

The Donald W. Treadgold Papers

*In Russian, East European,
and Central Asian Studies*

Military Threats and Threat Assessment in Russia's New Defense Doctrine and Security Concept

Stephen Blank

No. 31
July 2001

*The Henry M. Jackson
School of International Studies
The University of Washington*

**Military Threats
and Threat Assessment
in Russia's New Defense Doctrine
and Security Concept**

Stephen Blank

**The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington
2001**

ISSN 1078-5639

© Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington, 2001.

Co-Editors: Sabrina P. Ramet

Vjeran Pavlaković

Managing Editor: James M. Ward

Editorial Council: Herbert J. Ellison

James R. Felak

Judith A. Thornton

Daniel C. Waugh

The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies provide a forum for the rapid dissemination of current scholarly research on the regions indicated by the title. Publications include papers from symposia and monographs that may be too long for most journals but too short to appear in book form. Subscriptions and special orders are available. The Editorial Board of *The Donald W. Treadgold Papers* does not endorse the views, or assume any responsibility for the factual accuracy, of any publication in the series. The respective authors are solely responsible for the views expressed and the factual accuracy of their contributions.

Submissions in the field of Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies are considered for publication. Articles should be of substantial length — approximately 40–100 pages, including endnotes. All transliteration should conform to Library of Congress rules. Submission on disk is requested upon acceptance. Submissions should be sent in triplicate to the address below, with attention to Sabrina P. Ramet, editor. Scholars interested in submitting works for consideration are asked to obtain a copy of the style guide before submitting their work.

The Donald W. Treadgold Papers
Jackson School of International Studies
Box 353650
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3650
(206) 221-6348
treadgld@u.washington.edu

About this series

The *Donald W. Treadgold Papers* publication series was created to honor a great teacher and great scholar. Donald W. Treadgold was professor of history and international studies at the University of Washington from 1949 to 1993. During that time, he wrote seven books, one of which — *Twentieth Century Russia* — went into eight editions. He was twice editor of *Slavic Review*, the organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and received the AAASS Award for Distinguished Contributions to Slavic Studies, as well as the AAASS Award for Distinguished Service. Professor Treadgold molded several generations of Russian historians and contributed enormously to the field of Russian history. He was, in other ways as well, an inspiration to all who knew him.

The *Treadgold Papers* series was created in 1993 on the occasion of Professor Treadgold's retirement, on the initiative of Professor Daniel Waugh. Professor Treadgold passed away in December 1994. The series is dedicated to the memory of a great man, publishing papers in those areas which were close to his heart.

Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor

About the author of this issue

Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Blank has been an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1989. Prior to this appointment, Dr. Blank was Associate Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell AFB. Dr. Blank's M.A. and Ph.D. are in Russian History from the University of Chicago. He has published over 200 articles and monographs on Soviet/Russian military and foreign policies. His most recent book is *Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia* (Duke University Press, 1997), which he co-edited with Professor Alvin Rubinstein of the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Blank is also the author of a study of the Soviet Commissariat of Nationalities, *The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994) and the co-editor of *The Soviet Military and the Future* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992).

“Generals have told me that we must build a monument to Clinton because the campaign over Kosovo drastically changed political attitudes here. Now there is no more opposition to the idea that Russia should restore its military potential.”

Russian Military Correspondent Alexander Zhilin

On October 1999, Moscow published a draft defense doctrine and, in November 1999, a draft of the national security concept. That concept was then revised and given official imprimatur in January 2000. A revised and official version of the military threat was published during the spring of 2000. Because those publications have an official and normative, if not juridical, character, their content and unusual sequence of publication possess crucial significance. They aroused considerable interest due to their provisions on nuclear use and due to the frank way in which the authors of both documents postulated that the United States and NATO are a source of rising military and political threats. Therefore, this essay focuses on those threat assessments that underlie whatever justification may exist for the use of nuclear weapons or for any other defense policy.

Because of the importance of these documents, their content (threat assessments) and their context merit careful scrutiny. The draft doctrine states its purposes in its very opening.

Russian Federation [RF] military doctrine (henceforth military doctrine) represents a systemized aggregate of fundamental official views (guidelines), concentrated in a single document, on preventing wars and armed conflicts, on their nature and methods of waging them, and on organizing the activities of the state, society, and citizens to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies. Military doctrine elaborates on the 1993 "Basic Provisions of RF Military Doctrine" and, as applied to the military sphere, concretizes guidelines of the RF National Security Concept. It is based on a comprehensive assessment of the status of the

military-political situation; on a strategic forecast of its development; on a scientifically substantiated determination of current and future missions, objective requirements, and real capabilities for ensuring RF military security; and on conclusions from a systems analysis of the content and nature of modern wars and armed conflicts and of the domestic and foreign experience of military organizational development and military art.¹

The important character of the draft doctrine and security concept — and the centrality of the threat assessment to them — ensure that both documents and particularly their threat assessment emerged out of intense political struggles over the definition of the threat or threats. These struggles, which are continuing, are highly charged for the simple reason that whoever wins them gains decisive leverage over doctrine, strategy, and policy.

Assessments develop through an ongoing “ordered ferment” that constantly assesses the nature of war, its characteristics, potential threats to Russian security, and desirable responses to those threats. Since this debate remains — largely, though not exclusively — confined to officers within the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, and to key national security officials, the issues under debate are matters of high politics and political struggle within the military leadership and at the highest levels of the government. Indeed, today’s debate over a national security and a defense doctrine to revise that of 1993 had begun by 1996. Therefore, once the government announces an official doctrine based on the threat assessment and ensuing policy requirements, that doctrine should then determine the policies and strategy to meet those threats and defend Russia. But discussion and controversy clearly continue since the draft doctrine was sent back for revisions in February 2000.

All these documents appeared under very inauspicious conditions. Russian military apprehensions have grown with the collapse of Russian power, the augmentation of the power of the United States and NATO, the Kosovo crisis, the Anglo-American bombing campaign against Iraq, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the onset of information warfare and operations (IW and IO respectively). Kosovo was the last straw since it united many of the most feared military and political

elements of threat.² Authoritative spokesmen like Defense Minister General Igor Sergeev and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General Valery L. Manilov, who chaired the doctrine's editorial "collective", admitted that the Kosovo crisis led to revisions of the draft doctrine. Manilov also admitted that there were enormous differences of opinion among those charged with preparing the draft doctrine. Thus, the published draft doctrine represented the fifth such attempt since 1997. Not surprisingly, Manilov claimed that the draft doctrine's "supertask" was to ensure unanimity among everyone concerning the threats, the nature of contemporary war, and policy recommendations presented there.³

It is important, therefore, to understand exactly what threats Kosovo presented to or ratified in the minds of the Russian military-political elite and what the final unanimity concerning threats signified. According to Harvard University Professor Celeste Wallander, Kosovo presented or confirmed the following negative assessments of NATO enlargement:

For Russia all the hypothetical security concerns of the past decade are the threats of today. NATO is now closer to Russian borders, and is bombing a non-NATO state. Even before NATO's new strategic concept, the alliance's development of Combined Joint Task Forces offered ways for the alliance to employ forces outside the constraints of Article 5 (self-defense). NATO's changes, combined with its determination to use force against non-members threatens Russia because political turmoil in the former Soviet Union increases the likelihood of NATO involvement near and perhaps even in Russia. Moscow has long feared that expansion of the alliance could radicalize or destabilize neighboring countries, sparking internal splits or civil wars that could drag in Russia — a role it neither wants nor can afford.

Unfortunately, NATO-Russia cooperation failed to address these concerns even before Kosovo. After Kosovo, it is difficult to see what kind of cooperative relationship NATO and Russia can have. For one thing, the air strikes [as viewed from Russia — author] violated several

principles of the NATO-Russia Founding Act — primarily NATO's commitments limiting its right to use force and promising the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Russians interpret the ongoing military campaign absent UN Security Council approval as NATO's drive for unilateral security in Europe. NATO's new Strategic Concept adopted at the 50th anniversary expanded the alliance's mission to include non-NATO Europe as a potential area for further NATO use of force. While the Concept recognizes the role of the UN Security Council, it does not require that NATO obtain [a] UN mandate for actions beyond the alliance's border.⁴

Clearly these are largely political threats that would reduce and even potentially marginalize Russia's role in European and even Eurasian security processes. But they are not, for the most part, military threats against Russia or its vital strategic interests. However, this assessment, while correct so far as it goes concerning Russian perceptions of the importance of Kosovo, does not go far enough. In conversations, Russian military leaders and military-political analysts told the author that they perceived NATO's campaign in Kosovo to present serious military threats to Russia's military-political interests.

Indeed, already by 1999, Russia had come to see itself "as being under threatened or actual information attack, if not to the same extent as its friend Serbia. Western reactions to the 'anti-terrorist' operation in Chechnya are a case in point."⁵ But this perception preceded that operation. Military leaders and analysts also argued that NATO's Kosovo operation represented the template for future NATO operations against Russia or its vital interests in the "near abroad", as outlined in NATO's April 1999 strategy concept.⁶ Again, that perception preceded Kosovo, but the latter cemented and seemed to validate it.

A central element of that Russian perception is that NATO harbors designs of enlargement and unilateral out-of-area operations in both the Balkans and the Caucasus, areas that are regarded as more or less equally vital areas of Russian national interests. When the secretary-general of NATO, Javier Solana, told a NATO conference in September 1998 that both of those regions were troubled areas from which NATO "cannot remain aloof", he was not merely reiterating ideas he had already

voiced publicly; he was confirming the expansive threat assessment held with increasing conviction in Moscow.⁷ His subsequent statement that “We are not condemned to be the victim of events that lie beyond our control — we can shape the future” seemed to prove NATO’s and especially Washington’s hegemonic aspirations.⁸

The following examples show that while official policy as embodied in the documents under examination here had not yet fully crystallized by 1998, the trend was moving (at least in leading military circles) toward public acceptance of the expansive threat assessment found in the documents of 1999–2000. In November 1998, Colonel-General Yury N. Baluevsky, chief of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate, argued that the Western military-political threat is growing and had to be met by military means. At the same time, he also urged that the Ministry of Defense not go beyond the more optimistic line enforced by the 1997 security concept. Baluevsky observed that

A deepening of international integration, formation of a global economic and information space, and increased acuteness of the competitive struggle by world centers of strength for consolidating and expanding spheres of influence are among the main trends of the military-political situation. Views on [the] use of military force have also changed. Despite this, however, its role as an important factor in the process of achieving economic and political objectives has been preserved.

Yes, large-scale threats to Russia are basically hypothetical in nature. They can and must be neutralized by political means with reliance on the state’s military might, and first and foremost on combat-ready strategic nuclear forces and general-purpose forces with precisely functioning command and control, communications, intelligence, and early-warning systems. At the same time, with a diminished probability of a major war being initiated and with the main emphasis of interstate contradictions [being] transferred from the area of ideology into the sphere of politics and economics, there has been a significant growth in the danger of outbreak

of armed conflicts where escalation can lead to their expanded geographic scale, an increased number of participants and development into a local and then a regional war. Therefore, the Russian Armed Forces must be ready both to localize and to neutralize them as well as to carry on wide-scale military operations.⁹

These remarks clearly reveal the desire of the armed forces and the General Staff to have it both ways, conforming to policy at the same time they register the sense of expanding threats, the need for a large army, and the importance of the military factor as an instrument for resolving non-military problems as well as actual conflicts and wars. They just barely stay within the confines of the 1997 security concept, which the military resented because it stated that the main threats for now and the foreseeable future are not military but “are concentrated in the domestic, political, economic, social, environmental, information, and spiritual spheres.”¹⁰ The 1997 concept also cited the particularly critical state of the economy.¹¹ There is no doubt that this approach “unsettled” military commanders. General Leonty Kuznetsov, the commander in chief (CINC) of the Moscow Military District, publicly stated that the main provisions of the 1997 security concept underestimated the low probability of large-scale war within the next few years. Kuznetsov complained that civilians had reinserted the statement that Russia’s army should be prepared only for conducting regional and local wars — a qualification that he had removed from the original draft. Instead, Russian troops should prepare for large-scale aggression. The Kremlin, he lamented, accepted the draft “without his amendments”.¹²

Worse than this was the fact that the 1997 concept expressly invoked the availability of numerous political mechanisms and avenues for resolving disputed issues. Thus,

There has been an expansion in the commonality of Russia’s interests with many states on problems of international security such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, settling and preventing regional conflicts, countering international terrorism and the drugs business, and solving acute global ecological problems including nuclear and radiation security. This significantly increases the opportunity to ensure Russia’s

national security by nonmilitary means — by means of legal treaty, political, economic, and other measures.¹³

This posture presented Russian armed forces as more of a burden than an asset, and one whose priority had shifted from preparing for the previous total war template to the more extreme areas of the spectrum of conflict, namely, nuclear deterrence, information warfare (IW), and space war at one end and preparedness for small scale, “local”, and even internal conflicts at the other.¹⁴ While that posture met the desiderata of President Boris Yeltsin, his national security teams of 1997-98, and the defense minister, General Igor Sergeev, former CINC of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, it assuredly did not conform to the views of the General Staff on the threats facing Russia and the military forces needed to counter them. The General Staff's view emerges from the second example of pre-Kosovo threat assessments, one that also appeared in November 1998 under the authorship of lower-ranking but knowledgeable members of the General Staff.

This article, written as the crisis in Kosovo was nearing its zenith, lambasted NATO for desiring to act unilaterally out of area and to impose a new world order by bypassing the UN and the OSCE. It accused NATO and specifically the United States of trying to go beyond the Washington Treaty and to convert the alliance into an offensive military bloc that was expanding its “zone of responsibility” by punitive, military means.¹⁵ The authors charged that

At the same time, it is not unlikely that NATO could use or even organize crises similar to that in Kosovo in other areas of the world to create an excuse for military intervention since the “policy of double standards” where the bloc's interests dictate the thrust of policy (*the possibility of the use of military force in Kosovo against the Yugoslav Army and simultaneous disregard for the problem of the genocide faced by the Kurds in Turkey, the manifestation of “concern” at the use of military force in the Dnester Region, Chechnya, and Nagorno-Karabakh*) is typical of the alliance's actions.¹⁶

The authors went beyond this to hint that today's war in Chechnya was already on the agenda. This was intended to forewarn NATO openly about what Russia's likely reaction to an operation against Serbia would be. Rather than accept a NATO-dictated isolation from European security agendas and the negation of organizations such as the UN and OSCE, Russia would act because this crisis provided NATO with an opportunity to project military force not just against Serbia but against Russia itself. This was because the main objective of NATO enlargement was to weaken Russia's influence in Europe and around the world. Therefore, the following scenario was possible: "Once our country has coped with its difficulties, there will be a firm NATO ring around it, which will enable the West to apply effective economic, political, and possibly even military pressure on Moscow."¹⁷ Specifically,

When analyzing the development of events in the Balkans, parallels with the development of events in the Caucasus involuntarily suggest themselves: Bosnia-Herzegovina is Nagorno-Karabakh; Kosovo is Chechnya. As soon as the West and, in particular, NATO, has rehearsed the "divide and rule" principle in the Balkans under cover of peacekeeping, they should be expected to interfere in the internal affairs of the CIS countries and Russia. It is possible to extrapolate the implementation of "peacekeeping operations" in the region involving military force without a UN Security Council mandate, which could result in the Caucasus being wrested from Russia [it bears mentioning that this applies as well to the independent states of the Trans-caucasus, an involuntary hint of the continuing neo-imperial mindset of the General Staff—author] and the lasting consolidation of NATO's military presence in this region, which is far removed from the alliance's zone of responsibility. *Is Russia prepared for the development of this scenario? It is obvious that, in order to ensure that the Caucasus does not become an arena for NATO Allied Armed Forces' military intervention, the Russian Government must implement a well defined tough policy in the Balkans, guided by the UN charter and at the same time defending its national interests in the region by*

*identifying and providing the appropriate support for this policy's allies.*¹⁸

Moscow clearly sounded two warnings here: first, that it would intervene in Kosovo along with Serbia in the event of an attack and, second, that it was ready to use force in Chechnya not only to suppress secessionists and terrorists (or whatever threat Chechnya presented), but also to oust NATO from the Caucasus, an area that remains, insofar as these authors and those for whom they spoke are concerned, exclusively part of Russia. The fact that NATO went ahead and intervened in Kosovo — probably not even understanding such warnings, which were likely lost in the background “noise” of the Kosovo crisis — only confirmed the General Staff in its view of the threat or threats to Russia and the unilateral measures it had to take, e.g., landing in Priština and attacking Chechnya. It was essential for the General Staff that it do so to reorient threat assessments and thus subsequent defense policy in the direction that these documents then took. If one then adds the threat posed by the United States’ pending decision about theater and national missile defense (TMD and NMD), which Russia regards as a threat to the very basis of strategic stability worldwide, then the reason and context for subsequent Russian statements and policies become much clearer.

The content of the draft doctrine and security concept

The nuclear provisions of the security concept stated that a vital task of the armed forces is to exercise deterrence to prevent nuclear or other aggression on any scale against Russia and its allies. Thus, Russia extended deterrence to those allies, presumably CIS members. Likewise, “Nuclear weapons should be capable of inflicting the desired extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances.”¹⁹ The concept also stated that the use of nuclear weapons would become possible “in the event of the need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and proven ineffective.”²⁰ The security concept tailors nuclear use to the particular threat at hand, as implied by its phrases “aggression on any scale, nuclear or otherwise” and “to the desired extent of damage.”²¹ Other key officials, e.g., Deputy Defense Minister

Vladimir Mikhailov, confirm this interpretation of the conditions for nuclear use, thereby proclaiming limited nuclear war as Russia's officially acknowledged strategy in response to many different kinds of contingencies.²²

Therefore, Russian nuclear weapons serve two crucial but not necessarily complementary functions. They deter a wide range of phenomena along the spectrum of conflict that could conceivably threaten Russia. Second, they are also war-fighting instruments that are to be used in a wide range of actual conflict situations, including even small-scale operations.²³

The nuclear provisions of these documents also clearly related to NATO's Kosovo operation. Officers and analysts told the author in June 1999 that Kosovo led doctrine writers to include contingencies for deploying tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in conventional threat scenarios.²⁴ In December 1999, General Vladimir Yakovlev, CINC of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, admitted this, attributing the new strategy to Russia's economic crisis — where nuclear forces receive about half the funds they need — and new regional proliferation threats.

Russia, for objective reasons, is forced to lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, extend the nuclear deterrent to smaller-scale conflicts and openly warn potential opponents about this.²⁵

Russia would also continue to replace old arms with new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles. The foregoing statements illustrate as well the belief that Russia can use nuclear weapons for the purpose of deescalating conflict situations and wars.²⁶ These remarks also illustrate some of the "threat context" animating the formulations in these documents, amplify the language of the security concept, and suggest that TNW will be the weapon and/or deterrent of choice for many of the smaller scale contingencies that Russia fears. Russian doctrinal statements also represent the culmination to date of a debate going back at least to 1993 over nuclear first-strike use against certain kinds of conventional attacks on Russian interests and targets.²⁷

Conforming to the security concept, Yakovlev tied the new posture to the multiple threats facing Russia. He stated that nuclear weapons serve the *political* function of deterring "possible aggression of *any intensity*."²⁸ Like virtually every other senior commander and military-political analyst, he invoked Kosovo as a justification. NATO's campaign convinced Russia,

he said, that Washington and other NATO allies were rehearsing methods of warfare that will be the basis for future wars to which Russia must adjust. The General Staff shares this belief that Kosovo is a template of future NATO strategy.²⁹ Yakovlev cited, *inter alia*,

The massive use of aviation and long-range precision weapons; electronic countermeasures; and integrated use of space information assets — all these approaches have become a firm part of U.S. military threats beginning with Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991. Moreover, the primary targets in the course of the conflict were clearly specified; key installations of the economic infrastructure, elements of the state and military command and control system, and lines of transportation. NATO's eastward enlargement not only radically altered the force ratio in theaters of military operations, but also permitted a number of kinds of tactical and operational-tactical weapons to perform strategic missions previously set aside for Pershing II missile complexes and cruise missiles.³⁰

Therefore, the statements on nuclear issues in the draft doctrine and security concept are a fundamental aspect of Russia's adaptation to future war. Yakovlev and the Russian leadership are equally adamant about blocking U.S. efforts to build a ballistic missile defense (BMD), which they regard as a threat to the foundations of strategic stability between Moscow and Washington and a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.³¹

The defense doctrine and the security concept, as well as published statements by authoritative officials and spokesmen, invoke a broad range of political-military threats, many of which also emerge directly out of NATO enlargement, Kosovo, and the Anglo-American Iraqi operation of 1998–99. NATO enlargement together with its strategic repercussions constitutes a large number of the military-political threats. Apart from political or military-political threats, we also can identify three specific military threats displayed in Kosovo and Iraq that particularly trouble Russian leaders: information warfare (IW) and information operations (IO), the use of high-tech precision weapons in a primarily aerospace and long-range offensive (so-called contactless war), and BMD.

The threat assessments in these documents also portray the United States and NATO as threats in and of themselves. Those formulations serve two purposes: they justify and shape the increasingly anti-NATO and anti-American political orientation of the military and government, while, at home, they are the essential pillars of the General Staff's unprecedented resolve to define and control Moscow's entire national security policy and gain higher status and more resources for defense. Indeed, Sergeev stated that the forthcoming officially revised defense doctrine examines twelve new external threats and six new internal ones that have appeared recently.³² Inasmuch as only two years have elapsed since the old security concept and its official threat assessment, this remark tells us how much of the threat assessment we are now receiving has been fabricated out of a sense of paranoia and in order to justify obtaining more resources from the government. In other words, threat assessment is a major aspect of the military's rent-seeking proclivities. Threat assessments justify both its status in Russian politics and its demands for more resources in both funding and manpower from the government and Russian society. And those assessments also function to advance a view of Russia's global status and security situation that would further justify a large military establishment.

Consequently, by stipulating the rising possibility of direct aggression against Russia, the new security concept repudiated the official prognosis of its 1997 predecessor: an optimistic, high-level, and supposedly scientifically substantiated forecast of no direct threat.³³ The security concept and draft doctrine invoke NATO and the United States as the authors of growing threats, define international affairs mainly in terms of the threat U.S. unipolarity poses to Russia's espousal of a multipolar world, expand the parameters for nuclear first-strikes, urge vastly increased defense spending, and furthermore calculate that spending on a Soviet basis, i.e., upon the military's proclaimed needs rather than Russia's actual capabilities.³⁴ Thus, these documents give a kind of official sanction to the view that increasingly saturates the Russian media concerning the American and Western-inspired threats to Russia's very existence.

Western alleged misdeeds include: attempting to force inappropriate reform medicine down Russia's throat while failing to give real help to the ailing

economy; stealing Russia's markets, including blocking the sale of arms and nuclear technology; endeavoring to turn Russia into an economic colony, a provider of cheap raw materials and a market for dumping; inciting Ukraine and other CIS states against Russia; trying to limit Russian influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia with a view to controlling energy sources and transit routes; encouraging Balts and others to repress Russian minorities; establishing military and political hegemony through the expansion of NATO and the crushing of such Russian friends as Iraq and Serbia; perhaps even encouraging the disintegration of the Russian state [and civilization — author] (hence the increasingly vociferous condemnation of anti-terrorist actions in Chechnya).³⁵

Signifying the greater militarization of assessments and of thinking about national security, the official security concept also replaces the word "defense" (*oborona* and its derivative adjectives) in the 1997 concept with the word "military" (*voennyi* and its derivations).³⁶ Thus, the new documents not only conflate political and military threats, strongly suggesting the need to respond to the former by military means; they also reflect an increased militarization of the "discursive practice" of thinking about Russian security.³⁷

This mode of thinking about military-political and specifically military threats appears prominently in these documents and in public statements by leading military and political spokesmen and analysts. Sergeev, Manilov, and the chief of staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, argue that until and unless NATO recants over Kosovo and gives Russia a veto over its operations, the threat of more Kosovo-like crises and operations will remain, freezing Europe (and Russia) in a permanent state of insecurity.³⁸ This essentially political threat will endure and govern defense policy.

Russian military leaders charge that NATO's campaign in Kosovo, as aggression against a sovereign Serbian state, breached the UN charter and bypassed the UN. NATO's claim to use force unilaterally could trigger an international and global catastrophe. NATO also overturned European politics and security by negating concepts of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. This allowed Washington to intervene

abroad under the pretext of human rights and place a “bomb” under the structures of world politics.³⁹ Kosovo also damaged nonproliferation efforts because it convinced other governments that they could deter Washington only by obtaining nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).⁴⁰

Kvashnin openly stated that any enlargement of NATO, including the one completed in 1999, is at Russia’s expense and that European security is a zero-sum game. Thus, “We will view NATO’s further practical actions for eastward enlargement and for annexing Central and East Europe as a challenge to national security.”⁴¹ Sergeev went even further, saying that

The approaching of NATO’s infrastructure to Russian borders is a direct increase of NATO’s combat possibilities, which is unfavorable for our country in a strategic sense. We will regard the approaching of NATO’s tactical aviation to Russian borders as an attempted nuclear threat.⁴²

Sergeev here reiterated and even expanded Yakovlev’s threat assessment. He also showed how far he would go to expand deterrence against NATO in discussing the parameters of what the armed forces now call expanded deterrence.⁴³

His remarks evoke expanded deterrence with a vengeance. But they are not far removed from Kvashnin’s harsh rhetoric, which reads like a late nineteenth century treatise on *Realpolitik* wherein alliances “annex” states. Like Manilov and Yeltsin, Kvashnin demands an all-European security system based only on the OSCE’s framework. That supposedly would assure Moscow of an exclusive zone of influence in the CIS and equal status with Washington and NATO.⁴⁴ Kvashnin’s justification is simple, NATO’s enlargement extended its zone of responsibility 650–750 km eastward, substantially reducing Russia’s warning time during an offensive. Russia’s nuclear weapons, not to mention its conventional ones, are therefore insufficient as a deterrent.⁴⁵

Despite this implicit belief in the inutility of Russia’s nuclear deterrent, Kvashnin also takes for granted the need to extend nuclear deterrence to unspecified allies. Of course, few states might want such an alliance since, on the basis of these documents and statements like Kvashnin’s, Moscow is apparently ready to risk nuclear war even in small contingencies on their behalf. Nor does anyone anywhere spell out the criteria

for becoming a Russian ally and enjoying this extended deterrence. That omission in itself is a sign of how dangerous and slipshod the new approach to security issues is. At the same time, the contradiction between simultaneously affirming the inutility and declaring the potency of Russia's nuclear systems apparently eluded Kvashnin and other elites as well. This ambivalence reflects key strategic dilemmas. Indeed, if any of Russia's neighbors or enemies went nuclear, that would intensify the burden on an already overstressed nuclear force and pose a threat to vital Russian interests.⁴⁶

In December 1999, Sergeev also called NATO enlargement, in and of itself, a threat to global and European collective security and world politics. He particularly stressed the deployment and use of NATO forces out of area without UN or OSCE sanction as a threat that devalues confidence-building measures, arms control treaties, and security (probably having in mind the CFE Treaty and the strategic weapons agreements).⁴⁷ Kosovo duly became a moment of truth for Russia, rendering efforts to work with NATO towards equal security "totally worthless". It also follows that the nightmare scenario of NATO supporting secessionist or anti-Russian movements in the CIS is now a staple of threat assessments, including the doctrine and security concept.⁴⁸ After all, such threats, manifested in NATO's support for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and supposedly backed up by NATO's tactical aviation, tactical, or operational-tactical missiles, could appear as attacks against either Russia's nuclear missiles or their command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I).

Consequently, military leaders express the fear that NATO's continued existence in its present form will intensify Europe's dependence upon Washington, precluding any hope of a solid European security system. Manilov, similarly as Kvashnin, insists that

There has to be a search for a "European identity", and the "European factor" should be strengthened in dealing with the USA. This means establishing a pan-European security system serving the interests not only of two, five, or seven states but of absolutely all European countries.⁴⁹

These remarks in favor of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) neatly illustrate this conflation of political and

military threats and the efforts of the armed forces to direct foreign policy on European security issues.

Sergeev's strictures against NATO also stress Kosovo's impact regarding IW and IO. These two phenomena carry a many-sided threat and are cited for doing so in the new security concept as well as in official briefings given to foreigners.⁵⁰ Implicit in these publications, briefings, and many Russian writings is the understanding of an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA), in which the nature of war has changed or is undergoing a revolutionary transformation. Contemporary war typically displays new components that must be taken into account in constructing the armed forces. And those components include all aspects of the art of war on display in Kosovo, prominently including IW and IO.

Threat assessments in the draft doctrine and the security concept

The draft doctrine, security concept, and associated military-political commentary paint a very alarming picture. Because military elites view Kosovo as a template of NATO's future operations, they charge that NATO's strategic concept challenges the strategic military situation and the entire structure upon which the defense of Russian interests and, supposedly, world peace rest.⁵¹ The draft doctrine, security concept, and the threat assessments of its authors also demonstrate the General Staff's determination to realize the countermeasures it and political leaders suggested to NATO enlargement.

This mélange of political and military threats, further mixed with policy recommendations, tells us that the draft defense doctrine is above all a blueprint for a total national security policy, and not just defense policy. As such, it represents the General Staff's effort to seize the rudder of the ship of state with regard to national security. The discernible similarity in both documents of perceived military-political threats illustrates the primacy of the General Staff's vision of the threat. The draft doctrine postulates the following external military-political threats: territorial claims upon Russia; intervention in its internal affairs; attempts to infringe upon or ignore Russian interests in resolving international security issues and oppose Russia's strengthening as a center of a multipolar world; armed conflicts, especially near the borders of Russia and/or its allies; the

creation and buildup of forces and troop groupings that disturb the balance of forces near the waters of Russia and/or its allies; the expansion of military blocs and alliances against the interest of Russia and/or the military security of its allies; the introduction of troops without UN Security Council sanction to states contiguous with and friendly to Russia; the creating, equipping, supporting, and training of armed groups abroad for re-deployment against Russia and/or its allies or against installations and structures on their respective borders; operations aiming to undermine global and regional security or stability, including hindering the operation of Russian state and military C2 systems, systems supporting the functioning and combat stability of nuclear forces and missile attack warning, ABM defense, and space surveillance systems; hindering the operation of nuclear munitions storage facilities, power plants, chemical installations, and other potentially dangerous installations; information operations of a technical, psychological, or other nature against Russia and/or its allies; discrimination against Russians abroad; and international terrorism.⁵²

This all-encompassing list of military and political threats portrays NATO, and not only in its enlarged form, as a threat in and of itself and shows tremendous concern for the use of IO and IW in all their guises against Russia. Russian views of IO and IW form a consensus that they can be used to unhinge the basis of military control over weapons, political control and governance over the state, and overall social stability.⁵³ Given the centrality of nuclear weapons to Russian strategy and policy and the criticality of proper C3I for their deployment and use, obviously any weapons that strike at that C3I network are seen in the worst possible light.

Hence, the threat assessments of the draft doctrine and the security concept in many ways evoke Soviet precedents. By publishing the draft doctrine before the security concept that it is supposed to concretize, the General Staff sought to preempt and dominate the debate on national security policy. No other approach to potential threat assessments and policy recommendations would command a public platform.⁵⁴ Second, for the first time, Russian doctrine articulates Soviet-like perceptions of growing Western threats. The causal links between the military's dominance of threat assessment, its recommendations for defense and foreign policy, and unilateral efforts to define the volume and direction of defense spending recall So-

viet practice. The concurrent military operations in Priština and Chechnya, as predicted above, further sharpen anti-Western animus of the doctrine and serve three related goals.

The first of these goals is to forestall NATO's further enlargement in scope or mission. Russia still rejects NATO enlargement on principle and regards further NATO expansion in territory or mission as intolerable. Priština and Grozny forcefully illustrate how Russia plans to resist either kind of enlargement, especially in the Caucasus.

Second, Priština, Grozny, and the new threat assessment forcefully and directly reply to U.S. policies in Kosovo, NATO's attempts to exclude Russia from the Balkans, and Kosovo's implications for future warfare. Moscow's premeditated war with Chechnya suppressed a secessionist republic that might otherwise have gained foreign and probably NATO support; as in Kosovo, this would thereby deter NATO participation in those wars, particularly in the Caucasus. High-ranking military commentary explicitly yokes together internal secessionist threats with that of U.S. and/or NATO enlargement and implies that they are already joined together as a single composite threat. Therefore, the strongest possible military action is urged to resist those converging threats.

Finally, the doctrine also aims to reorient the domestic and defense agenda. In particular, it was designed to preserve Yeltsin — and now his successor, Vladimir Putin — in power.

Accordingly Manilov charged that

Actually, today the internal threat, that is associated with terrorism that is covered by Islamic phraseology, has become extremely exacerbated. That threat does not have anything in common either with Islam or with national-ethnic problems. Its roots and primary sources are outside Russia.... The pragmatic conclusion is as follows: we cannot weaken external security, while placing the emphasis on internal security. Or vice versa.⁵⁵

Manilov also listed new threats present in the new documents that are not listed in the 1993 doctrine:

attempts to ignore and all the more so infringe upon Russia's interests in the resolution of international Security problems and to oppose its consolidation

as one of the influential centers of the modern world. As you know, that's what happened when the United States and NATO made the decision to bomb the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Or [another threat is] the creation, equipping, support, and training of formations and groups on the territory of other states with the goal of their transfer for operations on the territory of Russia and its allies. Specifically, that is what happened with the manning, equipping, training, and financing of the Chechen terrorist formations that committed aggression against Russia in the North Caucasus.⁵⁶

Kvashnin also listed these items as threats as they are contained in the draft defense doctrine.⁵⁷ These primarily political and psychological threats now justify the *military* response of a major buildup of conventional weapons. Putin also linked foreign and domestic threats, even invoking the domino theory, and charging that the Chechen threat was part of an overall attempt to detach entire territories from Russia and CIS governments on behalf of an international Islamic project. He stated that

What happened this summer in Dagestan should not be seen as some particular, local occurrence. Combine in a single whole Dagestan, the incursions of the gang elements from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and the events in Kyrgyzstan. What was happening — we will call a spade a spade — was an attempt at the military and political assimilation of part of the territory of the former Soviet Union.... A rebellious self-proclaimed state supported by extremist circles of a number of Islamic countries had in these four years [since the Khasvayurt agreement of 1996 ending the first war with Chechnya — author] fortified its position on the territory of Russia. A self-proclaimed state which, in the intentions of these extremist circles, was to have become Greater Ichkeria from the Caspian to the Black Sea, that is to have seized all of the Caucasus, cut Russia off from the Transcaucasus, and closed the route into Central Asia. Dagestan was, after all, to have been merely the first step ... [s]o the danger

for our country was extremely high. We really could have lost Dagestan and quit the Caucasus. And subsequently in the very near future, we would have had, in accordance with the domino principle, attempts by the international terrorists to detonate the situation in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the Volga region. We must not close our eyes, these attempts could well have been successful. Centrifugal trends in the relations of the federal authorities and particular regions of the country are still strong on the territory of Russia. And it would not then be a question of today's anti-terrorist operation, which some overseas and Russian politicians consider incommensurate. It would be a question of truly broad-based combat operations, a call-up of reservists, and the transfer of the entire country absolutely to a war footing.⁵⁸

Kvashnin also echoed the draft doctrine and 1997 security concept that direct military aggression is at present unlikely. However, potential external and internal threats have been preserved "and in a number of regions are intensifying."⁵⁹ This parallels the revised and now official security concept's line that "the level and scope of the military threat are growing" — an unprecedented statement in Russian Federation official documents.⁶⁰ Kvashnin also took a strong line vis-à-vis these perceived threats. The principal threats facing Russia are for him:

- territorial problems connected to the absence of precise juridical borders
- intervention in Russian Federation affairs, including encroachment on state unity and territorial integrity
- attempts to ignore or infringe upon Russian Federation interests in resolving international security problems
- the appearance and escalation of armed conflicts, particularly near the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies

- the creation and buildup of troop groupings that disturb the balance of forces near those same borders
- the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of Russian security
- actions aimed at undermining global regional security, etc.⁶¹

While this list parallels the assessments of Manilov, the draft doctrine, and the security concept, Kvashnin, as stated above, also assessed any enlargement of NATO as being at Russia's expense and viewed European security as a zero-sum game.⁶² Kvashnin's response to the enlargement threat, extended deterrence to the CIS, is also not a new departure. Instead, it reflects a continuing policy trend. Preliminary discussions on doctrine in 1997 took extended deterrence in the CIS for granted. Secretary of the Security Council Yury Baturin's January 1997 reform plan stated that Russia, when confronting local wars that expand — due to outside assistance — into large-scale conventional wars, reserves the right to use nuclear weapons as first strike and preemptive weapons. This allegedly limited first strike will equally allegedly regain escalation dominance and force a return to the *status quo ante*.⁶³ Obviously this formulation closely anticipated the language of the security concept and its optimistic belief that Moscow could launch and control a supposedly limited nuclear war.

Kvashnin also strongly argued that Russia's exclusion from NATO means that NATO ignores Russian security interests. NATO's benevolent intentions are irrelevant because its capabilities are what matters, and they are awesome and growing. Kvashnin similarly invokes NATO's defiance of the OSCE and UN in Kosovo as an example of the growing trend to use force unilaterally out of area and of NATO's attempt to dictate European security by force. Hence, he too saw Kosovo as a moment of truth for Russia. He also invoked the threat of proliferation in the Middle East, blaming Israel, not Iran or Iraq, for it. Yet his answer to this problem is just dialogue with potential sources of proliferation, this being the official Russian position.⁶⁴ Though Russia shares Washington's unease about proliferation, he dismisses the likelihood of Third World states having the requisite technology to constitute a threat in the near

future and rejects ballistic missile defense (BMD) because that will undermine arms control and the reduction of strategic weapons.⁶⁵ This statement follows the official line in regard to BMD. But it also suggests indecision either concerning the desirability of fighting proliferation or about the best method of doing so.⁶⁶

Kvashnin's reasoning also suggests that Russia refuses to believe in the reality of the new proliferation threats even though the U.S. Rumsfeld Commission's findings in 1998 demonstrated that new proliferation threats are already a fact of life and multiplying in ways previously unforeseen and undetected either by Moscow or by Washington.⁶⁷ Or his argument may be an attempt to conceal the fact that Russia is assiduously exporting dual-use technologies and systems to China, Iran, India, and perhaps other states as well.⁶⁸ Given Russia's past record as a source of nuclear proliferation, one might be pardoned for suspecting that Russia, like China, is not totally unhappy to see at least certain states gain nuclear weapons and reduce the reach of U.S. military power.⁶⁹

Statements by Sergeev and the minister of foreign affairs, Igor Ivanov, now follow the same line as Kvashnin, Manilov, the security concept, and the draft doctrine concerning the linked foreign and internal threats sponsored by or emanating from the United States. On 12 November 1999, Sergeev, for the first time, linked internal and external threats, claiming that U.S. interests are best served by a continuing smoldering war in the North Caucasus. Allegedly, that would force Russia into major exertions to localize the conflict, thereby weakening her.⁷⁰ Furthermore, Kosovo allegedly showed that NATO's new strategy relies on the use of force. That strategy "is an attempt to defy Russia's positions, to oust it from the Caspian region, the Transcaucasian area, and Central Asia."⁷¹ Four days later, Ivanov wrote that

The question often raised in Moscow is whether Kosovo and Chechnya are links in a chain of steps toward the creation of a one-dimensional, NATO-centered world. Is Chechnya being used as a smokescreen for preparing NATO to assume the role of a world policeman, for undermining the fundamental components of strategic stability and reversing the disarmament processes? Has the anti-Russian campaign over Chechnya been launched to force

Russia out of the Caucasus, and then out of Central Asia? And these are by no means the only concerns that have arisen in Russian public opinion with respect to the action — or sometimes, the lack of actions — of our Western partners.⁷²

Accordingly, the draft defense doctrine and the security concept emit a sense of pervasive and linked internal and external threats. Sergeev's article on the foundations of Russia's military-technical policy in December 1999 reinforced that outlook. Here he listed as internal threats not just Russia's horrible socio-economic crisis and the constraints that this crisis put upon the modernizing and restructuring of the armed forces, but also the "aggravation of international relations, regional separatism and regional extremism which create favorable conditions for the outbreak of internal armed conflicts."⁷³ Consequently, the main foreign threats to Russia that derive from its weak global military position and that represent a threat to its sovereignty and integrity include:

- negatively developing trends in the entire system of international relations expressed in the United States and NATO's striving for military resolution of political problems and bypassing of the UN and the OSCE
- the strengthening of unfriendly military-political blocs and unions (i.e. the U.S. alliance system) *"and the broadening of their sphere of influence and 'zones of responsibility' with the simultaneous intensification of centrifugal forces within the CIS"*
- the outbreak and escalation of armed conflicts in proximity to the borders of Russia and the CIS
- "[t]he sharp escalation of the scale of international terrorism against Russia and its allies, to include the possible use of OMP (weapons of mass destruction)"⁷⁴
- the increasing gap between those leading military powers that are breaking away from other states and the growth of their capabilities for creating a new gen-

eration of military and military-technical weapons (This trend triggers a qualitatively new phase in the arms race and significantly changes the character, forms, and composition of military operations.)

• territorial claims on Russia from neighboring states (This is most powerfully expressed in NATO's "expansion to the East and its aggression against Yugoslavia, as well as the events in the Northern Caucasus."⁷⁵ Here Sergeev, too, linked domestic and foreign threats, recklessly conflating them to formulate his assessment and justify his political-military agenda.)

The draft doctrine and security concept echo this inflated threat perception. They both begin by polarizing two opposed tendencies, U.S.-led unipolarity and Russian-led multipolarity, as determining "the status and prospects for development of the present day military-political situation."⁷⁶ Accordingly, while there is a diminished threat of world war, including nuclear war, and the development of mechanisms for safeguarding international peace regionally and globally, doctrine writers nevertheless discern the formation and strengthening of regional power centers, national-ethnic and religious extremism, and separatist tendencies associated with those phenomena.

Although there are economic, political, technological, ecological, and informational trends favoring a multipolar world and Russia's equal position in it, the policies of the United States, of its allies, and of other countries associated with proliferation are working to circumvent international law and threaten Russia. Hence, military force and the resort to violence remain substantial aspects of international relations — a favorite justification of the military for their policy aims.⁷⁷

According to the draft doctrine, those negative trends fostered the escalation of local wars and armed conflicts, strengthened regional arms races, proliferation of WMD and delivery systems, and aggravated information conflict (*protivoborstvo*) and expanding transnational threats: crime, drug running, terrorism, and the illegal arms trade.⁷⁸ These actual and potential threats, in turn, *create the basic destabilizing factors* of the military-political situation, namely: support for extremist nationalist, ethnic, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements and organizations (Chechens or the KLA in Kosovo);

the use of informational and other non-traditional means and technologies to attain destructive military-political goals; diminished effectiveness of international security organizations, particularly the UN and the OSCE; operations involving military force in circumvention of “generally recognized principles and rules of international law [and] without UN Security Council sanction”; and the violation of international arms control treaties [and] the U.S. intention to amend or withdraw from the ABM treaty.⁷⁹

Russia’s active foreign policy and the maintenance of a sufficient military potential, including nuclear deterrence, presently avert direct and traditional forms of aggression against Russia and its allies. Nonetheless, “a number of potential (including large-scale) *external and internal* threats to Russia and its allies’ military security *remain and are strengthening in a number of directions*.”⁸⁰ The original draft security concept went further, reflecting the General Staff’s preeminence, charging that the combination or sum total of specific internal and external threats that encompass all the threats arising out of Russia’s socio-economic catastrophe “can present a threat to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including the possibility of direct military aggression against Russia.”⁸¹ Likewise, “the spectrum of threats connected with international terrorism, including the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, is widening.”⁸² Much of this language obviously paralleled Kvashnin’s and Sergeev’s views.⁸³ Although the final version of internal and external threats listed in the official security concept is broader and more specific in detail, interestingly, this language was left out except to cite the growing level and scope of the military threat.⁸⁴ In this context, the armed forces’ nightmare scenario of NATO support for an ethno-secessionist (and in Russian eyes necessarily terrorist) anti-Russian movement is not surprising.⁸⁵

Fusing internal and external threats

Not only must we pay attention to the scope of the *internal military threats* that these documents outline, but we must also pay attention to the manner of their presentation, for the latter permits the fusion of the internal and external threats described by Sergeev, Manilov, Kvashnin, Putin, *et al.* As the other military forces have proven unable to cope with these threats in

Chechnya, the draft doctrine and security concept now also strongly imply the use of the regular armed forces for those other forces' domestic mission.⁸⁶ This new set of missions is an extremely dangerous risk for the army and government because of the incompatibility of police functions and missions with those of the regular army. But in so stressed a country as Russia — where both the MVD and the armed forces are already thoroughly criminalized — placing the army in the domestic line of fire is apparently the only alternative. Here Russia is flirting with the risk of state failure.⁸⁷ The progression from linking internal and external threats to fusing foreign and domestic missions in a single organization automatically entails many great risks and was probably taken without sufficient forethought. Although it makes a nice logical progression, such policy decisions in practice are a confession of failure or of despair over the absence of usable effective police or military power inside Russia, a point all too tragically visible in Chechnya in 1994–96 and again today. We should also note that this fusion of internal and external threats also continues previous Leninist and more recent military-political arguments, invoking IW to link together external and internal threats of aggression and subversion from within.⁸⁸

The draft doctrine's internal threats comprise:

- attempts at a violent overthrow of the constitution
- separatist ethno-national, terrorist movements seeking to disrupt state unity and Russia's integrity or to destabilize the internal situation there
- planning, preparation, and accomplishment of actions to disrupt and disorganize the activity of state governmental organization
- attacks on governmental, military, economic, and information infrastructures
- the establishment, equipping, training, and functioning of illegal armed units
- the unlawful proliferation of weapons usable for terrorist or criminal actions

- organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, and other unlawful acts on a scale threatening Russian military security⁸⁹

While Putin altered the draft of the security concept to put more emphasis on internal threats and crime, the document as a whole exudes the Soviet sense of pervasive and all-encompassing threats.⁹⁰

After laying out a comprehensive description of those internal threats, the revised security concept then addresses the foreign threats. It is noteworthy that their order of presentation represents a full-blown attack on the United States. These threats are:

- the desire of states to bypass organizations of security such as the UN and the OSCE
- weakening Russian influence in the world
- the strengthening of military blocs and alliances, particularly, NATO's eastward expansion
- the possible emergence of military bases and presences "in the immediate proximity of Russia's borders," (not specifically in neighboring states, one should note — probably to include the Balkans)
- the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles
- weakening of integrative processes within the CIS
- the outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the borders of Russia and/or the CIS states
- territorial claims on Russia⁹¹

The revised concept also lists as threats attempts by other states to prevent a strengthening of Russian positions in world affairs and to hinder Russia's exercise of its national interests in Europe, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. The latter region was added due to Putin's intervention and to

signify renewed Russian interest in playing a key role there.⁹² A new note crept into this document because, in the wake of Kosovo and perhaps belatedly as a result of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, Moscow seems to show more concern, if not fear, of nuclear proliferation. Perhaps Pakistan's nuclear status and its supposed support for the Chechens and Taliban forces now give Moscow pause. Thus, the new security concept expressly warns against the aspiration of a number of states to strengthen their influence in world politics, including through proliferation.⁹³

Not surprisingly, then, the security concept cites terrorism as a serious threat. Information threats are also rising. They grow out of the desire of states (i.e. the United States) to monopolize the global information space "and expel Russia from the external and internal information market." The development of concepts of information warfare fit in here as well.⁹⁴ Finally, the rising military threats are attributable, as in the draft defense doctrine, to NATO's highhanded unilateralism in expanding its scope and missions in Kosovo without the sanction of international agencies.⁹⁵

All these threats, including an upgraded intelligence subversion of Russia, are growing as the Russian military remains at a "critically low level" of training and are facing the block obsolescence of its technical base. In addition, Moscow even sees cultural threats from abroad, not to mention the standard litany of transnational threats, narcotics, crime, etc.⁹⁶ These precepts, in turn, are shared by the military and were concretized in the official doctrine that was published in April 2000, which represents a revised version of the draft doctrine we have discussed here.⁹⁷

Signs of continuing debate

Because they are supposed to be authoritative documents, both the draft defense doctrine and the national security concept are obviously the subjects of enormous political maneuvering, much of it hidden from view. However, the struggles leading up to the publication of both these documents evidently continue. For the first time, the navy has been allowed to publish its draft of a naval strategy, and Putin went out of his way to focus on critical challenges confronting this service.⁹⁸ Evidently, the navy has won its constantly reiterated point that there is such a thing

as a separate naval strategy (if not doctrine), thereby upgrading to some degree its status in Russian military policy.⁹⁹ Clearly, there was a struggle over these issues. In October 1999, Eduard Shevelev, a leading naval theorist and vice-president of the Academy of Military Sciences, wrote to the Ministry of Defense, fearing that the navy was being ignored in the new doctrine.¹⁰⁰ This upgrading evidently occurred to some degree at the expense of the army, i.e., ground forces who have yet to reclaim their special status in the ministry that Sergeev and Yeltsin abolished in 1997–98. As a result of this struggle, Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, head of the navy's main headquarters, announced plans to create a Russian naval presence in all the world's major waterways, including the Mediterranean Sea. Heavy cruisers will regularly be posted there. The design and construction process of fifth generation ships is underway, and work on the naval strategic nuclear forces is "being conducted as a priority."¹⁰¹ This means that by 2005, the Russian navy will carry 55 per cent of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, the present tests of SLBM's RSM-50 are intended as possible responses to the expected withdrawal of the United States from the 1972 ABM Treaty and to the subsequent construction of an American national missile defense system.¹⁰²

Kravchenko's observations correspond to the revised program or budget for military spending in the year 2000. According to that program, there will be a 50 per cent increase in defense spending, an 80 per cent rise in spending on R&D, and a 70 per cent increase in state orders. Included in this plan are major increases in aerospace systems, microelectronics, and electro-optical systems; in new strategic, tactical, and miniature nuclear weapons; in the navy, including the first Borey class nuclear submarines armed with the new SS-NX-28 SLBM; and in C3I technologies for IW and nuclear weapons. Spending on naval force development will double to bring new ships on stream by 2008. Current plans also include increasing strategic naval forces to 55 per cent of the total by 2005.¹⁰³ In addition, other large-scale programs are also being announced.¹⁰⁴

Putin apparently contributed to this struggle by decreeing changes in the draft security concept and publishing them in the revised version in January 2000. These changes were designed to put an even stronger emphasis on fighting terrorism and crime, provisions that, if taken to their logical conclusion, would mean following Yeltsin's line of strengthening the Ministry of Interior troops (VVMVD) and FSB at the expense of the army,

or, alternatively, engaging the army even more in domestic “counterinsurgency” operations — which it has never liked.¹⁰⁵ Yet, as suggested above, there is no alternative. The replacement of the MVD CINC, General Vladimir Ovchinnikov, with an army general, Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, suggests an attempt once again to bring the MVD’s army up to snuff; but it is an attempt that will probably fail for all the usual reasons, i.e., lack of funding, corruption, inter-service rivalry, etc.

Analyzing the threats

These threat assessments are notable for their pessimism, pervasiveness, and expanded scope. They are also significant weapons in the internal political struggle to direct military reform and appropriations. Yet, at bottom, many of them are essentially psychological projections of threats to Russia’s vision of itself and/or political and diplomatic threats that are more normally the province of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These threat assessments expose the exaggerated but prevalent ideas in many quarters concerning Russia’s place and prospects in world affairs. While, as Wallander has noted, they are clearly derived from a sense of outrage over being disregarded during the Kosovo crisis, they also reflect an inability to come to terms with Russia’s real capacity to contribute now and for the foreseeable future to international and European security. They furthermore are a convenient refuge from the reality that Russian policy did nothing to contribute to a peaceful outcome in Kosovo before March 1999 and was notably obstructive of Western efforts to do so. While the United States and its allies contributed their own share of follies and misdeeds throughout this crisis, it is Moscow, not Washington, which has attempted to have one standard for Europe and another for its projected exclusive zone of influence in the CIS — an outcome that is clearly unacceptable to those states and Europe, not to mention Washington. Thus, many of the fears and threats that Moscow projects as due to Kosovo owe at least as much if not more to Russian policies and policy failures as they do to so-called Western “aggression”.

For example, another widely feared threat is that NATO’s enlargement will isolate and marginalize Russia as a serious player — let alone as a great power — in areas of historic influence and dominance. The idea that Russia will cease to be accounted a great European and global player on a par with

Washington terrifies many elites, even if the younger generation is allegedly more reconciled to contemporary reality. The determination to play a global role on a par with the United States or the belief that Russia “is entitled” to such a seat at the “presidium table” of world affairs dies very hard — indeed, too hard.¹⁰⁶

This great power mystique of *Derzhavnost'* — a kind of objectively fated quality that Russia must be a great power and seen as such by all, otherwise it will fall apart — pervades even the most routine diplomatic and political statements.¹⁰⁷ It has also been the most consistent justification behind anti-reform groups ever since the Decembrist Movement of 1825. This mystique is empowered by the profound conviction, going back to the Tsars, that in a multi-national empire and state like Russia, any reform could put the whole system and state at risk. Functionally speaking, *Derzhavnost'* is essentially the most recent contemporary manifestation of the deeply rooted Tsarist idea that the state and the empire are identical and inextricable concepts.¹⁰⁸

For instance, at a recent meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences (AVN) — at which future war was discussed, with Sergeev in attendance — its director, Retired General Makhmut A. Gareev, one of Russia's leading thinkers and a former deputy chief of staff, stated openly that

One of these unifying factors is the idea of Russia's rebirth as a great power, not a regional power (it is situated in several large regions of Eurasia), but a truly great power on a global scale. This is determined not by someone's desire, not just by possession of nuclear weapons or by size of territory, but by the historical traditions and objective needs in the development of the Russian society and state. Either Russia will be a strong, independent, and unified power, uniting all peoples, republics, krajs, and oblasts in the Eurasian territory — which is in the interests of all humanity — or it will fall apart, generating numerous conflicts, and then the entire international community will be unable to manage the situation on a continent with such an abundance of weapons of mass destruction. In the opinion of the president of the AVN [i.e., Gareev himself], there is no other alternative.¹⁰⁹

Gareev's perspective, widely shared across the entire Russian military-political elite, also logically entails the precept, enshrined in official policy documents, that Russia must expand territorially and politically as a central pole of the multipolar world if it is to survive at home.¹¹⁰ Putin has embraced this notion, not just by stressing integration with the CIS as a priority, but by his observations that if Russia were to grow stronger, those states would naturally gravitate to it because they are Russia's natural allies.¹¹¹ Prominent statesmen such as Yevgeny Primakov and Andrei Kokoshin also share a revisionist agenda concerning the territorial settlement of 1989-91. Furthermore, they are hardly alone in their thinking.¹¹² The distinguished Finnish diplomat and historian, Max Jakobson, observes that virtually everyone he meets in Russia expects the reintegration of the CIS into Russia.

The public flaunting of such delusions, revisionism, and anger at the post-1989 European status quo has long saturated the Russian media. But it only intensifies Russia's inability to devise realistic national security policies or threat assessments, while in neighboring states it fuels a constant fear and negative perceptions of Russia. The prevalence of *Derzhavnost'* also reflects the failure to consummate democratic reforms. It profoundly distorts the perceptual lenses through which Russian elites see themselves and other states, as well as broader trends in world politics, creating a self-centeredness on the part of policy-making elites who refuse to understand why their blighted state and economy do not count as much as those of the United States.

Nevertheless, it is clear that adherents of these views remain blind to the way in which provocative Russian actions have brought about Russia's worst nightmares. Russia wants status, not responsibility; indeed, it cannot comprehend its own substantial responsibility for its currently unfavorable international situation.¹¹³ Naturally, so archaic an outlook will cause an over-ambitious policy and expansive threat assessment.

For example, even though economic conditions rule out the need for power projection forces, the new security concept openly states that

The interests of ensuring Russia's national security predetermine the need, under appropriate circumstances, for Russia to have a military presence in certain strategically important regions of the world.

The stationing of limited military contingents [the same term used to describe forces in Afghanistan — author] (military bases, naval units) there on a treaty basis must ensure Russia's readiness to fulfill its obligations and to assist in forming a stable military-strategic balance of forces in regions, and must enable the Russian Federation to react to a crisis situation in its initial stage and achieve its foreign policy goals.¹¹⁴

This is an open call for stationing forces in CIS countries for Russia's benefit and thereby restoring the former military unity of the Soviet Union. Such stationing would resemble a permanent military occupation, albeit under an organizational scheme often described as being a reincarnation of the Warsaw Pact, not a coalition of equal allies. Apart from all the other unanswered questions in that paragraph, the fact that Moscow could assume the need to publicly state its necessity for a higher degree of security than its supposed allies enjoy epitomizes the strategic insensitivity that still characterizes too much of Russian policy.

Thus, NATO's enlargement in both scope and mission threatens some of Russia's most basic foundational myths. It undercuts both the reformers of 1991 and their acolytes' cherished belief that it was the Russian people and Yeltsin — and not NATO's steadfast resistance to Soviet power — that destroyed the Soviet Union (the reactionaries, in turn, ascribe this collapse to Mikhail Gorbachev). Second, enlargement equates the Soviet system with Russian imperialism and strikes at the very tenacious Russian myth that Russians suffered as much or more than any other peoples during the Soviet system. This contemporary version of Dostoyevsky's "egotism of suffering", or what Freud called the "narcissism of small differences", is deeply ingrained among many members of the elite, along with the older notion of state and empire being equivalent concepts. Thus, an enormous propaganda campaign to portray Russia as the victim of the Chechen campaign is now underway. Competitive victimization, almost by definition, cannot serve as a realistic basis for assessing either threats or opportunities in the international arena. By conflating Soviet power with Russian imperialism, NATO and partisans of enlargement also reveal their skepticism as to the extent of democratic rule in Russia.

NATO enlargement, seen from Moscow, is hostile even to what Russians believe are voluntary, foreordained integrationist tendencies in the CIS that would preserve what Russians perceive as the positive ties of the old empires. It allegedly denigrates the extent to which Russia has refrained from inciting its co-nationals in the CIS and Baltic states and from following Serbia's example under Slobodan Milošević.¹¹⁵ Russian thinkers continue to be oblivious of how their own state's actions are unacceptable to other European states, in particular: her flouting of basic democratic agreements with Europe on the use of the military at home and on the civilian democratic control of these forces; her attempting to restrict the OSCE from the CIS at every opportunity; her waging of "economic wars"; and her making of other threats to her neighbors. In addition, neither can Russian thinkers accept that Russia cannot play a role equal to that of the United States. As the Finnish Institute of International Affairs' Russia 2010 report recently stated,

In the realm of foreign and security policy, Russia is not committed to the principles of democratic peace and common values. Its chosen line of multipolarity implies that Russia is entitled to its own sphere of influence and the unilateral use of military force within it. Russia refuses to countenance any unipolar hegemonic aspirations; in particular it will not accept security arrangements in which the United States seems to have a leading role. As a solution, Russia proposes a Europe without dividing boundaries which will, however, require a buffer zone of militarily non-aligned countries between Russia and NATO. Russia's idea of Europe's new security architecture is therefore based on an equal partnership of great powers and supportive geopolitical solutions — not on common values accepted by all, nor on the right of every small state to define their own security policy. *The above summary of recent Russian developments is, in every aspect, practically in opposition to Finland's and the EU's fairly optimistic goals.*¹¹⁶

Conclusions

The strategy of limited nuclear war and the first-strike use of nuclear weapons, as a backup to a deterrence policy, alongside the singling out of the United States and NATO, are the most prominently reported negative aspects of these documents. But the deeper trends that undergird those strategies and policies are equally, if not more, disturbing. The draft doctrine, security concept, and Russian military policy, as shown in Priština and Grozny, highlight forces and factors that are much more troubling and structurally threatening than the temporary absence of usable conventional forces.

First of all, these documents and policies reinforce the bitter truth that there has been no military reform and little or no democratization of defense policy-making, nor of the intellectual foundations of a viable national security strategy. The Russian government has started three internal wars in six years — in the most recent case, mainly to win elections — and has also given its general staff a larger share of control over defense policy; as such, it is a permanent threat to its own people, even more so than to its neighbors and interlocutors.¹¹⁷ These documents conflate political and internal threats with military ones; support the use of the army for domestic repression; indefinitely postpone true military reform and professionalization; maintain, if not increase, the already high economic burden of militarization; continue to conceal the dimensions of that burden from the society's elected officials; and insist that the army must be ready for deterrence and defense on all azimuths and against all-encompassing threats across the spectrum of conflict.¹¹⁸

These documents also demonstrate the ascendancy of the trend that sees threats everywhere and postulates military control and military-like thinking over all aspects of national security policy as well as military answers to political challenges. Furthermore, these documents illustrate the existence of a military-political elite that cannot come to terms with the status quo — particularly the realities of Russia's shrunken estate — and who therefore are constantly acting in ways that, to put it mildly, unsettle their neighbors and interlocutors. The self-centered mystique of *Derzhavnost'* and the deeply entrenched Leninist axiom that international security is a question of who does what to whom (*kto-kogo*), rather than a mutual opportunity for all players to gain, remain among the greatest impedi-

ments to Russia's internal and external security and to its ultimate democratization and prosperity.

The greater danger here is not necessarily that a nuclear provocation will occur; it is rather that the military institutions and government have yet to devise a strategy and policy based on reality. Instead, they continue to chase after fantasies of recovering a lost status and of being a military-political global superpower. The deeply embedded notions of international security as a zero-sum game, of the militarization of politics, and the pervasiveness of threats from all sides, are axioms that are deployed first of all for domestic advantage and to obstruct reform. When juxtaposed with the absence of coherent controls and institutions to formulate and direct defense policy, these axioms are an invitation to disaster.

These documents and the security consensus that lies behind them represent only the latest manifestation of Russia's continuing failure to become a true democracy at peace with itself and the world. As long as this lack of realism and a pre-modern structure of politics govern the discourse and practice of Russian security policy, continuous internal unrest is the best scenario we can predict for Russia. Experience shows, however, that such unrest does not remain bottled up in Russia. The war in Chechnya is now accompanied by threats against Tbilisi and Baku as well as attempts at a military-political union in the CIS.

Thus, Russia's refusal or inability to adapt to reality presages a continuing struggle in the CIS and other unsettled areas like the Balkans. Every previous time when state power in Russia fragmented, the whole region within which it acted was engulfed in instability — if not conflict — and foreign armies were either tempted to invade or dragged into the quagmire. Thus, these documents are ultimately a confession of bankruptcy and of despair. If Russia perceives everything around it as a threat whose origins lie outside Russia, then the temptation to avert domestic reform will continue to strengthen and breed still more internal unrest and instability. Nor will any outside attempts to help be appreciated or accepted. In the absence of a reliable defense policy or defense forces and following an elite that seems hell-bent on rushing to the brink of a precipice, Russia's elites remain fixated on military threats that for the most part do not exist. Thus, they show themselves utterly unable to come to grips with the new but real threats to the security and stability of the state and the society.¹¹⁹ If this

situation continues, then the Russian people — if not their neighbors and partners — will evidently be dragged over the edge with Russia, as she falls into an economic, ecological, demographic, and possibly even nuclear abyss.

Notes

¹ *Krasnaia Zvezda* (Moscow), 9 October 1999, p. 3.

² Celeste A. Wallander, "Russian Views on Kosovo: Synopsis of May 6 Panel Discussion," *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Davis Center for Russian Studies, April 1999); *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* (Moscow), 19–25 November 1999, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 6 December 1999; Oksanna Antonenko, "Russia, NATO, and European Security After Kosovo," in *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Winter 1999–2000), pp. 124–144; Roland Dannreuther, "Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations," in *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Winter 1999–2000), pp. 145–164; Viktor Gobarev, "Russia-NATO Relations After the Kosovo Crisis: Strategic Implications," in *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1999), pp. 1–17; Colonel A. B. Krasnov (Ret.) "Aviatsiya v Iugoslavskom Konflikte," *Voennaya Mysl* (Moscow) No. 5 (September–October), 1999, pp. 71–74; and as told to the author in conversations with Russian officers and analysts in Helsinki and Moscow, June 1999 (henceforth Conversations).

³ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, October 8, 1999, p. 1; *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 29 October 1999, pp. 1, 4, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 6 December 1999.

⁴ Wallander, "Russian Views on Kosovo," pp. 3–4.

⁵ Charles J. Dick, *Russia's 1999 Draft Military Doctrine*, Occasional Brief, No. 72 (Camberley, U.K., and Surrey, U.K.: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 1999), p. 4.

⁶ Conversations.

⁷ Dick, *Russia's 1999 Draft Military Doctrine*, pp. 4–5.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ "Interview with Colonel General Yury Nikolaevich Baluevsky," trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 9 November 1998.

- ¹⁰ *Rossiiskaia Gazeta* (Moscow), 26 December 1997, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 30 December 1997.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² Deborah Yarsike Ball, "Spurred by Kosovo, the Russian Military is Down but Not Out," in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 1999, p. 17.
- ¹³ FBIS, 30 December 1997.
- ¹⁴ FBIS, 30 December 1997; Christopher Bellamy, *Spiral Through Time: Beyond 'Conflict Intensity'*, Occasional Papers, No. 35 (Camberley, U.K., and Surrey, U.K.: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1998), pp. 14–15.
- ¹⁵ *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 6–12 November 1998, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 9 November 1998.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.* (emphasis added).
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.* (emphasis added).
- ¹⁹ *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 14 January 2000, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 14 January 2000.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
- ²² *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* (Moscow), 12 October 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 12 October 1999.
- ²³ FBIS, 12 October 1999; FBIS, 14 January 2000.
- ²⁴ Conversations.
- ²⁵ Martin Nesirsky, "Russia Says Threshold Lower for Nuclear Weapons," Reuters, 17 December 1999.

- ²⁶ Martin Nesirsky, "Russia Says Threshold Lower for Nuclear Weapons;" FBIS, 12 October 1999; FBIS, 14 January 2000.
- ²⁷ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 19 November 1993, pp. 3–8.
- ²⁸ Nesirsky, "Russia Says Threshold Lower for Nuclear Weapons"; see also Interfax (Moscow) , 26 November 1999, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 26 November 1999.
- ²⁹ *Iadernyi Kontrol* (Moscow), November–December 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 24 December 1999.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ³¹ "Russia Rejects Changes in ABM Treaty," Reuters, 4 March 2000.
- ³² Stephen Blank, "Russia Rises to Perceived Threats," in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 2000, pp. 24–27; RIA (Moscow), 4 February 2000, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 4 February 2000.
- ³³ FBIS, 14 January 2000.
- ³⁴ FBIS, 14 January 2000; *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 9 October 1999, pp. 3–4.
- ³⁵ Dick, *Russia's 1999 Draft Military Doctrine*, p. 5.
- ³⁶ FBIS, 14 January 2000; FBIS, 30 December 1997.
- ³⁷ This term is taken from the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1927–84) and denotes the manner in which discussions about concepts are structured by the initial definition of those concepts. Thus, e.g., the word "security" is always defined in narrow military terms and in terms of military threats.
- ³⁸ *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 19–25 November 1999; trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 19 November 1999; *Politika* (Belgrade), 23 December 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 24 December 1999; ITAR-TASS

(Moscow), 18 October 1999; trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 18 October 1999.

³⁹ Conversations.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ FBIS, 19 November 1999.

⁴² *Politika*, 23 December 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 24 December 1999.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ FBIS, 18 October 1999; FBIS, 19 November 1999.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Stephen Blank, "Proliferation and Counterproliferation in Russian Strategy," and "Remarks on Russia," in *Proceedings from the Conference on Countering the Missile Threat: International Military Strategies* (Washington, D.C.: The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1999), pp. 127–149 and 41–45, respectively.

⁴⁷ *Politika*, 23 December 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 24 December 1999.

⁴⁸ Conversations; "Kontseptsiiia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii," in *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* (Internet Version), 26 November 1999, (henceforth cited as Kontseptsiiia); Nesirsky, "Russia Says Threshold Lower for Nuclear Weapons." Yakovlev's warnings about nuclear use also pertain to exactly this kind of scenario.

⁴⁹ FBIS, 18 October 1999.

⁵⁰ Conversations; FBIS, 14 January 2000.

⁵¹ Conversations.

⁵² *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 9 October 1999, pp. 3–4.

⁵³ Timothy L. Thomas, "Information Technology: US/Russian Perspectives and Potential for Military-Political Cooperation" (1999), Foreign Military Studies Office (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.), at <http://call.army.mil/fmsso/fmsopubs/issues/infotech.htm>, accessed 29 March 2001.

⁵⁴ Conversations; *Krasnaia Zvezda*, October 8, 1999, p. 1; *Vek* (Moscow) (electronic version), 26 November 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 29 November 1999.

⁵⁵ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 8 October 1999, p. 1.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ FBIS, 19 November 1999.

⁵⁸ *Vek*, 26 November 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 29 November 1999.

⁵⁹ FBIS, 19 November 1999.

⁶⁰ FBIS, 14 January 2000.

⁶¹ FBIS, 19 November 1999.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Nezavisiamaia Gazeta*, 22 January 1997, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 24 January 1997.

⁶⁴ FBIS, 19 November 1999.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ For an examination of the ambivalence of Russian elites concerning proliferation, see Michael Beck, "Russia's Rationale for Developing Export Controls," in Gary K. Bertsch and Suzette R. Grillot (eds.), *Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union* (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 37–38, 49; *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (Moscow), July 1998, pp. 50–60, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 28 August 1998.

⁶⁷ *Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States* [Washington, D.C.: The Commission, 1998], Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers.

⁶⁸ Stephen Blank, "Russia as Rogue Proliferator," in *Orbis*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 91–107.

⁶⁹ Colonel Larry M. Wortzel, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The View From Beijing," in *Proceedings*, p. 193; *Wall Street Journal*, (New York), 16 February 2000, p. A26.

⁷⁰ Interfax, 12 November 1999.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Igor Ivanov, "West's Hypocrisy Over Chechnya," in *The Financial Times* (London), 16 November 1999, p. 19.

⁷³ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 9 December 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 8 December 1999.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 9 October 1999, pp. 3–4; FBIS, 14 January 2000.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 9 October 1999, pp. 3–4.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* (emphasis in original).

⁸¹ Kontseptsia.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ FBIS, 17 November 1999; FBIS, 8 December 1999; FBIS, 23 December 1999.

⁸⁴ FBIS, 14 January 2000.

⁸⁵ Conversations.

⁸⁶ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 9 October 1999, pp. 3–4; FBIS, 14 January 2000; FBIS, 4 February 2000.

⁸⁷ Stephen Blank, "State and Armed Forces in Russia: Toward an African Scenario," in Anthony James Joes (ed.), *Saving Democracies: U.S. Intervention in Threatened Democratic States* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), pp. 167–196.

⁸⁸ One finds this similar conflation in China's perception of its threat environment, and it certainly carries over from the Leninist and Stalinist belief in capitalist encirclement at the same time as there are internal enemies of the socialist project. Denny Roy, "China's Threat Environment," in *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 27 (1966), No. 4, pp. 437–448.

⁸⁹ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 9 October 1999, pp. 3–4.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ FBIS, 14 January 2000.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* (electronic version), 5 February 2000, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 7 February 2000; *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, April 22, 2000, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 24 April 2000. The new doctrine does not significantly deviate from the draft doctrine and security concept's threat assessments. See also, S. J. Main, *Russia's Military Doctrine*, Occasional Brief, No. 77 (Camberley, U.K., and Surrey, U.K.: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal

Military Academy, Sandhurst, 2000), also available at <http://www.ppc.pims.org/Projects/csrc/OB77-SJM.htm>, accessed 30 March 2001.

⁹⁸ *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 19 November 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 19 November 1999; *The Jamestown Monitor*, 24 November 1999.

⁹⁹ "Presidential Bulletin," trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 27 December 1999.

¹⁰⁰ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, October 19, 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 19 October 1999.

¹⁰¹ RIA, 17 December 1999, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 17 December 1999; RIA, 23 November 1999, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 23 November 1999.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ FBIS, 23 November 1999; ITAR-TASS, 23 November 1999, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 23 November 1999; Interfax, 23 November 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 23 November 1999; Russian Public Television First Channel Network (Moscow), 17 November 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 17 November 1999; *Kommersant* (Moscow), 24 November 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 24 November 1999; Simon Saradzhyan, "Russia to Emphasize Replenishing Spy Satellite Fleet," in *Defense News* (25 October 1999), p. 6; Simon Saradzhyan, "Russia to Emphasize Electro-Optics in Future Projects," in *Defense News* (22 November 1999), p. 22; Christopher Foss, "Russia Develops MEADS Lookalike," in *Jane's Defence Weekly* (21 October 1998), p. 18; Interfax, 25 April 1999, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 25 April 1999; Interfax, 31 August 1999, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 1 September 1999; Simon Saradzhyan, "Russia Set to Invest More to Modernize Weapons," in *Defense News* (13 December 1999), p. 22; Simon Saradzhyan, "Russia Seeks to Catch Up With West in Microelectronics," in *Defense News* (13 December 1999), p. 8; Vladimir Isachenkov, Douglas Barrie, and Simon Saradzhyan, "Russian Air Force to Improve Tactical Strike Capability," in *Defense News* (6 December 1999), p. 5;

Radiostantsiia Ekho Moskvy (Moscow), 2 November 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 3 November 1999; ITAR-TASS, 28 October 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 28 October 1999; Interfax, 27 October 1999, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 27 October 1999; *Rosstskaia Gazeta*, 8 July 1999, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 8 July 1999; Richard Staar, "A Russian Rearmament Wish List," in *Orbis*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 605–612; Richard Staar, "Funding Russia's Rearmament," in *Perspective*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (September–October 1999), pp. 1–2, 8–10.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ FBIS, 14 January 2000.

¹⁰⁶ Dmitry Trenin, "Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy: NATO Expansion Can Have Negative Consequences for the West," *Nezavisimaaia Gazeta*, 5 February 1997, in FBIS *Observations and Analysis*, 12 February 1997; Sergei M. Rogov, *Russia and NATO's Enlargement: The Search for a Compromise at the Helsinki Summit* (Cover Title: CIM 513/May 1997), (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1997), p. 10. This was also the dominant theme of Russian presentations at the Biennial Conference of European Security Institutions (22–24 January 1996) in Moscow. See also Sergei Rogov, Henry Gaffney, Jr., and Paul Olkhovsky, *Security Concerns of the New Russia*, (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, 1995), Vol. 2, p. 34, where this demand is made explicitly; and Lena Jonson, "In Search of a Doctrine: Russian Interventionism in Conflicts in Its 'Near Abroad'," in *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 1996), p. 447.

¹⁰⁷ Thus Russia's ambassador to Seoul, Evgeny Afanasev, speaking of Moscow's new treaty with North Korea, observed, "Being a global and regional power, Russia will continue to positively involve itself in a peaceful resolution of the turbulent situation on the Korean peninsula, etc." *The Korea Herald* (Seoul) (electronic version), 7 January 2000, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 6 January 2000.

¹⁰⁸ Theodore Taranovskii, "Institutions, Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Late Imperial Russia," in Catherine Evtuhov, Boris

Gasparov, Alexander Ospovat, and Mark Von Hagen (eds.), *Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the Russian Empire* (Moscow: O.G.I., 1997), pp. 53–69; Richard Wortman, “Ceremony and Empire in the Evolution of the Russian Monarchy,” in Evtuhov, *et al.*, *Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg*, pp. 32–37.

¹⁰⁹ *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 31 July 1999, p. 2.

¹¹⁰ *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 23 September 1995, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 28 September 1995; For an excellent example of this pervasive mentality, see Andrei Kokoshin, *Reflections on Russia's Past, Present, and Future* (Cambridge, Mass.: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1998), p. 31. At the time, Kokoshin was deputy defense minister and soon after secretary of the defense council. Vassily Krivokhiza, *Russia's National Security Policy: Conceptions and Realities*, trans. by Richard Weitz (Cambridge, Mass.: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1998), p. 32; Alla Iaz'kova, “The Emergence of Post-Cold War Russian Foreign Policy Priorities,” in Robert Craig Nation and Stefano Bianchini (eds.), *The Yugoslav Conflict and its Implications for International Relations* (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1998), p. 112.

¹¹¹ FBIS, 14 January 2000; and the new foreign policy concept, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (WWW), 7 July 2000, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 10 July 2000.

¹¹² Kokoshin, *Reflections on Russia's Past, Present, and Future*, p. 31, is an excellent example of this pervasive mentality; *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 6 November 1996, p. 3, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Central Eurasia), 8 November 1996. Address by Yevgeny M. Primakov to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, September 20, 1996, p. 2, transcript made available by the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States.

¹¹³ Robert Legvold, “The ‘Russian Question,’” in Vladimir Baranovskii (ed.), *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda* (Stockholm, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 1997), p. 67. According to Sergei Medvedev, “In the

years to come Russia will stay a suspended, yet constant security threat on the edge of Europe; a nuclear power and still a major military force with unclear intentions, complicated domestic policies, with multiple interest groups influencing foreign and security policy, producing scores of refugees and migrants, raising security concerns of the CIS states and Eastern Europe, and, finally, unable to cooperate with the West on security issues." See Sergei Medvedev, "European Security After the Cold War: A Rejoinder," in *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 319–320.

¹¹⁴ FBIS, 14 January 2000.

¹¹⁵ Dannreuther, pp. 153–156.

¹¹⁶ Finnish Institute of International Affairs, *Russia Beyond 2000: The Prospects for Russian Developments and Their Implications for Finland* (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), pp. 1–2 (italics added).

¹¹⁷ Stephen Blank, "Vladimir Putin and Russia's Armed Forces; A Faustian Bargain?" in *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter–Spring 2000), pp. 185–200.

¹¹⁸ Interestingly enough, a great deal of the threat environment depicted in these documents corresponds to some analyses of China's "threat environment". Roy, "China's Threat Environment," pp. 437–448; and, for example, Major General A.F. Klimenko, "International Security and the Character of Future Military Conflicts," in *Voennaia Mysl*, No. 1 (January–February), 1997, p. 6.

¹¹⁹ Sergei Medvedev, "Former Soviet Union," in Paul B. Stares (ed.), *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey* (Tokyo: Center for International Exchange, 1998), pp. 75–116.

**Contributors to the Publications Fund of the
Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies Program of the
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies**

Patrons - \$1,000 or more

Donors - \$100 – \$499

Sponsors - \$500 – \$999

Supporters - \$99 and under

1993–94

Sponsor:

Alexander Muller

Donors:

Imre & Elizabeth Boba
John Budlong
Robert Byrnes
Thomas Hankins
Deborah Hardy
Dawson Harvey
John Headland
Richard & Kathleen Kirkendall
Mary Mann
Gloria W. Swisher
G. L. Ulmen
Daniel C. Waugh
Eugene Webb

Supporters:

Burton Bard
Walter W. Baz
Arthur & Dorothy Bestor
James & Edith Bloomfield

Boeing

John Phillip Bowen
Patricia A. Burg
Robert Croskey
Douglas Daily
Ralph Fisher
Anne Pietette Geiger
Rev. Paul Grivanovsky
James & Patricia Hamish
Donald C. Hellmann
Henry & Trude Huttenbach
Martin Jaffee
Douglas Johnson
Richard Johnson
Rodney Keyser
Elsa G. Kopta
Joel Migdal
Sergei Mihailov
W. J. Rorabaugh
H. Stewart Parker
Helen K. Pulsifer
Joel & Vivian Quam
Peter F. Sugar
Eric & Barbara Weissman
Seung-Ham Yang

1995

Patrons:

The Henry M. Jackson
Foundation

Donors:

John Berg
D. R. Ellegood
Herbert J. & Alberta M. Ellison

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

Robert Heilman
Donald C. Hellmann
David Hsiao
Ronald M. & Margaret S. Hubbs
David A. & Catherine J. Hughes
Jerome Johnson
Law Office of Lane, Powell,
Spears, & Lubersky
Joel & Abby Li

Lucile Lomen
Mary Earl Maltman
William L. Maltman
Margaret Nicholson
Stanton R. Pemberton
Peter F. Sugar
Alva G. Treadgold
Robert G. & Joan C. Waldo
Robert L. Walker
Daniel C. Waugh
Jun-Luh H. Yin

Supporters:

George N. & Lorna D. Aagaard
Franklin I. & Helen C. Badgley
Abbie Jane Bakony
Irwin S. & Freda R. Blumenfeld
Louise R. Bowler
Patricia A. Burg
Robert J. C. Butow
Mary P. Chapman
Luxar Corporation
Gerald & Lucille Curtis
Charles F. & Eugenia R. Delzell
Jean S. Fisher
Katherine Huber
Cathy Kawamoto

Bettina Kettenring
Elsa G. Kopta
H. G. & Estelle C. Lee
Jean Maulbetsch
Marion Osterby
Donna M. Poreda
Douglass A. & Katherine L. Raff
Sabrina P. Ramet
John S. Reshetar, Jr.
Joel & Nanci B. Richards
Nancy Robinson
John & Venus Rockwell
Harold J. & Betty Runstad
Barbara R. Sarason
Suzanne E. Sarason
Michael C. Schwartz
Stuart W. Selter
Thaddeus H. Spratlen
Donald & Gloria Swisher
Grace Tatsumi
Helen Louise Thwing
Natalie Tracy
The Fred & Steve Treadgold
Families
Annie T. Warsinske
Robert A. & Juanita Watt
David E. Williams

1996-97

Patrons:

Allen W. & Laura T. Puckett
Alva G. Treadgold

Sponsors:

Herbert J. & Alberta M. Ellison

Supporters:

Dagmar K. Koenig
Lewis O. Saum
Glennys J. Young

Donors:

Kent R. Hill
Daniel C. & Patricia
Matuszewski
Sabrina P. Ramet
William Ratliff
Floyd & Barbara Smith
Peter F. Sugar

1998

Patron:
Alva G. Treadgold

Sponsor:
Sabrina P. Ramet

Donors:
Peter F. Sugar
Victor Erlich

1999

Patron:
Alva G. Treadgold

Donor:
Leighton T. Henderson

Supporter:
Ralph T. Fisher
Jonathan Coopersmith

2000–01

Patron:
Alva G. Treadgold

Sponsor:
Allen W. & Laura T. Puckett

The Donald W. Treadgold Papers

In Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies

Available Papers

- No. 1: Law In Russia (1994) - Theodore Taranovski, Peter B. Maggs, Kathryn Hendley, and Steven A. Crown (\$5.25)**
- No. 2: Religion in Imperial Russia (1995) - Robert L. Nichols and Henry R. Huttenbach (\$5.25)**
- No. 3: The Fate of Russian Orthodox Monasteries and Convents Since 1917 (1995) - Charles Timberlake (\$6.50)**
- No. 4: The Mennonites and the Russian State Duma, 1905-1914 (1996) - Terry Martin (\$5.25)**
- No. 5: Corporate Russia: Privatization and Prospects in the Oil and Gas Sector (1996) - Leslie Dienes (\$5.25)**
- No. 6: Post-Communist Transitions: The Rise of the Multi-Party Systems in Poland and Ukraine (1996) Andrii Deshchytsia (\$5.25)**
- No. 7: Russian Banking: An Overview and Assessment (1996) Kent F. Moors (\$5.25)**
- No. 8: Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans since the 19th Century (1996) - Peter F. Sugar (\$6.50)**
- No. 9: Modes of Communist Rule, Democratic Transition, and Party System Formation in Four East European Countries (1996) - Grigorii Golosov - 2nd Printing (\$7.50)**
- No. 10: The Politics of the Domestic Sphere: The *Zhenotdely*, Women's Liberation, and the Search for a *Novyi Byt* in Early Soviet Russia (1996) - Michelle V. Fuqua (\$6.50)**
- No. 11: Ethnic Bipolarism in Slovakia, 1989-1995 (1996) David Lucas (\$6.50)**
- No. 12: Literacy and Reading in 19th Century Bulgaria (1997) Krassimira Daskalova (\$5.25)**

- No. 13: Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia (1997)**
Thomas Cushman - 2nd Printing (\$6.50)
- No. 14: Nation, State, and Economy in Central Asia: Does Ataturk Provide a Model? (1997) - Paul Kubicek (\$6.50)**
- No. 15: The Labor Market, Wages, Income, and Expenditures of the Population of the Republic of Uzbekistan (1997)**
Alexander Agafonoff, Dilnara Ismiddinova, and Galina Saidova, editors (\$6.50)
- No. 16: German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (1998)**
Daniele Conversi (\$6.50)
- No. 17: Romanian-Hungarian Economic Cooperation and Joint Ventures in Post-Ceausescu Romania (1998)**
Erica Agiewich (\$6.50)
- No. 18: Energy and Mineral Exports from the Former USSR: Philosopher's Stone or Fool's Gold? (1998)**
Leslie Dienes (\$6.50)
- No. 19: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (1998)**
Norman Naimark - 3rd Printing (\$7.50)
- No. 20: Nationalism, Populism, and Other Threats to Liberal Democracy in Post-Communist Europe (1999)**
Vladimir Tismaneanu (\$6.50)
- No. 21: The Formation of Post-Soviet International Politics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (1999)**
Rafis Abazov (\$6.50)
- No. 22: The Serb Lobby in the United Kingdom (1999)**
Carole Hodge (\$7.50)
- No. 23: The Security Services and the Decline of Democracy in Russia: 1996–1999 (1999) - Amy Knight (\$6.50)**
- No. 24: The Repluralization of Slovenia in the 1980s: New Revelations from Archival Material (2000)**
Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj, et al. (\$7.50)

No. 25: Ethnic Conflict and European Affairs Revisited: The Serb-Croat Quarrel and French Diplomacy, 1929–1935 (2000)
Brigit Farley (\$7.50)

No. 26: Poland and Germany, 1989–1991: The Role of Economic Factors in Foreign Policy (2000) - Randall E. Newnham (\$7.50)

No. 27: Eastern Europe and the Natural Law Tradition (2000)
Sabrina P. Ramet - 2nd printing (\$7.50)

No. 28: Local Self-Government and the State in Modern Russia (2001)
Thomas E. Porter and John F. Young (\$7.50)

No. 29: Catholic Power and Catholicism as a Component of Modern Polish National Identity, 1863–1918 (2001)
Konrad Sadkowski (\$7.50)

No. 30: Structure and Exposure: The Dilemmas of Democracy in Russia's Television Market (2001) - Ellen Mickiewicz (\$7.50)

No. 31: Military Threats and Threat Assessment in Russia's New Defense Doctrine and Security Concept (2001)
Stephen Blank (\$7.50)

Forthcoming

No. 32: Nationalism, Culture, and Religion in Croatia since 1990
Vjeveran Pavlaković, editor (\$7.50)

No. 33: Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge for Putin - Robert O. Freedman (\$7.50)

No. 34: Statistical Falsification in the Soviet Union: A Comparative Study of Projections, Biases, and Trust - Mark Tauger (\$7.50)

No. 35: The Land Question in Ukraine and Russia
Stephen K. Wegren (\$7.50)

No. 36: Regionalism in Russia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: A Case of "Reversed Anarchy" - Mikhail Alexseev (\$7.50)

**No. 37: Macedonia's Child-Grandfathers: The Transnational
Politics of Memory, Exile, and Return, 1948-1998**
Keith S. Brown (\$7.50)

To order: Make checks payable to the *University of Washington* (international orders add \$1.00 per issue, WA residents add 8.6% sales tax). For international orders, we can only accept money orders, checks drawn on American banks, or payment by credit card (Visa, MasterCard, or American Express). A ten issue subscription is available for \$65 (\$75 international). Orders and subscriptions should be directed to the managing editor at the following address:

Donald W. Treadgold Papers
Jackson School of International Studies
Box 353650
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3650

Tel: (206) 221-6348

Fax: (206) 685-0668

For orders and copies of the style guide: treadgld@u.washington.edu

For editorial queries: spr@u.washington.edu

For an order form and the latest prices:

Website: <http://depts.washington.edu/reecas/dwt/dwt.htm>

ISSN 1078-5639

The Donald W. Treadgold Papers
in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies

Jackson School of International Studies
Box 353650
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3650
