<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T14:29:40Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:digital.lib.washington.edu:1773/6980" metadataPrefix="dim">https://digital.lib.washington.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:digital.lib.washington.edu:1773/6980</identifier><datestamp>2025-01-08T01:32:42Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1773_4888</setSpec><setSpec>col_1773_4909</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US" authority="f21ddaea-a616-4f85-879b-5b3e05b70cb2" confidence="-1">Cary, Matthew, 1974-</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2009-10-06T16:57:44Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2009-10-06T16:57:44Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2007</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">b58539165</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">180702793</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">Thesis 57051</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/1773/6980</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2007.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory and microeconomics focused on incentive engineering. A mechanism is a protocol, typically taking the form of an auction, that is explicitly designed so that rational but non-cooperative agents, motivated solely by their self-interest, end up achieving the designer's goals. The challenge of mechanism design is to apply these methods to traditional computer science goals such as worst-case or competitive analysis. We consider two challenging problems related to mechanism design for profit maximization: the analysis of natural bidding strategies used by participants in sponsored search auctions, and the design of a mechanism for matroid procurement with provable performance guarantees.The sponsored search auctions of web search engines such as Google or Yahoo! use the generalized second-price (GSP) mechanism, in which bidders do not have a dominant strategy. We develop a framework for studying a variety of greedy bidding strategies and analyze their revenue, convergence and robustness properties. We compare the performance of greedy bidding strategies to that of a Nash equilibrium, quantifying how close these bidding strategies are to one of the most natural and rational stable points of the system.In the procurement problem a buyer is given a set of agents with values, along with a family of feasible sets over the agents. The goal is to procure a feasible set of maximum value, for minimum cost. Assuming that a buyer obtains a decreasing marginal benefit per feasible set procured, the problem is to determine the optimal number of feasible sets to procure in order to maximize the buyer's profit. We develop a mechanism that approximates the optimal profit to within a constant factor, when the set system is a matroid. Matroids are important structures in combinatorial optimization: for example, minimum spanning trees and node-weighted maximum matchings are both matroid problems. We also show that the well-known cost sharing revenue extraction mechanism is only truthful for matroid set systems, so that procurement problems over non-matroid set systems are not likely to be solved with current techniques.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="format" qualifier="extent" lang="en_US">v, 108 p.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">en_US</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" lang="en_US">Copyright is held by the individual authors.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" qualifier="uri" lang="en_US" />
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">Theses--Computer science and engineering</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">On profit maximization in mechanism design</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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