Kanan, Onur2025-07-172025-07-172016https://hdl.handle.net/1773/53166The use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been one of the most controversial issues in the American history. Historians have different ideas whether it was needed to be used and what were the alternatives to atomic bombs. Right after the end of the war, orthodox view of historians who were involved in the decision-process of using the atomic bomb tried to justify their decision claiming that the atomic weapon was no different from any other conventional weapon; it saved millions of American soldiers which would have been lost in case of an invasion of Japan; it put an early end to the war and the decision not to use the bomb would have been indefensible to the American people. Revisionist view of historians, on the other hand, claim that it was used for political reasons rather than military ones because the U.S. wanted to intimidate the Soviet Union with its new devastating weapon. The third school of historians think the Japanese emperor was responsible for the A-bombs because he did not bring about surrender earlier even though he could have done. The forth group assert that the unconditional surrender policy resulted in unconditional resistance, which led to the use of A- bombs. Among all these interpretations except for the orthodox historians, on the other hand, some evaluate the issue of using A-bombs from morality and humane perspectives and emphasize that the alternatives to use A-bombs such as clarifying the Potsdam Declaration, waiting for the Soviet entry to the war, demonstration of bombs in a remote place and naval blockade and conventional bombing were not given a detailed thought at all. This paper aims to focus on the strategy of naval blockade and conventional bombing of Japanese cities. Through the end of the war, Japanese economy was in shreds, people were starving and there was a lack of oil, rice, medicine and other crucial materials. Considering all the economic, political, sociological and psychological situation through the end of the war, this paper asserts that pummeling and strangling Japan with bombardment and blockade could have pushed Japan to surrender without the use of A-bombs. Although there is no guarantee for the time of surrender, postwar documents show that Japan had food only enough for a few days and people had already started to die of starvation. If the war had continued more, there would have been an internal upheaval with a high probability, which would push the emperor to end the war. The question is if the U.S. had not used the atomic bombs, would Japan have surrendered before November or would this strategy have prolonged the war? There is no one certain and clear answer to this question but there is only one thing that we are sure about: the strategy of bombardment and naval blockade was not thought throughly by American leaders when the A- bomb was available. This paper will look for answers to those questions by examining the Japan's war economy and the worsening situation in the country. In the first part of the paper, war preparations, economic mobilization and fundamental materials of the war economy will be discussed. In the second part, the strategy of bombardment and blockade from June to August, and the worsening domestic situation will be touched upon. In the final part, dropping A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet entry to the war and psychological and sociological despair among Japanese civilians will be explained and the question what would have happened if the A-bombs were not used will be answered.