

Medical Language in the Speeches of Demosthenes

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Abstract

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Introduction

This project is intended as an examination of medical language and imagery in the speeches of Demosthenes, with special attention given to his speeches against his political opponent Aeschines, *Against the False Embassy* (19) and *On the Crown* (18). In Chapter 1, I contextualize his use of such language and imagery by exploring the influence of Hippocratic medicine on fourth- and fifth-century non-medical literature. I argue that the shared anxieties of medicine and politics, namely that both arts demand quick action and foresight on the part of the good practitioner, and the rich new vocabulary of suffering and disease, made Hippocratic medicine an enticing model for the political writer, that is, the historian, philosopher, and orator.

Demosthenes' medical language and imagery should thus be seen as part of a tradition of analogizing the two arts, which began during the circulation of the first Hippocratic treatises and continued well into and past his own day.

In Chapter 2, I look at medical language and imagery in Demosthenes' prosecution of Aeschines for political misconduct during the Second Embassy to Philip II of Macedon, *On the False Embassy*. I examine how Demosthenes plays with the Hippocratic concepts of "right timing" (*kairos*) and "forecast" (*prognôsis*) to underscore Aeschines' political failures. I also look at how he blends contemporary medical and magico-religious views of disease to depict his opponent as infected with the contagious disease of Philippizing.

In Chapter 3, I scrutinize Aeschines' response to Demosthenes' medical invective in *On the Embassy* (2), his defense against Demosthenes' charges of political corruption during the Second Embassy (Dem. 19), and *Against Ctesiphon* (3), his prosecution of Ctesiphon for proposing an illegal action, namely that Demosthenes should be awarded a civic crown for exceptional service to the state. In each case, I argue that he appropriates his rival's medical language, particularly the analogy of the physician, in order to turn it against him. By redefining *prognôsis* in terms of the present, he deflects Demosthenes' accusation not only of political malice but also of political incompetency. Moreover, by applying the invective label "purifier" (*goês*) to his accuser, he draws attention to the absurdity of Demosthenes' self-representation as a physician of the state, especially in light of Athens' defeat by Philip at Chaeronea.

In Chapter 4, I turn to Demosthenes' use of medical language and imagery in his grand defense of his political career, *On the Crown*. I argue that he uses this language and imagery to redirect blame for his failed political policies onto Aeschines. By reintroducing the image of the charlatan physician, he both responds to Aeschines' purifier invective and transfers the blame for Athens' current misfortunes onto the inaction and bad leadership of politicians like Aeschines. In addition to the physician analogy, I look at how Demosthenes draws upon the language of

physical suffering to exhibit the consequences of allowing the politically and morally corrupt politician to remain in the city.

In the final chapter of this project, I examine Demosthenes' use of medical language and imagery in his political speeches, in particular, the *Olynthiacs* (Dem. 1-3) and *Philippics* (Dem. 4, 6, 9). I argue that similarities between the medical imagery and language of these speeches and that of his speeches against Aeschines suggest that Demosthenes recycled this imagery because of its positive reception by his audience. In the appendix to this chapter, I look at examples of medical imagery and language in the speeches of Demosthenes whose authenticity is contested: *Fourth Philippic* (10), *Reply to Philip* (11), and *Against Aristogeiton I* (25). I conclude with a recapitulation of my findings and brief discussion about the further directions in which this research can be taken.

To my sister, Amanda

CHAPTER ONE

Situating Demosthenes:
Medical Analogies in Late Fifth- and Fourth-Century LiteratureHippocratic Medicine

To provide background for Demosthenes' medical language and imagery, first it is necessary to contextualize the Hippocratics and their legacy, for Demosthenes' medical language at times shows direct Hippocratic influence, and at others it seems to be part of a tradition of analogizing politics and medicine.

The oldest of the "Hippocratic" medical treatises dates to the first half of fifth century, the latest to the late Hellenistic/early Roman period.¹ These texts represent a new brand of medicine, distinct from previous iterations in that they all reject divine causality and seek natural explanations (and cures) for disease (Jouanna 2001: 181).² These treatises are referred to as Hippocratic because they were believed to have been written by the famous Greek physician Hippocrates, who allegedly founded a medical school on the island of Cos in the first quarter of the fifth century. However, close examination of the style and content of the Hippocratic Corpus reveals the impossibility of single authorship. Jouanna (2001: 56-71) suggests that the Hippocratic Corpus can be loosely classified into three sets of writings, derived respectively from the historical Hippocrates and his disciples, the school of Cos, and the school of Cnidus--a rival medical school, who like the physicians of Cos claimed Asclepius as their mythical

¹ For dating the Hippocratic Corpus, see Jouanna (2001: 373-416).

² For Hippocratic medicine as the legacy of the Pre-Socratics, see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) and Longrigg (1998).

ancestor.³ Nonetheless, Jouanna (2001: 71) admits that even this distinction is forced and does not account for the heterogeneous nature of many of the texts.

In addition to being grouped by school, the Hippocratic medical writings can also be more reliably categorized by subject matter. The first-century C.E. grammarian Erotian groups the treatises, which he believed to be authentic, into the following list: semiotic works,⁴ etiological/physical works, therapeutic works, treatises on regimen, mixed treatises, and treatises defending medicine as a distinct art (*Frag.* (Nachmanson) 9).⁵ I would add to this list the ethical treatises *Decorum*, *Precepts*, and *Physician*, which although of a late date, "advocate a medical ethic that descends directly from the Hippocratic ideal" (Jouanna 2001: 70). Erotian's list reveals a great deal about the nature and struggles of Hippocratic medicine. First, it shows that semiotics, was a highly valued skill. Second, regimen, that is, the manipulation of diet, exercise, sleep and sex habits to produce optimal health, was an important therapeutic tool. Third, Hippocratic medicine never completely divorced itself from its philosophical roots, for the etiological works show that many physicians believed that effective treatment was only possible through an understanding of a person's entirety. Fourth, Hippocratic medicine was plagued by charlatanism, thus the necessity of ethical treatises. Since there were no formal standards for training or practice, anyone could pass him/herself off as a physician. The ethical treatises sought to prove

³ For the debate about the existence of medical schools on Cos and Cnidus, see Sudhoff (1927), Grensemann (1975; 1987), Sherwin-White (1978), and Lonie (1978a; 1978b).

⁴ Semiotics refers to the use of signs (e.g. the patient's countenance, urine, stools, sleep patterns, etc.) in the formulation of a *prognôsis*, that is, the forecast of a disease's course.

⁵ Erotian believed that two-thirds of the Hippocratic medical texts (60 in total) that were known in his time were authentic. Littré, whose work in the nineteenth century represented a major advance in Hippocratic scholarship, judged only eleven treatises to be authentic to Hippocrates. My concern, however, is not with the Hippocratic "question" but whether these medical texts were potentially in circulation by Demosthenes' day. For a discussion of the Hippocratic question, that is, which texts were authored by the historical Hippocrates, see Jouanna (2001: 56-71).

the legitimacy of Hippocratic medicine by suggesting that the practitioner follow a code of behavior that on many levels accorded with popular beliefs on morality and thus functioned as an informal license (Nutton 1992: 26).

As is clear from the variety of texts, Hippocratic physicians saw themselves as representatives of a new kind of medicine with a distinct approach and method. Before the rise of Hippocratic medicine, disease was largely believed to be the by-product of divine transgression, or in other words criminal behavior instigated the anger of the god(s), which manifested itself in disease (Temkin 1953: 213-25).⁶ The diseased individual was thus considered polluted; if s/he was not purified or formally secluded, s/he could potentially infect others (Parker 1985: 218-219). Although Pre-Hippocratic physicians used many of the same "rational" therapies as the Hippocratics would (cautery, surgery, and drugs), these physicians relied equally on incantations and purifications to combat disease because they were working under the assumption that most diseases were divine in origin (c.f. Pind. *P.* 3.35-55). Even with the rise of Hippocratic medicine, the belief that disease was divine and could be treated through magic and prayer never disappeared; rather it coexisted with Hippocratic "rationalism."⁷ For instance, the author of the Hippocratic treatise *Sacred Disease* attacks purifiers for perpetuating the erroneous belief that disease is caused by the gods (*Hp. Morb. Sacr.* 1). The defensive tone of this text suggests that Hippocratic physicians saw these magico-religious healers as competition and/or were worried that they would damage the reputation of legitimate (i.e. Hippocratic) medicine. Therefore, the circulation of Hippocratic treatises such as *Sacred Disease* was likely intended to shape how the

⁶ For disease as the manifestation of divine wrath, see Hom. *Il.* 1.43-458; Hes. *Op.* 213-264; Solon W4.

⁷ See Jouanna (2001: 181-209), for the debate about whether Hippocratic medicine was truly a rational system that was devoid of religious superstition.

public responded to the proliferation of Hippocratic physicians in marketplaces throughout Greece, including Athens, at the end of the fifth century.

For the remainder of this chapter, I turn to the fifth- and fourth-century non-medical writers whose use of medical language is similar to Demosthenes'. I begin with a brief discussion of the influence of Hippocratic medicine on fifth-century drama for the reason that medical language used by Demosthenes' also appears in dramatic contexts. I then examine Thucydides and Plato's use of medical language and ideas because, as I shall argue, Demosthenes may have been influenced by their comparisons of the good politician to the good physician, of political instability to disease, and of (judicial) punishment to medicine. Next, I turn to Isocrates and the minor orators of the fourth century. Since they are direct contemporaries of Demosthenes, their use of medical language and ideas may elucidate which usages are Demosthenean innovations and which ones had become *topoi* by this period.

I. Fifth-Century Drama

One of the first genres to adopt Hippocratic medical language and ideas in the fifth century was tragedy. Kosak (2004: 1) traces this phenomenon to the fact that both medicine and tragedy are concerned with human suffering.⁸ However, it was not so much the theories that attracted the Athenian tragedians to the Hippocratic medical writings but the rich new vocabulary of suffering (Jouanna 2012: 55). It is for this reason that it is common to see religious ideas of disease,

⁸ Of all the tragedians, Euripides is remarkable for his extensive use of Hippocratic medical language; next is Sophocles. See Kosak (2004) for a very detailed analysis of Hippocratic medical language in Euripidean tragedy; Psicharis (1908) and Ryzman (1992) for Sophocles. Aeschylus stands at the other end of the spectrum for the reason that the first Hippocratic medical texts only began to be circulated towards the very end of his career in the mid-fifth century--tradition hands down that he died in 456 B.C.E. in Gela, Sicily ([Plut.] *Vit.* 11). For a discussion of medical language in Aeschylus, see Miller (1942).

namely that plague and illness are the result of divine wrath and are communicable to others (i.e. infectious), expressed with Hippocratic terminology. One of the most notable instances of this blending of the religious with the medical comes from Euripides' *Orestes* (Rutherford 2012: 139). The tragedian describes the disease that the Furies have inflicted upon Orestes for the crime of matricide, with language evocative of Hippocratic depictions of epilepsy.⁹ At times Orestes lies groaning on his bed, at others he leaps up hysterical (Eur. *Or.* 34-45). Sometimes his mouth foams and his eyes roll back, and then there are other times when he is completely lucid (220, 253-54). The Hippocratic author of *Sacred Disease* describes epilepsy similarly:

And I see people become mad and demented for no manifest cause, and at the same time doing many things out of place; and I have known many persons in sleep groaning and crying out, some in a state of suffocation, some jumping up and fleeing out doors, and deprived of reason till they awaken, and afterwards becoming well and rational as before, although they be pale and weak, and this will happen not once but frequently. And there are many other things of the like kind, which it would be tedious to state particularly. (Trans. Lloyd 1983)¹⁰

The author goes on to describe how during fits of madness the epileptic patient's eyes will become "distorted" and his mouth will "foam and sputter like a dead person" (*Morb. Sacr.* 2). Since the condition depicted in *Sacred Disease* closely parallels Euripides', it is probable that the tragedian was familiar with Hippocratic descriptions of epilepsy, and he may have even read *Sacred Disease*.¹¹

Demosthenes often draws heavily upon the language of tragedy to give weight and authority to his speeches (Slater 1988: 126; Rutherford 2012: 68). In Chapter 2 and 4 I will argue that this is true of some of his disease language in his speeches against Aeschines--especially his

⁹ See Chapter 6 of Kosak (2004) for a full discussion of this passage and its relation to *Sacred Disease*. For the significance of disease to the plot of *Orestes*, see Smith (1967).

¹⁰ All translations are adapted.

¹¹ *Sacred Disease* dates to the second half of the fifth century (Jouanna 2001: 412) and *Orestes*, around 408 B.C.E. (*OCD* s.v. Euripides).

use of the language of religious pollution to communicate the infectiousness of his opponent's treacherous behavior. Rutherford (2012: 58) and Rowe (1966: 401) note, however, that in some instances Demosthenes' use of tragic language is actually comedic, which should not be viewed as anomalous, for, as Rowe states, "parody of tragedy is a favorite ploy of [Greek] comedy." Demosthenes was likely enticed to incorporate paratragic language into his invective against Aeschines to a greater extent than in his other speeches because of Aeschines' former career as third-part (*tritagonistês*) tragic actor (Dem. 18.129, 209).¹² In Chapter 2 and 4 I will also argue that Demosthenes' depiction of Aeschines as a magico-religious healer may have been inspired by comedic depictions of charlatan healers.¹³ Although medical language occurs less frequently in Greek comedy than in tragedy, the figure of the *alazôn* (charlatan) physician is a comic type (Rowe 1966: 400).¹⁴

II. Thucydides

Despite the fact that there are no quotations of or direct references to Thucydides in the speeches of Demosthenes (or any of the fourth-century orators), the ancient biographical tradition posits that Demosthenes consciously imitated Thucydides (Ps-Plut. *Vit. Dec.* 8).¹⁵ Wooten (1983: 4, 20) supports this tradition by pointing to Demosthenes' political vision, which he claims honors the "vision of power, prestige, and heroism" found in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. He also argues that Demosthenes' style provides evidence of a Thucydidean influence, for in his political speeches, notably the *Philippics*, he appropriates the fifth-century practice, most clearly seen in the speeches of Thucydides, of focusing on a single argument, usually the

¹² For a positive assessment of Aeschines' acting career, see Dorjahn (1929).

¹³ In Ch. 3 I examine how Aeschines turns this invective against Demosthenes.

¹⁴ See Miller (1945) and Bliquez and Rodgers (1998) for medical language in Aristophanes.

¹⁵ For the fourth-century and Hellenistic reception of Thucydides, see Hornblower (1995).

argument from expediency (42). Furthermore, in his examination of Demosthenes' medical language, Wooten (1979) draws attention to Demosthenes' use of *prophasis* in the *Second Olynthiac* (§9).¹⁶ He remarks that Demosthenes imitates Thucydides' innovative use of *prophasis* by drawing upon its medical connotations.¹⁷ Following Wooten, I suggest that there might be other Thucydidean resonances in Demosthenes' medical language, namely his comparison of the good politician to a physician and *stasis* to a disease. This may suggest that biographical tradition is correct in perceiving a Thucydidean influence on Demosthenes.

Many scholars have argued that Thucydides was profoundly influenced by the contemporary medical ideas of the Hippocratics (Jouanna 2001: 208). They point to his historical method, which shares with the Hippocratics an emphasis on keen observation (*autopsy*) and an inquiry into causes (*aitiai*) (Rechenauer 1991: 38). Moreover, like many of these medical writers, Thucydides' purpose is to teach the student of history (i.e. the statesman) how to predict future events by examining recurring patterns of human nature (Thuc. 1.22.4) (Hornblower 1987: 133). As regards specific examples of medical influence, Page (1953) and Parry (1969) point to Thucydides' description of the great Athenian plague, arguing that this account is filled with technical medical terms (Thuc. 2.47-54) Hussey (1985: 178) and Corwin (1988: 843) similarly observe that Thucydides' depiction of the Corcyrean *stasis* (in particular its language) "curiously resembles that of the plague at Athens" (Thuc. 3.70-85).¹⁸ Even though Solon (W 4) is arguably the first to depict political turbulence as a disease, Thucydides is the first to use disease imagery

¹⁶ For more on this passage, see Ch. 5; on *prophasis*, see further below.

¹⁷ For the medical connotation of *prophasis* in Thucydides, see Rechenauer (1991: 38-109) and Tuplin (1998: 285n11).

¹⁸ Hussey (1987) argues that Thucydides' depiction of *stasis* as a disease is inspired by Democritus fr. 300 in which *stasis* is compared to disease, but its date and authenticity is disputed (Procopé 1989). See Kallet (1999) for a discussion of disease language in Thucydides' description of the massacre at Mykalessos (7.27-29).

to highlight the "morally corrosive effects" of *stasis* (Hussey 1985: 188).¹⁹ This may have had an influence on Demosthenes, who likewise, as we shall see, throughout his speeches against Philip but explicitly in the *Third Philippic* (3.9) and extensively in *On the False Embassy* (19.259-262), uses disease imagery to depict the decay of political and moral order.

In addition to this, Demosthenes may have been inspired by Thucydides' depiction of the good citizen *qua* politician as a physician. In the Sicilian debate, Nicias uses the image of the physician to argue against Athenian intervention in Sicily:

Καὶ σύ, ὦ πρότασι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαί τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι **πολίτης ἀγαθός**, ἐπιπήφιζε καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὐτίς Ἀθηναίοις, νομίσας, εἰ ὀρρωδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσώνδ' ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, **τῆς δὲ πόλεως <κακῶς>βουλευσαμένης ἱατρὸς ἂν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι, ὅς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ ὡς πλείστα ἢ ἐκῶν εἶναι μηδὲν βλάβη.** (6.14.3)

So Chairman, if you see it as your responsibility to protect the interests of the city, and want to show yourself a **good citizen**, I ask you to put this to the vote and invite the Athenians to give their opinions once more. If you are nervous about calling for a second vote, you should consider that in front of so many witnesses you cannot be accused of a breach of procedure, and that **you have it in your power to be a physician of city when it has made a wrong decision. This is the honorable exercise of office--to benefit one's country as best as one can, or at least be no conscious party to its harm.** (Trans. Hammond 2009)

Nicias urges the good politician to adopt the Hippocratic principle of *non nocere* (Hp. *Jus.* 1), that is, physicians should never harm their patients on purpose (Hornblower 1987: 131).²⁰ Nicias makes this comparison in order to underscore his belief that pro-war politicians such as Alcibiades are harming their patient, the city, by subjecting it to immense financial hardship. As we shall see, Demosthenes appropriates the image of the physician in a similar way but for the

¹⁹ Cf. Eur. *Her.* (34, 273, 543) for the equation of *stasis* with disease, but here tyranny is the underlying cause.

²⁰ See Edelstein (1943) and Miles (2004) for a discussion of the principle of *non nocere* in the Hippocratic treatise *Oath*.

opposite reason: he uses it to argue for war with Macedon.²¹ The good politician, like the physician, speaks up and takes quick action (i.e. supports war) so that his sick patient, Athens, may survive. Like Thucydides' Nicias, Demosthenes makes use of contemporary medical ethics to support his argument.

III. Plato

Plato's dialogues teem with medical language and imagery, a phenomenon that can be explained by the fact that his *floruit*, like Thucydides', corresponds with the rise and spread of Hippocratic medicine. Hutchinson (1988: 18) hypothesizes that Plato drew his illustrations from this field because of its relatively high repute, and/or because it was the topic of contemporary discussion. Based on a direct reference to Hippocrates in the *Phaedrus* (270c), we can assume with some confidence that the brand of medicine with which Plato is engaging is likely Hippocratic.²² In the following, I do not attempt to explicate the ways in which Plato appropriated Hippocratic ideas; instead, I offer up some suggestions about how Demosthenes and his contemporaries may have been inspired by Plato's use of medical language.²³ I argue that the physician analogy in both its forms, that is, the comparison of a politician/orator to a physician and the portrayal of punishment as a type of judicial medicine is a Platonic concept.

Although Thucydides is arguably the first that we know of to directly compare the politician-orator with the physician, Plato uses this analogy so frequently that it can be considered distinctively Platonic. Of all his dialogues, it features most prominently in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*. In the *Gorgias*, this comparison, which frames the entire dialogue, arises

²¹ For more on this topic, see Ch. 5.

²² See Steckerel (1945) and Herter (1976) on the problematic nature of *Phaedrus* 270c.

²³ For Plato's use of the Hippocratic method (*diaeresis*) as model for all *technai*, see Hutchinson (1988), Jouanna (2001: 256-258), and Levin (2014).

from the title character's claim that medicine is subordinate to rhetoric.²⁴ He offers an anecdote from his own life to support his argument. He tells Socrates that his brother Herodicus, a physician, used to take him on his rounds because he required his powers of persuasion, for some of his brother's patients needed to be convinced of the benefit of painful therapies such as cautery and the knife (456b-c). Although both the orator and the physician need to be able to persuade, the orator, according to Gorgias, will always be superior at this task.²⁵ Socrates responds with an attack on rhetoric. He disparages it as a *technê* and groups it with fine cooking (ὄψοποιική), a pretender to the medical art, on the basis that both aim at gratification, not what is beneficial (462c). Socrates then presents medicine as model for rhetoric, because it investigates the nature of its subject and gives an account of its proceedings (501a). In the *Phaedrus*, Plato's Socrates more explicitly presents the physician as the model orator (Pender 2005: 44). He explains to Phaedrus that the good orator must adapt his speeches to his audience just like the good physician, who establishes a different regimen for each of his patients based on the idiosyncrasies of their nature (271b). As in the *Gorgias*, the Socrates of the *Phaedrus* also holds up the Hippocratic method of causal knowledge, that knowledge can only come from an understanding of causes (*aitiai*), as the model for rhetoric (270b).

²⁴ This scene may be inspired by Gorgias' *Helen* (14), in which Gorgias compares medicine and rhetoric, specifically the effect of speeches on the mind to drugs on the body (14). Although this is not explicitly stated in the *Helen*, the implication is that rhetoric is superior to medicine because it a powerful ruler (δυνάστης μέγας) capable of "godlike achievements" (θειότατα ἔργα) (8).

²⁵ Jouanna (2012) argues that scholars of ancient medicine often understate the influence of medicine on rhetoric. He contends that the Hippocratic texts *Art* and *On the Nature of Man* are epideictic treatises that were likely orally delivered by sophists. He adds that the purpose of these treatises may have been to instruct students in rhetoric, not in medicine, although the ideas presented are consistent with Hippocratic theories. If they were aimed at medical audience, it could show the extent to which physicians considered rhetoric a necessary tool for their profession.

The question that emerges from a brief look at the physician analogy in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* is why would the orators, as Campbell (1982) asks, imitate this analogy when it is so intimately tied to a condemnation of traditional rhetoric, their brand of rhetoric? Brock (2013: 150) explains that the answer might lie in the physician's function in the analogy: he represents an expert practitioner, whose authority people defer to because it comes from a place of superior knowledge. Just as Plato adapts medical ideas to suit the purpose of his dialogues, as Jouanna (2001: 258) notes, the orators adapt the physician analogy to highlight their political expertise.

As with the physician analogy, Brock (2013: 73) asserts that the moral content of the orators' medical language can be traced to Plato. This is most clearly manifested in their portrayal of punishment as a sort of medicine. This comparison figures prominently in the *Gorgias*, where the justice of the courts is compared to medicine:

{ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην δίδοναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν,
 πονηρίας;
 {ΠΩΛ.} Ἦν γάρ.
 {ΣΩ.} Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιότερους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται
 πονηρίας ἢ δίκη.
 (*Gorg.* 478d4-7)

Socrates: Well, did paying for one's crimes turn out to be a release from the greatest evil--badness?

Polus: Yes, it did.

Socrates: Yes, because just punishment teaches people self-control, and makes them more just, and justice is a medicine for badness.

(Trans. Schofield and Griffith 2010)

Plato's Socrates equates the two *technai* of medicine and justice on the grounds that they share a common aim: both restore health, one of the body, the other of the soul. Moreover, they both require their patient's compliance, even in the face of pain. For the healing of a soul to be successful, as Socrates explains, the "wicked" patient must possess manly courage in order to willingly submit to punishment, just as the physically ill patient must give him/herself over to

cautery or the knife in order to be healed (480c6-8). The comparison of corporal punishment to cautery and the knife, notoriously painful treatments, offers an explanation for why some souls become incurable (ἀνίατον).²⁶ Fearing pain, they avoid punishment, and as a result their souls festers (ὑπουλον) beyond the point where treatment would do any good. Even though Plato's Socrates does not explicitly express the consequence of incurability in the *Gorgias*, the implication is that the only option for the city is to kill or banish the *aniatos* individual.

In the *Republic*, as Levin (2014: 121) observes, the Platonic Socrates' attitude towards the irremediably unjust is more concrete and more extreme. Socrates recommends that those with psychic defects be killed, for in his eyes such individuals are of no use to the state (406c-d, 407c-e, 408a-b). Under this same reasoning, medicine has a more limited role in his ideal city. It is restricted to those who are "healthy in their nature and habits" (407c8-9). Those suffering from terminal illnesses are denied medicine because they are considered defective, and as such can no longer carry out their natural societal role (Levin 2014: 120).²⁷ It is for a similar reason that regimen is anathema in Socrates' ideal city, for it distracts citizens from fulfilling their societal function by encouraging excessive self-care of the body (*R.* 407b-c, cf. 405c-d) (Holmes 2010: 196-210). The logic of this exclusion, as well as his harsh stance towards deviant individuals, is to safeguard the order and well-being of the city

Although the orators adopt this comparison of punishment with medicine and the wicked individual with a terminal disease for reasons similar to Plato, they also innovate to fit the intent

²⁶ According to the Hippocratic medical writers, no disease was intrinsically incurable unless it originated from a defect in the *physis* of an individual, the disease was inherited, or it arose from a severe accident (Von Staden 1990: 93-95).

²⁷ Plato's Socrates underscores his belief that useless individuals should be killed with a mythical aside about how the sons of Asclepius at Troy allegedly denied medical attention to those who were "diseased and self-indulgent in their natures" because they lacked any value to others (*R.*408b).

of their speeches. As in the physician analogy, they pick and choose the aspects that strengthen their argument. Like Plato, they want a guilty verdict to be seen as the only way by which the city's order can be restored. However, I believe that they demand punishment because they fear that the offender will inspire others to imitate his/her bad behavior not because such an individual is useless to the state. These similarities between Plato and the orators may have contributed to the later biographical tradition that Plato taught some of them, namely Hyperides (Athen. viii. 342c) and Demosthenes (Ps-Plut. *Vit. Dec. Orat.* 8).

IV. Isocrates

Isocrates was an Athenian orator (436-338 B.C.E.) who, as far we know, exerted a strong influence on the intellectual culture of the fourth century, despite the fact that he never set foot in a courtroom.²⁸ Lacking confidence in his vocal abilities, he worked as *logographos* until, dissatisfied with that career, he abandoned it and opened a school for rhetoric in the early 390s (Kennedy 1963: 176-7). He gained notoriety for criticizing his fellow educators for teaching rhetoric and philosophy the wrong way (Wilcox 1945: 171). To him, virtue could only be acquired through training and experience; it did not require profound understanding (Hutchinson 1988: 31). Rhetoric played an important role in Isocrates' model of virtue, since he believed that practice in rhetorical composition could lead to an increased moral awareness, which in turn could lead to virtue (Hutchinson 1988: 28; Kennedy 1963: 178). Because of his views on rhetoric, education, and philosophy, Plato became one of his fiercest opponents, mocking him for teaching

²⁸ The primary sources for information about Isocrates' life are his own works as well as Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Isocrates* and Pseudo-Plutarch's *Lives of the Ten Orators*.

people how to argue, not how to think.²⁹ Despite this rivalry, Kennedy (1963: 180-185) notes, that the two have more in common than once was thought: in particular, Isocrates, like Plato, considered himself a follower of Socrates. The best evidence of this influence is the *Antidosis*, in which Isocrates defends himself against the same charges that were leveled against Socrates (as chronicled in Plato's *Apology*), namely that, he corrupted the youth with his teachings (181).

Since Isocrates also never set foot in the Assembly, his political influence, Kennedy estimates, was minimal at best (199).³⁰ The fact that his political thought constantly vacillated did not help. For instance, in the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates touts panhellenism, political harmony among the Greeks, as the only solution to Athens' decline (190). However, following the composition of the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates abandoned the concept and experimented with other types of oratory for the next decade. He eventually returned to panhellenism but with a notable change: he no longer considered its achievement possible under Athenian leadership, which, in his opinion, was ineffective (191). In the *Philip*, as he would later reiterate in his *First Letter to Philip*, Isocrates looks to Philip II of Macedon to unite Greece. In 342 B.C.E., perhaps due to criticism from his pupils, he changed his pro-Macedonian stance and composed a defense of Athens, the *Panathenaicus*. Nonetheless, he reverted to his former position after the battle of Chaeronea. In his *Second Letter to Philip*, Isocrates praises Philip's victory and predicts that the Macedonian will soon become a god with the defeat of the Persians.

Isocrates uses medical imagery with some frequency, and most examples, like Demosthenes', are confined to political contexts. The exception is the *Busiris*, which Isocrates

²⁹ For the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* (in particular) as Plato's responses to Isocrates' *paideia*, see Kennedy (1963: 185), Hutchinson (1988: 28-31), and Livingstone (2001: 56-76).

³⁰ Kennedy cautions against interpreting any of Isocrates' political thoughts as sincere, for the rhetorician, in his opinion, is more concerned with how he articulates an argument than the argument's content.

composed early in his pedagogical career, somewhere between 388-384 B.C.E., as a (sophistic) rhetorical exercise in the tradition of Gorgias' *Helen*, i.e. a defense of a notorious villain (cf. Isocr. *Helen*).³¹ This encomium to the mythological Egyptian tyrant Busiris, famous for violating the bonds of *xenia* by killing his guests, is a "sophisticated advertisement for Isocrates' educational program" (Livingstone 2001: 2). Isocrates wrote his *Busiris* as a response to his rival Polycrates' similarly titled encomium: he explains that his purpose is to show Polycrates how to praise Busiris properly because he failed to do so. By displaying his rhetorical superiority over Polycrates, his hope may have been to acquire (or steal) students.

The main argument of Isocrates' encomium is that Busiris should be lauded as the founder of Egyptian civilization, including a model constitution, which he implies the Greeks should adopt (Livingstone 2001: 2).³² The "medical passage" is found in Isocrates' praise of Egyptian ingenuity. He explains that they were the first to discover the medical art (ιατρικήν):

μεθ' ὧν ἐκείνοι βιοτεύοντες τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἰατρικὴν ἐξεύρον ἐπικουρίαν, οὐ διακεκινδυνευμένοις φαρμάκοις χρωμένῃν ἀλλὰ τοιούτοις ἃ τὴν μὲν ἀσφάλειαν ὁμοίαν ἔχει τῇ τροφῇ τῇ καθ' ἡμέραν, τὰς δ' ὠφελείας τηλικαύτας ὥστ' ἐκείνους ὁμολογουμένως ὑγιεινοτάτους εἶναι καὶ μακροβιωτάτους. . . (*Busiris* (11). 22)

And the priests, because they enjoyed such conditions of life, discovered for the body the aid which the medical art affords, not that which uses dangerous drugs, but drugs of such a nature that they are harmless as daily food, yet in their effects are so beneficial that the Egyptians are admittedly the healthiest and most long of life . . . (Trans. Norlin 1980)

Isocrates thus credits the Egyptians with the invention of pharmaceuticals. He also may be suggesting that they were the first to discover regimen, which is implied by the phrase "drugs of

³¹ For the date of Isocrates' *Busiris*, see Livingstone (2001: 40). See below for further discussion of Isocrates' relationship with Gorgias.

³² Based on the insincere nature of Gorgian encomia--Gorgias famously calls his *Helen* his παίγνιον ("play thing") (*Hel.* 21)--it is likely that Isocrates' *Busiris* should be viewed similarly. For the question of whether such sophistic exercises were taken seriously, see Gagarin (2001).

such a nature that they are harmless as daily food." If he is referring to regimen, this might indicate that he augmented his account of Egypt with images from his own society, specifically Hippocratic medicine. Livingstone (2001: 147), in reference to this passage, points out its similarities to depictions of Egypt in *Odyssey* 4, Herodotus' *Histories* 2, and Plato's *Republic* 3. In the *Odyssey*, Egypt is a "country of doctors" whose inhabitants are skilled in the use of drugs (*Od.* 4.231); in the *Histories*, they are credited with the discovery of enemas, purgatives, and emetics (Hdt. 2.84, 3.1, 3.129). Isocrates was likely influenced by these accounts of Egypt, especially when other passages of the *Busiris*, are considered. However, the only other source to mention regimen directly is the *Republic* (Jouanna 2001: 161).³³

The *Republic* differs from the previous two examples in that it has nothing to do with Egypt. However, Kennedy (1963: 181), Eucken (1983: 172-212), and Livingstone (2001: 54) all have brought up the numerous points of comparison between the *Busiris* and the *Republic* as evidence that the two works were meant to be read together. Livingstone interprets the *Busiris* as an attack on Plato's political philosophy, arguing that the ideal state of the *Busiris* is a parody of Kallipolis (54).³⁴ In Plato's ideal city, regimen is banned under the belief that it distracts citizens from the pursuit of a virtuous life. Caution, incision, and emetics, on the other hand, are allowed in Kallipolis (*Rep.* 406d), since they can restore a patient's health and thus work quickly--if used on minor ailments. By admitting medicine (esp. regimen) into his ideal state, Isocrates may be critiquing his opponents' political philosophy. Alternatively, Isocrates may include this note

³³ The Hippocratic author of *Regimen in Acute Diseases* describes regimen as a recent invention (1). Plato also disparagingly contrasts the pharmacological medicine of Homer with the dietary medicine of his contemporaries in the *Republic* (405c).

³⁴ Eucken (1983: 175) conjectures that, although the *Busiris* was composed before the publication of the *Republic*, the ideas in Plato's work were likely circulating well before its formal composition. Livingstone (2001: 47), on the other hand, believes that a later composition date of the *Busiris* would explain the parallels.

about the origin of medicine because it accords with Greek stereotypes of Egypt as a place of immense power, wealth, and learning (Livingstone 2001: 54).³⁵ Whatever the case, it is apparent that medicine was a source of fascination (and contention) for fourth-century Greeks and may explain its appearance in "popular" places such as oratory.

In some of Isocrates' other works, medicine appears in political contexts in the form of metaphors or similes.³⁶ In his *Encomium of Helen*, which was written around the same time as his *Busiris*, he refers to citizens who try to seize power by force as νοσήματα τῶν πόλεων, "diseases of cities" (10.34). The same phrase is also found several times in Plato, who similarly uses it to describe deviant constitutions such as oligarchy and tyranny (*Rep.* 544c7) and useless citizens (*Rep.* 552c4; *Leg.* 736a1). Another medical metaphor is found in Isocrates' *On the Peace*, which he composed in response to Athens' financial devastation in the Social War. In it he presses for peace with Macedon because, in his opinion, war would be financially crippling for an already weakened Athens. The medical metaphor revolves around a comparison of speeches to surgery and cautery:

Ἐμὸν μὲν οὖν ἔργον ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κηδομένων τῆς πόλεως προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν λόγων μὴ τοὺς ἡδίστους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὠφελιμωτάτους· ὑμᾶς δὲ χρῆ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο γινώσκειν, ὅτι τῶν μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσημάτων πολλὰί θεραπείαι καὶ παντοδαπαὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς εὐρηνταί, ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς ταῖς ἀγνοοῦσαις καὶ γεμούσαις πονηρῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο φάρμακον πλὴν λόγος ὁ τολμῶν τοῖς ἀμαρτανομένοις ἐπιπλήττειν, ἔπειθ' ὅτι καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν τὰς μὲν καύσεις καὶ τὰς τομὰς τῶν ἰατρῶν ὑπομένειν ἵνα πλειόνων ἀλγηδόνων ἀπαλλαγῶμεν, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἀποδοκιμάζειν πρὶν εἰδέναί σαφῶς, εἰ τοιαύτην ἔχουσιν τὴν δύναμιν ὥστ' ὠφελῆσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. (*On the Peace* (8). 39-40)

³⁵ One of the primary anxieties surrounding physicians in ancient Greece was that they were often of foreign origin (Burkert 1962: 53-54). By making Egypt the birthplace of medicine, the perception of physicians as non-Greek and therefore untrustworthy was encouraged. See Vasunia (2001) for a detailed study of Greek perceptions of Egypt.

³⁶ For examples of literal illness, see *Aegineticus* (19).28; *Panathenaicus* (12).267.

It is, therefore, my duty and the duty of all who care about the welfare of the state to choose, not those discourses which are agreeable to you, but those which are profitable for you to hear. And you, for your part, ought to realize, in the first place, that while many treatments of all kinds have been discovered by physicians for the ills of our bodies, there exists no remedy for souls which are ignorant of the truth and filled with base desires other than the kind of discourse which boldly rebukes the sins which they commit, and, in the second place, that it is absurd to submit to the cauteries and cuttings of physicians in order that we may be relieved of greater pains and yet refuse to hear discourses before knowing clearly whether or not they have the power to benefit their hearers. (Trans. Norlin 1980)

Isocrates begins by conflating ignorance and wickedness with disease. He then underscores the limitations of medicine by explaining that there are no medical remedies for this psychic disease. Rhetoric, on the other hand, does offer a cure: speeches can function as medicine.³⁷ This leads Isocrates to his second medical metaphor, that of surgery and cautery. He explains that speeches are like surgery and cautery because they are painful yet beneficial. This elaborate metaphor is intended to make his pro-peace arguments more palatable, for Isocrates knows that his fellow Athenians do not want to hear the truth of their situation, that is, that they do not possess sufficient resources to mount an offensive against Philip. Peace is their only option; although painful, it will be beneficial to them in the long run just like surgery and cautery.

Isocrates' subordination of medicine to rhetoric may be a legacy of his teacher, Gorgias. Tradition has it that as a youth Isocrates left Athens and traveled to Thessaly to study with Gorgias (Cic. *Orator* 176). Whether this is true or not, his mythological epideictic speeches, particularly his *Encomium of Helen*, are clearly influenced by Gorgias, who had composed his own *Encomium of Helen* (Kennedy 1963: 178). In this work, Gorgias equates the power of speech on the mind to that of drugs on the body (*Hel.* 14). Similarly, in Plato's *Gorgias*, Gorgias

³⁷ A fragment attributed to Isocrates but preserved by Maximus the Confessor expresses a similar view of rhetoric as medicine: Τὸν λογισμὸν ὡσπερ ἰατρὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι δεῖ ἐν ἀτυχίᾳ βοηθόν. (vol. 91, p. 590): "Just like a good physician, it is necessary to summon the help of logic in times of misfortune."

explicitly argues that rhetoric is superior to medicine (*Gorg.* 456b). Isocrates' metaphors express the same belief in rhetoric's superiority, for it is rhetoric, not medicine that can convince the obstinate mind to accept what it does not want to hear.³⁸

In addition to comparing bad citizens and ignorance to disease, Isocrates also equates *stasis* with disease. In the *Panathenaicus*, a discourse written to ameliorate his damaged reputation, Isocrates praises Athens by way of a lengthy diatribe against Sparta. One of the points that he makes is about the treatment of allies. He explains that critics blame both Athens and Sparta for stirring up faction (στάσις), slaughter (σφαγή), and revolution (μεταβολή), but it is Sparta that is guilty of filling its allied cities with misfortune (συμφοραί) and disease (νοσημάτα).³⁹ Athens never did such a thing until its disastrous defeat at Aegospotami (12.99). As we saw earlier, this comparison of political upheaval to disease is not novel. Thus, it is clear that Isocrates' metaphor was inspired by a tradition of interpreting political turbulence in this way.

V. The Minor Attic Orators

I conclude this chapter by looking at the fragments of the minor orators Hyperides, Demades, and Dinarchus, for Demosthenes was not the only professional logographer/orator to use medical language to capture the attention of his audience.⁴⁰ Campbell (1982) explains this phenomenon as the legacy of Plato. He states that Demosthenes and his contemporaries were inspired by Plato, who himself was inspired by the Hippocratics. Just like Plato, the orators use the figure of the physician to explicate the desirable qualities of the politician (810-11). I agree with Campbell

³⁸ See above for Plato's comparison of punishment to cautery and surgery.

³⁹ For a similar passage, see Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (4). 114.

⁴⁰ Hyperides and Demades are called "minor" orators only because little of them survives. For a full treatment of Aeschines' medical language, see Ch. 3.

that Plato and the Hippocratics (directly or indirectly) had a profound influence on their use of medical language. However, he fails to take into account the possibility that they may have borrowed from each other or that such medical metaphors had become *topoi* by the last quarter of the fourth century. But we know that the minor orators borrowed language and tropes from other (better) orators. Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Hermogenes of Taurus deem Dinarchus, the last of the traditional ten great orators, an inferior Demosthenes: Dionysius calls him a "rustic Demosthenes" (ἄγροικος Δημοσθένης; *Dinarch.* 8), Hermogenes, a "small-beer Demosthenes" (κρίθινος Δημοσθένης; *περὶ ἰδεῶν* B, p. 384W). Similarly, De Falco (1954: 97-99) notes that Demades, a more skilled orator than Dinarchus, borrowed his imagery from others, especially Demosthenes and Pericles.⁴¹ In the case of Hyperides, the biographers Hermippus (*Pupils of Isocrates* 3) and Athenaeus (*Athen.* viii. 342c) assert that he was the student of Plato and Isocrates, a claim which is dubious but which suggests that his style (including medical imagery) was or was perceived to be influenced by the two great philosophers. In sum, the picture that emerges is more complicated than Campbell supposes, for it is likely that the orators appropriated striking images not only from an established tradition but also from each other.

A. Hyperides

Hyperides, like his contemporary Demosthenes, was staunchly against peace with Macedon. Born in Athens in 390 B.C.E., he began his professional life as a logographer, but rose to prominence after his joint prosecution of Philocrates with Demosthenes in 343 B.C.E.⁴² It was during this trial that the two allegedly became friends. After Chaeronea Hyperides continued to

⁴¹ Hudson-Williams (1956: 27-28) notes that De Falco's study of the fragments of Demosthenes is full of unsubstantiated generalizations.

⁴² The primary source for Hyperides' life is Pseudo-Plutarch's *Lives of the Ten Orators*.

be active in the courts: he prosecuted Aristogeiton for introducing a proposal that violated the existing laws (cf. Dem. 25, 26),⁴³ and Philippides for trying to pass a pro-Macedonian measure. In 324 B.C.E., he prosecuted his (former) friend Demosthenes for accepting bribes in the Harpalus affair, although he himself had proposed that Demosthenes should be awarded a crown for his services before Chaeronea. After Alexander's death, Hyperides tried to stir up the Greeks against Antipater's reign, and it was during this time that he reconciled with Demosthenes. However, after Antipater defeated the Greeks at the Battle of Crannon, Hyperides was condemned to death in 322 B.C.E. along with Demosthenes and Demades at the Macedonian's behest.

Whitehead (2000: 13) describes Hyperides' style as "eclectic," "spiced with colloquialisms and comic diction," and "well-calculated" to the liking of his popular audience. It is likely for this reason that judgment of Hyperides' style is mixed.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, there is not much for the modern reader to judge, because only one speech in its entirety survives along with five other substantial fragmentary speeches. As Whitehead remarks, if it were not for the discovery of four papyri in the nineteenth century, we would have no Hyperides (3).⁴⁵ Despite this limited sampling, we have two examples of medical imagery that survive, the most elaborate coming from his speech *Against Philippides*, in which Hyperides compares the human body to a city:

ἔπ[ε]ιθ' [οὔ]τοι
 ἐπεμβάινουσιν τῶι δή-
 μωι ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχ[ί]αις. διό-

⁴³ See Ch. 5 for medical language in Demosthenes' *Against Aristogeiton* I (25).

⁴⁴ For a negative appraisal of his style, see Hermogenes (*peri ideôn*, 396. 18-397. 6), who finds fault with his extravagant and careless vocabulary. For a more positive assessment, see Dio Chyrsom (18.11), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*de ant. orat.* 4; *de. vet. cens.* 5.6, *de. Dinarch.* 6-7) and [Longinus] *De. Sublim.* 34.3.

⁴⁵ These are known as Ardenianus, Storbartianus, Londiniensis, and Parisinus.

περὶ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἄξι-
οί εἰσιν [μ]ισεῖσθ[αι]. ὥσ-
περ γὰρ τ[ὰ] σώματ[α] πλείσ-
της ἐπ[ιμ]ελείας ἐν [ταῖς
ἀρρωσ[τί]αις [δ]εῖται, οὐ-
τως καὶ [αἱ] π[ό]λεις πλείσ-
της θεο[απ]εί[α]ς ἐν ταῖς ἀ-
τυχίαις δι[έο]ντ[αι] (*Against Philippides* fr. 10)

Moreover, these men trample on the people in their misfortunes. Hence they are far more deserving of hatred. **Just as human bodies need most care when they are sick, so it is with cities, which need the most attention in times of misfortune.** (Trans. Campbell 1982, pg. 862)

Blass (1898: 32-33) judges this simile as "poetic" and ornate," but Whitehead (2000: 41) believes that it does not fit the simple context, in which Hyperides' urges the jurors to spurn men like Philippides who take advantage of the people's misfortunes to advance pro-Macedonian policies. In the simile itself he compares cities that have suffered misfortune to bodies in need of medical treatment. Although the simile dramatically (and a bit incongruously) shifts from the people to cities, it does effectively communicate the danger that Macedonian sympathizers were thought to pose in post-Chaeronea Athens. Hyperides' warning is that Athens cannot survive any more misfortune: if Philippides is allowed to pass his pro-Macedonian policy, the city might be destroyed. The jurors thus become physicians, who alone are able to safeguard the city with their vote.

In *Against Philippides*, Hyperides compares Athens to a sick patient, but in *Against Demosthenes*, he goes further by ensouling the city:

οἷς δὲ μήτε ταῦ-
τα ἰκανά ἐστιν μήτ' ἐ-
κείνα, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐπ' αὐ-
τῷ **τῷ σώματι τῆς**
πόλεως δῶρα εἰλή-
φασι, πῶς οὐκ ἄξι-
ον τούτους κολ[άξ]ειν

ἔστιν; (*Against Demosthenes* (5). 6, Col. 25)

If neither of these sources is enough for men who have now accepted bribes, which threaten the **very body politic**, who can doubt our right to punish them? (Whitehead 2000, pg. 369)

As Brock (2013: 70) points out, this is one of the first instances where the phrase "body of the city" appears; the other is found in Dinarchus (1.110), whose imitation of his fellow orators has already been noted.⁴⁶ This phrase is significant because it suggests that by the second half of the fourth century, the city was popularly conceived of as a corporate entity with unified interests, as opposed to a group of individuals defined primarily by the bonds of citizenship. It may also offer an explanation for the popularity of medical imagery in the orators, for under this corporate model one bad citizen has the power to damage the whole, just like a disease's effect on the body. The proliferation of the Hippocratic corpus, as well as the influence of Plato, during this time may have made such an analogy more attractive (Brock 2013: 151). Hyperides portrays the corruption of Demosthenes, as well as the other politicians who accepted bribes from Harpalus, as threatening the entire city, that is, the "life/body" of the city. The implicit appeal, just as in *Against Philippides*, is for the jury to protect the city with their votes. The irony is that

⁴⁶ The latter is the only example of "medical" language in the extant fragments of Dinarchus. As with Hyperides, the metaphor of the city-body appears in Dinarchus' prosecution of Demosthenes for accepting bribes from Harpalus. He urges the jurors not to take pity on Demosthenes, but to think of the city's body and the damage that Demosthenes has done to it: και ὅταν Δημοσθένης ἐξαπατήσαι βουλόμενος και παρακρουόμενος ὑμᾶς οικτίζηται και δακρύη, ὑμεῖς εἰς τὸ τῆς πόλεως σῶμ ἀποβλέψαντες και τὴν πρότερον δόξαν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῇ, ἀντίθετε, πότερον ἢ πόλις ἐλεεινότερα διὰ τοῦτον γέγονεν ἢ διὰ τὴν πόλιν Δημοσθένης. (*Against Demosthenes* (1). 110-111).

And when Demosthenes wishes to cheat you and cunningly turns pathetic, shedding tears, you must think of the **body of the city**, and the glory which it once possessed, and judge between two alternatives: which has become the more deserving of pity: the city because of Demosthenes or Demosthenes because of the city?" (Trans. Burt 1962).

Demosthenes had used a similar appeal in the *Philippics* regarding Philip and against Aeschines in *Against the False Embassy*; now this *topos* is successfully turned against him.

B. Demades

There is no ancient biography of the orator Demades (380-319 B.C.E.); rather, information about his life is gathered from references to him in both the fragments of his contemporaries and Hellenistic biographers such as Pseudo-Plutarch, Diodorus, and Athenaeus (Burtt 1954: 329). Demades seems to have been regarded as one of the most brilliant speakers of his day: he was especially admired for his wit and his excellence in *ex tempore* debate (322). Like Aeschines, he belonged to the pro-peace faction in Athens, and he is known to have opposed Demosthenes on the issue of the Olynthian War in 349 B.C.E. After the battle of Chaeronea, along with Aeschines he helped to broker peace with Philip (Quintil. ii. 17. 12; Suidas *s.v.* "Demades"). Moreover, he was later honored with free meals in the Prytaneum and a bronze statue in the Agora for persuading Alexander to relent from his demand that Athens hand over its chief statesmen after his sack of Thebes. Despite these honors, like Demosthenes he was convicted of accepting bribes in the Harpalus affair, and a few years he was disenfranchised for his inability to pay the enormous fine for putting forward three illegal proposals, including the motion that Alexander should be deified. His *atimia* was revoked, however, when he was needed as a mediator after the Battle of Crannon. During this time, he wrote to Alexander's general Perdiccas for help in overthrowing Antipater, a treachery that would later cost him his life. In 319 B.C.E., Antipater discovered Demades' letter to Perdiccas and sentenced him to death.

None of Demades' written works survives, only some of his gnomic sayings. The Byzantines attributed several works to him, most notably the apologetic *On the Twelve Years*, a

defense of "Demades'" career over the previous twelve years, which is now rejected as spurious.⁴⁷ As to the gnomic sayings preserved under his name, they are filled with examples of medical imagery, with all but one explicitly drawing an analogy between medicine and politics. Even if these sayings are fictitious, they may have been preserved under his name because he was fond of medical metaphors and similes. His relevant sayings are as follows:

Fr. 24: οὔτε δὲ ἰατρὸς ἐμπείρως δύναται θεραπεῦσαι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ἐὰν μὴ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ νοσήματος κατανοήσῃ, οὔτε δικαστῆς ὁσίαν θεῖναι τὴν ψήφον, ἐὰν μὴ τοῖς τῆς κρίσεως δικαίοις σαφῶς ἢ παρηκολουθηκῶς

Neither can the doctor heal the sick by experience, unless he understands the cause of the disease, nor the juror cast a right vote, unless he has clearly followed his right judgment.

Fr. 26: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν νόσος τὴν ὄρασιν συγγέασα κωλύει τὰ ἐμποδῶν κείμενα θεωρεῖν, οὕτως ἄδικος παρεισδύνων λόγος εἰς τὰς τῶν δικαστῶν γνώμας οὐκ ἐὰν δι' ὀργὴν συνορᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Just as disease of the eyes, having obliterated one's vision, prevents one from seeing what's lying in one's path, thus an unjust speech, penetrating into the minds of the jurors, does not allow them to detect the truth because of anger.

Fr. 38: Ἀσκληπιάδαις μείζων ὀφείλεται χάρις ἐπερχομένην ἀναστέλλουσι νόσον ἢ παραπεσοῦσαν ἰασαμένοις. [τοῦ γὰρ ἀπηλλάχθαι κακοῦ τὸ μὴ πάσχειν αἰρετώτερον]

A greater thanks is owed to the Asclepiads who repulse an attack of a disease than those who have healed a disease that has befallen one. [For not to suffer is more preferable than to be freed from an evil].

Fr. 64: δεῖ δὲ τὸν σύμβουλον, καθάπερ τὸν ἰατρόν, οὐ τῆς νόσου τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς θεραπείας τὴν χάριν ἀπολαμβάνειν.

It is necessary for the adviser, just as a doctor, not to be blamed for (causing) the disease, but to receive thanks for treating it.

⁴⁷ Blass (1898: 269-72), Burt (1954: 334-5), Kennedy (1963: 258, 286, 323), and Worthington (1991: 90).

Fr. 38 is unique because it may contain the only direct reference to the Hippocratics in the extant corpus of the Attic Orators--Hippocratic physicians were commonly referred to by the eponym "Sons of Asclepius" (Jouanna 2001). Further evidence for this identification may be found in the fragment's message, which advocates preventative medicine on the grounds that it causes less suffering to the patient. The Hippocratics, as Plato (disparagingly) points out, were the first to manipulate diet, sex, sleep, and exercise for both preventive and therapeutic purposes. Although a direct political context is absent, based on the political nature of the other fragments, fr. 38 may have been part of plea in which Demades urged his fellow citizens to look after the health of the city like physicians by taking taking pre-emptive action, so as to minimize future suffering. The fact that this sort of exhortation is found in his contemporaries suggests that the comparison of the jury to physicians was a *topos* by the end of the fourth century.

Fragments 24, 26, and 64 all contain explicit comparisons of the jury/political adviser to a physician. In fr. 24 Demades advises the juror to be careful when casting his vote. He urges him to imitate the physician who unites experience (ἐμπειρία) with an understanding of the cause (αἰτία) to effect a successful healing. Demades then explains his reasoning. He says that the juror will not be able to cast a holy vote (ὁσία ψήφος) unless guided by justice, a description that might be intended to remind him of the oath that he swore.⁴⁸ With this comparison, Demades may be suggesting that experience is not a reliable criterion because it can lead to a prejudiced vote.⁴⁹ Fr. 26 is of a similar tenor. Here unjust speech (ἄδικος λόγος) is compared to a disease

⁴⁸ The Heliastic Oath is the oath that jurors swore at the beginning of trial, in which they promised to listen impartially to both plaintiff and defendant and cast a vote in accordance with the laws or what they deemed just. At the end of the oath, each juror uttered a curse against himself to ensure that he did not violate the terms of the oath. See Hansen (1991) and Canevaro (2013) for a discussion and reconstruction of the Heliastic Oath.

⁴⁹ One of the fiercest debates among physicians that lasted well into Galen's time revolved around methodology: some (i.e. empiricists) believed that all a physician needed to achieve a

of the eyes, because both cause blindness: one of the physical sort, the other, metaphorical. Demades, as in the previous fragment, is urging the jurors to make a decision based on the truth (ἀλήθεια). In fr. 26, however, anger is presented as a reason why a juror might not cast a "pure vote." Like a disease of the eyes, an unjust speech arouses anger and thus clouds the one's ability to judge right from wrong. Both fragments thus highlight the potential unreliability of the juror.

In fr. 64 [Demades] turns his critical gaze to the political adviser (σύμβουλον): he uses the figure of the physician to communicate his ideal adviser. He explains that the adviser, just like a physician, should accept thanks only for treatment not for diagnosis alone. As in fr. 24, the good physician is expected to find out the origin (αἰτία) of a disease, but the additional requirement, articulated in this fragment, is that he also cures it. The implication seems to be that to do otherwise would be presumptive, for the physician/adviser has not done his duty until he has freed his patient/city from suffering.

De Falco (1954: 97-99) observes that Demades borrowed his imagery from others, notably Demosthenes and Pericles. Although he does not provide any specific examples, the fragments discussed above, especially fr. 64, may furnish evidence of a Demosthenic influence. For like Demades, Demosthenes uses the figure of the physician in *On the Crown* to explicate the desirable qualities of the political adviser (σύμβουλος): he too expects the good adviser like the good physician to unite word with action (see below, Ch. 2). However, since the authenticity and original context of Demades' fragments cannot be determined, this influence remains

successful healing was experience (*empeiria*), while others (i.e. dogmatists) stated that it was necessary to know the hidden causes of disease (*aitia*), for how could one cure it, if one did not know whence it came. Although there is no firm evidence of the existence of these sects until the third-century, Hutchinson (1988: 25) suggests that Plato's juxtaposition of the slave and free physician in the *Laws* indicates a fourth-century (if not earlier) origin of this controversy. Plato implies that he favors knowledge through causes, because he characterizes those who practice medicine based on experience as slaves, and those who learn by inquiry as free (*Leg.* 720b2-5; 720c3-6).

speculative. Nonetheless, when viewed alongside Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Hyperides' medical language and imagery, these fragments attest to the popular presence of Hippocratic medicine in the fourth century.

In this chapter I hope to have shown the pervasiveness of medical discourse prior to and contemporary with Demosthenes. From Euripides' depiction of the criminal as diseased to Hyperides and Demades' portrayal of the jury as physicians, fifth- and fourth-century writers were deeply influenced by the spread of Hippocratism. In the following chapters, I will examine how Demosthenes plays with and innovates upon this tradition to communicate his views on political excellence.

CHAPTER TWO

Medical Language in *Against the False Embassy*:
Epidemic Disease, *Kairos*, and *Prognôsis*

The medical aspects of Demosthenes' language in *Against the False Embassy* (Dem. 19) are often subtle, especially his use of *prognôsis* ("forecast") and *kairos* ("right timing").¹ Nevertheless, I argue that based on the appearance of these concepts in explicit medical contexts, namely in *On the Crown* (Dem. 18), they should also be interpreted as having medical resonances in *Against the False Embassy*.² In this speech, Demosthenes employs medical language in two different but complementary ways. First, he makes use of the tradition of analogizing politics and medicine to communicate the qualities of the good (and bad) political leader vis-à-vis the physician. Second, he plays with the language of disease to underscore the threat of the corrupt political leader. In this chapter, I examine each of these usages in turn.

Overview

First, I turn to explicit examples of medical language and imagery. Arguably the most striking image in *Against the False Embassy* is Demosthenes' depiction of Aeschines as a part of an epidemic disease of Philippizing (*nosêma deinon* §259): that is, being willing to speak in support of Macedon in exchange for money or advantages (bribes). Demosthenes recites Solon's *Eunomia* elegy (W 4) as a warning of the dire consequence of this disease: loss of political autonomy (*doulosunê*). I contend that the purpose of this metaphorical language is to arouse fear in the jury, so that they see Aeschines' conviction as the only possible way to keep Philipizing

¹ Wooten (1979), Campbell (1982), and more recently Brock (2013) have noted Demosthenes' use of medical language in his speeches against Aeschines (Dem. 18, 19), but they do not fully discuss his use of medical *prognôsis* and *kairos*.

² See Ch. 4.

away from Athens. By incorporating the language of religious pollution into his disease imagery, I argue that Demosthenes makes conviction a matter of civic health.

After examining this passage, I look at examples of implicit medical language and imagery. Throughout the speech, Demosthenes plays with the intersections between politics and medicine, particularly the overlapping qualities of the physician and politician. I assert that he utilizes the medical resonances of "right timing" (*kairos*) to emphasize the need for the politician to act decisively and quickly like a good physician. Moreover, I argue that he borrows the medical concept of "forecast" (*prognôsis*) to communicate his belief that a politician's goodness is measured by his willingness to speak his expert opinion for the good of the state, just as the good physician predicts the course of his patient's disease in order to gain his/her trust in his competency. I believe that the aim of this language and imagery is to present Aeschines as a political charlatan, whose silence and inaction has critically endangered Athens' wellness.

My analyses draw heavily upon the "ethical" and "prognostic" treatises from the Hippocratic Corpus because of all extant Greek medical texts these show a unique concern for the issue of medical competency.³ They lay out in great detail the qualities of the good physician (and conversely the bad) because they are anxious to disassociate Hippocratic physicians from the sort of quack healers that frequented the marketplace, trying to attract customers with boasts of miraculous healing powers (Nutton 1992).⁴ Thus, the ability to seize the *kairos* and to deliver a *prognôsis* became ways by which the Hippocratic physician could prove himself and earn the trust of his patients (as well as attract more of them). I believe that the appearance of these concepts in Demosthenes' speeches may be explained by that fact that politics, like medicine,

³ See Ch.1 for an overview of the nature and character of the Hippocratic Corpus.

⁴ By "charlatan physician" I mean a healer who does not adhere to Hippocratic medical principles. For the purpose of this paper, the "good" physician will be the Hippocratic physician, as idealized in the Hippocratic medical writings.

was also plagued by charlatanism, as is notoriously reflected in the comedies of Aristophanes.⁵ Medicine, therefore, is a useful comparandum for communicating this phenomenon.

Context

I begin by considering the context of *Against the False Embassy* since it informs Demosthenes' invective strategy. In 346 B.C.E the Athenians, unsettled by the growing threat of Macedon, sent two peace delegations to Philip II, in which Aeschines and Demosthenes both participated. During the first delegation (known as the First Embassy), the delegates negotiated the terms of what would be referred to as the Peace of Philocrates, named for one of the leading Athenian politicians in the embassy. Later that same year, there was a second delegation (the Second Embassy), the purpose of which was to ratify the Peace of Philocrates. In the opinion of Yunis (2005: 115), the Peace was an utter failure because the Athenians recognized all of Philip's northern territorial gains since 358 B.C.E. It also did nothing to stop his advancement into central Greece, for between the arrival of the envoys and the ratification of the treaty three months later Philip moved his troops into Thermopylae and gained possession of the pass, the gateway into central Greece. Due to this massive diplomatic failure, the envoys became the objects of blame. Yunis conjectures that Demosthenes must have foreseen the potential problems that might arise from the Second Embassy because he disassociated himself from it at the earliest possible point (115).

In the summer of 346 B.C.E., Demosthenes initiated an audit (*euthunê*) to prosecute Aeschines for misconduct during the Second Embassy. Aeschines responded indirectly by successfully charging Demosthenes' political ally, Timarchus, with prostitution. In 343 B.C.E.

⁵ Aristophanes' stage is replete with examples of charlatan politicians, who abuse their political powers for their own person gain (e.g. *Eq*, *Ach.*, *Vesp.*, *Pax*).

Demosthenes was finally able to bring his accusation of misconduct to trial. Yunis (2005: 117) posits two aims to Demosthenes' prosecution: to divorce himself completely from the disastrous Peace of Philocrates and to drive Aeschines, one of last remaining advocates for maintaining diplomatic ties with Macedon, from Athens. These two aims shape Demosthenes' invective. The first may explain why the issue of competency appears as a prominent theme in the speech, while the second may account for the depiction of Aeschines as disease that can only be cured only through political disenfranchisement.

I now turn to Demosthenes' explicit use of medical imagery in *Against the False Embassy*. As noted above, the most striking example is his comparison of Aeschines (and corrupt politicians like him) to a terrible epidemic disease (*nosêma deinon*). This comparison is framed by a discussion of Solon's statue at Salamis, which Demosthenes uses to highlight the superficiality of Aeschines' political excellence. In his prosecution of Demosthenes' political ally Timarchus, Aeschines had used the statue as a model for how an orator should comport himself when addressing the assembly, that is, with hands inside his cloak. He had brought up the statue in order to contrast it with Timarchus' egregious behavior: he dared to address the assembly drunk and half-naked (1.25-26). In *On the False Embassy*, Demosthenes sardonically replies that Aeschines, instead of focusing on the statue's appearance, should concern himself with Solon's mind and intent (19.251-52). He then adopts Solon's voice and recites his *Eunomia* elegy (W 4) in order to undermine his opponent's appropriation of Solon and to communicate the dangers of

allowing corrupt politicians like Aeschines, literally: "those who are obedient to money" (χρήμασι πειθόμενοι; 6), to have influence in Athens (Jaeger 1926: 70-71).⁶

In the beginning of the poem, Demosthenes-Solon warns that it is the city that will suffer for the misdeeds of its leaders, not the leaders themselves (8), and this punishment will take the form of divine retribution.⁷ He then draws upon the language of health and disease to express this punishment in terms with which the listener could easily relate (Cordes 1994: 19-23).⁸

οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα
ἢ σιγῶσα σύνοιδε τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ' ἔόντα,
τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἦλθ' ἀποτεισομένη.
τοῦτ' ἤδη πάση πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἄφυκτον,
εἰς δὲ κακὴν ταχέως ἤλυθε† δουλοσύνην,
ἢ στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ' εὕδοντ' ἐπεγείρει,
ὅς πολλῶν ἐρατὴν ὤλεσεν ἠλικίην. (19.255)

and neither do they guard the reverend foundations of Justice--
the silent one who knows what goes on and what went on before
and in times comes to exact full revenge.
That comes now, an **inescapable wound** upon the whole city,
and the city swiftly falls into evil servitude,
or she rouses civil strife and sleeping war,
which destroys the lovely youth of many. (Trans. Yunis 2005)

With the phrase "inescapable wound" (ἔλκος ἄφυκτον), Demosthenes-Solon turns the city into a traumatized body, helpless in the face of the divine wrath of Justice (Rowe 1972: 445-446).⁹

By closely associating the *helkos* with civil strife (στάσιν ἔμφυλον), servitude, and war, Demosthenes-Solon suggests that this wound is fatal.¹⁰ Nevertheless, despite this pessimistic

⁶ Solon W4 is preserved only here. In an elegy written later (W 10), Solon reiterates this same fear that "great men" will cause the city to fall into slavery to a monarch (Campbell 1982).

⁷ See Irwin (2005), who discusses the similarities between Hes. *WD*. 256-264 and Solon W4.

⁸ See Cordes (1994) for a brief survey of Solon's medical language and imagery.

⁹ In Homer (and the sixth-century lyricists) *helkos* primarily refers to a wound; for an exception, see *Il.* 2.723. By the fifth century, "ulcer, cancerous sore" becomes the standard meaning (LSJ s.v. ἔλκος).

¹⁰ Raaflaub (2004: 53-57) notes that in Solon's time "freedom" only existed in the form of personal liberty. The concept of freedom as "preservation of external independence" would not

forecast, a glimmer of hope is provided with the introduction of *Eunomia* (Good-Law) at the end of the poem. Demosthenes-Solon contrasts *Eunomia* with *Dusnomia* (Bad-Law). The former is said to make all things orderly (*eukosmos*) and sound (*artia*) (42-43), while the latter brings about all kinds of evil (*kakia*), the sort depicted at the beginning of the poem. The contrast, therefore, seems to be of civic illness and civic health, where the health of the city is intimately tied to the quality of leadership.

Demosthenes' recitation of this poem is inspired by similar circumstances, for like Solon he believes that Athens' misfortunes are the result of corrupt leadership. Yet, corruption in his case applies to politicians who have Philippized. Demosthenes recites Solon's elegy to urge the Athenians to remove corrupt leaders such as Aeschines from power. After his recitation, he makes this explicit: he exclaims, "Athenians, you hear what Solon has to say about men like Aeschines!" (19.256). With these words, Demosthenes revivifies Solon's image of the *helkos aphukton* and turns the lawgiver's cautionary example into a present crisis.

Demosthenes goes on to imitate Solon and deliver his own political forecast, but his use of Hippocratic medical language gives it more of a contemporary flavor. In it he presents Aeschines as a part of a terrible disease of Philipizing (*nosêma deinon*) that has infected Greece:

νόσημα γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, **δεινὸν** ἐμπέπτωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ **χαλεπὸν** καὶ πολλῆς τινὸς εὐτυχίας καὶ παρ' ὑμῶν **ἐπιμελείας** δεόμενον. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γνωριμώτατοι καὶ προεστάναι τῶν κοινῶν ἀξιούμενοι, τὴν αὐτῶν προδιδόντες ἐλευθερίαν οἱ δυστυχεῖς, ἀυθαίρετον αὐτοῖς ἐπάγονται δουλείαν, Φιλίππῳ ξενίαν καὶ ἐταιρίαν [καὶ φιλίαν] καὶ τοιαῦθ' ὑποκοριζόμενοι· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ καὶ τὰ κύρι' ἅπτα ποτ' ἔστ' ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν πόλεων, οὓς ἔδει τούτους κολάζειν καὶ παραχρῆμ' ἀποκτινύναι, τοσοῦτ' ἀπέχουσι τοῦ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν ὥστε θαυμάζουσι καὶ ζηλοῦσι καὶ βούλουσι τ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος τοιοῦτος εἶναι. (§259)

become an issue until the end of the sixth-century with the Persian invasions. Demosthenes adapts Solon's poem to fit his concept of freedom, namely, Athens' freedom from Macedonian hegemony.

Athenians, Greece has fallen victim to a **terrible disease**, one that is **relentless** and will require considerable good fortune and **treatment** on your part. The most prominent citizens and respected leaders in the cities are haplessly betraying their own freedom and voluntarily enslaving themselves, all the while talking euphemistically of Philip's friendship and goodwill and so on. Although the other citizens and whoever else has authority in each of the cities should be chastising their leaders and putting them to death forthwith, far from taking any action, they actually admire and emulate those leaders and to a man seek to be like them.

By describing it as a pan-Hellenic affliction, Demosthenes implies that his *nosêma deinon* is worse than Solon's *helkos aphukton*: it is not just an Athenian disease, but a disease that has devastated all of Greece--from Thessaly in the north to the Peloponnese in the south. He underscores the aggressive nature of the disease by calling it *deinon* and *chalepon*, adjectives often applied to acute diseases in the Hippocratic Corpus (e.g. Hp. *Prorrh.* 2.30.15, 27).¹¹ He also communicates the severity of the disease by personifying it as a soldier. It has invaded Greece (ἐμπέπωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, §259), it has advanced into the Peloponnese (εἰς Πελοπόννησον δ' εἰσελθόν, §260), it has brought about massacre in Elis (τὰς ἐν Ἡλίδι σφαγὰς πεποίηκε, §260),¹² it has marched into Arcadia (εἰς Ἀρκαδίαν εἰσελθόν, §261), and it is now hemming in Athens (ὡς βαδίζον γε κύκλω καὶ δεῦρ' ἐλήλυθεν, §262). Demosthenes' application of military imagery to his disease narrative echoes the language of the Hippocratic Corpus.¹³ Jouanna (2001) explains that Hippocratic writers often depict disease as an invading force, against which the physician and patient must unite to form a defensive front. By coupling martial and disease imagery, Demosthenes may similarly be implying that a successful healing of Athens depends on the jury's cooperation with him.

¹¹ Cf. Thucydides' description of *stasis* as causing *chalepa* evils (*kaka*) to happen (*Hist.* 3.82.2).

¹² For similar language, cf. Isocr. 12.99.

¹³ Jouanna (2001: 342-343), Rosen (2003: 95), and Holmes (2013: 50) have remarked on the heavy saturation of military metaphors in the Hippocratic Corpus.

Like Solon, Demosthenes depicts slavery as an attendant consequence of the *nosêma deinon*. He explains how the disease is causing politicians and influential citizens to betray their freedom (τὴν αὐτῶν προδιδόντες ἐλευθερίαν, §259) and voluntarily enslave themselves (αὐθαίρετον αὐτοῖς ἐπάγονται δουλείαν, §259) to a barbarian tyrant. The fact that they are *voluntarily* enslaving themselves highlights the virulence of the disease: it is forcing them to pervert their *autonomia*, a quality that was believed to be innately Greek.¹⁴ Demosthenes expresses the contagious nature of this disease by pointing out that other Greeks, instead of punishing their leaders, admire (θαυμάζουσι) and seek to imitate them (ζηλοῦσι καὶ βούλονται ἂν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος τοιοῦτος εἶναι, §§259-60). He offers the Peloponnesian city of Elis as an example of the dangers of this emulation. He explains that the *nosêma deinon* filled the Elians with delirium (*paranoia*) and madness (*mania*) to the point that they willingly shed the blood of their kin and fellow-citizens, a crime that stained them with blood pollution (§260).¹⁵

Demosthenes draws upon the language of tragedy to give tragic dimension to his description of the Elians, for the association between madness, disease, and blood pollution is a common trope in tragedy (see Ch. 1.).¹⁶ One of the most famous examples is Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, in which Oedipus' blood pollution (*miasma*), brought about by the murder of his biological father and incestuous marriage with his mother, brings disease (*nosos*) to Thebes (59-61). As in Solon's *Eunomia* elegy, the Theban people suffer for the misdeeds of their leader. In tragedy, the cure for blood pollution is purification (*katharmos*), which can be accomplished in three ways: by the gods (Eur. *Or.*), death (Soph. *Aj.*; Eur. *HF.*), or, in the case of Oedipus,

¹⁴ See Hp. *Aër.* 16 for *autonomia* as innate quality of Europeans, specifically Greeks.

¹⁵ See Parker (1983: 3) on the use of the prefix *mia-* as signifier of defilement and pollution.

¹⁶ Demosthenes has already shown himself a master of tragedy with his effortless tragic citations in his invective against Aeschines (Dem. 19.243, 245, 247; cf. 18.267). See Rutherford (2012) for the characteristic style and themes of tragedy, such as its concern with human suffering and its use of highly metaphorical language.

expulsion from the city (Soph. *OT*). The last method finds historical expression in the ritual of the scapegoat (*pharmakos*), where in times of crisis, such as plague or drought, an individual was selected, often from a lowly origin, to be driven out of the city in the hope that s/he would carry the impurity (*katharmata*) with him/her (Bremmer 1983: 299-320). Parker (1983: 225-230) notes that these rituals were a form of "cathartic medicine," aimed at restoring the wholeness of the city by removing the disordered part. Demosthenes' is playing with the tragic associations of disease and blood pollution to underscore the need for the Athenians to restore their city's health by removing the source of the infection, Aeschines.

After this lengthy and dramatic account, Demosthenes explicitly places the health of the city into the hands of the jury. At the beginning of his description of the *nosêma deinon* (see above), he tells the jury that this disease requires their treatment (*epimeleia*)--a term that can refer to medical treatment of the sick (cf. Pl. *Lg.* 720d). He repeats a similar request at the end of his narrative, when describing the disease's approach to Athens:

ταῦτα νῆ τὴν Δήμητρα, εἰ δεῖ μὴ ληροῖν, εὐλαβείας οὐ μικρᾶς δεῖται, ὡς βαδίζον γε κύκλω καὶ δευρ' ἐλήλυθεν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, **τὸ νόσημα τοῦτο. ἕως οὖν ἔτ' ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, φυλάξασθε καὶ τοὺς πρώτους εἰσαγαγόντας ἀτιμώσατε.** (§262)

To speak plainly, by Demeter, the situation requires no small amount of caution since the **disease** is moving in from all sides and has now reached us, Athenians. **While you are still safe, be wary and disenfranchise the citizens who first spread the disease among us.**

Demosthenes, like a good physician, calls on the Athenians, the ailing patient, to follow his expert advice (Eskin 2002: 102). Like the Hippocratic patient, their safety depends on their cooperation with him. The medical treatment that he prescribes is the disenfranchisement (*atimia*) of Aeschines and other corrupt citizens, which would entail the loss of citizen rights: the ability to speak in public forums, to attend religious festivals, and to receive support from the

state (Hansen 1976). Disenfranchisement works as a sort of cathartic medicine in that through this process, the *atimos*'s political presence would be completely erased, and thus the health of the civic body would be restored, for the danger of the lawbreaker is that others will imitate his/her behavior, as in the case of the Elians.

In the epilogue of the speech, Demosthenes reintroduces this same problem of imitation and urges the jury to apply the same therapy.¹⁷ He explains that Aeschines' acquittal would lead to mass corruption, because citizens, seeing his treachery condoned, would imitate him (§343). Just as he did with his recitation of Solon's *Eunomia* elegy, Demosthenes equates safety with punishment.¹⁸ He says, "It will not bring you any advantage to acquit this man--not to your reputation or your piety or your safety or anything else; so punish him and make him an example (*paradeigma*) for all men, both in Athens and throughout Greece" (§343). By characterizing their judicial action as a *paradeigma*, Demosthenes heightens the stakes of Aeschines' conviction, for it has the power to serve as exemplary warning not only to Athens but also to all of Greece. In response to the pan-Hellenic epidemic of Philipizing, Demosthenes offers a pan-Hellenic cure. Demosthenes makes Aeschines a scapegoat for all of the Greece's misfortunes.

Next, I turn to some less obvious medical resonances in Demosthenes' language and imagery. In order to cast doubt on Aeschines' political competency, Demosthenes plays with two concepts that are commonly discussed in Hippocratic medicine: *kairos* and *prognôsis*. I begin with the first. One of the main accusations that Demosthenes levels at Aeschines is that he wasted the city's time (*chronos*) and opportunities (*kairoi*). The centrality of these terms is highlighted in the

¹⁷ Wooten (1983) characterizes ring composition as a feature of Demosthenes' style.

¹⁸ The comparison of punishment with medicine recalls similar sentiments expressed in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Republic*. For Plato's potential influence on Demosthenes' medical language and imagery, see Ch. 1.

proem of *Against the False Embassy*, in which he enumerates the standards by which the jury should judge a public speaker: the quality of his report and advice, his obedience to instructions, his use of time (*chronos*), and his inability to be corrupted (§4). He goes to elaborate on why he chose these criteria. For *chronos*, he explains:

τῶν δὲ δὴ **χρόνων** διὰ τί; ὅτι πολλάκις, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, συμβαίνει πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μεγάλων **καιρῶν** ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὃν ἂν τις ἐκὼν καθυφῆ τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ προδῶ, οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν ποιῆ πάλιν οἷός τ' ἔσται σῶσαι. (§6)

But why his use of **time**? Because the **opportunity** for great, far-reaching action often arises for a brief moment; if he deliberately surrenders or betrays this opportunity to the enemy, he will not be able to get it back, no matter what he does.

The gravity of "wasting time" lies in Demosthenes' connection of *chronos* with *kairos*. When Aeschines wasted time (*chronos*), he lost the city's "right time" (*kairos*) for action, which, given the context of the speech, may be interpreted as military action against Philip. Demosthenes' implication is that Aeschines deliberately sabotaged his own country's success, and thus the blame for her misfortune should lie at his feet. By introducing this criterion at the beginning of the speech, he sets up the speech to be a discussion about political excellence, by whose standards Aeschines will be found wanting.

Although Demosthenes does not explicitly use medical imagery here, *kairos* is an important concept in medicine just as it is in politics. In the Hippocratic Corpus *kairos* denotes both the right measure and the right time for treatment (cf. Hp. *Loc. Hom.* 44; *Aph.* 1.1), but of the two usages, the second is by far the most common (Eskin 2002: 102).¹⁹ As Jouanna (2001: 344) explains, the greatest challenge that faced the doctor was deciding the right time and the right way to intervene. The quality of the physician; therefore, was determined by his ability to

¹⁹ For a detailed study of *kairos* from Homer to the end of the fourth century, which includes an in-depth analysis of Hippocratic usages, see Trédé (2002) and Wilson (1980).

make use of the *kairos*. Eskin (2002: 107) explains that like the physician the orator too was judged by his ability "to recognize the right moment, and, knowing that right moment, to take decisive action."²⁰ When one considers Demosthenes' use of disease imagery throughout this speech as well as in his others, the likelihood that he might be playing with the medical resonances of *kairos* is increased. The fact that there already existed a tradition of uniting politics and medicine by way of *kairos* also supports such a reading.²¹

Demosthenes' incorporation of *kairos* into his argument is part of his invective strategy against Aeschines. He draws attention to Aeschines' failure to properly utilize critical opportunities (*kairoi*) in order to expose his opponent's political incompetency (§8, §302), and at the same time, to highlight his own political excellence. Although the medical sense of *kairos* operates on an explicit level in this speech, I believe that such a sense becomes clearer when viewed alongside its most explicit medical usage, that is, in *On the Crown*, a speech that shares the same end goal as *Against the False Embassy*: to depict Aeschines as a "worthless, incompetent, and untrustworthy politician" (Pearson 1964: 106). Thus, I briefly turn to this speech.²²

After defending his use of political speech, Demosthenes draws attention to Aeschines' periodic silence during critical moments of Athenian policy. He compares his opponent to a physician who waits till his patients' funerals to deliver a *prognōsis*:

τί γὰρ ἢ σὴ δεινότης εἰς ὄνησιν ἦκει τῇ πατρίδι; νῦν ἡμῖν λέγεις περὶ τῶν παρεληλυθότων; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ἀσθενοῦσι μὲν τοῖς κάμνουσιν εἰσιῶν μὴ λέγοι μηδὲ δεικνύοι δι' ὧν ἀποφεύξονται τὴν νόσον, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τελευτήσειέ τις αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ νομιζόμεν' αὐτῷ φέροιτο, ἀκολουθῶν

²⁰ See Campbell (1982: 817) for a similar comparison between oratory and medicine.

²¹ In Pythian IV.269-74, Pindar hails King Arkesilaos of Cyrene as an ἰατὴρ **ἐπικαιρότατος**, "a physician most helpful in a time of need."

²² See Ch. 4 for a full discussion of this speech and passage.

ἐπὶ τὸ μνήμα διεξίει 'εἰ τὸ καὶ τὸ ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπος οὐτοσί, οὐκ ἂν ἀπέθανεν.' ἐμβρόντητε, εἶτα νῦν λέγεις; (18. 243)

How has your eloquence brought benefit to the city? Will you talk to us now about the past? You are like a doctor who visits patients when they are ill and gives no indication as to how they might recover from their illness, but when one of them dies and the customary rites are being performed, he follows the procession to the grave, reciting a list: 'If this man had done this or that, he would not have died.' Idiot! Do you speak now?" (Trans. Usher 1993)

Although Demosthenes does not use the word *kairos*, the passage is entirely concerned with the topic of "right timing." Like a bad physician, Aeschines' is incapable of predicting the future, and therefore cannot give sound political advice. To cover up his incompetency, Aeschines waits till the *kairos* has passed to give his political advice, when its effectiveness cannot be proved or disproved. Demosthenes, therefore, by way of this analogy communicates his belief that it is crucial for the politician to be able to give advice at the right time (*kairos*). The consequence of not doing so is the death of the patient--Demosthenes may be implying that Aeschines killed Athens with his incompetency, for *On the Crown* was delivered after Athens' defeat by Philip at Chaeronea. Returning to *On the False Embassy*, we can thus see Demosthenes' use of as complementing the image of Aeschines the disease, for like a disease the inability to seize the *kairos* can cause irrevocable damage to the city.

In addition to the expectation that the politician should be able to discern the *kairos*, he is also expected to be able to foresee and diagnose disaster. Just as in the case of *kairos*, there are medical connotations to the idea of forecasting. In medical literature, forecasting is technically called *prognôsis*, but the idea is more commonly expressed with the terms *pronoia*, *progignôskô*, *prolegô*, and *prorrhêma*. Although *prognôsis* refers to forecasting, it also includes diagnosis, which is a distinct skill for the modern physician (Jouanna 2001: 101). As with *kairos*, Demosthenes does not use *prognôsis* in an explicit medical context in *Against the False*

Embassy. However, the concept is integral to understanding the physician's simile in *On the Crown* (quoted above). There Demosthenes compares Aeschines to a physician who refuses to give medical advice--in other words, to provide a *prognôsis*. By using this simile Demosthenes implies that the good politician is required to speak up, to deliver a political *prognôsis*, for the health of the city. I would argue that the idea of political foresight in *Against the False Embassy* should be likewise read as having medical resonances for two reasons. First, political *prognôsis* is one of the central ideas behind the physician simile in *On the Crown* (Campbell 1982: 819). Second, Demosthenes' invective strategy in *On the Crown* expands upon the same accusations that are made in *Against the False Embassy* (see ch. 4).

The most complete discussion of *prognôsis* in medicine comes from the "prognostic texts" of the Hippocratic Corpus--a series of texts, written in the mid- to late- fifth-century, dedicated solely to the subject of *prognôsis* (*Prognosticon*; *Prorrhethicon* 1, 2). The proem of *Prognosticon*, in particular, provides the most complete definition of *prognôsis*:²³

Τὸν ἰητροῦν δοκέει μοι ἄριστον εἶναι **πρόνοιαν** ἐπιτηδεύειν· προγιγνώσκων γὰρ καὶ προλέγων παρὰ τοῖσι νοσέουσι τὰ τε παρεόντα καὶ τὰ προγεγονότα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσσεσθαι, ὅκόσα τε παραλείουσιν οἱ ἀσθενέοντες ἐκδιηγέμενος, πιστεύοιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον γιγνώσκειν τὰ τῶν νοσεόντων πρήγματα, ὥστε τολμᾶν ἐπιτρέπειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σφέας ἐωυτοὺς τῷ ἰητρῷ. (1.1)

I hold that it is an excellent thing for a physician to practice **forecasting**. For if he discover and declare unaided by the side of his patient the present, the past and the future, and fill in the gaps in the account given by the sick, he will be the most believed to understand the cases, so that men will confidently entrust themselves to him for treatment. (Trans. Jones 1959)

²³ The word used here is *pronoia*, a synonym for *prognôsis* in the Hippocratic Corpus.

The author posits *prognôsis* as the supreme measure of a physician's competency.²⁴ *Prognôsis*, by his definition, is laying out not just the future course of an illness but the past and present (cf. Pl. *Lach.*198d5). In order to do this, a physician is required to read the signs (*sêmata*) of his patient: changes in countenance, sleep patterns, appetite, bowel movements, etc. (*Prog.* 2). The vastness of the variables involved in *prognôsis* implies that only a seasoned physician is capable of delivering one. The author of *Decorum*, a text written for the novice on the proper behavior of a physician, implies this in his recommendation that the young physician deliver a forecast only when he has acquired the experience (9). *Prognôsis*, therefore, should be viewed as a display not only of medical skill but also of experience, the purpose of which is to gain the patient's trust (Eskin 2002: 102).

Moreover, by asserting that the physician should deliver his *prognôsis* by the side of his patient (παρὰ τοῖσι νοσέουσι), *Prognosticon* incorporates reputation (*doxa*) into the act of *prognôsis*. According to Jouanna (2001: 75), a physician was never alone with his patient. It was the norm for the entire household (and even curious pedestrians) to crowd around the bedside of the sick. When a physician delivered a *prognôsis*, he was proving himself not only to his patient, but also to a potentially hostile (or enthusiastic, and therefore lucrative) crowd. A *prognôsis* therefore, could make or destroy a physician's reputation. *Prorrhethicon* 2 explains the stakes:

συμβουλευώ δὲ ὡς σωφρονεστάτους εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ καὶ ἐν τοῖσι τοιούτοισι **προρόήμασι**, γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιτυχῶν μὲν ἂν τις τοῦ **προρόήματος** θαυμασθεῖη ὑπὸ τοῦ ξυνιόντος ἀλγέοντος, ἀμαρτῶν δ' ἂν τις πρὸς τῷ μισεῖσθαι τάχ' ἂν καὶ μεμηνέναι δόξειεν. (2.2)

²⁴ Medical *prognôsis* has its roots in "traditional forms of prophecy," where the prophet's knowledge of the past, present, and future was considered the result of divine inspiration (Jouanna 2001: 1001). Aeschines plays upon the interconnections between medicine and prophecy in his invective against Demosthenes in *On the Embassy* (2) and *Against Ctesiphon* (3). See Ch. 3 for a full treatment of this topic.

I advise you to be as cautious as possible not only in other areas of medicine, but also in making **forecasts** of this kind, taking into account that when you are successful in making a **forecast** you will be admired by the patient you are attending, but when you go wrong you will not only be subject to hatred, but perhaps even be thought mad. (Trans. Potter 1995)

The good physician wins renown with a successful *prognôsis*; if he errs, he is hated and thought to be insane. The inference is that an inaccurate *prognôsis* can destroy a physician's career or even lead to his ostracization from society. Thus, silence becomes an attractive option for the young or unskilled physician because it is self-preserving. On the other hand, due to the personal risk involved in speaking, it becomes a mark of courage for a physician to deliver a *prognôsis* (Rosen 2005).

Demosthenes exhibits his correct political *prognôseis* in *Against the False Embassy* in order to draw attention to Aeschines' inability to do the same. He reminds the jury of his foresight, when he warned them that the Peace of Philocrates would put their allies, the Phocians, and their possession of Thermopylae, into jeopardy (§18). This *prognôsis* came true, as he points out, because shortly after the Peace of Philocrates was ratified, Philip moved his army into central Greece, occupied Thermopylae, and captured Phocis (§30). To prove his political foresight, Demosthenes asks the clerk to read the Council's decree preliminary to his embassy report as well as the testimony of the citizens who passed it. He explains his purpose in doing so as being:

ἴν' εἰδῆθ' ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ τότε σιγήσας νῦν ἀφίσταμαι τῶν πεπραγμένων, ἀλλ' εὐθύς κατηγοροῦν καὶ προεώρων τὰ μέλλοντα. (§31)

In order that you may know that **I was not silent then** and only now disclaim responsibility, but rather I made my accusations **straightaway** and **foresaw what was to come**.

Demosthenes conveys the idea of *prognôsis* through the phrase "foresaw what was to come," and by emphasizing the fact that he accused right away and did keep silent when he recognized imminent danger. His claim to have forecasted before the people echoes *Prognosticon's* definition of *prognôsis*: "knowing and speaking beforehand the future by the side of the patient" (1). The similarity between these two expressions of foresight shows that the physician and politician were held to similar expectations: to predict and to speak that prediction in public. As the oral nature of this expectation suggests, both the good physician and the good politician were defined by their proper use of speech (cf. Pl. *Grg.* 456b-c).

Demosthenes offers up Aeschines as the inverse of the good politician. In contrast to his own accurate *prognôsis*, he emphasizes Aeschines' unwillingness to speak up, and in doing so makes speech an important index of political virtue:

πῶς οὖν ῥαδίως πάντες εἴσεσθε τίς ποτ' ἔσθ' ὁ **πονηρός**; ἀναμνήσθητε παρ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς τίς ἐσθ' ὁ κατηγορῶν τῶν πεπραγμένων ἐξ ἀρχῆς. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἡδικηκότι **σιγᾶν** ἐξήρκει καὶ διακρουσαμένῳ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον μηκέτ' εἰς λόγον περὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτὸν καθιστάναι, **τῷ δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ συνειδότι δεινὸν εἰσῆει, εἰ [δεινῶν καὶ] πονηρῶν ἔργων δόξει κοινωνεῖν τῷ σιωπῆσαι** εἰμὶ τοίνυν ὁ κατηγορῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐγὼ τούτων, τούτων δ' οὐδεὶς ἐμοῦ. (§33)

How then can all of you easily figure out who is the **wicked** one? Recall for yourselves who denounced the affair from the first. Clearly the wrongdoer was best served by **keeping quiet** and, after evading the question for the present, by never having to answer for what happened. **But the one with a clear conscience considered it terrible if his silence should create the impression that he had a part in the disastrous deeds.** I, indeed, am the one who accused them from the first, but none of them accused me.

Although this statement is framed as a generalization, Demosthenes is obviously talking about himself and Aeschines. The wicked individual (*ponêros*), who keeps silent (*sigan*) for the purpose of escaping censure, is Aeschines, while the self-aware (*suneidoti*) individual, who shuns silence because it creates the impression of complicity in "disastrous deeds," is

Demosthenes. The implication is that silence is a negative quality for the politician because it marks him as cowardly and guilty. Demosthenes contrasts speech with silence in order to express political excellence in simple but verifiable terms. Aeschines' responsibility for Athens' misfortunes can be proved by the fact that he kept silent during critical moments, while his excellence can be demonstrated by his constant protests for the wellbeing of the city.

Demosthenes reintroduces the problem of Aeschines' political silence in a jibe about his former career as a third-part tragic actor (*tritagonistês*). Worman (2008: 13) explains that Demosthenes frequently brings up Aeschines' theatrical career as means of communicating to the jury his opponent's disingenuous and corrupt character. Actors sell their vocal talents, and when they perform, they disregard content in favor of delivery. Demosthenes wants his audience to see that Aeschines the politician is no different from Aeschines the actor. The accusation of content-less speech lies behind Demosthenes' reference to Aeschines' portrayal of Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone*. Demosthenes orders the clerk to read a series of iambs from the play, in which Aeschines acted, that describe the ruler's duty to his city (§247):

ἐγὼ γάρ, ἴστω Ζεὺς ὁ πάνθ' ὄρων ἀεὶ,
οὐτ' ἂν σιωπήσαιμι τὴν ἄτην ὄρων
 στείχουσας ἀστοῖς ἀντὶ τῆς σωτηρίας
 (Soph. *Ant.* 184-186)

Let all-**seeing** Zeus take notice---
 neither **would I be silent** if in place of safety,
 If **I saw ruin** advancing on the citizens.

Creon's words express the expectation that the ruler should speak up if he sees disaster (*atê*) approaching his citizens. Sight, as well as speech, is important in these lines, for Zeus is described as "he who sees everything always" and Creon uses the same verb (*horaô*) to describe himself. Zeus, who is the highest and most supreme ruler, serves as a model for the mortal ruler, whose sight should result in speech: he must see *and* speak for the safety of his people. These

expectations recall the process of *prognôsis*. The good physician foresees the course of the disease and speaks his *prognôsis* for the benefit of his patient. If the disease is curable, then his *prognôsis* will include treatment and the patient's subsequent recovery (*sôtêria*).²⁵

When Demosthenes recites these lines, it involves several layers of irony. He explicitly spells out the first: Aeschines delivered these lines many times on stage but never paid them any heed during the embassy (§248). The second, however, is more implicit. Demosthenes remarks that *tritagonistai* "enjoy the particular privilege" of playing tyrants and "those who bear the scepter" (§247). Such a statement is pregnant with implication because tragic tyrants are often portrayed as agents of their city's destruction. Thus Sophocles' Creon claims to know what was best for Thebes, but his lack of foresight leads to the destruction of his house (the death of his son, niece, and wife). The suggestion is that Aeschines is like Creon because his political missteps have led to Athens' misfortunes. Yet, he is even worse than the Theban tyrant, since he harmed his city intentionally. Demosthenes comments:

ἀλλ' ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς πόλεως τὴν Φιλίππου ξενίαν καὶ φιλίαν πολλῶ
μείζον' ἠγήσαθ' αὐτῷ καὶ λυσιτελεστέραν, ἐρρώσθαι πολλὰ φράσας τῷ
σοφῷ Σοφοκλεῖ, τὴν δ' ἄτην ὁρῶν στείχουσαν ὁμοῦ, τὴν ἐπὶ Φωκέας
στρατείαν, οὐ προεῖπεν οὐδὲ προεξήγγειλεν, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον
συνέκρουσε καὶ συνέπραξε καὶ τοὺς βουλομένους εἰπεῖν διεκώλυσεν.
(§248)

But, bidding a fond farewell to sage Sophocles, he held Philip's hospitality and friendship far "**above his city**" and more profitable to himself, and as he "**saw ruin advancing**" close by--Philip's expedition against the Phocians--**he uttered no warning and gave no alert, but kept it hidden**, colluded, and obstructed those who wished to speak.

Demosthenes is claiming that Aeschines withheld his political *prognôsis*: he did not speak or warn his city, as the good leader should. His silence, therefore, is not an issue of incompetency in

²⁵ *Sôtêria* as "recovery" from a disease or illness in the Hp. Corpus (e.g. *Prog.* 5.5, 12; *VM.* 3; *Acut.* 11; *Aph.* 7.37; *Prorrh.* 2.14; *Coac.* 255, 384, 389, 571).

this instance, for he foresaw ruin (*atê*) coming, but of political corruption. Nevertheless, what is worse than his malicious silence is that he prevented those who wanted to speak for the city's *sôtêria* from being heard, namely Demosthenes.²⁶

Thus far I hope to have shown that Demosthenes' good and bad politician are portrayed in this speech as sharing many similarities with the good and bad physician of the Hippocratic Corpus. Like the politician's, the physician's role was public: he was expected to perform in front of an audience. In order to gain their trust, he was expected to display his knowledge and to give his expert opinion. The best means of doing so was to deliver a *prognôsis*--a forecast of the past, present, and future. The bad politician and physician both reveal their incompetency by their silence. Lacking the expertise to deliver a *prognôsis*, they preferred silence to accusations of madness and public hatred. The ability to deliver a *prognôsis* also depended on the ability to discern the right time (*kairos*) for action, the success of which, for both the physician and politician, was intimately tied to the health of the patient, whether the human or the city. These similarities between the physician and the politician (directly or indirectly) frame Demosthenes's use of medical imagery not only elsewhere in this speech but, above all, in *On the Crown* (see Ch. 3).

²⁶ Slater (1988) notes Demosthenes' heavy use of the language of salvation in his own defense in *On the Crown*.

CHAPTER THREE

Aeschines Responds:
Medical Invective in Aeschines 2 & 3Introduction

In the last chapter I examined how Demosthenes plays with medical language and imagery in *Against the False Embassy* to highlight Aeschines' political incompetency and treachery. In this chapter I look at Aeschines' response to these accusations and invective strategies in his defense speech, *On the Embassy* (2), and in his decade-later prosecution of his opponent, *Against Ctesiphon* (3). In the first part of the chapter, I consider *On the Embassy*. I argue that Aeschines confronts Demosthenes' portrayal of him as a bad physician in two ways: he renegotiates political prognosis in terms of the present not the future, and he uses the language of magic to depict Demosthenes as the bad physician *par excellence*, the purifier. Next, I contend that Aeschines addresses his portrayal as a "fearsome disease" by incorporating the language of pollution and disease into his own invective. Just as his opponent did, Aeschines uses such language to communicate the danger and infectiousness of political corruption.

In the second part of this chapter, I examine Aeschines' response to Demosthenes' medical language in *Against Ctesiphon*. I argue that, although his response is consistent with that of *On the Embassy*, there is a noticeable increase in vitriol, which can be attributed to the personal nature of this prosecution (Carey 2000: 162). I believe that this may account for Aeschines' direct confrontation of Demosthenes' medical language. In this section I also look at how Aeschines creates a portrait of Demosthenes that derives its potency from irony. He derides Demosthenes for using disease metaphors when he himself is polluted. Moreover, he weaves

together the image of the civic physician and the magician to emphasize Demosthenes' inability to measure up to his own ideal.

On the Embassy (Aeschin. 2)

I. Context & Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 2, Demosthenes takes great care in his prosecution speech (Dem. 19) to present Aeschines' voice as a danger to the city. He creates a portrait of the good politician that hinges upon the proper use of his voice: his ability and the willingness to forecast political disasters at the right time. As I have shown, these are the traits that are often ascribed to the good physician in the Hippocratic medical texts, and Demosthenes makes use of this medical imagery to highlight his own political excellence and Aeschines' political failings. Here I argue that Aeschines counters Demosthenes' invective by appropriating it: he makes Demosthenes' voice a point of anxiety, and in doing so he draws attention to problematic nature of his opponent's self-representation as a dutiful physician of the state.

In the proem to the speech, Aeschines set up Demosthenes' self-representation as a primary theme of his defense. He says, "In his speech [i.e. *Against the False Embassy* (Dem. 19)], it turns out that Demosthenes alone is guardian (*κηδεμών*) of the city, while all the rest are traitors" (§8).¹ With this statement, Aeschines introduces another important theme in his speech: exaggeration. Throughout the course of the speech, Aeschines will erode Demosthenes' laudatory self-portrait as guardian and healer of the state, which he will replace with the label that he himself acquired in Demosthenes' prosecution: charlatan.

¹ All translations from Aeschines' speeches are freely adapted from Carey (2000).

He begins the *narratio* of his speech with a lengthy retelling of the events that led up to the first embassy and then the events surrounding the embassy itself.² As Wooten (1988) and Carey (2000) note, Aeschines purposefully structures his defense chronologically. The advantage of this structure is that it creates a portrait of Demosthenes that derives its power from consistency: Demosthenes has been a bombastic charlatan at every stage of his political career. Aeschines starts off by drawing attention to Demosthenes' vocal failures during the First Embassy to Philip. He explains that on the way to Macedon, Demosthenes boasted of the "unlimited founts of argument" that he would unleash upon Philip and how he would "sew up his [i.e. Philip's] mouth with a dry reed" (§21). But when it came time to perform, his claims were revealed to be a gross exaggeration (ὑπερβολή, §34). Aeschines dramatically describes Demosthenes' performance in front of Philip:

Οὕτω δὲ ἀπάντων διακειμένων πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν, φθέγγεται τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο προοίμιον σκοτεινόν τι καὶ τεθνηκὸς δειλία, καὶ μικρὸν προαγαγὼν ἄνω τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξαίφνης ἐσίγησε καὶ διηπορήθη, τελευτῶν δὲ ἐκπίπτει τοῦ λόγου. (§34)

With all listening so intently, **this creature uttered an obscure prologue in a voice dead with fright**, and after a brief narration of earlier events, **suddenly fell silent and was at a loss for words**, and finally abandoned his speech.

With this remark Aeschines humorously deconstructs Demosthenes' grand self-portrait as a physician of the state. Instead of a physician, who boldly speaks up for the benefit of his patient, the state, Demosthenes is exposed as a mute beast (*thêrion*).³ By embellishing his account with paratragic language--Demosthenes' prologue is "obscure";⁴ he is "dead" with cowardly fear

² For the structure of *On the False Embassy*, see Carey (2000: 90-93).

³ For Demosthenes' vocal disability (stuttering) and his eventual cure, see Plut. *Dem.* 4.3-5, 6.3.

⁴ The adjective σκοτεινός, "obscure," recalls Heraclitus, who was called ὁ σκοτεινός because of his fondness for riddles (Arist. *Mu.* 396b20). Aeschines may be punning on Heraclitus' nickname to underscore the incomprehensibility of Demosthenes' prologue.

(τεθνηκὸς δειλίαι)⁵--Aeschines underscores the absurdity of his opponent's claim to civic excellence. He then magnifies Demosthenes' shame and further distances his opponent from any notion of political goodness by explaining that exactly the same reaction occurred, that is, silence (σιωπή), when Philip encouraged him to speak again (§35).

In contrast to Demosthenes' failure, Aeschines presents himself as an exemplar of the good politician, inserting himself into the narrative. Whereas Demosthenes struggled to speak, Aeschines "left out nothing but recalled everything in order" (§26). In opposition to Demosthenes' silence, he offers the jury a plethora of dense details about the content of his speech to Philip (26-33), which create the impression that he and his speech are truthful. The effect of these disparate portraits is that Demosthenes' accusations of incompetency are undermined, for it is he who cannot be relied on to speak up at the proper time, not Aeschines.

Aeschines' rhetoric of silence, therefore, may be seen as engaging directly with Demosthenes' claim that the good politician must prognosticate for the benefit of his city. After recounting the events surrounding the Second Embassy, Aeschines explicitly lays out what he believes to be the qualities of the good adviser (*sumboulos*). He includes political prognosis in his discussion:⁶

Τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν σύμβουλον τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν; τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν κατήγορον τί; οὐ τοὺς καιροὺς ἀποκρυπτόμενον τῆς πράξεως κατηγορεῖν; (§165)

What should a loyal adviser do? Will he not give the city the best advice as regards to the present? And what should a dishonest adviser do? Will he not he suppress the circumstances (*kairoi*) and criticize action?

⁵ This phrase, which brings to mind a frightened animal, reinforces the image of Demosthenes the wild beast (*thêrion*).

⁶ As Carey (2000) notes, Demosthenes will take up the theme of the good adviser (σύμβουλος) in *On the Crown* (cf. 18.190, 194, 209, 301). See Ch. 4 for a full treatment of this theme.

Instead of emphasizing the need for the good politician to speak beforehand (*proiepein*), as Demosthenes does (19.131), Aeschines orients political speech in terms of the present: the good politician deliberates "about the now" (πρὸς τὸ παρόν).⁷ With his appeal to the present, Aeschines once again tries to salvage his own reputation--although he uses generalizations, he is obviously describing himself. Even though he may not have forecasted the future, he expresses his belief that he always looked after the city's wellbeing by giving advice about present matters.

Demosthenes, on the other hand, is a *ponêros* adviser, because he suppressed the city's opportunities (*kairoi*). Aeschines' introduction of *kairoi* into the conversation is likely a pointed response to Demosthenes' heavy-handed use of "opportunity" in his rhetoric of the good politician in *Against the False Embassy* and perhaps elsewhere.⁸ In the proem to his prosecution of Aeschines, he had made quick utilization of the *kairos* one of the essential virtues of the good politician (19.6).⁹ Aeschines similarly makes suppression of *kairoi* a mark of the bad politician--the implication is that the good politician is a bold and quick actor, a definition that accords with Demosthenes'. Aeschines, therefore, may be appropriating his opponent's rhetoric to undermine his self-portrait as a physician of the state. As noted in the previous chapter, the ability to discern the *kairos* and act in time (*chronos*) was the mark of the good physician, because a successful healing was dependent on a union of the two. This sly and subtle manipulation of Demosthenes' language has the force of transforming Demosthenes the good civic physician into the bad.

II. The *Goês*

⁷ Swain (1994: 315) points out that Hippocratic *prognôsis* includes pre-knowledge, "that is, knowledge of the patient's health up to the present, as well as foreknowledge, knowledge of the patient's health from now and onwards." Demosthenes emphasizes the latter rather than the former.

⁸ See Ch. 5 for Demosthenes' use of *kairos* in his *sumbouletic* speeches, esp. *Olynthiacs* I-III.

⁹ See Ch. 1 for a discussion of this passage.

The type of bad physician to which Aeschines explicitly compares Demosthenes is the *goês*, "sorcerer/purifier/charlatan."¹⁰ Originally, the *goês* was an itinerant shaman-type figure that travelled town-to-town offering healing and religious services in exchange for a fee. He was regarded with awe and respect. However, with the rise of the polis at the end of the sixth century, the term *goês* begins to be used pejoratively, which suggests denigration in reputation.¹¹ Burkert (1962: 52-53) attributes this change to the creation and growth of state-sanctioned cults as well as the rise of Hippocratic medicine. In this new order, the *goês* was considered an outsider, whose services were antithetical to the state (53).¹² Despite their anathema status, however, *goêtai* were still popular to the extent that a Hippocratic medical writer felt a need to formally respond to such "charlatans." In the short treatise *On the Sacred Disease*, the author lambastes these shaman healers for not only perpetuating erroneous beliefs about disease etiology (in this case, epilepsy) but also making outrageous claims to extraordinary healing powers:¹³

Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκέουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι τοῦτο τὸ νόσημα ἀφιερῶσαντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι ἄνθρωποι οἳ καὶ νῦν εἰσι μάγοι τε καὶ καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται καὶ ἀλαζόνες, ὁκόσοι δὴ προσποιέονται σφόδρα θεοσεβέες εἶναι καὶ πλεόν τι εἰδέναί. Οὗτοι τοίνυν παραμπεχόμενοι καὶ προβαλλόμενοι τὸ θεῖον τῆς ἀμηχανίης τοῦ μὴ ἴσχειν ὃ τι προσενέγκαντες ὠφελήσουσιν, ὡς μὴ κατάδηλοι ἔωσιν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἱερὸν ἐνόμισαν τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἶναι, καὶ λόγους ἐπιλέξαντες ἐπιτηδεῖους τὴν ἴησιν κατεστήσαντο ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς σφίσι αὐτοῖσι. (2)

My own view is that those who first attributed a sacred character to this malady were like *magoi*, *kathartai*, *agurtai*, and *alazones*, men who claim

¹⁰ LSJ sv. γοής I.1-2.

¹¹ Consistently throughout Plato's dialogues, *goêtai* are characterized as dangerous, but the most flagrant example is from *Leg.* 909b: the Athenian Stranger compares *goêtai* to wild beasts (θηριώδεις) and goes on to explain how they actively seek to destroy households and cities for love of money (χρημάτων χάριν). See also *Pl. Leg.* 649b.

¹² *Sacred Disease* may also be viewed as an apology of Hippocratic medicine, for like the *goêtai*, many Hippocratic practitioners were itinerant healers, who traveled town-to-town, offering their services for a fee. The author of this treatise seems anxious to disassociate Hippocratic healing from the kind offered by the *goêtai*. For more, see below.

¹³ Jouanna (2001: 42) dates *Sacred Disease* to the mid-fifth century B.C.E.

great piety and superior knowledge. Being at a loss, having no treatment which would help, they concealed and sheltered themselves behind superstition, and called this illness sacred, in order that their supreme ignorance might be not manifest. (Trans. Jones 1923)

The magico-religious healers that he singles out are *magoi*, *kathartai*, *agurtai*, and *alazones*. Although the *goês* is not included in this list, by the time of *Sacred Disease*'s composition, the terms *goês*, *magos*, *alazôn*, and *agurtês* were interchangeable (Burkert 1962: 38; Graf 1997: 21-22). The fact that Aeschines also applies some of these other terms to Demosthenes (*magos*: 3.137; *alazôn*: 3.99, 101, 218, 238, 256), suggests that he too regarded them as synonymous with *goês*.

The thing that the author of *Sacred Disease* finds most distasteful about these healers, is their pretense. They claim to be pious and to have access to special knowledge (προσποιέονται . . . καὶ πλέον τι εἰδέναι, 1.25, 63), such as the ability to bring down the moon and darken the sun (1.68-71).¹⁴ In addition to this, he faults them for hiding their ignorance behind superstition, for by ascribing a divine origin to epilepsy, these magico-religious healers escape censure for a patient's death: it was not their treatment that was faulty, but it was rather the will of the gods. Their behavior stands contrary to the good physician who boldly risks his reputation by proclaiming his *prognôsis* in front of his patient, and in some cases before a potentially hostile crowd of bystanders.¹⁵ Finally, the third reason the author denounces these healers, although not expressed in the passage above, is their use of quasi-medical treatments. These healers not only offer purification and incantations to their patients but they also prescribe specialized diets (1.30-37). The author dwells on this point in detail, perhaps because their manipulation of diet

¹⁴ The full list is: to "bring down the moon, darken the sun, induce storms and fine weather, and rain and droughts, and make the sea and land unproductive. . ."

¹⁵ For a fuller discussion of the risks and rewards of *prognôsis*, see Ch. 2.

deceptively mimics the Hippocratic therapy of regimen. He may be implying that the *goês* could pass as a Hippocratic physician.

The impression of the *goês* that one is left with after reading *Sacred Disease* is that this magico-religious healer is the ultimate deceiver: he hides his ignorance behind grand boasts, piety, and semi-medical treatments. When Aeschines uses this label of Demosthenes, he too associates it with deceit (Hesk 2000: 232):

Τίνες οὖν ἦσαν αἱ ἀπάται, ταῦτα γὰρ τοῦ γόητος ἀνθρώπου, ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκε λογίσασθε. (§124)

See from his own statements **the lies he has told, for these are the mark of a *goês*.**

Συμπέπλεγμαι δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀνθρώπῳ γόητι καὶ πονηρῷ, ὃς οὐδ' ἂν ἄκων ἀληθὲς οὐδὲν εἶποι. (§153)

In my political life I have become enmeshed to an extreme degree with a *goês* **and a criminal (*ponêros*), a man who could not speak the truth even by accident.**

The unifying feature of these two passages is that Aeschines is calling Demosthenes a *goês* for his use of deceptive speech.¹⁶ In the first passage, his statements are "deceptions/lies" (αἱ ἀπάται); in the second, his speech is hyperbolically characterized as so false and duplicitous that he cannot even tell the truth by accident (οὐδ' ἂν ἄκων). The author of *Sacred Disease* views the *goês* as a threat because he can pass himself off as a professional, and Aeschines appears to be expressing the same anxiety: Demosthenes is dangerous because he can pass himself off as a

¹⁶ Aeschines' complements his *goês* invective with the language of magic. He characterizes Demosthenes' verbal deceit as τερατεία ("marvels") several times throughout the course of his defense (11, 49, 98, 153). This word refers to the bizarre and the unexplainable, as in the case of portentous speech (LSJ sv. τερατεία I.1-2). The agent noun form, τερατουργός ("wonder-workers"), also directly describes a magician (LSJ sv. τερατουργός I.1).

good politician because he can "imitate people telling the truth (μιμούμενος τοὺς τἀληθῆ λέγοντας)" (§153).

Aeschines' use of the invective term *goês* can thus be interpreted as a response to Demosthenes' use of medical language to highlight his civic excellence. In place of the good politician, who audaciously seizes the *kairos* and speaks his political *prognôsis* for the well-being of the city, Aeschines reveals his opponent to be a pompous charlatan, who embarrassed the city with his poor performance during the Second Embassy. In contrast to his opponent, Aeschines presents himself as a model of quiet virtue, who promised no more than he could deliver, that is, advice about the present.

III. Health and Disease

In his prosecution, Demosthenes' vividly portrayed Aeschines as part of a disease of Philipizing (*nosêma deinon*), threatening to overrun Greece. He drew heavily upon the language of religious pollution to instill fear of infection in his fellow Athenians.¹⁷ In his defense, Aeschines answers this image with like imagery. He depicts his opponent as polluted beyond remediation, and thus a threat to his countrymen. One example involves Aeschines' response to Demosthenes' allegation that he caused the ruin of the Thracian king Cersobleptes, an Athenian ally.¹⁸ Aeschines says:

Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, δοίητ' ἄν μοι συγγνώμην, εἰ κίναιδον αὐτὸν
προσειπὼν καὶ μὴ καθαρεύοντα τῷ σώματι, μηδ' ὄθεν τὴν φωνὴν
ἀφίησιν, ἔπειτα τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος τοῦ κατηγορήματος τοῦ περὶ
Κερσοβλέπτην ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ δείξαιμι ψεύδος ὄν; (§88)

¹⁷ See Ch. 2.

¹⁸ Cersobleptes was Athens' rival for influence in the Chersonese; however, he eventually turned to them for help against Philip, who was encroaching into his land (Yunis 2005: 167n.160). In *Against the False Embassy*, Demosthenes accused Aeschines of voting to exclude Cersobleptes from being enrolled as an Athenian ally, which would have allowed him to participate in the Peace of Philocrates (19.174-175). Here Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of doing the same (2.81-93).

Will you then forgive me, men of Athens, **if I call him a pervert (*kinaidos*), whose body is unclean, even the part his voice comes from**, before giving manifest proof that the rest of the accusation concerning Cersobleptes is a lie?

Aeschines claims that Demosthenes' duplicitous behavior is a signifier of a polluted *physis*, which he traces to sexual deviancy. This imputation is clearly seen in the epithet, *kinaidos*, which he applies to Demosthenes in both *Against Timarchus* and *On the False Embassy* (1.131, 181; 2.99, 151).¹⁹ According to Halperin (1998: 100-102), the *kinaidos* was a "freak of nature," because unlike normative men (i.e. socially constructed normative male), he was incapable of resisting pleasure. His deviance manifested itself in a fondness for what was considered the basest pleasure to the normative Greek male: sexual (anal) penetration (101). This failure of the *kinaidos* to master his passions marked him as effeminate because like a woman he allowed himself to be penetrated.²⁰ Halperin asserts that the *kinaidos*'s desire to be penetrated was indicative of a "physiological anomaly" or a "symptom of moral or mental disease," or in other words, a defective *physis* (101). Halperin's equation of the *kinaidos*'s sexual predilections with a disease reflects the danger that the *kinaidos* posed to the civic order: in a phallocratic society, his "feminine" constitution represented an inversion of the normative gender hierarchy, an inversion of the Greek male's social identity (101). This disruptiveness led to the label of "morally polluted" (Parker 1983: 96). When Aeschines calls Demosthenes *μη καθαρεύοντα τῷ σώματι* ("impure in body"), he draws attention to the infectious potential of his pollution.

¹⁹ *Kinaidos* is absent in Demosthenes' speeches, but *kinados* (fox) is present (18.162, 242). See Ch. 4 for a discussion of these passages from *On the Crown*.

²⁰ According to Gleason (1995: 178) and Williams (1999: 390), in the Roman period at least the *cinaedus*'s (Latinized form of *kinaidos*) effeminacy could be read on his body. To the trained eye, he could be identified by his "feminine clothing and mannerisms, oversexed-demeanor," and weak voice. The last might be detected in Demosthenes' legendary stutter (Plut. *Dem* 6.3) [see his nickname Batalos, "the stammerer," 1.26, 131, 164; 2.99], his fondness for dirty words (cf. Maxwell-Stuart 1976), and his "stage fright" (2.34).

Nonetheless, the greatest risk of pollution comes from Demosthenes's mouth. After drawing attention to his "unclean body," Aeschines points to the impurity of his mouth: *μη καθαρεύοντα τῷ σώματι, μηδ' ὅθεν τὴν φωνὴν ἀφίησιν* ("his body is unclean, **even the part his voice comes from**"). Aeschines is implying that Demosthenes has polluted his mouth by performing fellatio on other men.²¹ A man's willingness (and eagerness) to perform fellatio, an act that no respectable woman would even consider, marks him as a *kinaidos* (Halperin 1998: 101). According to Parker (1983: 99-100), the gravity of this offense derives from the belief that the head was the purest part of the body, and of the head, the mouth was the purest because it was a place of social action: prayers, political advice, and chaste kisses.²² When Demosthenes speaks in the Assembly or law courts--places whose purity was obligatory--he not only puts his audience at risk for pollution, but also degrades the sanctity of the aforementioned places.²³ Thus, Aeschines undermines Demosthenes' portrayal of his own political prognostications as salubrious to the state. He replaces the image of Demosthenes the good politician with a pervert, whose filthy mouth threatens to infect good citizens.

Aeschines builds upon his portrayal of Demosthenes as polluted during his justification of his own pro-peace political stance. By putting the Peace of Philocrates and its opponents in its historical context, he shows that a war with Philip would be a disaster for the Athenian

²¹ One such example is Aristion of Platea. In *Against Ctesiphon*, Aeschines describes Aristion as a young man of outstanding beauty, who lived a long time in the house of Demosthenes. The perverse nature of this *erastês-erômenos* relationship is implied by Aeschines' comment that "as to what he did and what was done to him (ὅ τι πάσχων ἢ πράττων), the allegations vary, and it would be quite improper for me to discuss the matter" (3.162). The fact that Aristion suffered (*πάσχων*) and acted (*πράττων*) indicates that the lines between the *erômenos* and *erastês* were blurred. Aeschines' *paralipsis* invites the listener to assume that Demosthenes and his lover were engaging in the basest of sexual practices (i.e. fellatio).

²² See Krenkel (1980: 83) for fellatio as a common political accusation.

²³ Before each meeting of the Assembly, a preliminary purification was always conducted. The purification of the Assembly, the placement of lustral stoups around the agora, and the garlanding of public officials show that the community was a sacred entity (Parker 1983: 153).

democracy (Carey 2000: 93). He describes the "people who have now formed ranks and come against" him (§178), that is, the generation after the Thirty, as follows:

κάνταυθα ἀναφύντος τοῦ δήμου καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἰσχύσαντος, ἄνθρωποι παρῆγγραπτοὶ γεγεννημένοι πολῖται, καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν τῆς πόλεως ἀεὶ προσαγόμενοι, καὶ πόλεμον ἐκ πολέμου πολιτευόμενοι, ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ τὰ δεινὰ τῷ λόγῳ προορώμενοι, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς φιλοτίμους καὶ λίαν ὀξείας ἐρεθίζοντες, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολέμοις ὄπλων οὐχ ἀπτόμενοι, ἐξετασταὶ δὲ καὶ ἀποστολεῖς γιγνόμενοι, παιδοποιούμενοι δὲ ἐξ ἑταιρῶν, ἄτιμοι δ' ἐκ συκοφαντίας, εἰς τοὺς ἐσχάτους κινδύνους τὴν πόλιν καθιστάσι, τὸ μὲν τῆς δημοκρατίας ὄνομα οὐ τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ κολακείᾳ θεραπεύοντες, καταλύοντες δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην, ἐξ ἧς ἡ δημοκρατία σφύζεται, συναγωνιζόμενοι δὲ τοῖς πολέμοις, ἐξ ὧν ὁ δῆμος καταλύεται. (§177)

At this point, when the democracy had sprung up afresh and recovered its original strength, **persons who had had themselves fraudulently enrolled as citizens constantly attracted to themselves the sick element of the city and pursued a policy of war and more war. In peace they spoke of the danger they prognosticated and tried to stir up ambitious and over-hasty minds, while in war they never lifted a weapon but got themselves made army auditors and naval inspectors.** These are men who father children on their mistresses, men disfranchised for malicious sycophancy. And they are placing the city in extreme danger. **They tend to the name of democracy not with their conduct but with flattering words; they are trying to destroy the peace that keeps the democracy safe,** while they champion the wars that destroy democracy.

Although Aeschines appears to be talking about opponents in the plural, the person whom he has in mind is Demosthenes. He once again underscores his opponent's dubious ancestry and therefore disqualification for Athenian citizenship by associating him with those who had fraudulently enrolled themselves as Athenian citizens during the tyranny of the Thirty (404-403 B.C.E.).²⁴ Here Aeschines turns Demosthenes' *nosêma deinon* metaphor against him and portrays Demosthenes as diseased. He explains that Demosthenes attracts the "diseased element" (τὸ νοσοῦν) of the city to himself,²⁵ the implication being that "like attracts like." The effect of this

²⁴ Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of having Scythian heritage on his mother's side (2.23, 180).

²⁵ Cf. Isocrates' description of citizens who try to seize power by force as νοσήματα τῶν πόλεων (10. 34).

rhetoric is that it casts Demosthenes as an outsider, and bolsters the plausibility of his treachery. It also invokes the principle of contagion. Since Demosthenes is a part of the Athenian civic body (albeit fraudulently), he has the potential to infect the whole. Aeschines thus shows that it is not Philip, who is the disease, but men like Demosthenes.

Aeschines once more brings up the topic of Demosthenes's political *prognôseis* when he mentions that his opponents voiced terrible predictions (τὰ δεινὰ τῷ λόγῳ προορώμενοι) about the bad things that would befall the state, if peace was pursued. This statement challenges Demosthenes' claim in his prosecution speech to have foreseen the disaster (προεώρων τὰ μέλλοντα) that would ensue from the Peace of Philocrates (19.31, 154). By contrasting Demosthenes' "terrible" *prognôseis* with his lackluster actions in war (e.g. self-appointments to non-combative positions), he further erodes the sincerity of Demosthenes' self-portrait as physician of the state.²⁶ The good physician was expected to possess *andreia* (manly courage), to combat the invasive disease bravely alongside his patient.²⁷ The incongruity of Demosthenes' actions announces him as a charlatan.

Moreover, Aeschines asserts that Demosthenes' civic offenses are symptomatic of a much larger crime: destruction of the democracy. The language that he uses to communicate this accusation can also be interpreted medically. For example, he snidely remarks that Demosthenes and his political protégés support (θεραπεύοντες) the democracy with flattery (κολακεία) rather than conduct (ἤθεσιν). The word used for support, *therapeuontes*, literally meaning "serve" or "tend," very commonly refers to medical treatment of the sick.²⁸ The effect of this

²⁶ In the Hippocratic prognostic texts only the most severe cases are described as *deinos* (cf. *Prog.* 2).

²⁷ Military metaphors are pervasive throughout the Hippocratic Corpus (Rosen 2003: 95-97).

²⁸ LSJ s.v. θεραπεύω II.7.

word choice is that it also undermines Demosthenes' self-portrait as physician of the state. Instead of helping the democracy with useful advice, he damages it with indulgent flattery.²⁹

Aeschines, on the other hand, portrays himself as truly concerned with the well being of the state by connecting peace with the city's health (καταλύοντες δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην, ἐξ ἧς ἡ δημοκρατία σφύζεται). The verb σφύζω can be used to describe recovery from a disease (e.g. *Prog.* 18.29; *Epid.* 1.2.8.11; *CP* 135. 2, etc.),³⁰ and the presence of other medical language in this passage encourages such a reading. As one of the most vocal proponents of peace with Macedon, Aeschines supplants Demosthenes as the true physician of Athens, for his peace acts have been acts of healing.

IV. Conclusion

As we have seen, Aeschines' challenges Demosthenes' medical invective through appropriation. He overturns Demosthenes' self-portrait as physician of the state by confronting his opponent's assertions that he has always spoken up, that is, prognosticated, for the benefit of the state. Instead of bold forecasts, Aeschines shows that the best that Demosthenes can offer the state, is silence, or more accurately, inarticulate mutterings more fit for beast than for man. Moreover, the prognoses that he does manage to deliver are incomplete: they focus on future rather than present exigencies.

²⁹ Aeschines' characterization of the bad politician's *therapeia* as *kolakeia* recalls Socrates' dichotomy of the arts in Plato's *Gorgias*. Socrates explains that every true art has been infiltrated by flattery (ἡ κολακευτική), including medicine. Cookery imitates Hippocratic regimen, for instead of providing the body with fortifying foods, it wins adherents by offering tasty delicacies (464c-e). The danger of Demosthenes's *kolakeia* is that he deceives the Athenian people by presenting them with pleasurable rather than politically salubrious advice.

³⁰ LSJ sv σφύζω I.1a.

Aeschines further undermines his rival's grandiose self-portrait as civic healer by labeling him as a *goês*. As shown in the Hippocratic treatise *Sacred Disease*, these magico-religious healers were considered a threat to legitimate healing systems, that is, to Hippocratic medicine, on the grounds that they perpetuate erroneous beliefs concerning the origin of disease, and they take advantage of their clients by offering them costly but ineffective treatments. The result is that they profit while using divinity to mask their incompetence. According to Aeschines, Demosthenes' political medicine is of this sort: he offers flattery that gratifies the Athenians' egos but does nothing to remedy the crisis at hand.

Furthermore, Aeschines responds to Demosthenes' characterization of him as diseased by arguing that it is Demosthenes who is diseased. Aeschines isolates Demosthenes from the civic body by drawing the jury's attention to his non-normative sexual activities, which make him polluted (οὐ καθαρὸς, §148) and a magnet for social sickness (ὁ νοσοῦν τῆς πόλεως ἀεὶ προσαγόμενοι, §177). He then communicates the consequences of having a "sick" man in power. He invokes Hesiod's unjust man not only to respond to Demosthenes' recitation of Solon's *Eunomia* elegy (W4), but also to illustrate dramatically his belief that the evil man brings ruin upon the entire city (§158, cf. Hes. *Op.* 240-1). The fact that Aeschines won the trial (albeit by a very narrow margin) attests to the persuasiveness of this defense strategy.

Against Ctesiphon (Aeschin. 3)

I. Context & Introduction

Aeschines delivered *Against Ctesiphon* little more than a decade after his success with *Against the False Embassy* (330 B.C.E.). According to Carey (2000: 159-166), in that short amount of time, the political climate of Athens had changed in Demosthenes' favor. His political

prognostications about Philip's expansion into central Greece had been proven correct, despite the terms of the Peace. The high esteem that Demosthenes acquired was reflected in the offices and honors that he received. He was chosen to deliver the funeral oration for the fallen at Chaeronea, he was selected as wall-builder (*teichopoios*) for his deme, and he was praised for the liturgies that he willingly provided for the fortification and entertainment of the city (Carey 2000: 159). The highest honor that he received, however, was a golden crown for his services to the state. In the theater before the Athenian people, Ctesiphon, a political ally, crowned him for "consistently speaking and acting in the best interest of the people" (3.50, 101, 237; Dem. 18.54, 59, 84). It is on this act that Aeschines built his prosecution case.

Aeschines' formal charge in *Against Ctesiphon* is that Ctesiphon's crowning of Demosthenes was illegal on three points. The first two comprise a *graphê paranomôn*, a claim that there has been a violation of constitutional law: to crown an official before he has submitted to a final audit is illegal, and so is its public announcement in the theater (Carey 200: 160). Nevertheless, it is the third point that strongly suggests the personal rather than political nature of this speech (162). Aeschines contends that the ground for the award, namely that Demosthenes "consistently spoke and acted in the best interests of the people," is unfounded. Both Gargarin (2010: 300) and Yunis (2000: 103-4) note that if Aeschines had focused on the first two charges, he might have won his case. Instead, by devoting most of his allotted time to the third charge (117 sections: cf. 3.51-167), he pushes aside "simple, undeniable facts" in favor of a trial based on character (Gargarin 2010: 201).

Perhaps inspired by his success with *On the Embassy*, Aeschines reuses much of the same medical language and imagery in *Against Ctesiphon*, albeit with greater intensity. This change once more highlights the personal nature of the trial. In addition to its former success,

Aeschines' motivation for recycling his invective may have been his opponent's intention to use medical language in his defense speech (Dem. 18). Even though Aeschines was formally prosecuting Ctesiphon, his intended target was Demosthenes, who would deliver Ctesiphon's defense, as if he were the one formally on trial. Despite the fact that Aeschines delivered his prosecution speech first, there is compelling evidence, according to Carey (2000), that drafts of Demosthenes' speech were in circulation before the trial.³¹ Aeschines' awareness that Demosthenes used, and would continue to use, medical language as rhetorical tool likely enticed him to incorporate similar language into his own prosecution. By speaking first, Aeschines had the opportunity to shape how the audience would receive Demosthenes' medical language.

II. Prognosis & the Charlatan Physician

From the very beginning of his prosecution speech, Aeschines anticipates Demosthenes' use of medical language in his defense arguments. He warns the jury to be on guard against his opponent's portrayal of his office of *teichopoios* as a duty (ἐπιμέλεια) (§13). Aeschines' word choice recalls Demosthenes' exhortation to the jury in *Against the False Embassy* to take care (ἐπιμέλεια) of the epidemic (*nosêma deinon*) of political corruption before it overtakes Athens (19.259). In the latter passage, taking into account the strong medical context, *epimeleia* refers to the careful attention given by a physician to his sick patient. Demosthenes plays here with the intersection between politics and medicine to give force to his plea. However, when Aeschines brings up the subject of *epimeleia*, which he does twice and always sardonically of his opponent's political service (3.13, 16), he seems to challenge Demosthenes' suggestion that

³¹ It is also possible that Aeschines' anticipation of Demosthenes' physician simile may be the product of revision, which suggests that his opponent's simile was so striking that he felt a need to respond to it in a later version of the speech. Usher (1993: 253), on the other hand, believes that Aeschines recycled the physician simile from an unpublished speech of Demosthenes.

political duty is something akin to medical service. He remarks that the only thing that Demosthenes did for the city was to heap misfortune (*atuchēmata*) at her door (§57).

Aeschines once again employs the image of the charlatan healer in connection to Demosthenes' oft-repeated claim to have anticipated future political events. As shown above, Aeschines made this very same accusation in *On the Embassy* (2.165, 177); the difference here is his presentation. He dramatically attacks Demosthenes for lying about how he received news of Philip's death:³²

Οὗτος τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁ τηλικούτος τὸ μέγεθος κόλαξι, πρῶτος διὰ τῶν κατασκόπων τῶν παρὰ Χαριδήμου πυθόμενος τὴν Φιλίππου τελευτήν, **τῶν μὲν θεῶν συμπλάσας ἑαυτῷ ἐνύπνιον κατεψεύσατο** ὡς οὐ παρὰ Χαριδήμου τὸ πρᾶγμα πεπυσμένος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, **οὐς μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιροχῶν νύκτωρ φησὶν ἑαυτῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι προλέγειν.** (§77)

Now this man, Athenian men, this consummate flatterer, was the first to learn of Philip's death through the scouts from Charidemus. **And he invented a dream of his own and told lies against the gods**, claiming that he had not heard of the event from Charidemus but from Zeus and Athena. **Though he perjures himself in their name by day, he claims these gods converse with him at night and tell him the future.**

Aeschines depicts Demosthenes like a charlatan priest, who manipulates religious superstition to give weight to his political predictions. He pretends that he has received news of Philip's death from Zeus and Athena, who have appeared to him in a dream. The word that Aeschines uses for "invent" is *συμπλάσας*, which can connote physical creation.³³ It gives the impression that his opponent's lies are the product of a master-craftsman, a notion reinforced by the epithets, *τεχνίτης λόγων*, "craftsman of words," (§200; cf. 1.170), and *δεινὸς δημιουργὸς λόγων*, "fearsome maker of words" (§215). The care that Demosthenes puts into the construction of his lies, that is, his use of precise details, recalls Aeschines' accusation in *On the Embassy* that his

³² Philip was assassinated by his bodyguard Pausanias in 336 B.C.E. (Arist. *Pol.* 5.1311b).

³³ LSJ sv. *συμπλάσσω* I.1.

opponent's danger lies in his ability to mimic the truth (2.153). Hesk (2000) asserts that Aeschines brings up Demosthenes' unusual expertise in lying because it complements his *goês* invective:³⁴ that is, Demosthenes' creation of truth-like lies is *goêteia*. Moreover, Demosthenes' lies gain credence from their cloak of divinity. Aeschines' characterization of Demosthenes' dream as a nocturnal vision (ἐνύπνιον) evokes the practice of nocturnal incubation, which was a well-known feature of the cult of Asclepius.³⁵ In this instance, Demosthenes' prophecies concern not his own health but the health of the state.

Aeschines unmasks Demosthenes' artificial piety by contrasting his opponent's nocturnal and diurnal relationship with the gods. By night he claims to have participated in intimate conversations with Athena and Zeus, but by day he swears falsely by them (μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐπορκῶν). Aeschines finishes his anecdote with a comment that highlights Demosthenes' sacrilege. He explains that seven days after the death of his daughter, Demosthenes donned a fillet and white clothing and made sacrifices to the gods. He pushed aside the ancestral custom of wearing black clothing for a prescribed thirty-day period (Carey 2000:191n86).

Aeschines' portrayal of Demosthenes as a charlatan priest, with pretense to divine knowledge, echoes *Sacred Disease's* tirade against magico-religious healers. As I mentioned in my discussion of *On the Embassy*, Aeschines calls Demosthenes a *goês* for his braggadocio and verbal dexterity, which echo the complaints made by the author of the *Sacred Disease* against these healers. In his prosecution speech, Aeschines uses the same invective label (§137, §207),

³⁴ Hesk cites Plato's description of the imaginary craftsman's extraordinary ability to make perfect replications of objects. This ability is called *apatê* and *goêteia* (R.10.598c1-d6) (239n.89)

³⁵ Asclepius' temple at Epidaurus, which flourished well into Demosthenes' day, was considered the most hallowed site of all the god's temples for incubation. The sick would make pilgrimages there in hopes that the healing god would visit them in a dream and cure them. Testimonies to successful healings (*iamata*) were inscribed on stelai that were hung on the walls of the temple. Divine visitations are called *enupnia* on these stelai. For detailed discussion of these Epidaurian *iamata*, see LiDonnici (1995).

plus a few additional ones that appear in *Sacred Disease*. As mentioned above, the author of the latter singles out *magoi*, *kathartai*, *agurtai*, and *alazônes* as the objects of his hatred because they profit at the expense of the religiously superstitious (1). He also attacks them for covering up their medical ignorance with strange dietary regimens, purifications, and claims to supernatural powers (1-2).

Like the author of *Sacred Disease*, Aeschines calls Demosthenes a *magos* (§137) and an *alazôn* (§99, §101, §218, §237, §238, §256) for his manipulation of the Athenian people for personal profit. As in *On the Embassy*, Aeschines integrates the subject of imitation into his charlatan argument. He asserts once more that Demosthenes transcends the ordinary *alazôn* in his ability to imitate the truth: his opponent is willing to swear oaths and add precise details to his lies to make them more believable (§99). Moreover, to augment the impression that his enemy's voice is dangerous, Aeschines describes it as a powerful charm (ἐπωδή) (§192), a word that brings to mind the charlatan healers of *Sacred Disease*, who use charms (ἐπαοιδή) to "heal" epilepsy (*SD* 1.8, 30, 93). Like their words, Demosthenes' sound impressive but are utterly useless.

Throughout his prosecution, Aeschines highlights his opponent's sacrilegious behavior with the epithets μαρός (§79, §101, §166, §212), ἀνοσίος (§101, §191), βδελυρός (§246), and κάθαρμα (§211). All of these adjectives to varying degrees convey the idea of pollution; nevertheless, it is the noun *katharma* that explicitly refers to infectious pollution: it describes the offscourings of a purification ceremony and, as such, is pollution in its purest form (Parker 1983: 3-4, 10, 24). By using such language, Aeschines suggests that Demosthenes' actions are not those of a common charlatan, the sort depicted in *Sacred Disease* or on the comedic stage, but of

someone, who poses a real threat to Athens.³⁶ The remedy that Aeschines offers the jury is expulsion. For example, in discussing the disastrous results of Chaeronea, he calls for Demosthenes to be "cast beyond the borders" (§130) for belittling the omens of the gods without any knowledge of the future (σὺ δ' οὐδὲν προειδὼς τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, §131), for if they had heeded the omens against engaging Philip, the outcome might have been different. This statement clearly undermines Demosthenes' self-portrait as prophet and healer by bringing up his opponent's numerous boasts about his ability to foresee the future.³⁷ In addition to this example, in the peroration of his prosecution speech Aeschines makes the same demand:

Οὐκ ἀποπέμψετε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς κοινήν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συμφορὰν;
(§253)

Won't you send this man away, as he is a common disaster for Greece?

The language and content of this exhortation, as well as in the previous example, evoke the scapegoat ritual, during which a person of lowly origin/character was sent away in the hope that that his/her removal would alleviate the sufferings of the afflicted city (Parker 1983: 24). By playing with the language of religious pollution, Aeschines presents Demosthenes' expulsion as the only way by which the jury can heal the city.

One of Aeschines' motivations for the using the language of religious pollution and disease is presumably Demosthenes' peculiar fondness for it. At one point in his prosecution, Aeschines quotes Demosthenes' speech in order to draw attention to his enemy's penchant for metaphorical language:

³⁶ For the *alazôn* as comedic stock figure, see Rowe (1966).

³⁷ For the intersection of prophecy and medicine, see Plato's *Cratylus* (405a-b), in which both arts are described as possessing the same goal of "making man pure in both body and soul" (Parker 1983: 215).

ἀμπελοουροῦσί τινες τὴν πόλιν, ὑποτέμνεται τὰ νεύρα τοῦ δήμου, φορομορραφούμεθα, ἐπὶ τὰ στενά τινες ὥσπερ τὰς βελόνας διείρουσι. (§166).³⁸

There are people who are pruning the city like a vine; people who have cut back the shoots of democracy. **The sinews of the state have been cut**, we are being stitched up like a mat. There are people pressing us into tight places like needles

Aeschines' quotation contains a mixture of metaphors: the first is agricultural, the second describes physical suffering, and the third belongs to the domestic realm. The metaphor of the sinews reads like a *prognôsis*, in that it is a pessimistic pronouncement about the political health of Athens: the body is the people (*dêmos*), and the sinews are democracy, that which enables the civic body to move and thus function. Aeschines' expresses his incredulity at Demosthenes' use of such language with the question: "What are these, sly fox, words or wonders (ὀήματα ἢ θαύματα)?" (§167). The word for wonders (*thaumata*) is borrowed from the language of magic. The concept of "miracle-like words" recalls the magniloquent claims of the magico-religious healers of *Sacred Disease*. Considered alongside Aeschines' characterization of Demosthenes' speech as a magic charm (*epoidê*), the implication is that jury should view Demosthenes' words as that of a deceptive charlatan not of a politician who cares about the health of his city.

The figure of the prognosticating physician reappears in Aeschines' *refutatio*, specifically in his defense of his own periodic silence. He presumes that Demosthenes will argue in his defense speech that Aeschines' silence is actually political quiescence (§§215-216).³⁹ Aeschines counters by connecting silence with moderation, a quality expected of the good Athenian citizen:

³⁸ Carey (2000: 221) points out that the text comprising Demosthenes' quotation is uncertain, and that later authors provide different variants from what is found in the manuscripts. Nevertheless, Carey does add that the "broad thrust of Aeschines' criticism is clear," that is, Demosthenes' style is overly ornate.

³⁹ Demosthenes will bring up the topic of Aeschines' silence (18.198, 308), but, as Carey (2000) remarks, he does so to point out that Aeschines only breaks his silence during catastrophic events, and then for the purpose of criticizing others (238n245).

Τὴν δ' ἐμὴν σιωπὴν, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ἢ τοῦ βίου μετριότης παρεσκεύασεν· (§218). He then goes a step further; he makes periodic silence the sign (σημεῖνον) of a democratic man:

Ἐπιτιμᾶς δέ μοι εἰ μὴ συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ διαλείπων πρὸς τὸν δῆμον προσέρχομαι. . . τὸ μὲν διὰ χρόνου λέγειν σημεῖον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀνδρὸς πολιτευομένου, τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν παραλείπειν ἡμέραν ἐργαζομένου καὶ μισθαροῦντος. (§220)

But you criticize me for not coming before the people continually, but at intervals . . . speaking at intervals is the mark of a man who engages in politics at the right occasion and when it is beneficial, while missing not a single day is the mark of a professional and a hireling.

In this passage Aeschines once more addresses Demosthenes' claim to have always spoken for the well being of the city. He undermines his enemy's grand self-portrait as good politician *par excellence* by characterizing his constant speech as antidemocratic. Demosthenes speaks only because he has been hired by Philip to do so. Aeschines, on the other hand, associates his own speech with the *kairos*, which he in turn connects with democracy. In the late fourth-century Hippocratic ethical treatise, *Physician*, a similar distinction is made. The author advises the neophyte physician to exercise prudence with his speech, including speaking only when necessary (1).⁴⁰ Taking into account the purpose of this treatise, which is to instruct the physician-in-training how to act like a physician, his recommendation may come from a fear that excessive speech may brand the young physician as a charlatan--one need only think of the outrageous boasts of the magico-religious healers of *Sacred Disease* to understand this fear. The fact that this text parallels Aeschines' pronouncement shows that how (and what) one speaks was

⁴⁰ The author advises the physician-in-training: Δεῖ δὲ σκοπέειν τάδε περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν σώφρονα, μὴ μόνον τὸ σιγᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὸν βίον [τὸ]πάνυ εὐτακτον, μέγιστα γὰρ ἔχει πρὸς δόξαν ἀγαθὰ, τὸ δὲ ἦθος εἶναι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, τοιοῦτον δ' ὄντα πᾶσι καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον· ("In matters of the mind, let him be prudent, not only with regards to silence, but also in having a great regularity of life, since this is very important in respect of reputation; he must be a gentleman in character, and being this he must be grave and kind to all.").

considered critical for the reputation of both the orator and the physician. By bringing up the issue of speech, Aeschines may be engaging with Demosthenes' self-portrayal as a physician of the state.

The figure of the charlatan physician explicitly comes to the foreground in Aeschines' attack on Demosthenes' invective strategy. Aeschines explains that in his defense speech Demosthenes will use medical imagery to tarnish his [i.e. Aeschines'] political reputation (cf. 18.243):

Ἐπειτα ἐπερωτᾶν με, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, μέλλει τίς ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος ἰατρός, ὅστις τῷ νοσοῦντι μεταξὺ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι μηδὲν συμβουλεύει, τελευτήσαντος δὲ ἐλθὼν εἰς τὰ ἔνατα διεξίει πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους, ἃ ἐπιτηδεύσας ὑγίης ἂν ἐγένετο. (§225)

And then he intends, so I am told, to ask what kind of a doctor it would be who gave no advice to a sick man during the course of his illness, but on his death went to the funeral and explained to the relatives the treatment that would have restored him to health.

Aeschines' awareness that Demosthenes' will depict him as an incompetent physician provides a compelling reason for his incorporation (whether by revision or prior knowledge) of similar invective throughout his prosecution speech--language that can be interpreted as having medical resonance is thus reinforced. Aeschines explains that the purpose of Demosthenes' simile will be to communicate the dangerous consequences of his own alleged political silence. In his paraphrase, Aeschines tells the jury that he will be compared to a physician who refuses to give timely medical advice to Athens, his sick patient. By preparing the jurors in advance, Aeschines takes away some of the force from his opponent's simile.

Aeschines attempts to negate the simile's effect further by offering up Demosthenes as a concrete example:

Σ'αυτὸν δ' οὐκ ἀντερωτᾶς τίς ἂν εἴη δημαγωγὸς τοιοῦτος ὅστις τὸν μὲν δῆμον θωπεύσαι δύναίτο, τοὺς δὲ καιροῦς, ἐν οἷς ἦν σφῆζεσθαι τὴν

πόλιν, ἀποδοίτο, τοὺς δ' εὖ φρονοῦντας κωλύοι διαβάλλων συμβουλευεῖν, ἀποδράς δ' ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων καὶ **τὴν πόλιν ἀνηκέστοις συμφοραῖς περιβαλὼν** ἀξιόη στεφανοῦσθαι ἐπ' ἀρετῆ, ἀγαθὸν μὲν πεποικηκῶς μηδέν, πάντων δὲ τῶν κακῶν αἴτιος γεγονώς. (§226)

But you do not ask yourself what kind of politician it would be who had the ability to ingratiate himself with the people **but sold off the opportunities by which the the city could be made safe**, used slander to prevent men of sense from giving advice and after running away from danger and **immersing the city in incurable catastrophe** demanded a crown for virtue, when he had done nothing of benefit and was to blame for every disaster . . .

In this way, Aeschines reveals Demosthenes to be the bad physician of his own simile. Just as his physician wasted the *kairos* of his patient, Demosthenes sold off the *kairoi* (τοὺς δὲ καιρούς . . . ἀποδοίτο) of Athens, a feat that he accomplished through flattery (δήμον θωπεύσαι δύναιτο).⁴¹ Aeschines communicates the importance of a city's *kairoi* with the modifying phrase, ἐν οἷς ἦν σῶζεσθαι τὴν πόλιν ("on which the city's safety depends"). In this medical context, the verb σῶζεσθαι evokes health and physical wellbeing, and thus creates the impression that Athens is a suffering body. Furthermore, Aeschines implies that the consequence of wasted *kairoi* is the same as with the bad physician: the death of the patient. He blames Demosthenes for killing Athens by bringing upon her a myriad of incurable disasters (**ἀνηκέστοις συμφοραῖς**), just as he did to the Thebans (τῶν **ἀνιάτων καὶ ἀνηκέστων κακῶν**).⁴² Demosthenes' association with death is strengthened when viewed beside Aeschines' comparison of him to a disease in his *refutatio*: "But you inflict wounds (ἐλκοποιεῖς) and are more concerned with arguments of the moment than the safety (σωτηρίας) of the city" (§208). With the verb ἐλκοποιέω, Aeschines equates Demosthenes with an ulcer that threatens the

⁴¹ For flattery as the tool of the charlatan healer, see Pl. *R.* 364b5-c5.

⁴² A year after Chaeronea (335 B.C.E.) the Thebans unsuccessfully revolted against Macedonian rule. During the entire affair, Demosthenes refused to become actively involved, and in the end, Alexander dealt with the

health (σωτηρία) of the city.⁴³ Not only is Demosthenes a bad physician, but he is also the disease that is destroying Athens.

As is implied in the physician simile, Demosthenes' most flagrant crime is his outrageous behavior. Just as the physician bragged after his patient's death that he knew exactly how to save him, Demosthenes demanded a crown for his civic excellence after he single-handedly destroyed Athens. Aeschines' perversion of Demosthenes' simile brings to mind his recitation of Hesiod's *Works and Days* earlier in the speech.⁴⁴ The specific passage that Aeschines recites is Hesiod's warning to Perses of the consequences of allowing an unjust man to rule (§135):

Πολλάκι δὴ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπήυρα
 ὅς κεν ἀλιτραίνῃ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάται·
τοῖσιν δ' οὐρανόθεν δῶκεν μέγα πῆμα Κρονίων,
λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμὸν, ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί·
 ἢ τῶν γε στρατὸν εὐρὺν ἀπώλεσεν ἢ ὃ γε τεῖχος,
 ἢ νέας ἐν πόντῳ ἀποτίνυται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς. (*Op.* 240-245)

Often enough the whole city has paid for an evil man
 who does wrong and devises deeds of wickedness.
Upon them from heaven Cronus' son brings great woe,
famine and plague together, and the people perish.
 He may destroy their vast army or their walls
 or take vengeance on their ships at sea, far-seeing Zeus.

After reciting this passage, Aeschines declares that this poem is an "oracle directed at Demosthenes' political career," for, just as Hesiod predicted, Demosthenes' policies destroyed entire navies, armies, and cities (§136). Hesiod's association of the unjust man with plague (λοιμὸν) fits with Aeschines' depiction of Demosthenes as destructive to the political health of

⁴³ Aeschines' use of this unusual verb may be his attempt at vengeance. In *Against the False Embassy* Demosthenes implicitly compared him to an ulcer (*helkos*) in his recitation of Solon's *Eunomia* elegy (19.255).

⁴⁴ Yunis (2005) notes that the poet Hesiod is a point of contention between the two orators. Demosthenes criticizes Aeschines for quoting Hesiod (*Op.* 763-64) in his prosecution of Timarchus (19.243; cf. 1.129). Aeschines responds in his defense to Demosthenes' attempt to manipulate his words (2.144-145).

Athens. It may also be Aeschines' way of responding once more to Demosthenes' metaphor of the *nosêma deinon* from *Against the False Embassy*--he counters an epidemic with a plague. Aeschines' recitation of Hesiod and his appropriation of the bad physician simile complement each other in that they undermine Demosthenes' self-portrayal as a physician of the state. They reveal the doctor as the disease.

III. Conclusion

Just as Demosthenes did in his prosecution speech, Aeschines leaves the power of healing in the jury's hands. One of his final statements in the speech regards the health of the city. He makes a plea to the jury that Demosthenes be punished because he is a "common disaster for Greece" and a "pirate who sails though political life on a ship of words" (§253). Aeschines here invokes the image of the ship of state.⁴⁵ He implies that Demosthenes has failed in his duty as a pilot to steer the ship to safety; instead, he has used his words to move the ship wherever he wished, that is, to destruction. In the Hippocratic treatise *Ancient Medicine*, the author uses a similar analogy to convey the importance of technical excellence. The author compares bad physicians to bad pilots, whose incompetency is exposed during times of crisis. He explains that the mistakes of the bad pilot may escape notice during periods of calm, but when a hurricane strikes, his inability to save his ship reveals him as a charlatan. Likewise, the bad physician may be able to cover up his mistakes when his patient's illness is minor, but if confronted with a serious and life-threatening disease, he is exposed (*VM* 9).

Aside from personal motives, the overarching purpose of Aeschines' speech is to bring Demosthenes' alleged charlatanism to the attention of the Athenian citizens, and thus to show

⁴⁵ For a detailed discussion of the use of the ship of state metaphor in Greek political writings, see Brock (2013: 53-62).

that his civic crown is unmerited. The images of the bad physician and charlatan healer provide useful ways of expressing the danger of having someone incompetent in charge. As reflected in *Ancient Medicine's* pilot simile, an unskilled (or corrupt) technician can cause dire consequences in times of crises. For Aeschines, this dire consequence was Chaeronea. Aeschines' use of disease and pollution imagery complements his bad physician imagery by adding the element of preemptive irony: Demosthenes may present himself as a physician of the state, but his words and action reveal him to be the charlatan that he accuses others of being.

Aeschines therefore presents Demosthenes with a challenge. By appropriating and turning Demosthenes' language against him, Demosthenes is put in an awkward position of having to respond to Aeschines' accusations in a new way, since his opponent has already informed the jury of his invective strategy. Despite Aeschines' efforts, Demosthenes will triumphantly meet this challenge.

CHAPTER FOUR

Medical Language and Imagery in Demosthenes' *On the Crown*I. Introduction

Aeschines' strongest claim in *Against Ctesiphon* is that Ctesiphon's decree that Demosthenes should be crowned for "speaking and acting in the best interest of the people" was illegal (3.49). Instead of focusing on this charge, Aeschines devotes most of his energy to persuading the jury of the former. He argues that Demosthenes does not deserve a civic crown because his political policies were an utter failure. They led to the tragedy of Chaeronea (Gagarin 2010: 200). In *On the Crown*, Demosthenes responds to Aeschines' charges by rejecting what Harvey Yunis calls a "success-oriented model of public discourse," that is, the idea that a politician's excellence is measured by the success of his policies (2000: 104). Demosthenes accomplishes this by redefining the meaning of success. He contends that his career and policies were "flawless," but that the gods and fortune were against the Athenians (105).

In this chapter I examine how Demosthenes makes use of medical language and imagery in *On the Crown* to both defend his political career and blacken Aeschines'. I argue that he uses two types of medical language and imagery, that of disease and that of contemporary medical ethics. In the first part, I consider explicit examples. I look at how Demosthenes uses the concept of *prognôsis* to highlight his own political excellence and to expose his opponent's political incompetence. I also examine how he uses disease imagery to make insinuations of treachery. In the second half, I explore how Demosthenes uses language and imagery with medical resonance to complement and extend the themes of his explicit examples. My overall goal in this chapter is

to show that Demosthenes' medical language and imagery is intimately connected with his ideas of political excellence.

II. Explicit Medical Imagery

Demosthenes structures the defense of his career chronologically. He begins his speech with a defense of his early policies and ends with a discussion of his popularity after Chaeronea in order to show that he has always spoken and acted in the best interests of the people. Demosthenes marries both types of medical language, that of disease and of *prognôsis*, in his description of his early policies, where he portrays himself as actively forewarning the Greeks of the growing threat of Philip:

ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ **προὔλεγον** καὶ διεμαρτυρόμην καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν **ἀεὶ** καὶ ὅποι πεμφθείην· **αἱ δὲ πόλεις ἐνόσουν**, τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ πράττειν δωροδοκούντων καὶ διαφθειρομένων ἐπὶ χρήμασι, τῶν δ' ἰδιωτῶν καὶ πολλῶντὰ μὲν **οὐ προορωμένων**, τὰ δὲ τῇ καθ' ἡμέραν **ῥαστώνῃ** καὶ **σχολῇ δελεαζομένων**. (§45)

For I was **constantly predicting** it and protesting it, wherever I was sent. But the **states were diseased**: some politicians were conducting their state business under the influence of bribery and corruption, while the majority of private citizens were either **improvident** or **ensnared by the ease and leisure** of their day-to-day lives.¹

The most salient example of medical language in this passage is Demosthenes' description of the Greek states as diseased (αἱ δὲ πόλεις ἐνόσουν). This statement recalls Demosthenes' recitation of Solon's *Eunomia* elegy (W 4) and his *prognôsis* of the *nosêma deinon* (19.255-262) in *Against the False Embassy* (see Ch. 2). In each instance, he equates political corruption (i.e. Philipizing) with disease. As in his prosecution of Aeschines, here too Demosthenes stresses his constant forewarning of the danger that would ensue from the Peace of Philocrates. The verb προὔλεγον,

¹ All translations from Dem. 18 are freely adapted from Usher (1993).

literally, "to tell in advance," suggests *prognôsis* (e.g. Hp. *Prog.* 1.1, 3, 15, 23, etc.), even more so when it is combined with Demosthenes' pronouncement of civic illness. Unlike his description of the *nosêma deinon*, however, there are no optimistic suggestions that the disease of corruption can be stopped through the disenfranchisement of corrupt leaders (19.262). The disastrous result of Chaeronea may be responsible for Demosthenes' change in heart--the disease of Philipizing has now completely overtaken Greece. By contrasting his own foresight with the Athenians' political blindness (οὐ προορωμένων), Demosthenes seems to place the blame for the disease's advance upon the Athenian people. He suggests that he fulfilled his duty by forewarning the people, like a good physician, of the consequences of corruption, but they did not listen, for they were ensnared by the "ease" of daily living. In the Hippocratic writings, a successful healing depends on the patient's cooperation with the physician (Jouanna 2001: 136-137). Demosthenes suggests on the same model that the Athenian people are to blame for their loss of political autonomy because they did not heed his political advice.

Although complicit in their own destruction, Demosthenes largely exonerates the Athenians by making Aeschines primarily responsible for the misfortunes of Athens. As in *Against the False Embassy*, Demosthenes accuses his enemy of using his political speech (or lack thereof) to advance Philip's interests. Here, he uses the language of disease to express the deleterious nature of Aeschines' periodic silence:²

πράττεται τι τῶν ὑμῖν δοκούντων συμφέρειν· ἄφρονος Αἰσχίνης.
ἀντέκρουσέ τι καὶ γέγον' οἷον οὐκ ἔδει· πάρεστιν Αἰσχίνης. ὥσπερ τὰ
ῥήγματα καὶ τὰ σπάσματα, ὅταν τι κακὸν τὸ σῶμα λάβῃ, τότε κινεῖται.
(§198)

² Flavius Josephus uses the same simile of the fracture and sprain (with almost the same wording) to describe Jewish quietude during the reign of Nero (*BJ.* 6.337). This may suggest that Josephus was inspired by Demosthenes' style, in this case, his medical language.

Something is being done that is thought beneficial to you: **Aeschines is mute.**
 Something adverse and undesirable has happened: Aeschines steps forth. **He is just like fractures and sprains, which are stirred to life when some malady seizes the body.**

Demosthenes derides Aeschines' unwillingness to speak, unless in adverse situations, by comparing him to an old injury, whose pain the body re-experiences in times of ill health.³ The body, although this is not explicitly stated, is the citizen body, while the malady (τι κακόν) is presumably Philip. With this simile, Demosthenes asserts his belief that Aeschines took advantage of his countrymen's apathy towards the Macedonian question, that is, whether the Athenians should mount an offensive against Philip or remain neutral. He interprets Aeschines' silence as his opponent's recognition that his brand of oratory (retrospective and accusatory) is useless in a prosperous and healthy state. Adversity, on the other hand, provides the most opportunity for doing harm because, according to Demosthenes, the Athenian people are too absorbed in their daily routines to care about what is happening in their city. Aeschines speaks up at such times, perhaps knowing that Athenian apathy will allow him to harm the citizen body with little consequence.

Arguably the most striking medical simile in *On the Crown* is Demosthenes' comparison of his enemy to a charlatan physician--Aeschines had warned the jury about this simile in his prosecution speech (see Ch. 3). Demosthenes introduces the simile with a string of invectives that highlight Aeschines' treacherous nature and his political charlatanry. Demosthenes says:

³ The Hippocratic Corpus contains the only other classical usages of the phrase τὰ ῥήγματα καὶ τὰ σπάσματα (Hp. *Aër* 4; *Morb. i.* 20, 22), and these texts antedate Demosthenes' *floruit* (Jouanna 2001: 375, 382). This leaves open the possibility that Demosthenes may have read, or at least was intimately familiar, with Hippocratic medicine to the extent that he appropriated their terminology. See also Ch. 5 for the appearance of this simile in other Demosthenic speeches.

τοῦτο δὲ καὶ φύσει κίναδος τάνθρώπιόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑγιὲς πεποιηκὸς οὐδ' ἐλεύθερον, αὐτοτραγικὸς πίθηκος, ἀρουραῖος Οἰνόμαος, παράσημος ῥήτωρ. (§242)

And this **little fellow** has just such a **foxy nature**, who **from the start has never done anything healthy or befitting a free man**, a **born tragic-ape**, a rustic Oenomaus, a **counterfeit orator**.

One of the most salient features of this list is Demosthenes' comparison of Aeschines to two different animals, a fox (κίναδος) (cf. §162) and an ape (πίθηκος).⁴ This "animal invective" might be his attempt to counter or outdo Aeschines' portrayal of him as a wild beast (θηρίον) in both *On the Embassy* and *Against Ctesiphon*.⁵ It could also be his response to Aeschines' aspersions on his masculinity (cf. 2.127, 137, 139; 3.160, 209, 247).⁶ Both the ape and the fox are often associated with deception, a stereotypically female fault (cf. Arist. *HA* 608b), which, as a result, leads to their equation with women.⁷

The most notable example of the latter comes from Semonides of Amorgos' *Catalogue of Women* (7). In this poem, he classifies women according to the animal with which they share the most traits--all women, in his opinion, conform to a type. The ape woman is lamented as one of the worst possible characters a man could encounter (71-72). She is physically, and therefore sexually, disgusting: her face is "hideous," and she has no neck or butt (73-75).⁸ She is "versed in every kind of trick" (78), she is "shameless" (79), and "she plots the whole day long to see how

⁴ For Demosthenes' comparison of Aeschines' cowardly disposition to that of a trembling hare, see 18.263.

⁵ In both of these speeches, Aeschines calls Demosthenes a *thêrion* to highlight his dangerous potential (cf. 2.34, 146; 3.182).

⁶ Kamen (2014: 405-8) interprets Demosthenes' use of *kinados* as a sexual pun, intended to respond to Aeschines' sexual taunts (see further below).

⁷ The ape and fox often appear together in folktales as complements: the ape as the dupe, and the fox as the cheat (McDermott 1935: 169). Despite this characterization, the ape does occasionally appear as the cheat (*Fab. Aesop.* 363; ed. Halm).

⁸ For the *πυγή* as a mark of female beauty, see Lloyd-Jones 1975: 83; cf. Hes. *Op.* 373.

she can do the greatest harm" (82-83). The ape woman surpasses all other women because of her shameless desire to harm her own friends.⁹

Aristophanes also exploits the ape's "natural" characteristics in his political comedies, especially its fondness for mischief (*Av.* 441; *Eccl.* 1072; *Eq.* 416, 887; *Pax* 1065-6; *Ran.* 707, 1083-6).¹⁰ Demagogues such as Cleon are called *δημοπίθηκοι*, "mob-apes," for their "burlesque" of true statesmanship, that is, their use of flattery to win over the people (*Ran.* 1083-6) (McDermott 1935: 172-3).¹¹ Aristophanes' ape is thus a natural sycophant (cf. *Archil. Frag.* 89.3-6; *Luc. Piscator* 37, 46, 47); he is the "personification of flattery" (*Pind. Pyth.* 2. 72-73) (McDermott 1935: 170). He is also a supreme imitator.¹² Therefore, when Demosthenes calls Aeschines a "tragic-ape," he may be trying to label his opponent as an imposter, who imitates not only a tragic actor, but also a man and a politician.¹³ The diminutive *τάνθρώπιον*, "little fellow," especially communicates the former, while the epithet *παράσημος ῥήτωρ*, "counterfeit orator," a financial metaphor, expresses the latter.¹⁴

The fox, like the ape, is also characterized by deceit in Semonides' poem (7.6-11).¹⁵ She is "pure evil" (7); she "misses nothing" (8)¹⁶ and "declares that good is bad and bad is good" (9-

⁹ The ape woman violates the principle of doing harm to your enemies and helping your friends (Dover 1994: 180-184).

¹⁰ For the relationship between iambic poetry and comedy, see Carey (2009: 149-167).

¹¹ The ape was an object of laughter and contempt because of its mimicry. In the words of McDermott (1935: 166): "The animal, exciting laughter, soon aroused contempt; with its imitations of man's actions, it is a natural burlesque--particularly funny because of the serious way in which he does his imitations, satiric because he is man's *reductio ad bestiam*."

¹² Artemidorus Daldianus compares the ape to the *goês* for his masterful skills of imitation: **πίθηκος** ἄνδρα πανούργον καὶ **γόητα** σημαίνει (*Onirocr.* 2. 12).

¹³ Demosthenes refers to Aeschines' "failed" acting career numerous times (18.262, 18.337). For a positive assessment of Aeschines' acting career, see Dorjahn (1929: 223-229).

¹⁴ LSJ s.v. *παράσημος* I.1.

¹⁵ Semonides uses *ἀλώπηξ* for fox, whereas Demosthenes uses *κίναδος*. Usher (1993: 229), citing a scholiast (*Etym. Magn.*, *Harp.*, *Phot.*, *Suda* s.v. *kinados* Σ), notes that *kinados* is the

10). Her latter characteristic qualifies her description as "pure evil." By conflating the bad with the good (v.v.), she justifies her own criminal behavior, which may encourage others to do the same.¹⁷ The fact that she accomplishes this with speech makes her words dangerous.¹⁸ For Demosthenes, the fox's deceitful behavior, especially in regard to speech, makes it a fitting choice for conveying the mendacity of Aeschines' speech.¹⁹ Moreover, it serves as a complement to the other implicit jabs at his sexuality in this passage. Kamen (2014: 406) proposes that *kinados* might be a pun for *kinaidos*, a man with insatiable sexual appetites and a fondness for anal penetration.²⁰ The crudeness of the pun matches the disgusting sexuality of the ape. It also harmonizes with τάνθρώπιον: Aeschines' sexual proclivities announce his failure as a "real man," rendering him as something lesser (Halperin 1998: 101).²¹ Kamen suggests that Demosthenes may be borrowing the pun from Aeschines 3.167 (407-408).²² This appropriation, Kamen argues, allows Demosthenes to covertly taunt Aeschines, in the same way that Aeschines did him, and to imply that Aeschines was "prostituting" himself to Philip (408). Thus,

"Sicilian word for fox, but generally used of anyone possessing animal cunning" (cf. Soph. *Aj.* 103; Ar. *Nub.* 448, *Av.* 429).

¹⁶ The adjective πολυίδρις refers to cunning (Lloyd-Jones 1975: 66); cf. Prometheus (Hes. *Th.* 616) and Sisphyus (Alc. fr. 38a,5).

¹⁷ The fear that people imitate bad behavior is pervasive throughout fifth- and fourth-century Greek literature. In Attic oratory, it becomes a trope that is most often used in the peroration of a speech. For a famous example, see [Dem.] 59.110-114.

¹⁸ Semonides predates the Sophists, but it is striking how his description of the fox woman's fondness for confounding good with evil echoes the sophist's notorious lessons in rhetoric on "making the weaker argument stronger."

¹⁹ For Demosthenes' (and Aeschines') use of the sound of their opponent's voice as invective, see Worman (2004:1-25) and Hesk (2000: 226)

²⁰ Kamen (2014: 406) points out that scholiasts on codices F², Y gloss *kinados* (18.242) with μαλακός ("soft"), ἀνδρόγυνος ("hermaphrodite"). She explains this gloss as a mistake or an explanation of a pun.

²¹ For the transgressive status of the *kinaidos/cinaedus*, see Halperin (1990), Winkler (1990), Gleason (1995), and Williams (1999).

²² Kamen (2014: 406) argues that the sexual nature of the pun is reinforced by Aeschines' frequent use of *kinaidos/kinaidia* to describe Demosthenes (1.131, 181; 2.88, 99, 151).

Demosthenes' animal invective, like his disease language, highlights the danger of Aeschines' treachery. It also brings to the forefront the problem of political imitation, which is inherent in the physician simile (to be discussed below).

Among Demosthenes' list of insults in §242, is the accusation that Aeschines has done "nothing healthy (ὕγιές) or free (ἐλεύθερον)". The coupling of these two words suggests that to Demosthenes "health" and "freedom" are interconnected.²³ In *Against the False Embassy*, Demosthenes expresses a similar connection through his recitation of Solon's *Eunomia* elegy (§255) and in his attendant *prognôsis* of the *nosêma deinon* of Philipizing (19.259-262). Demosthenes likens civic disorder, that is, corruption, to a disease that leads to political servitude at the hands of tyrant. The message of his recitation and *prognôsis* is that civic health (i.e. order and democracy) is political autonomy.²⁴ In this light, the phrase "nothing healthy nor free" can be interpreted as expressing Demosthenes' belief that Aeschines has not acted like a democratic citizen, and therefore, that he has contributed nothing to the preservation of Athenian democracy. Instead, his political policies have advanced Macedonian tyranny.

Alternatively, *hygiês* can also more specifically denote sound mental health (Dover 1994: 127).²⁵ Demosthenes, therefore, could be insinuating that Aeschines is insane, an interpretation reinforced by an earlier jab:

²³ Philoctetes uses the same phrase to describe Odysseus' treacherous mind: ὦ μηδὲν ὑγιές μηδ' ἐλεύθερον φρονῶν ("Oh man with a mind not at all healthy or free") (Soph. *Phil.* 1006). For the appearance of medical language in fifth-century tragedy, see Ch. 1.

²⁴ Raaflaub (2004) argues against the politicization of *eleutheros* in Solon's poetry. He contends that Solon recognized freedom only in the form of the citizen's freeman status; freedom as *autonomia* ("independence") from foreign rule would not emerge until after the Persian Wars. I believe that Demosthenes is retrojecting this post-Persian Wars concept of freedom upon Solon's poem. This reading is bolstered by Demosthenes' frequent and lengthy invocation of Marathon (e.g. 19.311-313). See Yunis (2000: 97-118) for Demosthenes' manipulation of history, particularly the example of Marathon.

²⁵ Demosthenes uses the same phrase "not healthy" to refer to mental illness in 24.58.

τί λόγους πλάττεις; τί σαυτὸν οὐκ ἔλλεβορίζεις ἐπὶ τούτοις; (§121)

Why do you fabricate arguments? Why do you not take a dose of hellebore for your illness?

Demosthenes suggests that Aeschines take hellebore, a medicinal herb traditionally used to treat insanity (cf. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1489; Pl. *Euthy.* 299b8).²⁶ Since this follows the proceeding question, "why do you fabricate arguments?," it may suggest that Aeschines' lies are symptomatic of insanity. The connection with freedom (*eleutheros*) may be related to the belief that freedom is dependent on self-mastery, or in other words, that the free man is one who can make sound decisions for his own wellbeing (Arist. *EN.* 1142b29-34). Since the mad individual has an incapacitated deliberative capacity,²⁷ he cannot be free. Demosthenes may be hinting that Aeschines' political policies, just like his arguments, reflect his madness and inability to act like an Athenian citizen. His sexual deviancy and treachery, represented by Demosthenes' animal invective, are also symptoms of his "un-Athenianness."

Demosthenes thus presents the audience with a depraved and insane creature, who has managed to pass himself off as an orator. The theme of the ensuing physician simile is charlatanry. It builds upon the image of the *παράσημος ῥήτωρ*, underscoring the consequences of allowing the charlatan to rise to a position of authority:

²⁶ Hellebore was one of the most dangerous drugs proscribed by the ancient physician. The physician-historian Ctesias of Cnidus describes the power of the drug: "In my father's and grandfather's time, one did not [as a rule] give hellebore, for neither the mixture, nor the measure, nor the weight according to which it was to be prepared, was known. When one did prescribe this medicine, the patient was prepared as [one would] before running a great risk. Among those who took it, many succumbed. Now the use of it seems more sure" (Oribasius, *Collectiones medicae* 8.8) (Trans. Jouanna 2001: 49). Bearing in mind the lethal nature of hellebore, Demosthenes' comment might contain the sinister undertone of "go kill yourself."

²⁷ Under Athenian law, the insane individual was considered unfit to manage his own property ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 35.2). The implication is that such a person is incapable of making rational decisions.

τί γὰρ ἡ σὴ δεινότης εἰς ὄνησιν ἤκει τῇ πατρίδι; νῦν ἡμῖν λέγεις περὶ τῶν παρεληλυθότων; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ἀσθενούσι μὲν τοῖς κάμνουσιν εἰσιὼν μὴ λέγοι μηδὲ δεικνύοι δι' ὧν ἀποφεύξονται τὴν νόσον, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τελευτήσῃε τις αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ νομιζόμεν' αὐτῷ φέροίτο, ἀκολουθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μνήμα διεξίει 'εἰ τὸ καὶ τὸ ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπος οὕτως, οὐκ ἂν ἀπέθανεν.' ἐμβρόντητε, εἶτα νῦν λέγεις; (§243)

How has your eloquence brought benefit to the city? **Will you talk to us now about the past? You are like a doctor who visits patients when they are ill and gives no indication as to how they might recover from their illness, but when one of them dies and the customary rites are being performed, he follows the procession to the grave, reciting a list: 'If this man had done this or that, he would not have died.'** Idiot! Do you speak now?

The force of the simile derives from a comparison between political and medical incompetence. Demosthenes defines the bad physician as one who waits till his patients' funerals to deliver his *prognōsis*.²⁸ The implication is that the physician is silent because he is afraid that his inexperience and ignorance will be exposed if he speaks:²⁹ he does not want to be blamed for the death of his patient, so he withholds his advice (Hp. *Prog.* 1.1; *Prorrh.* 2.1). Aeschines is like the bad physician because he lacks the ability to deliver a political *prognōsis*. He similarly protects himself from accusations of incompetence by delivering advice only about past events (παρεληλυθότων). An example of this delayed response is that Aeschines waited years after Chaeronea to tender his political advice about Demosthenes' Macedonian policies. He could at this point speak freely, since there was no longer any fear of exposure. In a way that is similar to the Hippocratic medical text *Prorrheticon*, whose author warns that a false *prognōsis* will lead to accusations of madness (*Prorrh.* 2), Demosthenes makes the same complaint against Aeschines for his *ex post facto* predictions. Prior to this simile, as we saw, Demosthenes hints at insanity

²⁸ See Ch. 2 for the significance of this passage for understanding the medical language and imagery in *Against the False Embassy* (Dem. 19).

²⁹ For the Hippocratic context of this problem, see Ch. 1.

with the phrase "nothing healthy." He does the same at the end of the simile by using the word ἐμβρόντητε, a comedic epithet for a 'mad' or 'gaping fool' (cf. Antiph. (Kock) Fr. 233; Oph. (Kock) Fr. 3; Phil. (Kock) Fr. 44; Men. *Dys.* 441, *Peri.* 523).³⁰ Demosthenes' comparison of Aeschines with a bad (even mad) physician underscores the absurdity of his opponent's charges. It also raises the question: to what extent has Aeschines damaged the city with his silence? The consequence of the physician's silence, that is, the death of his patient, is pregnant with insinuations.

If Aeschines is the bad physician, then Demosthenes is the good physician. Demosthenes creates this impression when he uses the language of *prognôsis* in his explanation of the orator's duties.³¹

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὦν γ' ἂν ὁ ῥήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἴη, πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν λαμβάνετε· οὐ παραιτούμαι. τίς οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα; **ιδεῖν τὰ πράγματα' ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθῆσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις.** ταῦτα πέπρακταί μοι. (§246)

But by all means make a searching examination of those aspects for which the orator can be deemed responsible: I do not ask to be excused. What are these? **To see things at their beginnings, to foresee them and foretell them to others.** These duties I have performed.

The good orator, like the good physician, is expected to forecast the future--an expectation that Demosthenes expresses through the participles ἰδεῖν ("to see"), προαισθῆσθαι ("to foresee"), προειπεῖν ("to foretell"). His emphasis on the need for the orator to speak the future in front of others (προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις) echoes *Prognosticon's* definition of *prognôsis*, as a "forecast" (προλέγων) that is made "by the side of the sick" (παρὰ τοῖσι νοσέουσι) (Hp. *Prog.* 1.1). By stressing the public nature of political *prognôsis*, Demosthenes renegotiates what it means to be

³⁰ LSJ. sv. ἐμβρόντητος I.1. The author of the late fifth- and early fourth-century Hippocratic text *De Diaeta* notes that those who are labeled ἐμβρόντητος are often victims of a "slow-approaching madness (μανία)" (35.58). For dating and authorship, see Jouanna (2001: 408-409).

³¹ This passage is likely a response to Aeschines' definition of the "political man" in his prosecution speech (3.220).

accountable (ὑπεύθυνος). This is important because one of the technical grounds for the trial revolves around the issue of accountability. Aeschines has alleged that Demosthenes' crowning was illegal because he failed to submit to a final audit (εὐθύνη) for his term of office as *teichopoios*. Demosthenes obviates the need for an official audit by claiming that his political career has always been performed in front of the people, and thus his actions have always been available for scrutiny.

With the pithy sentence ταῦτα πέπρακταί μοι Demosthenes forcefully presents himself as the model politician. He has met every expectation placed upon the politician. By appropriating the language of medical *prognôsis*, he extends the physician's simile: unlike Aeschines, he has publically forecast the future. His crown stands as evidence of his political excellence, while Aeschines' madness reveals the opposite. This contrast is at the heart of *Prorrheticon II's* explanation of the stakes of *prognôsis*: an inaccurate *prognôsis* leads to public odium and accusations of madness, while an accurate one leads to admiration (θαυμασθείη) (2).³² Demosthenes, therefore, subtly but deftly likens himself to a good physician.³³ He avoids the blame for Chaeronea by broadcasting his perfect execution of his political duties. He did everything in his powers to heal Athens' internal and external ills, but to no avail. Ultimately, it was the Athenians' non-compliance and incompetent leadership (i.e. Aeschines') that led to their own destruction.

³² The author of *Prognosticon* also lists admiration as a personal motivation for the physician to deliver an accurate *prognôsis* (Hp. *Prog.* 1). However, he omits the consequences of inaccuracy.

³³ Thucydides includes foresight as an attribute of "good" Athenian politicians, in particular Themistocles: κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής. . . τὸ τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεί ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα (Thuc. 1.138.3). "He was the best at conjucturing the future, more accurate than any in his forecast of events as they would actually happen. . . he foresaw better than any the possible advantage or disadvantage in a yet uncertain future" (Trans Hammond and Rhodes 2009). See Ch. 1 for Thucydides' influence on Demosthenes.

Demosthenes furthers the image of Aeschines the charlatan physician by bringing up Aeschines' former "career" as a purifier in his mother Glaucos's Eastern cult. This focus on Aeschines' past might be his attempt to outdo Aeschines' *goês* invective.³⁴ The most damaging (and colorful) example of the latter is Aeschines' depiction of him in *Against Ctesiphon* as a false prophet who is gifted with divine dreams about the future (3.77). Perhaps in response, Demosthenes depicts Aeschines the purifier as follows:

ἀνήρ δὲ γενόμενος τῇ μητρὶ τελούσῃ τὰς βίβλους ἀνεγίγνωσκες καὶ τᾶλλα συνεσκευωροῦ, τὴν μὲν νύκτα νεβρίζων καὶ κρατηρίζων καὶ **καθαίρων τοὺς τελουμένους** καὶ ἀπομάπτων τῷ πηλῷ καὶ τοῖς πτύροις, καὶ **ἀνιστὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ** κελεύων λέγειν ἔφυγον κακόν, εὖρον ἄμεινον, ἐπὶ τῷ μηδένα πώποτε τηλικούτ' ὀλολύξαι σεμνυνόμενος (καὶ ἔγωγε νομίζω· μὴ γὰρ οἴεσθ' αὐτὸν φθέγγεσθαι μὲν οὕτω μέγα, ὀλολύζειν δ' οὐχ ὑπέρλαμπρον) ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἡμέραις τοὺς καλοὺς θιάσους ἄγων διὰ τῶν ὁδῶν, τοὺς ἐστεφανωμένους τῷ μαράθῳ καὶ τῇ λεύκῃ, τοὺς ὄφεις τοὺς παρείας θλίβων καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς αἰωρῶν, καὶ βοῶν 'εὐοὶ σαβοί,' καὶ ἐπορχούμενος 'ὑῆς ἄττης ἄττης ὑῆς,' ἔξαρχος καὶ προηγεμῶν καὶ κιττοφόρος καὶ λικνοφόρος καὶ τοιαῦθ' ὑπὸ τῶν γραδίων προσαγορευόμενος, μισθὸν λαμβάνων τούτων ἔνθρουπα καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ νεήλατα (§§259-60)

On reaching manhood, you attended your mother's initiation sessions and read the texts for her, and helped conduct the rest of the ceremony: wrapping the initiates in fawn-skins and mixing the wine, **purifying the initiates** during the night, plastering them with clay and bran and scraping it off, **raising them up from their pollution** and bidding them say "I have escaped the evil, I have found better." You boasted that no one ever howled as loudly as you (and I believe him-- for do not suppose that he who speaks so loud is not a brilliant howler). In the daytime you led your noble bands through the streets, garlanded with fennel and poplar, squeezing the large-cheeked snakes and waving them above your head, and shouting "Euoi Saboi" and dancing to the words "Hyes Attes Attes Hyes," saluted as chorus-master, leader, ivy-bearer and fan-bearer by old hags, and getting as your reward for this tarts, biscuits, and rolls.

³⁴ In 18.276, Demosthenes implies that his description of Aeschines the *goês* was a response to Aeschines' *goês* invective. Aeschines may have made these accusations first, but he did so not because they were true but in order to anticipate the same charge being made against himself. Aeschines knew that Demosthenes' accusation would seem banal if said second, while his would be seen as credible because of its primacy.

See Ch. 2 for a discussion of Aeschines' *goês* invective.

What is striking about this passage is its length and plethora of detail. Based on that fact alone, it surpasses Aeschines' depiction of Demosthenes as a false prophet, or any other of his *goês* invective. Demosthenes makes little mention of Aeschines' career as a magico-religious healer in his earlier speech, *Against the False Embassy*: aside from some barbs against his mother for her illicit cultic activities (19.249, 281), the only direct attack against Aeschines is for reading books in his mother's initiation rites and fraternizing with her drunken revelers (19.199). This difference is probably a product of time, for more than a decade had passed since Demosthenes' delivery of *Against the False Embassy*. In the interim, Aeschines' parents had likely died, along with those who had known them well.³⁵ The passage of time made Demosthenes' exaggerations more believable and safer because there were fewer people alive that might take umbrage at such invective.

Demosthenes' portrayal of Aeschines' cultic activities brings to mind the magico-religious healers of *Sacred Disease*,³⁶ for, like them, his healing activities occurred in the context of an

³⁵ In *On the False Embassy* Aeschines uses his father Atrometus as a character witness. He gives his age as 94 (2.147). Based on his language (e.g. the use of deictic demonstrative pronoun), it appears that Atrometus is alive and present at court: **Οὐτοσί μὲν ἐστὶ μοι πατήρ Ἀτρώμητος**, σχεδὸν πρεσβύτατος τῶν πολιτῶν· ("This is my father Atrometus, almost the oldest of the citizens") (Trans. Carey 2000). It is less clear whether his mother is dead or alive, for he says: Ἐλευθέρους δέ μοι συμβέβηκεν εἶναι καὶ τοὺς πρὸς μητρὸς ἅπαντας, ἢ νῦν ἐμοὶ πρὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν προφαίνεται φοβουμένη περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς σωτηρίας καὶ διηπορημένη (§148) ("On my mother's side, too, all my relatives are in fact of free citizen birth. **And I see her before me now**, fearful for my safety and distraught") (§148). Carey explains that the phrase (lit.) "she appears before my eyes" could mean "she is alive and in court or present only in Aeschines' imagination and infirm or possibly dead." As to the issue whether his father was alive during the delivery of *On the Crown*, it is unlikely because Atrometus would have been 107.

³⁶ The same root *tel-* is used in both *Morb. Sacr.* and in the above passage. Aeschines aids his mother who performs the initiation (τῇ μητρὶ **τελούσῃ**). The author of *Sacred Disease* calls the purifiers impious for boasting that they can perform miraculous deeds through their rites (ἐκ **τελετέων**) (1.72).

initiation rite (*teletê*) that was not state-sanctioned.³⁷ Furthermore, his rite culminated in a purification ceremony. After clothing his initiates in fawn skins, Aeschines purified (*καθαίρων*) them and instructed them to utter the following incantation:³⁸ "I have escaped evil, I have found better (*ἔφυγον κακόν, εὕρον ἄμεινον*)." The reason that author of *Sacred Disease* attacks magico-religious healers for incorporating purifications (*katharmoi*) and incantations (*epaoidai*) into their healing rituals is that they use them to mask their incompetence and ignorance (*Hp. Morb. Sacr.* 1.8, 30, 93). Demosthenes presumably brings up Aeschines' cultic activities for the very same reason, that is, to underscore his opponent's deceptive behavior. He may also be motivated by the fact that a non state-sanctioned cult was considered a threat to the city, whose safety "depended upon the correct worship and relationships with the gods" (Bowie 1993: 114). Demosthenes therefore may be drawing an analogy between religion and politics: since his opponent's religious activities are dangerous, his political policies should be viewed in the same negative light.

In addition to calling to mind the Hippocratic text *Sacred Disease*, Demosthenes' portrayal of Aeschines evokes comedic characterizations of charlatan oracle-priests, notably those of Aristophanes.³⁹ Aristophanes portrays his priests as self-serving quacks like the magico-

³⁷ Scholars have proposed Dionysus or the Phrygian god Sabazius for the identity of the recipient of Glaucothea's cult (Usher 1993: 259n259). In *Morb. Sacr.* the purifiers' opposition to state religion derives not from the gods that they worship but their claim to be able to control the gods (2).

³⁸ Usher (1993: 259n259) describes *ἔφυγον κακόν, εὕρον ἄμεινον* as incantation. He points out its similarity with incantations said during marriage ceremonies and Dionysiac rites.

³⁹ See Smith (1989) for a political interpretation of Aristophanes' negative portrayal of oracle mongers and diviners. Aristophanes' portrayal of physicians is not any better: in *Wealth*, for example, the physicians at the temple of Asclepius steal sacrificial offerings. Aristophanes' harsh depiction may stem from the proliferation of charlatans in the medical art. Since there were no requirements for practicing medicine, nor any formal punishment for medical incompetence, anyone could practice medicine without legal repercussions.

religious healers of *Sacred Disease*.⁴⁰ However, in his comedies they are also marked by an obsession with food.⁴¹ In *Peace*, for example, the seer Hierocles is more concerned about filling his stomach than delivering true prophecies. He is called a gourmand (*tenthês*) and a charlatan (*alazôn*) (*Pax* 1105-1126).⁴² In the *Birds* too, an unnamed oracle-monger demands a portion of a sacrifice in exchange for his false prophecies (*Av.* 960-990). Aeschines shares this preoccupation with food. Demosthenes explains that Aeschines took "tarts, biscuits, and rolls" as payment for his services.⁴³ This willingness to work for food marks Aeschines (and Aristophanes' priests) as a comedic *gastêr*:⁴⁴ a slave or a lowly character who is always searching for food (Usher 1993: 262).⁴⁵ This characterization gains credence from the other comedic elements in the scene. Demosthenes invites the audience's laughter with bathos, comically interrupting the solemnity of the initiation rite with an aside about his enemy's narcissism. Demosthenes explains that

⁴⁰*Sacred Disease* explains that the purifiers choose their profession not because they are gifted with extraordinary powers but because they are ordinary men in need of a living wage: "Ἴσως δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωποι βίου δεόμενοι πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα τεχνέονται καὶ ποικίλλουσιν ἔς τε τᾶλλα πάντα καὶ ἔς τὴν νοῦσον ταύτην ("But perhaps what they profess is not true, the fact being that men, in need of a livelihood, contrive and devise many fictions of all sorts, about this disease among other things") (*Hp. Morb. Sacr.* 1) (Trans. Jones 1923).

⁴¹ For discussion of attitudes towards gluttony in ancient Greece, as exemplified by the figure of the *opsophagos*, see Davidson (1998: 3-35).

⁴² *Alazôn* is one of the terms used to describe the purifiers in *Sacred Disease* (1.24).

⁴³ Demosthenes extends this image in his description of Aeschines' acting career. He sardonically remarks that Aeschines was pelted with so much fruit for his bad acting that he was like a fruiterer who collects fruit in the countryside (18.262). Demosthenes' implication is that Aeschines may have collected it to eat or to sell later (Usher 1993: 261n262).

⁴⁴ Dover (1994: 114-5) notes, "In comedy, the crude sentiment that food and drink are the best that life can offer is apt to be uttered by slaves." This statement suggests that the comedic stock-figure of the *gastêr* arose from the harsh reality of a slave's life.

⁴⁵ Harding (1994) argues that unfounded accusations of servility were imported into the Athenian courtroom from the comic stage. He contends that the orators such as Demosthenes could make such allegations (as quoted above) with impunity "in the name of humour." Kamen (2009) agrees with Harding but also argues that this "servile invective" might have been inspired "by courtroom attacks against freedman as slaves." She believes that servile invective was meant to be humorous, but also was supposed to play upon the juror's "fear of status-boundary transgression" (i.e. a slave rising above his/her station). Kamen discusses servile invective in detail in *Against Ctesiphon* (Aeschin. 3) and *On the Crown* (Dem. 18).

Aeschines was more preoccupied with the sound of his voice than the rite itself: "You boasted no one ever howled as loudly as you (and I believe him--for do not suppose that he who speaks so loud is not a brilliant howler)." Additional humor can be found in that his "noble band" was constituted of hags. A comic reading of this passage invites the listener to laugh at Aeschines, but it also fills the listener with anxiety, for it raises the question: what happens when a slave becomes politician?⁴⁶ Unlike in the theater there is no "Dionysiac liberation," from these anxieties, for the stage is that of life.⁴⁷

Demosthenes next communicates the consequences of letting someone who is driven by appetite (i.e. the comedic *gastêr*) obtain a position of authority:

ἄνθρωποι μιαιοὶ καὶ κόλακες καὶ ἀλάστορες, ἠκρωτηριασμένοι τὰς αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι πατρίδας, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν προπεπωκότες πρότερον μὲν Φιλίππῳ, νῦν δ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, τῇ γαστρὶ μετροῦντες καὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, τὴν δ' ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτῶν, ἃ τοῖς προτέροις Ἕλλησιν ὄροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετροφότες. (§296)

Defiled, fawning, accursed creatures, who have each mutilated their own countries and toasted away their liberty, formerly to Philip and now to Alexander, **measuring happiness by their own stomachs and the most shameless standards**, and causing the overthrow of freedom and independence, which Greeks of former times held to be the standard and criterion of wellbeing.

Demosthenes groups Aeschines with those who measure "happiness by their own stomachs (*gastri*)." By using the word *gastri*, Demosthenes may be encouraging his audience to recall Aeschines, the comedic *gastêr*. Yet there is no humor in this statement. In place of pastries, Aeschines has consumed his city's freedom (*eleutheria*). Demosthenes underscores the danger of Aeschines' stomach by drawing upon the language of religious pollution. Aeschines is *miaros*,

⁴⁶ Kamen (2009: 56).

⁴⁷ Aristophanes played out the anxiety of a slave rising to the status of politician in the *Knights*, the slave Cleon being an overt stand-in for the politician Cleon. For the mechanisms of Aristophanic Comedy, particularly "Dionysiac liberation," see Bowie (1993: 68).

"defiled."⁴⁸ He is an *alastôr*,⁴⁹ one who has brought divine vengeance upon himself for his wicked deeds.⁵⁰ With the participle ἠκρωτηριασμένοι ("having mutilated"), Demosthenes creates the impression that Aeschines has committed sacrilege against Athens, just as someone might do to a corpse by cutting off its extremities (τὰ ἄκρα) (Usher 1993: 269n296). This language of pollution and sacrilege undercuts the image of Aeschines as a purifier by presenting him as the pollution.⁵¹ Furthermore, it once more brings to the foreground the problem of imitation: by imitating a politician, Aeschines has destroyed his own city.

III. Implicit Medical Language

I hope to have shown that Demosthenes uses medical language and imagery, that of disease and the charlatan physician, to illustrate vividly the dangers of Aeschines' political imposture and to highlight his own political excellence. I now turn to implicit examples of medical language and imagery in this speech. Throughout the review of his political career, Demosthenes emphasizes his constant and accurate foresight. For instance, he claims that he foresaw (προορώμενος) that Philip would try to violate the Peace of Philocrates (§27). This prediction came true, because within weeks of its ratification, Philip moved an army into central Greece and occupied the pass

⁴⁸ Parker (1983: 3) notes that *mia*- words indicate "defilement, the impairment of a thing's form or integrity." Demosthenes uses *miaros* of Aeschines multiple times (18. 94, 134, 141, 153, 289, 296; 19. 113).

⁴⁹ LSJ s.v. ἀλάστωρ II.

⁵⁰ For the *alastôr* in tragedy, cf. Aesch. *Eu.* 236; Soph. *Aj.* 374.

⁵¹ Demosthenes at various points in *On the Crown* associates Aeschines with religious pollution. He calls him *katharma*, the ritual offscourings of a purification: σοὶ δ' ἀρετῆς, ὃ κάθαρμα, ἢ τοῖς σοῖς τίς μετουσία; ("What share have you and yours in virtue, you **polluted heap of trash?**") (§128). He tells Aeschines that he will never be able to clean the pollution of his hands for the destruction of the Amphisseans: οὐδέποτε ἐκνήψει σὺ τὰκεῖ πεπραγμένα σαυτῷ· οὐχ οὔτω πόλλ' ἐρεῖς. ("**You will never cleanse yourself** of what you did there, however much you say.") (§140)

at Thermopylae.⁵² Demosthenes also boasts that he foresaw the consequences of a war with the Amphisseans. He reminds the Athenians of his forecast: "I protested straight away and cried out in the assembly (τότ' εὐθύς ἐμοῦ διαμαρτυρομένου καὶ βοῶντος), 'you are bringing a war upon Attica, Aeschines, an Amphictyonic War'" (§143).⁵³ Demosthenes magnifies his foresight about this issue by pointing to his countrymen's lack of foresight about the consequences of an Amphissean war: "no one foresaw (οὐδενὸς δὲ προειδότης) the situation or guarded against it" (§149). His prediction once again came true because Philip used the war as a pretext to capture the Phocian city of Elateia, a three-day march from Athens.

Demosthenes plays with the language of *prognōsis* to describe his response to the crisis on the eve of Philip's capture of Elateia:

ὁ κήρυξ 'τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται;' παρήει δ' οὐδείς. . . καλούσης δὲ [τῆς κοινῆς] τῆς πατρίδος [φωνῆς] τὸν ἐροῦνθ' ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας· ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκείνος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα· κείνη οὐ μόνον εὖνουν καὶ πλούσιον ἄνδρ' ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρηκολουθηκότα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ συλλελογισμένον ὀρθῶς τίνος εἴνεκα ταῦτ' ἔπραττεν ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ τί βουλόμενος. . . ἐφάνην τοίνυν οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγὼ καὶ παρελθὼν εἶπον εἰς ὑμᾶς. . . μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς οὐκ ἔλιπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγων καὶ γράφων ἐξηταζόμεν τὰ δέονθ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς φοβεροῖς (§172).

The herald asked: "Who wishes to speak?" And no one came forward. . . [the] country was crying out in her collective voice for a **man who would speak to save her**. . . that day and **crisis** called not only for the patriot and the rich man, **but for the man who had followed the course of events**

⁵² On the terms and aftermath of the treaty, see Yunis (2005: 114-115).

⁵³ The Amphisseans had begun to cultivate land that was sacred to Apollo, to the south of Delphi. In 339 B.C.E. the Athenians offered golden shields at Delphi inscribed with insults against the Amphisseans for what they had done. When the latter rejected this offering, Aeschines brought up their illegal cultivation of sacred land before the Amphictyonic council--a religious association that was created in the seventh century B.C.E. to support and defend the major temples of Apollo and Demeter. As a result, the Amphictyonic council declared war on the Amphisseans, which was known as the Fourth Sacred War. Philip intervened at the behest of Thessalians. He destroyed Amphissa and gave the land back to Delphi.

from the beginning, and had calculated correctly the reason and purpose of Philip's actions . . . Well, I was the man who came forth on that day and addressed you. . . I, alone of the speakers and statesmen, did not desert my patriot's post in the hour of peril, but I was to be found there advocating and proposing the measures that your predicament required.

Demosthenes equates speech here with the salvation of the city: the city cries "for a man who would speak to save her." Slater (1988: 126) interprets this language of "salvation" as Demosthenes' attempt to depict himself as an "epiphanic saviour hero." He points out that *phainesthai* and its congeners (e.g. ἐφάνην) are "*termini technici* for the appearance of the gods from Homer onwards" (126). He adds that when deictic οὗτος and παρελθών are added to ἐφάνην, they indicate cultic epiphany (128). Slater's reading is plausible, for Demosthenes could be borrowing the language of soteriology in order to imbue his political actions with gravity, but this does not exclude the presence of medical resonances as well.

First of all, *sôtêria* can refer to a healing act. In the Hippocratic Corpus, a successful healing or recovery is often termed *sôtêria*.⁵⁴ Second, Demosthenes stresses his willingness to speak at a critical time, the *kairos*. As I have argued above, this term can be interpreted medically. Third, Demosthenes just like a good physician shows off his expertise by drawing attention to his correct *prognôsis*, that is, his use of past events to correctly determine Philip's future plans: "that day and *kairos* called for. . . the man who had followed the course of events from the beginning (παρηκολουθηκότα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς), and had calculated correctly the reason and purpose of Philip's actions." Thus, Demosthenes' ability to prognosticate correctly put him in a position where he could save the city, or more precisely, to provide, literally, "the things needed on [their] behalf in those fearful situations." By stressing that he

⁵⁴ For *sôtêria* as recovery, cf. Hp. *Prog.* 5, 12; *Morb. Acut.* 11; *Epid.* 1.3.12; *Fract.* 31, 36, etc.

"alone of speakers and politicians" was able to do this, he once again highlights his unique political excellence.

Prompted by Aeschines' criticism of his proposal of a Theban alliance, Demosthenes once more draws upon the concept of *prognōsis* to defend it:⁵⁵

ὁ γὰρ σύμβουλος καὶ ὁ συκοφάντης, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἰοικότες, ἐν τούτῳ πλείστον ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γνώμην ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ δίδωσιν ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον τοῖς πεισθεῖσι, τῇ τύχῃ, τῷ καιρῷ, τῷ βουλομένῳ· ὁ δὲ σιγήσας ἡνίκ' ἔδει λέγειν, ἅν τι δύσκολον συμβῆ, οὗτο βασκαίνει. (§§189-90)

The counselor and the sycophant unlike as they are in all other respects, differ most of all in this: the **former reveals his opinion before events, and subjects himself to the scrutiny of those he has persuaded, to fortune, to the crisis, to all and sundry; whereas the latter remains silent when he ought to speak, and when anything disagreeable happens he deplores it.**

Demosthenes lays out the expectations of counselor (*sumboulos*), whom he contrasts with the sycophant (*sukophantês*), in order to show that he fulfilled his duty as Athens' adviser, while Aeschines did not. This approach also may be a direct response to Aeschines' juxtaposition of the "political man" (*politeuomenos*) with the hireling (*mistharnôn*) in his prosecution speech (3.165, 220).⁵⁶ Demosthenes counters Aeschines' political man, who speaks at intervals, with his *sumboulos*, who demonstrates his excellence by revealing "his opinion before the events." Moreover, he fashions his sycophant to parallel Aeschines' description of the political man. The sycophant likewise speaks at intervals: he is silent when there is a need for speech and speaks only when something bad has occurred. Demosthenes' contrast anticipates the physician simile, and in doing so highlights the fact that the politician, like the physician, is expected to prove his competence by forecasting the future of his patient, the city.

⁵⁵ On the eve of Elateia's capture, Demosthenes successfully proposed that the Athenians forgive their inveterate enemies, the Thebans, and unite with them to stop Philip's advancement into Boeotia. Demosthenes' proposal led to the Battle of Chaeronea.

⁵⁶ See Ch. 3.

After implicitly contrasting himself with Aeschines, Demosthenes provides a concrete example of why Aeschines is a sycophant, and he a *sumboulos*. He brings the jury back to the night of Philip's capture of Elaeteia to illustrate his point:

οὗτο τοίνυν ἐποίησα, τοῦ κήρυκος ἐρωτῶντος, Αἰσχίνη, ' τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται, οὐ τίς αἰτιᾶσθαι περὶ τῶν παρεληλυθότων, οὐδὲ ' τίς ἐγγυᾶσθαι τὰ μέλλοντ' ἔσσεσθαι'; σοῦ δ' ἀφώνου κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις καθημένου, ἐγὼ παριῶν ἔλεγον. (§191)

Well, this is what I did, Aeschines, when the herald asked "Who wishes to speak?" **he did not ask "Who wishes to complain about the past?" or "Who wishes to make pledges about the future?"** But **you sat silent** in the assembly-meetings during those times, **while I came forward and spoke.**

Demosthenes begins by putting two fictitious questions into the mouth of the herald. The first one, "who wishes to complain about the past?", describes the sycophant. The second question, "who wishes to make pledges about the future?", describes the flatterer, the politician who speaks to please rather than to give sound advice (Usher 1993: 236n191). The phrases περὶ τῶν παρεληλυθότων and τὰ μέλλοντ' ἔσσεσθαι once more evoke *prognōseis*. Demosthenes suggests that sycophant and the flatterer are deviant *sumbouloi* because they speak improperly, that is, they deliver incomplete/improper *prognoses*: the sycophant speaks about the past, while the flatterer focuses on the future. Demosthenes firmly attaches the label of sycophant to Aeschines by pointing out that his opponent sat silent (*aphōnos*) during that critical time.⁵⁷ On the other hand, he presents himself as a *sumboulos* by emphasizing his own active role on that day. In contrast to Aeschines' silence, he came forward and spoke.

Demosthenes reinforces these characterizations by elaborating upon his definition of the *sumboulos*. He explains:

⁵⁷ Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of being a *sukophantês* in 18.113, 121, 138, 242, 266, 289.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μὲν παρεληλυθὸς ἀεὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀφείται, καὶ οὐδεὶς περὶ τούτου προτίθησιν οὐδαμοῦ βουλήν· τὸ δὲ μέλλον ἢ τὸ παρὸν τὴν τοῦ συμβούλου τάξιν ἀπαιτεῖ. (§192)

But, of course, **the past is discarded by everyone**, and nobody in the world makes plans about that: **it is the future and the present that call for the counselor's attention**.

The *sumboulos* concerns himself with the present and the future. He uses the past to inform his forecasts, but he does not "make plans" about it like the sycophant does. This characterization once again recalls the definition of medical *prognōsis*. By repeatedly aligning himself with speech that considers the past but is aimed at resolving present and future conflict, Demosthenes show himself to be a true *sumboulos*. Furthermore, by repeatedly drawing attention to Aeschines' failure to speak during these times, he diverts, or at least softens, the blame for what his opponents would term "political missteps." Demosthenes reveals this to be his strategy when he directly questions Aeschines about the merits of his criticism: "If the future was clear (πρόδηλα τὰ μέλλοντ'), Aeschines, to you alone, when the city was deliberating on these matters, you ought to have forewarned us (τότ' ἔδει προλέγειν)" (§196). Demosthenes suggests that Aeschines' criticism could only have merit if he had delivered an accurate *prognōsis*, implied by *ta mellont'* and *prolegein*, about the future. Demosthenes forcefully presents the reality of Aeschines' actions with the simple phrase: οὐδ' ἐφθέγγξω ("you did not even utter a sound") (§199).

After delivering the physician simile, Demosthenes devotes the rest of the speech to reinforcing its message. However, there is a marked difference from this point on: Aeschines' silence becomes a sign of not only political incompetence but also treachery. Demosthenes says:

οὐ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἀποστάντα τῶν συμφερόντων τῇ πόλει, μισθώσαντα δ' αὐτὸν τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καιροῦς ἀντὶ τῶν τῆς πατρίδος θεραπεύειν. . . οὐδέ γ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἄδικον καὶ ὑπουλον, ὃ σὺ ποιεῖς πολλάκις. (§307)

But never, by heaven, should such a man abandon his city's interests, **hire himself out** to her adversaries and **tend to opportunities** favorable to her enemies rather than his own country . . . nor should he maintain a malicious and **festering silence**, as you often do.

Demosthenes calls Aeschines' silence "unjust" and "festering" (ὑπουλον), the latter being an adjective used often in medical contexts to describe malignant sores or an accumulation of pus within the body (Hp. *Medic.* 11; Arist. *Pr.* 863a12). These definitions suggest that *hupoulon* is an internal condition that can easily become incurable, for the sufferer may not even know that s/he is afflicted.⁵⁸ By using this adjective, Demosthenes encourages the listener to compare Aeschines' silence with a festering ulcer: it appears innocuous on the surface, but underneath it lie destructive intentions. Demosthenes' confirms the destructiveness of these intentions by implying that Aeschines' silence has been at the behest of Philip--the words *therapeuein* and *kairos* have medical resonance, even more so when read with *hupoulon*.

Demosthenes underscores the unhealthy nature of his opponent's silence by situating it in relation to the rest of the citizen body:

ἔστι γάρ, ἔστιν **ἡσυχία δικαία καὶ συμφέρουσα** τῇ πόλει, ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ὑμεῖς ἀπλῶς ἄγετε. ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτην οὕτως ἄγει τὴν ἡσυχίαν, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποστὰς ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξη τῆς πολιτείας (πολλάκις δὲ δοκεῖ) **φυλάττει**. . . **παρὰ τῆς τύχης τι συμβέβηκεν. εἴτ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ῥήτωρ ἐξαίφνης ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας ὥσπερ πνεῦμ' ἐφάνη**. . . (§§308-9)

For there is, there is a kind of **silence**, which is **just and beneficial** to the city, the simple life which most of you citizens lead. But this is not the kind of silent life that this man leads, far from it. No, he withdraws from politics when it suits him (and that is often), and **waits until**. . . **fortune has delivered some setback**. . . **This is the opportunity for our orator suddenly to emerge from his silence, like a wind**.

⁵⁸ See Ch. 1 for Plato's use of this adjective to express his belief that corporal punishment is like medicine (Pl. *Gorg.* 480a6-b5).

Demosthenes defines two types of silences. The first one describes the majority of the citizen body. It is "just" and "beneficial." The second describes Aeschines: he speaks only in times of misfortune and keeps quiet for the majority of the time. Demosthenes hints that his opponent's silence is unjust and detrimental--a description that builds upon his previous characterization of it as "festering." When Aeschines' silence is compared with that of the citizen body, a dichotomy between health and disease arises: "beneficial" versus "festering" silence. It also brings to mind the physician simile, in which the bad physician waits till "fortune has delivered some setback," that is, his patient's death, to deliver his *prognôsis*.

In the peroration of *On the Crown*, Demosthenes calls for the eradication of traitorous men like Aeschines, which he frames as a curse (Usher 1993: 277n324):

ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν καὶ τούτοις βελτίω τινὰ νοῦν καὶ φρένας ἐνθείητε,
εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἔχουσιν **ἀνιάτως**, τούτους μὲν αὐτοὺς καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐξώλεις
καὶ προώλεις ἐν γῆ καὶ θαλάττῃ ποιήσατε, ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν
ταχίστην ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν ἐπηρητημένων φόβων δότε καὶ **σωτηρίαν**
ἀσφαλῆ. (§324)

If possible inspire their minds and hearts with better sentiments, but if, after all, they prove **incurable**, cause them to be destroyed, desolate and alone, utterly and before their time, on land and sea, and grant us a swift deliverance, **safe** and secure, from our impending fears.

Demosthenes asks that Aeschines be wiped from the earth, on the basis that he is "incurable" (ἀνιάτως)--a medical adjective that describes illnesses that cannot be cured by drugs, surgery, or cautery (Hp. *Aph.* 7.87). By using this adjective, Demosthenes suggests that Aeschines is an incurable disease, a characterization that is bolstered by the simile of the fracture and sprain (§189) and the description of him as "having done nothing healthy (ὕγιές)" from the very beginning of his political career. Demosthenes complements this disease imagery with the language of religious pollution: the call for his complete removal from both land and sea recalls

the scapegoat ritual.⁵⁹ Demosthenes thus might be implying that Aeschines should be driven out of the city like a scapegoat, and that his removal might restore Athens' health (*sôtêria*).⁶⁰ The verdict of the trial fulfilled Demosthenes' wish, for Aeschines failed to obtain a fifth of the vote. In consequence, his enemy was fined one thousand drachmae and prohibited from bringing similar litigations to trial (Plut. *Dem.* 24.2). The shame of his defeat drove Aeschines out of Athens and into exile.

⁵⁹ See Ch. 3 for a discussion of the scapegoat ritual.

⁶⁰ For Demosthenes' use of religious imagery, see Martin (2009).

CHAPTER FIVE

Medical Language in Demosthenes' Other Speeches

I. Introduction

In order to fully understand the significance of Demosthenes' use of medical language in his speeches against Aeschines, it is necessary to look at his use of similar language in other orations. This is not a daunting task because there are only six other speeches in the Demosthenic Corpus that contain examples of explicit medical language and imagery: *Second Olynthiac* (2), *Third Olynthiac* (3), *Third Philippic* (9), *Fourth Philippic* [10], *Reply to Phillip's Letter* [11], and *Against Aristogeiton I* [25].¹ It is striking that all but one of these (*Against Aristogeiton I*) are demegoric speeches, that is, political speeches. Furthermore, most predate *Against the False Embassy*; all predate *On the Crown*.²

In this chapter I shall argue that the medical language of *Against the False Embassy* and *On the Crown* is deeply influenced by and thematically connected with that of Demosthenes' demegoric speeches, particularly the depiction of political corruption as a disease and the use of *prognôsis* and *kairos* as motifs to explicate his beliefs about political excellence. I then compare the medical language of these speeches with his Aeschines speeches. My intent is to show that Demosthenes' medical language is restricted to political contexts. Lastly, in the appendix to this chapter, I consider the Demosthenic speeches, whose authenticity is disputed. I argue that even if Demosthenes did not compose them, these speeches elucidate his style. They show that Hellenistic imitators considered medical language and imagery a Demosthenic idiosyncrasy.

¹ The speeches whose authenticity is disputed are noted in brackets.

² The *Third Philippic* (341) predates *Against the False Embassy* (343) by two years. Vince (1935: 515) puts the date of *Against Aristogeiton I* during 338-324, which lays open the possibility that it may have been delivered before *On the Crown* (330).

II. Demegoric Speeches

Demosthenes' demegoric speeches provide ample evidence that his use of medical language and imagery in the speeches discussed thus far was not a late development. These speeches, *Olynthiac* II-III and *Philippic* III, which were delivered at the beginning and middle of his political career (354-341), contain numerous examples of such language.³ I believe that the answer to why medical language appears only in these speeches and the Aeschines speeches may lie in their delivery dates.

Cecil Wooten (2010: 2) gives the following dates for each of Demosthenes' political speeches: *On the Symmories* (354), *For the Megalopolitans* (353/52), *Philippic* I (351), *For the Liberty of the Rhodians* (351/50), *Olynthiacs* I-III (349), *Philippic* II (344), *On the Chersonese* (341), *Philippic* III (341). He hypothesizes that Demosthenes was unsuccessful at the beginning of his political career because his speeches were dense, unorganized, and emotionless (5-7). He points to *On the Symmories* and *For the Megalopolitans* as examples of this dry and lackluster style (7). He then notes that beginning with *Philippic* I, Demosthenes starts to shift his style. His speeches contain more structure and ornamentation: he plays with ring composition to give "emphasis and weight" to his speech and employs metaphors and similes more frequently. He also adds more emotion to his speech, sometimes aggressively so (6). The *Olynthiacs* reflect this new experimental style, but it is the *Third Philippic* of his demegoric speeches that represents its culmination (10-13). I do not think it is a coincidence that the *Third Philippic* has the most examples of explicit medical imagery and language.

A. Olynthiacs

³ See below for a discussion of medical language in Demosthenes' disputed demegoric speeches, *Reply to Philip's Letter* and the *Fourth Philippic*.

In the three speeches that comprise the *Olynthiacs*, all delivered in 349 BCE, Demosthenes urges the Athenians to give military aid to the city of Olynthus in Northern Greece. At the time of their delivery, Philip was besieging the city.⁴ In the *First Olynthiac*, Demosthenes makes a utilitarian argument for aiding the Olynthians. He warns the Athenians that if they do not fight Philip now, they will have to contend with him later in their own territory. He demands that the Theoric Fund (a dole given to the Athenian poor so that they could watch dramatic performances) be reformed, and that the money be used to fund a war campaign against Philip. In the *Second Olynthiac*, he makes more of an emotional appeal. He lays out the reasons why Philip cannot be trusted and chastises his countrymen for their procrastination. Demosthenes also accuses them of hampering military action with political factionalism. In the *Third Olynthiac*, he reiterates the utilitarian argument of the *First Olynthiac*. He bids the Athenians to act now, unless they want to fight a war in Attica. He once again asks that they reform the Theoric Fund.

One of the continuous motifs throughout the *Olynthiacs* is *kairos* (Tuplin 1998: 279). In all three speeches, Demosthenes urges his fellow Athenians to act now, and warns them that their political indolence (ῥαθυμία) will have disastrous consequences, namely, a war on Athenian soil, if they do not engage Philip at Olynthus. This motif of "critical timing" or "crisis point" may have medical resonance. *Kairos*, as I have argued above, can refer to the point at which a disease becomes fatal if medical treatment is not sought. Tuplin (1998: 282) notes that of all speeches in the demegoric corpus, the *Olynthiacs* collectively have the most metaphors and similes. This is certainly true of medical metaphors and similes, as I will show below. The presence of this medical language thus supports the medical overtones of *kairos*, for when both are read together,

⁴ The exact order of the *Olynthiacs* is debated: the *Third Olynthiac* is generally agreed to be third, but the order of I and II is contested (Ellis 1967: 108-111; Tuplin 1998: 276). This question does not affect my analysis, as all three speeches were delivered in the same year.

the impression that emerges is of a city that is neglecting its political health like an uncooperative patient.

In the *First Olynthiac*, there are no explicit examples of medical language, but *kairos* appears as a key theme: it is used over ten times in the speech, more than in either of the other *Olynthiacs*. Demosthenes begins the speech with a striking personification of *kairos*, who calls on the Athenians to take control of their interests in the North (§2). He then proceeds to blame his countrymen for Philip's rise to power on the basis that they have wasted past *kairoi*, clinging to the false belief that the "future will right itself" (§9). He ends the speech by exposing Philip's disadvantages (*akairia*), and bids them to make these their own *kairos*.

In the *Second Olynthiac*, there are two explicit examples of medical imagery and one implicit. The latter comes at the beginning of the speech. Demosthenes, building upon the themes of the *First Olynthiac*, discusses the disadvantages (*akairia*) of Philip:

ὅταν δ' ἐκ πλεονεξίας καὶ πονηρίας τις ὡσπερ οὗτος ἰσχύσῃ, ἡ **πρώτη πρόφασις** καὶ μικρὸν ππαῖσμα ἅπαντ' ἀνεχαίτισε καὶ διέλυσεν. (§9)

But whenever someone like Philip grows strong as a result of greed and villany, the first **external exciting cause** and a small stumble overturns and destroys everything. (Trans. Trevett 2011)⁵

Wooten (1979: 157) and Tuplin (1998: 285n11) have both asserted that *prophasis* has medical resonance in this passage: in the Hippocratic corpus, *prophasis* often refers to an external or contributing cause of a disease (Deichgräber 1933: 1).⁶ This term is also very common in Thucydides, whose style and political principles are thought to have exerted a strong influence

⁵ All translations from the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* are adapted from Trevett (2011).

⁶ For *prophasis* as "exciting cause," cf. Hp. *Aph.* 3.12; *Epid.* 3.3, 3.17, etc.).

on Demosthenes (Wooten 1983:19-20).⁷ Thucydides, whom many scholars have argued was in turn inspired by Hippocratic medicine, uses *prophasis* as "exciting cause."⁸

Demosthenes' use of *prophasis* in the *Second Olynthiac* may therefore have medical resonance, because he may be imitating the lexicon of his literary idol, Thucydides. This probability increases when one considers the presence of explicit medical language later in the speech that touches upon the same theme (to be discussed below). With this added layer of meaning, Demosthenes may be suggesting that Philip's rule, that is, tyranny, is like a sick body. Unlike Athenian power, which is based on alliances created from good will (*eunoia*) and common interests (§12), Philip has built his upon greed (*pleonexia*) and crime (*ponêria*). The implication is that when some external force hits, such as an Athenian military expedition, his kingdom will be completely destroyed because it is already sick.

Demosthenes underscores this point with a medical simile, which follows a discussion of the weaknesses of Philip's government. As to the latter, he argues that Philip's power is unstable because of his wicked character: he is jealous, licentious, and a drunk (§§18-19). His people are discontented with him for selfishly stealing all the glory of a war, which they have to fight. What is more, this war has closed all the markets in Macedonia, preventing them even from making a living. Philip's jealousy, thus, denies them any form of success (§16). Demosthenes urges the Athenians to take advantage of these internal weaknesses by bringing war into Macedonian territory:

⁷ See Ch. 1 for a discussion of Thucydides' influence on Demosthenes.

⁸ For the meaning of *prophasis* in Thucydides, see Kirkwood (1952: 37-61), Lohmann (1952: 5-49), and Pearson (1952: 205-223). Although Pearson does not consider any Hippocratic examples, he rejects the notion that *prophasis* has medical resonance (210-11). This conclusion clashes with the numerous studies that have persuasively demonstrated the influence of contemporary medicine on the *Histories*. Nonetheless, I believe that Pearson is correct in his observation that *prophasis* has several shades of meaning in Thucydides (as well as in Demosthenes) (213).

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, τέως μὲν ἂν ἐρρωμένος ἢ τις, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθάνεται, ἐπὰν δ' ἀρρώστημά τι συμβῆ, πάντα κινεῖται, κἂν ῥήγμα κἂν στρέμμα κἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σαθρὸν ἦ, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν τυράννων, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἔξω πολεμῶσιν, ἀφανῆ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴν δ' ὄμορος πόλεμος συμπλακῆ, πάντ' ἐποίησεν ἐκδηλα. (§21)

For just as in our bodies, so long as a person is strong things go unnoticed, but when some weakness befalls him, be it a fracture or a sprain or some other underlying problem, everything is disturbed; so in the case of cities and tyrants: as long as they wage war abroad their troubles are invisible to most people, but when they are entangled in war on their own borders, everything is exposed.

Demosthenes compares Philip's government to a body, and its internal weaknesses to a preexisting medical condition such as a fracture (ῥήγμα) or sprain (στρέμμα), which escapes the notice of the afflicted in good health (ἐρρωμένος), that is, when war is abroad. He then compares a war fought on native soil to a disease (ἀρρώστημα) that exposes these internal weaknesses. This simile is clearly a vivid restatement of Demosthenes' comment that a *prophasis* will lead to Philip's downfall on the grounds that his power base has been built on weak foundations, *pleonexia* and *ponêria* (§§9-10). This simile reinforces the medical resonance of *prophasis*, for, as Wooten (1983: 180n9) observes, it is characteristic of Demosthenes to repeat certain motifs--here, the diseased nature of tyranny--to implant certain concepts into the minds of his listeners.

As in the case of *prophasis*, Demosthenes colors this simile with technical medical language. He labels the disease that causes the body to feel its preexisting (whether previously unnoticed or incompletely healed) injuries an ἀρρώστημα. The word first appears, with frequency, in the Hippocratic Corpus (*Diaet. Acut.* 22; *Epid.* 6.8.31; *Epid.* 7.1.93, *Flat.* 9, 15;

Epist. 24), and may even be Hippocratic in origin.⁹ Demosthenes (2.21) and Hyperides (col. 7) are the next to use the word.¹⁰ ῤήγμα (lesion/rupture of tissue) and στρέμμα (sprain) are also most likely Hippocratic technical terms. The first extant appearance of στρέμμα is in the Hippocratic Corpus (Hp. *Epid.* 5.1.75, *De. Off.* 23), and, although there are few antecedents for ῤήγμα, it is used for the first time in the Hippocratic medical writings to describe body parts (Hp. *Aër* 4, *Epid.* 7.1.2, 7.1.81, *Aph.* 6.22, *Flat.* 11, *Morb.* 1.20). The next non-medical usage of both terms, as with ἀρρώστημα, is the *Second Olynthiac*. These technical terms suggest that Demosthenes himself is a medical expert and as such is a sort of physician of the state, who is both prognosticating and diagnosing Athens' political problems (Wooten 1983: 180n9).

Demosthenes' fondness for the imagery of fracture and sprain is attested by the fact that he recycles this simile in *On the Crown*:¹¹

δηλοῖς δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὧν ζῆς καὶ ποιεῖς καὶ πολιτεύει καὶ πάλιν οὐ πολιτεύει. πράττεται τι τῶν ὑμῖν δοκούντων συμφέρειν· ἄφωνος Αἰσχίνης. ἀντέκρουσέ τι καὶ γέγον' οἶον οὐκ ἔδει· πάρεστιν Αἰσχίνης. ὥσπερ τὰ ῤήγματα καὶ τὰ σπάσματα, ὅταν τι κακὸν τὸ σῶμα λάβῃ, τότε κινεῖται. (§198)

Something is being done that is thought beneficial to you: Aeschines is mute. Something adverse and undesirable has happened: Aeschines steps forth. **He is just like fractures and sprains, which are stirred to life when some malady seizes the body.** (Trans. Usher 1993)

⁹ There are only two usages of ἀρρώστημα that may predate the Hippocratic examples listed above: Eupolis frag. 63 and *Apoth.* 7. 4. The date and authenticity of the latter, a collection of sayings from the seven sages, is dubious. As to the former, Eupolis' *floruit* (mid to early fifth century BCE) corresponds with the composition of the early Hippocratic treatises, including *Breaths*, in which *arrôstêma* appears three times. Eupolis thus may have been consciously imitating Hippocratic terminology.

¹⁰ The only other instance of *arrôstêma* in the Demosthenic Corpus comes from *Against Aristogeiton* II (26). 26. The present scholarly consensus is that this speech is spurious, the product of a fourth-century orator or a Hellenistic imitator. See below for a fuller discussion of the authenticity of Demosthenes 25 and 26. See Ch. 1 for medical language in fourth-century oratory.

¹¹ See Ch. 3 for a detailed analysis of this simile.

The only significant difference between these similes is that the *On the Crown* version is shorter and simpler. As for word choice, the only distinctive change that Demosthenes makes is that he substitutes the phrase ῥήγμα καὶ στρέμμα for ῥήγματα καὶ σπάσματα-- but ῥήγματα is just the plural form of ῥήγμα and σπάσματα is a synonym for στρέμμα.¹² Although the similes look the same, however, their points of comparison are completely different. In the *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes is illustrating the effect of a domestic war on Philip's power, while in *On the Crown*, he is describing Aeschines' tendency to voice his opinion only in times of political turmoil. This suggests that Demosthenes did not select the fracture simile because of its thematic unity with the *Second Olynthiac*. He may, however, have chosen to reuse it because the audience had responded well to it.¹³

There is one more explicit example of disease imagery in the *Second Olynthiac*, which Demosthenes uses, like the first two, to bolster his argument for sending aid to the Olynthians. He claims that the Athenians should help the people of Olynthus on the grounds that the Olynthians themselves have helped other Greek cities during times of political unrest:

πάλιν αὖ πρὸς Ποτεΐδαιαν Ὀλυνθίοις ἐφάνη τι τοῦτο συναμφότερον·
 νυνὶ δὲ Θετταλοῖς νοσοῦσι καὶ τεταραγμένοις ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννικὴν
 οἰκίαν ἐβοήθησεν· (§14)

And again it proved to be of some use in combination with the Olynthians against Potidea; and just recently it helped the Thessalians **sick and disordered**, against the family of tyrants.

¹² Σπάσμα cf. *Epid.* 7.1.73; *De Off.* 23; *Aph.* 5.25, etc. For ῥήγμα and σπάσματα, cf. *Hr. De Aër* 4, *De Morb.* 1.20, 22.

¹³ See Appendix II for the use of this simile in the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech, *Reply to Philip* (11.13-14).

Demosthenes thus uses a metaphor of sickness to communicate the effect of tyranny on the Thessalians (Tuplin 1998: 283n8).¹⁴ By describing them as "sick and agitated" (νοσοῦσι καὶ τεταραγμένοις), he creates the impression that the Olynthians acted like physicians.¹⁵ Just as a physician comes to the aid of his patient in his hour of need, they supported the Thessalians in their rebellion against the tyrants of Pherae. Demosthenes thus presents the Olynthians as an exemplar. His suggestion seems to be that it is time for the Athenians to take on the role of physicians, for it is the Olynthians who are now sick with tyranny.¹⁶

Demosthenes' *First* and *Second Olynthiac* were successful, but only to a limited extent. After their delivery the Athenians sent aid to the Olynthians in the form of "small and ineffectual" contingents (Wooten 1983: 6). Demosthenes delivered the *Third Olynthiac* soon after this aid was sent. In it Demosthenes pushes for the reformation of the Theoric Fund. As in the *First Olynthiac*, he asks that the dole be used for a more aggressive military campaign against Philip. Likewise, he reuses many of the same arguments but with a markedly harsher tone (Tuplin 1998: 290)--perhaps a reflection of his disappointment in his countrymen's anemic response. As in the *First* and *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes demands that the Athenians take advantage of the opportunity (*kairos*) that Philip's siege of Olynthus represents, namely to defeat Philip once and for all (§3). He warns the Athenians once more that Philip will not be satiated with Olynthus, but will soon turn his attention towards Attica (§9). Moreover, he accuses them

¹⁴ For the association of tyranny with disease, cf. A. *PV* 224; cf. Hp. *Aër* 16, Pl. *Alc.* 135a1, *R.* 544c6-7, Isocr. 10.34.

¹⁵ The verbs *noseô* and *tarassô*, although used throughout the Hippocratic Corpus, cannot be labeled as technical medical terms because of their generic nature.

¹⁶ Wooten (1983: 180n9) notes that the similes in Demosthenes' speeches delivered before Chaeronea are on the whole optimistic: "the Athenians are generally depicted as a force that had control over its destiny, that could ward off destruction if only it would take action." However, in *On the Crown*, this optimism is replaced by pessimism: the Athenians are depicted as a "passive force, which had no real control over its destiny."

again of political indolence (ῥαθυμία) and blames them for wasting critical opportunities in petty squabbling. He urges them to take the advice of the best politician, that is, himself, rather than engage in political factionalism (§§§18-20).

As in the *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes employs medical language and imagery to add force to his argument. However, instead of Philip being the focus of his disease imagery, the Athenian people are. This shift in imagery, just like the tone, may be due to his fellow citizens' lackluster response to his previous pleas for military action. Demosthenes criticizes them for allowing themselves to be "robbed of nerve and sinew":

νῦν δὲ τοῦναντίον κύριοι μὲν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα πράττεται, ὑμεῖς δ' ὁ δῆμος, ἐκνενευρισμένοι καὶ περιηρημένοι χρήματα, συμμάχους, ἐν ὑπηρέτου καὶ προσθήκης μέρει γεγένησθε, ἀγαπῶντες ἐὰν μεταδιδῶσι θεωρικῶν ὑμῖν ἢ Βοηδρόμα πέμψωσιν οὗτοι, καὶ τὸ πάντων ἀνδρειότατον, τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν χάριν προσοφείλετε. οἱ δ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει καθείρξαντες ὑμᾶς ἐπάγουσ' ἐπὶ ταῦτα καὶ τιθασεύουσι χειροήθεις αὐτοῖς ποιῶντες (§§31-32)

Now the opposite is the case: the politicians control all the good things, and everything is done through them, and you the people are **robbed of nerve and sinew**. Deprived of money and allies, you now play the part of a servant and an extra, content if these men give you a share of the Theoric Fund, or dispatch the procession at the Boëdromia, **your manliness reaches its climax when you thank them for your own possessions!** They have confined you to the city, and entice you with these baits **and tame you, turning you into docile pets.**

The verb, ἐκνευρίζω, "to rob of nerve and sinew" is a neologism.¹⁷ Demosthenes uses the participial form (ἐκνενευρισμένοι) as a metaphor for what the Athenians have allowed their leaders to do them, that is, to emasculate them. This implication is strengthened by the fact that the noun νεῦρον is sometimes used of the penis (Pl. Com. 173. 19; Gal. 8.442), and as such, the verb ἐκνευρίζω would literally mean "to remove the testicles" or "to castrate." Demosthenes

¹⁷ Aeschines mocks this neologism in *Against Ctesiphon* (3.166). See Ch. 2 for a discussion of this passage.

builds upon this suggestion with a series of snide remarks. First, he says that that the manliest thing (τὸ ἀνδρείοτατον) that the Athenians have done is to thank their leaders for what is rightfully theirs as citizens. Second, he notes that their leaders have "caged" (καθειρίζαντες) and "domesticated" (τιθασεύουσι) them. The former insinuates that they have become tame animals, whose agency has been completely removed by a cage of political complacency. The latter not only reinforces the image of the Athenians as caged animals (Pl. *Plt.* 264a), but it also suggests emasculation, for τιθασεύω is also used of the subservient/docile wife (Xen. *Oik.* 7.10).¹⁸

The metaphor of the sinews suggests that his fellow citizens' (willing) loss of political agency is a kind of sickness.¹⁹ When Athenian men prefer to act like women, it is sick. Demosthenes expands upon this connection in a medical simile that appears at the end of the speech. He compares the effect of the Theoric Dole on the Athenians to a medical diet:

Ἐὰν οὖν ἀλλὰ νῦν γ' ἔτι ἀπαλλαγέντες τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν ἐθελήσητε στρατεύεσθαι τε καὶ πράττειν ἀξίως ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῖς περιουσίαις ταῖς οἴκοι ταύταις ἀφορμαῖς ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν ἀγαθῶν χρῆσθαι, ἴσως ἂν, ἴσως, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα κτήσασθ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λημμάτων ἀπαλλαγείητε, **ἃ τοῖς [ἀσθενούσι] παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν σιτίοις [διδόμενοις] ἔοικε. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖν' οὔτ' ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὔτ' ἀποθνήσκειν ἐᾷ·** καὶ ταῦθ' ἃ νέμεσθε νῦν ὑμεῖς, οὔτε τοσαῦτ' ἐστὶν ὥστ' ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν τινὰ διαρκῆ, οὔτ' ἀπογνόντας ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἐᾷ, ἀλλ' ἔστι ταῦτα τὴν ἐκάστου ῥαθυμίαν ὑμῶν ἐπαυξάνοντα. (§§33-34)

If then, even now, you abandon these habits and are willing to go on campaign and to act in a way that is worthy of yourselves, and to use domestic surpluses as a starting point for external success, perhaps, men of Athens, perhaps you may acquire some great and lasting benefit and rid yourself of such payments, **which are like the foods that doctors prescribe: they neither build**

¹⁸ If such a meaning is at play, then Demosthenes may be suggesting with καθειρίζαντες that the Athenians are like women who have been shut in their house, and thus barred from participating in the political life of the city.

¹⁹ The verb τιθασεύω also shows up in medical contexts: it describes a disease that has become milder, or in other words, has passed its crisis point (Gal. 19.211; Ruf. ap. *Aët.* 11.29). I do not believe that this meaning is in operation in the passage quoted above, as it vitiates against Demosthenes' purpose, which is to depict the Athenians as sick.

strength nor allow the patient to die. In the same way, these sums that you distribute among yourselves are not large enough to have any lasting benefit, nor would renouncing them allow you to do anything else, but they serve to make each of you more idle.

As with the sinews metaphor, Demosthenes uses this simile to express his opinion that the Theoric dole is unhealthy. It distracts the Athenian people from acting like citizens, that is, from taking an active role in the political and financial decisions of their city. The comparison of the dole's effect to a diet is interesting, for diet (i.e. regimen) was the cornerstone of Hippocratic therapeutics because it was considered safe and less painful than surgery or cauterization.²⁰ The specific reason that Demosthenes criticizes Hippocratic dietetics is that it keeps the patient in a sort of limbo, for it neither kills nor restores his health.²¹ Demosthenes' implication seems to be that a more radical therapy is required. The only way the Athenians can make themselves healthy, and in the process reclaim their manhood, is to take action against Philip. Unfortunately, his warnings went unheeded, for Philip successfully seized Olynthus and all the surrounding allied towns.

B. *Philippics*

There are four *Philippics* that are preserved in the Demosthenic Corpus, of which only I-III are believed to be authentic.²² Similar to the *Olynthiacs*, the purpose of these speeches is to convince the Athenians of the necessity of taking military action against Philip. However, they were delivered over the span of a decade, not a year as the *Olynthiacs* were--*Philippic* I in 351,

²⁰ *On Regimen in Acute Diseases, Regimen in Health, On Regimen, On Nutriment*. For more on this topic, see Ch. 1.

²¹ For Plato's critique of Hippocratic regimen, which may have influenced Demosthenes, see Ch. 1.

²² But see Worthington (1991: 425-428) for an argument supporting the authenticity of the *Fourth Philippic*.

Philippic II in 344, and *Philippic* III in 341--and thus show a remarkable evolution of style. Demosthenes delivered the *First Philippic* after the failure of his first political speeches, *On the Symmories* and *For the Megalopolitans*. In this speech, he begins to realize the enormity of Philip's threat to Athenian foreign policy. He expresses his fear that Greek cities will start asking for Macedonian aid against hostile neighbors because of Athens' unwillingness to help, and that this will give Philip further opportunities to advance into Greece (Wooten 1983: 5). Stylistically, Demosthenes begins to experiment with devices that would become characteristic of his mature speeches, such as metaphor and simile (Wooten 2010: 7). However, the *First Philippic* does not contain any explicit examples of medical language and imagery, a fact that may be related to its early delivery date.

In the *Second Philippic*, delivered seven years after the first, Demosthenes responds to Philip's protests against his embassies in the Peloponnesus. At this time Sparta was threatening its neighbors, and these cities, just as Demosthenes feared, turned to Philip for help. In response, Demosthenes sent embassies to persuade these cities to turn to Athens for help against Sparta. Philip, however, saw Demosthenes' actions as a violation of the peace between Macedon and Athens (§7). This speech, like the previous one, does not contain any explicit examples of medical language. Nonetheless, foresight plays a prominent role for the first time, which will be important, as we have seen in *On the False Embassy* and *On the Crown*.

Demosthenes, frustrated by the factionalism in Athenian politics, advises the Athenians to adopt either his advice or that of his opponents, that is, those who support peace with Philip:

ἐὰν μὲν ἐγὼ δοκῶ βέλτιον προορᾶν, ἐμοὶ πεισθήτε, ἂν δ' οἱ θαρροῦντες καὶ πεπιστευκότες αὐτῷ, τούτοις προσθήσθε. (§§6-7)

If you think that **I show better foresight**, adopt my advice; but if you think that those who have confidently put their trust in him show more foresight, side with them.

Demosthenes offers foresight as the best criterion for their choice. His implication is that the good politician is defined by his ability to foresee the future. Later in the speech, he aligns himself with this position by displaying his ability to deliver a political *prognôsis*. He predicts that a catastrophe, a war on Attic soil, is coming:

τὸ γὰρ πρᾶγμ' ὀρῶ προβαίνον, καὶ οὐχὶ βουλοίμην ἂν εἰκάζειν ὀρθῶς,
φοβοῦμαι δὲ μὴ λίαν ἐγγύς ἦ τοῦτ' ἤδη. (§33)

For I see trouble coming, I hope that I may prove to have inferred incorrectly, but I fear that it is already all too close at hand.

In his grand defense of his civic crown, Demosthenes will use these speeches as proof of his political excellence.²³ Facing accusations of political misconduct and treachery, Demosthenes will show his fellow citizens that from the very beginning he alone, like a good physician, foresaw the solution to Athens' health but was ignored.

In the *Third Philippic*, which Wooten (2010: 22) lauds as the "finest deliberation speech from the ancient world," Demosthenes once again urged the Athenians onto the warpath, but this time they listened because circumstances had changed. Athens had sent the general Dioppeithes to the Thracian Chersonesus to support Athenian colonists, who had settled there in order to establish control of critical grain routes. These colonists had come into conflict with the city of Cardia, which was part of Philip's kingdom, and thus asked Athens for military aid. Upon his arrival Dioppeithes raided the parts of Thrace that were under Macedonian control, which prompted Philip to send a letter of protest to the Athenians. Demosthenes answered with the *Third Philippic*.

²³ Wooten (1983: 11) remarks that the battle of Chaeronea would probably not have occurred, if not for Demosthenes' "hysterical" and "obsessive" anti-Macedonian policy. It was Demosthenes who pushed for conflict, not Philip, for the latter was only interested in Athens as far as its navy was concerned, which he wanted to use in an expedition against Persia.

This speech is representative of Demosthenes' mature style: it shows a keen mastery of structure and emotion (Wooten 1983: 21), to which its medical metaphors, three explicit examples in total, attest. Unlike previous usages (e.g. in the *Olynthiacs*), these are seamlessly incorporated into the text and used to create an air of solemnity rather than reproach (Wooten 1983: 27). The first one appears towards the beginning of the speech and is embedded in a warning. Demosthenes advises the Athenian people not to trust Philip on the grounds that that he abuses his own friends:

καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα τοῖς ταλαιπώροις Ὠρεῖταις τουτοῖσι ἐπισκευομένους ἔφη τοὺς στρατιώτας πεπομφέναι κατ' εὖνοιαν· πυνθάνεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ὡς νοσοῦσι καὶ στασιάζουσιν, συμμαχῶν δ' εἶναι καὶ φίλων ἀληθινῶν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς παρεῖναι. (§§12-13)

And last, he offered these wretched men of Oreus the pretext that the troops had been sent as friendly observers. For, he said, that **they were sick from factionalism**, and it was the duty of true friends and allies to assist in such situations.

Philip knowingly violated the sacred trust between friends, "to help one's friends and harm one's enemies."²⁴ What is more egregious is that he committed this impious act in a time of crisis. His allies, the people of Oreus, asked for his help during a period of political unrest (*stasis*), which Demosthenes equates with a sickness, but instead of helping, Philip used their weakened state against them. He seized Oreus in 342 B.C.E. Demosthenes sardonically describes this destruction as Philip's goodwill (*εὖνοια*).

By Demosthenes' day, the comparison of *stasis* to a disease had become a commonplace.²⁵ Like his literary predecessors, he too draws upon the connection of *stasis* with tyranny: the Oreitians were sick from their internal struggle (*stasis*) with the tyrants of Pherae,

²⁴ For the Greek principle of conduct that one should help one's friends and harm one's enemies, see Dover (1974: 180-184) and Blundell (1989).

²⁵ See Ch. 1 for a discussion of this topic.

and as a consequence Philip was able to take advantage of their weakened state and to substitute one tyranny for another. Demosthenes uses the Oreitians as a caveat about Philip's friendship, for if his countrymen do not heal their internal discord and shake off the disease of political apathy (see above), they too will become victims of tyranny.

In the case of the Oreitians, Philip is not the disease but the "exciting cause" (*prophasis*) that leads to their downfall (cf. *Olyn.* 2.11). Later in the speech, however, Demosthenes (literally) makes him the disease. After implicitly warning the Athenians of Philip's imperialistic designs, Demosthenes tells them outright that they are not safe from Philip even in peace. To underscore his point, he compares Philip to a fever:

ὅτι γ' ὥσπερ περίοδος ἢ καταβολὴ πυρετοῦ ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς κακοῦ καὶ τῷ πάννυ πόρρω δοκοῦντι νῦν ἀφεστάναι προσέρχεται, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ.
(§§29-30)

Yet we all know that, **like the periodic return or the sudden onset of a fever or some other evil**, he [i.e. Philip] visits even those who have kept far away from him.

Demosthenes colors his simile with technical medical language: he equates Philip with a *περίοδος* or *καταβολὴ πυρετοῦ*, both synonyms for a periodic attack of a fever.²⁶ The concept of periodicity is Hippocratic, for the Hippocratic medical writers classified fevers according to the "rhythm of their fluctuations" (Jouanna 2001: 150): continuous, quotidian, tertian, and quartan.²⁷ The basis of this organization was the expected recurrence of the fever; for instance, a quartan fever reoccurred every four days. With this simile, Demosthenes expresses his concern that the Athenians are not taking the threat of Philip seriously. He is worried that his countrymen are interpreting the current peace with Macedon as safety, whereas they should expect another

²⁶ For *periodos*, cf. Hp. *Prog.* 19; *Epid.* 1.1.3, 6.3.18, 6.4.1; *Humor.* 20; *de Diaet.* 66; *Affect.* 47; *Judic.* For *katabolê*: Hp. *De Offic.* 9; Pl. *Gorg.* 519a.

²⁷ For a different classification system, see *Timaeus* (86a), where fevers are classified according to their origin, as in the excess of a certain humor.

attack from Philip--just like a periodic fever. But, instead of fortifying the citizen body, they are letting Philip take advantage of their political indifference and negligence (§5).

As in the *Olynthiacs*, Demosthenes lays the blame for the current crisis on the Greeks themselves. He hints that Philip would never have attained such levels of success, if not for the "disease" of corruption:

νῦν δ' ἅπανθ' ὡσπερ ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἐκπέπραται ταῦτα, ἀντεισῆγκται δ' ἀντὶ τούτων ὑφ' ὧν ἀπόλωλε καὶ **νενόσηκεν ἡ Ἑλλάς**. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τίς ζήλος, εἴ τις εἵληφέ τι γέλως, ἂν ὁμολογήῃ [συγγνώμη τοῖς ἐλεγχόμενοις·] μῖσος, ἂν τούτοις τις ἐπιτιμᾷ· τᾶλλα πάνθ' ὅσ' ἐκ τοῦ δωροδοκεῖν ἤρτηται. (§§39-40)

But now all these things are exported as if from the marketplace, and in exchange we import things that **cause Greece to be sick with a mortal illness**. And what are these things? Envy of anyone who has taken a bribe, laughter, if he admits it; [pity, for those who are convicted], hatred of anyone who rebukes this conduct; and everything else relating to the taking of bribes.

Here Demosthenes mixes his disease metaphor with the language of commerce, in particular, that of import and export, and in doing so, underscores the complicity of the Greeks in their own destruction. Philip is not entirely to blame, for the Greeks have willingly traded their virtue for Macedonian vices: envy (ζήλος), contempt (γέλως), and hatred (μῖσος). They actively brought the disease of corruption into Greece; Philip is only the exciting cause. Moreover, since the disease is pan-Hellenic, it will be even harder to cure. As Rennet (1951: 164) suggests, Demosthenes emphasizes this fact in order to inspire the Athenians to take up arms against Philip, for not only will they be able to cut off the source of infection, but they can also regain some of their ancestral honor. By engaging Philip, they will become healers of Greece.

The description of Greece in the *Third Philippic* as diseased with corruption is similar to Demosthenes' prognosis of the *nosêma deinon* in *Against the False Embassy* (19.259-262).²⁸ In his prosecution of Aeschines, which was delivered two years before the *Third Philippic* in 343 B.C.E, Demosthenes explained that a fearsome disease had overtaken Greece (see Ch. 2). He identified it as rivalry for Philip's favor (ζηλώματα)-- one of the imported vices listed above. He then described the disease's spread throughout Greece and warned the Athenians of its approach towards Athens. It seems likely that the image of the *nosêma deinon* was recycled from the *Third Philippic*, given the similar theme of corruption as a disease.

Appendix I: The Spurious Political Speeches

A. *Fourth Philippic* (10)

The authenticity of the *Fourth Philippic* has become the subject of heated debate, despite the fact that it was accepted as genuine in antiquity. The primary grounds for its rejection are that it shares two long and almost verbatim passages (10.11-27, 55-70) with *On the Chersonese* (8.38-67), and it contains a defense of the Theoric Fund, which contradicts Demosthenes vehement and consistent opposition to it in the *Olynthiacs*.²⁹ To add to this list, at the end of the speech there is a bitter personal attack on a certain Aristomedes, whose identity was completely unknown and believed to be a fabrication before the discovery of the Didymus papyrus in the eighteenth century (Körte 1905: 398).³⁰ The strangeness of this attack, however, has nothing to do with the

²⁸ Rennet (1951: 164) notes Demosthenes' self-representation as a "un patriote clairvoyant" in 9.39-40. See Ch. 1 for a full discussion of 19.259-262.

²⁹ For arguments against its authenticity, see Blass (1893), Vince (1930), Pearson (1976), and Trevett (1996).

³⁰ The Didymus papyrus identifies Aristomedes as a contemporary politician who was accused of theft and political treachery by both Demosthenes and Dinarchus. The former bestowed on him the epithets ὁ Χαλκοῦς and κλέπτης (col. 8, 5) (Körte 1905: 398-401).

identity of the attacked, but rather that it violates Demosthenes' normal practice: Demosthenes, as Plutarch notes (*Praecepta er. reip.* 14D), did not engage in personal attacks against his opponents in his demegoric speeches (Daitz 1957: 145).

Some scholars, however, have argued for its authenticity, namely Adams (1938), Daitz (1957), and Worthington (1991). They all assert more or less that the duplicated passages are the result of later editing: Demosthenes delivered *On the Chersonese* in winter of 341 and "hastily composed" the *Fourth Philippic* in the summer of that same year (Adams 1938: 133). Neither speech was published, but some time right before or after Chaeronea Demosthenes revised *On the Chersonese* for publication. He took the most compelling parts from the *Fourth Philippic* and added them to *On the Chersonese*, in order to boost popularity for his policies. By changing the focus of the speech from a question of sending reinforcements to Diopeithes to the question of what was the best for the city, Demosthenes put himself in a position to counter his opponents' criticism (Adams 1938: 134; Daitz 1957: 148). He could present this revised speech as evidence of his ardent patriotism and good will towards the city. As for Aristomedes and the Theoric Fund, the Didymus papyrus as well as a fragment from both Philochoros and Androtion (Harpocration *s.v.* διαψήφισ) about a revision of the citizen lists in 346/5 may support the authenticity of the speech despite these features (Daitz 1957: 146).³¹

In the *Fourth Philippic* there is one passage with explicit medical language, which has been used to support the view that this speech is inauthentic. This passage is unique to the *Fourth*

³¹ Nonetheless, the papyrus does not explain why the *Fourth Philippic* is the only demegoric speech of Demosthenes to contain such a personal attack. Körte suggests that the *Fourth Philippic* was published as pamphlet in speech form, thus freeing it from the conventions of a demegoric speech (410).

The fragments from Philochoros and Androtion about the revision of the citizen lists in 346/5 may explain Demosthenes' contrary attitude towards the Theoric Fund in the *Fourth Philippic*. With the revision of the lists, there were fewer citizens to take advantage of the dole, which may have freed up more money for military expenditure (Daitz 1957: 146).

Philippic; it does not appear in *On the Chersonese*. Here Demosthenes compares Athenian political apathy to a sedative:

ἡμεῖς δ' οὐ μόνον τούτοις ὑπολειπόμεθ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀνεγερθῆναι δυνάμεθα, **ἀλλὰ μανδραγόραν πεπωκόσιν ἢ τι φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον εἰκόσαμεν ἀνθρώποις**. (§6)

Nor is it only in these ways that we are left behind, men of Athens: we cannot even wake ourselves up **but are like people who have drunk mandrake juice or some other such drug**.

Apart from his insult towards Aeschines in *On the Crown*, when he tells him that he should go "take a dose of hellebore" (ἐλλεβορίζεις) (§121), this passage contains the only other reference to a specific drug (φάρμακον) in the Demosthenic Corpus. It was on this basis that Anastosios of Ephesus rejected the *Fourth Philippic*, for he believed that mandrake (μανδραγόρα) was too unusual a word for Demosthenes (Körte 1905: 389). However, there are several occurrences of mandrake that exist in other fifth- and fourth-century literature, suggesting that the word is not as unusual as Anastosios supposed. In Xenophon's *Symposium*, mandrake is also singled out for its somniferous properties (2.24).³² Similarly, in Plato's *Republic* mandrake is described as a sedative for mad individuals (*R.* 6.488c). Moreover, mandrake appears throughout fourth-century medical texts as a treatment for various afflictions; to name a few, it is a sedative (*Arist. Somn.* 456b), fever-reducer (*Hp. De Morbis i-iii* 2.43), antidepressant (*Hp. Nat. Loc.* 39), and antispasmodic (*Hp. Nat. Loc.* 39). From these examples, it is clear that mandrake was known in Demosthenes' day as a powerful medicinal drug. When considered alongside his awareness of

³² ὁ δ' αὖ Σωκράτης εἶπεν. Ἀλλὰ πίνεινμέν, ὧ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐμοὶ πάνυ δοκεῖ· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ὁ οἶνος ἄρδων τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς μὲν λύπας, ὥσπερ ὁ μανδραγόρας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, κοιμίζει, τὰς δὲ φιλοφροσύνας, ὥσπερ ἔλαιον φλόγα, ἐγείρει (*Xen. Sym.* 2.24-25). ("But Socrates again interposed. 'Well, gentleman, so far as drinking is concerned you have my hearty approval; for wine does of a truth 'moisten the soul' and lull our griefs to sleep just as the mandragora does with men, at the same time awakening kindly feelings as oil quickens a flame'") (Trans. Heinemann 1979).

hellebore' antipsychotic properties, it does not seem improbable that Demosthenes would use mandrake in a simile, especially since the theme here (political apathy as physical disability/disease) accords with his other medical metaphors and similes.

I conclude that this simile should not be used as an evidence to support the inauthenticity of the *Fourth Philippic*. The use of medical language is a Demosthenic idiosyncrasy--none of fourth-century orators (except maybe Demades) uses it to the extent that he does (see Ch. 1). Nevertheless, it does not support the speech's authenticity either, for it still could be the product of a Demosthenic imitator, who used medical language to make his speech seem more Demosthenic, and as such would reveal that medical language was considered a feature of his style. If this is the case, it obviates the question of authenticity, at least in regards to this project.

B. *Reply to Philip's Letter* (11)

In the summer of 340 B.C.E., right before his siege of the Thracian town of Perinthus on the Propontis, Philip sent a letter to the Athenians complaining of their numerous violations of the Peace of Philocrates. A version of this letter is preserved in *On the Crown* (18.77-78) and as Demosthenes 12. Vince (1930: 316-317) deems the former a "feeble forgery" and the latter spurious, but nonetheless a more faithful representation of Philip's original complaints.³³ Demosthenes delivered his response (Dem. 11) sometime during the siege of Perinthus and Byzantium.³⁴ Vince (1930: 317) asserts that the authenticity of this speech "will fool no one."³⁵ He explains that there is no attempt to answer Philip's allegations, and it contains "a hash of

³³ Vince (1930: 317) points to the fact that Dem. 12 is not preserved in the best Demosthenes manuscripts (S, L, A) to argue that the speech is inauthentic.

³⁴ The Byzantines sent aid to Perinthus, which prompted Philip to send part of his forces to destroy the Byzantines in revenge.

³⁵ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, however, accepted this speech as authentic and considered it the last of the *Philippics* (Vince 1926: 317).

phrases borrowed or imitated from earlier speeches" (317). Some scholars have attributed *Reply* to a contemporary of Demosthenes, Anaximenes of Lampaskos, based on a note in the Didymus papyrus, which claims that Anaximenes' *Philippica* contains an identical version of this speech (Sealey 1993: 239f).³⁶

One of the borrowed passages is the fracture and sprain simile from the *Second Olynthiac* (2.21):

συμβαίνει γάρ, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἡμῶν· ὅταν μὲν ἐρρωμένος ἦ τις, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθάνεται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα σαθρῶν, ἐπὰν δ' ἀρρωστήσῃ, πάντα κινεῖται, κὰν ῥήγμα κὰν στρέμμα κὰν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ μὴ τελέως ὑγιεινόν· οὕτω καὶ τῶν βασιλειῶν καὶ ἀπασῶν τῶν δυναστειῶν, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις κατορθώσιν, ἀφανῆ τὰ κακὰ ἐστί τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐπὰν δέ τι παίσωσιν, ὃ νῦν παθεῖν εἰκὸς ἐκείνον μείζον φορτίον ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν αἰρόμενον, γίγνεται φανερὰ τὰ δυσχερῆ πάντα τοῖς ἅπασιν. (§§13-14)

It is the same with our bodies: whenever a man is strong, he notices no individual weakness, but when he is unwell, everything comes out, whether it be a break or a sprain or some other pre-existing condition that is not completely healthy. So in the case of kingdoms and tyrannies, for as long as they are successful in war, their weaknesses are invisible to most people, but when they suffer some reverse, such as that man is now likely to suffer, by taking too heavy a burden upon himself, all his difficulties become evident to everyone.

As is apparent, the wording of this simile is almost completely verbatim with the *Second Olynthiac* (cf. 2.21). The only phrase that appears to be slightly changed is the third item: κὰν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ μὴ τελέως ὑγιεινόν is used here instead of κὰν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σαθρὸν ἢ. Nevertheless, the phrases are still synonymous. The purpose of the simile, as in the *Second Olynthiac*, is to highlight the instability of Philip's reign. Like a body with an old but unhealed injury, Philip will fall when some illness exposes the weakness of his power base. In the *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes is explicit about the "illness"; he equates it

³⁶ On this subject, see also Wendland (1904) and Körte (1906).

with a war fought on Macedonian territory. In the *Response to Philip's letter*, the speaker implies that Philip's personal failings (jealousy, treachery, and violence; 11.7-13) will lead to his downfall,³⁷ but no exciting cause is mentioned. As a result, the simile seems forced and disconnected from the alleged purpose of the speech: to incite the Athenians to send reinforcements to the people of Perinthus and Byzantium.³⁸ It is not difficult to believe that this speech is spurious, the product of a writer familiar with Demosthenes but not as skilled.

Appendix II. The Spurious Forensic Speeches

A. *Against Aristogeiton I* (25)

Not much is known about the orator-politician Aristogeiton except the following: his father, Cydimachus was condemned to death and exiled to Eretria; he was appointed to the office of Market Clerk (ἐμπορίου ἐπιμελητής) but was disqualified at his *dokimasia*; he incurred two public debts for unsuccessful litigations; and Demosthenes and Lycurgus brought an *endeixis* against him for speaking in the assembly as a state debtor, a charge from which he was exonerated.³⁹ The last piece of information that survives about him is that he was prosecuted for accepting bribes during the Harpalus affair, as was Demosthenes (Sealey 1960: 33-34). This biographical information about Aristogeiton is gathered from three speeches: Dinarchus' *Against Demosthenes* (2), and Demosthenes' *Against Aristogeiton I* (25) and *Against Aristogeiton II* (26). These speeches are the only contemporary sources for information about his life. Demosthenes' speeches, however, pose a problem. Even though it is known that he prosecuted Aristogeiton, it

³⁷ Demosthenes attributes these same failings to Philip in the *Second Olynthiac*, which he uses as evidence for the instability of his reign.

³⁸ See Wooten (1983: 22) for the functionality of Demosthenes' style.

³⁹ See Hansen (1976) for the legal procedure of *endeixis*.

is uncertain whether Dem. 25 and 26 represent Demosthenes' *endeixis*.⁴⁰ The authenticity of both speeches was and is still a subject of controversy. In antiquity, opinion was split. Longinus viewed Dem. 25 as authentic but regarded Dem. 26 as spurious (*De Sublimitate* 27). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, on the other hand, rejected both, calling them ἀηδέϊς καὶ φορτικοί, "unpleasant and vulgar" (*de Demosthenis dictionis* 57).

Since I am concerned with situating Demosthenes' medical language and imagery *vis-à-vis* his other speeches, I will address the authenticity only of *Against Aristogeiton* I, because it contains medical imagery, while *Against Aristogeiton* II does not. A survey of Demosthenes' medical language and imagery would be incomplete without an examination of this speech, for it is the only other forensic speech in the entire Demosthenic Corpus to use explicit medical language. I believe that the authenticity (or otherwise) of the speech does not drastically change its importance to a study of Demosthenes' medical language. If authentic, as Kennedy (1963: 207-8), Hansen (1976), and Ober (1989: 358) claim, this speech can provide further insight into Demosthenes' use of medical invective against his political opponents.⁴¹ If written by a rhetorician from the Hellenistic period in the style of Demosthenes, as Vince (1935: 515) and Sealey (1960: 33; 1993) assert, it will provide insight into the *Nachleben* of Demosthenes, demonstrating that medical language was considered a peculiarity of his style. I, however, favor the latter interpretation because the speech reads like a "rhetorical exercise." Vince (1935: 515) explains, "in some places the rhetoric is good of its kind [i.e. Demosthenic]," and in others it is

⁴⁰ Demosthenes allegedly delivered orations 25 and 26 at Aristogeiton's *endeixis* (Sealey 1960: 33).

⁴¹ Hansen (1976: 150) points out that scholars tend to reject the speech as spurious primarily based on the arguments of Lipsius (1883: 319-31), who argues that the speech has to be inauthentic because it contains glaring inaccuracies about Athenian political and juridical technicalities. Hansen responds to Lipsius's arguments in 146-150. See also Blass (1893: 408-17) and Jackson and Rowe (1969) for further arguments for the authenticity of *Against Aristogeiton* I.

"obscure and tedious . . . and contain[s] expressions not found in Demosthenes' admitted speeches." Thus, in what follows I consider the speech a product of a Demosthenic imitator.

Against Aristogeiton I (25) shares many similarities with Demosthenes's speeches against Aeschines. This may be due to the fact that like *Against the False Embassy* and *On the Crown*, it was delivered against another one of Demosthenes' political rivals.⁴² The premise of the trial (*endeixis*) is that Aristogeiton spoke in the Assembly illegally: as a state debtor, he was disenfranchised (*atimos*) and thus prohibited from participating in the Assembly, Council, or courts until his debts were resolved (Kamen 2014: 71).⁴³ In this speech, [Demosthenes] seeks the penalty for those who violate the conditions of their *atimia*: death. Similarly, in his speeches against Aeschines, Demosthenes pushes for the *atimia* of Aeschines. In *Against the False Embassy*, he demands that Aeschines be disenfranchised for accepting bribes from Philip, as well as for conspiring to destroy the democracy. He makes the same allegations in *On the Crown*.⁴⁴ The fact that these trials promote *atimia* (or its attendant consequences) may explain the appearance of similar invective in all three speeches, such as medical language and disease imagery.

The most explicit example of medical language in *Against Aristogeiton* I appears in the *peroratio* of the speech. [Demosthenes] implores the jury to take on the role of physicians:

ἀνιάτον, ἀνιάτον, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ πράγμα ἔστι τὸ τούτου. δεῖ δὴ πάντα, ὥσπερ οἱ ἰατροί, ὅταν καρκίνον ἢ φαγέδαιναν ἢ τῶν ἀνιάτων τι κακῶν ἴδωσιν, ἀπέκασαν ἢ ὄλωσ ἀπέκοψαν, οὕτω τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον

⁴² Aristogeiton allegedly brought Demosthenes to trial nine times for accepting bribes from Philip (25.37).

⁴³ Aristogeiton handed over his farm to his brother Eunomos under the agreement that the latter would pay off his debts in ten annual installments. Eunomos stopped paying after two installments, but Aristogeiton had already begun speaking again in the Assembly (Sealey 1960: 34).

⁴⁴ For crimes that merit *atimia*, see Hansen (1976) and Kamen (2014: 71-78).

ὑμᾶς ἐξορίσαι, ῥίψαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀνελεῖν, μὴ περιμείναντάς τι παθεῖν, ὃ μήτ' ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ προευλαβηθέντας. (§95)

His case is **incurable**, men of Athens, quite **incurable**. **Just as physicians, when they detect a cancer or an ulcer or some other incurable growth, cauterize it or cut it away, so you ought all to unite in exterminating this beast. Cast him out of your city; destroy him. Take your precautions** in time and **do not wait** for the evil consequences, which I pray may never fall either on individuals or on the community. (Trans. Vince 1935)

[Demosthenes] asks the jury to perform surgery and cauterization for the benefit of the city, the most extreme and painful medical procedures known at the time.⁴⁵ [Demosthenes] portrays Aristogeiton's punishment as a form of medicine for the city, which may be a concept inherited from or inspired by Plato (see Ch. 1). When he labels Aristogeiton's case as *aniaton*, he expresses his belief that punishment cannot make Aristogeiton "healthy," for his soul has festered beyond all hope of remediation. He is incurable because his crimes derive from a defective nature (*phusis*).

In fact, [Demosthenes] devotes the entire speech to explaining the ways in which Aristogeiton's *phusis* is deviant. For instance, he explains how Aristogeiton sold his mother (§65) and sister (§55) into slavery and refused to pay for a funeral for his father, Cydimachus, who had died in prison as a state debtor.⁴⁶ Instead, he prosecuted the man who paid for Cydimachus'

⁴⁵ *On the Surgery's* recommendation that physician perform his art "quickly" (ταχέως) and "resourcefully" (εὐπόρως) hints at the enormous amount of pain to which the patient was subjected; so does the mention of assistants, whom were likely used to restrain the patient (Hr. *Off.* 1, 4).

⁴⁶ [Demosthenes] explains that since the state imprisoned his father, it is natural that Aristogeiton inherited his hatred for the state: "For what fatal or dangerous act will he shrink from, men of Athens, this polluted wretch, infected with hereditary hatred of democracy (πατρικῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀνάμεστος)?" (§32). See Lape (2010) for Aristogeiton's antidemocratic and antisocial behavior as inherited.

funeral (§55).⁴⁷ [Demosthenes] explains that this familial abuse is evidence of a defective *phusis* because the "law of nature, laid down alike for man and beast, is that all should love their parents" (§§65-66). Aristogeiton is lower than a beast (*thêrion*) because he willingly violated the natural bonds of family, and, as result, has become "hateful to gods and men alike" (§67).⁴⁸ The implicit question behind this line of invective is, what would the man who so severely mistreated his friends and family hesitate to do to his city (Lape 2010: 74)?

[Demosthenes] also points to Aristogeiton's personality as proof of his defective *phusis*. He explains that his opponent "is implacable, restless, unsociable" and "has no charity, no friendliness, none of the feelings of a decent human being (οὐδὲν ὄν ἄνθρωπος μέτριος)."⁴⁹ With the last comment, [Demosthenes] once again draws attention to Aristogeiton's lack of humanity: he does not feel or act like a citizen should. Still, the most egregious example of his defective *phusis* involves the treatment of one of his fellow prisoners. While incarcerated for failure to pay his debts, Aristogeiton stole a book from one of his fellow prisoners. When the man confronted him, Aristogeiton allegedly bit off and swallowed his nose (§§60-61).⁵⁰ This act of cannibalism is evidence of his bestiality, a fact that did not go unnoticed by his fellow

⁴⁷ Another violation is Aristogeiton's abuse of his benefactor, the metic woman Zobia. While he was in prison for debt, she paid for him to be released, and then he tried to sell her into slavery when she complained of his ingratitude (§§56-57).

⁴⁸ Aristogeiton's mistreatment of his family would result in permanent *atimia* (Hansen 1976).

⁴⁹ [Demosthenes] makes a similar statement when he explains that Athenians worship the qualities of the good statesman but not those Aristogeiton possesses: recklessness (*anaischuntia*), sycophancy (*sukophantia*), perjury (*epiorkia*), and ingratitude (*acharistia*) (§35). For *metriotês* as a characteristic of the democratic man, see Dover (1974: 56n18).

⁵⁰ [Demosthenes] indirectly compares the prisoner's nose to a fresh fish: "But the Tanagran, a fresh-caught fish (νεαλής), was getting the better of the defendant, who was thoroughly pickled (τεταριχευμένου), having been long in jail. So when it came to this, he swallows the other man's nose" (§61). [Demosthenes] is suggesting that Aristogeiton is an *opsophagos*, a glutton of the most extreme type. This figure was lambasted, especially in comedy, for not being able to restrain his appetite. For example, he would pull fish straight off the grill, and in the process burn his hands because of his impatience (Davidson 1998: 144-147).

prisoners because: after the incident, the prisoners banded together and refused to share fire, light, food, or drink with him (§62). His level of criminality disgusted even criminals of the worst sort.

[Demosthenes] uses these incidents (and underscores these character flaws) to show that Aristogeiton's *phusis* is beyond remediation, a fact that he emphasizes with the language of pollution. He calls his opponent "polluted" (μαρῶς) (§28, §32, §41, §54, §58, §62, §81), "profane" (ἀσεβής) (§54, §63), "unholy" (οὔτε ὅσιον) (§81), "blood-thirsty" (ὠμός) (§63), and a "wild beast" (θηρίον) (§31, §58, §65, §95).⁵¹ It is this representation of Aristogeiton that sets the stage for the jury-physician simile. Cancers (*karkina*) and eating ulcers (*phagedaina*), the conditions to which he compares him in that simile, were viewed as difficult to cure or outright incurable, and thus serve as fitting comparanda for Aristogeiton.⁵²

Although [Demosthenes] deems Aristogeiton's case incurable (*aniation*), he implies that the citizen body, diseased by Aristogeiton's presence within it, can be cured, but only through his complete removal. They must vote against him and exact the most extreme penalty for those who violate the conditions of their *atimia*: death (Hansen 1976: 60). [Demosthenes] compares this

⁵¹ Throughout the speech [Demosthenes] uses animal imagery to highlight Aristogeiton's savage and inhuman nature. He makes a pun on his opponent's proudly earned title, "watchdog of the democracy," comparing Aristogeiton to a watchdog that has eaten its flock, and therefore must be euthanized because it has acquired a taste for mutton (§§40-41). He also compares him to a scorpion three times (§52, §84, §96), a snake twice (§52, §96), and a spider once (§96).

⁵² The deadliest type of cancer (*karkina*) is "hidden" (*kruptos*) cancer, that is, cancer within the cavity of the body. The author of *Prognosticon* qualifies these cancers as "deadly" (δεινά) and "especially difficult to get rid of" (δυσάπλλακτοι. . . μάλιστα) (2.11, 2.13). Similarly, *Aphorisms* advises against the treatment of "hidden cancers," explaining that it often hastens death, while inaction can at least prolong life (6.38). As to *phagedainai*, Aeschylus and Euripides memorialize the excruciating pain of this specific affliction in their versions of the Philoctetes myth (Aesch. Fr. 253; Eur. Fr. 792; cf. Soph. *Ph.* 313). The Hippocratic writer of *Ulcers* no less dramatically depicts this type of ulcer. He uses verbs that more appropriately describe animals than a medical condition: the *phagedaina* "grazes" (νέμηται) and "feeds" (ἐσθίη) on the skin (10).

verdict to surgery and cauterization because these therapeutic procedures are drastic. They demand bravery on both the patient's and the physician's part.⁵³ The patient must be willing to endure extreme pain, while the other must be willing to jeopardize his career. One mistake could ruin a physician's reputation (Hp. *Prorrh.* 2.1). [Demosthenes] compels the jury to take this risk by framing Aristogeiton's punishment as an obligation. He uses *δεῖ*, a verb of necessity, followed by a string of complementary infinitives to convey that it is their duty to "exterminate" (*ἐξορίσαι*), "to cast out" (*ῥίψαι*),⁵⁴ "to destroy" (*ἀνελεῖν*) Aristogeiton. He adds force to this exhortation by warning them of the time-sensitive nature of their verdict: "take your precautions in time and do not wait for the evil consequences, which I pray may never fall either on individuals or on the community" (§95). This statement reaffirms the message of the simile, namely that the safety of the community is dependent on their bold and quick action.

The primary threat that Aristogeiton poses to the city is that others will imitate his bad behavior. In the proem of the speech, [Demosthenes] lays out the consequences of his acquittal, explaining that if "every man were given license to do as he liked . . . the constitution (*politeia*) would vanish [and] life would not differ from the beasts of the fields (*thêria*)" (§20).⁵⁵ Here [Demosthenes] expresses his belief that an acquittal will serve as a public affirmation of Aristogeiton's transgressions, and that the Athenians, inspired by his example, would imitate his

⁵³ Drugs (*pharmaka*) were more commonly prescribed than surgery or cautery because they were considered, for the most part, less risky and more accessible; next in rank, the cautery (Jouanna 2001: 159-162). Of all invasive procedures, cauterization provided the least risk because the heat acted as a natural sterilization agent, inhibiting bacterial growth, or to the Greeks, who were unaware of bacteria, gangrene or suppuration. Last was surgery. This therapeutic measure was considered so risky that the Hippocratic author of *Oath* prohibits the swearer from using the "knife" (1). There is, however, a debate over what this exactly means. Edelstein (1943) has suggested that the author is advising the physician to leave surgery to a specialist.

⁵⁴ The phrase "to cast out from the city" (*ῥίψαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως*) evokes the scapegoat ritual (Rosenbloom 2003). See Ch. 2 for a discussion of the scapegoat ritual.

⁵⁵ Aristotle singles out gods and beasts as the only entities capable of existing without a political community (*πολιτική κοινωνία*) (*Pol.* 1253a)

crimes. In the epilogue, he circles back to this fear. He warns the jury that they will be watched when they leave the courthouse, and that everyone, citizen and foreigner alike, will be able to discern an acquittal from the looks on their faces (§98). [Demosthenes] adds gravity to their vote by explaining that Aristogeiton's "evil influence" (*κακοπραγμοσύνη*) has already spread to every class (citizens, foreigners, children, and women) and that all are anxious to see whether or not his wickedness (*ponêria*) is punished (§101). Demosthenes' closing statement reinforces the message of the jury-physician simile. By declaring the civic body morally polluted by Aristogeiton, he brings back the image of the suffering body, teetering on the edge of incurability.

As in Demosthenes' speeches against Aeschines, the figure of the charlatan healer makes an appearance in *Against Aristogeiton I*, specifically in the Demosthenic speaker's discussion of Aristogeiton's family. He uses their immorality as proof that his opponent's defective nature is inherited (Lape 2010: 73). He portrays each one of them as criminals: he reminds the jury that the city condemned Aristogeiton's father, Cydimachus, to death (§65), and draws their attention to his mother, who was sold into slavery for defrauding her *prostatês* (§65). It is, however, Aristogeiton's twin brother whose criminal activities receive special attention. [Demosthenes] uses his twin as mirror for Aristogeiton's character flaws. He explains how his twin seduced the servant of the notorious sorceress (*pharmakis*), Theoris of Lemnos, for financial reasons: he wanted to steal Theoris' drugs (*pharmaka*) and charms (*epôidai*) so that he could market himself as a magician with the power to heal epilepsy.⁵⁶ [Demosthenes] snidely remarks that

⁵⁶ According to [Demosthenes], Theoris was executed for witchcraft (25.79-80), but Collins (2001: 477), citing the fourth-century orators' unreliability in recalling historical details accurately, argues that she instead lost her life for poisoning her customers.

Aristogeiton's twin presented himself as a healer, although he himself was subject to epileptic fits of wickedness (§80).⁵⁷

This description of Aristogeiton's brother once more evokes the magico-religious healers of *Sacred Disease*, who profess to be able to cure the sacred disease (i.e. epilepsy) with charms (*epôidai*) and purifications (*katharmoi*) (Hp. *Morb. Sacr.* 1). The author of this treatise vehemently condemns them on the grounds that they are charlatans, and as such give the impression that true (Hippocratic) medicine condones their quackery. In *On the Crown*, as argued previously, Demosthenes uses Aeschines' former profession as a purifier, similar to those in *Sacred Disease*, to argue that his opponent is a charlatan and thus not to be trusted (18.259-60).⁵⁸ By focusing on Aristogeiton's twin's purification activities, the Demosthenic speaker achieves the same end as Demosthenes and *Sacred Disease*. Not only does he discredit the twin, who intends to plead for his brother's innocence (§80), but he also blackens Aristogeiton's character. Since his twin is a charlatan, Aristogeiton must be too, but of the political variety.

The parallels between the medical imagery and language of *Against Aristogeiton* and Demosthenes' speeches against Aeschines are striking. [Demosthenes'] cancer simile is reminiscent of Demosthenes' prognôsis of the *nosêma deinon* in *Against the False Embassy*: both speakers characterize their opponent's disease as infectious and warn that the only way that the disease (i.e. imitation of bad behavior) can be stopped is if the jury punishes the defendant. Moreover, like Demosthenes, the speaker of *Against Aristogeiton* I draws upon his opponent's association with magic (by way of his twin brother) to underscore his charlatanism. Based on the

⁵⁷ ἐξ ἧσπερ ὁ βάσκανος οὗτος πεπαιδοποιῆται, μαγγανεύει καὶ φενακίζει καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλήπτους φησὶν ἰᾶσθαι, αὐτὸς ὢν ἐπίληπτος πάσῃ πονηρίᾳ. ("This rascal has had children by her, and with her help he plays juggling tricks and professes to cure fits (*epilêptoi*), being himself subject to fits (*epilêptos*) of wickedness of every kind.")

⁵⁸ See Ch. 4.

thematic similarities between this speech's medical language and Demosthenes', it is understandable that *Against Aristogeiton I* was (and is still, by some) attributed to Demosthenes. This false ascription shows that medical language was most likely considered a Demosthenic feature in antiquity.

Conclusion

In this project, I hope to have shown that Demosthenes was deeply influenced by contemporary medical culture. In Chapter 1, I argued that Demosthenes' use of medical language and imagery should be seen as a part of a tradition of analogizing medicine and politics that began with the circulation of the first Hippocratic treatises in the mid- fifth-century and flourished well into his own day. In Chapter 2, I examined how Demosthenes appropriates the language of disease and religious pollution in *Against the False Embassy* (Dem. 19) to both communicate the dangers of political corruption and to express the need for the jury to take on the role of physicians and rid Athens of Philipizers such as Aeschines. I also looked at how Demosthenes incorporates the Hippocratic medical ethics of *prognôsis* ("medical forecast") and *kairos* ("right timing") into his dialogue on political excellence to show that he has always tended to the interests of the city like a good physician, while his opponent has done everything in his power to harm them.

In Chapter 3, I considered Aeschines' reponse to Demosthenes' medical language in his defense speech, *On the Embassy* (2), and in his decade-later prosecution of Demosthenes' political ally, Ctesiphon (*Against Ctesiphon* (3)). My aim was to show that Demosthenes' medical language was considered such a distinctive (and persuasive) feature of his style that Aeschines felt a need to respond to it. In the first half of the chapter, I examined how Aeschines attacks Demosthenes' self-representation as physician of the state by depicting his opponent as a charlatan healer, whose words never align with his actions. I also looked how he redefines *prognôsis* in terms of the present in order to show himself to be more worthy of the title civic healer. In the second half, I argued that Aeschines incorporates medical invective--much of it in the same tenor as *On the Embassy*--into his prosecution of Ctesiphon because he knows that Demosthenes will use medical language against him in his defense. By anticipating

Demosthenes' use of such language, I believe that Aeschines attempts to remove the "bite" from his opponent's invective.

In Chapter 4, I turned to Demosthenes' grand defense of his political career, *On the Crown* (Dem. 18). In this chapter, I argued that Demosthenes answers Aeschines' allegations of political failure by using the contemporary medical ethics of *prognôsis* and *kairos* to show that he always spoke and acted on behalf of the city like a good physician, and thus deserves his civic crown. I also argued that he transfers the blame for Chaeronea onto politicians such as Aeschines for not speaking up when necessary and for wasting critical opportunities with empty (and purchased) speech. Moreover, I looked at how Demosthenes uses the figure of the charlatan physician and the image of the sick body to highlight the consequences of political quiescence, that is, the death of the free city.

In Chapter 5, I explored Demosthenes' use of medical language and imagery in his other speeches, focusing on the *Olynthiacs* (1-3) and *Philippics* (4, 6, 9). First, I began by looking at medical language in the *Olynthiacs*, some of Demosthenes' earliest political speeches. I argued that the medical language in these speeches is intimately tied to Demosthenes' belief that his fellow citizens are alarmingly apathetic towards the growing threat of Macedon. By depicting them as diseased, Demosthenes attempts to shame his countrymen into action, that is, into helping the Olynthians. Next, I looked at the *Philippics*. I argued that the medical language of these speeches differs from the *Olynthiacs* in that it centers on Philip. Demosthenes depicts the Macedonian as a disease that must be eradicated through quick and decisive military action in order that Greece may be safeguarded from his infectious influence. By surveying the medical language in Demosthenes' other speeches, my hope was to draw attention to the diversity of his imagery. Demosthenes shapes his medical language to fit the intent of each speech.

In the appendix to this chapter, I looked at instances of medical language in the spurious Demosthenic speeches: *Fourth Philippic* (10), *Reply to Philip* (11), and *Against Aristogeiton* (25). By closely examining how medical language is used in these speeches, my intent, as in Chapter 3, was to show that medical language was considered such a distinctive feature of his style that Demosthenic imitators did not consider their speech "Demosthenic" without the inclusion of medical language.

One aspect of Demosthenes' language that I have yet to directly address and would like to conclude with is audience response. How did his audience react to his vivid medical metaphors and similes? Demosthenes' frequent use of medical language strongly suggests that such language was received well. I believe that he would not have continued to use this type of language if it elicited a lackluster or poor response. I think that this language stirred up both fear and hope in the listener, for it reminded them of their lived experiences. Life in fourth-century Athens was difficult and short. Disease was a reality of life. Without knowledge of modern hygiene, a simple cut could fester and claim the life of the afflicted; without knowledge of germs, a disease could rapidly spread and kill hundreds, and in some cases, thousands, as was the case with the infamous Great Plague. With the emergence of Hippocratic medicine in the fifth century, a new type of healer was introduced into the medical marketplace of ancient Greece, and his brand of medicine was optimistic. He believed that almost all diseases could be cured if caught in time (*kairos*) and treated in the right way. His fabulous *prognôseis*, when proven correct, added confidence and faith in his bold claims. The Hippocratic physician was likely viewed with great admiration for his ability to cure painful afflictions. He thus may have been seen as symbol of hope.

By using the language of the Hippocratics, Demosthenes coaxes the audience's trust. He puts Athens' political crises into terms that they can understand, since everyone has experience of health and disease. Moreover, by likening himself to a Hippocratic physician, he inspires confidence in his brand of politics and its power to heal. In contrast, by depicting his opponent Aeschines as a charlatan physician, he evokes fear and anger, for his fellow Athenians were likely very well acquainted with charlatan healers. The Hippocratic treatise *Sacred Disease* attests to the proliferation of quack physicians throughout Greece in the fifth century. The composition of treatises on medical ethics in the late fourth-century shows that this continued to be the case (or was even more so the case) in Demosthenes' day. His audience may have suffered or known people that had suffered at the hands of these healers. Therefore, when a political leader was compared to a quack healer, feelings of anger and/or fear for the city were presumably stirred up.

Much of this is speculative, for it is impossible to reconstruct what does not survive: that is, eyewitness accounts to Demosthenes' speeches. However, the fact that politicians still use medical metaphors and similes in their speeches today attests to the enduring power of this type of language. In future projects, I would like to implement a more comparative approach. By looking at the use of medical language in Roman oratory, I hope to gain a clearer understanding of the function of medical language in classical antiquity. Perhaps this may help to shed some light on how the Greeks and Romans understood their physical and socio-political bodies, as well as the relationship between the two.

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