Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Super-Brownian motion with reflecting historical paths
(Springer-Verlag GmbH, 2001-12)
We consider super-Brownian motion whose historical paths reflect from each other, unlike those of the usual historical super-Brownian motion. We prove tightness for the family of distributions corresponding to a sequence of discrete approximations but we leave the problem of uniqueness of the limit open. We prove a few results ...
Local time flow related to skew Brownian motion
(Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2001-10)
We define a local time flow of skew Brownian motions, i.e., a family of solutions to the stochastic differential equation defining the skew Brownian motion, starting from different points but driven by the same Brownian motion. We prove several results on distributional and path properties of the flow. Our main result is a ...
Coalescence of skew Brownian motions
The purpose of this short note is to prove almost sure coalescence of two skew Brownian motions starting from different initial points, assuming that they are driven by the same Brownian motion. The result is very simple but we would like to record it in print as it has already become the foundation of a research project of ...
Mechanisms for facilitated target location and the optimal number of molecules in the diffusion search process
(American Physical Society, 2001-06-26)
We investigate the number N of molecules needed to perform independent diffusions in order to achieve bonding of a single molecule to a specific site in time t [subscript] 0. For a certain range of values of t [subscript] 0, an increase from N to k · N molecules (k > 1) results in the decrease of search time from t [subscript] ...
The supremum of Brownian local times on Holder curves
For f : [maps the set] [0, 1] [into the set of real numbers] R, we consider L ([to the power of] f [subscript] t), the local time of spacetime Brownian motion on the curve f. Let S [subscript alpha] be the class of all functions whose Holder norm of order [alpha] is less than or equal to 1. We show that the supremum of L ...
Fast equilibrium selection by rational players living in a changing world
(The Econometric Society, 2001-01)
We study a coordination game with randomly changing payoffs and small frictions in changing actions. Using only backwards induction, we find that players must coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium. More precisely, a continuum of fully rational players are randomly matched to play a symmetric 2 x 2 game. The payoff matrix ...