

Rich Nation, Restrained Army (富国慎兵):
Toward Japan's Maritime Order in the 21st Century

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Abstract

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I explore Japan's grand strategy in the oceans, meaning its homegrown "intellectual architecture" for promoting "Open and Stable Seas (開かれ安定した海洋)." Japan has shown a resolute commitment to maintaining the connectivity of international seas that underpin the stability and prosperity of the world. Also, Japan has maintained a restrained posture regarding its military roles and presence. I define Japan's proactive economic engagement and restrained military posture as the "Rich Nation, Restrained Army (富国慎兵)." Why does Japan's statecraft in the oceans display economic proactiveness but military restraint?

The research question highlights a substantial gap between theoretical expectations and Japan's reality. Realism has traditionally been the dominant theory explaining Japan's foreign policy, with a primary focus on China's rise as a core driving force. However, these explanations

failed to elucidate Japan's restrained military stance, raising doubts about Beijing-centered realist narratives. Furthermore, Japan's vision for the maritime order, which emphasizes connectivity and an economic security approach, has been largely overlooked as well. To provide a comprehensive understanding of Japan's response in the 21st century, I aim to analyze Japan's grand strategy in the oceans, bridging the gap between theoretical expectations and Japan's post-Cold War realities.

To analyze Japan's statecraft in the maritime domain, my dissertation is structured in the following five chapters. The first chapter introduces the research question, argument, literature review, and research methods. The second chapter examines the evolutionary substance of Japan's grand strategy in the oceans, with a focus on domestic legal and institutional changes following the first Basic Act on Ocean Policy in 2007. The third chapter investigates Japan's regional approach to Southeast Asia, highlighting its cautious but proactive involvement in multilateral security cooperation and leveraging prior economic relations. This case underscores the strategic allocation of Official Development Assistance to enhance law enforcement capabilities through collaboration with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The fourth chapter assesses Japan's global security cooperation within the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework, with a focus on the roles of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the JCG. After reviewing Japan's contributions to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the research also examines bilateral cooperation with the U.S., as well as Australia, India, South Korea, and the Pacific Island Countries.

<Table of Contents>

Abstract	iii
Abbreviations	vii
Acknowledgments	ix
1. Introduction	1
Substance of Japan’s Grand Strategy in the Oceans	3
The Questions, Argument, and Alternative Explanations	8
Research Method and Case Selection	19
Roadmap	26
2. Origins of Rich Nation, Restrained Army: Japan’s Domestic Legal and Institutional Changes ...	28
Japan’s Inactivity in the Oceans: Limited Response to UNCLOS	29
The Rise of Bottom-Up Threat Perceptions and Responses	36
Towards A Proactive Grand Strategy	48
Analysis on the BAOP and the 1 st BPOP	60
Wandering Domestic Politics, Worsening Security Situation	68
Expanding Japan’s Maritime Rights and Interests	76
Analysis of the 2 nd Basic Plan on Ocean Policy	77
Analysis of the 3 rd Basic Plan on Ocean Policy	84
Chapter Summary	97
3. Rise of Rich Nation Restrained Army: Japan’s Regional Approach to Southeast Asia	100
Normalizing Post-War Relations with Southeast Asia Through the Economy	101
Strategically Responding to Non-traditional Security Threats with ODA	113
Japan’s Initial Security Initiatives Against Non-Traditional Security Threats	120
Moving Towards Security Engagement with JCG and JICA	127
Japan’s Economic Support Against Piracy in Southeast Asia	128
Japan’s Proactive Security Engagement in Southeast Asia	133
Chapter Summary	139
4. The Expansion of Rich Nation Restrained Army: Japan’s Security Initiatives in Global Maritime Domain	141
Postwar Standpoint: Economic Regionalist, Military Isolationist	142
The Shift to Proactive Contribution: Dispatch of the JSDF to the International Society	147
Expanding Japan’s Security Relations in the Global Maritime Domain	161
Japan-India Relations	167
Japan-Australia Relations	175

Japan-South Korea Relations	184
Japan-Pacific Island Countries Relations.....	198
Chapter Summary	212
5. The Future of Japan’s Grand Strategy in the Oceans	214
Main Findings.....	215
Theoretical and Policy Implications.....	217
References.....	219

Abbreviations

AIS	Automatic Identification System
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAOP	Basic Act on Ocean Policy
BASP	Basic Act on Space Policy
BPOP	Basic Plan on Ocean Policy
BPSP	Basic Plan on Space Policy
CeisNet	Coastal Environmental Information Service Network
ECS	East China Sea
ESI	Environmental Sensitivity Index
GIS	Geographic Information Service
Guidelines	The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation
HCOP	Headquarters for Comprehensive Ocean Policy
HOD	Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department
IOC	Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
JAXA	Japan Aerospace eXploration Agency
JODC	Japan Oceanographic Data Center
J-DOSS	JODC Data On-line Service System
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MICH	Marine Information Clearing House
MLIT	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
MOD	Ministry of Defense of Japan

MSA	Maritime Safety Agency (former Japan Coast Guard)
MSIL	MDA Situational Indication Linkages
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NF	Nippon Foundation
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSC	National Security Council of Japan
NSS	National Security Strategy of Japan
PICs	Pacific Island Countries
SHSP	Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SPF	Sasakawa Peace Foundation
SCS	South China Sea
UNCLOS	United Nation Conventions on the Law of the Sea

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1. Introduction

When the confrontational structure is cleared out of Northeast Asia, the maritime corridor running from the Arctic Ocean to the Sea of Japan, through the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean will become increasingly important. ...What I call the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" derives from our desire to preserve the blessings of open seas, together with these very countries, as well as the United States, Australia, India, and others, and indeed, all countries and peoples who share the same intent. What must control our sea and air spaces that are broad and wide is the rule of law, and the rules-based order, which are in turn backed by solid institutions. Hence my strategy. ... Maritime order is not a matter of power, but a matter of the rule of law and one that is rules-based. Every year a class learning such an everlasting truth and taking it as a guiding principle for their lives will head out from Japan to the seas. This is very promising indeed. Cultivating those who will protect and defend a free and open Indo-Pacific is, precisely, Japan's noble mission.¹

- Shinzo Abe 2018-

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), proposed by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, became the foundation of multilateral cooperation among like-minded states who support rule of the law, fundamental values, and the importance of stability in the oceans, which constitute the core pillar of Japan's understanding of the international maritime order.² Under the FOIP, Japan has taken initiatives to provide economic aid and deepen security ties to reinforce the rules-based international order and maintain peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Japan's efforts to realize the FOIP goes

¹ "Address by Prime Minister Abe at the seventy-third session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, September 25, 2018. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page3e_000926.html.

² Michael Green. *Line of Advantage: Japan's Grand Strategy in the Era of Abe Shinzo*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2022): 3-6.

beyond the military dimension, from humanitarian assistance to non-traditional security threats, including piracy and human trafficking.

In this research, I demonstrate how contemporary Japan has undergone a gradual but fundamental shift in its grand strategy in the oceans, meaning its homegrown “intellectual architecture” for promoting the maritime order.³ I investigate the substance, causes, and consequences of Japan’s grand strategy for “Open and Stable Seas (開かれ安定した海).” I show how Japan has transformed its national identity, from an isolationist island nation (島国) protected by the seas (海に守られた国) to a proactive maritime nation (海洋国家) committed to protecting the seas (海を守る国) – from a mere beneficiary to an active guardian. Building upon this identity shift, the Japanese government has expanded its economic and security engagement in the regional and global maritime domain, a reflection of Japan’s grand strategy in the oceans in the 21st century.

I focus on Japanese decision-makers, their shifting perceptions, and their efforts to craft an intellectual architecture, meaning a structural foundation for Japan’s statecraft in the oceans. My principal argument is that despite the changing security environment, Japan prioritizes economic cooperation in advancing its maritime interests while restraining its military engagement and balancing behaviors. This is the essence of Japan’s grand strategy, and building on one of the most well-known maxims, I call it Rich Nation, Restrained Army (富国慎兵).

³ Hal Brands. *What good is grand strategy: Power and purpose in American statecraft: From Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush.* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014): 1-3.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first show how this grand strategy in the oceans has manifested in practice as well as its substantively unique features. Using neoclassical realist frameworks,⁴ I argue that a “dual threat” narrative, perceived threat from the rise of China and concerns from the U.S. security commitment, is the core driver of Japan’s grand strategy in the oceans. This narrative intertwines with state-level intervening factors, such as perception and politics in domestic decision-making processes. Second, I set out the qualitative case study approach to examining the rise and spread of Japan’s grand strategy in the maritime domain. I introduce the research framework, method, and case selection. Finally, I set out a roadmap for the rest of the research.

Substance of Japan’s Grand Strategy in the Oceans

Scholars specializing in Japan have used the concept of grand strategy to analyze Japan’s behaviors across various strategic domains such as security, geopolitics, geoeconomics, and space.⁵ Additionally, Japan’s security engagement in the oceans has

⁴ Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell. *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁵ Richard J. Samuels. *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 2007); Narushige Michishita, “Japan’s grand strategy for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” in Robert J. Pekkanen and Saadia M. Pekkanen eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020): 492–513; Saadia M. Pekkanen, “Japan’s grand strategy in outer space,” in Saadia M. Pekkanen and P. J. Blount eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Space Security*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024): 334–362; Christopher W. Hughes, Alessio Patalano, and Robert Ward, “Japan’s grand strategy: The Abe era and its aftermath,” *Global Politics and Strategy* 63, no. 1 (2021): 125-160. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2021.1881258>; Saori N. Katada. *Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2020); Paul Midford, “The logic of reassurance and Japan’s grand strategy,” *Security Studies* 11, no. 3 (2002): 1-43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714005337>; Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s grand strategic shift: From the Yoshida Doctrine to an Abe Doctrine?,” in Ashley J. Tellas, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills. *Strategic Asia*

also drawn the attention of scholars, providing important implications for the regional security environment.⁶ To the best of my knowledge, however, there are no scholarly works examining Japan's grand strategy frameworks within the maritime domain. I take steps, in this work, to flesh out how Japan's grand strategy frameworks, aiming to enhance our comprehension of Japan's stances in the oceans.

Japan's statecraft in the oceans displays economic proactiveness but military restraint. It reflects Japan's resolute commitment to maintaining the connectivity of international waters, which serves as the bedrock for the stability and prosperity of the world. Through a series of domestic legal and institutional changes, Japan has been able to establish a centralized and orchestrated ocean policy, fostering enhanced regional economic and security cooperation stretching from Southeast Asia to the Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Furthermore, Japan has taken the lead in facilitating multilateral cooperation with like-minded states such as Australia, India, and South Korea to promote its vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). In practice, this statecraft is reflected at the domestic, regional, and global levels.

First, domestically, a series of legal and institutional changes have ensued, enabling Japan to formulate a coherent and centralized policy framework within the maritime

2017-18: *Power, Ideas, and Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific*. (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017): 73-105.

⁶ Lindsay Black. *Japan's Maritime Security Strategy: The Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Outlaws*. (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan London, 2014); Alessio Patalano. *Post-war Japan as a Sea Power: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience and the Making of a Navy*. (London, U.K.: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); Ian Storey, "Japan's maritime strategy interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea dispute," *Political Science* 65, no. 2 (2013): 135-156; John F. Bradford, "Japanese naval activities in Southeast Asian waters: Building on 50 years of maritime security capacity building," *Asian Security* 17, no. 1 (2021): 79-104.

domain. The enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy (海洋基本法, BAOP) in 2007 marked a significant milestone, representing Japan's evolving approach to national rights and interests in the maritime domain, shifting from mere 'use (利用)' to comprehensive 'management (管理).' These reforms have empowered Japan to more effectively address emerging challenges and opportunities in ocean governance, including the management of marine resources and maritime security issues near Japan and around the world.

Second, regionally, Japan has emerged as a key proponent of regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia. The Japanese government has strategically directed Official Development Assistance (ODA) to bolster law enforcement capabilities in addressing non-traditional security threats in the region. Collaborative efforts between the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have been instrumental in establishing regional coastguards in Southeast Asia and enhancing law enforcement capabilities through the provision of vessels and technical assistance. Japan's initiatives aimed at enhancing regional maritime stability have helped mitigate concerns over sovereignty and facilitated the institutionalization of multilateral security cooperation among law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, Japan's active involvement in regional security mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), underscores its commitment to fostering a secure and stable maritime environment in Southeast Asia and beyond.

Third, globally, Japan has emerged as a leader in multilateral security cooperation for upholding the integrity of the global maritime order. The concept of 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific (自由で開かれたインド太平洋, FOIP),' introduced by Shinzo Abe, has

garnered widespread support among democratic nations advocating for the rule of law in maritime affairs. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) stands as a notable example of multilateral security dialogue involving the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan, all united in their commitment to safeguarding freedom of navigation and ensuring stability in the maritime domain. Furthermore, the Japanese government has actively engaged in bilateral cooperation with like-minded states to expand the scope of multi-layered cooperation in the oceans.

Across all these levels, Japan has maintained a restrained stance regarding its military roles in the maritime domain. Japan's self-imposed domestic limitations on security strategy have significantly influenced its defense posture, with a primary emphasis on defending Japan's sovereignty. This emphasis is evident in Japan's adherence to three conditions for the use of force (武力の行使の三原則),⁷ its limited interpretation of the right of collective self-defense,⁸ and the so-called 'ittaika theory (一体化論),' which clearly indicate Japan's reluctance to engage in foreign affairs with military force.⁹ Despite facing

⁷ 1) When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, 2) when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan's survival and protects its people, 3) use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary. ("Japan's security policy," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 5, 2023. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000084.html)

⁸ After the cabinet decision in July 2014, the Japanese government changed the official interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and extended the limit of the right of collective self-defense. Based on the reinterpretation, Japan can use force to protect a state when an armed attack against that state fundamentally threatens Japan's sovereignty. (Adam P. Liff, "Policy by other means: Collective self-defense and the politics of Japan's postwar constitutional reinterpretations," *Asia Policy* 24 (2017): 159-161)

⁹ The Japanese government separates logistics support and "form an integral part (一体化)" of the use of force, and limits its supports to support activities, such as supply and transportation, away from the "scene where combat activities are actually being conducted." ("Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless

evolving security challenges, Japan has consistently prioritized diplomatic and non-military solutions to regional and global issues, reflecting its commitment to peace and stability in the international community.

Japan's restrained military posture is also apparent in regional and global domains. Regionally, Japan's military presence in Southeast Asia has remained relatively low-key. For instance, the Japan Maritime Self-defense Force (海洋自衛隊, JMSDF), Japan's *de facto* naval force, has maintained a limited presence in Southeast Asia. While there have been instances of the JMSDF participating in small-scale joint operations for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, these activities have not aimed at formal security cooperation with Southeast Asian states. Instead, Japan's engagement with the region tends to focus on addressing non-traditional security threats through existing economic relations. This approach reflects Japan's commitment to maintaining a peaceful and cooperative regional environment, emphasizing diplomacy and economic cooperation over military intervention.

Japan has also strategically employed a nuanced blend of economic and security initiatives to advance its vision of FOIP and foster multilateral cooperation in maritime affairs involving partners across the world. While the Malabar joint naval exercises represent a significant aspect of QUAD cooperation, Japan's approach recognizes the complex dynamics surrounding naval cooperation, including differing geopolitical interests and the delicate balance in relations with China. As such, Japan has adopted a

Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, July 1, 2014. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html)

multifaceted strategy that extends beyond traditional military exercises, such as information-sharing mechanisms and providing financial assistance to developing countries in the region. By focusing on these non-traditional security measures, Japan aims to build confidence and strengthen partnerships among maritime nations, while avoiding direct military engagement in foreign affairs.

The Questions, Argument, and Alternative Explanations

Why does Japan's statecraft in the oceans display economic proactiveness but military restraint in the 21st century? In other words, during a historical period characterized by significant power shifts and heightened great power competition in the oceans, we do not see a full-fledged militarization of Japan's stance in the maritime domain.

My research question highlights a significant disparity between theoretical expectations and Japan's security posture in the maritime domain. Neorealism has been the dominant theoretical approach to explain Japan's behaviors, with the rise of China's military and economic growth as the major drivers. I contend that neorealist narratives, largely focused on the threat of the rise of China do not fully explain Japan's restrained military stance and its utilization of the economic-security approach. In this research, I rely on the basic assumption of structural realism, the distribution of power in the international system as the core of the independent variable affecting state's posture in the maritime domain.

But I also focus attention on how decision-makers perceive the maritime behaviors of neighboring states and how they respond to secure short- and long-term national interests in the given situation. While various scholarly literatures have debated the definition of grand strategy, they commonly encompass several key components: the assessment of threats and opportunities within a given situation, the utilization of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools, rational calculation of costs and benefits, and a prioritized set of goals.¹⁰ In other words, the basis of statecraft is how a state identifies threats and opportunities (causes), chooses a range of governmental tools (substance), and assesses their impacts on international society (consequences). This makes it essential to examine the perceptions and processes involving Japanese decision-makers.

My central argument is that Japan's grand strategy in the maritime domain has been primarily shaped by a 'dual threat,' a shared perception among Japanese decision-makers regarding the rise of China's economic and military growth, and the uncertainty of the U.S. security commitment to the region. A system-level independent variable, specifically shifts in the distribution of power between the U.S. and China, is insufficient to explain Japan's changes in domestic system and foreign policy. By decision-makers, I refer to key governmental actors including the prime minister, ministry of foreign affairs and defense, as well as bureaucrats, who perceive threats and formulate core interests.

¹⁰ Michael J. Green. *By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017); Barry R. Posen. *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth. *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016); Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs. *The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021); Rush Doshi. *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2021).

These, then, become the political momentum to implement political decisions and policy changes. In other words, a state may decide to not respond to a situation militarily if decision-makers perceive it as non-threatening or see it as a diplomatic issue.¹¹ Shared threat perception among Japanese decision-makers acts as a unit-level intervening variable that deflects system-level variables and affects how Japan responds to the international security environment, consequently shaping their grand strategy in the maritime domain.

To identify the consistency between threat perception and Japan's grand strategy in the oceans, I focus on both the economic and security fronts. While the two aspects are intertwined and hard to separate from one another, I set a spectrum to measure the degree of proactive and restraint postures of Japan's grand strategy, from a complete economy-centric stance without security considerations to a military-centric stance where Japan pursues independent military strategic goals regardless of economic rationality.

Domestic changes in Japan, since the 1990s, also draw attention to the decision-making structures. Since the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955, Japan had formed unique political structures, so-called the "1955 system (55年体制)." The electoral system under the 1955 system was the Single Nontransferable Vote, each voter votes for individual candidates. Therefore, candidates established *koenkai* (後援会), a personal support group of the candidate, to secure votes in exchange for the pork. Also, the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), the major policymaking body of the LDP, had dominated the legalization process in Japan. Through the decision-making process within

¹¹ Raymond Cohen, "Threat perception in international crisis," *Political Science Quarterly* 93, no. 1 (1978): 93.

the PARC, the coalition of politicians, bureaucrats, and business groups, or “iron triangle (鉄のトライアングル),” allowed Japan to lead the government-led industrial policies.¹²

These features of the 1955 system limited the roles of the Prime Minister in Japan’s decision-making process. Along with the changes in the security environment, domestic political changes, and institutional changes since the late-1990s led Japan to shift the influence in the decision-making process from “bureaucracy-led (官僚主導)” to “cabinet-led (官邸外交).”¹³ Therefore, it is essential to consider the changes in the prime minister’s influence over Japan’s decision-making process as well.

Before proceeding, I want to note that there are possible alternative explanations for Japan’s changing grand strategy. I briefly set them out below, but each is inadequate to explain Rich Nation, Restrained Military posture, we see in practice.

First and foremost, the neorealist approach focuses primarily on the distribution of material power among states in an anarchic international system. According to Waltz, the absence of supranational authority leads states to ensure their survival by themselves.¹⁴ Therefore, the number of great powers in the system, or polarity, becomes the major determinant of state behaviors. Structural realism predicts that under shifts in the distribution of material power, states engage in balancing behaviors to match the military

¹² “Chapter 1: The Liberal Democratic Party in time,” in Ellis S. Krauss and Robert J. Pekkanen. *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP: Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011): 1-28.

¹³ Tomohito Shinoda, “The policymaking process in Japan,” in Robert J. Pekkanen and Saadia Pekkanen. *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021): 244-262.

¹⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz. *Theory of international politics*. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979): 96-97.

might of great powers to maximize their security. In particular, the rise of China's economic power became particularly evident after its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. Simultaneously, China's escalating military capabilities and the relative decline of the U.S. emerged as primary drivers of security dynamics both in Asia and globally.

Mike Mochizuki suggested theoretical expectations for Japan within the framework of structural realism.¹⁵ Under the offensive realist perspective, as John Mearsheimer suggested, Japan's preferred strategy would be either balancing against a rising power or buck-passing the burden of national security to other states.¹⁶ Buck-passing, a strategy Japan had maintained during the Cold War period, involves relying on the U.S. security commitment while remaining responsive to security concerns.¹⁷ If Japan chooses to buck-pass its security burden to the U.S., it would be difficult to observe significant changes in its security and foreign policy.

If Japan shows changing security postures, within the framework of offensive realism, such changes can be understood as manifestations of balancing behaviors. Basically, there are two options regarding balancing behavior: internal and external. Internal balancing involves strategies aimed at enhancing a state's own military

¹⁵ Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's shifting strategy toward the rise of China," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 4-5 (2007): 740-746.

¹⁶ John Mearsheimer suggested the following four strategic options: balancing, buck-passing, appeasement, and bandwagoning. He argued appeasement and bandwagoning are not useful options to deal with the rising power. (John Mearsheimer. *The tragedy of great power politics*. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001): 139-140)

¹⁷ Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or passing the buck? Testing theories of Japanese security policy," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (2004): 92-121.

capabilities or the economic foundations of its military potential, such as increasing military expenditure.¹⁸ Although Japan has not demonstrated significant quantitative changes, scholars have pointed out notable qualitative changes in Japan's security strategy. Shelia Smith emphasized the changing regional security environment and concerns over the U.S. security commitment as pivotal factors driving Japan to assume greater roles for the Japan Self-Defense Force (日本自衛隊, JSDF). Specifically, she highlighted the perceived threat posed by the potential missile crisis involving North Korea and the growth of Chinese military power, promoting Japan to reconsider the role of the "military as an instrument of statecraft."¹⁹ For instance, Smith underlined Japan's acquisition of Aegis-equipped ships, a decision previously prohibited by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.²⁰

External balancing, on the other hand, refers to a state's strategy of forming alliances or coalitions with other states to counter threats.²¹ While the U.S. has been the only formal security ally, Japan has been expanding its strategic relations with other states, especially in Southeast Asia.²² Corey Wallace explained Japan's strategic pivot to Southeast Asia, India, and Australia as a "strategic dual hedge" aimed at balancing

¹⁸ Jack S. Levy, and William R. Thompson, "Hegemonic threats and great-power balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," *Security Studies* 14, no. 1 (2004): 14.

¹⁹ Shelia Smith. *Japan rearmed: The politics of military power*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019): 5.

²⁰ Shelia Smith, *ibid.*, p. 107.

²¹ Kenneth N. Waltz. *ibid.*, p. 118.

²² Takashi Terada "The origins of ASEAN+6 and Japan's initiatives: China's rise and the agent-structure analysis," *The Pacific Review* 23, No. 1 (2010): 71-92.

between China and the U.S.²³ Ian Storey similarly argued that China's assertive behaviors in the maritime domain led Japan to cooperate with Southeast Asian states that share its concerns in the region.²⁴ Likewise, Sueo Sudo emphasized the changing nature of Japan's foreign policy, emphasizing the strategic networking between Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).²⁵

Some scholars scrutinized Japan's expanding security alignment with other regional states.²⁶ Thomas Wilkins examined Japan's twin-track approach, focusing on the new cooperative bilateral alignments with Australia and India. Wilkins argued that Japan's adoption of this approach stemmed from a strategic decision to overcome diplomatic isolation and to find a balance between the U.S. and China to pursue its own national interests.²⁷

However, those Beijing-centered neorealist approach overlook the nuanced dynamics of Japan's grand strategy in the maritime domain. Japan's proactive economic engagement and military restraint need to consider a broader understanding of Japan's strategic consideration beyond the military domain.

²³ Corey J. Wallace, "Japan's strategic pivot south: Diversifying the dual hedge," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 13, no. 3 (2013): 479-517.

²⁴ Ian Storey, "Japan's maritime security interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea dispute," *Political Science* 65, no. 2 (2013): 135-156.

²⁵ Sueo Sudo, "Japan's ASEAN Policy: Reactive or proactive in the face of a rising China in East Asia?," *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 1 (2009): 137-158.

²⁶ Madhuchanda Ghosh, "India and Japan's growing synergy: From a political to a strategic focus," *Asian Survey* 48, no. 2 (2008): 282-302; Yoichiro Sato, "Japan-Australia security cooperation: Jointly cultivating the trust of the community," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 35, no. 3 (2008): 152-172.

²⁷ Thomas S. Wilkins, "Japan's alliance diversification: A comparative analysis of the Indian and Australian strategic partnerships," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11 (2011): 115-155.

The second set of major scholarly works focused on the central role of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Since 2012, the second Abe administration achieved remarkable political, economic, and security changes in Japan. Particularly noteworthy are the changes in Japan's security strategy under Abe's leadership. In 2013, Abe established the National Security Strategy, marking Japan's first comprehensive document outlining its national security goals. Subsequently, in 2014, he revised the official interpretation of Article 9, allowing Japan's right of collective self-defense in limited situations. Additionally, in 2015, Abe led the revision of the Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, aimed at strengthening bilateral security cooperation and enhancing the roles of the JSDF. These actions underscore Abe's major roles in enhancing Japan's security posture and strengthening its alliance with the United States in the face of evolving regional security challenges.

Some scholars emphasized Abe's pivotal role as a game-changer in Japan's security policy.²⁸ Christopher Hughes argued Japan's security policy under the Abe administration as "fundamentally revisionist and nationalist," describing it as a departure "towards a radical trajectory" in response to external pressures from China and North Korea.²⁹ Michael Green highlighted the changes in Japan's strategic calculus under Abe,

²⁸ Sebastian Maslow, "A blueprint for a strong Japan?: Abe Shinzo and Japan's evolving security system," *Asian Survey* 55, no. 4 (2015): 739-765; H. D. P. Envall, "The 'Abe Doctrine': Japan's new regional realism," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 20 (2020): 31-59; Carlos Ramirez, "Japan's foreign and security policy under Abe: From neoconservatism and neoautonomy to pragmatic realism," *The Pacific Review* 34, no. 1 (2021): 146-175; Michael Auslin, "Japan's new realism: Abe gets tough," *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 2 (2016): 125-134.

²⁹ Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's 'resentful realism' and balancing China's rise," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 2 (2016): 109-150; -----, "Japan's strategic trajectory and collective self-defense: Essential continuity or radical shift?" *Journal of Japanese Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017): 93-126.

emphasizing the concept of the “line of advantage (利益線),” which entails internal and external balancing to “restore a more favorable equilibrium vis-à-vis China.”³⁰

Heginbotham and Samuels evaluated institutional reforms implemented under the Abe administration as the “most ambitious reorganization of Japan’s foreign and security policy.”³¹ These assessments collectively underscore Abe's proactive and assertive approach to reshaping Japan’s security posture and navigating complex regional dynamics.

On the other hand, some scholars explained Japan’s security changes under the Abe administration as a gradual shift or evolutionary process. Despite acknowledging Abe’s leadership, Adam Liff emphasized the significance of decades-long domestic and historical trends, emphasizing the persistence of self-imposed constraints.³² Similarly, Sasaki Alexandra denied evaluating Japan’s security policy changes under Abe as radical, contending that these changes align with the trajectory set by previous administrations.³³ Leif-Eric Easley concluded that Japan has made incremental policy adjustments, not aggressive militarization.³⁴

While acknowledging the significant influence of the Abe administration on Japan’s strategic decisions, these perspectives suggest a more nuanced understanding of

³⁰ Michael J. Green, *Ibid.*

³¹ Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, “Will Tokyo’s arms exports help or Hurt U.S interests in Asia?” *Cipher Brief*, July 14, 2017, <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/will-tokyos-arms-exports-help-or-hurt-u-s-interests-in-asia>.

³² Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s defense policy: Abe the evolutionary,” *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (2015): 79-99.

³³ Alexandra Sasaki, “Japan’s security policy: A shift in direction under Abe?,” *SWP Research Paper 2* (2015): 5-35.

³⁴ Leif-Eric Easley, “How proactive? How pacifist? Charting Japan’s evolving defense posture,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71, no. 1 (2017): 63-87.

Japan's security evolution. They highlight the continuity with past policies and emphasize the incremental nature of adjustments, suggesting that Japan's strategic trajectory cannot be solely attributed to Abe's leadership. Furthermore, they underscore the broader historical and geopolitical factors that shape Japan's grand strategy, indicating that shifts in Japan's security posture extend beyond the tenure of any single leader. By considering these broader contextual factors, these scholars offer a more comprehensive perspective on the complexities of Japan's security policy and its evolution over time.

The final set of scholarly work adopts a constructivist approach to analyze Japan's reactive foreign policy and isolationist stance in the international security domain during the postwar period, particularly highlighting its antimilitarist culture.³⁵ Scholars such as Thomas Burger and Peter Katzenstein criticized structural realist predictions regarding Japan's trajectory in the post-Cold War period and highlighted its pacifist national identity as the central variable constraining changes in its security policy.³⁶ They argued that Japan's experiences during the Imperialist era and the Pacific War have deeply ingrained a pacifist identity within Japanese society, exerting a profound influence over Japan's security policy and state decisions. Specifically, constructivists emphasized the resiliency of Japan's "self-imposed restrictions (歯止め)" in its security strategy: Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, the three non-nuclear principles, the limited use of the right of

³⁵ Glenn D. Hook. *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*. (London: Routledge, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara. *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Thomas U. Berger. *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

³⁶ Thomas U. Berger. *From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993); Peter J. Katzenstein. *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

collective self-defense, and the 1% of GDP cap on defense budget. By highlighting these institutional and cultural factors, constructivist analyses provide insight into the enduring norms and values that shape Japan's security behavior despite changing geopolitical circumstances.

Despite a recent easing of some restrictions, the constructivist approach underscores the persistence of strategic restraints and their ongoing relevance to Japan's security policy. For example, Andrew Oros stressed the importance of three historical legacies, the Pacific War and Imperial Japan, anti-militarism, and unequal relationship with the U.S., as crucial determinants of Japan's security posture. While Oros acknowledges a perceived "security renaissance," in Japan's approach, he argued that these legacies will continue to shape Japan's security posture.³⁷ Similarly, Hagstrom and Williamsson, and Easley argued that Japan's shift is neither dramatic nor toward aggressive remilitarization. They emphasize the enduring influence of antimilitarist norms in Japan's security policy, suggesting that despite incremental changes, Japan remains constrained by its historical and cultural legacies in its approach to security.³⁸ These analyses highlight the importance of understanding the complex interplay between historical memory, cultural values, and institutional norms in shaping Japan's security behavior.

While the constructivist approach captures the continuity of Japan's restraint stance on the military roles in the global domain, it overlooks the proactive aspects of Japan's

³⁷ Andrew Oros. *Japan's Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-first Century*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017).

³⁸ Linus Hagstrom, and Jon Williamsson, "Remilitarization," really? Assessing change in Japanese foreign security policy," *Asian Security* 5, no. 3 (2009): 242-272.

grand strategy. In other words, it does not provide a nuanced understanding of Japan's domestic changes, which demonstrate both economically proactive measures and a militarily restraint stance in the regional and global maritime domain.

Research Method and Case Selection

A case-based research design is most suitable to investigate the longitudinal process of Japan's grand strategy in the maritime domain in the 21st century. Case study has a distinctive advantage when investigating questions of "how" and "why" in contemporary events, where the investigator has little or no control.³⁹ Additionally, case study is especially useful for examining the process of change, revealing the effects of intervention or major actors.⁴⁰ Therefore, employing a case study design provides a useful analytical framework to analyze the evolving dynamics of Japan's grand strategy and the influence of intervening variables on Japan's decision-making process.

The principal analytical objective is to reveal Japanese decision-makers' perceptions and processes in crafting a grand strategy for the maritime domain. Specifically, I rely on process tracing to examine causal mechanisms and conditions linking threat perceptions to policy outcomes. To uncover how Japanese decision-makers perceive and interpret the structure of the international maritime domain, I examine

³⁹ "1. Introduction," in Robert K. Yin. *Case study research: Design and Methods, third edition*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003): 9; "Chapter 1. Case studies and theory development," in Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005): 3-36.

⁴⁰ "4. Flexible methods: Case study design," in Jeane Anastas and Marian L. MacDonald. *Research Design for Social Work and the Human Services*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2000): 377.

primary-level documents such as government papers, speeches, and legislative debates. Additionally, I investigate secondary sources from Japan's think tanks, which were deeply engaged in the establishment process of key legal and institutional changes. Unless stated otherwise, I translated and analyzed all the documents and articles in this dissertation.

A series of official documents published by the Japanese government serves as the primary source for the research, offering insights into the shared threat perception among Japan's decision-makers. The primary sources include the Defense White Paper of Japan (防衛白書) published by the Ministry of Defense of Japan (防衛省, MOD), the Diplomatic Bluebook (外交青書) published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (外務省, MOFA), and other materials from the official websites of the MOD, MOFA, and Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (官邸). Also, official speeches of the Prime Minister and Minister of relevant ministries are included in this category, accessible via their respective websites. Furthermore, the Japanese national diet search engine (<https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>) allows me to include debates on the Japanese diet as well. These primary sources reveal a shared perception of China's maritime behaviors, relations with the U.S., and the maritime domain among Japanese decision-makers, consistent with my Rich Nation, Restrained Army narrative.

I also include secondary sources in the research including reports published by Japan's key think tanks, such as the Japan Foundation and the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) under the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (笹川平和財団, SPF), and the National Institute for Defense Studies (防衛研究所, NIDS) under the MOD. In addition to

revealing scholarly opinions about my dual threat argument, these reports also shed light on the legal and institutional changes that often influence official documents. I also include news articles from Japan's major newspapers, such as Mainichi Shimbun (毎日新聞), Asahi Shimbun (朝日新聞), and Yomiuri Shimbun (読売新聞), which show the perceptions shared by the Japanese society. I then use these government documents, legal changes, legislative debates, think tank reports, secondary sources etc., to uncover the evolution of Japan's grand strategic thinking across three cases, forming the empirical foundation of this work.

The first case examines Japan's legal and institutional changes to reveal the domestic foundation of the shift in Japan's grand strategy in the oceans, focusing on the establishment process of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy (海洋基本法, BAOP) and the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (海洋基本計画, BPOP). The BAOP, established in 2007, is Japan's first comprehensive act defining Tokyo's rights and interests, revealing concerns and problems, and proposing ways to achieve goals in the maritime domain. Subsequently, the Japanese government introduced the BPOP in 2008, subjective to revision every five years, to address more specific concerns and issues Japan should cope with regarding the oceans. Moreover, the BAOP led to reforms in Japan's administrative system, such as the establishment of the Minister for Ocean Policy, and the Headquarters for Ocean Policy with the Prime Minister as the head of the Headquarters. Those reforms facilitated Japan's centralized and comprehensive decision-making process regarding ocean-related matters.

There are at least two puzzling phenomena regarding the establishment of the BAOP and BPOP. First, resource disputes between China and Japan acted as the catalyst

for Japan's move toward legalization. Japan perceived China's attempt to develop oil and gas in the Chunxiao gas field as a significant threat to Japan's national interests in the maritime domain. This shared threat perception among Japanese decision-makers became the major political driver of Japan's response, leading to the swift establishment of the BAOP in less than a year with bipartisan support.

Second, a gradual shift in Japan's grand strategy toward the security paradigm started to be observed in the BPOP. The first BPOP, announced in 2008, focused on economic interests under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), such as marine resources within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However, the central theme of the third BPOP, announced in 2013, shifted to Japan's maritime security, such as the security of key Sea Lines of Communication in Southeast Asia and multilateral cooperation to strengthen the international maritime order. This paradigm shift in Japan's maritime strategy, from a benign economic focus to a security-focused approach, clearly indicates that Japan is no longer a beneficiary but a guardian of the international order in the maritime domain, defined by themselves.

To analyze Japan's domestic legal and institutional changes, the first case proceeds in the following order. The first part focuses on the establishment process of the BAOP and BPOP. Specifically, I will analyze how the Chunxiao gas field development issue formed the threat perception among Japanese decision-makers, and how this shared perception prompted Japan to prepare for the perceived threat. Additionally, the roles of think tanks in Japan, such as the Nippon Foundation (日本財団) and the Ocean Policy

Research Foundation (海洋政策研究財団), as well as the bottom-up approach in formulating the BAOP and BPOP, will be emphasized.

The second case analyzes the changes in domestic institutions and the decision-making process of the Japanese government regarding the oceans. Prior to the establishment of the BAOP, Japan's decision-making process on ocean policy was scattered across various ministries. After the establishment of the BAOP, however, the decision-making process of the Japanese government became more centralized and comprehensive. By comparing the changes under each iteration of the BPOP, it becomes evident how Japan's approach to ocean-related issues has evolved.

Following the first case, the second case explores Japan's efforts to lead regional cooperation against non-traditional security threats in Southeast Asia. During the Cold War period, historical legacies stemming from WWII constrained Japan's regional approach to Southeast Asia primarily to economic matters. One of Japan's major economic tools for engaging with the region was Official Development Aid (政府開発援助, ODA), aimed at fostering the economic "self-help (自助)" of Southeast Asian states. Started as a form of war reparations in the 1950s, Japan's economic engagement with the region evolved into a key foreign market for post-war economic growth and the major tool to normalize relations with Southeast Asian states. With Japan's remarkable economic

growth, Japan became one of the top donors in the 1990s, contributing roughly a fifth of the total ODA by the Development Assistance Committee states.⁴¹

Since the 1990s, however, the Japanese government has experienced a transition period. Internationally, East Asia has witnessed dramatic economic and political transportation, primarily driven by the rise of China. Beijing's growing economic presence in the region urged Japan to reassess its regional strategy. Additionally, the Asian Financial Crisis in the mid-1990s, swamped Southeast Asia as well, severely curtailed law-enforcement capabilities in the region and led to a surge of non-traditional security threats, such as piracy and armed robberies. The resulting instability in the maritime domain of Southeast Asia emerged as one of the major concerns for Japan, posing threats to sea trade routes and Japanese ships.

Internally, Japan has major economic stagnation lasted for decades, putting domestic pressures on Tokyo's finance-focused ODA policy. Considering the growth of China's economic presence over the region, it became evident that Japan needed to review its perspective on ODA policy from quantity to quality. In other words, Japan needed to 'strategize' the ODA framework to adjust its regional approach to the evolving regional situation.

The research analyzes Japan's regional approach to Southeast Asia from the perspective of Japan's grand strategy in the maritime domain. Especially, the third case focuses on Japan's strategized ODA policy to support law-enforcement capabilities and

⁴¹ Hideki Esho, "From a late-comer donor to the top donor: How special is Japanese ODA?," *Journal of International Economic Studies* 8 (1994): 49-57.

strengthen multilateral cooperation to cope with non-traditional threats in the oceans, for two reasons. First of all, the Japanese government started to acknowledge that maritime instability in Southeast Asia has become one of the major threats to national interests. Over time, Japanese decision-makers started to perceive not only piracy and armed robbery but also territorial conflicts in the South China Sea as the core mission to maintain regional maritime order. Secondly, the case demonstrates Japan's efforts and practices to overcome mistrust between Tokyo and Southeast Asian states and become a leader in multilateral security cooperation. These capacity-building measures have become the central pillar of Japan's ODA policy and the FOIP vision.

The third case analyzes Japan's expanding security cooperation in the global domain, with the framework of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision and the Quad cooperation, as well as bilateral cooperations with Australia, India, South Korea, and the Pacific Islands Countries (PICs). First, the research traces the establishment process of the FOIP, from the "diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map (地球を俯瞰する外交)" proposed by the first Abe administration in 2006, has been transformed into the FOIP in 2016. The initial stage of the FOIP emphasized universal values, such as human rights and democracy. Considering the backlash from Southeast Asian states and China, however, the emphasis shifted away from democracy and focused more on connectivity and freedom of navigation in the ocean to promote multilateral cooperation.

In the second part, the research analyzes Japan's initiatives in the global maritime domain based on the FOIP vision, especially focusing on the establishment process of the

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and other bilateral security cooperation with other regional states, including Australia, India, South Korea, and the Pacific Islands Countries (PICs).

Roadmap

I proceed with the research on Japan's grand strategy in the oceans in the following ways. In chapter 2, I analyze domestic legal and institutional changes in Japan, focusing on the case of BAOP and BPOP. Specifically, I investigate how shared threat perception among Japanese key decision-makers becomes the major political driver toward the establishment of ocean-related laws and policies, as well as governmental changes for a comprehensive and centralized decision-making in the oceans. In chapter 3, I examine Japan's regional security engagement to Southeast Asia. Based on historical review of Japan's economic approach to the region, I investigate how Japan cautiously but proactively involves in multilateral security cooperation and leveraging prior economic relations. This case underscores the strategic allocation of Official Development Assistance to enhance law enforcement capabilities through collaboration with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The chapter 4 assesses Japan's global security cooperation within the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework, with a focus on the roles of the JMSDF and the JCG. After reviewing Japan's contributions to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the research also examines bilateral cooperation with Australia, India, South Korea, and regional cooperation with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

To narrow the scope of this research and analyze Japan's grand strategy in the maritime domain, I focus on Japan's behaviors from a broader perspective and do not delve

deeply into the military aspects, such as the quantitative changes in the military equipment of the JSDF or the specifics of Japan's security laws.

2. Origins of Rich Nation, Restrained Army: Japan's Domestic Legal and Institutional Changes

In this chapter, I focus on tracing the origins of Japan's grand strategy in the maritime domain from inaction, reaction, to proactive action. I focus on the key decision-makers who shaped domestic legal and institutional changes over time, who came to share rising threat perceptions. During the period of domestic changes, the decision-making locus shifted from civil society actors to Japanese political leaders. I examine how these actors helped to formulate key government documents and reports, legislative changes, news articles, and other domestic developments that are critical to the origin of Japan's grand strategy, "Rich Nation, Restrained Army."

First, I cover the late-1980s and 1990s prior to the establishment of the first Basic Act on Ocean Policy (BAOP). Although the UN Conventional Law of the Sea came into effect, Japan did not show much interest in managing the oceans, other than fishery management. Second, I move to the 2000s to reveal the formation of threat perception in Japan over China's claims on maritime rights, focusing on the case of the Chunxiao gas field dispute. Third, then I examine the legislative and policy changes related to the oceans in the broader context of other security-oriented changes led by political leadership in Japan.


Japan's Inactivity in the Oceans: Limited Response to UNCLOS

This section covers the broadly inactive nature of Japan's responses to the maritime domain from about the 1990s to 2004, as indicated in the case of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 1994, UNCLOS came into effect, fundamentally changing the implication of the maritime domain for sovereign countries. UNCLOS provided the legal foundation for sovereign states to argue their national rights and interests. Before WWII, most states limited their rights in the oceans to 3 nautical miles from coastlines, according to the 'cannon shot' rule.⁴²

As Figure 1 shows, sovereignty rights in the ocean have been expanded significantly under UNCLOS. Not only sovereignty rights within territorial seas but also exclusive economic rights within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) became the core parts of maritime rights. Additionally, technological advancements made various oil, gas, and minerals in the oceans profitable as well. Therefore, it was natural to expect states to change domestic laws and institutions to adjust the new maritime order under UNCLOS.

⁴² H. S. K. Kent, "The historical origins of the three-mile limit," *The American Journal of International Law* 48, no. 4 (1954): 537-553.

<Figure 1> Key Boundaries under UNCLOS



Jeff M. Smith, “UNCLOS: China, India, and the United States navigate an unsettled regime,” *Backgrounder* 3608 (2021): 3. <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/unclos-china-india-and-the-united-states-navigate-unsettled-regime>.

Following UNCLOS, Japan adjusted its domestic legal system to align with UNCLOS. During the 1990s, the Japanese government passed three new laws and amended four laws to define Japan’s expanded rights and interests in the ocean and to align with other domestic laws.⁴³ Among these changes, the revision of the law on territorial water (領海法)⁴⁴ and the new EEZ law⁴⁵ are worth emphasizing. In 1996, Japan

⁴³ Tadao Kuribayashi, “国際海洋秩序と日本の法的対応 [international maritime order and Japan’s legal response],” in Tadao Kuribayashi, and Takane Sugihara. *日本における海洋法の重要課題* [key issues of the law of the ocean in Japan] (Japan: Toshinto, 2006); Jun Tsuruta, “日本における国連海洋法条約の実施 [Japan’s implementation of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea],” *Kaiji Koutsu Kenkyu* 62 (2013): 13-14.

⁴⁴ The official title is the Law on Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zones (領海及び接続水域に関する法律).

⁴⁵ The official title is the Law on Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (排他的経済水域及び大陸棚に関する法律).’

revised the law on territorial water, which was established in 1977, to reflect the core changes under UNCLOS, such as the contiguous zone (接続水域) and the straight baseline (直線基線), expanding the area of Japan's territorial sea from 380,000 km² to 430,000 km².⁴⁶ The EEZ law, also established in 1996, defined EEZ and continental shelf, and Japan's rights to these areas.

Considering Japan's self-identity as an island nation and its high reliance on the oceans, however, it was unusual that Japan's response to UNCLOS was largely limited. Instead, Japan's primary interests in the oceans focused mainly on fisheries. For instance, the 'Grand Design for the National Land in the 21st Century (21世紀の国土のグランドデザイン),' published by the National Land Agency (国土庁) of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (国土交通省, MLIT) in 1998, shows how Tokyo's understanding of the oceans was narrow in the 1990s. There are only two pages regarding the maritime domain in the document, and most of the content is focused on fisheries management.⁴⁷ Furthermore, UNCLOS was understood in the context of fisheries as well, showing that Japan had not prepared for the new international maritime order.

3. New developments in the fisheries industry

⁴⁶ Nagai Toshio "新しい領海法と直線基線について [About the new law on territorial sea and straight baseline]," *Chizu* 34, no. 4 (1996): 13.

⁴⁷ Kokudocho, "21世紀の国土のグランドデザイン: 地域の自立の促進と美しい国土の創造 [Grand Design for the National Land in the 21st Century: Promoting regional independence and creating a beautiful national land]," *kokudo kotsusho* (1998): 55-56. <https://www.mlit.go.jp/common/001135926.pdf>.

(1) Development of an attractive fishery industry

Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, we will work to establish a new system to manage catchable stock and promote multifaceted resource management through initiatives such as voluntary resource management by fishermen. At the same time, in order to make maximum use of the productivity of the oceans and to ensure their sustainable and advanced use, we will comprehensively and organically promote the development of coastal fishing grounds, cultivation of fisheries, aquaculture, etc. To achieve those goals, we will develop the resource and catch management information system, and will promote related technology development as well as the development of fishing ground creation technology. (Kokudocho, *ibid.*, p. 95)

Although the Japanese government showed little interest in the oceans under UNCLOS, some groups urged to prepare for the expanded maritime sovereignty. Pointing out the lack of attention to the oceans, Japan Business Federation (日本経済団体連合会, JBF) published a statement called the ‘Grand Design for the Oceans in the 21st Century (21世紀の海洋のグランドデザイン)’ in 2000.⁴⁸ The statement pointed out the lack of Japan’s understanding of the expanded rights and interests in the ocean under UNCLOS, and recommended the following three points: 1) to know the oceans (oceanographic research and observation), 2) to use the oceans wisely (sustainable use of marine resources), and 3) to protect the oceans (maritime environment). Although the statement did not include specific plans for Japan’s new approach to the oceans, it should be noted that the JBF pointed out the importance of comprehensive governance of the maritime

⁴⁸ Japan Business Federation. “21世紀の海洋のグランドデザイン: 我が国 200 カイリ水域における海洋開発ネットワークの構築 [Grand design for the oceans in the 21st century: Establishment of an ocean development network in Japan’s 200 nautical mile zone],” *Japan Business Federation*, June 20, 2000. <https://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2000/028.html>.

domain and the necessity of comprehensive cooperation across the Japanese government, industry, and academia to secure newly defined national rights and interests.

Following JBF's statement, the Nippon Foundation (NF) announced the 'Proposal for Japan's Ocean Policy in the 21st Century (21 世紀における我が国の海洋政策に関する提言)' in 2002, which became the foundation of Japan's first law on the oceans.⁴⁹

Especially, Hiroshi Terashima, then-executive director of the NF, took a central role in preparing for the NF Proposal. Terashima criticized the lack of Tokyo's preparedness for the oceans under UNCLOS, the lack of domestic institutions and ocean policy for comprehensive management of the oceans.⁵⁰ Also, he pointed out that piracy would be a vital issue for Japan and Asia, and urged multilateral cooperation.⁵¹

After two years of research under the lead of Terashima, the NF summarized recommendations on Japan's response to the expanded sovereignty rights and interests in the oceans.

⁴⁹ Nippon Zaidan. *海洋と日本: 21 世紀における我が国の海洋政策に関する提言*. [Japan and the Oceans: Proposal for Japan's Ocean Policy in the 21st Century]. (Tokyo, Japan: Nippon Zaidan, 2002).

⁵⁰ Hiroshi Terashima, "海洋政策のない海洋日本 [Japan as a maritime nation without ocean policy]" *Asahi Shimbun*, December 3rd, 1999.

⁵¹ Hiroshi Terashima, "アジアの海と海賊の脅威 [Oceans in Asia and the threat of piracy]," *Gaiko huoramu* 14, no. 7 (2001): 38-41.

<Table 1> Summary of the proposal for Japan’s Ocean Policy in the 21st Century

NO	Proposal	Content
1	Establishment of comprehensive ocean policy	-Respect for the international rule of law in the oceans -Sustainable development and use of the oceans -Comprehensive management -Establishment of Basic Laws on Ocean Policy
2	Establishment of an administrative system to formulate and implement ocean policy	-Administrative reform: Ministerial conference on the oceans, Minister of Ocean Affairs, Ocean Policy Office under the Cabinet, ocean-related ministries and agencies liaison and coordination meeting, Ocean Council as an advisory group for the Prime Minister
3	Organization of a legal system for comprehensive management of the coastal zone	-Comprehensive coastal management by local government -Management based on the features of seas -Promoting the participation of civil society -Introducing conservation zone for the marine environment -Institutionalization of mitigation (minimizing environmental damages)
4	Rational management of fisheries resources, coordination with fisheries, and other marine uses	-Reform of the legal system for the fishing industry -Introduction of an arbitration system by a third-party organization for fishery compensation
5	The embodiment of comprehensive management of EEZ and continental shelf	-Establishing a comprehensive ocean policy and legal system for the development, use, and preservation of EEZ, continental shelf, and marine resources
6	Enhancing youth education, interdisciplinary education, and research on the ocean	-Improving primary and secondary education on the oceans -Supporting a higher-level education and research on the oceans

Author’s translation and analysis. (Nippon Zaidan. *海洋と日本: 21 世紀における我が国の海洋政策に関する提言* [Japan and the Oceans: Proposal for Japan’s Ocean Policy in the 21st Century]. (Tokyo, Japan: Nippon Zaidan, 2002): 1-32)

Three points of the NF proposal are worth noticing. First, the NF Proposal advised specific legal and administrative reforms on ocean-related topics for Japan’s comprehensive approach to the oceans. The NF Proposal proposed not only a legal system but also a long-term plan for Japan’s ocean policy, and a centralized government system for centralized decision-making process on the oceans, including a new minister, office, and a ministerial conference on maritime affairs. Furthermore, the NF Proposal covered various topics related to the maritime domain, including legislation for the management of

coastal zones, comprehensive governance of EEZ and continental shelf, and strengthening education and research on the oceans.

Second, the NF Proposal includes a wide range of ocean-related topics, fisheries, environmental protection, and management of EEZ and continental shelf. This was possible because various members with different backgrounds joined the Study Group, allowing the NF Proposal to include a broad range of topics regarding the oceans: four members from think tanks, eight members from academia, and one member from the government. Also, the eight members from academia had different backgrounds as well: Japan Coast Guard, law, marine science, environmental system, Southeast Asia, international society, and international environment.⁵² Those various participants allowed the NF Proposal to include ocean-related topics comprehensively.

Third, the NF Proposal did not include, however, traditional maritime security and law enforcement in the oceans. As discussed above, the major topics of the proposal were legal and administrative changes for comprehensive management of the oceans. If the changes in the security environment in Asia or the rise of China are the key drivers of Japan's changing maritime strategy, the NF Proposal would have included recommendations on security strategy or policy to enhance its national security. The lack of security concerns in the proposal, therefore, clearly shows that the primary concern to Japan was not a security threat from China or changes in the security environment, but the expansion of sovereign rights to the maritime domain.

⁵² Ocean Policy Research Institute. *海洋白書2004 創刊号: 日本の動き世界の動き*. [Ocean White Paper 2004: Japan's Decision, World's Decision]. (Tokyo, Japan: Sippu Ando Oshan Zaidan Kaiyo Kenkyujyo, 2004): 154.

In summary, Japan showed a limited response to the changes in the oceans after UNCLOS became effective in 1994. The Japanese government passed and amended several laws in accordance with UNCLOS, but their primary interest still focused on fisheries, and they did not show policy changes to secure the expanded maritime interests. Although there were proposals arguing Tokyo's more proactive response and comprehensive approach to the oceans, those did not lead to political movements as well.

The Rise of Bottom-Up Threat Perceptions and Responses


Japan's grand strategy in the oceans started to change as a response to China's attempts to secure resources, as revealed by the case of the Chunxiao gas field dispute in 2004. In terms of resource development in the oceans, Beijing showed a prompter response to Tokyo. China started developing natural gas in the East China Sea in the late-1990s, after a series of explorations since the 1980s. The Chinese government planned to build seven oil and natural gas fields, including Pinghu, Canxue, Duanqiao, Tianwaitian, and Chunxiao, and started the plan with operation at Pinghu in 1998.⁵³ In August 2003, two Chinese oil companies, Sinopec and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and two foreign oil companies, the Royal Dutch Shell and the Unocal Corporation, announced to explore three blocks and develop two gas fields at Xihu Trough.⁵⁴ Since those gas fields are within the Chinese side of the median line proposed by

⁵³ Suk-Kyoon Kim, "Chapter 12. Perspectives on East China Sea maritime disputes: Issues and context," in Schofield, Clive H., Lee, Seokwoo., and Kwon, Moon-Sang. *The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction* (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014): 292-293.

⁵⁴ Keith Bradsher, "Venture to Drill for Gas and Build Pipeline Off China," *New York Times*, August 20, 2003.

Japan, the Chinese government did not expect controversies with the Japanese government.⁵⁵

<Figure 2> Gas Fields at Xihu Trough and EEZ claimed by China and Japan



Gisela Grieger, “Sino-Japanese controversy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands: An imminent flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific?,” *European Parliament Think Tank*, July 30, 2021. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)696183](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)696183).

⁵⁵ “中日东海悬案谈判三年 春晓油气田见证不凡岁月 [Three years of negotiations on unsolved cases in the East China Sea between China and Japan, Chunxiao gas field witnesses extraordinary years],” *Sohu Xinwen*, June 19, 2008. <http://news.sohu.com/20080619/n257602203.shtml>.

Prior to 2004, the Japanese government maintained a cautious approach to the resource development issue in the East China Sea. As Figure 2 shows, the disputed gas fields are located near the middle line of both states' EEZ, thus the issue might turn into diplomatic friction between China and Japan. To make China's economic growth an "opportunity" not a "threat," the Japanese decision-makers prioritized a stable relationship with Beijing.⁵⁶ For instance, the Japanese government banned resource development or seismic surveys by Japanese companies, showing Japan's self-restraint stance over the issue.⁵⁷

However, a news article published by Tokyo Shimbun in May 2004 altered Japan's perception of the Chunxiao gas field development issue.⁵⁸ The article criticized the Japanese government for its inability to request a share from China, citing the absence of relevant data, despite the possibility that some of the reserves lie within Japan's jurisdiction. Moreover, the article contended that the resource conflict posed a security threat to Japan, asserting that the development of resources in Chunxiao could be the first step to transform the East China Sea into "China's inland sea (中国の内海)." Furthermore, the article raised doubts about the validity of the U.S.-Japan security system, highlighting the involvement of U.S. company in the development. The article concluded with a comment from personnel at the Japan Defense Agency, stating that "the day will soon

⁵⁶ Saadia M. Pekkanen. *Japan's Aggressive Legalism: Law and Foreign Trade Politics Beyond the WTO*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008): 116-118.


⁵⁷ James C. Hsiung, "Sea power, the law of the sea, and the Sino-Japanese East China Sea "resource war"," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 27, no. 6 (2005): 518-519.

⁵⁸ "中国、日中境界海域に施設ガス採掘へ建設資源独占の恐れ 東シナ海英米企業も参加 [China installs (facilities) in Japan-China border waters, construction for gas mining, fears of resource monopoly, the East China Sea, UK and US companies also participate]," *Tokyo Shimbun*, May 28, 2004.

come when the gas field will be built on the Japanese side while protected by [Chinese] warships.”

The article sparked domestic outrage in Japan, reinforcing Tokyo’s resolute stance on the Chunxiao gas field issue. Additionally, it heightened public awareness in Japan regarding marine resource, EEZ, territorial sea, and resource disputes with China in the future. Although China’s resource development in the East China Sea dates back to the 1990s, almost no news articles discussed the issue before 2004. Also, the Japanese public showed little interest regarding the expanded national rights and interests under UNCLOS, such as EEZ and continental shelf. Following Tokyo Shimbun’s article, however, a number of news articles discussing the resource development in the Chunxiao gas field dramatically increased, urging the Japanese government to respond to the issue with a firm stance.

<Figure 3> The Number of Japanese News Articles Regarding the Chunxiao Gas Field Dispute



Author's translation and analysis. The figure shows the number of news articles of Japan's major newspapers, using the news article search engine, Nikkei Telecom 21 (<https://t21.nikkei.co.jp/g3/CMNDF11.do>). Keywords for the figure: Chunxiao (春曉), ECS+GF (East China Sea and Gas Field, 東シナ海+ガス田), ECS+TS (East China Sea and Territorial Sea, 東シナ海+領海), EEZ+CN (Exclusive Economic Zone and China, EEZ+中国). Chinese character for Chunxiao in Japanese Kanji (春曉) is different from Chinese Hanji (春晓).

After the article, the Japanese government shifted its cautious approach to a more resolute stance. First, Tokyo turned to the resource development issue in the East China Sea to a firmer stance. Akira Chiba, then-press secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) criticized China's gas field development in the East China Sea as a 'unilateral move,' demanding a halt of the operation.⁵⁹ Also, Tokyo requested China to share its seismic data as a prerequisite for the joint development proposed by Beijing.⁶⁰

Second, Tokyo took a more proactive stance over the resource development in the East China Sea. In July 2004, the Japanese government sent a Norwegian survey vessel, the Ramform Victory, to conduct a seismic survey on the Japanese side of the median line. The result of the seismic survey, published in February 2005, showed that it is highly likely that the geological features of the Chunxiao Gas field stretch to the Japanese side of the median line.⁶¹ The result confirmed Tokyo's suspicions that China might "suck out

⁵⁹ Au Kung-wing, "The East China Sea issue: Japan-China talks for oil and gas," *East Asia* 25 (2008): 225.

⁶⁰ "東シナ海の日中境界で中国がガス田開発 日本、分配要求へ [China attempts gas field development on Japan-China border in the East China Sea, Japan requests allocation]," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 8th, 2004.

⁶¹ Manicom James, "Sino-Japanese cooperation in the East China Sea: Limitations and prospects," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 30, no. 3 (2008): 462.

Japan's resources with a straw.”⁶² Based on the result of the report, in July 2005, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI) granted the Teikoku oil company the concession rights of test-drilling in three areas, including the Chunxiao and Duanqiao gas fields.⁶³

Third, at the same time, Tokyo sought to solve the issue in diplomatic ways to manage tensions with China as well. During the first and second rounds of the bilateral talks on October 25th and 30-31st May 2005, Japan refused Beijing's offer of joint development and demanded to halt operations in the Chunxiao gas field. However, Tokyo proposed joint development of oil and gas fields close to the median line during the third round of the bilateral talks, held on September 30th and October 1st, 2005, and Beijing agreed to respond to Japan's proposal at the next meeting.⁶⁴

Nonetheless, diplomatic efforts for the joint development were largely limited for two reasons. First of all, a lack of domestic preparedness for ocean governance limited Japan's leverage for the negotiation.⁶⁵ The Japanese government did not conduct any basic data in the oceans around Japan, did not have domestic systems or plans to cooperate to secure sovereignty rights and national interests. For instance, Yoichi Matsuzoe, an LDP politician, pointed out the lack of political leadership and centralized government agencies and criticized buck-passing behaviors between the METI and the MOFA. The Agency for

⁶²James Brooke, “Drawing the line on energy,” *New York Times*, March 29, 2005.

⁶³ Mayumi Negishi, “Teikoku Oil gets drilling rights in East China Sea,” *The Japan Times*, July 15, 2005.

⁶⁴ Kung-wing Au, *ibid.*, pp. 229-230.

⁶⁵ Hiroshi Terashima, “新海洋秩序と日本の海洋政策 [The new maritime order and Japan's ocean policy],” *Journal of the JIME* 42, no. 3 (2007): 74-80; Kimiaki Kudo, “海洋管理時代の幕開けと海洋科学技術 [The opening of the ocean management era and marine science and technology],” *Science & Technology Trend* (2008): 21-30.

Natural Resources and Energy of the METI explained that “we cannot conduct a test-drilling unless the MOFA demarcates the median line,” and the MOFA stated that “we cannot protest China’s drilling without resource data from the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy.”⁶⁶ The lack of relevant data explains why the Japanese government kept requesting to share seismic data as the prerequisite for the joint development.⁶⁷

Furthermore, Japan’s legal preparation for the maritime domain was insufficient as well. Only three new laws and four revised laws were passed after the ratification of UNCLOS, although Japan had roughly 70 laws regarding the ocean, showing Japan’s reactive stance over the maritime domain.⁶⁸ One of those laws is the ‘law on the EEZ and continental shelf’ passed in 1996, but it consists of only four articles, defining the EEZ and continental shelf, and stating that domestic laws apply to the EEZ and continental shelf. Compared to other states in the region, Japan’s efforts in the new maritime environment under UNCLOS were largely limited.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ “核心: 中国ガス田開発 官庁間で責任転嫁 自民会合 政府の対応に怒号 「なぜ調査しない」 [The key point: China’s gas field development, passing the buck among government agencies, the Liberal Democratic Party holds a meeting, criticizes government’s response “Why do not investigate”],” *Chunichi Shimbun*, May 29, 2004.

⁶⁷ Kishiro Sawa, “東シナ海のガス田強度開発をめぐる中国の企み [A Chinese plot about the gas field joint development in the East China Sea],” *Yamaguchi Keizaigaku Zasshi* 55, no. 3 (2006): 61.

⁶⁸ The three new laws are ‘排他的経済水域及び大陸棚に関する法律 [law on the EEZ and continental shelf],’ ‘排他的経済水域における漁業などに関する集権的権利の行使などに関する法律 [law on the exercise of sovereign rights concerning fisheries, etc. in the Exclusive Economic Zone],’ and ‘海洋生物資源の保存及び管理に関する法律 [law on conservation and management of marine living resources].’ The number of revised laws varies depending on how to define the relationship between legal changes and UNCLOS, but a part of the revised laws are revised laws of ‘領海法 [Law on territorial seas],’ ‘水産資源保護法 [Fisheries and resource protection law],’ ‘海洋汚染及び海上災害の防止に関する法律 [Law on prevention of marine pollution and maritime disasters],’ and ‘海上保安庁法 [Japan Coast Guard law].’ (Tadao Kuribayashi, *ibid.*, p. 14)

⁶⁹ Seongwook Park, and Heecheol Yang, “A study on the analysis of Japan's Basic Ocean Law and policy of Korea: The case of Korea, Japan and China on the administrative system for ocean,” *Ocean and Polar*

Secondly, China's naval presence in the East China Sea posed a significant security threat to Japan, which might escalate resource conflict to military tension. In January 2005, before the bilateral negotiations regarding the Chunxiao gas field development, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) P-3 maritime reconnaissance aircraft spotted two Sovremenny-class destroyers near the Chunxiao gas field, which was "the first-time sighting of PLAN's most advanced destroyers in waters under Japanese surveillance."⁷⁰ Furthermore, in early September 2005, Japan spotted five naval vessels including one Sovremenny-class destroyer near the Chunxiao gas field.⁷¹ Considering that it was a day before the third bilateral meeting, the naval presence was a resolute signal to Japan that China would not give up its national interests.⁷²

As a result, bilateral negotiations regarding the Chunxiao gas field development were largely failed. Both states had 9 bilateral meetings and one expert-level meeting between early March 2005 and April 2007, and released a joint statement, merely reaffirming a friend relationship and a plan for joint development without any concrete

Research 30, no. 1 (2008): 119-128. <https://sciwatch.kiost.ac.kr/handle/2020.kiost/4559>; Ocean Policy Research Institute. *海洋白書 2004 創刊号: 日本の動き世界の動き* [Ocean White Paper 2004: Japan's Decision, World's Decision]. (Tokyo, Japan: Sippu Ando Oshan Zaidan Kaiyo Kenkyujyo, 2004): 9-14; Tadao Kuribayashi, *ibid.*

⁷⁰ "東シナ海のガス田海域に中国軍新鋭艦 [China's most advanced vessels were spotted near waters of the gas fields in the East China Sea]," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 25, 2005.

⁷¹ James Manicom, "Hu-Fukuda Summit: The East China Sea dispute," *China Brief* 8, no. 12 (2008). <https://jamestown.org/program/hu-fukuda-summit-the-east-china-sea-dispute>.

⁷² Christopher H. Sharman, "China moves out: Stepping stones toward a new maritime strategy," *China Strategic Perspectives* 9 (2015): 11. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA617178> .

plan.⁷³ One more joint statement was released in May 2008, but did not include any plans as well.⁷⁴

In conclusion, the Chunxiao gas field development issue not only posed a fundamental threat to Japan's national interests but also led to formulate a threat perception on China's maritime behaviors among Japanese leaders.⁷⁵ As mentioned earlier, fisheries and other marine resources had been central to Japan's understanding of the oceans. However, following the disputes over the Chunxiao gas field development, Japan understood China's resource development as a fundamental threat to its national interests. Also, Japanese domestic opinion started to emphasize the significance of EEZ and continental shelves, urging the Japanese government to manage the expanded sovereignty in the oceans.

For instance, Shigeo Hiramatsu, a professor at Keio University who later joined LDP's 'working team regarding maritime interests,' argued that "Japanese bureaucrats had not done anything to avoid conflicts with China. ...Senkaku Islands, continental shelf and oil resources in the East China Sea, the middle line between Japan and China,

⁷³ "Japan-China joint press statement," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 11, 2007. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pv0704/joint.html>.

⁷⁴ Reinhard Drifte, "From 'sea of confrontation' to 'sea of peace, cooperation and friendship'?: Japan facing China in the East China Sea," *Japan Aktuell 3* (2008): 27-51; XinJun Zhang, "Why the 2008 Sino-Japanese consensus on the East China Sea has stalled: Good faith and reciprocity considerations in interim measures pending a maritime boundary delimitation," *Ocean Development & International Law 42* (2011): 53-65. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2011.542105>; Moritaka Hayashi, "The 2008 Japan-China agreement on cooperation for the development of East China Sea resources," in Myron H. Nordquist, John N. Moore, and Judy Ellis, *Maritime Border Diplomacy*. (Netherlands: Brill, 2012): 35-46; "Joint statement: between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on comprehensive promotion of a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 7, 2008. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html>.

⁷⁵ Ikuo Kayahara, "中国の海洋進出、その軍事的意図 [China's maritime advance, its military intentions]," *Chuokoron* (2004): 62-69.

Okinotorishima, Japan's EEZ issues are, ironically, taught by China." His argument clearly shows how Tokyo's perception of national interests and sovereignty expanded to the oceans, and UNCLOS is central to securing those.⁷⁶

Changes in Japan's perception of China's maritime behaviors were clearly indicated in government documents. Since 2005, Japan's Defense White Paper (防衛白書)' started to add a subsection regarding China's maritime behaviors, "activities in the oceans (海洋における活動)," only under China's section. The subsection mentioned that China's oceanographic research near Japan's EEZ is against UNCLOS, and stated that Japan should pay attention to China's naval force which pursues a blue-water navy (外洋海軍).⁷⁷ In 2005, the Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan' also added a subsection, "issues regarding the oceans (海洋をめぐる懸案)," and explained Japan's stance on the Chunxiao gas field development issue.⁷⁸ Considering that these subsections on maritime behaviors were placed only under the China section, it was clear that the major driver of Japan's perception shift on the oceans came from China.

Three months before the release of the Tokyo Shimbun's article, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced to establish of the 'Working Team for Maritime

⁷⁶ Matsuzoe Yoichi, and Hiramatsu Shigeo, "対談: 中国にやられっぱなしでよいのか 東シナ海の資源採掘は国家存亡の大事と認識せよ [Dialogue: Is it okay to let China take over? Recognize that mining resources in the East China Sea are critical to national survival]," *Seiron* (2004): 69.

⁷⁷ Ministry of Defense of Japan. 防衛白書 平成 17 年版. [Defense of Japan 2005]. (Tokyo, Japan: Nikkei Insatsu Kabushikikaisha, 2005): 58-60.

⁷⁸ "第 2 章 地域別に見た外交 [Chapter 2: Diplomacy by region]," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, n.a.* <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2005/index1.html>.

Rights and Interests (海洋権益ワーキングチーム, the Working Team)’ under the Committee on Diplomatic Research (政務調査会) in March 2004. The goal of the working team was to conduct a basic oceanographic survey for drawing outer lines of Japan’s continental shelves and submitting it to the United Nations Commissions on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by 2009. However, the Working Team changed the main topic after the Chunxiao gas field development issue, and released a report called the “Nine Proposals to Secure Maritime Interests (海洋権益を守るための9つの提言, Nine Proposals)” in June 2004.

<Table 2> Summary of the Nine Proposals to Secure Maritime Interests

NO	Proposal	Content
1	Establishment of the ministerial conference on maritime rights and interests	-Establishing the ‘Ministerial Council on Maritime Rights and Interests,’ with the Prime Minister as the head of the council - Establishing ministerial meetings under relevant ministers and board of directors under assistant chief cabinet secretary
2	Implementation of government-led surveys and exploratory drilling on the Japanese side of the middle line	-Including granting rights for mining, which had been reserved for 40 years -Security posture to maintain security
3	Early resolution of the East China Sea demarcation issue	-Early resolution based on a comprehensive understanding of the ministerial conference on maritime rights and interests
4	Accelerating research for the 2009 extended continental shelf application	(To submit a report on the outer lines of Japan’s continental shelves to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by 2009, previous goal of the Working Team)
5	Developing a crisis management system, including gray-zone crisis	-Clarify the process of making judgments and decisions on how to respond to crises -Strengthen cooperation among the JCG, police, and the JSDF

6	Strengthening the Security and Surveillance System of the Japan Coast Guard near the Senkaku Islands ⁷⁹	-Deploy new-type patrol vessels near the Senkaku Islands -Increase the budget and the number of JCG personnel
7	Resolute response to Chinese oceanographic survey vessels	-Deploy aircraft and patrol vessels and strengthen the information sharing system between the JCG and JSDF to monitor near the Pacific Ocean -Make a manual based on international law to respond to China's illegal oceanographic survey
8	Strengthening Japan's administrative authority over Okinotorishima and the Senkaku Islands	-Examine a plan to utilize Okinotorishima -Considering fixing the heliport and surveillance camera on the Senkaku Islands
9	Strengthening the JSDF and utilizing the U.S.-Japan security framework	-Strengthen information sharing with the U.S. -Maintain the official position of the U.S. government that the U.S.-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands

Author's translation and analysis. Jiyuminshuto Seimuchosakai, “海洋権益を守るための9つの提言 [Nine Proposals to Secure Maritime Interests],” in Ocean Policy Research Institute. *海洋白書2005: 日本の動き世界の動き* [Ocean White Paper 2005: Japan's Decision, World's Decision]. (Tokyo, Japan: Sippu Ando Oshan Zaidan Kaiyo Kenkyujyo, 2005): 186-187.

Two features of the Nine Proposals are worth mentioning. First of all, the Nine Proposals urged a centralized approach to the oceans. It emphasized central roles of prime minister to secure Japan's national rights in the oceans, including the establishment of ministerial-level meetings and a plan to respond to various crises. It was closely related to Japan's domestic political situation, especially during the Koizumi administration. Junichiro Koizumi, then-prime minister of Japan between 2001 and 2006, attempted to strengthen roles of prime minister, especially in foreign and security affairs, which had been dominated by bureaucrats (官僚).⁸⁰ Different from the previous bureaucrat-led

⁷⁹ The islands are called Diaoyu Dao in Chinese, Senkaku Shoto in Japanese, and Diaoyutai in Taiwanese. The author used Senkaku Islands (shoto in Japanese) here because it represents Japan's understanding.

⁸⁰ Tomohito Shinoda. *官邸外交: 政治リーダーシップの行方*. [Kantei diplomacy: A direction of political leadership]. (Tokyo, Japan: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2004).

decision-making process, Koizumi's government-led (官邸主導) diplomacy showed a top-down style on diplomatic and security affairs, allowing him to dispatch the JSDF to Afghanistan for humanitarian relief operations and pass controversial 'contingency laws (有事法制).' Similarly, the Nine Proposals also underscored the importance of the prime minister and bureaucrats for a comprehensive approach to the oceans.

Second, the Nine Proposals showed the expansion of the perception of sovereignty rights to the maritime domain. It urged the Japanese government to strengthen governance on the Senkaku Islands and Okinotorishima (沖ノ鳥島) to protect Japan's sovereignty rights and interests. Specifically, the Nine Proposal recommended enhancing joint cooperation among the JSDF, Police, and the JCG, to respond to illegal activities near Japan's territorial seas, including China's oceanographic survey. Also, the Nine Proposals mentioned the U.S.-Japan security alliance to reaffirm the commitment of U.S. on the Senkaku Islands. Although there were no significant conflicts over these islands with China, the Nine Proposals showed that China's maritime behaviors might be a threat to Japan's maritime rights and interests in a broader sense.

Towards A Proactive Grand Strategy

This section analyzes the establishment process of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy (BAOP) and Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (BPOP), the foundational documents and legislation of Japan's grand strategy in the oceans. I cover how these elements were proposed, drafted, and subsequently enacted. I also analyze the specific provisions of the

BAOP and BPOP, and how they changed Japan's institutional and policy infrastructures for governing the oceans. Between 2008 and 2018, there were three 5-year basic plans on the oceans. One of the most critical features of the plans is the steady shift toward a more distinct national security posture in the maritime domain.

Although there was shared threat perception among Japanese decision-makers, there were two major hurdles to overcome to establish a comprehensive law on the ocean. First, there was no central administrative agency that could lead the establishment process of the law in Japan. Typically, Japanese bureaucrats had been responsible for most of the legislative process because of their professional knowledge and experience.⁸¹ For instance, 68.9% of entire drafts submitted to the Diet between 1980 and 2014 were submitted by bureaucrats. Also, the establishment rate of drafts submitted by bureaucrats were significantly higher (88%) than by politicians (34.3%), showing the dominant role of bureaucrats in law-making process.⁸² Considering that there was no central government agency on the ocean, it was hard to expect that a basic law on the ocean would be prepared and submitted by bureaucrats.

Second, it was anticipated that politicians, relevant agencies, and various private business groups would want to participate in discussions, which would delay the establishment process. As the name 'basic law' suggests, it was expected that it would

⁸¹ T. J. Pempel, *ibid.*, pp. 647-664.

⁸² Between 1980 and 2014, 5,364 drafts were submitted to the Japanese Diet. 3,697 of the overall drafts (68.9%) were submitted by the Cabinet, and 1,667 (31.1%) of the overall drafts were submitted by politicians. 3,257 of the drafts submitted by the Cabinet were established (88%), and 572 of the drafts submitted by politicians were established (34.3%). (Gonoi Ken, "日本の議員立法: 国際比較の視点から [Politician-led legislation in Japan: From the perspective of international comparison]," *Waseda seijikoho kenkyu* 114 (2017): 9)

encompass a wide range of topics related to the maritime domain, such as fisheries, shipping industries, maritime safety measures, and marine research. Therefore, it was necessary to have a political entity to lead the establishment process of the law, while managing conflicts from various stakeholders.

It is essential to focus on the ‘Study Group on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy (海洋基本法研究会, BAOP Study Group),’ who took the major roles to overcome these hurdles and establish the BAOP. In the initial stage of meetings of the BAOP Study Group, LDP politicians, bureaucrats from relevant ministries, and experts from business sectors and research institutions participated in the discussion, allowing them to avoid inter-agency conflicts while embracing various ocean-related topics in a draft. Furthermore, the BAOP Study Group successfully passed the BAOP within a year, without any major political opposition.

The BAOP Study Group consisted of three major actors: the Nippon Foundation, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF),⁸³ and LDP politicians, led by Keizo Takemi, who was the then-vice Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council of the LDP. Especially, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation provided a foundation for the BAOP took the major role in the initial period of the BAOP.

Hiroshi Terashima, who joined the OPRF in July 2002, prepared for a draft of the BAOP since 2003. After four years of research project, the OPRF announced the ‘Ocean

⁸³ The official name of the Ocean Policy Research Foundation is the ‘Ship and Ocean Foundation (シップ・アンド・オーシャン財団),’ but the OPRF is more commonly used. The OPRF was merged with the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (笹川平和財団, SPF), and the Ocean Policy Research Institute (海洋政策研究所) was established under the SPF in April 2015.

and Japan: A proposal toward ocean policy in the 21st century (海洋と日本: 21世紀の海洋政策への提言, OPRF Proposal).’ which became the basis of Japan’s comprehensive approach to the maritime domain. The OPRF Proposal consisted of three parts: Set a basic plan for ocean policy (海洋政策大綱), establish a system for Basic Act on Ocean Policy, and manage ‘national land (国土)’ expanded to the ocean and international cooperation.

<Table 3> Outline of the ‘Ocean and Japan: A proposal toward ocean policy in the 21st Century’

No	Proposal	Content
1	Basic Plan for Ocean Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Basic ideas of ocean policy -Framework for promoting ocean policy -Promotion of understanding, research, and education on the ocean
2	Establishment of a system for Basic Act on Ocean Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Establishment of Basic Act on Ocean Policy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -To provide basic principles, policy frameworks, and guideline for ocean policy etc. -Reform administrative organization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Establish ministerial conference on the oceans, minister of ocean affairs for policymaking and implementation of policy
3	Management of ‘national land’ expanded to the ocean and international cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Framework for EEZ and continental shelf management -Establishing maritime security -Promotion of protection, conservation, and restoration of the marine environment -Promoting the development of marine resources with consideration for marine ecosystems -Strengthening efforts to build an integrated coastal zone management system -Promoting disaster prevention and mitigation -Development of maritime information for maritime management -Promotion of research, education, and outreach for the comprehensive ocean policy

Author's translation and analysis. Ocean Policy Research Foundation, “海洋と日本: 21 世紀の海洋政策への提言 [Ocean and Japan: A proposal for ocean policy in the 21st century],” *Nippon Foundation* (2006): 1-33. <https://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2005/00812/pdf/0001.pdf>.

The basic structures of the OPRF Proposal and the NF Proposal were largely similar, but the OPRF Proposal had three distinguishing features. First, the OPRF Proposal outlined fundamental principles Japan should uphold as a maritime nation: sustainable development and use of the ocean, the promotion of an international order in the oceans and international cooperation, and comprehensive management of the oceans. In essence, the OPRF Proposal articulated that the maritime international order consisted of UNCLOS and the Agenda 21 of the Rio Summit, and Japan sought to establish a maritime strategy based on this international maritime order. To support Japan's comprehensive approach to the oceans within the maritime international order, the OPRF proposed a new system that included the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, the Basic Plan for Ocean Policy, and reform of the administrative organization.

<Table 4> Summary of the ‘Management of “National Land” Expanded to the Ocean and International Cooperation’ of the OPRF Proposal

No	Topic	Content
1	Framework for EEZ and continental shelf management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -System for surveys in the jurisdictional zone, including EEZ and continental shelf -New laws regarding EEZ and continental shelf -Management plan based on the features of sea areas -Surveys of remote islands and surrounding areas
2	Establishing maritime security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -System for the immediate maritime information collection -Maritime security regarding sea lanes -The Strait of Malacca: Establish a framework for cooperation

		<p>between states near the Strait and states using the Strait</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Piracy: Comprehensive regional cooperation in Asia -Maritime terrorism: Proactive response to International Maritime Organization treaties and the Proliferation Security Initiative
3	Promotion of protection, conservation, and restoration of the marine environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Introduction of a new environmental impact assessment system -Promoting the protection of ocean ecosystem, biodiversity
4	Promoting the development of marine resources with consideration for marine ecosystems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Rational management of catch -Strengthening measures to conserve the world's fishery resources -Promotion of development of energy and metal mineral resources
5	Strengthening efforts to build an integrated coastal zone management system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Construction of a local-based coastal zone management system -Construction of citizen participation system
6	Promoting disaster prevention and mitigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Establishment of regional disaster prevention plans -Promotion of education and training for disaster prevention
7	Development of maritime information for maritime management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Drafting of national strategy regarding maritime information collection -Construction of an integrated marine survey, observation, and monitoring system
8	Promotion of research, education, and outreach for the comprehensive ocean policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Strengthening of education and research on the ocean and ocean management -Promotion of marine science, technology, and research

Author's translation and analysis. Ocean Policy Research Foundation, *ibid.*, pp.

14-24.

Second, the OPRF Proposal suggested a wide range of ocean-related topics from the perspective of comprehensive ocean management. Compared to the previous proposals, the OPRF Proposal showed wider topics, such as maritime security, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine environment, maritime information, and scientific research on the ocean. Also, the OPRF Proposal intentionally used the term ‘national land (国土),’ emphasizing the importance of comprehensive management of expanded

‘sovereignty (主権)’ to the ocean. This explains why EEZ, continental shelf, and remote islands are in the same category, showing that the OPRF Proposal understood them from the perspective of maritime security, maritime environmental protection, and economic activity.

Third, the OPRF Proposal started to include the ‘maritime security’ issue into the discourse of Japan’s maritime strategy. The word ‘anzen (安全)’ in the context of ocean policy had primarily understood as ‘safety,’ such as marine accident or shipwreck. The NF Proposal did not mention piracy or suspicious ships issues as a threat to Japan’s national interests in the ocean, showing that the ‘security issue’ had not been considered from the perspective of ocean policy. However, the OPRF Proposal not only mentioned marine environmental protection and sustainable development of the ocean but also piracy, maritime terrorism, and suspicious ships from the perspective of security (安全保障). Those changes between the NF Proposal and the OPRF Proposal clearly showed that Japan started to realize that the stability of the maritime domain not only near Tokyo but also beyond the boundary is essential to its national interests.

After the release of the OPRF Proposal, the NF and the OPRF visited LDP politicians to request political support for the legislation. They visited Shinzo Abe, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary in November 2005,⁸⁴ Hidemasa Nakagawa, the Chairman of

⁸⁴ “海洋開発特別講演会 「海洋基本法と私たち」 [Special symposium on ocean development ‘Basic Act on Ocean Policy and us’]” *Japan Society of Civil Engineers Proceedings* (2007): 1-20.
https://www.jsce.or.jp/committee/ocean/dat/special_symp0704.pdf.

LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council,⁸⁵ and Keizo Takemi, a LDP politician who had participated in the Nine Proposals, both in February 2006.⁸⁶

Nakagawa agreed the importance of the OPRF Proposal and made the BAOP as LDP's political agenda.⁸⁷ In April 2006, The LDP then decided to change the 'Special Committee on Maritime Rights and Interests (海洋権益特別委員会)' to the 'Special Committee on Ocean Policy (海洋政策特別委員会),' and established the 'Study Group on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy (海洋基本法研究会, BAOP Study Group)' with Keizo Takemi as the leader.⁸⁸ The BAOP Study Group had 10 meetings between April and December 2006, discussing from basic reviews to the final negotiation among relevant stakeholders.

The Study Group had 10 meetings between April and December 2006, and discussed on various issues. The first two meetings were about the necessity of Japan's ocean policy under UNCLOS, mainly proceeded by the LDP members and Sasakawa. Based on the basic agreement of the necessity of the BAOP, the Study Group focused on

⁸⁵ The Policy Affairs Research Council is a primary policymaking body within the LDP. Since all proposals for legislative bills must go through the LDP before being submitted to the cabinet, the influence of the Policy Affairs Research Council on the legislative process is significant. (Robert J. Pekkanen, and Ellis S. Krauss. *The rise and fall of Japan's LDP: Political party organizations as historical institutions*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011): 19)

⁸⁶ Ocean Policy Research Foundation, “平成 18 年度我が国における海洋政策の調査研究報告書: 海洋基本法の制定に向けて [2006 research report on Japan's ocean policy: Towards the enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy],” *Ocean Policy Research Foundation* (2007): 10.

⁸⁷ Masahiro Akiyama, “Use of seas and management of ocean space: Analysis of the policy making process for creating the basic ocean law,” *Kaiyo Seisaku Kenkyu* 5 (2007): 4. https://www.spf.org/opri/global-data/opri/publications/jsop/ISSN1880-0017_vol5.pdf.

⁸⁸ Ocean Policy Research Foundation, *ibid.*, p. 52.

specific topics from the third to the seventh meetings. Bureaucrats, scholars, think tanks members, and people from relevant industries participated in the meetings and attempted to reflect their opinions to the BAOP. From the 8th to the 10th meetings, the OPRF and politicians discussed on details of the BAOP and the BPOP.

<Table 4> A list of meetings of the Study Group on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy

Phase	Date (No)	Main Topic	Main Presenters
Agenda Setting	06.04.24 (1)	-Urgent need of ocean policy	LDP, NF
	06.05.18 (2)	-UNCLOS and Japan's response -Marine environment, marine scientific research -Conflicts in expanded jurisdictional zones and maritime security issues	Academia, OPRF
Expanding Agenda / Suggesting Policies	06.06.18 (3)	-Framework for comprehensive research and development in the oceans and human resource development -Promotion of science and technology	Academia, Think tank
	06.07.11 (4)	-Ocean policies related to ministries and agencies	Bureaucrats
	06.09.05 (5)	-Issues to be included in the BAOP (1) -Principle of the BAOP -Ocean policy and resource energy issues -Basic perspectives of the BAOP and roles of education	Academia, Think tank
	06.10.13 (6)	-Issues to be included in the BAOP (2) -Current situation and issues of Japan's shipping -Japan as an advanced nation in use of the ocean -Maritime security: Order in the ocean and international cooperation	Academia, Think tank
	06.10.27 (7)	-Issues to be included in the BAOP (3) -Opinions regarding the BAOP -Opinions from private sectors: Shipping, fisheries, resource, construction	Academia, Think tank, Private sectors
Finalization of Draft	06.11.17 (8)	-Overall direction of Basic Plan on Ocean Policy	OPRF
	06.11.30 (9)	-Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, Basic Act on Ocean Policy	OPRF

	06.12.07 (10)	-Basic Plan on Ocean Policy -Outline of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy	LDP, Komeito, NF
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Author's translation and analysis. Ocean Policy Research Foundation, *ibid.*, pp. 61-64.

During the first phase of meetings, the BAOP Study Group established an agenda concerning the legalization of the BAOP. They defined the fundamental principles of the BAOP and clarified the necessity of a basic law on the oceans under UNCLOS. Additionally, the BAOP Study Group called for the participation of various stakeholders in the maritime domain.

In the second phase, the BAOP Study Group expanded the topics and concentrated on more specific areas, including oceanographic research, shipping, fisheries, resource management, and construction. During this phase, a wide range of participants joined the meeting and discussed their opinions on the BAOP. For instance, in the 7th meeting, representatives from Japan Shipowners' Association (日本船主協会), Japan National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Association (日本全魚共同組合連合会), Japan Fisheries Association (大日本水産会), Japan Petroleum Development Association (石油鉱業連盟), and Japan Ocean Development and Construction Association (日本海洋開発建設協会) took part and discussed their respective agendas. Also, bureaucrats from 8 ministries participated in the 4th meeting and discussed the opinions of each ministry on the BAOP as well.

In the 3rd phase of the meetings, the BAOP Study Group focused on the finalization of the BAOP and Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (海洋基本計画, BPOP). They finalized drafts

of the BAOP and BPOP during the 8th and 9th meetings, and invited Komeito (公明党), a coalition party of the LDP, to request approval on the drafts. Soon after the final meeting, both parties agreed on submitting a draft to the 166th Diet session, in April 2007. On April 27, the BAOP was passed with bipartisan support, except for a minor opposition from the Social Democratic Party (社会民主党).

In August 2007, the BAOP Study Group changed its name to the ‘Follow Up Study Group on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy (海洋基本法フォローアップ研究会, Follow Up Study Group)’ and continued research activities for the BPOP. In the Follow Up Study Group, one representative from each of the LDP, Democratic Party of Japan (日本民主党, DPJ), and Komeito, joined and worked as chairs of the meetings. Furthermore, more participants participated in the meetings and presented their opinions on the BAOP as well. For instance, more than 15 business groups and research institutions participated in the 1st (November 8th) and 2nd (November 29th) meetings, including JBF, Marine Technology Forum (海洋技術フォーラム), and the Oceanographic Society of Japan (日本海洋学会). The Follow Up Study Group submitted the ‘Opinions on the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (海洋基本計画に対する意見) in December 2007, summarizing opinions and a list of specific topics on the BPOP.⁸⁹ After three months of discussions within the Headquarters, the first BPOP was announced in March 2008.

⁸⁹ Kaiyokihonho huoroappu kenkyukai, “海洋基本計画に対する意見 [opinions on the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy],” *Sasakawa Peace Foundation* (2007): 1-2. https://www.spf.org/_opri_media/publication/approach/pdf/200712_basiclaw.pdf.

The establishment process of the BAOP and the BPOP showed three distinguishing features unprecedented in the past. First of all, the BAOP was established within a year without political debates. Except for the Social Democratic Party, most of major parties in Japan, including the LDP, DPJ, and Komeito, supported the law. The BAOP Study Group made the bipartisan support for the BAOP possible, because politicians from major parties participated in the meetings and discussed before submitting the law to the diet.

Secondly, the BAOP included a wide range of topics related to the oceans. Not only opposition party members but also business groups, research institutions, and opinions from civilians joined the discussion and expressed their opinions on the BAOP. Through the Study Group meetings, additional ocean-related issues from various perspectives could be added to the BAOP and BPOP. For example, article 20 of the BAOP states Japan's responsibility to secure Japanese vessels and crew members, which was not included in the OPRF Proposal, showing that maritime industries succeeded in reflecting their interests through the 7th Study Group meeting.

Thirdly, a series of meetings for the BAOP and BPOP highlighted a significant perception regarding expanded Japan's sovereignty rights and interests in the oceans, as well as concerns about China's maritime activities. Reports from these meetings indicated unanimous agreement among participants on the importance of enacting a basic law on the oceans to protect Japan's national rights and interests in the oceans, and shared concerns on the potential conflicts with China in this regard.

Analysis on the BAOP and the 1st BPOP

The BAOP consists of four chapters, 38 articles, and additional clauses. The first chapter of the BAOP (article 1 to 15) provides general provisions, including the purposes and basic philosophy of the act, and the responsibilities of relevant groups, local government, and Japanese citizens. The second chapter (article 16) defines the BPOP and regulates that the Japanese government should revise the BPOP every five years. The third chapter (article 17 to 28) explains the basic measures the Japanese government should take regarding the oceans. The fourth chapter (article 29 to 38) defines the Headquarters for Comprehensive Ocean Policy (総合海洋政策本部) which will be established under the cabinet of Japan.

<Table 5> Outline of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy

Major Objectives	1) Sound development of economic society	
	2) Stability of the lives of citizenry	
	3) Contribution to the coexistence of the oceans and mankind	
Basic Philosophy	1) Harmonization of the development and use of the oceans with the conservation of marine environment	
	2) Securing the safety and security on the oceans	
	3) Improvement of scientific knowledge of the oceans	
	4) Sound development of ocean industries	
	5) Comprehensive governance of the oceans	
	6) International partnership with regard to the oceans	
Basic Measures	1) Promotion of development and use of ocean resources	7) Promotion of research and development of oceanography and technology
	2) Conservation of marine environment	8) Promotion of ocean industries and strengthening the international competitiveness

	3) Promotion of development of exclusive economic zone	9) Integrated management of the coastal zone
	4) Securing maritime transport	10) Conservation of the remote islands
	5) Securing the safety and security of the oceans	11) Securing international coordination and promotion of international cooperation
	6) Promotion of ocean survey	12) Enhancement of citizen's understanding of the oceans
Headquarters for Comprehensive Ocean Policy	Establishment, Affairs under the jurisdiction, Organization, Director- and vice Director-General of the Headquarters for Comprehensive Ocean Policy, Members of the Headquarters for Ocean Policy, etc.	

Author's translation and analysis. “海洋基本法 [Basic Act on Ocean Policy],” *Cabinet Office of Japan*, n.a. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/law/pdf/law_je.pdf.


The most significant change brought about by the BAOP is the establishment of the Headquarters for Comprehensive Ocean Policy (総合海洋政策本部, Headquarters), which is responsible for overseeing Japan's ocean policy. Prior to the BAOP, there were two major interagency meetings related to Japan's ocean policy: the interagency meeting regarding ocean development (海洋開発関係省庁連絡会議) and the interagency meeting regarding continental shelf research and marine resource (大陸棚調査に関する関係省庁連絡会議), with Director-General-level personnel from more than 8 ministries. However, the decision-making process in these meetings was highly fragmented due to the lack of a

central coordinating agency, which resulted in conflicts over specific responsibilities among the relevant ministries.⁹⁰

After the BAOP, however, the Headquarters under the Japanese Cabinet became the central government agency for Japan's decision-making in ocean-related policies. The prime minister assumed the role of the head of the Headquarter, with the Chief Cabinet Secretary (内閣官房長官) serving as the vice-head. Additionally, the BAOP established the Minister in Charge of Ocean Policy (海洋政策担当大臣) as the vice-head of the Headquarters, and ministers from all ministries became members as well. Furthermore, a Participatory Meeting (参与会議) was established, comprising experts designated by the Prime Minister to provide specialized knowledge on ocean-related issues.

⁹⁰ Yoshihisa Imai, “海洋政策と海洋開発利用技術 [ocean policy and ocean development/utilization technology],” *Journal of the School of Marine Science and Technology* 2, no. 1 (2004): 52. <https://agriknowledge.affrc.go.jp/RN/2010700963.pdf>.

<Figure 9> Japan’s ocean-related decision-making system before and after the 1st BAOP



Author’s translation and analysis. Acronyms for government agencies: MIC: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, MAFF: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, MLIT: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, MOE: Ministry of the Environment, MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. (“海洋開発関係省庁連絡会議の設置について [About the establishment of inter-ministerial meeting on marine development],” *Cabinet Secretariat*, n.a. <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kaiyou/konkyo.html>; “大陸棚調査・海洋資源等に関する関係省庁連絡会議 [inter-ministerial meeting on continental shelf survey and marine resources],” *Cabinet Secretariat*, n.a. <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/tairikudana/renrakukaigi.html>; “総合海洋政策本部について [About the Headquarters for Comprehensive Ocean Policy],” *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, n.a. <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/honbu/honbu.html>)

Secondly, the Headquarters announced the ‘Overview of Ocean-related Policies for the year 2008 (平成 20 年度海洋関連施策の概要).’ As mentioned previously, in Japan, ministries had their own agencies responsible for implementing ocean-related policies, resulting in a fragmented approach to ocean governance. To coordinate these fragmented policies across ministries, the Headquarters created a comprehensive list of ocean-related

policies, each with a specific budget allocation. Also, the Headquarters requested ¥1,338.1 billion (\$13.38 billion) for ocean-related policies in FY 2008.

<Table 5> Summary of the Overview of Ocean-related Policies for the Year 2008

Category	Goals	Key Policies (billion ¥)
Use the Ocean	-Ensuring stable maritime transportation through the promotion of the marine industry - Active development and utilization of fisheries and mineral resources in exclusive economic zones	-Development of core port harbors (60.2) -Structural reforms in the fishing industry (10.2)
Know the Ocean	-Maritime Domain Awareness for the development, utilization, and conservation of the oceans -Promotion of research and development in oceanography and technology	-Promotion of earth environmental observation and deep-sea exploration projects (38) -Investigation of petroleum and natural gas reserves (15.1) -Survey of Seabed Topography, Crustal Structure, etc., in Territorial Waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (1.3)
Secure the Ocean	-Ensuring maritime safety and security -Conservation of remote islands -Conservation of the marine environment -Prevention of disasters	-Strengthening Responses to Armed suspicious ships in the Waters Surrounding Japan (105.7) -Project 'Zero Idle Patrol Vessel' (39.4) ⁹¹ -Maintenance and improvement of Remote Island Routes (4.1)
International Cooperation	-Ensuring international cooperation in the oceans -Japan's proactive contribution to the international community regarding the oceans.	-Collaboration in the Fisheries Sector for the Sustainable Utilization of Fisheries Resources (11.7) -Cooperation Necessary for Ensuring the Safety of the Malacca and Singapore Straits (0.6)

⁹¹ Project “Zero Idle Patrol Vessel (空き巡視船ゼロ)” aimed to increase the number of JCG personnel to introduce a multi-crew system. Previously, the JCG adopted a one-crew system, where five members became one crew responsible for one patrol vessel. However, there had been instances of delayed responses when a crew member was on leave or absent. In order to address this issue, the JCG aimed to increase the number of its personnel and implement a 'multi-crew' system. This allowed the JCG to assign multiple crew members to a single patrol vessel, ensuring that adequate personnel were available to respond to situations immediately. (“2. 「空き巡視艇ゼロ」を目指して [Toward the ‘zero idle patrol vessel’],” *Japan Coast Guard, n.a.* <https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2008/tokushu/p032.html>)

Author's translation and analysis. “平成 20 年度 [Year 2008],” *Cabinet Office of Japan*, n.a. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/budget/h20_budget.html.

Although the outline was a summary of previous policies from ministries, there were several new policies included in the list that are worth noticing. Especially, multiple new policies regarding maritime interests were included in the ‘know the ocean’ part, such as research project on seabed topography and crustal structure within Japan’s territorial seas and EEZ (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism, MLIT), basic tool development program for marine resources (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, MEXT), and oceanic research on Japan’s territorial seas and EEZ (Japan Coast Guard, JCG). This demonstrates Japan’s efforts to centralize fragmented ocean policies while simultaneously showing an expansion of Japan’s governance in the maritime domain.

Thirdly, the Headquarters announced the first BPOP in March 2008, outlining Japan’s specific efforts for the comprehensive management of the oceans. Article 2, Paragraph 16 of the BAOP obligated the Headquarters to publish the BPOP that outlines the direction of Japan's ocean policy for a period of five years. With the support of the Follow Up Study Group, the Headquarters led the discussion to release the first BPOP within a year after the establishment of the BAOP.

In the preamble, the three goals of the first BPOP were suggested: Pioneering challenges to global issues in the ocean, establishing the foundation for sustainable use of abundant marine resources and maritime domain, and contributing to the maritime domain for achieving safe and secure lives of people. The following chapter of the first BPOP

discusses basic policies of each topic related to the ocean, such as ocean development, safety and security in the ocean, comprehensive ocean governance, and international cooperation. The second chapter provides 12 specific topics, such as marine environmental protection, EEZ and continental shelves, and marine industries, and discusses policies to achieve the goals of each topic. The third chapter briefly mentions additional measures for ocean-related policies.

<Table 6 > Outline of the first Basic Plan on Ocean Policy

Chapter	Content
1. Basic Policies on Measures Related to the Ocean	1) Harmonization of the development and use of the sea with the preservation of the marine environment 2) Securing the safety and security of the sea 3) Enhancement of scientific knowledge of the sea 4) Sound development of marine industries 5) Comprehensive governance of the sea 6) International partnership regarding the sea
2. Measures that the Government Should Take Comprehensively and Systematically Regarding the Ocean	1) Promotion of the development and use of marine resources 2) Preservation of marine environment 3) Promotion of development of EEZ and continental shelves 4) Securing maritime transport 5) Securing the safety and security of the ocean 6) Promotion of oceanic survey 7) Promotion of research and development of marine science and technology 8) Promotion of marine industries and strengthening the international competitiveness 9) Comprehensive management of the coastal zones 10) Preservation of the remote islands 11) Securing international coordination and promotion of international cooperation 12) Enhancement of public understanding and human resource development in relation to the ocean
3. Other Matters Necessary to Promote Measures Comprehensively and	1) Effective implementation of measures regarding the sea 2) Responsibilities of related parties and mutual coordination and cooperation 3) Active publication of information concerning measures

Author's translation and analysis. “海洋基本計画 [Basic Plan on Ocean Policy],” *The Cabinet Office of Japan*, March 2008. <https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/plan/plan01/pdf/plan01.pdf>.

In conclusion, the establishment process of the BAOP has two key implications for Japan. First of all, China's maritime behaviors have led to a shared threat perception among Japan's decision-makers, which became a major driver of Japan's domestic institutional and legal changes. In particular, the Chunxiao gas field development issue became the inflection point in Japan's approach to the ocean, raising awareness of expanded sovereignty rights and interests in the maritime domain. The Japanese government shifted its previous cautious stance on the East China Sea to a more proactive approach, granting permission for Japanese companies to conduct test drills and proposing joint development with China.

However, Japan's efforts to address the issue were significantly hampered by domestic unpreparedness. There was no centralized government agency responsible for ocean-related policies, and ministries in Japan pursued their own agenda independently, leading to a fragmented approach to the maritime domain and resulting in interagency conflicts. This lack of preparedness within Japan's domestic system with regard to UNCLOS substantially limited Japan's leverage in dealing with the Chunxiao gas field development issue, due to the absence of basic information on the East China Sea, such as topographic data or seabed resources, as well as different opinions among ministries on the issue. Consequently, China's behavior toward maritime interests and Japan's domestic unpreparedness formulated a shared threat perception among Japanese decision-makers.

Secondly, the shared threat perception became a major political driver for the establishment of the BAOP. Not only Japan's key decision-makers, the LDP, the DPJ, Komeito, and bureaucrats from ministries, but also relevant stakeholders, such as business groups and experts, firmly agreed on the necessity of a basic law on the ocean to secure Japan's sovereignty rights and national interests in the ocean. This allowed Japan to establish the BAOP within a year, with bipartisan support from almost all parties.

The BAOP also fundamentally shifted Japan's governance on the ocean. The BAOP includes a wide range of ocean-related topics, from marine resource management and maritime environmental protection to the management of remote islands, continental shelf, and EEZ. This implies that Japan attempted to establish a domestic system for centralized ocean management led by the Japanese cabinet, not a case-specific response to a resource development issue with China.

Wandering Domestic Politics, Worsening Security Situation

Japan's grand strategy in the oceans is nested in the broader political and security changes. The late-2000s was the most turbulent period to Japan's domestic politics, especially for the LDP. Followed by the Koizumi administration, Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister in 2006. There were high expectations on the Abe administration that Japan's security policy would become more proactive, such as expanded roles of the JSDF in international affairs, more robust security cooperation with the U.S., and a potential amendment to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which had constrained Japan's security involvement beyond its borders since the end of World War II. The Japanese public also held high hopes for the Abe administration, evident by a remarkable approval

rate of 65% in October 2006.⁹² In his first policy speech at the Diet session, Abe emphasized his commitment to enhancing cooperation with “democratic countries that share our basic values (基本的な価値を共有する民主主義国).” He also announced plans to initiate research on amending Article 9 to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and to continue contributing to the reconstruction of Iraq by deploying the JSDF.⁹³

Nevertheless, a money scandal and the suicide of the agriculture minister, Toshikatsu Matsuoka, had a profound negative impact on the Abe administration, dropping the approval rating to 32% in May ⁹⁴. In addition to the political scandals, for health reasons, the first Abe administration was over in 10 months. The following Prime Ministers, Yasuo Fukuda and Taro Aso, had suffered from low approval rates as well and lasted only a year respectively. Political turbulence within the LDP persisted, and the largest opposition party, DPJ, achieved a landslide victory in 2009 election. Yukio Hatoyama, then-representative of the DPJ, became Prime Minister in September 2007.

The Hatoyama administration put emphasis on its relations with Asian states, particularly with China and South Korea, as well as the concept of an ‘equal security relationship with the U.S. (対等な日米同盟関係).⁹⁵ Prior to assuming the position of Prime

⁹² “The Abe Cabinet starts with a public approval rate of 65%,” *NHK*, December 2006. <https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/english/reports/summary/200612/01.html>.

⁹³ “第 2. 本会議の概要 [2. Overview of the plenary session],” *The House of Representative of Japan*. https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_annai.nsf/html/statics/ugoki/h18ugoki/02honkai/65honkai.htm.

⁹⁴ Martin Fackler, “Facing inquiry, Japanese official commits suicide,” *New York Times*, May 28, 2007.

⁹⁵ “民主党の政権政策マニフェスト [Democratic Party of Japan policy manifesto],” *Minshuto* (2009): 1-23. http://archive.dpj.or.jp/special/manifesto2009/pdf/manifesto_2009.pdf.

Minister, Hatoyama expressed his views on Japan's diplomatic approach and its relationship with the United States, which raised concerns in Washington. In a New York Times article, titled “A new path for Japan,” he raised doubts on U.S.-led globalism and urged to create an “East Asian community” for regional integration of East Asia.⁹⁶ Although he also mentioned that the U.S.-Japan security alliance will be the cornerstone for Japan’s diplomacy, he faced voices of worries and criticisms from inside and outside Japan.

Hatoyama’s efforts to establish an equal relationship with the U.S. soon faced a critical moment in his political leadership. In May 2006, Japan and the U.S. reached an agreement to reduce the number of U.S. Marine Corps personnel in Okinawa by 8,000 and to relocate Futenma Air Base to Camp Schwab in northeastern Okinawa Prefecture.⁹⁷ However, in July 2009, Hatoyama announced to relocate the base outside Okinawa, which led to a breakdown in the negotiation with the U.S. Hatoyama's plan encountered strong opposition from Washington and faced domestic criticisms. As a result, he announced the withdrawal of his plan in October 2010. The relocation of Futenma Air Base issue became the critical reason for the short-lived Hatoyama administration.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Yukio Hatoyama, “A new path for Japan,” *New York Times*, August 26, 2009.

⁹⁷ “在日米軍の兵力構成見直しなどに関する政府の取り組みについて [Regarding Japanese government’s efforts in reviewing the structure of U.S. Forces in Japan],” *Ministry of Defense of Japan*, May 30, 2006. <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/saihen/20060530.html>.

⁹⁸ Michael J. Green, “The Democratic Party of Japan and the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance,” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 37, no. 1 (2011): 91-116; Satoshi Kitamura, “普天間基地移設問題をめぐる鳩山首相のリーダーシップと世間の影響力 [The Influence of Prime Minister Hatoyama's Leadership and Public Opinion in the Futenma Base Relocation Issue],” *Doshisha Policy and Management Review* 1 (2012): 93-107; Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper et al., “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service* (2009): 1-32; Kazumi Fujimoto, “鳩山由紀夫の思想と行動: ロードマップ中に「理念」の宰相 [Thoughts and actions of Yukio Hatoyama:

Also, following Prime Ministers from the DPJ, Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda, had suffered from the lack of political leadership. Especially, the pitfall of the exclusion of bureaucracy in the decision-making process became obvious when the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake occurred. Experts pointed out that the major cause for the failure of Kan administration's response to the crisis is the rivalry between political leadership and bureaucracy.⁹⁹ The Hatoyama administration introduced institutional changes to emphasize roles of political leadership in decision-making process and minimize roles of bureaucracy, which significantly limited politico-bureaucracy relations.¹⁰⁰ However, failures of coordination between the Cabinet and bureaucrats during the crisis received domestic criticisms. The Kan administration attempted to bring bureaucrats back to the decision-making process and rely on bureaucratic support for crisis management, but did not work out well.¹⁰¹ The approval rating for the Kan administration dropped to 15.9% in December 2010, and 71.7% of respondent showed no expectations on the future implementation of policies.¹⁰² The following Yoshihiko Noda was short-lived as well due to political

Prime Minister of “philosophy” without roadmap],” *Senshudaigaku Shakaikagakukenkyujo Geppo* (2011): 2-23.

⁹⁹ Yuki Tatsumi, “Japan under DPJ rule: The costs of overemphasizing political leadership,” *Harvard International Review* 34, no. 3 (2013): 56-60; Jirou Yamaguchi, “政権交代と政官関係の変容・連続: 政治主導はなぜ失敗したのか [change/continuity in regime change and politico-bureaucracy relations: Why political leadership failed],” *Nenpo Gyousei Kenkyu* 47 (2012): 2-20; Kenji E. Kushida, “The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the Democratic Party of Japan: Leadership, structures, and information challenges during the crisis,” *The Japanese Political Economy* 40, no. 1 (2014): 29-68.

¹⁰⁰ Tomohito Shinoda, *ibid.*, p. 256.

¹⁰¹ Hayashi Yoshimasa, and Tsumura Keisuke. *国会議員の仕事: 職業としての政治*. [Job of diet members: Politics as a profession]. (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2011): 202-205; William L. Brooks, “Stress test for the U.S.-Japan alliance under the Democratic Party of Japan,” *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 32, no. 1 (2012): 121-135.

¹⁰² “Support rate for Kan Cabinet is 15.9%,” *Genron NPO*, December 28, 2010. https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5266.html.

scandals, the increase of consumption tax from 5% to 10%, and defections of anti-tax increase group from the DPJ. The Noda administration lost in the election in December 2012, and Shinzo Abe became the Prime Minister again.

While Japan has been struggled from political turmoil and unprecedented disasters, disputes between Beijing and Tokyo in the oceans started escalating as well. On September 7, 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with a JCG patrol boat near the Senkaku Islands, and the Chinese crew members and the skipper were arrested and detained.¹⁰³ The incident became a major diplomatic issue, and the Chinese government halted exports of rare earth minerals to Japan, urging the release of the crew members and skipper. The Japanese government decided to release them without charge in September 24, to manage stable relationship with China.¹⁰⁴ However, Japanese citizens criticized the decision, citing it as a “diplomatic surrender” to China.¹⁰⁵

Nonetheless, the collision incident was not a temporary conflict, as the sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands was at the core of the issue. Tensions surrounding the Senkaku Islands escalated significantly when the Japanese government nationalized them in 2012. In June 2012, Shintaro Ishihara, then-Governor of Tokyo, held a press conference and announced a plan to purchase the Senkaku Islands from a private owner.¹⁰⁶ He also

¹⁰³ “中国漁船、巡視船と接触し逃走…尖閣諸島近海 [Chinese fishing boat collides with patrol boat and escapes... Sea near the Senkaku Islands],” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 7, 2010.

¹⁰⁴ “尖閣漁船衝突事件、中国人船長を処分保留で釈放 [Senkaku fishing boat collision incident, Chinese skipper to be released with suspension of punishment],” *Reuters*, September 23, 2010.

¹⁰⁵ Shelia A. Smith, “Japan and the East China Sea dispute,” *Orbis* 56, no. 3 (2012): 370-390. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2012.05.006>.

¹⁰⁶ “石原知事定例記者会見録 [Record of Governor Ishihara’s regular press conference],” *Tokyo Metropolitan Government*, June 1, 2012. <https://www.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/GOVERNOR/ARC/20121031/KAIKEN/TEXT/2012/120601.htm>.


indicated to build port facilities to strengthen Japan's effective control over the islands, leading to strong protests from China regarding the decision.¹⁰⁷ To manage the tension with China over the islands, the Japanese government announced to nationalize the Senkaku Islands in September 2012. Although Japan's decision was "to maintain and manage (the islands) over the long term in a peaceful and stable manner," the Senkaku Islands became the core issue of China-Japan relations.

The Chinese government fiercely criticized Japan's decision, asserting that the Japanese government broke the promise to "solve it later," so-called "tana-age (棚上げ)," during the normalization process of the relationship in the 1970s. The Japanese government argued that there was no such agreement on the Senkaku Islands and denied the existence of territorial disputes with China.¹⁰⁸ To assert sovereignty over the islands, the Chinese government sent fishing boats and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to near Japanese territorial waters and contiguous zones since September 2012.

¹⁰⁷ "尖閣諸島に関する Q&A [Q&A about the Senkaku Islands]," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/senkaku/qa_1010.html#q17.

¹⁰⁸ Yasuo Nakauchi, "尖閣諸島をめぐる問題と日中関係: 日本の領土編入から今日までの経緯と今後の課題 [The issue of the Senkaku Islands and Sino-Japanese relations: Historical developments since Japan's incorporation of the territory and future challenges]," *Rippo to Chosa* 334 (2012): 73. https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2012pdf/20121101069.pdf.

<Figure 4> The number of vessels identified by the JCG near Japan



“Trends in China Coast Guard and other vessels in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's response,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, September 9, 2022. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html.

China’s regular dispatch of fishing vessels and law-enforcement vessels into Japanese territorial waters and contiguous zone posed a new type of threat, so-called ‘gray-zone situation.’ The US Special Operations Command defines gray zone as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality,” emphasizing some level of aggression, perspective dependent, and ambiguity.¹⁰⁹ In other words, gray zone situation is neither peacetime nor wartime, and a legal status of actors can limit state’s military response. In the context of China’s gray-zone ‘strategy’ to the Senkaku Islands, the Chinese government dispatched Chinese fishing

¹⁰⁹ Philip Kapusta, “White paper: The gray zone,” *United States Special Operations Command*, September 9, 2015. pp. 1-4. <https://info.publicintelligence.net/USSOCOM-GrayZones.pdf>.

vessels and law-enforcement vessels, without provoking the JSDF and the U.S.-Japan security alliance system.

China's gray zone strategy in the maritime domain posed three critical pitfalls of Japan's national security. First, the effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan security alliance system in responding to the situation may be in question. Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty regulates responsibility against an "armed attack (武力攻撃)."¹¹⁰ As a result, there is uncertainty regarding when a gray zone situation escalates to the level of an armed attack, triggering the activation of the U.S.-Japan security alliance system. This ambiguity in gray zone situations can significantly delay the system's response.¹¹¹ Second, Japan's dual security system might limit appropriate response to the situation as well. The JCG has refrained from any military operations or cooperation with the JSDF, because article 25 of Japan's Coast Guard Law regulates, the JCG is not allowed to be "organized, trained, or operated as a military force."¹¹² Therefore, the strict division of responsibility between the civilian JCG and the military JSDF limited appropriate responses to the ambiguity of China's gray-zone strategy.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ “日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約 [Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/jyoyaku.html>.

¹¹¹ Adam P. Liff, “China, Japan, and the East China Sea: Beijing's “gray zone” coercion and Tokyo's response,” *Global China* (2019): 4. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FP_20191202_east_china_sea_liff.pdf; Tomohisa Takei, “Gray zones and vulnerability in the U.S.-Japan alliance,” *Asia Policy* 15, no. 3 (2020): 25-27.

¹¹² “海上保安庁法 [Japan Coast Guard law],” *e-gov Horei Kensaku*, n.a. <https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=323AC0000000028>.

¹¹³ Céline Pajon, “Japan's Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force in the East China Sea,” *Asia Policy* 23 (2017): 111-130.

In conclusion, Japan encountered two significant challenges following the introduction of the first BPOP in 2008. On the domestic front, the transition from the LDP to the DPJ in government brought about a notable impediment to the political leadership of the Japanese government. The Hatoyama administration sought to reclaim political influence in the decision-making process from the bureaucracy and aimed for an equal security relationship with the U.S. However, the relocation of Futenma Air Base issue garnered widespread criticism, both within the domestic political landscape and from the U.S., ultimately contributing to the brevity of Hatoyama's political tenure. The subsequent administrations also revealed a lack of political leadership and mismanagement of domestic political issues, particularly in the aftermath of the contingency since March 11, 2011.

On the other hand, tensions between China and Japan became high due to the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands. The Japanese government's decision to nationalize the islands triggered a strong negative reaction from China, ultimately becoming a central issue in Sino-Japanese relations. In response, the Chinese government adopted a gray zone strategy, deploying Chinese fishing boats and coast guard vessels to assert sovereignty over the islands. This strategy posed a significant threat to Japanese decision-makers, revealing vulnerabilities in Japan's national security system and the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

Expanding Japan's Maritime Rights and Interests

The domestic political situation remained turbulent in the late 2000s. Furthermore, Japan's decision-makers continued to share their threat perceptions about the deteriorating

external security situation. However, by analyzing the 2nd and 3rd BPOP, I show below that Japan's efforts for a comprehensive approach to the ocean continued even after the regime change in 2009. In other words, Japan's responses remained consistent with the Rich Nation, Restrained Army narrative.

Analysis of the 2nd Basic Plan on Ocean Policy

<Table 7> The Outline of the 2nd Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2013)

Chapter	Content
0. General Remarks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Vision of Japan as a maritime nation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. International cooperation and contribution to international community b. Wealth and prosperity through ocean development and utilization of the sea c. From a country protected by the sea to a country that protects the sea d. Venturing into the unexplored frontier -Significance of Establishing the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy
1. Basic Policy of Measures with Regard to the Oceans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Current situations and Issues of Measures regarding the Oceans -Measures to be Intensively Promoted Under the Plan -Direction of the Measures Under the Plan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Harmonization of development and use of the oceans with conservation of the marine environment b. Securing safety and security on the oceans c. Improvement of scientific knowledge of the Oceans d. Sound development of marine industries e. Comprehensive management of the sea f. International partnership regarding the oceans g. Improvement of marine-related education and heightening of understanding of the oceans
2. Measures the Government Should Take Comprehensively and Systematically with Regard to the Sea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Promotion of development and use of marine resources -Conservation of marine environment -Promotion of Development of EEZ and Continental Shelves -Securing Maritime Transport -Securing Safety and Security of the Sea <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Securing security and public order of the sea b. Safety measures of maritime transport c. Countermeasures against natural disasters from the oceans -Promotion of Marine Surveys

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Promotion of comprehensive marine surveys b. Comprehensive management and disclosure of marine-related information -Promotion of research and development of marine science and technology a. Promotion of initiatives that use outer space -Promotion of Marine Industries and Increase in International Competitiveness -Comprehensive management of coastal zones -Preservation of remote islands -Securing International Coordination and Promoting International Cooperation -Enhancement of Citizens' Understanding of the Sea and Fostering of Human Resources
3. Requirements for Comprehensive and Planned Implementation of Ocean Measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Revision of Headquarters for Comprehensive Ocean Policy for effective implementation of measures -Duties of relevant personnel and mutual coordination -Proactive publication of information concerning measures


Author's translation and analysis. “海洋基本計画 [Basic Plan on Ocean Policy],” *Cabinet Office of Japan*, April 2013. <https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/plan/plan02/pdf/plan02.pdf>.

Although domestic political situation was turbulent, Japan's efforts for comprehensive approach to the ocean continued even after the regime change in 2009. After the announcement of the first BPOP, the Follow Up Study Group meetings have been continued and set key agendas for Japan's comprehensive ocean governance. One of their major topics was piracy and armed robbery issue, especially in African region. The number of piracy and armed robbery in the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden has increased significantly since 2008, due to political vacuum of Somalia since 1991 and deteriorating economic situation. Those reasons made piracy an economically rational choice to Somali, leading them to form organized piracy groups.¹¹⁴ The United Nations

¹¹⁴ Thomas Keating, “The political economy of Somali Piracy,” *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 1 (2013): 188-189.

Security Council unanimously adopted the resolution 1816 in June 2008, allowing states to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.¹¹⁵ Following the resolution 1816, the U.S., Russia, and other European states strengthened counter-piracy measures in the region.

<Figure 5> The number of piracies in Somalia, the Gulf of Aden and Southeast Asia



Author's analysis. "2015 年海賊対策レポート [2015 report on counter-piracy]," Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, March 2016. <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/siryoushou2/report2015.pdf>.

The Japanese government initiated legal preparations for conducting counter-piracy measures in Somalia. The first challenge was constitutionality of the deployment of the JSDF, as the upsurge in piracy in African region did not present a direct threat to Japan's

¹¹⁵ "Resolution 1816 (2008)," *United Nations Security Council*, June 2, 2008. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/627953>.

national security. Therefore, it was impossible to apply the legal basis of the right to self-defense in this case. The second issue was related to interagency cooperation between the JCG and the JSDF. Given the legal status of piracy, securing cooperation from the JCG was essential to carry out non-military operations such as boarding inspections, maritime rescue, and the apprehension of criminals. However, as mentioned earlier, the JCG refused to participate in military operations or cooperate with the JSDF.

The OPRF and the NF jointly held a conference to discuss Japan's response for counter-piracy measures in Africa in November 2008. Politicians from the LDP and DPJ, and members of the Follow Up Study Group, and other participants from shipping industry and academia participated in the meeting and discussed how to contribute to the maritime security in Africa. After the meeting, they summarized the discussion and submitted it to the Japanese government.¹¹⁶ The document argued that the Japanese government should issue article 82 of the JSDF law, "security operations at sea (海上における警備行動)," as a legal basis for swift dispatch of the JSDF to Somalia. The document also argued that the JCG should cooperate to secure Japanese and Japanese-flagged ships in the region.

After the recommendation, the Japanese government began legal preparations to engage in counter-piracy measures in Africa. The LDP established a 'project team regarding counter-piracy measures (海賊対策などに関するプロジェクトチーム)' to prepare for the "Anti-Piracy Law (海賊対策法)." Also, the JCG and the JMSDF held a first

¹¹⁶ "ソマリア沖海賊行為への日本の対応に関する提言 [Recommendation on Japan's response to piracy in the waters off Somalia]," *Sasakawa Peace Foundation*, November 18, 2008. https://www.spf.org/opri/global-data/opri/recommendation/20081118_08_13.pdf.

joint exercise for counterpiracy measures in February 2009.¹¹⁷ After the initiative of the OPRF, the Japanese government dispatched two JMSDF destroyers with JCG officers in March 2009 to Somalia to enhance maritime security in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016). Also, the JMSDF and the JCG held a joint exercise for counterpiracy measures in February 2009, for the first time in the Japanese history (Japan Coast Guard 2009). Considering that the JCG had held a strict identity as a civilian agency,¹¹⁸ it should be emphasized that Japan's security roles on non-military threats were significantly expanded (Furuya 2019, 30; Pajon 2017, 127). Furthermore, the Japanese government passed the counter-piracy measures law in June 2009,¹¹⁹ and a legal basis for JMSDF's counter-piracy measures was changed from the maritime security operation of article 82 of the JSDF law to the counter-piracy operation of the new law.

The second major goal was a comprehensive management of EEZ and continental shelf. The first BPOP stated that the Japanese government should prepare laws and system to manage EEZ and continental shelf and to solve conflicting interests with other states under the international law. In June 2010, the Japanese government established the 'low-water line preservation law (低潮線保全法),'¹²⁰ which was Japan's first law regarding the

¹¹⁷ “海上自衛隊及び海上保安庁による海賊対策にかかる共同訓練について [Regarding a joint exercise on counter-piracy measures by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard],” *Japan Coast Guard*, February 17, 2009. <http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/kouhou/h21/k20090217/k090217.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ Article 25 of the JCG law states that “Nothing contained in this law shall be construed to permit the Japan Coast Guard or its personnel to be trained or organized as a military establishment or to function as such.” (“Japan Coast Guard Law (Law no. 28 of April 27, 1948, as amended through law no. 102 of 1999,” *The Nippon Foundation Library*, 2001. <https://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2001/00500/contents/00021.htm>)

¹¹⁹ “海賊行為の処罰及び海賊行為への対処に関する法律 [Law on punishment of piracy and countering piracy],” *e-gov*. <https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=421AC0000000055>.

¹²⁰ “排他的経済水域及び大陸棚の保全及び利用の促進のための低潮線の保全及び施設の整備などに関する法律 [Law on conservation of low-level line and development of base facilities for the promotion of

management of EEZ and continental shelf. In the following month, the basic plan for preserving the low-water line, establishing low-water line conservation areas (低潮線保全区域) and specified remote islands (特定離島) to manage EEZ and continental shelf.¹²¹

The efforts of the OPRF for the establishment of a new law for the comprehensive management of EEZ and continental shelf continued. In June 2011, the OPRF announced the “Proposal for the legislation on the comprehensive management of EEZ and continental shelf (排他的経済水域及び大陸棚の総合的な管理に関する法制の整備についての提言).” The proposal pointed out that the previous law on the EEZ and continental shelf, established in 1998, was ineffective to protect Japan’s EEZ and continental shelf under UNCLOS, and urged Japan to establish a new law regarding the development, use, and preservation of the EEZ and continental shelf (OPRF 2011).

Nonetheless, the efforts for the legalization were lost momentum primarily due to the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. The OPRF and Keidanren emphasized the importance of the new legal framework for the comprehensive management of EEZ and continental shelf (Keidanren 2012; Basic Law on Ocean Policy Strategy Group 2012), additional efforts for the legalization were not found until 2013.

conservation and use of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf],” *Cabinet Office of Japan*. <https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/teichousen/seireikaisei/pdf/sekourei.pdf>.

¹²¹ “排他的経済水域及び大陸棚の保全及び利用の促進のための低潮線の保全及び拠点施設の整備などに関する基本計画 [Basic plan on the conservation of low-water line and development of base facilities for the promotion of conservation and use of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf],” *Cabinet Office of Japan*. <https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/teichousen/pdf/keikaku.pdf>.

The third major goal was the cooperation between ocean and space for Japan's comprehensive ocean governance. Similar to the case of the BAOP and BPOP, the Basic Act on Space Policy (宇宙基本法) and the Basic Plan on Space Policy (宇宙基本計画) in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Even before the announcement of the Basic Plan on Space Policy, the Committee on Ocean and Space Cooperation (海洋宇宙連携委員会) was established under the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (宇宙航空研究開発機構, JAXA), an independent agency under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), in March 2009. After three meetings, the Committee published a report on how to utilize ocean and space in ocean governance in May 2012. The report argued categorized possible fields of cooperation in four groups: ocean environment and fisheries, ocean energy and marine resource, security of maritime trade routes and ocean safety, and maritime security. Furthermore, the report emphasized the importance of centralized information sharing. By utilizing information and data from space, the report argued that space would contribute to solve various tasks in the oceans. Similar to the legalization for the management of EEZ and continental shelf, however, the cooperation between space and ocean did not lead to specific plans.

In conclusion, Japan could not achieve significant progress on the maritime domain under the first BPOP due to the drift of Japan's domestic politics and the 3.11 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. Before 2011, the OPRF had vigorously engaged in research for a more concrete progress such as legalization and ocean policies. Especially, the Follow Up Study Group had 13 meetings until October 2011 and discussed various topics on the oceans from the development of Japan's maritime diplomacy to the utilization of space for

ocean governance. Even after the ruling party had changed from the LDP to DPJ, the OPRF could lead ocean-related agendas and achieved several outcomes primarily due to the shared consensus across the parties on the oceans.

Analysis of the 3rd Basic Plan on Ocean Policy

The 2nd Abe administration started with various security challenges surrounding Japan, especially in the maritime domain. Japanese government's decision to nationalize Senkaku Islands became the most critical issue in the bilateral relations. Since the mid-2012, the Chinese government sent fishing boats and guiding China Coast Guard (CCG) to near the disputed islands to maintain its sovereignty rights. China's gray-zone strategy, using legal status and seam of Japan's national security strategy to maintain conflicts while denying military response, formulated perception of the fundamental threats among Japanese decision-makers. In November 2013, China declared the Air Defense Identification Zone, which covers most of the East China Sea including the Senkaku Islands, another attempt to strengthen its sovereignty rights over the islands.

Territorial conflicts over islands in South China Sea between China and Southeast Asian states became the serious security issues as well. Tensions between China and the Philippines were especially high, regarding the sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal. After the two-month standoffs between Philippine's naval frigate and CCG vessels and the failure of bilateral negotiations between April and July 2012, the Philippines initiated an international arbitration case under UNCLOS over China's sovereignty claims over the

islands in January 2013.¹²² On the other hand, China started to build artificial islands near the Spratly Islands to strengthen its sovereignty claims since December 2013.¹²³ Not only environmental damages caused by the construction, but also its geopolitical and security implications raised security concerns to the regional states.

Nonetheless, the U.S.-Japan alliance was very unstable, primarily due to the renegotiation of Futenma air base under the Hatoyama administration. The Noda administration, inaugurated in September 2011, attempted to normalize relations with the U.S. For instance, Noda accepted a joint military training between the JSDF and U.S. force in the Northern Marianas Island of Tinian in December 2012.¹²⁴ Also, Satoshi Morimoto, a minister of MOD of Japan appointed by Noda, emphasized the U.S.-Japan security alliance system as a cornerstone for Japan's national security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.¹²⁵ It was evident that the Noda administration strived to bring the bilateral security relationship back to the previous stable one under the LDP era.¹²⁶

China's assertive claims on sovereignty rights in the East and South China Seas and relatively unstable security relationship with the U.S. formulated the strongest threat perception among the Japanese decision-makers. Defense White Paper 2013 described that China "attempts to change the status quo by force" to claim their own unique claims that

¹²² "The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China)," *Permanent Court of Arbitration*, n.a. <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7>.

¹²³ Matthew Southerland, "China's island building in the South China Sea: Damage to the marine environment, implications, and international law," *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission* (2016): 1-11.

¹²⁴ Justin M. Pack, "Historic landing begins Forager Fury 2012," *Iwakuni Approach* 45, no. 4 (2012): 4.

¹²⁵ Yuka Hayashi, "Japan to boost defense in Pacific, minister says," *Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 2012.

¹²⁶ William L. Brooks, *ibid.*, p. 122.

are “incompatible with the existing international law and order.”¹²⁷ While emphasizing diplomatic efforts with China, Diplomatic Bluebook 2014 also showed concerns on China’s “attempts to change the status quo by force based on its own unique claims.”¹²⁸ Japan Coast Guard Report 2013 started with introducing China’s “incursion” into Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands, showing the significance of the territorial conflicts between China and Japan.

The strongest threat perception on China’s maritime behaviors since the early-2010s, relative decline of the U.S. in the region, and the drift of the U.S.-Japan security alliance under the DPJ became the foundation of security and ocean policy changes under the 2nd Abe administration. In December 2013, the Abe administration announced the two significant changes in Japan’s security posture, the “National Security Strategy (国家安全保障戦略, NSS)” and the “National Security Council (国家安全保障会議, NSC) of Japan.” The NSC became Japan’s strategic headquarter to improve crisis management

¹²⁷“中国は、わが国を含む周辺諸国との利害が対立する問題をめぐって、既存の国際法秩序とは相容れない独自の主張に基づき、力による現状変更の試みを含む高圧的とも指摘される対応を示しており、その中には不測の事態を招きかねない危険な行動も見られるなど、今後の方向性について不安を抱かせる面もある。[China has been criticized for its assertive responses, including attempts to change the status quo by force, based on its own claims that contradict the existing international law and order, especially concerning issues where interests clash with neighboring countries, including Japan. Within these responses, there are observed behaviors that could potentially lead to unforeseen circumstances and dangerous behaviors, raising concerns about the future direction.]” (Ministry of Defense of Japan. 平成 25 年版 防衛白書 [Defense of Japan 2013]. (Tokyo, Japan: Nikkei Insatsu, 2013): 30)

¹²⁸ “中国との間では意思疎通を維持・強化しつつ、中国が独自の主張に基づく力による現状変更の試みとみられる対応を示していることについては、日本としては事態をエスカレートさせることなく、中国側に自制を求めるとともに、引き続き冷静かつ毅然と対応していく。[While maintaining and strengthening communication with China, Japan aims to address the situation calmly and resolutely without escalating tensions, despite China's demonstrated responses, which appear to be attempts to change the status quo by force based on its unique claims. Japan seeks restraint from the Chinese side and intends to continue dealing with the situation in a rational and resolute manner.]” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 外交青書 2014 [Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan]. (Tokyo, Japan: Nikkei Insatsu, 2014): 124)

and intelligence, and to centralize security-related decision-making. The four-minister meeting was the core of the NSC, consisting of the Prime Minister, ministers of MOFA and MOD, and the chief cabinet secretary, which decides Japan's basic strategic policy and critical decisions.¹²⁹

Along with the institutional change, the Japanese government released the 2013 NSS, Japan's first official document which provides a long-term view on its national interests. The 2013 NSS defined Japan as a 'maritime state' and proposed three national interests, to maintain its sovereignty, to consolidate peace and security through economic development, and to protect international order based on rules and universal values, for "Open and Stable Seas."¹³⁰ Also, the document proposed three pillars, the defense of Japan, enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and reinforcement of diplomatic and security cooperation with other countries.

Two points from the 2013 NSS are worth emphasizing. First of all, the 2013 NSS chose maritime domain as the most critical domains to focus on. For instance, the document highlighted Open and Stable Seas as the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community and pointed out the various issues in the oceans as the core challenges to the global security environment. Especially, the document expressed concerns on China's attempts to change the status quo by force in the maritime domain,

¹²⁹ The NSC consisted of three different meetings. The other two meetings are the nine-minister meeting and the emergency meeting. (Hiroshi Nakanishi, "Reorienting Japan? Security transformation under the second Abe Cabinet," *Asian Perspective* 39, no. 3 (2015): 411)

¹³⁰ "国家安全保障戦略について [Regarding National Security Strategy]," *Cabinet Secretariat*, December 17, 2013. <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryoku/131217anzenhoshou/nss-j.pdf>.

including the declaration of ADIZ and intrusion near the Senkaku Islands.¹³¹ Also, various ocean-related topics, including remoted islands, sea lanes, and oceanographic survey, started to understand in terms of national security.

Secondly, the 2013 NSS showed concerns on the relative decline of the U.S. in the region as one of changing security dynamics in the world. Although the document underlined the U.S.-Japan security alliance as a cornerstone of Japan's national security and regional stability, the 2013 NSS pointed out the change of balance of power as the reason of a weakening leadership in the global security and economic domains. It was a unique situation that Japan's official document expressed concerns about the U.S. leadership, if not directly. The 2013 NSS also mentioned the Futenma base issue, and addressed Japan's efforts to manage the tensions between burdens of local community in Okinawa and the bilateral agreements on the U.S. Marine Corps.¹³²

Based on the shared threat on China's assertiveness and concerns on the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the Abe administration announced the cabinet decision to change the official interpretation of article 9 of the Japanese constitution in July 2014.¹³³ The Abe administration expanded the first condition of the three conditions for exercising the right of self-defense by adding the new condition, called the "Situations Threatening Japan's Survival (存立危機事態)." Under the official reinterpretation, Japan can also exercise the right of collective self-defense when an attack occurs against the U.S. forces currently

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 11.

¹³² Ibid., pp. 22-23.

¹³³ “国の存立を全うし、国民を守るための切れ目のない安全保障法制の整備について [Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People],” *Cabinet Secretariat*, July 1st, 2014. <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei.pdf>.

engaged in operations to contribute to the defense of Japan. Therefore, it became constitutional to protect the U.S. forces and assets in Japan when the U.S. forces are in operations for Japan's national security.

The Situations Threatening Japan's Survival became the central concept for the two major changes in Japan's security postures. First, the Japanese government released the 2015 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines (日米防衛協力のための指針, 2015 Guidelines) in April 2015. The 2015 Guidelines expanded the spectrum of security considerations, including gray-zone situations and cooperation in the cyber and space domains. Furthermore, the 2015 Guidelines removed the geographical limitations of the previous 1997 Guidelines, "Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (周辺事態)." The 2015 Guidelines explicitly stated that situations which might influence Japan's peace and security "cannot be defined geographically," implying that the U.S.-Japan security alliance would be operated globally.¹³⁴

Second, the Abe administration established the "Legislation for Peace and Security (平和安全法制)" in May 2015. The legislation consisted of two packages, the "Law for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security (平和安全法制整備法) which amends 10 security-related laws and the "International Peace Support Law (国際平和維持法)" which regulates legal authorities, and roles of the JSDF in peacekeeping operations. The Legislation for Peace and Security has expanded the legal authority and missions of the JSDF significantly, especially regarding the logistical

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

support for the U.S. For instance, the JSDF can provide ammunition and fuels for aircrafts which are preparing for military operations, which was prohibited under the previous interpretation of article 9.¹³⁵

Another change regarding Japan's security posture under the Abe administration was the incorporation of law-enforcement capabilities into Japan's national security strategy. In December 2016, the Japanese government announced the "Policy on Strengthening the Maritime Security System (海上保安体制強化に関する方針)."¹³⁶ The Policy directly pointed out China's maritime behaviors as a background of the decision, including the repeated incursion of China Coast Guard into the Japanese territorial seas near the Senkaku Islands and China's attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas. To respond to the situation, the Policy proposed two changes, the enhancement of JCG's capabilities, including increase of JCG personnel and vessels, strengthening multilateral cooperation with other coast guards, and reinforcing interagency cooperation with the JSDF and Japan Police for seamless surveillance in the maritime domain.

These legal and institutional changes under the 2nd Abe administration raised concerns over the possibility of JSDF's active engagement in military affairs, so-called

¹³⁵ Seunghyun Kim, "아베정권의 안보정책 변화와 의의: 평화안전법제 논의를 사례로 [Changes and implications of Japan's security policy under the Abe administration: A case study of the legislation for peace and security]," *Hanil Gunsa Munwha Yeongu* 20 (2015): 120-126.

¹³⁶ "海上保安体制強化に関する方針について [About the Policy on Strengthening of the Maritime Security System]," *Prime Minister's Office of Japan*, December 21, 2016. <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaihotaisei/taisei/dai1/siryou.pdf>.

“Ittaika (一体化).”¹³⁷ Since the Abe administration did not reveal the clear definition of the Situations Threatening Japan’s Survival,¹³⁸ it was plausible for the JSDF to participate in military operations with other military forces in the world.¹³⁹ Opposition parties and civil groups in Japan called the legal changes “war bill (戦争法案),” protesting to abolish them.¹⁴⁰

As scholars pointed out, however, Japan’s restraint in security postures were still in place, making Japan’s security posture restraint.¹⁴¹ First of all, the majority of the 2015 Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security was about Japan’s national security. While the JSDF has wider arrays of security cooperation with the U.S., from peacetime to contingency, the majority of bilateral cooperation are within the context of narrowly defined Japan’s national security. As Abe clarified in the early stage of the security

¹³⁷ According to the Japanese government, “Ittaika” refers to the integration in the use of force with other military force. To allow Japan’s logistical support and avoid controversy on the right of collective self-defense, the Japanese government takes a position that logistical support is not “Ittaika with the use of force” and thus constitutional. (“Cabinet decision on development of seamless security legislation to ensure Japan's survival and protect its people,” *ibid.*)

¹³⁸ Jeffrey W. Hornung. *Japan’s Potential Contributions in an East China Sea Contingency*. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2020): 97-98.

¹³⁹ Christopher W. Hughes. *Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism or New Dead End?* (London, UK: Palgrave Pivot, 2015): 55.

¹⁴⁰ “これでわかる戦争法案 いつでもどこでも米のどんな戦争にも参加 日本の若者の血を流す [Explain the War Bill. (Japan can) participate in any war with the U.S. anytime, anywhere. It will shed the blood of Japanese youth],” *Japanese Communist Party*, May 20, 2015. https://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik15/2015-05-20/2015052002_01_0.html; Hisashi Inoue, “戦争法案の強行可決に満身の怒りを持って抗議する [Protesting with full indignation against the forcible passage of the war bill],” *Japan National Confederation of Labor Union*, September 19, 2015. https://www.zenroren.gr.jp/jp/opinion/2015/opinion150921_01.html; “「戦争法案(安全保障法制等の法案)」に反対し、廃案を強く求める声明 [The statement rigidly opposing the ‘War bill (Legislation for Peace and Security) and strongly demanding its abandonment],” *Citizens Environmental Foundation*, June 13, 2015. <https://kankyoshimin.org/aboutus/policy/aboutus-82>.

¹⁴¹ Jeffrey W. Hornung and Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan: Still an exceptional U.S. ally,” *The Washington Quarterly* 39, no. 1 (2016): 95-116.

changes, the Japanese government rejected the possibility to exercise the right of collective self-defense on activities which are consistent with international law.¹⁴² Secondly, the U.S.-Japan security alliance outside the context of Japan's national security has largely been restraint as well. While the JSDF can cooperate broader range of operations, such as non-combatant evacuation, Search and Rescue, and provide additional logistic support, including maintenance and use of facilities, the limit on ittaika restricts the JSDF from engaging on-going military operations.

The essence of Japan's changes under the Abe administration is diversification of Japan's security cooperation with countries. As revealed in the 2013 NSS, the Japanese government announced to expand its roles to provide peace and security in the global domain, including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), maritime security, and partner capacity building. One of the representative example is the Development Cooperation Charter (開発協力大綱, 2015 ODA Charter) in 2015.¹⁴³ In the preamble, the 2015 ODA Charter revealed strategic goals of Japan's ODA policy to address various challenges from environmental issues and natural disasters to piracy and terrorism, especially in Southeast Asian region. Also, the 2015 ODA Charter emphasized sustainable growth as the key to Japan's national interest and peaceful international community.

One of the most important changes of the 2015 ODA Charter is the contribution to peace and prosperity through support for non-military purposes. The previous ODA

¹⁴² "Press Conference by Prime Minister Abe," *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, May 15th, 2014. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201405/0515kaiken.html.

¹⁴³ "開発協力大綱について [About ODA Charter]" *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, February 10, 2015. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000072774.pdf>.

Charter unequivocally prohibited any use of ODA budget for military purposes. However, the 2015 ODA Charter included development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare and disaster-relief purposes.¹⁴⁴ Even before the revision of the 2015 ODA Charter, the Japanese government provided 10 coast guard vessels to the Philippines Coast Guard in 2013, as a form of loan.¹⁴⁵ Therefore, the 2015 ODA Charter revealed Japan's solid stance on Southeast Asia to strategize its ODA budget to support security cooperation. It allowed Japan to provide two coast guard vessels to the Philippines Coast Guard, as a form of yen loans under the Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project, in 2016.¹⁴⁶

Different from the previous period, the establishment process of the 3rd BAOP started to embrace security considerations as well. In July 2013, the Headquarters established four project teams on the following topics, policy planning in accordance with the 2nd BAOP, marine industries, oceanographic survey and ocean-related information, and the management of marine area.¹⁴⁷ The initial discussions on those four topics did not consider Japan's national security, and discussed mainly in the context of Japan's ocean policy. However, oceanographic survey and ocean-related information, and the management of maritime zone started to include discussions in terms of national security.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p.9.

¹⁴⁵ Tomotaka Shoji, “日本とフィリピンの安全保障協力: 背景、進展、そして展望 [Security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines: Background, progress, and prospects],” *NIDS Commentary* 287 (2023): 2.

¹⁴⁶ “フィリピンに対する円借款の供与 [provision of yen loans to the Philippines],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, September 6, 2016. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_003661.html.

¹⁴⁷ “プロジェクトチームの設置について [about the establishment of project teams],” *Prime Minister's Office of Japan*, July 3, 2013. <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/sanyo/dai13/siryou1.pdf>.

The Project Team on oceanographic and ocean-related information included the basic research on Maritime Domain Awareness and its relevance to Japan’s ocean-related information sharing system. The previous system, “Marine Cadastre (海洋台帳),” included various social, legal, and environmental information in the oceans, other than security-related information.¹⁴⁸ After two years of research, however, the Headquarters released the report, “About efforts to strengthen Japan’s Maritime Domain Awareness (我が国の海洋状況把握の能力強化に向けた取組),” releasing a plan to establish Japan’s MDA based on the Marine Cadastre. After two additional years of the Headquarters’ efforts, the Maritime Domain Awareness Situational Indication Linkages, or “Umishiru,” was released in 2019. The most important feature of Umishiru is that it provides ocean-related information to three distinct groups: Japanese civilians, Japanese government agencies, and Japanese government agencies associated with national security.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the Headquarters emphasized that Umishiru would be a cornerstone for multilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and other like-minded states for the stability of the oceans.¹⁵⁰

The Project Team on the management of maritime zone showed a similar change as well. Most discussions on maritime zone focused on economic and environmental perspectives, such as renewable energy and environmental protection.¹⁵¹ Similarly, the

¹⁴⁸ “海洋台帳について [about marine cadastre],” *Japan Coast Guard*, n.a. <http://www4.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/htm/about.html>.

¹⁴⁹ “我が国における海洋状況把握(MDA)について [about Japan’s Maritime Domain Awareness],” *Cabinet Office of Japan*, October 2015. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/mda/pdf/mda_concept.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ “我が国における海洋状況把握(MDA)の能力強化に向けた今後の取組方針 [policy direction for strengthening Japan’s Maritime Domain Awareness],” *Cabinet Office of Japan*, May 15, 2018. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/mda/pdf/h30_mda_main.pdf.

¹⁵¹ “総合海洋政策本部「排他的経済水域等の海域管理の在り方検討チーム」[Headquarters on Comprehensive Ocean Policy “project team on approach for the management of maritime zone such as exclusive economic

management of remoted islands understood mainly as a basis for Japan’s EEZ. Therefore, Japan’s previous approach for maritime zone and remoted islands did not include security considerations.¹⁵² However, the Headquarters announced to revise the management of maritime zone and remoted islands in 2014. In addition to marine resources and EEZ, the Headquarters added stable management of remoted islands and maritime zone for maritime security and strengthening sovereignty over the islands. To achieve the goals, the Headquarters announced strengthening maritime surveillance on the islands and maritime zones, and seamless response among relevant government agencies.¹⁵³ Headquarters efforts led to the revision of basic policy on remoted islands and the management of maritime zone, and relevant laws were revised and established as well. For instance, the revised basic plan about remoted islands included duties of the Japanese government to protect the islands against illegal fishing and “maritime expansion” of foreign states.¹⁵⁴

zone],” *Prime Minister’s Office of Japan*, June 10, 2014. <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/dai11/siryou2.pdf>.

¹⁵² “排他的経済水域及び大陸棚の保全及び利用の促進のための低潮線の保全及び拠点施設の整備等に関する基本計画 [Basic Plan for the Conservation of the Low Tide Line and the Development of Base Facilities for the Conservation and Promotion of the Conservation and Utilization of Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves],” *Prime Minister’s Office of Japan*, July 13, 2010. <https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/teichousen/pdf/keikaku.pdf>; “海洋管理のための離島の保全・管理のあり方に関する基本方針 [Basic Policy on Conservation and Management of Remote Islands for Ocean Management]” *Prime Minister’s Office of Japan*, December 1, 2009. <https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/ritouhoushin/kihon/pdf/ritouhoushin.pdf>.

¹⁵³ “「海洋管理のための離島の保全・管理のあり方に関する基本方針」の見直しについて [Review of the basic plan on conservation and management of remote islands for ocean management],” *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, December 26, 2014. <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/dai12/siryou1.pdf>.

¹⁵⁴ “有人国境離島地域の保全及び特定有人国境離島地域に係る地域社会の維持に関する基本的な方針 [basic plan on the conservation of inhabited border islands and the maintenance of local communities in designated inhabited border island zones],” *Prime Minister’s Office of Japan*, April 7, 2017. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/kokkyouritou/yuuujin/pdf/h29_kihonhoushin.pdf.

<Table 7> The Outline of the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy

Chapter	Content
0. Introduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Overview of the last decade since the enforcement of the BAOP -Current situation surrounding Japan
1. Nature of Ocean Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Basic principles and policy direction in the next decade -Basic policy for measures regarding the ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Maritime security b. Foundation for the reinforcement of maritime security -Basic policy for other measures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Promotion of industrial use of the ocean b. Maintain and protect the maritime environment c. Improve scientific knowledge d. Promote Arctic policy e. International coordination and international cooperation f. Develop human resources and promote nationals' understanding
2. Ocean measure for comprehensive and systemic implementation by the government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Maritime Security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Secure national interests in Japan's "Territorial Waters" b. Secure stable use of Japan's important Sea Lines of Communication c. Strengthen the international maritime order -Promote industrial use of the ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Marine energy and mineral resource b. Marine industries and its competitiveness c. Secure maritime transport d. Management of fishery resources promotion of the fishery -Maintain and conserve marine environment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Comprehensive management of coastal zones -Strengthening the capacity for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Information gathering b. Structures for information gathering and information sharing c. International cooperation -Maritime research and marine science & technology -Preserve remote islands and develop EEZ -Promoting Arctic policy -International coordination and cooperation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Formulate and develop maritime order -Develop human resource and advance understanding of Japanese citizen on the ocean
3. Requirements for Comprehensive and Planned Implementation of Ocean Measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Measures to implement plans -Stakeholder's obligations and mutual cooperation -Proactive information disclosure relating to the measures

Author's translation and analysis. “海洋基本計画 [Basic Act on Ocean Policy],” *Prime Minister's Office of Japan*, May 2018. <https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/plan/plan03/pdf/plan03.pdf>.

The 3rd BAOP and domestic changes regarding Japan's ocean-related policy showed three distinguishing features. First of all, dual threat from China and the U.S. in the maritime domain became the central concerns driving domestic changes under the 2nd Abe administration. Especially, Japan's official documents explicitly addressed concerns on China's maritime behaviors. Before the Abe administration, the Japanese government did not mention specific countries, or addressed Japan's diplomatic efforts to maintain stable relationship. However, Japan started to point out China's maritime behaviors as an “attempt to change the status quo by force, based on its own claims that contradict the existing international law (既存の国際法秩序とは相容れない独自の主張に基づき、力による現状変更の試み).”

Chapter Summary

Shared concerns on the U.S. security commitment and relative decline of the U.S. in the region was another driver of Japan's domestic changes. Although did not address concerns on the U.S. directly, Japan's official documents addressed the shift of balance of power in the region as the core factor of security environment changes in the world. The drift of the U.S.-Japan security relations under the LDP government, especially during the Hatoyama administration, worsened Japan's concerns on the U.S. security commitment as well.

Japan's ocean policy started to embrace security considerations for comprehensive approach to the maritime domain. The previous BAOP discussed ocean-related topics from the perspective of economic, scientific, and environmental protection, and maritime security was not relevant. However, the 3rd BAOP put maritime security as the priority of Japan's ocean policy, emphasizing the relationship between ocean-related topics and Japan's national security. For instance, the 3rd BAOP chose seven specific topics related to Japan's maritime security: MDA, remoted islands, oceanographic research, science and technology, promotion to Japanese citizens, economic security, and environmental protection. It shows Japan's efforts to connect security perspectives into various ocean policies.

Japan's restraint stance on military and security policies has been unchanged. The shared threat perception on China's assertive maritime behaviors, concerns on the U.S. security commitment, and changing security environment and diversifying security threats in the oceans became the foundation for the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan alliance system and Japan's efforts for multilateral cooperation in the global domain. The 2013 NSS, the 2015 Guidelines, and the reinterpretation of article 9 of Japanese constitution have significantly expanded rights and roles of the JSDF under the 2nd Abe administration. Also, the revised 2015 ODA Charter showed Japan's efforts for strengthening Japan's security engagement, especially in Southeast Asia.

Contrary to some scholar's argument, however, self-imposed restraints on Japan's security policy have been remained. The limited right of exercise of collective self-defense applied only for narrowly defined Japan's national security, and majority of security changes focused primarily on its national security. The strengthened U.S.-Japan security alliance expanded scope of logistics support of the JSDF and bilateral cooperation on various issues

outside Japan, but the Japanese government did not allow the JSDF to engage in active military operations. Furthermore, the JCG, instead of the JSDF, became the major agency for Japan's security engagement to Southeast Asia by supporting law-enforcement capabilities by strategizing ODA budget.

3. Rise of Rich Nation Restrained Army: Japan's Regional Approach to Southeast Asia

In this chapter, I examine the evolutionary changes of Japan's regional maritime security initiatives in Southeast Asia. My focus is on how Japan's decision-makers changed their posture from primarily an economic approach to economic-security linkages, which is consistent with the grand strategy of Rich Nation Restrained Army. Driven by the upsurge of non-traditional security threats in Southeast Asia, Japan started to perceive instability of the regional maritime domain as threat to its own national interests. Additionally, during the 2010s, Japanese decision-makers began to draw connections between territorial disputes in the South China Sea involving China and Southeast Asian states and those concerning the Senkaku Islands. The evolution of Japan's threat perception significantly drove political momentum toward proactive engagement in economic-security measures within the region.

First, I cover the history of Japan's efforts for normalizing the relationship between Southeast Asia and Japan during the Cold War period, using ODA as primary economic tool. Second, I focus on the rise of non-traditional security threats, such as piracy and armed robbery, which led Japanese decision-makers to change their stance on the unstable maritime domain in the region. Finally, I examine how Japanese decision-makers strategically use foreign aid to strengthen law-enforcement capabilities in Southeast Asia, emphasizing the major roles of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Japan's efforts to establish a framework for multilateral

security cooperation in Southeast Asia resonate with its grand strategy of Rich Nation
Restrained Army.

Normalizing Post-War Relations with Southeast Asia Through the Economy

This section covers the origin of Japan's economic approach to Southeast Asia, using foreign aid as the primary tool. The U.S. strategic considerations to Asia and lessons from the case of Germany after WWI allowed Japan to focus on economic rehabilitation, instead of massive war reparations. The Potsdam Declaration and subsequent U.S. policy documents stipulated these strategic considerations. For instance, the Truman administration stated that "exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization."¹⁵⁵ While achieving rearmament and democratization, the U.S. also granted Japan's economic growth not to repeat the failures again.

Finding a foreign market, therefore, became Japan's major issue to overcome from devastating postwar economic situation. Since the initial stage of the Cold War

¹⁵⁵ State-war-navy Coordinating Committee, "United states initial post-defeat policy relating to Japan," *Office of the Historian*, August 12, 1945. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v06/d395>.

period, Japan chose Southeast Asia as the primary region for foreign trade. Along with the strong animosity of Korea and China, the outbreak of the Korean War and the victory of communist Mao led Japan to find an alternative market. The U.S. also emphasized economic ties between Japan and Southeast Asia not only for Japan's economic growth but also preventing the spread of communism in Japan.¹⁵⁶

Post-war Japan was also eager to go back to the international society, and Southeast Asia was the primary region they focused on. In October 1954, Japan joined the Colombo Plan and started technological cooperation with Southeast Asian states with a strong support of the U.S. Also, Japan launched the Yen Loan Program in 1958, and India became the first recipient of the program.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, Japan proposed plans to support regional economic growth and reenter the region. For instance, former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida proposed the "Asian Marshal Plan" in 1951, requesting \$4 billion from the U.S., the World Bank, and the Colombo Plan to support regional economic development.¹⁵⁸ In 1957, Nobusuke Kishi also suggested the establishment of a "Southeast Asian Development Fund" to strengthen regional economic foundations.¹⁵⁹ Nonetheless, both proposals were not realized mainly for three reasons. First, both proposals relied heavily on financial assistance from the U.S., but the U.S. domestic politics did not favor

¹⁵⁶ Hideki Kan, "アメリカの戦後秩序構想とアジアの地域統合: 一九四五年-五〇年 [U.S. concept of post-war order and regional integration in Asia: 1945-1950]," *Kokusai Seiji* 89 (1988): 89 (1988): 114. https://doi.org/10.11375/kokusaiseiji1957.89_109.

¹⁵⁷ "Overview of Japan's ODA to India," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, June 2011. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/sw_asia/india_o.pdf.

¹⁵⁸ John W. Dower. *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese experience, 1878-1954*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1988): 473-480.

¹⁵⁹ The initial proposal was "Asian Development Fund" and changed to "Southeast Asian Development Fund." (Hiroyuki Hoshiro, "Reconsidering Japan's war reparations and economic re-entry into Southeast Asia," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 34, no. 4 (2023): 673. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2023.2270320>)

shouldering the financial burdens. Second, the U.S. also worried that the plan might increase Japan's influence over the region, which might lead to the decrease of U.S. influence.¹⁶⁰ Second, regional states did not support the ideas as well due to the imperialist history of Japan.¹⁶¹ Although the proposals for regional economic development was not realized, they showed Japan's enthusiasm for regional economic approach in the early Cold War period.

At the same time, Japan started to negotiate war reparations to normalize relationship with Southeast Asian states. Article 14 of the Treaty of San Francisco, signed in September 1951, acknowledged Japan's obligation to compensate for damages from the war and negotiate with the Allied Powers.¹⁶² After the ratification of the treaty, the Japanese government started negotiations with states, but the specific forms of negotiations varied. For instance, four countries, Burma (1954), the Philippines (1956), Indonesia (1958), and Vietnam (1959), received formal war reparations from Japan.¹⁶³ In most cases, however, Japan's negotiations took a form of quasi-reparations, including economic and technical assistance, yen loans, and grants. For instance, Laos (1958) and Cambodia (1959) abandoned the claim on war reparations and chose economic

¹⁶⁰ Shintaro Hamanaka. *Asian Regionalism and Japan: The Politics of Membership in Regional Diplomatic, Financial and Trade Groups*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009): 84.

¹⁶¹ Yumi Hiwatari, "岸外交における東南アジアとアメリカ [Southeast Asia and America from the perspective of Kishi's Diplomacy]," in Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai eds. *戦後外交の形成 [The formation of post-war Japanese diplomacy]*. (Tokyo, Japan: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1989): 222-230.

¹⁶² "日本国との平和条約 [Treaty of Peace with Japan]," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/B-S38-P2-795_1.pdf.

¹⁶³ Toshiaki Takatsuka, "国会から見た経済協力・ODA (1): 賠償協定を中心に [economic cooperation and ODA from the perspective of Japanese diet: Focusing on negotiations on war reparations]," *Rippo To Chosa* 256 (2006): 4. <https://dl.ndl.go.jp/pid/1004006/1/1>.

cooperation.¹⁶⁴ Singapore (1967) and Malaysia (1967) also received grant from Japan after becoming independent. Japan did not admit the right to claim war reparation, because both states were under the British colonialism when the Treaty of San Francisco was signed. Instead, the Japanese government proposed economic cooperation as quasi-reparation for so-called “blood-debt (血責),” the massacre conducted by Japanese troops during the war, to normalize relationship with both states.¹⁶⁵

Japan’s reparations and quasi-reparations gradually became the foundation for Japanese business to access Southeast Asia and economic recovery since the 1960s. In 1960, the Ikeda administration announced the “Income-Doubling Plan (所得倍増計画),” a government-led long-term economic development plan. One of the major targets of the plan was Southeast Asia for Japan’s export-oriented economic development supported by the inflow of Japanese loans and credits.¹⁶⁶ Especially, the Japanese government increased budget for the Yen Loans¹⁶⁷ to support infrastructure investment, education, and improving

¹⁶⁴ “日本国とラオスとの間の経済及び技術協力協定 [agreement on economic and technical cooperation between Japan and Laos],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1959/s34-shiryuu-005.htm>; Shinsuke Tomotsugu, “「準賠償」としての日本・カンボジア経済技術協力協定: 日本政府内政治過程と国際関係 1955–59 [Japan-Cambodia Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation as “Quasi-reparation”: Political Process in the Japanese Government and International Relations in 1955–59],” *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu* 57, no. 1 (2019): 31-55. <http://hdl.handle.net/2433/243787>.

¹⁶⁵ “日本国とシンガポール共和国との間の千九百六十七年九月二十一日の協定 [the agreement between Japan and the Republic of Singapore dated September 21, 1967],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/A-S43-427.pdf>;
“日本国とマレーシアとの間の千九百六十七年九月二十一日の協定 [the agreement between Japan and Malaysia dated September 21, 1967],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/A-S43-311.pdf>.

¹⁶⁶ Sudo Sueo. *The International Relations of Japan and South East Asia: Forging a New Regionalism*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002): 2-3.

¹⁶⁷ Yen Loans is a type of ODA designed to support developing countries with low-interest rates and longer repayment periods compared to other commercial loans. For instance, in the case of a state in poverty (Gross


the investment environment for foreign trade in Southeast Asia.¹⁶⁸ The following Sato administration promised to increase foreign aid for Southeast Asia to 1% of Japan's Gross National Product.¹⁶⁹ Along with the impressive success of the Income Doubling Plan and Japan's rapid economic growth, the amount of Japan's foreign aid started to expand since the mid-1960s, and economic relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia began to get closer.

National Income per capita is lower than \$765), the interest rate is 1.3%, and the repayment period is 30 years. (“円借款供与条件表 [A conditions table for yen loans grant],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a., https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/keitai/enshakan/en_jyoken.html)

¹⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014 年版政府開発援助(ODA)白書: 日本の国際協力. [Official Development Assistance White Paper: Japan's international cooperation]. (Tokyo, Japan: Gaimusho, 2015): 14.



¹⁶⁹ Akira Suehiro, “The road to economic re-entry: Japan's policy toward Southeast Asian development in the 1950s and 1960s,” *Social Science Japan Journal* 2, no. 1 (1999): 101-102.

<Figure 6> Trends of Japan's Foreign Aid in the 1960s (million U.S. dollars)



Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan and Southeast Asia in the 1970s," *Current History* 60, no. 356 (1971): 203. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45312473>.


<Figure 7> Trends of Japan's Trade with Top Five Southeast Asian States, 1960-1972
(million U.S. dollars)



Kunio Yoshihara, “Japan’s economic relations with Southeast Asia,” *Southeast Asian Affairs* (1974): 58. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27908219>.

Japan’s commitment to Southeast Asia led to impressive economic growth since the mid-1960s. Even after the first Oil Shock in 1973, economic situation in Southeast Asia remained relatively stable. Singapore showed the most remarkable result, an average of 9.4% of annual growth in the 1960s. Thailand (8.2%), Malaysia (6.5%), the Philippines (4.9%), and Indonesia (3.9%) showed stable economic growth during the same period as well. Although Japan’s foreign aid to those states cannot explain the entire economic growth, it is plausible that financial flow from Japan helped regional economic stability.

<Figure 8> Annual GDP growth of Five Southeast Asian States, 1961-1971 (percentage)



Author's analysis using the World Bank database. ("World Bank Open Data,"
World Bank, n.a. https://data.worldbank.org/?most_recent_year_desc=true)

Nonetheless, Japan's foreign aid faced criticisms not only from Southeast Asia but also from the U.S. and Europe for following reasons. First of all, the U.S. and European states criticized that Japan's foreign aid aimed to support export and contracts of Japanese businesses. Yen loans was the largest form of Japan's foreign aid, and almost all the credits were tied until 1972.¹⁷⁰ Tied yen loans helped Japanese businesses to offer more attractive terms, promoting Japan's economic activities in the region. Furthermore, projects financed by tied loans should be conducted by Japanese firms, granting benefit for Japan's own economy. Therefore, the U.S. and European states criticized Japan for using foreign aid to support Japan's export rather than assisting economic support of target states.¹⁷¹ In the 1970s, the OECD prohibited Japan from using loans to finance commercial projects multiple times as well.¹⁷²

Second, Southeast Asian states also showed negative attitude towards Japan as well. Tied loans from Japan were not favorable to recipient states, because the increase in costs for the projects with tied credits was estimated to be between 15% and 30% higher than market prices. Also, Japan's foreign aid focused more on states with abundant raw

¹⁷⁰ Steven W. Hook and Guang Zhang, "Japan's aid policy since the Cold War: Rhetoric and reality," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 11 (1998): 1059. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645685>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004 年版政府開発援助 (ODA) 白書: 日本の ODA 50 年の成果と歩み [*Official Development Assistance White Paper: Achievement and history of 50 years of Japan's ODA*]. (Tokyo, Japan: Gaimusho, 2004): 34-36.

¹⁷¹ Andrew M. Moravcsik, "Disciplining trade finance: The OECD export credit arrangement," *International Organization* 43, no. 1 (1989): 181-182. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706730>.

¹⁷² Muyang Chen, "Official aid or export credit: China's policy banks and the reshaping of development finance," *GCI Working Paper 1*, (2018): 17. <https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/09/GCI-Muyang-Chen-18-int.pdf>.

materials and investment chances.¹⁷³ The increased Japan's economic presence in Southeast Asia and memories of Imperial Japan gradually formed anti-Japanese sentiment.

Regional animosity over Japan's economic commitment to Southeast Asia became evident when Kakuei Tanaka, former Prime Minister of Japan, visited some Southeast Asian states. When Tanaka arrived in Indonesia in January 1974, he faced massive anti-Japanese protest surrounding the airport, and had to stay in reception hall for three days. Reactions in other Southeast Asian states were similar to Indonesia, which gave a significant shock to Japan.

To rebuild the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia, Fukuda Takeo announced the "Fukuda Doctrine (福田ドクトリン)" in August 1977, Japan's first diplomatic strategy to the region. He proposed three principles regarding Japan's approach to Southeast Asia: Japan would not become a military power, Japan would aim to build a "heart-to-heart" relationship with ASEAN, and Japan and ASEAN would be equal partners.¹⁷⁴

Following the Fukuda Doctrine, the Japanese government expanded the amount of ODA budget significantly. In May 1978, the Fukuda administration announced the first mid-term ODA target(中期 ODA 目標), doubling the amount of last year's ODA budget within three years, from 1.4 billion dollars to 2.8 billion dollars. Following the first target,

¹⁷³ Jiyeoun Song, "Japan's Official Development Assistance in Southeast and South Asia," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 28, no. 1 (2021): 3. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27210932>.

¹⁷⁴ "ASEAN (東南アジア諸国連合)[Association of Southeast Asian Nations]," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, October 7, 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/page25_001325.html.

the Japanese government announced three mid-term ODA targets, aiming to double the amount of ODA budget for five to six years.

<Table 8> Japan's Mid-term ODA Targets

Prime Minister	Period	Target (billion dollars)
Takeo Fukuda	First 1978-1980	Double the amount of 1977 ODA budget (1.42) by 1980 (2.8)
Zenko Suzuki	Second 1981-1985	Double the total amount of 1981-1985 ODA budget (21.4) compared to the 1976-1980 budget (10.7)
Yasuhiro Nakasone	Third 1986-1992	Double the amount of 1992 ODA budget compared to 1985 budget (3.8), targeting the total amount of 1986-1992 ODA budget over 40 billion dollars
Noboru Takeshita	Fourth 1988-1992	Double the amount of 1988-1992 ODA budget compared to 1983-1987 ODA budget (50)

Author's summary. “第2章 評価対象の外的要素 [External factors of the (ODA) evaluation subject],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hyouka/kunibetu/gai/chuki/chuki03_01_0201.html.

Furthermore, Japan's ODA showed qualitative changes after Fukuda Doctrine. First, the Japanese government attempted to change the ratio of tied and untied credits in yen loans. Even before the Fukuda Doctrine, the Japanese government attempted to increase untied credits due to the negative responses from recipient countries.¹⁷⁵ After 1978, however, more than 50% of yen loans became untied credits, and the ratio of tied

¹⁷⁵ Nobuhiro Ihara, “1970年代東南アジアにおける日本の「経済支配」イメージの再検討 [Reconsideration of Japan's "economic dominance" image in Southeast Asia in the 1970s],” *Media To Shakai* 8 (2016): 14. <https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1390009224656056960>.

credits remained below 10%.¹⁷⁶ Second, Japan's ODA diversified its goals to meet the requirements in the region. In 1978, the Ohira administration announced to focus on Basic Human Needs (基礎生活分野) including social infrastructure, education, public health. As a result, the budget for Basic Human Needs, which was less than 10% until 1977, increased to 23% of Japan's overall ODA budget in 1978 and has been maintained in the range of 20~30%.

In conclusion, Japan's ODA policy to Southeast Asia during the Cold War period showed two features. First, Japan used economic tools as the major diplomatic tool for regional approach. Mainly due to the historical memories, not only domestic opposition but also negative responses from the region led Japan to rely heavily on economic tools, especially foreign aid. Nonetheless, Japan did not have solid strategic goals other than economic growth during the period. Although the Japanese government emphasized the importance of ODA to normalize relationship with Southeast Asian states, they did not suggest specific plans or policy goals. Instead, economic motives from Japanese business groups took major roles to expand Japan's economic presence in the region. The lack of strategic goals and profit-driven regional approach, along with historical memories, led to significant anti-Japanese sentiment in 1974.

Second, the U.S. and Japan showed a significant gap regarding the understanding of Southeast Asia, especially during the early-Cold War period. The U.S. paid more attention to security considerations of the region to limit the spread of communism. The establishment of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954 is the prime example

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2004 年版政府開発援助(O DA)白書: 日本の O DA 50 年の成果と歩み. [Official Development Assistance White Paper: Achievement and history of 50 years of Japan's ODA]. *ibid.*


showing how the U.S. primarily understood the region. On the other hand, Japan emphasized the importance of economic development for preventing Communist encroachment as well as regional stability. Throughout the Cold War period, the Japanese government refused to take any security roles outside Japan and attempted to contribute by economic policies. The first pillar of Fukuda Doctrine was nothing but the reiteration of Japan's attitude regarding military tool in the regional approach.

Strategically Responding to Non-traditional Security Threats with ODA

In this section, I explore the strategic background motivating Japan's security approach to Southeast Asia, using ODA as the primary tool. There are two major reasons explaining strategic shift of Japan's ODA policy to respond to security challenges in Southeast Asia. The first reason was various economic challenges from domestic and international domains. Domestically, Japan faced significant economic challenges during the 1990s. Although Japan had been proud of the status as the number one aid donor in the world, the solid commitment for economic support faced various challenges since the mid-1990s. The first challenge was economic recession, including so-called the "Collapse of Bubble Economy (バブル崩壊)" and the Asian Financial Crisis. Skyrocketing price of real estate and stock suddenly started to collapse since the early-1990s, and the following shockwaves triggered Japan's decade-long economic stagnation, called the "lost decade (失われた 10 年)". Following Asian Economic Crisis worsened Japan's domestic economy, urged the Japanese government to various reforms to address the economic challenges.

The economic recession negatively affected Japan’s domestic opinion about ODA as well. Although the majority of Japanese respondents supported maintaining the current level of the ODA budget, the percentage of those advocating for an increase decreased from 41.5% to 23%, while the proportion favoring a decrease rose from 8.6% to 22.3% between 1991 and 2001, respectively. 75% of respondents who had a negative opinion chose Japan’s economic situation as the primary reason of their negative view on Japan’s ODA. Because of the economic situation and domestic opinion, in 1997, then-Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced to reduce 10% of ODA budget for Fiscal Year 1998, and the trends of Japan’s ODA budget turned to a negative direction.

<Figure 10> Japan’s ODA budget, 1995-2005 (billion yen)



Author’s summary. “ODA 予算 [ODA budget],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, January 12, 2024. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/yosan.html>.

The second challenge was the rise of China as the major rival of Japan's ODA policy. Since the mid-1990s, the China expanded its economic activities in the developing world under the strategy of "Go Out Policy (走出去战略)." To provide foreign aid and to promote the export of Chinese goods and services, the Chinese government established the Export-Import Bank of China in 1994. Furthermore, the Asian Financial Crisis gave chances for China to strengthen its influence in Asia. One of the key contributions was China's decision not to devalue the renminbi, at the expense of financial difficulties of Chinese companies and decrease of foreign investments.¹⁷⁷ The decision helped neighboring states to stabilize domestic economy from significant devaluation, showing China's leadership for the entire region.¹⁷⁸

China's remarkable economic growth, shift to export-oriented approach, and economic leadership during the financial crisis became the backbone of China's approach to Southeast Asia. In 2002, China and ASEAN declared the Conduct of Parties in the South China Seas, showing a departure from previous security tensions over territorial disputes.¹⁷⁹ Following the declaration, both signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation, aiming to remove tariffs in November 2002.¹⁸⁰ China's emphasis on ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three, including China, Japan, and South

¹⁷⁷ Hongying Wang, "The Asian financial crisis and financial reforms in China," *The Pacific Review* 12, no. 4 (1999): 539. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512749908719305>.

¹⁷⁸ Leong Liew, "The impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on China: The macroeconomy and State-owned Enterprise reform," *Management International Review* 39, no. 4 (1999): 97-98. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40835847>.

¹⁷⁹ Nguyen Hong Thao, "The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A note," *Ocean Development & International Law* 34, no. 3-4 (2003): 279-285. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320390221849>.

¹⁸⁰ Bruce Vaughn and Wayne M. Morrison, "China-Southeast Asia relations: Trends, issues, and implications for the United States," *CRS Report for Congress* (2006): 8-9. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL32688.pdf>.

Korea, as opposed to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) with the U.S., clearly showed its efforts for a regional framework in Asia.

Budgetary restrictions from domestic economy and the rise of China's regional influence led Japan to reconsider its ODA policy toward Southeast Asia. Considering China's rapid economic growth, previous quantitative-centered foreign aid would not be a preferable long-term strategy. To address strategic adjustments, the Japanese government announced to revise previous 1992 ODA Charter in 2003. The four principles and ASEAN as the primary region for Japan ODA were same, but the priority issues of both Charters have changed significantly.¹⁸¹ While 1992 ODA Charter focused mainly on economic and environment issues, such as environmental protection, poverty, and infrastructure improvement, 2003 ODA Charter emphasized multilateral cooperation against terrorism, international crime, and efforts for peace-building measures.¹⁸² It is also noteworthy to mention that the core concept of ODA Charters was changed from "Basic Human Needs (基礎生活分野)" to "Human Security (人間の安全保障)."

¹⁸¹ The four principles of Japan's ODA policy are as follows. 1) Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem, 2) Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided, 3) Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries' military expenditures, their development and production of mass destruction weapons and missiles, their export and import of arms, etc., so as to maintain and strengthen international peace and stability, and from the viewpoint that developing countries should place appropriate priorities in the allocation of their resources in their own economic and social development, and 4) Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.

¹⁸² "旧・政府開発援助大綱(1992年6月閣議決定) [Former Official Development Assistance Charter (Cabinet Decision, June 1992)," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 平成16年版 外交青書 [Diplomatic Bluebook 2004]. (Tokyo, Japan: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 2004): 132-133; "政府開発援助大綱の改定について [regarding the revision of the Official Development Assistance]," *ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

The second reason was the change of security environment in Southeast Asia, threatening Japan’s sea trade routes. Japan has relied heavily on sea trade routes in the region, especially passing the Strait of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), for shipping trade and energy imports. Although the Japanese government sought diversification of energy sources after the two oil shocks in the 1970s, Japan still relied heavily on the Middle East.¹⁸³ Furthermore, Japan’s export-led economic growth means that stability of major sea routes in Southeast Asia is the core of Japan’s national interests.¹⁸⁴

Therefore, the upsurge of piracy and armed robbery in the SOMS became Japan’s primary security concerns. Since the mid-1990s, the number of reported piracy cases in East Asia and the Indian Ocean increased rapidly. In 2000, more than half of piracy occurred in East Asia, and about 40% of them occurred in the SOMS.

<Table 8> Number of Reported Piracy by Region, 1995-2004

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
East Asia	80	133	109	100	173	257	178	175	193	173
(in the SOMS)	(12)	(12)	(8)	(6)	(37)	(112)	(58)	(34)	(36)	(60)
Indian Ocean	15	30	41	25	51	109	86	66	96	41
Africa	15	28	41	41	52	62	80	70	89	70

¹⁸³ For instance, in the 2000s, Japan imported 86% of oil, 84% of LPG from the Middle East. (S. Hayden Lesbirel, “Diversification and energy security risks: The Japanese case,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 1 (2004): 5. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S146810990400129X>)

¹⁸⁴ In the 2000s, Japan ranked 3rd in overall numbers of vessels and 8th in overall tonnage of shipping vessels passing the SOMS. (Nihon Kainan Bousi Kyokai, “マラッカ-シンガポール海峡船舶通行量など調査[survey of ship traffic in the Malacca-Singapore Straits],” *Nippon Foundation*, February 2006. pp. 22-25. <https://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2005/00326/pdf/0001.pdf>)

Central/South America	20	32	45	38	29	41	23	67	72	46
Etc	2	5	16	6	4	2	3	5	2	0
Sum	132	228	252	210	309	471	370	383	452	330
Japanese ships damaged by piracy (in East Asia)	8 (5)	11 (10)	18 (12)	19 (14)	39 (28)	31 (22)	10 (4)	16 (12)	12 (11)	7 (7)

Author's summary. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 外交青書平成 18 年度版 [Diplomatic Bluebook 2006]. (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan): 178.

Two major factors explained the upsurge of piracy in Southeast Asia. The most critical reason was the staggering economic situation in the region, especially following the Asian financial crisis in the mid-1990s. The economic disaster that spread from Thailand to the entire Asian region resulted in the rise of unemployment rate and the number of pirates.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, economic and political instabilities significantly limited state budget allocations for law-enforcement capability in the ocean to enforce law and order in their territorial waters and beyond.¹⁸⁶ For instance, Indonesia, the most piracy-

¹⁸⁵ Erik Barrios, "Casting a wider net: Addressing the maritime piracy problems in Southeast Asia," *Boston College International & Comparative Law Review* 149 (2005): 150.

<http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol28/iss1/4>; Dana R. Dillon, "Piracy in Asia: A growing barrier to maritime trade," *Heritage Foundation*, June 22, 2000. <https://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/report/piracy-asia-growing-barrier-maritime-trade>; Karsten V. Hoesslin, "Piracy and armed robbery at sea in Southeast Asia: Organized and fluid," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35 (2012): 544. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.684652>.

¹⁸⁶ Peter Chalk. *The maritime dimension of international security: Terrorism, piracy, and challenges for the United States*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008): 11-12.

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG697.html>.

infested area in the mid-1990s, poverty rate increased from 11 to 40 percent, unemployment from 4.7 to 21 percent in 1999.¹⁸⁷

Another critical factor was a lack of leadership addressing piracy issues in Southeast Asia. The complex geographical features of the SOMS, piracy and armed robbery issues required multilateral cooperation in overlapping territorial waters and international waters. However, different geopolitical situations among coastal states made the threat of piracy asymmetrical. Singapore expressed the highest concerns on the issues, given its reliance on foreign trade, but Malaysia and Indonesia focused more on other issues, such as illegal fishing, smuggling.¹⁸⁸ Also, conflicts among coastal states regarding sovereignty over the strait and islands limited agreement on coordinated agreements.¹⁸⁹

The upsurge of piracy in the region also affected Japan's shipping industry as well. The number of Japanese ships damaged by piracy peaked in 1999, and two-third of the cases happened in the SOMS. Especially, the Alondra Rainbow incident shocked the Japanese society, realizing that piracy is relevant to Japan.¹⁹⁰ The Japanese government perceived piracy from a humanitarian perspective and as "Japan's issue (日本化),"

¹⁸⁷ "Economic crisis widespread, deeper, but glimmer of hope seen, ESCAP survey of Asia-Pacific States," *United Nations Press release rec/36*, April 8, 1999. <https://press.un.org/en/1999/19990408.rec36.html>.

¹⁸⁸ Robert M. Farley and Yoav Gortzak, "Fighting piracy: Experiences in Southeast Asia and off the Horn of Africa," *Journal of Strategic Security* 2, no. 1 (2009): 5. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26462967>.

¹⁸⁹ Ian Storey, "Securing Southeast Asia's sea lanes: A work in progress," *Asia Policy* 6 (2008): 111-112. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/24904662>.

¹⁹⁰ In October 1999, a Japanese ship, 'Alondra Rainbow,' was attacked by pirates in the SOMS. The pirates hijacked the ship and forced the crew members into a lifeboat. The crew drifted for 11 days before being rescued by a fishing boat. (Naoto Komeda, "近年における世界の海賊海上武装強盗事情 [recent global situation regarding piracy and maritime armed robbery]," *TRC EYE 156* (2007): 6.

becoming a major driver of Japan's security engagement in Southeast Asia and took the initiative for multilateral cooperation against piracy.¹⁹¹

Japan's Initial Security Initiatives Against Non-Traditional Security Threats

In this section, I examine Japan's proposals to establish multilateral cooperation to respond to the rise of non-traditional security threats in Southeast Asia in the 1990s.

Japan's initial response to the piracy issue in Southeast Asia was a multilateral security cooperation including naval forces. In 1997, the National Institute of Defense Studies (防衛研究所, NIDS), a core research institution of the MOD of Japan, published an article proposing a new concept, the "Ocean-Peace Keeping concept (海洋平和維持活動, OPK)."

The article suggested multilateral security cooperation among regional naval forces to maintain order, prevent armed conflicts, and assure the stable and sustainable development of the oceans.¹⁹² Former prime minister Keizo Obuchi formally proposed the concept at the ASEAN Plus Three meeting in 1999, but it was not adopted due to the opposition from China.¹⁹³ In 2003, Shigeru Ishiba, then-Director General of the Japan Defense Agency,¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ John F. Bradford, "Japanese anti-piracy initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy formulation and the coastal state responses," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, No. 3 (2004): 487. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798705>.

¹⁹² Susumu Takai and Kazumine Akimoto, "Ocean-Peace Keeping and new roles for maritime force," *NIDS Security Reports* 1 (2000): 57-79. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e1999_3.pdf.

¹⁹³ Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, "Japanese maritime thought: if not Mahan, who?," *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 3 (2006): 37. <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/4>.

¹⁹⁴ Japan Defense Agency (boeicho) has been promoted to the Ministry of Defense of Japan in 2007.

again put emphasis on the OPK for regional stability and proposed joint maritime operations among naval forces for law-enforcement activities.¹⁹⁵

One of the key goals of the OPK was to ensure the U.S.'s security commitment to Asia. Since the end of the Cold War period, there have been widespread concerns in Japan regarding the future of American strategy in Asia and the rationale of the U.S.-Japan security alliance system. During the 1990s, the U.S. government began to reduce its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, which was seen as part of a broader trend involving decreased regional security commitments by Asian states. Additionally, the reactive response of the Japanese government in the Gulf War and the limited roles of the JSDF in contingencies that occurred in the mid-1990s led to strong criticisms in the U.S., deriding it as “checkbook diplomacy.”¹⁹⁶

The U.S. also showed a limited interest in piracy issues in Southeast Asia in the 1990s. Since most of economic damages occurred by piracy issues in the SOMS was not directly related to the U.S., joining costly anti-piracy missions in Southeast Asia was hard to secure domestic support.¹⁹⁷ Military presence of the U.S. Navy was not a politically viable option as well, due to concerns on sovereignty from regional states. Furthermore, the primary focus of U.S. diplomacy was on the Middle East, following the Gulf War and

¹⁹⁵ “第2章 アジアにおける海洋安全保障協力: 海洋ガバナンスと OPK 構想 [Chapter 2. Maritime security cooperation in Asia: Ocean governance and Ocean-Peace Keeping],” in National Institute for Defense Studies. *東アジア戦略概観 2004. [Strategic overview of East Asia 2004]* (Tokyo, Japan: Kokuritsu Insatsukyoku, 2004): 28.

¹⁹⁶ Tayuki Hirose, “新しい地域秩序構想と外交政策デザイン: 1990年代以降の日米関係を中心として [The new regional order and foreign policy design of Japan: Focusing on the U.S.-Japan relations since the 1990s],” *Fukuoka University Review of Law* 58, no. 4 (2014): 828.

¹⁹⁷ Robert M. Farley and Yoav Gortzak, *ibid.* p. 6.

other conflicts among regional states. To ensure the U.S. security commitment to the region, the OPK concept was one of Japan's strategic decisions to establish a new multilateral security structure in the post-Cold War period.¹⁹⁸

Nonetheless, the OPK was not realized primarily due to its radical military nature. The Japanese government did not acknowledge the right of collective self-defense, but the core of the OPK was centered around multilateral naval cooperation. Furthermore, it was challenging to assume that piracy in Southeast Asia posed a direct security threat to Japan's national security. Coupled with concerns over sovereignty in the region, the OPK concept was rejected as impractical.¹⁹⁹

Instead, Japan started to focus on non-traditional threats, especially piracy and armed threats, to promote multilateral cooperation among law-enforcement agencies. First of all, the Japanese government focused on bilateral cooperation between the JCG and coast guards in Southeast Asia. After the Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Tokyo in April 2000, the Japanese government established a survey team, comprised of the MOFA, the Ministry of Transport,²⁰⁰ the JCG,

¹⁹⁸ Susumu Takai and Kazumine Akimoto, *ibid.*, p. 74; Kaneko Yuzuru, “軍事力の非伝統的役割と東アジアの安全保障 [Non-traditional roles of military force and security in East Asia],” *Proceedings of 50th International Symposium on Security Affairs*, National Institute on Defense Studies, January 21, 2003. p. 19. https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/12315380/www.nids.mod.go.jp/event/proceedings/symposium/pdf/2002/sympo_j2002_04.pdf; John F. Bradford, *ibid.*, p. 489.

¹⁹⁹ Gaye Christoffersen, “Japan and the East Asian maritime security order: Prospects for trilateral and multilateral cooperation,” *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 3 (2009): 118. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704684>; Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Japan's emerging maritime strategy: Out of sync or out of reach?,” *Comparative Strategy* 27 (2008): 31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930701839654>; Alessio Patalano, “Japan as a seapower: Strategy, doctrine, and capabilities under three defense reviews, 1995-2010,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, no. 3 (2014): 416. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.904788>.

²⁰⁰ The official name of Ministry of Transport (運輸省) was changed to Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (国土交通省) in 2001.

and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and sent to the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia in September 2000, and discussed how to promote regional cooperation against piracy. During the meetings, they decided to conduct mutual visits and joint exercises, human resource exchange and technical assistance, and hold maritime law-enforcement seminars.²⁰¹ After the meetings, the JCG visited India and Malaysia in November 2000, and Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, and Indonesia in 2001, and conducted joint trainings with law-enforcement agency of the host countries to strengthen cooperation for counter-piracy measures.²⁰² Furthermore, Japan promoted human resource exchanges since 2001, including annual seminar on maritime law-enforcement activities held by the JCG and exchange students from Southeast Asia to the Japan Coast Guard Academy.²⁰³

Secondly, the Japanese government attempted to institutionalize regional multilateral security cooperation among law-enforcement agencies for counter-piracy measures in Southeast Asia. In November 2001, then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed a “Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)” during the ASEAN Plus Three Summit. There are three key points of the ReCAAP: Establishment of Information Sharing Center, establishment of information sharing and cooperation system for piracy and relevant activities, and

²⁰¹ “Present state of the piracy problem and Japan's efforts,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, December 2001. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html>.

²⁰² Japan Coast Guard. *海洋保安レポート2002*. [Japan Coast Guard Report 2002]. (Nagano, Japan: Tsutamoto Insatsu, 2002): 134-136.

²⁰³ “会場保安学校に関する年表、平成一令和 [A timeline related to the Japan Coast Guard Academy: Heisei to Reiwa era],” *Japan Coast Guard Academy*, n.a. https://www.jcga.ac.jp/facility/museum/digital/history/present_2.html.

promotion of bilateral cooperation between states within the agreement.²⁰⁴ The ReCAAP was formalized in November 2004, and entered into force in September 2006 with 14 Asian states as the contracting parties.²⁰⁵ In November 2006, the Information Sharing Center was established in Singapore as well. As a result, Japan succeeded to establish the first regional intergovernmental agreement to promote cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia.

There are two major features of Japan's security initiatives in Southeast Asia against piracy. First of all, Japan started to perceive piracy issues in the region as a threat to broadly defined national interests and security in the maritime domain. Especially, the Alondra Rainbow incident in 1999 became the major inflection point for Japan's perception on piracy as closely related to Japan.²⁰⁶ Since 1999, the number of news articles about piracy in Southeast Asia increased significantly, and the Japanese society started to realize the importance of the SOMS in terms of Japan's maritime transportation.

It was also evident that the perceived threat on piracy shared by Japan was the key driver for regional security cooperation than actual economic losses. In 1999, more than


²⁰⁴ “アジア海賊対策地域協力協定 [ReCAAP: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, October 4, 2023. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaiyo/kaizoku_gai.html.

²⁰⁵ As of 2006, the following 14 states signed the agreement. Bangladeshi, Brunei, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Viet Nam. To date, 7 non-Asian states signed the agreement. Australia, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, the U.S. (“About ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre,” *ReCAAP*, n.a. https://www.recaap.org/about_ReCAAP-ISC#_ftn1)

²⁰⁶ A Japanese ship, the ‘Alondra Rainbow (アロンドラ・レインボー号), was attacked by pirates in October 1999. The crews were drifted in a lifeboat for 11 days and were found by a fishing boat. The incident shocked Japanese society, highlighting the significance of piracy to Japan's national security. (Yoshihiko Yamada, “現代海賊事情: マラッカ海峡を中心として [Modern Pirate Situation: Focusing on the Malacca Strait],” *Journal of the JIME* 42, no. 3 (2007): 61-62)

13,000 Japanese ships passed the Strait of Malacca and 29 of them were damaged by pirates.²⁰⁷ Also, the NF estimated Japan’s annual economic loss from piracy is \$10-15 million, relatively small amount given Tokyo’s shipping industry and domestic economy.²⁰⁸ However, the physical damages and “psychological aspects” of piracy played a key role in counter-piracy initiatives than the financial loss.²⁰⁹ In other words, “Japanized” piracy issue became the major driver for Japan to strengthen multilateral security cooperation against piracy in Southeast Asia.

<Figure 11> Number of Japanese News Articles, 1994-2004



²⁰⁷ Yoshihiko Yamada, “現代海賊事情 [Modern piracy situation],” *Navigation* 164 (2006): 50.

²⁰⁸ John F. Bradford, *ibid.*, p.484.

²⁰⁹ Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, and Amitav Acharya. *Non-traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016): 73.

Author's analysis. The figure shows the number of news articles of Japan's major newspapers, using the news article search engine, Nikkei Telecom 21 (<https://t21.nikkei.co.jp/g3/CMNDF11.do>). Keywords for the figure: Piracy (海賊), SEA (Southeast Asia, 東南アジア), Japan (日本).

The Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 stated that the upsurge of piracy issue in Southeast Asia “poses a threat not only to Japan’s maritime transportation but also has a substantial impact on the overall stability and economic development of the region.”²¹⁰ This statement reflects the core concept of the linkage between maritime stability and economic prosperity in Japan’s grand strategy in the oceans. The linkage began to be incorporated into Japan’s ODA policy, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

Second, dual threat from the U.S. and China was one of the key drivers of Japan’s multilateral security initiatives in Southeast Asia against piracy. The core goal of the OPK concept was to ensure stable utilization of the oceans by establishing regional maritime forces from the Asia-Pacific region and other region. While acknowledging that the regional maritime forces might hamper the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Japan tried to achieve two goals through OPK: maintaining the U.S.-Japan security alliance system as the core of Japan’s national security system, and actively engaging China into a multilateral cooperation for a more broadly defined security in the oceans.²¹¹

Although the OPK concept was failed, Japan continued to draw the U.S. and China into multilateral security cooperation through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) as the major

²¹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *外交青書2004*. [Diplomatic Bluebook 2004]. (Tokyo, Japan: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 2005): 35-36.

²¹¹ Susumu Takai and Kazumine Akimoto, *ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

framework. For instance, Japan signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) during the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in July 2004.²¹² At the expense of U.S. concerns on opting out the option of U.S.-Japan security cooperation in Southeast Asia, Japan declared to respect sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs in Southeast Asia, which are core principles of the TAC.²¹³ Japan's understanding of regional security framework in Southeast Asia was broader, including regional states that were "not like-minded."²¹⁴ The inclusiveness of Japan's regional security initiatives and careful approach to regional concerns over sovereignty allowed Japan to establish the ReCAAP with regional states, including China.

Moving Towards Security Engagement with JCG and JICA

In this section, I analyze Japan's strategic use of ODA for security engagement in Southeast Asia, focusing on two periods. In the first period, in the 2000s, Japan focused on bilateral approaches after failures of proposals for multilateral cooperation. During the first period, the JCG took the major roles to provide training programs and technical assistance to coast guards in the region. In the second period, in the 2010s, Japan's regional security engagement became more proactive, supporting the establishment of coast guards and

²¹² "Signing of the instrument of accession and depositing of the instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, July 2, 2004. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/treaty0407.html>.

²¹³ "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/treaty.html>.

²¹⁴ Gaye Christoffersen, "Chinese and ASEAN responses to the US regional maritime security initiative," in Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne eds. *China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign policy and regional security*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008): 131-132.

providing further coast guard vessels and equipment to strengthen law-enforcement capabilities in Southeast Asia. Also, Japan took initiative to institutionalize multilateral cooperation among law-enforcement agencies from the world to maintain maritime stability in the region.

Japan's Economic Support Against Piracy in Southeast Asia

Since the late-1990s, the Japanese government suggested several proposals for multilateral security cooperation against piracy in Southeast Asia. After the failure of the OPK concept, the Japanese government proposed the “Regional Coast Guard body” in 1999 and an organization for the cooperative management of safety in the SOMS in 2000. The Nippon Foundation (NF) also proposed the Organization for the Cooperative Management of Safety in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (マラッカ海峡管理協力機構構想) in 2003, suggesting to share burdens of coastal states among user states.²¹⁵ None of those proposals was realized primarily due to negative reactions from regional states, and China questioned the need for multilateral efforts against piracy.²¹⁶ However, Japan could confirm the regional consensus on the necessity of cooperation for anti-piracy measures. At the Asia Anti-Piracy Challenge 2000 conference, held in Tokyo in 2000, two documents were adopted: “Tokyo Appeal” and the “Model

²¹⁵ Yoshihiko Yamada, “マラッカ海峡の歴史的灯台 [Historic lighthouse of the Malacca Strait],” *Ocean Newsletter* 61 (2003). https://www.spf.org/opri/newsletter/61_1.html.

²¹⁶ John F. Bradford, *ibid.*, 491.

Action Plan.” Both documents called for joint cooperation against piracy, including information exchanges between governments and specific countermeasures.²¹⁷

Instead of institutionalization, Japan focused more on bilateral approach and informal relationship among maritime law-enforcement agencies in Southeast Asia. The JCG started to dispatch JCG vessels to India and Malaysia in 2000, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, and Indonesia in 2001, and hold bilateral exercises for anti-piracy measures.²¹⁸ Also, with support of the JICA, the JCG started to hold an annual seminar on the regulation of maritime crime among coast guard agencies from Southeast Asia since 2001.²¹⁹ Furthermore, the Japan Coast Guard Agency began to accept students from Southeast Asia since 2001.²²⁰

On the other hand, the JCG and JICA became the major actors of Japan’s bilateral security engagement in Southeast Asia. Although there were various cases where the JCG and JICA supported law-enforcement capabilities in the region, the following four states received the most assistance from Japan: The Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The Philippines was the first case the JCG and the JICA provided training

²¹⁷ “Japan's efforts to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, November 2001, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/relation/piracy.html>.

²¹⁸ “(5) 海賊対策のため巡視船・航空機を東南アジア海域へ派遣 [(5) Sending vessels and planes to Southeast Asia for anti-piracy measures],” Japan Coast Guard. *海上保安レポート2002*. [Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2002]. (Tokyo, Japan: Zaimushou Insatsukyoku, 2002): 226-267.

²¹⁹ “東南アジア海賊対策: 政府が人材育成支援 来年度から [Countermeasures against piracy in Southeast Asia: The Japanese government will support human resource development starting next year],” *Hokkaido Shimbun*, October 8, 2000.

²²⁰ “初の外国人留学生の受け入れ [Accepting foreign students for the first time],” Japan Coast Guard. *海上保安レポート2001*. [Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2001]. (Tokyo, Japan: Kokuritsu Insatsusho, 2001): 13.

programs using Japan's ODA in the 2000s. The Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) was separated from the Philippines Navy in 1998, and thus knowledge and experience as a law-enforcement agency were underdeveloped.²²¹ To provide education and training management system, the JICA initiated the "Project on Philippine coast Guard Human Resource Development" between 2002 and 2007, focusing on Search and Rescue (SAR), oil spill incidents, and illegal drug smuggling. Also, JICA provided grant to develop communication systems connecting the headquarter of the PCG and 12 district offices in the Philippines and relevant equipment, total cost of 801 million yen.²²²

The case of Malaysia was similar to the Philippines as well. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) was established under the Malaysian government in 2005, as a separate law-enforcement agency to the Marine Police Force (MPF) under the Royal Malaysia Police.²²³ To strengthen the capacity of the MMEA and the MPF, the Malaysian government requested technical assistance and equipment to Japan. The JICA initiated the "Project for Improvement of Equipment for Maritime Security Enhancement" in 2008 for the MMEA and in 2009 for the RMP and provided equipment necessary for SAR and maritime surveillance. Similar to the case of the PCG, the JICA used total of 702 million yen from Japan's ODA budget to procure the equipment.²²⁴

²²¹ "Legacies," *Philippine Coast Guard*, n.a. <https://coastguard.gov.ph/index.php/transparency/about-us/legacies>.

²²² "Ex-Post Project Evaluation 2015: Package III-3 (Philippines, Laos, Cambodia)," *Japan International Cooperation Agency*, September 2016. <https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/1000034401.pdf>.

²²³ Thomas Daniel, "Issues impacting Malaysia's maritime security policies and postures," *Policy Brief 3* (2018): 3. https://isis.org.my/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/attachments_commentaries_2018_TD_18_June_JIA.pdf.

²²⁴ "The project for improvement of equipment for maritime security enhancement," *Japan International Cooperation Agency*, April 2015. https://www2.jica.go.jp/en/evaluation/pdf/2014_0802700_4_f.pdf.

Japan's approach to Indonesia was even more proactive than the other cases. The Japanese government planned to strengthen Indonesia's law-enforcement capabilities in the maritime domain since 2004. Although more than a quarter of piracy happened near Indonesia in 2003, the Japanese government pointed out the lack of necessary capabilities to respond to the situation.²²⁵ When the Indonesian government established the BAKORKAMLA (Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board) in 2005, the BAKORKAMLA requested assistance to Japan.²²⁶ To respond to the request, the JCG and JICA had a meeting with the head of BAKORKAMLA and discussed on how to strengthen Indonesia's maritime security system. After the meeting, they decided to provide a plan on Indonesia's maritime security system, including the basic laws on the maritime security, and institutional reforms of relevant governmental agencies.²²⁷

Furthermore, Japan attempted to provide patrol vessels by avoiding the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. The JICA initiated the "Plan for the construction of patrol vessels for combating piracy, maritime terrorism, and weapons proliferation" to provide Indonesia three new patrol vessels.²²⁸ However, those

²²⁵ “対インドネシア 国別援助計画 [A country specific program for Indonesia],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, November 2004. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/enjyo/pdfs/indonesia0411.pdf>.

²²⁶ “国際航路を守るマレーシアの「海猿」たち: 海上保安能力向上プロジェクト [Malaysian “Umizaru” divers protect international shipping routes: Capacity building in maritime safety and security],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *政府開発援助(ODA)白書 2012 年版 日本の国際協力* [ODA White Paper 2012: Japan's international cooperation]. (Tokyo, Japan: Bunka Kobo, 2013): 17.

²²⁷ “インドネシア国 海上保安調整組織の体制強化プロジェクト 事前調査・実施協議報告書 [Report on preliminary survey and implementation consultation for the strengthening of the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board],” *Japan International Cooperation Agency*, April 2008. <https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11885548.pdf>.

²²⁸ “インドネシア国 海賊、海上テロ及び兵器拡散防止のための巡視船艇建造計画基本設計調査報告書 [Report on the Basic Design Survey for the Project for Construction of Patrol Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy,

vessels included bullet-proof equipment, thus were considered as “arms.” To bypass the three principles, both states made an additional agreement to ensure that the vessels should be used for law-enforcement activities and should not be transferred to third parties without Japan’s prior approval.²²⁹

The case of Vietnam is the most unique case of Japan’s bilateral efforts for the maritime security. Vietnam’s maritime law-enforcement agency, the Vietnam Marine Police (VMP), was under the Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense. Because of the principles of Japan’s ODA policy, prohibiting using ODA for military purposes, the JICA could not support the VMP. Instead, the JCG and JICA provided training program and dispatch JCG personnel as a form of technical cooperation to avoid Japan’s ODA principles.²³⁰ Japan’s bilateral support for the Vietnam became more proactive since 2013, only after the VMP became independent from the Vietnamese Navy and a pure civilian agency.

Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons, Indonesia],” *Japan International Cooperation Agency*, May 2006. <https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11831310.pdf>.

²²⁹ “Grant aid to Indonesia for the Project for Construction of Patrol Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, June 16, 2006. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0616-3.html>.

²³⁰ “東南アジア諸国における海上保安機関の設立支援・技術移転等 [support for the establishment of maritime security agencies and technology transfer in Southeast Asian states],” Japan Coast Guard.

海上保安レポート 2006 [Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2006]. (Tokyo, Japan: Kokuritsu Insatsusho, 2006): 245.

Japan's Proactive Security Engagement in Southeast Asia

During the 2010s, Japan's maritime security approach to Southeast Asia became more proactive, long-term, and both bilateral and multilateral. The primary driver of Japan's proactive regional approach was China's intensified maritime behaviors in the East and South China Seas. Since 2009, the Chinese government showed a more assertive stance on the sovereignty rights in the maritime domain. In 2009, Dai Bingguo, a former foreign policy chief, referred to the South China Sea as one of China's "core interests," implying the shift of China's stance on territorial issues.²³¹ To protect the core interest, China increased its presence in the South China Seas to protect its sovereignty rights from neighboring states, in more aggressive ways. For instance, the Philippines government summoned a Chinese envoy after multiple cases of incursion of Chinese naval vessels into its claimed territorial waters, heightening diplomatic tensions between the two.²³² Also, in 2011, Chinese patrol vessels interfered Vietnam's exploration ship sailing within Vietnam's EEZ and cut the cable. Soon after the incident, the Vietnamese government condemned China for breaching Vietnam's EEZ and the sovereignty.²³³

Two of the most important incidents driving Japan's more proactive security engagement in Southeast Asia happened in 2012. In April 2012, Vietnamese naval vessels and Chinese surveillance vessels confronted regarding Chinese fishing vessels near the

²³¹ Michael D. Swaine, "China's assertive behavior part one: on "core interests"," *China Leadership Monitor* 34 (2010): 4. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM34MS_FINAL.pdf.

²³² Carlyle A. Thayer, "Chapter 3. China-ASEAN and the South China Sea: Chinese assertiveness and Southeast Asian responses," in Yann-huei Song and Keyuan Zou. *Major law and policy issues in the South China Sea: European and American Perspective*. (London, UK: Routledge, 2016): 26-29.

²³³ Shoji Tomotaka, "Vietnam, ASEAN, and the South China Sea: Unity or diverseness?," *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security* 13 (2012): 6-7.

Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese government used various diplomatic and economic tools, including imposed stricter regulations on fruits from the Philippines and terminating senior-level bilateral visits, requesting the Philippines government to withdraw their naval vessels.²³⁴ Furthermore, People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Global Times urged the Chinese government to take a rigid stance on the Scarborough Shoal issue, including use of force, to protect its sovereignty rights.²³⁵

It was September 2012 when tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands became high. Japanese decision-makers started to understand the situation in the South China Sea closely related to their own situation, posing a significant security threat to Japan's national security. The shared threat perception on China's maritime behaviors allowed Japan and ASEAN to formally upgrade the relationship from economic-focused cooperation to the economic-security partnership. The 2013 Japan-ASEAN joint declaration clearly states that both reaffirmed the "enhanced commitment for the maintenance of peace, security, and stability," stark contrast to the previous joint declaration emphasizing the "significant contribution of Japan to the economic development and prosperity of ASEAN countries."²³⁶ This shared threat perception

²³⁴ Ketian Zhang, "Cautious bully: Reputation, resolve, and Beijing's use of coercion in the South China Sea," *International Security* 44, no. 1 (2019): 146. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00354.

²³⁵ Renato Cruz De Castro, "Facing up to China's Realpolitik approach in the South China Sea dispute," *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2016): 172-173. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48601794>.

²³⁶ "Tokyo Declaration for the dynamic and enduring ASEAN-Japan Partnership in the new millennium," *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, December 12, 2003. <https://asean.org/tokyo-declaration-for-the-dynamic-and-enduring-asean-japan-partnership-in-the-new-millennium>; "Joint vision statement on ASEAN-Japan friendship and cooperation: Trusted partners," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, December 17, 2023. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100597190.pdf>.

became the major driver leading Japan to engage in Southeast Asia more proactively, enhancing law-enforcement capabilities in the region with ODA budget.

Bilateral security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines showed the most significant changes since both had similar sovereignty issues with China. In January 2013, Fumio Kishida, then-minister of MOFA of Japan, announced to start technical assistance to the PCG and provision of communication system for maritime safety. During the Japan-Philippines summit in December 2013, both confirmed common concerns regarding China's recent maritime behaviors and agreed to provide coast guard vessels to the PCG.²³⁷ Soon after the summit, the JCG and JICA held a meeting with the Philippines and initiated the "Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project for PCG" in 2013 (Phase 1) and in 2016 (Phase 2). Both projects aimed to purchase 12 multipurpose vessels for the PCG to strengthen Philippines' law-enforcement capabilities in the maritime domain, mainly using the concessional yen loans.²³⁸ Especially, the two vessels purchased during the second phase of the project were 94-meter, the biggest vessels the PCG has.²³⁹

Furthermore, Japan proactively negotiated with Vietnam to provide patrol vessels to the VCG. During the conference on the maritime security at Hanoi in May 2013, the Japanese government requested Vietnam to separate the VCG from the Vietnamese navy.

²³⁷ "Japan, Philippines to Cooperate on China's Air Defense Zone," *Jiji Press*, December 13, 2013.

²³⁸ "事業事前評価表 [pre-evaluation form for the project]," *Japan International Cooperation Agency*, n.a. https://www2.jica.go.jp/ja/evaluation/pdf/2013_PH-P257_1_s.pdf; "事業事前評価表 [pre-evaluation form for the project]," *Japan International Cooperation Agency*, n.a. https://www2.jica.go.jp/ja/evaluation/pdf/2016_PH-P263_1_s.pdf.

²³⁹ Frances Mangosing, "Japan coast guard to hold training with Southeast Asian counterparts," *Global News*, November 09, 2021. <https://globalnation.inquirer.net/200165/japan-coast-guard-to-hold-training-with-southeast-asian-counterparts>.

Since the principles of Japan’s ODA policy prohibits using ODA for military purposes, Japan advised Vietnam to reorganize the VCG as a civilian agency.²⁴⁰ Soon after the proposal, the Vietnamese government announced to separate the VCG from the Vietnamese Navy to accept ODA from Japan.²⁴¹ A year after the decision, Japan provided six used patrol vessels to the VCG in August 2014, and announced a plan to purchase additional six patrol vessels in 2017.

<Table 9> Japan’s Procurement of Patrol Vessels to Southeast Asia

Country	Year	Contents	Aid Type
Philippines	2013~2018	Purchase ten 44m patrol vessels	Yen Loans
	2016~2022	Purchase two 97m Patrol Vessels	Yen Loans
Malaysia	2017	Transfer 92m and 87m patrol vessels	Grants
Indonesia	2006	Transfer three 27m Patrol vessels	Grants
Vietnam	2014	Transfer six 60m patrol vessels	Grants
	2017~2025	Purchase six 79m patrol vessels	Yen Loans

Author’s summary. The figure used the following reference except for the case of Malaysia.

(Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, “Japan’s security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam,” *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 4 (2018): 538;

“政策評価法に基づく事前評価書 [pre-evaluation report based on the policy evaluation law],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, June 7, 2017.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/press/shiryo/page23_001179.html)

Reference for Malaysia is as follows. (“07 新天地での活躍に 期待!!

マレーシアへ巡視船供与 [Looking forward to the proactive participation in the new world! Providing patrol vessels to Malaysia],” *Japan Coast Guard*.

海上保安レポート 2017 [Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2017]. (Tokyo, Japan: Nikkei Insatsu, 2017): 254)

²⁴⁰ “対ベトナム ODAでの巡視船供与 政府、異例の提案へ [Japanese government makes unprecedented proposal to Vietnam to provide patrol vessels through ODA],” *Sankei Shimbun*, May 8, 2013.

²⁴¹ “ベトナム海軍、一部を「海保」に日本のODA使い巡視船導入狙う? [Vietnamese Navy (announced) to separate a part to “coast guard,” aiming to receive ODA-funded patrol vessels from Japan?],” *Asahi Shimbun*, September 01, 2013.

It should be noted that providing patrol vessels to coast guard agencies in Southeast Asia is only a part of Japan's efforts to support regional maritime law-enforcement capabilities. The representative example of Japan's long-term and systemic efforts is the establishment of the Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT) in 2017. With the support of the JICA and the Nippon Foundation, the JCG established the MCT dedicated to dispatch JCG officers with specialized knowledge to overseas. Also, the Japan Coast Guard Academy opened the Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program in 2015, with the cooperation of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), to invite officers from law-enforcement agencies and deepen interactions among coast guard officers.²⁴²

Those efforts led Japan to become a leader of multilateral cooperation among maritime law-enforcement agencies in Southeast Asia. The most successful example is the first Coast Guard Global Summit (CGGS), held at Tokyo in 2017. With the help of the Nippon Foundation, the JCG invited coast guard agencies from 38 states and discussed various issues related to the oceans, including maritime safety and security, marine environmental protection, and capacity building to address maritime issues at the global level.²⁴³ The interests from in this biannual meeting has increased, and the number of participants of the third CGGS increased to 87 countries in 2023.²⁴⁴ Comparing the number of participants of the 19th Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (23

242 “諸外国への海上保安能力向上支援等 [Support for the enhancement of maritime security capabilities in various countries],” *Japan Coast Guard*, n.a. <https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/kokusai/kokusaikyoryoku.html>.

243 “1st Coast Guard Global Summit to be held on September 14,” *The Nippon Foundation*, July 19, 2017. <https://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/en/news/articles/2017/20170719-21206.html>.

244 The third CGGS was delayed and held online due to the pandemic in 2021. (“Report on 3rd Coast Guard Global Summit,” *The Nippon Foundation*, November 02, 2023. <https://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/en/news/articles/2023/20231102-96657.html>)

states) in 2023 or the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (6 states), the Coast Guard Global Summit is the largest multilateral network among coast guard agencies in the world.

Japan's regional approach to Southeast Asia clearly shows Japan's economically proactive but militarily restrained stance to the maritime domain in Southeast Asia. During the Cold War period, Japan started to use foreign aid as the major tool to reconstruct the relationship with the region and to promote exports to the region. After facing harsh anti-Japanese sentiment from the region, the Fukuda administration attempted to adjust Japan's ODA policy from profit-driven to non-profit driven, focusing more on social welfare and charitable goals. Along with the rapid economic growth, Japan became the first aid donor in the region in the 1990s.

However, economic recession and the rise of piracy in Southeast Asia during the late-1990s, and the lack of the U.S. leadership in counter-piracy measures in the region led Japan to take initiative multilateral cooperation against non-traditional security threats. Initially, Japan's effort aimed to establish a joint naval force to address the issues, which was failed due to the concerns over sovereignty from Southeast Asian states and lack of Japan's domestic support. To address non-traditional security threats, the Japanese government chose to strategize ODA to strengthen bilateral cooperation between the JCG and law-enforcement agencies. With the support of the JICA, the JCG deeply engaged in the establishment of coast guard agencies in the region, especially the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, by providing technical assistance and equipment necessary to strengthen law-enforcement capabilities.

Since around 2010, China's maritime behaviors in the East and South China Seas started to be perceived as aggressive by Japan and Southeast Asian states, heightening the

tension over the disputed islands. The Chinese government leveraged naval force and law-enforcement agency to advance the “core interests” in the maritime domain, which formulated a shared threat perception in Japan and Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, security roles of the JMSDF were largely limited and did not form any security cooperation among naval forces. Instead, the JCG and the JICA took the initiative roles in strengthening regional maritime law-enforcement capabilities, including the provision of patrol vessels and equipment, dispatch of JCG officers, and promotion of exchanges among coast guard officers. Japan’s long-term engagement in Southeast Asia led Japan to hold the first Coast Guard Global Summit in 2017, the largest international conference among coast guards.

Chapter Summary

In chapter 3, I examined Japan’s evolving regional engagement in Southeast Asia. Initially, Japan’s regional approach was primarily foreign aid, as a form of war reparation, to normalize relationship with Southeast Asian states and to secure interests in trade and investment. However, as non-traditional security threats began to rise in Southeast Asia, Japan started to perceive instability of the regional maritime domain as threat to its own national interests. This transition was consistent with Japan’s overarching grand strategy of Rich Nation, Restrained Army, economic proactive and militarily restraint features. As Japan increasingly perceived instability in the regional maritime domain as a threat to its own national interests, it began to reassess its posture and prioritize a more proactive role in addressing security challenges in Southeast Asia.

One significant aspect of Japan's evolving security engagement in Southeast Asia was its response to territorial disputes, particularly those in the South China Sea. Japanese decision-makers started to recognize the interconnectedness of these disputes with the longstanding issue of the Senkaku Islands. Additionally, concerns over the U.S. security commitment in Southeast Asia, and the rise of China's assertive claims over the territory in the maritime domain formulated a firm political momentum toward a more security engagement in the region. By acknowledging the potential spillover effects of conflicts in the South China Sea on its own security interests, Japan became increasingly motivated to engage more actively in economic-security initiatives in Southeast Asia.

As the perception of dual threat evolved among Japanese decision-makers, it catalyzed a shift in its foreign policy approach, leading to greater emphasis on cooperative efforts with Southeast Asian nations to address non-traditional security challenges. Led by the joint efforts of the JCG and JICA, Japan strategically used ODA to deeply engage in the establishment of coast guard and reinforcement of law-enforcement capabilities in Southeast Asia. This shift was not only driven by strategic considerations but also by a desire to strengthen Japan's regional influence and enhance its role as a responsible stakeholder in Southeast Asian security affairs. In conclusion, chapter 3 provides a nuanced analysis of Japan's changing security dynamics in Southeast Asia, shedding light on the multifaceted factors shaping its regional engagement strategy.

4. The Expansion of Rich Nation Restrained Army: Japan's Security Initiatives in Global Maritime Domain

The fourth chapter delves into the concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and its significance, the representative example of Japan's proactive engagement in the global maritime domain. I focus on how Japan's key decision-makers responded, particularly as a strategic response to China's geopolitical ambitions and concerns about U.S. security commitment. While the FOIP emphasizes principles like free trade, democracy, and a rule-based international order, it is largely seen as a coalition against China's rise, especially due to concerns over its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The U.S. views the FOIP as a strategy to counter China's ambitions in violating the existing order, such as human rights and international law. Japan, on the other hand, shows a nuanced approach. It actively engages in security cooperation with like-minded states but is cautious about adopting a confrontational stance toward China, reframing the FOIP as a "vision" rather than a "strategy" to mitigate ASEAN's concerns about exacerbating U.S.-China rivalry.

To understand Japan's Rich Nation, Restrained Army in the international maritime domain, I first review the history of Japan's economically regionalist, militarily-isolated stance in the global domain during the Cold-war period. Second, I analyze Japan's search for proactive contributions to international society in the 2000s. To respond to criticisms of focusing only on economic contributions, Japan sought to dispatch the JSDF to participate in Peacekeeping Operations. Third, I then examine Japan's bilateral and regional approach

in the Indo-Pacific oceans by focusing on the following four cases: India, Australia, South Korea, and the Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

Postwar Standpoint: Economic Regionalist, Military Isolationist

In this section, I review the history of Japan's economic regionalist approach to the global domain during the Cold-War period. The most common concept describing Japan's post-war strategy is the "Yoshida Doctrine (吉田ドクトリン)," coined by renowned Japanese researchers, such as Masataka Kosaka and Yonosuke Nagai, in the 1980s.²⁴⁵ The core pillars of the Yoshida Doctrine were the heavy reliance on the U.S. commitment for Japan's national security, minimum level of Japan's rearmament, and prioritizing Japan's domestic economic recovery. The Yoshida Doctrine, also known as the "light armament, heavy mercantilism (軽武装重商主義)," had guided post-war Japan's foreign policy, limiting Japan from engaging in security affairs in regional or global domain.

Although various scholars analyzed Japan's decision to minimize rearmament, it is clear that the perception of dual threat in Japan was low during the Cold War period. First of all, Japanese key decision-makers believed that security commitment from the U.S. was enough for their national interests. Different from Japan, the U.S. understood the security environment in Asia as a confrontation between the U.S.-led democracy and the communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union and the Communist China. Therefore, a major part of Japan's strategic value was, for the U.S., the maintenance of international peace

²⁴⁵ Taizo Miyagi, "サンフランシスコ講和条約と吉田路線の選択 [The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Choice of the Yoshida Doctrine]," *Kokusai Mondai* 638 (2015): 6.

and stability in the Far East by providing military bases for U.S. military forces.²⁴⁶ Similarly, the rationale for the Pacific Ocean Pact was to foster cooperation among regional states and to fight with U.S. forces to defend Japan from communist aggression.²⁴⁷

However, Japan's understanding of the security environment in Asia was different from that of the U.S. in various ways. From Yoshida's perspective, providing U.S. military bases in Japan "would be completely satisfy Japan's security" would prevent U.S. disengagement from Japan's national security. His perspective also resonated with concerns of U.S. politicians, because the U.S. believed that Japanese leaders might refuse to maintain U.S. military bases after restoring sovereignty. The MOFA took Yoshida's advice and wrote a draft of the U.S.-Japan security treaty.²⁴⁸

At the same time, Yosida's perspective also explain why Japan refused to further strengthen security cooperation with the U.S. and other neighboring states as well. For instance, when the U.S. proposed an idea of creating a multilateral alliance system in Asia, the Pacific Ocean Pact, Yoshida was reluctant because the pact might lead Japan to pursue further rearmament and be entrapped into another war. He mentioned that strengthening the National Police Reserve (警察予備隊)²⁴⁹ would be an "adequate contribution" to the

²⁴⁶ Takeshi Igarashi, "American-Japanese peace-making and the Cold War, 1947-1951," *Amerika Kenkyu* 1979, no. 13 (1979): 184.

²⁴⁷ Hiroyuki Umetsu, "Communist China's entry into the Korean hostilities and a U.S. proposal for a collective security arrangement in the Pacific offshore island chain," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 15 (1996): 114.

²⁴⁸ Yasuhiro Izumikawa, "Network connections and the emergence of the Hub-and-Spokes alliance system in East Asia," *International Security* 45, no. 2 (2020): 24..

²⁴⁹ The National Police Reserve (NPR) was a national police force established in August 1950. Due to the outbreak of Korean War, the U.S. forces in Japan were dispatched to Korean Peninsula. To fill the lack of

efforts of the U.S. in securing Japan's national security.²⁵⁰ From Yoshida's perspective, revitalization of Japan's military force was unnecessary and even dangerous in terms of Japan's national security.

Furthermore, Japan's perception on Communism was different from that of the U.S. as well. Although Yoshida perceived Communism as a threat, he was skeptical about the possibility of direct military aggression against Japan. In January 1951, during the Korean War, Yoshida stated that,

“...Present confrontation (Korean War) will eternally continue, though, from time to time... during which [Japan] should not be tricked by psychological warfare claiming, “war will break out soon.” I think that the Soviet Union will never invade Japan.”²⁵¹

Also, Kumao Nishimura, then-director of the Treaty Bureau of MOFA, and Sadao Iguchi, then-vice minister of MOFA, refused U.S. request for further rearmament, stating that the burden of rearmament would lead Japan to fall into poverty and social unrest, which communist states really wanted.²⁵² Considering that these statements were made during the Korean War, it is clear that Japan's relatively low threat perception on the

U.S. forces for Japan's national security, the General Headquarters requested the Japanese government to establish the NPR. The NPR became the foundation of the JGSDF in 1954.

²⁵⁰ Shigeru Yoshida. *The Yoshida memoirs: The story of Japan in crisis*. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1962): 267.

²⁵¹ Futoshi Shibayama, “The U.S., Britain, Japan and the issue of Casus Belli 1951-52,” in Makoto Iokibe et al., *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008): 18.

²⁵² Hiroyuki Umetsu, *ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

security environment was one of the key drivers leading Japan to resist from remilitarization.

The difference between the U.S. and Japan was even clearer regarding the relationship with China. Although Japan's diplomatic options were largely limited due to China's participation in the Korean War, relationship with Taiwan, and heavy reliance on the U.S., Japan sought to establish economic relations with China. For example, Yoshida proposed to establish a trade office in Taiwan and China to resume economic relationship unofficially while avoiding political tensions with the U.S. and Taiwan. Furthermore, he also stated that China "would adopt the attitude that 'war is war and trade is trade'... it would be possible for a reasonable degree of trade to take place between Japan and China."²⁵³ It was based on the idea that "politics and economic can be discussed separately (政経分離)," allowing Japan to resume trade relations with China while coordinating with the U.S. and Taiwan.²⁵⁴

Japan's preference on economic approach was evident in its regional approach as well. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Japan's primary region for cooperation was Southeast Asia through war reparations and foreign aid. Represented by the "Asian Development Plan," Yoshida and Kishi emphasized the importance of economic cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asia to foster regional economic development and limit the spread of

²⁵³ Howard Schonberger, "Peacemaking in Asia: The United States, Great Britain, and the Japanese decision to recognize Nationalist China, 1951-52," *Diplomatic History* 10, no. 1 (1986): 63. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1986.tb00450.x>.

²⁵⁴ C.W. Braddick, "In the shadow of the monolith: Yoshida Shigeru and Japan's China policy during the Early Cold War years, 1949-1954," in Harald Fuess. *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy*. (Munich, Germany: Iudicium Verlag, 1998): 208-209.

Communism.²⁵⁵ Also, Japan attempted to maintain regional stability in Southeast Asia since the late-1960s, when the U.S. influence was hampered by the Vietnam War. Instead of supporting U.S. operations in Vietnam or sending the JSDF to the region, Japan contributed to the post-conflict reconstruction in Indochina using aid programs and economic assistance. Especially, the Japanese government used the “Stick-and-carrot approach” to Vietnam to halt their military intentions and foster negotiation for regional peace.

To summarize, Japan maintained an isolationist stance on security roles in regional and global domains during the Cold War period.²⁵⁶ Not only distrusts of neighboring states on Japan’s security roles and domestic oppositions about rearmament, but relatively lower threat perceptions on the U.S. and China led Japan to restrain themselves from engaging security affairs or pursuing proactive security roles outside Japan. However, Japan used economic tools as a means to promote economic cooperation and to maintain regional stability. Japan’s preference on economic approach, such as the Asian Development Plan and the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Southeast Asia, allowed Japan to share the burden of U.S. security commitments and contribute to regional security dynamics without direct security engagement.

²⁵⁵ Valdo Ferretti, “In the shadow of the San Francisco settlement: Yoshida Shigeru’s perception of Communist China and Anglo-Japanese relations,” *Japan Forum* 15, no. 3 (2003): 428. <http://DOI:10.1080/0955580032000124781>; Hiroyuki Hoshiro, *ibid.*, pp. 390-391; Akira Suehiro, *ibid.*, p. 86.

²⁵⁶ Bhubhindar Singh, “Japan’s post-Cold War security policy: Bringing back the normal state,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, no. 1 (2002): 82-105.

The Shift to Proactive Contribution: Dispatch of the JSDF to the International Society

In this section, I examine the shift of Japan's proactive security contribution, as a response to criticisms of Japan's exclusively economic approach to the global domain. The end of the ideological confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and the easing of military tensions in the global domain posed a fundamental challenge to Japan's grand strategy for the post-Cold War period. Most important of all, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall raised concerns about the future of U.S.-Japan relations. The end of the communist threat and the shift of the international system to multipolarity meant that Japan needed to seek another *raison d'être* of the U.S.-Japan security alliance system, and to maintain U.S. security commitments to Japan and Asia.

The outbreak of the Gulf War and Japan's response became the catalyst for the realization of Japan's concerns over the U.S. and the necessity of new grand strategy. Against Iraq's invasion to Kuwait, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 678, authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to restore Kuwait's sovereignty.²⁵⁷ The Bush administration requested Japan to dispatch the JSDF to join the U.S.-led multilateral efforts in the Middle East. Although the Japanese government stated "firm support" for the U.S., due to the domestic "self-imposed restraint (歯止め)," represented by article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Instead, the Japanese government chose economic support for

²⁵⁷ "Resolution 678: Iraq-Kuwait (29 November)," *United Nations Security Council Resolutions*, November 29, 1990. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678>.

logistical support, postwar restoration, and economic support to the neighboring states, total of 13 billion dollars.²⁵⁸

Nonetheless, Japan's financial contribution to the Gulf War faced criticisms from the U.S. and the international society. Especially, the U.S. labeled Japan's response as "checkbook diplomacy (小切手外交)," criticizing Japan's refusal to take responsibility as Asia's economic power.²⁵⁹ Furthermore, it became obvious that Japan's economic approach to global security issues was not effective anymore. It was unavoidable that Japan needs to include "human contribution (人的貢献)" to contribute to the international society.

In April 1991, the Japanese government dispatched JMSDF minesweeper to the Persian Gulf to respond to the request for responsibility and manage tensions with the U.S. Although it was the first time for Japan to dispatch the JMSDF to overseas, the decision received little attention from Japan and neighboring states to avoid controversies.²⁶⁰ Following the decision, the Japanese government swiftly passed the Peacekeeping

²⁵⁸ “第2節 湾岸危機への日本の対応 [Section 2. Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 平成3年外交青書 [*Diplomatic Bluebook 1991*]. (Tokyo, Japan: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1991). <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1991/h03-2-2.htm>.

²⁵⁹ Courtney Purrington, “Tokyo's policy responses during the Gulf War and the impact of the “Iraqi Shock” on Japan,” *Pacific Affairs* 65, no. 2 (1992): 165.

²⁶⁰ Peter J. Woolley, “Japan's 1991 minesweeping decision: An organizational response,” *Asian Survey* 36, no. 8 (1996): 804.

Operation Cooperation Law (PKO 協力法, PKO Law) in 1992, with significant restraints on military roles of the JSDF, and participated in the UN Peacekeeping Operations.²⁶¹

Although the dispatch of Japan's *de facto* military force to overseas showed non-military features, using the JSDF as a tool for diplomatic purposes confronted criticisms. The Japanese public showed mixed opinions on the dispatch of the JSDF.²⁶² The survey poll revealed that 74% of respondents supported to dispatch the JSDF for humanitarian purposes, showing the necessity of human contribution to the international society.²⁶³ At the same time, however, Japanese did not support the PKO Law, opposing the general idea of dispatching the JSDF overseas.²⁶⁴

Japan's cautious efforts to participate in peacekeeping operations while reassuring neighboring states proved unsuccessful as well. China and South Korea, who suffered the most from Imperial Japan, criticized Japan for the revival of militarization. Although less

²⁶¹ The Japanese government clarified constraints in the Peacekeeping Operation Cooperation Law, called the "five principles of participation in PKOs (PKO 参加五原則)." 1. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts, 2. Consent for the undertaking of UN PKO as well as Japan's participation in such operation has been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts, 3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party to armed conflicts, 4. Should any of the above requirements cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent, 5. Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the peacekeepers' lives, etc. ("PKO 政策 Q&A [PKO policy Q&A]," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, February 27, 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/q_a.html)

²⁶² Aurelia G. Mulgan, "International peacekeeping and Japan's role: Catalyst or cautionary tale?," *Asian Survey* 35, no. 12 (1995): 1112.

²⁶³ Teruaki Aizawa, "The significance and lessons of the dispatch of minesweepers units to the Persian Gulf: Considerations from the history of the minesweeper force and the transition of maritime defense capability building up," *NIDS News* (2014): 1; "自衛隊海外派遣、74%が容認: 非軍事限定が大勢 本社世論調査 [74% of respondents approved the overseas deployment of the JSDF: The majority supports exclusively non-military operations]," *Asahi Shimbun*, June 19, 2001.

²⁶⁴ "茶の間からも激しい怒り: PKO 法案強行採決 [Japanese citizens got furious: The Japanese government forcefully passed the PKO Law]," *Asahi Shimbun*, November 28, 1991.

outspoken, Southeast Asian states also opposed the JSDF's roles outside Japan.²⁶⁵ The MOFA also acknowledged that there would be strong opposition from the "Asia-Pacific region as a whole to the concept of Japan's sending combat force abroad," due to the shared memories of Japanese aggression during the colonial period and WWII.²⁶⁶

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War did not lead to regional stability in Asia as well. In the early-1990s, Japan's perception about China was relatively positive. Japanese politicians and experts expected that the regional structure in Asia will be shifted to multipolarity, consisting of Japan, China, and ASEAN. Especially, both China and Japan perceived the "U.S.-China-Japan triangular relations (新三角関係)" would be beneficial to their national interests.²⁶⁷ At least until 1995, China perceived the U.S.-Japan alliance system as beneficial to their national interests and the regional stability for the following four reasons: 1) checking Japan's ambitions for regional hegemony, 2) restraining Japan's military buildup and ability to project military power, 3) reassuring concerns over China's growing economic, political, and military power, and 4) contributing to stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region.²⁶⁸ In other words, China agreed to the positive roles of

²⁶⁵ Paul Midford. *Overcoming Isolationism: Japan's leadership in East Asian Security Multilateralism*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020): 55.

²⁶⁶ Yukio Satoh, "The future nature of US influence in Western Europe and North-East Asia: A view from the Asia-Pacific region," in Douglas A. Phillips and Charles F. Gritzner. *America's Role in a Changing World*. (New York, NY: Chelsea House Pub, 2010): 42-47.

²⁶⁷ Shinjiro Takagi, "第四章 日米同盟に対する中国の認識と対応: 冷戦後の展開 [Chapter 4. China's response and perception on the U.S.-Japan security alliance: Post-Cold War development]," *Japan Institute of International Affairs* (2012): 83-84.

²⁶⁸ Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Apprehensions about revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 4 (1997): 385. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645655>.

the U.S.-Japan security alliance, called the “bottle-cap theory (瓶の蓋論),” to the regional stability.²⁶⁹

These positive expectations on the future of regional stability started to change in the mid-1990s due to a series of security issues. First of all, the North Korean government withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and threatened South Korea. To protest against Team Spirit in 1994, an annual joint military exercise between the U.S. and South Korea, North Korea stated that they will change Seoul into a “sea of flames (불바다).”²⁷⁰ Although North Korea stopped the military threat and resumed negotiations with the U.S., primarily due to the death of North Korea’s leader Il-sung Kim, the potential contingency in Korean Peninsula reminded Japan of the essence of the U.S.-Japan security alliance system in the post-Cold War period.

Secondly, significant military tensions between the U.S. and China regarding Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 questioned the effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan security alliance system. In May 1995, Teng-hui Lee visited the U.S. to give a speech about Taiwan’s economic growth and democratization.²⁷¹ Furthermore, the result of presidential election in 1996 triggered China’s furious response, deepening suspicions on the intentions of the U.S. and Taiwan. A series of missile tests and military exercises near Taiwan aimed to

²⁶⁹ Gerald L. Curtis. *New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations*. (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000): 10.

²⁷⁰ Jonathan Moran, “The role of the security services in democratization: An analysis of South Korea’s agency for national security planning,” *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no. 4 (1998): 16.

²⁷¹ David W. Chen, “Taiwan’s president tiptoes around politics at Cornell,” *New York Times*, June 10, 1995. <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/10/world/taiwan-s-president-tiptoes-around-politics-at-cornell.html>.

deter Taiwan from pursuing independence and to warn the U.S. about recent pro-Taiwanese decisions.²⁷²

Against China's aggressive decisions, Japan again showed a limited response to the crisis. The Japanese government revealed that Japan could not support U.S. in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, inviting harsh criticisms from the U.S. and Japan's conservative politicians. The U.S. complained unfairness of the bilateral alliance, lopsided security guarantees from the U.S. without any guarantees from Japan. Combined with trade frictions between the U.S. and Japan, some even argued that the U.S. should use the security relationship as leverage against Japan to solve trade imbalances.²⁷³ Japanese key decision-makers and scholars also criticized Japan's limited contribution to the U.S.-Japan alliance, resulting in the "alliance drift (同盟漂流)."

The shared concerns between the U.S. and Japan regarding the alliance drift led to two reports, the Higuchi Report and the 1994 Nye Report.²⁷⁴ To respond to the changing security environment, the Higuchi report emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance system as a foundation of regional multilateral cooperation and Japan's national security. Also, the Higuchi Report advised to strengthen Japan's defense ability (防衛力) to contribute to the regional security order. Similarly, the 1994 Nye Report also emphasized

²⁷² Andrew Scobell, "Show of force: Chinese soldiers, statesmen, and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 2 (2000): 231-232.

²⁷³ Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (1999): 59.

²⁷⁴ Boueimondai Kondankai. *日本の安全保障と防衛力のあり方: 21世紀へ向けての展望* [The modality of the security and defense capability of Japan: The outlook for the 21st century]. (Tokyo, Japan: Okura Insatsukyoku, 1994). <https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BN1173204X>; Office of International Security Affairs. *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*. (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995).

the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance system for regional stability in Asia. Specifically, the report outlined four recommendations: 1) maintaining the forward presence of U.S. forces, 2) developing multilateral institutions as a reinforcing mechanism, 3) putting U.S. allies, especially with Japan, on a firm basis in the post-Cold War period, and 4) based on the firm cooperation among allies, encouraging China to define its interests in ways that could be compatible with the U.S.

Based on the shared perception on the U.S.-Japan security alliance system, both agreed to revise the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines (日米防衛協力のための指針, Guidelines) in September 1997.²⁷⁵ One of the most significant differences between the 1978 Guidelines and 1997 guidelines is the expansion of geographical boundaries the U.S.-Japan security alliance covers. The 1978 Guidelines focused almost exclusively on Japan's national security, specifically military attacks against Japan. However, the 1997 Guidelines included the "Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (周辺事態)" which have a significant impact on Japan's security. This concept became the foundation of the Contingency Law in Areas Surrounding Japan (周辺事態法) established in 1999.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ “旧「日米防衛協力のための指針」 [Former “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation],” *Ministry of Defense of Japan*, November 27, 1978. <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/ampo/allguideline/sisin78.html>; “日米防衛協力のための指針 [Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation],” *Ministry of Defense of Japan*, September 23, 1997. <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/treaty/sisin/sisin.html>.

²⁷⁶ Hitoshi Mizuno, “周辺事態法の成立・米軍再編問題と「世界」: 日米同盟をめぐる論説の検証(5) [The establishment of the Contingency Law in Areas Surrounding Japan and the issue of U.S. Forces realignment, and the “world”: An examination of discussion surrounding the Japan-U.S. alliance (5)],” *Chiba Shoudai Kiyō* 47, no. 2 (2010): 81-96.

The establishment of the Contingency Law in Areas Surrounding Japan, with the situations in Areas Surrounding Japan has two important implications. First, it became the first step for Japan's human contribution to the international society. Before the Contingency Law, roles of the JSDF had been bound by geographical boundaries, Japanese territory. However, the Contingency Law allowed the JSDF to support the U.S. based on the features of situations. Removing geographical limit of Japan's security policy drew suspicions from neighboring states, especially from China, concerning the possibility of Japan's military activities overseas.²⁷⁷ To ease the controversies over the law, the Japanese government stated somewhat ambiguous geographical boundaries. For instance, former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi stated that "the Middle East or the Indian Oceans are not realistically anticipated as actual cases of the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan."²⁷⁸

Secondly, the Japanese government separated military aspects of the JSDF to strengthen interoperability between the U.S. and Japan. Although the 1997 Guidelines and the Contingency Law regulated Japan's duties applied to the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, such as search and rescue, evacuation operations, and logistical support for the U.S., both stipulated that Japan's support would be limited to rear areas only. The 1997 Guidelines defined the "rear area support (後方支援)" as a support from

²⁷⁷ Xinbo Wu, "The end of the silver lining: A Chinese view of the U.S.-Japanese alliance," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (2005): 124.

²⁷⁸ Hiroshi Sasamoto and Naoki Kuwayama, "後方支援法制に関する国会論議: 周辺事態安全確保法改正案・国際平和支援法案 [Diet debates on Rear Support Legislation: Amendments to Contingency Law in Areas Surrounding Japan and International Peace Support Law]," *Rippou to Chousa* 372 (2015): 48. https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2015pdf/20151214047.pdf.

areas which are “distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.”²⁷⁹ Also, the Contingency Law stated that the JSDF should cease operations and withdraw from areas if they come under military attacks, in order to distance themselves from military operations.

In conclusion, the primary driver of Japan’s efforts to find new grand strategy in the 1990s was concerns from the U.S. Japan’s diplomatic failure in the Gulf War crisis led Japan to reconsider the previous exclusively economic approach to the regional security issues. To manage the bilateral tensions with the U.S., the Japanese government passed the PKO Law and dispatched minesweepers to the Middle East. Furthermore, a series of significant security crises in the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula, and the lack of Japan’s roles in the bilateral security relations resulted in fierce criticisms from the U.S. To respond to the shared concerns on the future of the U.S. security commitment, the U.S. and Japan announced the 1997 Guidelines and established the Contingency Law in Areas Surrounding Japan in 1999.

The most significant feature of the changes in Japan’s security policy is the separation of military aspects from the JSDF, which became the core features of Japan’s grand strategy. The primary goals of Japan’s security policy changes in the 1990s were to strengthen Japan’s roles in the U.S.-Japan security alliance system and to dispatch the JSDF for human contribution to the international society. However, it was obvious that dispatching the JSDF overseas was outside the boundary of the “exclusively defense-oriented (専守防衛)” principle the Japanese government had maintained. To avoid

²⁷⁹ “日米防衛協力のための指針 [Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation],” *ibid.*

domestic controversies over the constitutionality, Japan included the “rear area support” and the “five principles of participation in PKOs” in the security laws to limit military roles of the JSDF outside Japan.

The September 11 attacks had tremendous impacts to the U.S. and the world in various aspects. Most of all, the threat of terrorism was shared by the international society, urging to strengthen security measures to prevent terrorist attacks. Also, the Bush administration declared the “Global War on Terrorism” on September 16, 2001, and military operation “Enduring Freedom” was initiated in the following month. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 was adopted anonymously on September 28, 2001, condemning the terrorist attacks and calling for joint cooperation, including economic sanctions on terrorist groups, information exchanges regarding terrorism, to prevent further threats.²⁸⁰

The terrorist attack had significant impacts to Japan’s grand strategy in the 21st century as well. First of all, Japan had to show a firm support for the U.S. to manage stable bilateral relations. Due to the traumatic lessons from the Gulf War crisis, Japanese decision-makers believed that financial support would not meet the expectation of the U.S., and therefore they sought to support the U.S. with dispatch of the JSDF.²⁸¹ A week after the terrorist attack, the Japanese government announced the “Seven Measures for Counterterrorism (テロ対応措置 7 項目, Seven Measures).” The Seven Measures stated that fight against terrorism is an issue directly related to Japan’s own national security, and

²⁸⁰ “Resolution 1373 (2001),” *United Nation Security Council*, September 28, 2001. https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf.

²⁸¹ Tomohito Shinoda, “Koizumi’s top-down leadership in the Anti-terrorism Legislation: The impact of political institutional changes,” *SAIS Review* 23, no. 1 (2003): 29-30.

showed a firm support for the U.S. including dispatch of JMSDF vessels for information-gathering and humanitarian assistance.²⁸²

Secondly, Japan attempted to separate military aspects of the JSDF to contribute to the global security affairs, similar to the case of the Gulf War crisis. Not only to show support for the U.S., but the Japanese government also emphasized the human contribution to the multilateral efforts for counterterrorism to justify the dispatch of the JSDF to the Middle East. To call for multilateral cooperation, the Japanese government sent special envoys to the Middle East and held a summit with South Korea. Domestically, the Japanese government attempted to convince the necessity of human contribution to the Japanese public.

To realize the human contribution, the Japanese government announced to initiate a legalization process of the new provisional law, “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (テロ対策特別措置法).” The core issue of the debate about the law was how to separate the JSDF from use of force, called the “Integration of use of force issue (武力行使との一体化).” Since the “Exclusively Defense-Oriented” principle restrained Japan from the right of collective self-defense, it was essential to justify that logistical support to the U.S. does not violate the Japanese constitution. The public poll showed similar opinion on the new law, a

²⁸² “(3) 日本の取り組み [(3) Japan’s response],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *外交青書 平成14年版 [Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan 2002]* (Tokyo, Japan: Zaimusho Insatsukyoku, 2002): 32-34.

mixture of “supporting U.S. for counterterrorism measures” and “concerning on the possibility of engaging in war.”²⁸³

The opposition parties, the DPJ and the Japan Socialist Party, and the coalition party, Komeito, clashed with the LDP on three major points regarding the separation of the JSDF from use of force.²⁸⁴ The first point was the definition of “rear area,” where the JSDF would conduct logistical support. The original draft of the law included provisions for medical support within the combat zone, as well as the provision of ammunition and weapons without the prior consent of a foreign government where the JSDF is providing logistical support. The second point contained the content of logistical support. The original draft included the provision of ammunition and weapons, and especially, “refueling and maintenance for aircraft in preparation for takeoff.” The Japanese government had been restrained from providing these supplies because it was too closely associated with the use of force. The third point was about the right of use of weapons for JSDF personnel. Although the PKO Law allowed JSDF personnel to use weapons only for self-defense, it was essential to expand the right to respond to emergency situations.

To prioritize the establishment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the LDP accepted opinions from the opposition parties and Komeito. The law restricted

²⁸³ 57% of respondents supported and 39% did not support the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and 63% supported U.S. military operation. However, half of the respondents supported mandating prior approval for dispatching the JSDF, showing a cautious stance on human contribution. (“57%がテロ特措法評価内閣支持率下がり 73% 米軍事行動の支持は 63% 緊急電話世論調査 [57% support the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, Cabinet approval rating drops to 73%, support for US military action is at 63%, according to an emergency telephone public opinion survey.],” *Shikoku Shimbun*, October 30, 2001)

²⁸⁴ Katsuhiko Tani, “テロ対策特別措置法の政策過程: 同時多発テロ以後の自衛隊派遣 [Policy Process of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law: Deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Force after Multiple Terror Attacks],” *Kokusai Anzen Hosho* 30 (2002): 134-138. https://doi.org/10.57292/kokusaiandenhosho.30.1-2_127.

logistical support from areas where military operations are not being conducted or military conflict is not expected to occur. Also, ammunition and weapons, and refueling and maintenance for aircraft in preparation for takeoff were removed from logistical support. The right of use of force for JSDF personnel was expanded, allowing them to use for self-defense and people under their control.²⁸⁵ As a result, the Japanese government was able to swiftly pass the law, with only 27 days until legislation and 62 hours of deliberation time.²⁸⁶ Also, the Japanese government dispatched JMSDF vessels to start logistical support since December 2001.

After two years, the Japanese government established another law, the “Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (イラク復興支援特別措置法, Iraq Special Measures Law) in August 2003.”²⁸⁷ The main goal of the Iraq Special Measures Law was to conduct humanitarian assistance and reconstruction assistance in Iraq. In February 2002, even before U.S. military operations started, Japan held a private meeting with the U.S. and showed a firm support for the

²⁸⁵ “第 8 章 日本の防衛政策: 米国同時多発テロをめぐる防衛政策論議と国際協力 [Chapter 8: Japan's defense policy: Discussions on defense policy and international cooperation in the wake of the United States simultaneous multiple terror attacks],” National Institute for Defense Studies. *東アジア戦略概観 2002 [East Asian Strategic Review 2002]*. (Tokyo, Japan: Boeicho Boei Kenkyujyo, 2002): 264-265.

²⁸⁶ The brevity of the deliberation time stands out when compared to the 154 hours for the Contingency Law in Areas Surrounding Japan in 1998 and the 179 hours for the the PKO law in 1992. (Hisakazu Nozaki, “日本のイラク戦争支持の問題点 (1) [The issue of Japan's support for the Iraq War (1)],” *Kikan Hokkaigakuendaigaku Keizaironshu* 56, no. 4 (2009): 144.

²⁸⁷ “イラクにおける人道復興支援活動及び安全確保支援活動の実施に関する特別措置法 [Law Concerning Special Measures Regarding the Implementation of Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Security Assistance Activities in Iraq],” *Cabinet Secretariat of Japan*, n.a. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/iraq_h.html.

U.S.²⁸⁸ When the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 in May 2003, lifting sanctions against Iraq and recognizing the establishment of a transitional governing council under the U.S.-U.K. joint responsibilities, the Japanese government announced to establish the law to dispatch the JSDF to Iraq.²⁸⁹

Due to the relatively more militaristic feature, domestic debate over the Iraq Special Measures Law was fiercer than the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. First of all, Japan's domestic opinion on the U.S. military engagement in Iraq became negative, questioning the justification of supporting U.S. The percentage of respondents opposing the U.S. military operation in Iraq was increased from 58% in 2002 to 68 in 2003, and 80% of respondents did not support the U.S. even the UN Security Council adopted the resolution.²⁹⁰ Opinion on Japan's support of the U.S. was divided as well, 50% of respondents did not support the decision.²⁹¹ Therefore, the Japanese government emphasized Japan's "proactive contribution" to the international society based on the UN Security Council Resolution, not a military support to the U.S.

Secondly, measures to separate military aspects of the JSDF from logistical support became the most controversial issue. Especially, it was essential to argue that logistical support in Iraq would be safe, considering high concerns on the possibility of military

²⁸⁸ “米大統領イラク攻撃を明言 2月の日米首脳会談で [U.S. President clearly mentioned the attack on Iraq at the February U.S.-Japan summit meeting],” *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 9, 2002.

²⁸⁹ “Resolution 1483 (2003),” *United Nations Security Council*, May 22, 2003. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1483>.

²⁹⁰ Hiroji Naoki, “イラク自衛隊派遣と国民意識: 政治意識月例調査から [Dispatch of the Japan Self-defense Force to Iraq and national consciousness: From monthly surveys on political awareness],” *NHK* (2024): 1-2. <https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/040401.pdf>.

²⁹¹ “イラク攻撃「不支持」が59% 本社緊急世論調査 [59% “did not support” attack on Iraq: Emergency public opinion survey],” *Asahi Shimbun*, May 22, 2003.

attack against the JSDF. Since the first reason of respondents opposing the dispatch of the JSDF was about the safety issue of the logistical support, the Japanese government stated to dispatch the JSDF to safer areas.²⁹²

Even though the opposition parties criticized other controversies over the the Iraq Special Measures Law, including the definition of non-combat area, the integration of use of force, and prior approval of the diet, the Japanese government passed the the Iraq Special Measures Law in July 2003. One of the primary reasons allowing Japan to establish the law was the domestic support over the necessity of contribution to the international society. Although Japanese domestics concerned the danger of operation in Iraq and opposed the U.S. military operations, the majority of respondents who supported the dispatch of the JSDF chose the contribution to the international society as a reason.²⁹³

Expanding Japan's Security Relations in the Global Maritime Domain

In this section, I analyze Japan's search for proactive contribution through the maritime domain beyond the scope of the U.S.-Japan security relations, focusing on the following four cases: India, Australia, South Korea, and the Pacific Island Countries. Japan's efforts for U.S. security commitment and contribution to the international society with human contribution since the early-1990s became momentum to regional multilateral

²⁹² Katsuhiko Musashi, “イラク復興支援特措法の立法過程 [The establishment process of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq],” *Doshisha Seisakukagaku Kenkyu* 7, no. 1 (2005): 109.

²⁹³ Hiroji Naoki, *ibid.*, p. 2.

cooperation in Asia.²⁹⁴ The first initiative was the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (自由と繁栄の弧),” proposed by Taro Aso, then-minister of MOFA, in 2006.²⁹⁵ While acknowledging the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the central pillar, he emphasized relationship with neighboring states, such as China, South Korea, and Russia, to establish another pillar to Japan’s diplomacy. To strengthen the relationship, he stressed the role of “universal values (普遍的価値),” including democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and free market system, as the core of Japan’s diplomatic strategy. Although the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was not institutionalized, the idea of combining security and economic approach to Japan’s geopolitical strategy was found.

The second initiative was the “Confluence of the Two Seas (二つの海の交わり),” proposed by Shinzo Abe in August 2007.²⁹⁶ During the speech at the Indian Parliament, he emphasized the importance of bilateral cooperation for the security of sea lanes and other issues related to the maritime security. Also, he pointed out the universal values as the foundation of bilateral “strategic global partnership” by the two maritime nations, and the possibility of expanding geographical concept to include the Pacific. The core ideas of the Confluence of the Two Seas, cooperation among states who share the universal values in

²⁹⁴ “7. Japan and regional security multilateralism, 1994-2000,” in Paul Midford. *Overcoming Isolationism: Japan’s leadership in East Asian Security Multilateralism*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020): 123-141.

²⁹⁵ “「自由と繁栄の弧」をつくる [Establishing the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, November 30, 2006. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/18/easo_1130.html.

²⁹⁶ “「二つの海の交わり」[“Confluence of the Two Seas”],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, August 22, 2007. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/19/eabe_0822.html.

the maritime domain, the expanded geographical scope of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, are also found in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) later.

This initiative led to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly referred as the “Quad Cooperation,” a strategic security dialogue among the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan, in 2007. The origin of the Quad Cooperation dated back to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, a joint effort for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief among the four states.²⁹⁷ After the U.S. showed interests in multilateral security cooperation among the U.S.-Australia-Japan in March 2007, India also expressed interests in the multilateral cooperation.²⁹⁸ The four countries held the first Quad Cooperation meeting in May 2007 during the ASEAN Regional Forum, and conducted a joint naval exercise, “Malabar Naval Exercise,” in the Bay of Bengal.

Although the Quad Cooperation was one of Japan’s meaningful achievements for multilateral security cooperation in the post-Cold War period, it lost the momentum quickly primarily due to the rising concerns from China. Although the Quad Cooperation or the Malabar Naval Exercise did not mention specific states, China criticized that the cooperation aimed to create an “Asian NATO,” *de facto* military coalition to encircle China.²⁹⁹ Different understanding of relationship with China among the four states

²⁹⁷ Jeff M. Smith, “The Quad 2.0: A foundation for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” *Backgrounder 3481* (2020): 3. <http://report.heritage.org/bg3481>.

²⁹⁸ Patrick G. Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, “Defining the Diamond: The past, present, and future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” *CSIS Briefs* (2020): 2-3. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue>.

²⁹⁹ Emma Chanlett-Avery and Bruce Vaughn, “Emerging trends in the security architecture in Asia: Bilateral and multilateral ties among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India,” *CRS Report* (2008): 12. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34312>.

hindered further discussions about the Quad Cooperation as well.³⁰⁰ Especially, Australia's withdrawal from the Quad Cooperation was the critical moment. Australia's then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd declared that Australia will not propose further dialogues with the other states, signaling priority of Australia-China relations over the aligned security efforts for the region.³⁰¹ The Indian government struggled with domestic criticisms on the idea of strengthening cooperation with the other three U.S.-led states.³⁰² In other words, shared threat perception on China among the four states was not sufficient enough to maintain the Quad Cooperation.

As the rise of China started to be perceived as threat, however, Japan's initiative for multilateral security cooperation gathered momentum again. Since the Chinese government referred the South China Sea as one of the "core interest" and China's claims on the maritime domain, calculation between stable relationship with China and threats over China's maritime behaviors started to change. Those shared threat perception in Japan and among regional states became a foundation of Japan's initiative toward regional security multilateralism in the oceans.

When Shinzo Abe became the Prime Minister of Japan again, he announced to continue legal and policy initiatives regarding Japan's security roles in the global maritime domain. In January 2013, Abe planned to give a speech titled "The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy (開かれた、海の恵み: 日本外交の新たな 5

³⁰⁰ Zongyou Wei, "The evolution of the 'QUAD': Driving forces, impacts, and prospects," *China International Strategy Review* 4 (2022): 289.

³⁰¹ Robert Ayson, "China central? Australia's Asia strategy," *The International Spectator* 44, no. 2, (2009): 37.

³⁰² Jeff M. Smith, *ibid.*, p. 4.

原則).”³⁰³ Emphasizing the importance of connectivity and stability of the maritime domain, and the role of the U.S. as the key state in the region, Abe stated the five principles as follows: 1) The universal values in the region, 2) rule of laws in the seas, 3) open and interconnected economies, 4) cultural connections between Japan and the world, and 5) human exchanges.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Japan showed significant changes in security postures: The establishment of the National Security Council, the National Security Strategy, and the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation revised in 2015 emphasized the roles of Japan’s security engagement in a broader domain for a greater U.S. security commitment to Japan against the perceived threats from China.³⁰⁴ At the same time, however, Japan’s efforts for multilateral security cooperation in the maritime domain showed the continuity of restrained military postures to ease tensions with China and strengthen inclusivity.

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the representative concept of Japan’s grand strategy in the maritime domain, was announced in August 2016. During the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), Abe emphasized openness and stability of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as the foundation of stability of

³⁰³ The Speech was cancelled because Abe returned to Japan earlier due to the case of the detention of Japanese in Algeria. (“開かれた、海の恵み: 日本外交の新たな 5 原則 [The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/25/abe_0118j.html.)

³⁰⁴ Andrew L. Oros, “12 The continued centrality of the United States to Japan’s security doctrine in an era of expanding security partnership,” in Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse. *New directions in Japan’s security: Non-U.S. centric evolution*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2021): 224-225.

prosperity of the world.³⁰⁵ After the speech, the MOFA stated that the goal of the FOIP is to ensure connectivity of Africa and Asia through the open and stable Indian and Pacific Oceans, as “international public goods.” Also, the MOFA suggested the three pillars to realize the FOIP: 1) Promotion and establishment of the fundamental values (基本的価値), such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade, 2) Pursuit of economic prosperity, and 3) Commitment for peace and stability.³⁰⁶ In other words, the FOIP was Japan’s economic and security proposals to maintain the existing international order and to provide alternative choices to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.³⁰⁷

Building upon the principles outlined in the FOIP, Japan has proactively pursued bilateral and regional initiatives aimed at promoting economic development, enhancing security cooperation, and strengthening diplomatic ties across the Indo-Pacific region. The primary driver of Japan’s security approach to the Indo-Pacific region is dual threat, shared concerns on U.S. security commitment and perceived threat on China’s maritime behaviors. Before dual threat became permanent, Japan had used economic policies as the primary tool to engage in regional security environment. However, perceived shift of power between the U.S. and China, doubts on U.S. regional commitment in Asia, and

³⁰⁵ Shinzo Abe, “TICAD VI 開会に当たって・安倍晋三日本国総理大臣基調演説 [Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, August 27, 2016. https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.

³⁰⁶ “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000430632.pdf>.

³⁰⁷ Shoji Tomotaka, ““Belt and Road” vs. “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: Competition over regional order and ASEAN’s responses,” *Security & Strategy I* (2021): 3-24. <https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/security/pdf/2021/01/04.pdf>; Zongyou Wei, “The evolution of the ‘QUAD’: Driving forces, impacts, and prospects,” *China International Strategy Review* 4 (2022): 288-289.

China's assertive claims over sovereignty rights in the oceans became momentum for further economic and security ties between Japan and regional states.

To provide insights into Japan's economically proactive and military restrained approach, I will examine the following four cases: Japan-India, Japan-Australia, Japan-South Korea, and Japan-Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

Japan-India Relations

Different from other Asian states, Japan's bilateral relationship with India in the early-post Cold War period was largely positive due to the experience of cooperation during the imperial period. Both Imperial Japan and India shared strategic goals: India wanted to be independent from Britain and Imperial Japan wished to purge British influence from Asia. Especially, Imperial Japanese Army's northward advancement ideology, against Russia and China, and strategic support of revolutionaries in Asia against Western Powers, led the Imperial Japan to support the Indian National Army.³⁰⁸

These historical contexts explain India's support for postwar Japan in the 1950s. Japan was the first state recognizing India's independence from British colonial rule and sovereignty in 1947. India, on its part, did not participate in the San Francisco Peace conference, criticizing the restrictions on Japan's sovereignty. India also invited Japan to the first Asian Games in New Delhi in 1951, and supported Japan to join the Colombo

³⁰⁸ "5. Japanese policy toward India," Joyce C. Lebra. *The Indian National Army and Japan* (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2008): 62-63. <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/18887>.

Plan.³⁰⁹ Based on this positive background, Japan and India signed a peace treaty separately after Japan restored its sovereignty in 1952, following India's decision to renounce war reparations.

Therefore, Japan's economic approach to India began earlier than other neighboring states. After Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's visit to India in 1957 and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's return visit to Japan in 1958, Japan launched the first ODA to India, as a form of yen loans in 1958.³¹⁰ India's decisions to waive war reparations and receive economic assistance from Japan gave Japan diplomatic leverage to Japan in normalizing relations with Southeast Asia. It became an example to Southeast Asian states to consider "scaling down" their reparation demands to Japan.³¹¹

Nonetheless, bilateral relations between Japan and India started to lost momentum since the 1960s, primarily due to the deepening strategic polarization between the U.S. and the Soviet. The U.S.-Japan security treaty and Yoshida Doctrine made Japan rely heavily on the U.S. security commitment, while India committed to the Non-Aligned Movement and democratic socialist identity. Also, Japan started to focus on Southeast Asia as the most important strategic and economic region, as discussed in Chapter 3. Along with the different economic goals between the two states, India's socialist-type economic policy, pursuit of autarky, focusing heavily on agriculture policy, and low economic growth made

³⁰⁹ Hiroaki Shiga, "Role of Japan in the evolution of Indian aid policy," in Jin Sato and Yasutami Shimomura. *The rise of Asian donors: Japan's impact on the evolution of emerging donors*. (London, UK: Routledge, 2012): 161.

³¹⁰ Chansoria Monika, "Japan-India at 70: The early origins of a relationship that defines Asia's future," *Japan Review* 5, no. 1 (2023): 4.

³¹¹ Hiroshi Sato, "India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan's post-war Asian diplomacy," *Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies* 17 (2005): 12.

India even less attractive partner to Japan. Lack of economic interests from Japanese business, as well as political turmoil in India, led both states remain lukewarm relations, their “mutual interests coinciding only rarely.”³¹²

The low-key bilateral relations continued after the Cold War, and even hit the lowest point when India conducted a nuclear test in 1998. Soon after the test, then-Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced to suspend new yen loans and grant aid, in addition to economic sanctions, to India and Pakistan.³¹³ Japan also used multilateral forums, such as the G8 and ARF, to denounce India and urge joint response to halt additional nuclear tests.³¹⁴ However, the nadir of the bilateral relations recovered soon. Following the historic visit of Bill Clinton to India in March 2000, Japan also approached to India to normalize relations. In August 2000, then-Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India and established the ‘Japan-India Global Partnership

³¹² Purnendra Jain, “Hesitant realism: China-India border tensions and Delhi’s deepening strategic ties with Tokyo and Canberra,” *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (2021): 84; Takenori Horimoto, “Synchronizing Japan-India relations,” *Japan Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (1993): 34.

³¹³ Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “インド・パキスタンの核実験: 内容、目的、動機および国際社会の反応 [Nuclear test of India and Pakistan: Content, objectives, motives, and response from the International society],” *Japan Institute of International Affairs* (1999): 3-4. <https://www.jiia.or.jp/topic-cdast/pdf/003-084.pdf>.

³¹⁴ “第 5 回 ARF 閣僚会合 [The 5th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, August 3, 1998. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/kiroku/g_obuchi/arc_98/pmc98/gh_arf.html; “G8 外相会合: インド及びパキスタンの核実験に関する G8 外相声明 [G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting: G8 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, June 12, 1998. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/india_paki/g8_gs.html.

(日印グローバル・パートナーシップ),’ while lifting all economic sanctions related to the nuclear tests.³¹⁵


Since then, cooperation between both states deepened quickly. High-level visits between India and Japan revealed a trend toward closer relations clearly, huge increase from 12 (1995-1999) to 23 (2000-2004) and to 61 (2005-2009).³¹⁶ Furthermore, Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) to India saw a notable increase, positioning India as one of the principal beneficiaries of Japan's ODA. Most of Japan's ODA was distributed for infrastructure investment, such as power plant, canal modernization, and water supply, to support India's stable economic growth.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ “日印共同宣言 [Japan-India Joint Declaration],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, December 10, 2001. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/yojin/arc_01/india_kyodo.html.

³¹⁶ Takenori Horimoto, “Japan-India rapprochement and its future issues,” *Japan's Diplomacy Series* (2016): 4-5. https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_library/japan_s_diplomacy/160411_Takenori_Horimoto.pdf.

³¹⁷ Lalima Varma, “Japan's Official Development Assistance to India: A critical appraisal,” *India Quarterly* 65, no. 3 (2009): 244-246.

<Figure 12> Japan’s ODA to India, 1996-2005 (billion yen)



Author’s summary. “国別援助実績 [Country-specific aid disbursements],”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 13, 2018. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/jisseki/kuni/index.html>.

Although India’s economic potential was important, changing security environment was the critical reason for Japan’s strategic approach to India. As discussed in Chapter 3, the rise of piracy and armed robbery in the SOMS and Southeast Asia in the mid-1990s changed strategic importance of India to Japan. To cope with the instability of the regional maritime domain, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) started annual joint exercise and exchange visits since 2000. Furthermore, Abe and Manmohan Singh held a summit and announced to elevate the level of bilateral cooperation to ‘Japan-India Strategic Global Partnership (日印戦略的グローバル・パートナーシップ)’ in

December 2006.³¹⁸ The announcement included high-level meetings between ministry of defense, cooperation between navies and coast guards of both states for stability of the maritime domain.

The Abe administration announced the Confluence of the Two Seas at India. Citing historical relations between Japan and India, Abe emphasized the importance of bilateral cooperation who shares strategic interests and the fundamental values, including freedom and democracy, and basic human rights. Also, he suggested to establish “broader Asia (拡大アジア),” with the U.S. and Australia to stretch security networks to the Pacific Oceans to secure sea lanes in the region. The connectivity of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, stability of sea lanes and maritime domain for peace and prosperity of the international society became the foundation of the FOIP.

Although Japan and India continued to strengthen bilateral relations, it was 2011 when bilateral security cooperation expanded to naval cooperation. In December 2011, Japan and India announced to expand cooperation for maritime security and to conduct bilateral naval exercise between the JMSDF and the Indian Navy next year.³¹⁹ In June 2012, Japan and India conducted the first bilateral maritime exercise, called “JIMEX,”

³¹⁸ “「日印戦略的グローバル・パートナーシップ」に向けた共同声明 [Joint Statement toward the Japan-India Strategic Global Partnership],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, December 15, 2006. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/india/visit/0612_gps_k.html.

³¹⁹ “野田総理夫妻のインド訪問 (概要と評価) [Visit to India by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and Mrs. Noda (Summary and Assessment)],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, December 29, 2011. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_noda/india_1112/gaiyo.html.

near the Bay of Bengal. Both naval forces conducted Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) and anti-piracy operations to enhance interoperability.³²⁰

Bilateral security cooperation between Japan and India further expanded, announcing to upgrade bilateral relations to the “Special Strategic Global Partnership (日インド特別戦略的グローバル・パートナーシップ)” in September 2014.³²¹ The announcement included to regularize bilateral maritime joint cooperation, Japan’s participation to U.S.-India Malabar naval exercise, and security cooperation in the maritime and cyber domains. Especially, the announcement emphasized trilateral security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and India, to maintain regional security and stability.

India’s historical strategic shift in 2014 also resonated with Japan’s efforts for further security cooperation. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced to pursue “Act East Policy,” replacing the previous “Look East Policy.”³²² Based on the three C’s (culture, commerce, and connectivity), the Act East Policy is India’s overarching strategy to expand economic and political arrangements to East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, especially through development cooperation in neighboring states.

³²⁰ IDR News Network, “JIMEX 12: First exercise between India and Japan,” *Indian Defense Review*, June 8, 2012. <https://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/first-bilateral-maritime-exercise-between-india-and-japan-jimex-12>.

³²¹ “日インド特別戦略的グローバル・パートナーシップのための東京宣言 [Japan-India Special Strategic Global Partnership],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, September 1, 2014. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000050478.pdf>.

³²² “QUESTION NO-1456 INDIA’S ACT-EAST POLICY,” *Ministry of External Affairs of India*, July 28, 2023. <https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/36927/QUESTION+NO1456+INDIAS+ACTEAST+POLICY>.

Although the Indian government did not specify security aspects, one of the core pillars of the Act East Policy is a convergence of India's geopolitical scope to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific for regional security cooperation.³²³ The primary driver of India's security initiatives in the maritime domain is China's perceived assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea.³²⁴ Against China's nine-dash line claim and territorial disputes between China and Southeast Asian states, India started to call for peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. The shared concern between Japan and India on China's maritime behaviors revealed in the joint statement on 'India and Japan Vision 2025' in 2015.³²⁵ Although the statement did not mention China, both states expressed concerns on unilateral actions in the South China Sea and decided to hold regular meetings to ensure maritime safety and security of the SLOC.

Even after the revival of the Quad Cooperation in 2017, Japan and India deepened bilateral cooperation in the maritime domain. In October 2018, the JMSDF and the Indian Navy agreed to strengthen the Maritime Domain Awareness, which is one of the core pillars of the FOIP and the Quad Cooperation. Most of all, Japan and India signed an

³²³ EFSAS, "From Look East to Act East: India's changing posture in the Indo-Pacific and the containment of China," *Study Papers* (2020): 8. <https://www.efsas.org/EFSAS-Study%20Paper-AEP-July-2020.pdf>.

³²⁴ Ashok Sajjanhar, "Taking stock of India's 'Act East Policy'," *ORF Issue Brief 142* (2016): 3. https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ORF_Issue_Brief_142_A_Sajjanhar.pdf; Thomas F. Lynch III and James J. Przystup, "India-Japan strategic cooperation and implications for U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region," *Strategic Perspectives* 24 (2014): 7; Nalanda Roy, "Is India retreating from its Act East to Act Indo-Pacific Policy?," *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2022): 45; Purnendra Jain, "Japan's development assistance to India: a strategic edge," *Japan Forum* 33, no. 2 (2021): 255.

³²⁵ "Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World," *Ministry of External Affairs of India*, December 12, 2015. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vision_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperty_of_the_IndoPacific_R.

agreement on Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements (ACSA) in August 2020.³²⁶

Especially, the Japan-India ACSA allows both naval forces to use facilities of the Indian navy in Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the JSDF base in Djibouti, enhancing interoperability for the FOIP in broader regions.³²⁷

Japan-Australia Relations

Although there were conflicts between Japan and Australia during WWII, diplomatic and economic relations were reestablished relatively early. Australia's initial response to postwar Japan was hardnosed, demanding Japan's permanent disarmament, restrictions on heavy or war-potential industry. Nonetheless, Australia accepted U.S. draft of the San Francisco treaty in exchange for the Pacific Security Pact which provides security linkage among the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand.³²⁸ Following the San Francisco Treaty, both states normalized diplomatic relations by exchanging ambassadors in 1952³²⁹ Australia's attitude toward Japan started to ease primarily due to the deepening tensions with Communist bloc. Australia understood that, in a long-term perspective, preventing association between China and Japan and supporting Japan's economic

³²⁶ "Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Force of Japan and the Indian Armed Forces," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, September 10, 2020. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100091751.pdf>.

³²⁷ G. V. C. Naidu and Yasuyuki Ishida, "インド太平洋時代の日印防衛協力: 日印戦略的パートナーシップの構築と進展 [The Japan-India defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific era: Building and advancing the Japan-India Strategic Partnership]," *Kokusai Anzen Hosho* 49, no. 3 (2021): 104-105.

³²⁸ James R. Roach, "Australia and the Japanese treaty," *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 20 (1951): 206.

³²⁹ Hirokazu Matsui, "Australia and Japan's return to international society: Negotiating allies and the Afro-Asian bloc, 1952-56," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 69, no. 2 (2023): 250.

recovery is in their national interests.³³⁰ In July 1957, both states signed the Agreement on Commerce between Australia and Japan for further development of economic and cultural relations.³³¹

Different from the case of Japan and India, bilateral relations between Japan and Australia were deepened further, but interactions between the two were largely confined to the economic sphere during the Cold War period. Economic interdependence between Japan and Australia was strengthened by the commerce agreement, allowing Japan to be the first market for Australia since the late-1960s. The share of Australia's export to Japan increased from 7.7% to 33.1% and import from Japan also increased from 2.8% to 19.5% between 1955 and 1975. The share of Japan's export and import was relatively low due to the high reliance on the U.S. market, maintaining about 7% for import and 3% for export.³³² However, Australia was one of the most important overseas markets for Japan for raw materials, such as coal, iron ore, and bauxite.³³³

Close economic relationship between Japan and Australia became the foundation for further diplomatic and security ties in the 1990s, against the shared concerns on U.S. commitment to the region. Similar to Japan's concerns, Australia's 1994 Defense White Paper stated that the U.S. "will neither seek nor accept primary responsibility for

³³⁰ Alan Rix. *The Australia-Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present*. (Oxford, UK: Taylor & Francis Group, 1999): 11-13.

³³¹ "Appendix 3 - Agreement on Commerce between Australia and Japan, 1957," *Parliament of Australia*, n.a. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/japan/report/e03.

³³² Yoshihiro Toyama, "貿易摩擦の発生と日豪関係の全般的危機: 1970年代 [The emergence of trade friction and the overall crisis in Japan-Australia relations: The 1970s]," *Otemon Keizai Ronshu* 41, no. 2 (2006): 191-192.

³³³ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

maintaining peace and stability in the region.”³³⁴ To overcome concern on U.S. security commitment in the region, Australia started to encourage Japan to assume a greater security role not only for regional peace and stability but also to enhance the U.S.-Japan security relations.³³⁵ To Australia, Japan’s greater regional security engagement was not about balance of power between China and Japan but more about sustaining U.S. military presence through the strong U.S.-Japan security alliance system.

Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s became one of the key topics for security cooperation between Japan and Australia, which were less military but proactive contribution to international stability. In September 1992, then-Prime Minister Paul Keating appreciated Japan’s participation of PKOs in Cambodia and argued that both states can “join forces diplomatically to help resolve regional disputes.”³³⁶ Those bilateral efforts for regional stability resulted in the ‘Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership’ in May 1995.³³⁷ Although the joint declaration focused mainly on bilateral and regional economic cooperation, security cooperation for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and peacekeeping operations were included as well.

After a series of security crises in the 1990s and the shared concerns about U.S. engagement in the Middle East became the major driver of closer security relations

³³⁴ Australian Government Department of Defense. *Defending Australia: Defense White Paper 1994*. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994): 8.

³³⁵ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade. *Japan’s Defense and Security in the 1990s*. (Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 1993): 175.

³³⁶ “Address to the Japan National Press Club,” *Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of Australia*, September 22, 1992. <https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-8670>.

³³⁷ “Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 26, 1995. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/join_au.html.

between Japan and Australia. In 2001, both states confirmed that U.S. regional engagement and “China as a constructive partner in the region” as common concerns.³³⁸ The shared dual threat led both states to the ‘Japan-Australia Creative Partnership’ in 2002.³³⁹ The partnership included “1.5 security dialogue,” a joint dialogue to exchange views on regional security, counterterrorism, and other security-related issues in the region.

One of the specific examples of joint security cooperation was the deployment of the JSDF and Australian Defense Force (ADF) to Iraq. In February 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi formally requested Australia to dispatch both forces to Samawah.³⁴⁰ Soon after the request, prime ministers of both states held a press conference and stated that Japan can cooperate with the U.S., Australia, and other multinational forces to contribute to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Samawah.³⁴¹ Joint efforts for humanitarian assistance in Iraq, along with the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operation in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, increased confidence between the two states, leading to further security cooperation.³⁴²

³³⁸ “Australia-Japan Conference for the 21st Century,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 2001, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/conf0104/outline.html>.

³³⁹ “創造的パートナーシップのための日豪会議 共同議長ステートメント [Japan-Australia Conference for a Creative Partnership Co-chairs' Statement],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, November 7-8, 2002. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/state0211.html>.

³⁴⁰ Tomohiko Satake and John Hemmings, “Japan-Australia security cooperation in the bilateral and multilateral contexts,” *International Affairs* 94, no. 4 (2018): 825. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iyy028>.

³⁴¹ “Joint press conference after the Japan-Australia summit meeting,” *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, April 20, 2005. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2005/04/20press_e.html.

³⁴² Tomohiko Satake and John Hemmings, *ibid.*, pp. 825-826.

In 2007, Japan and Australia announced the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.³⁴³ Emphasizing the shared values, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, the joint declaration stated practical cooperation between the military forces and security-related agencies for regional stability in Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, the joint declaration affirmed the strategic importance of security relationship with the U.S., and committed to strengthen trilateral cooperation, including the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, among the three states. Nevertheless, security cooperation between the two states remained a non-military level. The joint declaration, including the previous ones as well, confirmed security and defense cooperation against non-traditional security threats, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and human security concerns.

One of the core reasons hindering the bilateral cooperation to pursue further military dimension was the level of threat perception about China. Although Japan and Australia confirmed shared concerns over the rise of China, it was not enough for both states to sign a formal security treaty. Japanese domestic already showed a high concern on the dispatch of the JSDF to Iraq, negatively affecting the first Abe administration.³⁴⁴ Therefore, it was hard for Japan to imagine signing a formal security treaty with Australia.³⁴⁵ Australia also showed concerns over the risk of entrapment in any potential conflicts with China. For instance, then-U.S. Secretary Condoleezza Rice issued strong

³⁴³ “安全保障協力に関する日豪共同宣言 (仮訳) [Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (Provisional)],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, March 13, 2007. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/australia/visit/0703_ks.html.

³⁴⁴ Paul Midford. *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011): 43-48.

³⁴⁵ Greg Sheridan, “Security treaty rejected by Tokyo,” *The Australian*, March 12, 2007. <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/nation/security-treaty-rejected-by-tokyo/news-story/501f3084e08d35fe1630752abec0f316>.

warnings about the implications of China's military build-up in 2006, then Australian Prime Minister Alexander Downer drew the line with U.S., stating that Australia did not have any intentions of containing China.³⁴⁶ After signing the joint declaration in 2007, John Howard, then-Prime Minister of Australia, also stated that Australia would pursue an independent relationship with China.³⁴⁷

A short-lived, initial success of the Quad Cooperation in 2007 and 2008 revealed that the different threat perception of China as well. When Kevin Rudd became the Prime Minister of Australia in December 2007, he chose China as the first overseas trip in Asia and affirmed the priority of Australia-China relations.³⁴⁸ Also, Rudd announced Australia's withdrawal from the Quad Cooperation, marked the end of the initial Quad Cooperation. From the perspective of Australia, the Trilateral Security Dialogue among the U.S., Japan, and Australia was a better option to anchor U.S. security commitment to the region. Therefore, promoting the Quad Cooperation at the expense of stable Australia-China relations was not necessary.

On the other hand, however, bilateral security relations between Japan and Australia did not lost momentum. In June 2007, Tokyo and Canberra held the first '2+2' meetings between defense and foreign ministers from both sides. This was Japan's first '2+2' meeting other than with the U.S., showing the concerns over China's military

³⁴⁶ Sundeep Tucker, Guy Dinmore, and David Pilling, "China remarks add edge to Rice trip to Sydney," *Financial Times*, March 15, 2006. <https://www.ft.com/content/c05a35b0-b482-11da-bd61-0000779e2340>.

³⁴⁷ Yuki Tatsumi. *US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges*. (Connecticut, Washington D.C.: Stimson Center, 2015): 30-31. https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/US-Japan_Australia-WEB.pdf.

³⁴⁸ John Lee, "PM may trump Rudd in managing China," *The Australian*, April 21, 2011. <https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/pm-may-trump-rudd-in-managing-china>.

growth. Australia's concern over China's military growth as well, specified in Australia's 2009 Defense White Paper. It predicted that China's economy might overtake the U.S. as the largest economy in the world around 2020 and would become a major economic driver in the region and the world by 2030.³⁴⁹ Furthermore, it proposed to enhance Australia's military strength against China's increasing military presence in the region.

Australia's comment on China showed a growing threat perception over China's military modernization. Nonetheless, there was a split inside Australia between the Department of Defense of Australia, showing a hard line on China, and the Office of National Assessments, prioritizing a stable bilateral relation. Interestingly, Rudd allowed to release the 2009 Defence White Paper without changing the languages on China, despite the Office of National Assessment recommended to soften the expression.³⁵⁰

Those shared threat perceptions of China's military presence in the region between Japan and Australia resulted in various practical results since 2010. Both states announced to sign an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 2010.³⁵¹ Although the ACSA focused mainly on logistical support for PKOs, it became the foundation of logistical interoperability between Japan and Australia. Furthermore, in 2012, both states

³⁴⁹ Australian Government Department of Defence. *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*. (Canberra, Canada: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009): 34.

³⁵⁰ Whilliam Tow and Richard Rigby, "China's pragmatic security policy: The middle-power factor," *The China Journal* 65 (2011): 168.

³⁵¹ “日・豪物品役務相互提供協定の署名 [The Signing of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 19, 2010. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/22/5/0519_04.html.

announced to sign the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement.³⁵² Although Koichiro Gemba, then-foreign minister of Japan, did not specify the details, he argued that the scope of the agreement will be broader than that of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) since the agreement covers security-related issues.³⁵³

Similar to the case of Japan-India relations, those agreements and declarations became the foundation for higher bilateral cooperations between Japan and Australia. In 2014, both prime ministers announced to upgrade bilateral relations to a “Special Strategic Partnership,” strengthening economic relations and improving interoperability between the JSDF and the ADF.³⁵⁴ Also, both leaders agreed on joint research, development and production of defense equipment and technology, including the development of Australia’s next-generation submarines.³⁵⁵ From an economic perspective, both states signed the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement in July 2014, promoting bilateral trades including progressive removal of tariffs and subsidies.³⁵⁶

After the revival of the Quad Cooperation, bilateral security cooperation between Japan and Australia continued. In 2017, Japan and Australia decided to revise the ACSA, allowing the JSDF and ADF to supply ammunitions, which was Japan’s first decision

³⁵² “情報の保護に関する日本国政府とオーストラリア政府との間の協定 [Agreement on Information Sharing between the Japanese government and the Australian government],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 27, 2012. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/A-H25-003.pdf>.

³⁵³ “Press conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Koichiro Gemba,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 9, 2012. https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2012/5/0509_01.html.

³⁵⁴ “Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe joint statement: Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st century” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044640.pdf>.

³⁵⁵ Australia changed its plan and decided to develop them with France in 2016.

³⁵⁶ “Full text of JAEPA,” *Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia*, n.a. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/jaepa/full-text/Pages/full-text-of-jaepa>.

other than the U.S.³⁵⁷ The revised ACSA provided the foundation for broader interoperability between the JSDF and the ADF in the framework of bilateral and trilateral exercises, PKOs, and HADR overseas. In October 2018, the JCG vessels had the first port visit to Australia and signed the Statement of Intent with the Australian Border Force (ABF). The Statement of Intent covered human resource development and information exchange regarding maritime security.³⁵⁸ Furthermore, in 2022, Japan and Australia signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) between the JSDF and the ADF, paving the way for regional stability in the Indo-Pacific region.³⁵⁹

In summary, bilateral security cooperation between Japan and Australia will become another major pillar for the stability of the maritime domain in the region. In October 2022, both leaders made a joint statement, focusing heavily on the maritime domain, including support for the Pacific Islands, deepening regional engagement through the Quad Cooperation, peace and stability in the East and South China Seas. Furthermore, in 2023, the JCG and the ABF signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness to strengthen information exchange.³⁶⁰ Therefore, it is clear that both

³⁵⁷ “Signing of the Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement,” *Department of Defense of Australia*, January 14, 2017. <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2017-01-14/signing-australia-japan-acquisition-and-cross-servicing-agreement>.

³⁵⁸ Japan Coast Guard. *Japan Coast Guard 2023*. (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Coast Guard, 2023): 22. https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/e/pdf/r05_en.pdf; Jay T. Tarriela, “How Abe remade the Japan Coast Guard,” *The Diplomat*, January 24, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/how-abe-remade-the-japan-coast-guard>.

³⁵⁹ “日豪円滑化協定の署名 [Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, January 6, 2022. https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page4e_001195.html.

³⁶⁰ “日豪海上保安機関間の MDA に関する協力覚書を締結!：「自由で開かれたインド太平洋 (FOIP)」の実現に向け MDA における連携を強化 [Signing of Memorandum of Cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness between Japan and Australia!： Strengthening collaboration in MDA towards the realization of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)],” *Japan Coast Guard*, March 9, 2023. <https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/kouhou/r4/k230310/k230310.pdf>.

states are signaling their joint security commitment to maintaining the stability of the global maritime order.

Japan-South Korea Relations

Japan-South Korea relations might be one of the most unique and difficult cases for Japan's regional approach. Korea had been under the control of the Imperial Japan for 45 years since the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty in 1910. Even after Korea regained sovereignty following Imperial Japan's surrender in August 1945, the following Korean War in June 1950 and deepening security tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union limited normalization between Japan and South Korea.

South Korea's stance to Japan started to change when Chung-Hee Park, former general of South Korean Army, succeeded the military coup and seized power in 1961. Park prioritized economic growth and security cooperation with Western allies for the reunification of Korea, and normalization with Japan was essential to achieve those goals.³⁶¹ After becoming the President of South Korea in 1963, he emphasized the importance of Japan-South Korea relations to strengthen security relationship with the U.S. and other states to maintain regional stability against communist states. Also, Park thought that Japan's quasi-war reparations are essential for South Korea's post-war

³⁶¹ Yong-Joon Park, "한국의 교와 한일안보관계의 변용, 1965~2015 [South Korea's Diplomacy and the Evolution of Korea-Japan Security Relation, 1965~2015]," *Ilbon Bipyung* 12 (2015): 136-139.

industrialization. As a result of 14 years of negotiation, both states agreed that Japan provides \$300 million grant over 10 years and \$200 million low-interest loans.³⁶²

Nonetheless, distrusts between Japan and South Korea remained paramount after the normalization treaty. From the perspective of South Korea, the normalization process lacked Japan's appropriate apology for the past. For instance, it was unacceptable that Japan's economic aid was to "congratulate for South Korea's independence (독립 축하금)."³⁶³ Also, South Korea criticized Japan's attitude on the previous treaties. Article 2 of the Japan-South Korea normalization treaty states that "it is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void." Japan interpreted it that the previous treaties were once valid and therefore the Japanese occupation was once valid as well.³⁶⁴ Japan did not have strong momentum to deepen relationship with South Korea as well. Due to the colonization period and the following Korean War, South Korea was neither overseas market with economic potential nor a state with raw materials. Also, Japanese

³⁶² "No. 8473 Japan and Republic of Korea: Agreement on the settlement of problems concerning property and claims on economic co-operation (with protocols, exchanges of notes and agreed minutes)," *United Nations Treaty Collection*, June 22, 1965. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/volume-583-I-8473-English.pdf>.

³⁶³ A-Ra Cho, "한일회담 과정에서의 미국의 역할: 케네디 정권기 청구권 교섭을 중심으로 [The U.S. Role in Korea-Japan normalization Talks: Focusing on the claim negotiation under the Kennedy Administration]," *Ilbon Bipyung 10* (2014): 290.

³⁶⁴ Yuji Hosaka, "Article 2 of the Korea-Japan Basic Treaty and Japan's repatriation of Korean cultural properties: Reviewing Travaux Préparatoires," *Journal of East Asia and International Law 10*, no. 1 (2017): 176-177.

public showed distrust on South Korea, criticizing Park regime's violations on human rights and lack of democracy.³⁶⁵

It was U.S. regional strategic consideration which worked as the major driver of normalization process between Japan and South Korea, breaking a decade-old stalemate in the 1960s. The most urgent task of U.S. policy on South Korea was to revitalize South Korea to become the forefront of democracy against Communist states while reducing economic burden.³⁶⁶ The treaties among the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea in 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 made the U.S. to push Japan and South Korea toward the normalization. While persuading South Korea to focus on economic cooperation instead of historical issues, the U.S. also argued Japan to support South Korea to contribute to regional stability in Asia. So-called "Busan Red Flag Theory (부산 적기론)" justified domestic opposition and moved Japan to the normalization with South Korea.³⁶⁷

Therefore, it was perplexing for Japan and South Korea when both states confronted the Guam Doctrine. After the total failure of U.S. intervention in Vietnam, then-President of the U.S. Nixon proposed that Asian states must "seek their own destiny,"

³⁶⁵ Yasumasa Tanaka, "Japanese perception of the world of politics: An analysis of a subjective political culture," in Bae-ho Han and Tadashi Yamamoto. *Korea and Japan: A New Dialogue Across the Channel*. (Seoul, South Korea: Asiatic Research Center, 1978): 225-226.

³⁶⁶ Hyung-A Kim. *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-79*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004): 96-97.

³⁶⁷ Busan Red Flag Theory argues that if Busan, the second largest city in Southern part of South Korea, were occupied by communist force, it would have a devastating impact on Japan's national security. Therefore, the theory argues that Japan should provide economic support to South Korea to Japan's own national security. (Wonduk Lee, "한일관계 '65년 체제'의 기본성격 및 문제점: 북일 수교에의 함의 [The basic nature and issues of the '65 system' in Korea-Japan relations: Implications for North Korea-Japan normalization]," *Kukje Jiyeok Yeongu* 9, no. 4 (2000): 42-43).

requesting its Asian allies to bear the primary burden for own national security in 1969.³⁶⁸ Most of all, the U.S. decided to withdraw the 7th Infantry Division from South Korea, reducing a number of U.S. troops from 62,000 to 42,000. Furthermore, the U.S. economic aid to South Korea changed from mostly grants to loans, putting economic pressures to the Park regime.³⁶⁹ The following Carter administration also attempted to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea, pointing out the Park regime's brutal internal oppression. Although his plan was failed to overcome strategic consideration regarding the military balance between capitalism and communism in the region, it was evident that the shared threat among South Korea leaders drove South Korea to respond to the uncertain security commitment from the U.S.³⁷⁰

Japan also perceived the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea in terms of its own national security. Against Carter administration's decision in 1976, Japan's decision-makers, such as Prime Minister Takeo Miki and minister of MOFA Zentaro Kosaka requested to reconsider the decision. The following Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda also argued that Carter's decision is neither helpful to Japan's national security nor regional stability in Asia.³⁷¹ The shared concerns on U.S. security commitment led to so-

³⁶⁸ "Statement on the President's visit to Thailand," *The American Presidency Project*, July 28, 1969. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-presidents-visit-thailand>; J. L. S. Girling, "The Guam Doctrine," *International Affairs* 46, no. 1 (1970): 50.

³⁶⁹ Tae-Yang Kwak, "The Nixon Doctrine and the Yusin Reforms: American foreign policy, the Vietnam war, and the rise of authoritarianism in Korea, 1968-1973," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 12, no. 1-2 (2003): 48.

³⁷⁰ Lyong Choi, "Human rights, popular protests, and Jimmy Carter's plan to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea," *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 5 (2017): 936-937.

³⁷¹ Yong-Jun Park, "냉전기 한국과 일본의 대미동맹 인식 비교: 미국의 대외전략 전개에 대한 양국의 정책 대응을 중심으로 [Comparison of South Korea and Japan's perception of U.S. alliance relations during

called “Korean Clause.” The U.S. and Japan announced a joint statement emphasizing national security of South Korea as “essential to Japan’s own national security.”³⁷² Also, both states agreed to preserve U.S. “unrestricted rights to use conventional weapons” to defend South Korea.³⁷³ Furthermore, Japan extended economic assistance to South Korea for infrastructure and agriculture development, as a symbol of Japan-South Korea cooperation in the face of U.S. security disengagement from the region.³⁷⁴


the Cold War period: Focusing on policy responses of both states to U.S. strategy],” *Ilbon Yeongu Nonchong* 46 (2017): 98.

³⁷² “Joint statement following discussions with Prime Minister Sato of Japan,” *The American Presidency Project*, November 21, 1969. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/joint-statement-following-discussions-with-prime-minister-sato-japan>.

³⁷³ Yukinori Komine, “Okinawa confidential, 1969: Exploring the linkage between the nuclear issue and the base issue,” *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 4 (2013): 832.

³⁷⁴ Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, entrapment, and neoclassical realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000): 274-275.

<Figure 13> Bilateral Trade Between Japan and South Korea, 1965-1985 (million dollars)



Author’s summary. “SK to JP” means amount of South Korea’s export to Japan, and “JP to SK” means amount of Japan’s export to South Korea. (William E. James, “Trade relations of Korea and Japan: Moving from conflict to cooperation?,” *East-West Center Working Paper Economic Series 11* (2001): 40.

<https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ECONwp011.pdf>

Although it did not lead to direct military cooperation, the shared concern on the U.S. security commitment resulted in close economic relations between Japan and South Korea since the 1970s. Soon after the U.S.-Japan joint statement in 1970, Japan’s yen loans to South Korea was increased rapidly, \$2.29 million between 1966 and 1975 to \$4

million between 1972 and 1977.³⁷⁵ Japan's economic assistance to South Korea continued after the assassination of President Park. In 1981, President Doo-Whan Jeon requested Japan to share security burden in a form of economic aid. He argued that South Korea spent 6% of GOP and 37% of government budget against the threat from North Korea and to maintain regional security.³⁷⁶ South Korea's initial request reached to \$10 billion, \$6 billion of ODA over five years and \$4 billion from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). After a series of negotiations, Japan decided to provide \$4 billion, \$1.85 billion of yen loans and \$21.5 billion from the JBIC.³⁷⁷

In summary, shared concern on U.S. security commitment between Japan and South Korea was the major driver toward closer bilateral cooperation and Japan's economic aid to South Korea. After the failure of the U.S. engagement in the Vietnam War and détente in the 1970s led the U.S. withdraw military presence in Asia. The shared concern on the U.S. withdrawal from the region led Japan and South Korea to normalize relationship and deepen economic cooperation. Furthermore, Japan started to acknowledge that economic assistance to South Korea is essential to Japan's own national security. Therefore, the major momentum of Japan's economic aid to South Korea came from concerns on the U.S. security commitment and regional security in Asia.

³⁷⁵ Kiyohiko Azuma, “日韓安全保障関係の変遷: 国交正常化から冷戦後まで [The evolution of Japan-Korea security relations: From normalization of diplomatic relations to the post-Cold War era],” *Kokusai Anzenhosho* 33, no. 4 (2006): 90.

³⁷⁶ Ki-Seop Son, “한일 안보경협 외교의 정책결정: 1981-1983 년 일본의 대한국 정부차관 [Decision-making process of South Korea-Japan security and economic cooperation: Japan's yen loans to South Korea, 1981-1983],” *Kukje Jeongchi Nonchong* 49, no. 1 (2009): 315.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

As seen in the other cases, the end of the Cold War promoted closer bilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Especially, South Korea considered a stable relationship with Japan essential to improve relations with North Korea and regional security. In April 1994, both ministers of defense decided to hold a regular meeting, providing a basis for further exchanges between high-level defense experts and military forces.³⁷⁸ Also, both states adopted the ‘21st Century Joint Declaration of New Korea-Japan Partnership (21 세기 새로운 한일 파트너십 공동선언)’ with an action plan to establish a regular committee for security cooperation, defense exchanges, and joint response to North Korea’s nuclear development.³⁷⁹ Following the joint declaration, Japan and South Korea conducted joint maritime exercise for search and rescue for the first time.³⁸⁰

Nonetheless, bilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea did not lead to more direct security cooperation, due to the lack of trust between the two states. Specifically, South Korea understood Japan’s search for proactive regional security roles as “remilitarization (군사대국화).” South Korea’s 1991 Defense White Paper described Japan’s security policy that “gradually transforming defense capabilities from defensive to

³⁷⁸ Ministry of National Defense of South Korea. *1994-1995 년 국방백서* [Defense white paper of South Korea, 1994-1995]. (Seoul, South Korea: Ministry of National Defense of South Korea, 1993): 121.

³⁷⁹ “21 세기 새로운 한일 파트너십 공동선언(전문) [21st Century Joint Declaration of New Korea-Japan Partnership (full text)],” *Daehanminkook Jeongchaek Buriping*, October 12, 1998. <https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148746505>.

³⁸⁰ Seung-Won Suh, “21 세기 동아시아 지정학과 한일 안보협력: 수렴되는 중견국의 외교안보적 선택 [The Geopolitics of East Asia in the 21st Century and South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation: Diplomatic and Security Choices of Converging Middle Powers],” *Ilbon Yeongu 14* (2011): 384.

offensive one for advance defense.”³⁸¹ Some experts even argued that Japan’s remilitarization can become the major threat to South Korea’s national security in the post-Cold War period.³⁸²

Also, different perspectives on relationship with China led to limited security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. While Japan perceives China and North Korea individually, South Korea perceives relationship with China in the context of South-North relations.³⁸³ South Korea have showed a consensus on the importance of stable China-South Korea relations to solve issues between South and North Korea.³⁸⁴ The different understanding of relations with China led Japan and South Korea to choose different approaches to China and North Korea. On the one hand, Japan showed strong distrust on North Korea and thus chose a policy direction focused on pressure and sanctions. On the other hand, South Korea maintained the dual-track approach of pressure and dialogue with North Korea.³⁸⁵

³⁸¹ Ministry of National Defense of South Korea. *1991-1992 년 국방백서*. [Defense white paper of South Korea, 1991-1992]. (Seoul, South Korea: Ministry of National Defense of South Korea, 1991): 71.

³⁸² Yong-Joon Park, *ibid.*, p. 148.

³⁸³ Alexandra Sasaki, “The Japan-South Korea rift: “Inside” and “outside” pressures on relations,” in Robert J. Pekkanen and Saadia Pekkanen. *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021): 857-858.

³⁸⁴ Seong-II Lee, “1992 년 한중국교정상화 의의에 관한 재고찰: 한반도와 중국과의 관계 구조변화를 중심으로 [Reassessment of the significance of the normalization of Sino-Korean relations in 1992: Focusing on the structural changes in relations between the Korean Peninsula and China],” *Joonggookhak* 40 (2011): 533-534.

³⁸⁵ Cheol-Hee Park, “미국의 동맹 네트워크와 한일갈등: 미국은 방관자로 남을 수 있는가? [Alliance network of the United States and the South Korea-Japan conflict: Can the United States remain a bystander?],” *Hankook Kukga Jeonryak* 5, no. 1 (2020): 64-67.

The gap between Japan and South Korea regarding security relationship with China was even more obvious. South Korea acknowledged that China had maintained relationship with North Korea during the Cold War period and thus China was key stakeholder of South-North relations. Therefore, South Korea had to maintain stable relationship with China to solve North Korea issues. In a similar line of logic, South Korea refused to strengthen security cooperation with Japan to avoid unnecessary tensions with China. Along with the lack of trust between the two states, South Korea's understanding of China and North Korea led to limited security cooperation with Japan.³⁸⁶

The limited cooperation between the two states continued in the early-2010s, when the other cases showed deepening security cooperation with Japan. After the sinking of Cheonan and the Yeonpyeong bombardment in 2010, the need for security cooperation with Japan has been highlighted in Korea as essential for effectively addressing North Korea's security threats. In January 2011, defense ministers from Japan and South Korea agreed to sign the GSOMIA and ACSA. The U.S. also expected the GSOMIA between Japan and South Korea would strengthen security cooperation between the two states and expand intelligence-sharing networks among U.S.-allies in Asia.³⁸⁷

Nonetheless, the momentum toward closer security cooperation quickly lost momentum. When the plan for signing the GSOMIA and ACSA revealed to the public, the South Korean government faced domestic backlash.³⁸⁸ Even then-ruling party, Saenuri

³⁸⁶ Narushige Michishita, "Changing security relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and hopes," *Asia-Pacific Review* 21, no. 2 (2014): 19-32.

³⁸⁷ Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Zack Cooper. *Federated Defense in Asia*. (Rhode Island, Washington D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014): 16.

³⁸⁸ Chang-Soo Kim, "외교가 없다: 한일 군사정보보호협정, 감춰진 진실은? [Lack of diplomacy: South Korea-Japan GSOMIA, what is the hidden truth?]," *Chamyeo Yeondae*, August 6, 2012.

Party (새누리당), changed its stance and requested the government to postpone the GSOMIA.³⁸⁹ The lack of transparency in the decision-making process was a major cause of criticism, but the idea of security cooperation with Japan itself was the main reason of domestic backlash.

Nonetheless, shared concerns on the U.S. security commitment in the region led Japan and South Korea signed the GSOMIA in 2016. The North Korea conducted the fourth nuclear test in January 2016, announcing that they succeeded in testing the first hydrogen bomb. It implied that North Korea succeeded in miniaturizing and diversifying its nuclear weapons, thus realizing its expanded nuclear capabilities. However, U.S. security commitment, especially possibility of the U.S. providing a nuclear umbrella, raised concerns about uncertainty for the following two reasons. First, it was uncertain whether the U.S. will use nuclear arsenals at the expense of the possible nuclear retaliation from China. Second, then President-elected Donald Trump openly showed isolationist stance on global security affairs, so-called “America First.”³⁹⁰

Soon after North Korea’s nuclear test, Japan and South Korea reattempted to sign the GSOMIA. In April 2016, the U.S. and Japan requested South Korea to sign the

<https://www.peoplepower21.org/Magazine/935402>; “정부, 한·일 정보보호협정 예정대로 체결 “日 핵무장 하려는데...” 밀실처리 비판 확산 [The South Korean government proceeds to sign the South Korea-Japan GSOMIA as planned, criticism of behind-the-scenes handling spreads 'Japan is trying to arm itself with nuclear weapons...],” *Kookmin Ilbo*, June 29, 2012. <https://www.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0006195649>.

³⁸⁹ “새누리, 한일정보보호협정 보류·유예 요구 [Saenuri Party, requesting postpone the GSOMIA],” *Yeonhap News*, June 29, 2012. <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20120629135700001>.

³⁹⁰ Jeong-Min Woo, “한반도 군사적 현안에 관한 미중관계 고찰: 북핵, 사드, 한미동맹의 환경 하에서 [Reflections on U.S.-China relations regarding military issues on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea’s nuclear program, THAAD, and the environment of the U.S.-South Korea alliance],” *Yoonghap Boan Nonmoonji* 17, no. 3 (2017): 91.

GSOMIA, but South Korea showed a cautious stance, mentioning the previous domestic opposition. Also, the South Korean government refused the ongoing discussion on the GSOMIA until October.³⁹¹ A month before signing the agreement, the Department of National Defense of South Korea admitted the ongoing negotiation. The GSOMIA was signed in November 2016, with fierce backlash from the opposition parties and the public.³⁹² It was the first security agreement between Japan and South Korea since the end of WWII, allowing closer information sharing and deepened security cooperation between the two states.³⁹³

Nonetheless, the bilateral security cooperation was short-lived, showing unstable features of Japan-South Korea relations. The Jae-In Moon administration, which took office in 2017, prioritized addressing historical issues with Japan as its primary task, leading to a halt and reversal of bilateral relations. He denied the comfort women agreement in 2015 and refused to acknowledge it, nullifying the agreement on the comfort women issue. Furthermore, in 2018, South Korea's court ordered Japanese firms, such as Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, to pay damages for forced labor during the colonial period. The court order even included forcible liquidation of assets to compensate

³⁹¹ “청와대 “한일정보보호협정, 국민 생각 보면서 신중판단 입장” [The Blue House: “Regarding the South Korea-Japan GSOMIA, we will decide with caution while considering the public opinion”],” *Yeonhap News*, September 9, 2016. <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/MYH20160909006700038>.

³⁹² “대한민국 정부와 일본국 정부 간의 군사비밀정보의 보호에 관한 협정 [Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan on the Protection of Classified Military Information],” n.a. *Kukka Beopryung Jeongbo Senta*, <https://www.law.go.kr/trtyBInfoP.do?trtySeq=12539>.

³⁹³ Kang-Kyung Lee and Hyun-Joo Seol, “한일 GSOMIA 의 군사적 함의 고찰 [Analysis on security implications of South Korea-Japan GSOMIA],” *Kookbang Yeongu* 63, no. 1 (2020): 74-75.

the Japanese companies.³⁹⁴ Against Moon administration's stance, the Japanese government removed South Korea from fast-export status, so-called the "white list."³⁹⁵

The significantly damaged Japan-South Korea relations started to recover under the following Seok-Yeol Yoon administration. The Yoon administration emphasized the importance of strategic relationship with Japan and the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations. Most of all, the Yoon administration announced the Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Strategy (자유, 평화, 번영의 인도-태평양 전략) in December 2022.³⁹⁶ The report resonated with Japan's FOIP, emphasizing the importance of stability of the maritime domain and sea trade routes as the foundation of regional peace and prosperity. Furthermore, the report stated that South Korea will strengthen relationship with Japan, which shares universal values and mutual interests. Japan also responded to Yoon administration's diplomatic efforts, showing higher trust than the previous administrations.³⁹⁷

The rapid rise of threat perception of China explains South Korea's diplomatic shift. China's response to South Korea's decision on the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2017 became particularly crucial in shaping South Korea's threat

³⁹⁴ Joyce Lee, "South Korean forced labor victims to seek Japan's Mitsubishi asset sale," *Reuters*, July 16, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1UB0HO>.

³⁹⁵ "South Korea removes Japan from fast-track trade 'white list'," *Reuters*, September 17, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1W21T2>.

³⁹⁶ "윤석열 정부의 「자유, 평화, 번영의 인도-태평양 전략」 최종보고서 [Final report on the 'Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Strategy' of the Suk-Yeol Yoon Administration]," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea*, December 28, 2022. https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/down.do?brd_id=235&seq=373216&data_tp=A&file_seq=1.

³⁹⁷ Eisuke Mori, "ぶれない尹大統領、米韓同盟強化と日韓信頼回復にまい進 [Unwavering President Yoon, pushes forward with strengthening the U.S.-South Korea alliance and restoring trust between Japan and South Korea]," *Nikkei Biznesu*, May 15, 2023.

perception of China. China argued that the deployment of the THAAD showed U.S. intention to use the radar system to gather intelligence data in China.³⁹⁸ Although the Moon administration announced the “Three-Nos and One-Limit (3 불 1 한)” to assure China’s concerns,³⁹⁹ China implemented large-scale economic sanctions against South Korea.⁴⁰⁰ The percentage of South Korean respondents who selected China as the most important economic partner decreased from 56.1% to 33.9%, and as the most important security partner from 11.6% to 6.9% between 2016 and 2018. Furthermore, South Korean chose China as the main obstacle to the reunification in 2020, surpassing North Korea.⁴⁰¹ As a result, the heightened threat perception in South Korea gained political support for the Yoon administration toward closer bilateral cooperation with Japan. Additionally, trilateral cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea significantly strengthened under the Yoon administration, resulting in the historic Camp David trilateral summit in August 2023, affirming further alignment for collective efforts in the global maritime domain.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁸ Steven Borowiec, “THAAD missile system agitates South Korea-China ties,” *Nikkei Asia*, June 22, 2023.

³⁹⁹ According to China’s argument, the Moon administration promised that South Korea 1) would not consider additional THAAD deployment, 2) would not consider the use of other U.S. missile defense system, and 3) would not consider joining an alliance with the U.S. and Japan, and 4) limit the use of THAAD. (Dong-Hoon Lee, “중 ‘사드 3 불 1 한’ 주장... 문재인 약속했나 안했나? [China argues ‘THAAD Three Nos and One Limit’ ... Did Jae-In Moon promise or not?],” *Joogan Chosun*, August 11, 2022. <https://weekly.chosun.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=21549>)

⁴⁰⁰ Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova, “China’s response to U.S.-South Korean missile defense system deployment and its implications,” *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report (2017)*: 7-8. <https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-response-us-south-korean-missile-defense-system-deployment-and-its-implications>.

⁴⁰¹ O-Sung Lee, “중국에 대한 반감, 그 반대편에 친미가 있다 [Antagonism towards China, with pro-American sentiment on the opposite side],” *Sisain*, July 12, 2021. <https://www.sisain.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=45021>.

⁴⁰² “The spirit of Camp David: Joint statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” *The White House*, August 18, 2023. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements->

To summarize, the case of Japan and South Korea showed complex and distinguishing features. First, Japan and South Korea showed similar patterns to Dual Threat. Both states pursued closer security cooperation when they perceived threat from China and concerns on U.S. security commitment. During the Cold War period, Japan provided financial aid to South Korea from the perspective of regional security in Asia. Especially, the U.S. took initiatives toward closer cooperation between Japan and South Korea. As a part of regional burden sharing, Japan responded U.S. regional strategic considerations by economic assistance to South Korea.

Second, the gap of threat perception of China between Japan and South Korea limited closer bilateral security cooperation. Different from Japan, South Korea understood the relationship with China in the context of South-North relations. To manage relationship with North Korea, it was essential to South Korea to maintain stable relations with China. Therefore, South Korea showed cautious stance on closer security cooperation with Japan to avoid unnecessary tensions with China.

Japan-Pacific Island Countries Relations

The Pacific Island Countries (PICs), a group of islands in the Pacific Ocean, comprise three major island groups: Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.⁴⁰³ Melanesia, in the southern Pacific region, consists of Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, and

releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states.

⁴⁰³ Although the definition of the ‘Pacific Islands’ varies, the research uses the term defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (“Japan-Oceania Relations,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, February 23, 2023. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/index2.html>)

Vanuatu. Micronesia is in the northern Pacific and includes Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Nauru. Polynesia is in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, consisting of Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Tuvalu, and Niue. Aside from those 14 states, there are islands which belong to France, the U.K., and the U.S., such as French Polynesia and American Samoa.

Japan's diplomatic approach to the PICs began in 1978. Then-Prime Minister of Japan, Masayoshi Ohira, proposed the "Pacific Rim Solidarity Concept (環太平洋連帯構想)," emphasizing the economic potential of the Pacific region. Based on the Concept, Japan and Australia initiated the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council in 1980.⁴⁰⁴ In 1982, Zenko Suzuki, then-Prime Minister of Japan, visited the East-West Center in Hawaii and stated that "Japan will promote partnership in the Pacific based on the principle of a peaceful and free ocean, respect for diversity, and interdependence and mutual understanding," referred as the 'Suzuki Pacific Doctrine.'⁴⁰⁵

However, both Concept and Doctrine did not gain momentum in Japan and the PICs. First, the Concept did not consider the interests of the PICs because most of them was either under the control of Western states or on the brink of regaining independence. Therefore, Japan did not consider them as equal political actors. Second, Suzuki did not show interests in Japan- PICs relations because the economic growth of the region would

⁴⁰⁴ "太平洋経済協力会議 (PECC) [Pacific Economic Cooperation Council]," *Japan Institute of International Affairs*, n.a. <https://www.jiia.or.jp/pecc/aboutPECC.php>.

⁴⁰⁵ Izumi Kobayashi, "Japan's diplomacy towards member countries of Pacific Islands Forum: Significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM)," *Asia-Pacific Review* 25, no. 2 (2018): 92.

become a long-term challenge.⁴⁰⁶ Therefore, other than fishery, Japan's interests to the region had been largely limited.

Japan's more structured approach to the Pacific Islands started in 1987. Japan's foreign minister Tadashi Kuranari proposed the "Kuranari Doctrine," consisting of five principles: 1) Respect for the independence and self-reliance, 2) support for regional cooperation, 3) ensure political stability in the region, 4) expand economic cooperation, and 5) promote people-to-people exchanges.⁴⁰⁷ The Kuranari Doctrine became a foundation of Japan's economic-centered approach to the PICs, incorporating the region into Japan's diplomatic scope.

Similar to the case of Japan's approach to Southeast Asia, economic aid was Japan's major diplomatic tool to the PICs. Due to the limited economic potential of the region, however, the majority of Japan's foreign aid to the region was small-scale grants. Instead, agreements with the region for Japan's fishing industry became the major driver for financial aids. Due to the lack of strong political support in Japan for fishing industry and the preference of the Japanese government, financial aid and technical support for the region became the major driver of Japan's regional approach, as an indirect subsidy.⁴⁰⁸ Considering overall ODA budget, however, Japan's ODA to the region was relatively small. After the Kuranari Doctrine, Japan's regional aid started to increase sharply in 1988


⁴⁰⁶ Kai Tian, "環太平洋連帯構想の誕生(3): アジア太平洋地域形成をめぐる日豪中の外交イニシアティブ [The Birth of the Pacific Rim Solidarity Concept (Part 3): Diplomatic Initiatives of Japan, Australia, and China in Shaping the Asia-Pacific Region]," *Hokudai Hogaku Ronshu* 64, no. 1 (2013): 164.

⁴⁰⁷ Ryota Nichino, "Japanese Studies from the South Pacific: Present and future prospects as seen from the University of the South Pacific," *Japanese Studies Around the World 2021* (2022): 29.

⁴⁰⁸ Sandra Tarte, "Diplomatic strategies: The Pacific Islands and Japan," *Pacific Economic Papers* 269 (1997): 3-4.

and 1989, and went back to the pre-1988 level, showing the limit of political-driven approach. However, Japan’s long-term approach to the region succeeded in establishing the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) in 1997.

<Figure 14> Japan’s Grant Aid to the Pacific Island Countries, 1988-1993 (million dollar)



Author’s summary. Author calculated using the yen to dollar exchange rate from 1990, 1 USD = 144 JPY. (Sandra Tarte. *Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands*. (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1998): 179)

The PALM, held every three years, has several unique features. First, it is a multilateral summit between Japan and all fourteen Pacific Island states. Second, Japan, an extra-regional state, is the sole host of the summit. The U.S. and France host a similar summit with the region, but it is not held regularly. China has a regular summit with the region as well, but only half of the Pacific Islands attend due to the limited diplomatic

relations. Therefore, the PALM is one of Japan’s diplomatic successes, a foundation of Japan’s approach to the Pacific Islands.⁴⁰⁹

The major driver of the establishment of the PALM was Japan’s efforts to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In 1996, the Pacific Islands supported Japan’s permanent membership of the UNSC, and Japan realized diplomatic importance of the region. Also, other issues related to the oceans drew attention in Japan. Especially, increased competition for access to the region’s fishing ground became Japan’s major issue. The number of fishing fleets from China, Taiwan, and South Korea increased dramatically, putting upward pressure on access fees. For instance, between 1983 and 1991, the number of Taiwan’s purse seine vessels increased from 3 to 44, and South Korea’s from 11 to 37. This intense competition increased the leverage of the Pacific Islands and led them to request Japan to increase the access fee.⁴¹⁰

<Table 10> List of Pacific Islands Leaders Meetings and Main Agendas

No.	Date	Agendas and Issues
1	Oct. 1997	-Sustainable development -Enhancement of the partnership
2	Mar. 2000	-Pacific Frontier Diplomacy (太平洋フロンティア外交) -Miyazaki Initiative
3	May 2003	-Okinawa Initiative: Environmental issues, improvement in infrastructure

⁴⁰⁹ Takehiro Kurosaki, “日本の太平洋諸島外交における太平洋諸島フォーラムの影響: 太平洋・島サミットのメンバーシップをめぐる議論を中心に [The influence of the Pacific Islands Forum on Japan's Pacific Island diplomacy: Focusing on discussions surrounding membership in the Pacific Islands Summit],” *Tokaidaigaku Gendai Kyouyousenta Kiyō* 3 (2019): 4.

⁴¹⁰ Sandra Tarte, “Regional strategies: The Pacific islands and Japan,” *The Journal of Pacific Studies* 22 (1998): 165-166.

		and education, infectious disease, promotion of trade and investment -Japan-Australia-New Zealand Joint declaration
4	May 2006	-“Okinawa Partnership for a more robust and prosperous Pacific region” -“Pacific Plan”: Economic growth, sustainable development, good governance, security (disaster mitigation, measures against organized crime), people-to-people exchange
5	May 2009	- Islanders’ Hokkaido Declaration: Environment and climate change, human security, the “Kizuna Plan” (people-to-people exchange), fisheries, trade and investment, Japan’s support for peace and security in the Pacific region
6	May 2012	-Okinawa Kizuna Declaration: Up to \$500 million over the next three years to focus on the five areas: Natural disasters, environment and climate change, sustainable development and human security, people-to-people exchanges, and maritime issues (maritime environment, maritime safety and security, maritime surveillance, marine scientific research)
7	May 2015	-Fukushima Iwaki Declaration: No less than \$458 million over the next three years to focus on the seven areas: Disaster risk reduction, climate change, environment, people-to-people exchanges, sustainable development, oceans/maritime issues/fisheries, trade/investment
8	May 2018	-“We are Islanders – Partnership toward prosperous, Free and Open Pacific” -Maritime order based on the rule of law, sustainability of ocean resource -Resilient and sustainable development -People-to-people exchanges, human resource development -Multilateral cooperation between Japan and the Pacific Islands (including non-traditional security threats, North Korea issue)
9	July 2021	-“Pacific Bond Policy (KIZUNA)”: COVID-19 response and recovery, sustainable oceans based on the rule of law, climate change and disaster resilience, sustainable and resilient economic development, people-to-people exchanges

Author’s summary. “太平洋諸島フォーラム [the Pacific Islands Forum],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, March 22, 2019. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/pif/index.html>; “太平洋・島サミット (PALM) [Pacific Islands Summit],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, February 5, 2024. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/palm/index.html>.

The first PALM, held in 1997, confirmed Japan's diplomatic stance to the Pacific Islands with the Kuranari Doctrine as the basis and discussed following topics: 1) Economic situation in the region, 2) economic cooperation in the region, and 3) fisheries management and environmental issues in the region. Also, Japan and the South Pacific Forum states announced the joint declaration and affirmed the commitment on sustainable development and environmental protection.⁴¹¹ The following PALM meetings had held every 3 years, focusing mainly on economic development and regional stability.

However, PALM started to include security aspects into the discussions since 2006. During the 4th PALM, held in 2006, Japan and the PICs released a joint declaration and announced five areas to cooperate: economic growth, sustainable development, governance, security, and people-to-people exchange. Different from the previous PALM, the declaration included security support for disaster migration and management, and measures against organized crime.⁴¹² The following 5th PALM, held in 2009, Japan also included security assistance, mainly on natural disaster prevention. Japan's support for maritime security in the PICs further expanded in the 6th PALM, held in 2012. Japan and the PICs acknowledged the importance of promoting maritime cooperation, including marine environment, maritime safety and security, maritime surveillance. Also, Japan succeeded in including the importance of regional maritime order in the declaration,

⁴¹¹ The South Pacific Forum member consisted of 14 Pacific Island states, Australia, and New Zealand. ("Joint declaration on the occasion of the Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, n.a. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/spf/summit97/declaration.html>)

⁴¹² "The fourth Pacific Islands leaders meeting between Japan and the members of the Pacific Islands Forum Okinawa, Japan, May 26-27 2006," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 27, 2006. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/spf/palm2006/declaration.html>.

mentioning “the role of international law for the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific Ocean.”⁴¹³

Furthermore, Japan’s efforts to strengthen regional maritime law-enforcement capabilities started before the 6th PALM, in a non-governmental level. As a specific measure for security support, Japan initiated a project to strengthen maritime law-enforcement capabilities in the PICs. Different from other cases, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) and Nippon Foundation (NF) took the initiative in supporting maritime law-enforcement capabilities of the Three Micronesian Nations (ミクロネシア三国), the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. The three states signed the Compact of Free Association with the U.S. in 1982, receiving financial support from the U.S. in exchange for full international defense authority and responsibilities.⁴¹⁴ In March 2010, the SPF and NF announced to initiate the “Project for Strengthening Maritime Surveillance Capacity in Three Micronesian Nations.” Representatives from the Three Micronesian Nations, the U.S., Australia, and Japan participated in the meeting and discussed specific policies to support maritime law-enforcement capabilities.⁴¹⁵ Based on the discussions, Japan provided small patrol vessels to Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau in 2011.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹³ “第6回太平洋・島サミット(PALM6) 沖縄キズナ宣言 [The sixth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM 6) Okinawa ‘Kizuna’ declaration],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 26, 2012. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ps_summit/palm_06/kizuna_jp.html.

⁴¹⁴ “About the Compact of Free Association,” *US Compact.org*, n.a. <http://uscompact.org/about/cofa.php>.

⁴¹⁵ “ミクロネシアコーストガード設立に向けた国際委員会の開催 [International committee meeting for the establishment of the Micronesia Coast Guard],” *Sasakawa Peace Foundation*, n.a. https://www.spf.org/spinf/spinf_j/projects/project_16777.html.

⁴¹⁶ Celine Pajon, “Japan and the Pacific Islands Countries: Longstanding strategic interests, recent strategic engagement,” *ASIE.Visions 134* (2023): 17.

Japan's security approach to the PICs started primarily due to the increase of China's economic presence. In April 2006, China established the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum. During the forum, China announced a reduction in tariffs and approval of tourist destinations for Chinese visitors to island countries that maintain diplomatic ties with China. Also, China promised to provide 3 billion yuan (approximately \$376 million) of preferential loans in the next three years to enhance cooperation, and to cancel or extend the repayment period of debts that matured at the end of 2005.⁴¹⁷ Since the Forum, the Chinese government has expanded economic relations to more comprehensive approach, called "South-South Cooperation."

Especially, economic relationship between China and the PICs has expanded significantly following the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of South Pacific as the "southern leg" of the Maritime Silk Road," and initiated a strategic partnership with the PICs, called a "community of shared future."⁴¹⁸ The strategic partnership aimed to seek common development, shared prosperity, and regional peace by enhancing economic integration, confidence building, and security cooperation. The 'non-strings attached' feature of China's investments attracted the PICs, and the number of infrastructure development projects started to

⁴¹⁷ "China, Pacific Island Countries Forum opens," *China Daily*, April 5, 2006. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/05/content_560393.htm.

⁴¹⁸ Yu Lei and Sophia Sui, "China-Pacific Island Countries strategic partnership: China's strategy to reshape the regional order," *East Asia* 39 (2022): 83.


increase swiftly. Reciprocally, the PICs could access to China's domestic market as well.⁴¹⁹

As a result, economic relationship between China and the PICs grew significantly. The amount of China's export to the PICs exceeded that of Australia since 2016, and China's import from the PICs became similar to that of Australia in 2018. Considering the traditional dominancy of Australia's economic influence over the region, China became the most important trading partner to the PICs. Along with the increased economic presence in the region, China's diplomatic and security influence on the PICs has expanded significantly. For instance, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati changed its diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China in 2019, Nauru in 2023, reducing the number of states recognize Taiwan to 15.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁹ Carol Li. *The Belt and Road Initiative in Oceania: Understanding the People's Republic of China's Strategic Interests and Engagement in the Pacific*. (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii, 2022): 8-9.

⁴²⁰ Kate Lyons, "China extends influence in Pacific as Solomon Islands break with Taiwan," *The Guardian*, September 16, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/16/china-extends-influence-in-pacific-as-solomon-islands-break-with-taiwan>.

<Figure 15> China’s Export to and Import from the Pacific Island Countries, 2006-2016
(million dollar)



Author’s summary, using data from the World Bank. Import and export data between China and Niue was excluded due to the lack of relevant information. (“Trade statistics by country / region,” *World Bank*, n.a. <https://wits.worldbank.org/countrystats.aspx?lang=en>)

China attempted to increase military presence in the PICs as well, posing significant threat to the regional states. For instance, China’s military aid to the PICs started as well, providing military equipment, hydrographic and surveillance vessel, and military training of military officers in China.⁴²¹ Although it did not materialize, China proposed building a

⁴²¹ Denghua Zhang, “China’s military engagement with Pacific Island Countries,” *Asia & The Pacific Policy Society*, August 17, 2020. <https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-military-engagement-with-pacific-island-countries>.

military base in Vanuatu and refurbishing a port on Manus Islands in Papua New Guinea in 2018.⁴²²

The security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands is one of China's successes in expanding its presence in the Pacific region. Although details of the agreement were not released, both states released a joint statement in 2023, affirming joint efforts to build a comprehensive strategic partnership.⁴²³ Also, the joint statement included support of the Solomon Islands on One-China Principle and other issues related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and opposition of interference of other states in China's internal affairs.

In conclusion, China has strengthened its diplomatic, economic, and security ties with the PICs. Since 2006, China approached the region with economic assistance, using foreign aid and access to Chinese domestic market as tools. The BRI has strengthened China-PICs economic relations significantly, and led China became one of the most important economic actors in the region. The enhanced economic relations increased China's presence in the region, led some PICs to align with China's goals, including the shift of diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China. Although China's security initiatives

⁴²² David Wroe, "China eyes Vanuatu military base in plan with global ramifications," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, April 9, 2018. <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-eyes-vanuatu-military-base-in-plan-with-global-ramifications-20180409-p4z8j9.html>; Merriden Varrall, "Australia's response to China in the Pacific: From alert to alarmed," in Graeme Smith and Terence Wesley-Smith. *The China Alternative: Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands*. (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2021): 118.

⁴²³ "Joint statement on establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership featuring mutual respect and common development for a new era between the People's Republic of China and Solomon Islands," *China Daily*, July 11, 2023. <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202307/11/WS64ac6420a31035260b815946.html>.

are in an initial stage, it is assumable that China will attempt to expand its military presence in the region.

To respond to China's increased presence on the PICs, Japan's strategic approach has evolved as well. Although the 7th PALM did not show significant changes to the previous meeting, the 8th PALM revealed Japan's broader commitment to the region. First of all, Japan succeeded in including a joint commitment to the FOIP, including following three pillars: 1) promotion and establishment of the rule of law and freedom of navigation, 2) pursuit of economic prosperity through strengthening connectivity, and 3) commitment to peace and stability.⁴²⁴ It is also worth emphasizing that the scope of the PALM expanded from the Pacific to the Indo-Pacific region. Second, Japan and the PICs committed to seek further cooperation to address traditional security challenges, including nuclear disarmament, terrorism, and broader maritime issues, including law-enforcement capability and maritime connectivity.

Different from other cases, however, Japan's security engagement with the PICs was gradual and limited. First, diverse geopolitical situation and relationship with China limited the PICs to incorporate the FOIP into their policies. For instance, in the 8th PALM, member states "welcomed" Japan's initiatives in the region, including the FOIP, rather than endorsing them. Instead, the PICs selectively engaged in cooperation with Japan, without taking a unified strategic position in the Pacific region.

⁴²⁴ “第 8 回太平洋・島サミット(PALM8) 首脳宣言 [The Eighth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM8) Leaders' Declaration],” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 19, 2018. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/a_o/ocn/page4_004026.html.

Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate Japan’s approach to the PICs as “gradual.”⁴²⁵ Although Japan’s economic and security approach to the PICs did not show obvious strategic adjustments other than the FOIP in the 8th PALM, Japan is gradually strengthening its security ties with the region. First of all, Japan and the PICs started defense dialogue in 2021 and discussed possible areas of cooperation.⁴²⁶ Although the defense dialogue did not lead to specific outcomes, the JMSDF visited Fiji, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu in 2022, and Kiribati in 2023. Considering that Kiribati and the Solomon Islands shifted their diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China, Japan’s port visit to the two states was small but meaningful.

Second, it is expected that Japan’s economic-security approach to the PICs will be gradually increased as well. Different from military domain, recent cooperation between the JCG and law-enforcement agencies in the region showed a more proactive progress. In June 2023, Japan signed and exchanged notes on the “Project for Strengthening Capacity of Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies for Effective Maritime Crime Control.”⁴²⁷ Following the announcement, the JCG dispatched the Mobile Cooperation Team to Kiribati to provide technical support to the Kiribati Police Service, Kiribati’s maritime

⁴²⁵ H. D. P. Envall, “The Pacific Islands in Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’: From ‘slow and steady’ to strategic engagement?,” *Security Challenges* 16, no. 1 (2020): 65.

⁴²⁶ “Japan Pacific Islands defense dialogue joint statement,” *Ministry of Defense of Japan*, n.a. <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/images/e4b4d8b1ad510d146cab838b7f0a65ebbef9c99f.pdf>.

⁴²⁷ “太平洋島嶼国 9 か国(キリバス、ソロモン諸島、ツバル、ナウル、バヌアツ、パラオ、フィジー、マーシャル諸島及びミクロネシア)に対する無償資金協力 [Signing and exchange of notes on the Project for Strengthening Capacity of Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies for effective maritime crime control in the Pacific Island Countries],” *Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna*, June 1, 2023. https://www.vie-mission.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_ja/musho2023.html.

law-enforcement agency.⁴²⁸ Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that Japan will use its Official Security Assistance (OSA) for the PICs to support law-enforcement capabilities. In December 2023, Japan announced the provision of patrol boats and other related equipment to the Fiji Navy using OSA.⁴²⁹ The program aimed to strengthen surveillance capabilities and disaster relief, not to support Fiji's naval force.

Chapter Summary

In chapter 4, I examined Japan's search for proactive security engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, beyond the scope of the U.S.-Japan security relations. During the Cold War period, consistent with the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan chose an exclusively economic and militarily isolationist stance in its diplomacy. However, Japan faced criticisms from international society on its economic regionalist approach to global security affairs, which became the major political trigger for Japanese decision-makers to proactively seek "human contributions" to international society. Furthermore, the perceived shift of the distribution of power in the region, concerns with China's behaviors in the maritime domain and U.S. security commitments, also became the political drivers for Japan's search for security relations beyond the narrow confines of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

⁴²⁸ Yurika Ishii, "Japan-Pacific Islands Countries cooperation on maritime law enforcement," *National University of Singapore*, August 14, 2023. <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/blogs/japan-pacific-islands-countries-cooperation-on-maritime-law-enforcement>.

⁴²⁹ "フィジー共和国に対する警備艇等の供与 (「政府安全保障能力強化支援(OSA)」)に関する書簡の署名・交換 [Signing and exchange of notes for Official Security Assistance (OSA) to the Republic of Fiji]," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, December 18, 2023. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/pressit_000001_00114.html.

Consistent with my emphasis, Japan's diplomatic relationship with both allies, rivals, and new partners reflects the nuances of Rich Nation, Restrained Army.

5. The Future of Japan's Grand Strategy in the Oceans

In this work, I explored the conditions under which Japan shifted its grand strategy in the maritime domain during and after the Cold War period. I employed a neoclassical realist framework to analyze why and how Japan's response to the changing security environment varied economically and militarily. This approach recognizes that shifting the balance of power in the region, external threats, and the structure of the international system provide a foundation for the state's decision-making. However, those system-level variables are refracted through the perceptions, domestic political situation, and political considerations of key decision-makers of the state. My primary argument is that Japan's grand strategy in the maritime domain is best guided by the intellectual architecture of Rich Nation, Restrained Army.⁴³⁰ By this, I specifically mean that Japanese decision-makers are channeling their foreign affairs in economically proactive but militarily restrained ways. To verify how this concept plays out Japan's response to the oceans, I analyzed three empirical cases: Japan's domestic institutional and legal changes, regional approach to Southeast Asia, and global approach with the four specific cases (Australia, India, South Korea, and the Pacific Island Countries). In this conclusion chapter, I provide a brief summary of the main findings, and end with theoretical and policy implications.

Due to the limited scope of the research, I could not include some major changes worth emphasizing. As Japan scholars argued, it is hard to deny that Japan has shown more proactive aspects in terms of military spheres, compared to the previous period. For

⁴³⁰ "Introduction: The meaning and challenge of grand strategy," in Hal Brands. *What good is grand strategy: Power and purpose in American statecraft: From Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014):1-16.

instance, the Japanese government has increased high-level talks and discussions with defense ministers, and the number of port visits conducted by the JMSDF has significantly increased. Although these important changes should be included in the research, I did not discuss those changes in detail. I will include a more comprehensive analysis of these military aspects in future research.

Main Findings

Two major findings of the research are worth emphasizing. First, dual threat is the most important driver explaining the changes of Japan's grand strategy in the oceans. Not only shared threat perception on China's maritime behaviors but also shared concerns about U.S. security commitment in the region are the major momentum of Japan's seek for proactive security roles in the international maritime order. The Chunxiao Gas Field dispute between China and Japan is the representative example showing the importance of dual threat on Japan's grand strategy in the oceans. Although the dispute was centered on resources in the oceans, Japanese decision-makers perceived it as fundamental threat to Japan's national interests and sovereignty rights in the oceans. Also, the U.S.-Japan security alliance system, which had been the central pillar of Japan's national security, could not apply to the dispute as well. The shared dual threat became the major political driver shifting Japan's domestic legal and institutional changes.

The influence of dual threat generally applies to the changes in Japan's regional and global approaches as well. During the Cold War period, Japan showed an isolationist stance regarding security affairs in the regional and global domains. Instead, Japan used

foreign aid as the major tool to normalize its relationship with neighboring states and contribute to regional security, especially in Southeast Asia in the 1970s. Since the 1990s, however, Japan attempted to seek alternatives to respond to the security environment changes in Asia. While changing security laws and policies to anchor U.S. security engagement in the region, Japan attempted to strengthen security cooperation beyond the U.S. but mostly failed due to opposition from China and other states, concerns over sovereignty, and different perceptions of China.

It was around 2010 when China started to perceive maritime rights as the core of their national interests in the maritime domain, and other states began to form a shared threat perception over China's maritime behaviors. Japan started to perceive territorial conflicts between China and Southeast Asian states closely related to its own national interests and sovereignty rights. Other regional states also showed concerns over the stability of sea trade routes and China's assertiveness in the maritime domain. Those shared threat perceptions on China's maritime behaviors became the core driver of Japan's security engagement in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.

Second, Japan has shown the "economic proactiveness, military restraint" features in bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. Different from Japan's isolationist stance in security affairs during the Cold War period, Japan has deepened economic and security ties with states in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. Japan has strategized its ODA to support law-enforcement capabilities in Southeast Asia and the PICs to cope with non-traditional security threats, including piracy, illegal fishing, and human trafficking. Especially, the Japan Coast Guard and the Japan International Cooperation Agency took

major roles in leading multilateral cooperation among coast guards in the Indo-Pacific region.

Different from the cooperation among law-enforcement agencies, however, Japan's security cooperation among naval forces is relatively limited. During the 1990s, Japan proposed to strengthen multilateral military cooperation to stabilize the maritime domain in Southeast Asia but none of these initiatives succeeded. Strong opposition from China and Japan's self-imposed restraint on military explains Japan's failure, yet it was regional concerns over sovereignty from Southeast Asia that hindered institutionalizing the idea of a joint naval force. To ensure regional concerns from Southeast Asia and avoid unnecessary tensions with China, Japan chose to strategize ODA to support law-enforcement capabilities in the region to maintain stability in the maritime domain.

Theoretical and Policy Implications

Based on the two major findings of the research, there are two implications. First of all, the importance of economic instruments in promoting multilateral security cooperation should be emphasized, as underscored by Japan's strategic approach of economic proactiveness and military restraint in the maritime domain. Building upon Japan's successful utilization of economic instruments, such as ODA, to support law enforcement capabilities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island Countries, prioritizing collaboration among coast guards and other law enforcement agencies can effectively address non-traditional security threats such as piracy, illegal fishing, and human trafficking. By strengthening information sharing, conducting joint exercises, and facilitating capacity-building initiatives, regional states can enhance their ability to respond to common security

challenges in the maritime domain while minimizing the risk of escalating tensions. Moreover, fostering closer coordination among law enforcement agencies lays the groundwork for deeper trust and cooperation among regional stakeholders, contributing to the maintenance of maritime stability and the promotion of regional security architecture.

Secondly, the relationship between threat and state behaviors should be understood in a broader context. Represented by the balance of threat theory, proposed by Stephen M. Walt, threat perception focused primarily on how a state respond to the perceived military threat. As Japan showed, however, previous literature on threat perception elucidated the importance of considering non-military dimensions of threat, such as non-traditional security threats, conflicts among law-enforcement agencies or so-called “gray-zone situation,” which pose significant challenges to maritime security which require multifaceted responses beyond the conventional military means. In conclusion, the case of Japan’s grand strategy in the maritime domain suggests a broader understanding on how a state respond to diversifying security threats in the 21st century.

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