Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language 

      Lachmann, Michael; Szamado, Szabolcs; Bergstrom, Carl T. (National Academy of Sciences USA, 2001-11-06)
      The "costly signalling" hypothesis proposes that animal signals are kept honest by appropriate signal costs. We show that to the contrary, signal cost is unnecessary for honest signalling even when interests conflict. We ...
    • Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games 

      Bergstrom, Carl T.; Szamado, Szabolcs; Lachmann, Michael (The Royal Society of London, 2002-10-24)
      Much of the theoretical literature on costly signalling concentrates on the separating equilibria of continuous signalling games. At such equilibria, every signaller sends a distinct signal, and signal receivers are able ...