Russia's fight against drug trafficking: Challenges in developing local law enforcement capabilities

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A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in International Studies:
Russia, Eastern Europe & Central Asia

University of Washington

2013

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Program authorized to offer degree:
Jackson School of International Studies

University of Washington

Abstract

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This thesis discusses trafficking as a distinct form of organized crime. It highlights the different qualities of mafias and trafficking networks, the two dominant forms of organized crime in Russia. The four distinct qualities addressed are function, the potential for legalization of their operations, relationship to the state and state employees, and limits inherent in their geographic scope of activity. Studies conducted on two border programs that operate in post-Soviet states, EUBAM and BOMCA, provide real-world examples of challenges posed by traffickers, as well as challenges that exist in the current policing structures of Russia. The final section briefly offers policy suggestions that Russia should implement in order to refocus their anti-organized crime efforts to fighting trafficking.

Russia's organized crime problem is a familiar topic. The well documented explosion of criminal activity that followed the break up of the Soviet Union led to a subsequent explosion of academic works, government policy proposals and assessments all in response to this new and disturbing phenomenon. The nature of organized crime in Russia has been discussed from many angles, and a number of experts have criticized the Russian government's anti-organized crime policies over the last twenty years. As many have pointed out, Russia still suffers at the hand of professional criminal groups. Despite years of anti-organized crime programs, the country is still in need of a great many reforms before it will be able to tackle its organized crime problem.

This thesis focuses on *trafficking*, which here means the illegal transport of a goods. In discussions on Russian organized crime, trafficking is often overshadowed by the mafia-style crime that overtook the country during the last days of the Soviet Union. Where should trafficking fit in the discussion of Russia's organized crime problem today, and is the Russian government capable of tackling the problem? To answer these questions, my thesis looks at the variety of definitions used in discussions on the Russian mafia, and addresses the ways in which these two forms of Russian organized crime, mafias and trafficking networks, need to be addressed by law enforcement. Mafia-style crime and trafficking function in different ways. In order to successfully operate in Russia, these two forms of criminal enterprises operate in different geographic ranges and abide by different relationships, with each other and with law enforcement structures. These structural differences must play a role in determining the appropriate law-enforcement response.

I argue that the state's current efforts at curbing organized crime are based too much on centrally controlled power structures. While this approach can, arguably, impact Russia's mafia problem, it is insufficient for the fight against trafficking in Russia.

A centrally controlled law enforcement body cannot monitor the trafficking operations in Russia to its full extent. Central agencies need the street level intelligence that local police forces can provide in order to implement successful "intelligence-led" policing reforms. Interagency cooperation between local and federal level agencies is essential before any holistic anti-trafficking strategies can be implemented. A review of the current policing situation in Russia will show that while local law enforcement units are in place in Russia, they operate outside of the network of centrally controlled law enforcement agencies. In addition, the central government must show a greater interest in and concern with the corruption of regional law enforcement agencies. Russia's current efforts at curbing state corruption are not enough of a barrier to trafficking operations.

Few studies exist on Russian law enforcement personnel outside of the heavily centralized, federal policing structures, and they focus almost exclusively on corruption and the relationship between citizens and the police. The corruption discussion is a very relevant part of anti-organized crime policies, and it will be included here. However, this thesis looks beyond the discussion of corruption and considers the problems that exist in the internal structures of Russia's law enforcement agencies to provide a more detailed assessment of reforms that must take place. In the final section of the thesis, two border patrol programs, which operate in the post-Soviet region, will be used as test cases, to

address policy issues that are important to the discussion of Russia response to trafficking within her borders.

Organized crime in Russia[1]

The history of organized crime in Russia is extensive and complex. Its roots date back to the 18th century, and are filled with romanticized ideological and social themes.[2] Rawlinson (2010) explains that at a basic level, crime is a way of identifying the "others" of society. In other words, being labeled a "criminal", or as a member of an "organized crime group", is a classification of activity that is declared by "narrators" to be harmful and thus unacceptable. Understanding the history of Russian organized crime as a *narrative* enables researchers and law enforcement personnel to sort through the numerous ways in which the label *organized crime* has been used in Russia. "Hence, in understanding the significance of narratives of organised crime and the attendant ambiguities which emerge from its various cultural and historical settings," the true nature of criminal activity in Russia can be found. "Not only does it ask us to deconstruct the meaning of the term 'organised crime', it also helps to explain the context of its usage and provide a more self-critical approach to agendas behind these narratives" (Rawlinson, 2010, p. 39).

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[1] Under the United Nations' Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, part of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, "organized crime" is defined very broadly. There are four necessary elements that must be present for UNODC's organized crime laws to apply: there must be more than two members to the crime-committing group, who are not formed at random; the group must be existing for a period of time; the members of the group must act in collusion with the aim of committing a crime that results in at least four years of prison time; and the group's activity must directly or indirectly lead to material gain (UNTOC).

[2] For example, see Cheloukhine, Serguei "The roots of Russian organized crime: From old-fashioned professionals to the organized criminal groups of today".

The purpose of this section is to identify the "cultural and historical" settings as well as "the agendas behind these narratives" of Russian organized crime. Doing so will explore the simultaneous existence of the two dominant forms of organized crime in Russia. Further analysis will identify distinguishing features for each in its ideal form. Isolating these two forms of organized crime from each other is essential for analytical purposes. In reality, there is a great deal of cooperation and cross-over between the members and operations of mafias and trafficking networks. In many ways their functions complement each other. However, each form of organized crime can sustain itself without the other therefore their distinguishing qualities must be explored. For Russia, this means that forming policies to fight mafias will not automatically serve to stop trafficking as well. This gap in policing requirements must be addressed.

Traffickers in Russia deal in a variety of illegal goods. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal wildlife trading, and drug trafficking are all common in Russia. While trafficking in all of these products presents a grave set of dangers to Russia and its citizens, the example of the drug trade will be used in greatest detail because evidence of its proliferation throughout Russia over the last twenty years is easiest to track and so provides the most reliable data.[3]

The most often talked about form of Russian organized crime can generally be categorized as mafias. During the 1990s in Russia, mafias were extensively utilized to protect the business interests of legal and illegal enterprises. However, organized crime existed in the Soviet Union long before Gorbachev's reforms opened the market

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[3] As Tanya Wyatt's *Green Criminology and Wildlife Trafficking (2012)* shows, the illegal wildlife trade is a vastly understudied field. Human trafficking has been the study of numerous research projects, however the care that must be taken with interviews of human trafficking victims, and the psychological damage that results from being a victim, mean that data on human trafficking is less extensive and reliable.

subsequently leading to the rise of the Russian mafia. Before the reforms of the late 1980s, organized crime existed in a form that is today called trafficking. It is ironic that the mafias, which appeared in the late 1980s, were born out of Soviet trafficking operations.

Organized criminal groups in the Soviet Union worked almost exclusively in the illegal transport and sale of consumer goods. "Because it consistently led to product shortages, the centralized Soviet economic system benefited illegal private entrepreneurs, and organized crime groups realized tremendous profits from the growth of the black market" (Sokolov, 2004, p. 69-70). Deville (1999) notes that by the 1960s, black market trade was the dominant activity of organized crime groups. These black market goods were not stolen artwork or blood diamonds, but instead specialty foods and clothes purchased in the West. Organized crime groups supplied their wares to any member of Soviet society, provided they could pay. This included members of the Communist party who, as the keepers of the nation's wealth, were the major source of demand for goods being sold by Soviet criminal groups (Cheloukhine, 2008).

The demise of the Soviet Union led to a massive wave of government and criminal collaboration. Many Communist party members knew the collapse was coming, and turned to criminal groups to hold on to what money and power they could. Some joined the criminal ranks themselves, and others used criminal connections to funnel money into foreign banks. In return, privatized government assets were sold to criminals, particularly those with the best relationships with government elites, at extremely low cost (Williams, 1999). It was at this point, when these criminal groups and their former

state-employed accomplices acquired private property, that their criminal activity shifted away from trafficking activities toward mafias.

Russia's transition to a market economy created the conditions in which mafia-style organized crime quickly expanded. With the Soviet government falling apart and a market economy being established, there was no government structure capable or willing to regulate essential market structures such as business contracts and the protection of property rights. Much like the conditions that led to the birth of Italian and American mafias, these chaotic conditions created a unique opportunity for the rise of Russian mafias (Varese, 2001).

Before the rise of the Russian mafia and Russian trafficking can be analyzed further, the many definitions of the term *mafia* must be reviewed. The diverse ways in which the term has been used in the Russian context has led to a number of subjective uses of the term in the discourse of organized crime. *Organized crime* and more often *mafia* were often repeated words during the 1990s and they were applied liberally to discussions of Russia's social, economic, and government development. Leitzel and Gaddy, (1995) were early scholars to point out that the term *mafia*, which was often repeated by officials and news sources in reference to criminal activity in Russia, was not used in a uniform manner.

> *"It is not always easy to know who Russia's "mafia", is. The use of the term in Russia long predates the current reforms. In one common and traditional usage, it refers simply to whoever is in power--at nearly any level. In such a view, of course, the statement that "the mafia runs the country" is a tautology (Leitzel, et. al, 1995, p. 26)."*

The government's ambiguous use of the label *mafia* first appeared decades earlier, under the Soviet regime. In the 1970s, Soviet officials used the term when referring to regional upper class members who embezzled "public" Soviet property. "[T]he term *mafia* was also commonly used to qualify economic sectors (*trade mafia*) or professional branches (*taxi mafia*)" (Favarel-Garrigues, 2003, p. 426). In the Soviet Union, these broad applications of *mafia*, as a reference to business operations rather than dangerous or violent illegal activity was applied to virtually any business that offered special treatment in return for exclusive goods not commonly available in Soviet stores. This included service sector occupations, like doctors who provided better treatment if the right price was reached. But more important, the transport, or trafficking, networks that provided the supply of goods to these *mafia* businesses were closely associated with popular understandings of the term, leading to a mingling of trafficking and mafias in public perceptions.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia became its own country, social practice changed very little and Russian citizens continued to apply the "mafia" label to businesses that were in fact operating legally and who did not exhibit the same dangerous criminal behavior of some enterprises. Although the economy opened up to market processes, thus subjecting prices more to market forces than the will of business owners, Russian citizens continued to apply the "mafia" label to any business or individual who set their prices too high. Of course, the economic conditions of the time meant high prices were almost everywhere, which led to a distorted impression, especially in the West, of a mafia disease that had infested all of Russia (Serio, 2008).

Within law enforcement circles, the term was viewed in a different context. Joseph Serio spent many years following the development of organized crime in Russia. During his time serving with Russian law-enforcement, he noted that many law-enforcement officers would not refer to organized crime in their territory as "mafias". The term held, not only political but, ethnic and cultural connotations for them. "Mafias" were an Italian form of crime and not appropriate to apply to the Russian phenomenon (Serio, 2008).

After 1991, *mafia* was also used politically by competing sides of the reform process. As Favarel-Garrigues states "the imprecise meaning of the term *mafia* nourished political conflicts around the definition of organized crime and the threats it poses to society" (Favarel-Garrigues, 2003, p. 429). Political hardliners in Russia argued that the mafias were a result of Gorbachev's economic reforms. They also claimed that a criminal elite had quickly taken control of top government positions after 1991, and in actuality were the ones creating the insufficient economic reforms that kept prices high for Russian consumers. Polls of the Russian population taken during the mid-1990s showed that the majority of citizens believed this equivalency between the criminal mafias and political elites (Favarel-Garrigues, 2003). Law-enforcement agencies supported this argument for the most part. It was to their benefit that images of the proliferation of organized crime created as terrifying a picture as possible because fear guaranteed financial and social support for their role in society.

Russian economic reformers, on the other hand, argued that the mafias had been created by gaps in reforms; the absence of complete private property laws, and tax codes. "According to the [reformers], the introduction of market mechanisms should have

favored the integration of "underground" capital in the official economy" (Favarel-Garrigues, 2003, p. 437) had they been implemented fully. Their belief was that the continued development of economic reforms would lead to an end of mafia activities.

Federico Varese (2001) and Vadim Volkov (2002) attempt to avoid the political implications of the mafia in Russia, and instead focused on a more objective description. They both narrow the definition of *mafia* to activities of extortion and violence. Volkov (2002) takes the subject of mafias away from a legal/illegal framework, and instead focuses on a socio-economic phenomenon that played a key part in Russian development during the 1990s, violent protectionism. He discusses in detail groups that held a monopoly on the use of business protection and coercion. As Volkov explains it, "violent entrepreneurship" existed in both the legal and illegal realms. The chaotic legal situation in Russia, along with a lack of property rights, insufficient law enforcement capabilities, and a surplus supply of able-bodied fighters led to a boom in groups who violently protected entities of the newly established Russian market. Initially, these violent entrepreneurs operated outside of the law and state structures as completely illegal groups. But by the end of 1999, large private companies had developed and either absorbed or pushed out criminal operations (those protection groups that were not registered with the state). By this time, the government had also implemented legal reforms which gave them tighter control over the activities of these private companies. However, as Volkov states, these private companies do still operate in an ill-defined space. The state has not been able to completely subjugate these companies to state regulation, however they are still regulated to a much greater degree than the mafias were (Volkov, 2002).

Varese's use of the term *mafia,* defines a mafia as a group that supplies security and protection for legal and illegal property outside the legal parameters of the state. This definition is useful in introducing a more nuanced approach to Russian organized crime, and serves as a point of departure for isolating the two forms of organized crime in Russia: mafias and trafficking.

There are four basic differences between mafias and trafficking networks: function, legality, relationship to the state, and limitations of their geographic scope. The first and most obvious distinction is their function, their particular form of illegal activity. Varese defines a mafia as a criminal organization that works to control the economic activity of a market in order to extort profit from market participants. In return for protection from rival mafias, many of whom may be allied with business competitors, Mafiosi require regular payments from business owners. This protection is not just of physical property. Mafias also ensure the economic success of the businesses they protect. It is, after all, their source of livelihood too.

Kidnapping, blackmail, and the threat of vandalism and violence are important tools used by mafias to control both the businesses under their protection and the potential competitors or threats to them. The use of coercive techniques, such as blackmail and violence is important to note because it reveals the dangerous and parasitic nature of mafias. This destabilizing nature of mafias distinguishes it from legal forms of protection that are provided by the state. Volkov addresses the chaotic legal conditions inside Russia during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Varese as well credits the lack of property rights and capable policing forces for the rise of the Russian mafia. "[I]t is the state's failure to offer effective legal protection and the lack of avenues for legitimate

employment that set in motion a chain of events" that led to the rise of mafias (Varese, 2011, p. 10-11). However, emerging under conditions of state failure of weakness, "the mafia disregards the law… never supplies 'protection' as a public good, in the way the modern liberal-democratic state does (or aspires to do). It does not recognize citizens' rights. For this reason, one should resist the temptation to call the mafia 'a state-within-the-state' unless one strips the state of any appeal to justice" (Varese, 2001, p. 5-6).

The function of traffickers, on the other hand, is very different from that of mafias. They make their money in the transport of illegal goods from market to market, or from a production and supply region to the market. Since the end of the Soviet Union, traffickers have transported only illegal goods. As Russia's market advanced, it led to the development of legal forms of transportation capable of sustaining the legal market. Trafficking in Russia, today, is responsible for transporting things such as black market goods, stolen cars, illegal wildlife, drugs, illegal migrants and sex workers.

The different functions of these two forms of organized crime lead to a second important distinction, namely the relationship to the state. While mafias function as a form of protection that ultimately can be maintained by the state, traffickers operate exclusively in the illegal realm, transporting those goods which the state has declared illegal. Again, this was not always the case in Russia. In the Soviet Union, traffickers transported goods that were not illegal in the same sense they are today. Instead they transported those goods that the state simply did not have the capacity to provide. Today this has changed, and traffickers are "linked to the production, smuggling and sale of illegal goods and services: trafficking in drugs, or arms, smuggling of people, trafficking in women, loan sharking, trading in exotic species of animals and tropical timber,

dumping toxic waste and so forth. Organisations that engage in these activities ... have every reason to stay out of the way of the authorities and their law enforcement agencies" (Bovenkerk, 2007, p. 34).

A third distinction between mafias and trafficking networks is their relationship with the state, and the role corruption plays in their daily functions. Close association with state powers is a well-documented trait of Post-Soviet Russian mafias. Joseph Serio, while working in Russia alongside Russian police officers in the early 1990s recalled often being surprised by the many known Mafiosi who came in to police headquarters to collaborate with the head of the division (Serio, 2008). The history of the Italian mafia has also produced countless examples of mafias corrupting the political leadership of regional city councils (Donadio, 2012). The nature of a mafia's function necessitates an eventual corruption of politicians or political processes, through bribery or election rigging. As the state becomes stronger and more capable of fulfilling its role in protecting property and enforcing contracts, Mafiosi must either work their way into legal forms of business, or migrate into other forms of criminal activity such as trafficking, bootlegging, or financial fraud. Volkov identifies the beginning of this process in Russia as many Mafiosi moved into newly created private security firms, in the second half of the 1990s (Volkov, 2002).[4]

Trafficking in Russia also uses the corruption of state employees to operate, but unlike mafias, their interaction with the legal sphere (through the corruption of state employees) is done as a convenience not a necessity. This is, of course, because they can

[4] It must be noted that this process is by no means complete. While it looked like the Russian government was beginning to control the use of violence through legal regulations of the private security firms, many of those firms show signs of operating outside of state control. Private security firms, which Volkov equates in many ways to mafias, are not yet completely controlled by the Russian state.

operate completely outside the legal market. Drug smugglers in particular can be very creative in finding ways to prevent the detection of their contraband. The only reason traffickers may need to bribe a state official is to avoid arrest. All other aspects of trafficking can be carried out exclusively in the illegal market.

The last factor that distinguishes trafficking activities from mafias is the geographic scope of each. Returning again to Varese, mafias by definition must be able to control market activities. They do so by building a reputation for violence, which allows them to dominate by fear and coercion. He found that mafias that could not establish a reputation of violence, and thus create a sense of fear in the market community, were unsuccessful in establishing dominance over that market. Mafias need access to information in order to have the power of blackmail. Related to this, Varese also argues that the size of a market is important in limiting the reach of a mafia. "A mafia finds it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to create cartels when the market actors run into the hundreds" (Varese, 2011, p. 136).

Based on this, he theorized that mafias would not be able to maintain control over an export-oriented market.

> *"Mafiosi are stationary because the service they provide is inherently local. They ensure selective access to resources in a given territory. In order to do so, they build long-term relationships with the place in which they operate as well as the people, officeholders, and police… reputations are local and are the product of costly investments* (Varese, 2011, p. 191)."

This means that mafias are limited in how far they can stretch their operations. In fact, extending beyond a market is so risky that Varese argued no Mafiosi would attempt it unless forced by state action of another mafia.

Traffickers, on the other hand, are involved in moving goods from one market to another, and by definition transverse multiple markets within a region. For Russia, the largest country in the world, this means that the difference in geographic scope between mafias and traffickers is even greater than in smaller states. The example of drug trafficking demonstrates the geographic challenges that are posed by trafficking into and through Russia.

Drug Trafficking in Russia

Russia is plagued by a heroin problem that only seems to be getting worse, and of all goods trafficked in Russia, it poses one of the gravest dangers to Russian society. Proximity to Afghanistan, the world's largest heroin producer, plays an obvious role in this problem. There are three major trafficking routes out of Afghanistan along which Afghan heroin (eighty-three percent of the world's consumption) travels each year. One route carries the drugs east through China, and another carries it west through Iran and on to Europe. The third, northern route travels through Tajikistan and into Russia (Miraglia, 2012). Heroin is one of the most common derivatives of the class of drugs called opioids that are produced from poppy plants. In 2010, Iran's opioid using population was approximately 2.27% of its entire population. Data from 2007 put Russia's opioid using population at 2.29%. According to drug use measurements taken around the world by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime these two countries, Iran and Russia are in the top six opioid users worldwide. Their location near the source area of Afghanistan and along one of the major trafficking routes likely plays the biggest role in this (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012).

The OECD estimates that ninety tons of heroin are trafficked along the northern route, out of Afghanistan and into Russia. More than three-fourths (seventy tons) of all heroin trafficked along this route is distributed on the streets of Russia (Miraglia, 2012). For the drugs to reach the heavily populated cities of Russia's western regions, traffickers move them across more than 3,500 km from Central Asia to cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. They cross Russia's international border with Kazakhstan, as well as the borders of the Siberian, Ural and Volga federal districts.

The geographic scope of drug trafficking seen here far exceeds that of single-market mafia activity. Each of the federal district mentioned above has its own law enforcement structures. In order to monitor traffickers during their entire trip across the country, these districts need to coordinate information with each other. Traffickers will take advantage of any gaps in the coordination of these different law enforcement groups to "fall off the grid", or disappear into unmonitored territory. Mafias are much easier to monitor. As they are limited in how far their influence can reach outside of a market, it requires fewer personnel to monitor the territory a mafia will utilize. And the likelihood that districts will need to cooperate and share information is lower in the case of mafias.

In this section, the distinguishing characteristics of mafias and trafficking networks were identified. Trafficking networks, operate illegally in complete isolation from the legal order, and the wide geographic range of their activities make them significantly harder to monitor than mafias. The next section will describe the situation in Russia's law enforcement and will identify the areas in which Russia's policing forces lack the necessary capacities to detect, track, and deter trafficking inside Russia's borders.

Gaps in Russia's ability to police trafficking networks

Intelligence-led policing is quickly being acknowledged as the most effective means of policing criminal activity. It focuses on developing policing capacities that can keep up with the ever-changing networks of organized crime groups, but requires extensive cooperation between local police forces, and central policing agencies. "The basic set of raw materials that police work with are information and interactions with people" (Gottschalk, 2010, p. 92). This refers to interactions with citizens as well as fellow police officers.

The current conditions of Russia's regional police forces mean that they are not capable of implementing anti-trafficking operations that target entire trafficking structures as the goods are moved across the federal districts of Russia's vast interior. Organized criminal groups survive because they are quickly able to replace organization members who are arrested; therefore, it is most effective to pursue entire criminal structures as opposed to devoting resources exclusively to arresting individual criminals. The argument that Russia's policing forces are not capable of pursuing traffickers to the full extent is based on six structural impediments that have been found to hinder the successful implementation of anti-organized crime strategies.

Drawing on Atkinson (2006), Petter Gottschalk identified six factors that, when present, impede the implementation of successful anti-organized crime programs: top-down senior management, unclear intentions and conflicting priorities in police leadership, inefficient management, poor vertical communication, weak coordination

across borders/agencies/region, and inadequate leadership development. Gottschalk argues that until these "silent killers of strategy implementation," are eliminated, no measure of analysis or planning can be carried out within the policing forces of a country. I have identified four out of six "silent killers" in Russia's police today: poor vertical coordination, weak coordination across agencies, inefficient management, and inadequate leadership development (Gottschalk, 2010).

The first of the four inhibitors to Russia's ability to effectively police organized crime, poor vertical coordination, is evident in the politicization of Russia's police forces. Even before the end of the Soviet Union, Russia's political elite used the police for their own political security. They initiated policing reforms, which divided the loyalties of regional police from those of the central government establishing an almost institutionalized disregard for coordination between policing agencies. Corruption is also a major challenge in Russia's fight against organized crime. This is well documented and understood from professional circles to the general public. Less well understood is how corruption contributes to inefficient management and inadequate leadership development in the policing structures of Russia. Inefficient management and inadequate leadership development, in turn, are major contributors to the continued corruption of the police. This perpetual cycle of corruption hinders the ability of Russia's police to develop a positive relationship with Russia's citizens, who serve as important sources of information in detecting and monitoring traffickers, especially when the traffickers "fall off the grid".

The politicization of the Russian police

In Russia, the police, both central and regional, have long been an important tool in Kremlin power politics. Instead of Russia's law enforcement becoming a well-equipped crime fighting force, police units wax and wane with the political atmosphere of the country. This began after the death of Stalin, and still continues today under Putin.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the two main policing agencies, the KGB and the MVD, were reorganized by the Russia president in such a way that they lost much of their enforcement power. In 1991, Communist party members who were closely associated with Soviet security forces (police and the military), led the coup against then president Mikhail Gorbachev. When Yeltsin was elected president, he feared a powerful policing force would threaten his presidency, and so during his first years as president he divided the security forces. By overlapping the operational tasks and investigative jurisdictions of the "offspring" agencies of the KGB and MVD, he made many of their functions redundant. This break up also created an antagonistic atmosphere between the largely centralized structures of the former KGB and the policing units of the MVD, which worked more extensively outside of Moscow (Taylor, 2011).

The general understanding of Russia today is that President Putin directs the affairs of the security forces with an iron fist. However, one researcher suggests that Mr. Putin is at the mercy of the Russian political game, much like Soviet leaders were. Richard Sakwa explores what he identifies as the dual nature of the Russian government. In Russia, there is a perpetual conflict between the constitutional order and what Sakwa calls the "administrative regime". The constitutional order represents the liberal ideas of

democratic institutions and judicial representation that were established in the Russian constitution. Constitutional authority, however, is constantly being undermined by the administrative regime, representative of conservative and old-Soviet elites within the Russian government. These elites resist constitutional reforms in an attempt to maintain their status as power holders (Sakwa, 2011).

Sakwa argues that as president, Putin must maneuver within these competing forces in order to remain in power. While Putin is aligned most closely with the administrative regime, the constitutional order, which is backed up by constitutional law, has authority of its own. This has created a structural dualism in Russia's political system within which Putin must maneuver to maintain his legitimacy as a democratic representative of the Russian people. During his first two terms as president, Putin also had to balance competing forces within the administrative regime. As Sakwa surmises, "structural dualism was complemented by a fundamental dualism within the administrative regime itself, as the presidency mediated between the meta-factions" (Sakwa, 2011, p. 30).

Taylor (2011) offers an in-depth look into the development of policing capacities under Vladimir Putin. Taylor concludes that although factors existed which should have facilitated a strengthening of policing capabilities, this did not happen. The increase in state funding, which occurred during the first ten years of the new millennium, in addition to Putin's close history and association with former KGB officers, resulted only in what Taylor identifies as exceptional policing capabilities. "Putin succeeded more in increasing the capacity of law enforcement organs to implement exceptional state directives designed to increase the power of the Kremlin than in coping with their

routine, core tasks," such as policing traffickers and other forms of crime (Taylor, 2011, p. 72). The political game, which plays out in Russia's "dual" government, prevents Russia's police from being reformed into a society-oriented institution. Instead, the functions of policing structures continue to only represent the interests of the political elites.

Division Between Federal and Regional Police

Central, or federal, police in Russia are best identified as the enforcement agencies that were created out of the break-up of the KGB.[5] The Federal Security Service (FSB) is the most powerful of these central policing structures. The FSB's main task is counter-terrorism operations ("President sets tasks", 2013). However, in 2003, the Federal Border Service (FPS) was incorporated into the FSB. This gives federal police a key role in border security, and makes them directly relevant to anti-trafficking operations, and the monitoring of drug traffickers along Russia's border with Kazakhstan. In addition, the Federal Service for the Control of the Narcotics Trade (FSKN), tasked with combating Russia's growing drug problem, was created in 2003 out of the structures and personnel of the Federal Tax Police. Taylor notes that the Federal Tax Police was itself was staffed almost exclusively by former KGB personnel (Taylor, 2011).

Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is composed of regional police units as well as the Department for Countering Extremism, formerly the Department for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism. The federal government is in charge of

[5] A number of other, non-enforcement agencies were established during this break up, the Federal Guard Service (FSO) in charge of Presidential security, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main Directorate for Special Programs (GUSP) (Taylor, 2011).

approximately 460,000 of the 871,000 MVD police officers. This does not include the 200,000 Internal Troops, who operate more as pseudo-military forces, and do not have a role in crime fighting. Regional government authorities control approximately 400,000 MVD law enforcement personnel. The salaries of these local police have been paid out of regional budgets since the end of the Soviet Union and, as a result, they are loyal to regional power holders. Enforcement roles covered by regional MVD police include traffic stops, street policing (often referred to "beat cops"), and the investigation of organized crime (Taylor, 2011). These regular operations carried out by the regional MVD police are sources of information and intelligence vital to combatting trafficking operations.

When Putin came to power, he instituted a number of police reforms that were intended to re-centralize control of Russia's regional police units. Even before this, Yeltsin feared losing control of regional police and in 1992 Regional Anti-Organized Crime Directorates were created across Russia in an attempt to keep local police chiefs in check.

> *"Twelve RUBOPs divided up the country and were directly subordinate to a Deputy Minister of the central MVD, and, in the words of one former top MVD official, were used to 'control' the regional police chief"* (Taylor, 2011, p. 125).

As might be expected, the regional police chiefs resented this intrusion into their sovereignty. In 2001, Putin moved most of the RUBOP personnel into the newly created Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (GU MVD). The functions of the GU MVD include: investigating inter-regional organized crime, and coordinating the local police operations with the *polpredy*, the presidential representatives appointed by Putin to each of the seven federal districts (*okrugs*). The GU MVD personnel are funded

by the Kremlin and maintain a wide distance between themselves and local police units. The exact role of the GU MVD is unclear to many, however their role as a centrally controlled "check" on local police operations is widely recognized, and continues to create animosity between regional and central law enforcement groups (Taylor, 2011).

Leonid Kosals argues that because the police forces were neglected so completely in the early 1990s, and the Kremlin was more concerned with protecting itself than integrating regional police with those of the center, as shown by the politicization of the police, that local police forces started looking only to their own interest and the need for economic security. He calls this the "marketization" of Russia's police.

> *"During the early 1990s, when Russia's economic transformation had just begun, nobody cared about police restructuring; the authorities and emerging entrepreneurial class were interested in privatization and providing stability for the economic system… Accordingly, the Soviet militia (with its NKVD legacy) initiated marketization from below"* (Kosals, 2010, p. 4).

The "marketization" of the police forces is a reference to policing practices that exclusively serve the wellbeing of the individual police officers (Kosals, 2010). The practice of falsifying police records for the purpose of improving one's performance ratings was practiced widely in the Soviet Union. The self-serving mentality, which this practice still fosters today, no doubt played a role in facilitating this "marketization". This mentality is at the core of police violence toward citizens and a disregard for the value of cooperating with citizens.

Drawing from Stephen Hanson and others, Taylor argues that an absence of democratic norms within the policing and political structures is responsible for facilitating the self-serving nature, or "marketization" of Russia's police.

> "*[T]he high degree of uncertainty and the weakness of any overarching set of values of ideological projects in post-communist Russia means that the pursuit of short-term material interests has been the dominant mode of individual activity, including by state agents. In such circumstances, corruption and the 'unrule of law' are pervasive"* (Taylor, 2011, p. 32).

In the final section, the relationship between corruption and the remaining two "silent killers" of anti-organized crime reforms, inefficient management and inadequate leadership will be addressed.

Corruption

Pervasive corruption has resulted in extremely low levels of trust between police and the Russian population. It is well understood throughout Russia, that many criminal incidents, which are reported to police go unheeded, and are not pursued by the police. This represents an inefficiency in the management of the Russian police based on the fact that they are not fulfilling their function, their job, to secure society. In addition the continued corruption of the policing force suggest that policing academies and other forms of police training are not developing the appropriate qualities that policing units should have.

> *"In the Russian Federation, the promotion of trust between the police and the public has been hampered by the fact that the police are perceived by the public, and reported by the media, to be open to using their positions at work to obtain money, goods or services"* (Lee, 2002).

Whether they have witnessed brutality and neglect first-hand or not, Russian citizens understand their police force to be a corrupt and self-serving institution.

In *Darkness at Dawn*, a narrative account of life in "the Russian criminal state", the author describes a police force that refuses to do its job of investigating and protecting the population. He tells the story of a young Russian girl named "Tanya", who is being violently threatened by her ex-husband. Even after Tanya's sister is beaten twice, and Tanya is herself shot, the police take no action to find the responsible criminal. The officers investigate Tanya's ex-husband, but when he claims that he has been out of town the case is closed and no other leads are pursued. Satter explains their behavior as self-preservation. "[T]he Russian police are judged according to a quota system that rewards a low crime rate and a large number of "solved crimes." This system induces the police to avoid anything that will ruin their statistics" (Satter, 2003, p. 113).

In 2008, a poll was taken of 2.3 million Russians to gauge citizen trust toward police. Ten percent of respondents, 200,000 people, said they would not report crimes to police, and instead would find other means of justice. In addition, two percent of all respondents, roughly 46,000 people, reported that they had, themselves, been victims of police mistreatment (Kosals, 2010). In a separate survey, businessmen were questioned regarding their experiences with extortion. Seventy percent said they would not report any illegal incidents to the police, citing two main reasons. First, they feared retaliation from criminal groups, in other words they did not trust police forces to protect them. And second, they did not believe the police were capable of doing anything with the information (Holmes, 2007). These accounts verify that low levels of trust persist in Russian citizens' regard toward the police. Of vital importance to Russia's anti-organized crime efforts is the amount of intelligence and information that is not reported to authorities because of this lack of trust.

Taylor argues that one of the essential reasons corruption persists in Russia's policing forces, is because the leadership of the police forces have not yet established a unifying sense of purpose and service, a policing mission. Although it has been over two decades since the end of the Soviet Union, Taylor and others insist that the Russian government has yet to establish a mission for state policing agencies, central and regional. Such a mission would give the policing structures an important nudge toward becoming a service-based policing force, an important element in democratic states. Taylor defines state quality as "the extent to which the state and its officials serve the interests of the population in a fair manner that promotes the general welfare." He argues that state quality remains low in Russia's policing forces because of "the failure to instill a new mission in the power ministries that orients officials' behavior toward serving society rather than either state of personal interests" (Taylor, 2011, p. 157). This failure to develop a new mission is a clear example of inefficient management, and at the same time serves as a result of the persistently high levels of corruption in Russia.

In a 2001 survey, instructors at a state police academy indicated to a survey team that while their local police force did not have official arrest quotas, "failure on the part of an individual officer to achieve what might be considered an appropriate clear-up rate would mean a certain failure to achieve promotion" (Lee, 2002, p. 365). Available information indicates that the situation in parts of Russia, today, is largely the same. In November of 2012, a police captain in Astrakhan was charged with forcing confessions out of a local resident. The captain coerced a local resident into falsifying as many as

fifty police reports in order to boost his official record ("Astrakhan police officer charged", 2012).

A court decision in April 2013 resulted in two Dalny police men, each, sentenced to two years in jail for a 2012 incident that resulted in the death of a suspect who had recently been held in their custody. Eight officers in all, only two of which have been convicted so far, were accused of torturing a man at their police headquarters in an attempt to force a confession out of him. The man is reported to have been a wandering drunkard whom the officers found on the street, and he later died from wounds he sustained during the interrogation ("SK finishes probe", 2013).[6] A high-profile incident that came out in late April of 2013, claims that the former chief of Moscow's Federal Drug Control Services division has been arrested on drug trafficking charges. The accusation against him claim that he gave drugs to known criminals, then arrested them for drug possession, all in an attempt to boost his arrest rate ("Former senior drug police chief detained", 2013). This would be one of the most high profile accounts in recent years, and the fact that the police chief headed the anti-drug division in Moscow, would indicate that it is not just regional police who use corrupt means to boost their performance rate, but the elite metropolitain forces as well.[7]

A survey of police cadets who were enrolled in one of the state police academies showed that thirty percent of respondents approved of planting drugs on a criminal or at a crime scene in order guarantee a verdict. While the survey question identified the victim

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[6] There has been public outrage that only two of the eight officers have been convicted so far, also that the guilty sentences will only result in two years of prison time for the police officers. Many Russian specialists continue to doubt the Kremlin's intersect in curbing police violence.

[7] This case should be considered with care. The political situation in Moscow is often polluted by false accusation and fabricated evidence due to the unstable political atmosphere emanating from the Kremlin.

as a “known” and “active” criminal, the intentional disregard for appropriate judicial channels suggests a disturbing trait in Russia’s police forces (Lee, 2002).

The above examples not only prove the continued lack of a comprehensive policing mission, but also strongly suggest that even the leadership exhibits traits of corruption and “marketization”. In other words, they show inadequacies in the development of leaderhsip within the Russian police.

Charles King has written about corruption and the role it plays in illegal migration and human trafficking across post-Soviet space. In *Extreme Politics*, he notes that corruption within border and visa agencies plays an obvious role in illegal trafficking. However, even while King highlights the role corruption plays in trafficking operations, he argues that state capacity building is equally vital to stopping traffickers.

> *“[E]ven if state institutions made a good-faith effort to combat the phenomenon [of corruption], the very weakness of the institutions – including the basic inability of many states to control the territory they claim as their own – would hinder their efforts”* (King, 2010, p. 172).

As King notes, the “basic inability” of a state to control its territory is an important indicator of that state’s capacities. Reports from Russia’s drug trade give strong evidence that the police in Russia are not yet able to effectively monitor the entire country. Much of the territory in central Russia is under developed. The infrastructure does not yet exist to enable regular monitoring of transportation routes. This leaves them open for traffickers to use. In August of 2012 police found 200 kilograms of heroin on a train that had arrived from Dushanbe, Tajikistan (“Russian drug police seize record amount”, 2012). Another shipment of 190 kilograms of heroin was uncovered at a market place near Moscow in February of 2013. The cargo vehicle which was carrying

the drug shipment is believed to have originated in Uzbekistan, and was registered under a licensed shipping company ("$200 million in Afghan heroin seized", 2013). As Kosals (2010) states, the exact condition of Russia's regional police forces remains unknown. However, in both of these cases, the fact that the shipments reached Russia's capital before they were intercepted suggest that the incapacities of Russia's police force, outside of the central districts of western Russia, persists.

Trends in Russia's drug trade serve as a clear example that the country still lacks policing capabilities necessary to curb trafficking. The qualities of Russia's police, which have been described here, suggest that the politicization of Russia's law enforcement represents poor vertical communication between Russia's political leadership and policing forces. While Putin has developed policing capacities that successfully carry out "exceptional policing", this has not led to the successful integration of regional police with central structures. Instead, the recentralization of Russia's police has furthered a regional-central divide that hinders communication between agencies and has encouraged the "marketization" and continued corruption of police officers. For the final section of this thesis, policing reforms will be discussed along with the policing capacities needed to tackle the specific challenges posed by traffickers. This will be done through a discussion of border management in the post-Soviet space.

In the last ten years, the EU has introduced two border-monitoring programs to post-Soviet states, Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA), which is co-funded with the UN Development Programme, and the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). These programs are designed to facilitate improvements in the post-Soviet region's border management capabilities. Many of the

key institutional improvements that these two programs are attempting to initiate directly relate to the anti-trafficking capabilities of the local police forces. The shared Soviet history of these states created police structures and practices that still exist in today's post-Soviet space. These conditions, therefore, also describe the present condition of local policing forces in Russia. Since EUBAM and BOMCA address conditions that the Russian government must also deal with, this thesis takes lessons from these two programs applies them to Russia's current policing environment.

Lessons for policing trafficking in post-Soviet states

Leonid Kosals, Vice Dean for Research in the Sociology department at Moscow's Higher School of Economics, addressed the challenges of writing on Russia's law enforcement institutions:

> *"There is no publically-accessible and reliable data on the number, structure and operations of the Russian police at the moment…there is no data on regional breakdowns, the number of police stations overall or in various regions and cities, or for a variety of other important topics"* (Kosals, 2010, p. 2).

In short, there is a void in the discussion of Russia's police created by an absence of professional analysis on the situation of the police in Russia. These two EU border programs provide the only analysis of post-Soviet policing reforms that discuss the existing conditions and anti-trafficking capabilities of local law enforcement agencies. They offer analysis that is helpful, and appropriate in analyzing the post-Soviet policing conditions in Russia.

Charles King's research into human trafficking across post-Soviet space identified border management as a key indicator of the strength of human trafficking operations within a state's territory. Because border officials must inspect the travel paperwork of women who are the victims of sex trafficking, he argues, "the relative weakness of the border regime in any particular country is a reasonable indicator..." of anti-trafficking capabilities (King, 2010, p. 172). With drug trafficking, the illegal commodity in question is less obvious to border guards, as traffickers have developed numerous means of disguising drugs and avoiding detection. Still, border management is an important factor in anti-trafficking capacities regardless of what good is being smuggled.

BOMCA was established by the European Union in 2003. It is funded by the EU, implemented by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and operates in the Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. Also in 2003, the Central Asia Drug Assistance Programme was launched. The two programs are run out of the same office as their missions overlap with one another.

BOMCA has initiated training centers for the purpose of modernizing the equipment used by local border guards and assuring that they can operate the stations. They have computerized the outdated record-keeping systems in many areas, and have provided monitoring equipment such as infrared cameras and sensors at key high-traffic border crossing areas (Gavrilis, 2009). These measures have not been effective at stopping trafficking. BOMCA's work focuses primarily on facilitating cross-border cooperation and reforming the corrupt border guards so that they work with the local populations. So far, these efforts have not been effective in reforming the attitudes of these border guards. Militarization and corruption guarantee that a high level of mistrust

and avoidance define the relationship of the local populations with the border guards (Gavrilis, 2009). Russia also has a highly militarized border guard, a Soviet era characteristic that has not been challenged by any attempts at establishing a police mission.

A 2010 study on BOMCA's progress in Kyrgyzstan described a political situation much like what exists in Russia still.

> *"Politically, Kyrgyzstan has been characterized by over-centralised and authoritarian governments, ethno-nationalist and clan politics, weak democratic institutions and repressive law enforcement agencies … Large parts of the Kyrgyzstani security sector have been directly under the control of the President, enabling the Head of State to use the security forces to consolidate and expand his/her own power"* (Brethfeld, 2010, p. 11-12).

The relationship between the civilian population and law enforcement in Kyrgyzstan also suffers from the same lack of trust seen in Russia:

> *"Law enforcement agencies are more frequently seen as a threat than as providers of security, and there is a high degree of mistrust in the security sector. This is due to widespread human rights violations (including torture) and other forms of harassment, the perception that law-enforcement agencies are primarily tasked with protecting the ruling regime rather than providing security for the people, and endemic corruption"* (Brethfeld, 2010, p. 12).

This same study criticized BOMCA for pursuing the interests of the state agencies at the expense of civilian participation. "BOMCA is oriented solely towards the government agencies responsible for border management. They are considered the program's primary beneficiaries and it is their needs that direct the specific activities of the program" (Brethfeld, 2010, p. 18). Rather than focusing on the top-down reform plans that BOMCA is currently pursuing, the author suggests that coordination with the local populations is the only way to effectively curb corruption in the police forces. For this to

be put in place, the local populations must be made more aware of their rights and the opportunities that exist to report incidents of border guard abuse-of-power and corruption (Brethfeld, 2010).

Since 2005, the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) has worked on the ground in Ukraine and Moldova in an attempt to secure the borders surrounding Transdnistria. Transdnistria is a disputed territory that is widely recognized to be a hot spot for illegal trafficking due to the absence of a legitimate government authority there. The mission was established to improve border controls, to facilitate cooperation between Ukraine and Moldova, and to modernize the border monitoring capabilities of the region. In 2006, an additional unit was added to EUBAM's offices to work exclusively on improving the anti-trafficking capabilities of the border guards (Kurawska, 2009).

Reports on EUBAM's progress over the last seven years reiterates many of the same difficulties that BOMCA has come across regarding local policing capabilities to stopping trafficking. Ukraine in particular has been unwilling to relinquish the militarized, Soviet-style policing methods that maintain a distance between the border guards and the local populations.

> *"The focus on control, rather than management of the border is to some extent a legacy of the state border guard service's function as the guarantor of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The transition from a military force to a police-type service is likely to be long and difficult. The military/control mindset may well prove a significant obstacle to the development of user-focused service provision"* (Kurawska, 2009, p. 54).

The provision of technical equipment has been a very important element of EUBAM's mission. It is referred to by some as EUBAM's greatest contribution to the project, however, others criticize the mission for not instituting the additional reforms needed to

guarantee that the technical assistance is being used properly. In other words, EUBAM cannot guarantee that the border guards are using the equipment to hinder illegal trafficking and that it is not being used to pursue corrupt practices. "The pervasive corruption in the region appears to have been a major obstacle to the mission in achieving its aims. Despite being habitually mentioned, this issue has been mainly handled by a short-term expert rather than permanent EUBAM staff" (Kurawska, 2009, p. 63). The call for long-term solutions suggests the need of a permanent monitoring force. As Brethfeld (2010) suggested for the situation in Kyrgyzstan, local communities are an already established monitoring body that could perform this function if the proper channels are put in place.

Drawing on these two border programs, I will briefly argue in favor of three potential policy changes for Russia to consider in order to establish a network of police capable of detecting, tracking, and deterring trafficking inside the country.

Transfer border patrol out of the FSB

In 2003, Russia's Federal Border Service (FPS) was incorporated into the FSB. Taylor (2011) points out that this transfer gave the FPS access to the FSB's budget, which saw a relatively substantial increase during Putin's first two terms as president. However, the function of the FSB relates largely to anti-terrorism activities. A few months after being re-elected for his third presidency, Vladimir Putin addressed the heads of the FSB. He declared the primary tasks of the agency, for 2013, to deter Internet

extremists, monitor foreign associations of NGOs inside Russia, and continue their functions as an anti-terrorist agency ("President sets tasks", 2013).

The relationship between traffickers and terrorist cells is marginal at best. While Bovenkerk and Chakra (2007) note that traffickers, especially drug traffickers, are cooperating with terrorist groups to a greater degree than before, there are no signs that the two are working together to accomplish the ideologic goals of terrorism. Their relationship is nothing more than a business transaction. The majority of anti-trafficking efforts, then should still fall under criminal law enforcement agencies. It would be prudent to facilitate a closer cooperation with FPS and other law enforcement agenceis, most importanty regional law enforcement as Russia's borders are even more disconnected from the center (even just in a geogrpahical sense) than many of Russia's regions.

Focus on legal reforms rather than advanced detection equipment

Even without the analysis provided by BOMCA and EUMAB studies, it quickly becomes obvious that no measure of technology will be able to fortify Russia's border against illegal traffickers. Russia's border with Kazakhstan is 6,846 kilometers (4,254 miles) long. For comparison, the US border with Mexico is 3,141 kilometers (1,952 miles) long, less than half the length of Russia's window to Central Asia (CIA World Factbook, 2013). Any serious discussion of Russia's border monitoring capabilities and anti-trafficking measures must acknowledge the difficulties of technically based solutions.

In March, 2013, Vasily Yurchenko, the head of the FSKN asked for greater power so that his agency can better combat trafficking. According to news reports, he requested an extension of the time limit allotted for investigating drug trafficking that reached beyond Russia's borders. His argument was that it takes longer than the allotted two-month investigation period to receive requested information from foreign law enforcement agencies ("FSKN says it needs more powers", 2013). The Russian government should pool its efforts and resources toward non-techincal capabilities such as those mentioned by Mr. Yurchenko. For many years, judicial reform has been part of the discussion of the democratic transitions and the needed to fight crime in Russia.[8]

Crack down on police violence

The results of the Dalny case, mentioned above, led to a high level of public outrage at the lenient punishment that was given to the offending officers. Instead of siding with the police, in such incidents of brutal violence against citizens, the judicial branch should use these situations as a first step in the direction of establishing policing norms and a society-oriented institutional mission. BOMCA and EUBAM have both attempted to initiate reforms in the relationship between local communities and law enforcement personnel through training and education of police on the importance of non-corruption actions. These training efforts have not been successful in altering the behaviors of corrupt border guards.

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[8] See for example Firestone, T. (2006). What Russia must do to fight organized crime. *Demokratazatsiya*, 14 (1), 59-65.

A more aggressive form of "training", in the form of criminal punishments, offer a different approach to introducing a mission statement to individual police officers. This final policy suggestion falls in with an extensive amount of academic and government work dealing with corruption in Russia. Given the extent to which the subject has been studied, it is difficult to introduce new forms of mitigating the problem. As this thesis focuses on anti-trafficking policy solution, it is important to note that this anti-corruption measure is not a cure for Russia's extensively corrupt political and judicial system. Instead, it is meant to argue for an anti-corruption measure that will be most effective in reforming Russia's police and moving towards necessary anti-trafficking reforms. Increasing public trust will result in community members bringing information to the police, information that the police may have missed. Because police cannot possibly monitor every square kilometer that traffickers travers, intelligence provided by community members can be especially helpful.

Conclusion

Mafias and trafficking are two very active forms of Russian organized crime. Though much of the organized crime literature from the last twenty years does not draw a distinction between the two, there are important differences between them that should be addressed. According to Varese objective definition of mafias, which centers on the control of market activity through coercion and violence, there are different limits to the level of corruption that is necessary for mafias and traffickers. Both are also limited to different degrees by geographic conditions inherent in their function. While mafias will

ultimately have to utilize corruption in order to continue operating within a state, traffickers can operate in the spaces that are not monitored by law enforcement, thus eliminating the need to interact with state representatives.

The continued proliferation of trafficking, as shown by the drug trade in Russia, is a clear sign that the country's police forces cannot yet monitor trafficking in its entirety. Poor vertical communication between the elites in Moscow and police outside the capital is the result of a politicization of Russia's police. Reforms of the police in Russia have succeeded only in establishing a one-sided relationship in which the police are subject to the will of political leaders, what Taylor identified as exceptional policing. The politicization of the police in Russia has also facilitated a deep divide between central and regional policing agencies, a sign of weak cross-agency cooperation. Finally, the persistence of corruption within Russia's police subverts both management and leadership.

In conclusion, the two border studies reinforce the need for reform within the personnel and structures of police forces in order to establish capable anti-trafficking operations. Calls for more technical equipment and policing power do not address the problems of corruption and agency structure, namely the hierarchical units that operate in isolation from society. As this thesis has shown, Russia's current policing situation is insufficiently structured to develop relationships with the civilian population. In addition, the political situation in Russia prevents the cooperation of federal and regional crime-fighting agencies. Until these structural policing problems are addressed, no amount of anti-trafficking discussion or planning can be implemented. These challenges

represent Russia's first hurdle toward building the necessary police forces needed to combat trafficking within her borders.

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