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# The Donald W. Treadgold Papers

Number 8  
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*In Russian, East European  
and Central Asian Studies*

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## Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans Since the 19th Century

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By Peter F. Sugar

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*About the author of this issue....*

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The *Donald W. Treadgold Papers* publication series was created to honor a great teacher and great scholar. Donald W. Treadgold was professor of history and international studies at the University of Washington from 1949 to 1993. During that time, he wrote seven books, one of which -- *Twentieth Century Russia* -- went into eight editions. He was twice editor of *Slavic Review*, the organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and received the AAASS Award for Distinguished Contributions to Slavic Studies, as well as the AAASS Award for Distinguished Service. Professor Treadgold molded several generations of Russian historians and contributed enormously to the field of Russian history. He was, in other ways as well, an inspiration to all who knew him.

The *Treadgold Papers* series was created in 1993 on the occasion of Professor Treadgold's retirement, on the initiative of Professor Daniel Waugh. Professor Treadgold passed away in December 1994. The series is dedicated to the memory of a great man, publishing papers in those areas that were close to his heart.

Sabrina P. Ramet  
Editor

## Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans Since the 19th Century

By Peter F. Sugar

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The demise of communist rule in the various states of the Balkans was followed by steadily increasing tensions leading to a bloody civil war. Some of the events which have attracted world-wide interest began even before the critical years of 1989-90. Clever and unscrupulous leaders using the tools which modern media technology put at their disposal can channel and have directed popular sentiment and feelings in directions which suited their purpose. They did this during the long years of communist supremacy, and even more blatantly during the last few years. Shaping public opinion and action is easier when the direction in which the leadership wants events to move coincides with and/or is based on the feelings and wishes of the majority of those whom the leaders wish to mobilize. Each group of humans, from the smallest (the nuclear family) to the largest (nation) is held together by shared self-identifiers. In the Balkans (except Albania) the most pronounced differentiation separating the masses from those who ruled them for about a half millennium was religion, the main if not only criterion accepted and enforced by the masters of the Ottoman Empire. Has this enforced self-identifier survived into the present, or was it changed and if so why and how? This study attempts to answer this basic question.

The historic 19th Century in the Balkans begins with 1789. This region was affected, as were the other lands of Europe, by the French Revolution, but it was also in this year that Sultan Selim III (ruled 1789-1807) ascended the throne in Istanbul, drastically changing the basic philosophy of rule in all the lands of the Ottoman Empire over which he ruled. This long nineteenth century, the primary subject of this essay, ended in 1914 with the outbreak of World War I.

By 1789 the conditions under which the various inhabitants of the peninsula lived varied greatly. The Romanian principalities, never under direct Ottoman rule, were ruled by phanariot hospodars whose tenures in office were short and often rapacious. Montenegro's prince-bishops enjoyed life tenure and

considerable independence in their actions. Some districts of mainland Greece, mainly in the Morea, and most Aegean Islands were administered by members of hereditary local masters who acknowledged Ottoman rule and were not displaced when the Ottomans conquered the Balkans. In Albania and Bosnia-Hercegovina, local Muslim families held sway nominally as Ottoman functionaries, but in fact on the basis of their local prestige and wealth. The Serbs and Bulgarians saw their lands administered either by Ottoman functionaries or by various *ânyans* who established themselves in certain regions and ruled as petty local potentates. Everywhere, the overwhelming majority of the people inhabited the countryside and lived the life of cultivators or husbandmen. In the Greek and Romanian lands well established rural demographic patterns were still in place, but in the Slav-inhabited lands the *çiftlik* system had replaced the *timar* by this time making village elders and chiefs important individuals.

In spite of these significant differences all regions were identical in one very important respect besides the already mentioned heavy rural concentration of the population: Orthodoxy was the dominant religion everywhere. In terms of the number of followers, Islam followed Orthodoxy in Rumeli with Judaism in the third place. With Jews residing almost entirely in cities, the countryside was Orthodox and Muslim. If we are to analyze the shifting of the primary self-identifying criteria of the people of Southeastern Europe,<sup>1</sup> the rural-orthodox majority of those living in Ottoman-held lands and their attitudes deserve major attention although we know less about this group than we know of other segments of the population.

Istanbul looked at its subjects in Rumeli as members of various *millet*s, making religious identification crucial and the Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul a person of great importance for the people of the Balkans.<sup>2</sup> Although by the end of the 18th century the intellectual frontier between the Ottoman Empire and Europe had broken down and western ideas and ideals had penetrated into this state, the great majority of the population, being cut off by its illiteracy and immobility, knew nothing of these revolutionary thoughts.<sup>3</sup>

The gradual disintegration of law and order in the Ottoman Empire reached its apogee in the 18th century. The establishment of the *çiftlik*-based life and the emergence of the *ânyans* were not the only results of the Porte's inability to rule its

provinces. It also gave birth to the klephts, martalose, morlaks, hajduks, uskoks, etc., the various locally constituted armed bands who had their bases in the villages of given neighborhoods and made life very unpleasant to all foreigners, but especially to the representatives of the authorities. Future generations looked back at these bands as the early fighters for their nations' freedom. "Though in real life these guerrillas were pirates and brigands, the epic poetry extols them as champions of the oppressed against the Turks. Thus the Serbian people acquired a whole gallery of Robin Hoods who could be admired and emulated in the struggle for freedom."<sup>4</sup> The same can be said about Greeks and Bulgarians who practiced the same trades and became national heroes one or two generations later. It is also important to note that "the antagonism between the *asker* and *raya* increasingly came to be identified with . . . antagonism between Muslim and Christian."<sup>5</sup>

While the Ottomans looked at the Orthodox *millet* as one group, the Balkan Christians were anything but a united group. Orthodox Churches were historically national churches and symbols of a nation's sovereignty. Their memories of these states and Churches were still alive at the end of the 18th century. The Ohrid archbishopric was abolished in 1767 and the patriarchate of Peć in 1766. The latter's place was taken by the patriarchate of Sremski Karlovci which had been established by Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević who moved there from Peć in 1690. To these memories and the longing for their Church, the Slav people added their discontent with the manner in which the Patriarch in Istanbul governed his *millet*. Trying to maintain the doctrinal and organizational unity of their Church under very adverse circumstances, the patriarchs of this all-important see forbade the use of Church Slavonic and gave preferential treatment to those who had the proper theological training when appointing bishops. This training was given in Greek in the various seminaries and schools and, consequently, all bishops were Greeks. This fact was deeply resented by the village priests, often poorly trained sons of important local families. They learned the texts required, mainly in Church Slavonic, from their predecessors and recited them from memory without understanding the words they used. The situation was somewhat better in the Romanian Principalities, especially after the beginning of the phanariot period. Local boyars intermarried with and joined the phanariots. "The Greek

yoke," mentioned often by Balkan historians and very much resented both then and now, is based on the actions of the Greek hierarch and phanariots.

To the chaotic situation<sup>6</sup> and uncertainty surrounding the people of the Balkans a new element was added by the onset of the 19th century: the ideas and events of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Obviously, these were only accessible to those who could travel outside the confines of the Empire or to those who not only could read and write, but could do this also in a foreign language. Those who had these abilities were first of all merchants but included also members of the clergy. The most important people in this group were the phanariots, who had the means to hire tutors or study abroad and who produced some remarkable scholars, innovators and reformers. Several members of the Mavrocordatos family, Rhigas Pheraios, Adamantios Koraës, Agostino Capodistrias and Alexandros Ypsilantis, among others, come easily to mind. Even these few names indicate scientific, literary and political activities of a very significant nature.

The Greeks were not the only ones who profited from the activities of the phanariots. As hospodars of the Romanian Principalities they brought their culture and attitude to Bucharest and Iași where they intermarried with the local boyars creating an upper class with innovative tendencies. New ideas were brought to these lands not only from Istanbul, but also from Russia and Transylvania. It was in Transylvania that a Uniate bishop, Ioan Inochentie Micu (later Baron Klein) first proclaimed the Daco-Roman theory explaining the origin of his people and establishing the basis of modern Romanian nationalism.

The Romanians were not the only ones who profited from the activities of conationals living outside the Ottoman borders. Around the patriarchate at Sremski Karlovci numerous Serb institutions developed including a seminary and a school system producing the first learned Serb elite. As is well known, these *Prečani* Serbs, together with those who went to schools north of the border, became the diplomats of the Serbian Revolution and supplied most of the administrators and scholars who helped to establish the modern Serb state.

It is less well known that in 1790 a Serb *sabor* (assembly) met for three months at Temesvár. It was called by the patriarch Mojsije Putnik who died before the *sabor* met on 21 August. In preparation for this meeting the various Serb-inhabited commu-

nities in Hungary and the Military Frontier regions not only prepared instructions for their representatives, but also sent *cahiers* on the French model directly to the *sabor*. Several points of view were voiced during the discussions, but the final resolutions reflected the victory of a Serb national trend. The Emperor-King was not only asked to confirm the religious and national privileges granted by his predecessors, but it was also requested that a special vojvodate be created for the Serbs in which they could be self-governing as Croats were in Croatia.<sup>7</sup> Vienna promised everything but, in the end, granted nothing except the continuation of the earlier privileges. What is important to note is that at this congress the Serbs of the future Vojvodina demanded national and not only religious recognition. It is also significant that the important work of Jovan Rajić, *Istorija raznyh slavenskih narodov najpače Bolgar, Horvatov i Serbov . . .* was published in the mid 1790s.

The Transylvanian Romanians were encouraged by "the examples set by the Serbs of Hungary." They too demanded permission to organize their own *mare sober* (great assembly).<sup>8</sup> Several Romanian clergymen, including bishop Gherasim Adamovici, attended the Temesvár meeting. This frightened Count George Bánffy, governor of Transylvania, enough to propose "that the Rumanian and Serbian hierarchies be separated."<sup>9</sup> The government did not grant any of the Romanians' demands. What is important to note is that in the crucial years following the death of Emperor Joseph II (ruled 1780-1790) Uniate and Orthodox cooperated as Romanians.

Thus, at the beginning of the 19th century, Greeks, Romanians, and Serbs could rely on conationals living under better circumstances than they did under Ottoman rule to help them acquire new ideas about themselves and the world at large. The Bulgarians and Albanians had to rely on themselves and, as a result, lagged behind the three other nations in broadening their self-image and basic loyalties beyond their Churches and the immediate surroundings with which they were familiar.

The two nations of the Balkans which were not subjects of the sultan, the Croats and the Slovenes, were Roman Catholics as were most of the other people living in Habsburg-ruled lands. Therefore, the religious differentiation and conflict along confessional lines so important for Ottoman subjects played no role in their self-identification. In 1102, the Croats had elected Kálmán

(ruled 1095-1116), the King of Hungary, as their ruler. From that time on Hungary and Croatia were always ruled by the same sovereign whose representative, banus, was the highest ranking official in the Croatian administration. When the 19th century began the exact constitutional position of the two nations was subject to different interpretations. The Croats "claimed that in constitutional terms a common Hungarian-Croat state, a real union, had been established . . . while the Hungarians claimed they [Croatian lands] were subject provinces."<sup>10</sup>

The Croatian position, clearly expressed in 1790 by the Vice-comes of Zagreb county, Nikola Škrlec, demanded equality for the Croat and Hungarian nations. In this case, nation meant only the "political nations," i.e. the two nobilities. To this demand of equality the request was added, after the Habsburg acquisition of Dalmatia in 1797, that this new province be united with Croatia-Slavonia. These two issues, the constitutional position of Croatia and the demand for the establishment of the "Triune Kingdom," dominated Croatian politics up to the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. What changed, mainly in the 19th century, was the definition of the nation in whose name the demands were made.

The Slovene lands lie geographically outside the Balkans, but are inhabited by a Slavic people who joined Yugoslavia after the First World War. Not only are the Slovenes inhabiting a non-Balkan territory, but their history also differs sharply from that of the other people surveyed in these pages. Their lands were conquered by Charlemagne (ruled 768-814) during his anti-Avar wars lasting from 796 to 803. From this time to 1918 Slovenes lived first in the Holy Roman, then the Habsburg Empire. Their history is a part of that of Central Europe and not of the Balkans. On the one hand, they were never masters of their own house, which was divided into estates of German nobles; but on the other, they profited from being part of the Western World and sharing with its other inhabitants all the major developments from the Renaissance and Reformation to the Enlightenment. They retained their own language and thanks to this, their identity. This linguistic identity was transformed into a national one, to a considerable extent, during the few years between 1809 and 1814 when, together with Dalmatia and certain segments of Croatia proper, the Slovene lands became a part of Napoleon's Illyrian Provinces. Interestingly, religion became part of Slovene self-

identification only at a later date.

The first major and successful revolt against Ottoman rule in the Balkans broke out in the Paşalik of Belgrade in 1804. This event and the long struggle it set in motion is well known. A few facts have to be listed, however, because they are of importance for the nationalism-religion focus of these pages. In 1791, Sultan Selim III forbade the janissaries, by this time not much more than a privileged and well armed band of outlaws, to operate in the paşalik. Osman Pasvanoğlu *âyan* of Vidin, became their protector, and when the sultan was forced to make peace with this character, the janissaries were permitted to return to the paşalik. The Ottoman authorities, headed by the paşa of Belgrade, Hacı-Mustafa Sinikoğlu were as unhappy with the renewed presence and depredation of the janissaries who obeyed only their leaders, known as *dahis*, as were the Serbs. Thus a community of interests and actions tied the Porte's legal representatives to the inhabitants of the area under their jurisdiction. In 1801, the janissaries killed Sinikoğlu and began to terrorize everybody. Most history books tell us that the Serbs, provoked by their depredations, revolted against the rule of the *dahis* "trying to help the sultan." Preparations for resistance were certainly organized by the *knezes*, but "the spark that kindled the Serbian Revolution was set off not by Serbs, but by the Turkish Janissary leaders, the *dahis*."<sup>11</sup> These men decided that all *knezes* and other popular leaders must be killed, and only after their murderous expeditions began did the Serbs take action in self-defense. Clearly neither their religion nor their national identification prompted the Serbs to revolt although they were conscious of both. As the long struggle dragged on, it took on a more and more "national" character in the eyes of the rest of Europe and in the numerous declarations and diplomatic notes prepared by the Serb leadership. Some of these men might, indeed, have had a clear national concept in mind, but what about the population at large and the fighting men? They fought in self-defense, they fought because they were loyal to their leaders, they fought to revenge wrongs, but did they fight as Serbs for Serbia? I doubt it. Nor did they fight a modern crusade against infidels to save their souls; they fought for something more earthly and practical. Religion alone was no longer a motivating force, but religion was still an important element of their self-image. To describe this half-religious, half-lay identification the expression of *Konfessions-Nationalität*

proposed by Emanuel Truczynski is applicable and very helpful.<sup>12</sup> It is an unconsciously formulated self-awareness that melds the religious and ethnic into a new concept with which the majority of a given group could identify. It is no longer purely religious and not yet national; it is neither while it is both. For the history of the people of the Balkans this is a useful concept. Although none of the authors who contributed to the excellent volume edited by Wayne S. Vucinich<sup>13</sup> used Turczynski's concept, several chapters tackle this problem and come to similar conclusions. While some of the *Prečani* Serbs might have thought in nationalistic terms, the motivating ideology of most of those who revolted against the misdeeds of the *dahis* and later fought the Ottomans was something that can easily be identified as the confessional nationality presented by Turczynski.

The forces that motivated the Greeks were more complex and are more difficult to analyze than were those discussed in the case of the Serbs. First of all, Greeks could be found in practically all Ottoman provinces and in numerous foreign lands and were influenced by their immediate surroundings. A second important factor was the composition of the Greek "upper classes." These included, besides the phanariots, the higher clergy, numerous merchants who did not work within the phanariot system, leaders of the various mainland and island communities that were practically self-governing, and the *hocabaşis*, a group of Greek landowners, who often occupied minor administrative positions and worked as hereditary *mültezims* (tax collectors and tax farmers). Maintaining the Ottoman system was clearly in the interest of some of these people. The self-centered behavior and attitude of some of the local chieftains became obvious when they fought each other during the years of the Greek War of Independence. Others were either motivated by honest conviction or were forced to act by the circumstances in which they found themselves. Good examples of this last mentioned group are Alexander Mavrocordatos and the Patriarchs Grigorios and Evgenios. Mavrocordatos wrote that as good Christians the Greeks should "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's" and should not "confuse what is temporary and corruptible with what is divine and eternal."<sup>14</sup> Both patriarchs and 22 other bishops excommunicated, for very obvious reasons, all those who participated in the Greek Revolution.<sup>15</sup> While in the case of the Greeks we have much richer and diverse samplings of attitudes and con-

victions than we had in the case of the Serbs, the question of what motivated the revolutionaries of 1821 can still not be answered unequivocally.

There can be little doubt that the *Philiki Etairia* became a revolutionary organization after Alexandros Ypsilantis became its leader. It is also clear that he discussed his plans with Tsar Alexander I's (ruled 1801-1825) Greek minister of foreign affairs, Count Ioannis Kapodistrias, although it is not clear which of his numerous plans he shared with this important statesman.<sup>16</sup> Finally, it is also certain that Ypsilantis counted on Russian help, but this was denied him, if it was ever a possibility, because, unknown to him, the Tsar adopted the conservative views of Prince Clemens von Metternich at the Congress of Laibach (Ljubljana).<sup>17</sup> There can be little doubt that Ypsilantis, a highly educated man of the world, familiar with the political trends and philosophies of his time, was a Greek nationalist. The question that can be posed, but cannot be answered is: which of his various plans was nearest to what he truly hoped to achieve? Did he only wish to liberate Greece and if so what borders did he have in mind? Did he contemplate something of a crusade or did he hope that a Balkan-wide revolt would produce something akin to the Byzantine Empire, making him an early advocate of the *Megale* (great) idea? Whatever he had in mind came to naught when his expedition bogged down in the Romanian Principalities.

The second revolutionary movement that began in the Morea at practically the same time succeeded mainly because of the activities and influence of the European (and to lesser extent American) philhellenes, in spite of the fractional in-fighting of the Greeks. That by 1832 the Greeks were nationalists cannot be doubted. That the borders of their new state did not satisfy them is understandable and that, for this reason, the irredentist *Megale* idea dominated Greek thinking for something like the next 84 years is comprehensible. What made their nationalism unique for nearly a century was that it encompassed not only the Hellenic *demos* (people), but the entire Hellenic *genos* (race) making it rather difficult for the neighbors of Greece to understand the limits of Greek aspirations.

When Ypsilantis crossed into the Romanian Principalities he found a local revolutionary movement led by Tudor Vladimirescu in progress. Romanian historians writing since 1945 date the beginning of "modern" Romanian history from this

uprising.<sup>18</sup> It is not easy to find a convenient label for this revolt. It was certainly not motivated by religious considerations because the principalities were religiously homogeneous. It was not nationalistic either because it was not directed against the Ottomans. This becomes clear from the often quoted statement Vladimirescu made when meeting Ypsilantis:

You do not belong here. Go, cross the Danube and fight the Turks. As for me, I do not intend to fight them. I wish to fight only the abuses that tear up my country.<sup>19</sup>

The movement was not a spontaneous rebellion by the abused people to whom Vladimirescu referred; these he had to recruit once he decided that revolt was the only way to remedy some of the social and economic conditions he considered intolerable. His Padeş Manifesto calling his countrymen to revolt made it clear that the enemy was the ecclesiastical and political upper hierarchy which was almost exclusively phanariot. Yet some of the people who were members of this group of enemies not only knew what Vladimirescu was planning, but even financed his movement. I am not the only one who has difficulties in pigeonholing this movement which had national, social and political elements, but no truly dominating ideology. Romanian Marxist historians found an interesting label for Vladimirescu's movement, calling it a "Prolog al revolutiei burgheze" [A Prologue to bourgeois revolutions].<sup>20</sup> Given the absence of a middle class in the Principalities in those years, this explanation makes no sense.

In Transylvania, the Romanians were the "tolerated" nation and the religion of most of them, Orthodoxy, was also only a "tolerated" confession. The Uniate faith, followed by those Romanians who were not Orthodox, enjoyed an "accepted" position as part of the Catholic Church. The well known *Supplex libellus Valachorum*, the petition submitted to the Emperor-King in 1792, demanded not only equality for the Romanian nation with the three "accepted" ones (Magyar, Székely and Saxon) and for the Orthodox Church with the four "accepted" ones (Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed and Unitarian), but also proposed some constitutional changes reflecting the influence of western ideas. This famous document was prepared by clergymen of both religions, i.e. Orthodox and Uniate, to which the Romanians belonged, and showed a remarkable degree of national unity. This unity became even stronger when the so-called second Romanian re-

formist generation, consisting not only of clergymen, but more and more of well educated laymen, became vocal in Transylvania. These people were Romanians first of all; following a given creed was only a secondary consideration for them. They continued to demand equality for their people and church, but placed emphasis on uplifting their poor and illiterate conationals by establishing schools and publishing books and newspapers. These men, who were active mainly in the 1830s and 1840s, were Transylvanian and Romanian nationalists, although they did not yet think in broader nationalistic terms about possible unity with the Principalities. This makes good sense. Their "oppressors" were fellow Christians, not Muslims and, in spite of the misery of the peasant majority, even this social group lived better than its equivalent in Wallachia and Moldavia.<sup>21</sup>

The second Greek generation after the French Revolution was mostly involved in its struggle with the Othonian system. Party politics dominated public life and became more and more partisan as years went by. The most notable achievements were the "nationalization" of the Church in 1833 and the transformation of Otho's arbitrary regime (1832-1862) into a constitutional monarchy. The first of these two changes was inevitable. The patriarch residing in Istanbul was subject to pressure by the Ottoman government even in religious matters and national churches were the norm for centuries in lands with an Orthodox majority. Otho's regime was not only arbitrary, but also "foreign" in the eyes of most Greeks not only because he was a German, but mainly because his regime was run almost exclusively by Bavarians. Given the nature of Greek politics in those days, one can wonder to what extent the constitutional movement was anti-foreigner, anti-absolutist or simply a move to open the highest offices in the land to ambitious Greek politicians. After all, the corrupt "System" operated on the national level similarly to what is known to Americans as the political machines on the city level of William Tweed in New York or on the state level of Huey Long. While everybody in public life proclaimed his dedication to the aims of the *Megale* idea, the same politicians completely neglected their own countrymen. Nationalism was the official doctrine and those in public life always showed great concern for their unredeemed brothers without doing much if anything for those whose redemption had already taken place.

Among the Slavs, irrespective of where they lived, the

only important developments during these years occurred in the Slovene and Croatian lands. This fact is well illustrated by the title of Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt's excellent work, *Nationalismus bei Serben and Kroaten, 1830-1914*.<sup>22</sup> I refer to the well known Illyrianist Movement and the careers of men like Ljudevit Gaj. The importance of this movement for South Slavic history needs no repetition here. An excellent study dealing with it is easily available.<sup>23</sup> Gaj and his collaborators attempted to show "that [the] Croat and Slavonian tribe is not so insignificant . . . and that the Croats and Slavonians are only a part of the greater Illyrian people, just as in turn the Illyrian people are a part of the great Slav People." This is why they selected the Illyrian appellation for their basically Croat Revival movement.<sup>24</sup> It was this attempt to define Croat/Illyrian as broadly as possible that made the Illyrianists select the štokavian version of Croatian as the basis for their linguistic reforms although this was not the dialect they spoke.<sup>25</sup>

Behschnitt begins his examination of Serb nationalism with a detailed analysis of Ilija Garašanin's *Program of Serbia's Foreign and National Policy at the End of 1844*, better known as the *Načertanije*. This document is well known and has been studied in detail by many scholars. What is interesting is that Behschnitt considers it the first expression of both a vague Yugoslavism and also of Great Serbianism.<sup>26</sup> Ivo Banac sees this document, in contrast to Behschnitt, only as a clear approach to Great Serbianism.<sup>27</sup> This document was certainly a pre-1848 expression of Serb nationalism. The next important document of Serb nationalism discussed at length by Behschnitt, Vuk Karadžić's *Srbi svi i svuda*, (All Serbs and Serbs everywhere) is well described by Banac in a few words: "Karadžić, in short, brought forth a modern Serb national ideology, the purpose of which was to assimilate the vast majority of Catholic Croats and all Bosnian Muslims. . . ."<sup>28</sup> These two authors reach the same conclusion shared by others also. By the crucial revolutionary period Serb identity had moved beyond Orthodoxy and became aggressively national.

The Illyrianists dominated the Slovene scene during the first half of the 19th century, and the Slovenes were, consequently, not narrowly nationalist or Catholic. No major movements existed in Croatia although Croats became gradually more and more aware of their position in the Habsburg domain in response to the growing Hungarian nationalism and, especially, to

the actions of the Diet of 1843-44 which replaced Latin with Hungarian as the official language in all lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. The Croats "in turn replaced Latin with their own vernacular as the official language in the autonomous 'associate country' of Croatia-Slavonia."<sup>29</sup> Thus began a growing hostility between two Catholic nations first as an expression of cultural and soon thereafter of political nationalism.

The revolutionary year of 1848-49 was of great importance for the development of nationalism in the Balkans. The revolutionaries were defeated and liberal ideas had to wait for several decades before they were adopted by various governments. Even before the ultimate triumph of liberalism the image which the great masses had of themselves and other nations was altered drastically and permanently. This change was the result of the civil war that raged in Hungary parallel to the struggle between the Magyars and the Habsburg forces. Not only did the banus of Croatia, Baron Josip Jelačić, lead his forces against the Magyars, but the Serbs of the Vojvodina and the Romanians of Transylvania also revolted due to the chauvinistic nearsighted nationalities policy of Lajos Kossuth's Hungarian government. For the first time, peasant masses fought each other as members of nations. The revolts of Serbs and Romanians received help from conationals living in Serbia and the Principalities. It became clear to those fighting that their brothers were not fellow (Hungarian) peasants, but those who came to help them from across the borders. The memories of this struggle and the lines of division drawn along national lines never faded from the minds of those who fought in 1848 and were transmitted by them to later generations. After 1848 nationalism became the most important element determining the self-image and loyalty of Serbs, Croats and Romanians, as it was already for the Greeks.

The aim of the neo-absolutist regime known as the Bach Period that followed the Habsburg victory in 1849 was the creation of a highly centralized unitary state. It was as ruthless in dealing with those nations that had fought the Magyars as it was in dealing with the Magyars. Anybody who opposed the centralizing tendencies of Vienna was automatically placed under police surveillance, including the Illyrianists Ljudevit Gaj and Ivan Kukuljević among others. Their colleagues Mirko Bobović and Ivan Filipović wound up in jail, and Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who had opposed the introduction of German as the offi-

cial language, escaped this fate only because of his position. He was accused of withholding taxes, and military units were sent to confiscate some of his property. The Serbs, who had claimed the right of local self-government since at least the 1790s, had to be satisfied with an additional title given to the ruler, who became Grand Vojvod of the Vojvodina which was not yet a separate administrative region.<sup>30</sup>

In Transylvania the situation was similar. General Ludwig Wohlgemut was given full powers to transform this land into an imperial province as quickly as possible. The Romanians--considered simply an inconsequential *Bauernvolk*--were not consulted or given any new rights or privileges.<sup>31</sup> The Magyars said, quite rightly: the nationalities received as reward what we received as punishment.

After the *Ausgleich*, the position of the non-Magyars in Hungary did not improve and even became worse after Kálmán Tisza became Prime Minister in 1875. The story of Hungary's minorities is too well known to require repetition here and easily accessible in several well known works.<sup>32</sup> All I want to do is stress a few aspects of the story leading to the end of the 19th century.

Reaction to the growing arbitrariness of their Hungarian "partners" provoked two reactions among the Croats. One, tied to the names of Eugen Kvaternik and Ante Starčević, fought for the recognition of the right of Croatia to manage its own affairs in the lands laying between the Danube and Albania and stretching from the Drina to the Adriatic. Later Josip Frank advocated the same rights for Croatia. This super-nationalistic approach paid scant attention to the Serbs of Slavonia, making it easy for Count Károly Kuen-Héderváry, banus of Croatia from 1883 to 1903, to organize a majority in the Croatian *sabor* made up of some Magyarone Croats and the Serbs. I see in this clash between a party based on Serbs and the nationalistic Croats the first serious division of the two people, a beginning of hostilities based entirely on nationalistic considerations.

The other trend, less political, more cultural but nevertheless very influential was the Yugoslav movement, a newer form of Illyrianism advocated with growing success by Bishop Strossmayer and Franjo Rački. This movement was at first *Kaisertreu*, aiming at the unity of Croats and Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy in which they were to be granted equality with the Germans

and Hungarians. As all pan-movements, this one too was based on the recognition that Serbs and Croats alone, and especially when disunited, were too weak to fight the two dominant nations of the Habsburg lands. Politically, the union of the two Slavic nations was achieved by the Croato-Serb coalition, the *Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija* of 1905. It aimed at South Slavic unity in the Dual Monarchy, including the Slovenes, and was anti-Frankist and opposed to the plans of the Franz Ferdinand circle. When Franjo Supilo, its most influential founder, retired from politics and when Hungarian politics became less and less tolerant, the HSK lost its popularity. Another, later very important party, the *Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka* (Croat People's Peasant Party) was established in 1904 by Stjepan Radić. This party too advocated an Austroslav solution until the end of World War I. During the last years before the war, the form of Yugoslavism ready to leave the Dual Monarchy and unite with Serbia, was represented in Croatia by the *Nacionalistička Omladina* (Nationalist Youth) movement. All these parties and movements testified to the existence of a strong nationalist sentiment in Croatia without regard to religious considerations. This was true even of clergymen of the Strossmayer-Rački stamp.

The Catholicism of the Slovenes, their relatively high living standards, and the fact that Austrian rule was much more tolerant than Hungarian rule, produced a less militant nationalism than among the Croats and Serbs. Furthermore, most of the political leaders of this nation were clergymen who sympathized with the equally strongly Catholic circle of Franz Ferdinand. They learned to play a clever game of wait and see, which they continued to play after the First World War with great success in Yugoslavia.

The Serbs of Serbia had their hands full trying to build up their state, resist outside pressures coming from Austria and later Austria-Hungary, digest national humiliations like the defeat in 1885, and take sides or try to keep away from the dynastic struggles that ended only in 1903 with the murder of Alexander Obrenović. Those who killed their king and queen, military and civilian conspirators, were mostly members of the *Ujedinjenje ili Smrt* (Unification or death) society whose aim, as this name indicates, was the unification of all Southern Slavs--Bulgarians excepted--in a Greater Serbia. These grandsons of the Garašanin idea were impatient and ready to use force to gain their ends.

The Great Serbia idea had a more patient, and in the end more successful, champion in the leader of the Radical Party, Nikola Pašić who worked to achieve the same ends by diplomatic means. All partisans of Great Serbia preached South Slavic unity, but wanted to make certain that it would be achieved in a state in which the Serbs will occupy the position of *primus inter pares*.<sup>33</sup>

After the *Ausgleich*, the Transylvanian Romanians found themselves in a worse position than that in which they had been in before 1867. While in Transylvania they had no rights, they were at least the majority of the principality's inhabitants whose rights had to be recognized sooner or later. When their land became an integral part of Greater Hungary they became an important minority, but a minority nevertheless. This fact made collaboration between Uniates and Orthodox an absolute necessity. The collaboration of the two Churches became easier when, in 1868, the Andrásy government's truly liberal minister of cultural affairs, Baron József Eötvös, satisfied a long standing demand of the Romanians and gave them their own metropolitanate which was independent of Sremski Karlovci. This was a very important concession because it made possible the establishment of parochial schools for the majority of the Romanians living in Hungary. This apparently religious move, for which the Romanians had fought since 1848, was also a significant political move.<sup>34</sup>

To return to the Croats and oversimplify a complicated issue: the political thought of the Croats split into Austro-slav (or at least *Kaisertrou*) and secessionist movements. The same was true of the Romanians living in Great Hungary. While cultural life and political action became more and more difficult as the position of Budapest became more and more intransigent, Romanians made significant progress in all respects. Most of their leading political figures, including the future Prime Ministers of post-1918 Romania, Iuliu Maniu and Alexandru Vaida-Voievod, represented their conationals in the Hungarian parliament. Those who despaired and did not believe that life in a Magyar-dominated state had a future for Romanians moved to the Principalities.

The Principalities, united into a Romanian state in 1859, made rapid progress economically and politically. After full independence was achieved in 1878, the two leading political parties, the Liberal and the Conservative, agreed on their next common goal, the creation of a Great Romania which was to include

not only Transylvania, but also the Banat, Bessarabia, and the Bukovina. The yearning for this great state was so general on all levels of society that the country's adherence to the Triple Alliance in 1883 had to be kept secret. Irredentism was the basic element of the country's foreign policy from at least 1878 if not already in earlier periods. The only feature of Romanian policy that could be labelled religious was its anti-Semitism, but this had a large economic aspect also.<sup>35</sup>

One additional region of the Balkans had its Habsburg connection--Bosnia-Hercegovina. Here the religious factor of the religion-nationalism equation played a significant role. Together with the Albanian lands, Bosnia-Hercegovina was the westernmost province of the Ottoman Empire until 1878. "At the end of four centuries of Ottoman occupation approximately 38 per cent of the population followed Islam, 42 per cent were Orthodox, and 18 per cent were Catholics."<sup>36</sup> Irrespective of their religious affiliation all inhabitants of the *sancak* were ethnically Southern Slavs and spoke one or the other of the Serbo-Croatian variants. While the population increased by an amazing 68 per cent under Habsburg rule, the religious division hardly changed.<sup>37</sup> Under Ottoman rule, the local Muslim notables were strong enough to run the *sancak* and even forced their nominal superior, the governor, to live in Travnik while they sat in Sarajevo. Not all Muslims were notables. Most of them were simple peasants and lived much as did other peasants belonging to other religions.<sup>38</sup> Christianity survived the long centuries of Ottoman rule mainly thanks to the work of the Bosnian Franciscans.<sup>39</sup>

When, after 1878, Bosnia-Hercegovina was administered and in 1908 annexed by the Dual Monarchy, the Common Minister of Finance was assigned the task of governing this newly acquired province. It was taken for granted that the Catholics would be delighted with living under a Catholic master, but their number was too small to supply the administration with a pro-Austro-Hungarian population base.<sup>40</sup> It was also assumed that the Orthodox would be hostile. For this reason the social and economic positions of the Muslims was not changed; on the contrary, they were courted by Vienna. The antagonism of the various elements of the population, in this case clearly based on religious divisions, was obvious and remained unchanged. This prompted the most talented and able of the Common Finance Ministers, Benjámín Kállay, to invent a Bosnian nationality which

he tried to propagate with all means at his disposal. The murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by young Bosnian Serb nationalists is the best proof of the total failure of this attempt.

Greece was one of the few countries that had no revolution in 1848. Her existence still depended to a considerable extent on the good will of the Great Powers who helped her gain her independence. The British Ambassador in Athens declared that "a really independent Greece is an absurdity. Greece is either Russian or English and since she must not be Russian she must be English."<sup>41</sup> The well known Don Pacifico affair of 1850 and the occupation of Piraeus from 1854 to 1857 by a joint British-French fleet proves that the Great Powers meant what they said.

The Greek revolt of 1862 ousted Othon and brought the Danish George I (Georgios - ruled 1863-1913) to the throne. A new constitution of 1864 signaled a change in Greek politics. The *Megale* idea continued to dominate Greek thinking, but the two leading politicians disagreed on the means to achieve the national goal. Charilaos Trikoupis wanted to build up the country economically first and hoped to make foreign policy gains through diplomacy. His approach was opposed by Theodore Deligiannes, a jingoistic firebrand who mobilized the Greek army in 1886 to get "compensation" for the territorial gains made by Bulgaria the year before. He was unsuccessful, but tried again in 1897 when he went further and attacked the Ottoman Empire with catastrophic results. The only territorial gain on the mainland was awarded to Greece by the Great Powers who, at the Congress of Berlin, instructed Istanbul to negotiate border revisions with Athens. When negotiations dragged on for three years, the Conference of Istanbul, to which the Greeks were not invited, awarded Greece most of Thessaly in 1881. The Great Powers, in this case Great Britain, were also responsible for another Greek gain of territory, the acquisition of the Ionian islands, which London handed over as a sort of accession gift when George I became King of Greece. The other focus of Greek irredentism was Crete where successive revolts in 1841, 1858, 1866-68, 1875-76, 1896, and 1909 brought more and more concessions from the Ottomans. From 1897 to 1909 the island was occupied by troops of the Great Powers who came to prevent the expansion of the Greek-Ottoman war to the island. By 1909 Crete was, for practical purposes, ruled by the Greeks, but *enosis*, unification with Greece, had to wait until the Balkan wars. Greece fought

these under the leadership of one of her truly great statesman, Eleutherios Venizelos, Crete's gift to Greece. This summary of Greek activities outside the country's borders indicates an expansionist drive pursued with the help of both religious and nationalistic slogans. As far as the Greek population was concerned, the two really were one and the same thing.

The Balkan wars represented an important phase in what is known as the Macedonian question. This question is closely connected with the emergence of modern Bulgaria and Macedonia.

The Bulgarians lived geographically closer to Istanbul than did the other Balkan subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Military and economic considerations also made their lands of primary importance to Istanbul, which, therefore, kept a tight control over the Bulgarians. Nor were the Ottomans the only ones interested in keeping the Bulgarian *sancaks* in the Empire. Similar to the Greek *hocabaşis*, a group of Bulgarians, the *çorbacis* fit well into the existing system from which they profited as also did members of the large Bulgarian merchant community in Istanbul. The first Bulgarian nationalists were members of other merchant colonies living in Belgrade, Bucharest, Odessa, and several other cities. "The first organised armed group of Bulgarians was the small Bulgarian legion formed in Belgrade in 1862 by George Rakovski."<sup>42</sup> It was disbanded almost immediately by the Serbian government at the request of the Ottoman government. Four years later a Bulgarian Central Committee was established in Bucharest by Liuben Karavelov and Vasil Levski. Levski led several filibustering expeditions into Bulgarian lands and was captured and executed in 1873. Other important figures working outside the Ottoman Empire included Georgi Benkovski and Hristo Botev, all of whom have a secure place in the Bulgarian pantheon. They organized revolutionary committees all over the territory of the future Bulgaria, the core of which was clearly delineated by the edict of the Sultan Abdülaziz (ruled 1861-1876) on 11 March 1870. This *firman*, the result of long and persistent pressure by the Russians, created a Bulgarian Exarchate, an autocephalous Church, in spite of the objections of the patriarch.<sup>43</sup> This dignitary quite correctly predicted as early as 1867 that a Bulgarian Church could easily serve as "a bridge to the political independence of the Bulgarians."<sup>44</sup> The traditional sequence of appearance was reversed in this case. In the past, Orthodox

rulers who succeeded in establishing states created national Churches. In this case the Church predated the establishment of a state. The dioceses assigned to the Exarchate were situated mainly between the Danube and the Balkan range. That the patriarch excommunicated the clergy and laity of the new ecclesiastical unit had no historical significance. The area assigned to the exarchate did, indeed, become the core of a new Bulgarian state. It was established as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1875-1878. The Treaty of San Stefano dictated by the victorious Russians assigned to Bulgaria all those lands which, according to the Article X of the sultan's original *firman*, could possibly be considered Bulgarian. This article allowed any diocese that voted by a two-thirds majority to join the exarchate to do so. The Greek and Serb churches understood this article to mean that if any diocese voted by a two-thirds majority to join them they too could do so. As is well known, the Congress of Berlin changed the borders drawn at San Stefano and limited Bulgaria practically to the same territory that had been assigned eight years earlier to the exarchate. The area between the Balkan and Rhodope range was set up as the Christian-governed Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia with the remaining lands, Macedonia, returned to the Ottomans. In their small state the Bulgarians showed amazing political maturity and sophistication in setting up their new state.<sup>45</sup> When Eastern Rumelia voted to join Bulgaria seven years later and Serbia tried to prevent this, an equally amazing Bulgarian military victory assured this union. The Bulgarians now had their own *Megale* idea, the aim of which was to regain their country's San Stefano borders.<sup>46</sup>

The tenth article of the sultan's *firman* and the decision of the statesmen assembled at Berlin created the Macedonian problem which is still with us to the present day. The Macedonian question has been studied in great detail for the last hundred years and is too complicated to summarize in a few sentences.<sup>47</sup> What is important for this paper dealing with religion and nationalism is that in this area of the Balkans the nationalisms of three Orthodox states clashed and that one of the weapons all three states used in their struggle was religious. Priests became some of the fighters in this struggle and much too often also its victims. The attempts of the Great Powers to settle the Macedonian question before World War I were unsuccessful. The three Orthodox states of the Balkans fought the two Balkan wars pri-

marily over Macedonia. The activities of IMRO continued in the interwar period. In World War II Bulgaria gained temporary possession over some of Macedonia. It was Tito who tried to solve this question by creating a Macedonian state in the Yugoslav Federation after World War II and who secured the agreement of Georgi Dimitrov for this move. This did not mean that the majority of Bulgarians ever believed that this was a just and final solution of the Macedonian question and that their dreams of regaining the San Stefano borders had ended. They were not the only ones with a "Macedonian question." When Macedonia declared its independence in October 1991, Greek nationalists found a new focus for their feelings. Claiming that only a Greek-ruled area had the right to be called Macedonia and prompted by their paranoiac fear of "Slav imperialism," they not only refused to recognize this state, but also prevented--using their NATO membership--its recognition by the West. The Bulgarians' acceptance of the existence of Macedonia was less the result of praiseworthy restraint than it was a clever political move. The area ceased to be part of Yugoslavia, was obviously anything but Greek, feared Serbia and, therefore, had only Bulgaria as a possible friend. It is noteworthy that Sofia recognized a Macedonian state, but made clear that it does not recognize the existence of a Macedonian nation--I am afraid that we have not seen the last fights in and over Macedonia. Today only the clergy are interested in the religious aspects of the problem in spite of the fact that the secessionist Macedonian state has its own national Church which would certainly be abolished should the state lose its independence. The present situation is far from settled. The future might still hold some new conflicts linked to the territorial problem created in 1878.

There is not much to be said about the Albanians prior to 1914. They lived in the most neglected region of the Ottoman Empire, divided by the two dialects, Gheg and Tosk, which they spoke, by their tribal social organization, and their religious divisions. Most of the 70% which was Muslim followed Sunni practices; a minority observed rites established by the Bektashi dervishes, who were tolerant of other creeds. Of the rest of the population 20 per cent, mainly in the south were Orthodox Christians and the remaining 10 per cent, mainly in the north, belonged to the Catholic church. The first Albanian movement that gained European attention was the League of Prizren. It was es-

established in 1878 to lobby at the Congress of Berlin preventing Serbia, Montenegro and Greece from claiming and receiving Albanian territory. The League continued to exist until it was dissolved by Ottoman armed forces two years later. It was replaced by the similarly short lived Albanian League, 1899-1902. Even after the victory of the Young Turks, relations between Istanbul and its Albanian provinces remained tense. Finally, in 1910, an Albanian revolt broke out in Priština and spread rapidly. It was suppressed and all Albanian institutions and schools were closed. Albania was created by the Great Powers in 1913, on the request of Austria-Hungary. The Dual Monarchy's aim was to keep the victorious Serbs from gaining an outlet to the sea after the Second Balkan war.

The Albanians gained some national heroes from all these activities. They include the Frashëri brothers, Sami and Naim, Haxhi Mulla Zeka and Ismail Kemal Vlora. These individuals and their collaborators were early Albanian nationalists, but the great majority of their countrymen continued in their old established ways. It was the Albanian emigration in the United States that became the germ of the Albanian national life that began after World War I. In 1906, the first Albanian weekly *Kombi* (Nation) began publication in Boston, followed two years later by the establishment of the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church by Fan S. Noli and in 1912 by *Vatra* (the Heart), a Pan-Albanian Federation. During the First World War the newly established Albanian state disappeared and was fully occupied by Austro-Hungarian forces. It had to be reconstituted after the war.<sup>48</sup>

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I have spent a great deal of time dealing with the historical nineteenth century because it was during those years that nationalism joined religion in the Balkans as a self-identifying criterion demanding the loyalty of the various people. Furthermore, in the present century I have to deal only with three topics that touch on possible conflicts involving both religion and nationalism: the problem of Yugoslavia since its creation; the Turkish problem in Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus; and the Muslim problem artificially created after the great changes that began in 1988. Of these three topics, the Yugoslav problem has the longest history.

Pseudo-experts and self-appointed pundits discussing

Yugoslav problems like to stress "the centuries-old hostility" infecting the various ethnic groups that became the citizens of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the First World War. Knowledgeable scholars disagree with this interpretation. It is true that Orthodox, Catholics, and Muslims disliked each other and developed unflattering stereotypes describing the customs, habits and characteristics of those belonging to national and religious groups other than their own. There were occasional clashes, but all in all, Serbs, Croats, and Muslim Slavs not only learned to live peacefully side by side, but also began to intermarry in steadily growing numbers. The Slovenes had always lived by themselves and had little to do with the problems of the other three groups.

In my opinion, serious, although still non-violent, disagreements began to separate Serbs and Croats during World War I when discussions concerning a future Southern Slav state began. Émile Haumant, author of one of the earliest histories of Yugoslavia, wrote that Pašić "wanted to achieve Yugoslavia by stages. First came the establishment of Greater Serbia, a Serbo-Croat state next, and Yugoslavia last." He even reports that according to Marko Jakovljević, member of the Yugoslav Committee established at Niš, Nikola Pašić confused Slovenes and Slovaks.<sup>49</sup> All experts agree that Pašić was an advocate of Greater Serbia and that he had this in mind when he announced that Serbia's war aim was the liberation of all Slavs living in Austria-Hungary.<sup>50</sup> He made quite clear what he had in mind when, in 1918, he declared:

Serbia wants to liberate and unite the Yugoslavs and does not want to drown in the sea of some kind of Yugoslavia . . . but to have Yugoslavia drown in Serbia.<sup>51</sup>

The man who had negotiated the Corfu agreement, Ante Trumbić, had something quite different in mind. While attending the Peace Conference he explained "that although he was for state unity, he was not for a united state. 'This is not a fine point,' he stressed . . . 'but a conception.'"<sup>52</sup>

That Ante Trumbić, Frano Supilo, and the other founders of the Yugoslav Committee had something else in mind is also well known. When the discussions began that led to the Corfu Declaration of 20 July 1917, Pašić argued for the establishment of a unitary, and Trumbić of a federated, state. In spite of this,

Trumbić agreed that the new state had to be a monarchy ruled by the Karadjordjević family. Trumbić, who would have preferred an independent Croatian state, came to the conclusion that a united Southern Slav state was the optimal solution for his people because he "was convinced that, in the event Croatia achieved independence, Serbia would get the lion's share of any contested territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere, as well as Dubrovnik and other coastal areas."<sup>53</sup> The events of 1991-92 justify his premonitions. The Slovenes had no representatives at Corfu. As a matter of fact, the future leader of the Slovene People's Party, Anton Korošec, had proposed two months earlier, on 30 May 1917, in the Austrian Parliament the creation of a Croatian-Slovene state with a position and rights equal to those of Austria and Hungary.<sup>54</sup>

While the Slovenes still pursued their own aims, the Montenegrin Committee in Paris endorsed the Corfu Declaration. In spite of what some Croatian politicians would claim later, this declaration did not stipulate either a centralized or a federal form of government for the future state.<sup>55</sup> Subsequent meetings and declarations did not help either. The final outcome, the centralized state enshrined in the Vidovdan Constitution of 28 June 1921, was simply the result of the fact that the only force available in the lands of the future Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was the Serb army. If important documents like constitutions can be accepted by a simple majority, this constitution was legal and binding because, in spite of numerous abstentions, thirteen more votes were cast for it than was required for a simple majority. This fact did not impress or satisfy those, primarily the Croats, who were unhappy with the result of the work of the Constituent Assembly. Trumbić voiced his and his fellow Croats' displeasure and declared,

A centralist system is pushed through under the guise of unity. . . . This system represents a danger to peace and harmony. . . . This constitution will sharpen the tribal conflicts all the more . . . they are today acerbated more than under Austria-Hungary.<sup>56</sup>

The situation did not improve during the inter-war years. Croats continued to look at Serbs as oppressors, and the Serbs saw in the Croats nothing but troublemakers. This confrontation

was made worse by the shooting in 1928 of Stjepan Radić and others in Parliament by a fellow deputy, Puniša Račić, and by the growing influence in the ranks of the *Hrvatska seljačka štranka* (Croatian Peasant Party) of the Ante Pavelić-led, fascist, right-wing *Ustaša* movement.<sup>57</sup> The royal dictatorship which began on 6 January 1929, suspended the constitution and established *banovinas* in place of the historic entities making up the country. On 3 October 1929, King Alexander renamed the country Yugoslavia. King Alexander was assassinated in Marseilles in October 1934, but his successor, Regent Prince Paul, was not an effective sovereign. In spite of the need for unity, it took five years before, on 26 August 1939, Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković and Vladko Maček, leader of the HSS, signed the *Sporazum* (Agreement) which was supposed to replace Serb-Croat hostility with collaboration. As the date indicates, it was too late to make a difference.<sup>58</sup> The Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims stayed out of the dispute of Serbs and Croats, and by playing clever politics gained several advantages by siding sometimes with one and then with the other of the two groups. Their behavior was dictated entirely by political considerations, and was intended to gain the most possible for their nations. Even the Bosnian Muslims played a purely nationalistic game. Religious differences had almost nothing to do with their actions. It is my contention that this was true of the Serbs and Croats also. In spite of this contention, it has to be admitted that religion was not unimportant. If a Serb moved to Croatia, adapted his speech to the local usage and fitted perfectly into his environment, he was still considered a Serb if on Sundays he attended an Orthodox service. The same was true of a Croat living in a Serb-dominated region. The views of the members of each nation toward the other were made steadily more and more hostile by the constant accusations, often based on actual practices, which their politicians and the daily press dished out day after day after day. In 1939, Croats and Serbs were less inclined to cooperate with each other than they had been when their common state was born at the end of World War I. Nationalistic politics must carry the major share of the blame for this development.

The tragic civil war that was fought while the country was occupied by Germans and Italians is too well known to require detailed description. The *ustaša*, *četniks* and partisans were the major actors. The partisans proclaimed their religious and

nationalistic neutrality in the name of liberation and the Communist ideology. The *četniks* were Serb nationalists and royalists with clearly defined non-religious motivations for their stand, but they did not refrain from committing violent acts against non-Orthodox people when it suited their purpose. The *ustaša*, Croat super-nationalists and racists, were the most guilty and responsible for the country's massive losses in people and livestock, housing, etc. The Croatian national-socialist state was racist and aimed at the establishment of a purely Croat state. As is well known, the number of people who were driven from their homes was large enough to bring a German intervention halting the process. The Germans were not sorry for the Serbs, Jews, and others who were the victims of this drive. They simply understood that the economy, in which they were very much interested, could not afford the huge loss of workers being caused by the Croatian policy. Unfortunately, the Croatian Fascists also used religion as a criterion in determining nationality. The 1946 trial of Zagreb's Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac did not prove that he was in favor of the mass conversions forced on something like 200,000 Orthodox to turn them into Croats or for the extermination of the Jews, but segments of the Catholic clergy were certainly involved. I doubt that the *ustaša* were religious people. Nazis anywhere generally were not religious, but some of them clearly equated religion not only with nationality, but even with race.<sup>59</sup> These actions of the *ustaša* indicate that nationalism had become the dominant consideration, and that religion had been relegated to be no more than one of the characteristics of national (racial) belonging. This is why the conversion issue became important. It signified the change in national self-identification. *Konfessionsnationalität* had been a vague concept, but clearly *Konfession* was its crucial element. Now it had lost its centrality. What took its place was nationalism. *Nationale Konfession* (national religion) took the place of the concept identified by Turczynski. It had become as difficult to be a Catholic Serb or an Orthodox Croat as it was to be an Orthodox or Protestant Pole.

From 1945 to 1980, Josip Broz Tito was the undisputed master of Yugoslavia. In retrospect, the Croats accuse him of being pro-Serb, while the Serbs maintain that just the opposite was true. Tito was hostile to all forms of nationalism and tried to balance economic, political and party preferences between regions. He tried to make them as independent from each other and the

central government as possible. Yet, whenever he attempted meaningful decentralization, hostilities became obvious again and he had to recentralize the state. What he faced was the nationalism of each of the nations living in Yugoslavia. Their nationalism differed and still differs sharply from that of Western Europe and North America. One of these differences, in my opinion, is that in the case of Balkan nationalisms the hatred of others is the dominant feature, while elsewhere the love of one's own nation is the primary element. The second basic difference was mentioned earlier in this paper. In the "west," nationalism developed gradually as the concept of nation broadened, and it became an integral part of representative, parliamentary democracy. In the Balkans this form of democracy is unknown in spite of the parliamentary institutions that were introduced in every state. This is why Tito's decentralization had to fail. This is the reason why Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution also had to fail when, after Tito's death, it was supposed to maintain the viability of Yugoslavia. For a while, the Communist Party was able to keep a semblance of order amid steadily growing difficulties. When Communism began to lose its hold everywhere beginning in 1988 and the old "Balkan type nationalism" took its place, the party leaders also became "nationalists." Using name familiarity and what was left of the party machinery under new names, they had themselves elected presidents of the various republics. Only in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a president, Alija Izetbegović, elected who had not been a Communist.

In the now "democratic" states of Yugoslavia opposition parties made their appearance forcing the various presidents to take gradually more and more extremist positions to show how well they served their people. Slobodan Milošević, still chairman of his renamed party besides being president of Serbia, prevented, in 1991, the assumption of the Federation's rotating presidency by a Croat. It was also in 1990 that Milošević proclaimed that every Serb had the right to live in a Serbian state. He and his followers interpreted this statement to mean that all those areas and regions with a mixed population had to become part of Serbia with the members of the other nations who could or would object forced to leave. This statement by Milošević led to a series of additional statements, actions and confrontations ending in the Declaration of Independence first of Slovenia and Croatia followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina and finally Macedonia. *Četniks*

made their appearance again mostly in the form of Serb officered Yugoslav Army units and the civil war in Croatia and subsequently in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out. What the Serbs tried to achieve was the "ethnic cleansing" of those regions in the other states which they wanted to attach to Serbia. Naturally, they called the resisting Croats *ustaši* thus reviving the memories of the bloody civil war years of 1941-1945. The Serbs and Milošević are not the only villains in Yugoslavia's tragedy. Franjo Tuđman, the ex-partisan general and now President of Croatia, has long been a rabid Croatian nationalist. This is proven not only by the intermittent troubles he faced while Tito was still alive, but also by his writings.<sup>60</sup> He was the only communist who tried to white wash - at least to some extent - the *ustaši* and was ready to falsify the history of World War II to achieve this goal. From the beginning of hostilities, Tuđman voiced his "nation's" claims to large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and discussed the possible partition of this region/state with the Serbs even while fighting them in eastern Slavonia and the Krajina.<sup>61</sup> Given the characteristic features of "Balkan nationalism," the savagery which we are witnessing is really no surprise. Nor should we forget the role of secondary actors. A good example of these is the ex-convict, ex-protégé of Milošević, Vojislav Šešelj. He is an out-and-out fascist, controls one third of the seats in the Serb legislature, and his "tigers" are the most inhumane "fighters" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I doubt that he obeys anybody or that he and his men would honor any agreement even if Milošević would accept it.

What deserves special attention is the newly coined term, "ethnic cleansing." The Serbs finally found a term to describe what the SS *Einsatztruppen* had done in Poland, Belorussia and Ukraine during World War II and what the *ustaši* had done until they were stopped. The behavior of the Serbs during the last four years deserves being listed as equal in its inhumanity with those for whose actions they invented the appropriate label. Over a million people had become refugees by mid-summer of 1992; the number of the dead and wounded cannot yet be established, but it is growing steadily. In one respect the actions of the Serbs differ from those of the Germans in World War II; the Serbs and even the Croats use confessional criteria in determining who has to be cleansed. Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and all other inhabitants of Yugoslavia have lived in the same country since 1918. Disregarding dialectic variants, they speak the same language or simi-

lar languages (with the exception of the Slovenes). Is what is taking place in what used to be Yugoslavia a new form of the Crusades? Do the Serbs of Bosnia fight heretics (Catholics, 17 per cent of the population), or infidels (the 44 per cent Muslims)? Certainly not. Most of the young fighters grew up under communism and few of them became religious zealots.

What we witness is, first of all, Serb nationalism-imperialism aiming to establish Great Serbia with an outlet/coastline of her own on the Adriatic. This required conquests in northern and western Bosnia and in the Krajina region of Croatia. To create secure western borders for this state, especially for Belgrade, Eastern Slavonia and the west bank of the Drina river had to be attached to Serbia. This Great Serbia was planned as a national state "cleansed" of non-Serb elements. How could these be identified when they speak the same language, lived with "Serbs" in these regions for centuries and were fellow "Yugoslaves"? *Nationale Konfession* supplied the answer to this question because it is an easy, obvious, convenient and historical criterion separating Serbs from Croats. Religion becomes simply an identifying ethnic name tag. Let us not forget that the expression used by the Serbs to define their actions was ethnic--not religious--cleansing.

The Croats had been one of the victims of Serb aggression. Yet, as already indicated, they are no better than are those who attacked them when it comes to chauvinism and the application of *Nationale Konfession* which they were first to use in nationalistic excesses during the second World War. When the Serbs shifted their attention to Bosnia-Herzegovina, having achieved their preliminary goals in Croatia, the Croats backed the Muslims hoping to regain what they had lost in their own country in this neighboring state. After it became obvious that this would not be the case and that the Serbs' *Drang nach der Adria* could not be stopped in the Bosnian mountains, the Croats began to cooperate with the Serbs in preparation for Bosnia-Herzegovina's defeat and dismemberment acting in accordance with the same purely nationalist considerations expressed some seventy years earlier by Ante Trumbić.<sup>62</sup> To counteract the Serb push to the sea, the Croats concentrated their conquests and "ethnic" cleansing on regions east of the Dalmatian border with Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this case too, religion served as a criterion of ethnic belonging.

If religion in itself is of no primary value, but is used as a

nationalistic label, a viable claim to territory and a state requires a national identity. The Serbs and Croats have it. The Muslims lacked it. This is why they, who had been glad when their ethnic identity was recognized albeit with a religious label, now began to call themselves Bosnians giving themselves the double self-identifier enjoyed and utilized by their enemies. Why should this be important? When the world media, following local usage, write or speak of the struggle in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they do not refer to the combatants as Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims, but as Croats, Serbs, and Muslims. For many readers this could and did mean that two nations are fighting a religious group in their middle, creating a picture which too often brings terrorists to mind.

It is also of interest to note that the newly independent ex-Yugoslav states differentiate between nationality and religion. The Croatian Constitution does not recognize minority rights, but guarantees the free practice of religion. This could protect the few Muslims living in Croatia. On the other hand, it means that it is all right to be Orthodox as long as this does not lead to Serb demands for national rights. The Slovene Constitution grants minority rights to Italians and Magyars, minuscule in number and Catholics like the Slovenes, but the more numerous, equally Catholic, Croats and Germans are not given the same rights. In each case, it is clearly the national identity and not the religious one that the framers of the constitutions had in mind.

Returning to the civil war of 1992-95 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I doubt, having watched the futile peace process and the continuing atrocities, that anybody is truly in charge of the forces operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This does not exculpate those who are mainly responsible for what is occurring. This is true as much for Milošević as for the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić, or the leader of the "Bosnian Serb Army," General Ratko Mladić, Vojislav Šešelj, or the Croatian "soldiers." As Gale Stokes of Rice University remarked correctly, the present leaders of the various nations fighting in what was Yugoslavia have taught a new generation old hatreds and nobody can rein in the murderous feelings which they set free.<sup>63</sup>

What these men offer most of the time is propaganda often of the most ridiculous kind. For example, Karadžić stated on 14 August 1992 on American television that Serbs were not laying siege to Sarajevo, but simply defending their positions under at-

tack by 50,000 Muslims in that city. The well known Bosnian Serb historian, Milorad Ekmečić, wrote recently that the campaign of Prince Eugen of Savoy that liberated those Hungarian and Slavonian territories still under Ottoman rule and led to the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718 was the result of a conspiracy between the Habsburgs and the Papacy with the aim of preventing the absorption of the Croats by the Serbs.<sup>64</sup> That the present problems would not exist had this and other anti-Serb actions not taken place in the past was an obvious conclusion.

While religion is used only as a convenient label to mask the nationalism of the combatants in Yugoslavia, there is a danger that a truly religious war might be in the offing in the Balkans. On the same day on which Karadžić made his statement, another American network interviewed a wounded Serb. This young man stated that he had no choice, but had to fight to prevent a fundamentalist Muslim takeover of the Balkans. This danger does not exist, but not only the Serbs, but Greeks also mention it repeatedly. Almost all Muslims living in Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, and European Turkey are either Hanafi or Hanbali Sunnis and have nothing to do with any fundamentalism. Yet the fear of Muslim fundamentalism is spreading. I do not know who is responsible for the rumors making the round in Yugoslavia, Greece, and even Bulgaria. The danger is that constant repetition of this "danger" might convince a growing number of people that it really exists.

Not only religious war, but also new instances of "ethnic cleansing" are distinct possibilities in what was once Yugoslavia. Some violence and destruction of property have already occurred in the Vojvodina.<sup>65</sup> If fighting is renewed in Croatia, new displacements of people will occur. What and who will or can prevent the Serb army or Seselj's "tigers" from cleansing Kosovo should they be freed, even if only temporarily, from involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina? In this province too the victims would be Muslims giving the action not only an ethnic, but also a religious coloring. Would the Albanians of Albania and Macedonia simply watch while their coreligionists/conationals are destroyed? I doubt it. If they should move, could Greece remain neutral? If she gets involved could Bulgaria refrain from acting? This is, of course, the worst possible scenario and it is not likely to become reality. A third Balkan War is something Europe cannot afford. Yet, the possibility of this happening cannot be de-

nied.

I will not discuss Bulgaria at length. I only wish to point out that she offers an interesting example of how the weakening of Communism increased the nationalist factor in the equations which were supposed to result in policies designed to keep the people loyal to the regimes. The Zhivkov regime gradually built up its anti-Turkish campaign which finally resulted, in 1984, in the expulsion of some 300,000 Turks. Sofia's action was not the result of a religious policy; rather, it was nationalistic. It would be very difficult for a communist regime to be opposed to only one religion. Furthermore, not all Muslims were attacked. Change of names was, seemingly, more important in escaping persecution than was a change of religion. While the Communist regime disappeared and some Turks returned to Bulgaria, the main target of post-Communist Bulgarian nationalism remains the same. Given the history of Bulgaria and the presence in the country of a large and fairly well-to-do minority, anti-Turkism is an easy and obvious means showing the patriotism of those in power. It is not likely to produce a more serious confrontation with Turkey than was the one of 1984. The major interest of Turkey right now is Central Asia and she will not move in the Balkans unless forced by either anti-Muslim or anti-Turkish moves much stronger than were those up to the end of 1995.

The Turkish issue has a longer and much more complicated history and presence in Greece. While the long Ottoman occupation is always mentioned when the Turkish issue is discussed by Greeks, the present dispute between two NATO members is of more recent origin. At the earliest, it began when, in the Spring of 1921, a Greek force, poorly equipped and badly led, crossed the Aegean Sea hoping to add Ionia to the country's impressive gains in the Balkan Wars. By the fall, the Greeks were in full retreat, and a year later, on 9 September, 1922, the last remnants of their army and much of the population of Izmir (Smyrna) were mercilessly destroyed by Mustafa Kemal's forces. The *Megale* idea was dead and the events that occurred in Izmir rankled. The Turkish-Greek population exchange between 1923 and 1930 involved some 400,000 Turks who were easily absorbed, but in exchange Greece received more than three times that many people who resented being moved, whose life-style was entirely different, who could not be absorbed easily and whose presence was a constant reminder of a humiliating defeat.<sup>66</sup>

The end of World War II and of the colonial regimes all over the world created the issue of Cyprus.<sup>67</sup> Ottoman rule, lasting from 1570 to 1878, saw the migration of Turks to this strategically priceless island. By 1945 Turks made up about 30 per cent of the population. Given the island's importance, this was one colony Great Britain, which had ruled the island since 1878, did not wish to give up. The island is the ideal "aircraft carrier" for any power interested in the Near East and also serves as the best "listening post" for broadcasts and rumors coming from the Arab world and Israel. The Greek majority living on the island was in favor of *enosis*, (unification with Greece) which the Turkish minority feared. It was not until 19 February 1959 that the Zürich-London agreement, signed by Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey, established the Republic of Cyprus. The Greeks were not happy with this solution and neither were the Greek Cypriots. *Enosis* had not been achieved. Archbishop Makarios III, previously a strong advocate of *enosis*, became president of Cyprus and together with his first vice-president, Fazil Küçük, honestly tried to implement the new state's constitution. This became more difficult after Rauf Denktaş took the place of Küçük. During the long years leading to the pact that set up the new republic, a third force, EOKA (The National Organization of Cypriote Fighters) was an active, mainly anti-British, terrorist organization on the island under the leadership of the right leaning Col. Georgios-Digenis Grivas. He temporarily disappeared from the scene after Cyprus became a republic.<sup>68</sup>

This is not the place to go into details on the history of Cyprus from 1960 to 1974. It is enough to note that during these years relations between Greeks and Turks on the island, and consequently also between Greece and Turkey, continued to worsen. The United States and even the Soviet Union got involved in these disputes. On the island three armed forces came into existence: a National Guard of roughly 20,000 men, commanded mainly by officers from Greece; a Turkish Guard of about 15,000 men led by officers who came from Turkey; and EOKA-B established by Grivas before he died in 1973.<sup>69</sup> It did not help that the regime of the colonels, that came to power in Athens on 21 April 1967, formulated its own policies seeking a closer military alliance with Turkey within NATO. Yet the Junta-backed EOKA-B infiltrated the National Guard and, contrary to the Junta's policy, turned this unit into a pro-*enosis* force unacceptable to Turks on

the island and in Turkey. A pro-Makarios, pro-independence, but strongly leftist force was organized by Dr. Vassos Lyssarides. Public law and order disappeared from the island. In an attempt to end this disorder, but even more to save the weakening position of the Junta by acquiring Cyprus, the Junta's last leader, Brig. Gen. Demetrios Ioannides, acted impulsively and unwisely. He was provoked into action by a letter Makarios sent to the puppet President of Greece accusing the Junta of interfering in Cypriot affairs, trying to kill him, committing numerous other crimes, and demanding the withdrawal of all officers of the National Guard. On 8 July Ioannides and the rest of the Junta decided to replace Makarios with a man of their own choice. The rest of the story is well known. The coup set in motion by Ioannides took place on 14-15 July 1974 followed by the landing of Turkish troops six days later.<sup>70</sup> The existence of the Cypriot Turkish Republic established by the victorious Turkish forces has plagued Greek-Turkish relations for nearly 20 years.

Why was it not possible either for NATO or the United States, the supplier of arms to both of her allies, to bring the two countries together and force them into solving their dispute over Cyprus? Why has Greece repeatedly indicated that she fears a Turkish attack, while military observers could not find the slightest indication that an attack was planned? Is Cyprus that important? I may be cynical, but my answer is "no." What makes the Greek-Turkish dispute even more complicated--and a possible rapprochement of Greece and Bulgaria likely--is the discovery of oil in the Aegean Sea during the year of the Cypriot crisis. What definition of territorial waters applies in the Aegean area is not easy to say given the numerous differing answers offered to this question by several states all over the world. None of the possible answers would or could solve this Greek-Turkish problem because of the close proximity of Greek and Turkish territories in the Aegean. The oil deposits and possibly other riches remain unexplored although both, rather poor countries badly need them, and the Balkan's Turkish problem also remains unsolved. The problem is neither religious nor national although past conflicts of both kind are cited by politicians and the media of both countries. It is quite possible that the memories of past controversies help to create the distrust which the two contending parties feel for each other making their negotiations futile to the present, but neither religious zealots nor extreme chauvinists run the

affairs of Greece and Turkey. What, then, has prevented meaningful progress in the relations of the two countries? I am afraid it is something much less prosaic than historically rooted religious and national feelings, it is the fear of loss of face and prestige by those who sit at the negotiating tables. This, of course, is true not only of Greeks and Turks; it is a curse from which the entire world suffers.

I find it almost impossible to evaluate the events that have occurred in Albania since the end of Communist rule. The situation is confused to say the least and the major problems are clearly economic. It is ironic, but it appears to be the fact that Communism succeeded in lessening religious, tribal and linguistic differences in Albania and that, as a result, most inhabitants of this country are--for the first time in their history--Albanians first before they are anything else. To what extent this fact, if indeed it is one, will complicate the solution of the Kosovo problem remains to be seen.<sup>71</sup>

Romanian nationalism is, once again, complicating Romania's relations with Hungary in spite of the fact that after the fall of Ceaușescu the chance of solving the nationalistic antagonisms in Transylvania was greater than it had ever been before. Judging by the scanty information I was able to gather, it is my impression that during the winter of 1990-1991 Transylvanian Romanians and Hungarians were ready to cooperate, but that this chance was lost as a result of the Iliescu-Roman government's actions and directions which aimed to prove their national loyalties. Hungarian propaganda which contrasted the handling of Romanian refugees in Hungary with the manner in which Hungarians were treated in Transylvania only added fuel to the fires. The Transylvanian problem will be with us for some time to come even after the Moldavian/Bessarabian question will be settled one way or another.

All these considerations--the Aegean, Cyprus, Transylvania and Bessarabia--although geographically not in the Balkans only add to the problems of the peninsula itself and keep nationalistic clashes going. Some of these controversies might use religious labels as short hand to identify the various camps facing each-other, but the true conflicts are national everywhere today. There is an additional danger. The continued use of religious labels, supposed religious conspiracies, and religious criteria for "ethnic cleansing" might easily reawaken feelings and hostilities

that "disappeared" with the Ottomans and their *millet* system. If this occurs and further envenoms "Balkan nationalism," the Third Balkan War will become inevitable. Due to the Bosnian "Peace" agreement signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, NATO troops are now stationed in Bosnia. Their presence there gives the inhabitants of this state at least a temporary respite, but by itself it does not solve the problems of Bosnia, of the other ex-Yugoslav states, or of the Balkans in general. The future remains fraught with serious dangers.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Two studies deal with the topic of this essay. Emanuel Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation. Zur Frühgeschichte der serbischen und rumänischen Nationsbildung* (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1976) and Pedro Ramet (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, revised edition, 1989).

<sup>2</sup> Scholars date the establishment of the *millet* system to the year of the conquest of Constantinople when Mehmed II, the Conqueror (b.1432 - ruled 1444-1446 and 1451-1481) appointed Genadius Scholarius patriarch of all Orthodox. A Jewish *haham başı* was appointed by him soon thereafter. Some scholars give 1461 others 1516 as the year when the first Armenian patriarch was named with jurisdiction over all monophysites. These appointments created de facto *millet* systems. It was only during the rule of Selim III (b.1761 - ruled 1789-1807) that the Ottomans began to use this term and to treat their minorities accordingly. For further reading see, among others: Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963); Theodoros Papadapoulos, *Studies and Documents relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination* (n.p., 1952); and László Hadrovics, *Le peuple serbe et son église sous la domination Turque* (Paris: Presse Universitaire, 1947).

<sup>3</sup> While military roads were always kept in good repair, most other Balkan roads were passable only during the summer

months. Merchants and tax collectors regularly visited villages and were, more often than not, the peasantry's only contact with the outside world. Rivers, especially the Danube, carried much freight, but even the inhabitants of riverine villages hardly used them for anything besides fishing. Illiteracy was the norm in rural Rumeli with literate individuals the exception to the rule.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918*, 2 vols. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), Vol. 1, p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Božić, Sima Ćirković, Milorad Ekmečić, *History of Yugoslavia* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), p. 193.

<sup>6</sup> On the chaos in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire see: Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, Vol. 5 of Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold (eds.), *A History of East Central Europe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), pp. 233-247.

<sup>7</sup> On the Serb Congress of 1790 see Gyula Mérei and Károly Vörös, *Magyarország Története, 1790-1848* Vol. 5 in two volumes of Zsigmond Pál Pach (ed.), *Magyarország Története tíz kötetben* [The History of Hungary in ten volumes] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1980), Vol. 5, Part 1, pp. 123-129.

<sup>8</sup> Keith Hitchins, *The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania 1780-1849* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 117.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 118.

<sup>10</sup> Emil Niederhauser, *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe* (Budapest: Corvina, 1981), p. 209.

<sup>11</sup> Petrovich, *Modern Serbia*, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation*, pp. 188-193.

<sup>13</sup> Wayne S. Vucinich, *The First Serbian Uprising, 1804-1813*. Vol. 8 of the *War and Society in East Central Europe* series (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1982).

<sup>14</sup> Cyril Mango, "The Phanariots and the Byzantine Tradition", in Richard Clogg (ed.), *The Struggle for Greek Independence* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1973), p. 51.

<sup>15</sup> Philip Sherrard, "Church, State and the Greek War of Independence," in Clogg (ed.), *The Struggle*, p. 183.

<sup>16</sup> Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 48-49.

<sup>17</sup> E.D. Tappe, "The 1821 Revolution in the Rumanian Principalities" in Clogg (ed.) *The Struggle*, p. 142 quotes from one of Metternich's letters dated 23 February [1821]: "No one believes that the Emperor Alexander and I understand one another thoroughly, and yet it is so..."

<sup>18</sup> Among the works that date the beginning of "modern" Romanian history are: Miron Constantinescu, Constantine Daicoviciu, Ștefan Pascu et al.. *Istoria României* (Bucharest: Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, 1969); Andrei Otețea (chief ed.), *Istoria României*, Vol. 3 (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 1964); Andrei Otețea, *The History of the Romanian People*, trans. from Romanian by Eugenia Farca, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1970); Dinu G. Giurescu, *Illustrated History of the Romanian People* (Bucharest: Editura Sport-Turism, 1981). The best monograph, Dan Berindei, *Revoluția Româna din 1821* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 1991) has a good French summary at the end of the volume.

<sup>19</sup> Giurescu, *Illustrated History*, p. 337.

<sup>20</sup> Constantinescu et al., *Istoria*, p. 271.

<sup>21</sup> The section dealing with Transylvania is based on Keith Hitchins, *Rumanian National Movement*.

<sup>22</sup> Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt, *Nationalismus bei den Serben und Kroaten, 1830-1914* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1980).

<sup>23</sup> See Elinor Murray Despalatovic, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian*

*Movement*, (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1975).

<sup>24</sup> Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 76, quoting Bogoslav Sulek.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

<sup>26</sup> Bechschmitt, *Nationalismus*, p. 54.

<sup>27</sup> Banac, *National Question*, p. 80.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>29</sup> George Barany, "The Age of Royal Absolutism, 1790-1848," in Peter F. Sugar, Peter Hanak, and Tibor Frank (eds.), *A History of Hungary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 201.

<sup>30</sup> Endre Kovács and László Katus, *Magyarország Története, 1848-1890* vol. 6 in two parts of Zsigmond Pál Pach (ed.), *Magyarország Története tíz kötetben* [The History of Hungary in ten volumes] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1979), Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 479-480.

<sup>31</sup> Keith Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality: Andreiu Șaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 79.

<sup>32</sup> E.g., Éva Somogyi, "The Age of Neoabsolutism, 1849-1867," in Sugar, Hanák, Frank, *History of Hungary*.

<sup>33</sup> The paragraphs dealing with the Southern Slavs are based on the already mentioned works of Bechschmitt and Banac.

<sup>34</sup> Keith Hitchins' *Orthodoxy and Nationality* is devoted primarily to the Transylvanian Orthodox Romanian's struggle to gain an independent church of their own. He also deals with other issues of importance to the Romanians. It is the best work available for the years which it covers.

<sup>35</sup> We still lack a History of Romania in English which is not ideologically biased. Giurescu's is better in this respect than is

Oteĵea's. I have, therefore, relied on the dated work of R.W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, chapters 10 and 13 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934) and on Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1958) chapters 18 and 26, but also checked the works cited in n. 18.

<sup>36</sup> Peter F. Sugar, *Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963), p. 6.

<sup>37</sup> Dimitrije Djordjevic, "Die Serben," in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.) *Die Habsburger Monarchie, 1848-1918* vol. 3 in two parts (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), Vol. 3, Part 1, p. 764.

<sup>38</sup> See Robert J. Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1878-1914*, (Boulder, Colo: East European Monographs, 1981).

<sup>39</sup> Ivo Andrić, *The Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia under the Influence of Turkish Rule*. Zelimir B. Juričić and John F. Loud (eds. & trans.), (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 39-57.

<sup>40</sup> This assumption was incorrect. When Dr. Josef Stadler was appointed Archbishop of Sarajevo in 1882, he found the Bosnian Franciscans badly trained in theology and replaced them in the parishes with priests of his choice. This move alienated most of the Bosnian Catholics. See Sugar, *Industrialization*, p. 38.

<sup>41</sup> L. Bowers and G. Bolitho, *Otho I King of Greece: a biography* (London, 1939), 106 quoted by Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, p. 292.

<sup>42</sup> R.J. Crampton, *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 18. We still need a good, detailed English language history of Bulgaria. Besides Crampton's short history the following are useful: Thomas Butler (ed.), *Bulgaria Past and Present, Studies in History, Literature, Economics, Music, Sociology, Folklore & Linguistics* (Columbus: AAASS, 1976); and Nikolai Todorov, Liubomir Dinev, and Liuben Malnishki, *Bulgaria. Historical and Geographic Outline* (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1968).

<sup>43</sup> Thomas A. Meininger, *Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864-1872* (New York: Laymark Editions, 1970).

<sup>44</sup> Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, p. 375.

<sup>45</sup> Cyril E. Black, *The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943).

<sup>46</sup> For the history of Bulgaria up to the end of World War I see: Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History*. (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1983).

<sup>47</sup> The literature dealing with Macedonia is voluminous. It includes numerous "official" publications as, for example: Mihailo Apostolski, Bogo Grafenauer, Ljuben Lape, Aleksandar Stojanovski, Jorjo Tadić, *La Macédonie et les macédoniens dans le passé* (Skopje: Institute de l'Histoire Nationale, 1970), a bilingual collection of essays presenting the Yugoslav-Macedonian side of the argument. Voin Bozhinov and I. Panaiotov (eds.), *Macedonia: Documents and Materials* (Sofia: Institute of History, 1978) presented the Bulgarian argument in a very sophisticated form. Of the numerous monographs published, I prefer Fikret Adanir, *Die Makedonische Frage: Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908*. Vol. 20 of *Frankfurter Historische Abhandlungen* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979). A good fairly recent publication is Duncan M. Perry, *The Politics of Terror: the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement, 1893-1903* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988). Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966) has become a highly regarded work on the subject. The most recent work is Hugh Poulton, *Who are the Macedonians?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

<sup>48</sup> In writing this short summary of Albanian activities I relied on Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, pp. 502-506 and on Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. 2: *Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 84-89.

<sup>49</sup> Emile Haumant, *La Formation de la Yougoslavie* (Paris: Bossard, 1930), pp. 682-683.

<sup>50</sup> See among others: Michael Boro Petrovich, "Russia's Role in the Creation of the Yugoslav State, 1914-1918," in Dimitrije Djordjevic, *The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1914-1918* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1980), p. 74; Dedijer et al., *History*, p. 482; and Ivo J. Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study in Frontiermaking* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 4.

<sup>51</sup> Banac, *National Question*, p. 132.

<sup>52</sup> Petrovich, *Modern Serbia*, p. 647.

<sup>53</sup> Alex N. Dragnich, *Serbia, Nikola Pašić and Yugoslavia* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974), p. 120.

<sup>54</sup> Janko Pleterski, "Die Slowenen" in Wandruszaka and Urbanitsch, *Monarchie*, Vol. 3, Part 2, p. 836; and Banac, *National Question*, p. 125.

<sup>55</sup> I know of no English version of the Korfu Agreement. For the Serbo-Croatian text see: Ferdo Šišić, *Dokumenti o Postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1920), pp. 96-100.

<sup>56</sup> Banac, *National Question*, p. 402.

<sup>57</sup> Dimitrije Djordjević, "Fascism in Yugoslavia, 1918-1941," and Ivan Avakumović, "Yugoslavia's Fascist Movements," in Peter F. Sugar (ed.), *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918-1945* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1971), pp. 125-134 and 135-143.

<sup>58</sup> Barbara Jelavich, *Twentieth Century*, p. 203.

<sup>59</sup> For a good short summary of Yugoslavia in World War II see: Jozo Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia during the Second World War," in Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), *Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 59-118.

<sup>60</sup> For Tudjman's ideas see: *Bespucá povijesne zbiljnosti* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1989) (Deadlocks in Historical Reality) and *Nationalism in Contemporary Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: East European

Monographs, 1981).

<sup>61</sup> *Financial Times* (London), 10 August 1991, p. 22, and 16 January 1992, p. 2.

<sup>62</sup> See p. 40 above.

<sup>63</sup> Under old hatred Stokes understood the feelings generated during the inter-war years by Belgrade's high-handed dealing with the non-Serb people and those resulting from the horrors of World War II. Stokes' comments were made during a roundtable discussion on 15 December 1993, entitled "The Former Yugoslav Republics," at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

<sup>64</sup> Milorad Ekmečić, "Budućnost Jugoslavije," (The Future of Yugoslavia), *NIN*, November 16, 1990, pp. 55-59. I am grateful to Professor Ivo Banac for bringing this article to my attention.

<sup>65</sup> See the article and photographs on the "Vojvodina" in *Hungarian Observer*, Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1993), pp. 2-5.

<sup>66</sup> On the population exchange see: V.M. Boulter, "The Exchange of Population between Greece and Turkey," in C.A. Macartney (ed.), *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, Vol. 2 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1925) Vol. 2, pp. 257-266; Idem, "The Settlement of Refugees in Greece, 1923-6," *Ibid.* Vol. 2, pp. 272-279 and Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece* (Paris: Mouton, 1962).

<sup>67</sup> The two histories of Cyprus which I prefer are: Costas P. Kyrris, *History of Cyprus with an Introduction to the Geography of Cyprus* (Nicosia: Nicocles, 1985) and Stavros Panteli, *A New History of Cyprus from the earliest Times to the Present Day* (London: East-West Pub., 1984).

<sup>68</sup> On Archbishop Makarios see Stanley Mayes, *Cyprus and Makarios* (London: Putnam, 1960) and by the same author, *Makarios: A Biography* (London: Macmillan, 1981). On Grivas see Wilfred Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story of EOKA* (London: R. Hale, 1959).

<sup>69</sup> These figures are given in Taki Theodoracopulos, *The Greek Upheaval: Kings, Demagogues and Bayonets* (London: Stacey International, 1976), p. 24.

<sup>70</sup> On the events of July, 1974 see Theodoracopulos, *Greek Upheaval*, pp. 35-90; Mayes, *A Biography*, pp. 242-252; Zenon Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood* (Wakefield: the author, 1975), pp. 85-91; Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern* (New York: P. Lang, 1985), pp. 103-115 and many others. On a Turkish view of the conflict see: Rauf R. Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982) and Sabahattin Ismail, *20 July Peace Operation: Reasons-Development and Consequences* (Istanbul: Kasta, 1989).

<sup>71</sup> The problems of present day Albania are discussed in Francis Trix, "The Resurfacing of Islam in Albania," in *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1994) and Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995).

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