

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington



Northeast Asian Security Cooperative:

*Opportunities and Obstacles for a Multilateral
U.S. Approach to Asia-Pacific Diplomacy*

Task Force 2010

HENRY M. JACKSON SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

TASK FORCE 2010

Evaluator: Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill

Participants:

Christopher Jones, Professor
Jordan Swarthout, Coordinator
Alex Cutler, Editor
Jessica Kuhn
Tamara Patton
Paul Moroni
Stephanie Kim
Amanda Rynes
Justin Rohrer
Isar Mahanian
Johanna Martinez
Jenny Gawf
Tiffany Martin
Mirella Warren
Julien Bezerra

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Executive Summary

The proliferation of nuclear weapons presents a leading existential threat to the United States. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) poses the greatest current threat of proliferation and is at the nexus of a complex web of security issues in Northeast Asia. Left unchecked, the continued progress of North Korea on its nuclear weapon and missile programs jointly hold the potential to drive a regional arms race. Considering America's strong ties with regional allies and military presence, the U.S. currently is a resident power in the Northeast Asia. However, the increasing assertiveness and strength of regional powers makes clear that American influence is waning.


To counter this security threat while maintaining U.S. influence in the region, this Task Force proposes the formation of the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO). The current effort in the form of the Six Party Talks remains mired in stalemate. An institutionalized security cooperative has the potential to coordinate the efforts of members in addressing security issues like the one in North Korea. By increasing military collaboration, mediating regional conflicts, and encouraging multilateral cooperation on arms control this organization can overcome the underlying problems currently stymieing resolution of the crisis.

The United States ought to use the proposal of this organization as a demonstration of its commitment to multilateral cooperation and renunciation of past unilateral tendencies. The formalized NEASCO structure will prevent stormy relations or domestic politics from triggering a collapse of past agreements in a fashion similar to situation that precipitated the latest North Korean nuclear crisis. Regime change as the goal of American policy towards the DPRK must be dropped in order to make progress on denuclearization. North Korean concerns about energy

security should be harnessed as a catalyst for increasing cooperation and easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. should acknowledge the sensitivities of regional powers over safeguarding sovereignty and focus the proposed organization on security and economic matters. Such a grave and intractable problem demands bold action. NEASCO offers benefits to all of the regional powers, and the United States in particular, as the best solution for leading the world away from the brink of nuclear proliferation or war.

Jordan Swarthout

Coordinator



Introduction

*By Amanda Rynes,
Justin Rohrer and Alex Cutler*

The Importance of Engaging in East Asia

By Amanda Rynes

In the coming decade a shift in the United States' focus to the growing security concerns in East Asia will be critical to the preservation of national security. The threat of a rogue nation gaining the ability to successfully deploy weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the emergence of global economies with the capacity to not only reach but surpass the United States and the eroding American foothold in the region all illustrate the need to reestablish East Asia as our primary concern. East Asia is home to around 40 percent of the total global population. As a region, they represent approximately 54.2 percent of the global GDP and around 43.7 percent of world trade.¹

Growing Security Concerns

In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review released in late January, the Department of Defense expressed that its key security concerns for the coming years included the spread of weapons of mass destruction, rising powers with sophisticated weapons and the danger of failed or failing states. Also included was the need for the U.S. to account for the “current global trends that are reshaping the international landscape, complicating the ability to exercise statecraft and overseas relations”.² These critical security concerns can be seen developing in regions throughout East Asia at an incredible rate. The emergence of a nuclear program in the hands of a notoriously rogue government not only poses a threat to U.S. security but also to the security of our allies in the region, predominantly that of Japan and South Korea. Growing discontent with the presence of U.S. military personnel within the region is just one example of the aforementioned global trends which, if they continue, will hamper the United States' ability to

¹ APEC Regional Trade and Investment, www.apec.org/aboutapec

² Quadrennial Defense Review, U.S. Department of Defense 9

react in the event of a crisis in the area. The United States must recognize the importance of these issues now and begin planning how to maintain its influence in the coming years. The security concerns present on the Korean peninsula are perfect examples of a coming crisis that, if not dealt with properly, could result in devastating losses of lives and infrastructure in the East Asian region.

The Department of Defense also explicitly stated in the section pertaining to defense strategy that “...the US faces a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union or the end of World War Two has the international terrain been affected by such far reaching and consequential shifts. The rise of new powers, growing influence of non-state actors and spread of WMD along with other destructive technologies pose profound challenges to international order.”³ Two of the issues mentioned specifically were the rise of China and the proliferation of WMD. To expand on these issues, the Department of Defense discussed the refusal to follow international norms that has prompted the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to continue testing their ballistic missile systems as well as China’s goal of long-term, comprehensive military modernization. This includes the development and fielding of “large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons and advances fighter aircraft.”⁴ As these nations continue pursuing increased military capacity, other nations in the region will have no choice but to respond. The United States must be prepared to take action and work towards establishing ties between nations in the region in order to preserve regional peace and stability. If the U.S. allows itself to fall out of a position of influence in the region, there will be little hope of coming to a peaceful agreement.

³ QDR 27

⁴⁴ QDR 54

Economic Ramifications

East Asia is home to two of the largest economies in the world, with China and Japan taking second and third place (respectively) behind the United States in annual GDP. In 2009, China's exports were worth \$1,194 trillion, placing them behind only the European Union. Out of this, 17.7 percent were items exported to the United States; the primary importer of Chinese goods ahead of Hong Kong at 13.3 percent and Japan at 8.1 percent.⁵ China is ranked as the fourth largest importer in the world behind the European Union, the United States and Germany with imports worth a total of \$921.5 billion in 2009. As stated by Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton in her speech at the East-West center, American countries export \$320 billion in goods and services to Asian Pacific countries each year. This in turn creates and supports millions of jobs for populations on both sides of the Pacific.

Beyond the potential loss of a multi-billion dollar trading partner in the event of a collapse of regional stability, China owns, as of July 2009, \$800.5 billion in U.S. Treasury securities (placing them in a position of) giving them leverage over the U.S. economy.⁶ Any threat to their regional security and domestic prosperity is a direct threat to our own. Because of our economic interdependence, it is absolutely key to both American security and prosperity that we not only remain an active partner in the East Asian sphere but a leader in the development of institutions working to protect regional stability. The price of losing our place as a major trading partner is impossible to measure but would certainly result in the loss of millions of jobs, as well as billions of dollars in revenue. Meanwhile, China's leverage over the American economy make cooperation an economic necessity.

⁵ CIA World Factbook

⁶ US Department of the Treasury

Strategic Interests

As the American military presence in the region comes under increasing criticism and scrutiny it will be necessary to guarantee our role as a “resident power” by other means. In recent months the Japanese government has expressed interest in working toward a more independently run defense program that would greatly cut down on American presence in the region. The issues surrounding the base in Okinawa further illustrates the growing discontent with U.S. troops even in our strongest military ally in East Asia. The strategic concerns surrounding the emergence of a nuclear DPRK, the remilitarization of China or the loss of more U.S. bases in the region are vast and demand immediate attention.

Strategic Importance of the Middle East

While the concerns in East Asia seem theoretical in comparison to the threat currently residing in the Middle East, the possible losses associated with strained ties with this region are far greater with even more irreversible long term losses. While terrorism is in no way a minor threat to national security and should never be addressed lightly, the prospect of a nuclear DPRK who is not only rogue in nature but willing to sell nuclear material and technologies to anyone is an immense threat not only to our own national security but to global security as a whole. Sales of fissionable material to unstable or failing states are a terrifying prospect. This fear is made worse by the prospect of North Korea selling material to terrorist organizations themselves, increasing the threat of a civilian nuclear attack exponentially.⁷

⁷ Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation

American economic ties with the Middle East are also far smaller than those with East Asia. While American oil imports from the region are huge, with 837,000 barrels of crude oil from Saudi Arabia and 458,000 barrels from Iraq imported per day in November of 2009, the primary source of American crude oil imports is actually Canada, at 1,984,000 barrels per day in the same month.⁸ Even with vast oil imports from the Middle East, our ties to the economies of East Asia are not only greater but far more integrated. Goods, services, technology, (civilian and military) as well as natural resources are all incorporated in U.S. trade with East Asia, resulting in billions of dollars in revenue and countless American jobs. While a loss of economic ties with the Middle East would result in major issues concerning oil, loss of ties with East Asia would be crippling to the American economy and place the U.S. in a vulnerable position due to trade ties and the immense number of treasury securities owned by states in this region.

What is the most pressing issue facing Northeast Asian security today? *By Alex Cutler*

The Taiwan Issue

Some scholars point to the ‘Taiwan issue’ as an equally critical flashpoint in East Asian relations compared with the DPRK crisis. U.S.-Taiwanese relations, a relic of the Cold War, have become a major point of contention in the growing relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The January 2010 arms sale between the U.S. and Taiwan is an excellent example of how this continued support for their security and independence could sour further Sino-US cooperation. However, there are two important factors relating to the ‘Taiwan issue’ that effectively limit the significance of crisis; that is the absence of a binding

⁸ U.S. Energy Information Administration, DoE

security guarantee between the United States and Taiwan, and China's mounting strategic importance to the United States.

Unlike their unique relationship with South Korea and Japan, the U.S. has no legally binding commitment to defend Taiwan in the event of an invasion. In the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. took an ambiguous stance towards their security relationship with the island, and instead stressed enabling Taiwan to be self-defensive.⁹ If China were to pursue an invasion to retake the island by force, it would be up to the United States Congress to decide the appropriate reaction.

When the Taiwan Relations Act was formulated in 1979, the world was a very different place. The United States was in the middle of the Cold War, and the red scare still dominated their security considerations. The People's Republic of China was nowhere near the power it is today, and supporting Taiwan served our interest as a key symbolic player in the fight against communism.

Today, China has become exponentially more important to the United States than Taiwan. China's rapid modernization has led to the establishment of a deep set Sino-U.S. economic relationship, it has become a key political voice in issues like the North Korean nuclear crisis, and many in Congress assert that the U.S.-China relationship is now the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

Given this setting, it is extremely unlikely that Congress would intervene in any China-Taiwan conflict today. While the U.S. has followed through with its arms sales to Taiwan, support will likely be limited to this because Taiwan is no longer worth it to the U.S. compared with China's new strategic importance.

⁹ Taiwan Relations Act 1979

The North Korean Issue

In an effort to reduce tensions in Northeast Asia, the U.S. began proposing multilateral forums for the Asian-Pacific region in the 1970s. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, organizations like the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue or Northeast Asian Security Dialogue floundered under regional disunity. In a report for the Brookings Institution, the South Korean author Ok-Nim Chung cited three factors that led to the demise of these early efforts; “a lack of regional consensus, their inability to develop into official level talks, and an inability to include the principle party of concern, North Korea”.¹⁰

As a reclusive, autarkic government, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) represents the last of the Soviet-era socialist regimes. With an aging military complex and an industrial capacity crippled by energy shortages, the inflammatory actions of this totalitarian government appear to be largely unfounded. However, the instability surrounding the North Korean regime has exploded over the past two decades and now has the potential for becoming a global crisis. The implications of this, whether it is a second Korean War or the collapse of the Kim Jung-il regime, could be catastrophic for the Northeast Asian region and its allies.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have never fully subsided from the Korean War. In the face of a half-century ceasefire, both sides remain ever prepared for an outbreak of war. Both the Republic of Korea and the DPRK do not recognize the other’s right to exist, and maintain contingency plans for their liberation and unification of the peninsula.¹¹ While conflicts have always remained small and controlled, there is no doubt that a Second Korean War is

¹⁰ Chung, Solving the Security Puzzle in Northeast Asia: a Multilateral Security Regime 2000

¹¹ Chung, Reality Check: Diverse Voices on Internal Conflict 2002

possible and unacceptable. A confrontational end to the Korean crisis has significant implications on a global scale, both militarily and socially.

Military consequences: Maintaining the Nuclear Club

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is by many accounts one of the most successful markers of international cooperation in modern history. Proposed in the middle of the Cold War, the NPT was an ambitious undertaking and many doubted the achievability of forming a valid nonproliferation regime.¹² However with 189 signatory states, it is now the largest arms control treaty in existence. Despite fears of widespread proliferation during the second half of the 20th century the ‘nuclear club’ has remained stable, with only a few exceptions. The basis of the NPT- non-proliferation, disarmament, and the sovereign right to peaceful nuclear technology- has been crucial to the stabilization of the nuclear arms race. Mutual security and trust was supported by cooperation in the NPT, as nonnuclear states committed themselves to maintaining that status, while those in the ‘nuclear club’ (states recognized as possessing nuclear weapons) committed themselves to a gradual reduction of their stockpiles to zero.

When the DPRK officially withdrew from the NPT in 2003, it was the first major challenge to the capabilities of the nonproliferation regime. It was a reminder that the world was still full of “de facto” nuclear states- nonnuclear states who have the industry, technology, and materials to produce a nuclear weapons program. By unfreezing their nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, the DPRK demonstrated just how quickly and easily a de facto nuclear state can obtain its own nuclear weapon program. Despite diplomatic measures to reverse it, the security

¹² Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation

concerns surrounding the North Korean nuclear program have worsened. Originally the Kim Jong-il regime insisted that they were operating a peaceful energy program, but over the past seven years it has become clear that they are attempting a full scale nuclear program. While hard evidence is hard to produce in the midst of the most secluded country on earth, the North Koreans are suspected to have taken significant steps towards a fully functional nuclear weapons program; reprocessing spent fuel rods, underground nuclear tests, and most recently the launch of a nuclear-capable missile- with a range that threatens western U.S. targets. This unbridled expansion has created a global security concern and in their report on the actual and potential development of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, Large & Associates argued that “[i]n response, it would not be unexpected for South Korea and Japan both, independently, to respond to this geo-political situation by striving to improve their readiness to acquire nuclear weapons should the need arise...”¹³

Along with a potential expansion of the nuclear club, North Korea has been implicated in clandestine nuclear activities and ballistic missile sales, including being linked to the infamous A.Q. Khan network. Thirteen different countries are suspected of arms deals with the DPRK, including Pakistan, Iran, and Libya. Unchecked, the North Koreans could choose to pass on nuclear technology and weaponry to whomever they so choose, and their history points to a progression of less than rational decision making. The potential for this information slipping into the wrong hands is far too great and has far too grave of consequences, to be left unaddressed by the international community.

Nuclear catastrophe?

¹³ Large 2002

By most standards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an insignificant member of the international community, but they made a calculated choice to pursue nuclear weapons and therefore place themselves at the forefront of international relations. Their nuclear program presents a troubling case for international assessment; it is largely indigenous and any foreign assistance has been difficult to trace. Regardless of the origins of the program, intelligence suggests that the DPRK now has enough plutonium for 9-12 weapons and in June 2009 the Korean Central News Agency announced plans to weaponize their stockpile. From analyses of the 2006 and 2009 underground nuclear tests, these weapons (if successful) would have a payload similar to the bomb that struck Hiroshima in 1945.¹⁴ While it is a rudimentary weapon by modern standards, the effects would still be catastrophic if used on a population center. Against international law, the DPRK has also pursued a vigorous ballistic missile program and is believed to be the origin of the Pakistani Ghauri missile. The DPRK announced testing of a satellite launch in 2009, but South Korean and Japanese observers claim it was a cover for an ICBM (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile) test, capable of reaching targets within a 1,500 mile range.¹⁵ With the United States out of reach, it does not rule out implicating the U.S. in a nuclear war. Long standing security guarantees with both South Korea and Japan would force the U.S. to intervene in the event of a North Korean attack, likely inciting a Second Korean War. Even if the region is spared of a nuclear showdown, an outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula would have severe consequences for East Asia.

Conventional warfare

¹⁴ Large 17

¹⁵ Ibid

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea maintains one of the largest military programs in the world. With approximately 1.2 million active duty servicemen, 60% of whom are placed along the Korean DMZ¹⁶, a Second Korean War promises to be short and devastating. The Korean People's Army relies on a Soviet-era infrastructure and despite modernization efforts in the 1980s it is an obsolete force. With an almost nonexistent navy and defensive-only air force, the DPRK puts great emphasis on ground forces. Any likely adversary enjoys vastly improved equipment and technical training, but they cannot underestimate the ability of the DPRK in sheer numbers and determination. Due to the *Songun* policy, meaning military first, the DPRK puts tremendous emphasis on its military capability. Regardless of its dated equipment, North Korea has a 2:1 advantage over South Korea in tanks, artillery, and personnel along the DMZ. Any offensive military operation undergone by the DPRK would likely be their last, but it would not be without the potential devastation of the Republic of Korea.

Best and Worst Case Scenarios for the North Korean Nuclear Crisis *By Justin Rohrer*

American actions between 2010 and 2020 will likely decide the fate of East Asia's nuclear weapons. Therefore, in order to inform our later policy recommendations, this task force has chosen to illustrate theoretical best and worst case scenarios for 2020 and their potential ramifications throughout the next several decades. In the worst case, North Korean nuclearization has not been successfully managed. Proliferation runs rampant in East Asia and war looms on several fronts. The Nonproliferation regime is in danger of failing. In the second,

¹⁶ Ibid

North Korea has ceased to be an escalating threat to proliferation-control regimes, allowing peace and stability to reign over East Asia.

Worst Case Scenario

By 2020, North Korea has neither disarmed nor eased their aggressive posture. North Korean missile and nuclear tests, production of fissile material, aggressive rhetoric, and other threatening actions continue. North Korea has successfully coupled a miniaturized nuclear device on a missile capable of reaching the United States' West Coast. It threatens the nations around it and acts as a destabilizing force throughout the region. In the face of such actions, the United States failed to assure the security of its allies in the region against this increased threat. This instigated a cascading failure of U.S. influence in the region, a multi-party arms race among Northeast Asian powers, and the introduction of dramatic weaknesses to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The escalation of the threat posed by North Korea in the face of America's inadequate response would bring about significant rearmament in Japan and South Korea. Given their significant civilian nuclear programs, both might easily become nuclear powers. In such a situation, Japan would additionally pursue increases in its missile defense capability and continue its recent moves towards gaining projectable power, evidenced in the purchase of mid-air refueling capabilities, which might be used as a conventional first strike capability against a North Korean missile threat. In order to provide a significant deterrent against the DPRK, South Korea as well would have made significant increases in its ability to strike north of the 38th Parallel.

Significant increases in armament by both South Korea and Japan come at the price of weaker alliances with the United States. Yet both of these countries would likely maintain significant ties to the U.S. despite the perceived weakness of a U.S. deterrent threat versus North Korea. Significant increases in armament by two U.S. allies, especially Japan, would heighten Chinese fears of encirclement. An escalating threat would be met with escalating capabilities, including capabilities focused more on Japan which would further enhance the security dilemma. Additionally, the significant nationalistic feelings that exist in China, combined with the vivid memories of Japanese atrocities during the Asia-Pacific War, leave China with no major domestic impediments to participation in a regional arms race. Furthermore, as each of the East Asian powers militarizes, the extreme proximity of Japan, South Korea, and China ensures that any weapons systems targeted at North Korea might also be used against any of the other powers in the region. Proximity and old hatreds make Northeast Asia fertile ground for growing security dilemmas.

In addition to the threat of a great power arms race stemming from the North Korean threat, North Korean posturing might lead to an escalating confrontation with South Korea with the potential to grow into a second Korean War. In a region characterized by significantly increased tensions and nuclear capabilities, either an arms race or a war, or both, would be disastrous.

Best Case Scenario

In this version of 2020, North Korea entered into good faith negotiations with the other members of the six party talks and, as a result, ended its nuclear weapons program, disarmed and gave up its current supply of nuclear weapons, and ceased its aggressive posturing. The NPT

has been strengthened by North Korea's re-entry, as has the possibility of global disarmament. America's proactive strategy in engaging North Korea has left our allies with a firm belief in the strength of America's commitment to the region. Furthermore, a multilateral organization providing a forum for security concerns among the powers involved in Northeast Asia, combined with the reduction of the North Korean threat, has greatly reduced the perceived threats to each of the Northeast Asian actors and thus greatly reduced the probability of an arms race.

Northeast Asia is characterized by general stability. The current North Korean government persists. Failure of the North Korean government is not seen as a best case outcome due its potential to create significant instability in the region, a refugee issue in China and South Korea, and the potential sale of the North Korean nuclear arsenal to terrorists. Additionally, as long as regime change of any sort is a U.S. goal, North Korea will likely feel insecure enough to refuse to participate in disarmament talks.

However, through enticements offered to the North Korean government, various issues generally considered to provide incentives for regime change have been dealt with. North Korea has been integrated into the global economy through a set of limited reforms which allow for trade to occur on terms the North Korean government finds comfortable. Such an introduction of trade allowed for the diminishment of the humanitarian crisis that plagues North Korea's citizens and the movement of North Korea away from its current status as a net aid recipient and towards self-sufficiency. Additionally, the reduction of tensions on the peninsula allowed the commencement of negotiations aimed at formally concluding the Korean War.

This Task Force believes that the policies of the United States during the next ten years will determine whether the Northeast Asian situation ten years from now will most resemble the

worst case scenario or the best case. The remainder of this paper lays out a strategy for attaining the latter scenario and averting the former.

Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO): The Asiatic Multilateralism? *By Alex Cutler*

“The process of managing transition on the Korean Peninsula holds the potential to create new patterns of cooperation that would lay the foundation for a 21st century security architecture in Northeast Asia.”¹⁷

This Task Force does not belittle the tremendous undertaking of creating and implementing a successful multilateral organization, however this review of the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula demonstrates how necessary this sort of action is. Despite the Bush Administration’s assertions otherwise, war or regime change in North Korea are unlikely to have a positive outcome for the region. Instead, the United States should support the creation of a cooperative organization that would not only alleviate Pyongyang’s demands for relations with Washington and Tokyo, but also secure of itself a permanent presence in the region. As will be discussed, the traditional bilateral “hub and spokes” system which has driven U.S. relations with Northeast Asia is no longer an appropriate system for the United States to rely on as the regional powers begin to assert their control.

This is not a proposal of appeasement, but rather a proposal of timing. Regional integration and cooperation is stunted in Northeast Asia, and there is no illusion of a magic solution to the question of recruiting and attracting membership. The United States has been disinclined to agree to formalized talks with the North Koreans, while all of Northeast Asia is wary of any U.S. attempt at extending its control in the region. For these and many other reasons

¹⁷ *Brookings Institute*

it is understandable why there is so much skepticism surrounding any attempt to foster cooperation across this insecure region. However, this Task Force will argue that the region (as well as the United States) is at a significant crossroads due to the rapid modernization of the past twenty years. While multilateralism has not been a favored route for Northeast Asia so far, this Task Force will introduce several important crises that could be greatly benefitted from increased regional integration and cooperation, as well as the means of encouraging countries to sign on to a new and untested organization.

For the United States, this begins with a reassessment of their security structure. As a physical U.S. military presence begins to decrease in importance and popularity, the United States must act to guarantee its continued presence in the region. Regardless of the future, it would be beneficial for the U.S. to push for a “multilayered, multi-dimensional forum of bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, and multilateral security dialogues [that] will play a positive function in supplementing, if not supplanting, the existing bilateral security architecture.”¹⁸

Despite skepticism surrounding the possibility of multilateral security dialogue processes, it must be credited that these loose cooperatives have often been a vital mechanism in reducing the uncertainties and mistrust that lead to unnecessary arms buildups and tension. This form of regional integration is vital for the growth of positive relations as it reassures possible adversaries of their mutual dedication to the status quo and to a cooperative solution. This is not to say that a multilateral security cooperative would be sufficient to protect the region, nor does this Task Force expect a significant amount of military cooperation within Northeast Asia. Instead, NEASCO would function to “improve regional relations, promote confidence, and foster

¹⁸ Brookings 3

trust, which, in turn, should help ameliorate the security dilemma and the chances for accidental miscalculations.”¹⁹

Recognizing the stresses of globalization and the vast interpretations of security issues, this forum provides flexibility for the region to react to just about any crisis they may face in a cooperative, supportive, and integrated fashion. NEASCO faces the difficult task of limiting its own power and infringement on member sovereignty, while still guaranteeing effective results. Below is an outline and explanation of the structure of NEASCO and how this will enable the cooperative to make meaningful accomplishments.

Structure of NEASCO

1. Membership:

- a. Permanent Council: China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, United States, Russia
 - a. Voting rights in Special Projects and Advisory Council
 - b. Decisions based on consensus, nonbinding
- b. Partners: ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, India, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
 - a. Non-voting
 - b. Have seats in all Advisory Council subcommittees
 - c. Any country may apply for Partner status by demonstrating their strategic importance to Northeast Asian security

2. Forums

- a. Forums will be hosted annually
- b. All members are invited to attend the forum and sit in all meetings
- c. The Session Chair will be expected to give a report on the proceedings and recommendations of the Advisory Council
- d. Motions presented by the Advisory Council will be considered at the Permanent Council
 - i. If a unanimous decision is reached by the Permanent Council, it will constitute a nonbinding security agreement between the countries of NEASCO
- e. At the end of the conference, a new Session Chair will be elected. All members have the right to elect a Session Chair, and a country cannot be elected to Session Chair more than once every five years.

¹⁹ Ibid

3. Session Chairs

- a. Session Chairs will be selected annually, during the annual forum
 - i. Only members of the Permanent Council may hold the Session Chair position
- b. The Chair country holds these responsibilities:
 - i. Plan, host, and chair the annual forum
 - ii. Oversee the agendas of the Advisory Council and Subgroups
 - iii. Review and select applications for Special Projects
 - iv. Coordinate relations between the Permanent Council and Partners

4. Advisory Council

- a. The Advisory Council will oversee four major subgroups;
 - i. Anti-terrorism
 - 1. Similar to the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO
 - ii. Arms Control
 - 1. Export Controls (Regional ‘universal’ Export Control System)
 - 2. Nonproliferation
 - iii. Mediation and Conflict Prevention
 - 1. Border disputes
 - iv. Military Exercises
 - 1. Joint naval practices
 - a. Humanitarian, rescue, and anti-piracy
- b. Subgroups can be comprised of members of the Permanent Council and Partners
 - i. Chairs will be selected for each subgroup at the annual Forum
 - ii. All members are eligible to Chair subgroups
- c. Subgroups meet four times a year to discuss and plan for the annual forum
 - i. Identify issues and offer solutions
 - ii. Prepare action plans and present at the annual forum for final approval

5. Special Projects

- a. Any concern not addressed in the Advisory Council may be submitted to the Session Chair as a Special Project
 - i. The Session Chair may not apply for a Special Project during their appointment
 - ii. Possible special projects: post conflict rehabilitation, cyber security, Japanese abductees issue
- b. Proposals must include:
 - i. Explanation of conflict
 - ii. Plan of action & timeline
 - iii. Cooperating nations
- c. If accepted by the Session Chair, a Special Project is allowed to present to the Permanent Council for approval of their report

Membership

Initial membership will be opened strictly to the members of the Six Party Talks, who will retain a status of privilege within the organization. This body will be referred to as the Permanent Council, which will function at the heart of NEASCO and act as its governing body. Voting rights and the ability to serve as a Session Chair will be limited to the Permanent Council.

After the formation of NEASCO, a select group of countries will be asked to participate as Partners. These countries have been identified as key allies for the Northeast Asian region and whose cooperation and alignment with a regional security cooperative would be beneficial. This membership has been identified by the topics discussed in this Task Force, but it allows for the possibility of new members as global geopolitics shift to integrate more countries into the Asia-Pacific region. While these countries will not have final voting rights, they will have significant opportunity to create and discuss policy within NEASCO. They will have seats in all subgroups as well as the Advisory Council, and Partner states will have the ability to propose Special Projects for consideration by the Permanent Council.

This design is very purposeful, and will be discussed many times within the Task Force. Many concerns were taken into account; maximizing U.S. influence in the region, creating an incentive for the countries of the Six Party Talks to institutionalize the organization, as well as balancing the scope and efficacy of NEASCO.

Annual Forums

For NEASCO to be successful, it must create and maintain momentum within the organization to encourage cooperation. The annual forums will be crucial to this process, as open communication is crucial to identify and resolve the security concerns of Northeast Asia. These annual forums can provide a place for member countries to hold each other accountable and build trust. Each year, the Subgroups will provide a report to the Advisory Council and

present their work at the Forum. This will include an overview of their quarterly meetings, major concerns and projects, and any proposals they have drafted for the Permanent Council. After the Advisory Council reviews and edits these proposals, they are sent to the Permanent Council for a final vote. If the Permanent Council is able to reach a consensus on the proposal, it will form a non-binding security agreement between the members of NEASCO. Although there is no enforcement regime attached to NEASCO (for the reason of feasibility) the Task Force will present several areas of concern that could serve as catalysts to begin this process of collaboration.

Special Projects

The Special Projects arm of NEASCO presents the most innovative and promising portion of NEASCO. The extent of the subgroups is purposefully limited, and the overall functions offered by NEASCO is few, but with the flexibility offered by the Special Projects will allow NEASCO to respond to the ever changing demands of the Asia Pacific region with potentially limitless tools. As the first test of the Special Projects, NEASCO will institutionalize the Six Party Talks and engage a revitalized KEDO in a project that will address the security and energy needs of Northeast Asia, focusing on North Korean verification, denuclearization, and economic development.²⁰

Other areas of mutually beneficial cooperation that could attract states to utilizing the Special Projects of NEASCO includes a comprehensive ground transportation system connecting Russia, China, North Korea, and South Korea. This would be economically and logistically beneficial for all of the countries involved, as well as making a significant step in linking North Korea to the region while improving their infrastructure. NEASCO can work with the public

²⁰ As further discussed within this Task Force

sector to put the cost of modernizing the DPRK in the hands of the public sector. An example of this already in action is Orascom, the Egyptian telecommunications giant who has put a significant amount of effort into expanding cell phone service within North Korea.²¹

Applying NEASCO

Again, the authors of this Task Force are under no illusion as to the complex challenges which face the creation of a security cooperative such as NEASCO. The remainder of this report will offer a comprehensive look into the major players of East Asian politics and the opportunities and obstacles that they offer for the creation of NEASCO. It will also examine the history of multilateralism both in Asia and Europe to identify key trends and consequences of regional integration, and ultimately make a case for a new Asian multilateralism based on military security and energy cooperation.

²¹ Now estimated at 80,000 customers, Orascom 2008 Annual report

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
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The nuclear trajectory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has diverged significantly from the rest of East Asia since the late 1960s. In countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, leaders have had stronger incentives to avoid the political, economic, and other costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. North Korea is the anomalous state in this region, pursuing a nuclear path that differs greatly from East Asia's pattern of denuclearization since the end of World War II. In 2003, the DPRK became the first state to withdraw from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty; by 2005, it acknowledged possession of a "nuclear deterrent"; and in 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon, the first new East Asian state to do so in forty-two years.²² The volatile North Korean nuclear arsenal has compromised the enforceability of all international nuclear arms control treaties and has the potential to ignite a nuclear arms race throughout Northeast Asia.

The instability surrounding the DPRK regime continues to expand, creating the potential for a cataclysmic global crisis. It seems that the international community is in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. The global threat posed by North Korea's nuclear proliferation is outpacing the U.S. response, calling for more speed, resources, and effort in negotiating with Pyongyang. Why has the DPRK's nuclear path differed so greatly from the rest of East Asia, and why was there such strong demand for nuclear weapons in North Korea? Today's urgent dilemmas of nuclear proliferation require answers to these questions and others, including: how might the United States and the international community resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, and how can policy options for the U.S. take advantage of opportunities for regional multilateralism in North Korea?

²² Etel Solingen, *Nuclear logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 118.

A North Korean History: Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Nuclearization

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the northern part of the Korean peninsula. The government took control in 1945. It is a self-described *juche* (self-reliant) state with a pronounced cult of personality organized around Kim Il-Sung (the founder of North Korea and the country's first president) and his son and heir, Kim Jong-Il. One of the few countries still under Communist rule, the DPRK is a rigid, state-controlled system characterized by its dilapidated economy and secretive nuclear ambitions. Aid agencies have estimated that up to two million people have died in North Korea since the 1990s because of food shortages, natural disasters, and economic mismanagement. The totalitarian state relies heavily on foreign aid to feed millions of its people and stands accused of many systematic human rights abuses.²³

Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il gained and maintained power through the use of ruthless punishment and flexible rewards. Their model of regime survival differed dramatically from that of most of their neighbors. After World War II, Kim forged a regime characterized as "ideologically paternalistic, economically collectivist, ethnically racist, diplomatically isolationist and culturally nationalist."²⁴ This militarized regime controlled every aspect of economic activity, emphasizing self-sufficiency or *juche*. *Juche* was formally introduced by Kim Il-Sung as the official state ideology in the 1950s, becoming far more prominent in the 1960s. In Kim Il-Sung's words, "self-reliance in the economy is the material basis of *chajusong* [all around independence in international relations] and economic dependence leads to political subordination."²⁵ For Kim, self-sufficiency and militarization was both the path to a self-dependent national economy and to national or ethnic independence.

²³ BBC, "Country Profile: North Korea," 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/1131421.stm.

²⁴ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 125.

²⁵ Ibid.

Juche was the quintessential essence of Kim Il-Sung's model of political control and vital to his leadership cult. The outcome of the Korean War provided a convenient opportunity for the deepening of militarization and *juche* ideology. Japan's occupation of Korea and war economy had left a relatively advanced heavy industry infrastructure, allowing Kim Il-Sung to nationalize industrial enterprises and mold them to serve a militarized state. The military was Kim's regime backbone, receiving one-third of the state budget, one-fourth of GNP since the 1960s, and considerable political autonomy. Soviet military assistance helped build this vast military-industrial-complex, which by 1950, was 300,000 strong.²⁶

The DPRK's first Five-Year Plan (1957-60) emphasized heavy industry including machine building, electricity, coal mining, and chemicals. In 1962, the unified Workers' Party adopted the "four great military policy-lines": arm the entire people, fortify the entire country, cadetify the entire army, and modernize the entire army. At this time, North Korea also began training programs in nuclear science with the Soviets and Chinese. In 1964, North Korea established the Yongbyon nuclear research facility with Soviet assistance, which Kim Il-Sung hoped could "increase the defense capabilities of the country so as to reliably safeguard its security on the basis of[...] the Party's idea of *juche*."²⁷

The 1970s were characterized by hostile actions and compromising initiatives in North Korea, reflecting incipient tensions between the party's old guard and forces advancing economic reform as an alternative strategy of regime survival. Throughout the 1980s, the reigning autarkic model forced North Korea to discontinue paying foreign debts, which limited access to additional capital and foreign investment. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the opportunity costs of military investments for satisfying the population's basic needs increased

²⁶ Ibid., 126.

²⁷ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 127.

significantly. The collapse of the Soviet Union widened the gap between *juche* adherents and incipient reformers, while allowing Kim to justify a turn to Japan and the United States for economic aid, normalization, and investment.²⁸

In 1994, a bilateral agreement was forged between the U.S. and the DPRK through the Geneva Agreed Framework. One of the key components of the Agreed Framework included U.S.-DPRK cooperation in fully replacing North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors (which are not capable of plutonium production) by 2003. Graphite-moderated reactors were to be shut down until converted. To offset energy lost due to the powering down of graphite-moderated reactors, the U.S. agreed to supply North Korea with up to 500,000 tons of heavy oil for heating and electricity production annually, until all reactors had been converted. The DPRK agreed to return to compliance with all international nuclear non-proliferation agreements and to eventually stabilize, store, and dispose of all spent nuclear fuel already produced. The Framework also called for a commitment to achieve full normalization of political and economic relations between the U.S. and Pyongyang.²⁹ Unfortunately, the 1994 Agreed Framework lacked serious commitment from the U.S. Congress and adherence to its terms by the DPRK. For reasons to be discussed in depth in subsequent sections, the Agreed Framework had effectively broken down by 2003.

1994 was also marked by the death of Kim Il-Sung, leaving Kim Jong-Il to inherit the highest post. Kim Jong-Il introduced the policy of *son'gun* ("military first") to replace *juche* with a policy of "strong and prosperous great power". To prevent regime collapse due to energy and food crises, Kim supported a new economic policy for the period of adjustment (1994-1996)

²⁸ Ibid., 132.

²⁹ Kairouz, "North Korean," 27.

signaling new priorities in agriculture, light industry, and foreign trade.³⁰ In 2002, Kim launched the most comprehensive reforms ever, most of which were deeply rooted in monetization, decentralization, and foreign capital acquisition. Monetization and decentralization were mainly domestic in nature, intending to increase food supply, regain state control over sectors of the economy being encroached upon by the black market, and reduce the burden of subsidization. Foreign capital acquisition was geared toward obtaining large amounts of capital to kick-start the industrial sector and increase productivity.³¹ Unfortunately, these reforms only benefited the few and the wealthy while increasing inflation, unemployment, urban poverty, and corruption. Just as North Korea's domestic policies have mutated and transformed over the last half-century, so too has their path of nuclearization, the history of which is extensive and thoroughly complicated. In the aftermath of World War II, the DPRK became an indigenous adaptation of Soviet-era regime models. Kim Il-Sung launched the Korean War, suffered defeat, and subsequently experienced substantial U.S. military presence in the South.³² During the Korean War and following the U.S. defeat at the 38th parallel, the Truman administration considered the North Korean attack as a Soviet-Chinese orchestrated aggression against the free world; since then, North Korea has been isolated, outcast, and closely watched by western military forces stationed in Southeast Asia.³³ Fearing regime-collapse, Kim Il-Sung made North Korea into a military fortress heavily supported by Soviet and Chinese allies.

In 1964, China conducted a nuclear test, after which Kim Il-Sung sent a delegation to Beijing requesting assistance in developing a parallel program. Although the request was presumably denied, neither China nor the Soviet Union was able to curtail North Korea's

³⁰ Ibid., 134

³¹ Christopher Hale, "Real Reform in North Korea?", *Asian Survey*, 45 (2005): 823.

³² Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 118.

³³ A. Kairouz, "North Korean Nuclear Crisis," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 39 (2004): 25.

subsequent nuclearization. During the 1960s, North Korea obtained plutonium from a Soviet-supplied research facility, and by the 1970s, North Korea had begun construction of other plutonium-related facilities. In 1985, the DPRK signed agreements with the Soviets for a nuclear power plant, and for trade and economic cooperation.

That same year, the Soviets persuaded the DPRK to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), only to withdraw from it in 2003 following extensive violations of its 1985 ratification commitments.³⁴ In 1993, the DPRK refused to allow United Nations inspection of its nuclear sites, violating its obligations under the NPT and suggesting that there could be truth to the rumors that North Korea had been secretly separating plutonium for bombs production. The UN considered such a refusal a dangerous action and a flagrant violation of international law.³⁵

After withdrawing from the NPT and threatening to convert South Korea and Japan into a “sea of fire,” North Korea further alarmed the international community and set the stage for the creation of the Six Party Talks, which were aimed at facilitating dialogue for peaceful resolution to security concerns between the U.S., China, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, and Japan. The initial and subsequent rounds of talks have produced little net progress, and indeed, by 2005, the DPRK acknowledged possession of a nuclear deterrent estimated at four to six bombs by the International Atomic Energy Agency.³⁶ In July of 2006, North Korea tested seven missiles and, three months later, a plutonium-filled bomb. The UN responded quickly by imposing stringent sanctions on North Korea, causing the DPRK to refuse to engage in the Six Party Talks and pushing the nation further into a looming humanitarian crisis.³⁷

³⁴ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 118.

³⁵ Kairouz, “North Korean,” 26.

³⁶ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 118.

³⁷ Ilsoo David Cho and Meredith Jung-En Woo, “North Korea in 2006: The Year of Living Dangerously,” *Asian Survey*, 47 (2007): 71.

The year 2007 witnessed a gradual rapprochement between North Korea and the international community with the resumption of the Six Party Talks and the second North-South Summit.³⁸ Under two separate agreements reached in 2007, North Korea agreed to disable its nuclear programs in return for economic assistance and the lifting of sanctions. However, by August of the same year, the North Korean foreign minister announced that nuclear disablement activities had ceased. In 2008, North-South relations worsened, food shortages reemerged, and turbulent nuclear negotiations continued.³⁹ In 2009, North Korea declared that it would pull out of the Six Party Talks and resume its nuclear enrichment program, expelling all nuclear inspectors from the country. Since that time, the U.S. and its allies have been attempting to resume international talks on ending the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. After many failed attempts to denuclearize North Korea in the past, it is necessary to look to the domestic conditions that have led the DPRK to pursue a path of proliferation.

Nuclear Logic in an Unstable Regime

Nuclear weapons arguably allowed North Korea to achieve superiority over South Korea, deter U.S. attacks, and carve independence from their Soviet and Chinese patrons. Nuclear weapons also provided a security guarantee to the DPRK, which was not being offered to the North from any major superpowers in the international community. Furthermore, because North Korea faced a tenuous security context, especially during the Korean War, nuclear weapons proliferation became a source of regime security for Kim Il-Sung and subsequent leaders. North Korea's inclusion in the 2002 "Axis of Evil" speech prompted even greater concerns with regime

³⁸ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, "North Korea in 2007: Shuffling in from the Cold," *Asian Survey*, 48 (2008): 107.

³⁹ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, "North Korea in 2008: Twilight of the God?" *Asian Survey*, 49 (2009): 103.

survival.⁴⁰ Over the last four decades, North Korea's nuclear behavior has been characterized by an unstable regime rooted in autarky and self-sufficiency and the desire for power, prestige, and economic security.

Emerging efforts to reform the economy in North Korea have been burdened by decades of ruling through *juche*. Kim Jong-Il's decision to move away from the *juche* policy to a more military-centric ideology required an enormous societal transformation that risked Kim's own survival and his regime continuity. In this context of instability, nuclear weapons endowed Kim with prestige, resources, and a *raison d'être* in the face of domestic economic hardship. The DPRK's weapons were conceived as tools of regime survival that enhanced domestic support, bargaining chips that maximized international concessions, and a potential deterrent against external threats.⁴¹ The North Korean urgency of securing a self-reliant deterrent were accentuated by the loss of the Soviet nuclear umbrella in 1990, when the Kremlin announced that it would normalize relations with Seoul. The DPRK said in a prophetic memorandum that Moscow-Seoul normalization would mean an end to the DPRK-USSR alliance and that Pyongyang would "have no other choice but to take measures to provide for ourselves some weapons for which we have so far relied on the alliance."⁴² Without a reliable security guarantee from the Soviets, Pyongyang had all the more incentive to seek security from the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons.

The multiple sources of North Korea's nuclearization can be traced to the absence of security guarantees and to *juche* as the guiding inward-oriented model of political control. From this point of view, the DPRK's nuclear program became a flexible support system for Kim Jong-

⁴⁰ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 119.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 138, 139.

⁴² Samuel Kim, "North Korea's Nuclear Strategy and 'Intermestic' Politics," *Nuclear Politics, North Korea and the Political Economy of Northeast Asia in the Wake of the World Economic Crisis*, 2009: 9.

Il's overriding goal of regime preservation. North Korea's nuclear program was never satisfied with repeated U.S. pledges of nuclear non-aggression; on the contrary, the DPRK viewed U.S. policy toward the North as "hostile" and "aimed at seeking the DPRK's regime change."⁴³ Some precarious progress was made in thwarting the DPRK's nuclear ambitions in 2005, when the Six Party Talks yielded an unprecedented statement where North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for energy, trade, and security guarantees from the five powers. However, Kim Jong-Il's decision in 2005 was rooted in the shifting logics of political survival, and his subsequent retractions took place in 2006, when North Korea launched seven missiles into the Sea of Japan and exploded a nuclear device. The decision to test and the ensuing disregard of agreements made in 2005 was a purely political act in revenge for financial sanctions imposed by the U.S. against illegal banking activities that were directly related to the personal income of the leadership in North Korea.⁴⁴

As North Korean domestic policy transformed with Kim Jong-Il's new policies and economic reform, any moderate elements in their policy transformed. After the U.S. imposed financial sanctions, the extreme hardliners in Pyongyang who had complete control over policy making possessed enormous political determination to launch their missiles, test their bombs, and direct their nuclear arms program. Possessing nuclear weapons also allowed the North Korean regime to help solidify their domestic support and to show their people and army that they were strong. North Korea's own statement regarding its nuclear weapons program is transparent regarding the test's domestic support: "The nuclear test was conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology one hundred percent. It marks a historic event as it greatly

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 140.

encouraged and pleased the KPA (Korean People's Army) and people that have wished to have a powerful self-reliant defense capability.”⁴⁵

Relations between North Korea and South Korea have also been a major factor in the DPRK's decision to pursue nuclear weapons proliferation. In 1994, when American and North Korean negotiators were discussing the details of an Agreed Framework, Pyongyang warned that it would turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into a “sea of fire.” The already unstable relationship between the North and South amplified as the DPRK later fell back on the promises made in the Agreed Framework and continued to pursue a nuclear weapons program to achieve superiority over South Korea. The ongoing conflict between the North and the South has undoubtedly been an underlying factor in the introduction of the DPRK's “military-first” policy, which has given North Korea significantly greater military power than the South possesses. Admittedly, Kim Jong-Il acknowledged to South Korean military chiefs that “my power comes from the military.”⁴⁶ Indeed, the improvement of North-South relations is a crucial precursor to any successful strategy for North Korean disarmament due to the defensive role that nuclear weapons hold for the DPRK against the South.

North Korean nuclear ambitions can also be attributed to economic reasons. Since the 1970s, the North Korean government has been accused of condoning, and even encouraging, its agencies to bring in badly needed hard currency through criminal activities, such as selling weapons. In August of 2009, the United Arab Emirates seized a ship carrying North Korean weapons that were bound for Iran in violation of the U.N. embargo which allows for inspections of cargo to and from North Korea in response to a second nuclear test conducted by the DPRK in May. The weapons seized reportedly included rocket launchers, detonators, munitions and

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 136.

ammunition for rocket-propelled grenades. The revenues from illicit activities and sales of weapons are estimated to cover a large portion of North Korea's annual trade deficit, which was estimated at \$1.5 billion in 2008 by the South Korean government. Kim Jong-Il is said to use illicit proceeds funneled to his private financial reserves to buy the loyalty of elites as well as finance his nuclear projects.⁴⁷

Economic rationale for the North Korean nuclear weapons program is also apparent in the DPRK's right to maintain nuclear energy capabilities. When the DPRK economy began to decline after the Cold War, its energy sector went with it. Today, the entirety of North Korea is running at most on the equivalent of two to four large-sized power plants, sitting at about where the South Korean energy economy was in 1965. An extremely low energy-producing capability coupled with high demand for energy in North Korea has surely made nuclear energy sources seem like an attractive option for Pyongyang.⁴⁸ Indeed, North Korea's energy insecurities must be overcome if it is ever to reverse course, disarm its nuclear weapons, and dismantle its nuclear fuel cycle.

In his article on U.S. policy toward North Korea, Wade Huntley describes North Korea's nuclear weapons program as "the sole instrument for confronting and exploiting the vulnerabilities of a gigantic adversary." The adversary he is referring to is the United States, who has historically made no apparent effort to shape its North Korea policy on the basis of extant conditions. The DPRK has viewed U.S. policy toward the North as part of an activist global program premising the universality of American values. This has led an already extremely nationalistic state to lash out at U.S. impositions with continued attempts at nuclear

⁴⁷ Thomas Fuller and Choe Sang-hun, "Thais Say North Korea Arms Were Iran Bound," *New York Times*, 31 January 2010.

⁴⁸ D. Von Hippel and P. Hayes, "Energy Security for North Korea," *Science*, 316 (2007).

proliferation.⁴⁹ The dynamic between Washington and Pyongyang has historically been extremely volatile and unstable. It is crucial to look further into the past successes and failures in negotiating with North Korea to fully understand the DPRK's nuclear logic and to bring to light opportunities for cooperation and denuclearization.

Negotiating with Pyongyang: Past Failures and Successes

In 1992, North Korea agreed to allow inspections by the IAEA, but over the next two years refused access to sites of suspected nuclear weapons production. In 1993, the North threatened to withdraw from the NPT sparking major concerns from the international community. The first major attempts at U.S.-North Korean negotiations occurred in 1994, when the IAEA reported that the DPRK had failed to comply with inspection rules and procedures.⁵⁰ In an attempt to normalize relations between the U.S. and the DPRK, the Clinton administration proposed the aforementioned bilateral Agreed Framework to temporarily halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program and return to non-proliferation negotiations in Geneva. The Agreed Framework also authorized the establishment of a multilateral consortium named the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to implement the terms of the Framework. The provisions of KEDO and the Agreed Framework were not fully implemented, and several problems surfaced during its application. First of all, the North Koreans were not equipped with the technological know-how to safely operate the converted reactors, and the supplying of these reactors would force the U.S. to violate its own export laws to the DPRK. The Agreement also failed to tackle the large North Korean stockpile of biological and chemical weapons. Under the Framework, the South Koreans were in charge of designing, manufacturing, and managing the

⁴⁹ Wade Huntley, "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate," *Asian Survey*, 47 (2007): 460.

⁵⁰ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 118.

newly developing nuclear facilities, which was a point of contention for the DPRK who vehemently objected to such a role being given to their contentious neighbor. Furthermore, the Agreement did not refer to the status of the quantities of plutonium already processed, raising several questions about the ability of the Framework to address hidden plutonium and uranium stores already secured in the North. In the end, the Agreement lacked serious commitment from the U.S. Congress and adherence to its terms by the DPRK who perceived American sluggishness to uphold their end of the bargain as a violation of the Framework.⁵¹ The Agreed Framework was near collapse toward the end of the Clinton administration, and indeed, its fate was sealed with the election of George W. Bush in 2000, who focused U.S. attention away from the Korean peninsula, thus deteriorating U.S.-DPRK relations.⁵²

The next major U.S. initiative to deal with the North Korean nuclear crisis came in 2003 after North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, which was the first time a member of the treaty had refused to allow IAEA inspection. Since the NPT has no enforcement mechanism against violators, the U.S. took upon itself the task of stopping the North Korean nuclear program and began negotiations with Pyongyang.⁵³ The initiative proposed became known as the Six Party Talks, whose members included China, North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Russia. The Six Party Talks have been a limited success despite their potential for creating viable solutions to the North Korean nuclear crisis. The Chinese hosted round one of the Talks in August of 2003. While this round achieved little in regards to resolving the crisis, the precedent of bringing the six parties together in one place was unarguably valuable. An apparent breakthrough was achieved during the fourth round of Talks in 2005, when North Korea agreed

⁵¹ Ibid., 27, 28.

⁵² G. J. Moore, "America's Failed North Korea Nuclear Policy: A New Approach," *Asian Perspective*, 32 (2008): 12.

⁵³ Kairouz, "North Korean," 26.

to end its nuclear weapons program in exchange for economic assistance, only to withdraw its commitment one year later and perform a series of nuclear tests, bringing tensions between North Korea and the U.S. to a new high.⁵⁴

The Six Party Talks continued in 2007, and eventually an agreement was reached, giving North Korea a million tons of fuel oil in exchange for the closure of its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. The North closed and disassembled the facility, prompting the U.S. to take North Korea off its list of supporters of state-sponsored terrorism in 2008. Despite the appearance of some measure of success in the outcome of the Six Party Talks, there are still several reasons U.S. policy toward North Korea must be judged a failure. First, the U.S. has not prevented North Korea from acquiring and testing a nuclear weapon, despite diplomatic efforts and deterrent strategies. Second, the U.S. has not prevented North Korea from transferring its nuclear technology to Iran, Pakistan, and Syria. North Korea is also on record as having sold uranium hexafluoride, a compound that can be enriched to produce weapons-grade uranium, to Pakistan who then sold it to Libya. Iran has also helped finance North Korea's nuclear program in exchange for nuclear technology, equipment, and cooperation on enriching uranium. All of these illicit activities took place under the watch of the Bush administration and have the makings of the post-9/11 nightmare scenario U.S. policy makers have been striving to avoid. They are evidence of the unfortunate failure of U.S. policy toward North Korea.⁵⁵

There have also been several attempts in the past to curb nuclearization in North Korea through institutions that have remained mostly ineffective. The most prominent security institution in regards to the North Korean nuclear dilemma is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Until 2006, ASEAN played the role of driver in the search for multilateral regionalism,

⁵⁴ Moore, "America's Failed," 13-14.

⁵⁵ Moore, "America's Failed," 15-16.

but its weakness as an organization eventually exposed its limitations, mainly that it required consensus among diverse actors but remained marginal for the main Asian powers.⁵⁶ The challenge has remained for ASEAN institutions to establish a forward-looking regional strategy that contains a balanced approach to national interests in the North Korean nuclear crisis. Moreover, ASEAN's limits in building momentum were amplified by the inherent uncertainty about the U.S. role in regionalism under Bush administration policies.⁵⁷ That being said, the effort made by ARF to pursue sub-regional dialogue and conduct meetings to address common issues and interests is very valuable indeed. The existence of such a formal, official, multilateral dialogue in the Asia Pacific is crucial in fostering cooperation, promoting confidence-building, and encouraging preventative diplomacy in the region. The limited successes of regional forums such as ARF must be fully recognized by the U.S. and built on for future cooperation in East Asia.

There are a number of reasons for the failure of U.S. policy toward North Korea under the Bush administration. The first was its initial failure to continue the Clinton-era Agreed Framework principles. U.S. policy failure in the North can also be contributed to the neoconservative takeover of U.S. foreign policy and the subsequent distractions posed by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. U.S.-imposed sanctions have also been a major policy failure, which have been seen by the North as the equivalent of a declaration of war.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the Bush administration largely rejected not only bilateral talks that could have fortified the Kim regime against collapse but also multilateralism with the potential to put in place a new broader regional

⁵⁶ Gilbert Rozman, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia," *Asian Survey*, 47 (2007): 617.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 621.

⁵⁸ Moore, "America's Failed," 19.

security framework.⁵⁹ Clearly, the U.S. is in need of a new approach for American policy toward North Korea.

New American Policy Options

Washington must not continue to pursue its North Korea policy by relying on isolation, non-recognition, hostility, and containment, because as we have seen, such a model has not been successful in the past. As such, the Obama administration may do well to consider a new approach rooted in confidence building and multilateralism. Such an approach is radically different from anything pursued by the Bush administration and has the potential to pave the way for a real breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear dilemma. Under a confidence-building approach, the U.S. would offer North Korea full diplomatic recognition, including the opening of a U.S. embassy in Pyongyang and eventually the opening of a North Korean embassy in Washington. The U.S. should also formally end the Korean War, turning the 1953 Korean War armistice into a full-fledged peace agreement. Although there would be no preconditions in this approach, it does not require a retreat from any past agreements the U.S. has in place regarding the North's disabling of its nuclear facilities and full disclosure of all nuclear activities.⁶⁰

Although such an approach sounds radical and potentially unfeasible, it has actually proven effective in the past when Britain opened an embassy in Pyongyang in 2000, greatly improving U.K.-DPRK relations. Furthermore, as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the U.S. already discussed opening up full diplomatic relations with Pyongyang as part of the end game for U.S.-DPRK relations. Before beginning such an approach, it is important that the U.S. consult closely with its South Korean ally to assure them that establishing a peace treaty with

⁵⁹ Rozman, "The North Korean," 619.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 21.

North Korea would not entail any weakening of the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea. Further, the U.S. must also make clear that such an approach does not entail the rejection of denuclearization in North Korea, as the U.S. would still encourage an end to all proliferation activities in the North.⁶¹

The U.S. would have little to lose in taking such an approach toward North Korea. If the DPRK refused the U.S. offer to normalize diplomatic relations, open embassies in each other's capitals, and establish a peace treaty, this would deny that North Korea truly wants to be treated like a "normal" country by Washington. Such a peace offering would also improve U.S. citizenship in the international community, making it easier to gather support for a firmer stand on North Korea in the region and for any multilateral framework organization that would hopefully be formed down the road. One of the most important advantages of a confidence-building strategy with multilateral support is the establishment of an elementary level of trust between Washington and Pyongyang, the lack of which has been the biggest obstacle to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Building trust between the two nations would be the first step to removing Kim Jong-Il's fear of U.S. power, which is what has led him to believe that his only source of security is nuclear weapons.⁶²

Opportunities for a Northeast Asian Security Cooperative

The most viable U.S. policy option to pursue in North Korea is the institutionalization of the Six Party Talks into a regional security framework or organization aimed at holding North Korea accountable to regional powers. Such an organization will henceforth be referred to as the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO). There would surely be support from China

⁶¹ Ibid., 22.

⁶² Ibid., 24.

for such a framework, who has been promoting dialogue within East Asia in their interests of averting disaster on the Korean peninsula. And due to the past precedence of all nations agreeing to meet, it is probable that most nations would have a desire and interest in contributing to such an organization. This forum would be a useful way to address American concerns with North Korea and could facilitate face-to-face talks with the U.S. and North Korea that have been instrumental in creating somewhat successful deals in the past.⁶³

The importance of such an institution is underscored by the facts that the six parties include the world's most powerful nation (the United States), some of the world's most powerful nuclear powers (the U.S., Russia, and China), and several of the world's most powerful economies. It is crucial that discussions among these six parties takes place now and continue even if the immediate crisis of North Korean nuclearization is resolved. It is essential that the U.S. promote a broader multilateral framework to engage North Korea, rather than continue to pursue the more neoconservative unilateral efforts of past administrations.⁶⁴ The creation of NEASCO could operate multilaterally to provide the security guarantee that the DPRK so desperately needs to dismantle its weapons program. Because North Korea would be a Permanent Council member in NEASCO, they would have voting rights and the ability to hold conferences and participate in an Advisory Council. This facet of NEASCO would grant a certain degree of legitimacy to North Korea, helping to ease concerns over regime survival in Pyongyang that have been a central force in the rationale for their nuclear weapons program.

A new multilateral approach toward North Korea's nuclear program must also encourage mutual cooperation in energy provision on the Korean peninsula. In his article in *Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy*, Kyle Beardsley discusses how sharing nuclear

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

energy and materials could serve as a means by which cooperation could become self-sustaining on the Korean peninsula. He proposes an approach to mutual cooperation in which North Korea, which currently has no existing capabilities for nuclear energy generation, hosts reactors that deliver energy to South Korea, which currently imports most of its energy. Income transfers from third parties in the international system should also supplement such a relationship between the North and South. This approach would address the fear experienced by the North that the ROK would threaten its energy independence, as well as the need by the South to be assured that the North will not engage in weapons production. This approach would also satisfy growing energy needs at a minimum cost, while removing the commitment barriers on the Korean peninsula and enable long-term cooperation between the two neighbors. Indeed, the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the ROK through energy codependence could serve as a stepping stone to enhance the prospects of more long-term goals. It would also augment confidence and trust-building measures with the potential to lead to cooperation over disarmament.⁶⁵

Mutual cooperation in energy provision on the Korean peninsula could be facilitated by NEASCO and supported by a subgroup of its Advisory Council, which could implement a Special Project in energy sharing. This would provide a forum for the implementation and sustained support for such a project, while holding both North and South Korea accountable to their ends of the bargain. Within the broader multilateral security framework, North and South Korea could establish conditions where there exists a stable equilibrium so that the DPRK never finds it in its interest to disrupt energy supplies to the ROK, and the ROK is willing to pay the fixed costs of nuclear plant construction in exchange for a discounted energy supply from the

⁶⁵ Kyle Beardsley and Jamus Lim, “Atoms for Peace, Redux: Energy Codependency for Sustained Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula,” *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 15 (2009): 2-3.

North. This cooperative relationship would also be supported and augmented by third-party income streams, making cooperation more likely by lowering the incentive to deviate from the cooperative strategy.⁶⁶

North-South energy cooperation would allow the DPRK to stay true to its *juche* ideology, while lowering the price of energy and decreasing incentives to produce weapons; indeed, Beardsley points out, “the North cannot afford to produce weapons when the opportunity cost of not devoting resources to the energy sector is so large.”⁶⁷ Since the power plants would be in the North, Pyongyang would have some amount of leverage to hold the ROK in check, while the ROK in turn could simply stop its flow of investments and return to the status quo sources of energy if the North fails to deliver. Furthermore, once reactors are built to provide energy to the South, the ROK could offer a subsidy to keep the price of energy low in the North. This would maximize the amount of energy that the North delivers to the South and minimize the incentives to produce weapons.⁶⁸ Through NEASCO, the international community can insist that the reactors in the North are proliferation-resistant and encourage continued cooperation to sow the seeds for even greater future cooperation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia more generally. Energy sharing would also allow North Korea to perceive the ROK and its international supporters as trustworthy, decreasing the DPRK’s sense of vulnerability and resistance to disarmament.

The establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1994 demonstrates the feasibility of forging multilateral cooperation to meet North Korea’s energy security needs as a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. KEDO was established as a multilateral body to oversee the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework that froze

⁶⁶ Ibid., 3, 18.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 13.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 21.

North Korea's nuclear program and tied full denuclearization to the provision of two 1000-megawatt light water reactors. North Korea reluctantly was obligated to accept the necessity of South Korean and Japanese technical and political involvement in the project, and even came to accept KEDO as a legitimate counterpart, despite the fact that it originated in a bilateral U.S.-DPRK agreement. The establishment of KEDO was a practical step forward in forging multilateral cooperation to meet North Korea's energy security needs as it provided a unique institutional framework through which Japanese and South Korean diplomats worked with each other together with U.S. colleagues.⁶⁹ Core membership in KEDO was incomplete, as China and Russia declined to participate in the project; however, the multilateral nature of the KEDO process had collateral benefits in promoting inter-Korean relations and should be viewed as a valuable precedent for how to create an improved energy cooperative under a multilateral framework such as NEASCO.

A confidence building and cooperative approach must be accompanied by a strong commitment by the U.S. and other regional powers to work multilaterally to establish trust and transparency on global security issues. It is important that the six parties work multilaterally and collectively toward negotiating a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula to help constitute a wider East Asian cooperative security regime that can displace the deterrence and balance of power dynamics now dominating regional relations. Efforts by East Asia's predominant states to establish such broader security mechanisms through NEASCO would reinforce the Six Party Talks process and strengthen prospects of denuclearization and resolving conflict on the Korean peninsula.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Scott Snyder, "The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization: Implications for Northeast Asian Regional Security Cooperation?" University of British Columbia Working Paper Series, 2000.

⁷⁰ Huntley, "U.S. Policy," 474.

Bush administration policy makers tended to favor emancipatory militancy over multilateralism, making any lasting mechanisms for regional security cooperation difficult to develop and sustain. This approach has proven to be an unfortunate failure in mitigating the North Korean nuclear issue. Moving forward, the Obama administration would do well to favor multilateral approaches in North Korea, building a more collaborative strategic relationship regarding Northeast Asia more broadly. In this context, peace-building efforts in North Korea must move to the forefront of U.S. policy in the region, reinforced by the aim to establish broader security cooperation drawing on the successes of the Six Party Talks. Indeed, it has become clear that region-wide security cooperation is a prerequisite to peaceful achievement of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.⁷¹

Building an East Asian security community will require initiative, innovation, and a comprehensive understanding of the complex tensions throughout East Asia. The U.S. must be the leader in promoting a strategy toward collaborative international community building to build trust among regional powers and to demonstrate a fresh commitment to proactive global dialogue.⁷² It is also important to build off of the successes of preexisting organizational structures, for example, by keeping the Six Party Talks moving forward so that its setting may become the foundation of NEASCO. The most important matters for NEASCO to address in North Korea are the uranium enrichment and nuclear transfer issues, mutual consent for inspection of undeclared sites, and the issue of nuclear bombs that the DPRK is supposed to possess. The U.S. must also show leadership in regional cooperation by joining the East Asian Summit. Such gatherings as ARF and ASEAN+3 should be recognized as confidence-building

⁷¹ Ibid., 474-475.

⁷² Ibid., 479-480.

measures to complement American leadership. Support and recognition of these institutions would open the prospect for an institutional evolution in East Asia over a longer period.⁷³

The United States absolutely must not allow North Korea to continue to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities due to the possibility that Kim Jong-Il could sell such weapons or technologies to terrorists or organizations connected to them. Further, the regime may use them or threaten to use them for blackmail purposes. That being said, there are certainly obstacles and directions to avoid in a new U.S. approach toward North Korea. For example, it is not feasible to remove the DPRK's nuclear capabilities with military strikes for two important reasons. First, the U.S. military cannot possibly assume that they are certain of where all the nuclear facilities are located. And second, there is a strong likelihood that North Korean artillery and missiles would devastate Seoul, a city of 14 million just thirty miles from the North Korean border. Indeed, Kim Jong-Il indicated doing just that when he threatened to reduce Seoul to a "sea of fire" if the United States attacked North Korea.⁷⁴ Continuing with the status quo is also not an option, as it gives Kim Jong-Il more time to develop his weapons and threatens the security of the U.S. and its allies. Due to the paucity of U.S. options and the obstacles to creating effective policies, it is crucial that the U.S. pursue options that directly address American interests in North Korea.⁷⁵

Challenges to the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative

The goals of any new multilateral framework cannot be reached without genuine cooperation from North Korea. As such, confidence-building measures discussed earlier are

⁷³ K. Sung-han, "Searching for a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism," *Asian Perspective*, 32 (2008): 137, 152.

⁷⁴ Moore, "America's Failed," 19.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

crucial to realizing the steps in creating an East Asian security mechanism. Moreover, inter-Korean relations must continue to improve, while Six Party and bilateral negotiations progress. The international community must encourage the normalization of relations between North and South Korea, keeping in mind that the central objective of a security framework in East Asia should be to integrate North Korea into the regional and global economic system.⁷⁶ It is also important that the U.S. work to transform its current alliance with South Korea into a comprehensive security alliance that employs “soft power diplomacy” to build empowering networks among like-minded nations with respect to Asia-Pacific human security issues.⁷⁷ A multilateral security dialogue in East Asia should be pursued in a manner consistent with and conducive to improved inter-Korean relations; as long as inter-Korean relations remain unstable, lasting peace and stability in the region will be improbable.⁷⁸

It is absolutely crucial that NEASCO provides North Korea with a quasi-security guarantee as well as legitimacy in the international community. Without security and legitimacy, the DPRK will have no incentive to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In the past, North Korea has shown strong hesitation in joining multilateral frameworks and has violated commitments made in such organizations, such as their 2003 withdrawal from the NPT. As such, NEASCO must provide the incentives and the security for the DPRK to consider it a worthy investment of its political and economic resources. The issue of North Korea’s nuclear program cannot be resolved without addressing their legitimate security needs and fears in strategically and economically credible ways, with the right mix of security assurances and economic benefits that have become Pyongyang’s bottom line. NEASCO could provide a security guarantee to the North through a common-security approach, breaking away from the

⁷⁶ Ibid., 140.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 143.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 148.

deadly unilateralist logic of security dilemmas and a desire for absolute power. Working multilaterally and collectively, NEASCO would recognize the interrelations and interdependencies among nations to revive the notion of common security and promote more safe and stable relations in Northeast Asia.⁷⁹

NEASCO must also learn from past failures and successes in negotiating with Pyongyang. For example, in 2007, the Six Party Talks brought substantial headway when North Korea agreed to shutdown its Yongbyon facilities in exchange for economic and energy assistance for the other parties. Although this agreement eventually reached a stalemate when Pyongyang expelled all international inspectors from its nuclear facilities, it highlights the need to provide the North with incentives and assistance if the crisis is to be resolved. As such, NEASCO must appease threats to Pyongyang's economic, political and physical security by encouraging an energy agreement between North and South Korea and negotiating to address concerns about external security, regime stability, flagging economy, and deteriorating inter-Korean relations.

In order for an East Asian security mechanism to be effective, it is important that it recognizes that democratic development, human rights, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development, and social equality are as essential to lasting global security as arms control and disarmament.⁸⁰ International policy coordination must respect the complex interconnection of such issues, promoting an agenda based on common values and human security. In this context, an improved multilateral framework born out of the Six Party Talks can stand for something, not against something.

⁷⁹ Kim, "North Korea's," 30.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 142-143.

Conclusion: Multilateralism in East Asia

The best strategy for U.S. policy toward Pyongyang is the establishment of an East Asian peace and security mechanism based upon a resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem that leads to a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula.⁸¹ This comprehensive strategy would essentially convert the Six Party Talks into a regional security framework that would be reassuring to all. It is crucial that the Obama administration take seriously the threat posed to the international community by North Korea's nuclear capabilities and take action to forge a genuine strategy for multilateralism in the region. The most favorable strategy would promote a Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO), with members including China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and Russia. These six parties would constitute a permanent council with voting rights and decisions that were non-binding and based upon consensus.

This multilateral framework would not infringe on the sovereignty of any nation and would promote continued discussion among the permanent council and any other strategic partners that wish to be involved (i.e. ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, India, and other Central Asian states). It would focus mainly on resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis as well as issues such as terrorism, arms control, mediation and conflict prevention, and military exercises. The framework would also allow for Special Projects for other possible issues such as energy security, post-conflict rehabilitation, territorial disputes, and human rights. The establishment of NEASCO is the first step in mitigating the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula as well as a necessary benchmark in enhancing global partnership and security.

⁸¹ Ibid., 138.

A sense of urgency and continued dialogue are needed in order to establish lasting peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the greater Asia-Pacific region. The most effective way to bring about a complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is through the creation of a multilateral security forum that would address common security challenges in East Asia, while recognizing and respecting its members' sovereignty. A multilateral framework in East Asia could offer Pyongyang a security guarantee as well as grant it legitimacy in the international community. The most favorable outcome of such a fresh approach to North Korea from the U.S. perspective would be a reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula, a vast improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations, an end to Kim Jong-Il's nuclear brinkmanship, a North Korean commitment to cease proliferation activities to Syria, Iran, and other buyers, and a general relaxation of tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Kim Jong-Il has continuously stated that his greatest concern is security and that the U.S. is the greatest threat to that security. The U.S. could diminish the security threat Kim Jong-Il's regime faces by building trust with Pyongyang and facilitating open dialogue among Asian powers, making it possible to end the North Korean nuclear dilemma and, in the long run, bring lasting peace and security to all of Northeast Asia.

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
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It is safe to say that Northeast Asia in 2010 is nowhere near the same environment that it was ten years ago. In recent years, a multitude of new security concerns have emerged and drastically transformed the region, including the rapid rise of China economically and militarily, proliferation risks such as the increasingly volatile nuclear-armed North Korea, and the rise of cyber security threats corresponding to increased information system integration in the region. All of these pressures call upon the United States to rethink its security strategy if it wishes to maintain a strong economic and firm military presence in the region through 2020. Rather than starting from scratch, this strategy must dexterously play upon the current trends of multilateralism currently building in Northeast Asia. As each of the security threats mentioned above are beyond the United States' power to unilaterally alleviate, a multilateral security approach thus provides the most effective means of securing both our voice and interests in the region. The Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO), detailed in the policy prescription paper written by Alex Cutler, exemplifies this multilateral approach by institutionalizing and expanding the Six Party Talks as a framework for comprehensively addressing the integrally linked security challenges of East Asia. Provisions for this security organization also include a "special projects" branch or efforts whereupon members would actively collaborate to address uniquely explicit regional challenges. NEASCO thus represents a capable means for the U.S. to comprehensively address the numerous security challenges arising from a changing Northeast Asian region.

This analysis will therefore illustrate how a security organization such as NEASCO would relate to China, drawing upon the notion that a key purpose for initiating such an

organization would be to more capably address the growing preeminence of China as a regional power, as well as the critical role it plays in nearly every security challenge we face in East Asia. The first half of this paper will address two critical, recent domestic developments within China (its multilateralism campaign and its military modernization effort) and the corresponding capacity of NEASCO to balance these challenges. The second half of this paper will address two key regional challenges threatening the U.S. (i.e. cyber security threats and the North Korean nuclear crisis) and the strategic utility of engaging China cooperatively to address these issues through the “special projects” provision of NEASCO. Please note that the Taiwan issue, although existing as a major point of contention between the U.S. and China, will not be addressed here in the context of NEASCO due to the issue’s strictly bilateral nature, as well as the fact that resolving this issue is largely contingent upon internal U.S. government issues surrounding the continued existence of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

China in 2010: Multilaterally Engaged and Militarily Powerful

The China of 2010 is no longer the insecure and indecisive giant that it was only a few decades ago. It now possesses both a powerful diplomatic voice and a concrete strategic agenda from which it is uneasily swayed. Consequently, in attempting to engage China in a multilateral security organization like NEASCO, it will be of principal importance to sell the idea to Beijing in a way that highlights the potential for mutual security gains, rather than simply another way to control China. Dr. Ying Ma of the Hoover institution explains that the Chinese “increasingly view America today as a bully who habitually badgers their pride, belittles their accomplishments, transgresses their national sovereignty, and attempts to thwart the rise of their country’s international influence. Perceived American self-righteousness, arrogance,

'obsession' with liberty and democracy, and most of all, missionary zeal to change China's communist regime have served to fan sentiments that range from indignation to rage".⁸²

Steadily proliferating on the popular level since 1989, this general anti-American sentiment is imperative to keep in mind as the United States formulates actions for approaching China on a cooperative security level. It will be crucial to highlight the potential for solving common Sino-U.S. problems such as the North Korean nuclear threat, a regional arms race invoked by proliferation, and common cyber security threats in order to induce the Chinese to participate in an organization that they could easily deem as an attempt of U.S. containment.

Despite this sensitive factor, there are still major incentives and opportunities for the U.S. to engage China through a multilateral security organization like NEASCO. The two primary motives for this coming from Beijing include China's new soft power multilateralism campaign and its hard power military modernization effort. The following two sections will illuminate the implications of each of these developments in turn and analyze the utility of NEASCO for handling them for the benefit of U.S. interests.

China's New Multilateralism

The rise of China economically and the country's new emphasis on multilateralism has dramatically altered the balance of power in East Asia and the influence of the U.S. in the region. Over the past few decades, China has undergone a drastic transformation both domestically and internationally, and its role in East Asia has done a 180 turn as China has gone from an insecure recluse to a stronger and more responsible global power. As Singaporean diplomat Lee Kwan Yew famously stated, *"the U.S. may dominate the balance of power in East Asia, but not the*

⁸² Ying, Ma . "China's America Problem." Hoover Institution- Policy Review, Feb. 2002. 14 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3461921.html>>.

balance of influence.”⁸³ China is not the same country it was ten years ago, and it’s important for the U.S. to recognize this as it attempts to maintain and strengthen its own influence in the region.

In the past, China’s regional posture was characterized by suspicion and hostility, sparse diplomatic relations, and a myriad of border disputes. In the early decades of the Chinese Communist Party, the government was extremely suspicious of multilateral organizations and saw them both as power constraining mechanisms and avenues through which the U.S. could attempt to control it. Thus, rather than cooperatively engaging other regional powers, the Chinese government attempted to export Maoist ideology, mainly through supporting armed insurgencies and by mobilizing fifth columns among overseas Chinese communities in attempts to destabilize Southeast Asian governments. This reclusive yet interventionist attitude is exemplified by the fact that just over a decade ago China did not enjoy full diplomatic relations with Indonesia, Singapore, or South Korea, and relations with Vietnam and India were hostile and their borders militarized over a slew of territorial disputes.⁸⁴ Even beyond East Asia, China was internationally ostracized as a result of the killing of civilians in Beijing in June 1989.

Despite these past tendencies, in the last decade we have seen the striking results of China’s gradual reform and opening policies. Today, China is exemplified by rapid growth of economic, military and political power (yet does not in any way purposefully threaten any other country in East Asia), a distinct diplomatic voice as it aims to be a responsible global power, and most importantly, it possesses a new and intense focus on multilateralism. As Cui Tiankai, director general of Asian affairs in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflected, *“It was a gradual learning process for us, as we needed to become more familiar with how these*

⁸³Shambaugh, David L. "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order ." International Security. 2004. 14 Feb. 2010. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v029/29.3shambaugh.html>.

⁸⁴ Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order”.

organizations worked and to learn how to play the game."⁸⁵ Whereas not too long ago China refused to participate in any multilateral organizations, the prosperity of China's economy has inspired it to take a new regional stand. Beginning in the 1990s, China has steadily immersed itself within a slew of multilateral agencies including ASEAN + 3 (ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea); the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; the Pacific Basin Economic Council; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group; the Asia-Europe Meeting; the Forum for East Asia Latin America Cooperation Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific; the Northeast Asia Security Cooperation Dialogue; the Shangri-la Dialogue; and the Boao Forum. The sheer multitude of these organizations are evidence of the change going on in East Asia, and China's participation in these multilateral agencies is only serving to further accelerate the process.

A major challenge that China's multilateralism campaign poses to the United States is the greatly increased competition the U.S. now faces to maintain its influence in the region. The growth of Chinese economic and diplomatic power corresponds to a trend of slowly eclipsing U.S. sway and authority in the region as more and more countries and companies are forced to prioritize the interests of China over the United States due to the increasing strategic vitality of their trade relations with China and its growing economy. Powerful political figures throughout East Asia now largely sing the praises of China's new regional posture: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of Indonesia, stated that "*a prosperous, active and dynamic China is good for the stability of the region.*"⁸⁶ On a similar note, commenting on the tremendous amount of aid China offers to developing countries in the region, Bouasone Bouphavanh, Prime Minister of Laos, asserted that "*the Lao people are grateful for China's supports for the nation's economic*

⁸⁵ Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order".

⁸⁶ "Indonesia-China Joint Statement." Embassy of Indonesia, 2 Aug. 2005. 14 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/information/details.php?type=speech&id=52>>.

and social development."⁸⁷ The tenor of these political voices give strong evidence to why the U.S. cannot simply rest upon the status quo of its traditional "hub and spokes" model of engagement in East Asia which is currently characterized by one-directional, bilateral alliances. While the United States should not work to directly counter China's rising influence (which would undoubtedly provoke unnecessary and debilitating Sino-U.S. hostility), it must seek to secure a strong economic and security presence in the region that directly mirrors and complements China's spider web approach of multiple and interlinking relationships. NEASCO is one avenue through which the United States can work to secure a *security* voice and presence in the region, while U.S. *economic* interests and relationships could perhaps be best served through deepening and expanding the activities of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC). In any case, China's multilateralism campaign show no signs of slowing down, and thus the United States must subsequently seek new multilateral avenues to assure that it is not isolated and overcome in the region.

China's Military Modernization

Having already accomplished over a century of development within a mere two and half decades, the Chinese economy continues to grow. A key beneficiary of this extraordinary economic boom has been the People's Liberation Army and its supporting domestic defense industrial complex (DIC). The expansion of the Chinese economy has allowed the country to stray from the traditional guns or butter budget curve by giving it the leeway to both nurture its domestic economic infrastructure and largely increase its defense spending. In a historically unique feat, China's official defense budget allocation for military equipment grew from 5

⁸⁷ "Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing Meets with Lao Deputy Prime Minister ." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 27 Apr. 2004. <<http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2686/2688/t94434.htm>>.

billion RMB in 1990 to 64.8 billion RMB in 2003.⁸⁸ According to a recent RAND Project Air Force study, China's defense industrial growth is currently on a trajectory that could potentially allow it to become a viable U.S. military rival by 2020.⁸⁹ Aside from the obvious challenge this presents to the United States, China's military modernization effort also presents several other risks including weapons proliferation through the privatization of its DIC, an increased capacity for exploiting the United States' vulnerabilities in the cyber security realm, and the prospect that China could eventually choose to align with more traditional partners such as Iran and North Korea once it becomes powerful enough to make such unilateral decisions. Given these realities, the benefits that NEASCO could provide for Sino-U.S. security relations include the potential to increase military trust and transparency, to establish cyber security agreements and standards of operation, to construct joint Sino-U.S. naval diplomacy efforts, and to help ensure that China's strategic security goals remain in congruence with those of the U.S. and other NATO powers through close, maintained cooperation.

In coming to understand the unique nature of the threat of China's military modernization effort, it is first important to thoroughly understand the changing nature of China's DIC from a centralized, state controlled branch to a more loosely governed, privatized (and thus less secure) web of corporation-like entities. These profound changes have come at the hands of free market reforms that began in 1979 with the death of Mao Zedong and the institution of Deng Xiaoping, steadily and progressively continuing to this day. In recent years, these economic reforms have resulted in a substantial expansion of the role of China's "private sector" in economic activity,

⁸⁸ Medeiros, Evan S. *A new direction for China's defense industry*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 2005. Pg. xvi

⁸⁹ Cliff, Roger *The Military Potential of China's Commercial Technology*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 2001.

and this is largely evident in the domain of China's new private defense enterprises. Chinese policymakers have recently adopted several policies intended to make defense enterprise operations more efficient and raise research, development and production capabilities. Their main goals have been to separate the government administrative units from enterprise operations, make defense enterprises more sensitive to market forces by exposing them to competitive pressures, introduce new mechanisms for quality assurance and quality control, and make enterprises less reliant on state subsidies.⁹⁰ Essentially, China's defense industrial complex (which for the past few decades has been fundamentally based on 1950s Soviet era technology) is entirely renewing and reorienting itself towards facilitating a new and improved direction for the Chinese military. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, China is focusing its weapons acquisitions programs, adjusting its doctrine, and instituting systemic reforms on three fronts: *Organizationally*, it's shifting from a traditionally ground forces-centric military to one that gives increased emphasis to naval and air forces. *Operationally*, it's transforming from a military historically postured to fight long wars of attrition on the mainland to a military that is capable of defending Chinese interests offshore or farther out at sea in short high-intensity maritime and aerospace joint campaigns. *Technologically*, it's retooling from a military that previously relied on large numbers of forces (personnel and units) to a military that is leaner in numbers but that fights with state-of-the-art capabilities.⁹¹ These three fronts form the scaffolding upon which China's defense enterprise reforms are now working to build upon.

The United States' major concern regarding this expansion lies in doubts over the government's ability to control the exports of rapidly growing and multiplying Chinese defense

⁹⁰ Medeiros, Evan S. *A new direction for China's defense industry*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 2005.

⁹¹ *National Geographic atlas of China*. Washington, DC: National Geographic Books. 2007.

enterprises. As a result of the historically unique rapidity of China's economic growth, today the government struggles to concurrently adapt quickly enough to deal with such internal expansion, thus leading to concerns over whether it has the ability to adequately enforce the many new non-proliferation commitments it has recently taken on. China's legal system remains poorly developed relative to Western standards and its private sector is still in its infancy in regards to infrastructure stability and system efficiency. Thus, while the Chinese government may have sincere and positive intentions in jumping on the world's non-proliferation bandwagon, its capacity to monitor exports and effectively enforce the regulations it has agreed to abide by appears to be limited at best. For instance, the George W. Bush administration imposed sanctions on private Chinese firms for transfers related to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and cruise missiles to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries on fifteen occasions between 2001 and 2005.⁹² This problem of "third-party proliferation", or the process in which exports are illegally transferred from their intended destinations to other locations, is a severe concern surrounding China's privatized DIC. For example, in July 2006 Hezbollah fighters in Beirut fired an Iranian made C-802 anti-ship cruise missile, destroying an Israeli naval corvette. It was eventually discovered that C-802 missiles were shipped in large quantities to Iran by China in the mid 1990s, and Iran subsequently developed its own version designated the Noor, possibly with Chinese assistance. This is just one illustration of how monitoring incapacity can have far-reaching consequences for non-proliferation objectives and broader international security conflicts. Another example of even greater alarm involves the immense level of trade between Chinese and Pakistani defense companies that draws much concern due to the political volatility and radical infiltration of Pakistan's government. As Pakistan was in large part armed with

⁹² Sutter, Robert G. *Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 2008. Pg. 141

nuclear weapons through Chinese assistance, there is concern that the growth of this largely unregulated relationship could easily lead to dangerous weapons falling into the hands of Pakistan's many extremists which target the United States.⁹³ Today, the Chinese government is doing its best to walk a fine line between sustaining its old and deep-rooted alliances with countries of proliferation concern such as Iran and Pakistan with balancing U.S. assertion for stricter non-proliferation and export controls. Therefore, as the global security environment moves steadily from being primarily characterized by U.S. hegemony to an increasingly multipolar international system, there is a notable risk that China could revert to these old, preferred alliances to the immense detriment of U.S. security interests.

A related and perhaps even more daunting concern involves China's willingness to comply with Western interests as its defense capability continues to escalate. While China has made a valiant effort to demonstrate its cooperative stance in the international community in subjecting itself to and even advocating on the behalf of certain non-proliferation and arms control efforts, its record also shows a significant level of reluctance to embrace many of these norms in their entirety. For instance, Chinese foreign policy expert Robert Sutter explains that Chinese leaders are loath to restrict China's own national defense programs, and they appear to weigh carefully the pros and cons of restrictions on Chinese weapons and weapons technology transfers abroad, leading to a slew of ambiguities and loopholes in their commitments that are often criticized by the United States and others.⁹⁴ These reasons precisely indicate why China has not yet fully complied with many existing nonproliferation and arms control efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, despite the fact that the government loudly preaches for global disarmament.

⁹³ Busch, Nathan E. *Combating weapons of mass destruction: the future of international nonproliferation policy*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2009. pg. 258

⁹⁴ Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pg. 142

While the country hopes to reassure the international community, especially the United States, of its peaceful rise, it still certainly doesn't want to tie its own hands in any way that will inhibit the economic development of its defense industrial complex anytime soon. This essential hesitance of China's arms control compliance posture combined with the government's present inability to regulate its domestic defense enterprises is a potentially dangerous combination that should call for close international scrutiny as China's expanding defense industry continues to push and test its boundaries.

Given this characterization of China's military modernization efforts, avenues for positive U.S. engagement through a multilateral security organization such as NEASCO become largely evident. Regarding export controls, Beijing will need assistance to more fully implement and enforce its own export control laws, including more effective dissemination of nonproliferation information among its domestic producers and building a greater nonproliferation "norm" or "culture", as well as guidance for investing greater financial resources for personnel training, monitoring, and interdiction.⁹⁵ NEASCO and its 'Arms Control' forum is an ideal environment for helping to cooperatively establish such norms in China as well as other potential NEASCO members such as Russia and North Korea. In this regard, members of NEASCO could work from the platform of UN Resolution 1540, the first ever piece of international legislation that imposes binding obligations on all states to establish domestic export controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery, and dual-use components.⁹⁶ While the measure is a vitally significant step for securing the international defense and nuclear energy market, its provisions for what constitutes a legitimate domestic

⁹⁵ Busch, Nathan E. pg. 257

⁹⁶ "Resolution 1540 (2004)." United Nations Security Council. 28 Apr 2004. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed Feb 14, 2010).

export control system is very vague and the overall resolution has no significant enforcement mechanism. NEASCO could thus play a key role in helping to define and more broadly implement such controls in the interests of promoting greater regional stability in the interest of all participating parties. In this way, the proliferation risks posed by China's military modernization efforts could be largely mitigated through the close cooperation facilitated by NEASCO.

Other avenues for the U.S. to beneficially engage China through NEASCO include cooperation through the 'Military Exercises' forum, primarily through naval cooperation efforts with the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). In an attempt to portray its military modernization effort as peaceful and beneficial for the international community, China is engaging a full throttle campaign of naval diplomacy to complement its growing capability in this sector. This includes donations of naval equipment to win international goodwill, the construction and deployment of the largest hospital ship in the world for humanitarian aid efforts, and increased anti-piracy operations. For instance, medium and small vessels have been donated to Bolivia, Mauritania, Tanzania, Burma, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone; and China has repaired or built naval bases, constructed barracks, storage facilities, and military hospitals, and donated communication equipment, diving equipment, and cartographic materials to 34 countries around the world. Regarding its hospital ship, on October 2008, the Chinese Navy inaugurated Hospital Ship 866, a 10,000 ton vessel that is considered the largest hospital ship ever built by any country. It will be based in Qingdao and could become a major tool in Chinese diplomacy. Following the example of the U.S. Navy hospital ship USNS Mercy, which has conducted several humanitarian missions, the PLAN hopes to use its ship to conduct humanitarian operations and gain positive international recognition. Regarding anti-piracy operations, PLAN

destroyers have escorted dozens of vessels off the coast of Somalia including Taiwanese, Japanese, and UN World Food Program cargo-carrying ships.⁹⁷ As these actions all largely complement efforts of the United States Navy, the ‘Military Exercises’ forum of the NEASCO could serve as an extremely useful coordinating tool for increasing joint naval diplomacy ventures between the United States and China. Such cooperation could overtime hopefully lead to greater trust and subsequent transparency between the PLA and the U.S. military.

NEASCO Special Projects

The “special projects” branch of NEASCO would serve as a useful forum to coordinate efforts toward mitigating distinctive regional security challenges that require more immediate action from NEASCO member countries. With regard to Sino-U.S. relations, two issues in particular stand out when considering the latent capability of increased cooperation between China and the United States for successfully solving them. These issues include regional cyber security threats and the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis. The following two sections will thus respectively scrutinize China’s involvement in each of these issues and analyze the potential of NEASCO’s special projects branch for facilitating coordinated Sino-U.S. efforts in creating multilateral solutions.

Special Project #1: Managing Domestic and Regional Cyber Security Threats

With multilateral policies and initiatives coming from both China and the United States, issues of cyber security must become a priority for the U.S. as its economy and information

⁹⁷ Horta, Loro. "China Takes to the Sea ." Pacific Forum CSIS. 18 Sep 2009.
www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/.../2009_09_18_China_Takes_to_the_Sea.pdf (accessed Feb 14, 2010).

systems become more deeply integrated with those of Northeast Asian countries. Major cyber security threats include espionage, identity theft, IPR theft, equipment sabotage or disruption, monetary theft, and attacking critical infrastructure. While the U.S. can do its best to identify ways in which it can preemptively act to protect itself as it more deeply engages East Asia, it cannot act effectively alone. International agreements, laws, standards, and even cultural norms must be established through multilateral cooperation, and NEASCO's "special projects" branch provides a useful and flexible means of facilitating such collaboration. In approaching the problems of cyber security, it is important to recognize that cyber attacks are unique in the sense that they are enabled not through the generation of force but by the exploitation of a system's vulnerabilities. Therefore, work in the NEASCO's cyber security special project task force would necessarily be oriented towards strengthening these weaknesses and establishing the capacity to more quickly and capably respond to these threats.

China faces unique cyber security concerns domestically and poses a severe threat to cyber infrastructure internationally due to the fact that China possesses the biggest population of hackers in the world as well as the widely dispersed nature of China's cyber hacking community. This hacking community is internationally distinctive in the way that it largely functions as an assembly line where each person does a specific job through a method known as "crowd sourcing". Rather than working for big individual payoffs as do the tightly-knit internet criminal gangs of Russia and the United States, hackers in China get paid piecemeal by selling their work within a larger community. For example, a programmer of malicious software usually assembles his program with lines of computer code he bought elsewhere. The programmer then makes customers out of others who pay to undertake the broader attack, spreading the malicious software, triggering it and sharing the payoff. "The chain business is uniquely Chinese," says a

Chinese security expert for a major U.S. technology company in Shanghai. Thus unlike other cyber crime initiatives around the world, hacker conspiracies in China are uniquely structured like multi-level sales networks and pyramid schemes. This method of hacker “crowd sourcing” makes the Chinese hacking community much more difficult to control, making sources of attacks much harder to pinpoint and making it nearly impossible for officials to ever fully cut off every avenue of a cyber attack.⁹⁸ These challenges inevitably characterize China as a potent cyber security threat where the United States’ only real hopes of building its defenses lie in coordinated multilateral efforts. Although tension currently exists between China and the U.S. over issues of internet censorship and human rights abuses as exemplified in the Google conflict, the Chinese government nevertheless appears amenable to international cooperation to increase comprehensive international cyber security. The Mission of China to the EU’s Deyi Gao said China was making efforts to prohibit cyber crime and was doing its best to ensure cyber security, however he said he still saw the need for international cooperation and collaboration.⁹⁹

This is where NEASCO could enter as the only currently available security forum to facilitate such cooperation. Actions in NEASCO’s cyber security special project could largely expand upon similar work already accomplished in the European Union. The EU recently created the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC), an agency that is largely helping to satisfy the need for standards and the search for government and industry best practices for cyberspace in Europe. Actions by the NEASCO cyber security task force would similarly be geared toward speeding up the response capability of systems, personnel, and

⁹⁸ Areddy, James T. "People's Republic of Hacking." *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 Feb 2010, sec. Asia Technology <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704140104575057490343183782.html?KEYWORDS=people's+republic+of+hacking> (accessed Feb 19, 2010).

⁹⁹ Chapman, John. "Assessing the Cyber Security Threat." Security and Defence Agenda. 2008. http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Portals/7/Reports/2008/SoD_110208_cyber.pdf (accessed Feb 19, 2010).

processes in the defense against cyber attacks. Furthermore, NEASCO would work to create an effective multilateral cyber security authority which would be developed to manage cyber defense capabilities and facilitate capable first responders to an attack.¹⁰⁰ For instance, a regionally-unified and widespread cyber defense authority under the auspices of NEASCO could help to police a large and growing array of chat rooms that currently serve as indoctrination and training grounds for new hackers. Li-Jun, a 27 year old Chinese hacker recently jailed and released for the infamous Panda Burns Incense computer worm, reported that like most Chinese hackers, he was nurtured inside an active network of online chat rooms where technology break-ins are plotted. These largely unregulated Chinese forums have been described as “*a cyber underworld where the locks on technological secrets that power online games, bank Websites and Apple Inc.'s iPhone undergo brutal stress tests from the world's largest Internet population.*”¹⁰¹ Such a widely dispersed and elusive threat can only be mitigated through a regionally coordinated cyber security effort in East Asia that draws upon the intelligence capabilities of all NEASCO members and its partners.

Thus far, cyber security has only been addressed with regard to interactions between governments and companies or individuals. When we consider cyber security threats and issues on the government to government level, the playing field becomes infinitely more complicated. The United States intelligence community already has strong evidence of numerous Russian and Chinese attempts to infiltrate the United States' electrical infrastructure, and some of these attempts have been somewhat successful. These Russian and Chinese ‘cyber spies’, most likely acting on behalf of their governments, have planted and deeply buried software tools within the

¹⁰⁰ Chapman, John. "Assessing the Cyber Security Threat."

¹⁰¹ Areddy, James T. "People's Republic of Hacking."

computer systems controlling the U.S. power grid. In the event of a conflict with either of these countries, these software tools could potentially allow Russia or China to gain remote access of the U.S. electrical system and allow them to turn key components on or off, or otherwise manipulate the system in ways that could be extremely detrimental for day to day operations in the U.S., let alone the damage it could do to U.S. national defenses. Although the actions of these cyber spies do not pose an immediate threat and are most likely evidence of “contingency planning” by Russia and China in case of future conflict with the U.S., the U.S. is nevertheless deeply concerned about the vulnerabilities of its critical infrastructure such as electrical power to foreign cyber attacks.¹⁰² Due to the fact that these same domestic infrastructure vulnerabilities are likely faced by other Northeast Asian countries as well, the NEASCO cyber security special project could also serve as a useful forum for crafting international agreements to refrain from exploiting one another’s cyber security weaknesses. These agreements would be based on the premises that closer information system integration is mutually beneficial for the increased economic relations and interdependencies desired by all countries, and that exploiting one another’s critical infrastructure vulnerabilities only serves to inhibit this cooperation. In brief, NEASCO’s cyber security special project would serve to establish international cyber security norms and help to facilitate inter-government agreements and trust in increasing the comprehensive strength of regional cyber security as a platform for continued regional economic growth, integration, and prosperity.

Special Project #2: North Korean Nuclear Disarmament

¹⁰² "U.S. Intelligence Detects Cyber Spies." *Wall Street Journal*, 8 Apr 2009, http://online.wsj.com/video-center?mod=WSJ_formfactor (accessed Feb 19, 2010).

Up until now, China has played a reticent role in the Six Party Talks. Beijing has attempted to keep North Korea in the negotiations while simultaneously trying to preserve a positive relationship with Kim Jong-Il's ruling regime whose stability is regarded as crucial for China's security interests. As a result of this conflict of interests, China has spent many years carefully prioritizing the preservation of Kim's regime over the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, after the events of 2009, the North Korean nuclear situation has reached a new level of criticality which will demand strategic reevaluation from Beijing. Despite years of grueling negotiations through the Six Party Talks, in April 2009, North Korea sent a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile sailing directly over Japan. One month later, North Korea successfully conducted its second nuclear test as it detonated a four kiloton nuclear warhead in its northeastern region. The six parties are now at a standstill as they are forced to fundamentally re-strategize their approach to this critical international security threat. Due largely to the lack of success of the current Six Party Talks framework, it is argued here that the North Korean nuclear crisis can be more effectively mitigated if the problem is addressed as a special project within the context of NEASCO and the organization's greater regional security efforts. Reorienting multilateral efforts surrounding the North Korean nuclear threat to be designated as a special project within NEASCO would accomplish several objectives which the Six Party Talks are currently incapable of addressing. These two main objectives include (1) addressing the greater regional security challenges which have incited North Korea to develop a nuclear arsenal through the utilization of NEASCO's larger security forums, and (2) allowing for closer cooperation between China and the United States as Beijing considers taking a firmer hand with North Korea.

Regarding the first objective, it is argued here that a main reason for the Six Party Talks failure to reach a solution after years of continuous efforts is due to the fact that the process has largely ignored the surrounding regional security issues that have led North Korea to seek security through nuclear arms in the first place. These security threats from the North Korean perspective include the lack of a peace treaty and continued state of war on the Korean peninsula, the highly hostile posture of forces on the Korean peninsula's demilitarized zone since the 1950s, and expanding discourses involving the buildup of missile defenses in Japan and South Korea through U.S. assistance. Each of these aspects have caused North Korea to continue to feel deeply threatened by other regional powers when in reality, war with North Korea is truly in no country's best interests. However, instead of seeking veritable peace on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War ended in 1953, regional powers have allowed an unstable status quo to fester for decades and the situation has, of course, resulted in North Korea seeking and acquiring the most dangerous weapons in existence to compensate for its military deficiencies. It is therefore evident that until these security issues contributing to North Korea's sense of vulnerability are sufficiently dealt with, regional powers will continue to make little progress in successfully disarming the North Korean regime. Addressing this problem within the context of NEASCO would allow for the simultaneous mitigation of both the nuclear issue as well as issues of a peace treaty and regional missile defense. In this manner, the North Korean nuclear issue can be alleviated more comprehensively and thus more effectively.

Regarding the second objective of closer Sino-U.S. cooperation on handling North Korea, it has become clear that the events of 2009 are leading to a serious altering of China and the U.S.'s respective roles as simply "good cop" and "bad cop". China could be gearing up to take a more assertive posture with North Korea due to the destabilizing regional ramifications that its most

recent missile and nuclear test have instigated. Both NEASCO's larger security communication forums and a North Korean special project have the potential to greatly increase Sino-U.S. cooperation and compel China to take a firmer hand with North Korea as the U.S. has called for many times in the past. China's incentives for pursuing this course of action fall into three main risk areas including the rearming of Japan and South Korea in response to the increased threat posed by North Korea, increased U.S. presence in the East Asian region as it attempts to thwart aggressive North Korean activity, and possible illicit transfers of nuclear material from North Korea to other countries or radical organizations, causing further regional instability. Despite its historical hesitancy to take harsher actions against the North Korean regime, these incentives will likely push China to take a more assertive position with North Korea in the near future as it first attempts to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. As China's burgeoning economy continues to swell, it seeks at all costs to preserve a stable East Asian region as a necessary platform for continuing its successful growth. North Korea's renewed hostility severely threatens this stability as it begins to catalyze the growth of other East Asian military defenses and a renewed U.S. offensive. If China wishes to preserve and strengthen the current East Asian security status quo, it will begin to play the cards that it alone holds. The closer cooperation and greater level of trust that NEASCO would promote between the United States and China would greatly contribute to closer Sino-U.S. cooperation and thus a greater chance of successfully solving the nuclear issue through NEASCO's North Korean special project.

Conclusion

In brief, both NEASCO's security cooperation forums and its special projects branch hold vast potential for facilitating greater Sino-U.S. cooperation in alleviating Northeast Asia's

most pressing security concerns. However, the actualization of this potential is heavily contingent upon the United States' ability to successfully sell the concept of NEASCO to Beijing in a way that highlights security opportunities for China. As Beijing is likely to initially view NEASCO suspiciously as a tool of U.S. containment policy, the United States must clearly communicate the potential of the organization to effectively mitigate issues of a regional arms race, the North Korean nuclear threat, and mutual cyber security threats, all issues of great concern to the Chinese government.


As China continues along a trajectory of becoming a center of gravity in East Asia, rather than working to counter or reverse this process, the U.S. would be best enabled by seeking new avenues for multilateral cooperation through a mechanism such as NEASCO in order to guarantee the longevity of its economic and security interest in the region. Here in 2010 at the emergence of a new decade and an even more politically and militarily powerful China, Sino-U.S. security relations face equal potential of cooperative convergence or injurious divergence. NEASCO will not only help to ensure closer and more collaborative Sino-U.S. relations, but through a multifaceted and versatile approach, it will help to achieve a more stable, transparent, and comprehensively secure Northeast Asian region in 2020.

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It is now social science dogma that “any discussion of the future must begin with a discussion of China.”¹⁰³ The United States has played a unique role in facilitating the People’s Republic of China’s opening and rise. Given the extent of current Sino-U.S. interdependence, China occupies an especially important role in the future of U.S. foreign policy.

Regardless of what develops in China over the coming decade and beyond, the outcome will have serious implications for the United States and its allies. How Washington engages with and responds to developments in the region will be critical to ensuring outcomes favorable to U.S. interests. Just as China’s future carries implications for the region, Beijing’s constructive involvement will be critical to shaping the new economic and security landscape sought by the United States for East Asia. Standing in the way of this new order are several longstanding, and as yet unresolved problems: the Taiwan issue, the legacy of Sino-Japanese antagonisms and distrust and the nuclear crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Before the Obama Administration can look to a new order in Northeast Asia and the greater Asia-Pacific region, near term challenges must be addressed. Thus, over the period 2010-2020, the United States must work to engage China in addressing these crises, continue to promote multilateral cooperation, and hedge against the uncertainties of a rising China.

After briefly surveying the general tenor of US-China relations in 2010, this paper explores the options for the U.S. policy towards China over the coming decade in the context of broader Northeast Asian policy priorities. The first part examines the history of U.S.-China relations in two critical areas, the Taiwan issue and U.S. security posture towards China, and the impact of these realities on the potential for a new multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia. Currently an unpredictable mix of engagement, hedging, and containment, U.S. security

¹⁰³ George Friedman. *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century*. New York: Anchor Books, 2009, 88.

posture towards China is in need of strategic direction. In the second part of this paper, China's foreign policy in the 21st century is examined by tracing the roots of China's new multilateralism back to U.S. initiatives to engage China from the 1980s and exploring the challenges China could pose to U.S. security in Northeast Asia over the coming decade. The final section of the paper examines two common challenges facing China and the U.S., the North Korean nuclear crisis and global disarmament, as well as explores options for solving these challenges in the framework of the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative.

Rather than a set of rigid goals to be achieved by implementing rigorous policy initiatives, this paper prescribes the necessary trajectory the United States must set itself on regarding its relations with the People's Republic of China. The goal is to optimize the chances of not only reaching U.S. near term goals for the region but also increasing the ability of Washington to recognize and seize upon opportunities to make long term progress and usher in positive changes. 2020 will not bring Fukuyama's end of history, or even the end of U.S. foreign policy in Asia, any more than did the end of the Cold War. The best that U.S. policy makers may hope for by 2020 is a regional context in Northeast Asia favorable to the pursuit of U.S. interests and ongoing U.S. involvement and leadership.

The Taiwan Issue

Beijing's perspective on the Taiwan issue and the PLA's military modernization

The significance of the Taiwan issue in the long-term outlook of Beijing's strategic policy makers cannot be overstated. Aside from the complex psychological significance of Taiwan as an integral part of a unified China, contemporary policy in Beijing concerning the island has developed an internal momentum that operates to a large degree independent from the

broader security context facing the PRC.¹⁰⁴ A war between the United States and the PRC over Taiwan is, as Ashton Carter, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, described in a 2005 congressional hearing, what the PLA “wakes-up every morning thinking about.”¹⁰⁵ Lewis and Xue refer to this perceived threat as “the PLA’s recurrent nightmare.”¹⁰⁶

According to the 1993 Chinese white paper on the Taiwan issue, “the Chinese Government is firmly against any words or deeds designed to split China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.”¹⁰⁷ Beijing opposes “two Chinas”, “one China, one Taiwan”, “one country, two governments” or any attempt or act that could lead to independence of Taiwan. Despite a declaration in the white paper that “peaceful reunification is a set policy of the Chinese Government,” Beijing also maintains the sovereign entitlement to use “any means it deems necessary” to prevent self-determination for Taiwan.¹⁰⁸

Over the past two decades, this rationale has led the PLA to begin developing options to “meet contingencies”¹⁰⁹ in the event of conflict across the Taiwan straits. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield in 1991, the PLA “drew lessons from U.S. combat experience, attributing the strengths and weaknesses they discerned in U.S. forces to their future adversary. Transference made the emerging hegemon China’s potential enemy.”¹¹⁰ It is out of this ominous tautology that the PLA has begun to “hone joint-operation doctrine, test these in

¹⁰⁴ John W. Lewis and Xue Litai. *Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006, 252.

¹⁰⁵ *China's proliferation practices and role in the North Korea crisis : hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, March 10, 2005*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2005.

¹⁰⁶ Lewis and Xue, “Imagined,” 252.

¹⁰⁷ Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office State Council of the PRC. “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China.” White Paper, Beijing, 1993.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ S. Mahmud Ali. *U.S.-China Relations in the "Asia-Pacific" Century*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, 13.

¹¹⁰ Ali, 12.

increasingly complex exercises, and modernize by integrating newly imported and indigenous weapons systems.”¹¹¹

In 2005, the PRC passed the anti-succession law. This new law formalized Beijing’s longstanding “one-China” policy, mandating the PLA’s use of “non-peaceful means” to prevent a shift in the status quo leading to Taiwan’s independence. Passage of the bill met criticism in Taiwan, Washington, and elsewhere in the international community for allegedly creating ambiguity as to whether Beijing intended to signal a shift in policy on the Taiwan issue.¹¹²

Taiwan’s Role in the U.S. Security Architecture

On the U.S. side, attachment to Taiwan goes far beyond the Cold War doctrine of containment and Congress’s attachment to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. For the Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department, and the Department of Commerce, increased tensions across the Taiwan Straits have the potential to trigger a breakdown in stability across Northeast Asia. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the logic in Washington of maintaining strong ties with autocratic regimes on the grounds that they opposed Communism disappeared. Instead, the Clinton Administration turned its attention to the promotion of democracy and the strengthening of democratic alliances. U.S.-Taiwan relations developed a deeper ideological dimension with Taiwan’s opening to the democratic process from the mid-1990s.

For the Department of Defense, Taiwan represents an important link in the US defense perimeter in East Asia. U.S. nuclear armed submarines patrol the waters along the ‘first island chain’ running from Japan in the north to the Philippines at the southern tip of East Asia. Currently, access to these waters removes the need for stationing land-based nuclear weapons on the territories of U.S. allies in the region. In the event of reunification of Taiwan with the

¹¹¹ Ibid, 13.

¹¹² Peter Kammerer. “War Laws.” *South China Morning Post*, March 14, 2005.

mainland, these waters could shift to Chinese control, not only providing the mainland with a forward base for power projection beyond continental Asia, but also effectively pushing U.S. naval forces as far East as the 'second island chain' on Guam. China is already moving towards the operational capacity to control these waters with its development of a blue-water navy.

Perhaps the largest factor driving both Beijing and Washington's tacit decision to leave the Taiwan issue aside indefinitely is the uncertainty that would accompany even the most benign attempts to shift the status quo. This reality was succinctly captured by then Assistant Secretary Defense Joseph Nye's response when asked how America would respond if the PLA attacked Taiwan. He said simply, "nobody knows."¹¹³

Given recent developments and the recognition in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington that any disruption in the status quo could have potentially grave consequences, the Taiwan issue is unlikely to threaten Northeast Asian stability in the coming decade. The return to power of the KMT has allowed for a level of engagement between Taiwan and the mainland not seen in a decade, perhaps even since the CCP's takeover of the mainland in 1949. Leaders on both sides of the strait have agreed to return to the 1992 'agree to disagree' framework, meaning that the issue of Taiwan's future will be sidelined indefinitely with both sides adhering to the officially-unofficial status quo.¹¹⁴ The development of a new, more stable security paradigm in Northeast Asia requires a long-term solution to the Taiwan issue that respects the divergent evolutions of the PRC and the ROC and avoids the outbreak of war. However, with the current U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle a byproduct of the Korean War, the North Korean nuclear crisis and de jure state of war on the Korean Peninsula frustrate resolution of the Taiwan issue.

¹¹³ Ali, 38.

¹¹⁴ *China Post*. "KMT, CCP Talk as Equals." May 28, 2008.

U.S.-China Relations

U.S. Force Posture towards China: Hedging or Containment?

A strong foreign policy often requires states to hedge their bets, pursuing parallel policy tracks in tandem. Thus the United States engages China even as it continues to champion human rights and maintain extended security guarantees to allies throughout the Asia-Pacific into the new century. Likewise, China actively engages in economic trade and military trust building exercises with the United States while quietly opposing U.S. hegemony. However, over the past two decades, U.S.-China relations developed beyond these parallel, hedge-your-bets strategies into an unprecedented level of contradictory policy making. This is in part due to varying levels of compartmentalization within the national bureaucracies of both countries.¹¹⁵ Primarily, however, this has been due to a lack of overarching vision in U.S. policy.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, both China and the United States lost a huge portion of their incentive for engagement and cooperation in security affairs. Ironically, it was with the end of the Cold War that the Taiwan issue took on such a central role in U.S.-China relations. While U.S.-China relations in the economic realm have only grown since then, Washington's security posture over this period has been a haphazard and at times unpredictable combination of engagement, hedging, and containment, with the latter two directions often winning out in the security arena.

Despite various economic sanctions in the years following the 1989 Tianenmen incident, Washington continued to renew China's MFN status each year,¹¹⁶. In a speech at the American Univeristy in early 1993, President Clinton vowed the United States to contribute "to the

¹¹⁵ For more on this see: Kevin Pollpeter. *U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004. Michael D. Swaine. *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1998.

¹¹⁶ The PRC acceded to the WTO in 2002

astounding revitalization of the Chinese economy.”¹¹⁷ Yet, by the summer of that year Clinton also began articulating formulations for a “new Pacific community,” envisioned as a collective economic, security, and democratic partnership.¹¹⁸ One of Clinton’s first moves on this agenda was the convening of the Tripolar Forum for North Pacific Security with Japan and newly re-emergent Russia. Inclusion of the PRC in this forum was conspicuously absent and resulted in further distancing of Beijing from the United States on security matters.

In the years following Taiwan’s democratization and the third Taiwan Straits Crisis, U.S.-China relations slowly rebounded leading up to PRC President Jiang Zemin’s state visit to Washington in the fall of 1997. However, the following year, the Department of Defense released a force posture review, explicitly naming China for the first time. Then, with Beijing’s cooperation at the Conference on Disarmament finally emerging, Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, perceived by the PLA as an initiative to undercut China’s nuclear deterrent.

This pattern of engagement and containment continued under the Administration of George W. Bush. In the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 attacks on the United States, the PRC’s perspective on nonproliferation reached a new phase and Washington began collaborating with Beijing in the war on terrorism. Simultaneously, the Department of Defense released the first Nuclear Posture Review since 1994. In it, China was cited as one of seven countries “that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency” with nuclear weapons.

By President Bush’s second term, China had become the United States’ largest trade partner and “public” holder of federal debt. In this new era of economic interdependence, the coherence of U.S. policy towards China on security affairs continued to languish. Critics of the

¹¹⁷ Bill Clinton. “Address at the American University.” February 26, 1993.

¹¹⁸ Ali, 18.

2005 Bush-Singh Civilian nuclear agreement charge that the deal was little more than a thinly veiled initiative in the Bush Administration's ongoing efforts to contain China in East Asia.¹¹⁹ The United States also in 2005, declared for the first time in a joint U.S.-Japan security statement Taiwan as a common security concern.¹²⁰

The overall effect of this approach is debatable, some even asserting this approach an inevitable reality given the structure of the U.S. system.¹²¹¹²² With China's future trajectory as yet uncertain, an amount of hedging appears prudent. However, the haphazard combination described above betrays the lack of strategic direction in U.S. policy making toward China. At the least, U.S. policies that aim to hedge against or contain China should be intentional and must not run directly contrary to other specific U.S. goals for the region.

China's Foreign Policy

China's New Security Concept

As with any autocratic regime, the overarching priority shaping Beijing's policies is the maintenance of the Chinese Communist Party's hold on power. During the reign of Premier Mao Zedong, the PRC directed efforts towards revolutionary struggle and expected "an early war, a major war, and a nuclear war."¹²³ This meant in practice, international isolation and some of the most horrific acts of despotism of the 20th century. However, since the late 1970s, Beijing's security calculus has been formulated in terms of what Bates Gill calls the CCP's "grand bargain

¹¹⁹ Interestingly, both in the Bush Administration's declared objectives and the deal's specific provisions, the agreement bears striking resemblance to the one reached by President Reagan with the PRC in 1985. For further analysis of both agreements see (Tellis, *Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal* 2006, 7, 42) and (Qingshan 1992, 120-130).

¹²⁰ Ching Cheong, "U.S., Japan United on Taiwan." *The Straits Times*, February 20, 2005.

¹²¹ Henry Kissinger. *American Foreign Policy*. 1977.

¹²² Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble, . *Strategic Asia 2008-09: Challenges and Choices*. Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008, 49.

¹²³ Gill. *Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007, 3.

with the Chinese citizenry: economic gain for regime security.” Driven by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s 1982 “strategic verdict,” this “grand bargain” is rooted in premise that “the world is tending toward peace and development, the possibility of world war is remote, and China could expect a stable international environment in which it could carry out its much-needed domestic development.”¹²⁴

In the mid-1990s, China’s global and regional security diplomacy took another significant step forward as Beijing began recognizing the utility of a more proactive role in international institutions.¹²⁵ As part of an effort to reassure its neighbors, “in the early 2000s senior Chinese leaders and strategists began to speak of *Zhongguo de heping jueqi* (China’s peaceful rise). The formulation...expresses both a confidence and an acknowledgement that China is a rising power but also asserts that China’s emergence will not be disruptive.”¹²⁶

China’s Opening to Multilateralism

A large part of China’s new security concept now includes the adoption of a more proactive approach towards regional multilateralism. The United States has played a critical role in facilitating China’s new embrace of multilateralism. Washington has often made membership in multilateral organizations a prerequisite for Beijing in bilateral U.S.-China agreements— first in arms control and nonproliferation from the 1980s, then in free trade from the 1990s. Only after China developed the institutional capacity and began to perceive the need to assure its neighbor’s of its benign intentions did Beijing begin to take a proactive role in multilateralism at a regional level from the mid-1990s.

¹²⁴ Information Office of the State of the PRC. “China’s National Defense in 2000.” White Paper, Beijing, 2000.

¹²⁵ Gill, 1.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 6.

Over the past two and half decades, China “gradually transitioned from staunch opposition to participation in and advocacy of international nonproliferation and arms control efforts.”¹²⁷ Throughout the 1980s, Beijing remained deeply skeptical of arms control and the NPT. The primary, if not sole, factor in Beijing’s decision to sign up to such agreements during this era was desire to improve bilateral relations with the United States with an eye toward trade agreements and other favorable treatment. The PRC’s accession to the IAEA in 1984 and consequent decision to limit nuclear cooperation in many countries to safeguarded facilities arose as a response to U.S.-China deals providing the PRC with access to civilian nuclear technology. Still, Beijing continued to have a major stake in Pakistan and Pakistan’s national security, including assistance on strategic weapons development. In addition, the PRC’s massive poorly integrated bureaucracy made enforcement of restrictions difficult. None the less, these years set an important precedent in the linkage between Beijing’s nonproliferation pledges and the “overall tenor of U.S.-China relations.”¹²⁸ With the United States leading the formal movement to establish new security architecture for East Asia, and U.S.-China relations stronger than at any time since 1949, the prospects are high for Beijing’s constructive involvement.

As the PRC’s role in the political and economic landscape grew into the 1990s, there was a twofold impact on Beijing’s nonproliferation policies and practices. Beijing grew increasingly responsive through the decade to international pressure to halt nuclear and missile support for various uncouth regimes. Illegal transfers decreased or stopped entirely to Algeria, Syria, Libya, Brazil, Argentina and others. Beijing also began to view multilateral arms control regimes through the lens of its purported rise as “responsible great power.” The PRC’s shifting policy perspectives during an era of new leadership, the desire to be seen as responsible international

¹²⁷ Evan S. Medeiros. *Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-2004*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, 1.

¹²⁸ Medeiros, 246.

actor and to carve out a stable environment for growth played a decisive role in the decisions to sign on to the NPT in 1992, take a more active role in the CD soon after and accept limited nonproliferation norms more broadly. Other factors also continued to play a role during the 1990s. The desire to improve relations with the United States remained significant, particularly in the wake of Tiananmen in 1989. With China beginning to develop the foundations of a market economy, the economic incentives for nuclear exports weakened.

Beijing's adoption of multilateralism has been a direct response to an evolving security calculus. That is, these shifts represent an acknowledgment of the changing global security landscape and are congruous with the PRC's primary goal of fostering stability and maintaining regime security. China's embrace of certain multilateral organizations does not signal a wider belief in Beijing that multilateralism necessarily carries with it any intrinsic value. Beijing remains wary of organizations perceived as a threat to the PRC's sovereignty and security. Instead, the PRC's leadership has used multilateralism to pursue specific policy objectives and continues to weigh the costs of any proposal against the perceived benefits. Even in the context of U.S.-China bilateral relations, Beijing has been more apt to sign onto agreements supported by international norms.¹²⁹

The PRC also remains staunchly opposed to military-security alliances such as NATO and is unlikely to sign up for any such agreement. In the early 1990s, Beijing lambasted Clinton Administration overtures aimed at re-structuring the U.S. hub-and-spokes system in Asia. Beijing views multilateral international agreements as having the potential to foster international stability and peace while promoting internal order and economic growth. Thus, Beijing signed on to the NPT in the early 1990s and the WTO in the early 2000s. However, military-alliances and

¹²⁹ Thus, Beijing mix-track record in the area of missile-technology exports. For more information see Medeiros, Evan S. 2007. *Reluctant restraint: the evolution of China's nonproliferation policies and practices, 1980-2004*. Studies in Asian security. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, pages 97-174.

collective security organizations are seen as threatening and destabilizing.¹³⁰ This perception dates back to the Cold War, when Beijing preferred opportunistic partnerships to long term alliances, repeatedly shifting engagement between the Soviet Union and the United States to maximize regime security. Beijing opposes the zero-sum competition characteristic of traditional alliance systems and would staunchly oppose the possible bifurcation of the region in the event the United States attempts to reorient the hub-and-spokes system towards a sort of ‘NATO for East Asia.’

However, a multilateral framework that addresses issues of mutual concern, fosters continued stability across the region, and recognizes China’s growing international status will be readily embraced by PRC leadership. Thus, there remains significant room for optimism. From the mid-1990s, Beijing began making “high-profile appeals”¹³¹ for multilateralism. According to the PRC’s 1995 white paper on arms control and nonproliferation, it is China’s desire to “establish a new mutual respect and friendly relationship between nations.” To that end, all nations should “spare no effort to establish a new peaceful, stable, fair, and reasonable international political and economic order.”¹³² Regional security mechanisms and confidence-building measures such as the SCO and the ARF are now viewed in Beijing as fundamentally different from traditional alliances.¹³³ In the new century, the notion of a ‘peaceful rise’ has provided the PRC with a degree of international recognition, stability, and economic prosperity unprecedented in its post-War history. The desire to maintain and further these developments in the new century will surely inform Beijing’s future actions in the area of multilateral engagement.

¹³¹ Gill, 5.

¹³² Information Office of the State Council of the PRC. “China: Arms Control and Disarmament.” White Paper, Beijing, 1995.

¹³³ Gill, 8.

Challenges Facing the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative

Sino-Japanese Tensions

As with Sino-U.S. relations, there exists between China and Japan an unsettling dichotomy between growing economic interdependence and languishing security. Cooperation between China and Japan has not been matched by a concurrent easing of mutual mistrust or resolution of historical disputes. The combination of Japan's unwillingness to face historical truths regarding their imperial past, opposition to Korean unification, more assertive military posture,¹³⁴ and unresolved territorial disputes have fueled a deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations in the security arena over the last decade.¹³⁵ The fact that Sino-Japanese differences stem from historical legacies and are not rooted in current direct confrontations or rivalry does not make those differences any less of an obstacle to the development of a new security paradigm for Northeast Asia. On the contrary, because Sino-Japanese antagonisms do not represent a fleeting rift in otherwise solid relations, the potential is high for problems there to have broader implications.

In an official visit to China earlier this year, Prime Minister Yukio Hatayama made the first open apology by a Japanese prime minister over Japan's aggression against China. This could signal a turning point in relations between the two states. However, interactions in the security arena continue to be informed by collective memories and perceived historical injustices. As a practical matter, Beijing remembers Japan's use of the Korean peninsula as a beachhead for attacks on China and continues to harbor fears about the long term security

¹³⁴ Japan officially named China as a potential threat for the first time in 2005: *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2005 and After*. Tokyo: Ministry of Defense (Japan), 2004.

¹³⁵ Rozman, Gilbert. *Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, 99, 126, 131.

structure in Northeast Asia. Resolving the history of mutual antagonisms in Sino-Japanese interactions requires a settlement of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Yet, the current security relationship between China and Japan could preclude the emergence of a consensus over the future of the Korean peninsula. A U.S. led framework for institutionalizing the Six Party Talks must stabilize the current crisis while working to establish a consensus on the long term future of Northeast Asia's regional security paradigm.

China's uncertain future

The CCP maintains a precariously balanced hold on power in China. Increasingly, Beijing worries about the potential for confrontation in the Taiwan Straits, regime collapse in North Korea, or a slowdown in economic growth to destabilize the country and pose serious risks to regime security. Another possibility is that the CCP may soon 'lose its grip' and face no other choice than to acquiesce to forces of democratic change.

While the potential for a democratic movement to gain momentum in the post - Tiananmen landscape, to say nothing of the willingness of the CCP to acquiesce to such a movement, remains uncertain, there exists a precedent. The 1979 Formosa Magazine incident on Taiwan can be considered the island's version of the Tiananmen massacre. However, the incident is also cited as one of the earliest movements towards Taiwan's eventual opening to democratic elections in the mid-1990s.¹³⁶ There is also the widely recognized, though hotly debated, phenomena first established by Seymour Lipset, where in "the more well to do a nation,"¹³⁷ the greater the chances for the success of democracy. Goldstone and Kocornik-Mina cite higher levels of income per capital as "strongly associated with a higher likelihood that a

¹³⁶ For more on this see Bruce Gilley, and Larry Jay Diamond. *Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan*. Boulder: Rienner Publishers, 2008.

¹³⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *The American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (March 1959): 69-105, 75.

country will be a democracy.”¹³⁸ For Taiwan, per capita GDP topped \$13,000US when the first elections were held in the mid-1990s. Given China’s current trajectory, the country will hit the \$13,000US per capita GDP mark in the next 10-15 years. How the PRC’s leadership copes with China’s shifting domestic landscape will have significant implications for the United States and the region. The CCP draws difficult lessons from the Soviet Union’s response to U.S. demands for reform and fears a similar fate for China if democracy is rushed. If Beijing responds to incipient movements for democracy as it did in 1989, the consequences could send shock waves across the region and dash hopes for success of any emerging security framework. However, the CCP’s treatment of internal developments will surely be measured against the international context China faces. The development of a regional security organization that explicitly respects the internal dynamics of members and avoids harsh treatment of the PRC’s human rights record could help reassure Beijing and offer the international community a hedge against uncertainties associated with China’s domestic development by allowing democracy in China to develop organically as the country’s rising middle-class gains a prominent voice.

Opportunities for the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative

The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

There is no doubt that the United States and China have the two most critical roles to play in bringing a desirable resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. Any settlement that comes into being will have to have these two states involved. China’s official position on the crisis requires peaceful resolution of the standoff, denuclearization of the peninsula and regime

¹³⁸ Jack A. Goldstone and Adriana Kocornik-Mina. *Democracy and Development: New Insights from Dynagraphs*. Arlington: School of Public Policy, George Mason University, 2005, 2.

security for Pyongyang leading to reunification.¹³⁹ In the Six Party Talks over North Korea's nuclear program, China has thus far played the role of willing facilitator, although all parties seem to agree a larger role for Beijing is necessary. When a disagreement arises, particularly between Washington and Beijing, it is over what an expanded role for China would look like. In Congress, there continue to be accusations that China willingly allows North Korea to continue its nuclear program by providing aid intended to alleviate the country's famine. While the situation is more nuanced than some in Congress would assert, there is clear evidence that the DPRK regime would have fallen as far back as 2004 if not for an injection of Chinese aid.

Beijing shares an ideological and historical legacy with the Kim Jong Il regime rooted in their respective socialist systems and the two states in common cause during the Korean War. Today, however, China is in the process of shedding its ideological baggage. Increasingly, Beijing finds it would rather distance itself from Pyongyang. The DPRK's tattered economy and unhinged leadership represent a liability on the PRC's modernization balance sheet. For its part, Pyongyang views with contempt China's apparent disavowal of socialism. China now finds itself with a sense of obligation to provide aid to North Korea principally to prevent a capitulation of the regime in Pyongyang that would lead to a massive humanitarian crisis and an exodus of refugees into China. Further complicating Beijing's calculus in dealing with North Korea is the ever present risk that a more hard line approach towards Pyongyang's treatment of the North Korean citizenry may draw unwanted attention to similar situations in China.

In dealing with North Korea, China draws lessons from its own experiences with Washington and the international community in the 1960s. Beijing perceives North Korea as resentful of over perceived historical humiliations. Any solution will require giving face to the

¹³⁹ Rozman, 102.

North Koreans. Beijing views Pyongyang as firmly resistant to pressure and that a hard-line stance towards the regime will only strengthen its resolve.¹⁴⁰ Beijing also draws lessons from Gorbachev's embrace of U.S. designs for radical reforms in the former Soviet Union and empathizes with Pyongyang's rejections of much of what the United States has previously proposed.¹⁴¹ China finds the U.S. approach too impatient. Gong Keyu, Deputy Director of the Center for Asian-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies asserts that "the implementation of (UN) Resolution 1874 and PSI, the seaborne check of North Korean ships, the increasing tension between North Korea and South Korea on their west coasts and the intensified military deployment of the United States, Japan and South Korea on the peninsula, all add to confrontation and possibilities of war in the region."¹⁴² Beijing supports the notion that North Korea must be indirectly exposed to the gains within its reach, and then be allowed to reach its own conclusions.¹⁴³

"Many analysts in Beijing also see the North Korean crisis as having less to do with WMD and more to do with a contest for control of Northeast Asia."¹⁴⁴ As a result, there has been a growing desire in Beijing over the past several years to see the Six Party framework expand beyond the North Korean nuclear issue to deal with an array of issues facing Northeast Asia. The experience of the Six Party Talks helped to increase Chinese interest in forming a lasting security organization in Northeast Asia to coexist with the SCO and the ARF on other sides of China.¹⁴⁵

While China officially supports peaceful reunification of the peninsula, many in Beijing remain uneasy about the implications of that might have for China. The prospects of a unified

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 119.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 121.

¹⁴² Keyu, Gong, interview by Henry Shinn. "Deputy Director of the Center for Asian-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies." *Beijing Not Ready for Policy Shift on North Korea*. The Korea Herald, (June 26, 2009).

¹⁴³ Rozman, 120.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 124.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 140. Conceptualizations of this framework in Beijing include the "NEA Security Cooperation Dialogue."

Korea renewing dormant territorial disputes or aligning with the United States make even peaceful reunification an uncertain proposition for the PRC. Drew Thompson of the Nixon Center in Washington states that “until there is a shared vision of a paradigm of one Korea, China prefers the current status quo.”¹⁴⁶ Institutionalizing the Six Party Talks would represent the first step towards ending the contest for control of Northeast Asia while establishing a “unified vision” for the future of the Korean Peninsula. Indefinite separation with a negative security guarantee for North Korea might represent the best compromise China will accept.

Global Nuclear Disarmament

Since crossing the nuclear threshold in 1964, China has maintained an official policy decrying nuclear war, heralding peace, and calling for global nuclear disarmament. For decades however, China saw these goals in terms of distorted Maoist principles. This led the PRC to large scale proliferation initiatives in Asia, Africa, and South America. However, changes over the last two and a half decades signal significant improvements across the board in Beijing’s views on nonproliferation and disarmament. The PRC has now come to recognize the importance of nuclear nonproliferation for its own existential security and the necessity of developing a less reactionary, more proactive approach to ensuring that security through engagement in multilateral frameworks.¹⁴⁷ In *Rising Star*, Bates Gill summarizes the three factors motivating Beijing’s new perspective on nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives: 1) “By taking a more constructive approach toward nonproliferation and arms control, Beijing looks to reduce tensions and instabilities in its external security environment, particularly around its periphery, so it can focus on pressing economic, political, and social reform challenges at home. 2) A more proactive

¹⁴⁶ Keyu.

¹⁴⁷ For more information on the evolution of the PRC’s support for nonproliferation mechanisms see Jeffrey G. Lewis. *The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007. Evan S. Medeiros. *Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-2004*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.

and responsible approach toward non proliferation and arms control helps Beijing project its influence in a more reassuring way toward its neighbors and key international partners. 3) China's changing approach to nonproliferation and arms control aims to quietly balance against American influence while defusing overt confrontation with Washington."¹⁴⁸

Beijing has signaled its staunch support for the new movement towards disarmament ushered in by the Obama Administration last year. Addressing the UN Security Council summit on nonproliferation and disarmament last September, PRC President Hu Jintao said "all countries should join the NPT," adding that China is willing to make its share of contributions to future nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives.¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰ The speech is just one of a number of similar pronouncements made by Beijing's leadership in the past year.

With two resident NPT nuclear weapons states (China and Russia), one former NPT member and recently declared nuclear weapons state (North Korea), three latent nuclear weapons powers (Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea), and one nuclear guest (the United States), Northeast Asia is the single most nuclearized region in the international system.¹⁵¹ The North Korean nuclear crisis has become a testing ground in the future of the NPT and the movement for global disarmament. Establishing a regional framework for addressing the cause of nonproliferation and disarmament would promote China's strategic goals while helping to strengthen existing nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives.

¹⁴⁸ Gill, 84.

¹⁴⁹ Peng Hua, and Xin Kuang. "Nuke-Free World Urged." *Chinadaily.com*, September 25, 2009.

¹⁵⁰ On November 29th 2009, less than two months after President Hu's speech, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a public statement declaring India's desire to seek NPT membership as a nuclear weapons state. See: David P. Ganguly and Fidler and Sumit. "Singh's Shrewd Move: A Shift on India's Nuclear Policy." *Newsweek*, December 14, 2009.

¹⁵¹ Andrew O'Neil. *Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia: The Quest for Security*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

Conclusions

How Beijing responds to an evolving domestic landscape will have broad implications for U.S. policy over the coming decade. The economic integration that has swept across Asia has not been matched by concurrent easing of strategic rivalries and mutual-distrust. The shifting equilibrium that accompanies the rise of new great powers has throughout history led to a period of turmoil and instability as new powers stake their claim as existing and declining powers struggle to maintain their stature in the international arena.^{152 153}

In formulating and executing U.S. policy towards the People's Republic of China over the coming decade, Washington must follow these prescribed recommendations. The first is to maintain the status quo on the Taiwan issue. The decision on both sides of the Strait to adhere to a "one China, but not now" policy remains steadfast. Over the near term, Washington's primary objective is to maintain stability. A withdrawal of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act or a push for Taiwan's independence will disrupt the relative stability pervading current relations.

The next is to reorient economic ties to ensure long-term dominance. The relative self-sufficiency of the U.S. economy represents a significant source of the nation's long term strength. However, the current U.S. trade and federal budget deficits with China weaken this self-sufficiency. It is in the mutual interests of the United States and the PRC to promote the development of economic demand within China's borders. Promoting the rise of China's middle-class may help strengthen the chances for democracy to take hold without drawing negative reactions from Beijing.

¹⁵² Henry Kissinger. *American Foreign Policy*. Third Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977.

¹⁵³ Weimar Germany and Imperial Japan come to mind here.

Regarding societal issues, the U.S. will need to temporarily set aside inflammatory human rights policies. The annual Human Rights Review offers Washington a ready political tool in diplomatic maneuvering towards Beijing. However, as a long term strategy for democratization, promoting economic growth and the rise of a consumer class within China may prove far more effective. With Beijing's cooperation critical to Washington's near term objectives for the region, policies towards China should not foster regime insecurity.

Another necessary policy decision will be to hedge against the uncertainties of a rising China. Revitalizing the U.S.-Japanese strategic alliance has been a hallmark of Asia-Pacific security policy for every post-Cold War president. The Department of Defense must continue planned restructuring to prevent ambiguity while reassuring allies and signaling potential aggressors of America's resolve. Low level military-to-military exchanges with the PLA could foster a level of national mutual understanding not possible with more senior level exchanges. The State Department also has a crucial role to play in fostering mutual understanding between the two populations.

Engaging Beijing to address mutual challenges will also be critically important in the near future. As the PRC continues to mature over the coming decade, Washington and Beijing's security interests will continue to converge. While opposed to U.S. hegemony, the PRC recognizes the benefits of U.S. preeminence to regional stability and growth. By increasing engagement with Beijing on the North Korean nuclear crisis, global disarmament, and a host of other common challenges from energy security and piracy to cyber-security and nonproliferation, Washington can facilitate China's rise as a responsible stakeholder while reaffirming the U.S. role in East Asia.

NEASCO is a viable option for the United States to pursue in light of its relations with China as it will serve two critical functions towards the establishment of new security architecture for Northeast Asia. One, the forum will allow the United States and China to take their necessarily leading roles in addressing the most critical near term issues to Northeast Asian security. Two, NEASCO will foster transparency, cooperation, and understanding between the United States and China over critical long-term issues and provide a ready and tested context for addressing resolution of these issues at the point they do arise as immediate concerns.

China has long seen potential in the Six-Party Talks for initiatives on issues beyond the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Institutionalizing the Six Party Talks in the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative will satisfy Beijing's vision for the talks while reassuring the region of Washington's intentions to take a measured approach to disarming the peninsula. Beijing already appears to be losing patience with Pyongyang. The United States should pursue options for creating incentives rather than using coercion in convincing Beijing to take a more hard line approach toward Pyongyang.

Increasingly the PRC has recognized the efficacy of taking a proactive role in arms control and nonproliferation initiatives as it seeks a stable environment for the country's development agenda. Progress towards a resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis under NEASCO will revitalize the legitimacy of the NPT and promote cooperation between Russia, China, and the United States and its allies on the broader disarmament agenda.

With improvements in cross-strait relations, Beijing has accepted a larger role for Taipei on the international stage. With Taiwan's accession to the WTO in 2002, and WHO (as an observer) in 2008, precedent exists for Taipei to take part in NEASCO. Offering Taiwan

partnership status in NEASCO could help facilitate regional consensus regarding the Taiwan issue and prevent unilateral challenges to the status quo.

The recent downturn in relations between Washington and Beijing do not represent a divergence in the core interests of the two states. Already tensions appear to dissipating. Every diplomatic relationship faces ups and downs and the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative will not change this reality. However, NEASCO does offer a framework for shifting the entire foundation of Sino-U.S. relations in a positive direction.

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
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Any attempt at founding a multilateral organization to deal with the security problems of East Asia will certainly require the willing assistance of Japan. At the time of this writing, Japan's economy by GDP is the second largest in the world. Japan's military is in the process of a significant modernization program which includes the acquisition of power projection capabilities. Additionally, Japan is the oldest democratic government in East Asia, and the oldest U.S. ally in the region. Japan, in short, is important.

However, many in the United States tend to take excellent relations with Japan for granted. A great deal of this complacency likely stems from the so called "Yoshida doctrine" of the Cold War. Pioneered by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, this doctrine called for Japan to avoid re-armament and instead focus on economic growth. Yoshida and his successors used the initial attempts of the U.S. occupation to permanently pacify Japan to avoid becoming embroiled in the Cold War. They did this by leveraging domestic protests and Article Nine of the U.S.-written Japanese Constitution, which forbids "land, sea, and air forces" and renounces the right of belligerency,¹⁵⁴ essentially giving up the capacity to create their own foreign policy. Instead, Japan practiced what is now known to many as "karaoke diplomacy" singing along with America's Cold War policy of containment; allowing American bases in Japan and accepting the United States' security guarantee while not becoming embroiled in the Korean or Vietnam wars despite U.S. pressure to do so.¹⁵⁵ America accepted the lack of real commitment to the alliance by Japan because it needed a regional ally, and because the risk of a communist Japan was so great that no effective pressure could be brought to bear on Japan's apparent pacifism. Throughout the Cold War, the Yoshida Doctrine, buoyed by a near consensus among Japan's

¹⁵⁴ "The Constitution of Japan." *The Solon Law Archive*. 1946.
<http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>.

¹⁵⁵ Kenneth Pyle. *Japan Rising*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

ruling elites and America's need for an ally in East Asia, allowed Japan to act as a security free rider.

In the last two decades, both the consensus supporting this policy in Japan and American willingness to accept a Japanese free rider failed. American willingness to countenance massive defense outlays for a non-contributing ally suffered as the Soviet Union ceased to be a threat. This resulted in increased American and international pressure for Japanese engagement on security issues. During the first Gulf War, Japan promised to send medical assistance to the coalition preparing to liberate Kuwait but failed to do so. Instead, they fell back to their tried and true Cold War strategy and sent financial aid. This manifestation of "checkbook" diplomacy proved unpopular with the rest of the world and led to a great deal of pressure on Japan's government. Additionally, as the Japanese economic growth that characterized the previous several decades came to an end with the economic crash of the late 1980s and early 90s during Japan's so called "lost decade", Japanese dissatisfaction with their government began mounting. Prior to this, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) or its predecessors, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, had ruled since the American occupation. The continuous nature of the LDP's rule allowed Japan to pursue the Yoshida Doctrine as a coherent strategy for foreign policy despite domestic debate.¹⁵⁶ The decline of the LDP and that of the Yoshida Doctrine thus paralleled each other. This decline first manifested itself in an electoral defeat in the 1993 parliamentary elections when the LDP lost its majority in the Diet. For a short time thereafter, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) was the major member in a coalition of almost every other party. However, the LDP soon regained power. Then, in 2001, a maverick by the name of Koizumi Junichiro was elected president of the LDP. He took measures to enhance Japan's

¹⁵⁶Lief-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, "Electing a New Japanese Security Policy," *Asia Policy*, (2010): 47.

economy and assault the dominance of hidebound factions within the Diet which restricted debate and action on the part of Japan's government. Unfortunately, his chosen successor, Abe Shinzo, quickly fell victim to scandal and lacked the charisma that was so instrumental to Koizumi's success. After a string of LDP prime ministers, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the majority in the lower house of parliament in the election of 2009 and set up its own government.

No coherent Japanese security strategy to replace the Yoshida Doctrine is yet apparent. A great many theorists, scholars of Japan and policy-makers have spent a great deal of time attempting to determine just what, if anything, this security strategy will be. Most scholars seem to see a more assertive, internationally active Japan emerging in the future, even if they disagree on the causes of this activity or its eventual nature.¹⁵⁷ In response to increasing domestic clamor for Japan to end the tradition of karaoke diplomacy, both the DPJ and the LDP have put forward visions for a more active, assertive, normal Japan. Both strategies center on the U.S.-Japan Alliance, but where the LDP tends to favor a broad policy of co-operation with the United States including limited military deployments abroad, the DPJ is far more leery of U.S. "unilateralism."¹⁵⁸ The LDP put their strategy to the test through a refueling mission in the Indian Ocean supporting American actions in Afghanistan and infrastructure projects in Iraq. However, as U.S. military actions have become more unpopular, anti-U.S. sentiment has increased and the foreign policy message of the DPJ has become more popular among the

¹⁵⁷Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007) 4.

¹⁵⁸ Easley *et.al.*, 51.

Japanese people. The DPJ tends to favor multilateral action under the auspices of the UN and increased movement to engage with the rest of Asia.¹⁵⁹

Although it is unclear which vision for the future of Japan's security policy will win out, it is very clear that any attempt to create a multilateral organization in East Asia will require special attention to the needs of Japan. Multiple causes for concern exist. Among them are Japan's history within East Asia, the abductee issue with North Korea, the negative reactions of Japan's populace to American bases and recent American policies, and the growing desire to avoid the appearance of giving in to America. However, there are also significant reasons to believe that a multilateral organization like NEASCO will appeal to Japan in light of Japan's domestic and foreign policy preferences. These include Japan's desire for multilateral action and the currently undetermined nature of Japanese security requirements along with Japanese concerns over China. With the correct set of policies, policies that magnify the advantages of the latter list and mitigate the problems of the former, America could certainly bring Japan into NEASCO.

Challenges for NEASCO

The first set of Japan-related problems for establishing a multilateral organization in East Asia stems from the history of the region. The first is a lack of precedents. There is no history of a multilateral security organization in East Asia. There was never an East Asian NATO meant to contain the Soviet Union. Instead, America built bilateral alliances with its allies in the region. This system, known as the "hub and spokes" model, meant that the primary U.S. allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, did not have to cooperate with each other to the same degree

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 54-55.

that America's European allies did. Although Australia, New Zealand and the United States did create the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) alliance, this alliance never grew to include other Asian powers. Likewise, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), although it was intended to be a Southeast Asian version of NATO, did not include Japan and included South Korea only as a dialogue partner. Cooperation along the lines of Europe would have made the organization this Task Force recommends much easier, and the lack of a tradition of security cooperation between former U.S. allies in the region may cause friction as nations used to a primarily bilateral security dialogue must confront multiple points of view.

These points of view are themselves colored by Japan's history of aggression and the hatred this engendered in its neighbors. In the last half millennia, Japan made two attempts at becoming a regional military power. The first occurred in the 1590s, when Toyotomi Hideoshi twice attempted to conquer China by way of the Korean Peninsula. Then, in the late 19th and early 20th century, after the Meiji Restoration rendered Japan more powerful than any other Asian power, Japan took Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1905, the German mandates in the Pacific following World War I, Manchuria in 1931 and much of the rest of China's seaboard in 1937. Both of these attempts involved the subjugation, torture, murder, and rape of vast numbers of Chinese and Koreans. This has caused a great deal of lingering hostility and suspicion directed at Japan. To this day, some Chinese and Korean analysts see nefarious, power hungry motives behind many Japanese actions.¹⁶⁰ Additionally, Japan has yet to apologize to China for atrocities and has offered only limited apologies to North and South Korea for its actions. Koizumi Junichiro apologized in 2001 for the "enormous damage" inflicted by the colonial policies to South Korea, and the Pyongyang Declaration expresses "deep remorse and heartfelt apology" for

¹⁶⁰ Samuels, 2.

the “tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea” it caused.¹⁶¹ Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya recently made a similar statement, saying that depriving Koreans of “their nation and their identity” was a “tragic incident.”¹⁶² In addition to the limited nature of Japanese apologies, the representation of history in Japanese textbooks has caused a great deal of conflict in the region. Japanese textbooks tend to understate Japanese war atrocities. The Nanjing massacre became “the Nanking Incident” to comfort women, poor Japanese women and others from Korea, China, and other conquered nations who were forced into prostitution and omitted entirely in the 2005 revision of the *New History Textbook*, a textbook published by a group of conservative scholars and approved by the Ministry of Education for use in schools.¹⁶³ The occasional denials by high ranking Japanese officials of wartime wrongdoing also make ridding the region of the legacies of the Japanese Empire difficult.¹⁶⁴

Japanese wrongdoing is not, however, the only historical issue affecting regional relations. Japan has never concluded a formal treaty to end World War II with the Russians, and a number of territorial disputes remain. The Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island both extend northward from Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home island. Both Russia and Japan have historically staked claims to these islands. Since Japan’s opening in the mid-19th century, Japan and Russia have drawn their border in this region at several different places. After the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese possession of the Kuril chain extended nearly to the Russian mainland. However, during its attack on Japan during 1945, Russia took the entirety of

¹⁶¹ “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. September 17, 2002. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html.

¹⁶² CNN. “Japan apologizes for colonial rule of Korea.” *CNN.com*. February 11, 2010. <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/02/11/japan.korea.apology/> (accessed February 15, 2010).

¹⁶³ Claudia Schneider, “The Japanese history Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (2008): 116.

¹⁶⁴ Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s insistence that the comfort women were not in fact forced to become sex slaves but rather did so of their own free will is one of the more egregious examples.

the Kurils. Russia still holds the disputed Kuril Island Chain and Sakhalin Island. Japan renounced its claims to Sakhalin and most of the Kurils in the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco, but it still lays claim to four of the Kuril Islands and a number of ethnic Japanese live in the region. Although these disputes appear a low priority for both governments, they offer a potential sticking point for Japanese-Russian relations. It is possible that some domestic actor in Japan could incite opinion against cooperation with Russia as a result of Russia holding the territories. Alternatively, action to resolve this issue could be one of the first special projects undertaken by NEASCO.

The other Japanese domestic issue with the potential to undermine negotiations has to do with North Korea in particular and thus is extremely relevant to this discussion. Between 1977 and 1983, North Korean agents kidnapped at least 17 Japanese citizens.¹⁶⁵ Suspicions that had existed for the last 30 years were confirmed when Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korea in September of 2002, weeks before the United States announced that North Korea was pursuing a second nuclear program. When the two leaders met, Kim Jong Il apologized for the kidnappings and, to a certain extent, repudiated the actions of his father. The two leaders laid the foundations for what appeared to be a promising future with the creation of the Pyongyang Declaration, raising hopes further.¹⁶⁶ Few however anticipated the response of the Japanese people to the abduction issue. Interest in the abductees and their children quickly grew to the point of obsession in Japan. After the return of a number of the abductee's children and several sets of remains, several of which turned out to be falsely identified after DNA testing, the furor surrounding this issue grew even farther. Now, although Japan takes part in multiparty

¹⁶⁵ Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, Government of Japan. *Individual cases - 17 abductees identified by the Government of Japan*. August 2009. <http://www.rachi.go.jp/en/ratimondai/jian.html> (accessed February 18, 2010).

¹⁶⁶ David C. Kang, "Japan: US Partner or Focused on Abductions?" *Washington Quarterly*, (2005): 108.

negotiations regarding North Korean nuclear weapons, Japan “has continued to remain focused almost exclusively on the abductee issue.”¹⁶⁷ The issue caused a great deal of domestic antagonism towards North Korea, which although it led to support for American attempts to impose sanctions might conceivably lead to resistance to any inclusion of North Korea in a regional organization that would require recognizing the North Korean government.

Such concerns likely would not have mattered only a few years ago. Up until the end of the LDP’s half-century of rule, the static nature of the Diet and Japan’s leadership led to a disconnect between domestic feelings and international politics. Despite being a nominal democracy, the parliamentary nature of Japan’s government combined with institutionalized rule by the LDP determined the makeup of the Cabinet and thus the nature of Japan’s foreign policy without any real input from the people. However, with the rise of the DPJ and the apparent creation of a two-party system, responsiveness to the feelings of the Japanese people will likely begin to increasingly shape Japan’s foreign policy.

Besides negative responses to North Korea, the Japanese public offers a further challenge to proponents of NEASCO. This challenge results from the unpopularity of America and the desire of many Japanese people for an independent foreign policy. Karaoke diplomacy no longer holds as many advantages for Japan as it once did, and Japan’s status as a junior partner irks many Japanese considering the fact that Japan ranks extremely highly in many indicators of latent power, especially those relating to economic size.

The disparity between Japan’s potential power and its real power is reflected on a daily basis for the Japanese who live near American military installations. Many bases include golf

¹⁶⁷Ibid., 109.

courses and shopping malls. In a land where real estate is a rare and valued commodity, such prolificacy causes resentment. Rather than symbols of Japan's security, these bases create a sense of fundamental antagonism. Newspapers seize on crimes committed by American servicemen or military accidents such as debris falling off American fighter jets. When America's last non-nuclear carrier, based at Yokosuka naval base near Tokyo, was replaced with a nuclear powered ship, many Japanese expressed worries about the possibility of a nuclear accident in spite of a nearly flawless naval nuclear safety record. Furthermore, the payments offered by Japan to support the American military presence are extremely unpopular. Additionally, much of the burden of the bases falls on Okinawa, which was administered by America for some time even after the end of the occupation. American forces occupy 20% of the best agricultural land in Okinawa.¹⁶⁸ Much of this land was seized after the invasion of Okinawa in 1945 and never returned to its rightful owners even after America returned the island to Japanese control in 1972.¹⁶⁹ It is not very difficult to see where the resentment of U.S. bases stems from. Further exacerbating the problem, the military has made several major mistakes that caused significant public relations crises. These included the use of radioactive depleted uranium artillery rounds on Japanese soil¹⁷⁰ and failures to quickly respond to crimes committed by, or accidents involving, U.S. military personnel.¹⁷¹

This antagonism engendered by these bases, and the increased power of Japanese public opinion, can be seen in the controversy over recent attempts to remove some of the burden of the bases from Okinawa. This included moving 8000 troops to Guam and the relocation of the Futenma airbase to a less urban area in the city of Nago, which is a significantly less populated

¹⁶⁸ Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback*. (New York: Henry Hold and Co., 2000), 36.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 46.

area of Okinawa and was considered more capable of handling the base without friction. During the LDP era, treaties were signed that obligated Japan to pay for a significant portion of the move to Guam, up to six billion dollars. However, the new DPJ government has come under pressure to reduce the amount Japan pays in that move, and the recent winner of the mayoral election in Nago is firmly against the relocation of the base there. Both of these new factors have called into question whether or not the moves will go forward. If they do, the United States will likely end up using a great deal of political capital to make this happen.

American bases are not the only unpopular instances of American security strategy in Japan. America's actions in Iraq and Afghanistan proved extremely unpopular to the Japanese populace. The DPJ campaigned in the last election against even the limited participation of Japan in the Afghanistan and Iraq missions by the LDP. They spun this as both a problem of illegal warfare, since there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the dreaded karaoke diplomacy.¹⁷² Anything that appears to be overly friendly military cooperation with the United States will likely be seized upon as hypocrisy and giving into American demands.

Opportunities for NEASCO

However, the situation in Japan is far from lost. Japan possesses a number of characteristics which would make any attempt to create NEASCO easier. Perhaps most important is Japan's preference for multilateral action. According to its platform, the DPJ's strategy for creating a more internationally engaged Japan involved ensuring that any military commitments occur under the auspices of the UN.¹⁷³ This desire, along with the increasing desire of Japan to engage with its region would provide a significant incentive for cooperation

¹⁷² Easley *et.al.* 52.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 55.

with the United States in the creation of NEASCO. This desire has grown as Japanese economic engagement with the rest of its region has increased relative to its trade with the United States.¹⁷⁴ Japan has significant economic engagement with most of its region but lacks a corresponding degree of political engagement. By offering a route to both of these desires, NEASCO would offer Japan a policy option in keeping with its conception of itself as a state that is fundamentally interested in multilateral action which additionally allows the goal of engagement with the rest of the region that does not risk the U.S. alliance.

The Japanese perception of Japan's nature could prove useful in more ways than a predilection towards multilateral actions. Japan's populace has a longstanding, and imminently reasonable, distaste for nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation has more than security implications for some Japanese who believe that the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki imparted a responsibility to educate the world on the evils of nuclear weapons. The cause of nonproliferation as a justification for engagement with North Korea is one which might eventually gain traction among Japanese.

Furthermore, the current status of the DPJ could easily be turned to the advantage of an American seeking to create a multilateral organization like NEASCO. The DPJ, as the party more accepting of multilateralism, would likely see this as an advantage. Such an organization would allow them to show their more leftist members and coalition partners that progress was being made. Additionally, the support of the United States would allow them an excellent argument against hawks, who generally support the policies of the United States. The DPJ provides further advantage for Americans pressing for NEASCO through its relative weakness.

¹⁷⁴ Ministry of Finance. *Trade Statistics of Japan*. 2009. <http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/srch/indexe.htm> (accessed 2 24, 2010).

The DPJ's status as a new ruling party has prevented it from truly implementing a unified security policy. This weakness provides a gap which NEASCO could potentially fill. If the DPJ lacks the capacity to implement its own comprehensive policy on Japanese security, it might conceivably fall back on NEASCO as an easy alternative which, thanks to its support from the U.S., would allow them to make progress on security without a major domestic political battle.

The change of leadership in Japan also allows for potential change in the way Japan relates to North Korea. Prior to the DPJ victory, Japan was generally conceived to have played one of two roles, neither positive. The first of these conceptions is that of Japan as an American puppet. It is exemplified by chief negotiator Christopher Hill's statements hailing "constructive Japanese ideas" and "very good" suggested approaches alongside similar statements regarding the "very good understanding" and "excellent relationship" between the two delegations.¹⁷⁵ The second conception of Japan has Japan playing the role of a spoiler. In this conception, Japan exercises its power to prevent any movement on the issue of nuclearization until the abduction issue has been worked out.¹⁷⁶ Each of these conceptions has proven a more apt description of Japanese policy than the other as Japan took positions at various points between the two extremes during the Six Party Talks. The Japanese willingness to bow to the wishes of their American ally can be seen in their accession to the deal reached in the 6th round of the Six Party Talks. However, Japan has also had many moments throughout recent negotiations where the second conception appeared the more correct. One example would be the statement made in 2003 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that:

The nuclear problem, the missile problem, and the abduction issue must be solved before the normalization of the relations between Japan and North Korea. Japan will provide economic cooperation to North Korea only after the normalization of the relations

¹⁷⁵ Linus Hagstrom, "Normalizing Japan: Supporter, Nuisance, or Wielder of Power in the North Korean Nuclear Talks?" *Asian Survey*, (2009): 834.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 832.

between Japan and North Korea is achieved. The abduction issue must be solved through concrete discussions between Japan and North Korea. Solution of the abduction issue is essential for reaching a comprehensive solution of the problem.¹⁷⁷

Throughout the Six Party Talks, Japan vacillated between these two positions, occasionally standing up for itself on the abduction issue, often to the detriment of the general effort to denuclearize North Korea, occasionally acting as an extension of the United States' diplomatic efforts. A new Japanese ruling party may be able to leave behind the hawkish rhetoric if concrete movement on the issue seems likely through other means.

Additionally, NEASCO offers the DPJ a chance to improve the somewhat tumultuous Japanese relationship with China. Despite increasing bilateral trade, which provides an incentive for political stability, Japan and China maintain a somewhat standoffish relationship. This partially stems from Chinese fears that the Japan-U.S. alliance exists primarily as an instrument meant to contain China.¹⁷⁸ Additionally, Japan has a number of territorial disputes with China, including one over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands which is, in actuality, a dispute over the estimated 7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 100 billion barrels of oil under the East China Sea. Both countries have deployed military forces to the area in support of their claims, and in one case Chinese forces in the region trained their weapons on a Japanese military aircraft that was observing them.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, Japan is extremely concerned by the lack of transparency in China's rapid military modernization. The Defense of Japan white paper for 2009 argues that "in order to allay concerns over China, it is becoming more and more important for China itself

¹⁷⁷ MOFA. "Six-Party Talks on North Korean Issues." *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. September 2003. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party0308.html (accessed February 2010).

¹⁷⁸ Paul J. Smith, "China-Japan Relations and the Future Geopolitics of East Asia." *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, (2009): 232

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 234.

to improve transparency of its national defense policy and military capability.”¹⁸⁰ NEASCO offers the opportunity for Japan to push for increased official Chinese transparency, for Japan and the U.S. to reassure China of their intentions, and for China and Japan to potentially work out a solution to their territorial differences. Even should that not be possible, negotiations at NEASCO would allow for a much lower probability of brinksmanship such as the Chinese training of guns on the Japanese observer plane off the coast of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

Policies

Should America wish to bring Japan into a multilateral security arrangement such as NEASCO, it will have to maximize the impacts of the positive aspects of Japan’s current position while minimizing the negative aspects. It should not be entirely difficult to do. After all, Japan is the United States’ oldest ally in the region and has expressed a desire to become more involved with Asia. However, any negotiators would be well served by keeping the following items in mind throughout the negotiations with Japan. First, nonreliance on nonproliferation in Korea will be essential as a primary motivator for Japan. Japan views the likelihood of an unprovoked strike as unlikely and therefore has little reason to put much of anything on the line solely for non-proliferation, no matter how desirable an outcome it might be.¹⁸¹ For this reason, NEASCO’s applicability to East Asian security in general terms will be a necessity if Japanese participation is to be assured. Particularly, the forum must be allowed to address the abductee issue. This has grown into an issue of extreme importance for Japan and any reconciliation with Korea will likely require at least the possibility of movement on this

¹⁸⁰ Japan Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan 2009." 2009. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2009.html (accessed February 1, 2010): 50.

¹⁸¹ Christopher Hughes, "Super-Sizing the DPRK Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea." *Asian Survey*, (2009): 293.

issue. Such a special project would grant the additional advantage of setting a precedent within NEASCO for the consideration of humanitarian issues. Additionally, American negotiators must keep in mind the possibility that America may have to make concessions on the basing question in order to assure Japanese participation. Finally, America must at all costs avoid the appearance of bullying. Anything that leads to karaoke diplomacy comparisons will significantly limit the Japanese ability to respond positively. In addition to the way in which NEASCO is negotiated, certain attributes would, if included within the final agreement, increase the potential utility of this agreement for Japan and therefore the probability that such an agreement would be acceptable. Perhaps the most important of these would be the inclusion within NEASCO of an agreement which forbids changing borders by force. This would allow Japan the chance to negotiate its disputes with China and Russia in good faith and would increase Japanese feelings of security in the face of China's military buildup.

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
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Importance of the US-Japan Alliance and Growing Regional Concerns

As mentioned in the previous paper by Justin Rohrer, Japan is the oldest, most important U.S. military ally in East Asia. Mainland Japan is currently home to seven U.S. bases or posts at Yokota, Misawa, Camp Zama, Iwakuni, Yokosuka, Atsugi and Sasebo as well as the installation at Okinawa. American Army forces in the region consist of 36,000 troops on shore and 11,000 afloat in the surrounding waters amongst 18 ships¹⁸². U.S. Navy presence is made up of the entire 7th Fleet which consists of 60-70 ships, 200-300 aircraft and around 40,000 Sailors and Marines in operation on a daily basis.¹⁸³ Equally important to both U.S. and Japanese security is the joint theater missile defense system as well as the Japanese ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. As our strategic interdependence increases and the stability of the region comes into question it will become increasingly important for the United States to remain both aware and involved in the defense systems being put into place in order to keep our position in East Asia secure. With the advent and proposition of the new, multilateral North East Asian Security Cooperative, the United States will need to take into account the obstacles presented by the newly emerging desire for an increasingly Japanese run defense system and the future of both American and Japanese ballistic missile defense.

Since 1987, ballistic missile defense has been a joint issue for the U.S. and Japan. Due to the threat emerging from a nuclear DPRK, the growth of a Japanese run BMD system is a greater possibility. Since the DPJ came into power, several statements have been made by the Japanese

¹⁸² Defense, Department of. "U.S Forces in Japan." *U.S. military website*. <http://www.usfj.mil/> (accessed February 15, 2010).

¹⁸³ U.S Navy. *Commander U.S. 7th Fleet*. <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/forces.htm> (accessed February 13, 2010).

government regarding the desire for greater defense independence.¹⁸⁴ In the 2009 edition of the *Annual White Paper; Defense of Japan* published by the Japanese Ministry of Defense, the Japanese government expressed that while the interdependence of state security has greatly increased since the end of the Cold War, new threats are emerging that must be treated differently. Two of the primary threats mentioned were the development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in the DPRK and the emergence of China as a regional political and economic power.¹⁸⁵ In the section titled “Japan’s Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability” the Ministry gave a brief framework of how there will need to be a “shifting emphasis from ‘deterrent effects’ to ‘response capability’”¹⁸⁶ in response to changes in regional stability. This shift would revise the standard that has been in place since WWII with the United States acting as the primary means of protection for Japan. While the Japanese government plans to use the Japan-U.S. security agreements as a preemptive means of protecting against potential invasion, the build-up of a Japanese based defense force would allow for additional prevention as well as an effective response in the event of an attack.¹⁸⁷

While an improved Japanese run BMD system would appear to offer greater stability for the U.S. in the region by placing a close ally in a position of greater military power, the potential destabilizing effects of a remilitarized Japan on regional stability are vast. For China and the DPRK, increased military capabilities in Japan, while defensive in nature, appear as a direct threat to national security. The build-up of Japanese defenses is viewed as a threat to their deterrent missiles and just a few steps away from the emergence of a Japanese offensive arsenal.

¹⁸⁴ Easley, Leif-Eric, Tetsui Kotani, and Aki Mori. *Asia Policy Number 9*. The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010.

¹⁸⁵ Defense, Japanese Ministry of. *Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper)*. Government Doc, Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2009. 136-137

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 138

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, 139

For Russia, increased American led Theater Missile Defense (TMD) shows an increase of U.S. presence in the region which appears as a major security threat. Japanese and American joint technological research and implementation is problematic for Russian defense due to the fact that these shared technologies have the capacity to find and destroy missiles launched out of Russia shortly after they are fired. Since China's primary form of defense are land-based missiles acting as a deterrent to a first strike, having a nation in the region capable of striking their missiles is destabilizing to their defenses. This perceived threat of an attack could lead to questioning the need to increase their arms stockpile, resulting in greater defense buildup and eventually a circular pattern of rearmament.

The expansion of a defensive arsenal would appear to serve as a means of pulling together nations with a united security agenda. However, it must be understood that because it is a defensive system, it is a direct threat to the offensive installments as well as the traditionally deterrent based systems in the region. With this threat in mind, nations feel that while they may hold a defensive posture, increased defenses in another state places them in a position of weakened defense and, with a fear of being hit first, will either force them to commit an initial preemptive strike or build up defenses themselves. This defensive led arms race remains only a few steps away from the emergence of an offensive and is in great part why BMD systems in Japan must be addressed within NEASCO. Unless these concerns are approached upfront during the initial stages of NEASCO's creation it may be impossible to gain ground when discussing the North Korean nuclear threat as they will not agree to cease proliferation until they feel secure within the region.

History of Japanese Ballistic Missile Defense

Japan began developing plans with the United States to pursue a ballistic missile defense system in 1987 when the two countries signed the Agreement Concerning Japanese Participation in Research for the Strategic Defense Initiative¹⁸⁸. In December of 1993, the United States and Japan created the Theater Missile Defense Working Group (TMD WG) under the Security Subcommittee to provide the opportunity to discuss TMD issues including “regional political implication and treaty compliance”.¹⁸⁹ The following October, the Japanese government initiated a U.S.-Japan Bilateral Study of Ballistic Missile Defense in order to better understand the ballistic threat to Japan as well as the alternative architectures for a missile defense system.¹⁹⁰ With the test of North Korea’s Taepo Dong-1 missile in August of 1998 and the reports of solid-fuel, three-stage missiles being launched over Japan into the Pacific ocean, interest in creating a BMD system increased, leading to the Japanese Security Council reaching an agreement with the United States to research a Navy Theater Wide Defense System. This was later combined with the Sea-Based midcourse Defense System (SMD).¹⁹¹ As security concerns increased, the Department of Defense signed a memorandum of Agreement with the Japan Defense Agency to conduct cooperative research to improve the capabilities of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) which is used to provide theater defense against medium and long range ballistic missiles¹⁹² as part of the Aegis BMD System.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ Pike, John. *Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Deployment*. February 25, 2008.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3-japan.htm> (accessed February 15, 2010).

¹⁸⁹ Ibid

¹⁹⁰ Fouse, David Dr. *Japan Gets Serious about Missile Defense: North Korean Crisis Pushes Debate*. Government Publication, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies-US DoD, 2003. Pg. 2

¹⁹¹ Ibid

¹⁹² Pike, John. *Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense*. September 7, 2009.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3.htm> (accessed February 13, 2010).

¹⁹³ “The Aegis BMD Weapon System integrates the SPY-1 radar, the MK 41 Vertical Launching System, the SM-3 missile and the weapon systems command and control system. The Aegis BMD Weapon System also integrates with the BMDS, receiving cues from and providing cueing information to other BMDS elements” (Lockheed Martin)

In 2001, a speech made on BMD by President Bush further altered the course of the Japanese BMD issue after no distinction was made between United States National Missile Defense (NMD) and the systems put in place to protect U.S. troops and allied around the world (America's TMD program). This statement raised concerns in Japan regarding the integration of American BMD into Japanese defense systems as this integration would violate the (2001) interpretation on the right of collective self-defense.¹⁹⁴ At the time, concern was also voiced about the possibility of BMD integration leading to a regional arms race and increased regional instability. Then in December of 2003, the Government of Japan, through a formal cabinet decision, agreed to become the first U.S. ally to deploy a multi-layered BMD system, spending 15.6 billion yen in FY 2003 on research. On May 5, 2004, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency informed congress of the possibility of a Foreign Military Sale to Japan of an SM-3 as well as associated equipment and services.¹⁹⁵ In total, the government of Japan had requested a possible purchase of nine SM-3 missiles as well as BMD upgrades to one of their AEGIS Weapon Systems, spare parts, supply supports and U.S. technical assistance to upgrade previous Japanese defense systems. A second sale of similar proportion took place in June of 2005.¹⁹⁶ In November of 2005, constitutional revisions were proposed that would lead to the creation of a cabinet level Defense Ministry. Less than a year later, the Japanese cabinet endorsed a bill that elevated the Defense Agency to a Defense Ministry. This bill was passed in the Diet in December of 2006.¹⁹⁷ The expansion of the defense division opened the way for increased cooperation with U.S. defense systems and the emergence of Japanese based defenses. The first

¹⁹⁴ (Fouse, 2)

¹⁹⁵ (Pike, 2008)

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

¹⁹⁷ *BBC News-Japan Upgrades Defense Status*. December 15, 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6182087.stm> (accessed February 16, 2010)

installation of an Aegis BMD system in the Japan maritime Self Defense Force took place in 2007 with three Japanese ships containing the system in 2010.¹⁹⁸

Current Japanese BMD System

The primary weapon of the Japanese BMD system is the SM-3 long range anti-air/Anti-ballistic missile. This missile system forms the outer layer of Japan's ABM system and is deployed from a fleet of four Kongo Class¹⁹⁹ Aegis destroyers. Japan was the first state outside of the United States to field the Aegis system as part of the Kongo Class fleet which, in all, is comprised of 2-3 air-defense ships, 5-6 anti-submarine destroyers and eight ASW helicopters.²⁰⁰ The superstructure of the Kongo is dominated by the phased array radar which makes up the base of the Aegis system. This radar, developed by Lockheed Martin, guides a reflective beam electronically from a stationary panel (rather than rotating the panel, as in traditional radar systems). This results in the ability to track several objects within microseconds while covering a large area with a single system. This technological advance is of particular concern to China and Russia as it has the ability to track a missile almost immediately after launch from great distances. This neutralizes both states ability to effectively deter against an attack and for Russia, the improvement of these radar systems could removes the ability to carry out a successful first strike.

¹⁹⁸ Lockheed Marin Corporation. *Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense*. 2010.

<http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/AegisBallisticMissileDefense/index.html> (accessed February 17, 2010).

¹⁹⁹ The Kongo Class is a 4th generation Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG)

²⁰⁰ Pike, John. *DDG Kongo Class*. June 8, 2008. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/kongo.htm> (accessed February 21, 2010)

The inner layer of the initial missile defense system is comprised of land-based Japan Self-Defense System PAC-3 Patriot missiles.²⁰¹ Testing in 2007 illustrated the systems abilities by successfully tracking and destroying dual short-short range Block IA missiles²⁰² fired simultaneously from the USS Lake Erie Range Facility on Kauai, Hawaii.²⁰³ In October of 2009, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force ship JS Myoko fired a test Block IA missile at a medium-range ballistic missile target more than 100 miles over the Pacific Ocean, successfully hitting two out of the three fired missiles for the day, totally twenty successful intercepts out of twenty-four attempts.²⁰⁴ The full BMD system will eventually include Aegis sea-based missile defense, land-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor missiles (PAC-3) and mobile land-based X-band radar²⁰⁵. By 2010, the goal is the deployment of 124 PAC-3 missiles throughout Japan, including deployment near Tokyo. These land based missiles are used to defend against limited short-range attack, such as missiles coming out of North Korea. In the event of an attack, around thirty interceptors are needed to successfully remove the threat. The X-band radar has the capability to detect and respond to long-range attacks such as those originating from far within the continent.²⁰⁶

An in depth understanding of the progress of the U.S. BMD system in Japan as well as Japanese aspirations of self-defense will be critical in working with the Japan as well as other states in the region to get them to join NEASCO. Because these aspirations started over two decades ago, their intensity has only increased with the prospect for future expansion growing

²⁰¹ Defense Industry Daily. *Japan's Fleet BMD Upgrades*. November 25, 2008.

<http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/up-to-387m-for-japanese-naval-abm-components-0807/>

²⁰² Block IA missile is an upgraded version of the Standard SM-3

²⁰³ (Defense Industry Daily)

²⁰⁴ Ibid

²⁰⁵ "The X-band radar operates at a frequency of 10 gigahertz, and provides surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill assessment for missile defense systems."

²⁰⁶ Claremont Institute. *Japanese Ballistic Missile Defense*. 2006.

http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.30/system_detail.asp (accessed February 21, 2010).

annually. As these systems become more diversified in scope and capabilities, the perceived threat the DPRK, Russia and China will also increase, leading to increased difficulty in convincing these five nations to work together within an American based framework. As the new governing party, the DPJ has expressed hopes to maintain the U.S. alliance while striving to become a more mutual security partner, reducing Japan's dependence on the United States security umbrella. The greater independence illustrated by the Japanese military, the greater the threat to regional stability.

Ballistic missile defense systems directly play into the main security dilemma plaguing the organization of finding a solution that protects sovereignty and ensures security while discouraging the need of East Asian nations to bolster self-defense via a regional arms race. Since the five states being discussed would hold permanent membership within NEASCO under a consensus based voting system (the ROK, while a permanent voting member, would be less likely to view these advancements as a direct threat as they are U.S. allies and in a similar security position to Japan), the perceived threat of an expanding BMD system could stall progress in any of the four sub-groups or, most problematically, in dealing with the Special Projects. Understanding and working with these perceived threats will be important from early on the development stages of the organization to ensure progress can be made. Because the sub-groups only meet four times a year, a stall on one matter as a result of defense disagreements could lead to an extended stand-still within the organization. It will be critical for the United States to continue reiterating the strength and existence of the security umbrella while making it clear to Russia, the DPRK and the PRC that any expansion of BMD in the region is a reinforcement of Japanese security systems rather than stating that it is for the sole purpose of

protecting American troops abroad. In doing to, the U.S. can help to defuse fears of an offensively prepared Japan and keep all members of the Security Council working together.

The Future of Japanese Security under the DPJ

Under the new administration there is a growing departure from the “U.S.-Japan global alliance” that grew out of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1960 and that was pushed to expand under the Koizumi and Bush administrations.²⁰⁷ This is in great part a response to the unilateral actions taken by the United States in Iraq and the Japanese cooperation that not only went against Japan’s national interests but gave the appearance of Japan as a puppet to the US security agenda. This stance is bolstered by the DPJ party platform which calls for a “clear basic policy for Japan-U.S. joint [defense] actions” as well as the desire to move away from a U.S. emphasis in the region and on to a more Asian-centric path, reestablishing Japan as a “member of Asia”²⁰⁸ The “Basic Policy” of the DPJ is that the party will “uphold the principals of Japan’s national security policy-an exclusively defensive doctrine, no exercise of collective self-defense, (and) the three non-nuclear principals”.²⁰⁹ However, as previously mentioned, statements from the Ministry of Defense allude to an interest in pursuing a far more independent form of defense. In the *Annual White Paper for 2009*, the Ministry of Defense stated that “Defense capability is in itself an expression of a nation’s will and ability to repel aggression. It provides the ultimate guarantee of a country’s security and cannot be replaced by other means...therefore the government has been strengthening its defense capabilities...thereby improving the credibility of such arrangements and bolstering its defense measures.”²¹⁰ With this defense posture, increased

²⁰⁷ (Easley, Kotani and Mori, 52)

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 54

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 58

²¹⁰ (J. M. Defense)

Japanese military capabilities are unavoidable. The United States must place itself in the position to support these increases as a means of lowering the need for U.S. security without losing its position in the region. With this support and the entrance of the NEASCO into force, the U.S. must act as a mediator between Japan and China as well as between Japan and the DPRK to ensure that these moves are strictly defensive in nature and do not pose a threat to the security of the other nations.

Obstacles Facing BMD and TMD

While many of the obstacles facing a Japanese run defense system are international in nature, there remain several domestic problems as well. Japanese popular opinion, while favoring a move towards a more normalized system of defense, remains hesitant at the prospect of any form of Japanese remilitarization. The presence of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the use of force as well as the creation of land, sea or air forces, means the idea of increased military capabilities is often met with resistance due to the fear that it directly contradicts the constitution. However, after the testing of the North Korean Taepodong-1 missile, support has grown for the expansion of a self-run defense system that would offer the Japanese mainland greater protection in the event of an attack. There are currently fifty nuclear-armed intermediate-range missiles in China that are able to reach Japan and possibly up to one hundred No-dong missiles in North Korea.²¹¹ As Japanese defense systems increase, it is inevitable that both China and the DPRK will feel the need to respond with expanded arsenals, a path that NEASCO will need to mediate and avoid. The ability to keep Japanese defense systems (as well as those fielded by member states) operational while alleviating the desire felt by other states to

²¹¹ Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. *BMD and China*. August 2009. http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f2d3_2.html (accessed February 24, 2010)

react will be a critical component of NEASCO. If the member states are unable to agree to acceptable defense terms, the desire to proliferate will continue and the organization will suffer.

The expansion of U.S. troops in the region is another undesirable side effect of a bolstered TMD and Japanese BMD system. With increased TMD comes the possibility of increased U.S. troops in Japan; a prospect that is growing increasingly less favorable both with the Japanese population and other states in the region. This is especially present with the newly elected DPJ and illustrated with the growing discontent for the base at Okinawa and its proposed move to Guam. As Japanese ballistic missile systems continue to grow both in size and capabilities, the number of U.S. military personnel needed to aid in the construction and maintenance of these sites will also increase. As reiterated throughout this Task Force, increased U.S. troops in East Asia are perceived as a direct threat to China, Russia and the DPRK. Fears of U.S. imperialism and actions similar to those taken in Iraq help drive North Korea's desire for a nuclear deterrent in the first place. China and Russia both have traditionally been against an expansion of U.S. influence with American presence acting as an illustration of American power progression in the region. Having increased troop deployment and thus increased U.S. weapons availability has the ability to be a sticking point for these three nations who may push for troop decreases before progress in the North East Asian Security Cooperative can be made. The United States will need to be aware of this and prepared to make concessions when necessary to help secure the presence of the organization and remedy the DPRK nuclear issue.

Another major problem of implementing a BMD system is the cost. Starting in the 1950s, the United States has spent over \$120 billion on research and development of missile defense systems with a projected cost of up to \$1 trillion by 2035.²¹² In FY08 the Japanese defense

²¹² (Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies)

budget allocated 635 million yen to the weapons system alone, adding BMD capabilities to the Aegis system, upgrading the Patriot system and acquiring PAC-3 missiles. The sensor systems added an additional cost 180 million yen. In total, the Japanese BMD system cost 1,132 million yen in 2008 with similar figures projected for 2009. Due to the extent of the joint research division of the program, Japanese research costs for the further development of the Advanced SM-3 missile from FY06-FY14 are estimated at \$1.0-1.2 billion, around half of the overall projected amount. The other half of the 2.7 billion dollar total is to be covered by the United States.

Implications for China- China's Opposition to Japanese BMD

One the largest areas of contention regarding the development of a comprehensive Japanese BMD system is China. In accordance with their defensive no first-strike stance, China views the development of Japanese BMD as a direct threat to their missile defense by undermining their strategic nuclear deterrent. With the no first-strike stance, their nuclear stockpile is kept for the sole purpose of acting as a deterrent to another nation making an initial nuclear first strike against China. China currently has an estimated 18 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed capable of reaching the United States. In most instances, these missiles are relatively old, land-based liquid-fueled which are highly vulnerable to a first strike.²¹³ By placing a defensive program in range, Japan effectively reduces the extent to which the deterrent can still act as a deterrent. Emerging from this is the fear that China will no longer feel that its current stockpile is sufficient and would feel the need to produce more nuclear weapons. Because of the increased threat this would create, it is possible that the DPRK could

²¹³ (Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies)

feel the need to build up its program in the event of Chinese aggression, leading to Japan deciding to further build its defenses. This vicious cycle, while illustrating a worst case scenario in the region, is a real enough threat that the United States must move with caution through BMD and TMD system expansion, keeping the intent of the program incredibly clear. Despite the defensive nature of the Japanese system, historical precedents play into these fears, resulting in the belief that these systems could eventually lead to the build-up of an offensive Japanese force and eventually full Japanese remilitarization.

Part of this fear also results from China's distaste for American National Missile Defense (NMD) and "its ability to undermine (their) small strategic deterrent capability."²¹⁴ The deployment of U.S. ABM within striking range of a Chinese ballistic missile in the boost phase would neutralize China's minimum strategic deterrence, leaving them vulnerable to a nuclear attack. Also working against these systems is the presumed halt of U.S.-Russian strategic arms reductions that could occur with the continued increase in NMD systems, leading to the resurgence of arms competitions, a collapse of arms control efforts and greater regional instability. With an increase in Japanese participation in an American led TMD, especially following the test launch of North Korean missiles, China believes that the United States is using the DPRK's missile launch as an excuse to develop unnecessary weapons systems in the region. Because of the close security, research and development ties between the United States and Japan, the development of TMD also aids in the further improvement of U.S. NMD.

The opinion of the Chinese military, as stated by Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission General Guo Boxiong, is that "China must strive to increase capabilities of its strategic nuclear weapons is it wants to stand firm against the U.S who routinely treats China as

²¹⁴ Wortzel, Larry M. *China's Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control and Campaign Planning*. Strategic Studies Institute Report, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007,pg 3

an enemy in its strategic planning”²¹⁵. Witnessing improved American NMD capabilities via Japanese technology and research directly supports this perceived posture and lends itself as justification for increasing arms stockpiles.

Due to the extending outreach of the U.S. into the region and the increase in Japanese military power, which are both seen as huge threats to the security of the DPRK, there is the possibility that increased Japan-U.S. TMD would aggravate, rather than help solve, the security problems on the Korean peninsula. A threatened North Korea would lead to greater instability in the region and places China, their main line of support, in a difficult position. In the event of greater destabilization on the peninsula, China would be the main actor regarding North Korea as they are currently their largest trading partner. While the monetary aspect of their trade relationship may not be incredibly important to China, the relatively close relationship they currently have with the DPRK would result in their need to intervene in the conflict, especially in the event that aggression resulted in a flood of refugees into Chinese territory. However, this also means they would have to decide to work against the United States and, in turn, Japan, a strategic decision they would be unlikely to want to make.

Because of the distrust present in the region, the United States will have to work closely to assure China that this is not an offensive posture against them while keeping the Japanese defense alliance strong. Increased support of a Japanese led defense system could result in tensions not only between Japan and China but an increased strain on U.S.-Chinese relations. While American troop presence in the region is already a cause for concern, the emergence of an American supported (through technology sales and support) defense system in Japan with the capacity to hit China could be seen as a direct American threat.

²¹⁵ Ibid)

Another major issue for the China is what the emergence of BMD and TMD systems in the region would mean for U.S. intervention in Taiwan. Some members of the Chinese government believe that “as long as China can threaten the United States with nuclear weapons, the U.S. would be cautious in escalating its involvement in the defense of Taiwan during a conflict.”²¹⁶ Because they believe that the U.S. would not risk the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear attack, the presence of a system of effective deterrence would be enough to keep the U.S. from advancing in the region and coming to the aid of Taiwan. However, with the construction of missiles capable of removing China’s deterrent, there is no longer a nuclear security threat keeping the U.S. from becoming involved and pushing for Taiwanese independence.

China is also greatly concerned at the prospect of the United States or Japan selling Taiwan missile defense systems which could, in the eyes of the Chinese government, result in both the minimization of their deterrence capabilities as well as bolster the Taiwanese independence movement. In order to get China to the table the United States will need to avoid selling defensive material to Taiwan and illustrate their willingness to consider Chinese demands regarding Taiwanese security concerns.

Despite the long withstanding distrust between Japan and China, progress has been made in recent years that will aid in the creation and acceptance of the NEASCO. A meeting in August 2007 between the Chinese Minister of National Defense and the Japanese Minister of Defense established the needed for increased development of Japan-China defense exchanges, including the promotion of high-level exchanges in military branches and sectors. In December of the same year, the Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda took an official visit to China where both sides expressed their support for the “promotion of exchanges and mutual trust”²¹⁷ as one of

²¹⁶ (Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies)

²¹⁷ (J. M. Defense, 307)

three pillars of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.”²¹⁸

This progress was continued in 2008 when the Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Japan and reached an agreement with the Japanese government that would establish a line of communication between the two nation’s defense authorities. Joint military educational and exchanges of good faith have also increased in the last two years which, while seemingly only small steps to increased security and trust in the region, show a willingness to cooperate that is not only unprecedented but lends itself to becoming more formalized in the NEASCO.

Implications for the DPRK

The initial security fears faced by China are also seen as problematic by the DPRK. A dark colonial history and its effects on the infrastructure of the DPRK to this day have resulted in a general distrust towards Japan, especially regarding any sign of remilitarization. An equally large distrust of the United States also has had a negative impact as large portions of the newly emerging Japanese BMD system were purchased from the U.S. with training and maintenance being led by American personnel. The negative effects on regional security have the potential to be immense and difficult to reverse in the event the perceived threat is not properly dealt with. A major question to consider is at what point will the DPRK see the Japanese missile system as enough of a threat to proliferate further and, even worse, go on the offensive. With the ability to shoot down a North Korean missile, the Japanese defense system poses a threat to the DPRK’s own defense system which could prompt them to take action before it is taken against them. With increased proliferation in the DPRK as a response to the Japanese threat comes the possibility of increased proliferation in the region as the next response. This sort of domino-

²¹⁸ Ibid, 307

proliferation would serve to decrease regional stability and trust, making the successful creation of the NEASCO incredibly difficult.

Because the initial focus of the NEASCO is the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, it will be critical for the United States to remain both careful and aware of the responses to any military action in the region, both Japanese and American led. If the DPRK feels overly threatened and unwilling to become involved, the organization will be behind from the start and may never have the opportunity to take hold in the region.

Implications for Russia

While Russia's primary concerns in East Asia center more around North Korean nuclear proliferation and the rapid ascension of China into a position of power rather than on Japan's remilitarization, distrust of a U.S. funded BMD system in the region has the potential to cause problems both for regional security and the success of NEASCO. Relations between the United States and Russia have, in recent years, suffered further due to the proposed ABM system in the Czech Republic and Poland. Which these projects have been placed on hold, the same fears will arise in East Asia as technology improves and the ability to destroy Russian Missiles surpasses their ability to be successful deployed. In November of 2005 a prototype radar system, built by the Japanese Defense Agency's Technical Research and Development Institute, monitored the test firing of a ballistic missile launch from a Russian submarine in the Sea of Okhotsk 1,000 miles away. After tracking the launch, the radar was able to follow the progress of the missile's flight for thousands of miles across northern Russia to the Barents Sea in the Arctic Ocean.²¹⁹ This prototype, the FPS-XX radar unit, was deployed in four locations across Japan by 2008 and

²¹⁹ Sieff, Martin. *New Japan BMD Radar Tracks Russian Missile Test*. November 15, 2005. <http://www.spacewar.com/news/radar-05zb.html> (accessed February 24, 2010).

pared with the U.S. X-band radar, places pressure on the successful deployment capabilities of Russia's missile system.²²⁰ Russia views an increase of BMD systems, particularly those that are U.S. run or funded, as having destabilizing effects on the current nuclear balance. Especially with the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty in June of 2002, the Russian government fears that the United States will build up defense systems that will result in the need of increased defensive capabilities as well as improved offensive ones. As Russia witnesses Japanese BMD systems destroying Russian missiles and increased presence of American TMD, it is inevitable that they will feel their security is threatened and that the U.S. in particular is trying to overstep its bounds in East Asia. In this instance, as with China and North Korea, the United States will need to endure Russia that it does not pose a threat nor is it interested in challenging the power dynamic emerging in the region. The U.S. will need to reiterate the importance of the equal voice allowed to each voting member as well as explain the merits of BMD and TMD systems as stabilizing factors in the region rather than a cause to rearm.

Implications for NEASCO

Despite the fact that the security threat posed by a BMD or increased TMD system may initially create some tension within the organization, the overall posture of Japanese defense cooperation is an acceptance of multilateralism which will aid in the overall cooperation within NEASCO. As mentioned in the previous section, Japan is committed to working with the UN, a position that easily lends itself to accepting the presence of multilateralism in the region. This is further supported in the *Annual White Paper* discussing Japan's commitment to not only the UN but to upholding the U.S.-Japan alliance. While Japanese BMD and TMD could create a major

²²⁰ Ibid

barrier in the organization, posing as a perceived security threat to China, Russia and the DPRK, it also offers itself as a possible “special project” in the NEASCO. While it would be logistically and strategically impossible for all information pertaining to a BMD system to be shared with all parties present in the organization, the availability of a forum to express concerns and offer reassurances to other members safety would be one way to work around the security threat and increase defense dialog between states in the region. While cooperation between states in the region is not traditionally strong, the presence of the future voting members of the NEASCO at the Six Party Talks offers some hope as to feasibility of getting all nations to the table, despite pending security concerns.

Support for a multilateral organization in the region was expressed again in the 2009 White Paper in the section titled “Multilateral Security Dialogue Sponsored or Participated in by the Japan Defense Ministry and the SDF.”²²¹ In this section, the Ministry of Defense further discussed its commitment to promoting dialogue and increased relations between states in the region and have begun sponsoring international seminars and participating in international forums. Seeing the continued reiteration of the willingness and desire to join a multilateral organization involving security concerns gives great promise to the possibility of creating a successful multilateral organization.

Policy Prescriptions and Recommendations

It will be critical to the security in the region and the success of the NEASCO for the United States to play a strong yet careful role in the progress of BMD and TMD system in and around Japan. The approach will need to be as open as possible, with all surrounding nations

²²¹ (J. M. Defense 2009)

feeling comfortable with expansion of Japanese defense systems without threatening the system itself. It will also be critical that the United States does not over step its bounds in any particular direction. Pushing the rapid expansion of the BMD program will be seen as a direct threat to Russia, Chinese and North Korean security and has the potential to keep any of the three nations from wanting to join NEASCO. Because distrust towards Japan and the U.S. still runs strong, the ability to understand the goals of these systems as defensive in nature will be necessary to their increased implementation. With the continued sale of American weapons systems, American led training facilities and maintenance, improved relations through the NEASCO will greatly help ease tension in the region while keeping American presence strong.

However, if the U.S. pushes too hard to keep a primarily American run program in place, the DPRK will once again see this as a direct security threat and may remain unwilling to cooperate. With overbearing American presence in the organization, Russia, China and the DPRK may balk at any issue pushed through by the United States, stalling progress and continually threatening regional stability. Especially with the advancing nature of American TMD as well as Japanese BMD and the residual fear of either of these powers going on the offensive, taking an overly aggressive stance will be viewed as similar to the unilateral action that took place during the Bush administration which will, without question, be met with a great amount of distrust.

Overall, the United States must stick to as neutral position as possible. In keeping the traditionally close ties with Japan firmly in place without appearing overbearing, the U.S. will be able to secure BMD and TMD as well as a position in the security agenda in the region without infringing on Japanese security independence. By opening and preserving open defense dialogues with China, Russia and North Korea through NEASCO, the U.S. can adhere to the

agenda of solving the security issues on the peninsula while limiting the perceived threat of Japanese BMD and curbing the supposed need for these nations to further arm.

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
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Decades after the Korean War of 1950, a poor and war-torn Republic of Korea has withstood political turmoil and a series of military dictatorships to emerge with one of the largest economies in the world while achieving political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Today, South Korea is taking more responsibility in securing its own defense and is an increasing provider of public goods in the areas of peacekeeping, overseas development assistance and post-conflict stabilization.²²² As the thirteenth largest economy in the world, South Korea's influence on the international community is also expanding, creating opportunities for multilateral relations, both functionally and geographically.²²³

Within this context, it is more important than ever for the United States to reinforce its alliance with South Korea to establish a common vision that fully takes advantage of the dramatically expanded potential that comes from a shared set of values and interests. In the face of instability in Northeast Asia from North Korea's growing nuclear threat, a multilateral framework like the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO) should be seriously considered to address the heavy issues of denuclearization and nonproliferation on the Korean Peninsula. Peace and security in Northeast Asia will depend on cooperation by multiple partners who can provide accountability and reliability in response to various crises originating in the region, with North Korea's nuclear weapons development as the foremost threat. In order to shape U.S. foreign policy in Asia, it is imperative to understand the diverse histories and perceptions of the countries in the region. In this chapter on the Republic of Korea, the following

²²² Scott Snyder, *Strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance*, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy (The Asia Foundation, 2008), 2.

²²³ Ibid

sections will provide an overview of South Korea's current and former foreign policies, its fluctuating relations with North Korea, its evolving alliance with the United States, and possible routes towards pursuing stability on the Korean peninsula through multilateralism and U.S.-ROK policy coordination.

Background Analysis on Foreign Policy Under the Current Administration of Lee Myung-Bak

Since the accession of Lee Myung-Bak's conservative administration in February 2008, the Republic of Korea's (hereafter referred to as ROK or South Korea) foreign policy has been dominated by efforts to shape the ROK into a 'Global Korea' in order to achieve the national vision of an "advanced and prestigious country."²²⁴ Lee promised to restore the alliance with the United States and campaigned with a policy of conditional engagement towards North Korea, which reflects the more traditional South Korean policies of working closely with the United States while engaging cautiously and defensively with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea).

The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) cites three diplomatic tasks to prioritize the year, which include revitalizing the economy, further developing the ROK-U.S. Strategic Alliance and making substantial progress on the North Korean nuclear issue.²²⁵ These task preferences stand in contrast to the prior administration goals of Roh Moo-Hyun and Kim Dae-Jung, whose foreign policy objectives were aimed at engaging North Korea through the Sunshine Policy, while also reevaluating the conventional ROK-U.S.

²²⁴ "2009 Diplomatic White Paper (June, 2009), 26, <http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/whitepaper/index.jsp> (accessed February 1, 2010).

²²⁵ "Key Diplomatic Tasks." <http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/tasks/index.jsp>

relationship brought about by domestic anti-American sentiments.²²⁶ However, Lee Myung-Bak's administration is oriented towards finding ways to cooperate with the U.S. for regional and global peace in the 21st century and restoring friendly relations between the two countries after a previous 10-year strain under Lee's predecessors.

Thus far, leading South Korea's foreign policy in a straightforward direction has proven difficult for Lee, whose initiatives have encountered both internal and external challenges. Integrating Lee's vision of a "Global Korea" into existing South Korean diplomatic structures and priorities has made slow progress, but the Lee administration must move past these obstructions so as to maximize South Korea's capacity to manage relations with the major powers and with North Korea.²²⁷

There have been significant challenges in initial engagements with the U.S. Among them, the decision to open South Korea's beef market after meeting with President Bush sparked widespread public criticism of the Lee administration. Furthermore, U.S. Congress denied the much anticipated Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for ratification in 2008.²²⁸

With Japan, longstanding historical issues aside, structural barriers in the external regional environment have challenged the renewed efforts to advance diplomatic ties and economic partnership.²²⁹ Lee is nevertheless making efforts to move past the difficult issues in the relationship, or to manage them in ways that keep specific problems from affecting the rest of the relationship. In his meeting with newly selected Prime Minister Taro Aso in 2008, Lee and

²²⁶ Park, Tong-whan. "From Collective Defense to Security Co-Management: Thoughts About the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance." *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies- The United States and South Korea: Reinvigorating the Partnership* 14 (2004): 14-15

²²⁷ Snyder, Scott. "Lee Myung-Bak's Foreign Policy: A 250 Day Assessment." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, no. 21.1 (March 2009): 85

²²⁸ Ibid pg. 92-93

²²⁹ Ibid pg. 93

Aso agreed to resume regular informal summit meetings, which were suspended since the early part of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.²³⁰ As former businessmen, Lee and Aso may be more determined to manage political problems in the relationship while keeping top-level dialogue channels open. Both Aso and Lee appear to have converging worldviews and priorities.²³¹

In regards to ROK-Chinese relations, despite the explosion of trade and exchanges since the normalization of relations in the early nineties, the Chinese government had previously shown hesitance to advance relations with South Korea, presumably so as not to further alienate Pyongyang. Yet following Lee Myung-Bak's election, Chinese officials were ready to promote higher-level ties, perhaps out of concern over South Korea's renewed vigor for aligning with the U.S.²³² During Lee's first visit to Beijing as president in May 2008, Lee and Hu Jintao elevated relations to a level of "strategic cooperative partnership," signaling South Korea's inclusion in a rather large inner circle of countries that have the closest level of relations with China.²³³ This label also reflects the realities of a bilateral trade relationship between the two nations that continues to grow and is expected to surpass 200 USD billion/year by 2010.²³⁴ Sino-South Korean private sector cooperation has grown across most major industries, and China remains South Korea's leading trade partner and leading destination for foreign investment. As China becomes a more willing partner in addressing North Korea's nuclear program, it will be important to explore avenues of multilateralism with both China and South Korea, as China's influence over the DPRK is immeasurably valuable. The discussion will now turn towards the complex relationship between the two Koreas.

²³⁰ Ibid pg. 93

²³¹ Ibid pg. 94

²³² Ibid pg. 95

²³³ Ibid pg. 95-96

²³⁴ Ibid pg. 96

Inter-Korean Relations

Past Inter-Korean Conflict and ROK's Engagement Policy under Kim Dae-Jung

South Korea's long-standing dominance in inter-Korean social and economic competition, along with its democratization at the end of the Cold War, has been a factor in its strategy to use an engagement policy toward the North.²³⁵ From the onset of the Kim Dae-Jung's "Sunshine Policy" in 1998, the ROK government declared three principles of engagement toward North Korea that declare the following: a) South Korea will not tolerate any armed provocation by North Korea, b) the South will not attempt unification by absorption of the North, and c) the South will promote inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.²³⁶

Under this policy, inter-Korean cooperation and exchange quickly developed, ranging from tourism development in the North's Mt. Geumgang to the historic North-South Korean summit, held in Pyongyang from June 13-15, 2000. At this summit, the leaders of the two Koreas signed the June 15 Joint Declaration, which designates significant measures on the issues of unification, reunion of separated family members, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural exchange.²³⁷ In numbers, South Korean visitors to the North increased from 1,015 in 1997 to 12,825 in 2002, while the number of North Korean visitors to the South only rose modestly from 1,890 in 1998 to 1,981 in 2002.²³⁸ Similar trends exist for family member reunions—between

²³⁵ Koh, Dae-Won. "Dynamics of Inter-Korean Conflict and North Korea's Recent Policy Changes: An Inter-Systemic View." *Asian Survey* no. 44.3 (2004): 422-41. Web.

²³⁶ Ibid pg. 435

²³⁷ Ibid

²³⁸ Ibid pg. 436

2000 and 2003, the number of South Koreans who visited the North to meet family members totaled 1,301, while only 301 North Koreans visited Seoul.²³⁹

The leadership in Pyongyang seems to be aware that rapprochement and reconciliation with the South will pose a serious threat to its insular system. Inter-Korean rapprochement would cause and spread disillusionment amongst the North Korean people about the sustainability of North Korea's regime.²⁴⁰ Despite the recent expansion of inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, Pyongyang's foreign policy towards the South continues to minimize the proportion of socioeconomic exchange and maintain tight government control over it. In this way, the Pyongyang regime seeks to keep its society tightly insulated and to prevent the spread of people's awareness of its socioeconomic failures.

An Increasingly Troubled and Lower Priority Relationship

President Lee's "Denuclearization and Opening, 3000" proposal marked the starting point for his effort to introduce conditional reciprocity into the inter-Korean relationship. The proposal contrasted with the focus on engagement and unconditional economic assistance that formed the foundation of Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo-Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy toward North Korea. Compared to the previous two progressive administrations, the Lee administration's relatively low priority assigned to inter-Korean relations was more surprising to observers.

Scott Snyder, in his assessment of President Lee's foreign policy, asserts that Lee's relative low priority in improving inter-Korean relations had several important effects. First, it led to North Korea's frustration with Seoul since it meant that it would be more difficult for

²³⁹ Ibid

²⁴⁰ Ibid pg. 437

North Korea to receive economic benefits from South Korea.²⁴¹ Second, it meant that in light of the lack of interest and attention on Lee's part himself, other hard-liners in his administration filled the void and defined his policy more harshly than he might have intended. In addition, when troubles arose in the inter-Korean relationship, difficulties were harder to overcome since Seoul was less likely to weigh in to safeguard the relationship against negative consequences of specific actions. The DPRK appears to have decided a policy in which Pyongyang focuses on negotiations with the United States while marginalizing South Korea.²⁴²

Two early statements by Lee's administration were quickly followed by North Korean criticism of the new administration. The first was a statement by unification Minister Kim Ha-Joong in his first policy briefing to the president in March 2008 in which he said that "the speed and scope of as well as ways to push for any development in inter-Korea relations will be decided according to progress in the North Korean nuclear issue."²⁴³ That statement preceded a North Korean announcement that South Korean officials would no longer be allowed to stay at the Kaesong Industrial Complex.²⁴⁴ The second statement came from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kim Tae-Young, in March 2008, when he stated that there were contingency plans for responding to a possible nuclear weapons strike by North Korea, telling lawmakers, "we would identify possible locations of nuclear weapons and make a precise attack in advance."²⁴⁵ These statements provided a context for North Korea's decision to take a publicly adversarial role towards the Lee administration, interpreting his policies as confrontational and in

²⁴¹ Ibid pg. 100

²⁴² Ibid pg. 102

²⁴³ "Minister vows to raise nuclear issue in inter-Korean dialogue," *Yonhap*, March 26, 2008.

²⁴⁴ A joint economic collaborative development between North and South Korea, an industrial complex located 6 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone that employs North Korean workers in fifteen South Korean companies.

²⁴⁵ Kim Min-seok and Jung Ha-won, "North's nukes on attack radar: New military chief says plans exist for possible 'pre-emptive strike,'" *JoongAng Ilbo*, March 27, 2008.

direct contrast to the progressive spirit of the past inter-Korean agreements.²⁴⁶ In effect, Pyongyang was “rejecting Lee’s bid for conditional engagement, betting that the South Korean public would eventually put pressure on the Lee administration to soften its policy toward North Korea or that the South would find renewed tensions with the North costly enough to recalibrate its policies and continue to offer a down payment in return for peaceful coexistence.”²⁴⁷

Dealing with North Korea will remain the single most important issue facing the ROK-U.S. alliance or years to come. While the U.S. and ROK have not always seen eye to eye over the North Korean nuclear issue, the U.S. should nonetheless step up bilateral and trilateral consultation and coordination on North Korea with the ROK and Japan, for these two nations are indispensable partners in solving the nuclear issue.²⁴⁸

After testing nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009, North Korea seems less and less likely to relinquish its nuclear capabilities. Without a binding multilateral security option in place and the limited effects of sanctions, the Six Party Talks offer the most viable avenue with which to engage North Korea. Despite their limitations, the Six Party Talks are necessary because of the regional nature of the North Korea problem. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, however small, will always remain a proliferation risk. It would serve as a precedent weakening the global nonproliferation regime. The U.S. should agree to a peace treaty and normalize relations with North Korea contingent upon their complete abandonment of nuclear weapons.²⁴⁹

Republic of Korea-U.S. Relations

²⁴⁶ Snyder, “Foreign Policy,” 102

²⁴⁷ Ibid pg. 102

²⁴⁸ New Beginnings Policy Research Study Group, “New Beginnings in the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Recommendations to the Obama Administration,” Policy Research Study Group, The Korea Society and Shorenstein APARC (2009), 7-8.

²⁴⁹ Ibid pg. 7-8

The ROK and U.S. have maintained a resilient security alliance for over 50 years. Although a reassessment of the security alliance to accommodate the changing internal and external circumstances are inevitable and currently underway, few can deny the fact that the ROK has become a successful if not rare example of establishing a liberal democracy and market economy with the help of the U.S.²⁵⁰ Clearly, the ROK and the U.S. share mutual interests in maintaining a robust security alliance. Thus, Young-Ho Park, in his “ROK-U.S. Policy Coordination on North Korea,” argues that the starting point for a solid partnership and policy coordination for North Korea in particular should be based on shared fundamental values and the common perception of mutual interests. Differences in shared values and goals arise from diverging perceptions of North Korea, national interests and concerns, strategic considerations, and policy priorities of each nation.²⁵¹

While the government in Seoul tended to view Pyongyang’s leader as ‘pragmatic’ and its government’s policy as ‘practical’ for its stability and economic recovery, the White House under the Bush administration publicly aired its mistrust of Kim Jong-Il, calling him a “despot” and a “tyrant”.²⁵² Considering the ‘North-Korean-style’ characteristics of embedded socialism in the country, the ROK believed that the efforts taken by North Korea since the first inter-Korea summit should be interpreted as significant changes, regardless of whether or not they fell short of fundamental reforms.²⁵³

Both the ROK and the U.S. share the goal of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, but different approaches to solutions should be considered. In the past, South Korea has paid

²⁵⁰ Park, Young-Ho. “Building a Solid Partnership: The ROK-U.S. Policy Coordination on North Korea. *Implementing the Six-Party Joint Statement and the Korean Peninsula* (2005): 101-103

²⁵¹ Ibid pg. 104

²⁵² Ibid pg. 105

²⁵³ Ibid pg.104

more attention to the improvement of inter-Korean relations, especially by extending various forms of aid to North Korea, and also through the revitalization of a variety of exchanges and cooperation programs. The ROK wishes to gain the DPRK's trust through the process of aiding the economic rehabilitation of the North, with the hope that the North will finally agree to give up its purported nuclear weapons program. The ROK has firmly stood by the U.S.' side in its insistence that North Korea give up its nuclear program, but the ROK believes that military tension could also be mediated with better inter-Korean economic and socio-cultural relations. The ROK's historical approach has been a slow and steady one, and aspires to a policy that will promote political and military confidence on the Korean Peninsula.²⁵⁴

Brief History of ROK-U.S. Alliance

The historical foundation of the ROK-U.S. alliance is based on a partnership on security efforts between the two countries. Before the end of the Cold War, the strategic priorities of the alliance were exclusively focused on bilateral issues such as deterring North Korean attacks and developing South Korea's economy and democratic system. However, the end of the Cold War introduced a new era of uncertainty that affected the ROK-U.S. alliance.

In the 1990s, the roles and responsibilities of the ROK-U.S. alliance began changing. Due to political demands from both countries and increasing Korean military capabilities, the dominant role of U.S. forces in Korea under the Combined ROK-U.S. Defense Structure started to shift to more of a supporting role, particularly the transfer of peacetime operational control to the ROK Forces in 1994. During this period, remarkable changes took place on the international outlook of the ROK's status. Upon graduating from the World Bank's lending list in 1995, the

²⁵⁴ Ibid pg.106-107

ROK went from being a recipient to a donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA). With a rapidly maturing economy and transformation from a war-torn country, South Korea finally joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996.

More recently, the Bush administration undertook a number of initiatives to strengthen cooperation with South Korea, including the reduction and realignment of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the negotiation of a bilateral free trade agreement (KORUS FTA). On North Korea policy and other issues, the United States undertook initiative to fortify bilateral coordination with the ROK, as well as trilateral coordination with Japan. In October of 2008, U.S. Congress upgraded South Korea's status as a purchaser of U.S. armaments to the "NATO+3" level, signifying a clear recognition of the ROK's status as a major ally. In November, the U.S. and ROK signed a five-year cost-sharing plan for the military alliance, easing an irritant in bilateral relations. In addition, the U.S. included the TOK in the Visa Waiver Program, putting the ROK on an even footing with the European and Japanese allies.²⁵⁵

Despite these encouraging developments, the ROK-U.S. alliance has not been without its setbacks. Growing anti-American sentiments, spurred on by rising nationalism among a younger generation of South Koreans, has made the relationship more volatile. Notable incidents that enflamed anti-Americanism in the ROK include the 2002 accidental killing of two Korean girls by an American tank, North Korea's inclusion in President Bush's "axis of evil" union address, the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ROK's subsequent involvement, as well as President Lee Myung-Bak's decision to allow re-entry of American beef exports in 2008 after the Mad Cow disease debacle in 2003.

²⁵⁵ New Beginnings Policy Research Study Group. *"New Beginnings in the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Recommendations to the Obama Administration."* The Korea Society and Shorenstein APARC (2009), 16.

Nevertheless, South Korea is a critical American ally in dealing with North Korea's brinkmanship and China's ever-increasing power, and as the world's thirteen-largest economy, the nation wields a considerable influence in all regions of the world. Presently, the alliance faces a complicated set of future challenges and opportunities in a regional and global context beyond the borders of the Korean Peninsula. To successfully face these challenges, the ROK and U.S. must articulate a joint vision and take steps towards common strategic goals for a deeper, more expansive global partnership.

Working Towards a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula

Nuclear Politics: ROK Involvement in the 1994 Agreed Framework and KEDO

The 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework that froze North Korea's nuclear program and tied full denuclearization to the provision of two 1000-megawatt light water reactors was a result of bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea. It became clear during the negotiations that a multilateral body would need to be created to oversee the implementation of the Agreed Framework. Thus, the Agreed Framework authorized the establishment of a multilateral consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to implement the terms of the deal. North Korea reluctantly accepted South Korean and Japanese technical and political involvement in the project, and even came to accept KEDO as a legitimate counterpart.²⁵⁶

KEDO's establishment helped forge multilateral cooperation to meet North Korea's energy security needs as a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. KEDO's governing board included representatives from South Korea, Japan, the United States and the European Union,

²⁵⁶ Snyder, Scott. "From Nuclear Talks to Regional Institutions: Challenges and Prospects for Security Multilateralism in Northeast Asia," Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, The Asia Foundation (The Asia Foundation, 2009), 2-3.

while China and Russia declined to participate. KEDO provided a unique institutional framework through which South Korean and Japanese diplomats worked with U.S. colleagues. This multilateral nature of the KEDO process also had benefits in promoting inter-Korean technical contacts and indirectly contributed to an improvement in relations between the North and South as demonstrated by the implementation of Seoul's Sunshine Policy in 1998.

Six Party Talks: ROK-U.S. Policy Coordination on North Korea

The Six Party Talks commenced in the wake of revelations in October of 2002 that North Korea had been pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program. This program clearly violated the spirit of the Agreed Framework and thus led to a winding crisis as North Korea kicked out International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, reprocessed spent fuel rods stored under the Framework, and resumed production of bomb-grade fissile material by re-starting its 5 megawatt nuclear reactor in December of 2002 and January of 2003.²⁵⁷

With South Korea, North Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia at the same table, the primary achievement of the talks to date has been the crafting of a Joint Statement in September of 2005, which commits all the parties to a shared set of objectives, including: denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations among members of the Six Party talks; recognizing the importance of economic development, including provision of economic assistance for North Korea; and the establishment of a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.²⁵⁸

Currently, the Six Party's process lies in uncertainty after an aggressive series of missile and nuclear tests by North Korea in April and May of 2009. The DPRK foreign ministry stated

²⁵⁷ Ibid pg.2-3

²⁵⁸ Ibid pg. 2-3

that the “Six Party talks have lost the meaning of their existence never to recover” and that the “DPRK will never participate in such six-party talks nor will it be bound any longer to any agreement of the talks.”²⁵⁹

However, Snyder offers suggestions as to why the Six Party talks are important in developing a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism.²⁶⁰ He writes that the talks are the only venue in which the North Koreans have made a public commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as stated in the 2005 Joint Statement. In addition, the six party process continues to serve as an umbrella for bilateral discussions designed to implement the objectives of the talks, which include normalization of bilateral relations among all parties. The process highlights the principle that improved bilateral relations among the parties are beneficial to the promotion of regional peace and stability. Furthermore, the U.S. commitment to the talks has become the main forum in which the U.S. is able to demonstrate its continued commitment to North Korea’s denuclearization in an increasingly skeptical atmosphere about the DPRK’s brinksmanship.²⁶¹

Opportunities for a Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO)

The Six Party process has laid down the foundations for the development of a permanent regional security mechanism in Northeast Asia. The September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks provides a fundamental set of principles that might form the basis for common action in the sphere of regional politics and security, essentially identifying the objectives of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of diplomatic relations among all six

²⁵⁹ KCNA statement, April 14, 2005.

²⁶⁰ Snyder, Scott. “From Nuclear Talks to Regional Institutions: Challenges and Prospects for Security Multilateralism in Northeast Asia,” Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, The Asia Foundation (The Asia Foundation, 2009), 6-8.

²⁶¹ Ibid

parties, economic development on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the pursuit of a permanent peace regime as the basis for future cooperation. Therefore, this Task Force on U.S. foreign policy in Northeast Asia for 2010-2020 strongly recommends the formation and institutionalization of a Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO) to be implemented in the coming decade. With a wide membership, annual forums, session chairs, an advisory council and special projects committee, NEASCO would share some traits with ASEAN or the East Asian Summit, composed of a more formal structure geared towards security in Northeast Asia. An organization like NEASCO would be able to address the uncertainty in Northeast Asia arising from the lack of a multilateral framework or dominant power in the region.

NEASCO's Permanent Council seats all six members of the Six Party Talks, which means that North Korea would be entitled to equal voting rights in a forum of much stronger nations. This type of egalitarian forum would go over well with the South Korean public, who has expressed that the demonization and belittling of their Northern brethren in international politics only adds to insecurity in Asia. Moreover, NEASCO membership is compatible with Lee Myung-Bak's vision of a Global Korea and would provide another much needed arena in which South Korea and North Korea could come together at one table. With the recent tensions in inter-Korean relations, an organization like NEASCO has the capability to ease these tensions and promote confidence-building measures between the two nations, as it lends legitimacy and credibility to North Korea's political gestures. The flexibility of a forum like NEASCO would allow for diverse outlets of cooperation amongst Permanent Council and Partner members. Furthermore, South Korea would not only be limited to issues of North Korean denuclearization, as NEASCO provides mutually beneficial opportunities for political, economic and humanitarian development related to the DPRK.

Potential Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula Through Host Reactors

As already discussed in the section on North Korea, Beardsley and Lim's "Energy Codependency for Sustained Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula" suggests an alternative route towards cooperation between the two Koreas. They propose that North Korea, which currently has no existing capabilities for nuclear energy generation, host reactors that deliver energy to South Korea, which currently imports much of its energy. This type of Korean interdependence may address the DPRK's fear that South Korea would threaten its energy independence if the reactors were located in the South, while also assuring Seoul that Pyongyang would not engage in weapons production.²⁶² Their proposal is a concrete, technical way to address the energy and security dilemmas of both North and South Korea, and one way the United States could offer a viable way to improve inter-Korean relations.

Conclusion: ROK-U.S. Policy Coordination*Acknowledging Differences and Making Joint Efforts*

South Korea and the U.S. can take advantage of a close policy coordination mechanism for which they have previous experience. Close coordination is a necessary condition for the improved bilateral relations vis-à-vis North Korea. Coordination should start from the acknowledgment that each nation might have a different perception on North Korea, dependent upon its own national interests or policy priorities, but they should do their best to come up with a wide range of common denominators, especially in dealing with the North Korean problems. There should also be a policy guideline for North Korea that includes goals, strategies, specific tasks as well as practical measures.

²⁶² Kyle Beardsley and Jamus J. Lim, "Atoms for Peace, Redux: Energy Codependency for Sustained Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula," *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* (The Berkeley Electronic Press) 15, no. 1 (2009).

Working in Partnership with the Republic of Korea Towards Comprehensive Security: Policy Recommendations

Scott Snyder, in his 2009 report on "Strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance", argues that there is room to establish a much more comprehensive relationship between the U.S. and South Korea than ever before given that both countries are democracies and have advanced market economies.²⁶³ The first critical challenge, he writes, is a need to reconcile divergent perspectives between the U.S. view on security in global terms with South Korea's security perspectives, which historically begin and end with the peninsula.²⁶⁴ The second challenge lies in gaining critical public support for broadening the alliance. Public opinion in South Korea remains "ideologically polarized" and memories of past inequalities still haunt current relations²⁶⁵. Third, an alliance must be based on cooperation from common interests and shared values, not on the basis of a common threat perception, since the alliance's priority is no longer rebuffing a threat from a third party.²⁶⁶

Snyder offers four principles of a comprehensive alliance between the United States and South Korea whose summary implications consider how to reinvigorate the existing alliance in order to more effectively meet the shared needs of the two countries.

1) "The ROK-U.S. alliance should be based on a broader foundation of political cooperation than currently exists." A relationship that focuses too much on military cooperation limits South Korea's ability to use the alliance as a "platform" on which to enhance its political leverage in dealing with neighboring countries and to globally strengthen its status. South Korea seeks to

²⁶³ Snyder, Scott. "Strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance," Center for U.S.-Korea Policy (The Asia Foundation, 2008), 2.

²⁶⁴ Ibid pg. 2

²⁶⁵ Ibid pg. 2

²⁶⁶ Ibid pg. 3

improve its international standing and gain more influence in international affairs, and cooperation with the U.S. can serve these needs. In this respect, a more influential South Korea, in alliance with the U.S., could temper China's growing strength in Northeast Asia to allay Sino-American tensions²⁶⁷.

2) As South Korea's economic and political confidence have grown, the traditional ROK-U.S. alliance requires a reassessment. Snyder asserts, "Military commitments to mutual defense should be reciprocal, involving responsibilities and obligations to work together in response to peninsular, regional, and global threats." Snyder's principle holds a two-fold value: not only would South Korea be able to start asserting its own military independence since the Korean War, but North Korean's security fears could potentially be reduced with an American troop reduction.²⁶⁸

3) The ROK-U.S. alliance in the 21st century should focus upon mutual common interests and a broad understanding of security, as opposed to being justified "on the basis of targeting a single threat." Instead of letting outdated Cold War security concerns dictate present day needs, "military cooperation should be organized in such a way as to maximize respective capacities and contributions to preserve *regional* stability (emphasis added)." An analysis of Snyder's principle would mean, for the sake of a long-term alliance with South Korea, that it would be wise to shape a comprehensive alliance that addresses much more than tactical security concerns posed by its Northern neighbor. Snyder writes, "If military coordination is organized in such a way as to maximize capacity to respond to multiple threats and is embedded in a broader politically-based partnership designed to respond to regional, global, and functional security

²⁶⁷ Ibid pg. 12

²⁶⁸ Ibid pg. 12

needs, **it would be harder for neighbors to object to such cooperation** (emphasis added)."²⁶⁹

4) An alliance based on common interests could provide the inroads for future cooperation with "like-minded countries on missions...both within and beyond Northeast Asia." Snyder says an approach like this would enable flexibility to develop a bilateral and regional response capacity to natural disasters and humanitarian missions, which would be fulfilled by this Task Force's NEASCO Special Projects unit. Such cooperation, he posits, could form the *core of an eventual mechanism for multilateral security cooperation that would respond to common regional and global threats* (emphasis added)."²⁷⁰

Based on these policy recommendations, it appears that the U.S. should take a multi-pronged approach to engaging with South Korea. In order to maintain a vigorous relationship with one of its most important allies in Asia, the U.S. needs to review and re-evaluate its policies towards the ROK as discussed above. Additionally, in recognition of the importance and necessity of multilateralism in East Asia, the U.S. should promote an organization like the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative to help build consensus in the region for such a multilateral framework. With South Korea's rising influence in the global economy, it remains a crucial partner of the U.S. to have on board with NEASCO and to face the challenges arising from North Korea's nuclear ambitions. It is in the security interests of the United States and South Korea to cooperate in both bilateral and multilateral forums, and U.S. foreign policy in Northeast Asia must reflect these two interconnected needs.

²⁶⁹ Ibid pg. 13

²⁷⁰ Ibid pg. 13

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
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The reinstated national emblem of the imperial double-headed eagle aptly reflects Russian foreign policy. The Russian Federation spans two continents. It must contend with being sandwiched between the economic and political military power centers of China and the European Union, while continuing to fear hostile encirclement from the United States. The fluidity of Russian foreign policy stems from a continuous tension inherent in the need to always look both east and west, as well as the complex interplay of domestic, economic and security factors.

Internal politics are crucial in determining the direction of Russian policy, especially the attributes of those in power and their level of control over an opaque and corrupt bureaucracy.²⁷¹ The strong pull of nationalism across society fuels Russian desire to regain great power status. The falling and rising fortunes of the Russian economy, which often mirror the price of a barrel of oil, have determined how effective Moscow can be in accomplishing its stated aim of pursuing an independent foreign policy. Kremlin leaders have repeatedly directly linked economic renewal with foreign policy clout.²⁷² Current Prime Minister and former President Vladimir Putin's demonstrated desire to retain the levers of power and move towards authoritarianism mean that security has come to be defined as protecting the power of those currently occupying the Kremlin.

Russian policymakers have a keen ability to identify their greatest current threat and act accordingly with a mix of bandwagoning and balancing. That is, based on changing situations, Russia either strives to create bilateral or multilateral coalitions aimed at balancing any one pole

²⁷¹ Arkady Ostrovsky, "A Still Darker Russia," *The Economist*, Special Edition: The World in 2010 (January 2010): 92.

²⁷² Robert Legvold, *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century & the Shadow of the Past*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 183.

that has become too strong,²⁷³ or to join in with the greatest power in the hope that close ties and following their agenda will have bandwagoning benefits for Russia as well. The strength derived from domestic economic and political stability largely determines Moscow's calculation of which strategy will bring the greatest reward.

On the Korean Peninsula Russia has become ensnared in a dilemma. The Kremlin shares American goals for denuclearization. However, Moscow has come to see close relations with Pyongyang as the only guarantor of its clout in the region. Russia is therefore torn between protecting its influence by buffering North Korea from the U.S. and thereby promulgating the status quo, or achieving its stated aim of denuclearization. Only the inclusion of Russia in the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO) can untie this Gordian knot, allowing the Kremlin to retain its great power aspirations in Asia while pursuing a solution to the Korean crisis.

Why Russia Must be Engaged

The United States needs cooperation from Russia, the world's largest nuclear power, in upholding the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Russia has blamed the U.S. in recent years for many of the failings of the NPT.²⁷⁴ Washington and Moscow must work together, and with all the nuclear powers, as they continue efforts towards global nuclear disarmament. The focal point of current proliferation concerns, the crisis on the Korean Peninsula presents a key test of the capacity of Russia and the U.S. to cooperatively resolve nuclear issues worldwide.

²⁷³ The United States, considered a hegemon by many Russians, continues to be the main focus of balancing efforts.

²⁷⁴ Yong-Chool Ha and Beom-Shik Shin, *Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula* (Seattle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006): 29.

Moscow and Washington share the same aims of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and upholding the NPT. Yet the two sides disagree on the means for solving the issue, while mutual distrust and frustration has grown in U.S.-Russian relations over the last decade. Russia prefers multilateral negotiation accompanied by economic incentives and security guarantees, a model of disarmament that induced Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to give up their nuclear weapons stockpiles after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By contrast the U.S. has taken a harsher stance of coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions and threats of military action. This approach has been lauded for convincing Libya to relinquish its nuclear program in 2003.²⁷⁵ Thus Russia believes that there can only be a diplomatic solution to the North Korean issue, and finds U.S. rhetoric on regime change harmful to the process. The ignoring of Russia in the 1994 round of negotiations pushed Moscow towards cooperation with Pyongyang. One Russian academic, B.I. Tkachenko, went so far as to claim that “one of the most important reasons for the collapse of the Agreed Framework was that Russia was excluded from the process.”²⁷⁶ Since 2002 Russia has often thwarted American strategies, striving to act as a buffer between the U.S. and DPRK under the mantle of “honest broker.”²⁷⁷ Final resolution of the issue will require coordination of policy towards North Korea in order to reach agreement on how to achieve their shared aims.

Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy

To begin defining Russia’s foreign policy goals, it helps to start with the metrics outlined by the Russian government. In July 2008 the new Medvedev administration presented its foreign policy direction in *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*. Like the administration itself, the document is largely a continuation of the direction adopted under

²⁷⁵ Ha and Shin, v.

²⁷⁶ Ha and Shin, 27.

²⁷⁷ Ha and Shin, 19.

Vladimir Putin, President (2000-08). This realist approach outlines the following as the “chief objectives” of Russian foreign policy:

to ensure national security, which is defined as upholding sovereignty, territorial integrity and Russian global influence; to create favorable conditions for economic modernization and competitiveness in a globalizing world; to influence formation of a global world order based on supremacy of international law and recognizing the United Nations (UN) as the central international governing body with “unique legitimacy”; to promote good neighborly relations; to establish bilateral and multilateral relations based on “agreement” and “coinciding interests”; to protect Russians abroad; and to promote Russian language and culture.²⁷⁸

A clear picture of the Russian worldview may be extrapolated from the above statement. Global influence as an aspect of national security and promoting Russian culture speak to Russians’ belief in their nation as deserving a leading role on the global stage. The Kremlin desires the prestige of being a great power, one among the poles in a multipolar world. Mired in the logic of the ‘great game,’²⁷⁹ Russian policymakers continue to harbor a century’s old faith in the need for control over neighboring states in pursuit of security. Accordingly, Moscow claims the former Soviet Republics as its zone of ‘privileged interest.’ The mention of protecting Russians abroad defends actions taken in the Georgian conflict of August 2008, including Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics. Both are home to large Russian populations. Independence in pursuit of its economic and security interests is tantamount to the Kremlin, which refuses to accept an international order constructed solely according to Western principles. In international law Russian leaders vehemently argue for the protection of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, as enshrined in the UN Charter.

²⁷⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, 2008.

²⁷⁹ Maria Raquel Freire, “Russian Policy in Central Asia: Supporting, Balancing, Coercing, or Imposing?” *Asian Perspective*, November 2, 2009: 147. <http://www.asianperspective.org/> (accessed Feb. 10, 2010). First coined by a British officer referring to Russian and British competition over central Asia in 1829, the ‘great game’ refers to the territorial competition of empires over spheres of influence

The special power stemming from a veto in the Security Council (UNSC) and the organization's theoretical ability to act as a break on unilateral actions by hegemonic powers explains Russia's emphasis on the centrality of the U.N. in the international order.

Domestic Factors

The political and economic collapse that accompanied the demise of the Soviet Union led to a parallel incapability of Russia to exert itself on the international stage. Throughout the 1990s the communist bloc's leading successor state, the Russian Federation, remained largely entangled in domestic chaos and ongoing economic volatility. Given this weakened position, President Yeltsin (1991-99) turned wholeheartedly to a bandwagoning strategy, looking to the West for Russia's economic, political, and foreign policy models. The hardship stemming from the transition to capitalism and stigma of being a lackey of the West left many Russians despising markets, democracy and Yeltsin. After taking power in 2000, Putin initially followed a similar path. He sought close relations with the U.S. in a bandwagoning attempt to legitimize Russian actions in Chechnya as part of the War on Terror. However, by 2003 Putin had become one of the most outspoken opponents of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Putin's rise to power coincided with a restoration of the Russian economy and rise in oil prices that have allowed for Russia to once again reassert itself internationally.

The political situation within Russia has a defining role in shaping the country's interaction with the world. Over the last decade Putin has centralized power in the Kremlin. Under Yeltsin, unruly regional leaders thwarted foreign policy aims, but Moscow has once more exerted clear command over the nation's foreign policy.²⁸⁰ This centralization of power also

²⁸⁰ Legvold, 147.

illustrates a distinct move away from democratizing trends. While president, Putin oversaw the rollback of independent media, tightening of state control over large sections of the economy and end of truly competitive elections. Most major Russian newspapers and television networks have been acquired by companies or individuals loyal to the Kremlin.²⁸¹ In September 2004 Putin announced that regional governors would be appointed by Moscow rather than elected. At the end of 2003 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) criticized that year's State Duma (parliamentary) elections as failing to meet their standards for democratic elections.²⁸² Then the Kremlin did not allow the OSCE to field a large enough observer mission to monitor the 2008 presidential elections.²⁸³ Forced to step down from the Presidency due to constitutionally mandated presidential term limits, Putin was replaced by his handpicked successor Dmitry Medvedev.

A lopsided executive dyad now rules Russia. According to the Russian Constitution, the President "directs its national foreign policy and, in his capacity of the Head of State, acts on behalf of the Russian Federation on the international stage."²⁸⁴ Yet few doubt that Putin continues to be a powerful, if not dominating, force from his new position as Prime Minister. Medvedev is looked to as a force for liberalizing and much needed reform. In his September 2009 article, "Go Russia!" President Medvedev called for reforms moving away from economic dependence on raw materials, combating corruption with the creation of an 'open' political system and moving away from the paternalism that leads many to look to the state for

²⁸¹ Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "The Myth of the Authoritarian Model," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2008). <http://web.ebscohost.com> (accessed Feb. 14, 2010).

²⁸² McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008.

²⁸³ Press Release, "OSCE/ODIHR regrets that restrictions force cancellation of election observation mission to Russian Federation," Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: Elections, February 7, 2008. http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/item_1_29599.html (accessed Feb. 22, 2010).

²⁸⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008.

survival.²⁸⁵ Yet in practice and in word Putin has lauded the current system, reinforcing the idea that the government, and he in particular, “are able and ready to take care of all the dispossessed, unemployed and underpaid.”²⁸⁶ Many have also speculated that Putin will run for the presidency again in 2012. While the public disagreements between Medvedev and Putin have remained largely domestic, an evident tension exists between the liberal, reformist minded President and his more conservative, nationalistic Prime Minister. Though Putin clearly still holds the reins of power, the ongoing flux in the Kremlin power structure, speculation about his future political career and the dangers of the nation’s policy being determined by the whim of a single individual all combine to make it difficult to divine a clear path for future Russian policy.

Putin’s appeal stems largely from the nostalgia many Russians have for past prestige. A broad based view of Russian exceptionalism exists, with a large portion of the population viewing their nation’s rightful place in the world order as among the great powers.²⁸⁷ To Russians it is important that their country take back its rightful mantle as a world power actively participating in all major global and regional initiatives. Two ideological strains hold great sway over the Russian national psyche. Eurasianists strive for the promotion of a resurgent Russian empire or close-knit bloc of states reminiscent of the USSR, capable of challenging any power for global preeminence. They see Russian culture and the Orthodox Church as the focal points of a new multinational power.²⁸⁸ Nationalists, on the other hand, focus on promoting the ethnically Russian population. These groups have a markedly xenophobic anti-immigrant stance.²⁸⁹

However, with an aging and dwindling population Russia faces a demographic crisis that

²⁸⁵ Dmitry Medvedev, "Go Russia!" *Kremlin.ru*, September 9, 2009.

http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml (accessed Feb. 12, 2010).

²⁸⁶ Pavel K. Baev, "Putin Reassures his Audience and Reduces Medvedev to Irrelevance," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, December 7, 2009. <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/> (accessed Feb. 17, 2010).

²⁸⁷ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 60.

²⁸⁸ Mankoff, 66.

²⁸⁹ Mankoff, 63.

threatens to cut the population, 140 million in 2009, by more than 15 percent by 2050.²⁹⁰ The hardship and uncertainty that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union simply accelerated plunging birth rates while producing a simultaneous drastic fall in life expectancy. Thus Russia has an economic interest in inviting immigrants to fill labor positions that Russians do not desire. Yet there exist public concerns about the 'yellow peril,' invading hordes of Chinese staking claim to Russian territory. Hostility to outsiders has limited Russia's ability to transition to a more open labor market. Thus domestic expectations drive Kremlin policymakers to retain Russia's international status, while complicating efforts to integrate regionally in Asia.

Economic Factors

Economic policy continues to vacillate between a return to past autarkic practices relying on state-owned enterprises and fitful efforts to engage the global economy. The Russian economy remains dominated by state-owned corporations that are largely employed in extracting their nation's great natural resource wealth. President Medvedev, who himself served on the board of energy giant Gazprom while serving as first deputy prime minister in Putin's administration,²⁹¹ only recently implemented a new policy of independent directors being appointed to the boards of major state-owned enterprises.²⁹² Russian interest in accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has appreciably waned over the last year. The public distrusts the Western dominated trade group. The large, inefficient government monopolies have also lobbied hard against accession, fearing outside competition. Putin reversed his past position,

²⁹⁰ Dmitri Trenin, "Russia Reborn," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2009): 64-78. <http://web.ebscohost.com> (accessed Feb. 21, 2010).

²⁹¹ Neil Buckley and Arkady Ostrovsky, "Back in business - how Putin's allies are turning Russia into a corporate state," *Financial Times*, June 19, 2006: <http://www.ft.com/> (accessed Feb. 9, 2010).

²⁹² Andrew E. Kramer, "Rise in Oil Price Eases Push for Reform in Russia," *New York Times*, June 3, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/> (accessed Feb. 9, 2010).

announcing in June 2009 that Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus would pursue WTO membership jointly as a customs union.²⁹³ This unprecedented move will inherently complicate and slow the process of gaining membership, which Russia has been pursuing for sixteen years.

Russian prosperity in the last decade has depended largely on oil exports. “For each \$1 increase in the price of oil, for example, Russia’s government budget earns about \$1.7 billion a year,” according to Yulia Tseplayeva, the chief economist for Merrill Lynch in Moscow.²⁹⁴ Referring to energy geopolitics Foreign Minister Lavrov commented, “Russia is beginning to protect its national interest by using its competitive advantages.”²⁹⁵ The shut off of gas to Ukraine in 2009 over pricing disputes is but the most blatant example of energy policy as a tool in foreign affairs. Energy wealth has also become an indirect enabler of Russian independence in foreign policy by undergirding its economic stability.

Russia is as interested in diversifying its energy customers as Europe is in finding a more diverse supply. Thus, it has looked to Asia with the proposal of an over 2,500 mile trans-Siberian oil pipeline. The Kremlin refused to finance the project, with an initial price tag of \$15.5 billion. In turning the bidding over to foreign financiers it essentially became a bidding war between China and Japan for influence in the Russian Far East.²⁹⁶ The final decision to place the terminus in a Russian Pacific port rather than China had more to do with Russian interest in diversifying purchasers than Japan winning the bidding. A Russian controlled terminus would allow oil from the pipeline to go to any Asia-Pacific country. Chinese anger over this decision was placated by the agreement to build a spur from the pipeline directly linking to China, with \$400 million of

²⁹³ Matthew Saltmarsh, "W.T.O. Chief Sees Russian Interest in Joining Waning," *New York Times*, October 2, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/> (accessed Feb. 9, 2010).

²⁹⁴ Kramer 2009

²⁹⁵ Freire, 128.

²⁹⁶ James Brooke, "INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS; Disputes at Every Turn of Siberia Pipeline," *New York Times*, January 21, 2005. <http://query.nytimes.com/> (accessed Feb 14, 2010).

financing from China's National Petroleum Company.²⁹⁷ Despite the 67 billion barrels of untapped oil reserves along the pipeline route, questions remain as to whether there will be enough oil to fill it, because so many of these oil fields remain underdeveloped.²⁹⁸

Broader economic development of the Russian Far East stands as the greatest economic issue in the region for Moscow. By some estimates, developing this area and bringing its resources to market will cost up to \$100 billion by 2020.²⁹⁹ Accomplishing these goals will require regional economic integration in trade, finance and labor. Yet, at this time, the Russian economy remains too corrupt, antiquated and closed to effectively attract outside investment. Due to sheer distance and poor quality of transportation links with the West, the eastern parts of Russia are quickly becoming more economically connected to China than with the rest of Russia. It is far cheaper to import products from China. In a region that can only grow its own food four months of the year, dependence on trade includes staple foods, as well as cheap toys, electronics and increasingly labor.³⁰⁰ Akademgorodok (Academicville), a suburb of the eastern city of Novosibirsk, is home to 52 scientific institutes and some 18,000 scientists. While the West has been wary of selling high technology products to China, Russia's underemployed research and technology sector has happily taken to meeting Chinese demand. In 2006 Akademgorodok received roughly 80% of its income from trade with China.³⁰¹ This economic fact has raised fears in Moscow about slipping influence over its own territory in Asia.

²⁹⁷ "China wins assurance on pipeline," *New York Times*, March 22, 2006: <http://www.nytimes.com/> (accessed Feb 14, 2010).

²⁹⁸ Brooke 2005

²⁹⁹ Mankoff, 223

³⁰⁰ Gabriel Gatehouse, "Russia's Far East looks to China," *BBC News*, June 5, 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/> (accessed Feb 11, 2010).

³⁰¹ Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova, "Fear and Loathing in Siberia," *Newsweek*, March 27, 2006. <http://www.newsweek.com/> (accessed Feb 11, 2010).

Though the border disputes with China have all been resolved, there is much talk of China making future claims on Russian territory by means of demography. Immigration from former Soviet Republics has long caused debates and tension within Russian society. Recently the rush of Chinese immigrants into the Far East has caused even greater concern. The demographic decline has already hit hard in the Far East, as Russians flee economic depression and lack of investment there. The population has shrunk from a peak of around ten million in the Soviet period to around 6.5 million at present, while just across the border live hundreds of millions of Chinese.³⁰² In 2006 Putin stated that the economic and demographic collapse of the Far East “poses a serious threat to our political and economic position in the Asia-Pacific region... and Russia’s national security in general.”³⁰³ Much of the immigration from China has been illegal. Estimates place the number of Chinese residents in Russia, mostly laborers and petty traders, between 200,000 and 400,000. These numbers remain relatively low due in large part to laws like the ban on foreign workers in Russian marketplaces enacted in April 2007.³⁰⁴ While the job creation scheme succeeded in forcing foreign owned firms to hire local Russians to run their stands, it has also raised prices and is bad for business, driving many out completely. Furthermore, in these hard economic times already tight quotas for foreign workers are being slashed, by as much as 50 percent.³⁰⁵ Despite desperately needing greater investment in infrastructure, which inevitably will have to come from outside Russia’s borders, Chinese companies have been blocked from buying strategic oil and gas assets.³⁰⁶ Import duties for goods coming in from China and restrictions on labor markets have only exacerbated an already bleak

³⁰² Stephen Kotkin, "The Unbalanced Triangle," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 2009): 130-38. <http://web.ebscohost.com> (accessed Feb. 20, 2010).

³⁰³ Mankoff, 222.

³⁰⁴ Gatehouse 2007.

³⁰⁵ Kester Kenn Klomegah, "RUSSIA: Migrant Workers Forced to Head Home," *Inter Press Agency*, January 17, 2009. <http://ipsnews.net/> (accessed February 20, 2010).

³⁰⁶ Matthews and Nemtsova 2006.

economic picture in the Russian Far East.³⁰⁷ Moscow will need to overcome its strategic concerns and a nationalistic aversion to immigration, especially virulent in border regions, in order to enact the sort of economic regional integration necessary to develop the region.

Security Factors

Russian strategic planners continue to take a state centered security approach. They divide their security policy into three main vectors following the three cardinal directions West, South, and East (while the Arctic is important to Russia, the north factors little into its defense strategy). To the west lay the U.S. and NATO, named in the new Russian military doctrine Medvedev signed in February 2010, as continuing to be the leading threats to Russian security.³⁰⁸ Of primary concern to the Kremlin are NATO's enlargement, the plans for which bring it right up to Russia's borders, and the proposed American missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Moscow initially praised the Obama administration's decision to scrap plans for missile systems in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic. However, Russian policymakers and generals continue to complain that the paired down system appears more aimed at them than Iranian missiles, especially after Romania and Bulgaria announced in early February that they had accepted American proposals to base missile interceptors.³⁰⁹

To the south, Russia claims the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia as its zone of privileged interest. Formed during the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a loose union of former Soviet Republics. This organization has had little success and seems a thinly veiled effort by Moscow to bind these governments to Russia

³⁰⁷ Gatehouse 2007.

³⁰⁸ "The cruel Sea," *The Economist*, February 13th-19th, 2010: 54.

³⁰⁹ Reuters, "Missile Threat Signals U.S.-Russia Reset Strains," *New York Times*, February 15, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/> (accessed Feb. 15, 2010).

through political loyalty, business interests and the predominant influence of Russian culture.³¹⁰ Within this framework rose the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). First initiated as the CIS Collective Security Treaty, the organization is currently composed of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. To an extent the CSTO has functioned as a counterbalance to U.S. and NATO presence in the region. It provides the legal grounds for the permanent stationing of Russian forces in these countries, ostensibly to protect them against terrorism.³¹¹ Thus Russia jealously guards the CIS, using tools like the CSTO to block western influence and ensure these nations' continued dependence on Moscow for military and economic security.³¹² As Yale University professor and adjunct fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations Jeffrey Mankoff states, "Russia has throughout its entire history viewed having some measure of control over the states along its borders as a condition necessary for its security."³¹³ This demand for a 'zone of special interest' reinforces how Russia remains entrenched in old-fashioned power politics.

Similar motives have driven Russian participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Founded on the principles of multipolarity and national sovereignty, the SCO reflects a rejection of American hegemony and an alternative to the intrusive European style multilateralism Russia and China both deplore. While the Chinese have taken a largely economic interest in Central Asia, the Russians see military cooperation as the primary focus.³¹⁴ Nervous about China's rise, this has also allowed Russia leverage over the inevitable creeping of Chinese power over its historical sphere of influence. Some have pointed to the SCO as Russia's

³¹⁰ Trenin, "Russia Reborn," 2009.

³¹¹ Freire 2009, 139.

³¹² Mankoff, 281.

³¹³ Mankoff, 294.

³¹⁴ Mark Katz, "Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Moscow's Lonely Road from Bishkek to Dushanbe," *Asian Perspective* 32, no. 3 (2008): 183-87, <http://www.asianperspective.org/> (accessed Feb. 8, 2010).

best response to NATO.³¹⁵ In addition to opposing ballistic missile defense, the organization called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Central Asia in 2005. Furthermore, Moscow has tried to use the SCO to counter democratizing trends in member states.³¹⁶ Thinking according to zero-sum logic, the Kremlin views the rash of color revolutions in former Soviet Republics as the result of Western interference.³¹⁷ The rise of democratic regimes in the region not only undermines Russian influence abroad, but also threatens the powers of an increasingly undemocratic Kremlin. However as the SCO expands or the power of China grows, Russian influence may wane. If left feeling too weak, the Kremlin may eventually downplay the SCO, and return to emphasizing the CIS and CSTO, since these are organizations that Russia can dominate. Of course Russia must be careful that such a strategy does not simply further push the region towards China or the West.³¹⁸

To the east, Russian policymakers are trying to manage the rise of China, once again vacillating between bandwagoning with the regional power through economic and military ties, and balancing it through cultivation of relations with other nations in Asia. China and Russia have shared interests in the development of a multipolar world and fiercely reject any interference by outside powers in their internal affairs. In light of China's quickly growing strength, President Putin sought to codify the "essential equality of the two states."³¹⁹ The 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was the first official recognition of China as an equal partner by Russia, while ensuring that Russia officially retained level footing with its growing neighbor for the treaty's twenty year duration. A decades long piecemeal

³¹⁵ Mankoff, 196.

³¹⁶ Katz, 183.

³¹⁷ Freire, 143.

³¹⁸ Katz, 187.

³¹⁹ Dmitri, Trenin, "Russia's Asia Policy under Vladimir Putin 2000-5," in *Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia*, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo and Joseph Ferguson. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 114.

process of delineating their 2,700-mile frontier came to a close in 2004, and the last dispute over two islands was resolved in 2008.³²⁰ Moscow did not want to leave an increasingly assertive Beijing, “the option of withdrawing from the ‘incomplete’ agreement and making the case again for the return of territories ceded by the Qing dynasty under ‘unequal treaties’ with the Russian empire,”³²¹ concludes director of studies at the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Dmitri Trenin.

Russian and Chinese military ties go beyond the joint exercises coordinated through the SCO. Russia happily filled the niche opened by western embargos on sales of arms to China following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. In the 1990s sales to China kept the Russian military industrial complex afloat as the Russian Federation slashed military spending levels.³²² Weapons sales ranked second only to oil as the export at the core of Russia’s economic recovery. And for many years China was Russia’s leading customer.³²³ Yet the Kremlin has long been wary of the strategic consequences of arming a potential rival. The Chinese military has increased in strength, expanded indigenous military-industrial capacity, and begun demanding more advanced technical systems. At the same time Russian military capabilities have failed to keep pace. Russia continues to struggle with the maintenance of its Soviet military inheritance. The quantities of armaments have dropped drastically in the last twenty years. This had led to a defense strategy with ever greater reliance on its nuclear deterrent. Yet China has not been party to any of the bilateral nuclear and conventional arms limitations treaties concluded between the U.S. and Russia. Russia will likely demand broader participation in any further moves toward

³²⁰ Mankoff, 203.

³²¹ Trenin, “Russia’s Asia Policy,” 114.

³²² Mankoff, 215.

³²³ Ko Sangtu, “Russia’s Choice of Alliance: Balancing or Bandwagoning,” in *Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia*, ed. Iwashita Akihiro. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), 149-161.

nuclear disarmament after whatever reductions agreed upon in the current START follow-on negotiations are enacted.

Russia's role as a leading arms dealer, with an orders portfolio in 2009 of between \$22 to \$32 billion according to the head of the government's arms export agency Anatoly Isaikin,³²⁴ provides an ability to build up militarized powers that can collectively rival even the United States, much less China.³²⁵ Within the dynamics of Asia, Russia has turned its focus to building up other powers capable of balancing China. In 2008 sales of weapons to China decreased dramatically.³²⁶ In 2009 Vietnam was Russia's largest weapons customer.³²⁷ In the past decade even when China was receiving the greatest quantities of Russian arms, India has been the recipient of the most sophisticated Russian weapons.³²⁸ Thus the dance of bandwagoning and balancing carries on.

For the time being engagement has won over arms fueled rivalry. The Primakov Doctrine, named for former Russian Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov who advocated cooperation with other regional powers to increase Russian international clout, demonstrates the pinnacle of Russia's pursuit of multilateralism as a break on U.S hegemony. Moscow continues to pursue a strategic Asian triangle in the form of China-India-Russia trilateral cooperation. With annual special meetings of the three foreign ministers and elevation of the trilateral dialogue to the summit level the participants are moving towards institutionalization of their trilateral cooperation. Noting successes in laying the groundwork for greater trilateral collaboration, in 2007 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, V. Losyukov noted that more than just economic

³²⁴ Nabi Abdullaev, "Vietnam Top Buyer of Russian Arms," *www.defensenews.com*, January 21, 2010, (accessed Feb. 14 2010).

³²⁵ Susan Turner, "Russia, China, and a Multipolar World Order: The Danger in the Undefined," *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 1 (2009), 159-184. *www.asiaperspective.org/* (accessed Feb. 10, 2010).

³²⁶ Katz, 187.

³²⁷ Abdullaev 2010.

³²⁸ Turner, 173.

cooperation, this framework allows “for efficient participation of the three states in the construction of a new, more democratic and fair world order.”³²⁹ Such language is a thinly veiled euphemism for using the collective strengths and coinciding foreign policy interests of these three Asian powers to create a multipolar world in which the West, and U.S. in particular, is not allowed to dominate.

Among the powers of East Asia, Russia’s relations are worst with Japan. The two nations never signed a peace treaty officially ending World War II hostilities. The leading strain in relations comes from an ongoing dispute over four islands in the Kurile chain, which are administered by Russia but claimed by Japan. Economic factors have brought the two powers together in recent years, especially the Japanese financing of economic development in the Russian Far East. In the early 1990’s when the Russian economy was at its weakest Moscow offered to return the two southernmost, and smallest, of the four disputed islands, in exchange for Japanese investment in the Russian economy.³³⁰ Japanese nationalists rejected the deal, and currently both sides lack interest in the issue. Russia continues to court Japan as a regional counterweight to China, a factor seen in the chosen path of its Trans-Siberian oil pipeline and growing contacts through the Six Party Talks.

Interests in the Korean Peninsula

As the geostrategic center of Northeast Asia, involvement in the Korea issue is key to maintaining influence in the entire Asia-Pacific Region. Due to its geographic proximity and potential destabilizing effects, North Korea presents a security interest to Russia. Moscow insists that the issue must be resolved diplomatically rather than militarily, and has denounced

³²⁹ Mikhail L. Titarenko, "Russia's Strategic Partnerships in Asia: The Asian Dimension of Russian Federation Foreign Policy," *China Report*, (July/September 2008), 281-95. <http://chr.sagepub.com> (accessed Feb. 19, 2010).

³³⁰ Mankoff, 226.

American language on regime change as unhelpful. Potential to benefit from economic integration drives further interest in resolution of the crisis. The Russian intent to exert itself as a regional power drives its desire to be involved in the process of reaching a resolution of the current crisis. Yet with a weak hand, its adoption of the role of honest-broker has put Moscow in a difficult position.

The Soviet Union played an integral role in the birth of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), helping Kim Il Sung in his rise to power over the communist half of the divided peninsula in 1948. The USSR continued to provide economic, political and security support to the DPRK until the former's dissolution. In the 1980s, Moscow also provided Kim Il Sung with nuclear energy reactors, and demanded that North Korea follow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and join the NPT.³³¹ The loss of Russian support, and especially the Soviet era security guarantee, played a large part in the decision of a weakened North Korea to turn to nuclear blackmail as a means of grabbing the attention of the U.S. and gaining economic aid.

Russian security interest in the Korean Peninsula focuses on preventing armed conflict or a Northeast Asian arms race. Russia wishes to check the concentration of armaments on the peninsula and lessen the imbalance vis-à-vis its own forces in the region.³³² Moscow does not perceive North Korea as a direct military threat. They believe Kim to be in firm political control, the DPRK unlikely to use its nuclear capability unless backed into a corner, and feel assured that Russia would not be a target of any dirty bomb attacks resulting from North Korean links to

³³¹ Vasily Mikheev, "Russian Strategic Thinking toward North and South Korea," in *Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia*, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo and Joseph P. Ferguson. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 187-204.

³³² Ha and Shin, 14.

terrorism.³³³ Furthermore, as the interaction point of three nuclear powers and two countries with latent nuclear capabilities, the North Korean issue threatens to be a catalyst for both vertical and horizontal proliferation. Russia has long expounded its support for the NPT and eventual goal of global nuclear disarmament, both of which are undermined by North Korean nuclearization. Also, any issue that induces China to build up its nuclear forces is seen as a loss of relative defensive strength for the Russians. Though it would never admit so publicly, Moscow recognizes that long term security on the peninsula will require a new regime in Pyongyang.³³⁴ Yet they remain vehemently opposed to any military or other actions that would bring about the precipitous fall of the current regime. Such an event would be destabilizing in the region, although Russian concerns about coping with a humanitarian disaster and an influx of refugees may be overblown considering its heavily fortified and narrow 17km border with North Korea.³³⁵ The Kremlin has consistently expounded its interest in a peaceful, nonnuclear Korean Peninsula so as to lessen its own security costs in Asia.

In economic terms Moscow has further incentive for maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula. Since establishing relations with the Republic of Korea (RoK), Moscow has been hoping to benefit from this rising economy's power in the form of investment in the Russian Far East. Despite pursuing a policy of balanced relations with both Korean states, these economic concerns will inevitably continue to skew Russian interests towards South Korea.³³⁶ Russian scholar Vasily Mikheev argues that Russia benefits from extending the status quo for as long as possible. Many have accepted that eventual reunification will involve South Korea absorbing its northern counterpart. This would produce a larger, more powerful state that Moscow fears would

³³³ Mikheev, 199.

³³⁴ Ha and Shin, 25.

³³⁵ Mikheev, 201.

³³⁶ Ha and Shin, 16.

continue to be a U.S. client. Furthermore, should this occur South Korean capital would be devoted to upgrading the North Korean economy rather than being invested in the Russian Far East.³³⁷ Conversely, gradual market reform has a potential to benefit Russian business interests, if they could take advantage of close Russian relations with Pyongyang to have a role in the privatization of North Korea's state-owned firms.³³⁸ Thus, economics shine light on Moscow's measured and passive approach towards Pyongyang.

There has been much discussion of the benefits to Russia stemming from economic integration with the peninsula and the possibility of an 'Iron Silk Road'. The integration of a trans-Korean rail line with Russia's trans-Siberian railroad to create a transport for the shipment of containers from Asia to Europe would greatly benefit all involved. The fact that such a transport link can only meet fruition with the resolution of issues on the Korean Peninsula provides an economic incentive for Russia to work towards such a goal. Yet despite a 2001 agreement to begin planning for this project, political obstacles and the expense of upgrading the North Korean Russian rail systems continue to prove major obstacles.³³⁹ Also, if developed, a direct route through Chinese Manchuria would be quicker.³⁴⁰ More promising is the Russian role in contributing to energy integration on the Korean Peninsula. Moscow has floated several proposals to take advantage of its energy supply, both in hydrocarbons and electricity production. In terms of gas, Moscow has proposed a pipeline either running through Korea from North to South, or in the event of continued tensions, linking directly to the lucrative South Korea market via the Sea of Japan. Russia's electricity monopoly Unified Energy Systems of Russia (RAO UES) is interested in providing excess supply to the Korean Peninsula. North

³³⁷ Mikheev, 198.

³³⁸ Mikheev, 198.

³³⁹ Michael Berk, "Russia's Perspective on the DPRK and Regional Security," *Canadian Institute of International Affairs*, February 23, 2007, Cankor Report #274, <http://www.nautilus.org/> (accessed February 10, 2010).

³⁴⁰ Legvold 2007, 123.

Korea would gain much needed electrical power and profitable fees for transferring Russian electricity to South Korea. A joint electricity grid would also be a crucial link in North-South cooperation. Another plan proposed the construction of a nuclear power facility in the Primorsk region dedicated to supplying North Korea. However the required international investment was lacking and many have environmental concerns about nuclear power plants in such a seismically active region.³⁴¹ Thus it is clear why Moscow resented being left out of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which emerged from the 1994 agreement. Russia has a vested economic interest in partaking in Korean electricity development, as well as a potentially positive role to play.

Matters of prestige are most important to the role Russia has adopted in its approach to solving the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Its involvement in the Six Party Talks has largely been based on the assumption that as a regional power, Russia has the right to participate. After the abandonment of North Korea in the 1990s, Moscow felt snubbed when it was not consulted in the creation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.³⁴² With the weakest hand of the powers in Northeast Asia, Putin focused on making Russia relevant once more by developing a special relationship with Pyongyang. Russia has pursued an 'equidistant' strategy towards Korea, restoring influence through rapprochement with the North without negatively affecting relations with the South.³⁴³ In this way Russia has striven to posit itself as an 'honest-broker' in the negotiations over the North Korean nuclear crisis, using its comparative advantage in dealing with 'rogue states' shunned by the United States.³⁴⁴ In 2002 this strategy appeared to pay off, as

³⁴¹ Berk 2007.

³⁴² Gilbert Rozman, "Russian Strategic Thinking on Asian Regionalism" in *Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia*, ed. Gilbert Rozmo, Kazuhiko Togo and Joseph P. Ferguson. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 229-254.

³⁴³ Ha and Shin, 12.

³⁴⁴ (Trenin, "Russia's Asia Policy," 122.

the North Koreans insisted over U.S. objections that Russia be included in the multilateral framework.

While Russia and the U.S. share the same objective of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, they have come into conflict over the best means to achieve that objective. Russia prefers the diplomacy and economic incentives of the Ukraine model, while the U.S. has pursued the sort of hard line sanctions and military threats outlined in the Libya model. In the Six Party Talks Russia presented a collective security plan calling for denuclearization of the peninsula, a resumption of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks that include discussion of a security assurance for the North, and a resumption or continuation of the humanitarian and economic support.³⁴⁵ Russia also proposed that in order to overcome the political impossibility of a direct U.S. security guarantee of the North Korean regime, it and China could provide the necessary backing so long as some sort of nonaggression agreement can be hammered out between the U.S. and DPRK.³⁴⁶ Despite American skepticism about allowing Pyongyang any sort of nuclear technology, the Russian head of delegation to the Six Party Talks echoed Moscow's policy in stating, "Russia has always insisted that the DPRK, as a sovereign state, can develop its peaceful nuclear program in keeping with international law."³⁴⁷

Russia faces a dilemma in maintaining its strategy of increased influence by way of close relations with Pyongyang while also upholding its interest in supporting the NPT. Russia entered into this strategy assuming that Washington's untenable position towards Pyongyang was based on pursuit of hegemony and that North Korea had legitimate interests requiring attention, chiefly

³⁴⁵ Ha and Shin, 20.

³⁴⁶ Ha and Shin, 20.

³⁴⁷ Charles L. Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of how North Korea got the Bomb* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2007), 95.

regime security concerns.³⁴⁸ Even after North Korea announced itself to be a nuclear power in 2006, it was politically easier for Russia to cling to their previous belief that the North Korean's would not actually cross that line, and were just bluffing. Thus, the ensuing nuclear tests have made Moscow's position that much more untenable. To retain its strongest card, the role of honest broker, Russia cannot simply follow U.S. initiatives for economic and military sanctions.³⁴⁹ On the U.S. side there has been much criticism of the Russian's buffering North Korea from the brunt of U.S. pressure. The results are mixed from the Kremlin's perspective. This may have undermined a resolution of the crisis in allowing North Korea to benefit from endless rounds of diplomacy that bring economic aid but no denuclearization. Yet the Russians take pride in crediting themselves with having prevented military hostilities, and the ongoing multilateral process has fulfilled their goal of legitimizing Russia's role in the region.

Opportunities for Engaging Russia in the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative

Russia has a proven track record of interest in multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia. The Soviet Union, especially under Gorbachev, repeatedly pushed for the creation of collective security organizations in the region.³⁵⁰ In this tradition Yeltsin proposed eight party talks to deal with the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. Rebuffed by the U.S., this plan would have included the current six parties plus the IAEA and UN Secretary General.³⁵¹ Additionally, when tensions rose again in 2002 Russia was the first to propose being an active moderator.³⁵² This desire for multilateralism stems directly from both the underlying determinants of Russian foreign policy as a whole, and its particular interests in the Korean Peninsula. Having a seat at

³⁴⁸ Rozman, 239.

³⁴⁹ Ha and Shin, 20.

³⁵⁰ Ha and Shin, 10.

³⁵¹ Ha and Shin, 10.

³⁵² Ha and Shin, 18.

the table in a regional institution would legitimate an equal Russian voice in a region where its claims to great power status have been unstable and tenuous. It is clearly within Russia's interest to maintain peace on its borders and reduce its own security costs in the region by diffusing a situation that could lead to conventional and nuclear arms races. Russia desires economic integration, a point backed by their particular interest in regional energy and transport integration.

A number of current trends further push Russia towards participation in a multilateral framework. The rise in energy prices makes it that much more appealing to open links for energy export and development of Far East oil and gas fields, which will continue to rely on foreign financing. Despite the temporary drop during the recession, the long term trend upwards in prices also gives the Japanese and Chinese further incentive to help Russia in this pursuit. Centralization of power in the executive has given the Kremlin much greater control over its foreign policy in the last ten years. Regardless of the internal consequences this has for democracy, it means that policymakers may be able to bypass mass hysteria about immigration and overcome the trouble once posed by meddling local officials.³⁵³

Russian foreign policy actions point to an existing penchant towards multilateral efforts. This can be largely attributed to a continuing strategy of combining bandwagoning and balancing in the region. It is important to define the type of multilateral organizations that Russia views favorably and is likely to join. Moscow remains inherently suspicious of European style integration through institutions that promote human rights and democratization. As discussed later in *Lessons from Europe* by Mirella Warren, Russian relations with the European Union, OSCE and NATO remain strained due to perception that they are tools of the west meant to

³⁵³ Rozman, 245.

remake the world in their own image. Such democratization presents a direct threat to the regime security of the Putin-Medvedev administration. Yet hostility towards perceived U.S. hegemony actually increases Russian investment in those institutions it views as lending Moscow greater leverage in international affairs while not infringing on its sovereignty. The quintessential multilateral organization for Moscow continues to be the UN because the legitimacy it grants Russia while abiding by the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Russia remains a staunch supporter of the UN, all the more so after its disappointment with American disregard for the Security Council in the run-up to the Iraq war.³⁵⁴ Moscow has also worked closely on security issues with Beijing in co-leading the SCO. There have been overtures towards India and China to form a strategic Asian triangle. Finally, Russia has recently taken a key interest in ASEAN. Moscow sees huge potential for cooperation in different fields of industry; energy sector equipment; agriculture; transport; science and technologies, including information technology (IT).³⁵⁵ Kremlin leaders appear earnest in their desire for economic and security cooperation, so long as it does not lead to a questioning of their authority.

The security focused NEASCO constitutes just the sort of multilateral organization Russia has shown a preference for. Russia's demonstrated interest in multilateral cooperation on the Korean issue means that it would view favorably an institutionalized forum that guarantees their equal voice in the region. The Anti-Terrorism and Military Exercises Advisory Councils echo and expand on the sort of cooperation Moscow has already successfully engaged with Beijing in the SCO. The Arms Control Advisory Council also perfectly aligns with Russian desires to decrease the levels of armament on its borders and demands to broaden discussions on nuclear arms control beyond the traditional bilateral format with the United States. Moscow

³⁵⁴ Tatiana Zakaurtseva, "The Current Foreign Policy of Russia," in *Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia*, ed. Iwashita Akihiro. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), 87-112.

³⁵⁵ Titarenko, 293.

would likely look favorably upon the Special Projects section as a forum for encouraging economic integration and foreign investment in the Far East. A security focused NEASCO in which Russia felt its influence to be strong therefore presents a lucrative prospect for Moscow.

Challenges to the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative

Despite recent trends towards multilateralism, Russia has historically preferred bilateral relations. The Russians remain vigilant about being forced into intrusive organizations founded on international norms derived from Western principles of sovereignty, democracy, or human rights. Binding institutions that infringe on state sovereignty are viewed as undermining the security of a Kremlin that continues to consolidate power at the center. The vaguely defined mandate of the Special Projects section will be identified by the Russian's as a dangerous opening for the United States to pursue its human rights and democratizing agendas. Moscow has not forgotten the lessons of the Helsinki Accords. They are determined not to be fooled in a fashion similar to the Soviet leaders, who trumpeted the OSCE predecessor as an economic success for themselves, only to find that it severely undermined their regime by opening the door to criticisms of human rights abuses.

Moscow's continued mistrust of the U.S. could also make it wary of any regional organization that it perceives as giving the American's undue influence in the region. Many of Moscow's regional ties have been aimed at creating bilateral and multilateral coalitions capable of balancing American hegemony.³⁵⁶ Thus Moscow may be skeptical of permanently legitimizing a U.S. role in the region. Russia would rather allow American influence to wane. The cowing effects of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan combined with Obama's less

³⁵⁶Iwashita Akihiro, "Primakov Redux? Russia and the 'Strategic Triangles' in Asia," in *Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia*, ed. Iwashita Akihiro (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), 165-194.

confrontational approach to foreign policy make Russia more amenable to cooperating with a U.S. that it no longer views as pursuing hegemonic designs. Yet Russia may forever see the American democratizing agenda as a direct threat to its regime security.³⁵⁷ While the Arms Control Council has positive attributes in addressing the Korean issue, any further moves on nuclear disarmament must include all the nuclear powers, and therefore will likely occur in a different, broader forum. Russia may also be hesitant to join an organization in which it could be potentially overshadowed by greater powers like the U.S. and China. Yet the overall increase in prestige and engagement offered by this organization make it likely that participation in such an institution would lessen rather than increase this tendency.

Finally, Japanese-Russian relations continue to stand as a stumbling block to regional cooperation. Despite their increasing economic ties, the two countries have been unable or unwilling to tackle the strategic questions. The territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands remains unresolved, and they lack a peace treaty concluding WWII. A domestic rejectionist tendency born of nationalism and strains of xenophobia further complicate cooperation in Northeast Asia. Though economics present a promising driver for regional integration, the corrupt inefficient Russian economy fails to attract interest from foreign investors. Thus political frictions, domestic factors, and mistrust of the United States could complicate moves to integrate Russia into NEASCO.

Policy Considerations

As the United States approaches the creation of the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative it must keep in mind a few key points critical in relation to Russia. Above all an emphasis must

³⁵⁷ Rozman, 232.

be made on our shared interests in reaching a denuclearizing solution on the Korean Peninsula. Serious efforts ought to be made to align American strategies with those of partners seeking the same result. Many question whether the Libya model of denuclearization was truly successful even in Libya, or if factors well beyond the military threats from the U.S. played a larger role in al-Gaddafi's decision. Thus it is advisable for American policymakers to take a harder look at the Ukrainian model preferred by Russian and China. A compromise in which the U.S. dropped its military threats against the North Korean regime could prompt Moscow to take a harsher stance on Pyongyang.

Engaging Russia in an institutionalized organization that ensures Moscow lasting clout in the region would solve the dilemma they currently face as an honest broker. Russia would no longer remain reliant on good relations with the DPRK to retain their voice in the regional process. Therefore the Kremlin would be freed to de-couple from Pyongyang and take a tougher line in pursuing its own interests in denuclearization. A softening of the American stance would thereby remove Russia as an impediment to the process. Agreeing on a common strategy would allow the U.S., Russia, and China to amplify each other's sway with North Korea, rather than canceling each other out as has often been the case in the divided Six Party Talks. The U.S. cannot and should not ignore Russia in this process, and therefore should encourage a bandwagoning of resources and energies to reach our shared goal.

American policymakers must remain vigilant of Russian sensitivities towards appearances of hegemonic designs. Efforts to underline the break from the Bush administration's unilateralist tendencies should continue. Globally, the U.S. must act in a way that reassures allies and partners rather than leaving them feeling threatened. Reengaging the United Nations and showing a dedication to the accepted norms of international law will prove a welcome change of

pace from what many saw as the rampaging hegemon of the last decade. By reducing the perceived threat level in other capitals, the U.S. may find more ready partners.

The U.S. must also accept that the Russians are opposed to and threatened by our democratizing agenda. To make progress on other vital issues, we must therefore place these issues on separate tracks. Non-starter issues like human rights or other mechanisms that inflame Moscow's aversion towards intrusion in its internal affairs should be avoided.

NEASCO must be advertised as an organization that will give all the countries involved equal voice. The U.S. must remind Moscow how much they have to gain from integration in Northeast Asia, and acknowledge how much the Kremlin has to offer in reaching a solution to the Korean issue as well. Finally, the U.S. must take advantage of Russian interest in being seen as a great power to encourage it to take on the responsibilities of a modern great power.

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
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In the last few decades, the United States has had considerable influence in the North-East Asian region: politically, militarily and economically. In the last decade, countries in this region have become increasingly less dependent on the United States and less willing to engage with Washington regarding various issues. For example, after the Asian economic crisis, post-crisis regionalism took place which was accompanied by a “desire to limit the influence in the region of the U.S. and the international financial institutions.”³⁵⁸ We have also witnessed the steady emergence of China into the regional and global community. Whether China is labeled as a hegemonic power or not, it can not be disputed that its rising influence in the region continues to increase while the influence of the United States is diminishing. The United States economic ties with the North-East Asian region remain crucial for its economic growth. China and Japan are third and fourth ranking export partners with the United States and first and fourth import partners, respectively.³⁵⁹ Countless American corporations and businesses rely on economic exchange with countries in the Asian region. The United States must seriously consider its level of engagement with countries in this region, especially at this crucial moment where the United States presence is not always welcome, let alone required as it was in the past. It is imperative for the United States, for political, economic and security reasons, to be engaged with Six-Party Talks member nations, especially the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, in a manner that is both effective and successful.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

³⁵⁸ Paul Bowles, “Asia’s Post-Crisis Regionalism: Bringing the State Back in, Keeping the (United) States Out,” *Review of International Political Economy*, vol.9 no.2 (2002): 230.

³⁵⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: United States,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>.

The Six-Party Talks represent a recent role the United States has assumed in Asia in regards to security within the region. Since the inception of these talks, North Korea remains a major concern to the United States as well as the other member states. Regarding an agreement of the Six-Party Talks made on October 3, 2007 in Beijing, President Bush affirmed that it “reflects the common commitment of the participants in the Six-Party talks to realize a Korean Peninsula that is free of Nuclear Weapons³⁶⁰ .

The last decade bore witness to extremely unstable relations between the governments of the United States and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea. After September 11th, 2001 relations severely deteriorated and on January 10th, 2002, Pyongyang released a formal statement withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)³⁶¹. On October 16th, 2002, Pyongyang admitted to violating the 1994 Agreement Framework by secretly continuing to develop nuclear weapons³⁶². While the United States have employed various methods of negotiation with North Korea, the country’s recent actions have rapidly countered much of the progress previously made with the Six-Party talks. North Korea now, more than ever before represents a threat to stability in the Asia region, and by default, the United States. On January 30th, 2009 North Korea “suspended or nullified all major inter-Korean agreements” which included the 1953 armistice that maintained peace between the two countries³⁶³. On April 5th, 2009 North Korea launched a long-range missile, defying “appeals from the international community” as well as a series of United Nations resolutions. The U.N. responded by issuing a

³⁶⁰ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *North Korea and Its Nuclear Program – A Reality Check*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, 2.

³⁶¹ Akl Kairouz, “North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 39 no.1 (2004):28.

³⁶² Akl Kairouz, “North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 39 no.1 (2004):29.

³⁶³ House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Tests and the Six-Party Talks: Where Do We Go From Here?*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 2.

Presidential Statement of Condemnation, at which point North Korea withdrew completely from the Six-Party Talks³⁶⁴. One day later, on April 6th, North Korea expelled inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from the Yongbyon nuclear facility. At the end of the month the DPRK announced that it would again produce plutonium and weaponize all of its fissile material³⁶⁵.

It is clear that North Korea represents a grave threat to its Asian neighbors and the United States. After this rapid succession of events in North Korea, the United States and South Korea reaffirmed political and security commitments to each other. The United Nations resolution which passed in response to the North Korean threat was called “balanced” by a Chinese spokesperson and “moderate” by a Russian ambassador, proving the need for more proactive and effective engagement with North Korea.³⁶⁶ President Lee of South Korea stated the Six-Party Talks “aren’t working and need to be changed” while Defense Secretary Gates said he is “tired of buying the same horse twice” and President Obama pledged to “break [the] pattern.”³⁶⁷

There is a consensus that proper measures to deal with North Korea are lacking. What is needed, and has potential to be the most efficient means of establishing security in North-East Asia, is a multilateral organization. The proposed organization by this committee is the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO).

Japan

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Tests and the Six-Party Talks: Where Do We Go From Here?*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 2.

³⁶⁶ House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Tests and the Six-Party Talks: Where Do We Go From Here?*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 9.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

Reviewing Japan's recent security publications and policy decisions, it has become evident that North Korea is at the forefront of security threats facing Japan, proving to be more threatening than China.³⁶⁸ The North Korean threat has dramatically altered Japan's military posture, causing the "re-gearing" of the Japan Self-Defense Forces to: "respond to guerrilla incursions; introduce Ballistic Missile Defense; "[force] the pace of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation in East Asia and globally in 'out of area' contingencies;" and reconsider the non-nuclear stance.³⁶⁹

Much of Japan's recent military posture towards North Korea stems from the fear of "entrapment" by the United States if Japan is asked to provide military support in a conflict in the Korean Peninsula and also the fear of abandonment by the United States in the wake of a military North Korean threat. Japan is working to "strengthen its autonomous defense options" while also remaining confident in the U.S.-Japan security treaty.³⁷⁰

China

Following the DPRK withdrawal of membership from the NPT, China offered to "work closely with the U.S. to create a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula."³⁷¹ Beijing requested the use of diplomatic channels to resolve the North Korean conflict and asked the U.S. and DPRK to "normalize their relations through constructive and fair dialogue among equals" and offered a venue to hold such talks.³⁷² It is in China's best geo-political interests to thwart North Korea's

³⁶⁸ Christopher W. Hughes. "'Super-Sizing' the Dprk Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea," *Asian Survey*, vol.49 no.2 (2009):291.

³⁶⁹ Christopher W. Hughes. "'Super-Sizing' the Dprk Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea," *Asian Survey*, vol.49 no.2 (2009): 292.

³⁷⁰ Christopher W. Hughes. "'Super-Sizing' the Dprk Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea," *Asian Survey*, vol.49 no.2 (2009): 293.

³⁷¹ Akl Kairouz, "North Korean Nuclear Crisis," *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 39 no.1 (2004):29.

³⁷² *Idib.*

attempts of acquiring nuclear weaponry. It is important to note that the DPRK's success of developing weaponry will lead to an arms race in the region, which will prove a great threat to China and its surrounding countries.

The Bush Administration Policies

In order to design the most effective policy prescription, it is appropriate to reflect on the policies of President Bush's Administration to gather a comprehensive review of successes and failures as they currently stand. When speaking of dealing with North Korea, former President George W. Bush stated, "I believe this is not a military show-down...this is a diplomatic show-down."³⁷³ During this period, the United States found its military capabilities overstretched and saw extreme difficulty in containing a potential conflict in the Northeast Asian region.

For a number of years, the United States sought multilateral mechanisms to engage North Korea until they withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Six-Party Talks. After 2001, the two nation's unstable and distrusting relationship began. In 2001 Bush rejected then Secretary of State Colin Powell and former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's goal of "preserving continuity in the Sunshine Policy."³⁷⁴ Kim Dae-jung was regarded as "too-soft on the North as well as a lame duck who could be left waiting until the U.S. set a new course and then discussed it with his successor."³⁷⁵ In 2002, Bush named North Korea as part of the "Axis

³⁷³ Roland Bleiker, "A Rogue Is a Rouge Is a Rouge: US Foreign Policy and the Nuclear Crisis," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, vol. 79 no.4 (Jul. 2003): 720.

³⁷⁴ Gilbert Rozman, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia" *Asian Survey*, vol. 47 no. 4 (July-Aug., 2007): 604.

³⁷⁵ Gilbert Rozman, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia" *Asian Survey*, vol. 47 no. 4 (July-Aug., 2007): 605.

of Evil” in his State of the Union address, which prompted much anger from Pyongyang.³⁷⁶

Professor Roland Bleiker states that the perception of North Korea as a “‘rogue state’ severely hinders both an adequate understanding and a possible resolution of the crisis.”³⁷⁷ In 2005, after the gravity of North Korea’s nuclear attainment had become more and more pressing, President Bush referred to North Korea as a ‘tyrant,’ which further hindered attempts at multilateralism.³⁷⁸

In addition, President Bush’s consistent reference to North Korea as a terrorist regime, rouge state, etc. led to a “propaganda counteroffensive” where North Korea stated that “the most lawless regime in the world is none other than Bush’s regime, which is pursuing unilateralism, violating international laws and commitments in disarmament, environment, human rights and other sectors.”³⁷⁹ Although many regard Kim-Jong Il’s claims as made by a crazed and manic dictator, the United States should recognize that according to North Korea and some other nations, the United States acts unbound by international treaties and agreements. The United States has a long history of changing policies rather drastically with each presidential or congressional term. Indeed, in the international sphere the U.S. is viewed with a lack of credibility with regards to upholding its agreements. This is especially true because of other decisions made by the Bush Administration in other aspects of international policy. The very act of occupying Afghanistan and Iraq greatly upset the international community because of its unilateral and aggressive nature. These two wars led by the United States were also found especially threatening to North Korea because they regime change was of central importance. In

³⁷⁶ Gilbert Rozman, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia” *Asian Survey*, vol. 47 no. 4 (July-Aug., 2007): 604.

³⁷⁷ Roland Bleiker, “A Rogue Is a Rouge Is a Rouge: US Foreign Policy and the Nuclear Crisis,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, vol. 79 no.4 (Jul. 2003): 721.

³⁷⁸ Gilbert Rozman, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia” *Asian Survey*, vol. 47 no. 4 (July-Aug., 2007): 609.

³⁷⁹ Alexandre Mansourov, “The Hermit Mouse Roars: North Korea,” *Asian Affairs*, vol.30 no.2 *The Responses of Asian Nations to Bush Administration Security Policies*, (Summ. 2003): 90.

order to engage North Korea effectively and make steps to nuclear disarmament, the United States must give the DPRK a security guarantee.

Rather than “prioritizing multilateral coordination, Bush relied on unilateralism” in facing North Korea.³⁸⁰ After Pyongyang had admitted to secretly operating a uranium-enrichment program, President Bush discontinued shipping heavy oil shipments via KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization).³⁸¹ This withholding of oil is said to have lead Kim Jong-Il to restart his nuclear reactor, which in turn led to the eviction the inspectors of the International Energy Agency (IAEA).³⁸² As Doctor Gilbert Rozman states, “the Agreed Framework was dead, a showdown loomed and the states most affected watched helplessly.”³⁸³

Three successive policy measures towards North Korea emerged in the spring of 2003. First was the use of “tough talk” in which the United States threatened a preemptive attack on the DPRK. This threat was taken seriously by North Korea as well as China. However, since the United States was militarily and economically overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq, this was not followed through.³⁸⁴ Second, the United States asked China to persuade North Korea into trilateral talks. However, North Korea was only allowed to participate in the negotiations if Kim Jong-Il would “commit to verifiable, complete, and irreversible elimination of his nuclear programs.”³⁸⁵ Kim refused this proposal and China retreated to offering to facilitate the talks rather than participate. Bush’s third attempt to engage North Korea involved Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun in launching the Proliferation

³⁸⁰ Gilbert Rozman, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia” *Asian Survey*, vol. 47 no. 4 (July-Aug., 2007): 605.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Gilbert Rozman, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia” *Asian Survey*, vol. 47 no. 4 (July-Aug., 2007): 605.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

Security Initiative (PSI). This measure failed when South Korea demanded a coupling of pressure with the talks and then refused to enter the PSI, as did China.³⁸⁶ These three unilaterally led measures left the United States with “little choice but to turn to multilateralism.”³⁸⁷

In the summer of 2003, there was a renewed effort on the Six-Party Talks as well as bilateral talks between North Korea and other countries such as Japan and China. Another critique of the Bush Administration is the decision to require complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID) as a requisite to North Korea receiving any rewards or even to “begin talks on forthcoming incentives.”³⁸⁸ This stance frustrated China and Japan which were both willing to give a very limited, albeit, existing security guarantee or to find a middle ground on the CVID.³⁸⁹ The lack of the consensus between the countries attempting to engage the DPRK led to a lack of pressure on North Korea, and subsequently, real progress was not made.

Wade Huntley describes the Bush Administration’s policies to the DPRK as part of an overarching orientation in which the United States views itself as an invincible super-power in a post-Cold War era. He asserts that the Bush Administration devised its policy towards North Korea based on this attitude in addition to a set of erroneous assumptions about the North Korean regime. The result was the Administration’s inability to adapt which led to deteriorating circumstances with the DRPK and weakening of ties between other regional powers, including South Korea.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁶ Gilbert Rozman, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia” *Asian Survey*, vol. 47 no. 4 (July-Aug., 2007): 606.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Gilbert Rozman, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia” *Asian Survey*, vol. 47 no. 4 (July-Aug., 2007): 607.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Wade L. Huntley, “U.S. Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath’s Fate,” *Asian Survey*, vol. 47, no.3 (May-Jun., 2007): 460-61.

Many have referred to Bush's policies as 'revolutionary' but it can be argued that his policies are indicative of historical Republicanesque policies. The United States has asserted itself as a superpower in the international sphere on countless occasions and has intervened in many global and interregional issues and has acted as a leader in global security. North Korea has been countering the United States attempts to reign in their nuclear program.

A brief historical analysis of United States engagement with nuclear-armed hostile socialist states leads one to the conclusion that more equal, multilateral, voluntary engagement has led to the collapse of such regimes while very tough policies with threats and sanctions have not produced regime changes.

Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO)

The Northeast Asian Security Cooperative presents an opportunity for the United States to engage North Korea with the equal and voluntary participation of other Northeast Asian countries. The United States should enter this organization without qualms about human rights violations, environmental or economic policies. It is imperative that the Northeast Asian region become stabilized and that all immediate and potential threats of either a nuclear arms race or show of force is eliminated. Any issues not related to immediate security regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction can be addressed through other political means and through other organizations or a special topics committee. The priority must remain nuclear disarmament and international security.

Conclusion

Based on the review of the failings of the Bush Administration, the United States must adopt a posture of learning and change the method of policy measures towards North Korea. The

United States must center its focus on the denuclearization of the DPRK. The most effective way to do achieve this is without military force, and with the complete cooperation of the North Korean regime. The United States must be prepared to give North Korea a security guarantee and engage the government with a non-threatening posture. Based on the historical review of United States policy and an analysis of the Bush Administration, the United States should consider the pros and cons of removing a number of sanctions from North Korea.

The United States must understand the severity and complexity that North Korea's nuclear program presents. The Obama Administration must put this issue at the forefront of its foreign policy agenda. The United States policy must also account for the legacy and failings of the Bush Administration's policy with North Korea. There is no doubt that NEASCO is the most effective international cooperative measure that can be formed. It presents an opportunity for multilateral collaboration and an opportunity to engage North Korea in order international security and a nuclear free Korean peninsula to exist.


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The current direction of United States strategy in Asia as addressed by Secretary Hilary Clinton is multilateral engagement. This is also the approach taken in this Task Force recommendation. Although there are many admirable aspects of the U.S. vision for Asia, there are some features of U.S. engagement that need to be addressed. In her speech, Secretary Clinton quotes how Defense Secretary Robert Gates notes that the “United States is not a visiting power but a resident power”³⁹¹. This suggests that the United States will remain in Asia, not only through economic or political ties but also militarily and remain an influential force throughout Asia.

However, John G. Ikenberry notes that the United States is experiencing a “legitimacy deficit” and that anti-Americanism in East Asia is a reflection of this problem³⁹². The United States might not be the global power it sees itself as. The American presence and influence in the Asian region could experience some resistance from local forces. Three leading factors undermining American influence in the region are: the shifting power dynamics in Asia, negative perceptions of American power (soft and hard), resentment towards U.S foreign policy and local reactions to U.S. military bases abroad. The United States needs to take into account how it is perceived before further engaging itself in East Asia. Several factors are involved in discussing anti-Americanism in Asia³⁹³, however; for purpose of brevity, not all factors will be mentioned.

³⁹¹ Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities,” (remarks, Imin Center Honolulu, Hawaii, 12 January 2010) *US Department of State*.
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135090.htm> (accessed Feb. 24, 2010)

³⁹² David I. Steinberg, *Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics*. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 4.

³⁹³ Mathew Carlson and Travis Nelson, “Anti-Americanism in Asia? Factors shaping international perceptions of American influence.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, no. 8/3(2008): 303-324.

The history of anti-American sentiment can be traced back to 18th century European literature, which depicted Americans as rude, uncivilized, and being culturally inferior.³⁹⁴ This remained constant throughout the 20th century as negative stereotypes of Americans and American culture set.

U.S. foreign policy problems today are a result of what Chalmers Johnson calls “blowback” or unintended consequences of previous US efforts to secure a region or assert its imperial power³⁹⁵. Many researchers now suggest that much of Islamic anti-Americanism is rooted in American foreign policy³⁹⁶ as well as the spread of anti-American propaganda in that region. In order to fully comprehend some of the reasons behind anti-Americanism in Asia, we need to address why they hate us by understanding the history of American foreign policy, as well as the spread of anti-American propaganda in states like the DPRK.

Martin Mcgriffith identifies American economic and military power as one of the sources of anti-Americanism but argues that the United States will likely remain a global power welcome in various regions due to the economic and strategic benefits it provides. Although most states may “continue to accept US power as legitimate and benign because of its lack of territorial ambition and the global public goods it delivers through international stability”³⁹⁷; nations like North Korea that ideologically differs from the United States and has been plagued with instability and memories of U.S. intervention in the Korean war, might not agree.

³⁹⁴ Brendon O'Connor, and Martin Griffiths, *The rise of anti-Americanism*. (London: Routledge, 2006), 13.

³⁹⁵ Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), 9-13.

³⁹⁶ O'Connor and Griffiths, 76-77.

³⁹⁷ O'Connor and Griffiths, 117

Anti-Americanism- “the expression of negative attitudes towards the United States”³⁹⁸ can come in two forms: cultural anti-Americanism and anti-American political sentiment. Cultural anti-Americanism, which is rooted in deep hatred towards the United States, its ideology, history, institutions or culture is different from anti-American political sentiment. Anti-American sentiment is usually fuelled as a response to specific actions or policies of the United States,³⁹⁹ such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Much of the anti-American sentiment which developed after the U.S. decision to invade Iraq was the result of the disapproval people felt about the way the United States handled the “war on terror.” According to the PEW Global Attitudes Project, beginning from the year 2000, the overall trend of global opinion on American image has been increasingly negative. In Japan, for example, favorable view towards the United States decreased from 72 percent in the year 2002 to 50 percent in the year 2008.⁴⁰⁰ After the invasion of Iraq, American influence started to be regarded more negatively. In the twenty-five countries polled in a global opinion survey in 2006, 73 percent disapprove of the U.S. handling of the war in Iraq.⁴⁰¹ There is a general consensus that the overall unilateral stance that U.S. policy adopted during the Bush administration had negative effects on global perceptions of the United States and fueled anti-American sentiment as nations across the world became uneasy of U.S. actions.

³⁹⁸ Peter J. Katzenstein, and Robert Keohane. *Anti-Americanism in World Politics*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), 2.

³⁹⁹ Chang Hun Oh and Celeste Arrington. "Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentiments in South Korea." *Asian Survey*. 47 no. 2, (2007): 327-350.

⁴⁰⁰ PEW Research Center, *Opinions of the United States*, <http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&country=109&response=Favorable> (accessed February 25, 2010).

⁴⁰¹ “Global Views of the US,” *Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)*. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan07/BBC_USRole_Jan07_quaire.pdf (accessed Feb. 15, 2010)

The rise of cultural anti-Americanism or anti-American political sentiment weakens the United States' ability to negotiate for its own interests. For example, in an independent task force by the Council of Foreign Relations, authors stated that, "Anti-Americanism, in general is endangering our [U.S.] national security and compromising the effectiveness of our [U.S.] diplomacy"⁴⁰². If the international community perceives American ideals, way of life, presence and intervention negatively, agreements to safeguard America's future could be affected. It would be politically beneficial for the United States to not be portrayed as threatening or imperialistic. In order to achieve this goal, the notion of America as an empire and the reasons behind cultural anti-Americanism and anti-American political sentiment need to be addressed.

Most of the worldwide awareness of deep rooted cultural anti-Americanism came after September 11th, as citizens across the world began to ask why the United States was attacked. This extreme form of cultural anti-Americanism predominantly has come from a long history of conflict, difference in religious, political and cultural beliefs, accompanied by unwanted American intervention or presence. Cultural anti-Americanism and its consequences represent a fight against American cultural imperialism. The danger of extreme anti-Americanism is that it has the power to motivate extreme acts against the United States similar to the 9/11 terrorist attack.

Countries with relatively different cultural underpinnings and values from the U.S. may perceive the spread of American ideals and values as a threat. The Wilsonian and Puritan tradition that make up the American character⁴⁰³ can be summed up by what Walter Russell

⁴⁰² Peter G. Peterson, Kathy Bloomgarden, Henry Grunwald, David E. Morey, and Shibley Telhami. *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy*, (Independent Task Force, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003.), 3.

⁴⁰³ Leszek Buszynski, *Asia Pacific Security- Values and Identity*, (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 111.

Mead exemplifies as “promoting American values with a missionary zeal”⁴⁰⁴. The Wilsonian tradition, inspired through the enlightenment includes the promotion of democracy, political liberty and human rights through active multilateralism, international law and institutions⁴⁰⁵. This is combined with the America’s Puritan heritage evoking a sense of universal righteousness and morality which results in the “American imperialistic impulse, justifying involvement in the external world to defend American values or to protect American interests and its close allies.”⁴⁰⁶ However, it is worth mentioning that these human values of freedom, human rights and democracy, which America advocates as universal, actually vary from different cultural perspectives. In some countries, America’s aggressive, sometimes arrogant pursuit to spread the “American way of life” has been received negatively. Mahathir Mohammad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia and avid critic of the United States, adopted the “look East” Policy in 1982, which prompted Malaysians to look at “Asian Values” rather than Western ideas for the modernization process. He questioned the universality of Western values and stated the Malaysia needs to “look east... [and] rid ourselves of western values we’ve absorbed.”⁴⁰⁷⁴⁰⁸

Despite this negative view of the imposition of American values and culture that is often present in the increasing globalization- “Americanization” of the world after the Cold War, most Asian nations understand the relative necessity of American presence. Although critical of American social order, in a conversation with Fareed Zakaria, first Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, understood America’s role in providing security as a power balancer in East

⁴⁰⁴ Kohut, Andrew, and Bruce Stokes. *America Against the World*. (New York: Henry Holts and Company, LLC. , 2006), 20

⁴⁰⁵ Buszynsky, 111.

⁴⁰⁶ Buszynsky, 112-113.

⁴⁰⁷ Mahathir Mohammad, (Speech, Kuala Lumpur, Sept. 10, 1982) 33rd UMNO general Assembly.

⁴⁰⁸ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian foreign policy in the Mahathir era, 1981-2003: dilemmas of development*, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 181.

Asia.⁴⁰⁹ In his rather ambivalent view of the West he also states that, “If we did not have the good points of the West to guide us, we wouldn’t have gotten out of our backwardness... but we not want all of the West”

South Korea

Negative Korean perception of America cannot be ignored because of their implications for U.S.-Korean relations and for regional politics in North East Asia. This can be caused by a wide range of factors too broad to discuss in detail involving American power, foreign policy, cultural criticism, political and economic resentment, ideological rejections⁴¹⁰⁴¹¹. While overall relations with the United States have had a number of developments as discussed on the section on Korea, anti-American sentiment has been nevertheless, present since the Korean War.⁴¹²

The United States’ involvement with Korea can be traced back to the U.S.-Soviet Agreement that divided Korea at the 38th parallel in 1945. After which, the United States established the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). The U.S. withdrew their forces from South Korea in 1949 after the Republic of Korea was formed in 1948, only to return the following year to defend the South Koreans from the invasion from the North in an attempt to reunify the two Koreas. The war lasted from 1950-1953 ending in an armistice. Since then, U.S. military presence has remained primarily due to the threat North Korea poses. However, as the South Korean economy grows and the perceived North Korean threat, by the new generation of South Koreans, diminishes; questions on the relevance and size of American presence (economic

⁴⁰⁹ Fareed Zakaria and Lee Kuan Yew, "Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," *Foreign Affairs*, 73 no. 2 (1994): 125.

⁴¹⁰ Gi-Wook Shin, "South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective," *Asian Survey*, 36/8(1996): 789.

⁴¹¹ David I. Steinberg, *Korean attitudes toward the United States: changing dynamics*, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 8-13.

⁴¹² See Stephanie Kim, North Korea section, Task Force.

and military) ensue. In response to the rise of the South Korean economy, some Koreans have become resentful of U.S. intervention in domestic affairs. To understand this phenomenon, it is important to address some of the sources of this resentment.

South Korean's receive a strong sense of nationalism as they feel that their sovereignty as a nation has come under attack. This "attack" can be perceived through:

1. How certain U.S. interests are not aligned with Korean national interest. The United States effort to open Korea's protected markets such as their beef⁴¹³ and rice markets, have raised concerns among the rural and private sectors.⁴¹⁴ There is a fear that Korea has to give up some of their sovereignty in order to preserve their alliance with the United States. This trade off is not likely to be perceived positively by Korean nationalists. Korean nationalism seems to have served as a hindrance towards America's ability to assert its own interest.
2. The cultural consequences of U.S. influence. Similar to Mohathir's endorsement of "Asian Values," there is debate that accepting strong western influences, both cultural and political, from the west is contrary to their goal of self-determination and nation-building. The South Korean government has practiced "scapegoatism" in labeling some of the internal problems to be a result of "unhealthy values exported from the west."⁴¹⁵ Yet, in a comparative study conducted by Gi-wook Shin, there does not seem to be an apparent relationship between South Korean anti-Americanism and disapproval of capitalism and modernity, both of which have a strong basis on American values⁴¹⁶.
3. U.S. support for repressive regimes - In the past, the United States has had a tendency to support certain dictatorial regimes as long as their policies align with the United States. This can be regarded as hypocritical and counter to the U.S. stance on democracy, freedom and human rights. For example, many Koreans blamed the United States for not intervening in Chun Doo Hwan's military coup after President Park Chung Hee's assassination in 1979⁴¹⁷. This led to massive protests known as, the "Kwangju Uprising" where many students and citizens were killed in an attempt to

⁴¹³ "Policing the Candlelight Protests in South Korea." *Amnesty International*. August 25, 2008. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA25/008/2008/en/7866408a-9395-11dd-8293-ff015cefb49a/asa250082008en.pdf> (accessed February 20, 2010).

⁴¹⁴ David I. Steinberg, *Korean attitudes toward the United States: changing dynamics*, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), xviii.

⁴¹⁵ Jojo Liu and Richard Hughes. "GROWING RESENTMENT: The Rise of Anti-Americanism in South Korea." *Harvard International Review*. 17/4 (1995): 60.

⁴¹⁶ Shin, 797.

⁴¹⁷ Liu, 60.

quiet the crowds and legitimize their authority. This furthered anti-American political sentiment as the United States supported Chun's coming to power.

4. U.S. military presence. Since the Korean War, Korean views on military presence slowly changed for the worse, namely due to some of the "incidents" involving military personnel and Korean civilians near the Army bases. For South Korea, which has 106 military bases,⁴¹⁸ accidents involving U.S. military personnel have raised several concerns. In 2002, two Korean girls were run over by a U.S. military vehicle. When the U.S. military officers involved were found innocent by the U.S. court, it intensified arguments and debates regarding the necessity for U.S. military presence in the region. These social consequences have created conflicting views of American military presence as South Koreans begin to question the role of the U.S. armed forces as either "protectors" or harmful "occupiers."⁴¹⁹

After the 2002 incident, candlelight vigils and anti-American protests were held in response to the deaths. However, these protests were not a call for all American troops to leave but rather an expression of the negative sentiment towards the acquittal of the soldiers involved; as well as a call to revise the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). If issues like this repeat itself and the United States does not act to counter such activities, the attitude toward American troops by the local population "may affect the long term efficiency of US security assistance"⁴²⁰ to its allies and vice versa.

Although, anti-American sentiment did not peak until after the 2002 incident, general anti-Americanism was already present in South Korea. However, it was suppressed by previous authoritarian governments that viewed the Korean relationship with the U.S. as essential for security against North Korea. Some also claim that the support for the U.S. by the government and the silencing of individuals who went against this was in order to legitimize the claim to

⁴¹⁸ "U.S. Military Bases" *Global Policy Forum*, 2008, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/1030globalbases.pdf> or <http://www.globalpolicy.org/tables-and-charts-ql/empire-tcql.html> (accessed February 15, 2010).

⁴¹⁹ Jinwung Kim, "Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States Forces Korea (USFK)." *Asian Affairs, an American Review*. 30 /4(2004): 268.

⁴²⁰ Combat Studies Institute Military History Symposium, Kendall D. Gott, and Michael G. Brooks. 2006. *Security assistance: U.S. and international historical perspectives*. Fort Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute Press, 581.

power⁴²¹. By the end of 1987, with the democratization of South Korea, many Koreans were able to freely express their views on the presence of the American forces.⁴²² Yet, there is still some criticism on the reality of the freedom and democratization with the release of the 1988 national security law which prohibits its citizens from engaging in actions that would be considered anti-state.

Despite the negativity towards the American forces in South Korea, many Koreans still seem to recognize the need for an American security commitment⁴²³, especially with the looming threat of North Korea. This is more so for the older generation who still remember the pain, casualties and outcome of the Korean War.

North Korea

Ever since the United States fought the ideological threat of communism leading to the division of Korea, there has been a cultural and political animosity between North Korea and the United States. U.S. military presence in Korea was initially the primary obstacle to Korean reunification. Differences aside, as South Korea's economy strengthens, merging the two Koreas proves even harder. This represents another problem that will serve as an obstacle to solving the North Korean crisis.

Understanding the reasons behind North Korea's stance for disliking the United States and their reason for attempting to get nuclear weapons can help the United States engage in a

⁴²¹ David I. Steinberg, *Korean attitudes toward the United States: changing dynamics*. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), x.

⁴²² Kim, 274

⁴²³ Jinwung Kim, "Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States Forces Korea (USFK)," *Asian Affairs, an American Review*. 30 /4(2004): 272

more effective diplomatic relations with North Korea that will help foster mutual respect instead of misunderstanding and hate.

Although there are significant differences between North Korea and the United States system, merely labeling a country ‘rogue’, ‘backwards’ or ‘tyrannical’ does not get to the root of the problem. Part of the crisis in the North Korean peninsula is not merely a result of their government’s leadership and *juche* (self-reliant) ideology but can also be attributed to U.S. foreign and domestic policy.⁴²⁴ In order to understand some of the reasons behind anti-Americanism in North Korea, we need to address why they hate us by understanding the history of American foreign policy, as well as the spread of anti-American propaganda in the DPRK.

North Korea’s relationship with the United States is far from friendly and the anti-Americanism there is rooted with its difference in history, ideology and governance from its cold war mentality, fear of an American invasion and the division of Korea. From the perspective on the North Koreans the United States are the bad guys responsible for the division at the 38th parallel⁴²⁵. Americans killed Koreans and wish to overthrow North Korea’s leader in a regime change-- at least that is the propaganda issued by the government. An online search for anti-American propaganda in North Korea can easily display poster of Korean missiles or soldiers attacking or crushing the United States⁴²⁶.

⁴²⁴ United States, *Words have consequences: the impact of incitement and anti-American and Anti-semitic propaganda on American interests in the Middle East : hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, second session, 2002*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2-3.

⁴²⁵ “North Korean’s Offer Opinion on America” *ABC News online*, June 9, 2005, <http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/International/story?id=834858&page=1> (accessed, Feb. 20, 2010)

⁴²⁶ Comstock, Paul. 2008. “North Korean Propaganda Posters” *website*, <http://calitreview.com/875> (accessed, Feb. 19, 2010).

After the end of the Cold War, the United States, again claimed the throne as a global power. North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons could also be seen as a backlash against rising American power. This could be an effort, as Stephen Walt suggests, to tame American power.⁴²⁷

The challenges the United States faces with domestic politics, as well as drastic changes to foreign policy when a new political party takes over also discredits the reliability of the United States as a partner worthy of maintaining relations with. Evidence of which can be seen through the foreign policy shift from multilateralism and bilateral negotiations under the Clinton administration to unilateralism in the Bush administration then back to multilateralism under the current Obama administration.

An obstacle to negotiations with North Korea would be the distrust and risk that lies on both sides. Difference in governance structures may be another reason for an autocratic North Korea to distrust any kind of agreement as the United States changes governments and political leaders every few years. An agreement such as the six-party talks, involving more players, decreasing U.S. power could serve as a viable option.

Although North Korea is often seen as a 'rogue' nation with little regard for international treaties and agreements, the same can be said about the United States after the Clinton administration failed to deliver its end of the 1994 Agreed Framework bargain by the agreed time frame. So, another cause for anti-American sentiment not only in the Korean peninsula but also in other part of the world is how the United States, due to its power can disregard international agreements and act unilaterally whenever the circumstance arises⁴²⁸. In a global

⁴²⁷ Walt, S. M, "Taming American Power." *FOREIGN AFFAIRS -NEW YORK*, 84/5 (2005): 105-120, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031709>

⁴²⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler, "Bush's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, 144 (2004): 22-28.

poll in 2008, 17 of 19 nations view the U.S. as being hypocritical of promoting but not following international laws.⁴²⁹ This view did not change much even under the Obama administration. United States foreign policy has inflamed anti-Americanism worldwide.

For the current North Korean regime, regime survival is the most important objective and the United States is the biggest threat in achieving that. The leaders of North Korea view the development of nuclear weapons as its only means for regime survival⁴³⁰. However, from Bush administration's "we do not negotiate with terrorists" and labeling North Korea as an "Axis of Evil" to Secretary Clinton's comment the U.S will not be "blackmailed" by North Korea⁴³¹ might pushed North Korea to no other option.

Rising nationalism leads to critical views of the U.S.

Rising nationalism as a result of events involving the United States actions in South Korea, China and Japan are the one of the biggest threats to American image and influence in the region. Nationalist groups have banded together as incidents make the United States an enemy.

After China's humiliation though the opening up of China after the Opium Wars, China has engaged in massive changes in its government, economic and educational institutions. In 1989, there was rise in pro-Western opinion which resulted in the catastrophic Tiananmen Square incident. In 1999, there was another dramatic shift as a U.S. air strike bombed the

⁴²⁹ Steven Kull, "America's Global Image in the Obama Era," *The Program on International Policy Attitudes*, July 7, 2009, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_USObama_Jul09_packet.pdf (accessed, Feb. 23, 2008)

⁴³⁰ Kull, 25.

⁴³¹ "North Korea Says it Has Started Extracting Plutonium" *Reuters*, April 25, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSEO30413320090426> (Accessed, Feb. 20, 2010).

Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Public sentiment towards the U.S. then changed as Chinese demonstrators in China voiced their anger and dislike of anti-Chinese behavior by the U.S.

With the current U.S. economic crisis and negative perception of U.S. foreign policy, the United States appears to be losing its foothold as a global power. Rumors of the U.S. dollar losing its dominance as a world currency to the Chinese renminbi are a cause for worry. Chinese may begin to doubt U.S. values, democracy, and institutions previously believed to have brought about Western strength and stability.

Military bases

As of 2008, the United States spends more on its military than any other country in the world. The United States spent 711 billion dollars, 48% of the total global military expenditure. In 2007, 156 countries in the world had U.S. troops stationed suggesting that about seventy percent of the world's countries had U.S. military presence⁴³². With 737 military bases worldwide, Chalmers Johnson equates this as evidence to the United States as a global empire⁴³³. The United States has military presence in many parts of the world; however, their presence has not always been greeted with acceptance and joy.

Hillary Clinton wants to “engage” and “stay” in Asia, which reading between the lines suggest that the United States will maintain its imperial power, and will remain a key player in the events that occur in East Asia. Since the foundation of the U.S. empire has been said to lie in

⁴³² "U.S. Military Bases" *Global Policy Forum*, 2008, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/1030globalbases.pdf> or <http://www.globalpolicy.org/tables-and-charts-ql/empire-tcql.html> (accessed February 15, 2010).

⁴³³ Johnson, Chalmers, “America’s Empire of Bases,” Jan 15, 2004. <http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-08.htm> (accessed, Feb. 20, 2010)

it military bases⁴³⁴, the question of whether or not the United States can afford to be in such a position still remain.

Much of the negativity towards military presence in East Asia has been due to the lack of accountability of the United States military for its impact on society. There have been several cases where local residents have said that they have been assaulted or raped by American soldier such as the 1995 rape in Okinawa and the 2005 rape in the Philippines. Acquittals due to the agreement made through SOFA, has sparked protests and rallies in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines where United States military is present.

Negative environmental effects are also a cause for concern for the local residents where the bases are located. Article 4 of Japan's SOFA stipulates: "The United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and areas to Japan on the expiration of this Agreement or at an earlier date, to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces, or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration." This is often resented as American forces are not accountable for any negative externalities or environmental damage they cause as a result of their training. Chalmers Johnson argues that SOFA's invariably "infringe on the sovereignty of the host nation" and he gives several examples of this.⁴³⁵

These incidents and problems with the Status of Forces Agreement have led a number of not only Japanese citizens but other nations with American military presence to distrust & in some cases fear the United States military presence. Rising anti-American sentiment in Japan

⁴³⁴ Chalmers A. Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004.

⁴³⁵ Chalmers A. Johnson, *Nemesis: the last days of the American Republic*. (The American empire project, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 171-207.

due to these incidents may hamper U.S. aims to have a strategic military presence in Asia to combat rising powers (North Korea and China) and serve as an anchor for stability and protection for the region.

U.S. military presence in Asia especially in Japan has been said to aid in sustaining regional stability⁴³⁶. The United States current security policy in Asia addressed in a speech by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton Asia seems to project the same hypothesis that, “hundreds of thousands of our (U.S.) servicemen and women provide the region with security, a task our military has shouldered for generations”⁴³⁷ However, this view of American engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, whether necessary or not, does not take into account whether the people in these nations want U.S. presence (economic or military).

Although the U.S. military presence in different parts of the world has received criticism by their local community and their media, certain actions can be undertaken by the U.S. government. These include creating special action committees or new guidelines like the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) that was later formed in response to the 1995 gang rape incident of a twelve year old girl. This can serve as a step to regain the trust and commitment the United States has for the region.

The percent and usage of land by U.S. military forces in Okinawa has been a subject of debate since World War II⁴³⁸. Mark L. Gillem provides evidence for the inefficient use of land resources used up by American bases. Only 43 percent of land in the Kadena airbase in Japan is

⁴³⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*. 74 /4(1995): 90.

⁴³⁷ Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, "Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities," (remarks, Imin Center Honolulu, Hawaii, 12 January 2010) US Department of State <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135090.htm> (accessed Feb. 24, 2010)

⁴³⁸ Gillem, Mark L., *America town: building the outposts of empire*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 37

used for production necessary for an air base. The rest is for housing, commercial and recreational space, such as golf courses, swimming pools, baseball fields and Rest and Recreation (R&R) sites for their troops⁴³⁹. Not to mention that these military bases are often accompanied by bars, strip clubs, and entertainment for the U.S. military personnel that affect the local community⁴⁴⁰. These communities are often called “American towns,” created by private entrepreneurs in that community to serve this new demand. It is important to address the physical and cultural impact of U.S. bases abroad. The U.S. bases in Okinawa already occupy about 20 percent of the land on the main island.⁴⁴¹ In 2003, the governor of Okinawa petitioned U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to scale down the American military bases.⁴⁴² Recent discussions of moving the Marine Corps Air Station in Futenma off Okinawa have caused tension in the U.S.-Japan relationship as recent changes in its government might decide not to fulfill the agreement.⁴⁴³

Seeing that there is hesitation among the Japanese people to maintain U.S. military presence even with the threat of North Korea, the U.S. should seriously consider decreasing some of its military bases in the area. Although the argument that military bases provide security in the region still exists, closing down a few military bases could gain the popular support that America needs. Apparently, the current administration appears to be taking the right steps in signing the Guam International Agreement on February 2009 that promised to move 8,000 U.S.

⁴³⁹ Gillem, 98

⁴⁴⁰ Johnson, “*Blowback: the costs and consequences of American empire*”36.

⁴⁴¹ Gillem, 237.

⁴⁴² “US urged to reduce Japan Bases,” *BBC news online*, Nov. 16, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3274877.stm> (accessed, Feb. 20, 2010).

⁴⁴³ Roland Buerk “US airbase tests ties with Japan” *BBC news online*, Jan. 12, 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8448811.stm>, (accessed, Feb. 19, 2010).

troops from Okinawa to Guam.⁴⁴⁴ The closure of military bases does not always decrease security nor does it cut essential ties the U.S. has in the region. Taking the Philippines for example, upon the expiration of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) with the United States in 1991 the military bases in Clark Air Force base and Subic Naval base was not renewed and relations among the two countries remain positive. However, there were significant difference between the U.S. situation in the Philippines and to that of Japan and Korea, where the negotiations for their presence were significantly different. The differences will not all be mentioned in this document but one such difference was how in the Philippines, U.S. military presence was allowed in exchange for economic assistance given by the U.S to the Philippines,⁴⁴⁵ whereas no such exchange took place in Japan. The economic costs for the maintenance of the bases in the Philippines were very high considering the diminishing Soviet threat. Given the domestic rebel groups in the Philippines, in 1998, the Philippines and The United States signed the bilateral Visiting Armed Forces Agreement (VFA) stating that under the “purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations... to strengthen international and regional security in the Pacific area...obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951;...from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines... cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security interests” Given an attack by North Korea, the U.S. could easily re-enforce or re-establish their military troops in the area forming similar negotiations on different terms.

⁴⁴⁴ “Signing of the Agreement Concerning the Relocation of Marine Force Personnel from Okinawa to Guam,” *Japan Now the Embassy’s News Letter*, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/jicc/JapanNow/EJN_vol5_no4.html#Article4 (Accessed Feb. 23, 2010)

⁴⁴⁵ Claver, Francisco F., Ed Garcia, Antonio C. Abaya, Jose Veloso Abueva, and Romeo J. Intengan. *Building a Reasoned and Principled Consensus on the Bases Issue*. (Manila, Philippines: Institute on Church and Social Issues, 1989), 31.

Recommendation


Due to the course of events that the United States has positioned itself, the United States has lost much of its legitimacy in involving itself in international affairs. This could be through negative interpretations of United States policy and military presence. Such to the extent, that regional organization in Asia like, the ASEAN +3 have excluded the United States in any of their discussions or forums. The only course of action then would be for the United States to pursue actions that would regain the trust and cooperation of the region, even if it means losing some of the United States military bases present in Okinawa renegotiating the SOFA towards South Korea to terms equally agreed upon by both parties. The United States also needs to analyze the long term effects of their actions and foreign policy as well as fix its internal government problems first before it can create sustainable treaties or negotiations.

Lastly, in respect to North Korea, the U.S. needs to show respect for the different ideologies and nationalistic identities of different nations, understanding that regime change is not the only solution. This way the United States will not be seen so much as a threatening force but as a partner whose voice will be readily accepted in multilateral frameworks, such as the Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO). Unless these challenges to American presence, no matter how trivial it may seem, are first solved, the NEASCO proposed by the United States will encounter strong resistance.

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As we embrace the new decade and subsequent existent and emerging challenges, the two most populous nations in the world, China and India, continue to engage in an extensive and complicated accord. Considering their disputed border, internal problems, nuclear rivalry, and the competition for influence in Asia, reciprocity between these two powers will have a significant effect not only on the stability and prosperity in the region, but will also serve as a source of contention for vital U.S. interests. Successful implementation of a multilateral organization, such as the proposed Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO), needs to recognize India's strategic geopolitical position and ability to contend as a rising Asian power by extending to India opportunities for partnerships.

This paper is focused on Sino-Indian relations, how previous conflicts have affected current policies and interactions and what this holds for future implications. While Pakistan is briefly discussed, this paper does not go into depth regarding the Kashmir-Jammu region. Nevertheless, Pakistan has played a significant role on India's foreign policy as well as Sino-Indian relations.

Conflict Cemented in History

Jawaharlal Nehru led India to independence as the world's largest democracy on August 15, 1947. The Himalayan mountain range provided an expansive natural buffer between the ideologically, socially and politically different nations of India and China. Coined as the 'honeymoon' years, initial Sino-Indian relations were manifested in friendship as the two nations established diplomatic relations and exchanged high-level visits between Beijing and New Delhi. Nehruvian foreign policies and security perspectives were optimistic and at times, ambitious as

Nehru conceived the notion that the chances of an outside invasion were remote.⁴⁴⁶ Nehru preached the idea of an Indian greatness that would one day lead India to become not only a dominant force in the Asian sub-continent but also allow India the opportunity to stand as a powerful global influence. The lack of perceived threat provided grounds for Nehru's strong belief that India should remain a non-nuclear nation and influenced the decision to create the 'nuclear weapons option' – reserved the right for India to maintain the ability to build nuclear weapons, which Nehru chose not to exercise.⁴⁴⁷ According to Nehru, anything other than friendly relations were not in the strategic interests of either China or India. Both were suffering from domestic issues as China dealt with the liberation of Tibet and India was concerned for the maintenance of geopolitical cohesion due to the extensive differences of language, culture and religion within the newly independent state, as well as the deadly repercussions of partition. Regionally both countries recognized their incapacity to carry through with two-front war threats – China being primarily concerned with the eastern United States threat from the China Sea while India remained engaged with the probable threat from Pakistan.⁴⁴⁸

Nehru's optimism collided with reality in 1958 over an exchange of notes regarding the Chinese Xinjiang-Tibet road that ran through the Aksai Chin area. Nehru claimed the road ran through the Ladakh region of India arguing that Chinese maps were drawn incorrectly had a complete disregard of the McMahon Line (all the while, Nehru was also openly denying the existence of a border dispute). Zhou's response contrasted Nehru's allocations and blatantly highlighted the existence of a border dispute between China and India as he said, "historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been signed between the Chinese

⁴⁴⁶ Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, *China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003), 11.

⁴⁴⁷ Sidhu and Yuan, 27.

⁴⁴⁸ LiLi, *Security Perception and China-India Relations* (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2009), 50.

central government and the Indian government.”⁴⁴⁹ The McMahon Line was a product of the Shimla meeting, held in 1913-1914 and was created to separate Tibetan China from British India with no regard to existing physical boundaries.⁴⁵⁰ China had challenged the legitimacy of the line and never formally signed the agreement. On September 9 1959, New Delhi published a White Paper detailing the exchange of letters, yet refusing to recognize the border disagreement and negotiate a boundary settlement. Zhou urged both countries to temporarily respect the ‘*status quo*’ – keep to the border areas under each countries current jurisdiction – until a formal resolution could be established. Unfortunately the *status quo* carried different meanings for each country, consequently resolving nothing. It was Nehru’s strict non-recognition and non-negotiation border policy, compounded with India’s forward policy and China’s ‘tit-for-tat countermeasures’ that pushed for the inevitable war.⁴⁵¹

While it was the border disagreements that set precedent for increasing suspicion and distrust between the two countries, the catalyst for the 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict was the Tibetan Rebellion. On March 22nd 1959 after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked Tibetan rebels, India offered political asylum to the fleeing Dalai Lama. These actions infuriated China who requested the halt of such activities and published an article in the *People’s Daily* declaring that “no foreign country should interfere in the matter of the rebellion in Tibet which is purely china’s internal affair.”⁴⁵² Following this provocative action, China and India found themselves engaged in minor border skirmishes at Longju and Kongka Pass during the months before the official attack on October 20, 1962. The Sino-Indian Border War came to an end on November

⁴⁴⁹ Xuecheng Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations* (London: University Press of America, Inc., 1994), 20.

⁴⁵⁰ Sidhu and Yuan, 11.

⁴⁵¹ Liu, 17.

⁴⁵² Liu, 24.

21, 1962 as China called for a cease-fire and halted their advance after India's atrocious defeat. This 'all-out armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border'⁴⁵³ was heavily disputed as India felt the war was a Chinese invasion of Indian Territory, and China described it as a self-defense counterattack. The conflict did not result in new borderlines as China proceeded to withdraw their forces to where they had earlier started. Consequently, the border war can be seen as nothing more than a simple display of power by Chinese forces, providing no resolutions to the immediate issues and later creating rationale for the establishment of the Indian nuclear program.

Born into the turmoil of bipolar politics surrounding the Cold War era, Sino-Indian relations have never been completely bilateral as the two superpowers frequently inserted their opinion, with the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict being no different. Immediately after independence, India was expected to take sides in the U.S.-Soviet conflict as the Soviet Union acknowledged India's geopolitical importance and the United States recognized their similarities as democracies.⁴⁵⁴ Nehru's response was non-alignment, creating the Non-Alignment Movement and seeking equally good relations with the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴⁵⁵ The 1962 Sino-Indian Border War received global criticism as both the United States and Britain rallied behind India, scolding China for thinking "that a state such as India, which is militarily and economically immeasurably weaker than China, would really launch a military attack on China and commit aggression against it."⁴⁵⁶ However, in the midst of their healing wounds from the heated conflict, India came to the realization that despite verbal backlash towards China from other powerful nations, India could not rely solely on the security assistance of outside nations. In this way, the 1962 conflict reaffirmed the Indian decision to arm itself with nuclear weapons.

⁴⁵³ Liu, 17.

⁴⁵⁴ LiLi, 44.

⁴⁵⁵ LiLi, 46.

⁴⁵⁶ Liu, 37.

Nuclear India

In the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict, relations between India and China remained unstable as the underlying suspicious attitude towards one another did not dissolve with the blatant expressions of hostility. India and China sought Sino-Indian normalization through summit meetings between heads of state and government, regular visits between high-ranking military and nonmilitary officials and civilian officials, and a gradual process of institutionalizing a series of confidence building measures (CBMs).⁴⁵⁷ India's embarrassing defeat at the hands of China forced New Delhi to reassess its security perception and take military security more seriously. Shortly after the border war, India witnessed a transfer of power when Nehru died in 1964 and his daughter, Indira Gandhi became prime minister in 1966. Indira took the initiative to alter Indian foreign policy as she rejected her father's soft attitude towards Indian security threats, disagreeing with his lack of regard to utilize India's nuclear weapons option. The 1962 military humiliation subjugated by China highlighted the incompetence of Indian policymakers, as domestic politics appeared negligent with Nehru's non-alignment policy leaving India too vulnerable. This was further exacerbated by China's first nuclear test in 1964, providing further substantial, but not decisive grounds for shaping India's nuclear program.

India's nuclear capabilities began to take speed as the nation engaged in its first peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. This test stood alone as Indira wanted to signal to the United States, China and the Soviet Union that India's autonomy would not be impinged upon. Indian leaders did not feel that an operational nuclear deterrent rendered necessary to counter China but India

⁴⁵⁷ Sidhu and Yuan, 22.

wanted it to be known that they possessed the capabilities to build a nuclear weapon and could launch if adequately threatened by nations like China and Pakistan.

Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

When the United States and the Soviet Union drafted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India was quick to express its discontent and refused to sign as it came into force on March 5, 1970. India felt it made unfair distinctions between nations as “nuclear haves” and “nuclear-have-nots,” further declaring, “continued nuclear abstinence of the non nuclear states was not linked to explicit reciprocal obligations on the part of the nuclear weapons states.”⁴⁵⁸ Regardless, India has openly expressed its commitment to non-proliferation unlike the other non-signatory nations – Israel, Pakistan and in 2003, North Korea. India’s nuclear doctrine rests on the concept that nuclear weapons are not war-fighting instruments, but rather means of deterrence and is also committed to following a strict no-first-use policy, launching nuclear weapons only upon an aggressor.⁴⁵⁹ India also rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), pragmatically challenging the “entry into force” clause, as they feared the affects this would have upon their untested nuclear program. By signing the CTBT India’s opportunities to improve its nuclear weapon capabilities would be severely impaired. India also had growing skepticism regarding China’s willingness to accede to the CTBT, fearing this implied China’s nuclear program was at a level of competence that no longer required testing to confirm the quality of Chinese nuclear devices. India withheld signature of the treaty in 1996 and conducted nuclear test in 1998.⁴⁶⁰ In the closest articulation of the connection between India’s nuclear

⁴⁵⁸ Raju G. C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds., *India’s Nuclear Security* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2000), 45.

⁴⁵⁹ Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, eds. *The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 194-195.

⁴⁶⁰ Frankel and Harding, 55.

weapons program and New Delhi's perceived nuclear threat from China, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee linked the five nuclear tests conducted in Pokhran in May 1998 to "the overt nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962"⁴⁶¹ in a letter to U.S. president Bill Clinton.

China-Pakistan-India dynamic

As a nation, India is weaker than China, resulting in New Delhi being far more concerned with China's capabilities, intentions and policies than Beijing is concerned about India. Likewise, Pakistan is a weaker nation than India resulting in Islamabad holding greater concern for India's capabilities intentions and policies.⁴⁶² However, it is not always unidirectional as Pakistan has stood as a viable threat to India with initial unstable relations grounded in the August 14 and 15, 1947 Indian partition that separated Pakistan as the homeland for Muslims and established India as an independent nation and the homeland for Hindus. Continued animosity throughout the contested states of Jammu and Kashmir kept tensions high between the neighboring nations, eventually resulting in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, in which China sided with Pakistan, providing further impetus for India's concern and heightened suspicions of both China and Pakistan. During the next two decades China became the primary supplier of nuclear arms to Pakistan, which many Western and Indian analysts believe was established with the principal intention of constraining India.⁴⁶³ It was Beijing's relationship with Islamabad that stood as a crucial impediment to successful Sino-Indian normalization. China's contribution to Pakistan's culminating nuclear weapon program resulted in a 1986 nuclear cooperation between

⁴⁶¹ Sidhu and Yuan, 26.

⁴⁶² Frankel and Harding

⁴⁶³ Frankel and Harding, 146.

China and Pakistan consequently increasing the sense of extreme apprehension for India.⁴⁶⁴ It meant that not only did India have two nuclear powers on its borders, but also that, they were in what India felt was an anti-India agreement.

Looking Ahead

The last half-century has witnessed Sino-Indian relations fostered in rivalry with tensions rising and falling throughout – intense in the 1950s and early 1960s, tensions spiked again in the 1970s before hitting a relative low in the 1980s and 1990s. Recently, relations have appeared to be on the rise as China has begun to seek strategic partnership with India while India reiterates its commitment to the development of a friendly, cooperative, and mutually beneficial relationship with China.⁴⁶⁵ However, Indian analysts argue “while China professes a policy of peace and friendliness towards India, its deeds are clearly aimed at the *strategic encirclement of India* in order to marginalize India in Asia and tie it down to the Indian sub-continent.”⁴⁶⁶ Given China’s unwillingness to quickly resolve the border dispute, the fear of the Indo-Pak alliance, and the continued Chinese reluctance to admit to its nuclear capabilities to threaten India, it is no wonder that Indian elites and policy makers remain distrustful of China.

Sino-Indian relations will continue to be complex and multidimensional, suspended by elements of cooperation, rivalry and suspicion because China cannot forget India, just as India cannot forget China. These two nations along with Japan and Russia stand as the four major contestants for influence in Asia and unlike most other states along China’s periphery, India represents a substantial concentration of economic, political and military capabilities – to make matters worse, China and India have a disputed border. India has also created leverage in the

⁴⁶⁴ Frankel and Harding, 138.

⁴⁶⁵ LiLi, 176.

⁴⁶⁶ Frankel and Harding, 158.

region as their increasingly adequate conventional military forces excel in logistics and air power raising the potential to pose a serious threat to China's southwest region, especially since China is losing control in Tibet. Also, corresponding to India's emerging economic strength, its geophysical location makes it a relevant and worthy concern for China's long-term security, as India could become a major regional rival by continuing to expand its naval capabilities.⁴⁶⁷

Beijing is therefore forced to treat India with caution leading New Delhi to choose its own subtle approach. New Delhi has avoided rhetorical, political and military fights with China choosing to refrain from public challenge regarding issues that directly threaten India's security – such as the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan and Beijing targeting India with nuclear weapons. Consequently, India has sought to improve relations with China by engaging in CBMs with Beijing, persistent negotiations relating to the border dispute and improving relations in areas of rapid improvement such as bilateral trade. Regardless, India is not blind to the potential of this relationship turning sour, engaging in nuclear capabilities.⁴⁶⁸

The multidimensional strategies pursued by both sides suggest that the decade old judgment holds true, "The Sino-Indian relationship is...an uneasy one." India still regards China as a threat to its security and China understands the threat India poses on its ability to serve as a dominating Asian influence. "China and India will be faced with the task of deterring, defending, and reassuring each other simultaneously in the presence of multiple actors, each with its own capabilities, preferences, and constraints."⁴⁶⁹

U.S.-Indian Civil Nuclear Deal

⁴⁶⁷ Frankel and Harding, 140.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Frankel and Harding, 172.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and United States President George W. Bush signed a joint statement on July 18th 2005 announcing their intention to enter into a bilateral civil nuclear agreement between India and the U.S. In doing so, India assumed the same responsibilities of other nuclear advanced countries and has agreed to: identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities, place civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, continue unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities, work with the U.S. for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Nuclear Cut-off Treaty, refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them, and secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group. The United States has reciprocally promised to seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India and consult with partners on India's participation in the fusion energy consortium and support India's part in work to develop advanced nuclear reactors.⁴⁷⁰ Referenced as the Indian-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal, it became officially operationalized on October 10th 2008 when India and the U.S. signed the 123 agreement – a section of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that prerequisites an agreement of cooperation for nuclear deals between the U.S. and any other nation. In so doing, both the U.S. and India got what they wanted: India gained conditional admission to the Nuclear Club and the United States successfully placed a cap on India's nuclear possibilities.⁴⁷¹ Advocates have referred to the deal as a strategic achievement that will

⁴⁷⁰ Rahul Bhonsle, Ved Prakash and K.R. Gupta, eds., *Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal*, (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors Ltd., 2007), 425.

⁴⁷¹ Kripa Sridharan, *Indo-U.S. Engagement: An Emerging Partnership and its Implications* (New Delhi: Macmillan Publishers India Ltd., 2009), 129.

strengthen international security, enhance energy security and environmental protection, and foster economic and technological development.

However, the deal has not gone without disapproving remarks from the nuclear global community as critics have raised a number of questions regarding future implications. As a non-signatory nation of the NPT, there is rising concern that this India specific nuclear deal will not only create a double standard potentially resulting in 'rouge' nations, such as North Korea, to continue the pursuit of a nuclear program under the assumption that a similar deal could arise in their favor but will also inherently weaken the non-proliferation regime. There is further skepticism that this will further accelerate a nuclear arms race in South Asia and allow India to continue expanding its nuclear arsenal and only 14 of its 22 nuclear power reactors will be placed under safeguard.⁴⁷² Just as quickly raised, these criticisms have also been quickly dismissed. North Korea, Pakistan and Israel have little in common outside the fact that they have chosen to remain non-signing members of the NPT. While North Korea continues to violate their IAEA obligations, India is forming new obligations and taking initiatives towards peaceful international cooperation and global nuclear disarmament.⁴⁷³ U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley said, "this is actually a way to bring India within the non-proliferation framework. It will be adopting the kind of non-proliferation protections we do. India has a good record, as a practical matter, in terms of proliferation to third countries. They have been a very responsible party. This is actually the vehicle to bring India on to our page, in terms of proliferation policy."⁴⁷⁴

The United States' Perspective

⁴⁷² Rajesh Kumar, *Indo-U.S. Politico-Strategic Relations* (New Delhi: Indpendent Publishing Company, 2007)

⁴⁷³ Bhonsle, Prakash and Gupta, 286.

⁴⁷⁴ Bhonsle, Prakash and Gupta, 35.

The wavering and chaotic past of Indo-U.S. relations arrived at a new starting point when the ‘long overdue’ 123 agreement was signed between India and the United States demonstrating that scholars had been correct in finding the oddity of the world’s largest democracy and the world’s oldest democracy butting heads for the previous half-century. The Bush Administration was first to actively seek and demonstrate the U.S. necessity of establishing policies of engagement with India as it continued to rise as an Asian superpower. Ashley Tellis of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that President George Bush was influenced when making his decision to engage in the deal by the following factors: The recognition of India as a rising power with common intrinsic merits such as its commitment to democracy and the geopolitical necessity in securing U.S.-Indian partnership that will only occur with a change in national and international laws and rules banning technological cooperation with India. As India’s population continues to increase, it will have to increase its use of nuclear energy in order to foster future economic growth and reduce greenhouse emissions. The need to mobilize states on China’s periphery in order to balance Chinese power and prevent harmful competition with the United States and finally, the acknowledgement that India has never served as a threat to the United States nor to non-proliferation efforts.⁴⁷⁵

China’s Perspective

China remains rather ambiguous in regards to its opinion on the U.S.-Indian Civil Nuclear deal as it has yet to take an official stance. Rather, informal actions have been the sole constituent behind a portrayal of displeasure for the heightened level of engagement between the United States and India. In an article published by a leading political newspaper, *Renmin Ribao*

⁴⁷⁵ Ashley J Tellis, *India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005)

(People's Daily), the U.S. was accused of acting too softly towards India, ultimately depreciating the NPT. It further expressed the opinion that the United States had created 'double standard's and made a 'nuclear exception' leading *Renmin Ribao* to raise the argument that other nuclear countries will now feel the right to execute flexibility in making exceptions for their own strategic nations that could result in a series of negative impacts.⁴⁷⁶ On September 6th 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) approved the waiver for India lifting the ban for nuclear trade and China attempted to block the deal at the NSG. However, Sino-Indian relations could witness further disagreements in the future as an Indian backlash for Chinese contempt of the agreement stemming from the double standard of China supporting Pakistan's growing nuclear program in the 1980s as that significantly increased the nuclear threat to India.

Opportunities and Obstacles for NEASCO

India's involvement with NEASCO will not be found through a direct connection to the nuclear threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Rather, India needs a place in NEASCO with recognition as a geopolitically strategic nuclear nation. Bordering Pakistan and China, India is directly in the midst of constant nuclear influence and nuclear threat. With both borders grounded in unsettled disputes, the United States would be foolish to disregard Sino-Indian relations, remembering that Pakistan has also been an influential actor through the Sino-Pakistani nuclear agreement and the double threat it posed towards India. If it plays its cards right, the United States will have the opportunity to evolve U.S., China and India into a strategic triangle. Nonetheless, the United States must not enter with naivety, thinking that all three powers are equal and can grow in absolute cooperation. China and India are influential and powerful rising powers and while not necessarily equal, the United States

⁴⁷⁶ Bhonsle, Prakash and Gupta, 217.

cannot look at India as a sub par nation to China. The Asian region is growing strategically more important and the Sino-Indian relationship will play a major role.⁴⁷⁷

Opportunities

Despite lacking direct links with the DPRK and its related nuclear issue India, as a rising Asian power does have a real interest in participating in any major Asian regional forums. The attraction of security and prestige which led India to pursue nuclear weapons will also make participation in NEASCO desirable for New Delhi. India's interests revolve around peaceful coexistence with the United States and China, meaning as NEASCO works to establish Asian security, India will have no reason to see that this is not accomplished. India has clear interest in participating in each of the four forums within NEASCO.

The Mediation, Conflict Prevention Forum has strong potential to help mediate and solve border disputes. Engaging China through this forum could help to mitigate these territorial flash points through communication and seeking compromises. Incorporating India into these discussions is crucial to ensuring that India and China do not continue to increase military leverage against one another in order to hedge the possibility of conflict over these territorial disputes. This forum could consolidate improvements made in recent years in Sino-Indian relations. Indian participation would indirectly increase China's gain from NEASCO by diminishing border tensions in Asia and allowing China the ability to focus on more immediate security threats than the Sino-Indian disputed border.

The Military Exercises Forum presents a second opportunity for India to positively engage potential rivals. India's interest in seeking increased naval capabilities has the potential to

⁴⁷⁷ Frankel and Harding, 343.

put it in direct competition with China's aspiration to create a blue water navy, noted in both Tamara Patton and Paul Moroni's papers on China in their discussions of China's military modernization. Increased naval diplomacy efforts with China and the U.S. should be seen by New Delhi as a means of comprehensively increasing trust and transparency between militaries.

India has clear interests in the Anti-terrorism forum. Terrorism continues to be one of the leading existential threats to Indian security. Homegrown terrorist cells and Maoist rebels in the Northeastern part of India take hundreds of lives each year.⁴⁷⁸ However, the Islamic organizations, especially those of Pakistani origin, are what gain the most attention in India. Since India remains fixated on Pakistani terrorism, a forum that highlights and weakens the ties between Pakistan and North Korea would certainly be of interest to the Indians.

Though prickly towards calls for it to join the NPT in its current form, which India sees as producing too great a rift between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots,' India does have an interest in preventing nuclear proliferation. Therefore, even the Arms Control Forum could be of interest to New Delhi. The DPRK-Pakistani ties mentioned above have largely been in the form of exchanges of nuclear and missile technology. India thus has an interest in participating in the creation and enforcement of export control systems to ensure the safe and legal transport of nuclear and dual-use components. As discussed in the Patton report on China, the Arms Control Forum could be a valuable communication working group for helping to define and implement the terms of UN Resolution 1540 in East Asia. As a regional nuclear power, India would be a key player in this process.

Obstacles

⁴⁷⁸ *The Economist*, "Terrorism in India: On a Short Fuse," 394, no. 8670 (Feb. 20, 2010), 39.

Sino-Indian relations are currently friendly, but history has shown us that this has not always been the case. The oldest and perhaps greatest obstacle towards long-term positive relations between India and China lies in the unresolved border dispute. While both countries have agreed that it is currently more important to put the border conflict on the back burner and address economic and political issues in hopes of restraining from a repeat of 1962, the border cannot remain contested forever. If Sino-Indian relations were to flair again, China's attention could easily be drawn towards the border conflict with India instead of focusing on the DPRK issue at hand.

Indian suspicion surrounding the NPT could make it difficult to persuade New Delhi to join an organization essentially founded with the aim to convince North Korea to rejoin the NPT. India will be hesitant to join NEASCO if the U.S. makes it apparent that it wants to use it as a forum for pushing India to adhere to the NPT. Therefore, India should be engaged in NEASCO on the basis of soliciting their assistance in defining the terms of domestic and international export control systems in order to ensure the safe transport of nuclear and dual-use components as discussed above.

The U.S.-Indian Civil Nuclear Deal has both advocates and critics regarding India's non-signatory status on the NPT. Some worry that the DPRK will simply look to this as an example of how it must simply wait out the U.S. and hold onto its nuclear status until the Americans accept it, as this deal appears to do with regards to India. However, the U.S.-Indian Civil Nuclear Deal is still relatively new. Considering, Beijing has not yet released an official statement regarding their position, it is difficult to say what the future implications of the deal will be and if it fails to follow through on its promises, the United States will be facing an angry nuclear community. The controversy it stirred in both countries also appears not to have helped in

strengthening relations between the U.S. and India over the issue of arms control. Thus India remains inherently skeptical about joining any American designed organization with an arms control component.

Policy Recommendations


As the world's second most populous country, a nation growing in economic clout, and undisputed regional power in Asia, India must be engaged as a partner in NEASCO. India is a factor in the foreign policy of several proposed NEASCO core members, but above all in relation to China. If Sino-Indian relations once again soured, this could pose a great threat to the type of regional security cooperation sought in NEASCO.

India has interests in conflict mediation, military cooperation, and anti-terrorism that make all three of these forums of clear interest to New Delhi. Thus in proposing NEASCO the U.S. must emphasize India's interest in participating in a forum centered on these topics.

Addressing the issue of arms control must be done more delicately. India continues to refuse to sign the NPT. Yet it also stands as an example of non-proliferation advocacy. To overcome Indian suspicions regarding the arms control component of NEASCO, the U.S. must highlight its interest in engaging India on this issue on the basis of international export control systems. Furthermore, the cooperation and trust built in this forum could eventually lead to discussions surrounding the NPT and the necessity of NEASCO's permanent council members and partners to submit to its legislation.

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Demonstrated as a unique organization of cooperation in Southeast Asia, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has been engaged since its inception in 1967 in regional peace and stability through processes of multilateralism. Since 1967 it has transformed itself into a remarkable force for cooperation and peace among some of Asia's more hostile states. Initially conceived during the Cold War period to be a multilateral organization of non-communist nations, it was founded on the common front: "against communist states, specifically Vietnamese-led neighbors."⁴⁷⁹ Its aims are focused on acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development. In its early stages as a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality for Southeast Asia Nations (ZOPFAN)," ASEAN witnessed and survived some of the major wars of the Cold War period. Although establishing hard security arrangements has never been a priority, ASEAN's endeavors include initiatives to respond to relevant security concerns. Major endeavors include the declaration of the ZOPFAN (1971), and the Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1995. In addition, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) started in 1994 contributes extensively to efforts to resolve security issues. ASEAN, with the help of ASEAN +3 (China, Japan and South Korea), is appreciated as a way to further peace and stability beyond Southeast Asia encouraging hopes for East Asia regionalism, or regional cooperation through a common sense of identity. Highlighted for its many successes and progress to mutual understanding and trust among its members, ASEAN also expands relations beyond the Southeast area to form important bilateral communications with neighboring and external nations. The U.S.-ASEAN alliance is valuable in expanding economic agreements. Moreover,

⁴⁷⁹ The Founding of ASEAN" Association of Southeast Asian Nations. <http://www.aseansec.org/20024.htm> (accessed Feb. 10, 2010)

important bilateral alliances with the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei assist in ensuring continued U.S. engagement and interests in the Southeast Asia region.

The ASEAN region is imperative to United States interests because it is growing politically and economically. Politically, ASEAN is the third largest democratic organization in the world⁴⁸⁰ and promoting democracy remains a key value. Economically, ASEAN is neighbors to the rapid growing economics of China and India, and growing trade and investment from external powers like the U.S. is increasing Southeast Asia's economic leverage. Projections state that by 2015 ASEAN will be a single market of 550 million people and U.S.' fifth largest export market.⁴⁸¹ ASEAN continues to expand its economic incentives by establishing TIFAs (Trade and Investment Framework Agreements) with most of its members as well by incorporating APEC's economic measures into its practices.

The United States continual engagement with ASEAN and all of East Asia is not only important to the future economic successes of the United States but also to U.S. security. ASEAN has the most populous Muslim majority in East Asia and Islamic extremist actions present security concerns in and outside the region.⁴⁸² Also, Myanmar's rumored nuclear program is a pressing concern for the U.S. and international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Within Southeast Asia there are a multiplicity of security issues surrounding food, military, energy and nuclear security. U.S.-ASEAN relations since World War II have stemmed off of U.S. security assurances to weak states. While predominantly providing military presence, new developments involve the need for nuclear security assurances.

⁴⁸⁰ Scot A. Marciel, "US engagement in Southeast Asia," *INDONESIA QUARTERLY*, vol. 36, no. 3-4, (2008): 328.

⁴⁸¹ Marciel, 328.

⁴⁸² Marciel, 328.

In dealing with a diverse socio-cultural and political Southeast Asia landscape, ASEAN is a model of multilateral cooperation and an indication that multilateral solutions are possible in Asia. ASEAN's norms of informality and consensus continue to be relevant as efforts to create greater regional cooperation and stability. ASEAN is valuable and plays a leading role in the international relations of Asia. Other organizations have collapsed or failed to combat the volatile landscape of Asia. What makes ASEAN unique? How is ASEAN still relevant to contemporary Asia as well as the interests of the United States? This section will provide an analysis of ASEAN as a multilateral framework solution for addressing and resolving security concerns of Southeast Asia, while also fostering regional community building. By presenting its successes its relevance can be determined. Furthermore, as the landscape of Asia is continuously changing, the dynamics of issues facing the Asia-Pacific are intensifying. While ASEAN may be inadequate to address the vast complexities, and the formation of a new regional institution may be necessary, lessons can be learned in recognizing the weaknesses and limitations of ASEAN and necessary prescriptions can be constructed. Creating Asia-Pacific regionalism, let alone East Asia regionalism, is a complicated undertaking with many opportunities and challenges. It must be approached cautiously and strategically. Ultimately, based on the lessons of ASEAN, this analysis will provide implications for the creation of a new regional institution, NEASCO (Northeast Asian Security Cooperative), to launch East Asia regionalism. These lessons include identifying common perceptions of risks, establishing shared characteristics, and building mutual assurance of trust for peaceful means to resolution.

Background of ASEAN

The Post-Cold War era in Asia is characterized as an unpredictable time of immense insecurity and suspicion among Asian neighbors. Already a region of vast socio-cultural, political and economical diversity, the desire for peaceful cooperation was of primary interest. There were several implications for creating a multilateral organization to deal with security concerns and foster regional cooperation. Varying processes of cooperation under multiple schools of thought were attempted, yet often times competition led to the inability to address issues effectively. Many past organizations such as the ASA (1961) and Maphilindo (1963) have become irrelevant and cease to exist.

The history of Southeast Asia cooperation prior to ASEAN was just as volatile. ASEAN is the largest standing regional organization. Lead-up organizations attempted to address post Cold War sentiments in establishing a project of “neutral and non-aligned foreign policy away from superpower rivalry,” and with a conviction that regional countries ought to determine regional politics.⁴⁸³ Initial attempts, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, failed to achieve support and legitimacy in the region. There were provisions for an institution for the peaceful reconciliation of interstate conflicts and a way to bring together peoples of common ethno-cultural background. As a result, ASEAN emerged in 1967 and embedded the ethno-cultural tensions that previous organizations were incapable to deal with.

Originally comprised of only five countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - ASEAN has expanded to include Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia. It was not until the end of the Indo-China war and the resulting Paris

⁴⁸³ N. Ganesan, "Rethinking ASEAN as a Security Community in Southeast Asia." *Asian Affairs* 21, no. 4 (Winter, 1995): 211, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172234>.

Peace Accords in 1991 that Vietnam and Cambodia became members. Lao, Myanmar and Brunei later joined to make ten permanent members. Besides the ten permanent member states, and eleven dialogue partners, there is also an Ambassadorial program where non-ASEAN members and inter-governmental organizations may appoint and accredit ambassadors to ASEAN. Each ASEAN member state also has appointed a permanent representative to ASEAN with the rank of Ambassador. The ASEAN Secretariat is a very influential part to ASEAN's practices and successes; its sole function is to provide efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN internal structure as well in implementation of projects and activities.

To express a commitment to regional security issues, ASEAN has two member States that sit on the UN security board⁴⁸⁴. Additionally, ASEAN sponsors two multilateral forums: the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that both focus on conflict resolution of security concerns.

Maintaining positive relations with member states is pertinent to the organization's success, as are bilateral partnerships with external powers regionally and internationally. ASEAN tries to conduct friendly cooperation and partnerships with intra-regional and sub-regional countries, in addition with international organizations and institutions. External country relations include dialogue partners with Australia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, United States, and Pakistan. It also conducts external relations with sub-regional states specifically China, Japan and the Republic of Korea through the ASEAN +3 (APT) cooperation. The bilateral relations with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are strategic efforts to improving security issues in the East Asia region. ASEAN-China relations began when China signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation after working

⁴⁸⁴ Marciel, 328.

out a code of conduct for the South China Sea.⁴⁸⁵ China continues to contribute to the ASEAN Regional Forum. China's involvement in ASEAN, ARF and other multilateral organizations in Asia give hope to continual engagement of China in leading efforts of regional cooperation. Similarly, ASEAN's bilateral alliance with Japan through the ARF and ASEAN +3 has increased economic and political engagement influencing Japan as a leader in Southeast Asia. Relations with the Republic of Korea are based on participation in ASEAN +3 and recent timeline for a Free Trade Agreement by 2010 encourage greater cooperation.

Moreover, ASEAN facilitates the East Asia Summit (EAS) where economic ministers from the ten ASEAN member state as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand meet and exchange views on regional and global issues. ASEAN also actively participates in regional and international cooperation groups to include: the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation).

The declaration of the ASEAN Concord is the foundation of the success of ASEAN. The declaration emphasizes political stability, promotion of harmonization of views, coordination in positions, and common actions through a process of dialogue. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed in 1976 reaffirmed these intentions establishing ASEAN's regulatory principles to include "mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, renunciation of the threat or use of force, settlement of difference or disputes by peaceful means and finally, effective cooperation among members".⁴⁸⁶ The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia underlined the

⁴⁸⁵ (Glosserman 90).

⁴⁸⁶ Ganesan, 214.

code of conduct of intra-ASEAN relations. The cultural norms characterized as the “ASEAN way” place emphasis on relationships rather than formal legalistic structures; on consensus building as well as non-interference in others internal affairs with a general suspicion of ‘western’ solutions by external powers.⁴⁸⁷ Most successes can be attributed to this so-called ‘ASEAN way’.

ASEAN’s Success

ASEAN has had great and even unexpected successes for multilateralism as a solution for conflict resolution. The ultimate success is ASEAN’s apparent reduction of the security dilemma for nations within the zone. Described by Alan Collins as the security dilemma, he defines it as “a self-help approach to seeking security”, in which with “no guarantor providing security for states, states are forced to act as egoists acquiring the capabilities to protect themselves from neighboring powers.”⁴⁸⁸ Collins argues that the security dilemma is based on misperceptions, and within a security community these uncertainties are reduced.

As a composition of smaller states, the existence of a security dilemma within Southeast Asia is understandable. According to the 2000 Armitage/Nye Report on Japan, and a CIA-sponsored assessment, Asia is continually ranked as having the greatest potential for serious inter-state conflict.⁴⁸⁹ Southeast Asia easily fits into the confines of this assumed rank for potential risk.⁴⁹⁰ Different leadership styles as well as historical animosities have led to differing perceptions of threat contributing to intra-regional tensions and at times a sense of anarchy.

⁴⁸⁷ Lucian W. Pye. “Review [Untitled]: *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*,” vol. 80, no. 3. (2001): 148.

⁴⁸⁸ Collins, 205.

⁴⁸⁹ Sandra R., Leavitt. "The Lack of Security Cooperation between Southeast Asia and Japan: Yen Yes, Pax Nippon no." *Asian Survey* 45, no. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2005): 216. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4497095>.

⁴⁹⁰ Huiskens, R. "Civilizing the Anarchical Society: Multilateral Security Processes in the Asia-Pacific." *CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA* 24, (2002): 189

ASEAN solutions to security concerns include multilateral dialogue in addition to presence of state-centric bilateral approaches to dealing with issues independently. ASEAN sponsored intra-regional success include the settlement of the “Cambodia in Conflict”. The resolution called for a “durable and comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia,” and received consistent support from the international community. ASEAN norms of behavior and measures for building mutual trust and confidence have contributed most to ASEAN’s success in reducing overall uncertainties within members that would conflict with peace cooperation.

Successfully identifying common perceptions of risk and establishing mutual trust and willingness to deal with risk issues creates a degree of certainty that is an important means of mitigating the security dilemma. Global security matters such as Islamic extremism, terrorism, environmental impacts and nuclear proliferation are central concerns of ASEAN members security uncertainty.⁴⁹¹ A priority security trepidation regionally as well as internationally and the highlighted focus of this entire document is the security threat of North Korea. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has the potential to destabilize efforts of non-proliferation in East Asia and in the international arena. ASEAN members successfully identified the common perceptions of nuclear threats and established common understandings for cooperation. ASEAN members cooperatively contribute to efforts of non-proliferation in the initiation and participation in supportive organizations and security relation formations. ASEAN’s first initiative toward regional nuclear security and non-proliferation was the 1971 Declaration for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia. The Declaration prescribed fourteen guidelines as a “code of conduct” in the region.⁴⁹² The Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone

⁴⁹¹ Ganesan, 217.

⁴⁹² C.P.F. Luhulima, “Regional Strategy for a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone: The ASEAN Case” *INDONESIA QUARTERLY*. Vol. 36, No 2 (2008): 121.

(SEANWFZ) based on the 1971 declaration was created in 1995 as ASEAN's first initiative to foster a regional security arrangement for arms control and towards nuclear disarmament. With the establishment of a SEANWFZ Commission in 2007, there are hopes for improvement in implementation, and promotion of the SEANWFZ under the 'Plan of Action' for the period 2007-2012.⁴⁹³ ASEAN continues to pursue actions to strengthen the SEANWFZ by securing pledges from all nuclear weapons states. However, the efforts of ASEAN are limited to the support for the SEANWFZ treaty by the U.S. and China. Both countries object to the treaty's restriction against use of nuclear weapons within the zone as well as on the passage of nuclear-powered ships through the zone.⁴⁹⁴ In other efforts, despite rumors about nuclear ambitions of Myanmar, all ten ASEAN members have either signed or made a payment to be a part of the Non-proliferation Treaty.

ASEAN Region Forum

More significantly, the most important contribution by ASEAN towards regional security and stability is in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ASEAN Regional Forum includes ASEAN and seven-dialogue partners-U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and the European community as well associate and observer countries.⁴⁹⁵ The objectives of the ARF outlined in its inaugural meeting in 1994 was "to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region."⁴⁹⁶ The 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in

⁴⁹³ Luhulima, "Regional Strategy for a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone: The ASEAN Case," 126.

⁴⁹⁴ Luhulima, "Regional Strategy for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: The ASEAN Case", 130.

⁴⁹⁵ Ganesan, 219.

⁴⁹⁶ "About Us" *The ASEAN Regional Forum*. <http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx> (accessed Feb. 10, 2010).

1994 stated that, "The ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region."⁴⁹⁷ The ARF continues to provide a critical forum of collaborative discussion to Asia's pressing security issues.

Proponents of the ARF say fundamental characteristics based on ASEAN principles contributed to ARF's successful launch. Most states had some exposure to the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference process through ASEAN's regular practices, which gives confidence in ASEAN norms of caution and moderation in resolution building and decision-making processes. Similarly, casting the forum as an arena for discussion on security issues at the political level (among foreign ministers), and indicating that the agenda of all ARF meetings would be subject to the consensus principle provided initial reassurance that the forum could effectively be managed⁴⁹⁸. Operating on the basis of consultation and consensus in accordance with the UN charter's five principles of peaceful co-existence as well as the TAC, ASEAN norms of respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of a State has fostered a basis of neutrality, justice and impartiality and ultimately has improved mutual assurance of trust among participants. The ARF's three objectives include: Confidence building, Norms building, and Enhancing Channels of Communication.⁴⁹⁹ Besides confidence building, the ARF's tangible actions in preventative diplomacy have been extremely useful.

The Confidence Building initiative has helped build comfort levels that have allowed discussions among ARF members to be candid and frank, encouraging greater transparency,

⁴⁹⁷ *The ASEAN Regional Forum.*

⁴⁹⁸ Huiskens, 201.

⁴⁹⁹ *The ASEAN Regional Forum.*

mutual trust and understanding of each other's concerns, interests and positions.⁵⁰⁰ Mutual respect and trust is pertinent to the confidence of members to contribute.

The concept of 'preventative diplomacy' is most pronounced in the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ARF defines preventative diplomacy as "consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties: to help prevent disputes and conflicts between States,[...]to help prevent disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and to help minimize the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region."⁵⁰¹ In order for initiatives of preventive diplomacy to work, mutual confidence and assurance of peaceful means are important. The measures of the ARF are sternly recognized as non-legal obligations.⁵⁰² The forum operates preventative diplomacy in adherence to ASEAN's norms and is ultimately sustained by willingness of members. Until recently, the ARF was viewed as "promising hope to [East Asia] regionalism."⁵⁰³ As diverse problems in the region exacerbate, the ARF may not be suitable as a singular solution.

ASEAN today and in the future

ASEAN expects to continue as a leading player in Asia. At its Ninth Summit in October 2003 ASEAN announced what became known as the Bali Concord II which put forth intention to transform ASEAN into an "ASEAN Community" based upon three pillars: namely the ASEAN

⁵⁰⁰ "ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)

CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY" *The ASEAN Regional Forum*.
<http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ASEANRegionalForumARFConceptandPrinciples/tabid/113/Default.aspx>

⁵⁰¹ *The ASEAN Regional Forum*.

⁵⁰² Luhulima, "Preventive Diplomacy: ASEAN Perspectives," *INDONESIA QUARTERLY*. Vol.36, no 2 (2008), 8

⁵⁰³ Christopher B. Roberts "The ASEAN Security Community Project . the Prospects for Comprehensive Integration in Southeast Asia." *The Indonesian Quarterly*. 34, no. 3 (2006): 270.

Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) and ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). The Bali Concord II put the APSC as the priority emphasizing principles of conflict resolution through non-violent means and renunciation of the use of WMDs, threat or use of force and also the avoidance of an arms race in the region.⁵⁰⁴ The Concord also recognized the ZOPFAN, TAC, and SEANWFZ as essential to ASEAN's efforts as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum in aims toward regional peace and security.

More recently, in 2008 at the 14th ASEAN Summit in Thailand, nearing its 40th anniversary, ASEAN adopted an ASEAN Charter to carry out the implementation of the three community pillars. The ASEAN Charter declared a commitment to its principles of common action to promote greater cooperation and progress in regional integration. The ASEAN Charter is not only a compilation and codification of existing agreements and treaties of the past 40 years, but it also provides a legal framework and international status for progressing its member's common interests of democracy, human rights and good governance in hopes of achieving its goals of greater East Asia regional stability and prosperity through cooperation. The charter is legally binding to all ten ASEAN member states and sets clear targets for ASEAN. In the area of security issues, response and progress must be effective and immediate. The ASEAN charter provides hope for better efficiency and effectiveness of multilateral solutions. Clear targets are to be established and progress to be managed. Some contents the Charter has established for more efficiency include a new ASEAN bodies, more ASEAN meetings, more roles for ASEAN Foreign Ministers, new role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN and most importantly new and enhanced commitments. This charter brings optimism that ASEAN is working towards more accountability and compliance in effectively creating progress in

⁵⁰⁴ Hernandez, Carolina G. "The ASEAN Charter and the Building of an ASEAN Security Community." *INDONESIAN QUARTERLY* 36, no. 3/4 (2008): 308.

economic, socio-cultural and security issues. The ASEAN charter is a great way ASEAN has bolstered its presence and continuation in the regional and international arena.

ASEAN successes overall

ASEAN has been successful in reducing the uncertainties members have about one another's intentions and involvement in multilateral processes, which is pertinent to a security community. While intra-regional disputes over various issues may still exist, the goal is for war to not be seen as a policy option. ASEAN has succeeded in suppressing any such inclination. Additionally, in the formation of a security community, Collins claims certain prerequisites must develop.⁵⁰⁵ Advocates state that in describing a security community there must be common perceptions of security threats, shared respect and values, along with a mutual willingness and confidence for cooperation. Otherwise, the "fear of defection" against malign intent or retreat to act selfishly by member states will make the security community problematic.⁵⁰⁶ Through ASEAN's norms of informality and consensus as well as confidence building initiatives, it hopes to eliminate permanently the fear of defection from the minds of members within the organization. The ultimate goal of reducing uncertainty exists in a "dependable expectation of peaceful change."⁵⁰⁷ Supporters are confident that ASEAN is a dependable organization capable of peaceful change for many years to come.

Limitations of ASEAN

⁵⁰⁵ Collins, Alan. "Forming a Security Community: Lessons from ASEAN." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 2 (2007): 223

⁵⁰⁶ Collins, 206.

⁵⁰⁷ Collins, 206.

Reliance on diplomatic and peaceful methods such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation has not always provided immediacy of progress needed in issues of regional and global security. In actuality, relying on volunteer participation founded on the approach of “progress at a pace comfortable to all members on the basis of consensus” is bound to be slow-paced.⁵⁰⁸ A desire for immediacy in progress in ASEAN and the ARF was never part of its intentions. ASEAN has limited indigenous resources and capabilities that according to analysts force ASEAN states to seek bilateral agreements with external powers who have the resources as well as common threats and concerns to help assist in resolution processes.⁵⁰⁹ The two greatest conflicts the ARF has faced: the East Asia crises and the problem of East Timor have been resolved by external powers; the first by the U.S. and the latter by Australia.⁵¹⁰ In addition, two other cases between ASEAN members have resorted to assistance from international institutions rather than ASEAN norms in settling disputes. The first case of the Malaysian and Indonesia dispute over the Sipadan- Ligitan islands was settled at the international court of Justice 2002. The second case pending relates to Singapore and Malaysia’s intending territorial claims to Pulau Batu Puteh.⁵¹¹

Adherence to ASEAN’s norms has posed difficulty for the ARF to solve domestic disputes permanently of member states. Under the authority of ASEAN, the future of the ARF as a regional security solution is uncertain. The ARF is a vehicle for ‘confidence-building’ and leader of initiatives on non-traditional security matters like pandemic disease and terrorism

⁵⁰⁸ Luhulima, “Preventive Diplomacy: ASEAN Perspectives,” 8

⁵⁰⁹ Amitav, Archaya. "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)." *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 1 (1992): 18 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/423875>.

⁵¹⁰ G.V.C. Naidu. *Multilateralism and Regional Security: Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference?* East-West Center. No 45 (2005):1-8

⁵¹¹ Nicholas, Khoo, "Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 4, no. 1 (2004): 43-44.

within in Southeast Asia. However in regards to traditional “hard security” matters, such as nuclear proliferation, skeptics propose another or other institutions like the Six Party Talks will better addresses these issues.⁵¹² Although ASEAN has become important in the political and security landscape of Asia, the future of becoming a principle force of major security undertakings in the region seems unlikely. Great power presence and influence in the Asia-Pacific region are seen as necessary to address ‘hard security’ concerns.⁵¹³ In its initial potential as a security mechanism for the entire the Asia-Pacific region, the ARF will face conflict among more integral members such as the United States, China, Japan, Russia and India in their aspirations for more control. There is understanding for the United States responsibility to take a firmer role in the ARF.⁵¹⁴ The United States, as a key member of the forum could provide the potential influence of APEC as a greater influential force for security and trade collaboration. However, many in Southeast Asia believe that ASEAN must remain at the helm of the ARF to prevent domination by great powers. Therefore, unless there is a reformation of the ARF and ASEAN’s control of it, the ARF will remain under the control of ASEAN and limited to the constraints of the organizations norms.

Intensifying regional and international security concerns increasingly affect ASEAN and its position as a leader in the regional and international arena. ASEAN’s influence in the region is stipulated to means of settling differences and disputes only by ‘peaceful’, mutually consensual means. ASEAN has been criticized for its inability to resolve internal disputes principally regarding intra-member conflict. This fundamental problem impedes constructive

⁵¹² Wanandi, Jusulf. “Strategic Trends in East Asia” *INDONESIA QUARTERLY*, Vol. 36, no. 3-4 (2008): 325

⁵¹³ Huiskens, 24.

⁵¹⁴ Huiskens, 24.

progress in extra-member and regional cooperatives.⁵¹⁵ ASEAN still faces challenges resolving present intra-regional security issues of member states such as “competing territorial claims or cross-border intrusions, insurgent movements and terrorism.”⁵¹⁶ Differing internal security fears include a variety of areas including human, energy, economic in addition to chemical, biological and nuclear security concerns. Furthermore, problems of developing formal institutions to put into operation military-security cooperation and achieve target objectives are beginning to test ASEAN’s international leverage as a cooperative power. Although beneficial, ASEAN still lacks many signifiers needed to create a community of security to resolve regional and international security concerns quickly. As security issues within the Asia Pacific deepen, ASEAN’s fundamental reluctance to use coercive force and greater governance as an option towards resolving “hard security” threats are posed in ASEAN’s limitations.

Ultimately, several limitations exist within ASEAN that limit its ability to lead the region towards strategic conflict resolution and stability as a community for East Asia. The weaknesses that challenge ASEAN’s competency addressed above are the continuous intra-regional conflicts, lack of common perceptions of risk and finally, little institutionalization to achieve target objectives quickly. In addition, as ASEAN is still dealing with the expansion of its members, it remains in a strategic environment of change in which it must grapple with diverse political regimes and differences in level of economic development among members.

Despite its limitations, there still continues to be positive results that contribute to creating multilateralism in Northeast Asia. ASEAN will continue to deal with intraregional conflicts peacefully. Extensive dialogues and workshops of the ARF indicate the growing

⁵¹⁵ Chau, Andrew. "Security Community and Southeast Asia: Australia, the U.S., and ASEAN's Counter-Terror Strategy." *Asian Survey* 48, no. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2008): 627, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25150724>.

⁵¹⁶ Ganesan, 217.

comfort of regional countries with the ARF's multilateral mechanism and approach.⁵¹⁷

ASEAN's "habit of dialogue and culture of consultation" has significantly contributed to the institutionalization of self-restraint in member states to act unilaterally as well as mutual respect among them to further progress targeted objectives. Additionally, the ARF has succeeded in promoting multilateralism as helpful to progress while highlighting bilateral security relations as a useful and principal approach in foreign relations specifically in regards to U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific.⁵¹⁸ The co-existence of bilateral and multilateral models will be essential in addressing the complexities of the regional security issues and proves pertinent to the success in efforts of greater regionalism.

ASEAN's Relevance

The relevance of ASEAN to Southeast Asia is imperative. Despite the diversities of culture and heritages of ASEAN member states, ASEAN has continued to shape a sense of common identity or "we-feeling" needed in the beginnings of an ASEAN 'community'. The successes of community building literature in the ASEAN Charter and in the promotion of common values characterized in the "ASEAN way" have been an important mechanism of sustainability for the organization. ASEAN has even established its own motto, anthem and ASEAN day.

The relevance of ASEAN to the Asia-Pacific region is vital. ASEAN continues to maintain centrality and proactively in its relations with external partners and external organizations.⁵¹⁹ Dynamic relations with Northeast Asian powers increase significance of ASEAN to the Asia-Pacific region and hopes for continued cooperation. ASEAN +3, in addition

⁵¹⁷ Sukma, Rizal. "Building the ASEAN Community" *INDONESIA QUARTERLY*, Vol 36, no. 3-4 (2008): 264

⁵¹⁸ Sukma, 264

⁵¹⁹ Wulan, Alexandra Retno. "ASEAN Charter. Framing Process or Progress?" *INDONESIA QUARTERLY*, Vol 36, no.1 (2008): 110

to bilateral partnerships with each of the +3 members, with the U.S., and with other external powers like Australia and New Zealand, must be maintained as holding legitimate importance for the future of the region. ASEAN continues to expand its engagement in the international arena through socio-economic cooperation with the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) for future investment initiatives outlined in the ASEAN Charter. In addition diplomatic strategies such as establishing a foreign ministers retreat will make ASEAN more responsive to future challenges.⁵²⁰

ASEAN was established with the objective to act as a framework of balancing the dominant powers in their international system. At the time the balance was between U.S. and the Soviet Union and today ASEAN continues to act as a power-balancer between China and Japan, and the U.S.' presence. While also focusing on regional peace and prosperity through intra-member state building, ASEAN's will have to deal with the question of its own power leverage among growing members in the East Asia region.

Its relevance maintains importance specifically in the area of economic growth and social-cultural issues it focuses most. To continue to be a relevant actor in Asia's security concerns it must strengthen the SEANWZ, while furthering commitment to ARF's processes and ASEAN's vision for 2020 in the formation of ASEAN Security Community. At this time, the real impact of the ASEAN Charter on the community building process is uncertain. Some believe the ASEAN Charter proposes nothing new to the goals and processes already existent in ASEAN.⁵²¹ Others reflect that although the ASEAN culture may not deliver concrete results, peace and stability in the region continue to improve with its existence.

⁵²⁰ Collins 204; AFTA.

⁵²¹ Sukma, 276

Lessons from ASEAN: Opportunities and Challenges of NEASCO

Opportunities

At present, it is a turbulent time for East Asia. The U.S. has a strategic opportunity for further involvement in Asia affairs. The role of the U.S. could be as a power-balancer among rising powers in Southeast Asia or as a facilitator for great North-South collaboration. American policy could also encourage allies like Japan to take more responsibility for regional security issues. As security concerns are a pressing matter to regional stability there is the need for an effective security forum. The Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO) proposed by this Task Force could act as an effective security institution. Within this multilateral framework the United States will be a central player. Hard security issues would take precedent. U.S.'s expanding presence and influence in the region could foster positive benefits to ASEAN as well as increased stability for the entire East Asia region. It does depend however, if ASEAN and Northeast Asia nations, including China and Japan, will allow the U.S. to take such a dominant role.⁵²²

The United States' interest in Asia is longstanding. American policy prescriptions have revolved around the objective of maintaining its involvement in the region's affairs, or more specifically, not being excluded from it.⁵²³ The United States has had supportive involvement in the region since the Cold War through the creation of military alliances, defense pacts signing, provision of aid and support to anti-communist government through direct military intervention were required during the Cold War.⁵²⁴ U.S. presence is still pertinent to regional peace and

⁵²² Huskien, 189

⁵²³ Brad Glosserman. "Traditional Security Issues with Regard to the US Role in the Asia Pacific Region." *INDONESIA QUARTERLY*, 36, no. 3/4 (2008): 86.

⁵²⁴ (Ganesan 213).

security. The U.S.' commitment to the region is appreciated by ASEAN and members want closer cooperation with stronger trade and commercial ties, more technology, education and more dialogue.⁵²⁵ Through a continual U.S. presence as a "foundation of stability, the region can focus on economic growth and prosperity".⁵²⁶ It is certain ASEAN would be interested in further US-ASEAN cooperation on security issues.

Challenges/Recommendations

The value of a security community is most apparent when seen as a means of escaping the core problem in international relations and what many analysts have called: *the security dilemma*. The Asia-Pacific region although growing economically in the last decades, is still considered to be in anarchical state in which diverse political, cultural and economic developments and transformations are met with tensions, high levels of armament, and risks of serious conflict.⁵²⁷ Collins refers to the security dilemma as arising from the anarchical nature within the international system. Where there exist no guarantee of security for states, states are forced to act independently and in their own self-interest by acquiring capabilities to protect themselves from neighboring powers. Within the Asia Pacific region, self-help methods to security matters still ensue and are decreasing the legitimacy of multilateral success.

Creating Asia-Pacific regionalism through multilateralism is a complicated undertaking that needs to be built on the lessons of past and existing processes. Recognizing both the success and failures of ASEAN certain requisites needed for multilateralism to work can be identified. These requisites include: identity of common perceptions of concerns; shared understandings of mutual trust as well as; assurance of resolution through peaceful means. Emanuel Adler and

⁵²⁵ Marceil, 328.

⁵²⁶ Marceil, 329

⁵²⁷ Collins, 206.

Michael Barnett emphasize institutions, values, and shared understandings are integral to the multilateral process.⁵²⁸

Firstly, a common perception of risk is required for cooperation. They claim states are drawn into an arrangement that identifies common threats to regional security. Following ASEAN's example, Asia is a diverse region with varying differences and histories, as a sub-region, the member states of ASEAN are present to the same challenges of balancing differing interests and security risks. ASEAN was founded with the common fear of a communist risk. Only after the Indo-China war and Vietnam's cautious admittance in 1991 to ASEAN was the common perception of risk dismantled and remains somewhat ambivalent today. Today, differing perceptions of internal and external threat lead weak, smaller states within ASEAN to focus more on state-centric behavior.⁵²⁹

Secondly, shared understanding of values will foster mutual trust. ASEAN's norms of behavior provide confidence in respectable actions of members. ASEAN continues to promote a community identity through community rhetoric and emphasizing processes as the 'ASEAN way'. Yet, in its present state the ASEAN community lacks maturity. For example, war remains an option for some ASEAN members as evidenced in the Burmese-Thai relations and the resort to force is seen as a viable alternative. In order to build a security community successfully, social norms and values need to be consistent.

Finally, in building a security organization assurance of resolution through peaceful means needs to be present. ASEAN's processes of consensus and non-interference foster assurance that no coercion will take place in resolving disputes through ASEAN processes.

⁵²⁸ Chau, 628.

⁵²⁹ Collins, 203.

Building trust and confidence is key within ASEAN's principles of state sovereignty and equal consideration. Although 'peaceful' means as outlined by ASEAN's practices are pertinent to the processes of multilateralism it must be noted that this has posed limits to succeeding. Based on voluntary consensus, future objectives will depend on the willingness of those who have direct involvement. As well, ASEAN's non-interference nature ultimately restricts the ability of SE Asia to produce denser networks of security cooperation.⁵³⁰ Resolution processes remain slow and prospects for the future remain limited to ASEAN practices⁵³¹. More governance and institutionalization is recommended.

Moreover, in building a sense of community, further recommendations include the need for more collaboration between peoples of the security community. Incorporation of civil society organizations (CSO) into the organization is an important way for greater participation. Greater participation by the people in addition by government officials, is essential for the emergence of a common regional identity and improves regional governance in attaining a plurality in the decision making processes. Collins insists multilateralism in security solutions and community building must be a bottom-up process. ASEAN must further incorporate CSO into its decision making process to improve its community identity across borders.

Although ASEAN discourse is saturated with language of 'community' building, absence of concrete security assurances usually provided by superpower states, ASEAN members still pursue self-interest behavior by securing bilateral relations as a mean to mitigate crucial security concerns. ASEAN initial focus of national building has influenced a majority of attention on conflict resolution particularly regarding territorial disputes among members. Focus on sub-

⁵³⁰ Chau, 648.

⁵³¹ Khoo, 106

regional and national issues has fostered and initiated rhetoric of community building but attention on extra-regional issues have been minimized. The association's reliance on state-centric approaches could deter such a progress. ASEAN must enforce a real multilateral incorporation and approach. Collins states in the presence of the security dilemma in State's unilateral pursuit of security, all are ultimately worse off.⁵³² Collins and Huiskens, among others argue deliberate intervention through multilateral processes forge more desirable outcomes and is not only an alternative but is a necessity for solving security concerns.⁵³³

The NEASCO will incorporate many if not all of the lessons learned from ASEAN. The prerequisites to a security community will be considered and implemented through strategic measures. The common identity risk will be nuclear weapons and the unpredictable state of North Korea. Additionally, peaceful, multilateral means through consensus will be NEASCO's practices. Still, permanent members will have coercive power in holding voting rights. This is will incorporate greater governance and make results proceed more efficiently.

Conclusion: Multilateralism as a solution

Multilateralism is the solution to dealing with security matters in the Asia Pacific. Based on the case of ASEAN presented here, strong multilateral relations among all members enable a collaborative, voluntary environment to foster regional security and stability. Through peaceful means of dialogue and cooperation, mutual trust and confidence appears to be building a future for an ASEAN Security Community. ASEAN's reputation as a successful multilateral organization capable of fostering 'peace and prosperity' in the Southeast Asia region remain intact. Thus ASEAN as an example of successful multilateralism should be followed.

⁵³² Collins, 205

⁵³³ Collins, 206; Huiskens, 202

Identified by Collins as a prerequisite to defining a security community, ASEAN accurately represents the beginnings of a constructive security community and as a way of escaping the security dilemma that exists in Southeast Asia. In building a security community based in a multilateral approach as prescribed by this Task Force, a security regime can develop in the constructions similarly founded in ASEAN. Through norms of behavior a mutual degree of certainty among members of individual State's intentions can form and mitigate conforms of a security dilemma or the 'fear of defection' mentality. Additionally, by identifying shared perceptions of threat and security issues as a requirement, trust and confidence can be built.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that multilateralism as a solution has limitations. With the complexities of concerns and interests relevant to Asia, underlying the international security dilemma, Ron Huiskens argues "no imaginable development of multilateralism in Asia can significantly displace the elemental instinct that states have to deter or defend themselves against perceived threats".⁵³⁴ Uncertain expectations and self-interests may be impossible to dismantle especially of great powers. Thus, as learned from ASEAN, bilateral relationships will continue to be fundamental in shaping the quality of a regional security environment. To continue the United States' legitimate presence in the region, the U.S. must also actively continue participating in and strengthening existing regional security arrangements like ASEAN and the ARF. Furthermore, with the similarities to ASEAN, the NEASCO will act complimentary to ASEAN.

The U.S. ultimately wants the ASEAN region to be a good partner. Also, ASEAN's good relations with China can help U.S. interests for China's further engagement. Therefore, the U.S. must respect the efforts of ASEAN and the ARF and see it in the U.S' best interest to work with

⁵³⁴ Huiskens, 199.

her. The U.S. would not want to hinder or undermine the continuous and courageous efforts of ASEAN toward regional stability. ASEAN should be welcomed to participate in NEASCO and offered the position of a secondary member. In the formation NEASCO all of these interests and concerns must be taken into account. As a result, U.S. engagement in the region will be more valuable and effective and, with the recognition of ASEAN's values and limits, future efforts for Asian regionalism will be more successful.

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
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The last twenty years have seen a vast transformation in the geopolitical arrangement of Europe. The end of the Cold War precipitated the emergence of a new regional security structure, encompassed by the establishment and strengthening of existing multilateral institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Throughout the nineties, these multilateral institutions extended to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which sought to benefit from the shared provisions of a multilateral institution. Their membership in NATO, the EU and participation in the OSCE framework empowered smaller nations in regions where the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity was often well beyond the scope of national means. Furthermore, membership provided the impetus for countries' progress in democracy and economic liberalization and increased assurances to human rights to countries in regions where they had never before existed. These measures provided an unprecedented reflection of successful collaborative achievement in the eyes of institutions like NATO and the EU, which in turn have justified the continual effort to expand to the east.

The increasing membership of Balkan and Central Asian nations in expanding institutions like NATO, the EU and the OSCE is especially threatening to countries like Russia, whose geopolitical interests traditionally extend beyond its borders and into their territories. Concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity are recurring themes in this discussion, in addition to the pursuit and protection of democracy and human rights. These issues are equally applicable in Asia, where big power politics consign countries like China and India to a position that is all too familiar.

The successes of the current European security structure, formulated in the aftermath of the Cold War, provide a valuable foundation for a conceptual understanding of multilateral

security in East Asia. The multilateral framework was initially constructed on Cold War lines, but changed tremendously after 1989. For these reasons, the multilateralism seen in Europe is not replicable. Without careful consideration of its failures, however, policymakers on all sides risk repeating the mistakes that are currently driving them to reassess the European security framework. This paper outlines the basic lessons from Europe regarding a multilateral security structure by drawing on the relative successes and failures of NATO, the EU and the OSCE in Europe and Central Asia following the end of the Cold War. The Northeast Asian Security Cooperative (NEASCO) cannot effectively mitigate security concerns in East Asia if policymakers do not first recognize and learn from the lessons provided by Europe.

NATO, the EU and the OSCE

NATO, the EU and the OSCE each played and continue to play equally important roles in the ever-changing topography of the European economic, political and security climate, especially since the end of the Cold War. NATO is arguably the most successful regional security alliance to date, and the EU provides a common economic, political and legal framework for member states while significantly increasing stability and security in the region through its operational European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The OSCE is the largest security alliance, and also holds a relevant place in the regional security framework. As noted by Hilary Clinton in her most recent 2010 ‘Remarks on the Future of European Security,’ these institutions collaboratively “provide the full range of tools to meet common challenges” to security, so “the United States works with [them] to extend this kind of comprehensive human security to other places.”⁵³⁵ The continual involvement of the U.S. in the maintenance of a

⁵³⁵ Clinton, Hilary. “Remarks on the Future of European Security.” Speech: Paris, France, L'Ecole Militaire, 29 January 2010 available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/136273.htm>.

European security structure is worth noting, as well as Russia's gradual closure on any sort of extended participation.

Each organization has its relative strengths and weaknesses, but the manner in which they operate multilaterally with countries in and around European territory, especially Russia, bears significant implications for U.S. involvement in setting the foundation for a multilateral framework in East Asia, particularly with regard to China. As noted earlier in the Task Force by Jordan Swarthout in his report on Russia, invariably Moscow will want to be part of any multilateral institution that is formulated to address the security concerns in East Asia. Hence, the development of a more nuanced understanding of the Russian perspective will be a valuable asset towards recognizing the challenges involved in formulating an Asian multilateral system.

The lessons to be extracted from Europe are primarily those taken from Russian relations to multilateral institutions of the region. The provisions of the 1992 Charter of Paris established under the OSCE framework to which both Russia and the United States were a party, have largely failed to produce lasting cooperation in this arena and are worth examining.

The following section provides a brief historical overview of NATO, the EU and OSCE, citing successes, failures and contemporary concerns to illustrate the wide range of scenarios and insights that will prove both relevant and indispensable to the formulation of a multilateral security policy prescription embodied by the proposed NEASCO structure.

NATO Issues Overview

When NATO was created in 1949, it operated solely as a strategic defensive alliance between sovereign Western European nations. The central focus of the organization was to form a collective defense network to protect all member states from internal and external security

threats, consisting primarily of “Communist subversion and Soviet military invasion”.⁵³⁶ NATO also provided an outlet for Western European countries in “grounding West German political and economic reconstruction” efforts.⁵³⁷ At the same time, NATO’s involvement in West Germany indirectly facilitated economic reconstruction efforts throughout Western Europe.

A reevaluation of NATO’s general strategy became necessary after the end of the Cold War, when the organization’s “identity crisis” came to the forefront of political and scholarly discussions alike.⁵³⁸ The 1991 New Strategic Concept sought to include the basic principles on which NATO was established, such as members’ resolve “to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”⁵³⁹ At the same time, NATO’s new general strategy sought to establish greater flexibility to ensure security against new threats.⁵⁴⁰

Formulating a contemporary strategy proved difficult, however, due to the changing geopolitical landscape of Europe in the years following the dissolution of former republics such as the Soviet Union. NATO Heads of State and Government first agreed to reexamine the original Strategic Concept in 1997 and introduced a second New Strategic Concept in 1999,⁵⁴¹ while making major additions to its constituency in 2004.⁵⁴²

Questions of sovereignty, territorial integrity and membership in the Atlantic Alliance all provide a topographical framework for the ever-changing orientation of European multilateral

⁵³⁶ Davis, Samantha Paige. “The Long-term Outlook for NATO and ESDP: Moving Toward Tighter Cooperation or the Breakup of the Western Alliance,” in *Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum* (Berlin: Peter Lang Ag, European Academic Publishers, 2003), 210.

⁵³⁷ Ibid et al., 210.

⁵³⁸ Richard K. Betts, “The Three Faces of NATO,” *The National Interest* 100 (2009): 31.

⁵³⁹ “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” NATO Ministerial Communiqué, 8 November 2001, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm

⁵⁴⁰ Davis, 211

⁵⁴¹ NATO, comment on “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” NATO Ministerial Communiqué, 8 November 2001, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm

⁵⁴² NATO, “NATO Timeline.” www.nato.int/docu/posters/timeline-eng.pdf (accessed 3 February 2010).

institutions, particularly NATO. The concerns also reflect critical positions taken against the Alliance in response to defensive action and/or inaction outside of Western Europe.

Enlargement is largely due to many Central and Eastern nations' newly acquired ability to align themselves to whichever alliance they prefer, a key provision of the 1990 Charter of Paris. For example, Central European leaders suggested their preference for NATO participation as early as the beginning of the nineties.⁵⁴³ When the former Warsaw Pact nations of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were admitted into NATO in 1999, it was only one month after the Alliance released the revised New Strategic Concept.⁵⁴⁴ The issue of NATO's enlargement entered official discussion in 1993, after an article in *Foreign Policy* identified NATO as "the most appropriate mechanism for addressing security threats" across European territory.⁵⁴⁵ NATO has since maintained its open door policy, with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania joining the Alliance in 2004.⁵⁴⁶

Although the Atlantic Alliance has provided one of the most effective defense networks to ensure stability throughout Europe, the impact of its failure in Operation Allied Force at the end of the Balkan Wars is worth mentioning. The credibility of the Atlantic Alliance was severely tested in 1999, after NATO conducted airstrikes on the Kosovo region without express authorization by the United Nations Security Council. The airstrikes contributed to the largest civilian displacement since WWII,⁵⁴⁷ and subsequently forced the European community to

⁵⁴³ Chandrashekhar Dasgupta. "The Reinvention of NATO," in *Europe and Asia: Perspectives on the Emerging International Order*, ed. V.P. Malik and Erhard Crome (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006) 130.

⁵⁴⁴ Vladimir Bilcik, "ESDP and the Security Policy Priorities and Perspectives of Central European and EU Candidate States," in *Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum* (Berlin: Peter Lang Ag, European Academic Publishers, 2003), 122.

⁵⁴⁵ George W. Grayson. *Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1997), 38.

⁵⁴⁶ NATO, "NATO Timeline." www.nato.int/docu/posters/timeline-eng.pdf (accessed 3 February 2010).

⁵⁴⁷ Murphy, R. *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia, and Kosovo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 77.

rethink its capacity to act militarily.⁵⁴⁸ As Elmar Brok, chair of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, stated at the time, Operation Allied Force "acted as a catalyst for Europe's consciousness because it became clear to the Europeans that no diplomatic action could ever be successful if it could not be sustained, if necessary, by military action."⁵⁴⁹

One result was the creation of an agreement between NATO and the EU to make European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) operational. In this way, criticism of NATO for intervening in the affairs of a sovereign nation became the catalyst for a transition from NATO regional military hegemony to action through alternative means. Since then, European security has increasingly undergone a division of labor between NATO, the EU and the OSCE. For implementation of a multilateral security framework to be successful in Asia, the proposed institution must effectively collaborate with the regional institutions that are already in existence.

The responses to military intervention in a sovereign state's affairs resulted in a wide array of reactions from the international community, and are best reflected through conflicting responses from within the United Nations Security Council itself. Western member states like the United States and the United Kingdom condoned NATO military action on the grounds of moral responsibility. However, it should be noted that China, Russia and India publically condemned the intervention.⁵⁵⁰ It must be recognized that these three critics continue to face regional disputes regarding issues of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and conflict over human rights and democracy. If policymakers plan to engage China as an active participant in a multilateral

⁵⁴⁸ Richard G. Whitman. "NATO, the EU and ESDP: an emerging division of labour?": Contemporary Security Policy," in Contemporary Security Policy 25 (2004), 3: 436.

⁵⁴⁹ Elmar Brok. 'Statement on European security and defense identity after the EU summit in Cologne and the transatlantic link', Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, 10 Nov. 1999.

⁵⁵⁰ Gurmeet Kanwal. "Sovereignty, Intervention and UN Reforms: Asian Perspective," in *Europe and Asia: Perspectives on the Emerging International Order*, ed. V.P. Malik and Erhard Crome (New Dehli: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006) 42.

institution, they must tread lightly, honoring the divergent perspectives on matters such as sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Furthermore, NATO's failure to expeditiously respond in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 by way of collaborative efforts with the ESDP, after repeated appeals from Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili for assistance from the European Union, is another example of NATO's failures, and resulted in the "greatest crisis in European security" since Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s.⁵⁵¹ Former U.S. Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State for European Affairs, Ronald Asmus retrospectively observed that "a close partner of the United States and a candidate country for NATO was invaded and neither Washington nor the Atlantic Alliance did much to come to its assistance."⁵⁵² The 2008 Russo-Georgian War provides the latest example of NATO failing to take appropriate action so as to stabilize the security of a sovereign nation.

EU Security Overview

The European Union (EU) is a regional alliance of twenty-seven nations, initially established after the members of its immediate predecessor organization, the European Community (EC), signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.⁵⁵³ The provisions of the treaty provide a common legal and economic framework for all EU members, setting the groundwork for monetary union and a shared foreign security policy, as well as cooperation in legal and domestic

⁵⁵¹ Ronald Asmus, *A Little War That Shook the World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 4.

⁵⁵² Ibid, 5

⁵⁵³ Chandrashekhar, 142.

fronts.⁵⁵⁴ After the Berlin Plus Agreement, the EU developed a security structure with the assistance of NATO to partake in independent military operations.

Originally, the European Union was intended to provide an aggregated economic framework for the European community; however, its composition and operational structure began to change after the end of the Cold War, in accordance with an altered European geopolitical landscape. The end of the Cold War triggered a series of debates as to whether the EU should play a role in the changing European security climate.⁵⁵⁵ The conversion from European Community to European Union allowed for economic union through establishment of the euro as a common currency. More importantly, this transition provided the impetus for the development of an organization that dealt primarily in economic trade matters into one with “a limited but progressively developing role in the foreign policy and security sphere.”⁵⁵⁶

A number of measures were taken to develop the organization’s capabilities throughout the early and mid nineties. However, it was not until December 1998 that the French and British governments issued an official statement “affirming their joint willingness” to develop EU military capacity, effectively laying the groundwork for an operational European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).⁵⁵⁷ This was an unprecedented occurrence in the history of the European membership. Acting collectively in direct response to NATO’s controversial military intervention in Kosovo during Operation Allied Force, EU members agreed to develop an “autonomous capacity to take decisions, and where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch

⁵⁵⁴ Albrecht Rothacher. “Developments in Europe: The Future of European Convention: Enlargement Issues and Institutional Reforms” in *Regionalism in Asia and Europe and Implications for Asia-Europe Relations*, ed. Zainal Mantaha and Sean Golden (Barcelona: Asef University, 2002) 100.

⁵⁵⁵ Richard G. Whitman. “NATO, the EU and ESDP: an emerging division of labour?": Contemporary Security Policy,” in *Contemporary Security Policy* 25 (2004), 3: 432.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid et al., 432.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid et al., 436.

and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.”⁵⁵⁸ The establishment of an operational ESDP reflected consensus between EU nations on the notion of a European military security, and reshaped the EU’s security role throughout the region.⁵⁵⁹ The implementation of ESDP resulted in the introduction of non-combatant EU forces, with the legal ability to support the internal affairs of sovereign European nations, which were previously beyond limitations of NATO’s reach.

Policymakers must seek to engage an array of institutional actors within the NEASCO framework, or make efforts to reinforce cooperation between existing regional institutions in order to effectively address issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity in a way that is both diplomatic and practical. The European model demonstrates that a new multilateral organization must begin with well defined objectives, and only assume broader responsibilities in response to the desires of its members. The following section more deeply examines the relationship between the European institutions and their collaborative effort.

Joint NATO-EU Security

The Berlin Plus Agreement (2002) solidified joint efforts by the EU and NATO by allowing the EU to draw on NATO military assets to pursue its own, independent military doctrine.⁵⁶⁰ Although the agreement was non-binding in nature,⁵⁶¹ its provisions signified a turning point from within the European security climate, as well as a general shift away from an

⁵⁵⁸ Chandrashekhar, 142.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid, 129.

⁵⁶⁰ Martin Reichard. “Some Legal Issues Concerning the EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreement.” *Nordic Journal of International Law* 73 (2004): 37.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid et al., 37.

exclusive NATO military presence in the region for the first time since the end of the Cold War.⁵⁶²

Since then, European security has gradually become more divided in its appropriation “of labor between the EU, through its ESDP, and NATO.”⁵⁶³ Beyond avoiding duplicity in affairs, the organizations’ two primary security goals include combating terrorism and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weaponry.⁵⁶⁴ The joint EU-NATO website lists the key to their success as including transparency of affairs, avoiding duplicity in their efforts, respecting international norms and regulations and maintaining regular contact between all levels of personnel.⁵⁶⁵ As with NATO and the EU, the challenges of implementing a multilateral institution like NEASCO in Asia stem from actively engaging big powers like China and Russia, while at the same time ensuring transparency and a maintenance of respect for international norms.

Operational ESDP under the provisions of the Berlin Plus Agreement was not intended to displace NATO military involvement. The security efforts have previously centered on shared desires for similar results, but are tactically different in terms of their approach. NATO’s desire to engage its Rapid Reaction Force at an international level to combat terrorism after 2001 differed from EU requests to engage the NATO Force in peacekeeping operations “in its near abroad.”⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶² Richard G. Whitman. “NATO, the EU and ESDP: an emerging division of labour?": Contemporary Security Policy,” in Contemporary Security Policy 25 (2004), 3: 430

⁵⁶³ Ibid et al., 432.

⁵⁶⁴ “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” NATO Ministerial Communiqué, 8 November 2001, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid et al

⁵⁶⁶ Martin Reichard. “Some Legal Issues Concerning the EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreement.” *Nordic Journal of International Law* 73 (2004): 38.

Martin Reichard points out that if the EU-NATO partnership resulted in competition over military access, it would render the organizations' "military operations mutually exclusive."⁵⁶⁷ Past experience in Kosovo showed that an institutional division of labor could effectively be implemented to provide a direct peacekeeping response in places where NATO action was no longer possible. However, the EU's failure to quickly respond after months of appeals from Georgian President Saakashvili for assistance negates the supposition that EU-NATO collaboration has steadily become more successful over time.

OSCE Overview

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest collective security arrangement currently in existence. Like NATO, the basis for its organization, as it is seen today, emerged during the Cold War. The OSCE predecessor organization, the Helsinki Commission, otherwise known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), arose from a series of talks held from 1973-75.⁵⁶⁸ Leaders from thirty-five nations were party to the talks, including President Gerald Ford and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.⁵⁶⁹ The negotiations aimed to provide a forum for the economic and security aspects of European cooperation and to address human rights issues.⁵⁷⁰ The terms of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and documents later adopted by the CSCE member states contained "norms

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid

⁵⁶⁸ Ingo Peters. "The OSCE and German Policy: A Study in How Institutions Matter," in *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Roert O. Keohane & Celeste A. Wallander (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 196.

⁵⁶⁹ Vladimir Putin. "Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy." Speech: Munich, Germany, Munich Conference on Security Policy, 12 February 2007 available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>.

⁵⁷⁰ Peters, 199.

and rules that defined the guidelines for legitimate state policy in international and domestic affairs alike.”⁵⁷¹

One of the key achievements of the CSCE was the creation of the 1990 Charter of Paris, which was signed by most European governments and became the primary agent for the formation of a European security structure following the end of the Cold War. Protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, in addition to securing national rights to pursue any alliance of choice were among the most important of the ideals that signatories agreed to. Commitment to the ideals made up a critical component of European security in the last two decades, making Russia’s disengagement from the multilateral system one of the primary sources of concern.

Furthermore, after 1989 Germany played an active role in pushing the institutionalization of the Commission, to act as a collaborative operational security strategy in the new post-Cold War climate.⁵⁷² The CSCE became the OSCE after 1994, when member nations applied the original norms and rules included in the provisions of the Charter of Paris, to the broader set of security challenges that were surfacing in the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe.⁵⁷³ The organization has since expanded to include countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The organization continues to play an active role in European affairs, but has failed to continually implement principles, which were agreed upon in the creation of a framework for the Charter of Paris. The Russo-Georgian War and the events leading to it provide perhaps the most illustrious examples of OSCE failure. As early as the beginning of the nineties, the UN and the OSCE worked collaboratively to establish several missions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, respectively to ensure stability and monitor ceasefire, but the two missions found no real

⁵⁷¹ Ibid

⁵⁷² Ibid et al., 199.

⁵⁷³ Ibid et al., 199.

authority on the ground.⁵⁷⁴ Instead, Russian officials used their presence on the ground to mask broader geopolitical ambitions.⁵⁷⁵

That the OSCE was unsuccessful in developing sustained relations with Russia demonstrates the dynamic interaction and regional posturing between both entities. In 2007, Vladimir Putin condemned the organization, calling it a tool to advance Western foreign policy interests for its support of liberal democratic institutions.⁵⁷⁶ Furthermore, when Russia invaded Georgia, it showed Moscow's willingness to break with the most paramount provisions of the Charter of Paris; "the cardinal rule of post-Cold War European security that borders in Europe would never again be changed by force of arms."⁵⁷⁷

Sustained cooperation between the OSCE and Russia has yet to be achieved. However, OSCE relations with Russia provide a useful lens for understanding the issues that arise in multilateral engagement of the unwilling, which are to be further discussed in the sections to come.

Russian Relations with NATO, the EU and the OSCE

How Russia interacts with NATO, the EU and the OSCE is an important aspect of the ever-changing European security dynamic, originally formulated by the European community at the end of the Cold War. Although relations between Russia and the multilateral institutions cannot currently be characterized as cooperative, over the last two decades "the West offered Moscow new partnerships" with all three organizations "as part of an overall strategy of creating

⁵⁷⁴ Ronald Asmus, *A Little War That Shook the World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 11.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid et al., 11.

⁵⁷⁶ Vladimir Putin. "Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy." Speech: Munich, Germany, Munich Conference on Security Policy, 12 February 2007 available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>.

⁵⁷⁷ Ronald Asmus, *A Little War That Shook the World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 4.

a Europe, whole, free, and at peace.”⁵⁷⁸ The OSCE, in its Cold War framework, facilitated the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Empire, which would not have been possible without the support of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Moscow also engaged in a number of opportunities for cooperation, under the auspices of NATO and the EU, to reestablish relations with the rest of Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, however, Russian relations began to display visible signs of strain. Putin has been quoted condemning the OSCE as an instrument of a Western neo-imperialist agenda.⁵⁷⁹ The tensions in the relationship between Moscow and the multilateral institutions became increasingly clear when, in February of 2008, the OSCE was forced to cancel its election observation mission to the Russian Federation.⁵⁸⁰ Furthermore, the Russo-Georgian war raised some major concerns about the future of European security, as well as the roles of the EU and NATO. According to Ronald Asmus, the “European security system diplomats had spent two decades developing failed in August 2008.”⁵⁸¹ Notably after the end of the 2008 war, Russia suspended its implementation of the Conventional Forces of Europe Treaty (CFE) and proposed that a new European security strategy be formulated that more effectively ensured the security and stability of continental Europe.⁵⁸²

The following sections examine Russian relations with the European multilateral institutions and draw on contemporary anxieties from both sides of the spectrum to demonstrate the greater implications for multilateral engagement with countries that may not as readily accept the terms of the institution. Understanding the role of Russia and its relationship to the

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid, 7.

⁵⁷⁹ Putin, “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.”

⁵⁸⁰ Press Release, “OSCE/ODIHR regrets that restrictions force cancellation of election observation mission to Russian Federation,” Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: Elections, <http://www.osce.org/item/29599.html>.

⁵⁸¹ Asmus, 7.

⁵⁸² Clinton, “Remarks on the Future of European Security.”

multilateral institutions in Europe, however, not only provides useful lessons for engaging East Asian countries in a multilateral framework. Russia's participation in an Asian multilateral institution is certain. Therefore, considering the role of Russia as it pertains to the European community will additionally provide insights into the nature of its own involvement in the proposed NEASCO framework.

NATO and Russia

The relationship between NATO and Russia has been tense throughout NATO's history. In the last several years, efforts have been made to facilitate cooperation. Although the NATO-Russia Council was established in 2003, a true partnership has yet to be achieved. From the Russian perspective, relations with NATO are characterized by a string of humiliating experiences occurring at times when Moscow was considered to be at its weakest.⁵⁸³ The South Ossetia War between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 most poignantly exemplifies the lack of NATO-Russian cooperation.⁵⁸⁴ The NATO-Russian partnership during the South Ossetia War was unprecedented, and revealed the dysfunction of the relationship between both entities, while at the same time heightening concerns over Russia's role as it pertains to the multilateral European community.

Two important historical sources of tension between Russia and NATO stem from contradictory perspectives on agreements that were made at the end of the Cold War as well as the issue of NATO's enlargement.⁵⁸⁵ Russian officials believe that through its support of NATO

⁵⁸³ Antonenko, Oksana and Bastian Guegerich. "Rebooting NATO-Russia Relations," in *Survival*, Vol. 51, 2009, 14.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid et al., 13.

⁵⁸⁵ Mary Elise Sarotte. "Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbechev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990," in *The Journal for the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations*, Vol. 34, 2008, 119.

expansion, the U.S. broke promises made during the George H.W. Bush presidency to expand no further than East Germany.⁵⁸⁶ Former American Secretary of State James Baker told Russian President Gorbachev, “If we maintain a presence in Germany that is part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.”⁵⁸⁷

According to former United States National Security Advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Anthony Lake, during the Cold War the “expanded alliance [provided] a hedge against the unlikely but very real possibility that Russia [would] revert to past behavior.”⁵⁸⁸ Russian policymakers have viewed NATO as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy since the Cold War, especially with regard to Europe and Eurasia. Despite NATO officials’ insistence that the Alliance is not directed against anyone, officials in Moscow continue to view the organization as anti-Russian.⁵⁸⁹

Enlargement beyond East Germany is in keeping with NATO’s open door policy. Although Western European member states such as France do not recognize Russia as a threat, smaller Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and Central Asian countries whose territories fell within the borders of the former Soviet Union continue to view the country as such, due to historic grievances with the Moscow’s increasingly assertive posture in the region.⁵⁹⁰ Public support for NATO membership demonstrates this dynamic, and was especially strong in countries with a history of Russian military intervention.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid et al., 119.

⁵⁸⁷ Strobe Talbott. *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy* (New York: The Random House Trade Paperback Edition, 2003), 93).

⁵⁸⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski and Anthony Lake. “New Members, Not New Missions,” *Wall Street Journal*, 9 July 1997.

⁵⁸⁹ Antonenko, Oksana and Bastian Guegerich. “Rebooting NATO-Russia Relations,” *Survival*, Vol. 51, 2009, 14.

⁵⁹⁰ Antonenko and Guegerich, 15.

⁵⁹¹ Tatiana Kostadinova, “East European Public Support for NATO Membership Fears and Aspirations,” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 37, 2 (2000): 235-249.

The Russo-Georgian war is important, not only for the lessons that can be taken away from the war itself and the events that occurred immediately before it. Several important points can be also made about NATO's actions leading up to Moscow's invasion of Georgia.

At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, for example, it was announced that Georgia and Ukraine were to be offered partnership to NATO after Russia had warned many times that its relations with Georgia, especially regarding the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were contingent upon whether Georgia decided to align itself with the West.⁵⁹² Another key event setting the tone for Moscow's invasion was the West's recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, despite warnings that Russia would respond by taking action to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁵⁹³ According to Ronald Asmus, these events created Russia's "double pretext" to act unilaterally against Georgia.⁵⁹⁴

There are major lessons that can be ascertained from the experiences in Europe, especially with regard to the Russian perspective of the multilateral framework. Primarily, in the eyes of Moscow, the feared impact of Georgia's involvement in a "pro-Western democratic experiment" could result in political losses for Russia in the "Southern Caucasus and potentially across the border in the Northern Caucasus within Russia itself."⁵⁹⁵ Furthermore, Asmus speculates that Russia fears if Ukraine and Georgia embrace liberal democracy, are supported by NATO and fall under Western influence, "the Russian ruling class's narrative about its own sovereign democracy at home and the reestablishment of Russian power abroad might be

⁵⁹² Asmus, 12.

⁵⁹³ Ibid, 12.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid, 12.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid, 8.

exposed as hollow.”⁵⁹⁶ As noted in Jordan Swarthout’s report on Russia, American democratizing foreign policy agenda threatens the Russian regime security.

If a multilateral security structure is to be implemented in the Asian region, it will have to be cautious and calculated in its approach to integrating China and other big Asian powers within its framework, with special regard to its perspective on democracy as well as ethnic conflict that exists both internally and in its immediate surrounding territories.

The EU and Russia

Just as enlargement set the tone for NATO-Russian relations at the end of the Cold War, so too did it influence relations between the EU and Russia, especially with regard to the Union energy security policy, as well as its democratization efforts.⁵⁹⁷ Comparatively, there is more cooperation between Russia and the EU than with NATO, further serving to highlight the institutional division of labor between the two entities. The accession of CEE nations to the EU, however, has heightened the necessity for a reestablishment of the cooperative relationship between Russia and the EU. This is especially important in the realm of European energy supply, as the CEE countries remain dependent on Russian energy provisions, and a move toward alternative energy sources is seen as especially threatening in the eyes of Kremlin officials.⁵⁹⁸ Furthermore, EU enlargement could be perceived as a threat to Russian security because it serves as a facilitative tool for countries’ transition to democracy and Western influence.

The dynamic associated with EU enlargement in this context is particularly interesting for several reasons. Although Russia has maintained a strategic monopoly on the energy market,

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid, 9.

⁵⁹⁷ Andrei V. Belyi, “New Dimensions of Energy Security of the Enlarging EU and Their Impact on Relations with Russia,” *European Integration* Vol. 25, 4 (2003): 351.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid, 352.

Balkan nations are beginning to voice their desire to strategically limit dependence on Russian energy supplies.⁵⁹⁹ Access to a diverse energy supplies is one key aspect of the White Paper on Energy Policy that the EU issued in 1997.⁶⁰⁰ However, access to the Caspian Sea is contingent on the resolution of conflicts in the Caucasus such as those between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, and Georgia versus Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁶⁰¹ Although Russia has maintained a military presence in the region, both Georgia and Azerbaijan consider the Russian presence to be detrimental to their security interests, favoring engagement with Western institutions to facilitate conflict resolution.⁶⁰²

It is clear that the decision to align with the West placed the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia in an exceedingly precarious position. What remains unclear, however, is the issue of whether the Russian response was aimed at Western institutions or at the leaders of those governments themselves. Ronald Asmus notes that by the time Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, a series of proposals had been presented by the Georgian government and promptly rejected so that negotiations over the disputed territories were a futile attempt to solve an issue that Moscow had little intention of resolving.⁶⁰³ In this way, the European expansion of institutions like NATO and the EU are seen as mutually threatening to Russia, because it is seen as an act of recruitment for territories that lie within its strategic sphere of influence; that is, away from Russia and toward the West.

The EU has steadily expanded eastward, and poses an increasing threat to Russia's relations with countries purportedly in its sphere of influence. However, the EU's failure to place

⁵⁹⁹ Belvi, 358.

⁶⁰⁰ European Commission, *White Paper for Energy Policy* (1996): COM (95) 682.

⁶⁰¹ Belyi, 358.

⁶⁰² Ibid, 358.

⁶⁰³ Asmus, 12.

peacekeeping forces on the ground in the months leading up to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, after repeated appeals from Georgian president Saakashvili, show that the institution was already treading softly in its relationship with Russia.

In this regard, an Asian multilateral structure must address the security concerns of all members equally, interacting with big regional powers in a way that does not interfere with protecting smaller nations across surrounding territories.

The following section looks at Russian relations with the OSCE and focuses on contemporary concerns from both the perspective of the OSCE and Russian officials, in order to illustrate a more comprehensive picture of Russia's interaction with multilateral institutions.

The OSCE and Russia

The relationship between the OSCE and Russia, as with previously discussed multilateral organizations is marked by a complex dynamic, which can be traced from the creation of its predecessor organization, the CSCE, in 1975. Additionally, the creation of the Helsinki Commissions, which were intended to monitor human rights in Russia and compliance to democratization measures throughout Europe, was an important outcome of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which Russia has struggled to accept in its own terms.

Although Russia was fairly complacent with the measures created by the Helsinki Final Act, its hostility toward multilateral organizations that support the liberalization of Central and Eastern European countries, as well as countries in Central Asia that previously fell under Soviet control, marks another instance of aggression toward the democratization process. Russian hostility toward the OSCE became clear on 7 February 2008 when the organization had to cancel

its plans to dispatch an observation mission to the country to monitor elections in the following month.⁶⁰⁴

Additionally, the role of the OSCE in giving a voice to smaller CEE and Central Asian countries has exacerbated already existing tensions in the relationship between Moscow and the OSCE. Although Moscow has pledged its support for the current OSCE presidency, it should be noted that the present OSCE Chairperson in Office is Secretary of State and Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kanat Saudabayev. Additionally, the OSCE Chairperson prior to Saudabayev was Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs George Papandreou.

Furthermore, over the last few years, the United States and the OSCE have been engaged in cooperative measures aimed to propel a series of arms control agreements throughout Europe, as well as related efforts “to promote democratic transformation, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,”⁶⁰⁵ leading one to speculate on the antagonistic situation the US Mission to the OSCE created for Russian cooperation. Largely present in the leadership’s condemnation of the organization is a disdain for Western influence and promotion of a separate, neo-imperialist agenda. Russian President at the time, Vladimir Putin, is quoted to have said,

“They [unnamed Western States] are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.”⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰⁴ Press Release, “OSCE/ODIHR regrets that restrictions force cancellation of election observation mission to Russian Federation,” Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: Elections, http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/item_1_29599.html

⁶⁰⁵ “What is the OSCE and why does it matter to the United States,” *United States Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe*, <http://osce.usmission.gov/usandosce.html> (accessed February 3, 2010).

⁶⁰⁶ Putin. “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.”

The OSCE has failed to sustain a working relationship with Russia since 2007, giving more responsibility and thus, liability, to NATO and the EU for upholding a working relationship in the future. If one lesson remains to be taken from Europe, it is that the NEASCO framework in Asia will have to reinforce its permanent position through collaborative action with other multilateral organizations, so that in the event of its failure it will still have produced tangible results for increasing the security and stability of the Asian community.

Comprehensive Summary of Lessons

Multilateral institutions like NATO, the EU and the OSCE have changed immeasurably since the end of the Cold War. They provide the most successful example of multilateral structures currently in existence, but these successes may prove difficult to replicate. More importantly, the failures of these institutions provide valuable insights into a more nuanced understanding of how multilateral security can be applied in places like Northeast Asia. Without careful consideration of these failures, policymakers risk repeating the mistakes that are presently driving them to reevaluate the current security structure in Europe.

Concerns about sovereignty and territorial integrity will need to be addressed in a practical manner. Policymakers must be cautious and calculated in their approach to engaging nations like China, Russia and North Korea. Special regard must be given to these countries' perspectives on democracy, and the former two's concerns over ethnic conflict and breakaway regions. At the same time, NEASCO must address the security concerns of all members equally. The interests of regional powers must not interfere with protecting smaller nations.

Policymakers must balance the need to engage an array of institutional actors within the NEASCO framework with avoiding the creation of a dysfunctional organization overly broad in

scope. As with NATO and the EU, the challenges of implementing a multilateral institution in Northeast Asia stem from actively engaging big powers like China and Russia, while not compromising the ability to take effective action. Failure to incorporate Russia into European multilateralism provides an important lesson on alternatives measures to be used in Northeast Asia. This organization must be able to benefit all members, so that no country in the region sees it as directed against them.

For implementation of an institutionalized multilateral framework to be successful in Asia, there must be a division of labor amongst organizations. The proposed institution must effectively collaborate with the existing regional institutions. While concentrating on security affairs, NEASCO should enlist the help of APEC and ASEAN to further economic cooperation. The NEASCO framework will have to reinforce its permanent position through collaborative action with other multilateral organizations, so that in the event of its failure it will still have produced tangible results for increasing the security and stability of the Asian community.

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
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Multilateralism in Asia is a relatively new phenomenon. Asia's immense geographic size encompasses a variety of different governments, cultures, languages, and religions. Such a multitude of variables makes it virtually impossible to settle upon a common set of characteristics, which could identify a specific category, collection or community of states. Many of the states in this region are themselves geographic conglomerations of self-identified groups that are significantly different from each other by one standard or another. Despite their diversity, Asian countries have managed to form multilateral organizations to deal with shared concerns. Since the era of European colonialism, security has been a primary concern of all Asian countries. The rapid spread of information and technology enables any country, with enough resources and funding, to develop nuclear weapons. Establishing reliable security measures has never been a larger priority. Since the mid-1990s, several multilateral organizations in Asia have emerged, with the goal of tackling security concerns in the region. The productivity of these organizations has varied. While some have produced significant treaties, others have yet to make a considerable impact.

The purpose of this essay is to measure the efficiency of security-related, multilateral organizations in Asia. The three organizations analyzed in this paper are: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and the Six Party Talks. These groups represent the diversity of Asian multilateralism. Despite their shared concentration on security concerns, they are very distinct from one another, and they each take a different approach to the security issue. Although the Six Party Talk framework is not technically an organization, the forum has provided progressive contributions to nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The analysis of their origins, progression, and results will determine whether they have been successful in dealing with their stated objectives.

The subsequent section outlines the general trends of multilateral organizations in Asia from a historical perspective. The following section briefly explains the obstacles obstructing Asian multilateralism, globalization's effect on Asian multilateralism, the beginning of multilateral cooperation and the development of international organizations in the region. The next section highlights the effect that existing Asian cultures and values have on multilateralism. Culture is deeply rooted in transnational politics, and its impact cannot be ignored. In order to evaluate success, the qualities of an ideal multilateral security organization must be defined. This essay offers an original, ideal model for a multilateral organization in Asia. The model is used as point of comparison for the SCO, CICA, and Six Party Talks. The subsequent section analyzes the SCO, CICA, and Six Party Talks, individually. Following each study is a determination of whether they have been successful. The conclusion recommends a multilateral solution for security in Asia based on the successes and failures of the SCO, CICA, and Six Party Talks.

Historical Perspective

Much of Asia was considered isolationist before globalization made regional cooperation essential for maintaining global competitiveness. Claes G. Alvstam explains this pattern in his essay in the book *Regionalization in a Globalizing World*, in which he describes the prevailing tradition of East Asian nation-states as being "self-contented isolation, autarchy, inward-looking and technological self-reliance, interfoliated by shorter periods of military aggression, confrontation and territorial expansion".⁶⁰⁷ East Asia viewed the outside world as a threat, much less a partner. However, the progression of globalization did much to change Asia's inward tendencies.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid

Globalization was the catalyst of modern multilateralism in Asia. The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s highlighted the importance of regional multilateral organizations in the globalized world.⁶⁰⁸ Asian countries were frustrated with the failure of international organizations, especially the IMF, to provide crisis relief. They accused the IMF of having insufficient understanding of the Asian region.⁶⁰⁹ They responded by developing multilateral organizations to increase regional financial cooperation. An essay by Richard Higgott in the book, *Regionalism in Asia and Europe and Implications for Asia-Europe Relations*, argues that the financial crisis encouraged Asian states to take greater control of financial affairs through regional forums rather than relying on foreign-led international institutions.⁶¹⁰ In the late 1990s, Asian regionalism started growing in the financial sector, as a defensive measure against financial crises. However, it paved the way for multilateral organizations dealing with virtually all overlapping regional concerns.⁶¹¹ Today, Asia's regional organizations deal with extremism, terrorism, separatism, nuclear energy, WMD, trade, investment, transport, health, environment, human rights, and other social and cultural projects.

Cultural Perspective

The impact of culture cannot be ignored when discussing multilateralism in Asia. The East Asian region, alone accounts for almost a quarter of the world's population.⁶¹² The region is home to many of the world's most ancient religions and cultures. Economists and political theorists often overlook cultural beliefs and traditions as a factor in governmental decision-

⁶⁰⁸ Zainal Mantaha and Sean Golden, *Regionalism in Asia and Europe and Implications for Asia-Europe Relations* (Barcelona: Asia-Europe Foundation, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Fundació Cidob, Casa Asia, 2004). P. 6

⁶⁰⁹ Mantaha; Golden, 127.

⁶¹⁰ Mantaha; Golden, 7.

⁶¹¹ Mantaha; Golden, 128

⁶¹² Schulz; Söderbaum; Öjendal, 173

making.⁶¹³ In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington writes, “In an era in which peoples everywhere define themselves in cultural terms, what place is there for a society without a cultural core and defined only by a political creed?”⁶¹⁴ Culture and religion are not only deeply rooted in Asian society, but also in politics. Huntington’s statement is especially relevant when referring to U.S. relations with Asia. U.S. officials can make poor policy decisions due to a limited knowledge of cultural influence in the region. The effect is even greater in multilateral organizations, as a variety of different cultures are expected to work together and coordinate policy.

Ideal Organization Model

The ideal multilateral organization for security in Asia requires balance in three main areas: membership, identity, and responsibility. The three terms are original, but the ideas are drawn from several scholarly articles that criticize aspects of Asian multilateralist organizations. These particular characteristics were chosen because they deal with managing Asia’s diversity. First, the organization must have a certain degree of trust within its membership.⁶¹⁵ If members are generally distrustful of each other, agreements and treaties are more likely to be violated. Trust between members is impossible to measure and difficult to achieve, but it can be built. To begin the process, members must enter the organization with similar concerns and objectives. By sharing concerns, members have a greater incentive to resolve the issue at hand. There would be greater trust in the other parties to cooperate since it would be in each member’s best interest. Second, the organization must develop a definite identity. Establishing an organization’s identity

⁶¹³ Mantaha; Golden, 92

⁶¹⁴ Mantaha; Golden, 94

⁶¹⁵ C. P Chung, "The Role Of Asia-Pacific Organizations in Maintaining regional security," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 20, no. 2 (2008): 169-185.

is crucial to its success. The first few summits are vital in shaping identity. It defines the organization to the rest of the world. Identity also determines whether the organization is capable of being the primary forum in the region responsible for its stated concerns, which greatly influences its effectiveness.⁶¹⁶ The identity must be suited for the particular region both politically and culturally.⁶¹⁷ Finally, the organization must have the correct amount of responsibilities. If it takes on too many responsibilities, the organization might not have the resources to commit to them, resulting in failure. If it does not take on enough responsibilities, the organization will not receive enough acknowledgement or respect from the global community.⁶¹⁸ Once its responsibilities are defined, the organization must, cohesively and systematically, find solutions to the issues that come with its responsibilities.

SCO

The Shanghai Five, precursor to the SCO, had its first meeting on April 26, 1996. Its original members were China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Tajikistan, with all the countries sharing a border with China. The Shanghai Five met a total of five times. Initially, their intentions were to repress separatist groups, mainly the Uighurs, and deepen military trust along the border regions. The Sino-Soviet border cold war left China's borders heavily militarized.⁶¹⁹ With each passing meeting, the members successfully coordinated the reduction of fortification along the border. The 3rd summit was held in Almaty in 1998, where the members agreed to increase cooperation to work on peace and stability in the region. At the 5th and final summit, held in Dushanbe in 2000, the members decided to convert the organization into one that address

⁶¹⁶ Ibid

⁶¹⁷ Aris Stephen, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A Regional Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?," *Europe-Asia Studies* 61, no. 3 (2009): 457-482.

⁶¹⁸ Zhao Huasheng, "Where is the SCO Heading?," *Beijing Review* 49, no. 24 (2006): 10-12.

⁶¹⁹ Henry Plater-Zyberk, *Who's Afraid of the SCO?* (Manchester: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2007), 5.

challenges and threats. The SCO was founded on June 15th, 2001, and Uzbekistan was admitted to its membership shortly afterward.

The SCO's members' shared security interests have encouraged them to separate external, political relations from internal, member relations. China's ability to offer unmatched economic assistance to its Central Asian neighbors gives it considerable leverage within the organization.⁶²⁰ Russia's position in Central Asia, combined with its oil and gas reserves, comfortably establishes it as the SCO's other great power. Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan accepted China and Russia's economic status and saw them as powerful allies and potential threats. China and Russia were content knowing that the four Central Asian countries would not challenge their leadership or political paths.⁶²¹ They agreed that the greatest threats to regional security were the Uighurs and Salafist Islamic radicals. However, more generally, their stated objective was to eliminate terrorism, extremism, and separatism in Central Asia.

The structure of the SCO consists of five meeting mechanisms and two permanent bodies. The top decision-making body of the SCO is the Council of Heads of State. They meet once a year to discuss all topics concerning the members, and they decide the SCO's budget. The Council of Heads of Government is the second highest council in the organization. It holds annual summits, where members discuss issues of multilateral cooperation, and it approves the organization's budget. The Council of Foreign Ministers meets one month before the annual meeting of the Heads of States, where members discuss the current international situation and their interaction with other international organizations. The Council of Ministers and Heads of Agencies coordinates specific issues in areas ranging from military affairs to cultural issues. The

⁶²⁰ Plater-Zyberk, 1.

⁶²¹ Plater-Zyberk, 1.

Council of National Coordinators meets at least three times a year to coordinate the tasks established by the decision-making councils. The Secretariat, located in Beijing, is one of the SCO's permanent organs, and it is the primary executive body of the organization. It is responsible for the political groups, the economic group, the administrative and legal group, and the media group. It implements decisions and degrees, drafts proposed documents and arranges specific activities within the organizational framework.

The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is the other permanent body of the SCO. RATS is located in Tashkent and is run by its own Council and Executive Committee. RATS's activities are covert due to the sensitive security information exchanged within its branches. The Council probably consists of SCO officials combating terrorism within the member states.⁶²² It processes information provided by member states and coordinates the SCO's anti-terrorist struggle. RATS's jurisdiction is restricted by its focus on non-state security. Therefore, it cannot enforce its policy recommendations. This limits RATS's responsibilities to facilitating communication between the SCO member states to increase coordination between the states' individual security authorities.⁶²³ Since RATS is dependent on participation of domestic security bodies, activity and progress within RATS is delayed by the member states governments' approval. Also, China and Russia's reluctance to share sensitive security information is hindering progress.⁶²⁴ However, RATS has achieved some results. They have begun the creation of a regional security approach by identifying, and creating a list of, organizations and individual extremists prohibited across the region. They have also harmonized lower-level security laws among member states, and they increased collaboration between national and local police

⁶²² Plater-Zyberk, 2

⁶²³ Aris, 469

⁶²⁴ Aris, 470

forces.⁶²⁵ By its formal inception in mid-June, 2004, RATS held information on approximately 600 wanted individuals and 30 terrorist organizations.⁶²⁶ China and Russia provide 25% of the funding for RATS.

The first SCO summit was held in Shanghai from June 14-15 in 2001. The members announced Uzbekistan's addition to the original Shanghai Five. They also initiated the Shanghai treaty, stating their mission to diminish terrorism, separatism, and extremism in the region. The second summit was held in St. Petersburg, Russia on June 7th, 2002. The members' presidents signed three documents: the Charter of the SCO, and anti-terrorism agreement and the presidents' declaration to chart the organization's development goals and institutionalize cooperation. The third summit was held in Moscow on May 29th, 2003. They vowed to further develop a comprehensive partnership that would embrace even more threats and challenges. The leaders of member states also acknowledged the United Nations' global involvement and requested a cooperative effort in combating terrorism. In August, 2003, the SCO conducted a joint military exercise. This being China's first joint anti-terror military exercise, the event was significant in promoting cooperation within the SCO. The fourth summit formally launched RATS, and the member states pledged to strengthen their economic trade ties. At the fifth summit, SCO leaders grant observer status to India, Iran, and Pakistan, and they agreed to provide mutual help in emergency relief during disasters or crises.⁶²⁷

The SCO began as an organization solely devoted to dealing with security concerns in Central-Asia, but their involvement has since expanded to include all areas that stabilize the region. The SCO has initiated projects related to customs cooperation, cross-border transportation, harmonization of laws and regulations, energy and railway construction,

⁶²⁵ Ibid

⁶²⁶ Plater-Zyberk, 3

⁶²⁷ Zhao Huasheng, 10-12

establishment of substantial local links, creation of common education standards, harmonization of the region's legal framework and cooperation between businesses⁶²⁸. The SCO continues to reach and further its original objectives, while pushing for organizational expansion to new security threats in the region.

One of the SCO's best features is its resistance to becoming a military or close political alliance.⁶²⁹ By maintaining a strictly Central-Asian stability partnership, the SCO is less threatening to other countries and existing alliances. Another vital feature of the SCO is the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure as a permanent body. The guaranteed existence and achievement of RATS allows the SCO's councils to focus on other pertinent concerns without deviating from terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Also, the SCO benefits from China's leadership and funding. In 2005, China supplied funding for the special training of 1500 people from its member states and \$900 million in export credits with a meager 2% interest.⁶³⁰

One of the SCO's most limiting features is the discrete and exclusive nature of its security and defense activities. China and Russia are slowing the SCO's regional progress by refusing to share sensitive security information. Also, RATS has proven to be effective in fighting terrorism in Central Asia, but they are not a factor on the global level.⁶³¹ Despite claims to increase global cooperation, the SCO's members have yet to actively work with other organizations and share strategic information.⁶³² Many Western political theorists view the SCO as an anti-Western bloc whose only purpose is to counter U.S. influence in the region.⁶³³ The suspicion comes from the fact that none of the SCO's members have liberal democracies. The

⁶²⁸ Aris, 472-473

⁶²⁹ Plater-Zyberk, 5

⁶³⁰ Ibid

⁶³¹ Aris, 472

⁶³² Ibid

⁶³³ A Rothacher, "Allying with an Evil Axis? The Ambivalent Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Central Asia," *Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies* 153, no. 1 (2008): 68-73.

dominance of democracy in multilateral organizations is threatening to these autocratic governments, and some view the SCO as an organization focused on counterbalancing democracy.⁶³⁴

Since its inception, the SCO has been a generally successful organization within Central Asia. Trust within the membership was established during its Shanghai Five years. However, RATS still struggles to acquire sensitive security information from China and Russia. Despite some tensions among its members outside of the organization, the agitation has not penetrated the membership or significantly interfered with its objectives. The institutional framework is appropriate for a regional forum with a security dimension. Its actions are based on mutual agreements between the members, and there is no penalty system in place for accountability measures. The members have been responsible about fulfilling their obligations to the organization because they mutually benefit from a stabilized Central Asia. They have also been careful not to overexpand their reach, so much so that the U.S. is concerned about its exclusive nature. The SCO's hesitance to work outside of the region has drawn criticism from some of its counterparts in the fight against terrorism.⁶³⁵ Its success in tackling security concerns regionally should be collaborated with global efforts. Global cooperation is unlikely because its members are only acting in their best interests, none of which involve Western concerns.

CICA

The idea of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia was first proposed on 5 October 1992, at the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. President of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, recommended this organization

⁶³⁴ Ibid

⁶³⁵ Ibid

with the belief that dialogue and cooperation were the most crucial aspects to securing peace and stability in Asia. Many Asian countries supported President Nazarbayev's initiative. The member states include: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Palestine, South Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan.

The first step was to convene and define the conference's initiatives. In 1999, the first meeting was called among the member states. They drafted the Declaration on the Principles Guiding Relations. In 2002, the Almaty Act, the organization's founding documents, which identified CICA's basic principles and their stated objectives, was drafted. Its basic principles are: sovereign equality as well as respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force, territorial integrity of the States, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs of States, disarmament and arms control and social and cultural cooperation; human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁶³⁶ Its stated objectives are: to enhance cooperation through elaborating multilateral approaches towards promoting peace, security and stability in Asia; to eradicate the menace of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations; combat illicit drug production and trafficking; to promote trade and economic cooperation for the prosperity and stability in Asia; to increase cooperation on all issues relating to environment; prevention of proliferation and eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction; to develop measures to address humanitarian issues; and to promote mutual respect, understanding and tolerance in the relations among civilizations.⁶³⁷

The structure of CICA consists of a combination of regular meetings and specialized meetings. The meetings of the Heads of State occur every four years in order to conduct

⁶³⁶ Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, *About CICA*, 2008, www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1 (accessed February 2, 2010).

⁶³⁷ Ibid

consultations, review progress, and set priorities for CICA activities. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs meets every two years. It is the main forum for examination of all CICA issues. The Committee of Senior Officials meets at least once a year to follow-up on previous decisions, discuss current issues and oversee the work of Special Working Groups. Special Working Groups are assigned to study specific issues, and they must carry out tasks related to that issue. The member states also agree to convene for specialized meetings to discuss issues of a specific nature.⁶³⁸ The structure gives member states the flexibility needed to deal with such a wide range of issues.

At the first summit, the member states drafted the CICA Declaration on Eliminating Terrorism and Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations. Signatories to the document affirmed their commitment to cooperate to eliminate all forms of terrorism. The second summit adopted the Statute of CICA Secretariat, which provides support for all CICA forums and maintains CICA documents. The members also declared 5 October as CICA Day to celebrate the idea behind of the organization and its initiatives. At the second Ministerial Meeting, the member states adopted the CICA Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures. The document was categorized into five categories: economic dimension, environmental dimension, human dimension, fight against new challenges and threats and military-political dimension. The member states select an issue that they are most capable of dealing with and implement a particular measure from catalogue if deemed appropriate by the members.

Currently in its 18th year, CICA has developed into the most inclusive forum for dealing with security concerns in Asia. Its membership accounts for nearly 90% of Asia's geography and

⁶³⁸ CICA Senior Members, "Almaty Act," in *Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia* (Almaty, 2002).

85% of Asia's population.⁶³⁹ Recognizing the large task at hand, CICA began developing external relations. They now cooperate with multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, Economic Cooperation Organization, Eurasian Economic Community, Administration of International Organization for Migration, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Additionally, CICA granted observer status to Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Qatar, Vietnam, Ukraine, U.S., UN, OSCE and League of Arab States. In response to new concerns, CICA created an annual specialized meeting, titled New Challenges and Threats. It manages the implementation of Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures in new areas of cooperation, namely, tourism, transportation corridors, development of small and medium enterprises, energy security, national disaster management and information technology and agriculture.

CICA is a necessary forum to help coordinate efforts and decrease tensions between Asian countries. However, the sheer size of its membership and volume of issues makes the CICA less effective in improving the situation. The Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures is useful because it matches areas of concern with the member states that are most capable of implementing corrective measures. The system has much room for improvement. Since members are expected to volunteer for a certain measure, some issues are left unaccounted for. In the area of New Challenges and Threats, nobody volunteered to coordinate confidence-building measures in the environmental dimension.⁶⁴⁰ A characteristic that limits CICA's influence is its inability to be the main forum in the region for stability concerns. CICA includes almost all the countries in Asia and all of its concerns. Multilateral organizations that specialize in a particular region or concern are more effective because they use all their resources on more achievable goals.

⁶³⁹ Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, *About CICA*, 2008, www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1 (accessed February 2, 2010).

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid.

Six Party Talks

The Six Party Talks originated as a way to continue talks about disarming North Korea's nuclear weapons program. After initial trilateral talks between the U.S., North Korea, and China failed, Secretary Powell asked China to persuade North Korea into five-party talks that included Japan and South Korea. After some deliberation on both sides, North Korea agreed to begin multilateral talks with the inclusion of Russia as the sixth party.

Each member of the Six Party talks had a different reason for engaging diplomatically about nuclear proliferation in North Korea. The U.S.'s primary interest is to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program by regime change. Washington also stated that any negotiations must include the improvement of human rights in North Korea. Washington and Pyongyang's long history of tensions and disagreements further complicate the current situation.

Japan is primarily concerned with North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens. Throughout the dispute, Japan supported the U.S.'s hard line approach to North Korea on the nuclear issue because of North Korea's refusal to settle the domestic abduction issue. Japan's usefulness in the talks has been completely contingent on North Korea's compliance in settling the abduction issue.⁶⁴¹

China's influence over North Korea gives them a unique position in the talks. The dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is not an immediate concern for China's national security. Their primary interest is the stability of Asia. If North Korea's nuclear weapons program frightened Japan into developing weapons of their own, China would be concerned. Any attack by the U.S. on Asian soil would destabilize the region, also creating concern for China. China's position in the talks has to remain balanced to protect its interests

⁶⁴¹ Charles L Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 89.

regarding the U.S. and North Korea. China needs the U.S. to remain non-confrontational, but they are weary of disrupting relations within the region by exercising too much influence over North Korea.⁶⁴²

South Korea's alliance with the U.S. complicates their position in the Six Party Talks. South Korea's objectives are to maintain stability in the peninsula, promote economic development and protect their national security.⁶⁴³ Therefore, they want to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program, but they are unsupportive of the U.S.'s hard line approach with North Korea. South Korea wants to protect the prospects of future engagement with North Korea, making it difficult to balance Seoul's priorities with those of U.S. South Korea's delicate position has further strained their political alliance with the U.S.

Russia plays an intermediary role in the Six Party talks. As a former super-power in Asia, Russia has some leverage over North Korea. They have expressed frustration with North Korea's incomppliance but remain sympathetic to the small country's situation.⁶⁴⁴ In "Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula", Yong-ch'ul Ha and Beom-Shik Shin explain why the U.S. and Russian approaches to nuclear proliferation in North Korea differ. They argue that the U.S.'s strategy consists of coercive diplomacy based on sanctions and threats to attack or force regime change.⁶⁴⁵ Ha and Shin label the U.S.'s approach as the Libyan model.⁶⁴⁶ Russia prefers multilateral negotiation aimed at influencing nonproliferation in exchange for economic compensation and security guarantees, namely, the Ukrainian model.⁶⁴⁷ Russia routinely sided

⁶⁴² Pritchard, 93

⁶⁴³ Pritchard, 94

⁶⁴⁴ Pritchard, 95

⁶⁴⁵ Ha, Yong-ch'ul, and Beom-Shik Shin. 2006. *Russian nonproliferation policy and the Korean peninsula*. U.S. and Russia, regional security issues and interests. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS78152>, 5

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid

with North Korea in the Six Party Talks because they disagree with the U.S.'s use of hard politics and believe the Ukrainian model could successfully resolve the issue.

North Korea uses strategic diplomacy in the Six Party Talks to advance their interests. The existence of their nuclear weapons program gives them leverage in the multilateral negotiations. North Korea blames the U.S.'s hard line policy, especially financial sanctions and placement of North Korea on the terrorist list, for disrupting negotiations. They use China's intermediary position to their advantage. By reassuring China of their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, North Korea uses them to request more flexibility from the U.S. in the talks.⁶⁴⁸

After six rounds of talks over a four-year period, the Six Party talks have only resulted in heightened distrust between the U.S. and North Korea.⁶⁴⁹ The first and second rounds of talks took place between August 2003 and February 2004. They resulted in the members' acknowledgement that the Korean Peninsula had to be denuclearized peacefully. They also agreed to hold more talks.⁶⁵⁰ The third round ended with the U.S. and North Korea both making proposals that would end the nuclear weapons program in North Korea, but neither side agreed to the other party's stipulations. Pyongyang wanted U.S. assistance in their uranium enrichment program, which the U.S. was not prepared to offer.⁶⁵¹

Progress was finally made in September 2005 during the second phase of the fourth round of talks. North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons programs and return to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as soon as possible. The conditions included nuclear facility inspections by IAEA personnel, U.S. confirmation to not attack North Korea, efforts to normalize relations between the U.S. and North Korea and Japan and North Korea, and an

⁶⁴⁸ Pritchard, 96

⁶⁴⁹ Pritchard, 131

⁶⁵⁰ Pritchard, 102-105

⁶⁵¹ Pritchard, 106

agreement to discuss the issue of light water reactors at an appropriate time.⁶⁵² Before the fifth round, the U.S. officially accused North Korea of manufacturing counterfeit \$100 bills. They acted on their accusation by freezing the assets of eight North Korean companies under U.S. jurisdiction. While the U.S. viewed the financial situation as separate from the talks, North Korea labelled the U.S.'s actions as further hostility toward the regime.⁶⁵³

Their disagreement disrupted the fifth round of talks. The first round ended with the parties unable to agree on a date for the sixth round. North Korea refused to continue the talks unless the U.S. unfroze North Korea's financial assets. The fifth round finally resumed, and all parties agreed that North Korea would shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facility and invite IAEA inspections in exchange for emergency energy assistance to North Korea by the five other parties. The details of the economic and energy assistance were to be determined in the sixth round of talks. The sixth round commenced in March 2007. The U.S. agreed to unfreeze North Korea's funds in return for the progressive efforts by Pyongyang to shut down their nuclear reactor. The U.S. and North Korea agreed on the details of the arrangement. However, both parties refused to deliver their side of the bargain first.

Pyongyang viewed the U.S.'s actions as a breach of their agreement, and they responded by announcing a satellite launch in April 2009. The launch failed but Washington decided North Korea must be punished for their actions and the UN Security Council agreed. North Korea responded to expanded sanctions by claiming to never take part in Six Party Talks again and resuming their nuclear weapons program.

Despite instigating negotiations and preliminary agreements, the Six Party Talks failed to curb the development of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Distrust and conflicting

⁶⁵² Pritchard, 124

⁶⁵³ Pritchard, 130

interests within the membership contributed to the conclusion of talks. The U.S. and North Korea have a long history of unfriendly relations, so trust between the countries is fragile. Charles L. Pritchard reveals his opinion in the book *Failed Diplomacy*, in which he blames U.S. administration officials for their “inexperience in dealing with North Korea” and “the discrepancy between the administration’s stated goal of negotiating a peaceful resolution and its desire to see the regime collapse”.⁶⁵⁴ The U.S.’s desire for regime change was evident, and it made North Korea sceptical of U.S. intentions to comply with the agreements. The counterfeit U.S. dollars accusation strained relations further.⁶⁵⁵ Ultimately, neither country trusted the other to comply with the arranged agreement, so the conflict was never settled. The inclusion of interests unrelated to nuclear weapons was also harmful. Japan’s insistence on using the Six Party Talks as a channel to settle the abduction issue complicated nuclear weapons negotiations.

Thus far, the Six Party Talks provided the best opportunity to achieve nuclear non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula. The multilateral structure of the forum was effective in utilizing China and Russia’s influence over North Korea. They played important roles in resuming Six Party Talks during idle periods of negotiation. The talks also led to various agreements between the U.S. and North Korea that could have potentially resolved the dispute. However, the Six Party Talks is a non-institutional forum, so there were no accountability measures in place to guarantee U.S. and North Korean cooperation. It is unlikely that the Six Party Talks can transform into an institutional organization in which North Korea would participate, but resolution of the proliferation issue is dependent on the existence of such a forum.

⁶⁵⁴ Pritchard, 161

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid

Conclusion

The SCO could never be the primary security organization in Asia because it would require them to coordinate their efforts with those of the U.S. and the EU. The organization's membership, identity and responsibilities do not match those of an organization focused on Asian security as a whole. The organization's contributions to eliminating terrorism, extremism, and separatism in Asia, have been trivial considering the potential fortune of resources China and Russia could offer to counter these threats in other Asian regions. The SCO's focus on preserving Central Asian interests overwhelms its desire to secure Asia.

CICA is an extremely inclusive organization with a multitude of objectives but a lack of accountability. The diversity of the Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures makes it difficult to address any one particular issue. Also, the voluntary nature of the organization means there is no accountability for members who do not actively participate. CICA's vast membership could be beneficial, but the organization's potential effectiveness relies on its ability to manage and utilize nearly all of Asia's countries and resources. CICA is far from reaching such a high level of organization and coordination.

The Six Party Talks had the best chance to resolve the issue because the appropriate members states were involved in negotiations. However, the forum structurally lacked an institutional backbone that established accountability. Negotiations at the Six Party Talks convinced North Korea to finally give up its nuclear weapons program completely.⁶⁵⁶ If the agreement was followed, the Korean Peninsula may very well have been denuclearized peacefully. The forum lacked a framework that obliged the U.S. and North Korea to deliver their part of the arrangement.

⁶⁵⁶ Pritchard, 124

The U.S. has resorted to unilateral efforts to promote non-proliferation, but the initiatives create no incentive for North Korea to participate. The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are both American led nuclear non-proliferation projects. The Proliferation Security Initiative, proposed to seize illicit weapons as they are transported across oceans or by air, already has 90 member nations. The initiative directly led to the abandonment of Libya's nuclear weapons program.⁶⁵⁷ Some of its centrifuge parts were seized from a German ship bound for Libya. Such successes have played part in the Proliferation Security Initiative's growing membership. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, intended to prevent terrorists from obtaining and using a nuclear weapon, has 76 member nations. Efforts are focused on detecting and securing nuclear stockpiles within countries.⁶⁵⁸ These initiatives have been successful in expanding nuclear nonproliferation efforts because more countries have signed on than originally expected. Nonetheless neither of these initiatives creates incentive for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The solution must be an institutionalized multilateral organization.

The SCO, CICA, and Six Party have structural flaws that prevent them from being the primary multilateral solutions for Asian security. The SCO's regional focus is necessary for Asia, however, their governments are too concerned with their own interests to expand efforts past Central Asia. The CICA's inclusive nature creates too broad of a forum to effectively coordinate and execute efforts. The non-institutional nature of the Six Party Talks makes it inadequate in enforcing the implementation of a complicated agreement that affects many parties.

⁶⁵⁷ David E Sanger, "U.S. and Russia Will Police Potential Nuclear Terrorists," *New York Times*, July 2006.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid

Along with their failure to represent a complete, multilateral security forum for Asia, the SCO, CICA and Six Party Talks demonstrate that U.S. interests are not sufficiently served in existing multilateral frameworks. Indeed, the goal of some organizations is to limit U.S. power and influence in Asia. An institutionalized regional organization, like our proposed NEASCO, would take advantage of the best features of the SCO, CICA, and Six Party Talks, while making up for their flaws in membership, identity, and responsibilities.

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⁶⁵⁹ Beardsley and Lim 1

A Six Party Review

Lessons from the region

There is no doubt that multilateral cooperation has had a significant presence in East Asia in the post-Cold War era. However, no situation has presented a better opportunity for the United States to use multilateralism to secure its long term presence in the Asia-Pacific region than the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In recent years, Washington has made a concerted effort to play a role in existing organizations in East Asia, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While APEC has provided an outlet for economic and some energy concerns, its future as a multilateral organization will be fixed in that arena. The ARF (and ASEAN in general) should be applauded for the significant strides they have made in expanding regional cooperation in a broad area and overcoming the differences of Southeast Asia through multilateralism. Unfortunately, the scope and size of ARF has made it difficult for the forum to become anything more than a talk shop.

Northeast Asia has gone through a dramatic transformation in the past two decades, and there is an unresolved need to address the new dynamics that have arisen in this now decisive region. The review of Northeast Asian security structure in this Task Force has offered several important lessons for the future of trans-Pacific relations. Instead of building off of an existing organization, this Task Force proposes an institutionalization of the Six Party Talks to create a Northeast Asian Security Cooperative, or NEASCO. To successfully attract membership, any organization should actively identify and eliminate security concerns within the Northeast Asian region, including;

1. Resolving the crisis on the Korean Peninsula
 - i. Securing the permanent denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
 - ii. Finding a solution that promotes long-term peace and stability
- b. Alleviating the security dilemma which now exists in Northeast Asia to avoid a future arms race. This includes, but is not limited to;
 - i. Developing a regional solution to ballistic missile defense
 - ii. Resolving remaining territorial disputes
 - iii. Encouraging cooperation in energy exploration, provision, and research
 - iv. Opening and maintaining diplomatic relations across NE Asia
 - v. Respecting and maintaining the sovereignty of all member states

In this way, NEASCO is opposite of ARF, beginning with a narrow focus of specific security issues, instead of trying to taper down an overly broad organization.

United States

While the strategic importance of Northeast Asia for the United States has continued to rise over the past decade, U.S. soft power within the region has declined. It is in Washington's best interests to reinterpret and reassert the U.S. presence. A shift in domestic politics along Northeast Asia has the possibility of fundamentally altering the alliances with South Korea and Japan, and the creation of a multilateral organization like NEASCO would allow the United States to maintain a presence even if their physical military presence fades out. It is doubtful that either South Korea or Japan will make any drastic moves away from their historic ties to the United States, but it would be shrewd of the U.S. to recognize the coming tide of diplomatic independence. The hard-line unilateralist approach of the Bush Administration has left an unsettled animosity within the region, and the United States could benefit from supporting a multilateral effort, such as NEASCO, as a sign of cooperation and limiting their reputation as the overbearing, unilateral superpower. There is no shortage of security issues to discuss in Northeast Asia, but a shortage of appropriate institutions to address these concerns. The United

States must dedicate itself to presenting an effective and agreeable solution to the region if it hopes to maintain a significant physical military presence.

People's Republic of China

China's future as a regional and global power is bright, but an inability to properly manage its array of domestic and regional concerns could lead to a hindering of Chinese power. Record economic growth and development has only increased China's need for a stable Northeast Asia, and this gives excellent incentive for joining NEASCO. By focusing on resolving the North Korean question, as well as opening a dialogue for energy cooperation, NEASCO identifies key concerns of Beijing. China will see the logic of a small multilateral organization, and would likely want to play a leading role in any forum which comes from the evolution of the Six Party Talks. For the Chinese, NEASCO could be the intermediate step away from the bilateralism of the Cold War and towards a modern security relationship in Northeast Asia.

Having NEASCO evolve from the Six Party Talks will be attractive to the Chinese because it will not encompass the traditional social issues that arise in many multilateral organizations. As a security cooperative, NEASCO will avoid many of the areas which the Chinese are often at odds with- human, political, and religious rights, environmental protection, and binding agreements.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The DPRK has incentive to join NEASCO in order to obtain a well sought after security guarantee and to be recognized as a legitimate member of the international community. The Special Projects division of NEASCO would greatly benefit Pyongyang in regards to energy

security. By establishing a mutually beneficial relationship with South Korea and agreeing to share energy and disarm, the DPRK would further demonstrate to the international community that it is trustworthy and responsible. Thus, NEASCO would allow North Korea energy security, economic payoffs, and protection from vulnerability on the world stage. To further incentivize Pyongyang to join NEASCO, the members of the cooperative must be sure to guarantee voting rights to the DPRK while engaging Pyongyang in dialogue that does not depend on the hostility and containment policies relied upon by the Bush administration. It would be beneficial for NEASCO to offer full diplomatic recognition to the DPRK to remove Kim Jong-Il's deep rooted sense of fear. NEASCO can encourage the normalization of relations with North and South Korea, keeping in mind that the central objective of a security cooperative in East Asia should be to integrate North Korea into the regional and global economic system.

Republic of Korea

South Korea's current foreign policy vision of a 'Global Korea' would be compatible with membership in NEASCO and may provide another much needed forum in which South Korea and North Korea could come together at one table. With the recent rise of tension in inter-Korean relations, an organization like NEASCO has the capability to ease these strains and promote confidence-building measures between the two nations, as it helps to lend legitimacy and credibility to North Korea's political gestures. Furthermore, South Korea would not only be limited to issues of North Korean denuclearization, as NEASCO provides mutually beneficial opportunities for political, economic, and humanitarian development within the DPRK. In recognition of the importance and necessity of multilateralism in East Asia, the Republic of Korea together with the U.S. should promote an organization like NEASCO to help build consensus in the region for such a multilateral framework. With South Korea's rising power and

influence in the global economy, its active participation in NEASCO is critical in facing the challenges arising from North Korea's nuclear ambitions. It is in the security interests of both South Korea and the United States to participate in a forum like NEASCO, not only to further mutual alliances, but also to respond to the growing need for multilateral dialogue and cooperation in East Asia.

Japan

As an important U.S. military ally in East Asia, Japan will be a critical partner in the creation and implementation of NEASCO. It would be unfathomable to go forward with a Northeast Asian security organization within securing Japanese membership. With the recent change in majority party and the increased destabilization growing out of the Korean peninsula, there is a shift emerging in military and foreign policy goals that could alter the relationship that Japan has traditionally held with neighboring states. Regarding Japanese interests, involvement in a regional multilateral organization will set the stage for not only solving their primary security concerns but will aid in developing improved relations amongst East Asian states while expanding Japan's position in the region. The ability to work within a regional forum will be critical to Japanese security as it will aid in the resolution of North Korean nuclear proliferation while offering a place to incorporate other major concerns such as the abduction issue. To counter the growing concern of Japanese remilitarization that emerged as a reaction to their expanded defense systems, joining NEASCO would offer Japan the ability to ensure other nations that these are in fact strictly defensive operations and may even be able to eventually incorporate multinational defenses into the organization. In doing this, the ability to curb the possibility of a regional arms race becomes a possibility.

However, while the Japanese government supports a posture of cooperation and working with multinational organization, joining an organization crafted by the United States may still remain unappealing. The recent desire to move away from the traditionally close U.S.-Japan defense relationship as well as growing distaste for U.S. military presence would be an important issue for NEASCO to address to improve U.S.-Japanese relations.

Nonetheless, the importance of Japanese membership makes it imperative that the United States finds a way to bring them to the table. The U.S. will need to make it clear that Japan will be an equal partner and not a puppet to U.S. interests. The ability for Japan to introduce its own concerns as special projects in the organization will be an appealing option as well and should be explained as a major advantage to membership. Avoiding an overbearing stance or the appearance of unilateral action will also greatly increase the possibility of Japan joining NEASCO while re-strengthening U.S.-Japan relations.

Russia

An institutionalized multilateral organization resolves the dilemma Russia faces in choosing between regional clout and its interests in denuclearization. The U.S. must remind the Russians of our shared interests in a denuclearized, peaceful Korean peninsula and point to the proposed framework as an opportunity to work cooperatively towards that common goal. By legitimizing Russian influence in the region, NEASCO aligns perfectly with Moscow's concerns about prestige and desire to be seen as a major power. Russia would no longer remain reliant on good relations with the DPRK to retain their voice in the regional process. Therefore, the Kremlin would be freed to de-couple from Pyongyang and take a tougher line in pursuing its own interests in denuclearization. American policy makers must remain ever vigilant of Russian

sensitivities towards appearances of hegemonic designs. NEASCO must be advertised as an organization that will give all members equal voice. The U.S. must also accept that the Russians are opposed to and threatened by our democratizing agenda. Non-starter issues like human rights or other mechanisms that inflame Moscow's aversion towards intrusion in its internal affairs should be avoided. Rather, NEASCO can be sold to Russia as just the type of multilateral organization they have already shown a preference towards. It will allow the Kremlin a voice in events occurring near its borders, open the door to greater regional economic integration of the Russian Far East, yet not threaten Russian sovereignty.

Solving the sovereignty standoff

As Mirella Warren's paper argues, the multilateralism of European descent is a non-transferable success. The NATO-EU-OSCE triad has created a strong forum for economic, political, and security cooperation and integration in Europe, and these organizations are now considered some of the most effective examples of international collaboration in modern history. All three organizations have been tested throughout their existence, but continued to expand and prosper despite decades of criticism that they marked the death of nation-state sovereignty. As Western Europe moves towards a political-economic homogenization, any discussion of an East Asian multilateral organization must recognize why this is not an appropriate basis for Asian political dynamics. In their review of regional integration opportunities in Europe and Asia the EU-Network of European Studies Centre in Asia (NESCA) makes this phenomenon clear, that there "exists no single, unified, universally applicable model to copy" for multilateral cooperation and that "the Eurocentric model cannot be applied in an unmodified or mechanical

fashion”⁶⁶⁰. Two fundamental roadblocks face any organization trying to promote integration in Northeast Asia; the first is *intergovernmentalism*, which argues that the “direction and pace of regional integration will be determined by the interaction of sovereign national states... [therefore] state power, matched to national interests, matters greatly.”⁶⁶¹

The Russian relationship with NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is a strong indicator of intergovernmentalism and the weaknesses of an organization that imposes itself upon the autonomy of its members and their neighbors. As Mirella Warren argues, NATO attempts at expansion into ex-Soviet territory and the OSCE’s focus on human rights and democracy promotion have made relations with the Russian Federation a point of constant struggle. Russia, which will undoubtedly want to have a part in any NE Asian forum, see European multilateralism as over imposing. While smaller countries perceive multilateral organizations as an opportunity to leverage their power against that of regional great power, it has always been a struggle to address the needs of a superpower in a way that would encourage them to voluntarily sacrifice their sovereignty. The second roadblock is *regulationism*, in which states will be unlikely to accept parameters created by a multilateral organization unless “the level and extent of economic and social interdependence is very high.”⁶⁶² Unlike Western Europe, Asia lacks almost any unifying factors which could encourage regional integration. There is little in terms of a shared cultural or historical identity, and in fact these differences often create rifts between the potential cooperating parties. The powers of Northeast Asia have been historically disinclined to cooperate fully, however this Task Force has come up with a viable solution to the issue of encouraging participation in a multilateral forum.

⁶⁶⁰ Park 69

⁶⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶⁶² Park 70

Energy Crisis in Northeast Asia

The growing tension surrounding energy supplies in Northeast Asia presents an excellent case study for the type of looming crisis which could greatly benefit from the existence of NEASCO by encouraging open communication and cooperation.

Northeast Asia is the third largest energy importer today (behind the United States and Europe), but is expected to rise to the #1 status by 2030.⁶⁶³ As the region continues to enjoy rapid industrialization, it will be a decisive time in their foreign relations as individual countries search for supply and delivery routes to meet the expected 1,520 mtoe increase in demand.⁶⁶⁴ Energy has always been an important factor for modern nations, both economically and for military security. Asia now appears to be undergoing their industrial revolution, facing a bleak forecast for the energy demands that it will create.

The International Energy Agency predicts that China will overtake the United States as the largest energy consuming nation this year. Due to domestic availability, coal remains the primary energy source for the Chinese, but oil consumption is expected to double in the next two decades. Although China had self sufficient oil production until 1993, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences projected that dependency on oil imports will raise to 60% by 2020.⁶⁶⁵ This means a significant increase in demand for Middle Eastern oil, which currently supplies a disproportionate amount of oil to the NE Asian region. Japan, the second largest oil importer in the world, relies on the Middle East for nearly 90% of its supplies and has no significant domestic oil production. South Korea is in a similar situation as Japan's, facing a heavy reliance on imported oil and particularly from the Middle East.⁶⁶⁶ The three NE Asian powers now face a

⁶⁶³ Choi 3

⁶⁶⁴ Millions of tonnes of oil equivalent

⁶⁶⁵ Choi 7

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid

possible crisis due to the insecurity of their energy dependencies. China, Japan, and South Korea all import over 50% of the oil that they consume⁶⁶⁷ - making them vulnerable to supply disruptions, price shocks, and increased tension as these powers compete to satisfy their domestic energy demands.

Over the next two decades, we predict an increase in Northeast Asian geopolitical rivalries centered on the energy crisis. This will be fueled by a series of territorial disputes and increased competition over foreign energy supplies. As Northeast Asia moves to reduce their dependency on foreign energy, explorations of domestic energy supplies will only increase tension as the region competes for access to offshore deposits. With hazy international law, these territorial disputes could lead to a naval faceoff and arms race as countries look to bolster their claims with an enforceable regime.

A 1968 survey by the United Nations identified petroleum deposits in the East Asian Sea⁶⁶⁸ that (while unconfirmed) could rival those in the Persian Gulf.⁶⁶⁹⁶⁷⁰ However, any extensive exploration of this initial claim has been blockaded by a dispute over the ownership of these sea beds. Both Japan and China claim at least partial control of the East Asian Sea, and the rights to undersea exploration given to a country by the United Nations International Law of the Sea overlap in this narrow area. While neither country pursued these deposits at the time of the 1968 UN Report, this situation changed dramatically after both countries experienced rapid development and by the early 1990s there was unresolved contention over China's exploration of the East Asian Sea. The territorial disputes over the East Asian Sea have remained a strain in

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid

⁶⁶⁸ A compromised term created by the UN council, COBSEA. Also known as the Sea of Japan or East Sea

⁶⁶⁹ proven and probable 175-210 cubic feet of natural gas and up to 100 billion gallons of oil

⁶⁷⁰ Harrison 3

Sino-Japanese relations, and as energy needs increase for both countries and diplomatic solutions fail, it could very well lead to a naval conflict.

Similarly, China, South Korea and North Korea are in a simultaneous territorial dispute over a smaller petroleum deposit in the Yellow Sea.⁶⁷¹⁶⁷² Again, international law is blurred by the individual interpretations and any diplomatic solutions are complicated by the North Korean presence. The South Korean government made several concessions for exploration of the Yellow Sea, but drilling was ended in 1974 after the Chinese intervened militarily.⁶⁷³ The three countries have never settled their maritime boundaries, and while all three countries are facing growing energy needs, any discussion of Yellow Sea concessions has been displaced by the North Korean nuclear crisis.

In addition, Northeast Asia will be forced to compete for foreign energy resources and further damage their diplomatic ties. As China, Japan, and South Korea all look to diversify their energy supplies, they will be have to contend for the same resources and partnerships. China and Japan underwent a diplomatic battle from 2001-2004 to secure the rights to a Russian oil pipeline, illustrating the stress securing energy resources can have on maintaining cooperative ties between competing governments.

While none of these situations present an imminent security threat to the region, it would be naive to downplay the importance of energy security to Northeast Asia. Regional resources are limited, some unsubstantiated, and the players have proven incapable of reaching a diplomatic solution to their ownership. Mikal Herberg describes how this could unravel into a full on military engagement; “Energy nationalism would be likely to spill over into maritime control of sea lanes and transport routes through the South China Sea, Strait of Malaca, Indian

⁶⁷¹ Also known as Hwang Hai

⁶⁷² Estimated at 1 billion gallons

⁶⁷³ Harrison

Ocean, and the East Asia Sea...[a]lthough a serious naval arms race has yet to develop, resorting to competitive and confrontational means to ensure control over sea lanes would very likely contribute to a future naval arms race.”⁶⁷⁴ This naval buildup is a very real threat- China and South Korea have focused on naval expansion since the early 1990s, likely to catch up to Japan who is the most advanced Northeast Asian naval force. This behavior, of favoring military prowess over diplomacy, promises to create a security dilemma that could spread throughout NE Asia and beyond. “One imagines nightmare scenarios in which China goes to war with Japan over potential energy resources in the East China Sea, or South Korea deploys its Aegis-equipped destroyers in a confrontation with Japan over the disputed Liancourt Rocks.”⁶⁷⁵

The Prisoner’s Dilemma?

While some critics may argue that the above argument is overly pessimistic, we see this as a very possible outcome of an inherently anarchic international system. Despite good diplomatic ties across the region, it is undoubted that security issues have never been properly addressed in Northeast Asia. In his review of energy security in Northeast Asia, Hyun Jin Choi compares the situation to a prisoner’s dilemma, in which two self-interested players choose to sell each other out, although both would fare better if they cooperated.⁶⁷⁶ Under the PD conditions, logic and rational action is sidelined by fear and distrust for the players who assume a worst-case scenario for the behavior of the other parties involved. Any possibility of cooperation is discouraged by the natural human tendency towards maximizing individual benefits- even if it results in an overall loss.

⁶⁷⁴ Herberg 368

⁶⁷⁵ Choi 16

⁶⁷⁶ Choi 4

A study exploring the effects of the PD mentality on state decision makers suggests that while there is a strong anarchical trend in international relations, situations which encouraged reciprocity supported the development of cooperative ties over time.⁶⁷⁷ In the case of North Korea, this involves an agreement which convinces the Kim Jong-il regime to go against its inherent inclination to proliferate and instead engage in substantive diplomatic talks. Robert Keohane, the coauthor of the report, describes how an international institution would be the foundation for this solution;

“[Institutions] increase the symmetry and improve the quality of the information that governments receive. By clustering issues together in the same forums over a long period of time, they help to bring governments into continuing interaction with one another, reducing incentives to cheat and enhancing the value of reputation. By establishing legitimate standards of behavior for states to follow and by providing ways to monitor compliance, they create the basis for decentralized enforcement founded on the basis of reciprocity.”⁶⁷⁸

To avoid a destabilizing energy crisis, China, Japan and South Korea must build such an institution to encourage regional integration and security. As the prisoner’s dilemma theory suggests, Northeast Asia could utilize their growing and mutual energy needs as a catalyst to creating an institution that demonstrates the benefits of cooperation. Areas of suggested collaboration include the joint exploration of offshore resources like those in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea, researching clean energy technology, oil stockpiling, and even joint naval operations protecting critical sea lanes like the Strait of Malacca. Each of these projects has the ability to reduce mutual security concerns, while offering large benefits to engaged players. As for the makeup of this proposed institution, Choi stipulates that “[b]ecause energy and traditional security issues are closely connected, the long-term prospects for energy cooperation may also depend on the presence of effective security institutions. Although Northeast Asia currently

⁶⁷⁷ Keohane

⁶⁷⁸ Keohane 244

lacks such an institution, the ongoing six-party talks present an unprecedented opportunity for regional institution building.”⁶⁷⁹

Agreed Framework of 1994

The Agreed Framework of 1994 is another lesson of regional diplomacy that supports the benefit of a multilateral forum like NEASCO. It is unclear who is ultimately at fault for the collapse of the Agreed Framework, but this Task Force would suggest that it was failed to succeed from the beginning because of its bilateral roots. The actions of both the United States and North Korea show how little the countries had invested in making this cooperative effort succeed. The first Director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) commented that due to a change in Senatorial leadership, “[t]he Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature”.⁶⁸⁰ By choosing to pursue a bilateral solution to the North Korean dilemma, it instilled within the Agreement a lack of institutional enforcement or guarantee. Unlike a multilateral forum in which member countries can be held accountable for their actions (or inaction), the Agreed Framework was marred by a series of delays and setbacks that went unaddressed.

The major lesson of the Agreed Framework is the importance of building off of existing diplomatic cooperation to ensure the success of any proposal. The Agreed Framework was intended to foster ties between the U.S. and DPRK, but instead it put strain on an already precarious relationship. By repositioning negotiations to NEASCO, it will institutionalize the Six Party Talks and help ensure that future negotiations do not fall victim to an enforcement nightmare like the Agreed Framework of 1994.

⁶⁷⁹ Choi 22

⁶⁸⁰ Behar

Six Party Talks

At first glance, the Six Party Talks do not appear to be a significant step in fostering cooperative relations in Northeast Asia. After six years of negotiations, the North Korean nuclear program has only expanded further and tensions in the region have continued to increase. Under the watch of the Bush Administration and the Six Party Talks, North Korea has developed and tested a nuclear bomb, sold nuclear technology to Iran, Pakistan and Syria, and done significant research into delivery systems. With a plethora of security concerns and diplomatic issues, no member of the Six Party Talks has been willing to make a substantial first move. The most significant achievement, the 2005 freeze of the DPRK program at Yongbyon, ended with the testing of a nuclear weapon. The behavior of the North Korean regime continues to cast doubt on the hopes of an opening in their economic and political stature. While the Kaesong Industrial Complex (a joint DPRK-ROK project) has been successful, the North Korean ideology of self-reliance will make further economic liberalization unlikely and extremely difficult to pass through Pyongyang. In addition, few countries have shown interest in further investment into North Korea until the situation has stabilized, but most experts point to development as the next crucial step in finding a solution to the North Korean issue. To add to this contentious stalemate, the workings of the Six Party Talks risk duplicating existing regimes.⁶⁸¹ Because of the expansiveness of the North Korean issue and the varied possible solutions, the parties are already undergoing projects with the World Bank, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme- as well as possible projects with the International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, and a proposal to grant North Korea membership into the WTO.⁶⁸²

⁶⁸¹ Haggard Noland 119

⁶⁸² Haggard Noland 126

Despite this bleak forecast, we still stand firmly that the Six Party Talks offer the greatest promise for finding a resolution to the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula. First, while progress has been slow, it is important to note that no party has given up on the process. Despite setbacks, all of the initial six member states still recognize the importance of adhering to the talks and this fact alone shows the symbolic importance of the organization. A report by the Brookings Institution noted the value of engaging in these multilateral forums;

“Despite cynicism dismissing these multilateral security dialogue processes as mere talk shops, the dialogues have been instrumental in reducing distrust and misunderstandings. It would be a good lesson to remember that history is created by vagaries, and not by status quo proponents. A multilayered, multi-dimensional forum...will play a positive function in supplementing, if not supplanting, the existing bilateral security architecture [of NE Asia].”⁶⁸³

Institutionalizing the Six Party Talks

A proposal to forge the Six Party Talks into a permanent cooperative will come under reasonable skepticism. On one hand, the crisis on the Korean Peninsula has been a regional issue for decades. However, when the United States introduces NEASCO, the cooperating parties will come hesitantly and likely require a show of potency to legitimize and encourage their support. This Task Force has created a preliminary plan which could help stabilize the Korean peninsula while also addressing the growing question of energy cooperation.

After years of beleaguered diplomacy, the Six Party Talks has few strong governmental supporters. Trust and understanding has long since faded, and no country perceives a benefit from making a first move towards a solution. Essentially, the current situation is coming to an impasse. In response, a “no first move” solution is the obvious necessary step towards revitalizing these talks. As lofty as this may sound, this report has already identified an excellent

⁶⁸³ Chung 12

proposal which could do exactly that. The Beardsley and Lim energy sharing project, as outlined in Jessica Kuhn's review of North Korean policy⁶⁸⁴ would be the best solution to this dilemma. The project would create codependency for the two Koreas, while offering them a win-win benefits package. North Korea would continue to benefit from the sale of nuclear energy to South Korea, and South Korea would enjoy low cost energy that would help them diversify their energy imports. Coauthors Beardsley and Lim assert that this mutually codependent relationship would be the best possible catalyst for developing closer ties within the region.⁶⁸⁵ NEASCO could empower and legitimize itself through implementing these type of smaller projects which would build on the multilayered multilateralism that the Brookings Report recommends as "the foundation for a 21st century security architecture in Northeast Asia"⁶⁸⁶.

The Beardsley and Lim project is not a cheap proposal, and it does not come without sacrifices from each country, but without innovation the crisis will continue to stagnate. Aid and altruistic concessions to North Korea on behalf of the other members of the Six Party Talks is neither a sustainable nor a viable solution to satisfying the complex security needs of Northeast Asia. The status quo is tiresome for the countries supplying the North Korean regime with aid, and it would be in all of their best interests to move to a more productive system for increasing stability within the region.

A litmus test?

This Task Force was not the first serious discussion of boosting multilateralism in Northeast Asia. We strongly agree with the study by the Network of European Study Centres in Asia, which supports the creation of an organization similar to NEASCO. As the perceived loss

⁶⁸⁴ Pages 38-45 of this report

⁶⁸⁵ Beardsley and Lim 14

⁶⁸⁶ Brookings 1

of sovereignty is a key concern for Northeast Asia, the United States must learn the limits of its power and propose a scaled back cooperative compared to their European ventures. They simply cannot attempt to pursue a North Atlantic agenda with the rising powers of East Asia, particularly in the backyard of the Chinese, who have proven to be considerably more defensive than the Russians. NESCA provides a comprehensive list of criteria which could be used as a litmus test for regional integration in Northeast Asia;

1. *Understanding that “regional integration is a process and not a product”*⁶⁸⁷.

While policy makers could be tempted by the all-in-one packaging of a Eurocentric multilateralist model, they must remember their humble beginnings. The European Union began as the six-nation European Coal and Steel Community, an early Cold War attempt to bolster cooperative ties in the once unstable Western Europe. Now a powerful supranational organization, the European Union even started out in an area “of relatively low political visibility...that could generate significant benefits for all participants.” For this reason, Northeast Asia must find a similar catalyst for regional cooperation which the current Asian forums are failing to identify.

2. *Recognizing that cooperation comes from a “convergence of interests, not a formation of an identity”*⁶⁸⁸.

As previously mentioned, diverse political, economic, and cultural identities make consensus-building a difficult task in Northeast Asia, however the unresolved crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the growing energy crisis both offer significant areas to begin dialogue. NEASCO would not enjoy the same unifying characteristics that successful organizations like the EU or ASEAN have had. Instead of unifying under political or social norms, Northeast Asia will have to focus on shared concerns and mutual interests- such as solving the crisis on the Korean peninsula and increasing energy cooperation.

3. *Accepting that any organization should “start out with a small number of member states, but should from the beginning announce it is open to future adherents”*.

Any future growth would, much like the United Nations, offer the initial “core” member group a larger role in the design and implementation of the organization. This would create an excellent incentive for the nations of the Six Party Talks to sign on quickly before they are left behind from a possible power position.

4. *“Demonstrating that integration can become a security guarantee for smaller nations.”*⁶⁸⁹

This is a crucial step towards getting the North Korean government to join any sort of cooperative forum. Their nation is built on the basis of self-reliance, and therefore their

⁶⁸⁷ Park 74

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid

perception of sovereignty is acute. Much like the relationship between the United States House and Senate, this could be based off of a system of overcompensation for the smaller parties of the organization.

5. *Realizing that any multilateral organization “requires leadership, i.e. actors who are capable of taking initiatives and willing to pay a disproportionate share of the cost for them”*⁶⁹⁰

Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the United States will be allowed to play a leadership role in NEASCO. The sensitivity of the region to hegemonic powers makes South Korea the best option for leading NEASCO into maturity. As Stephanie Kim’s paper argues, the Republic of Korea is open to policy innovation and would likely be willing to take the lead on an effort such as the Beardsley and Lim project.

Looking to the future

As the 21st century progresses, Asia needs a flexible and open United States. To be successful, Asia and the United States will have to work on their continuing partnership and recognize each others’ growing strategic importance. Putting aside all unease on behalf of the Asian nations, it must be understood that the Asia-Pacific region represents a very beneficial codependent relationship. The U.S. military presence is based on three major wars- the Pacific front of WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. These major conflicts demonstrate how the U.S. became bound to the region, and legitimizes their effect on the security, economic, and social foundation of Asia. For better or for worse, we have become inseparably attached as a globalized, interconnected, and interdependent Asia-Pacific region. Despite an increase in anti-Americanism over the past decade, the United States has and will remain a powerful authority in the future. NEASCO is the next generation of Northeast Asian cooperation, and the United States would benefit greatly by its promotion.

On the other hand, Asia is far more than a bystander. It is an able and willing partner and the U.S. needs to treat it as such if they do not want to be left behind. Asia has become an

⁶⁹⁰ Park 75

important resource on matters like economic growth, development, trust building, and energy security, and it is undoubted that the region will only continue to grow in global significance. Asia has a complementary role to play with the United States, and this is a fact that Washington cannot afford to overlook, especially as the balance of global power continues to shift eastward. It is in the Obama administration's best interest to renew the United States' commitment to Asia and devote due attention to the concerns and interests of their Asian friends and allies.

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