagonism, intimidation, avoidance, or physical assault. Societal discrimination is disseminated by rank-and-file members of the society not affiliated with larger systems or institutions, often occurring at social gatherings, in streets, shops, or other public and private spaces where individuals interact with one another. Drawing from a plethora of epidemiological studies related to discrimination, belonging, and well-being, I show that people who feel rejected due to persistent negative interpersonal encounters are likely to internalize negative evaluations and suffer from devastating mental health outcomes such as a depression, powerlessness, and low self-esteem. Bridging the gap between research on mental health and political behavior, I then argue that societal discrimination, on average, has the capacity to increase the likelihood of behavioral alienation. Specifically, individuals who experience peer rejection are likely to become more pessimistic than their counterparts in believing that they can effectively challenge systematic inequality. And without the feeling that one is capable of bringing about social or political change, or that one's opinions and preferences are valued, citizens are likely to become indifferent to or disheartened with the democratic process (Almond and Verba, 1963; Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Guterbock and London, 1983; McCluskey et al., 2004; Michelson, 2000) . As such, societal discrimination, unlike political discrimination, is detrimental to democratic engagement.

The theory of societal and political discrimination that I advance does not conclude with a differentiation of discrimination by source. I also advocate for delineating between "in-group or ethnic-based" and "mainstream" participation measures. Combining traditional political participation measures—such as voting or contacting a public officials—

with "in-group" or "ethnic-based" activities can muddle the relationship between discrimination and democratic engagement. Drawing from Social Identity Theory and the Rejection-Identification Model, I specifically argue that although victims of societal discrimination may not feel inclined to take part in mainstream democratic activities such as participating in elections, they are likely to seek out members of their own group for the purposes of reaffirmation. Individuals exposed to political discrimination may likewise participate in in-group or ethnic-based activities, but primarily for the purposes of bolstering their group's status or position. Overall, my research highlights the importance of understanding discrimination with greater nuance and its varying effects on the civic and political engagement of lower-status groups. I argue that discrimination is a multidimensional concept that requires more careful conceptualization, operationalization, and analysis. Furthermore, I suggest that conflating in-group and conventional participation measures should be avoided in studies of discrimination and political behavior.

1.4 The Ensuing Chapters

The following chapters will provide a more detailed account of the of proposed theoretical framework and empirically assess various aspects of the S&PD theory with survey and experimental data among three different minority groups in two different contexts—the United States and Great Britain. By testing the analytical framework among different populations, I can evaluate the extent to which the framework is generalizable to different groups despite any distinct group-level experiences that may exist. Stated differently, the multi-group approach enables me to evaluate whether measures of political discrimination mobilize individuals, and whether measures of societal discrimination dissuade racial or ethnic minorities of differing backgrounds to partake in democratic activities.

Chapter 2 begins with an overarching look at the concept of discrimination, highlighting its multiple dimensions and the ways in which discrimination, in general, may impact

individuals. Following this section, a detailed definition of the two primary and conceptually distinct sources of discrimination—political and societal—will be offered before the S&PD theory is presented. The theoretical framework that I advance incorporates research from political science, sociology, psychology, and epidemiology to explain how perceptions of political and societal discrimination could lead to divergent, rather than similar, behavioral outcomes. In the final section of this chapter, four research hypotheses will be offered to test the direct relationship between discrimination and participation in mainstream and ethnic-specific sociopolitical activities. Unlike previous research on discrimination and democratic engagement, the hypotheses that I present are not specifically aimed towards a particular racial or ethnic minority group. Rather, the hypotheses are formulated more broadly and can be tested on groups that have faced stigmatization in democratic societies on the account of race or ethnicity.

Chapter 3 will test the four research hypotheses with two different national datasets of Muslim-Americans—the 2007/2008 MAPOS dataset and the 2007 PEW Study of Muslim-Americans. This chapter aims to accomplish several key objectives. First, I contextualize the Muslim-American experience in the larger literature on religion and politics to show that there is nothing inherently undemocratic about Islam and its adherents. Contrary to popular rhetoric in the US as well as Europe, religiosity and mosque attendance is actually positively, rather than negatively, associated with increased civic and political engagement. In fact, research suggests that the saliency of religion and the racialization of Muslim-Americans has aided in the formation of a common group identity. After demonstrating that Islam is not incompatible with participation in the American democracy, as some have argued, I next turn to the main analysis. The analysis is divided into two parts. In the first section, I investigate the relationship between indirect perceptions of political discrimination and four measures of political participation. In the second part, I appraise the relationship between direct perceptions of political and societal discrimina-

tion on voter turnout and a measure of in-group participation. The purpose of this section is to not only test the main research hypotheses but to also resolve some of the conceptual confusion regarding "group" versus "individual-level" perceptions of discrimination. Before concluding the chapter, I also further examine the S&PD theory by assessing the impact of political and societal discrimination on attitudes towards the government and a measure of psychological well-being. While not conclusive, this section helps explain why individuals exposed to societal discrimination may behave differently when compared to individuals who either did not experience any discrimination or perceived political discrimination.

For some researchers it may seem peculiar to start an investigation of discrimination and political behavior with a population that, according to the most generous estimates, comprises of only two percent of the U.S. population. Certainly, groups such as African-Americans, Latinos, or even Asian-Americans represent a much larger portion of the total U.S. population and have a longer history of racial and ethnic conflict. I started the investigation with Muslim-Americans as opposed to other groups because no minority group has been exposed to the same level of discrimination that Muslim-Americans have been subjected to since 9/11. Due to unprecedented spikes in discrimination against this population, survey researchers started to pay more attention to the various ways that Muslims have been stigmatized in both social and political domains. As a result, recent surveys on Muslim-Americans contain several specific questions to begin examining the direct relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior in much more detail than previous studies, making this population an ideal starting point.

Chapter 4 aims to answer the same key questions posed in chapter 3, however, with data on ethnic minorities in Great Britain in order to test the generalizability of the S&PD theory outside the U.S. context. In this chapter I rely on the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES), which is a nationally representative telephone survey of 2,787

Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black-Caribbean, and Black-African individuals residing in the UK. What makes this survey appropriate for this study, and better suited than the MAPOS and PEW surveys of Muslim-Americans, is the availability of multilayered discrimination questions. That is, respondents were asked to report *how often* (frequency of exposure) they have experienced *multiple forms* of societal and political discrimination. As a result, this chapter is unique because I am able to show that different operationalizations of discrimination can significantly alter a researcher's substantive conclusions regarding the influence of unfair treatment in civic and political life. When broad measures of discrimination are used in models of political participation, or when different measures of discrimination are combined to construct overarching discrimination scales, the results demonstrate that there is no statistical or substantive relationship between the key explanatory variable and measures of political behavior. However, when discrimination is disentangled by source, the results illustrate that societal discrimination has a strong and negative impact on behavior, while political discrimination significantly increases the propensity of engaging in politics. In addition to testing the effect of discrimination on mainstream as well as in-group engagement, this chapter further evaluates the theoretical framework by assessing the relationship between discrimination and well-being. Consistent with findings from chapter 3, the analysis demonstrates that societal discrimination, unlike political discrimination, is linked to depleted health. This suggests that individuals stigmatized by their peers in the course of everyday life may internalize negative evaluations—a claim advanced by false consciousness theorists as well as many epidemiological studies.

Utilizing a unique survey of African-Americans and an original online experiment on Muslim-Americans, Chapter 5 assesses the psychological mechanisms linking political and societal discrimination to sociopolitical behavior. This chapter offers a more detailed explanation of how different sources of discrimination may increase or decrease an in-

dividuals' propensity to engage in civic and political activities. In the first part of this chapter, two hypotheses are proposed and tested with survey data. The first hypothesis is called the anxiety-dissatisfaction hypothesis, and contends that exposure to either political or societal discrimination increases levels of anxiety and dissatisfaction in life. The second hypothesis is called the internalization hypothesis, which posits that individuals exposed to societal discrimination are likely to internalize negative evaluations and exhibit adverse psychological outcomes such as symptoms of depression, signs of hopelessness, and the inability to control important matters in their lives. Both of these hypotheses serve to further evaluate the underlying mechanism linking discrimination to activism or alienation.

In the second part of the chapter, a novel randomized discrimination experiment is utilized to answer several key questions. First, the experiment aims to assess whether individuals actually differentiate between acts of societal and political discrimination. After demonstrating that individuals do not necessarily merge all of their experiences together as "racism in general," and can notice the difference between discrimination perpetrated by rank-and-file members of the society as opposed to government actors, I evaluate the third hypothesis of the chapter—the false consciousness hypothesis. This final hypothesis postulates that individuals exposed to societal discrimination are more likely than their counterparts to develop an inflated sense of pessimism and believe that the majority of their white community members disagree with them or would not advocate for their rights, interests, or needs. This proposition, along with the internalization hypothesis, help explain why societally stigmatized individuals may not be inclined to engage in mainstream democratic activities. Next, the direct relationship between discrimination and political behavior is also evaluated with this experiment. The results show that while political discrimination can motivate Muslim-Americans to petition the government, societal discrimination does not appear to have the same motivating effect.

Chapter 6 is the final chapter where I recap the contributions of the study, review the hypotheses and findings, and speculate about future research.

Chapter 2

**CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THEORY OF
SOCIETAL & POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION**

Discrimination is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon that can be carried out systematically or informally in a multitude of ways ranging from fairly obvious to subtle methods (Essed, 1991; Jones, 1997; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Krieger, 1999; Ridley, 1995). Since discrimination can be perpetuated by an array of actors both affiliated and non-affiliated with larger political dynamics, a holistic evaluation of discrimination and its consequences on the civic and political engagement of lower-status groups requires paying attention to aspects of differential treatment that are not solely bound to the structural boundaries of systematic decision-making (Blank et al., 2004). As highlighted in chapter 1, current research in political science has not paid close attention to the various intricacies of this construct and thus, presents a limited and imprecise account of how discrimination impacts the behaviors and attitudes of marginalized individuals. The prevailing wisdom, especially as it pertains to work on group consciousness, is that a sense of "deprived status," derived from perceptions of discrimination, translates into a collective orientation to politics that mobilizes individuals to take action against practices of dominance and oppression (Miller et al., 1981; Padilla, 1985; Sanchez, 2006; Stokes, 2003; Uhlaner, 1991). This chapter challenges this perspective, contending that the source of discrimination plays a vital role in understanding how individuals are affected by perceptions of mistreatment, and how they respond to it.

Specifically, it will be argued that a more comprehensive and detailed explanation of the relationship between discrimination and democratic engagement requires a theoretical framework that accounts for the impact of both macro- and micro-level expressions of prejudice. Research that takes a broad or one-dimensional approach to studying discrimination erroneously accepts that all forms of discrimination, regardless of the source or the way that it is expressed, have a comparable effect on individuals' well-being, attitudes, and behaviors. This assumption is problematic and can lead to shortsighted conclusions. In order to capture a more representative range of experiences with rejection and devalua-

tion that individuals face, research needs to be expanded and take into consideration two overarching, yet conceptually distinct, sources of discrimination. The aim of this dissertation, and this chapter in specific, is exactly that; to offer an interdisciplinary theoretical model that accounts for both "political" and "societal" manifestations of discrimination.

2.1 Chapter Outline

This chapter is broken down into six major sections. I first present an overarching definition of discrimination and discuss the ways in which individuals may perceive or experience marginalization, and how they may respond to differential treatment. After that, I will specifically define the two key sources of discrimination and explain how they are conceptually and qualitatively distinct from one another. Following conceptualization, the next three sections present the theory of Societal and Political Discrimination (S&PD). The theoretical framework that I present is interdisciplinary and unique, incorporating research from political science, sociology, psychology, and epidemiology. Before concluding, the last section presents the research hypotheses that will be tested in the subsequent empirical chapters.

2.2 Conceptualizing Discrimination

Before discussing in detail the difference between political and societal discrimination and why such a distinction is vital when evaluating sociopolitical agency or lack thereof, it is instructive to first take an overarching look at what discrimination, in general, entails and the potential consequences it has on individuals. Broadly conceived, discrimination means drawing a distinction by judgment or action in favor or against a person or group based on sociocultural or phenotypical characteristics such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexuality (Blank et al., 2004; Krieger, 1999). Stated differently, discrimination can be conceived as "the process by which a member, or members, of a socially defined

group is, or are, treated differently (especially unfairly) because of his/her/their membership of that group" (Jary and Jary, 1995). Discrimination differs conceptually from prejudice in that the latter is an attitude or belief that is negative and based on a faulty and inflexible generalization about a person because he or she is a member of a particular group (Allport, 1955). Discrimination, then, is the manifestation of prejudice. That is, behavior based on conscious or subconscious attitudes or beliefs that are negative. To "discriminate against" means to treat individuals or groups as second-class citizens, inferior, subordinate, or undeserving of equality and fairness, which maintains or reinforces privileges for members of dominant groups.

As shown in Table 2.1, discrimination is a form of differential treatment that entails multiple dimensions. Discrimination can be perpetrated systematically or informally in a multitude of ways ranging from overt, blatant, or direct to covert, subtle, or indirect methods (Essed, 1991; Krieger, 1999; Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002; Kinder and Sears, 1981). Targets of discrimination can either indirectly perceive or directly experience mistreatment once or multiple times throughout their childhood, adolescence, or adulthood. Indirect perception differs from direct experience in that individuals who indirectly perceive discrimination are cognizant of the presence of mistreatment in a given context by having observed or heard about the mistreatment of their group members, but have not personally faced any bias. For instance, by watching the news, an individual can become aware of the local police department's propensity to use violence against her group members without having personally been exposed to any police violence. Conceived this way, indirect perception may be considered a less vivid recognition of the presence of discrimination or the scope of the problem. Connected to this idea is the severity of discrimination, which can range from simply being treated with less courtesy or respect in public or private places to being verbally or, worse, physically threatened or assaulted. In the context of racial discrimination, verbal antagonism encompasses racial slurs or disparaging racial comments,

which contrasts with nonverbal and covert hostility that gets disseminated in posture or tone of voice. One specific form of nonverbal discrimination is known as avoidance. This entails situations in which people self-segregate along racial lines, picking the comfort of their group over interaction with the out-group (Allport, 1955). For instance, a group of students may consciously or subconsciously choose to sit together at a lunch counter and avoid interacting with or sitting close to another group of students. Lab experiments show that both verbal and nonverbal acts serve as reliable indicators of discriminatory effects because they create a hostile environment for the targeted or excluded individuals (Blank et al., 2004).

Table 2.1: Dimensions of Discrimination

Main Sources	Political/Systematic Societal/Interpersonal
Awareness	Indirectly Perceived Directly Experienced
Expression/Severity	Blatant/Overt vs. Subtle/Covert Non-Verbal, Verbal, or Physical
Frequency	Single Event/Acute Multiple Events/Chronic
Timing	Childhood Adolescence Adulthood
Responses	Resistance/Confrontation Denial of Problem Behavioral Alienation

Behavioral responses to discrimination can take various forms depending on the source and severity of the mistreatment. However, generally speaking, subjects of discrimination could display three common patterns of behavior. Stigmatized individuals may either engage in resistance or confrontation, deny the existence of discrimination, or internalize experiences of devaluation and avoid action-based responses (Krieger, 1999). Resistance is considered a protective response to discrimination, and ranges from directly challenging or confronting discriminatory action(s) in an effort to enhance the group's status to creating safe spaces for the purpose of self-affirmation. For example, protective responses entail, but are not limited to, organizing a community meeting to raise awareness and help victims of discrimination with overcoming experiences of devaluation, engaging in peaceful or violent protests, boycotting, contacting community representatives, or taking legal action. A real-world and timely example of confrontation in the form of collective action is the recent Black Lives Matter Movement, which has sparked protests and civil unrest in numerous cities across the country as a result of disproportionate use of violence by the police against the African-American community (BBC, 2015).

In contrast to resistance, victims of discrimination may internalize acts of subjugation or accept their inferior status (Krieger, 1999). Such individuals may become too pessimistic and believe that confrontation will not yield desired or beneficial outcomes. In fact, confrontation could make the situation worse and create further marginalization. As a consequence, stigmatized individuals may not confront culprits of discrimination, refraining from any measure of collective action. Worse, some may even cope with their negative experiences by engaging in behaviors that are detrimental to their overall well-being. Research shows that stigmatized individuals may deal with the pain of rejection by resorting to alcohol and substance abuse (Gibbons et al., 2004; Guthrie et al., 2002; Krieger, 1999; Whitbeck et al., 2001).

The last potential response to discrimination is known as denial or avoidance. Accord-

ing to Crosby's (1984) denial of discrimination hypothesis, stigmatization may provoke such psychological distress that individuals may deny the extent to which they have experienced discrimination. Individuals using avoidance or denial to cope with discrimination may reason that the situation is not problematic or that it will surpass (Foster, 2000). In fact, they may not even acknowledge that they have perceived discrimination.

2.2.1 Difference between Political & Societal Discrimination

Overall, discrimination, in its various shapes, forms, or facets, can be perpetrated by a diverse array of actors, potentially leading to divergent cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Individuals, such as one's neighbors, colleagues, community members, or classmates can be culprits of mistreatment and devaluation as much as non-state institutions (e.g., religious and private organizations) and the state and its institutions (e.g., lawmaking and law enforcement bodies) can systemically deny equal opportunity and fairness to citizens. It is therefore critical to look beyond the confines of the political arena or in Lasswell's (1936) words, "who gets what, when, and how" when studying the impact of discrimination on individuals. In fact, an analysis of discrimination on behavior that does not also take into consideration the more informal and everyday experiences of discrimination that ethnic and racial minorities face paints an inaccurate portrait of the realities on the ground. To avoid this pitfall, it is important to assess two primary and conceptually distinct categories discrimination: Political and Societal. This is especially necessary since behavioral responses to discrimination may depend on the qualitative nature of the discrimination perceived.

Although the usage of the terms varies, *political discrimination* refers to systematic actions in the form of laws, policies, symbols, frames, or practices carried out by state or private institutions and/or their affiliated actors. The American political landscape, for instance, is marked by an array of political discrimination. Over the course of American

history, a significant number of people due to their race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or sexual orientation have been systematically portrayed as unintelligent, lazy, violence-prone, irrational, sexual deviants, or perpetually foreign and denied equal standing and opportunities on issues pertaining to citizenship, civil liberties, sovereignty, immigration, and access to social, legal, and economic resources (Bruyneel, 2007; Canaday, 2009; Kim, 1999; Kinder and Mendelberg, 1995; Matthews and Prothro, 1966; Ngai, 2014; Schuman et al., 1985; Smith, 1993). Even in the alleged "post-racial" or "colorblind" era the role of political discrimination has certainly not dissipated. Racial and ethnic minority groups face systematic discrimination, especially under the mantle of "colorbliness" (Krieger, 1999). Notable contemporary examples of political discrimination include, but are not limited to: (1) California's racially charged mid 1990s anti-immigration propositions, which denied health care, public education, and social services to undocumented immigrants, who were perceived as the underlying cause for the state's economic and social hardships; (2) The infamous 2001 USA Patriot Act passed by Congress, which authorized intrusive national security measures such as illegal searches and seizures, surveillance, and indefinite detentions, disproportionately targeted at Muslim-Americans; (3) The Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (HR4437) adopted by the House of Representatives in 2005 that would have made undocumented persons felons under the law; (4) Arizona's infamous 2010 anti-immigrant bill titled SB 1070, which required state law enforcement officers to engage in racial profiling by checking the immigration status of individuals if there is a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual is an "illegal" immigrant; and (5) Systematic efforts to make voting more difficult for African-American and Latino citizens through voter ID requirements, limited polling places, and limited registration offices.

The aforementioned examples of political discrimination in addition to historical accounts of mistreatment in places like the Jim Crow south in the form of poll taxes, liter-


acy tests, and white primaries, exhibit common features that set them conceptually apart from societal discrimination. These types of discrimination in the form of policies, laws, rules, political symbols, or campaign messages are intended to influence a group of people based on group-based categories such as race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability. More specifically, political discrimination can be viewed as frames or projects that attempt to interpret, represent, or explain group dynamics and reorganize or redistribute various resources along sociocultural markers, characteristics, or lines (Haney López, 2000; Winant and Omi, 1994). As such, acts of political discrimination are often formal, systematic, organized, and group-oriented in nature.

In contrast to political or "macro-level" discrimination, people can also be treated as distrustful, subordinate, and undeserving of equality and fairness in their everyday encounters with rank-and-file members of the society (Essed, 1991; Jones, 1997). This is called *societal discrimination* (or interpersonal discrimination), which refers to the more informal discriminatory interactions between individuals in public or private settings. Specifically, I conceptualize societal discrimination as actions taken by one person or a small group of individuals in the form of verbal or non-verbal antagonism, intimidation, devaluations, avoidance, or worse, physical threat or assault. Unlike political discrimination, societal discrimination is disseminated by individuals not affiliated with the state or its institutions in more routine, everyday encounters (see Figure 2.2 for comparison). Such discrimination occurs primarily at the micro-level, often directly experienced on the street, in shops, at social gatherings, or other public and private spaces where individuals interact with one another (Essed, 1991).

Since political and societal discrimination capture qualitatively distinct dimensions of discrimination, it is necessary to measure and analyze their independent impact on citizens separately. Krieger (1999) accurately points out that researchers need to be more precise and inquire about various types of discrimination in multiple situations. Asking

individuals about experiences of racial discrimination in general is not as informative as designing questions that address multiple facets of discrimination. In fact, global questions are "likely to underestimate exposure and are little of use for guiding interventions and policies to reduce exposure" (pg. 56). The empirical chapters in this dissertation support this assertion, and show that broad questions, especially those that conflate the source of discrimination, as well as questions that ignore other important dimensions such as frequency of exposure, can lead to misleading conclusions.

Figure 2.1: Main Sources of Discrimination



Clearly distinguishing between political and societal discrimination is also useful for another important reason: it reduces the level of conceptual confusions in the literature of discrimination and behavior. Take for example the unclear characterization of discrimination as "group-oriented" vs. "individual" or "personal." On one hand, group-oriented discrimination can be referred to as systematic or institutionally-based bias, or what I refer to

as "political" discrimination. However, group-based discrimination is also referred to as the type of awareness (i.e., indirect perception) rather than the source of bias. Likewise, an analysis of "individual-level" or "personal" discrimination usually denotes interpersonal or societal discrimination, but this is not always clear. In some cases, individual discrimination implies directly experiencing rather than indirectly perceiving mistreatment [for example, see (Schildkraut, 2005)]. In other instances, individual-level discrimination is really about the source of discrimination, that is, peer-to-peer stigmatization.

I contend that my conceptualization of societal and political discrimination reduces confusion by clearly defining societal discrimination as distinction by judgment or action between members of the public, which is, more often than not, directly or personally experienced rather than indirectly perceived. In contrast, political discrimination means systematic, institutional, or group-oriented discrimination, which can be directly experienced or indirectly perceived, depending on the context. For instance, an individual can indirectly perceive a certain policy to be targeting her group by simply paying attention to the news or discussing current events with her friends without having personally experienced the actual impact of given policy. In this case, personal experience with policy implementation is not necessarily a prerequisite to perceiving discrimination in the political arena. Alternatively, an individual can become aware of a discriminatory policy through a vivid personal experience, such as being harassed by the police because of her race or ethnicity.

Would it be reasonable to assume that individuals can actually distinguish between different sources of discrimination rather than merging all of their negative experiences together and seeing them as general racism? I contend that such differentiation is quite conceivable, and the empirical chapters on Muslim-Americans, African-Americans, and Ethnic Minorities in Great Britain provide strong support for this position. But before presenting the empirical results, consider the following example: An Arab-American has

lived in a very liberal, diverse, and relatively welcoming neighborhood for his whole life. He has not personally experienced any noticeable mistreatment in his everyday social encounters and neither have his family members. He is generally treated with respect and is accepted by the people in his greater community. However, when traveling, he notices that he gets repeatedly singled out by airport security for extra screening, which he presumes is due to his ethnic background. This person, while upset by being repeatedly singled-out by airport security, will not necessarily extrapolate such events to broader social dynamics and believe that the society, for the most part, is prejudiced toward Arabs. His positive, everyday encounters with citizens do not necessarily confirm this type of belief. This person will most likely attribute the racial profiling to more systematic or institutional dynamics, such as George Bush's post-9/11 security policies and not think that the entire public, especially people in his community, who have treated him with respect, are racist.

A final note about discrimination is in order before presenting the theoretical framework in the next section. Although the examination of perceived discrimination on sociopolitical behavior is the focus of this dissertation, less recognizable, but perhaps equally consequential, acts of prejudice are also prevalent and deserve to be mentioned and studied. While some experiences with discrimination are obvious, others are more invisible and hard to recognize (Krieger, 1999). This is especially the case in the post-civil-rights era, where outright expressions of bigotry have become increasingly taboo (Kinder and Sears, 1981). One may be denied a mortgage, an apartment, a business permit, admission to a club, or given a lower salary without realizing that the basis for such actions are related to factors associated with one's race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation. While this study is an investigation of perceived discrimination, as it relates democratic engagement, future research needs to also take into consideration the consequences of subtle or even unrecognizable bias as such covert acts of discrimination that can powerfully shape

the life chances of lower-status groups.

2.3 An Interdisciplinary Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 Political Discrimination & Activism

One vital avenue of political influence is through political participation. Normatively, political activity is an essential element of democratic process (Verba et al., 1995). It is thus not surprising that the study of political behavior has received extensive scholarly attention. Since Anthony Down's economic theory of democracy (1957), several major theories have been offered to explain why some individuals engage in politics whereas others do not. The conventional view is that political activity is a function of at least three factors: resources, recruitment, and psychological orientations. For instance, Verba, Scholzman and Brady's (1995) civic voluntarism model, Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) account of political mobilization and participation, and standard socioeconomic status models (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978), point out that older citizens of higher socio-economic strata and those who are asked to take part in politics participate more. Specifically, higher levels of education and income translate into more political participation through the attainment of "civic skills" and connections to social networks that foster mobilization. These "networks" can be understood as group-based resources such as political parties, civic organizations, unions, and places of worship (Campbell et al., 1960; Guth, 1997; Harris, 1994; Putnam, 2000; Tate, 1994; Verba et al., 1995; Wong, 2008).

In addition to individual-level and group-based resources, attitudinal variables such as strength of party attachment, political interest and knowledge, efficacy, and a sense of civic duty have expanded our understanding of political behavior (Almond and Verba, 1963; Campbell et al., 1960; McCluskey et al., 2004; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). Adding to these dominant theories, scholarship on immigrant political incorporation has identified factors such as nativity, length of time in the U.S., country of

origin, language proficiency, and racial identity as essential predictors of political engagement (DeSipio, 1998; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Sanchez, 2006; Wong, 2008).

While this expansive body of literature has certainly advanced our understanding of political behavior, many of these explanations best describe who is most likely to participate and how much, rather than explaining *why* and under *what circumstances* individuals are likely to spend their time, skills, and resources on the political process. The question of why and under what circumstances people choose to engage in politics is of particular importance to answer because ambivalence is considered a fairly common condition of citizens. Even before the emergence of cable television, the internet, and social media, Dahl (1961) described the ways in which political activity is constantly in competition with the many responsibilities and distractions of everyday life. This means that an abundance of resources does not necessarily translate into increased attention and engagement (Gamson, 1968). To understand temporal variation in activity levels, specially across individuals of similar socio-demographic backgrounds, we must pay more attention to issues of motivation (Campbell, 2003).

One powerful source of motivation, which helps clarify the link between discrimination and engagement, is considered political threat. Undesirable or threatening political contexts can serve as an impetus to political mobilization by potentially impacting individual's tangible well-being, values and principles (e.g., Miller and Krosnick (2004); Campbell (2003); Platt (2008)). According to Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT), such an awareness can motivate people into action because context interacts with emotion to produce political judgments and behaviors (Marcus et al., 2000). That is, we think about and act on politics when our emotions tell us to. Drawing on research in neuroscience, physiology, and experimental psychology, Marcus and colleagues contend that people possess two distinct emotional systems that manage the various demands on thoughts and attention: the disposition and the surveillance system. The disposition system monitors

the everyday interactions of a person, assessing the success and failure of routine behavior. Conversely, the surveillance system continually cycles to compare sensory information, signaling threat or novelty in the environment and indicating the need to reevaluate routine beliefs, behaviors, and preferences. When citizens encounter threatening actors, events, or issues on the political horizon, the surveillance system shifts one's emotional state from a sense of calm to increased anxiety. The change in the emotion generated by the surveillance system interrupts ongoing activity, aligning focus toward intrusive stimuli, and energizing people into action.

In contemporary politics, an "intrusive stimulus," especially for Latinos (and Muslim-Americans), looks something like Donald Trump. During his 2016 presidential campaign, the GOP hopeful has made numerous inflammatory claims against Latinos, threatening their undocumented co-ethnics with mass deportation and depicting them as "rapists" and "murderers" (Lind, 2015). While Trump has received extensive attention in the media and has soared in many pre-election polls, especially among uneducated conservative white republicans, AIT would suggest that his xenophobic and racist campaign strategy would mobilize eligible Latino voters. After all, this appears to have been the fate of Sharon Angle, who took a similar path a few years back. During her Senatorial race in Nevada against incumbent and Senate majority leader Harry Reid, Angle ran a series of offensive anti-Latino ads, depicting undocumented immigrants as shady gangbangers and calling Reid "the best friend illegal aliens ever had." This strategy was certainly effective, but not in the way that Angle had imagined. In the 2010 midterm elections, the Tea Party challenger had all the advantages to propel her to victory. She was running against a fairly unpopular incumbent in a state that was leading the nation in unemployment. According to some estimates, Angle had also raised and spent a record amount of money for a Senate race. In almost every pre-election poll the Republican challenger was leading the race, with FiveThirtyEight giving Angle an 83 percent probability of winning the elec-

tion (Times, 2010). Despite all this, the attack on Latinos had unintended effects. Instead of mobilizing more white voters by eliciting fears about "illegal" immigration, Latinos turned out at record numbers, resoundingly rejecting Angle. Reid won the election by a comfortable 5.7 percent, with Latinos picking Reid over Angle by an astonishing margin of 90 to 8 percent (LD, 2010). Overall, Latinos gave Reid an estimated 10-point boost. After his victory, Reid knew what had happened and attributed his re-election to a strong Latino turnout by making the following statement: "I would not be the majority leader in the United States Senate today, but for the Hispanics in Nevada" (Myers, 2011).

What this suggests is that candidates who adopt such strategies with the hope of increasing their share of votes among a certain cleavage of the electorate can also powerfully motivate the group under attack to mobilize. In fact, Marcus and colleagues (2000) tested the impact of such "intrusive stimulus" with an experiment and discovered that individuals who feel threatened by an opposing candidate's potential electoral success are more likely to engage in politics than those who do not feel threatened.

Studies focused on policy change also provide considerable support for the contention that threatening political contexts motivate individuals to participate in politics. For example, Miller and Krosnick (2004) designed a policy change field experiment where they informed a group of ideologically liberal-leaning women that Congress is trying to make it more difficult for women to get legal abortion. They found that women in the treatment group were more likely to make financial contributions to a pro-choice interest group than women of comparable backgrounds in the control group. Similarly, Campbell (2003) discovered that senior citizens reacted to the proposed social security and Medicare cuts of the 1980s by contacting members of Congress. Specifically, senior citizen contacting rose from 13 percent prior to the threat to 20 percent—a 7-point increase. Both studies indicate the policy threat can stimulate political activity by highlighting potential loss and making political activity salient for the group.

The aforementioned findings are not exclusive to dominant group members who feel threatened by various candidates, events, or policies. In fact, there is strong reason to believe that dissatisfaction with existing political order or concern of adverse political outcomes, in the form of political discrimination, can motivate racial and ethnic minorities to turn to politics. Historically, African-Americans have shown a long tradition of confronting political apparatuses of racism despite considerable barriers to participation. Even when highly dissatisfied with the political system, many African-Americans mobilized and challenged unfair, immoral, and illegitimate government practices to gain equality and inclusion in the United States (Dawson, 1994; Matthews and Prothro, 1966; Mcadam, 1982; Parker, 2009). Other minority groups such as Latinos, Asian-Americans, and Arab-Americans have likewise not remained silent when confronted with acts of political discrimination that violated democratic norms of equality and fairness. Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura (2001) found that recently naturalized Latino immigrants residing in California during the tremulous anti-immigration environment of the 1990s (propositions 187, 209, and 227) displayed high rates of voter registration and turnout, whereas those who naturalized in more neutral political contexts, such as Florida, had much lower levels of participation.¹ Barreto and Woods' (2005) analysis of political participation in Los Angeles County also illustrated that during a period marked by xenophobic rhetoric and anti-immigrant legislation (1994-1998), registration and voting increased substantially among Latinos.² In addition to finding a link between political discrimination and participation in California among Latinos, Ramakrishnan (2005) discovered that politically biased legislation motivated Asian, Black, and White immigrants residing in New York and Texas to participate more in elections. And in response to the policy aftermath of the

¹Proposition 187 rolled back state services for undocumented immigrants (1994); Proposition 209 sought to end affirmative action in public institutions (1996); and Proposition 227 ended bilingual education programs in public schools (1998).

²For another example of Latino political mobilization under politically threatening circumstances, see Ramirez (2007).

September 11 terrorist attacks (i.e., enactment of the USA Patriot Act), Cho, Gimpel, and Wu (2006) observed a spike in registration rates among Arab-American citizens. Summarizing the point that political discrimination energizes individuals into action, Cho, Gimpel and Wu write:

A solid body of evidence ...indicates that political mobilization is a direct response to the degree of threat and discrimination a group experiences. If the political learning process includes the encounter of worrisome events, say, about particular government policy actions, it may provide the motivation to participate from those who have the ability to participate but heretofore have chosen not to do so.

While the psychological mechanism behind reactions to politically threatening contexts among minority groups is not always clear (Pérez, 2015), theories of group consciousness and linked fate have provided important insights into how such contexts could mobilize individuals. This strand of literature suggests that a shared racial identity and a sense of deprived status in the political system leads people to develop strong feelings of group attachment, linked fate, or group consciousness (Dawson, 1994; Miller et al., 1981; Sanchez, 2006; Stokes, 2003; Tate, 1994; Verba and Nie, 1972). It is this sense of commonality and shared circumstances that encourage groups to become politically cohesive and active. More specifically, feeling of connectedness, as a consequence of systematic group marginalization, translate into the emergence of a "collective orientation" (Garcia, 2011), motivating individuals to challenge violations of equality and fairness embedded within the political system (Chong, 1991; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). Perhaps more importantly, group consciousness has the potential of promoting collective action by bolstering group pride and political efficacy, and helping group members to place blame on systematic or institutional forces rather than on individual shortcomings or failings (Chong and Rogers, 2005; Miller et al., 1981; Welch and Foster, 1992).

In addition to impacting behavior, a sense of deprived status has also been shown to powerfully shape political orientations to politics. Research demonstrates that, African-Americans, due to a shared legacy of discrimination, tend to adhere to a common core of policy interests classified as "black issues," and make political decisions based on group-based interests (Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1994; Walton, 1985; Walton and Smith, 2015). This notion of linked fate has been offered to explain African-American's overwhelming support for the Democratic party despite increased economic polarization within this population since the civil rights era of the 1960s (Dawson, 1994).

2.3.2 *Societal Discrimination & Disengagement*

While perceptions of political discrimination can motivate individuals into action, is it reasonable to assume that individuals exposed to societal discrimination will behave similarly? Although political scientists have, to some extent, empirically investigated how individual behavior is shaped by the apprehension of politically threatening circumstances, an investigation of how socially hostile contexts impact participation is largely missing from the literature. One notable exception is Schildkraut's (2005) investigation of Latino political engagement, where she finds a significant and positive association between experiences of societal rejection conceptualized as "individual-level discrimination and behavioral alienation. Schildkraut finds that Latinos who reported receiving poor service at restaurants or stores, called names or insulted, and treated with less respect because of their race or ethnicity were less likely to register and vote than those who did not encounter any discrimination. Outside of this study, research has overlooked the potential impact of societal discrimination. Consequently, it is unclear the extent to which anxiety (AIT) or a sense of "deprived status" (Group Consciousness Theory) continues to motivate people, especially in contexts in which individuals face persistent peer stigmatization. Marcus and colleagues contend that some dose of anxiety is considered healthy

or even necessary to motivate people, but they also acknowledge that a shift in the direction of depression weakens one's motivation to expend effort and undermines one's confidence that political action will prove successful (see, p. 10). This issue is, however, not directly addressed, leaving no clear indication of what circumstances turn moods too gloomy or when enthusiasm for action fades and confidence crumples. Although political discrimination can spur political action by making politics more salient for the group members under threat, we cannot necessarily assume that individuals exposed to micro-level, societal discrimination will see the same value in mobilization. There is, actually, very strong reason to believe that societal marginalization can have the opposite effect and turn people away from democratic engagement such as participating in elections or campaign events.

Even a cursory review of literature on discrimination and mental well-being problematizes the notion that discrimination is usually met with defiance and collective action. A deeper look at public health studies questions the mechanism altogether, revealing that the source of discrimination is an important dimension to understanding how discrimination shapes the behaviors of lower-status groups. Over the past several decades, peer discrimination has been linked to a number of adverse mental health outcomes among numerous minority groups. The evidence is overwhelming, with over hundreds of studies linking depleted self-esteem, feelings of hopelessness, powerlessness, sadness, and depression to experience with interpersonal discrimination (Gee et al., 2009; Paradies, 2006; Pascoe and Smart Richman, 2009; Williams and Mohammed, 2009). For instance, in an examination of mental wellbeing among Southeast Asians in Canada, Noh and his colleagues (1999) discovered that experiences with interpersonal racial discrimination were significantly associated with self-reported depressive symptoms. Perceived discrimination measured by asking respondents whether they have been called derogatory or insulting names, treated disrespectfully at a place of business, or excluded from social activities

has also been linked to depression and feelings of inferiority among Native American adults (Whitbeck et al., 2002). Likewise, Finch and colleagues (2000) attributed symptoms of depression among adults of Mexican origin to adverse societal interactions. In their study, discrimination was operationalized by asking respondents how often they perceived people treating them or their friends unfairly, or disliked them due to their Mexican identity. Similarly, a recent study attributed feelings of depression and high levels of anxiety within an African-American cohort in Detroit to perceptions of societal discrimination, such as being treated with less courtesy (Banks et al., 2006).

Research further suggests that individuals who perceive discrimination by dominant group members tend to internalize negative evaluations (Krieger, 1999; Jost, 1995) and display low levels of self-esteem (Greene et al., 2006; Leary et al., 1995; Umaña-Taylor and Updegraff, 2007; Verkuyten, 1998). Importantly, this voluminous body of research supports the link found between societal discrimination and psychological distress across multiple populations, irrespective of the manner in which societal discrimination is operationalized. As can be seen in Table 2.2, questions range from asking individuals the extent to which they have been treated with less respect or courtesy, have been left out of conversations or activities, or worse, teased, insulted, threatened or attacked by people in their day-to-day activities.³ Although the measures of discrimination utilized are not specifically conceptualized as "societal discrimination," the questions squarely fall under the conceptual framework of "everyday" or "day-to-day" rejection, which is perpetuated by *members of the society* rather than larger systems or institutions.

In short, what Table 2.2 highlights is that societal stigmatization has the capacity to psychologically harm individuals, most commonly eliciting feelings of sadness and depression. These negative psychological outcomes of societal discrimination do not necessarily give us confidence that when individuals encounter discrimination they will be more

³As indicated in the diversity of questions listed in Table 2.2, public health research lacks a standardized methodology to measure self-reported experiences of peer discrimination.

likely to engage in confrontation or political activism. Quite contrary, feelings of sadness turn attention inward (i.e., individuals focus on personal deservingness, failings, or shortcomings) rather than outwards (Stearns, 1993), and have been associated with perceived lack of control, passivity, withdrawal, and reduced attention to external cues (Cunningham, 1988; Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989). Furthermore, depressed individuals tend to be socially isolated (Rubin and Coplan, 2004) and more withdrawn and less talkative (Ainsworth, 2000). Under these circumstances it is unlikely for citizens to expend their limited resources on the political process. In fact, recent research shows that depression reduces the probability of political participation because depressed individuals lack the motivation to partake in politics and reduces the willingness for social interactions (Ojeda, 2015).

Table 2.2: Measures of Discrimination & Mental Health Outcomes Across Different Populations and Contexts

Author(s)	Sample	Group	Measures	Outcome(s)
(Almeida et al., 2009)	2006 Boston Youth Survey (BYS)	LGBT Youth, Grades 9-12	In the past 12 months, have you felt discriminated against by other people because some thought you were gay, lesbian, or bisexual?	Depressive Symptoms, Elevated risk of self-harm, & Suicidal ideation
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Author(s)	Sample	Group	Measures	Outcome(s)
(Banks et al., 2006)	1995 Detroit Area Study (DAS)	African-Americans	In your day-to-day life how often have any of the following things happened: 1) Treated with less courtesy than others; 2) Other people acted as if they are better than you	Depressive & Anxiety Symptoms
(Borrell et al., 2006)	Longitudinal coronary artery risk development in young adults study (CARDIA)	African-Americans	7 questions on experiencing racial discrimination in various settings (e.g., at school, on the street or in a public setting)	Poor self-reported health; Depressive Symptoms
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Author(s)	Sample	Group	Measures	Outcome(s)
(Brody et al., 2006)	FACHS Longitudinal on Health & Development.	African-American Adolescents	Discrimination based on questions about racially based slurs or insults, disrespectful treatment from community members, physical threat, & false accusations	Depressive Symptoms; Conduct Problems (e.g., shoplifting, physical assault, fire setting, & robbery)
(Cano et al., 2016)	1,084 Hispanic Emerging Adults (ages 18-25) enrolled in post-secondary institutions	Hispanic Adults in the U.S. (18-25)	7-item Ethnic Discrimination: called names, followed around stores, & generally viewed with suspicion by members of the receiving community.	Higher Anxiety, Depressive Symptoms, & Lower Self-Esteem

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Author(s)	Sample	Group	Measures	Outcome(s)
(Finch et al., 2000)	Mexican American Prevalence and Services Survey (MAPSS)	Mexican-Americans	How often do the following things happen to you because you are Mexican or of Mexican Origin: 1) People dislike you; 2) people treat you unfairly; 3) Friends treat you unfairly	Depressive Symptoms
(Greene et al., 2006)	3-Year Longitudinal Study of high school students	Black, Latino, & Asian-Americans	How often respondents: 1) treated unfairly by adults because of their race or ethnicity; 2) called names or insulted by other teenagers because of their race or ethnicity	Decreased Self-Esteem (Rosenberg Scale); Depressive Symptoms
(Hodge et al., 2015)	Purposeful snowball sample of 265 self-identified Muslim-Americans	Muslim-Americans	Single item: Have you been called offensive names during the past 12 months as a result of being a Muslim?	Depressive symptoms (CES-D scale)

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Author(s)	Sample	Group	Measures	Outcome(s)
(Larson et al., 2007)	Cross-sectional survey of 639 Aboriginal Australians	Aboriginal Australians	2 questions of interpersonal discrimination	Poor self-reported physical and mental health
(Mak and Nesdale, 2001)	Survey of 372 ethnic Chinese Migrant adults from three cities	Chinese Migrants in Australia	2 items: "teased or insulted" or "threatened or attacked" in interactions with people because of ethnic Chinese background.	Psychological Distress (10-item scale)
(Matthews et al., 2013)	Convenience Sample of 458 African-American Men	African-American Men	18-item Daily Life Experiences Scale (DLE-R)	Depressive symptoms (CES-D scale)
(Noh et al., 1999)	3rd wave of the Refugee Resettlement Project (PRP) Survey	Southeast Asian Refugees (Canada)	1 item: Discriminated against because of race (e.g., being looked down upon or being insulted)	Depressive Symptoms
Continued on next page				

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Author(s)	Sample	Group	Measures	Outcome(s)
(Noh and Kaspar, 2003)	Growing Up Canadian Project	Korean Immigrants (Canada)	8 items measuring frequency of personal experience with discrimination such as: hit or handled roughly, insulted or called names, treated rudely, or treated unfairly.	Depressive Symptoms
(Padela and Heisler, 2010)	Arab American Adults in Detroit Area	Arab-Americans	Multiple items (e.g., In the last 2 years... experienced verbal insults or abuse, threatening words or gestures, physical attack, vandalism or destruction of property, or loss of employment, due to your race, ethnicity, or religion?)	Psychological Distress; Reduced Happiness; Poor self-reported health status
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Author(s)	Sample	Group	Measures	Outcome(s)
(Panchanadeswaran and Dawson, 2010)	Cross-sectional study of 235 immigrant Dominican women in NYC	Dominican Immigrant Women	45 items were measured using the 9-item Every Day Discrimination Scale (Williams, Spencer, & Jackson, 1999) that measures daily experiences of discrimination (e.g., being treated with less courtesy, not receiving service in a restaurant) on a 5- point Likert-type scale (0 = never, 5 =very often)	Reduced Self-Esteem
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Author(s)	Sample	Group	Measures	Outcome(s)
(Schulz et al., 2000)	Detroit Metropolitan Area Surveys of 1995 & 1996	African-American Women in Detroit	Daily encounters with discrimination: 1) Treated with less courtesy than others; 2) Other people acted as if they are better than you	Poor self-reported health status (In general, would you say your health is: excellent, very good, good, fair or poor?)
(Schulz et al., 2006)	Two waves of data (1996 & 2001): Eastside Village Health Worker Partnership Survey	African-American Women in Detroit	Frequency of everyday discrimination: 1) Treated with less courtesy than others; 2) Other people acted as if they are better than you	Depressive Symptoms; Poor self-reported health status
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Author(s)	Sample	Group	Measures	Outcome(s)
(Sheridan, 2006)	222 Muslims in the UK	Muslims in the UK	19 items (e.g. being treated with suspicion, being stared at by strangers, being left out of conversation or activities, and being asked to speak for one's entire ethnic, racial, or religious group)	Depressive Symptoms
(Umaña-Taylor and Updegraff, 2007)	273 Latino adolescents in the Midwest	Latino Adolescents	5 items (e.g. "How often have others said something bad or insulting to you because you are Hispanic/Latino?")	Decreased Self-Esteem (Rosenberg Scale); Depressive Symptoms
(Whitbeck et al., 2002)	287 American Indian adults from the upper Midwest	Native Americans	10 items (e.g., called derogatory or insulting names, treated disrespectfully at a place of business, & excluded from social activities)	Depressive Symptoms
				End of Table

This explanation poses an additional and highly important question: why would so-

cietal discrimination lead to depleted psychological health? To answer this question, we need to recognize one of the most fundamental desires of human beings: the need to belong. Belongingness is considered a universal emotional need of people to be accepted by members of a group (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). According to Hagerty and colleagues (1992), sense of belonging is "the experience of personal involvement in a system or environment so that persons feel themselves to be an integral part of that system or environment" (page 173). It is the experience of "fitting in" or being "valued" or "needed" with respect to other people, groups, or environments. This concept of establishing and maintaining relatedness to others is considered a pervasive human concern (Kohut, 1977; Maslow, 1954; Thoits, 1982). As such, the nature and quality of a person's relatedness to others can significantly promote or impair health and influence behavior (Anant, 1966, 1967, 1969; Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Hagerty and Patusky, 1995; Hagerty et al., 1992, 1996).

The scholarship on belonging and well-being poses further challenges to existing accounts of discrimination and political behavior. After all, why would societally devalued individuals feel inclined to spend their limited time and resources on the political process? When one considers the political mobilization of African-Americans prior to and during the civil rights era, it is often assumed that African-Americans from various backgrounds challenged inequality. However, this does not paint an accurate picture of the civil rights movement. In his seminal book, *Protest and prejudice: a study of belief in the black community*, Gary Marx (1967) finds that blacks raised in the deep South were much less likely to confront oppression than those who were raised in the North because they did not possess the "... necessary psychological outlook [morale, sophistication, and pride in self] to support and encourage militancy" (page 93). Southern blacks were extremely marginalized and faced tremendous societal rejection in comparison to northerners. As such, they were much less likely to believe that confrontation and resistance would pro-

duce meaningful social and political changes. Similarly, Parker (2009) finds that the reason black servicemen, more than other southerners, risked physical harm and economic hardship to contest white supremacy was because their military experiences furnished them with a sense of entitlement and increased self-confidence. Deprived of such psychological strength, their behavior would have likely mirrored other similarly situated southerners who were not as nearly confident in their ability to bring about change.

An analysis of the more recent situation of African-Americans further underscores the critical influence of adverse social contexts on psychological outlooks. Cohen and Dawson's (1993) study of neighborhood poverty in Detroit shows that socially isolated African-Americans are less confident in the black group effectiveness and are less likely than their counterparts to participate in politics. This implies that even African-Americans, a group which generally displays strong levels of racial solidarity, may demonstrate distinctive political views and behaviors given the social context. While Cohen and Dawson's work is predominately about the weakening of attachments to black institutions and social networks as a result of extreme poverty rather than discrimination per se, it demonstrates that paying attention to micro-level societal conditions can shed light on variations in attitudes and political participation levels across individuals of similar racial and ethnic backgrounds. It is certainly possible that socially marginalized individuals may see little value in collective action either as a function of a breakdown in social ties as result of extreme poverty or/and extensive levels of peer stigmatization.

Socio-psychological research on "false consciousness" also explains how marginalized individuals could become disheartened by the political process and withdraw from political action (Jost, 1995). False consciousness is defined as "the holding of false or inaccurate beliefs that are contrary to one's own social interest and which thereby contribute to the maintenance of the disadvantaged position of the self or the group (Page 400)." According to this strand of literature, socially devalued individuals could develop an inflated

sense of pessimism and genuinely believe that they are incapable of taking meaningful action against the causes of their subordination. This is known as "fatalism," which is a key feature of false consciousness (Cunningham, 1987). People acquiesce to unjust social conditions and desists from advocating needed reforms because they assume that the majority of their peers disagree with them and that nothing but embarrassment can be gained by expressing their dissatisfaction (for example, see Miller and McFarland (1991)). As such, racial and ethnic minorities who are confronted with societal rejection may not find it worthwhile to participate in mainstream democratic activities such as participating in elections. For such individuals, effective social organization may appear either impossible or unproductive (Cunningham, 1987).

2.3.3 Discrimination & In-Group Engagement

Research on the relationship between discrimination and behavior has not only been one-dimensional with respect to how discrimination is conceptualized and measured. Another pressing problem with current research is the common tendency to conflate "in-group" or "ethnic-specific" activities with "mainstream" activities such as such as voting or attending campaign events. Failing to distinguish between these activities can muddle the relationship between discrimination and behavior. Mainstream institutions tend to be dominated numerically in membership and leadership positions by the majority/dominant group. Furthermore, such institutions are predominately tailored to serve majority rather than minority interests (Strolovitch, 2008). The lack of attention to and concern with minority issues, whether explicitly or implicitly, differentiates these mainstream institutions from ethnic-based or in-group institutions that pay much more attention to the problems that lower-status individuals face. Perhaps it is not surprising that Sanchez (2006) has found that the perception of discrimination among Latinos promotes attendance in meetings or demonstrations based on Latino issues, but not participation

in mainstream channels of political influence. Considering these differences, it is not only important to disentangle discrimination by source, but to also distinguish between different types behavioral engagement.

While the theoretical position offered thus far is that societal discrimination may decrease the propensity of engagement in mainstream activities such as voting, there is strong reason to suggest that experiences of peer discrimination has the capacity to bring similarly positioned individuals together. According to Social Identity Theory, this is to be expected because individuals cope with the pain of rejection by increasing identification with their disadvantaged group members (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). The Rejection-Identification Model further supports this contention, suggesting that individuals who face out-group hostility seek out their group members to fulfill a strong desire for acceptance and belonging that has been undermined by experiences of peer rejection (Branscombe et al., 1999). This mechanism is not only at play for socially marginalized individuals. Those who perceive political discrimination may likewise seek their ethnic-based community organizations or associations because such associations are more likely to care about and pay significant attention to the needs of the group (Wong, 2008). Furthermore, in-group organizations, such as historically black churches, can be a great place to not only talk about salient political issues, but to help group-members to effectively organize against the challenges that their group faces (Calhoun-Brown, 1996; McDaniel, 2008; Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2014). Considering these dynamics, overarching participation scales that combine broader forms of engagement with ethnic-specific or in-group activities can lead to misleading conclusions. Therefore, delineating between different forms of civic and political engagement can help us better understand the ways in which minority groups respond to experiences of marginalization.

2.4 Research Hypotheses

When faced with injustice, various minority groups have displayed higher rates of political participation. Several viable reasons help explain why heightened awareness of political discrimination may facilitate participation, independent of socioeconomic resources. The most compelling answer is the desire to bring about change or prevent adverse policies to be considered or implemented. Discrimination in the political sphere can lead people to develop strong feelings of group attachment, linked fate, or group consciousness as citizens are treated differently based on group-based characteristics (Dawson, 1994; Miller et al., 1981; Stokes, 2003; Tate, 1994; Verba and Nie, 1972). Based on insights from literature on political threat, emotions, group consciousness and social movements, I theorize that, on average, political discrimination facilitates increased political engagement because it is a challenge or "threat" to a group's political, cultural, or economic status or opportunities. This group threat, in turn, serves as an "external stimulus" that increases attention to politics (Marcus et al., 2000) and helps individuals develop a collective orientation toward politics (Garcia, 2011, 2000; Miller et al., 1981; Sanchez, 2006). This collective orientation toward systematic injustice makes individuals more receptive to appeals of collective action by civic and political organizations (Wong, 2008), bolsters group pride and efficacy, and shields individuals from placing blame on personal shortcomings (Chong and Rogers, 2005; Miller et al., 1981; Welch and Foster, 1992). Instead, individuals are likely to externalize their negative experiences and challenge violations of democratic norms embedded within the political culture of democratic regimes. This argument generates the following research hypothesis regarding the behavioral consequences of political discrimination:


H₁: On Average, individuals in a minority group who have been exposed to political discrimination are more likely to take part in mainstream activities than those who did

not perceive any discrimination.

While the perception of political discrimination could serve as a mobilizing force, societal discrimination has the capacity to make people feel too pessimistic, exhausted or uncertain of their abilities to bring about change. Bridging the gap between political science and social psychology, I theorize that the accumulation of negative societal encounters has the capacity to vividly highlight one's second-class status not only in the complex world of politics, but also in one's immediate surroundings. This is because peer discrimination is an extremely unpleasant and stressful experience of personal rejection that has the capacity to undermine one's sense of belonging (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Hagerty and Patusky, 1995; Hagerty et al., 1992). As the aforementioned epidemiological studies highlighted, whether one is intentionally ignored while waiting to be served at a restaurant, verbally threatened at a social gathering, or physically assaulted on the way to work, the accumulation of these experiences of rejection can lead to the internalization, rather than the externalization, of devaluation, leaving individuals unhappy, depressed or powerless. Exposure to inferior treatment and devalued status is also damaging to self-esteem, undermines self-worth, and may inhibit aspirations (Krieger, 2000; Parker, 1997). Consequently, societally stigmatized individuals may become less attuned to calls of collective action or believe that they can effectively challenge inequality (Cunningham, 1987; Jost, 1995). Without feeling that one is capable of bringing about meaningful change, citizens will likely become indifferent to or disheartened with the democratic process. And in fact, a plethora of research demonstrates that among various political outlooks, the belief that one's actions can have a consequential impact on political outcomes is a particularly important factor shaping political involvement (Almond and Verba, 1963; Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Guterbock and London, 1983; McCluskey et al., 2004; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Michelson, 2000).⁴ Specifically, depression and (self)efficacy are related in

⁴Although research has not specifically explored the direct link between societal discrimination and

Figure 2.2: Hypothesized Nexus between Discrimination & Sociopolitical Behavior



that "depression is associated with beliefs that one will not be able to achieve important goals in important spheres of life" (Barone et al. (1997), page 268). This argument generates the following research hypothesis regarding the behavioral consequences of societal discrimination:

H₂: On Average, individuals in a minority group who have been exposed to societal discrimination are less likely to take part in mainstream activities than those who did not perceive any discrimination.

Although societally marginalized individuals may decide to adapt to the exclusionary circumstances and avoid directly challenging their deprived position in society, there is strong reason to believe that such individuals will gravitate toward their group members to seek reaffirmation and acceptance. After all, a sense of belonging is considered a very important and basic human need (Maslow, 1954; Thoits, 1982). As such, individuals rejected by dominant group members may increase identification and interaction with in-group members because groups give people a strong sense of belonging to the social world (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Drawing from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) and the Rejection-Identification Model (Branscombe et al., 1999), I hypothesize that the recognition of prejudiced treatment by dominant group-members increases participation in ethnic-based sociopolitical activities. The logic is that identification with one's disadvantaged group is one avenue in which individuals can cope with the pain of societal rejection. For example, a devalued young Muslim-American may gravitate towards the local Islamic center because it can be a safe and welcoming environment that can help her cope with feelings of rejection. In-group members are more likely to understand what it means to be a Muslim in the post 9/11 era, and are likely very sympathetic to the negative societal encounters this person has experienced. What this means is that although expe-

efficacy, a few studies suggest that mental health impairments such as symptoms of depression are linked to lower self-efficacy (Maciejewski et al., 2000; Smith and Betz, 2002)

periences of societal rejection have the capacity to make one feel pessimistic, dissatisfied, or disengaged from mainstream channels of civic or political participation, such experiences may turn individuals inward and promote engagement in ethnic-specific activities. Individuals exposed to political discrimination may likewise seek their in-group members because ethnic-based institutions such as the mosque or historically black churches can be a great place to not only talk about salient political issues, but to also help individuals to effectively organize against the obstacles that their group faces. This argument generates the following hypotheses regarding the impact of discrimination on in-group engagement:

H₃: Exposure to societal discrimination, on average, will promote in-group or ethnic-based engagement.

H₄: Exposure to political discrimination, on average, will promote in-group or ethnic-based engagement.

2.5 Conclusion

To recap, I defined societal and political discrimination and provided theoretical justification for why it is important to measure their independent impact on participation separately. The ensuing empirical chapters will test each of the proposed claims across different populations and contexts. What the results will show is that the interdisciplinary theoretical model of discrimination, which shall be referred to as the Social and Political Discrimination Theory (S&PD), is portable and applicable to various racial and ethnic minority groups. Public health researchers have, indeed, found consistent patterns of psychological distress attributed to discrimination among individuals from different backgrounds. Based on these findings, there is nothing to suggest that certain groups can effectively shield themselves from the debilitating psychological effects of peer discrimination such as feelings of inferiority, sadness, depression, or worthlessness. Therefore,

it is reasonable to expect similar behavioral outcomes across different groups, and this is what my research reveals among Muslim-Americans, African-Americans, and ethnic minorities in Great Britain.

In addition to the proposed relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior, I have also argued that discerning between different types of activities can further enhance our understanding of the ways in which minority groups respond to marginalization. Specifically, I advocated for differentiating between "in-group" or "ethnic-based" activities and "mainstream" activities, and hypothesized that while experiences of both societal and political discrimination can have divergent effects on broader forms of participation, both types of discrimination are likely to promote in-group engagement. The aforementioned hypothesis will also be tested in different contexts.

Chapter 3

**WHEN THE CLIMATE WORSENS:
DISCRIMINATION & MUSLIM-AMERICAN LIFE
IN THE POST 9/11 ERA**

Combative and woefully ignorant policy experts, whose world experience is limited to the Beltway, grind out books on "terrorism" and liberalism, or about Islamic Fundamentalism and American foreign policy, or about the end of history, all of it vying for attention and influence quite without regard for truthfulness or reflection or real knowledge.

- Edward Said, May (2003)

3.1 Setting the Stage: Why Study Muslim-Americans?

Shortly after the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the social and political climate for Muslim-Americans quickly changed for the worse. Muslims became subjected to growing suspicion, scrutiny, and animosity along a number of fronts (Cho et al., 2006). In fact, it can be argued that no racial, ethnic, or religious group has been exposed to societal and political discrimination to the degree that Muslim-Americans have been exposed to since the events of 9/11. In the last decade and half, this population has experienced unprecedented surges in hate crimes, workplace discrimination, and the infringement of civil liberties, leaving many fearful of potential hostility and hatred from out-group members (Hussein, 2003; Abu-Ras and Suarez, 2009; Baqi-Aziz, 2001; Kira et al., 2010; Rippey and Newman, 2006). The religious and racial animosity against Muslims in the United States and the West, in general, as well as the utilization of fear tactics through the invocation of "Islamophobia," is certainly not a new phenomenon. Ever since the post-colonial era, Islam has been painted as an oppressive, outmoded, and extremist religion that threatens the viability of democracy worldwide.

Scholars such as Edward Said (1979; 1997), John Esposito (1999), and Jack Shaheen (2003) have documented in great detail the multitude of ways in which Muslims have been vilified in the news media, Hollywood productions, political discourse, and academic research. Said's work on Orientalism provides one of the most comprehensive and

ground-breaking accounts of how the "occident" has portrayed the "orient." His research on Orientalism provides a powerful critique of the West's historical, political, and cultural perceptions of the East, revealing the distorted lens through which the Muslim world is viewed and explained. According to Said, this distorted lens lumps together the behaviors and interactions of Muslims, Arabs, and Middle-Easterners, resulting in widespread misconceptions of the belief structures of a highly diverse group of people.

The generalizations and stereotypes against Muslims are overwhelming, with Islam and the Arab world on one side, and Westerners on the other side. The negative and deeply entrenched categorizations are, indeed, rooted in history, culminated overtime in "subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arabo-Islamic peoples and their cultures" in the arts, literature, news media, political discourse, and scholarly research (Said, 1979). Leveling a profound critique on those with the material and intellectual resources and responsibility to describe the "orient," Said claimed, "...very little of the detail, the human density, and the passion of Arab-Muslim life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report on the Arab world" (Said, 1980). This type of representation has had profound consequences not just for Muslims residing in the United States, but also abroad. The pervasive and long-standing negative depiction of Muslims has created a mindset among many Westerners that followers of Islam are culturally inferior, uncivilized, and out of touch with modern social and democratic norms. Recounting the historical and contemporary military aggressions of the West against the "semi-mythical orient," and foreseeing what was yet to transpire in Afghanistan and Iraq, Said (2003) cautioned that a series of "crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world" have made the contemporary Middle-East and its "backward" people vulnerable to military aggression.

Twenty-five years after his book, *Orientalism*, was first published in 1979, Said, once again, reflected on the status of the orientalist discourse and the condition of Muslims

in the post 9/11 era: "...I wish I could say, however, that general understanding of the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam in the United States has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn't" (2003, preface). Said is certainly not alone in his assessment of the current status of Muslims in the United States. More recent investigation demonstrates that the events of September 11 have, indeed, resurrected many of the long-standing anti-Muslim stereotypes—such as non-modern, anti-Christian, and barbaric—that may have been weakening over time. In an analysis of media portrayals, political cartoons, and political discourse, Dabashi (2011) demonstrates that Islamophobia has only strengthened in the twenty-first century. In fact, the saliency of the traumatic events of 9/11 and the association of Islam with terrorism has only intensified preexisting perceptions of Arabs, Middle-Easterners, and Muslims (Cainkar, 2002; Howell and Shryock, 2003; Sheridan, 2006). Today, Americans rate Muslims more negatively than nearly all other religious, ethnic, or racial groups (Edgell et al., 2006; Putnam and Campbell, 2010), with Representative Peter King (R-NY), the Chairman of Homeland Security Committee, casting further suspicion on the community by claiming that the vast majority of American Muslim leaders are "an enemy living amongst us" and that "mosques in this country are controlled by Islamic fundamentalists" (WND, 2011).

Perhaps not surprisingly, Muslims have faced a rising tide of discrimination in communities across the country. According to the 2002 FBI Uniform Crime Report, shortly after 9/11, hate crimes against Muslim-Americans increased by an astonishing 1,600 percent. In places like Chicago and Los Angeles, officials reported fifteen times the number of anti-Muslim crimes in 2001 compared to previous years (Singh, 2002). More than a decade later, the rate of hate crimes against Muslim-Americans has not decreased to the pre-attack numbers. Quite contrary, between 2009 and 2010, a year in which Muslims and mosques across the country came under substantial social and political scrutiny (see Wajahat et al. (2011) for details), the FBI reported a 50 percent increase in hate crimes against

Muslims.¹ During the same timeframe, Congressman King held a congressional hearing on the so-called "radicalization" of mosques and Muslim-Americans. According to King, Americans should be alarmed because "there are too many mosques in this country," and "80 percent of them are controlled by radical Imams" (Wing, Wing). In March of 2011 a Gallup poll found that the majority of Americans believed that the Congressional hearings led by King were appropriate, and a CNN poll reported that 40% of Americans held an unfavorable impression of Islam.


By 2011 the condition of Muslims had become so dire that the Assistant U.S. Attorney General for Civil Rights, Thomas Perez, testified in front of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on the Constitution, Civic Rights, and Human Rights about the importance of protecting the civil rights of Muslim-Americans. Perez stated that in each city and town where he had met with Muslims, he was "...struck by the fear that pervades their [Muslims] lives," with Muslim youth often falling victim to schoolyard bullying and harassment, and their parents encountering discrimination on the job.² Perez's account corroborates the anti-Muslim sentiment that the media has picked up between 1999 to 2011. Using Lexis-Nexis, Dana, Barreto, and Oskooii (2011) tracked the number of news articles that included the terms "Muslim American" or "American Muslim" within one word of radical, jihad, terror, threat, or extremism. Their inquiry revealed that there was a spike in coverage of Muslim-Americans shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with a total of 76 articles written in that period (see Figure 3.1). After year 2002, coverage started to decline and stabilize with an average of 40 articles written per year. However, between years 2009-2011, the number of stories drastically increased. The year that the anti-mosque movement had spread beyond New York's Park 51 Islamic Center contro-

¹In the recent years, 53 proposed mosques and Islamic center projects have encountered opposition. For more information on efforts to interfere with the construction of mosques and Islamic centers in the U.S., visit: <http://features.pewforum.org/muslim/2012Mosque-Map.pdf>

²Statement of Thomas E. Perez is available online at: <http://www.justice.gov/ola/testimony/112-1/03-29-11-crt-perez-testimony-re-protecting-the-civil-rights-of-muslim-americans.pdf>

versy, and Representative King put the issue of Muslim-American loyalty on the national stage, a total of 714 articles were published. In addition to the increased media coverage, Panagopoulos' (2006) examination of public opinion data reveals that Americans hold lingering resentment toward Muslim-Americans, and display growing anxiety about Islam's compatibility with "Western values of tolerance, acceptance, and civility" (page 613). While the biggest increase in negative sentiment was observed immediately after the terrorist attacks, Islamophobia, because of its strong roots dating back the post-colonial era, plays a prominent role in contemporary society and politics.

Figure 3.1: Lexis-Nexis Newspaper Search: Muslim-Americans, Terrorism, and Extremism 1999–2011



Source: Dana, Barreto, & Oskooii 2011

Although President George W. Bush declared in a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001 that "The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends" and that "No

one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background and religious faith," his actions sent a profoundly different message to the Muslim-American community. Nearly a month after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the 107th Congress, with the support and leadership of the Bush administration, passed the USA Patriot Act of 2001. This act granted government officials expansive investigative authority such as the ability to conduct secret searches and to detain or deport individuals judged to be a "threat" to the United States. Shortly after the USA Patriot Act, Congress also established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) aimed at increasing the monitoring of airplane passengers. Since the establishment of the TSA, frequent incidences of racially targeted searches and questioning at airports across the country popularized the catchphrase "Driving while black, flying while Muslim" among journalists and activists (Ragavan, 2007).

In addition to the wrongful detention, racial profiling, and even deportation of Muslim-Americans spearheaded by the federal government, the New York Police Department (NYPD) secretly built one of the largest domestic intelligence agencies in the country to catalog where Muslims work, shop, and pray (Greenwald, 2012). The operation, headed by David Cohen, who had previously held a high-ranking position in the Central Intelligence Agency, was intended to remain top-secret—the department could not and would not confirm the existence of a surveillance program (Moynihan, 2016). However, four Associated Press investigative reporters, who received the Polk and Pulitzer Awards for their investigation, discovered that the NYPD collected information on Muslims throughout New York City, as well as mosques within one hundred miles of its jurisdiction in places such as Newark, New Jersey. Their detailed investigation revealed that "Plainclothes officers from the NYPD's Demographics Unit fanned out across Newark, taking pictures and eavesdropping on conversations inside businesses owned or frequented by Muslims... " to compile a guide to Newark's Muslims. The NYPD also created a list of

devout Muslims to watch, treated name changes as worthy of investigation, and placed informants or so-called "mosque crawlers" inside mosques.

According to the American Civil Liberties Union (2016), the purported rationale for profiling Muslim communities is captured in a 2007 NYPD Intelligence Division report titled "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat." The report identifies a "radicalization process" that treats anyone who identifies as Muslim or engages in Islamic religious practices with suspicion. Some "indicators" of radicalization included wearing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard, or becoming involved in social activism. Despite using a variety of methods to spy on and monitor hundreds of Muslims and infiltrating dozens of mosques and student groups without any suspicion of wrongdoing, the NYPD did not find any evidence of terrorism or criminal behavior.

In response to the surveillance program, and consistent with the assertion that political discrimination has the capacity to promote political action, an estimated five hundred Muslim-Americans gathered for Friday prayer service in Lower Manhattan Park and marched to New York Police headquarters chanting, *Surveillance is violence, we won't remain silent!* During the protest, Imam Talib Abdur-Rashid, addressing the crowd, stated that "We are unapologetically Muslim and uncompromisingly American," and asked Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly to "respect" Muslims. In addition to the demonstration, a coalition of Muslim organizations and their supporters sent a letter to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and the state Attorney General asking for a speedy investigation into the extent of NYPD's spying activities in New Jersey. A group of New York and New Jersey residents, mosques, and organizations, with the assistance of ACLU, also filed lawsuits against the City of New York, accusing the NYPD of violating their constitutional rights by targeting them on the basis of religion. As a result of lawsuits filed in Manhattan and the federal district court of Brooklyn, the city of New York agreed to limit the use of undercover operatives and confidential informants, and

to require the police to obtain factual information about possible unlawful activity before starting a preliminary investigation into any political or religious organization or activity. In addition, the city also agreed to abide by an existing policy that prohibits investigations in which race, ethnicity, or religion are "substantial" or "motivating" factors (Moynihan, 2016).

As this section has demonstrated in detail, Muslim-Americans have historically been portrayed very negatively, often associated with violence, oppression, and radicalism (Esposito, 1999; Said, 1997; Shaheen, 2003). And since the events of 9/11, the situation of Muslims residing in the U.S. has certainly deteriorated, with the community being subjected to unprecedented levels of discrimination (Cainkar, 2002; Edgell et al., 2006). As such, the widespread discriminatory treatment of Muslims at airports, places of business, mosques, in community groups, and neighborhoods across the country provides a unique opportunity to sufficiently evaluate the direct impact of both political and societal discrimination on behavior. The mounting concern and speculation about Islamophobia in the U.S has motivated survey organizations, such the Pew Survey Research Center, to not only study this population, but to assess, in much more detail than before, exposure to different types of discrimination. Thus, the availability of specific survey questions inquiring about the different sources of discrimination provides an avenue to evaluate the independent impact of both societal and political discrimination on a range of mainstream and ethnic-based activities.

Muslim-Americans are also an ideal population to begin examining the relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior because current studies have largely neglected this rapidly growing population. Most of the political science research on understanding the patterns of social, civic, and political participation and integration of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States have only focused on African-Americans, Latinos, and to a lesser degree, Asian-Americans (Bowler and Segura, 2012). While study-

ing the aforementioned populations is certainly very important, more attention needs to be paid to other marginalized groups.

Furthermore, I contend that there are at least three additional reasons why more research on Muslim-Americans is needed. First, from a normative standpoint, one of the core principles in a democratic society is the equal consideration of the welfare and preferences of *all citizens* (Verba, 2003). If some citizens are unable or unwilling to participate in politics due to pervasive experiences of marginalization, they may be denied access to crucial resources and opportunities. And, considering that political participation is essential for a healthy and vibrant democracy (Campbell et al., 1960; Conway, 2000; Verba et al., 1995), studying how historically and new marginalized populations engage with the political system is critical. Second, a focus on the current status of Muslims in the United States is valuable because it can shed light on broader issues concerning prejudice in America, which are relevant to other minority groups. Drawing parallels or recognizing dissimilarities between Muslim-Americans and other groups such as African Americans, Latinos, or Asian-Americans can enhance our overall understanding of how discrimination impacts political behavior, in specific, and democratic longevity in general. Third and lastly, it is important to note that Islam—the fastest growing religion in the world—is rapidly increasing the number of its adherents in the United States (Jamal, 2005; Leonard, 2003). The number of Muslims in the United States is projected to increase from an estimated 2.6 million in 2010 to 6.2 million by 2030, meaning that Islam will surpass Judaism and become the second largest religion behind only Christianity (Pewb, Pewb). Given that Muslim-Americans are also considered "middle class" and "mostly mainstream" (Pew, 2007, 2011), their increasing presence in social and political spheres around the country necessitates more investigation. While the post 9/11 climate raises many questions about the prospects of political marginalization, due to its increasing size and resources, this group has the capacity to play an important role in American politics

in the near future. Taken together, these reasons demonstrate why more research on this rapidly growing population is not only increasingly necessary, but also useful in better understanding the attitudinal and behavioral implications of discrimination on marginalized groups, especially new out-groups who have faced increasing scrutiny and exclusion since 9/11.

3.2 Chapter Outline

This chapter is organized in the following way. First, a review of research on Muslim-Americans will be presented to inform the analysis on discrimination and sociopolitical behavior. Research on Muslim-Americans is at its infancy compared to groups such as African-Americans and Latinos. Nevertheless, several key studies provide the necessary building block to explore in detail how discrimination impacts this population. This section will highlight several key points: (1) There is nothing to suggest that Islam is incompatible with participation in the American democracy as some have argued; (2) Religiosity and mosque attendance promote the civic and political engagement of Muslims as churches and synagogues do for Christians and Jews; (3) The history of Muslim-American partisanship has been complex, with a major shifts taking place after 9/11; and (4) A number of factors, such as saliency of religion and the racialization of Muslims, have aided the formation of a common group identity among American Muslims.

After a review of existing literature, I will discuss the two datasets that were selected for the initial test of the S&PD theory. On their own, each dataset has key shortcomings. But, together, they complement each other and enable me to analyze the impact of both political and societal discrimination on a range of sociopolitical activities. The analysis is broken down into two sections. In the first part, I investigate the relationship between the indirect perception of political discrimination on four political participation measures. In the second part, I explore the extent to which direct perceptions of political

and societal discrimination independently influence participation in mainstream politics, such as voting, and in-group or ethnic-based activities. Before concluding this chapter with a summary section, I further evaluate the S&PD theory by testing the impact of political and societal discrimination on a measure of psychological well-being and attitudes towards the government.

3.3 *Research on Muslim-Americans*

Although Muslims in the U.S. are rapidly increasing in size, and have been subject of considerable debate, there are only a handful of studies that have systematically examined the political attitudes and behaviors of this population. The objective of this section is to present an overview of this relatively thin, but developing line of research to better understand how discrimination relates to the factors that most powerfully shape the outlooks and behaviors of this group. This is important because in order to isolate the influence of political and societal discrimination on a host of outcome variables—to the extent that it is possible to do so with observational data—one must account for theoretically relevant predictors of sociopolitical engagement.

Since the vast majority of Muslim-Americans are first or second generation immigrants with roots in the Middle-East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, and a sizable portion identify as African-American (Pew, 2007, 2011), the line between race, ethnicity, and religion has often been blurred in conceptualizing this population (Byng, 2008; Naber, 2000). Despite their diversity, Muslim-Americans are often viewed as a monolithic religious minority group or a "band of others" at odds with Western values and radically different from Judeo-Christian groups (Kalkan et al., 2009; Said, 1979, 1997). As such, research questions have predominately focused on the role that religiosity and mosque attendance play in promoting or inhibiting the civic and political participation of Muslims. This topic has become salient not only because of the historical and contemporary association of Is-

lam with radicalism and violence, but also because scholars such as Samuel Huntington (1996) have forcefully argued that Islam, as a religion and a culture, is incompatible with liberal, democratic American values.

In *The Clash of Civilization* (1996), Huntington bolstered the long-standing notion that core Anglo-Protestant American values are under attack by non-English speaking, non-Protestant cultures growing in numbers—namely Muslims and Latinos. He theorized that contemporary conflicts in the world would occur purely on cultural grounds, with Muslims on one side and the West on the other. According to Huntington, Islam poses a direct and significant challenge to the West because it demands for the expansion of Islamic ideology and the rejection of non-Islamic world views. The implication to scholars like Huntington is that Muslims cannot and will not participate in secular, pluralist societies because they have a duty to resist Western governments and to impose Islamic law (March, 2006).

As I have argued and shown in the first section of this chapter, this line of reasoning has also been advanced in contemporary politics by the likes of Representative King and former Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich. In fact, just last year, Republican presidential candidate, Dr. Ben Carson, was asked whether he believed that Islam is consistent with the Constitution. Without much hesitation he replied, "No, I don't, I do not. ...I would not advocate that we put a Muslim in charge of this nation. I absolutely would not agree with that" (NBCNEWS, 2015). The central question of whether Islam is incompatible with the American democracy, and the association of Muslims with radicalism, especially those who regularly attend the mosque, has motivated scholars to take a deeper look into the civic and political incorporation of Muslim-Americans, and the role that mosques play in that process.

In one of the first and most well-known studies on this topic, Amaney Jamal (2005) pointed out that although churches have long been recognized as increasing levels of

civic and political involvement through the enhanced of civic skills, political knowledge, and efficacy (Djupe and Grant, 2001; Djupe and Gilbert, 2006; Verba et al., 1995), virtually no empirical research exists on the political roles of mosques in the U.S. (page 523). To overcome this shortcoming, and to bring empirical evidence to the forefront of political discourse, Jamal analyzed the behaviors and attitudes of Muslims in New York area, and found that, overall, mosque attendance promotes civic and political engagement and fosters a sense of group consciousness.³ Consistent with research by Bagby (2004) in Detroit, she concluded that mosques, similar to other religious institutions, are conduits of civic education, enhance civic skills, and provide a regular meeting place for individuals to interact and discuss public events and affairs.

Expanding this work, Dana, Barreto, and Oskooii (2011) fielded an original, multi-state public opinion survey of Muslims in the U.S. Situating their argument not only in the larger literature of religion and politics, but also in scholarship on immigrant political incorporation, they argued that there is no reason to believe that Muslims, just like German, Italian, Irish, and Latino Catholics, who also faced challenges to incorporation, cannot or will not engage in politics. Their analysis revealed that there is nothing to suggest that Islam is incompatible with the American democracy or that the mosques alienate Muslims. Specifically, they found that regular mosque attendance is significantly associated with increased political participation, and that the most religiously devout Muslims were *more likely*, than their counterparts, to believe that Islamic teachings are compatible with participation in the American political system. Similar to Jamal's findings, they also discovered that mosque attendance promotes a common identity or group consciousness. That is, frequent mosque-goers are more likely to identify as "Muslim-American" rather than based on national origin. In the context of the U.S., this finding is not surprising because nearly nine out of ten mosques are composed of members with different racial and

³Civic involvement includes activities such as working with organizations helping the poor and participating in neighborhood or community groups (page 531).

ethnic backgrounds (Jamal, 2005). Hence, the promotion of a common "Muslim American" identity is to be expected.

More specific research on group consciousness provides support for the notion of a unified or cohesive Muslim-American community despite differences in race, ethnicity, language, and religious tradition. Barreto, Masuoka, and Sanchez (2008) argue that the saliency of religion, common experiences with discrimination, and the racialization of Muslims as non-white has aided the formation of a common group identity similar to other diverse, pan-ethnic communities such as Latinos or Asian-Americans. With respect to religiosity, the authors argue that Islam provides several key sources of unity. Although Muslim-Americans speak a variety of languages ranging from English and Arabic to Farsi, Urdu, Turkish, Amharic, and Indonesian, the symbolic bond to Arabic through prayer and religious texts and services provides the foundation for a common identity. Added, mosques in the US are extremely diverse, bringing congregants of different backgrounds together (Jamal, 2005). This integration, under the umbrella of Islam, has the potential of promoting a strong sense of commonality. Perhaps more importantly, Islamic teachings regularly signify the importance of an Islamic community referred to as *Ummah*. This concept, and its synonym, *ummat al-Islamiyah*, is commonly used to mean the collective community of Islamic peoples. In the context of a Pan-Islamic identity, the word Ummah is also related to *ummat al-mu'minin*, which means a commonwealth of believers.

In addition to religious factors, experiences of discrimination and the racialization of Muslims has also contributed to a sense of shared identity. Naber (2000) has argued that Muslim-Americans, particularly Arabs, are racialized through their religious association as Muslim. And public opinion research shows that Muslim-Americans are viewed as a distinct, non-white population (Kalkan et al., 2009; Kundnani, 2007; Park et al., 2007). Given these dynamics, in addition to historical and contemporary negative depiction and treatment of Muslims in politics, the media, and communities across the U.S., there is

strong reason to believe that a strong sense of commonality is existent. In fact, survey research finds " ...very high levels of shared group commonality and linked fate among Muslim American" (see Barreto et al. (2008), page 24). Furthermore, a number of surveys show that a significant portion of Muslim-Americans do not differentiate between themselves and prefer to call themselves "Muslim" or "Muslim-American" (Barreto and Bozonelos, 2009; Bukhari and Nyang, 2004; Nyang et al., 2001; Pew, 2007, 2011).

Returning to the discussion of the compatibility of Islam with liberal democratic norms and the role that institutions play in politics, scholars have found that beyond mosques, Muslim-American organizations such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim-American Society (MAS) play a prominent role in facilitating the political mobilizing of their members (Nimer, 2004). Instead of discouraging political participation, organization leaders actually encourage greater engagement (Afridi, 2001). Moreover, Muslim-Americans are forming local political organizations and contributing financially to candidates (Afridi, 2001; Nimer, 2004). What this suggests is that Muslim-specific institutions and their leaders present an avenue for increased engagement rather than blocking the participation of Muslims in politics and community affairs.

Supplementing the empirical findings highlighted above, scholars of Islamic political thought have also argued that Islamic teachings are compatible with liberal democratic values (see Rauf and Armstrong (2004); March (2006, 2007); Swaine (2003)). While a cursory review of Islamic doctrine suggests "prohibitions on submitting to the authority of non-Muslim states, serving in their armies, contributing to their strength or welfare, and participating in their political systems," a comprehensive review of how Islam is interpreted and practiced by devout Muslims indicates otherwise (March (2006), page 236). An in-depth analysis actually provides considerable support for the acceptance of the demands of citizenship in a liberal democracy. Dating as far as back to medieval texts, March (2007) explains that Islamic jurisprudence on the inviolability of contract, among

other values and principles, explains why Muslims living in United States would follow the principles of the American social contract. As such, legal experts and theorists have argued that the notion that Islam is incompatible with Western liberal democracies is vastly taken out of context. And of course, empirical evidence shows that Muslims, especially the most religiously devout, do engage with the American political system and believe that mosques encourage Muslims to integrate into the American society (Dana et al., 2011).

Setting aside the question of whether mosques, just like churches and synagogues, serve as conduits of political participation, the next central question pertaining to Muslim-Americans concerns partisanship. Partisanship is an important variable because it is considered a key predictor of participation, vote choice, and views on policies (Campbell et al., 1960). The development of partisanship among Muslims has been quite complex, with a tremendous shift occurring shortly after 9/11 (Ayers, 2007; Barreto and Bozonelos, 2009; Jalalzai, 2009). While the first noticeable Muslim political mobilization effort took place during the 1996 presidential election, it was not until the following election that Muslim-American bloc voting took shape. In year 2000, various Muslim-American civic organizations, including a coalition of Muslim organizations known as the American Muslim Political Coordination Committee (AMPCC), started to advocate for George W. Bush, and eventually endorsed him enthusiastically over Democratic presidential candidate, Al Gore (Jalalzai, 2009). Findley (2001) reports that Muslims closed ranks behind Bush fairly quickly, with support surging from 28% in June of 2000 to 72% by the time of the election. It is important to note that African-American Muslims were not part of this coalition of voters. However, about 15% of African-American Muslims voted for Bush, which was twice as many votes that Bush received from Christian African-Americans (Findley, 2001).

A number of reasons explains the strong support behind Bush. In early October, Bush

made an earnest effort to court Muslims, meeting with local and national leaders of AM-PCC (Findley, 2001). Although his father, former president George H.W. Bush, launched air attacks against Iraq in 1991, Bush was able to win over Muslim voters by promising to address their domestic and foreign policy concerns. One such a concern, which has the ability to unite Muslim-Americans of all backgrounds, was the plight of the Palestinian people and the debate of Jerusalem as the undisputed capital of Israel. Bush's predecessor, President Bill Clinton, was viewed by many Muslim-Americans as a strong supporter of Israeli actions, and his democratic successor, Al Gore, made a strong case for supporting Israel. Additionally, Gore selected a strong advocate of Israel and an observant Orthodox Jew, Joseph Lieberman, and his running mate. These factors, in addition to the fact that Muslim-Americans are considered middle class and possess high rates of small business ownership (Pew, 2007, 2011), created the perfect opportunity for Bush to win over the vast majority of Muslim-Americans.

The honeymoon period for Bush and the Muslim community quickly ended, however. After the 2001 terrorist attacks, support for Bush declined dramatically. Bush had not only abandoned his foreign policy pledges, but actually became a strong proponent of Israeli policies toward Palestinians residing in occupied territories. More importantly, in an effort to fight against the War on Terror, the Bush Administration advocated and successfully implement various domestic policies that exposed Muslim-Americans to increased scrutiny and suspicion. The domestic responses to 9/11 and how the Bush administration managed military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq influenced many to question their support for Bush and the Republican Party, in general. This quote, by a Pakistani Muslim-American, borrowed from Jalalzai's (2009) study vividly demonstrates the change in appraisal of President Bush:

When I first came here I was a very conservative Muslim. Good boy. And I went from there. I had no party affiliation. It took me a couple of years to

figure it out, and then I decided Republican. Then Bush got elected. Like seven months, eight months after that especially after September 11, the response to that was what changed my mind about what Bush was.

The decline in support was not only dramatic, but it occurred very rapidly. Support for the Republican Party decreased from a high of 72% in year 2000 to 23% by the end of 2001 (Barreto and Bozonelos, 2009; Jalalzai, 2009). During the 2004 presidential election, the American-Muslim Taskforce on Civil Rights and Elections (AMT), which is a collection of Muslim-American organizations, endorsed John Kerry (Poole and Tahir, 2005). An accumulation of fifty state exit polls conducted by the National Election Pool showed that nearly 85% of Muslim voters supported John Kerry, while only 11% voted for Bush (Pew, 2007). This number was almost identical to black protestant's support for Kerry, which was estimated at 86%. By the time the Pew Research Center conducted its first national survey of Muslim-Americans in 2007, party identification had shifted significantly. Overall, only 11% of respondents identified or leaned towards the Republican Party, 26% did not identify with any of the two major parties, and 63% self-identified as Democrat (Pew, 2007).

According to Barreto and Bozonelos (2009), major shifts in partisan identification in a relatively short period can be explained by an exogenous shock. For Muslims, this shock was the terrorist attacks, which influenced many to reevaluate which party could best further their interests. In line with Ayers (2007) and Jalazai (2009), their investigation revealed a major shift from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. In particular, Muslim-Americans with a high degree of linked fate were much more likely than their counterparts to move away from the Republican Party. Additionally, Barreto and Bozonelos found relatively high rates of no party identification. In their sample, over one-quarter of Muslim-Americans stated "none" when asked which political party they most identified with—a similar trend found by the Pew Research Center in 2007. Interestingly, high

degree of linked fate and perceptions of discrimination were also predictive of identifying with none of the two major political parties. This result, while interesting, is not surprising. The authors mention that although both major political parties tend to campaign for votes among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, they have not only neglected Muslims but have actually toughened their rhetoric against them. For instance, campaign organizers for President Barack Obama removed two Muslim women from a televised event because they were wearing the Hijab and sitting behind the candidate.

While the development of Muslims as an active political group has increased exponentially since 9/11, the shift from Bush to Kerry and high levels of support for Obama does not mean that Muslims will maintain a strong relationship with the Democratic Party (Ayers, 2007). In fact, anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies supported by both sides of the aisle make the relationship very complicated. Dissatisfaction with both political parties does not, however, mean that Muslim-Americans, as a group, will reject political participation. For Muslims, the stakes are very high. The complexity of the situation and a movement away from both parties may just decrease enthusiasm to consistently turnout and vote during elections. This certainly does not equate to complete withdrawal from the political arena. Overall, research on Muslim-Americans, as with other groups, demonstrates that party identification is important variable that needs to be accounted for when examining the attitudinal and behavioral outcomes.

Before concluding this section, it is important to also underscore other variables that are theoretically associated with political participation among Muslim-Americans. Perhaps not surprisingly, civic skills and socio-demographic factors play a prominent role for Muslims as they do for other minority groups. For instance, organizational experience, income, and education are associated with a number of political activities (Ayers and Hofstetter, 2008; Dana et al., 2011; Jalalzai, 2009; Jamal, 2005). Age has produced mixed results depending on the type of participation. Older individuals tend to be more

engaged than younger Muslims when it comes to voting, but not as engaged when it comes to activities such as protests. As for gender and political participation, studies do not find any discernible difference between men and women despite claims that men are more dominant than women in Muslim-American household and communities (Jalalzai, 2009; Jamal, 2005). Also, without exception, nativity is a key predictor of participation. Muslims born in the U.S. are more familiar with the political system and more engaged in politics (Ayers and Hofstetter, 2008; Dana et al., 2011; Jalalzai, 2009; Jamal, 2005).

As for the impact of discrimination on behavior, there is much less research that has been conducted. At best, the results suggest that discrimination serves as a mobilizing force, but existing analyses suffer from serious shortcomings. For starters, the only relatively clear analysis of the consequences of political discrimination on political engagement has only focused on registration levels among Arab-Americans. Relying on aggregate-level data, Cho, Gimpel and Wu (2006) found that the apprehension of worrisome government policy actions, namely the Patriot Act, motivated Arab-Americans to register at higher levels, especially those residing in the highest education contexts. Political discrimination also had the impact of compelling a large number of individuals to register as Democrats or independents. Beyond changes in registration status, the authors do not present any other analysis. Furthermore, their measure of political threat is a Lexis-Nexis search of "daily occurrence of newsworthy events that could have mobilization potential" (page 982). This is a fairly crude measure of political discrimination, and considering that they rely on aggregate-level data, the results can not be extrapolated to individual Muslims or Arabs.

Another study that explores the impact of discrimination is conducted by Ayers and Hofstetter (2008), which reports that the post 9/11 environment has had a small indirect effect on fueling American Muslim's political participation. Similar to many other studies that have paid attention to discrimination—but not solely focused on this topic—the

authors use measures that are relatively vague and fail to consider different sources of marginalization. In specific, Ayers and Hofstetter operationalize discrimination or post 9/11 "anxiety" by asking if it is "a good time or bad time to be Muslim in America." They also ask respondents whether the society as whole has been respectful or tolerant toward Muslims. While the second question is more specific, it does not ask about direct perceptions of societal discrimination nor does it ask about severity levels. Perhaps more importantly, they acknowledge that their results should be taken with caution since their "model does not satisfy commonly accepted norms of fit" (page 17). Furthermore, political participation was measured by adding responses to a number of acts instead of analyzing the impact of discrimination on each individual method of political engagement. Creating an overarching political participation scale is problematic because in-group or ethnic-based activities can be conflated with mainstream or broader forms of political engagement such as participating in elections. Due to these shortcomings and overall lack of research on Muslim-Americans, more detailed studies are needed to better understand how discrimination influences sociopolitical behavior.

3.4 Data Selection & Rationale

Two national surveys, the 2007-2008 Muslim American Public Opinion survey (MAPOS) and the 2007 Pew Research Center Study of American Muslims, have been selected to assess the impact of political and social discrimination on sociopolitical behavior. The rationale for using two datasets is to adequately test the the impact of discrimination on a number of political outcomes, and to assess the generalizability of the findings across two sources of data collected during a similar timeframe. On their own, both datasets have certain limitations. However, together, they permit a more comprehensive assessment of the relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior.

The first dataset—MAPOS—allows me to test the impact of indirect perceptions of

political discrimination on a range of political participation measures. In this dataset, respondents are not only asked whether they have voted, but were also asked if they have participated in a protest/rally, wrote a letter to a public official, or attended a community meeting between years 2006 to 2008. The drawback with MAPOS is that it only contains a specific question related to indirect perceptions of political discrimination. Since MAPOS does not ask any precise questions regarding experiences with societal discrimination, the analysis is one dimensional—that is, it only focuses on one source of discrimination. However, focusing on one source of discrimination is still important because existing research has not yet investigated the extent to which political discrimination—in this case, the perception that airport security measures unfairly target Muslims—influences the political participation of Muslim-Americans beyond registering to vote.

In contrast to MAPOS, the Pew survey contains several precise questions to construct suitable political and societal discrimination variables. Specifically, questions related to discrimination in this dataset enable me to test the impact of direct experiences of airport discrimination and compare those results with the findings obtained from the MAPOS dataset. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the Pew dataset includes questions regarding direct experiences of societal discrimination to evaluate how both sources of discrimination independently impact behavior. The only shortcoming of Pew is that it only asks respondents whether they have registered to vote and whether they have voted in the presidential election. The absence of non-traditional political participation measures effectively eliminates non-citizen Muslims (23% of the sample) from the analysis. However, the Pew survey does have several key attitudinal measures to further examine the proposed theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2. Before further discussing the availability of different questions and how all the variables utilized in the regression models were constructed, the next section will provide a more general overview of how the surveys were collected.

MAPOS was fielded outside twenty-two randomly selected mosques and Islamic centers in the East, West, and Midwest, as well as the major Muslim population centers in the U.S.⁴ Participants were selected using a traditional skip pattern to randomize recruitment. The survey was administered in an exit-poll format whereby trained research assistants handed paper questionnaires to selected individuals who then completed the survey on their own. In total, 1,410 self-administered surveys were completed in English, Arabic, or Farsi. A large number of the surveys were gathered during Eid al Adha and Eid al Fitr, which are events similar to religious services for Christmas and Easter Mass. This recruitment choice makes sure that both devout and secular Muslims are included in the sample.⁵

The 2007 Pew Survey of Muslims was conducted by telephone between January 24 and April 20, 2007 using a nationally representative random sample. The 1,050 self-identified adult Muslims who completed the survey were given the opportunity to answer questions in English, Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi.⁶ The average margin of sampling error of the completed surveys is +/-5 percentage points. A response rate of 27% was achieved for the list sample, 58% for the re-contact sample, and 29% for the RDD sample.

Both surveys cover a wide range of topics related to religious, social and political issues, and are quite representative of the overall American Muslim population, containing a large number of Arab, African-American, Asian, and foreign-born respondents. Table 3.1 provides a comparison of the key demographic characteristics of the two surveys. Overall, the sample demographics are fairly similar. The largest discrepancy between

⁴ Cities in which surveys were conducted were Dearborn, MI, Seattle, WA, San Diego, CA, Irvine, CA, Riverside, CA, Los Angeles, CA, Raleigh-Durham, NC, Chicago, IL, Dallas, TX, Houston, TX, Washington D.C., and Oklahoma City, OK. A response rate was not recorded because research assistants were unable to keep track of individuals who refused to participate in the study.

⁵ For more detailed info about MAPOS visit: www.muslimamericansurvey.org/survey.html

⁶ For more detailed info about the survey visit: <http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf>

Table 3.1: Comparison of PEW & MAPOS Demographics

	MAPOS (07-08)	Pew (2007)
Arab	44%	25%
Asian	24%	18%
Black	16%	24%
Sunni	65%	50%
Shi'a	11%	16%
U.S. Born	45%	35%
Foreign Born	55%	65%
Citizen	73%	75%
Voted	64%	59%
N	1,410	1,050

the two datasets is the percentage of self-identified Arab or Arab-American respondents. In MAPOS, 45% of the participants self-identified as Arab. In Pew, only 25% of the respondents are clearly identified as Arab. A deeper investigation of the the data collection process and survey questions provides a reasonable explanation for this difference. While the MAPOS survey had an "Arab" option under the race category, the Pew study did not. As a result, a good portion of third generation Arab respondents may have self-identified as "other" or "White" since they were not asked to report their grandfather and grandmother's country of origin, and an Arab or Arab-American option did not exist.

Scholars who have studied this population recognize that there are only a few nationally representative samples available and suitable for research purposes. Among the few datasets that do exist are the Zogby International polls and surveys fielded by CAIR. The former polls do not contain any precise questions regarding discrimination that would

aid in analyzing the independent influence of both societal and political discrimination. The 2004 Zogby poll, which was commissioned by project Muslim Americans in the Public Square (MAPS), for example, does not have any clear questions about discrimination. This survey asks whether it is "A good time or bad time to be Muslim in America" or asks questions about general attitudes toward Muslims. These questions are problematic because they do not allow a researcher to disentangle discrimination by source and do not clearly ask respondents whether they have directly perceived any discrimination when interacting with the government, public officials, or members of the community. As for the CAIR surveys, they are not publicly available, and if accessed can be gained, there is a clear conflict of interests that researchers must confront. The CAIR surveys are conducted by an organization that has the central goal of advocating for the political incorporation of Muslims in the U.S. Considering these challenges, the MAPOS and Pew datasets present the best options to analyze the impact of discrimination on the sociopolitical behaviors of Muslim-Americans during a similar timeframe—between years 2007 to 2008.

3.5 Variable Construction & Descriptive Statistics

As previously mentioned, the MAPOS dataset is utilized to evaluate the effect of political discrimination on four types of political activities: self-reported voting, participation in a protest/rally, attendance in a community meeting, and contact with a government representative. Among the entire sample, which includes citizen and non-citizen respondents, 27% attended a protest/rally, 47% participated in a community activity, and 33% wrote a letter to a public official. As for electoral participation, 61% of all citizens indicated that they had voted in the 2006 or 2008 November elections. Each of the participation measures ranges from 0 (inactivity) to 1 (activity).⁷

⁷Coding and distributions of all the variables used in this chapter are presented in Appendix A—see Tables A.8 & A.9.

3.5.1 *Dependent Variables*


The Pew Survey is utilized to estimate the effect of political and societal discrimination on self-reported voter registration status, turnout, and participation in mosque activities beyond prayer, which is considered an "in-group" or "ethnic-based" participation measure. Respondents were asked whether they are registered to vote in their precinct or election district and whether they have voted in the presidential election between George W. Bush and John Kerry. Among the citizens, who composed 58% of the sample, 69% registered to vote and 59% voted—71% chose Kerry and 14% voted for Bush. The in-group involvement variable was constructed by assigning a one to respondents who indicated that they took part in religious and social activities at the mosque or Islamic center outside of Salah and Jum'ah prayer (32%) and a zero to those who did not engage in mosque activities beyond regular prayer (68%). In the United States, mosque activities outside of prayer service can range from Islamic study and Arabic classes to programs for women and youth, fitness/sports classes, and parenting and marriage courses. This means that the mosque provides more services than just religiously oriented activities. However, because religiosity can confound the relationship between discrimination and this specific, mosque-related dependent variable, the in-group participation model controls for a set of religious-based variables that will be discussed in more detail in the upcoming sections.

3.5.2 *Key Independent Variables*

The key independent variables are political and societal discrimination. In the MAPOS models political discrimination was measured by using the following question: "Do you think the new security measures at U.S. airports are targeted at Muslims or at all Americans equally?" Approximately 75% of the respondents perceived the security measures to be implemented in a biased manner (see Figure 3.2). As indicated earlier, a reliable measure of societal discrimination does not exist in the MAPOS dataset. The only remotely

related question invites respondents to conflate perceptions of political discrimination with perceptions of societal discrimination. Specifically, respondents were asked to what extent they think discrimination against immigrants is a problem in today's society. This question is not only vague but it also does not ask individuals to consider whether discrimination is a problem for *Muslims* in specific.


Figure 3.2: **Political Discrimination (Pew)**



The Pew dataset, on the other hand, has several detailed questions that were combined to compose a societal discrimination variable ranging from zero to three ($\alpha=0.55$). Specifically, respondents were asked the following questions: Have people acted as if they are suspicious of you because you are Muslim?; Have you been called offensive names because you are a Muslim?; and Have you been physically threatened or attacked because you are a Muslim? The distribution of this variable is heavily skewed to the left tail with 71% of respondents not reporting any form of societal discrimination (see Figure 3.3). About one-fifth (19%) of the sample reported one type of social discrimination,


8% two types, and 2% three forms of discrimination. As for political discrimination, individuals were asked if they have been singled out by airport security because they are Muslim. Close to one out of five respondents answered in the affirmative to this question (see Figure 3.4). The correlation between these two independent variables is very weak ($r=0.26$).

Figure 3.3: Societal Discrimination (Pew)



The difference between indirect and direct perceptions of political discrimination across the two datasets is quite large. While only 23% of the respondents in the Pew dataset reported directly encountering airport discrimination, 75% of MAPOS participants indicated that security measures at U.S. airports unfairly target Muslims. This difference is certainly noteworthy, but not surprising. Research has documented that members of lower-status groups typically report perceiving greater discrimination directed toward their group than themselves personally (Crosby, 1984; Ruggiero and Taylor, 1994; Ruggiero, 1999; Taylor et al., 1990, 1994). Furthermore, when it comes to airport discrimi-

Figure 3.4: Political Discrimination (MAPOS)



nation, not all the participants had the chance to travel during the timeframe that the question was asked. As such, only respondents who actually traveled were asked the airport discrimination question. The interesting question, then, is not about the large discrepancy between direct and indirect perceptions of discrimination; It is whether both types of discrimination have the same impact on political participation. Since MAPOS and Pew tap into different dimensions of political discrimination, but still focus on the same issue, I am able to evaluate the extent to which direct and indirect perceptions of airport discrimination have the capacity to mobilize Muslim-Americans.

3.5.3 Control Variables

Any serious examination of discrimination and sociopolitical behavior must account for a variety of alternative explanations. To keep the models across the two datasets as consistent as possible, only theoretically relevant variables that are available in both datasets are

utilized. The first set of variables for which I control for are socio-demographic indicators. These include age, education, income, race, gender, and nativity (U.S.-/foreign-born). Previous work has demonstrated that older, more educated, and wealthier individuals are not only better positioned to comprehend and access information about political issues, but they are also situated in social environments that further enhance communicational and organization capabilities (civic skills) crucial to democratic engagement (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Gender could also play an important role when assessing the political engagement of Muslims.⁸ Wearing the headscarf, or hijab, could expose women to greater scrutiny, and Muslim women may be less involved in politics than men due largely to conservative notions of women's proper role within the household and the community (Jalalzai, 2009). However, recent empirical studies have not found any significant differences between the political participation of Muslim men and women in the United States (Ayers and Hofstetter, 2008; Dana et al., 2011; Jalalzai, 2009; Jamal, 2005). Nativity is also an important control because first generation immigrants are likely to have less exposure to democratic practices (especially those from restrictive societies), be less acclimated to the American political system, and feel less entitled to confront acts of discrimination than their U.S. born counterparts. Other important indicators of political engagement are length of time in the U.S. and language proficiency. Unfortunately, both datasets did not have a measure of length of time lived in the U.S. among foreign-born participants. With that said, MAPOS did have a question about language spoken at home (a crude indicator of acculturation) but Pew did not. It should be noted that controlling for language spoken at home and other variables such as linked fate (whether the respondent thinks what happens to Muslims in the U.S. will affect what happens in to them) in the MAPOS models did not impact the study's main findings. In the Pew dataset, questions

⁸For more general literature on gender and politics, refer to Verba et al. (2001).

about linked fate or language spoken at home were not available. However, Pew did ask a question about identity—whether individuals consider themselves first as Muslim or American (options for "both equally" or "neither/other" were also available). Controlling for identity did not have a measurable impact on the relationship between discrimination and political participation. Perhaps not surprisingly, those who identified as American first had a higher likelihood of voting than those who identified as Muslim first. Again, these variables are not included in the final models because they are not available in both datasets, and on their own, do not have a measurable impact on the direct relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior.

In addition to standard demographic controls, measures of political interest and partisanship were also incorporated. In the Pew sample, political interest was measured by asking respondents whether they subscribe to a weekly newspaper. Participants in the MAPOS survey were asked how closely they followed news about candidates and initiatives in the 2006 or 2008 elections. Party attachment was measured by creating a dummy variable (no partisanship=1) that separates individuals who do not identify with a party from those who identify with or lean towards the Democratic or Republican Party—in both datasets about 25% did not affiliate with the two major parties. As research on Muslims and other minority groups has demonstrated, both of these measures serve as important controls. Those with higher levels of political interest and attentiveness tend to be more active in sociopolitical affairs (Miller et al., 1981; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) and also more likely to be aware of policies that target Muslims negatively. Party identification is strongly linked to political engagement because individuals who identify with a political party are more likely to vote, attend campaign meetings, and organize voter registration drives than those with weak or nonexistent party attachment (Campbell et al., 1960; Verba et al., 1978).⁹

⁹Other important psychological controls that were not available in both datasets include political trust,

Lastly, mosque attendance was included in all of the political participation models since such activity could enhance political engagement and awareness to discrimination. Previous research demonstrates that religious institutions—especially historically Black churches—are considered catalysts to political participation because they play an important role in developing civic skills, political knowledge and attentiveness, and commitments to a cause by providing a regular meeting place for individuals to interact and discuss public events and affairs (Dawson, 1994; McDaniel, 2008; Tate, 1994; Verba et al., 1995). Places of worship also directly engage members into the political process by providing cues about salient issues (for example, discrimination toward one’s group), endorsing local or national candidates, and asking those affiliated to take political action (Harris, 1994; McDaniel, 2008). Research on Muslims also demonstrates that mosques, just like churches and synagogues, are conduits of political participation (Dana et al., 2011; Jamal, 2005). Hence, mosque attendance is an important control.

Mosque attendance was measured by asking respondents how frequently they attended the mosque. Levels of attendance are fairly similar across the two datasets despite differences in question wording.¹⁰ About 16% of Muslims in the Pew sample stated that they frequently attend worship (more than once a week), with 18% indicating no attendance. As for Muslims in the MAPOS dataset, 12% reported no involvement at all while 26% indicated being very involved in their mosque.

For the in-group participation model, two additional controls—religiosity index and importance of religion in life—were introduced to isolate the effect of discrimination and religiosity when estimating the likelihood of attending mosque or Islamic center activities beyond prayer. The religiosity index ($\alpha=0.77$) was composed by adding responses

knowledge and efficacy. However, these measures are available in the dataset used for Chapter 4.

¹⁰Pew interviewees were asked to report mosque attendance (0=no attendance, 5= weekly attendance) while MAPOS respondents were asked to indicate involvement in mosque activities (0=no involvement at all, 4=very involved).

to the following questions: How often do you pray?; How important is fasting during Ramadan?; Do you believe Koran is the word of God?; and Do you believe the Koran is to be taken literally, word for word? The index ranges from two to fourteen with a mean of 10.85 and a standard deviation of 3.13. As for the importance of religion in one's life, about 54% indicated that religion is very important in their life, 29% stated somewhat important, and 16% thought that religion is not too important or not at all important.

3.6 MAPOS Findings

3.6.1 A Preliminary Look

Before presenting the findings obtained from the multivariate models, this section first discusses the bivariate relationship between discrimination and the four participation measures available in the MAPOS dataset.¹¹ A glance at Table 3.2 demonstrates that the perception of political discrimination is correlated with participation in a variety of political acts. Specifically, 66% of the respondents who stated that TSA security policies at airports unfairly target Muslims reported voting in the most recent election. In comparison, 55% of participants who did not perceive any discrimination reported voting. While self-reported voting is relatively high among those who perceived and those who did not perceive any discrimination, the 11-point difference is fairly large and statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

When asked about attendance in community meetings, a majority (51%) of those who perceived political discrimination indicated that they participated in such activities. In contrast, only 35% of individuals who did not perceive any discrimination took part in community meetings. This difference of 16 percentage points is not only statistically significant, but also sizable. As for participation in a protest or rally, discrimination appears to have a measurable impact again. Although participation in protest activity, in compar-

¹¹All the bivariate results have been weighted using the original survey weights.

Table 3.2: Political Participation by Political Discrimination (MAPOS)

Vote	No Discrimination	Discrimination
No	45% (96)	33% (268)
Yes	55% (117)	66% (535)
<i>N</i>	213	803
Meeting	No Discrimination	Discrimination
No	65% (204)	49% (528)
Yes	35% (112)	51% (544)
<i>N</i>	316	1072
Protest	No Discrimination	Discrimination
No	81% (255)	64% (689)
Yes	19% (61)	36% (383)
<i>N</i>	316	1072
Write	No Discrimination	Discrimination
No	80% (252)	74% (797)
Yes	20% (64)	26% (275)
<i>N</i>	316	1072
<i>*Chi2 significance at $pr < 0.05$</i>		

ison to voting and attending community meetings, is less popular among the entire sample, Muslim-Americans who did not perceive any discrimination were much less likely to hit the streets to publicly express their dissatisfaction. Specifically, 36% of respondents who perceived airport discrimination reported partaking in protests or rallies. In contrast, only 19% of those who did not perceive any discrimination chose the same path.

Lastly, and similar to the other results, political discrimination appears to impact writing to public officials. In his study of political threat and senior citizen engagement, Campbell (2003) discovered that perceived cuts to social security and Medicare during the 1980s motivated seniors to organize a letter writing campaign. Consistent with his findings, airport discrimination is statistically associated with letter writing among Muslims. The difference, however, is not substantively large. About 26% of discriminated individuals reported writing a letter to a public official as opposed to 20% of individuals who did not perceive any discrimination.

3.6.2 *Multivariate Results*

Overall, the bivariate results suggest that indirect perceptions of political discrimination may motivate Muslim-Americans to vote, attend community meetings, protest, and write to public officials. This finding supports the first hypothesis, which is that the perception of political discrimination serves as a mobilizing force. However, these results are, at best, suggestive. A more rigorous analysis requires controlling for theoretically relevant predictors of participation to isolate the impact of discrimination on all of the four political participation measures. As such, four two-tailed logistic regression models were estimated to carefully test hypothesis 1. In addition to reporting regression coefficients and fit statistics for each of the models, predicted probabilities were calculated to graphically demonstrate the relative strength of each independent variable on the dependent variables. Using a standard simulation technique, predicted probabilities were calculated


by changing the independent variables under analysis from minimum to maximum value while holding all the other covariates at their central tendency (mean).

Models 1-4 (Table A.1 in appendix A) measure the impact of political discrimination on political participation among MAPOS participants. Based on the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2, political discrimination is expected increase an individual's propensity to engage in politics. The results show strong support for this claim, confirming hypothesis 1. The perception that airport security measures are being implemented discriminatorily has a statistically and substantively significant impact on all four participation measures (see Figure 3.5). The voting model reveals that the perception of political discrimination increased the likelihood of voting by 14 percentage points. As expected, various socio-demographic and attitudinal variables also structure the political participation of American Muslims. Respondents who were born in the U.S., are more educated and have higher incomes, older, more interested in politics, and identify with either the Democratic or Republic Party were about 13%, 23%, 10%, 31%, 28%, and 27% more likely to cast a ballot, respectively. Gender disparities were not found in the election model. That is, women were not less likely than men to turnout and vote.

Comparing the substantive impact of political discrimination with other model covariates, it becomes apparent that discrimination is an important predictor of voting behavior. Changes in predicated probabilities show that discrimination has a similar impact on voting as nativity, income, and to some extent, education. Only three variables in the model have a larger impact on voting than discrimination—political interest, age, and party attachment. Perhaps surprisingly, mosque attendance is not associated with voting behavior. However, mosque attendance is an important predictor of the other political activities, notably protest activity and attendance in community meetings.

Taking a look at the protest results, discrimination is once again an influential predictor. Those who perceived political discrimination were 12% more likely than their

Figure 3.5: The Change in the Predicted Probability of Political Participation



Note: Symbols in figure indicate the change in the predicted probability of voting, protesting, attending a meeting, and writing to a public official. The lines attached to the symbols represent 95% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

counterparts to take part in a protest or rally. An effect size comparison with other variables in the model demonstrates that only mosque attendance and nativity have a larger impact than political discrimination on the propensity to engage in a protest. The influence of mosque attendance is particularly large. Individuals who regularly attend the mosque are about 25% more likely to participate in protests than those who do not attend the mosque for the purposes of prayer or religious activities. A similar trend is found in the meeting model. Keeping all the model covariates at their respective means, political discrimination increased the likelihood of attending a community meeting by 15 percentage points. This effect size is only smaller than political interest and mosque attendance. While the influence of political discrimination on voting, protesting, and attending community meetings is fairly substantial, its impact on writing to public officials is fairly small—an increase of only 6 percentage points.

Although political discrimination is statistically associated with all the participation measures, one concern is that the results are heavily influenced by interest in politics. Considering that indirect, rather than direct, perception of airport discrimination is being measured with the MAPOS dataset, individuals who are highly attuned to news about politics may not only participate more but also be more attentive to discriminatory policies toward Muslim-Americans. Although political interest is accounted for in all of the models, I estimated additional models separating individuals who indicated that they were very attentive to news about candidates and initiatives from those who indicated less interest. If political discrimination is not statistically associated with political participation among those who are not too interested in politics, then political interest may be driving both awareness to discrimination and propensity to participate in politics.

For the most part, the additional models (see Tables A.2 & A.3 in appendix A) alleviate the concerns about the impact of political interest on the key independent variable as well as the dependent variables. Political discrimination in both subsamples—among

those who are very attentive to politics and those who are not as interested—is positively associated with voting, attending a protest, and attending a community meeting, but not writing to a public official. Overall, the results suggest that the indirect perception of political discrimination has an influential impact on political behavior among not only individuals who are very interested in politics, but also among those who are not as interested or attuned to political news.

3.7 *Pew Findings*


3.7.1 A Preliminary Look

Having established the association between indirect political discrimination and political behavior with the MAPOS dataset, this section explores the influence of direct political discrimination and brings in societal discrimination into the equation. Once again, the analysis begins with a casual glance at the bivariate relationship between the key independent variables and the dependent variables. What distinguished this analysis from the MAPOS results is that Pew contains specific questions to explore the influence of direct experiences of both political and societal discrimination on mainstream participation and in-group engagement.

Figure 3.6 illustrates a statistically and meaningful difference in voting patterns of individuals who directly experienced political discrimination compared to those who did not encounter any discrimination. As can clearly be seen, a higher percentage of individuals who were exposed to airport discrimination reported voting in the presidential election (73% vs. 56%) than those who did not perceive any discrimination. This result is consistent and fairly similar to the bivariate relationship found between indirect perception of airport discrimination and voting with the MAPOS dataset.


In contrast to the impact of political discrimination, however, the correlation between societal discrimination and voting behavior is negative. Figure 3.7 shows a significant

Figure 3.6: Turnout by Political Discrimination (Pew)



reduction in self-reported voting (75% to 25%), but only among individuals who reported experiencing three acts of discrimination ($pr < 0.05$). This suggests that it may take accumulated experiences of discrimination for individuals to internalize societal stigmatization and feel that they cannot make a meaningful difference by engaging in democratic activities.


Figure 3.7: Turnout by Societal Discrimination (Pew)



The last set of results illustrate the connection between discrimination and in-group engagement (see Figures 3.8 & 3.9). As outlined in chapter 1, the expectation is that both sources of discrimination are likely to promote in-group engagement. The simple two-way analysis supports this notion and demonstrates stark differences in Islamic center or mosque-related in-group involvement between individuals who directly perceived societal or political discrimination and those who did not face any discrimination. About half (46%) of Muslims who reported encountering political discrimination participated in mosque or Islamic center activities beyond prayer as opposed to 23% of the respondents

who did not experience any discrimination. Similarly, 64% of respondents who reported three acts of societal discrimination, versus 23% of individuals who did not experience any discrimination, indicated attending mosque functions excluding Salah and Jumiah prayer. These results suggest that discrimination has the capacity to promote ethnic-based engagement.


Figure 3.8: **In-Group Engagement by Political Discrimination (Pew)**



3.7.2 Multivariate Results

Chapter 1 demonstrated that research in political science often ignores the source of discrimination and that some researchers combine various discrimination-related questions to form overarching discrimination scales without providing any theoretical justification for their decision. The lack of distinction by source is problematic. We cannot assume


Figure 3.9: In-Group Engagement by Societal Discrimination (Pew)



that all types of discrimination lead to similar behavioral outcomes. To empirically show that distinctions by source do matter, I first regressed voter turnout on a broad discrimination variable that conflates experiences of political with societal discrimination. That is, responses to political and societal discrimination questions were combined to create an overarching discrimination variable.

Table A.4 (in appendix A) reports the results of conflating different sources of discrimination. When an overarching scale is created, the relationship between discrimination and voting behavior is indistinguishable from zero (see Figure 3.10). This finding could lead scholars to conclude that discrimination is not an important predictor of the political participation of lower-status groups. After all, the results show that those who reported high levels of discrimination are no more or less likely than their counterparts to turnout and vote in the presidential election. However, this outcome is misleading because discrimination is not disentangled by source.

Figure 3.10: Impact of Broad Discrimination on Voter Turnout (Pew)



Note: Symbols in figure indicate the change in the predicted probability of voter turnout. The lines attached to the symbols represent 95% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.


Models 5 and 6 were estimated to test the claim that political and societal discrimination have divergent impacts on mainstream or broader forms of political engagement, such as voting in elections. Table A.5 (in appendix A) displays the results of the two-tailed logistic regression models. As with the MAPOS results, changes in the predicted probabilities were calculated to show the substantive impact of each independent variable on the dependent variables of interest. Figure 3.11 illustrates that political discrimination increases the likelihood of registration by 7% and voting by 13%. The substantive impact of political discrimination on voting is almost identical to the results found with the MAPOS dataset—an increase of 14 percentage points. In sharp contrast to the influence of political discrimination, however, societal discrimination stifled the willingness to register to vote and to turnout. Pew participants who reported three acts of societal discrimination were 17% less likely to register to vote and 20% less likely to turnout and vote in the presidential election between George W. Bush and John Kerry compared to individuals who did not experience any discrimination. The findings confirm hypothesis 1 and 2, providing

strong support for the claim that differentiating between political and societal discrimination is important. While the perception of political discrimination can serve as a mobilizing force, the opposite impact was found among individuals exposed to societal stigmatization.

Consistent with the MAPOS voting model results, political interest, age, education, income, nativity, and party attachment were all significantly associated with electoral participation. And once again, no differences based on gender were detected. Although the results are almost identical across the two datasets—despite minor differences in question wording—Arabs in the Pew model, unlike self-identified Arabs in MAPOS model, were not more likely than Blacks, Asians, and other groups to turnout and vote. As previously mentioned, this difference needs to be taken with caution because of the limitations discussed with accurately identifying second and third generation Arabs within the Pew sample.

In addition to testing the independent effects of political and societal discrimination on turnout, I also examined the combined impact of both variables. The interaction term was not associated with the propensity to vote, and it did not alter the main results. That is, individuals who reported experiencing societal discrimination but not any political discrimination were less likely to vote, and those who experienced political discrimination but not any societal discrimination were more likely to vote. It is important to note that the visual representation of the interaction results (see Figure 3.12) illustrates that individuals who experienced both political and societal discrimination were less likely to indicate that they voted as opposed to those who did not experience any discrimination. However, this result does not meet the acceptable threshold of statistical significance. Considering that less than 1% of the total sample reported experiencing both high levels of societal and political discrimination, there are only a few observations to test the moderating impact of political and societal discrimination. Due to the low subsample size, the


Figure 3.11: The Change in the Predicted Probability of Registration & Turnout (Pew)



Note: Symbols in figure indicate the change in the predicted probability of registration and voter turnout. The lines attached to the symbols represent 95% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

interaction results are inconclusive at best.

Figure 3.12: **Predictive Margins of Voting: Political Discrimination & Varying Degrees of Societal Discrimination**



To test the third and fourth hypotheses of the S&PD theory, participation in mosque or Islamic center related activities beyond Salah and Jumiah prayer was regressed on political and societal discrimination. Based on social identity theory and the rejection-identification hypothesis, the expectation is that the perception of societal or political discrimination increases the desire to identify with one's in-group. The results obtained from Model 7 provide strong support for this hypothesis (see Table A.6 in appendix A). Figure 3.13 shows that political discrimination is positively and significantly associated with participation in mosque activities beyond prayer. Individuals who experienced political discrimination were 11% more likely to attend mosque activities beyond prayer than those who did not face any discrimination. Likewise, societal discrimination is a key predictor of in-group engagement, increasing the likelihood of mosque attendance beyond prayer by 28%.


The positive effects were observed even after accounting for religiosity and importance of religion in one's life, which are two key covariates of mosque attendance beyond prayer. This suggests that Muslims attend the mosque for other purposes besides religious motives. For societally stigmatized individuals, a key reason is to seek reaffirmation and acceptance. For those who experienced political discrimination, the mosque is a place to effectively organize against group-level, systematic discrimination such as the post-9/11 national security policies that have disproportionately targeted Muslim-Americans for extra scrutiny.

3.8 Further Evaluation of the S&PD Theory

A key theoretical argument that I have advanced in this study is that societal discrimination has the capacity to impact a person's relatedness to others, which can impair health and influence behavior. Drawing from literature on belonging and psychological well-being I have specifically argued that individuals stigmatized by their peers tend to internalize negative evaluations and display symptoms of sadness, depression, and low levels of self-esteem. And research shows that these adverse psychological outcomes are linked to perceived lack of control, passivity, withdrawal, and reduced attention to external cues (Cunningham, 1988; Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989). As such, it is reasonable to hypothesize that societal discrimination has the capacity to decrease political participation because it impairs psychological health. Political participation, after all, requires tremendous material and psychological capital. Deprived of psychological strength, individuals may find little value in spending their limited resources on the democratic process and genuinely believe that they are incapable of taking meaningful action.

The empirical analyses presented in this chapter support this assertion among American Muslims. Societally stigmatized Muslims are significantly less likely than their coun-

Figure 3.13: The Change in the Predicted Probability of In-Group Engagement (Pew)



Note: Symbols in figure indicate the change in the predicted probability of mosque attendance beyond prayer. The lines attached to the symbols represent 95% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

terparts to register to vote and to actually vote. While this finding sheds light on the behavioral consequences of societal discrimination, it is yet unclear whether individuals who reported perceiving high levels of peer stigmatization are, in fact, somehow psychologically worse off than their counterparts or those who only perceived political discrimination. It may be true that a plethora of epidemiological studies have found a direct link between societal discrimination and adverse mental health outcomes, yet, no such evidence has been presented in the context of this chapter.

Using survey data and an original experiment, Chapter 5 investigates in detail the relationship between discrimination, mental health, and attitudes toward one's community and peers. Before that, however, the relationship between discrimination, attitudes toward government, and a measure of psychological well-being will be explored to provide some preliminary evidence in support of the theoretical framework. In specific, six logistic regression models were estimated to evaluate the relationship between discrimination and three key survey questions available in the Pew dataset. The first four models in Table 3.6 assess the relationship between discrimination and disapproval toward President Bush and dissatisfaction with the general state of the country. The expectation is that those who experienced political or societal discrimination will be more likely than individuals who did not experience any discrimination to repudiate government actors and institutions that pose a threat to their interests or contributed toward their marginalization. For Muslims, the introduction of the USA Patriot Act by Congress and its subsequent approval by president Bush is one source of dissatisfaction and frustration. This discontent could be a driving force behind increased political activism. As Dahl (1961) has argued in *Who Governs?*, people engage in politics not necessarily from a sense of duty or sustained interest in politics. Rather, they become politically active "...when primary goals at the focus of their lives are endangered" (page 224). When faced with undesirable political conditions, such as secret searches and seizures or racial profiling in airports, mobilization

is likely to ensue.

However, as previously argued, for citizens to spend their limited resources on the political process, they must feel that their actions carry some weight. Cynicism could keep people at home during election night or discourage citizens from sharing their concerns with their representatives. It is precisely at this juncture where we can expect to observe a difference between individuals exposed to persistent societal as opposed to political discrimination. While unwelcomed policies or institutional violations of equality and fairness can make individuals angry, which is an emotion associated with mobilization (Valentino et al., 2011), accumulated experiences of interpersonal rejection can moderate participatory inclinations. Peer stigmatization is an extremely hurtful and intimate experience of personal rejection that has the capacity to make people feel sad or depressed—an outcome that reduces the motivation to partake in politics (Ojeda, 2015). According to the theory of false consciousness, rejected individuals may also develop an inflated sense of hopelessness and genuinely believe that the majority of their peers disagree with them even if such a perception does not match the realities on the ground. Drawing from this strand of research, I have argued that one major psychological difference between individuals exposed to societal, interpersonal discrimination rather than political, group-based discrimination is this feeling of hopelessness or sadness that victims of peer stigmatization tend to exhibit as a result of internalizing experiences of personal rejection.

To determine if there is, in fact, any psychological difference between individuals who experienced societal as opposed to political discrimination or no discrimination at all, the following question will be used: "Generally, how would you say things are these days in your life—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?"¹²

¹²Ideally, one would want to measure the impact of prejudice on a host of socio-psychological indicators of mental well-being. However, besides this survey question, no other indicators of psychological health were available.

While this is not the most ideal measure of psychological well-being, it does help us to evaluate if societal discrimination is associated with an indicator of mental well-being within the same sample that was used to test the direct link between discrimination and behavior.¹³ If the theoretical position offered in this study is sound, we should expect to see a positive association between societal discrimination and feelings of unhappiness. On average, victims of peer stigmatization should be more likely than their counterparts to indicate that they are not too happy with things in their life partly due to their negative interpersonal encounters. However, we should not expect to find a positive relationship between political discrimination and depleted happiness because, as I have highlighted in Chapter 2, individuals exposed to this type of group-level discrimination tend to externalize, rather than internalize, negative evaluations or actions, placing blame on institutional forces rather than on personal shortcomings.

The results (see Table A.7 in appendix A) offer strong support for the S&PD theory. There is a clear association between both types of discrimination and disapproval toward Bush and discontent toward government in general. When asked whether participants approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president, those who reported being singled out by airport security were 9% more likely to disapprove of Bush. Similarly, citizens who experienced three acts of social discrimination were 6% more likely to disapprove of Bush as compared to those who did not experience any discrimination. This result is robust even when various socio-demographic and political controls are introduced (see Model 8.1). Likewise, when asked whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the country today, Muslims who reported political discrimination were 13% more likely to show displeasure, and those subjected to

¹³ Respondents who indicated that they were "very happy" or "pretty happy" were combined and assigned to value 0 and those who stated that they were "not too happy" were assigned value 1. Alternatively, ordered probit regression was estimated without combining the "very happy" and "pretty happy" response options. The results from the logistic and ordered probit models did not substantively differ.

interpersonal hostility were 10% more likely to state that they are dissatisfied. In contrast, political discrimination had no bearing on feelings of sadness. However, as expected, discrimination in the form of insults, threats, or harassments in social domains was associated with self-reported unhappiness. Victims of societal discrimination were about 6% more likely than those who did not experience any discrimination to state that they are "not too happy." This difference further illuminates that drawing a distinction between political and societal discrimination is useful and necessary. Chapter 5 extends this analysis and provides a much more detailed investigation to further test the underlying mechanism linking discrimination to behavioral engagement and alienation.

3.9 Conclusion

The prevailing wisdom within the discipline of political science is that the awareness of discrimination motivates individuals from various ethnic and racial backgrounds to take action rather than to resign from politics. The findings presented in this chapter challenges this perspective and suggests that heightened or depressed political activism is partly contingent on whether individuals have experienced political or societal discrimination. Although previous work and the empirical results obtained in this chapter demonstrate that political discrimination has the capacity to motivate individuals to engage in a wide variety of political activities, the same conclusion cannot necessarily be drawn for individuals who have experienced peer stigmatization. In fact, the results show (see summary Table 3.3) that Muslim-Americans exposed to societal discrimination were less inclined to register to vote or to cast a ballot than those devoid of such experiences. This outcome should, perhaps, not be surprising as a plethora of epidemiological studies have found a strong link between perceptions of unfair treatment in social domains and destructive psychological outcomes such as symptoms of sadness, depression, worthlessness, and hopelessness among various racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups.

Table 3.3: Summary of Pew & MAPOS Findings

	Political Discrimination	Societal Discrimination
Registration (Pew)	+7%	-17%
Vote (Pew)	+13%	-20%
Vote (MAPOS)	+14%	NA
Protest (MAPOS)	+12%	NA
Meeting (MAPOS)	+15%	NA
Contact (MAPOS)	+6%	NA
In-Group Activity (Pew)	+11%	+28%
Bush Disapproval (Pew)	+9%	+6%
Dissatisfaction (Pew)	+13%	+10%
Unhappy in Life (Pew)	No Association	+6%
<i>*Change in Predicted Probability (min-max), keeping all covariates at their respective means.</i>		

On a different, and a more positive note, although victims of societal discrimination may not be motivated to turnout due to an inflated sense of pessimism, it is encouraging to find that such individuals are not completely withdrawn or isolated. Consistent with social identity theory, the findings demonstrate that devalued Muslim-Americans, those who have been denied acceptance and fair treatment by rank-and-file members of society, were more likely than their counterparts to get involved in ethnic-based or in-group activities. One reason for why discrimination increases in-group involvement has to do with people's desire to feel that they belong (Branscombe et al., 1999). For Muslims who sense that gaining acceptance in everyday interactions is improbable due to their negative experiences, the most adaptive response might be to increase investment in one's own group. This is an encouraging step as increased identification with one's in-group

can aid victims to overcome psychological barriers to political participation. However, panel studies are needed to sufficiently investigate how in-group involvement can translate into participation in mainstream politics for victims of societal rejection—a direction future research needs to go into.

One question that arises from this chapter is whether the S&PD theory is applicable to other lower-status groups. After all, Muslim-Americans are a relatively small, new out-group on the block with less group-based resources than other established minority groups. Groups with a much longer history of confronting inequality and more established in-group, neighborhood-level institutional resources may respond differently to discrimination. There is, however, reason to believe that the outlined theory is pertinent to other underrepresented groups. Although Muslim-Americans have experienced high levels of political discrimination in the past decade and half as a result of the War on Terror, other groups have also been subjected to extensive levels of group-level, political discrimination. And perceptions of political discrimination have indeed motivated groups such as African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Latinos to become politically engaged (Pantoja et al., 2001; Barreto and Woods, 2005; Parker, 2009; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramírez, 2007). As such, the political activism displayed by Muslim-Americans in the face of discriminatory post-9/11 policies is not an exceptional reaction. What may be distinctive is how much influence Muslim-Americans can actually attain through political participation since they comprise a very small percentage of the total population.

As for the relationship between societal discrimination and withdrawal from mainstream politics, there is evidence to suggest that other groups may also be adversely impacted. Epidemiological studies have exhibited a strong association between various interpersonal, societal discrimination and negative psychological outcomes among racial and ethnic groups such as Asians (Noh et al., 1999), African-Americans (Banks et al., 2006), Native Americans (Whitbeck et al., 2002), and Latinos (Finch et al., 2000). Again,

there is nothing about the Muslim experience that appears to be exceptional or out of the ordinary. Nevertheless, the above studies did not analyze the nexus between societal discrimination and sociopolitical behavior. Their focus was rather on psychological health. To account for this limitation, Chapters 4 & 5 investigate the impact of political and societal discrimination on political behavior among ethnic minorities in the UK and African-Americans. The aforementioned chapters will illustrate that the theory of social and political discrimination is portable to other groups in different contexts.

Lastly, the the analysis in this chapter helped resolve some of the conceptual confusion about the difference between "group" and "individual" or "personal" discrimination. The findings illuminated that it is the *source* rather than the mode of *awareness* that is most prominently impacting behavior. Both indirect perceptions (often termed group discrimination) and direct experiences (often called individual discrimination) of political discrimination were positively associated with increased political participation. If, in fact, it is the mode of awareness rather than the source of discrimination that is driving the relationship, we should not have found a positive relationship between direct experiences of political discrimination and political engagement because research suggests that personal experiences promote behavioral alienation while group discrimination stimulates behavioral engagement (Schildkraut, 2005). The results showed that the difference is really about source rather than mode. When direct experiences of political and societal discrimination were compared in the same model, the latter was positively linked to participation while the former was negatively associated. Both variables were measures of personal experiences of discrimination, but had divergent effects on behavior. As such, it is not necessarily the case that personal experiences of discrimination, regardless of source, can moderate participatory inclinations. Rather, it appears that the source of discrimination is driving the relationship.

When individuals become aware of systematic discrimination on behalf of the gov-

ernment or other public or private institutions such as universities, they are more likely to act than stay complacent regardless of whether they have personally experienced or indirectly perceived such discrimination. With that said, what happens if both indirect and direct perceptions were included in the same model? Under this scenario, I hypothesize that, on average, direct experiences would provide a more powerful realization of marginalization than indirect perceptions such as hearing about discriminatory airport security practices on the news. Due to question-wording limitations, this chapter did not present a direct comparison of the mode of awareness with the same dataset. However, what this chapter contributed to the literature of discrimination and behavior is that a comparison of group-level and personal discrimination needs to evaluate the same source of discrimination rather than conflating political with societal discrimination or vice versa.

Chapter 4

**EVALUATING THE THEORETICAL IMPORT:
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE UK**

*I was traveling on the bus and about to open up my bag when a voice from behind me said 'Go on then, take out that bomb!' He repeatedly told me to 'F*** OFF back to my country.' He said repeatedly that I don't belong here. He tried to racially incite the other passengers against me. He kept swearing and at me and said things like, 'why do you keep a beard?? Tell everyone!!!' He got up a few times and came close to me as if he was going to become physical but at the end sat back down. One of the worst things was that NOBODY was saying anything to him...*

- A Pakistani Student in the UK (Sheridan, 2006)

The previous chapter demonstrated that among several factors, the sociopolitical behavior of Muslims in the United States is powerfully shaped by the type of discrimination encountered. The results supported the claim that, on average, societal discrimination is demobilizing, while political discrimination serves as a mobilizing force, and that both sources of discrimination promote in-group engagement. While the results are illuminating and present a challenge to existing studies of discrimination and democratic engagement, they are bound to the experiences of one group, in one specific context and time-frame. In this regard, the findings are limited. Without additional analysis, one could question the extent to which societal and political discrimination have a comparable impact on the behaviors of other groups in different contexts. Although the world of social sciences is infinitely more complex than the arguments we present, generalizability is one of the most important aims of any research endeavor. A theoretical model certainly gains more leverage if it can reasonably explain variation in more than one setting.

I suggested in Chapter 3 that the dynamics at work for Muslim-Americans are not necessarily unique or exceptional, and that the theory of Social and Political Discrimination (S&PD) is applicable to other lower-status groups. Muslims were selected as the first case study primarily because of the high rates of social and political discrimination that this group has had to contend with since the events of 9/11. As Muslims became increasingly

subjected to alarming levels of discrimination, researchers began to pay more attention to this group, and started to ask more specific questions about their diverse experiences with discrimination. Instead of inquiring about broad perceptions of discrimination, attempts were made to ask questions about more explicit experiences of maltreatment in specific contexts, such as at airports or on the street. Overall, their experiences did not just offer another vivid illustration that discrimination is still a major issue facing minority groups in the supposed "colorblind" era, but that discrimination is not solely bound to structural boundaries of systematic decision-making. In some ways then, Muslim-Americans were selected for very practical reasons: their experiences offered a new and unique opportunity to adequately evaluate under which conditions discrimination mobilizes or demobilizes.

The present chapter extends the analysis to a new setting to evaluate the generalizability of the societal and political discrimination theory. I claim that the theoretical model is portable to other diverse groups in countries with similar democratic norms and institutions as the United States. To empirically support this assertion, the sociopolitical behavior of ethnic minorities in the UK was selected for investigation. Studying ethnic minorities in the UK fulfills the following important research objective: it demonstrates the extent to which the S&PD theory explains the behaviors of *other racial or ethnic minority groups in a different context*. Besides fulfilling this goal, ethnic minorities in the UK were specifically selected for practical purposes, similar to the decision to analyze Muslims in the U.S.

Scholars today might be discouraged by the formidable barriers that exist in studying how discrimination impacts marginalized populations, especially in a comparative context. Many surveys of political attitudes and participation do not contain a sufficient number of minority participants, and when they do, investigators do not inquire about different rates and sources of discrimination. For instance, the British Election Study (BES)

is one of the longest running social science survey in Britain, with over 50 years of data collected since 1963. Yet, the BES has predominately made a major contribution to understanding the political attitudes and behaviors of the majority white population. It was not until 2010 that a survey paid extensive attention to the experiences of minority groups in Britain.

Recognizing the need to conduct more studies on subgroups, Heath and colleagues specifically designed the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) to shed light on the political attitudes and behaviors of the five main ethnic minority groups: Black-Caribbean, Black-African, Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi individuals. This survey not only contains a large number of individuals who self-identity as one of the main minority groups, but also inquires about a variety of encounters with discrimination. In this sense, the EMBES offers a unique opportunity to examine the portability of the S&PD theory outside the United States with yet another diverse population that has faced extensive levels of discrimination in social and political spheres.

4.1 Chapter Outline

This chapter is organized in the following way: I first provide contextual information on each of the five largest ethnic minority groups to highlight the key similarities and differences that exist between and across them as a result of their distinct migration histories. This background information is then supplemented with a review of their shared experiences as minorities in a majority white British society. What this section will highlight is that despite some obvious contextual, cultural, and linguistic differences, there are more commonalities than differences between these groups as it pertains to experiences of societal and political discrimination.

In this section, I will also review previous research that compares and contrast minorities with the majority British population to show how similar or different the attitudes and

behaviors of these marginalized groups are from British whites. Throughout this section, it will also become evident that some of the key factors that drive political participation among minorities in the U.S., such as socioeconomic status, civic skills, party attachment, and a sense of civic duty, also shape the political behaviors of minorities in the UK. After a review of the literature, I present pertinent information about the EMBES dataset and discuss in detail how the variables used in the multivariate models were constructed. Following variable construction and descriptive statistics, I test all of the four hypotheses of the S&PD theory. What the analysis and findings section will illustrate is that accurately operationalizing discrimination plays a significant role in the conclusions that one draws. Once discrimination is disentangled by source, the results show that societal discrimination is associated with behavioral alienation, while political discrimination is associated with behavioral engagement. Before concluding the chapter, I further evaluate the S&PD theory with a measure of well-being. This analysis demonstrates, once again, a positive association between societal discrimination and depleted health, suggesting that individuals stigmatized by societal actors in their everyday experiences are likely to internalize negative evaluations. However, the findings reveal that political discrimination does not have the same effect on mental/physical well-being.

4.2 *Ethnic Minorities in British Society & Politics*

Without a doubt, ethnic minorities are increasingly becoming a significant part of British society. According to the 1991 Census by the Office of National Statistics, about 6 percent of the total population in Great Britain was composed of ethnic minority populations. In year 2011, the share of the ethnic minority population in the UK increased to about 14 percent. As it stands, one in four children under the age of ten is from a minority group, with ethnic minorities accounting for 80 percent of the total population growth in the UK. Moreover, experts are predicting that by 2051, ethnic minority communities will represent

an estimated 20 to 30 percent of the total population. While Black Africans are the fastest growing population of the five main ethnic groups primarily due to immigration, Indians are the largest minority group in the UK, accounting for about 2.5 percent of the total population. Pakistanis are not too far behind, constituting 2 percent of the population, while Black African come in third with 1.8 percent, Black Caribbean fourth with 1.1 percent, and Bangladeshi individuals accounting for about 0.8 percent of the population. The rest of the ethnic minority population is split between individuals of mixed backgrounds and other ethnic groups such as the Chinese, which account for an estimated 0.7 percent of the British population.

Although the five minority groups are combined in this study to overcome sample size limitations, these groups certainly have distinct histories of migration, arriving in Britain over somewhat different periods under distinctive legal statuses and immigration rules. While a comprehensive accounting of the complex migration patterns of these groups, which spans over four centuries, is beyond the scope of this study, an overview of their journeys to the UK is provided to illustrate the ways in which these groups are distinct from one another, and to depict the unique challenges to cultural and political incorporation that they have encountered over time. Yet, while distinct in many ways, minorities share several similarities in the UK, especially as it pertains to experiences of discrimination. Furthermore, barring some cultural, religious, and linguistic differences (even within groups), research suggests that the political attitudes and behaviors of Britain's ethnic minority citizens are fairly uniform, and that there are more commonalities between them when compared to the majority white population.

4.2.1 Background: South Asians

South Asians have a long history in the UK, arriving from different social and economic backgrounds with distinct migration journeys and reasons for settlement. Out of the three

main South Asian groups, the Indian diaspora is the largest with ties between the Punjab region of India and Britain going back as far as the 1850s when many Punjabis served in the British Army. The British armed forces also recruited many Sikhs from the Punjab to serve in both world wars. Beyond a history in armed forces, the Britain government recruited many Indians to work in East African colonies as clerks and lower-level officials. When East African countries eventually secured independence from Britain in the 1960s, many Indians were forcibly expelled, most notably from Uganda and Kenya, due to policies of "Africanization." Although the British government had limited entry for New Commonwealth citizens in 1962 and 1968, many East African Indians were eventually allowed to migrate to the UK.

Migration from India also significantly increased due to post WWII labor shortages, with mostly men from middle-ranking peasant families from the Punjab region finding work in service sector jobs, manufacturing, and textile. When the Immigration Act of 1962 restricted the free movement of workers from the Commonwealth, most workers settled in the UK permanently and were able to bring their families to join them. Finally, when discussing the Migration of Indians, it is important to mention that the partition of India in 1947, with the dissolution of British India, dislocated many Sikhs from their homes in the West of the Punjab. As such, dislocation and displacement is another contributing factor of migration to the UK. As can be seen, Indians in the UK arrived for various reasons, during different time periods, and from different locations. Consequently, the Indian diaspora is fairly diverse in terms of socioeconomic attainment, languages spoken at home (English, Punjabi, Gujarati, Hindi, and Tamil), and belonging to different religious traditions (Hindu, Sikh, Catholic, and Sunni Muslim).

In some ways, the Pakistani migration is fairly similar to that of Indian migration. Historically, many Pakistanis also served in the British armed forces, and a sizable number of sailors from Mirpur secured work as engine-room stokers on British ships that sailed

out of Bombay and Karachi. Pakistanis who migrated to the UK after the world wars also found employment in the textile industries. Some Pakistanis were also recruited to work in East Africa in the same roles that Indians served (although to a lesser degree), and just like Indians, were pressured to leave newly independent African countries due to discrimination or outright expulsion. Muslim Punjabis were also displaced by the 1947 partition in the same way that Sikh Punjabis were.

While the pattern and period of migration between the two groups is fairly similar, there are also some notable differences. A large majority of Pakistanis originated from Mirpur in Kashmir, which has a long history of out-migration. Although some Pakistanis speak English and Punjabi at home, a sizable number of them also speak Urdu, Mirpuri, and Pashtu. Perhaps the biggest difference pertains to religious tradition. Pakistanis in the UK almost exclusively belong to Islam, with about 85 percent identifying as Sunni Muslim in specific. As a result, Pakistanis are usually viewed as a homogenous ethnic group. Furthermore, because many Pakistanis originated from the Mirpur region, there is a tendency to stereotype this group as poorly educated and low-skilled. However, data by Health and colleagues (2013) reveals that about half of the Pakistanis in the UK possess secondary or higher foreign qualifications, and that the stereotypical views of Pakistanis do not match the realities on the ground.

Out of the three South Asian groups, Bangladeshi are the smallest and the last to arrive in large numbers to Britain. Although Bangladeshis are known to have served in the British armed forces and to have worked in the steel and textile mills before these industries collapsed, large scale Bangladeshi settlement in the UK is a more recent phenomenon. Present-day Bangladeshi families migrated to Britain to seek a better life primarily due to civil unrest in their homelands. Many settled in the East London boroughs from Sylhet, which is a relatively poor and rural area in Northern Bangladesh that was dislocated by the war of independence against Pakistan in 1971. As such, the vast major-

ity of Bangladeshis are foreign-born, and tend to have lower education and incomes than Pakistanis and Indians. Bangladeshis are also perhaps the most homogenous of the five main ethnic minority groups in Britain. The main language spoken at home is Bengali (or Sylheti, a dialect of Bengali), and there is less ethnic or religious divide within this group. Bangladeshi families are almost exclusively Muslim (mostly Sunni), and the vast majority of them migrated from the Sylhet region.

More recently, migration from East Asian countries, especially India, has also significantly increased due to employment opportunities in new technology and other skilled service occupations such as banking and commerce. Therefore, the more recent arrivals are very skilled and educated compared to non-migrants in their country of origin as well as their predecessors who migrated as manual workers recruited to fulfill the post-WWII labor shortages in the manufacturing and the service sector. And of course, the new arrivals are also better off than those who fled fairly unfavorable circumstance back home due to civil unrest, discrimination, or lack of economic opportunities.

4.2.2 Background: Black Caribbean & African

In terms of size, black people from the former Caribbean colonies of Britain are the fourth largest ethnic minority group in the UK. The mass migration of individuals from the Caribbean started right after WWII due to high unemployment rates in Caribbean countries and labor shortages in Britain. Many of the male migrants, some of whom had served in the war, were recruited to work on the London Underground, with women being recruited to work as nurses in the National Health Service (NHS). The majority of the African-Caribbean population in the UK is from Jamaica, with a sizable inflow arriving from other countries such as Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Antigua and Barbuda. The migrants who entered the UK after the war were granted citizenship and voting rights upon arrival, similar to other citizens of the British Commonwealth who

had legal privileges that facilitated their migration to Britain (Spencer, 2002). However, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act curbed immigration from the new Commonwealth. As a consequence of limiting the right to entry, Caribbean migrants who sought to enter the UK after independence had to obtain work vouchers.

The Caribbean guest-workers that arrived in the UK took mainly low-skilled and poorly paid jobs but were considered more skilled than other continental guest-workers. This is especially the case with respect to Caribbean women, who came voluntarily as nurses by selectively responding to job advertisements rather than leaving their respective countries due to economic adversity or expulsion. Another factor that distinguishes the more recent arrivals from other continental guest-workers and South Asians has to do with their exposure to British culture and traditions. Black Caribbean migrants are predominately Christian, speak English, were exposed to British institutions and values, and were, of course, socialized under British rule before independence. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that British Caribbean people have fairly high rates of mixed-race partnerships compared to other ethnic minority groups. Latest estimates from the 2011 census show that there is now a substantial growth in the number of people of mixed White and Black Caribbean heritage. Furthermore, Black Caribbean individuals are more likely to be viewed as "cultural insiders" as opposed to many South Asians who are stigmatized as inassimilable outsiders due to linguistic and religious differences with the "mainstream" or ethnicity white majority British society (Hiro, 1991). The recent terrorist attacks in the US and across Europe has also worsened the public's view of South Asians, with individuals from that region of the world being viewed as dangerous and suspicious (Modood, 2005).

Despite high levels of familiarity with the British society, culture, and institutions, as well as high rates of interracial marriages and a lower likelihood to live in segregated neighborhoods (Modood et al., 1997), Maxwell (2009) finds that contrary to expectations,

Caribbean migrants are much less likely than South Asians to have a positive attachment to the British national identity. Focusing on host-society discrimination dynamics, he finds that the lower positive attachment to British identification among Caribbean individuals is partly explained by high expectations of discrimination. Despite more favorable incorporation patterns and greater understanding of British society, the next section will also illustrate that Black Caribbean individuals are, interestingly, more likely than other ethnic minorities, notably South Asians, to report experiencing discrimination in the UK due to their race, ethnicity, or skin color.

The last and final group is generally referred to as Black African. If Pakistanis are the most homogenous group, Black Africans are considered the most diverse group of the five ethnic minority groups. Black Africans are also the fastest growing ethnic minority population in the UK due to more recent migration trends from more than thirty countries in Africa. Migration from this region of the world has accelerated rapidly over the past couple of decades for a number of different reasons. A sizable number of highly educated individuals from fairly affluent backgrounds from places such as Nigeria and Ghana decided to pursue further education in the UK. As such, their demographic characteristics are much different from labor migrants from the Caribbean or South Asia. Employment-related recruitment is also another source of migration, with doctors and nurses from sub-Saharan countries responding to NHS advertisements. Asylum-seekers from both Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries represent another significant source of migration into the UK. Asylum applications from Africa vastly increased in the 1990s and early 2000s due to political unrest, civil war, and persecution, with a bulk of asylum-seekers migrating from Somalia, Zimbabwe, Congo, Algeria, and Eritrea. Economic opportunity is also now becoming a more important reason as the economic circumstances of some African countries continues to deteriorate.

For the reasons highlighted above, Black Africans are a highly diverse group. With

that said, the largest number of migrants come from Commonwealth countries, notably Nigeria. As such, the majority of these individuals speak English at home, are British citizens, and belong to various Christian denominations. The more recent arrivals who fled war and persecution from places such as Somalia, however, are more likely to be Muslim and less likely to speak English at home.

4.3 Shared Experiences of Marginalization

Having described the various paths that South Asian and Black minorities have taken to the UK, and the tremendous diversity that exists within and across these groups, I now turn to the similarities that they share as ethnic minorities residing in a predominantly white British society. In terms of socio-demographic characteristics and social position, ethnic minorities predominantly live in three main cities, with about fifty percent living in London, Manchester, and Birmingham. They are also more likely than white Brits to live in urban areas as well as environmentally and economically poorer geographic regions, suffer from housing deprivation (i.e., overcrowded housing and absence of central heating), have lower incomes or be in "persistent poverty," report being unemployed, and receive lower pay on average for similar positions (Institute of Race Relations 2016). Across all of the groups, new arrivals (first generation) are much less likely than second generation immigrants to speak English at home and to identify as British rather than Black/Asian (Heath et al., 2013). Interestingly, however, members of the second generation are more likely than members of the first generation to report experiencing discrimination in the UK.

When discussing the shared experiences of ethnic minorities, discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or skin color is a theme that takes center stage. While Britain has made some progress toward racial equality, racial discrimination is still a persistent phenomenon, just as it is the case for minority groups in the United States. Chahal and Juli-

enne's (1999) investigation of discrimination among ethnic minority groups illustrated that for many individuals, being made to feel different was seen as a routine or even expected part of everyday life. As a result of expecting interpersonal discrimination, about a third of respondents in a UK-based study reported that the way they led their lives was constrained by the fear of being racially harassed (Virdee, 1995). More recently, the Diversity and Disadvantage study and the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain reported that up to 20,000 African-Caribbean individuals are exposed to some form of physical assault every year (Modood et al., 1997; Parekh, 2001). Another study found that South Asian communities, especially Pakistani and Bangladeshi individuals, stand a much higher risk of becoming a victim of a racially motivated crime than whites (Clancy et al., 2001). And according to Home Office statistics, from years 2012 to 2015, an average of 106,000 racially motivated hate crimes per year were reported.¹ Certainly, this is an issue that impacts a sizable portion of the minority population, with interpersonal experiences of discrimination having significant consequences on well-being. Specifically, research finds that individuals who experienced verbal and physical attacks in the UK were more likely to display symptoms of depression, assess their overall health as poor, report high blood pressure, and suffer from other adverse mental and physical health outcomes (Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002).

In addition to experiences of societal stigmatization, it is also well-documented that minorities in Britain, as in the United States, face more systematic barriers to inclusion, especially at various stages of the criminal justice system. Minorities in general, but specifically people of African-Caribbean and African descent, are not only more likely than whites to be stopped and arrested, but they are almost six times more likely to be imprisoned and to receive longer sentences (Clancy et al., 2001; Mooney and Young, 1999). And when reporting a crime, minorities are less satisfied than whites with the police response

¹The actual number is likely much higher as racial violence is largely underreported to the police.

(Clancy et al., 2001). A recent study by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2010) also found that black people are incarcerated seven times more than their share of the population, and that they constitute about 15 percent of all the stop and searches conducted by the police despite making up only about 3 percent of the total population. This study further reports that ethnic minorities are twice as likely as whites to report being worried about violent crime, with non-Christians being ten times more worried about attacks and harassment. Undoubtedly, concerns with terrorism across Europe has contributed to non-Christian immigrants, notably Muslims, being exposed to increasing levels of hate crimes and widespread discrimination and profiling by governmental institutions and actors (Allen and Nielsen, 2002; Lambert and Githens-Mazer, 2010; Sheridan, 2006).

Despite significant improvement in levels of educational attainment, Brown and colleagues (2013) revealed that ethnic minorities also face tremendous barriers to employment opportunities and social mobility when compared to their white British counterparts. Their analysis showed that Black and South Asian groups have been most exposed to unemployment during the recession, with black unemployment remaining double that of whites. Available unemployment statistics from 1974 to 2010 demonstrates that the minority joblessness rate is consistently higher than that of whites, with the biggest minority/majority gap reported under the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major Heath et al. (2013). In addition to this, Li and Heath's longitudinal study (2014) of social mobility revealed that although 44 percent of whites moved up to a higher socio-economic class than their father, first generation ethnic minorities had significantly lower upward mobility rates, with second generation minorities still facing significant "ethnic penalties" in the labor market.

Institutional racism in the work places is also another shared experience of ethnic minorities. The largest survey published on race equality in the UK workplace, called the


Race at Work Survey (2015), reported that Black and Asian minorities are underrepresented at every management level in the workplace, with white Brits more likely to be rated as top performers. Furthermore, about three out of ten employees in the UK have witnessed or experienced racial discrimination in the workplace, and only 55 percent of ethnic minorities compared to 71 percent of whites felt that they are valued members of their team.

A glance at the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study dataset also reveals that discrimination is certainly a significant problem, with slightly more than one out of five individuals reporting some level of experienced discrimination in the UK due to their race, ethnicity, or skin color. When the data is disaggregated by ethnicity, some differences emerge, with blacks reporting higher levels of discrimination than their South Asian counterparts. Figure 4.1 illustrates that 44% of Black Caribbean and 33% of Black African respondents reported experiencing racial discrimination, respectively. In comparison, 26% of Indians, and 19% of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis reported encountering discrimination in the UK. Although the weighted rates of discrimination for Black respondents is higher, stigmatization is certainly something that a sizable number of individuals from South Asian backgrounds have also experienced. However, consistent with previous research, the EMBES dataset also reveals that Black people in Britain report higher rates of discrimination.

4.4 Minority Political Attitudes and Behaviors

When researching any racial or ethnic minority group, it is vital to keep in mind that identities and preferences are not fixed or absolute. Since identities are socially constructed, they can change over time or across generations. For instance, racial distinctions between white and mixed white and black are increasingly becoming unclear in the context of the UK. Official classifications based on ethnicity or nationality are also problematic. Punjabi

Figure 4.1: Experienced Discrimination by Ethnicity (2010 EMBES)



Sikhs, for example, may identify as "Indian" under the official classification but think of themselves a separate ethno-religious group. I raise these issues to point out that when discussing the attitudes and behaviors of ethnic minorities in any context, it is important to keep in mind that the diversity within and between different groups is fluid and dynamic rather than fixed. As such, the attitudes and behaviors that "ethnic minorities," as an overarching group, may hold in present time may certainly change in the future. Furthermore, some groups or even subsections of groups may hold distinct attitudes on certain issues from other ethnic minorities. The same point is also applicable to the "white" ethnic majority population as divisions based on ethnicity and nationality between the English, Irish, Scots, Welsh, and other groups can make it difficult to speak of a holistic "white British" group. Nevertheless, because of their disadvantaged socioeconomic position relative to the ethnically white Brits, and the experiences of marginalization that

Black and South Asian communities have faced due to their race, ethnicity, or skin color, one can expect these groups to hold some distinctive and uniform attitudes and concerns that may shape their political behaviors.

In this section, I rely on the two most recent and comprehensive studies of ethnic minorities to date, conducted by Heath et al. (2013) and Sanders et al. (2014), to provide a brief review of the ways in which ethnic minorities are similar or different from their white counterparts, and the factors that shape their political behaviors. The purpose of this section is to set the foundation for analyzing how experiences with societal and political discrimination may impact the sociopolitical behaviors of racially and ethnically marginalized individuals.² This section will also illustrate that discrimination is a central theme in the calculus of minority citizens, and a variable that scholars must seriously contend with.

I begin this review by highlighting the distinctive interests and concerns that minorities have vis-a-vis the majority white population. While broad consensus across the entire British society on some issues exist, such as concerns with the state of the economy or the recession, contrasting views on a variety of issues are also visible between whites and minorities. For instance, minorities place a higher priority on issues related to unemployment. This is certainly a key issue for both Black and Asian communities because they have historically faced, and continue to face, tremendous barriers to employment opportunities and social mobility, reflecting the "ethnic penalties" that they encounter in the labor market (Brown et al., 2013; Yaojun and Heath, 2014). Minorities also place bigger emphasis on issues of crime primarily because they are more likely to live in urban areas, suffer from race-based harassment or violence, and receive unfair treatment by the police and the criminal justice system as a whole. This is not to say that crime is not an important topic for white Brits, it is that minorities place a higher premium on this issue. The

²For a detailed examination of democratic engagement, in general, refer to "The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain" by Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders, and Sobolewska (2013).

same is also true for immigration and asylum policy.³

Perhaps not surprisingly, however, the most dramatic difference in attitudes between minorities and whites deals with issues of equal opportunity and fair treatment. Redress for racial discrimination is one issue that unites the different minority groups regardless of class or other socioeconomic interests. It is a policy area where a distinct "ethnic minority agenda" exists. Research by Heath et al. (2013) shows that on the question of whether the government should make every effort to improve opportunities for Black and Asian people, only about 20 percent of whites took the progressive stance. In sharp contrast, 70 percent of all ethnic minorities agreed that the government should provide opportunities—a 50-point difference. When asked about affirmative action policies, only 1 percent of whites agreed that Blacks and Asians who apply for jobs should be given priority to try to make up for past discrimination. While the percentage of minorities who agreed with the aforementioned proposition is only 28 percent, possibly due to social desirability effects as a result of primarily white interviewers, it is nevertheless sharply different from the views of British whites. Overall, redress for discrimination is a principle that all minorities take a very similar stance on. As Heath and colleagues put it in their study:

This is an objective which all minorities share, and the majority/minority differences on these issues are much the largest of any included in our survey. They dwarf almost every other cleavage that can be found either in the BES or EMBES. (page 70)

Due to their distinct views, especially with respect to issues of discrimination and immigration, minorities also contrast to whites with respect to partisanship. Both Blacks and Asians have historically supported the Labour party, and have shown the least amount of

³However, with respect to whether "asylum seekers should be sent home," Black Caribbean and Black African individuals are much more likely than whites and even South Asians to take a progressive stance.

support for the Conservative party. British electoral studies and public opinion surveys as early as the 1980s demonstrate that minorities express much higher levels of support for the Labour party than whites, with Blacks generally showing higher levels of allegiance for the Labour party than South Asians (Anwar, 1980, 1984, 1998, 2001; Amin and Richardson, 1992). And more recent examination of partisanship with the EMBES dataset mirrors previous research. While, as of 2010, only one-fifth of minorities do not identify with any of the three major parties in the UK, about two-thirds identify with the Labour party compared to only 28 percent of whites. This vast difference in partisanship cannot be explained by variations in socioeconomic status or attitudes toward issues that impact the entire British society in general, such as policies related to the overall state of the economy. Rather, the feeling of discrimination or relative deprivation is a key factor for the different levels of support toward the Labour party between whites and minorities (see Heath et al. (2013), page 124). Once again, discrimination takes center stage in the calculus of ethnic minorities in Britain.

An analysis of party platforms and legislation demonstrates that the allegiance to the Labour party is not without significant reason. The Labour party has established itself as the party of minority concerns in both promises and actions. Heath and colleague's (2013) examination of party manifestos from 1974-2010 illustrates that the Labour party has made a much greater commitment to tackling issues of racial discrimination, with the Conservative party demonstrating significant opposition toward immigration and staying largely indifferent towards issues of equal opportunity. The Labour party has not only proposed measures to combat discrimination, but has also enacted a number of legislations to tackle racial discrimination. In contrast, the Conservative party has failed to propose any specific measures to combat discrimination, and has enacted a series of measures to limit immigration and restrict citizenship.

However, this is not to claim that the Labour party has always acted favorably toward

minority interests. While attempting to promote equality of opportunity, the Labour party has also tried to take a tough stance on immigration. For instance, under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (1997-2010), the Labour governments passed the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act of 2002 and the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2009. The former extended the government's power to detain asylum seekers and created a 'white list' of safe countries, and the latter strengthened border controls and changed residence rules for the acquisition of citizenship.

Despite efforts to limit immigration, perceptions of the Labour party by minorities has remained fairly favorable, with British whites also thinking that the Labour party is more progressive on opportunities for minorities than the Conservative party. Overall, the conservative party is viewed as the party that is concerned with the interests of the middle class and big business, while the Labour party is viewed to be more concerned with issues of unemployment, Blacks and Asians, the working class, and labor unions. An astonishing two thirds of minorities feel that there is a major difference between the two party's policy positions on the issues that most powerfully impact their lives—that is, issues of equal opportunity and fair treatment, especially in the labor market. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that a big difference exists between the party affiliation of minorities and whites.

Given differences in experiences of discrimination, party affiliation, and attitudes toward equal opportunity, unemployment, and, to some degree, immigration, one may reasonably wonder the extent to which patterns of ethnic minority democratic engagement may be different than that of whites. Both Heath and colleagues (2013) and Sanders and colleagues (2014) tackle this question and find that minorities are, by and large, as interested and engaged in politics as whites. Furthermore, they find that the variables that have theoretically and empirically been identified as powerfully shaping the political behaviors of the majority white British population and citizens in the United States,

are also associated with the political engagement of ethnic minorities. For instance, they found that socioeconomic and psychological resources as well as civic skills were associated with increased engagement. Other factors such as a sense of civic duty also explained variations in political activism, notably voting. Party identification was also an influential predictor of turnout as was generational status, with second generation minorities being more likely than first and 1.5 generation minorities to take part in politics primarily due to their ability to more effortlessly navigate the British political landscape.

Interestingly, however, Heath and colleagues (2013) did not utilize a specific measure of experienced discrimination in their voting models despite placing big emphasis on this topic throughout their comprehensive study.⁴ Sanders and colleagues (2014) do include a measure of experienced discrimination but did not find it to be associated with "democratic engagement." However, their index of democratic engagement conflates behavioral factors such as participation in the 2010 general election with attitudinal and psychological measures such as a sense of civic duty, political trust, political interest and knowledge, satisfaction with British democracy, and even party identification. Furthermore, their measure of "Egocentric discrimination," which is operationalized by asking respondents to report if they have personally experienced discrimination in the UK, is problematic. First, their measure conflates experiences of different types of discrimination rather than solely focusing on discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or skin color. Second, they do not differentiate between different sources of marginalization. As it will be illustrated in the upcoming sections, these two factors, along with the imprecise index of democratic engagement, help explain the lack of findings. As such, while both studies make a very important contribution to the study of minority politics in the UK, they fall short in specif-

⁴A measure of "relative deprivation" was included, but was not found to be statistically associated with turnout among registered voters. This measure was operationalized with the following question: "There is a big gap between what people like me expect to get out of life and what they receive." This question is fairly vague and is not specifically focused on issues of discrimination.

ically analyzing the role that *discrimination* based on race, ethnicity, or skin color plays in the behavior engagement or alienation of minority groups.

To conclude, previous work has certainly shed light on the distinct patterns of immigration, ties to colonial Britain, and the current status of Britain's racial and ethnic minorities in social and political spheres. Past research certainly makes it clear that while certainly diverse, minorities share various commonalities, primarily due to experiences with discrimination. We also know that discrimination, notably verbal and physical violence, reduces the physical and mental well-being of ethnic minorities (Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002). However, there is still a major gap in existing literature. We still do not know the extent to which discrimination can potentially mobilize ethnic minorities in the UK or depress their political activity. Thus, while this chapter tests the theoretical import of the S&PD framework in a new context, it also fills a major gap in the literature of minority political behavior in British politics.

4.5 Data Selection & Variable Description

Having reviewed the distinct histories and shared experiences of ethnic minorities in Britain, I now return to the central question of the present study: what is the impact of societal and political discrimination on sociopolitical behavior? To answer this question, and to evaluate the generalizability of the theoretical model of discrimination and sociopolitical behavior with different racial and ethnic groups, the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) was selected. The EMBES study is the most recent and comprehensive survey of ethnic and racial minorities in the UK. This survey was administered face-to-face by computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI) along with a follow-up mail-back questionnaire in English.⁵ From May 7th of 2010 to August 31st of 2010 interviewers conducted a total of 2,787 interviews in England, Scotland, and Wales. While the


⁵None of the variables used in this analysis are part of the mail-back questionnaire.

dataset is comprised of a number of core questions taken from the main British Election Study, the sample design differs considerably from the main post-election study in that it focuses exclusively on the five biggest ethnic minority groups in Great Britain. The survey population consists of a random sample of adults eighteen years old or higher who are residents of Great Britain and self-classify into one of the five Census ethnic groups: Black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi. The vast majority of the respondents completed the survey in English as interviewers were instructed to ask to speak to an English speaker within the household. In cases in which respondents faced language barriers, interviewers had translation cards in a multiple of languages at their disposal. All interviewers received cultural sensitivity training and were shown how to administer translated versions of the questionnaire.⁶ The survey yielded a high response rate of 58 percent, and the estimated coverage levels for each ethnic group is also very high—between 85 to 90 percent. Figure 4.2 visually displays the population breakdown by ethnic group identification. As can be seen, each ethnic minority group represents roughly twenty percent of the total sample with the exception of Bangladeshi participants, who only comprise ten percent of the total sample. Out of the five minority groups in Britain, the Bangladeshi community is certainly the smallest.

The EMBES survey is an appropriate dataset for this study because one of its primary goals is to assess patterns of ethnic minority turnout, vote choice, partisanship, and trust in British democracy, as well as determining the key factors that shape minority political engagement. As such, the dataset contains a number of detailed questions to rigorously test the independent impact of discrimination on sociopolitical behavior. Furthermore, the survey has several key strengths that sets it apart from the Pew and MAPOS surveys utilized in Chapter 2. Questions regarding discrimination are multi-layered, enabling scholars to measure not just the *presence* of racial or ethnic discrimination, but also the *fre-*

⁶About 9% of the total sample used translation cards with the help of the interviewers.

Figure 4.2: EMBES Sample Distribution by Ethnicity



quency levels of discrimination in different domains. Participants were first asked to identify whether they "have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in the UK" because of their ethnicity, race, or skin color in the past 5 years. Respondents who indicated "yes" were then asked "how often" they have experienced such discrimination or unfair treatment in Britain. Valid responses include: none, rarely, sometimes, and often. This format is advantageous because it enables researchers to take into consideration both the occurrence and rate of ethnic or racial discrimination. Unlike the Pew study of Muslim-Americans, which only offered binary response options to specific discrimination questions (a simple "yes" or "no"), this questions introduces more variation.

The last and most important layer focuses on the source of discrimination. Specifically, the emphasis is placed on who discriminated against the subjects and where such encounter occurred. Three specific questions most closely resemble experiences of societal discrimination. Respondents were asked whether they have experienced unfair treat-

ment (1) on the street, (2) in a shop, bank, restaurant, or bar, or (3) at social gatherings.⁷ These items were combined to create an additive scale that ranges from 0 to 9, in which 0 represents an individual who did not experience any discrimination and 9 represents an individual who has experienced a great deal of societal discrimination. About 80% of the respondents indicated that they did not experience discrimination in any of the three domains, while 20% of the participants experienced at least some racial or ethnic discrimination. Out of the three items, street discrimination is the most prevalent type of discrimination reported followed by discrimination in a shop and stigmatization in social gatherings. The scale is fairly reliable, with a Cronbach's alpha of .63 and an omega coefficient of .67.⁸ Theoretically, these questions are appropriate indicators of societal, rather than political or systematic, discrimination because they inquire about more routine or everyday encounters between rank-and-file members of the society.

In contrast to the societal discrimination measure, the following four questions seek to capture respondent's experiences with political discrimination: participants were asked whether they have encountered discrimination (1) when dealing with immigration or other government offices or officials, (2) when dealing with the police or courts, or (3) in domains such as colleges or universities or (4) when applying for a job or promotion. The political discrimination scale ranges from 0 to 12 with an alpha coefficient of .59 and an omega coefficient of .62.⁹ Overall, 81% of the participants did not report any

⁷Each individual item ranges from value 0 (no experience of discrimination) to 3 (often experiencing discrimination).

⁸Since Cronbach's alpha relies on assumptions that are hardly ever met, the internal consistency estimations are either inflated or attenuated. This is especially the case under violations of tau-equivalence. Omega has been shown to provide a more sensible index of internal consistency under such circumstances (Zinbarg et al., 2005, 2006; Graham, 2006). As such, omega coefficients are also provided.

⁹Considering that the latent discrimination variables are comprised of only a few secondary survey items and that the individual questions were not specifically devised for the purposes of composing highly reliable and unidimensional societal and political discrimination scales, the alpha and omega scores are not particularly high. However, in addition to the theoretical justification offered for combining each specific item, the forthcoming analysis will demonstrate that the proposed distinction by source translates

political discrimination. The preceding questions most closely fit the concept of political discrimination, which is defined as systematic, structural, or group-oriented exposure to unfair treatment. Rather than experiencing peer discrimination at social gatherings or on the street, individuals were targeted by the government, its actors, or organizations that are supposed to, at least theoretically, abide by laws and principles of equal treatment. When institutions, intentionally or unintentionally, violate notions of fairness or fail to adequately respond to discriminatory behavior, mobilization is likely to ensue on the grounds that such organizations have an affirmative duty to abide by the laws and norms of equality embedded within democratic regimes.

Certainly, discrimination in the labor market has become a central political issue, with the Labour party making various efforts to alleviate differential treatment and outcomes. In 2001, the Labour party manifesto promised to tackle work discrimination so that " ...all the people can make the most of their talents" (see Heath et al. (2013), page 101). In 2005, the Labour party once again focused on promoting employment opportunities for minorities, promising to make recommendations to the Prime Minister on tackling disadvantage and promoting equality of opportunity for all groups. The same sentiment was echoed in 2010. Liberal Democrats have also taken similar positions, albeit promising to combat discrimination with an all-inclusive Equality Act, which was eventually adopted under the Labour government of Tony Blair, and again in 2010 under Gordon Brown. As can be seen, discrimination in the labor market has become a political issue that the Labour party and Liberal Democrats have focused on, but one that the Conservative party has largely ignored. Instead, the Conservative party has placed considerable emphasis on reforming border protection, immigration, and asylum policies, oftentimes making the process more restrictive than before.

Returning to the data selection rationale, another benefit of using the EMBES dataset


into divergent behavioral outcomes.

is that it contains five questions to adequately test the four hypotheses of this study, and to further evaluate the theoretical framework by investigating the relationship between discrimination and well-being. Two questions were selected to test the influence of political and societal discrimination on participation in mainstream politics. Respondents were asked whether they managed to vote in the 2010 local and general elections. For each question, 0 was assigned to participants who did not vote, and 1 was assigned to individuals who voted. About 64% of all eligible voters (citizens, dual citizens, and commonwealth citizens) voted in the local election and 69% voted in the general election. Both elections were held on May 6th, but not all places in the UK held a local election.¹⁰ Figure 4.3 presents rates of self-reported voting by election type and ethnic group classification using original survey weights for within each group comparison. A casual glance at the rates of electoral participation by ethnicity demonstrates that East Asian participants are more engaged than Black-Caribbean and Black-African respondents. Since differences in participation could be explained by socio-demographic variation between the groups and other factors such as efficacy, trust in government, and various degrees of experienced discrimination, multivariate analysis is necessary to assess between-group differences more carefully.

In addition to questions about electoral engagement, two question were used to test the impact of discrimination on in-group identification and engagement. In-group identification is measured with the following question: "Some people think of themselves first as British. Others may think of themselves first as (Black/Asian). Which best describes how you think of yourself?" About 17% of the sample identified as mostly or exclusively British, half of the respondents (50%) viewed themselves as equally Black/Asian and British, and about one-third (33%) decided to identify as mostly or exclusively Black/Asian. This variable ranges from value 1 to 3 with the highest value representing moderate or

¹⁰Only 55 out of 2,787 of the respondents were not eligible to vote. Local elections were not held in all areas of Great Britain.

Figure 4.3: EMBES Electoral Participation Rates by Ethnicity



strong national British identity. As for in-group or ethnic-specific engagement, respondents were asked to indicate whether they have taken part in the activities of an ethnic or cultural association or club in the past 12 months. This dichotomous variable (0-1) is an improvement from the Pew in-group participation question because it does not conflate religious-specific activities with general in-group engagement. Interestingly, however, the rate of ethnic-specific participation in the EMBES dataset is similar to the rate of participation among Muslim-Americans in the Pew dataset. About 30% of the EMBES respondents indicated taking part in activities of an ethnic or cultural association or club while 33% of Muslim-Americans participated in activities of the mosque or Islamic center beyond prayer.

The last and final outcome variable used in this study inquires about physical and mental health. Individuals were asked if they have any physical or mental impairment,

illness, or disability that has troubled them over a period of 12 months or that is likely to affect them over such a period. This question is useful in evaluating general well-being among individuals who experienced political and societal discrimination to further evaluate the proposed mechanism. While this measure is imperfect in that long-term mental and physical impairment, illness, or disability is combined under one category, it does provide a crude measure of well-being to further assess the claim that, on average, societal discrimination has an adverse effect on health, which is one reason why socially stigmatized individuals may be less inclined or able to engage in politics. The mental/physical health variable is dichotomous (0-1), with 17% of the entire sample reporting a long-standing issue. When the question was broken down by ethnicity, Black-Caribbean respondents reported the highest rate of impairment (23%), while Bangladeshi individuals reported the lowest rate of adverse health outcomes (12%) followed by Pakistani (14%) and Indian (15%) participants. Interestingly, Black Caribbean individuals also reported the highest rate of experienced racial or ethnic discrimination. But again, variation in health outcomes, as with voting behavior, is conditioned by several confounding factors, including, but not limited to, income, education, and age. Therefore, between-group differences need to be evaluated more carefully in a model that controls for difference in socioeconomic status and, of course, experiences of marginalization.

4.5.1 Model Controls

An examination of discrimination and sociopolitical behavior needs to account for possible confounding factors. This section provides a description of all the variables that are included in the regression models. In an attempt to limit the threat of omitted variable bias, as many theoretically relevant covariates of participation as possible are taken into consideration while still keeping the models reasonably parsimonious. The goal is to isolate the independent impact of political and societal discrimination rather than to assess

all the possible variables that shape the sociopolitical behaviors of ethnic minorities in the UK.

To this end, the first set of variables that are included in all of the models are socio-demographic controls. Dummy variables were created for each of the five ethnic groups (reference category= Pakistani) as well as sex (female=1, $\mu = 0.52$), generational status (second gen=1, $\mu = 0.35$), and income (reference category=low income). Age ranges from 18 to 97 ($\mu = 39.0$, $SD = 14.9$). Education is an ordinal variable that ranges from 0 to 4, with value 4 indicating post-graduate degree obtained in either the UK or abroad, and 0 signifying no British or overseas qualifications ($\mu = 1.64$, $SD = 1.24$). Identity ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 indicating moderate to strong Black or Asian identification and 2 representing moderate to strong British identification ($\mu = 0.84$, $SD = 0.69$). The middle category represents individuals who identify equally as British and Asian/Black. Lack of fluency in English can pose considerable barriers to registration and turnout, especially among the most recent arrivals from Africa. As such, English fluency is also considered, and this variable is operationalized by asking respondents whether English is the main language spoken at home ($\mu = 0.65$, $SD = 0.48$).

In addition to standard demographic controls, theoretically important predictors of sociopolitical engagement were also incorporated. Party identification is a dummy variable, where 0 means no party identification, and 1 signifies identifying with one of the parties in the UK such as the Labour party ($\mu = 0.80$, $SD = 0.40$). Political interest is a four-category measure of interest in British politics. The lowest response option means no interest at all, and the highest value stands for a great deal of interest ($\mu = 2.2$, $SD = 1.1$). Political knowledge (0-5) is composed of the number of correct items reported from a five-item political quiz ($\mu = 3.1$, $SD = 1.2$). Political efficacy ($\mu = 2.6$, $SD = 2.9$) is operationalized using the following question: "On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics

and public affairs?" Institutional trust is measured similarly to political efficacy, but this time respondents were asked how much they trust (0-10; 10=high trust) the Parliament at Westminster ($\mu = 5.1$, $SD = 2.7$). Satisfaction with democracy is a categorical variable where 0 represents very dissatisfied with democracy in Britain, 1 stands for a little dissatisfied, and values 2 and 3 denote fairly or very satisfied, respectively ($\mu = 1.7$, $SD = 0.82$). The last three variables are particularly important to account for because political efficacy, institutional trust, and satisfaction with British democracy correlate both with discrimination and political activity.

The final covariates of participation are worship attendance and a sense of civic duty. Worship attendance is an important catalyst to political participation because religious institutions play a significant role in developing civic skills and providing a common meeting place for individuals to interact and discuss salient issues (Verba et al., 1995). The ethical norm that citizens have a duty to vote is also considered an equally consequential and powerful predictor of voting behavior that is widely endorsed and adopted in North America and Europe (Blais and Achen, 2010; Blais and Galais, 2016; Clarke, 2009; Galais and Blais, 2014, 2016). The higher an individual's sense of duty, the higher the propensity that he/she will care a great deal about the outcome of the election and hence, to participate in politics. This certainly holds true among ethnic minorities in Britain (Heath et al., 2013). As such, civic duty is a key variable that is included in the local and general election models. To gauge a sense of civic duty, individuals were asked to report how strongly they agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is every citizen's duty to vote in an election." About 85% of the respondents either agree or strongly agree that they have a duty to vote in elections. While questions such as these are susceptible to social desirability effects, the high sense of duty is, nevertheless, noteworthy and consistent with previous research that identifies this variable as a widely endorsed ethical norm (Blais and Galais, 2016). More detailed information about this variable and all of the other

variables used in the analysis is reported in appendix B (see Table B.6).

4.6 Findings: Discrimination & Political Behavior

The analysis begins with an examination of discrimination and electoral engagement. The purpose of this section is twofold: (1) to test hypotheses 1 and 2 and (2) show that imprecisely operationalizing discrimination can lead to the incorrect conclusion that discrimination has a negligible effect on behavior. To recap, hypothesis 1 suggested that the perception of political discrimination motivates individuals to take action against unfair government practices or, more generally, systematic violations of equality. In contrast, hypothesis 2 suggested that societal discrimination is likely to make individuals pessimistic and disheartened by the democratic process. Individuals exposed to peer discrimination are likely to internalize negative feelings and display symptoms of sadness, depression, or powerlessness. Consequently, those stigmatized by their peers in everyday encounters may be less inclined to spend their limited time and resources on the democratic process. As false consciousness theorists would claim, such individuals are likely to develop an inflated sense of pessimism and genuinely believe that the the majority of their peers disagree with them (see (Cunningham, 1987; Jost, 1995; Miller and McFarland, 1991) for details). Under these circumstances, it makes sense if societally stigmatized individuals decide to stay home during elections.

In regards to measurement, I estimated three logistic regression models per election to illustrate that question-wording and disentangling discrimination by source matters greatly. When discrimination is broadly operationalized, the conclusions that we reach on the impact of discrimination on political behavior is vastly different than when attention is paid to the source of mistreatment, and the variables we utilize are more precisely measured. In the first stage, I operationalized racial and ethnic discrimination by utilizing the first discrimination question available in the EMBES survey, which simply asked

individuals to report whether they have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or skin color.¹¹ This variable will be referred to as "Broad Disc I." The title assigned to this variable is fitting because this question does not inquire about the nature of the discrimination experienced. We actually do not know what the respondents are thinking about at the time that they are answering this question. Some participants may be thinking about the mistreatment they recently experienced on the street or at a social gathering, while others may be thinking about their negative interactions with immigration officials or the police. Because this question is imprecise, there is no way to identify what the respondent is considering at the time that he/she is answering this question. Furthermore, this question is also broad because it does not provide any indication on frequency levels of occurrence—respondents are only asked to report "yes" if they have experienced discrimination.

The second measure of discrimination is referred to as "Broad Disc II." This variable is an improvement to the first measure because individuals are asked to report "how often" they have experienced discrimination in Britain on the basis of ethnicity, race, or skin color. Despite this improvement, this question is still imprecise for the same reasons previously described. That is, no attention is paid to the source of mistreatment. To overcome the aforementioned shortcoming, I disentangled discrimination by source and created two unique variables that tap into different dimensions of discrimination. The "societal discrimination" variable not only considers the rate of discrimination experienced, but also identifies the specific domains of stigmatization. This variable specifically focuses on everyday experiences of racial and ethnic discrimination between rank-and-file

¹¹EMBES also inquires about other types of discrimination such as unfair treatment based on gender, accent, religion, age, and sexuality or disability. This study only considers the impact of racial and ethnic discrimination rather than conflating all types of experiences with discrimination. It is important to note that because this is a sample of ethnic minorities in the UK, racial and ethnic discrimination is by far the most common type of discrimination reported. However, for those interested in evaluating the impact of other types of discrimination, this survey may be appropriate.

members of the society on the street, in shops, or at social gatherings. In contrast, "political discrimination" is an indicator of systematic discrimination. Instead of combining responses to any type of discrimination experienced, respondents who only encountered racial or ethnic discrimination when interacting with the government or institutions were assigned to this variable.


The analysis begins with turnout in the local election first. As previously mentioned, I take a three-step approach to assessing the influence of discrimination on voting behavior. All the three models reported in Table B.1 (in appendix B) are identical with the exception of the discrimination variables, which change with each subsequent model. Since the substantive impact of the discrimination variables on reported voting cannot easily be identified by simply looking at the reported logistic regression coefficients, I plotted changes in predicted probabilities to aid in the interpretation of the results. Using a standard simulation technique known as first difference, predicted probabilities were calculated by changing the independent variables under analysis from minimum to maximum value while holding all the other covariates at their respective means. Figure 4.4 illustrates the post-estimation results per model, beginning with the first discrimination variable. As can be seen, the first broad, dichotomous discrimination variable has no impact on reported voting in the local election. Similarly, the second ordinal, but also broad, discrimination variable has no substantive and statistically significant impact on the dependent variable. Both variables inquire about the types of discrimination, which is discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or skin color. The second measure introduces more variation but that does not change the results. If the analysis were to end here we would conclude that discrimination is not an influential predictor of the political behavior of lower-status groups. After all, the results demonstrate that the relationships are statistically indistinguishable from zero and the effects negligible. But, taking the next step and disentangling discrimination by source reveals a completely different result. As

expected, societal discrimination has a negative and substantial impact on turnout and political discrimination has a positive influence on voting behavior. Specifically, individuals who experienced high levels of societal discrimination were 19% less likely than those who did not experience any discrimination to report that they voted in the 2010 local election. Conversely, individuals exposed to political discrimination were more motivated to vote than those who did not experience any discrimination—a 22-point increase in likelihood of voting. These differences are quite sharp, illustrating that the source of discrimination matters. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that discrimination, when measured precisely, is a powerful predictor of political participation. In addition to the substantive results, goodness of fit statistics suggest endorsing Model 3 over Models 1 and 2. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values, which are estimated measures of the relative quality of the models show the societal and political discrimination model is the best model out of the three—Model 3 has the lowest AIC.

Since local elections are not held in every electoral jurisdiction in the UK, the next set of models (4-6) reported in Table B.2 (in appendix B) assess the impact of discrimination on turnout in the general election. This analysis provides additional support for hypotheses 1 and 2. Again, the broad discrimination measures are not statistically associated with voting and the substantive relationship is nearly zero (see Figure 4.5). However, the specific measures of discrimination impact the likelihood of turnout greatly, and in the opposite direction. Keeping all the model covariates at their respective means, societal discrimination reduces the likelihood of turnout in the general election by 18 percentage points. In contrast, political discrimination serves as a mobilizing force, increasing the probability of voting by 16 percentage points. A glance at the reported AIC values indicate once again that Model 6, which focuses on the type, frequency, and source of discrimination is more superior than the models that contain broad measures of discrimination (Models 4 & 5).


As the preceding electoral analysis has illustrated, discrimination is a powerful predic-

Figure 4.4: Discrimination & Turnout in the 2010 Local Election



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of voting in the 2010 Local Election. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

Figure 4.5: Discrimination & Turnout in the 2010 General Election




Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of voting in the 2010 General Election. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

tor of political behavior if attention is paid to the source of discrimination. To demonstrate how the key independent variables fare in comparison to the other explanatory variables in the voting models, Figure 4.6 displays the direction and substantive impact of every single variable. Other than a sense of civic duty, which increases the probability of voting in both elections by about 45 percent points, political and societal discrimination have as big of an impact on turnout as other key predictors of voting behavior. For instance, both sources of discrimination have a comparable effect on voting as political interest, political knowledge, party attachment, and age. Other variables such as worship attendance, efficacy, English fluency, and generation are also associated with voting, but their impact is considerably smaller than the discrimination variables.

The analysis also reveals several interesting results. First, women, independent of ethnicity and socioeconomic resources, are about 6% more likely than men to vote in both the local and general elections. Ethnic group differences also emerged in the fully specified models. Keeping all the model covariates at their respective means, Black Caribbean, Black African, and Indian respondents were significantly less likely than Pakistani participants to indicate that they participated in the local election. In contrast, Bangladeshi individuals were about 9% more likely than Pakistanis to participate in the local election. As for the general election, the same results hold with one exception: Indian participants were no more or less likely than Pakistani individuals to report having voted. The discrepancy in voting between Black and Asian respondents could potentially be explained by arrival to Britain in different periods, and for different reasons. The most recent large-scale arrivals to Britain, for instance, have been migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. As such, it may not be too surprising to find that Black-Africans are less likely than their Asian counterparts to engage in elections.

Figure 4.6: Predictors of Turnout in the Local & General Election



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of voter turnout. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

4.7 Findings: Discrimination, In-group Identification, & Ethnic-Based Engagement


I argued in Chapter 2 that discriminated individuals are likely to gravitate toward their in-group members for the purposes of reaffirmation and acceptance, and to possibly organize against experiences of marginalization through ethnic-based associations. Chapter 3 demonstrated that both political and societal discrimination were indeed substantially associated with increased in-group engagement. In this section, I test hypotheses 3 and 4 once again, but with an additional outcome variable. Instead of just analyzing the impact of discrimination on in-group or ethnic-based engagement, the EMBES dataset contains a clear question about identity preference. Respondents were asked whether they first consider themselves as Black/Asian or British, with the option of identifying as "equally both" also available.

Table B.3 (in appendix B) reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression model to test the claim that experiences of political and societal discrimination are likely to influence individuals to identify more with their racial group than a national British identity. For ease of interpretation, Figure 4.7 displays simulated first difference results and calculated confidence bands for both of the key explanatory variables. The results provide considerable support for the proposition that discrimination, regardless of source, is associated with in-group identification. Individuals exposed to societal discrimination were about 30% more likely than their counterparts to first identify as Black/Asian relative to British. Furthermore, such individuals were also 25% less likely to identify as "equally both" relative to Black/Asian.¹² Experiences of political discrimination had a similar impact on identity choice. Exposure to political discrimination increased the likelihood of identifying first as Black/Asian relative to British by 25 percentage points. As with societal discrimination, this variable also reduced the likelihood of identifying as equally

¹²As expected, Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi participants were asked about "Asian" racial identity, and Black-Caribbean and Black-African participants were asked about "Black" racial identity.

both compared to Black/Asian—a decrease of 15 percentage points.

Figure 4.7: The Relationship Between Discrimination & Identity



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of identity choice. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

One concern with this model of identity choice is that individuals who live in heavily concentrated ethnic neighborhoods may not only experience more discrimination but may also identify more with their racial group rather than a British identity. This is certainly plausible, and a claim that deserves attention. To address this concern, the identity model includes a control for ethnic concentration. Individuals were asked: "As far as you know, how many of the people in your neighbourhood have the same ethnic background as you?" This variable ranges from 1-5 ($\mu = 2.55$, $SD = 0.95$) with the following response options: (1) none of them, (2) a few of them, (3) about half of them, (4) most of them, and (5) all of them. About two-thirds of the respondents indicated living in neighborhoods that are populated by a few or less than a few individuals of the same ethnic background. Less than 2% of participants believed that they live in a neighborhood that is exclusively populated by people of their own ethnic background. Nearly one-fifth selected option three (about half of them), and also one-fifth chose option four (most of them). With this variable included in the model, the direct relationship between discrimination and iden-

tity choice is unaffected. That is, keeping ethnic neighborhood concentration constant, experiences of societal or political discrimination are likely to drive individuals towards a minority rather than a national British identity. It is important to note that ethnic neighborhood concentration did have an independent influence on identity choice, but the effect is not as substantively large when compared to discrimination. Individuals who live in predominately ethnic neighborhoods are about 11% more likely than their counterparts to identify as Black/Asian relative to British. This impact is not negligible, but also not as strong as the impact of discrimination, which ranged from 25-30 percentage points. Again, the results demonstrate that discrimination is an important explanatory variable that deserve further attention and research.


Having discussed the role of discrimination on identity choice, the next model explores the propensity of in-group engagement, given experiences with discrimination. Hypothesis 3 suggested that peer stigmatization is likely to promote in-group participation because ethnic-based activities have the capacity to help individuals cope with the pain of societal rejection. Ethnic-based organizations can be conceived of as safe and welcoming environments that can give individuals a sense of belonging to the social world. Similarly, hypothesis 4 posited that political discrimination is likely to increase in-group engagement, but perhaps for a different reason than societal discrimination. Individuals who perceive systematic, group-based discrimination may gravitate towards ethnic-based associations because such organizations provide an avenue to discuss salient group-based issues and organize individuals toward a cause that impacts the entire group, such as discrimination in the job market. After all, ethnic organizations are predominately composed of members who may be more sympathetic to group-based issues than more diverse institutions that are dominated by majority-group members. It is also easier to find common ground on group-specific issues in more ethnically homogeneous, rather than diverse, organizations. Furthermore, as the literature review demon-

strated, minority citizens do hold distinctive views from white Brits on various policy matters.

To test the proposed claims, participation in an ethnic or cultural associations or club was regressed on societal and political discrimination and host of control variables to isolate the effect of discrimination on in-group engagement. Table B.4 (in the appendix B) presents the results of a logistic regression model since the dependent variable is dichotomous (0-1). To aid in the interpretation of the results, changes in predicated probabilities were calculated and graphed to visually depict the substantive impact of all the variables on ethnic participation. As Figure 4.8 displays, both discrimination variables are associated with participation in activities of an ethnic or cultural association or club.

Individuals who experienced high levels of societal discrimination were about 23% more likely than those who did not experience any discrimination to take part in ethnic activities. Likewise, political discrimination increased the likelihood of in-group engagement by 19 percentage points. These effects are quite large when compared to the other explanatory variables in the model. Discrimination has a similar impact on in-group activism as does worship attendance, and has a much larger impact than generational status and education. Perhaps surprisingly, ethnic neighborhood concentration was not statistically significant, although the impact is in the positive direction. Identity was also not a statistically significant predictor of in-group engagement (at least not at the traditional bounds), but the effect is in the expected direction. Those who identify as British first compared to Asian/Black are less likely to report having participated in the activities of an ethnic or cultural association or club.

Figure 4.8: The Relationship Between Discrimination & In-Group Engagement



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of in-group engagement. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

4.8 Findings: Discrimination & Health

The final analysis of this chapter considers the link between discrimination and well-being. Although Chapter 5 provides a more detailed investigation of this topic, the present section aims to further examine the theoretical framework with the same dataset that the main analyses were conducted with. To summarize, the theory chapter advanced the argument that peer stigmatization has the capacity to negatively impact a person's relatedness to others and consequently, impair health and influence behavior. Specifically, research suggests that societally rejected individuals are likely to internalize negative evaluations and display symptoms of sadness, depression, and low self-esteem. These adverse psychological outcomes provide one plausible explanation for why societally marginalized individuals may be less inclined to partake in democratic activities such as elections. Depression, for one, is associated with perceived lack of control, passivity, withdrawal, and reduced, rather than increased, attention to external cues (Cunningham, 1988; Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989). Perhaps not surprisingly, research finds that depressed individuals lack the necessary motivation to participate in politics (Ojeda, 2015).

The empirical analyses of this chapter, thus far, have only focused on the behavioral consequences of discrimination. No evidence has yet been offered that shows a direct link between peer stigmatization and health outcomes. If the proposed mechanism is at work, we should expect societal discrimination to have a meaningful and negative impact on psychological well-being, but political discrimination to have a negligible impact. While exposure to political discrimination can certainly elevate levels of stress and anxiety, individuals are unlikely to take institutional or group-oriented discrimination personally to the extent that they are likely to internalize day-to-day interpersonal experiences of stigmatization. In fact, there is reason to believe that systematic violations of equality aid in the formation of group solidarity or a collective orientation towards pol-


itics, which helps enhance pride and shield individuals from placing blame on personal shortcomings or failings (Chong and Rogers, 2005; Garcia, 2011; Miller et al., 1981; Welch and Foster, 1992). As such, the psychological dynamics at work for threatening political campaigns, laws, or institutional practices are different than acts of micro-level, societal discrimination. This provides one explanation of why political discrimination is associated with activism or resistance while societal discrimination is linked to acquiescence or withdrawal.

To recap, one way to test if the proposed mechanism is actually different for political and societal discrimination is to evaluate their independent impact on a reasonable measure of psychological well-being. As previously mentioned, one such a measure is available in the EMBES dataset. All of the respondents were asked to report if they have any long-standing mental or physical impairment. Admittedly, this is not the most ideal question since self-reported physical well-being is also included in this assessment. A better question would more specifically inquire about a person's psychological state. However, if anything, a broad question provides a much tougher test of the proposed theoretical framework than a specific question that focuses on a specific type of psychological outcome, such as depression. With the EMBES question, we can expect older and less fortunate individuals (lower socioeconomic status) to report higher rates of physical (and perhaps mental) issues due the natural process of aging and lack of resources such as proper access to health care, healthy foods, and other amenities that help decrease the odds of long-term or serious illnesses. Since this question does not solely focus on psychological well-being, the impact of societal discrimination has to be fairly strong for any meaningful relationship to be detected in a multivariate model that controls for confounding factors.

Considering that the EMBES health question is a dichotomous variable (1=impairment), a logistic regression model was estimated. Model 9 in Table B.5 (in appendix B)

reports the coefficients and standard errors of all the explanatory variables. To make sense of the findings, changes in predicated probabilities were calculated for each of the model covariates, with the results displayed in Figure 4.9. The findings provide support for the preceding claims, demonstrating that individuals who reported high levels of societal discrimination are indeed worse off than those who did not experience any discrimination. Societal discrimination increases the likelihood of self-reported mental and physical impairment by about 12 percentage points. Comparing this estimate with the other variables in the model, it becomes evident that the impact of societal discrimination is fairly significant. Only age has a bigger substantive impact on health than societal discrimination. For instance, simulated probabilities show that 65 year olds were about 33% more likely than 18 year olds to report a long-standing physical or mental condition. Socioeconomic status also had a meaningful impact on health. Individuals who are more educated and reported higher household incomes were about 5 to 8 percentage points less likely than their less fortunate counterparts to suffer from a long-standing health issue. Most importantly, and as hypothesized, political discrimination does not appear to have the same internalization effect that societal discrimination has. Respondents who experienced high levels of discrimination when interacting with the government or institutions such as universities were not more likely than those who did not experience such discrimination to report any adverse mental or physical issues. The political discrimination variable is statistically insignificant, and the size of the impact is essentially zero. This finding supports the assertion that, on average, political discrimination does not impact well-being to the extent that societal stigmatization has the capacity to do so.

Figure 4.9: Predictors of Mental/Physical Impairment (EMBES)



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of self-reported physical/mental health impairment. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter makes a number of noteworthy contributions to the study of discrimination and sociopolitical behavior. First, the analysis showed that the theory of political and societal discrimination is transferrable to other contexts (notably democratic societies), and applicable to other minority populations. There is nothing to suggest that the findings found in the United States are exceptional or unique. Ethnic minorities in the UK are also mobilized or demobilized depending on the source of discrimination. Second, the empirical analysis also illuminated that attention needs to be paid to the operationalization of discrimination. When the concept of discrimination was broadly measured and no attention was paid to the source of marginalization, the explanatory variable under question had no bearing on political behavior. However, when discrimination was disentangled by source, the results revealed that societal discrimination is associated with behavioral alienation, while political discrimination motivates individuals to partake in local and general elections. Model fit statistics also demonstrated that the models with specific measures of discrimination were preferable to those with broad measures of discrimination.

Third, the empirical analysis showed that there is a difference between in-group and mainstream participation. While societally stigmatized individuals were less likely to engage in democratic activities such as voting, they were more likely than their counterparts to embrace in-group associations or clubs. According to the rejection-identification model and social identity theory, this is to be expected since in-group engagement offers an opportunity for reaffirmation and acceptance for marginalized individuals. Similarly, political discrimination was also an influential predictor of ethnic-based engagement. For individuals who have been denied equality and treated unfairly by institutional forces or actors, in-group associations offer an opportunity for collective action. Since, presumably, both societal and political discrimination promotes in-group involvement, the possibility

exists that the most pessimistic individuals (those who have faced high levels of societal stigmatization) may eventually embrace the possibility of collective action through mainstream channels of political influence such as election. However, to appropriately assess this dynamic, panel data is needed to examine attitudes and behaviors over a much longer period of time. Pessimistic individuals do not become energized overnight.

Fourth, the present chapter made another unique contribution. Instead of just looking at behavioral outcomes, such as engagement with ethnic-based associations, research was extended to the impact of discrimination on identity. Specifically, individuals were asked whether they first identify based on race or an overarching national British identity. The results, in line with prior expectations, demonstrated that discrimination, regardless of source, promotes the rejection of a unifying national British identity. Individuals exposed to political or societal discrimination were much more likely than their counterparts to identify as Black/Asian relative to British. This finding does not suggest that a racial identity alienates minorities from British politics. Results from the voting models did not show any evidence that those who predominately identified as British were somehow more engaged than those who identified as Black/Asian first. However, the ramifications of different identities could be witnessed in distinctive policy preferences, party support, and vote choice (Heath et al., 2013).

Lastly, the underlying mechanism linking societal discrimination to behavioral alienation was evaluated to see if societally stigmatized individuals are indeed psychologically worse off than their counterparts as a plethora of epidemiological studies suggest. Although a precise measure of psychological health was unavailable, the EMBES dataset did inquire about general physical and mental well-being, and the findings demonstrated that societal discrimination is linked to depleted health. On average, those who experienced high levels of societal discrimination were significantly more likely than their counterparts to report a long-standing physical or mental impairment. However, politi-

cal discrimination, as expected, had no discernible impact on health. While this analysis is far from perfect, it does present reasonable support for the claim that victims of peer stigmatization are much more likely to internalize negative evaluations than those who are faced with political or systematic discrimination.

Chapter 5

**ASSESSING THE MECHANISM LINKING SOCIETAL & POLITICAL
DISCRIMINATION TO (DIS)ENGAGEMENT**

The contemporary equivalent of lynching—racially motivated verbal and physical attacks—may have an important effect on the health experiences of ethnic minority groups in industrialized countries.

- Karlsen and Nazroo (2002)

The previous chapters provided evidence for the notion that discrimination is a multi-dimensional concept, and that the source of discrimination plays an influential role in whether individuals decide to participate in or withdraw from mainstream democratic activities. Further evaluation of the societal and political discrimination theory also suggested that individuals exposed to societal stigmatization may internalize negative evaluations, but not those who experienced political discrimination. Specifically, the Muslim-American chapter demonstrated that exposure to unfair airport security measures was not associated with self-reported unhappiness, but exposure to peer discrimination in the form of verbal or physical antagonism was positively linked to depleted happiness in life. A similar internalization pattern was also detected in the context of Great Britain. Ethnic minorities who reported multiple acts of societal discrimination, but not individuals who reported multiple acts of political discrimination, were more likely than those who did not experience any discrimination to report suffering from a long-term physical or mental health condition.

Overall, the analyses in both contexts illustrated that, on average, societal discrimination is associated with behavioral alienation and depleted psychological or physical health, while political discrimination is associated with political activism but not linked to destructive health outcomes. While illuminating, the findings are, nevertheless, limited due to lack of detailed survey questions to evaluate the underlying mechanism in more detail. Furthermore, the analyses relied solely on public opinion surveys. As such, issues of endogeneity and omitted variable bias can pose a threat to the reliability of the results, especially the causal direction. Considering these shortcomings and concerns, the

aim of this chapter is to take the investigation a step further and to specifically answer the following question: What psychological mechanisms link experiences of discrimination to behavioral (dis)engagement?

5.1 Chapter Objective

To answer the preceding question, the present chapter is divided into two major parts. Following the theory and hypotheses section, the first part will draw from a unique dataset on African-Americans to assess the independent impact of social and political discrimination on outlooks about life and well-being. The purpose of this section is to investigate the extent to which psychological health and individual opinions are affected by differential treatment, and how the results map onto the theoretical framework. For example, the following questions will be posed: Is it the case that societally marginalized individuals are more likely than their counterparts to be pessimistic about their future? How often do they feel like they are losing hope, think that they are unable to control important things in their life, or believe that things do not generally go their way? What about levels of stress and overall health? In comparison, what is the influence of political discrimination on the aforementioned outcomes? Can we expect the same internalization effect to be in play for those exposed to political discrimination?

Overall, two specific hypotheses will be tested in part one. The first hypothesis is called the anxiety-dissatisfaction hypothesis, which posits that exposure to either political or societal discrimination is likely to increase levels of anxiety and dissatisfaction. The second hypothesis is called the internalization hypothesis, which contends that individuals exposed to societal discrimination are likely to internalize negative evaluations and exhibit adverse psychological outcomes such as symptoms of depression, signs of hopelessness, and the inability to control important matters in life.

After evaluating the underlying mechanisms linking discrimination to activism or

alienation among African-Americans, the second part of the chapter will bring to bear a unique randomized online experiment conducted on Muslim-Americans. The aim of this experiment is to investigate the extent to which individuals differentiate between acts of societal and political discrimination, and how their opinions and behaviors may contrast depending on the source of differential treatment. The key research questions of this section are as follows: (1) How does the source of discrimination influence one's attitudes towards their community members? and (2) How do perceptions of differential treatment impact political behavior? Specifically, this section will test the false consciousness hypothesis, which postulates that individuals exposed to societal discrimination are more likely than their counterparts to develop an inflated sense of pessimism and believe that the majority of their white community members disagree with them or would not advocate for their rights, interests, or needs.

5.2 Theory & Expectations: How Discrimination Impacts Behavior

Well before the emergence of cable television, the internet, and social media platforms, scholars such as Dahl (1961) and Gamson (1968) recognized that an abundance of resources do not necessarily translate into increased attention and engagement because political activity is persistently in competition with the many responsibilities and distractions of life. Resources alone are also unable to explain temporal variations in political participation among individuals of similar socioeconomic backgrounds (Campbell, 2003). Therefore, to better understand why and under what conditions individuals decide to expend their limited time, skills, and capital on the political process one must look beyond the standard resource model.

In an effort to solve the riddle of political participation amid numerous distractions of everyday life, research has increasingly paid attention to the contexts in which citizens find themselves in. Such research endeavor has yielded interesting results, discover-

ing that the awareness of undesirable political contexts or threatening circumstances can serve as a strong impetus for political mobilization among multiple groups including, but not limited to, whites (Campbell, 2003; Marcus et al., 2000; Miller and Krosnick, 2004), African-Americans (Dawson, 1994; Mcadam, 1982; Parker, 2009), Latinos (Barreto and Woods, 2005; Pantoja et al., 2001; Ramírez, 2007), Muslim-Americans (Cho et al., 2006), and white and Black immigrants (Ramakrishnan, 2005).

The psychological mechanism linking "political threat" or "undesirable political conditions" to increased attention and participation is perhaps best understood through the lens of Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT), which contends that context interacts with emotion to produce political judgments and actions (Marcus et al., 2000). According to AIT, our emotional system continually cycles the environment and compares sensory information to signal threat or novelty. When we encounter a threatening situation, our emotional system shifts our state of mind from a sense of calm to increased anxiety that interrupts ongoing activity and aligns our focus towards the intrusive stimulus. This shift in emotion is what compels us to reevaluate or change routine beliefs, behaviors, and preferences. As it relates to political behavior, when citizens encounter threatening actors, events, or issues on the political horizon they pay more attention to politics and are likely to act in a way to minimize the impact of that threat. This psychological mechanism helps explain why undesirable political conditions tend to increase people's motivation to partake in politics independent of traditional correlates of political behavior such as socioeconomic resources or civic skills.

One type of anxiety-inducing stimulus or exogenous shock, as I have argued in Chapter 2, is considered political or systematic discrimination. Instances of political discrimination can make politics more salient and activate participatory dispositions because they present a challenge or "threat" to a group's political, cultural, or economic status or opportunities. Additionally, group consciousness theorists suggest that systematic injustice

promotes a sense of dissatisfaction or relative deprivation, which is an influential factor in developing a collective orientation toward politics (Garcia, 2011; Miller et al., 1981; Sanchez, 2006; Stokes, 2003). A collective orientation, group consciousness, or linked fate is beneficial in that it makes people more receptive to appeals of collective action by civic and political organizations, bolsters group pride and efficacy, and shields individuals from internalizing negative experiences—that is, placing blame on personal shortcomings or actions (Chong and Rogers, 2005; Dawson, 1994; Miller et al., 1981; Welch and Foster, 1992). As such, anxiety and dissatisfaction prompted by political discrimination help explain why individuals—especially lower status groups—in democratic regimes may challenge or standup to violations of equality and fairness.

If the aforementioned mechanism is plausible, we should expect to observe at least two psychological outcomes among individuals exposed to political discrimination. First, since threat induces anxiety, and this emotion is what compels individuals to pay attention and respond to worrisome contexts or events, individuals exposed to political discrimination should, on average, display higher levels of stress and anxiety as compared to those who did not experience any discrimination. As Marcus and colleagues have postulated, some level of anxiety is healthy and even essential to motivate individuals to reevaluate their behavior and to take action. Second, we should also expect the perception of political discrimination or systematic violation of democratic norms to make individuals feel dissatisfied or discontent. Without a strong sense of dissatisfaction, people may not necessarily be attentive to appeals of collective action and be compelled to take part in politics when the opportunity arises. As such, anxiety and dissatisfaction are two plausible mechanisms by which one can understand why political discrimination is likely to increase, rather than decrease, a person's propensity to partake in politics. This argument generates the *anxiety-dissatisfaction hypothesis*, which stipulates that exposure to political discrimination will, on average, increase levels of anxiety and dissatisfaction.

If anxiety and dissatisfaction shed light on why political discrimination, on average, is associated with participation, what then explains the nexus between societal discrimination and disengagement? What mechanisms are at work for individuals stigmatized by their peers in the course of everyday life? To answer this question, we need to understand the circumstances that may turn moods too gloomy or when interest in collective action fades and confidence crumples. It may certainly be the case that peer rejection can also elevate anxiety levels and promote feelings of dissatisfaction, but that does not necessarily translate into increased engagement in politics if the mental health consequences of societal discrimination supersede those of political discrimination, and if individuals start to genuinely believe that their actions are inconsequential or worthless.

Indeed, research in social psychology suggests that the mental health effects of societal discrimination are quite disturbing. Societal discrimination—whether in the form of non-verbal, verbal or physical antagonism, intimidation, or devaluation—sends a powerful message of personal rejection by one's peers. It is the experience of not fitting in, valued, respected, or needed in the course of everyday life, which is highly detrimental to one of the most fundamental desires of human beings: the need to belong Hagerty et al. (1992). The desire to be accepted and to establish and maintain relatedness to others is a pervasive human concern (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Kohut, 1977; Maslow, 1954; Thoits, 1982). Consequently, the nature and quality of a person's connections with others can profoundly impair or promote health and influences behavior (Anant, 1966, 1967, 1969; Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Hagerty and Patusky, 1995; Hagerty et al., 1992, 1996).

Perhaps not unexpectedly then, societal discrimination is not only associated with increased anxiety or stress, but also linked to depleted self-esteem, powerlessness, hopelessness, sadness, and depression among various lower-status groups (see Gee et al. (2009); Paradies (2006); Pascoe and Smart Richman (2009); Williams and Mohammed (2009)). Adverse psychological outcomes such as feelings of sadness and depression dampen,

rather than enhance, individual motivations to partake in politics (Ojeda, 2015) and reduce the willingness for social interactions (Rubin and Coplan, 2004). In addition, they turn the discriminated individual's attention inwards—focus on personal shortcomings and failings—rather than outwards (Stearns, 1993), and are linked to perceived lack of control, passivity, withdrawal, and reduced attention to external cues (Cunningham, 1988; Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989). Deducing from this strand of literature one can expect victims of societal discrimination to not only report high levels of anxiety and dissatisfaction, but to also suffer from symptoms of hopelessness and depression, as well as believe that they lack sufficient control over important matters in life. For such individuals, chances are that moods do turn too gloomy as a direct consequence of societal rejection. This argument revises the anxiety-dissatisfaction hypothesis—to include experiences of societal discrimination into the calculus—and generates the internalization hypothesis.

Revised Anxiety-Dissatisfaction Hypothesis: *Individuals in a minority group who have been exposed to either political or societal discrimination will, on average, display higher levels of anxiety and dissatisfaction than those who did not experience any discrimination.*

Internalization Hypothesis: *Individuals in a minority group who have been exposed to societal discrimination will, on average, internalize negative evaluations and display symptoms of depression, hopelessness, and inability to control important things in their life.*

The theory of false consciousness also suggests that rejected individuals can develop an inflated sense of pessimism and genuinely believe that they are incapable of taking meaningful action (Jost, 1995). For such individuals, effective social organization may

appear unproductive or impossible (Cunningham, 1987). Furthermore, stigmatized individuals may acquiesce or desist from taking any meaningful action because they assume that the majority of their peers disagree with them irrespective of the realities on the ground (Miller and McFarland, 1991). Under these conditions, it makes sense that individuals exposed to repeated societal discrimination are less likely than their counterparts to engage in mainstream democratic activities. They are simply more prone than those who did not experience interpersonal rejection to become pessimistic and believe that the majority group (source of discrimination) does not care about their needs, interests, and rights. This perception decreases the effectiveness of mobilization efforts and generates the final research hypothesis:

False Consciousness Hypothesis: *Individuals in a minority group who have been exposed to societal discrimination will, on average, develop an inflated sense of pessimism and believe that the majority of their their white peers (majority group) disagree with them and would not advocate for their interests, rights, or needs.*

5.3 Part I: Assessment with Survey Data

Before I begin with the first part of the analysis, a note on case selection is in order. In the context of the U.S., the main analysis was only conducted with Muslim-Americans for the reasons highlighted in chapter 3. While the post-9/11 experience of Muslim-Americans presented a unique opportunity to study the impact of political and societal discrimination on political behavior, and to extend research to other racial and ethnic minority groups, it focused on a relatively new and small out-group. Groups with a much longer history of confronting inequality and more established group-based resources may display distinctive behaviors to experiences of stigmatization. Specifically, it could be argued that African-Americans may have developed a higher tolerance toward discrimination due to a long legacy of racism and exclusion, and may be able to translate micro-level experiences of marginalization into motivation for resistance and political action. The story, however, is more complicated than it appears.

On the one hand, African-Americans, due to the systematic inequalities of the past, are considered the most politically alienated group in America (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Even presently, experiences of discrimination have made African-Americans, especially black youth, feel that they are not equal and full citizens compared to their white counterparts (Cohen, 2010). As the emergence of the Black Lives Matter Movement and protests on university campuses over micro-aggressions and racial inequality have demonstrated, feelings of dissatisfaction and inferiority have certainly not faded. Indeed, the election of the first black president has fueled, rather than ameliorated, many of the long-standing racial tensions and divisions (Parker, 2016).

While feelings of alienation, rooted in historical and contemporary experiences of discrimination, are still prevalent among many African-Americans and pose a challenge to a healthy and vibrant democracy, some have shown that separation from the political system has actually invigorated blacks and increased their political participation (Daw-

son, 1994; McAdam, 1999; Smith and Klinkner, 1999; Parker, 2009). In fact, experiences of exclusion and isolation have led to the establishment of black civic groups and institutions that work to mobilize and politicize the black community (Dawson, 2003; McAdam, 1999). Considering that the African-American political development is characterized by both alienation and activism, assessing the impact of political and societal discrimination on this group provides the toughest test of the S&PD theory. As such, African-Americans were selected in this section to not only examine the mechanisms by which discrimination impacts behavior, but to also assess the extent to which theoretical model is applicable to a group that has a legacy of racism and discrimination stretching all the way back to the eras of slavery and Jim Crow.

5.3.1 Data, Measurement & Descriptive Statistics

The 2006 Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard African-American Men Survey was selected to evaluate the ways in which societal and political discrimination may influence behavior, attitudes about life, and well-being. This is a unique, national survey that contains a number of detailed questions about discrimination and what African-Americans think about their life and future prospects. From March 20 to April 29 of 2006, a diverse group of interviewers conducted 2,864 full interviews of randomly selected adults nationwide via telephone using a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system. While the survey is predominately focused on African-American men, which make up 1,328 of the total sample population, the dataset contains a sizable portion of black women as well—507 respondents. The remainder of the sample consists of predominately White, and some Asian and Hispanic male and female respondents. However, only African-American respondents are included in data due to the small sample size of other minority groups, and because some key questions, such as experiences of police discrimination, were only asked of black participants. The margin of sampling

error for black men is plus or minus 3 percentages points, and about 5 percent for black women. The overall response rate for the survey is fairly high, at 49.8 percent.

Although the African-American Men Survey does not focus on political behavior specifically, it is, nevertheless, an appropriate dataset because it offers a number of key questions to adequately test both the anxiety-stress and internalization hypotheses. Furthermore, the dataset contains a number of discrimination-related questions to construct distinct societal and political discrimination variables that resemble the experiences of marginalization that African-Americans experience in various settings. The societal discrimination variable is a reliable scale ($\alpha = 0.85$) composed of responses to five total questions. Participants were asked how often they have experienced any of the following situations in their day-to-day life because of their racial background: (1) treated with less respect than other people; (2) received poorer service than other people at restaurants or stores; (3) People acted as if they think you are not smart; (4) People acted as if they are afraid of you; and (5) People acted as if you are dishonest. These questions distinctly focus on instances of stigmatization in the course of everyday life between ordinary people rather than cases of political discrimination or systematic violations of equality by the government or its actors. Valid responses include: never, once in a while, somewhat often, and very often, with each item scored 0-3. The scale ranges from 0 to 15, in which 0 represents an individual who has not encountered any of the aforementioned experiences of stigmatization and 15 represents an individual with has faced extensive discrimination due to his or her race. Because a small number of respondents scored the highest values on the scale, the higher values were collapsed into a single value, and the overall scale was transformed so that it ranges from value 0 to 2. Value 0 represents individuals who never or hardly experienced any discrimination, value 1 signifies somewhat routine encounters of mistreatment, and value 2 denotes very frequent experiences of stigmatization. Approximately 64% of African-Americans reported very low or non-existent perceptions of

discrimination, 27% reported moderate levels of peer stigmatization, and 9% reported very high levels of discrimination.¹

In contrast to experiences of societal discrimination, respondents were also asked whether they have been *unfairly* stopped by the police because of their racial background. This question is used as a proxy for political discrimination because it is a systematic issue that has historically impacted the African-American community. In fact, the concern about police misconduct and discrimination has become very salient as of late, leading to the emergence of the Black Lives Matter Movement across the United States. Specifically, high-profile cases of unarmed black men dying at the hands of the police—for example, the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, and Freddie Gray—have sparked protest and civil unrest in numerous cities across the country. These examples are not uncommon or bound to specific geographic areas. Although national estimates are difficult to obtain due to a lack of systematic reporting by police departments, some estimates show that, as a whole, African-Americans are three times more likely to be killed by the police than whites. A recent analysis of police violence found that young black men are 21 times more likely to be shot by the police than their white counterparts (Gabrielson et al., 2014). More detailed local-level investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice have also revealed the use of excessive force, including deadly force, and patterns of "clear racial disparities" as well as "discriminatory intent" on the part of police departments in numerous places—for example, Albuquerque, Cleveland and Ferguson. These findings demonstrate that police discrimination is a systematic issue that impacts African-Americans, especially men, not just regionally but also nationally. Hence, nearly 40 percent of the survey respondents stated that they were unfairly stopped by the police because of their race. Perhaps not surprisingly, men reported a much higher rate of police discrimination than women. About half of all black men indicated that they have been

¹Alternative specification of the societal discrimination variable (0-15 scale) does not change the substantive relationship between societal discrimination and the outcome variables.

unfairly stopped by the police, but only 13 percent of black women reported experiencing the same acts of political discrimination.

To test the anxiety-dissatisfaction hypothesis, two questions were selected as dependent variables. The first question inquires about anxiety. Respondents were asked to report how often they experience stress in their daily life. In total, about 25% of the African-American respondents reported never or rarely experiencing stress, while 75% stated sometimes or frequently feeling stress in the course of everyday life. The second question deals with levels of satisfaction. Individuals were asked how satisfied they are with their life as a whole. In contrast to self-reported stress, roughly 14% stated not being too satisfied or at all satisfied whereas 86% indicated feeling somewhat or very satisfied.

For the internalization hypothesis, five total questions were chosen. The first three questions ask participants to indicate how often they have felt the following things during the past month: (1) unable to control the important things in their life; (2) that things were going their way; and (3) that they were losing hope. Among African-Americans, 23% indicated somewhat or very often losing hope, 27% reported that things were not going their way, and 49% stated somewhat or often not being able to control important things in their life. The remaining two questions also tap into the internalization effect because they probe about a general state of hopelessness and overall health status. The first question asks individuals whether they feel mostly optimistic or pessimistic about their future. Overall, the vast majority of individuals felt generally optimistic, with only 15% of the respondents feeling mostly pessimistic when looking ahead into their future. The last dependent variable inquires about general health status. Three-fourths (75%) rated their general health as excellent, very good, or good, while one-fourth (25%) evaluated their health as fair or poor.²

²All of the seven dependent variables are binary (0-1) because I am interested in examining changes from positive to negative feelings or health status given the type of discrimination experienced rather than incremental changes from very positive to somewhat positive, etc. With that said, all the dependent

Before assessing the relationship between discrimination and the preceding outcome variables, it is important to examine whether each type of discrimination does in fact have divergent outcomes on behavior within the same dataset and among the same sample. Without any evidence that political participation is partly contingent on the specific source of discrimination, an assessment of the mechanism by which societal discrimination leads to alienation and political discrimination leads to activism becomes problematic. Fortunately, the 2006 African-American men survey contains a question about voter registration status ($\mu = 0.82$, $SD = 0.38$). While one would ideally like to see more specific measures of democratic engagement such as voter turnout, this question does, nevertheless, provide a crude test of whether the source of discrimination influences behavior.

To the extent that it is possible to isolate the relationship between discrimination and the aforementioned outcome variables, I accounted for theoretically relevant variables—that were available in the dataset—in each of the regression models. All the models include standard socio-demographic controls that appear in epidemiological studies on discrimination and health. Dummy variables were constructed for sex (female=1, $\mu = 0.28$), marital status (married=1, $\mu = 0.48$), residential status (home owner=1, $\mu = 0.62$), low to high household income categories (low income as reference category), and geographic regions (south as reference category). Education attainment was measured on a five-point scale (1-5) that ranges from completion of a high school degree or less to post-graduate training or professional schooling after obtaining a bachelor's degree ($\mu = 2.62$, $SD = 1.14$).

In addition to socio-demographic indicators, variables that aid in clarifying the relationship between discrimination on health among African-Americans are also included. Consistent with Banks and colleagues' (2006) study on discrimination and psychological

variables were also analyzed in their original categorical format using ordered logistic regression. The findings of the ordered logistic regression models mirror those of the logistic regression models. However, the impact of discrimination on each dependent variable is larger in the logistic regression models because I am assessing changes from negative to positive feelings or health rather than changes from "very good" to "excellent" health, for example.

distress among African-Americans, a dichotomous measure of mental health assistance was constructed. Professional help ($\mu = 0.24$, $SD = 0.43$), which is considered an indicator of individual-level support, was captured by asking respondents whether they have sought previous mental health treatment by visiting a mental health professional, such as a therapist, counselor, psychologist or psychiatrist. This variable is an important control because professional help can moderate the impact of discrimination on mental health. Furthermore, individuals who suffer from mental health issues are more likely to seek help and may report higher levels of discrimination than those who do not suffer from any mental health problems.

In addition to individual-level support, social support can also reduce the side effects of stressful life events. Worship attendance, in particular, is one source of social support that can help people deal with adversity. A growing number of studies suggest the people who are more involved in their faith tend to receive more support than individuals who are less religious (Ellison and George, 1994), and tend to benefit from better physical and mental health (Ellison and Levin, 1998; Koenig et al., 2001; Levin, 1993). With respect to African-Americans in specific, it is well-known that black churches have played a powerful role in providing the emotional, motivational, and organizational resources in facilitating civil rights activism during times of tremendous adversity (Dawson, 1994; Harris, 1999; McAdam, 1999; Morris, 1984; Tate, 1994). As such, worship attendance ($\mu = 3.09$, $SD = 1.51$), which is an ordinal variable that ranges from 0-6, is an important group-based support that is included in the models. This variable was constructed by asking individuals how often they attend religious services outside of weddings and funerals, with valid responses ranging from never to several times a day.

Since the key outcome variables deal with mental health outcomes and general health (as well as voter registration status) among African-Americans, a dichotomous measure of military service experience ($\mu = 0.19$, $SD = 0.40$) was also incorporated into the regres-

sion models. Military service was constructed by assigning value 1 to individuals who indicated that they had served in the U.S. armed forces or reserves. This variable is an important control because research demonstrates that military service can powerfully effect health, and reshape educational, occupational, marital, and other life course trajectories and outcomes (Elder Jr et al., 1997; MacLean and Elder Jr, 2007; Settersten, 2006). On the one hand, experience in the military can be very beneficial for individuals, especially African-Americans. Military service can help with coping by furnishing members with a sense of confidence to challenge inequality, even in the most racist contexts (Parker, 2009). On the other hand, military experience, especially exposure to combat, can severely decline mental and physical health (Bedard and Deschênes, 2006; Dobkin and Shabani, 2009; Elder Jr et al., 1997; Schnurr et al., 2000). As such, a question accounting for military experience can aid in further clarifying the relationship between discrimination and health.

Finally, when examining the influence of discrimination on the political behavior of African-Americans, one must account for the concept of linked fate: the recognition that individual life chances are inextricably tied to the chances of the group as a whole (Dawson, 1994). The sense that one's group faces shared problems rooted in historical experiences of marginalization has, indeed, been identified as an influential predictor of African-American political choice and behavior (Dawson, 1994; Davis and Brown, 2002; Tate, 1994). Considering this, the registration model controls for the notion of linked fate ($\mu = 0.55$, $SD = 0.50$). In addition to this, partisanship is also included in the registration model because those who identify with one of the major political parties are more likely than those who do not identify with a party to register and vote (Campbell et al., 1960; Verba et al., 1978). Partisanship is a dichotomous variable ($\mu = 0.67$, $SD = 0.47$) that was measured by assigning value 1 to respondents who identified with the Democratic or Republican party, and value 0 to participants who did not identify with any of the aforementioned parties. In sum, all the models account for a variety of alternative expla-

nations to ensure that the observed relationship between discrimination and the outcome variables are not driven by other individual- or group-level factors.

5.3.2 *Analysis and Findings*

I begin this section by first reporting the impact of discrimination on registration status—the only measure of political behavior available. As previously mentioned, before examining the effect of discrimination on views toward life and health outcomes, it is first important to demonstrate that discrimination, depending on source, has divergent effects on political behavior within the same dataset that the rest of the analyses is conducted with. To visually depict the substantive impact of both societal and political discrimination on self-reported registration status, and how these key explanatory variables compare to known correlates of participation, predicted changes in the probability of registering to vote for all of the independent variables were estimated and plotted.³ Changes in predicted probabilities were calculated using a standard simulation technique whereby each explanatory variable was changed from its highest to lowest unit while setting all the other model variables at their respective means.

Figure 5.1 clearly demonstrates that discrimination is a predictor of registration status, and that the source of discrimination impacts behavior differently. Consistent with the findings among Muslim-Americans and Ethnic Minorities in Britain, the results show that societal discrimination is negatively associated with democratic engagement. Individuals who reported high levels of peer rejection were about 9 percentage points less likely than their counterparts to indicate that they registered to vote. In comparison, political discrimination is a possible source of motivation, independent of traditional predictors of participation. Participants who believed that they were unfairly stopped by the police because of their race were about 5% more likely than individuals who did not

³All of the regression models used in this analysis are reported in appendix C.


report such an experience to register to vote.

When comparing the relative impact of discrimination on registration status, two things become evident. First, nearly all the known correlates of political behavior are in the expected direction and substantively associated with registration status. For instance, age, education, home ownership, and party attachment each increased the probability of registration by several percentage points. While linked fate was not statistically indistinguishable from value zero, the effect is, nevertheless, in the anticipated direction. Second, both societal and political discrimination have a similar influence on registration as known predictors of participation. As such, it is not just the case that discrimination is simply "statistically associated" with behavior. The results suggest that both sources of discrimination influence the likelihood of registration as strongly or nearly as strongly as key explanatory variables of political behavior such as age and education.

Having demonstrated that the source of discrimination impacts political behavior differently, I now turn to the stress and dissatisfaction models to test the anxiety-dissatisfaction hypothesis (see Tables C.2 & C.3 in appendix C). To recap, the expectation is that both sources of discrimination will independently elevate levels of stress and dissatisfaction in life. Figure 5.2 displays the results of the stress model. As can be seen, both societal and political discrimination are positively associated with heightened anxiety. Individuals exposed to high levels of societal discrimination were about 14 percent more likely than those who did not report any discrimination to indicate that they often experience stress in daily life. Likewise, political discrimination increased the likelihood of self-reported stress, but only by 5 percentage points.


The results from the dissatisfaction model are in the same direction (see Figure 5.3). Keeping all the model covariates constant, political discrimination increased the probability of dissatisfaction in life by about 5 percent. With respect to societal discrimination, the effect size is much larger—a 24-point increase. As one would expect, socioeconomic

Figure 5.1: **Impact of Discrimination on Registration Status, 2006 Kaiser Study**



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of voter registration status. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

Figure 5.2: Impact of Discrimination on Stress, 2006 Kaiser Study




Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of self-reported stress. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

status is negatively correlated with stress and dissatisfaction in life. Furthermore, individuals who sought, or are seeking, mental health counseling were more likely to suffer from high anxiety, and reported lower levels of satisfaction than their counterparts. This relationship makes sense because depleted mental health is the reason individuals decide to seek professional help in the first place.

Taken together, the main results provide sufficient support for the anxiety-dissatisfaction hypothesis. Interestingly, the effect of societal discrimination on both outcome variables is noticeably larger than the impact of political discrimination. While this could be the result of measurement in that societal discrimination was operationalized with a number of detailed questions, the discrepancy in effect sizes is in line with Marcus and colleagues' (2000) assertion that some level of anxiety is healthy and necessary to encourage engagement. However, as the Inverted-U model of arousal and performance—or the well-known Yerkes-Dodson Law—suggests, peak performance is achieved with moderate levels of anxiety (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908). When people experience too much or too little stress, their performance declines, sometimes dramatically. This implies that increased arousal can only be beneficial to a certain point; when anxiety becomes excessive, enthusiasm or motivation to participate in politics can decline. While it is difficult to ascertain what "level" of anxiety is "too harmful" for a given task or where the "tipping point" on the anxiety spectrum is, the difference in effect size between political and societal discrimination provides some indication that exposure to societal stigmatization may produce unhealthy levels of stress that deter individuals from getting engaged, enthused, or motivated.

Admittedly, however, the anxiety-performance theory, alone, is not sufficient in explaining divergent behavioral outcomes given the source of discrimination. Simply put, the analysis has not empirically demonstrated that the positive relationship between societal discrimination and self-reported anxiety is in the range of "bad stress" that could inhibit performance, especially as it pertains to political engagement. The results only

Figure 5.3: Impact of Discrimination on Dissatisfaction in Life, 2006 Kaiser Study



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of self-reported dissatisfaction in life. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

show that both types of discrimination are associated with stress and dissatisfaction, and that some amount of stress, as AIT suggest, is required to motivate individuals to take action. To shed more light on the relationship between discrimination and behavior, and to specifically understand why societal discrimination is negatively associated with engagement, the second hypothesis needs to be tested.

The internalization hypothesis is fairly straightforward and can be tested with a number of questions. In a nutshell, the hypothesis posits that peer stigmatization has the capacity to turn moods too gloomy because non-verbal, verbal or physical antagonism, intimidation, or devaluation harm a person's relatedness to others, which is an important human concern. Consequently, one would expect societally stigmatized individuals to not only display elevated levels of anxiety, but also suffer from symptoms of hopelessness, pessimism, and the inability to exert control over important matters in life. Testing the internalization hypothesis is important for the following reason: If societal rejection is linked to indicators of "internalization," but political discrimination does not have the same effect, one can make sense of the divergent behavioral outcomes between the two sources of discrimination. Stated differently, the internalization hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for why societal discrimination is, on average, associated with disengagement from mainstream democratic activities while the same is not necessary the case for political discrimination.

To examine whether societally stigmatized individuals internalize negative evaluations, five logistic regression models were estimated (see Tables C.4-C.8 in appendix C). The first model examines the relationship between discrimination and control over important matters in life. Figure 5.4 displays changes in predicted probabilities for all of the explanatory variables. As expected, socioeconomic status is negatively linked to depleted health or negative outlooks. Higher educated and affluent African-Americans were about 15% less likely than lower educated and low income participants to feel that they do not


have control over important matters in life. Independent of socioeconomic status, however, societal discrimination *increased* the probability of "not having control" by 14 percentage points. In contrast, political discrimination was not statistically associated with control. This finding suggests that political discrimination does not appear to have the internalization effect that societal discrimination does.

Related to the concept of being in control of one's life, individuals were also asked to report whether they feel "things in life usually go their way." Figure 5.5 shows that out of all the model covariates, societal discrimination is the only variable positively associated with the feeling that things hardly ever go one's way. Specifically, societal discrimination increased negative mood by a total of 27 percentage points. In comparison, political discrimination does not have a measurable impact on the outcome variable. Similar to the first model, high SES is once again a predictor of positive outlook. In addition to this, worship attendance is also associated with the feeling that things do generally go one's way.

The results of the third model—hopelessness—are almost identical to the second model (see Figure 5.6). Keeping all the model covariates at their respective means, societal discrimination increased the likelihood of often or very often losing hope in life by 28 percentage points. In comparison to other explanatory variables, societal discrimination is the single most important predictor of hopelessness. However, political discrimination, once again, does not have any noticeable influence.


So far, the analysis has shown that the experience of not fitting in, valued, respected, or needed by one's peers is linked to lack of control, the feeling that things do not go one's way, and often losing hope in life. The fourth dependent variable assesses the impact of societal and political discrimination on general health, which is another indicator of the internalization effect. Krieger (1999) suggests that discrimination leads to negative health outcomes because societally marginalized individuals "embody" socially inflicted trauma.

Figure 5.4: Impact of Discrimination on Control, 2006 Kaiser Study




Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of self-reported control over important matters in life. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

Figure 5.5: **Impact of Discrimination on Things Not Going One's Way, 2006 Kaiser Study**



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of believing things in life do not generally go one's way. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

Figure 5.6: Impact of Discrimination on Feeling Hopeless, 2006 Kaiser Study



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of often feeling hopeless. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

Research has also shown that discrimination contributes to depleted health because stigmatized individuals may deal with the pain of rejection by resorting to activities that are detrimental to their well-being, such as alcohol and substance abuse (Gibbons et al., 2004; Guthrie et al., 2002; Whitbeck et al., 2001). Drawing from previous research then, one should expect to find a positive association between societal discrimination and depleted health. But, if political discrimination does not have the internalization impact that societal discrimination does, we should not expect to find a positive link between political discrimination and depleted health.

Figure 5.7 displays the results of the health model. Socioeconomic status is yet again a reliable predictors of good health. In line with previous studies on religion and health (Ellison and Levin, 1998; Koenig et al., 2001; Levin, 1993), the results also illustrate that worship attendance helps promote health. African-Americans who regularly attended religious services were about 17% less likely than their counterparts to report fair or poor health. As one would logically expect, older individuals were also much more likely than younger individuals to report fair or poor health due to the natural process of aging. Military service, however, was not associated with positive or negative health. This finding bodes well for the overall theoretical framework because military service, in this dataset, is linked to increased, rather than decreased, registration status. If military service were to be associated with negative psychological outcomes, its positive link to registration status would have posed a problem for the mechanism linking discrimination to political behavior. However, this is not the case as military service is not related to any of the five outcome variables.


Turning our attention to the key independent variables, it becomes evident that societal discrimination has a powerful impact on health. Simulated probabilities show that societally devalued individuals were 18% more likely than those who did not report any discrimination to assess their health as fair or poor. Relative to other variables in the

model, this is a sizable impact. In contrast, political discrimination was not related to health. That is, those who reported being unfairly targeted by the police were no more or less likely than those devoid of such experience to assess their health as poor.

The final model of the present analysis investigates the influence of discrimination on general outlooks about one's future. Specifically, individuals were asked to indicate whether they feel mostly optimistic or pessimistic about their future. Figure 5.8 visually depicts the influence of each independent variable on the aforementioned question. In terms of effect size, the most influential explanatory variable is societal discrimination. African-Americans who experienced high levels of societal stigmatization were about 11% more likely than those who did not experience any discrimination to indicate that they are mostly pessimistic about their future. Political discrimination, on the other hand, did not have a measurable impact on pessimism or optimism about one's future.


Overall, the findings provide fairly strong support for the anxiety-dissatisfaction and internalization hypotheses. While both sources of discrimination were significantly associated with higher levels of stress and dissatisfaction in life, only societal discrimination was related to indicators of internalization such as lack of control over important matters in life, feeling hopeless, or reporting poor health. These divergent outcomes help explain why societal discrimination is, on average, associated with behavioral disengagement while political discrimination serves as a catalyst to increased participation in politics. The next section will supplement the aforementioned findings, focusing this time on the third and final hypothesis. More importantly, instead of relying on observational data, the proceeding section will take advantage of a unique randomized experiment to further examine the the impact of discrimination on individual attitudes.

Figure 5.7: Impact of Discrimination on Health, 2006 Kaiser Study



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of self-reported fair or poor health (compared good or excellent health). The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

Figure 5.8: Impact of Discrimination on Feeling Pessimistic, 2006 Kaiser Study



Note: Symbols indicate the changes in the predicted probability of feeling pessimistic about one's future. The lines attached to the symbols represent 90% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically indistinguishable from value zero.

5.4 Part II: Assessment with Randomized Experiment

While observational studies can provide valuable insights, they suffer from at least two well-known limitations. First, even when utilizing complex statistical models, omitted-variable bias can undermine the researcher's ability to make credible causal inferences. This is because not all of the possible confounding factors, or even the theoretically relevant ones, can be identified or successfully measured, especially when relying on secondary data. Second, model-based approaches are oftentimes confronted with issues of endogeneity, making it difficult to evaluate the reliability of the results, specifically the causal direction. Thus, in an effort to address such concerns, social scientists have increasingly relied on a variety of experimental approaches to investigate a range of research questions and to make reliable inferences about causal effects (Druckman et al., 2011; Falk and Heckman, 2009; Gerber and Green, 2012; Green and Gerber, 2002).

The key advantage of a randomized experiment is that it creates statistical independence between confounders and the treatment assignment, ensuring that any differences in outcome between the control and the treatment group is either due to chance or to the causal effect/treatment. The experimental method, thus, produces new inferential power because it allows researchers to exercise control over the subjects of the study, to randomly assign participants to various conditions, and to carefully record observations. Since random assignment ensures that subjects have an equal chance of being in a particular treatment condition, a well-designed experiment also offers simple and transparent analysis. A straightforward comparison of the difference in average outcomes of the treatment and control groups often suffices to estimate a causal affect. The reason for this is because random assignment provides a basis for assuming that the control or placebo group behaves as the treatment group would have behaved had it not received the treatment. In other words, prior to intervention (the treatment), subjects have the same expected outcomes.

The challenge with experiments, however, is that manipulation can often be impracti-

cal, poorly designed, unethical, or even expensive. Furthermore, subjects know they are being studied, the stakes are low as most experiments are conducted in the confines of a secure university lab, and only certain types of individuals may agree to partake in the experiment (issue of self-selection). Despite all this, a properly designed experiment can ensure that potential confounders are balanced across the treatment and control group, giving researchers more confidence that the treatment—in this case societal and political discrimination—is independent of other factors that could impact the outcome. An experiment can also pinpoint the specific channels through which the relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior operates.

Considering the unique advantages of experimental methods, an original randomized online experiment was designed to assess the relationship between discrimination and political behavior, and to further probe the mechanism by which the effect is transmitted. Specifically, a set of Muslim-American subjects were randomly assigned to a societal discrimination treatment, a political discrimination treatment, or to a control/placebo condition for two key reasons: (1) to assess the extent to which the relationship between discrimination and political behavior found with secondary data holds in an experimental condition and (2) to test the false consciousness hypothesis, which I was not able to fully examine with survey data.

Since the key experimental manipulation is exposure to discrimination, the S&PD experiment is considered an *impact* rather than a *judgment* experiment. In a judgment experiment, participants are more or less passive observers as they evaluate, recall, or classify material presented to them (Aronson et al., 1998). For example, they may read about a story about discrimination or perhaps witness such behavior, but the act is not happening to them directly. In an impact experiment, the participants are active participants of a series of potentially dramatic events, which can have a substantial impact on their self-image (Aronson et al., 1998). In this scenario, they are exposed to direct mistreat-

ment. Since the main objective of this study is to evaluate what happens when a person experiences discrimination, an impact experiment is more appropriate than a judgment experiment. The ensuing section provides a more detailed account of the experiment.

5.4.1 *Design and Implementation*

As previously mentioned, experimentation afford researchers a unique opportunity to disentangle discrimination by source with the aim of evaluating its impact on the outcomes of interest. However, the interpretation, internal validity, and external validity of any experimental result requires in-depth knowledge of how and under what conditions an experiment was conducted. As such, it is necessary to provide a detailed description of the key features of the S&PD experiment and the design-related decisions that were made in light of alternative choices.

To begin, it is important to point out the difficulties that arise with conducting impact experiments that *expose* individuals to any type of harmful stimuli, especially treatments of discrimination. As it stands, discrimination-related experiments have predominately focused on how subjects differentiate between individuals or groups based on sociocultural or phenotypical characteristics. When evaluating the extent to which individuals are likely to discriminate against other people—as opposed to how they respond to instances of discrimination—the task is relatively simple. The most common strategy to detect respondent bias is through the "dictator game," whereby subjects are asked to decide how much of an endowment, if any, to give to other hypothetical individuals (Camerer, 2003). Interpreting differential donations in such dictator games is one indicator of discriminatory behavior on the part of the subject.

Notice that in the aforementioned scenario, the participants are the potential *source*, rather than the *object*, of discriminatory behavior. The task becomes much more complicated in the latter situation because ethical and practical concerns limit the options that

are available to a researcher. For obvious reasons, one cannot simply create a hostile "societal atmosphere" by inviting participants into a laboratory setting and exposing them to racial slurs, threats, or any other intense form of stigmatization. Beyond ethical and practical concerns, and assuming consent can be secured for this type of experiment, high rates of attrition due to the abrasive nature of the treatment could severely undermine the study. Therefore, experiments on sensitive topics, especially those that expose individuals to potentially harmful psychological or physical treatments, require a unique approach that enables researchers to manage practical and ethical constraints while still creating a realistic context for the study.

In an effort to overcome some of the most pressing challenges that arise with subject-sensitive impact experiments, a novel "Name Evaluation" study was designed and administered online, rather than in a controlled laboratory setting. Before providing a detailed description of the treatment conditions, at least three key design strategies of the S&PD experiment require justification. The first two choices concern the mode of administration and method of participant recruitment, and the third pertains to the use of deception or a "cover story."

While many experiments, especially in the field of psychology, are conducted in laboratory settings with university students, this option was forfeited in favor of an online experiment conducted on a panel of adults in the United States who self-identified as Muslim or Muslim-American.⁴ The confines of a university laboratory environment is not practical for the S&PD experiment for two noteworthy reasons. Considering that the target population consists of Muslim-Americans, which makeup a very small por-

⁴Whether individuals self-identified as Muslim or Muslim-American was determined at the beginning of the study with a set of pre-treatment demographic questions. If the participants did not meet the study criteria based on the answers that they provided, they were not able to partake in the study and were thanked for their time in the "We have reached the quota" screen. To ensure that individuals did not just select the desired demographic characteristics (i.e., Muslim or Muslim-American) to secure a spot in the study, they were not informed about the desired sample characteristics in the recruitment email.

tion of the total student body at any given university, it becomes extremely challenging to find and recruit a sizable number of participants who would be willing to partake in the S&PD study. Even if the researcher can successfully recruit small and hard-to-reach populations, the university environment poses the threat of information sharing when the recruitment pool is extremely small. At most universities, especially at the institution in which the researcher is located in, Muslim student organizations provide various services and programs that aim to familiarize students with one another and create a sense of community on campus. As such, heavily recruiting from a very small and potentially connected network of students can pose the problem of information sharing. Specifically, student subjects who participated in the study may share detrimental information about the experiment with prospective participants, rendering the experiment useless.

The problem of information sharing becomes pronounced when deception plays a prominent role in the study. Deception is not only a useful and necessary tool that is commonly employed in the political and social psychology research traditions (Dickson, 2011), but one that forms the basis of the S&PD experiment. Concealing the purpose and nature of the study from subjects is necessary because the post-treatment behaviors of the participants are contingent on whether the discrimination treatment is perceived authentic as opposed to hypothetical or fake. If participants are exposed to acts of discrimination that they do not perceive as realistic or credible, they may place little to no importance on the stimulus, and thus, remain unaffected by the treatment. Therefore, it is vital that the subjects are not made cognizant of the true purpose and design of the study until its conclusion. And when the study is completed and the subjects are informed of the its true purpose, it is imperative that they do not share any information with prospective research subjects to ensure that each participant receives the same treatment. For these reasons, an online panel is preferable to a pool of student subjects in the confines of a lab.

Furthermore, because deception is a crucial component of the S&PD experiment, a

computer-assisted online experiment was adopted in favor of a face-to-face experiment. The use of deception in the S&PD experiment is complex and multilayered to ensure the treatments are perceived as discriminatory behavior on the part of societal and political actors. The cover story begins with the first mode of contact: a recruitment letter. A set of Muslim-American members of an opt-in, online research panel through Research Now were sent a recruitment statement via email that asked them to partake in a "Name Evaluation" study.⁵ Subjects were informed that the purpose of the study is to find out how individuals are evaluated based on their names only. The participants' task is to simply review all the evaluations presented to them and to answer a set of follow-up questions. Once the participants agree to partake in the study, the computer randomly assigns them to one of the three conditions—societal treatment, political treatment, or placebo—where they are given further information about the nature of the study depending on the treatment assignment.

In the **societal treatment**, participants are informed that as part of a research project, we, the researchers, would like to find out how white adults in their local area (city or town) would evaluate various individuals by just looking at their first and last names. To find this out, the subjects are told that we contacted a large number of white adults in their local area via the internet, and asked them to give us their impressions of the subject and other individuals by just seeing their names. The deception here consists of multiple parts. First, participants are under the impression (and were told) that we obtained their names prior to sending them an invite to take part in the "Name Evaluation" study because they had previously participated in other studies through Research Now. In reality, their names were obtained at the beginning of the study and inserted by the computer in predetermined evaluation place holders. Because it is not customary for sample and data collection companies to share any identifying information, such as par-

⁵All the participants were located inside the United States (confirmed by IP addresses).

participant names, subjects were given the following message: "To confirm that you are the actual person we invited to participate in this panel, please type in your correct first and last name in the box." Since participants received a monetary reward through Research Now, contingent on completing the survey, they were incentivized to type in their correct first and last names. Once they inserted their name into the first and last name text boxes, the computer automatically adjusted any formatting issues (e.g., the use of all caps), and input their names is predetermined evaluation slots.⁶

After a set of pre-treatment demographic questions, the participants were then informed that we would like to show them the results of the evaluations, which cover the following three topics: (1) how much white adults would "respect" or "not respect" individuals; (2) whether white adults are likely to "invite" or "exclude" individuals to private social functions such as dinner parties, fundraisers, or birthday celebrations; and (3) whether white adults would "value" or "not value" the opinions of various individuals. For all the three evaluations, which were displayed one at a time, Muslim-American research subjects were able to see that their name is placed *unfavorably* with a set of other Muslim-sounding names, and that all the white-sounding names on the screen received favorable evaluations by white community members (for an example see Figure 5.9).

Following this step, participants are then informed that the white community members were asked to share a comment about the names that they negatively evaluated. At this point, research subjects are shown three comments that "matched" their name. All the three comments are aimed to further highlight prejudice on the part of white community members toward the individual in specific:⁷

⁶Names were not shared with the researcher. A manipulation check was employed to ensure that the treatments were perceived as authentic rather than fake. Participants were also given the following information in the name screen: "Your personal information will be kept secure and all of your answers to this survey are confidential. You just need to confirm your name to participate."

⁷The experiment was programmed so that pronouns were automatically adjusted in the comments to match the subject's gender. For instance, "his" was replaced with "her" if the participant identified as

Figure 5.9: Societal Treatment Result Screens



"Wouldn't say it in public, but many people I know would not give a shit about what he or people like him or his kind think."

"I am liberal and all but some people just don't belong in our community... His living and thinking style doesn't fit ours."

"Why would I respect this person!?! These are the type of people behind the terrorist attacks and now they live among us as if nothing has happened!"

In the **political treatment**, participants go through the same procedure but this time, the evaluators are Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents, who were asked to evaluate a set of names—including the respondent's name—as part of "their TSA training." As with the societal treatment, subjects are informed that the purpose of the study is to find out how TSA agents evaluate different individuals for extra security screening based on *names only*, and that this evaluation occurred online anonymously by the agents. The following language was used for the setup:

As part of a large online study, we wanted to know how the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents target different individuals for extra security screening when they are shown only those individuals' first and last names.

To find this out, we contacted a large number of TSA agents via the internet, and asked them to give us their impression of you and other individuals by just seeing your first and last names.

The purpose of this study is to show you the results of their evaluations.

After the preceding prompt, three specific evaluations were shown in the following order: (1) agents were asked to label individuals as "safe" or "suspicious"; (2) agents were

female at beginning of the experiment.

asked to label individuals as "citizen" or "foreign"; and (3) agents were asked to label individuals for "extra security screening" or "no extra security screening." To keep things consistent, participants observe that their name is evaluated negatively, and grouped with other Muslim-sounding names, and that white names, in comparison, are grouped together and evaluated favorably (see Figure 5.10). In addition to the evaluations, TSA agents also anonymously "shared" a comment about the names that they negatively evaluated or "targeted," showing specific bias towards Muslims:

"A random process is ideal but it really doesn't exist. We are constantly asked to target people based on their name, appearance, religious affiliation, or country of origin."

"Since the terrorist attacks we must single-out people who appear to be Muslim-American for extra screening regardless of whether they are U.S. Citizens. This is why I joined the TSA in the first place."

"A huge emphasis of our training since the passage of the PATRIOT Act under the Bush administration has been to single-out people who appear to be Muslim-American or come from Muslim majority countries..."

The third treatment is the **placebo condition**. The aim of this treatment is to administer the same name evaluation exercise that was employed in the societal and political treatments without cueing discrimination. To accomplish this goal, subjects go through the same procedure individuals in other treatment groups went through except this time, a computer is sorting names based on three linguistic criteria. Specifically, participants are informed that the objective is to assess how accurately computer algorithms cluster different names based on onomastic (origin), phonetic (pronunciation), and semantic (meaning) similarities. This exercise, they are told, is called "Computational Linguistics." To find how accurately names are indexed based on similarity, a computer algorithm,

Figure 5.10: Political Treatment Result Screens



called METAPHONE 3, indexed a set of first and last names (including the participant's name) based on the aforementioned criteria.⁸ To keep the placebo as similar as the other evaluations, but circumventing any hint of discrimination or bias, technical language is deliberately used to describe the indexing procedure:

To get the best possible performance out of the computer program METAPHONE 3, your first and last name was compared to a set of different names several times.

By running the computer program several times, the METAPHONE 3 algorithm achieves the most accurate result.

Please note that this is just an attempt by the computer program to match names as accurately as possible based on the origins, pronunciations, and meanings of different names. Your task is to evaluate the computer's overall performance.

Once the technical information is provided and the respondents are informed of their "task," they are presented with the results. Explicitly, they observe that their name is matched or grouped with other Muslim or Middle-Eastern sounding names based on similarity in origin, pronunciation, and meaning. And to keep things consistent, they also see that white sounding names, such as Todd Ryan and Brad Baker, are grouped together based on linguistic similarity (see Figure 5.11).

Considering that the other two treatments also revealed a set of comments by community members or TSA agents, participants randomly assigned to the placebo condition were also shown a set of comments. In an effort to divert attention from any possible discrimination, the comments are intentionally technical of nature and very generic. The

⁸METAPHONE 3 is a real phonetic encoding algorithm rather than a fictional program.

Figure 5.11: Placebo Result Screens

Names Dissimilar To Yours

Brad Baker	Molly Taylor	Greg Kelly
	Todd Ryan	Madeline Adams
Claire O'Brien		

Names Similar To Yours

Abbas Fadel	Respondent Name	Maya Habib
Ali Hassan	Amira Assaf	Ismael Abdullah

Names Similar To Yours

Ahmad El--Mofty	Mohamed Khan	Imani Attar
Nadima Khalaf	Respondent Name	Jamal Osman

Names Dissimilar To Yours

Tanner Scott	Brett Sullivan	Emma Miller
Kathryn Wilson	Allison Smith	Connor Young

Names Dissimilar To Yours

	Carly Nelson	Scott Carter
Logan Reed	Dustin Evans	Susan Murphy
Jenna Hall		

Names Similar To Yours

Mahmood Hamidi	Fatima Farooq	Noor Edris
Hassan Basher	Jayed Islam	Respondent Name

three "outputs" or comments simply report the computer's own assessment of its performance/ability to sort names:

This name was somewhat efficient to sort based on onomastics.

In the phonetic algorithm this name was mostly efficient to sort.

The semantic sorting procedure was capable of assessing this name.

After the name evaluation portion of the survey is completed, all of the participants are presented with the post-treatment questionnaire. To ensure that the subjects are not under the impression that the name evaluations had any basis in reality, they were directed to a debrief screen before they were thanked for completing the survey. The debrief screen states that the study is *fictional* in order to assess how negative evaluations impact individual attitudes (see debrief statement in appendix C). For the panelists who terminated the survey prior to completion, a debrief statement was shown before the exit screen. In addition, a debrief statement was also emailed to all the participants who started the survey, but did not complete it to make sure they are also made aware of the fictional nature of the "Name Evaluation" survey. Overall, less than 5% of the participants started the survey but did not finish, which is a very low attrition rate.

5.4.2 *Manipulation Check*

There are a number of concerns that arise with experiments that employ deception and rely on participants to judge the perceived ethnic or racial backgrounds of other individuals based on names, social ties, group affiliations, or phenotypical features. With respect to the S&PD experiment in specific, the first concern is fairly straightforward: are the fictitious names perceived as racially or ethnically distinct? Deciding which names to use in the evaluations is a very important decision. If participants cannot tell the difference be-

tween the white and Muslim names, discrimination based on names may not be detected by the subjects.

To ensure that the names are perceived as distinctively "white" or "Muslim," two steps were taken. To begin, a set of white-sounding male and female names were selected from studies that relied on racially distinct white names to conduct experiments related to discrimination (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004); Levitt and Dubner (2009)). Considering that similar studies on Muslim-sounding names were not found, a set of popular Middle-Eastern first and last names with roots in Arabic were selected from websites that recommended "Muslim Baby Names." All the names selected for the experiment have some type of connection to Islam. For instance, Mohamed (under all of its different spellings) was chosen because it is by far the most popular name among Muslims due to its association with prophet Mohamed. Likewise, Fatima is a popular name because she was one of the daughters of prophet Mohamed.

Upon completion of the "white" and "Muslim" name selection process, a short name matching survey was designed and implemented using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) interface for survey administration and subject recruitment. MTurk was selected in favor of other options due to its low cost and efficient method of fielding fairly unsophisticated surveys (see Berinsky et al. (2011) for details). The name matching survey presented all the selected first and last names to 204 Mturk workers (in the United States), and asked them to identify each name as either White / Caucasian, Muslim / Middle-Eastern, Black / African-American, Hispanic / Latino, Asian / Pacific Islander, or "other" for a small payment. This design allowed respondents to attribute, to the best of their abilities, a racial / ethnic category to each name. To ensure that Mtruk workers paid attention, an attention check question (ACQ) was inserted at the beginning of the survey to eliminate participants who did not read important directions carefully, and randomly selected response options. In addition to this, a few Asian and Hispanic-sounding

names were also used in the survey (e.g., Katsu Kiyoshi and Sergio Sanchez) to ensure that participants recognized names that were not distinctly White / Caucasian or Muslim / Middle-Eastern.⁹

The final list of the first and last names used in the S&PD experiment is shown in Table C.9 (in appendix C).¹⁰ All the Muslim-sounding names were identified by at least 75% of Mtruk workers as distinctly Muslim / Middle-Eastern. None of the Muslim-sounding names in the final list were recognized by more than 11% of Mtruk workers as White / Caucasian. In contrast, over 94% of Mtruk workers identified the white-sounding names as White / Caucasian but no more than 1% recognized the white names as Muslim / Middle-Eastern. Overall, the results provide a fair amount of support for the notion that the hypothetical names used in the S&PD experiment are very likely to be perceived as clearly white or Muslim.

A second, and perhaps more pressing, concern with any experiment, especially those that employ deception to manipulate original latent constructs, deals with the effectiveness of the manipulations. Even in cases in which the manipulations appear obvious and the operationalization of a given independent variable is well-known and widely used, there is no guarantee that the subjects were affected in the way that the investigator intended. Whether subjects actually believed in the cover story is especially critical for the S&PD experiment because the use of deception is multilayered and complex. Prior to participation, respondents were informed that their names were evaluated by real community members or TSA agents (depending on the treatment). Considering this, one

⁹Katsu Kiyoshi was identified by 95% of Mtruk workers as Asian / Pacific Islander. Sergio Sanchez was identified by 98% of Mtruk workers as Hispanic / Latino.

¹⁰One weakness of the Mtruk name-matching survey is that almost all of the workers self-identified as White / Caucasian. This means that they could be more familiar with white-sounding names than Muslim participants in the S&PD experiment. However, their familiarity with Muslim-sounding names is likely weaker. This is not necessarily concerning because if predominately white Mtruk workers can correctly identify Muslim-sounding names, it is likely that Muslim participants, who have more familiarity with Muslim names, can identify those names as distinctly Muslim rather than white.

cannot assume that the participants simply believed that this step was actually taken. Furthermore, even if the subjects believed that the evaluations were authentic, there is no guarantee that they actually perceived any discrimination once they viewed the evaluations. As such, employing manipulation checks are critical (Berinsky et al., 2014; Foschi, 2007; Sansone, Morf, and Panter, Sansone et al.).

Three types of checks were employed in the S&PD experiment. First, a standard attention check question was used to make sure respondents were attentive to the prompts rather than quickly clicking through the information and evaluation screens. Second, a timestamp was added to the survey screens to examine how quickly respondents completed the survey. These standard features enable the researcher to sort through the data and identify respondents who were generally inattentive or those who completed the experiment significantly below the average time it took for all of the participants to finish the entire survey.¹¹

The final manipulation check consists of a post-treatment question about the details of the treatment in order to assess the subject's level of attention and awareness to the discriminatory stimuli. Specifically, respondents were asked to describe what they observed in the evaluation screens. The open-ended responses show whether the respondents believed the evaluations to be authentic and whether they perceived any discrimination. An examination of the responses revealed that only five respondents did not buy the evaluations. For instance, one respondent stated: "I saw that you guys are faking the results." Another simply wrote: "Not true!" Clearly, the treatments did not work on these individuals. Accordingly, these respondents were removed from the final analysis. Over 95% of the participants, however, indicated through their comments that they did perceive

¹¹Average response time was at 8 minutes and 21 seconds. A number of research assistants completed the survey several times to establish a minimum time needed to reasonably complete the study. Based on their analysis, it was established that a completed survey in less than 2.5 minutes is most likely very unreliable. As such, the few respondents who completed the survey in less than 2.5 minutes were removed from the study.

discrimination. Table 5.1 reports a set of representative comments about the participants' perceptions of the observed community and TSA evaluations. These responses strongly suggest that the deceptive manipulation did indeed have the desired effect on the subjects in that they clearly perceived discrimination based on names.

Table 5.1: Open-ended Responses to Discrimination Treatments

Open-ended Responses
"Very racist people and a lot of discrimination"
"DISCRIMINATION"
"That my name is now on these lists"
"I was disfavored in everything...."
"They clearly discriminated against people just because they were Muslims. It is upsetting but I'm all too used to it."
"Wow they consider me a bad person"
"That based on my name, I would be unrespected, untrusted and excluded"
"There were higher security levels for muslim americans"
"Muslims get no respect"
"It looked like discrimination and ignoring the people with muslim names or backgrounds"
"I am being biased against"
"I saw discrimination"
"I was excluded form everything"
"Always on a suspicions list"
"They all excluded my name"
"I saw my name in places that I would normally not like to be in. It was a very weird experience."
"White people dont trust muslims and dont feel safe around muslims."
"A whole lot of racism."
"They clearly discriminated against people just because they were Muslims. It is upsetting, but I'm all too used to it."
"That because of just my name I can be suspect for anything"

5.4.3 Experiment Results

Before reporting the main results, it is first important to highlight some of the unique characteristics of the S&PD experimental sample. Due to the difficulty with identifying Muslim participants in online panels, the final dataset is not representative of the general Muslim-American population. For instance, of the 222 self-identified Muslim participants, 70% are men, and 87% are registered to vote. Participants are also slightly younger, more educated and earn higher incomes than the average American Muslim. Furthermore, more than 80% of the participants reported attending the mosque at least once a week for the purposes of prayer, which is a much higher rate of mosque attendance than what the 2011 Pew Study of Muslim-Americans has reported (47%). Considering these demographic characteristics, a disclaimer is in order: The S&PD data is more akin to a convenience sample—rather than a representative one—obtained to evaluate the mechanism by which discrimination impacts political behavior. Therefore, the findings need to be considered in light of this information. However, regardless of the fact that the sample is not representative of the general Muslim-American population, it is important to note that the participants were *randomly assigned* to the three treatment conditions. This means that prior to the administration of the treatments, the demographic composition of the three groups is nearly identical, enabling me to assess the direct and independent impact of societal and political discrimination on the attitudes and behaviors of interest.

The analysis first begins with an evaluation of the open-ended responses. Exploring such responses allows me to first investigate the extent to which participants may differentiate between acts of societal and political discrimination. If individuals have a tendency to merge all types of experiences with discrimination together, one should not expect to find any distinct patterns in how subjects describe and respond to exposure to different sources of discrimination. Recall that the S&PD theory suggested that differences in political behavior derive partly from the internalization or externalization effect

of negative evaluations. That is, societal discrimination tends to dampen democratic engagement because individuals exposed to peer stigmatization tend to internalize negative evaluations, exhibiting feelings of sadness, pessimism, and hopelessness. In contrast to peer rejection, systematic violations of democratic norms tend to elicit a different reaction. When a group's political, social, or economic status or opportunity is under jeopardy, group members are likely to challenge the government with the shared beliefs, values, and norms that define the relationship between citizens and government. In the context of the U.S., justice and equality are two core American values that citizens can draw from to challenge the legitimacy of discriminatory government actions. However, group members are likely to take action against systematic discrimination to the extent that they believe their actions carry weight. If individuals believe that the majority of their peers disagree with them or would not advocate for their rights, interests, or needs, their willingness to partake in mainstream politics for expressive or instrumental purposes may weaken.

A glance at the responses suggests that individuals exposed to the political discrimination treatment hold views that differ from those that were exposed to the societal discrimination treatment. First, nearly all of the respondents in the the political discrimination condition identified the TSA as the culprit of mistreatment rather than the society as a whole when asked to describe what they saw in the evaluations. For example, participants made statements such as: "The TSA is suspicious of people who are Muslim," "My name is now on these lists," or "My name is a reason for caution for a TSA agent." More interestingly, individuals relied on democratic norms of equality and fairness to criticize the security screening practices. Recognizing that the TSA singles out Muslims based on names, one subject wrote: "It is not right!" Other participants used more explicit language. A 27-year old male subject emphasized that "... [The] Law is wrong." Another person argued that "the separation is radical" and "does not follow the principle

of freedom." Others mentioned that the screenings are "un-American" and "unfair." One respondent in particular wrote the following comment: "A great deal of prejudice was put on me just based on my name. This is very un-American, and it's offensive!" It is important to mention that these sentiments were willingly shared with a question that only asked respondents to report what they had witnessed in the evaluation screens.

Individuals exposed to societal discrimination were also asked to describe what they had witnessed. Societally stigmatized participants, however, expressed noticeably contrasting views. When describing what they had witnessed, the vast majority of subjects specifically identified members of the public rather than systematic forces or government actors as culprits of discrimination. For instance, one participant clearly described what she saw in the evaluations and recognized being rejected by societal actors: "I saw that my opinions do not have any value. That I don't have a part in their social circles nor would I be invited." Others simply stated that "White Americans do not like Muslims" or "People in the US hate Muslims."

Others not only described what they saw but also voluntarily shared how the evaluations made them feel. A married, middle-age female subject expressed how "disheartening" the evaluations were and wondered what opinions people have of her when they first see her. Not one participant mentioned ideals of fairness, rights, or equality when responding to the experience of societal discrimination. Instead, some appeared to have even internalized the discriminatory behavior of the white community members. In contrast to a male subject who wrote "I think they are bigoted idiots" after exposure to TSA evaluations, a male subject exposed to social discrimination emphasized: "No one really likes muslims, it hurts but it's the truth." Other participants wrote statements such as: "I seen that I was excluded from all 3 evaluations and I feel bad about it," "They have no respect for us," or "I'm all too used to it." The evaluations also seemed to confirm some of the experiences that Muslim-Americans have had since 9/11, suggesting that the con-

structured discrimination manipulation has basis in reality. For example, one participant viewed the evaluations as: "About the same prejudices I see in daily life." Another wrote: "upsetting, but predictable."

Overall, the sentiments expressed in the open-ended responses appear to be in line with the S&PD theory. While a number of subjects provided fairly generic responses to the discrimination stimuli such as "This is racist" or "A lot of discrimination," most of the participants provided more specific information, suggesting that people recognize the difference between societal and political discrimination rather than conflating the two. Only one subject—a 36-year old male exposed to societal discrimination—did not appear to clearly differentiate between societal and political discrimination, and blamed mistreatment by his/her peers on Donald Trump: "Wow I was profiled by my name, Thanks Donald Trump." With the exception of this account, however, the qualitative findings corroborate much of what has been argued throughout the chapter. Most importantly, the results demonstrate that individuals not only differentiate between distinct sources of discrimination but may also react differently when faced with peer as opposed to government discrimination.

Having discussed the open-ended responses, I now turn to the post-treatment questions to test the "false consciousness" hypothesis and evaluate that extent to which discrimination, depending on source, may motivate individuals to take political action. At the core of the false consciousness hypothesis is the notion that socially rejected minorities develop an inflated sense of pessimism and start to believe that members of the dominant group would not advocate or care about their needs, interests, or rights. As such, political participation through mainstream channels of political influence such as voting, in which minority groups are vastly outnumbered, may not appear as an appealing option. Two statements were presented to the participants in order to test this hypothesis. The first statement is about the participants' perception of whether people who do not share

his/her viewpoints would be willing to listen to the subject if those opinions were expressed publicly. Specifically, individuals were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the following claim: "People with differing views would be willing to listen if I expressed my opinions in public." The second statement focuses more specifically on policy support for Muslim-Americans. Subjects were asked to report whether they agree or disagree with this statement: "I think the majority of residents in my city or town would support policies that would benefit Muslim-Americans."

The results of the viewpoint question provides strong support for the false consciousness hypothesis. Figure 5.12 shows that over 65% of individuals in the placebo and political condition agreed that people would listen to their opinions even if they disagreed. Only 53% of respondents in the societal treatment condition provided the same answer—a difference of 13-15 percentage points. Results from the policy statement also suggests that societal discrimination has a detrimental impact on perceptions toward members of the public. Once again, about 65% of individuals in the placebo and political discrimination treatment agreed with the notion that the majority of their community members would favor policies that would benefit Muslim-Americans. In sharp contrast, only 43% of individuals in the societal condition agreed with the previous statement—a difference of 22 percentage points (see Figure 5.13). Overall, the results suggest that societal discrimination has the capacity to negatively impact people's perceptions of their community members. But, a comparison of the placebo and political treatment results demonstrates that political discrimination has no discernible impact on how individuals view their community members.

The last and final question evaluates the propensity to engage in politics. The political participation measure used in the S&PD experiment is modeled after Miller and Krosnick's (Miller and Krosnick (2004)) experiment on the impact of policy threat on political behavior. Miller and Krosnick were interested in finding out whether ideologically

Figure 5.12: Experiment Result I

People with Differing Views Would be Willing to Listen if I Expressed my Opinions in Public





Figure 5.13: Experiment Result II

The Majority of Residents in my City or Town Would Support Policies that Would Benefit Muslim-Americans




liberal-leaning women, who were informed about congressional action to restrict abortion, would be interested in signing a letter addressed to President Clinton urging him to support abortion rights. What they found is that when given the opportunity, women in the policy threat treatment group were more likely to sign the letter than women in the control condition. Using a similar technique, participants in the S&PD experiment were also presented with an opportunity to sign a letter. Before ending their survey, all of the participants were asked the following question: "Every year Congress may review national security and screening policies to assess whether or not different groups are being singled out by the process. Would you like to add your name to a letter to Congress, urging them to review security policies so that they don't single out Muslim Americans?" Individuals who agreed to attach their name to the letter were then taken to a second screen where they could provide their full name.

Figure 5.14 presents the proportion of participants who signed and did not sign their name for each treatment condition. Consistent with the findings obtained with observational survey data, political discrimination appears to have a positive impact on political behavior. About 65% of subjects who were negatively evaluated by the TSA signed their name onto the Congress letter as opposed to about half of individuals exposed to the placebo or societal discrimination treatment. Comparison of the societal and placebo condition results is interesting, and not necessarily in the expected direction. While discrepancy in the proportion of signatures between the political and societal condition and the political and placebo condition is clearly evident, almost the same exact proportion of participants in the placebo and societal condition signed the Congress letter. This suggests that individuals exposed to societal discrimination are not as willing as subjects exposed to political discrimination to take political action, but they are also not less likely than those who did not experience discrimination to sign their name onto the letter.

There are a number of ways one could interpret this finding besides accepting the null

Figure 5.14: Experiment Result III



hypothesis. First, it is possible that multiple instances of societal discrimination may be required to meaningfully impact individual's willingness to take political action. As such, one treatment in an online setting might not resemble real-life experiences on the ground. Second, with the small sample size of 222 participants, split between three treatment conditions, one may only be able to detect disparities that are rather substantial. It is possible that an increase in the sample size could reveal a small but still meaningful difference between societal discrimination and the placebo condition. Third, the result could be a function of the dependent variable under question. Attaching one's name to a letter is much easier than registering to vote and actually expending material and temporal resources to vote on election-day. Finally, nearly 9 out of 10 participants reported that they are currently registered to vote, which indicates an already established connection to the political system prior to the administration of the treatments. It is thus possible that the

participation finding could be a function of the type of participants recruited. Those who are already registered to vote may not easily be deterred to urge Congress to review security policies when given the opportunity—especially an opportunity with minimal costs. Considering these issues, and the fact that this is the first discrimination experiment of its kind conducted on a hard-to-reach population, replication is needed to further examine the direct impact of societal and political discrimination on political behavior.

5.5 Conclusion

Using two unique datasets, this chapter focused on evaluating the psychological mechanisms by which societal and political discrimination may stifle or promote political participation. The 2006 African-American Men Survey was first selected to test the anxiety-dissatisfaction and the internalization hypotheses. As expected, multivariate regression analysis revealed a positive connection between both sources of discrimination and elevated levels of anxiety and dissatisfaction. Additional analysis also provided strong support for the internalization hypothesis. While societal discrimination was associated with the inability to control important things in life, to believe that things do not go one's way, loss of hope, pessimism, and depleted health, political discrimination was not. The combination of these two findings helped elucidate why peer rejection may reduce individuals' propensity to engage in mainstream politics, while political discrimination serves as a catalyst to increased activism. More importantly, this section also demonstrated—to the extent that it was possible with secondary survey questions—that the S&PD theory is applicable to other groups in the U.S., notably African-Americans.

In an effort to further identify and evaluate the underlying psychological mechanisms linking societal discrimination to behavioral alienation, a novel experiment was designed and conducted online among a panel of Muslim-Americans. The experimental section made three significant contributions to the study of discrimination and political behav-

ior. First, it demonstrated that individuals have distinct reactions to different sources of discrimination. An overview of the open-ended responses showed that subjects exposed to societal discrimination identified societal actors as the culprits of mistreatment and expressed sentiments that contrasted with the views shared by individuals exposed to political discrimination. Second, a more in-depth investigation of the post-treatment questions provided support for the false consciousness hypothesis. Societally stigmatized individuals were much more likely than individuals in the placebo and political discrimination conditions to believe that people with differing views would not listen to them if they expressed their opinions in public, and that the majority of their community members would oppose policies that would benefit Muslim-Americans. If this is in fact how socially marginalized individuals feel, it makes sense if they are not as enthusiastic as their counterparts to participate in US democratic politics. Lastly, the S&PD experiment also provided a new and innovative approach to exposing research subjects to credible treatments of discrimination outside the confines of a university lab. While the experiment needs to be replicated with different groups and larger sample sizes, it provided a new and cost-effective approach to overcoming the formidable challenges that researchers face when examining the psychological and behavioral consequences of discrimination.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION: ACTIVISM OR ALIENATION?

Year 2016 has been an interesting time for scholars interested in studying the role that discrimination plays in politics. Donald Trump, who started his presidential campaign, "Make American Great Again," recently became GOP's presidential nominee despite calling Mexican immigrants rapists and drug dealers, and stigmatizing Muslims and women. In fact, some have argued that his success in the primary elections is owed to his racist and sexist rhetoric. In Britain, a Brexit vote brought major political and economic changes to the UK. The case for withdrawal from the European Union was, similar to the Trumpian campaign, partly built on the stigmatization and fear of racial and ethnic minorities, notably muslim immigrants. Cabinet ministers, party leaders, and those aspiring to further their political careers built a campaign riddled with bigotry, xenophobia, and Islamophobia to "take their country back." Nigel Farage, the former head of the right-wing UK Independence party (UKIP) and the key architect of the Brexit referendum, argued that Europe is at a "breaking point" and that UK must "take control of our borders" because Syrian refugees are "rapists" and "pose a threat" to the safety of the nation.

Not coincidentally, racial abuse and hate crimes in both countries have been on the rise. A new study by the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University reported that anti-muslim hate crimes have increased over the last year, with several cases directly linked to Trump supporters. In the UK, several high profile cases such as the vandalism of a Polish Cultural Center was specifically linked to the Brexit referendum. According to a survey of police reports, racially or religiously motivated assaults particularly increased in areas of the country that strongly favored the withdrawal of Britain from the EU. In this climate of racism and xenophobia in both political and social domains, the question for researchers is straightforward: how will stigmatized individuals respond? Will minorities such as Latinos and Muslim-Americans turnout at high numbers to defeat the likes of Trump? Could the perception of political discrimination be one of the most important predictors of minority voter turnout and vote choice in

the 2016 presidential election? How will individuals directly exposed to racial abuse and hate crimes in their immediate communities respond? Will they also become motivated and engaged or will they become alienated and withdraw from mainstream political activities? How important is it to distinguish between different sources of discrimination when analyzing the political behavior of racial and ethnic minorities? Do individuals even recognize the difference between different sources of discrimination?

The present dissertation attempted to answer these pressing questions. In the opening chapter I argued that discrimination is an important and multifaceted phenomenon that occurs in almost every facet of public and private life. However, our understanding of how it impacts sociopolitical attitudes, behaviors, and group dynamics is still relatively limited. Existing political science research lacks coherent conceptualization and theory, suffers from inconsistent and vague operationalization, and has largely ignored advancements in other disciplines. This is not to claim that no progress has been made. Several noteworthy studies have certainly advanced this subfield. For instance, scholars has demonstrated that discrimination has the capacity to increase political participation, and help foster a sense of group identity or consciousness among African-Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and Muslim-Americans. Interestingly, however, three decades of epidemiological research has found a strong and direct link between discrimination and alarming psychological outcomes such as feelings of inferiority, insecurity, powerlessness, and depression among numerous minority groups including, but not limited to, African-Americans, Black African and Caribbean Brits, Latinos, and Asians in the US, UK, and Canada. These findings pose a challenge to existing accounts of discrimination and democratic engagement, presenting an interesting research puzzle: how is it that discrimination could motivate individuals to spend their limited time and resources on the political process when it also has the capacity to make people feel pessimistic, depressed, or discouraged?

The primary objective of this dissertation was to tackle this puzzle. I argued that we need to expand the scope of inquiry and delineate between different sources of discrimination. While discrimination is broadly conceived as drawing a distinction by judgement or action in favor or against a person or group based on sociocultural or phenotypical characteristics, it is a more complex concept with at least two major dimensions. The first dimension is called "political discrimination," which I defined as systematic actions in the form of laws, policies, practices, symbols, or frames that deny to attempt to deny equal access to resources, opportunities, or rights to a certain class of people. Political discrimination is the violation of democratic norms, which transpires in a multitude of ways. At times it takes a form of policies or practices that undermine civil liberties such as the surveillance and scrutiny of Muslim-Americans in the post-9/11 era, or the treatment of African-Americans and Latinos by the police. Other times it is an attempt to deny access to the ballot or restrict access to resources such as health care, public education, or social services. Political discrimination may also emerge in campaigns, with candidates such as Donald Trump depicting certain groups as unintelligent, lazy, unpatriotic, or dangerous to mobilize certain voters. In contrast to political discrimination stands "societal discrimination," which I defined as verbal, non-verbal, or physical antagonism or violence between rank-and-file members of the society in the course of everyday life. This type of discrimination is informal, often occurring on the street, in shops, at restaurants, or other public and private spaces where people interact with one another. For instance, societal discrimination can look like a subtle act of avoidance or rejection in posture or tone. It could also be more transparent and upfront such as racial slurs or disparaging racial comments or worse, physical intimidation or violence. While political discrimination is considered a systematic challenge to a group's political, cultural, or economic status, societal discrimination is the mistreatment of individuals disseminated by dominant group members in the course of everyday life.

As I have argued in chapter 2, the distinction between political and societal contexts is consequential for research on democratic engagement because behavioral responses to discrimination depend on the qualitative nature of discrimination perceived. Scholars should not simply assume that all forms of discrimination lead to similar outcomes. Unfortunately, political science research has operated under this assumption or has primarily focused on cases of political discrimination. On the other hand, social psychologists have predominately focused on societal discrimination. As a result, we are currently presented with two strands of literature on discrimination that are disconnected from one another. One major contribution of this dissertation was to bridge this gap. I offered a new interdisciplinary theoretical model that helps explain why discrimination may spur political activism despite its link to adverse mental health outcomes.

Drawing from research on political threat, emotions, motivation, and group consciousness, I theorized that political discrimination serves as an impetus to political mobilization, motivating individuals to take action against systematic injustice due to at least three reasons. First, group threat has the capacity to make politics more salient to individuals. According to Affective Intelligence Theory and research on policy threat, when citizens encounter threatening actors, events, or issues on the political horizon they not only pay more attention to politics but also engage more in politics for expressive or substantive purposes. Second, systematic violations of democratic principles such as equality before the law can also promote a collective orientation to politics, making individuals receptive to appeals of collective action by civic and political organizations. Third, and perhaps more importantly, when faced with political discrimination, citizens are likely to place blame on systematic or institutions forces (externalize discrimination) rather than internalizing such experiences and placing blame on personal failings or shortcomings. Due to these reasons, I hypothesized that the perception of political discrimination can mobilize, rather than alienate, individuals.

While political discrimination could serve as mobilizing force, I argued that societal discrimination, on the other hand, could promote behavioral alienation. Drawing from literature on belonging, false consciousness, and efficacy, I theorized that the accumulation of negative societal encounters can make individuals pessimistic and disheartened by the democratic process—a process in which minorities tend to be outnumbered and rely on some majority group support to achieve their objectives. One primary reason for the decline in enthusiasm has to do with the fact that peer discrimination is an extremely unpleasant and stressful experience of *personal* rejection that can severely undermine a person's sense of belonging to the community. This sense of relatedness to others is an important emotional need of human beings, and is considered an influential predictor of psychological well-being. When individuals feel that they do not "fit in" because of how they look, behave, or where they come from, they may internalize negative evaluations and suffer from detrimental mental health outcomes such as depression, insecurity, and low self-esteem. Adverse outcomes such as depression are hardly a source of motivation and optimism. Instead, researchers have found that sadness and depression is associated with perceived lack of control, passivity, withdrawal, and reduced attention to external cues. In addition, as studies on false consciousness have highlighted, rejected individuals may also develop an inflated sense of pessimism, and genuinely believe that the majority of their peers disagree with them even if the realities on the ground do not match that perception. Added, research on efficacy has demonstrated that citizens engage in politics to the extent that they believe meaningful change is achievable. Taken together, one can imagine how societal discrimination could decrease participatory inclinations in a world of competing interests and limited resources.

In addition to disentangling discrimination by source, I also argued that researchers would benefit from drawing a distinction between in-group or ethnic-specific activities and broader forms of civic or political engagement. While individuals may decide to

participate or withdraw from democratic activities due to their experiences of discrimination, they may seek their in-group members when faced with any type of marginalization. This is because individuals tend to cope with the pain of prejudice by increasing identification with their disadvantaged group members. Seeking one's in-group can fulfill the strong desire for acceptance and belonging that stigmatized individuals have been deprived of by dominant group members. Furthermore, the in-group offers the opportunity for collective action for those who feel that their group is being systematically discriminated against. Due to these reasons, combining broader forms of participation such as voting with ethnic-specific activities can muddle the relationship between discrimination and engagement. That is, while societal discrimination could promote alienation from mainstream politics, it could, at the same time, promote in-group engagement such as participating in the activities of the local mosque or Islamic center.

All this points to my other major contribution: a multi-method, multi-group, and comparative study of discrimination and sociopolitical behavior. In the first empirical chapter I investigated the political participation of Muslim-Americans in the post 9/11 era using two national survey datasets. My analysis revealed that political discrimination is one of the most influential predictors of political participation. In some of the models, notably the Pew turnout model, the perception that airport security officials singled-out the participant because he or she is a Muslim had as strong of an impact on self-reported voting as traditional predictors of political engagement such as political interest, age, education, and income. In contrast, accumulated experiences of societal discrimination—suspicious looks, racial slurs, physical threat—significantly decreased the likelihood of voting. In fact, peer discrimination was on par with no party attachment as the two most powerful predictors of abstention. The Muslim-American chapter not only demonstrated the importance of discrimination as a key independent variable in models of political behavior, but also showed that conflating measures of political and societal discrimination leads to

misleading conclusions. Furthermore, this chapter illustrated that drawing a distinction between broader forms of political engagement and ethnic-specific activities can enhance our understanding of discrimination and behavior. While societal discrimination reduced the likelihood of voting, it was, as predicted, significantly associated with increased in-group engagement—that is, participation in mosque or Islamic center activities beyond prayer.

To show that the S&PD theory is portable to other groups, especially groups in different contexts, I also tested my claims with a national survey of ethnic minorities in Britain. This chapter highlighted yet another strength of my study: even when operationalizing political and societal discrimination with different survey questions, I found consistent patterns across different groups. Furthermore, by utilizing three-layered discrimination questions I was able to show more effectively that broad or global measures underestimate the effect of discrimination on behavior, and that the source of discrimination plays a powerful role in whether individuals decided to partake in or withdraw from politics. Specifically, my analysis revealed that just like Muslims in the U.S., political discrimination was a powerful predictor of voting among ethnic minorities in the UK. Likewise, societal discrimination significantly reduced the likelihood of voting in local and national elections. However, broad discrimination questions had no substantive impact on the participants' propensity to partake in elections.

Chapter 4 also expanded on the notion that discrimination promotes in-group engagement by presenting an analysis of discrimination ethnic identification. The results illustrated that discrimination, regardless of source, not only increased in-group engagement, but was also linked to identity choice. That is, discriminated individuals were more likely than their counterparts to identify as Black/Asian rather than British. This finding is especially relevant in the context of anxiety and fear of immigrants, notably Muslims, in places like Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, and Poland. What it suggests is that the

type of xenophobic and anti-muslim rhetoric that emerged during the Brexit campaign and the instances of mistreatment of racial and ethnic minorities in communities across Britain may be pushing individuals away from national or collective identities and toward ethnic-specific identities. As such, countries concerned with the assimilation of immigrants need to look within and address issues of discrimination if their objective is to promote integration and unity.

The last major contribution of my dissertation is an attempt to identify the psychological mechanisms by which discrimination may promote or inhibit participation. In chapters 3 and 4 I showed some preliminary evidence that societal discrimination, unlike political discrimination, is linked to general unhappiness in life and self-reported mental and physical impairment. In chapter 5 I took this investigation a step further and proposed three specific hypothesis to examine the underlying mechanisms in more detail with two unique datasets. In the first section of this chapter I showed that discrimination, depending on source, has divergent effects on political behavior among yet another group: African-Americans. I then illustrated that while both societal and political discrimination variables were linked to increased anxiety and dissatisfaction in life, only societal discrimination made African-American respondents feel hopeless, that they are unable to control important things in their lives, and that things do not generally go their way. These findings suggest that experiences of discrimination, in general, are anxiety-inducing stimuli, which, according to Affective Intelligence theory, is what compels individuals to pay attention and respond to worrisome contexts or events such as policies that violate principle of equality and fair treatment. After all, without a sense dissatisfaction and anxiety people may not necessarily be attentive to appeals of collection actions or be compelled to take part in politics when the opportunity arises. However, peer rejection appeared to have the internalization effect that political discrimination did not have. The experience of not fitting in, valued, or respected by one's peers impacts a

person's connection to others and can, as a consequence, significantly impair health and influence behavior. For such individuals, the possibility exists that moods may indeed turn too gloomy and interest in collective action fades.

In the second section of chapter 5 I brought to bear results from a novel online experiment on discrimination that was administered on a panel of Muslim-American adults. Two important insights were gained by administering and utilizing the aforementioned experiment. First, open-ended responses provided some preliminary evidence that individuals can distinguish between different sources of discrimination. This finding addressed a pressing concern about the S&PD theory: whether individuals simply merge all of their experiences with discrimination together rather than recognizing differences. Second, the post-treatment questions demonstrated that societally stigmatized individuals were much more likely than those exposed to the placebo or political discrimination treatments to believe that the majority of their community members would disagree with them and would not support policies that would benefit their group. Perhaps not surprisingly then, when asked to add their name to a letter to Congress to urge them to review security policies, societally discriminated individuals were much less likely than those exposed to political discrimination to do so. Overall, the survey analysis and the experimental findings attempted to identify the reasons societal discrimination may stifle democratic engagement while political discrimination may have the opposite impact.

While the present dissertation made a number of contributions to research on discrimination and sociopolitical behavior, there are still a number of interesting questions that remain to be answered and deserve scholarly attention. First, research needs to be extended to other marginalized groups such as members of the LGBTQ community. While my theoretical framework focused on racial and ethnic minorities, the reasons for participation and alienation could certainly apply to other groups as well. For instances, Almeida et al. (2009) found that peer discrimination among gay, lesbian, and bisexual

youth is linked to depressive symptoms, elevated risk of self-harm, and even suicidal ideation. In addition to extending the theory of S&PD to other groups, it is also important to consider intersectionally disadvantaged individuals. That is, individuals who may not only face racial or ethnic discrimination, but may also be exposed to discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation.

Another area for research deals with in-group discrimination, which is a prominent issues among diverse groups like Latinos. A recent study by Sanchez and Espinosa (2016) discovered that nearly 40 percent of Latinos reported being discriminated against by other racial or ethnic minorities, notably other Latinos, and that this experience of internal discrimination suppressed a sense of common group identity. Similarly, Lavariega Monforti and Sanchez (2010) found that 84 percent of Latinos in a survey believed that in-group discrimination such as discrimination based on accent or skin color is highly problematic. This means that another important dimension of discrimination is the background of the discriminator. For diverse groups, especially those with a history of tension based on country of origin, religious differences, or dissimilarities in culture, the perpetrators are not just white, dominant group members. And if individuals are exposed to both out-group and in-group discrimination the level of alienation could become so severe that such individuals may become susceptible to appeals by radical groups since the sense of rejection comes from both sides of the equation.

The last area of research that also deserves attention, but is much harder to pinpoint has to do with threshold effects and the other dimensions of discrimination that I attempted to address with different survey questions. For instance, individuals could indirectly perceive or directly experience discrimination at different levels of severity and frequency. Furthermore, individuals could also experience discrimination throughout their lifespan or only at different points such as childhood, adolescence, or adulthood. The question for future research is to what extent do these other dimensions influence

outcome variables of interest such as sociopolitical behavior.

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Appendix A

Table A.1: The Impact of Discrimination on Political Participation (MAPOS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<i>Vote</i>	<i>Protest</i>	<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Write</i>
	(MAPOS)	(MAPOS)	(MAPOS)	(MAPOS)
Political Discrimination	0.594** (0.189)	0.691*** (0.186)	0.592*** (0.153)	0.382* (0.177)
Political Interest	0.396*** (0.095)	0.157 [†] (0.086)	0.297*** (0.077)	0.295** (0.091)
Mosque Attendance	0.079 (0.079)	0.489*** (0.076)	0.510*** (0.066)	0.213** (0.073)
Female	-0.061 (0.157)	0.364* (0.143)	-0.297* (0.131)	-0.017 (0.147)
Age	0.501*** (0.111)	0.024 (0.096)	0.213* (0.086)	0.008 (0.096)
High Education	1.103*** (0.266)	-0.174 (0.235)	0.242 (0.213)	0.845** (0.260)
Mid Education	0.716*** (0.208)	-0.151 (0.195)	-0.021 (0.180)	0.602** (0.230)
Missing Education	-1.479 [†] (0.830)	-0.145 (0.598)	0.018 (0.534)	0.535 (0.638)
High Income	0.431 [†] (0.234)	0.361 [†] (0.216)	0.144 (0.193)	0.282 (0.216)
Mid Income	0.498** (0.187)	0.330 [†] (0.172)	0.386* (0.152)	0.261 (0.174)
Missing Income	0.049 (0.351)	-0.151 (0.317)	0.055 (0.271)	-0.448 (0.346)
U.S. Born	0.563** (0.171)	0.961*** (0.150)	0.608*** (0.139)	0.538*** (0.152)
No Party Attachment	-1.164*** (0.189)	-0.445** (0.170)	-0.451** (0.147)	-1.135*** (0.198)
Black	-0.521* (0.232)	-1.089*** (0.211)	-0.310 [†] (0.188)	-0.668** (0.215)
Asian	-0.649*** (0.192)	-0.778*** (0.171)	-0.438** (0.152)	-0.344* (0.170)
Other Race	-0.809** (0.247)	-0.838*** (0.220)	-0.455* (0.197)	-0.014 (0.211)
(Intercept)	-2.983*** (0.491)	-3.430*** (0.445)	-3.277*** (0.394)	-3.441*** (0.461)
<i>N</i>	920	1256	1256	1256
<i>McFadden's R</i> ²	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.09
<i>ML(Cox - Snell) R</i> ²	0.19	0.14	0.14	0.10
<i>log L</i>	-464.787	-611.875	-726.677	-602.939

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table A.2: Predictors of Voting and Protesting by Political Interest (MAPOS)

	Vote (Low Interest)	Vote (High Interest)	Protest (Low Interest)	Protest (High Interest)
Political Discrimination	0.546* (0.240)	0.765* (0.325)	0.627** (0.243)	0.806** (0.300)
Mosque Attendance	0.142 (0.099)	-0.025 (0.140)	0.494*** (0.098)	0.561*** (0.123)
Female	-0.081 (0.195)	-0.048 (0.289)	0.284 (0.183)	0.631* (0.247)
Age	0.546*** (0.143)	0.433* (0.189)	0.047 (0.133)	0.026 (0.145)
High Education	1.316*** (0.339)	1.142* (0.480)	-0.092 (0.297)	-0.244 (0.417)
Mid Education	0.712** (0.244)	0.917* (0.423)	-0.231 (0.232)	-0.044 (0.376)
Missing Education	-1.719 (1.109)	-0.909 (1.268)	0.288 (0.653)	-14.103 (618.5)
High Income	0.145 (0.292)	0.987* (0.404)	0.272 (0.274)	0.601 (0.367)
Mid Income	0.243 (0.232)	0.961** (0.323)	0.252 (0.216)	0.478 (0.296)
Missing Income	0.352 (0.454)	-0.224 (0.574)	-0.459 (0.423)	0.374 (0.501)
U.S. Born	0.309 (0.217)	1.086*** (0.304)	0.950*** (0.197)	1.043*** (0.249)
No Party Attachment	-1.167*** (0.223)	-1.339*** (0.363)	-0.534** (0.203)	-0.444 (0.317)
Black	-0.527 [†] (0.298)	-0.341 (0.390)	-1.004*** (0.297)	-1.292*** (0.316)
Asian	-0.505* (0.237)	-0.693* (0.330)	-0.847*** (0.229)	-0.683* (0.267)
Other Race	-0.863** (0.311)	-0.576 (0.428)	-0.246 (0.266)	-1.933*** (0.410)
(Intercept)	-1.935*** (0.519)	-1.802* (0.826)	-2.945*** (0.497)	-3.280*** (0.677)
N	534	386	757	499
log L	-274.447	-139.915	-342.118	-213.787

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table A.3: Predictors of Meeting and Write by Political Interest (MAPOS)

	Meeting (Low Interest)	Meeting (High Interest)	Write (Low Interest)	Write (High Interest)
Political Discrimination	0.453* (0.197)	0.883*** (0.246)	0.248 (0.246)	0.534* (0.261)
Mosque Attendance	0.508*** (0.085)	0.517*** (0.109)	0.355*** (0.103)	0.102 (0.106)
Female	-0.362* (0.164)	-0.132 (0.234)	-0.043 (0.199)	0.017 (0.229)
Age	0.161 (0.115)	0.254 [†] (0.136)	-0.079 (0.143)	0.063 (0.133)
High Education	0.399 (0.264)	-0.291 (0.401)	0.757* (0.349)	0.877* (0.419)
Mid Education	0.158 (0.211)	-0.562 (0.371)	0.709* (0.289)	0.511 (0.394)
Missing Education	-0.106 (0.631)	0.734 (1.211)	0.706 (0.754)	0.182 (1.229)
High Income	-0.004 (0.244)	0.472 (0.322)	0.327 (0.303)	0.197 (0.319)
Mid Income	0.275 (0.189)	0.621* (0.260)	0.513* (0.237)	0.024 (0.263)
Missing Income	0.011 (0.343)	0.093 (0.445)	-0.291 (0.459)	-0.714 (0.527)
U.S. Born	0.430* (0.177)	0.870*** (0.237)	0.414 [†] (0.212)	0.674** (0.229)
No Party Attachment	-0.539** (0.173)	-0.423 (0.278)	-1.486*** (0.264)	-0.730* (0.305)
Black	-0.231 (0.253)	-0.474 (0.296)	-0.644* (0.323)	-0.563 [†] (0.295)
Asian	-0.290 (0.193)	-0.639* (0.253)	-0.697** (0.244)	0.035 (0.248)
Other Race	-0.270 (0.245)	-0.877** (0.333)	-0.092 (0.283)	0.099 (0.322)
(Intercept)	-2.352*** (0.425)	-2.059*** (0.618)	-2.791*** (0.530)	-2.212*** (0.631)
N	757	499	757	499
log L	-428.315	-246.427	-296.737	-253.559

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table A.4: Impact of Broad Discrimination on Turnout (Pew)

	Broad Disc Model DV: <i>Turnout</i>
Broad Discrimination	-0.007 (0.094)
Political Interest	0.942*** (0.215)
Mosque Attendance	0.053 (0.053)
Female	-0.126 (0.174)
Age	0.023*** (0.007)
High Education	0.879** (0.282)
Middle Education	0.401 [†] (0.205)
Missing Education	-1.533 (1.347)
High Income	0.649* (0.274)
Middle Income	0.375 [†] (0.209)
Missing Income	-0.315 (0.286)
U.S. Born	1.082*** (0.244)
No Party Attachment	-0.988*** (0.221)
Black	-0.060 (0.297)
Asian	0.244 (0.235)
Other Race	0.306 (0.240)
(Intercept)	-1.600*** (0.428)
<i>N</i>	742
$\log L$	-369.604

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table A.5: The Impact of Discrimination on Registration & Turnout (Pew)

	Model 5 Registration (PEW)	Model 6 Turnout (PEW)
Political Discrimination	0.460 [†] (0.249)	0.656** (0.230)
Societal Discrimination	-0.295* (0.131)	-0.283* (0.128)
Political Interest	0.262 (0.226)	0.934*** (0.217)
Mosque Attendance	0.037 (0.057)	0.055 (0.053)
Female	0.068 (0.188)	-0.111 (0.176)
Age	0.032*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.007)
High Education	1.015** (0.323)	0.860** (0.285)
Mid Education	0.471* (0.210)	0.405 [†] (0.207)
Missing Education	-0.296 (1.274)	-1.423 (1.385)
High Income	0.226 (0.312)	0.511 [†] (0.279)
Mid Income	0.221 (0.231)	0.304 (0.211)
Missing Income	-0.649* (0.269)	-0.410 (0.292)
U.S. Born	0.448 [†] (0.245)	1.170*** (0.249)
No Party Attachment	-0.757*** (0.226)	-0.997*** (0.222)
Black	0.520 [†] (0.303)	-0.001 (0.301)
Asian	0.826** (0.265)	0.292 (0.238)
Other Race	0.276 (0.247)	0.369 (0.243)
(Intercept)	-1.078* (0.430)	-1.652*** (0.431)
<i>N</i>	776	742
<i>McFadden's R</i> ²	0.11	0.15
<i>ML(Cox – Snell) R</i> ²	0.12	0.17
<i>log L</i>	-321.985	-361.350

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table A.6: Discrimination & Attending Mosque Activities Beyond Prayer

	Model 7 (PEW)
Political Discrimination	0.551** (0.192)
Societal Discrimination	0.383*** (0.113)
Religiosity	0.224*** (0.041)
Importance of Religion	0.607** (0.185)
Political Interest	0.256 (0.182)
Female	0.035 (0.162)
Age	-0.002 (0.006)
High Education	1.019*** (0.261)
Mid Education	0.679*** (0.203)
Missing Education	0.656 (1.350)
High Income	0.964*** (0.255)
Mid Income	0.624** (0.203)
Missing Income	0.196 (0.260)
U.S. Born	1.046*** (0.210)
No Party Attachment	-0.084 (0.200)
Black	0.370 (0.257)
Asian	0.198 (0.221)
Other Race	0.132 (0.239)
(Intercept)	-7.328*** (0.759)
<i>N</i>	973
<i>McFadden's R</i> ²	0.20
<i>ML(Cox – Snell) R</i> ²	0.22
<i>log L</i>	-434.728

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses
[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table A.7: The Effect of Discrimination on Bush Disapproval, Dissatisfaction, & Unhappiness in Life

	Model 8 <i>BushDisap.</i>	Model 8.1 <i>BushDisap.</i>	Model 9 <i>Dissatisfied</i>	Model 9.1 <i>Dissatisfied</i>	Model 10 <i>Unhappy</i>	Model 10.1 <i>Unhappy</i>
Pol. Disc.	0.717** (0.265)	0.744* (0.290)	0.463** (0.173)	0.504** (0.191)	-0.300 (0.214)	-0.031 (0.235)
Soc. Disc.	0.571** (0.175)	0.531** (0.187)	0.564*** (0.114)	0.430*** (0.121)	0.417*** (0.111)	0.496*** (0.126)
Pol. Interest		-0.099 (0.230)		0.007 (0.174)		-0.152 (0.228)
Mosque Att.		0.167** (0.062)		0.074 (0.046)		-0.077 (0.055)
Female		0.353 [†] (0.204)		0.220 (0.151)		-0.244 (0.187)
Age		0.016* (0.008)		0.011 [†] (0.006)		0.011 (0.007)
High Educ		0.162 (0.324)		0.220 (0.234)		-0.733* (0.301)
Mid Educ		-0.123 (0.241)		0.324 [†] (0.182)		-0.560** (0.206)
Mis Educ		-0.680 (1.324)		-1.154 (1.200)		-0.541 (1.215)
High Inc		0.360 (0.320)		0.379 (0.242)		-0.920** (0.308)
Mid Inc		0.630* (0.258)		-0.064 (0.187)		-1.012*** (0.241)
Mis Inc		-0.539 [†] (0.287)		-0.570* (0.234)		-0.579* (0.270)
U.S. Born		0.844** (0.303)		1.034*** (0.214)		-0.868*** (0.262)
No Party		-0.279 (0.236)		-0.421* (0.182)		0.190 (0.219)
Black		0.008 (0.356)		0.485 [†] (0.253)		0.203 (0.302)
Asian		-0.496 [†] (0.265)		-0.077 (0.198)		-0.288 (0.262)
Other Race		0.038 (0.280)		0.207 (0.204)		0.367 (0.243)
(Intercept)	1.283*** (0.103)	-0.019 (0.468)	0.101 (0.079)	-1.021** (0.355)	-1.703*** (0.105)	-0.854* (0.409)
N	898	873	969	936	1008	972
McFad.R ²	0.03	0.11	0.04	0.11	0.02	0.10
MLR ²	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.13	0.02	0.09
log L	-383.744	-297.118	-620.960	-504.677	-444.821	-352.924

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table A.8: Summary of Variables, Pew

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote	757	0.593	0.492	0	1
Voter Registration	792	0.690	0.463	0	1
Mosque Beyond Prayer	1048	0.303	0.450	0	1
Political Discrimination	1050	0.228	0.418	0	1
Societal Discrimination	1033	0.446	0.753	0	3
Mosque Attendance	1044	2.510	1.776	0	5
Religiosity Index	1009	10.85	3.135	2	14
Religious Importance	1038	3.566	0.760	1	4
Political Interest	1049	0.217	0.412	0	1
Female	1050	0.481	0.499	0	1
Age	1027	38.736	13.876	18	88
Education	1031	2.607	1.242	1	5
High Income	1050	0.121	0.326	0	1
Middle Income	1050	0.247	0.432	0	1
Low Income	1050	0.376	0.485	0	1
Missing Income	1050	0.257	0.437	0	1
U.S. Born	1024	0.354	0.478	0	1
No Party Attachment	1050	0.262	0.440	0	1
Unhappy	1008	0.171	0.376	0	1
Dissatisfied	969	0.599	0.490	0	1
Bush Disapproval	898	0.832	0.374	0	1

Table A.9: Summary of Variables, MAPOS

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote	962	0.644	0.479	0	1
Protest	1410	0.318	0.446	0	1
Meeting	1410	0.473	0.499	0	1
Write	1410	0.241	0.428	0	1
Mosque Beyond Prayer	1410	0.642	0.480	0	1
Political Discrimination	1387	0.772	0.420	0	1
Mosque Involvement	1387	2.767	0.972	1	4
Political Interest	1380	3.106	0.888	1	4
Female	1410	0.498	0.500	0	1
Age	1302	1.856	0.782	1	4
Education	1301	3.643	1.083	1	5
High Income	1410	0.176	0.381	0	1
Middle Income	1410	0.426	0.495	0	1
Low Income	1410	0.279	0.449	0	1
Missing Income	1410	0.119	0.324	0	1
U.S. Born	1410	0.450	0.498	0	1
No Party Attachment	1410	0.244	0.430	0	1

Appendix B

Table B.1: The Impact of Discrimination on Voting in the 2010 Local Election

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Broad Disc I	-0.103 (0.120)		
Broad Disc II		-0.016 (0.059)	
Societal Disc			-0.091** (0.046)
Political Disc			0.124*** (0.046)
Vote Duty	0.482*** (0.068)	0.486*** (0.068)	0.495*** (0.068)
Worship Attendance	0.091*** (0.033)	0.093*** (0.033)	0.092*** (0.033)
Political Interest	0.260*** (0.057)	0.261*** (0.057)	0.252*** (0.057)
Political Knowledge	0.187*** (0.048)	0.184*** (0.048)	0.186*** (0.048)
Political Efficacy	0.031 (0.020)	0.033* (0.020)	0.035* (0.020)
Democratic Satisfaction	0.040 (0.076)	0.050 (0.076)	0.068 (0.077)
Trust Parliament	0.045* (0.024)	0.044* (0.024)	0.047* (0.024)
British Identity	0.051 (0.084)	0.052 (0.084)	0.066 (0.085)
English (Main Lang)	0.236* (0.135)	0.231* (0.135)	0.214 (0.135)
Native Born	0.361*** (0.140)	0.365*** (0.140)	0.383*** (0.141)
Party ID (Yes)	0.883*** (0.140)	0.880*** (0.140)	0.878*** (0.140)
Female	0.187* (0.108)	0.193* (0.108)	0.208* (0.109)
Age	0.040*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.005)
Education	-0.009 (0.049)	-0.014 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.049)
High Income	0.142 (0.210)	0.139 (0.210)	0.141 (0.210)
Mid Income	0.118 (0.161)	0.111 (0.161)	0.120 (0.161)
Missing Income	0.060 (0.124)	0.060 (0.124)	0.071 (0.125)
Black Caribbean	-0.770*** (0.185)	-0.775*** (0.185)	-0.793*** (0.185)
Black African	-0.806*** (0.171)	-0.813*** (0.171)	-0.829*** (0.171)
Indian	-0.520*** (0.167)	-0.520*** (0.167)	-0.509*** (0.167)
Bangladeshi	0.397* (0.215)	0.398* (0.215)	0.411* (0.215)
(Intercept)	-5.403*** (0.446)	-5.438*** (0.447)	-5.554*** (0.450)
N	1980	1979	1979
Adj.R ²	0.14	0.14	0.15
AIC	2176.659	2174.503	2168.735

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses
 * significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table B.2: The Impact of Discrimination on Turnout in the 2010 General Election

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Broad Disc I	-0.030 (0.124)		
Broad Disc II		-0.020 (0.060)	
Societal Disc			-0.089* (0.046)
Political Disc			0.110** (0.047)
Vote Duty	0.515*** (0.066)	0.519*** (0.066)	0.525*** (0.066)
Worship Attendance	0.104*** (0.033)	0.106*** (0.033)	0.106*** (0.034)
Political Interest	0.306*** (0.058)	0.311*** (0.058)	0.303*** (0.058)
Political Knowledge	0.214*** (0.049)	0.213*** (0.049)	0.215*** (0.049)
Political Efficacy	0.033 (0.020)	0.034* (0.020)	0.035* (0.020)
Democratic Satisfaction	0.049 (0.078)	0.054 (0.078)	0.068 (0.078)
Trust Parliament	0.021 (0.025)	0.019 (0.025)	0.021 (0.025)
British Identity	0.097 (0.086)	0.092 (0.086)	0.104 (0.086)
English (Main Lang)	0.268* (0.138)	0.269* (0.138)	0.259* (0.138)
Native Born	0.386*** (0.144)	0.392*** (0.144)	0.405*** (0.144)
Party ID (Yes)	0.914*** (0.139)	0.915*** (0.139)	0.917*** (0.139)
Female	0.363*** (0.111)	0.366*** (0.112)	0.376*** (0.112)
Age	0.037*** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.005)
Education	-0.061 (0.051)	-0.063 (0.051)	-0.070 (0.051)
High Income	0.350 (0.223)	0.343 (0.224)	0.348 (0.224)
Mid Income	0.322* (0.168)	0.315* (0.168)	0.321* (0.168)
Missing Income	0.195 (0.126)	0.188 (0.126)	0.202 (0.126)
Black Caribbean	-0.677*** (0.187)	-0.669*** (0.187)	-0.678*** (0.187)
Black African	-0.705*** (0.171)	-0.708*** (0.171)	-0.723*** (0.171)
Indian	-0.120 (0.170)	-0.119 (0.170)	-0.105 (0.170)
Bangladeshi	0.619*** (0.222)	0.619*** (0.223)	0.626*** (0.222)
(Intercept)	-5.603*** (0.449)	-5.615*** (0.449)	-5.699*** (0.452)
N	2103	2102	2102
Adj.R ²	0.16	0.16	0.16
AIC	2120.596	2116.783	2112.748

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses
 * significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table B.3: The Impact of Discrimination on Identity Choice

	Equally Both (1)	British (2)
Societal Disc	-0.144*** (0.041)	-0.118** (0.058)
Political Disc	-0.078** (0.039)	-0.179*** (0.064)
Worship Att.	-0.092*** (0.030)	-0.168*** (0.040)
Native Born	0.783*** (0.132)	1.333*** (0.172)
Ethnic Neighborhood	-0.108* (0.057)	-0.189** (0.075)
English (Main Lang)	0.556*** (0.123)	0.880*** (0.165)
Female	-0.014 (0.100)	-0.244* (0.135)
Age	0.018*** (0.004)	0.034*** (0.005)
Education	-0.016 (0.045)	0.012 (0.061)
High Income	-0.411** (0.187)	-0.507** (0.253)
Mid Income	0.015 (0.149)	-0.136 (0.202)
Missing Income	0.188 (0.115)	-0.048 (0.155)
Black Caribbean	-1.341*** (0.179)	-2.492*** (0.238)
Black African	-1.067*** (0.163)	-2.023*** (0.243)
Indian	-0.438*** (0.161)	-0.716*** (0.198)
Bangladeshi	-0.351* (0.188)	-0.319 (0.232)
Constant	0.463 (0.305)	-0.630 (0.409)
AIC	4,413.287	4,413.287

Multinomial Logistic Regression; Standard errors in parentheses

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table B.4: The Impact of Discrimination on In-Group Engagement (EMBES)

	Model 8
Societal Disc	0.108*** (0.038)
Political Disc	0.067* (0.037)
Worship Attendance	0.232*** (0.030)
British Identity	-0.115 (0.072)
Ethnic Neighborhood	0.047 (0.053)
English (main Lang)	-0.114 (0.115)
Native Born	0.360*** (0.121)
Female	0.065 (0.095)
Age	0.006 (0.004)
Education	0.146*** (0.042)
High Income	0.197 (0.174)
Mid Income	0.032 (0.138)
Missing Income	-0.154 (0.110)
Black Caribbean	0.442*** (0.169)
Black African	0.506*** (0.158)
Indian	0.947*** (0.144)
Bangladeshi	0.236 (0.182)
(Intercept)	-2.510*** (0.305)
<i>N</i>	2307
<i>log L</i>	-1312.307

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table B.5: Predictors of Long-Standing Mental/Physical Impairment (EMBES)

	Model 9
Societal Disc	0.086* (0.052)
Political Disc	-0.030 (0.054)
Worship Attendance	0.023 (0.038)
British Identity	0.146 (0.094)
Ethnic Neighborhood	0.044 (0.070)
English (main Lang)	-0.302* (0.158)
Native Born	0.344** (0.175)
Ethnic Activity	-0.078 (0.137)
Female	0.110 (0.125)
Age	0.056*** (0.005)
Education	-0.184*** (0.057)
High Income	-0.426* (0.245)
Mid Income	-0.586*** (0.201)
Missing Income	-0.523*** (0.143)
Black Caribbean	0.384* (0.222)
Black African	0.477** (0.215)
Indian	0.095 (0.200)
Bangladeshi	0.298 (0.237)
(Intercept)	-4.020*** (0.404)
<i>N</i>	2295
<i>log L</i>	-819.580

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses
 * significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table B.6: Summary of Variables (EMBES)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Local Election	2569	0.64	0.48	0	1
General Election	2742	0.69	0.46	0	1
British Identity	2602	0.84	0.69	0	2
Ethnic Engagement	2780	0.30	0.46	0	1
Mental/Physical Health	2761	0.17	0.38	0	1
Broad Disc I	2659	0.30	0.46	0	1
Broad Disc II	2658	0.57	0.93	0	3
Societal Disc	2658	0.55	1.37	0	9
Political Disc	2658	0.55	1.41	0	12
Vote Duty	2757	4.21	0.88	1	5
Worship Attendance	2761	2.66	1.79	0	5
Political Interest	2763	2.18	1.12	0	4
Political Knowledge	2787	3.13	1.24	0	5
Efficacy	2669	2.64	2.86	0	10
Democratic Satisfaction	2670	1.73	0.82	0	3
Trust Parliament	2552	5.08	2.73	0	10
Party ID (yes=1)	2735	0.80	0.40	0	1
English Language	2772	0.65	0.48	0	1
Second Generation	2787	0.35	0.48	0	1
Ethnic Neighborhood	2585	2.55	0.95	1	5
Female	2787	0.52	0.50	0	1
Age	2787	39.01	14.89	18	97
Education	2787	1.64	1.24	0	4
High Income	2787	0.08	0.27	0	1
Middle Income	2787	0.15	0.36	0	1
Low Income	2787	0.39	0.49	0	1
Missing Income	2787	0.38	0.49	0	1
Black-Caribbean	2787	0.24	0.43	0	1
Black-African	2787	0.21	0.41	0	1
Indian	2787	0.21	0.41	0	1
Pakistani	2787	0.24	0.43	0	1
Bangladeshi	2787	0.10	0.30	0	1

Appendix C

Experiment Debrief Statement

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THE STUDY! PLEASE REVIEW VERY IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE STUDY BELOW.

In this study we were interested in understanding more about the impact that discrimination may have on feelings of efficacy and attitudes toward civic and political engagement. However, you were initially provided with general information about the purpose of this study. This information was purposely vague in order to ensure that your responses to the study were not influenced by detailed knowledge of the study itself.

You were also informed that that your name was used in an online survey where you and your peers were evaluated on a number of characteristics. In reality your name was not shared with anyone, as the online survey results/evaluations we presented were fictitious. Therefore, all the evaluations you observed had no basis in reality. In order to accurately evaluate how perceptions of discrimination can impact orientations toward oneself, society, and politics, we needed to temporarily convince you that the evaluations were real.

To summarize, any information that you provided during the course of this study is absolutely confidential. None of your responses can actually be traced back to you. More importantly, your name or any other identifying information was not actually shared with anyone as the "online survey" and its "evaluations" were fictitious.

If you have any further questions about this study please do not hesitate to contact the lead research investigator.

We really appreciate your participation in this study!

Table C.1: Discrimination & Registration Status, 2006 Kaiser Study

	Voter Registration
Societal Discrimination	-0.213*
	(0.112)
Political Discrimination	0.338*
	(0.169)
Female	0.476*
	(0.192)
Age	0.021***
	(0.005)
Married	0.185
	(0.181)
Education	0.224**
	(0.078)
Middle Income	-0.022
	(0.218)
High Income	0.173
	(0.274)
Missing Income	-0.249
	(0.244)
Own Home	0.559***
	(0.159)
Linked Fate	0.203
	(0.152)
Party Attachment (Yes)	0.902***
	(0.151)
Worship Attendance	0.051
	(0.050)
Military	0.434 [†]
	(0.236)
North-Central	0.170
	(0.197)
NorthEast	-0.283
	(0.204)
West	0.019
	(0.401)
(Intercept)	-1.164***
	(0.310)
N	1518
log L	-552.727

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table C.2: Discrimination & Stress, 2006 Kaiser Study

	Stress
Societal Discrimination	0.320** (0.104)
Political Discrimination	0.248† (0.137)
Female	0.385* (0.153)
Age	-0.011** (0.004)
Married	0.149 (0.140)
Education	0.003 (0.059)
Middle Income	-0.353* (0.173)
High Income	-0.007 (0.201)
Missing Income	-0.380† (0.203)
Own Home	0.071 (0.136)
Worship Attendance	-0.065 (0.042)
Military	0.032 (0.163)
Mental Health Help	0.456** (0.154)
North-Central	-0.059 (0.157)
NorthEast	-0.027 (0.178)
West	-0.457 (0.301)
(Intercept)	1.436*** (0.256)
N	1607
log L	-805.216

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table C.3: Discrimination & Dissatisfaction, 2006 Kaiser Study

	Dissatisfaction
Societal Discrimination	0.514*** (0.107)
Political Discrimination	0.293 [†] (0.170)
Female	0.113 (0.191)
Age	0.007 (0.005)
Married	0.000 (0.180)
Education	-0.144 [†] (0.077)
Middle Income	-0.651** (0.251)
High Income	-0.926** (0.307)
Missing Income	-0.170 (0.262)
Own Home	-0.263 (0.162)
Worship Attendance	-0.088 [†] (0.051)
Military	-0.063 (0.213)
Mental Health Help	0.601*** (0.160)
North-Central	-0.086 (0.196)
NorthEast	0.585** (0.198)
West	-0.292 (0.438)
(Intercept)	-1.786*** (0.317)
N	1603
log L	-554.128

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table C.4: Discrimination & No Control, 2006 Kaiser Study

	No Control
Societal Discrimination	0.192* (0.082)
Political Discrimination	0.065 (0.117)
Female	-0.222 [†] (0.129)
Age	0.000 (0.003)
Married	-0.025 (0.120)
Education	-0.139** (0.051)
Middle Income	-0.175 (0.152)
High Income	-0.560** (0.171)
Missing Income	-0.287 (0.184)
Own Home	-0.086 (0.115)
Worship Attendance	0.023 (0.036)
Military	-0.204 (0.142)
Mental Health Help	0.264* (0.122)
North-Central	-0.002 (0.134)
NorthEast	0.115 (0.152)
West	-0.031 (0.276)
(Intercept)	0.359 (0.218)
N	1598
log L	-1025.851

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table C.5: Discrimination & Things Not Going Your Way, 2006 Kaiser Study

	Your Way
Societal Discrimination	0.388*** (0.088)
Political Discrimination	0.124 (0.132)
Female	0.101 (0.147)
Age	-0.003 (0.004)
Married	0.040 (0.138)
Education	-0.180** (0.059)
Middle Income	-0.535** (0.183)
High Income	-0.618** (0.206)
Missing Income	-0.176 (0.205)
Own Home	0.164 (0.130)
Worship Attendance	-0.130** (0.040)
Military	-0.035 (0.164)
Mental Health Help	0.193 (0.134)
North-Central	-0.235 (0.155)
NorthEast	0.201 (0.167)
West	-0.326 (0.337)
(Intercept)	-0.217 (0.244)
N	1604
log L	-844.497

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table C.6: **Discrimination & Hopelessness, 2006 Kaiser Study**

	No Hope
Societal Discrimination	0.461*** (0.093)
Political Discrimination	0.002 (0.142)
Female	-0.022 (0.158)
Age	-0.003 (0.004)
Married	-0.197 (0.152)
Education	-0.194** (0.064)
Middle Income	-0.700*** (0.202)
High Income	-0.967*** (0.243)
Missing Income	-0.570* (0.230)
Own Home	0.134 (0.137)
Worship Attendance	-0.105* (0.043)
Military	-0.177 (0.182)
Mental Health Help	0.680*** (0.137)
North-Central	0.169 (0.158)
NorthEast	0.248 (0.180)
West	-0.268 (0.367)
(Intercept)	-0.487† (0.261)
N	1608
log L	-748.266

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table C.7: Discrimination & Poor Health, 2006 Kaiser Study

	Poor Health
Societal Discrimination	0.306** (0.099)
Political Discrimination	-0.148 (0.146)
Female	0.225 (0.157)
Age	0.038*** (0.004)
Married	0.201 (0.150)
Education	-0.296*** (0.065)
Middle Income	-0.867*** (0.218)
High Income	-0.919*** (0.242)
Missing Income	-0.338 (0.222)
Own Home	0.046 (0.143)
Worship Attendance	-0.192*** (0.044)
Military	-0.216 (0.179)
Mental Health Help	0.640*** (0.144)
North-Central	0.333* (0.158)
NorthEast	-0.011 (0.191)
West	-0.002 (0.349)
(Intercept)	-1.729*** (0.274)
N	1610
log L	-723.984

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table C.8: Discrimination & Pessimism, 2006 Kaiser Study

	Pessimism
Societal Discrimination	0.238* (0.113)
Political Discrimination	-0.260 (0.169)
Female	-0.050 (0.185)
Age	0.010* (0.005)
Married	-0.023 (0.173)
Education	-0.075 (0.073)
Middle Income	-0.188 (0.225)
High Income	-0.097 (0.249)
Missing Income	0.220 (0.253)
Own Home	0.006 (0.165)
Worship Attendance	-0.030 (0.051)
Military	0.090 (0.197)
Mental Health Help	0.284 [†] (0.168)
North-Central	0.088 (0.184)
NorthEast	-0.083 (0.221)
West	-0.652 (0.487)
(Intercept)	-1.923*** (0.315)
N	1492
log L	-573.207

Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table C.9: Name Matching Mtruk Survey Results (N=204)

Muslim Names	% Muslim	% Caucasian	White Names	% Caucasian	% Muslim
Abbas Fadel	93%	0%	Allison Smith	95%	0%
Ahmad El-Mofty	99%	0%	Brad Baker	98%	0%
Ali Hassan	95%	3%	Brett Sullivan	98%	1%
Amira Assaf	98%	0%	Carly Nelson	97%	0%
Fatima Farooq	86%	0%	Claire O'Brien	98%	0%
Hassan Basher	95%	1%	Connor Young	94%	1%
Imani Attar	89%	0%	Dustin Evans	97%	0%
Ismael Abdullah	98%	0%	Emma Miller	97%	0%
Jamal Osman	82%	0%	Greg Kelly	96%	0%
Jayed Islam	95%	1%	Jenna Hall	97%	1%
Mahmood Hamidi	98%	0%	Kathryn Wilson	95%	0%
Maya Habib	88%	0%	Logan Reed	95%	1%
Mohamed Khan	96%	0%	Madeline Adams	95%	1%
Nadima Khalaf	92%	0%	Molly Taylor	99%	0%
Noor Edris	75%	11%	Scott Carter	93%	0%
			Susan Murphy	95%	0%
			Tanner Scott	99%	0%
			Todd Ryan	98%	0%