THE HENRY M. JACKSON SCHOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON ! February 27, 2012 CAN NATO REACT TO THE ARAB SPRING? DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & THE RULE OF LAW The Henry M. Jackson Schol of International Studies University of Washington TASK FORCE 2012 Can NATO React to the Arab Spring?: Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law Task Force Advisor: Profesor Christopher Jones Task Force Evaluator: Dr. Bates Gil, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Task Force Members: Andrea Banel Armando Cortes Alice Jacobson Jake Lustig Pavel Mantchev Morgan McAlister Kelsey Miler Margaret Moore (Editor) Francis Ramoin (Editor) Alyson Singh (Secretary) Hae Suh (Editor) Josiah Surface Samantha Thomas-Nadler Jasmine Zhang (Editor) ! ! I! TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page EXECUTIVE SUMARY Tunisia [2-49] 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 INSTITUTIONS & DEMOCRACY BUILDING IN TUNISIA Mohamed Ghanouchi and the Transition The Justice System The Election Democracy Building in Tunisia and Iraq NATO 2 6 7 10 12 2 2.1 2.2 2.2.a 2.2.b 2.3 2.4 2.4.a 2.4.b 2.4.c 2.5 2.6 THE MILITARY & FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE DOMESTIC AFAIRS OF TUNISIA Background and Role of the Army in Society Foreign Interests and Asistance to the Local Army United States Europe Army in the Revolution and the Government Transition Foreign Reactions to the Revolution Europe France United States Post-Revolution Role of the Army NATO 16 17 20 22 25 27 29 30 32 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY? The Theoretical Framework of Islamic Democracy Shari?a Law The History of Islamism in Tunisia Enahda Today International Examples of Non-secular Democracies NATO 36 38 43 45 46 48 49 Egypt 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 WHAT THE DICTATORS TAUGHT US Pillar of Stability: Iran A Well Understod Value: Egypt What Does it Mean?: Egypt and Iran Compared here to go from Here: US and NATO Policy Recommendations 52 53 58 64 66 5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES & THE REVOLUTION OF 201 Background Military Influence & Privileges The Military Role in the Revolution Transition of Authority & The Future of the Egyptian Military 70 71 75 77 79 ! II! 5.5 US & NATO Recommendations 83 6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 DEMOCRACY & THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOD Egypt?s Influential Role in the Middle East The History of the Muslim Brotherhod The Brotherhod Enters Egyptian Politics The Future of Egypt and the Brotherhod Recommendations to NATO 86 87 88 92 94 101 7 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 THE COPTIC QUESTION: WELFARE OF MINORITY GROUPS AS INDICATIVE OF DEMOCRACY Historical Background of the Marginalization of the Copts Coptic Involvement and Response to the Arab Spring Women in Egypt Next Steps: How can NATO respond? 102 104 107 108 111 Libya 8 8.1 8.1.a 8.1.b 8.2 8.2.a 8.3 8.3.a 8.3.b 8.3.c 8.3.d 8.4 8.5 8.6 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT & LIBYA?A CASE STUDY Who?s Responsible? The Principle of R2P The Tactics of R2P The Danger of Unilateral Coercive Intervention UN Security Council Reform Double Standards & the Consistency of R2P?s Aplication Preventing a Masacre Qaddafi?s Actions & Rhetoric Political Legitimacy & Legal Authority Local Requests for Intervention Clear Legal Basis Firm Regional Suport Multilateral Coalition Operational Feasibility Two Big Criticisms of NATO?s Operation The Future of R2P: Focusing on Prevention 114 115 116 120 121 122 123 127 128 133 134 137 140 145 148 154 156 9 9.1 9.2 9.3 THE FUTURE OF NATO IN LIBYA Political Timeline for Libya and the NTC Challenges for the future of Libyan state-building NATO?s future role in Libya 174 161 163 168 Syria 10 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 SYRIA, POLITICS & PROTEST The uprising and its evolution, in brief The backdrop to revolt, economic and social contexts Political alliances and the building of alternative leadership The movement on the ground and the organization of forces Geographies of resistance and represion Prognosis and Political Posibilities 174 175 178 181 183 186 188 ! III! 11 11.1 11.2 11.2.a 11.2.b 11.3 11.3.a 11.3.b 11.3.c 11.4 11.5 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS & ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE SYRIAN UPRISING State?s Authoritarian Nature & Determination to Stay in Power Syrian Economics Oil and Economic Sanctions Rusia and China Human Rights in Syria The Hama Masacre Escalation and Continuing Deaths in the Syrian Uprising Human Rights Violations International Response The Future of Syria 189 191 192 194 192 196 197 202 204 208 12 12.1 12.2 A CASE FOR NATO: INTERVENTION IN SYRIA NATO NATO & Syria 213 215 220 Thoughts from Outside the Maghreb 13 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE ARAB SPRING Human Rights Discourse Human Rights Watch as a Western Organization Human Rights Watch and the Arab Spring Humanitarian Intervention Human Rights in Libya and Syria Future of Human Rights and the Arab Spring 227 228 230 232 236 238 240 14 14.1 14.2 14.2.a 14.2.b 14.2.c 14.2.d 14.3 14.3.a 14.4 ISRAEL & THE ARAB SPRING Israel and the Modern Middle East The Arab Spring and Israel - Challenges and Concerns Egypt Who will replace Mubarak? hat will become of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace agrement? Does the Muslim Brotherhod pose a threat to Israel? The role of Egypt in an Israeli-Palestinian agrement Syria: The Wildcard Islamic Extremism A pro-Western, Anti-Asad Regime Who will play the role of Franz Ferdinand? The Necesity of Renewed Negotiations Obstacles to Restarting Negotiations What Comes Next? Joining the Middle East Step 1: Significant Peace Negotiations Step 2: Israel as a Powerful Economic Ally in the Region Investment in Infrastructure A Regional Trade Agrement Step 3: The Israeli Model The Future of the US and NATO in Arab-Israeli Relations 242 244 247 249 250 251 253 254 256 257 260 261 264 265 266 267 269 LIST OF ACRONYMS ! ABC?Anyone But Comunists ABTAnyone But Terorists AIOC? Anglo-Iranian Oil Company ANTArm?e Nationale Tunisiene CPR?Congres for the Republic. A political party in Tunisia DF4DDomestic Finance for Development ENP?European Neighborhod Policy ENPIEuropean Neighborhod Partnership Instrument EU?European Union FGMFemale Genital Mutilation FMF?Foreign Military Financing FOMFre Oficers Movement FSA?Fre Syrian Army GDPGros Domestic Product ICC?International Criminal Court IDFIsraeli Defense Forces IMET?International Military Education and Training IMFInternational Monetary Fund INSE?Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques ISAFInternational Security and Assistance Force LCC?Local Cordinating Comites (In Syria) LRLiberation Raly MD?Mediterranean Dialogue MENAMidle East North Africa MNNA?Major Non-NATO Aly NADRHDNonproliferation, Anti-terorism, Demining, and Related Programs - Humanitarian Demining NATO ?North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDP National Democratic Party OPEC?Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries PAP-TPartnership Action Plan against Terorism PLO?Palestinian Liberation Organization PNAPalestinian National Authority, created after the Oslo Acords RCC?Revolutionary Comand Council RCDConstitutional Democratic Raly. The political party of the former Tunisian president Ben Ali RCD?Rasemblement Constitutionel D?mocratique SARCSyrian Arab Red Crescent SCAF?Supreme Council of Armed Forces SFORStabilization Force SNC?Syrian National Coalition UDHRUniversal Declaration of Human Rights UN Security Council?United Nations Security Council UN?United Nations UNGA?United Nations General Asembly UNHCRUnited Nations Human Rights Resolution UNHRC?United Nations Human Rights Council UNSC ? United Nations Security Council UNSG?United Nations Secretary General US ? United States USD ? US Dolars ($) 1" EXECUTIVE SUMARY The Arab Spring brought a regional paradigm shift in which human dignity and participatory involvement in the political proces became the demands of the mases. As long-standing dictators began to fall, NATO was and continues to be confronted with the challenge of revaluating its adherence to the Cold War status quo of regional stability at any cost. NATO can no longer aford to ignore the popular opinion of North Africa and the Middle East and thus must seize this as an oportunity to solidify their commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of the law. While NATO member states have long championed these values domestically, they now witnes the Arab World collectively strugling to champion them as well. However, the uncertain future of the governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria makes it difficult for NATO to act. While each country section will highlight individualized recommendations to NATO and its member states, the overall theme that can be extracted is that NATO should adopt a facilitating role in these respective state-building proceses. In a time of unprecedented regime change, domestic ownership of the transition is esential to guarante legitimacy. Due to the diverse nature of the countries afected by the Arab Spring, our task force chose to write about four nations at very different transitionary stages: 1) Tunisia; 2) Egypt; 3) Libya; and 4) Syria. Each group studied the issues that pertained most to their country. The Tunisia and Egypt groups? analysis is centered on the future of democracy and the state building proces, while the groups studying Libya and Syria explored human rights and the international principle of the Responsibility to Protect. Part V of our report, Thoughts from Outside the Maghreb, incorporates a wider perspective by looking at the reception Israel and Human Rights Watch have had in the unfolding of these events?as well as ofering thoughts on what role they might play in the future. PART I TUNISIA Until December 2010, the small North African country of Tunisia was relatively unknown to the international political sphere. When a young fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi committed self immolation to protest the lack of economic oportunities and the unfair treatment by the police force, it signaled the rest of the country to rise up against the political and economic stagnations (that have hapened) under the authoritarian leader Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. The month-long nationwide protests captured the atention of the world, and Ben Ali fled the country on 14 Jan after 23 years of rule. This spirit of the revolution resonated through North African and the Middle East, starting the phenomenon that came to be known as the Arab Spring. As the catalyst of the Arab Spring, the legacy of Tunisia is significant; although the actual revolution is over, the state building proces after the longtime dictatorship will set a trajectory for the other Arab Spring nations. This transition to a democratic state will determine the ultimate suces of the revolution and bring about a new political discourse to the region. Thus, the writers of this section primarily focus on the transition proces and the future of Tunisian politics. In the paper ?Tunisia: the military and the foreign influence in domestic afairs,? Pavel Manchev discuses the internal and external factors of the army and the foreign actors before, during and after the revolution. He states that the role of the army was crucial to the ousting of Ben Ali. The significance of the army will continue to increase during the transition as it will provide security to the nation. The foreign partners, especially the United States and France, have the oportunity to reinvent their tainted image by asisting and advising the army to continue to implement domestic stability. Morgan McAllister delves further into the topic of the importance of political and institutional stability during the democracy building proces by providing an observation of the events. TUNISIAN REVOLUTION TIMELINE Dec 17 2010 Mohamed Bouazizi commits self immolation in Sidi Bouzid to protest police interference and a lack of economic oportunities. Dec 20 2010 Development Minister Mohamed al-Nouri al-Juwayni anounces a new $10 million employment program in Sidi Bouzid. Protests continue. Dec 22-28 Protests continue throughout Tunisia Dec 28, 2010 President Ben Ali delivers a televised addres promising more jobs while vowing to punish protesters. He further states that the violence and unrest were manipulated by the foreign media. The ministers of Communication, Trade and Handicrafts, and Religious Afairs are fired. The governors of Sidi Bouzid, Jendouba, and Zaghouan provinces are dismissed for unspecified reasons. 3,00 lawyers rally near the government palace in Tunis The Tunisian Federation of Labor Unions protest in Gafsa, met with violence by security forces. Dec 29 2010 Nesma TV becomes the first major Tunisian media outlet to cover the protests. Dec 30 2010 France?s Socialist Party condemns the ?brutal represion? of the protestors, calling for the French government to make an oficial statement Jan 3-12 Protests continue throughout Tunisia. Violence escalates betwen civilian demonstrators and national security forces Jan 13 201 Ben Ali gives a national addres pledging to step down after the end of his term in 2014 and to overse fresh parliamentary elections before then, and to end state censorship. Jan 14 201 Ben Ali flees to Saudi Arabia. Former Prime Minister Mohamed Ghanouchi takes post as Interim President. Jan 19 201 Switzerland?s Federal Council frezes asets of Ben Ali and encourages Tunisia to sek criminal actions against the former president. Jan 24 201 French President Nicholas Sarkozy admits to undermining the protests and admits to making a mistake suporting Ben Ali?s regime until his refuge. Feb 27 201 Prime Minister Ghanouchi resigns his post with Beji Caid-Esebsi as his replacement in the face of protests calling that he was to close to the former government. Turmoil continues in the strets of Tunis as demonstrators call for the disbanding of the interim government and the curent parliament, suspension of the constitution, formation of an elected asembly to organize elections and overse the transition to democracy. Interim government disbanded along with the curent parliament. Mar 7 201 A third interim government of technocrats revealed with Beji Caid Sebsi as the leader after critiques of the previous governments being to close to Ben Ali?s regime. Mar 9 201 Tunisian court rules Ben Ali?s party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (RCD) be dissolved; including the disbandment of the party and confiscation of the funds. May 8 201 Tunisia reinstates an emergency nightime curfew after four days of clash betwen anti-government protesters and the police force. May 25 201 Slim Amamou, former revolution bloger apointed minister of youth and sport resigns, critiquing the stalemate conditions of the transition, claiming that there?s nothing more to be done until the elections. May 27 201 G8 leaders pledge $20 billion of loans and aid to Tunisia and Egypt for the proces of democratization. June 14 201 Prime Minister Beji Caid Sebsi anounces that the general elections to select the constitution assembly delegates, scheduled for July, delayed until October 23 to give candidates more time to prepare. June 20 201 Ben Ali and his wife Leila Trabelsi tried in absentia and sentenced to 35 years of jail for theft of foreign curency, artifacts, weapons and drugs. June 23 201 Rached Ghanouchi, the leader of the main Islamist Party Enahda warns that the further delay of elections could be an attempt by Ben Ali?s former allies to regain their posts and hinder the democratizing proces. Oct 23 201 The first fre elections of Tunisia for the seats in the constitution asembly Election results: the moderate Islamist party Enahda wins a 41% plurality with 90 of 217 seats. The liberal Congres for the Republic party wins 20 seats. Oct 28 201 Protests break out in Sidi Bouzid after the votes for the Popular List party were nullified when the party was removed from the ballot over acusations of campaign finance violations. Nov 22 201 Democratically elected Constituent Asembly holds inaugural sesion. Dec 13 201 the interim parliament, the Constitutional Asembly, elects human rights activist Moncef Marzouki of the Enahda party as the president with 153 of the 202 votes cast. He wil serve for a year until the constitution is rewriten and new elections are held. Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 2! Chapter 1 INSTITUTIONS & DEMOCRACY BUILDING IN TUNISIA Of all the Arab Spring countries, Tunisia is the furthest along in its transitionary proces. It has a new president, a new parliament, is proceding to draft a new constitution and has stabilized enough to allow the economy to return to growth. These achievements are all quite impresive for such a short space of time. Yet the Tunisian model for democratic change in the Middle East did not rely solely on people power. The aspect of the power of popular movements, sen so vividly in the demonstrations that followed the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, was complemented by the actions of the Tunisian institutions in building democracy. These institutions were able to guide the people?s movement in Tunisia down the path towards a functioning and stable democracy and are instrumental in ensuring the suces of the Tunisian experience in democracy building. In light of the high importance that institutions play in the development of democracy, this paper proposes the following actions; 1) that NATO develop ties betwen its own institutions and those of the Arab Spring nations; 2) that NATO asist the Arab Spring nations in developing strong institutions; and 3) that NATO help provide international oversight and expertise in runing fair and fre elections in the Arab Spring nations. I. MOHAMED GHANOUCHI AND THE TRANSITION [1.1] As important as Mohamed Bouazizi is to the overthrow of Ben Ali and his regime, former Prime Minister Mohamed Ghanouchi (not to be confused with Rachid Ghanouchi, the leader of the political party Enahda) is just as crucial to all the developments that hapened after Ben Ali fled on 14 January 201. Mohamed Ghanouchi would not become a popular transformational politician, his leadership during his brief term in ofice would transform Tunisia and the change the course of the revolution. On the day Ben Ali left, Ghanouchi, then the Prime Minister, asumed Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 3! political leadership of Tunisia. However, the Constitutional Court ruled against Ghanouchi stating that under the Constitution, since the post of President had ben vacated, the speaker of parliament or Fouad Mebaza would become interim President. 1 Ghanouchi complied with the court?s decision and recognized the Presidency of Mebaza. His actions reconfirmed the importance of the Constitution to Tunisian politics, even during this interim period as Tunisians pres for a new government. Ghanouchi continued on as Prime Minister and was tasked with dealing with an important problem. The protests that had topled Ben Ali were continuing outside the government ofices. Though Ben Ali had gone, to many Tunisians the government that was in charge had lost its legitimacy by its asociation with Ben Ali. To addres these concerns, Mohamed Ghanochi resigned from the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), the party that had ruled the state under the Ben Ali regime and began the proces of separating government ofices from the ofices of the RCD. 2 At this point the number of people resigning from the RCD began to grow to the point that the RCD Politburo was forced to dissolve. 3 Ghanouchi then began the proces of creating a new government body, replacing several old ministers while keping a few of the old ministers in their positions based on competency in order to maintain stability in governance. 4 In presenting this new government composition, Ghanouchi highlighted the mission of the government, to ensure that the later elections take place in an atmosphere suitable to an election which reflects the will of the people. To this end the government would begin to reform the Fight Against Terorism Act, the Pres Code, the Electoral Code and laws regarding political parties to bring more openes into the election. 5 Furthermore, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 ?Tunisia swears in interim leader? Al Jazera. [Tunis] 15 Jan. 201. Web. 2 ?Main assignment of NUG is resumption of all utilities? and preparation of Presidential election? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 20 Jan. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 3 ?RCD Politburo disolved? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 20 Jan. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 4 ?Mr. Mohamed Ghannouchi: New government, fruit of national consensus and wil to achieve democratic transition? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 28 Jan. 201 Synigate.info. Web 5 Ibid. Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 4! Ghanouchi highlighted that the future election would be administered by an independent commission under the observation of international observers. 6 In response to this reorganization and new orientation, the government headed by Ghanouchi won endorsements from the Tunisian General Labor Union, the Tunisian Agricultural and Fisheries Union, the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, and the National Union of Tunisian Journalists. 7 8 9 10 Winning these endorsements quieted down the protests and began to legitimize the governmental institutions in Tunisia, enabling these institutions to get back to focusing on gaining the conditions necesary for fre and democratic elections. The government had established that the upcoming fre and fair election was its primary political goal. Meanwhile Ghanouchi?s government was also able to go back to the busines of governing in Tunisia. The government began to reasert its influence in security and economic development. On the security front, it finally tok the action of bringing anti-riot squads to clear the Kasbah Government Square of sit in protestors by force. 11 This action tok place without major clashes betwen the demonstrators and the security forces. This government began to asert security forces to bring stability to the country and even called up the military reservists, further expanding the size of security forces. 12 On the economic front the government was able to secure the suport of European investors, gaining promises of low interest loans to help diversify the Tunisian economy and provide skilled employment for Tunisian youth. 13 Though the government was able bring about security improvements and greater stability, Ghanouchi?s government continued to graple with establishing its own legitimacy as many !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6 Ibid. 7 ?UGT endorses government led by Mohamed Ghanouchi? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 28 Jan. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 8 ?UTAP endorses new NUG? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 28 Jan. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 9 ?UTICA backs new government? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 28 Jan. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 10 ?SNJT Chairman: new government has much work to do? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 28 Jan. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 11 ?Antiriot forces disperse Kasbah sit-in protestors? Agency Tunis Afrique Press [Tunis] 28 Jan. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 12 ?Army reservists recalled? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 7 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 13 ?European parliament calls for energising of co-operation with Tunisia? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 3 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 5! protests continued. Throughout February, the government continued to work towards the dual goals of stability and legitimization. Ghanouchi?s government tok steps to dismiss all Ben Ali?s staf, 14 permanently disband the RCD and prohibit it from participating in the upcoming election, 15 and declare a general amnesty for all prisoners of the Ben Ali regime. 16 At the same time, it condemned eforts to incite hatred or sow discord among Tunisians, 17 and called on the security forces to protect the nation and its people. 18 To atest to the eforts the security forces, on 17 February 201 the first tourists to Tunisia since the revolution came to visit. 19 Nevertheles, protests continued to be a major feature driving political change in the leadership of the government. By the end of February, in order to apease popular demand, Mohamed Ghanouchi resigned from government. 20 In his resignation spech Ghanouchi highlighted his government?s eforts to avoid bloodshed, to govern with the consent of the people, to fre political prisoners, to seize the asets of the Ben Ali regime, to ensure political openes in the upcoming elections. Almost as a final act, Ghanouchi confirmed the formation of a committe for the protection of the revolution, for political reform and democratic transition. 21 In efect, Ghanouchi was able to institutionalize the revolution started by Bouazizi and the protest movements that followed. The revolution?s voice was the people, but the revolution?s progres was now in the hands of a government fully committed to the revolution?s fulfillment while continuing to operate within the framework of the previous Constitution. To gage Ghanouchi?s suces in this regard, one only neds to se the reaction of 2,00 protestors who called for his return to ofice and the goals of his sucesor to the ofice of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 14 ?Al President?s former staff dismised? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 4 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 15 ?Interior Minister claims that RCD be disolved? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 21 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 16 ?General amnesty at the wekend and appointment on Friday of FM, says Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 18 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 17 ?Interior Ministry calls upon security forces to be vigilant against any attempt to sow disorder? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 15 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 18 ?Interior Ministry condemns incitement to violence and hatred among Tunisians? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 15 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 19 ?First tourists arrive in Tozuer, after revolution? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 23 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 20 ?Mohamed Ghannouchi resigns? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 28 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 21 Ibid. Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 6! prime minister. 22 The new prime minister Caid Esebsi stated that ?We will se to it that this election be the first one in Tunisia's history to take place in total credibility and transparency, which is an important step on the path of democracy,? 23 and also stated that the government would take ?continued action to further improve the security situation, which has already registered some amelioration, is part of the government's priorities in the coming period, insofar as security and stability remain the cornerstone to cary on economic activity and development efort.? 24 These goals are remarkably similar to those of Mr. Ghanouchi and reflect his suces in geting the institutions of Tunisia to take over and lead the transfer to democracy. II. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM [1.2] In a similar fashion, the institutions of Tunisian justice system are visible in the proces of democracy building. Already mentioned is the Constitutional Court?s ruling on Ghanouchi?s eligibility to be the interim president. However the justice system has a much wider influence on Tunisia?s progres towards democracy than just constitutional rulings. Since the departure of Ben Ali, several individuals of the old regime have ben arested to be tried for such crimes as embezlement and coruption. Many of those arested have ben prosecuted, however institutional justice takes time and only a few have ben sentenced. 25 Furthermore many of those arested including a former transportation minister and a former justice minister have ben fred. 26 Some of those arested have even ben allowed to leave the country, although in one instance, it later led to the dismissal of the involved chief prosecutor. 27 All of this is not without controversy, and many !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 22 ?Protestors demand return of Ghannouchi? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 27 Feb. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 23 ?Mr. Beji Caid Esebsi: ?We wil se to it that this election be the first one in Tunisia?s history to take place in total credibility and transparency? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 4 Mar. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 24 ?Caid Esebsi: ?Government mision, making Tunisia reach safe heaven til Constituent Asembly election?? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 7 Mar. 201. Syndigate.info. Web 25 Jarboui, Ramy. "Anger at Slow pace of Tunisian Trials." Institute for War and Peace Reporting [Tunis] 25 Aug. 201. Print. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 7! protesters have demonstrated to expres their more populist leanings towards justice. However, the slow pace of trials and prosecution, combined with the hesitancy to give in to populist demands, demonstrates the institutional stability of the Tunisian justice system as Tunisia moves down the road toward democracy. Trying Ben Ali oficials for coruption is not the only task the Tunisian justice system is dealing with. It is also involved in reviewing the cases of those imprisoned under the Ben Ali regime to determine eligibility for amnesty granted to political prisoners. 28 These actions by the Tunisian Justice Ministry, seking court based justice for corupt former oficials and seking redres for the wrongfully imprisoned, highlight its institutional role in moderating the potential extremes of Tunisian popular justice and the potential extremes of the Tunisian revolution as well. III. THE ELECTION [1.3] However the key to the interim government?s legitimacy lies in its ability to deliver the results the people demanded, the first of which was a fre, fair and democratic election. On 23 October 201, this election tok place and the results of the hard work of the government and its institutions are impresive. The campaign season, which lasted 3 weks, was fre of government censorship and the media was fre to pick candidates or pick them apart. 29 There were 81 parties that fielded candidates for the election, and reflecting the government?s eforts to kep from denying any party an oportunity to compete. 30 None of the standing government oficials were allowed to sek re-election, which included not only President Fouad Mebaza, Prime Minister Caid Esebsi, but also former Prime Minister Mohamed Ghanouchi. To monitor the elections, there were 7472 acredited election observers, including 53 foreign observers. 31 The purpose of these oficials was to ensure that the election followed procedure, fre of vote tampering, ballot stufing or other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 28 ?General amnesty at the wekend and appointment on Friday of FM, says Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi? 29 Price, Rob. "Tunisian Elections?It?s The Real Thing This Time " Suport Democracy in Tunisia. 28 Oct. 201. Web 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 8! electoral fraud. These developments highlight the government?s commitment to completing the transfer to democracy in the fairest, most fre, and most democratic maner posible. In addition to the scale of party participation and electoral infrastructure planing, the scale of popular participation was also tremendous. Out of 4.4 million registered voters, 90% participated in the election. 32 In a country of 10.5 million this is a very sizable portion of the total population; men, women and children. Furthermore, Tunisians living abroad managed to participate in the election including about 10,00 eligible voters living in the United States. 33 The election produced victory for a plurality of parties, although the most sucesful parties were; the moderately Islamic Enahda, the Congres for the Republic (CPR), and Etakatol. Enahda won about 45% of the vote and 90 of 219 seats. CPR gained about 15% of the vote and 30 seats, and Etakatol gained 21 seats. All thre of these parties had ben outlawed and harased during the Ben Ali regime, however only Enahda was able to develop an underground party infrastructure and remain active on the fringes of society during the Ben Ali era. 34 During the campaign Enahda and CPR were both subject to intense and critical scrutiny as the media deemed them beneficiaries of foreign suport. These negative campaigns backfired as many voters identified them as reminiscent of the way Ben Ali used to demonize his oponents. 35 Negative campaigning against Enahda and political Islam particularly backfired as Enahda saw its suport grow and the parties going negative were largely trounced in the election. 36 Considering the situation of the Tunisian electorate, these are the results one would expect from a fre and fair election. This was a year when Tunisians demanded change, and as the election results show, they punished the parties that were to similar to Ben Ali?s regime and rewarded his political oposition. Additionally as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Chaouachi, Adnen ?The Nation?s Media and Propaganda? Tunisia Information Services [Tunis] 31 Oct. 201 AllAfricaGlobalMedia Web. 36 Price, Rob. Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 9! negative campaigning tok an inapropriate turn, the campaigns simply rallied suport to the victimized parties. The results and their reflection of general expectations are themselves a testimony to the fre and fair election proces of this election and of the independent election oficials foreign and domestic. Directly following the election, there were complaints among many of the voters that the results did not acurately reflect the will of the people. Many complained that the results were either to liberal or to radical. 37 However, it is important to note that this is the first of many elections and the pendulum of public opinion will swing back and forth as it works to find a match over several election cycles. For Tunisia to oficially finish its transfer to democracy, it will ned to conduct several elections. For now however Tunisia has managed an impresive start as it has completed the first fre election under the leadership of the interim government. This interim government gave institutional stability and legitimacy to the proces of its own removal from power. Completing the transfer of power to the newly elected government body, President Mebaza in December 201 steped down peacefully to make rom for the newly apointed by parliament President Marzouk of the CPR. This government institution continues to its next phase, as a newly elected body tasked with writing a new constitution headed by a pluralist legislature led by oposition parties and candidates. This institution is now a direct instrument in the hands of the new democratic-fledgling Tunisia, rather than merely an interim body overseing the path to democracy. Even as it embarks on the path to becoming an established democracy, Tunisia?s institutions are there to manage the various populist outbursts that come with mesy democratic politics. In January 2012, a full year after the departure of Ben Ali, several thousand people demonstrated in the strets. They were protesting the actions of a Salafist organization in Manouba. In an atempt to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 37 Chaouachi, Adnen. Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 10! force their ideology a group of radical Islamic Salafists conducted a sit in for weks at a university, demanding that they be allowed to wear the niqab or full Islamic veil. For decades, this had not ben allowed as the leaders of Tunisia sought to cultivate a secular society within a predominantly Islamic nation. Earlier that wek the police finally shut down the weks long sit in demonstration, but several thousand individuals were still disturbed enough by the incident to protest the Salafist agenda. 38 These events illustrate that Tunisia?s government and institutions will continue to have to adjust its actions to meet the concerns of Tunisians even as it continues to deal with the issues of governance. IV. DEMOCRACY BUILDING IN TUNISIA AND IRAQ [1.4] Tunisia?s experience is in stark contrast to another relatively recent atempt to build a democracy in the Middle East. While Tunisia was able to use its institutions to guide, direct and facilitate the development of democracy, in the Iraqi experience institutions were systematically dismantled as a part of the efort to bring about democracy. Clearly there are limitations to the comparison betwen democracy building eforts in Tunisia and those eforts in Iraq. Tunisia was a domestic operation while democracy was imposed by the United States on Iraq. However, despite these obvious differences in source, the implementation of democracy building measures with regards to the prodemocracy institutions is just as stark as are their results. In both countries, the former ruling party was legally removed from power. In Tunisia, the oficials had to resign from the RCD and then the party was dissolved. For a month and a half the interim government was led by a man who had simply resigned from the RCD and had set about governing for a new Tunisia. Those RCD members in the former government were forbidden to run for public ofice in the next election. Nevertheles in that election many of the former RCD !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 38 ?Thousands protest conservative Islam in Tunisia? AFP [Tunis] 28 Jan. 2012 AlArabiya.net Web. Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 11! oficials ran for ofice anyways and a few were even elected. 39 Even at the most basic level of removing the former ruling party from power, the extent of de-RCDification was very light and forgiving. By contrast in Iraq, Jery Bremer, who led the American eforts at rebuilding Iraq, embarked on a harsh program of de-Bathification, eliminating the Bath party from all institutions in Iraq. The program of de-Bathification afected society?s ability to function as a whole. De-Baathification meant ?that thousands upon thousands of teachers, university profesors, medical doctors and hospital staf, enginers and other profesionals who are neded have ben dismissed.? 40 This proces was extremely disruptive, because it not only removed people from government, but actually removed them from positions and profesions, where they can serve society. This proces, unlike the Tunisian case, created a group of people excluded from democracy. Although it is true that the Bath party was largely sectarian based, and that Tunisia lacks large sectarian or ethnic rifts, the Tunisian model is an example of changing the regime without actually excluding a segment of society. This distinction is crucial because Tunisia was capable of creating a democracy that seks legitimacy from all its constituents, whereas Iraq would unfortunately strugle for several years with pacifying and incorporating the newly disenfranchised. Additionally, the interim government of Tunisia began its term by increasing the size of the military and security forces available. The paper by Pavel Mantchev deals extensively with the role of the military in Tunisia?s revolution. However, for the purposes of this paper, it is notable that the interim government in Tunisia called up the military reservists 41 and made increasing stability an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 39 Byman, Daniel. Elections and Reform in Moroco and Tunisia. Proc. of The Brokings Institution, USA, Washington DC. Alexandria, VA: Anderson Court Reporting, 201. Print. 40 Diamond, Lary Jay. Squandered Victory: The American Ocupation and the Bungled Efort to Bring Democracy to Iraq. Pg. 256 New York: Times, 205. Print. 41 ?Army reservists recalled? Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 12! explicit goal of the government. 42 By contrast in Iraq, Jery Bremer ?dissolved not just the army, but the air force, the navy, the ministry of defense, and the Iraqi intelligence service.? 43 It was also clear at the time that the American security forces would not be large enough to run the security afairs of the new Iraqi state, let alone police the chaos of the transfer to democracy. While the Tunisian interim government sought to increase stability in Tunisia, the American led experience actively cut down the very institutions that would be able to kep stability in Iraq. The Iraqi experience would quickly become a violent arena with a very large disenfranchised segment of society, on the other hand the Tunisian experience has ben a relatively peaceful and inclusive experience, and has quickly established a legitimate government to continue the proces of democracy building because it has managed to use the institutions already present in Tunisia to advance the cause of democracy. V. NATO [1.5] Considering the importance that institutions play in maintaining stability in fledgling democracies, it is important that the Arab Spring countries are able to develop or maintain strong security forces in their countries. In Tunisia this ned has largely ben met by using the existing military structure and policing institutions. However this is not necesarily the case in all Arab Spring countries. Libya in particular sufers from a complete lack of institutions that both have national legitimacy and provide stability. NATO and its member states can help the Libyans train their military and police forces to maintain stability. This stability and governance can tremendously help the new government maintain legitimacy and allow the potential for economic growth. Some progres has already ben made in this direction as the French have helped to train both the new Libyan military and some police forces. 44 Unfortunately, Libya continues to strugle with security !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 42 ?Caid Esebsi: ?Government mision, making Tunisia reach safe heaven til Constituent Asembly election?? 43 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone. Pg. 76 New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 206. Print. 44 ?Libyan former rebels to get oficial recognition? The Tripoli Post 2 Dec. 2011 Web. Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 13! and stability, and more training and expertise will be necesary as Libya works towards developing its democracy. Egypt and potentially Syria or any other new Arab Spring nations will ned to ensure stability as they make their own transitions. As these nations make that transition to democracy, NATO can help them, by providing training and expertise for security forces to ensure stability. Expertise in institution building does not ned to end with security institutions alone. NATO and its member states can help the Arab Spring nations, most particularly Libya, develop the full range of institutions neded for governance. Advisors can be sent to help set up structures for the judicial system, government services and communication betwen the new governments and the people they represent. These new governments will have to prove themselves responsive to the demands and neds of their people in order to maintain their legitimacy and NATO advisors can ensure that the new governments have all the expertise neded to quickly develop the institutions of basic governance. One of the best ways that NATO and its member states can help the Arab Spring nations is to provide asistance to them ensure that their new elections proced smoothly and fairly. In the Tunisian experience, foreign nationals, many of them from NATO member states, were quickly invited to help observe the planing of the new election which eventually tok place in October 201. These observers were able to help the Tunisians plan apropriately for the challenges of holding elections and provide oversight of the actual elections to give the elections credibility and legitimacy. As both Libya and Egypt prepare to hold their own elections, they can benefit from the expertise of foreign observers in the same maner as Tunisians did. This will give the elections beter preparation for any challenges it might face and lend the results greater legitimacy by allowing foreign and impartial oversight to determine the fairnes and level of fredom in the elections. Any election deemed fair and fre by foreign observers will give greater legitimacy to the electoral Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 14! proces and the newly elected body, compared to an election without an objective third party. This foundation of electoral legitimacy will help foster the transition to democracy. Finally, the institutions of NATO and its member states should develop direct ties with the institutions of the Arab Spring nations. In Tunisia this was done quickly, as Germany sent a Federal Commissioner to Tunisia to discus judicial coperation betwen the two countries with Tunisia?s Justice Minister. 45 These ties strengthen not only the international coperation betwen the two countries, but also can increase information and expertise sharing, enhancing the capabilities of the Tunisian judicial system, and giving the Tunisian judicial system international recognition increasing its own domestic legitimacy. As these international ties are established, they will show the Tunisians that their government has the suport and confidence of NATO and the international community. As the Arab Spring nations continue their transition to democracy they will continue to ned foreign expertise and they will ned to continue to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of their own people. International ties betwen similar institutions of the NATO member states and the Arab Spring nations will help these new democracies manage their transition to full democracy smoothly and with the full foreign recognition and suport. The role of institutions in providing stability during a nation?s transition to democracy is very important and provides the new government with the legitimacy neded to cary itself to full democracy. NATO and its member states can play an invaluable role by asisting the Arab Spring nations develop their institutions and maintain the stability neded for these new governments to respond to the neds and demands of their people. NATO and its member states should provide observers and advisors to help plan and overse elections to ensure that they are caried out smoothly and are fre and fair. They should also provide training to the security forces of the Arab !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 45 ?Justice Minister confers with German Federal Comisioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid? Agency Tunis Afrique Pres [Tunis] 11 Mar. 201. Syndigate.info. Web Institutions & Democracy Building in Tunisia Morgan McAllister ! 15! Spring states to ensure that these countries can maintain stability, and develop ties betwen their own institutions and those of the Arab Spring nations to help provide expertise and legitimacy not only to the international community, but also to their own citizens as these nations continue on the path towards full democracy. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 16! Chapter 2 THE MILITARY & FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE DOMESTIC AFAIRS OF TUNISIA The political upheavals that tok place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) last spring constitute a turning point in the history not only for the countries directly concerned, but also for the Muslim world in general. Indeed, the MENA region was one of the last geopolitical platforms where authoritarianism was still present. The austere regimes in place have ben mainly ?sponsored? by the West for economical and political reasons. The natural resources available in these countries are the most vital for the West, thus securing low prices for the resource was the primary objective. Politically, these regimes were collaborating with the West to combat terorism and allowing an indirect yet nonetheles strong fothold in the region. These facts explain the relative delay of NATO to respond to the uprisings. Some of the member states of NATO have supported the dictators for several decades and decided not to turn their back on them until the very last moment. In Tunisia, the reactions of the West ocured only after Ben Ali had fled the country; until then, the West maintained its neutral role. The Tunisian army sided with the popular uprisings and played a major role in the overthrowing of Ben Ali. In Tunisia, the army was one of the only institutions in place working separately from the government. The necesity of such a player in the ousting of a dictator is crucial. Considering the army?s status and the external influences on the army and the country, what is the role of the military institution in the Tunisian society? How are the foreign actors/institutions going to respond to the restructuring of the political landscape? In the first place, I will provide the necesary background to understand the role of the army in the Tunisian society as well as to emphasize the foreign influence on the institution and on the country pre-revolution. In the second place, I will analyze the role of the army during the revolution and its role in ousting Ben Ali, as well as provide the reaction of international institutions and individual The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 17! countries, to the upheavals. Finally, I will present the role of the army post-revolution and consider NATO?s different posibilities for intervention. This paper will make the following recommendations: 1) Provide peace keping forces to help the police and the army monitor the Tunisian society during the transition which is subject to turmoil due to Tunisia?s economic condition. The goal is to provide individual and societal security; 2) Help the army and the police secure the rule of law and respect the constitution by creating a national intelligence service fitting the country, and facilitate a deeper dialogue betwen the army and the police for domestic coperation and avoid further political crimes; 3) Help the local intelligence prevent Tunisia from becoming a site for terorist organizations through NATO partnership and programs. Tunisia is already part of some international partnership but it could join new programs and play a more important role. I. BACKGROUND AND ROLE OF THE ARMY IN SOCIETY [2.1] Although Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali has ben the dictator since 1987, the political structure recognized in Tunisia was not put in place by him. Habib Bourguiba, the first president of the Tunisian Republic and the founder of the Neo-Destour political party, was the figure who institutionalized this paternalistic and monopolistic party ruling after the Tunisian independence. Over thre decades, Bourguiba kept his party in power and cultivated a cult of personality. He was suported by the Tunisian people in the first few years due to his fight for independence. Although he was a francophone lawyer, he saw the future of Tunisia as an independent country. In 1987, when Ben Ali arived in power and ousted Bourguiba in a bloodles coup, the new president was sen as a political figure with new ideas and a strong will for change in contrast to the last few years of Bourguiba that were characterized by serious economic mismanagement. His first major action was to ban the Enahda party of a mild Islamist ideology. He forced its leaders into exile or jailed them and more or les eradicated the party. However, quickly after his arival to power, the new president The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 18! started to conduct austere politics by infiltrating his own Rasemblement constitutionel democratique (Rally for Culture and Democracy/RCD) party members in all the important fields of society (education, police, trade unions, universities, etc.). People quickly realized that Ben Ali was following Bourguiba?s steps with his fake elections and his obsesion with security. Tunisia ?came to have more police than France, a country with six times more people.? 46 Ironically, Tunisia is considered as being one of the most homogenous countries in the Maghreb region as well as in the Arab world with a population of 98% Arabic and Suni Muslim. Consequentially, the police force was mainly used to blackmail the oposition and enforce the ?Ben Ali doctrine? or Benalism 47 acording to the Tunisians, which consists of farcical elections, absurd media coverage on the president and the vengeful nature of the security forces. The Arm?e Nationale Tunisiene/Tunisian National Army (ANT) was founded in 1956, most oficers at the time had served in the colonial army and were relieved from their duty once the country had gained its independence: the navy was created in 1959 and the air force a year later, in 1960. 48 During the first decade of independence, the army remained modest in both its size and importance. At the time, Tunisia was not facing any threats to its sovereignty and unlike other newly independent countries, the army was not in charge of managing domestic afairs, which was the responsibility of the growing police force and National Guard. ?Indeed, Tunisia?s armed forces have never ben called upon to defend the country?s teritorial integrity, and they have only a limited capability to do so.? 49 In the region, Tunisia was never able to, and never wanted to asert itself as a major military power. The country is considerably smaller than its neighbors, in terms of surface as well as in population, and simply could not aford an imposing military force. The only reason for its expansion over the years was in reaction to the building tensions with the neighboring countries. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 46 The Economist: ?Ali Baba gone, but what about the 40 thieves?? 47 Ibid 1. 48 A Tragedy of Arms: Military and Security Developments in the Maghreb, Anthony H. Cordesman. p264. 49 Ibid, p264. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 19! In the Arab world, the Tunisian army is one of the few armies that has never played a constant role in the national politics?seized power or threatened the regime. Its size throughout the last few decades is an argument for its pasivenes, but its composition in terms of structure and manpower is esential in understanding it. Over the early 200s, the total active military strength was about 35,00; however, 23,40 of these men were conscripts that served only 12 months. 50 Moreover, the country did not provide efective training in combat or a reasonable pay for its conscripts, making it harder to retain the neded and most skilled junior oficers. The army was thus mostly characterized by a turning and temporary enrollment of the youth and an insuficient training that limited its societal influence and role. The very fact that the army was disorganized, underpaid and lacking in manpower limited its popularity among society as well as among soldiers, affecting the number of men enrolling in the institution. The army?s primary role was border defense, internal security and protection of key economic facilities. 51 The army lacked significant forces, which resulted in the inability to deploy considerable strength on either side of the border, thus forced to focus its power near urban centers. All these factors contributed to the relative unpopularity and weaknes of the army and partly explain its decentralized position in politics. In the 1980s, the Tunisian government started a renovation and modernization of the army to addres the security concerns caused by the Israeli raid and the worsening relations with Libya. Although this modernization improved the military, the place of the institution in the country remained decentralized. The regimes in place after the independence never had to use military power to unify the country, since the majority of the population is ethnically Maghrebin Arab. In terms of domestic paramilitary forces, the National Guard and the police shared responsibility for internal security. They coperated or divided areas of jurisdiction but both were under the control of the Minister of Interior and the President. The police presence was heavy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 50 Ibid, p265. 51 Ibid, p265. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 20! throughout the country and was involved in surveillance as well as law enforcement. However, its close ties to the president made it a corupt institution which main goals were surveillance and aprehension of Islamists and extremists and of political oponents to Ben Ali. The implicit re- orientation of the institution has ben the focus of many claims of human rights violation. The law authorized the police to arest individuals without a warant in the cases of suspected felons or crimes in progres. 52 Acording to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Tunisia was ranked 14 out of 167 countries studied in their democracy index (in 2010) pre-revolution, showing its limits in electoral proces and pluralism, functioning government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties. 53 II. FOREIGN INTERESTS ASISTANCE TO THE LOCAL ARMY [2.2] [2.2a] United States The varying ties betwen Ben Ali?s Tunisia and the West asured the dictator to stay in place. The United States has suported and considered Ben Ali as an ally since 1987, the year that he came to power. Until his ousting, the USA and Tunisia worked closely for political and military reasons. On America?s War on Teror, Tunisia provided a perfect platform for counter spying activities. As a mater of fact, the Tunisian Constitution prohibited the establishment of political parties based on religious beliefs and the proselytizing of Muslims. Oficially, it kept a relatively secular society by allowing the Hijab/veil only in government buildings, and discouraged women to wear it in public. Men were also encouraged not to portray ?Islamic apearance? refering to beards. The United States suported the counter-terorism activities by financing the programs and has given $349 million !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 52 Ibid 3. p271. 53 Economist Inteligence Unit, Democracy Index 2010. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 21! during Ben Ali?s entire reign. 54 In the 1980s, the Tunisian government started a renovation and modernization of the army to addres the security concerns caused by the Israeli raid and the worsening relations with Libya. The reasons for the US suport are different but all are crucial in understanding the outcome of the revolution and the influences of the external actors. The US policies have focused on the Maghreb region considerably due the posible alteration of European stability, which constitute the extension and complement the Western doctrine. In order to balance the Mediteranean region, the US worked closely and often ?relinquished its role as a key player to France, the major former colonial power in the region.? 55 However, the relations betwen the US and Tunisia has always ben good; the only crisis was the 1985 Israeli bombing of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) headquarters in Tunis, 56 which caused considerable civilian casualties. The US had information about the bombing but refused to prevent it for ideological reasons involving its strong alliance with Israel. Nonetheles, over the next decade, the US policy makers depicted Tunisia as a suces story in terms of economic development and fre-market reforms. Investments had ben made in Tunisia through the foreign-asistance program defined by the US Agency for International Development. 57 Economic and development policies aside, the US mostly favored Tunisia for security reasons. The two countries have held joint military exercises?amounted on average of eleven per year?which was greater than with any other countries in the Mediteranean. In addition, the Algerian civil war of the 190s?oppositional Islamist guerillas against the Algerian government after cancelled election?forced the US to watch over its main allies Moroco and Tunisia in order to prevent any intra-continental spills. The Department of Defense focused on the maintenance of stability in North Africa and the removing of terorism expansion into Tunisia and Moroco. As of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 54 The Arab Awakening: America and the transformation of the Middle East, Keneth M. Pollack p15. 55 North Africa: State, Society and Economic Transformation in the 190s, Yahia H. Zoubir p27. 56 Ibid,10. p238 57 Ibid,10. p238 The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 22! 209, the ?Nonproliferation, Anti-terorism, Demining, and Related Programs - Humanitarian Demining (NADR-HD)? for Tunisia was estimated at $425,00 and other programs such as ?International Military Education and Training (IMET)? amounted to $5, 7 million from 208 to 2010. Nevertheles, the US intervened indirectly in the military afairs of Tunisia through ?Foreign Military Financing (FMF)? and financed arms deliveries of about $35.3 million betwen 208 and 2010, 58 to ensure that its interests in the region were secured. In the 190s, the US was the main arms trading partner of Tunisia but in the past decade, it has shared this role with France. In order to defend its interests, the US has closed its eyes on some other issues such as human rights. Although fully aware of the violation ocuring in the country perpetrated by the domestic security forces, the US always avoided publically critiquing such acts of violence. Acording to the State Department?s anual reports on human rights violations, the level of incivility was leveled with that of Algeria. 59 [2.2.b] Europe The major trading partner of Maghreb is Europe due to the historical ties with the region. However, the European Union is facing problems due to its internal structure that limits it to promote foreign policy in the name of the supranational institution. Each member states have different interests, which do not necesarily corespond. Analyzing the situation from the EU perspective, the political and security policies are relatively weak since promoting a singular foreign policy presents a challenge, entirely due to internal structure?the institution lacks a constitution or any text on which it can build something else than economic ties. These instabilities are actually perceived in the foreign programs created by the EU and mostly focus on economic purposes to kep stability within the European market. The past programs have ben developed for two major !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 58 U.S. Department of State, Tunisia Security Asistance. 59 North Africa: State, Society and Economic Transformation in the 190s, Yahia H. Zoubir, p239. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 23! reasons: the first being the concerns over migration into Europe due to strong unemployment and domestic presure, and the second being the ned for Europe to addres the geopolitical and economic implications of its regional role among its periphery. 60 The institution thus focuses on the development of the region to strengthen its status quo and to prevent domestic conflicts of immigration. Under Ben Ali, ?Tunisia promoted liberalization of trade policy to encourage foreign trade and direct foreign investments.? 61 The country signed several agrements in the 190s with the EU which focused on fre trade and asociation and were the first acords established betwen the EU and its Mediteranean neighbors. The Barcelona Proces, which later evolved into the Union for Mediteranean, represented the limits of the EU policymaking. The declaration of 195 provided incentive for thre main objectives: political and security dialogue, aimed at creating a comon area of peace and stability underpined by sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and human rights; Economic and Financial partnership, including the gradual establishment of a fre-trade area aimed at promoting shared economic oportunity through sustainable and balanced socio-economic development; and social, cultural and human partnership, aimed at promoting understanding and intercultural dialogue betwen cultures, religions and people, and facilitating exchanges betwen civil society and ordinary citizens, particularly women and young people. 62 With the introduction of the European Neighborhod Policy (ENP) in 204, the Barcelona proces became a forum for dialogue and coperation betwen the EU members and the Mediteranean states. In the years following its implementation, the ENP policies had different repercusions: as of 2010, the budgetary deficit remained at 3% of the GDP?notably thanks to domestic privatization and foreign aid?and the public debt stabilized at 43.1% of the GDP, but inflation increased to a level of 4.8% mainly due to the rise of fod prices. The balance of payments worsened and reached 4.5% of the GDP in 2010, and the brut reserves of US dollars slightly diminished from 209 to 2010?to the equivalent of $9.5 billion. 63 However, since the actions and influence of the EU are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 60 North Africa: State, Society and Economic Transformation in the 190s, Yahia H. Zoubir. p245 61 A Tragedy of Arms: Military and Security Developments in the Maghreb, Anthony H. Cordesman. p253 62 European Union External Action, The Barcelona Proces. 63 Comision Europ?ene, Document de travail conjoint des services. Mise en ?uvre de la politique europ?ene de voisinage en 2010. Raport pays: Tunisie. p8 and 9. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 24! limited, individual member states? interests and their foreign policies ned to be analyzed in the general scope of European and North African relations. Since the countries have gained their independence, the trade betwen the ex-colonizers and the ex-colonies has stayed strong. On average for the entire region, about 17% of the exports are directed towards Europe; these numbers are even higher for some individual countries. 64 The suport of Europe for these regimes was based mainly on the liberalization of economic interests for both spheres. The example of France is the most prominent for Tunisia for their trade partnership, and the Tunisian Civil Law is based on the French Civil Law. Similar trends have ben sen in France; the government suported Ben Ali until the very end and suported the upheavals only after he fled the country. Acording to The Bureau of Arms Control in the US State Department, Tunisia tok delivery of $465 million worth of arms during the regime transition (1985-1989) mostly divided betwen the US and France. France constitutes the biggest exporter of arms and weapons in the ?Conseil de l?Europe? (which encompases 47 states, the majority of the European continent). According to the Minister of Defense of France, pre-revolution, Tunisia had ordered 70.9 million euros from 205 to 209. In 209 alone, the amount expected to be delivered was 38,520,210 million euros?this constitutes the authorization of military weapons importation from France?but only a very small amount was delivered 65 . The weight France played in the arms trade considerably increased over the past decade, sharing the task with the US; nonetheles, it sems to have taken a slight advantage over its transatlantic partner in the trade. On the other hand, France also saw Tunisia as a stronghold against radical Islamism in North Africa thus explaining another reason for the suport of Ben Ali. If the regimes in Algeria and Moroco had to follow the example of Tunisia, the French diplomacy in the Maghreb region would be greatly hurt since it has suported all the Maghreb austere regimes. In Algeria, France fears the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 64 The Arab Awakening: America and the transformation of the Midle East, Keneth M. Pollack. p285 65 Raport au Parlement , Aout 2010, Les exportations d?armement de la France en 209 The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 25! arival of a radical Islamist party if the government is challenged. 66 The French politicians have to act carefully with their recommendations and their suport for these regimes since the immigration from this block constitutes a considerable minority in French society with a North African Diaspora of about 10% of the total population in France. Although the Ben Ali regime did not follow the ideology of the West?US, EU and France?it remained as a western ally due to its geopolitical importance. The interests that were protected by the western powers apeared significantly more important than the domestic issues faced by Tunisia. For these western powers, suporting an autocratic regime permitted easier control over that regime and opened a window for coruption through military or economic bribe?vices practiced by the West. Ben Ali was sen as a pupet for European and American stability as well as an easy character to influence for economic agrements. III. ARMY IN THE REVOLUTION AND THE GOVERNMENT TRANSITION [2.3] The role of the army in the Tunisian revolution characterizes the last but crucial part of the uprisings: the ousting of Ben Ali. Rachid Ammar, head of the Tunisian army, was the last element in the revolution that pushed Ben Ali into exile, but was a crucial actor in sustaining the popular protests. When the army oficially declared its refusal to militarily engage the unarmed protestors, Ben Ali saw his future as a political figure in Tunisia collapse. In his spech in the strets of Tunis on 24 January 67 ?where he decided to immerge himself in the popular crowd for direct contact?Rachid Ammar declared that the army will stay loyal to the Constitution and thus suport the uprisings and defend the protestors against the police and National Guard, which at the time was still loyal to Ben Ali. The will of the army was to se the revolution of the ?youth? culminate towards the popular demands and avoid hijacking from Ben Ali?s cronies or rising political parties. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 66 "Africa Research Buletin" NORTH AFRICA: Tunisia's 'Jasmine Revolution'. p3 67 JeuneAfrique, ?Le General Amar l?homme qui a dit non? The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 26! The military also played the role of mediator betwen the people and the interim government. It emphasized the ned of time that the new government required to organize and start building up a new state. Under the last few hours of Ben Ali?s regime, Mohammed Ganouchi ocupied the role of prime minister, a position he had held for eleven years. Following the uprisings, he remained prime minister and altered the composition of his government to meet the demand of the people; he however kept two ministers who?although not members of the RCD party?were old Ben Ali cronies. He also renounced his RCD membership and declared that all the RCD real estate became the propriety of the state. But he still kept RCD members in key roles of the political structure and as a result, new demonstrations ocured in the strets within 24 hours. He reacted by presenting a new government the very next day and declared that he will retire from politics once the transition is over (which he estimated at six months). But the populace demanded more and especially the dissolution of the RCD, which led to his demission on 27 February 201. 68 Along with his demission, the dissolution of the Parliament and the survey commission post-revolutionary strongly purged the judiciary from the ?Benalists.? The role of the army in this political disorder was to protect public buildings and asure public safety without harming the protesters following confrontations with the police forces loyal to Ben Ali, which prevented bloodbaths in several cities. It presented itself as the protector of the revolution but nonetheles, General Rachid Ammar, chief of the armies, claimed that if calls for the overthrowing of the government kept hapening, the alternative could be a dictatorial regime; a risk he depicted as a posibility coming from the ex-partisans of Ben Ali. 69 Another factor that can explain the choice of Rachid Ammar is the considerable diminution of investment by the government in the institution. The total share of military expenditure, including civil services?such as the police?has fallen abruptly over the past years; after Ben Ali?s arival to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 68 Les Etats-Unis et le gouvernement d?interim conspirent contre les mases tunisienes, An Talbot 69 Ibid, 23. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 27! power in 198, the total share of GDP for military purposes was 2.31%, in 201, it was only 1.2%. 70 This reduction can be also be interpreted through the overall fiscal health of the country, which prefered investing in more important sectors for development such as education (2.74% of the government expenditures source: tradingeconomics.com), health (about 3% of GDP) and tourism (1.23% of GDP) rather than to finance the army. 71 On the other hand, the perpetual political separation of the Tunisian military from the government also depicts the relationship betwen the two institutions. In comparison with the Algerian army for example, the generals in Tunisia never had enterprises in the state aparatus or even the security aparatus of the country. Domestically, politicians asured their positions and status with enterprises benefitting directly from the political structure, and the police asured order and represion to kep the landscape stable. IV. FOREIGN REACTIONS TO THE REVOLUTION [2.4] [2.4.a] Europe The challenges observed since the Revolution have mainly concerned the major polarization of the Tunisian society with the strengthening of conservative ideas and parties such as Enahda and the Salafis. 72 The new suport from the European Union (EU) for democracy in Tunisia is not entirely positively endorsed by the population, considering the previous EU suport of Ben Ali. The challenge faced by Europeans is to establish once more god relations that will benefit both sides. Tunisia is a part of the European Neighborhod Partnership Instrument (ENPI) which focuses on strengthening democracy and relations with countries neighboring the enlarged Union. Tunisia?s head of the state Hamadi Jebali has traveled to Brusels for his first oficial visit abroad and met with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 70 Military expenditure (% OF GDP) in Tunisia, Trading Economics 71 Tunisia ? National Statistical Data, Trading Economics 72 New York Times, Tunisia Faces a Balancing Act of Democracy and Religion, Anthony Shadid. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 28! the President of the European Commission Jos? Manuel Dur?o Baroso. 73 The negotiations were primarily based on political coperation and suport for democratization, liberalization of commerce, the establishment of a common economic space and the mobility, migration and security betwen the two agents. 74 The main points of focus sem to be the ones secured under Ben Ali: the EU is acting fast in order to restablish a strong conection with the region; however, it has also expresed in its ?Programme Indicatif National 201-2013 de la Tunisie? (201-2013 Indicative National Program of Tunisia) that a main point of focus is also civilian security. The EU has reacted to the Arab Spring by reconsidering its past policies towards its southern neighbors. Although the European institution is aware that suporting the popular sovereignty in the region might provoke unwanted and uncomfortable outcomes for the European interests, notably a combination of politics and religion, and that the results might be les beneficial for their partnership, it still stands for societies that mirror popular demands. 75 (cf. Hae Suh section on governance and religion). Moreover, even if direct benefits can be lost, indirect ones?such as Tunisia joining the International Criminal Court?can help a re-normalization of the relations. However, due to the economic situation in Europe and the change in the political landscape of Maghreb, the EU canot ofer direct financial help nor comply with the concesions on trade and visa liberalization in which the southern countries are interested. 76 The EU will most likely use conditionality through their European Neighborhod Policy (ENP) and provide close partnership with Tunisia and the other countries of the region if they embrace political reforms through the ENP. However, the EU has lost its pre-eminence and image of political ideal in the region due to the implementation of its economic and modernizing programs under Ben Ali which had no real political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 73 European Union External Actions, website 74 D?claration du Pr?sident de la Comision Europ?ene Jos? Manuel Dur?o Barroso suite ? sa rencontre avec le Premier Ministre de la Tunisie, M. Hamadi Jebali, Point prese Bruxelles, le 2 f?vrier 2012 75 European council on Foreign relations, Europe and the Arab revolutions: a New vision for Democracy and Human Rights, Susi Denison and Anthony Dworkin p2 76 Ibid 30, p2. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 29! agenda but purely served the economical interests of the Western countries. As a result, the EU is not able to strongly intervene in the political restructuration of these countries. Acording to the European Council, the new trend in the ENP sems to target popular empowerment and self- determination rather than a convergence of a fixed political model designed by outsiders. Here lies the problem the EU member states are facing. In the case of Tunisia, where popular elections already tok place and the majority of the votes benefited Enahda, the main trading partners?France, Italy and Germany?ned to suport democracy as well as suport their commercial interests. However, the visit of the head of the state Hamadi Jebali with the EU representatives, for his first oficial meeting abroad, shows a sign of positive diplomacy betwen the two regions and more importantly future collaboration on concrete projects. [2.4.b] France France has had a major influence on the country?s economy by holding the largest share of foreign-owned enterprises; 77 thus, the European program aiming at establishing a free-trade zone with Tunisia is a positive project for French interests. Moreover, President Sarkozy has insisted to the EU to declare Tunisia as having the ?Statut Avanc?? (Advanced Status) that would permit more direct economic exchanges. 78 President Sarkozy said in a spech that France had previously underestimated the anger of the Tunisian people: ?Behind the emancipation of women, the drive for education and training, the economic dynamism, the emergence of a middle clas, there was a despair, a sufering, a sense of sufocation. We have to recognize that we underestimated it.? 79 France was trying to protect its interests since it is the primary benefactor of Tunisia?s external trading policies. Acording to the Central Bank of Tunisia, the country exports 81% of its products to Europe, and France is the main benefactor with about 32% of Tunisian exports. The main exports of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 77 World Socialist, French government in crisis over its suport for Tunisian Dictatorship 78 Conf?rence de Prese de Nicholas Sarkozy a L??lys?e, 24-01-2011 Conf?rence G20 ? G8 79 Ibid, 3. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 30! Tunisia are raw material acording to the (French) national institute of Statistics (INSEE). Acording to the French government, the French exports to Tunisia reached 3 billion Euros, and Tunisian imports in France stod at 3.1 billion Euros in 206. 80 [2.4.c] United States The reaction of the United States to the uprisings was fairly slow due to the links betwen the two governments. Indeed, thre days before Ben Ali was forced to leave the country, the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared the neutrality of the United States, and the Obama administration condemned regime violence only after Ben Ali was gone. The financial suport ofered by the United States for a smooth democratic transition has ben considerably low: The Obama administration has ofered the sum of $20 million with an additional 12 million dollars from other U.S. institutions. Acording to the interim government, the country?s unemployment rate could rise by 7%, bringing the total unemployment rate to 20%. The revolution brought the economy to a halt and paralyzed any economical asets and plunging the country into deep recesion. It is believed that Tunisia neds $125 billion to bost unemployment and revive the economy. Consequently, the sum ofered by the Obama administration apears meager and does not provide a clear anticipation of the economical status of Tunisia in the near future. On the other hand, the Foreign Minister of Tunisia Mohammed Mouldi Kefi and Hillary Clinton signed a joint political and economic partnership on 2 Sept 201 depicting the new relationship betwen the two countries. The statement shows the different levels of near future collaboration in different fields; defense and security sectors: To demonstrate our mutual comitment to Tunisia?s construction of a new society governed by the rule of law and respect for human rights, the Governments intend to conclude negotiations [?] for a foreign asistance program to suport the development of more transparent, responsive, and accountable criminal justice institutions. 81 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 80 France-diplomatie, Presentation de le Tunisie. 81 Joint Statement on the U.S.-Tunisia Joint Political and Economic Partnership, U.S. Department of State, September 22, 2011 The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 31! The US is also resolved to asist in reinforcing the defense capacities of Tunisia through military training. The US is thus restablishing its position in the North African region to meet its interests of national security and fight against international criminality and terorism. Another terain d?entente (mutual ground of understanding) is based on socio-economic policies to benefit Tunisia in the long term: To reinforce our mutual comitment to creating broad-based economic opportunity for Tunisia?s citizens, the Governments resolve to deepen and broaden their cooperation on creating an environment conducive to busines and entrepreneurship. That cooperation includes providing regulatory, legal and institutional suport to advance transparent governance and combat corruption, and to develop more efective financing for entrepreneurs and small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) in Tunisia. 82 To stimulate growth and trade partnership as well as enhancing productivity and spuring high quality jobs oportunities, the governments are also working on an ?Open Skies? Air Transport Agrement. Jointly, they also are also aiming at improving the fiscal discipline in tax collection through the Domestic Finance for Development (DF4D) initiative introduced by President Obama and Secretary Clinton, which focuses on improvements in tax administration, reduction of coruption and an increase in fiscal transparency. Even through the economic partnership, the goal is to limit coruption and thus legitimize the actions of the government. As the US advisers take an important role in this proces, Tunisia will continue to ocupy an important place in US foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, the army will remain sponsored and trained by the US and will acquire more strength and posibly more political power. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 82 Ibid, 38 The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 32! V. POST-REVOLUTION ROLE OF THE ARMY [2.5] On 23 Oct. 201, the elections for the Constituent Asembly of Tunisia tok place acros the country under the supervision of the army. The army was in charge of transporting the election equipment from the 27 central depots to the delegations in the different regions of the country. In addition, the army asured the security of the votes by gathering a force of about 22,00 soldiers dispatched throughout the country and asured security at each polling station. 83 With the new role given to the military after the revolution and the strengthening of partnership with the US, it is posible to se Tunisia becoming a ?second Turkey?. While Turkey played a key role for the US in its fight against Communism during the Cold War, Tunisia could become an equal partner of the US in its fight against terorism. By giving more importance to the military and forming it with expertise of US training programs, the US can restablish itself in the region and act indirectly to serve its interests. VI. NATO [2.6] NATO member states such as France and the US have already put in place policies? political, economic and military?in order to maintain stability in Tunisia but are mainly acting in acords with their own domestic interests or the interests of an interegional institution (such as the EU for France). By establishing new dialogues with the new government, the member states have tried to limit their los, due to their suport for the previous regime, and re-legitimize themselves as main partners for Tunisia. However, NATO could still help in the state-building proces that Tunisia is facing today. Indeed, since the country is still facing major economic issues, and the transition still being fresh, the internal stability can be questioned. Although the elections depicting the voice of the people have occurred, it is not a synonym of stability, especially in these harsh economic times. As !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 83 Tunisie/Elections: L'arm?e asurera la s?curit? le jour du vote, Fran?ais, 19.10.201 The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 33! stated by General Rachid Ammar, the status of the revolution can shift towards a dictatorship if people rebel once more to protest the regime in place, thus NATO could still intervene on different levels to strengthen the newly established democracy. The first task would be asuring the security of the individuals and their human rights. Similar to some policies (to a leser extent since the societal situation in Tunisia is a lot more peaceful) of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) 84 in Bosnia Herzegovina acting within the frame of the Dayton agrements at the time, NATO could help the local military and police to patrol and secure stability. The country neds time to asimilate its new constitution and improve the socio-political and economical situation. The issue is that the actual situation is truly difficult and the revolution hapened at a time where economic suport from foreign agents will be limited, thus the country is still vulnerable to manifestations of violence and instability. One of the primary reasons for the upheaval was unemployment and human rights violation, but based on the state of the economy, unemployment will not decrease in the near future. The country will thus improve with time and stability, which could be implemented with the help of peace keping forces from NATO. NATO and member states could also provide asistance in training the police forces to respect the rule of law and the constitution acording to standards fitting Tunisia, not necesarily based on a Western model. Due to the diversity of the NATO member-states, there is a posibility of creating domestic forces and intelligence unique to Tunisia which would collaborate with other member-states? intelligence. This policy could also increase the dialogue betwen the police and the military in order to aply a coherent partnership betwen the two institutions. Coperation for domestic missions could be put in place to lesen the influence of the police in the society and increase the military role in its suport of the people, as sen during the Revolution. Consequently, perpetrators of political crimes could be arested and judged for their doings over the past decades. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 84 NATO ? Topic: Bosnia Herzegovina, Peace and Suport operations. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 34! Last but not least, NATO could implement policy to monitor and fight any developing terorist threats. With an eficient intelligence put in place, NATO could share its knowledge and help monitor and prevent terorist forces from manifesting in Tunisia. The institution provides training and education in the field of counter-terorism in establishments based in the member states. Tunisia is already member of the NATO Mediteranean Dialogue which is mainly political and has goals to promote regional security and stability through NATO policy. Tunisia could eventually become a partner and join the Partnership Action Plan against Terorism (PAP-T): ?The Action Plan defines partnership roles as well as instruments to fight terorism and manage its consequences.? 85 Some of the goals are the safety of the air space, ?security of energy infrastructure, border security as well as financial aspects of terorism and disruption of terorist organizations? sources of finance.? 86 NATO could have a stronger role than it has today in Tunisia. It has the resources to help the country in some of the difficulties it is facing; however, this help can only be implemented if Tunisia requests it. Self-determination is the driving force of the Revolutions and the people believe in creating a society encompasing the Tunisian nationalism and culture, therefore the West canot intervene forcefully in the region and put in place a democracy traced from the ocidental picture. For some of these countries, democratic elections have never taken place thus it is a major event for society because it can finally write its own history without the influence of ex-colonizers or interest- based partners. Tunisia was the precursor for popular uprisings in the region and inspired its neighbors and other Arab countries to emulate it. The austere regime suported by the different international actors could no longer sustain the societal presure, due to unequal economic policies and human rights violation, and with the help of the military the mases were able to obtain the demission of Ben Ali. The military played an important role in the revolution by protecting it and by acting along the lines !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 85 NATO: Counter terorism 86 Ibid. 40. The Military and Foreign Influence in Tunisia Pavel Mantchev ! 35! of the Tunisian Constitution. The US, the EU and France had to find a new place in the country in order to protect their interests and are now facing a dilemma of reaserting their image as equal partners instead of interest-based powers. NATO can help the Tunisian society in the post- revolution problems it is facing nowadays but only if the people demand it and agre with the policy sugestions. Tunisia is still facing major issues especially economic and political but it can now act as a fully sovereign power. People finally had the oportunity to write their history instead of it being dictated to them hence the difficulties faced by the West to retrieve a role in the region. Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 36! Chapter 3 ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY? THE ROLE OF ISLAM AND ISLAMIS IN THE STATE BUILDING PROCES OF TUNISIA The concept of an Islamic democracy is a topic that has ben frequently debated in academic and political circles for the past decade. However, with the events of the Arab Spring Uprisings, where the collaboration of the people ousted their longtime dictators, the reality of true democracies, even Islamic democracies, is a posible future direction for many of the countries. Although the tumulus revolution in Syria ocupy much of the media and international community?s concern and surely is a crucial topic to observe, it is equally important to kep in mind that the semingly bygone revolution of Tunisia is far from over. As the catalyst of the uprisings, Tunisia will set a trajectory for the ultimate suces of the revolution as the nation rebuilds itself from the authoritarian regime of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. After 24 years of single dictator rule with no opposition parties, the nation lacks much political experience, the results of which have ben reflected by the somewhat turbulent interim government proces. However, with the October 201 election of the Constituents Asembly, Tunisia is beginning the slow proces of democratic state building. But the question remains, what form of governance will the newly democratic nation adopt? Specifically, what will be the role of Islam in the state building proces? How will Islamic law (Shari?a) and Islamist political parties shape the new democratic government? Unlike the previous revolutionary nations that have focused on the secularity of state and society (e.g. France, United States, China), Tunisia is characterized by the largely homogenized religious afiliations with Islam. Islamism, a political ideology based on the belief that Islam and Islamic law should play a prominent role in public policy. 87 Acording to Fred Halliday, a crucial point of emphasis is that Islamism is ?an asertion of the relevance of religious belief to politics, not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 87 Hamid, Shadi. ?Islamists and the Brotherhod: Political Islam and the Arab Spring.? The Arab Awakening. Ed. Keneth Polack. 1 st ed. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Pres, 201. p. 30 Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 37! a revival of faith. In the face of secular, modern and European ideas, Islamic values should play a dominant role in political and social life and should define the identity of the Islamic people.? 88 The October 201 elections portrayed a level of civilian preference to incorporate religion in the government with the Islamist Enahda party willing the plurality of the seats in the Constituents Asembly. Enahda and the Muslim Brotherhod of Egypt will certainly redefine the role of Islamist politics in the region (Josiah Surface provides an in-depth scrutiny of the politics of the Muslim Brotherhod in his paper. However, it is important to note that the Islamism of Enahda is much more moderate that the political agenda of the Muslim Brotherhod). Does this phenomenon ofer oportunities for the establishment of an Islamic democracy in Tunisia? In order to answer these questions, I will first examine the theory of Islamic democracy addresed by various scholars and politicians. Many scholars and theologians have proven that the proces of democratic governance is embedded in Islam itself; therefore the two ideas are compatible. Through an examination of the theological background of Shari?a law and case studies of nations that integrate religious law into their jurisprudence, I will establish that secularism and the notion of separation of church and state are westernized ideas. In this sense, an Islamic democracy is a viable?albeit not the only posible?form of government in the Middle East. For the specific case of Tunisia, the study of the Islamist political party Enahda will illustrate the developing and modernizing course of Islamic political discourse and demonstrate the direction of the future of Tunisian politics. This paper will make the following recommendations: 1) NATO should respect the self- determination of the Tunisian people in building a government that most suits their nation; 2) NATO should asume an engaged, but not asertive role in the state building proces of Tunisia and other Arab Spring nations. NATO and its member states should provide asistance and advice for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 88 Haliday, Fred. Nation and Religion in the Midle East. Boulder, CO: Riener Publishers, 200. p. 132. Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 38! the drafting of the Constitution and the election proces; 3) Turkey as an advisory actor in the state building proces: as a NATO member state that has the most cultural and ideological commonality with the Arab Spring nations, the role of Turkey will be integral in NATO and its other member nations providing resources; 4) NATO member states should recognize the Constitution and the new government that emerged from the democratic proces as legitimate, no mater what form it takes; 5) NATO member states should quickly build diplomatic relationships with the new government of Tunisia as well as those that emerge from the post Arab Spring transition process. NATO should host a convention for the nations of the Mediteranean Dialogue to demonstrate its commitment to facilitating the regional security discusion. I. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY [3.1] In many democracies, mainly those of the United States and Western Europe, one of the major components of the government is the separation of church and state, an idea argued by many western political scholars to be the foundation of democratic governance. Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the notion of Allah as the supreme ruler of all aspects of life as stated in the Qur?an is fundamentally incompatible with the ideas of sovereignty in democracy. However, an analysis of the Qur?an and the structure of Islamic law sugest that the goal of Islam is to ultimately develop society and to guide human life for godnes and prosperity through the participation of the people. Moreover, secularism is not a prerequisite for a democratic state, as proven in the case of Israel, a democracy that provides for a special privilege for Judaism, a topic discused by Jake Lustig. Addresing the compatibility of Islam and democracy, Noah Feldman states that a vital force in the realms of politics and society is embedded in Islam?s language of justice, morality, hope and commitment. 89 He further compares democracy and Islam under the lens of ?mobile ideas?: ideas !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 89 Feldman, Noah. ?Shari?a and Islamic Democracy in the Age of al-Jazeera.? Shari?a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context. Ed. Amanat, Grifel. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Pres, 207. p.6 Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 39! that have the capacity to apeal to many different kinds of people in many places due to their universality, flexibility and simplicity. 90 It is these thre qualifications of mobile ideas that make Islam and democracy compatible and aplicable worldwide. Below, I summarize Feldman?s arguments regarding the commonality of Islam and democracy through the scope of mobility of ideas: First, universality requires the presentation of an idea as relevant and true transcending time and space; it has the ability to change in order to be relevant to a wide variety of people. The notion of universality in democracy comes from its insistency that everyone has the right to participate in government and poseses equal rights before the law; Islam has a similar view on human equality derived from the belief that God requires the same demands on all people, whom he created equal. Second, in order to have flexibility, an idea must be able to acommodate itself to a wider variety of situations, cultures and environments. The worldwide adaptation of Democracy conveys its capacity for flexibility; democracy has maintained its principle values while modifying details to acommodate the different cultural and societal conditions of various nations. Similarly, Islam has maintained the core beliefs and texts while transforming itself to become aplicable to the diverse languages, family structures, economic systems and cultural values of its international believers. Third, simplicity sugests that an idea has to be elegant and easily comprehensible in order to have extremely broad apeal. Like any form of government and religion, both democracy and Islam delve into great detail about specific rules and laws; however, the core beliefs and ideas are very simple. Democracy is a form of collective self governance through fre elections. The central belief of Islam is: the concept of shah?da: ?There is no god but God, and Mohammad is his prophet.? Feldman states that as long as these values are maintained and transfered, the foundation of democracy and Islam is upheld. Due to these thre factors, mobile ideas come into contact with a vast amount of adherents, ?when mobile ideas meet, they can conflict, but that is hardly the only posibility. People can take on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 90 Ibid. p. 32 Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 40! different parts of disparate ideas for themselves, mixing and matching to come up with arangements that work for them, even if they are not perfectly coherent.? 91 The famous Egyptian theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi?s recent fatwa states the compatibility of Islam and democracy when he further discuses the concepts held in democracy and Islamic law. Democracy is a system of governance whereby the people chose who will govern and represent them. Specifically, they are not ruled by a ruler or regime that they reject; the law limits the ruler; and the people are not governed acording to economic, social, cultural, or political principles on which they have not agred or which are prefered only by a minority. Elections and referenda are institutional practices that corespond to these procedural aspects of democracy and embody the principle of majority rule. 92 The concept of shur??consultation?in Islamic law prescribes the desirable form of governance as that whereby the ruler is described as a delegate of the community, from whom the people may withdraw their delegated power. 93 From these main concepts, al- Qaradawi draws the points of commonality betwen democratic and Islamic law and politics: first, he compares the fundamental aspect of democracy?voting?to shah?da, atestation or bearing testimony. Both voting and shah?da are conceptualized as duty with open participation; just as voting is a fundamental cornerstone of democracy, the idea expresed by shah?da encapsulates the esence of Islamic belief. Secondly, al-Qaradawi uses the concept of sovereignty to illustrate the parallels of the binding forces on the rulers, which translates to the ultimate rejection of tyranical or autocratic rule. The esence of democracy is the absolute sovereignty of the people; thus, a ruler in a democratic government is bound by the constitution to serve the people following the law. In Islam, the sovereignty belongs to Allah, and the Qur?an (the Holy Scripture) is the divine law that an Islamic ruler must follow. The ruler must be in ordinance with the divine sanctions imposed by God (which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 91 Ibid. p. 34 92 Ibid. p. 10 93 Ibid. p. 11 Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 41! al-Qaradawi states as being similar to the Constitution of a state), and for him/her to overthrow this sanction is a form of a tyranical rebellion. 94 This notion of sovereignty in Islam has ben of much debate. Some scholars argue that since Islamic law states that sovereignty belongs to God, this limits the human authority to chose their governance, a requirement of democratic governments. However, upon an examination of Qur?anic verses, one can se that sovereignty is a complex concept: ?Lord, sovereign of all sovereignty. You bestow sovereignty on whom You will, and take it away from whom You please; You exalt whomever You will and abase whomever You please. In your hand lies all that is god; You have power over all things.? 95 In this sense, sovereignty in Islam signifies God?s ultimate legal and governmental authority over the universe, life and humanity. This is quite different from the western notion of sovereignty. In esence, the western sovereignty refers to human governmental and legal authority, which implies a multiplicity of authorities that creates a varying set of rules and laws. 96 These differing authorities of sovereignty often perplexes scholars and raises the question of the ability of self governance in Islamic law; if the authority to rule rests upon God, then are humans sanctioned by the divine to create their own rule of law? This concept of divine sovereignty and authority of governance is addresed by Sayed Khatab and Gary Bouma in Demcracy in Islam. First, Bouma and Khatab establish that ?government in Islam is not a kind of absolute government?it is a government limited to a Constitution,? whereby the Qur?an and the Shari?a compose ?a Constitution establishing the concept of sovereignty and its relevant issues as well as the rules that regulate the relationships betwen all members in the state.? 97 On the other hand, there exists a Constitutional polity that refers to the methods and the means that explain the limitations of governmental power, ascertained by the proces of scholarly and popular !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 94 Ibid. p. 13 95 The Qur?an. Trans. M.A.S. Abdel Halen. New York: Oxford Univ. Pres, 208. 3:26. 96 Boudin, Gary and Sayed Kahtab. Democracy in Islam. New York: Routledge, 207. p.14 97 Ibid. p.15 Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 42! consultation. This human authority of governance is further emphasized through the concept of shurah, consultations required by the Qur?an. Similar to the form of amendments in democratic constitutions, many scholars often regard shurah as an aplication of continuous temporal legislation to the Shari?a. 98 From this concept, Islamic law requires a constant evolution of the law to suit the neds of a developing society following the will of the people. By these definitions of Constitution and Constitutional polity, there is a distinction betwen the source of authority and the administration of the said authority. This differentiation is critical to Islamic political theory since it explains the concept of sovereignty and elucidates the nature and identity of the government. It signifies that humans are to facilitate the aplication of God?s law and will through governance and administration, implying the human authority to political sovereignty, or the commitment to the will of the people. Although Islamic democracy does not mandate a specific model of governance or the degre to which Shari?a has to be incorporated, there are thre contemporary alternatives of Islamic jurisprudence 99 : First is an adoption of Islamic law as the exclusive legal system, where the legislature enacts a code of rules that coresponds to Shari?a. Used in Saudi Arabia 100 and Afghanistan, this form of governance often raises criticism regarding democratic rights of citizens and increases the likelihod of authoritarian governance The issue of human rights violation, especially concerning women?s rights, is pertinent in both Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. A second form of more modernized form of jurisprudence calls for the declaration of Shari?a law as a legitimate source of civil code but only !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 98 Ibid. p.19 99 Feldman, Noah. After Jihad: American and the Strugle for Islamic Democracy. 1 st ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 203. p. 57-61 100 Milicent Has, Lecture: Saudi Arabia lacks a formal Constitution. Basic Law articulating government's rights and responsibilities issued by King Fahd in March 192. Includes provisions declaring Islam oficial state religion and Qur?an and sunah the Constitution; that "[t]he state protects the rights of the people in line with the Islamic shari?a; and assert independence of the judiciary; and that administration of justice is based on "shari?a rules according to the teachings of the holy Qur?an, the sunnah, and the regulations set by the ruler provided that they do not contradict the holy Qur?an and sunah Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 43! aply it to personal status law; a measure taken by Pakistan 101 and Egypt 102 . The last and the most liberalized form is the fusion of Shari?a with modern principles of democracy and human rights, namely, the guarante of equal rights and fredom of religion to all its citizens, a measure adopted by Iran; 103 although the actual practice of Islamic law and governance in Iran is a topic of controversy especially regarding women?s rights. The most critical feature one must draw is that an Islamic democracy does not equate a theocracy. By the literal definition of Islam?submission to God?the governance in Islam requires the submission of both the ruler and the ruled to the ultimate sovereignty of the law, the framework of which was established by the divine sanctions of the Qur?an and the Sunah. But Islamic democracy leaves rom for modern modifications by the people, who also have the power to elect their own governmental oficials. An Islamic democracy must maintain the delicate balance of the majority rule and minority rights. As portrayed by the above thre cases, a variant of practical options are available for the establishment of an efective Islamic democracy. II. SHARI?A LAW [3.2] Shari?a, or Islamic law, refers to the rules and regulations that govern all aspects of human existence. Shari?a does not represent a set of theories and rules for governance, but signifies a comprehensive way of life, which is similar to the path leading to water. 104 Thre primary sources !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 101 Pakistan: Constitution adopted 10th April 1973, suspended in 197 and reinstated in 1985 and has been amended several times, and was suspended in 199.Article 1 of curent (3rd) Constitution declares that Pakistan?s oficial name shall be the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and Article 2 declares Islam the state religion. The Objectives Resolution of the preamble of the Constitution was made a part of its substantive provisions by the insertion of Article 2A in 1985, thereby requiring all laws to be brought into consonance with the Qur?an and sunah. 102 Egypt: Constitution adopted 1th September 1971; Article 2 afirms Islam as state religion; amended in 1980 to ad recognition of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence as the principal source of legislation. 103 Iran: Current Constitution adopted 2nd-3rd December 1979; significant revisions expanding presidential powers and eliminating prime ministership in 1989. Article 4 provides that all civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and any other laws must be based on Islamic criteria; Article 12 provides that oficial religion is Islam and the twelver Ja?fari schol; other schols of law to be accorded ful respect and freedom of religious practice, including maters of personal status. 104 Kramer, Gudrun. ?Justice in Modern Islamic Thought.? Shari?a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context. Ed. Amanat, Grifel. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 207. p.35 Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 44! compose Shari?a: the Qur?an, Sunah and Ijtihad. The Qur?an, the Islamic holy bok, is considered the ultimate word of the Divine, which indicates the significance of textual authority in Islamic jurisprudence. 105 The Sunah, the other divine source of Shari?a, refers to the words ascribed to the Prophet Mohammad that designate a norm of tradition. In the context of Shari?a, the Sunah enacts its rulings in thre capacities: reiteration or coroboration of a ruling of the Qur?an, an explanation or clarification of the Qur?an, or rulings on which Qur?an is silent. 106 The last source, the Ijtihad (human reasoning) is a compilation of scholarly and legal commentary and consensus whose practice was closed during the 10 th century. In contemporary context, the proces of qiy?s (system of legal precedence) and fiqh (academic discusion) are used to incorporate new cases and issue not covered by the thre primary sources. 107 Although Shari?a derives its laws from divine sources, unlike the Qur?an and the Sunah, it is not divine in itself. The establishment of Shari?a is a distinctly human enterprise that requires its own kind of scholarship. This ?human nature? indicates that Shari?a is a body of jurisprudence whose aplication will continue to evolve as societal and governmental neds and expectations change. In the contemporary context, the aplication of Shari?a as the sole source of jurisprudence is realistically improbable. In order to remain relevant to today?s legal neds, the pre-modern Shari?a legislation has to be enriched, or in some aspects, replaced by Western legal tradition. 108 Religion by itself canot posible addres or provide answers to all of today?s issues. The strictly Islamic governments of Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan unfortunately illustrate the problems of modern adaptability and human rights concerns brought on by exclusively religious governance. In today?s legal context, many modern Islamists and liberal Muslims focus on the general principles and values encrypted in Shari?a rather than specific rules and regulations detailed by the Qur?an or the Sunah. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 105 Izzi Dien, Mawil. Islamic Law, from Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Pres, 204. p.35. 106 Haas. Lecture 107 Izzi Dien, Mawil. Islamic Law, from Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice. p.53 108 Amanet and Grifel. ?Introduction.? Shari?a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context. Ed. Amanat, Grifel. Staford, CA: Stanford University Pres, 207. p.15 Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 45! The Five Golden Values of Islam?justice, fredom, equality, consultation/participation, and acountability/responsibility?is an example of such macro-structure of Islamic ideal that provides overarching guidance. 109 III. THE HISTORY OF ISLAMISM IN TUNISIA [8.3] Now that I have established the theoretical compatibility of Islam and democracy and illustrated the aplication of Islam and Shari?a in the contemporary political sphere, we can now examine the specific case study of Islamism in Tunisia. Although a diverse range of Islamist political parties exist in Tunisia today, the Enahda party is the longest existing and the most prominent one. It is not an exageration to state that the history of Enahda party and the changes in its political agenda pre- and post-Ben Ali reflect the development of Islamism in Tunisia. The Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI, later changed to Enahda/Al-Nahda, meaning the Renaissance) was founded in 1981 by Rachid Ghanouchi and Abdel Fatah Moro and quickly gained wide grasrots popularity, contributing to the undermining the authority of the Bourguiba administration. Acording to reports at the time, the Enahda party was "the single most threatening oposition force in Tunis. One word from the [group] will close down the campus or start a demonstration." 110 Due to its popularity, the Enahda party was the largest victim to Ben Ali?s extremely secular authoritarian agenda in his campaign to eradicate the group and all signs of conservative Islam. The Tunisian government denied legal status of the political party due to its religious nature and violently atacked its activists. 111 In 192, the government claimed the discovery of an Islamist plot to asasinate Ben Ali, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 109 Kramer, Gudrun. ?Justice in Modern Islamic Thought.? Shari?a. P. 23 110 Wright, Robin. Sacred Rage. Simon and Schuster, 2001. 111 Arief, Alexis. United States Congresional Research Service. Political Transition in Tunisia. Washington DC: Congresional Research Service, 2011. Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 46! and Tunisian military courts convicted 265 Enahda members of treason. The case was critiqued by human rights advocated for its political bias and the lack of due proces. 112 IV. ENAHDA TODAY [3.4] Enahda and Islamist politics in general, tok a new role in Tunisia after the revolution. In the October 201 elections to select the National Constituent Asembly, which will write the new Constitution, the Enahda party won the largest plurality of the 217 total seats; the results of the election are displayed below: 113 Ennahda: 89 seats, 41% Congres for the Republic: secular moderate-left: 29 seats; Al-Aridha al-Chabia (Popular Petition): populist, conservative, and fractious independent coalition: 26 seats Ettakatol (Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties): secular, center-left: 20 seats Progresive Democratic Party: leftist, secularist: 16 seats 22 other parties and independent groups with at least 1 seat each ! Although this victory of Enahda certainly does not imply a homogenous preference for an Islamic democracy or Islamic governance, the election caries undeniably significant implications for the future of Tunisian politics. As the Constituent Asembly composes a new Constitution, the wide variety of voices?both Islamic and secular?within the group will decide on the crucial question of to what degre religion will impact society and government. The main political parties have agred not to significantly alter Article 1 of Tunisia?s curent Constitution: ?Tunisia is a fre, independent and sovereign state. Its religion is Islam, its language is Arabic and its type of government is the Republic.? 114 The preservation of Article 1 will provide a key implication for the framework of the new Constitution and politics. With the declaration of Tunisia as an Islamic nation, the government and the parties are able to propose and implement legislation based on the Qur?an and Shari?a, which is a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid 114 Ibid Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 47! concern for internal and external observers regarding the future of Tunisia?s government. However, Ennahda?s curent platform sugests a form of moderate, pragmatic Islamism, showing godwill and willingnes to collaborate with the secular parties. Enahda built an alliance with the two other most sucesful secular parties, the Congres for the Republic (CPR) and Etakatol. Additionally, it yielded the majority of the ministerial positions within the Asembly to CPR and Etakatol. 115 At this point, it is reasonable to addres the concern regarding the topic of religious, mainly conservative Islamist, governments. Many scholars and political experts (such as Halliday, Courbage and Todd discused in this text) claim that in the midst of a rapidly changing, modernizing society, there is a tendency of nations to revert back to more conservative, religious politics as a backlash to such societal changes. Furthermore, particularly in nations with a history of negative Western influence, people are more likely to be inclined toward conservative, Islamic policies as a result of a cultural backlash against the more ?Western? politics of the past. It is true that Tunisia fits the prerequisites of this framework. The Revolution brought about unprecedented changes to the previously stagnant political stage that was a result of the prolonged authoritarian regime, which was sustained by the West?s alliance and suport for the dictator. Easy parallels can be drawn from these conditions to the popularity of Enahda, concerns regarding the nature and the legitimacy of this movement, and how the party will impact the future of Tunisian politics if this electoral momentum continues. But these views neglect to comprehend the core of Enahda as a grasrots movement that also stod against Ben Ali?s regime far before the Revolution. Aprehensions exist inside and outside of Tunisia about the potential for a radical Islamist agenda and the posible ?double discourse? of portraying a moderate face in order to enter government and gradually introduce more conservative, restrictive laws and institutions. 116 There certainly is conflict within the party regarding !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 115 Ottaway, Marina. ?A Strong Start to Tunisia?s Long Journey.? Sada. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 29 Dec 201. Web. 116 Arief, Alexis p.7 Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 48! its religious platform as well as many newly recognized Islamist parties. The fundamentalist Salafi youth movement in particular reflects the phenomenon of a conservative ?backlash?, creating much controversy regarding the dichotomy of secularism and Islamism. However, evidence of Enahda?s political activities thus far sugests that the party is trying to emulate a style of pragmatic Islamism, similar to that of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) of Turkey. It would be safe to state that Enahda?s popularity is not a backlash to the modernization of society; it is a part of the movement. Under these circumstances, Enahda is likely to maintain its position as the largest political party in Tunisia and cary this momentum to the general elections post-Constitution. Continuing the moderate, pragmatic rhetoric will be the key to Enahda?s suces; demonstrating itself as an example of the first established government of the Arab Spring nations. V. INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF NON-SECULAR DEMOCRACIES [3.5] As previously mentioned, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) of Turkey has created a new model for a discourse of political Islam in a secular nation. The AKP achieved its electoral victory not for its ideological agenda but for its pragmatic politics: both the Prime Minister and the President are from the party and in the June 201 parliamentary election, the AKP won 49.9% of the total votes. 117 The theme of moderate Islamic ideology is reiterated in this case. The AKP gained its political suces by avoiding the controversial branding as the Islamist party and emphasizing its moderate tendency and commitment to democracy. 118 The Turkey model can provide guidance to the emerging democratic nations of the Arab Spring, whether roted in secularism or a national religion. For the emerging political parties and Western observers alike, Islamism should not be a single-dimensional political ideology based on religious faith alone. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 117 ?Turkey.? Bureau of European and Eurasian Afairs. U.S. Department of State, 9 Dec. 201. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. 118 Ghanim, David. ?Turkish Democracy and Political Islam.? Midle East Policy Council. (208). Web. 12 Feb. 2012. Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 49! Undeniably, Islamist politics have its rot in religious belief and may aply Shari?a law to aspects of personal and civil law, as is the case in Israel with religious courts (as discused in depth in Jake Lustig?s paper) and has proven itself as a valid form of governance. However, modern Islamism should not and canot limit itself to faith-based rhetoric. Although the topic of national religion and secular vs. Islamic nation will be a key issue in the Constituents Asembly, religious ideology should take a more moderate backseat to more presing economic and national security issues?an important notion for both the new governments and the Western counterparts that harbor aprehension regarding non-secular states, let alone an Islamic nation. VI. NATO [3.6] 1. Respect the self-determination of the Tunisian people in establishing a government that most suits their nation. 2. NATO and member states should asume an engaged and committed, but not an imposing role in the state building proces of Tunisia and other Arab Spring nations by providing NATO asistance and advice for the drafting of the Constitution and the election proces. 3. Turkey as an advisory actor in the state building proces: as a NATO member state that has the most cultural and ideological commonality with the Arab Spring nations, the role of Turkey will be integral in NATO and its other member nations providing resources. 4. NATO member states should recognize the Constitution and the new government that emerged from the democratic proces as legitimate, no mater what form it takes. 5. NATO member states should quickly build diplomatic relationships with the new government of Tunisia as well as those that emerge from the post Arab Spring transition proces. NATO should host a convention for the nations of the Mediteranean Dialogue to demonstrate its commitment to facilitating the regional security discusion. For the Arab Spring nations, Turkey has a larger role than as an ideological model. As a NATO member state, Turkey?s role in establishing a solid diplomatic relationship with the new governments will be integral to the relationship betwen the Arab Spring states and NATO. As my recommendation sugests, Turkey should become an advisory actor in the state building proces of Tunisia. With the anti-West rhetoric present in many of the Middle East and North African cultures, Western nations should take caution in their asistance to the emerging states and emphasize their respect for the self determination of the Tunisian people. As the goal of NATO?s Mediteranean Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 50! Dialogue sugests, the regional security and stability lies foremost in the domestic security and the establishment of a government that efectively represent and resolve the neds of its own people. In this sense, the NATO nations must continue to ?respect and take into acount the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners [of the region].? 119 The member nations of NATO should encourage each other to recognize and build relationships with the new governments of the region, which will crucially impact the development of not only domestic but regional security. Furthermore, NATO should provide a friendly and efective environment for the Arab Spring nations and NATO member nations to discus the future political rhetoric of the new states. VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENTS The 2010 uprisings in Tunisia after the self immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi quickly became the fire sen around the world. Since then, the world saw an unprecedented phenomenon of mas mobilization of citizens against their long term dictators. While the revolution is very much at large in many nations, prominently in Syria, Tunisia has sucesfully ousted its dictator Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali and set out to establish a new democratic state. As the first nation of the Revolution, the path to democracy Tunisia builds will become an indicator and an example for the region as a whole. And during this transition proces, the topic of Islamism has received much atention as the Enahda party emerged as the foreruner in the October 2010 election. As I have examined in this paper, the theoretical and theological framework of Islam and Islamic law afirms the compatibility of Islam and democracy, contrary to many western beliefs. Undeniably, there has ben, and are forms of Islamism that promote a more fundamentalist aproach to politics. Even politics of the Muslim Brotherhod of Egypt are producing controversial reactions from the Egyptian citizens and outsiders alike, a topic which Josiah Surface addreses in depth. However, the Enahda party of Tunisia has ben working vigorously to recreate their image and agenda as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 119 ?NATO Mediteranean Dialogue.? North Atlantic Treaty Organization. n.date. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. Islamic Democracy? Hae Suh ! 51! moderate form of Islamism, emulating the Justice and Development Party of Turkey. Despite the interegional and extra-regional aprehension regarding Islamist politics, the Enahda party thus far has reflected its strong commitment to democracy and upholding the spirit of the Revolution. As demonstrated, the Arab Springs provides a new oportunity for redefining Islamism for both its participants and observers. As important as it is for modern Islamism itself to actively advocate democratic ideals and practice moderate and pragmatic politics, it is equally crucial for the rest of the world to change their perceptions of Islamism. PART I EGYPT To say that no one saw the fall of Hosni Mubarak?s regime coming is quite an understatement. One of the United States? closest allies in the Arab world looked steady in the region even as Tunisia was convulsing with violence. But as the uprisings spread and seized the Egyptian spirit, the United States was quickly confronted with the revelation that long standing dictator was completely out of touch with the will of his people. From the time of its independence, Egypt has ben ruled by a sucesion of military generals, the last of which favoring a strong autocratic regime. Now the most populous Arab country is left with a large question mark hanging over the top of everything: the military, the economy, foreign relations, democracy and governance. With so much at stake and no crystal ball to predict the future, this section of the Task Force focused heavily on the future of Egypt and what the next steps are not only for its new government but for how the international community as a while should aproach a post-Mubarak nation. The first paper deals with the overarching lesons that can be gleaned from suporting dictators such as Mubarak. The United States has a dark history of suporting regimes that benefit their economic, security and political interests. Thus by drawing comparisons betwen suport for the Shah of Iran and Mubarak, lesons from past foreign policy mistakes in the region can guide the US and NATO towards greater suces and understanding in the future. Much of US aid in Egypt was sent directly to the military, so the second paper deals with the Egyptian military structure and its future place in the new government. As of when this paper was published, the military remains at the helm of the state which flies in the face of the sweping changes demanded by the revolution. Whether or not the military will be PART I EGYPT willing to peacefully transfer power as of June 2012 is greatly complicated by their previously held superiority in Egyptian society. In all likelihod, the majority of the new parliament elected will be members of a group previously marginalized under Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhod. The third paper explores the history of the Muslim Brotherhod and what their parliamentary gains mean for the future of the country. This parliament will be the one tasked with the duty of drafting a new constitution for Egypt. Not only is a constitution an extremely difficult document to conceive, but what the new constitution will look like is troubling for anyone to predict. Given the Muslim Brotherhod?s Islamic stance, it remains unclear what kind of state will enginered: a theocracy or a democracy? Lastly, the type of constitution drafted in Egypt will have perhaps the most profound efects on the countries minorities; namely the Christian Copts. This sizable minority group has long ben on the sidelines of Egyptian society, yet participated equally in ousting Mubarak. The fate of Copts status in Egypt rests on the constitution, and this last paper demonstrates the past experiences of the Copts under Mubarak and what steps the new government should take to end their discrimination. Overall, these papers work in concert to show that all of the issues facing Egypt rest on the decisions to be made in the coming months. Will the military step aside and how can that be achieved? What type of government will come to power and what efect will this have on Egyptian minorities? Can the US and NATO member states start a new era of fruitful relations with Egypt that does not suport government run human rights violations? This sections aims to answer all these questions and create productive policy recommendations for the US and NATO. EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION TIMELINE 1 January 25 On national Police Day thousands marched to the ofices of the National Democratic Party in downtown Cairo. Police and demonstrators clashed in Tahrir Square, with the police using tear gas and water cannons. Alexandria, Mansura, Tanta, Aswan, and Asiut also se protests. The interior ministry isues a statement blaming the Muslim Brotherhod for the protests, the Muslim denies the charge. The interior minister states that three protestors and a police oficer have been kiled. Facebook and Twiter are used by protest organizers. January 26 55 protestors and 15 police officers are reported dead by medical workers in Suez. January 27 Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the UN nuclear monitoring agency, arives in Egypt and joins the protests. Police and protestors continue to clash in Cairo, Suez, the northern Sinai, and Ismailia. Facebook, Twiter, and Blackbery Mesenger are disrupted. January 28 Eleven civilians kiled in Suez and 170 injured. Countrywide 1,030 injured. Trops ordered into Cairo, Suez, and Alexandria but do not act in clashes betwen police and protestors. Mubarak dismises government. January 29 Mubarak anounces cabinet has ben dismised but he refuses to step down. Military secures Egyptian Museum from loters. National Democratic Party headquarters set on fire by protestors. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 !"Timeline:!Egypt's!Revolution.?!Al#Jazera#English.! Al!Jazera,!14!Feb.!2012.!Web.!27!Feb.!2012.! .! Mubarak apoints first vice-president, Omar Suleiman. January 31 250,000 gather in Tahrir Square. Hundreds march in Alexandria. Suleiman promises dialogue with oposition parties on constitutional reforms. EU cals for fair elections in Egypt. Mubarak names new cabinet. February 1 Mubarak anounces on television that he wil not stand for re-election but he wil not step down. Mubarak promises constitutional changes. More than a milion people are in Tahrir Square. Thousands more protest in Alexandria and Suez. February 2 Clashes between anti-government and pro- Mubarak protestors take place in Alexandria. Estimated 1,50 people are injured in Tahrir Square. February 3 Heavy gunfire bursts in Tahrir Square leaves at least five dead. Sustained automatic weapons fire and single shots begin at 4am and continue for over an hour. February 4 Protestors gather for ?Day of Departure? in Tahrir Square. February 5 The thousands remaining in Tahrir Square fear an approaching evacuation by the military. Egyptian health minister reports 1 dead. UN estimates 30 deaths country-wide. February 7 Thousands are camping in Tahrir Square. Egyptian government aproves 15 per cent pay raise. Google executive and facebok organizer Wael Ghonim released from jail. February 9 Labor unions join protestors caling for beter pay and Mubarak to step down. February 10 Mubarak gives a televised spech saying he wil remain in power until elections in September. February 1 Omar Suleiman anounces that Mubarak has resigned and handed power over to the military. February 12 Celebrations take place in Tahrir Square. Protestors begin cleaning the square. Military rulers pledge to hand over power to elected, civilian government and honor al international treaties, understood as an acknowledgment of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Travel bans are imposed on several former ministers. February 13 Soldiers remove remaining protestors and their tents. Trafic alowed through Tahrir Square again. Cabinet spokesman say the cabinet apointed while Mubarak was stil in power wil stay to overse political changes. An estimated 2,00 policemen protest outside the interior ministry for beter wages and against their bad reputation. February 14 Protestors leave Tahrir Square only to have a few thousand people return to protest against the police. Military leaders isue ?Cominique No. 5? in a cal for national solidarity and against strike action in order to revive the economy. What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 52! Chapter 4 WHAT THE DICTATORS TAUGHT US LESONS LEARNED FROM PAST FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES AND SUGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE During the Cold War, the patern of foreign policy in the United States followed a very simple rule; the ABC. ?Anyone But Communists? was used several times in justifying the overthrow of democratically elected governments in the third world. The US ambasador to Guatemala proposed the ?duck test? stating; ?Many times it is imposible to prove legally that a certain individual is a communist; but for cases of this sort I recommend a practical method of detection ? ?the duck test??[If a] bird certainly looks like a duck. Also, he goes to the pond and you notice he swims like a duck. Well, by this time you?ve probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he?s wearing a label or not.?? 120 This reference may sem outdated, but it is quite the oposite. The United States has continued to use the ?duck test? rule of thumb beyond the Cold War, and the word ?communist? has ben replaced with ?terorist?. This ABT atitude is evident in the US involvement with Middle Eastern governments. Perhaps the most striking, and disastrous, example is the case of Iran and the overthrow of the popularly elected Muhammad Musadiq in 1953. Seen as a threat in British and American interests in the region, ?Iran is perhaps the quintesential case of both superpowers not only failing to promote, but actually undermining, Middle Eastern democracy in their headlong pursuit of their strategic and economic objectives.? 121 As the events of the Arab Spring have ben unfolding acros the Middle East, ABT and the duck test policy were brought into the light as regimes began to tople. The fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt had perhaps the biggest implication in terms of the United States and the aplication of ABT foreign policy. After examining the relationship betwen the two nations, parallels betwen Egypt !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 120 Jentleson, Bruce. "Beware the Duck Test." Washington Quarterly. 34.3 (201): 137-149. Print. 121 Khalidi, Rashid. Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Midle East. Boston: Beacon Pres, 207. Print, 167 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 53! and Iran began to arise in terms of mistakes and misjudgments by the American policy makers. While the United States did not facilitate the asasination of Anwar Sadat that put Mubarak in power, it is the atitude the US adopted after that bears a striking resemblance to that of the atitude adopted towards the Shah of Iran. Both are cases of the United States throwing their economic and military suport behind a dictator in order to protect strategic interests in the region. This poses an interesting moral conundrum, along the lines of ?does the end justify the means??. Did the White Revolution reforms under the Shah serve US interests in keping communism out of the Iran? Was the intelligence acquired under the interogations held in Egypt worth proping up Mubarak, a known human rights abuser? While the case in Iran has the benefit of hind sight, it is more difficult to come to a conclusion about Egypt. The backlash of suporting Mubarak is still unfolding; however there are lesons to be learned from the Iranian case that can be aplied to how the US and NATO aproach Egypt and the broader Middle East in the future. In this paper I will explore these parallels of the past and use them to analyze the future. By doing this, I aim to craft a preliminary answer to the question: What lesons can be learned from suporting unsavory dictators and what policies should the United States adopt towards Egypt in the light of the Arab Spring? By examining and comparing the history of US foreign policy in Iran and Egypt, this paper will sugest a new direction for US foreign policy that eliminates ABT and duck testing. This paper will make the following recommendations: 1) Elimination of previous held biases towards new regime leaders; 2) recognition and aceptance of newly elected regimes; 3) adopt a facilitating role in the state building proces. I. PILLAR OF STABILITY: IRAN [4.1] For the scope of this inquiry, the story of US interest in Iran goes back to the end of World War II. It became clear that the United States ?must have secure aces to foreign oil suplies to What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 54! ofset its depleted domestic reserves? 122 and the Roosevelt administration looked to the Persian Gulf. The looming Soviet presence so close to Iran put presure on ensuring said resources. Therefore, Truman stresed the ned for the Soviet Union to pull out of Iran, but they initially refused. With suport from the United States, the Iranian prime minister traveled to Moscow to petition trop removal and was eventually sucesful in 1946. At the same time, political unrest and resentment was growing towards the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British company that had a monopoly over Iran?s oil industry. This movement was backed by the Tudeh Party, which was pro-Soviet communist party. Leaders from Tudeh formed a group called the National Front, which pushed for political reforms and the nationalization of AIOC. The National Front was led by Muhammad Musadiq, and under great popular presure, ?the shah apointed Musadiq prime minister on April 29 and signed the oil nationalization bill into law? 123 . British operations to eliminate Musadiq churned more political turmoil in Iran, resulting in a brief resignation of Musadiq, only to have him be reinstated several days later. When Eisenhower tok ofice in January 1953, the administration was looking for a more agresive way to contain the Soviet threat. ?An important element of this efort was a decision to strengthen pro-Western countries located along the Sino-Soviet periphery?with its proximity to the Soviet Union, and Musadiq?s failure to resolve the oil crisis, Iran was a crucial pawn in this new strategy?? 124 Eisenhower?s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, the new CIA director Allen, looked at Iran with grave concern in terms of containing the Soviet Union and they came to the conclusion that he must be removed from power. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 122 Litle , Douglas. American Orientalism: The United States and the Midle East since 1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Print, 51 123 Lesch, David, ed. The Midle East and the United States. Boulder: Westview Pres Inc, 196. Print, 5. 124 Lesch 59 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 55! The British and American governments began ploting the coup in February of 1953, and in August Musadiq had ben replaced by Mohammad Reza Shah who was sympathetic to US oil interests. For the moment this was viewed as a positive step forward in the containment of communism. Unfortunately, ?he strategic considerations that led US policy makers to undertake the 1953 coup and then build-up the shah?s regime therefore helped set in motion a chain of events that later destroyed his regime and created severe problems for US interest.? 125 Under the Shah, modernization of Iranian society became the number one priority. Acording to Ali M. Ansari, author of the article ?The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, ?Modernization and the Consolidation of Power?, the revolution served a very distinct purpose. ?The ?White Revolution? was? a strategy for legitimation, through the use of rationalization, universalization and externalization. Socio-economic benefits were emphasized in an efort to disguise the real political gains?? 126 These political gains mentioned were to be gained from the United States. The modernization reforms enacted by the Shah only increased domestic tensions. In an efort to pas his sweping reforms, ?political parties that resisted the shah?s absolute consolidation of power were silenced and pushed to the margins. In 1961 the shah dissolved the 20th Majles and cleared the way for the land reform law of 1962? (Britanica). Under the law, land owning peasants had to give up their farms so the land could be redistributed. Robed of their property and without political representation to lend them a voice, Iran?s growing middle clas began to resent the Shah?s autocratic regime. This growing resentment was also directed towards the Shah?s close relationship with the West, specifically the United States. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 125 Lesch 63 126 Ali M. Ansari (201): The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohamad Reza Shah, 'Modernization' and the Consolidation of Power, Midle Eastern Studies, 37:3, 3 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 56! Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini spoke out harshly against the reforms put in place by the Shah, condemning the land reform and women?s emancipation. His violent language quickly made him the symbol against the Shah?s regime for thousands of Iranians. This lead to several riots in Qom and Tehran, and eventually Khomeini?s arest days later. ?By 1964, Khomeini had ben forced into exile after having launched a vitriolic atack on the Shah following the anouncement of legal exemptions for all US personel working in Iran?? 127 Although the charismatic Khomeini was out of the country, the unrest in Iran continued. Unfortunately, misreading the implications of Khomeini?s movement, the Kenedy administration and its sucessors encouraged the shah to press on with his White Revolution. Dismissing the recent disorders as the product of ?demagogic discontent? that would fade away in the face of concerted program if land reform, women?s sufrage, and public education, the State Department?s Philips Talbot told a congresional panel on 17 July 1963 that the shah?s initiatives ?truly constitute a peaceful revolution? 128 Heding the Kenedy?s administrations guidance, the Shah proposed rigid, top down social reform to apease Iranian citizens that wouldn?t limit his authority. The United States chose to work with Iran and the reforms, and the Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated in a report that doing so would ?preserve and kep Iran fre from all foreign domination, with a stable government oriented toward the West and an economy capable of self-sustaining economic growth.? 129 Public discontent, however, was masked by Iran?s illusion of progres. Acording to the Encyclopedia Britanica, ?these reforms eventually redistributed land to some 2.5 million families, established literacy and health corps to benefit Iran?s rural areas, further reduced the autonomy of tribal groups, and advanced social and legal reforms that furthered the emancipation and enfranchisement of women. In subsequent decades, per capita income for Iranians skyrocketed, and oil revenue fueled an enormous increase in state funding for industrial development projects.? Coupled with the dramatic increase in the price of oil in the 1970s, Iran was awash with cash and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 127 Ansari 20 128 Litle , Douglas. American Orientalism: The United States and the Midle East since 1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Pres, Print, 21 129 Litle 20 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 57! Shah had a desire to spend it. Therefore, ?in exchange for Iran?s serving as ?the guardian and protector? of the Gulf, the Nixon administration extended virtual carte blanche to the Shah to go in for American arsenal.? 130 The Shah engaged in drastic amounts of government spending focusing on external threats to Iran, but spent little time acknowledging his internal threat: his own people. The growing pains of the Shah?s rapid modernization created a false sense of prosperity thus when the government failed to deliver all that was promised, there was a harsh backlash of dissatisfied Iranians. The United States, only seing Iran?s outward apearance of progres, hailed the Shah and his White Revolution; Henry Kissinger regarded the Shah as ?a pillar of stability in a turbulent and vital region who despite the travesties of retroactive myth was really a dedicated reformer.? 131 In reality, Iran was experiencing high inflation due to the Shah?s military spending that eroded the earnings of his people. ?Moreover, his close ties with Washington let him vulnerable to charges leveled by middle-clas students and disgruntled mullahs that he was fast becoming an American stoge. The Pahlavi regime responded with a fresh round of represion, jailing its leading critics and steping up surveillance by its secret police.? 132 Washington was left feling uneasy by the Shah?s move, however little was done to put actual presure on the regime to change its autocratic ways, and few apreciated the potential for an explosive response until it was to late. Instead, President Ford aplauded the Shah?s ?wise leadership? and that he had enabled Iran to make ?extraordinary strides in its economic development and in its relationships with other countries of its region.? In January of 1978, thousands of students reacted to what they believed was slanderous marks against Ayatollah Khomeini and tok to the strets in protest. They were joined by others who were dissatisfied with the Shah, many of which were unemployed middle clas citizens. The Shah !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 130 Khlaifat, Riayd, and Ali Bashayreh. "Consequences of US Intervention." European Journal of Social Sciences. 16.3 (2010): 327-339. Print, 333 131 Litle 21 132 Litle 22 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 58! responded by open firing on the crowds, killing two dozen demonstrators and further creating anti- Pahlavi sentiments. Demonstrations by angry citizens continued into the summer, and trop loyal to the Shah continued with deadly force. ?By the end of the month William Sullivan, the US ambasador in Tehran, was insisting that the ?masive firestorm directed against the Shah? had ben ?brought on to a considerable extent by the frustrations, inequities, coruption, and rising expectations engendered by the shah?s program of economic development and westernized social reforms since 1963.?? 133 What was ocuring in Iran was unintended consequences of US foreign policy of containment. This planted the seds ?of a US-Iranian hostility that continues to the present day at the cost of much anxiety for both Washington and Jerusalem.? 134 II. A WEL UNDERSTOD VALUE: EGYPT [4.2] Following the asasination of Anwar Sadat, the ned to reward Egypt for signing a peace treaty with Israel was brought into relief quite violently. Hosni Mubarak steped into power during a time of high Cold War tensions in the region, from the Iranian revolution to US hostage crisis to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. ?Sadat?s murder by extremists demonstrated that a serious response could not wait any longer. The most obvious answer, of course, was to provide Cairo with a reliable source of arms now that it had severed military ties with the Soviet Union.? 135 Mubarak presented Washington with another chance at a strategic ally in the Middle East in the fight against Moscow, and Mubarak was well aware of his valuable status. ?In exchange for military aid that would total 1.5 billion over the next thre decades, second only to the aid extended to Israel, Mubarak would kep the peace treaty Sadat had signed in 1979, provide the United States !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 133 Litle 24 134 Saikal, Amin. "Authoritarianism, Revolution and Democracy: Egypt and Beyond." Australian Journal of International Afairs. 65.5 (201): 530-544. Print, 535 135 Gardner, Lloyd G. The Road to Tahrir Square. New York: The New Pres, 201. Print, 149 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 59! with a number of other valuable asets, such as his contact with the PLO?s Yaser Arafat?? 136 Knowledge of his leverage over the United States gave Mubarak a large bargaining chip, which can be summed by the phrase: ?He may be an SOB, but at least he?s our SOB.? In response to the terorist atacks that killed former President Sadat, Mubarak enacted emergency laws that included steped up surveillance, arests, torture and secret trials. This focus on military control over society did not leave much rom to focus on economic and social progres within Egypt. The leader was against any kind of reform that would shake up public order or stability. So instead, Mubarak relied on American security guarantes and ?in return, Egypt would be rewarded with increased foreign direct investment, a leading place in an emerging system and continued international suport; its suceses in the efort would be measured by investment dollars, trade surpluses, and regime continuity rather than any true internal regeneration..? 137 This point held true, and Egypt stagnated and declined under Mubarak. The large population was severely underemployed, and many young people were growing resentful that their education and skills were not being put to use as they were unable to find work. Acording to a study conducted by Solava Ibrahim entitled A Tale of Two Egypts: Contrasting State-reported Macro-trends with Micro-voice of the Poor, ?In the past decade, the absence of acountability mechanisms and increasing levels of coruption simply led to the absence of justice in Egyptian society. The perception among many por people was the ?the powerful??could simply get away with any crime.? 138 Ibrahim also cites that 85 percent of the rural population still did not have adequate sewage aces as of 205 and that ?the dominant rent seking behavior among government oficials (at all levels) and their indifference towards serving the public showed not only the limited state capacity, but also the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 136 Gardner 151 137 Gardner 161 138 Solava Ibrahim (2011): A Tale of Two Egypts: contrasting state-reported macro-trends with micro-voices of the por, Third World Quarterly, 32:7, 1347-1368, 1349 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 60! absence of state will to respond to public demands? 139 (Ibrahim, 1350). From the macro view point, Egypt was growing. But not unlike Iran, this wealth was not trickling down to the people who neded it the most. In the past few years poverty in Egypt has in fact risen yet again from 17% in 202 to reach 20.16 in 205 to 21.6 in 209. ?Despite designing a Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, 30 years after Mubarak tok power 42.8 per cent of Egyptians are still living on $2 a day or les?These poverty trends indicate the unsustainable nature of poverty reduction strategies under Mubarak?s regime?? 140 Throughout his reign, Mubarak was constantly reminding the United States of his value to their strategic security interests. Several US administrations aplied presure to Mubarak to open up Egyptian society; to make it more democratic, and every time they were rebufed. ?In reply to American eforts to prod him toward political reform, Mubarak used to great advantage US fears of Muslim radicalism, pointing to what hapened in Iran, and, after the Second Gulf War, the chaos Iraq caused, he aserted, by the eforts to install democracy in that country.? 141 Mubarak was clever in coupling Washington?s fear of Muslim extremism with his own strategic advantage: Egypt allowed torture. If the United States wanted an ample suply of information on Al-Qaeda and other terorist actions, Egypt would deliver. ?Mubarak?s resentment toward American insistence that he move forward with reforms and ease up on political oponents apears highly ironic in light of the infamous CIA ?rendition? plan devised in the mid-190s and operated with Egypt?s close coperation over more than a decade.? 142 Esentially CIA operatives were allowed to use ?enhanced interogation techniques? that were baned under US and UN law in a ?host country? aka Egypt. While this may have ben swept under the metaphorical rug, a vast amount of intelligence about Al-Qaeda was collected. ?During the Cold !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 139 Ibrahim 1350 140 Ibrahim 1351 141 Gardner 171 142 Gardner 167 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 61! War, wrote one terorism expert at Georgetown University, Bruce Hofman, the United States had a window into the Soviet Union through Iran. ?We have the same kind of window into Iran and other countries via the Egyptians? he said after Mubarak?s fall. ?Whatever hapens next, this will never be the same.?? 143 The real test of Egypt-US relations came after September 11, 201. After the atacks, the question of whether or not it was wise to invest so heavily in the military strength of the region came to the forefront of policy-makers minds. ?The Cold War was over, after all, and the Soviet Union was no more. So on that level why was it necesary to go on suplying the militaries of those countries.? 144 Previously, the only concern for policy-makers had ben balancing the power in the region; making sure it did not tip in favor of the Soviets/extremists. The atacks of September 11 th brought up another aspect of US security: the backlash. ?The United States had invested $50 billion in arms for Egypt ? and what had ben the result? The result of suporting Middle Eastern dictatorships, it was argued, had ben the atacks of 9/11.? 145 After the 9/11 atacks, the amount of military aid being given to Egypt raised a serious questions about Egypt?s ability to truly reform. Mubarak?s police state relied heavily on the loyalty of the military, and the flow of US dollars helped Mubarak kep them hapy. The Bush administration recognized that if they were to truly protect American interests in the Middle East, real change neded to ocur in Egypt. The presure was again light, having Secretary of State Rice made a spech at American University in Cairo in 205 calling for fre and transparent elections, stating to Mubarak that ?The people of Egypt should be at the forefront of this great journey, just as you have led this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 143 Gardner 169 144 Gardner 171 145 Gardner 172 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 62! region through the great journey of the past.? 146 Unfortunately, the elections held that September were a sham, and the oposition candidate Ayman Nour was arested afterward. Time and time again, Mubarak played into the ?he?s our SOB? sentiment that the United States demonstrated. ?The failure to persuade Mubarak to halt the human rights violations, let alone open up the political proces, indicated both that he intended to run again for president in 201 and that he could not change his policies under any presure the United States dared to impose without endangering the ?strategic relationship.?? 147 While American foreign policy had relatively stayed the course in terms of how Mubarak was handled, hopes to change the status of Egyptian-American relations were renewed with President Obama?s election in 208. In a spech in Cairo in 209, Obama acknowledged some of Washington?s past mistakes in its foreign policy towards the region, stating that during the Cold War ?Muslim majority countries were to often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations.? 148 After the spech, Egyptians were filled with excitement towards the new Obama administration, hoping their policies would alter the Egyptian-United States dialogue. For a while, it semed as though this administration was looking to write a new chapter of American foreign policy towards the Middle East. The 209 Cairo addres was President Obama?s first international addres, and it was delivered to a crowd of Egyptian youth. The President was speaking to issues that the people of Egypt cared about such as the legacy of colonialism and Western hostilities to Islamic culture. Obama also stated, Violent extremists have exploited these tensions in a smal but potent minority of Muslims. The attacks of September 1th, 201 and the continued eforts of these extremists to engage in violence against civilians has led some in my country to view Islam as inevitably hostile not only to America and Western countries, but also to human rights. This has bred more fear and mistrust. 149 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 146 Stacher, Josh. "Condoleza Rice's Remarks from her Cairo Spech at AUC." The Arabist. N.p., June, 205. Web. 2 Feb 2012. . 147 Gardner 179 148 Obama, Barack. "Obama's Spech in Cairo." New York Times [New York] 4 06 2009, n. pag. Web. 22 Feb. 2012. . 149 Obama 209 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 63! Here Obama is clearly drawing a line betwen the vast majority of the Muslim world and the few extremists that aim to cause great harm. This spech represented the voices in Washington that were not always heded; the voices that called for aplying real presure to Egypt instead of chosing to maintain the status quo in the region. Washington, however, had very little time to engage in a new formal dialogue with the Mubarak regime. In December 2010, fruit vendor Mohammad Bouazizi set himself on fire, after having his cart confiscated, in an act of frustration and protest. ??Is there a more poignant portrayal of what ails that Arab world? wrote Egyptian-born author Mona Eltahawy the day after Ben Ali fell, ?than images of its young people killing themselves as their leaders get older and richer??? 150 The protests that started in Tunisia quickly spread acros the Maghreb, and Egypt was son in the midst of a popular uprising against their leader, Hosni Mubarak. The Obama administration was put betwen a rock and a hard place as the people of Egypt were protesting in the strets. ?On the one hand, it did not want to intervene and be blamed for atempting to prop up a government that its people deserted; on the other hand, it did not want to be held responsible for deserting a government that had ben a ?cornerstone? of US Middle Eastern policy.? 151 Obama decided to take a step back from the events and chose to strongly urge Mubarak into carying out promised reforms (the firing of his government) over a phone call. Mubarak made a few speches promising reforms and that he would not sek relection, but that he would stay in power until then. Shifting to a policy strategy that ordinarily lost in favor of some form of apeasement, the Obama administration ultimately sided with the Egyptian people stating that ?We have discused with the Egyptians a variety of different ways to move [the transition] proces forward, but all of those decisions must be made by the Egyptian people.? 152 On 11 February 201, a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 150 Gardner 184 151 Gardner 186 152 Obama 201 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 64! mere 18 days after protests started in Tahrir Square, President Hosni Mubarak?s vice president Omar Suleiman anounced that the leader had steped down. III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN?: EGYPT AND IRAN COMPARED [4.3] While the Shah?s reign in Iran came to an end almost 30 years before Mubarak?s, the similarities surounding US foreign policy towards the two dictators is evident. This patern is somewhat troubling in light of the Arab Spring. While there is not charismatic leader at the helm of the Egyptian movement that resembles Khomeini, what post-Mubarak Egypt will look like is still unclear. Therefore, it is important to look into the past of US relations with Iran and se what lesons there are to extract for the future. Iranian and Egyptian society before their US suported dictator was deposed look eerily similar. From a macro perspective, both apeared to be growing. The GDP was on the up in Egypt, and oil prices were increasing which was bringing wealth to Iran. However, closer examination showed that the vast majority of citizens in both nations were sufering. The Shah?s American suported White Revolution ostracized many Iranians who believed these reforms were an afront to Islamic tradition. Under Mubarak, Egyptian discontent was growing towards their leader due to his inability lift them out of poverty. During his reign, the growth of ashwa?iyyat, or slums, grew considerably. ?Although the data and scale of ashwa?iyyat in Egypt is highly varied and under- estimated, depending on the definition of ?informal areas?, the population living in these areas ranges from 5.7 million to 21 million. In Greater Cairo alone the number of people living in informal setlements acounts for almost 65.6 percent (about 10.7 million).? 153 Clearly both regimes were operating under an inability to listen to their populations demands and respond to said demands properly. This lead to a growing domestic resentment of the United States in both nations. In Iran, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 153 Ibrahim 1349 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 65! the people felt as though their leader was an American stoge and in Egypt that the United States was unwilling or unable to help them enact real reform from the state. During the Cold War, the Soviet threat was an ever present danger in Washington. In order to combat this, the US sought to kep the third world fre of Soviet influence and any regime that looked to have communist sympathies had to be dealt with. The United States chose to overthrow the democratically elected President in Iran when he apeared to threaten US interests in the region. ?Time magazine refered to Musadiq as a fanatical nationalist whose obsesion with martyrdom would ruin Iran. Newswek characterized him as inconsistent, unreasonable, and irrational and warned against ?the red threat.?? 154 With the gift of hindsight towards Iran, these fears are relatively unfounded and Iran ended up becoming a foreign policy nightmare for the US. How did this hapen? The United States was providing unwavering suport and military aid to a dictator that was becoming increasingly unpopular with his people because he aligned himself with the US?s foreign policy objectives: containing the Soviets. Now if one takes the previous sentence and removes the word ?Soviets? and replaces it with the world ?Muslim extremists?, one is left with US posture towards Egypt and Mubarak. He acted in similar ways as the Shah, touting suces under the guise of economic progres that never trickled down to the rest of the population. ?Contrary to promising a beter and gentler government, [Mubarak] strengthened the authoritarian system of party-bureaucratic-security governance, which had ben established to a large extent under his two predecesors?? 155 Both the Shah and Mubarak enforced an increasingly totalitarian regime that the United States suported because ?they may be SOBs, but they?re our SOBs?. The relationship the United States fostered with Mubarak was born right on the hels of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The threat of extreme political Islam was fresh on Washington?s mind, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 154 Lesch 69 155 Saikal 531 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 66! thus they adopted a similar aproach they tok with Communism: containment through alliances and rewards. ?As well as the United States has protected its basic interests during the past, it has often done so by dealing with illegitimate regimes, a situation that still exists today and that is increasingly worisome.? 156 It is worisome because using the template of ?if you scratch my back, I?ll scratch yours? towards the threat of Communism and extreme political Islam is inefective, and above all, hypocritical. The United States claims to be for fredom and equality everywhere, and yet it suported leaders such as the Shah and Hosni Mubarak because political and security interests are deemed more important. This is not to say that the security threats the United States were not real or illegitimate. After 9/11, there was no doubt that terorism was an ever present danger in the world and that Al-Qaeda was capable of causing a considerable amount of damage. But there comes a time when corecting past mistakes in foreign policy neds to be considered. As Bruce W. Jentleson points out, ?No question there are terorism risks amidst instability as well as regarding the shape sucesor regimes take. But what we?ve sen these past months is the risks of ABT strategies. And now potential oportunities are being opened up for alternative paths toward societal changes that help to counterterorism and public diplomacy can.? 157 IV. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE: US AND NATO POLICY SUGGESTIONS [4.4] Many countries in the Middle East are steping onto a post-dictator world stage, and the United States is being presented with a unique oportunity. Now is the time to change foreign policy and atitudes towards the region in order to build a most trusting relationship betwen the US and Egypt. Fostering a strong relationship with the new Egyptian government would be the first step in establishing beter relations with the region as a whole. The following thre sugestions will ster US !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 156 Lesch 417 157 Jentleson 143 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 67! policy towards this goal: 1) elimination of ABT atitudes held by many policy makers, 2) recognition and aceptance of newly elected regimes, 3) adopt a facilitating role in the state building proces. The first sugestion comes from Jentleson, stating why these atitudes have become inapropriate: ??we have to stop substituting ABT (Anybody but Terorists) for the Cold War Anybody but Communists. That aproach has, in part, traped the United States in the regional box it is now trying to escape ? trying to avoid suporting unpopular, corupt regimes whose principal claim to leadership is that terorists will take over if they do not rule.? 158 With the fall of Mubarak and a new Egyptian state on the horizon, the United States is being presented with an oportunity to at least begin wiping the slate clean of past mistakes in their aproach to Middle Eastern policy. This can be started by following the second recommendation or as Robin Wright, author of Rock the Casbah, stated : ?To have credibility, [The United States] will have to acknowledge, if not enthusiastically embrace, any democratically elected leaders who renounce violence, play by international rules and honor democracy?s practices.? 159 The end of Wright?s quote brings of the important point that may complicate the first recommendation. While the United States neds to engage in damage control over their past relationship with Egypt, it is important to recognize when these leaders do not respect international laws, democracy and the will of their people. The new government and constitution that is to come out of Egypt may not resemble what the United States would hope, but a measured response neds to be taken. Instead of jumping to the ABT atitudes from before, more extensive understanding of what these new political parties and leaders stand for is necesary. That is why I recommend reinvigorating NATO?s Mediteranean dialogue. The stated goals here are to contribute to regional security and stability; achieve beter mutual understanding; dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries. If the US and NATO member countries are truly to turn over a new leaf with the Middle East, a Mediteranean dialogue conference !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 158 Jentleson 142 159 Wright, Robin. Rock the Casbah. New York: Simon & Schuster, 201. Print, 261 What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 68! would be the perfect place to start once Egypt?s military turns over power to the new government in June. The meting can begin with talks on very small issues, such as tourism or energy, but the important thing is a fresh conversation betwen all involved parties begins. The Arab Spring has brought an unprecedented amount of change to the Middle East, as well as an oportunity for the Western powers of NATO to alter their past relationships with the region. The third recommendation (taking a ?hands of? aproach to the state building proces) can also be expanded to NATO member states, not just the United States. What is clear is that Egypt is embarking on a mission to build the Egypt the people desire, and the only way this state will have legitimacy with the people is if Western powers and their influences are kept at bay. Instead, the course of action that can be taken by the US and NATO member states is of a facilitating nature in which policy and economic advisors or constitution drafters from the International Republican Institute and/or the National Democratic Institute can be ofered to help the transition proces. By laying these experienced advisors and NGOs on the table, Egypt will have the oportunity to take the help or leave it. What is esential is that US and NATO members states do not apear to be meddling in the new Egyptian government?s state building afairs, and they have so often in the past. The element that will complicate the United States? role in the transition to the new Egyptian government is the military aid. Acording to a CRS report obtained by WikiLeaks, this problem of whether or not to cut of military funding to Egypt has ben heavily debated for the past four years. Some Members believe that U.S. asistance to Egypt has not ben efective in promoting political and economic reform and that foreign asistance agreements must be renegotiated to include benchmarks that Egypt must met to continue to qualify for U.S. foreign aid?The Administration, some lawmakers, and the Egyptian government asert that reducing Egypt?s aid would undercut U.S. strategic interests in the area, including suport for Midle East peace, U.S. naval acces to the Suez Canal, and U.S.-Egyptian inteligence coperation. 160 Due to the uncertain nature of exactly what the new Egyptian government would look like, eliminating this military aid would be highly unwise. On 16 February 2012, the New York !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 160 (CRS-RL 303) What the Dictators Taught Us Margaret More ! 69! Times reported that ?The Islamist party that leads the new Egyptian Parliament is threatening to review the 1979 peace treaty with Israel if the United States cuts of aid to the country over a crackdown on American-backed nonprofit groups here.? 161 Maintain the 1979 peace treaty is a top priority for US-Israeli relations, and jeopardizing said relations and peace is not an option. These recommendations will allow NATO member states, and specifically the US, to build an entirely new foundation for future relations with Egypt. Instead of seing this large Arab nation as a prize to be won and a friendship to pay for, Egypt?s emerging democracy represents a chance to right a past of wrongs. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 161 Kirkpatrick, David D. "Muslim Brotherhod Threatens to Review Treat with Israel." New York Times [New York] 16 Feb 2012, n. pag. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. . Democracy & the Muslim Brotherhod Josiah Surface ! ! 95" the lower house. Thus, the lower house, the house that the Muslim Brotherhod already controls, sems to have the uper hand in both size and influence. Once the elections for the uper house have ben concluded these two representative bodies will select 10 Egyptians to write the constitution. 200 If the way the voting for the lower house went is any indicator of how the citizens of Egypt will vote in the elections for the uper house, than it is highly likely that the uper house will also contain a majority if not a plurality of members from the Muslim Brotherhod. Already the lower house has named Mohamed Saad Al-Katatni, the former general secretary of the Muslim Brotherhod?s political party, as the speaker of the house. Taking into acount the large influence the Muslim Brotherhod already has in the Egyptian government and considering that the party will likely increase their grip on power once the uper house elections are brought to a close, one must conclude that the Muslim Brotherhod will probably have a large influence in the writing of the new constitution, and by extension the legacy of a new government in Egypt. Thus it sems that the Muslim Brotherhod out of any other political party in Egypt is particularly poised to have a lasting impact on the new government in Egypt. Therefore, the responsibility of forming a new government in Egypt rest primarily with the Muslim Brotherhod. In an atempt to cary out this responsibility the Muslim Brotherhod will use Sharia or Allah?s divine law as the constitution for the new government. The second largest political party in the lower house, the Salafist party and the Muslim Brotherhod disagre on how Sharia should be interpreted. Primarily this because the Salafists in at least their ideology and zeal for the Muslim religion are like the Wahbists in Saudi Arabia. Though the Salafists and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 200 Meital, Yoram. "The ?Revolutionary Parliament? and the New Governmental Order in Egypt." Democracy & the Muslim Brotherhod Josiah Surface ! ! 96" the Muslim brotherhod disagre on a variety of other issues, they both agre that Sharia should be the law of the land. Once the president is elected in June and the government has ben established it will be interesting to se if the law, Sharia, will be enforced in different ways depending on what party is in power at the time. It is hard to predict exactly how each party will interpret and enforce the law. However, those nations that do use Sharia as the basis for their law or as a suplement to their own law tend to be fairly strict in its aplication. For example, women may not be able to go out in public without wearing a hijab, a full body covering. Also, the schols may all be segregated by gender so as to not allow the mixing of genders, which the many in the Muslim Brotherhod believe to be wrong. It could result in brutal punishments for adulterers, thieves, and homosexuals. To be more specific, ?a December 2010 poll of Egyptians found that 82 percent favored stoning adulterers and 77 percent suported cuting of the hands of thieves.? 201 While the Muslim Brotherhod does not publicly suport such forms of punishment, their much conservative political colleagues, the Salafists, might. Unfortunately, this poll makes it aparent that a majority of the Egyptian electorate believes these horific punishments would apropriate. Thus it sems that the Muslim Brotherhod will have a hard time establishing a Western styled democracy simply because the people of Egypt would likely reject it. But for now the Egyptian people sem to trust the Muslim Brotherhod and their Fredom and Justice party, as evidenced by their clear majority in the lower house of parliament. Hopefully the Brotherhod will use this power to move the new Egyptian government and the people of Egypt toward advocating les lethal and maiming punishments for adultery and thieving. In addition to how it treats adulterers and thieves, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 201 Pollack The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Midle East. Pg. 35 Democracy & the Muslim Brotherhod Josiah Surface ! ! 97" Muslim Brotherhod may have to fight the people of Egypt and its own party over restricting the political rights for women and Christians. Compared to Saudi Arabia and the Salafists party in Egypt, The Muslim Brotherhod, it sems, will atempt to be rather measured in its aplication of Sharia when it comes to women and Christians. However, if the Salafists ever got their way women and Christians would certainly have a marginalized role in Egyptian society. Already most of the political parties in the lower house have agred that women and Christians will be bared from holding the ofice of the presidency. This also makes one wonder how much the Christians in Egypt will be able to participate in the new government. Curently, there are women in the Egyptian Parliament but there are no Christians. But even the women ought to wory about how long they will be able to participate in the government. Importantly, the Islamist ?base? ? the gras roots rank and file that form the core of most Islamist groups ? has not been visibly supportive of its leaders? reorientation away from a sharia-centric agenda. Specificaly, the Brotherhod?s recent adoption of more ?moderate? positions on women?s political participation and the rights of non-Muslims has ben met with skepticism or indiference by the base. 202 While women and Christian minorities may enjoy political liberty now, their ability to participate in the future political proces of Egypt is uncertain. But these are the problems one will run into when they use a religious document as their constitution. The use of Sharia as the constitution will likely kep the Muslim Brotherhod from being able to establish a Western styled democracy, primarily because Western styled democracies simply do not use religious texts as the sole basis for their constitutions. The reluctance demonstrated by Western democracies, to use a religious text for the constitution is due to the fact that in the West the separation of ?church? or ?religion? and state is a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 202 Pollack The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Midle East. Pg. 34 Democracy & the Muslim Brotherhod Josiah Surface ! ! 98" generally acepted fact of life. However, in Arab nations where the majority of the population is usually Muslim, the electorate usually ses no reason or ned to separate the church from the state. The only real disadvantage caused by selecting a religious text as constitution is that the government may then become the sole owner of religious and political authority. This often results in the state being able to exert even more control over its citizens. For example, while all the citizens of Egypt may be able practice different faiths, the punishment for various crimes may all be determined by Islamic beliefs and not acording to laws that have ben pased by democratically elected leaders. Whether the Muslim Brotherhod or the other political parties of Egypt will use the based constitution to exert more control over its citizens remains to be sen. However, thanks to a 207 document entitled Muslim Brotherhood Initiatives For Reform in Egypt that was published by the Muslim Brotherhod, it is posible to know something about their designs for a new Egyptian government and how that government might act in the future. First in regards to political reform, the Muslim Brotherhod believes that, ? the people are the source of all authority. No individual, party, group or body is entitled to claim the right to be in power or to continue practicing power unles through sound, fre public will.? 203 Also, the Muslim Brotherhod has stated that, ?power will transfer through fre general election. People will poses the fredom to have individual beliefs. Citizens of Egypt will also be allowed the fredom of practicing religious rites for all acknowledged divine religions.? 204 In addition citizens would be allowed ?the fredom of opinion, expresing it peacefully within the framework of the public system, the general traditions, and the basic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 203 "Ikhwanweb : The Muslim Brotherhod Oficial English Website." Muslim Brotherhod Initiatives For Reform in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhod, 10 June 207. Web. 14 Feb. 2012. . 204 Ibid. Democracy & the Muslim Brotherhod Josiah Surface ! ! 99" foundations of society.? 205 To this end, people will have the ?fredom to poses and use various forms of media in order to expres their opinions.? 206 Some of these fredoms are worded in extremely vague ways. Take for example the fredom of religion, a fredom that if denied to the citizens of Egypt could have devastating impact on Egypt?s Coptic minorities. The fredom as outlined by the Muslim Brotherhod states that citizens will be ?allowed the fredom of practicing religious rites for all acknowledge religions.? 207 What exactly does that mean? What religions will be acknowledged? Who will be determining what religions are acknowledged and which ones are not? While the published beliefs of the Muslim Brotherhod in this 207 document sem quite democratic and also extremely Western, because of their wording they should be taken with a grain of salt. In addition to the already listed political fredoms, the Muslim Brotherhod would ensure that certain laws are rescinded and reforms made. More specifically, the Muslim Brotherhod is adamant that the Emergency Laws of Egypt should be revoked, the police must ?serve the people?, and that the police must stop torturing people while they are in prison. Thus, it sems that in the short run if the Muslim Brotherhod gets its way, the people of Egypt will have more personal fredom. But because the last government ruled with such an iron fist, almost any changes would be an improvement. Concerning the economy, the Muslim Brotherhod desires to have a fairly liberal economy in which the government would play a large role. First, the government would be in charge of providing a safety net for those unfit to work and for the por. Second, the government would be in charge of ?protecting the economy?. One can only gues at the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 205 Ibid. 206 Ibid. 207 Ibid. Democracy & the Muslim Brotherhod Josiah Surface ! ! 100" parameters the government will have in order to fulfill the second responsibility. Also, as is the case among other Muslim countries, interest would be baned. Concerning women and Copts, the Muslim Brotherhod that women should be educated so as to stop the spread of illiteracy among Egyptian women. Also, women would be allowed to participate in elections and in the parliament. But of course women and Copts would not be allowed to hold the position of president or of the ofice of the grand Imam. Acording to the Muslim Brotherhod, the fredom of belief and worship is respected for all. Therefore, one would asume that the Copts would have the right to perform their religious Christian rites. Then again, if Christianity is not an ?acknowledged? religion, then the Copts might not be permitted to worship frely. Over all it sems that the Muslim Brotherhod means well. That is the group desires to provide beter lives for the citizens of Egypt, odds are they will suced in doing so in the short run. But there is still a strugle going on inside the Muslim Brotherhod, as some members believe that the party should become more secular while others believe that it neds to remain strictly Islamic. All the while there is and will continue to be a fight among the political parties of Egypt for control over the new government. The only sure thing is that Sharia will be the law of the land. But how it will be interpreted remains to be sen. Hopefully when the dust setles, the Muslim Brotherhod will be able to move the government and nation of Egypt toward a more independent and fre future, where citizens posses the right to govern themselves in numerous areas of society. But this can only hapen if the Muslim Brotherhod continues to disavow some of its original ideological cornerstones and truly clings to the idea that citizens can chose for themselves, what to believe, what to worship, how to worship, what to say, and how to say it. This does not mean that the Muslim Brotherhod canot create a constitution upon themes derived from Democracy & the Muslim Brotherhod Josiah Surface ! ! 101" Sharia. However, it does mean that if the Muslim Brotherhod desires to build a true democracy it will most likely ned to reject Sharia as the sole basis for its constitution. V. RECOMENDATIONS TO NATO [6.5] In light of what has ben shared so far concerning the Muslim Brotherhod, the nation of Egypt, and the future government of Egypt, the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) would do well to consider the following recommendations. First and foremost, NATO or the member nations of NATO, especially the United States, should do whatever is diplomatically posible to ensure that the Egyptian army relinquishes all political power. Second, the member nations of NATO should diplomatically reach out to the Muslim Brotherhod as well as the other political parties of Egypt to encourage them to respect the rights of women and of minorities within Egypt. If the Arab states were to permit a greater centralization of their economic, military, and political resources, they might be beter positioned to protect their states and their evolving democratic institutions. Lastly, the member nations of NATO should work with the International Monetary Fund or IMF to encourage the new Egyptian government to create a fre and open economy for Egypt, and implement an economic system that allows for the greater integration of the Egyptian economy with the global economy. The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 102" Chapter 7 THE COPTIC QUESTION WELFARE OF MINORITY GROUPS AS INDICATIVE OF DEMOCRACY The world watched as Egyptian protestors in Cairo?s Tahrir Square and around the country called for the end of the Mubarak regime and sucesfully overthrew the dictator in a mater of weks. Images of Coptic Christians protecting Muslims as they prayed in Tahrir Square and croses held up with Qurans were stirring demonstrations of unity, all the more impactful in light of the recent sectarian violence leading up to the beginning of the protests on January 25. On New Year?s Day a bombing of a church in Alexandria killed 23 people and was the worst sectarian violence in a decade. 208 The question of whether the unity shown betwen Muslims and Christians in Tahrir Square will translate to a new Egypt and a new constitution is central to the suces of a democratic government. At the First International Coptic Symposium in Zurich in 204 Paul Marshall aserted that Egypt?s influential role as the ?major intellectual and cultural center in the Arab Islamic world? and one of the largest recipients of US aid means that ?the fate of the Copts? as the largest Christian community in the Middle East ?is both an indicator and a factor in the future of other religious minorities in the region.? 209 Egypt?s Coptic Christians make up about 8 to 12 percent of the Egyptian population of aproximately 83 million, or about 6 to 10 million people. Copts are not the only minority group; about les than 1 percent of the population are Shi?a Muslims, an estimated 2,00 Baha?is, les than 20 Jews, and various Christian denominations. 210 As the largest minority group in Egypt, the marginalization of the Coptic Christians is test of how the Egyptian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 208 Leyne, Jon. "Egypt on Alert as Copts Celebrate Christmas." BBC News. BC, 01 July 201. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. . 209 Khalil, Magdi. "The Ordeal of Arab Christians." Copts in Egypt: A Christian Minority Under Siege : Papers Presented at the First International Coptic Symposium, Zurich, September 23-25, 2004. Zurich, Switzerland: G2W-Verlag, 206. 45-50. Print.. Page 49. 210 "Egypt: International Religious Fredom Report 207." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 207. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. . The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 103" constitution?s provision for fredom of belief and religious practices is caried out. So in the Task Force?s theme of analyzing the strugle for democracy a case study of the marginalization of and violence toward the Coptic Christians in Egypt will contribute an indicator for the future of other religious and ethnic minorities in the Arab Islamic world. Examining the historical marginalization of the Copts in order is useful for making informed recommendations for NATO to help Egyptians build the democracy demanded in Tahrir Square. In this paper I argue that the rise of radical Islam in Egypt and the systematic discrimination against Coptic Christians from military and government jobs have marginalized this sizable minority and contributed to increased sectarian violence. By examining the underlying historical and socio-economic factors of the Islamization of the Egyptian state and the consequential marginalization of the Copts informed policy recommendations can follow that addres rot problems. Any lasting gains for Copts must come from Egyptians themselves and therefore canot be imposed by an outside force such as NATO. My recommendations take this into acount and focus on how NATO can help facilitate positive and lasting change in Egypt. In the final section of this paper I call for NATO member hosted dialogues with constitution writers to encourage proportional representation for Copts and equal rights for all Egyptians to be clearly stated in the new constitution. As last resorts, should violence against Copts escalate and be allowed by the new government I recommend NATO member states to acept Copts as refuges and the use of sanctions on Egypt. This paper will make the following recommendations for NATO: through NATO member hosted dialogues NATO ought to advocate for 1.) Proportional representation for Copts in parliament; 2.) The realization of equal rights for Copts by lifting legal The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 104" discrimination practices; and 3.) equal rights and political representation for women. This paper also recommends that NATO member states acept Copts as refuges and that the United States use sanctions provided by the 198 US Fredom from Religious Persecution Act to limit foreign aid to Egypt should violence against Copts escalate on a large scale without adequate response from the Egyptian government. I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MARGINALIZATION OF THE COPTS [7.12] Conflict betwen Muslims and Copts canot be reduced solely to religious tensions. Instead, the recent violence leading up to the Arab Spring and continuing in Egypt today can be beter understod through the historic proceses that brought about the Islamization of the Egyptian state. Islamization since the 1952 Revolution has had strong socio-economic impacts on Copts. Also, legal decisions have systematically marginalized the Copts, pushing them out of economic oportunity and labeling them as second-clas citizens in their own country. At the First International Coptic Symposium Magdi Khalil quoted the contemporary Egyptian writer and human rights activist Galal Amin saying, ?Evidently, the issue of Muslims and Copts is not a religious issue, it stirs up all our issues: education, fredom, rational thinking, justice, ethics, and development. If this argument is valid, then it is obvious that if we want to se Muslims fred, we ned to fre the Copts first.? 211 The myriad of issues Amin describes means that violence betwen Copts and Muslims has complex rot causes and so require multifaceted solutions. Initially, Gamal Abdel Naser?s plans for the Islamization of the Egyptian state sought to present a united front to the rest of the world. For the Copts, this false claim of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 211 Marshal, Paul. "Egypt?s Endangered Christians." Copts in Egypt: A Christian Minority Under Siege : Papers Presented at the First International Coptic Symposium, Zurich, September 23-25, 2004. Zurich, Switzerland: G2W-Verlag, 206. 24-29. Print. Page 24. The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 105" Islamic unity has had very real consequences. The rise of systematic discrimination of Coptic Christians in Egyptian society can be conected to the second article of the Egyptian constitution and several legal decisions since the 1952 Revolution, including land redistribution programs. In 1980 the second article of the Egyptian Constitution, ?Islam is the oficial religion of the state,? was Amended under Anwar al-Sadat to include the clause ?and the principles of the Islamic sharia (law) are the major source of legislation,? further problematizing the status of the Copts. 212 In The Chalenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State, Rachel M. Scot raises the question of how a constitutional commitment to an Islamic state means for non-Muslims ?both as individuals and as members of religious communities.? 213 Scot goes on to sugest that defining the Egyptian state places Coptic Christians as second- clas citizens with unequal rights despite the Egyptian constitutions promise of equality. This inequality of citizenship is made more tangible with the legacy of Naser?s land redistribution program. Thousands of hectares were taken from Copts as well as from the Coptic Orthodox Church, which was never compensated for the los of its main source of revenue. The land was then ?redistributed? to Muslims only. The 1961 nationalization laws which ?transfered privately held industries to government control? also severely impacted the Copts who ?had owned a substantial number of factories, companies and banks.? 214 The legacy of the 1952 Revolution is still felt economically by Coptic Christians in Egypt today. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 212 Iskander, Milad. "The Coptic Strugle after the Revolution of 1952." Copts in Egypt: A Christian Minority Under Siege : Papers Presented at the First International Coptic Symposium, Zurich, September 23-25, 2004. Zurich, Switzerland: G2W-Verlag, 206. 36-44. Print. Page 40. 213 Scot, Rachel M. The Chalenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010. Print. Page 2. 214 Iskander, Milad. "The Coptic Strugle after the Revolution of 1952." Copts in Egypt: A Christian Minority Under Siege : Papers Presented at the First International Coptic Symposium, Zurich, September 23-25, 2004. Zurich, Switzerland: G2W-Verlag, 206. 36-44. Page 39. The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 106" Next, in a presentation at the First International Coptic Symposium Adel Guindy argued that the ?exclusion and marginalization of the Copts? must end in positions such as ?senior cabinet members, governors, city executives, university and faculty deans, and high- ranking positions in the media, military, and police? in order for there to be a restoration of full citizenship rights for Copts. Also, typical limits of 1-2% are placed on the enrollment of Copts ?into military academies, to teaching position apointments at universities, and to participation in the judiciary and diplomatic corps? 215 efectively kep Copts out of the political proces. How can the Copts be politically involved in state institutions when the state purposefully excludes them? Acording to the US State Department?s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor the Egyptian Constitution ?provides for equal public rights and duties without discrimination based on religion or cred? but there is ?government discrimination against non-Muslims.? For example, Christians, while making up 8 to 12 percent of the population, ?hold les than 2 percent of the seats in the People's Asembly and Shura Council? and are bared from studying at Al-Azhar University, a publicly funded university. Additionally, ?university training programs for Arabic language teachers bar non-Muslims because the curiculum involves study of the Qur'an? and public funds are used to pay Muslim imams but not Christian clergy. 216 The lack of representation in the Egyptian government of Coptic Christians is extremely problematic and hinders eforts for equal rights for all Egyptians. Agravating the sense of injustice are the restrictions on repairing and building new churches coming from the use of an 1856 Otoman law, Hatti Humyun ?which stipulates that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 215 Guindy, Adel. "Towards the Restoration of Full Citizenship Rights to Copts in Egypt." Copts in Egypt: A Christian Minority Under Siege : Papers Presented at the First International Coptic Symposium, Zurich, September 23-25, 2004. Zurich, Switzerland: G2W-Verlag, 206. 13-141. Page 136. 216 "Egypt." Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. U.S. Department of State, 1 Mar. 208. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. . The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 107" a presidential decre is required for building a church or even repairing a toilet in a church.? This restriction does not aply to mosques, which are ?built and maintained with money from the state treasury, i.e. form taxes that were collected from Copts as well.? 217 Additionally, ?divisive decisions by public servants and courts? hurt the Coptic community. In a ?questionable measure against swine flu? in 209 Egyptian authorities destroyed 250,00 pigs kept by Cairo?s Coptic zabaleen community who work as garbage collectors in the city and raise the pigs on the discarded fod. This unecesary cull of pigs was sen by ?a veiled Muslim expresion of disgust at pigs? and denied the zabaleen community an esential source of fod. 218 The growing outrage and frustrations of Coptic Christians in Egypt is compounded by the government?s discriminatory practices. II. Coptic Involvement and Response to the Arab Spring [7.2] Despite the recent violence, especially the Alexandria bombing, the coperation betwen Copts and Muslims during the protests may bring hope for the future of Egypt. In an interview for BBC News University of Cambridge lecturer on Egyptian politics and society Maha Abdelrahman said, ?The united front which the pro-democracy protesters have used shows that Egyptians, once united, can se through and subvert the regime's manipulation.? Acording to Abdelrahman, the Egyptian government has ben spuring on violence against the Copts and not a popular anti-Christian sentiment. Abdelrahman reafirms that "systematic discrimination against the Copts has ben common in some areas such as exclusion from top state and military positions," but goes on to say that the state has ?indirectly incited and fuelled sectarian tension betwen Muslims and Christians? through !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 217 Ibrahim, Fouad. "The Human Rights of Copts in Egypt." Copts in Egypt: A Christian Minority Under Siege : Papers Presented at the First International Coptic Symposium, Zurich, September 23-25, 2004. Zurich, Switzerland: G2W-Verlag, 206.142-148. Page 143. 218 Knel, Yolande BC. "Growing Fears of Egypt's Copts in Climate of Violence." BBC World News. BC, 5 Jan. 201. Web. 17 Feb. 2012. . The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 108" ?its complete control over the state-run media, education and religious institutions." 219 This shows that the conflicts betwen Muslims and Christians were not only religious or cultural but were in part spured on by the Mubarak regime. In sharp contrast to this ?legacy of state-sponsored religious discrimination? is a long tradition of unity in protest among Christians and Muslims. The symbol of the crescent and cros together, sen so often in Tahrir square, was the symbol for both the 1919 revolution that fred Egypt from British control and the nationalist Wafd party that was a dominating political force in Egypt until the 1950s. 220 The displays of unity in Tahrir Square, both the crescent and the cros as well as groups of Muslims and Christians protecting each other as they prayed, conect to this legacy. While these signs of unity are hopeful, the problems faced by the Copts did not go away with Mubarak steping down. As the early election results for Egypt come in showing strong numbers for the Muslim Brotherhod and Salafist parties many Copts are woried about their future in potentially even more Islamized state. The hopes and fears of millions of Copts are pinned on a new constitution for Egypt. III. Women in Egypt [7.3] As a vulnerable population, perhaps more than anything the status of women of all faiths in post-revolution Egypt will be extremely telling of progres on human rights overall. The forced ?virginity tests? caried out by the Egyptian military during the revolution exposed the world to the high prevalence of sexual asault in Egypt, where 83 percent of women have experienced sexual harasment and 53 percent of ?blame women for ?bringing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 219 Alexander, Anne. "Egypt's Muslims and Christians Join Hands in Protest." BBC News. BC, 02 Oct. 201. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. . 220 Alexander, Anne. "Egypt's Muslims and Christians Join Hands in Protest." BBC News. BC, 02 Oct. 2011. Web. 22 Feb. 2012. . The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 109" it on?? acording to a 208 survey by the Egyptian Center for Women?s Rights. 221 Furthermore, there are fears that the campaign against Female Genital Mutilation will sufer due to the suces of the Muslim Brotherhod and the Salafists in the recent elections. Nivine Rasmi, a doctor and women?s rights advocate said that ?Of course we fear this new parliament won't tackle issues like FGM because already there are extremists who want FGM unlike the previous regime?We know that there will be a decline in women and children rights with this new government and parliament.? 222 Issues such as FGM, sexual harasment, and sexual asault afect all Egyptian women. For Egypt to suced in its transition to democracy the rights of women ned to be recognized. Egyptian women were part of the Tahrir Square demonstrations and are active in the push for social change and democracy. In Robin Wright?s bok Rock the Casbah she chronicles how the ?pink hejab generation? is influencing a cultural shift in Egypt. With colorful hejabs ?highly visible on every Egyptian campus? Wright states that this generation of educated women using the internet is ?one of the most dynamic forces in the curent social and political upheavals.? 223 That these empowered, female activists involved in the Egyptian revolution are centering their activism in an Islamic identity, as expresed by their embracing of hejab, is problematic for non-Muslim women and especially for Coptic Christian women who do not wear hejab. This dynamic may act to exclude Coptic Christian women even further and the growing number of young, educated, Muslim women wearing hejab in fact makes those who do not wear hejab all the more visible and separate. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 221 Topol, Sarah A. "Sexual Harasment in Egypt." Views From Writers Around the World. New York Times .com, 3 Feb. 2010. Web. 17 Feb. 2012. . 222 Lloyd-Roberts, Sue. "Female Genital Mutilation Rife in Egypt Despite Ban." BBC News - Home. BC Newsnight, 15 Feb. 2012. Web. 17 Feb. 2012. . 223 Wright, Robin B. Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebelion Acros the Islamic World. New York: Simon & Schuster, 201. Print. Page 147. The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 110" Wright goes on at length to draw conections betwen wearing hijab and the counter-jihad, calling it both a ?a declaration of activist intent? and ?an instrument that makes a female untouchable as she makes her own decisions in the macho Arab world.? Furthermore, Wright aserts that wearing hejab gives a women protection against ?extremism?s pull into the past? and makes a women?s demands for change more legitimate as ?militants canot criticize her for being corupted by Western influence.? 224 If Wright?s argument is true, then Coptic Christian women are made targets and excluded from the same activism and legitimacy. Surely, the violence against women during demonstrations, including women wearing the hejab, shows that wearing hejab does not make a woman ?untouchable? as Wright claims. Police brutality, torture, rape, and ?virginity tests? all show that women are still vulnerable. More importantly however, the persistence of women taking part and leading others in the upheavals acros the Islamic world shows the intensity of their desire for change and their commitment. With early election results for Egypt showing strong numbers for the Muslim Brotherhod and Salafist parties there is concern for how ideals expresed by the ?pink hejab generation? during the revolution will cary over into a new Egyptian government. The lack of women in political parties and parliament despite their involvement in the revolution is deeply troubling. In fact, concern is voiced in Casbah over the Muslim Brotherhod?s ?draft manifesto that would prevent women and Christians from becoming president? and keps the role of women within their party to a women-only branch. 225 The election results make the question of women?s rights all the more urgent; protecting the human rights of all !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 224 Wright, Robin B. Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebelion Acros the Islamic World. New York: Simon & Schuster, 201. Print. Page 145. 225 Wright, 147 The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 111" Egyptian women and making use of their tremendous potential to contribute to a new Egypt will be critical to the suces of the fledgling democracy. IV. NEXT STEPS: HOW CAN NATO RESPOND? [7.4] Based on these recent signs of coperation, the NATO response ought to encourage equal rights for all Egyptian citizens in a new democratic state regardles of religion or gender. NATO member states ought to host dialogues betwen Egyptian leaders on how the Egyptian government can beter serve minorities in a new, more democratic government. Embracing Egypt?s diversity may prove an aset to the new government. In his bok Inside Egypt: the Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of Revolution John R. Bradley argues that the ?vast gap betwen the [Mubarak] regime?s claims and reality,? betwen the false claim of unity and the reality of diversity, underlay the harasment and torture of Egyptian citizens. Bradley goes on to state that ?the claim of unity is fundamentally inconsistent with the tenets of democracy, which are based on? the ?legitimacy and value? of ?the existence of diversity and differences.? 226 NATO member hosted dialogues ought to foster this value of diversity and encourage the writers of the new Egyptian constitution to include this value in the law. As discused earlier, much of the marginalization of the Copts stems out of the constitution and laws coming out of the 1952 Revolution. Emphasizing equal rights as citizens for all in the new constitution will be important to addresing this marginalization. Through NATO member hosted dialogues with constitution writers and Egyptian leaders NATO ought to encourage the following concrete actions to embrace Egypt?s diversity as an aset; proportional representation for Copts in parliament, ensure the realization of equal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 226 Bradley, John R. Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 209. Print. Page 83. The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 112" rights for Copts by lifting legal discrimination practices, and ending violence against women. Should violence against Copts escalate further and be either caried out or pasively allowed by the new government or military I recommend that NATO member states acept Copts as refuges and that the United States use sanctions provided by the 198 US Fredom from Religious Persecution Act to limit foreign aid to Egypt. It is absolutely vital that these changes come from within Egypt if they are to have lasting efects. No outside power, including NATO, can impose these actions on Egypt. Instead, I advocate that NATO members use their influence to help facilitate positive change in Egypt. The demonstrators in Tahrir Square holding up Qurans and Croses together were a symbol of the hope for unity of all Egyptians regardles of religion. In this spirit, my recommendations sek to promote Egyptian national unity based on equal citizenship. Equal rights and national unity must be the goal but as a transition to the aceptance of this I recommend more proportional representation for Copts. This is especially important for Coptic rights if the statement from Article 2 of the curent Egyptian constitution, ?Islam is the oficial religion of the state and the principles of the Islamic sharia (law) are the major source of legislation? or similar wording remains in the new constitution. I recognize that proportional representation for Copts in parliament may sem at odds with the concept of puting citizenship separate from religion; however, given the early suceses of Islamist parties in the recent election it sems likely that the ideas of Article 2 will cary into the new constitution. While promoting unity based on national Egyptian unity is the goal of my recommendations, it is more realistic to increase Coptic representation in parliament in order to reduce their political marginalization. I sugest NATO encourage several actions to ensure equal rights for Copts and lift legal discrimination; get rid of religious status on government identification documents; The Coptic Question Anie Banel ! ! 113" addres Coptic concerns over church building and repairs and remove the ned for a presidential decre for these actions; and rapidly expand the economic, government, and military oportunities for Copts by removing ceilings on enrollments to military academies, university teaching positions, and judiciary. Removing religious status from government documents will also benefit other minority groups in Egypt such as members of the Baha?i faith whose religion is not recognized by the state and are consequently denied ?civil documents, including ID cards, birth certificates, and mariage licenses? and ?face great difficulties in conducting civil transactions, including registering births, mariages and deaths, obtaining pasports, enrolling children in schol, opening bank acounts, and obtaining driver's licenses.? 227 Finally, NATO ought to exercise its influence in a dialogue on violence against all women in Egypt by encouraging the involvement of all women in politics and civil society. As a vulnerable population, perhaps more than anything the status of women in post- revolution Egypt will be extremely telling of progres on human rights overall. These issues and more, including political representation for women ought to be addresed in NATO member facilitated dialogues with Egyptian leaders. The Egyptian people?s triumph in bringing down their dictator has brought them to the center of the world stage. The influence of Egypt in the region has the oportunity to be a leader establishing a democratic government that respects the equal rights of all its citizens, regardles of religion or gender. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 227 "Egypt: International Religious Fredom Report 2007." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 207. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. . PART II LIBYA The 2011 NATO coalition intervention in Libya was without precedent. For the first time in history, the UN authorized a humanitarian intervention that?save for the baring of ground trop deployment?was limited by neither scope nor time. The operation was largely sucesful in preventing the slaughter of tens of thousands of civilians in eastern Libya, and allowing Libyans to take ownership of their revolution. Yet a half a year after the death of Muammar al-Qaddafi, and one full year after NATO?s involvement, Libya is in a state of disaray. Despite admirable efforts by the National Transitional Council, the administrative body is finding it difficult to manage disparate militias as it atempts to unify the country down the path towards a representative government. With an abundance of arms throughout the country, and a complete lack of any institutional foundation, Libya has many challenges ahead of creating a peaceful and stable government. While Muammar al-Qaddafi had few friends by the end of his 42-year rule, his departure, greatly facilitated by NATO?s military operations, reignited a debate over the proper use of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The first chapter of this section focuses on the principle of R2P as it aplies to the NATO led coalition intervention in Libya. It is a defense of both the principle of R2P, as well as a defense of the Libyan intervention as a whole. The chapter first focuses on R2P?s maturation as an international norm intended on preventing mas atrocities. Using Libya as a case study, the paper then defends the use of military force aplied to humanitarian intervention. By observing the operation in Libya, the study then makes projections as to what the future of R2P will look like. The subsequent chapter ofers a forward-looking view at Libya by presenting the curent challenges that face the newly liberated country. By looking at its demographics, PART II LIBYA economy, and lack of institutions, the chapter probes at what posible role NATO might have in Libya?s future. Having the largest oil reserves in Africa, Libya can either fall victim to the ?oil curse? or use the oil to drive economic growth and diversification in other sectors of the economy. With a youth bulge that translates into about half of the population being minors, Libya must develop other parts of its economy it if hopes to reduce unemployment and put its educated youth to work. Libya has the highest Human Development Index on the African continent, and can manifest a positive future if it draws on its existing human capital while protecting its political proces from the corupting influence of its natural capital. Libya now has the oportunity to create an exemplary representative government from scratch, but must quickly learn to unite its populace to this end. The chapter takes a distinctly optimistic view of the future as it follows the roadmap set forth by the National Transitional Council. The paper argues for NATO?s continued engagement in Libya only as it pertains to their demands and a respect for their self-determination. To this end, the chapter suggests that NATO and its member states facilitate the transition through a capacity building advisory role. ! ! ! L i b y an R e v o l u t i o n o f 2011 M ar c h 1 A p r i l 1 M ay 1 J u n e 1 J u l y 1 A u g u s t 1 S e p t e m b e r 1 O c t o b e r 1 Arab League votes unanimously to request NFZMar 12 Britain recognizes NTCJul 27 NTC passes interim Constitutional DeclarationAug 3declares statehood, basic rights, and provisions for the transitional phase Battle for TripoliAug 20?23 NTC Defense Minister killedJul 28 N AT O t a k e s f u l l comma n d of op e r a t i on s Mar 31 Coalition begins enforcing UNSCR 1973Mar 19UNSCR 1973 was passed on 3/17 U.S. recognizes NTC as Libya's legitimate gov.Jul 15 UN releases $500 million in frozen assets to NTCAug 25 IMF recognizes NTCSep 10 Prominent human rights lawyer arrested along with several protesters showing support for himFeb 15Lawyer Fathi Terbil represented 1,200 prisoners massacred by Libyan security forces in Abu Slim prison in 1996 "Day of Rage" sparks nationwide revolutionFeb 17?25Peaceful pro-democracy protests turn into armed rebellion after government clampdowns; 1000+ reportedly killed in Benghazi, Tripoli, and Misrata alone Formation of the NTCFeb 27National Transitional Council formed with new fl ag adopted R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 114" Chapter 8 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT & LIBYA A CASE STUDY On October 30 th of 201?shortly after the death of Muammar al-Qaddafi on August 23 rd ?NATO?s operations in Libya oficially ended. With the final arests of the Qaddafi circle, the people of Libya liberated themselves from a dictatorship that spaned over four decades. As Libyans now begin a new chapter in building a legitimate government of their own, some are still debating whether intervention in Libya was ever justified. Although Libyans tok ownership of their revolution from the beginning, these eforts would have ben fruitles were it not for the internationally backed NATO-coalition intervention. Indeed, the use of military force to protect civilians is an extremely delicate proces with a highly contentious history. While most would agre that the recent international recognition of humanitarian norms has positively contributed to the reduction of mas atrocities, military force justly remains a last resort option in the scope of foreign policy prescriptions. When used, these emergency responses necesitate esential legal, political, and operational preconditions before becoming a viable humanitarian efort. The following chapter is a defense of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as well as an atempt to make the case for military force aplied to humanitarian intervention. Using the 201 NATO-coalition intervention in Libya as a case study, we argue that military force must be part of the full range of mechanisms available to the international community in order to efectively react to unfolding mas atrocities. Our study begins with a look at the evolution of R2P, explaining why the principle is important, as well as how its ?thre pillar? framework adds to the civilian-protection regime. This is followed by a selected review of R2P?s aplications since its inception in 205, highlighting the comprehensivenes of the doctrine and the multitude of peaceful tols that comprise the R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 115" initiative. We then consider R2P?s aplication in the Libyan case, first by evaluating the suceses of the NATO-coalition?s operation at length. The study concludes with an asesment of where the concept of international responsibility stands after Libya. I. WHO?S RESPONSIBLE? [8.1] Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever afects one directly, afects al indirectly. -Martin Luther King Jr., Leter from a Birmingham Jail, 3.16.1963 The recent international military intervention in Libya has rengaged the fundamental question of whether the Westphalian sanctity of state-sovereignty supersedes the moral imperative to protect civilian populations from mas atrocities. While the international community has overwhelmingly embraced the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 228 * there remains a lively debate over the tactics that should be used for its practical implementation. Criticism of R2P has ben almost exclusively reserved for its ?third pillar,? the so-called ?sharp edge? of the principle?s framework. While the third pillar draws on a wide range of peaceful diplomatic and political tols, it leaves the option of collective military action open as a last resort in cases where all available peaceful measures have previously ben exhausted. Yet for all of the criticism over how military force was aplied in NATO?s intervention in Libya, there remains a lot of misunderstanding over what R2P is and how it works. To some critics, military intervention and R2P have become synonymous. Many unfamiliar with the normative principle have conflated this last resort set of military tactics reserved for emergency response, with a humanitarian doctrine backed by a full range !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 228 *Edward Luck, UN Special Advisor to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said: ?We don?t have any chalenges anymore on the principle. A lot of challenges on the tactic, a lot of challenges about regime change, about people misusing R2P, which is a wory. But not on the principle.? "International Responsibility After Libya." [P.30] Washington D.C.: The Brokings Institution, 2012. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. . R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 116" of preventionary and reactionary tols available in the context of multilateral atrocity prevention. In the following section we intend to clarify this distinction betwen R2P?s principles and its tactics. We begin by tracing the evolution of R2P, recalling how the principle emerged from history?s tainted conscience. A subsequent analysis of its aplication then illustrates how R2P is a much more comprehensive doctrine than its extreme response of military intervention. We point to the broad international consensus around R2P as an international norm, and respond to the reservations some have had over its emerging tactics. From consistency in aplication, to the fear of unilateral action, we will acknowledge the major criticisms of R2P in implementing theory to practice. The section concludes by arguing that for the framework to be both efective and flexible, military force?albeit rare and not in any way the main tol of R2P?must remain a last resort option available to the international community. [8.1.a] The Principle of R2P During the post-WII reconstruction era, the international community, compelled by the horors of the Holocaust, tok first steps towards developing worldwide standards for human rights. In writing the 1945 UN Charter, member states declared through Article 5 & 56 under Chapter IX, a universal commitment to ?human rights and fundamental fredoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.? 229 The UN again reafirmed this commitment through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide (1948), and the subsequent Geneva conventions that outlined the proper treatment of civilians in wartime. While the push for international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 229 United Nations. General Asembly. Charter of the United Nations: Charter of the United Nations: Chapter IX: International Economic and Social Co-operation. 1945. Web. . R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 117" humanitarian law was moving forward, the violent proxy conflicts of the Cold War revealed the changing landscape of armed conflict. Where civilians were once a minority of casualties in the days of large inter-state wars, a shift to internal conflicts (Figure 1.1) revealed that non-combatants were now the vast majority of casualties. Acording to a report by the European Union?s Institute for Security Studies: ?Since 190, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians.? 230 After the complete failure of the international community to respond to the genocides of Cambodia (1975-9), Rwanda (194), and Srebrenica (195), it became evident that an efective framework for prevention and response had to be developed. These large-scale loses of civilian life were the impetus for an international push to begin prioritizing the protection of people, rather than just the protection of states. Figure 1.1: Average Number of International Conflicts per Year, 1950-2008 231 At the 205 UN World Summit, the largest gathering of heads of state to date, world leaders vowed to outline a framework intended on ?never again? allowing man-made mas !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 230 ?A Secure Europe in a Beter World: European Security Strategy? [P.5] European Union Institute for Security Studies, 203. Paris. Web. . 231 Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 209/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Pres, 2011. Figures from the Human Security Report 2009 / 2010 Citation and Data Information Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and The Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Armed Conflict Dataset v4-2009, http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ (accessed 16 November 2010). Figure 1.1 Average Number of International Conflicts per Year, 1950?2008 Extrastate Interstate Years 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1950?591960?69 1970?791980?89 2000?081990?99 Av erag e Number of Conf li ct s pe r Ye ar Data Source: UCDP/PRIO. There has been a steady decline in the number of international conflicts?defined here to include interstate and extrastate conflicts?around the world. Extrastate, or anticolonial conflicts, ended in the 1970s. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 118" atrocities to be repeated. Building of of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan?s detailed reports on sovereignty, security, and human rights, as well as the African Union?s ?Constitutive Act? (200), 232* what emerged was the initiative of R2P. In drawing up R2P, world governments made a political commitment built on already existing international laws intended on preventing four mas atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon clearly outlined the ?thre pillar? framework of R2P in his 209 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: 1) The enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 2) The comitment of the international comunity to asist States in meting those obligations. 3) The responsibility of Member States to respond colectively in a timely and decisive maner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection. 233 By consolidating the international community?s tols of mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctioning (Figure 4.6), and military intervention, R2P thus created a powerful political tol that unified long-standing regional and international humanitarian laws. In adopting R2P, world leaders therefore agred that sovereignty came with the responsibility to protect the people within its teritory. By recognizing a state?s sovereign responsibility to protect its populations, it gets at the very esence of what state sovereignty encompases. In stresing the State?s individual Responsibility to Protect, it seks to strengthen that sovereignty through legitimacy. When UN member states aproved the initiative, the international community thereby agred to its collective duty in strengthening the State?s will and capacity to protect its populations. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 232 * The initiative reflected the AU?s eforts to move from ?non-interference? to ?non-indifference.? The Constitutive Act declares member states? ?respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance?. It also cals for the ?condemnation and rejection of impunity,? and states that it is the ?right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Asembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.? African Union, ?Constitutive Act of the African Union?. Lom?, 2000. Web. . 233 ?Implementing the responsibility to protect: report of the Secretary-General?. UN General Asembly, 12 January 2009, A/63/67, R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 119" Figure 4.6: Countries Targeted by Multilateral Sanctions Regimes, 1960-2008 234 Since the UN World Summit in 205, R2P has gained significant ground and ben reafirmed as a core principle in international circles. That same year the African Union adopted the ?Ezulwini Consensus,? a ?common African position? that embraced R2P, stresed the role of regional organizations in protection, and reaserted the Security Council?s authority to decide on the use force in the four mas atrocity cases. 235 Acording to Edward Luck, Columbia Profesor of International Relations and UN Special-Advisor to Ban Ki- moon, there has ben: ?a real reluctance on the part of member states to vote against a resolution that has R2P in it.? Mr. Luck believes this is because member states are acepting human security as a central concern of the UN and its member states. 236 In July 209, the UN General Asembly held a plenary debate highlighting widespread international suport for the principle. Out of the 180 member countries in atendance, only four?Cuba, Venezuela, Sudan, and Nicaragua?sought to ?roll back the R2P principle from the agrement already reached. 237 Notably, China?s representative said that the World Summit !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 234 Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 209/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Pres, 201. 235 African Union. Executive Council. The common African position on the proposed reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus. Adis Ababa: Ethiopia, 205. Ext/EX.CL/2 (VI). Web. . 236 "International Responsibility After Libya." [P.30] Washington D.C.: The Brokings Institution, 2012. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. . 237 ?The Responsibility to Protect? Oxfam, n.d. Web. 25 Feb 2012. . Figures from the Human Security Report 2009 / 2010 Citation and Data Information Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and The Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Joakim Kreutz, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; updated from Joakim Kreutz, ?Hard Measure by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union,? Bonn International Center for Conversion Paper 45, 2005, http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/ publications/papers/paper45/paper45.pdf (accessed 25 November 2010). The graph includes UN, European Union, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe sanctions regimes. Figure 4.6 Countries Targeted by Multilateral Sanctions Regimes, 1960?2008 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Number of Coun trie s Ta rgeted 19651960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year Data Source: Joakim Kreutz. The number of countries targeted by economic and political sanctions exploded after the end of the Cold War, going from just two in 1989 to 26 in 2008. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 120" Outcome Document ?gave a very prudent description? of R2P. 238 Among the key areas of consensus that arose were agrements on: 1) the 205 World Summit outcomes not being up for renegotiation; 2) R2P?s legal legitimacy in acordance with existing international law; and 3) the renewal of a commitment to the ?thre pillar? concept for mas atrocity prevention. 239 In budgeting debates over UN R2P funds, the pro-R2P side won in 2010 by a 4-to-1 margin, and in the following year won by an even greater margin of 6?-to-1. 240 Lastly, while Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has always ben a staunch suporter of R2P there have ben no major eforts to unseat him or stymie his leadership on the issue. The Secretary- General invoked R2P on four separate ocasions throughout 201 (Cote d?Ivoire, Libya, South Sudan, and Yemen), and was still unanimously relected in June (when the suces of NATO?s Libyan mission was still very much in question) by the 192-nation UN General Asembly. 241 [8.1.b] The Tactics of R2P I don?t think the responsibility to protect as a standard, as a doctrine, as a principle was being tested in Libya. I think everyone agreed that it aplied very apropriately in the Libyan situation. The differences realy were about tactics -Edward Luck, Special Advisor , 6.16.201 R2P consolidates a wide range of tactics from the UN Charter: 1) the peaceful measures of Chapter 6 include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial setlement; 2) Chapter 8 outlines regional and sub-regional mechanisms for resolving disputes; and finally 3) Chapter 7 traces the proper procedure for the enforcement of coercive measures. If R2P is to make a lasting difference in the realm of human security, it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 238 "Implementing ?responsibility to protect? must not contravene state sovereignty." Xinhua News Agency 25 Jul 209. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . 239 GCR2P. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect The 209 General Asembly Debate: An Asesment. 209. Web. . 240 "International Responsibility After Libya." [P.6-7] Washington D.C.: The Brokings Institution, 2012. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. . 241 "Ban Ki-moon re-elected UN chief." Al Jazera 21 Jun 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 121" canot simply exist in the theoretical world. While the principle of R2P is no longer in question, its tactics continue to be tested as apropriate calls for its implementation arise. Since a chief goal of R2P is a flexible and timely response, the international community agred to a case-by-case basis for tailoring its prescriptions to specific evolving neds on the ground. Without precise guidelines that dictate the tactics used for implementing its broadly defined pillars, there continues to be differences in opinion over how best to respond in times of crises. In this section we addres some of the most significant concerns over its practical aplication. 1) The Danger of Unilateral Coercive Intervention Concern regarding unilateral action has ben voiced by a small minority of member states and reflects a misunderstanding of R2P as per the 205 World Summit Outcomes Document. Indeed, R2P was developed to prevent unilateral interventions, since it specifically outlines ?collective actions? in acordance with the UN Charter. In paragraph 77 of the consensus World Summit Document, under the section entitled Use of force under the Charter of the United Nations, member states declared that they are: ??determined to take efective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the supresion of acts of agresion or other breaches of the peace?? 242 The language here is unambiguous and if insuficient is again restated unequivocally in paragraph 139, under the section entitled Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity: The international comunity, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in acordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 242 United Nations, ?General Asembly Resolution 60/1?, October 205, [P.21] Article 77, R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 122" take collective action, in a timely and decisive maner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VI, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as apropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stres the ned for the General Asembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. 243 By stresing the importance of complying with the UN Charter as well as with international law, R2P clearly canot be used to legitimize unilateral intervention because it falls outside of the parameters agred to by UN member states. It is for this reason that when Rusia duplicitously cited R2P when unilaterally invading Georgia in 208, the international community widely condemned its actions and pointed out their direct violations of numerous UN Security Council resolutions. 244 2) UN Security Council Reform & Enhancing the Role of the UN General Asembly While arguments for reform of the UN Security Council have ben around since the very beginning of the UN, there remains legitimate reason for expanding membership. Security Council reform and greater inclusivenes of the General Asembly was debated in every year there has ben dialogue on the subject of R2P. Many member states have voiced their concerns over the frequent lack of consensus betwen the permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council. To this end, the Secretary General has repeatedly warned P-5 members to use extreme caution in exercising their veto in the context of mas atrocity situations. 245 Fearing that this might lead to inaction, the UN General Asembly can still convene under the ?Uniting for Peace? procedure. Although non-binding, the procedure allows for the General Asembly to put political presure on the P-5 by making !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 243 Ibid. Articles 138 & 139, [P.30]. 244 "Ungodly Sufering: An American take on a war that fed conspiracies throughout Europe." The Economist. 21 Jan 2010: Web. 26 Feb. 2012. . 245 GCR2P. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect The 209 General Asembly Debate: An Assessment. [P.9] 209. Web. . R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 123" recommendations for collective measures when it judges the Security Council to have failed in meeting its responsibilities. 246 Recently in the case of Syria, the General Asembly used the proces to overwhelmingly condemn Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad after a stronger worded UN Security Council resolution was double-vetoed by Rusia and China. 247 Continued discourse over increasing General Asembly powers in issuing binding resolutions have long ben considered but are unlikely to be adopted son given the highly entrenched nature of United Nations operational structure. Some countries like South Sudan and Venezuela have called for the General Asembly to be the sole body to implement the use of force under pillar thre. However this would require an extremely unlikely rewriting of all Articles in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as it specifies that the Security Council be the ultimate arbiter of collective measures regarding international peace and security. 248 Furthermore, considering the great disparity in resources available to commit for last resort humanitarian intervention, a strictly democratic proces within the General Asembly could potentially be both dangerous and inefective since most countries would by default not cary the burden of seing through a military operation. 3) Double Standards & the Consistency of R2P?s Aplication A popular criticism of R2P?for those who disregard its full body of tactics?is that the standard is not consistently aplied. In our view this is the most important reservation to expound. While we recognize that the use of military force has ben rarely deployed, we point out that the principal is much more comprehensive that this extreme, and that the military option is intended to be used in only the most dire of situations. Frequently, this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 246 United Nations. ?General Asembly?Fifth Sesion.? [P.10] Article 37, Uniting for Peace. 1950. Web. . 247 Gladstone, Rick. "General Asembly Votes to Condemn Syrian Leader." New York Times. 16 Fed 2012, Web. . 248 United Nations. General Asembly. Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VI: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Agression. 1945. Web. . R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 124" criticism is raised by those who simply do not want to aply the principle at all. Since military intervention is inherently dangerous, it often overshadows lower profile cases of the principle?s implementation. Nevertheles R2P is not an ?all or nothing? aproach. On the contrary, R2P has more often than not ben used in a preventative way. We recall that while the UN Security Council is a political body and is bound to make political decisions (that reflect national interests, military & political costs, and reasonable prospects) in authorizing the use of force, the principle of R2P has actually ben very consistently invoked when one considers its first and second pillars. Since R2P?s birth, the UN Secretary-General along with the UN Human Rights Council have had an exceptional record of consistency in their use of political and diplomatic presure. One example that reveals the complexities of implementing R2P within the political confines of the Security Council came at the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 209. While the UN Security Council observed a horifying number of human loses, 249 short of releasing a pres statement urging both sides to end the conflict, the UN SC was unable to take any concrete actions. In a telling illustration of how UN operations can be very politicized, it was reported that: Rusia, China, Libya and Vietnam had oposed puting the isue on the agenda of the Security Council, [?] But they relented in issuing a statement after the Western council members agred to discus a U.N. report on Israel's war in January in Gaza that the United States and its alies did not want raised, diplomats said. 250 Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stated that he believes the Sri Lankan government largely benefited from the political suport of the international community in combating the ?threat? of state-terorist activities by Tamil Tiger. 251 However, Ban Ki-moon, the Under !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 249 United Nations. Civilian casualties in Sri Lanka conflict ?unaceptably high? ? Ban. UN ews Centre, Web. . 250 Leopold, Evelyn. "Sri Lanka: UN Security Council Makes Its First Move." Hufington Post World n.d., n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . 251 Ki-moon, Ban. R2P: The Next Decade. The Stanley Foundation, 2012. Video. . R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 125" Secretary for Humanitarian Afairs, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and some member states were all very forceful in using the language of R2P to condemn the Sri Lankan government. 252 The Secretary-General also commissioned a report that outlined the necesary measures for acountability regarding international law, and found "credible allegations" that both sides of the conflict engaged in war crimes and crimes against humanity. 253 Considering the highly politicized discourse of the combat against the Tamil Tigers, as well as the Sri Lankan refusal to allow humanitarian groups aces to civilians, it?s clear that invoking R2P beyond its first and second pillars would not have ben feasible. Another example of suposed double standards came when some UN member states, including Algeria and Qatar, cited the case of Israel?s bombing of Gaza in December 208 and January of 209. 254 Yet while UN Security Council tok no collective action, R2P was invoked multiple times by the UN Human Rights Council and the Secretary-General. Richard Faulk, UN Human Rights envoy stated very poignantly that Israel?s ofensive constituted ?war crimes of the greatest magnitude.? 255 Following this the UN Human Rights Council pased a resolution condemning Israel for ?grave violations of human rights,? and called for an independent international investigation. 256 We must remind ourselves not to let perfection be the enemy of the god. Just because we canot do everything, does not mean we should not do something. On numerous ocasions the UN Security Council has acted on the third pillar of R2P without employing the use of military force. In the case of Guinea in 2010, the UN Security Council collectively !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 252 United Nations. Department of Public Information ? News and Media Division. Pres Conference on Sri Lanka by Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. New York: 209. Web. . 253 United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka. 201. Web. . 254 GCR2P. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect The 209 General Asembly Debate: An Asesment. [P.9] 209. Web. . 255 "UN envoy: Gaza op sems to be war crime of greatest magnitude." Haaretz 19 Mar 2009. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . 256 Nebehay, Stephanie. "South African to head U.N. rights inquiry in Gaza." Reuters 3 Apr 2009, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 126" ?deplored the violence? and ?stresed the responsibility of Guinea?s security forces and government oficials to maintain public order and to protect civilians?. 257 In South Sudan, the UN Security Council pased Resolutions 1591 (205) and 1945 (2010), both were economic sanctions of arms embargos, travel bans, and aset frezes on the parties implicated in the violence. 258 In the context of R2P, military intervention must be considered on a case-by-case basis, and can only be implemented on rare ocasions in which the interests of operational feasibility, demonstrable ned, and political will converge. For instance, some have misleadingly questioned why military intervention was pursued in Libya and not Syria. First, a call for a ?No-Fly Zone? in Syria, as was done in Libya, would prove to be useles since Syrian government forces are atacking primarily from the ground using heavy artillery, mortar fire, and tanks. While the bombing campaign in Libya was facilitated by vast open land and military infrastructure being far from populated areas, Syria is just the oposite, with heavy population density surounding regime strongholds. Second, with all the divisions in Syria?s populace, there are legitimate concerns over whether arming the oposition or sending in ground trops would not actually lead to greater violence and instability. Finally, with Iran continuously providing provisions and Rusia/China blocking any meaningful resolutions, there is little political will to make any bold moves in Syria. While military intervention is not the purpose of R2P, its availability as the last resort option of the third pillar is esential for having a comprehensive set of tols for flexible and efective response. When used with great care, military force can be efective in preventing mas atrocity situations from worsening. Legitimate implementation of the limited use of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 257 "Security Council urges leaders in Guinea to end pol diferences peacefuly." UN News Centre, 27 Jun 2010, Web. 26 Feb. 2012. 258 "Security Council Comite established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan." United Nations. The United Nations, n.d. Web. 2 Feb 2012. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 127" force in the context of humanitarian intervention can save vulnerable populations in dire situations. In the remaining portion of our study we defend the ?sharp edge? of R2P by presenting the following case study of the NATO-coalition?s intervention in the Libya Revolution of 201. II. PREVENTING A MASACRE [8.2] Worse than war is the systematic kiling of civilians as the world turns a blind eye. -Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, 3.3.201 Substantive ethical arguments for the use of military force in order to protect civilians must prove that the costs of inaction would have ben greater than were the costs of action. Because of Libya?s extreme represion and lock-down of communication that only intensified after the February 17 th movement kicked of, our knowledge of the crimes committed against the Libyan people is limited to the independent reporting of civilians, journalists, and international human rights groups. While evidence of mas atrocities continued to transpire after the coalition involvement (i.e. the discovery of ?13 more mas graves? 259 ), this report will limit itself to evidence that was public before intervention because it aims to explain the international impetus for military interference. A cros examination of these reports reveals very significant reasons to believe hundreds of thousands of lives were at risk. Even if one were to ignore the historical and economic factors that imply Qaddafi?s potential for brutality, the moral case for intervention can confidently be made by exploring the conduct of the Libyan government forces in the context of Qaddafi?s threats. By following his rhetoric and actions, this section intends to emphasize the costs of inaction consisting of: 1) Libyans dying on a masive scale; 2) Qaddafi posibly remaining in power !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 259 "PresTV ? 13 more mass graves found in Libya" . Pres TV. 15 September 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 128" for years; and 3) a mesage being sent out to all dictators that ruthlesnes and brutality works. [8.2.a] Qaddafi?s Actions & Rhetoric We are coming tonight. We wil find you in your closets. We wil have no mercy and no pity. -Muamar al-Qadafi in a spech directed at Benghazi residents, 3.17.201 As early as February 22 nd the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, declared that the atacks against the Libyan people were both ?widespread and systematic?? potentially amounting to crimes against humanity. 260 Thre days later and les than a wek into the civilian protests, Ms. Pillay confirmed independent reports from human rights organizations that: ?thousands may have ben killed or injured?. 261 By February 26 th the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had refered the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, all the while drawing on Libya?s responsibility to protect its citizens. 262 In early March, the bombing by Libyan Air force of civilian populated towns in the east finally prompted the rebels to reluctantly call-in a formal request for foreign intervention. 263 For two weks these requests for military asistance by Libya?s National Transitional Council (NTC) went completely unanswered as the world watched Qaddafi?s forces use !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 260 "Civil Society: UN General Asembly should suspend Libya?s UN Human Rights Council membership." Defending Human Rights Worldwide. Human Rights Watch, 24 Feb. 201. Web. 18 Sept. 201. . 261 "Libyan Crackdown 'Escalates' ? UN" . BC News. 25 February 2011. 262 Cotler, Irwin, and Jared Genser. "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect." The New York Times 28 Feb. 2011, sec. Opinion: 2. NYTimes.com. Web. 18 Sept. 201. 263 Fadel, Leila. "Libyan rebels cal for foreign military help." The Sydney Morning Herald [Sydney, Australia] 3 Mar. 201: 2. smh.com.au. Web. 18 Sept. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 129" planes, tanks, and gunboats on non-combatants in rebel-held teritory. 264 By March 12 th , the then-president of the NTC, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, warned that if Qaddafi?s forces were to sucesfully bomb-and-advance into the rebel stronghold of Benghazi?as defected-Libyan pilots made clear Qaddafi?s intentions were 265 ?the onslaught would result in ?the death of a half a million? people. 266 On March 16 th , the day before UNSCR 1973 was pased, Qaddafi?s son and military commander, Saif al-Islam declared: "The military operations are finished. In 48 hours everything will be over. Our forces are close to Benghazi.? Concerning the UNSC vote for intervention, he said: ?Whatever decision is taken, it will be to late." 267 The words ?to late? galvanized the world?s political leaders at the emergency sesion of the UN Security Council. The rhetoric the Qaddafis had used up to this point was unequivocally clear. On February 20 th , Saif al-Islam described the intended breadth and scope of the brutal government response. Saif warned the protesters that ?thousands? would die, ?rivers of blood would flow?, and that authorities would ?fight [down] to the last man, woman, and bullet.? 268 Two days later, Qaddafi called on his suporters in a state television spech: ?Come out of your homes and atack [the oposition] in their dens?. Muammar al- Qaddafi called the protesters ?greasy rats? and ?cockroaches.? 269 His threats to ?cleanse Libya house by house? harked back chilling memories of Rwanda, when in 194 Radio Mille !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 264 Tran, Mark. "Gadafi trops pound Libya rebels out of Ras Lanuf." Guardian. (201): n. page. Web. 23 Oct. 201. . 265 "Updated: Libyan fighter jets arrive in Malta" The Times of Malta. [Malta] 21 Feb. 201. 266 McGreal, Chris. "Gadafi's army wil kil half a milion warn Libyan rebels." The Guardian [UK] 12 Mar. 2011: 2. Guardian News. Web. 18 Sept. 201. 267 ?UN chief calls for ceasefire in Libya? Al Jazera. [Libya] 16 Mar. 201. 268 Walt, Viviene. ?Gadafi?s Son: Last Gasp of Libya?s Dying Regime?? Time. 21 Feb. 2011. 269 Stalinsky, Steven. ?Gaddafi cals out ?greasy rats? and ?foreign agents?? National Review. 22 Feb. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 130" Collines? broadcasts served to catalyze genocide. 270 The spech praised the Chinese authorities? crackdown of the famous protests in Tiananmen Square as an example of national unity being ?worth more than a small number of protesters?. Surprisingly, Qaddafi?s rhetoric turned even more explicit when he dryly stated that: ?anyone who plays games with the country?s unity will be executed.? 271 If the rhetoric could be dismissed as a maniacal scare tactic, the civilian body count certainly could not. Betwen February 15 th & March 5 th , two weks before the NATO bombing campaign tok place, 6,00 civilian casualties had ben killed 272 . Only one wek into the protests, Human Rights Watch submitted a report stating: Colonel Gadafi has admited the systematic intent behind the violence unleashed on the Libyan population and has given cause for substantial concern that further violence wil occur. [HRW 2.24.201] When it became evident that many within the Libyan military units were not going to fire on demonstrators, Qaddafi?s intentions were only made clearer by his conscription of thousands of African mercenaries that fall outside the normal line of command and control. 273 Their march towards the rebel capital of Benghazi?a town with a population of 70,00?meant either the bloody end to a popular rebellion or a desperate last minute save by an international coalition. Although it is imposible to determine how many lives were saved in averting Qaddafi?s takeover of the large eastern cities, his behavior in cities like Zawiya, Ras Lanuf, and Misrata !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 270 "Responsibility to Protect: The lesons of Libya." The Economist. 19 May 2011: 2. Print. 271 ?Libya protests: defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit? BBC. 22 February. 2011. 272 ?Libya uprising ? Thursday 10 March? The Guardian. 273 Fahim, Karem; Kirkpatrick, David D. ?Qaddafi Masing Forces in Tripoli as Rebelion Spreads? The New York Times. 23 February. 201. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 131" showed an exemplary lack of concern for civilian life. 274 In Zawiya, Qaddafi?s forces bombed a mosque full of civilians, 275 while at least 50 tanks opened fire on the city?by one protester?s acount tearing it ?down to the ashes?. In Ras Lanuf, Qaddafi?s warplanes fired missiles into residential areas. 276 Moreover, the indiscriminate rocket and mortar fire, as well as the landmines planted in and around Misrata resulted in up to 2,00 killed by the month of April. 277 Furthermore, the International Criminal Court (ICC) later revealed in war crimes investigations that Qaddafi personally ordered the bombardment and starvation of the civilian population in Misrata. 278 Qaddafi?s knowledge of the strategic significance in the NTC?s capital of Benghazi was clearly illustrated by the disposition of his military might towards the city. 279 His commitment to capturing the city at al costs was divulged when the International Federation for Human Rights revealed that on February 23 rd : "130 [of Qaddafi?s] soldiers were executed by their [own] oficers in Benghazi for refusing to fire on crowds of protesters.? 280 Just before the coalition forces produced air strikes that forced the retreat of Qaddafi?s trops, the fall of Benghazi semed inevitable. 281 Even if we asume the head of the NTC was exagerating when he said 50,00 lives would be lost if Qaddafi?s forces were allowed to fully advance, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 274 Cole, Juan. Informed Coment. 22 August. 2011. . 275 ?Qaddafi suporters attack mosque in Zawiya with anti-aircraft misile? Feb 17 th News. 24 February. 2011. 276 ?Libya: Gaddafi tanks and planes attack rebel towns? BBC News Africa. 8 March. 2011. 277 ?How rebels held Misrata? Associated Pres. 4 May. 2011 278 ?Muammar Gaddafi war crimes files revealed? The Guardian. 18 June. 2011. 279 Western, Jon. "Protecting States or Protecting Civilians." The Masachusets Review. 52.2 (Sumer 201): 348-357. Print. 280 ?Libya - 130 soldiers executed? News 24. 23 Feb. 2011. 281 ?Libya: Benghazi about to fall.. then came the planes? The Telegraph. 20 March. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 132" there is no question that countles lives were saved 282 by preventing an abrupt and violent end to the popular rebellion. Manal Omar, Director of the North Africa Programs at the United States Institute of Peace noted at a Brokings lecture: 283 There?s a very strong acknowledgment consistently that the reason why Benghazi has the oposition and is able to operate, is due to the fact that the NATO intervened, and also an acknowledgment that they could have ben Zawiya. [Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, Broking Institute, 6.16.2011] From the very beginning Qaddafi vowed to fight until ?the last man standing, [and] even the last woman standing? 284 . Not only did he declare that he would ?die [in Libya] as a martyr? 285 , but a New York Times report revealed that Qaddafi had ?tens of billions? of cash reserves (separate from the frozen international funds) to help finance a prolonged war against the rebels 286 ?forces which he already enjoyed tremendous military superiority over. There is little doubt that Qaddafi would have continued to cary out his 42-year policy of eliminating oposition voices had he ben given the chance. 287 Imagine a situation where Qaddafi was to stay in power and the intervention would have never taken place. Libya would enter into an era of isolation, sanction, and deprivation. Like North Korea, the international community would esentially be condemning the Libyan people to continuous poverty and degradation. The international implications for mas atrocity prevention would be crippling. The normative international principle of the Responsibility to Protect would be dealt a coup de gr?ce. Allowing the Qaddafis to stay in power rather than face the charges of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 282 ?Benghazi on the Hil? Foreign Policy. 18 June. 2011. 283 ?Libya and the Responsibility to Protect? The Brokings Institution. 16 June. 2011. 284 ?Analysis: Gaddafi wil fight to the biter end? ABC News. 28 Feb. 2011. 285 ?Muammar Gaddafi says he wil die a martyr rather than quit? The Guardian. 22 Feb. 2011. 286 ?Hoard of Cash Lets Qaddafi Extend Fight Against Rebels? The New York Times. 9 March. 2011. 287 ?Challenges ahead as rebels reach Tripoli? The Financial Times. 22 August. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 133" both war crimes and crimes against humanity would have only empowered the tyranical rulers of the world to use unrestrained violence in the future. III. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY & LEGAL AUTHORITY [8.3] I was the one who created Libya and I wil be the one to destroy it. -Muamar al-Qadafi directing pilots (who later defected) to bomb protesters, 2.20.201 288 Almost immediately after Qaddafi?s first violent reaction to the popular protests, an exodus of defectors began to emerge. 289 By the time the emergency UN Security Council meeting tok place in March, Qaddafi had very few people left to defend him. Calls from the Libyan people beged the international community to asist in every way short of direct military invasion. Upon hearing these desperate calls for help, diplomatic and popular suport for steping-in only increased. Qaddafi had efectively lost all domestic and international legitimacy. Regional suport allowed for the most important political step neded to provide coalition asistance to the oposition. What made the Libyan case so remarkable was not just the credible threat to a large civilian population, but the extent to which political and legal legitimacy for the operation was sought before launch. The Iraq invasion of 203 provided an antithetical reference from which a legitimate mandate for Libyan intervention would be derived. Lesons from Iraq prompted both the NATO chief and the Obama Administration to set basic preconditions for deployment. NATO articulated their preconditions to be a: 1) demonstrable ned; 2) clear legal basis; and 3) firm regional suport. Similarly, the Obama Administration required: 1) local requests for intervention; 2) regional legitimacy; 3) legal legitimacy; and 4) a truly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 288 ?Libya Update: The Violence of An Unraveling Regime [On Qaddafi?s Spech]? Jadaliya. 21 Feb. 2011. 289 ?Defections From the Libyan Regime? The Wal Stret Journal. 23 Feb. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 134" multilateral coalition that shared the burden of costs. The US 290 and NATO 291 have both publically stated that these preconditions were all met. By delineating how the coalition?s military actions were fulfilled, this section seks to demonstrate its political legitimacy and legal authority. [8.3.a] Local Requests for Intervention Mr. Jalil, the former-president of the NTC, gave his illustration of Libyan popular opinion when he quipped: "There is a feling on the stret that if Qaddafi can employ foreigners to fight for him then why canot we?" 292 In order to provide basic political legitimacy, intervention would ideally have ben requested from the Libyan population as a whole. Let us examine the credibility of the popular representation embodied in the NTC by looking at both data and on the ground, as well as coverage of public opinion. While the NTC was not a representative body chosen through democratic elections, it is the de-facto interim-government of Libya and curently enjoys international recognition as their sole legitimate representative. However, at the time of intervention, the only country that had oficially recognized the NTC was France, and the UN?s recognition of the NTC did not come until September 16 th , 2011. 293 Nevertheles, the NTC defended its selection proces by aserting that members were chosen in close collaboration with local tribes and revolutionary councils inside liberated zones. 294 Although its 45 members were chosen !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 290 ?Obama's Libya spech: Ful text as delivered? Politico. 28 March. 2011. 291 ?NATO says preconditions fulfiled for actions against Libya? Xinhua News Agency. 19 March. 201. 292 ?Rebels in east Libya set up crisis comite? Reuters News Agency. 5 March. 2011. 293 ?UN assembly recognizes NTC? English.Libya.Tv. 16 September. 2011. 294 ?The rebelion?s leaders: God intentions, fragile legitimacy? The Economist. 27 August. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 135" through a fairly narow consultation proces, the administrative body apears to boast extensive popular suport. 295 Suport for the NTC begins with the uniting of the populace against Muammar al- Qaddafi. Let us consider the percentage of the population represented in cities that are reported to have fallen out of Qaddafi?s control, even before tanks had ben ordered to fire into crowds of peaceful protesters. As University of Michigan profesor Juan Cole has pointed out, when one takes into acount the populations of cities like Tobruk, Derna, Bayda, Benghazi, Zawiya, Zuara, and districts of Tripoli (Suq al-Juma & Tajourna), anywhere from 80-90% of the Libyan population is represented as anti-Qaddafi. 296 Clearly not all of the cities? residents were participating in the February 17 th movement, but it was from these cities that the vast majority of Libyans demanded a No-Fly Zone. 297 Arezki Daoud, editor of the North Africa Journal, explained how already in the first wek of the protests, Qaddafi had ?few followers,? but that they were ?very dangerous and very powerful. They?re esentially a trained security elite? Mr. Daoud went on to say on February 22 nd : Essentialy al of the tribes are siding against [Qadafi]. It?s unclear whether his own tribe is revolting. [But] the fact that Tripoli is revolting, which is the base of his tribe, says that even his tribe is against him. 298 In what is arguably the first fre Libyan public opinion poll, the Research and Consultation Center of the University of Benghazi (formerly Garyounis University) surveyed six liberated eastern cities and found that 92% of 2,50 respondents agred with? the NTC ?expreses the views and wishes of Libyans for change?. The same survey, conducted betwen March and April, found that 95% believe that it would be imposible to implement !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 295 ?Voice of the Libyan Stret? National Transitional Council. Sourced from: Research and Consultation Center, Garyounis University, Benghazi 296 ?130 Libyan soldiers executed for mutiny? PresTV. 24 Feb. 2011. 297 ?Top Ten Ways that Libya 2011 is Not Iraq 2003? Informed Coment. 22 March. 2011. 298 ?Gaddafi?s spech: Decoding a tyrant?s words? National Post. 22 Feb. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 136" political reform if the Qaddafi family were to stay in power. Even more promising was that 96% of those polled shared the belief that Libya can pragmatically direct its revolutionary unity, specifically to build a democratic model based on a constitution that respects human rights. 299 Although the survey canot be sen as representing Libya as a whole (since it only covered eastern cities), it helps legitimize the NTC as a representative voice of the people. On-the-ground reports of Libyan popular opinion before NATO tok action overwhelmingly revealed intense frustration with the international community. The Guardian newspaper interviewed a chemical enginer in Libya just before the NATO campaign began. The incredulous resident cried: ?Where are the air strikes? Why is the west waiting until it is to late? Sarkozy said it. Obama said it. Gaddafi must stop. So why do they do nothing? Is it just talk while we die?? 300 Another Libyan interviewed by the New York Times denounced the West as having ?lost all credibility.? Harking back memories of Iraq in 191, she went on to say: ?I am not crying out of weaknes [?] but we will never forget the people who stod with us and the people who betrayed us.? 301 Many were beginning to wonder if it was to late to engage in a military intervention. 302 Perhaps that is why when NATO finally decided to intervene; the rebel capital of Benghazi resonated with relief in the form of ?shouts of thanks to America and the West.? 303 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 299 ?Eastern Libyans believe in national unity, distrust AU and Turkish mediation, survey reveals? English.Libya.TV. 25 April. 201. 300 ?Benghazi rebels plead for Libya air strikes as Gaddafi forces advance? The Guardian. 19 March. 2011. 301 ?Weak and Cripled by Rivalry? The New York Times: Opinion Pages. 16 March. 2011. 302 ?Libya crisis: to late for UN military intervention?? The Guardian Blog. 23 Feb. 2011. 303 Nordland, Rod. ?In Libyan Rebel Capital, Shouts of Thanks to America and the West? The New York Times. 28 May. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 137" [8.3.b] Clear Legal Basis The bigest question people would ask me is how are we wiling to go with right to protect, and for [the oposition], it was hard for them to draw that line betwen regime change and protection of civilians. For them, it?s one. You can?t kep Qaddafi and expect people wil remain safe. The moment that the international comunity starts to shift vision away from Libya, then Gadafi wil come in and Benghazi might then sufer the atrocities that it avoided. -Manal Omar, Brokings Institute, 6.16.201 Although the Responsibility to Protect is a useful principle for guiding international conventions, we must remember that it is simply a norm and not a law. In the Libyan case, there are two main issues to ases regarding the legality of the coalition intervention. The first legal question is whether the coalition had the legal right to intervene in Libya to begin with. The second is concerned with whether coalition forces were legally permitted to target loyalist forces?including Qaddafi himself. Chapter 7 of the UN Charter provides a framework within which the Security Council may take enforcement action. The Security Council can ?determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of agresion" and take military and nonmilitary action to "restore international peace and security". It was under this UN statute that France, the United Kingdom, and Lebanon proposed the adoption of the United Nations Security Council 1973. The vote on UNSCR 1973 provided the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan Revolution by first demanding an immediate ceasefire, and then authorizing the international community to enforce a No-Fly Zone?aproving ?all necesary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas.? 304 On March 17 th the measure was unanimously adopted with ten Security Council member countries voting in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 304 ?Security Council authorizes ?all necesary measures? to protect civilians in Libya? UN News Centre. 17 March. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 138" the afirmative, five abstaining, and none oposing. 305 UNSCR 1973 thus specifically authorized all coalition intervention??excluding a foreign ocupation force of any form on any part of Libyan teritory??aimed at the protection of civilians. 306 As mandated by the resolution, over the course of thre months legitimate atempts at ?immediate ceasefire? repeatedly tok place to no avail. All other viable political alternatives were completely exhausted leading up to the commitment of regime change. Negotiations proved to be near imposible when Qaddafi reafirmed that his word could not be trusted. On March 18 th Qaddafi formally acepted a ceasefire but failed to uphold it. His forces never stoped advancing-into and firing-on the southern outskirts of Benghazi as well as on the rebel city of Ajdabiyah. 307 It was only after it became blatantly obvious that Qaddafi showed no intention of suspending his military, that coalition leaders anounced the start of military intervention. 308 At the beginning of April, the rebels ofered a ceasefire agrement that included the withdrawal of loyalist forces from in and around oposition cities so that Libyans could safely protest?Qaddafi once again refused. 309 After such striking insincerity, the oposition could no longer aford to take chances and acept another disingenuous and piecemeal ofer of a ceasefire. In mid-April, the Libyan leader met with delegates of the African Union and apeared to have acepted a ?roadmap to peace.? 310 However, the oposition rejected the deal, arguing that it was non-binding and did not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 305 ?Libya: Nigeria votes in favour of no-fly resolution? Reuters News Agency. 18 March. 2011. 306 ?UN security council resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya ? ful text? The Guardian. 17 March. 2011. 307 ?Rebels: Asaulted In Spite of Gaddafi ?Cease Fire?? Time. 18 March. 2011. 308 ?Gadhafi blasts 'crusader' aggresion after strikes? MSNBC News. 19 March. 2011. 309 ?Gaddafi Forces Reject Rebels' Cease-Fire? Reuters. 1 April. 2011. 310 ?Libya: Gaddafi has acepted roadmap to peace, says Zuma? The Guardian. 10 April. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 139" addres the issue of Qaddafi?s ouster. 311 The NTC then toughened their conditions, clearly stating that there would be no ceasefire negotiation without the incorporation of a political proces leading up to Qaddafi?s departure. 312 Not surprisingly, when Qaddafi once again proposed a truce, he refused to acept the condition of ceding power, 313 efectively proposing a partition of the country. Since such an outcome would cripple the economy and completely contradicted one of the major goals of the revolution?to kep Libya unified? the oposition refused to consider it. 314 Last-ditch ceasefire negotiations through South African president Jacob Zuma sufered the same fate, as Qaddafi refused to acept a Libya without his supremacy and loyalist forces continued indiscriminate atacks. 315 With no reliable partner in political negotiation, military force was the only option that remained for the ousting of the Qaddafi regime. The broad language of the resolution, not only licenses air suport for the Libyan people, but also legally warants the targeting of Libyan government forces. Targeted atacks on government forces are legally waranted because their engagement in the state?s crackdown have proved to pose an inherent existential threat to the civilian population. This threat has ben covered in previous sections (se Moral Obligation: The Costs of Inaction), as well as heavily documented in the UN Human Rights Council?s International Commission of Inquiry for Libya. The report found that the threat to civilians included but was not limited to: 1) the use of indiscriminate and prohibited weapons in civilian populated areas (expanding bullets, cluster munitions, mines, white phosphorous, mortars, etc.); 2) the use of mercenaries; 3) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 311 ?Libya Rebels Reject Cease-Fire That Doesn?t Oust Qaddafi? Blomberg Businessweek. 11 April. 2011. 312 ?The Future of Libya: A View from the Oposition? The Brokings Institution. 12 May. 2011. 313 ?Gaddafi ofers truce but not exit? Al Jazera. 30 April. 2011. 314 ?Libyan rebel forces reject Muammar Gaddafi's ceasefire ofer? The Guardian. 30 April. 2011. 315 ?Gaddafi insists on truce not departure? Albawaba News. 31 May. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 140" arbitrary detention and torture; 4) denial of aces to medical care; 5) sexual violence; and 6) the use of children in armed conflict. 316 Because these threats are posed by the Libyan government forces on the civilian population, UNSCR 1973 authorizes the elimination of these forces in order to protect ?civilians and civilian populated areas?. It does not exclude the targeting of top oficials?especially Qaddafi?as long as loyalist forces were to continue to cary out the systematic killing of civilians. Furthermore, some have falsely asumed that arming the oposition violates the UNSCR 1970 arms embargo imposed on Libya on February 26 th 201. In fact, UNSCR 1973 explicitly addreses this posible overlap by authorizing: ?all necesary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970?. Therefore, as Hillary Clinton has ben ken to point out, 317 the resolution?s language specifically references the arms embargo in order to make a temporary exception. 318 [8.3.c] Firm Regional Suport While there were certainly Arab voices warning of imperialism and oil seizures and Israeli conspiracies, the overwhelming majority actively demanded Western intervention to protect the Libyan people and their revolution. The urgency of preventing the coming massacre mattered more to them, and despite al the legacies of Iraq they determined that the United States and the international comunity take on that responsibility. -Marc Lynch, Foreign Policy, 8.2.201 Most analysts would agre that the biggest political obstacle for action rested in the consent of the Arab world. Without the Arab world?s explicit request for coalition intervention, the West risked being acused of neocolonial imperialist exercise. Thanks to Qaddafi?s unambiguous brutality?as well as his belligerence towards his Arab neighbors over 42 years?those that favored suporting the Libyan oposition quickly emerged. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 316 ?Report of the International Comision of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya? Human Rights Council. 1 June. 2011. 317 ?Libya: Coalition divided on arming rebels? BBC News Africa. 29 March. 2011. 318 ?Security Council Aproves ?No-Fly Zone? over Libya, Authorizing ?Al Necesary Measures? to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions? UN Department of Public Information. 17 March. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 141" Remarkably, a regional consensus transpired within mere weks. Our survey of the Arab solidarity in backing the Libyan oposition examines the reaction of influential regional IGOs and NGOs, as well as Arab popular sentiment. We then conclude the section by briefly evaluating the significance of responses from African countries in the region. By February 25 th , before even the formation of the NTC, 20 Arab NGOs cordinated their eforts by calling for the protection of civilians in Libya through a UN- sponsored and Arab League-led No-Fly Zone (NFZ). 319 The diverse groups spaned 18 countries and included a public statement signed by 35 prominent Arab intellectuals: The Libyan people are living through a defining moment in their history. Their demands for basic human rights and an end to 42 years of cruel oppresion are legitimate. We shall not stand silent and watch them pay the price of this demand with their blood. Without urgent action from the UN Security Council suported by the EU, African Union and Arab League, the window of oportunity to protect civilians from the threat of further atrocities wil close. We believe it is the personal and moral responsibility of each and every one of you to ensure imediate action is taken to stop the bloodshed in line with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. [CONDEMNATION IS NOT ENOUGH!, 2.25.2011] Among the punitive measures they petitioned were sanctions, aset frezes, and an arms embargo. The UN implemented all of them only two days later. 320 Although the Security Council did not aprove enforcement of a NFZ until nearly a month later, there is no question the agency of NGOs and prominent figures in the Arab world served to increase presure on regional IGOs and raise awarenes in the international community. On March 11 th , the Gulf Coperation Council (GCC) denounced Qaddafi?s regime as illegitimate and called on the Arab League to take action so as to stop the bloodshed. 321 After establishing contact with the NTC, the GCC stated its suport for a NFZ, in turn !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 319 Rogin, Josh. ?Over 20 Arab groups cal for Libya no-fly zone? Foreign Policy. 25 Feb. 2011. 320 ?UN Security Council Imposes Sanctions Against Libya?s Qaddafi? Blomberg Businesweek. 27 Feb. 2011. 321 ?Libyan regime ?lost legitimacy??Arab League? Agence France-Prese. 13 March. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 142" urging the UN Security Council to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Libyan civilians. 322 Citing Qaddafi?s use of ?heavy weapons against civilians?, the employment of foreign mercenaries against his own people, and the rejection of humanitarian aid packages, the GCC went so far as to call for an end to Qaddafi?s rule. 323 The following day the Arab League voted unanimously to establish a NFZ over Libya. The secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Mousa, declared that the limited military engagement was a mater of ?humanitarian action,? and was the only way of ?suporting the Libyan people in their fight for fredom against a regime that is more and more disdainful.? 324 Even the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)?a 57-member state group not least famous for their democratic acomplishments?suported a NFZ intended to protect civilians from air raids. 325 Perhaps even more important is the popular suport for the Libyan oposition. As the Arab Spring creates a new global cultural paradigm, human dignity, democracy, and more participatory involvement in the political proces are becoming unifying ideals amongst the youthful Middle Eastern and North African population. Many young Arabs have called for intervention in Libya in part to renew hopes in the wilting Arab Spring. Shadi Hamid, Director of Research at the Brokings Doha Center, points out that Arab popular suport for the Libyan intervention far exceds that of the Iraq war in 203. 326 In an April poll of 1,00 people acros 16 Arab states, only 10% of respondents still thought that Qaddafi?s regime was legitimate?compare that to 41% backing the NTC. The same poll found that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 322 ?GC: Libya regime lost legitimacy? Al Jazera. 11 March. 2011. 323 Shahen, Karem.?GC wants no-fly zone over Libya? The National. 8 March. 2011. 324 Freman, Colin. ?Libya: Arab League cals for United Nations no-fly zone? The Telegraph. 12 March. 2011. 325 ?OIC plans to suport no-fly zone over Libya? Gulf News. 16 March. 2011. 326 ?Ask a Think Tank: Brokings? Shadi Hamid on Arab Suport in Libya? Think Tanked. 21 March. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 143" 75% suported the forcible removal of Qaddafi from power, although most would have liked to se Arab governments take the lead in mounting the operation. The poll also revealed that the majority of Arabs showed greater suport than oposition for NATO?s NFZ over Libya?many stating that: ?Arab states can?t react in a timely and efective maner; and Arab states are unable to play any role due to the wave of revolutions.? 327 Finally, while the African Union oficially recognized the NTC as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people in September, 328 some have argued that the international community had largely ignored the AU?s continued oposition to the NFZ. We point out that thre prominent African countries (Nigeria, Gabon, & South Africa) voted in favor of UNSCR 1973, 329 and China?s statement clearly underscored its decision to abstain (as oposed to ?veto?) the resolution by directly citing their ?consideration of the wishes of the Arab League and the African Union. 330 Granted, the African Union has never ben a very efective regional group. Yet to their credit, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, ?strongly [condemned] the indiscriminate and excesive use of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protesters, in violation of human rights." 331 But with a big membership, a huge diversity of situations, and conflicts of interest by way of boundles favors from the Qaddafi regime, it does not have a very robust platform in international afairs. Since Qaddafi?s instrumental leadership in establishing the AU ten years ago, 332 his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 327 ?Huge majority of Arabs want Gaddafi removed from power? The Doha Debates. 18 May. 2011. 328 Martinez, Andres R. Franz Wild. Blomberg News. 20 Sep. 2011. ?African Union Recognizes National Transitional Council as Libya Authority ? 329 ?Libya: Nigeria votes in favour of no-fly resolution? Reuters. 18 May. 2011. 330 ?Security Council Aproves ?No-Fly Zone? over Libya, Authorizing ?Al Necesary Measures? to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions? UN Department of Public Information. 17 March. 2011. 331 ?Libya: Africa?s Rights Body Should Act Now? Human Rights Watch. 25 Feb. 2011. 332 St. John, Ronald Bruce (p.229) ?Libya: From Colony to Independence.? Oxford: Oneworld, 208. Print. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 144" far-reaching influence through deep financial ties has ben widely reported on. 333 The Financial Times refered to Qaddafi?s relationship with the continent as a ?complex web of allegiances he has cultivated both among governments and paramilitary and insurgent groups.? 334 The same article goes on to describe the extent of his influence acros Africa: Col Gadafi has comercial, military and political fotprints acros much of the continent, where he has concentrated eforts at extending Libyan influence since giving up on promoting Arab unity in the 190s. He has channeled bilions of dollars of investment into as many as 31 African states and provided backing to numerous African politicians and leaders. [Gadafi cals in favours from Africa, Financial Times, 3.27.201] ! To be fair many African countries distanced themselves from Qaddafi early on in the military campaign. 335 However, consider that in the previously mentioned poll, a stagering 97% of Libyans did not se the African Union as a neutral mediator to resolve the Libyan crisis. 336 Their suspicion comes with god reason. In February of 209 he was apointed chairman, even though his election caused ?unease among some of the group?s member nations.? 337 Qaddafi worked hard to create strong bonds with the leaders of the 54 member countries in hopes that he would someday realize his long-standing dream of a unified pan- African state rivaling the EU and US. 338 In light of the African Union?s political history, it?s clear that the regional group could not be separated from its close ties to the Qaddafi regime. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 333 Chothia, Farouk. ?What does Gadafi's death mean for Africa?? BBC News. 21 Oct. 2011. < http://ww.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-africa-15392189> 334 ?Gaddafi calls in favours from Africa? The Financial Times. 27 March. 2011. 335 ?The Arab Spring: Hopes and Challenges? The Brokings Institution. 6 June. 2011. 336 ?Eastern Libyans believe in national unity, distrust AU and Turkish mediation, survey reveals? English.Libya.TV. 25 April. 201. 337 Polgren, Lydia. ?Qaddafi, as New African Union Head, Wil Sek Single State? The New York Times. 2 Feb. 2011. 338 Getlemen, Jefrey. ?Libyan Oil Buys Alies for Qadafi? 15 March. 201. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 145" [8.3.d] Multilateral Coalition Figure 1: Breakdown of the UNSCR 1973 vote Pledging political suport and promising military participation are often mistakenly conflated in the realm of coalition building. Due to great American unease over another US intervention, 339 the Obama Administration focused their sights on the former, thereby building a coalition based on formal multilateralism. Learning from the mistakes of Iraq in 203, Obama sought broad political endorsements for the intervention, signaling to the international community that the Libyan campaign was not going to be another Western unilateral inquisition. Although Resolution 1973 had five abstentions, the Security Council pased it without oposition. For the first time in the UN?s history, the body had pased a ?blanket resolution??limited by neither scope nor time?authorizing the use of force in order to protect civilians. 340 However, because UNSCR 1973 explicitly ruled out the posibility of ?a foreign ocupation force of any form on any part of Libyan teritory,? 341 individual pledges for military contributions were limited to those countries that were both willing and posesed the capabilities of advanced aircraft and naval vesels. Therefore, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 339 Landay, Jonathan S. ?Despite reluctance, U.S. could be forced to act in Libya? 2 March. 201. 340 ?Protection of Civilians ? France ONU? 341 ?Security Council Aproves ?No-Fly Zone? over Libya, Authorizing ?Al Necesary Measures? to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions? UN Department of Public Information. 17 March. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 146" operational multilateralism?that which concerns actual military inputs?was largely made up of NATO?s more militarily robust member states, along with a few Arab partners providing airpower. Since we?ve covered the formal multilateralism demonstrated by broad Arab state suport, the subsequent tables provide the empirical evidence of operational multilateralism in terms of the shared military and humanitarian contributions. TABLE 1: ROUGH ASSESMENT OF MILITARY CONTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY 342 Belgium 6 Bulgaria 1 2 Naval special forces Canada 7 2 2 4 2 Special forces Denmark 6 1 France 33 5 38 2 1 Grece 1 2 Airborne radar Italy 12 4 2 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 342 ?2011 military intervention in Libya: Forces Comited? 8 November. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 147" Jordan 6 Netherlands 6 1 Norway 6 Qatar 6 2 Brigade training Romania 1 Spain 6 1 2 2 1 Sweden 8 1 Airborne radar Turkey 6 5 1 U.A.E. 12 U.K. 29 5 Yes (#?) 4 2 2 Minesweper; special forces U.S.* 90 11 Yes (?3) Special forces; drones Note: In a little more than two weks, the US officially relinquished operational control and withdrew its strike aircraft, transitioning into providing a suporting role. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 148" TABLE 2: SURVEY OF THE HUMANITARIAN AID BY COUNTRY 343 Donor Comitments Total (cash and in-kind) US$ In-kind Asistance (MIC/CECIS) Main items 1. Austria 1,627,077 Health kits, kitchen sets 2. Belgium 1,414,849 Plane for repatriation 3. Bulgaria 197,584 Plane for repatriation 4. Czech Republic 141,485 5. Denmark 6,854,507 Experts 6. Estonia 141,485 7. Finland 4,032,321 Blankets, tents, medical team 8. France 4,163,313 Planes, vesels, medicines 9. Germany 14,026,620 Planes, vesels, sanitation 10. Greece 2,349,714 11. Hungary 72,440 Plane, experts 12. Ireland 1,414,849 Blankets, tents 13. Italy 5,662,186 Planes, tents 14. Lithuania 20,488 15. Luxembourg 1,524,783 Expert 16. Malta 609,728 Planes for repatriation 17. Netherlands 3,537,124 18. Poland 391,959 19. Slovenia 70,742 20. Spain 9,347,617 Planes, medical post 21. Sweden 22,441,480 Planes, tents, sanitation 22. United Kingdom 19,315,431 Planes, vesels ECHO (Humanitarian Aid department of European Comision) 99,039,459 Co-financing requested by 8 participating states* 14,960,737 Transport co-financing requests European Union Total $213,357,978 Note: *8 participating states are Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Spain and Sweden IV. OPERATIONAL FEASABILITY [8.4] While military intervention is never an ideal political solution, certain factors can make a purely air-enforced intervention more operationally feasible. In the case of Libya, favorable ground conditions as well as a local partnership with the rebels on the ground ensured that civilian casualties were significantly minimized. Moreover, since the NTC?s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 343 ?Humanitarian aid in Libya: how much has each country donated?? The Guardian. 22 Aug. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 149" administrative leadership was organized and united by mid-March, coalition forces could count on a legitimate political partner during the highly volatile transitional stages. This section will review what made the Libyan case operationally suited for enforcing UNSCR 1973. Figure 6: NATO?s targeting of Qadafi?s equipment At only 6.4 million people, 344 Libya?s population is very small for how vast its teritory is. Libya has the 4 th lowest population density in Africa, and the 10 th lowest in the world. 345 The CIA World Fact Bok describes the expansive Libyan teritory as ?mostly baren?, with ?flat to undulating plains, plateaus, and depresions?. 346 These topographical features represent the best posible landscape conditions for calculated airstrikes. Since major air bases are geographically removed from large city centers like Tripoli and Benghazi, premptively bombing these targets proved to be relatively easy for coalition partners. 347 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 344 ?World Development Indicators | Data? The World Bank. September 2011. 345 ?World Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision? The United Nations: Development. 2008. 346 ?The World Fact Bok: Field Listing: Terain? Central Inteligence Agency. November 201. 347 [P.18] Vira, Varun; Anthony H. Cordesman; and Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman. ?The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory? Center for Strategic and International Studies. 20 June. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 150" Notice that the Figure 6 above shows the coalition?s eforts to neutralize the ground exchange by targeting military capital in the first few weks of the campaign. Next, compare the Figure 7 below with Table 1 (se section: Multilateral Coalition, p.12), and it becomes clear that the Libyan Navy?s pre-war resources were no-match for the coalition forces? naval contributions Figure 7: Libyan Navy statistics pre-War 201 R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 151" The table found above (On the Table) was released in anticipation of NATO?s enforcement of UNSCR 1973. It further proves that Qaddafi?s forces posed no serious threat to the combined military capabilities of the coalition. His 40 outdated jets and 12 ships were both quantitatively and qualitatively inferior to the 195 aircrafts and 18 ships that the coalition had pledged by the beginning of April. 348 Yet, where Qaddafi?s forces lacked sea and airpower, they made up for in ground control. In addition to the 160 tanks at their disposal, the Qaddafi forces enjoyed greater military training and organization than the rebels. But due to Qaddafi?s paranoia of the threat from coup d??tats, Libya lacked a serious long-term investment in military infrastructure: Historicaly, Libya invested in equipment and facilities rather than sound manpower infrastructure, and suport base. This seriously hurt military efectivenes and morale, particularly after a decisive defeat in Chad at the hands of lightly armed Chadian forces. Its forces further declined in quality, and any reform atempts were token gestures with negligible impact on overall force quality, and certainly not resembling the scale of structural and ideological change neded for army-wide impact. [Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Libyan Uprising, 6.20.201] The fact that 25,00 mercenaries have ben reported to be operating in Libya is a testament to the overall weaknes of pro-Qaddafi forces. 349 Because could no longer rely on ideological suport, he became dependent on hired guns to fight in his name. Since UNSCR 1973 strictly prohibited NATO from sending in ground forces, it relied heavily on cordination with the Libyan rebel oposition and Special Forces. This partnership proved to be very efective in swiftly striking key military facilities before they were at risk of being used against the Libyan people (se Figure 6). The relative inferiority of the loyalist forces was only compounded by the practically ideal demographic conditions on the ground. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 348 [P.20-37] Vira, Varun; Anthony H. Cordesman; and Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman. ?The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory? Center for Strategic and International Studies. 20 June. 201. 349 [P.21] Vira, Varun; Anthony H. Cordesman; and Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman. ?The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory? Center for Strategic and International Studies. 20 June. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 152" While some have argued that Libya?s past tribal influence during its colonial years makes it susceptible to falling into sectarian divide, we find these concerns to be rather anachronistic. Qaddafi?s forty-two years left Libya?s tribes completely stripped of political power. 350 Modernizing economic forces like labor mobility and specialization further diminished tribal influences in Libyan society. With an urbanization rate of 78%, Libyans are largely disconected from their tribal history and it is not a primary means of identification. 351 Similarly, with a median age of 24.5, 352 there is a generational disconect from tribalism since most Libyans have no memory of when it was prevalent. Moreover, the homogeneity of the population makes it extremely unlikely that religious and ethnic factions can absorb the momentum of the revolution. Libya has a largely uniform demographic breakdown with; 97% of its people being either Arabs or Berbers; 353 95% of the population speaking Arabic, 354 and 97% of Suni Muslim faith. 355 Qaddafi helped to enforce the religious homogenization of his former subjects by adopting a law that had limited one church per each foreign denomination per city. 356 Qaddafi saw all extremist elements outside of his regime as potential threats to his power. He responded with heavy state crackdown on Islamic extremists, thereby virtually exterminating their influence in all populated regions of Libya. 357 The few parts of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 350 Kurczy, Stephen; Drew Hinshaw. ?Libya tribes: Who?s who?? The Christian Science Monitor. 24 Feb. 201. 351 Frederic Wehrey, ?Libya?s Terra Incognito,? Foreign Afairs, February 28, 201. 352 ?The orld Fact Bok: Africa: Libya? Central Inteligence Agency. 17 Nov. 2011. 353 Gleitz, Chloe. ?Regionalism, ethnicity, and tribes in the trial of Libya's democratic transition? Consultancy Africa Inteligence. 17 Oct. 2011. 354 ?As Libya chers, questions over brutal Gadhafi death? CTV News. 22 Oct. 2011. 355 ?The World Fact Bok: Africa: Libya? Central Inteligence Agency. 17 Nov. 2011. 356 ?Libya: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices? U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 4 March. 2002. 357 Vira, Varun; Anthony H. Cordesman; and Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman. ?The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory? [P.68] Center for Strategic and International Studies. 20 June. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 153" country that might be responsive to extremist ideology are the least populated, educated, and developed places of the desert. In general, Libya is more educated and secular than its neighbors?making it much les susceptible to the influence of Islamic extremism. 358 With a population that has a literacy rate of 86.8%, 359 the highest Human Development Index (HDI) on the African continent, 360 and a largely ?internet savy? youth, 361 there is little evidence to sugest that extremist elements can hijack the revolution. The NTC and the rebel oposition have ben clear since the beginning of the revolution that they want a unified Libya with Tripoli as its capital. While there have ben reports of the dueling legitimacies disagreing over the proces in which the country?s political order will be rebuilt, 362 the NTC has laid out a smart political roadmap towards democracy that incorporates the disarming of brigades in exchange for educational benefits and political participation. 363 NTC oficials studied closely the faults of the Iraq political proces, and are ensuring that political inclusion is central to the reconciliation that will ensue. Their hope is to continue to build on the curent of unified Libyan popular suport. The aforementioned Libyan popular opinion poll reminds them that: ?98% of Libyans do not favor a sectarian divide. In addition, 94% said that Al-Qaeda had not played any role in the 17th of February revolution, and 91% thought it imposible for Al-Qaeda to play any !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 358 Ibid. [P.69]. 359 ?Education for Al Global Monitoring report 2010? United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 2010. 360 ?Libya ? African Economic Outlok? African Economic Outlok. 22 June. 2011. 361 Jawad, Rana. ?Tripoli celebrates, but on a smaller scale? BBC News. 23 October. 2011. 362 Ghanoushi, Soumaya. ?Dueling legitimacies in Libya? Al Jazera: Opinion. 16 Sep. 2011. 363 ?The Future of Libya: A View from the Oposition? The Brokings Institution. 12 May. 2011. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 154" political role in the new Libya.? 364 Lastly, the NTC has taken many precautions that stem from the lesons from Iraq and the sectarian divide that arose after inclusion was not made a priority in the political system. By encouraging pluralism in a very homogeneous state, they are protecting themselves from the mistakes sen in previous interventions. V. TWO BIG CRITICISMS OF NATO?S OPERATION [8.5] Alegation of ?Mision Crep? Some have acused NATO of oversteping its mandate to protect civilians because of its engagement in ofensive operations following the bombing campaign in March. Many point out that UNSCR 1970 & 1973 were not adopted for regime change, but rather for the explicit purpose of protecting the Libyan people. However, as we have already previously acknowledged, the language of the resolutions was clear in that it permitted ?all necesary measures? to protect civilians. This language is quite commonly used in the United Nations, and is well understod to encompas ofensive military action if it is to prevent further indiscriminate atacks on vulnerable populations. 365 We recall that even after NATO?s engagement in Libya, Qaddafi regime tanks and forces did not relent or pullback, instead they continued to advance and indiscriminately shell civilians. 366 UNSCR 1973 permitted strikes on both Qaddafi loyalist equipment and on the forces themselves since they proved to pose an existential threat to lives of civilians through continued asault by heavy artillery and tanks. Had the government forces retreated, relented, or even complied with the cease-fire agrements they agred to, NATO would have ben forced to avoid any ofensive strikes. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 364 ?Eastern Libyans believe in national unity, distrust AU and Turkish mediation, survey reveals? English.Libya.TV. 25 April. 201. 365 "International Responsibility After Libya." Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2012. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. 366 Karam, Souhail. "Gadafi forces shel Misrata hours after ceasefire ." Reuters 18 Mar 2011, eb. 27 Feb. 2012. . R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 155" Furthermore, we recall that NATO never introduced ground trops and since the entire operation was being conducted from the air, regime change was bilateral in nature since it was ultimately the Libyan rebel forces that fought Qaddafi?s mercenaries and advanced?in the end capturing Qaddafi and his son Saif al-Islam. 367 Alegation of ?War Crimes? Allegations of ?war crimes? are particularly poignant since the whole reason for NATO intervening in Libya was to protect civilians in the first place. A Report by the Arab Organization for Human Rights, together with the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights and the International Legal Asistance Consortium, has alleged that NATO?s bombings amounted to such mas atrocities. 368 Although Libyans themselves do not sem to vocal critics of the NATO airstrikes (besides some mentioning they came too late), a few human rights organizations have denounced the NATO operations for ?war crimes? concerning the bombing of Sirte. Yet out of the 26,50 sorties, ?including some 7,50 strike sorties against Qaddafi?s trops and military infrastructure,? 369 the most critical estimates put NATO?s total civilian death toll at betwen only 40 to 70 people. 370 NATO does not take civilian deaths lightly and went into Libya knowing full well that it was going to be scrupulously asesed. Consider that nearly two-thirds of intended strike sorties were ultimately cancelled because of the risk of civilian los. 371 A zero-casualty rate is an improbable reality of any intervention?let alone one conducted from the sea and air. While independent fact-finding missions bring transparency and must be encouraged, the term ?war crimes? should not be used to describe events that do not refer to the systematic violations of international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 367 Gumuchian, Marie-Louise. "Gadafi's son captured, scared and without a fight." Reuters 19 Nov 201, n. pag. Web. 27 Feb. 2012. . 368 Shabi, Rachel. "Nato acused of war crimes in Libya." Independent 19 Jan 2012, n. pag. Web. 27 Feb. 2012. 369 "International Responsibility After Libya." Washington D.C.: The Brokings Institution, 2012. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. 370 Shabi, Rachel. "In Strikes on Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian Tol ." New York Times 17 Dec 2011, n. pag. Web. 27 Feb. 2012. 371 Shabi, Rachel. "Nato acused of war crimes in Libya." Independent 19 Jan 2012, n. pag. Web. 27 Feb. 2012. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 156" humanitarian law. While Qaddafi spokesmen atempted to release fraudulent cases of NATO systematically bombing civilian centers, there is absolutely no reliable evidence that points to NATO strikes doing anything other than atempting to protect the Libyan people. When studying R2P it is important to differentiate ?mas crimes,? from the operational failure of one strike sortie. Regardles, there are two ongoing independent investigations that are being conducted to investigate NATO?s actions in Libya. The first is by the UN Human Rights Council (scheduled to be released March 2012), and the second is by the International Criminal Court. The UN Human Rights Council report should ofer a very detailed picture of the valid allegations against NATO, thereby informing any future decision of the UN to call on NATO in future humanitarian missions. At the International Criminal Court, Chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has declared that he intends to hold both the rebel and NATO forces fully acountable for serious breaches of international humanitarian law. 372 VI. THE FUTURE OF R2P: FOCUSING ON PREVENTION [8.6] Former Balkans & East European specialist for the US State Department and Columbia Profesor, Jon Western, argues that R2P and its predecesor ?humanitarian intervention? are crucial contributions to the: ?dramatic expansion of norms, institutions, and practices that protect civilian populations during conflict [and have] ben critical to saving lives acros the globe.? 373 Our study of R2P?s proper aplication in Libya coroborates Western?s point, and our review of R2P?s aplication in other instances underscores his bigger point of emerging standards of international humanitarian law. While R2P is simply a normative principle, its continued aceptance throughout the world has the potential to change the existing human security and human rights landscape. Consistent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 372 "Rusia and U.S. clash over NATO bombing probe" Al Arabiya News - The Asociated Pres 23 Dec 2011, Web. 27 Feb. 2012. . 373 Western, Jon. "Protecting States or Protecting Civilians." The Masachusets Review. 52.2 (Sumer 201): 348-357. Print. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 157" aplication of the principle, especially in its preventionary capacities, has the potential of being just as important as the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). Like the UNDHR, many once dismissed it as being irrelevant, non-binding, and having no concrete mechanisms for enforcement. Today however, the UNDHR is the basis for the drafting of many constitutions around the world, and has led to the adoption of many binding international treaties such as the European Convention on Human rights (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976). Presenting his ?Five Year Action Agenda? last month, Secretary-General Ban Ki- moon declared that his plan puts ?prevention at the very center of our work, from development to peace and security, to protecting human rights and advancing democracy.? 374 In a spech to the Stanley Foundation he stresed R2P?s ned to focus on prevention as opposed to reaction. The Secretary-General reiterated the importance of regional and sub- regional powers such as the leadership from the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)?pointing to their vital part in the response to the post-election conflict in Cote d?Ivoire last year. Ban Ki-moon also pointed to the implementation of R2P in Yemen, South Sudan, and Libya, saying that the UN?s actions helped to give ?hope to people long opresed.? 375 He then asked those in the rom to ?join [him] in making 2012 the Year of Prevention.? By calling on civil society organizations, regional organizations, and international institutions to asist States under stres before crises and conflict break out, the Secretary-General hopes to create an environment of proactive humanitarianism. Herein lies the future of R2P, one of early engagement in which early !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 374 http://ww.unisdr.org/archive/24847 375 "Adres to Stanley Foundation Conference on the Responsibility to Protect." UN News Centre 18 Jan 2012, n. pag. Web. 27 Feb. 2012. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 158" warning mechanisms are ideally not neded because incitement of violence is addresed before it has the power to mobilize bloodshed. The goal is to catch potential risks early through greater cordination with regional groups and by engaging early in troubled countries. Regional peacekeping operations have already ben long in efect (Figure 4.3), but preventionary mechanisms for promoting security and encouraging economic development are only now becoming integral parts of the United Nations? mission. ! Figure 4.3: UN and Non-UN Peacekeping Operations, 1948-2007 ! I. CONCLUDING STATEMENTS [8.7] It?s far to early to declare Libya ?Mission Acomplished?. While Qaddafi suporters no longer pose a threat to the transitional government, Libyans must now manifest their democratic aspirations. Having absolutely no political institutions to build-up from could be sen as both a blesing and a curse. Although this limits the fotprint of the former regime on Libya?s future, many question whether the NTC can build transitional bodies that encourage stability and have mechanisms for acountability. Similarly, the masive oil and natural gas endowment can act as either a great strength or a great weaknes. In the past countries blesed with the ?oil curse? have ben reduced to failed states as there Figures from the Human Security Report 2009 / 2010 Citation and Data Information Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and The Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Dr. Birger Heldt, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sand?verken, Sweden. Note that the graph shows the average number of peacekeeping operations per month for each year. 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Non-UN PKOs UN PKOs 19531948 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 Year Number of PK Os Figure 4.3 UN (United Nations) and Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), 1948?2007 The number of UN PKOs almost doubled between 1989 and 2007. There has been an even larger increase in the number of non-UN PKOs over the same period. Data Source: Birger Heldt. Note: Figure 4.3 is a ?stacked graph,? meaning that the number of operations in each category is indicated by the depth of the band of colour. The top line shows the total number of operations of all types in each year. R2P & Libya: A Case Study Francis Ramoin ! ! 159" is a tendency for the natural resource to be used as a political tol used by demagogues. Conversely, if Libya learns from Norway?s history and outlaws political campaign promises over oil, its exports can fed into a long-term state sovereign wealth fund and lead to development and a diversification of the economy. Alyson Singh?s subsequent paper will focus narowly on the future of Libya and what role NATO might play in state and institutional capacity building. While we have yet to se if Libya can suced in becoming a democratic model for the Arab world, this analysis has shown that without NATO?s coalition intervention the mere prospect of a Libyan democracy would have ben inconceivable, and the international community would have efectively permitted a masacre. ! The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 160" Chapter 9 THE FUTURE OF NATO IN LIBYA On October 31 201, NATO oficially ended its military operation in Libya. However, Libya has the chance to become a model of a functioning democracy in the Middle East in the wake of a political revolution. NATO and its member countries must find a way to balance the wishes of the Libyan people and prevent Libya from falling again into chaos. While the curent situation in Libya is chaotic and unpredictable, Libya neds a starting point, and this paper will outline what foreign observers will be looking for in Libya concerning specific challenges. While the situation is still chaotic, there is an optimistic future if Libyans take the time to establish legitimacy and build solid institutions. Libya has no civil society or state administration institutions, and those institutions must be built to create a legitimate Libyan government. First Libya must take the steps to form a constitution, followed by elections. However, as they take those steps they must deal with 4 main challenges?demographic changes, economic development, management of oil wealth, and a creation of psychological-political unity among citizens of Libya. After this detailing of the optimistic future of Libya, I will provide policy recommendations on what NATO?s involvement in Libya should be while keping in mind the challenges to a Libyan democracy. This Paper will make the following recommendations: 1) NATO should kep a small naval presence outside of Libya to protect international boarders; 2) NATO and its member states should emphasize disarmament of the Libyan population through incentives rather than direct military force; and 3) NATO and it?s member states should ofer advisory roles in Libya?s state-building proces. The point of my paper is to indicate what obstacles must be overcome to establish the best posible outcome after the overthrow of Qaddafi. It is an optimistic look at the future of Libya from the ending point of Francis Ramoin?s paper. The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 161" I. POLITICAL TIMELINE FOR LIBYA AND THE NTC [9.1] The interim National Transitional Council (NTC) must call for the convening of a National Congres. This congres will be ?composed of members of all regions of Libya, all cities and towns. Taking into consideration the relative demographic weight of each town and city? 376 and will be responsible for selecting the committe to write up a constitution. This constitution will detail the election for both parliament and the president and must balance the power betwen the different institutions. After the aproval of the constitution, there should be a fair election of parliament. Two months after the parliamentary elections, there should be a presidential election. This is a recommendation for a positive outcome, not a prediction of a positive one. The most important thing about this constitution as well as the curent NTC is inclusion, meaning any Libyan citizen should be given a fair chance to be part of the rebuilding proces. Only with inclusion will Libya be able to establish legitimacy. The government should include experts from diverse background including policy makers, economists and technocrats as well as include representatives from all geographic areas of Libya. During the uprisings, Qaddafi?s main strongholds were in the Western area of Tripoli, while the rebels were concentrated in the east. However, the interim government, in order to represent democratic values, should represent both the east and west. Unfortunately the NTC?s members are still biased towards the eastern areas of Benghazi. For example, Benghazi has nine representatives in the NTC while Tripoli, twice its size, only has five. 377 As I will discus later, creating a psychological unity among the Libyan population is esential in creating a legitimate Libyan government and that goal will be derailed if there is a perceived division betwen the east and the west. The interim government should also include a mix of the curent NTC as well as the old !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 376 Mahmoud Elwarfaly, ?The Future of Libya: A View from the Oposition? (Interview, Brokings Institution). 377 ?Libya?s New Regime: Who?s in Charge??, (The Economist, September 11, 201). The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 162" regime. The experience of those old members of the regime, especially in vital sectors like economics, should not be ignored. Even Noman Benotman, the former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a Islamic organization that fought against Qaddafi?s regime in the 190s, argued ?To manage the bumpy transition toward democracy, elements formerly close to the Qaddafi regime will also have to be included? 378 . However, even though the new regime should include qualified members from Qaddafi?s regime, it would be the best posible solution to establish a criterion of non-violence in the rebuilding proces. 379 Dr. Mahmoud Gibril Elwarfally, interim prime minister of the Libyan National Transitional Council has stated that the interim national congres should also include ?two or the elements from security, military oficers, a judge from the Supreme Court and importantly a group from civil society?. 380 Since the Libyan revolution was a gras rots revolution it is important to include those in the civil society regardles of social and political background as to prevent another elitist government. Inclusion serves to prevent chaos; government security and legitimacy are vital to the suces of the future Libyan government. Inclusion is also important to counter the tribal culture of Libya. People are still loyal to their individual tribal and militia commanders. There are more than 140 tribes and clans in Libya, though 30 are more active than others. 381 While tribal participation could be used to promote individual political agendas, they could also be a tol for promoting peace and reconciliation: Due to their highly respected social standing, tribal leaders can use their moral power to exert influence on the members of their tribe to forgive and reconcile. Tribal leads can also use political incentives like recognition to entice their folowers to join and support the national reconciliation proces. 382 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 378 Ibrahim Sharqieh, ?Imperatives for Post-conflict Reconstruction In Libya? (Brokings Institute, December 201). 379 Ibid 380 Mahmoud Elwarfaly, ?The Future of Libya: A View from the Oposition? (Interview, Brokings Institution). 381 Ibid 382 Ibid The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 163" However, part of the promotion of peace will be the disarmament and weapons collection and registration. This can either be done with outside help like the United States or even beter by utilizing tribal infrastructure already in place. Dr. Bates Gill argues that a disarmament and demobilization proces is a huge priority for the NTC to ?ensure security inside?and, arguably, outside?Libya and to create space for the political proces and institution building?. 383 While this proces would ideally be caried out with coperation betwen the NTC and the tribes, it is highly unlikely that the proces will be completely harmonious and therefore ?the international community can play a decisive role in safeguarding and disposal of weapons?. 384 If sucesful, Libya will serve as a model of democratic transition for other North African countries, from Maghreb to Mashreq. Suces is by no means asured, but a vision of a sucesful legitimate democracy is a necesary starting point. These recommendations also represent the viewpoints and agenda of the NTC leaders themselves. Because the Libyans ned to demonstrate their own agency in order to legitimize their rule, it is a sign of optimism that the curent leaders, like Mahmoud Gibril Elwarfally, envision a society of complete inclusion. II. CHALENGES FOR FUTURE LIBYAN STATE-BUILDING [9.2] Although there is a posible optimistic future for Libya, there are still four main challenges facing Libya today. First, Libya faces demographic changes and challenges. The population is shrinking and population growth rates droped from 4.8% to 1.5% in early 2011. 385 Although this recent change could be in response to the uprisings, if it continues Libya will not have the labor necesary to sustain its economy. Even more significant is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 383 Bates Gil ?Sept. 1: Libya at the Crosroads?the Challenge of Consolidating Peace? (SIPRI, September 201) 384 Ibid 385 Mahmoud Elwarfaly, ?The Future of Libya: A View from the Oposition? (Interview, Brokings Institution). The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 164" Libya?s youth bulge. More than half of Libya?s population is under 18 (se figure 1). 386 The youth population was instrumental in topling Qaddafi?s regime, but now they will expect a reliable source of employment. However, towards the end of Qaddafi?s reign unemployment was estimated at 30%. 387 That number is not going to reverse itself without significant investment in private-sector development and education. Building from the youth bulge challenge, the second challenge for Libya is economic development and diversification. The only way Libya is going to diversify its economy is by developing laborers skilled in areas other than oil. With the youth bulge, there is curently not a shortage of laborers but a shortage of economic oportunity. GDP growth fell sharply in 201 due to the conflicts, 388 but again there is a posibility of an optimistic future. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues that: ?if political stability can be found, there is potential in undeveloped non-oil industries, for example in an undeveloped tourist industry?. 389 Also investments in other non-oil industries like petrochemicals, iron and stel will help make those sectors internationally competitive. 390 The management of the economy must tangibly benefit the people of Libya. Another way to diversify the economy is to invest in education and infrastructure. Through education, Libyans will receive the necesary skills to work outside the oil sector as well as become entrepreneurs themselves. If mutually beneficial foreign trade and investment relationships can be fostered, the Libyan economy will hopefully continue to diversify and grow outside the oil sectors. Creating jobs is imperative in order to avoid recruitment by radical or terorist Islamic groups or other criminal enterprises. The government will gain much !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 386 Ashley Bates, Sidhartha Mahanta, Hamed Aleaziz and Asawin Suebsaeng, ?"What's Hapening in Libya Explained? (Mother Jones, August 20 201) 387 CIA Factbok, acesed February 19, 2012 388 ?Libya-African Economic Outlok? (African Economic Outlok, June 22 2011). 389 Varun Vira and Anthony Cordesman, ?The Libyan Uprising: an Uncertain Trajectory? (CSIS, The Burke Chair in Strategy, June 20 2011). 390 Ibid The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 165" legitimacy if it wins the suport of and recognition by this youth population that was instrumental in the topling of Qaddafi. However, management of oil revenue is the third major challenge that Libya must deal with. Libya is burdened with what political economists call the ?resource curse?, where countries with large amounts of natural resources sufer economically due to a lack of diversification, mismanagement of revenue and lack of institutions. Libya is one of many countries that must manage the burden of the ?resource curse?; as well as the ?Dutch Disease? which is when: A suden rise in the value of natural resource exports produces an apreciation in the real exchange rate. This, in turn, makes importing non-natural resource commodities more dificult and competing with imports acros a wide range of comodities almost imposible. 391 The domestic markets sufer from competition and lack of development, diversification and investments, and the state in charge of oil often becomes corupt. The entire economy rests on the volatile nature of oil and gas prices, which makes long-term economic planing difficult. Curently 98% of the Libyan economy is related to oil and gas. 392 ?Oil is the economy in Libya?; 393 however, with the uprisings, oil production and sales have ben significantly stalled. 394 In the long-term, the Libyan economy would benefit from using oil revenue from rising oil prices to remake the entire socio-economic structure of the country and the skills of its labor force. The most sucesful example of a country that avoided the resource curse is Norway. However, Norway already had established institutions, which allowed for a diversified economy and skilled population. Foreign experts like Iraqi geologist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 391 Escaping the resource curse (5) 392 Adam Davidson, ?Economists Diagnosis Libya With 'Resource Curse'? (NPR, February 25 2011). Note: 81% of Libyan?s industrial economy is atributable to oil and gas while most of the 17% of the services sector is related to that. 393 Ashley Bates, Sidhartha Mahanta, Hamed Aleaziz and Asawin Suebsaeng, ?"What's Hapening in Libya Explained? (Mother Jones, August 20 201) 394 ?Libya-African Economic Outlok? (African Economic Outlok, June 2 201). The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 166" Farouk al-Kasim who advised Norway on the allocation of oil resources, advocates self- restraint, only allocating a finite amount of license blocks for drilling each year. 395 The money in Norway was not spent on state expenditures, but was reinvested into oil drillings and technologies. Importantly Norway did not waste its oil income. A balance was struck betwen private and state participation in the oil sector: if you rely too much on private foreign companies, too little of the oil wealth benefits the country in the form of government revenue or economic development; if you go to far in the other direction, you risk a bloated, politicized oil sector that evades both acountability to the people and competitive presure to be eficient. 396 Al Kasim also argued that the ?state has to be in the driver?s seat? 397 . He pushed Norway to increase the extraction rate, and created a structure of ?squezing the last drop out?. 398 That mindset spured technological investment and development, which allowed Norway to remain competitive while benefiting other economic sectors. Libya could do the same by increasing prospecting and drilling in the Gulf of Sidra. However, it is imperative that the increase in oil revenue is balanced by an increase in transparency and acountability for the state-government controlling the revenue. The most important aspect to the Norwegian model is that it is understod that no politician is allowed to discus the posibility of freing up oil money and distributing it to the public during campaign. 399 This strategy secures the safety of the oil reserve fund, as well as prevents the breakdown of the political society. However, while this tactic worked in Norway, it would not necesarily work in Libya. Norway at this time (1970s) already had developed institutions and legitimacy and transparency of government in place. The oil revenue is an oportunity for Libya, and it must not be squandered but instead invested. The future government will decide how that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 395 Farouk Al-Kasim, ?The Friday Podcast: Norway Has Advice for Libya? (Interview, NPR, August 26 201). 396 Martin Sandbu, ?The Iraqi Who Saved Norway from Oil?, (Financial Times Magazine, August 2009). 397 Ibid 398 Ibid 399 Farouk Al-Kasim, ?The Friday Podcast: Norway Has Advice for Libya? (Interview, NPR, August 26 201 The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 167" money should be invested, and one can only hope that investment from the revenue will be decided based on what is best for the Libyan economy as a whole, rather than the political aspirations of those in power. It would be highly beneficial for Libyans to include outside advisement, like Farouk al-Kasim, on how to re-structure their economy and manage oil wealth. The final and most important challenge is the diminishing of the sense of state in the minds of the Libyan people. This challenge will be overcome only by developing institutions of civil society and god governance. First, Libya has very few institutions. The state provided almost everything, and with the elimination of the Qaddafi regime, the state institutions are nonexistent. Libya neds to not only restructure their state institutions, but also institutions of civil society?private busineses, NGOs, and civic organizations from sports teams to religious entities. There was widespread coruption within the state during Qaddafi?s reign and acording to CSIS: Political players wil also have to overcome new patronage and corruption networks that wil be strengthened by the flood of post-war aid, as wel as resist the temptation to focus on distributive isues and redistribution of wealth, and instead create a sustainable, and national political framework. 400 The framework must distinguish betwen state administration and society. Qaddafi marginalized state institutions to increase their subordination to his elite-run government, and today the only state institutions that do exist are in place ?merely to extract the country?s vast oil wealth and distribute it via subsidies?. 401 Libya must build up other state institutions, like an administrative bureaucracy, educational system, military, and other government ministries. There should be mutual acountability betwen the central government as well as the state institutions. Second, the civil society must also be both fostered and trusted. Civil !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 400 Varun Vira and Anthony Cordesman, ?The Libyan Uprising: an Uncertain Trajectory? (CSIS, The Burke Chair in Strategy, June 20 2011). 401 Barak Barfi, ?Rebuilding the Ruins of Qadafi?, (CN, December 26 201). The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 168" societies working acordingly with the government can give Libyans more oportunity to participate in society as well as create new job sectors. Establishing state and civil society institutions will not only increase the productivity and suces of Libya, but it will also increase people?s faith in Libyan society and government. The people?s faith in the state must be restored. A major reason for the uprising was the los of people?s faith in the state. The Libyan people have not trusted their government?s acountability or management (se Figures 2 and 3). Foreign experts will be looking for Libya to acomplish this through security and the development of solid institutions. However, although security is important, ideally the military would not participate in the government. This transition is a ?best case? scenario, but an optimistic specific vision is necesary to acomplish this difficult project. These views and challenges come both from foreign experts as well as Libyans. NATO and its member states curently recognize the legitimacy of the NTC, but continued recognition will help legitimize Libyan governance. III. NATO?S FUTURE ROLE IN LIBYA [9.3] Lastly in light of all the aforementioned challenges, can and should NATO play a role in Libya post-operation? The answer is yes: NATO should continue to play a role in the future of Libya, although it should be primarily in an advisory capacity. If necesary, NATO can provide external security to protect the curent borders of Libya and be willing to respond if an external state challenges these borders. NATO could provide this external security by keping a Naval force in the Gulf of Sidra. This NATO presence will not only allow Libya to focus on building internal institutions and governance but it will also prevent Libyan acumulation of large amounts of weaponry which could result in destabilizing efects such as spillover and blowback. However, although the Responsibility to Protect was The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 169" invoked by the UN for the original NATO invasion of Libya (See Francis Ramoin?s paper), it could not be used to justify this naval presence. The first pillar of Responsibility to Protect states ?The State caries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity?. 402 Since the situation in Libya is no longer at the same level as genocide or war crimes, neither the UN nor NATO can invoke the Responsibility to Protect. Doing so would violate the core principles of R2P. Although the militia violence in Libya has increased, it also has not reached the level that R2P requires. There has recently ben discourse on the action that NATO and the West should take concerning militias in Libya. NATO did not use ground trops in their operation and would neither have the capacity nor the political legitimacy to militarily intervene and stop the militias. However, NATO could help train a Libyan police force, which in turn could stop the militias. Western powers can also use other methods to put presure on the Libyan government and militias. Donatella Rovera, the senior crisis response advisor at Amnesty International, argues ?There are a lot of countries and governments seking contracts in Libya, so there?s no shortage of contacts that the West can use?. 403 Libya could use outside aid to help with infrastructure building and it is a posibility that NATO and its member states can use that aid as leverage. Dr. Bates Gill admits that the ?international community can play a decisive role? in this proceses and that ?it may also be necesary to ofer incentives?economic or otherwise?for disarmament and demobilization?. 404 In this way judicious asistance from the international community will help the Libyan government both legitimately control its population as well as demonstrate its independence from NATO. Politically, NATO (or NATO member states) should provide advisory suport, bringing in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 402 United Nations General Asembly, Implementing of the Responsibility to Protect, (United Nations, 12 Jan 209) 403 Peter Spielmann, ?Amnesty: Libyan Militias Commit War Crimes?, (MSNBC, February 15 2012). 404 Bates Gil ?Sept. 1: Libya at the Crosroads?the Challenge of Consolidating Peace? (SIPRI, September 201) The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 170" experts on building institutions and ofer any asistance that the Libyans want. Interim NTC Prime Minister, Dr. Mahmoud Gibril Elwarfally, sugests that the constitution should be ?laid out in referendum supervised by observers from the United States?. 405 Institution building will be one of the biggest obstacles in state building because during Qaddafi?s reign, the society was completely dependent on the state and lacked any formal institutions. While the NATO countries can provide experts and even invest in institution building, it is important to kep in mind the wishes of the Libyan people. NATO, and NATO member countries should not force policies on Libya. It is important for the Libyans to build up state legitimacy, and the state will not gain that legitimacy if it is perceived to be a NATO pupet. With the US invasion of Iraq, there has ben a growing trend of anti-US and anti-western feling in the Middle East. NATO and the US are depicted as invaders, who force their western ideals onto Arab nations. This unfortunate stereotype of western democracies takes away from their ?soft power? influence in the area: ?NATO neds to strike a balance betwen helping the Libyans manage their own afairs and intervening in their decisions?. 406 NATO can provide the hard power neded to protect Libyan borders from outside invasion, but the NATO states can provide economic and political experts to advise the Libyan governance. However, foreign aid and advice will only be acepted if it is completely advisory and not reminiscent of colonialism, or the forcing of western models on eastern countries without being culturally sensitive. NATO should not take away the agency of the Libyan people. The Arab league can also play a decisive role in advising Libya. However, it is imperative for international security that Libya does not fall again into internal chaos, and the NATO states can hopefully help by ofering technocratic help. Finally, foreign experts continue to state that this proces will not hapen overnight, and nor should !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 405 Mahmoud Elwarfaly, ?The Future of Libya: A View from the Oposition? (Interview, Brokings Institution). 406 Ibrahim Sharqieh, ?Imperatives for Post-conflict Reconstruction In Libya? (Brokings Institute, December 201). The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 171" it. From Dr. Mahmoud Gibril Elwarfally to Farouk al-Kasim to Dr. Bates Gill, each implores that time is important to create legitimate institutions. The timetable that Dr. Elwarfally and the NTC have set out is vital because it allows for the development of other policies in continuity with elections. Dr. Gill expands that: The experience of democratic transitions elsewhere has highlighted the risks of seing democratization as chiefly a mater of holding elections and ignoring the wider and deeper proceses required. Elections should be situated within a broader set of policies adresing, among other things, social justice, equitable arrangements for the teritorial distribution of power, protection of minorities and measures to strengthen the rule of law. Otherwise, tensions could arise among minorities or regions may fel they could be marginalized through the ballot box. 407 Legitimacy will not hapen overnight, and it is a hopeful sign that both Libyans as well as foreign observers understand that. In conclusion, the four main challenges will shape the way Libyans structure their government and economy. The political challenges are a priority and foreign observers will look for Libya to build and sustain institutions that legitimize their government. NATO member states can ofer advisory asistance to help Libya build these institutions, and eventually foreign aceptance will further legitimize Libyan governance. Militarily NATO can help Libya by protecting the international borders, which will prevent Libya from building up its army to fight a war with neighboring countries and fre them to focus on building god stable governance. However, it is still important to understand that the situation in Libya is still very chaotic and unpredictable. This optimistic vision is a useful starting point as Libya, NATO and the international community move forward to deal with these challenges. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 407 Bates Gil ?Sept. 1: Libya at the Crosroads?the Challenge of Consolidating Peace? (SIPRI, September 201) The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 172" Figure 1: Population Bulge in Libya 408 Figure 2 : Control of Coruption 409 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 408 Varun Vira and Anthony Cordesman, ?The Libyan Uprising: an Uncertain Trajectory? (CSIS, The Burke Chair in Strategy, June 20 2011). 409 Ibid The Future of NATO in Libya Alyson Singh ! ! 173" Figure 3: Government Efectivenes by World Percentiles 410 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 410 Ibid PART IV SYRIA Syria's nearly year-old uprising is on the brink of civil war. The brutal forces of the Asad regime continue their crackdown, with a death toll at 540 and rising, while the oposition grows increasingly militarized and the Fre Syrian Army gathers strength. A political solution, without the backing of military force, is increasingly unlikely. The decisions of the international community on economic suport or sanctions and military intervention will be pivotal in determining the balance of forces and thus the direction of Syria's conflict. As of February, the Asad regime shows no signs of retracting military force or moving towards a peaceful solution, having violated the Arab League peace plan it formally acepted in November and ignoring ardent international calls for withdrawal of trops and tanks from the strets. The strong statement of international condemnation expresed in the recent 137-12 vote of the UN General Asembly calling for the resignation of Asad has made no significant impact on the decisions of the regime. Since the uprising began, Asad's regime has persistently refused to hear the demands of its people, blaming unrest on foreign or fundamentalist agitators and refusing to publicly acknowledge the existence of real problems. Asad preaches to a pro-regime choir inclined to acept this vision of conspiracy, calling on this base to reject the legitimacy of the discontented majority. The last major dividing line within the oposition concerns the role of international intervention. The oposition within Syria is coalescing politically under the Syrian National Council (SNC) and militarily under the Fre Syrian Army. Peaceful and armed dissidents, once divided in opinion on dialogue with the regime and the necesity of force, have united as the prospect of political solutions fades. Military intervention could divide the oposition and alienate large sectors of the populace. Humanitarian intervention and in particular PART IV SYRIA medical aid, however, is increasingly viewed as necesary by both the Syrian people and the international community. The role of NATO as a global stabilizer provides a case for its in the Syrian conflict. Major violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also call for and justify an agresive international response. However, in light of the negative legacies of Western intervention and the potential of Arab and Syrian resentment, NATO military intervention is highly inadvisable. The Arab League, as the major regional coalition, is the most viable player to orchestrate intervention but is curently lacking in the political and economic force necesary to cary out sucesful intervention, hence its calls to the UN and international community for suport. Curently, the most viable form of intervention would be political and economic suport for the oposition spearheaded by the Arab League and countries such as Turkey and Qatar, backed by the suport of UN members. Military intervention in the form of peace-keping force will potentially be necesary to prevent wider outbreak of conflict but, if so, must be led by regional players. This report will examine the prospects for intervention from the perspectives of Syria's domestic situation, the humanitarian imperative, and international political dynamics. Part one looks into the shifting balance of powers within Syria and the formation of the curent political and military players. Part two traces human rights abuses and weighs the prospect of intervention in terms of humanitarian goals. Part thre examines the history of NATO and the practical potentials of its intervention in the curent crisis. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 174" Chapter 10 SYRIA, POLITICS AND PROTEST Recent reports on Syria have solemnly anounced the prospect of civil war. As February rolls in and the aniversary of protests aproaches, the brutal crackdown in Syria continues and the Fre Syrian Army, representing the militarized segment of the oposition, grows. At the top of news headlines are the continual death toll reports that have issued out of the country since March; these come no longer acompanying the images of protests and funerals that marked the early days of protest, but alongside reports of the advances and retreats of the Fre Syrian Army as they fight of Syrian military and security forces. Syria?s future now sems to hinge on the loyalty of Bashar?s military forces, the power of the Fre Syrian Army, the suport or oposition for both from the mases, and the posibilities of international intervention. A political compromise apears unlikely, or at least will be heavily contingent on the alignment of military forces, which are curently batling over teritory. This first segment of our Syria report ofers a dissection of alignments of military and political power curently within Syria. This paper will recommend the following: ? Foreign powers should recognize and endorse the Syrian National Coalition, which now presents the most viable political alternative, with fairly broad popular suport and representation of diverse religious and ethnic groupings. ? NATO should not materially suport the Syrian National Coalition as this would sacrifice its legitimacy with the people. It should, however, stand by the Arab League to provide substantial suport, as the later is more widely favored by the Syrian people. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 175" ? NATO should publicly take a stance against military intervention, cuting of a debate which has the potential to split the oposition. I. THE UPRISING AND ITS EVOLUTION, IN BRIEF [10.1] Syria?s oposition movement began 18 March, 201, thre months after the first outbursts of popular dissent in the Arab world. Protests emerged in the southern city of Dera, in response to the arest of fiften children for scrawling anti-government slogans on their schol walls. This inspired political fredom demonstrations in five cities, including Damascus; while four were uneventful, Dera?s became violent. Clashes with security forces left five civilians dead. The next day, Syrian security forces atacked a mosque asociated with the protests, killing six more. From there, the revolution began. As Dera grew increasingly bloody--a cycle of killings, funerals, and more killings during those funerals-- sympathy for the protesters spread. The first Friday following these killings, solidarity protests emerged around the country, in towns, villages, and cities, from Latakia to Homs and Damascus. Videos and reports of the violence emerged over facebok, twitter, and other online and ofline media, inciting mases to come out in suport. Those who came out were young and old, rural and urban, but almost all came out in indignation against the raw police brutality the crackdowns revealed. The particular naratives, sentiments, and demands that drive the Syrian movement were shaped in its first few months. The narative of violent represion played a particularly central role in Syria, relative to other movements in the Arab Spring. Protests emerged in response to unfair censorship of children and expanded through a string of funerals commemorating those who died at state hands; the movement?s primary early demands were a removal of emergency law, a restriction of security forces, and an end to the violent crackdown. Protests centered their critiques on state violence, and martyrdom became a Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 176" driving narative of the movement. In response to small protests, Bashar tok a course of action that had a particularly negative resonance among peoples who recalled both represion from Bashar in the recent Damascus Winter and the infamous masacre perpetrated by his father 1982 Hama. These naratives of represion have remerged in Syria?s Arab Spring and the unavoidable comparison of Bashar with his les-than-popular father have torn apart his image as a modernizer and liberal, emphasizing the continuities of his regime with his father?s dictatorship, and the continuity of problems. As protests spread, the state crackdown escalated, hand in hand. Bashar atempted other concesions, rapidly ofering up in the first few weks of protest military service cuts, fuel subsidies, increased media fredom, his whole cabinet, and then finally, on April 19th, the emergency law itself. But during this month dozens more had ben killed, and the concesions were deemed ?to little, to late.? Chants evolved from targeting the emergency law to ?down with the regime? slogans. By late April, the state response intensified. On 4-25 army forces were called in for the first time to control protests in Dera. This marked the beginning of military sieges of civilian areas, with Banias (in May), Hama (June), the Damascus suburbs and Homs becoming other major targets of military force. Trops and tanks have rolled into cities and in the northern port city of Lakatia, even gunboats were deployed. Meanwhile, in May, government security forces began raids to round up prominent activists and intellectuals, seking out both prominent oposition figures and new young activists involved in protests. 411 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 411 Mona Alami, ?Syrian regime ratchets up crackdowns on disident forces,? USA Today, January 30, 2012, acesed January 31, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-01-30/syria-protesters-crackdown- assad/52894842/1. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 177" Over this period, protesters grew increasingly organized. Originally convening at mosques, the one socially sanctioned place of asembly, protesters moved to develop ?online and ofline networks? to conect with each other beyond and independent of mosque gatherings. ?Local cordination committes,? networked with each other trough different cities and towns around the country and cordinating protests, son emerged. These bodies continued to cordinate grasrots action, but as represion escalated and the violence draged on, other oposition bodies formed. In September, signs of organized military defectors apeared. Originally two separate bodies, the Fre Oficers Corps and the Fre Syrian Army (FSA), they later merged under the baner of the FSA. The army has ben called ?more a collection of small disparate groups than an army? is unified under a central command on the Turkish-Syrian border. It functions in most areas to ring protests and defend civilian activists but has increasingly moved to defend whole neighborhods and teritories, vying for control with Syrian military and security forces. The FSA has grown dramatically since September, with defection rates rising. September also saw the formation of an organized political oposition in the form of the Syrian National Council (SNC), a 140 member transitional council based in Turkey uniting several prominent oposition groupings as well as local activists. The Syrian National Council stands posed against the National Cordination Council for Democratic Change (NCC), an internal political oposition group consisting of a coalition of left-leaning political parties. They NCC has become increasingly irelevant as its reformist tendencies and calls for dialogue with the regime are ardently rejected by dissidents. International intervention during this period tok the form of various sanctions against government figures and finally an agrement with the Arab League that began with a Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 178" monitoring mission in December. As the mission and agrement fel through, violence has escalated once again and the batle has become one of teritory betwen state and the oposition armed forces. II. THE BACKDROP TO REVOLT, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS [10.2] The Syrian uprising takes place in the context of a sharply divided and politically unstable nation. Syria?s population is divided along religious, ethnic, and clas lines, and those divisions are exploited to uphold the power of the ruling clas. Syria is 90% Arab. Its largest ethnic minority is the Kurd population of the Northeast, while Armenians and others constitute les than 1% of the population. Religiously, the country is 74% Suni Muslim, with significant populations of Alawite and Druze Muslims (16%), as well as a sizable Christian minority (10%). The country is 44% rural, fairly agricultural relative to other Middle Eastern states, and the economic divide betwen city and country widened significantly under Bashar?s rule. 412 413 Bashar?s rule in Syria is premised on a careful balancing of factions. He came to power in 200 inheriting his father?s political deck and has since somewhat rearanged the cards. The Syria Bashar tok over featured a strong party-state, with a firm grip on the economy and ?civil? society. The party of Bashar and his father Hafiz, the socialist Ba?ath Party, has controlled Syria since 1963, when they staged a coup and tok over the country after months of turmoil following the secesion of Syria?s political union with President Naser?s Egypt. Under Ba?ath rule, Syria nationalized a number of key industries and established state monopolies over important commercial gods. In 1970, with the takeover !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 412 CIA World Factbok - Syria 413 Mona Alami, ?Ongoing unrest threatening economy,? Inter Pres Service, June 30, 201, aces January 31, 2012, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=56309. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 179" of Bashar?s father Hafiz, the state extended its reach over much of civil society, establishing state controlled unions in agriculture, industry, and the profesions and restricting other forms of organization. With state organizations operating as the ?mediating, organizing ?brain?, and each group function[ing] as not only as an asociation for its members but also as a government agency and an instrument of government control over its members?, the elder Asad efectively established hierarchical control in all sectors of society. 414 As Alan George explains, ?Previous regimes had perched atop the country, enforcing their write as best they could and tackling problems esentially ad hoc. From the start, Asad understod that to ensure real security for his regime every niche of society would have to be brought firmly under his control.? 415 The elder Asad greatly expanded the Ba?ath Party, growing the state bureaucracy and especially its military and intelligence services. By the end of his rule, party membership encompased nearly 10% of the population, securing a wide base of loyalty in government oficials who depended on the regime for their jobs and security. 416 The base of political power established under Ba?ath rule was primarily in por and minority populations, in oposition to the old Suni merchant elite. The army, developed under the French colonial state as a counterweight to potential political challengers of the Syrian aristocracy, consisted of (then) politically marginalized populations--primarily Alawites, as well as Druze, Armenians, Christians, and rural Sunis. It was in these populations that the Ba?ath found its power base. One of the Ba?ath sources of political power has ben the fear of fundamentalist Suni rule among minority populations, as well as its promise of political power to those not part of the economic elite. Its most loyal base is among Alawites, the Shiite of-shot religious minority to which the Asads belong. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 414 Alan George, Syria: neither bread nor fredom (London: Zed Boks, 203), 9. 415 George, Syria, 7-8. 416 George, Syria, 10. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 180" state as it was established under Hafiz became an Alawite oligopoly, with the Asad family directly controlling the state and military forces and Alawites, fiercely loyal to the ruling family, spread in other positions of power. Under Bashar, a UK-trained physician before his ascent to political power, the state began a program of economic liberalization and built its popularity with an urban commercial clas, ?the petit bourgeois busines community,? that it had previously neglected. Bashar retracted elements of state control, allowing limited liberalization and an increasing role for the private sector. This enriched a limited, primarily urban clas, concentrated in Damascus, Alepo, and to some degre Homs, leading to growing inequality both within cities and especially betwen city and country. Bashar?s reforms risked alienating much the party?s traditional base, which included ?hundreds of thousands liv[ing] well under the poverty line.? 417 His popularity curently is high among Alawites who continue to receive the patronage and protection of the stage as well as the urban commercial clas that has prospered under his rule. Christians and Druze, many of whom fear a backlash of fundamentalist Suni rule, suport Asad for the stability he represents. Bashar, in the early days of his rule, based his popularity on his image as an anti- coruption reformer and modernizer for the country. He was further known for campaigns to clean up the country?s political establishment as well as a strong stance on Israel and refusal to compromise the nation?s integrity. His reformist image, however, began to erode with crackdowns on civil society activists in the Damascus Spring of 201, when hundreds of civil society forums were closed down and prominent activists arested. Nevertheles, Bashar?s base remained stable among a majority that was les concerned with civil liberties than with economic prospects--whether busines suces or the daily strugle to survive. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 417 George, Syria, 159. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 181" The stage for Syria?s recent unrest was set by declining economic conditions. As population growth continued to exced rates of growth in the economy, and as privatization removed state jobs, unemployment was on the rise. While oficial reports put figures at 8.1%, it is estimated that real unemployment figures are over 20%. Among youth betwen the ages of 15 and 24, this crisis is especially severe, at 19% even in oficial statistics, while unoficial sources estimate closer to 30%. 418 Meanwhile, the rural-urban divide became a major source of tension, with nearly 40% of the state budget being spent on urban areas. 419 The crisis was exacerbated by four years of drought that heavily damaged Syria?s large agricultural sector, prompting significant migrations of youth to the cities. 420 This stratified experience of economic strain left the country divided, with strong suport for Bashar remaining among urban commercial clases and the Alawite population, but growing discontent in the party?s rural base. The southern region of Dera?a, where the protests started were especially hard-hit by famine. These economic strains are also reflected in the predominantly rural composition of the early protest movements. III. POLITICAL ALIANCES AND THE BUILDING OF ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP [10.3] One of the major problems identified for the Syrian revolution has ben its lack of a unified oposition and viable political alternative. Curently, the oposition is organized under two main groupings--the National Cordination Committe (NCC) and the Syrian National Council (SNC). The National Cordination Commission, under the chairmanship of Husein Abdel Azim, is based in Damascus. It consists of 13 left-leaning political parties and a number of independent and youth activists; thre Kurdish political parties participate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 418 Official figures from CIA World Factbok; unoficial estimates quoted George, Syria, 30. 419 Alami, ?Ongoing unrest.? 420 Elie Elhadje, ?What?s behind the uproar in Syria?s labor relations? The reform proces and jobs??, Syria Coment, November 5, 2010, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=7710. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 182" in the alliance. The group represents a number of long-standing civil society activists and political oposition figures. The Syrian National Council, formed in September in Istanbul, is more strongly tied to the organizing bodies of the uprising. Its 140 member council includes members of many political groupings, notably the Damascus Declaration Group, the Muslim Brotherhod, the Istanbul Gathering, the Kurdish National Bloc, and youth activists. Its foundational statement, released September 16, lays out a membership structure with ?fifty two percent of SNC members belong[ing] to the new grasrots movements that sprouted from the revolution?, sixty percent coming from within the country and forty percent from abroad. The SNC and NCC differ most significantly in their policies towards foreign intervention and negotiation with the Bashar regime. Whereas the NCC is open to negotiation with the government on the condition of trop withdrawal and release of political prisoners, the SNC strictly oposes dialogue with the regime, believing that it would compromise the unity of the oposition. Both coalitions oficially opose foreign intervention, but sub-groupings within the SNC, particularly a portion of youth activists, continue to call for intervention, including a no-fly zone in the vein of the Libyan intervention. The NCC is heavily criticized for its reformist position, and protesters have attacked the legitimacy of the committe, rejecting its ability to represent them. 421 Criticism of the SNC is directed at its large foreign composition and its ambivalent atitude towards foreign intervention as well as its heavily Muslim composition. The NCC and nationalist elements atack the National Council as foreign-influenced and point to the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhod within the group. The shortage of Kurdish representation within !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 421 ?Syrian opposition rivals in Cairo scufle,? BBC News, November 9, 201, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-midle- east-15661382. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 183" the group also serves as a point of critique. Recently, the SNC has risen in prominence as the movement militarizes and the likelihod of dialogue with the regime fades. IV. THE MOVEMENT ON THE GROUND AND THE ORGANIZATION OF FORCES [10.4] To understand the potential of political groupings, it is necesary to understand the bases on which they depend. Important networks of suport and power include each of the parties bases, their conection to grasrots organizing committes, and the predilection of the oposition military forces of the Fre Syrian Army. One of the most prominent bodies of Syria?s grasrots organizers is the nationwide Local Cordinating Committes network. The LCs unite committes in Dara, Homs, Banias, Saraqeb, Idleb, Hasaka, Qamishli, Der Ezor, the Syrian Coast, Hama, Raqa, Swayda, the Damascus suburbs, and Damascus. 422 They arose as the organizational bodies for those cordinating protests and began to conect with each other formally as the protests spread. The LCs released their first joint statement on 22 April and have since served as a voice for the grasrots through regular formal and informal statements acesible on facebok and their website (lccsyria.org). The Guardian also cites them as a valuable network of eyes on the ground, reporting casualty numbers. The internal structure and functioning of the LCs is unclear--whether they poses an internal hierarchy or a direct or representative democratic structure. The various local committes apear to function autonomously, having arisen independently and seking ?greater cordination? but not centralization. 423 These groups continue to publish autonomous statements and deal with vastly different situations in their respective localities. Their significance is in their role !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 422 ?About the LCS,? Local Cordinating Comites of Syria (LCS), accesed January 30, 2012, http://www.lccsyria.org/about. 423 ?About the LCS.? Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 184" facilitating local, national, and global communication in the grasrots resistance. Their statements and positions reach, and hypothetically represent, the broad milieu of the resistance; their alignment can serve as a valuable sign of where the resistance is headed. In the early days of the uprising, the LCs articulated the dominant calls for media fredom, return of the disapeared, an end to violent represion, regular elections and constitutional reform, and the creation of a national body to addres grievances. 424 The network was used to put out calls for suport to various localities under atack, to release statements against each of Asad?s speches, and to articulate refusal to dialogue unles state violence stoped and trops were withdrawn. It was also used to refute the conection of the movement to Al Qaeda after Ayman Zawahiri?s spech; to anounce coperation with groups like the Fre People of the Revolution of Dignity, the Coalition of the Civilian Youth of Syria, the April 17th Movement for Democratic Change in Syria, the Violations Documenting Center, and Syrian Lawyers for Fredom; and to endorse the Arab League injunction and the formation of the Syrian National Council. Its organization allows it to articulate clear perspectives and analysis, cordinate action, and organize formal partnerships and cordination. Furthermore, the committes have the power to call for actions such as the December 11th ?Strike for Dignity,? which evolved into ?the largest general strike since the protest movement began in march.? This strike, ocuring at the same time as the government?s atempt to move ahead with a flimsy show of local elections, created a venue for expresing mas discontent against the regime, layering this mesage over the embarasment of low voter turnout. 425 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 424 ?Statement of the Syrian Local Cordinating Comites,? LCS, April 22, 2011, accesed January 30, 2012, http://www.lccsyria.org/1103. 425 Mary Casey and Tom Kutsch, ?Syrian workers hold general strike; voter turnout is low in local elections,? December 12, 2011, accesed January 30, 2012, Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 185" The strike was a demonstration of the power of the grasrots resistance and its networks; simultaneously an atempt to call atention to the Syrian people and the extent of its discontent. Any political actor in Syria must act with consciousnes of this grasrots, decentralized network that is represented in but not controlled by the Syrian National Council, which continues to organize actions and rally people on the ground. They are a major network of influence capable of building or subverting the building of a political base. The general strike, however, is a god example of the limits of this coalition?s efectivenes. The ripple of the strike has ben small in the context of increasing militarization. The state?s atention and fear is directed not towards these coalitions, that will undoubtedly be important in considering the building of alternatives, but towards the increasingly powerful Fre Syrian Army. In a sign of the turning tides, the Local Cordination Committes, which from the beginning have called for peaceful resistance, called on February 4 upon ?our brothers in the Fre Syrian Army to sucesfully protect or people in Homs and Zabadany.? 426 It has become clear, to the government, international community, and Syrian people, that this batle will be one of military forces. The Fre Syrian Army, composed of defectors from the Syrian army and reportedly some civilian participants, operates under a command based in Turkey with suport bases along the border in Lebanon. It curently has control over large parts (by its own claim, over 80%) of Homs and controls pockets in many other military ocupied towns and cities. The FSA is a loose alliance of at least 12 reported brigades under different commanders. Despite central leadership, the groups are only loosely conected and intergroup tensions abound. They are united in their oposition to the Syrian regime but for the most part maneuver !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/201/12/12/syrian_workers_strike_meanwhile_voter_turnout_is_low_in_local_e lections. 426 ?LC?s statement 4-2-2012,? LCS, February 4, 2012, http://www.lccsyria.org/608. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 186" autonomously and control different teritories. Al-Akhbar reporter Radwan Mortada reports from her stay with Al-Dhaher Bibar Brigade that groups ?rival each other for control and influence, and contact betwen these groups? commanders is minimal. They find fault in each others? performance, and trade charges of exploiting the ?revolution? for personal gain.? 427 The army is able to wage guerilla warfare against the government and hold select teritories--notably large sections of Homs--where they have pushed out military forces. They operate on light weaponry, including Kalashnikovs and other automatic rifles, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, and tank mines. 428 These are smugled in through Lebanon, as well as acquired through rebels and secret suporters in the Syrian military itself. The Syrian army relies heavily on suport in Lebanon for its importation of weapons and medical suplies as well as its base for suport activities and injured fighters. Demographically, the army is heavily Suni, with brigades named after historic Muslim military commanders, but FSA spokesmen publicly deny any religious afiliation. Regardles, the FSA could potentially inspire fear along sectarian lines, especially drawing divides betwen Alawis--who traditionally have ben highly positioned in the Syrian military- -and Sunis who identify with defectors. As the Fre Syrian Army becomes more powerful, the dynamics and fissures within the army itself will become increasingly significant in determining the course of the conflict. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 427 Radwan Mortada, ?Wadi-Khaled: the Fre Syrian Army Base in Lebanon (I),? Al-Akhbar English, February 8, 2012. accesed February 12, 2012, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/wadi-khaled-fre-syrian-army-base-lebanon-ii. 428 Mortada, ?Wadi-Khaled.? Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 187" V. GEOGRAPHIES OF RESISTANCE AND REPRESION [10.5] Much of the political division is reflected in the geography of the uprising and escalating conflict. Syria?s revolts began in the south city of Dera?a, a heavily agricultural area hit hard by the recent famines, reflecting the rural composition of discontent. In these southern agricultural areas, division runs more heavily along lines of geographic identity than on religious or ethnic lines. As the revolts spread to larger cities, especially in the north, the tensions became more visible. In Lakatia, a town hit surprisingly early by revolts considering its significant Alawi population, the lines were starkly drawn betwen a slim Suni majority and a powerful Alawi minority. In Alepo, an economically flourishing city that has benefited much from Asad?s program of modernization, protest was sucesfully represed for a long time; however, factory strikes which hit Alepo during the Dec 11th general strike and the state represion caried out in response brought out fault lines in the city betwen the working and mercantile clases. Homs, Syria?s third largest city, after the political center of Damascus and the financial center of Alepo, has become the core of the uprisings, again with a resistance superseding identity, united by common represion at the hands of the state. The lines of civil war will likely take place as an advance upon Syria?s political and financial centers in Alepo and Dara?a, while Homs becomes a base for the revolution. The lines of this civil war, especially in the broad-based resistance in Homs and the southern areas around Dara?a, do not apear to be drawn in any significant way along religious lines. Sectarian violence is a tol being used by the state to try to incite conflict, but the resistance to these lines of apeal within the grasrots resistance have ben strong. Syria, Politics & Protest Jasmine Zhang ! ! 188" VI. PROGNOSIS AND POLITICAL POSIBILITIES [10.6] This analysis highlights a few significant points about the revolution. The first is that its future hinges increasingly on the balance of military power, seting up a decisive place in the game for foreign military intervention. The second is that popular sentiment decidedly rejects Asad and his administration; setlement with Asad and his administration is unlikely and regime change will be a necesary step. Third, the lines of disagrement within the oposition concern the role of foreign military intervention, which is a debate still undecided within both the Syrian National Council and the Fre Syrian Army. Foreign intervention would be devastatingly divisive for the oposition. Fourth, religious and ethnic lines are not yet and not poised to be dominant divisive lines within this civil war. They are tensions that will continue, but apear to be navigable and actively engaged in the opositions atempts to build coalition. Finally, an active civil society movement has organized in Syria which will remain an active player in the coming political project. The role of foreign powers should be to respect and suport the grasrots-suported political oposition while carefully avoiding divisive roles. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 189" Chapter 11 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS & ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE SYRIAN UPRISING Since 26 January 201, small peaceful protests have escalated to an ongoing internal conflict in Syria. The Arab Spring that began with the Tunisian revolution of January, 201, reached Syria by mid-March, when residents of the small southern town of Dara?a tok to the strets to protest the torture of students who had put up anti-government grafiti. The protests gained momentum on 25 March 201, on the ?Day of Dignity? when thousands of Syrians tok part in nationwide protests after Friday prayers in at least a dozen cities, extending from Dara'a to the capital, Damascus, to the restive northern Kurdish area of Qamishli. Although the day started of peacefully, by late afternon there were double-digit death tolls in several regions and reports of 24 people were killed in Dara'a. 429 After this day, the White House stated, "Syrian government's ofensive in northern Syria has created a humanitarian crisis". 430 On 21 April 201, the government formally declared the repeal of an emergency law, in place since 1963, which allowed the government sweping authority to suspend constitutional rights. The same month the Syrian government launched the first of what became a series of crackdowns, sending tanks into restive cities as security forces opened fire on demonstrators. Security forces used tanks and snipers to force people of the strets. Water and electricity were shut of and security forces began confiscating flour and fod in particularly restive areas. By October, 201, the United Nations (UN) estimated that over 2,00 civilians had ben killed and 10,00 imprisoned. By January 2012, the UN then reported that 5,40 Syrian civilians had died. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 429 Abouzeid, Rania. "Syria's Friday of Dignity Becomes a Day of Death ." Time Magazine. 25 March 201: n. page. Web. 31 Jan. 2012. http://ww.time.com/time/world/article/0,859,2061452,0.html . 430 "BBC: News -Midle East." Syria: US warns of 'humanitarian crisis' over crackdown. 3cBC News, 12 June 201. Web. 16 January 2012. http://ww.bbc.co.uk/news/world-midle-east-13740873 . Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 190" The systematic killings of protestors and bystanders caught the atention of many human rights group. Human Rights Watch acuses the Syrian government of crimes against humanity: Human Rights Watch believes that the nature and scale of abuses commited by the Syrian security forces, the similarities in the aparent unlawful kilings and other crimes, and evidence of direct orders given to security forced to ?shot to kil? protestors, strongly sugest these abuses qualify as crimes against humanity. Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity can also be commited during time of peace, if they are part of a widespread or systematic atack against a civilian population. (Human Rights Watch 20) There has ben history of atacks on the civilian population by Hafiz al-Asad?s, Bashar?s father. The masacre of Hama in 1982 showed that the Syrian police state flatened any oposition. In any police state, violence must be rationalized and routinized if it is to bring stability to a deeply divided society. 431 There is a history of violence in Syria and crimes against humanity have ben going on in Syria for decades. The ongoing killings of civilians in Syria caused outrage in the International community. The UN Security Council atempted to pas a proposal in October, 201, but it was aposed by Rusia and China. The UN tried again in February, 2012, but it was again vetoed by China and Rusia. Turkey, the European Union and the United States discontinued economic relations in late 201. The Arab League expelled Syria even as the agrement on a peace plan increased atacks on civilians. International actions reacted towards the violence witnesed acros Syria with economic sanctions. This report looks at the curent humanitarian crisis in Syria and the international response with ethical implications. It is divided into four main sections. The first section explains the authoritarian regime of the Asad family. The second section explores the past and curent economic situation in Syria, focusing on the outcomes of the recent international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 431 Pollack, Kenneth M. The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Midle East. Washington, DC: Brokings Institution, 201. Internet resource. P. 249. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 191" sanctions. The third section discuses the violence and the human rights violations that continue in Syria. The fourth section consists of international responses including those who suport intervention and those who do not. The final section explores the future of Syria and proposes thre recommendations: ? Syrian people want humanitarian help and no military intervention. Therefore, NATO should not intervene. ? Humanitarian aid neds to be provided mainly by the Arab League and other countries in the region. ? Syria must discover democracy on its own and remove the Asad government. I. STATE?S AUTHORITARIAN NATURE & DETERMINATION TO STAY IN POWER [11.1] The Asad family has ruled Syria for forty-one years. Bashar al-Asad was not expected to inherit the Presidency but the violence that continues in Syria shows that Asad is determined to stay in power. This was shown in Asad?s March 30 th spech to Parliament. Rather than focus on the socio-economic problems behind the unrest and ofer ways to addres them, he blamed terorists, conspirators, and external enemies for instigating the protests. David W. Lesch, who has met Asad explains: Most outside of Syria were left scratching their heads after the spech, but anyone who has spent time in the country would understand that for the most part Asad was preaching to the converted. It is a national psyche that generaly believes in conspiracy. Many Syrians, even those who have spent significant time in the West, stil believe Monica Lewinsky was an Israeli mole planted to help weaken or bring down a US president who was demed more favorably disposed to the Arab side of the Arab?Israeli equation at the time. The problem is that there has ben just enough real conspiracy perpetrated by outside powers in Syria over the years to lend credence to such notions. (2) One of the results is that the security forces in Syria have ben given a tremendous amount of leeway to ensure domestic stability and protect the regime in what is almost always a Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 192" threatening environment in the heart of the Middle East. But the security forces acumulation of empowerment over the years oversen, if not sanctioned by the government, led to systemic recklesnes that obviously backfired against the regime. After all, it was their collective hubris in aresting and roughly handling scholchildren who had written anti-regime grafiti in the southern Syrian town of Dara?a early in February, 201, that launched the uprising. 432 The death and torture of Hamza Ali al-Khateb only reinforced the characterization of Asad as an outlaw regime that must go. It laid the foundation for crimes against humanity charges that could be brought against Asad and his government by the International Criminal Court. Syria denies fredom of expresion and asociation to its citizens and denies them their rights to democratic participation in the government. In the eleven months of the uprising, the government has killed thousands of its own people while denying innocent civilians their right to medical care, fod and shelter. Evidence from many human rights groups shows that the government tortures on a routine bias and arests and hold thousands without change or trial. 433 Decades of authority by the Asad regime is now being questioned internationally and the international consensus is that Asad must be removed from power. II. SYRIAN ECONOMICS [11.2] [11.2.a] Oil and Economic Sanctions Hafiz Al-Asad, Bashar?s father and prior president, created an economy dependent on oil. Syria?s main export became oil in the 190s with at least 50% of its trade revenues !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 432 Lesch, David H. "The Arab Spring - and winter - in Syria." Global Change, Peace and Security. 23. no. 3 (2012): 421-426. 433 Paul, James A. Human Rights in Syria. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 190. Print. P. 175. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 193" from crude oil exports. Without oil, Syria?s overall economic performance would be far les positive. Paradoxically, without the development of new sources, Syria?s proven reserves of oil are projected to run out in this decade. 434 Most of this oil travels to Europe and the United States. Syrian economic growth remained in the 4% to 5% range from 208 until 2010. Even though the global economic crisis afected oil prices, the economies of Syria's key export partners and Syria?s sources of investment continued to rise. The Syrian government has implemented modest economic reforms in the past few years, including cuting and lending interest rates, opening private banks, consolidating all of the multiple exchange rates, raising prices on some subsidized items, most notably gasoline and cement, and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange - which began operations in 209. In addition, President Asad signed legislative decres to encourage corporate ownership reform and to allow the Central Bank to issue Treasury bills and bonds for government debt. Nevertheles, the economy remains highly controlled by the government. Long-run economic constraints include declining oil production, high unemployment (especially in the youth demographic) 435 rising budget deficits, and increasing presure on water suplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, rapid population growth, industrial expansion and water pollution. The excesive control of the economy by the government allowed countries around the world to aply presure to Asad by imposing economic sanctions. The sanctions imposed on Syria in late 201, contain various economic, financial and psychological repercusions for the general economic capacity. Thus, the sanctions represent a concerted policy package designed to weaken the regime and reduce its political capacities and, at a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 434 Leveret, Flynt. Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial By Fire. Washington, D.C.: The Brokings Institution, 205. Print. P.5. 435 According to the CIA World Factbok 61% of the population is betwen the ages of 15 to 64. The other stagering statistic is that the unemployment rate for this demographic is 19.1%. The World Factbok 209. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 209. https://ww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbok/index.html. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 194" maximum, to open the way for its collapse due to economic damage. Kimberly An Elliot, a senior fellow at the Center of Global development explains, ?Sanctions by the E.U. and U.S. impacted Syria?s exports heavily. In the short-run, there are no direct sanctions that explicitly refuse to import medicines, fod, etc., but they clearly have broader impacts on growth in the country. This efect will be indirect over time and may hurt the Syrian people more than the Asad government?. 436 Economic sanctions have ben in place since late 201, but the special forces of the Syrian government continue to cling to power by killing their own people. [11.2.b] Rusia and China In 1954, the first Communist party member was elected into the Syrian parliament. Khalid Bakdash did not ignite a communist revolution in the area but he was the first Communist deputy in the Arab world. 437 His position in Syria created a long-term relationship with Rusia. Rusia and Syria had anti-western interests. Rusia, the Soviet Union at the time, sought to counter the Western presence in the region by recruiting local allies. 438 Syria was driven to ally with Rusia for defense considerations. Domestic instability arose in Syria after 195, after Israel?s retaliatory raids on the Arab countries and Iraqi and Turkish threats. 439 Syria tried to avoid any alliance with former colonial powers. On 29 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 436 Wil International Sanctions Help Syrians? Interview by Melissa Block. NPR radio, 29 November 201. Radio. http://ww.npr.org/201/11/29/14291219/wil-sanctions-help-syrians. 437 Syria Unmasked: The Supresion of Human Rights by the Asad Regime. New Haven: Yale University Pres, 191. Print. P. 138 438 The Soviet Union?s main interest in the Midle East was in order to undermine the Baghdad Pact which, from the Soviet Union?s view, was a major threat. The Pact no longer made the area a bufer zone and extended NATO?s military power to the Soviet Union?s backyard. Karsh, Efraim. The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years. London: Royal Institute of International Afairs, 198. Print. P. 3. 439 Karsh, Efraim. The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years. London: Royal Institute of International Afairs, 198. Print. P.3. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 195" October 1957, Syria and the Soviet Union signed their first large-scale economic arms deal at a total cost of $579 million. 440 Rusia?s refusal to augment Syria's missile capabilities drove Syria to sek other partners to bolster its military potential. The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent los of military and economic suport from Rusia left Syria severely weakened in the face of its more powerful neighbors and with few viable options to emerge out of its regional isolation, save for its relationship with Iran. 441 As a result, Syria was eager to gain China as an ally. In fact, the Syrian regime saw China as a defender against U.S. presure, especially amid growing concern from the U.S. over Syria's so-called links to terorism. China is widely recognized as a rising power that is becoming increasingly confident in exerting its interests and shape geopolitics in its favor. China?s main interest is projecting its influence in the Middle East. China's controversial decision to export intermediate-range ballistic missile systems and related technology to Syria and other states in the region in the late 1980s and early 190s represented Beijing's first significant inroads as an actor in the Middle East with the potential to shift the balance of power on the ground. 442 No treaty or arms deal has ben signed betwen Syria and China but Syria is a source of economic potential and an oportunity to project China's influence in the region. However, as China's interests in Syria expand, Syria's complex geopolitics will pose a series of challenges for Chinese diplomacy that warant consideration. Despite of the fall of the Soviet Union, Rusia and Syria still continue their strong alliance and the arms shipments continue. This alliance provided the Syrian government with a strong ally who holds a position on the UN Security Council and on the political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 440 Karsh, Efraim. The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years. London: Royal Institute of International Afairs, 198. Print. P. 4. 441 Zambelis, Chris. "China Tests its Metle in Syria." Asia Times [Hong Kong] 6 November 208, Print. 442 Ibid. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 196" world stage. Syria also has an ally in China which is also a member of the UN Security council. Acording to Human Rights Watch, neither Rusia nor China has ever expresed public concern about Syrian human rights. Now, Syria has two allies who wield extreme power at the UN. This kind of action was witnesed in late 201 and February 2012 when China and Rusia vetoed two UN proposal for Syrian intervention. III. HUMAN RIGHTS IN SYRIA [11.3] [11.3.a] The Hama Massacre The rise of the Asad regime brought stability to Syria. However, their rise to power came at a price. Hafez Al-Asad became Syria?s president after multiple military coups on 22 February 1971. In the years following, President Hafez al-Asad would repres many protests and uprisings. The most brutal atack on its own people tok place in a city in the Northern Syria called Hama. 443 Hama was the fourth largest city in Syria with a population of 200,000. 444 Hama was also a tough oponent of the government and consisted of a majority of Suni Muslims. In 1982, the regime brutally confronted the Muslim Brotherhod-led insurgency centered on the city of Hama. 445 On 2 February 1982, the regime decided to end Hama?s oposition by sending in the Syrian Army to confiscate arms. The city?s population decided to resist. An ambush ended up near a Muslim Brotherhod base and citizens along with Islamist fighters started fighting the Syrian Army. The batle was in a stalemate until February 5, when security forces started killing hundreds of people by mas executions. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 443 See Apendix 1 for geographical reference. The World Factbok 209. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009. https://ww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbok/index.html. 444 Syria Unmasked: The Supresion of Human Rights by the Asad Regime. New Haven: Yale University Press, 191. Print. P. 19. 445 Pollack, Kenneth M. The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Midle East. Washington, DC: Brokings Institution, 201. Internet resource. P. 248. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 197" Thousands of people atempted to flee the city only to be caught by security forces and arested. The Syrian Human Rights Committe estimated that 10,00 to 40,00 citizens were killed along with one thousand solders. 446 Many thousands were injured and more than a third of the city?s houses were completely destroyed. Thirty years later, human rights are still being violated as the people of Syria rise up to protest the Asad regime. On 2 February 2012, oposition activists in Syria say government trops deployed in flashpoint areas acros the country to prevent protests marking the 30th aniversary of a masacre in the central province of Hama. Even with the Syrian government trying to crush the protests, people came out to the strets dresed in black for a demonstration after Friday prayers to commemorate the 30th aniversary of the Hama masacre. [11.3.b] Escalation and Continuing Deaths in the Syrian Uprising In December, 201, Navi Pillay, United Nations high commissioner for human rights anounced that over 5,00 people have ben killed since the uprising. The governmental military and security forces enacted these atacks on civilians. As of 4 February 2012, the UN reports that more than 6,00 people have ben killed since the protests began in March, 201. In June, 201, the Human Rights Watch published a report titled ?We?ve Never Seen Such Horor: Crimes against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces? from March, 25 th , until 29 April 201. The events during this specific time tok place in the southern province of Dara'a but since then the protests and violence has spread throughout the entire country. Recently, (Feb. 2012) the city of Homs in the northern part of Syria has ben under siege. In order to highlight the events in respect to human rights violations, it is important to start analyzing the situation in March, 201. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 446 "Massacre of Hama." Syrian Human Rights Comite. SHRC, 2 Feb 206. Web. 1 Feb 2012. SHRC.org. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 198" While popular uprisings swept the Arab world in January, 201, Syria semed to be immune. In February, 201, the protests started apearing in Syria, but the failed to gain enough momentum because they were outnumbered by Syrian Security Forces. In mid- March, people participated in anti-government demonstration in the city of Dara'a. In response to the arest and torture by political security of 15 schol children Protests erupted on March 18 th . 447 Security forces opened fire on the protestors killing four civilians. On March 19 th , the government would form a committe to investigate these incidents in Dara'a. The next day, the government sent out oficials to the area asuring people that the government would find who opened fired on individuals and they would be brought to justice. 448 As the protests continued to spread in the nearby towns, security forces increased their brutality. The Syrian government controlled media denied the Security forces violence blaming the actions on foreign elements, gangs and terorist groups. 449 On March 30, President Asad spoke before Parliament pledging to enact reforms. However, the reforms promised by Asad resulted in more represion. In April, Friday protests resulted in thousands of protestors in cities of Syria, including Damascus. This was the first of what became wekly mas anti-government demonstrations cros Syria. 450 As protests continued, cities, mostly in Dara'a, set up blockades and checkpoints. By mid-April, Human Rights Watch documented that Syrian security forces prevented medical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 447 Human Rights Watch. ?We?ve Never Sen Such Horor?. ? June 201 by Human Rights Watch. P. 13. 448 ?Syria: Government Crackdown Leads to Protester Deaths,? Human Rights Watch news release, March 21, 2011, http://ww.hrw.org/en/news/201/03/21/syria-government-crackdown-leads-protester-deaths. 449 ?Instigators Mingle with Crowds of Prayers Trying to Cause Chaos in Daraa & Banias,? SANA, March 18 2011, http://ww.sana.sy/eng/21/201/03/18/337436.htm. 450 ?Syrian Protesters Clash With Security Forces,? The New York Times, April 1, 2011, http://ww.nytimes.com/201/04/02/world/middleast/02syria.html?ref=world. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 199" personel and others from reaching the wounded. 451 Human Rights Watch also interviewed 19 people who had ben detained in Dara'a and Damascus. Acording to the report, all but two of the detaines arested during the protests were beaten by security services and others were subjected to various forms of torture. 452 On April 21 st , President Asad issued decres to lift the state of emergency to abolish the state security court and recognize and regulate the right to peaceful protests. 453 This did not stop the killings of protestors. April 22 nd was one of the bloodiest day of the protests. The Human Rights Watch estimated that 82 people, including thre boys and an elderly man, were killed. 454 Security forces launched a large-scale operation on town and cities acros Syria. The forces imposed checkpoints and placed snipers on top of buildings. In Dara'a, they cut of electricity and communication and prevented evacuations by opening fire on anyone who tried to leave. When the forces obtained full control of the city, they began to arest hundreds. On May 25 th , security forces returned the body of 13 year-old Hamza Ali al-Khatib to his family in Jeza, a town near Dara'a. He had ben missing for a month and had ben injured when he was atempting to bring fod to Dara'a. 455 His death and reported torture ignited protestors cros the country on Friday, May 27 th . These protests resulted in 16 deaths and the arests of young men in Dara'a. At the end of May, the military stormed Homs, a city in the middle of Syria, and open fired on homes and residents. Throughout the remainder of the spring and summer of 201, protestors continued !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 451 ?Syria: Security Forces Barring Protesters from Medical Care,? Human Rights Watch news release, April 12, 2011, http://ww.hrw.org/en/news/201/04/12/syria-security-forces-baring-protesters-medical-care; 452 Human Rights Watch. ?We?ve Never Sen Such Horor?. ? June 201 by Human Rights Watch. P. 15 453 ?Syria: Rein in Security Services,? Human Rights Watch news release, April 21, 201, http://ww.hrw.org/en/news/201/04/21/syria-rein-security-services. 454 Human Rights Watch. ?We?ve Never Sen Such Horor?. ? June 201 by Human Rights Watch. P. 16. 455 Human Rights atch interview ith relative of Hamza al-Khatib, May 29, 2011. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 200" every Friday. These Friday protests were termed ?Friday of Fre Woman? and ?Friday of Children?. 456 In June, 201, trops besieged the northwestern town of Jisr al-Shughour and the government claims that 120 members of the security forces have ben killed by ?armed gangs?. 457 The Syrian government continued to blame the so-called uprisings on gangs and terorists. In response to the continuing protests, in July, 201, Asad sacked the governor of the northern province of Hama after a mas demonstration. By August, 201, the international community steped in, starting with the U.S. calling for Asad to step down. In September, 201, the U.S., Turkey, and the E.U. imposed economic sanctions on Syria. After seven months of protesting, two oposition groups started to form. One is the Syrian National Council that claims to have a front of internal and exiled oposition activists from the Syrian Army. The other oposition group consists of the defectors of the Syrian military and are identified as the Fre Syrian Army. At the end of 201, the UN reports that over 5,00 people have ben killed along with many thousands detained. The fighting apeared to get more intense in Damascus as two suicide bombs outside a security building killed 44 people and oposition groups suspected the government of the atacks. In January, 2012, as the Arab League monitors entered Homs, a suicide bomber killed 26 in Damascus and fighting intensified betwen the oposition and the government. On 5 February 2012, reports indicated that over 250 were killed due to government atacks on the city of Homs after a protest. As of 5 February 2012, human rights groups claim that 5,40 people have ben killed by governmental military in the eleven-month uprisings. The area that has the most deaths since March, 201, is the area of Homs, which sufered 250 casualties from February 3 rd to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 456 "'Dozens kiled' in fresh Syria protests." Al-Jazera English 3 June 2011, Print. 457 "Syria Profile Timeline." BBC World News. (2012): January. Web. 5 Feb. 2012. http://ww.bbc.co.uk/news/world- midle-east-14703995. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 201" the 5 th . On 4 February 2012, China and Rusia vetoed a second proposal for humanitarian intervention in Syria. On 12 February 2012, The Arab League asked the United Nations Security Council to send a peacekeping mission to Syria and called on Arab nations to sever diplomatic relations with Damascus in an efort to presure the government to end the violence there. On 15 February 2012, Assad set a date later this month for a referendum on a new constitution, a gesture aparently designed to ofer some kind of government- controlled change even as fighting continued in Damascus and elsewhere. Due to Rusia and China?s veto at the UN Security Council, the United Nations General Asembly voted on 16 February 2012 overwhelmingly to aprove a resolution condemning President Asad?s crackdown on the uprising and called for adoption of an Arab League proposal to resolve the conflict. The resolution, which called for Mr. Asad to relinquish powers to a vice president, was a nonbinding action with no power of enforcement at the world body. 458 As this report goes to print, the bombings continue in the cities of Homs and Alepo. Acording to many reports more killings go on everyday but there is no way to tell which report has legitimacy. The Syrian government will not allow outside journalists into the country. Human Rights organizations get their information from oposition groups who report the number of people who died. Without going into Syria to observe the situation, the international community is not able to determine how many total have died. What remains to be true is the fact that the government and Asad continue to repres its people by violating basic human rights. 459 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 458 Gladstone, Rick. "United Nations General Asembly Vote to Condemn Syrian Leader." New York Times [New York City] 16 February 2012, Web. www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/midleast/secretary-general-ban-ki-moon-castigates-syria- ahead-of-general-assembly-vote.html?hp 16 Feb. 2012. 459 In Apendix 2 there is a visual of the rise of daily casualties in Syria provided by Juylan Arbel. 9 February 2012. http://statisfaction.wordpres.com/2012/02/09/daily-casualties-in-syria/ 13 February 2012. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 202" [11.3.c] Human Rights Violations In the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states ?Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including fod, clothing, housing, and medical care and necesary social services, and the right to security in the even of unemployment, sicknes, disability, widowhod, old age and other lack of livelihod circumstances beyond his control.? 460 Along with shoting peaceful protestors, the Syrian authorities have denied wounded protestors aces to medical asistance. 461 Human Rights Watch reported that security forces tok control of hospitals and detained the wounded in Dara'a. Al-Jazera English released a video reporting on the torture in Homs claiming, ?Those injured have to take their chances in hospitals in pro- Asad areas. Reports of people being taken from their and being tortured are common. The only alternatives are secret, makeshift hospitals with little or no suplies?. 462 The people who are sufering are not only those that are fighting for their fredom but also those innocent civilians who fear to receive or are denied medical care. It is clear that the security forces deliberately targeted protesters who were unarmed and posed no threat to the forces. The militarization of the oposition was not evident until late January 2012. Evidence from the Human Rights Watch highlights who the Syrian security forces were targeting, ?Rescuers who were trying to take the wounded and the dead away; medical personel trying to reach the wounded; and, during the siege people who dared to go out of their houses or to gain aces to suplies. In some cases, they also shot bystanders, including women and children? (7). The Human Rights Watch also sugests that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 460 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (II), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948): at Article 25. http://ww.un.org/Overview.rights.html. Print. 461 Human Rights Watch. ?We?ve Never Sen Such Horror?. ? June 201 by Human Rights Watch. P. 30. 462 ?Syria Live Blog.? Al-Jazeera English Live Blogs. 2 February 2012. http://blogs.aljazera.com/midle- east/2012/02/05/fighting-back-against-assads-forces. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 203" the security forces participating in the operation had orders ?shot to kill? from their commanders. 463 Along with blocking medical aid within Syria, the government is also blocking any outside humanitarian aid. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, based in London, claimed that Syrian authorities blocked 20 activists from entering the country. The Activists were made up of Syrians who fled to the surounding countries and are called the ?Fredom Convoy?. 464 Fredom Convoy spokesperson Bilal Dalati said, ?The Syrian Government said ?no? to medical suplies, ?no? to doctors who are going in and treat the wounded, and they said ?no? to fod and miscellaneous [items] that we were going to take to Syria to help the towns that?s under siege?. The only available humanitarian aid, at the moment, is the Syrian Arab Red Crescent organization. They are a voluntary humanitarian organization that provides medical asistance. 465 SARC works with the International Committe of the Red Cros. The SARC is not immune to the violence in Syria. On 26 January 2012, Abdulrazaq Jbeiro, the secretary-general of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and head of the aid group's branch in the northern-western province of Idlib, was shot dead on Wednesday. The International Committe of the Red Cros called on the government to investigate into his death. The oficial Syrian news agency, SANA, reported that Jbeiro was asasinated by "a terorist group" when they opened fire with a machine gun, shoting him in the head. 466 Jbeiro?s death did not stall the violence in Syria, instead the fighting became more violent. The question now is how do we remove Asad from power? The next section !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 463 Human Rights Watch. ?We?ve Never Sen Such Horor?. ? June 201 by Human Rights Watch. P.8 464 "Syria Observatory for Human Rights." 6 February 2012. Web. 6 February 2012. http://ww.syriahr.org/. 465 "Syrian Arab Red Crescent." 31 January 2012. Web. 1 Feb 2012. www.sarc.sy. 466 "Senior Red Crescent oficial Kiled in Syria." Al-Jazera English 26 Jan 2012, Web. 7 Feb. 2012. http://ww.aljazera.com/news/middleast/2012/01/20121251044175248.html. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 204" explains the international response to the violence. The economic sanctions are a slow way to eliminate Asad. These sanctions may also have long-term negative impacts on the Syrian people. The Syrian oposition does not want military asistance and many experts, including Dr. Joujati, believe that the only intervention in Syria should be to protect innocent civilians. Rusia and China are convinced that the policies that are being pushed in the UN apear to pursue a pro-democracy government in Syria in order to fulfill the Western political agenda. All of these point will be examined as the report delves further into the international reaction of the atrocities in Syria. IV. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE [11.4] After reports of Human Rights violations became more public, the international community began to respond. Initially, most countries imposed economic sanctions. As of 6 February 2012, the U.S. had closed its embasy in Damascus and the UN continues to presure China and Rusia to aprove a proposal. The Syrian people are still undergoing represion by their government. The UN and other western governments are pushing for Asad to step down while Rusia and China are trying to maintain influence in the area. Turkey and the Arab League wish for Asad to step down in order to prevent the spread of violence into the surounding counties such as Jordan, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq. The next section will outline the actions of countries and international institutions and their policy implications. When the protests began in March, 201, the UN immediately reacted. The Human Rights Committe of the UN started filling reports and countries such as France and Britain began submitting economic sanctions. It was not until October, 201, when the UN decided to pas a proposal. On 5 October 201, the UN Security Council voted on the proposal. Only Rusia and China vetoed the Syrian recommendations. In response, Susan Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 205" Rice, the U.S. representative on the UN Security Council, explained ?The international community neds to spread sanction and stop arms trading to Syria. Thousands of people have died and action neds to be taken immediately?. 467 The UN proposal does not consist of military intervention in Syria. The UN Security Council met again in February, 2012, to pursue another proposal for Syria. China and Rusia vetoed the proposal again claiming it was a violation of Syria?s sovereignty. 468 The second resolution was meant to endorse an Arab League plan to promote a political transition in Syria. ?It was an Arab sponsored text and what made it important was that it was the first time the Arab League?s first time coming to the UN Security Council asking to back their initiative. The purpose was to give full political backing to the Arab initiative which called for a political proces to which Asad would have to delegate political power to his vice President to negotiate the terms of a democratic transition. This proposal was not about military intervention nor Libya.? (Susan Rice US ambasador to the UN Security Council). 469 Unlike the first proposal, the second one eliminated language that required Asad to cede power and instead, added language that specifically bans military intervention. On 7 February 2012, Rusian oficials traveled to Damascus to talk with Asad. Susan Rice says that Rusia has a great deal of influence in Syria. Rusia remains a staunch defender, providing Damascus with a political lifeline as well as arms and ammunition. ?Moscow entrenched itself as Asad?s political bulwark on Friday, declaring that it would, with China, opose a Security Council resolution calling on Mr. Asad to step down. A deputy foreign minister, Genadi Gatilov, told the Interfax news !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 467 US Ambasador To UN Storms Out Of Security Council Meting After Syria Resolution Vetoed. BC World News: YouTube, 2011. Web. 28 January 2012. http://ww.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDZ-0gkJ9S4&feature=related. 468 Altafer, Mary, writ. "Syria Veto 'Outrageous' Says U.N. Envoy Susan Rice." Perf. Rice Susan . Weekend Edition Sunday. NPR: KUOW, Seatle, 5 February 2012. Radio. 469 Altafer, Mary, writ. "Syria Veto 'Outrageous' Says U.N. Envoy Susan Rice." Perf. Rice Susan . Weekend Edition Sunday. NPR: KUOW, Seatle, 5 February 2012. Radio. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 206" agency that the resolution was ?doomed to failure? unles the demand for Mr. Asad?s ouster was droped and a call for oposition forces to renounce violence was included.? 470 Rusian political suport has proved esential to the Asad government. ?They believe that the international community is divided. So Rusians are providing cover for the regime to push forward with their aproach.? 471 Rusia has staked out this position for a variety of reasons that have little to do with the specifics of Syria?s political crisis, chief among them weapons exports, domestic politics and resentment over the Libyan campaign. It reflects a shift that has taken place as Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin prepares to return to the presidency, deeply distrustful of the West?s intentions both in Rusia and in the Middle East. He has accused the United States of orchestrating uprisings in both regions. The economic sanctions imposed on Syria have had some efects on the Asad regime. There are two sides to the economic sanctions: one, is to push out Asad by cuting of his economic and political ties with the rest of the world and two, is to suport the Syrian people. Andrew Tabler claims that there has ben a difference in opinion betwen Western allies on how to deal with the situation because Syria is central in the world. Everyone wants a role in post-Asad Syria and by backing the Syrian people now they may play a role in the future. Turkey also has two sides in the issue: one is that it wants pro-democracy and two it does not want the uprising of the Kurdish minority in their country. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayip Erdo?an, said ?No regime can survive by killing and jailing its citizens?. On 1 December 201, Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish foreign minister anounced !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 470 Bary, Elen, and Michael Schwirtz. "Rusia Warns Against Suport for Arab Revolts Could Cause a 'Big War'." New York Times, January 18, 2012. http://ww.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/world/europe/rusia- warns-against-suport-for-arab-uprisings.html?_r=1&ref=world. 471 Ibid. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 207" that ?Until a legitimate government at peace with its people a travel ban has ben enacted on those Syrian oficials who have allegedly used violence against the Syrian people. Their asets in our country will be frozen. Similar measures will be taken for businesmen who have suported the Asad regime?. 472 Syria was expelled from the Arab League after it agred to a peace plan only to step up atacks on protesters. On 28 November 201, the league imposed economic sanctions on Syria that included a travel ban against scores of senior oficials, a freze on Syrian government asets in Arab countries, a ban on transactions with Syria?s central bank and an end to all commercial exchanges with the Syrian government. Iraq and Lebanon were the only two countries in the league who decided to kep their ties with the Syrian government. On 19 December 201, Syria again agred to allow Arab observers into the country, a day after the league threatened to take the initiative to the United Nations Security Council. The observers arived on 27 December 201, but their presence did nothing to slow the violence. Through it all, Asad?s government has stubornly clung to the narative that a foreign plot besieges it. On 22 January 2012 the Arab League unexpectedly floated a proposal under which Mr. Asad would relinquish power to a deputy and start negotiations with oponents within two weks. It was promptly rejected by Syria. When the Arab League recently decided that they would go to the UN, they were urged to sek help at the UN from the Fre Syrian Army. Going to UN Security Council meant that the crisis was not internationalized and the EU and US would have the uper hand. The Human Rights violations call for international intervention and can be sen throughout how many countries and organizations are responding to the violence. As of 22 February 2012, there is no clear initiative for Syria but the Red Cros is now negotiating !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 472 Davutoglu, Ahmet. "Syria faces fresh Sanctions from Turkey." 1 December 201. Spech. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 208" humanitarian aces with Syrian authorities and oposition groups to provide humanitarian aces but these talks are at a very early stage. 473 As innocent people continue to die, the international community continues to work to find a solution but escalating violence results in the removal of diplomats from Syria. Rusia is the only player that seks to help Syria independently. 474 The next section of this report details the policy recommendations for Syria and what the future holds. V. THE FUTURE OF SYRIA [11.5] This report specifically examines the human rights violations in the Syrian Uprisings. As of 19 February 2012, the conflict in Syria has not subsided. China and Rusia are acting alone with Syria while the UN is now enacting the proposal put forward by the Arab League. As the violence continues, protests now engulf both Lebanon and Iraq. Syria has already crosed the threshold of civil war and the situation is likely to get worse before it gets beter. Unlike the cases examined throughout this task force, there is no peaceful revolution like Tunisia and Egypt. Instead, like Libya, it is a recipe for deepening conflict. One of the biggest concerns is highlighted by Keneth Pollack, ?Spillover from the civil war manifests itself in six pernicious ways: terorism, refuges, economic dislocation, radicalization of the neighboring populations, secesionism and intervention by neighboring states?. 475 Curently we have sen most of these outcomes with emerging intervention by neighboring states and radicalization of neighboring populations. This task force has proposed recommendations !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 473 "Syrian opposition says military intervention may be needed if cease-fire cals fail." Washington Post [Washington, D.C.] 22 February 2012. Web. 2 Feb. 2012. http://ww.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/rusia-says-it-suports-red-crosss- cal-for-daily-humanitarian-ceasefire-in-syria/2012/02/2/gIQARN9qSR_story.html 474 Bakri, Nada. "Rusian Envoy Cals Syria Visit 'Very Productive'." New York Times [New York City] 7 February 2012, Web. 7 Feb. 2012. http://ww.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/middleast/syria-renews-bombardments-after-us- embassy-closes.html?ref=world. 475 Pollack, Kenneth. ?The Revolt in Syria Could Easily Spread to Other Middle East Countries.? Brokings Institute. (31 January 2012). Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 209" for NATO?s role in the Arab Spring. This report concludes that NATO should not be used in Syria. The Syrian people do not ned military help. Instead, they ned humanitarian aid. The Syrian people want humanitarian help and not military help. NATO is sen internationally as a military force. Instead of using NATO to help the people of Syria, other recommendations include having the Red Cros provide aid and have NATO forces protecting humanitarian aid workers. However, this could be taken as military action. The next question is whether it should be UN humanitarian aid or NGO humanitarian aid, such as the Red Cros. At the moment, NGO humanitarian aid sems welcome internationally and by the oposition forces in Syria. Syria is not Libya. NATO should not cary out a bombing operation there. The United States and Europe have little apetite for another war in the Middle East, particularly without UN cover. Meanwhile, sanctions are reshaping Syrian politics. Those sanctions, including travel bans and frozen asets, are devastating Syria?s tourism and energy sectors. The value of the Syrian pound is collapsing. All of this places tremendous presure on Asad. One important thing to consider in this recommendation is that using only western humanitarian aid is not a wise choice. This is why the UN should train Arab League monitors or create a peacekeping force within the Arab League. Turkey should be involved in the humanitarian proces. The Economist recommends that Turkey and NATO take a more forceful route, ?To help persuade them, Turkey, with the blesing of NATO and the Arab League, should create and defend a safe haven in north-western Syria. The FSA (The Fre Syrian Army) can train fighters there, and a credible oposition can take shape. Turkey sems willing to do this, providing it gets Western suport. The haven would be similar to that created for the Kurds in northern Iraq; Asad would sufer only if he atacked it?. 476 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 476 ?How to Set Syria Free.? The Economist. 11 February 2012. Print. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 210" Unlike the recommendations above, this would be militarization action and may result in war betwen Turkey and the government of Syria. At the moment, the violence is spreading into Lebanon and contrary to the Economist article, Lebanon is now serving as a base for refuges and oposition forces. The critical point to highlight in this recommendation is that Western countries should not be the only ones intervening. The Arab League and other Middle Eastern countries should help provide humanitarian aid. One important factor to consider for Western policies is mentioned in Robin Wright?s book, Rock the Casbah. Instead of implementing democracy upon these countries, it is necesary for these countries to discover democracy on their own. As Wright argues, it is not for outsiders to determine the shape of change in Islamic societies. That is why it important to work with these newly formed governments instead of forcing Western ideology. The U.S. and other countries sometimes intervene for their own self-interests. The Syrian uprisings do undermine the regional stability, but past humanitarian intervention came about on rare ocasions when U.S. international policies were at stake. If NATO canot intervene and help the people of Syria then what is the future of Syria? Should it be a peacekeping force or be restructured to minimize the military focus? The next report titled A Case for NATO: Intervention in Syria will answer these questions. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 211" Apendix 1 ?Map of Syria?. The World Factbok 209. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 209. https:/ww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbok/index.html. Human Rights & Ethical Implications in the Syrian Uprising Samantha Thomas-Nadler ! ! 212" Apendix 2 Arbel, Juylan. ?Daily Casualties in Syria?. 9 February 2012. htp://statisfaction.wordpres.com/2012/02/09/daily-casualties-in-syria/ A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 213" Chapter 12 A CASE FOR NATO INTERVENTION IN SYRIA No one expected that the self immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi would cause a reaction that itself would spread like wild fire acros the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Popular dissatisfaction, economic woes, an increasingly growing, educated, and dissatisfied youth-bulge, among other factors led to mas popular movements acros North Africa and the Middle East demanding change and democracy in a stagnant region ruled by dictators and full of religious extremists and terorists. The reactions to these movements varied greatly; Egypt and Tunisia were able to overthrow authoritarian dictators through peaceful protests and minor presure from the international community, while on the other hand, in Libya and Syria, Bashar al-Asad and Muammar Qaddafi clung to power by using represion and violence to stunt the popular movements. The Libyan experience itself and the ousting of Qaddafi with the asistance of a United Nations (UN)-backed NATO operation will be the backdrop with which we will consider the role of NATO in the development of the Arab Spring. NATO?s intervention created a powerful precedent for intervention in order to maintain global security and to prevent mas atrocities from ocuring which will have lasting efects for NATO as a global institution but in the more proximal scope will help us to discover what NATO?s role will be as the events of the political turmoil in the greater Middle East and North Africa unfold. While the Libyan experience will help us understand the prerequisites for intervention by the UN and subsequently NATO, this paper will consider the case for Syria as it develops dialogue about the future of NATO. This paper will begin by examining the history of NATO and its past interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan as precedents for what could hapen in Syria. This will A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 214" help us to develop an understanding of NATO?s role in the past and how it has evolved in order to meet the demands of an increasingly globalized world. NATO?s interventions in the Balkans will be considered in terms of being peace-enforcing missions within NATO?s geopolitical proximity and the intervention in Afghanistan will be taken into acount as an example of a military exercise in regional stabilization that ocured relatively out of NATO?s mandated range. The paper will conclude by looking into the future of NATO, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa through more discusion on what could hapen in Syria based on what has already hapened in previous interventions. It will look into the eforts of intervention by other actors while doing so and draw a timeline of these events. As of 19 Feb 2012 several developments have ben made. NATO?s chief oficer has denied the posibility of a NATO response to the Syrian uprisings, the UN General Asembly has oficially condemned the Asad regime, and China has expresed suport for a peaceful transition of power led by the Arab League. The paper will draw from these events in conjunction with historical precedents of past NATO interventions and will recommend the following: ? Action must be taken. Particularly in regards to the humanitarian crisis. As events unfold we can decide the scope of such action. Right now, it is necesary to for the UN and NGOs to provide humanitarian aid. ? The Arab League and countries like Turkey and Qatar should lead whatever action is taken, whether humanitarian aid or military intervention. ? The Arab League does not have the political or military capacity to act alone. It should work alongside other international actors, such as the UN or NATO. A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 215" I. NATO [12.1] On 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic treaty was signed by several European nations and the US as a means of countering the threat of the Soviet Union and it?s Communist bloc. The treaty gave rise to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was originally founded with thre specific goals, ?detering Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.? 477 Once the Cold War was over, many questioned whether NATO would be necesary. While the threat of Soviet expansionism was averted, the later goals of NATO remained front and center, particularly with a united Germany and the political spill over of the disintegration of many Eastern European countries. It was not until after the Cold War era that NATO began to fully flex its muscles. The organization has increasingly evolved to beter suit the neds of its member states, and while it was originally a deterent against the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc, throughout history it has proven to be an efective tol used to ensure European security and perhaps in totality global security as well. To beter understand NATO?s role today, it is vital to look at how it has evolved as an institution and has come to understand itself through the experiences and roles, which it has taken on overtime. Stephen Cimbala and Peter Forster argue that today, ?NATO is committed to war fighting, stability and security operations, social and economic reconstruction, and creative diplomacy for regional stability.? 478 If these are NATO?s commitments, then have they changed? And what is the scope of these goals and priorities? Taking past interventions into consideration we will be able to establish an idea of NATO?s evolving role as an international mechanism and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 477 "A Short History of NATO." NATO History. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d. Web. 25 Feb 2012. . 478 Cimbala, Stephen, and Peter Forster. Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing. Ashgate, 2010. 254. eBok. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 216" arguably enforcement tol for the UN. This paper will look into thre military interventions led by NATO as a means of understanding how the organization understands itself through its past actions. In the early 190?s NATO became involved in the former Yugoslavia after what had ben once perceived, as a civil war quickly became a case of ethnic violence and other atrocities. NATO acted in concert with the UN and ?ofered its full suport to United Nations eforts to end war crimes, including direct military action in the form of a naval embargo.? 479 Eventually the continuation of the conflict led to a no-fly zone enforced by NATO and then a nine-day airstrike campaign in 195 that would play a major role in ending the conflict. December of that same year, NATO under an UN-mandated peace agrement, deployed a multinational force with the goal of helping the region ?create the conditions for a self-sustaining peace.? 480 NATO?s intervention in what is now Bosnia can be sen as its first military exercise under the UN as a means of stabilizing the region and preventing what could have led to a humanitarian crisis past saving. Taking a leson from this experience in hopes of aplying it to NATO and its role in the Arab Spring, it is important to understand that NATO acted under the UN and because of this its actions were politically legitimate. Another important thing to consider is that the conflict was geographically situated in Eastern Europe and the implications of regional instability were of great concern because even though NATO had originally ben a Western European alliance, with then fall of the Soviet Union, the concept of Europe began to reach eastward and encompas Central and Eastern Europe as well. NATO had no choice but to step in because of the regional security interests of its member states. However NATO did not step in right !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 479 A Short History of NATO." NATO History. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d. Web. 25 Feb 2012. . 480 A Short History of NATO." NATO History. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d. Web. 25 Feb 2012. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 217" away because of the nature of this conflict, which did not necesarily necesitate action by NATO because of a lack of precedent. The main leson that the intervention in the Balkans demonstrates is the dissatisfaction that was felt with the West?s inaction pertaining to the situation as a whole. What Bosnia shows is the inability of Europe to act and the failure of America to lead.? In Bosnia, the fundamental principles of the ?new orld order? that theoreticaly formed the basis of the coalition against Saddam Husein ? the rule of law and the oposition to unprovoked agresion ? were violated. The authority of the United Nations was ignored. Protection of human rights, including acces to humanitarian aid, was denied. Moral outrage caused by the brutality of the conflict, and more importantly, the threatened credibility of the UN and later NATO atracted global atention. 481 This demonstrates that NATO has taken the role of defending the defenseles and steping somewhat outside of its original mandate in order to ensure security and stability as well as to uphold the right to protect. Shortly after the Bosnian conflict, NATO had to intervene in Kosovo after the failure of intense international eforts to setle the crisis had failed. ?Increasing regional instability, the atrocities of war, and the threat of expanding conflict eventually captured European and UN atention prompting a larger international efort,? 482 This intervention in the Balkans was another humanitarian crisis in Eastern Europe that included a refuge crisis alongside posible genocide from ethnic violence betwen thre different ethnic groups. NATO led an airstrike in order to allow a peacekeping mission to enter Kosovo and after the withdrawal of the Serbian army on 4 June 199 deployed trops to help establish stability in the region. This intervention is not only another example of NATO?s evolving role as a last resort military force used as peacekeper and peace enforcer but also it demonstrates the willingnes of NATO member states to intervene in conflicts so long as all other eforts !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 481 Cimbala, Stephen, and Peter Forster. Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing. Ashgate, 2010. 254. eBok. . 482 Cimbala, Stephen, and Peter Forster. Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing. Ashgate, 2010. 254. eBok. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 218" were exhausted and regional security was at stake which was the case both in Kosovo and in Bosnia before. NATO?s experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated that the debate of whether NATO was to enforce a European peace was mot: events had forced the Aliance?s hand. Before the fal of the Berlin Wal, NATO had ben a static organization whose mere existence was enough to deter the Soviet Union. Balkan intervention began the Aliance?s transformation into a more dynamic and responsive organization. Gone was the Cold War doctrine of nuclear retaliation, and in its place, the determination to use, after al peaceful means had failed, measured and carefuly aplied force in combination with diplomatic and humanitarian eforts to stop conflict, and to do so, if necesary out of NATO?s traditional North Atlantic sphere. 483 For our purposes both of these interventions, through necesity, changed the dynamics of NATO and have shifted the organization?s goals and the scope through which it is determined to meet these goals. Understanding NATO through past interventions will help us to understand the direction in which NATO will continue to follow and what that means for the developments unfolding as a result of the Arab Spring. After the events of 11 Sept 201, NATO was called upon to respond because of the legally binding nature of the North Atlantic Treaty. Intervention in Afghanistan was the first time in NATO?s history that NATO acted out of regard for Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which defines the commitment by which members of the treaty must respond to an atack on another member. The UNSC pased a resolution after the fall of Afghanistan?s Taliban regime to allow for the deployment of the ?International Security and Asistance Force (ISAF), a multilateral force in and around Kabul to help stabilize the country and create the conditions of a self-sustaining peace,? 484 Shortly after, NATO tok control of the mission. NATO?s mission in Afghanistan included much more than a military campaign for victory against the agresor but the stabilization of the region as a whole particularly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 483 A Short History of NATO." NATO History. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d. Web. 25 Feb 2012. . 484 A Short History of NATO." NATO History. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d. Web. 25 Feb 2012. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 219" through the nation building eforts of a democratic Afghan state. ?Real suces is predicated upon a continuous presence of military force to quell insurgents in order that civilian-led political and economic development may take hold. Security, economic development, and legitimate governance are the triad of afghan suces. This plan requires a concerted efort by the international community.? 485 In this case, NATO led a mission that required nation- building exercises that included political, social, and economic factors. NATO?s role once again evolved because it acted somewhat as a stabilizing agent rather than just a military force. Before in the Balkans, NATO acted as a stabilizing factor that hoped to ensure peace in the region and quell ethnic violence; In Afghanistan, NATO?s role was defined by ensuring a peaceful political and economic transition after the fall of the Taliban regime and amidst the threat of al-Qaeda and other militant extremist groups. NATO canot hope to take on the role of nation-building by itself and so must continue to and begin forging new partnerships in order to achieve its goals and priorities and maintain peace and security. As time progreses and new conflicts arise, NATO will have to continue to evolve in order to meet the neds and interests of its member states. Since its founding in 1949, the transatlantic Aliance?s flexibility, embeded in its original Treaty, has allowed it to suit the diferent requirements of diferent times. In the 1950s, the Aliance was a purely defensive organization. In the 1960s, NATO became a political instrument for d?tente. In the 190s, the Alliance was a tool for the stabilization of Eastern Europe and Central Asia through the incorporation of new Partners and Allies. Now NATO has a new mission: extending peace through the strategic projection of security. 486 The lesons that can be learned from past interventions help us understand NATO?s role and how it has changed from being an instrument of the West to use against the Soviet Union during the Cold War to now being an instrument of the UN and of Western interests to intervene when intervention is deemed necesary and can be sen as legitimate. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 485 Cimbala, Stephen, and Peter Forster. Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing. Ashgate, 2010. 254. eBok. . 486 A Short History of NATO." NATO History. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d. Web. 25 Feb 2012. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 220" ?Stabilization missions like the one in Afghanistan are likely to remain the most high- profile tasks NATO undertakes for the foreseable future,? 487 and as of the intervention in Libya which closely resembles the Balkan intervention but may continue on to resemble the Afghanistan intervention in that it be a nation building exercise, NATO?s role may continue to evolve to become much more globally influential and political. NATO?s involvement in the Middle East began with its intervention in Afghanistan in 201 and continued with an intervention in Libya in 201, which I will not discus but is discused in depth in an (previous) esay. The events that unfolded alongside the Arab Spring eventually sparked mas protests in Syria. These protests were met by a strong response by Syrian forces at the command of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. In order to prevent redundancy this section of my paper will forgo discusing the timeline of events of the Syrian uprising nor will it atempt to make a humanitarian call for help. Instead I will atempt to discus the prospect of a NATO response in Syria through developments in what it would take for a response to be given, by using deductive reasoning as provided by previous interventions and NATO missions as to whether or not a NATO response is merited, and then prescriptions to how a NATO response would take place and what it would look like. II. NATO & SYRIA [12.2] Before prescriptions can be made it is imperative that we discus eforts for intervention that have already ben made. As of 18 Feb 2012 there have ben many atempts made by both regional actors such as the Arab League as well as the United Nations to have Bashar al-Asad step down and for a peaceful transition of power to take place. Many !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 487 Kitchen, Veronica. The Globalization of NATO: Intervention, Security and Identity. 1st ed. Routledge, 2010. 1-164. eBok. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 221" European and Arab countries have set heavy sanctions against the regime of Bashar al-Asad in hopes of using soft power to force the regime?s demise. The Arab League, represented by 23 Arab states, has ben quite vocal about their stance on a peaceful transition of power in Syria. The League has already ben responsible for deploying monitors in Syria to observe the situation but quickly retreated the observers because of the escalation of violence. The Arab League has also drafted a proposal for a peaceful transition of power and the steping down of Bashar al-Asad that it presented to the UN in hopes that the UNSC would vote on a resolution condemning the Syrian government and then taking steps towards this goal through whatever means necesary. Al-Jazera reported that ?thirten countries voted for the resolution proposed by European and Arab nations to give strong backing to the Arab League's plan to end the violence in Syria that has claimed thousands of lives acros the country since March 201.? 488 Rusia and China however used their veto to stop the resolution from pasing. Both Rusia and China had become disillusioned with NATO?s military intervention in Libya and have therefore ben very ken on not allowing Syria to become another Libya. Both nations are also known to have strong diplomatic relationships with the regime of Bashar al-Asad and strongly believe that state sovereignty should be respected. Much like in the Balkans in which, ?Rusia and China were concerned that by authorizing international intervention in Kosovo, [because] they would be establishing a precedent in which human rights violations become a raison d?etre for violating national sovereignty potentially curtailing their fredom of action in Chechnya and Tibet, respectively,? 489 they believe that national sovereignty should not be undermined. Among these reasons, both countries also claim that before any action can be taken much more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 488 "Veto on Syria sparks Arab and Western fury." Al Jazera 05 02 2012, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . 489 Cimbala, Stephen, and Peter Forster. Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing. Ashgate, 2010. 254. eBok. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 222" consultation must be taken into acount. Both European and Arab states were outraged at China and Rusia?s decision to veto the resolution and called for further condemnation of the Syrian regime. France?s Nicolas Sarkozy even went as far as arguing that, ?the veto would encourage further crackdowns by the Syrian regime.? 490 There is a wide consensus that action must be taken to prevent further civilian deaths by the Syrian regime as well as what could if it has not already, escalate into a humanitarian crisis, civil war, and a masive refuge crisis as well. On 17 Feb 2012, the United Nations General Asembly ?voted 137 to 12 to aprove a non-binding resolution calling for an immediate halt to the Syrian government's crackdown on protests against President Bashar al-Asad's rule.? 491 The Asembly?s resolution while not binding like a UNSC resolution is an important step towards a multilateral response for Syria. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun met in Damascus with President Bashar al-Asad on 18 Feb 2012 and stated that China would suport the Arab League?s proposals for Syrian peace. ?The semingly contradictory stance on the Arab League?s proposals apear to reflect Beijing?s desire for mediation but aversion to UN involvement that could lead to authorizing force, as hapened with Libya.? 492 This change in direction for Beijing is an important development for the Syrian people and will undoubtedly have many implications. It is clear that NATOs involvement in Syria if any will not resemble the Libyan intervention because of the complex nature of Syrian society as well as Syria?s geopolitical context. Based on previous NATO interventions, an intervention in Syria would not be completely unprecedented. While Syria is not traditionally considered to be within the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 490 "Veto on Syria sparks Arab and Western fury." Al Jazeera 05 02 2012, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . 491 "UN condemns crackdown in Syria." Al Jazeera 17 02 2012, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . 492 AP. "China suports Arab League's proposals for Syria."CBS News [Beijing] 18 02 2012, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 223" regional mandate of NATO, regional stability is still in the best interest of NATO member states, particularly Turkey. If intervention in Afghanistan and Libya were merited even though both states are geopolitically out of NATO?s tradition North Atlantic sphere, then Syria would surely not be considered regionally out of strategic reach. Considering the escalation of violence in Syria, in which the UN ?says more than 5,40 people were killed in Syria last year. In addition, 25,00 people are estimated to have sought refuge in neighboring countries and more than 70,00 are internally displaced.? 493 A humanitarian case for intervention would also have strong precedent in consistency with NATO interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya based on the premises of quelling humanitarian crises and civil wars. NATO has a strong precedent for intervention in Syria as we have taken note of based on past interventions. However, on 17 Feb 2012, in Ankara, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmusen stated ?the Western military alliance will not intervene in Syria even in the event of a United Nations ?mandate to protect civilians.? 494 The NATO chief has stated that even with UN mandate NATO would likely not respond because of the unique nature of Syrian society which he claims to be ?complicated ethnically, politically, [and] religiously.? 495 Rasmusen argued that a regional response and solution would be a much more efective response. In regards to this new development it is important to kep in mind that the Syrian uprisings are perhaps the most violent in regards to the other uprisings to have come from the Arab Spring. With a masive refuge crisis, a humanitarian crisis, and the posibility of civil war looming ever greatly, will the Arab League be suficient in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 493 AP. "China suports Arab League's proposals for Syria."CBS News [Beijing] 18 02 2012, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . 494 "NATO Chief rules out Syria intervention." Tehran Times 18 02 2012, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . 495 "NATO Chief rules out Syria intervention." Tehran Times 18 02 2012, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 224" responding? Does the Arab League have the enforcement capabilities and/or the peacekeping abilities necesary for a peaceful transition of power to come about in Syria? Ruling out a NATO intervention in Syria because of the complex dynamics of Syrian society still leaves us with the question regarding what should be done in this situation. Oposition groups in Syria canot come together to form a sucesful challenge to the Asad regime and the Arab League does not have the mechanisms to sucesfully implement a peace plan which is the reason why they presented their proposal to the UN in hopes of obtaining multilateral suport in the form of a peacekeping mission or perhaps even a NATO intervention. Does the UN alone; even have the recourses to deploy such a force? China has agred that an Arab led peace plan would be in the best interests of all and NATO as well as many other groups including the US sem to agre with that thought. Even if NATO does not respond to the Syrian uprising, many NATO member states would most likely be involved in a response. Turkey which is a NATO member state has vital interest in stabilizing the region not only because refuges would likely flee to Turkey, but also because at the outbreak of a civil war the Syrian state would be a breding ground for terorist groups and extremists which because of its proximity to Iran could hold very dangerous implications. Turkey should lead along with Qatar and the combined aid of the UN, a peacekeping mission made up of Arab state forces and some help from European states and the US for the man power and enforcement mechanisms that the Arab League lacks. NATO has learned from past interventions and it?s ever evolving dynamic that suces can best be found within a conjoint efort. The Aliance is not and canot be a civilian reconstruction agency, but NATO can make a significant contribution provided that it is part of a coherent international response. In this way, the Aliance?s A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 225" efforts are only as effective as its ability to work with others, and NATO must liaise with countries and organizations that can provide resources and expertise in civilian reconstruction. 496 Even if NATO does not intervene, the Arab League will ned to follow this same advice. True suces in an efort to intervene in Syria will only be posible through coperation betwen different states and organizations. As of 25 Feb 2012, two new developments have come to be that could help in deciding how intervention will be aplied to Syria. The first being the International Red Cros?s apeal to oposition groups in Syria to allow for a daily two hour ceasefire in order to distribute aid. ?The International Committe of the Red Cros said it had asked authorities and rebels to agre daily ceasefires so life-saving aid can reach civilians in hard-hit areas including Homs.? 497 This is the first sign of intervention from an NGO and would provide humanitarian relief. The second development is the formation of the Friends of Syria group. The group asembled foreign ministers from several countries as well as the leaders of many international organizations and began to draw out plans that would both suport the Syrian oposition, particularly the Syrian National Council, and call for the steping down of power of Bashar al-Asad and a peaceful transition of power. The Friends group recognized this call by giving a gren light to U.N. chief Ban Ki-moon to start drawing up plans for such a joint Arab League-U.N. peacekeping operation that would be comprised of civilian police officers. Ban is expected to begin recruiting possible contributors to the mission and preparing its mandate. Such an operation would not be a military intervention but would stil require authorization from the U.N. Security Council, where it wil likely face oposition from veto-wielding members China and Rusia, neither of which attended the Tunis conference, and Iran. Rusia and Iran are Syria's two biggest military supliers. 498 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 496 A Short History of NATO." NATO History. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d. Web. 25 Feb 2012. . 497 Karouny, Mariam, and Stephanie Nebehay. "Red Cros seks Syria ceasefires; more than 10 kiled." Reuters [BEIRUT/GENEVA] 21 02 2012, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. 498 Lee, Mathew. "'Friends of Syria' vow support for opposition." Asociated Pres [Tunis] 25 02 2012, n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2012. . A Case for NATO Armando Cortes ! ! 226" The group disagred on whether to arm the oposition, on creating protected ?humanitarian coridors? to deliver vital aid, and on the scope of intervention. The importance of this group however lies on the demonstration of international coperation against the Bashar regime. Many of the countries included NATO members and Arab League members, and whether the group calls on a NATO led mission or a peacekeping mission by the UN, or even a multilateral intervention by independent countries, the group is sending a clear mesage to Asad, and that is that the international community no longer considers his regime legitimate and will do whatever it takes to end it. The case for intervention in Syria has goten ever more convoluted because of the complex dynamics of Syria society, the threat of civil war because of sectarian disagrements, the humanitarian crisis, the refuge crisis, and the lack of an organized oposition that could peacefully replace the Asad regime. Along with these challenges, intervention sems unlikely because of the inability of the UNSC to pas a resolution and the fact that the Arab League, the only regional organization that could garner enough suport, does not have the mechanisms for enforcement necesary to achieve a peaceful transition of power in Syria. This paper has focused on NATO and the posibility for intervention based on past interventions, NATO goals and interests, and developments that are ocuring in real time that could allow or prevent a NATO intervention in Syria like the one in Libya. As of 20 Feb 2012, a NATO intervention sems highly unlikely and NATO?s Secretary General has even expresed that a military intervention even under UNSC mandate would likely not ocur. Because these events are ocuring as you read this, anything could hapen and further developments could lead to intervention or some other plan lead by the Arab League. PART IV?A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE ARAB SPRING ! Human Rights Watch is an organization dedicated to publicly shaming governments and countries that do not observe the proper respect for human rights. The organization defends a set of universal rights, first outlined in the United Nation?s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The idea of human rights as universal is inherently flawed in that it asumes a universal morality as well. This paper aims to criticize the western-centric democratic ideology surounding modern human rights discourse. The growing trend to combine morality and politics has led to a system in which human rights rhetoric is beginning to chalenge the existing framework of international law. This ideology has, in the recent past, led to humanitarian intervention: the justification to use foreign military force to protect individuals from further human rights violations. This paper wil situate Human Rights Watch within framework of western ideology; the organization?s democratic and western biases wil be investigated through its coverage of the Arab Spring. This paper aims to answer: How does the ideology of Human Rights Watch miror NATO countries dealings in the Midle East and North Africa in the wake of the Arab Spring? Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 227" Chapter 13 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND THE ARAB SPRING HOW DOES HUAN RIGHTS WATCH COVERAGE OF THE ARAB SPRING REFLECT HE DILEMAS FACED BY NATO IN THE MIDDLE AST AND NORTH AFRICA? Human Rights Watch is an independent organization, dedicated to educating the global community on, and promoting respect for, human rights worldwide. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Human Rights Watch has ben active in covering the events taking place in the Middle East and North Africa, and reporting on the human rights violations taking place. The organization Human Rights Watch is based out of democratic countries, therefore the information on global human rights is situated within a western, democratic ideology. This paper will focus on the organization, Human Rights Watch, as lens for the dilemmas facing the western global powers, specifically the democratic countries of NATO, as they adjust to new order arising in the wake of the Arab Spring. This paper will investigate the idea of ?humanitarian intervention? based on the protection of human rights, specifically focusing on the curent issues in human rights taking place in the wake of the Arab Spring. To begin, I will present a background of the curent human rights discourse that has ben widely acepted as the ideal by democratic global powers. The next section will situate Human Rights Watch as a western-based organization with western ideals and perspective. Next, I will addres the situation in the Middle East and North Africa as reported by Human Rights Watch. This section will center on the West?s atitude toward human rights in the Middle East and North Africa. I will then focus on the ideas of humanitarian intervention, and the use of human rights to justify military intervention. In the following section, continuing with Human Rights Watch coverage, I will narow my scope of focus to two countries: Libya and Syria. The last section will focus on Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 228" the future of human rights in the region based on the Human Rights Watch coverage, and potential for international response. I. HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE [13.1] Human rights have ben given a place of utmost importance in the realm of international politics. The idea that there is a set of universal human rights that must be protected by any means posible has established a radical framework for progresive change in the West?s aproach to international relations. The document that best encompases the idea of a set of universal human rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Asembly in1948. The declaration extensively outlines the rights that should be provided to all people at all times. The UDHR declares the civil political, economic, social and cultural rights of humans: it lists, among others, the rights to fredom from arbitrary arest and torture; to fredom of thought, expresion and religion; to property and mariage rights; to a healthy standard of living. 499 It promotes the respect for fundamental rights and fredoms on an international level. The UDHR is not legally binding, but it is often cited as the human rights standard to which all nations should be held. The key point of importance to the UDHR is that it is written based on a set of values specific to democratic, western societies with little respect to global cultural diversity. The ?universality? of the UDHR is flawed. Cultural diversity should not be used to protect unjust dictators, explain the use of torture, or allow the opresion of minorities within a country. There is a limited set of human rights that should be enjoyed by all citizens, but the core of human rights that are truly universal, are much smaller than those outlined in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 499 Mary E Wiliams. Human Rights: Oposing Viewpoints. (San Diego: Grenhaven Pres, 198), 12. Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 229" UDHR. It is not adequate to think that the true social nature of human rights was setled with the adoption of the UDHR. 500 Acording to David Chandler in From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention, the atractivenes of human rights in the arena of international relations is based around thre ideas: universality, empowerment and a human-centered approach to politics. In an increasingly conected world, the protection of human rights is for the greater god of the global community. This lends a sense of universality to the importance of human rights in that the importance of protecting human rights, however they are defined, is universally beneficial. Second, human rights provide a sense of empowerment to the average citizen; unlike traditional politics, in which power is held by the government or elected elite, human rights redistribute the power into the hands of the individuals and addres the neds of opresed groups and minorities. Third, human rights policy provides a human-centered aproach to politics, based on ethics and morality rather than an adherence to the grand ideas conected to traditional politics of the ?Left and Right?. 501 Human Rights Watch also focuses on these thre apeals of human rights to strengthen their methodology of public ?naming and shaming? of abusive governments and leaders. These thre points lead to the emerging paradigm of human security. A vague concept, suported mainly be democracies, human security challenges the traditional notion of national security. The paradigm of human security posits that the true symbol for security should be the individual as oposed to the state, and that this shift in discourse is necesary for national, regional and global stability. Human rights, and subsequently human security, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 500 Bilahari Kausikan. ?A Universal Definition of Human Rights Ignores Cultural Diversity? in Human Rights: Oposing Viewpoints, ed Mary E. Williams. (San Diego: Grenhaven Pres, 198), 2. 501 David Chandler. From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto, 206), 3. Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 230" have grown in popularity based on the ideas universality, empowerment and human-centered aproach to politics. Mirroring some of Chandler?s arguments outlined above, Rainer Forst, outlines the different aspects of human rights as they are defined today in his piece ?The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive Aproach?. Favoring a les western-centric position than Chandler and Human Rights Watch, Forst states that human rights have moral, legal, political and historical aspects: moral in that they expres human concerns that must not be ignored or violated; legal as they are outlined in national constitutions, lists of basic rights and within international declarations; political because they can be legitimized politically, fulfilled or violated by governments; historical existence although circumstances of the apearance of human rights is contested. 502 While these four aspects are important when considering human rights history, it is imperative not to overlook the esential social aspect of human rights: ?namely, that when and where they have ben claimed, it has ben because the individuals concerned sufered from and protested against forms of opresion and/or exploitation that they believed disregarded their dignity as human beings.? 503 This definition by Forst of the social nature of human rights encompases the overarching goal of the Arab Spring to rise up against the opresion and exploitation that they have sufered from in past at the hand of their political leaders. II. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AS A WESTERN ORGANIZATION [13.2] In 1975, the Helsinki Final Act was signed by thirty-five states that participated in the Conference on Security and Coperation in Europe. The act was sen as an atempt to improve relations betwen the Communist bloc and western democratic countries in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 502 Rainer Forst. ?The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: a Reflexive Aproach.? Ethics. 120.4 (2010): 711. 503 Forst, ?The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: a Reflexive Approach,? 712. Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 231" midst of the Cold War. The Helsinki Final Act established ten basic principles for relations among the participating states, the most relevant of which was ?respect for human rights and fundamental fredoms, including the fredom of thought, conscience, religion or belief (principle 7).? 504 Human Rights Watch as an organization emerged in 1978, as Helsinki Watch, and was dedicated to monitoring the Soviet Union?s compliance with the act. Through media coverage and critical publications Human Rights Watch used public ?shaming and naming? of abusive governments to encourage democratic transitions in the region through the 1980s. Throughout the 1980?s America, Africa, Asia, and Middle East Watch were founded and in 198, the organization adopted the all-inclusive name Human Rights Watch. 505 Today, Human Rights Watch has it main headquarters in New York City. The organization?s directors consist mainly of members based in the United States; the Executive Director, Chairman of the Board, and even the Middle East and North African Director are all Americans, with educations from prestigious American universities. 506 In 201 Human Rights Watch received the first ten million dollar installment of a ten-year grant from The George Soros Open Society Foundation. 507 The private foundation providing the grant is based in New York and aimed to shape public policy to promote democracy, human rights, and economic and social reform. 508 With a budget of slightly over 51 million dollars in 2011, 509 an anual contribution of ten million over the next ten years will be significant for the future of Human Rights as an organization. The ties to North America through the corporate leadership and foundation contributions inevitably lend an unavoidable western, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 504 Daniel C Thomas. The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Comunism. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Pres, 201), 5. 505 ?Our History?. Human Rights Watch | Defending Human Rights Worldwide. 506 ?Our People?. Human Rights atch | Defending Human Rights orldwide. 507 Financial Statements: Year Ended June 30, 201. Human Rights Watch, Inc. 16. 508 ?About? The Open Society Foundations. htp://ww.soros.org/about 509 Financial Statements: Year Ended June 30, 201. Human Rights Watch, Inc. 7. Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 232" democratic bias to the work taken on by Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch has ben criticized for its western-centric biases. In a New York Times Op-Ed piece Robert L. Bernstein, who served as Human Rights Watch chairman from its inception in 1978 through 198, and is now the founding chairman emeritus, states: ?I must do something that I never anticipated: I must publicly join the group?s critics.? 510 Bernstein goes on to criticize the organization?s dealings in the Middle East and the organization?s aparent bias against Israel. He argues that, regardles of the situation in the Middle East as a whole, Human Rights Watch has written more condemnations of Israel for human rights violations than any other country in the region. Bernstein believes this bias has not shed enough light on violations by other despotic regimes in the Middle East: Meanwhile, the Arab and Iranian regimes rule over some 350 milion people, and most remain brutal, closed and autocratic, permiting litle or no internal dissent. The plight of their citizens who would most benefit from the kind of attention a large and well-financed international human rights organization can provide is being ignored as Human Rights Watch?s Midle East division prepares report after report on Israel. 511 Bernstein is intimate with the inner-workings of Human Rights Watch and yet finds flaw with the organization?s tendency to link western values to the values of minorities in the Middle East when addresing the human rights situation in the region. III. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND THE ARAB SPRING [13.3] Powerful democratic countries, some of which were past colonial powers in the Middle East and North Africa, have ben critical of the human rights situation since long before the beginning of the Arab Spring. The curent situation in the Arab world is one of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 510 Robert L Bernstein. ?Rights Watchdog, Lost in the Mideast.? The New York Times. (20 Oct. 209). 511 Bernstein. ?Rights Watchdog, Lost in the Mideast,? 209. Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 233" political unrest and a widespread shift in cultural ideals. The people, especially the large proportion of the population betwen the ages of eighten and thirty, are rising up against the powerful regimes and dictatorships in the name of political rights and social justice. Often, as in Tunisia and Iran, the political and social revolutions have ben sparked by a specific event that moves the population into action. In the case of Tunisia, the self- immolation of a disparaged fruit seller shocked the population into action against its political system, sucesfully ousting the long-standing president. In a handful of countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa these largely peaceful uprisings have ben sucesful in overthrowing political leadership that has ben in power for decades. During the uprisings and in the melee after, Human Rights Watch has made a concentrated efort to cover and report on the historical events taking place. While they are thorough and apear to be unbiased in their reporting, Human Rights Watch suports an ideal of human rights based on western-centric democratic values. While being heavily anchored in the morals of the west, the organization?s coverage of human rights abuses in the wake of the Arab Spring can be used to mirror the dilemma faced by NATO democratic world powers as they begin to respond to the new order of the Middle East and North Africa. In the Human Rights Watch 201 World Report, the organization?s Executive Director Keneth Roth writes on the history of the West?s complacency toward the region?s autocratic leaders. Many of these leaders have created systems of ongoing human rights abuses in their countries; human rights violations that continue to grow exponentially in some countries where the leaders of the past atempt to cling to power by any means necesary. He argues that in the past the West has aproached the region with a policy of Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 234" containment; ?as if the Arab people were to be feared, hemmed in and controlled.? 512 As democracy flourishes around the world, the Middle East and North Africa continued to be controlled by autocratic leaders. Where democratic ideals prevail governments are expected to serve and be held acountable to their people, but in the Middle East and North Africa autocratic rulers were sen by western powers as stabilizing agents in the otherwise unstable regions. This viewpoint is shifting as citizens in the region are beginning to demand to be full citizens of their country, aforded with all the same rights. In the past the West has ben suportive of Arab autocrats for many reasons. A primary reason for democratic world power?s past suport of autocrats in the Middle East and North Africa is based on the perceived threats to western ideals from political Islam. Democracy promotion has ben a loudly argued justification for invasion and intervention in the region, but these voices quieted as Islamic political parties have came into power through fair elections: Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza in 206, and the Muslim Brotherhod in Egypt?s 205 parliamentary elections. 513 In a region known for terorism against Western countries by extremist groups, autocrats that have ben perceived to fight terorism in their own countries have garnered suport from the West. Another reason for Western suport of autocrats is sustained peace betwen Israel and the Arab world. Autocratic leaders that signed peace treaties with Israel often saw masive US aid regardles of their domestic policies. 514 One of the most important reasons for the West?s complacency toward autocratic rulers stems from the importance of oil to the global economy. The threat of economic turmoil from a disruption of the flow of oil has allowed autocrats to remain in power stemming from democratic country?s fear that a shift toward a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 512 Keneth Roth. ?Time to Abandon Autocrats and Embrace Rights: The International Response to the Arab Spring? in Human Rights Watch World Report. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 201), 1 513 Roth, ?Time to Abandon Autocrats and Embrace Rights: The International Response to the Arab Spring? 514 Ibid [P.5] Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 235" citizen run government would upset energy markets. The revenue collected by autocrats in oil-rich countries is also a coercive means to retain power without public suport from the tax-paying citizens. 515 With these arguments, Roth is openly critiquing western policy that has a history of disregarding human rights in favor of economic and strategic incentive. Incidentally none of these forces feared by democratic world powers lay behind the recent uprisings of the Arab Spring. By suporting autocratic dictators, democratic global powers have created an extensive history of overlooking and puting at risk the human rights of the citizens in Middle East and North Africa. In the wake of the uprisings democratic countries have had a chance to redeem themselves by acknowledging the importance of human rights for the citizens of the countries involved in the Arab Spring. The international community must encourage, and if ned, place presure on, new governments to respect basic rights. The intrinsic problem in this is that democratic world leaders will hold the new governments, arisen from the Arab Spring, to a set of human rights based in western morals and values. Rainer Forst presents the idea of ?right to justification? within human rights as a means to avoid the ethnocentrism inherent in modern day human rights discourse. Forst?s argument asumes that the human rights are meant to ensure that no human being is treated in a way that canot be justified to themselves as fair treatment as a person equal to others. He states: One claim underlies al human rights, namely, human beings? claim to be respected as autonomous agents who have the right not to be subjected to certain actions or institutional norms that cannot be adequately justified to them? human rights have a comon ground in one basic moral right, the right to justification. 516 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 515 Ibid 516 Forst, ?The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: a Reflexive Approach,? 712. Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 236" Forst states that the legal and political function of human rights should be to make efective the right to justification. He argues that rights must be formulated so that they expres mutual respect betwen government and individual. As an extension, a government should not subject its citizens to any set of laws which they as an individual canot participate in as an autonomous agent of justification. ?Thus, human rights do not just protect the autonomy and agency of persons, they also expres their autonomy politically?. 517 This point is extremely important to take into consideration when addresing the future of human rights in the wake of the Arab Spring. Human Rights Watch acknowledges the moral, legal, political and historical realms of the global human rights campaign, but does les to addres the social aspect of human rights. Human Rights Watch, in this sense, can apear to be a western centered organization pointing a finger at the wrongdoings of another culture. Forst?s aproach to human rights suports humans as their own autonomous actors. The Arab Spring uprisings started at a grasrots level with citizens of each country mobilizing against the opresive government and demanding autonomy. The citizens of the countries involved in the Arab Spring have ben taking their rights into their own hands, demanding justification, and fighting back against the traditional rhetoric of autocratic leaders and western ideologies that have in the past dictated their treatment as humans. IV. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION [13.4] Human rights based humanitarianism is very different in content and form from the practice and principles of the original humanitarian movement, which focused more on ?neds? and les on ?rights? of citizens. Until recently, the promotion of human rights policy was limited to fundraising and campaigning atempts by NGOs. The transformation of humanitarianism from the margins of the political arena, to the center of the international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 517 Forst, ?The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: a Reflexive Approach,? 712. Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 237" afairs has ben achieved through the redefinition of humanitarian policy and practice, and its integration into the quickly growing human rights agenda. The new international discourse of human rights based humanitarian policy no longer separates states and international aid from humanitarianism but atempts to combine the two under ?ethical? or ?moral? foreign policy. 518 The growing trend to combine morality and politics has led to a system in which human rights discourse is beginning to challenge the existing framework of international law: ?Democracy and human rights have very different, and often competing, theoretical and moral foundations.? 519 Democracy and state sovereignty are held in high regard by the democratic countries of NATO. With the shift in discourse surounding international human rights policy, democracy and state sovereignty have begun to take the back seat to the protection and respect of human rights. Since the end of World War II, human rights violations have garnered a more drastic international response. International agencies have begun to use military action to protect human rights. In the case of human rights, war is sen as the leser of two evils. The Kosovo war in the late 190s marked the beginning of a new age of human rights enforcement. A war not fought for self-interest or the promotion of democracy, but as acording to Tony Blair fought ?over the values of civilization?. 520 Despite the fact that the NATO bombing campaign for the protection of the Kosovars resulted in many targeting erors, and unecesary civilian deaths, the general international opinion was that the war was likely to be remembered ?not for its military and political misjudgments, but as the first war waged for ethical principles alone?. 521 The human rights justification for military action !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 518 Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention. 519 Ibid [P.13]. 520 Tony Blaire, 1999: Cited in Chandler David Chandler. From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention, 15. 521 Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention, 15. Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 238" has opened the floodgates for countries to use human rights violations as an excuse for more a self-interest centered military ocupation. V. HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBYA AND SYRIA [13.5] The autocratic leaders in the Middle Eastern and North African countries involved in the uprisings of the Arab Spring have extensive histories of mistreatment of their citizens. As a whole, the West has chosen to largely ignore the human rights violations, in favor of the ?stability? provided to the region by the autocratic leaders. Recently, with widespread the populist uprisings against these leaders, and subsequent violent response, western opinion leaders have shifted suport toward the citizens. As one of the preminent human rights organizations in the world, Human Rights Watch provides an important perspective for the past and present events in the largely peaceful uprisings involved in the Middle East and North Africa. Using real time reporting of events as well as in depth documentation, Human Right Watch works to educate the global community on the human rights atrocities taking place in the wake of the Arab Spring. Every year Human Rights Watch publishes a comprehensive document on the state of human rights respect worldwide. The World Report goes by through each country and outlines the state of the human rights in the past year. The 201 World Report focused on heavily on the circumstances surounding the Arab Spring. This paper focuses specifically on the Human Rights Watch coverage of the human rights situation in Libya and Syria because of the implications for past and future humanitarian intervention in the two countries respectively. In Libya, the popular uprising against Gaddafi?s autocratic rule led quickly to a government crackdown against protestors; a subsequent armed revolt, a NATO response, and ultimately the death of a dictator who, acording to Human Rights Watch, has amased Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 239" a ?deplorable human rights record over 42 years?. 522 The human rights violations that tok place in Libya in 201 are extensive. The revolt stemmed from the arbitrary arest of government critics, including a lawyer who represented the families of more than a thousand prisoners who had ben killed in Abu Salim prison in 196. As the government represion grew in violence and strength, the uprising rapidly degenerated into an armed conflict. Human Rights Watch reports that from February until August when Tripoli fell, Gaddafi forces arested thousands of people acros the country. The government provided no information on how many people had ben arested, where they were being held, or what charges they faced. Those released from government custody reported frequent torture, some aparently even died from the abuse or the subsequent lack of medical care. Many prisoners of Gaddafi?s forces were executed during the conflict, especially leading up to the fall of Tripoli. 523 Human Rights Watch reports at least ten cases of aparent gang rape and sexual asault of men and women by Gaddafi forces. The extent of sexual violence remains unknown, due in part to the stigma surounding rape in Libya. Gaddafi forces were not the only ones to commit human rights and humanitarian law violations. HRW reports that rebel forces and localized volunter security groups were also found to have participated in torture, revenge atacks, arbitrary arests, and mas killings of Gaddafi suporters and oficials. Syria also saw extensive human rights abuses during the 201 pro-democracy Arab Spring movements, atrocities and violations that continue to this day. Syria has ben ruled under emergency law by a represive police state since 1963. Anti-government protests erupted in southern Syria in mid-March, and quickly spread to the rest of the country. Government security forces responded brutally, acording to HRW, killing at least 350 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 522 Human Rights Watch World Report. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 201), 595. 523 Ibid. Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 240" protesters, and detaining thousands more, including children under age 18. Many of these prisoners were held incommunicado and subjected to torture. Security forces have also arested many protesters at hospitals, even from operating roms. This has forced many wounded people to sek medical treatment in private field hospitals, for fear of arest. Although the government enacted reforms in an efort to quell protest movements, security forces continued bloody represion that showed the government?s determination to crush dissent and reject reforms that might undermine its authority. 524 VI. FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ARAB SPRING [13.6] In the case of the Arab Spring, international organizations must adopt a more culturally diverse definition of human rights, as oposed to the curent dominant discourse that situates human rights from a democratic, western-centric point of view. While Human Rights Watch makes a concentrated efort to report human rights violations from an unbiased stance they are equally guilty of being situated within this discourse. An aproach to human rights as outlined by Forst would allow increased individual autonomy and for beter tailoring of human rights to suit the neds of the new political order rising from the ashes of the Arab Spring. Human rights violations as outlined in broad terms in the 201 World Report, and presure from organizations such as Human Rights Watch most certainly add to the international presure on NATO to intervene. This has led to the discovery that military power may not be a useful instrument in dealing with specific country by country issues in the region. NATO is a group of democratic countries who in turn each have an individual agenda when dealing in the Middle East and North Africa, and are tied to the region by their oil dependency; but protection of human rights as justification for military intervention must !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 524 Ibid Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring Alice Jacobson ! ! 241" be acros the board or not at all. Military intervention in Libya was completed swiftly based largely on the economic incentives of NATO?s democratic powers, whereas in Syria, NATO has ben immobilized as more people die everyday. Human Rights Watch is an organization dedicated to publicly shaming governments and countries that do not observe the proper respect for human rights. The organization defends a set of universal rights, first outlined in the United Nation?s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The idea of human rights as universal is inherently flawed in that it asumes a universal morality as well. Forst presents ?the right to justification? as a valid alternative to the curent human rights rhetoric. The growing trend to combine morality and politics has led to a system in which human rights discourse is beginning to challenge the existing framework of international law. NATO and Human Rights Watch share a similar ethos on human rights. Based on the presure from nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch, NATO is able to justify humanitarian intervention and the foreign military force to protect individuals in countries of economic interest from further human rights violations. PART IV?B THE ARAB SPRING & ISRAEL Since the formation of the State of Israel in 1948, the world?s only majority Jewish State has played a prominent role in the political, social and cultural landscape of the entire Middle East. It has been at the heart of violent conflicts for over sixty years and it has defined regional dynamics. However, the unprecedented events of the Arab Spring have provided the impetus for the next chapter in Israeli-Arab relations. Today, Israel faces enormous chalenges in the form of uncertainty in neighboring countries, increased isolation on the global stage and growing hostilities with Iran over its nuclear program. Additionaly, the cals for democracy acros the Midle East have placed an al-new presure on Israel to addres the Palestinian population under occupation, largely void of democratic rights. In order to confront these chalenges and secure its long-term survival, Israel must agre to a lasting solution with the Palestinians. Both negotiations and implementation wil require the assistance of the Quartet on the Midle East and/or NATO. No mater how dificult this may be, an Israeli- Palestinian peace is the prerequisite for any sense of regional stability. Once Israeli-Palestinian peace is secured, Israel and the member states of NATO can greatly promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law through heavy investment in the Arab World. In adition, Israel can provide a valuable model to emerging Arab democracies of how a first-world democracy with a distinct ethno-religious identity can both exist and flourish in the modern world. Since 1948, the major roadblock to Middle Eastern peace has ben the unending Arab-Israeli conflict. However, using the extraordinary events of the Arab Spring as motivation, Israel and the West must begin to actively seek an end to the world?s most complex geopolitical crisis. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 242" Chapter 14 THE ARAB SPRING AND ISRAEL HOW THE SWEEPING CHAGES ACROSS THE MIDLE EAST ILL IMPACT THE JEWISH STATE In the early hours of 15 May 201, tens of thousands of protesters, inspired by the popular uprisings taking place acros the Middle East, began to march towards Israel?s borders. Protesters from Syria, Jordan, Egypt and from within the ocupied West Bank and Gaza strip marched in commemoration of al-Nakba Day. Nakba, Arabic for ?catastrophe,? is the day the Arabic-speaking world has used to commemorate the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent creation of Palestinian refuges. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), defending their national sovereignty, fired upon the protesters atempting to enter the country, particularly along the Syrian border. The symbolic atempt to ?return? to Palestine was met with a forceful response from the Israeli military. However, the mesage sent to the Israeli government and the entire Western World canot be denied. The Arab Spring, the collective name given to the popular protests acros the region, had reached Israel. While the nature of the conflict has changed over time (Israel has become a regional power, Palestinian nationalist movements have fluctuated), it is still undoubtedly one of the most presing and complex political challenges in the world today. The calls for democracy and acountability acros the Arab World along with continued isolation of Israel on the world stage have placed new presure on Israel, the United States and the international community. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Israel must act to secure its long-term survival with the acomplishment of thre primary objectives. First, a lasting peace agrement with the Palestinians is a necesity for any sense of regional stability and coperation in order to move forward, no mater how daunting that task may sem. Second, the changes acros the Arab World present new oportunities for Israel to positively impact the region in an unprecedented way. As a highly The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 243" developed first-world nation, Israel can and should be a major source of investment and resources as new Arab democracies begin the difficult task of state building. Lastly, while Turkey is generally viewed as the primary model of democracy and Islam, Israel should be viewed as a potential theoretical model of a developed religious democracy with high levels of economic and political fredom. As Arab nations continue to develop in the wake of the Arab Spring, they can look to Israel as an example of how a liberal democracy in the western mold can coexist with an ethno- religious national identity. Why does Israel mater to NATO policy? When discusing the Arab Spring movement, Israel?s unique place in the geopolitical landscape of the modern Middle East canot be overlooked. For all its polarity on the international stage, Israel still receives bipartisan suport from Washington D.C. and remains a key strategic interest for US policy in the region. Therefore, an uncertain future for Israel translates to an uncertain policy for the US. Given NATO?s reliance on the United States, US concerns are NATO concerns. Consequently, any NATO response to the Arab Spring must consider American and Israeli interests. The fear of another Arab-Israeli war will constrain the US and NATO responses to shifting regional dynamics. Regional instability and the overthrow of relatively friendly regimes, most notably Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, could pose a new set of challenges and potential violence towards Israel. However, the sweping changes acros the region could also present a new oportunity for coperation betwen Israel and its historically hostile neighbors that would enable a lasting peace. This paper will make the following recommendations: 1) Israel will be able to secure its future and provide stability to the entire region through a lasting agrement with the Palestinians; 2) NATO, along with the Quartet on the Middle East, must provide necesary suport in implementing an Israeli-Palestinian peace agrement; 3) Once a lasting arangement is in place, Israel and the NATO member states will be able to asist in stabilizing the region through investment in The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 244" infrastructure and the formation of a trade union; 4)As highly developed first world democracy, Israel should play a useful role as a model for newly emerging democracies in the Middle East. I. ISRAEL AND THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST [14.1] Historical Context On May 14 th , 1948, David Ben-Gurion read aloud the Declaration of Independence of the newly formed State of Israel. The next day, armies from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon invaded the fledgling state with the intention to destroy the Jewish community in Palestine. After nearly a year of fighting, Israel emerged victorious and tok control of 77% of mandate Palestine as oposed to the 56% that had ben alloted to them in the 1947 UN partition plan. 525 From 1948 to 1973, Israel and its neighbors coexisted in a state of perpetual war. Even after ceasefire agrements were enacted in 1949, small border skirmishes eventually erupted in to major conflicts in 1956 and 1967. The later, known in Israel as the Six-Day War and acros the Arab World as An-Naksah (?the Setback?), had profound implications acros the entire Middle East. After the war, the number of Palestinian refuges roughly doubled as the Golan Heights, the West Bank (including the old city of Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula all came under Israeli military ocupation. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War marked a monumental turning point in the history of Israeli-Arab relations. Israel aserted itself to the level of regional superpower while the results of war shocked and embarased the Arab world. At the Khartoum Summit of August 1967, the Arabs solidified their rejectionist policies towards the Jewish State and issued their ?thre noes: no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel.? 526 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 525 Jones, Clive, and Ema Murphy. Israel: Chalenges to Identity, Democracy, and the State. London: Routledge, 202. Print. Pg. 17 526 Stephens, Elizabeth. "Caught on the Hope: The Yom Kipur War." History Today 58.10 (2008): 44-50. EBSCO Host. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 245" In 1973, Arab armies launched a surprise atack against the state of Israel on the eve of the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur. Despite heavy initial loses, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) eventually drove back the invading Arab armies before the US and Soviet Union presured both sides to acept a ceasefire. The United States pledged to suport Israeli prior to the war and a $2.2 billion commitment to Israel during the war solidified the ?special relationship? betwen Israel and the United States that has continued to this day. 527 Around the world, the Arab members of OPEC led by Saudi Arabia anounced an oil embargo to protest US suport of Israel during the conflict, contributing to the 1973 energy crisis. However, the fighting also paved the way for a major breakthrough in relations betwen Israel and its Arab neighbors. Building around a strategy of ?Land for Peace,? President Jimmy Carter hosted negotiations at Camp David betwen Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. In 1979, Israel agred to return the entirety of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt (although the Gaza Strip remained under Israeli ocupation) in exchange for a peace treaty with Egypt and normalized diplomatic relations. Additionally, Egypt became the second highest recipient of foreign aid from the United States (after Israel). In the face of Israeli-Egyptian peace, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) continued their campaign calling for the destruction of Israel. In 1982, Israel launched a military campaign into southern Lebanon to drive Palestinian factions from the teritory. Growing public unrest in Palestinian leadership and the 1987 popular uprising against Israeli ocupation ? the Intifada ? forced Yaser Arafat and the PLO to informally recognize Israel and pursue negotiations in the late 1980?s. 528 This willingnes to negotiate led to the Madrid conference of 191. While the conference had few significant acomplishments, it was the first time the Israel-Palestinian conflict was addresed in an international forum and negotiations were conducted face-to-face. More !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 527 Ibid 528 Ghanem, As?ad. Palestinian Politics after Arafat: A Failed National Movement. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2010. Print. Pg. 1 The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 246" importantly, Madrid laid the groundwork for the 193 Oslo Acords. Based upon declarations of mutual recognition and eventual Israeli withdrawal, the Oslo Acords semed to be a crowning achievement in the search for a lasting peace. Since 193, the peace proces has ben defined by failure. In spite of its early suceses, the Oslo Acords were not a final solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over the course of the 190?s, internal forces on both sides stalled negotiations, namely the election of the right-wing Netanyahu government and reports of widespread coruption pushing the Palestinian National Authority (PNA, created as a result of the Oslo Acords) near bankruptcy. In September 200, renewed violence in the form of the Second Intifada efectively destroyed the peace proces. The death of Arafat in 204 coupled with a declining legitimacy of the PNA and Fatah gave way to the rise of Hamas as a genuine alternative. Hamas, a militant Islamist group with strong ties to Egypt?s Muslim Brotherhod, has ben the ruling political party in Gaza following a coup d??tat against Fatah in 206. Since then, a factional conflict (in some cases violent) betwen Hamas and Fatah and an increasingly hard-line Netanyahu government suporting setlement construction have contributed to a notable absence of optimism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Recent developments such as the Palestinian Authority?s unilateral push for full member status at the United Nations in late 201 or a unity agrement betwen Hamas and Fatah in February 2012 have reinvigorated the discusion. However, these developments do not apear to have brought negotiations any closer to a final resolution. The promising post-Oslo image of Yaser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands on the White House lawn has ben replaced by hostility and a failed peace proces. At the onset of the Arab Spring, a lasting Israeli-Palestinian agrement semed as distant as ever. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 247" II. THE ARAB SPRING AND ISRAEL - CHALENGES AND CONCERNS [14.2] [14.2.a] Egypt: The End of ?Cold? Peace or a New Partner in the Region Before the 1978 Camp David Acords, Israel and Egypt semed to be locked in an endles state of war. Full-scale conflicts in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 solidified Egypt as the principal threat to Israeli sovereignty and the leading voice of the Arab oposition to the Jewish State in Palestine. However, over the course of 30 years, geopolitical shifts in the region and the proverbial carot ofered by the United States in the form of foreign aid pushed Anwar Sadat to make an unprecedented peace agrement with Israel in 1979. The deal was heavily criticized within Egypt and Sadat eventually paid the ultimate price in 1981 when he was asasinated at the hands of Islamists oposed to peace with Israel. 529 Even with domestic and pan-Arab oposition, the regimes of Sadat and his sucesor Hosni Mubarak honored their obligations to Israel. By maintaining a minimalist aproach to relations with Israel, Egypt efectively reconciled their relations with the Arab world by the late 1980?s and secured the benefits of increased suport from the United States. This ?cold peace? has ben the hallmark of Israeli-Egyptian relations since 1979. The early 190?s were a period of optimism in the Middle East. The 191 Madrid Conference, the formation of the left-leaning Rabin government in 192, the Oslo Acords and the eventual peace treaty with Jordan all pointed towards signs of improved relations. The separate agrement with Egypt set a precedent for peace since the Egyptian-Israeli agrement was vital to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However, the Mubarak regime ?could not easily dissociate itself from the cold peace policy, for it was dealing with a radical Islamic oposition, was ocasionally pursuing a neo-Naserist regional and foreign policy, and wanted to signal that it was not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 529 Cold Peace: The History of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Acords of 1979 and Their Legacy Today. Al Jazera World. Al Jazera English, 27 Oct. 2009. Web. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 248" Washington?s captive.? 530 By the mid 190?s, Egyptian atitudes towards Israel had transformed from potential coperation to rivalry amid fears of losing regional power. Israeli peace with Jordan, improved relations with the Gulf and North African states and the posibility of Israeli nuclear hegemony in the region fueled the competitive antagonism in Egypt. Acording to Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli ambasador to the US and curent profesor at Harvard University, from the Egyptian perspective, ?having Israel come to a setlement with the Palestinians and eventually with Syria would be one thing; watching Israel use these agrements to develop a network of political and economic relations acros the Middle East, to construct new strategic relations with Turkey and to continue special relations with Washington while retaining a nuclear monopoly ? that was another.? 531 In the early 21 st century, armed conflicts betwen the Israelis and Palestinians furthered strained ties with Egypt. The Second Intifada from 200-203, the 206 Israel-Lebanon War against Hezbollah and Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 208 presented new challenges to the Mubarak regime. By maintaining the ?cold peace?, the government was forced to addres growing Egyptian public suport for their Palestinian Muslim counterparts especially as technological developments brought the images of these conflicts to households acros Egypt. Ultimately, the Israeli campaign against Iranian-suported Hezbollah in 206, the takeover of Gaza by Hamas and presure from the US for Egyptian coperation in regards to Gaza sustained Mubarak?s commitments to Israel. In January of 201, as hundreds of thousands of Egyptians tok to the strets Israel monitored the events with utmost concern and anxiety. The Netanyahu government instructed its ministers not to comment on the events and did not take a political stance on the events given the nature of the fragile relations betwen the two countries. Israeli military strategists began planing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 530 Rabinovich, Itamar. The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Midle East, 1948-2011. Washington, D.C.: Brokings Institution, 2011. Print. Pg. 207-208 531 Rabinovich, Itamar. Pg. 21 The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 249" worst-case scenarios of violence and the potential response. Israeli president Shimon Peres addresing a conference of European parliament members in February 201, praised Mubarak?s contributions to peace and added his aprehension at the potential risks of open elections in Egypt, particularly in regards to the historically hostile, Muslim Brotherhod. 532 By the time the collapse of the Mubarak regime semed inevitable, the uncertainties surounding the future of Israeli-Egyptian relations began to take shape acros Israel. Fears were exacerbated following the atack by a mob of protesters on the Israeli embasy in Cairo in September 201. Only a personal intervention by President Obama forced the military council to send Egyptian commandos to protect the premises. ?Emergency Law,? the ability of the military to maintain legitimate control, and Obama?s diplomatic might were put to the test as the events marked a major turning point in Israel-Egypt relations in the post-Mubarak era. Tensions within Egypt combined with popular frustrations over peace with Israel threatened Egyptian security both internally and externally. Similar to Hosni Mubarak, the military council ruling Egypt strugles with the challenge betwen anti-Israel sentiment on the Egyptian stret versus the strategic benefits of peaceful relations with Israel. One year removed from the protests at Tahrir Square, Egypt still faces enormous challenges. If and how the Egyptian people addres these challenges will have a major impact on Israel-Egyptian relations and Israel?s role acros the entire region. Below are the four key questions of concern for Israel one year after the Egyptian uprising. 1) Who will replace Mubarak? The military has maintained control in Egypt since the Mubarak regime fell but the transition apears to be under way as parliamentary elections tok place at the end of 201. However, even with continued statements of a commitment to transfer power to civilians and the historic elections !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 532 Efraim, Omri. "Peres Praises Mubarak for His Contribution to Peace." Ynetnews.com. 6 Feb. 201. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. . The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 250" last fall, the armed forces still maintain rule over the country. This comes in the face of growing unrest with military rule and continued clashes betwen protesters and the police. Military control in Egypt has benefitted Israeli security concerns thus far. Unlike the Egyptian stret, the army is fully aware of Israeli military might and would presumably continue to honor the 1979 peace agrement. But as of late February 201, key questions remain for Israel. Will the Egyptian military eventually relinquish control? Will an anti-Israel, Islamist government rise to power? Will internal tensions in Egypt spiral out of control leading to a violent power vacum? 2) What will become of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace agrement? Despite frosty relations with Israel, Mubarak?s regime still upheld their fundamental peace agrements; there have ben no Egyptian-Israeli wars since the 1970?s. American incentives and Israeli military strength had prevented both Sadat and Mubarak from violating the peace agrement in spite of widespread domestic oposition to the deal. Will these factors continue to be enough to dissuade a new Egyptian regime from breaking the agrement? In the aftermath of Arab Spring?s push for participatory governance, will anti-Israel sentiment on the Egyptian stret finally be enough to break the peace treaty? The future of relations betwen Egypt and Israel largely depends on what type of government eventually takes form in Cairo. 3) Does the Muslim Brotherhod pose a threat to Israel? The Islamist political party, illegal under the Mubarak regime, made a resounding return to political life with overwhelming suport in the first elections of the post-Mubarak era. As the uprising developed last spring, early responses from Israel were marked by concern and aprehension towards the historically hostile organization. If an Islamist coalition led by the Muslim Brotherhod forms in Egypt, will this threaten the future of Israel-Egypt peace? What will be Egypt?s role in regards to Gaza, especially in light of the close ties betwen Hamas and the Brotherhod? Will the The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 251" prospect of US foreign aid, at a time when the Egyptian economy is sufering, be enough to dissuade the brotherhod from some extreme policies? 4) What will be the role of Egypt in an Israeli-Palestinian agrement? Since 1979, the Egyptian peace treaty has ben one of the defining characteristics of Israeli national security policy. Despite the ?cold peace,? Israel and Egypt have often worked together, especially in regards to securing the borders of Gaza. The interim military government in Egypt played a key part as mediator in the October 201 prisoner swap that brought Gilad Shalit (captured by Hamas in 206) back to Israel in exchange for over 1,00 Palestinians from Israeli prisons. 533 The future of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and potential setlements will largely depend on the outcomes of the Egyptian uprising. Will the new Egyptian government open the border betwen Gaza and Egypt? Will the Muslim Brotherhod continue to suport Hamas? What will be the future of Israeli citizens living near Gaza who have lived under the threat of rocket fire for nearly a decade? Or, will the new regime take an active role as a mediator betwen the two sides in an efort to end the nearly 65-year crisis? [14.2.b] Syria: The Wildcard Since 1948, Syrian-Israeli relations have ben defined by periods of violence, ceasefires and failed talks. Syria played a major part in the wars of 1948, 1967, 1973 and Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Madrid Conference of 191 marked the first time in history that Syria suported the idea of a peace agrement with Israel. Throughout the 190?s, Israeli leaders and the Clinton administration worked towards peace with Syria as a necesary prerequisite for peace with the Palestinians. While talks eventually broke down in 200, the basic framework for peace with Syria remained in place ? use the Golan Heights (teritory ocupied by Israel since 1967) in a ?Land for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 533 Galpin, Richard. "Gilad Shalit Fred in Israeli-Palestinian Prisoner Swap." BBC News. British Broadcasting Corporation, 18 Oct. 2011. Web. 11 Feb. 2012. . The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 252" Peace? deal similar to the role of the Sinai Peninsula in the treaty with Egypt. In recent years, the transfer of power from Hafiz to Bashar al-Asad, Israeli operations in southern Lebanon, declining US-Syria ties over the Iraq War and Syria?s alliance with Iran have all impacted relations betwen the two nations yet peace still sems like a far-of chance. In March 201, inspired by the events acros the Arab World, Syrians tok to the strets to protest the rule of Bashar al-Asad. Nearly one year later, the country has become the global focal point of the Arab Spring movement. The Syrian government continues shelling civilian populations in the face of widespread oposition from the international community. Despite Rusian and Chinese vetoes of the UN Security Council Resolution, the situation on the ground and statements from powerful actors such as the Arab League, EU, US and Turkey have signaled the inevitable fall of the Asad regime in the near future. As of late February 2012, the Asad government continues to fire artillery and mortar rounds at major population centers acros the country while the oposition movement grows. Furthermore, the violence has spilled into the neighboring countries of Lebanon and Iraq. The instability has spawned a wave of sectarian clashes as powerful regional actors such as Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda sek to exploit the situation. 534 If the leading resistance groups such as the Syrian National Council and the Fre Syrian Army can organize under one united front, a full-fledged Syrian Civil War sems inevitable. If so, a refuge and humanitarian crisis would surely arise. While the vast majority of Syrian refuges thus far have fled to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, Israel should neither think it is immune from people seking refuge nor can it aford to turn them away. Additionally, even with recent vetoes by China and Rusia at the UNSC, the situation on the ground could disintegrate to the point where international intervention becomes a viable option either through NATO or a type !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 534 "Syrian Conflict Spils to Neighbors." Wal Stret Journal. 16 Feb. 2012. Web. 21 Feb. 2012. . The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 253" of coalition of the willing. In this situation, Israel could play an important role as a position for entry into Syria or as a source of strategic intelligence. However, Turkey?s geographic proximity, an outspoken stance against the Asad regime and its membership status in NATO all apear to have solidified a commitment to provide an entry point in a potential NATO humanitarian intervention in Syria. Furthermore, the active role taken by the Arab League in regards to the Syrian uprising and the organization?s historical oposition to the Jewish State indicate that Israel most likely would not participate directly in an international intervention. Still, any type of full-scale armed conflict in a neighboring country would undoubtedly require monitoring by the Israeli government. Asuming that the conflict does not resolve peacefully in the coming months and Asad is ousted from power, there are thre potential routes the Syrian uprising could take, each having a significant impact on Israeli policy. 1) Islamic Extremism As the Asad regime falls and the subsequent power vacum develops in Syria, various organizations and groups will strugle for control. One posible path would be the rise of militant Islamist ideologies that already play a major role in regional politics. Similar to the elections in Egypt, fre elections in Syria could produce an Islamist government that would develop even stronger ties to the fiercely anti-Israel militant groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas or Islamic Jihad. In this scenario, the new Syria would most likely maintain or even strengthen its ties with Iran while continuing its hostility towards Israel. While this scenario does negate the prospects for a lasting peace, it also does not directly threaten Israel?s existence. The new Syria would likely still be far to weak to launch an atack on Israel and any strike would be relegated to rocket fire from the northern borders similar to the situation before the 206 Lebanon War. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 254" 2) A pro-Western, Anti-Asad Regime Prior to the uprising, the actions of the regime of Bashar al-Asad had isolated Syria from much the Western World. This isolation stems from numerous allegations of providing financial and military suport to militant Islamist groups viewed in the west as teror organizations as well as various diplomatic strains with the US over terorism and the Iraq War. The curent crackdown has all but destroyed the Asad regime?s standing in the international forum. As of now, the regime is still backed by Rusia and China, although there is speculation that the Rusian and Chinese suport stems from fear of empowering their own domestic oposition movements. Whatever government that eventually rises from the conflict in Syria will face a difficult challenge in rebuilding the state and establishing new ties with the outside world. In this situation, the US government could provide valuable incentives for a peace agrement with Israel to the new Syrian regime. The next chapter in Syrian history could be the formation of an anti-Asad government that seks to reduce relations with its anti-Western allies (Iran and Rusia) in favor of a pro-western policy. Peace with Israel could then be a condition for valuable aid from the US and the West in the rebuilding proces. 3) Who will play the role of Franz Ferdinand? In a recent lecture addresing the Jackson Schol Student Asociation, Resat Kasaba, director of the Jackson Schol, described the curent situation in Syria as reminiscent of the Balkans just before World War I. In the early 20 th century, internal tensions, external alliances and power strugles acros the region produced what became known as the ?Powder Keg of Europe.? Ultimately, the fuse was lit with the asasination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand that started World War I a month later. In the case of Syria, its complex religious and ethnic history, the role of powerful outside actors and general instability could produce a series of events that could quickly spiral out of control. Batle lines have ben drawn betwen Rusia, China and Iran suporting the Asad regime and the US, the member states of NATO and the Arab League calling for him to step down. The threat of a The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 255" nuclear Iran and the geographic proximity might be enough to push Israel in to the conflict. Undoubtedly, a crisis such as this, especially if it involves nuclear weapons or the threat of nuclear weapons, would be the World War III for the 21 st century. So the question remains, who or what will play the role of Franz Ferdinand? The Palestinians: The Most Difficult and Most Esential Question in the Middle East Since the disintegration of the Otoman Empire, the ?Question of Palestine? has dominated the political landscape of the entire region. It has defined the agenda of the United Nations, numerous wars, politicians on all sides and it lies at the heart of the Arab World?s relationship with the West. While the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the years, its impact and significance remain the benchmark for regional stability. Nevertheles, the events of the Arab Spring are truly unprecedented. The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi and the mas demonstrations at Tahrir Square symbolize the beginning of the next chapter of Middle Eastern history. Cries for democracy and participatory governance, not jihad, now dominate the Arab World. Despite the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?s aparently endles role in regional politics, the changing dynamics of the entire region will undoubtedly impact the future of the conflict. The ways in which Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Quartet (US, EU, UN and Rusia) respond to these changing times will ultimately determine the future of lasting peace in the Middle East. As protests swept the Middle East last year, Israel also became a target of protests and demonstrations from the Palestinian Arabs living under ocupation and in neighboring Arab states. In addition to the march on Israel?s borders on Nakba Day in May, similar protests were organized on 5 June 201 to mark the day that Palestinians commemorate the Israeli ocupation of the West Bank and Gaza after the 1967 war. 535 These Palestinians, subject to the same youth bulge and high !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 535 Pollack, Kenneth M. The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Midle East. Washington, DC: Brokings Institution, 2011. Print. Pg. 50 The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 256" unemployment that defined protesters acros the Arab World, tok to the strets, made their voice heard and reopened the question of Israel and Palestine. Will the Palestinian push for democracy and independence fall on deaf ears? As the Arab Spring enters its second year, what will be the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Will these extraordinary changes acros the region be a force for a peaceful two-state solution? Or, will the regional instability empower fundamentalist groups determined to destroy Israel and ?restore? Palestine? Unquestionably, the events in the last year have drastically altered the geopolitical landscape of the entire Middle East. Seemingly stable regimes have fallen, civil war has raged and the regional order will be redrawn. All of these changes combined with the mounting unrest from within Israel and the Ocupied Teritories has never made peace more esential nor sem more elusive. [14.2.c] The Necesity of Renewed Negotiations betwen Israel and the Palestinians The Arab Spring has put a new presure on Israel to resume negotiations with the Palestinians for thre principle reasons. First, the hard-line policies of the Netanyahu government have sucesfully isolated Israel on the international stages. Both the refusal to agre to a freze on setlement activity and the forceful aproach to national security (se the 206 Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead from 208-09) have drawn heavy criticism from the international community. Furthermore, the dissolution of relations with Turkey, once a key strategic regional ally, and the dwindling role of the United States in the region (se former US allies Mubarak and Ben Ali) have further added to this isolation. Secondly, the very core of the Arab Spring is a cry for democracy and self-determination. While progres towards Palestinian autonomy has ben made in years past, most notably with the implementation of the Oslo Acords and the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, Israel still maintains military control. As the outcomes of Arab Spring continue to unfold, democracy and autonomy will The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 257" be the guiding lights for newly emerging Arab governments. How much longer will the Palestinian people, the international community or even the Israeli public allow for the lack of self-rule in the Ocupied Teritories? If Israel does not proactively addres the status quo with the Palestinians, then some other power inevitably will. Perhaps it will come from a member of the Quartet or perhaps from an emerging power such as Turkey or China. Either way, a forced negotiation, not fully suported by either Israel or the Palestinian leadership, is almost certainly doomed to fail. The third justification for resuming negotiations with the Palestinians is the threat of violence. Since the Arab Spring began, violence from Palestinians has ben largely reserved to just rock throwing or the ocasional rocket fire from Gaza in to southern Israel. However, continued Israeli military action in Gaza or upon protesters along the borders will inevitably add to growing Palestinian hostility. Every counter atack that Israel launches could escalate and spill over into neighboring countries similar to the border raids in Egypt in August of last year. Given the instability on the ground in both Egypt and Syria, any type of military action could have enormous repercusions. Regional ?wildcards? such as Iran and Hezbollah contesting Israeli legitimacy or Turkey challenging the blockade of Gaza could also escalate violence. The Arab Spring, thus far defined by both peaceful protests and violent crackdowns, could ultimately be the catalyst for a third Intifada or another Arab-Israeli War. The Israeli government could presumably bypas these war scenarios by actively pursing a peaceful setlement with the Palestinians. [14.2.d] Obstacles to Restarting Negotiations Regardles of the presing ned for resumed negotiations, peace has never semed more distant for thre primary reasons. The first challenge to resuming Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is the lack of a mediator. Israeli peace agrements with Jordan and Egypt have historically cast them as valuable mediators. However, the overthrow of the US-backed Mubarak regime and King Abdullah of Jordan facing protests illustrates the regional instability preventing these Arab nations from being The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 258" viable intermediaries. Turkey, an increasingly powerful regional actor, once enjoyed strong coperative relations with Israel and semed poised to ascend to the role of regional mediator. But in recent years, ties betwen the two nations have sufered greatly as a result of diplomatic rows over Israel?s conduct during Operation Cast Lead and the death of 8 Turkish NGO workers in a confrontation aboard a humanitarian vesel atempting to break the maritime blockade of the Gaza Strip. 536 Lastly, the United States, long believed to be esential to the Middle East peace proces, has sen a declining influence in the region. While the US will still play a prominent role in any lasting agrement, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as a strugling economy have greatly harmed the reputation of the US around the Arab World. Mahmoud Abas and the PNA?s unilateral push for statehod in September 201 at the UN demonstrated the Palestinian desire to circumvent US intervention. The lack of a strong mediator or a strong force pushing for negotiations have made Israeli-Palestinian peace all the more elusive. The second challenge to renewed talks is strong internal forces on both sides. In Israel, the summer of 201 was defined by protests. Not from Palestinians in the Ocupied Teritories inspired by the Arab Spring but rather from inside Israel. Beginning in July, the Social Justice Movement, as it became known in Israel, culminated in masive protests against rising costs of living in the Jewish state. Israeli media puts the number of protesters upwards of 40,00 and these protests dominated the domestic political scene and demanded the atention of the Netanyahu government. 537 On the other side, factional divides betwen Hamas and Fatah have dominated Palestinian politics since 206. Hamas, a militant Islamist organization with a charter that calls for the destruction of Israel, has long ben a roadblock to any negotiations. While some se the recent unity deal betwen Hamas !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 536 Kershner, Isabel. "Israel Cancels Military Contract With Turkey to Suply Aerial System." New York Times 24 Dec. 2011. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. . 537 "Israelis Hold Renewed Mass Protests over Living Costs." BBC News. British Broadcasting Corporation, 3 Sept. 201. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. . The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 259" and Fatah as an important step in the right direction, Bibi Netanyahu and the Israeli government continue to stres, ?Hamas and peace do not go together.? 538 The last obstacle to talks betwen Palestinians and Israel has ben the growing threat of a nuclear Iran. While the history of nuclear power in the Islamic Republic dates back to the 1960?s, the 205 election of conservative president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, reinvigorated the country?s nuclear program. Since then, various international reports from agencies such as the IAEA and the CIA have warned about the potential military capabilities of Iran?s nuclear program although Iran claims that its intentions are peaceful. 539 Iran?s outspoken anti-Israel stance, demonstrated by missiles draped in baners that read ?wipe Israel of the map,? has sparked a justified fear from the Jewish state. 540 In the past few months, diplomatic batles betwen Iran and the West (the EU, US and Israel) have resulted in tougher sanctions and heightened rhetoric. Israeli leadership has repeatedly stresed that it will not shy away from a military strike against Iran?s nuclear program. As a result, any type of public call for Palestinian negotiations within Israel has ben sidelined by the posible threat of a nuclear Iran. Since 1948, the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts have ben at the center of East- West relations in the Middle East. From 1948 until the fall of the Soviet Union, regional batle lines were drawn and the Middle East became one of many theatres of the Cold War. American suport for Israel has long drawn criticism from the Muslim world and became a common theme in Jihadist rhetoric against the US. In recent years, the showdown betwen Iran and the West has ben the latest example of this conflict on an international level. Therefore, any sense of regional stability !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 538 Flower, Kevin. "Palestinian Factions Hamas, Fatah Reach Unity Deal." CNN. 06 Feb. 2012. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. . 539 "Iran's Nuclear Program." Times Topics. New York Times, 15 Feb. 2012. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. . 540 "Iran's Nuclear Program." The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 260" must include an Israeli-Palestinian setlement. In today?s world, peace has never semed more esential due to Israel?s increasing isolation, the mesage of the Arab Spring and the potential for another outbreak of violence. However, these historic times also present great challenges to negotiations such as the lack of a strong mediator, internal politics and the growing threat of a nuclear Iran. In spite of these challenges, the situation on the ground canot undergo sustained improvement until Israel and the Palestinians reach a substantial agrement. III. WHAT COMES NEXT? ? PROPOSALS TO SECURE REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST [14.3] [14.3.a] Joining the Midle East In 202, at the height of the second Palestinian Intifada against Israeli ocupation, leaders from the Arab League met in Beirut and suported a plan for peace acros the Middle East. The Arab Peace Initiative, proposed by Saudi Arabia, called for Israel to withdraw from all of its teritory ocupied since 1967 and to refer the refuge issue to previous UN resolutions. In exchange, all 22 members of the Arab League would establish normalized, peaceful relations with Israel. 541 While Israeli leadership quickly rejected the plan, claiming that the influx of Palestinian refuges would destroy the Jewish character of the state, it had two significant outcomes. First, it marked a monumental landmark in Arab-Israeli relations. While Arafat and the PLO recognized Israel?s right to exist as early as 198, the Arab Peace Initiative marked the first time that the greater Arab World recognized this right in the form of a two-state solution. Secondly, while the specifics of the initiative were unaceptable to Israel, the overiding concept canot be dismissed. Namely, Israeli peace with the Palestinians will result in peace with the entire Arab World. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 541 "Arabs Ofer Israelis Peace Plan." BBC News. British Broadcasting Corporation, 28 Mar. 202. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. . The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 261" The opening for an Israeli agrement with the Arab League is further strengthened due to the growing strains betwen Iran and the Arab world. Since the early history of Islam, sectarian clashes betwen Suni and Shi?a have ben a constant theme. In recent years, that divide has re- emerged itself by way of the regional rivalry betwen the oil-rich nations of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Since 203, competing ideologies and rival spheres of influences have led to Iranian-Saudi tension in regards to gulf politics, influence in post-Saddam Iraq, conflicting visions for the Levant, and most recently, the quest for nuclear weapons. 542 As a result, the Saudi-sponsored Arab Peace Initiative strategy becomes a valuable way for Saudi Arabia to break the regional stalemate. By welcoming Israel?s military might (namely its not so secret nuclear plan) in order to curb growing Iranian influence in the region, Saudi Arabia will efectively adopt an ?enemy of my enemy is my friend? aproach to foreign relations. Israel must take advantage of this potential Arab push for regional coperation and make steps towards a lasting agrement with the Palestinians. By reaching an agrement with the Palestinians as described below, Israel could then join the Middle East and begin working towards establishing diplomatic relations and promoting regional stability. Step 1) Significant Peace Negotiations with the Palestinians In the early 190?s, changing PLO politics along with a push from the United States and the Soviet Union enabled extraordinary symbolic progres in the form of the 191 Madrid Conference. These talks then gave way to the much more concrete Oslo Acords in 193, which ushered in the greatest period of optimism towards Middle East peace since 1948. However, various factors eventually contributed to the demise of the Oslo proces. Recently, renewed violence and domestic challenges on both sides have since put any hope for negotiations on indefinite hiatus. The central role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in politics acros the Arab World demands that any lasting regional stability MUST include a resolution to the over 60 year-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 542 Wehrey, Frederic M. Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fal of Sadam: Rivalry, Coperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 209. Print. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 262" Despite these semingly insurmountable challenges, a future resolution is both posible and esential however they will require painful concesions by leaders on both sides in the name of peace. Therefore, I propose another round of negotiations similar to Madrid 191 and Oslo 193 in which both Israeli and Palestinian leaders sit down under the mediation of the international powers, presumably the Quartet on the Middle East. While both sides may have historically oposed preconditions, this new conference will take the presumption of a two-state solution and will require that Hamas denounce its open call for the destruction of Israel. Seeing as how the Islamist group now plays a significant role in Palestinian politics, it is esential that representatives are present at the negotiations. The United Nations defines the five key issues in a permanent agrement as the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, Jerusalem, refuges, Israeli setlements/borders and water rights. 543 In regards to these challenges, I present brief predictions of what the final setlement would entail. Rights of the Palestinian People ? The sucesful creation of an internationally recognized Palestinian state would require international respect for its sovereignty. Palestinian self- determination would be guaranted under international law. Any infringements of these rights by Israel or any other state could then be brought to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, Netherlands. Additionally, a future Palestinian state would require easy transportation betwen the West Bank and Gaza, protected by an outside presence such as NATO or the UN. Jerusalem ? the complex issues surounding the holy city of Jerusalem present some of the greatest challenges to any round of negotiations. In a proposed setlement, Jerusalem will continue to be the capital of Israel however Israel must also concede areas of East Jerusalem that will become the site of the future Palestinian capital. The walled Old City and areas of historical religious !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 543 United Nations. Key Isues in a Palestinian Settlement. The Question of Palestine. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. . The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 263" importance will come under joint authorization along with the presence of a United Nations (or NATO) force to ensure peace and coperation within Jerusalem. Refuges ? To ensure the future Jewish character of the state of Israel, an esential component for Israeli coperation, Palestinian refuges will not be given a full right of return to Israel. The sovereign Palestinian state will be fre to make any decisions it wants in regards to immigration and refuges. In lieu of a right of return for refuges, Israel must be prepared to ofer some sort of reparations or provide financial suport for the building of housing in a Palestinian state. Israeli Settlements/Borders ? Since 1967, sucesive Israeli governments have promoted and protected setlements in the Ocupied Teritories in the face of frequent UN resolutions against them. In May 201, Barack Obama tok a step that no other US president had done before him and sugested that the 1967 borders be used as the basis for negotiations. 544 In the last 40 years, the situation on the ground has transformed to one where a complete withdrawal to the ?67 borders is no longer posible. Nevertheles, both sides will ned to come together to negotiate land swaps to acount for Israeli setlements. Israel must be ready to make painful concesions and withdraw from sections of the ocupied West Bank as part of a final agrement. Water ? Like much of the Middle East, the arid climate of Israel and the Palestinian teritories makes water a scarce commodity. Curent Israeli policies place severe drilling and water use restrictions on the residents of the Ocupied Teritories. Israel, as a global leader in water resource technology, must be prepared to suport water development projects in the new Palestinian state. Additionally, I propose a transnational regional agency to monitor water use, eficiency and hygiene betwen Israel, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. This agency would follow a similar model of the Sava River Basin Commission; an international organization that operates betwen the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 544 Landler, Mark, and Steven L. Meyers. "Obama Ses ?67 Borders as Starting Point for Peace Deal." New York Times 20 May 2011: A1. New York Times Online. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. . The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 264" previously waring nations of the former Yugoslavia, and would require monitoring from outside parties such as the UN or NATO member states. Step 2) Israel as a Powerful Economic Ally in the Region Asuming that a lasting agrement can be reached with the Palestinians (no small acomplishment) and Israel establishes ties with the Arab nations, it becomes critical for Israel to begin strengthening those ties. The conventional wisdom surounding international relations holds that a strong economy and low unemployment greatly improve political stability. Therefore, I propose the following set of strategies for developing strong, stable Israeli-Arab relations. For the following proposals, acept the existence a separate Palestinian state and normalized relations with the entire Arab League. An inflation crisis in the mid-1980?s led to sweping economic reforms that have since pushed the Israeli economy in to the uper echelon of international economies. Israel?s boming high-tech industry helped spur growth throughout the 90?s and 200?s while atracting substantial outside investments. Israel?s large defense industry, a labor force trained in sophisticated technologies during military service, a large pol of researchers in the Jewish Diaspora, and a highly educated wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the early 190?s have all contributed to Israel?s impresive economic growth in the last 25 years. 545 Today, Israel, along with Turkey, represents the only two nations from the Middle East region in the Organization for Economic Coperation and Development. For all of its economic suceses, the potential for Israeli growth has still ben severely curbed by geopolitical factors. While the rate has diminished from previous highs in the 1980?s, Israeli defense spending still totals about 6.5% of the country?s GDP, considerably higher than !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 545 "A Profile of the Israeli Economy." OECD Observer 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 265" almost all developed nations. 546 Huge drops in foreign investments during the second Intifada as well as costly wars in 206 and 208-09 further limited potential growth and investment. The India- based think tank Strategic Foresight has placed the cumulative oportunity cost of conflict to Israel from 191-2010 at nearly $1.1 trillion. 547 A lasting peace with its historically hostile neighbors would enable for huge cuts in Israeli defense spending and fre up masive amounts of capital for investment both inside of Israel and abroad. Using the World Bank?s 2010 GDP of Israel (about $20 billion), just a 33% cut in military spending would fre up about $9 billion USD. 548 Some percentage of that money could and should be used to provide reparations or compensation to Palestinian refuges necesary for aceptance from Palestinian leadership of an agrement without a right of return. Beyond just the humanitarian and security incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace, a lasting agrement would invariably bring a huge economic bom to the Jewish state. Investment in Infrastructure Achieving self-sustaining Arab economies will require foreign investment. Israel, in an efort to truly secure its long-term survival and security, should promote investing in the Arab states, particularly in the newly formed state of Palestine and the other emerging democracies. An invigorated international community, ecstatic after solving the world?s most drawn out political stalemate, would almost asuredly begin the proces of investing in Palestinian state-building and economic growth. If similar international responses in post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo are any indication, then a Palestinian state could be predicted to se anywhere from $6-12 billion USD in foreign aid. 549 A major portion of the foreign aid to newly emerging Arab democracies must go towards infrastructure development. Particularly in the Palestinian teritories, decades of conflict !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 546 "A Profile of the Israeli Economy." OECD Observer 2011. 547 Cost of Conflict in the Midle East. Rep. Strategic Foresight Group, Jan. 209. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. . 548 "Israel." Country Data. The World Bank. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. . 549 Rand Palestinian State Study Team. Building a Sucesful Palestinian State. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 205. Print. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 266" have left the infrastructure damaged or even non-existent. Furthermore, Palestinian per capital GDP is still just one-tenth that of Israel?s. 550 Therefore, it must be a major priority of the international community to build the infrastructure in Palestine and other emerging Arab democracies in order to suport competitive trade domestically and abroad. Additionally, as a global leader in water resource technology, Israel must invest or coperate with local nations to develop similar water projects acros the arid Middle East. Israel must also work on coperative development projects for sewage and energy plants, particularly in Gaza where both poverty and anti-Israel extremism are prevalent. By leading a global charge of investment in the Arab World, Israel can quickly begin work on creating ties with an Arab world that had largely ben nonexistent. A Regional Trade Agrement Like emerging economic superpowers India and China, Palestine and the greater Arab World?s comparative advantage lie in its masive labor force. With a close proximity to both Europe and Asia and increasingly liberalized trade policies under new democracies, the Middle East could become the next great manufacturing power. In order to invigorate this proces, the region should begin discusions for a fre trade or reduced tariff agrement. I propose the creation of a multi- national trade agrement, to counter the Gulf Coperation Council, comprised of Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. This trade organization would lead to reduced trade restrictions thereby lowering the costs of gods within the new Arab democracies while simultaneously making exports more competitive on the global market. Increased economic coperation could also spawn joint commercial enterprises betwen Israel and the other states in the fre trade agrement particularly in regards to water, energy, tourism and transportation. This would further strengthen ties betwen Israel and the Arab world while simultaneously providing employment necesary for regional stability. Improved economic relations would produce improved diplomatic and personal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 550 Rand Palestinian State Study Team. Building a Sucesful Palestinian State. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 205. Print. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 267" relations especially in regards to foreign employment. In particular, Palestinian employment in Israel must continue as a necesity for building a stable Palestinian economy while helping to erode the decades of animosity and contempt. While the obvious aprehensions to fre trade are still present (environmental concerns, exploitation, los of jobs, etc.), economic union betwen Israel and the Arab World would invariably produce an atmosphere of coperation that would transcend economics and create lasting, mutually beneficial relationships. Step 3) The Israeli Model Since the onset of the Arab Spring, cries for democracy have dominated the Arab World. As of 201, Israel ranked as the only democracy in the Middle East. 551 With the widespread criticism of Israeli policy in the ocupied Palestinian teritories, it is important to note the difference betwen governance in Israel proper and the Ocupied Teritories. All of the land ocupied in the 1967 war, except for Jerusalem and the Golan Heights which have both ben formally anexed by Israel (an act that violated the Geneva Convention and has drawn heavy international criticism), is under varying degres of Israeli military jurisdiction and Palestinian autonomy. This distinction is not to be used as a justification for human rights violations in the Ocupied Teritories but rather to illustrate the complexities in describing the Israeli political system. After narowing the scope of comparison, Israel can and should be considered a first-world country in a region long relegated to the tag of ?developing world.? The 201 UN Human Development Index, which efectively measures the ?standard of living? through various factors, gave Israel the 17 th highest score in the world, higher than any other country in the Middle East and over 50 spots higher than the next Middle Eastern country without oil reserves (Lebanon at #71). 552 Today, Israel exists as a unique juxtaposition of western ideals of democracy and economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 551 Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Decline. The Economist Inteligence Unit. The Economist, 2010. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. . 552 United Nations. United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report. New York, 201. Web. 19 Feb. 2012. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 268" liberalization in the Middle East. While Turkey is commonly used as the archetype of coexistence betwen democracy and Islam, the Israeli political structure can serve as a useful model for newly emerging Arab democracies of a first-world religious democracy with relatively high levels of economic and political fredom. The 1948 Declaration of Independence established a ?Jewish State? in part of the teritory of Mandate Palestine. It also created a 120-person parliament that has, over the years, pased a series of laws known as the Basic Laws, which form the de facto constitution of Israel. In Israeli elections, citizens vote for a political party with each party receiving a number of seats in parliament proportional to their percentage of the election. Despite the lack of a constitution, the stable government that has emerged in Israel since 1948 can be described as ?a secular republic, with a theoretically sovereign parliament, a politically powerful cabinet, an independent secular judiciary and a largely ceremonial president.? 553 The unique relationship betwen the state and the various population groups represents an issue that newly democratic Arab states must addres. Palestinian Arabs that stayed in Israel after 1948 were granted citizenship and have become active members of society. Today, Israel?s Arab minority comprises roughly 20% of the population. As such, minority Arab political parties and representatives in parliament form a key component of Israeli political culture. Israel?s parliamentary structure of government could be a posible solution to the deep political schisms that have plagued parts of the Arab World. This could be particularly efective for nations with deep-seded religious or ethnic divides such as Lebanon, Syria or Iraq. Additionally, the Israeli model would be useful for governance over an ethno-religious state identity that aplies to the majority of the population while protecting minority groups. The 1984 Basic Law established the Israeli judiciary system: in Israel, most maters that require litigation are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 553 Edelman, Martin. Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel. Charlotesville: University of Virginia, 194. Print. Pg. 9 The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 269" handled in secular civil courts with an Israeli Supreme Court being the highest governing body in the country. This Basic Law also enacted the creation of various religious courts that have highly specialized jurisdictions, particularly focused on issues such as immigration, mariage and religious conversion. Jews, as well as Muslims, Druze, Bahair or any of the ten recognized Christian communities, are mandatorily subject to the jurisdiction of religious courts for their religious identity. 554 Subsequent Israeli laws have protected the rights of all citizens to religious expresion and protected human dignity and liberty. A secular state with religious jurisdictions could provide a mold for how new Arab democracies will reconcile Islam and the modern nation-state while protecting human rights and the rule of law. While the Israeli system is not perfect, it could serve as useful theoretical model of political structure to be emulated acros the region. IV. THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE US AND NATO IN ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS [14.4] On 9 February, the secretary general of NATO, Anders Fog Rasmusmen made a scheduled visit to Israel to speak with government oficials. When asked about the future role of NATO, Rasmusmen gave a clear answer stating at any NATO involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace-proces would require thre ?ifs?: an agrement based on a two-state solution, a request from both sides to step in and a UN mandate suporting it. 555 These powerful statements indicated the much more asertive role that NATO is willing to take in a final setlement. Asuming that these thre ?ifs? are met, NATO will provide necesary suport for implementing a stable, lasting agrement betwen Israel and the Palestinians. This suport will come in the form of providing security for negotiations, monitoring transfers of power from Israel to Palestinians in the West !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 554 Edelman, Martin. Pg. 51 555 Oren, Amir. "NATO Chief Ses Group's Future Involvement in Israeli Arab Peace Proces." Ha'aretz [Tel Aviv] 9 Feb. 2011. Ha'aretz.com. Web. . The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 270" Bank, maintaining stability in Jerusalem, ensuring the fredom of movement betwen the West Bank and Gaza and guaranteing that religious sites in Jerusalem are open to all visitors. Once a setlement betwen Israel and the Palestinians is stabilized, NATO trops will continue to monitor the efectivenes of the agrement, particularly in Jerusalem where constant international suport will be neded. As one year pases since the onset of the Arab Spring, the future of the Middle East still sems highly uncertain. The changing regional dynamics indicate a highly volatile situation for years to come. Furthermore, Israel has long played a key role in US policy and therefore NATO policy in the Middle East. Thus, how the West responds to potential changes in Israeli-Arab relations will impact policy in the entire region. While the political landscape of the Arab World changes, it will present both new challenges and new oportunities for the Jewish State. Israel must proactively addres these challenges to secure its long-term stability through a lasting agrement with the Palestinians. Both NATO and the Quartet on Middle Eastern Peace will play esential roles in the development and implementation of this peace proces. Once Arab-Israeli peace is achieved, Israel and the member states of NATO must invest in the Arab World in order to asist in developing regional stability through economic growth. If the member states of NATO can asist in promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace and invest in the development of the Arab World, this will have enormous benefits in regards to promoting regional stability, democratization, human rights and the rule of law. The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 271" Source: the CIA The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 272" The Arab Spring & Israel Jake Lustig ! 273"