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dc.contributor.authorBergstrom, Carl T.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLachmann, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2004-11-04T05:07:38Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-13T19:58:24Z
dc.date.available2004-11-04T05:07:38Zen_US
dc.date.available2007-06-13T19:58:24Z
dc.date.issued1998-04en_US
dc.identifier.citationBergstrom, C. T. and M. Lachmann. 1998. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 95: 5100-5105en_US
dc.identifier.issn0027-8424en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1773/2010en_US
dc.description.abstractThe Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that begging is energetically inexpensive for nestling birds; this finding led some researchers to question the applicability of the costly signaling framework to nestling begging. Our results show that cost-free or inexpensive signals, as observed empirically, fall within the framework of signaling theory.en_US
dc.format.extent152280 bytesen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherNational Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.titleSignalling Among Relatives. III. Talk is cheap.en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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