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Document: [redacted] Subject: [redacted] AS083-0496079
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TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR [redacted]

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1. RECOMMEND AGAINST DISSEM OF REF. IF HQS DOES NOT AGREE, SUGGEST FOLLOWING COMMENT.

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WE CONSIDER THIS TO BE AN OVERLY PESSIMISTIC AND INACCURATE ASSESSMENT. IT PROBABLY WAS INFLUENCED BY THE FACT THAT THE

[redacted] MILITARY OFFICER VISITED SAN SALVADOR AT A LOW POINT FOR THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES. AT THE TIME, THE HIGH COMMAND WAS REACTING TO AN EMBARRASSING MILITARY REVERSE IN USULUTAN DEPARTMENT, FROM WHICH THEY HAVE RECOVERED, AS WELL AS INTENSIFIED OPPOSITION WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS AGAINST THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE. IN OUR VIEW, THE REPORT GROSSLY EXAGGERATES THE EXTENT TO WHICH "MERCENARIES" ARE REPORTED TO BE PARTICIPATING WITH THE INSURGENTS. . . . IT APPEARS

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THAT [redacted] IS NOT WELL INFORMED ON THE SALVADORAN MILITARY-POLITICO SITUATION OR THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

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REQUESTED. WHILE OPPOSITION TO GARCIA CONTINUES TO ADVERSELY AFFECT THE UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES, OCHOA PEREZ HAS DEPARTED ON 10 FEBRUARY FOR THE U.S. AS SCHEDULED.

3. SUGGEST SUBJECT LINE READ "[redacted] ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR".

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4. NO FILE. [redacted]

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