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Toward a theory of mutual mate choice: Lessons from two-sided matching

Show simple item record Bergstrom, Carl T. en_US Real, Leslie A. en_US 2004-11-04T04:12:21Z en_US 2007-06-13T19:58:10Z 2004-11-04T04:12:21Z en_US 2007-06-13T19:58:10Z 2000 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Bergstrom, C. T. and L. A. Real (2000). Evolutionary Ecology Research. 2:493-508 en_US
dc.identifier.issn 1522-0613 en_US
dc.identifier.uri en_US
dc.description.abstract Theoretical models of mate choice and sexual selection typically make one of two simplifying assumptions. Either mate-preferences are assumed to be uniform (e.g., all females have the same preferences with respect to males), or mate-choice is assumed to be a one-sided affair (e.g., females do all the choosing). Recent empirical studies suggest that in many cases, neither assumption holds. In this paper, we show how two-sided matching - a branch of game theory developed in the economics literature - can be used to model mutual mate choice with non-uniform mate preferences. The economics literature is reviewed, and a number of biological applications are suggested. We charactize a systematic conflict of interest between males and females over the optimal matchings in mutual mate choice systems. Moreover, we observe that the component of choice that confers the major benefit in this conflict is not choice in the conventional sense of accepting or rejecting courtships, but instead the power to choose the individuals to whom one displays. en_US
dc.format.extent 126873 bytes en_US
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Evolutionary Ecology LTD en_US
dc.subject assortative mating en_US
dc.subject coalitions en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject group formation en_US
dc.subject mating systems en_US
dc.subject sexual selection en_US
dc.title Toward a theory of mutual mate choice: Lessons from two-sided matching en_US
dc.type Article en_US

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