

Minimizing race, emphasizing individuality: The relationship between support for color-blindness and American views about the self

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**Abstract**

Minimizing race, emphasizing individuality: The relationship between support for color-blindness and American views about the self

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Color-blindness, or the belief that people should minimize their attention to racial and ethnic groups, pervades the American legal system, education system, and organizational context. This dissertation examined how the appeal of color-blindness may be tied to Americans' independent self-construal, or dominant definition of the self as an individual, separate and distinct from others. In Study 1a and 1b, the more people supported color-blindness, the stronger their independent self-construal. This association held across multiple measures of color-blindness even when controlling for individual differences. In Study 2, an experimental manipulation of self-construal revealed some

evidence to suggest that people primed with independent self-construal supported color-blindness more than people primed with interdependent self-construal. In Study 3, however, people primed with independent self-construal did not significantly differ in their evaluation of a company with a color-blind policy from people primed with interdependent self-construal. Study 4 then examined the reverse relationship: that support for color-blindness influences self-construal. Participants primed with color-blindness defined themselves more as independent than people primed with multiculturalism. In addition, people primed with color-blindness defined themselves less in terms of their social group memberships than people primed with multiculturalism. This dissertation broadens the current knowledge on color-blindness by demonstrating how it has implications that extend beyond intergroup relations to affect how people think about and defines the self.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

*We're Different, We're the Same* is the title of a popular children's book about race starring the renowned Muppets of Sesame Street. The story begins with the declaration "We're different. Our noses are different," and is accompanied by pictures of noses of all shapes, sizes and colors. As readers turn to the next page, however, they are presented with a paradoxical statement: "We're all the same. Our noses are the same" (Kates, 1992, pp. 1-3). The narrative maintains this pace by continuing to highlight differences, only to conclude that these differences do not really matter. These beliefs play such a prominent role in children's lives that by the age of 10, White and Asian children have learned to internalize such beliefs and begin to strategically avoid acknowledging differences based on race (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Ambady, Sommers, & Norton, 2008). This idea of minimizing attention to race is known as color-blindness and extends beyond children's books. Indeed, themes in children's books often reflect highly valued, widely distributed cultural ideas (Miller, Wiley, Fund, & Liang, 1997; Tsai, Louie, Chen, Uchida, 2007) and increasingly, color-blindness appears to be one of them.

Color-blindness pervades many domains of American life, including the American education system (e.g., Schofield, 2009), legal system (e.g., *Adarand v. Pena*, 1995) and business contexts (e.g., Ely & Thomas, 2001). Within school settings, color-blindness is often used to justify curriculums that do not take into account the racial and ethnic makeup of its students (Schofield, 2009; Tatum, 1999). Instead, schools are asked to promote a curriculum that focuses on core American values, which often reflect cherished dominant group values (Bennett, 1987). For instance, the passage of House Bill 2281 in Arizona prohibiting the instruction of courses that "advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals" (HB 2281) caused many public and

charter schools within the state to shut down their Ethnic Studies programs. The creator of this bill, Attorney General Tom Horne, justified this change in Arizona's education system by appealing to color-blindness: "This is consistent with the fundamental American value that we are all individuals, not exemplars of whatever ethnic groups we were born into. Ethnic studies programs teach the opposite" (Calefati, 2010). Elimination of programs that seek to recognize and respect racial and ethnic groups suggests the power of color-blindness to shape the American education system.

As demonstrated by HB 2281, color-blind beliefs can play a highly influential role in the U.S. legal system. Many of the most recent landmark court decisions made by the Supreme Court regarding racial discrimination invoke the color-blind perspective as a way to justify the Court's decision (e.g., *Adarand v. Peña*, 1995; *Bakke v. Board of Regents*, 1978; *Gratz v. Bollinger*, 2003; *Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools*, 2007; *Richmond v. Croson*, 1989; *Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education*, 1986). In *Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools* (2007), for example, the use of children's racial background to help determine the school they would be allowed to attend was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Roberts used a color-blind rationale to justify this ruling when speaking for the majority opinion, stating, "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." Similar arguments were put forth to justify the court's decision in *Adarand v. Peña* (1995) where the justices ruled to further restrict the use of government incentives designed to help minority owned business. In support of the court ruling, Justice Scalia denounced the use of race-conscious initiatives or what he termed "racial entitlements," stating, "In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American." The pervasive reference to

color-blindness has led scholars to argue that it has become the new legal standard within the U.S. legal system (Apfelbaum, Sommers & Norton, 2012; Plaut, 2010).

Within business contexts, organizations have been known to take on a color-blind perspective as their way of attempting to promote workforce diversity (Plaut, 2002). The Fortune 500 company Time Warner, for example, states in their diversity statement that “when we think about diversity, we must go beyond race, ethnicity and gender to include all the things that make us unique, including life experiences” (Time Warner, 2013). This approach to cultivating diversity is shared by many organizations and has a strong influence on workplace norms. For example, companies with color-blind policies have been known to cultivate environments where addressing conflicts that occur between members of different racial groups is looked down upon both by fellow employees and management (Ely & Thomas, 2001). Within business contexts, color-blind beliefs often play an influential role in shaping an organization’s approach to diversity at multiple levels.

Why does color-blindness play such an influential role in many social and economic domains of American society? What are the potential consequences of endorsing color-blindness for the individual? My dissertation examines how color-blindness may be tied to the dominant American understanding of what it means to be a person in relation to one’s group. Examining this relationship has the potential to open a new line of inquiry regarding the motivations and consequences of color-blindness.

To begin, I will summarize the research on color-blindness by examining how it has been defined in the literature, its historical development, and its consequences for intergroup relations. Then, I turn to the work on cultural self-construal and examine how

endorsement of color-blindness affects and is affected by the way Americans tend to define the self. I propose that there is a relationship between the endorsement of colorblindness and the tendency for Americans to hold an independent self-construal, or a view of the self as being separate and distinct from others. I then investigate the direction of this relationship. First, I examine whether an independent self-construal fosters beliefs about the need to minimize attention to racial and ethnic groups. Then I turn to investigating the opposing relationship: that color-blindness shapes how people come to define themselves. Finally, I conclude by outlining the importance of understanding the relationship between color-blindness and self-construal. Previous research on color-blindness has primarily examined the potential motivations and consequences of endorsing color-blindness on intergroup relations (for a review see Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2012; Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2012). Here I broaden the current knowledge on color-blindness by suggesting that the pervasiveness of color-blindness has implications for how we think about and define the self.

### **What is Color-blindness?**

Countless views exist regarding how Americans should manage their racial and ethnic diversity, but two dominate this conversation (Jones, 1998; Plaut, 2002). One view, called color-blindness, proposes that the way to achieve harmony and equality for all is for people to minimize their attention to racial and ethnic groups (Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012; Plaut, 2010).<sup>1</sup> As one famous example, people often construe Martin Luther King's "I have a Dream" speech as a speech about his hope for a color-

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to being defined as a belief, color-blindness has also been defined as a behavioral strategy that entails actively refusing to acknowledge racial and ethnic differences from fear of appearing prejudiced (Apfelbaum, Sommers & Norton, 2008; Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006). In the current paper, I limit my investigation to color-blindness as a belief.

blind society. In his speech, King expressed hope that his children would one day live in a nation where “they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.”<sup>2</sup> At its core, color-blindness is based on the belief people should minimize their attention to racial and ethnic groups. However, expanded definitions of color-blindness build on this core belief by offering alternative ways to understand people that are not in relation to their racial and ethnic group. The two most commonly proposed ways include focusing on the ways people are similar to each other (e.g., “we are all human”) or by focusing on people’s individuality (see Table 1 for definitions; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). Note that across all definitions of color-blindness, racial and ethnic groups are still acknowledged. However, underlying all these definitions is the belief that people should downplay their attention to racial and ethnic groups.<sup>3</sup>

*Table 1. Definitions of color-blindness*

	Definition
Similarities Color-blindness	
Crisp, R. J., & Turner, R. N. (2011)	“Casting aside cultural differences and unifying on a much broader basis, such as nationality”
Ferber, A. L. (2012)	“A color-blind perspective assumes that discrimination is a thing of the past, and denies the reality of race and racial inequality today. This approach argues that we should treat people as simply human beings, rather than as racialized

<sup>2</sup> It is worth noting that some scholars contest color-blind interpretations of King’s “I Have a Dream” speech (e.g., Ullucci & Battey, 2011) especially since he also advocated for race-conscious policies (Plaut, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Color-blindness can also take on different meanings depending on the academic discipline. For instance, other disciplines in the social science often equate color-blindness with racism-blindness and define it as the denial of the existence of interpersonal and structural forms of racism (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Brown et al., 2000). As an example, a widely used scale in counseling psychology called the Color-blind Racial Attitudes scale (Neville et al., 2000) defines color-blindness as an attitude that has three components: denial of racial privilege, denial of institution discrimination, and denial of blatant racism.

Holoien, D. S., & Shelton, J. N. (2012)	beings” “Colorblindness downplays the salience and importance of race by focusing on the commonalities people share, such as one's underlying humanity”
Morrison, K. R., & Chung, A. H. (2011)	“Argues that treating people as individuals or as members of an overarching category (e.g., Americans), rather than as members of separate groups, is the best way to reduce interethnic conflict”
Plaut, V.C., Garnett, F.G., Buffardi, L.E., & Sanchez-Burks, J. (2011)	The color-blind model, exemplified by the metaphor of the “melting pot” in American society, emphasizes that people are basically the same, that racial categories should be ignored or avoided, and that differences based on social identity should be assimilated into an overarching unifying category.
Purdie-Vaughns, V., Steele, C.M., Davies, P.G., Ditlmann, R., & Crosby, J.R. (2008)	“Assumptions underlying the colorblind philosophy include notions that people are universally similar and that group differences should be minimized”
Ryan, C. S., Hunt, J. S., Weible, J. A., Peterson, C. R., & Casas, J. F. (2007)	“According to this colorblind ideology, then, race and ethnic distinctions can and should be ignored and people should be treated in an identical manner”
Stevens, F. G., Plaut, V.C., & Sanchez-Burks, J. (2008)	“Focuses on ignoring cultural group identities or realigning them with an overarching identity”
Todd, Andrew R., & Galinsky, Adam D. (2012)	“Advocates of color-blindness claim that the intergroup landscape is best traversed by ignoring intergroup differences and instead focusing solely on commonalities (e.g., shared superordinate identities”
Vorauer, J. D., & Sasaki, S. J. (2010)	“Color-blind ideology instead encourages focusing on underlying similarities and acting as though ethnic categories do not exist and do not matter”
Vorauer, J. D., & Sasaki, S. J. (2011)	“Color-blindness calls for attention to underlying similarities and acting as though ethnic categories do not exist and do not matter”
Vorauer, J. D., Gagnon, A., & Sasaki, S. J. (2009)	“Color-blindness instead encourages focusing on underlying shared human qualities and acting as though ethnic categories do not exist”
Individuality Color-blindness	
Gutiérrez, A. S., & Unzueta, M. M. (2010)	“According to colorblind ideology, racial and ethnic differences should be ignored and everyone should be judged as individual human beings”
Levin, S., Matthews, M.,	“Proponents of colorblindness propose that the cultural characteristics of all groups should be abandoned so that all

- Guimond, S., Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Kteily, N., Pitpitan, E. V., & Dover, T. (2012)  
Morrison, K. R., Plaut, V. C., & Ybarra, O. (2010)  
Rattan, A. & Ambady, N. (2013)
- Richeson, J. A., & Nussbaum, R. J. (2004)
- Ryan, C. S., Casas, J. F., & Thompson, B. K. (2010)
- Wolsko, C., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2000)
- General color-blindness
- Apfelbaum, E. P., Norton, M. I., & Sommers, S. R. (2012)  
Apfelbaum, E. P., Pauker, K., Sommers, S. R., & Ambady, N. (2010)  
Correll, J., Park, B., & Smith, J. A. (2008)
- Markus, H.R., Steele, C., & Steele, D. (2000)
- Mazzocco, P. J., Cooper, L. W., & Flint, M. (2011)  
Knowles, E. D.,
- people are treated equally as individuals rather than as members of particular cultural groups”
- “The belief that ethnic group categories should be ignored and that people should instead be judged as individuals”
- “The colorblind ideology argues that equality among groups is best gained by downplaying group distinctions and treating people as unique individuals”
- “Racial categories do not matter and should not be considered when making decisions such as hiring and school admissions. The primary tenet of this approach is that social categories should be dismantled and disregarded, and everyone should be treated as an individual”
- “According to the colorblind ideology, differences associated with race and ethnicity are superficial and unimportant; perceivers can and thus should ignore race and ethnicity. That is, people should be judged as individuals without regard to race or ethnicity”
- “A colorblind perspective that stresses the importance of breaking down social categories and judging one another as individuals”
- “Color blindness is rooted in the belief that racial group membership and race-based differences should not be taken into account when decisions are made, impressions are formed, and behaviors are enacted”
- “An approach to managing diversity in which intergroup distinctions and considerations are deemphasized”
- “Minimize attention to racial and ethnic divisions”
- “The desire to remedy group prejudice by not seeing group difference...the core of this idea, given legal force by the Fourteenth Amendment, is that people are equal, that differences between people in race and ethnicity should not affect opportunity in society”
- “We define racial colorblindness as simply an opposition to racial categorization”
- “Color-blind ideology’s core meaning—the humanistic

Show, R. M., Lowery, B. S., & Hogan, C. M. (2009)	admonition that race should not matter”
Plaut, Thomas, & Goren (2009)	“Color blindness, an assimilationist ideology, stresses ignoring or minimizing group differences”
Rosenthal, L., & Levy, S. R. (2012)	“Belief that group memberships like race and ethnicity should be ignored”
Zou, L. X., & Dickter, C. L. (2013)	“People who endorse color blindness believe that ‘race should not and does not matter’”

The second view, called multiculturalism, is often proposed as the alternative to color-blindness. Similar to color-blindness, multiculturalism takes on many forms (Citrin, Sears, Muste, & Wong, 2001; Hollinger, 1995; Verkuyten, 2005). For example, one popular form of multiculturalism proposes that U.S. society should acknowledge and appreciate racial and ethnic groups as a means to identify commonalities among them (Citrin, Sears, Muste, & Wong, 2001; Hollinger, 1995). An alternative form of multiculturalism advocates for appreciating racial and ethnic differences as a means of preserving the distinction among cultural groups (Citrin, Sears, Muste, & Wong, 2001; Hollinger, 1995). Although these forms of multiculturalism may differ in their implications, they all stem from the core belief that appreciating group differences allows people to develop a better understanding of others from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, these forms of multiculturalism agree that acknowledging and appreciating differences is the way to achieve intergroup harmony and equality for all.

While color-blindness and multiculturalism dominate these conversations about racial and ethnic diversity, they are only two of many views on this topic. Lesser known views that have recently captured the attention of social psychology include anti-racism (Vorauer & Sasaki, 2011) and polyculturalism (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Anti-racism

proposes that equality and harmony can be achieved through greater awareness and understanding of how racism continues to shape peoples' experiences (Dei, 1996; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2011). This view proposes that by learning how to recognize racism in its interpersonal as well as structural form, people can learn to work against and counteract its negative effects. Polyculturalism proposes that intergroup harmony and equality can be achieved through a deeper understanding of the common history shared by different racial and ethnic groups (Prashad, 2003; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). This shared history can help demonstrate the interconnectedness of different cultures by showing the ways in which different cultures have shared ideas and influenced each other. In sum, this view proposes that being aware of how cultures are interconnected will help people to develop a greater appreciation and respect for others of different racial and ethnic backgrounds.

Although alternative views exist, none of these views have captured as much as attention as color-blindness and multiculturalism (Jones, 1998; Plaut, 2010). Color-blindness and multiculturalism also propose contrasting views about racial and ethnic groups that are comparable and facilitate their comparison. Color-blindness proposes that people should minimize their attention to racial and ethnic groups while multiculturalism proposes that people should acknowledge and appreciate racial and ethnic groups. For these reasons, my dissertation will focus on color-blindness and use multiculturalism as its point of comparison.

### **The History of Color-blindness and Multiculturalism in the United States**

Color-blindness entered the national conversation about race at a time when blatant racism was commonplace in U.S. society (Brown et al., 2003; Carr, 1997). In the

early 1960s, segregation between races was still legal, employment discrimination was rampant, and African Americans were systematically being denied their voting rights. In response to this blatant, systematic oppression of racial minorities, color-blindness was a progressive solution. This idea would gain further notoriety among Americans after Dr. Martin Luther King, one of the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement, invoked this belief in his famous “I Have a Dream” speech (Brown et al., 2003; Carr, 1997). King’s words resonated with many Americans and secured a growing belief that color-blindness could be an answer to addressing racial inequalities and promoting harmony among the different racial groups.

These notions of equality that led to the rise of color-blindness during the Civil Rights era were also the same ideas that gave way to racial and ethnic minority assimilationism (Deaux, 2006; Frederickson, 2010). This view proposes that racial and ethnic minorities shed their cultural ties and embrace a more mainstream American identity, which often meant adhering to the values and practices of the majority group. Racial and ethnic minorities, before the Civil Rights era, were often deemed ineligible for assimilation because they were assumed to be inherently inferior to the racial and ethnic majority (Frederickson, 2010). Indeed, the assimilationist view before the Civil Rights era targeted southern and eastern European immigrants (e.g., Irish immigrants) who were at least deemed capable of conforming to the Anglo-American way of being. Assimilation and color-blindness therefore have several historical commonalities: one, both views are motivated by a sense of equality at their core (Deaux, 2006; Frederickson, 2010). Two, both views seek to minimize attention to racial and ethnic groups. Assimilation, however, takes a more extreme stance and proposes that racial and ethnic

minorities erase their ties to their cultural heritage in favor of adhering to dominant American cultural values. It may be these commonalities that lead some scholars to use the terms color-blindness and assimilation interchangeably (Guimond et al., 2013; Markus, Steele, & Steele, 2002; Plaut, 2002).

The view that is often considered the alternative to both color-blindness and assimilation is multiculturalism (Jones, 1998; Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010). The earliest conceptualizations of multiculturalism in the United States were about acknowledging and appreciating different religious groups (Hollinger, 1995). However, multiculturalism as a view about acknowledging and appreciating racial and ethnic groups arose as a response by racial minorities to color-blind and assimilationist messages (Banks, 2009; Plaut, 2010). Racial and ethnic minority groups including African Americans, Asian Americans, Latino Americans, and Native Americans resisted the belief that they needed to forego their racial and ethnic identities in order to become citizens of the United States. Instead, they demanded that the U.S. recognize and appreciate them for their racial and ethnic identities (Frederickson, 2010; Moya & Markus, 2010). Racial and ethnic minorities directed their energies first to advocate for school curriculums that reflected the diversity of experiences, histories, and cultural perspectives within American society (Banks, 2009). While multiculturalism has its roots in reforming educational practices to better reflect the experiences of racial and ethnic groups, it soon expanded to include other marginalized groups such as women, sexual minorities, low-income groups, and people with disabilities. As multiculturalism gained momentum it soon evolved into a worldview that provided Americans and American

society with an alternative perspective on how to achieve racial and ethnic equality and promote intergroup harmony.

In the present day, multiculturalism and color-blindness remain at the forefront of the conversation on racial equality and intergroup harmony (Jones, 1998). While both views converge on the goal of racial equality, they diverge on the proposed way of achieving it. Of these two views, a growing body of work across social science disciplines suggests color-blindness may be an ineffective or even harmful way of attempting to remedy racial inequalities (Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Brown et al., 2005; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). Nevertheless, color-blindness continues to be applied as a solution within important social and economic domains of American society (*Adarand v. Peña*, 1995; HB 2281; Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009). As Americans continue to apply these beliefs as a potential solution to address racial inequalities and to achieve intergroup harmony, it will become increasingly important to understand the motivations and implications of endorsing color-blindness.

### **Negative Consequences of Color-blindness**

Much of the experimental work on the consequences of color-blindness in social psychology to date is based on an experimental manipulation of color-blindness and multiculturalism developed by Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink (2000). Wolsko and colleagues (2000) developed a three-step priming procedure designed to make salient color-blind or multiculturalism views. In the color-blind condition, participants read the following passage:

Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a #1 concern for the U.S. We are currently experiencing a great deal of conflict among various ethnic groups. Social scientists note that it is extremely important to heed our creed in the Declaration of Independence that

"all men (and women) are created equal." That is, to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember that we are all first and foremost human beings, and second, we are all American citizens. To make the U.S. as strong and successful as possible, we must think of ourselves not as a collection of independent factions, but instead as parts of a larger whole. We must look beyond skin color to understand the person within, to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger group, "Americans." Currently, we are spending too many resources on conflict between ethnic groups. If we can recognize our "sameness" we will be able to re-channel those resources to work on other difficult and important societal problems. Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture, to appreciate that at our core, we really are all the same.

Those in the multiculturalism condition read the following passage:

Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a #1 concern for the U.S. We are in the unique position of having many different cultural groups living within our borders. This could potentially be a great asset. Different cultural groups bring different backgrounds to life, providing a richness in food, dress, music, art, styles of interaction, and problem solving strategies. Each ethnic group within the U.S. can contribute in its own unique way. Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of harmony and complementarity among the various ethnic groups. Each group has its own talents, as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we validate the identity of each group and recognize its existence and its importance to the social fabric. We can allow each group to utilize its assets, to be aware of its own particular problems or difficulties, and overall to live up to its potential. Thus, social scientists argue that understanding both the similarities and differences among ethnic groups is an essential component of long-term social harmony in the U.S.

After reading one of these two passages, participants are asked to write a one page reflection on their thoughts and feelings about ethnicity in the United States. Participants in both conditions are then asked to write the top five reasons that U.S. society should adopt the perspective promoted in the initial passage.

Using these experimental manipulations, a growing body of work suggests color-blindness may have negative consequences for intergroup interactions. For example, White Americans primed with color-blindness showed evidence of more racial bias on a Black-White implicit association task (IAT) and Black-White feeling thermometers than

Whites primed with multiculturalism (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; but see Wolsko et al., 2000)<sup>4</sup>. White Canadians primed with color-blindness displayed more negative behaviors towards Aboriginal Canadians than White Canadians who received no prime (Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009). Alternatively, Asian Americans and African Americans who interacted with White Americans primed with color-blindness showed greater cognitive depletion after their interaction than racial minorities who interacted with Whites primed with multiculturalism (Holoien & Shelton, 2012). Furthermore, Asian American and African Americans' great experience of cognitive depletion in the color-blind condition was mediated by White Americans' greater display of racial prejudice as coded by two ethnic minority judges. Taking a color-blindness perspective can have negative consequences for intergroup interactions.

Alternative work examining the consequences of color-blindness provides corresponding evidence of its negative effects. For example, within business contexts, the more White employees in a business department endorsed color-blindness, the more racial minority employees in the same department reported feeling psychologically disengaged from their job (Plaut et al., 2009). African American professionals felt greater distrust and discomfort towards a company with low minority representation and a color-blind policy than a company with low minority representation and a multiculturalism policy (Purdie-Vaughns, Steele, Davies, & Crosby, 2008). However, there were no differences in how much trust and comfort African American professionals felt between companies with color-blind or multicultural policies when racial minority representation

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<sup>4</sup> Wolsko and colleagues (2000) found that White Americans across multiculturalism and color-blindness conditions reported significantly lower pro-White bias than Whites in the baseline condition. However, they did not report the results of the formal comparison between color-blindness versus baseline or multiculturalism versus baseline. This makes it difficult to conclude whether color-blindness did indeed reduce pro-White bias.

in these companies was high. Color-blindness may threaten intergroup harmony, particularly in potentially threatening contexts such as when racial minority representation is low.

The problematic consequences associated with color-blindness have led many prominent public figures and organizations to make public statements denouncing these beliefs. For example, in a report to Congress about the viability of color-blindness as an approach to racial equality, the American Psychological Association (1997) proclaimed that “we cannot be, nor should we be, color-blind.” Similarly, in a piece written for the American Association for School Administrators, Dr. Beverly Tatum (1999), president of Spelman College, appealed to teachers to avoid taking a color-blind perspective. Color-blindness, she argued, ignores the ways that race shapes children’s understanding of themselves as well as the world. Despite attempts to expose the potential perils of color-blindness, these beliefs remain entrenched in American society (Bonilla-Silva, 2003).

What motivates support for color-blindness?

### **The Motivations Behind American’s Support for Color-blindness**

Understanding the motivations behind endorsing color-blindness can be challenging for several reasons. One, there are many definitions of color-blindness. These definitions have led to a body of work that examines color-blindness using different scales that may measure different constructs (Plaut, 2010). Two, interpretations of color-blindness have been shown to depend on context (Knowles et al., 2009). For example, anti-egalitarian White Americans who are made aware of their White identity switch from a distributive understanding of color-blindness (i.e., a belief about equal distribution of outcomes for all racial groups) to a procedural one (i.e., a belief in process equality for

all racial groups). These alternative interpretations of color-blindness have different consequences for race relations that may be important to consider when attempting to understand who endorses color-blindness.

In the present investigation, I address these two challenges in several ways. On the topic of measurement, I include a comprehensive set of color-blindness measures found in the social psychology literature to date (i.e., Knowles et al., 2009; Levin et al., 2011; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). Additionally, I develop a scale that attempts to encompass the most common ways researchers have defined color-blindness. Including these scales will allow me to examine motivations underlying multiple forms of color-blindness. Next, as for the challenge of multiple interpretations, I will suggest in subsequent sections that knowing that the core meaning of color-blindness may be enough to understanding who is most likely to endorse it.

### **Who Supports Color-blindness?**

Despite the challenges involved in trying to understand who endorses color-blindness, an emerging body of literature has begun to theorize and examine individual differences that may be associated with people's support for color-blindness. In an attempt to provide a comprehensive review of this literature, I include work that examines color-blindness more broadly defined. The research on color-blindness has identified that the following individual differences predict attitudes toward color-blindness or theoretically related constructs: modern racism (McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2003), internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle,

1994), and political orientation. I define these individual differences and explain how they may relate to color-blindness below.

Modern racism is defined as the expression of anti-Black attitudes through endorsement of beliefs that African Americans violate American notions of equality in their demand to change the racial status quo (McConahay, 1986). Modern racist attitudes are often hypothesized to be positively associated with support for color-blindness. However, this relationship has been proposed in fields such as sociology and political science, where color-blindness is often equated with racism-blindness (Brown et al., 2003; Carr, 1997). In contrast, there are no known studies that examine the relationship between modern racism and color-blindness defined as the belief that people should minimize attention to racial and ethnic groups. I test for this potential relationship in the present investigation.

Internal motivation to respond without prejudice (IMCP) is defined as the extent to which non-prejudicial responding is due to an internal motivation (Plant & Devine, 1998). Alternatively, an external motivation to respond without prejudice (EMCP) is defined as the extent to which a person's non-prejudicial response is due to social pressures not to appear prejudiced (Plant & Devine, 1998). Research has shown that EMCP is positively related to color-blindness defined as a behavioral strategy in which people avoid acknowledging a person's race (Apfelbaum et al., 2009). In contrast, there are no known studies that examine the relationship between IMCP, EMCP, and color-blindness as a belief that people should minimize their attention to racial and ethnic groups. I also explore this potential relationship in the present investigation.

Social dominance orientation is defined as an individuals' preference for social hierarchy and domination of inferior groups (Pratto et al., 1994). Research has shown that the more people prefer social hierarchy and domination of inferior groups, the less they endorse color-blindness (Knowles et al., 2009; Levin et al., 2011). This is consistent with the view that color-blindness exists as way to promote racial equality.

Political orientation refers to people's beliefs about the proper way to order society (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). People's beliefs are often understood to fall along a liberal-conservative spectrum of political orientation characterized by how accepting they are of social change and how tolerant they are of inequality. Both liberalism and conservatism have been associated with color-blindness at different time points in U.S. history. In the 1960s, color-blindness, as a response to *de jure* segregation, embodied a rejection of social inequality consistent with liberalism (Carr, 1997). Beginning in the 1970s, however, color-blindness began to be associated with conservatives who used color-blindness as a way to argue against the use of race-conscious policies such as affirmative action (Carr, 1997). Liberals and conservatives have both endorsed color-blindness for different reasons.

Racial group membership may also help shed light on the kinds of people who are most likely to support color-blindness. There are several proposed reasons why racial minorities may be less likely to support color-blindness than White Americans. One, racial minorities are often socialized to derive pride in their racial and ethnic group (Phinney, 1990). To the extent that racial minorities are more likely to view their racial and ethnic group memberships as a source of positive self-esteem, they may be less likely to support color-blindness than White Americans (Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, &

Casas, 2007). Two, White Americans may be more motivated to support color-blindness as a way of maintaining their status as the dominant group in U.S. society (Carr, 1997; Knowles et al., 2009). Lastly, work on the consequences of color-blindness demonstrates that racial minorities tend to react negatively to outgroup members who espouse color-blind beliefs (Holoien & Shelton, 2010; Vorauer et al., 2009).

Empirical support that suggests racial minorities support color-blindness less than White Americans, however, has been mixed.<sup>5</sup> For instance, a survey conducted on African Americans and White Americans who agreed to participate in a diversity dialogue revealed that African Americans were less likely to believe that color-blindness would improve intergroup relations than White Americans (Ryan et al., 2007). In contrast, a study conducted on African American and White American undergraduates at a public East Coast University revealed that African Americans were more likely to believe color-blindness would improve intergroup relations than White undergraduates (Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). Lastly, across both undergraduate and community samples, researchers have also found no differences in support for color-blindness or beliefs in its ability to improve intergroup relations among Latinos Americans, Black Americans, Asian Americans, and White Americans (Rosenthal & Levy, 2012; Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010). The variability in these findings suggests that it will be important to further examine under what conditions and for which forms of color-blindness these racial group differences in support for color-blindness can arise.

Who endorses color-blindness? It may appear from this summary that the answer to this question requires understanding its implication for race relations. However, those

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<sup>5</sup> When color-blindness is operationalized as assimilation, however, majority group members tend to support assimilation more than minority group members (Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko, Park, Judd, 2006; but see Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010).

who support color-blindness, regardless of its downstream implication, share the core assumption that attention to racial and ethnic group memberships should be minimized. This dismissive view of race and ethnicity may be the key to understanding the appeal of color-blindness. In this dissertation, I examine how the appeal of color-blindness may be tied to a more global belief about how people define themselves in relation to their groups.

### **Cultural Self-Construals and Understanding of Group Memberships**

People vary in how they define the self (Cross, Hardin, & Swing, 2009; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Two of the most commonly documented ways that people define the self include independent and interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Independent self-construals are defined by an understanding of the self as unique, separate and distinct from others. As an alternative, interdependent self-construals are defined by an understanding of the self as similar and connected to others. People hold both forms of self-construal and endorse each to varying degrees (Singelis, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 2010). Indeed, rather than thinking of these two forms of self-construals as competing views on opposing sides of the same spectrum, it may be more appropriate to think about which self-construal is most chronically accessible or activated by one's context (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Triandis, 1995).

Cultural context has been shown to be one factor that helps determine which self-construal is most chronically accessible to individuals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). For example, as a core tenet of American individualism (Triandis, 1995), independent self-construal is deeply entrenched within the pattern of ideas, practices, institutions, products, and artifacts that make up American culture (Markus & Kitayama, 2010). In

turn, this cultural context shapes the psychological processes of those embedded within these contexts. For example, American children, through their daily interactions with their parents and teachers, learn that the way to be a good person is to be a unique, independent person (Markus & Conner, 2013). People within American cultural contexts are bombarded daily by cultural products that promote independence, for example in music (Snibbe & Markus, 2005) and magazines (Kim & Markus, 1999). In contrast, the patterns of ideas, practices, institutions, products, and artifacts that make up East Asian cultural contexts have a greater tendency to promote an interdependent view of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 2010). For example, parents and teachers from East Asian contexts teach their children in daily interactions that the way to be a good person is to be an interdependent person (Markus & Conner, 2013). Furthermore, East Asian contexts are replete with cultural products that promote interdependence (Kim & Markus, 1999; Snibbe & Markus, 2005).

Self-construals also inform people's construction of their relation to others (Adams, 2005; Kim, 1994; Triandis, 1989). With an independent self-construal, for example, an affiliation with others and groups is cultivated at the discretion of inherently autonomous individuals. In contrast, with interdependent self-construals, affiliation with others and groups is an inherent part of being a person. The power of these constructions to guide perceptions and behaviors was demonstrated in work on the psychology of enemyship across American and Ghanaian cultural contexts (Adams, 2005). While Ghanaian contexts tend to promote a more interdependent view of the self, American contexts, in contrast, tend to promote a more independent view of the self. When people from American contexts were asked about their personal experiences with enemyship, or

“personal relationships involving hatred, malice, or sabotage,” (Adams, 2005) they were more likely to characterize these kinds of relationships as choices made by inherently autonomous individuals (e.g., “I think [having enemies] is up to the individual... That is up to me to decide and I choose not”). In contrast, Ghanaians were more likely to characterize enemyships as inevitabilities based on the inherent connectedness of individuals (e.g., “The world is such that everybody is bound to have enemies”) (Adams, 2005). People’s definition of the self can act as guides for how they make sense of their relations to others and their groups.

What motivates those who see themselves as inherently autonomous individuals to belong to groups? Independent constructions of group membership propose that people affiliate with groups in order to accomplish self-relevant motives (e.g., positive self-esteem; Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Oyserman, Coon, & Kimmelmeier, 2002). As these self-relevant motives are satisfied, those with an independent self-construal continue to maintain this affiliation with others and their groups. However, if the costs of being connected to others outweigh their benefits, those with an independent self-construal are not obligated to stay in those groups, and instead can seek new ones out. In other words, those with an independent self-construal tend to uphold a construction of group membership as a voluntary commitment that people can abandon whenever membership does not meet their needs. Can the prominence of independent self-construals within American cultural contexts and its corresponding construction of what it means to belong to a group help explain the appeal of color-blindness?

## **Independent Self-Construal and Support for Color-blindness**

Color-blindness arose in a time when race and ethnicity were seen as group memberships that unfairly disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities (Brown et al., 2003; Jones, 1998). Based on this understanding, the idea of minimizing attention to race and ethnicity was viewed as a way of freeing individuals from the negative impacts of belonging to a racial and ethnic group. This color-blind view closely aligns with the independent view of group memberships. To the extent that the cost of belonging to racial and ethnic groups outweighs their benefits, these memberships should be downplayed. Part of the appeal of color-blindness may rely on an underlying understanding of people as autonomous individuals who choose their group affiliations.

Is there evidence that independent self-construals can cause people to downplay the importance of social group affiliations? Work on the intergroup consequences of American individualism supports this possibility. For example, within American cultural contexts, the dominant construction of people's actions as freely-made choices that reflect personal preferences, intentions, and motivations cause American women to believe that gender discrimination no longer exists. In particular, the more mothers believed it was their choice to leave their careers, the less likely they were to believe gender discrimination played a part in women's underrepresentation in male dominated fields (Stephens & Levine, 2012). Furthermore, the same set of beliefs can also cause Americans to downplay the influence of external forces on people's life outcomes. Indeed, Americans primed with choice were more likely to blame victims for their negative outcomes (e.g., being physically abused) and were less supportive of affirmative action (Savani, Stephens, & Markus, 2011). This work suggests that American

individualism can cause people to downplay the structural constraints that may be placed upon them. I build on these findings in my dissertation by examining how American individualism may cause Americans to believe that race and ethnicity are group affiliations that people should minimize.

It may also be the case that self-construals are shaped by color-blindness. Telling people they should minimize their attention to racial and ethnic groups may cause people to see themselves as unique individuals who are separate from their groups. There is some evidence that color-blindness leads people to see individuals as separate from their group, at least from the perceiver's perspective. For instance, White Americans primed with color-blindness were less likely to use a person's ethnicity in judging their behavior than White Americans primed with multiculturalism (Wolsko et al., 2000). In my dissertation, I examine whether priming color-blindness can cause people to define themselves more as individuals, separate and distinct from their group.

Might the relationship between self-construal and support for color-blindness depend on whether one is part of the racial minority versus majority? Because people across racial and ethnic groups have access to both independent and interdependent self-construals (Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008), I predict that the relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness applies across racial and ethnic groups. It is possible, however, that the task of switching between independent and interdependent self-construals may be easier to experimentally manipulate for racial minorities. Racial minorities, compared to the racial majority, may be more practiced at switching between self-construals by virtue of being more readily exposed to social contexts that require them to switch between independent and interdependent self-

construals (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007). Because of this possibility, I test for the potential moderating role of racial group membership across all the studies in my dissertation.

### **Interdependent Self-construals and Support for Color-blindness**

Interdependent self-construals emphasize similarity and connection to others (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Specifying who these “others” are may be important in understanding how color-blindness relates to interdependent self-construal. Interdependent self-construals can come in at least two forms, namely relational and collective interdependent self-construal (Brewer & Chen, 2007). Relational-interdependent self-construal refers to the extent to which people feel a similarity and connection to close others. People who endorse a relational-interdependent self-construal tend to define themselves in terms of their close relationships with others (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000). Collective-interdependent self-construal refers to the extent to which people feel a similarity and connection to larger social groups (Brewer & Chen, 2007). People who endorse a collective-interdependent self-construal tend to define the self in terms of their memberships in social groups (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Of these two forms of interdependent self-construal, collective interdependent self-construals appear to be more conceptually related to color-blindness. The tendency for individuals to see themselves in terms of their group memberships should be negatively correlated with their belief in the minimization of race and ethnicity.

In the work on cultural self-construal, the call to distinguish between relational and collective interdependent self-construals is new and has not received much empirical attention. Indeed, much of the work on cultural self-construal does not explicitly

differentiate between these two forms of interdependent self-construal.<sup>6</sup> In their foundational paper on cultural self-construals, Markus & Kitayama (1991) defined interdependent self-construal as “seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship” (p. 227) and used examples that included both close relationships and valued ingroups. From this work, the large body of literature on cultural self-construal developed that by and large did not distinguish between relational and collective forms of interdependent self-construal (for a review see Oyserman et al., 2002). An examination of various measures of interdependence used in the cultural self-construal literature shows that the majority of interdependent self-construal measures incorporate both close relationships and collective relationships (Brewer & Chen, 2007).

One potential reason these two forms of interdependent self-construal remained undifferentiated in past literature is that both forms represent two ways of understanding one of the fundamental components of interdependent self-construal. Both relational and collective forms of interdependent self-construal suggest the fundamental connectedness of human beings to each other (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). To the extent that these two forms of interdependent self-construal lead people to the same core understanding, they may produce similar effects. In my investigation, I examine the relationship between interdependent self-construals and color-blindness by including both an undifferentiated measure of interdependent self-construal (i.e., Singelis, 1994) and more specific measures of interdependent self-construal (i.e., Cross et al., 2000; Gabriel & Gardner, 1999).

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<sup>6</sup> The relationship between relational and collective forms of interdependent self-construal remains highly debated. A third perspective on this debate suggests that interdependent self-construal is a super-ordinate category with relational and collective interdependent self-construal as subcomponents (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011)

## **Overview**

The present investigation examines the relationship between independent self-construals and endorsement of color-blindness. Chapter 2 examined the correlation between independent self-construals and endorsement color-blindness. Chapter 3 experimentally manipulates self-construal in order to test whether independent self-construals cause greater endorsement of color-blindness and companies that endorse color-blind policies. As color-blind beliefs continue to spread and become embedded within the practices, institutions, products, and artifacts that make up American society, they may begin to shape how people see themselves. Chapter 4 tests this hypothesis and examines whether people primed with color-blindness construe the self as more independent than people primed with multiculturalism.

## **Chapter 2: Examining the Relationship Between Color-blindness and Independent Self-Construal**

Chapter 2 examined the relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness when measured as individual differences. To examine the unique relationship between color-blindness and independent self-construal, these studies also measure various individual differences related to color-blindness and independent self-construal in order to statistically control for them. Including these individual differences also let me examine their relation to support for color-blindness. Lastly, these studies also included measures of interdependent self-construal to examine its relationship with support for color-blindness.

### **Study 1a**

Study 1a examined the relationship between endorsement of color-blindness and independent self-construal for White Americans. The initial focus on White Americans was based on previous work on color-blindness that has investigated its antecedents and consequences primarily for White Americans (Levin et al., 2011; Knowles et al., 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Plaut et al., 2011; Wolsko et al., 2000).

In this study, I measured independent and interdependent self-construal using a scale developed by Singelis (1994). I chose the Singelis (1994) self-construal scale because of its sound psychometric properties and because it is currently the most commonly used measure of independent self-construal in the literature (Heine, Lehman, Pen, & Greenholtz, 2002).

Support for color-blindness was measured in two ways. First, I used a scale developed by Knowles and his colleagues (2009). This scale operationalizes color-

blindness as the extent to which people believe race is a label that obscures people's individuality. I chose this scale because it closely corresponds to one of the most common definitions of color-blindness in the literature as the belief that people should cast aside racial and ethnic groups and focus instead on their individuality. Using this scale allowed me to test the relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness using an established scale. Second, I measured endorsement of color-blindness by developing a preliminary 5-item measure that accounts for the two most common definitions of color-blindness. Across these two measures, I hypothesized that greater support for color-blindness would be positively associated with independent self-construal. In contrast, I hypothesized that greater support for color-blindness would be associated with a weaker interdependent self-construal.

To test for the unique relationship between color-blindness and independent self-construal, I also measured other individual differences associated with color-blindness and independent self-construal. The measures associated with color-blindness include: social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), modern racism (McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2003), internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), and political orientation (Napier & Jost, 2008). The measure associated with independent self-construal includes Protestant work ethic (Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998; Sears & Henry, 2003). These measures were included as controls in two regression models that examined the potential bi-directional relationship between independent self-construal and support for color-blindness. In one model, I examined whether independent self-construal predicts support for color-blindness controlling for other individual differences. In another model, I examined

whether support for color-blindness predicts independent self-construal controlling for other individual differences. Overall, I hypothesized that the relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness remains significant even when controlling for these individual differences.

For exploratory reasons, this study also included additional questionnaires. First, I included two additional measures of independent self-construal called horizontal and vertical individualism. Horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism nuance the general construct of individualism and collectivism by distinguishing between forms of individualism that emphasize equality versus social hierarchy (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Horizontal individualism is defined as the extent to which people construe the self as an autonomous individual that is equal in status to others. Vertical individualism is defined as the extent to which people construe the self as an autonomous individual that is not equal in status to others. These scales were included to explore whether more specific measures of independent self-construal could uniquely predict responses to the color-blindness scales when simultaneously controlling for other measures of independent self-construal.

Second, I also included four alternative measures of interdependent self-construal: relational-interdependent self-construal, collective-interdependent self-construal, horizontal collectivism, and vertical collectivism. Relational-interdependent self-construal is defined as the extent to which one construes the self in terms of one's relationship to close others (Cross et al., 2000). Collective-interdependent self-construal is defined as the extent to which one construes the self in terms of one's group memberships (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Horizontal collectivism is defined as the extent

to which one construes the self as inherently connected and equal in status to others (Singelis et al., 1995). Vertical collectivism is defined as the extent to which one construes the self as inherently connected and unequal in status to others (Singelis et al., 1995). I included these measures to explore whether more specific measures of interdependent self-construal could uniquely predict responses to color-blindness scales when controlling for other interdependent self-construal measures.

Lastly, measures of White guilt, White privilege, racialized Protestant work ethic, and racism-blindness were included in this survey. White guilt is defined as the feelings of guilt that arise from becoming aware of racism perpetrated by Whites as a group (Swim & Miller, 1998). White privilege is defined as the belief that one has unearned privileges based on being a White American (Swim & Miller, 1998). These measures were included in order to examine whether support for color-blindness is related to awareness of one's White identity. Racialized Protestant work ethic is defined as the extent to which a person believes that African Americans just need to work hard in order to get ahead (Sears & Henry, 2003). This measure was included to test whether support for color-blindness is associated particularly with the extent to which people apply a core American value to African Americans. Racism-blindness is defined as the extent to which people deny the existence of institutional and interpersonal forms of racism and is often considered a form of color-blindness in other social science disciplines (e.g., Carr, 1997; Neville et al., 2000). This measure has three subscales: denial of racial privilege, denial of institutional discrimination, and denial of blatant racism. I included this measure to empirically examine how related racism-blindness is to more social psychological definitions of color-blindness.

## Participants

One hundred and two (57 female) University of Washington students who self-identified as White in a pre-screening survey participated in exchange for participant pool credit. In a subsequent demographic questionnaire embedded in the survey, 99 self-identified as White and 3 identified as mixed race.<sup>7</sup>

## Procedure

Participants completed an online survey that contained the measures of interest.<sup>8</sup> The order of the measures from first to last were presented in the following way: Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale (5-item), Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale, racism-blindness – denial of White privilege (Neville et al., 2000), racism-blindness – denial of institutional discrimination (Neville et al., 2000), racism-blindness – denial of blatant racism (Neville et al., 2000), independent self-construal (Singelis, 1994), interdependent self-construal (Singelis, 1994), horizontal and vertical individualism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), horizontal and vertical collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), collective interdependent self-construal (Gardner & Gabriel, 1999), relational-interdependent self-construal (Cross et al., 2000), modern racism (McConahay, 1986), racialized Protestant work ethic (Sears & Henry, 2003), symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2003), external motivation to control prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), internal motivation to control prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), White privilege (Swim & Miller, 1998), White guilt (Swim & Miller,

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<sup>7</sup> Results did not change when these three mixed-race participants were omitted.

<sup>8</sup> This study included a self-construal manipulation and participants were randomly assigned to write about how they were either different or similar from their family and friends (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). However, this manipulation had no significant effects on any of the reported measures (all  $p$ 's > .06). I test this relationship again in Chapter 3.

1998), Protestant work ethic (Levin et al., 1998), and racial identification (Leach et al., 2008). Demographic questions were assessed at the end.

### **Main Measures**

**Color-blindness.** Support for color-blindness was measured using the Knowles et al. color-blindness scale (2009;  $\alpha = .83$ ) and a 5-item preliminary measure of color-blindness that I developed ( $\alpha = .58$ ). An example from the Knowles et al. (2009) scale includes, “Putting racial labels on people obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.” An example from my 5-item preliminary measure of color-blindness includes, “No matter a person's race or ethnicity, in the end, everyone is basically the same.” I refer to this scale as the Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale. Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree).

**Independent self-construal.** Independent self-construal was measured using the 12-item independent self-construal subscale ( $\alpha = .81$ ) from the Singelis (1994) self-construal scale. An example of an item from the independent self-construal subscale includes, “My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.” Responses across all these measures were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 4(neither disagree nor agree) to 7(strongly agree).

**Interdependent self-construal.** Interdependent self-construal was measured using the 12-item interdependent subscale ( $\alpha = .79$ ) of the Singelis (1994) self-construal scale. An example of an item from the independent self-construal subscale includes, “I often having the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments.” Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 4(neither disagree nor agree) to 7(strongly agree).

**Protestant work ethic.** Protestant work ethic was measured using 4-items (Levin et al., 1998;  $\alpha = .78$ ). An example item from this scale includes, “If people work hard they almost always get what they want.” Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with these statements on a scale from 1(not at all) to 7(extremely).

**Internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice.** The Plant and Devine (1998) 5-item internal ( $\alpha = .89$ ) and 5-item external ( $\alpha = .90$ ) motivation to respond without prejudice scale was also included in this study. An example of an item from the internal motivation to respond without prejudice includes, “I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people.” An example item from the external motivation to respond without prejudice includes, “I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others.” Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 9(strongly agree).

**Modern racism.** Modern racist attitudes were measured using both the 7-item modern racism scale (McConohay, 1986;  $\alpha = .91$ ) and a 7-item measure of modern racism (Sears & Henry, 2003;  $\alpha = .77$ ). An example of a modern racism item includes, “Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.” An example of item from the symbolic racism scale includes, “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.” Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree).

**Social dominance orientation.** Social dominance orientation was measured using 16-items (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994;  $\alpha = .93$ ). An example of an item includes, “Inferior groups should stay in their place.” Participants were asked to rate how positively they felt about statements on a scale from 1(very negative) to 7(very positive).

**Political orientation.** Participants were asked to indicate their political orientation on a scale from 1 (extremely liberal) to 4 (moderate) to 7 (extremely conservative).

**Racial identification.** Racial identification was measured using 3-items (Leach et al. 2008;  $\alpha = .86$ ). An example of an item includes, “The fact that I am a part of my racial group is an important part of my identity.” Responses were on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

### **Exploratory Measures**

**Horizontal and vertical individualism.** This construct was measured using the 8-item measure of horizontal ( $\alpha = .77$ ) and vertical ( $\alpha = .69$ ) individualism developed by Triandis and Gelfand (1998). An example of a horizontal individualism includes, “I’d rather depend on myself than others.” An example of an item from the vertical individualism scale includes, “It is important that I do my job better than others.” Responses across all these measures were on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither disagree nor agree) to 7 (strongly agree).

**Horizontal and vertical collectivism.** This construct was measured using the 8-item measure of horizontal ( $\alpha = .78$ ) and vertical ( $\alpha = .72$ ) collectivism developed by Triandis and Gelfand (1998). An example of a horizontal collectivism includes, “I feel good when I cooperate with others.” An example of an item from the vertical collectivism scale includes, “It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.” Responses across all these measures were on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither disagree nor agree) to 7 (strongly agree).

**Relational-interdependent self-construal.** Relational-interdependence was measured using an 11-item measure developed by Cross and colleagues (2000;  $\alpha = .89$ ). An example item from this scale includes, “When I think of myself, I often think of groups I belong to as well.” Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree).

**Collective-interdependent self-construal.** Collective-interdependence was measured using a 10-item measure developed by Gabriel and Gardner (1999;  $\alpha = .91$ ). An example item from this scale includes, “When I think of myself, I often think of groups I belong to as well.” Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree).

**White guilt.** White guilt was measured using a 5-item scale of White guilt (Swim & Miller, 1998;  $\alpha = .88$ ). An example of an item includes, “When I learn about racism, I feel guilt due to my association with the White race.” Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 4(neither agree nor disagree) to 7(strongly agree).

**White privilege.** White privilege was measured using a 5-item measure of White privilege (Swim & Miller, 1998;  $\alpha = .89$ ). An example of an item includes, “My status as a White person grants me unearned privileges in today’s society.” Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 4(neither agree nor disagree) to 7(strongly agree).

**Racialized Protestant work ethic.** This construct was measured using 6-items developed by Sears and Henry (2003). An example of an item includes, “If Blacks work hard they almost always get what they want.” Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 4(neither agree nor disagree) to 7(strongly agree).

**Racism-blindness.** Racism-blindness was measured using 18-items (Neville et al., 2000). These 18 items were broken down into three subscales: denial of racial privilege (e.g., “Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become rich”;  $\alpha = .81$ ), denial of institution discrimination (e.g., “Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against White people”;  $\alpha = .57$ ), and denial of blatant racism (e.g., “Racism may have been a problem in the past, it is not an important problem today”;  $\alpha = .69$ ). Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 6(strongly agree).

## Results

**Means and standard deviations of all measured constructs.** Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of all the individual differences measured in this study.

*Table 2.* Means and standard deviations for individual differences measured in Study 1a (N = 102)

	Means	SD
1 KNOWLES CB	4.98	1.05
2 SIY (2013a) CB	4.65	0.95
3 INDEP	4.88	0.75
4 HORIND	5.49	1.04
5 VERIND	4.62	0.96
6 INTER	4.99	0.67
7 RISC	5.05	0.93
8 CISC	4.50	1.00
9 HORCOL	5.15	0.92
10 VERCOL	5.10	0.98
11 PWE	3.82	1.16
12 RPWE	4.77	1.17
13 IMRP	7.23	1.59
14 EMRP	4.85	1.80
15 MRS	2.64	0.96
16 SYMR	3.46	0.93
17 RBRP	3.76	0.98
18 RBID	3.40	0.72
19 RBBR	2.66	0.70

20	SDO	2.72	0.84
21	WHITEG	3.78	1.38
22	WHITEP	4.16	1.33
23	PO	3.57	1.49
24	RACEID	3.39	1.38

**Note:** **INDEP** = Independent self-construal. **HORIND** = Horizontal individualism. **VERIND** = Vertical individualism. **INTER** = Interdependent self-construal. **RISC** = Relational-interdependent self-construal. **CISC** = Collective-interdependent self-construal. **HORCOL** = Horizontal collectivism. **VER** = Vertical collectivism. **PWE** = Protestant work ethic. **RPWE** = racialized Protestant work ethic. **IMRP** = Internal motivation to respond without prejudice. **EMRP** = External motivation to respond without prejudice. **MRS** = Modern Racism. **SYMR** = Symbolic racism. **RBRP** = Race-blindness, denial of racial privilege. **RBID** = Race-blindness, denial of institutional discrimination. **RBBR** = Race-blindness, denial of blatant racism. **SDO** = social dominance orientation. **WHITEG** = White guilt. **WHITEP** = White privilege. **POLITICAL** = Political orientation. **RACEID** = Racial identification. Responses to IMRP and EMRP were on a 9-point scale. Responses to RBRP, RBID, and RBBR were on a 6-point scale. Responses to all other measures were on a 7-point scale.

**Correlation between color-blindness and related constructs.** I conducted bivariate correlations to examine the relationships between all constructs measures (see Table 3). An examination of the correlations between color-blindness and other individual differences revealed four noteworthy observations. One, as predicted, independent self-construal was positively associated with support for color-blindness. I examine this relationship in more depth in a subsequent section. Two, stronger social dominance orientation was negatively related to White participants' support for color-blindness, consistent with previous work (Knowles et al., 2009; Levin et al., 2011; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). Three, White participants' internal motivation to respond without prejudice was positively associated with support for color-blindness. Lastly, and counter to my hypothesis, interdependent self-construal was also positively associated with support for color-blindness. As a result, I examined the relationship between

interdependent self-construal and support for color-blindness further in subsequent analyses.

Exploratory measures also revealed some interesting patterns. Responses to racism-blindness, a construct considered parallel to color-blindness in other social science disciplines (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2003), were unrelated to responses to more social psychological definitions of color-blindness (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2012). However, responses to racism-blindness were positively associated with responses to modern racism. This provides initial evidence to suggest that the work on color-blindness in other social science disciplines may have more in common with the work on modern racism in social psychology than the work on color-blindness. Additionally, endorsement of racialized Protestant work ethic was unrelated to support for color-blindness. This suggests that support for color-blindness may be independent from particular beliefs White Americans hold of African Americans' ability to adhere to core American values. Lastly, awareness of White privilege and feelings of White guilt were also unrelated to support for color-blindness. Perhaps Whites who acknowledge their privilege and experience White guilt may have competing motivations when it comes to supporting color-blindness. They may support color-blindness as a strategy for alleviating racial inequalities while simultaneously being aware of its potential pitfalls.

Table 3. Correlations between all individual differences measured in Study 1a (N=102)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	
1 KNOWL ES CB	1																								
2 SIY CB (5-item)	.67**	1																							
3 INDEP	.42**	.45**	1																						
4 HORIND	.37**	.17	.34**	1																					
5 VERIND	.12	-.01	-.03	.11	1																				
6 INTER	.50**	.31**	.20*	.24*	.21*	1																			
7 RISC	.38**	.38**	.29**	.13*	.17	.44**	1																		
8 CISC	.093	.16	.07	-.10	.21*	.31**	.48**	1																	
9 HORCOL	.46**	.36**	.50**	.27**	.12	.50**	.58**	.31**	1																
10 VERCOL	.55**	.41**	.40**	.20*	.15	.57**	.50**	.30**	.56**	1															
11 PWE	-.071	.02	.08	-.13	.01	-.03	-.19	.04	-.04	.12	1														
12 RPWE	.081	.16	.19	-.01	.11	.05	.05	.10	.14	.11	.56**	1													
13 IMRP	.52**	.32**	.38**	.33**	.06	.42**	.38**	.18	.55**	.32**	-.20*	.13	1												
14 EMRP	.11	-.11	-.07	.03	-.12	.29**	.17	.10	.22*	.10	-.03	-.11	.20*	1											
15 MRS	-.27**	-.13	-.09	-.14	.05	-.19	-.18	-.06	-.19	-.02	.52**	.23*	-.45**	.07	1										
16 SYMR	-.09	-.07	-.03	-.08	.10	-.06	-.10	-.09	-.10	.07	.57**	.48**	-.27**	-.01	.67**	1									
17 RBRP	.01	.06	.15	.04	-.03	-.04	-.06	-.05	.14	.10	.62**	.56**	.07	.01	.33**	.49**	1								
18 RBID	-.10	-.06	.11	.10	.08	.01	-.05	-.01	.19	-.01	.35**	.28**	-.13	.10	.46**	.49**	.34**	1							
19 RBBR	-.10	-.05	-.12	-.25*	.05	-.08	-.15	.02	-.15	.02	.50**	.36**	-.27**	.07	.52**	.61**	.37**	.35**	1						
20 SDO	-.37**	-.31**	-.30**	-.31**	.15	-.25*	-.24*	-.03	-.32**	-.22*	.40**	.17	-.61**	-.02	.57**	.48**	.14	.38**	.43**	1					
21 WHITEG	.06	-.067	-.03	-.08	-.01	.16	.09	.05	.18	.05	-.24*	-.24*	.31**	.27**	-.24*	.34**	-.23*	-.25*	.26**	-.22*	1				
22 WHITEP	.06	.02	.06	.07	-.06	.07	.18	.08	.12	.09	.63**	.50**	.14	.13	.44**	.63**	.69**	.38**	.61**	.27**	.37**	1			
23 PO	-.35**	-.22*	-.07	-.24*	-.01	-.19	-.04	.14	-.04	.07	.39**	.22*	-.40**	-.08	.32**	.41**	.30**	.43**	.41**	.50**	.26**	.39**	1		
24 RACEID	-.18	-.06	-.10	-.17	.16	.07	.15	.22*	-.02	-.03	.02	-.13	-.28**	.15	.24*	.03	-.16	.14	.00	.28**	-.02	.19	.15	1	

Note: INDEP = independent self-construal. HORIND = horizontal individualism. VERIND = vertical individualism. INTER = interdependent self-construal. RISC = Relational-interdependent self-construal. CISC = Collective-interdependent self-construal. HORCOL = horizontal collectivism. VERCOL = vertical collectivism. PWE = Protestant work ethic. IMRP = Internal motivation to respond without prejudice. EMRP = External motivation to respond without prejudice. MRS = Modern Racism. SYMR = Symbolic racism. RBRP = Race-blindness, denial of racial privilege. RBID = Race-blindness, denial of institutional discrimination. RBBR = Race-blindness, denial of blatant racism. SDO = social dominance orientation. PO = political orientation. RACEID = racial identification

**Independent self-construal predicts support for color-blindness controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences.** To test for the unique relationship between independent self-construal and support for color-blindness, I conducted a regression with support for color-blindness as the outcome and independent self-construal as the focal predictor while controlling for individual differences. The following analyses controlled for individual differences theorized to be related to independent self-construal and color-blindness. I was not able to control for all 20 individual difference variables due to two concerns based on the relatively small sample size in this study. One, including all individual differences increases the likelihood of obtaining a significant predictor by chance, thereby increasing the likelihood of a type I error (Maxwell, 2000). Two, including all individual differences also increases the likelihood of obtaining correlated predictors by chance, thereby increasing the likelihood of a type II error (Shoda, 2013). As a result, I controlled for the theoretically-relevant individual differences and combined scales that measured conceptually-related individual differences. For instance, the measure of interdependent self-construal used in the following analyses is an average of the responses to items from the following interdependent self-construal scales ( $\alpha = .92$ ): Singelis (1994) interdependent self-construal scale, relational-interdependent self-construal (Cross et al., 2000), collective-interdependent self-construal (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999), and horizontal and vertical collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Similarly, the measure of Protestant work ethic ( $\alpha = .86$ ) is an average of the responses to items from the Protestant work ethic scale and racialized Protestant work ethic scale (Sears & Henry, 2003). Lastly, the measure of modern racism used in subsequent analyses is an average of the responses to items from

the following scales ( $\alpha = .90$ ): modern racism (McConahay, 1986), symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2003), racism-blindness (Neville et al., 2000)<sup>9</sup>. Overall, I controlled for the following individual differences: interdependent self-construal, Protestant work ethic, political orientation, internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice, modern racism, and social dominance orientation.

**Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale.** The Singelis (1994) independent self-construal significantly predicted responses to the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale (see Table 4). Inspection of the beta for independent self-construal revealed that independent self-construal was associated with greater support for color-blindness.

**Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale.** Similarly, independent self-construal significantly predicted responses to the Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale. Inspection of the beta for independent self-construal showed that independent self-construal was associated with greater support for color-blindness (see Table 4).

*Table 4.* Color-blindness (CB) measures regressed on Singelis (1994) measure of independent self-construal controlling for individual differences in Study 1a (N = 102)

	Knowles et al. (2009) CB		Siy (2013a) CB	
	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value
Interdependent self-construal	.33	.001	.35	.001
Protestant Work Ethic	-.02	.82	.08	.49
Modern Racism	.12	.34	.11	.41
Social Dominance	-.02	.84	-.14	.28
IMRP	.24	.05	-.03	.84
EMRP	-.04	.68	-.19	.051
Political	-.24	.02	-.21	.054
Singelis (1994) independent self-	.18	.05	.27	.006

<sup>9</sup> Because responses to these measures were on different scales, the responses to these scale items were first standardized and then combined.

construal

**Note:** Betas reported are standardized. **IMRP** = internal motivation to respond without prejudice. **EMRP** = external motivation to respond without prejudice.

**Support for color-blindness predicts independent self-construals controlling for other individual differences.** I examined whether support for color-blindness predicted independent self-construal controlling for the same set of theoretically-relevant individual differences used in previous analyses. I conducted two regression analyses, one for each measure of color-blindness. Results revealed that greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale predicted independent self-construal controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences,  $\beta = .23$ ,  $t(91) = 2.00$ ,  $p = .05$ . Similarly, greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale predicted independent self-construal controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences,  $\beta = .30$ ,  $t(91) = 2.81$ ,  $p = .006$ .

**Interdependent self-construal and color-blindness.** I conducted similar regression analyses outlined above to investigate whether interdependent self-construal as measured by the Singelis (1994) scale predicted greater support for color-blindness controlling for individual differences. Once again, controls were limited to theoretically-relevant individual differences. Additionally, if an individual difference was measured in multiple ways, those measures were combined. As a result, the measure of independence used in the following analyses is an average of the responses to items from the following independent self-construal scales ( $\alpha = .75$ ): Singelis (1994) independent self-construal scale, horizontal individualism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), and vertical individualism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Similarly, the measure of Protestant work ethic ( $\alpha = .86$ ) is an average of the responses to items from the Protestant work ethic scale and racialized

Protestant work ethic scale (Sears & Henry, 2003). Lastly, the measure of modern racism used in subsequent analyses is an average of the responses to items from the following scales ( $\alpha = .90$ ): modern racism (McConahay, 1986), symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2003), racism-blindness (Neville et al., 2000).

Results revealed, contrary to my hypothesis, a significant positive relationship between interdependent self-construal and support for color-blindness as measured by the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale,  $\beta = .35$ ,  $t(91) = 3.84$ ,  $p < .001$ . Similarly, there was a significant positive relationship between interdependent self-construal and support for color-blindness as measured by the Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale,  $\beta = .23$ ,  $t(91) = 2.17$ ,  $p = .03$ .

**Support for color-blindness predicts interdependent self-construals controlling for other individual differences.** I examined whether support for color-blindness predicted interdependent self-construal controlling for the same set of theoretically-relevant individual differences used in the previous analysis. I conducted two regression analyses, one for each measure of color-blindness. Results revealed that greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale predicted interdependent self-construal controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences,  $\beta = .40$ ,  $t(91) = 3.84$ ,  $p < .001$ . Similarly, greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale predicted interdependent self-construal controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences,  $\beta = .22$ ,  $t(91) = 2.16$ ,  $p = .03$ .

### **Exploratory Analyses**

*Does type of independent self-construal matter?* I explored whether each measure of independent self-construal scale could uniquely predict responses to the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale when all measures of independent self-construal were entered simultaneously and when controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences. For this analysis, I used the combined measures of interdependent self-construal, Protestant work ethic, and modern racism. Results revealed weak evidence to suggest that a more specific measure of independent self-construal uniquely predicted responses to the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale when all three independent self-construal scales were entered simultaneously while also controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences (see Table 5). Similarly, there was weak evidence to suggest that more specific measures of independent self-construal uniquely predicted responses to the Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale when entered simultaneously with other measures of independent self-construal as well as theoretically-relevant individual differences. In fact, the general measure of independent self-construal predicted responses to the Siy (2013a) color-blindness questionnaire better than the more specific measures of independent self-construal.

*Table 5.* Color-blindness (CB) scales regressed on all measures of independent self-construal controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences (N = 102)

Predictor	Knowles et al. (2009) CB		Siy (2013a) CB	
	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value
Interdependent self-construal	.32	.002	.39	<i>p</i> < .001
Protestant work ethic	-.001	.99	.07	.56
Modern Racism	.09	.48	.13	.33
Social Dominance	-.01	.91	-.10	.43
IMRP	.22	.08	-.001	.99
EMRP	-.03	.77	-.22	.03
Political Orientation	-.22	.04	-.23	.04
Singelis (1994) Independent self-construal	.15	.11	.26	.01

Horizontal Individualism	.13	.15	-.03	.73
Vertical Individualism	.02	.83	-.12	.22

**Note:** Betas reported are standardized. **IMRP** = internal motivation to respond without prejudice. **EMRP** = external motivation to respond without prejudice.

*Does type of interdependent self-construal matter?* I explored whether each measure of interdependent self-construal scale could uniquely predict responses to the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale when all measures of interdependent self-construal were entered simultaneously and when controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences. For this analysis, I used the combined measures of independent self-construal ( $\alpha = .75$ ), Protestant work ethic, and modern racism. Results revealed weak evidence to suggest that a more specific measure of independent self-construal uniquely predicted responses to the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale when all measures of interdependent self-construal scales were entered simultaneously while also controlling for various individual differences (see Table 6). Turning to the Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale, there was a lack of evidence to suggest that more specific measures of interdependent self-construal uniquely predicted responses to the Siy (2013a) color-blindness scale when controlling for individual differences and alternative measures of independent self-construal.

*Table 6.* Color-blindness (CB) scales regressed on all measures of interdependent self-construal controlling for theoretically-relevant individual differences (N = 102)

Predictor	Knowles et al. (2009) CB		Siy (2013a) CB	
	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value
Independent self-construal	.15	.12	.13	.24
Protestant work ethic	-.01	.89	.12	.34
Modern Racism	.03	.81	.07	.61
Social Dominance	-.003	.97	-.16	.21
IMRP	.26	.03	.001	.99
EMRP	-.03	.72	-.19	.07
Political Orientation	-.12	.22	-.16	.19

Singelis (1994) interdependent self-construal	.20	.05	.08	.53
Horizontal Collectivism	-.04	.72	.02	.87
Vertical Collectivism	.34	.00	.16	.20
RISC	.04	.72	.19	.11
CISC	-.09	.34	.01	.94

**Note:** Betas reported are standardized. **IMRP** = internal motivation to respond without prejudice. **EMRP** = external motivation to respond without prejudice. **RISC** = relational-interdependent self-construal. **CISC** = collective-interdependent self-construal.

## Discussion

This study demonstrated that the more White Americans defined themselves as unique individuals, separate and distinct from others, the more they supported color-blindness, or the belief that people should minimize attention to racial and ethnic groups. This relationship appeared bi-directional. Independent self-construal predicted greater support for color-blindness and support for color-blindness predicted independent self-construal even when controlling for individual differences. The definition of individuals as separate and distinct from others may be intimately linked with the belief that people can be more clearly understood in separation from their racial and ethnic group.

Interestingly, color-blindness was also related to interdependent self-construal. While surprising, there are several potential explanations for this result. One, the interdependent self-construal scales may be tapping into ways of being interdependent that align with endorsing an independent self-construal, a hypothesis consistent with findings from a recent meta-analysis on collectivism scales (Oyserman et al., 2002). Indeed, a bivariate correlation analysis between independent and interdependent self-construals in this study revealed a significant positive relationship,  $r(102) = .20, p = .048$ . Two, interdependent self-construal is also associated with a desire to maintain harmony with others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) which is consistent one of the goals of color-

blindness to promote positive interracial relations (Jones, 1998; Plaut, 2010). Perhaps White participants with interdependent self-construal also more strongly endorse color-blindness because both are associated with motivations to maintain harmonious social relations.

Examining the relationships between color-blindness, internal motivation to respond without prejudice, and social dominance revealed that people's support for color-blindness was associated with benevolent intentions. The more people were internally motivated to respond without prejudice, the more they endorsed color-blindness. Additionally, the more people disliked group hierarchies within society, the more they endorsed color-blindness. At first, this relationship may appear to contradict the growing body of literature that associates color-blindness with prejudice and discrimination (Carr, 1997; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). How is it possible that egalitarian motives positively predict support for color-blindness if color-blindness can cause prejudicial outcomes? This seemingly contradictory relationship between egalitarian motives and support for color-blindness may be partially explained by the discrepancy between the assumed and actual consequences of color-blindness. People who hold egalitarian motives may support color-blindness based on the assumption that color-blindness promotes harmony among racial groups despite actual evidence of the contrary. Revealing this discrepancy, therefore, may attenuate the relationship between egalitarian motives and support for color-blindness.

Exploratory analyses revealed several noteworthy findings. One, racism-blindness (Neville et al., 2000) is empirically distinguishable from social psychological definitions of color-blindness. Two, there was little evidence to suggest that more specific measures

of independent self-construal could uniquely predict responses to the color-blindness scales in comparison to other measures of independent self-construal. Similarly, there was little evidence to suggest that more specific measures of interdependent self-construal could uniquely predict responses to the color-blindness scales in comparison to the other measures of interdependent self-construal. To examine the consistency of these findings, I conduct these exploratory analyses once again in the next study.

### **Study 1b**

Study 1b was designed to replicate the main findings from Study 1a using a non-college student sample. Additionally, I build on the previous study in four ways. First, I included two additional color-blindness scales (i.e., Levin et al., 2012; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012) to test whether the relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness applied to other established measures of color-blindness. These scales were selected because they were the only published scales examining support for color-blind beliefs available during the time this study was conducted. An empirical examination of how these different scales relate to independent self-construal can shed light on which forms of color-blindness are tied to independent self-construal.

Second, I expanded on my preliminary measure of color-blindness to develop an 11-item measure that was based on the two common ways color-blindness has been defined in the literature. These two ways include a form of color-blindness that prescribes minimizing attention to race and instead focusing on people's underlying similarities and a form of color-blindness that prescribes minimizing attention to race and instead focusing on people's underlying individuality. In developing items for this scale, I also attempted to account for the conceptual idiosyncrasies of each published scale. For

example, the color-blindness scale developed by Knowles and colleagues (2009) includes items that may also be tapping into general negative attitudes about race (e.g. “I wish people in this society would stop obsessing so much about race”). Additionally, the Levin et al. (2011) scale operationally defines color-blindness as the extent to which people believe we should minimize attention to groups more generally in favor of embracing a common American identity. Lastly, the Rosenthal & Levy (2012) operationally defines color-blindness as the belief that race does not matter for understanding people. I account for these conceptual idiosyncrasies in several ways. First, in contrast to the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale, all items in my scale refer to beliefs about how individuals should relate to racial and ethnic groups. Second, in contrast to the Levin et al. (2011) scale, my scale focuses solely on people’s views about race and ethnicity. Lastly, in contrast to the Rosenthal & Levy (2012) scale, my scale is more about minimizing attention to race, regardless of how much race may actually matter. Including all these color-blindness scales allowed me to statistically investigate whether existing items used to measure color-blindness can conform to a two-factor structure that differentiates between forms of color-blindness that emphasize focusing on people’s similarities versus individuality (Rosenthal & Levy, 2012).

Third, I examined the relationship between multiculturalism and self-construals by including Wolsko et al.’s (2006) multiculturalism measure. This measure defines support for multiculturalism as the extent to which people believe it is important to recognize the unique history and characteristics of different groups. It is possible that independent self-construal may be positively related to this measure of multiculturalism because this measure emphasizes uniqueness, which is an idea consistent with

independent self-construal. However, it is also possible that independent self-construal may be negatively related to this measure of multiculturalism because it highlights the primacy of groups. As for how multiculturalism relates to interdependent self-construal, I predicted these two constructs will be positively correlated because both have corresponding views about groups.

Fourth, this study also included racial minorities in order to examine whether the relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness applied across racial and ethnic groups. I predicted that the relationship between independent self-construal and support for color-blindness will apply across racial groups. With the inclusion of racial minorities, I also explored potential racial group differences in support for color-blindness, which have been inconsistent in past literature (Rosenthal & Levy, 2012; Ryan et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2010).

For exploratory purposes, the following scales were included: horizontal and vertical individualism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), horizontal and vertical collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), and collective-interdependent self-construal scale (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Including these measures allowed me to examine whether a more specific measure of independent and interdependent self-construal could uniquely predict responses to color-blindness scales when controlling for other measures of self-construal.

### **Participants**

Three hundred and seventy eight participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (291 White, 25 African American, 20 Latino American, 18 Asian American, 3 Native American, 19 mixed-race, and 2 who did not indicate a

race/ethnicity; 353 U.S.-born; 205 female) and participated in exchange for monetary compensation. The average age of each participant was 35.18 ( $SD = 13.11$ ).

### **Procedure and Additional Measures**

Participants completed an online survey that contained the same measures as the previous study, with the addition of two more color-blindness scales (Levin et al., 2011; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012) and one multiculturalism scale (Wolsko et al., 2006) and the omission of scales of White privilege (Swim & Miller, 1998), White guilt (Swim & Miller, 1998), and relational-interdependent self-construal (Cross et al., 2000). The order of the measures from first to last was: Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale ( $\alpha = .89$ ), Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale ( $\alpha = .84$ ), Rosenthal & Levy (2012) color-blindness scale ( $\alpha = .88$ ), Levin et al. (2011) color-blindness scale ( $\alpha = .86$ ), Wolsko et al. (2006) multiculturalism scale ( $\alpha = .88$ ), independent self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994;  $\alpha = .81$ ), interdependent self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994;  $\alpha = .79$ ), collective-interdependent self-construal scale (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999;  $\alpha = .94$ ), horizontal individualism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998;  $\alpha = .75$ ), vertical individualism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998;  $\alpha = .77$ ), horizontal collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998;  $\alpha = .76$ ), vertical collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998;  $\alpha = .78$ ), social dominance scale (Jost & Thompson, 2000;  $\alpha = .93$ ), external motivation to respond without prejudice scale (Plant & Devine, 1998;  $\alpha = .90$ ), internal motivation to respond without prejudice scale (Plant & Devine, 1998;  $\alpha = .89$ ), racism-blindness – denial of White privilege (Neville et al., 2000;  $\alpha = .88$ ), racism-blindness – denial of institutional discrimination (Neville et al., 2000;  $\alpha = .81$ ), racism-blindness – denial of blatant racism (Neville et al.,  $\alpha = .80$ ), symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2003;  $\alpha = .81$ ), modern racism scale (McConahay, 1986;  $\alpha =$

.91), Protestant work ethic (Levin et al., 1998;  $\alpha = .77$ ), and racial identification (Leach et al., 2008;  $\alpha = .92$ ). Presentation of the items in the Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale was randomized for each participant. Demographic questions were assessed at the end.

Below I review the new measures included in this study but not the previous study.

**Color-blind Beliefs.** In addition to including the Knowles et al., (2009) color-blindness scale, I also included color-blindness scales developed by Levin and Colleagues (2011) and Rosenthal and Levy (2012). An example item from the Levin et al. (2011) scale includes, “We should treat citizens of this country as Americans and not as members of particular ethnic, religious, or sexual communities.” An example item from the Rosenthal and Levy (2012) scale includes, “Racial and ethnic group memberships do not matter very much to who we are.” Additionally, I also developed an 11-item scale to complement the three other scales. An example item from this scale includes, “By minimizing racial and ethnic group differences, people can focus on what makes them similar to each other.” Participant’s responses were on scales from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree).

**Multiculturalism.** Endorsement of multiculturalism was measured using the Wolsko et al. (2006) multiculturalism scale ( $\alpha = .88$ ). An example item includes, “In order to live in a cooperative society, everyone must learn the unique histories and cultural experiences of different groups.” Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> One item was accidentally omitted from this scale (see appendix).

**Political Orientation.** Participants were asked to indicate their political orientation on a 9-point scale from 1(extremely liberal) to 9(extremely conservative).

**Social Dominance Orientation.** Social dominance was measured using the scale developed by Jost & Thompson (2000). This scale is a revised version of the original social dominance scale (Pratto et al., 1994) that balances the number of items in the scale that are positively and negatively worded. Responses were on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 11(strongly agree).

## Results

**Means and standard deviations of all measured constructs.** Table 7 shows the means and standard deviations for all constructs measured in the present study. I present overall means and standard deviations, and also break them down by participant race because I will examine participant race as a moderator in a subsequent section.

*Table 7.* Means and standard deviations for all individual differences measured in Study 1b (N = 378)

	All Participants		White Americans		Non-White Americans	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
1 KNOWLES CB	5.19	1.25	5.18 <sub>a</sub>	1.22	5.22 <sub>a</sub>	1.34
2 LEVIN CB	5.38	1.15	5.36 <sub>a</sub>	1.16	5.48 <sub>a</sub>	1.11
3 ROSENTHAL CB	3.91	0.39	3.82 <sub>b</sub>	1.34	4.20 <sub>a</sub>	1.50
4 SIY (2013b) CB	4.90	1.10	4.85 <sub>a</sub>	1.11	5.05 <sub>a</sub>	1.08
5 WOLSKOM	5.15	1.14	5.05 <sub>b</sub>	1.14	5.50 <sub>a</sub>	1.07
6 INDEP	5.13	0.84	5.13 <sub>a</sub>	0.82	5.13 <sub>a</sub>	0.92
7 HORIND	5.70	0.92	5.70 <sub>a</sub>	0.86	5.70 <sub>a</sub>	1.12
8 VERIND	4.15	1.20	4.09 <sub>a</sub>	1.23	4.37 <sub>a</sub>	1.07
9 INTER	4.63	0.78	4.58 <sub>b</sub>	0.78	4.79 <sub>a</sub>	0.79
10 CISC	4.12	1.16	4.03 <sub>b</sub>	1.17	4.40 <sub>a</sub>	1.08
11 HORCOL	4.96	0.99	4.91 <sub>a</sub>	0.97	5.13 <sub>a</sub>	1.02
12 VERCOL	5.09	1.11	5.03 <sub>a</sub>	1.11	5.28 <sub>a</sub>	1.11
13 PWE	3.27	1.16	3.22 <sub>a</sub>	1.20	3.43 <sub>a</sub>	1.00
14 IMRP	7.05	1.83	7.04 <sub>a</sub>	1.90	7.11 <sub>a</sub>	1.61
15 EMRP	4.33	2.22	4.22 <sub>a</sub>	2.18	4.70 <sub>a</sub>	2.33
16 MRS	3.08	1.35	3.14 <sub>a</sub>	1.38	2.87 <sub>a</sub>	1.22

17	SYMR	3.79	1.23	3.83 <sub>a</sub>	1.26	3.62 <sub>a</sub>	1.09
18	RBRP	3.54	1.27	3.68 <sub>b</sub>	1.30	3.06 <sub>a</sub>	1.04
19	RBID	3.66	1.09	3.76 <sub>a</sub>	1.13	3.33 <sub>a</sub>	0.88
20	RBBR	2.68	0.95	2.71 <sub>a</sub>	0.96	2.56 <sub>a</sub>	0.90
21	SDO	3.66	1.88	3.71 <sub>a</sub>	1.95	3.51 <sub>a</sub>	1.66
22	PO	4.38	2.18	4.45 <sub>a</sub>	2.21	4.16 <sub>a</sub>	2.07
23	RACEID	3.41	1.70	3.06 <sub>b</sub>	1.56	4.58 <sub>a</sub>	1.60

**Note:** **INDEP** = independent self-construal. **HORIND** = horizontal individualism. **VERIND** = vertical individualism. **INTER** = interdependent self-construal. **CISC** = Collective-interdependent self-construal. **HORCOL** = horizontal collectivism. **VERCOL** = vertical collectivism. **PWE** = Protestant work ethic. **IMRP** = Internal motivation to respond without prejudice. **EMRP** = External motivation to respond without prejudice. **MRS** = Modern Racism. **SYMR** = Symbolic racism. **RBRP** = Race-blindness, denial of racial privilege. **RBID** = Race-blindness, denial of institutional discrimination. **RBBR** = Race-blindness, denial of blatant racism. **SDO** = social dominance orientation. **PO** = political orientation. **RACEID** = racial identification. Responses to IMRP and EMRP were on a 9-point scale. Responses to RBRP, RBID, and RBBR were on a 6-point scale. Responses to SDO were on an 11-point scale. Responses to PO were on a 9-point scale. Responses to all other measures were on a 7-point scale. Subscripts that differ across row reflect statistically significant differences.

**Correlations between all measured constructs.** When examining the relationships between different color-blindness scales and measured individual differences, several consistent patterns emerge that replicate findings from Study 1a (see Table 8). One, independent self-construal was positively associated with greater endorsement of all measures of color-blindness. I perform a more in-depth analysis of this relationship in a subsequent section. Two, an internal motivation to respond without prejudice correlated positively with endorsement of all measures of color-blindness. Three, greater social dominance orientation was negatively associated with all measures of color-blindness. Four, interdependent self-construal was positively correlated with all measures of color-blindness. I perform a more in-depth analysis of this relationship in a subsequent section.


Next, I turned to examining the correlations between multiculturalism and other measured individual differences. As predicted, endorsement of multiculturalism was positively associated with interdependent self-construal. Interestingly, multiculturalism was also positively related to independent self-construal (see Table 8), a finding I discuss further in the discussion to this study. Multiculturalism inconsistently correlated with the four measures of color-blindness. Specifically, the Levin et al. (2011) and Siy (2013b) color-blindness scales were positively associated with support for multiculturalism. However, the Knowles et al. (2009) and Rosenthal and Levy (2012) color-blindness scales were non-significantly correlated with multiculturalism. Examining how multiculturalism relates to other individual differences revealed that multiculturalism was negatively related to modern racism, negatively related to social dominance orientation, positively correlated with an internal motivation to respond without prejudice, and was associated more with liberalism.

Table 8. Correlations between all individual differences measured in Study 1b (N = 378)

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
1	KNOWL ES CB	1																						
2	LEVIN CB	.70**	1																					
3	ROSEN THAL CB	.55**	.58**	1																				
4	SIY (2013b) CB	.67**	.69**	.66**	1																			
5	WOLSK OM	.07	.17**	-.02	.19**	1																		
6	INDEP	.18**	.18**	.07	.16**	.26**	1																	
7	HORIN D	.21**	.20**	.03	.15**	.23**	.48**	1																
8	VERIN D	-.01	-.04	-.03	-.05	.08	.10*	.17**	1															
9	INTER	.27**	.203*	.28**	.31**	.28**	-.03	-.04	.14**	1														
10	CISC	.07	-.003	.08	.11*	.31**	.08	-.06	.33**	.47**	1													
11	HORCO L	.23**	.26**	.21**	.31**	.36**	.34**	.11*	-.02	.53**	.42**	1												
12	VERCO L	.24**	.16**	.10*	.22**	.19**	.15**	.11*	.15**	.49**	.36**	.41**	1											
13	PWE	-.03	-.12*	.04	-.03	-.02	.06	-.05	.20**	.08	.18**	.09	0.13*	1										
14	IMRP	.38**	.47**	.26**	.41**	.31**	.07	.10*	-.22**	.23**	-.01	.25**	.08	-.31**	1									
15	EMRP	.01	-.08	-.02	-.05	.02	.24**	.17**	.18**	.14**	-.16**	-.07	.04	.04	-.05	1								
16	MRS	-.03	-.28**	-.08	-.21**	.36**	.00	-.04	.17**	-.09	.05	-.10*	.11*	.41**	-.57**	.09	1							
17	SYMR	.04	-.17**	-.06	.13**	.29**	.01	-.02	.17**	.00	.12*	-.04	.17**	.42**	.47**	.15**	.82**	1						
18	RBRP	.14**	-.002	.07	-.02	.28**	.05	.02	-.04	.03	-.03	.04	.16**	.44**	.22**	-.06	.52**	.55**	1					
19	RBID	.16**	-.03	.01	-.05	.30**	.06	.06	.16**	-.04	.05	-.06	.15**	.33**	.35**	.02	.70**	.75**	.56**	1				
20	RBBR	.04	-.15**	.07	-.08	.40**	-.07	-.12*	.12*	-.07	-.03	-.18**	.08	.40**	.47**	.11*	.73**	.66**	.53**	.61**	1			
21	SDO	-.18**	.45**	.17**	.32**	.31**	-.03	.13**	.31**	-.06	.15**	.17**	.10	.41**	.61**	.21**	.63**	.54**	.32**	.43**	.56**	1		
22	PO	.10*	-.13*	-.05	-.07	.14**	.08	.06	.15**	.07	.16**	.01	.26**	.32**	.20**	-.03	.50**	.48**	.46**	.49**	.44**	.46**	1	
23	RACEID	-.15**	-.13*	.14**	-.11*	.21**	.10	.08	.17**	.10	.34**	.15**	.20**	.09	-.12*	.03	.09	.04	.16**	-.02	-.05	.08	.13*	1


**Note:** **Note:** INDEP = independent self-construal. HORIND = horizontal individualism. VERIND = vertical individualism. INTER = interdependent self-construal. CISC = Collective-interdependent self-construal. HORCOL = horizontal collectivism. VERCOL = vertical collectivism. PWE = Protestant work ethic. IMRP = Internal motivation to respond without prejudice. EMRP = External motivation to respond without prejudice. MRS = Modern Racism. SYMR = Symbolic racism. RBRP = Race-blindness, denial of racial privilege. RBID = Race-blindness, denial of institutional discrimination. RBBR = Race-blindness, denial of blatant racism. SDO = social dominance orientation. PO = political orientation. RACEID = racial identification. \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$

**Factor analysis of color-blindness scales.** First, I conducted a factor analysis to investigate whether responses to items from the various color-blindness scales distinguished between a form of color-blindness that emphasizes focusing on people's similarities from a form of color-blindness that emphasizes focusing on people's individuality. Factor analyses using a principle components extraction method did not support this conclusion. Inspection of the scree plot revealed that responses to items from the various color-blindness scales were highly intercorrelated. There was no subset of items that had particularly high intercorrelations (see Figure 1). This analysis suggests that the items from across the color-blindness scales could be combined into one overall measure. However, keeping the scales separate allows one to compare the present results to previous work. Because of this, I chose to keep these scales in their original form and analyze each scale separately.



*Figure 1.* Scree plot from factor analysis of items from all color-blindness scales in Study 1b.

Next, I examined whether the color-blindness items I developed would conform to the hypothesized two-factor solution that distinguishes between two forms of color-blindness. A factor analysis using a principle components extraction method did not support a two-factor solution. Inspection of the scree plot revealed that responses to the items were highly intercorrelated. There was no subset of items with particularly high intercorrelations (see Figure 2). As a result, I proceeded to combine the 11-items in this scale into one measure and refer to it as the Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale.



*Figure 2.* Scree plot from factor analysis of items from the Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale in Study 1b.

**Independent self-construal predicts support for color-blindness.** In the following set of analyses, each color-blindness scale was regressed on the Singelis (1994)

measure of independent self-construal while controlling for various individual differences. These individual differences include: endorsement of multiculturalism (Wolsko et al., 2006), interdependent self-construal (Singelis, 1994), collective-interdependent self-construal (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999), horizontal and vertical collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), Protestant work ethic (Levin et al., 1998), internal motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), external motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), modern racism (McConahay, 1986), symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2000), the three racism-blindness subscales (Neville et al., 2000), social dominance orientation (Jost & Thompson, 2000), political orientation, racial identification, gender, race, and age. Exploratory measures of independent self-construal (i.e., horizontal and vertical individualism) were not considered controls because the current analysis sought to examine how independent self-construal predicts support for color-blindness. I explore the relationship between different measures of independent self-construal and how they relate to support for color-blindness in a subsequent section (see *exploratory analyses*).

***Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale.*** Consistent with Study 1a, independent self-construal predicted greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Knowles et al. (2009) scale even when controlling for various individual differences (see Table 9).

***Levin et al., (2011) color-blindness scale.*** There was a significant positive relationship between participant's independent self-construal and their endorsement of color-blindness as measured by the Levin et al. (2011) scale even when controlling for various individual differences (see Table 9).

**Rosenthal and Levy (2012) color-blindness scale.** There was a significant positive relationship between participant's independent self-construal and their endorsement of color-blindness as measured by the Rosenthal and Levy (2012) scale even when controlling for various individual differences (see Table 9).

**Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale.** As hypothesized, independent self-construal predicted greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale even when controlling for various individual differences (see Table 9).

*Table 9.* Color-blindness measures regressed on independent self-construal controlling for individual differences in Study 1b (N = 378)

	Knowles et al. (2009)		Levin et al. (2011)		Rosenthal & Levy (2012)		Siy (2013b)	
	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value
MULTI	-.05	.36	-.04	.48	-.17	.01	-.02	.70
INTER	.15	.01	.12	.04	.24	< .001	.16	.01
CISC	.03	.59	-.02	.74	.09	.16	.06	.28
HORCOL	.004	.95	.04	.49	.05	.40	.08	.19
VERCOL	.08	.14	.08	.15	-.04	.50	.09	.11
PWE	-.03	.56	.01	.90	.08	.19	.06	.25
IMRP	.35	< .001	.25	< .001	.23	.001	.26	< .001
EMRP	.06	.23	.02	.64	-.01	.79	-.01	.93
MRS	.04	.65	-.17	.06	.02	.83	-.05	.57
SYMR	-.07	.43	-.02	.80	-.17	.08	-.08	.40
RBRP	.01	.86	.05	.44	.01	.91	-.06	.36
RBID	.24	.001	.24	.001	.10	.18	.11	.15
RBBR	.14	.06	.15	.03	.28	< .001	.23	.002
SDO	-.13	.06	-.35	< .001	-.15	.04	-.23	.001
PO	.05	.37	-.05	.36	-.09	.16	-.03	.67
RACEID	-.18	.001	-.10	.05	-.18	.002	-.17	.002
Gender	.06	.23	-.05	.29	-.03	.49	-.02	.67
Race	-.10	.05	-.09	.07	-.17	.002	-.10	.04
age	.04	.49	.01	.77	-.01	.86	.06	.29
INDEP	.18	.001	.15	.004	.11	.04	.12	.03

**Note:** Betas reported are standardized. **MULTI** = multiculturalism **INTER** = interdependent self-construal. **CISC** = Collective-interdependent self-construal. **HORCOL** = horizontal collectivism. **VERCOL** = vertical collectivism. **PWE** = Protestant work ethic. **IMRP** = Internal motivation to respond without prejudice. **EMRP**

= External motivation to respond without prejudice. **MRS** = Modern Racism. **SYMR** = Symbolic racism. **RBRP** = Race-blindness, denial of racial privilege. **RBID** = Race-blindness, denial of institutional discrimination. **RBBR** = Race-blindness, denial of blatant racism. **SDO** = social dominance orientation. **PO** = political orientation. **RACEID** = racial identification. **INDEP** = independent self-construal.

*Examining racial group membership as a moderator.* To examine whether independent self-construal predicted responses to color-blindness differentially based on race, I conducted a moderation analysis for each measure of color-blindness with race as a moderator. To conduct each moderation analysis, first I mean-centered participants independent self-construal scores, dummy coded participants' racial group membership (1 – White, 0 – Not White), and multiplied these variables to create the interaction term. For each moderation analysis, I simultaneously regressed participants' color-blindness scores on independent self-construal, racial group membership and the interaction term in addition to including all other individual differences.

*Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale.* Moderation analysis revealed a main effect of independent self-construal,  $\beta = .24$ ,  $t(354) = 2.71$ ,  $p = .007$ , a main effect of racial group membership,  $\beta = -.10$ ,  $t(354) = 2.05$ ,  $p = .042$ , and a non-significant independent self-construal X racial group membership interaction,  $\beta = -.08$ ,  $t(354) = -.90$ ,  $p = .37$ .

*Levin et al. (2011) color-blindness scale.* Moderation analysis revealed a main effect of independent self-construal,  $\beta = .20$ ,  $t(354) = 2.27$ ,  $p = .024$ , a marginal main effect of racial group membership,  $\beta = -.09$ ,  $t(354) = -1.86$ ,  $p = .06$ , and a non-significant independent self-construal X racial group membership interaction,  $\beta = -.06$ ,  $t(354) = -.73$ ,  $p = .47$ .

*Rosenthal and Levy (2012) color-blindness scale.* Moderation analysis revealed a marginal main effect of independent self-construal,  $\beta = .18$ ,  $t(354) = 1.90$ ,  $p = .06$ , a main effect of racial group membership,  $\beta = -.17$ ,  $t(354) = -3.24$ ,  $p = .001$ , and a non-significant independent self-construal X racial group membership interaction,  $\beta = -.08$ ,  $t(354) = -.86$ ,  $p = .39$ .

*Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale.* Moderation analysis revealed a main effect of independent self-construal,  $\beta = .27$ ,  $t(354) = 3.03$ ,  $p = .003$ , a main effect of racial group membership,  $\beta = -.11$ ,  $t(354) = -2.21$ ,  $p = .03$ , and a significant independent self-construal X racial group membership interaction,  $\beta = -.19$ ,  $t(354) = -2.12$ ,  $p = .04$ . A simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that independent self-construal was positively associated with greater support for color-blindness controlling for individual differences for non-White Americans,  $\beta = .27$ ,  $t(354) = 3.03$ ,  $p = .003$ , but not for White Americans,  $\beta = .06$ ,  $t(354) = .94$ ,  $p = .35$ .

**Greater support for color-blindness predicts independent self-construal.** I conducted four regression analyses, one for each color-blindness measure, to investigate whether support for color-blindness predicted independent self-construal controlling for the same set of individual differences used in previous analyses.

Regression analysis revealed that greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale predicted independent self-construal controlling for various individual differences,  $\beta = .18$ ,  $t(355) = 3.46$ ,  $p = .001$ . Similarly, greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Levin et al. (2011) color-blindness scale predicted independent self-construal controlling for individual differences,  $\beta = .16$ ,  $t(355) = 2.93$ ,  $p = .004$ . Also, greater support for color-blindness as measured by the

Rosenthal and Levy (2012) color-blindness scale predicted independent self-construal controlling for individual differences,  $\beta = .11$ ,  $t(355) = 2.10$ ,  $p = .04$ . Lastly, regression analysis revealed that greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale predicted independent self-construal controlling for individual differences,  $\beta = .12$ ,  $t(355) = 2.24$ ,  $p = .03$ .

**Examining the relationship between interdependent self-construal and support for color-blindness.** To examine the relationship between color-blindness and interdependent self-construal, each color-blindness scale was regressed on the Singelis (1994) measure of interdependent self-construal while simultaneously controlling for various individual differences. These individual differences include: endorsement of multiculturalism (Wolsko et al., 2006), independent self-construal (Singelis, 1994), horizontal and vertical individualism (Triandis and Gelfand, 1998), internal motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), external motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), modern racism (McConahay, 1986), symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2000), the three racism-blindness subscales (Neville et al., 2000), social dominance orientation (Jost & Thompson, 2000), political orientation, racial identification, gender, race, and age. Exploratory measures of interdependent self-construal (i.e., collective-interdependent self-construal, horizontal and vertical collectivism) were not considered controls because the current analysis sought to examine how interdependent self-construal predicts support for color-blindness. I explore the relationship between different measures of interdependent self-construal and how they relate to support for color-blindness in a subsequent section (see *exploratory analyses*).

*Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale.* Interdependent self-construal predicted greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Knowles et al. (2009) scale even when controlling for various individual differences (see Table 10).

*Levin et al. (2011) color-blindness scale.* Interdependent self-construal predicted greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Levin et al. (2011) scale even when controlling for various individual differences (see Table 10).

*Rosenthal & Levy (2012) color-blindness scale.* Interdependent self-construal predicted greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Rosenthal and Levy (2012) scale even when controlling for various individual differences (see Table 10).

*Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale.* Interdependent self-construal predicted greater support for color-blindness as measured by the Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale even when controlling for various individual differences (see Table 10).

*Table 10.* Color-blindness measures regressed on interdependent self-construal controlling for individual differences in Study 1b (N = 378)

	Knowles et al. (2009)		Levin et al. (2011)		Rosenthal & Levy (2012)		Siy (2013b)	
	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value
MULTI	-.06	.29	-.05	.40	-.16	.01	-.008	.88
INDEP	.12	.02	.12	.02	.12	.04	.12	.03
HORIND	.14	.01	.08	.10	.03	.61	.08	.14
VERIND	.03	.59	.08	.10	.001	.99	.01	.92
PWE	-.02	.68	.01	.92	.09	.12	.08	.15
IMRP	.36	< .001	.27	< .001	.23	.001	.27	< .001
EMRP	.07	.18	.02	.75	-.01	.85	-.001	.99
MRS	.05	.60	-.15	.09	.02	.84	-.05	.60
SYMR	-.08	.34	-.03	.74	-.16	.09	-.07	.44
RBRP	.02	.77	.08	.23	< .001	.99	-.05	.44
RBID	.22	.003	.21	.004	.10	.19	.10	.17
RBBR	.15	.04	.16	.02	.26	.001	.22	.002
SDO	-.11	.12	-.35	< .001	-.15	.05	-.21	.003
PO	.05	.37	-.06	.30	-.09	.14	-.02	.70
RACEID	-.17	.001	-.10	.04	-.16	.004	-.14	.01

Gender	.06	.19	-.04	.43	-.03	.57	-.02	.76
Race	-.10	.04	-.09	.05	-.16	.002	-.11	.04
age	.06	.28	.05	.36	-.01	.80	.07	.21
INTER	.21	< .001	.17	< .001	.28	< .001	.27	< .001

**Note:** Betas reported are standardized. **MULTI** = multiculturalism. **INDEP** = independent self-construal . **HORIND** = horizontal individualism . **VERIND** = vertical individualism. **PWE** = Protestant work ethic . **IMRP** = Internal motivation to respond without prejudice . **EMRP** = External motivation to respond without prejudice . **MRS** = Modern Racism . **SYMR** = Symbolic racism . **RBRP** = Race-blindness, denial of racial privilege . **RBID** = Race-blindness, denial of institutional discrimination. **RBBR** = Race-blindness, denial of blatant racism. **SDO** = social dominance orientation. **PO** = political orientation. **RACEID** = racial identification. **INTER** = interdependent self-construal.

**Examining racial group membership as a moderator.** To examine whether interdependent self-construal predicted responses to color-blindness differentially based on race, I conducted a moderation analysis for each measure of color-blindness with race as a moderator. To conduct each moderation analysis, first I mean-centered participants interdependent self-construal scores, dummy coded participants' racial group membership (1 – White, 0 – Not White), and multiplied these variables to create the interaction term. For each moderation analysis, I simultaneously regressed participants' color-blindness scores on interdependent self-construal, racial group membership and the interaction term in addition to including all other individual differences.

*Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale.* Moderation analysis revealed a main effect of interdependent self-construal,  $\beta = .24$ ,  $t(355) = 2.63$ ,  $p = .009$ , a main effect of racial group membership,  $\beta = -.10$ ,  $t(355) = -2.06$ ,  $p = .04$ , and a non-significant interdependent self-construal X racial group membership interaction,  $\beta = -.04$ ,  $t(355) = -.40$ ,  $p = .69$ .

*Levin et al. (2011) color-blindness scale.* Moderation analysis revealed a main effect of interdependent self-construal,  $\beta = .24$ ,  $t(355) = 2.72$ ,  $p = .007$ , a marginal main

effect of racial group membership,  $\beta = -.09$ ,  $t(355) = -1.90$ ,  $p = .06$ , and a non-significant interdependent self-construal X racial group membership interaction,  $\beta = -.09$ ,  $t(355) = -1.00$ ,  $p = .32$ .

*Rosenthal and Levy (2012) color-blindness scale.* Moderation analysis revealed a main effect of interdependent self-construal,  $\beta = .40$ ,  $t(355) = 4.04$ ,  $p < .001$ , a main effect of racial group membership,  $\beta = -.16$ ,  $t(355) = -3.00$ ,  $p = .003$ , and a non-significant interdependent self-construal X racial group membership interaction,  $\beta = -.14$ ,  $t(355) = -1.38$ ,  $p = .17$ .

*Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale.* Moderation analysis revealed a main effect of interdependent self-construal,  $\beta = .38$ ,  $t(355) = 4.00$ ,  $p < .001$ , a main effect of racial group membership,  $\beta = -.10$ ,  $t(355) = -1.99$ ,  $p = .047$ , and a non-significant interdependent self-construal X racial group membership interaction,  $\beta = -.13$ ,  $t(355) = -1.38$ ,  $p = .17$ .

### **Exploratory Analyses**

*Does the type of independence and interdependence matter?* First, I explored whether each measure of independent self-construal could uniquely predict responses to the color-blindness scales when controlling for the other measures of independent self-construal as well as other individual differences. Across the four color-blindness scales, there was a lack of evidence to suggest that a more specific measure of independent self-construal uniquely predicted responses to the color-blindness scales when controlling for other measures of independent self-construal and other individual differences (see Table 11).

Next, I turned to explore whether each measure of interdependent self-construal could uniquely predict responses to the color-blindness scales controlling for other measures of interdependent self-construal as well as other individual differences. Results across the four color-blindness measures revealed that out of all the interdependent self-construal scales, the Singelis (1994) measure of interdependent self-construal appeared to be the strongest predictor. Evidence that more specific measures of interdependent self-construal uniquely predicted responses to the color-blindness scales was weak.

*Table 11.* Color-blindness measures regressed on multiple measures of independent and interdependent self-construal controlling for individual differences in Study 1b (N = 378)

	Knowles et al. (2009)		Levin et al. (2011)		Rosenthal & Levy (2012)		Siy (2013b)	
	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value	$\beta$	<i>p</i> -value
MULTI	-.07	.19	-.05	.34	-.18	.004	-.04	.53
PWE	-.02	.66	.004	.94	.08	.17	.07	.21
IMRP	.35	< .001	.26	< .001	.23	.001	.25	< .001
EMRP	.07	.18	.02	.68	-.01	.84	.001	.99
MRS	.06	.56	-.16	.08	.03	.80	-.05	.62
SYMR	-.10	.27	-.03	.70	-.18	.06	-.09	.30
RBRP	.01	.85	.06	.31	.01	.94	-.06	.35
RBID	.22	.003	.21	.003	.10	.20	.10	.19
RBBR	.16	.03	.16	.02	.28	< .001	.24	.001
SDO	-.12	.09	-.35	< .001	-.15	.05	-.21	.002
PO	.04	.46	-.06	.29	-.09	.15	-.03	.59
RACEID	-.19	< .001	-.11	.03	-.18	.001	-.18	.001
Gender	.06	.21	-.04	.41	-.04	.48	-.02	.65
Race	-.10	.04	-.09	.06	-.17	.001	-.11	.04
Age	.05	.32	.04	.43	-.01	.90	.06	.24
INDEP	.11	.06	.09	.10	.09	.13	.07	.21
HORIND	.15	.01	.08	.11	.05	.36	.10	.07
VERIND	.02	.75	.09	.08	-.01	.86	-.07	.92
INTER	.15	.01	.11	.06	.24	< .001	.16	.01
CISC	.05	.38	-.02	.67	.10	.13	.08	.19
HORCOL	.02	.72	.07	.26	.06	.38	.09	.15
VERCOL	.07	.20	.07	.21	-.04	.47	.08	.13

**Note:** Betas reported are standardized. **MULTI** = multiculturalism **PWE** = Protestant work ethic. **IMRP** = Internal motivation to respond without prejudice. **EMRP** = External

motivation to respond without prejudice. **MRS** = Modern Racism. **SYMR** = Symbolic racism. **RBRP** = Race-blindness, denial of racial privilege. **RBID** = Race-blindness, denial of institutional discrimination. **RBBR** = Race-blindness, denial of blatant racism. **SDO** = social dominance orientation. **PO** = political orientation. **RACEID** = racial identification. **INDEP** = independent self-construal. **HORIND** = horizontal individualism. **VERIND** = vertical individualism. **INTER** = interdependent self-construal. **CISC** = Collective-interdependent self-construal. **HORCOL** = horizontal collectivism. **VERCOL** = vertical collectivism.

## Discussion

Across four different measures of color-blindness, I replicated the findings from Study 1a and showed that the more people define themselves as separate and distinct from others, the more they endorse color-blindness. Furthermore, this relationship remained even when controlling for individual differences. Interestingly, the relationship between color-blindness and independent self-construal also existed when color-blindness was broadly defined as downplaying religious and sexual identities in favor of seeing people as Americans. This suggests that independent self-construal may be tied to a more global belief about downplaying the importance of historically stigmatized groups or groups that may divide Americans.

Consistent with predictions, three out of four moderation analyses revealed that the relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness applied to White Americans and racial minorities. The one color-blindness measure that did show evidence of moderation, the Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale, suggested that independent self-construal was associated with greater support for color-blindness particularly for racial minorities. Perhaps the lack of relationship for White Americans may reflect a general tendency for Whites to construe race as a trait characteristic as opposed to a social group (Moya & Markus, 2010). However, because this result did not appear for the other color-

blindness scales, it appears to be a result that was limited to the particularities of the scale I developed and was not more broadly true for the other scales.

As predicted, support for multiculturalism was positively related to interdependent self-construal. The more people defined themselves as connected to others, the more they supported multiculturalism. Interestingly, multiculturalism was also correlated with independent self-construal. I surmise that this relationship may be driven by the portrayal of multiculturalism as a view about acknowledging how groups bringing something unique to the table, which is consistent with independent motives to be seen as unique and different from others.

Factor analysis of all the color-blindness scales revealed that items across all the different measures of color-blindness were highly intercorrelated and could be best described by one factor. These results paint an encouraging picture of how to interpret previous work on color-blindness that has used one of these published measures. That is, it may be possible to compare the results of color-blindness studies that use different existing measures of color-blindness because there is evidence to suggest that the scales are highly related.

Together, Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate the relationship between support for color-blindness and independent self-construal. However, a correlational approach does not rule out the possibility that an unmeasured individual difference may still be accounting for the relationship between color-blindness and independent self-construal. Additionally, a correlational approach makes it difficult to conclude whether endorsement of color-blindness causes an independent self-construal or whether it is the reverse. I hypothesize that color-blindness beliefs and independent self-construal have a

bi-directional relationship, and subsequent studies test this idea using experimental manipulations. In the next chapter, I examine whether priming an independent self-construal can cause greater endorsement of color-blindness.

### **Conclusion**

Across two studies, I showed that the more White Americans and racial minorities define themselves as individuals, separate and distinct from their groups, the more they support color-blindness. This relationship remained after controlling for various individual differences theorized to be related to color-blindness and independent self-construal. Interestingly, I found consistent evidence to suggest that interdependent self-construal may also be tied to greater support for color-blindness. I proposed that this relationship may be driven by a common association with the motivation to maintain harmonious relations. I investigate these relationships further by experimentally manipulating self-construal in the next chapter.

### **Chapter 3: Examining the Causal Relationship Between Independent Self-Construal and Color-blindness**

Chapter 3 builds on previous findings by examining whether independent self-construals can cause greater support for color-blindness. I explore this question in two studies. In Study 2, I examined whether independent self-construal causes greater support for color-blindness compared to interdependent self-construal or a baseline condition. Including the baseline condition also allowed me to address the possibility proposed in the previous studies that interdependent self-construals may also cause greater support for color-blindness. In Study 3, I examined whether independent self-construals can cause more positive evaluations of companies that endorse color-blind policies than interdependent self-construals. Examining how independent self-construals can cause greater support for color-blindness may help explain the appeal color-blindness holds in many domains of American society.

#### **Study 2: Can Independent Self-construal Cause Greater Endorsement of Color-blindness?**

Study 2 examined the causal relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness. Although there is a tendency for people within American cultural contexts to endorse an independent self-construal, Americans have access to both independent and interdependent self-construals (Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1995) and can shift between self-construals depending on context (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999; Oyserman & Lee, 2007).

These shifts in self-construal can be reliably manipulated through the use of experimental primes (for a review see Oyserman & Lee, 2008). The three most common

priming techniques used to manipulate self-construals include the Similarities and Differences From Family and Friends task (SDFF) (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991), the Sumerian Warrior Story task (Trafimow et al., 1991), and the Pronoun Circling Task (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). In the SDFF task, participants are asked to either think about their similarities or differences from their family and friends. In the Sumerian Warrior Story task, participants are asked to read a paragraph about a Sumerian warrior who makes decisions out of self-interest or out of loyalty to his family. In the Pronoun Circling Task, participants are asked to read and circle pronouns in a paragraph written in first person singular or plural about a day in the city. Out of these three primes, I chose to use the pronoun-circling task (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999) as my manipulation of self-construal because it is a tightly controlled experimental manipulation that shares no semantic similarity to the color-blindness measures.

In the present study, participants were primed with an independent self-construal, interdependent self-construal, or were not primed. Participants then completed a survey that assessed their support for color-blindness using four color-blindness scales used in the previous study: Knowles et al. (2009), Levin et al. (2011), Rosenthal & Levy (2012), and Siy (2013b). I hypothesized that participants primed with an independent self-construal would support color-blindness more than participants primed with an interdependent self-construal. However, the results from Study 1a and 1b also suggest the alternative possibility: that participants primed with interdependent self-construal would endorse color-blind beliefs more than participants primed with an independent self-construal. I test both hypotheses by including a no prime condition. As for the no prime condition, because people are known to vary in the chronic salience independent and

interdependent self-construal (Oyserman & Lee, 2008), I hypothesized that support for color-blindness in this condition would fall between the two other conditions.

In addition to testing the main hypothesis, this study examined whether currently published color-blindness scales could differentiate between two hypothesized forms of color-blindness. These two forms of color-blindness include one that emphasizes a focus on people's similarities and another that emphasizes a focus on people's individuality (Rosenthal & Levy, 2012).

### **Participants**

Three hundred and eighty nine University of Washington students (213 White, 123 Asian American, 11 Latinos, 2 African American, 1 Native American, 36 mixed race, and 3 who did not indicate their race/ethnicity) participated in exchange for partial course credit in a psychology course. There were no significant main effects of gender or gender by condition interactions. There were no significant main effects of race or race by condition interactions. Therefore, all analyses collapsed across gender and race.

### **Procedure**

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which they completed an independent self-construal prime, an interdependent self-construal prime, or no prime. For both prime conditions, participants were told they would be engaging in a task "to clear their mind," which required them to read and circle the pronouns in a short passage. In the independent self-construal condition, participants read and circled the pronouns found in the following passage (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999):

I go to the city often. My anticipation fills me as I see the skyscrapers come into view. I allow myself to explore every corner, never letting an attraction escape me. My voice fills the air and street. I see all the sights, I window shop, and everywhere I go I see my reflection looking back at me in the glass of a hundred

windows. At nightfall I linger, my time in the city almost over. When finally I must leave, I do so knowing that I will soon return. The city belongs to me.

In the interdependent self-construal condition participants read and circled the pronouns found in the following passage:

We go to the city often. Our anticipation fills us as we see the skyscrapers come into view. We allow ourselves to explore every corner, never letting an attraction escape us. Our voices fill the air and street. We see all the sights, we window shop, and everywhere we go we see our reflections looking back at us in the glass of a hundred windows. At nightfall we linger, our time in the city almost over. When finally we must leave, we do so knowing that we will soon return. The city belongs to us.

Participants in the control condition proceeded directly to the questionnaire, which included the four color-blindness scales. The scales were presented in the following order: Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale ( $\alpha = .83$ ), Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale ( $\alpha = .80$ ), Rosenthal & Levy (2012) color-blindness scale ( $\alpha = .83$ ), and Levin et al., (2011) color-blindness scale ( $\alpha = .80$ ).<sup>11</sup> Demographics were collected at the end.


## Results

**Factor analysis of color-blindness scales.** First, I conducted factor analysis to investigate whether responses to items from the various color-blindness scales would conform to a hypothesized two-factor solution that distinguished between the similarity form of color-blindness and the individuality form of color-blindness. Consistent with the previous study, factor analysis using a principle components extraction method did not support this conclusion. Inspection of the scree plot revealed that the items from the various color-blindness scales were highly intercorrelated, indicating a single factor.

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<sup>11</sup>The Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness scale, Rosenthal and Levy (2012) color-blindness scale, and Levin et al. (2011) color-blindness scale were added a third of the way into data collection.

There were no clusters of items with particularly high intercorrelations (see Figure 3). Although this analysis suggests that I should combine all the items into one overall measure, I chose to keep the scales in their original form for similar reasons outlined in Study 1b,



*Figure 3.* Scree plot from factor analysis of items from all color-blindness scales in Study 2.

I also conducted a second factor analysis to examine whether the color-blindness items I developed (the Siy color-blindness scale) could distinguish between the two hypothesized forms of color-blindness. A factor analysis using a principle components extraction method did not support a two-factor solution. Inspection of the scree plot revealed that the items were highly intercorrelated. There was no subset of items with particularly high intercorrelations (see Figure 4). Therefore, I proceeded to combine the 11-items into one measure.




Figure 4. Scree plot from factor analysis of items from the Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale in Study 2.

### Self-construal and support for color-blindness

*Knowles et al., (2009) color-blindness scale.* A 3 (Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal vs. no prime) between-subjects ANOVA on the Knowles et al. (2009) color-blindness revealed no main effect of Condition,  $F(2,252) = .35, p = .71$ . However, the means were in the theoretically predicted direction (see Table 12).

*Levin et al. (2011) color-blindness scale.* A 3 (Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal vs. no prime) between-subjects ANOVA on the Levin et al., (2011) color-blindness revealed no main effect of Condition,  $F(2,252) = .05, p = .95$  (see Table 12).

**Rosenthal et al. (2012) color-blindness scale.** A 3 (Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal vs. no prime) between-subjects ANOVA on the Rosenthal et al. (2012) color-blindness revealed no main effect of Condition,  $F(2,252) = .86, p = .43$ . However, the means between conditions were in the theoretically predicted direction (see Table 12).

**Siy (2013b) Color-blindness Scale.** A (Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal vs. no prime) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the Siy (2013b) color-blindness revealed no main effect of Condition,  $F(2,386) = 1.74, p = .18$ . However, examination of simple effects revealed a marginally significant tendency for participants primed with independent self-construal to endorse Siy (2013b) color-blindness ( $M = 4.68, SD = .95$ ) more than participants primed with interdependent self-construal ( $M = 4.48, SD = 1.00$ ),  $p = .07, d = .21$ .

*Table 12.* Means and standard deviations for each color-blindness scale broken down by condition in Study 2.

	Independent Self- Construal		Interdependent Self- construal		No Prime	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
KNOWLES CB	4.99	1.11	4.85	1.23	4.87	1.07
LEVIN CB	5.01	1.02	4.97	0.99	5.01	1.04
ROSENTHAL CB	4.72	1.16	3.50	1.13	3.55	1.1
SIY (2013b) CB	4.68	0.95	4.48	1.00	4.63	0.87

**Note:** Responses to scales were all on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

## Discussion

Across four different measures of color-blindness, I found limited evidence to suggest that independent self-construal can cause greater support for color-blindness. Specifically, there was a trend for people primed with independent self-construal to

support color-blindness more than people primed with interdependent self-construal when color-blindness was measured using the Siy (2013b) color-blindness scale. There are several reasons to explain these weak effects. One, my experimental manipulation of self-construal, the pronoun circling task (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999), may have been too weak to produce statistically detectable differences on endorsement of color-blindness. Indeed, the effect sizes using the pronoun circling task on outcomes related to self-concept have traditionally been small (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Future work should look at alternative, stronger experimental manipulations of independent self-construal to rule out this possibility. Two, it is possible that the effect of independent self-construal on support for color-blindness may be stronger for alternative forms of color-blindness that are not captured by the present color-blindness measures. I attempt to re-investigate whether independent self-construal causes greater support for color-blindness in the next study.

### **Study 3: Can Independent Self-Construals Cause People to Endorse Companies that Support Color-blind Policies?**

Study 3 builds on Study 2 by examining whether independent self-construals can cause people to endorse institutions that promote color-blind policies. This is an important consideration based on work showing that people's support for abstract beliefs do not necessarily correspond to their support for the same beliefs in application (see Zimmerman & Reyna, in press). Color-blindness is embedded within the practices and policies across many domains of American society. For example, many companies develop diversity statements that can evoke elements of color-blindness (Plaut, 2002). Can the appeal of these color-blind statements and the companies that promote them be

due to the tendency of people from American cultural contexts to endorse independent self-construals?

In the present study, participants were primed with an independent or interdependent self-construal and asked to form impressions of companies with mission statements that evoked color-blind or multicultural beliefs. Consistent with past work that shows these beliefs shape people's sense of belonging and impression of a company (Plaut et al., 2011; Purdie-Vaughns et al., 2008), I measured participants' impressions and sense of belonging to each company. I hypothesized that participants primed with an independent self-construal would have more positive impressions and feel a greater sense of belonging at a company with a color-blind mission statement than participants primed with an interdependent self-construal. In contrast, I hypothesized that participants primed with an interdependent self-construal would have more positive impressions and feel a greater sense of belonging at a company with a multiculturalism policy than participants primed with an interdependent self-construal.

### **Participants**

One hundred and thirty-three University of Washington students (82 Whites, 32 Asian Americans, 6 Latino Americans, 3 African Americans, 10 Mixed race; 94 females) participated in exchange for participant pool credit.

### **Procedure**

Participants were primed with an independent or interdependent self-construal using the same pronoun circling task used in Study 2. Participants were then asked to imagine themselves going on a job interview at two different companies, Company A and Company B. They were told that these companies were identical in terms of what they

would be doing, their salary and benefits, and the number of hours they would be working. The only difference across these two companies was their mission statements, which evoked either color-blind or multicultural beliefs. These color-blind and multicultural statements came in two versions to ensure that any findings were not due to something idiosyncratic about any one set of statements. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two following versions:

#### Version One

Color-blind 1: Our company recognizes that the way to cultivate a talented, diverse workforce is by looking beyond people's group backgrounds, such as their race, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, and disability status. Ultimately, regardless of the groups to which they belong, people are fundamentally the same. We aim to cast aside these surface-level group differences in order to form a united community.

Multiculturalism 1: Our company recognizes that the way to cultivate a talented, diverse workforce is by acknowledging people's group backgrounds, such as their race, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, and disability status. Ultimately, people are shaped by the groups to which they belong. We aim to recognize these meaningful group differences in order to form a united community.

#### Version Two

Color-blind 2: We aim to recruit and retain talent by disregarding group differences such as race, ethnicity, nationality, disability status, and gender. We believe that these group differences are superficial distinctions and that at their core, people are fundamentally the same.

Multiculturalism 2: We aim to recruit and retain talent by acknowledging and appreciating group differences such as race, ethnicity, nationality, disability status, and gender. We believe these group differences to be meaningful distinctions that shape who people become.

The presentation order of color-blind and multicultural statements was counterbalanced so that some participants saw the color-blind statement first while others saw the multiculturalism statement first.

Each time participants viewed a company's statement, they were asked to respond to a set of questions about the company (Plaut et al., 2011; Purdie-Vaughns et al., 2008) that measured their evaluation of the company, sense of belonging with the company, and sense of values compatibility with the company. Demographics were collected at the end.

Evaluation of the company was measured by asking participants how much they agreed with the seven following statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree;  $\alpha$ 's = .94-.93): "I would like to work at this company," "I would work hard at this company," "I would respect this company," "This company would be an intelligent company to work for," "I would be confident in this company's success," "I think this company would inspire me to do the best job that I can," and "I would be willing to put in a great deal of effort to help this company become successful."

Feelings of belonging were measured by asking participants how much they agreed with the three following statements on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree;  $\alpha$  = .90-.91): "I think I could 'be myself at this company,'" "I would feel welcomed at this company," and "I would feel a sense of fit at this company."

Values compatibility was measured by asking participants how much they agreed with the four following statements on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree;  $\alpha$  = .82-.88): "This company's values are incompatible with my own values (reverse-scored)," "this company and I share the same perspective," "I think that my values and this company's values are similar," and "I endorse this company's values."

## Results

**Collapsing across block.** First I examined whether I could collapse across Block. A 2(Statement: color-blind vs. multiculturalism) within by 2(Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal) between by 2(Version: one vs. two) between by 2(Block: color-blind first vs. multiculturalism first) between mixed-models ANOVA revealed no theoretically-relevant effects of block on any of the dependent variables.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, I collapsed across block.

**Evaluation of the company.** A 2(Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal) between by 2(Version: one vs. two) between by 2(Statement: color-blind vs. multicultural) within mixed-model ANOVA on evaluation of the company revealed only a Statement by Version interaction,  $F(1,129) = 4.21, p = .042, \eta_p^2 = .03$ . There was a trend for participants to evaluate the company with the version two color-blind statement more positively than the company with the version one color-blind statement. In contrast, there was a trend for participants to evaluate the company with the version two multicultural statement less positively than the company with the version two multicultural statement. However, these simple effects were non-significant,  $p > .17$ . There were no other main effects, all  $p$ 's  $> .70$ , or interactions, all  $p$ 's  $> .14$ .

**Feelings of Belonging.** A 2(Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal) between by 2(Version: one vs. two) between by 2(Statement: color-blind vs. multicultural) within mixed-model ANOVA on feelings of belonging revealed a

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<sup>12</sup> There was a significant Statement by Block interaction on sense of belonging,  $F(1,125) = 9.26, p = .003$ , and on values compatibility,  $F(1,125) = 13.85, p < .001$ . Participants felt a greater sense of belonging and greater values compatibility to companies with color-blind statements when these statements were presented first than second. Similarly, participants felt a greater sense of belonging and greater values compatibility to companies with multicultural statements when these statements were presented first than second. There were no other main effects or interactions with Block on any of the dependent variables,  $p$ 's  $> .15$ .

Prime by Version interaction,  $F(1,129) = 5.89$ ,  $p = .02$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .04$ . Participants primed with independent self-construal felt a weaker sense of belonging to the version one statements ( $M = 4.62$ ,  $SD = .73$ ) than version two statements ( $M = 5.15$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ),  $p = .01$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .05$ . Participants primed with interdependent self-construal did not differ in their sense of belonging across the two versions,  $p = .34$ . There was also a marginal Statement by Version interaction,  $F(1,129) = 3.29$ ,  $p = .07$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .03$ . Participants felt a lesser sense of belonging to the version one color-blind statement ( $M = 4.59$ ,  $SD = 1.19$ ) than the version two color-blind statement ( $M = 5.04$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ),  $p = .05$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .03$ . Participants did not differ in their sense of belonging between the two multiculturalism statements,  $p = .56$ . There were no other main effects,  $p$ 's  $> .27$ , or interactions,  $p$ 's  $> .14$ .

**Values compatibility.** A 2(Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal) between by 2(Version: one vs. two) between by 2(Statement: color-blind vs. multicultural) within mixed-model ANOVA on values compatibility revealed only a marginal Prime by Version interaction,  $F(1,129) = 3.34$ ,  $p = .07$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .03$ . There was a trend for participants in the independent self-construal prime condition to feel greater values compatibility with companies that had version two statements than companies that had version one statements. In contrast, there was a trend for participants primed with interdependent self-construal to feel greater values compatibility with companies that had version one statements than companies that had version two statements. However, these simple effects were non-significant,  $p > .11$ . There were no other main effects,  $p$ 's  $> .46$ , or interactions,  $p$ 's  $> .16$ .

**Examining the potential moderating role of gender and race.** First, I examined whether the hypothesized Prime by Statement interaction was moderated by gender. A

2(Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal) between by 2(Version: one vs. two) between by 2(Gender: male vs. female) between by 2(Statement: color-blind vs. multicultural) within mixed-model ANOVA on all dependent variables revealed neither Prime by Statement by Gender interaction, all  $p$ 's > .28, nor Prime by Statement by Gender by Version interaction, all  $p$ 's > .42, on any of the dependent variables.

Second, I examined whether the hypothesized Prime by Statement interaction was moderated by race. A 2(Prime: independent self-construal vs. interdependent self-construal) between by 2(Version: one vs. two) between by 2(race: White vs. non-White) between by 2(Statement: color-blind vs. multicultural) within mixed-model ANOVA on all dependent variables revealed neither Prime by Statement by Race interaction, all  $p$ 's > .13, nor Prime by Statement by Race by Version interaction, all  $p$ 's > .20, on any of the dependent variables.

**Other analyses.** The design of this study allowed me to conduct two follow-up analyses. One, I had opportunity to analyze participants' responses from the first statement only. These follow-up analyses revealed no theoretically-relevant significant differences on any of the dependent variables. Two, I was able to analyze the data separated by version of statements used. These follow-up analyses also revealed no theoretically-relevant significant differences on any of the dependent variables.

## **Discussion**

An experimental manipulation of self-construal revealed no significant difference in participants' evaluation, sense of belonging, and sense of values compatibility at companies that supported color-blind or multiculturalism policies. These results did not

change depending on whether the goal of the mission statement was explicitly stated (i.e., “to form a more united community”) or not. These null results combined with the weak results in Study 2 provide little evidence that independent self-construals cause greater endorsement of color-blindness. Perhaps the relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness, as demonstrated in in Study 1a and 1b, may exist when examined in the reverse causal direction. That is, color-blindness may cause people to define themselves more as individuals. I examine this in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 4: Examining the Causal Relationship Between Endorsement of Color-blindness and Independent Self-Concept**

The more that Americans support color-blindness, the more likely it is for these beliefs to be reflected in the practices, policies, and institutions that characterize American cultural contexts (Plaut, 2010). This trend is most clearly illustrated within social and economic domains of American society where work has shown the power of color-blind beliefs to shape law (e.g., *Adarand v. Pena*, 1995), education (e.g., Schofield, 2009), and business (e.g., Ely & Thomas, 1996). What are the psychological implications of living in a social context characterized by color-blind beliefs?

As one potential consequence, Study 4 examined whether color-blind beliefs can cause people to see themselves more as individuals, separate and distinct from others. This research question is informed by the theory of mutual constitution (Markus & Hamedani, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 2010), which proposes that individual psychologies and sociocultural context make each other up. In other words, social worlds shape or reinforce how people think, act, or feel just as much as people's thoughts, actions, and feelings can reinforce and shape their social worlds. Applied to the present case, I examine whether color-blind beliefs cause Americans to see themselves more as individuals.

### **Study 4: Can Color-blind Beliefs Foster an Independent Self-Concept?**

In the present study, participants were primed with either color-blindness or multiculturalism and then asked to define themselves using the twenty-statements task (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). For this study, I developed my own experimental manipulation of color-blindness and multiculturalism instead of using the most common

experimental manipulation of color-blindness and multiculturalism (i.e., Wolsko et al., 2000). This decision was made for several reasons. One, the Wolsko et al. (2000) priming manipulation is a three step priming procedure that makes it difficult to pinpoint which aspects of the prime are affecting participants. Two, the content of the priming manipulations vary considerably across conditions and may be priming more than just color-blindness or multiculturalism (e.g., American identity).

I hypothesized that participants primed with color-blindness would define themselves more as individuals than participants primed with multiculturalism. Additionally, I hypothesized that these effects would not depend on racial group membership.

### **Participants**

Fifty-seven University of Washington students (39 White, 7 mixed-race, 4 Asian, 3 Black, 2 Latino, and 2 who did not self-identify with any racial group) were recruited on campus. There were no significant main effects of gender or gender by condition interactions on any of the dependent measures.<sup>13</sup>

### **Procedures**

Participants were randomly assigned to complete a 5-item questionnaire designed to prime either color-blind or multiculturalism beliefs (cf. Bryan, Dweck, Ross, Kay & Mislavsky, 2008; Jost & Kay, 2005; Katz & Hass, 1988). In the color-blind condition, participants responded to five easy-to-agree-with questions indicating support for color-

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<sup>13</sup> Female and male participants differed in the extent to which they agreed with two out of the five multiculturalism statements. Specifically, females agreed more that “Americans should celebrate their racial and ethnic group differences” ( $M = 4.50, SD = .73$ ) than males ( $M = 3.54, SD = 1.45$ ),  $t(27) = 2.32, p = .03, d = .84$ . Also, females agreed more that “people should remember that we are shaped by the racial and ethnic groups to which we belong” ( $M = 3.94, SD = 1.44$ ) than males ( $M = 2.85, SD = 1.41$ ),  $t(27) = 2.06, p = .05, d = .76$ . There were no main effects or interactions with gender on any of the dependent variables.

blindness (e.g., “Race and ethnicity are surface-level group distinctions between people that should be disregarded”) that were based on the color-blindness scale developed in Study 1b. None of the items mentioned recognition of individuality because of its semantic similarity to my dependent variable. In the multiculturalism condition, participants responded to five questions that endorsed multiculturalism (e.g., “Americans should celebrate their racial and ethnic group differences”) (see Appendix for items). The statements were carefully crafted in order to maintain parallel sentence structure across conditions.

Participants proceeded to complete the Twenty Statements Task (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). This task required participants to write up to twenty self-descriptive statements that each began with the phrase “I am”. These statements were coded by two judges who were blind to condition and hypothesis. Statements were coded as independent if they referred to personal attributes (e.g., trait, ability, physical descriptor, or attitude) ( $\kappa = .80$ ) and interdependent if they referred to a role in an important relationship or membership in a social group ( $\kappa = .84$ ) (see Ashton-James, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chartrand, 2009; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999). Statements could be coded as both independent and interdependent. Statements that did not fall under either category or reflected transient statements (e.g., “kind of busy”) were not considered self-definitions (see Table 13 for example statements). These statements were rare and made up only 4% of all statements. The total number of independent statements made by each participant was divided by their total number of coded statements overall in order to calculate proportions. As a result, the proportion of independent statements that participants made could range from 0 to 1 depending on how many independent

statements they made. The same calculation was done for interdependent statements.

Demographic information was collected at the end.

*Table 13. Coding Categories in Study 4*

Category	Examples
Independent Self-Construal Statements that describe a personal attribute (trait, ability, physical descriptor, or attitude)	"Smart" "Complex" "I am unique"
Interdependent Self-Construal Statements about a role in an important relationship or membership in a social group	"Younger sister" "Googler" "Washingtonian"
Not included Statements that do not fall into any of the above categories or refer to transient states	"Who am I?" "good question" "busy"

Note: Coding scheme adapted from Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee (2000); Ashton-James, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chartrand (2009)

## Results

**Examining potential differences in support for color-blindness and multiculturalism by race and gender.** First, I examined whether participants differed in their endorsement of color-blindness and multiculturalism based on their racial background. White and racial minority participants did not differ in their support for the five color-blindness items,  $t(55)s < 1.71, ps > .10$ . Similarly, White and non-White participants did not differ in their support for the five multiculturalism items based on race,  $t(55)s < 1.36, ps > .19$ .

**Independent and interdependent self-descriptions.** Consistent with our hypothesis, participants primed with color-blindness described themselves more independently ( $M = .59, SD = .23$ ) than participants primed with multiculturalism ( $M = .42, SD = .20$ ),  $t(55) = 2.85, p = .006, d = .79$ . Additionally, participants primed with color-blindness described themselves less interdependently ( $M = .41, SD = .23$ ) than

participants primed with multiculturalism ( $M = .58$ ,  $SD = .20$ ),  $t(55) = 2.85$ ,  $p = .006$ ,  $d = .79$ . These results did not statistically differ when I re-analyzed these data controlling for participants' agreement to the five-item questionnaire manipulation.

To examine whether results were driven by participants' unwillingness to mention their racial, ethnic, or national identity less in the color-blind condition, I conducted a follow-up analysis that removed any mention of racial and ethnic groups. Again, participants primed with color-blindness defined themselves more independently ( $M = .62$ ,  $SD = .23$ ) compared to participants primed with multiculturalism ( $M = .45$ ,  $SD = .21$ ),  $t(55) = 2.85$ ,  $p = .005$ ,  $d = .77$ . Additionally, participants primed with color-blindness described themselves less interdependently ( $M = .41$ ,  $SD = .23$ ) than participants primed with multiculturalism ( $M = .57$ ,  $SD = .20$ ),  $t(55) = 2.85$ ,  $p = .006$ ,  $d = .74$ .

**Examining the moderating role of race.** First I examined whether the effect of priming condition on independent self-descriptions depended on race. A 2(Prime: color-blind vs. multiculturalism) by 2(Race: White vs. non-White) between subjects ANOVA on independent self-descriptions revealed a main effect of Prime,  $F(1,51) = 9.99$ ,  $p = .003$ ,  $d = .88$ , a non-significant effect of Race,  $F(1,51) = .08$ ,  $p = .78$ , and a marginally significant Prime by Race interaction,  $F(1,51) = 2.85$ ,  $p = .10$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .05$ . Racial minorities primed with color-blindness defined themselves more independently ( $M = .65$ ,  $SD = .18$ ) than racial minorities primed with multiculturalism ( $M = .33$ ,  $SD = .20$ ),  $p = .006$ ,  $d = 1.46$ . There was a trend for Whites primed with color-blindness to define themselves more independently ( $M = .56$ ,  $SD = .25$ ) than Whites primed with multiculturalism ( $M =$

.46,  $SD = .23$ ), however the difference did not reach a conventional level of significance,  $p = .18$ .

Next, I examined whether the effect of priming condition on interdependent self-descriptions depended on race. A 2(Prime: color-blind vs. multiculturalism) by 2(Race: White vs. racial minorities) between subjects ANOVA on interdependent self-descriptions revealed a main effect of Prime,  $F(1,51) = 9.98$ ,  $p = .003$ ,  $d = .88$ , a non-significant effect of Race,  $F(1,51) = .08$ ,  $p = .78$ , and a marginally significant Prime by Race interaction,  $F(1,51) = 2.85$ ,  $p = .10$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .05$ . Racial minority participants primed with color-blindness defined themselves less interdependently ( $M = .35$ ,  $SD = .18$ ) than racial minority participants primed with multiculturalism ( $M = .67$ ,  $SD = .20$ ),  $p = .006$ ,  $d = 1.46$ . There was a trend for Whites primed with color-blindness to define themselves less interdependently ( $M = .44$ ,  $SD = .26$ ) than Whites primed with multiculturalism ( $M = .54$ ,  $SD = .20$ ), however the difference did not reach a conventional level of significance,  $p = .18$ .

## **Discussion**

Exposing people to color-blindness caused them to define themselves more as individuals than people exposed to multiculturalism. I showed that these effects were not driven simply by people's hesitance to mention their race or ethnicity in the color-blind condition by excluding statements that mentioned race and ethnicity in subsequent analyses. Interestingly, there was a trend for these effects to be less pronounced in White participants. This trend may be explained in several ways. One, perhaps the weaker effect for Whites reflects their perception that these statements about racial and ethnic diversity are considered less self-relevant for them (Unzueta & Binning, 2010) thereby making the

primes less potent. Alternatively, this effect may be more pronounced for racial minorities because they may be more practiced at switching between self-construals (e.g., Hong et al., 2000). Overall, encouraging people to cast aside racial and ethnic differences may cause people to define the self as separate and distinct from others. As American practices, policies, and institutions continue to promote and reflect these color-blind beliefs, it may inadvertently cause Americans to see themselves as individuals.

## Chapter 5: General Discussion

Color-blindness pervades many important domains of U.S. society. In education, for instance, policymakers and educators appeal to color-blindness to defend curriculums that focus solely on teaching mainstream American values, which often reflect the values of the dominant group (Bennett, 1987; HB 2881). In law, many of the Supreme Court landmark decisions on racial issues invoke a color-blind justification to limit the use of race-conscious policies (e.g., *Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools*, 2007). In organizational contexts, companies promote color-blind policies, establishing workplace norms that make discussion of racial and ethnic differences difficult (e.g., Ely & Thomas, 2001). Why does color-blindness continue to play such an influential role in U.S. society? What are the potential consequences of supporting color-blindness?

Across five studies, I examined whether support for color-blindness may be tied to the dominant American definition of the self as an individual, separate and distinct from one's groups. In Studies 1a and 1b, I showed that independent self-construal was correlated with greater support for color-blindness. This association held across multiple measures of color-blindness and when controlling for individual differences also associated with independent self-construal and color-blindness, including social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), modern racism (McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2003), internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), political orientation (Napier & Jost, 2008), and Protestant work ethic (Levin et al., 1998).

In a subsequent set of studies, I examined whether there was a causal relationship between self-construal and color-blindness. First, I examined whether independent or

interdependent self-construal could cause greater support for color-blindness. In Study 2, an experimental manipulation of self-construal revealed weak evidence that independent self-construal caused greater support for color-blindness. Specifically, there was a trend for people primed with independent self-construal to support color-blindness more than people primed with interdependent self-construal. Therefore, in Study 3, I sought to re-investigate this hypothesis by examining whether people primed with an independent self-construal would evaluate companies with color-blind policies more positively than people primed with interdependent self-construal. Contrary to my prediction, there was no difference in how the companies were evaluated across experimental manipulations. In two studies, I found little evidence to support the theory that the way Americans tend to define the self influences how much they support color-blindness.

Although I found a lack of evidence to suggest that independent self-construal caused greater support for color-blindness, there may be other psychological components of American individualism that could demonstrate this effect. For example, American individualism promotes perceiving people's actions as expressions of their personal preferences, intentions, and goals as opposed to perceiving them as responses to the expectations and obligation of others or the situation (Markus & Kitayama, 2003). Perhaps the more people believe that people's actions are driven primarily by internal motives, the more likely they are to construe people as individual actors who are separate and distinct from their racial and ethnic groups. Alternatively, American individualism also emphasizes personal obligation and freedom from others as opposed to forms of obligation that emphasize being responsive to others' needs and conforming to group norms (Triandis, 1995). Conceivably, the more people endorse these values of personal

obligation and freedom from others, the more they may be willing to downplay racial and ethnic groups. Future research should look at how different components of American individualism may be tied to color-blindness.

Could the causal effect be in the reverse direction such that color-blindness shapes a person's self-construal? This notion regarding how prominent, cultural ideas can transform individual psychologies is consistent with the theory of mutual constitution (Markus & Kitayama, 2010). Mutual constitution proposes that the sociocultural context and psyche make up each other. In other words, the way people think, feel, and behave can shape sociocultural context and in turn, sociocultural context can shape the way people think, feel, and behave. In Study 4, I investigated how people's conceptions of the self are shaped by cultural ideas about race. In particular, I examined whether priming color-blindness can cause people to see themselves more as independent individuals than priming multiculturalism, or the belief that people should acknowledge and appreciate racial and ethnic groups. I found that people primed with color-blindness defined themselves more in terms of their unique traits, characteristics, and merits than people primed with multiculturalism. Additionally, people primed with color-blindness defined themselves less in terms of their close relationships or group memberships than people primed with multiculturalism. These effects remained even after statements of race, ethnicity, and nationality were omitted from analyses, suggesting effects were not driven solely by a greater tendency for people primed with color-blindness to avoid identifying themselves in terms of these groups. Taken together, these findings suggest that color-blindness causes people to construe the self as a unique individual, separate and distinct from others.

### **Interdependent Self-construal and Color-blindness**

Interestingly, the current work revealed that interdependent self-construal was also correlated with support for color-blindness. In other words, the more people defined the self as similar and connected to others, the more they believed people should minimize attention to racial and ethnic groups. This relationship remained significant across multiple measures of color-blindness, even when controlling for individual differences. How can we make sense of these findings in light of results that showed that independent self-construal is associated with support for color-blindness? As one potential explanation, perhaps the relationship between support for color-blindness and these two forms of self-construal are each enabled by different pathways. For instance, the positive relationship between interdependent self-construal and color-blindness may be driven by a common underlying motivation to maintain harmonious relations with others. In contrast, the positive relationship between independent self-construal and color-blindness may be driven by a common understanding of groups as secondary and individuals as primary. That these two relationships can be explained through different pathways addresses this potential discrepancy.

As another explanation, people with an independent self-construal may focus on and endorse a different part of color-blindness than people with an interdependent self-construal. Those with an interdependent self-construal, for example, may focus more strongly on color-blindness' unifying declaration (e.g., "we are all human") and less on the mandate to minimize attention to racial and ethnic groups. Those with an independent self-construal might do the opposite, and instead focus more strongly on the mandate to minimize attention to racial and ethnic groups and less on color-blindness' unifying

declaration. Teasing apart the components of color-blindness will help clarify how its relationship with independent self-construal may be different from its relationship with interdependent self-construal.

### **Implications of Racial Group Differences in Support of Color-blindness**

The current findings revealed that racial minorities support color-blindness more than White Americans when controlling for various individual differences. What implications do these findings have based on the current work? One implication is that racial minorities – who have a greater tendency to hold an interdependent self-construal compared to White Americans (Markus & Conner, 2013) – may shift to a more independent self-construal as color-blindness takes further hold in U.S. society. The findings in Study 4 allude to this possibility. Specifically, the tendency for people primed with color-blindness to define the self more independently compared to people primed with multiculturalism was especially pronounced for racial minorities. As another implication, supporting color-blindness may make racial minorities less likely to construe their personal experiences in relation to their racial group membership. Instead, racial minorities may be more likely to individualize their experiences, preventing them from engaging in self-protective strategies such as attributing negative outcomes to prejudice (Crocker & Major, 1989). Racial minorities may steadily weaken their psychological connection to their racial group as color-blindness is further embedded within social and economic domains of U.S. society.

### **Color-blindness and Consequences of Independent Self-construal**

That color-blindness causes people to see themselves more as independent individuals than multiculturalism has implications for self-related psychological

processes. The large body of work on cultural self-construal has demonstrated that cultural self-construal affects how people think, feel, and behave (for a review see Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2009). For instance, people with independent self-construals are more likely to commit the fundamental attribution error, or make dispositional as opposed to situational attributions, than people with an interdependent self-construal (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). Furthermore, people with an independent self-construal are more motivated to seek out and maintain positive self-esteem than people with an interdependent self-construal (Heine, Lehman, Markus & Kitayama, 1999). Lastly, those with an independent self-construal are more likely to use choice as a form of self-expression than those with an interdependent self-construal (Kim & Markus, 1999).

The current work suggests that these psychological consequences of independent self-construal may be triggered by color-blindness. Color-blindness may enable these consequences by causing people to construe the self as independent. For instance, people exposed to color-blindness may be more likely to make dispositional inferences for their own behavior, to see themselves as better than average, and to choose unique products than people exposed to multiculturalism. Any of these potential phenomena may be explained by the tendency for color-blindness to cause people to see themselves as individuals who are separate and distinct from others. Overall, exposure to color-blindness may have consequences that extend beyond interpersonal interactions to affect more basic processes involved in cognition, emotion, and behavior.

### **Implications for the Field: A New Lens on the Consequences of Color-blindness**

Past work on the consequences of color-blindness has by and large focused on the potential consequences of color-blindness for intergroup relations. For example, color-blindness causes Whites to display more negative behaviors towards racial minorities in an interracial interaction (Holoien & Shelton, 2012; Vorauer et al., 2009) and also increase Whites' implicit and explicit bias towards racial minorities (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). However, the current findings that reveal that color-blindness causes people to define themselves more independently provides a new lens to interpret this previous work. For example, perhaps the negative interracial interactions that occur when White Americans are primed with color-blindness (Vorauer et al., 2009) apply to interactions with others more generally. That is, color-blindness may lead to poorer interpersonal interactions because it increases people's sense of separation from others. A future study could include a same-race interaction condition to examine if the negative effects of color-blindness extend to interactions with others more generally.

The current work also provides an alternative interpretation for the finding that White Americans exposed to color-blindness like racial minorities who engage in counterstereotypical behaviors more than White Americans who were not exposed to color-blindness (Gutiérrez & Unzueta, 2010). Perhaps these results generalize so that people exposed to color-blindness prefer those who seek to differentiate themselves from their group because color-blindness causes people to value individuality. To investigate this hypothesis, a study could include a condition where the racial minority engages in behaviors that emphasize their individuating traits and characteristics. The consequences

of color-blindness may extend beyond intergroup interactions to affect both cross-group and same-group interactions.

### **Implications for Society: Color-Blindness and a More Individualistic U.S. Society**

As color-blindness continues to influence important social domains in U.S. society, including its legal system, education system, and organizational context, color-blindness may further reinforce the message that people are first and foremost individuals and secondarily members of social groups. This finding may be timely, given observations by political commentators (Brooks, 2013; Andersen, 2012) and scholars (e.g., Myers, 2000; Putnam, 2001) alike about the continued rise of American individualism. For instance, a review of the content in five million American books between 1960-2008 revealed a steady increase in the use of individualistic words and phrases in American literature over time, suggesting a growing emphasis on individualism (Twenge, Campbell, & Gentile, 2012). Other empirical evidence to support the rising prominence of American individualism includes analysis of the structural changes in U.S. social institutions that indicate social institutions are further reflecting American individualistic values (Bellah et al., 1985; Myers, 2000; Putnam, 2001).

The current work suggests that color-blindness is contributing to the growing prominence of American individualism. What are downstream consequences of cultivating American individualism? Certainly there are positive consequences of American individualism. For instance, American individualism causes people to feel a sense of ownership over their choices (Markus & Kitayama, 2003), and this sense of control can have downstream benefits for motivation and psychological wellbeing (Patall, Cooper, & Robinson, 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2000). However, there is also a growing body

of work spanning social science disciplines that highlight the potential “dark side” of American individualism. For instance, sociologists link American individualism to a decreased sense of civic commitment (Bellah et al., 1985). Political scientists propose that American individualism is contributing to a growing sense of isolation among individuals (e.g., Putnam, 2001). In psychology, American individualism is proposed to explain the generational increases in narcissistic tendencies (Twenge & Foster, 2010). These converging findings across multiple fields suggest that American individualism is leading Americans to pay less attention to their connection to others. This phenomenon has been termed by Bellah and colleagues (1985) as a rise in “the culture of separation.” Cultivating a culture of separation may therefore be a consequence of the growing institutionalization of color-blindness.

### **Contributions of the Current Work to Measurement of Color-blindness and Self-construal**

In addition to examining how color-blindness shapes self-construal, the current studies also shed light on the multiple ways color-blindness and self-construal have been measured. To date, it has been difficult to know whether the current body of scales measure different forms of color-blindness (Knowles et al., 2009; Levin et al., 2011; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). For example, Levin and colleagues (2011) operationally define color-blindness as the belief that people should minimize attention to race, religion, and sexual orientation and instead focus on a common American identity. Alternatively, Rosenthal and Levy (2012) operationally define color-blindness as the extent to which people believe race does not matter for understanding people as individuals. Can people distinguish between these different forms of color-blindness? The current work found no

evidence that people psychologically differentiate between these different forms of color-blindness using existing, published measures of color-blindness. Instead, people's patterns of responding across items from different color-blindness scales were highly related.

Although these results suggest that these published measures cannot tap into different forms of color-blindness, it does not suggest that multiple forms of color-blindness do not exist. Researchers could develop a measure that differentiates meaningfully between different forms of color-blindness. An examination of the various color-blindness definitions (see Table 1) suggests multiple ways that one could begin to test for such differences. For example, a scale could be developed that distinguishes between descriptive forms of color-blindness (i.e., we have minimized attention to race) from prescriptive forms of color-blindness (i.e., we should minimize attention to race). Such distinctions have been useful in clarifying the effects of other prominent ideologies, like meritocratic ideology (Son Hing et al., 2011). Additionally, there may be value in distinguishing between forms of color-blindness that emphasize people's similarities versus individuality (Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). Indeed, these two forms of color-blindness can refer to distinct literatures in psychology. Similarities color-blindness refers to the work on the use of a common ingroup as a strategy for prejudice reduction (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) while individuality color-blindness refers to work on individuation as a strategy for prejudice reduction (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Tapping into these distinct literatures could inform the potential antecedents and consequences that are associated with these different forms of color-blindness. Overall, further distinguishing

between different forms of color-blindness will enhance the theoretical and empirical developments of this growing literature.

Researchers have also developed a wide array of scales designed to measure cultural self-construal (for a review see Brewer & Chen, 2007; Triandis, 1995). These measures differ in a variety of ways, both qualitatively and quantitatively. For instance, there are 10-item measures of cultural self-construal (Cross & Markus, 1991) and there are 132-item measures of self-construal (Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985). Additionally, measures can also differ drastically in content. Some self-construal scales examine how people see themselves in relation to abstract groups (e.g., Gabriel & Gardner, 1996) while other self-construal scales examine how people see themselves in relation to family, friends, and co-workers (e.g., Hui, 1988). This large variation in measurement of self-construal has led several researchers to call for more dimension-specific measures of self-construal (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Oyserman et al., 2002). Dimension-specific measures of self-construal, these researchers argue, increase the fidelity of research findings and make comparison across studies possible.

In an attempt to be responsive to these calls, the present dissertation included both broad and dimension-specific measures of independent and interdependent self-construal. The findings did not provide strong support for the use of dimension-specific measures of self-construal when examining its relationship to color-blindness. Instead, the broader measures of independent and interdependent self-construal appeared to be the best predictors. However, these results may have been due to a variety of factors unrelated to differences in dimension specificity between the various self-construal scales (e.g., issues of construct validity across scales). This makes it difficult to make specific conclusions

about dimension-specific measures of self-construal. More generally, however, there is at least one conclusion that can be made from the present work: measures of self-construal should not be assumed to be interchangeable. The moderate correlations among different measures of the same type of self-construal suggest the measures are similar yet distinct from each other. Therefore, when one is considering the use of a self-construal scale, it may help to examine the context in which that scale has been used in past research to assess its suitability for future use.

### **Forms of Group-blindness and Independent Self-construal**

The current work demonstrates a positive relationship between independent self-construal and the view that people should minimize their attention to racial and ethnic groups. Can the current findings apply to other forms of group-blindness, such as sexual orientation-blindness (Cech & Waidzunas, 2011) or gender-blindness (e.g., Keonig & Richeson, 2010)? Results from Study 1b allude to this possibility. In particular, examination of the Levin et al. (2011) color-blindness scale revealed that the more people believed that people should focus on a common American identity and minimize attention to racial, religious, and sexual identities, the stronger their independent self-construals. These findings suggest that beliefs in the minimization of religious and sexual group memberships may also be tied to independent self-construals. Anecdotal evidence also supports that other forms of group-blindness, such as gender-blindness, can go hand in hand with defining oneself as an individual. In an interview about gender and technology, Marissa Mayer, CEO of Yahoo!, reminisced about her path towards a career in technology, highlighting how her individual skills and merits were unhampered by concerns about her gender (Hare, 2013):

“I was really good at chemistry, biology, physics, calculus in high school, and my teachers were genuinely really supportive of that and they never said anything like, 'wow, you're really good at this, and that's unusual for a girl.' They never really brought up the gender issue ... And I think I've just always been very gender-unaware.”

For Mayer, gender-blindness allowed her to fully realize her individual potential in math and science. Such evidence supports a more generalized link between independent self-construal and alternative forms of group-blindness.

For what kinds of groups might the relationship between group-blindness and independent self-construal apply? The theory of cultural self-construal proposes that those with independent self-construal minimize their connection to a group when membership is psychologically costly (Adams, 2005; Bellah et al., 1985; Markus & Kitayama, 2010). Therefore, the positive association between independent self-construal and group-blindness may depend on perceptions that a particular group membership may confer more costs than benefits. In other words, the relationship between independent self-construal and group-blindness may be stronger for stigmatized groups (e.g., race). Alternatively, the current phenomenon may apply less for groups perceived to be chosen. Choice can be a form of self-expression within independent cultural contexts (Kim & Drolet, 2003; Kim & Sherman, 2007). Therefore, people with an independent self-construal may be less likely to believe that people should minimize their attention to chosen groups. Instead, the opposite association may apply. That is, the stronger a person's independent self-construal, the more they are willing to acknowledge and appreciate groups that are chosen (e.g., college affiliation).

The current work examined how color-blindness and multiculturalism may be tied to dominant construal of the self within American cultural contexts. However, there are

other views that aim to accomplish the same mission of racial harmony and equality, including assimilationism (Frederickson, 2010) and anti-racism (Vorauer & Sasaki, 2011). Future research could examine how these alternative views may also be tied to self-construal. Alternatively, dominant views regarding racial and ethnic relations have been shown to vary by country. For example, multiculturalism is more prominent in Canada, while assimilationism is more prominent in Germany (Guimond et al., in press). Future research could also examine how this cross-cultural variation in support of color-blindness and multiculturalism is linked to cross-cultural variation in understanding of the self. Mapping this variation may help illuminate the set of conditions that promote or attenuate the relationship between how people define the self and what they think about race and ethnicity.

### **Conclusion**

Past work on color-blindness has focused on its antecedents and consequences within the domain of intergroup relations. This dissertation broadens the knowledge on color-blindness by examining whether color-blindness may also be connected to dominant American definitions of the self as individuals, separate and distinct from their groups. As predicted, I found that the more people defined themselves as individuals, the more they supported color-blindness. Furthermore, I found that this effect was driven by the tendency for people exposed to color-blindness to construe the self as more independent than people exposed to multiculturalism. Examining how color-blindness shapes self-construal reveals how people's view on race and ethnicity informs and influences their understanding of the self.

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**Appendix A: Questionnaires and Experiment Stimuli**

### **Color-blindness scales (various authors)**

Instructions: Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree)

#### **Knowles, Lowery, Hogan & Chow (2009)**

1. I wish people in this society would stop obsessing so much about race.
2. People who become preoccupied by race are forgetting that we are all just human.
3. Putting racial labels on people obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.
4. Race is an artificial label that keeps people from thinking freely as individuals.

#### **Levin, Matthews, Guimond, Sidanius, Pratto, Kteily, Pitpitan, & Dover (2011)**

1. We should treat citizens of this country as Americans and not as members of particular ethnic, religious, or sexual communities
2. I do not want Americans to be identified by their race, national origin, or religion
3. American society is made up first and foremost of citizens, not of groups
4. For the unity of the country, individuals should be considered Americans before any consideration is given to their race or religion
5. It's best to judge one another as individuals rather than members of an ethnic group
6. It's important to recognize that people are basically the same regardless of their ethnicity.

#### **Rosenthal & Levy (2012)**

1. Ethnic and cultural group categories are not very important for understanding or making decisions about people.
2. It is really not necessary to pay attention to people's racial, ethnic, or cultural backgrounds because it doesn't tell you much about who they are.
3. At our core, all human beings are really the same, so racial and ethnic categories do not matter.
4. Racial and ethnic group memberships do not matter very much to who we are.
5. All human beings are individuals, and therefore race and ethnicity are not important.

#### **Siy (2013a) 5-item Color-blindness Scale**

1. In the end, individual members of different racial groups are all the same
2. No matter a person's race or ethnicity, in the end, everyone is basically the same.
3. People of different races may look different, but deep down we're all the same
4. Paying attention to racial/ethnic differences obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.
5. No matter a person's race or ethnicity, in the end, everyone is a unique individual.

**Siy (2013b) 11-item Color-blindness Scale**

1. People of different racial groups may look different, but deep down we are all the same.
2. No matter a person's racial or ethnic background, in the end, everyone is a unique individual.
3. In the end, individual members from different racial groups are all the same.
4. Race and ethnicity are meaningless group categories that conceal the underlying similarities between people.
5. Regardless of one's racial or ethnic background, deep down everyone is the same.
6. Paying attention to racial and ethnic group differences obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.
7. By minimizing racial and ethnic group differences, people can focus on what makes them similar to each other.
8. People should cast aside racial and ethnic group differences and focus on what makes them similar.
9. No matter a person's racial or ethnic background, in the end, everyone is basically the same.
10. Race and ethnicity are superficial group distinctions that undermine people's individuality.
11. Race and ethnicity are meaningless group categories that only obscure the similarities between people.

**External motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998)**

Instructions: Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree)

1. Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards, I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people.
2. I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others.
3. If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.
4. I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others.
5. I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others.

**Internal motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998)**

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree)

1. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me.
2. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK.
3. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people.
4. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong.
5. Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.

## Independent self-construal measures (various measures)

### Horizontal and vertical individualism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998)

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree)

#### Horizontal independence

1. I'd rather depend on myself than others.
2. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.
3. I often do "my own thing."
4. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.

#### Vertical independence

1. It is important that I do my job better than others.
2. Winning is everything.
3. Competition is the law of nature.
4. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.

### Independent self-construal (Singelis, 1994)

Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. Speaking up during class is not a problem for me.
2. I am comfortable with being singled out for praises or rewards.
3. I am the same person at home that I am at school.
4. I act the same way no matter who I am with.
5. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I've just met.
6. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects.
7. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.
8. I value being in good health above everything.
9. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me.
10. Having a lively imagination is important to me.
11. I'd rather say "no" directly, than risk being misunderstood.
12. I feel comfortable using someone's first name soon after I meet them, even when they are much older than I am.

### **Interdependent self-construal scales (various authors)**

#### **Collective-interdependent self-construal (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999)**

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree)

1. The groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.
2. When I am in a group, it often feels to me like that group is an important part of who I am.
3. I usually feel a strong sense of pride when a group I belong to has an important accomplishment.
4. I think one of the most important parts of who I am can be captured by looking at the groups I belong to and understanding who they are.
5. When I think of myself, I often think of groups I belong to as well.
6. In general, groups I belong to are an important part of my self-image.
7. Overall, the groups I belong to are unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. **(R)**
8. If a person insults a group I belong to, I feel personally insulted myself.
9. My sense of pride comes from knowing I belong to groups.
10. When I join a group, I usually develop a strong sense of identification with that group.

#### **Horizontal and vertical collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998)**

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree)

##### Horizontal Collectivism

If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.  
The well-being of my coworkers is important to me.  
I feel good when I cooperate with others.

##### Vertical Collectivism

Parents and children must stay together as much as possible.  
It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice when I want.  
Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.  
It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.

#### **Interdependent self-construal (Singelis, 1994)**

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact.  
 It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group  
 I respect people who are modest about themselves  
 I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in.  
 I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments.  
 It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group.  
 I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I'm not happy with the group.  
 If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible.  
 Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument.  
 I should take into consideration my parents' advice when making education/career plans.  
 My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me  
 I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor

### **Relational-interdependent self-construal (Cross, Hardin, & Morris, 2000)**

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree)

My close relations are an important reflection of who I am.  
 When I feel very close to someone, it often feels to me like that person is an important part of who I am.  
 I usually feel a strong sense of pride when someone close to me has an important accomplishment.  
 I think one of the most important parts of who I am can be captured by looking at my close friends and understanding who they are.  
 When I think of myself, I often think of my close friends or family also.  
 If a person hurts someone close to me, I feel personally hurt as well.  
 In general, my close relationships are an important part of my self-image.  
 Overall, my close relationships have very little to do with how I feel about myself.  
 My close relationships are unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.  
 My sense of pride comes from knowing who I have as close friends.  
 When I establish a close friendship with someone, I usually develop a strong sense of identification with that person.

## Modern racism scales (various authors)

### Modern racism (McConahay, 1986)

We would like to ask you some questions concerning your beliefs about current social issues as well as personal reactions you have to various situations. You should base your answers and your responses on your own opinions or beliefs; there are no right or wrong answers and your responses are completely confidential.

**Below are a number of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. Please read each statement and indicate how much you agree or disagree with it by writing a number from 1, Strongly disagree, to 7, Strongly agree.**

1-Strongly **Disagree**

4-Neutral

7-Strongly **Agree**

2-Moderately **Disagree**

6-Moderately **Agree**

3-Slightly **Disagree**

5-Slightly **Agree**

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7  
 Strongly **Disagree** Neutral Strongly **Agree**

\_\_\_ 1. I am proud to be an American.

\_\_\_ **2. Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.**

\_\_\_ 3. A lot of rules regarding modesty and sexual behavior are just customs that are not necessarily any better or holier than those other people follow.

\_\_\_ **4. Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to blacks than they deserve.**

\_\_\_ **5. Discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem in the US.**

\_\_\_ 6. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.

\_\_\_ **7. It is easy to understand the anger of black people in America (reverse-scored)**

\_\_\_ 8. Flag-burning should be illegal.

\_\_\_ 9. The world should be run by those most capable.

\_\_\_ **10. Blacks have more influence upon school desegregation plans than they ought to have.**

\_\_\_ 11. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.

\_\_\_ **12. Blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.**

\_\_\_ 13. A person should be concerned about the well-being of others.

\_\_\_ **14. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.**

**Symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2003)**

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree)

1. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (R)
2. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
3. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities over- came prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
4. Black leaders have been trying to push things too fast.
5. Blacks are demanding too much from the rest of society.
6. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (R)
7. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.

**Multiculturalism (Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006)**

Instructions: Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

1. We must appreciate the unique characteristics of different groups in order to have a cooperative society.
2. Learning about the ways that different groups resolve conflict will help us develop a more harmonious society.
3. In order to live in a cooperative society, everyone must learn the unique histories and cultural experiences of different groups.
4. When interacting with a member of a certain group that is different from your own, it is very important to take into account the history and cultural traditions of that person's group
5. If we want to help create a harmonious society, we must recognize that each group has the right to maintain its own unique traditions.
6. I would like my children to be exposed to the language and cultural traditions of different ethnic groups (**omitted**).

**Protestant work ethic (various authors)**

**Protestant work ethic (Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998)**

**Instructions:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*extremely*):

- \_\_\_1. If people work hard they almost always get what they want.
- \_\_\_2. Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system; they really have only themselves to blame.
- \_\_\_3. In America, getting ahead doesn't always depend on hard work.
- \_\_\_4. Even if people work hard, they don't always get ahead.

**Racialized Protestant work ethic (Sears & Henry, 2003)**

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree)

- 1. Even if Blacks try hard they often cannot reach their goals. **(R)**
- 2. Even if Blacks are ambitious they often cannot succeed. **(R)**
- 3. If Blacks work hard they almost always get what they want.
- 4. Most Blacks who don't get ahead should not blame the system; they really have only themselves to blame.
- 5. Hard work offers little guarantee of success for Blacks. **(R)**
- 6. Any Black person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding

**Racial Identification**

**Instructions:** Please respond to the following questions as they relate to the race/ethnicity you've indicated.

1(Strongly disagree) to 7(Strongly agree)

1. I often think about the fact that I am a part of my racial group.
2. The fact that I am a part of my racial group is an important part of my identity.
3. Being part of my racial group is an important part of how I see myself.

## Social Dominance Orientation Scales (various authors)

### Social Dominance (Jost & Thompson, 2000)

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1 – Disagree strongly 5 – neither disagree nor agree 11 – Agree strongly

Inferior groups should stay in their place.  
 Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.  
 It's a real problem that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.  
 If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.  
 No group of people is more worthy than any other.  
 To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.  
 Superior groups should not seek to dominate inferior groups.  
 In getting what your own group wants, it should never be necessary to use force against other groups.  
 We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.  
 No one group should dominate in society.  
 Increased social equality would be a bad thing.  
 Treating different groups more equally would create more problems than it would solve.  
 It would be good if all groups could be equal.  
 All groups should be given an equal chance in life.  
 There is no point in trying to make incomes more equal.  
 Group equality is not a worthwhile ideal.

### Social Dominance (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994)

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you have negative or positive feelings towards the following statements

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Negative	Negative	Slightly negative	Neither positive nor Negative	Slightly positive	Positive	Very Positive

In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.  
 It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.  
 To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.  
 Inferior groups should stay in their place.  
 Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.  
 It would be good if groups could be equal.

Group equality should be our ideal.

All groups should be given an equal chance in life.

We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

Increased social equality.

We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.

We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.

No one group should dominate in society.

If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.

It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.

**White guilt (Swim & Miller, 1998)**

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements

1(Strongly disagree) to 4(neither agree nor disagree) to 7(Strongly agree)

1. Although I feel my behavior is typically nondiscriminatory toward Blacks, I still feel guilt due to my association with the White race.
2. I feel guilty about the past and present social inequality of Black Americans (i.e., slavery, poverty).
3. I do not feel guilty about social inequality between White and Black Americans.  
**(R)**
4. When I learn about racism, I feel guilt due to my association with the White race.
5. I feel guilty about the benefits and privileges that I receive as a White American.

**White privilege (Swim & Miller, 1998)**

**Instructions:** Using the scale below, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements

1(Strongly disagree) to 4(neither agree nor disagree) to 7(Strongly agree)

1. White people have certain advantages that minorities do not have in this society.
2. My status as a White person grants me unearned privileges in today's society.
3. I feel that White skin in the United States opens many doors for Whites during their everyday lives.
4. I do not feel that White people have any benefits or privileges due to their race.
- (R)**
5. My skin color is an asset to me in my everyday life.

### Color-blind and Multiculturalism Questionnaire Manipulation

Instructions: Please provide your opinions on the way Americans should approach race relations. Using the following scale, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5
Do not agree				Strongly Agree

#### Color-blind questionnaire

- \_\_\_ 1. Americans should cast aside racial and ethnic group differences and focus on what makes people alike.
- \_\_\_ 2. Regardless of people's racial or ethnic background, deep down everyone is the same.
- \_\_\_ 3. People should remember we're all just human, regardless of the racial and ethnic groups to which we belong.
- \_\_\_ 4. Race and ethnicity are surface-level group distinctions between people that should be disregarded.
- \_\_\_ 5. Having a focus on racial and ethnic group differences conceals the underlying similarities between people.

#### Multiculturalism questionnaire

- \_\_\_ 1. Americans should celebrate their racial and ethnic group differences.
- \_\_\_ 2. People's racial and ethnic backgrounds shape how they think, feel, and behave.
- \_\_\_ 3. People should remember we are shaped by the racial and ethnic groups to which we belong.
- \_\_\_ 4. Race and ethnicity are valuable group distinctions between people that should be appreciated.
- \_\_\_ 5. Having a focus on racial and ethnic group differences allows people to appreciate and learn about each other.