Henry M. Jackson Schol of International Studies Confronting Terrorism: A Strategy for U.S. Policy 209 Task Force Report The Henry M. Jackson Schol of International Studies Presents 209 Task Force Report Confronting Terorism: A Strategy for U.S. Policy Task Force Advisor Profesor Daniel Chirot Contributors Hilary Eaton Dagny Ihnot Nicola Karp Sakurako Kato Fahimeh Khalegi Tehmoures Kiani Stephanie Kinion Theresa Klasen Ema Land Camile McDorman Samir Memon Beth Midanik-Blum Cameron More Sena Strenge Editors Luke McKinley Victoria Stephanova CONTENTS Acronyms Executive Sumary PART I PART I PART II PART IV Acronyms AA: American Anthropological Asociation ANA: Afghan National Army AQ-I: Al Qaeda in Iraq AQIM: Lands of the Islamic Maghreb CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CIA: Central Inteligence Agency CIN: National Inteligence Centre, Spain CTC: Security Council?s Counter-Terorism Comite DHHS: Department of Health and Human Services DHS: Department of Homeland Security DoD: Department of Defense FATA: Federaly Administered Tribal Areas FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency FOIA: Fredom of Information Act G8: Group of Eight GAO: The United States Government Acountability Ofice GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat HLF: Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development HTS: Human Terain System HTT: Human Terain Team HUMINT: Human Inteligence IC: International Criminal Court ICU: Islamic Union Courts IED: improvised explosive devices INA Imigration and Naturalization Act INS: Imigration and Naturalization Service ISAF: International Security Asistance Force MUKUB: ?Bureau of Services for Arab Mujahideen? or Maktab al-Khidmat ul ujahideen ul-Arab NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCS: National Clandestine Services NCTC: National Counterterorism Center NGO: Non-Governmental Organization NPF: National Peace Foundation NSA: National Security Agency NSC: National Security Council NWEP: North-West Frontier Province OHS: Ofice of Homeland Security OWCI: Ofice of War Crimes Isues PP: Pakistan People?s Party SIGINT: Signals Inteligence SOCOM: Special Operations Comand SOF: Special Operations Force TFG: Transitional Federal Government TFR: total fertility rate TWA: Trans World Airlines UCLAT: l'unite de cordination de la lute anti teroriste UK: United Kingdom UN: United Nations USA PATRIOT Act: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Apropriate Tols Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terorism Act USEC: United States Enrichment Corporation USR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WITS: Worldwide Incidents Tracking Systems TC: orld Trade Center Executive Summary Terorism is one of the most presing national security isues facing the United States today. The counterterorism policies of the last eight years, however, have done litle to safeguard the U.S. against potential terorist atacks in the future. In this report, we aim to provide U.S. policymakers with a series of practical recomendations for combating terorism. We begin by presenting our definition of terorism, which we adapt from the U.S. State Department: ?The term terorism eans premeditated, politicaly motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub- national groups or clandestine agents, usualy intended to have a psychological impact on a broad audience? [our modification]. 1 A number of factors produce terorism. Here, we focus on thre: Islamic radicalism, the ?youth bulge,? and U.S. global hegemony. First, radical Islamic fundamentalist groups are especialy likely to target the U.S. because of their disatisfaction with Westernization and the longstanding U.S. involvement in the internal afairs of Muslim countries. Second, countries with large populations of disafected youth, particularly young men, tend to experience higher rates of political violence than countries that lack ?youth bulges?; disafected youth sometimes turn to terorism to expres their personal frustrations. And finaly, the notion of the U.S. as a meddling ?superpower? serves as a major recruitment tol for terorist organizations which often use the internet to spread their anti- American sentiment to certain populations. We sugest that the U.S. make diplomacy a central component of its counterterorism policies. The U.S. should try to improve its public image abroad by developing its relations with populations in regions where anti-American sentiment has grown. In addition, the U.S. should work ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 1 United States Department of State. Paterns of Global Terorism 203, April 204 (acesed January 13, 209); available from htp:/ww.state.gov/documents/organization/31932.pdf. more closely with foreign governments that also face terorism in order to addres curent and future threats together. We subsequently present specific recomendations for the ways in which the U.S. should deal with terorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Somalia. The U.S. military also has a role to play in counterterorism eforts. Nevertheles, we believe that large-scale military asaults against terorist targets should not be pursued unles al diplomatic options have ben exhausted. If the ned to launch a masive incursion were to arise at some point in the future, however, the military should be prepared to engage in non-conventional warfare; in the second part of this report, we ofer sugestions on how this could be acomplished. Furthermore, the U.S. should obtain international suport for military strikes, acurately estimate the (financial) costs of going to war, deploy a high level of trops, and gather information on the social, cultural, political, and economic systems of the area being invaded. The report wil explore how the United States is responding to the danger of terorism domesticaly. These policies, principles, strategies, organizations, and programs incorporate al levels of the government, afect the personal safety of every American, and impact every aspect of the nation?s political, financial, transportation, health, and legal systems. For example, we sugest that the Department of Homeland Security and its afiliated agencies asume a more authoritative role to cordinate a more coherent domestic security policy. We find that U.S. inteligence agencies must improve their capacities to share information in the hopes of formulating a more unified and potent front to combat terorist organizations with superior inteligence analysis. Moreover, evaluate the isue of border and transportation security and imigration reform, isues that remain a contentious part of homeland security because they involve political motivations unrelated to terorism. In the years folowing 9/11, the nation?s unprecedented efort to improve upon domestic security has ben met with many failures, critiques, bureaucratic obstacles, and has at times endangered the fredoms of expresion and privacy that are at the core of American democracy. In loking backward at our past mistakes and forward to our future potential, we provide evidence to suport the creation of necesary policies, the continuation of policies that function to protect the American public, and the elimination of those that have proven inefective. This report addreses long-term solutions that could lesen the apeal of the kind of extremism that generates terorism. A historical perspective shows how the U.S. could learn from its previous responses to terorist atacks on its interests abroad. This examination reinforces the absolute preminence of diplomatic, coperative measures with countries in the Middle East to aleviate geopolitical grievances that are conducive to violent extremism. By studying modern examples of democratic policy reforms and structures in other countries, our own government can strive to gain more international suport through similar policies. We believe that the recomendations in this report could ameliorate U.S. eforts to fight terorism, enhance our national security, and protect our interests abroad. Part I Nicola Karp, Sakurako Kato, Sena Strenge erorism is not a recent phenomenon; it has long ben used as a form of asymetrical warfare. More specificaly, non-state actors engage in terorist activity in order to compel larger military powers to acquiesce to their demands. Despite the widely held view that terorists are ?senseles? or ?uncivilized,? we argue that their actions are anything but irational. While it must never be condoned, certain groups merely use terorism as a means of expresing their grievances and furthering their political and ideological objectives. In the past several decades, the United States has ben the target of terorist threats from Islamic radical groups. Though these groups have various motivations for their actions, U.S. foreign policy and geopolitical interests in the Middle East serve as major reasons for their existence. The U.S. should constantly be mindful of this consideration when devising its counterterorism policies. T Definition of Terorism The task of defining terorism is dificult, subjective, but necesary. Acording to Rushworth Kidder, ?Most definitions of terorism include four elements: the method (force and violence), the perpetrator (a revolutionary or conspiratorial group), the target (governments and civilian populations), and the purpose (to coerce and intimidate for political ends).? 2 In this policy report, we propose a working definition of terorism, meaning that most terorist acts fit this definition. Please note, however, that this definition, obtained from the U.S. State Department?s Paterns of Global Terorism (204), is not static or permanent, but functions for the purposes of this report: ?The term terorism eans premeditated, politicaly motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usualy intended to influence an audience.? 3 We chose to modify the last phrase to ?usualy intended to have a psychological impact on a broad audience.? This change reflects our emphasis on the fact that terorist acts aim to instil fear in the target population. As Alan B. Krueger writes, ?the goal of terorism is to spread fear. The imediate victims are not as important as the broader mesage sent to the public.? 4 The State Department amended the Paterns report definition by specifying that the term ?noncombatant? includes, in addition to civilians, military personel who at the time of an incident are unarmed or are not on duty. As Krueger explains, ?The [U.S.] government also considers terorism to include atacks on military instalations or on armed military personel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the particular site.? 5 Furthermore, the State Department regards international terorism as terorism that involves citizens or the teritory of more than one country. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 2 Rushworth Kider. ?Acts of Teror?? Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 1986 (acesed February 10 th , 209); available from htp:/ww.csmonitor.com/1986/0513/zter1d.html. 3 United States Department of State. Paterns of Global Terorism 203, April 204 (acesed January 13, 209); available from htp:/ww.state.gov/documents/organization/31932.pdf. 4 Alan B Krueger, What Makes a Terorist: Economics and the Rots of Terorism (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 207), 14-15. 5 Ibid., 54-5. We to adopt these specifications for our definition of terorism. The term terorism is dificult to define. For example, various definitions exist within the U.S. government, which wil be discused below, not to mention even greater diferences amongst definitions from other countries and organizations. To understand the dificulties involved in defining this term, one has to lok no further than the various definitions that exist within the U.S. government. These departmental definitions, and their diferences, shed light on the contested nature of the term. The FBI defines terorism as ?the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.? 6 The U.S. Department of Defense?s Dictionary of Military Terms defines terorism as ?the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generaly political, religious, or ideological. 7 Our definition simply considers the violence as ?politicaly motivated,? while the FBI specifies that the violence promotes ?political or social objectives,? while the Department of Defense further specifies that terorist aims are ?generaly political, religious, or ideological.? Some scholars, such as Brian Michael Jenkins, argue that ?terorism ust be defined acording to the quality of the act itself, not the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause.? 8 Though Jenkins has a point, the U.S. government has valid reasons for specifying that terorists have a certain agenda. We regard terorism as being ?politicaly motivated,? which serves to narow ho exactly is a terorist. For curent terorist threats this specification is reasonable ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 6 FBI ?Terorism 200/201,? (acesed February 17, 209), available from htp:/ww.fbi.gov/publications/teror/teror200_201.htm. 7 United States Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military Terms. 204 (acesed February 16, 209); available from htp:/ww.asafm.army.mil/pubs/jp1-02/jp1-02.pdf. 8 Brian Michael Jenkins, ?Where I draw the line,? Christian Science Monitor, 202 (acesed February 1, 209); available from htp:/ww.csmonitor.com/specials/terorism/frameset.html. considering that the most threatening atacks have come from groups such as al-Qaeda who have stated political aims. The term terorism caries strong negative conotations, and is often used as a political label by governments to insinuate that the perpetrators are uncivilized, imoral, unjustified, and such. No one wants to be labeled a terorist, thus actors whose actions have ben labeled as terorist use expresions such as fredom fighters, rebels, vigilantes, liberators or other terms with relatively positive conotations to describe themselves. Guerila warfare lacks the pejorative conotations of terorism, and at times terorist tactics have ben labeled urban guerila warfare by certain Western media outlets. Terorism is a tactic, and this tactic has ben used by groups labeled ?terorist? as wel as by guerila movements, and states. This report focuses on atacks that fit our definition of terorism and that pose a threat to the U.S. The aim of those who comit terorism against the U.S. is not to gain control over a particular teritory. This makes terorism vastly diferent from other forms of warfare. Whereas guerila strugles often aim for control of a teritory, Chaliand writes that ?as a strategy, terorism remains in the domain of psychological influence and lacks the material elements of guerila warfare.? 9 Terorists tend to operate in smal units and utilize homemade bombs, car bombs, and other weapons uncharacteristic of military personel. The case of the September 1, 201 atacks ilustrates the ways in which terorists use atypical weapons for purposes of inciting fear in the U.S. population and beyond (rather than the acquisition of teritory). ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 9 Chaliand, 24-25. Conditions that Facilitate Terorism Individuals might join terorist groups because they are true believers in the political or ideological goals stated by the group, because of personal or selfish motivations, or because of the pul of group psychology. More importantly, perhaps, It may be more useful to se terrorists as rational and intentional actors who develop deliberate strategies in order to achieve political objectives. They make their choices between diferent options, on the basis of the limitations and posibilities the situation ofers. When aplying such an actor- oriented aproach we would be interested in understanding dynamic proceses rather than focusing on more or les static causes. 10 Instead of loking for the causes of terorism, we prefer to examine conditions that are conducive to the emergence of terorism, a phenomenon that is embedded in particular historical contexts. Tore Bjorgo provides the folowing list of posible conditions: ? A lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law leads to domestic terorism ? Failed or weak states leaves a power vacum for terorist groups ? Rapid modernization may corelate with rise in ideological terorism but not with ethno-nationalist terorism ? Extremist ideologies of secular or religious origins ? Historical antecedents of political violence, civil wars, revolutions, dictatorships or ocupation may provide a more acepting atmosphere for political violence and terorism ? Hegemony and inequality of power when local or international powers poses an overwhelming power compared to opositional groups ? Ilegitimate or corupt governments frequently give rise to oposition that may turn to terorist means ? Powerful external actors upholding ilegitimate governments may be sen as an insurmountable obstacle to neded regime change ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 10 Tore Bjorgo, ed. Rot Causes of Terorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, (New York: Routledge, 205), 3. ? Represion by foreign ocupation or by colonial powers ? The experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin is the chief rot cause of ethno-nationalist terorism ? Failure or unwilingnes by the state to integrate disident groups or emerging social clases may lead to their alienation from the political system ? The experience of social injustice is a main motivating cause behind social-revolutionary terorism ? The presence of charismatic ideological leaders able to transform widespread grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent strugle ? Trigering events are the direct precipitators of terorist acts 1 Though a number of the abovementioned isues are worthy of further examination, we are focusing on thre conditions in this report. These conditions?Islamic radicalism, demographic ?youth bulge,? and U.S. hegemony?were chosen as thre of the most crucial curent conditions in ned of explanation. We dem these conditions to be closely conected to terorist groups that target the U.S. Condition One: Islamic Radicalism Terorism is politicaly motivated. The U.S. State Department?s National Counterterorism Center (NCTC) states that ?politicaly motivated violence? is ?any life threatening atack or kidnaping by any ?Foreign Terorist Organization? or group previously apearing on the list of ?Other Organizations of Concern.?? 12 Similarly, any atack by an organization or individual against a ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 1 Ibid., 258-260. 12 United States State Department, National Counterterorism Center. 207 Report on Terorism. April, 208 (acesed February 1, 209); available from htp:/wits.nctc.gov/reports/crot207nctcanexfinal.pdf, 7. government or diplomatic oficial or a government/diplomatic building is deemed politicaly motivated and is therefore considered terorism. Acording to the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) of the NCTC, aproximately 14,00 terorist atacks ocured in various countries in 207, resulting in over 2,00 deaths. Compared to 206, the number of atacks remained aproximately the same in 207 while deaths rose by 1,80, a 9 percent increase. 13 As was the case in previously recorded years, the largest number of reported atacks and deaths ocured in the Near East and South Asia. The perpetrators of over 9,20 atacks (64 percent of total atacks) in 207 could not be determined from open source information. However, of the remaining atacks, as many as 130 diferent sub-national groups, many of them wel-known foreign terorist organizations or clandestine agents, were conected to an atack in various ways. Of those roughly130 sub-national groups, al-Qaeda in Iraq, more than any other group, claimed it conducted atacks with the highest casualty totals. 14 For example, open source reporting aleges that Islamic extremists played an important role in a 207 United Kingdom bombing plot that was foiled when vehicle bombs were discovered outside several night clubs, as wel as a disrupted German bombing plot that targeted American interests. Furthermore examples of al-Qaeda?s involvement in recent terorist atacks include: ? Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb atacked a United Nations facility in Algeria kiling over 40 people and wounding over 150. ? Perpetrators with ties to al-Qaeda may have ben behind the Benazir Bhuto asasination that kiled the former Pakistani prime minister along with 153 others and wounded aproximately 250. 15 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 13 Ibid., 9. 14 Ibid., 1. 15 Ibid. Recent cases of terorist atacks reveal they are often motivated by a smal segment of a population?s disatisfaction with how their society is organized and those in power to run it. Such grievances are especialy on the rise in the Near East. For example, terorist atacks increased by 137 percent in Pakistan betwen 206 and 207, largely due to certain groups? disagrements with the central authorities. Although the government signed a peace agrement in September 206 with pro- Taliban tribes in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federaly Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the region acounted for 54 percent of the total atacks. 16 This escalation in terorist activity included the FATA-based rocket and suicide improvised explosive devices and vehicular bombing atacks against police, military, and civilian targets countrywide. These incidents should be considered against the backdrop of Pakistan?s changing social and political environment; in other words, the actions of terorists in Pakistan and elsewhere grounded in evolving historical contexts. By loking at terorism in this light, we can, for the purpose of policymaking, analyze one of the corelating conditions for contemporary terorism: Islamic radicalism. Radicalism can be defined as an ideology that aims to change a fundamental aspect(s) of society. Today, the terms radicalism and fundamentalism are used interchangeably and most often taken to describe religious trends such as increased religiosity and increased identification with a favored religion. We wil further discus this notion of fundamentalism when we get to the manipulation of Islam to adhere to radical notions of sharia law, the politicization of Islam, and its increasingly favored use in global jihad. The Muslim world includes 57 Muslim-majority countries spaning Asia and Africa, which house about 1.5 bilion believers, making Islam the second-largest faith after Christianity. 17 The spread of Islam in the Western societies of Europe, America, and Australia is a relatively recent ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 16 Ibid., 17. 17 Raphael Israeli, ?The New Demographic Balance in Europe and its Consequences,? March, 207 (acesed January 25, 209); available from htp:/jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&TMID=11&LNGID=1&FID=379&PID=0&ID=1509. phenomenon, and as its numbers increase, either via imigration (legal or ilegal) or by natural growth, the awakening of a Muslim identity discourages integration within Western societies and gives rise to a variety of social, political, and economic problems. Some Muslim inority comunities in Europe have imported their deeply roted ethnic, political, and religious conflicts into their host countries. For instance, anti-Semitism in certain areas has become more prevalent, and certain Jewish comunities have ben subjected to violence by Muslim imigrants. 18 In 207, U.S. federal court documents that were acepted into evidence during the trial of the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) revealed details about the Muslim Brotherhod?s (discused later in further detail) global mision to create a unified Muslim state. A sixten-page Arabic document discloses an inside lok at the Muslim Brotherhod?s role in recruitment, organization, ideology, and the development of the organization in diferent phases in the United States 19 . It states ?the Ikhwan (the Muslim Brothers or the Group) must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within and ?sabotaging? its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God?s religion is made victorious over al other religions.? 20 This example provides evidence that Islamic radicalism is a prominent threat to the United States as wel as to the world. Thus, when formulating U.S. policy toward global terorism, Islamic radicalism ust be considered as one of the conditions that are conducive to the development of this problem. In order to discus Islamic radicalism, we must first distinguish the diference betwen the basic theological doctrine of Islam and today?s radicalization of Islam. ?Islamism refers not to a ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 18 Ibid. 19 Douglas Farah and Ron Sande, ?The Ikhwan in North America: A Short History?. htp:/ww.nefafoundation.org/miscelaneous/nefahlf0807.pdf. 20 Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, ?The Muslim Brotherhod: A Moderate Islamic Alternative to al-Qaeda or a Partner in Global Jihad?? November, 207 (acesed January 25, 209); available from htp:/jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=2&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=11&FID=379&PID=18 59&ID=1920&TL=The_Muslim_Brotherhod:_A_Moderate_Islamic_Alternative_to_al- Qaeda_or_a_Partner_in_Global_Jihad?. theological doctrine but to the political use of Islam,? and must be distinguished from Islamic theology and even more, fundamentalism. 21 Fundamentalism advocates the return to the founding texts of Islam; this fundamentalism only becomes Islamism when its ideology is used to impose a strictly interpreted model of original Islam based on ?sharia,? or Islamic law, on society and the state. Islamism then, is described by Philipe Migaux, as a movement toward the use of Islamic theology to ?reform the institutional structure and socio-cultural environment of a geopolitical grouping,? something the Taliban did in Afghanistan when they came to power after the end of the Soviet ocupation of the country. 2 However, we should distinguish betwen Islamism and ?militant Islamism? or what we, in our policy proposal wil refer to as Islamic radicalism. Islamic radicalism is a term used when Islamist movements resort to violence to achieve their goals of creating a unified Muslim state. Within this militant Islamic movement, we wil focus on the ?mujahideen,? which ?places greater emphasis on individual action on the part of its folowers, however, in the context of what is to them a holy undertaking.? 23 The mujahideen movement is part of a radical faction of the multifaceted Islamist ideology?the most notorious and internationaly focused one being al-Qaeda. 24 The main diference betwen the mujahideen movement and other Islamists is the group?s comitment to the violent overthrow of the existing international system and its replacement by an al-encompasing Islamic state. 25 In order to justify their resort to such extreme violence, members of the mujahideen define ?jihad,? a term that in its original text means an internal strugle to please God as wel as an external batle to open countries to the cal of Islam, to have a narower meaning. They alter this religious ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 21 Philipe Migaux, ?The Rots of Islamic Radicalism?, in The History of Terorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda, ed. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (Berkley and Los Angeles, California: The Regents of the University of California, 207), 259. 2 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Teror, (New Haven: Yale University Pres, 206), 4. 25 Ibid. ?jihad? into an external fight against non-believers, fighting alone?using tactics such as suicide bombings, kidnapings, and executions of non-Muslims as wel as their own people if necesary to incite a broader audience. 26 Because they identify the U.S. as one of their main enemies, analyzing the mujahideen could help us beter understand contemporary terorist threats against the United States. Religious Rots It is dificult to understand the mujahideen movement?s motivations without understanding its religious rots. Members believe that the destruction of the curent world order is ?the necesary first step to create an Islamic utopia on earth.? 27 Their reasoning is intertwined losely with both historical fact and traditional religious interpretation. Islam, meaning surender to God, is based on the absolute respect by the ?uma??the comunity of believers?for the ?suna??meaning the tradition. This Islamic tradition consists of two series of sacred texts, the Qur?an, whose 14 ?suras? contain al the divine teachings transmited to Muhamad by the Archangel Gabriel, and the ?hadith,? the reported sayings and acts of the prophet Muhamad. This body of theology then became the subject of interpretations that were declared infalible, which created the juridical model based on sharia, or Qur?anic law. Centuries ago, special dispensations were acorded to those who were in a position to spread Islam (soldiers, tradesmen, and seamen) but these dispensations however, were used by the jihadist movement, in the context of strugle against infidels, to justify actions traditionaly forbidden by the ?suna.? Greater jihad is considered the spiritual work that every Muslim ust do individualy in order to abide by the rules of Islam. It is an ongoing duty for Muslims to kep their religious faith alive and act as true believers. There is another duty compeled upon al Muslims caled the leser jihad, the duty for al Muslims to defend, by al means at their disposal, their religion when it is under ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 26 Ibid., 5. 27 Ibid., 7. atack. 28 Those in power within various radical Islamic groups, in order to justify the radical movement toward destroying the curent world order and its non-believers, have manipulated the notion of leser jihad through sucesive interpretations. Thus, it is important for us to lok at the leser jihad, because it is this doctrine that evolved in the 1960s into the international jihadist movement. Based on its sucesive interpretations, the leser jihad has become the incesant cal by the mujahideen movement for the Muslim population to fight for Islam. The Muslim Brotherhod One of the first Islamic-based organizations that turned to fundamentalism and created the organizational groundwork for the politicization of Islam was The Muslim Brotherhod. In March 1928, Hasan al-Bana founded the Muslim Brotherhod in Colonial Egypt with a mision of ?doing god and stamping out evil.? 29 The Brotherhod atempted to reintroduce the afirmations of Islam to the Muslim comunity at a time when Egyptian society was under considerable European influence. Its members believed that the ?obvious and only solution to [their] woes [was] to find a way back to the true path? of Islam, the unification of their lives with the one and only God. 30 Twenty years later, the movement had nearly 2 milion folowers and had spread throughout the Muslim world. Led by al-Bana, and fueled by their resentment of the Western colonization of Egypt and other parts of the Middle East, the Brotherhod argued that Western domination and a distancing from Islam were responsible for the Muslim comunity?s problems. The Brotherhod advocated comprehensive social reform aimed at bringing about social justice, and rejected any form of nationalist ideology?considered a Western concept?and caled for the revitalization of the ?uma.? The folowers believed that Islam governed every part of their lives; they sought refuge in the idea that they had ?God?s permision to defend themselves against their injustices,? and began to ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 28 Migaux, 265. 29 Ibid., 274. 30 James W. Roberts, ?Political Violence and Terorism in Islamdom?, in Democratic Development and Political Terorism, ed. Wiliam Croty, (Boston: Northeastern University Pres), 108. arm themselves under a ?secret organization? led by Salah Ashmawi that rapidly grew into a ful- fledged armed entity. 31 Even though Al-Bana was asasinated on February 12, 1949, shortly after his organization was dismantled within Egypt and almost 4,00 of its members arested, the Brotherhod had laid the organizational as wel as the ideological groundwork for later mujahideen movements and continued as an underground network of Islamic radicals. Sayid Qutb A prominent figure in radical Islam, Sayid Qutb (1906-196), believed that a resort to violence could be a religious obligation in the fight against a political leadership that had lost its Muslim rots. Qutb further developed the theory of punishing and chalenging those in power (i.e. those who ruled over a Muslim state), further distinguishing Islamists from radicals by labeling governing authorities as unbelievers. At a time when many Muslims felt opresed by their political leadership and there was growing discontent in the Muslim world about growing secularization, Qutb?s words semed the likely ideology to lead them away from the Muslim odernization movement under colonial rule and Western principles. Although Qutb was hanged in 196, acused of having conspired against Egypt and his words condemned as being heretical by the renewed Muslim Brotherhod (which neded to maintain its legitimacy as a non-violent group), his words created two main ofshots of the Brotherhod: one cals for conversion through religious apeals and nonviolence (fundamentalist) and the other that cals for radical direct involvement in political violence (jihadist). Qutb laid the foundation for the extreme belief jihad was a cardinal Islamic obligation, that it had to be ofensive in nature, and that it aplied also to Muslims whose misconduct was ?tantamount to apostasy,? which is punishable by death. 32 Jihad and Terorism ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 31 Migaux, 275. 32 Ibid, 286. With the groundwork laid by Qutb, the Muslim Brotherhod, and past Islamist theories, jihad and the mujahideen movement by the 1970s was a ful-blown force to be reckoned with throughout the Middle East. Al-Jihad, the most hard-line jihadist group was founded by Abd al- Salam Faraj, from Egypt, as he put his theories that jihad was the sixth pilar of Islam into action. Fara argued that both the Qur?an and the hadith esentialy dealt with warfare in the service of God and in oposition to evil. In his writings, Muslims are caled upon to be soldiers for Islam that would be wiling to use any means available in order to achieve their righteous goals 3 He thus elevated the duty of armed revolt ?against an infidel political leadership to the level of a standing religious obligation.? 34 Al-Jihad, as wel as its many predecesors and sucesors, organized political protests and comited various acts of political violence, most notably in the asasination of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The ?Bureau of Services for Arab Mujahideen? or Maktab al-Khidmat ul-Mujahideen ul- Arab (MUKUB) is a more recent example of a jihadist group. MUKUB was created in 1984 by ?Abdalah ?Azam in order to manage the substantial amount of funding, volunters, and combat training that was neded to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. ?Azam?s organization used the Arab-language magazine Al-Jihad, to perpetuate propaganda for MUKUB and spread the idea that ?mujahideen combat in Afghanistan was an individual obligation for al Muslims?jihad is a lifelong obligation.? 35 The MUKUB recruited fighters from around the world who ?felt that they were sloughing of their nationalities and forming a new comunity of holy wariors, like the Prophet?s companion. No longer were they Saudis, Egyptians, or Algerians; they were Salafist mujahideen.? 36 This sense of unity became a comon feature in future international jihad groups after the MUKUB was disbanded. These fighters, however, gained a sense of confidence after the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 3 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 294. 36 Ibid., 296. Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan; claiming victory, they adopted the belief that they had a mision to retrieve al the lost lands of Islam that had falen to the infidel. AQIM and al-Qaeda Another example of the growing global threat of jihad and terorism is the anouncement in September 206, of the ?blesed union? betwen al-Qaeda and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) that came to be known as al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is an Algerian-based Suni jihadist group which, after its formal aliance with al-Qaeda, expanded its goals of overthrowing the Algerian government and establishing an Islamic caliphate 37 to launching atacks on Western targets. With this renewed mision against the West, members of AQIM have ben behind several improvised explosive devices (IED) asaults against convoys of foreign nationals working in the Algerian energy sector. In December 207, AQIM atacked United Nations ofices in Algiers with a car bomb and in February 208 it atacked the Israeli Embasy in Nouakchot, Mauritania with smal arms. 38 Although AQIM mainly employs conventional tactics including guerila-style ambushes and mortar, rocket, and IED atacks, in May 207, AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdal anounced that suicide bombings wil become the group?s main tactic. 39 Implications Radical Islamic activity has taken rot inside the United States. The curent federal court case, United States of America v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al. in Texas, which was mentioned earlier in this report, sheds light on some of the Muslim Brotherhod?s U.S. operations. The case file contains Muslim Brotherhod documents from the 1980s and early 190s. In an internal memorandum writen in 191 by a senior Brotherhod leader titled, ?On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,? it is revealed that: ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 37 United States State Department, National Counterorism Center 209 Calendar ?Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)? (acesed February 3, 209); available from htp:/ww.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. ? The Brotherhod established a highly structured organization with many diferent faces inside the United States while deliberately and continualy seking to hide the Brotherhod?s links to its front groups. ? The agenda caried out by these groups in the United States were not necesarily true to the publicly proclaimed goals of the organizations, such as promoting civil rights protection for Muslims. Rather, the goal had ben to destroy the United States from the inside and work for the establishment of a global Islamic society. ? The primary function of the Brotherhod structures, from the early 190s forward, was to suport materialy and politicaly, the Hamas movement in the Palestinian teritories, as instructed by the ofice of the Muslim Brotherhod in Cairo. 40 This example of how deeply roted the Muslim Brotherhod is within the United States ofers insight into how dificult the ?war on teror? waged by former President George W. Bush is on a domestic and international level. Condition Two: A Demographic ?Youth Bulge? Another condition that is conducive to terorism is the presence of a demographic ?youth bulge? in a particular region. A ?youth bulge? is defined as a disproportionately large, betwen 30 and 40 percent, concentration of a country?s population in the 15-to-29 year-old age group; this phenomenon is present in most of the world?s modern terorism ?hotspots? including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. 41 In many countries, such as Pakistan, this phenomenon has existed since the mid-twentieth century and it is expected to last until at least 2020. History ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 40 Farah and Sande, 1-2. 41 Helgerson, John L. ?The National Security Implications for Global Demographic Change? National Inteligence Council, April 30 th , 202. Acesed February 20 th , 209. htp:/ww.dni.gov/nic/speches_demochange.html. The ?youth bulge? phenomenon has fueled violence and warfare for much of recorded history. From Europe?s medieval wars up until World War I, an exces population of young surplus males, meaning those who are not firstborns, tends to facilitate conflict and violence. While humanity?s birth rate has slowed in recent years, the population continues to anualy increase at a significant percentage. Additionaly, one bilion people live in countries that are expected to double their populations in les than 35 years. 42 Though in Pakistan, for example, the total fertility rate (TFR) has droped from 6.28 in 1950 to 5.08 in 205, the population has increased fourfold from 36 milion to 157 milion. 43 Gunar Heinsohn argues that, In such ?youth bulge? countries, young men tend to eliminate each other or get kiled in agresive wars until a balance is reached between their ambitions and the number of aceptable positions available in their society. In Arab nations such as Lebanon (150,00 dead in the civil war between 1975 and 190) or Algeria (20,00 dead in the Islamists' war against their own people between 199 and 206), the slaughter abated only when the fertility rates in these countries fel from seven children per woman to fewer than two. The warring stoped because no more warriors were being born. 4 Just as in the past, we are now experiencing a global ?youth bulge? that is threatening to erupt in violence, as shown by unsustainable TFR in developing countries that also exhibit other conditions for terorism. This population and demographic situation, along with rising Islamic radicalism and a host of political, social, and economic factors, create an environment that fosters the development of terorism. In many of the countries that exhibit ?youth bulges,? there is a prevalence of political violence and, increasingly, terorism. Iran has come to fulfil many of the predictions for the efects ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 42 Elizabeth Leahy with Robert Engelman, Carolyn Gib Vogel, Sarah Hadock And Tod Preston, ?The Shape of Things to Come - Why Age Structure Maters To A Safer, More Equitable World,? Population Action International, April 1 th , 207 (acesed February 20, 209); Chapter 1 available from htp:/ww.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/The_Shape_of_Things_to_Come/Sumary.shtml. 43 Pakistan: Total Population, (acesed February 20, 209); available from htp:/globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?Country=PK&IndicatorID=132#row. 4 Gunar Heinsohn, ?Ending the West?s Proxy War Against Israel,? Wal Stret Journal, (acesed January 20, 209); available from htp:/online.wsj.com/article/SB12317179743471961.html#articleTabs_coments%26articleTabs%3Darticl e. of the bulge. For example, Iran?s demographic distribution was already very unbalanced in 1980 and was dominated by the 70% of the population under 30 years-old. During this time period, Iran saw great political and social upheaval that was largely orchestrated by its youth. This demographic phenomenon contrasts with the graph for 205, in which TFR greatly declined from 6.6 to 2.1 and resulted in a much healthier population alocation. 45 While the ?youth bulge? in Iran was not a direct cause of the Iranian Revolution, it was significant in creating large groups of disafected youth without aces to the job market who then engaged in political violence. Figure 1 46 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 45 Leahy, Chapter 1. 46 Ibid. Conflict and terorism-prone regions tend to have large numbers of young people and a lack of social and economic oportunities. Yet contrary to popular belief, ?it is a profound and repeated finding that the mere facts of poverty and inequality or even increases in these conditions? 47 do not necesarily facilitate terorist activity. For example, ?today, thre or four Pakistani boys compete for one place in society, or for the property left by their father. Angry, frustrated young men are easily recruited into radical groups and teror organizations.? 48 Therefore, it is not simply the por or uneducated that turn to terorism but rather educated, middle-clas individuals who are frustrated with their inability to suport themselves or atain the lifestyle of their parents. A portion of the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 47 Jack A. Goldstone, "Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict," Journal of International Afairs 56, no. 1 (Fal 202): 8. 48 Gunar Heinsohn, ?Batle of the Youth Bulge,? The Wekly Standard, November 29 th , 207. disafected youth population consequently has the potential to turn to extremism in order to expres its grievances. A specific set of demographic factors is necesary for the ?youth bulge? efect to be transmuted into terorism. Specificaly, ? A rapid growth in the labor force in slow-growing economies ? A rapid increase in educated youth aspiring to elite positions when such positions are scarce ? Unequal population growth rates betwen diferent ethnic groups ? Urbanization that exceds employment growth and migrations that change the local balance among major ethnic groups 49 As these factors amplify the primary efect of the ?youth bulge,? they also increase the probability for violence and terorism. The absence of terorism and home-grown terorists in a country with a ?youth bulge? may be due to a lack of aditional conditions to make the cause atractive enough to youth. Aditionaly, it is often dificult to distinguish betwen civil wars and civil wars that include acts of terorism by non-state militias or foreign groups (for example in the Lebanese conflicts, by Kurds in the Midle East). There has ben a significant ?youth bulge? in the past several decades and some estimate that ?more than half the world?s countries remain to young for comfort.? 50 Nonetheles, an additional 70 countries display the advanced demographic transition that post-dates a bulge; this sugests that there could be a decrease in the likelihod of terorism steming from these areas. 51 The ?youth bulge? thus has the potential to disapear naturaly from certain populations. For example, if there is a demographic transition from large families to smal families within twenty years ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 49 Goldstone, 5. 50 Ibid, 81. 51 Ibid, 81. of the bulge?s apearance in a population, the ?youth bulge? wil ?mature.? 52 However, it wil continue to be important to monitor global TFR and to track large increases as they may be a precursor to yet another ?youth bulge.? Condition Thre: U.S. Hegemony Why is the United States a terorist target? Most acts of terorism are not aimed directly at the U.S.; in fact the majority of atacks ocur within foreign countries; India has the highest incident rate of atacks, while the West Bank and Gaza Strip have the highest ratio of atacks in relation to population size. 53 In order for this report to provide recomendations for U.S. counterterorism policy, however, it wil focus on terorism that has the potential to harm the United States or its interests around the world. To begin with, the curent threats we face must be understod as products of recent history. The colapse of the Soviet Union left the U.S. as the world?s sole superpower, enabling the Western world-view, embodied in U.S. foreign policy, to dominate numerous aspects of international afairs. Does this dominance explain why the one at the top is the most hated? Is the U.S. perceived as a gleaming target? Terorists chose targets to get their points acros, and it helps that the U.S. is a responsive, interactive target. Yet retaliation on the part of the U.S. does litle to lesen the threat of terorism. 54 For example, in retaliation for the April 5, 1986 bombing of a nightclub in West Berlin that kiled thre and wounded over 20 (including American servicemen), the Reagan administration authorized direct military strikes on Libya which kiled 37 and wounded 10. Andrew Silke writes that subsequent studies ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 52 Richard P. Cincota, "How Democracies Grow Up," Foreign Policy (March 208): 80-82. 53 Krueger, 71. 54 Andrew Silke, ?Fire of Iolaus: The role of state countermeasures in causing terorism and what neds to be done,? in Bjorgo, 248. uncovered that the retaliatory strike led to a significant short-term increase in terrorism directed against the U.S.A and its close aly the UK. Libya, far from being cowed into submision, actualy increased its comitment to terrorism and started to sponsor even more acts of terrorism than before. In the four years prior to the strikes, Libyan-suported terrorism kiled 136 people. In the four years after the strikes, Libyan terrorism left 59 people dead. 5 Hence, the U.S. policy of responding agresively to terorism probably does more to encourage acts of retaliation from terorists than it does to prevent them. Terorist organizations do not expect to bring down the U.S.; it is precisely their inability to wage conventional warfare that has led them to pursue this tactic. It is worth noting that most terorist groups fail to gain momentum, however; only a few pose a serious threat to the U.S. Such groups, notably al-Qaeda, use their disatisfaction with U.S. hegemony to legitimize their existence and garner suport for their cause. One of al-Qaeda?s goals is to rid Arab nations of American influence, particularly the presence of the U.S. military. The spread of American companies, gods, and culture is also sen as a negative development. The international media, particularly through online and television outlets, has played a key role in spreading information about terorist organizations. Acording to the State Department?s report Country Reports on Terorism 206, al-Qaeda is adept at utilizing media for propaganda, especialy as their operational capabilities have ben disrupted. Members of the organization ?exploit and interpret the actions of numerous local, pseudo-independent actors, using them to mobilize suporters and sympathizers, intimidate oponents and influence international opinion. Terorists consider information operations to be a principal part of their efort.? 56 The report continues, ?[al- Qaeda?s] curent aproach focuses on propaganda warfare ? using a combination of terorist atacks, insurgency, media broadcasts, Internet-based propaganda, and subversion to undermine confidence and unity in Western populations and generate the false perception of a powerful worldwide ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 5 Ibid. 56 United States Department of State. Country Reports on Terorism, 207. Publication 9705. (Acesed January 20, 209); available from htp:/ww.state.gov/documents/organization/8383.pdf. movement.? As John Horgan writes, ?the reality of terorism in today?s world is that political movements that use terorism skilfuly manipulate events, and their media coverage, to create for their existing or potential audiences deliberate and often sophisticated impresions and interpretations serving their own particular purposes.? 57 Terorist groups have also used the media to amplify the psychological impact of their atacks on the targeted populations. Many Americans watched as the first World Trade Center tower in New York City stod smoking, and as more and more tuned in to watch, the second tower was hit. Yet atacks are only the most visible exercise of power ? the real power lies within the ability of terorist organizations to drum up suport (especialy monetary suport) and legitimacy for their organizations. They use the media within their own comunities, by way of flyers that denounce the U.S., and spread their mesage through newspapers, television, and the internet. Some groups make videos of suicide bombers before he or she is sent of to fulfil their mision; this ensures that the participant wil go through with the atack, provides their family with a farewel mesage, and then is released to the media after the atack as propaganda. Alex P. Schmid sugests that the propaganda is especialy aimed at those who already identify positively with the terrorist group (goal: to maintain or increase their suport); those who are their declared oponents (goal: to demoralize, intimidate or coerce them); uncomited members of the local comunity or external audiences (goal: to impres them); the terrorists? own organization (goal: to kep it united through planing ?the biger one?); rival groups (goal: to show them who is ?number one?). 58 As Schmid continues to explain, the ?fact that an act of terorism is more than an act of violence, that it is first and foremost an act of violence-induced comunication, makes the public afairs and propaganda dimension of both terorism and counterterorism crucial.? 59 The internet has ben an important tol for those involved, or seking to become involved, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 57 John Horgan, ?The social and psychological characteristics of terorism and terorists? in Bjorgo, 45. 58 Alex P. Schmid, ?Prevention of Terorism: towards a multi-pronged aproach? in Bjorgo, 230. 59 Ibid. in terorist activity. Over the last decade, the number of known terorist websites has increased from roughly 10 to over 4,80. 60 Though denoting a site as ?terorist? is a subjective proces, there has nevertheles ben a clear rise in the number of internet sites and resources for terorists. These sites ofer training tutorials, mesage boards to facilitate international comunication, morale-bosting videos, and fundraising links. Keeping track of terorist online activity wil certainly continue to be an important component of U.S. counterterorism eforts. Part II Hilary Eaton, Tehmoures Kiani, Samir Memon ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 60 Eben Kaplan, ?Terorists and the Internet,? Council on Foreign Afairs, January 8, 209 (acesed February 2, 209); available from htp:/ww.cfr.org/publication/1005/. T he U.S. has a number of tols at its disposal when it comes to formulating foreign counterterorism policy. Diplomacy, in particular, should be our greatest aset. For instance, the U.S. has the ability to improve the curent state of its military operations in Afghanistan by fostering closer relations with Pakistan, especialy since the Taliban and certain terorist organizations have ben seking refuge and building up their forces in the mountainous regions along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Bilateral talks resulting in greater coperation betwen the U.S. military and its Pakistani counterpart could increase the U.S.?s chances of establishing a stable security environment in Afghanistan. Though diplomacy is preminent, this report notes that the U.S. could also bost the efectivenes of its overseas counterterorism operations by strengthening the military?s capacity to engage in non- conventional combat. Finaly, the development of a more diverse and thus more qualified body of inteligence oficers in the National Clandestine Services has the potential to bolster the U.S.?s inteligence gathering capabilities abroad. Fighting Terorism: the Diplomatic Front War is a failure of diplomacy. In any examination of previous U.S. wars, especialy in asesing the failures of the curent ?war on teror? in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. should not only lok at the failures of inteligence, but should also understand why it could not achieve its objectives through diplomatic means. The U.S. has the best equiped and best trained military in the world, but the soldiers are not adequately prepared for geting involved in wars against terorism which involve, to a great degre, dealing with native populations and engaging in nation-building. For this reason, the U.S. should prioritize diplomacy; it should be used as the first option when the U.S. neds to addres certain problems and disputes with others. Weak diplomatic strategies have harmed U.S. counterterorism eforts as wel as U.S. operations in Iraq. In the mid-190s, for instance, the U.S. ?lost an oportunity to capture a major terorist operative because Yemeni authorities turned a blind eye as he went through the Yemen airport.? 61 The fact that the Yemeni government at the time of incident had (and continues to have) a friendly relationship with the U.S. sugests that the U.S. did not fuly inform the Yemenis about its counterterorism neds. More recently, Turkey would not alow the U.S. to use its teritory to move U.S. military forces to the Persian Gulf during the Iraq war. The U.S. had not talked to the Turkish government about its reservations toward the removal of Saddam Husein from power. Talking to Turkey would not have meant that the U.S. should have sought Turkey?s permision to engage in the war; rather, the U.S. may have ben able to convince the Turks that their concerns would be respected and thereby gain aces to their teritory for logistical purposes. Thus the U.S. should work to gain the suport of its friends and alies by reaching out to them through bilateral discusions. How should the U.S. beter prepare itself for the ?war on teror?? Diplomaticaly, the U.S. should fight terorism on two fronts. First, the U.S. should try to improve its public image internationaly. If diplomacy depends on the coperation of others, including friendly and non- friendly countries, then the U.S. must take a hard lok at its standing in the world. It is true that public opinion is not always the best predictor of government policy, but some leaders in the Muslim world and certain developing countries are under increasing presure by the public and some ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 61 Walker, S. Edward, Jr. the former U.S. ambasador to Israel, Egypt, and curent president of The Midle East Institute in Washington DC. hardliners to change their position toward the U.S. Acording to The Pew Global Atitudes survey, which tracks the standing of the U.S. in major countries throughout the world, favorable opinion toward the U.S. has falen sharply in the past eight years, even among some Western countries such as Canada, Germany, and Britain. Favorable opinion has declined even more sharply elsewhere, particularly in the Muslim world. Since the ability of the U.S. to persuade other countries to suport its policies depends, to some extent, on its public image abroad, the U.S. should try to bolster its standing by increasing its relations with the public in regions where anti-American sentiment has become more prevalent. When visiting such regions, U.S. oficials should hold open discusions with journalists, university students, and other concerned citizens in public town hal-style metings. The U.S. should also show greater respect for international bodies such as the United Nations and we should also lok for comon ground with other states to solve comon problems. For example, the U.S. shares an interest with Rusia and other former Soviet republics to discourage terorism and combat the ilicit drug trade that has recently increased in Afghanistan. The U.S. also has comon interests with Iranians in fighting against the Taliban and decreasing the drug trade. The Jordanians and Egyptians share an interest with the U.S. in fighting religious extremists in the Middle East. Furthermore, the U.S. should engage in discusions with some of the groups that it curently clasifies as ?terorist.? Terorist organizations should be divided into two categories. The first category includes those groups, such as al-Qaeda, that are unavailable for direct and indirect talks; since no definite links betwen these groups and any government exist, dealing with the groups through their sponsors is virtualy imposible. Instead, diplomatic eforts should be focused on building beter relations with the countries that house these groups. A close relationship betwen the U.S. and the countries in which terorist groups are hiding wil make, on the one hand, inteligence exchange easier, and, on the other, wil make these countries more inclined to coperate with U.S. counterterorism forces. The second category includes terorist groups that operate in specific countries with nationalist objectives and groups that operate as proxies for other states. These include the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the remnants of the Ba?ath Party in Iraq, the Shi?a militia, and the Suni Salafis in Iraq, Hezbolah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian teritories, and the Islamic Union Courts in Somalia. After eight years of the ?war on teror,? it has become aparent that the U.S. canot simply uprot these groups through military means. Sugestions for dealing with these groups on a case by case basis are ofered below: Iraq Despite the fact that the campaign of ?shock and awe? dismantled Saddam Husein?s regime quickly and eficiently, the developments that unfolded in the aftermath of the initial invasion, including the mounting costs of the war and the geopolitical changes in the region, sugest that the intervention has not ben beneficial for the U.S. so far. The U.S. must take several initial measures to foster stability in Iraq. ? As it has ben sugested in the Hamilton-Baker Comite Report, to fight terorism in Iraq and ensure internal order, the U.S. should bring in the neighboring countries together and make them part of the solution. ? The thre major militia groups and some political parties in Iraq have ben suported by neighboring countries. The Iranians back Shi?a militias and political parties, the Saudis, Jordanians, and the United Arab Emirates back Sunis and Salafis, and the Syrians back what is left of Ba?ath party. The U.S. should begin to talk with the Iranians in order to bring them into the fight against terorism in the region. ? The U.S. also should talk more seriously with the Saudis and Jordanians about their strategies and concerns in Iraq. ? Domesticaly, the U.S. neds to work with the Iraqi Shi?a leaders to help them work out a beter deal for power-sharing with Sunis and other factions. Afghanistan As most experts now believe, the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. The Taliban has regained control of certain teritories and the curent government in Kabul has proved incapable of maintaining stability. It is the time for the U.S. to change the curent course in Afghanistan. ? First of al, the U.S. should make a distinction betwen the Taliban and other Islamic groups. As General David Petraeus has stated, there are numerous forces that are fighting us in Afghanistan, but the Taliban deserves the most atention. Since those groups do not have any ideological problem with the U.S. like the Taliban does, the U.S. should atempt to open a chanel to talk with them while further isolating the Taliban politicaly. ? The U.S. should also work with the Pakistanis to help them fight the Taliban more efectively. The U.S. has ben giving Pakistan financial suport, but it has ben unable to overse how the money is being spent. The U.S. must continue to help Pakistan under strict conditions; Pakistan should prevent terorist groups stationed within its borders from launching atacks in Afghanistan. ? Kyrgyzstan recently canceled an important contract that had alowed the U.S. to use a Kyrgyz airbase for U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The weak nature of curent U.S.-Rusian relations is one of the reasons this contract was canceled. While the U.S. should prevent such acts from hapening through active diplomacy, alternative facilities in the region should be found by opening dialogues with other countries. For example, the U.S. could suply trops in Afghanistan through Iran?s roads, which are safer and more developed than those we are now using in Pakistan. Lebanon Among the groups that the U.S. State Department has clasified as ?terorist,? Hezbolah is the most influential. However, Hezbolah has evolved substantialy over the past decade. During the 1980s and the first half of 190s, Hezbolah participated in many terorist operations against American, European, and Arab targets. But since the second half of 190s, Hezbolah has become a strong militia group in Lebanon that participates in political activities and plays an important role in the Lebanese government. Hezbolah has also limited its military actions to include only Israeli targets (mainly Israeli military units). As some experts have argued, Hezbolah ?operates openly on the batlefield, seizes and holds teritory, and exerts sovereignty over civilian population. In other words, Hezbolah fits the definition of a guerila force.? 62 ? Due to Hezbolah?s shift in its terorist activities, its participation in the government, its broad social base, and its wilingnes to talk to Israel about bilateral agrements, 63 we believe that the U.S. should open a dialogue with this group through back chanels while keping the group on the State Department terorist list for the time being. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 62 Robert Bear. The Devil We Know. (New York: Crown Publishers, 208), 78. 63 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbolah: A Short History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Pres, 207). ? At the same time, the U.S. can influence the group?s future endeavors through negotiations with the Iranians and the Syrians. More importantly, if the U.S. pays atention to Shi?a grievances in the curent Lebanese political system, Hezbolah may be wiling to change its behavior. Palestinian Teritories The U.S. did not actively participate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks for almost seven years only to return to the discusion in the last year of President George W. Bush?s second term in ofice. During those seven years, the peace proces deteriorated significantly. Despite that the death of Yaser Arafat, who had ben a major obstacle to negotiations, created an oportunity for the U.S. to make headway in the peace proces, the White House did not take advantage of the situation because it was more focused on the war in Iraq. However, the combination of the separation of power betwen Palestinians (i.e. betwen the West Bank and the Gaza), the curent standof betwen Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and the curent war in Gaza, has hindered prospects for peace. As some observers believe, this is the most critical year ever for Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy. One observer has noted that ?We?re geting perilously close to closing the window on a two-state solution, because the two chief window-closers ? Hamas in Gaza and the fanatical Jewish setlers in the West Bank ? have ben in the driver?s seats. Hamas is busy making a two-state solution inconceivable, while the setlers have steadily worked to make it imposible? 64 . Regardles of what the U.S. labels Hamas, this political group now has veto power over any Palestinian peace deal. It is true that Hamas just provoked a reckles war with Israel which devastated the people of Gaza, but it ?is not going away. It is wel armed and, despite its suicidal behavior of late, deeply roted. And if the Jewish setlers continue with their ?natural growth? to ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 64 Thomas L. Friedman, ?This is Not a Test,? The New York Times, January, 209. devour the West Bank, it wil also be efectively of the table? 65 . No Israeli government has mustered the political wil to take down even the unauthorized setlements, despite promises it made to the U.S. that it would do so. ? The U.S. should put presure on the Israelis to met their promises to not only stop new setlements and remove the ilegal ones, but also prepare to negotiate to remove the old legal setlements. ? One the other hand, the U.S. should pres the Palestinian Authority and some moderate Arab states to prepare for some concesions and land swaps. ? At the same time, with Hamas having a veto power against any posible deal betwen the Israelis and Mahmoud Abas, the U.S. focus ?should be on creating a clear choice for Hamas for the world to se: Are you about destroying Israel or building Gaza?? 6 ? The U.S. should make it clear to Israel?s right wing political parties that if they ?are out to destroy Hamas, casualties wil be horific and the aftermath could be Somalia- like chaos.? Israel must ?resist the blackmail of the setlers, and the rightist parties that protect them, in order to implement a two-state solution. Because without a stable two-state solution, the situation wil be Israel hiding behind a high wal, defending itself from a Hamas-run failed state in Gaza, a Hezbolah-run failed state in south Lebanon, and a Fatah-run failed state in Ramalah.? 67 ? The Palestinian Authority, led by Mahmoud Abas in the West Bank, wil not make any compromise with Israel as long as it fears that Hamas would denounce it as ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 65 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 67 Ibid. traitorous. Therefore, the second task for the U.S., Israel, and the Arab states is to find a way to bring Hamas into a Palestinian national unity government. ? Without Hamas playing a part in Palestinian decision-making, any Israeli-Palestinian peace agrement wil be virtualy meaningles. Since bringing Hamas into a Palestinian unity government, without undermining the West Bank moderates would be dificult, the U.S. wil ned Saudi Arabia and Egypt to cajole and presure Hamas into keping the cease-fire, suporting peace talks, and giving up its rockets. ? Because Iran and Syria wil be tuging Hamas the other way, we should begin to talk to Syrians and find a way to engage the Iranians in the peace proces. Somalia Since the fal of Said Bare in 191, Somalia has ben involved in a civil war. It is curently a lawles country without a central government. After the 9/11 atacks, the U.S. started paying more atention to Somalia in order to prevent it from become a base of operations for al-Qaeda. At the time, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which had lost both its credibility and authority to govern, claimed power; the U.S. presed a group of nine clan militia leaders and businesmen to form the Aliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terorism in Mogadishu as a counterweight to the TFG. The group proved incapable of acomplishing any of its goals, including the capture of a smal number of ?high value targets? comprised of thre to five foreign al-Qaeda operatives implicated in the 198 U.S. Embasy bombings in Africa. The Aliance also became involved in a conflict with an Islamic group caled the Islamic Union Courts (ICU). The Courts won almost every batle and proved to poses a beter trained and equiped armed force than the group of militiamen who were part of the Aliance. Eventualy, the ICU seized power in Mogadishu; for the U.S. government, this result was the exact oposite of what it had intended when encouraging the formation of the Aliance. 68 The courts declared themselves as moderate Islamists and caled on the international comunity for recognition and help; they received no such acknowledgment. The emergence of the ICU and the rapid defeat of the Aliance was not in itself a disaster for Somalia, however. On the contrary, while it was an embarasing setback for the U.S., the outcome of the war apeared for many to be a welcome development which rid Mogadishu of lawlesnes and armed gangs. Meanwhile, the government of Ethiopia was alarmed at the rapid rise of the Courts. The ICU leadership included some hard-line r believed to be linked to a wave of terorist atacks inside Ethiopia in the mid-190s. In contrast to the U.S. and Ethiopia?s asesment of the ICU hierarchy and its policies, the militant elements were not in a position of power within the ICU. Nonetheles, the Ethiopians wished to remove the ICU from power and restore the TFG but the U.S. would not suport them. However, the U.S. has ocasionaly continued to atack some terorist targets in Somalia with misiles and as the only country which is able to lead the international comunity, the U.S. should change its curent policy toward the ICU. ? The curent U.S. counterterorism policy in Somalia is primarily based on military operations. It is time to pres for a diplomatic solution to the TFG?ICU stand-of and forge working relations with moderate Islamists. There are many reasons to believe that such an aproach could result not only in the creation of a broad national-based coalition, but also in the isolation of the extremists and the warlords. ? Although the ICU leaders previously dismised U.S. concerns about some radical elements within their group as a result of their serious misreading of the U.S. government, the more moderate leader are now more wiling to coperate. The U.S. government should not only reach out to the moderates, but should also encourage Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 68 Chris Tomlinson, ?Somalia?s Islamic Extremists Set U.S. Back,? Asociated Pres. June 6, 206. [Acesed via Lexis- Nexis, Jan. 27 209]. and Egypt to work with the moderates to help them get rid of the hardliners and capture those militias responsible for terorist atacks in the past. ? Finaly, by using diplomacy, the U.S. should bring influential European and Arab countries to help rebuild Somalia?s infrastructure. Conclusion The U.S. should use diplomatic tols more efectively and extensively to aid its counterterorism eforts. The U.S. wil not be able to fight terorism worldwide alone. It would be very costly and without any end. Bringing together alies and other countries that share U.S. concerns about terorism requires a sound diplomatic strategy. The U.S. must not only talk to others, but also must listen to others. Fighting Terorism: The Role of the Military The United States reacted agresively to the 9/11 atacks. Within weks, the U.S. sent trops to Afghanistan to find Osama bin Laden and bring about an end to the Taliban regime. Within two years, the U.S. sent nearly 150,00 trops to Iraq to remove Saddam Husein and his Ba?ath party from power. Despite the considerable resources that the U.S. has directed toward fighting terorism, however, this phenomenon continues to pose a major threat to the U.S. and its friends and alies. What can be deduced from the past eight years of the U.S. ?war on teror? is that military power may not be an efective means of fighting terorism. While the military has an important role to play in certain situations, especialy since the U.S. is curently engaged in two major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, that role should be minimal until other methods of combating terorism have ben exhausted. The folowing section of this report wil be organized as folows: (1) Iraq and Afghanistan wil be examined (2) the smal-scale interventions discusion wil deal with previous terorist atacks and retaliatory responses, (3) the conventional and unconventional warfare discusion wil outline the means by which the U.S. military could evolve into a force that emphasizes non-conventional warfare to combat terorism, (4) the presing situation in Pakistan wil be discused in its own section, and (5) the conclusion. While the U.S. is curently engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we strongly sugest that any subsequent, large-scale military actions against countries known to be involved in terorism or harboring terorists be used only as a last resort. Major military incursions are not an apropriate means of combating terorism and they could wind up exacerbating terorist activity. With these sugestions in mind, the folowing subsections wil be devoted to a comparison of the sucesful and unsucesful elements of recent large-scale military operations and our recomendations for future operations, should the unlikely ned for them arise. The Iraq War Though no clear links betwen Iraq and al-Qaeda have ben established, the 203 invasion of Iraq was justified by the Bush Administration, in part, on the premise that Saddam Husein?s regime was afiliated with al-Qaeda. 69 This view, along with Iraq?s aleged involvement in the 9/11 atacks 70 and the Administration?s adoption of a strategy of premption, ultimately led to the war in Iraq. Besides suport from the United Kingdom and a few other nations, the invasion of Iraq was not suported by the international comunity and the White House did not wait to obtain aproval from the United Nations or ?build a coalition such as George H. W. Bush had asembled before the Gulf War.? 71 The U.S. military was unprepared for the unconventional tactics that were employed by the Iraqi insurgency such as the guerila-like strikes and the presence of suicide bombers and insurgents disguised as civilians. 72 Additionaly, inefective security measures emboldened insurgents; in the years folowing the 203 invasion, violence escalated and both civilian and trop casualties greatly increased. The U.S. transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 204 did litle to stem the blodshed. U.S. popularity declined substantialy within Iraq and more civilians were suspected of suporting and becoming a part of the insurgency. In other words, while few extremist militant groups existed during Saddam Husein?s regime, they became more prevalent after the U.S. invasion. This increase was due in part to the de-Bathification proces and the disbanding of the Iraqi military which left nearly every soldier or individual who was asociated with Husein?s regime unemployed and frustrated. 73 Even though a surge of 20,00 U.S. trops in 207 at the behest of General David H. Petraeus aleviated these problems considerably, terorism continues to pose a threat to the long- ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 69 Keneth Katzman, ?Al Qaeda in Iraq: Asesment and Outside Links (RL3217),? U.S. Congresional Research Service, August 15, 208. Acesed February 15, 209. Available from The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 3. 70 Ibid., 5. 71 Jesamyn Conrad, What You Should Know About Politics But Don?t: A Nonpartisan Guide to the Isues (New York: Arcade Publishing, 208), 74. 72 Buzle.com, Editorials, Iraq Insurgency Forces Pentagon to Rethink on Ability to Fight Two Wars at Once, July, 205 (acesed February 25, 209); available from htp:/ww.buzle.com/editorials/7-5-205-72680.asp. 73 Conrad, 80. term stability of Iraq. Several dangerous groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I), the Shi?a faction under the radical Muqtada al-Sadr, and various extremist Suni groups are established within the country. Acording to General Petraeus, however, the surge helped to significantly damage AQ-I. 74 While the mistakes made in Iraq canot be reversed and further U.S. military action is limited by its impending (201 at the latest) withdrawal, there are key lesons to be learned: ? First, obtaining international aproval and building a coalition before invading Iraq should have ben top priorities for the U.S. and should be in the future if the ned arises. ? Trop levels were drasticaly underestimated. By loking to past interventions such as the 190 Persian Gulf War (in which over 50,00 trops were deployed), it should have ben aparent that betwen 30,00 and 40,00 trops (as oposed to the 145,00 that were ultimately deployed in Iraq) were necesary to fight the war in Iraq. 75 ? A strong security force should have ben instated imediately. In the words of Lary Diamond, ?Without some minimum level of security, people canot engage in trade and comerce, organize to rebuild and revive their comunities, or participate meaningfuly in politics.? 76 Stability in Iraq would enable people to live somewhat normaly and without constant fear and then fewer would be tempted to turn to insurgency and terorism. In any future large-scale operation in which public infrastructure and basic security aparatuses are damaged, American trops should help train local law enforcement to prevent masive instability. Until local forces can confidently replace American trops, the U.S. military wil be neded to perform these functions. Although the prolonged presence of a foreign ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 74 Katzman, 15. 75 Conrad, 79. 76 Lary P. Godson, ?The Lesons of Nation-Building in Afghanistan,? Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Pres, 206), 176. security force may be resented by some, it also may discourage crime and hostility betwen religious factions and enable inter-group comunication. To ensure legitimacy for U.S. security forces, fostering respect and understanding through coperation and comunication with the local comunity is esential. ? Aproximately $61 bilion was spent on the Gulf War?a war in which the United States withdrew after about one year, did not have to completely rebuild the government, and did not have to engage in nation-building. The original estimate for the war in Iraq was $50-$60 bilion dolars. 7 Even if inflation is not taken into acount, by comparing the cost of the Gulf War to the Iraq war it would have ben imediately obvious that $50-$60 bilion was a drastic underestimation of cost. To litle funding can result not only in shortages of resources neded to rebuild physical infrastructure, but also in a shortage of the body armor, weapons, and electronic equipment neded by U.S. trops to fight against the insurgency. Adequate funding is a key component of any military operation, because without it, trops would be unable to conduct their operations efectively. ? Animosity betwen Suni and Shi?a Muslims was not anticipated upon planing the initial invasion, but could have ben if research had ben properly conducted and experts consulted. Any incursion, whether smal or large, should always take into acount local conflicts that may be exacerbated by military action. ? American trops were largely isolated from Iraqi civilians and their living conditions were much beter. American trops had electricity and runing water and when it became evident that the trops would be remaining for a longer term than anticipated, their living conditions were improved further. The Iraqis were resentful of the American trops who ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 7 David M. Herszenhorn, ?Estimates of Iraq War Were Not Close to Balpark,? NewYorkTimes.com, March 19, 208 (acesed February 15, 209); available from htp:/ww.nytimes.com/208/03/19/washington/19cost.html?_r=2. continued to be provided with benefits while the local population?s living conditions worsened. 78 While it is necesary to kep trops safe and healthy, great atention should also be paid to civilian living conditions in order to promote sympathy and friendship betwen civilians and the U.S. military. ? For the remainder of the U.S. ocupation in Iraq, which is set to completely expire at the end of 201, al trop interactions with civilians should continue to be directed with the intention of building bonds with the Iraqis and increasing sympathy for the U.S. General Petraeus, after taking over comand in Iraq, has ben atempting to aply his ?doctrine,? which insists that ?the Army?is entering an era in which armed conflict wil be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous?with the aplication of force becoming a leser part of the soldier?s repertoire.? 79 Part of this new ?repertoire? wil include learning to interact in a culturaly apropriate way with civilians. The U.S. trops, for remainder of their time spent in Iraq, should cultivate these skils. The War in Afghanistan In the weks folowing the 9/11 atacks, the U.S. had obtained international aproval to invade Afghanistan and on October 7, 203, the U.S. and the United Kingdom, with help from the Afghan Northern Aliance, launched a military asault against the Taliban. By mid-December, 203, the Taliban had ben ousted from Kabul and al major cities in Afghanistan had come under control ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 78 Conrad, 80. 79 Andrew J. Bacevich, ?The Petraeus Doctrine,? TheAtlanic.com, October, 208 (acesed February 25, 209); available from htp:/ww.theatlantic.com/doc/20810/petraeus-doctrine. of the U.S. and the coalition forces. 80 The initial atack in Afghanistan was largely sucesful and utilized a variety of non-conventional tactics that surprised al-Qaeda and the Taliban and enabled the U.S. to push the terorists back into the mountains bordering Pakistan. The U.S. Special Operations Forces worked closely with CIA paramilitary oficers to undermine and defeat the enemy. Superior leadership and coperation resulted in eficient and acurate enemy targeting. In Henry A. Crumpton?s words, CIA oficers, and U.S. Special Forces?together created the glue that held the operation together. The CIA?s paramilitary oficers, with their dep knowledge of special operations and inteligence, provided the most adhesive element of this mixture?. [T]he blended glue emerged from profesionalism rooted in a sense of colective mision and personal relationships built on mutual respect. The result was a war of supreme cordination between Afghan tribal alies and U.S. air power. 81 While the early stages of the war were sucesful in driving back the Taliban and al- Qaeda, several prominent enemy leaders such as Osama bin Laden escaped capture. Additionaly, although the country was secured quickly and a new government under Hamid Karzai, was instated in Kabul, political violence has ben on the rise in the past couple of years. In particular, the Taliban has regained considerable power. Furthermore, the Afghan government is sen by much of the population as corupt and has ben largely unable to extend its authority beyond the areas directly surounding Kabul. Two operations are curently working in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Fredom (OEF)?a solely U.S. operation?and the International Security Asistance Force (ISAF), which, as of 206, has ben under control of NATO and includes a coalition of trops from various NATO and non-NATO alied countries. ISAF has aproximately 56,420 trops and OEF has about 28,00 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 80 Henry A. Crumpton, ?Inteligence and War: Afghanistan, 201-202,? Transforming U.S. Inteligence, ed. Jenifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington DC: Georgetown University Pres, 205), 162. 81 Crumpton, 164-165. trops. The U.S. contributes 24,90 trops to ISAF. 82 Although there is debate about whether the apropriate place to center U.S. military atention is Iraq?which received the majority of U.S. trops?or Afghanistan, the later is probably the more presing location. A lack of trops in Afghanistan has made stabilizing the country and defeating the Taliban insurgency quite dificult. Lack of adequate security has, acording to Lary Godson, ?alowed various warlords; opium and heroin smuglers, retro- and neo-Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other Islamist militants?to return, survive, or arise to bedevil Afghanistan.? 83 And while U.S. forces may have worked efectively to build bonds with leaders from tribal militias, the plan of the U.S. was to limit trop interactions with civilians in order to ?minimize both U.S. casualties and the abrasive efect on local sensibilities of an ocupying presence.? 84 Although the U.S. has done a great deal to utilize necesary unconventional tactics to combat terorism in Afghanistan, there are several steps the U.S. should take militarily to improve the situation in Afghanistan and create favorable conditions for the U.S., including: ? Increase trop numbers to levels requested by top comanding oficials such as General David Petraeus and presure NATO to increase force numbers in ISAF. ? Continue to train Afghan security and army forces, while working to build bonds with the national Afghan trops. The U.S. and ISAF forces should withdraw from Afghanistan as son as posible, but not until the country is secure and Afghan forces are suficiently trained and able to protect their country. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 82 NATO, International Security Asistance Force, ISAF Placemat, February 13, 209 (acesed February 15, 209); available from htp:/ww.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf. 83 Godson, 148-149. 84 Godson, 149. ? Work to establish relationships with civilians?use of Special Forces and CIA oficers who are knowledgeable about Afghan culture and language wil come of use here. An increased use of Special Forces wil be discused in greater detail below. ? Folowing from the previous sugestion, increased use of the Human Terain System is recomended and wil also be discused in further detail below. ? Work alongside the CIA with civilian populations to atempt to spread pro-American sentiment, discourage extremism, and increase legitimacy of the Karzai government. ? Utilize paramilitary agents and Special Forces trops in cordination with the CIA to infiltrate and undermine terorist organizations in Afghanistan. ? Work closely with local leaders to increase their legitimacy and to build solid relations with Afghanistan?s curent and future leaders. Suporters of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan argue that another terorist atack against the United States has not transpired because al-Qaeda and other terorist group members have ben engaged in fighting the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if this were true, the U.S. canot remain fighting in Afghanistan or Iraq indefinitely in order to distract terorists from atacking the U.S. A long-term counterterorism plan wil ultimately ned to replace the curent operations in these areas. With this in mind, the U.S. military, once oficialy withdrawn, should atempt to work closely, on a smal-scale, with the Afghan government and military to continue combating terorist organizations remaining in the country. While an initial trop surge in Afghanistan is necesary to stabilize the country and help the government obtain legitimacy, smal- scale, unobtrusive use of military force should be aplied in place of a large-scale ocupation as son as posible. Smal-Scale Interventions By the time the U.S. withdraws from Iraq and Afghanistan, it is likely that terorism wil remain a threat to the U.S. and its alies. The folowing section wil discus the justifications for using military force and the costs and benefits of responding militarily to smal-scale atacks or using premptive force to deter atacks. There are several benefits to taking military action against a group responsible for a terorist atack: First, as the most dramatic posible demonstration of U.S. seriousnes in fighting terrorism, a military atack may stimulate other governments to enhance their own eforts to fight it. Second, the strike may directly disrupt the operations and impair the capability of the targeted terrorist organization. Third, the implicit threat of further retaliation may deter the targeted organization from atempting aditional terrorist atacks. And fourth, there may be similar deterrence of other terrorist groups or states. 85 Additional benefits of striking back include bolstering ?national morale,? 86 and increasing alied suport and adversarial fear by sending a mesage that the U.S. wil not tolerate terorism and wil take action to combat it. While these are the benefits that the U.S. hopes wil result from ilitary action, there are significant costs as wel, ?making the net impact on U.S foreign policy uncertain.? 87 Bombings of the U.S. Embasies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam One major case of terorism and retaliation came on August 7th of 198, in which terorist bombings against the U.S. embasies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salam, Tanzania, kiled over two hundred people and left several thousand injured. The atacks were linked to Osama bin Laden and the U.S. responded on August 20 th by bombing targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. The bombings in Afghanistan were targeted at terorist training camps and were intended to kil Osama bin Laden. The target in Sudan was a pharmaceutical plant that was suspected (with a high degre of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 85 Paul R. Pilar, Terorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Washington DC: Brokings Institution Pres, 201), 102. 86 Ibid., 101. 87 Ibid., 102. certainty) of either producing chemical weapons or being involved in chemicals used to create weapons. 8 The air strikes in Afghanistan substantialy damaged their targets, but those targets, acording to Paul Pilar, consisted primarily of ?simple housing, firing ranges, and asembly areas, with few substantial structures that could not easily be repaired of replaced? and ?probably most of the people kiled were traines and instructors.? The benefits of U.S. action, however, included the posibility that the strikes presured the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against the Taliban the folowing year. While the air strikes in Afghanistan were sen by the international comunity as a legitimate response to the embasy bombings, the U.S. strike against al-Shifa, the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, resulted in international controversy and damaged the reputation of the U.S. Acording to Pilar, the inteligence that the U.S. gathered showed, with much certainty, that in addition to having ties to Osama bin Laden, the pharmaceutical plant was indeed engaged in some sort of activity involving chemicals used to make weapons. However, the inteligence did not say that bin Laden had any specific plans to use chemical weapons from this particular plant, and the inteligence did not sugest that bombing al-Shifa would inhibit bin Laden?s abilities to use chemical weapons to atack the U.S. in the future. The controversy came from the fact that, in addition to being involved in chemical weapons, al-Shifa was also a legitimate producer of medicines and by bombing the plant, the U.S. was sen as ?using its military might to kil Muslims?[and] striking at por dark-skined Muslims by destroying a factory that made their medicines.? 89 Ultimately, Pilar argues, ?The decision to atack al-Shifa ilustrates a procedural hazard of employing the military instrument.? He continues to note that ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 8 Ibid., 108. 89 Ibid., 107. The [U.S.] would never have struck al-Shifa in the absence of the embasy bombings and the decision to retaliate for them; the evidence about chemical weapons did not come close to justifying that kind of preemptive strike?. Retaliatory strikes in response to terrorist atacks wil always be primarily mesage-sending exercises, rather than a physicaly significant cripling of terrorist capabilities. The United States should kep the mesage as clear and defensible as posible by limiting itself to the most credible targets. 90 Although the strike in Sudan sent a mesage that the U.S. would not tolerate terorism, it did litle to discourage Osama bin Laden and al- Qaeda from engaging in terorist activities. If the U.S. intends to use military force in retaliation for a terorist atack, the targets should be planed with meticulous care. Conventional vs. Unconventional Warfare While the U.S. military is certainly prepared for conventional warfare, ?military doctrine and culture have historicaly not ben wel atuned to the demands of counter-insurgencies? 91 The incidence of terorism has not waned in recent years and, as the evidence present above sugests, this is partialy due to the fact that the U.S. military has not developed an adequate strategy to addres this problem. At the begining of the War in Iraq, for example, the smalest bomb in the U.S. inventory was 50 lbs. As Kely points out, droping a 50 lb. bomb on a house in which terorists are hiding wil almost certainly kil the terorists, but may also kil inocent civilians, destroy a large portion of a neighborhod and subsequently tarnish the image of the U.S. in the eyes of the local population. Though recent military planing has emphasized minimizing trop casualties by keping them at as far a distance as posible from combat (aircraft remaining above 10,00 fet, for instance), this may not produce the best strategy for combating terorists and their unconventional methods of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 90 Ibid., 109. 91 Terence K. Kely, ?The Just Conduct of War Against Radical Islamic Teror and Insurgencies,? in The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty First Century, ed. Charles Red and David Ryal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 207), 208. waging war. While the danger for U.S. soldiers could increase as a result of sending in covert ground trops instead of droping an extremely destructive bomb, that may be a sacrifice the U.S. must make in order to sucesfuly combat terorism. General Petraeus argues that the use of conventional ?forces? and ?capabilities? in counterinsurgency operations wil ?almost always fail,? and contends that ?[c]onducting a sucesful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, wel-informed, culturaly astute leaders.? 92 As the initial atack in Afghanistan and General Petraeus? recent recomendations indicate, some non-conventional methods have started to make their way into military strategy. Non-conventional elements that should be cultivated and increased wil be discused below. Human Terain System The dificulty in fostering a sense of cultural understanding betwen U.S. soldiers and civilians in conflict zones can be sumed up in the folowing analogy: ?Conducting military operations in a low-intensity conflict without ethnographic and cultural inteligence is like building a house without using your thumbs: it is a wasteful, clumsy, and unecesarily slow proces at best, with a high probability for frustration and failure.? 93 In 205, this problem was addresed with the development of a program caled the Human Terain System (HTS). The HTS employs the use of anthropologists and other social scientists in order to enhance the ?military?s ability to understand the highly complex local socio-cultural environment in the areas where [forces] are deployed,? and ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 92 David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, ?Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24, MCWP 3-3.5),? U.S. Army Publication, August 15, 208. Acesed February 15, 209. Available from Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Foreword. 93 U.S. Army, U.S. Army Profesional Writing Colection, ?The Human Terain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century,? October, 206 (acesed on February 16, 209); available from htp:/ww.army.mil/profesionalwriting/volumes/volume4/december_206/12_06_2.html. ?to asist the U.S. government in understanding foreign countries and regions prior to an engagement within that region.? 94 The ?human terain? is defined as the population and society in the operational environment?as defined and characterized by socio- cultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data?. Human terrain information is open-source derived, unclasified, referenced?information. It includes the situational roles, goals, relationships, and rules of behavior of an operationaly relevant group or individual. 95 Human Terain Teams (HTs) are embedded in military brigade units; they are made up of five members, al of whom are specialists in the culture of the area in which they are stationed. Their job is to conduct ethnographic research and advise comanders on the basis on pertinent cultural data. When a comander or unit leaves an area, the HTT remains to work with the next comander or unit that comes in. HTS has ben highly controversial among some anthropologists and the American Anthropological Asociation (AA) has isued an oficial statement condemning the program. Anthropologists wory that the military wil use anthropological information to undermine its enemies, which stands in oposition to the AA?s ethical obligation to do no harm and protect the people the anthropologists work with. 96 Though the information gathered through the HTS may be used to harm U.S. enemies in isolated instances, this should not hinder the U.S. from using anthropology and social science to create bonds with local comunities to foster cros-cultural understanding, sympathy, and peace. In order to combat terorism and lesen its apeal in the long run, mutual understanding and respect betwen civilian populations and the U.S. military is vital. HTS has the potential help the U.S. achieve this goal and the program should be expanded. With this in mind, any knowledge gained by HTS should never be used to degrade, demoralize, or ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 94 The Human Terain System (acesed on February 16, 209); available from htp:/humanterainsystem.army.mil/default.htm. 95 ?The Human Terain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century.? 96 Kambiz Fatahi, ?U.S. Army Enlists Anthropologists,? BC.co.uk, Tuesday, October 16, 207 (acesed on February 16, 209); available from htp:/news.bc.co.uk/2/low/americas/7042090.stm. humiliate enemy combatants. Comanders must emphasize this point to their trops since U.S. interests are ultimately damaged by the misuse of cros-cultural knowledge. Special Operations Forces Special Operations Forces (SOFs) are U.S. military forces that are involved in direct action operations, unconventional warfare, special reconaisance, and counterterorism. SOFs are trained extensively in language and are educated to have a thorough understanding of the sociocultural environment in which they wil be deployed. 97 SOFs have ben working closely alongside CIA paramilitary agents to combat terorism in Afghanistan and fight the insurgency in Iraq. Thus, the deployment of SOFs in conflict areas should be of utmost importance. The training proces for SOFs is extremely rigorous. While it is important that the SOFs are made up of highly qualified soldiers, some elements of SOF training, particularly in unconventional warfare, language, and culture, should be aplied to trops who are not of SOF caliber. A Recon Marine, who has almost completed his training and is scheduled to be deployed to Afghanistan, was asked whether or not he had received training about the customs, culture, language, etc. of the people whose country he would be traveling to. He replied, There has ben basic instruction on al of those things but it was very basic. Most of the time it is up to you to find any information on those sorts of things. If it is mision esential than we are briefed on it. It is one of the areas of my training that I wish would have ben covered beter. I supose that asumption is that if you are joining the Marines in this day and age then you already know everything you ned to know and you have decided to fight. 98 As of 206, Force Recon Marines were made an oficial part of the U.S. Special Operations Comand (SOCOM) team. Recon Marines are trained diferently than SOFs, are not expected to be proficient in cultural or language skils, and are intended to interact with civilians on a minimal basis. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 97 Army Special Forces Center - Special Forces Training (acesed on February, 18, 209); available from htp:/ww.military.com/army-special-forces/training.html. 98 Interview with an anonymous member of the U.S. military, conducted February 8, 209. However, as more SOCOM trops are deployed to places like Afghanistan in the near future and frequent interaction with tribal leaders and militias becomes a crucial component of counterterorism operations, providing more than ?basic instruction? to non-SOF trops would be very beneficial. Pakistan The history of Pakistan has ben marked by political and economic instability. Alternate periods of civilian and military rule and continuing tension with neighboring India are primarily responsible for the curent situation. Economic, political, and social conditions have ben deteriorating in Pakistan for some time, but since 207, they have worsened. President Pervez Musharaf (who tok control of Pakistan after a military cop in 199) and his regime were very unpopular; many Pakistanis regarded Musharaf?s government as rampantly corupt and inefective. 9 After briefly instating emergency military rule in 208, Musharaf was presured to resign and the subsequent strugle for power turned violent; Benazir Bhuto, the former Prime Minister and oposition leader was asasinated shortly before the national elections. Bhuto?s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who tok her place at the head of her Pakistan People?s Party (PP), was ultimately elected and pledged to continue the aliance betwen the U.S. and Pakistan that had ben forged betwen former President Musharaf and the Bush administration. God relations betwen Pakistan and the U.S. are considered to be necesary for U.S. suces in Afghanistan. After the 9/11 atacks, the Pakistani government denounced the Taliban and became a key suporter of the U.S.?s eforts to combat terorism. When the U.S. ousted the Taliban from power, however, many members of the Taliban simply relocated to Pakistan. U.S. incursions ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 9 Country Profile: Pakistan (acesed February 15, 209); available from htp:/news.bc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/157960.stm. over the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to pursue insurgents have increased tensions betwen Pakistan and the U.S. and anti-American sentiment is believed to be widespread throughout Pakistan; the U.S. is sen as an obstacle to the proces of democratization in the country. Recently, domestic Islamic extremism has become even more prevalent and the Pakistani army has had dificulty subduing the militancy. The Congresional Research Service notes that [T]he los of human life related to Islamist militancy was greater in 207 than in the previous six years combined. The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center?s most recent anual report found the incidence of terrorism in Pakistan in 207 up by 137% over the previous year, with 1,35 terrorism- related fatalities placing the country third in the world on such a scale, after Iraq and Afghanistan. Only two suicide bombings were reported in Pakistan in al of 202; that number grew to at least 57 in 207. Acording to Pakistan?s inteligence agency, Pakistan has now overtaken Iraq as site of the world?s most suicide-bombing deaths. 10 Furthermore, ?Top Islamabad government oficials identify terorism and extremism as Pakistan?s most urgent problems. They vow that combating terorism, along with addresing poverty and unemployment, wil be their top priority.? 101 However, ?there are numerous signs that Al Qaeda is resurgent on Pakistani teritory, with anti-U.S. terorists apearing to have benefited from what some analysts cal a Pakistani policy of apeasement in western tribal areas near the Afghan border.? 102 By using the Western Pakistani border as a sanctuary, al-Qaeda and the Taliban have ben able to launch atacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and then retreat back to their hiding places. The U.S. military has ben unable to take significant action within Pakistan and the Pakistani army?s counterterorism eforts have ben insuficient. Most recently, a truce betwen the Taliban and the Pakistani government has alowed sharia law to be instated in the Delaware-sized valey of Swat, which has a population of about 1.3 milion and is located 10 miles northwest of Islamabad (the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 10 K. Alan Kronstadt, ?Pakistan?U.S. Relations (RL3498),? U.S. Congresional Research Service, November 10, 208. Acesed February 15, 209. Available from The Federation of American Scientists Acesed (FAS), 6. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid., 5. nation?s capital). 103 This new development gives the Taliban considerable control over a large teritory and has ben considered by many to be a ?capitulation? to demands of extremists that could eventualy encourage other Islamist militants acros Pakistan to force similar concesions from the Pakistani government. The mounting problems in Pakistan are multiplied by the fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. If Pakistan?s nuclear weapons were to fal into the hands of terorist organizations, there could be disastrous consequences for the U.S. and its alies. This scenario would become increasingly likely should the recent political tensions erupt into a larger conflict. The U.S. wil have to work much more closely with the Pakistani government to destabilize the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan and although the role of the U.S. military in Pakistan remains to be determined, the U.S., in addition to financial asistance, should ofer military aid to Pakistan. President Asif Zardari has already stated that Pakistan ?wil not tolerate the violation of [its] sovereignty and teritorial integrity by any power in the name of combating terorism,? 104 but the U.S. should continue to ofer military aid in as unthreatening a way as posible. U.S. military incursions in Pakistan without the authority of the central government should be avoided and used only in instances of utmost necesity and secrecy; increased incursions would most likely result in further tension betwen the U.S. and Pakistan, and treading on Pakistan?s sovereignty would do litle to decrease the anti-American sentiment that serves as a driving factor for terorism. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 103 The Swat Valey, (acesed February 25, 209); available from htp:/topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandteritories/pakistan/northwest- pakistan/swat_valey/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=Swat%20Valey&st=cse. 104 Kronstadt, 2. Conclusion Combating terorism ilitarily is not an easy or straightforward task. Mistakes have ben made in the past and wil probably be made in the future. But by loking at the past and learning from those mistakes, by utilizing various opinions, by making decisions based on meticulous and extensive research, and by creatively exploring unconventional means of building cros-cultural bonds, the U.S. could develop a more sucesful way of dealing with terorism. Inteligence Reform Carl Levin, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Comite, has stated that in the proces of combating teror tactics, ?acurate inteligence is absolutely esential.? 105 Though the 9/11 atacks (along with the Iraq weapons of mas destruction debacle) brought considerable atention to the shortcomings of the U.S. inteligence system, the inteligence agencies themselves (particularly the CIA) have ben strugling to kep afloat through various budget/personel cuts and constant administrative changes since the imediate post-Cold War period. 106 The focus of this report is not to examine the technical and administrative inteligence faults of the past two decades, however, but rather to take a step forward and discus the measures that the U.S. inteligence comunity neds to adopt in order to function more efectively in the face of the threat of terorism. Transforming U.S. inteligence requires creativity along with a progresive mindset focused on future chalenges. In this section of the report, clandestine inteligence colection/covert action reform wil be examined in two broad arenas: inteligence agency personel and inteligence agency tactics/goals. Though the sixten inteligence agencies of the U.S. handle numerous aspects of counterterorism, from the National Security Agency?s monitoring of comunication signals to the Treasury Department?s tracking of the financial transactions of suspected terorists, the primary focus of this section wil be on human inteligence. Human inteligence (HUMINT) provides the most important and relevant method of data colection for the purposes of combating terorism. Retired CIA operations oficer and former station chief Burton Gerber explains that ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 105 Burton Gerber, ?Managing HUMINT,? Transforming U.S. Inteligence, ed. Jenifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington DC: Georgetown University Pres, 205), 181. 106 Frederick Hitz, Why Spy? (New York: St. Martin's Pres, 208), 124. countering terrorism ? recruiting sources, uncovering plots, and understanding how terrorist organizations develop and grow ? is chiefly a HUMINT task. Signals inteligence (SIGINT) provides some, but diminishing, inteligence, as terrorists learn through analysis or leaks in Western media how they must counter Western eavesdroping. And imagery inteligence is usualy not valuable against this target. 107 When compared to inteligence colection programs based on acoustic, imagining, and other technical sensory methods, HUMINT is far cheaper, yet the hardest to retarget and protect. 108 Individual case oficers spend years developing their skils. The responsibilities of case oficers include recruiting and clandestinely meting local agents, infiltrating organizations (as sleper cels), and maintaining corespondence with agency analysts through writen and digital comunications. Due to the diverse and continuously changing nature of terorist groups, HUMINT agencies (particularly the CIA) must adapt their strategies to confront these evolving chalenges. Requirements for New Oficers Updating oficer recruitment procedures should be a priority, particularly amongst the National Clandestine Services (NCS) branches of the CIA. This is not to say that traditional methods are completely obsolete; however, the CIA should actively sek individuals with diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural heritage. In 203, reports showed that only 2-4% of CIA oficers hailed from non-European backgrounds. 109 More must be done to bring in oficers whose backgrounds are relevant to regions that are prone to producing terorist groups (Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and East Africa). The CIA must expand the number of oficers fluent in ?critical neds languages? like Arabic, Farsi/Dari, and Pashto. A more diverse body of inteligence oficers would greatly expand the capabilities of overseas stations. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 107 Gerber, 182. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. The major obstacles to the recruitment/retention of diverse oficers lie primarily within the agency?s conservative screning, testing, security, and clearance procedures. 10 Gerber explains that security investigators and authorities must do their best to ensure the loyalty and reliability of those aplying for and working within the inteligence comunity..so the granting of a security clearance stil involves a great deal of careful work in determining an aplicant's suitability and loyalty. At the same time, security authorities and their supervisors should recognize that many of the people U.S. inteligence neds to hire for highly clasified positions wil necesarily have extensive foreign experience and foreign contacts. Some security authorities, at least in the initial stages of the clearance proces, sem uneasy about an aplicant's foreign travel, work experience, and relative. Close conections with foreigners raise suspicions, though the most qualified aplicants wil often be those who by definition have such conections. Undue caution about such persons wil hamper our eforts to obtain information on threatening targets such as terrorist groups. 11 The length of time betwen an initial interview and final hiring is substantialy greater for aplicants with extensive foreign conections and travel experience. 12 The ineficient handling of background checks and the agency?s over-reliance on the polygraph (a device which has failed to identify double agents on more than one ocasion) are primarily responsible for the long time it takes to gain security clearance. 13 The prospect of waiting a lengthy period of time to posibly gain security clearance often discourages qualified individuals from aplying to the NCS in the first place. Instituting a method of short-term security clearances while information is being colected could sped up the proces. The NCS must also rexamine/update its traditional case oficer profile to met the necesities of counterterorism inteligence work. Rigorous psychological and language proficiency screning procedures often make it dificult for aplicants with talents to become employed. 14 For example, former Director of Central Inteligence Robert Gates comented on his delight when the agency found a candidate who was fluent in Azeri; however, Gates? delight turned sour when the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., 186. 12 Lindsay Moran, Blowing My Cover (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 205), 51. 13 Floyd Paseman, A Spy's Journey (St. Paul: Zenith Pres, 204), 18. 14 Gerber, 18. candidate was rejected on the basis of his inability to write memos in English. 15 Gates comented that he had thousands of people who could write in English, but not one who could speak Azeri. 16 Improving the Capabilities of Curent Oficers As oficers rise through the administrative ranks of the agency, they could benefit from obtaining additional education. Gerber sugests that leadership, often considered an inate talent, may also be a learned skil. It can be fostered by giving senior managers a larger perspective on their mision through broadening asignments and graduate education. The CIA in particular has ben insular in this respect, in that few of its senior oficers have had asignments outside the organization. The U.S. military, by contrast, has ensured that its rising oficers take time of from their traditional asignments to study for graduate degrees..inteligence oficers given time away from their own profesion to work in other organizations or pursue academic courses gain insights into their own work and how it relates in broader ways to national security isues. 17 In addition, oficers in the CIA could benefit from asuming temporary positions in the FBI, NSA, State Department and other agencies. This could greatly broaden the knowledge of both CIA oficers along with their host departments and set the stage for inter-departmental coperation beyond the top political-apointe level. The coperation of the various agencies could also lead to a positive transformation of the ethical dimensions of espionage and inteligence work. Due to the clandestine (and sometimes covert) nature of inteligence operations, public chanels are usualy unable to addres specific isues of moral wrongdoing unles a breach of security publicizes a specific incident. If the various agencies were to coperate from an administrative as wel as operational standpoint, they could serve as ?checks and balances? on each other?s actions. Isues ranging from the responsibility of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid., 194. protecting foreign agents to torture during interogations could be addresed and dealt with amongst the agencies without bringing public atention to delicate situations. The Evolution of Human Inteligence Given that terorist groups tend to operate in ?cel? structures and conduct comunications through the internet, what can traditional human inteligence techniques acomplish that thorough website/comunication investigation and modified police work can not? To put it simply, human inteligence work is responsible for the recruitment of spies who have the ability to infiltrate terorist networks and obtain information that would otherwise be unknown to U.S. inteligence agencies; the tradition of hiring local spies to gather inteligence for case oficers has ben practiced by various countries for centuries. 18 Former CIA Inspector General Frederick Hitz outlines a number of factors that could influence a person?s decision to betray their pers: money, revenge and score setling, sex, intimidation, and blackmail. 19 Spying has historicaly ben conducted in exchange for material gain. Hitz describes ?money and treasure? as the ?esential lubricant of this clandestine form of comerce. If the truth be known, most inteligence services prefer it that way. They consider it a fe for services rendered, without the complications of faith in a given system or ideology.? 120 During the Cold War, spies from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were largely recruited in this maner. Perhaps the most famous case in the United States is that of CIA Soviet Afairs operations oficer, Aldrich Ames, who ofered to give the Soviets clasified information in exchange for a payment of fifty thousand dolars. It is reasonable to asume that this method of recruiting spies wil be able to work efectively in the post- Cold War world. However, Hitz explains that ?it may not be posible for an American case oficer ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 18 John MacGafin, ?Clandestine Human Inteligence,? Transforming U.S. Inteligence, ed. Jenifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington DC: Georgetown University Pres, 205), 86. 19 Hitz, 139. 120 Ibid., 34. to get close to inviting a terorist target individual, but a coperating Pakistani or Jordanian inteligence oficer might and can relay the ofer of U.S. monetary or material asistance, or do it in his own name.? 121 As shown by the capture of numerous al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq and elsewhere, using financial incentives for the recruitment of spies can work in a region where the United States is viewed as an enemy. During the Cold War, revenge and score setling was a motive for those who spied on the behalf of a foreign country. The CIA and the KGB recruited government employes who had ben denied promotions and were thus eager to take ?revenge? on their employer. For example, FBI agent Robert Hansen, who did not subscribe to comunist ideology and had litle interest in financial gain, gave information to the Soviets for twenty-four years because he was not promoted. 12 Hansen had ben frustrated with his carer and considered seling secrets as a way to get back at his superiors in the FBI. However, since terorist groups do not employ individuals in the same way a state would, it sems unlikely that the CIA would be able to sucesfuly recruit spies in this maner. Finaly, the CIA has used sexual intimidation/blackmail to acquire spies. This tactic is based on entraping an agent through an embarasing or ilegal sexual ploy and then blackmailing that individual for information. Neither the Americans nor the British found this tactic very sucesful against the Soviets mainly because cultural norms in Eastern/Central Europe did not consider compromising sexual behavior to be a major problem. 123 Nonetheles, Soviet inteligence oficers benefited greatly from this technique; they placed American oficials in uncomfortable sexual situations while KGB photographers colected evidence that would be used to blackmail the victims into coperation. Today, it is posible that this tactic could be efective in the recruitment of spies in the Muslim world. However, it is important to note that a complete understanding of the notions of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 121 Ibid., 39. 12 Ibid., 42. 123 Ibid., 51. sexuality within a particular culture is necesary. Hitz uses the example of Abu Ghraib, where prisoners were sexualy taunted by female guards (yet did not produce any valuable information) as evidence that this tactic may not always produce the intended results. It is important that the capabilities of American inteligence agencies adapt to met the continuously evolving tactics used by terorist organizations. Part II Theresa Klasen, Camile McDorman, Beth Midanik-Blum, Cameron More his part of the report explores the U.S. domestic counterterorism policy. An efective strategy at home must reinforce our actions abroad. This discusion is led by examining the Department of Homeland security, an organization with a vital role in fighting terorism at home that has yet to be fuly implemented. The next section outlines the ned for reforming inteligence agencies and at the federal, state, and local levels of the American government. Although they face many cordinative, comunicative, technological, and bureaucratic chalenges, these government stratifications have the potential to colaborate to forge a powerful inteligence response to safeguard homeland security. We then evaluate the isue of border and transportation security and imigration reform, isues that remain a contentious part of homeland security because they involve political agendas that are ostensibly unrelated to the isue of terorism. To conclude, we ofer an analysis of some posible courses of action and provide policy recomendations with the goal of strengthening domestic safety without eroding the personal fredoms that are an esential component of our national identity. T Homeland Security and Domestic Counterterorism The terorist atacks of September 1, 201 radicaly altered Americans? perception of their national security. Anti-American terorists have demonstrated not only the intent, but the capacity to do grave harm. With one event, the false sense of security and confidence that existed in the bipolar post-Cold War world disapeared. Acutely aware of our vulnerability, the United States launched a ?war on terorism? to combat this threat. Unfortunately, terorist activity has not declined since 9/11, and even though we have not experienced another atack on U.S. soil, there is significant evidence pointing to an increase in anti-American terorist activity worldwide. The ultimate goal of counterterorism policy must be to change the dynamic that drives a person to kil for a radical cause. This, however, is likely to take generations, and in the intervening time we wil be confronted with many threats. How should U.S. domestic counterterorism policy be orchestrated to maximize homeland security? What were the mistakes leading up to 9/11, and have they ben resolved in a satisfactory maner? The purpose of this section of this part of the report is to describe how the U.S. government is responding to the danger of terorism domesticaly. These policies, principles, strategies, organizations, and programs incorporate al levels of the government, afect the personal safety of every American, and impact every aspect of the nation?s political, financial, transportation, health, and legal systems. However, in the years folowing 9/11, the nation?s unprecedented efort to improve upon domestic security has ben met with many failures, critiques, bureaucratic obstacles, and has at times endangered the fredoms of expresion and privacy that are at the core of American democracy. In loking backward at our past mistakes and forward to our future potential, we hope to provide evidence to suport the creation of necesary policies, the continuation of policies that function to protect the American public, and the elimination of those that have proven inefective. The Definition of Homeland Security The U.S. government defines homeland security as the domestic efort to defend America from terorist threats. The ?al-hazards? policy adopted by the government, however, has the added benefit of improving the general preparednes for any catastrophe, including not only atacks, but natural disasters or human-made acidents like chemical spils. 124 The National Strategy for Homeland Security, released by the Bush Administration in 202, has ben the major force shaping the homeland security doctrine, and this document has continued to shape the agenda folowing the inauguration of the Obama administration in January 209. The thre main categories of the strategic objectives are preventing terorism, reducing vulnerabilities, and minimizing damage and recovering from atacks. A brief overview of each folows. Preventing Terorism Preventing terorist atacks from ocuring is the top priority, and includes improving ?inteligence and warning? of terorist activities, ?border and transportation security? to kep terorists and weapons out of the country, and ?domestic counterterorism,? which includes preventive activities by domestic law enforcement agencies such as surveilance. The first asumption that one neds to acept is that no solution wil ever be perfect; suficiently motivated atackers wil always be able to overcome a static defense system. Reactive measures wil only be efective for as long as it takes the threat to change its means of atack. The United States is an open, democratic society with personal fredoms and an infinite number of atractive targets. Therefore, preventative measures can only go so far. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 124 Sauter, Mark, and James Jay Carafano. 205. Homeland security: a complete guide to understanding, preventing, and surviving terorism. New York: McGraw-Hil. Pg. xv Reducing Vulnerabilities This objective encompases the eforts to ?protect critical infrastructure? and ?defend against catastrophic terorism? by prempting terorist actions and identifying national weakneses. The critical infrastructure sectors include agriculture, fod, water, public health, emergency services, government, the defense industrial base, information and telecomunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal and shiping. The increasing use of the internet and telecomunications equipment by nearly everyone in American society, including the security and financial sectors, means that homeland security policy must also focus on protecting cyberspace from infiltration by terorist networks. Critical infrastructure also encompases ?key asets? such as national monuments, dams, power plants, government buildings, and major comercial facilities like skyscrapers. Because an estimated 85 percent of the about ?critical infrastructure? is owned by the private sector 125 , we must not forget that corporations and comercial busineses play an esential role in homeland security. Minimizing Damage and Recovering from Attacks This final strategic objective deals with improving the nation?s capacity to respond if an atack does ocur on American soil. Terorism, as explained earlier in this report, is a desperate act perpetrated by a group against a superior military enemy, with the ultimate goal of spreading fear. Terorists depend on overeaction and panic to broaden the impact of their actions, ?giving what is in fact an isolated incident strategic dimensions,? 126 investing their organizations with disproportionate power. Enhancing ?emergency preparednes and response? includes cordinating incident management capabilities and meting the financial, logistical, informational, and material neds of responders. This material suport ranges from stockpiling vacines and medical suplies, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 125 Sauter, Mark, and James Jay Carafano. 205. Homeland security: a complete guide to understanding, preventing, and surviving terorism. New York: McGraw-Hil. ( xvi) 126 Shehan, Michael A. 208. Crush the cel: how to defeat terorism without terorizing ourselves. New York: Crown Publishers. Pg. 3. improving comunication devices, and achieving nation-wide standards for response acros diferent government jurisdictions. Training and suport of state and local fire, emergency, and law enforcement personel, who are often the ?first responders? on the scene of an atack, is a key part of this objective. Historical Context and Political Suport for Homeland Security Cold War vs. Today Although homeland security has certainly ben intensified after 9/11, the war on terorism was not the first time in U.S. history that the public and government felt there was a clear threat of iminent atack on the United States; there are clear paralels betwen the curent era and the Cold War era. However, one of the major diferences is in the level of political suport for disaster relief as a component of national security. Political suport for civil defense during the Cold War era was weak, in part because ?leaders and legislators regarded civil defense as either strategicaly superfluous or futile?. 127 Superfluous in the fact that deterence had more to do with nuclear arsenals than civil defense, and futile in the sense that a nuclear atack would be so destructive that investments in civil defense would be unlikely to make any diference in the levels of mortality. After the colapse of the Soviet Union, the United States national security policy continued to operate as if the major goal was to prepare for the next Cold War; although America was the only superpower remaining, this status would be fleting. 128 The isue of global hegemony and the ability of the leading superpower to shape the global system were central to the strategies of the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 127 Ibid. Pg. 4 128 Krauthamer, Charles. 190-191. The Unipolar Moment. Foreign Afairs. 70 (1) 23-3 administrations of George H.W. Bush, Bil Clinton, and George W. Bush. 129 Although the terorist threat was far from ignored, it remained a secondary isue until September 1, 201. Modern Political Suport Unlike nuclear war scenarios, the terorist threat to the United States has galvanized the public and politicians to acept investment in disaster response as a critical component of national security. Chemical and biological weapons are a real threat, and there is litle doubt that specialized equipment, research, and training wil be esential to mitigate their threat. Indeed, several case studies have already demonstrated that terorists poses and are wiling to use biological and chemical weapons. In 195 the Aun Shinrikyo group used the nerve gas Sarin to atack the Tokyo subway system, kiling twelve and injuring over six thousand. 130 The anthrax mailings of 201, while not perpetrated by a terorist organization, readily demonstrated the ease with which an individual with enough knowledge and aces to materials could readily manufacture biological threats. To drive home the reality of the terorist threat, September 1, 201 also stands as a transformational event and a temporal reference point for dividing national security policy into ?before? and ?after? categories. Warnings about the potential threat to the United States were isued years prior; the U.S. Comision on National Security/21 st Century ?warned of a ?new orld coming? in which the United States would be chalenged by the global reach, ambition, and increasing technological sophistication of terorist organizations.? 131 In 199, the Gilmore Comision Report declared that a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear atack on the United States was a question of ?when? not ?if.? 132 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 129 Newman, Wiliam. 201. Causes of Change in national Security Proceses: Carter, Reagan, and Bush Decision Making on Arms Control. Presidential Studies Quarterly 31(1). Pg. 129. 130 Shehan, Michael A. 208. Crush the cel: how to defeat terorism without terorizing ourselves. New York: Crown Publishers. (4) 131 Newman, Wiliam W. 202. ?Reorganizing for National Security and Homeland Security.? Public Administration Review. Vol. 62 (127) 132 Ibid. Problems with Politicizing Homeland Security However, despite the clear public and political wil to engage in homeland security, there is much debate over how to apropriately achieve this goal. The Government of the United States of America has historicaly revolved around some discusion of federalism, the proper relationship betwen the national, state, and local governments, and the roles that each play. There is an embedded suspicion of centralized government, and the many laws, jurisdictions, regulations, and operating protocols that make up the American federal system purposefuly deny control by any one entity. How can we then improve homeland security without violating the sovereignty of these independent bodies and maintain decentralization? Additionaly, there is some question over whether politicians are overstating the threat to the public in order to gain political leverage to acomplish their goals, alowing for the pasage of such laws as the Patriot Act and propeling the nation into the curent Iraq War. Another problem of terorism that creates political chalenges and changes traditional security paradigms is the breakdown of what constitutes ?internal? and ?external? security. Since the fight against terorism is considered a war, homeland security must deal with threats from this enemy on the home front; national security and homeland defense strategies must be merged, but their operation must remain separate. Hamre (200) argues for the development of a unified field theory that acknowledges where these two fields overlap and other instances where they do not, such as local law enforcement. 13 Inherent to this isue is the danger of increasing the domestic security environment with various levels of overlap, leading to an increase in the proces of securitization on both a political and social level. Adamson and Grosman argue that ?producing a ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 13 Hamre, John. 200. ?A Strategic Perspective on U.S. Homeland Defense: Problem and Response. In To Insure Domestic Tranquility, Provide for the Comon Defense, edited by Max Manwaring, 1-25. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies institute, U.S. Army War Colege. cycle of increasing securitization (at both the international and domestic levels) is exactly what a political strategy of teror is designed to set in motion.? 134 What are the Terorist Threats to Homeland Security? The terorist threats to homeland security are to numerous to delve into each in detail. However, since the 9/11 atacks there has ben increased scrutiny over the techniques that may be employed by smal groups of people intended to inflict harm, while maximizing panic. Counterterorism experts become much more aware of the potential presence of ?sleper? cels, terorist groups that have infiltrated the United States, either from abroad or home-grown, that have the potential to become active threats at any moment. The increasing reliance on the internet and telecomunications systems for almost every aspect of our governance and economy, combined with the numerous security gaps in this technology and the relative ease with which these technologies can be exploited, means that cyber-terorism has imense potential for disrupting our economic system and way of life. The last, and perhaps most deadly threat, is that of a nuclear, chemical, biological, or radioactive atack. ?Sleper? Cels The creation and subsequent propagation of terorist cels from within the U.S. population is a growing concern for counterterorism profesionals, especialy considering that this is increasingly becoming a threat abroad in Europe as wel. On excelent case study that demonstrates this danger is that of the Lackawana Six, young men who grew up in suburban New York and who were inspired to form an al Qaeda cel by Kamal Derwish in spring 201. Derwish was also born in the United States, but spent a significant portion of his life in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. As the most radical of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 134 Adamson, Fiona and Adam Grosman. 204. ?Framing ?Security? in a Post-9/1 Context.? Social Science Research Council: Reframing the Chalenge of Migration and Security. Acesed at htp:/programs.src.org/gsc/publications/gsc_activities/migration/adamsongrosman.pdf on 12 February 209. this group of six, he inspired the others with war stories, and convinced them to go to Afghanistan and atend al Qaeda camps. This group clearly knew of al Qaeda?s past atacks in East Africa and that of the US Cole. Derwish was kiled in Yemen by a unmaned CIA misile when traveling in a convoy with other al Qaeda leadership, and after his death the group lost their initiative. When arested in September 202, they pled guilty to teror charges to avoid being sent to a military camp. While some scof or even defend this group as a bunch of mislead suburban boys turned-failed- aspirant-jihadists, one must seriously consider what may have hapened if Derwish had returned to New York and resumed leadership of the group. What if the group had ben more driven even without his leadership? One must asume that this is not the only ?sleper? cel present and growing in the United States today. As anti-American sentiment grows abroad, it is also undoubtedly alive in the minds of many marginalized groups in the diverse U.S. society. Home-grown cels in the United Kingdom and Spain have already suceded in carying out atacks, such as the July 205 atacks in London and the Madrid train bombings in 204. While most of these cels have received leadership and training from abroad, the telecomunications technology and the readily available information of the internet on bomb-making demonstrate that the means to cary out atacks are already in the hands of many. Home-grown cels also may escape detection because they have valid identification and fluency in English. Cyber-terorism and threats to Information Networks The Obama administration has made the prevention of cyber-terorism central to their homeland security mesage. The United States is one of the most electronicaly open countries on earth. 135 Although electronics are used by the government and private sector to run many networks, including those that regulate our financial systems, comunications, energy, etc., very litle has ben ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 135 Ranum, M.J. (204). The Myth of Homeland Security. New York: Wiley Publishing Inc. done to protect against a ?cyber atack.? Federal IT workers in particular have ?consistently laged behind their comercial counterparts in expertise and training.? 136 Contributing to this was the giant dot.com buble built up in the last decade, which drew many federal employes away by the lure of the more lucrative private sector. Additionaly, unlike most companies, the government has failed to standardize their software and electronic products; taxpayers instead must pay for masive database conversion projects or projects to interconect incompatible systems. One anecdote is particularly teling: in 204 within the FBI there were over twelve major databases containing criminal and terorist information; in order to check to make sure a visa request isn?t for a suspected terorist, the INS must log in to six diferent computer systems and query them separately, then compare them anualy. CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats This report has already included a brief explanation as to why the threat of CBRN atack has increased the impetus for political suport of homeland security. These weapons would alow a terorist organization to achieve a huge strategic impact in a single atack, not to mention inspire the chaos, panic, and hysteria that are the ultimate goals of terorism. How real are these threats? Terorist organizations work outside the law, and are therefore not restricted in their choice of weapons. Though terorist organizations have historicaly ?moderated their choice of weapons in order to maintain popular suport,? this is increasingly not the case. 137 Scientific and logistical evidence points to the fact that while threats of this type are very real, some basic steps can be taken to prevent their employment. The threat of nuclear weapons faling into the hands of terorists was one of the reasons given by the Bush Administration for going to war with Iraq. However, because nuclear weapons curently remain the hands of nations, their containment is primarily an isue of non-proliferation, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 136 Ibid. pg. 153 137 Slater, M.S. and D. Trunkey. (197) ?Terorism in America: an Evolving Threat.? Archives of Surgery. and counterterorism experts should focus more on weapons of ?mas disruption? rather than mas destruction. 138 The fear of a ?dirty bomb,? or an improvised radiological device that would spread radioactive material when it explodes, has long ben a focus of counterterorism. Chemical weapons, though deadly, are easier to contain and can usualy be cleaned up with relative sped. They are also complicated to manufacture, not lending themselves to facile employment by smal, untrained terorist groups. The 195 Aun Shinrikyo atacks on the Tokyo subway kiled 12, but the group would have kiled more people had they used automatic rifles. They most imediate problem with chemical weapons is that they are dificult to recognize, unlike firearms or bombs. The threat of biological weapons came to the forefront after the September 1 atacks, when leters laced with anthrax spores were sent through the U.S. postal service. Law enforcement and public oficials were slow to respond to these atacks, and the protection strategies put into place afterwards were more panicked than useful. More research neds to be done to ases how terorist cels might be capable to carying out these atacks on a larger scale, and how to clean up a contaminated area should that ocur. Local law enforcement and security should be beter trained to recognize these threats. The reality is that although al Qaeda has ploted to use anthrax, chemical devices, and ?dirty bombs,? high explosives stil continue to be the weapon of choice for their atacks. As a result, the federal government should remain focused on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We should also focus on preventing the proliferation of the materials neded to manufacture chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. Tracking these materials requires the coperation of al levels of government, as wel as the private sector. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 138 Shehan, Michael A. 208. Crush the cel: how to defeat terorism without terorizing ourselves. New York: Crown Publishers. Pg. 193 Part II Overview What folows is a more detailed asesment of some of the major isues of homeland security. The subsequent section is an introduction to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including a description of its background, chalenges to its suces, critiques and failures of the Department, and its acomplishments to date. The next section outlines the ned to reform the inteligence comunity and levels of government. It analyzes both the failures and potential of these agencies and organizations, which face many cordinative, comunicative, technological, and bureaucratic chalenges. We then examine the contentious balance struck betwen legal and constitutional restraints to domestic inteligence work, focusing on the National Information Policy, the USA Patriot Act, information disclosure, and coperation betwen diferent branches of government. We then evaluate the isue of border and transportation security and imigration reform, isues that remain a contentious part of homeland security because they involve political motivations unrelated to terorism. In conclusion, we ofer an analysis of some posible courses of action and provide policy recomendations with the goal of strengthening domestic safety without eroding the personal fredoms that are an esential component of our national identity. Department of Homeland Security The political environment and the heightened perception of vulnerability after September 1 precipitated a huge organizational transformation within the field of national security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created by The Homeland Security Act of 202 (HSA) by combining twenty-two existing agencies and 170,00 federal employes into a new cabinet-level department. This was the largest and most complex reorganization by the federal government since the creation of the Department of Defense (DoD) over six decades earlier, and created the third largest cabinet department. It combines such disparate organizations as the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Secret Service, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Any masive reorganization of this sort is bound to be faced with many chalenges. Each of the twenty-two agencies already faces their own management chalenges; the U.S. Comptroler General reported that many of the major components are already facing chalenges such as failures in information technology management, financial vulnerabilities, and human capital risks. 139 The ned for urgent action to protect America from atack is clear; however, the DHS wil undoubtedly continue to evolve from its curent form for years to come. The DoD, which was created through comparable government reorganization, went through extensive modifications in the decades folowing its creation, and many would say that it neds continued evolution. The DHS faces many chalenges and unfortunately, in its curent form, it wil be unlikely to ensure America?s safety from future terorist atacks. It is imperative, therefore, that constructive criticism be directed toward the department in order to improve upon its organization and direction. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 139 U.S. General Acounting Ofice. 203 c, January. Major management chalenges and program risks: Department of Homeland Security (Performance and Acountability Series). Washington, DC: Author (GAO-03-102.) Background While the September 1 atacks created the political impetus for the creation of the DHS, the blueprints for an Ofice of Homeland Security (OHS) were already on paper, a product of the first Bush and the Clinton administrations. Even prior to 9/11, a number of comisions had concluded that the government lacked the capacity for sucesful counterterorist eforts. The most significant of these to the eventual creation of the DHS was the U.S. Comision on National Security/ 21 st Century, beter known as the Hart-Rudman Comision, named after its Senatorial leadership. The comision?s final report recomended the creation of an independent National Homeland Security Agency that would plan, cordinate, and integrate U.S. government activities around security, including the ofices of FEMA, customs, and border patrol. These recomendations were pursued by Representative Thornbery and Senators Lieberman and Specter, who made the first sugestion of a cabinet-level department. The ofice of the president was initialy oposed to the bil proposed by the Lieberman contingent. However, a month after the bil was introduced to the Senate, the president introduced a new bil that, although based on the first, had several crucial diferences. For instance`, the Ofice of Homeland Security would remain a presidentialy created agency rather than an ofice created by statute, giving the White House considerable political sway over the Department. Critiques and Chalenges Prior to the Creation of the Department The Department, perhaps the most important single aparatus for ensuring the suces of homeland security, has faced persistent criticism since its inception due to claims of bureaucracy, waste, and inefectivenes. Early on, critics felt that the DHS was being asembled hastily for the wrong reasons. Representative Timothy Roemer claimed that the bil?s momentum was like ?a boulder rushing down the mountain?and nobody wants to stand in front of it to change and stop it.? 140 Even prior to its creation there was controversy regarding whether an interagency model, representing an advisory and oversight position over several departments, or the departmental model favored by Congres would be beter suited to face the new threats to security. Those who suported the interagency model argued that the wide scope of isues involved were to complex and far-reaching for a single agency. While the Department combined 2 existing agencies, the number of agencies involved in homeland security is estimated at anywhere from 40 to 151 at the federal level. 141 Additionaly, some argue that the ?highest hurdle in homeland security is the cordination of tasks by dozens of agencies at the federal, state, and local level,? and that a single- agency model was il-suited for this task. 142 Democrats imediately came out against provisions in the bil that eliminated civil service and labor protections for its employes, who could thus be dismised without union protection. President Bush argued that flexibility of apointment and ease of dismisal was important folowing the increased security concerns post-9/11. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 140 Sanders, Irene T. 5 May 202. ?To Fight Teror, We Can?t Think Straight.? The Washington Post. 141 U.S. Senate, Comite on Governmental Afairs. 201. Organizing for Homeland Security: Hearing before the Comite on Government Reform. Statement of Ivo Dalder and I.M. Destler. Available at htp:/ww.brok.edu/dybadocrot/views/testimony/dalder/201012.htm. Acesed 10 February 208. 142 Newman, Wiliam W. 202. ?Reorganizing for National Security and Homeland Security.? Public Administration Review. Vol. 62 (127) Fiscal Isues The bil itself is also controversial because of the unrelated ?riders? and ?pork barel? spending included in its 450 pages of text. As of September of last year, Congres estimated that the department has wasted roughly $15 bilion on failed contracts. The Department has paid milions of dolars of homeland security money to state and local authorities, often with very litle efect on overal security. 143 The President?s 204 budget of $36.2 bilion for the DHS ?anticipates heavy reliance on the private sector for providing bilions of dolars in research and development, pharmaceuticals, and al many of technologicaly based products from sophisticated information exchange systems.? 14 While this in and of itself does not constitute a problem, experiences with private contractors on the military fronts in Afghanistan and Iraq and prove that this relationship can be problematic because of coruption and wastefulnes. Additionaly, heavy reliance on outside expertise to prioritize neds in the field of homeland security may influence Congres and the White House into funding costly projects which may prove to be inefective. Lack of Jurisdiction over Inteligence Before the signing of the HSA, many argued that the first priority for policy makers was to enact inteligence reform, since it was largely failures in the inteligence comunity that failed to prevent the atacks of 9/11. Folowing that logic, there was a push to incorporate the FBI and CIA into the department?two organizations that have ben left largely untouched since the National Security Act of 1947. In the end, they were both left out. The acomplishments of the Department are seriously undermined by its lack of authority in inteligence gathering. The Homeland Security Act of 202 states that the ?responsibility for investigating and prosecuting acts of terorism shal be vested not in the Department, but rather in the federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 143 Shehan, Michael A. 208. Crush the cel: how to defeat terorism without terorizing ourselves. New York: Crown Publishers. (23) 14 Haynes, Wendy. 204. "Seing around Corners: Crafting the New Department of Homeland Security". Review of Policy Research. 21 (3): 369-395 with jurisdiction over the acts in question,? 145 giving the Department litle authority to intervene in local or state governments isues. The DHS?s mision is very expansive, giving it the responsibility of isuing ?warnings and information to state and local government personel, agencies, and authorities and to the public.? However, the HSA does not provide for departmental jurisdiction over the information posesed by the FBI, which remains the lead agency for terorism investigations. Simply put, the DHS lacks the ability to control this information sharing because they only have limited aces to the information. The Department has no aces to inteligence reports for other agencies, due to a prevailing culture of secrecy in the inteligence comunity and the claim that they ned to preserve the agencies sources and methods. Thus, the DHS only has aces to polished inteligence, and has litle or no control over what inteligence it does receive. If the Department?s requests for specific information is denied, they must make an apeal to the White House, ?nedlesly consuming time and other valuable resources 146 . Performance and Accountability The complex bureaucratic arangement of the DHS makes it dificult to remain acountable and to acurately evaluate performance and results. For the Department, the performance measures revolve around the survival of American citizens. Acording to some reports, there are eighty-eight congresional comites and subcomites that have jurisdiction over homeland security isues, and many of those isues are oversen by agencies now a part of the DHS. There is no single oversight or apropriations comite overseing this proces. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 145 United States. 202. Public Law 107-296. ?Homeland Security Act of 202.? Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O. 146 Lewis, James T. 203. ?Reform by Catastrophe.? Swords & ploughshares: a chronicle of international afairs. Washington, D.C.: Graduate Student Council of the Schol of International Service of the American University. Cordinating Federal, State, and Local Governments and Inteligence Agencies In the domestic fight against terorism, the dispute over which agencies should be involved and what kinds of roles they should play has ben fervent, especialy after 201. Both 9/11 and the 201 anthrax atacks have revealed the weakneses in the complicated structure of U.S. agencies. These isues are sen in U.S. inteligence agencies as wel as the network betwen Federal, State and local oficials. The U.S. inteligence comunity is facing the folowing problems: outdated technology, lack of comunication betwen and within inteligence agencies, decentralized structure, lack of acountability and encouraging the wrong work culture. Beyond U.S. inteligence, Federal, State and local oficials ned to play a key role in the fight against teror. For these oficials, this role generaly means preparednes, but their atempts to prepare their regions for domestic teror have ben stifled by the folowing obstacles: an overabundance of U.S. agencies working with overlaping agendas, lack of comunication betwen agencies, deficiencies concerning the awarenes agencies have for both each other and the threat terorism poses on their jurisdiction, and fiscal dificulties and discrepancies. U.S. Inteligence: Separate Entities Rather Than a Cohesive Team In January of 200, the trail that the CIA had ben keping on two of the suspected 9/11 hijackers went cold. The CIA was aware of a meting betwen al-Qaeda operatives in Malaysia and established surveilance operations for the meting. After the meting, the future 9/11 hijackers tok flights to Bangkok and then to the U.S. but the CIA?s tracking was stifled by a few main isues: outdated technology, the lack of cohesive work within the U.S. inteligence comunity, decentralized organization within inteligence agencies, and incentives for inteligence oficials that rewarded inefective techniques. Before 9/11 the CIA was not able to comunicate efectively with the 13 other agencies involved in U.S. inteligence. Each agency had its own goals, budget, e-mail and database systems, and hiring and training programs. There was no mechanism to pul these inteligence agencies together or to function as the nucleus for the inteligence comunity. This parochial culture has always ben present in the inteligence comunity and was at work during the tracking of the Kuala Lumpur terorists. The CIA neglected to ask the National Security Agency and the State Department for information on the suspects even though it was designated as the lead agency. Also, for years before 9/11, the CIA and FBI had atempted to create unity by cordinating a direct exchange with oficials from each agency. This program failed not only because of the loyalty that each oficial fels to their own agency but also because neither managers nor oficials loking to work their way up the ladder of suces want to send their best oficials away. The culture of the CIA has generated many isues in regard to fighting terorism. Instead of fostering a sense of alegiance to the overal inteligence comunity, each agent fels a sense of loyalty to the specific agency he or she works for. There has never ben a philosophy that the inteligence comunity works as a team, and this has stifled the fight against terorism, as information sharing is vital in these eforts. Instead, a culture of posesivenes has pervaded the inteligence comunity. Before 9/11 tok place the CIA was folowing Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, two suspected terorists, but neglected to share their information with other important agencies. The CIA did not notify the FBI or State Department so that they could take action to kep the men out of the U.S. or find them if they were already in America. The FBI could have easily found the men while they lived in California during the months before the atacks as they used their real names on rental agrements and identification cards. 147 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 147 Zegart, Amy B. "CN with Secrets:" 9/1, the CIA, and the Organizational Rots of Failure. International Journal of Inteligence and Counterinteligence, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 18-49, spring 207. Fragmentation, Accountability and Contemporary Strategies Not only was there a lack of unity within the entire U.S. inteligence comunity, but specificaly within the CIA. The CIA had an incredibly fragmented structure that was left over from the Cold War. For example, each field ofice was able to have sovereignty over particular isues. This was a structure that worked during the Cold War, when the enemy was clear and generaly stationary. But tracking terorist suspects cals for comunication betwen field ofices and coresponding headquarters. The field ofices were focused on their geographic jurisdiction rather than tracking a specific individual. This was a major problem when tracking the suspected 9/11 hijackers from Malaysia. There was not a single agent or ofice that was left in charge of tracking the suspects and analyzing information found by various inteligence agencies. This lack of responsibility resulted in the trail going cold on the suspects. 148 The lack of acountability for the inteligence agencies has also created isues in regard to the fight against terorism. Before 9/11, as agents caried out their work and reported to their supervisors, there was no single authoritative figure to kep the agencies and their oficers acountable for their actions. Since 9/11, the U.S. government has created the Terorist Threat Integration Center, which is suposed to act as the hub for various inteligence agencies. 149 But the U.S. inteligence comunity has yet to set up a working acountability function. Quantity over Quality The CIA encouraged a work ethic that was counterproductive for the fight against terorism. Performance evaluations, carer awards, and promotion criteria focused heavily on oficers? ability to addres imediate neds rather than long-term goals. This focus is manifested in the fact that the CIA uses only obvious and quantifiable benchmarks to evaluate their employes. Specificaly, performance evaluations for CIA analysts and clandestine case oficers use the number of spies ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 148 Se id. 1 149 Dufy, Michael. Could It Hapen Again? Time. recruited or number of analytic reports compiled instead of for reaching acros agency lines to improve information sharing. Quantity trumps quality in this system and consequently promoted a work ethic that was not conducive to fighting terorism. After 9/11 CIA oficials said that they were overwhelmed with the daily grind of urgent neds and did not have the time or the resources to addres long term projects, no mater their importance. Comunication betwen Foreign, National and Local Oficials In the post-9/11 world, the U.S. inteligence system was an over-centralized, multilayered structure that could not work as fast as it neded to. Foreign inteligence and domestic information could not be put together and analyzed with enough sped to be pased on to those who would take action: CIA oficers, FBI agents, foreign partners, and state and local police oficers. Pre-91 there were few to any domestic analysts. There was no line of comunication from U.S. inteligence oficers working abroad to state and local oficials in the U.S. This is a major isue for U.S. inteligence as they work to quel terorist action. The state and local oficials are the ones who can imediately act on the information that is gathered and analyzed. Without eficient lines of comunication, potentialy critical actions are stifled. Inteligence oficers ned to be informed on more than just data, and they should have knowledge on terorists and their tactics. The CIA has masive amounts of information on terorist organizations, yet they kep much of it clasified. This wealth of knowledge should be received by local and state oficials so that they have an educated context from which to plan terorism strategies, apropriately alocate resources, and acurately train their workforce. Consequently, instead of merely alerting a local oficial that they may be facing a threat, the local oficial should have aces to information about posible threats to have time to prepare for them. More generaly, the model of U.S. national inteligence must be more decentralized so that information flow is rapid and set at a gradation for diferent levels of inteligence. We have the technology to provide varied levels of de-clasified information for diferent oficials so that each organization has aces to the data they ned. 150 Federal, State and Local Government Preparednes and Cordination There is a complex structure of U.S. agencies and organizations, public and private, foreign to local, that neds to comunicate and colaborate to fight the threat of domestic and foreign terorism. Past incidents, such as the 9/11 atacks and the 201 anthrax scare, revealed that many weakneses in this structure exist. The threat that these agencies try to protect their nation from has changed form and in turn, the agencies must change the way they function to acomodate this shift in fighting terorism. Although there have ben eforts to adapt to the threat of terorists, there are stil many isues that this structure of agencies face. These eforts must not be planed or executed with each agency working independently. Changes must be made as a part of a national plan with each local, federal and national agency playing a role. As the General Acounting Ofice has mentioned, ?to develop this esential national strategy, the federal role neds to be considered in relation to other levels of government, the goals and objectives for preparednes, and the most apropriate tols to asist and enable other levels of government and the private sector to achieve these goals?. 151 In the folowing section we wil discus the isues we have found concerning U.S. agencies and organizations and the changes that ned to be a part of this national strategy. To Many Agencies with Not Enough Clarity The first isue facing the U.S. inteligence comunity is the sher number of agencies and organizations that ned to colaborate in order to efectively fight terorism. On the federal level ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 150 Tenet, George, and Bil Harlow. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York: HarperColins Publishers, 207. 151 Posner, Paul L. 202. Combating Terorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparednes. Testimony before the U.S. House, Comite on Government Reform, Subcomite on Government Eficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations. March 2. Washington, DC: General Acounting Ofice. GAO-02-547T. alone there are over 40 entities curently participating in the fight against terorism. The state and local level governments are just as overwhelmed with the number of agencies and operations. When planing for and reacting to an emergency, state and local governments are asisted by the folowing four diferent agencies: the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Justice, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Department of Health and Human Services. The federal government has provided almost 10 diferent terorism training courses and developed over 10 federal terorism response teams. An example of how these problems stifle the fight against terorism is clearly sen in the 201 anthrax atacks. After the anthrax outbreak, state and local law enforcement was not sure if they were to take direction from the FBI, the Postal Service, the CDC, or the DHHS. This is a major obstacle that neds to be addresed if local and state oficials are to respond quickly to future terorism. Comunication Network Moving deeper into the isues that U.S. agencies confront, we find that it is not only the number of agencies that have jurisdiction over a given terorist atack but also the functions and operations that each agency is in charge of. Terorism is a complex threat that demands that agencies work together at a rapid pace to provide a multitude of diferent resources to fight against it. When responding to a terorist atack, local and state governments must cal for political, fiscal, and social resources that can be beyond their limits. There must be a comunication network set up betwen federal, state and local agencies that is ready to function eficiently when an emergency arises. Many of the weakneses in this network are concentrated in the lack of knowledge and awarenes that local oficials have about terorist threats. 152 Even after 9/11 local fire oficials complained about this lack of awarenes when they were quoted saying, ?We ned recomendations on the risk our area is in for weapons of mas destruction,? and ?we ned to ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 152 Organizing the Federal System for Homeland Security: Problems, Isues, and Dilemas. know hat potential exposure we have in our area. We have no idea if we should be preparing for these incidents or not.? 153 This lack of awarenes is strongly tied to the limited aces that state and local oficials have to U.S. federaly-gleaned inteligence. As mentioned previously, every state and local oficial, from the governor to the fire department, neds to have an apropriate level of knowledge concerning terorist threats. Oficials have often complained that their level of preparednes is stifled by a lack of information and comprehension of the risks their region may face. Other weakneses in the comunication network betwen federal, state and local agencies are concentrated in the ability of state and local oficials to cal on the federal government for resources in the time of an emergency and vice versa. For example, state and local oficials are not fuly aware of the abilities that the Armed forces poses and the Federal government does not have a clear picture of the role state and local responders ned to take. Even after eforts were made to try and corect this miscomprehension in the post-9/11 world, agencies did not have a clear understanding of the new structure. It has ben pointed out that ?the underlying problem is that military and civilian oficials?especialy at the state and local levels?have distinctly diferent ideas about how the new authority should work.? 154 A structure has ben set up but the specific actualization for the configuration is stil unclear. For example, FEMA has ben designated as the lead Federal agency for ?consequence management? while the FBI has ben chosen as the lead Federal agency for ?crisis management.? These semingly similar roles must be clearly defined so that responsibilities and acountability are established within the military and civilian configuration. 15 Local, state and federal oficials must clearly comprehend the structure of homeland security and who they cal upon in time of an emergency. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 153 Advisory Panel to Ases Domestic Response Capabilities for Terorism Involving Weapons of Mas Destruction. 202. Third Anual Report. Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofice. 154 Fredberg, Sydney J., Jr. 201. Homeland Defense Efort Breaks Down Wals of Government. GovExec.com, October 19. Available at ww.Govexec.com/dailyfed/101/101901nj1.htm. Acesed April 25, 202. 15 Se id. 3 Fiscal Dificulties and Discrepancies When preparing for an emergency, the isue of monetary resources is always prominent in strategic planing. In regard to local and state imediate response plans, the Federal government distributes money heavily to local oficials rather than to state oficials. Although it is important that local oficials are prepared to respond to a terorist threat or atack, a key part of preparednes is a state-cordinated response plan. Without funding to the state, a coherent, expansive, and quick response plan wil not be cordinated for the local level. Another reason it is important to fund the state level rather than send most federal funds to the local level is that state disaster agencies have more experience and knowledge concerning disaster relief than their local counterparts. 156 The actual administration of asistance programs to the local and state level is another isue as promised funds can be dificult to materialize. For example, a program started by the Justice Department in 199 pledged monetary provisions for biological, chemical and radiological response equipment for emergency oficials. After thre years, only 23 of the 56 states and other jurisdictions had actualy received money from the program. The Ofice of Justice Programs spokespersons admited that this delay has ocured because of the expansive and painstaking aplication that the states must fil out in order to receive funds. 157 When the nation is atempting to prepare itself for the threat of terorism specificaly, time is incredibly crucial and the alocation of funds must be set on a similarly urgent timetable. It is clear that state and federal oficials must comunicate closely, and that state oficials are informed of terorist threats and can then prepare their own local oficials apropriately. Consequently, state oficials ned the fiscal authority to distribute funds as necesary to their local counterparts. Along with this ned for flexibility, acountability is important because diferent levels of government must be keping one another in check in order to function eficiently. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 156 Straton, Ruth M. 1989. Disaster Relief: The Politics of Inter- governmental Relations. Lanham, MD: University Pres of America. 157 Seigle, Greg. 202. Justice Department Slow to Get Anti-Terroism Funding to States. Available at ww.govexec.com/dailyfed/0402/042402gsn1.htm. Acesed April 25, 202. Within the context of funding for the domestic fight against teror there neds to be a balance betwen flexibility and acountability. U.S. Inteligence and National Information Policies: Balancing Privacy, the USA PATRIOT Act, and Terorist Financing With the rise of terorism to the forefront of American political agendas and public discusions, the United States government, including many interelated agencies and coperating organizations, have atempted to identify the key mechanisms that foster the domestic conditions for terorism, both at home and abroad. Concomitantly, it is imperative to identify the financial and social chanels that enable operational coherence acros the globe, foster recruitment, provide financial feasibility, and steal and diseminate vital security information to terorist networks. The United States government has identified the availability and acesibility of information as a critical component to mitigate the efect and eficiency of terorist operations. In addition, the U.S. government uses information interception and domestic surveilance as preventive indicators to thwart terorist plots before they ocur. The terorist atacks of September 1, 201 were sobering instances of failed surveilance and interception, and provide harowing evidence for the ned for increased atention to realigning national information policy as an integral component of comprehensive national security strategies. However, inherent to the discusion of government-regulated acesibility to the disemination of information are the growing complaints of activist organizations that cite growing surveilance as a violation of citizens? rights to privacy and fredoms of expresion. The consequences of such reformations to information policy wil inevitably require a change in how the country addreses the terorist threat in relation to its desire for maintaining civil liberties, as wel as a reasesment of what comprises an aceptable level of surveilance and government intrusion into citizens? private lives for the sake of national security. National Information Policy Historicaly, the United States has ben considered one of the most-fre nations in the world in respect to aces to information, and the right of citizens to personal privacy. However, folowing 9/11, the United States has realigned its practices into a more intrusive system based on government surveilance and increased aces to personal records. Privacy International, an independent human rights watch group based in London, whose aim is to ases the national levels of government intrusion into citizens? private lives, gave the United States one of the porer rankings among First World Nations (rivaling Rusia and the United Kingdom) specificaly due to its inadequacies in the fields of imigration, terorism, privacy law, domestic spying, and weak protections of personal information including financial and medical records. 158 Fredom of Information Act The United States afords to its citizens rights against unreasonable search and seizure and many fredoms of personal expresion outlined in the Bil of Rights. Under the Fredom of Information Act (FOIA) pased in 196, the United States granted its citizens rights to aces to information including government documents, although it also provided for nine exemptions to aces, ranging from clasified secrets and national defense, to trade secrets and financial information, to personal information afecting an individual?s privacy. These nine exemptions were designed to avoid leaks of government secrets and intrusion into the private lives of citizens. Folowing 9/11, these exemptions would provide the foundational navigation for The USA PATRIOT Act in circumventing many of the rights that the FOIA provided. The desire for national defense greatly trumped citizens? rights to fre aces to government-owned information and privacy. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 158 Privacy International (acesed February 4, 209); available from htp:/ww.privacyinternational.org. USA PATRIOT Act Within weks after the terorist atacks on 1 September 201, ?national information policy based on the founding fathers? concepts of openes in a representative democracy began to change.? 159 In the aftermath, the U.S. government, in both the executive and legislative branches, reacted by increasing the scope of executive authority and increasing the power of the law enforcement comunity, not an unsurprising outcome given the grave uncertainty surounding Washington D.C. Congres enacted several regulatory changes that ?enhance the colection and use of personal information for inteligence and law enforcement purposes,? culminating in the huried pasage of the USA PATRIOT Act. 160 The Patriot Act was pased by both houses of Congres and signed by former President George W. Bush in the weks folowing 9/11. It provided the ?teth? for law enforcement agencies to try to rot out teror from within and along our borders, whose grit and security had ben tested during the atacks on New York and Washington D.C. The Patriot Act would son be considered the harbinger of the way in which our country would react to the terorist threat. Government Secrets: Costs and Benefits Prior to the Patriot Act, the seminal report on national information policy and government guarding of information was the ?Report on the Comision on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy? (197). This report concluded that: ? excesive secrecy can harm the national interest; ? policymakers are not fuly informed on the relevant isues; ? to much is clasified; ? leaking is frequent and pernicious; and ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 159 Le S. Strickland, ?The information gulag: Rethinking openes in times of national danger.? Government Information Quarterly 2 (205): 547. 160 Priscila M. Regan, ?Old isues, new context: Privacy, information colection, and homeland security.? Government Information Quarterly 21 (204): 481. ? ?real? secrets are not wel protected 161 The report recomended that Congres enact a statute that set forth principles regarding a ?life cycle? for secrets, as wel as ofering a recomendation for seting up protocols for declasifying information. This recomendation, however, did not pas, and would foreshadow an age of increased surveilance and government acesibility to private information. The Patriot Act, in many ways unrelated to counterterorism, revised the U.S. government?s policies towards privacy and aces to both private and public information. It increased the scope of law enforcement agencies to include requesting telephone, e-mail, medical, and financial records, and enhanced the authority of imigration and customs oficials for detaining and deporting imigrants suspected of subversion. The Patriot Act amends information privacy statutes in order to facilitate greater government aces, increase data colection, and ?reduce the due proces and privacy protection for record subjects.? 162 However, in years pased, many critiques have risen up against The Patriot Act. While it initialy was not met with significant oposition in both Houses of Congres, many representatives, academics, and civilians have folowed with expresed concern over the expanded powers acorded to the government. In particular, many have criticized the scope of the Patriot Act, citing the weakening protection of basic civil liberties, such as citizen?s rights against search and seizure outline in The Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and efects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shal not be violated, and no Warrants shal isue, but upon probable cause, suported by Oath or afirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized 163 The powers of The Patriot Act expand authority to inteligence gathering services and atempt to strengthen the comunication networks among these services, such as interagency ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 161 Report of the Comision on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 197 (acesed January 23, 209); available from htp:/ww.gpo.gov/congres/comisions/secrecy/index.html 162 Priscila M. Regan, ?Old isues, new context: Privacy, information colection, and homeland security.? Government Information Quarterly 21 (204): 482. 163 The United States Constitution (acesed January 23, 209); available from htp:/ww.usconstitution.net/const.html coperation among the FBI, CIA, NSA, DoD, and DHS. The folowing are examples of information and privacy modifications provisioned for under the Patriot Act: ? Section 21 reduces the privacy protections of the Cable Comunications Policy Act regarding the release of the customer records of cable companies; ? Section 215 amends the Electronic Comunications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) to expand the types of Internet Service Provider (ISP) subscriber records that law enforcement oficers can aces with an administrative subpoena; ? Section 358 amends the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA) to permit banks to disclose banking records to law enforcement authorities for analysis of inteligence activities; ? Section 505 amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Financial Right to Privacy Act, and the Electronic Comunications Privacy Act to permit government aces to personal information when a FBI agent certifies that the records are relevant to a terorist investigation; and ? Section 507 amends the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act to require educational institutions to disclose student records when law enforcement authorities certify that they may be relevant to a terorism investigation 164 These examples are indicative of the key structural changes that The Patriot Act entails: curtailing protections of privacy and expanding government intervention methods in acesing private records. However, these examples are only a few elements of the existing mosaic in a comprehensive strategy to fight against teror. National Security Leters (NSLs) and technological breakthroughs harnes the capacity to be great alies against teror. National Security Leters ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 164 Priscila M. Regan, ?Old isues, new context: Privacy, information colection, and homeland security.? Government Information Quarterly 21 (204): 482-3. Counterterorist programs have chalenged citizens? rights in many arenas, as both the FBI and CIA, using the expanded power given to them under The Patriot Act, have isued NSLs and gag orders in order to aces and analyze the records of individuals and busineses for suspicious activities without the subject being able to inform legal counsel. 165 The isuance of gag orders has since ben ruled unconstitutional as an infringement on fre spech under the ruling of Doe v. Ashcroft and subsequent apeals. 16 The initial conception of NSLs came with the pasage of the RFPA (1978) and the ECPA (1986), and was then expanded under the National Security Act and the FCRA (1970). The FBI was thus granted aces to financial institution records and comunications service provider customer information. The imediate efects of The Patriot Act have resulted in the exponentialy increased use of NSLs: their isuance has increased over one hundred fold since 201, resulting in more than 30,00 isuances per year. 167 The Patriot Act ofers almost limitles justification for isuing NSLs, and no longer requires that the subject of investigation be a foreign agent. In addition, The Patriot Act expanded the definition of financial institution to include Internet Service Providers (ISPs), casinos, jewelers, the U.S. Postal Service, travel agencies, and insurance companies. The digital fotprints of American consumers are now semingly limitlesly acesible to government agencies which no longer ned to provide just cause. NSLs have ben used to aces library, financial, and telecomunication records for both individuals, and as part of sweping inquiries into groups of individuals. Law enforcement tols like wiretaps, electronic comunications interceptions, and government requests of personal records are pivotal components in creating a comprehensive, defensive strategy to combat terorism. The intersections betwen knowledge, information, and ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 165 Doe vs. Ashcroft (acesed February 3, 209); available from htp:/ww.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/nsl_decision.pdf 16 Doe vs. Ashcroft (204) was filed by the ACLU on behalf of an unknown Internet Service Provider when the government subpoenaed disclosure of its private customer information. Folowing apeal procedures and PATRIOT Act restructuring in 206, NSL provisions were ruled a violation of the First Amendment and the separation of powers. 167 Librarian Who Chalenged NSLs Urges Congres to Fix Patriot Act (acesed February 1, 209); available from htp:/ww.aclu.org/natsec/gen/29314prs207041.html acesibility are now heavily governed by the expanding responsibilities acorded to the CIA, FBI, and NSA as these agencies now hold the keys to personal and busines records. Due to the far- reaching nature of NSLs, they have the potential to be valuable tols in domestic counterterorism operations. The Department of Justice and Information Disclosure Information disclosure policy as outlined by former Atorney General John Ashcroft?s recomendation on 12 October 201, recomended that ?governmental agencies withold whenever there is a legal basis to do so and is based, acording to the Department of Justice (DoJ), on the importance of protecting sensitive institutional, comercial, and personal interests that can be implicated in government records ? such as the ned to safeguard national security, to maintain law enforcement efectivenes, to respect confidentiality, to protect internal agency deliberations, and to preserve personal privacy.? 168 This directly chalenged a previous 193 memorandum under then-Atorney General Janet Reno which promoted the disclosure of information unles it was a foreseable threat to national security. It is imperative to distance acts of government secrecy regarding counterterorism protocols from taking a general oficial disposition towards government secrecy. Terorist Financing Perhaps the most important anti-terorist component is disrupting and dismantling the flow of funds and resources that fuel terorist operations and recruitment. International coperation in disrupting financial resources can severely dampen recruitment and limit the spatial scope and linkages of terorist networks. Charities, mosques, nongovernmental organizations, websites, and ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 168 Le S. Strickland, ?The information gulag: Rethinking openes in times of national danger.? Government Information Quarterly 2 (205): 57. banks comprise the global terorist financing network, and it is imperative to U.S. interests that the government develops a comprehensive, multilateral plan to undermine terorist finance eforts. The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terorism Act of 201, Title II of the Patriot Act, aimed to facilitate the prevention, detection, and prosecution of money laundering and terorist financing through strengthening international banking rules, improving comunication betwen financial institutions and law enforcement agencies, and exponentialy increasing penalties for counterfeiting and smugling. In addition, the Ofice of Foreign Asets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury is responsible for administering trade sanctions against foreign countries, terorism sponsoring organizations, and international narcotics trafickers predicated on U.S. foreign policy and national security. It has ben alocated the power to impose controls on financial transactions and freze foreign asets within U.S. jurisdiction. This is but one front. The other requires more heavily integrated coperation with nations responsible for alowing the facilitation for financing, including the oil-rich nations of the Middle East. This, however, wil require legal and regulatory consent and restructuring at the state-level in order to achieve sustainable suces over the long-term. 169 Imigration, Border and Transportation Security ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 169 Council on Foreign Relations, Terorist Financing, ed. Maurice R. Grenberg (New York: Publications Ofice, 202): 3. The United States government has always ben aware of both the advantages and disadvantages that come with imigration. Over the course of the history of the United States, diferent waves of imigrations have led to various outcomes in imigration policy ? some groups of people have ben turned away due to quotas, while other groups have ben solicited for their labor. Many new eras of imigration policies have ben welcomed by some, and some have angered others; these sentiments apear most recently in relation to the imigration policies that have ben legalized post-September 1, 201. Due to the fact that the nineten 9/11 hijackers were not American citizens, both the Bush administration and the general public quickly made the conection betwen imigration and domestic terorism. 170 As a result of the terorist threat, new imigration policies have ben made in order ?to deter and punish terorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tols, and for other purposes,? 171 which is most specificaly sen within the Patriot Act, enacted in October 201. Along with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 202, criticism over lack of civil rights given to both legal and ilegal imigrants in the United States is now a diferent situation than it was pre-9/11. With new laws, quotas, and restrictions, imigration after 9/11 has sucesfuly reputed the belief that ?America is welcoming to al,? as border security and stricter imigration policies are tightly enforced. Important Imigration Acts: The McCaran-Walter Act & The Patriot Act ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 170 Bil Ong Hing, ?Misusing Imigration Policy in the Name of Homeland Security,? New Centenial Review, volume 6, 195-23. Available from Project Muse. Acesed January 20, 209. 171 The Library of Congres: THOAS. Search Result: H.R. 3162. In regard to imigration, the USA PATRIOT Act in fact only strengthened existing policies. In 1952, the McCaran-Walter Act, formaly known as the Imigration and Nationality Act (INA), ?ended the blanket exclusion of imigrants based on race and created the foundation for curent imigration law, but imposed a racialized imigration quota system and new ideological grounds for exclusion.? 172 The INA received much criticism, and parts of the Act regarding the ?ideological grounds for exclusion? were formaly repealed in 190. 173 Yet many of these repealed provisions were resurected in 201 with the PATRIOT Act. Specificaly, the PATRIOT Act has made it much more dificult for imigrants and non-citizens to ?? gain U.S. permanent residency, citizenship, visas and work permits due to the added requirements.? 174 Imigration & the Department of Homeland Security With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 202, the Imigration and Naturalization Services (INS) became part of the larger department, and was renamed the U.S. Citizenship and Imigration Services (USCIS). Within former President George W. Bush?s proposal for the Department of Homeland Security, ?Border and Transportation Security? was sen as a top priority, for which USCIS and other government departments would work together to improve the safety of America. Specificaly, the DHS would be ? ?the single federal Department in charge of al ports of entry, including security and inspection operations, and would manage and cordinate port of entry activities of other ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 172 ?The McCaran-Walter Act: A Contradictory Legacy on Race, Quotas, and Ideology.? Imigration Policy Center, June 204. Acesed February 1, 209. 173 Ibid. 174 United States Imigration Suport. ?The Patriot Act and U.S. Imigration.? Acesed on February 4, 209. federal departments and agencies.? 175 The conection was made betwen ?border and transportation security? and the por utilization of imigration policies, wherein Bush?s proposal provided the link betwen terorism and imigration, to be used specificaly by increasing security at al 350 oficial ports of entry to the United States. In hopes to deter terorism from entering America?s borders, former President Bush?s policies linked al forms of imigration to posibilities of terorist activities. Restrictions and regulations on both legal and ilegal imigrants in the United States were thoroughly altered after 9/11. The ned for enhanced domestic security procedures in transportation, imigration, and border patrol was made clear by the ease with which the September 1 th bombers entered the country, although some were known to be suspected terorists. The INS was il- suited to folow up on their whereabouts. The true severity of the problem was realized when, a ful six months folowing the atacks, the INS mailed documents for several of the terorists extending their stay in the United States. 176 Failures on the part of the INS were, unfortunately, not new. During the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, the INS was able to confirm the location of only 9,00 of the 50,00 Iranian students in the United States. 17 In 193, Jordanian Eyad Ismoil drove a truck loaded with bombs into the World Trade Center, and it was only afterward that the INS realized he had violated his student visa. 178 Facts like these provide startling evidence to politicians for the ned for reform; however, how that reform should take place is a more dificult question. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 175 President George W. Bush. ?The Department of Homeland Security.? Published in June, 202. Acesed January 30, 209. 176 Thompson, Cheryl W. 30 July 202. ?In Congres, a Tug of War Over INS?s Role in New Department.? The Washington Post. 17 Kamarck, Elaine Ciula. 202. Aplying 21st-century government to the chalenge of homeland security. New ways to manage series. [Arlington, VA]: PricewaterhouseCopers Endowment for the Busines of Government. htp:/ww.businesofgovernment.org/pdfs/KamarckReport.pdf. Acesed 2 February 209. 178 Ibid. Although it was clear to both the U.S. government and the general public that in fact, al nineten of the September 1 th suicide bombers were Middle Eastern men of Muslim- descent, imigration policies that were created and utilized to enhance homeland security was mainly sen in relation to the U.S.-Mexico border. The questionable use of political leverage to enforce another ?imigration-related? agenda, such as the ongoing isues regarding imigration from Mexico to the U.S., can especialy be sen within the creation of DHS, and their policies on border and transportation security. There has continualy ben a history of xenophobia in the United States, and it is only more evident now after 9/11. Whether America targets Muslim or Middle Eastern countries with certain restrictions on student or profesional visas, or if border security is continualy expanded at the U.S./Mexico border, it is sen that the blanket term ?imigration? is biger and broader than just detering terorism from specific groups of people. The Department of Homeland Security?s mandate is to stop terorism within America?s borders, and isues of imigration are used as symbolic ways of increasing security and providing ?efective ways? of promoting an anti-imigration agenda. A New Take on Imigration: The Obama Administration As discused earlier, DHS continues to use a responsive tactic when aproaching new aves of imigration policy, by only changing broken-down systems of bureaucracy when the system so obviously fails (as can be sen on 9/11). With the new Obama administration in political ofice for barely two months, the ?Imigration Policy Working Group? that the President has put together is already working to rearange and rebuild a defunct USCIS. The Obama-Biden campaign ran on thre imigration-specific ideals: ? Barack Obama wil secure our borders: Obama and Biden want to preserve the integrity of our borders. They suport additional personel, infrastructure, and technology on the border and at our ports of entry. ? Improve our imigration system: Obama and Biden believe we must fix the dysfunctional imigration bureaucracy and increase the number of legal imigrants to kep families together and met the demands for jobs that employers canot fil. ? Bring people out of the shadows: Obama and Biden suport a system the requires undocumented imigrants who are in god standing to pay a fine, learn English, and go to the back of the line for the oportunity to become citizens. 179 Although there is some overlap betwen former President Bush?s goals with the creation of DHS, it is evident that the Obama-Biden campaign (and now administration) aproached imigration reform with a critical eye. Specificaly, it is sen from the second point that it is obvious how many influential people ? whether from Washington or the general public ? think the entire system of imigration in the United States is defective. ?Dysfunctional imigration bureaucracy? is a phrase that shows how the DHS?s incorporation of the USCIS is failing, as imigration policies continue to be used incorectly and end up causing more harm for many inocent people. Homeland Security and Domestic Counterterorism Recomendations ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 179 Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change We Ned: Imigration. Acesed February 1, 209. < htp:/ww.barackobama.com/isues/imigration/> The inevitable dilema of homeland security lies in making the necesary tradeofs betwen wasting valuable resources on misguided preparation or over-preparation for false alarms, and the risk of failing to prepare enough for real threats to the American public and infrastructure. Similarly, the homeland security aparatus faces a trade-of betwen increased securitization at the potential cost of fewer human rights, and tragic situations that could ocur because of a lack of public surveilance. Recomendations to improve homeland security, therefore, must carefuly balance these isues. The safety of the American public depends on the ability of scholars, politicians, oficials, consultants, public and private agencies, organizations, and indeed the entire populace of the United States to join together in facing these chalenges. Fortunately, the constantly evolving nature of the threats to our security also means that the government has infinite potential to evolve and improve in order to create a homeland security aparatus that works. Department of Homeland Security In order to achieve its goals, the DHS must be alocated more power and its inteligence colection capabilities must be augmented. There are strong incentives for the CIA and FBI to withold information and asistance for the Department, as it encroaches upon both their jurisdictions and funding. Legislation may be necesary to compel the inteligence agencies to share both their procesed and un-procesed inteligence. To improve fiscal discipline, the DHS should act in an advisory role to Congres as a ?smart- buyer? to define ?what they want to buy, know ho to buy it from, and judge the quality of what they buy when it arives? 180 . While the prevailing neoconservative logic of the past administration relied heavily on privatization, the reality is that the interests of the public and those of public ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 180 Haynes, Wendy. 204. "Seing around Corners: Crafting the New Department of Homeland Security". Review of Policy Research. 21 (3): 369-395. (387) contractors often conflict. Additionaly, no-bid and cost-plus contracts should be eliminated, as they discourage the very climate of competition that is suposed to make contracting private-sector enterprises more eficient. In order to maximize the efectivenes of their research and eforts, the Department should create a standard operating procedure for al local and state jurisdictions. The government should require al medium- to large-sized cities to adopt an ?al-hazards? aproach to emergencies, including terorist atacks, flods, huricanes, toxic spils, plane crashes, and fires. This involves preparing the first responders for these atacks and creating standard operating procedures. Again, the benefit of an ?al-hazards? aproach is that while preparing for a terorist threat, it also improves the security of citizens from any other threats. The DHS should also spearhead the push for standardization of other systems acros the United States. A god example of this would be to isue guidelines and push Congres for apropriations to standardize identification cards and drivers? licenses. While states undoubtedly wil wish to kep jurisdiction over their own driver?s license programs, transitioning to ?smart ID? cards that have ?a standardized hologram and digitaly encoded biometric data specific to each holder? could be tremendously helpful. 181 In addition to standardization, state identification databases should also be linked to alow for more widespread disemination of information and a reduction of identity theft. Though not alowed by law, under the curent system it is fairly easy to obtain multiple ID cards from diferent states. 182 The DHS also has a tremendous oportunity to protect the United States against cyber- threat and information leaks by creating standards for government firewal and network security controls. One posible solution to prevent terorist networks from hacking into sensitive materials ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 181 Ham, Shane and Robert D. Atkinson. 202. ?Modernizing the State Identification System: An Action Agenda,? Progresive Policy Institute Policy Report.? Washington, DC: Progresive Policy Institute. 182 Ibid. on federal computers would be to create some computer systems and networks that would never be conected to the Internet. By alowing diferent government departments and agencies to set their own security standards, the federal government has created a vulnerable system that now must be changed despite bureaucratic resistance. Cordination of Government Levels and Agencies The nature of the terorism threat has changed in the past decade and consequently U.S. domestic agencies have ben faced with the chalenge of updating the way they work to protect the United States. The atacks on September 1, 201 revealed many weakneses within the U.S. inteligence comunity. If national security is to be a top priority, there must be a strong progresion towards resolving these failures. First of al, the various inteligence agencies must have a strong comunication network both within and betwen themselves. A part of this network wil be a shared database system that wil alow various inteligence agencies and oficers aces pertinent information. This database should also be available to state and local agencies so that states and cities wil be aware of terorist threats as they form. In order to create this database, the overal technological capacity of the U.S. inteligence comunity must be advanced dramaticaly and rapidly. The ways in which inteligence oficers receive, analyze, store and share information must be updated through software that is compatible with other oficers and agencies. In addition to a building a strong comunication network betwen U.S. agencies, there also neds to be a functioning acountability structure that keps agencies responsible for their work. This system wil also help to clarify the role of each federal, state, and local agency and decrease overlap of jurisdiction. The role of each agency must also be clearly enforced in training programs that Federal, State and local agencies proctor. Within these training programs, oficials should receive holistic training on the terorism threat. This holistic training would include education about terorists and their tactics so that state and local oficials can beter understand the nature of the threat. It would also entail state and local oficials being informed of the chain of comand that they should cal upon in times of emergency and where to get their resources from. These training programs would greatly improve the preparednes of state and local agencies for the threat of terorism. Preparednes must also be improved with a more straightforward fiscal distribution plan provided by the U.S. government. The work culture that is created in both the U.S. inteligence comunity must be improved in multiple ways. First, the U.S. inteligence agencies must reward employes for comitment to long-term projects so that inteligence oficials kep track of suspected threats as long as they remain an enemy. Specificaly, the CIA neds to develop a more comprehensive and acurate system to measure their employe?s output and value rather than using simple numerical benchmarks. Agencies must also work to corect the dep divides that exist betwen the various agencies. These rifts are reinforced by an extreme alegiance-centered mentality that is fostered by the agencies themselves. Inteligence agencies must increase the amount of information they share, not only through the database but also in a face-to-face manor. The administrative department of the agencies must work to promote the goals that unite the agencies?the fight against teror in the pursuit of national security. National Information Policies With the pasage of The Patriot Act and the resulting expansion of executive power, many questions have arisen over the legality and constitutionality of many U.S. actions, including its policies on detainment, information gathering, domestic security, and surveilance. Additionaly, oponents have criticized the indefinite detention of imigrants, the semingly unmitigated search and seizure authority given to law enforcement oficials, the expanded aplication of NSLs, and expanded government aces to busines and personal records. It further expands law enforcement powers against money laundering and terorist financing, providing increased penalties for counterfeiting as wel as increased coperation betwen financial institutions and government agencies. The U.S. must not act as an explicitly agresive and coercive agent abroad in presuring nations to disrupt terorist financing networks, but must use incentives and promises of funding and guidance in order to persuade these countries that coperation is in their best interests. Long-term suceses wil ultimately be calculated and judged by the eficacy of government agencies and politicians in improving international coperation, focusing the scope of the PATRIOT Act singularly towards counterterorism investigations, and ensuring that America and its foreign policies promote a culture of progres and prosperity throughout the world. The isue over government regulation of information acesibility betwen and among the public is a contentious one due to the longstanding position of the United States as a forebear of democracy and fredom of expresion. However, in a world where boundaries are increasingly transformed by transportation and technology, the overwhelming ned for more intricate preventative security measures may outweigh the ned for individuals? rights to certain kinds of privacy. While The Patriot Act is a vital tol in counterterorism operations, its unmitigated use must be countered by some form of judiciary oversight. Inherent to the debate are ideas of cost and benefit, as wel as origins and ownership of information as dictated by property and privacy rights. Reactionary responses from individuals, activists, busines owners, telecomunications providers, and even libraries punctuate the gravity of this debate. In order to fuly exercise the capabilities of U.S. domestic inteligence gathering, it is imperative to develop intimate, interagency networks for file-sharing, interagency coperation, and the development of organized, acesible mechanisms for acesing information. A sucesful response to terorist threats wil not only encompas how e addres the problems overseas, but also how e introduce, form, and sculpt the public debate at home. Imigration, Border, and Transport Security As can be sen with President Obama?s new focus group on imigration, the topic is extremely prevalent in America today. A key policy recomendation that has already ben taken into acount is to simply reorganize, revaluate, and rethink the way imigration as whole (including imigrants, security, borders, ports, travel, etc.) is dealt with. Of course there are difering opinions on what should be done to kep America safe post-9/11, but al in al, it is clear that a reactive strategy is not a sucesful deterent of terorism. Proactive, efective, fair imigration policies can be used to promote a healthy flow of imigration in the United States, as it is unrealistic to think that imigration wil end if we use the corect tols to prevent it. More or les, with the asistance of a new focus group, the mas bureaucracy that imigration isues fal under ? the Department of Homeland Security ? neds to change its aproach by understanding that imigration is fluid, but with a wel-working, preventative team, policies can be used to kep America safe from outside terorist atacks while also providing a home for the thousands of imigrants living within its borders. The Patriot Act, as one example of extremely influential imigration policy, could prove to be efective at detering terorism from American borders ? if it were used wisely and within its original framework. Politics aside, the idea that the United States should have a more in-depth procedure of imigration is not so radical, as countries such as Israel have practiced such high standards for decades. Part IV Dagny Ihnot, Fahimeh Khalegi, Stephanie Kinion, Ema Land t is beyond the scope of this report to identify the exact motivations that cause some individuals to resort to terorism. However, this part of the report examines long-term policy posibilities that could lesen the apeal of the kind of extremism that generates terorism. It is crucial for the United States to recognize but not to condone the rationality of terorism as a tactic. This theme of political empathy is a critical first step in addresing the geopolitical grievances that motivate a smal number of individuals to resort to acts of terorism to achieve their goals. A historical perspective on how the United States has responded to terorist atacks against its interests and facilities is ilustrative of how geopolitical interests in the Middle East have bred animosity among terorist organizations. These interests are often ralying cals for terorist acts perpetrated against the United States and our alies. A comparative view of how other countries have tailored their terorist policies provides a number of lesons the U.S. government can learn. Realizing that terorism is a global isue is necesary to begin to formulate a globaly-oriented response, one that requires coperation and dialogue among al nations. Long-Term Solutions: Lesoning the Appeal of Terorism The systematic use of violence to achieve political ends has become a comon tactic among a wide variety of groups, from independence movements to a country's secret services. By studying I past cases of terorist activity, we can sugest beter formulate ways to protect our nation and decrease the ocurences of terorism worldwide. By exploring ways to reduce violence and prevent new cycles of retaliation from continuing, we ned to describe plausible alternatives that wil addres the threat of terorism, deal with the rots behind terorist activity, and ultimately reduce tensions to satisfy the ned for justice. Since our military canot eliminate terorists through conventional war tactics and military secrecy, we must demand a more comprehensive policy on the part of the new administration to work more openly and more closely with the United Nations and other countries to further our ultimate goal of national and global peace. We wil focus our discusion first by giving examples of what other countries have done to on the counterterorism front. By studying modern examples of democratic policy reforms and structure, our own government can strive to gain more international suport through similar policies. Also, we wil examine the diferent ways that inteligence agencies have ben structured in other countries, because this wil aid in reviewing the inteligence structure in the United States. After analyzing the UK, Spain, France, Israel and India, our analysis wil shift to the United States in the pre-September 1 th era and what lesons can be learned. We argue throughout the section about the United State?s response to terorist atacks abroad before September 1 th that awarenes of past U.S. counterterorist wil help future administrations deal with curent terorism isues more sucesfuly. The United States had never experienced international terorism on its own soil before 201 and the response to atacks abroad on US interests and embasies were far les harsh than the reaction to September 1 th . Begining in the 1970s, terorist activities began to increase and during this time period, the United States began to increase its inteligence-gathering on diferent international terorist organizations. For the purpose of this paper, we wil be focusing on international relations through historical data and comparisons. Since terorism in part dictates the counter-terorist response, governments continue to react to the nature of the given threat. 183 Searching for cause of the phenomenon of terorism has proven to be a dificult task. By rexamining the way society views terorism and proposing ways of refocusing counterterorism eforts, we work towards policy proposals that reflect these desired goals. By studying the influence of the United Nations, for example, we wil highlight the importance of maintaining the United States as an internationaly-involved with the aim of increased comunication and a beter international perception. We argue that in order for the United States to beter addres and respond to the threat of terorism, it is crucial that there is greater comunication and sharing betwen inteligence organizations, and an increase in international coperation and social outreach programs to reach those who are marginalized within US society. The United States must begin to focus on the geopolitical grievances that cause terorists to turn to kiling inocent people to send mesages of discontent. By joining with other states and international organizations to lesen the apeal of terorism, the United States wil have greater suport, aliances and ideas with which to create policies. A multilateral aproach to counterterorism is the most productive way for the United States to continue the curent administrations? fight to reduce terorism and prevent terorist atacks against the United States and around the world. Lesons for the Future: A Study of the Past Policies by the United States on Terorist Acts Until the World Trade Center atacks on September 1, 201, terorism had never had a direct impact on the United States? teritory, politics or social life. However, there were a number of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 183 Adams, James. The Financing of Teror. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 15. major atacks that struck American interests or embasies within the last several decades. These were undertaken in preparation for a biger terorist atack against the U.S., the World Trade Center atacks of 201. For the purpose of this section, we wil first briefly cover some of the terorist atacks against the United States outside its borders betwen 1979 and 201 and the U.S. response. From these case studies, we have elucidated a patern in which Iran has ben implicated in most of the terorist atacks on U.S. facilities outside the country. This section wil examine some of the United States? reactive counter terorism policies in the last several decades and how the United States can learn efective lesons from its past. Despite the fact that this section is organized by country, it is important to note that most of these countries are not direct terorist suporters. However, this section is organized by the country in which a terorist atack against U.S. facilities ocured. We sugest that awarenes of past eforts to fight terorism wil provide a sense of what is efective and inefective in the fight against those who use terorist tactics. Iran Iran, Nov. 4, 1979: About 50 Iranian students seized the U.S. Embasy in Teheran along with about 90 hostages, including up to 65 Americans 184 . The Iranian hostage crisis lasted 44 days until Jan. 20, 1981, when 52 remaining U.S. hostages were fred 185 . The imediate U.S. government reaction was to halt oil exports from Iran, to freze Iranian asets and investments, and to expel many Iranians living in the U.S. President Carter ordered a military rescue mision, Operation Eagle Claw, which turned out to be a complete failure, resulting in the deaths of eight U.S. military personel. Eventualy, Iran released the hostages hours after Ronald Reagan's presidential inauguration on Jan. 20, 1981, but this crisis continues to afect Iran-U.S. relations up to this day. 186 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 184 U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy in action, Iran Profile 185 Ibid 186 Ibid This makes the United States? eforts to combat terorist organizations dificult because Iran is an important geopolitical actor in the Middle East. U.S. policies toward Iran are inefective and Iran has ben suporting terorism for the last 30 years. Lebanon April 1983: Sixty-thre people were kiled when a pickup truck loaded with explosives blew up at entrance to the U.S. Embasy in Beirut, demolishing most of the building. The dead included 17 Americans, while 40 Americans were wounded. At the time, a Shite Muslim group caling itself the Islamic Holy War asumed responsibility for the atack. Reportedly, this group was receiving suport from Iran and Syria. 187 The U.S. government tok no military action. October 1983: A suicide truck-bomb explosion went of at U.S. Marine baracks located at the Beirut International Airport, kiling 241 U.S. Marines and wounding many others. The Marines had ben sent to Lebanon to overse and restore order during the Lebanese Civil War and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Hezbolah was suspected to have directed the atack with suport from Iran, but Hezbolah denied involvement. At the time of this incident, the U.S. government planed a military action against Hezbolah but later reportedly aborted the mision due to concerns that a military action against Hezbolah would harm U.S.-Arab relations in the Middle East. This incident led to the withdrawal of an international peacekeping force from Lebanon. This was a significant act since the U.S. declared its failure and withdrew its trops from Lebanon. In addition, in atempting to undertake a military action, the U.S. exhibited a wilingnes to take a more ofensive aproach to combating terorist organizations. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 187 U.S. Department of State, Syria: Background and U.S. Relation, Updates February 26, 208, eremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Midle Eastern Afairs, Foreign Afairs, Defense, and Trade Division September 1984: the bombing of the U.S. Embasy anex in east Beirut kiled at least 14 people, including two Americans and 12 Lebanese. Almost 70 people were wounded. Acording to the U.S. State Department's 199 report on terorist organizations, ?elements of Hezbolah are known or suspected to have ben involved in the bombing.? The U.S. did not take any military action in response, yet it began covert operations in Lebanon against Hezbolah. Journalist Bob Wodward says ?the CIA trained foreign inteligence agents to act as ?hit teams? designed to destroy the terorists' operations.? 18 The operation was not efective and President Reagan caled of the covert operation later when Lebanese inteligence operatives alegedly trained by the U.S. detonated a bomb and kiled over 80 people. This was another U.S. failure in counterterorism because the U.S. inteligence was not able to cary out its covert operation efectively, and is again an example of a more ofensive aproach to counterterorism. Libya In 198, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 from London to New York caused a total of 270 fatalities. Early suspicions, acording to pres acounts, fel on the Syrian-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Comand, or the government of Iran. The later was suspected of seking revenge for the U.S. Navy shoting down an Iran Air flight over the Persian Gulf in July 198. 189 However, later acounts, including the report published by the State Department, did not blame Iran or Syria. Acording to the State Department's ?Paterns of Global Terorism, 191,? released in April 192, the bombing of Pan Am 103 ?was an action authorized by the Libyan Government.? 190 This reason was one of the main elements that soured U.S.-Libya relations. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 18 Terorist atacks on Americans, The atacks, the group, the response, 1979-198 ( acesed February 10,209); available from htp:/ww.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html 189 The State Department, CRS Isue Brief for Congres, Libya May 2, 205 190 Terorist atacks on Americans, The atacks, the group, the response, 1979-198 ( acesed February 10,209); available from htp:/ww.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html There were many incidents of varying degres of seriousnes that damaged U.S.-Libyan relations in the past. The U.S. generaly did not opose Libya during the Cold War because Libya?s Revolutionary Comand Council was anti-Soviet. But U.S.-Libyan relations deteriorated by 1973 due to Libya?s suport for terorist groups. 191 In 1981, the U.S. ordered the Libyan diplomatic mision to close in Washington because the U.S. suspected that Libyan diplomatic personel were involved in terorist activities. In 1981, ?the pres reported that Libyan ?hit squads? had entered the United States to asasinate President Ronald Reagan.? 192 In return President Reagan baned U.S. travel to Libya and ordered U.S. citizens to leave Libya to avoid a hostage situation similar to Iran in 1979. 193 The 1986 Libyan-suported nightclub bombing in Berlin convinced President Reagan to undertake a military action against Libya. ?Some 10 U.S. aircraft, including comunications, reconaisance, electronic warfare aircraft, and refueling tankers atacked two military complexes, two air bases, and a port in Libya. Libyan sources said 70 people were kiled in the atack.? 194 It was the first time that U.S. militarily atacked Libya, but Libya suported terorism until U.S. started diplomatic relations with Libya. U.S. relations with Libya are significant to U.S. counterterorism policy because they show how a switch from ilitary to diplomatic actions helps improve international relationships, as wel as how this transition has the potential to reduce the efectivenes of state- agent terorism due to diplomatic coperation. Kuwait In addition to the U.S.-Libyan incidents, there were several other terorist atacks on American interests abroad in the 1980s. For instance, in 1983 the American embasy in Kuwait was ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 191 Paul R Pilar, Terorism and U.S. foreign policy. (Washington, D.C.: Brokings Institution Pres, 201). 192 The State Department, CRS Isue Brief for Congres, Libya May 2, 205 193 The State Department, CRS Isue Brief for Congres, Libya: Background and U.S. relation, August 208 194 Ibid bombed, six people were kiled, and more than 80 others were wounded. 195 Later, a series of atacks included the American embasy, the country?s airport, a main oil refinery, and residential area for American employes. These terorist atacks were directed by the Al-Dawa party, a militant Islamic group. There are also alegations that Iran suported this atack because of the U.S.?s asistance to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-198. 196 Therefore, it apears that the United States? involvement in the Middle East during the Iran-Iraq war was a primary cause that provoked a terorist atack in Kuwait. The U.S. did not take any military action in retaliation, but it arested 17 people, caled the ?Kuwait 17,? who were convicted for participating in the atack. These 17 perpetrators were incarcerated in Kuwait. This incident became one of the main cals to action for plane hijackers and kidnapers of Western hostages in Lebanon. 197 This shows the interconectednes of geopolitical actions in the Middle East: The U.S.?s involvement in the Iran- Iraq war spured a retaliatory atack on the U.S. embasy in Kuwait. The subsequent conviction of the Kuwait 17 then became a ralying cal for Hezbolah and other terorist groups in the region. Many kidnapings and hijackings ocured betwen 1982 and 192, and many of the kidnapers demanded the release of the Kuwait 17. Some of these incidents include the kidnaping of the vice-president of the American University in Beirut, David Dodge, and the hijacking of Kuwait Airways flight 21 and TWA flight 847. Some of these atacks ended with tragedy. U.S. oficials believed that Hezbolah was behind most of these terorist atacks, with Iran?s suport. As a result, the Reagan administration devised a covert plan, the Iran-Contra afair. The scheme was to ilegaly trade American arms to Iran in exchange for freing U.S. hostages. This covert plan was leaked to the public and turned out to be a failure as wel as an international embarasment for the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 195 Terorist atacks on Americans, The atacks, the group, the response, 1979-198 ( acesed February 10,209); available from htp:/ww.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html 196 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'alah in Lebanon: the politics of the western hostage crisis. (New York: St. Martin's Pres, 197). 197 Ibid U.S. government. This was a controversial isue due to the U.S.?s ilegal gun trade to a terorist state. It was also an embarasment for the U.S. government because it did not stand by its ideals and laws, which state that it is ilegal to trade with terorist groups. This is significant because it demonstrates the U.S.?s continued atempts to use non-diplomatic means to combat terorism and how these means continue to fail. But more importantly, the U.S. embasy bombing in Kuwait shows the interelatednes of geopolitical actions in the Middle East. It was one link in a vast chain of political actions and reactions that provoked terorism. While we advocate a diplomatic, reactionary aproach to handling terorist acts, we realize the irony of the U.S. embasy bombing in Kuwait. Despite being a symbol of diplomatic relations, the embasy was targeted because of the United States? prior political involvement in the Middle East. It sugests that the United States should interact with Middle Eastern nations in a diplomatic, mutualy beneficial maner. Tanzania and Kenya In 198, the U.S. embasies were bombed in Tanzania and Kenya by Al Qaeda operators during the second term of President Clinton?s presidency. 24 people were kiled, including 12 Americans. In response, the U.S. bombed chemical and pharmaceutical factories in Sudan, which were suposed to be owned by Osama Bin Laden. The Clinton administration claimed there was evidence to prove that the factories produced chemical weapons. Later investigations proved that the inteligence was wrong and unreliable. 198 The significance of this failure is that it provides an example of how the U.S. has acted to quickly on the basis of faulty inteligence, in both Democratic and Republican administrations. This same lack of credible inteligence led to September 1, 201 and the War in Iraq. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 198 U.S. Department of State, ?U.S. Embasy Bombing? In 200, the second U.S.S Cole atack was a suicide bombing atack against the U.S. Navy destroyer while it was harbored in the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventen American sailors were kiled. The atack was organized and directed by Osama Bin Laden?s terorist organization with the suport of Sudan. 19 During the 90s, Al-Qaeda atacked the U.S. more than Hezbolah and other Shite extremist groups. This was significant in that it caused Al-Qaeda to come to the top of the U.S. counterterorism policy agenda. Even so, the United States failed to gather acurate inteligence to stop future atacks and continued to ignore the ful importance of Al-Qaeda. Implications There were more terorist acts in the last thirty years than ever before, but the U.S. reaction remains unchanged. Few policies have truly worked; economic and social sanctions as wel as military actions can sometimes have positive efects, but the majority of cases mentioned above have proven these policies to be inefective. We propose that the U.S. government neds to learn from its past and aply some of its efective policies on other unsucesful cases. To help understand U.S. diplomatic policies that have worked, we wil compare U.S. relations with Libya and Iran. By loking at the terorism activities mentioned above, it can be sen that Hezbolah and Al- Qaeda were the main terorism organizations that atacked the United States. We believe that ??terorism canot be defeated- only reduced, atenuated, and to some degre controled.? 20 Therefore, the U.S. government wil not be able to eliminate terorism entirely. But the goal of counterterorism should be to control and reduce terorism. U.S. foreign policies toward Iran in the last decades have not ben sucesful and have not helped to control or reduce terorist atacks, and have perhaps even increased the motivation for terorists to atack the U.S. One of the bigest breakdowns in U.S. counterterorism policy is that the U.S. has continued to refuse to establish ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 19 U.S. Department of State, Patern of Global Terorism, April 30, 201 20 Paul R Pilar, Terorism and U.S. foreign policy. (Washington, D.C.: Brokings Institution Pres, 201), 218. diplomatic ties with Iran. There are some alegations that Iran suported some of the acts of terorism perpetrated by Hezbolah or other Shite terorist organizations. It sems that U.S. counterterorism policy is self-defeating by refusing to utilize the abilities of a potentialy valuable aly. The U.S. constantly responded to Iran in a hostile maner after the 1979 Islamic revolution and Iranian hostage crisis. The crisis has ben described as the "pivotal episode" in the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. 201 The crisis also marked the begining of American legal action and economic sanctions against Iran, which weakened economic ties betwen Iran and America. 202 Another diplomatic tactic that the U.S. government implemented was an efort to change the Iranian regime. These tactics have not helped U.S.-Iranian relations or U.S. relations with the rest of the Islamic world, and have had a detrimental efect on counterterorism eforts. We realize that it is unrealistic to think that terorism wil be completely eradicated. But, if the U.S. could develop efective diplomatic relations with Iran, it may be able to quel some Shite terorist acts caried out by Hezbolah. There are several reasons that U.S. should consider restablishing god diplomatic relations with Iran: ? Iran has suported Hezbolah and has influence on some Shite terorism, so Iran could posibly turn that influence to positive efects. ? Iraq, with a Shite government, gets suport from Iran, and again Iran has an influence on the Iraqi government, as wel as on Lebanon and Palestine. This could lead to Iranian influence being turned into positive efects on non-Shite and Hezbolah related terorist organizations. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 201 ?Stephen Kinzer, Inside Iran?s Fury,? Smithsonian, October 208. 202 Herman Fransen and Elaine Morton, ?History of U.S. sanction against Iran,? The Midle East Economic Survey, no. 34 (202) ? Iran and the U.S. both share the same interests for containing and eliminating the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and both countries could be more efective in combating these threats by colaborating with knowledge and resources. The U.S. government has created diplomatic relations with other nations believed to sponsor terorism, such as Libya. As was mentioned before, there was deep animosity betwen the U.S. and Libya, and U.S. military action against Libya did not put an end to Libyan-sponsored terorism. The U.S. even placed an economic sanction on Libya, and President Reagan listed Libya as a terorist state. Finaly, after many years of diplomacy and comunication, the U.S. ended economic sanctions on Libya in 204 and now permits its citizens to travel there. The two nations have started joint humanitarian projects, and Libya was even invited to open a diplomatic interest section in Washington. In addition, Libya is no longer listed as a state that sponsors terorism after it paid compensation to the victims of Pan AM. This shows how diplomacy can turn a state sponsor of terorism such as Libya into a more coperative aly, one that now atempts to help the U.S. government combat terorism. The U.S. wil not conduct efective counterterorism policy unles it builds an environment where coperation wil be awarded in the international arena. Sucesful counterterorism canot be achieved solely through military or economic sanctions. The U.S. government neds to colaborate with other governments to help fight terorism. The objective should not be to condemn people for past deeds, but to forge relationships to save lives in the future. Diferent Approaches to Counterterorism: A Study of the Policies of the United Kingdom, France, Spain, India and Israel Though terorism has threatened nations acros the globe for years, the United States has only become cognizant of this threat in the last several decades. On the other hand, nations like the United Kingdom, France, Spain, India and Israel have ben working to eliminate the threat of terorism since the mid-20 th century and before. Each of these nations has developed extensive counterterorism policies that deal with both domestic and international terorist actions, and have implemented these policies in many diferent situations. 203 We propose that an examination of these nations? counterterorism policies could potentialy provide new avenues of investigation and methods to improve the counterterorism policies of the United States. This section wil examine whether the United States can learn useful lesons from the counterterorism policies of the United Kingdom, France, Spain, India and Israel. We have chosen these particular nations as case studies for several reasons. First and foremost, each nation?s style of government shows similarities to the United States government, and each is a democracy that is limited to some extent in the ways that it fights domestic terorism threats by their laws. Granted, there are varying opinions as to the levels and types of democracies in some of these nations, as wel as debate as to whether or not some of these nations can be considered ful-fledged democracies. For the purpose of this analysis, on a counterterorism policy level, we wil consider each of these nations to be a democracy. Second, as mentioned above, each of these nations has a long history of fighting terorism. Lastly, the histories and curent policies of these nations? fights against the use of terorist tactics provide examples of methods that have the potential to work in the United States, as wel as methods and policies that wil not work in the United States. These examples wil show that centralization and cordination of inteligence agencies and civil, police and military authorities, development of stop and seizure policies, and outreach programs to both educate the populace and help decrease felings of alienation among critical groups have al helped these nations combat terorism efectively. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 203 Ramraj, Hor, and Roach , Global Anti-Terorism Law and Policy The United Kingdom To begin, the United Kingdom has dealt with terorist threats for over a century. 204 For the first part of the United Kingdom?s fight to eliminate the use of terorist tactics, almost al of the threats came from domestic groups. Starting in the 190s the focus began to expand to include international terorist threats. 205 Despite the shift in focus, the base policies and special powers acts that shape the counterterorism policies of the United Kingdom began to apear around the 1970s 206 and grew out of the policies developed during the United Kingdom?s fight against terorist activities in Northern Ireland. 207 Most of today?s counterterorism legislation started out as special emergency expansions of government powers intended to restablish law. However, as the years progresed and the conflict in Northern Ireland continued, the continued existence of these emergency measures began to be justified to kep the peace in non-emergency situations, and some measures were integrated into the legal code of the United Kingdom. 208 Some of the emergency measures that became regular law are evident today and are key pilars of the counterterorism strategies in the United Kingdom. For instance, today the United Kingdom permits extensive use of stop, search, and seizure powers in order to hinder terorist activities. 209 These powers include the ability to detain suspected persons for twenty eight days without charge, as wel as extensive abilities to stop both pedestrians and cars at any time if the police have any suspicion of conections of the vehicle or person to terorism. 210 These and other powers represent part of the extensive body of legislation in the UK that deals with a four-pilared counterterorism strategy designed to prevent terorist acts, pursue suspected terorists, protect the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 204 Donohue, Counter-Terorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom 192-200: pg. xix 205 d'Apolonia and Reich, Imigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective: pg. 14 207 Ibid.: ch. 4 208 Ibid: pg. xi. 209 ?The Terorism Act 200.? 210 ?Terorism Act 206 .? populace from terorist atacks, and prepare for future posible avenues of atack. 21 These diferent pilars each atempt to disrupt terorism by atacking organizations that fund terorism, working on a social level to try and prevent the situations that lead to terorism, providing acurate inteligence, and being prepared to minimize the impact of a terorist atack and therefore minimize the acomplishment of a terorist organization?s goals. Much of the United Kingdom?s counterterorism strategy has remained unchanged for decades. However, the United Kingdom has backed away from policies relating to the use of lethal force because the government has found that these tactics are often counter-productive, especialy with regard to terorist groups with nationalist ideologies. 212 The legislative situation in the United Kingdom has also recently changed significantly. Specificaly, additional ?emergency powers? have ben integrated into the regular ?civil defense or protection legislation?. 213 In addition to this, some anti-terorism legislation was chalenged in the courts because it focused on indefinite detention of foreigners suspected of being terorists. Due to the chalenges, the wording of the most recent Terorism Act of 205 was changed to get around the ilegality of indefinite detention by making it aplicable to both citizens and foreigners. In esence then, the most recent legislation embodied by the ?Prevention of Terorism Act 205 was therefore meant to corect the act of 201 by making what was unaceptable treatment for foreigners aceptable treatment for al suspects.? 214 In addition to stop and search powers used by law enforcement agencies, the incorporation of special powers acts into regular counterterorism law and the employment of legislation to indefinitely detain any citizen or foreigner suspected of being a terorist, one of the major changes that the United Kingdom has made has not ben in its policies, but rather in the structure of how the government aproaches the threat of terorism. Specificaly, there has ben a ?shift to ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 21 ?Counter Terorism.? 212 Ramraj, Hor, and Roach , Global Anti-Terorism Law and Policy. 213 Ibid. 214 d'Apolonia and Reich, Imigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective inteligence-based and proactive methods [with] the primary aim of preventing terorist atacks, rather than responding to events and atempting to solve crimes after they ocur.? 215 In other words, the UK has switched from a response-oriented to a prevention-oriented aproach that focuses on improving inteligence-gathering methods as wel as improving cordination betwen the diferent relevant branches of the government. 216 This prevention-oriented aproach also works to eliminate the rots of terorism and acordingly, the United Kingdom has developed social outreach programs designed to aleviate various minority groups? felings of ostracism from the rest of the population. Some of these programs include ?suporting reform at home and abroad to tackle social disadvantages, inequality and discrimination that contributes to radicalization,? ?detering people who asist or encourage terorism and by changing the environment in which the extremists can operate,? and ?chalenging the ideologies that extremists use to justify violence by helping people who wish to dispute these ideas to do so.? 217 The government has also begun to heavily emphasize the importance of international coperation due to the nature of terorist organizations in an increasingly globalized world, as wel as coperation among police, civil and military authorities in order to ensure the quickest and most eficient response to terorist threats and atacks. 218 From an examination of the United Kingdom?s policies, it is posible to sugest that there are several reasons for the government?s relative suces in preventing terorism. First, the extensive stop and search powers permited to the police apear to make it dificult to transport ilegal weapons or terorists themselves. 219 Second, the cordination of relevant branches of the government, including the high levels of cordination among the inteligence services, alows for ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 215 Ramraj, Hor, and Roach , Global Anti-Terorism Law and Policy 216 Wilkinson, Homeland Security in the United Kingdom: future preparednes for terorist atacks since 9/1 217 ?Counter Terorism.? 218 Tailon, The Evolution of Special Forces in Counterterorism 219 ?Countering International Terorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy | Home Ofice.? easy flow of information vital to the prevention and management of terorist atacks. 20 Lastly, the social outreach programs sem to help give an outlet for frustrations with the government as wel as helping to bring ostracized groups into the fold of daily life in the United Kingdom. One particular policy from the United Kingdom that the United States should take a closer lok at is establishing social outreach programs that tackle social disadvantages and discrimination, and chalenge extremist ideologies, as these programs would help prevent ethnic minority groups from feling marginalized from U.S. society and help eliminate some of the rots of terorist motivations. Spain Spain has also had a long history of dealing with domestic terorist threats, particularly threats from Basque separatist groups using terorist tactics. Historicaly, Spain has dealt with these threats by atempting to eliminate funding sources for terorist organizations and utilize their extensive stop and seizure police powers. 21 Today, the Spanish government continues to use both of these tactics in addition to other methods. Unlike the United Kingdom, however, terorism and al policies dealing with prevention and punishment are defined in the Spanish criminal code rather than in specialy enacted legislation. 22 However, many of the same extended police powers stil exist, and suspects can be detained without comunication for up to thirten days. 23 Also, Spain has legislation that esentialy limits judicial restrictions on ?domicile searches? and ?interception of private comunications? in teror cases. 24 In addition, Spain has a special set of courts to deal with people who have ben acused of terorist activities, and the government has enacted expanded ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 20 Perliger, Pedahzur, and Zalmanovitch, ?The Defensive Dimension of the Batle against Terrorism- An Analysis of Management of Teror Incidents in Jerusalem.? 21 d'Apolonia and Reich, Imigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective 22 Sunderland, Spain: Seting an example? Counterterorism measures in Spain 23 Ibid. 24 van Leuwen, Confronting terorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies deportation powers in order to imediately deport any non-Spanish citizen acused of having conections to terorists or terorist organizations. 25 In addition to the judicial element of the system and increased police powers, the Spanish government has cordinated the counterterorism branches of the military, the Guardia Civil (national police) and the local police on the enforcement end. 26 The government also has a highly centralized and cordinated National Inteligence Centre (CIN), which was created to increase cordination of inteligence services after the September 1 th atacks in the United States. 27 Also, after 9/11, Spain developed enhanced airport security, airspace surveilance, and border security measures. 28 After the sucesful terorist atacks on the train systems were caried out by Islamic extremist groups in an incident known as M/11, Spain atempted to place stricter controls on mosques throughout Spain, which eventualy resulted legislation that mandated registration of al religious places and leaders. 29 In addition, the Spanish government maintains relations with nearby nations and nations acros the globe to facilitate extradition of terorist suspects held in other nations back to Spain. 230 Esentialy, the Spanish government focuses in four main areas: prevention of terorist atacks through law enforcement techniques, international coperation, interupting financing to terorist organizations, and baning organizations that suport terorism. While Spain, like the United Kingdom, has experienced the disastrous efects of recent terorist atacks, in general their counterterorism policies apear to be sucesful. While sucesful terorist atacks ocur, many others are prevented. Like the UK, Spain?s stop and seizure policies make it dificult to move terorism-related gods and people. Also, Spain has a highly motivated and cordinated inteligence gathering system that helps prevent terorist atacks by using and sharing ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 25 von Hipel, Europe Confronts Terorism 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 van de Linde et al., Quick scan of post 9/1 national counterterorism policymaking and implementation in selected European countries 29 von Hipel, Europe Confronts Terorism 230 Sunderland, Spain: Seting an example? Counterterorism measures in Spain acurate inteligence. It is uncertain whether Spain?s policies of religious registration wil be sucesful. For the United States, the most important leson to learn from Spain could be international coperation, as Spain efectively uses international contacts to gain inteligence as wel as to build positive relationships with home nations of terorist organizations in order to ensure the extradition of terorist suspects back to Spain. France France has folowed two sets of counterterorism policies, those from the years before 1980, and the policies from the years after 1980. These two sets of policies present two very diferent views about the best way to reduce terorism. In the years preceding the 1980s, France atempted to remain ?as neutral as posible with respect to the isues that motivated international terorism? which could operate with impunity, as long as they did not perpetrate acts of terorism within France or against French interests.? 231 The French government was esentialy a safe haven for terorists and from terorism, and saw terorism as a foreign policy problem to be solved by diplomacy rather than domestic policy isue to be solved by law enforcement measures. 232 Post-1980 policies on terorism and the prevention and prosecution of terorist acts present a very diferent picture. France pased the September 9th Act of 1986 that defined terorism as ?an infraction comited by an individual, or a group of individuals, aimed at seriously disrupting public order through intimidation or teror? and provided for the prosecution of these acts under French law. 23 Terorist acts could not only be prosecuted after 1986 under French law, but they caried some of the harshest penalties in the penal code if the suspect was convicted. 234 While this legislation ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 231 d'Apolonia and Reich, Imigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective 232 Ibid. 23 van de Linde et al., Quick scan of post 9/1 national counterterorism policymaking and implementation in selected European countries. 234 Ibid. was an important part of the picture, France also started to change how it fought terorism. 235 The government began the centralization of a vast network of government agencies that each played diferent roles on the inteligence and law enforcement end of fighting terorism. The goal was for each branch to operate independently, but to report back to the centralized aparatus, alowing for both cordination and flexibility. 236 In addition, the counter-terorist branches became a part of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice rather than the Ministry of Foreign Afairs. 237 Curently, France has a multipronged aproach that includes the specialization of departments on counterterorism, a special cordination unit (l'unite de cordination de la lute anti- teroriste, or UCLAT) that helps cordinate information among the diferent departments, a multi- level system of grading to help ases the level of readines required to prevent a terorist atack, and a focus on international coperation. 238 French legislation alows for extensive stop and search policing in addition to detention for up to four days without comunication and preventative detention of terorist suspects. 239 France also has policies that encourage ?the hiring of French citizens of North African origin and the recruitment of spies within terorist cels in exchange for a reduction of their prison sentences,? and policies that folow a plan of ?agresive inteligence and destabilization operations (including the wide use of phone taps) against subversives.? 240 These tactics have ben very sucesful at eliminating terorist networks within France, and have led to over 230 arests since 202. 241 France, like Spain and the United Kingdom, also alows its police extensive stop and search powers, and again these apear to be sucesful. In addition, their destabilization operations are extremely sucesful, as wel as the practice of hiring citizens of foreign origins to aid in the French ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 235 Debat, ?Teror and the Fifth Republic.? 236 Ibid. 237 d'Apolonia and Reich, Imigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective 238 ?France-Diplomatie - Terorism.? 239 d'Apolonia and Reich, Imigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective 240 Debat, ?Teror and the Fifth Republic.? 241 Ibid. inteligence gathering proceses. The counterterorism branches of the French government are not only wel cordinated, but are flexible and capable of acting quickly to respond to many diferent terorism-related incidents. One leson that France has learned that could greatly benefit the United States would be the extensive use of French citizens from foreign backgrounds to obtain inteligence and infiltrate terorist networks. By utilizing a more diverse force, the United States would not only be able to gain more inteligence from diferent sources, but could eliminate some of the felings of persecution that some groups perceive by recruiting them to help with government eforts to fight terorism. Israel Ever since Israel gained its independence in 1948, the Israeli government has held itself in a state of readines in an atempt to counter any actions taken against Israel, be they terorist atacks or the first maneuvers in a war. This has led to the development of many interesting and sometimes controversial counterterorism policies, such as Israel?s ?selected targeting policy.? 242 This policy involves targeting selected individuals who are vital to the operation of a terorist organization and eliminating the selected individual through the use of lethal force. 243 It is highly contested, both in its legality and efectivenes. From a legal perspective, oponents contend that Israel is violating international human rights law and the right to life, while proponents point out that Israel considers the situation to be an armed conflict, where International Humanitarian Law prevails and therefore diferent legal definitions come into play. 24 Despite the legal arguments, several studies show that this policy is efective in eliminating terorist networks? capability, but not their motivation, which ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 242 Luft, ?The logic of Israel's targeted kiling.? 243 Plaw, ?Terminating Teror: The Legality, Ethics, and Efectivenes of Targeting Terorists.? 24 Ibid. tends to increase with targeted persecution. 245 By eliminating key leaders and people in terorist organizations, Israel throws these organizations into confusion due to a lack of quality personel, and deters the apearance of new leaders. 246 Studies also purport that it reasures the population by proving that the terorists are not beyond the law. 247 In addition to the selected targeting policy, Israel has a series of ?vigilant security policies? that prevent as many terorist atacks as are caried out 248 . These include encouraging the population to stay continualy alert to suspicious people, items or actions, as wel as utilizing an extensive number of volunters in the police force to achieve the manpower necesary to protect the necesary places. Esentialy, the government of Israel uses its civilian population as another arm of the government. 249 The government also has an extensively cordinated inteligence network that frely shares information and provides the police with almost unlimited stop and search powers. 250 Lastly, regarding crisis management, case work in Israel has shown that certain defensive methods of fighting terorism help to significantly reduce both the efectivenes and magnitude of terorist atacks. 251 Procedures like increased surveilance of atractive targets for terorist atacks, ?routinely conducted body and posesion searches? and codified quick response procedures have made it posible for Israel to reduce the number of sucesful atacks, as wel as mitigate the psychological efects on the populace after a sucesful atack. 252 Israel also atempts to have efective cordination and comunication betwen law enforcement and medical personel after a ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 245 Ibid. 246 Luft, ?The logic of Israel's targeted kiling.? 247 Plaw, ?Terminating Teror: The Legality, Ethics, and Efectivenes of Targeting Terorists.? 248 Lehrer, ?Citizen Soldiers: What the U.S. Can Learn from Israel about Fighting Teror.? 249 Ibid. 250 Ibid. 251 Perliger, Pedahzur, and Zalmanovitch, ?The Defensive Dimension of the Batle against Terrorism- An Analysis of Management of Teror Incidents in Jerusalem.? 252 Perliger and Pedahzur, ?Coping with Suicide Atacks: Lesons from Israel.? terorist atack, making it easier to send the apropriate numbers of medical personel through the safest and most eficient route to the scene of the atack. 253 Al of Israel?s policies demonstrate an agresive aproach to counterterorism, with a multi- pronged strategy that confronts terorists, mobilizes the population, and efectively manages the scene of a sucesful atack. While some might say that Israel is not a god example for the United States to folow due to the multitude of sucesful terorist atacks that have hapened on Israeli soil since 1948, Israel has undergone a ?proces of learning from experience and drawing conclusions? that has led to a reduction in the size and efectivenes of terorist atacks. 254 As for potential recomendations for United States policy, the United States already has a much contested unoficial policy of "targeted kiling? that has ben chalenged and condemned by legal experts and humanitarians, and the same constant state of vigilance required of the Israeli population is probably not necesary in the United States. However, the United States could investigate the feasibility of utilizing more volunters in its police forces in order to cover more ground and increase surveilance of potential targets. 25 India Like Israel, India has faced both war and terorist atacks since its independence in 1947. 256 Unlike many other nations, India has faced many types of terorism with diferent methods, including both religiously-motivated and non-religiously motivated terorism. 257 Much of India?s counterterorism policy stems from colonial times, but these policies have ben adapted since India?s ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 253 Perliger, Pedahzur, and Zalmanovitch, ?The Defensive Dimension of the Batle against Terrorism- An Analysis of Management of Teror Incidents in Jerusalem.? 254 Ibid. 25 Lehrer, ?Citizen Soldiers: What the U.S. Can Learn from Israel about Fighting Teror.? 256 Raman, ?Counterterorism: India, China, Rusia Coperation.? 257 Ibid. independence to suit the new types of terorism that India began to face. 258 In more recent times, India has pased several acts that deal with terorism, though the most recent one was overturned for being unconstitutional and providing to much potential for abuse of powers. 259 Curently the foundation of India?s counterterorism policy is in the 1967 Unlawful Activities Prevention Act that was strengthened when the Prevention of Terorism Act of 202 was overturned. 260 This legislation alows for stop and search powers for the police, the use of specialized intervention forces and paramilitary groups to stop terorist atacks, detention without charge and preventative detention, and the ability to ?intercept comunication including electronic, oral, and wire comunication.? 261 In addition to the legislation, the Indian government focuses on other ways to eliminate the use of terorist tactics. First, they atempt to focus on long-term prevention by promoting practices of god governance, democracy, policing tactics, and economic development strategies as ways to lesen the apeal of terorism. 262 The government also does not respond to atempted intimidation tactics of terorists and wil only negotiate with terorist groups who pledge to give up violence. 263 In addition, the government atempts to promote inteligence sharing among Indian states, but is stil working to improve the curent structure of the police and inteligence agencies which make it dificult for the efective flow of information to cros betwen departments. 264 After the most recent atacks on Mumbai, many critics are caling for even more extensive restructuring of India?s systems, particularly the inteligence gathering systems and the link that these and the police structures have to the bureaucracy of the Indian government. 265 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 258 Ramraj, Hor, and Roach , Global Anti-Terorism Law and Policy 259 Ibid. 260 Ibid. 261 Ramraj, Hor, and Roach , Global Anti-Terorism Law and Policy. 262 Raman, ?Counterterorism: India, China, Rusia Coperation.? 263 Ibid. 264 Kaplan and Bajoria, ?Counterterorism in India.? 265 Ibid. Despite recent criticisms, most scholars think that India has managed to efectively protect its citizens from a multitude of varied terorist atacks. Many of India?s policies, especialy those related to reducing the long-term otivations for terorism, have great potential to suced. These policies, as wel as India?s wilingnes to negotiate with terorists once they have given up violent tactics, are positive aproaches to counterterorism policy, and when combined with more eficient inteligence structures, they should help reduce terorist. The specific policy that should be examined for use in the United States from India?s example is the use of negotiation to air grievances in the event that terorist groups renounce the use of violence and terorist tactics. While this policy has not necesarily ben proven sucesful, it has also not ben proven unsucesful and therefore should not be dismised before it is more thoroughly examined. Implications for United States Counterterorism Policy Nations acros the globe use various methods in their atempts to prevent terorist acts on their soil and against their nation?s interests. Despite the wide variation among the counterterorism measures, some sem to hold true acros al five of the counterterorism strategies from the United Kingdom, Spain, France, Israel and India that were examined in this section. Some of these canot work and should not be atempted in the United States due to isues of constitutional law and the general American refusal to give up certain dearly-held rights and fredoms. In particular, the extensive stop and search powers alowed the police branches of al five aforementioned countries would not work in the United States. The best precedent for this is the huge public outcry that has met the powers put forth by the USA PATRIOT Act, which are similar to other nation?s counterterorism policies, and have ben highly contested and considered by many to be ilegal and frightening. 26 For example, the reduction of limits on wiretaping, similar to the laws in place in ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 26 ?American Civil Liberties Union : USA PATRIOT Act.? Spain, have already sen extensive chalenges, as have the reductions of the rights of non-citizens in that same act. 267 In addition to legal isues, while stop and search policies work efectively in other nations, it is posible that the geographic size of the United States would make atempting to set up these systems imposible due to the amount of manpower neded and the amount of ground to be covered. Thus, any further atempt to expand police powers, no mater how efective it can be in preventing terorist atacks, is probably not feasible for the United States. Also, country-specific policies that have worked in the United Kingdom, Spain, France, Israel and India would probably be dificult to implement and could have negative efects. From Spain, it would be unadvisable to create a registration of religious groups and figures due to isues of constitutionality as wel as general isues dealing with the geographic size of the United States that would make the scope of such a registry unimaginably huge. From Israel, it would be unadvisable for the United States to continue to employ selected kiling measures, even without considering the legal isues, as these measures have ben shown to increase terorist motivation. Lastly, from India and France, based of of the public outcry and Supreme Court chalenges to the legality of Guantanamo, it would not be a god policy to continue measures that employ preventative detention or detention without charge. However, other methods used in al five case studies could help the United States develop a more efective and eficient counterterorism policy. For instance, every nation examined in this report emphasized the importance of a unified and cordinated inteligence structure. This cordination alows for the eficient flow of information through diferent departments to those that can eficiently use the information. The United States should lok into increasing the cordination betwen major inteligence gathering agencies, and perhaps lok into creating a centralized body to receive the inteligence similar to the UCLAT program in France. In addition, al of the nations ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 267 ?American Civil Liberties Union : USA PATRIOT Act.? mentioned in this report realize to some extent the importance of social outreach programs and positive involvement with marginalized groups in society. If the United States government could reach out to diferent marginalized groups acros the nation and make them fel included rather than ostracized, it could significantly reduce tensions among ethnic and religious minorities and improve the likelihod of those groups reporting suspicious activity among their own members as it has in other nations. Lastly, by returning to a more internationaly coperative mindset, the United States could gain more alies and develop new lines of comunication and coperation. Terorism is a very real threat in an increasingly globalized world. Not only can terorists move with some ease betwen countries, but atacks can be planed in one place, caried out in another and use weapons from al over the world, al of which hapens unoticed. In such a world, the United States neds not only to lok to nations acros the globe that have fought terorism for decades in order to learn how to improve our counterterorism ethods, but to coperate with these nations in order to prevent those who sek to control the world through intimidation, fear and violence from wining the batle for lives of citizens acros the globe. Lesening the Appeal of Terorism If it can be argued that terorism is not a result of poverty and lack of education, then there must be another reason for the increase of terorism that began in the 1960s. First, there was the impact of Cold War policies and aliances that formed in the strugle betwen the United States and the Soviet Union. As the Cold War came to a close, the United States tok the forefront in international politics and began to dictate the way in which global policy would be conducted. Today developing countries, particularly those that do not conform to Western models, find themselves increasingly excluded from international politics. We argue that is it necesary for the United States to understand the motivations behind terorist action, instead of deeming al terorist activity as ilegitimate. If the grievances of a terorist group can be identified and addresed without demonizing those who participate in terorist acts, then the motivation to turn to terorism wil be reduced. Violent acts of terorism wil never be condoned. However, we would like to sugest that if the motivations of terorist actions are legitimized and understod, the United States and other Western states wil be forced to respond to the grievances of such organizations instead of dismising them as the acts of irational, blod-thirsty, imoral aliens. In this section, we wil explore the ways in which demonizing terorists only furthers the terorists? goals and impedes the ability of states to combat terorism. The Dehumanization of the Terorist Terorism is a tactic that is politicaly motivated and meant to instil fear into those who are afected by the violence. The reason for the atacks may be clear or may be chalenging to determine. However, the violence is not without motivation and the perpetrators are not subhuman. The view held in the Western world, particularly in the United States and Britain, of terorists as subhuman makes their causes or strugles ilegitimate and incomprehensible. The isue becomes a strugle betwen god and evil, instead of the victims of atacks searching for the cause of terorist violence. It is esential to find the motivation behind terorists? actions and this wil enable countries to begin to lesen the apeal of terorism. We would like to sugest that this dehumanization is one of the rot causes of terorism, and only by responding to the causes of each terorist group wil terorism be reduced in the long term. Mathew Car, the author of The Infernal Machine: The History of Terorism, explains that the representation of terorists as alien enables the United States to treat terorists as inhuman and lacking the ability for rational action. He states, ?Oficial representations of ?terorism? have often depicted its protagonists as a uniquely alien bred of humanity, driven by blodlust, insane hatred or pure evil. From the point of view of mainstream society, even the most violent criminality sems more comprehensible than politicaly motivated homicide.? 268 By dehumanizing the terorist, the tactical choice of inflicting harm through violence canot be viewed as s what they consider to be a viable means to a political goal. Terorists view their actions and their tactic of violence as a rational way to obtain their desires. This is not to say that using terorism as a tactic should be condoned or acepted. Rather, the conditions that provoke acts of terorism should not be portrayed as actions inflicted by evil, insane actors. The actions may be evil, but we must understand them as their perpetrators do if we wish to understand how to fight against the underlying causes of terorism. . Car goes on to explain that ?from the point of view of established authority, any violence directed against the state is unlawful and the concept of terorism provides a convenient category of unaceptable violence through which its unconstitutional oponents can be striped of political and moral legitimacy.? 269 After the atacks of September 1, 201, President George Bush told Congres that nations either had a choice to join with the United States or they would be deemed terorists by ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 268 Mathew Car, The Infernal Machine: A History of Terorism, from the Asasination of Tsar Alexander I to Al-Qaeda. (New York: The New Pres, 207), 1. 269 Car, 5. their lack of alegiance. 270 Terorism becomes a term that can be used to describe particular behavior that has ben deemed deplorable. Terorism or terorist are buzwords that reinforce propaganda about that particular form of politicaly motivated violence. In order for the United States to adequately addres terorist threats, the primary political concerns of the atackers must be researched and acknowledged. What Makes a Terorist? The reasons that some people resort to terorism are not directly clear. Alan Krueger, the author of, What Makes a Terorist: Economics and the Rots of Terorism, argues that terorism is not caused by poverty or lack of education and that providing economic incentives and scholing wil not halt the spread of terorism. He explains that many terorists come from ore economicaly prosperous comunities, although there may be poverty within their country of origin. Kreuger states that, ??many turned to a simple explanation: economic deprivation and a lack of education cause people to adopt extreme views and turn to terorism.? 271 Explanations such as por education, poverty and lack of democracy, or the catchal ?they hate our way of life and fredom? were used by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair to explain September 1, 201 and the terorist atacks that folowed in its wake. 272 However, scholars and even the 9/11 Comision Report stated plainly that a person?s decision to turn to terorism is not a result of poverty. Terorist organizations have ben depicted as ilogical, but they perceive their tactics to be rational. In other words, terorism is a ?form of political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of a basicaly rational actor, the terorist organization.? 273 It is necesary to take into acount ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 270 Car, 3. 271 Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terorist: Economics and the Rots of Terorism (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 207), 1. 272 Krueger, 2. 273 Martha Crenshaw, ?The Causes of Terorism,? Comparative Politics 12, no. 4 (Jul. 1981), 380. the environment in which terorism ocurs and the psychological variables involved when a person choses terorist actions. Terorism often does not stem from as societal discontent, but that ?more often it represents the disafection of a fragment of the elite, who may take it upon themselves to act on the behalf of a majority unaware of its plight, unwiling to take action to remedy grievances, or unable to expres disent.? 274 Many terorist groups respond to the inequality they se around them and act out in order to achieve change. Instead of terorists coming from poverty where many are unable to react to injustices because they are concerned about their day-to- day existence, many terorist leaders come from wealthy backgrounds. Terorism is not about a violent personality or inherent social deviance. Instead, if a person ses the state or an outside force as being unfair and corupt then fighting against that state may sem justified. Therefore, the United States should stop focusing on education and poverty, and instigate policies that encourage greater outlets for citizens to expres their political grievances. Western countries are frequently targets of terorists? atacks because of their international influence and not a result of their wealth. Kreuger explains that, ?terorists are motivated by political goals that they believe are furthered by their actions. The West is often a target ? not because it is rich, but because it is influential and because terorism has a greater chance of suceding when it is perpetrated against a democracy than an autocracy.? 275 The Western view that terorism is motivated by a lack of education posibly stems from the belief that economic circumstances are a more powerful motivator than ideological grievances. Krueger argues that terorists are motivated by geopolitical reasons and that their targets and actions are meant to change the political behavior of Western states. In certain instances, countries in the Middle East may be frustrated with the United States? policies in the region. . He explains that, ?If we acknowledge that terorists are motivated by ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 274 Crenshaw (1981), 396. 275 Krueger, 4. geopolitical grievances instead of desperation, then we have to confront their grievances.? 276 The goal of a terorist is to make a statement through violence that canot be ignored. Frustration at social, political and economic isues may be grave enough to encourage a group to use terorism as a tactic to expres their frustration. As Krueger explains, it is the responsibility of countries that are afected by threats of terorism and terorist atacks to acknowledge the complaints of the atacking organization in order to work towards peace. Goals of Terorists The most comon outcome of a terorist atack is to bring international atention to the grievances and posibly goals of the terorist organization. Scholars have outlined four sucesive goals that terorist organizations hope to acomplish. The first goal is to recruit suport within the domestic population. This enables a terorist group to acomplish greater levels of insurection. Second, the group desires to draw the atention of the international comunity through atacks or bombings. Third, the terorist group desires to obtain international legitimacy and be regarded as an organization whose demands should be recognized. Last, the terorist organization hopes to gain political concesions from the group it is at odds with. 27 Frequently the last demand is not fulfiled because terorist groups do not obtain legitimacy and as a result their grievances are ignored. Taking these motivations into acount, the United States should lok at atempting to cut of terorist organizations at the rot, in terorist organizations? eforts to gain suport from the population. Causes of Terorism? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 276 Krueger, 51. 27 Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin. The History of Terorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda. (Berkeley: University of California Pres, 207), 40. Terorism has arisen as a tactic of violence that has ben used increasingly since the 1960s. Society on al levels has become more complex and interconected as a result of modernization, which creates both oportunities for terorism and vulnerability to terorist atacks. As areas become more urban and agregated, the acesibility of targets of terorism and acumulation of new methods of violence and terorist atacks become more available. There are two conditions that can be corelated with the causes of terorism. First, grievances?socialy, politicaly or ethnicaly based? predominantly afect a smaler minority within a larger population. This may be an ethnic minority that believes the majority is discriminating against it or a country that fels that it is being opresed by a larger and more powerful country. It is beyond the scope of this report to understand why terorism exists in each group and to understand each specific grievance, but it is crucial to be aware that terorists are responding to perceived injustice. The second condition is the lack of oportunity for political participation. Political regimes that stop citizens from obtaining social power and persecute those that disent create large amounts of public disatisfaction. 278 Terorists often are a group of disafected elites who chose to act on the behalf of a wider group whose input or aproval has not ben asked for. Many in the wider population may not aprove of the behavior of a terorist group, although the organization believes it is acting on their behalf. 279 Domestic terorism ay be considered an atractive tactic to groups that are strugling against their government regardles of ideological persuasion. Organizations that desire to ?dramatize a cause, to demoralize the government, to gain popular suport, to provoke regime violence, to inspire folowers, or to dominate a wider resistance movement, who are weak vis-?-vis the regime, and who are impatient to act, often find terorism a reasonable choice.? 280 A terorist act can be quickly put together, depending on its size, and provokes an imediate response and action ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 278 Crenshaw (1981), 383. 279 Crenshaw (1981), 384. 280 Crenshaw (1981), 389. by the government. If there was a greater capacity for people to voice their discontent with the government without facing retribution, domestic terorist atacks might decrease. The Perceived Link betwen Islam and Terorism The view in the Western media is often that terorism and Islam are intrinsicaly linked. In particular, violence by terorist against the West is always by a Muslim perpetrator. This report argues that terorism neds to be sen outside the context of Islam, but also acknowledges that there is a relationship betwen U.S. foreign policy and Islamic terorism. The West has become a dominant political force throughout the years, and after the Cold War, the United States was viewed globaly as the political and economic hegemon. It is true that the only atacks on United States soil have ben perpetrated by radical groups from the Middle East; therefore the U.S. has used this conection to label Islam the religion as closely asociated with terorism, a tactic of violence. The Role of the Media in Spreading Teror Terorist atacks are meant to be spectacles that gain the atention of a larger audience. Violence and blodshed is meant to instil fear within a comunity. For many terorist groups, the atention that they receive may be their ultimate goal. As a result, the media atention that a terorist atack receives heightens the fear and interest of the targeted population. The repeated airing of terorist atacks perpetuates the terorist goal of psychological warfare and in certain cases encourages imitators. 281 The media also use previous terorist atacks to reinforce the link betwen Islam and terorism and create a general state of fear among a population. The media in fact, further the goals of terorists? organizations because they enhance the psychological impact through constantly replaying and speculation about hypothetical atacks. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 281 Chaliand, 249. Terorists chose to atack civilians because it wil have the greatest psychological impact. The practice of atacking civilians derives from the ?general evolution of political structures and the emergence of the mas media.? 282 By atacking a person who is not imediately involved with terorist goals, an atack is more terifying to the general mases. The tragedy of September 1 was made al the more horific because many Americans felt that they could identify with the people flying on the planes or working in an ofice building. Terorist organizations also chose to atack democracies because ?the political legitimacy of a democracy and its elected representatives lies by definition with its citizens.? 283 An atack on the citizens of a democratic country can spur their government to act, and the media within the country is able to broadcast the event more widely because of the protections on fre spech and the pres. While it is important for citizens to be aware of an atack, using the atack to create stereotypes about religions or to incite fear after an atack has ben perpetrated is inefective. In many cases, if media covers a terorist atack for an extended period of time after it ocurs, it can sensationalize nonexistent terorist activity and contribute to a pervasive climate of fear. Therefore, the United States government should work with the media to develop specific guidelines in the event of an atack to limit the psychological impact of terorism and at the same time be able to warn their population about an atack. Conclusion Terorism has ben a tactic used for centuries and is not likely to vanish without changes within international policy. Terorism is also not a method of violence that can be fought against; there can be no war on teror. Instead, the grievances that cause terorist groups to form and adopt terorism as the most viable aproach must be addresed. In each case, these problems difer and there is not a blanket solution to addres them. The two most important goals of terorist ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 282 Chaliand, 8. 283 Chaliand, 8. organizations are to be internationaly recognized and have their demands met. If the groups are not viewed as legitimate and their claims are ignored because they are believed to be sub-human or pure evil, then the international comunity canot interact with them on any level. Former President George Bush?s proclamation that ?you are either with the United States or with the terorists? shows that this isue can be interpreted as a choice of god or evil, black or white, when the isue fals much more in the middle. The first step is to view terorism as a tactic with a motivating political goal, the primary purpose of which is to obtain international recognition for the grievances of certain parties. Once terorism is sen as a response to what is believed to be political injustice and not the actions of a deranged group of people, international political action can be taken. The Relationship betwen the United Nations and the United States to Fight Terorism Terorism is a threat to al states, as wel as to the United Nations as a whole. New aspects of the threat including the rise of a global terorist network, and the potential for terorists? use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons require new coperative responses. The UN has not done al that it can. The United Nations neds to forge a strategy of counterterorism that is respectful of human rights and the rule of law. In 201, The United Nations General Asembly released a statement noting that they colectively, ?strongly condemn al acts of terorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever comited?. 284 Member states are caled upon to enact apropriate domestic legislation to ensure that the jurisdiction of their courts enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of al criminal acts, including terorist acts. Obviously enacting apropriate domestic legislation is complicated and requires an imense amount of coperation and openes. This has led to cals for the creation of a UN High Comisioner for terorism to cordinate al of these initiatives, and a G8 heads of State sumit statement in July 206 caled for a more coherent UN counterterorism program and response to the threat. Much of the discourse on counterterorism focuses on what organizations like the United Nations canot do, which includes serving as mechanisms for inteligence sharing and directly facilitating operational coperation, rather than on what they can do and must do to addres the multidimensional facets of terorism. 285 Since there are now 16 new international treaties that criminalize nearly every imaginable terorist ofense and international standards have ben developed in areas such as aviation, maritime and port security, and the development of travel documents, it is important to begin to streamline these treaties. 286 Within diferent parts of the UN, whether in areas such as development, human rights, or education, contributions to addresing some of the underlying conditions that may give rise to terorism al asist the goal of both the United ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 284 UN Chronicle. A Comprehensive Action Against Terorism. (Isue 3, 201). 285 James Adams. The Financing of Teror (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 34-40. 286 Dominic McGoldrick, The Permanent International Court (Hart Publishing 204). States and United Nations in fighting terorism. The UN?s seal of aproval can ofer legitimacy to a wide range of counterterorism programs and initiatives, thus reinforcing the eforts of the United States and other countries outside of the UN. Development has to be the first line of defense for a colective security system that takes prevention seriously. It has ben argued that terorists are not specificaly por or under-privileged, and are often wealthy and wel educated. 287 However, combating poverty wil not only save milions of lives but also strengthen States? capacity to combat terorism, organized crime and proliferation. 28 We propose a clear and direct increase in suport by the United States to the functions that the United Nations can and should play in promoting international diplomacy and conecting its member states in a peaceful way. Our perspective is that in the globalized world today, finding comon ground through the forum of the United Nations can serve as a useful mechanism to work towards beter comunication and safety worldwide. The purpose of this section is to addres the ned for more comprehensive eforts on the part of the United States government to increase work with the United Nations on counterterorism eforts. Although the UN itself may not often directly be able to deal with terorist organization, it can work with its member states to facilitate comunity development and international security. The rapid increase in the number of bodies, from new NGOs to new tribunals, active on the counterterorism plane since 201 has led to a growing ned for greater coperation, cordination, and information sharing to create the most cost-efective and timely solutions. While there is great potential for multilateral bodies to contribute, their performance since September 201 has ben uneven and disorganized. Although the events of 9/1 energized a number of regional bodies to become engaged and increase their comitment to counterterorism activities, the responses have ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 287 Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terorist: Economics and the Rots of Terorism (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 207), 28 Amartya Sen, Development as Fredom. (Oxford University Pres, 199). varied greatly. One of the main problems with this engagement is that many are under-funded, providing few if any legitimate resources for counterterorism. In order to promote the global framework as decided by the Security Council?s Counterterorism Comite (CTC), ?Member States through the General Asembly have ben increasingly cordinating their counterterorism eforts,? 289 which has highlighted the ned for a more encompasing aproach. Past Presidential Policy on the UN and IC By loking at what both the Clinton and Bush administrations have done on the topic of the International Criminal Court, we wil gain further background to the curent situation that the Obama administration wil face. It was the United States that first proposed the creation of an International Criminal Court (IC) under President Clinton. While this proces was underway, ad hoc tribunals were created to deal with diferent atrocities that had taken place in diferent regions? both in Africa (The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) and in the former Yugoslavia (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). 290 The Clinton administration participated actively in negotiations toward the International Criminal Court treaty, seking Security Council screning of cases. 291 If adopted, this would have enabled the U.S. to veto any dockets it oposed. When other countries refused to agre to such an unequal standard of justice, the U.S., in light of realizing it would not get exactly what it wanted, campaigned to weaken and undermine the court. In what was sen as a very bold move in international politics, in 202, the Bush administration unsigned the treaty. 292 Importance of the International Criminal Court ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 289 UN Action to Counter Terorism (acesed February 9, 209); available at ww.un.org/terorism. 290 Le Feinstein, Council on Foreign Relations (October 5, 205). 291 Global Policy Forum: U.S. Oposition to Criminal Court. 292 Daniel B. Prieto War About Teror (Council on Foreign Relations 209). Although clearly controversial, the use of the International Criminal Court to prosecute war criminals should be sen as a mechanism to be used in the future to facilitate inter-state eforts to fight terorism and prosecute those who comit terorist acts. 293 The United States government has historicaly oposed an international court that could hold U.S. military and political leaders to a uniform global standard of justice. As explained throughout this section, there are ample provisions in the Rome Statute designed to protect a mature democracy's capacity to engage in legal self- regulation and self-policing while stil maintaining suport for the eforts of the International Criminal Court. On July 17, 198, the Rome Statute was signed, establishing a permanent international criminal court with a seat in The Hague. 294 After the sixtieth ratification, the Statute pased on July 1, 202, in acordance with Article 126. Article 1 of the Rome Statute states that ?the Court shal have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.? These crimes of international concern include genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and after much debate, crimes of agresion. However, the IC wil not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of agresion unles agrement is reached regarding how to define the crime and regarding the conditions for the court?s exercise of jurisdiction over it. It is important to note the intended neutrality of the International Criminal Court when arguing for future efectivenes. In acordance with Article 36, judges wil be selected acording to an equitable geographic representation, thus eliminating the posibility for any dominant control over decisions by one singular state. 295 The question of how to categorize terorist crimes in the judicial system has come up in much discusion on the legality of convicting terorists. The IC outlined this exact dilema in Article 7 and noted that the posibility of crimes against humanity ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 293 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer, The International Criminal Court (Ashgate Publishing, 204). 294 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 99 (198). 295 John T. Holmes, National Courts versus the IC, (The Rome Statute, A Comentary, Volume 1). ocuring in the context of an organizational policy; thus, customary international law today now includes non-state actors such as terorist organizations. 296 Chalenges and Arguments against the IC Military Influence It has ben argued from the military?s perspective that the IC is a potential threat to the comand authority of military oficers because soldiers are trained to reject orders they believe to be violations of international law. Thus, the notion that a soldier could be prosecuted is argued to jeopardize the military?s chain of comand. 297 During the Clinton administration?s suport for the IC, there was a conservative movement arguing that Clinton was ?anti-military.? Contrarily, the Bush administration began in 201 publicly saying it would not cede interests to international bodies. However, the Bush administration moved from a posture of active oposition to the very existence of the court to a position much closer to what the Clinton administration adopted in its last days. The Bush administration acquiesced to the court?s existence even though it had problems with its conception by agreing to the UN referal of Sudan to the IC. 298 It is true that this court has never before ben able to become what it was meant to become. However, this argument alone is not reason enough to completely abandon the future prospects of creating an International Criminal Court. Acording to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, "war crimes" are defined to include fifty separate acts that violate the Geneva Conventions, international law, or the laws and customs of war. They include murder, torture, "causing great sufering, or serious injury to body or health," "depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 296 Paul W. Kahn Why The United States is so Oposed (acesed February 5, 209); available at crimesofwar.org. 297 Julian Schofield Militarization and War (Palgrave Macmilan 207). 298 Marlies Glasius International Criminal Court: A Global Society Achievement (Taylor &Francis 205). rights of fair and regular trial," ilegal deportation, unlawful confinement, the taking of hostages, and "comiting outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." 29 If we acept that definition, then, military and CIA personel have comited acts that constitute war crimes under international law in the ?War on Teror? since 201. 30 These were not, as Donald Rumsfeld contended at the time of Abu Ghraib, isolated acts comited by rogue personel. Since men and women on the ground comiting these abuses did so with the ful authorization and suport of the Bush Administration, the decision of who is considered at fault is obviously complicated and wil require increased acountability to be placed on the men and women giving orders to comit war crimes under the pretenses of ?fighting terorism.? Ofice of War Crimes Isues (OWCI) The OWCI was created by ex-Secretary of State Madeline Albright to suport the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 301 The Ofice?s first ambasador, David Schefer, headed the U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference that created the International Criminal Court. It was his leadership that led to the Rome Treaty's definition of war crimes. The Ofice of War Crimes Isues advises the Secretary of State directly and ?formulates U.S. policy responses to atrocities comited in areas of conflict and elsewhere throughout the world.? 302 However, the Bush Administration made OWCI complicit of its own war crimes aparatus. Since September 1, OWCI has ben responsible "for negotiating the repatriation, to their home countries, of individuals detained by the United States for their involvement in terorist activities." Whenever the Administration discovers that someone it has tortured or mistreated is, in fact, inocent, it turns to the OWCI to make the arangements to send that person home, showing the importance of this ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 29 Tim Stephens International Criminal Law and the Response to International Terorism (Sydney Centre for International and Global Law 206). 30 Jane Mayer, The Dark Side (New York: Random House, 208). 301 Mira Banchik, The International Criminal Court and Terorism (Peace Studies Journal, 208.) 302 Ofice of War Crimes Isues (acesed February 10, 209); available at state.gov/s/wci. branch in an efort for international diplomacy. United Nations and IC Efectivenes There are several United Nations General Asembly resolutions and declarations concerning terorism. It is important to note that as resolutions or declarations of the General Asembly, they do not have legal efect and thus, are not binding on the United Nations member states. However, they are not completely irelevant because they have the status of recomendations, which can serve to create international precedence. 303 In 202 at the fifty- seventh sesion of the United Nations General Asembly, the report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terorism stated that international terorism could be decreased if the IC would try the most serious crimes comited by terorists. 304 Previously, on September 28, 201, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, obligating States to implement more efective counterterorism easures at the national level and to increase international coperation in the strugle against terorism. This resolution created the Counterterorism Comite (CTC) to monitor action on this isue and to receive reports from States on measures taken. Former High Comisioners urged the UN to take acount of human rights in its review of counterterorism easures. Mr. Vieira de Melo, speaking to the CTC in October 202, stated his conviction that "the best - the only - strategy to isolate and defeat terorism is by respecting human rights, fostering social justice, enhancing democracy and upholding the primacy of the rule of law." Since then, the CTC and the UN Human Rights Comite have exchanged briefings on their working methods and areas of concern. 305 The International Criminal Court came into being on July 1, 202, ratified by 90 nations in the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 303 Boaz Ganor, Defining Terorism: Is One Man?s Terorist Another Man?s Fredom Fighter? (acesed February 14, 209); available at htp:/ww.ict.org. 304 Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terorism, U.N. (acesed February 13,209); available at htp:/ww.un.org/terorism/a57273.htm. 305 UN Human Rights Comite, (acesed February 9, 209); available at htp:/ww.unhchr.ch/terorism/index.html). United Nations. The Relationship Agrement of October 204 betwen UN and IC acknowledges that, "the International Criminal Court is established as an independent permanent institution in relationship with the United Nations system.? The IC?s subject mater jurisdiction encompases the most serious crimes of international concern. Terorism certainly fals within that category. International Partnerships The Security Council?s eforts to protect fundamental human rights while countering terorism are guided by its resolution 1456 (203), which declared that ?States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terorism comply with al their obligations under international law and should adopt such measures in acordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refuge and humanitarian law.? 306 The United States Government Acountability Ofice (GAO) released a report in 208 focused on enhancing U.S. partnerships to counter transnational terorism. The report argues that the United States neds to ?strengthen and work with its coalitions and partnerships to facilitate apropriate solutions to the chalenges posed by transnational terorism.? 307 The partnerships that the U.S. government, foreign, and nongovernment representatives said they are engaged in during the 208 U.S. (GAO) conference include information and inteligence sharing, training and on the ground asesments, as wel as increased cultural knowledge of specific regions to take into acount the varying nature of counterterorism activity. 308 Al these examples continue to lend suport to the argument of increased coperation betwen governments, specificaly the United States government with the United Nations and other foreign bodies. Since the 9/11 atacks in 201, the Bush administration and Congres repeatedly stated that destroying terorist threats and closing terorist safe havens were one of the nation?s most critical security ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 306 RESOLUTION 1456 (acesed February 2, 209); available at ww.unhchr.org 307 Inteligence Reform and Terorism Prevention Act of 204, (December 17 204); the National Strategy for Combating Terorism (September 206). 308 Enhancing U.S Partnerships in Countering Transnational Terorism (acesed February 18, 209); available at ww.gao.gov. goals. 309 Carying this focus into the Obama administration?s goals wil be of utmost importance to increase counterterorism eforts and coperatively work with other countries and agencies. Conclusion During the Obama campaign, many news articles sought to predict the relationship that Obama would strive to have with the United Nations. Dozens of U.S. foreign policy leaders, including Democratic and Republican ex-Cabinet members, urged the incoming Obama administration to strengthen ties with the United Nations. In a statement to apear in a ful-page advertisement in The New York Times, they identified priorities for Obama that could bost international coperation via the United Nations. "The U.N. canot suced without strong U.S. leadership and suport," the advertisement said. "This investment wil pay of substantialy by helping to enhance our standing internationaly and strengthen our ability to kep America safe and strong." Ultimately, the U.S. is stil vital to the suces of the United Nations, and the U.S. clearly neds to find beter ways to work with the UN. The U.S. would not cede its sovereign authority by complying and working with the UN and IC, but rather would exemplify a functioning democracy working toward a more coperative and safe global environment. International law has generaly ben asociated with diferent states? actions with each other. However, these lines betwen state and non-state actors are continualy blured and mark a new starting point in the discourse on international law. As the host state for the United Nations headquarters, it is increasingly important for the United States to send an international mesage of solidarity with the United Nation?s general functions and recomendations. While isues such as veto power and Security Council membership remain highly controversial, the new administration?s goal of a more international aproach to ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 309 National Strategy for Combating Terorism (U.S. State Department, published February 203). combating terorism, and the acknowledgement of the interconected environment we face today wil only increase the chances of change and understanding betwen states, combatants, and potential enemies. The Obama administration can be expected to execute homeland security and counterterorism policy in a substantialy diferent way than the Bush Administration. The arguments made in this section have sought to highlight the potential role the UN wil play in the Obama administration?s fight against terorist organizations. Clearly, the controversy surounding these topics is imense, yet this fact alone does not mean we should disregard the largest non- governmental body in the world and turn inward to solve our problems. We should work to change our national focus and to become more interconected to, and understanding of, foreign countries? both friends and foes. This year brought stark reminders that the mere establishment of international treaties baring war crimes and other atrocities does not always translate into action against violations of the law. It wil take work and patience to change this system, but it can be done. Recomendations to Lesen the Appeal of Terorism, Increase International Coperation, and Streamline Domestic Counterterorism Networks The ?War on Teror? under the Bush administration strayed from engaging multilateraly and ignored the reality that that can be no war on a strategic tactic of violence. There may never be a day when terorism is truly eradicated, because there wil always be people who believe that they have a cause worth dying for. The hope, however, is that the apeal of terorism as a tactic to expres geopolitical discontent wil be replaced with the posibility of open dialogues and international reactions to perceived grievances. We have focused our arguments based on the importance of learning from past suceses and erors, the counterterorism aproaches of other countries, and the ned to forge greater international and domestic aliances. The new administration has the oportunity to change international and domestic counterterorism strategies based on lesons learned from the previous administrations, in conjunction with international law and with help from other countries. Outreach and Education about Islam in the United States The front pages of newspapers in the United States are filed with atacks the U.S. claims were perpetrated by radical Islamic organizations. Radicalism in any religion is often asociated with blodshed, but it never the core teaching of the faith. Just as the United Kingdom has made a concerted efort to create social outreach programs and education programs to include minority populations within society, the United States should folow in their path. We sugest that the United States should include information about religions and cultural diversity into public schol education. The social outreach programs in the United Kingdom are meant to bring ostracized groups into the daily life and fabric of the United Kingdom. It is esential that the United States reaches out to diferent groups within the U.S. and end the proces of marginalizing diferent races and cultures. In the United Kingdom, the focus of these outreach programs is to increase security by showing marginalized groups that they are members of society with the same rights and the ability to report crimes and identify suspicious activities to the police. The United States Department of State has provided grants to schols and organizations to beter understand Muslim life in the United States. An example of such a grant was given to the National Peace Foundation (NPF). NPF designed a project to bring 24 scholars and clerics from the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Qatar for a two-wek period to explore the reality of Muslim life in the U.S. and to work with the scholars and clerics to break down eroneous stereotypes about Islam. The themes outlined by the National Peace Foundation included Muslim women in the United States, Islam in practice, and discusing stereotypes with American journalists and writers. In exchange, a group of American scholars and clerics traveled to the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Qatar and have similar discusions abroad. 310 We argue that the United States should encourage more grants to understand Muslim life in the United States and focus such studies on how to break down stereotypes, particularly stereotypes that wrongfuly link terorism and Islam together. International Coperation Recomendations Reacting to violent terorist activity, is far more expensive than investing in tols to prevent conflict from turning deadly. By clear leadership in reshaping U.S. foreign policy and mending relations with the international comunity, we can ultimately reduce the costs asociated with terorist activity both in monetary and human terms. Including conflict prevention and civilian protection as fundamental pilars of U.S. foreign policy in the next National Security Strategy wil lay the foundation for a more efective aproach to building security throughout the world. This strategy should inform an integrated, interagency mechanism for strategic planing, tied directly to ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 310 Grants by Theme: Faith and Comunity, United States Department of State. htp:/exchanges.state.gov/citizens/profesionals/grant-theme/faith-and-comunity.html the alocation of resources, which would ensure the swift implementation of these principles. Comenting in 205 on how the U.S. should engage, Tony Blair provided this advice: If America wants the rest of the world to be part of the agenda it has set, it must be part of their agenda, to. It can do so, secure in the knowledge that what people want is not for America to concede, but to engage?so there is comon ground as to interdependence. 31 Through a deeper relationship with the United Nations, the United States can continue its eforts to promote diplomacy with the rest of the world. The prioritization of conflict prevention at the most senior levels, a wise investment of national funds and resources, efective U.S. foreign policy institutions, and international cordination are al neded in the new administration?s counterterorism policy. The growth of cros-national links among diferent terorist organizations, which may involve military training, funding, technology transfer or political advice is another important reason an internationalized policy is neded to deal with this international situation. We sugest shaping a more sensible, efective U.S. foreign policy by making the prevention of deadly conflict and civilian protection the highest priorities. Inteligence Cordination and Unification In the months and years after the devastating World Trade Center atacks on September 1, 201, as the shock and horor of the day began to wear of, oficials and citizens began to ask questions. Many caled for action and reform, particularly in the inteligence sector of the government, as the lack of acurate inteligence apeared to be an important factor in the United State?s inability to prevent the September 1 atacks. 312 Reform began in the inteligence sector with the Inteligence Reform and Terorism Prevention Act of 204, but this act focused on cros-border ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 31 Tony Blair, World Economic Forum (Davos, Switzerland 205). 312 9/1 Comision Report: Final Report of the National Comision on Terorist Atacks Upon the United States inteligence and only created one position to facilitate information flow. 313 We believe that inteligence reform neds to go further. This section has shown that without acurate, timely inteligence, tragedies like September 1, 201 ocur with terifying ease and it is esential to create a unified, centralized inteligence structure that gathers information from al inteligence agencies into one area for efective disemination to the apropriate governmental figure. The curent structure of the United States inteligence comunity should be adapted to alow for greater ease of movement of inteligence, as wel as centralization of the inteligence comand structures. We therefore recomend, as has ben recomended before in the 9/11 Comision Report, the creation of a unified terorism- inteligence comand structure that would gather al terorism related inteligence from the Central Inteligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security counterterorism inteligence branches. 314 By creating a unified comand structure, the apropriate inteligence wil not be stoped by bureaucracy in the lower levels of the government and wil instead reach the levels of government where it can be acted upon. Concluding Remarks ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 313 ?Prevention of Terorism Ordinance No 3 of 5708-19.? 314 9/1 Comision Report: Final Report of the National Comision on Terorist Atacks Upon the United States Terorism is an old tactic used by the weak fighting against stronger forces. As a violently unconventional tactic of war, the idea that the United States or any country can efectively conduct a ?War on Terorism? is misleading. A war against a tactic can have no begining or end, and the idea of a War on Terorism paralels a number of equaly futile endeavors like the ?War on Drugs? or the ?War on Poverty.? The United States must take a balanced and strategic aproach to prevent terorists from harming American interests and citizens. It is unrealisticaly ambitious to think that terorism can be completely eliminated, but the United States must endeavor to reduce and contain it as efectively as posible. Addresing a truly global threat requires international action, and the U.S. government must work closely with its alies and must forge mutualy beneficial relationships with foreign governments. And in this international enterprise, acurate inteligence is the most efective tol to minimize terorist threats, requiring the United States to constantly ases and revolutionize its structure for inteligence gathering and analysis. Despite taking bold steps to reduce terorist threats, the government must not stray from the fundamental ideals of fredom, liberty, justice, and equality that underpin our country. In these times of tremendous uncertainty, our guiding values must be caled upon to bolster a productive counterterorism strategy that recognizes the United States as a political actor in an international comunity. We would like to conclude this report with the folowing sumary of our policy recomendations. Policy Recomendations The Diplomatic Aproach to Fighting Terorism Diplomacy should be a central feature of U.S. counterterorism policies. As the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown, addresing terorist threats solely through military means is unfeasible. It is our belief that large-scale military action should be used to combat terorism only if the U.S. is no longer able to pursue diplomatic options. In this report, we have sugested that the U.S. could use diplomacy to achieve its counterterorism goals in five areas. ? The U.S. should include neighboring states (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran) in power-sharing negotiations betwen Kurdish, Suni, and Shi?a leaders because these states are known suporters of various insurgent groups and waring ethnic/religious factions in Iraq. ? The U.S. should work more closely with Pakistani forces to subdue the Taliban and the terorist groups that are afiliated with it in Afghanistan. ? The U.S. should open a dialogue with Hezbolah in Lebanon through back chanels while keping it clasified as a ?terorist? organization. ? In Palestine, the U.S. should encourage the Israeli government to end the construction of new Jewish setlements along the West Bank and Gaza and to remove the ones that already exist ilegaly. Furthermore, the US must ensure that Hamas takes part in any potential Israeli-Palestinian peace agrement. ? The U.S. should establish working relations with the moderate forces within the Islamic Union Courts in Somalia. Terorism and the U.S. Military As previously mentioned, large-scale military actions against countries suspected of being involved in terorism or harboring terorists should be used only as a last resort. In any event, there are a number of steps that the U.S. military neds to take in order to beter respond to the non- conventional batle tactics that insurgents and terorist groups use in war zones. ? The U.S. military should specialize in launching smal-scale retaliatory strikes against terorist targets rather than engaging in large-scale warfare. ? The U.S. should increase the military?s use of the Human Terain System. ? At least part of the training that is given to the members of the Special Operations Forces should be extended to other soldiers in the U.S. army. Enhancing Diversity within Intelligence Agencies Inteligence plays a key role in U.S. counterterorism policies, particularly with regard to the prevention of future terorist atacks. Improving inteligence gathering capacity should therefore be a top priority for U.S. inteligence agencies. ? The CIA should increase its capability to conduct human inteligence by expanding the number of oficers in the National Clandestine Services. ? Inteligence oficer recruitment procedures should be updated in order to atract individuals from diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. ? The CIA should give its existing oficers additional language training. Department of Homeland Security The Department of Homeland Security is a crucial domestic entity in the United States? endeavors against terorism. However, its curent structure does not alow it to be completely efective in fulfiling its roles. Inteligence is the most useful tol to combat terorism, and the DHS should be reformulated to give the Department more authority to share inteligence betwen various federal, state, and local agencies. ? To improve fiscal discipline, the DHS should act in an advisory role to Congres as a ?smart- buyer? to define ?what they want to buy, know ho to buy it from, and judge the quality of what they buy when it arives.? 315 ? To maximize the efectivenes of their research and eforts, the Department should create a standard operating procedure for al local and state jurisdictions. ? The DHS should spearhead the push for standardization of other systems acros the United States, such as isuing guidelines and urging Congres for apropriations to standardize identification cards and drivers? licenses. ? The DHS also has a tremendous oportunity to protect the United States against cyber- threat and information leaks by creating standards for government firewal and network security controls. Cordination of Government Levels and Agencies ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 315 ?Haynes,?Wendy.?204.?"Seing?around?Corners:?Crafting?the?New?Department?of?Homeland?Security".?Review?of? Policy?Research.?21?(3):?369?395.?(387)? The nature of the terorist threat has changed in the past decade and consequently U.S. domestic agencies have ben faced with the chalenge of updating the way they work to safeguard national security. The atacks on September 1, 201 revealed many weakneses within the U.S. inteligence comunity. If national security is to be a top priority, there must be a strong progresion towards resolving these failures. ? Various inteligence agencies must have a strong comunication network both within and betwen themselves. ? In order to create a comprehensive inteligence-sharing database, the overal technological capacity of the U.S. inteligence comunity must be advanced dramaticaly and rapidly. ? There neds to be a functioning acountability structure that keps agencies responsible for their work, to clarify the role of each federal, state, and local agency, and to decrease overlaping jurisdiction to promote eficiency. ? The role of each agency must be clearly enforced in holistic training programs that federal, state and local agencies proctor. ? U.S. inteligence agencies must reward employes for comitment to long-term projects so that inteligence oficials kep track of suspected threats for as long as they pose a threat to national security. ? The CIA neds to develop a more comprehensive and acurate system to measure their employe?s output and value rather than using simple quantitative benchmarks. ? Inteligence agencies must work to bridge the deep philosophical and alegiant divides that exist betwen them. National Information Policies With the pasage of The Patriot Act and the resulting expansion of executive power, many questions have arisen over the legality and constitutionality of many U.S. actions, including its policies on detainment, information gathering, domestic security, and surveilance. Additionaly, oponents have criticized the indefinite detention of imigrants, the semingly unmitigated search and seizure authority given to law enforcement oficials, the expanded aplication of NSLs, and expanded government aces to busines and personal records. Long-term suceses wil ultimately be calculated and judged by the eficacy of government agencies and politicians in improving international coperation, focusing the scope of the PATRIOT Act singularly towards counterterorism investigations, and ensuring that America and its foreign policies promote a culture of progres and prosperity throughout the world. ? While the Patriot Act is a vital tol in counterterorism operations, its unmitigated use must be countered by some form of judiciary oversight. ? It is imperative to develop intimate, interagency networks for file-sharing, interagency coperation, and the development of organized, acesible mechanisms that alow inteligence agencies to aces necesary information. Imigration, Border, and Transport Security It is important to realize that imigration is a central of component of the United States, one that wil not readily disapear in the future. Therefore, the U.S. government must cary out proactive, efective, fair imigration policies that balance the influx of imigrants with an efective national security policy. The U.S. should implement a focused imigration policy that efectively tracks imigrants and foreign visitors in the United States. Threat Prevention and International Coperation Reacting to violent terorist activity is far more expensive than investing in tols to prevent conflict from turning deadly. By reshaping U.S. foreign policy and mending relations with the international comunity, we can ultimately reduce the costs asociated with terorist activity both in monetary and human terms. Including conflict prevention and civilian protection as fundamental pilars of U.S. foreign policy in the next National Security Strategy wil lay the foundation for a more efective aproach to building security throughout the world. ? Realizing that education is a key component of ameliorating the posibilities of both domestic and foreign terorism, the US should strategicaly implement cultural diversity curicula into public education. ? The US should forge a closer relationship with the United Nations, alowing it to continue the efort to promote diplomacy and international coperation around the world. Works Cited 9/11 Comision Report: Final Report of the National Comision on Terorist Attacks Upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Ofice, July 204. Adams, James. The Financing of Teror. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986. Adamson, Fiona and Adam Grosman. 204. ?Framing ?Security? in a Post-9/11 Context.? Social Science Research Council: Reframing the Chalenge of Migration and Security. Acesed at htp://programs.src.org/gsc/publications/gsc_activities/migration/adamsongrosman.pdf on 12 February 209. Alexander, Yonah. 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