

**Kim Il Sung and the DPRK- USSR- PRC Triangle:
The Creation of an Asian Dynasty in a Communist State**

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A thesis

**submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts in International Studies

University of Washington

2012

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Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

Jackson School of International Studies

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Introduction

Kim Il Sung, Kim Jung Il, and Kim Joung-un constitute a North Korean dynasty. From the foundation of country in 1948 to the present, over sixty years, North Korean leadership has not been challenged and has, indeed morphed into a dynasty. A dynasty of the three generation is rare in the modern world. How then did this system of hereditary rule come about?

The Kim dynasty began with Kim Il Sung. He was “[the] Great Leader, the Sun of the Nation, [and] the Marshal of the Mighty Republic”.¹ He was a party chief and the president and comrade in chief of the North Korean armed forces. He held the highest positions in both the party and the government longer than any other political leader in the post-World War II era. His rise to leadership started during the Japanese colonial period, when a great number of Korean nationalist and communist independence groups formed. He was one of the guerrilla leaders to carry out armed struggle against the Japanese in Manchuria. After severe Japanese suppression, Kim left Manchuria and crossed into the Soviet Union. In 1942, he was assigned to the 88th Brigade, which absorbed the remnants of the Manchurian guerillas in the Soviet Far East. Kim took command of one battalion with the rank of captain. This is the moment when the Kim family dynasty begun. With his background of service in the Soviet army, the Soviet Union appointed him as the first leader of the Democratic People’s of Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948.²

However, Kim Il Sung did not earn the DPRK leadership. Leadership was handed to him by others. Kim began from a weak political position. Among the factions in North Korea at the end of World War II- the Soviet, the Yanan, the Domestic, and the Partisan- Kim was the leader of the Partisan group which was the weakest group. The first chairman of the First Congress of

¹ Ree, Erik Van, “Socialism in one Zone, Stalin’s Policy in DPRK 1945-1947”, Oxford and New York, 1985, p.5.

² Buzo, Adrian, “Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea”, Westview Press, 1999, ch.1.

the Workers' Party of Korea was not Kim Il Sung but Kim Tu-bong from the Yanan faction. However, during the Cold War era, Kim's power and the number of his supporters grew enormously. Thus it is important to study North Korean leadership development in the Cold War era.

In this regard, the Soviet Union and China were important factors because they were North Korea's two closest allies. From the establishment of a network of Party and state institutions to the appointment of leaders, the Soviet Union played an important role. China was also influential especially after the Korean War. In addition, North Korea was cut off from its traditional economic partners- Japan, South Korea, and Manchuria- so it had to rely on imports from the Soviet Union and China.³ At the same time, Chinese and Soviet relations were experiencing their own ups and downs while North Korea was developing centralized leadership.

Thus, this paper will analyze Kim Il Sung's consolidation of power during the Cold War era in the context of the relationship between Moscow and Beijing as it related to North Korea.

a. Design and Method

I will show the consolidation of Kim Il Sung's power by examining the pattern of changes in the membership of the Central Committee of Workers' Party of Korea, also known as the Korean Workers' Party. The political system in North Korea is highly centralized. The effectiveness of Kim Il Sung's leadership is partly the result of his control of these elite groups. The elite group consists of; the members of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea; the members of the Council of Ministers; members of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly; generals of the People's Army of Korea; justices in the judiciary branch of

³ Luthi, Lorenz M, "The Sino-Soviet Split," New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 218

the government; members of the diplomatic corps, local and provincial level leaders, and the others.⁴

However, this paper focuses on changing patterns of membership within the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. I do this for two major reasons. First, the Central Committee consists the most important leaders of the political, economic, cultural, military, and other fields. It also includes the members who are held in the highest esteem by the people. They perform the most important tasks of the party, such as setting party policy, organizing and administering party organization and selecting, educating, and assigning members to the party cadres.⁵ Second, the members of the Central Committee are elected by the delegates at the time of each party congress and membership is limited to a number authorized by the congress. Looking at the composition of the Central Committee will give us an opportunity to see how the old revolutionaries who fought in Manchuria during the early stage of North Korea development were gradually outnumbered by newer members who supported Kim's dynastic rule.

In Chapters 1 to 4, I will look at four significant time periods in post-World War II Korean history and the membership in the corresponding Party Congresses that occurred during that time. The events are as follows: 1) the end of the World War II (1945-1950) and membership in the First and Second Congress in 1946 and 1948; 2) the Korean War (1950-1953) and membership in the Third Congress in 1956; 3) the Sino-Soviet Dispute (1950s, 60s, 70s) and membership in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Congresses in 1961, 1970, 1980 respectively and 4) the Seoul Olympics (1980s) and members in the Political Leadership. I consider these events important because Moscow and Beijing's different interests are clearly seen in these four events.

⁴ Suh, Dae-Sook, "Communist Party Leadership" in Dae-Sook Suh, Chae-Jin Lee ed., *Political Leadership in Korea*, WA: University of Washington Press, 1976, p.159.

⁵ Article 32 of the bylaws of the Workers' Party of Korea

Also their impact on the North Korea is clearly seen through the Central Committee's six congresses.

For this paper, I rely the books and articles that examined archival materials and memoirs from the former Communist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For many years after 1945, Western scholars had to rely exclusively on Western archives and on published Soviet, East European, and Western research. However, after the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegrations of the Soviet Union two years later, the former Soviet archives were partly opened and the East European archives were more extensively opened. Thus, my paper takes advantages of the books and articles that used these documents.

Chapter1. The End of the World War II (1945-1950)

a. Post War Recovery in the Soviet Union and China

In the Potsdam agreement on May 8, 1945, the Soviet Union finally agreed to enter Korea to fight against Japan with the United States. Three month later, the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima in August 6, and Nagasaki in August 9. On August 10, units of the Soviet 25th army entered the Korean peninsula- the north Korean cities of Unggi and Najin, and encountered Japanese resistance. These two events forced an abrupt Japanese surrender and the World War II ended on August 15.⁶

After World War II, the Soviet Union needed to recover from the war. Most of Soviet industry was located in the European rather than the Asian Soviet Union and was extensively damaged in the war. In 1941, the Red Army adopted a 'scorched earth' policy and destroyed industrial sites in order to deny valuable resources to the enemy. From 1942 to 1943, a high

⁶ Cumings, Bruce "The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergent of Separate Regimes 1945-1947", Princeton: Princeton Universit Press, 1981, pp. 385.

proportion of the surviving industry was destroyed. In 1946, Russia experienced a severe drought which caused crop failure in both 1946 and 1947.⁷

China was also left devastated and divided. The Nationalist and Communists both aspired to central authority. The Soviet Union recognized the Nationalist government but had kept its options open by supplying arms to the Communists Party. The United States public opinion sympathized with Chiang Kai-shek as a war time ally. A renewal of the Chinese civil war followed. Chiang's Nationalist forces opted for a strategy of holding cities, while Mao's guerrilla armies based themselves in the countryside. The United States urged a coalition between the Nationalist and Communists. President Harry Truman sent General George Marshall to China to encourage the two sides to work together. However, during that time, the Nationalist military position was collapsing and the Nationalist troops retreated to the island of Taiwan in 1949. The Nationalist declared the relocation of the Republic of China's capital to Taipei, and maintained that they would gain their strength and return to the mainland.⁸

Thus, both Stalin and Mao needed to rebuild their countries. In order to achieve this, Stalin exploited expansionism and Mao practiced continuous revolution. The Soviet Union became the largest land empire in history after the World War II. It incorporated the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, eastern Poland, the eastern Czechoslovakian regime of Ruthenia and the northern Romanian regime of Bessarabia.⁹ The Soviet Bloc also included most of Eastern Europe which was experiencing Soviet dominance for the first time. This Soviet Empire was expedited by Stalinist expansionism. Stalin's regime lasted many years and throughout this period, Sovietization underwent significant internal transformations. Mao

⁷ Tismaneanu, Vladimir, "Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe", Central European University Press Budapest: NY, 2009, p. 60.

⁸ Kissinger, Henry, "On China", Penguin Press, Baltimore: MD, 2011. P. 89.

⁹ Pearson, Raymond, "The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire", Studies in Contemporary History, Palgrave: NY, 2002, p. 45.

organized China apart from traditional Chinese Confucianism. His goal was continuous revolution. He idealized upheaval and the clash of opposing forces in both domestic and foreign affairs. He sought radical and instant transformation and a total break with the past. He even declared war on China's traditional art, culture, and modes of thought, even though, China still relied on many of China's traditional institutions; including an imperial style of governance and a mandarin bureaucracy.¹⁰

In order to avoid conflict with Taiwan and to pursue his continuous revolution, Mao traveled to Moscow on December 16, 1949, barely two months after having proclaimed the People's Republic of China. It was his first trip outside of China. His purpose was to form an alliance with the Communist superpower, the Soviet Union. In his meeting with Stalin he said, "Decisions on the most important questions in China hinge on the prospects for a peaceful future. With this in mind the [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] entrusted me to ascertain from you, Comrade Stalin, in what way and for how long will international peace be preserved." Mao needed peace to bring the economy back to pre-war conditions and to stabilize the country in general.¹¹

On the other hand, the Stalin was focused on the Eastern Europe to achieve his goals. For Stalin, security, the economy and ideology were crucial in Eastern Europe. First, in the 1940s, Stalin saw Eastern Europe as a highly valuable buffer-zone against future invasions by European armies and a safeguard against the threat of revived German militarism. The history of Russia's and later the Soviet Union's vulnerability to foreign invasion- from the Napoleonic Wars to the final year of World War I to the Russo-Polish War of 1919-20 to Hitler's invasion in June 1941-

¹⁰ Pearson, Raymond, *ibid*, p. 93.

¹¹ Pearson, Raymond, *ibid*, p. 116.

all deeply colored the perceptions of Stalin and his subordinates.¹² Thus, the Soviet Union continued to attach tremendous importance to the maintenance of its position especially in the three northern tier countries- East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. This continued until the Brezhnev government. In August 1968, in Moscow, Brezhnev explained the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and said that the Soviet Union needed to preserve the guarantee of security which the post-war borders represented.¹³

Second, Stalin viewed the East European states as a source of economic benefit. While East European states such as Poland and Serbia were severely damaged, Eastern Europe, as a whole, was in better shape than the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet strategy was to exploit Eastern Europe backed by the occupying forces of the Red Army.¹⁴ From Eastern Germany alone, the Soviet Union stripped some 3,500 factories and removed them to the USSR. In 1945 and 1946, 1.15 million pieces of industrial equipment were taken to the USSR.¹⁵ Also, Eastern Europe was useful to the Soviet Union as an assured and relatively 'soft' market for a variety of industrial products, including engineering products and consumer goods, which it were much more difficult to sell in outside markets.¹⁶

Last, Stalin saw this area as a useful springboard for extending communist influence into Western Europe. Ever since the inspirational October Revolution of 'Petrograd 1917', the Bolshevik state and the Soviet Union portrayed itself as the bastion of communism and believed that a world revolution would eventually be achieved by exercising ideological expansionism.¹⁷ Thus, the secession of any Eastern European states would have represented a serious reversal to

¹² Tismaneanu, Vladimir, *ibid.*, p. 59.

¹³ Summerscale, Peter, "The East European Predicament: Changing Patterns in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania", Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1982, pp. 18-19.

¹⁴ Pearson, Raymond, *ibid.*, pp. 28-31.

¹⁵ Tismaneanu, Vladimir, *ibid.*, p. 60.

¹⁶ Summerscale, Peter, *ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁷ Pearson, Raymond, *ibid.*, p. 42.

the cause of world socialism. This is partly because the Soviet Union needed as many allies as possible in order to maintain its authority.¹⁸

The development of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe started with the Stalinist phase from 1944 to 1953. Control was established by the Red Army, the security policy, the governmental and party bodies of the USSR, and through the Soviets close links with the institutions in each individual country. The invasion of central Europe from the east and west was not only Stalin's decision, but was authorized jointly by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Teheran in November-December 1943.¹⁹ The Red Army was necessary for the Allied military victory over Nazi Germany and the USSR's push into Eastern Europe was sanctioned in advance by the West. As a result, most of German-occupied Eastern Europe was emancipated by the advance of the Red Army. But the Soviet Union went further. For instance, as early as July 1944, it established the Lublin Committee as its favored agency in Poland in order to build a political stake in Polish affairs. The Soviet's intension was confirmed by formal recognition of a Lublin Committee based provisional government of Poland announced in December 1944.²⁰

With the backing of the Soviet Army, the Communist parties in Eastern Europe gradually solidified. From 1945 to 1947-48, the local Communist Parties ruled in alliance with other left of center and peasant parties. In 1947, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was established. It was responsible for binding together the East European Communist parties under the exclusive leadership of the Soviet Communist Party. A year later, the final step in the establishment of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe came with the seizure of power by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, or KSC). From that

¹⁸ Summerscale, Peter, *ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁹ Ionescu, Ghita, "The Breakup of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe", Harmondsworth, 1965, p. 35.

²⁰ McCauley, Martin, "The Soviet Union since 1917", London, 1991, p. 57.

point on, “People’s Democracies” allied with the Soviet Union were in place all over the Eastern Europe.²¹

After achieving military occupation in combination with party consolidation, the Soviet Union initially introduced reforms, particularly land redistribution, as well as limited nationalization of industry. However by 1947, the Stalinist model of Sovietization that was enforced in its most intense way, through consolidation of the one party state, collectivization of agriculture, the nationalization of industry and the rapid development of heavy industry. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the ‘Great Terror’ brought Soviet discipline to Eastern Europe. In three consecutive stages the Soviets formed genuine coalitions of Communist and non-Communist parties, while purging any non-Communists or any other elements regarded as unreliable in their unconditional allegiance to the Kremlin line. For example, a series of show-trials claimed the lives of several of high ranking leaders in Hungary and Bulgaria in 1949, Czechoslovakia in 1952, and Romania in 1954. Below the level of the elite, an estimated one-quarter of the bureaucratic cadres and Communist party members suffered execution, imprisonment or dismissal over the half decade following 1948.²²

The above shows that the Soviet Union and China were both focused on war recovery in the post-war era. At this time, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing was bright, at least in appearance, when they signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950. However, from the beginning Stalin found it difficult to embrace China. During the Japanese invasion in 1930s and 1940s, Moscow maintained official ties with the

²¹ Tismaneanu, Vladimir, *ibid*, pp. 79-81.

²² Morris, L.P., “Eastern Europe since 1945”, London, 1984, p. 25.

Nationalist government. At the end of the war against Japan in 1945, Stalin got Chiang Kai-shek to grant to Soviet Union privileges in Manchuria and control over Outer Mongolia.²³

Thus, Stalin hesitated to rush into an alliance with Mao. On December 16, 1949, Mao traveled to Moscow seeking economic aid in order to bring the economy back to pre-war condition and to stabilize the country in general. However, Stalin had little interest in helping Mao. Stalin was afraid that Mao would become another Tito, the leader of Yugoslavia and the only European communist leader to achieve power by his own effort and not as the result of Soviet occupation. Tito broke with the Soviet Union during the preceding year. Stalin was determined to avoid a similar outcome in Asia. Even though Mao had announced China's intent to "lean to one side", Stalin doubted China. When Mao raised his worries about security, Stalin argued that there is no immediate threat since Japan, America, and Europe were all afraid of war.²⁴

Mao was dissatisfied with the Stalin's willingness to settle with Chiang Kai-shek at the expense of the Chinese Communist Party during the World War II. Also in exchange for Moscow's security umbrella, Mao had to make major economic concessions in Manchuria and Xinjiang that impaired Chinese unity. To Moscow, this was natural since the same pattern of dominance prevailed in Eastern Europe. However, to Mao, who had Sino centric views, this was repugnant.²⁵

Thus, Moscow and Beijing's signing a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950 was pragmatic. Namely, Stalin wish to avoid the emergence of a potentially powerful eastern neighbor and Mao needed a security umbrella. This treaty

²³ Morris, L.P, *ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

²⁴ Zhang, Shu Guang, "Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, Lawrence: University Press of Kansan, 1995, p. 125.

²⁵ Luthi, M Lorenz, "The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World", *ibid.*, p38.

provided an obligation of mutual assistance in case of conflict with a third power which gave Mao a safety net if the potential crises around China's borders were to escalate.

b. War Recovery, the Birth of Democratic People's of Republic of Korea (DPRK)

In the context of Soviet expansionism and Chinese goal of continuous revolution, both Moscow and Beijing paid attention to North Korea. After the Sino-Soviet Treaty in 1950, Mao agreed to transfer up to fifty thousand ethnic Korean troops who served in the People's Liberation Army units to North Korea. The result was to leave Pyongyang in a significantly strengthened military position.²⁶

Notwithstanding Soviet expansionism, some scholars have argued that Stalin was not interested in North Korea. Bruce Cumings points out that the Soviet Union did not exploit its military advantage to unify the peninsula. After the August 15 Japanese surrender, the Russians entered the major port city of Wonsan on August 21. Three days later they marched into Hamhung and Pyongyang. Through their quick and extensive engagement of Japanese forces, the Soviets won military and political advantage. Militarily, they were in a position to march down the peninsula to Pusan. Politically, they won favor among the Koreans because they saw the Russians come in to the country and fight whereas Americans were unable to reach Korean until early September, and did not fight on Korean soil.²⁷

Historically, Russian experiencing in Asia was frustrating and kept them away from this region. In 1894, Russia expanded to the Pacific and Russia and Japan were rivals for Korea and Manchuria. Russia and Japan's competing claims to Manchuria led to a war in 1904, ending in a

²⁶ Weathersby, Kathryn, "Should We Rear This?: Stalin and the Danger of War with American", Cold War International Project Working Paper no.39, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002, pp. 9-11.

²⁷ Cumings, Bruce, "The "The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergent of Separate Regimes 1945-1947", *ibid*, pp. 385-386.

Japanese victory. The 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth gave Japan the dominant position in Korea and potentially in Manchuria. However, the American President, Theodore Roosevelt, mediated the end of the Russo-Japanese War based on principles of a balance of power which kept Japan from seizing Manchuria and preserved equilibrium in Asia. Stymied in Asia, Russia returned its strategic priorities to Europe.²⁸

It is true that geographically, North Korea was not an security asset to the Soviet Union in case of a United States' invasion. Economically, North Korea was immature and insufficient. However, there was one reason left to explain that North Korea was important to the Soviet Union- ideological expansion. Stalin attempted to solidify his own political control and to shield Soviet society from Western influence. He became increasingly worried about the political and ideological "threat" from the West. In this sense, he wanted to have as many alliances as possible. Thus, the Soviet Union assisted in establishing North Korea to expand socialism.

The role that Soviet troops played in liberating most of the East European states from Nazi occupation contributed in Soviet dominance in the region. This was also exploited in North Korea. The units of the Soviet 25th army entered the Korean peninsula- the north Korean cities of Unggi and Najin, and attacked Japanese resistance on August 10. After the Japanese surrender, the Soviet Union agreed a three-year Korean trusteeship.²⁹

When the Korean peninsula was divided, North Korea was occupied by the Soviet military and the Soviet military greatly influenced the formation of the North Korean state. On August 9, 1945, the first Soviet military troops of the 25th Army arrived in North Korea with several influential Soviets officials including N.G. Levedev, Andrei Alekseevich Romaneko and Terentill Fomich Shtkov. Direct communications between Soviet military authorities in

²⁸ Kissinger, Henry, "On China", *ibid*, p. 85.

²⁹ Cumings, Bruce "The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergent of Separate Regimes 1945-1947", *ibid*, pp. 385-386.

Pyongyang and Moscow was established and North Korea was governed by the military until the early 1947.³⁰

The Soviet's impact on North Korea also can be found in 1) state and economic reform, 2) exchanging personnel and 3) the origins of the military and security organization. In 1946, North Korea was moving toward the Soviet type of economic reformation. Compared to the East European states, it was ahead in terms of the speed of reform. In 1946, a student exchanging program was developed between the two states universities and after two years in 1948 a special school for North Korea dignitaries was established in Moscow where high level NKWP members studied.³¹

In addition, the first unit of the North Korean army was established with guidance from the Soviet army in the same year that South Korean police force was established by the United States and South Korea. This army was developed as the separate North Korean Army (KPA) with the Soviet's approval. The Soviet Union armed the Korean People's Army (KPA) when it was formed in 1946. In 1946, the Soviets shipped 17,000 rifles and carbines, 5,800 machine guns, 268 mortars, and 234 artillery guns.³² At the end of 1949, the KPA had 43,300 pieces of small arms, 442 mortars, 515 artillery guns, 151 tanks, and 89 air planes. The Soviets also started to develop the North Korean Navy by sending three ASW ships, five torpedo boats, three minesweepers, six patrol craft and other hardware.³³ By the end of 1950, the number of artillery guns tripled from the 1949 level and the number of tanks and air planes doubled. As Kim Il Sung

³⁰ Lankov, Andrei, "From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960", Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick: New Jersey, 2002, pp. 3-9.

³¹ Lankov, Andrei, *ibid.*, pp.33-40.

³² Anthony, Ian, "Russian and the Arms Trade", Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1998, p.151.

³³ Anthony, Ian, *Ibid.*, p152.

said, “Our People’s Army was organized on the basis of the principles of the Soviet Army and profited from its wide experience.”³⁴

The Soviet Union also displayed notable power to select a new leader. There were three significant candidates, Cho Man Sik, Pak Hong Yong and Kim Il Sung. Cho attempted to build a united state between North and South Korea. Pak was considered less reliable since he was not known to Soviet authorities. Kim Il Sung was in Russia at the time of liberation. In 1942, he was assigned to the 88th Brigade, a brigade which absorbed the remnants of the Manchuria guerillas that were in the Soviet Far East. He returned to Korea on September 19, 1945, with 66 other former Korean officers of the 88th brigade in order to assist the Soviet occupation authorities in liaison with the local population. This placed him in an important position. The Soviet Union needed Korean political allies who shared its political philosophy and who could become reliable instruments of rule. Kim was a well-known guerilla leader and had the rank of captain in the Soviet army during the World War II. To the Soviet Union, he was the perfect match. Thus, Kim Il Sung achieved the full support from the Soviet Union. On Oct 14th, Soviet General Levedev spoke at a rally and called Kim a “national hero [and] outstanding guerrilla leader.”³⁵

Kim Il Sung, however, did not have power at first. From the establishment of North Korea until the Korean War, there were four factions: Domestic (Korean indigenous communists), Yanan, Soviet communists and Guerrilla fighters. The domestic factions: were Korean communists who were part of the underground in Korea throughout the colonial period. They were centered in Seoul. After being banned by the U.S. military government, they fled the North in 1946. The leader of this faction was Pak Hong-yong. The Yanan faction were the Korean communists who move to China in the 1920s and 1930s. The leader of this faction was

³⁴ A.Frolov, “War in Korea: Experience in Escalating a Conflict”, *International affairs (Moscow)*, Volume 56, Issue 4, 2010, p.165.

³⁵ Lankov, Andrei, “From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960”, *ibid.*, pp.14-20.

Kim Tu-bong. He had a good personal relationship with Mao and was influenced by his version of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet faction: were Soviet Koreans who were sent to North Korea by the Soviet authorities in 1945-8. The leader of this faction was AI Hegai. Unlike Yanan factions who were born and grew up in Korea and then fled to China, the Soviet members had never been to Korea and had not been active in Korea's independence movement. Fourth, the Partisan, also known as Guerrilla, factions were Koreans who went to Manchuria to fight against the Japanese with alongside Chinese fighters. Kim Il Sung joined the Manchurian guerrillas and was later drafted into the Red Army.³⁶

Table 1 The First Congress Membership by group in August 1946

- Chairman: Kim Tu-bong (Y)
- Vice-chairmen: Kim Il Sung (P), Chu Yong-ha (D)

Party Congress	D	N	P	S	U	Y	Total
1WPK CCM	13	—	4	6	8	12	43

NOTE: 1WPK CCM = the First Congress of Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee Member; D = Domestic; N = New Group; P = Partisan Group, S = Soviet Korean Group; U = Unknown Group; Y = Yanan Group.³⁷

From Table 1, it is apparent that Kim Il Sung was certainly not a powerful factor in the early period of North Korea. His Partisan faction was the weakest in the North Korean political structure. Only later would he emerge as the leader chosen by the Soviet Union. He was also not a party leader within the Party. He started as a member of the North Korea Bureau and was promoted at the Third Extended Plenum of the Bureau on Dec 17-18th. A sign of Kim's weakness can be seen in Cho Man Shik's attempt to assassinate him. Cho was a nationalist. He was denied of trusteeship from the Soviet Union and the United States and attempted to kill the

³⁶ Lankov, Andrei, "From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960), *ibid.*, pp.78-82.

³⁷ Sources from, Suh, Dae-Sook, "Communist Party Leadership" in Dae-Sook Suh, Chae-Jin Lee ed., *Political Leadership in Korea*, WA: University of Washington Press, 1976, p164.

one of the high ranking party members, Kim Il Sung. However, Kim survived the assassination attempt with help from the Soviet's General Ya T. Novicheko.³⁸

After that incident, the North Korean political structure never really experienced popular resistance from the inter society, unlike South Korea that experienced several leftist uprisings. Kim Il Sung became a party leader in the late spring of 1946 when the North Korean Bureau became the North Korean Communist Party and in August 28-30, it emerged as the current North Korea party, North Korean Workers' Party (NKWP). The first chairman was not Kim Il Sung but Kim Tu Bong who was a communist leader who previously worked in China. The highest ranking leaders of the party were those who held positions as chairman and vice-chairman.³⁹

Under close Soviet supervision, Leninist principles of party structure provided a blueprint for the fledgling Korean Communist oligarchy as it consolidated power in 1945. The result was the establishment of a network of party and state institutions directly inspired by the Soviet models and precedents. This, in turn, led to a polity in which the processes of political, social, and economic changes were conceived and directed by a small political elite. In February 1946, the North Korean Provisional People's Committee was initiated with Kim Il Sung as the chairman. In November, the People's Committee held elections.⁴⁰ Thus by 1947, a political structure was already in place in North Korea and it was heavily centered to the Central Committee of WPK.

³⁸ Lankov, Andrei, *ibid*, pp. 20.

³⁹ Lankov, Andrei, *ibid*, pp.22-24.

⁴⁰ Dea-Sook Suh, "Kim Il Sung: The North Korean leader," NY: Columbia University Press, 1988, p.36.

Table 2 The Second Congress Membership by group in March 1948

- **Chairman: Kim Tu-bong (Y)**
- **Vice-chairmen: Kim Il Sung (P), Ho Ka-I (S)**

Party Congress	D	N	P	S	U	Y	Total
1WPK CCM	13	—	4	6	8	12	43
Dropped from 1WPK	2	-	-	-	6	4	12
Re-elected from 1WPK CCM	11	-	3	6	2	8	30
New Members	10	-	4	8	10	5	37
Total 2WPK CCM	21	-	7	14	12	13	67

NOTE: 2WPK= the Second Congress of Workers' Party of Korea; CCM= Central Committee Member; D=Domestic; N=New Group; P=Partisan Group, S= Soviet Korean Group; U=Unknown Group; Y=Yenan Group⁴¹

As in Table 1, Table 2 shows that Chairman Kim Tu-bong from the Yanan faction has remained in power and was not superseded by Kim Il Sung. This indicates that Kim Il Sung's power has yet to be established despite his good standing due to the Soviet Union's support. Also the Soviet and Yanan factions were still a large part of the Central Committee, even though no single group had approached a majority in any of the Central Committees. Kim Il Sung's Partisan faction was almost half the size of the other factions. This shows that Kim Il Sung and his group had not achieved powerful leadership by 1948.

The Soviet Union's influence can be seen in Table 2. Compared to Table 1, the vice-chairman changed from the Domestic faction Chu Yong-ha to the Soviet faction Ho Ka-i. The Soviet's influence at the beginning of North Korea was huge. Even though North Korea was not his highest priority compared to Eastern Europe, Stalin preferred to maintain a certain level of influence in Korea. More specifically, Stalin did not want Mao to have larger influence in North Korea than he did.⁴² Therefore, Stalin might have viewed Kim Tu Bong's position as chairman

⁴¹ Sources From, Suh, Dae-Sook, "Communist Party Leadership" in Dae-Sook Suh, Chae-Jin Lee ed., *Political Leadership in Korea*, WA: University of Washington Press, 1976, p164.

⁴² Shu, Dae-Sook, "Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader," *ibid.*, Chapter 2.

might as a threat. Thus, it was not a surprise that two of the vice-chairmen were Kim Il Sung and Ho Ka-i who were the two closest to Stalin among the Central Committee members.

All of the evidence presented above demonstrates that the Soviet Union's expansionism played an important role in establishing North Korea during 1945-1950. The political structure was built, the economy was reformed, the military was organized, and there was an exchange program for the elite. This was especially true for the leadership of North Korea. A virtually unknown and unpopular Kim Il Sung was appointed to the DPRK as its leader in 1948. Due to the lack of data, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the growth of the Partisan group was unknown. However, an interesting fact emerges from Table 2, no member dropped from the previous Committee in the Partisan group unlike the other factions, in which two members dropped in the Domestic faction and four members dropped in the Yanan faction. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, this trend continues in the later four other Central Committee congresses. Thus, it may be the first sign of the increasing Partisan group during North Korea's initial history.

Chapter 2. The Korean War (1950-1953)

a. Moscow and Beijing: Desire of Expansion

The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, -when the North Korean military crossed the 38th parallel. This was the only war in Soviet Union history where its armed forces fought against the United States armed forces. The Cuban Crisis in 1962 is commonly viewed as the most dangerous conflict in that crisis during the Cold War. However, no actual armed conflict occurred as it did during the Korean War. The war came close to becoming a global war and even to the point of nuclear strikes.

“Who started the war”, is still controversial. According to the recent documents, the Korean War was initiated by Kim Il-Sung. At first, Kim did not support a military solution to unify the two Koreas. However, South Korean guerilla leaders like Pak Hon-yong and Yu Song-chol convinced him that there was widespread leftwing support among the people and that South Korea would collapse after a first attack. In addition, after the United States withdrawal its troops from South Korea in June 1949, Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong went Moscow on August 12th and met the Soviet Ambassador Shtykov to persuade the Soviet Union to approve an invasion of South Korea.⁴³

Stalin and Mao, initially, refused to endorse North Korea’s aggressive plan. According to Nikita Khrushchev, Kim Il Sung talked with Stalin during his visit to Moscow and mentioned that “the North Korea wanted to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet [and] to extend a friendly hand to their brethren in South Korea who are under the heel of Syngman Rhee.” Stalin doubted this idea whereas Kim was absolutely certain of success. Stalin worried about United States intervention but Kim assured him that “everything could be finished swiftly and the war with the United States could be avoided.”⁴⁴ However, Stalin was still cautious and consulted Mao about invading South Korea. Mao also judged the risk of American intervention as too high. Moreover he thought any project to conquer South Korea should be deferred until the completion of the Chinese civil war through the conquest of Taiwan.⁴⁵ Throughout 1949-1950, Kim Il Sung had tried to convince both Stalin and Mao to acquiesces in a full scale invasion of the South, but Stalin and Mao both refused this request.

⁴³ Jian,Chen, “China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation”, Columbia University Press, NY, 1994, pp. 88-90 and pp.106-113.

⁴⁴ A.Frolov, “War in Korea: Experience in Escalating a Conflict”, *ibid.*, p. 167.

⁴⁵ Jian, Chen, *ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

However, Stalin and Mao reversed their position in April 1950. In a speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Acheson reinforced the White Paper's message and put forward a sweeping new Asia policy. This was in fact the judgment of NSC-48/2, a document reflecting national policy prepared by the National Security Council staff and approved by the President. Adopted on December 30, 1949, it concluded that "the strategic importance of Formosa [Taiwan] does not justify overt military action." Truman had made a similar point at a press conference on January 5. "The United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."⁴⁶ It is not clear that how and why this policy impacted on Stalin and Mao. However, the clear fact is the Korean War begun only several months after this policy announcement. Until today, Russia and China denied their direct order to Kim to go to the war. However, Kim would never invade South Korea without having an acceptance from both states.

"What was Stalin and Mao's real intention of the war" is also not clear. However, the distrust between Stalin and Mao can be a partial explanation. As it is described in the Chapter 1, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing was difficult from the beginning since Moscow had maintained official ties with the Nationalist government in 1940s and Mao disliked it. Even though they reached a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950, Stalin still did not trust Mao and Mao felt unpleasant with Stalin.

Mao's distrust became worse during the Korean War. Stalin informed Mao that in view of China's hesitation, the best option would be to withdraw the remnants of the North Korean forces into China, where Kim Il Sung could form a provisional government-in-exile. He knew that Mao less like to have a provisional Korean government in Manchuria than American forces

⁴⁶ Goncharov, N. Serge, Lewis, W. John W, Litai, Xue, "Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War", Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 98.

at China's border. Now China had to deal with both an American army on the Yalu and a disgruntled Soviet Union, holding back on supplies perhaps re-invoking its "rights" in Manchuria. In addition, when Mao asked Stalin to provide the military support, there were several days of delay. Stalin pledged substantial logistical support, provided only that it involved no direct confrontation with the United States. Air force cover Manchuria but not over Korea. Stalin informed that no supplies would start moving until Chinese forces had entered Korea. Mao issued the order on October 19th without assurance of Soviet support. After that, the originally promised Soviet support was reinstated except the air force.⁴⁷

Consequently, Moscow and Beijing's intention of the Korean War was not conventional military victory or communist revolution in Korea. Both Stalin and Mao distrust each other and they were maneuvering for dominant influence to keep the other partner from achieving it. Stalin was afraid that Mao would become another Tito and Mao felt displeased with Stalin's willingness to settle with Chiang Kai-shek during the World War II. Thus, Stalin's purpose in the Korean War was to create lasting hostility between China and the United States and increase China's dependence on Moscow. China, barely finished with the civil war and largely equipped with captured Nationalist weapons, could not back the Korean War. Mao wanted to obtain Soviet military supplies to modernize his army-received equipment for sixty-four infantry divisions and twenty-two air divisions.⁴⁸ Thus, when the Korean War started, there were high deliberations and much hesitation.

b. The Result: Hesitation of Entering the War

⁴⁷ Goncharov, N. Serge, Lewis, W. John W, *ibid.*, p.

⁴⁸ Zhihua, Shen, "The Discrepancy Between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao's 2 October 1950 message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar's Reply", *Cold War International Center for Scholars*, Sinter 1996, p. 240.

During the Korean War, Stalin was unwilling to get directly involved and curtailed Soviet military assistance. Stalin wanted to play it safe even during the preparations for military operations and he ordered the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers from North Korea. He explained to Khrushchev: “They [the military advisors] could be taken prisoner. We do not want any evidence supporting accusations of our participation in this affair. This is Kim Il Sung’s affair.”⁴⁹

While North Korea may not have been of equal importance compared to the Eastern Europe, the Korean Peninsula was geo-strategically vital since it served as a buffer for a potential United States-Japanese threat first against Pacific Siberia and later against China.⁵⁰ In fact, to Stalin, it was too much to handle the pro-American Korea and the emerging NATO in Europe. On June 26, 1950 the Soviet newspaper Pravda cited Kim Il Sung’s radio report “Address to the Entire Korean People” which said: “On June 25, the army of the puppet government of the traitor Syngman Rhee launched an all-out offensive along the 38th parallel against the northern half of Korea...” This was Stalin’s attempt to show the public that a South Korean’s invasion justified the Soviet military supplies. Thus, during the first month of the war, the Soviet Union sent to North Korea an additional 124 warplanes, 130 tanks which included modernized T-34s, 32 self-propelled guns, 310 mortars, 248 artillery guns of various caliber, 84 anti-aircraft guns, 50,000 rifles and carbines, 705 machine guns, 68,000 mortar shells, 82,000 artillery rounds, 15,000 tank rounds, and 120 radio stations for command and control. This initial military support made it possible for North Korea to quickly take over Seoul.

Therefore, at the early stage of the Korean War, North Korea saw the close victory. However, the situation radically changed after the massive landing of American ground troops

⁴⁹ Frolov, *ibid.*, p.168.

⁵⁰ Goncharov and Lewis, “Uncertain Partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War”, *ibid.*, Chapter 5.

under the United Nation flag. One month into the war, Harry Truman declared a national emergency. In the absence of the Soviet Ambassador at the United Nation Security Council, the United States was able to pass a resolution to give assistance to South Korea. As a result American troops were joined by military contingents from other countries. The first landing of 45,000 American troops reinforced the last South Korean stronghold near Pusan and the Korean People's Army (KPA) was pushed back to the north by mid-September. North Korea's combat losses of equipment rose to 50 percent, some 200 tanks were abandoned on the battlefield.⁵¹

From this moment Stalin and Mao showed high deliberations and much hesitation entering the Korean peninsula. Stalin tried to avoid a direct involvement in the Korean War. Instead, he sent troops to China. Before the Korean War, in 1949, the Soviet Union shipped to the PLA 332 warplanes, 360 antiaircraft guns for 10 antiaircraft regiments, 32 radio station, and 130 telephone stations. After the talks between China's Premier Zhou Enlai and the Soviet Premier, Marshall Nikolai Bulganin, it was decided to send more supplies.⁵² On February 14, 1950, Stalin and Mao signed a Soviet-Chinese treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation that would run for 30 years. In March, Stalin, Mao and Kim finally formalized a military alliance between three socialist countries of Asia based on strategic supplies of Soviet weapons to the PLA and KPA. China received additional 450 warplanes, including Mi-G-15s, La-9s, Il-10s, Il-28s, and Tu2s. Also 52 patrol crafts, four minesweepers and other naval hardware. In May 1950, China had 235 railcars with weapons and ammunition, plus 92 railcars with spare parts for combat equipment delivered earlier.⁵³

During the Korean War, Stalin not only strengthened Chinese troops by sending huge stocks of weaponry which was remained after the end of the Second World War, Stalin sent

⁵¹ Anthony, Ian, "Russian and the Arms Trade", Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1998, p.58.

⁵² Frolov, "War in Korea: Experience in Escalating a Conflict", *ibid.*, p.165.

⁵³ Anthony, Ian, *ibid.*, p.55.

Soviet troops in Chinese uniforms during the war. He was cautious about participating the war. Arming China and signing the treaty with China was preferable even though he was uncertain about Mao. Similarly, he was cautious about sending Soviet troops for North Korea. The Soviet military changed their uniforms to Chinese uniforms without insignia and military equipment bore Chinese marks. Nineteen Soviet air divisions under the legendary Soviet ace Ivan Kozhedub were move into take part in air combats in Korea and protect the northeastern areas of the PRC.⁵⁴

Mao also showed hesitation on entering the war when Stalin sent a message to Mao to demand Chinese intervention on October 1. Zhou emphasized that the Korean War was an important international issue on August 26 in a talk to the Central Military Commission. He argued that the United States would turn to Vietnam and other colonial countries after conquering Korea and urged to prepare to enter the war. However, the actual implementation was different especially when the North Korean army was on the verge of disintegrating. Mao received military supplies to modernize China's army in order to secure its own country. Thus, he needed more weapons for assisting outside war. It was crucial to have Soviet supplies especially the Soviet air cover to China. Zhou and Lin Biao warned Stalin that without assurance of guaranteed supplies, China might not carry out what it had been preparing for two months. Mao informed Stalin that Beijing was not prepared to send troops.⁵⁵

Mao asked Stalin to provide air support. On October 11, Zhou Enlai met Stalin in his summer villa near the Black Sea. Zhou explained that since China dispatched troops, the Soviets must provide weapons, equipment and air support. Stalin, however, pointed out that he could provide airplanes, tanks and artillery, but the Soviet Air Force was not yet ready. On October 14, Mao again sent a telegram to Zhou reiterating his request for Soviet assistance- namely bringing

⁵⁴ Frolov, *ibid.*, p.172

⁵⁵ Jian,Chen, "China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation", *ibid.*, pp. 149-150.

the Soviet Air Force into the conflict. However Stalin stated that even if the Soviet Air Force was sent out, it could only operate north of the Yalu River and would not enter Korea to cooperate in military operations with the Chinese volunteers. When China finally decided to send the troops into Korea on October 19 and engaged with the United Nation Army, Stalin came to believe that Mao as not a nationalist or a pro-American element. Moscow agreed that the Soviet Air Force will be in charge of air defense at the battle. The Soviet Air Force was sent to the Korean border on November 1st.⁵⁶

As it is mentioned on Chapter 1, the relationship between the Soviet Union and China was shallow. Stalin's distrust on Mao caused his hesitation on sending military supplies to China. When the United Nation entered the Korean War, Stalin refused or ignored Mao's request to assist Chinese troop. Even at the end of the Korean War, Stalin seemed to prefer a prolonged war. What Stalin did resulted in a direct confrontation between the United States and China during the Korean War. These may be highlighted Stalin's intention of Mao's confrontation with the United States. As above, Stalin strengthened the armed forces of the People's Republic China (PRC) and played an important role on creating the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA). Arming China was the complement to Stalin's aversion to direct Soviet involvement in the Korean War. Stalin considered China would face the United States in the event of an escalation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean War only made their relationship worse.

c. The Hesitation, Kim Il Sung and Purges in 1953

⁵⁶ Shen, Zhihua "The Discrepancy Between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao's 2 October 1950 message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar's Reply", *ibid.*, p.224-228.

Above tries to describe Moscow and Beijing's true intention of the Korean War. Both Stalin and Mao had a desire to expand their influence over the communist bloc and their state itself. In order to achieve this goal, Stalin hesitated to send the Soviet troops to Chinese which led China and the United States' direct confrontation. Mao, on the other hand, also hesitated to join the Korean War in order to receive sufficient amount of modern military supplies from the Soviet Union. All of these initiated from the distrust between Stalin and Mao came from the early stage of their relationship. It is impossible to know whether Kim Il Sung aware of Stalin and Mao's shallow relationship. However, there is clear evidence North Korea changed because of Moscow and Beijing's hesitation entering the Korean War.

Studying "what caused Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea?" lead us to answer how Stalin and Mao's hesitation impacted on Kim Il Sung's leadership. From the Chapter 1, we learned that Kim Il Sung was not the chairman of the Central Committee at the beginning of the DPRK. Kim's faction was the weakest among the political factions. It was June 1949 when Kim finally replaced Kim Tu-bong as the chairman. This was the time when the United States withdrawal its troops from South Korea and the North and South Korean Workers' parties were officially merged and renamed the Workers' Party of Korea. Thus, the Korean War was an opportunity for Korea to increase his power.

Yet, in 1950, North Korea was weak. Without the Soviet Union and China's support, it could not afford the war. Thus, Kim Il Sung frequently traveled to Moscow and China in 1949 to persuade his two allies. He entered the war only when he received agreement from them. However, Moscow and Beijing did not join the war as smoothly as he expected. When the United States landed troops on the Korean peninsula and the Korean People's Army was pushed back to the North, Kim dispatched his private secretary, the Korean-born Soviet citizen Mun Il to

see Terentii Shtykov, the Soviet ambassador to North Korea. Mun Il requested Soviet air support. However, Shtykov lacked of instruction from Moscow and he only suggested that Kim “quickly harness the army’s military strength and throw reserve forces into battle in order to advance quickly.” On September 19, Zhou and Kim made an agreement on sending the Chinese army to help North Korea. Kim reported this to Shtykov and added even though Chinese army would enter the war, the battle would still be rather difficult without the Soviet air cover. Moscow avoided answering this.⁵⁷ This Soviet Union and China’s reluctant and insufficient support provided Kim easy scapegoats for the war. The result was a purge of the rival foreign factions in the Central Committee.

Kim Il Sung purged the Yanan and Soviet factions asking responsibility for the War. The leader of the Soviet Koreans such as Ho Ka-i lost his position in 1951. Kim attacked the Yanan faction when there was a military disaster in the Korean War before the Chinese intervention was made. The best general in Yanan faction, Mu Chong, was expelled from the party as a scapegoat.⁵⁸ The purge was necessary to led consolidation of Kim’s power. The below Table 3 shows the result of the purges after the Korean War.

⁵⁷ Shen, Zhihua, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The Formation of the Chinese-Soviet-Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the Korean War”, *ibid.*, April 2010, p. 218.

⁵⁸ Lankov “From Stalin to Kim Il Sung,” *ibid.*, pp. 92-102.

Table 3. The Third Congress Membership by group in April 1956

- **Chairman:**
 - a. **Kim Il Sung (P)**
- **Vice-chairmen:**
 - a. **Cho'oe Yong-gon, Pak Kum-chol (P)**
 - b. **Pak Chong-ae, Chong Il-young (D)**
 - c. **Kim Chang-Man (Y)**

Party Congress	D	N	P	S	U	Y	Total
Total 2WPK CCM	21	-	7	14	12	13	67
Dropped from 2WPK	13	-	*2died	6	10	6	35
Re-elected from 2WPK CCM	8	-	5	7	2	7	29
New Members	15	-	6	4	10	7	42
Total 3WPK CCM	23	-	11	11	12	14	71

NOTE: 3WPK= the Third Congress of Workers' Party of Korea; CCM= Central Committee Member; D=Domestic; N=New Group; P=Partisan Group, S= Soviet Korean Group; U=Unknown Group; Y=Yenan Group.⁵⁹

According to Table 3, the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen had been changed from the Second Congress Membership. Kim Il Sung replaced Yenan faction's Kim Tu Bong as a chairman. During Kim's era, the chair has not changed since then, except that the title of the post has changed from Chairman to Secretary-General of the Central Committee in 1966. As mentioned above, the Second Congress Vice-President and the leader of the Soviet Koreans, Ho Ka-I, lost his position in 1951. Instead, two Partisan group members, one Domestic group member, and one of Yenan member filled these positions. However, this does not mean that these factions, Domestic and Yenan, still had power after the Korean War. The Yenan faction member, Kim Chang-man, was recruited only because he openly denounced his fellow Yenan revolutionaries. The fall of Kim Tu-bong made obvious the fall of the Yenan group. Similar to Kim Chang-man, the two new vice-chairmen from the Domestic faction lacked close ties with the mainstream Domestic Groups. Thus, except for two Partisan members, all of the Vice-

⁵⁹ Sources from Suh, Dae-Sook, "Communist Party Leadership" in Dae-Sook Suh, Chae-Jin Lee ed., *Political Leadership in Korea*, WA: University of Washington Press, 1976, p164.

Chairmen lacked close to their own factions. It was subtle but Kim's Partisan group actually dominated the higher leadership in the Party Congress by 1956.

Growth of the Partisan Faction also can be seen in Table 3. First, the Central Committee increased to 71 without losing any partisan members. This is a significant difference compared to the other factions. The members from the Soviet and Yanan groups were dropped from the Second Party Congress. Note that in general no one was reinstated in the Central Committee after failure to be re-elected to the succeeding Central Committee.⁶⁰ Additionally, the total number of the Central Committee Member was increased. The number of Partisan members grew to 11 similar to the Soviet and Yanna factions. By the Second Party Congress, the Partisan group was half the size of the other groups. Although the Domestic group was more represented than any other groups; this was caused by the relative abundance of Communists who fought within Korea and Japan during the Japanese colonial era.⁶¹

Kim considered the Soviet and Yanan factions as dangerous since they were under China and the Soviet's influence. Having them in power might question the legitimacy of his leadership. From the beginning, Kim called Syung Man Rhee, the South Korean President, a puppet of the United States government.⁶² Even though Kim himself was also elected by a foreign state, he tried to differentiate himself from Rhee. Public propaganda involving events such as his guerilla movement in Manchuria and his influence in liberating Korea from Japanese colonialism would be difficult to exercise with powerful allies present in North Korea. Thus, to increase his power, purging other factions was necessary. When Stalin and Mao showed hesitation, it was a great

⁶⁰ Suh, "Communist Party Leadership," *ibid.*, p167.

⁶¹ Suh, "Communist Party Leadership," *ibid.*, p165.

⁶² Myers, Brian, "The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters," Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House, 2010, Chapter 6.

opportunity to accuse the Soviet and Yanan factions for the loss of the war. In addition, the public praise of Stalin had extremely reduced after the Korean War.

Chapter3. The Sino-Soviet Dispute (late 1950's-1970's)

In the Chapter 1, it is discussed that the sign of the deteriorated relationship between the Soviet Union and China was already seen at the beginning of their relationship. This caused by Stalin's changing policy of backing the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao's China during the Japanese invasion in 1930s and 1940s was one cause. Mao was unsatisfied with Stalin's attitude. While Moscow and Beijing's Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950 showed public that its relationship was bright and eternal. However, the distrust between two states was even bigger after the Korea War. In the later years of the alliance, there were frequent and public polemics of political differences between two countries and the alliance finally collapsed in the mid-1960s. Indeed, throughout 1970s, the Soviet Union became China's worst enemy. This lasted until the mid to late 1980s when Deng Xiaoping's abandoned Mao's revolutionary policies, instituted political reforms and opened China's policy.

Examining the Sino-Soviet split is a crucial to understanding the Northeast Asian security environment during the Cold War. More specifically, the Soviet Union and China were the major allies of North Korea, and studying the Sino-Soviet alliance and how it impacted North Korea is vital to an analysis of the foundations of the North Korea's foreign policy and how it was integrated into the DPRK's domestic goals. The first part of this chapter will cover three specific periods: 1) late 1950s: Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence policy, 2) 1960s: Cuban Missile

crisis, and 3) 1970s: Nixon's visit in Beijing. The second part of this chapter will analyze how Kim Il Sung's leadership changed in this period of time.

a. Khrushchev and Mao: Split after the 20th Communist Congress, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Nixon's Visit to Beijing

The split was caused by the fundamental differences between Russia and China. Russia had never claimed to be a universal inspiration to other societies. A significant part of its population was non-Russian. Its rulers had brought foreign thinkers and experts to their courts to learn from more advanced foreigners. Russian diplomacy tended to be power-oriented. On the other hand, China was, in the Chinese view, the most beneficent political institution in the world. Mao would never concede intellectual leadership of Moscow. Such a country inevitably found it impossible to play the role of junior partner.⁶³ This explains why Mao refused to join the Warsaw Pact of Communist countries. Instead, China tried to organize the Non-Aligned while attending the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung. Mao needed Soviet support for the potential American pressure, however, he tried to create the Non-Aligned for a safety net against Soviet hegemony.⁶⁴

The Moscow and Beijing relationship worsened after the Korean War. First, Khrushchev addressed the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. Stalin died in 1953. After a transition period Nikita Khrushchev succeeded Stalin. Unlike Stalin, the new leader's foreign policy was realistic. Deep down, he considered that the United States a stronger than the Soviet Union. At this congress, he denounced Stalin for a series of purges and personality cults. Khrushchev emphasized peaceful co-existence with the West. Mao, on the other hand, formally acknowledged Stalin's special ideological contribution. Later, the insult was

⁶³ Kissinger, Henry, "On China", *ibid.*, p. 161.

⁶⁴ Kissinger, Henry, "On China", *ibid.*, p. 163.

deepened and Mao branded Khrushchev's de-Stalinization initiative a form of "revisionism"- a new ideological insult that implied that the Soviet Union was moving away from Communism and back toward its bourgeois past.⁶⁵ Mao said "They're trying to tie our hands and feet. But they're full of wishful thinking, like idiots talking about their dreams". As for Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence", Mao said, "We shouldn't be afraid of atomic bombs and missiles. No matter what kind of war breaks out, we'll win". Khrushchev did not like this speech. The public controversies were prevailed.⁶⁶

De-Stalinization was a challenge to Mao's revolution. Stalin's model was the basis for socialism in China. It was on Stalin's model, and it was the model for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plan for state-building, societal transformation, and economic reconstruction. Thus, repudiating Stalin also meant repudiating Mao's grand enterprise to continue the revolution in China. In addition, the cult of personality and the use of terror were also factors in Mao's regime. In the tension between Mao and some CCP members over the first five year plan and the rush for economic advancement and societal transformation, Mao needed to use terror to continue to consolidate the revolution. Thus, criticizing Stalin's cult and purges could cause damage to Mao's leadership and consequently could halt the revolution.⁶⁷

Mao's reaction also can be explained by his strong belief in Stalinist ideology. Mao was against de-Stalinization in order to suppress a general debate on de-Stalinization inside CCP and to strengthen his own ideology. Mao saw criticizing Stalin as moving away from the anti-imperialist commitment of the alliance treaty and disagreed with Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence not because of security concerns, but because of it rejected Stalinism and because of

⁶⁵ Luthi, M Lorenz, "The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World", *ibid.*, p. 50.

⁶⁶ Zhisui, Li, "The Private Life of Chairman Mao, trans. Tai Hung-chao", New York: Random House, 1994, pp. 261-261.

⁶⁷ Chen, Jian, "Mao's China and the cold war," *ibid.*

its supported for bourgeois democracy. To Mao, Stalinism was Marxism, and de-Stalinization was revisionist.⁶⁸

After Khrushchev's announcement and watching the Poland and the Hungarian revolution, Mao created a rush advance policy called the Great Leap Forward which proposed a radical industrial transformation in China. This is a policy that resulted from Mao's revolutionary plan. To support this idea, Mao published "Sixty Articles on Work Methods" on January 31, 1958. There Mao said, "Our revolutions come one after another". He believed, "the seizure of political power" was followed by "the anti-feudal land reform," and the next revolutionary step would be "the agricultural cooperativization." Mao also urged that China to prepare for a revolution in "the technological field." Thus, the purpose of the Great Leap Forward was to keep Mao's revolutionary process going- especially in "the technological field." Even though this Soviet economic and technical aid to China continued throughout this period, by the end of 1959, both sides were reassessing the alliance. Mao thought the alliance had lost a lot of its usefulness to Chinese security and economic development. The Soviets, on the other hand, were weary of Mao's extremism.⁶⁹

Then came the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962. In the early 1960s, there were moments when the Chinese and the Soviets acted like allies- for instance after the Great Leap Forward collapsed and after the downing of American U-2 spy plane. However, the cracks in the alliance became widener and more visible as the 1960s progressed. Changes in the global environment, the Sino-American rapprochement and the desire for the arms control contributed to the end of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

⁶⁸ Luthi, M Lorenz, "The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World", *ibid.*, p38.

⁶⁹ Chen, Jian, "Mao's China and the cold war," *ibid.*

Mao considered the Soviet's peace policy toward the U.S. revisionism. In 1962 Wang Jiaziang stated that, "Chinese foreign policy should be the maintenance of world peace to focus on socialist construction at home, easing international tension not exacerbating it." Mao viewed this as, "an attempt to be conciliatory toward imperialist, revisionist and international reactionary." It was Mao's position to fight against the imperialist revisionism and reactionaries in all countries to promote revolution at home and abroad. Thus, the Soviet-American arms control negotiations in Geneva and Peng Dehuai's evaluation of "losses and achievements" of the Great Leap Forward in 1959 reinforced Mao's anti-Soviet revisionism and anti-socialist imperialism. Preventing a Soviet style, "capitalist restoration," was so important to Mao that he created polemics to the Soviets during 1963-64. It became a preparation of domestic purges to the anti-revisionist. To Mao, it was crucial to sustain his position as a Chinese leader to continue his revolutionary program in China.

Mao's criticism of the Soviet Union especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 made the Sino-Soviet relationship worse, but made the Soviet-American relationship improved. The Soviets joined the Limited Nuclear Test Ban (LNTB) negotiations (1963) in part of China's anti-Soviet propaganda. This isolated China internationally and raised new security concerns. However, the LNTB did not prevent nor deterred the Chinese from working toward a nuclear bomb, and the Soviets linked their criticism of Chinese extremism to the danger of nuclear war. The collapse of party relations and the military alliance came in 1966.

In a year, Nixon's visit to Beijing. Above Sino-Soviet clashes were caused by the restoration between the Soviet Union and the United States. Ironically, the clash deepened by the reconciliation between China and the United States. The two countries considered each other implacable enemies. China called America, "capitalist-imperialist" country, the United States had

similar images as China had considering a number of military conflicts. However, due to the both country's needed the relations to change. China needed to recover from the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and America wanted to change growing protest movement against the Vietnam War. In October 1967, Nixon, proposed the invite China to reenter the community of nations.⁷⁰

Around this time, the clashes along Sino-Soviet border multiplied and this speeded up reconciliation between China and the United States. On August 28, 1969, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ordered all Chinese military units to the borders. This was caused by increasing Soviet troop concentrations which grew to some forty-two divisions-over a million men. It was also caused by a major battle at the border of Xinjiang. Strategically, China had to contact America in case of a large-scale Soviet attack on China. The United States, on the other hand, accelerated new foreign policy.⁷¹

On February 21, 1972, Nixon arrived in Beijing. Twenty years of isolation made it difficult to restore two nations relationship. However, after exchanging diplomats in various capitals around the world, the two finally met. The Nixon's visit in China gave a new vitality and flexibility to the international system. In 1973, Mao said, "the United States and China had once been two enemies, but now we call the relationship between ourselves a friendship."⁷²

b. Split, the Purges and Kim Jong Il in Power

b-1. Reaction to the Khrushchev's 20th Communist Congress

⁷⁰ Kissinger, Henry, "On China", *ibid.*, p202.

⁷¹ Kissinger, Henry, *ibid.*, p. 213 and p. 219.

⁷² MacMillan, Margaret, "Nixon and Mao : the week that changed the world," New York : Random House, 2007, Ch.19.

Kim Il Sung disliked the idea of de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence since it threat basis of leader. He had been very fond of Stalin so the idea of collective leadership that Khrushchev criticized did not bother him at all. Also he has never conceded that he would recognized the existence of the regime in South and peaceful coexist with it. He would never renounced the use of force to achieve unification even after the Korean War. Thus, he condemned those who opposed him as revisionists and purged those who advocated peaceful coexistence with the South.

On August 30, several months after the USSR 20th Congress and Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech in February of 1956, Kim's power was challenged during the KWP Central Committee Plenum. A group of top party cadres staged an unsuccessful attempt to replace Kim Il Sung as the country's leader. Echoing Khrushchev's speech, they delivered highly critical speeches about Kim and his policies- accusing him of being an adherent to outdated Stalinist methods and personally responsible for numerous distortions of the social legality and rushing into heavy industrialization.⁷³

This rebellion was inspired by Khrushchev's speech on de-Stalinization and international coexistence. In fact, Khrushchev's speech influenced many countries inside the Soviet bloc and internationally it reduced tension with West capitalism states. The dissident's claims were very much alike as Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress. Kim Il Sung believed Stalin was a true Marxist-Leninist and created his own ideology, *Juche*- similar to Stalin's. While Kim felt threatened by Khrushchev's criticism in 1956, he could not publically oppose Khrushchev since North Korea was highly dependent to the Soviet Union. This was especially true after the Korean War. Kim desperately needed the Soviet Union's assistance in re-constructing the war damage.

⁷³ Lankov, Andrei, "Kim Takes Control: The "Great Purge" in North Korea, 1956-1960", Korean Studies, Volume 26, Number 1, 2002, p. 90.

So he made speeches about avoiding Stalin's personality cult and emphasizing the Party. However, he never implemented a de-Stalinization policy. The result was the August 1956 challenge to his authority.

Kim Il Sung responded with purge but he did not success. At first he purged the Yanan and Soviet factions from the Party by a majority vote of Central Committee members at the Plenum. The dissidents were expelled and arrested. A few escaped to China. However, this incident was noticed by China and the USSR. However, in September, delegations from both states were dispatched to North Korea and demanded Kim Il Sung cease his purges of the opposition Yannan and Soviet faction. To receive economic and security support, Kim Il Sung had to bow to his allies. Even though Kim constructed polity North Korean according to Stalin's ideology, he did not, at that time, have Stalin's monolithic power. The decision to restore the Yannan and Soviet faction leaders was publicized in the North Korea press to appease the Moscow and Beijing. As a result, the opposition leaders, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and Pak Ch'ang-ok, were immediately restored their positions.⁷⁴

However, Kim Il Sung did not stop purging other factions and increasing his personal power. Kim and his supporters considered the August crisis the result of foreign influence. Kim shared Stalin's view that a powerful state is necessary until the proletarian revolution and that a powerful leader is necessary for a powerful state. Kim further believed that a strong leader could protect North Korea from the denationalized cadres of the Yannan and Soviet factions. Kim saw de-Stalinization as a foreign influence. To defend against this intrusion, he promoted North Korean nationalism. The uprising in Poland and Hungary in 1956-57, also encouraged Kim to stifle opposition inside North Korea.

⁷⁴ Lankov, "Kim Takes Control: The "Great Purge" in North Korea, 1956-1960", *ibid.*, p.91.

Although the North Korean attitude toward the Polish and Hungarian crisis were extremely negative, the North Korean press, *Nodong sinmun*, regularly published the official Soviet reports of these riots. The information about changes in Moscow and other Communist countries continued to flow into North Korea and encouraged people who dreamed of a more liberal society. Those who had overseas connections such as Yunnan and Soviet factions, and intellectuals who had moved from South Korea before the Korean War, were more open to de-Stalinization and changes in the Eastern European bloc. Following the Hungarian uprising, some students at Kim Il Sung University drew graffiti and distributed handwritten leaflets supporting the Hungarian movement and demanding change in industrial policy in North Korea. Other students, who were recalled to Pyongyang from studies in Hungary and Poland during the uprising, asked lectures improper questions and raised politically sensitive issues.⁷⁵

These situations show that in mid-1950s Kim Il Sung did not have a monolithic power and people felt free to dissent. It is not difficult to expect Kim's second purge would be aimed at these people. When he analyzed the crisis in Poland he concluded that, "the Polish leaders had not paid enough attention to the wrong ideological trend among the intellectuals."⁷⁶ In the late summer of 1957 to the end of the year, North Korean intellectuals, party cadres and ordinary citizens were attacked.

In May 1957, Kim sent Chang Ik-hwan, the Deputy Minister of Education, to a Soviet diplomat. Chang said "a certain part of the high school teachers, university professors and students after the August incidents and under the influence of the Hungarian events had demonstrated their political immaturity and ideological unreliability. In the middle and high schools of South Pyongyang province alone it has been deemed necessary to replace three

⁷⁵ Lankov, "Kim Takes Control: The "Great Purge" in North Korea, 1956-1960", *ibid.*, p. 96.

⁷⁶ Lankov, *ibid.*, p. 95.

thousand teachers due to political considerations.”⁷⁷ These purges demonstrate Kim’s intent to wipe out the seed of dissent from the academy and how seriously he took the threat of dissent. Among the victims of the purges at the Kim Il Sung University was a prominent historian and corresponding member of the DPRK Academy of Sciences, Yi Chong-won. Many other scholars and teachers as well as up to one hundred students and postgraduates were also purged.⁷⁸ At the Academy of Science scholars who refused to use the phrase “our beloved leader Kim Il Sung” and who argued for increasing living standards were punished as factionalists.⁷⁹

Kim purged all predictable sources of ideological contamination at the academy. However on a larger scale, the purges took place at “criticism meetings” and “ideological examinations” throughout the country. In these meetings, the victims-mostly a Party cadre- were subjected to lengthy public sessions at their workplace when their co-workers were to insult them every day sometimes for weeks. Public executions became a customary practice in North Korea in late 1950s. This was earlier than the Cultural Revolution in China and went even further than Stalin’s practice. Stalin’s secret police killed people in droves but there was usually a trial by officially appointed judges and the execution was held in public only under the exceptional circumstances such as on the battlefield or in a prison camp.⁸⁰ Ordinary citizens in North Korea were also targeted for this terror. Many trials were held to search for “traitors” who collaborated with the South Korean and American armies during a short occupation of the North by UN forces from October to December 1950.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Lankov, *ibid.*, p. 97.

⁷⁸ Lankov, “Kim Takes Control: The “Great Purge” in North Korea, 1956-1960”, *ibid.*, p. 97, and Nodong sinmun, Aug 6, 1957.

⁷⁹ Lankov, *ibid.*, p. 98.

⁸⁰ Lankov, *ibid.*, p. 99.

⁸¹ Lankov, *ibid.*, p. 105.

By Kim Il Sung's faction was the dominant force in the Political Committee and the Central Committee at the expense of the Yanan and domestic communist factions. Kim Il Sung's goal to push these people out of politics and out of the country was successful. The shift in significantly reduced foreign influence in North Korea and made possible by both internal and external changes. Internally, North Korea could abandon Soviet models and pursue Juche. Externally, it could use the differences between the Soviet and China for its own advantages.

The purge was concluded after a secret meeting between the Mao and Kim Il Sung. In November 1957, the representatives of forty-six Communist parties gathered in Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. During this meeting, Mao secretly met Kim Il Sung and apologized for the unjustified interference of the Chinese's Communist Party in the affairs of the KWP in September of 1956. By this time, the position of the Soviet Union to international communism was rather weak. Its relationship with China was strained by several international clashes and personality cult criticism. Thus Mao attempted to build a strong relationship with other communist countries. The Mao's apology for the September incident enabled Kim to conclude his purge on Yanan and Soviet Faction more freely.⁸² The result can be seen in below Table 4.

⁸² Lankov, "Kim Takes Control: The "Great Purge" in North Korea, 1956-1960", *ibid.*, pp. 106-109.

Table 4. The Fourth Congress Membership by group in September 1961

- **Chairman:**
 - **Kim Il Sung (P)**
- **Vice-chairmen:**
 - **Cho'oe Yong-gon, Kim Il, Pak Kum-chol, Yi Hyo-sun (P)**
 - **Kim Chang-man (Y)**

Party Congress	D	N	P	S	U	Y	Total
Total 3WPK CCM	23	-	11	11	12	14	71
Dropped from 3WPK	12	-	*1died	9	9	12	42
Re-elected from 3WPK CCM	11	-	10	2	3	2	28
New Members	8	21	25	1	2	-	57
Total 4WPK CCM	19	21	35	3	5	2	85

NOTE: 4WPK=the Fourth Congress of Workers' Party of Korea; CCM=Central Committee Member; D=Domestic; N=New Group; P=Partisan Group, S=Soviet Korean Group; U=Unknown Group; Y=Yenan Group.⁸³

This Table testifies to the severe purges of 1956. All of the high ranking members were from the Partisan group except Kim Chang-man of the Yanan faction. However, as mentioned in chapter 2, Kim Chang-man was not close to his own faction. No Partisan group members were dropped out from the Third Central Committee. In the Fourth Central Committee, the Partisan group had 35 members whereas the Soviet and Yanan groups had only three and two members respectively. The Central Committee expanded but none of the Yanan members were newly elected to this Central Committee while 25 of members were newly elected to the Partisan group. For the first time, a majority faction emerged in the Congress.

On a course marked by Soviet de-Stalinization, the uprisings in Hungary and Poland and Mao and Kim's meeting in 1957, Kim Il Sung emerged as the undisputed leader of North Korea. The North Korean purges were equivalent to the Soviet Great Purge of 1937. During a short period of time, both countries' purges eliminated those who had any connection to opposition groups and subjected the entire population, not just the Party, to a campaign of terror. To

⁸³ Sources from, Suh, Dae-Sook, "Communist Party Leadership" in Dae-Sook Suh, Chae-Jin Lee ed., *Political Leadership in Korea*, WA: University of Washington Press, 1976, p164.

maintain his authority, Kim even limited official contact with the Soviet Union since it considered de-Stalinization a source of ideological contamination. Kim built a cult of personality in the Stalinist mold.

While Kim Il Sung purged the people who followed Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy, he did not publicly show his negative reaction toward the Soviet Union, unlike China's policy which publicly denounced Khrushchev. In the *Nodong sinmun* in November 1961, he emphasized that "the judgment of Stalin's role in the Soviet Union was an internal problem and he had no intention of meddling with that country's domestic problems." Kim also stated "the Workers' Party of Korea should abide by the principle of noninterference in domestic problems of fraternal parties."⁸⁴ However, this was excluded from all collections of Kim's selected works. In fact, Kim never spoke on the subject until after Khrushchev was removed from power. Yet, Kim made efforts to remain neutral and tried to understand the seriousness of the dispute between the Soviet Union and China on this issue. Kim visited Moscow almost five times from 1956 to 1961 and he also visited China in 1958 and 1959. For Kim, the relationship with the Soviet Union and China was still important.⁸⁵

b-2. Reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis

After the Cuban missile crisis, Moscow and Pyongyang's relationship was deteriorated in 1963 and 1964. However it was more because of two issues: the Soviet Union's misinterpretation of Korean history and its criticism on North Korea economic plan, rather than the Sino-Soviet dispute on the Cuban missile issue. North Korea supported Cuba and condemned the United States on the Cuban missile crisis. However Kim Il Sung tried to avoid direct

⁸⁴ Dallin, Alexander ed., "Diversity in International Communism" pp. 388-394.

⁸⁵ Suh, Dae-Sook, "Kim Il Sung The North Korean Leader", *ibid.*, p. 179.

commenting on Khrushchev's capitulation.

North Korea tried to readjust its relationship with the Soviet Union after the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964. This was caused by the growth in South Korea. In 1965, the United States and South Korea's relationship was strengthened by sending South Korea troops to Vietnam. Also South Korea normalized its relationship with Japan and its rapid economic growth. In contrast, North Korea was suffered from the seven-year economic plan.⁸⁶ North Korea should please the Soviet Union in order to receive assistant. The result was changing policy from the militant policy to more friendly phase toward the South and the West in late 1960s.

Changes caused another purge. Surprisingly, it was the intraparty struggle of the partisans. On October 1968, all partisans from the third to seventh ranking secretaries of the Central Committee were dropped. Many important party and military leaders were eliminated. This was the first intraparty struggle in North Korea. The prior party struggles came from the factional struggles. The struggle was caused by the policy differences. The demoted partisans were almost all military leaders such as Pak Kum-chol, Yi Hyo-sun, Kim Kwang-hyop, Sok san, Kim chang-bong, Ho Pong-hak, Choe Kwang, Yi Yong-ho, and Yim Chun-chu.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Suh, *ibid.*, p. 190.

⁸⁷ Suh, "Communist Party Leadership," *ibid.*, p. 181.

Table 5 The Fifth Congress Membership by group in November 1970

- **Secretary General:**
 - **Kim Il Sung (P)**
- **Vice-chairmen:**
 - **Cho'oe Yong-gon, Kim Il, Pak Kum-chol, O Chin-U, Kim Tong-guy, Han Il-su (P)**
 - **Kim Chung-nin (D)**
 - **Hyon Mu-gwang, Yang Hyong-sop (N)**

Party Congress	D	N	P	S	U	Y	Total
Total 4WPK CCM	19	21	35	3	5	2	85
Dropped from 4WPK	11 *1died	19	15 *1died	2	3	2	52
Re-elected from 4WPK CCM	7	2	19	1	2	-	31
New Members	2	66	13	1	4	-	86
Total 5WPK CCM	9	68	32	2	6	-	117

NOTE: 5WPK=the Fifth Congress of Workers' Party of Korea; CCM=Central Committee Member; D=Domestic; N=New Group; P=Partisan Group, S=Soviet Korean Group; U=Unknown Group; Y=Yenan Group.⁸⁸

In by 1970, Table 5 shows that Partisan and New groups had approached a majority of the Central Committee. Interestingly this Table shows that 15 members from the Partisan group were dropped from the Fourth Central Committee. From the First to Fourth, none of the Partisan members had been dropped. This was caused by an internal struggle within the partisan group as discussed above. However, the Partisan group added 13 new members to the Fifth Central Committee to replace this elimination. New and Partisan groups accounted for 100 out of 117 total members. There was not a single member of the Yanan group in this Congress while only 2 Soviet and 9 Domestic members remained. By this time, the Yanan and Soviet groups had stopped being a serious contenders for power in the party. They were ineffective after the Korean War, when most of their leaders were purged. A factional struggle based on the past revolutionary groupings was no longer necessary.

From this period of time, there was a fundamental change in the composition of the Central Committee. As many as 66 members were newly elected to the New group, which

⁸⁸ Suh, *ibid.*, p. 164.

became larger than the old Partisan Group. The primary task of the Partisan group changed from the struggle to eliminate other competing groups to training and controlling the leaders of the New Members. The Partisan group was able to consolidate its power with the assistance of this newly emerging group. Thus, the old revolutionaries who participated in the Communist revolution abroad were disappearing and the newly Korean-trained leaders took their place.

The Partisan group's consolidation of power and Kim Il Sung's successor Kim Jong Il's emergence happened in the same time period. Kim Jong Il began to work for the Party's Central Committee in April 1964 after he graduated from Kim Il Sung University. He strengthened his influence over the division of movie making. He tried to emphasize the image of Kim Il Sung by organizing special creative artists' groups such as the Pakdusan Creation Group, the April 15 Literature Creation Group, and the Mansudae Creative Group.⁸⁹ It is believed that all these groups were created in the late 1960s, the same time the Partisan took a majority in the Fifth Congress.

b-3. Reaction to Nixon's Visit to Beijing

From 1967 to 1969, while Mao and Nixon were trying to reconcile their relationship, the Sino-Korean dispute began. The cause of this dispute was the attack by the Red Guards on Kim Il Sung, and the Chinese territorial claim in the Chinese-Korean border area, rather than the Sino-Soviet dispute or the Sino-American reconciliation. The relationship soon normalized after Nixon's visit in Beijing when a number of important emissaries from both China and the Soviet Union came to the North to explain the changing relations. This led to a joint communique on July 1972 and the North-South Coordinating Committee on November 4, 1972. Direct

⁸⁹ Sakai, Takashi, "The Power Base of Kim Jong Il," in Has S Park ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1996, p. 110.

negotiations between the North and South also brought significant changes in the political systems of both sides. Moreover, North Korea established a new constitution in December 1972.⁹⁰

Proposing a DPRK new constitution had been discussed as early as 1960. However, in the changing international environment made North Korea could no longer postpone a constitutional revision. This can be seen in Kim Il Song's speech at the first session of the fifth Supreme Peoples' Assembly on December 25, 1972.

*...our realities today urgently demand the establishment of a new socialist constitution legally to consolidate the great achievements of our people in the socialist revolution and building of socialism and lay down principles for the political, economic, and cultural spheres in socialist society.*⁹¹

A number of changes distinguished in the new constitution. For example, Article 7 of the new constitution states that the "sovereignty of the DPRK rests with the workers, peasants, soldiers and working intellectuals," while the old constitution only stated that "the sovereignty of the DPRK resides in the people." The capital was finally changed from Seoul to Pyongyang (Article 149). However, the most important changes were the status of North Korea and Kim Il Sung.

In the new constitution, the status of North Korea was changed from a satellite Communist party under the Soviet Union to an independent state. Emphasizing the role of the government can be seen from the Kim's speech at the sixth Supreme People's Assembly entitled "Let Us Further Strengthen the People's Government." He said, "it was the government of the

⁹⁰ Suh, "Kim Il Sung The North Korean Leader," *ibid.*, p. 253.

⁹¹ "Korea Today," Pyongyang : Foreign Languages Pub. House, no.196, 1987. p. 3.

republic that defended the democratic freedom and rights of the people, and it was the government that was the revolutionary banner for the country's independence and prosperity...the people would become happier and more dignified and the country would prosper endlessly." He did not mention the party's role even once.⁹²

Another important change was Kim Il Sung's status. Under the new constitution, Kim Il Sung became the President of the DPRK. He became the head of state serving as commander of the armed forces and chairman of the National Defense Committee, he had the power to issue edicts, grant pardons, and conclude or abrogate treaties. Under the old constitution, there was no one designated as the head of state. The chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly represented the state. This followed by the Soviet practice.⁹³

The extent of Kim's power under the new constitution can be seen in Article 76, which stipulated that "the Supreme People's Assembly had the right to elect or recall the vice-president of the republic, the secretary, and members of the Central People's Committee, but only on the recommendation of the president of the republic."⁹⁴ Kim Il Sung was not only the head of the party, he was now the chief of state. It is true that he had exercised power from the late 1950s to the 1960s, but only in 1972 were these facts legally recognized. From the late 1950s, Kim Il Sung purged his rivals. As a result his Partisan group took control of the ruling Party. Furthermore, Kim created a new constitution in which he further consolidated the power of presidency. This granted him not only in the Party but also increased his overall power in the state.

⁹² Kim, Il Sung, "On some problems of our party's Juche idea and the government of the Republic's internal and external policies," Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1972, pp. 24-34.

⁹³ Lee, Chong-sik, "The 1972 Constitution and Top Communist Leaders," p. 195.

⁹⁴ Suh, "Kim Il Sung The North Korean Leader," p271, ***"On the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's of Republic of Korea."

As a result of Kim Il Sung's success, Kim Jong Il also succeeded in establishing his leadership during 1970s. Kim Jong Il was elected as the Secretary of the Party and took charge of the organization and ideology at the Party's Central Committee in 1974. He strengthened his leadership while emphasizing the ideology of "the whole society thoroughly under Kim-Il-Sung-ism," and publishing and broadcasting Kim Il Sung's inauguration. In addition he continuously worked on the reinforcement of the activities of Comrade Kim Il Sung's Revolution Ideology Research Center Network which he created in 1960s. The public also started to know Kim Jong Il in 1970s through public documents.⁹⁵

Under Kim Il Sung's power, Kim Jong Il was able to achieve significant positions by the time of the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. He was named secretary of the party's Secretariat like his father. He was also elected the fourth highest ranking position to the Politburo, the Presidium of the Politburo, and the Central Committee of the party. In the Military Commission of the Party, he was the third highest ranking member behind his father and General P Chin-u. Suh, Dae-Sook concluded that, "No other North Korean political leader had achieved such prominence in the Party during four decades of Kim's rule. It is clear that the takeover of the operational aspect of the party by Kim's son was completed by October 1980."⁹⁶

The two major characteristics of this Party Congress are the stability of Kim Il Sung's supporters and the new stream of Kim Jong Il's people. A number of high-ranking Partisan members were re-elected. These people were the surviving core of Kim Il Sung's prewar Manchurian guerilla group. The seven Secretariats were filled with new faces, all supporters of Kim Jong Il. At this time, the Partisan members who were close to Kim Il Sung were getting old.

⁹⁵ Sakai, "The Power Base of Kim Jong Il: Focusing on Its Formation Process," *ibid.*, pp. 112-119.

⁹⁶ Suh, *ibid.*, p. 281.

Many of the new members were from the younger generation. They were related by blood, marriage or patronage to the older Partisan group.⁹⁷ This shows that the Kim Il Sung's Partisan group created a total monopoly on power within the party and the designation of Kim Jong Il as the heir was completed in 1980.

Chapter4. The End of the Cold War and Seoul Olympic Games (1980s)

Seoul was chosen to host the 24th Summer Olympics by The International Olympic Committee (IOC) on September 29, 1981. This decision was considered risky due to the political situation. Domestically, there was tension in the Korean peninsula. Even though the Korean War had ended in 1953, the official status was a cessation of hostilities with an artificial boundary of 38 degrees parallel between two opposing regimes. This 38 parallel is only thirty miles north of Seoul. Internationally, there had been heavy boycott of the Moscow Games in 1980 and the Los Angeles Games in 1984. The boycott of the Moscow Games was so serious that only eighty-one countries took part. Political pressure exerted by the United States caused countries to decide not to participate.⁹⁸ Four years later, the Soviets boycotted the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984. Even though the Soviets had announced that they would not try to influence anyone else to not participate, their allies and friend supported the Soviet position.⁹⁹

However, the lessening of tensions between the superpowers and the international spirit of cooperation that grew in the middle and the late of the 1980s contributed to the Olympic movement to launch the Games. At first, the Soviet's allies said they would attend the Games. Later, Gorbachev ended up being positively involved in finding the diplomatic solutions

⁹⁷ Buzo, Adrian, "The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and leadership in North Korea," *ibid.*, pp.113-114.

⁹⁸ Sarantakes, Evan Nicholas, "Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, The Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 226.

⁹⁹ Sarantakes, *Ibid*, p. 244.

necessary for the Games to take place. Participation by the Soviets was essential to the Games. The Chinese did the same. However, the Soviets and China had different reasons for supporting the Games.¹⁰⁰

The 1988 Olympic Games were also difficult for North Koreans. Watching it allies recognizes South Korea must have been very difficult for them since North Korea had never been recognized as a country by most of the world. It had increasing anxiety that it was on the verge of losing the competition with the South. But the Soviet Union and China's favorable reaction toward the Games restrained North Korea objections and the 24th Olympic was held in Seoul in 1988 with 159 countries taking part. This Olympics made North Korean leadership realize that the Cold War was at an end and it was time to prepare new plan for survival. In this chapter, the Soviet Union and China's decision to the Games will be examined. Later, the impact of this decision on North Korea will be described.

a. The Decision to Participate and the Soviets and China Economic Development

The positive attitude toward the Seoul Olympic was caused by Mikhail Gorbachev, who became general secretary of the Communist Party on March 11, 1985. Unlike the former Soviet leaders, Gorbachev understood that the Soviet Union could not maintain its place in the world forever. He was prepared to recognize publicly that the economic situation in the Soviet Union was desperate, deteriorating, and virtually unsolvable. The continued economic decline was caused by the momentum of decades of inefficient central planning, hopeless distribution channels, demoralized labor, misapplication of valuable sources, corruption, and military

¹⁰⁰ Sarantakes, Ibid, p. 256.

expenditures. The Soviets was heading into bankruptcy.¹⁰¹ The Soviets needed major transformations. Gorbachev tried to achieve this goal by injecting massive amounts of Western capital into the Soviet economy. This required better relation with the outside world and the Seoul Olympics was a perfect opportunity.

In December 1987, the United States and the Soviets had a summit meeting in Washington. During this meeting, the Olympic Games were discussed. The Soviet had a positive reaction. When the director of policy planning staff of the U.S. State Department, Richard Solomon, expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would participate in this Olympic, the Soviet Institute of World Economy and Internal Affairs, Primakov replied that the Soviet Union was 95 percent in favor of participating. The final decision was made in January 1988, however, Soviet athletes had been in training with the intension of participating.¹⁰²

While meeting with the United States in 1987, the Soviet Union addressed North Korea's demand to cohost the Games. However, it did not link the Soviet decision on participation to the North Korean proposal. On December 9, the United States Secretary of State, George Shultz had explained the U.S. position that the 1988 Olympic Games should be held without any trouble with the participation of all member countries. In response, Gorbachev mentioned briefly that the allocation of several sports to North Korea could help the Olympic Games to be held in Seoul smoothly. He also noted that North Korea proposed cohosting of the Games and expressed the hope that a number of sports would be held in North Korea. However, the Soviet did not take any further action to assist North Korea.¹⁰³ The Soviet Union could not afford to continue to act as

¹⁰¹ Pound, W. Richard, "Five Rings Over Korea: The secret Negotiations Behind the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul," Little, Brown & Company, 1994,

¹⁰² Pound, "Five Rings Over Korea," *ibid.*, p. 265.

¹⁰³ Pound, *ibid.*, p. 266.

they had in the past. The ideological deference was no longer a high priority. Thus, it did not fully support the countries that boycotted the Olympic.

China had its own priorities to consider. It was practicing the modified form of socialism that included moving away from full centralized planning by using Western style test markets. The Chinese were not certain how this would work and were having some difficulties to adjust into the international requirements of full participation in market-driven economics. The major concern on the Chinese leadership was economic readjustment and the controlling the corresponding social fallout. Thus, there was no wish to have instability or chaos in the region even on the Korean peninsula.¹⁰⁴

China tried to avoid an escalation of tensions. It was certain that if there were any significant hostilities in the Korean peninsula, the Chinese would be involved. This was not in China's best interest. It was assumed by both the Soviets and China that North Korea would not start something serious without being relatively certain of the backing from at least one of its major allies. Thus, when the decision was mad to have North and South Korea negotiate under the IOC, China was pleased. It indirectly but warmly supported the IOC's decision that the Olympics would be organized only in South Korea not in North Korea. This was far from encouraging to North Korea.¹⁰⁵

The Chinese did not wish to have its relationship with North Korea worsen. In order to calm North Korea, China carefully treated North Korea as a valued ally. This included a state visit in September 1982, where Kim Il Sung was given very high-level treatment. In November, the Soviets senior officials in the Ministry of Culture, G. Popov visited South Korea and had a meeting with South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan at the Blue House. It was the first Soviets

¹⁰⁴ Pound, "Five Rings Over Korea," *ibid.*, p. 331.

¹⁰⁵ Pound, *ibid.*, p332.

to visit Korea on official ROK visas. This made North Korea anxious. China therefore invited Kim Il Sung for another visit on May 21-26, 1987. On this occasion Kim met with Den Xiaoping and had a lengthy meeting with Premier Zhao Ziyang.¹⁰⁶

For their own interests and economic readjustment, the Soviet Union and China attended the Seoul Olympic. This was possible, in part, by the South Korea's new foreign policy, *Nordpolitik* which was first introduced by South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk in 1983, based on the West German *Ostpolitik* policy with East Germany. More important than any athletic competition, the ROK wanted to show the world that South Korea was no longer a poverty stricken Asian war victim, but a strong, modern, and increasingly prosperous country. This international showcase was part of the ROK's plan to establish relations with communist countries such as the Soviet Union, China and in Central and Eastern Europe. The goal was to enhance its security environment and possibly undercut the DPRK.¹⁰⁷

Under this policy, Roh tried to cooperate with communist countries which were allies of the DPRK. Hungary was the first Eastern bloc country to establish diplomatic relations with the ROK. On November 10, 1988, the Soviet Union Politburo, for the first time, reconsidered its relationship with the ROK. This began the Soviet Union's transition from the huge superpower security guarantor and the economic supporter of the DPRK to the partner and client of the ROK. Moscow took this position out of its own national self-interest rather than the impact this would have on the Korean peninsula. Rather, the relationship between Moscow and the U.S. was improving by the new thinking policy and would eventually lead to the mutual cooperation on nuclear weapons reduction. At the same time, relations between Moscow and the ROK were also improving. At first, Moscow was reluctant to establish political relations with the ROK and

¹⁰⁶ Pound, *ibid.*, p333.

¹⁰⁷ Oberdorfer, Don, "The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History," Perseus Books, 1997, p. 186-192.

limited its contact to cultural, sports and other ties. However, economic ties also began and by 1991 the two countries established full diplomatic relationships.¹⁰⁸

Beijing's relationship with the ROK was also improving. From 1979 on trade with South Korea increased. On the other hand, trade between China and the DPRK was decreased. However, by the Seoul Olympic in 1988, while the Soviet Union and Eastern European states were moving toward the ROK, China remained cautious and separated any economic relationship from political contact. However, President Roh continued to signal his interest in diplomatic relations with China and in the spring of 1990, China finally established diplomatic relations with Seoul. The DPRK slipped further down China's priority list.¹⁰⁹

During this period, the Soviet Union and China decreased threats to the other side. The Soviet, for example, reduced the frequent military exercises along the Chinese border. China, on the other hand, cut back the forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet border. In fact, the Soviet Union was more willing to reconcile relationship with China since it was afraid of growing Sino-American ties. The Moscow put a lot of effort to develop relations with Beijing while Beijing rejected. For example in March 1983, the Soviets proposed a nonaggression pact, but the Chinese turned down the idea. In August 1983, Andropov- deputy minister- again suggested the value of confidence-building measures, the Chinese were not responsive. In 1986, again, China declined a Soviet proposal for a nonaggression pact.¹¹⁰

However, this Chinese reaction moved toward the favorable side after the Gorbachev's major speech on Soviet policy in Asia and Pacific in mid-1986. In this speech, he said "I would

¹⁰⁸ Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, p. 197-228.

¹⁰⁹ Oberdorfer, "Two Koreas," *ibid.* p. 229-248.

¹¹⁰ Garthoff, L. Raymond, "The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War," The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 647-650.

like to confirm that the Soviet Union is prepared, at any time and at any level, in the most serious way to discuss with China questions of additional measures to create an atmosphere of good neighborliness.”¹¹¹ He also announced a reduction of troops in Afghanistan and considered the significant number of Soviet troops withdrawal from Mongolia. By 1989, the Soviet troops left Afghanistan and Mongolia and by 1991, Russia and China normalized their relations.¹¹²

b. Kim Il Sung’s Response: Nuclear Weapons and Kim Jong Il

All of the above shows that by the 1980s, the Soviet Union and China changed while normalizing their relations. The Stalinist-Maoist doctrine that a modern economy could be built by an isolated and highly regimented population, devoted to military production and hero-worship was set aside in both the Soviet Union and China.

The growing changes in the great powers around the Korean peninsula greatly impacted on Pyongyang. Especially, the steady decline of Soviet and Chinese economic support and trade partnership with North Korea greatly impacted North Korea. For example by 1987, both the Soviet Union and China only gave North Korea minimal support. Instead, they improved relations with South Korea. China participated to the Asian Game and the Seoul Olympic Games and increased its trade with South Korea. On the other hand, Soviet historians began to acknowledge that North Korea had invaded South Korea in 1950, for the first time.¹¹³

It appears that North Korea also changed its policies. For example we can look at the changing inter-Korean relationship during 1980s. Kim Il Sung had a hard-line policy toward South Korea until the early 1980s. This can be seen in North Korea’s reaction when Seoul was awarded the 1988 Olympic Games. The first unofficial commentary was released through radio

¹¹¹ Garthoff, *ibid.*, p. 652.

¹¹² Garthoff, *ibid.*, p. 653.

¹¹³ Garthoff, *ibid.*, p. 668.

broadcasts saying that “South Korea, in its campaign to invite the Games, demonstrated a felonious plot of perpetuating the division of two Koreas.” The Olympic plot was considered to be the preparation for war.¹¹⁴ This reaction became the official reaction. On December 3, 1981, the Communist Party daily Rodong Shinmun said, “...anti-Communist confrontation and war preparation of the puppet clique would be intensified and tension will increase, which would have not good influence on peace in Asian and the world.” It was also indicated that North Korea would boycott the Games.¹¹⁵ The worst manifestations of Kim Il Sung’s hard-line policy was the bombing incident in Rangoon on October 9, 1983. It was an attempt to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan during his official state visit to Burma. The North Korean terrorism was failed to kill the President but a number of South Korean high government officials were killed.¹¹⁶

Sign of change were seen after the Rangoon incident. The first sign was sending relief goods to flood victims in the South in September 1984. The North Korean Red Cross Society delivered approximately 7,200 tons of rice, 500,000 meters of textiles, 100,000 tons of cement, and 759 cases of medical supplies. It was the first time since the division of the country that such a goodwill offer was made and accepted either side.¹¹⁷ Later, the new position of North Korea with respect to the Games was released on the customary outlets for North Korean political news, the Kyoto News Agency. On July 30, 1985, the deputy prime minister of the DPRK Chung Jun Gi announced that “the 1988 Olympic Games were Korean Games; Korea was a single country; the Games should be divided equally between the two parts of this divided country; the revenues from the Games, such as television rights and sponsorship receipts, should likewise be divided

¹¹⁴ The Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, November 20, 1981.

¹¹⁵ Nodong Shinmun December 3, 1981.

¹¹⁶ Suh, “Kim Il Sung The North Korean Leader,” *ibid.*, p. 293.

¹¹⁷ Suh Dae-Sook, “Changes in North Korean Politics and the Unification Policy,” *Korea and World Affairs*, 9(4):684-706.

equally between the two parts of the Korean peninsula.”¹¹⁸ Also North Korea proposed bilateral economic talks and the exchange of the 151 member delegation of separated families and performing artists in September 1985. These were a significant modification of Kim’s hard-line policy.

Yet, Kim Il Sung found it difficult to follow Moscow and Beijing. Because of its vulnerable economy and security, North Korea needed to agree its two great allies. Kim learned this from the deteriorated relationship with the Soviet Union and China during the 60s and 70s. He suffered from the lack of Soviet and Chinese assistance for economic development and the modernization of the military forces. However, he could not entirely change his policy. From the foundation of the DPRK, anti-imperialism was the key aspect.

Opening the market and working with the countries that he used to call imperialist would weaken strength of Kim Il Sung’s regime. While North Korea announced its willingness to trade with capitalist countries and to seek investment capital from abroad in 1984, however, there were only limited policy changes at this stage. The DPRK remained in isolation and maintained a clear priority for ideology over economic development. On 29, December 1986, Kim reaffirmed traditional policies of rigid orthodoxy in economic matters at the inaugural session of the Eighth Supreme People’s Assembly.¹¹⁹ To survive with these two contrasting idea, Kim needed something new: build nuclear weapons.

The origins of the nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula date back to 1945 when Japan started secretly moving a nuclear program to the Northern part of Korea. The beginnings of the current DPRK drive to obtain a nuclear bargaining chip can be found in the Korean War, 1950-1953, when Mac Arthur requested permission to use atomic weapons and Eisenhower said

¹¹⁸ Kyoto News Agency, July 30, 1985.

¹¹⁹ Trigubenko, Marina, “Industry of the DPRK: Specific Features of the Industrial Policy, Sectoral Structure and Prospects”, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1991, pp. 101-135.

that the United States would use the atomic bomb if the deadlock persisted in the negotiation to conclude an armistice ending the war. In 1964, China became a nuclear state. North Korea asked China to share the atomic secret, but China refused.

However, in the 1980s, as China began to open up, the North Korea desire to have nuclear programs increased. This was the time when the IOC agreed on China's full membership of the Olympic Family on March 1981 and its Enquiry Commission visited Seoul on April to inspect its bid for the 1988 Olympics. According to an East Germany diplomat in May 1981, North Korea said "we need a nuclear bomb."¹²⁰ The first sign of DPRK's nuclear program was the nuclear reactor vessel at Yongbyon in April 1982. It was not coincidence that the North Korea had been developing nuclear programs in 1980s. A concern about the North Korea nuclear program began to grow during 1989 since it had not signed a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In response to this pressure, the DPRK advised the IAEA in February 1990 that it would sign a safeguards agreement if the United State gave legal assurance that it would not resort to a nuclear threat against the country. Watching Russia and China established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990 and 1992 respectively, having nuclear weapons became significant in Pyongyang. North Korea started to play the nuclear card in 1991.¹²¹

Meanwhile, during 1980s, there were definite signs of change within the North Korean political leadership in the Supreme People's Assembly and the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. Some of the changes resulted from the vacant positions caused by the death of Kim's partisan leaders such as Kim Il and Kang Yang-uk, but the changed can also be

¹²⁰ Trigubenko, Marina, "Industry of the DPRK," *ibid.*, pp. 251-253.

¹²¹ Mack, Andrew, "North Korea and the Bomb", *Foreign Policy*, no.83, 1991, pp. 87-104.

attributed to the recruitment of new leaders. The Table below shows these changes in the political leadership.

Table 6. The Changes of Members in the Political Leadership

The Seventh Supreme People's Assembly			The Sixth Central Committee	
TFS in 1982	TSS in 1983	TTS in 1984	TSP in 1983	TEP in 1986
Died (2) Kim Il Kang Yang-uk	Dropped (3) Hwang Change-yop Ho Chong-suk Hong Ki-mun	Dropped (4) Kim I-hun Kim Hwan Yun Ki-bok	Dropped Unknown	Dropped (6) Kong Chin-tae Hong Song-yong An Sung-hak Yon Hyong-muk An Sung-hak Kim Chung-nin
	Elected (7) Yim Chun-chu Yi Yong-ik Choe Yong-nim Yang Hyong-sop Son Song-pil Yo Yon-gu Kim Il-tae	Elected (12) Yi Chong-ok Kang Song-san Kim Pong-ju Kim Man-gum Chu Chang-jun Pak Su-dong Chi Chang-ik Cho Se-ung Kim Pok-sin Kim Chang-ju Sung-hak Chae Hui-jong	Elected (3) Ho Tam An Sung-hak Hong Song-yong Kim Pok-sin	Elected (4) Hong Si-hak Hong Song-nam Yi Kun-mo Kim Hwan Kye Ung-tae

NOTE: FS=The First Session, TSS=The Second Session, TTS=The Third Session, TSP= The Seventh Plenum, TEP=The Eleventh Plenum¹²²

Many high-level members of the government and party were dropped or elected during the 1980s. Unfortunately, how these rapid changes occurred is not known. Suh argued that the change in the top leadership was to accommodate the transition from Kim Il Sung to a new era under Kim Jong Il cannot be ruled out. While it is not possible to know who are loyal to Kim Jong Il, the newly elected leaders could be those whom Kim Jong Il wanted to consolidate his

¹²² Sours from Suh, "Kim Il Sung The North Korea Leader," *ibid.*, pp. 294-296.

power.¹²³ On the other hand, Buzo argues that change in the leadership during this period was only a routine change and there was no significant group of people that were linked to Kim Jong Il. He says “policy formulation and execution in the key areas of ideology, the economy and foreign policy remained in the hands of veteran cadres and this obviously constituted a severe retardant on any moves toward reform.”¹²⁴ However, both agree on this changes happened and the image of Kim Jong Il as a devoted cadre occurred during 1980s.

By the end of the Cold War, changes were seen in the Leader. Kim Il Sung still exercised absolute power in the North. He was reelected president in 1986 and still general Secretary of the Party. However, there were visible signs of Kim’s relaxation. He seldom made the on-the-spot guidance tours to the countryside that he had enjoyed in the past He also made fewer appearances at the public gatherings and reduced the number of his speeches. He only made three speeches that can be considered important during 1980s including the speech on his birthday celebration- three policies designed to enhance the power of the people- on April 14, 1982; the speech reviewing the *chuche* idea in June 1983; and the lecture to the teachers and students at the Kim Il Sung Higher Party School on May 31, 1986. However, he did not speak out when the new third seven-year National Economic Plan was launched.¹²⁵ On the other hand, Kim Jong Il was busy making the rounds of the guidance tours each year in the country and begun to receive official messages from foreign governments and gifts from the foreign visitors.¹²⁶ Clearly a change took place in North Korea during the 1980s.

¹²³ Suh, “Kim Il Sung,” *ibid.*, p. 296.

¹²⁴ Buzo, “the Guerilla Dynasty,” *ibid.*, p. 138.

¹²⁵ Suh, “Kim Il Sung The North Korean Leader,” *ibid.*, Chapter 16.

¹²⁶ Zhebin, Alexander, “Russian and North Korea: An Emerging, Uneasy Partnership,” *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXV, no.8, 1995, pp727.

Conclusion

This paper examined the ups and downs in Moscow and Beijing's relationship and Kim Il Sung's rise to power during the Cold War era. Considering the pattern of changes in the membership of the Central Committee of Workers' Party of Korea, Kim's regime would have been established with or without the Sino-Soviet dispute and thaw. More specifically, the first part of each chapter covers Moscow and Beijing's different interests and how these interests impacted the Sino-Soviet relationship and the dynamics of this relationship impacted on Kim Il Sung's rise to power.

Sino-Soviet relations were, for the most part, friendly in 1945-mid 1950s, the two states did not fully trust each other. Post-war recovery and the Soviet Union's goal of communist expansionism and China's goal of continuous revolution meant that they needed each other. During this period, Kim Il Sung consolidated his power and purged his rivals. I define Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate in the late 1950s through the 1970s. I described the three major events during this period- the 20th Communist Congress, the Cuban Missile crisis, and Nixon's visit to Beijing. I chose these events because these events not only impacted on Sino-Soviet relations but also impacted on the 4th, 5th, and 6th Party Congresses in North Korea. Due to the Sino-Soviet dispute, Kim Il Sung was able to purge his rivals and replace Congress members with his people. North Korea even established a new constitution in 1972. Kim became the President of the country which evidenced his absolute power not only in the party, but also in the state. Lastly, Sino-Soviet relations were normalizing in the 1980s and early 1990s. For the Soviet Union's economic growth and to balance Sino-American ties, Gorbachev was actively seeking normalized relations with China. During this period, Kim Il Sung to transfer power to his power succession to his son, Kim Jong Il.

Whether the relationship between the Soviet Union and China was good or bad, Kim Il Sung continuously consolidated his power. North Korea was not a strong country, however, it skillfully survived while the Soviet Union was attempting to restraint Chinese growth and China was increasing its influence in the East Asia. Some scholars think North Korea is an isolated country. Many scholars have attempted to analyze the origin of its isolationist foreign policy and despotism. It is true that North Koreans pursued an isolationist foreign policy and laid great stress on ideological orthodoxy. However, it is also clear that North Korea in fact feared isolation. Kim was well aware of North Korea's weaknesses. Without the ability to negotiate between the Soviet Union and China, Kim's regime would have been threatened.

This explains, as a part, why Kim Il Sung decided to use the nuclear card. At the end of the Cold War era, both Moscow and Beijing were reluctant to give a great amount of support to Pyongyang. Thus, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il choose to build nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to trade for recognition, security assurances, and economic benefits from the more powerful countries. The United States threats of atomic weapons during the Korean War in 1950-1953, China becoming a nuclear state in 1964 and the ROK's Nordpolitik in 1988 all supports this argument.

The psychological effect of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988 also may have had an impact on Kim Il Sung's new security policy. North Korea described South Korea as a living hell. However, in reality, South Korea already had exceeded economy that North Korea. The Olympics also improved South Korea's status by the eyes of international community. When the Seoul Olympics were held on September 16, 1988, the South Korean newspaper, Chosun Ilbo, ran an article titled, "Seoul that as seen by a foreign reporter". In this article, John Oakley a sports reporter from England, PA said "I have never seen so many friendly citizens...[I would

give a] gold medal for all the [South Korean] equipment and [Seoul citizen's] efforts.”¹²⁷ At the end of the Olympic Games, two reporters from Moscow and New York evaluated the Seoul Olympics as “Gold Olympics” that “South Koreans have creatively realized.” They also said that “South Korea became a member of the international community.”¹²⁸ In reaction to the approval South Korea received, North Korea sought to improve its own status. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 1993 by which enhanced its bargaining power and skillfully improved its policy of brinkmanship.

Kim Il Sung's regime survive the dynamics of Moscow and Beijing's relationship during the Cold War era. His regime continues to survive even though his major ally collapsed with holding nuclear card. Answering why North Korea has persisted in its nuclear program is crucial to understanding the future of North Korean security policy. Whereas international community typically focuses on its nuclear problem, yet seldom pays attention to North Korea history and legacy of Kim dynasty which made unsuccessful outcome for resolving its nuclear threat. My paper has not attempt to analyze North Korea's nuclear policy. However, examining Kim Il Sung's power established during the Cold War era gives a partial explanation of the origins of Kim Il Sung's nuclear policy.

North Korea was created as a communist state with Soviet support. Kim Il Sung could have not succeeded without the Soviet Union's support. Sixty years after Kim Il Sung became the “Great Leader,” on December 19th 2011, his grandson Kim Jong-un became the “Supreme Leader”. North Korea has survived while maneuvering among strong sates. In this current time of transition, the dynamic relationship between North Korea and its neighbors will continue to shed light on North Korean domestic behavior.

¹²⁷ Chosun Ilbo, September 16, 1988, p. 9.

¹²⁸ Chosun Ilbo, October 3, 1998, p. 4.

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