

#NotAllWhites:
Liberal-leaning Whites Racially Disidentify in Response to Trump-Related Group-Image Threat

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Abstract

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Liberal-leaning Whites Racially Disidentify in Response to Trump-Related Group-Image Threat

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Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election, in large part, due to support from White Americans. This win created a new socio-political reality in which White Americans as a group became associated with Trump and his anti-egalitarianism. Four studies ($N=3245$) explored how liberal-leaning Whites negotiate their racial identity to contend with group-image threat arising from the association between their racial ingroup and Trump. Trump-related group-image threat (i.e., Whites' agreement with Trump's anti-egalitarianism or disapproval of his impeachment) led liberal-leaning Whites to disidentify from their racial ingroup. In turn, racial disidentification predicted greater signaling of egalitarian beliefs (i.e., expressing intentions to advocate for racial equity and supporting policies designed to benefit racially minoritized groups) and behaviors (i.e., donating money to racial equity-focused organizations). These results suggest that the

process of negotiating Trump-related group-image threat has implications for both White Americans' racial identities and ongoing efforts to achieve racial equity.

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Liberal-leaning Whites Racially Disidentify in Response to Trump-Related Group-Image Threat

While politics are notoriously divisive, the 2016 U.S. presidential election exposed deep political and cultural divisions (Jacobson, 2016). Then-candidate Donald Trump derogated and proposed policies targeting marginalized groups (e.g., Muslims, Latin@s, immigrants, women; Conway et al., 2017). Despite public backlash, Trump won the election, in large part, due to support from White Americans. Exit polls revealed that the majority of White Americans (54%) voted for Trump and that they comprised 88% of his voter base (Pew, 2018a). This outcome created a new socio-political reality in which White Americans, as a group, became associated with Trump and his anti-egalitarianism. We theorize that this new reality creates psychological tension for liberal-leaning Whites by linking their racial group to anti-egalitarianism, which is personally offensive (Kiley, 2017). Drawing on group-image threat research, we explore how liberal-leaning Whites contend with this tension by shifting racial identification and signaling egalitarian beliefs.

Group-image threat arises from negative societal portrayals of one's ingroup (Iyer et al., 2007; Knowles et al., 2014; Rabinovich & Morton, 2010), including stereotypes (Barrie et al., 2016; Ward, 2004), negative group evaluations (Rabinovich et al., 2010; 2014), and information about ingroup transgressions (Doosje et al., 1998; Shuman et al., 2018). Negative portrayals harm both the group's collective image and individual members' self-image. When ingroup portrayals conflict with one's self-image, individuals must contend with the resulting psychological tension (i.e., group-image threat) in order to maintain a positive self-view (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003).

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One way individuals respond to this tension is by *disidentifying*, or creating distance between their self-concept and negative ingroup portrayals (Beck & Tausch, 2014; Branscombe et al., 2012; Hodson & Esses, 2002). For example, women and racial minorities disidentify from their social groups in response to negative stereotypical representations (Arndt et al., 2002; Mussweiler et al., 2000; Yip, 2016). White Americans also disidentify from their racial ingroup when confronted with negative ingroup portrayals involving White privilege (Chow et al., 2008; Knowles et al., 2014; Powell et al., 2005). For instance, upon learning that Black-White achievement gaps arise from systemic biases favoring White people, White participants report weaker racial identification (Chow et al., 2008).

In the current socio-political reality, we theorize that liberal-leaning Whites experience group-image threat arising from the association between their racial ingroup and Trump. Across four studies, we examine whether Trump-related group-image threat leads liberal-leaning (vs. conservative-leaning) Whites to racially disidentify. Moreover, we examine whether disidentification has positive implications for liberal-leaning Whites' efforts to promote racial equity (Studies 3 and 4) such that racial disidentification leads liberal-leaning Whites to signal and act upon their egalitarian beliefs.

Study 1

Study 1 examined the effect of Trump-related group-image threat on liberal-leaning White Americans' racial disidentification. We manipulated group-image threat by providing information that White Americans agree (vs. disagree) with Trump's anti-egalitarianism. We hypothesized that information suggesting White Americans agree (vs. disagree) with Trump would increase liberal-leaning Whites' racial disidentification.

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Method

Participants

We recruited 509 non-Hispanic, U.S. born, mono-racial White adults from Amazon's Mechanical Turk to participate in a 30-minute online survey in exchange for \$1.50. In this and all subsequent studies, we excluded participants who failed to correctly respond to *both* manipulation check questions, as specified during pre-registration. Participants who chose "I am not sure" or "I do not remember" to either manipulation check were also excluded (see the *Measures* section for details). Results and interpretations of all studies remain unchanged when analyses include these participants (see *Full Sample Primary Analysis Results* at https://osf.io/f6gh3/?view_only=87de617d72d0423592aab5fc90bb9f94; assess all henceforth mentioned supplements at the *Supplementary Materials* folder via this link). In Study 1, we excluded 31 participants, leaving a final sample of 478 (57% women; $M_{\text{age}}=37.08$ years; 46% had not obtained a 4-year college degree). A sensitivity analysis indicated that this sample size allowed us to detect small effects ($f^2 \geq .027$) with 80% power (Faul et al., 2009).

Procedure

Participants first completed a measure of political ideology and then were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: no information control, *Whites Support Trump*, and *Whites Oppose Trump*. Participants in the control condition proceeded straight to the measures, while participants in the *Whites Support Trump* and *Whites Oppose Trump* conditions first viewed results from an ostensible survey describing White Americans' agreement with five different anti-egalitarian beliefs Trump has expressed about people of color and immigrants (see Figure 1; see *Manipulation Materials* at OSF for full manipulation materials).

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
The *Whites Support Trump* condition was intended to amplify group-image threat for liberal-leaning Whites by depicting White Americans as agreeing with Trump's anti-egalitarianism:

Last month, a nonpartisan think tank conducted a survey with a nationally representative sample of 12,000 White adults (age 18-82) to assess the extent to which they agreed with President Trump's beliefs about different social groups and issues. Overall, the survey revealed that the majority of White adults agreed with President Trump's opinions and beliefs. This was especially true with respect to issues related to immigration and race. This condition then included pie charts of survey results indicating that 60-70% of White respondents agreed with five anti-egalitarian Trump views (see Figure 1).

The *Whites Oppose Trump* condition suggested that most White Americans disagreed with Trump's views. Participants viewed the same survey description as in the Whites support Trump condition. However, the description stated that "Overall, the survey revealed that the majority of White adults disagreed with President Trump's opinions and beliefs." In the corresponding pie charts, we reversed the percentages depicted in the *Whites Support Trump* condition to indicate that only 30-40% of White respondents agreed with Trump's anti-egalitarianism (see Figure 1). This range of agreement reflected Trump's approval rating at the time of Study 1, which fluctuated between 30% and 40% (FiveThirtyEight, n.d.).

After reading the survey results, all participants completed a measure of racial disidentification, followed by manipulation checks and demographic questions.

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Figure 1*Example pie chart in manipulation materials (Studies 1-3)*

Note. Panel A was presented to participants in the *Whites Support Trump* condition; Panel B was presented to participants in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition.

Measures

Political Ideology. One item assessed the extent to which participants' beliefs leaned liberal versus conservative: "When you think about your political beliefs, how would you describe yourself in general?" (1-*extremely conservative* to 8-*extremely liberal*). Overall, the sample leaned liberal ($M=4.96$; $SD=2.13$; $95\% CI=[4.77, 5.16]$; see Table 1 for the distribution of political ideology in all studies).

Table 1*Distribution of political ideology in Study 1, 2, 3, and 4 samples*

Political ideology	Study 1 (%)	Study 2 (%)	Study 3 (%)	Study 4 (%)
Extremely conservative	5.6	5.6	4.7	5.6

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Conservative	12.1	16.9	13.9	15.4
Somewhat conservative	7.5	8.5	9.1	6.5
Slightly conservative	16.3	12.4	14.6	12.8
Slightly liberal	18.2	12.4	16.1	15.0
Somewhat liberal	7.7	9.6	10.1	7.3
Liberal	18.2	21.5	18.5	21.0
Extremely liberal	14.2	13.1	13.0	13.4

Racial Disidentification. We assessed racial disidentification using nine items adapted from Becker and Tausch’s Three-component Measure of Disidentification (2014) to explicitly refer to White Americans (e.g., “Being a White American gives me a bad feeling”; 1-*Strongly disagree* to 7-*Strongly agree*). Items were presented in random order. We averaged across all items such that higher scores indicated increased White disidentification ($\alpha=.94$; $M=3.38$; $SD=1.47$; $95\% CI=[3.25, 3.51]$).¹

Manipulation Checks.

Exclusion Criteria. Two questions assessed whether participants correctly interpreted the survey results. Both questions were multiple-choice and included options stating “I am not sure” and “I do not remember.” One question asked “Which racial group did the survey respondents belong to?” The correct response in both conditions was “White American.” The second question asked participants to select one of two statements that best described the survey results. The correct response was “The majority of respondents agreed with Trump's perspectives on race and immigration issues” in the *Whites Support Trump* condition, and “The majority of respondents

¹ We pre-registered thirteen items (9-items MOD; 4-items White Identity Scale; Anderychik & Gill, 2009). However, an EFA revealed two factors. Because our hypotheses focused on disidentification, we removed WIS from the composite.

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disagreed with Trump's perspectives on race and immigration issues” in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition. Questions were presented in fix order.

Perceived Credibility of Manipulation. To ensure that participants believed the manipulation materials, we included two items assessing the extent to which participants found the manipulation credible (“The survey results are similar to what I have heard from other media sources” and “I believe that the survey results are accurate”; 1-*Strongly disagree* to 7-*Strongly agree*; $r=0.76, p<.001$). Items were presented in random order. We averaged across these items such that higher scores indicate higher perceived credibility. Participants were not excluded based on their responses to these two items.

See Table 2 for bivariate relationships between all variables.

Table 2

Bivariate relationship between Studies 1-4 variables

Variable	Study 1				
	1	2	3		
1. Political ideology	—				
2. Racial disidentification	.41***	—			
3. Perceived credibility of manipulation	-.04	.14*	—		
Variable	Study 2				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Political ideology	—				
2. Racial disidentification	.56***	—			
3. Perceived credibility of manipulation	.06	-.05	—		

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4. Trump's perceived representativeness	-.55***	-.26** *	.05	—			
5. Liberal identification	.80***	.40***	.17***	-.48***	—		
Study 3							
Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Political ideology	—						
2. Racial disidentification	.53***	—					
3. Perceived credibility of manipulation	-.02	-.07	—				
4. Trump's perceived representativeness	-.59***	-.31***	.07	—			
5. Closed-ended intentions to advocate for racial equity	.49***	.38***	.05	-.35***	—		
6. Open-ended intentions to advocate for racial equity	.43***	.50***	-.001	-.23***	.42***	—	
7. Policy support	.65***	.53***	.05	-.46***	.64***	.50***	—
Study 4							
Variable	1	2	3	4			
1. Political ideology	—						
2. Racial disidentification	.39***	—					
3. Perceived credibility of manipulation	.03	-.01	—				
4. Amount of monetary donation	.11**	.23***	.11**	—			

Note. Study 1 $N=478$; Study 2 $N=1005$; Study 3 $N=849$; Study 4 $N=914$, high threat $n=283$, actual threat $n=265$, control $n=301$. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$.

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Analytic Strategy

Across all studies, our primary question of interest was whether liberal-leaning Whites racially disidentify as a result of Trump-related group-image threat. To test this question, we conducted linear regression analyses predicting racial disidentification from political ideology, condition, and their interaction. In all models, we mean-centered political ideology and dummy coded condition, such that the *Whites Support Trump* condition (i.e., group-image threat for liberal-leaning Whites) served as the reference category (for comparisons between the *Whites Oppose Trump* and *Control* condition, see *Regression Results with Whites Oppose Trump Condition as Reference Category* at OSF). We also conducted simple effects analyses by probing significant interactions at 1SD above (i.e., relatively liberal participants) and 1SD below (i.e., relatively conservative participants) the mean of political orientation.

In the case of non-significant simple effects, we conducted equivalence tests to examine whether these effects were practically equivalent to zero. We considered standardized $\beta \leq |.06|$ as practically equivalent to zero, as research suggests that this value is 1SD below the mean effect size reported in published psychological research (Richard et al., 2003). Following the recommendations of Lakens and colleagues (2018), we conducted TOST (two one-sided tests) examining the hypothesis that the simple effects were greater than $|.06|$ (i.e., $H_0: \beta \leq -.06$ or $\beta \geq .06$; Campbell, 2020; Lakens, 2017; Lakens et al., 2018), or in other words, large enough to be considered meaningful. If both one-tailed tests were significant ($p < .05$), we would conclude that the effect was practically equivalent to zero (i.e., that the true effect is less than $|.06|$; Campbell, 2020; Lakens et al., 2018). If one or both of the one-tailed tests were non-significant, then the interpretation of the simple slope would be undetermined (i.e., the effect was not

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statistically different from 0, yet there was no evidence that the effect was practically equivalent to 0; Lakens, 2017).

In subsequent studies we expand upon this simple moderation approach to investigate an alternative explanation for racial disidentification (Study 2) and to investigate downstream consequences of racial disidentification (Studies 3 & 4). All regression analyses were conducted in SPSS version 25 using the PROCESS macro with 5,000 bootstrap resamples (Hayes, 2013). Equivalence tests were conducted in R (code developed by Campbell, 2020).

Results

Perceived Credibility of Manipulation

Overall, participants perceived the information presented in the manipulation as credible. On average, participants' responses ($M=4.34$, $SD=1.66$, $95\% CI=[4.19, 4.49]$) were significantly above the scale midpoint (4=*Neither agree nor disagree*; i.e., finding the manipulation neither accurate nor inaccurate), $t(320)=3.69$, $d=.21$, $p<.001$. Notably, participants in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition ($M=4.52$, $SD=1.58$, $95\% CI=[4.28, 4.76]$) viewed the manipulation as more credible than participants in the *Whites Support Trump* condition ($M=4.16$, $SD=1.72$, $95\% CI = [3.89, 4.43]$), $t(319)=1.96$, $d=.22$, $p=.051$. In this and all subsequent studies, the results and interpretations of our primary analyses remained unchanged when perceived credibility was included as a covariate. For results of models adjusted for the covariate, see *Perceived Credibility as Covariate* at OSF.

Does Group-image Threat Increase Racial Disidentification Among Liberal-leaning Whites?

We hypothesized that liberal-leaning Whites racially disidentify when exposed to information suggesting that the majority of White Americans agree with Trump's anti-

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
egalitarianism (*Whites Support Trump* condition), compared to when exposed to no information or when exposed to information that the majority of White Americans disagree with Trump's anti-egalitarianism (*Whites Oppose Trump* condition). To assess this question, we ran multiple regression analyses according to our analytic strategy. As hypothesized, we found significant two-way interactions between political ideology and condition (see Table 3 for model results).

Supporting our hypothesis, relatively liberal participants (1SD above the mean) in the *Whites Support Trump* condition racially disidentified more than those in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition and in the *Control* condition. In contrast, relatively conservative participants (1SD below the mean) did not differentially racially disidentify across conditions (all $ps > .05$; see Figure 2 & Table 4 for simple effects & Table 5 for equivalence test results). Thus, exposure to information that the majority of White Americans agree with Trump's anti-egalitarianism increased racial disidentification among relatively liberal participants. These results support our hypothesis that liberal-leaning Whites racially disidentify as a result of Trump-related group-image threat.

Figure 2

The relationship between political ideology and racial disidentification across all studies (Panel A: Study 1; Panel B: Study 2, Panel C: Study 3, Panel D: Study 4)

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Note. The horizontal dashed lines refer to $\pm 1SD$ from the mean of political ideology in each study. Around each slope, 95% confidence bands are depicted. * denotes a statistically significant slope, $p < .001$.

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Table 3

Studies 1-4 results of models predicting racial disidentification with Whites Support Trump condition as the reference category

Variable	<i>B (SE)</i>	Study 1				Study 2				
		β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i> β	<i>B (SE)</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i> β
Intercept	3.58 (.11)	.14	1.91	.057	[-.004, .28]	3.85 (.05)	.37	11.18	<.001	[.30, .43]
Political ideology	.40 (.05)	.57	8.15	<.001	[.44, .71]	.51 (.02)	.79	23.94	<.001	[.73, .86]
W1 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump</i>)	-.24 (.15)	-.16	1.60	.110	[-.36, .04]	-1.02 (.07)	-.71	15.52	<.001	[-.79, -.62]
W2 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Control</i>)	-.40 (.15)	-.27	2.64	.008	[-.47, -.07]	—	—	—	—	—
Political ideology * W1	-.15 (.07)	-.22	2.16	.002	[-.50, -.11]	-.29 (.03)	-.45	9.89	<.001	[-.54, -.36]
Political ideology * W2	-.21 (.07)	-.30	3.06	.031	[-.43, -.02]	—	—	—	—	—
Variable	<i>B (SE)</i>	Study 3				Study 4				
		β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i> β	<i>B (SE)</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i> β
Intercept	3.37 (.06)	.16	3.14	.002	[.06, .25]	3.39 (.07)	.15	2.93	.004	[.05, .25]
Political ideology	.39 (.03)	.64	13.17	<.001	[.54, .73]	.32 (.03)	.56	10.86	<.001	[.46, .66]

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W1 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump</i>)	-0.30 (.09)	-.23	3.27	.001	[-.37, -.09]	-0.25 (.09)	-.20	2.66	.008	[-.34, -.05]
W2 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Control</i>)	-0.32 (.09)	-.24	3.51	<.001	[-.38, -.11]	-0.31 (.09)	-.25	3.44	<.001	[-.39, -.11]
Political ideology * W1	-.15 (.04)	-.24	3.41	<.001	[-.38, -.10]	-.20 (.04)	-.35	4.78	<.001	[-.49, -.21]
Political ideology * W2	-.07 (.04)	-.11	1.56	.120	[-.24, .03]	-.08 (.04)	-.15	1.99	.046	[-.29, -.002]

Note. Study 1 $df=471$; Study 2 $df=1001$; Study 3 $df=842$; Study 4 $df=907$.

Table 4

Studies 1-4 racial disidentification simple effects analyses probing the significant interactions at ± 1 standard deviation from the mean of political ideology (relatively conservative vs. relatively liberal)

Variable	<i>B (SE)</i>	Study 1				Study 2				
		β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% CI_{β}	<i>B (SE)</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% CI_{β}
<i>Simple effects of Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump condition</i>										
Relatively conservative (1SD below the mean)	.21 (.21)	.14	.97	.331	[-.14, .42]	-.37 (.09)	-.26	3.97	<.001	[.73, .86]
Relatively liberal (1SD above the mean)	-.68 (.21)	-.46	3.35	<.001	[-.74, -.19]	-1.68 (.09)	-1.16	17.97	<.001	[-1.28, -1.03]

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Simple effects of Whites Support Trump vs. Control condition

Relatively conservative (1SD below the mean)	-.07 (.21)	-.05	.31	.755	[-.33, .24]	—	—	—	—	—
Relatively liberal (1SD above the mean)	-.73 (.22)	-.49	3.38	<.001	[-.78, -.21]	—	—	—	—	—

Variable	<i>B (SE)</i>	Study 3				Study 4				
		β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i> β	<i>B (SE)</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i> β
<i>Simple effects of Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump condition</i>										
Relatively conservative (1SD below the mean)	.01 (.13)	.01	.07	.947	[-.19, .20]	.19 (.13)	.15	1.49	.136	[-.05, .35]
Relatively liberal (1SD above the mean)	-.62 (.13)	-.48	4.70	<.001	[-.67, -.28]	-.69 (.13)	-.55	5.17	<.001	[-.76, -.34]
<i>Simple effects of Whites Support Trump vs. Control condition</i>										
Relatively conservative (1SD below the mean)	-.18 (.13)	-.14	1.37	.171	[-.33, .06]	-.13 (.13)	-.10	1.01	.313	[-.31, .10]
Relatively liberal (1SD above the mean)	-.46 (.13)	-.35	3.61	<.001	[-.54, -.16]	-.50 (.13)	-.40	3.86	.001	[-.60, -.19]

Note. Study 1 *df*=471; Study 2 *df*=1001; Study 3 *df*=842; Study 4 *df*=907.

Table 5

Equivalence test results for non-significant simple effects.

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Political Ideology	Study 1			Study 3			Study 4		
	NHST	Equivalence test	Conclusion	NHST	Equivalence test	Conclusion	NHST	Equivalence test	Conclusion
<i>Simple effects of Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump condition</i>									
Relatively conservative (1SD below the mean)	$\beta=.14$, $p=.331$	$t=-2.65$, $p=.933$, ncp=-1.14	Undetermined	$\beta=.01$, $p=.947$	$t=-.18$, $p=.069$, ncp=-1.67	Undetermined	$\beta=.15$, $p=.136$	$t=-3.93$, $p=.991$, ncp=-1.54	Undetermined
<i>Simple effects of Whites Support Trump vs. Control condition</i>									
Relatively conservative (1SD below the mean)	$\beta=-.05$, $p=.755$	$t=-.89$, $p=.383$, ncp=-1.19	Undetermined	—	—	—	$\beta=-.10$, $p=.313$	$t=-2.65$, $p=.869$, ncp=-1.53	Undetermined
<i>Simple effects of Whites Oppose Trump vs. Control condition</i>									
Relatively liberal (1SD above the mean)	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\beta=.15$, $p=.143$	$t=-3.92$, $p=.990$, ncp=-1.56	Undetermined

Note. NHST=null hypothesis significance test; ncp=non-central parameter. All equivalence tests

are one-sided and used non-central t-distributions. Following Lakens, Scheel and Isager's

recommendation (2018), we reported the one-sided equivalence test yielding the higher p value.

NHST (null hypothesis significance test) results are the same as results from Table 4. There is no

equivalence test conducted for Study 2 because all simple effects are significant.

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Discussion

As hypothesized, Study 1 demonstrated that group-image threat (i.e., the majority of White Americans *support* Trump's anti-egalitarianism) increased racial disidentification among liberal-leaning Whites. An alternative explanation for these results is that knowing that one's racial group supports a president whose beliefs differ from one's own heightens the salience of liberal-leaning Whites' political (vs. racial) identity, which in turn leads liberal-leaning Whites to racially disidentify.

Another limitation of Study 1 is that while liberal-leaning Whites disidentified more in the *Whites Support* (vs. *Oppose*) *Trump* condition, they also found the *Whites Support* (vs. *Oppose*) *Trump* manipulation less credible. We address this issue in Study 2 by measuring the extent to which participants perceived Trump as representative of White Americans. If participants in the *Whites Support* (vs. *Oppose*) *Trump* condition view Trump as more representative, this would suggest the group-image threat manipulation was effective.

Study 2

Study 2 was pre-registered and replicated Study 1 and addressed the two issues noted above. Specifically, we examined whether racial disidentification resulted from increased liberal identification following group-image threat or as a direct response to group-image threat and whether participants in the *Whites Support* (vs. *Oppose*) *Trump* condition viewed Trump as more representative of White Americans.

Method

Participants

We recruited 1,069 non-Hispanic, U.S. born, mono-racial White adults from Amazon's Mechanical Turk to participate in a 30-minute online survey in exchange for \$1.50. Using the

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same exclusion criteria as in Study 1, we excluded 64 participants, giving a final sample of 1,005 participants (51% women; $M_{age}=37.73$ years; 43.5% had not obtained a 4-year college degree). A sensitivity analysis indicated that this sample size allowed us to detect small effects ($f^2 \geq .011$) with 80% power (Faul et al., 2009).

Procedures

Study 2 used the same procedure and manipulation materials as Study 1 with three exceptions: 1) Study 2 did not include a control condition; 2) we added a measure of liberal identification, and 3) prior to the perceived credibility manipulation checks, participants completed a measure assessing the extent to which they believed Trump's views represented Whites as a group. We counterbalanced liberal identification and racial disidentification measures and found no reliable order effects, all $ps > .720$.

Measures

Study 2 included the same measures of political ideology ($M=4.90$; $SD=2.24$; 95% $CI=[4.76, 5.03]$), racial disidentification ($\alpha=.94$; $M=3.32$; $SD=1.45$; 95% $CI=[3.23, 3.41]$), and perceived credibility of manipulation as Study 1, along with two additional measures.

Liberal Identification. We adapted a four-item scale from Andreychik and Gill (2009) to assess liberal group identification (e.g., "Being a liberal American is an important reflection of who I am"; 1-*Strongly disagree* to 7-*Strongly agree*). Items were presented in random order. We averaged across all items such that higher values indicated increased liberal identification ($\alpha=.97$; $M=3.54$; $SD=1.88$; 95% $CI=[3.43, 3.66]$).²

² We pre-registered thirteen-items from Study 1 adapted to liberal identification. Because our hypothesis concerned liberal identification, we used the adapted four-item WIS.

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Trump’s Perceived Representativeness. To ensure that our manipulation materials shaped participants’ perception of the association between White Americans and Trump, we included an additional three-item manipulation check assessing the extent to which participants believed Trump’s views represented White Americans (e.g., “I think that President Trump’s values reflect the values of most White Americans”; 1-*Strongly disagree* to 7-*Strongly agree*). Items were presented in random order. We averaged across all items such that higher scores indicated greater perceived representativeness ($\alpha=.88$; $M=3.31$; $SD=1.73$; $95\% CI=[3.20, 3.41]$).

See Table 2 for bivariate relationships between all variables.

Results

Manipulation Checks

Perceived Credibility of Manipulation. Overall, ratings of manipulation credibility ($M=4.00$, $SD=1.55$, $95\% CI=[3.91, 4.10]$) did not significantly differ from the scale midpoint (4), $t(1004)=.07$, $d=.02$, $p=.945$, suggesting participants found the information neither high nor low in credibility. Similar to Study 1, participants in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition ($M=4.10$, $SD=1.52$, $95\% CI=[3.97, 4.23]$) found the manipulation to be more credible than those in the *Whites Support Trump* condition ($M=3.90$, $SD=1.57$, $95\% CI=[3.76, 4.04]$), $t(1003)=2.02$, $d=.12$, $p=.044$.

Trump’s Perceived Representativeness. Despite the relatively low credibility ratings, the manipulation successfully altered the extent to which participants perceived Trump as representative of White Americans. As expected, participants in the *Whites Support Trump* condition ($M=3.53$, $SD=1.74$, $95\% CI=[3.38, 3.69]$) perceived Trump as significantly more representative of White Americans than those in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition ($M=3.10$, $SD=1.69$, $95\% CI=[2.95, 3.24]$), $t(1003)=4.05$, $d=.26$, $p<.001$.

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Does Group-image Threat Increase Racial Disidentification Among Liberal-leaning Whites?

Following the analytic strategy outlined in Study 1, as predicted, there was a significant two-way interaction between political ideology and condition (see Table 3 for model results). Supporting our hypothesis, relatively liberal participants (1SD above the mean) in the *Whites Support Trump* condition disidentified from their racial ingroup more than relatively liberal participants in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition. Unexpectedly, relatively conservative participants (1SD below the mean) in the *Whites Support Trump* condition also disidentified from their racial ingroup more than relatively conservative participants in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition. However, the magnitude of the effect of condition on racial disidentification for relatively liberal participants was significantly larger than the effect for relatively conservative participants (as evidenced by the significant omnibus interaction results; see Table 4 & Figure 2). Thus, in line with our hypotheses, and consistent with Study 1, exposure to information that the majority of White Americans agree (vs. disagree) with Trump's anti-egalitarianism increased racial disidentification among relatively liberal participants more so than relatively conservative participants. These results support our hypothesis that liberal-leaning Whites racially disidentify as a result of Trump-related group-image threat.

Does Group-image Threat Increase Racial Disidentification Among Liberal-leaning Whites Because It Increases Liberal Identification (i.e., An Alternative Explanation)?

We next assessed the viability of an alternative explanation that racial disidentification in response to Trump-related group-image threat stems from greater liberal identification (see Figure 3 for the conceptual model). Using Model 7 in the PROCESS macro, we tested a moderated mediation model examining whether liberal identification mediated the effect of


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political ideology on racial disidentification. We specified condition as a moderator of the relation between political ideology and liberal identification (i.e., the a path).

Figure 3

Conceptual representation of the moderated mediation model testing the alternative explanation.

The conditional indirect effect of political ideology on racial disidentification through liberal identification, moderated by condition (Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump).



Preliminary analyses suggested that this model involved mild, but not severe, multicollinearity, as political ideology and liberal identification were highly correlated ($r=.80$, $p<.001$). However, both variance inflation factor (VIF) values were below 4 {liberal identification VIF=2.76; liberal political ideology VIF=2.76}, both tolerance values were above .2 {liberal identification tolerance=.36; liberal political ideology tolerance=.36}, and all condition indices were below 15 (largest condition index=8.61) (see Hair et al., 2010 for more information about these diagnostic factors). Given that the multicollinearity was not severe, we proceeded with our planned analysis.

Although political ideology predicted liberal identification, condition did not moderate this relationship. That is, exposure to information suggesting that the majority of Whites agree (vs. disagree) with Trump's anti-egalitarianism did not differentially shape liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning Whites' liberal identification. Further, increased liberal identification was

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related to *decreased* racial disidentification, which is in the opposite direction of predictions specified in the alternative model (for full model statistics see, Table 6; note that despite the negative coefficient of the *b* path, liberal identification and racial disidentification were positively correlated ($r=.40, p<.001$), suggesting potential multicollinearity). Taken together, these findings indicate that exposure to information suggesting that the majority of Whites agree (vs. disagree) with Trump's anti-egalitarianism did *not* indirectly increase liberal-leaning Whites' racial disidentification by increasing their liberal identification. Thus, results did not support the alternative explanation that liberal-leaning Whites racially disidentify as a result of increased liberal identification in response to Trump-related group-image threat.

Table 6

Study 2 regression results for moderated mediation models predicting racial disidentification (alternative explanation)

Predictor	Liberal identification (mediator variable model)				
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
Intercept	3.44	.05	66.73	<.001	[3.34, 3.55]
Political ideology	.68	.02	29.09	<.001	[.63, .72]
Condition (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump</i>)	.19	.07	2.69	.007	[.05, .33]
Political ideology * condition	-.01	.03	.28	.781	[-.07, .05]
Predictor	Racial disidentification (dependent variable model)				
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
Intercept	3.65	.12	29.26	<.001	[3.40, 3.89]
Political ideology	.42	.03	15.00	<.001	[.37, .48]
Liberal identification	-.09	.03	2.77	.006	[-.16, -.03]
Conditional indirect effects of political ideology					

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Condition	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap 95% CI
<i>Whites Support Trump</i>	-.06	.03	[-.12, -.01]
<i>Whites Oppose Trump</i>	-.06	.03	[-.12, -.01]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	.001	.003	[-.01, .01]

Note. *Whites Support Trump* $n=481$, *Whites Oppose Trump* $n=524$. Political ideology and liberal identification were mean-centered; condition was dummy coded such that Whites support Trump condition was the reference category. Unstandardized coefficients are reported because standardized coefficients are not available for moderated mediation models in the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013). Bootstrap sample size=5,000.

Discussion

Replicating Study 1, Study 2 demonstrated that group-image threat (i.e., the majority of White Americans *support* Trump's anti-egalitarianism) led liberal-leaning Whites to racially disidentify. Notably, diverging from Study 1, conservative-leaning Whites also disidentified more when they read that White Americans largely support (vs. oppose) Trump. It is possible that this conservative sample differed from the Study 1 sample. Noteworthy, however, is that we conducted Study 2 one day before the release of the Mueller report regarding Russian interference in the 2016 election (Figure 6). Given media speculation, the *Whites Support Trump* condition may have led participants to associate their racial ingroup with Trump and his purported crimes (vs. anti-egalitarianism). This association may lead to group-image threat for White Americans, regardless of political ideology.

Regarding the alternative explanation, Study 2 revealed that increased liberal identification does not explain liberal-leaning Whites' increased racial disidentification in

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response to group-image threat. Although further research is needed to understand when political identity supersedes racial identity, we suspect that, in this case, the relative invisibility of political compared to racial identity makes emphasizing political identity less effective than distancing oneself from the highly visible racial identity.

Finally, Study 2 provided additional support for the manipulation effectiveness. Although participants found the *Whites Support (vs. Oppose) Trump* manipulation less credible, they also perceived Trump as more representative of White Americans, suggesting the manipulation amplified the association between White Americans and Trump, as intended. These results support our assertion that the White American-Trump association is a key component of the group-image threat liberal-leaning Whites experience in the current socio-political moment.

Study 3

Study 3 was pre-registered and replicated and extended Studies 1 and 2 by investigating whether racial disidentification in response to group-image threat increased liberal-leaning Whites' efforts to promote racial equity. Prior research suggests that group-image threat led individuals to attempt to affirm their personal values (Iyer et al., 2007; van der Toorn et al., 2015) and White racial disidentification led White individuals to report positive attitudes toward racial minorities (Branscombe et al., 2007; Wong & Cho, 2005). Taken together, we hypothesized that Trump-related group-image threat would increase racial disidentification among liberal-leaning Whites and, subsequently, lead them to affirm personal values by signaling egalitarian beliefs.

Method

Participants

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We recruited 923 non-Hispanic, U.S. born, mono-racial White adults from Amazon's Mechanical Turk to participate in exchange for \$1.50. Using the same exclusion criteria as Studies 1 and 2, we excluded 71 participants, giving a final sample of 849 participants (57% women; $M_{\text{age}}=40.22$ years; 48.5% had not obtained a 4-year college degree). A sensitivity analysis indicated that this sample size allowed us to detect small effects ($f^2 \geq .015$) with 80% power (Faul et al., 2009).

Procedure

Study 3 used the same procedure, manipulation materials, and measures (political ideology ($M=4.93$; $SD=2.13$; 95% $CI=[4.78, 5.07]$), racial disidentification ($\alpha=.95$; $M=3.16$; $SD=1.30$; 95% $CI=[3.08, 3.25]$), and perceived credibility of manipulation) as Study 1, with the following exceptions: 1) after completing the measure of racial disidentification, participants completed the measure of Trump's perceived representativeness of Whites ($\alpha=.89$; $M=3.11$; $SD=1.66$; 95% $CI=[3.00, 3.22]$) used in Study 2; and 2) participants responded to three measures assessing egalitarian intentions.

Measures

Intentions to Advocate for Racial Equity (Close-ended). We assessed intentions to advocate for racial equity using a five-item scale adapted from the individual advocacy subscale of Pieterse et al.'s Anti-Racism Behavioral Inventory (2016; e.g., "When I hear people telling racist jokes or using racial stereotypes, I will confront them"; 1-*Extremely unlikely* to 7-*Extremely likely*). Items were presented in random order. We averaged across all items such that higher scores indicated stronger intentions to advocate for racial equity ($\alpha=.81$; $M=4.73$; $SD=1.34$; 95% $CI=[4.64, 4.82]$).

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Intentions to Advocate for Racial Equity (Open-ended). We also assessed intentions to advocate for racial equity using an open-ended question: “What will you personally commit to doing in the future to reduce inequality (e.g., health, wealth, education, employment, housing, incarceration, etc.) between Whites and racially minoritized groups (e.g., Black, Latino, and Native Americans)?” Two trained coders blind to hypotheses and condition coded the number of actions participants listed (see *Study 3 Codebook* at OSF). Cohen’s kappa indicated substantial agreement between the coders ($\kappa=0.92$, $p<.001$; Landis & Koch, 1977). We considered listing more actions as an indication of stronger intentions to advocate for racial equity ($M=1.17$; $SD=1.23$; $95\% CI=[1.08, 1.25]$).

Policy Support. We assessed support for policies designed to benefit racially minoritized groups using an eight-item scale adapted from Iyer et al.’s Support for Compensatory Policy and Support of Equal Opportunity Policy measures (2003; e.g., “Due to a history of discrimination, American society has a responsibility to create special programs to provide Black, Latino, and Native American people with jobs”; 1-*Strongly disagree* to 7-*Strongly agree*). Items were presented in random order. We averaged across all items such that higher scores indicated stronger policy support ($\alpha=.96$; $M=4.11$; $SD=1.66$; $95\% CI=[4.00, 4.23]$).

See Table 2 for bivariate relationships between all variables.

Results

Manipulation check items

Perceived Credibility of Manipulation. Similar to Study 2, ratings of the manipulation’s credibility ($M=4.07$, $SD=1.56$, $95\% CI=[3.96, 4.17]$) did not significantly differ from the scale midpoint (4), $t(547)=-.98$, $d=.04$, $p=.329$, suggesting that participants found the information neither high nor low in credibility. Consistent with both Studies 1 and 2, participants

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in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition ($M=4.21$, $SD=1.55$, $95\% CI=[4.03, 4.39]$) found the manipulation to be more credible than those in the *Whites Support Trump* condition ($M=3.93$, $SD=1.72$, $95\% CI=[3.74, 4.11]$), $t(546)=2.11$, $d=.18$, $p=.035$.

Trump's Perceived Representativeness. Similar to Study 2, despite the relatively low credibility ratings, the manipulation successfully altered the extent to which participants perceived Trump as representative of White Americans. Participants in the *Whites Support Trump* ($M=3.32$, $SD=1.66$, $95\% CI=[3.12, 3.51]$) condition perceived Trump to be significantly more representative of White Americans compared to participants in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition ($M=2.89$, $SD=1.65$, $95\% CI=[2.69, 3.09]$), $t(546)=3.03$, $d=.26$, $p=.003$.


Does Group-image Threat Increase Racial Disidentification Among Liberal-leaning Whites and Subsequently Lead to Signaling of Egalitarian Intentions?

To test whether racial disidentification stemming from Trump-related group-image threat leads liberal-leaning Whites to express more egalitarian intentions we conducted a series of analyses using PROCESS Model 7, seed 27 (see Figure 4 for the conceptual model). By specifying the seed, we ensured that for each model tested, the effects of political ideology, condition, and their interaction on racial disidentification were the same and thus only need to be reported once (see PROCESS documentation for discussion of multiple dependent variables; Hayes, 2013). Only the estimates of the effect of racial disidentification on egalitarian intentions differed across models, as each model assessed the effect of racial disidentification on a different operationalization of egalitarian intentions.

Figure 4

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Conceptual representation of the moderated mediation model tested in Studies 3 and 4. The conditional indirect effect of political ideology on egalitarian intentions (Study 3) or egalitarian behaviors (Study 4) through racial disidentification, moderated by condition.



First, notably, the two-way interaction between political ideology and *Whites Support Trump* vs. *Control* condition was not significant. However, as hypothesized and consistent with prior studies, there was a significant two-way interaction suggesting that the effect of political ideology on racial disidentification differed for participants in the *Whites Support Trump* condition and the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition (see Table 3 for model results). As hypothesized, relatively liberal participants (1SD above the mean) disidentified more from their racial ingroup in the *Whites Support* versus *Oppose Trump* condition. In contrast, relatively conservative participants (1SD below the mean) did not differentially racially disidentify across conditions (see Figure 2 & Table 4 for simple effects & Table 5 for equivalence test results).

Moreover, greater racial disidentification predicted greater signaling of egalitarian intentions across all three measures (all $ps < .001$; see Table 7 for model results; also see *Study 4 Model 8 Results* at OSF for results from a more saturated model, which yields similar results and conclusions). Taken together, exposure to information that the majority of White Americans

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agree (vs. disagree) with Trump's anti-egalitarianism increased racial disidentification among liberal-leaning participants, which subsequently increased intentions to advocate for racial equity and support policies designed to benefit racial minorities. These results support our hypothesis that Trump-related group-image threat leads liberal-leaning Whites to racially disidentify and subsequently signal their egalitarian intentions.

Table 7

Study 3 regression results for moderated mediation models predicting egalitarian intentions: close-ended intentions to advocate for racial equity (Model 1), open-ended intentions to advocate for racial equity (Model 2), and policy support (Model 3), with the Whites Support Trump condition as the reference category.

Predictor	Racial disidentification (mediator variable model)				
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
Intercept	.20	.06	3.15	.002	[.08, .33]
X1 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump</i>)	-.30	.09	3.27	.001	[-.49, -.12]
X2 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Control</i>)	-.32	.09	3.51	<.001	[-.49, -.14]
Political ideology	.39	.03	13.17	<.001	[.33, .45]
X1 * Political ideology	-.15	.04	3.40	<.001	[-.23, -.06]
X2 * Political ideology	-.07	.04	1.56	.120	[-.15, .02]
Predictor	Close-ended intentions to advocate for racial equity (dependent variable Model 1)				
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
Intercept	4.65	.08	62.56	<.001	[4.50, 4.79]
X1	.09	.11	.87	.384	[-.12, .30]
X2	.16	.10	1.53	.127	[-.05, .36]

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Racial disidentification	.40	.03	12.14	<.001	[.34, .47]
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Conditional indirect effects of X1 (*Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump* condition)

Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap 95% CI
-1SD	.004	.05	[-.10, .10]
<i>M</i>	-.12	.04	[-.20, -.05]
+1SD	-.25	.06	[-.37, -.13]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-.06	.02	[-.10, -.02]

Conditional indirect effects of X2 (*Whites Support Trump vs. Control* condition)

Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap 95% CI
-1SD	-.07	.04	[-.16, .02]
<i>M</i>	-.13	.04	[-.20, -.06]
+1SD	-.18	.06	[-.30, -.07]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-.03	.02	[-.06, .01]

Open-ended intentions to advocate for racial equity (dependent variable Model 2)

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% CI
Intercept	1.20	.06	18.76	<.001	[1.07, 1.32]
X1	-.10	.09	1.04	.297	[-.28, .08]
X2	.01	.09	.06	.954	[-.17, .18]
Racial disidentification	.47	.03	16.62	<.001	[.42, .53]

Conditional indirect effects of X1 (*Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump* condition)

Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap 95% CI
-1SD	.004	.06	[-.11, .12]

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<i>M</i>	-0.14	.05	[-.24, -.06]
+1 <i>SD</i>	-0.29	.07	[-.44, -.15]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-0.07	.02	[-.12, -.03]

Conditional indirect effects of X2 (*Whites Support Trump vs. Control* condition)

Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap 95% CI
-1 <i>SD</i>	-0.08	.05	[-.19, .02]
<i>M</i>	-0.15	.04	[-.24, -.07]
+1 <i>SD</i>	-0.22	.07	[-.36, -.08]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-0.03	.02	[-.07, .01]

Policy support (dependent variable Model 3)

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
Intercept	4.00	.08	47.36	<.001	[3.83, 4.16]
X1	.25	.12	2.07	.039	[.01, .49]
X2	.11	.12	.94	.248	[-.12, .34]
Racial disidentification	.68	.04	18.13	<.001	[.61, .76]

Conditional indirect effects of X1 (*Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump* condition)

Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap 95% CI
-1 <i>SD</i>	.01	.09	[-.16, .17]
<i>M</i>	-0.21	.07	[-.34, -.08]
+1 <i>SD</i>	-0.42	.10	[-.62, -.22]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-0.10	.03	[-.16, -.04]

Conditional indirect effects of X2 (*Whites Support Trump vs. Control* condition)

Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap 95% CI
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-1SD	-0.12	.07	[-.27, .03]
<i>M</i>	-.22	.06	[-.34, -.10]
+1SD	-.31	.10	[-.51, -.12]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-.05	.03	[-.10, .01]

Note. Whites Support Trump n=283, Whites Oppose Trump n=265, Control n=301. Political

ideology and racial disidentification were mean-centered; condition was dummy coded such that Whites support Trump condition was the reference category. Unstandardized coefficients are reported because standardized coefficients are not available for moderated mediation models in the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013). Bootstrap sample size=5,000.

Discussion

Study 3 replicated Studies 1 and 2's findings that group-image threat (i.e., the majority of White Americans *support* Trump's anti-egalitarianism) leads liberal-leaning Whites to racially disidentify. Study 3 also provided initial evidence that racial disidentification has positive implications for liberal-leaning Whites' intentions to advocate for racial equity and support policies benefiting racial minorities. However, it is unclear whether increased egalitarian intentions translate into actions (i.e., the intention-behavior gap; Sheeran, 2002) and whether Trump-related group-image threat generalizes to triggers of threat beyond anti-egalitarianism and to other groups (e.g., conservative-leaning Whites). Notably, Study 2 (but not Studies 1 or 3) suggested that conservative-leaning Whites were influenced by our manipulation. Given that conservative-leaning Whites' values do not center around anti-egalitarianism (Sidorsky, 2016), testing generalizability requires activating threats relevant to conservative-leaning individuals.

Study 4

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Study 4 was pre-registered and expanded on prior studies by: 1) examining whether racial disidentification increases liberal-leaning Whites' egalitarian behaviors (i.e., monetary donations to racial equity-focused organizations) and 2) testing another trigger of Trump-related group-image threat—information that the majority of White Americans *Support* versus *Oppose Trump's continuation in office*. Accusations that Trump abused power and obstructed Congress resulted in an impeachment inquiry and trial (Fandos & Shear, 2019). Conceptually replicating previous studies, we hypothesized that information suggesting that Whites disapprove of Trump's impeachment (i.e., *Support Trump's continuation in office*) would create group-image threat for liberal-leaning Whites, increasing racial disidentification, and subsequently egalitarian behaviors. We also hypothesized that this threat would resonate with conservative-leaning Whites because Trump's loss of power threatens their political ingroup's status, given that the majority of conservatives identify as Republican (Pew, 2018b). Thus, we predicted that conservative-leaning Whites would racially disidentify when exposed to information suggesting that Whites *approve* of Trump's impeachment (i.e., *Oppose Trump's continuation in office*).

Method

Participants

We recruited 956 non-Hispanic, U.S. born, mono-racial White adults from Amazon's Mechanical Turk to participate in exchange for \$1.50. Using the same pre-registered exclusion criteria as Studies 1-3, we excluded 42 participants, giving a final sample of 914 (46% women; $M_{\text{age}}=40.65$ years; 45.5% had not obtained a 4-year college degree). A sensitivity analysis indicated that this sample size allowed us to detect small effects ($f^2 \geq .014$) with 80% power (Faul et al., 2009).

Procedure

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We launched Study 4 on December 17, 2019, one day before the House of Representatives voted to impeach Trump, and closed the survey on the morning of December 18, 2019, before the House vote began. We used the same procedure and measures of political ideology ($M=4.95$; $SD=2.22$; $95\% CI=[4.81, 5.10]$), racial disidentification (nine-item; $\alpha=0.91$; $M=3.20$; $SD=1.26$; $95\% CI=[3.12, 3.28]$), and perceived credibility of manipulation as Study 3 with the following exceptions: 1) we measured egalitarian behaviors (i.e., donations to organizations that promote racial equity) instead of intentions; 2) we used a revised manipulation of group-image threat framed in terms of Trump's impeachment.

The manipulation format was the same as Studies 1-3. Participants in the *Control* condition proceeded straight to the measures after rating their political ideology, while participants in the *Whites Support Trump* and *Whites Oppose Trump* conditions viewed results from an ostensible survey. Importantly, the survey content differed from prior studies. The *Whites Support Trump* condition portrayed White Americans as largely supportive of Trump's continuation in office by *disapproving* of his impeachment. The survey description stated: "the survey revealed that the majority of White adults disapprove of the impeachment of President Trump." The corresponding pie charts indicated that 30-40% of White respondents "supported the current impeachment inquiry of President Trump," "[...] believed that the House of Representatives should impeach President Trump," and "[...] believed that the Senate should convict and remove President Trump from office" (see Figure 5; full stimulus can be accessed at *Manipulation Materials*).

In contrast, the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition portrayed White Americans as largely opposed to Trump's continuation in office by *approving* of his impeachment. The survey description stated: "the survey revealed that the majority of White adults approve of the


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impeachment of President Trump.” The corresponding pie charts showed reversed percentages from the *Whites Support Trump* condition, indicating that 60-70% of White respondents supported Trump’s impeachment (see Figure 5).

We decided this range of agreement based on public opinion regarding impeachment. At the time of Study 4, 40% of American adults in general, 15% of Republicans, and 85% of Democrats approved of Trump’s impeachment (FiveThirtyEight, 2020). However, there were no available polls regarding White Americans’ opinions specifically. Because White individuals are only slightly more likely to affiliate with the Republican (51%) versus Democratic Party (43%; Pew, 2018b), to ensure the credibility of our manipulation, we used less extreme values (i.e., 30-40% impeachment approval rate in the *Whites Support Trump* condition and 60-70% impeachment approval rate in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition).

Figure 5

Example pie chart in manipulation materials (Study 4)



Note. Panel A was presented to participants in the *Whites Support Trump* condition; Panel B was presented to participants in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition.

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Measures

We measured egalitarian behaviors by offering participants an opportunity to donate a research bonus to non-profit organizations focused on promoting racial equity (Sharps & Schroeder, 2019). Participants read:

Congratulations! You have received a bonus of \$1.00. You can keep your entire bonus or share some or all of your bonus with one or more of the following non-profit organizations. These organizations all work within the field of racial equity, and on a variety of issues and topics. The donations will really go to the organization(s).

Then, participants read about seven organizations (e.g., the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the American Indian College Fund) and their mission statements. Participants then indicated whether they wished to keep their bonus or donate part or all of the bonus to one or more of the non-profit organizations listed. Options were presented in random order. We tested two indicators of behavioral advocacy for racial equity: 1) decision to donate part or all of the bonus versus keep the bonus (76.6% kept all bonus; see table 8 for detailed breakdown by condition and political ideology), and 2) total amount of donation regardless of which organization(s) the donation went to ($M=\$0.16$; $SD=\$0.34$; $95\% CI=[0.14, 0.18]$).

See Table 2 for bivariate relationships between all variables.

Table 8

Percentage of participants who donated some or all bonus, by condition and political ideology

Political Ideology	Control Condition (%)	Whites Oppose Trump Condition (%)	Whites Support Trump Condition (%)
Extremely conservative	5.3	16.7	13.3

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Conservative	23.8	7.0	25
Somewhat conservative	20.0	25.0	17.4
Slightly conservative	17.9	15.2	11.1
Slightly liberal	29.5	24.3	9.1
Somewhat liberal	33.3	20.0	44.0
Liberal	32.8	21.7	23.1
Extremely liberal	25.5	34.1	35.9

Results

Perceived Credibility of Manipulation

Ratings of the manipulation's credibility ($M=4.16$, $SD=1.59$, $95\% CI=[4.03, 4.28]$) were significantly above the scale midpoint (4), $t(599)=2.38$, $d=.10$, $p=.017$, suggesting participants found the information relatively credible. Moreover, perceived credibility did not differ across conditions (*Whites Support Trump*: $M=4.23$, $SD=1.54$, $95\% CI=[4.06, 4.40]$); *Whites Oppose Trump*: $M=4.07$, $SD=1.65$, $95\% CI=[3.89, 4.27]$; $t(598)=1.17$, $d=.10$, $p=.241$).

Does Group-image Threat Increase Racial Disidentification Among Liberal-leaning Whites and Subsequently Lead to Egalitarian Behaviors?

To test whether racial disidentification stemming from Trump-related group-image threat led liberal-leaning Whites to engage in egalitarian behaviors, we focused on two key behaviors: 1) donation decision—a binary variable indicating whether people donated at least part of their bonus or not, and 2) amount of donation—a continuous variable. We tested these two indices of egalitarian behaviors using the same analytic strategy as Study 3 (see Figure 4 for the conceptual model).

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First, we found significant two-way interactions between political ideology and condition (see Table 3 for model results). As predicted, relatively liberal participants (1SD above the mean) in the *Whites Support Trump* condition disidentified more from their racial ingroup when compared to those in *Whites Oppose Trump* condition and those in the *Control* condition. In contrast, relatively conservative participants (1SD below the mean) did not differentially disidentify across conditions (see Figure 2 & Table 4 for simple effects & Table 5 for equivalence test results).

Moreover, in general, greater racial disidentification predicted greater egalitarian behavior (all $ps < .001$; see Table 9 for model results; also see *Study 4 Model 8 Results* at OSF for results from a more saturated model, which yields similar results and conclusions). Taken together, exposure to information that the majority of Whites disapprove of Trump's impeachment (i.e. support his continuation in office) increased racial disidentification among liberal-leaning participants, and subsequently increased their likelihood of donating to organizations that promote racial equity and donating a larger amount to these organizations. These results support our hypothesis that Trump-related group-image threat for liberal-leaning Whites increases racial disidentification and subsequent engagement in egalitarian behaviors.

Table 9

Regression coefficients for moderated mediation models predicting donation decision (Model 1) and amount of donation (Model 2), with the Whites Support Trump condition as the reference category.

Predictor	Racial disidentification (mediator variable model)				
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
Intercept	3.38	.07	51.69	<.001	[3.25, 3.50]

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X1 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump</i>)	-.26	.09	2.75	.006	[-.44, -.07]
X2 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Control</i>)	-.33	.09	3.55	<.001	[-.51, -.15]
Political ideology	.31	.03	10.75	<.001	[.26, .37]
X1 * Political ideology	-.18	.04	4.38	<.001	[-.27, -.10]
X2 * Political ideology	-.07	.04	1.56	.121	[-.15, .02]

Donation decision (dependent variable Model 1)

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
Intercept	-2.69	.28	9.50	<.001	[-3.26, -2.14]
X1	-.01	.21	.03	.980	[-.41, .40]
X2	.34	.20	1.73	.084	[-.05, .72]
Racial disidentification	.42	.07	6.35	<.001	[.29, .55]

Conditional indirect effects of X1 (*Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump* condition)

Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap <i>SE</i>	Bootstrap 95% <i>CI</i>
-1 <i>SD</i>	.06	.06	[-.04, .18]
<i>M</i>	-.11	.04	[-.20, -.03]
+1 <i>SD</i>	-.28	.07	[-.44, -.15]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-.08	.02	[-.13, -.04]

Conditional indirect effects of X2 (*Whites Support Trump vs. Control* condition)

Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap <i>SE</i>	Bootstrap 95% <i>CI</i>
-1 <i>SD</i>	-.08	.06	[-.19, .03]
<i>M</i>	-.14	.04	[-.23, -.06]
+1 <i>SD</i>	-.20	.07	[-.34, -.08]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-.03	.02	[-.07, .01]

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Amount of donation (dependent variable Model 2)					
Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% <i>CI</i>
Intercept	-.05	.03	1.29	.196	[-.11, .02]
X1	-.01	.03	.27	.786	[-.06, .05]
X2	.02	.03	.86	.393	[-.03, .08]
Racial disidentification	.06	.01	7.21	<.001	[.05, .08]

Conditional indirect effects of X1 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Whites Oppose Trump</i> condition)			
Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap <i>SE</i>	Bootstrap 95% <i>CI</i>
-1 <i>SD</i>	.01	.01	[-.01, .03]
<i>M</i>	-.02	.01	[-.03, -.005]
+1 <i>SD</i>	-.04	.01	[-.06, -.02]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-.01	.003	[-.02, -.01]

Conditional indirect effects of X2 (<i>Whites Support Trump vs. Control</i> condition)			
Political ideology	Bootstrap indirect effect	Bootstrap <i>SE</i>	Bootstrap 95% <i>CI</i>
-1 <i>SD</i>	-.01	.01	[-.03, .005]
<i>M</i>	-.02	.01	[-.03, -.01]
+1 <i>SD</i>	-.03	.01	[-.05, -.01]
<i>Index of moderated mediation</i>	-.004	.003	[-.01, .001]

Note. *Whites Support Trump* $n=314$, *Whites Oppose Trump* $n=293$, *Control* $n=307$. Political

ideology and racial disidentification were mean-centered; condition was dummy coded such that *Whites Support Trump* condition was the reference category. Unstandardized coefficients are reported because standardized coefficients are not available for moderated mediation models in the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013). Log-odds coefficients are reported for the model predicting donation decision. Bootstrap sample size=5,000.

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Does Group-image Threat Increase Racial Disidentification Among Conservative-leaning Whites?

We hypothesized that conservative-leaning Whites would racially disidentify when exposed to information suggesting that the majority of Whites approve of Trump's impeachment, which indicates that Whites largely oppose Trump's continuation in office. To test this hypothesis, we followed the analytic strategy outlined in Study 1, with the exception that the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition (i.e., group-image threat for conservative-leaning Whites) was coded as the reference category. As reported in the prior section, conservative-leaning Whites' racial disidentification did not differ in the *Whites Oppose Trump* and *Whites Support Trump* conditions. However, we found a significant two-way interaction indicating that the relationship between political ideology and racial disidentification significantly differed between the *Whites Oppose Trump* and *Control* conditions (see Table 3 for model results).

As hypothesized, relatively conservative participants (1SD below the mean) in the *Whites Oppose Trump* condition disidentified more from their racial ingroup compared to those in the *Control* condition. In contrast, relatively liberal participants (1SD above the mean) did not differently disidentify across conditions (see Figure 10 for model results and simple effects & Table 5 for equivalence test results). Thus, exposure to information that the majority of Whites approve of Trump's impeachment (i.e., opposing his continuation in office) increased racial disidentification among relatively conservative participants relative to a no-information control condition. These results support our hypothesis that conservative-leaning Whites racially disidentify as a result of Trump-related group-image threat, when that threat is framed in context of Trump's impeachment.

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Table 10

Study 4 results of model predicting racial disidentification with Whites Oppose Trump as the reference category, and simple effects of condition on racial disidentification at $\pm 1SD$ from the mean of political ideology.

	<i>B (SE)</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95% CI_{β}</i>
Intercept	3.15 (.07)	-.05	.09	.39	[-.15, .06]
Political ideology	.12 (.03)	.21	3.96	<.001	[.10, .31]
W (<i>Whites Oppose Trump vs. Control</i>)	-.07 (.09)	-.05	.73	.468	[-.20, .09]
Political ideology * W	.12 (.04)	.20	2.76	.006	[.06, .35]
<i>Simple effects of Whites Oppose Trump vs. Control condition</i>					
Relatively conservative (1SD below the mean)	-.32 (.13)	-.26	2.44	.015	[-.47, -.05]
Relatively liberal (1SD above the mean)	.19 (.13)	.15	1.46	.143	[-.05, .35]

Note. For comparisons between *Whites Oppose Trump vs. Whites Support Trump* condition, see Table 3 for model results and Table 4 for simple effects.

Discussion

Study 4 demonstrated that liberal-leaning Whites who racially disidentified in response to group-image threat subsequently engaged in more egalitarian behaviors (i.e. were more likely to donate and to donate larger amounts of money to racial equity-focused organizations). The study also demonstrated that Trump-related group-image threat generalizes to triggers beyond anti-egalitarianism (i.e., continuation in office) and elicits racial disidentification among conservative-leaning Whites.

General Discussion


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Four studies demonstrated group-image threat arising from White Americans' perceived support for Trump's anti-egalitarianism (Studies 1-3) and opposition to his impeachment (Study 4) increased racial disidentification among liberal-leaning Whites. Furthermore, racial disidentification increased signaling of egalitarian beliefs (Study 3) and engagement in egalitarian behaviors (Study 4) among liberal-leaning Whites. Notably, the effect of group-image threat on racial disidentification persisted even after major political wins for liberal Americans (e.g., Democrats winning control of the House, Trump's associates pleading guilty to Mueller investigation charges, and the impeachment inquiry; see Figure 6), suggesting that liberal-leaning Whites' racial disidentification is not simply a response to a loss of political power, but instead stems from the persistent portrayal of their racial ingroup as being supportive of Trump. For conservative-leaning Whites, White Americans' lack of support for Trump's political power increased racial disidentification; however, the consequences of their racial disidentification remain unclear.

Figure 6

Timeline of Studies 1-4 and the major political events leading to and following each study

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Note. Study 2 was conducted before Study 3. The order was switched for ease of presentation.

These results are consistent with past research demonstrating that individuals disidentify from negative ingroup portrayals in order to maintain positive self-views (Becker & Tausch, 2014) and extend this literature in two ways. First, disidentification research largely focuses on low-status groups (e.g., racial minorities, women; Branscombe et al., 2012), whereas the current studies focus on a high-status group (i.e., Whites). Documenting disidentification among White individuals speaks to the generalizability of this phenomenon and the importance of including Whiteness in the study of racial identity (McDermott & Samson, 2005; Sue, 2004). Second, prior research on White racial identification primarily investigates how contending with White privilege leads White individuals to distance themselves from their racial ingroup (e.g., Chow et al, 2008; Knowles et al., 2014; Powell et al., 2005). Our work reveals that associations with highly visible ingroup members (i.e., Trump) can elicit similar psychological consequences. While Study 4 provides support for the generalizability of White group-image threat to a new

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trigger, further research is needed to fully understand group-image threat and racial identity, particularly among conservative-leaning Whites.

Studies 3 and 4 also have implications for promoting racial equity. Prior research examining White racial identity and egalitarian attitudes offers mixed results. Some research shows that White disidentification benefits racial equity by enhancing attitudes toward racial outgroups (Branscombe et al., 2007; Wong & Cho, 2005), while other research finds that disidentification undermines racial equity by leading Whites to deny their racial privilege and oppose affirmative action (Goren & Plaut, 2012; Knowles et al., 2014). Our findings align with the first set of research, as racial disidentification among liberal-leaning Whites predicted greater signaling of egalitarian intentions and more egalitarian behaviors. These results suggest that disidentification in response to group-image threat can positively influence racial equity efforts.

Conclusion

Given Whites' privileged position in U.S. society, White Americans can largely avoid thinking about their racial identity (Sue, 2004). However, in the current political climate, where their racial ingroup is credited with electing and continuing to empower a president who consistently attacks, dehumanizes, and devalues marginalized groups (Conway et al., 2017), liberal-leaning White Americans are forced to contend with their racial identity. Racial disidentification is not simply a matter of individual psychological protection for liberal-leaning Whites; it is a matter of grappling with one's role in a system that continually—and explicitly—discriminates against marginalized groups. The question moving forward is how to leverage this psychological process to encourage liberal-leaning Whites to ally themselves with communities fighting to build a more inclusive, equitable society.

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