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dc.contributor.authorBergstrom, Carl T.en_US
dc.contributor.authorReal, Leslie A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2004-11-04T04:12:21Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-13T19:58:10Z
dc.date.available2004-11-04T04:12:21Zen_US
dc.date.available2007-06-13T19:58:10Z
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.citationBergstrom, C. T. and L. A. Real (2000). Evolutionary Ecology Research. 2:493-508en_US
dc.identifier.issn1522-0613en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1773/2003en_US
dc.description.abstractTheoretical models of mate choice and sexual selection typically make one of two simplifying assumptions. Either mate-preferences are assumed to be uniform (e.g., all females have the same preferences with respect to males), or mate-choice is assumed to be a one-sided affair (e.g., females do all the choosing). Recent empirical studies suggest that in many cases, neither assumption holds. In this paper, we show how two-sided matching - a branch of game theory developed in the economics literature - can be used to model mutual mate choice with non-uniform mate preferences. The economics literature is reviewed, and a number of biological applications are suggested. We charactize a systematic conflict of interest between males and females over the optimal matchings in mutual mate choice systems. Moreover, we observe that the component of choice that confers the major benefit in this conflict is not choice in the conventional sense of accepting or rejecting courtships, but instead the power to choose the individuals to whom one displays.en_US
dc.format.extent126873 bytesen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherEvolutionary Ecology LTDen_US
dc.subjectassortative matingen_US
dc.subjectcoalitionsen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subjectgroup formationen_US
dc.subjectmating systemsen_US
dc.subjectsexual selectionen_US
dc.titleToward a theory of mutual mate choice: Lessons from two-sided matchingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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