ResearchWorks Archive

Browsing Faculty and Researcher Data and Papers by Author "Lachmann, Michael"

Browsing Faculty and Researcher Data and Papers by Author "Lachmann, Michael"

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  • Bergstrom, Carl T.; Lachmann, Michael (Academic Press LTD Elsevier Science LTD, 2001)
    Alarm-calling behavior is common in many species that suffer from predation. While kin selection or reciprocal altruism are typically invoked to explain such behaviors, several authors have conjectured that some alarm calls ...
  • Lachmann, Michael; Szamado, Szabolcs; Bergstrom, Carl T. (National Academy of Sciences USA, 2001-11-06)
    The "costly signalling" hypothesis proposes that animal signals are kept honest by appropriate signal costs. We show that to the contrary, signal cost is unnecessary for honest signalling even when interests conflict. We ...
  • Lachmann, Michael; Bergstrom, Carl T. (The Royal Society of London, 2004)
    Combinatorial communication allows rapid and efficient transfer of detailed information, yet combinatorial communication is used by few, if any, non-human species. To complement recent studies illustrating the advantages ...
  • Bergstrom, Carl T.; Lachmann, Michael (MIT Press, 2003)
    Mutualisms generate surpluses. While much of the theoretical literature to date focuses on mechanisms by which cooperation is stabilized so that these surpluses can continue to be produced and enjoyed, we address a second ...
  • Bergstrom, Carl T.; Lachmann, Michael (National Academy of Sciences USA, 2003-01-21)
    Mutualisms provide benefits to those who participate in them. As a mutualism evolves, how will these benefits come to be allocated among the participants? We approach this question using evolutionary game theory and explore ...
  • Bergstrom, Carl T.; Szamado, Szabolcs; Lachmann, Michael (The Royal Society of London, 2002-10-24)
    Much of the theoretical literature on costly signalling concentrates on the separating equilibria of continuous signalling games. At such equilibria, every signaller sends a distinct signal, and signal receivers are able ...
  • Bergstrom, Carl T.; Lachmann, Michael (The Royal Society, 1997)
    Zahavi's handicap principle, originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection of elaborate male traits (Zahavi, 1975) suggests that signalling can be honest if less desirable signallers must pay a higher cost in ...
  • Bergstrom, Carl T.; Lachmann, Michael (Academic Press INC Elsevier Science, 1998)
    Models of costly signalling are commonly employed in evolutionary biology in order to explain how honest communication between individuals with conflicting interests can be stable. These models have focused primarily on a ...
  • Bergstrom, Carl T.; Lachmann, Michael (National Academy of Sciences, 1998-04)
    The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, ...

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