



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 20301



TRANSLATION

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FOREIGN TITLE OF TRANSLATION AGENCIA NO. 0124 ACERCA DE LAS POSIBILIDADES DE ATAQUE A POBLACIONES DE CHALATENANGO PUERTO COLIMA Y ACELHUATE		ANALISIS DE INTEL-		
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TRANSLATION				

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MEMORANDUM

NOTE: TAKE NO ACTION

TO: (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec.
FROM: 1.4(c)
DATE: 15 July 1983

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 0124 ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF ATTACK
OF THE TOWNS OF CHALATENANGO BRIDGE OF COLIMA AND ACELHUATE

1. SITUATION/INFORMATION

- a. Situation of the Order of Battle of the general region of Chalatenango including the places close to the bridges of Colima and Acehuate (see appendix).
- b. The terrorists have developed the following activities in the region, in the period between 16 June 1983 and 14 July 1983.
 - 1) July 16, 1983: The terrorists distributed propaganda of the FMLN in the public transport between Tejutla and la Palma, Chalatenango.
 - 2) July 16, 1983: In early morning hours the terrorists harassed the military reserves located in the peripheral region of the city of Chalatenango.
 - 3) June 19, 1983: The terrorists harassed the reserves of the DM-1 (Military District 1) located west of the city of Chalatenango resulting in one of our people dying in action and another being wounded in action.
 - 4) June 22, 1983: The terrorists attempted to obtain supplies on June 22 and 23, 1983 of weapons and munitions through a helicopter which they sent to the village of Las Tablas (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) J/Nueva Concepcion, Chalatenango.
 - 5) June 30, 1983: The terrorists moved in groups of approximately 50 from Comalapa towards Concepcion Quezaltepeque, Chalatenango.
 - 6) July 2, 1983: The terrorists of the general region of Chalatenango have threatened the owners of vehicles not to move on the northern trunk highway starting from July 9, 1983 because otherwise they would burn the vehicles.
 - 7) July 2, 1983: An unknown number of terrorists moved from El Volcancillo (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) J/Comalapa, Chalatenango towards the region between Los Prados and El Ocotalito (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) of the same J/ (jurisdiction).
 - 8) July 4, 1983: The terrorists distributed propaganda in pamphlets in the Hda (Hacienda) of Tetultepeque (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) J/Guazapa, San Salvador with the caption "Do not collaborate with the D. C. (Civil Defense)".
 - 9) July 5, 1983: The terrorists moved from the general region of Morazan towards the general region of Las Vueltas, Chalatenango.

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- 10) July 5, 1983: The terrorists moved from the village of La Laguna J/Las Vueltas, towards the Cton. and Crio. of El Comun [redacted], J/Dulce Nombre de Maria, Chalatenango and towards the Hill of Guazapa, San Salvador. (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)
- 11) July 5, 1983: The ex-soldier [redacted] (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) who came to the DM-1 seeking protection of the decree of amnesty and who had deserted stated that: the FES was moving from the La Laguna Camp [redacted] to the camp of El Comun [redacted] (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) and the U.V.Z. towards the Hill of Guazapa. (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)
- 12) July 6, 1983: The terrorists intended to dynamite between July 10 and 12, 1983 the bridges of Colima and Acelhuate, to prevent the Armed Forces from sending reinforcements and to seize the province of Chalatenango.
- 13) July 7, 1983: An unknown number of terrorists moved between the Crio. of El Barrancon [redacted] and the Cton. of Tilapa [redacted] J/La Reina, Chalatenango. (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)
- 14) July 7, 1983: The terrorists ambushed with a Claymore bomb the personnel of the DM-2 in the town of San Antonio la Cruz, Chalatenango.
- 15) It was observed that when the enemy programmed the destruction of a profitable target, he developed test statics, harassing as often as necessary this target with a number of persons suitable for establishing routes of escape, avenues of approach and efficiency in the development of the project.

c. The indications known according to reports on the possibilities of attacks by the terrorists are as follows:

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

- 1) July 6, 1983: There are indications that the terrorists carried war equipment towards the Cton. and Crio. Los Apoyos [redacted] and the Cton. and Crio. of El Gavilan [redacted], J/Nueva Concepcion, Chalatenango, for which they used the Santa Ana-San Pablo Tacachico Highway. (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)
- 2) July 10, 1983: The terrorists harassed the bridge of Colima and the Bridge of the Acelhuate River, located on the northern trunk highway.
- 3) On several occasions the terrorists showed that they would have total control of the province of Chalatenango if the bridges of Colima and Acelhuate were destroyed.

d. The vulnerable elements which the terrorists now have are as follows:

- 1) The group of terrorists predominating in the region of Chalatenango are the FPL. With the death of their greatest leaders, Salvador Calletano Carpio, a certain lack of control arouse within the group with regard to command, causing disorganization in the implementation and execution of their objectives.

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2. POSSIBILITIES

a. Attack at any moment starting from today the following places:

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1) Colima Bridge | (short-term) |
| 2) Acelhuate Bridge | (short-term) |
| 3) Fourth B.I. (Infantry Brigade) | (medium-term) |
| 4) DM-1 | (medium-term) |
| 5) 5 de Noviembre and Cerron Grande Dam | (medium-term) |
| 6) Any town of the region | |

3. CONCLUSIONS

- a. In accordance with the information contained in the appendix through the Order of Battle and paragraph 1-b, the enemy is reinforcing itself in terms of manpower and logistic supplies, indicating that the attainment of its objectives according to the possibilities is probable.
- b. For the purpose of obtaining a political image as a belligerent force both at a national and international levels, the enemy has always attempted to isolate the northern and eastern region of the country; however under the pressure to which the enemy is subject in the eastern range, they are attempting to reorganize their cadres in the region of Chalatenango, attempting to presumably to achieve their objective of isolating part of the country, so that the planned possibilities should have a concrete form in this direction.
- c. The most probable possibilities are as follows:
- 1) Attack the security of the Colima and Acelhuate Bridges, until their destruction is achieved.

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ENEMY SITUATION NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE COLIMA BRIDGE; J/EL PARAISO

I. LAYOUT

a. LOCATIONS OF CAMPS

1) CONFIRMED AND ORGANIZED OR PERMANENT CAMPS

- a) Cton. and Crio. El Trunador
- b) Crio. of El Astillero
- c) Cton. and Crio. El Jicaron
- d) Cton. and Crio. Las Ventanas
- e) Cton. and Crio. El Zapote
- f) Cton. and Crio. Mirandilla
- g) Cton. and Crio. Buena Vista

(b)(1); Sec.
1.4(b); Sec.
1.4(c)

approximately 100 terrorists
unknown number of terrorists
unknown number of terrorists
approximately 30 terrorists
approximately 200 terrorists
unknown number of terrorists
unknown number of terrorists

2) MOBILE TEMPORARY CAMPS

- a) Hacienda of El Trapichon
- b) Cton. and Crio. Potrero Grande
- c) Hacienda San Rafael
- d) Crio. of Pueblo Viejo
- e) Hacienda of San Cristobal
- f) Cton. and Crio. San Cristobal
- g) Crio. Las Penas
- h) Crio. El Susto
- i) Cton. and Crio. Las Delicias
- j) Cton. and Crio. Consolacion
- k) Crio. of Los Palitos
- l) Crio. of El Seretal
- m) Crio. and Hacienda Valle Verde
- n) Hacienda of San Antonio
- n) Crio. of La Asuncion
- o) Cton. and Crio. San Jose Los Sitios
- p) Cton. and Crio. El Salitre
- q) Cton. and Crio. San Jose
- r) Loma Macacio

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b);
Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec.
1.4(c)

3) RECENT AND UNCONFIRMED CAMPS

- a) Crio. Palo Verde
- b) Hill of Chachaco
- c) Cton. and Crio. Ojo de Agua
- d) Crio. El Jote
- e) Hill of La Pava

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b);
Sec. 1.4(c)

b. MOVEMENTS

- 1) July 8, 1983: The terrorists coming from the western region moved in unknown numbers towards the hill of Guazapa, passing through the Cton. and

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

Crio. of Pishishapa [redacted] and the Cton. and Crio. of El Pinalito J/Aguilares. [redacted]

- 2) The terrorists moved permanently from the hill of Guazapa towards the Hacienda of El Trapichon [redacted] J/Aguilares, Hacienda of San Rafael [redacted] Hacienda of El Mirado [redacted] and moved towards the Cton. and Crio. of El Jicarón [redacted], from that place they returned to the hill of Guazapa, where they crossed the northern trunk highway and carried out some activities.

- 3) An unknown number of terrorists moved from one place to another along the highway leading from Tejutla to La Palma establishing reserves in the region of the Crio. El Barrancon [redacted] of the Cton. and Crio. of El Jardin while they have their base of operations in the Cton. and Crio. of El Jardin [redacted] J/Na Reina.

2. MANPOWER

It is considered that in this area there are approximately 500 to 600 armed terrorists located in the following regions:

a. REGION NORTH OF THE COLIMA BRIDGE

- 1) Cton. and Crio. San Jose Los Sitio
- 2) Cton. and Crio. El Salitre
- 3) Loma Macacio
- 4) Crio. of Palo Verde
- 5) Hill of Chchacos
- 6) Cton. and Crio. Ojo de Agua
- 7) Crio. El Jute
- 8) Hill of La Pava

b. REGION SOUTH OF THE COLIMA BRIDGE

- 1) Cton. and Crio. El Tronodor
- 2) Cton. and Crio. El Jicarón
- 3) Cton. and Crio. Las Ventanas
- 4) Cton. and Crio. El Zapote
- 5) Cton. and Crio. Mirandilla
- 6) Cton. and Crio. Buena Vista
- 7) Crio. El Astillero
- 8) Hacienda of El Trapichon
- 9) Cton. and Crio. Potrero Grande
- 10) Hacienda of San Rafael
- 11) Crio. Pueblo Viejo
- 12) Hacienda of San Cristobal
- 13) Cton. and Crio. San Cristobal
- 14) Crio. of Las Penas
- 15) Crio. of El Susto
- 16) Cton. and Crio. Las Delicias

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- 17) Cton. and Crio. Consolacion
- 18) Crio. Los Palitos
- 19) Crio. El Sersital
- 20) Hacienda Valle Verde
- 21) Hacienda San Antonio
- 22) Crio. La Asuncion

(b)(1): Sec.
1.4(b): Sec.
1.4(c)

3. LOGISTICS

The terrorists are obtaining supplies of provisions and personal articles which they rob from drivers of vehicles and buses passing on the northern trunk highway in the region of Km. 28, Cton. and Crio. Potrero Grande J/Aguilares.

The terrorists are obtaining supplies of livestock (38) which they robbed around Km. 30 and a half on the northern trunk highway and brought them towards the camp which they had presumably in the Crio. Tres Ceibas J/Aguilares.

The terrorists of the region of Guazapa are obtaining supplies of provisions and munitions coming from the colony of San Jose Las Flores and Tonacatepeque.

The terrorists are obtaining supplies by robberies carried out along the highways leading from Apopa towards Tejutla.

The terrorists located in the northern region of Guazapa have as their supply center the Crio. of La *

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I. PLANS AND INDICATIONS

a. POLITICAL

Under this aspect the terrorists have programmed the following activities which they will accomplish in accordance with a previously established and detailed plan according to the latest events with political repercussions:

- 1) They will exploit at the national and international level the death of the terrorist Melida Anaya Montes.
- 2) The confrontation with the Bellosa Battalion in which they suffered 40 casualties.
- 3) The FMLN - FDR will reactivate the function of the labor unions at the national level.
- 4) They maintain the struggle to achieve "Dialogue".
- 5) Declaration at the international level on what the terrorists declared as liberated zone, east of the country.
- 6) The FMLN - FDR will develop a campaign for discredit of the Salvadorean government, before the date of the elections.

b. MILITARY

- 1) Attack small military garrisons and reactivate terrorism at the urban level, especially in Santa Ana and San Salvador. There are already clear evidences of this in the city of Santa Ana.
- 2) Increase at the national level the acts of sabotage, kidnappings, assassinations, threats, in fact anything concerning the destruction of the national economy. This was announced by the terrorists because of their protest of the death of the terrorist Melida Anaya Montes.
- 3) Possibilities of attack and harassment starting from today and at any moment, of the following places:

a) WESTERN WAR FRONT

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|
| (1) Miramundo relay station | J/Santa Ana |
| (2) Installations of RASA Acajutla | J/Sonsonate |
| (3) Izalco ground station | J/Sonsonate |
| (4) " " geothermal plants | J/Ahuachapan |
| (5) Guajoyo hydroelectric station | J/Santa Ana |
| (6) City of Santa Ana | J/Santa Ana |
| (7) City of Coatepeque | J/Santa Ana |
| (8) City of Arce | J/Santa Ana |
| (9) El Congo | J/Santa Ana |
| (10) Santo Domingo de Gusman | J/Ahuachapan |

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(11) San Antonio del Monte	J/Ahuachapan
(12) Jujutla	"
(13) Guaymango	"

b) CENTRAL WAR FRONT

(1) Nueva Concepcion	J/Chalatenango
(2) La Reina	"
(3) Tejutla	"
(4) San Ignacio	"
(5) Citala	"
(6) San Fernando	"
(7) San Francisco Morazan	"
(8) Dulce Nombre de Maria	"
(9) Santa Rita	"
(10) El Paraiso	"
(11) Puente Azambio	"
(12) Puente Colima	"
(13) El Carrizal	"
(14) Comalapa	"
(15) Ojos de Agua	"
(16) Concepcion Quezaltepeque	"
(17) Las Vueltas	"
(18) San Antonio los Ranchos	"
(19) San Jose Cancasque	"
(20) San Luis del Carmen	"
(21) San Francisco Lempa	"
(22) Azacualpa	"
(23) Potonico	"
(24) San Isidro Labrador	"
(25) San Jose Las Flores	"
(26) Nueva Trinidad	"
(27) Arcatao	"
(28) San Antonio de la Cruz	"
(29) Nombre de Jesus	"
(30) 5 de Noviembre and Cerron 6 Dams	"
(31) Tenancingo	J/Cuscatlan
(32) El Paisnal	J/San Salvador
(33) Aguilares	"
(34) Guazapa	"
(35) San Jose Guayabal	J/Cuscatlan
(36) Apopa	J/San Salvador
(37) Nejapa	"
(38) La Esperanza Prison Center	"
(39) Mejicanos	"
(40) Ayutucstepeque	"
(41) Cuscatancingo	"
(42) Ciudad Delgado	"
(43) Soyapango	"
(44) Ilopango	"

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(45) San Salvador J/San Salvador
(46) Saragoza J/La Libertad
(47) Huizucar "
(48) Santa Cruz Michapa J/Cuscatlan

c) PARA CENTRAL WAR FRONT

(1) Zacatecoluca J/La Paz
(2) Santo Domingo J/San Vicente
(3) Tepetitlan "
(4) San Cayetano Istepeque "
(5) San Vicente "
(6) San Sebastian "
(7) San Lorenzo "
(8) San Esteban Catarina "
(9) Apastepeque "
(10) Santa Clara "
(11) Tecoluca "
(12) Fenadesal Bridge "
(13) Cuscatlan Bridge "
(14) Cton. of El Pajal (1169) J/La Paz
(15) Santa Lucia Plantation (1569) "
(16) Santiago Nonualco "
(17) San Pedro Nonualco "
(18) San Rafael Obrajuelo "
(19) Guadalupe J/San Vicente
(20) San Isidro J/Cabanas
(21) Dolores "
(22) Sensuntepeque "
(23) San Ildefonso "
(24) La Herradura J/La Paz

d) EASTERN WAR FRONT

(1) Carolina J/San Miguel
(2) San Antonio "
(3) Ciudad Barrios "
(4) Gualococti J/Morazan
(5) Guatajiagua "
(6) Yamabal "
(7) Sensembra "
(8) San Francisco Gotera "
(9) Lolotiquillo "
(10) Cacaopera "
(11) San Agustin J/Usulután
(12) San Francisco Javier "
(13) Jiquilisco "
(14) Puerto el Triunfo "
(15) San Dionisio "
(16) Ozatlan "

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- | | | |
|------|--|--------------|
| (17) | Usulután | J/Usulután |
| (18) | Berlin | " |
| (19) | Santiago de María | " |
| (20) | Mercedes Umana | " |
| (21) | Santa Elena | " |
| (22) | Alegria | " |
| (23) | California | " |
| (24) | Ereguaíquin | " |
| (25) | Concepción Batres | " |
| (26) | Jucuarán | J/San Miguel |
| (27) | Chirilagua | " |
| (28) | Intipuca | " |
| (29) | San Miguel | " |
| (30) | ToroLa | J/Morazan |
| (31) | San Fernando | " |
| (32) | Perquin | " |
| (33) | Lolotique | " |
| (34) | Meanguera | " |
| (35) | Joateca | " |
| (36) | Corinto | " |
| (37) | Sociedad | " |
| (38) | Nueva Esparta | J/La Unión |
| (39) | Anamorós | J/Morazan |
| (40) | Santa Rosa de Lima | " |
| (41) | La Unión | J/La Unión |
| (42) | The terrorists intend to implement the plan which they called "SOMPOPO" consisting in a large-scale ERP - FARN attack, in the eastern region, specifically Santa Rosa de Lima, for this they are reinforcing the terrorist concentrations in the general area of Santa Rosa de Lima with terrorists coming from the general region of Conchagua and/or west of Berlin. | |

C. ECONOMICS

- 1) The many forms used by the terrorists to implement their actions aimed at the destruction of the economy of the country include: sabotage, stopping of cultivation, stopping of collective transport, destruction of government buildings, destruction of towns, destruction of bridges, telephone booths, posts and towers for the transmission of electricity, etc.

In view of the present situation the terrorists may possibly attempt to increase their actions as previously described.

There are different reasons, some of them are: the death of the Commander terrorist Melida Anaya Montes, in view of the problem that she was living in Nicaragua, possibly there is a migration of Salvadorean terrorists towards that country, we may expect as corollary a demonstration of their force, by implementing a campaign of total destruction, for this they are

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already establishing a situation by which according to indications it may be presumed that they will develop we refer to the increase of actions in the urban region of Santa Ana; possibly San Salvador.

d. SOCIOLOGY

- 1) One of the plans which the terrorists are developing very carefully but precisely is that of converting into multiplying agents the masses which have "escaped" from the regions of their origin, to form camps of refugees in the different parts of the republic.

It was confirmed that terrorist elements have been visiting these camps with the imminent danger that through previously established plans they may undermine the mind of these people, whom they can easily use in general.

- 2) Also in this sense it should be mentioned that the terrorists are possibly infiltrating in the sector of labor unions, since they had announced it, being a consequence of the agitation of some of them there in January and February this year, and also October, November and December this year, while for the moment there is a brief respite, which may mean a preparation in the labor union association.

e. PSYCHOLOGICAL

- 1) In view of the results, the terrorists will increase their actions on a national level, in terms of propaganda, especially aimed at the soldier and ranks of the Armed Forces, so that when they are in combat they should surrender easily.
- 2) When the terrorists kidnap members of the Armed Forces, they make sure they return them in public view, generally in the central park of some town, with the presumed purpose of psychological infiltration into the mind of the Salvadorean nation.

f. INTELLIGENCE

- 1) The terrorists continue to develop intelligence actions concerning the infiltration of terrorist elements in the Armed Forces at all their levels.
- 2) They continue to kidnap personnel of the Armed Forces, since that is one of their sources of information.

g. ORGANIZATION

Under this aspect the terrorists have not done much in the last few days, up to about 3 or 4 months ago they were reinforcing their cadres, kidnapping children, young people and women; but now they are a little disorganized because of the pressure which has been applied to them by the Armed Forces; on the other hand the lack of supplies of all types and the escape of terrorists have caused in some way an imbalance in their projections.

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This does not mean that in some sectors the terrorists cannot offer resistance to attack, especially in San Vicente, Chalatenango, Usulután and Morazan.

NOTE REFERRING TO PLANS AND INDICATIONS, MILITARY SECTORS

It was learned that Commander "EDGARD" is moving towards the south of San Vicente, accompanied by three FAL FPL platoons, the purpose is to carry out operations in the indicated region.

2. CHARACTERISTICS AND PECULIARITIES:

a. PERSONNEL

- 1) As far as possible when the terrorists are in combat, they attempt to recover their casualties, to hide from the Armed Forces the number of deaths in the confrontation.
- 2) In places where the terrorists have a certain control, they cultivate marijuana, since they use it to get drugged when in combat. They also use other types of narcotics or tablets such as Diasepan.
- 3) When the terrorists occupy a town, whether or not there is a resistance on our part, they carry out festivities for the purpose of creating an atmosphere of confidence within the population.
- 4) For the purpose of boosting their morale, the terrorists in their recreational period celebrate birthdays and anniversaries of terrorists fallen in combat.

b. LOGISTICS AND FINANCES

- 1) With the recent increase to a certain extent of the logistic support coming from communist countries via Nicaragua, the terrorists have devoted themselves to attacking small military garrisons, for the purpose of obtaining armament.
- 2) The terrorists are devoting themselves to open robbery of the highways, attempting to obtain: personal objects, money, articles, etc. and also watch for the payment days in estates and/or haciendas, to rob the money from the workers.
- 3) For their survival they rob cattle, eggs or chickens in places where it is possible for them to do so.
- 4) They raid small towns to rob helpless persons of their small belongings and cash.

c. COMMUNICATIONS

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- 1) The terrorists established their own rudimentary systems of communications. However they have technically elaborated codes.
- 2) Since they robbed much of their communication equipment from the Armed Forces, it may be considered that they may develop a satisfactory communication system.
- 3) They use what they call "CORREO" (messenger) for interpersonal communications.
- 4) They also use the social means of communication for their communications, especially in open and classified announcements.
- 5) They use signals from the ground, by means of bonfires or reflectors; this is for the purpose of obtaining supplies by air.

3. VULNERABLE POINTS

a. MILITARY

- 1) The terrorists fear air fire. This was confirmed through the declarations made by captured and deserting terrorists.
- 2) The desertion of terrorists, especially at the level of the masses, which after all are their support.
- 3) When the terrorists are in combat they cannot obtain continuous replenishment of supplies. This does not allow them to sustain indefinitely the combat.
- 4) The disagreement existing now between the combatant and especially of the organizational level, causes an imbalance at the military level.
- 5) At present there are serious problems as regards the Supply Corps.

b. POLITICAL

- 1) At present one of their political problems is international and results from the situation existing in Nicaragua.
- 2) Politically most of the Salvadorean nation does not accept the ideology of the terrorists, nor the pursuance of its objectives by the work of national destruction.
- 3) The fact that the terrorists have allowed the involvement of foreigners in the armed struggle causes political prejudice especially at the international level; we refer to the organizations following closely the process taking place in the country.

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c. ECONOMICS

- 1) The terrorists are suffering serious problems in this area since the means of economic aid involves the solution on a priority basis of other inherent problems.
- 2) To be able to satisfy their economic needs, they have to use tactics of robbery, assault, etc. which presents a certain degree of risk.

d. PSYCHOLOGICAL

- 1) To a certain extent the enemy morale is low; this is the result of the many casualties caused in combat.
- 2) At the combatant level there is discontent, since some operational management has been entrusted to foreign terrorists and this causes an imbalance in the acceptance of orders.
- 3) The want of aid in all aspects plus the disagreement between combatants and commanders and the problem of the social level within the organizations causes a psychological imbalance. This interferes with the assured developments of their projections.

e. ORGANIZATIONAL

- 1) The continuous deception to which the terrorists are exposed and the frustrated aspects causes escape of personnel; this results in the disorganization of their cadres.
- 2) Also the lack of necessary support in economic, logistic and supply terms etc. results in a disorganization of the terrorists.
- 3) The problem of the psychological and social relationships experienced by the terrorists internally also disorganizes their cadres.
- 4) Although temporarily, air fire disorganizes the terrorists.

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