



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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OCPAS/CTC

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National Intelligence Daily

*Monday
25 July 1983*

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
El Salvador:



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EL SALVADOR:

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[Redacted] the Popular Liberation Forces. That group briefly seized two commercial radio stations in San Salvador last week to announce its support for negotiations but its rejection of any discussion of participation in elections. [Redacted]

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Comment: Despite the insurgents' efforts to portray publicly a united front on the negotiations issue, serious disagreements persist. The government's peace offers and Ambassador Stone's initiative appear to have put them on the political defensive. Leftist political leaders may view negotiations as an opportunity to increase their influence within the alliance, which has been dominated by their military counterparts. [Redacted]


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
The major problem for the leadership is how to maintain the guerrillas' motivation in combat and at the same time pursue a negotiated settlement. The prospect of talks may look good to some of the guerrilla rank and file in the aftermath of the government's recent military campaign and the extension of the amnesty period. Insurgent military leaders, however, probably believe that the government offensive has not caused much damage and that they can regain the initiative. [Redacted]

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
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












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