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THE IMPACT OF THE SELJUQ INVASION ON KHUZESTAN: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, NUMISMATIC, AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE

University of Washington
Ph.D. 1982

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The Impact of the Seljuq Invasion on Khuzestan:
An Inquiry into the Historical,
Geographical, Numismatic, and Archaeological Evidence

by

Nanette Marie Pyne

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

1982

Approved by ___________ M.B. Loraine _______ (Chairman of Supervisory Committee)

Program Authorized to Offer Degree Individual Ph.D. Program: Near Eastern History, Archaeology, and Literature

Date ___________ August 5, 1982 ___________
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My interest in the history of medieval Iran began in 1973, when I participated in an archaeological survey in the province of Khuzestan, in southwestern Iran. This interest was sharpened and focussed on the impact of the Seljuq invasion by Dr. Jere Bacharach in a history course at the University of Washington in 1975.

In pursuing this subject, I was led to the study of the Persian and Arabic historical literature, in which efforts I received excellent instruction and continual encouragement from members of the faculty of the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literature at the University of Washington. I am most grateful for their support.

I would like to thank Dr. Michael Loraine, the Chairman of my Supervisory Committee, who introduced me to the rewarding intricacies of the Persian language and literature and gave freely of his time over the past six years.

I am one of many students who owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Farhat Ziadeh for his untiring leadership as Chairman of the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literature, as Director of the Near East Center, and as Professor of Arabic.

Dr. Jere Bacharach, in addition to encouraging my interests
in Seljuq Iran, spent many hours reading preliminary drafts of this manuscript, making many useful suggestions in the process. Both this study and my academic training in general have benefited greatly from his efforts.

I would like to thank Dr. Nicholas Heer for serving on my doctoral committee and for his instruction in the various facets of medieval Arabic literature over the past few years. I am also grateful to Dr. Robert C. Dunnell, Chairman of the Department of Anthropology, for taking the time from his busy schedule to serve on my doctoral committee and for offering helpful suggestions about the archaeological data.

I would like to thank the U.S. Department of Education for many years of graduate student support through their Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships and the Fulbright-Hays Program. During the course of my doctoral research, supported by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, I studied manuscripts at the Dār al-Kutub and the Arab League's Institute of Manuscripts in Cairo, the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin, the British Museum in London, and the Library of University of Leiden in the Netherlands. I was also fortunate to be able to study the Islamic coins at the British Museum, London, through the efforts of Mr. Nicholas Lowick, Curator of Islamic Coins. I would like to thank him and the many others who helped me, including: Mme. Arlette Nègre, of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris; Dr. Michael Bates, Curator of
Islamic Coins at the American Numismatic Society, New York; Dr. Norman D. Nicol, former Acting Director of the Library of Congress, Cairo Office; Dr. I. Witkam, Director, and the staff of the Oriental Manuscript Room at the University Library, Leiden; Mr. P. Henchy, Director, Dr. D. James, Curator of Islamic Manuscripts, and the staff of the Chester Beatty Library; Mr. Mahmūd al-Jalālī, Curator, the Arab League's Institute of Manuscripts; Dr. Paul Walker, Dr. James Allen, and the staff of the American Research Center in Egypt, Cairo; and Dr. M.I. Waley and the staff of the Oriental Reading Room at the British Library.

I have been particularly fortunate over the past few years to have had the aid and services of Mrs. Gidget Terpstra as typist and editor.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my husband, Dr. Robert J. Wenke, of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Washington, who gave me the opportunity to go to Iran, who encouraged me to take up the study of Middle Eastern languages, and who shares my lingering hopes of returning to Iran to pursue our archaeological studies of the many issues raised here.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When the invading Turkish-speaking tribesmen we know as the Seljuqs finally quelled local resistance in southwestern Iran in A.H. 446/A.D. 1054,\textsuperscript{1} they came into possession of one of the Middle East's great cultural and economic centers. As early as the fourth millennium B.C., for example, the southwestern Iranian province of Khuzestan (Figure 1) gave rise to one of the world's first state-level societies,\textsuperscript{2} and, in the first millennium B.C., the Achaemenids reached out from their capital in Khuzestan to create one of the world's first truly international empires.\textsuperscript{3}

The political, social, and economic changes associated with the Seljuq conquest of Khuzestan have also been considered


\textsuperscript{2}G. A. Johnson, Local Exchange and Early State Development in Southwestern Iran, Anthropological Papers of the Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, no. 51, Ann Arbor (1973).

pivotal developments in Middle Eastern culture history. With the Seljuqs came a further breakup of the Abbasid Empire, the first large-scale influx of nomadic Turkish tribes, and the disintegration of central bureaucratic control through taxation.

My purpose in this study is to attempt to document and analyze these important patterns of change by examining the periods immediately prior to, during, and after the Seljuq invasion. I shall argue that the events of this period are of relevance to an understanding of many aspects of Middle Eastern political history, and also that the role of the Seljuqs in this history has often been misinterpreted.

In addition to an analysis of some specific aspects of Seljuq history in Khuzestan and the rest of Southwest Asia, I shall consider the Seljuqs and this period as a case study relevant to a more general level of historical analysis, namely, the nature and dynamics of pre-industrial empires. Many grand schemes purporting to describe and explain early empires have been promulgated,¹ and it is my intention to relate the results of my analyses to these more general concerns.

This study will be based on three general classes of information: historical documents, archaeological evidence,

and numismatic analyses. My objective will be to combine these sources of information, augment them with data about the physical geography of Southwest Asia, and from all this construct a precise history of late Buyid/early Seljuq times in southwestern Iran, particularly in Khuzestan.

I have focussed on Khuzestan for several reasons. Pre-industrial empires in general, and the Seljuqs' in particular, tend not to be monolithic entities: their component regions differed greatly in social, economic, and political characteristics. Of the provinces of the Seljuq political structure, Khuzestan was one of the three or four most important areas in economic production\(^1\) and was certainly one of the most important areas from an administrative point of view,\(^2\) even though it contained no political center equivalent to Baghdad or Rayy. And though many previous studies concentrated on Baghdad

---


\(^2\)Tughril Beg considered Khuzestan so vital that he made one of his closest companions and strongest generals, Hizārasb ibn Bankīr ibn C̄Ayyād, muqta\(^3\) over it (Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kūmil, vol. IX, pp. 613-614) in 447/1055 as soon as the Seljuqs gained control of it.
during this period, it must be remembered that as concerns economics, Baghdad is atypical of the individual component parts of the Seljuq Empire: it drew resources to support it from regions as far away as Syria and Transoxiana. But from looking at areas like Khuzestan, we perhaps get a more realistic portrait of administrative and economic events of the period than we would by looking at the capital. Obviously, we cannot read from Khuzestan directly to the whole of the rest of the Seljuq Empire: many of its events and circumstances are unique. Nevertheless, because of its dense population, its agricultural potential, its central position on the trade routes, and its role as a center of craft production, Khuzestan represents a good test area for a study of economic conditions.

Because of Khuzestan's importance as a tax base, it is frequently mentioned in the Arabic and Persian historical and geographical literature of the periods before, during, and after the Seljuq period, so that we have ample documentary evidence.

---

The archaeological evidence too is substantial, although the Islamic periods in general are still, surprisingly, far less researched and understood in Khuzestan (as well as in the rest of Southwest Asia) than their predecessors.

Finally, I chose Khuzestan as a focus because I have had the opportunity to conduct archaeological research there on the Seljuq and other periods of occupation.

The Research Problem

The Seljuq invasion, though relatively unexplored textually and neglected archaeologically, is thought by many scholars to have resulted in a series of profound and long-lasting changes in the Islamic Empire's essential economic structures. But Western scholars disagree on the specific results of this invasion: Robert McC. Adams concluded that it simply continued a long phase of economic decline; Bernard

---


Lewis\textsuperscript{1} saw it as causing a shift in economic emphasis from trade to agriculture; Carla Klausner\textsuperscript{2} maintained that it brought unity and stability to an area (the western caliphate) that had not enjoyed these things for over one hundred years; Ann Lambton\textsuperscript{3} viewed it as bringing a more stable agricultural system; C. E. Bosworth\textsuperscript{4} suggested that although trade and industry lessened (in the eastern caliphate), the area was still economically prosperous till the seventh/thirteenth century; while Stephen Fairbanks\textsuperscript{5} held that few of the social and political innovations traditionally believed to have been instituted at this time were in fact original with the Seljuqs.

Given that the effects of the Seljuq invasion are not agreed upon, it should also be mentioned that seldom is it precisely stated what local conditions were prior to the invasion, so that one cannot say with certainty what is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2}Klausner, The Seljuk Vezirate, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{3}A. K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 28.
\end{itemize}
attributable to the Seljuqs and what was indigenous or already developing. Part of this paper will be to describe as precisely as possible economic and political conditions in Khuzestan during the years leading up to the Seljuq invasion, then to look at the first years of Seljuq rule and to try to determine what conditions changed, what came about by Seljuq fiat, and what occurred because of pre-existing developments.

But this thesis is not only an investigation of the effects of the Seljuq invasion on Khuzestan, rather it is also an investigation into the nature of the evidence: What can we learn from the documentary evidence? What are its limitations? How can we use the numismatic data? What does archaeological evidence offer that the other types do not?

The evidence to be examined falls into four broad categories: the physical geography of Khuzestan, the documentary sources, the Islamic numismatic evidence, and the archaeological remains. And each of these types of evidence has its strengths and weaknesses.

In the past two centuries, Islamic history has been re-written and analyzed mainly on the basis of the documentary evidence: the legal treatises, the universal and regional histories, the geographies, the Quran, the Sunnah, and government records. And these documents very often have been accepted at face value or have been considered to be full, complete accounts of the events or circumstances they purport to convey.
But this evidence cannot be viewed as an unbiased, straightforward recording of events—almost no history is that. Rather, a selection process takes place in almost all recordings of history—whether it is in the form of selecting stories for a newspaper front page, battles to include in a history of the WWII Pacific theater, or factors to analyze in a history of Khuzestan.

Moreover, documentary sources, especially before the advent of the printing press, have been for the most part records of the elite—written by them, for them, and about them—and they therefore incorporate certain political and social biases. Perhaps more important, before the rise of the Scientific Method, most historical writing was written with a "world view" in the mind of the author: events were "made to conform to an image of reality that governed . . . social thought."¹

So to get a more unbiased or complete idea of the events that took place, but more important, of the processes that were underway, we must include in our analysis other lines of evidence, types of evidence that are "unpremeditated transmitters of facts,"² specifically, physical geographic evidence, numismatic evidence, numismatic evidence,


and archaeological evidence.

While not at all arguing that geography is destiny, it seems self-evident that to analyze the economy of a given locale one must establish first the limits of its ecological potential. Only in this way can we understand the risks and decisions involved when, for example, a town is established by imperial fiat away from natural resources, or when the government decides to invest heavily in cash-cropping in a given region. Therefore, the first evidence we shall examine will be the ecological setting of Khuzestan.

We are limited in our analysis of the archaeological evidence by the nature of the work that has been done here in the past. For the most part this work has concentrated on pre-Islamic occupations, and the Islamic occupations that have been excavated here were either poorly excavated or poorly reported. But the extensive pre-Islamic work does give us a sound basis for later comparison, and the archaeological data in general give us sound evidence of the type of things not often recorded in elite documents: settlement patterns, the extent of local canal systems, types of crops grown, the degree of internal security, etc. Archaeological evidence then, presents perhaps the most accessible and accurate reflection of past political, social, and economic conditions. Archaeological evidence alone, however, does not give us the precise economic and political data necessary for a complete history.
Numismatic evidence too can be biased in terms of differential preservation: copper weathers more easily than silver, and gold is often preserved or melted down simply because of its intrinsic value. And the more basic issue in dealing with numismatic evidence is how to interpret the data—numismatic evidence is notoriously ambiguous: a cessation of minting at any given site can be laid to economic stagnation, overproduction in previous years, overproduction at other mints, imperial fiat that all coins be minted at the capital, imperial pique, or simply poor recovery techniques. But while problematical, numismatic data can provide supportive evidence for conclusions based on documentary and archaeological data.

From these categories of evidence I shall construct a model that describes the interactions of the major economic, political, and social forces in Seljuq Khuzestan, relate this model to general analyses of pre-industrial empires, and specify directions for future research.
CHAPTER II

THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND ECOLOGICAL SETTING

One cannot explain the culture history of an area strictly in terms of its environment, particularly in the case of the Seljuq Empire, which drew on environments as diverse as the Arabian desert to the Central Asian steppe. But the history of Khuzestan and its role in the Seljuq Empire cannot be understood in isolation from the basic material conditions of life: its physical environment set the broad limits within which the form and context of its political systems were realized. And the history of Khuzestan differs from that of other areas under Seljuq rule because the conditions of its material life differed: Khuzestan had (and still has) an enormous capacity for agricultural intensification, given sufficient irrigation and efficient administration; the ability of this area to produce "exotic" crops (orchard crops, sugar cane, rice, luxury wools and silks) made it attractive for imperial development plans and taxation; and because of its agricultural potential Khuzestan has the ability to support an extremely dense population, both settled lowland agriculturalists and highland pastoral nomads.

Khuzestan has been, for over 4,000 years, one of the most
important political and economic centers of many of the empires that ruled the Near East. In terms of agricultural potential alone, it is easy to see why this would be so. Comprising as it does the eastern edge of the fertile Mesopotamian alluvium, Khuzestan is relatively broad and flat, with three major perennial rivers flowing across it from the Zagros Mountains (Figure 1), and it has a climate of long, hot, cloudless, summer days and temperatures that rarely drop below freezing even during the coldest part of winter. Thus Khuzestan has the three elements necessary for intensive agriculture: fertile soil, warm, sunny climate, and abundant, predictable water supplies. It is the elasticity in supply of the last of these, water, which sets off Khuzestan from the rest of Iran. Before ca. 391/1000, the rivers had not down-cut so deeply (as they did subsequently) as to make the dams and weirs that are necessary for irrigation prohibitively expensive.¹ This made it possible since at least early Sasanian times to grow water-intensive crops such as rice and sugar cane in quantities great enough to fulfill the demands of much of the rest of Iran and Mesopotamia.²


The Land

The low-lying plain of Khuzestan, geologically speaking a continuation of the Mesopotamian Alluvium, forms a unique, natural physiographic unit bordered by the Zagros Mountains on the north and east, sand and salt marshes on the west, and the Persian Gulf on the south. The plain itself was formed by the alluvium of the three main rivers brought down from the Zagros Mountains. It is thought that concurrent with this deposition, the entire Mesopotamian Plain has been experiencing subsidence, which allowed the sedimentation to continue without raising the level of the land, but this is far from certain.\(^1\)

Going north from the marshes around Khurramshahr, \(^2\) Abbadan, and Bandar Shapur, one sees near Ahwaz the first break in the flat plain—the Ahwaz anticline (Figure 2). North of this one next encounters the small Sha\(^3\)ur anticline, then the Haft Tepe anticline, then about 50 km north again the Dizful anticline—all parallel ridges running northwest-southeast.\(^2\)

This series of anticlines/synclines, formed by tectonic actions associated


Figure 2. Major anticlines of Khuzestan.
with the approach of central Iran towards the stable massif of 
Arabia, continues north and east into the mountains with the 
Dasht-i Gul and the Aidaj (Izeh) Plain, among others.¹

The soils of the plain today fall mainly into five cate-
gories: 1) saline alluvial soils, usually the product of 
insufficient drainage and washing on irrigated land, predomi-
nate in the southern part of Khuzestan, south of Ahwaz;
2) non-saline alluvial soils, consisting of recent, water-
deposited sediments laid down on flood plains; 3) occasional 
sand dunes, occurring mainly in the western and southern 
areas of the plain; 4) grey and red desert soils, formed as 
a result of severe moisture deficiency, are found in the 
plateau areas north and east of the plain; and 5) solonchaks 
and solonetz soils, formed by poor drainage conditions on 
gysiferous and saliferous marly soils and distinguished by 
a high percentage of soluble salts and by a light crust, are 
found in the north part of the plain.²

It must be noted that these are the prevailing soil 
conditions today and that the predominate, agriculturally 
unproductive soil types, saline alluvial soils and solonchaks

¹Lees and Falcon, "Mesopotamian Plains," p. 27; Kirkby, 

History of Iran, vol. 1: The Land of Iran, ed. W. B. Fisher 
and solonetz soils, were probably not so prevalent in ancient and medieval times, but rather were caused by poor agricultural practices, especially but not exclusively in medieval times.¹

These saline soil conditions were produced in the following way. The rivers of Khuzestan, as they flow through the Zagros Mountains, dissolve, absorb, and carry high concentrations of salts, gypsum, and calcium carbonates from the surrounding rocks. As they flow to the plain, the rivers lose some water through evaporation, thus increasing the mineral concentrations. Through irrigation and the evapo-transpiration of the irrigation water by the crops in the cultivated area and immediately downslope from it, these concentrations reach such high levels that the minerals are precipitated into the soil. If this process continues unabated the mineral content of the soil will become so high that crops cannot grow and the high salt concentration will not allow for proper drainage. But if excess irrigation water is applied, at least yearly in most cases, so that the fields are flooded and "washed," then the mineral concentrations will not build up to permanently damaging levels.² This "washing" sometimes even occurs naturally: a zone of date groves about one mile north of the Shatt al-ĊArab is known to be "washed" twice daily by the fresh water of the Shatt when it is backed up


But without constant upkeep of the irrigation systems, this washing is not possible, and much cultivable land in Khuzestan has been lost in this manner. Southern Khuzestan has suffered this loss most severely (Figure 3), perhaps because this area is downslope of most of the cultivated areas of the plain and therefore more saline, and because by the time it reaches there the water is more scarce and more saline, and thus even more necessary in abundance for proper maintenance.\footnote{Kirkby, "Land and Water Resources," pp. 2 and 4.} One effect of this gradual salinization of the downslope areas of the plain is a change in these areas from the cultivation of wheat to the cultivation of barley, which may have a higher tolerance for saline conditions.\footnote{Wenke, "Imperial Investments and Agricultural Development," p. 158.}

In some areas of southern Khuzestan today soil salinity has reached the point that "salt crusts" form on the surface of the land. That this is not an exclusively recent occurrence is evidenced by the fact that the Zenj rebellion in nearby Basrah (which quickly spread to Ahwaz), in the third/ninth century was carried out by African slaves who were forced to remove this
salt crust for the profit of Basran entrepreneurs. Anyone who has had to walk across these salt crusts and had the sodium fumes rise up and burn his eyes can sympathize with the plight of the Zenj.

North of the Haft Tepe anticline, salinization is not so severe as in the southern area, and it must have been even less so in ancient and medieval times. This area forms natural pasturelands when not cultivated, and has traditionally provided the chief winter grazing grounds for the Bakhtiari from the Zagros north of the plain. These rich pasturelands, together with the lush summer grasslands in the highland area north and east of Dezful constitute "a single natural ecosystem . . . [that] provides as strong an inducement to migratory stockbreeding as to intensive, settled agriculture."\(^1\)

**Water Resources**

Khuzestan is the largest lowland area in Iran, and because of its large expanse of flat plain, downsloping gently from the Zagros foothills to the Gulf, and its fertile alluvial soils, irrigation here, at least in the past, has been relatively easy and rewarding. But for land use and human settlement on the plain, at least as important as these characteristics has been

the factor of water availability, especially the availability of irrigation water.\textsuperscript{1} This in turn means the availability of non-saline water and the ability to transport it (usually by gravity canals and qanats) to the fields.

Qanats (Figure 4) have been used in Iran for at least 2,500 years. They are underground irrigation tunnels that extend upslope until the water table is tapped and downslope to bring the fresh water to a village or field. Access to the tunnel is by a series of vertical shafts, some of which are several hundred feet deep, spaced about 30 to 100 yards apart. The tunnel is constructed by first sinking the shaft, then tunnelling upslope approximately half the distance to the next projected shaft and downslope an equal distance. The next shaft is sunk and the process is repeated until the water table has been tapped upslope at the mādar chāh (mother well). This tunnelling process incidentally creates a series of earthen rings around the mouths of the shafts, which are then visible on air photos and easily mapped (Figure 5). The water in most qanat tunnels is about six to twelve inches in depth and flows at the rate of a mile or two an hour. Although there are qanats known to deliver up to 4,200 gallons of water per minute, most qanats average between 400 and 30 gallons per minute, which generally is sufficient to

\textsuperscript{1}Kirkby, "Land and Water Resources," p. 12.
Figure 4. Cross-section of a qanat.
Figure 5. The irrigation system that supported Jundi-Sabur.
irrigate between 200 and 50 acres.\textsuperscript{1} One great advantage qanats have over other types of water delivery systems is that they tap water high up on the alluvial fan, where it is fresh and non-saline. And compared with open irrigation canals, their losses due to evaporation are low.\textsuperscript{2}

Northern Khuzestan is fortunate to have three major perennial rivers, the Diz, the Karun, and the Karkhah (see Figure 6), all of which in the past were accessible for irrigation in certain areas, before they down-cut so deeply into their present channels. Northern Khuzestan also has three seasonal streams, the Siah Mansur, the Sha'ur, and the Ouj-i Rud, which are used by the present inhabitants of the plain for irrigation purposes.

Farther south, near the Persian Gulf, the Jarrahi River (formerly known as the Tab) joins the Karun. Today this river has numerous offshoots that bleed into the Gulf before the Jarrahi meets the Karun, and some of the area directly south of the river (see Figure 6) is a tidal estuary, which usually floods during high tide. Conditions were similar 1,000 years ago, as can be seen from accounts of Abbad and Mihruban:


\textsuperscript{2}For a complete review of qanats in the Near East, see: Cressy, "Qanats, Karez, and Foggaras," pp. 27-44; or H. Goblot, Les Qanats. Une Technique d'Acquisition de l'Eau (Paris: Mouton, 1979).
Figure 6. Major hydrological resources of Khuzestan.
the former became an island during high tide, while the latter was inhabitable only because of a "sea wall."\(^1\)

North of the Haft Tepe Ridge (see Figure 2) the water can be raised five to ten meters above the present river levels to plain level by means of canals or qanats, and thus the whole of the northern plain can be irrigated rather easily. Irrigation is more difficult, however, south of the Haft Tepe Ridge, where the units of the plain are somewhat smaller and thus more complex canal systems are needed.\(^2\)

It is believed by most scholars (e.g., Wenke, Kirkby, Adams, etc.) that the efforts required for canal systems in this southernmost area were only undertaken in Sasanian or early Islamic times and that during earlier and later periods this area saw extremely light human settlement, except along the rivers. Today this southern area is often submerged by spring flood-waters, which are occasionally severe enough to cut off the railroad between Ahwaz and Khurramshahr for up to 100 days in the winter. It has even been suggested\(^3\) that such severe


flooding may in fact be one of the factors preventing the agricultural redevelopment of this southern area.

For all these reasons, the northern half of the plain has been the area of heaviest and most consistent settlement and development throughout the history of human occupation in this area. This holds true even for the past century, when oil discoveries turned Abbadan into one of the world's largest oil refining centers. That the inhabitants of the area recognize a distinction between the two areas is supported by Maqdisī's reporting of an encounter between his travelling companion and a man of Ahwaz who, when referred to by Maqdisī's companion as a Khūzī, replied, "The Khūz are those who are [found] above al-Ahwāz [in towns] such as al-Askar, Jundisābūr, and al-Sūs. As for us [Ahwaz and south], we are Īrāqīs."¹ And the government in the past has recognized this distinction as well, by granting the northern part of Khuzestan (specifically Sus and Jundishapur) as tax farms separate from the southern area.²

Another factor in the division at Ahwaz between northern and southern Khuzestan is that the Karun is navigable by (pre-modern) ocean-going vessels from the Gulf up to that point.

¹Maqdisī, Ahsan, III, p. 403.
North of Ahwaz the river has a series of rapids, which made portage necessary. But in many modern accounts of Khuzestan the distinction between these two separate ecological zones is not always articulated, and it should be remembered that it is the northern part (often called the Susiana Plain) that has experienced most of the agricultural and urban development in the past and that has been the focus of recent intensive archaeological studies.

Michael Kirkby, who made a study of the water resources of Khuzestan, evaluated the agricultural potential of its three major rivers in this way:

In the northern area the most important area for irrigation is on the fan formed by the Ab-i-Diz when it was at a higher level. The fan, which is almost entirely on the east side of the river, can thus be irrigated with a minimum of effort. The Diz has the additional advantages of relatively low salinity, and a relatively high summer flow . . . allowing summer irrigation. The area of intensive summer irrigation is mostly on the upper part of the fan, close to Dizful . . . . The Karun also has high enough summer flows, with low salinity, to allow summer cropping, but there are not such

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large areas of flat land along the upper Karun, most of the water from which is used for irrigation farther south. The Karkheh flow is much less in summer, and more saline, so that only a small area is suitable for summer irrigation. Below these areas of year-round growth are larger areas in which the river waters are used to augment and more-or-less guarantee a winter crop. . . . This area extends south of Shush across the full width of the fans, and farther south in a band running close to the rivers, but widening out again south of Ahwaz.¹

Because of the location of various bridges, dams, and weirs that date to Sasanian times, we know that except for becoming more deeply incised the river regimes have changed little in the past 1,500 years. For example, parts of the Sasanian bridges at Dizful (over the Diz River) and at Shushtar (over the Karun) are still standing and are only meters away from modern ones. Even today the remains of these bridges are impressive structures—and must have been even more so when first constructed. Both bridges are mentioned in numerous Arab and Persian medieval geographies²—the one at Shushtar especially,


because it was constructed entirely of iron, boulders, and mortar, and was so big it had a mosque in its middle and shops along its span.¹

But even though these river regimes have not changed substantially for the last 1,500 years, there is evidence that the flow characteristics of the rivers have. This change in flow characteristics is important because irrigation systems depend on rate of water flow almost as much as on location. For example, we can see on the plain today Sasanian canals that are off-shoots of streams presently carrying too little water for irrigation purposes.² This suggests that sometime after the Islamic Conquest the flow characteristics of certain streams in Khuzestan changed and that this may have caused agricultural strategies there to change also.

To understand traditional agricultural strategies on the plain, we must also understand how and why these irrigation systems were used. The present irrigation system on the plain is closely matched to summer requirements. But this may not always have been so:


Sasanian and Early Islamic canal systems appear to have been approximately twice as extensive as present ones for both the Karkheh-Shaur and the Diz systems. The inference is that these systems were constructed primarily for winter irrigation. Under present economic and population conditions, the increased winter yields resulting from irrigation are not sufficient to justify the costs of canal maintenance in the absence of summer cropping. It may be argued however that the combination of high population and efficient central canal organisation might be sufficient to increase crop values and decrease irrigation costs to a point where canals used only in the winter could be worthwhile. Such conditions may have existed in Sasanian/Early Islamic times.¹

And if water-intensive cash crops like rice and sugar cane were major crops during Sasanian and Islamic times (as will be argued below), this type of irrigation systems makes more sense.

In discussing irrigation practices here, we should not lose sight of the fact that not only is dry-farming (agriculture relying only on rainfall) possible in Khuzestan, but that it often has been employed here. The first millennium of settled agriculture (ca. 6000-5000 B.C.) in this region almost certainly saw reliance on dry-farming,² and it occasionally is still practised today in the area just north of the Haft Tepe Ridge, a recent study showed that dry farming yields of about six bushels of wheat per acre could be increased.

to approximately nine bushels per acre with irrigation. While this is a dramatic 50 percent increase in yield, it also shows that man-made water control systems (including canals, qanats, weirs, etc.) are not necessary prerequisites for settled life or agriculture in this area: they represent "conscious attempts to increase or stabilize agricultural production" and the remains of these systems represent important primary archaeological data for marking changes in central government political and economic control and policy.

Climate

The climate of Khuzestan is perhaps the single most important factor for its history as an area for human settlement. The three main factors determining this climate favorable for agriculture are rainfall, temperature, and cloud cover. Although dry-farming is possible in areas of Mesopotamia receiving as little as 200 mms of rainfall annually, under such conditions agricultural stability is not always possible. Dry-farming in areas receiving between 200 and 300 mms of rain annually generally takes the form not of permanent settlement,

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2Wenke, "Imperial Investments and Agricultural Development," p. 146.
but of sporadic "catch-crop" cultivation.\textsuperscript{1} Thus the area of most consistent human settlement and agriculture in Khuzestan has been the area north of the 300 mm isohyet (Figure 7) up to the mountains.

And while the evidence is contradictory, the amount of rainfall over the past three millennia seems to have been relatively stable, with occasional wet and dry periods (Figure 8). But since the canals and qanats may have been constructed to augment winter cropping, when the area receives almost all of its annual rainfall,\textsuperscript{2} even these minor swings may have had great importance for agriculture. During late Sasanian times (A.D. 500-640), for example, we see an extended dry period, and other evidence\textsuperscript{3} suggests a concurrent population decline and a decline in investments in irrigation systems. And while these events may have independent causes, it is possible that consecutive years of decreased rainfall put sufficient strain on the complex Sassanian canal systems to begin a destructive cycle of reduced maintenance investments, followed by reduced agricultural productivity.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}Adams, "Agriculture and Urban Life," p. 110.


\textsuperscript{3}Wenke, "Imperial Investments and Agricultural Development."

\textsuperscript{4}Wenke, "Imperial Investments and Agricultural Development," p. 145.
Figure 7. Rainfall gradients in Khuzestan.
Figure 8. Meteorologic conditions in ancient & medieval Khuzestan.
And, Wenke might have added, followed by reduced population.

Since we can see from Figure 8 a similar dry period during medieval Islamic times (A.D. 1100-1200), we shall examine agricultural productivity and population estimates for this period as well, in order to understand possible causes and effects. Unfortunately, the meteorological information for the period directly preceding and of main interest to this study (A.D. 700-1000) is ambiguous, but we may be able to shed some light on this area through historical works.

Khuzestan's weather is marked by extreme seasonality, but these extremes are almost never drastic enough to prevent year-round agriculture. Average daytime summer (May-October) temperatures regularly exceed 40°C (104°F) and it is not too unusual for them to reach 50°C (122°F) on occasion. And although the annual range in temperature in Khuzestan is 25°C (77°F), the absolute minimum recorded at Abadan during the 1960s was -4°C (25°F), while the average minimum during the coldest part of winter was 7°C (45°F).¹ Dizful and Ahwaz, more typical Khuzestani towns (since they are inland and unlike Abadan do not suffer the direct effects of the Gulf on their climate), had as average minimums 8.7°C (48°F) and 7.8°C (46°F) respectively during the same winter period.² This basic range in


²Ganji, "Climate of Iran," pp. 246-247.
temperature, between about 8°C (46°F) and 40°C (104°F), provides a year-round growing season—ideal for growing cash-crops like sugar cane, which requires 13 months to mature.

Other factors equally as important for such crops in this area are the amount of cloud cover and the length of day. Orchard crops, rice, and sugar cane all require intensive irrigation and long growing seasons, and they are especially dependent on the intensity and duration of the sunlight as well. Rice productivity, for example, is more closely tied to the amount of sunshine (in which the variables are lack of cloud cover and the length of day) than to almost any other single variable.¹

The combination of all these factors favorable to agriculture occurs nowhere else in Iran. The only area in Iran that approaches Khuzestan in agricultural potential is Azerbaijan, where winter conditions prohibit the successful cultivation of most of the cash-crops we find traditionally grown in Khuzestan, such as pears, dates, citrons, pomegranates, grapes, rice, and sugar cane.²


CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL SOURCES

Although there are many general works on Middle Eastern economic and political history\(^1\) and specific works on certain areas, especially Baghdad,\(^2\) there exists as yet no study of political and economic conditions in Khuzestan during the period from about 320/932 to 498/1105.\(^3\)

To remedy this I shall in this chapter describe the basic criteria for utilizing any evidence, examine certain problems that are specific to medieval Islamic historical works, discuss

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\(^3\) The politics of the last few centuries, however, are described in J. R. Perry, "The Banū Kaʿb," Le Monde Iranien et l'Islam I (1971): 131-152.
the relevant historical sources, and construct a political history of Khuzestan for the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries.

Criteria for Evidence

In order to be able to utilize any given piece of evidence there are two basic questions about it that must be answered: first, is this evidence genuine (meaning not a forgery), and second, is it authentic (meaning accurate, trustworthy, or truthfully reported)?¹

Fortunately, in Medieval Arabic, Persian, and Turkish documentary research, much of the work involved in answering the first question has already been done for the researcher. By a quick search of C. Brockelmann's Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, C. A. Storey's Persian Literature, Fuat Sezgin's Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums, or various manuscript catalogues,² one can usually determine if the document in question (published or manuscript) is in fact genuine or forged. For questions other than a work's genuineness, however, these reference


²Especially the British Museum manuscript catalogues, e.g., Charles Rieu, Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum (London: The British Museum, 1879-1883).
books should be used critically, since they occasionally disagree and often do not consider the authenticity of any given work or such related questions as: Is the information in this work original with this author? Was this author in a position to know about what he wrote? Did this author copy (or learn) information from an earlier author? And, did this author have an unstated reason (perhaps financial, personal, or political) for writing what he did and how he did?

The implications of the above questions are clear: We must be able to ascertain the credibility and trustworthiness of the evidence and we must be able to judge which is the best available evidence.

In the last analysis we must recognize that any historian's perceptions will be colored by circumstances we cannot entirely know. With Islamic history, as with any history, there is no entirely objective historiography.

Problems with Islamic Historical Documents

We must never over-estimate the evidence from medieval histories: It alone does not comprise all the necessary data for a complete history. It comprises information that was thought important at the time the work was written, which is usually quite different from the types of information sought by modern scholars. Thus we see that the topics al-Mada'ini, for example,
(one of the most famous and prolific early Islamic historians—

_d. 225/840) felt worthy of reporting were mainly social (e.g.,

Genealogy of the Quraysh, Book of Caliphs' wives who married
again, Book of Women who aped men, etc.) and only occasionally
included discussions of a more historical or economic nature
(e.g., Book of the Striking of Dirhams and the Exchange Rates,
Addresses of _Ali and his dispatches to his governors, etc.).¹

Political or economic information, therefore, can often be
gleaned from such accounts, but we cannot expect all these works
to be of equal use, or to present all the information we need,
or to present it in an easily usable form.

Perhaps most important to remember though is that these
are records of the elite and that they are usually written with
a conscious eye towards one's place in history, as Maqdisi
says:

The learned do not cease to prefer composing books
so that their traces may not be extinguished and
their stories not cease. I wanted to follow their
practices and imitate their habits; and to set up a
signpost, by which my memory will be kept alive,
and a benefit to mankind, by which my Lord would
be pleased.²

The two purposes of writing history that Maqdisi mentions

¹See D. S. Margoliouth, *Lectures on Arabic Historians*
(Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delhi, 1930), pp. 87-89.

deserve further mention here, for they influence not only the way the histories were written but the information they include as well. The urge to have one's memory kept alive, for example, predisposes one towards writing something "memorable," so that often in works such as the Ta'rikh-i Bayhaqi or the Saljuqnamah\(^1\) we read speeches (usually portrayed as spontaneous outbursts) that are remarkable examples of great rhetoric and hindsight, blending Quranic sayings with legal precedents, historical insights, references to the life of the Prophet, touches of poetry, and great wit.\(^2\) And since it's difficult to believe that every great general, Caliph, or Companion was a budding Oscar Wilde, we must attribute at least parts of these "speeches" to contemporary or later literary editing by the historians themselves.

Maqdisi's second purpose, to provide a "benefit to mankind" is an echo of Herodotus, who thought that by giving great men their "due meed of glory"\(^3\) those who follow would learn

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\(^1\)These histories are often written, and thus the speeches recorded, by court attendants (i.e., people who would have been "at the scene"), so there is at least the superficial possibility of faithful transmission.

\(^2\)See, for example, \(\text{Imád al-Dín's portrayal (through al-Bundarí) of Alp Arslân's deathbed speech (in Recueil des Textes Relatifs à l'Histoire des Seldjoucides, vol. II, p. 47) or any of Mahmúd's or Mas'úd's speeches as recorded by Bayhaqi (in the Ta'rikh-i Bayhaqi).}\)

\(^3\)Barzun and Graff, Modern Researcher, p. 56.
moral lessons. This didactic sense was especially strong in early Islamic historiography, when history was seen as the unfolding of God's plan for the believers.

Similarly we cannot see medieval Muslim historiography as secular history or as apart from religion, since their religion gave these historians a world-view into which all historical fact "fit."

And other factors influenced the writing of history in this area as well. Contemporary Seljuq historians, for example, occasionally fabricated tales of terrible depredations visited upon the caliph and the Iranian populace by the Shi'i Buyids, at least partially to legitimize and glorify the invasion by the Sunni Seljuqs. Some authors (such as Niẓām al-Mulk) fabricated fantastic tales of aberrant, irreligious behavior by the Isma'iliis, to justify the extreme anti-subversive methods employed by the state. Such biases extend even to the later secondary sources: Spuler has been criticized for showing anti-Daylamite and pro-Turkish leanings in his Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit.¹

The Seljuqs especially, since they were the first Turks to rule in Iran as Turks (rather than as assimilated Persians, as had Sebuktegin in Ghazna), have suffered a perhaps unjustifiably

bad reputation as the group that initiated the decline of the "golden age of Islam." And the reasons behind this reputation may lie as much in the biases of the historians as in any actions the Seljuqs might have taken. The anti-Ottoman, anti-Turkish bias of Arab intellectuals after the First World War is well known, but it is not often noted that political conditions in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe also resulted in a prejudice against Turkey and things Turkish, a prejudice that influenced scholarship.\(^1\) Similarly, there may have been a subtle but pervasive anti-Seljuq bias in the West because of the Crusades.

Also, in medieval Middle Eastern historiography especially,\(^2\) there is a tendency to idealize certain individuals and to ascribe all good works from any one dynasty to the most famous member of that dynasty. Thus we have certain real figures in Iranian history taking on almost legendary qualities: Chosroes Anushirvan (Khusraw Nushirvān) is invariably portrayed as the wise, compassionate, all-knowing monarch; his minister Buzurgmehr, as the ideal vizier, cunning but above all loyal to


\(^2\)And consequently this tendency appears in the later works that rely on these histories as well.
his ruler; Alexander the Great as the ideal hero-warrior (viz., the *Iskandarnāmah*), fearless and daring;  

*Cābud al-Dawlah* as an example of a just Shi'i ruler (most roads, canals, qanats, etc. built during the Buyid period (whether by him or by his brothers) are ascribed to him, and his biography is embellished with legendary tales taken from the story of Bahram Gur); and Shapur I as another ideal Sasanian ruler, to whom the building of many towns, bridges and canals in Khuzestan are (incorrectly) ascribed.

Other medieval writers, such as Niẓām al-Mulk or Kay Ka'us, intentionally idealized previous rulers for didactic purposes. For example, when in the *Siyyāsātīnāmah* Niẓām al-Mulk sang the praises of Chosroes Anushirvan or *Cābud al-Dawlah*, it was to show the Seljuq ruler Malikshāh that in spite of having the "wrong" religion, these rulers acted as monarchs should—that there were standards of government that every good monarch should

1It is now proposed by some historians that Buzurgmehr was not an historical personage, but rather a creation of Muslim historiographers specifically for didactic purposes. See M. R. Waldman, *Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative: A Case Study in Perso-Islamicate Historiography* (Columbus: OSU Press, 1980), p. 192.


should practice. 1 Niẓām al-Mulk was not unaware of historical fact, he simply chose (often) to ignore it to further his didactic purposes. Unfortunately, many later scholars reading such works as the Siyāsāt-nāmah or the Qābūs-nāmah overlook their original didactic purpose and read them as history, leading to inappropriate inferences on their part. 2 To avoid unwarranted or inappropriate conclusions based on the didactic or mythological aspects of these works, it is necessary to utilize the histories written as close in time to the event or person as possible and to regard many of these "histories" with a very critical eye.

The very nature of the traditional means of transmitting history in the Middle East, that is, its oral tradition, makes it susceptible to such mythologizing, exaggeration, and mistakes in detail. Further, even after writing became established as a legitimate medium for transmitting history, the practice of repeating many varying hadiths about a single event made for confusion and inaccurate conclusions. This is especially true when the hadiths were presented uncritically, as done by Tabari.


Tabari is regarded by some modern historians as especially valuable for accounts of pre-Islamic times because, they say, he "sifted conflicting and contradictory accounts" of these early times. This is potentially harmful to reliable historiography, since such unquestioning acceptance could easily lead to unwarranted conclusions.

And finally we should mention that the distinction usually made between primary and secondary sources of evidence is a bit strained here. Even those works often considered primary sources for Middle Eastern history are often in truth secondary: Tabari, for example, was not a witness to the many events he recorded (from "Creation" to 310/923), he merely copied earlier sources—some of whom were (obviously) also not first-hand observers. So when we write the history of the Middle East of over 1,000 years ago, even using sources written in Arabic or Persian, we are often just sifting out the sometimes contradictory secondary or tertiary sources.

Given all these problems, what can we expect to accomplish using Islamic historical documents? We can hope to construct a

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2For "unshifted" accounts, see, for example, Tabari's accounts of some Sasanian activities on the Susiana Plain (Tabari, Tarih al-Rusūl wa'l-Mulūk, I, ed. M. J. de Goeje et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1879-1901), pp. 839-840.
basic outline of political events (who ruled when and where); we can discover the ostensible reasons for many actions (why rulers did certain things); and we can glean as much economic data as possible from these sources, and then subject them to comparative analyses in the light of numismatic, geographical and archaeological evidence.

**Islamic Historiography**

Except for the Qur'an, almost nothing else was written during the first few centuries of Islam. The reasons for this curious fact are many and include: paper wasn't introduced into the Islamic world until the late second/late eighth century; the belief was prevalent during the first two centuries of Islam that the Qur'an should be the only written book--even the Sunnah\(^1\) were only rarely written--and it was felt that all other works should be transmitted orally, if at all; since Islam cancelled all that went before it, it was not felt necessary to record the history of the conquered peoples; in traditional Arab society (and this is still somewhat true today) learning and one's

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\(^1\)The Sunnah are the collected stories of the sayings and actions of the prophet Muhammad, and as such, form one of the bases of Islamic jurisprudence. A Sunnah consists of a hadith (a tradition), a narrative dating to the time of the Prophet or his Companions and describing his sayings or actions (from which are garnered legally binding precedents), and an isnād, a listing of an unbroken chain of reliable transmitters of this hadith.
reputation consisted of what one memorized and could recite orally.\(^1\)

But eventually histories and other written works such as dictionaries and biographical dictionaries were necessary in Islam: 1) for explication of certain illusive surahs in the Qur'an; 2) because rank and privilege in Islamic society (e.g., receiving part of the booty) were determined by precedence in accepting Islam and by tribal affiliation; and 3) because cities and countries enjoyed different rights under Islamic law according to how they reacted to the Conquest (i.e., if they submitted peacefully, if they resisted the invaders, etc.). And, it may be argued, the written word was allowed because it was impossible to govern and administer an empire that stretched from Spain to Khorasan without some form of efficient communication system. Similarly, the early Islamic rulers were finding it impossible to rule their expanded empire on the basis of the Qur'an alone—more guides to Islamic law were necessary, and after the late second/eighth century, these were provided by biographies of the Prophet and the codification of hadiths.

Until at least the third/ninth century, the distinctions between historiography, geographical writing, \(\text{adab}\) (belles

\(^1\)D. S. Margoliouth notes (in Lectures on Arabic Historians, p. 94) that "even beyond the middle of the second century" there was an objection to written (rather than oral) transmission.
lettres), and hadith were not great. The difference, for example, between Ṭabarī's Ta'īkh (history) and Bukhārī's Sahīh (a collection of hadiths) is partly that Ṭabarī arranged his stories annalistically, and Bukhārī legal-topically. They both repeat isnads (though Ṭabarī is not so rigorous as Bukhārī) and even repeat basically the same narratives. Similarly, the distinction made between Ṭabarī's Ta'īkh (history) and Yāqūt's Muṣjām al-Buldān (usually called a geography) is arbitrary. In addition to geographical description, Yāqūt's Muṣjām contains local history, biographical information, and even poetry!

Nevertheless, for ease of discussion, we may divide the relevant sources broadly into histories and geographies, and even make some few subdivisions in these categories.

Ṭabarī's Ta'īkh al-Rusūl wa al-Mulūk is probably the most famous early history in Arabic, and certainly the most comprehensive. Even in its own day it was considered so authoritative that "no later compiler ever set himself to collect and investigate afresh the materials for the early history of Islam, but either abstracted them from al-Ṭabarī . . . or else began where al-Ṭabarī left off."

This sense of taqlīd is one of the strongest currents in

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2Taqlīd is the unquestioning adoption of concepts or information, or uncritical faith (e.g., in a source's authenticity).
Islamic historiography (and, of course, is not absent in the West). Almost every historian in this area drew on his predecessors for some or all of his information. This in itself is not bad, as long as the reader can make a judgement about the veracity of the statements presented. And to be able to do this, one needs to know which historians drew on which previous ones.

Figure 9 shows this information for the principal general histories used in this paper. Figure 10 is its equivalent for histories that tend to concentrate on Iran or the Seljuqs in particular. Though not exhaustive, these figures do show what books were major influences on later works and what books were used as sources for these later works. A more complete description of these relationships can be found in Appendix III. Suffice it here to say that these figures show the intricacies of information transfer and the extent to which some authors relied on others.

The first of these authors to concern us directly here is Miskawayh, whose Tajārib al-Ummam is invaluable for the study of this period. Miskawayh was a kātib (secretary) in the service of the Ādud al-Dawlah and Bahā al-Dawlah, so that it might be thought that his account would be biased in favor of the Buyids, but fortunately it is comparatively simple, straightforward, unfanatic, and scrupulous in attributing praise and blame where

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1Parentheses around titles indicate the work is no longer extant.
Figure 9. The inter-relationships of various histories.
Figure 10. The inter-relationships of various "Seljuq" histories.
due. Miskawayh does favor certain Buyids over others, and the Buyids over some of the provincial rulers, but he is usually obvious in such prejudices, allowing us to discount certain of his opinions.

The fact that Miskawayh was a kāṭīb in government service has two additional benefits: he was in a position to observe first-hand the events he records (or to have accounts of the events on the authority of eye-witnesses), and the types of information that most interest many later historians were of some interest to him (e.g., the mechanics of the taxation system, the inter-familial power struggles, the relationships between the provincial rulers and the Buyids, etc.).¹

Miskawayh's chronicle ends with the year 369/979, at which point we can use a rather less satisfactory source, the Dhayl Tajāriba al-Ummām by Rūdhīwarī. This is perhaps less useful because, first, it was written under the Seljuqs and is somewhat biased against the Buyids, and second, it is less dispassionate. It has been proposed that this Dhayl is in fact

¹I have seen (and copied) an unattributed manuscript in Ottoman Turkish in Leiden (Cod. 1408) called "Excerptum turricum de familia al-Baridi et Schahinides," which covers much of the same information as does the first volume of Miskawayh's Tajāriḥ. Although it has been suggested (by Professor Pierre MacKay) that this is an Ottoman Turkish translation of Miskawayh, on close examination I have determined it is not. Because the author is unknown, however, the veracity of his statements cannot be ascertained, and I have therefore followed Miskawayh when the two have differed.
an abridgement\textsuperscript{1} of part of the Ta'\text{\textr}ikh by Hil\text{\textl} al-\text{\texts}\text{\textb}\text{\texti}b (much of which is no longer extant), who was, like Miskawayh, a k\text{\textt}ib and therefore in a position to speak with authority on the events of his day. Part of Hil\text{\textl} al-\text{\texts}\text{\textb}\text{\texti}b's Ta'\text{\textr}ikh is extant, however, and provides much useful information about the years 389/999 to 393/1002.

After this period we no longer have such "k\text{\textt}ib-style" books for this area, and instead we rely on more "universal" histories. These histories, of which Ibn al-Jawz\text{\texti}l's, Ibn al-Ath\text{\texti}r's, Sibt ibn al-Jawz\text{\texti}l's, and Ibn Sh\text{\textk}ir's were the principal ones used in this study, are not as detailed for the individual provinces or for individual events as a work like Miskawayh's, since they cover usually the entire Islamic world. Still these universal histories often make use of sources no longer available to us (e.g., Ibn al-Ath\text{\texti}r makes use of now-lost portions of Hil\text{\textl} al-\text{\texts}\text{\textb}\text{\texti}b's Ta'\text{\textr}ikh), and they suffice as a supplement to the earlier works and where no other particularistic history exists.

Of these "universal" works simply copied earlier reports, so that it is quite unnecessary (and redundant) for the modern scholar to cite both Miskawayh and the corresponding pages in Ibn al-Ath\text{\texti}r (since the latter took most of his information on the early Buyids from the former) or the F\text{\texta}rn\text{\textn}\text{\textm}ah (see

\textsuperscript{1}By D. S. Margoliouth in The Eclipse of the \textsuperscript{c}Abbasid Caliphate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1921), Preface, viii. It is more probably, however, a reworking and abridgement of this, since the two styles vary so.
Figure 9.) and the Nuzhat al-Qulūb and the Ta'rikh-i Guzīda (since Mustawfi took almost all his information on Fars during this period from Ibn al-Balkhi).\footnote{As, for example, M. Kabir does in his The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad (334/946-447/1055) (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1964).}

For certain years we have extant parts of both Sibt ibn al-Jawzī's work and that of his grandfather. And when during the Buyid period these accounts overlap, Sibt ibn al-Jawzī's Mirāt al-Zamān is preferable as a source to his grandfather's al-Muntazam for two reasons: Ibn al-Jawzī was a Sunni jurist, writing under the caliph and the Seljugs in Baghdad, and at times he was arrested and sent into exile by Shi'a viziers.\footnote{See Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, s.v. "Ibn al-Djawzi."} Since the Buyids were both Shi'a and the predecessors of the Seljugs, he may have been biased against them. Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, on the other hand, was more concerned with Muslim-Christian struggles during the Crusades, and therefore less concerned with intra-Islamic rivalries.\footnote{See Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, s.v. "Sibt ibn al-Djawzī."}

Second, Ibn al-Jawzī's teachers were all Cūlamā, so that his background and sources are religio-legal. And while his sources (Ibn Zaghuni, al-Jawaliqī, etc.) are impeccable in their own way, the information he can transmit from them is more legal than historical. Sibt, however, used not only his grandfather's
history, but also Hilāl al-Ṣābi's and Cīmād al-Dīn's, and other now lost works (see Figure 9).

The Ṣuyūn al-Tawārīkh by Ibn Shākir also relied heavily on Ibn al-Jawzī's al-Muntazam but contains much additional information, particularly about climatological and agricultural topics (e.g., he reports droughts, famines, locust plagues, floods, earthquakes, etc.). Such events may have been even more economically devastating than they are today, when a quick recovery is added by the state's ability to draw on resources from unaffected areas.

As for the histories that concentrate on the Seljuqs, probably the most detailed ones about their rise and entry into the Islamic world are the Ta'īkh-i Bayhaqī and the Saljūqnamah. Abu al-Fadl Bayhaqi was a Ghaznavid court official and thus was in a position to see firsthand the Seljuq's initial encounters with the Muslim world. By the time he wrote his history, his former patrons (Maḥmūd and Masʿūd) were dead, so that he was able to write quite frankly about the events he witnessed. And though most of his Ta'īkh is lost, the part that concerns us most directly (the entry of the Seljuqs into the Dār al-Islām) is extant.

The Saljūqnamah, too, concentrates on this early period, though from the point of view of the Seljuqs rather than the

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1Although it covers events up to the 6th/12th century.
Ghaznavids, and it formed the basis for many of the later works on the Seljuqs. Some time after its composition a Dhayl-i Saljūqnāmah was written, but it is a rather disjointed account and may have been gleaned from other works.¹

Given this basic introduction to some of the problems and potentials of the historical sources, I shall now utilize this evidence. No previous synthesis of this evidence has been specific to Khuzestan or has focussed on the political and economic history of this area in this period. While not ignoring, of course, the major events outside of this area that had affected it, I shall try to use the evidence from these historical sources to construct a basic political history of Khuzestan from 320/932 to 498/1105.

**The Political History of Khuzestan:**
**320/932 to 498/1105**

By the year 320/932, when the caliph al-Muqtadir was put to death, the Abbasid Empire was a shadow of its former self. For over 75 years it had been wracked by internal convulsions: the Zenj rebellion in Basrah and Ahwaz had tied up the caliph's troops (and revenues from these areas) for more than 15 years;

¹The British Museum manuscript Add. 7628 fol. 260b-262a (not 260b-261b, as noted in their catalogue, vol. 1, pp. 74-78) called "Dhayl-i Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh" by Abū Hāmid Muḥammad ibn Ibrahim is supposedly a continuation of the Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh by Rashīd al-Dīn (see Figure 10), but it is in fact a mislabelled copy of the Dhayl-i Saljūqnāmah.
at the same time the caliph was confronted by, and, because of the Zenj rebellion, was forced to make some concessions to, the Saffarids, who controlled for a time Khuzestan, Fars, and Sistan; Egypt had broken away from Baghdad and in it was established the semi-independent Ikhshidid dynasty; the Qarmatians were actively rebelling in eastern Arabia; and other Shi'ites were active political threats in Daylam, Fars, Yemen, and other parts of Arabia.

All these political/religious problems descended on an already much reduced empire: in 206/821 Khorasan had broken away under Tahir and by this time was ruled by the powerful Samanids, who offered only nominal obeisance to the caliph in Baghdad, and Spain, with its own Umayyid caliph, was totally independent of Baghdad.

The reduction in area ruled meant a reduction in revenue for the caliphate, and the rise of the Samanids in Khorasan meant the loss of the steady flow of Turkish mercenaries for the caliphal army, so that the caliph became easy prey first to his own provincial governors, and then to the Shi'ite Buyids.

The Baridis 315/927 - 329/941

The history of Khuzestan during this period is inextricably intertwined with that of one family, the Baridis (Figure 11). Their eponymous ancestor was apparently a postmaster of Basrah, and in the contemporary sources this same nisbah is used
Figure 11. The Barid family.
invariably for the eldest son of this family, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Ahmad (d. 333/944).

By all accounts Abū ʿAbd Allāh was duplicitous and so ruthless that he killed his own brother (with whom he had been on good terms) when he wanted the revenue from his brother's estate. But even given the probable literary editing, his quick thinking and wit and the fact that he wasn't too different from the men he was dealing with, all come through in the following anecdote:

ʿAlī ibn ʿIsā (the vizier) was rebuking Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Barīḍī, saying "Oh, Abū ʿAbd Allāh, did you not fear God when you swore what you swore when we were all assembled in the Dār al-Sulṭān [the Caliphal palace] (Oh surely God's vengeance is eternal!) that your revenues and the revenues of your brothers from your estate (dayr) in Wasit were 10,000 dinars, and I found from the account which al-Humānī submitted to me that it was 30,000 dinars?" Abū ʿAbd Allāh replied, "I was guided by the example of our Master [meaning ʿAlī ibn ʿIsā:] may God support him, who, when Abū al-Ḥasan ibn al-Furāt [the previous vizier] asked him about the revenues (irtifāʿ) from his estate, did not tell the truth, rather he concealed it. And I knew that with his piety [he would not have done this] had he not known that dissimulation (al-taqiyyah) was permissible if one fears oppression from answering truthfully." It was as though he made ʿAlī ibn ʿIsā swallow a stone.1

Abū ʿAbd Allāh and his brother Abū Yūsif began to amass wealth and influence by farming the private estates of the viziers and managing the kharāj of Ram Hurmuz and Surraq.2 Kharāj

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1Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 110.

2Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 152-153 and 158.
is one of the various names for land tax, at first levied on all lands conquered by force and not divided among the Muslim armies, i.e., land still held by unbelievers. Since kharaj is a fixed percentage of the yield (usually 10 percent or 20 percent), it is a good economic indicator. After the conversion of many land owners to Islam (and the subsequent alienation of the tax on their land), it came to be imposed on all undistributed land.¹ A detailed discussion of Islamic taxation is beyond the scope of this thesis, but basically, up to the Mongol period, taxation in Mesopotamia was mainly on land, not on manufactured goods. When the government tried to impose a tax on cotton and silk manufactured items (in 375/986 and 389/999), it was considered so un-Islamic (and unusual) that the populace rioted and the government withdrew it.² Taxes on other commodities (animals, ships, imports, etc.) were occasionally levied, but by their temporary (and usually religiously illegal) character, they


usually reflected the lack of revenue coming into the government from the previously accepted taxes (kharāj and the poll-tax on non-Muslims).

CAlī ibn CĪsā during his second vizierate (from 315/927 to 316/928) seems to have attempted some sort of reform over the previous practice of granting the kharāj of certain areas as tax farms to the person who promised the greatest return or who paid the greatest bribe. This practice was not calculated to promote stability or reinvestment, and the potential for ruination was high, as the "good vizier" realized:

CAlī ibn CĪsā asked Ahmad ibn CUbayd Allāh al-Khasibī [another predecessor], "Why did you grant the districts of Fars and Kirman to Ibrāhīm ibn ČAbd al-Misma? as tax farms?" He answered, "Because of the increase he offered." CAlī replied to him, "Don't you know that protecting the principle is more important than seeking profits?"

But CAlī ibn CĪsā was again deposed in 316/928, and the new vizier, Ibn Muqlah, like many other government officials, seems to have been more concerned with maximizing his own returns

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1CAlī ibn CĪsā has been epitomized as the "Good Vizier." See H. Bowen, The Life and Times of Ali ibn Isa (Cambridge, 1923).

2Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 154. ČImād al-Dīn's account (see page 132) of Nīẓām al-Mulk's "reform" of granting such tax farms is suspiciously close to this (the account is cited in Bernard Lewis' The Arabs in History (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 148, though I cannot find the original in Bundārī's recension of ČImād al-Dīn). And both these accounts harken back to the famous hadiths about Ėumar's concerns for future generations (see, e.g., al-Bukhārī, Sahīh Abī Ėabd Allāh al-Bukhārī (Cairo: Muhammad ĖAli Subayḥ wa-Awīdūhū, 19??), vol. 3, p. 132 (Book 41, section 14)).
while in office than with protecting future revenues for the good of the *ummah*. Accordingly, when Abū CAbd Allāh offered him 20,000 dinars as a bribe to be allowed to collect the taxes in Ahwaz, Ibn Muqlah accepted, and the Barīḍī family then had a firm and very lucrative financial base. And how lucrative a sinecure Ahwaz was can be judged by the report that just two years after receiving it Abū CAbd Allāh was prepared to remit to the caliph 9,000,000 dirhams from his personal fortune as a personal levy.

The infighting and changes in political alliances characteristic of this unsettled time are too complicated to detail here. A glance at Figure 12 shows that conditions were so unsettled that it was not uncommon for a new vizier to be named every other month! Suffice it to say that the Barīdis' political fortunes rose and fell, but that as long as they held Ahwaz they had a constant, large source of revenue to call on and to use to buy continued favors at court and thus keep their positions.

More important than these political machinations is the

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1The *ummah* is the Muslim community.


3Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, I, p. 208. Though this figure may be somewhat exaggerated, and there is no evidence that the money was ever paid.

4The Arabic is *musadarah*, which was a "fine" levied on those holding grants from the government. It was applied at the end of the year and the amount depended on how much the government needed. See Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, I, pp. 108, 118, and 123.
Amīr al-Umarā  Vizier

CAlī ibn CIsā 315/927-316/928
M. ibn CAlī Abū CAlī ibn Muqlah 316/928-318/930
Abū al-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Ḥasan 318/930-319/931
Ubayd Allāh al-Kalwadhānī 319/931
Ḥusayn ibn Qāsim (CAmīd al-Dawlah) 319/931-320/932
Abū al-Faḍl al-Faḍl ibn JaCfar 320/932 (6 months)
M. ibn CAlī Abū CAlī ibn Muqlah 320/932-321/933
Abū JaCfar M. ibn Qāsim al-Karkhī 321/933
Abū al-CAbbās al-Khasibī 321/933-322/934
M. ibn CAlī Abū CAlī ibn Muqlah 322/934-324/936
Abū JaCfar M. ibn Qāsim al-Karkhī 324/936 (3 months)
Abū al-Qāsim Sylamān ibn Ḥasan 324/936 (weeks)

Ibn RaCiq 324/936-326/938
Bajkām 326/938-329/941 (no vizier)
Ahmad ibn Maymūn 329/941 (33 days)
Abū CAbd Allāh al-Barīdī 329/941 (24 days)

Kurankij ibn Faradī 329/941 (a few months)
Abū Ishāq M. ibn Ahmad Iskafī al-Qararītī 329/941
(43 days)

Abū JaCfar M. ibn Qāsim al-Karkhī 329/941 (53 days)

Ibn RaCiq 329/941-330/941
Abū CAbd Allāh al-Barīdī 330/940 (a few days)
Abū Ishāq M. ibn Ahmad Iskafī al-Qararītī 330/942
(43 days)

(hiatus - no vizier)
Abū Ishāq M. ibn Ahmad Iskafī al-Qararītī 330/942-
331/943

Ḥasan ibn CAbd Allāh ibn Ḥamdān (Nasir al-Dawlah) 330/942-331/943
Abū al-CAbbās Ahmad ibn CAbd Allāh al-Isfahānī
331/943

Tuzun Abū al-Hafī 331/943-334/945
Abū al-Ḥusayn CAlī ibn M. ibn Muqlah 331/943-333/944
Abū al-Farāj! M. ibn CAlī al-Samarrī 333/944 (42 days)

Ibn Shirzād M. ibn Yahyā Abū JaCfar 334/945
MuCizz al-Dawlah (Ahmad ibn Būyāh) 334/945-356/967

Figure 12. Viziers, 315/927 - 334/945.
economic effect of this constantly unsettled state on the provinces. Although we do not have the means to chart a year by year income from the area, it seems that throughout this period (pre-Buyid, 300/912 - 330/942) in spite of political turmoil, Khuzestan remained relatively prosperous. We can see by Figure 28 that the kharāj revenues from Ahwaz for the year 316/928 were substantial (23,000,000 dirhams) and, as mentioned above, Abū ʿAbd Allāh was able in 318/930 after only two years of collecting the revenue of this area, to pledge nine million dirhams from his personal fortune as a personal security (though whether he could have paid it or not is open to question).

But, admittedly, these reports date to the early part of this period. What were conditions after some years of Baridi suzerainty over this area? Miskawayh reports a skirmish in this area in 321/933, during the turmoil that followed the murder of the caliph al-Muqtadir, some of whose supporters fled Baghdad and Wasit to Ahwaz, laying waste to Jundi-Sabur and Sus on the way and plundering both traders and cultivators. Abū ʿAbd Allāh Barīṭī, fearing the loss of the wealth of Ahwaz to these rebels, pledged to pay the caliph's army to counterattack. And to make good his pledge,

\[1\] Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 254.
al-Barīdī paid 30,000 dinars1 of his own capital and himself resorted to plunder for the remainder, extorting 50,000 dinars (ca. 750,000 dirhams) from the people of Sus2 and 100,000 dinars (ca. 1,500,000 dirhams) from the Jewish trading community at Tustar.3

But the evidence is ambiguous; that such sums could be raised almost overnight by the trading communities (particularly in Sus, which had already been plundered) attests to some sort of financial prosperity; on the other hand, we saw that in 318/930 al-Barīdī was able to pledge nine million dirhams from his personal fortune, so that one wonders why he did not offer the necessary sum here. The answer to this may be simply that he knew he could raise the sum easily by force, and thus save decreasing his personal fortune, or it could be that the earlier pledge was merely a boast on his part and he was unable to pay more than 30,000 dinars at a time. In any case, al-Barīdī by this expedient stayed in caliphal favor and had the finances

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1Roughly the equivalent of between 360,000 and 450,000 dirhams, the rate at this time fluctuating between 1 dinar = 12 dirhams (Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 273-274) and 1 = 15 (Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 278; II, p. 54). Later, because of inflation and a silver crisis it becomes impossible to speak of a standard equivalent, the rate at times rising to 1 dinar = 200 dirhams (see al-Rūdhrawarī, Dhayl, p. 250; or Hilāl al-Ṣābī, Tārīkh, p. 373).

2Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 255.

3Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 257.
of Ahwaz restored to his care.\footnote{Miskawayh, \textit{Tajārib}, I, p. 258.}

With a change in viziers later in this same year, al-Barīdī again fell into disfavor and the caliph demanded 12,000,000 dirhams to spare his life. Pleading that he did not then have that sum, he avowed that if he were released and allowed to return to Khuzestan, he could easily raise it there. He pledged 2,000,000 dirhams in addition to his "fine" and was allowed to return to Ahwaz to collect it.\footnote{Miskawayh, \textit{Tajārib}, I, p. 258. There is no indication if this amount was paid.}

But on the horizon was a new threat not only to the Baridis but to caliphal power as well, and this threat was the family known as the Buyids. The three Buyid brothers (see Figure 13), \(\text{Alī, Ḥasan, and Aḥmad,}\footnote{This family will be referred to here as the Buyids, although they are also commonly known as the Buwayhids. Each member of the family (see Figure 13) will be referred to by his best-known laqab, even though he may be as well known by his kunyah (a fact that has often led to confusion in reading the sources, where one may see on one page a reference to Muṣīz al-Dawlah, on the next to Aḥmad ibn Būyāh, and on the next to Abū al-Ḥusayn, when they are all one and the same person). While this is anachronistic (since, e.g., Aḥmad was not known as Muṣīz al-Dawlah until after 334/945), I hope it will prove less confusing to the general reader.} \) were from Daylam, on the south shores of the Caspian, and had come south into Fars as mercenaries in the armies of Mardavīj.\footnote{The founder of the Ziyarid dynasty in northern Iran.} The Daylamites had in fact
Figure 13. The Buyids.
been occasionally employed for centuries in the armies of the Achaemenids, the Parthians, and the Sassanians. ¹ Recent converts to Islam, but more important to Shiʿa Islam, they may also have come south with the desire to re-establish the ancient Persian empire.²

By 322/934 the Buyids had taken control of Fars from the caliph al-Rāḍī's governor and for a promise of 8,000,000 dirhams in annual tribute were given Fars as iqṭāʿ.³ It is difficult to say exactly when the practice of iqṭāʿ began in the Islamic world, and part of this difficulty lies in the various explanations of the word. Generally, iqṭāʿ is considered to be a particular kind of tax-farming: the granting by the state either of a certain amount of revenue (in the form of kharāj) from a particular piece of land (a practice usually called iqṭāʿ al-istīghlāl) or of the use of the land (called iqṭāʿ al-tamlīk), with the proviso to pay the kharāj on it to the government, any additional revenues


³Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 299.
accruing to the muqta (holder of the iqtâ).\textsuperscript{1}

But the special meaning iqtâ took on in the 4th/10th century was in making the grant of the tax-farming contingent on the grantee's providing for the pay due to a given segment of the army. The connection between army pay and tax-farming can be traced back at least to 198/813, when Tahir ibn al-Husayn refused to turn over the tax revenues from Khorasan to the head of al-Ma'mûn's Diwân al-Kharâj until the army there had been paid. Eventually Tahir took the revenues, paid the army, and submitted the remainder to the diwân.\textsuperscript{2}

The question of military pay has always been problematical for Muslim rulers, partly because there was no suitable precedent from the Prophet's time for them to draw on: Before ca. 20/641 there was no standing army. And before 132/750 the greater part of remuneration for the army came from booty from the conquered territories.\textsuperscript{3} But toward late Umayyad times the influx of booty

\textsuperscript{1}See either Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, pp. 61 and 430, or Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, s.v. "Iqtâ," by Claude Cahen for the most accepted definitions. It might be noted here that damân, the various forms of iqtâ, and ghâya were all types of "tax-farming"--the granting by the government of a certain price of land or the revenue from that land in return for either a service or a remittance to the government. The semantics here (like those with kharâj, ĕushr, and jizya--see Dennett, Conversion and Poll Tax, chapters 1-3) often lead to confusion.

\textsuperscript{2}Tabarî, Ta'rikh, 3, p. 975.

\textsuperscript{3}See Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, s.v. "Djaysh," "'Aṭâ,'" or "Diwân."
slowed, and taxes became the main source of income for the
government to tap for army pay. At this same time the army was
increasing in number, for while some garrisons were dropped from
the Diwan al-Jund\(^1\) (such as the garrison at Fustat), others were
being added (more Khorasani and Central Asian Turks, the entire
Daylamite Buyid army, later the entire Seljuq army), thus
increasing the pressure on the government to raise taxes.

It is difficult to say whether the practice of allying
tax-farming with army pay came about by plan or was a fait
accompli. It seems that the caliph was at least aware of the
loss of revenue and the potential harm to his authority in this
practice, since the vizier Ibn Muqlah is recorded as exhorting
the caliph al-Radi to lead a campaign to expel Ibn Ra'iq

from Wasit and al-Basrah, and said to [the
caliph], "These lands are closed to you and
they are lands of revenue in which Muhammad ibn
Ra'iq is endeavoring to refuse to deliver the
revenues from his tax-farm (daman). And when
others see that this has been accomplished by
him and it is permitted for him, they will
support him. Then the revenues of al-Ahwaz
will end, then the Empire will cease."\(^{2}\)

Nevertheless, by 324/936 the caliph al-Radi was consciously
allying tax-farming with army pay. Faced with a stoppage of
revenue because of the unsettled state of the countryside\(^3\)

\(^{1}\)The government registry of the army.

\(^{2}\)Miskawayh, Tajarih, I, p. 335.

\(^{3}\)Miskawayh, Tajarih, I, pp. 366-367.
(with constant battles and intrigues among the Buyids, other Daylamites, the Hamdanids, the Samanids, the Baridis, the caliph's own viziers, and assorted others vying for power), al-Rādī asked Ibn Rā'iq (who already held Wasit, Basrah, and other lands as tax-farms) to take over the administration of the army and to collect the taxes for their pay. Al-Rādī also named Ibn Rā'iq Amīr al-Umarā (Prince of Princes) and gave him various other honors.

It is difficult to say which aspect of this action was the more potentially ruinous for the Abbasid Empire, the alignment of army pay directly with the revenues of the land or the caliph's abdication of administrative responsibility in turning over all such matters to one he placed above his vizier. In any case, this appointment seems either to have occasional or to have coincided with a break-up of central authority. Ibn Rā'iq's own general, Bajkām, broke away from him, defied his authority, and set up his own establishment in Wasit, while the Baridis became more independent in Basrah and Ahwaz. At the same time the Hamdanids, Ḥasan (Nasir al-Dawlah) and al-Ṣayf al-Dawlah) took control of Mosul, Diyar Bakr, and Diyar Rabi'ah. But most important for the future of the caliphate, the Buyids were gaining strength in Fars.

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2Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 350-351.
From 324/936 until 329/941 the Buyids alternately shared and vied for control of Ahwaz with the Baridis. But though the Buyids issued coins in their own names at various mints in Khuzestan from 327/939 on, they seem to have gained sole control only after 329/941, when the Baridis' sphere of influence was confined to Samrah and Wasit. Even in this circumscribed area, the Baridis remained for some years a political force to be reckoned with, such that Abū ṣAbd Allāh was twice more named vizier to the caliph (See Figure 12). But eventually, Abū ṣAbd Allāh's profligate waste led him to such a reduced state, that in 332/943 he killed his brother Abū Yūsif for the latter's fortune. A short eight months later, Abū ṣAbd Allāh himself died of a high fever, and though his son Abū al-Qāsim and his remaining brother Abū al-Ḥusayn intrigued against each other to take his place, after Abū ṣAbd Allāh's death the Baridis were no longer a serious threat to the growing Buyid power.

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1 See Figure 39, Chapter V.
2 Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 17-23 and 48.
3 Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 15 and 23.
4 Abū ṣAbd Allāh was said to have collected over 8 million dinars (!) while he ruled Wasit, and to have spent them all (see Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 52).
5 Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 53.
6 Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 58.
7 Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 58-60 and 78-79.
What can we say about the economic status of Khuzestan under the Baridis, judging from the historical sources? As mentioned above, the revenues in the early part of their rule seem substantial: the kharāj was 23,000,000 dirhams in 316/928 and Abū ʿAbd Allāh pledged 9,000,000 dirhams as muṣadarah in 318/930 and 14,000,000 dirhams in 321/933.¹ The revenues from the latter part of their tenure seem even more amazing: Abū ʿAbd Allāh and his brother Abū Yūsif collected 8,000,000 dinars (ca. 120,000,000 dirhams) in taxes in just three years in Ahwaz (322/934 - 325/937),² while during his tenure in Wasit, Abū ʿAbd Allāh was thought to have amassed a personal fortune of over 8,000,000 dinars, or an average of about 6,700,000 dirhams per year (315/927 - 333/944).³ And though the provincial sources of revenue had dried up for the caliph,⁴ that does not necessarily mean that these provinces were destitute—given the figures above, it is more likely that the caliph had lost his power to collect the taxes, and instead in most cases the local rulers were collecting the taxes and expending them at least partly on army

¹Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 273-274. There is no evidence, however, that these two sums were ever paid.

²Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 349-350.

³Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 52. This is a low average, since his rule was not continuous there.

⁴Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 335 and 350-351; Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 18.
On the other hand, total revenues may have decreased since 318/930: in 325/937 Ibn Rā'iq gave Bajkām Ahwaz as a tax-farm, with the proviso to send only 130,000 dinars (ca. 1,950,000 dirhams) annually to Baghdad. While this is far below the 316/928 level, again it is probably indicative of Baghdad's reduced ability to make and enforce demands on the provinces, rather than of an absolute reduction in kharāj since, it should be noted, this grant was contingent on Bajkām paying the army.

Despite periodic plunderings of the trading and farming communities in Tustar, Ahwaz, Askar Mukram, Sus, and Jundi-Sabur, the sources make no mention of trade suffering, and only occasionally mention that over-taxation (or early taxation, with the tax levied before sowing) caused a decrease in the crop for that year. Indeed, in 326/938 agricultural conditions were still so good that Abū Čabd Allāh agreed to farm Ahwaz for Ahmad ibn Büyāh (Mučizz al-Dawlah) for the annual sum of

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1Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 374.
2Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 374.
3Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 255 and 257.
4Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 257.
5Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 257 and 301.
6Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 254.
7Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 254.
8Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 25 and 128.
18,000,000 dirhams, close to the 316/928 figure.¹

Thus it seems that while agriculture in Ahwaz may have had its good and its bad years during this period, in general the economy remained productive enough so that the tax revenues of this area allowed whoever received them to maintain a strong power base for the political struggles that were taking place in Baghdad.²

Occasional interruptions in trade and bad years in agriculture (e.g., from confiscation of crops by troops, early taxation, which would reduce the amount sown, or natural causes) while disruptive to large land-owners depending on cash crops, would probably not have been so catastrophic for the small-scale agriculturalists of this period. If the individual farmer was growing wheat, for example, as long as he had enough for his own family's subsistence, he could survive until conditions got better.³ This subsistence strategy would work—as long as the disruptions or poor

¹Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 381.
²Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 335, 375 and 377.
³The British encountered this "Zen road to affluence"—the simple scaling down of expectations—during the Mossadeq-British confrontation in the early 1950s, when they thought that by interrupting trade in Iran's most important "cash-crop" (oil) they could force political concessions. Though faced with a drastic cut in cash flow, the Iranian economy simply scaled down, survived, and quickly rebounded. And a similar situation might have applied in the economy of medieval Khuzestan.
economic conditions were not so severe or did not last long enough to damage the support systems (canals, trade networks, etc.) or the soil permanently.

The Buyids 329/947 - 447/1055

Although the Buyids had ruled Fars, Ahwaz, and occasionally cities in Iraq such as Wasit and Basrah for some years, their suzerainty was not formally acknowledged until the caliph named Mu'izz al-Dawlah Amīr al-Umarā in 334/946. That the Šumāni ČAbbasid caliph was forced to honor this Shi'ite Daylamite warrior by naming him "Strengthener of the State," when all around him Shi'ites were working hard to overthrow that state, is a measure of both Daylamite power and caliphal weakness.

Soon after the Buyid takeover, Mu'izz al-Dawlah deposed the caliph al-Mustakfī, ostensibly because of his intrigues against the Buyids and their Shi'ite companions, and placed a son of the murdered al-Muqtadīr on the caliphal throne.1 The Buyid's usurpation was not a peaceful one, however, and soon a former Amīr al-Umarā, Nasir al-Dawlah (see Figure 12), was challenging Mu'izz al-Dawlah's right to the post.2 The fighting at this time seems to have been so devastating that the tales of suffering

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1Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 86-87.
2Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 89-94.
and starvation it caused rival later accounts of Europe during the Plague. But while suffering was acute because of fighting, crop failure, and pillaging, "when the rebellion (al-fitnah) ended and the new crops came in, prices dropped."  

During this same year the Daylamite army Mu'mizz al-Dawlah had bought with him rebelled and forced him to guarantee the discharge of their pay by a fixed date. To do this Mu'mizz al-Dawlah is said to have resorted to oppression and extortion, to giving as iqṭāʾ the estates (diyaʾ) of former government officials, and to giving his troops "the rights of the Treasury over the estates of the populace."  

Thus Miskawayh dates the decline in agriculture that later authors would ascribe to the Seljuqs to the early part of Buyid rule:

When the years passed, and the regions (al-nawāḥī) became cultivated, the revenues in some of them increased with the increase in crops and decreased in some of them with decline in prices (this is because the iqṭāʾ were assigned to the army when prices were excessively high because of the famine we just mentioned). Those who benefitted by what happened held tight to the iqṭāʾ they had, and it was not possible to inquire about them. Those who lost returned their iqṭāʾ and substituted others, and the shortfall was made up for them. This folly increased until

1Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 95-96.  

2Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 96.  

3Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 96. That is, the rights to the revenue of non-governmental land.
it became the rule that the army would ruin its 
irrigation and then exchange them, substituting for 
them wherever they pleased .... They refrained 
from trying to cultivate [these estates] .... The watering holes (al-mashārib) became putrid, 
repairs ceased to be made, and the destruction 
ruined the settled people (al-tunnā'), whose 
conditions progressed to the point that some fled 
and some became nomads ....¹

Miskawayh goes on for pages detailing the disastrous 
effects turning over the revenues to shortsighted military and 
civilian² officials eventually had. But the effects may not have 
been felt overnight, and Khuzestan, for example, probably only 
began to experience an economic decline after some years of 
neglecting irrigation repairs and upkeep.

In the meantime Mu'izz al-Dawlah finally eliminated the 
Baridis' last power base by taking control of Basrah from Abū al-Qāsim, Abū Abd Allāh's son in 336/947³ and consolidated Būyid 
control of the Empire by subduing not only the Hamdanids and 
the Samanids, but also in 345/956 a serious rebellion by his 
own Daylamite troops in Ahwaz.⁴

To do this Mu'izz al-Dawlah relied on his Turkish 
retainers,⁵ and after their success he rewarded them by making 

¹Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 97.
²Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 98.
³Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 112.
⁴Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 162-166.
⁵Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 173.
their pay, the responsibility of Wasit, Basrah, and Ahwaz,\(^1\) three of the most consistently productive areas of the Empire. And to collect this pay, Mu\(^{c}\)izz al-Dawlah sent the Turkish troops themselves out into the provinces, with disastrous effects:

\[Mu^{c}\]izz al-Dawlah\] intended to use [the Turks] temporarily, not permanently. But in this way the door to ruin was opened for him and was more damaging than increasing the burden of their regular pay would have been. That is because they chose to have their income delayed, in order to increase the days of their stay [in the provinces]. ... sometimes they stayed two or three years. The trades (al-tijārāt) found a place in their hearts,\(^2\) and they had leave [to collect] what came to them by road without impost or inconvenience. Then by intrigue they overstepped the bounds of protection and soon ownsed the land. They acted arrogantly toward the civil authorities, and they offered protection to the traders and to whoever sought protection from them. The hands of the civil authorities grew weak and [the soldiers] enslaved the people. This has continued and multiplied to the present day.\(^3\)

This practice was followed in other provinces as well and led to a cessation in the flow of revenue to Baghdad.\(^4\)

Although Mu\(^{c}\)izz al-Dawlah was named Amīr al-Umarā by the caliph and ruled Iraq and Ahwaz, the Buyids central authority figure was the eldest brother, Imad al-Dawlah (Figure 13), who

\(^1\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 174.

\(^2\)Literally "in their chests" (fī šūdūrihim), meaning, I assume, that they took up trades.

\(^3\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 174.

\(^4\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 175.
set up rule in Fars. Perhaps equal to him (since his name alone
and the caliph's appeared on the coinage, in contrast to that of
Khuzestan where Mu'izz was usually entitled the na'ib1 of CImād--
see Chapter V) in Rayy was the second brother, Rukn al-Dawlah.
This triumvirate and the tripartite division of territory (with
capitals at Shiraz, Rayy, and Baghdad) were to prove powerful
forces in preventing a single, unified (and thus more powerful)
Buyid state from developing and, in fact, almost proved fatal to
their cause in the struggle for the senior amirate2 after the
death of Rukn al-Dawlah in 366/976. The location of these three
main centers in Fars, Iraq, and Rayy (to the east, west, and
north of Ahwaz), also meant that Khuzestan would be center stage
for many of the battles in the various power struggles.

The intra-family maneuverings for power can be seen as
early as 338/949, when the childless CImād al-Dawlah, ill and
feeling the approach of death, sent for Rukn al-Dawlah's son, the
future CĀdud al-Dawlah, to be named his successor in Fars.3 And
although CImād al-Dawlah had attained the allegiance of all his
officers to CĀdud al-Dawlah, after CImād's death Rukn al-Dawlah
seized the opportunity to go himself to Fars "to secure" his

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1"Deputy."

2Symbolized by the designation amīr al-umārā, but more
just a position of authority within the Buyid family.

3Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 121.
son's place and, not so incidentally, to secure the senior amirate for himself.¹

Meanwhile, Muṣṣizz al-Dawlah, still in power in Khuzestan and Iraq, accepted his elder brother's new overlordship and simply substituted Rukn al-Dawlah's name for that of Ḥimād al-Dawlah on his coinage from these areas (see Chapter V). While campaigning in 356/967 against one of the few remaining threats to his consolidation of power in Mesopotamia—the Shahinids, brigands who had achieved near independence in the marshes north of Basrah—Muṣṣizz al-Dawlah fell sick, returned to Baghdad, appointed his son Bakhtiyār (Ṣazz al-Dawlah) his successor, and died.²

What can we say about economic conditions in Khuzestan during the rule of Muṣṣizz al-Dawlah? Almost no mention is made in the sources about economic or agricultural conditions in this area during his rule, except for the passages mentioned above. And while the agricultural deterioration they report may have been gradual and continuous, even its initial effects may have been drastic, for in 359/969, a few years after Muṣṣizz al-Dawlah's death, we hear Bukhtigīn Āzādhrūyah, the ostensible tax-farmer of Khuzestan complaining to Muṣṣizz al-Dawlah's son and successor Ḥazz al-Dawlah that "nothing remained for him and that what had

¹Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 120 and 137.
²Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 231-232.
been made obligatory to the Turks and for their provision had completely taken up the dues and more besides.\textsuperscript{1}

In the West (Turkey, Armenia, Syria, etc.) during the time of Mu\textsuperscript{2}izz al-Dawlah, the Byzantines were continually threatening and raiding Muslim areas. Because of these disruptions, at times prices became so high that no bread was available and people were reduced to eating only dates and grasses, and over 50,000 people migrated from Antioch and the sea ports to Ramla\textsuperscript{2}. A few years later (354/965) the Byzantines had reduced the residents of some Muslim towns to eating dogs and carcasses of animals that died a natural death.\textsuperscript{3} But while Khuzestan was protected from these invasions by the vast land area of Mesopotamia, which served as a buffer between it and the enemies of Islam, these protracted battles may have had at least a temporary effect on the economy of this area, drawing off troops, taxes, and provisions to the west.

Perhaps as significant for the economy of Khuzestan as the occupation of the area by Mu\textsuperscript{2}izz al-Dawlah's troops was the fact that with the death of \textsuperscript{3}Imād al-Dawlah in 338/949 and the accession by Rukn al-Dawlah to the senior amirate, the main flow

\textsuperscript{1}Miskawayh, \textit{Tajārib}, II, p. 269.

\textsuperscript{2}Miskawayh, \textit{Tajārib}, II, p. 203.

of troops and trade ceased to be Baghdad-Ahwaz-Shiraz and instead was Baghdad-Kirmanshah-Rayy or Shiraz-Isfahan-Rayy.\(^1\) For while Shiraz and Ahwaz were firmly in Buyid hands, Rukn al-Dawlah faced continued battles for supremacy in the north, and in his new position as senior amir he could draw off troops and supplies from these southern areas.\(^2\)

When C'izz al-Dawlah succeeded his father in Baghdad and Ahwaz in 356/967, he acceded to his wishes and acknowledged the primacy of Rukn al-Dawlah as senior amir and promised to consult and obey both him and C'adud al-Dawlah in all matters of importance.\(^3\) He also promised a number of other things his father thought would lead to good government (e.g., to placate the Daylamites, keep certain bureaucrats in office, treat his servants well, etc.), but in the end C'izz al-Dawlah "violated every one of these injunctions"\(^4\) and spent his time in amusements and games. Miskawayh portrays C'izz al-Dawlah as a drunkard, incompetent, and incredibly gullible\(^5\) (all qualities especially bad for a Muslim ruler), but since the author was a subordinate


\(^2\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 154, 159, 222, and 225.

\(^3\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 234.

\(^4\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 234.

\(^5\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 235, 286, and 295-299. Cf. the Siyāsātnamah or the Qābūsānāmah for qualities considered important for a Muslim ruler.
of Čağud al-Dawlah, who later opposed ČIzz al-Dawlah, this
description may have had political motivations.

It soon became obvious, however, that ČIzz al-Dawlah had
failed to follow certain of his father's injunctions, for from
361/971 to 362/972 the Turks and the Daylamites in his army,
whether out of racial, political, religious, or personal
grievances, fought and almost destroyed Baghdād.¹ To quiet
his troops ČIzz al-Dawlah tried to find new sources of revenue,
and even resorted to extorting money from the caliph (al-Muṭi'Ć).
Times were so bad though that in order to raise a paltry 400,000
dirhams the caliph had to sell his own clothing.² The common
people too joined in the attacks, pillaging, and arson until

The markets fell into disuse, means of subsistence
were cut off, and for most people getting to the
water of the Tigris became impossible, so that
they drank water from wells,³ and they remained
in almost a state of siege.⁴

And as a direct result of ČIzz al-Dawlah's incompetence, irre-
responsibility, and inattention to affairs of government

All dignity collapsed, the common people went
wild and raided one another, various sects and
hostile schemes emerged, and murder became so
widespread that not a day passed without someone
killed—they didn't know who killed them, and

¹Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 305-306.
²Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 308.
³Because of the highly saline character of the soils in
this area, well water was probably a definite second choice to
river water.
⁴Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 308.
if they knew, they couldn't do anything about them. The bases of revenue were cut off and the far regions\(^1\) became ruined because of the ruin of the capital (Dār al-Mamlakah). There appeared in every village a leader (ra'īs) who took control of it and they quarreled among themselves. The Sultan was left empty-handed, the common people wiped out, the dwellings ruined, food nonexistent, and the army dispersed.\(^2\)

In 363/974, in the midst of this civil strife, ʻIzz al-Dawlah led an attack on the Hamdanids in Mosul, probably in hopes of raising money to pay his army.\(^3\) When this campaign proved unsuccessful, ʻIzz al-Dawlah's vizier convinced him the fault lay in the treachery of his Turkish hājib Sabuktigīn, so ʻIzz al-Dawlah made off for Ahwaz, in hopes of securing the iqṭā\(^4\) there for himself and then the better to resist Sabuktigīn and his Turks in Baghdad.\(^4\) Sabuktigīn offered to make Abū Ishāq, a brother of ʻIzz al-Dawlah (see Figure 13), amīr in ʻIzz al-Dawlah's place. The Sunni populace of Baghdad apparently rose up and sided with the Turks (also Sunni) against the Shīʿī Daylamites, leading to a veritable civil war in Baghdad.\(^5\)

ʻIzz al-Dawlah did not fare well in Ahwaz, perhaps because

\(^1\)That is, the provinces outside Baghdad.

\(^2\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 314.

\(^3\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 316-321.

\(^4\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 322-327.

\(^5\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 327-328.
his previous policy in this area left nothing to be collected after the Turks finished with it.\(^1\) He sent off urgent pleas for help to Rukn al-Dawlah and \(\text{A}\text{ğud al-Dawlah},\) and the latter, anxious to add Iraq and Khuzestan to his rule, offered to come to his cousin's rescue,\(^2\) though he didn't rush: "\(\text{A}\text{ğud al-Dawlah hesitated and promised to depart, parrying the delays in hopes of [\(\text{Izz al-Dawlah}'s\) destruction.}^3\]

The death of Sabuktigin, the defection of the Hamdanids from the Turkish side, and the arrival of \(\text{A}\text{ğud al-Dawlah} and his army in Ahwaz finally led to a Buyid victory in 364/975.\(^4\) It was, however, a Pyrrhic victory for \(\text{Izz al-Dawlah},\) since \(\text{A}\text{ğud al-Dawlah} forced him to abdicate soon after.\(^5\) But \(\text{Izz al-Dawlah}'s\) young son Marzuban (see Figure 13), although only 15 years old governor of Basrah, objected forcefully to his father's removal, writing to the senior amir, Rukn al-Dawlah, to complain and plead for the restoration of his rights.\(^6\) And even though \(\text{Izz al-Dawlah} had proved himself incompetent, Rukn al-Dawlah came out four-square on his side and against his own son, because, he

\(^1\)See Miskawayh, \textit{Tajārib}, II, p. 269.
\(^3\)Miskawayh, \textit{Tajārib}, II, p. 332.
said, of a promise he had made to his brother Mu'izz al-Dawlah before the latter's death. It may also be that Rukn al-Dawlah was trying to curb CAgud al-Dawlah's appetite and preserve the tri-partite division of the Empire, so that his other sons would be secure in their domains.

In any case CAgud al-Dawlah was compelled to release CIzz al-Dawlah and restore him to some semblance of sovereignty. He did so in return for CIzz al-Dawlah's pledge to rule as his deputy in Iraq and Khuzestan, though it wasn't long before CIzz al-Dawlah broke his pledge.

In 365/976 CAgud al-Dawlah met his father at Isfahan, where the question of succession to the senior amirate was settled to their mutual satisfaction. It was decided that CAgud al-Dawlah should be sovereign, with his brothers Mu'ayyid al-Dawlah and Fakhr al-Dawlah his deputies in Isfahan and Rayy, respectively. CIzz al-Dawlah was not at this conference and though CAgud al-Dawlah assured him of his good intentions, CIzz al-Dawlah took fright, broke off relations, and allied himself with his former enemies the Hamdanids and Shahinids against CAgud al-Dawlah.

CIzz al-Dawlah went east from Wasit, and CAgud al-Dawlah

1 Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 351.
2 Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 352.
4 Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 364.
travelled quickly to Arrajan.  Izz al-Dawlah proposed to fight his cousin in Ahwaz and to use the canal network there to his advantage. He also sent parts of his army out to Askar Mukram and Ram Hurmuz to secure those areas, but they were soon routed in the latter and withdrawn in the former.

Ağud al-Dawlah built a bridge near Basiyan, crossed over, and made ready for battle. Miskawayh portrays the two sides as badly matched: Ağud al-Dawlah well-provisioned, well-prepared, and well-arrayed; Izz al-Dawlah with no money, his troops dispirited, and the calvary deployed in front of the infantry.\(^2\) Izz al-Dawlah's army was duly routed, and he fled to Wasit.\(^3\) After vacillating between fighting and submission, Izz al-Dawlah was finally taken captive by his cousin and beheaded in 367/978.\(^4\)

This left Ağud al-Dawlah in full control of Fars, Khuzestan, Iraq, and points west, and when he returned to Baghdad in 368/979, the caliph bestowed great honors on him.\(^5\) Ağud al-Dawlah lost no time in repairing the effects of 15 years of misrule and mismanagement by his cousin:

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\(^3\) Miskawayh, \textit{Tajārib}, II, p. 370.  
\(^4\) Miskawayh, \textit{Tajārib}, II, p. 381.  
In this year [369/980] Ăגud al-Dawlah ordered the rebuilding of the houses of Baghdad and of its markets . . . . Then he ordered the rebuilding of the mosques of the outlying areas (al-arbād) that had been destroyed . . . . There were in Baghdad many canals . . . . from which were conduits for people to water their gardens and to drink, up to the outskirts some distance from the Dijlah. Their channels had become buried, their traces covered over, and generation after generation people grew up who did not know of them. The indigent people had to drink the disagreeable water from the wells or carry water some distance from the Dijlah. [Ăגud al-Dawlah] ordered the digging of the main channels and its feeders . . . . Bridges had been destroyed . . . . they were all built anew and strong and made into secure structures . . . . many dams at the mouths of rivers were restored . . . .

And Miskawayh goes on to credit Ăגud al-Dawlah with a plethora of other good deeds and signs of good rulership, some of them believable, some of them not so much so (especially since Miskawayh was in the employ of Ăגud al-Dawlah). In any event, Ăגud al-Dawlah's rule over Iraq and Khuzestan was short—from 368/979 to his death in 372/983. Moreover, from 369/980 to his death, he suffered repeatedly from epilepsy (al-šar Ăג) and "lethargy" (litarghus), so that his active period of reconstruction in Iraq and Khuzestan may only have lasted a year or less. This last fact seems highly significant in view of the literature that sprang up after his death extolling him as the model ruler (see, e.g., the Siyāsātnāmah, or to a lesser extent,

1Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, pp. 404-406.
2Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 416; al-Rūdhrāwī, Dhayl, pp. 9, 24, and 28.
the opening chapters of the Absan al-Taqāsim), a legend that is still perpetuated today (by, e.g., Kabir or Busse) and to which we shall return in the next chapter.

The economic effects, then, of ʿIzz al-Dawlah's rule seem totally negative: again no money flowed to Baghdad; what money was raised by taxes in Ahwaz went for troop payment, with nothing left over; bridges and dams fell into disrepair; and at times there was famine. And while ʿAḍud al-Dawlah may have been full of good intentions and may have even begun to carry them out, one year's worth (or even four years' worth) of repairs would not have been nearly enough to counteract over twelve years' mismanagement and neglect. Further, at this point economic recovery required a systemic change: the burden of the Turkish troops' payments had to be lifted so that a surplus might develop, which could then be plowed back into maintenance and improvements, both in the agricultural support system and in the textile industry in this area. But there is no indication in the historical sources that ʿAḍud al-Dawlah even contemplated such changes.

Although Miskawayh¹ says the date of tax collection was changed to after the harvest and that various additions and "interpretations" (ta'wilāt) were removed, neither Miskawayh nor al-Rudhrawārī suggests a systemic change in the taxation system at this time. Al-Rudhrawārī, who devotes much space to ʿAḍud

¹Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 407.
al-Dawlah's accomplishments\textsuperscript{1}, implies a continuation of the previous system as regards troop payments, as does Miskawayh. Indeed, the only other changes \textsuperscript{2}Agud al-Dawlah made in the tax system were in the nature of increases:

With a stroke\textsuperscript{2} of his pen he increased by 10\% [the tax] on acreage and added this to the original [tax]. He made this a continuous tax and it continues to the present in all of the Sawad. He introduced collections that had not existed and business taxes that had not been known. He interfered with\textsuperscript{3} every mill and took its profits, conceding only a bit to the people there. Such injustices increased until the end of his days . . . . He interfered with the waqfs\textsuperscript{4} of the Sawad, assigning to their rightful owners a lease, which disengaged them from [the waqfs] and by which means a great sum was produced, became revenue, and was spent as iqta\textsuperscript{5} from then on.\textsuperscript{5} He imposed a tax on everything that was sold in the horse-market, the donkey-market, and the camel-market. He increased previous levies on exported and imported merchandise. He prohibited the manufacture of ice and of silk and put them under special license, whereas previously they were unrestricted for whoever wanted to make them . . . .\textsuperscript{6}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1}al-Rūḍhrāwarī, Dhayl, pp. 39-70.
\textsuperscript{2}bi-qalam
\textsuperscript{3}Literally "inserted his hand" (adkhala yadahu).
\textsuperscript{4}Waqfs are charitable institutions established under Muslim law by bequeathing one's estate as a religious endowment with proceeds to go as support for the donor's family.
\textsuperscript{5}A patently illegal act, since waqfs cannot be expropriated in this manner.
\textsuperscript{6}al-Rūḍhrāwarī, Dhayl, p. 71.
\end{flushleft}
Since Rūdhrāwarī (the author of the preceding passage) was writing for the Seljuq Malikshāh, might we not assume that this passage is purposely biased to show what bad rulers the Buyids were? Quite the contrary. First, Rūdhrāwarī spent the previous 31 pages describing all the good deeds and sound policies of Āḍud al-Dawlah instituted. Moreover, Āḍud al-Dawlah, more than any other Buyid, was seen by later authors (but especially by those in the Seljuq era) as the epitome of a good Muslim ruler.¹ So it is probable that this passage is an accurate reflection of Āḍud al-Dawlah's actions during his short tenure in this area.

From 367/978 to 372/983 Šāmsām al-Dawlah served as his father's governor in Ahwaz.² And at the death of his father in 372/983, Šāmsām al-Dawlah managed to have himself declared vālī al-Cahd³ and amīr al-umrā in quick succession.⁴ His elder brother, Sharaf al-Dawlah, previously had been banished to Kirman, and when news of the events in Baghdad reached him, he set off for Fars. Šāmsām al-Dawlah's actions towards his younger brother Tāj al-Dawlah,⁵ in the meantime, vacillated—"at one point he

¹See, e.g., how he's glorified in the Siyāsātnāmah.

²Based on numismatic evidence (see Chapter V), though the historical sources make no mention of this appointment.

³Crown prince.

⁴Rūdhrāwarī, Dhayl, pp. 77-78.

⁵Rūdhrāwarī, Dhayl p. 79. Not Tāj al-Millah, as Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, pp. 69 and 73, asserts. Tāj al-Millah was a title given to Āḍud al-Dawlah (Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 385).
imprisoned him, but soon after released him and sent him to Fars as his deputy. Before Tāj al-Dawlah could reach Arrajan, however, news arrived that Sharaf al-Dawlah had already established himself in Shiraz, so Tāj al-Dawlah turned back to Ahwaz. Once there he broke away from Samsam and had the khutbah read in his name alone.\(^1\) And at this point he was strong enough also to impose his brother Diyā al-Dawlah as ruler of Basrah.\(^2\)

At the same time Mu'ayyid al-Dawlah, the ruler of Jurjan, felt that as Āqūd al-Dawlah's eldest surviving brother he had a claim to the senior amirate, and he sent a messenger to Sharaf al-Dawlah in Fars to this effect.\(^3\) Sharaf al-Dawlah seems to have acceded to this request, allowing Mu'ayyid's name to be read in the khutbah and be struck on the coinage in Fars, but in the meantime there came "the order that cannot be disobeyed," and Mu'ayyid died without testing his nephew's allegiance.\(^4\)

Fakhr al-Dawlah then set off for Jurjan from his exile in Khorasan and took up his late brother's role. He also began a correspondence with his nephew Tāj al-Dawlah that led to his name being included in the coinage in Khuzestan and Basrah in 374/985.\(^5\)

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\(^1\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, p. 79.
\(^2\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, p. 80.
\(^3\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, p. 91.
\(^4\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, p. 91.
\(^5\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, p. 99.
At this point, then, at least four Buyids were vying for power: Şāmṣām al-Dawlah in Baghdad was opposed by his elder brother Sharaf al-Dawlah in Fars and rebelled against his younger brother, Tāj al-Dawlah in Khuzestan and Diyā al-Dawlah in Basrah. Tāj al-Dawlah may have been paying lip-service to Sharaf al-Dawlah through the efforts of the former's mother, a high-ranking and respected Daylamite princess.\(^1\) And Tāj al-Dawlah at the same time gave his uncle Fakhr al-Dawlah supreme obeisance.

Sharaf al-Dawlah then (375/985-986) decided to march against his brother in Baghdad by way of Khuzestan. Tāj al-Dawlah refused him passage, and at Askar Mukram a battle ensued, in which both the Daylamites and the Turks of Tāj al-Dawlah's army deserted him.\(^2\) Tāj al-Dawlah fled to the safety of his uncle Fakhr al-Dawlah's court, where he was given refuge for a time, then imprisoned, and later put to death.\(^3\)

Before Sharaf al-Dawlah reached Baghdad, he came to an agreement with Şāmṣām with the result that Sharaf was acknowledged as senior over Şāmṣām but agreed to let him freely enjoy his own dominion.\(^4\) Şāmṣām did not have long to enjoy his freedom however, for in 376/986 when his troops mutinied and the populace of Baghdad revolted, he sought refuge with Sharaf, who was camped

\(^1\)al-Rūḍhrāwārī, Dhayl, p. 121.
\(^2\)al-Rūḍhrāwārī, Dhayl, p. 121.
\(^3\)al-Rūḍhrāwārī, Dhayl, pp. 122-123.
\(^4\)al-Rūḍhrāwārī, Dhayl, pp. 124-125.
near Wasit. Later he was conveyed to a fortress in Fars, while Sharaf established himself in Baghdad.

Sharaf al-Dawlah's amirate lasted almost three years, until his death in 379/989, and it is said that his vizier, Abū Mansūr M. ibn Ḥasan ibn Saliḥān, mandated attention by the provincial governors to the agricultural system, which was still suffering from bad management and the ravages of troops. Whether or not this mandate was effective, we cannot say. It is mentioned that because of the lack of food, crop importation by sea transport was arranged, but no mention is made of any changes in the īqtā system that would have released money to pay for these imports.

Bahā al-Dawlah succeeded his brother in Baghdad and kept his vizier Ibn Saliḥān. Before long the Turkish troops were again fighting with the Daylamites, and, as had his predecessors, Bahā al-Dawlah came down on the side of the Turks. The defeated Daylamites then threw their allegiance to the former ruler Šāmṣām al-Dawlah, who with his brother Diyā al-Dawlah (former governor of Basrah) had escaped their imprisonment in Fars.

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1 al-Rūdhrāwī, Dhayl, pp. 128-129.
2 al-Rūdhrāwī, Dhayl, pp. 137 and 144.
3 al-Rūdhrāwī, Dhayl, p. 137.
5 al-Rūdhrāwī, Dhayl, p. 158.
6 al-Rūdhrāwī, Dhayl, pp. 158-160.
In this same year (379/989), Fakhr al-Dawlah left Jurjan for Baghdad, intending that he, rather than Bahā al-Dawlah, should succeed his brother. When he reached Ahwaz he forbade the Turkish troops access to their iqṭāʾiūṭ there and prohibited them from spending any of the revenue from them, instead sending out his own officials to collect whatever they found.

In addition it seems that Fakhr al-Dawlah, through his vizier the Sāḥib Ibn ĞAbbād, attempted to revise the iqṭāʾ system in Ahwaz at this time:

It is said that he ordered the clerks (al-kuttab) of the land to make an accounting of the revenues of each district, which they made and brought to him. Then he ordered the civil officials and administrators to gather and the revenues of each district to be announced, to be offered to them, and to be auctioned to them. They were hawking districts among officials just like wares one hawked among merchants. This report is novel in legal opinion.\(^2\)

Of course, the only thing novel about this approach is the openness with which the transaction was carried out, since the practice dates at least back to the Barīdis in this area (p. 63).

The re-assignment of iqṭāʾiūṭ served to alienate the Turks in Fakhr al-Dawlah's army, and at the same time the Daylamites with him became disloyal when they found out the value of these Khuzestani holdings (ranging from 200,000 to

\(^{1}\)al-Rūdhrāwārī, Dhayl, p. 163.

\(^{2}\)al-Rūdhrāwārī, Dhayl, p. 171.
300,000 dirhams each) compared to their own in Rayy and Jibal, which were worth one-tenth of that.¹

To make matters worse for Fakhr al-Dawlah the Karun² rose so high at this time that his camp was flooded and some of his tents washed away. And since he and his men were unaccustomed to floods, they took fright. Bahā al-Dawlah's army marched to meet them and defeated them badly in a battle near Ahwaz. Fakhr al-Dawlah then returned to Rayy, and Abū al-ʿAlāʿ ibn Faḍl took control of Khuzestan for Bahā al-Dawlah.³

The next year (380/990) Bahā set off to quell a revolt by his brother ʿAmsām al-Dawlah, who had recently escaped his imprisonment in Fars. Passing from Basrah through Ahwaz they stormed the fortress at Arrajan, recovering an enormous amount of wealth: 1,000,000 dinars and 8,000,000 dirhams (the equivalent of ca. 23,000,000 dirhams), plus jewels, robes, and arms.⁴ But within a short while, because of the excessive demands of the army, all that was left was 400,000 dinars and 400,000⁵ dirhams.

¹al-Rūḍhrāwārī, Dhayl, pp. 165-166.
²Called the "Dijlah of Ahwaz," al-Rūḍhrāwarī, Dhayl, p. 166.
³al-Rūḍhrāwarī, Dhayl, pp. 166-171.
⁴al-Rūḍhrāwarī, Dhayl, p. 183.
⁵Though the text says 400,000,000 dirhams, which is obviously a mistake since it is more than the original total.
which were then sent back to Ahwaz.\textsuperscript{1}

Bahā al-Dawlah's army then suffered a series of reverses in Fars, so that eventually he signed a treaty with his brother giving Şāmšām the rule of Fars (including Arrajan) and keeping Khuzestan and Iraq for himself.\textsuperscript{2}

Except for minor problems Ahwaz seems to have been quiet and relatively secure in Bahā's camp, until 383/993, when Şāmšām al-Dawlah's armies invaded Khuzestan from Arrajan, taking first Ram Hurmuz, then Ahwaz. Even though Bahā al-Dawlah melted down his gold and silver plates, he did not have sufficient means to pay his army, which was then defeated at Ahwaz.\textsuperscript{3}

The next year (384/994) Khuzestan was recovered for Bahā al-Dawlah by his Turkish troops, who came from Wasit to Sus, and finding that Şāmšām's army had already fled to Ahwaz, they then recaptured the stronghold of Jundi-Sabur and made for Tustar, whence they began a night march in the hopes of taking Samsam's army by surprise in the morning.\textsuperscript{4} And although the Turkish army became lost on this night march and forfeited the element of surprise, they won the battle nonetheless and slaughtered

\textsuperscript{1}al-Rūḍhrāwari, Dhayl, p. 183.

\textsuperscript{2}al-Rūḍhrāwari, Dhayl, p. 184.

\textsuperscript{3}al-Rūḍhrāwari, Dhayl, pp. 252-254.

\textsuperscript{4}al-Rūḍhrāwari, Dhayl, pp. 255-256.
Sāmsām's Daylamite troops.\(^1\)

Their advantage was short-lived, however, for the very next year Sāmsām's reconstituted Daylamite army overran ʿAskar Mukram, Ram Hurmuz, and Sus, and the iqṭāʾ of Khuzestan were broken up and redistributed once again.\(^2\) The demands of this Daylamite army, on which Sāmsām was now totally dependent, became more excessive—so much so that the iqṭāʾ of Khuzestan and Fars could not satisfy them.\(^3\) Sāmsām thought his only remedy was to reorganize his pay registry, retaining all those with a good pedigree and removing all the latecomers.\(^4\) By doing this, however, he created a force of 650 armed, experienced fighters who no longer had any allegiance to him, and they then joined his enemies and killed him in 388/998.\(^5\) After this, Bahāʾ al-Dawlah was able to recover Khuzestan and Fars.\(^6\)

This of course necessitated yet another reorganization of

\(^{1}\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, pp. 256-257. One wonders at their becoming lost on the way from Tustar to Ahwaz: By this time a major road connected the two (see Maqdisī's map, next chapter), and all one needs to do is follow the river south!

\(^{2}\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, pp. 268 and 295.

\(^{3}\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, pp. 311-312.

\(^{4}\)For this he had simple precedent set by ʿUmar I and al-Muʿtasim. See Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, s.v. "ʿAṭāʾ", "Djaysh," or "Dīwān."

\(^{5}\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, p. 314.

\(^{6}\)al-Rūḍhrāwī, Dhayl, pp. 316-317, 321, and 327.
the iqtā' of Khuzestan, since they previously were held by officers of Šāmsān's army. The arrangement this time was that the categories of wealth that are in the chief cities of the land stay with those who presently hold them;¹ and that what is left over, in the way of estates (ṣiyāq) and arable land (sawād), be divided equally.²

And although this may have resulted in less pay for the troops (since the total being redistributed was less than before), Bahā al-Dawlah managed to get the various parts of his army to assent to this. This arrangement seems, on the face of it, to have been designed to promote stability and economic growth, since it implies that textile manufacturing, orchards, and sugar refineries, for example, would no longer be under military rule, but rather they would be administered by people more closely connected with these "categories."

But it's difficult to say whether this promoted economic prosperity or not. Both politically and economically, Khuzestan seems to have been relatively stable since the death of Samsam in 388/998. But in 391/1001 a former governor of Khuzestan, the Sāḥib Abū ʿAlī³ wrote to Bahā al-Dawlah requesting to be put in charge of Khuzestan and promising to remedy its "financial

¹And since the Daylamites at this point had fled, it is probable that "those who hold them" were the indigenous families of Khuzestan.

²al-Rūḍhrāwarī, Dhayl, p. 323.

³Also known as Ibn Ustadhurmuz and ʿAmīd al-Juyūsh.
disorder."1 The disorder must have been severe enough for this offer to appear attractive to Bahā al-Dawlah, for he reappointed Abū ʿAlī, who then put the system in order, corrected what was [legally] wrong, and gathered what was widespread.2 He became familiar with the common people,3 he eliminated the practice of personal fines,4 and he administered the armies with the best policy. Within a short period of time he had gathered wealth, which he transmitted to Bahā al-Dawlah . . . .5

And while in 392/1002 Baghdad was suffering famine and sharp rises in food prices,6 and its affairs "were in a state of unrest, its order dissolved, and the causes of ruin and revolt becoming more powerful,"7 Khuzestan had become an island of stability. The Sāḥib Abū ʿAlī had put its affairs in order "and returned it to a peaceful, prosperous state."8

As a consequence, Bahā al-Dawlah ordered Abū ʿAlī to Baghdad, where he carried out an extensive policy of legal,

1 Hilāl al-Ṣābī, Taʾrīkh, p. 400.
2 This phrase may refer to administrative policies, i.e., "collected information."
3 Becoming familiar with the needs of the "common people" is traditionally considered a mark of good rulership in Islam.
4 "Muṣādaraḥ," which we saw could be heavy, arbitrary fines.
5 Hilāl al-Ṣābī, Taʾrīkh, pp. 400-401.
6 Hilāl al-Ṣābī, Taʾrīkh, p. 418.
7 Hilāl al-Ṣābī, Taʾrīkh, p. 437.
8 Hilāl al-Ṣābī, Taʾrīkh, p. 437.
fiscal, economic, and administrative reform.\textsuperscript{1} Abū CAlī was so successful an administrator that his policies, and the social tranquility they brought, continued for some years after his death in 401/1010-1011, at least partly because Bahā al-Dawla\ī installed a man of equal honesty and competence, Fahkr al-Mulk, in his place after him.\textsuperscript{2} Historians ascribe many of the same characteristics to Fahkr al-Mulk as to CAgūd al-Dawla\ī, for example, Fahkr is said to have been keenly interested in repairing bridges and dams.\textsuperscript{3}

When Bahā al-Dawla\ī died in Arrayan in 403/1012, the Buyid domain was again divided, with his sons, Sulṭān al-Dawla\ī, the eldest, taking Fars, Jalāl al-Dawla\ī taking Basrah, and Qi\ıvām al-Dawla\ī taking Kirman.\textsuperscript{4} Fahkr al-Mulk remained in Baghdad as deputy and vizier to Sulṭān al-Dawla\ī until 407/1016, when at the request of Sulṭān al-Dawla\ī, he went to Ahwaz to aid Sulṭān in a struggle with Qi\ıvām al-Dawla\ī for control of Khu\ızestan. Urged on by his courtiers, Sulṭān al-Dawla\ī seized upon some

\textsuperscript{1} Hilāl al-Ṣabī, Ta'rikh, pp. 437-444.


\textsuperscript{4} Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 241.

\textsuperscript{5} Although part of Iraq was under the nominal control of Jalāl al-Dawla\ī.
pretext to have Fakhr al-Mulk arrested, and he put him to death.\footnote{Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, "Mirāt al-Zamān," p. 227; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 260-261.}

Baghdad, at least, may indeed have enjoyed improved economic conditions under Fakhr al-Mulk's rule, as we see during one period when Fakhr al-Mulk was trying to placate Sultān al-Dawlah by sending him (in Shiraz) money, splendid vestments, royal clothes, and ships of gold, on each of which was 1,000 mithgāls of gold.\footnote{Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, "Mirāt al-Zamān," p. 225. A mithgāl was a weight equalling approximately a dirham and a half. On his death Fakhr al-Mulk also left a fantastic treasure in money and jewels (Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, "Mirāt al-Zamān," pp. 230-231).}

But the prosperity was short-lived, for after Fakhr al-Mulk's death Sultān al-Dawlah appointed Ibn Sahlān to succeed him,\footnote{Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 261; Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, "Mirāt al-Zamān," p. 233.} and while they were busy sorting out who should rule Ahwaz (Sultān al-Dawlah finally won out, and his brother returned to Kirman) disorder once again came to prevail in Baghdad, and the Treasury was sacked, the haram was violated, and violence broke out again between the Sunni and the Shi'ī.\footnote{Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, "Mirāt al-Zamān," p. 237; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, p. 306.}

Ibn Sahlān, with his Daylamite troops, repressed the sectarian violence harshly, bringing him the enmity of the Sunni Turks, who then sent a party to Ahwaz to plead with Sultān
al-Dawlah to return to Baghdad. Sultān did return in 409/1018 and replaced Ibn Sahlān with someone more acceptable to the Turks.1 The Turks were not placated for long though, and in 411/1020 they rebelled against Sultān al-Dawlah and installed his younger brother Musharrif al-Dawlah as amīr al-umarā in Baghdad.2

Sultān al-Dawlah then left Baghdad for Tustar, whence he and Ibn Sahlān took control of Ahwaz and used it as a base in their attempt to regain power from Musharrif al-Dawlah.3 Ibn Sahlān led Sultān al-Dawlah's Daylamite army to Wasit to fight Musharrif and the Turks, but he was defeated and Musharrif was declared Shahanshah in Baghdad in 411/1020.4 Musharrif then decided to march against his brother in Ahwaz, but because of heavy troop defections he was forced to compromise.5 Sultān al-Dawlah installed his son Abū Kālinjār as his deputy in Ahwaz (in 412/1021), and a year later a peace treaty was concluded

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between the brothers, with Musharrif keeping control of Iraq and Sultân getting a free hand in Kirman and Fars.¹

Sultân al-Dawlah's death in Shiraz in 415/1024 precipitated another dispute over succession. His son Abû Kālinjâr was ruling in Ahwaz and was seen by some as his father's likely successor in Fars. Others, especially the Turkish troops, preferred Sultân al-Dawlah's brother Qiwâm al-Dawlah.² And although Qiwâm al-Dawlah reached Shiraz first and was installed as ruler by the Turks, Abû Kālinjâr soon defeated him and took over rule of Fars in addition to that of Ahwaz.³

With the death of Musharrif al-Dawlah in 416/1025, the post of amir in Baghdad again became open, the two contenders this time being his brother, Jalâl al-Dawlah (ruler of Basrah) and his nephew Abû Kālinjâr (ruler of Ahwaz and Fars). It was eventually resolved (by the Turkish troops) in Abû Kālinjâr's favor, but since he still had trouble with his uncle, Qiwâm al-Dawlah, on his eastern border, he could not come immediately to Baghdad.⁴

The power of the unsupervised Turks in Baghdad thus increased, as did the injustices the perpetrated on the populace:

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¹Ibn al-Athîr, al-Kâmîl, IX, pp. 323 and 327.
³Ibn al-Athîr, al-Kâmîl, IX, p. 337.
They increased the muṣadarāt, confiscated property, and even imposed a special levy on al-Karkh\textsuperscript{1} of 100,000 dinars. Misadventures became common, evil increased, and homes, lanes, and markets burned. Both the common people and the brigands became avaricious, entering people's homes and demanding what they had stored away... War broke out between the common people and the army, and the army won.\textsuperscript{2}

Seeing that Abū Kālinjār was not coming soon to remedy this situation, the Turks sent for Jalāl al-Dawlah, who arrived in Baghdad in 418/1027.\textsuperscript{3} Thus the southern tier of the Buyid Empire for the first time was divided between Basrah and Ahwaz,\textsuperscript{4} so that Jalāl al-Dawlah ruled Baghdad and Basrah, Abū Kālinjār Ahwaz and Fars, and Qiwām al-Dawlah Kirman. This alignment stayed in effect, with minor variations until 429/1038, when Abū Kālinjār added Basrah to his rule.\textsuperscript{5}

Jalāl al-Dawlah did not bring order to Baghdad, as the populace and army had hoped he would, and his rule (to 435/1044) is marked by continued rebellions against him by the army, sectarian clashes, depredations by brigands, and even an alliance between the army and the criminals the better to

\textsuperscript{1}Karkh was said to be home to many of Baghdad's Jews and Rafidis (Shī'a). See Ibn Shākir, "Cūyūn al-Tawārīkh," fol. 60b.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 353.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 353 and 361.

\textsuperscript{4}Which, up to that time, had usually been governed together.

pillage the common people.  

In addition, Mesopotamia seems to have suffered serious damage to its agricultural system at this time, not only from the lack of upkeep and the ravages of the troops and marauders, but also from "natural causes." Ibn Shākir, whose ْUyūn al-Tawārīkh takes special notice of climatic conditions, reports a series of bad years for agriculture starting in 418/1027 with a terrible hail storm that ruined field crops (grains), fruit, and dates and killed people, sheep, and wild animals; dust-bowl conditions the next year, caused by the ruin of the date palms and other trees the year before; more heavy rain and hail in 420/1029; the collapse of one of Baghdad's main dams in 421/1030; and a severe drought in 423/1031 that killed many in Baghdad; and though not directly connected with the agricultural system, the death of over 90,000 people in Baghdad in one month alone from the diptheria epidemic of 425/1033 must have had a debilitating effect.

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1 Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 366, 418-421, and 423-424, etc.; Ibn Shākir, "ْUyūn al-Tawārīkh," fol. 30a, 60b, 66a, 68a, 68b, 80b, 98b.

2 Fruit being one of Khuzestan's biggest cash-crops at this time (see next chapter).


effect on the economy.\footnote{Ibn Shākir, "Uyūn al-Tawārīkh," fol. 67a.}

Agriculture in this area may have recovered in a relatively short time from the effects of some of these catastrophes—a drought, for example, could have been remedied by sufficient rain the next year. But some of these weather conditions may have had more far-reaching effects—the destruction of the fruit trees and date palms by hail, for example, may have been devastating to the economy, since date palms in this area take over 25 years maturation before they bear their first crop. The loss of the fruit trees meant of course the loss of capital investment and earning potential for at least three or four years.

Another measure of the unsettled condition of the countryside at this time is whether or not people were able to make the hajj. The hajj is one of the pillars of Islam, incumbent on all Muslims once in their lives, and is such a necessary part of religious life that up to the 5th/11th century almost no special mention is made as to whether groups from certain areas made it or not—it is just assumed by historians to have been made yearly. But after 410/1019 conditions became so unsettled, the roads in such disrepair,
and the highwaymen so numerous,¹ that it often was not possible for the faithful to perform this religious duty. Indeed, conditions became so bad in Iraq that in 412/1021 the would-be pilgrims appealed to Maḥmūd of Ghaznah for aid!² Figure 14 shows that the historians record it was impossible for the people of Iraq (and one assumes of Khuzestan as well) to make the hajj at one point for seventeen years! Unfortunately, it is difficult to know if the situation improved after 453/1061, since the extant part of Sibt ibn al-Jawzī's Mirāt al-Zamān stops at 434/1043 and the copy I used of Ibn Shākir's Cuyūn is illegible after 453/1061, and these two sources are the most scrupulous in recording this event.

After Jalāl al-Dawlah's death in 435/1044, the Turkish soldiery sent for his eldest son, al-Malik al- CONSTRAINT Azīz, who had been ruling his father's name in Wasit, to take his father's place in Baghdad.³ He was delayed slightly (because of his "bereavement"), and his cousin, Abū Kālinjār, ruler of Basrah, Ahwaz, and Fars, took advantage of the delay to send the army leaders in Baghdad a great amount of money, at which point

¹See Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, "Mirāt al-Zamān," p. 319; Ibn Shākir, "Cuyūn al-Tawārīkh," fol. 30a, 52b, 66a and 90b. Their not going might also be a measure of the state of the economy, since outfitting a caravan from Iraq for the long trip was quite expensive.


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X = recorded in the Mirāt al-Zamān
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Figure 14. Occurrence of the Hajj from Iraq.
they repudiated al-Malik al-Aziz and opted for Abū Kālinjār.¹

Presumably Abū Kālinjār got the money to bribe the Turks from the revenues of Fars and Ahwaz, for we see in 420/1029, in a dispute between him and Jalāl al-Dawlah, that Jalāl al-Dawlah, on the point of running out of money and losing the battle, was encouraged to invade Ahwaz and plunder its wealth. He did so, and took from the central treasury alone 200,000 dinars and "unmeasurable" wealth from elsewhere.² At the same time "Kurds," Arabs, and others entered Khuzestan pillaging and enslaving the people.³

Jalāl al-Dawlah was not able to capitalize on this event because of his continued problems in Baghdad⁴ and Abū Kālinjār eventually regained control of this area and more.⁵

Kabir⁶ says that Abū Kālinjār was a successful ruler because he was able to use the revenues of Ahwaz and Fars to pacify the Turks and Daylamites who had given Jalāl al-Dawlah such continuous trouble. Unfortunately he gives no references

¹Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 516-517.
³Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 375. "Kurds" in this sense probably does not indicate ethnic Kurds, but rather any nomadic group from the Zagros region.
⁴See, e.g., Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 423.
⁶Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, pp. 110-111.
to primary sources for this evidence of continued prosperity in these areas and, except for the above implication of better conditions in Ahwaz than in Baghdad, I can find no indications in the sources that Ahwaz did not share the gradual economic decline and "natural" disasters that Baghdad experienced at this time. All the main sources become noticeably more sketchy during late Buyid rule, so that a definitive statement about economic conditions here cannot be made on the basis of documentary evidence alone.

On his death in 440/1048 Abū Kālinjār was succeeded in Baghdad, Ahwaz, and Basrah by his son al-Malik al-Raḥīm. Another son, Fūlād Sutūn, who was in Kirman with his father on the latter's death, went to Shiraz and established his rule there, though not for long, for al-Malik al-Raḥīm soon sent out another brother, Abū Saʿīd, to wrest control of the province in his name.¹ This same year al-Malik al-Raḥīm appointed another brother, Fānā-Khusraw, to rule in his name in Basrah.²

By 441/1049 the power and prestige of one of the Buyids' Turkish army commanders, al-Basāṣīrī, had increased to the point that the citizens of al-Anbār (an important town near Baghdad)

¹Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 547-548.

²Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 548. N. b. The story given here about the caliph's objections to the honorific "al-Malik al-Raḥīm" is almost identical to the one given in Ibn Shākir, "Cūyun al-Tawārīkh," (fols. 89a-89b) about objections to the title "Shahanshah."
came to him and asked him to rid them of a rival group (the Qirwāsh) who had been plundering their wealth for some time.\textsuperscript{1} He went there with his army and, so Ibn al-Athīr reports, threw out the Qirwāsh, improved the people's lives, and treated them with such justice that not a single loaf of bread was taken by his soldiers but they paid for it.\textsuperscript{2} After the misrule and disorder of the previous 100 years, this must indeed have been remarkable. And it is significant for the Buyids as well—for the people appealed to one of their generals and not to one of their family, most of whom were busy fighting each other for supremacy in see-saw battles in Ahwaz and Fars.\textsuperscript{3}

This rivalry among the Buyid family eventually led to some of them aligning themselves with the Seljuqs, the Turkish group whose power was spreading out from Khorasan.\textsuperscript{4} The caliph offered the khutbah in Baghdad in Tughril's name in 447/1055, and he and the general populace looked to the Seljuqs for deliverance from the constant civil wars between the Daylamites and Turkish contingents of the army, from the brigands and highwaymen who made the hajj impossible, and from the constant

\textsuperscript{1}Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 559.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 559.
\textsuperscript{4}Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 589 and 596.
pillaging and levying of high taxes by rival groups.¹

The main resistance in Baghdad to the Seljuqs came not from the Buyid family itself, but from the general al-Basāsīrī, who ruled Baghdad and Basrah, while the nominal Buyid ruler, al-Malik al-Raḥīm, was occupied with fighting the Seljuqs in Khuzestan,² and although from 443/1051 to 446/1054 control of Fars and Khuzestan fluctuated between the various Buyids and the Seljuqs (led by Ṭūghrīl Beg), by 443/1051 the Seljuqs had gained a firm foothold in Isfahan and Aidaj and temporarily took Ahwaz by force and set it on fire.³ The economic ruin caused by the constant fighting among these groups in Khuzestan at this time was fairly devastating: almost no town in this area escaped being pillaged or ruined.⁴ In 446/1054 after having concentrated his resources and army on the battle for Fars, Ṭūghrīl Beg took Ahwaz, this time for good, and sent Abū Ḍalīl Ṭāhir al-Malik al-Raḥīm, there to rule in his name.⁵ The next year he gave Ahwaz and Arrajan to one of his principal commanders, Hizārāsp as iqṭāʾ.⁶


³Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 574-575.

⁴See, e.g., Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 572-573.

⁵Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 603.

From the historical sources, then, what conclusions can we draw about the effects of Buyid rule on Khuzestan? First, the system of allying some form of tax-farming with military pay continued in the Buyid period and, in Khuzestan (especially during the period of Muṣṭafā b. Izz al-Dawlah's and ʿIzz al-Dawlah's rule) this practice gradually led to all revenues accruing to the military and almost none to the central government.

Second, there is evidence that certain Buyids, principally ʿAḍud al-Dawlah, tried to repair the ruin of the agricultural support system caused by over forty years of neglect and warfare in Mesopotamia. But there is also evidence that ʿAḍud al-Dawlah's effective rule in this area may have been as short as one year—certainly not enough time to complete such a renewal.

Third, warfare in this area was sporadic from 320/923 on, and almost constant after about 407/1016. All indications we have from the historical sources are that the economic effects of this unsettled state were damaging to the economy.

Fourth, after about 410/1019, highway robbery and economic conditions became so bad that for most years until the end of Buyid rule, people were unable or unwilling to undertake the ḥajj.

In short, as might be expected, under strong rulers such as Muṣṭafā b. Izz al-Dawlah and ʿAḍud al-Dawlah, who enjoyed the support of their armies and most of their relatives, the countryside may have been relatively more secure than under the later, less
powerful rulers, and the economic consequences of the rule of these early Buyids may have been a slow, more gradual, decline than with the later Buyids. Nevertheless, all the historical sources point to a definite economic decline during the rule of this dynasty.

The Seljuqs 447/1055 - 498/1105

Turks had been entering the Islamic world long before the Seljuqs invaded in the fifth/eleventh century. Indeed, it was fear of his Turkish soldiers that caused the ֶAbbasid caliph al-Mu'tasim to move the center of government from Baghdad to Samarra in the early third/ninth century. But this previous infiltration had been gradual and, more or less, individual. The incursions of the Seljuqs were something quite different.

At the end of the fourth/tenth century most of the area included within present-day Iran was divided between the Ghaznavid Empire and what were soon to become its tributary states in the east, and the Buyid-controlled ֶAbbasid Empire in the west (see Figure 15). Into this Islamic world, through the corridor of Transoxiana, entered a tribe of Oghuz1 Turks under their chieftain Seljūq ibn Duqāq.2 These pastoral nomads from the

1Also often called the Ghuzz or the Oghuzz.

Figure 15. The Iranian world, ca. 388/998.
Central Asian steppe initially came south as a mercenary group in support of the Samanids in their battles with the Qara-Khanids. These Turks had only recently been converted to Islam from shamanism, a fact borne out not only by the histories,¹ but also by their names (Figure 16): Seljûq and his father Duqâq both had Turkish names, while the sons of Seljûq (Mîkâ'îl, Mûsâ, Isrâ'îl, Yûnus, and Yûsîf) all had Muslim names.² Isrâ'îl in fact, is often referred to by his Turkish name, Arslân.³ And their recent conversion to Islam is important in two ways: 1) The "zeal of the convert" is often credited for their great initial military successes, especially against the Byzantines; 2) They were converted to Sunni Islam and thus could see themselves as true "warriors in the path of God" in liberating the caliph and the Empire from the Shi'a Buyids and from the growing threat of the Fatimids.

Many reasons are given for these pastoral nomads leaving the Central Asian steppe: the shrinking of their traditional

¹Ibn al-Athîr, al-Kâmil, IX, p. 474.

²Though the Judaean-Christian rather than strictly Muslim character of these names has led some (see, e.g., Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, s.v. "Seljûk") to suggest the Seljuqs came to Islam by way of Christianity.

Figure 16. The Seljuqs.
pasturelands for their flocks; population pressure; and the unsettled political condition of Transoxiana offering both an "open niche" and an irresistible opportunity for a nomadic mercenary group.

Since the reason the Seljuqs entered the Islamic world probably influenced the way they entered and spread across Iran, it might be productive to consider these proposed "causes" briefly here. The evidence for the first of these is inconclusive: as we saw in Figure 8 (Chapter II) there is disagreement on meteorologic conditions (which would have had the most direct effect on their pasturage) in the Middle East during the period directly preceding the Seljuqs entry into Iran. If they experienced several dry years during this period, however, it is certainly possible that they may have come south in need of pasturage for their sheep, goats, and horses.

The second reason often given, that of population pressure, by itself seems less likely to have been a factor. The Seljuqs were pastoral nomads with seasonal migrations over the Central Asian steppe and it is difficult to imagine the kind of

1Nishābūrī, Saljūqnāmah, p. 10.


population pressure on this vast steppe area that would have closed them off from acceptable pasture and living areas. Moreover, it has been shown that nomads in particular are adept at regulating their own population (by female infanticide, abortion, late marriage, increased bride-price, etc.) as well as that of their flocks.¹ If the nomads in this area hadn't practiced efficient checks on the growth of their population before this, the "compound interest" effect of such growth would have led to overpopulation of the area long before the fourth/tenth century.

The cause of the migration probably had as much or more to do with the unstable political situation in Transoxiania at this time² and the availability of an open niche attractive to these nomadic Turks for various reasons, including the possibilities of great plunder.

Whatever the reason for their entry into the Dar al-Islam, the Seljuqs' initial confrontation with the representatives of Islamic power was resolved through violent means. Their first battles fought not as Samanid mercenaries but rather for their own aggrandizement were with the famous Maḥmūd of Ghazna,³ and,


²See Bosworth, Ghaznavids, p. 222.

³See, e.g., Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 377. N.b. Maḥmūd's honorific was Yāmīn al-Dawlaḥ, and so he is often referred to, without giving any other name.
after his death in 421/1030, with his son Mas'ud, and culminated in the victory of Seljuq's grandsons Tughril Beg and Chaghri Beg at the battle of Dandangān (near Marv) in 431/1040. Mas'ud then retreated to Ghazna, while the Seljuqs looked to the west.

In Baghdad the caliph al-Qā'im looked on these events with favor and in 447/1055 offered the khutbah in Baghdad in Tughril Beg's name and soon after married the daughter of Tughril's brother Chaghri Beg.

Though the caliph welcomed the Seljuqs, al-Basāsitī appealed to the Fatimids of Egypt (fellow Shi'ites) for help against these invading Sunni Turks. In the ensuing struggle, which lasted from 447/1055 to 452/1060, control of Baghdad and Iraq vacillated between the two forces. Finally in 451/1059-60

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2 According to Bayhaqī, Ta'rīkh-i Bayhaqī, ed. ČAlī Akbar Fayyād (Mashhad: Danīshgāh-i Mashhad, 1350/1971), pp. 834-839; but cf. Nīshābūrī, Saljuqnāmah, p. 16, which gives the date as 429 (1038). Most other histories don't mention this battle by name, but rather just mention heavy fighting in this area, viz., Ibn Shākir, "Cîyūn al-Tawārīkh," fol. 89a-b, 90b, 91b, etc., or Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 457-459.

3 Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 481-484.

4 As early as 435/1044 the caliph was sending emissaries to Tughril Beg (Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 522), and as early as 429/1038 the Seljuqs sent letters of support to the caliph (Nīshābūrī, Saljuqnāmah, p. 17).

5 Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IX, pp. 609-611 and 617.

al-Basāsīrī was killed in Wasit by Seljuq troops.¹

Ṭughril Beg was received in Baghdad by the caliph, with great honors, in 455/1063 and died later that same year.²

What do the sources say about economic conditions during this initial period of Seljuq rule? First of all, the expected internal security and relief from the Shia-Sunni fighting that the caliph and the populace had hoped the Seljuqs would bring did not materialize during Ṭughril's reign. As late as 455/1063, the year of his death, we still read of continued depredations by the Turks, Kurds, and Arabs,³--indeed it almost seems as though the initial effect of the invasion was simply to add one more group to those already terrorizing the populace.

Second, although there is evidence that Ṭughril wanted to revitalize trade and manufacturing and to renew the splendor of the Empire by rebuilding Baghdad, the lot of the common people had not improved drastically, if at all.⁴ By 449/1057 famine was widespread across Ahwaz, Kufa, Azerbayjan and Wasit, and the situation was so desperate that tales of cannibalism are not


uncommon at this time.\footnote{1}\footnote{1} But it must be remembered that this initial period of Seljuq rule was taken up with consolidation efforts: al-Basāsīrī wasn't killed until 451/1059-1060 and the Buyids weren't dispelled from Fars until 454/1062.\footnote{2} So perhaps we should look to the rule of the next Seljuq, Alp Arslān, for indications of economic conditions after the consolidation of Seljuq rule.

Ţughril Beg died leaving no direct heir, so that Alp Arslān, the son of his brother Chaghri Beg, succeeded him. Up to his death in 451/1059 Chaghri Beg had been ruling in his brother's name in the eastern part of the Empire, which meant that the succession of Alp Arslān in the west in 455/1063 signaled the unification of Seljuq sovereignty from Iraq to Khorasan.

Alp Arslān's accession was not without opposition, however. It seems that Ťughril's own choice, and that of his influential vizier al-Kundurī, was Chaghri Beg's second son, Suľaymān.\footnote{3} But Alp Arslān had many of the army commanders and his own powerful vizier, Niżām al-Mulk, on his side, and

\footnote{1}{Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, pp. 180-181; Ibn al-Âṭīr, al-Kāmil, IX, p. 636.}

\footnote{2}{Ibn al-Balkhī, Fārsnāma, p. 166.}

\footnote{3}{Ibn al-Âṭīr, al-Kāmil, X, p. 29.}
al-Kundurī soon acquiesced. 1

And although Alp Arslān ruled from Iraq to Khorasan in name, in practice he gave out much of this territory as iqṭā' to his army commanders and relatives. 2

After his accession, and perhaps in an effort to end the pillaging by his own troops in Iraq and western Iran, Alp Arslān turned the main body of his troops away from the Islamic world and toward the Fatimid-held areas and Byzantium, where he met the Roman Emperor Diogenes in battle at Manzikert (Malāzkird) in 463/1071. 3 This battle was decisive for the later history of Anatolia, for the defeat and capture of the Roman Emperor by Alp Arslān signaled the opening of the whole interior of the Anatolian plateau to Turkish expansion and settlement.

Alp Arslān then turned his attention back to the east, where a revolt by the Qara-Khanids was in progress in Transoxiana, and there in 465/1073, while interrogating a rebel chieftain, he was assassinated. 4

Except for anecdotes about his personal exploits and bravery, the sources are rather quiet about the rule of Alp

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2 Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, X, p. 50.


4 Nīshābūrī's Saljūqnamah (p. 28) has a graphic account of this event.
Arslān. It seems he spent all his time with his troops, fighting on various frontiers, and never once went to Baghdad.¹ He may have been successful, nonetheless, in bringing some order to western Iran and Iraq, for after 455/1063 mention of pillaging by various Turks and Kurds drops off drastically, and we hear of only occasional Sunni-Shīʿa clashes.² Whether this relative tranquility is real or is an artifact of the historians' concern with the major battles shaping up between the Dār al-Islām and the Christian powers is difficult to say. After 456/1064, however, most of the major Islamic historians for western Iran (Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Shākir, etc.) give much more detail to clashes on the western and eastern frontiers than to events in Baghdad and the central provinces.

One indication of economic conditions in the first fifty years of Seljuq rule is given in Figure 17. A few things are striking about this chart: first, though it contains all the references to damān³ in Ibn al-Athīr's al-Kāmil and Ibn al-Jawzī's

¹He was in Khorasan when the caliph named him "Cādu al-Dawlah" (Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, X, p. 35), and I can find no mention of him ever visiting Baghdad (viz., e.g., Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VIII, pp. 231-284).

²Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VIII, p. 277. These clashes may have been beyond the power of mortal rulers to stop, since 900 years later they still continue.

³Damān, like ʿiqṭāʿ, is basically a granting of the revenues of a specified area in return for a remittance to the central government (like ʿiqṭāʿ al-tamīlīk). N.b. Ibn al-Athīr occasionally mentions damān without stating a sum, and these mentions (Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, X, pp. 294, 338, 341, 354, 372 and 396) thus are not included in this figure.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
<th>REFERENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>447</td>
<td>Ahwaz</td>
<td>360,000 dinars</td>
<td>IA, 1 IX, 613-614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>448</td>
<td>Basrah &amp; Ahwaz</td>
<td>300,000 &quot;</td>
<td>IJ, 2 VII, 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>451 (for 3 years)</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>400,000 &quot;</td>
<td>IA, X, 8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>452</td>
<td>Kufa &amp; environs</td>
<td>4,000 &quot;</td>
<td>IA, X, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>454</td>
<td>Caliph's estates (near Baghdad)</td>
<td>30,000 &quot;</td>
<td>IA, X, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>455</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>150,000 &quot;</td>
<td>IA, X, 25-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>455</td>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>200,000 &quot;</td>
<td>IA, X, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>459</td>
<td>Basrah &amp; Wasit</td>
<td>300,000 &quot;</td>
<td>IA, X, 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>472</td>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>100,000 &quot; (+ 100 horses)</td>
<td>IA, X, 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>474</td>
<td>Isfahan</td>
<td>70,000 dinars</td>
<td>IJ, VIII, 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>474</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>700,000 &quot;</td>
<td>IJ, VIII, 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>497 (for an unspecified number of years)</td>
<td>al-Batihah &amp; environs</td>
<td>50,000 &quot;</td>
<td>IA, X, 377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 IA = Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil.  

Figure 17. Post-Buyid đamān.
al-Muntazam for this fifty year period, the data are sporadic and not annual. This may indicate a lessening of power (or centralization) for the Seljuqs, i.e., after awarding these grants of land for these sums the grantee never felt compelled to notify the nominal rulers (the Seljuqs) of the yield in subsequent years or to pay it.

Second, very little land changed hands during this period, i.e., once a damān was awarded (to usually an army officer) it was seldom repossessed and then awarded to someone else.

Third, the few times these land grants were repossessed and awarded to others we can see the relative change in the worth of the grant, e.g., the damān of Ahwaz alone in 447/1055 was worth 360,000 dinars, yet one year later the combined damān of both Ahwaz and Basrah was worth only 300,000 dinars.

Fourth, during the first twelve years of Seljuq rule the amounts remained high (i.e., hundreds of thousands of dinars per grant) but by the middle of Malikshāh's reign (474/1082) the total amount of revenue collected from all grants by Nizām al-Mulk was only 700,000 dinars—not that much more than the combined total of only three grants twenty years earlier (those of the caliphal estates, Baghdad, and Wasit). Whether this indicates lowered economic productivity or reduced ability to collect the sums due is difficult to say.
Fifth, the relative economic worth of Ahwaz in 447/1055, even after over 60 years of being a center of battle, pillaging, and ruin, was still extremely high.

Sixth, all the amounts are given in dinars, not dirhams as in previous records, a fact that is significant in itself and also because it means we cannot compare these revenues with earlier ones. The causes of this shift from silver to gold issues will be discussed in Chapter V.

Seventh, the great drop in revenues seems to have occurred between 472/1080 and 474/1082, or, in other words, in the middle of Malikshäh's reign.

Malikshäh had succeeded his father Alp Arslân on the latter's death in 465/1073, and continuity was maintained by Alp Arslân's appointing his own vizier, Niẓām al-Mulk, as his 18 year old son's guardian.¹ Thus began a period of political, religious, and administrative activity for the Seljuqs, when they (principally through the efforts of Niẓām al-Mulk) finally subjugated Samargand and the East, established madrasahs (for the promulgation of Sunni "orthodoxy"), and it is said, tried to regularize the system of military pay and local administration:

¹Nīshābūrī, Saljūqnamah, p. 29.
It had been the custom to collect money from the country and pay it to the troops and no one had previously had a fief.\textsuperscript{1} Nizam al-Mulk saw that the money was not coming in from the country on account of its disturbed state and that the yield was uncertain because of its disorder. Therefore he divided it among the troops in fiefs, assigning to them both the yield and the revenue. Their interest in its development increased greatly and it returned rapidly to a flourishing state.\textsuperscript{2}

The question, of course, is whether in fact it returned to a "flourishing state" or not. And closely connected with that is the question of this shift from \textit{iqtā\textsuperscript{c} al-istīghlāl} (the granting of a certain amount of revenue as practiced by the Buyids) to \textit{iqtā\textsuperscript{c} al-tamīlīk} (the granting of both the "yield and

\textsuperscript{1}Iqtā\textsuperscript{c} is commonly mistranslated as "fief," but as both Cahen (Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, s.v. "Iktā\textsuperscript{c}", pp. 1088-1091) and Lambton (Landlord and Peasant, pp. 53-54) note, the element of legal, mutual obligation implicit in the European feudal system is absent in \textit{iqtā\textsuperscript{c}}. Further, the validity of transferring indiscriminately such a culture-bound term as feudalism is questionable. And finally, there are as many differences between Western European feudalism and \textit{iqtā\textsuperscript{c}} as similarities: \textit{iqtā\textsuperscript{c}} only accounted for, at most, half of actual land holdings in Islam (waqf, private estates, and day\textsuperscript{c}ah, or non-military, hereditary grants, being common); the lack of primo-geniture in Islam meant a continual division of estates; grants of \textit{iqtā\textsuperscript{c}} were (theoretically at least) not hereditary; in Islam, slaves were continuously recruited to counterbalance the established military; and in Islam, holders of \textit{iqtā\textsuperscript{c}} generally did not live on their estates, but instead lived in the large towns.

\textsuperscript{2}Quoted in Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 148. Since Imad al-Dīn was writing during Seljuq times and for a Seljuq sultan, this excerpt should be read with caution. I would have preferred a better translation of this passage (e.g., one that did not translate \textit{iqtā\textsuperscript{c}} as "fief"), but I was unable to find the original passage in \textit{Imād al-Dīn's Nusrat al-Fatrah} and Lewis does not give a full citation for it.
the revenue, as practiced by the Seljuqs)—was it intentional
(as Imad al-Din claims above, and as Ann Lambton proposes) or
was it a result of the decline in central control (as Claude
Cahen believes), with such passages as Imad al-Din's above
being "post-facto justification"?

Although there is no overwhelming proof for either
argument, many scholars have long thought that Cahen was right
and that the Seljuqs were simply faced with a fait accompli.
But the suddenness of the drop in revenue noted above between
472/1080 and 474/1082 (Figure 17), its occurrence at this time
(when Nizam al-Mulk was at the peak of his power), and the fact
that few, if any, daman were re-assigned between the years
474/1082 and 493/1100 (indicating, perhaps, that by receiving
both the yield and the revenue the troops' "interest in its
development" did increase) all point to this change in the
land-tenure system as being a single, intentional act and to
its being instituted between 472/1080 and 474/1082.

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1 Landlord and Peasant, pp. 28-29.

pp. 1088-1091.

3 The discussion of the iqta C system under the Seljuqs is
necessarily brief here. Entire books and many papers have been
devoted to the subject: see Lambton's Landlord and Peasant, or
C. Cahen's "L'evolution de l'iqta C du IXe au Xllie siecle.
Contribution à une histoire comparee des societes medievales,
Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilisations, VIII (Jan.-March,

This and other actions by Niẓām al-Mulk may have ushered in a period of tranquility for this area. The constant Sunni-Shi‘a clashes that characterized the late Buyid-early Seljuq period seem to have ended, there is no repeat of the terrible famine of 449/1057, and brigands are only occasionally a problem.¹

Instead, one of Niẓām al-Mulk's main concerns became the expulsion or elimination of heretics and deviants from Sunni Islam.² This was not only or even principally religious fervor on his part: the Shi‘ite Fatimids, the remaining adherents of the Shi‘ite Buyids, and the growing Isma‘ili movement all presented immediate political threats to Seljuq rule. That Niẓām al-Mulk was justified in seeing the last of these as particularly dangerous is demonstrated by his assassination by their hands in 485/1092.³ Malikshāh died a few months later,⁴ and with the death of these two, the period of strong central Seljuq rule ended.

On the death of Malikshāh four of his sons pressed their claims to succeed him, and, just as it had with many of the

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³Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, X, pp. 204-206.

Buyids and with his father before him, the question of succession proved disruptive and divisive. Succession in Turkish tribal custom was by seniorate,¹ but once in power the Seljuqs tried to succeed by designation (of a wālī al-Cahd), as we saw in the case of Tughril Beg and Alp Arslan. And Alp Arslan (and later his son Malikshāh) were able to gain power in this way only because of the support of the Turkish army and of Niżām al-Mulk.² With Niżām al-Mulk dead the question of Malikshāh’s succession became even more of an open contest.

The custom of tribal leadership also proved to be a major problem for the Seljuqs in that it was not one of absolute power but rather of only being a primus inter pares, which meant that all male members had equal right to spoils and to rule. Soon various members of the Seljuqs’ extended family (see Figure 16) had established separate rule in Kirman, Asia Minor, and Syria.

The fragmentation of Seljuq rule in western Iran and Iraq was brought about by the death of Malikshāh. His eldest son, Barkyaruq, had enjoyed the support of Niżām al-Mulk and the army, but Niżām al-Mulk’s death preceded his master’s,³ and through


³And may well have been caused by his master as well, since they had well-known differences of opinion, viz., Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, X, p. 116.
the machinations of one of Malikshāh's widows, Turkān Khātūn, her 4-year-old son Maḥmūd was recognized instead.\(^1\) Thus began another civil war in this area that was not settled until Barkyarūq succeeded his half-brother two years later, in 487/1094.\(^2\)

The governor of Khuzestan, Bursuq, had been one of Barkyarūq's most loyal partisans, and had fought for Barkyarūq's father Malikshāh and grandfather Tughrīl as well.\(^3\) Like Niẓām al-Mulk, Bursuq too was killed by Ismaʿīlīs, who apparently had many mountain strongholds in Khuzestan and Fars at this time,\(^4\) and he was succeeded in this area by his son-in-law, Chāvī Saqāvūh.\(^5\)

Much of the constant battle for succession among the remaining sons of Malikshāh (Barkyarūq, Muḥammad, and Sanjār) was played out on the Susiana, principally because of the support of Bursuq's sons for Barkyarūq.\(^6\) And though we have little direct information from the historical sources on conditions in


Khuzestan during this last period of our study, we can gather from references to other areas that the effects of these battles were once again devastating: the crops around Mosul, for example, were burned to the ground by the combatants, the Câyýar (brigands) were again preying on the general populace in Baghdad, and in the areas around Damghan, Gurgan, and the fortress of Girdkūh the destruction was so bad that people were reduced to eating dogs, carrion, and each other.

Eventually, Barkyarūq and his brother Muḥammad made peace with each other, Barkyarūq keeping rule over Fars, Khuzestan, western Iran, Tabaristan, and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and Muḥammad taking Azerbayjan, Armenia, Isfahan, and northern Iraq. But Barkyarūq soon died (in 498/1105), and though his infant son Malikshāh was proclaimed in his place, Muḥammad soon regained control of the entire Empire.

The initial period of Seljuq rule can be said to have ended with the death of Malikshāh in 485/1092, but this study has considered the period up to the death of Barkyarūq (498/1105) as well in order to gain a fuller view of which elements of Seljuq

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3Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, X p. 305.
rule were consequences of their invasion and which effects would be more permanent and indicative of future policy.

From the historical sources, then, we would draw the following conclusions: First, that the beginning years of Seljuq rule were highly unsettled and did not bring the hoped for economic and political stability.

Second, like the Buyids, the Seljuqs had problems with succession and sharing power. This eventually led to a lessening of their power because of intra-familial struggles, as it had with the Buyids.

Third, though the caliph may have welcomed the Seljuqs and hoped for a revitalization of court life in Baghdad, the imperial capital actually became less important during this early part of Seljuq rule. Some Seljuq rulers never even bothered to visit there. Instead certain provincial capitals (Rayy, Isfahan, and Shiraz) gained in importance as official governmental residences.

Fourth, the tax-farming system may have changed during this initial period of Seljuq rule from *iqṭāʾ al-istighlāl* to *iqṭāʾ al-tamlīk*. This change may have been intentional, to insure the reception by the government of at least some revenue, but there is no evidence from the historical sources that this was in fact the result.

And finally, this change in the tax-farming system probably led to increasing decentralization, to increasing
the power of the people who received these various forms of iqtāc (principally the military) over the civilian administration, and to certain military leaders thus gaining firm territorial bases that often later became hereditary.

Conclusions

One of the most noticeable aspects of the historical data is that the type of evidence depends on the source available. For the Baridis and Buyids we have Miskawayh, who was a kātib, so that the type of things important to him happen to be the type of evidence important to us: Basic political data (who ruled what, when), military engagements, the effects of these engagements (and incursions) on the countryside, and some financial information.

Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Shākir, both of whose works we have only in part, both continue this tradition to some extent, though by their more "universal" nature (they cover Egypt and Syria), they give less detail about southern Iraq and Iran.

The extant Seljuq histories, principally Ta'rīkh-i Baghaqī and the Saljūqnamah, cover the initial Seljuq period in Khorasan very thoroughly, and then become sketchier after about 465/1073 and about events to the west of Khorasan.

Ibn al-Athīr is, as always, useful for this post 465/1073 period, partly because of his critical sense (in sifting out conflicting accounts) and partly because he utilized some
primary sources no longer extant (e.g., parts of Hilāl al-Ṣābī’s Taʾrīkh). But by this time, and certainly after this time, events on the western frontier with the Franks and the Crusades begin to overshadow events in Baghdad and Khuzestan, so that information is more difficult to come by.

But even in this great welter of names, dates, places, and figures we can discern a few basic themes—developmental patterns so fundamental that they emerge even from the imperfect historical information we have for much of this period. First, there is the pattern that developed very early in this period (by 330/942) of leasing the tax-revenue of an area to the highest bidder. At the same time the military was growing in numbers and power. This soon developed into the caliph abdicating military rights and responsibilities in an area in favor of the person who controlled this income. Eventually this system resulted in a virtual stoppage of income to the central government. The Seljuqs came in and probably intentionally changed this system to one of the muṣṭa’ā’s remitting a fixed amount of kharāj per year in return for a free hand with the surplus.

A concurrent theme is the cycle of central rule and provincial independence. Baghdad exerted strong central control over Khuzestan after the last Saffarids (late third/ninth century); then the local Barādī family gained some independence (315/927); the Buyids came in and reasserted control from Baghdad (ca. 330/941); after the death of ʿImād al-Dawlah.
central control waned and then was reasserted in this area by ʿAḍud al-Dawlah after 367/978. ʿAḍud al-Dawlah died in 372/983 and his son Tāj al-Dawlah was virtually independent in Khuzestan. Bahā al-Dawlah (379/989) reasserted central control, but after his death (403/1012) his sons again divided the Empire. His grandson Abū Kālinjār eventually gained control of Khuzestan, Fars, and Baghdad (416/1025), and his death (440/1048) was followed by a period of disorder, then of rule by the Seljuqs (447/1055), who enjoyed nominal unity in this central part of the Empire, but whose provincial tax-farmers soon exerted direct provincial control. With the deaths of Malikshāh and Niẓām al-Mulk in 485/1092, even nominal central rule fragmented.

Another theme to emerge from this information is the resiliency of the agricultural system as at least a subsistence base. With all the pillaging, destruction of canal systems, and inattention to the constant needs of upkeep of the agricultural support system, it is surprising that famine was not more common. Yet it is reported in this area only a few times.

This, then, would be our picture of Khuzestan for the period 320/932 to 498/1105 by using evidence from historical sources alone. But there are many questions that the historical sources leave unanswered: For example, exactly what products was the economy of Khuzestan during this period based on? How much would these products have been affected by the lack of upkeep of the water-supply system? Were any towns other than
Ahwaz politically or economically important? Was there a population decline concurrent with the proposed agricultural decline? And, what effects did the periods of political decentralization have on the economy of this area?

To answer these questions, and to find out if our initial conclusions based on historical evidence alone are valid, we shall now turn to a different kind of evidence, that provided by the "geographers."
CHAPTER IV

THE GEOGRAPHICAL SOURCES

Many of the same questions we asked about the historical sources apply to the geographical sources as well, since the two genres do not differ greatly in form, but only in content. And the most important question we can ask of each of these geographies is of its veracity and accuracy—how did the geographer acquire his information? and, is the information reported original with him?

Using these geographies, we can then ascertain a great deal of economic data to supplement the basic historical-political outline we constructed using the historical documents in Chapter III. In addition to answering the questions enumerated at the end of Chapter III, we can also, for example, reconstruct trade routes through this area, determine what were the main centers of commerce and administration and where they were located, and discover what items were being manufactured in certain areas for trade or internal use.

**Problems in Utilizing the**
**Geographical Sources**

Previous attempts by historians and archaeologists to
utilize the geographical sources to gain economic data on Islamic Khuzestan 1 were often hampered by the later authors' reliance on German 2 and English 3 translations of the original Arabic and Persian sources. These translations are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons: neither Schwarz nor LeStrange is consistent in translating geographical terms 4 ; Schwarz especially is unspecific in translating technical manufacturing terms 5 ; and LeStrange's geographical information is presented in only the most schematic fashion, while Schwarz includes no maps at all. 6

But the main problem with LeStrange's work, as with Schwarz's, is his uncritical, unquestioning transmittal of all the information presented by the various geographers, even if


4Schwarz indiscriminately reduces rustaq, balad, kurah and iqlim to the German Bezirk and Gebiet, while LeStrange renders them as "district."

5The various types of cloth manufactured, for example, he usually lumps together as Manufakturen.

6LeStrange's maps especially bear little relationship to geographic reality.
these geographers had only copied centuries-old, secondhand reports. Figure 18 shows that the medieval geographers (like the historians in Chapter III) often relied on earlier treatises for much of their information. Thus for those scholars unable to examine the original Persian or Arabic works themselves, accepting the information from these sources, as it is presented in Schwarz and LeStrange, as firsthand, reliable, and contemporary with the respective author can only lead to confusion, contradictory reports, and misleading information.

These very things occurred when Robert McC. Adams and Donald Hansen tried to use the geographic evidence, as presented by Schwarz and LeStrange, to supplement their archaeological data. They concluded that "the survival of [Jundi-Sabur] into the fifth century A.H. [eleventh century A.D.] as more than a small, impoverished village simply cannot be demonstrated from the available archaeological evidence." But they also note that Islamic geographers up to Mustawfi (d. after 740/1340) "continue to attest to its survival and even prosperity as a town." The two post-fifth/eleventh century geographers (Abū al-Fidā and Mustawfī) they cite, however, probably never visited

1 This figure is based on information supplied in Appendix III.


3 Adams and Hansen, "Jundi Shahpur," p. 58.
Figure 18. The inter-relationships between various geographers.
Khuzestan. A look at Abū al-Fidā’s chapter on Khuzestan\textsuperscript{1} shows that it is not original material: of the numerous sources he admits copying for this chapter, perhaps Ibn Hawqal (who wrote in 366/977) is the most heavily used (see Figure 18, and Appendix III), so that in fact what Abū al-Fidā is describing in his work is conditions in Khuzestan three centuries earlier.

The other post-fifth/eleventh century source Adams and Hansen cite is Mustawfī’s Nuzhat al-Qulūb,\textsuperscript{2} which can easily be shown to be merely a compilation and abridgement of previous authors, and not even updated to 740/1340 (when it was compiled). Mustawfī names some of his sources (see Figure 18), such as the Suwar al-Aqālim,\textsuperscript{3} the “Diary” of Malikshāh,\textsuperscript{4} the Fārsnāmah,\textsuperscript{5} and Yāqūt,\textsuperscript{6} while others are easily discernable.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{1}Abū al-Fidā, Geographie d’Abou l-Feda (Texte Arabe), ed. M. Reinaud and MacGuckin de Slane (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1840), pp. 311-319.


\textsuperscript{3}Mustawfī, Nuzhat, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{4}Mustawfī, Nuzhat, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{5}Mustawfī, Nuzhat, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{6}Mustawfī, Nuzhat, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{7}Compare, for example, his account of Byzantine works on the Susiana Plain (Nuzhat, p. 107) with Ťabarī’s (Ta’rikh, vol. I, p. 845), or his report of the scorpions of Āfkar Mukram (Nuzhat, p. 110) with Iṣṭakhrī’s (al-Masālik, p. 92), or the attribution of digestive powers to the waters of this area (Nuzhat, p. 108) and Iṣṭakhrī, al-Masālik, p. 90).
One other factor that Schwarz and LeStrange overlook, but one that should be kept in mind by the critical reader is the distinction between straightforward geographical reporting and the genre of Cəjā'ib literature. Cəjā'ib literature¹ (like its counterpart in historical writings, the latā'if genre²) deals with the unusual or fantastic: the author describes the "curiosities of the world" with the express purpose of amazing the reader. Thus the very character of these works puts them outside our interest here, since they are by nature composed of fantastic, incredible stories. But some of this Cəjā'ib genre overlaps with the more straightforward geographical treatises, as, for example, when Ibn al-Faqīh says, "Characteristic of al-Kufah are types of fruits and dates, the like of which have disappeared from al-Basrah, al-Ahwaz, Baghdadh, and al-Hijaz."³ We must not take this as prima facie evidence of agricultural decline in these latter areas, since Ibn al-Faqīh states that here he is concerned with "Cəjā'ib al-aqālīm," and readers of his own time would have

¹Cəjā'ib comes from the root Cajaba, to astonish or amaze, and thus the genre is one in which the author tries to astonish the reader (see, e.g., Abū Dulāf's Kitāb Cəjā'ib al-Buldān).

²Latā'if comes from the root latafa, to be delicate or amiable, and the genre thus consists of light, amusing anecdotes (see, e.g., al-Tha'ālibī's Kitāb Latā'if al-Ma'ārif).

expected hyperbole in this section. We must, however, be aware that this genre of writing exists and that almost all the medieval Islamic geographers occasionally lapse into it.

Similarly, when we come across two distinct styles of writing in one geographical work, this distinction deserves our attention, for we must determine if the different styles of writing indicate anything about the information presented. The principal case where this has been noted is in Maqdisī's Ahsan al-Taqāsīm. Maqdisī throughout this work used two very different writing styles: one style is very straightforward, specific, and informative; the other is more formally written, general, and opinionated, and is written in $\text{saj}^c$ or rhymed prose. And perhaps most important, the subject matter seems to vary directly with the writing style: the former style usually deals with the products and people of the area and is very much a first-hand description (e.g., "Bayrut is large and in it are many date palms. They call it 'Little Basrah,' and they say it was the chief city of a district in the past. I saw it from afar as I was travelling from al-Bidhan on my way to Basinna."2); and

1Though Maqdisī is not alone in this practice. Ibn al-Faqīh (Mukhtasar Kitāb al-Buldān) often breaks into $\text{saj}^c$ (rhymed prose) in the midst of unrhymed prose, as does Hāfiẓ-i Abrū ("Jughrāfiyāh-i Hāfiẓ-i Abrū," British Museum Or. 1577, e.g., fol. 82a).

2Ahsan, p. 408.
latter usually centers around some religious or moral judgement
(e.g., "al-Ahwaz, it is the ugly, stinking, narrow metropolis of
the clime. It has no religion, no noble principles, no religious
jurists, and no wise reciters."

Moreover, the Ahsan contains glaring swings of opinion:

often Maqdisi seems overjoyed with Khuzestan.

\begin{quote}
bihi al-dawâlîb al-ṣarîfah
wa al-tawâhîn al-gharîbah
wa al-aʃmâl al-fâjîbah
wa al-khaṣâ'îs al-kâthîrah
wa al-mîyâh al-ghazîrah.
Dakhluhu kâna ya'$âdû al-khalîfah
wa lâhu â'în wa-ṭîbah.
Lam yaṭîb lî fî al-thamâniyâh ghayruhu
fa-mâ 'ajalluhu min iqâlim lawlâ 'ahluhu.
\end{quote}

In it are elegant water-wheels,
extraordinary mills,
wondrous handicrafts,
many specialties,
and abundant water.
Its revenues support the caliphate
and (its people) have manners and goodness.
Nothing but it pleases me in the eight,
For nothing is more exalted than the clime,
except its people.

But just as often he considers it one of the lowest places on
earth:

\begin{quote}
al-Ahwâz mazbalat al-dunyâ
wa 'ahluhu fa-min sharr al-warâ.
\end{quote}

\footnote{Ahsan, p. 410.}

\footnote{Ahsan, pp. 402-403. Though written in prose, it is
arranged thus here so that non-Arabic speakers may see its
rhyming aspects.}

\footnote{Ahsan, p. 403.}
al-Ahwaz is the dung-hill of the world
and its people among the evil of mankind.

al-Ahwaz huwwa miṣr al-iqlīm
ḍayyiq munattan dhamīm
lä dīn wa-lā lahum 'ašl karīm
wa-lā faqīh 'īmām wa-lā mudhakkir hakīm
wa-lā waqt ṭayyib wa-lā qalb salīm
al-gharib bihī fī hayrah saqīm
wa-lā 'aysh hani' fīhi aydān îl-muqīm
buqq wa-barāghīth wa karb Cazīm.¹

al-Ahwaz is the ugly, stinking,
narrow metropolis of the clime.
It has no religion, no noble principles,
no religious jurists, no wise reciters,
no pleasant time, and no pure heart.
The stranger there becomes sick with confusion.
The resident has no comfortable living there,
(just) bed-bugs, fleas, and great afflictions.

Again it should be noted that almost all these strong subjective
opinions (either pro or con) appear in the sajC—the straight,
unrhyming prose is usually objective and neutral.

Since Maqdisī mentions that he purposefully put some
things in rhyme "to entertain the common people,"² it is possible
he wrote in these two styles for effect or that he made a distinc-
tion himself, i.e., when he wanted to present geographic facts he
wrote in prose, but when he wanted to speak in generalities or on
religious topics, he used sajC.

If, as seems the case, Maqdisī was using hyperbole when he
wrote in sajC, the information contained in these passages must

¹Ahsan, p. 410.
²Ahsan, pp. 5 and 8.
be treated differently from the information he presented in unrhymed prose. This distinction has not been noted before, and I believe it is an important one. Maqdisi's passage on Jundi-Sabur, for example, makes much more sense when seen in this light. Adams and Hansen\(^1\) cite this passage to show that Jundi-Sabur was in ruin by 391/1000. But the passage, taken as a whole with the \textit{saj}\(^3\) isolated, gives quite a different impression:

Jundisabur was a great, populous, major city and an ancient city, and it was the capital of the clime. Now it is in disorder. Of it the Kurds have taken possession; manifest are corruption and oppression. Nevertheless, it is plentiful with sugar, and I heard them say that most of the sugar of Khurasan and al-Jibal is from here. They are people of the Sunnah, and they have two rivers and many \underline{tirāz} factories and great landed estates (\underline{diya\text{t}}) and fields of rice and rakhs\(^2\) and resources. And in it are jurists and prosperous people.\(^3\)

If the part written in \textit{saj}\(^3\) (the underlined sentence) is read as hyperbole, then the impression this passage gives is one of relative prosperity.

Given the problems in identifying and separating out sources (see Figure 18 and Appendix III), it would seem to be a productive avenue of research for scholars in this area to employ

\(^1\)Adams and Hansen, "Jundi Shahpur," p. 58, working from Schwarz's translation (\textit{Iran im Mittelalter}, p. 349).

\(^2\)Rakhs could be a type of soft, supple cloth or a low-quality grain, or it could have the meaning of "food was cheap."

\(^3\)Ahsan, pp. 408-409.
some of the new computer-based techniques for analyzing and discriminating between literary styles.\textsuperscript{1} Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to subject the \textit{Absan} to such a study here, it is hoped that such an analysis can be carried out in the near future. For the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to note the two styles and take the differences into consideration when using the information they present.

Finally, the other problem that mitigated against being able to utilize the information presented by the medieval Islamic geographers is that prior to this study no attempt had ever been made to locate accurately all the Khuzestani cities mentioned by these geographers.\textsuperscript{2} In this study the settlements were located in the following way: a base map was prepared using U.S. Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center Maps ONC G-5 (ed. 6) and ONC H-6 (ed. 4). Then locations were determined for the Islamic


\textsuperscript{2}LeStrange's Map II locates only about half of these cities, and his locations are only approximate, while his map is only a schematic diagram. It should also be mentioned that both LeStrange and Schwarz accept the distances given in these geographies without comment. But the distances are given in \textit{farsangs} (or in Persian \textit{parsang}) or \textit{barids} (i.e., postal stages), and neither of these was an absolute measure (cf. J. H. Kramers, \textit{Analecta Orientalia} (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), pp. 215 and 180; and \textit{Maqdisi}, \textit{Absan}, pp. 65-66).
settlements in different ways (and with proportionate degrees of confidence): in some cases a positive location was possible either because the city is still inhabited (e.g., Ahwaz) or there are "ruins" located on the Defense maps and we know from other evidence (either archaeological or geographical) that these ruins date to medieval Islamic times; a more tentative location was determined for certain settlements by matching topological features from the Defense maps with descriptions given in the medieval geographies; and a possible location was determined for the remainder of the cities mentioned by the geographers using information from the itineraries alone (e.g., that Azam was on the road between Ahwaz and Ram Hurmuz). Figure II.1, Appendix II, shows which cities were located by which method.

**Trade Routes**

The first genre of Islamic geographical literature to develop after the Conquests can be subsumed under the category of Kutub al-Masālik wa'l-Mamālik (Books of the Roads and the Countries) which arose in the early third/ninth century to enlighten the caliphs about their new possessions (and about what they could expect in the way of taxes and tribute from them) and as geographical aids for those Muslims making the hajj or trading expeditions.

These travelogues are usually quite detailed, describing actual roads, the number of days journey between stops, the
relative size of the towns encountered, what the traveller could expect to find in each, and what each is famous for.

Since these itineraries were usually prepared for the trader or the hajj pilgrim, they can give us an indication not only of the primary directions of travel (i.e., where most of commercial and political/military traffic went) but also, perhaps, since the hajj routes always went to Mecca, which were the safest routes at certain times. In contrast with Khuzestan's current traffic pattern, which is oriented almost entirely north-south (north to Tehran, south to the Gulf ports), the medieval patterns were predominantly east-west (west to Basrah and Wasit, east to Shiraz and Isfahan). It is easy to see why this would be so: past Wasit to the northwest lay Baghdad, the imperial capital, and to the east of Khuzestan lay Fars, a political base for both the Buyids and the Seljuqs.

Deviations from these straight Shiraz/Isfahan to Basrah/Wasit routes, then, might well be regarded as significant in terms of route safety (since highway robbers were known to be operating in certain areas) or of basic changes in trade patterns, specifically the change proposed by B. Lewis\(^1\) from trade centered on the Persian Gulf to trade centered on the Red Sea after about 391/1000.

The earliest author to give us enough information to

\(^{1}\)Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 158.
reconstruct these routes is Ibn Khurdādhbih, an ʿAbbasid post-master in Jibal province, who wrote in 232/846. He may have travelled to many of the places he describes in his book\(^1\) (Khuzeastan being just south of Jibal, it is likely that he visited here), but it may not be necessary to know whether in fact he did or not, since his position in the government allowed him access to a great deal of information, not only about the postal routes, but also about government income (discussed later in this chapter). Ibn Khurdādhbih gave detailed routes (diagramed in Figure 19)\(^2\) from Ahwaz to the east, but the route from the west he simply declared was "from al-Basrah to al-Ahwaz."\(^3\) It is difficult to ascertain the significance (if any) of this brevity, but at least we can see that two main trade/hajj routes did exist and that they came from Shiraz and Isfahan.

The next author to describe these routes was Qudāmah, an ʿAbbasid tax accountant, who wrote his Kitāb al-Kharāj\(^4\) in

\(^1\)al-Masālik.

\(^2\)Information for this figure came from Ibn Khurdādhbih, al-Masālik, pp. 43 and 57-58.

\(^3\)Ibn Khurdādhbih, al-Masālik, p. 155. We possess only an abridgement of this work today, and it is not known if the original complete work contained maps to supplement the text.

\(^4\)Qudāmah ibn Jaʿfar, Kitāb al-Kharāj in Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, vol. VI, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1885). Again, with Qudāmah it is not so necessary to know whether he personally travelled these routes, since he was in a position to acquire accurate information. Data for the figure came from pages 194-195 and 197.
316/928. There are two major differences between his routes (Figure 20) and Ibn Khurdadbeh's: first, Qudāmah's route from Ahwaz to Isfahan incorporates a stop at Ḳasqar Mukram; and second, Qudāmah describes a route to Wasit that goes the round-about way of south to Basrah and then north. It is difficult to say if the addition of Ḳasqar Mukram to this route signifies an increased economic import for it, or perhaps only the preference of Qudāmah. It cannot be because the town was settled after Ibn Khurdadbeh wrote, since he mentions it as one of the districts of Ahwaz.

The second difference between the two itineraries is not so much a difference (since Ibn Khurdadbeh did not state a route from Wasit) as a description by Qudāmah of a very indirect way to proceed from Ahwaz to Wasit, and it could have any of several reasons behind it: the continued incursions by the Qarmatians in this area in 315/927 and 316/928 could have made travel by ship the only safe means of transport; the mutiny by certain parts of the army in Baghdad and Anbar could have made the countryside unsafe; or it could be that before Qudāmah's time there was no

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1Ibn Khurdadbeh, al-Masālik, p. 42. And although Abū al-Fidāʾ cites an earlier source attesting to the "newness" of Ḳasqar Mukram (in Taqwīm al-Buldān, p. 317), the town itself dates to at least before 71/690, when it is recorded as taking its name from an army commander who made his camp there (Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, IV, p. 329.

2Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 172-184.

3Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, p. 182.
Figure 20. Khuzestani roads, according to Qudāma (316/928).
easy, direct land route from Ahwaz to Wasit, as there was later.

Militating against the acceptability of this last as a plausible reason for Qudāmah's convoluted route is the fact that a short two to five years later Iṣṭakhrī (who wrote his Kitāb al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik between 318/930 and 321/933) described not one but two more routes to Wasit (Figure 21).¹ What is perhaps more interesting however is the fact that all of Iṣṭakhrī's routes avoided Ahwaz and instead centered on ṬAskar Mukram and Qurqub in the north and Arrajan in the south. Also, Iṣṭakhrī gave no route to Isfahan at this time, perhaps in response to the growing Daylamite incursions in that area.

One other important aspect of Iṣṭakhrī's itinerary is that he said travel between Hisn Mahdi and Bayan (in the south) was by land and Ibn Hawqal, who wrote in 366/977, agreed with this description.² For in the description of Khuzestani roads provided by Maqdisī (Figure 22)³ in 391/1000, he said that travel between these two cities was made easier by ṬAğud

¹Iṣṭakhrī, al-Masālik. The data from this figure come from pages 95-96.


³Maqdisī, Absan. The information on roads is from pages 418-420.
Figure 21. Khuzestani roads, according to ʿIṣṭakhrī (321/933).
Figure 22. Khuzestani roads, according to Naqdi (391/1000).
al-Dawlah's opening of a canal between the Ahwaz River (the Karun) and the Dijlah (the Tigris). Maqdisi does not give actual itineraries as the previous geographers did, so comparison is somewhat difficult. But still we can see that there are main roads leading to Wasit (west of Tib), Basrah (west of Bayan), Isfahan (northeast of Aidaj) and Shiraz (southeast of Arrajan). In addition Maqdisi includes a direct link between Aidaj and Ram Hurmuz (which is a task more difficult than it appears on the map, since both of these towns are in rugged mountain areas), and he links both Ahwaz and Askar Mukram with Ram Hurmuz.

The last reliable itinerary we have for the period of our study is that followed by Nāṣir-i Khusraw on his return from making the hajj in 443/1051-444/1052 (Figure 23). The fighting among the sons of the Buyid Abū Kālinjār had made all the land routes so unsafe at this time, he said, that from Basrah he travelled by boat to Mihrurban, then waited for an armed guard to go with him to Arrajan and then north.

From the middle of the fifth/eleventh century up to 656/1258 (the Mongol sack of Baghdad), there was almost a cessation of geographical works dealing with the "Eastern Caliphate."

1Maqdisi, Absan, p. 419.

2Nāṣir-i Khusraw, Sefernameh (information for the figure was from pages 88-92). All page numbers are references to the Persian text.

3Nāṣir-i Khusraw, Sefernameh, p. 91.
Figure 23. Nāṣir-i Khusraw's return route from Mecca (443/1051).
Instead the only geography that dealt directly with Iran was regional—the Fārsnāmah—and it does not include itineraries for Khuzestan. The other two extant geographies of this period (those by Idrīsī and Ibn Jubayr) were concerned mainly with the Mediterranean world and though they discussed Iran, they only repeated secondhand evidence.¹

The other important post-Buyid geographer is Yāqūt, who wrote the Muṣjam al-Buldān in 621/1224. This work is important because it is based on many previous geographies that would have been lost to us had Yāqūt not utilized them in his work. But it is also important to remember that the Muṣjam is almost entirely based on these earlier works, so that Yaqut does not transmit firsthand, verified information—not even information we can reliably date to the seventh/thirteenth century.

From these few itineraries, we can draw some preliminary conclusions: first, that since most of these works were written in the fourth/tenth century, this period represents either a time when travel was easier and safer, or a time when the writing of such travellogues was encouraged for some reason. Second, the routes were not constant, and probably varied directly as a result of political or military turmoil in certain areas. Third, we have evidence that a canal linking the Karun and the Tigris rivers was built between 366/977 and 391/1000 and it is ascribed

to the efforts of Āḍud al-Dawlah.

Medieval Maps

Many of these Kutub al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik also contain maps, which provide us with additional geographic information by aiding in the location of now-abandoned medieval Islamic settlements.

Two of the most famous Arab cartographers were Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Hawqal, whose maps are reproduced in facsimile (but with English legends) in Figures 24 and 25. The question of the relationship between these two maps, and between them and the now-lost map of Abū Zayd al-Balkhī (see Appendix III), is complex and cannot be fully treated here.¹ Suffice it here to say that both Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Hawqal used al-Balkhī's work in some form (as did many other geographers), but that both Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Hawqal travelled at least in the central part of the empire and verified their information.² Generally, Iṣṭakhrī's and Ibn Hawqal's maps and descriptions are quite similar, and they are singled out for individual mention both here and in Appendix II.


Figure 24. Iṣṭakhrī's map of Khuzestan.
Figure 25. Ibn Hawqal's map of Khuzestan.
only when they differ.

The information represented on these two maps has been transferred to a standard map of Khuzestan (Figure 26) to facilitate comparison.¹ And a comparison shows that, in general, these early geographers were rather accurate in their positioning of most cities. The main problems seem to be Ibn Hawqal's placement of Karkhah directly north of Jundi-Sabur (rather than northwest of Susa) and the placement by both of them of Suq al-Arba²a and Jubba on the Karun, when other evidence suggests they were located on the Tab.²² The other main problems with their maps are with the rivers, specifically, the omission of the Karkhah River, the labelling of the Diz as the Nahr al-Sus (a name usually given to the Karkhah),³ the implication that the Diz did not join the Karun in its lower reaches, and the joining of the Masruqan with the Karun at Ahwaz instead of at ⁴Askar Mukram. This last is especially strange, since both Ištakhrī and Ibn Hawqal state clearly in their texts that the "Masruqan flows until it leads to ⁴Askar Mukram."⁴ But in general, taking

¹Where Ibn Hawqal and Ištakhrī differ from the positions I have proposed for these cities, their locations are underlined.

²Maqdisī, Ahsan, p. 412.

³That Ištakhrī and Ibn Hawqal do not intend the Nahr al-Sus as the Karkhah is assumed from the placement of towns.

⁴Ištakhrī, al-Masālik, p. 89; Ibn Hawqal, Surat, p. 252.
Figure 26. The placement of towns, according to Istakhri and Ibn Hawqal.
the bottom right corner of their maps for north, we can see that for their time, these maps were rather accurate (one might even say they compare favorably with LeStrange's Map II). ¹

These two maps compare especially favorably with the information presented in zij tables, ² specifically those given by Abū al-Fidā (Figures 27a and b) and Mustawfī (Figure 27c). Even given that longitude is relative (the zero meridian’s placement being chosen arbitrarily by each geographer)⁵, one

²These particular maps by Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Hawqal compare well with geographic reality, but other maps by Iṣṭakhrī (see, e.g., H. Mzik, al-Iṣṭahri und seine Landkarten im Buch "Suwar al-Akālim" (Vienna: Georg Prachner, 1965), map X) seem to make no attempt at geographic reality, or even to match Iṣṭakhrī’s descriptions. The Gotha manuscript of Iṣṭakhrī’s work (ed. J. H. Moeller, Liber Climatum (Gotha: Officina Beckeriana, 1839), Tab. VIII) also has problems: the Nahr Tustar (the Karun) there is labelled as the Nahr Tab, the name usually given to the Jarrah River that flows from Fars through Arrajān in the south.

³Zij tables are tables of geographic coordinates for various locations. They were especially important because the geographic coordinates indicated the direction of Mecca (the direction of prayer).

⁴Abū al-Fidā, Taqwīm al-Buldān. The information for these figures comes from pages 312-318. Figure 27a is based on what Abū al-Fidā calls "al-ʿAtwāl" (presumably the Kitāb al-ʿAtwāl, see Appendix III) and Figure 27b on "al-Qanūn" (presumably the Qanūn al-Masʿūdī, by al-Birunī, see Appendix III).

⁵Mustawfī, Nuzhat. The information for this figure comes from pages 107-110.

⁵Zero meridians for longitude seem to have been arbitrarily chosen and to have varied greatly among medieval Islamic geographers. Al-Birunī used Ghazna as his starting point (J. H. Kramers, Analecta Orientalia, p. 222) while others used Mecca or Baghdad. Still others followed Ptolemy in using the Fortunate Islands (al-Jażāʾir al-Khālidat) or followed the Indian geographers in using Arīn, which was also called the "Meridian
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<td>30°</td>
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**a. Kitāb al-Atwāl (cited in Abū al-Fidā)**

- Qurqub Bilad al-Lur
- Jundi- Askar Mukram
- Sabur Tustar
- al-Ahwaz Ram Hurmuz
- Jubbā- Nahr Tira
- Hisn Mahdī Ārrajan
- Mihruban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34°</td>
<td>74°-77°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33°</td>
<td>75°-76°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32°</td>
<td>76°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31°</td>
<td>77°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b. al-Qanūn (cited in Abū al-Fidā)**

- Qurqub Jundi-Sabur
- al-Sus al-Dawraq
- Ḥubil al-Ahwaz
- Tustar Askar Mukram
- Ārrajan Hisn Mahdī
- Basiyan Mihruban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32°</td>
<td>74°-77°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31°</td>
<td>76°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30°</td>
<td>77°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**c. Nuzhat al-Oulūb**

- Askar Mukram
- Jundi-Sabur
- Dizful Hasrigan
- Ram Hurmuz
- Huwayza

Figure 27. The placement of Khuzestani towns, according to zij tables.
can still see that many of these coordinates given in the zi'j tables are incorrect: in Figure 27a the placement of Susa, Askar Mukram, and Nahr Tira are far from where they should be; in Figure 27b Bilad al-Lur, Tustar, Askar Mukram, and Basiyan are mispositioned; and in Figure 27c Askar Mukram and Ahwaz are both out of place. The inaccuracies of the zi'j tables may have been recognized even in medieval times—Maqdisi notes\(^1\) that people made jokes about praying in Khuzestan because Khuzestanis never face the true qiblah.

Any attempt to explain these mispositionings would be too involved to detail here. Suffice it here to offer these tables as a comparison for Ištakhrī's and Ibn Hawqal's maps, a comparison in which the zi'j tables come out a poor second.

**Tax Tables**

Another type of information some of these geographies provide is information on the tax revenues for various provinces. Figure 28 was constructed using information given by Ibn Khurdādbih, Qudāmah, and Maqdisi.\(^2\)

---

\(^1\)Maqdisi, Ahsan, p. 415.

\(^2\)Ibn Khurdādbih, al-Mašālik, passim; Qudāmah, Kitāb al-Kharāj, pp. 237-239, 249-251, et passim; Maqdisi, Ahsan, passim.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Tax (dirhams)</th>
<th>Tax (dinars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khorasan</td>
<td>44,846,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fars</td>
<td>33,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ahwaz</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isfahan &amp; Qumm</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinawar</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qazvin</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Tax (dirhams)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dimashq</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinnasrin &amp; al-CAsim</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Urdunn (Jordan)</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Tax (dirhams)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khorasan</td>
<td>37,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fars</td>
<td>24,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ahwaz</td>
<td>23,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayy &amp; Dimawand</td>
<td>20,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbayjan</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qumm &amp; Qaslan</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qazvin, Lanjan, &amp; Abhar</td>
<td>1,828,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinnasrin</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jund Filastin</td>
<td>259,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jund Dimashq</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jund al-Urdunn</td>
<td>109,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Tax (dirhams)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khorasan</td>
<td>44,800,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ahwaz</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimawand</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Rayy</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dijlah</td>
<td>8,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinawar</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qazvin, Abhar, &amp; Zanjan</td>
<td>1,628,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qumm</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimashq</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinnasrin &amp; al-CAsim</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filastin</td>
<td>259,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Urdunn</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 28. Land tax on selected provinces during the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries.
It would help us greatly to be able to use these tables to chart periods of economic prosperity or recession. But the approximately seventy year gap between each precludes their use in this manner. Moreover, while we know that by virtue of their government positions Ibn Khurdādhbih and Qudāmah had access to the official tax records, we know no such thing about Maqdisī. Maqdisī, in fact usually does not state where he got his information on kharāj, but we can surmise that he got part of it from local officials while on his travels, and part of it from previous works. Maqdisī's and Ibn Khurdādhbih's figures for Ahwaz and Khorasan are too close not to suspect Maqdisī of copying—and that suspicion is confirmed when one compares the passages in question.\(^1\) Thus Maqdisī's figures are a melange of contemporary data and information from up to 160 years earlier. This fact is not taken into consideration by modern authors who use Maqdisī, many of whom unquestioningly accept his figures and postulate continued (or unchanged) economic prosperity for these regions.\(^2\)

But if these tables cannot be used to chart long-term economic trends, they can at least be used to show relative

---

\(^1\)Compare, for example, Ibn Khurdādhbih, al-Masālik, p. 42 with Maqdisī, Ahsan, p. 418. Maqdisī also drew on information from Qudāmah: cf., Qudāmah, Kitāb al-Kharāj, pp. 250-251 with Maqdisī, Ahsan, p. 189.

\(^2\)See, for example, Kabir, The Buwayhid Dynasty, pp. 149 and 165.
economic activity among the provinces. And in this way we see that Ahwaz was consistently in the forefront of economic activity—always among the top two or three provinces in terms of kharāj submitted, so that we can indeed appreciate Maqdisī's comment that "its revenues support the Caliphate."¹

And we can also note a drop in revenues for almost every province between 232/846 and 316/928, but it is difficult to say whether this is due to deflation, a higher value of silver in the fourth/tenth century (discussed in Chapter V), or the loss of revenue because of an increase in tax farming.

**Political Subdivisions**

For most medieval and modern works on the ⁶Abbasid Empire, the smallest unit of political or economic administration considered is the province. But thanks to Maqdisī's Ahsan al-Taqāsīm and to the extensive locating of medieval settlements on the Plain that was carried out as part of this thesis, we can now determine where the actual kuwar (singular, kurah) or districts and their capital cities were located in Khuzestan at about 391/1000 (see Figure 29).

These political and economic subdivisions of Maqdisī's may on first sight seem to be highly irregular, but on closer examination they seem quite logical and in fact have their basis in

¹Maqdisī, Ahsan, p. 402.
Figure 29. The political sub-divisions of Khuzestan (according to Maqdisi).
geographical and ecological grounds: the kurah of Ahwaz includes all the riverine settlements south of it (and thus within easy access by the river); the Dawraq kurah includes the surrounding lowland area; the Ram Hurmuz kurah includes all the eastern foothill and montane settlements; the Sus kurah includes most of the Susiana Plain; the Jundi-Sabur kurah includes the rest of the Susiana and all the northern foothill and montane areas; and though Maqdisi professes to "know no towns"¹ that belong to Tustar, it may well be that the eastern edge of the Plain was in some way its dependency. It must be noted that today this eastern edge is only lightly inhabited by semi-nomadic peoples, and if such was the case in Maqdisi's time as well, then one can understand why no "towns" belonged to Tustar.

The only anomalous case in this subdividing is that of the Askar Mukram kurah, which well could be following an ecological zone (a pre-foothill, non-lowland zone), but since I could locate only one settlement dependent on it (Zaydan), this cannot be stated with any certainty.

These subdivisions accord well with the previous information we had from other sources: that the northern part of Khuzestan (the area of Sus, Jundi-Sabur and Tustar) was considered distinct from the south (see Chapter II); and that Sus and Jundi-Sabur were given out as tax farms separate from the

¹Maqdisi, Ahsan, pp. 51 and 404-405.
other areas (presumably the higher economic productivity of these two areas because of the greater abundance of water would have made them the remunerative equivalent of the much larger southern area).

Some of the earlier geographers also list the "districts" of Khuzestan, but they do not list the dependent cities of each "capital," so that it is not possible to create comparative maps. It is interesting, however, to see that Ibn Khurdādhbih lists ten "districts" for Khuzestan (denoted in Figure 19 by circles on the cities with the same names as the districts) and that Ištakhrī lists seven (denoted in Figure 21 by large stars)—the same number as Maqdisī, so that perhaps the political subdivisions stayed relatively stable from 321/933 to 391/1000.

Economic Bases

Perhaps the most important information we can learn from the geographers concerns the bases of economic production in Khuzestan, so that we can better understand the effects of various political actions in this area. And one of the most important bases of the economy in this area was the manufacture of luxury cloth. For Khuzestan this consisted of various types of silk, silk/wool blends, and brocades, and most significant as a measure of political importance and political control was the production of tirāz fabric.

Tirāz is the name given to the annual gift of clothing
given by the caliph as a reward to his chief officers. It usually consisted of a robe with elaborate embroidery in the form of an inscription. Because of this official aspect, the "factories" where ṭirāz was produced were under the control of the central government.¹

The beginnings of this system are still debated. Greek sources, such as Strabo and Herodotus, imply that although the Achaemenids and Parthians wove their own domestic-use fabrics, their luxury cloth market was almost entirely import-based, with cloth coming mainly from Babylon, Kashmir, India, Phoenicia, Egypt, Damascus, and Greece.² The Sassanians, on the other hand, seem to have encouraged the production of heavy luxury embroideries for official use. There is evidence, for example, that the Sassanian monarchs, in an attempt to rival the Mediterranean workshops, established a silk industry in Khuzestan, with workshops in Tustar, Jundi-Sabur, and Sus.³ Some of the remaining Parthian and Sassanian art also suggests that the Sassanians were the ones to introduce this luxury embroidery industry to Iran:


the Achaemenid monarchs at Persepolis, for example, are portrayed wearing Greek-style flowing gowns, while the Sassanian officials at Takht-i Bustan are all in heavy, extensively embroidered robes.

Though the origins of ṭirāz are still debated, whether the actual practice of embroidering names and honorifics on royal robes began under the Sassanians or earlier in Iran, or rather had a Coptic-Byzantine origin, is not as important for our purposes as is the fact that the ṭirāz system was a continuation of the previous Sassanian system of production of luxury goods under imperial control.

Ṭirāz had a political aspect, much like the political aspect of Quran inscriptions on coins or that of the khūtbahs. Traditional symbols of sovereignty in Islam have always been having one's name stamped on the sīkah (coinage) and mentioned in the khūtbah (Friday "sermon"). But it seems that control of the ṭirāz factories, by the fact of their being a state monopoly, was also a sign of authority. The medieval authors are full of passages linking these three insignia of authority:

And in [269/882] al-Muʿtamid\textsuperscript{1} uttered imprecations against Ahmad ibn Ṭūlūn in the "General Audience," and ordered that he be cursed in the minbars . . .

\textsuperscript{1}Al-Muʿtamid (ruled 256/870-279/892) was the rather weak, "puppet" caliph who was dominated by his brother al-Muwaffaq. Al-Muwaffaq, in fact, energetically ruled the empire, and some of his military exploits figure prominently in Chapter 3 of the Siyāsāt-nāmah.
and the cause of this cursing was that Ahmad ibn Tulun stopped the khutbah in al-Muwaqqaf's name and dropped his name from the tiraz.\(^1\)

Al-Mu'tamid came out and sat with the leaders and jurists and prominent people. He informed them that he removed his son al-Mufawwad Cilâ Allâh Ja'far from the succession and settled the heir-apparencty on al-Mu'taqid bi-llâh Abî al-Abbâs Ahmad, the son of al-Muwaqqaf. They all bore witness that al-Mufawwad was removed from the succession and his name was dropped from the sikkah, the khutbah, and the tiraz.\(^2\)

Given this brief introduction to textile manufacturing in this area, and given the political importance of certain kinds of this manufacture, let us now turn to the geographers who mentioned the bases of economic production, in order to determine the distribution of agricultural and textile industries in this area over time.

Figure 30 shows the towns mentioned by Ištakhrî, Ibn Hawqal, Maqdisî, and Ḥâfiẓ-i Abrû\(^3\) and the textiles these towns produced at certain times. Figure 31 lists the towns said by these same geographers to have had non-textile bases of production.

What can we gather from these figures? First of all,


\(^3\)The information for these figures comes from Ištakhrî, al-Masâlik, pp. 90-95; Ibn Hawqal, Surât, pp. 254-258; Maqdisî, Absan, pp. 402-418; and Ḥâfiẓ-i Abrû, Jughrâfiyâh, fol. 82a-83a.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>city</th>
<th>product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basinnah</td>
<td>sutūr (curtains)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birkhan</td>
<td>copies of Basinnian sutūr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliwan</td>
<td>copies of Basinnian sutūr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tustar</td>
<td>dibāj (brocade), Kiswaḥ (the covering for the Ka'bah), and tirāz (N.B. only Iṣṭakhrī notes these manufactures, Ibn Hawqal does not)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ram Hurmuz</td>
<td>abrisām (silk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Sus</td>
<td>khazūz (silk), tirāz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Tib</td>
<td>tikā (trouser cord), aṣṣiyah (robes), and barrakanāt (black mantles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qurqub</td>
<td>Susanjird cloth, tirāz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahr Tira</td>
<td>imitation Baghdadi clothes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iṣṭakhrī - Ibn Hawqal (ca. 321/933 - 366/977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>city</th>
<th>product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basinnah</td>
<td>anmāt (carpets), sutūr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tustar</td>
<td>dibāj, anmāt, cotton, thiyyāb Marvīyah (Marvian-styled clothes), (two cloth markets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Dawraq</td>
<td>khaysh (tent-cloth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿAskar Mukram</td>
<td>tirāz, maqāni (veils), durable cloth, manādīl (scarfs), qazz (silk), al-qunnab (flax)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Lur</td>
<td>tirāz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Sus</td>
<td>bazz (cloth), khuzzūz (silk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qurqub</td>
<td>anmāt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ahwaz</td>
<td>fuwāt min al-quzz (&quot;towels&quot; or cloth of silk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahr Tira</td>
<td>uzūr kibār (large cloaks or cumberbuns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jundi-Sabur</td>
<td>tirāz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maqdisī (ca. 391/1000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>city</th>
<th>product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tustar</td>
<td>tirāz, ḫarīr (silk), dibāj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahr Tira</td>
<td>woven garments that resemble Baghdadi clothes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hāfiẓ-i Abrū (ca. 833/1430)

Figure 30. Textile products of Khuzestan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>city</th>
<th>product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asak</td>
<td>naft, grape syrup, date palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubba</td>
<td>date palms, sugar cane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jundi-Sabur</td>
<td>date palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ram Hurmuz</td>
<td>orchard crops (date palms, walnuts, citrons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Sus</td>
<td>citrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Askar Mukram</td>
<td>poor quality sugar, date palms, grains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manadhīr</td>
<td>date palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Kubra</td>
<td>date palms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iṣṭakhri-Ibn Hawqal (ca. 321/933 - 366/977)

| Aidaj             | batīkh (watermelons)                                                  |
| Bayrut            | date palms                                                            |
| Basinna           | legumes                                                                |
| Tustar            | dastānbūyī (melon), orchard crops (citrons, grapes, fruits), date palms|
| Jubba             | date palms                                                            |
| Jundi-Sabur       | rice, sugar (and a sugar refinery)                                    |
| Ram Hurmuz        | date palms, olives, grains, hašīr (reed mats), garden crops           |
| al-Sus            | rice, sugar cane (and a sugar refinery), livestock, sukkar al-šanāb (grape syrup) |
| Karkhāh           | garden crops                                                          |
| Kuzuk             | rihān (sweet basil)                                                   |
| al-Lur            | poor quality sugar                                                    |
| Nahr Tīrā         | rutāb (dates)                                                         |

Maqdisī (ca. 391/1000)

| Jubba             | date palms, sugar cane                                               |
| Jundi-Sabur       | date palms, grains                                                    |
| Dawraq            | sulfur                                                                 |
| Ram Hurmuz        | naranj (oranges), annūr (grapes), anār (pomegranates)                 |

Hāfiẓ-i Abrū (ca. 833/1430)

Figure 31. Non-textile economic products of Khuzestan.
Ishakrî/Ibn Hawqal, Maqdisi, and Ḥāfiz-i Abrū list different centers of ṭirāz production (Ishakrî/Ibn Hawqal list Tustar, Sus, and Qurqub; Maqdisi lists ĈAskar Mukram, al-Lur, and Jundi-Sabur; and Ḥāfiz-i Abrū lists only Tustar), implying that these centers were not constant; the location of two of the three centers of ṭirāz production at 391/1000 in the Jundi-Sabur district would seem to indicate the importance of this district at this time; Maqdisi lists a greater variety of cloth being made, perhaps implying greater textile production at 391/1000 (but it is difficult to attach too much importance to this since Maqdisi could simply have been more interested in textile manufacture than other geographers); Tustar and Tib seem to have manufactured the greatest variety of cloth in the early fourth/tenth century, then Tustar and ĈAskar Mukram in the late fourth/tenth century, then Tustar and Nahr Tira in the mid-ninth/fifteenth century, indicating that Tustar was probably always one of the two or three most important textile centers in this area (as it is today); and Tustar's economic importance was also signified by its being allowed to make the Kiswah (the embroidered covering for the Ka'bah) in 321/933.¹

Though the (anonymous) author of the Hudūd al-ĈĀlam attests to dibāj manufacture and even the manufacture of the Kiswah for the Ka'bah (pardah-i Makka) at Aidaj in 372/

¹Ishakrî, Masālik, p. 92.
982,\textsuperscript{1} this account must be discounted, since there is no proof that this author ever left the northeastern area of Iran and travelled to Khuzestan and since known travellers to this area make no mention of textile manufacture at Aidaj. The honor of making the Kiswah was so politically important that if it had been at Aidaj, it not only would have been mentioned by other geographers, but would have formed an important part of that town's folk legend for ages. Needless to say, it hasn't.

From Figure 31 we can see that: at least in the late fourth/tenth century there were only two sugar refineries, and both were in the northern part of the Plain, one at Sus, and one at Jundi-Sabur, and since Maqdisî says Jundi-Sabur provided all the sugar consumed in Khorasan and Jibal,\textsuperscript{2} these two refineries must have been of great economic importance; Maqdisî listed many more and varied products and more cities involved in producing these products, but again, it is difficult to say whether this reflects increased production and economic diversification, or simply more interest in economic production on Maqdisî's part; as far back as 321/933 this area was famous for petroleum products (naft at Asak); the heavy reliance on date production throughout these periods must have left the producers vulnerable to pillaging

\textsuperscript{1}Hudūd al-\textsuperscript{C}Ālam, ed. and trans. V. Minorsky, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, New Series, II (London: Luzac & Co., 1937), p. 130.

\textsuperscript{2}Maqdisî, Ahsan, p. 408.
and poor weather conditions (as mentioned in Chapter III), since date palms take approximately 25 years maturation in this area before they bear fruit. There is a famous story recounted by Ṭabarī\(^1\) (and thus also by subsequent historians) about the Byzantines destroying the date palms in this area and Shapur II ordering the Byzantines to plant olive trees in retribution. Yet only Maqdisī mentioned olives growing here, and he only noticed them in one place.

It is also interesting that the only reference in these geographical works to livestock (sheep and goats) was by Maqdisī. Since sheep and goats form such a noticeable, basic part of the economic structure of Khuzestan today, one wonders if they gained in economic importance only after Maqdisī's time or if their importance was constant and simply went unnoticed before this time. Since Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū did not mention them, the mention in Maqdisī's time may represent a temporary increase.

It may be significant that the earliest mention of rice-growing in Khuzestan was made by Maqdisī, thus dating to about 391/1000. Schwarz\(^2\) translates Ibn Hawqal's (wrote ca. 366/977) reference to rice in this area, but neglects to mention that this reference in the Surat is a much later (sixth/twelfth century)

\(^{1}\)Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, vol. 1, p. 845.

\(^{2}\)Schwarz, Iran im Mittelalter, p. 403; LeStrange, Eastern Caliphate, on the other hand, omits any reference to rice growing in this area during Islamic times.
addition to Ibn Hawqal's original manuscript. Thus with Maqdisi's mention of rice, grains, and sugar production (all good cash-crops dependent on good irrigation) in the northern part of Khuzestan (at Jundi-Sabur and Sus), we must ask if this signifies a re-intensive effort in irrigation agriculture some time after 366/977 but before 391/1000? If it does, can the credit for this effort be given to Qudud al-Dawlah, who ruled in this area from ca. 367/978 to 372/983? As mentioned in Chapter III, Qudud al-Dawlah is one of the mythic figures in Iranian history about whom we must exercise some amount of caution. But on the other hand, we do have some evidence of Buyid involvement in repairing and creating new canal systems in this area at this same time—the canal linking Hisn Mahdi and Bayan was dug sometime between Ibn Hawqal's travels in this area (366/977) and Maqdisi's (391/1000). And the struggle for power among Qudud al-Dawlah's would-be successors mitigates against such investments being made after his death. Given this information, it may well be that Qudud al-Dawlah, in his short reign in this area, deserved his reputation as "the Great Builder."

To see how geographic location affected the economic activity of this area, the information from Figures 30 and 31 has been transferred to standard maps of Khuzestan (Figures 32, 33, and 34).

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1Ibn Hawqal, Surat, p. 254.
Figure 32. Khuzestani commodities, according to Iṣṭakhrī (321/933).
Figure 34. Khuzestani commodities, according to Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū (823/1418).
What can we say about these commodity maps? First, it is striking that almost all the cloth manufacturing centers were along rivers. This is probably to be expected for numerous reasons: the rivers were used for irrigating the fields where the cotton, flax, and mulberry trees were grown; because of their favorable locations near water, these settlements were probably larger to begin with, and thus more likely to have had the large numbers of workers needed for these industries; the rivers were used to run mills to process the raw materials for cloth; and the rivers probably facilitated trade and transportation.

Second, many of these cloth manufacturing centers, especially the ones with state-controlled ārāz factories, such as Jundi-Sabur, Sus, and Tustar, were former imperial capitals (either Achaemenid, Parthian, or Sassanian).

Third, Ahwaz, then as today, actually produces very little—almost no food items and few manufactured goods (only Maqdisī reported it as producing anything). Ahwaz's function, probably then as now, was as a redistribution center and governmental seat. And at least part of the reason this location was chosen as an administration and redistribution center is that for medieval ocean-going vessels the Karun was navigable from the Gulf up to this point. North of Ahwaz there are rapids on the Karun and it was necessary to portage for some distance. But Ahwaz has easy access to all points south, and this access is probably at least partly responsible for this southern riverine
area forming about 90 percent of the kurah of Ahwaz.

And fourth, although during Iṣṭakhrī's time (ca. 321/933) dates were grown at Jundi-Sabur (a well-irrigated area more suitable for cash crops), the general trend for date-growing seems to be that dates were grown in the saltier, less well-irrigated southern sections of Khuzestan, such as Asak, Jubba, Ram Hurmuz, Manadhir al-Kubra, and Manadhir al-Sughra. This trend continues to at least 391/1000, when Maqdisī reported date-growing at Bayrut, Ram Hurmuz, and Jubba. Wherever they were grown in Khuzestan, dates seem to have been a consistent crop in this area—Ṭabarī even noted their production during Sassanian times here.1 But dates are mainly a subsistence crop, and only marginally a cash crop, so that date production is not as good an indicator of agricultural intensification as are cash crops like rice and sugar. A good cash crop is one that many people want and few can produce, i.e., one that requires special growing conditions, such as supplemental water, extensive sunlight, or intensive labor. Dates fit none of these criteria. Even though they require a certain amount of care, they can be easily grown throughout the Middle East, so that people in Khorasan, for example, wouldn't have paid for Khuzestani dates when they just as easily could have grown their own.


Summary and Conclusions

If the evidence presented by the geographers does not change our conclusions based on historical evidence alone, it at least provides a supplement for them—one that greatly fills out the picture of economic life in this area during medieval times. The geographical sources helped us to ascertain the location of many of the cities discussed in the historical sources; showed us that the main trade routes were east-west, and that at times these routes changed, probably because of political or military uncertainties; gave us tax-revenue figures that indicated a drop in revenue between 232/846 and 316/928; allowed us to delineate political subdivisions on the district level; and gave us a better understanding of the economic basis of Khuzestan.

It is unfortunate that almost all the reliable geographers for this area pre-date the Seljuq period, so that we cannot obtain a precise picture of the economic consequences of the Seljuq invasion from geographical evidence alone. But without evidence from these geographers we would not have known the extent to which agriculture in Khuzestan relied on irrigation, and thus was vulnerable to pillaging and official neglect, or that the textile industry formed such an important part of Khuzestan's economy, and that so much of this textile industry was based on luxury and state-controlled fabrics. It is difficult to say
whether the lack of mentions of Khuzestani tīrāz factories in
geographies written after Maqdisī's time was indicative of a
lessening of central, state control, or if it was merely indica-
tive of a lack of travellers in this area after this time. The
latter possibility may in itself indicate a loss of central
control, with the destabilized, unsettled condition of the
countryside making travel difficult or unwise after about
391/1000.
CHAPTER V

THE NUMISMATIC EVIDENCE

Let us begin our discussion of Islamic coins in Khuzestan with a *caveat*: alone, numismatic data prove nothing. Proof demands decisive evidence—evidence that *proves* one theory and *denies* all others,\(^1\) and this our numismatic data cannot do. Numismatic data can, however, provide a supportive line of evidence for hypotheses developed with other types of information, and this is how they will be used here.

One of the drawbacks to a greater use of Islamic numismatic evidence is that most published Islamic coins come from museum or private collections, and thus may not reflect the original balance between gold, silver, and copper (or lead) output at the time of striking. Many factors are behind this potential imbalance: copper weathers more easily than gold or silver and thus very few pre-Safavid (pre-tenth/sixteenth century) copper coins are of collector quality; copper is intrinsically worth less than gold or silver, and thus less often preserved as an investment; and since copper was usually minted in greater quantities than gold or silver, it has no  

\(^1\)Barzun and Graff, *The Modern Researcher*, p. 155.
"scarcity" value in the numismatic marketplace. Therefore, any discussion based only on these museum-quality coins is bound to have strong biases.

Also, since these are museum pieces in this study, and not excavated finds, in most cases their provenience is lost, and thus we forfeit valuable information that might be recovered about trade, if we knew, for example, that coins minted at Bukhara consistently turned up at certain fifth/eleventh century sites in Khuzestan.

And because this information comes from private and museum collections and not from systematic excavations or surveys, it is sporadic and cannot be quantified with any assurance of accuracy. The coins of single-issue mints, for example, which might indicate periods of governmental expansion, are less likely to be uncovered by random looting than by systematic sampling. And because of these unsystematic collection methods, it would be useless to attempt to count up all the examples of individual issues from each mint and make a histogram of output, since one could never be sure one had a statistically reliable sample.

In this study, some of the distortions caused by these factors have been avoided by noting (in Appendix I) only the

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1Appendix I and all the figures in this chapter were constructed using information from: E. von Zambaur, Die Münzprägungen des Islams (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1968); S. Lane Poole, The Coins of the Turkuman Houses of Seljok, Urtuk, Zengee, etc. (London: The British Museum, 1875-1890); Ahmad Ziya, Catalogue of Islamic Coins
presence or absence of issues at any given mint, and not the quantity or rarity of the individual issues. Such presence or absence statistics must be used with caution, since they ignore numerical output. That is, in the early Abbasid period there were only seven operating mints in Khuzestan, as opposed to thirteen in Buyid times (see Appendix I). But one cannot, however, infer from this an upswing in economic activity during Buyid times, since the output of the seven Abbasid mints may have been equal to or greater than that of the thirteen Buyid mints.

With these cautions in mind, then, we can attempt to use the numismatic data to determine: geo-political divisions in Khuzestan by noting the names of rulers on coins; the relative importance of towns as mint-cities by consistency of issue; and the occupation and abandonment of certain towns based on the presence or absence of coin issues. We can then use these lines of evidence as checks on the history we have already constructed.

(Constantinople: Methbeet Amire, 1910); J. Walker, A Catalogue of the Arab-Byzantine and Post-Reform Umayyad Coins (London: The British Museum, 1956); the unpublished notes of Dr. Michael Bates, Curator of Islamic Coins at the American Numismatic Society; the unpublished notes of Dr. N. D. Nicol and Dr. J. Bacharach for the revised Khedival coin catalogue; my own review of the British Museum Islamic Coin Collection; and a review conducted on my behalf by Mme. Arlette Nègre of the Khuzestani coins in the Cabinet des Médailles at the Bibliothèque Nationale. I would like to thank Drs. Nicol and Bacharach for making their unpublished data available to me, Dr. Bates for allowing me unlimited access to his unpublished notes, and Mme. Nègre for her efforts on my behalf.
for Khuzestan using historical and geographical evidence.

Islamic Coins from Archaeological Contexts in Khuzestan

The only archaeological survey in Khuzestan that has made a systematic effort to locate coins on the surface of every site surveyed was the 1973 Khuzestan Survey, headed by Robert Wenke, and in which I participated. In this survey of over 1,200 sites on the Susiana Plain we found only one Islamic coin. This coin was in such weathered condition that it was not possible to read a date on it or to determine if it was silver or bronze. The words "Allāh fī . . ." ("God in . . .") and "Rasūl . . ." ("Prophet . . .") were legible on one side, and on the other was "ṭuriba bi-Abba [dan]" ("struck in Abba [dan]").

The only pre-Mongol Islamic coins known to have been struck in Abbadan were dirhams and they date to 332/943 and 336/947 (see Appendix I). But given the tentativeness of the identification and given that only one coin was found, it would be presumptuous to postulate any relationship between KS-15 (the site where the coin was found) and Abbadan on the basis of this one coin alone, or indeed to date KS-15's occupation to the mid-fourth/tenth century on this basis, since this coin could easily have been discarded or lost by a traveller.

1See Wenke, "Parthian and Sassanian Khuzestan" (1975), pp. 59-76, for a description of these coins.
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But even if we cannot attach too much importance to this single coin, we still should examine its context: of the twenty-one identifiable coins found on this survey, only one was Islamic. Why should this be so? Numerous possibilities suggest themselves: since most (90 out of 91) of the other coins found on this survey were copper (silver and gold having intrinsic value, they are less likely to be lost in the first place, and more likely to be picked up by passersby), was Islamic copper coin production extremely low? Or, because of the Quranic inscriptions on all Muslim coins, were they more likely to be kept by their owners or to be picked up by passersby? Was Islamic society in Khuzestan less monetarized? Was Islamic coin production in general so much lower than the pre-Islamic rate that the recovery ratio in fact represents a true reflection of the ratio of coins struck?

Some of these questions can be answered by looking at the numismatic evidence from the excavations of two Islamic sites in southern Iran, al-Sus in Khuzestan and al-Istakhr in Fars. In the excavations at al-Sus, a site we know from historical, geographical and archaeological evidence to have been occupied and to have been economically and politically important throughout early and medieval Islamic times, G. Miles found no coins struck after 265/878.1 At al-Istakhr, another important Islamic site,

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he found only ten coins (out of 1,051 total) that post-dated the second/eighth century.¹ This last information gives us our only evidence for numismatic quantity—and it does indeed seem that post-second/eighth century Islamic coin production in general was drastically lower than previous levels.

But the only possibility for answering these questions with any reliability is through intensive archaeological survey and excavation of Islamic sites in this area—a possibility that is ruled out for the immediate future because of political considerations. We may, however, shed some light on one of these possibilities by examining the metals used for Islamic coinage in Khuzestan.

Metals

Figures 35, 36, and 37 present histograms of coinage output in different metals for all the mints in Khuzestan for the period from 250/864 to 530/1135. These figures were prepared using the more detailed information presented in Appendix I. For these three figures, all issues in any one metal from one mint in a one-year period were counted as one. That is, what was considered important for these figures was the fact that a mint was

For purposes of this figure, all silver issues of one mint for one year are considered one issue.

Figure 35. Silver issues from Khuzestani mints, per 5-year period.
For purposes of this figure, all gold issues of one mint for one year are considered one issue.

Figure 36. Gold issues from Khuzestani mints, per 5-year period,
Figure 37. Gold and silver issues from Khuzestani mints, per 5-year period.
issuing coins in a given metal, not that it may have struck two different issues (i.e., in the names of two different rulers) in that metal in one year. These issues were then grouped together in five-year periods, to conserve space and to avoid anomalies presented by any single year (and thus better to observe general trends).

In looking at Figures 35 and 36, we can see that the Buyid takeover of Khuzestan (ca. 329/941) coincided with a ten-year cessation of gold coin production in this area and a tremendous increase in silver coin production, which reached an all-time high for this area in the period from 340/951 to 344/955. And even after gold coin production started again in 340/951, its production was sporadic and never again approached the number of issues struck during the period from 300/912 to 330/942. This near-cessation of gold coin production simultaneous with an increase in silver coin production is a phenomenon in need of study.

One possible explanation for this phenomenon may lie in the nature of the two coinages: it may be that silver coinage was used for inter-regional, intra-empire exchange and that gold, because of its high intrinsic value, was used mainly in external trade: thus, that the Buyid consolidation of rule in Mesopotamia and Iran after 330/942 may have facilitated trade within the empire, to the detriment of trade outside the empire.

A similar dichotomy between coinage metals was proposed
for pre-Islamic coins minted at Sus: that silver coins were used for external transactions and for those transactions involving large sums of money for agricultural and industrial products, while the copper coinage circulated locally. ¹ A similar distinction was observed during Achaemenid times: copper was used for local exchange, silver was struck by individual generals to meet military expenses, and gold was totally an imperial prerogative. ²

Silver coinage may have been used during the fourth/tenth century primarily for cash crops such as rice, refined sugar, melons, and citrons that were traded inter-regionally (as Maqdisi noted, ³ for example, all the sugar for Jibal and Khorasan was brought from Jundi-Sabur), and it was probably used for the luxury textiles (silks, dibāj, tirāz) that went to the political administrative centers, such as Baghdad and Fars.

The drop in silver coinage production after 385/995 then, needs some explanation as well. One indication that this drop in production of silver coinage was general to the Islamic world and not specific to Khuzestan is that previous to the mid-fourth/tenth century trade had been heavy between the Islamic world and Russia,


³Maqdisī, Ahsan, p. 408.
but only a scatter of Islamic coins dating to after 344/955 have been found in various Russian sites, and none at all dating to after 403/1012.¹ The fall-off in Islamic silver coinage in circulation here after 344/955 may be related to the possibility of increased trade within the Abbasid Empire that was mentioned above. And the total cessation of Islamic silver coins being exported to Russia after 403/1012 was probably not because of events in Russia, but because of events in the Islamic world and along the trade routes. This is proposed for two reasons: first, large amounts of Islamic silver coins (in hoards) have been found throughout northern Russia, and if unsettled conditions there had led to a cessation of trade, it would be unlikely that we would find hoards of such wealth; second, since the silver-producing areas of Armenia were lost to Islamic control in the late third/ninth century, most Islamic silver then came from Turkestan, and the Turkestan-north Russia trade route was greatly reduced in the fourth/tenth century by the devastation of the Bulgar kingdom on the Volga--one of the main interchange areas of this route.²

Other factors also led to the decline in silver production and circulation in the Iran-Khorasan area: the Samanids lost


control of the main silver-producing Zarafshan Valley mines in Turkestan at about 365/975;\textsuperscript{1} Maḥmūd of Ghazna, who took over the Zarafshan mines, utilized most of its silver production for his Indian campaigns; the Seljuq invasion shifted the focus of trade and government from Khorasan back to Baghdad, Fars, and Rayy, and their subsequent military engagements in Anatolia and the Levant drew off more of the silver production to the west;\textsuperscript{2} and trade within the empire may have experienced a decline after ca. 391/1000 because of the unsafe conditions for travel that prevailed in the countryside.

The sudden reappearance of silver coins in the Islamic world after 658/1259 is most probably connected with the invasion and subjugation of this area by the Mongols at this time. One wonders, though, at the exact nature of this connection. One factor (and one that might also be connected with the continued lack of production of silver issues during the fifth/eleventh century) might be that prior to their arrival in the Islamic world, the Seljuqs had played the role of mercenaries for various groups, while the Mongols


\textsuperscript{2}Blake, "Circulation of Silver," p. 310.
for centuries had been accustomed to trade and commerce; in fact their very existence depended upon it, as they exchanged the products of the steppes, of their flocks and herds, for grain and textiles from China or from Turkestan.¹

The Mongols' familiarity with (and thus perhaps encouragement of) trade, in conjunction with other economic factors, may be at least partly responsible for the reappearance of silver after 658/1259. One can see in the Mongol administration of China, for example, a degree of concern for administration and fiscal responsibility² that was not evident (or was not possible?) under the Seljuq rule of Iran (despite the many good practices attributed to Niẓām al-Mulk's administration), and it is possible that under the Mongols commerce was similarly encouraged in Iran.

Mention of Islamic copper coinage was avoided for the most part in the above discussion because, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, many more factors may have affected the collection and preservation of copper coinage from this area.

But if we were to assume that the lack of Islamic copper coinage was real, and not just apparent because of differential

¹Blake, "Circulation of Silver," p. 312.

²E.g., their introduction of banknotes (balysh), see Blake, "Circulation of Silver," p. 313. It should be noted, however, that a similar attempt by the Mongols to introduce paper currency (the chaq) in Iran was met with riots, and the chaq was quickly withdrawn (see E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), pp. 37-39).
collecting and preservation factors, it is possible that this lack may indicate not a cessation of local trade (since, as mentioned before, pre-Islamic copper coinage was used for local exchange), but rather a local trade based on bartering or on some medium other than copper coins. It is also possible that overproduction of copper coinage in previous years met the monetary needs in this area for some time. G. Miles proposed such an explanation for Fars,¹ but the evidence for Khuzestan does not seem to indicate a similar surplus.²

Local trade could have continued, however, based on a medium other than copper. We know from Don Whitcomb's study of the Buyid coinage of Fars³ that tirāz, for example, had such a constant, accepted value that it was used as a fiduciary currency. Since tirāz manufacture was under government control, this may have given sufficient confidence in its authenticity and value that it was accepted in lieu of money. But it must be remembered that in Khuzestan at least, there were numerous cases of cloth being fraudulently sold (curtains from Kaliwan and Basiyan being sold as "made in Basinna," and cloth from Nahr Tira being sold as Baghdadi--see Figure 30), so that all cloth could not have been

¹G. Miles, "Persepolis," pp. 4-5.
²G. Miles, Numismatique Susiane.
used in this way.

Another aspect of monetary activity can be seen in Figure 37, which shows the combined output of both silver and gold issues from Khuzestani mints for the period from 250/864 to 530/1135. And if this total output figure is compared with the land tax tables presented in Chapter IV, some relationship seems obvious: when the revenues from the land tax went down (in 316/928), coin production went up, and when the revenues from the land tax were higher (in 232/846 and 391/1000), coin production was much lower. Since we only have tax tables for three periods (and one of these, Maqdisi's, is not reliable), we cannot draw conclusions from these comparisons, but the triple coincidence is suggestive of a relationship.

One might suspect that the high bars on these coin graphs (Figures 35, 36, and 37) may be more indicative of political turmoil than of economic conditions, since during times of disputed succession each ruler might want to strike coins in his name in as many different localities as possible as political propaganda. But Figures 35, 36, and 37 were constructed to avoid such biases by considering all issues from one mint during one year as the same. Figure 38, however, enumerates all the different issues (i.e., issues struck in different rulers' names)\(^1\) for these same years, and in some cases political

\(^1\)Where gold and silver issues were struck in the same ruler's name, only one such issue was counted for Figure 38.
Figure 38. Issues from Khuzestani mints, in relation to selected political events.
change does seem to be accompanied by an increase in minting activity: the absolute high point for different issues during a five-year period occurred from 340/951 to 344/956, after the death of ointment al-Dawlah; another high was recorded (after a twenty year decline) in the period from 365/976 to 374/984, a period that witnessed the deaths of Rukn al-Dawlah, ointment al-Dawlah, and ointment al-Dawlah, and the disputed successions that each of these occasioned.

But just as often there seems to be no relationship between periods of political turmoil and increased minting activity: ointment al-Dawlah's fall from power in 376/986 and the subsequent rise of Sharaf al-Dawlah were accompanied by a sharp decline in the number of different issues struck; ointment al-Dawlah and Bahā al-Dawlah's quarrels in Khuzestan in 383/993 and 384/994 occasioned no increase in minting; although the succession was disputed following the death of Bahā al-Dawlah in 403/1012, only two issues were struck; and after the most heavily disputed Seljuq successions (after the death of Alp Arslān in 465/1073 and after the death of Malikshāh in 485/1092) there were no great increases in minting activity.

Furthermore, although the greatest minting activity in Khuzestan followed the death of ointment al-Dawlah, it must be remembered that his death occasioned no disputed succession in Khuzestan—as before, Muẓiz al-Dawlah stayed in power there.

Thus we can see that while minting activity does coincide
with some periods of political turmoil, just as often it does not. Therefore, the causes of increases and decreases in minting activity will have to be sought elsewhere.

Coins as a Measure of Political Sovereignty

For the most part, the numismatic evidence seems to support the political alignments postulated by the medieval historians and geographers. In a few places, however, it supplements rather obscure periods and even contradicts some previously-held opinions.

One of the reasons these coins are so useful to a study like this is that from the Buyid period onwards, the names of secular rulers were struck on the coinage along with the caliph's name, so that we can use the information thus provided to chart the geographical divisions of secular rule.

Muhammad al-Dawlah was only the second person whose name the caliph allowed to be struck on the coinage along with his own. The first had been 'Abd al-Dawlah (Husayn ibn Qāsim--see Figure 12), in 320/932, but this policy lasted only a few months.¹ Until the advent of the Buyids, no other amīr al-umara was strong enough or influential enough to enjoy this privilege in Khuzestan. After Muhammad al-Dawlah, however, it became standard practice, until the fall of Baghdad in 656/1258.

¹Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, pp. 223 and 228.
The position of the Buyids vis-à-vis the caliph is perhaps symbolized by the fact that they usurped the honor of having their names on the sikkah in Ahwaz (see Figure 39) as early as 328/940 (even earlier in Arrajan—323/935), but that this practice did not gain official caliphal sanction until 334/946, when Mu'Cizz was finally named Amīr al-Umarā and took control of Baghdad.¹

But even though the caliph named Mu'Cizz al-Dawlah Amīr al-Umarā, it is obvious that from the beginning ġImād al-Dawlah (the oldest Buyid brother, who ruled in Fars) was regarded as the senior member of the Buyid dynasty. Figure 39 shows that for the first 12 years or so of Buyid rule in Khuzestan, most coins minted there were in the name of ġImād al-Dawlah, with his brother Mu'Cizz al-Dawlah (who actually exercised control of Khuzestan and Iraq) as his nā'īb (deputy).² But a few towns in this area (Surraq, ġAskar Mukram, and Arrajan) seem to have minted coins in the name of ġImād al-Dawlah alone. Admittedly, we are working with a small sample here (three towns, nine identifiable issues), but it is possible that since these three towns were among the first in southwestern Iran conquered by the Buyids from the Baridis, and since this victory in Khuzestan was a watershed in Buyid dealings

¹Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 85.

²On the question of Mu'Cizz's subordination to ġImād, see Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 113, for an account of their meeting in Ahwaz.
Figure 39. Buyid sovereignty in Khuzestan, by names on coins.
with Baghdad, ı̇mād al-Dawlah may have decided to express his supreme sovereignty in these key towns by having his name alone struck on these coins.

An interesting numismatic anachronism involving ı̇mād al-Dawlah is also evident in Figure 39: in Suq al-Ahwaz an issue in the name of ı̇mād al-Dawlah (with Muizz al-Dawlah as his nāʿib) was struck in 340/951—two years after ı̇mād’s death—and this issue was simultaneous with the striking of a coin at this mint in the name of Rukn al-Dawlah (with Muizz as his deputy).¹ A similar anachronism occurred in 368/979 in Arrajan: a dirham was struck in the name of Rukn al-Dawlah, though he had died in 366/977.² These anachronistic coins point up some of the dangers in relying too heavily on numismatic evidence alone.

But perhaps one of the most important things that the numismatic evidence shows is that contrary to the previously-held belief that Khuzestan was governed as part of Fars province,³ Khuzestan was in fact usually at least nominally ruled by the same governor as Baghdad, else it was independent. And based on the numismatic evidence (Figure 40) the geographical dividing line

¹Information from Dr. M. Bates’ unpublished notes.

²Information from Dr. M. Bates’ unpublished notes.

Figure 40. Mint cities of Khuzestan.
between Fars and Khuzestan ran to the west of Arrajan, so that politically Arrajan was always a part of Fars, except in 363/973 and 364/974, when the coins from Arrajan and from Ahwaz bore the names of Rukn al-Dawlah and Āḏūd al-Dawlah. Except for those two years, the coins from Khuzestan bore the names of different rulers from those of Fars.

The striking of coins in the names of Āḏūd al-Dawlah and Rukn al-Dawlah in Khuzestan in 363/973 and 364/974 is, incidentally, evidence that supports Miskawayh's contention\(^1\) that Āḏūd al-Dawlah intended to keep Khuzestan for himself, after he had entered the province in support of his cousin Īzz al-Dawlah to put down a rebellion of Īzz al-Dawlah's mutinous troops (see Chapter III). And Īzz al-Dawlah's loss of power is signified by the fact that no coins were minted in Khuzestan in his name even after Āḏūd al-Dawlah was forced (by Rukn al-Dawlah) to return the province to him. In fact, it may be that Īzz al-Dawlah never again exercised power in this area, for in 365/976 Šāṃšām al-Dawlah had coins minted in Ram Hurmuz in his name (as the deputy of Rukn al-Dawlah). Then, until, his father's (Āḏūd al-Dawlah's) death and his own investiture in Baghdad, Šāṃšām governed Khuzestan as his father's deputy (from 367/978 to 371/982, with his name on coins from Suq al-Ahwaz, Ram Hurmuz, and Āḵšar Mukram)—much of this while Īzz al-Dawlah was still

\(^1\)Miskawayh, Tajārib, II, p. 341.
alive. As far as I know, no historical or geographical sources mention these early activities of Şāmsām al-Dawlah in this area. But these activities are important because most previous authors\(^1\) attribute the rebuilding of roads, canals, and dams in this area at this time to ČAğud al-Dawlah. And given the geographic evidence presented in Chapter IV, we can be relatively sure that at least some rebuilding activity did take place after 366/977 and before 391/1000. Since Şāmsām al-Dawlah had his name on the coinage in this area, it implies that he exercised political control for his father here, and therefore credit for the rebuilding should perhaps go to him instead.

The coins of 373/984 to 375/985-986 reflect the political uncertainty after the death of ČAğud al-Dawlah (in 372/983). In 373/984, when Tāj al-Dawlah rebelled against his brother Şāmsām al-Dawlah (who ruled in Baghdad) and had the khutbah read in his name alone in Ahwaz,\(^2\) he also had coins struck in his name alone in Suq al-Ahwaz and Tustar (Figure 39), but soon after, he acknowledged Sharaf al-Dawlah as overlord by including his name on a coin struck in Ram Ḥurmuz. In the power struggle that took place later in that year and the next, the names of Tāj al-Dawlah, Sharaf al-Dawlah, and MoCayyid al-Dawlah appeared together on the

\(^1\)See, e.g., Maqdisī, Ahsan, p. 419; Busse, "Iran under the Buyids," p. 284.

\(^2\)See Chapter III, or al-Rūdhrāwī, Dhavāl, p. 79.
coins from Suq al-Ahwaz, and Tustar; and the names of Tāj al-Dawlah, Sharaf al-Dawlah, and Fakhr al-Dawlah appeared together on the coins from Tustar, Ram Hurmuz, and ʾAskar min al-Ahwaz. Sharaf al-Dawlah's eventual reassertion of power is attested to by the coin struck in his name alone in Ram Hurmuz in 375/986. After the death of Sharaf al-Dawlah in 379/989, during the years of constant seesaw battling for control of Khuizestan between Bahā al-Dawlah and Šāmsām al-Dawlah (from 380/990 to 388/998), neither seems to have made extensive use of the prerogative of sikkah: Šāmsām struck coins only in Arrajan, though he often controlled other cities in this area that had previously been mints; and Bahā struck coins only in Ahwaz, though he controlled other mint cities. This absence of coin minting could be due to several factors: since at times it was necessary to melt down plate before coinage could be struck,¹ it is possible that neither Bahā al-Dawlah or Šāmsām al-Dawlah had sufficient plate or access to raw materials² to mint coins at more than one place; the turnovers in political control of these areas could have been too quick for the dies to have been cast; the rulers may have felt the minting unnecessary as a symbol of sovereignty; or, sovereignty may have been expressed in some other way.


²The loss of the Zarafshan Valley mines mentioned previously in this chapter may have affected minting in this area by this time.
The lack of coinage during these years also shows that simply charting the names on coins is not sufficient to chart the changes in rule: control of Ahwaz vacillated between Bahā al-Dawlah and Śāmsām al-Dawlah several times between 380/990 and 388/998, yet from the coinage alone we would not know this.

Similarly, we would not be able to chart any changes in rule in this area between 401/1010 and the consolidation of Seljuq power in Khuzestan in 446/1054, since we have no coins with identifiable names on them dating to this period. Partly this is an artifact of poor data-recording: Zambaur, for example, often simply records coins as "Buyid" or "Seljuq" with no further identification given. But even complete identifications would not have aided greatly in this period, for, as Appendix I shows, only two issues were minted in Khuzestan during this period.

The Seljuq coinage of Khuzestan is not so informative as the Buyid coinage, partly because there are so many fewer coin issues to deal with: almost no silver was minted, and gold coins were struck in Khuzestan proper only at two mints. This centralization of gold issues is reminiscent of the Umayyad practice of minting all gold issues in the imperial capital (though in Seljuq times this was done on a provincial level).

But even with these few coin issues, we can still gather some information to supplement the historical and geographical data. The dates of the coinage with the names of Ṭughril Beg,
Alp Arslān, and Malikshāh (Figure 41) accord well with the dates of rule for these Seljuqs that we ascertained from historical sources (compare Figure 16 with Figure 41). But the number of issues during this period (17 total issues from 446/1054 to 485/1092) was so small compared to the initial years of Buyid rule here (150 issues during their initial 40 years of rule), that we must consider the possibilities that the Seljuqs were minting the main body of their coinage elsewhere (e.g., in Rayy, Baghdad, or Isfahan) and using these coins as currency in Khuzestan,\(^1\) or that the quantity of output from these few issues was sufficient for the monetary needs of this area at this time. Since almost all the Buyid issues during this initial period were in silver, while almost all the Seljuq issues were in gold, it might be expected that fewer issues would have been necessary.

After the death of Malikshāh in 485/1092, the infant Maḥmūd was proclaimed Sultan and a civil war ensued when three of Malikshāh's other sons disputed this succession (see Chapter III). We would expect that if the partisans of Maḥmūd ever gained the upper hand in Khuzestan during this period (485/1092 to 487/1094) they might have struck coins in his name here, but there is no evidence that they did. Instead Barkyarūq's consolidation of power was marked in this area by a gold issue from Ahwaz at 488/1095.

\(^1\)This is exactly the type of situation that an intensive archaeological survey or excavations in Khuzestan could resolve.
Figure 41. Seljuq sovereignty in Khuzestan, by names on coins.
Barkyarūq's rule of Khuzestan may not have been as direct as his father's, for in 495/1102 a coin was issued in the names of Barkyarūq, Nūr al-Dawlah Ahwāzī, and Bursuq.\(^1\) It is perhaps significant that this was the first time that local tax-farmers were allowed (or usurped) the privilege of sikkah in this area, and it may not be so much a measure of a loss of Seljuq power (since coins in the name of Barkyarūq alone were also minted in this year--see Figure 41), as a measure of the respect and power the Bursuq family gained from their steadfast support of Barkyaruq in his battles with his brothers.

Although Barkyarūq lived to 498/1105, and his infant son Malikshāh was proclaimed Sultān after his death, his effective rule in Khuzestan may have ended the year before, since his brother Muḥammad issued coinage in his own name in 497/1104 at Ahwaz.

**Honorific Titles**

The problem of when and which honorific titles were bestowed by the caliphs on political rulers is another area in which numismatic evidence may prove to be an aid and a check on  

\(^1\)A coin in these names can be found in the collection of the American Numismatic Society (viz., M. Bates' unpublished notes). I can find no historical references to Nūr al-Dawlah Ahwāzī, but from his name I would assume he was a local official. Bursuq was the Seljuq general and muṣṭaṣir of Khuzestan. But since he died in 490/1097, this must refer to his son Bursuq ibn Bursuq, who was a supporter of Barkyaruq (see Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, X, pp. 271 and 353.
the textual evidence. Since having one's name on the coinage was regarded as a premier sign of rulership, it may be assumed that the form in which this name appeared was also important (as it has been shown elsewhere that the particular surah from the Quran that was selected to appear on coins had political import). ¹

But the form of the honorific title is not often noted in coin catalogues (Zambaur, for example, usually simply noted whether the name signified Rukn al-Dawlah or ʿImād al-Dawlah), so that until someone makes a systematic personal inspection of the relevant coins, we shall not be able to assess this significance fully.

Textiles and Minting Activity

One way to investigate economic activity in medieval Islamic society is to try to correlate numismatic evidence with the production of craft items, especially such items as luxury textiles (such as silks or brocades) or textiles under government supervision (such as tirāz). Donald Whitcomb has investigated this connection in Fars, and has concluded that the location of tirāz factories, especially, encouraged a decentralized pattern of coin minting.² He also noted the presence of two mints in


the capital city, one at the government center and one at the "Sūq al-Amīr" (the "industrial trading center").

Khuzestan seems not to have experienced the initial centralization of minting practices that Whitcomb noted for Fars during Umayyad and early Abbasid times, rather, its minting pattern had been "decentralized" throughout early and medieval Islamic times (see Figures 39 and 41). But the existence of two mints in the capital city that Whitcomb noted for Fars may have a parallel in Khuzestan, where coins were minted bearing the names "al-Ahwaz" and "Suq al-Ahwaz." This dichotomy seems to have existed in Khuzestan since at least Umayyad times (see Appendix I) and consistent dual minting began in 291/903, when consecutive issues bearing the name "Suq al-Ahwaz" began to be struck (the mint called "al-Ahwaz" had already been consistently producing coins since 255/869). This dichotomy in Khuzestan predates the Buyid period and the period that seems to have witnessed the greatest importance of textile production in this area (ca. 321/933 to 391/1000).

The same type of dichotomy between mint names might be postulated for at least two other mints in Khuzestan: Ram Hurmuz (and Ram Hurmuz min al-Ahwaz); and CAskar Mukram (and CAskar min al-Ahwaz and al-CAskar). Unfortunately, we cannot speak with authority about this because most coin catalogues do not

distinguish between these different names, rather they simply mention that coins were minted using variations on a name. Appendix I, however, shows that some patterning in the use of these names may exist. But assessing the relative importance of this phenomenon must await a more thorough, systematic study.

Figure 42 shows that not all centers of cloth production were mints, and not all these cities manufactured the same types of cloth. It is also interesting to note that there were mint cities at this time (e.g., Abbadan, Aidaj) that did not seem to be involved in textile manufacture and whose main importance may have been due to their geographic positions on the trade routes.

It is also interesting to note that many of these minting cities (e.g., Abbadan, Aidaj, Ram Hurmuz) received only passing mention in the contemporary geographies while presumably economically less-important cities (i.e., non-minting, non-textile producing centers) such as Asak, Sanbil, or Basiyan were treated to more thorough descriptions (see Appendix II). This of course may be part of the same phenomenon noted with the historians—that what was important to them (or what they deemed worthy of mention) does not happen to be what is important to us.

Conclusions

Unlike the geographical evidence, which only filled out our picture of economic life in medieval Khuzestan, the numismatic evidence has both supplemented this history and led us
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Primary textile</th>
<th>Minting activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basinna</td>
<td>sutūr</td>
<td>not a mint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birdhawn</td>
<td>sutūr</td>
<td>not a mint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliwan</td>
<td>sutūr</td>
<td>not a mint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tustar</td>
<td>dibāj; tirāz</td>
<td>consistent minting throughout period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ram Hurmuz</td>
<td>silk</td>
<td>consistent minting from 331/942 to 375/986 - second mint name1 from 333/944 to 334/945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Sus</td>
<td>silk; tirāz</td>
<td>1 issue (325/937)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Tib</td>
<td>non-luxury clothes</td>
<td>not a mint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qurqub</td>
<td>tirāz</td>
<td>not a mint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahr Tira</td>
<td>non-luxury clothes</td>
<td>not a mint at this time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Dawraq</td>
<td>tent cloth</td>
<td>1 issue (334/945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ᶜAskar Mukram</td>
<td>silk; tirāz</td>
<td>consistent minting from 331/942 to 374/985 - three mint names3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Lur</td>
<td>tirāz</td>
<td>not a mint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ahwaz</td>
<td>silk</td>
<td>consistent minting throughout period - two mint names4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jundi-Sabur</td>
<td>tirāz</td>
<td>1 issue (351/962)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ram Hurmuz min al-Ahwaz.
2. Struck as Surraq.
3. ᶜAskar Mukram, al⁻ᶜAskar, and ᶜAskar min al-Ahwaz.
4. al-Ahwaz and Suq al-Ahwaz.

Figure 42. The relationship between textiles and minting activity in Khuzestan, 321/933 to 391/1000.
to change certain parts of it.

Perhaps one of the most important conclusions we might change because of the numismatic evidence is our assessment of ādud al-Dawlah. Based on the historical and geographical evidence (and even exercising due caution) it was possible to draw the conclusion that ādud al-Dawlah had in fact instigated and overseen the building and repair of the canal systems in this area. The numismatic evidence, however, strongly suggests that ādud al-Dawlah never exercised direct control over Khuzestan, rather that his son Šāmšām al-Dawlah ruled in his name here. This is important because to gain a more accurate picture of Buyid activities in this area it is necessary to gain a more accurate idea of what may rightfully be ascribed to a legendary figure such as ādud al-Dawlah.

Also, the number of issues from Khuzestani mints seems to have risen gradually before Buyid times here and then sharply just after the Buyid takeover, only to begin a rather more steep decline that preceded a total cessation of coinage in this area between the years 524/1129 and 658/1260. As with most numismatic evidence, biases affecting the preservation and recovery of these coins are such that we cannot conclude with any degree of certainty that the apparent patterns in the Khuzestani sample accurately reflect economic conditions in their area of circulation. We can however state that if these numismatic data do reflect economic trends, then there was probably some measure
of economic prosperity from about 255/869 on, that this prosperity gradually reached a peak after the Buyid takeover of Khuzestan from about 330/941 to 350/961, and that it then sharply declined, interrupted only by a brief recess from about 365/976 to 375/985 (when Khuzestan was ruled by Şāmšām al-Dawlah) and by the beginning of Seljuq power in this area. And we can state that this prosperity was probably connected with manufacture of textiles, especially luxury or state-controlled fabrics, whose production seems to have been greatest from about 321/933 and 391/1000.
CHAPTER VI

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE

The preceding review of the ecological, historical, geographical, and numismatic evidence concerning fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh century Khuzestan enables us to speak with some degree of precision about certain aspects of this period and place. We know, for example, the general sequence of rulers, the movements of armies, some economic circumstances, the ecological setting, and, to some extent, the relationships between the various provinces. All of our information on these points is, as frequently noted, biased by many different factors.

Thus, when we turn to the archaeological data, we must consider how we can "connect" these data with the information already gleaned from other sources, what kinds of biases affect the archaeological data, and how these biases compare with those affecting the historical and numismatic materials.

First, it must be stressed that archaeological data are fundamentally different from historical or documentary evidence. Taken simply as artifacts and settlements, archaeological data are a record of what happened with regard to some kinds of movements of people and things, whereas documentary evidence is a record of what people said happened. This does not mean,
obviously, that archaeological data are unbiased; they usually are, and in many complex ways. Nonetheless,

[a] document produced by a subject population is not the same kind of evidence as a potsherd or the remains of a structure. As a body of phenomena, the archaeological record has one grand virtue for the study of human history; it records only what actually transpired, and it does so without the complications introduced by human motivations, intentions, and rationalizations . . . .2

In dealing with the archaeological data, then, we must consider first the uses to which we hope to put them; then we must determine whether they are adequate for these uses.

In anthropological terms, much of the present study has been an exercise in cultural history and reconstruction:3 I have tried to fix a specific culture in its time and space in history and then to reconstruct some of its composition and operations over a selected time interval. One use of the archaeological data is to check the accuracy of these reconstructions based on documentary and numismatic evidence. Another use is to consider


the archaeological data as a class of evidence interpretable on its own terms, a level of analysis which presently offers little in the way of explicit method and theory and about which archaeologists are currently in considerable dispute.\(^1\)

Regarding the use of archaeological data in cultural histories and reconstructions, it seems likely that archaeological data will be most useful in providing some evidence for determining: (1) the locations and physical extent of the settlements mentioned in the historical and geographical sources; (2) the specific crops, animals, and industries around which the economy was organized; and (3) a basis for inferences about the political and economic relationships that existed among different settlements (based on settlement pattern studies and the locational geography of the sites).

In order to use the archaeological data to ascertain these things we must be able to determine: (1) the period of occupation of each site; (2) the site's size (in order to have an idea of the size of the population during different periods); and (3) the range of economic activities performed at these sites.

For each of these uses of the archaeological data, the basic question is, how do these data compare with the "story" as it was derived from the historical, geographical, and numismatic data?

\(^1\)See R. C. Dunnell, "Evolutionary Theory and Archaeology."
In order to determine the type of archaeological evidence that is available, let us look at the previous work that has been carried out on the Islamic archaeological sites in Mesopotamia and Iran most relevant to Khuzestan.

Previous Work in Islamic Archaeology in Iran

Adequate estimates of population densities and settlement patterns from archaeological data require systematic surveying of large areas, followed by mapping the sites located, and collecting ceramics from their surfaces. The only reliable and practical method we have for dating the periods of occupations of Islamic archaeological sites remains the seriation of the pottery styles found in the surface collections, since radiocarbon dating is extremely expensive and often not sufficiently precise as to allow the chronological distinctions that are important here.¹

Although such ceramic seriations are subject to many qualifications,² there is considerable evidence that it is possible to use surface samples of ceramics to estimate with accuracy the periods of occupation of even large sites.

¹For the same reasons of costs, accuracy, and practicality, neither thermoluminescence, obsidian hydration, nor other absolute dating techniques have been systematically applied to the Islamic archaeological record.

When we turn to the archaeological analyses of Islamic occupations in Iran, however, we see that from the perspective of the research objectives of this study, these analyses suffer from two primary faults: first, although some systematic archaeological surveys have been done, the great majority of early and medieval Islamic occupations in Iran remain unsurveyed; second, in those cases where adequate surveys have been done, seriations of ceramics (which must be done at no scale greater than regional) are extremely crude and imprecise chronological measures. Moreover, to be maximally useful, survey data must be complemented with excavated data, so that ceramic seriations can be confirmed through stratigraphic analysis and so that other categories of evidence (such as animal bones and plant remains) can be recovered. But excavations of Islamic occupations of Iran have been few and, for the most part, either poorly done\(^1\) or not yet fully reported.

Islamic archaeology has not been subjected to the rigorous scrutiny general anthropological archaeology underwent in the 1960s and 1970s, and in many cases it remains no more scientific or informative today than it was 100 years ago. It is still basically a descriptive discipline, and art historical in orientation. For example, when the volume on the Islamic

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pottery of Nishapur was recently published\(^1\) (40 years after the excavations), 11 of its 12 chapters were devoted to the decorated and glazed wares and only one to the undecorated, unglazed common wares—a reversal of the usual ratio of glazed to unglazed ceramics found on Islamic archaeological sites\(^2\)—and no attempt was made to seriate these glazes systematically or to treat their frequencies and proveniences statistically.

The excavation of Islamic archaeological sites in Khuzestan began in 1897, when French archaeologists began digging at Susa (al-Sus). This site, important since Biblical times,\(^3\) comprises over 50 meters of vertically stratified cultural debris, the top several meters consisting of Islamic material. But in order to reach the earlier material, the Islamic levels over most of this site were removed without careful study. French archaeologists (principally Roman Ghirshman, Jean Perrot, Myriam Rosen-Ayalon, and Monique


\(^2\)See Adams, Heartland, p. 232. Islamic occupations have, in fact, been found completely without glazed wares or glass, see Jean Deshayes, "Rapport Preliminaire sur la Onzieme Campagne de Fouille à Torang Tepe." Proceedings of the IVth Annual Symposium on Archaeological Research in Iran, ed. Firouz Bagherzadeh (Tehran: Iranian Center for Archaeological Research, 1976), p. 309.

\(^3\)See mentions of this area in the Book of Esther and the Book of Daniel.
Kervran) continued to excavate at this site until 1979, but for the most part French activities at Susa remained concentrated on the substantial earlier (principally pre-Achaemenid) occupations. All the published studies of these excavations end at the fifth/eleventh century, though there is ample archaeological, historical, and geographical evidence that Susa continued to be an important city throughout the later Islamic periods.

In the late 1960s Robert McC. Adams and Donald Hansen conducted excavations at the large, walled Sassanian capital of Jundi-Sabur (Figure 43). Because of the lack of an established ceramic seriation for the various Islamic occupations in this area, Adams and Hansen dated the periods of occupation at Jundi-Sabur on the basis of ceramics from Iraq—and for much of the history of human occupation of the Susiana Plain, ceramics from

\[1\]


\[2\]

Figure 43. Areas of archaeological surveys in Khuzestan.
these two areas were similar. But, as Adams later noted, Islamic ceramics are still too little studied to allow precise absolute dating of sites either in here or in Iraq,\(^1\) a fact that may explain the disparity between the *terminus ad quem* Adams and Hansen proposed for Jundi-Sabur of the late third/ninth century\(^2\) and the evidence from the historical, geographical, and numismatic data that Jundi-Sabur was one of the most economically active cities in this area well into the fourth/tenth century.

The only other extensive excavations on Islamic sites directly relevant to this study of medieval Khuzestan were carried out by David Whitehouse at Siraf, a Gulf port in Fars, where he uncovered traces of substantial late \(^C\)Abbasid and Buyid economic activity. As yet, however, a complete site report has not been published.

As for surface surveys, as opposed to excavations, of Islamic period settlements, although no systematic surveys have

\(^1\)Adams, *Heartland*, p. 183.


\(^3\)Brief reports have been published in D. Whitehouse, "Recent Discoveries at Siraf," *Proceedings of the IIInd Annual Symposium on Archaeological Research in Iran*, ed. F. Bagherzadeh (Tehran: Iranian Centre for Archaeological Research, 1974); D. Whitehouse, "The Decline of Siraf," *Proceedings of the IIIrd Annual Symposium on Archaeological Research in Iran*, ed. F. Bagherzadeh (Tehran: Iranian Centre for Archaeological Research, 1976), pp. 263-270; and in D. Whitehouse's annual reports during the mid-1970s in the journal *Iran*. 
focused specifically on sites of this period, Adams,\textsuperscript{1} Whitehouse,\textsuperscript{2} Wenke,\textsuperscript{3} Schacht,\textsuperscript{4} and Wright\textsuperscript{5} have all located and identified Islamic occupations.\textsuperscript{6}

Perhaps the most comprehensive and systematic of these was Wenke's 1973 Khuzestan Survey (Figure 43), during which samples of ceramics were collected from all sites located.

\textsuperscript{1}The results of Adams' survey are in his unpublished field notes and in his "Agriculture and Urban Life in Early Southwestern Iran," \textit{Science} 136 (1962):109-122.

\textsuperscript{2}See Whitehouse, "Recent Discoveries at Siraf."

\textsuperscript{3}See R. J. Wenke, "Parthian and Sassanian Khuzestan (1975)," or "Parthian and Sassanian Khuzestan," (Mesopotamia) for the results of this survey. It should be noted that none of these Susiana Plain surveys (by Adams, Wenke, or Schacht) includes Tustar (modern Shushtar) in the area studied.


\textsuperscript{6}Other archaeological surveys in Iran often ignored all but the largest Islamic sites or simply subsumed all post-Sassanian sites under the name "Islamic," with no further temporal or cultural distinctions. See, e.g., Sei-Ichi Masuda, "Report of the Archaeological Investigations at Sahrud, 1975," Proceedings of the IVth Annual Symposium on Archaeological Research in Iran, ed. Firouz Bagherzadeh (Tehran: Iranian Center for Archaeological Research, 1976), pp. 63-70. For brief descriptions of archaeological projects in Iran during the 1970s, see other volumes of this series.
Because this was an intensive walking survey supplemented by air photos, Wenke believes that at least 95 percent of all sites in the northern Susiana Plain were located and collected.

After he established a ceramic seriation for the Achaemenid through the early Islamic periods based on a multi-dimensional scaling of a large number of samples from over 1,200 sites, Wenke was able to designate more than 150 of these sites as "early Islamic." And although this seriation was not free of biases and did not distinguish between the various later Islamic periods, it at least provided a local ceramic sequence that distinguished between Sassanian and Islamic sites.

Robert McC. Adams, in his 1960-1961 Khuzestan Survey, located and mapped over 200 sites, ranging in dates from ca. 6000 B.C. to the eleventh/seventeenth century. As in his excavations at Jundi-Sabur, Adams dated these sites on the basis of similar ceramics in Iraq.

Based on Wenke's ceramic seriation, R. Schacht in his 1974 Southern Khuzestan Survey identified 16 Islamic sites in the area south of the Haft Tepe Ridge (Figure 43). And as a comparison with these lowland areas, we have two surveys conducted by H. Wright in the mountains near Aidaj¹ and around Dasht-i Gul and Iveh (Figure 43).

¹Aidaj is rendered in modern Persian as "İzah" and the modern town near these ruins is called Malamir.
As part of this study, I attempted to establish a seriation of Islamic ceramics in Khuzestan by correlating Rosen-Ayalon's pottery sequence from excavations with the typology Wenke established for the early Islamic materials from his survey. I soon found this an impossible task. The principal problem was that Rosen-Ayalon did not group the ceramics based on stated dimensions of variability—rather, she referred only to undefined similarities between individual pieces.¹

The analyses of ceramics from other excavations at Susa (with occupations dated to the third/ninth through the fifth/eleventh centuries)² have not yet been published, but it is hoped that they will aid in the establishment of an Islamic ceramic seriation for Khuzestan.

In none of these excavations or surveys have the accoutrements of the Islamic textile industry in Khuzestan (such as cards, combs, whorls, wheels, and looms) been reported. Since many of these objects were made of wood, it is not surprising


²These dates have been assigned on the basis of a "Chinese-like" porcelain bowl, the presence of "sgraffiato" ware, and "selon les estimations des archeologues anglais," Kervran, "Les niveaux islamiques," p. 35.
that they were not encountered in surface surveys. The volume on "small finds" from Rosen-Ayalon's excavations at Susa has not yet been published, so it is not yet known if any such implements were found there. They have not, however, been reported in previous publications of these excavations.

Because of the poorly defined ceramic sequence for post-second/eighth century occupations in Khuzestan, it is possible to draw only general conclusions based on these studies. And since the Islamic period ceramics in Khuzestan are too poorly defined to allow any differentiations to be made within the Islamic period, we can only make valid comparisons between the Sassanian and the early Islamic periods. Still, using the data from these studies, we can make some general statements about Islamic settlement in Khuzestan.

Settlement Pattern Evidence

Islamic urbanism on the Susiana Plain seems not to have had the same initial pattern as in Iraq, which experienced a sharp decline from the Sassanian period in the number of large urban settlements,¹ and where new capitals were built by fiat (e.g., Baghdad) and large contingents of the Arab army were garrisoned in newly constructed amšar (military camps). Adams says that in Iraq these amšar

¹Adams, Heartland, pp. 183-184.
stand out as swollen foreign enclaves of an exceptional character, abruptly superimposed on the pre-existing urban hierarchy and only very gradually becoming an organic part of it.\(^1\)

In contrast, the settlement pattern in Khuzestan shows that the concentration of urban settlements increased slightly from Sassanian to early Islamic times (Figure 44)\(^2\) and that for the most part these increases occurred in pre-existing settlements, not in newly constructed towns (compare Figures 46 and 47). Similarly, the Islamic historians usually considered accurate for these early periods (Ṭabarī in his Ta'rikh, Baladhurī in his Futūḥ and his Ansāb al-AShrāf, Khalīfah ibn Khayyat in his Ta'rikh, or Ibn Ḥazm in his Jamharat Ansāb al-ʿArab) do not mention in their accounts of the Arab conquest of Khuzestan the construction of any new cities or even the settling of a large Arab population here.

The increase in average site-size and inferred increase in population density in the early Islamic period (Figure 44) may, however, signal a shift of a large part of the rural population to the cities and the involvement of this population in centralized handicraft production (principally textiles) and in large-scale, state-directed agricultural projects (principally the

\(^1\)Adams, _Heartland_, p. 217.

\(^2\)These figures were constructed using information from Wenke, "Parthian and Sassanian Khuzestan (1975)," Figures 26, 27, and 28.
Figure 44. Site-size and settlement area in Khuzestan during various periods.
growing of sugar, rice, grains, and orchard crops).

Comparison of the distribution of early Islamic settlements (Figure 47)\(^1\) with the distribution of settlements in the Uruk period (Figure 45)\(^2\) and the late Sasanian period (Figure 46)\(^3\) shows that in the early Islamic period people lived in the same areas of the Susiana Plain as they had for over 4,000 years and that they tended to avoid settlement of areas that had also been avoided for many millennia.

The reasons for this strong conservative trend in settlement location are obvious: agricultural activity on any level greater than subsistence farming in this area requires irrigation, and given the rivers of Khuzestan, the easiest areas to irrigate and farm are, and have always been, the areas of the southern Diz, the northern Karkhah, and the eastern Karun. Dry-farming is possible along the eastern edge of the Plain, across from Tustar (Shushtar), but people in this area engage in marginal subsistence farming today, as they probably always have in periods when irrigation systems there were not in operation. These same factors operate in determining the location of industrial activities (such as ceramic and textile manufacture).

A similar conservative trend is evident in some aspects

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\(^1\)After Wenke, "Imperial Investments and Agricultural Developments," figure 22.

\(^2\)After Johnson, *Local Exchange*, figure 19.

\(^3\)After Wenke, "Imperial Investments and Agricultural Developments," figure 21.
of village architecture. Mud-brick construction is, for reasons of availability, cost, and adaptability to the climate, by far the best presently available construction material in this area, and thus it is not surprising that the material remains of early Islamic occupations closely resemble those of the preceding several millennia.

Both Adams and Wenke note, however, that a significant difference in settlement type emerged in the late Parthian period and continued into the early Islamic era. This was the growing number of "dispersed" villages—communities made up of buildings spread irregularly over large, apparently unenclosed, areas, in contrast to the densely settled, compact, and usually walled settlements that typified settlement patterns throughout the history of occupation of the Susiana Plain. Without excavations it is impossible to determine the significance of this development, especially since the previous settlement type (concentrated, enclosed sites) continued to be utilized well into the early Islamic period. For example, the presence of Islamic forts in this area (one of the most important of which may have been at Basinna—Figure 48) is attested to by both archaeologists and medieval geographers.¹

But if settlement patterns on the Susiana Plain remained relatively constant into the early Islamic period, other areas

¹See Adams, unpublished field notes, site KS-235; Schacht, "Rural Settlement," site KS-235; Maqdisi, Ahsan, p. 408.
of Khuzestan seem to have experienced the same population decline that Adams noted in Iraq.

Schacht, in his study of the area south of the Haft Tepe Ridge,¹ proposed a linear progression of settlement extending south from the Ridge with time, and he attributed this progression to population expansion and the expansion of ShaCur-derived canals. And, as Figure 48 shows, this expansion was greatest in the Parthian period, and retreated slightly in the Sassanian and Islamic periods.

Since this southern area is a marginal area even for dry farming, the expansion of settlement in this area involved substantial investment. And this investment had to be made in two ways: first, since this area receives little rain (see Figure 7, Chapter II), agriculture in this area is reliant on irrigation, specifically on irrigation from the ShaCur²; and because this area was exposed to the open desert on the west and southwest, and thus exposed to raids by the Qarmatians and local brigands, it was necessary to locate the settlements in more easily defensible positions (e.g., partially surrounded by marshes) or to establish administrative or military centers in this

¹Schacht, "Rural Settlement." Information for this figure comes from his Figure 1 and Table 1.

²It is necessary to use the ShaCur rather than the Karkhah (though the Karkhah has carried a much greater volume of water here) because the Karkhah is too downcut to get water from in this southern area.
Figure 48. Islamic settlements south of the Haft Tepe Ridge.
southwest region of the plain. Therefore, the retreat of settlement in this area during Islamic times may imply the deterioration or loss of these canal systems coupled with the inability to defend these southern settlements.

Another indication that the canal systems may have deteriorated (and thus the salinity of the land increased) in medieval Islamic times is the fact that in the third/ninth century, for the first time, we hear of such heavy salt crusts forming on the surface that African slaves were employed to remove them.¹ At the same time Adams noted² a "precipitate retreat" of settlement from the previously well-populated Sawad. This southern area of Schacht's study would have been among the first areas in Khuzestan to experience the effects of increased salinization of the land, since already by Islamic times it was a highly saline area (see Figure 3, Chapter II).

As a comparison to settlement in these lowland areas, ¹

¹Though whether this was for the purpose of readying the soil for cultivation or for the purpose of gathering salt to sell as a commodity is not clear. The two purposes are not mutually exclusive, of course. This would seem an inefficient way to amass salt to sell as a cash crop, and there is no mention in the geographies of its being one. But it may have been "mined" strictly for local consumption, as it is in some parts of the Middle East today (e.g., the Fayyum area of Egypt).

²Adams, Heartland, p. 214.
we have Wright's studies of settlement patterns in the Aidaj and the Iveh/Dasht-i Gul regions in the mountainous areas northeast of Jundi-Sabur (Figure 49). As in the southern region, settlement in the mountains seems also to have declined in the early Islamic period. But here too we face two of the major problems in dealing with archaeological evidence in this area: first, especially in this montane area, an increase or decline in settlement area noted by archaeological means may not necessarily indicate an increase or decline in population--it may only be a reflection of an increase or decrease in the non-sedentary population, the extent and frequency of whose activities and occupations are difficult to ascertain by archaeological means; and second, Wright's ceramic seriation for the Islamic periods does not agree with Wenke's, Adams', or Rosen-Ayalon's.\footnote{Figure 49 is based on information found in Wright, "Middle Karun Valley," Figures 2 and 3 and Table 1. See also Wright, Archaeological Investigations in Northeastern Khuzestan, 1976, University of Michigan, Museum of Anthropology Technical Reports, no. 10, Ann Arbor, 1979, Fig. 52, for evidence of a similar population decline in the Aidaj area.}

\footnote{Adams, Heartland, p. 70.}

\footnote{For example, Wright (Archaeological Investigations) calls a distinctive fine-lined incised ware "Seljuq"; Adams (unpublished field notes) dates this ware to the third/ninth century; Wenke ("Parthian and Sasanian Khuzestan," Mesopotamia, p. 208, Figure 7) calls it "Early Islamic" (his ceramic type #178); and Rosen-Ayalon ("Niveaux Islamiques," pp. 182-183) dates it to the second/eighth century (illustrated in her Figure 60:6).}
Figure 49. Islamic settlements in the Iveh Valley.
Settlement Size

The application of mathematical models of locational geography to archaeological data includes many dubious premises.\(^1\) Archaeologists must estimate such things as population densities and fluctuations in the economy from static, biased archaeological samples. And even when these applications are most convincing,\(^2\) in the end, it simply means that the ancient culture could have resembled a modern society in some of its aspects. Nevertheless, given an understanding of the potentials and limitations of the archaeological records, locational models can be applied to archaeological data, and they give us an opportunity to generate hypotheses that can be tested against other kinds of data.

Robert Wenke and I recently applied the rank-size rule to early Islamic settlements on the Susiana Plain,\(^3\) and it seems likely that the broad pattern of settlement size-distribution we have defined for the early Islamic occupation of this area

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\(^2\)See, e.g., Johnson, Local Exchange.

\(^3\)Wenke and Pyne, "Sasanian and Islamic Urbanism." Much of the discussion of rank-size distributions is taken from this paper.
is a rough approximation of the actual ancient pattern.

Rank-size graphs are constructed by tabulating the settlement area of the component cities, towns, and villages of a political or economic entity, and then ranking these settlements according to size, from rank 1 for the largest settlement, to 2 for the second largest settlement, and so on. For reasons not relevant here, one converts both the size and the rank to base-10 logarithms, then one plots size against rank, so that each settlement is represented as a single point on a graph.

The shape of the line made by connecting the points on this graph has been shown to correspond in many different contexts to specific political and economic conditions. It has been shown,\(^1\) for example, that in some advanced industrial countries, the line approximates a 45° angle (Figure 50), with the largest city about twice as large as the next largest, about ten times as large as the tenth largest, and so on. Such a configuration is thought to correspond to a highly interdependent economic system with a relatively long history of political stability.

In contrast to this, the line can be markedly convex, with the largest three cities being dramatically larger than the others. Such a configuration is thought to correspond to somewhat simpler economic and political situations, in which fewer factors are at

Figure 50. Sample rank-size distributions.
work and there is rapid change and relocation of institutions. Modern Egypt's plot, for example, is markedly convex, with Cairo and Alexandria encompassing much of the population.

A concave plot, on the other hand, is thought to correspond to a situation with a small degree of integration, where towns and villages tend to be much more self-reliant for goods and services.

Figures 51 and 52 show the rank-size distribution for three successive periods on the Susiana Plain. In the late Parthian period (ca. A.D. 125-250), maximum rural population densities were reached on the Plain, and northern Khuzestan was a rich and almost wholly autonomous kingdom associated very loosely with the Parthian Empire. The rank-size distribution of this period (Figure 51) approximates the 45° angle associated with an integrated, well-established economic system, in which there is a fairly even distribution of economic and administrative functions throughout many different settlements.

The rank-size distributions for the late Sassanian and early Islamic periods (Figure 52), however, are in marked contrast to the Parthian. Both of these periods show a primate distribution, typical of "an excess of centrality and . . . either an extraordinary centralization of regional services or a role for the primate city that extends beyond its regional hinterlands."¹

Figure 51. Rank-size distribution of Late Parthian settlements (ca. A.D.100).
Figure 52. Rank-size distribution of Late Sassanian (ca. A.D.400) and Early Islamic (ca. 184/800) settlements.
The relative crudity of these data does not allow us to make many inferences about differences between the Sassanian and early Islamic distributions here, nor does it allow us to plot the distributions for the various Islamic periods.

The largest early Islamic cities on the Susiana (Basinna, KS-107, the Islamic occupation at Jundi-Sabur) were smaller than their Sassanian predecessors (Ivan-i Karkhah, Susa, Jundi-Sabur), but the general trend in each period was the same: abandonment of the hinterland, concentration of the populate in the large cities, and probably—though this is an inference—the connection of the major cities to economic and political centers far beyond the immediate sustaining area of the Susiana Plain.

**Evidence Concerning Trade and Economic Exchange**

By Buyid and Seljuq times, rural communities in Khuzestan may have been less directly tied into the imperial economy and monetary system than were communities during earlier periods of settlement on the Susiana. As evidence for this is the fact that in over five months of archaeological survey of the Susiana, we found over 90 bronze coins dating to the Parthian period, only one Buyid coin, and not a single Seljuq coin. Even given all the many biases such information is liable to (see Chapter V), it seems a strong possibility that bronze coins (of any Islamic minting date) did not circulate on these rural settlements.
during Buyid and Seljuq times.

As discussed above (Chapter V), what this means is uncertain: export crops may have been regionally organized and taxed, with money exchanged for them only at trading depots and storage centers outside the Susiana (though there is no historical or geographical evidence for this); silver and gold coins—notoriously less common on archaeological sites, for obvious reasons—may have displaced most of the bronze coinages of the later Abbasid period (there is numismatic evidence for this); or, local trade could have been conducted almost entirely by barter or by use of a currency other than metal (there is some geographical and numismatic evidence for this).

Other evidence concerning trade on the Susiana comes from settlement location and the ceramics found on their surfaces. Without excavating these sites there is little we can state definitely about them, but it is interesting that: many have ceramics that are obviously mass-produced in central kilns; some glazed wares are found at even the smallest rural communities; and the rural economy was able to support thousands of people living at the major cities and, presumably, not engaged in agricultural work.

Summary and Conclusions

Because of the nature of archaeological data, they represent one of the potentially most useful bodies of evidence for a
cultural reconstruction such as this study and as a check on documentary and numismatic evidence. They can help locate sites determined to be important from these other types of evidence; by analysis of plant and animal remains taken from excavations they can tell us about what the economy was based on; and the location and sizes of the archaeological sites can tell give us much information about the political and economic relationships that obtained in the region.

The data collected from the study of Islamic archaeological sites in Khuzestan, however, is too general to allow us to distinguish anything more than the difference between Sassanian and Islamic occupations. Given this distinction, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions: 1) the early Islamic settlement pattern did not differ greatly from the late Sassanian in this area; 2) the initial phases of Islamic occupation on the Susiana Plain did not parallel those of Iraq; 3) the primate distribution of late Sassanian and early Islamic cities on the Plain may be tied to the organization of centralized textile production and large-scale agricultural projects; 4) and settlement on the Plain concentrated in the most easily irrigable areas, as it had for at least 4,000 years previously.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding chapters of this dissertation, I have assembled the ecological, historical, geographical, numismatic, and archaeological evidence relevant to a reconstruction of the political and economic history of fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh century Khuzestan. In weaving together these disparate lines of often incomplete evidence, I have noted the many important aspects of this history that we still know very little about, but, in general, the evidence seems to express three inter-related historical "themes" or developments.

First, rather than the political and economic catastrophes usually seen as attendant upon the Seljuq invasion, there is evidence of considerable continuity in the already established pattern of economic decline in Mesopotamia and Khuzestan. As D. Waines\(^1\) has established for Mesopotamia, tax revenue lists and other factors chart a gradual economic decline from the second/eighth century on. In Khuzestan, this decline seems to have increased somewhat after 316/928 and then quickened sharply.

after about 391/1000. Some of the evidence for this is: the fact that it was impossible for people from Mesopotamia and Khuzestan to make the hajj for almost 50 years after 410/1019; by 444/1052 pilgrims who did dare to attempt the hajj bypassed Mesopotamia and Khuzestan because of the fighting among the various partisans of the sons of Abu Kalinjar and between them and the Seljuqs; coin production of every denomination virtually ceased after 403/1012; and after 391/1000 the geographies that were written about the Islamic world did not include firsthand information about Khuzestan (implying at least a decrease in travel and trade in this area).

The reasons for this decline seem to be both political and economic. Control of Khuzestan and direction of its agriculture (in the form of control of tax farms) fluctuated throughout the fourth/tenth century, depending on who was in favor at court in Baghdad or who had superior military power. Without some assurance of continued control (and thus of continued reward), there was no incentive for the muqtadī to reinvest part of his profits in the upkeep of the irrigation system. And there is evidence that often during the internecine battles that seem to have almost continually plagued this area during the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, soldiers breached the dams and canals to flood out enemy positions. All these factors must have resulted in an almost devastated agricultural system by 446/1054.

By the time the Seljuqs took control of Khuzestan (in
446/1054), the agricultural reverses may have been too drastic to repair, and there is evidence that Niżām al-Mulk may have decided to insure the flow of at least some revenue to the capital by instituting or legitimizing iqṭāᶜ al-tamlīk, possibly between 472/1080 and 474/1082. Any benefit this measure may have brought to the central treasury, however, probably was only temporary, since by the time of Barkyarūq's reign, decentralization was such that in Khuzestan, at least, the muqtaᶜ and other local officials had enough independence to mint coins in their own names.

The second development can be seen as the beginning in late Sassanian times of the agricultural strategy of cash-cropping such things as rice, sugar, and orchard crops. This strategy, along with the state-directed manufacture of certain luxury textiles (such as tirāz, dibāj, and silks) continued into at least the late fourth/tenth century and resulted in the concentration of the population in the larger cities and the location of these cities in areas well-suited for irrigation, industry, and trade. This meant that settlement was heaviest in northern Khuzestan (principally in the Susiana Plain) and along the three major rivers, the Karkhah, the Diz, and the Karun.

The third historical theme is that the cultural elements often seen as radical changes brought about by the Seljuq invasion deserve re-evaluation. C. Bosworth, for example,
proposed that the effects of the Turks' grazing of their animals on previously agricultural land had damaging economic consequences.\(^1\) But the actual number of men involved in the Seljuq invasion was probably not great (perhaps in the tens of thousands)\(^2\) and what little Turkish settlement there was tended to concentrate in the more northern areas of Iran, like Rayy, Azerbaycan, and Hamadan, and in Anatolia, where living conditions were closer to those of their Central Asian homeland.\(^3\) Areas like Mesopotamia and Khuzestan, where the land and weather were not especially conducive to large-scale pastoralism, experienced almost no settlement by Turks, except perhaps in garrisons.\(^4\) As A. Lambton emphasized, the major settlement of Turkish tribes in

\(^1\) Bosworth, "The Iranian World," p. 10; and Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, pp. 128, 224, et passim.


\(^4\) Cahen, "The Turkish Invasions," p. 145; C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1968), p. 33. R. Frye (in "The Turks in Khurasan and Transoxania at the Time of the Arab Conquest," The Moslem World, XXXV (1945): 308) reports Turkish-speaking Qashqai in Khuzestan, but he must be referring to the Qashqai settlements in the far southeastern mountain region within the borders of the modern province of Khuzestan, and not to the more circumscribed area traditionally considered as Khuzestan.
Iran dates not to Seljuq times, but probably to the periods of the Mongols, Timurids, Qara Qoyunlu, and Safavids.¹

In any case, the percentage of the population engaged in nomadic pastoralism as a subsistence strategy may have increased long before the advent of the Seljuqs. Miskawayh said that in during the reign of Muṣṣizz al-Dawlah (334/945-356/967) economic conditions became so bad that previously settled agriculturalists became nomads.² And it seems that economic conditions after Muṣṣizz al-Dawlah's reign never became so prosperous that they would have provided a great incentive to lure these nomads back into settled life. Rather, life as a settled agriculturalist seems to have become more hazardous after this time.

The consequences of this increased pastoralism may have been serious. In Khuzestan, for example, pastoralism usually takes place in the highlands: the winter pastures (garrāṣir) are mainly on the foothills just below the first rise of the Zagros, and the summer pastures (sardāṣir) are in the more northern mountain plateaux. Increased grazing in these highland areas could reduce vegetation to the point that erosion would take place, and as a result the river flows would tend to become more flashy, with higher flood peaks, and lower low-flows. The effect on sedimentation in the Khuzistan plains would be

the same as for a dry period: that is increased grazing would lead first to aggradation, and then to incision within the deposited material as the system settled down to its new equilibrium. Both aggradation and incision will follow from a single change to more intense grazing . . . \(^1\)

The effects of this increased aggradation and incision on irrigation agriculture systems that were finely attuned to normal river flows must have been destructive. If nomadic pastoralism increased in the Buyid period, any increase during the Seljuq period (whether because of the influx of Turks themselves, or because of previously settled people changing subsistence strategies) may have only added to this problem. Since the Mongols invaded Iran relatively shortly after the Turks, and in much greater numbers and with larger flocks,\(^2\) there would have been no respite from the effects of this increased pastoralism.

Apart from these ethnographic and economic changes brought about by increased pastoralism, however, the point must be made that the "permanent institutional changes" that scholars have long associated with the Seljuqs may not have been as permanent or as much of a change as they seem. Many innovations attributed to the Seljuqs had been evolving for centuries: the practice of allying tax farming with responsibility for army pay (\(\text{iqt\(\text{\^{a}}\)}\))

\(^1\)Kirkby, "Water Resources," p. 32.

\(^2\)Lambton, "Saljuq-Ghuzz Settlement," p. 120.
can be traced back to the time of Ibn Rā'iq (see Chapter III); although the office of the sultān can probably be traced to the Seljuqs, the word was used during Buyid times as almost interchangeable with vizier, and the office has been called "the logical development of the office of amīr al-umārā . . . [signifying] the holder of supreme secular power"; and though the political orientation of the madrasah system may have been a Seljuq innovation, the system itself had precedents in the well-known Sassanian universities (one of the most famous being at Jundi-Sabur) and in al-Ma'mūn's Bayt al-Ḥikmah at Baghdad (founded ca. 214/1829) and the Dār al-ʿIlm in Baghdad (founded ca. 380/990). Perhaps the one permanent change that can be directly ascribed to the Seljuqs is the institution of the atābeg, the practice of having a military leader as "guardian" over a nominal (usually young) Seljuq ruler. Even this is probably attributable more to circumstance than to previous tribal custom or Seljuq "innovation."

These general historical themes, then, constitute a set of testable hypotheses about the Buyid and Seljuq periods. We

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can have no definitive proof of their validity or relevance until stratified excavations are conducted on many more sites and other settlement pattern surveys and analyses are completed, but I would argue that the extant documentary and numismatic evidence has been sufficiently analyzed that our only hope of a significantly greater understanding of this period and place lies in systematic archaeological work.

But it must be recognized that even if such archaeological work is completed, and the Buyid and Seljuq periods in Khuzestan are known in considerably greater detail, we must still confront the problem of the significance of our knowledge. After all, we know the political and economic history of many areas and eras of the Islamic world much better than we know Buyid and Seljuq Khuzestan, and it is difficult to see that knowledge of any one such area or era revolutionized our overall understanding of early or medieval Islam.

I suggest that the proper perspective in which to place the preceding review of Buyid and Seljuq Khuzestan, and the most productive way to interpret any additional archaeological evidence, may be in the context of comparative history and anthropological theory.

Neither historians nor anthropologists have had much success in constructing general explanations for the clear patterning evident in both the historical and archaeological records. Various schemes, such as comparative political
analyses,\textsuperscript{1} cultural ecology, systems theory, and Marxian analyses,\textsuperscript{2} have been applied to early empires, primarily in order to answer the question of why these ancient empires show such consistent patterns of political, economic, and social expansion and collapse.

Despite the generally unimpressive success of such generalized analyses, many scholars\textsuperscript{3} remain confident that there is much to be gained from classifying the world's ancient states and empires as variants of a single developmental process and then trying to adduce general principles in explanation of these phenomena.

In this context, then, medieval Khuzestan is one of many instances in which an established, pre-industrial but complex society experienced alternating periods of expansion and collapse in political integration and economic productivity. Medieval Khuzestan, of course, is not alone in this experience: scholars

\textsuperscript{1}See Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires.


have studied this phenomenon in Mesoamerica,\textsuperscript{1} Peru,\textsuperscript{2} and China,\textsuperscript{3} to name but a few other places; and this phenomenon has been observed in pre-Islamic Khuzestan as well.\textsuperscript{4}

Common to these cycles of expansion and collapse, and perhaps important causes and expressions of them, are radical changes in population growth rate, maladaptive systems of taxation, unwise and ineffective management of administrative institutions and agricultural systems, and stresses induced by periodic warfare and economic and political relations with nomadic and other marginal groups. What is not agreed upon, however, is the specific relationship of these factors in any given case or in general application to early empires. Given the data presented in this dissertation, however, it is possible to construct a tentative model (Figure 53) in which are proposed the relationships of these factors in medieval Khuzestan. These relationships may have some general applicability to other situations as well.


\textsuperscript{3}O. Lattimore, \textit{Inner Asian Frontiers of China} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951).

\textsuperscript{4}Wenke, "Parthian and Sassanian Khuzestan" (1975).
Figure 53. Model showing the relationships of various political, economic, and social factors in medieval Khuzestan.
An explanation of the model would go as follows: imperial investments in agriculture (in the form of canals, qanats, weirs, etc.) and in manufacturing (specifically of cloth) had two results: in agriculture it resulted in more stable subsistence production of wheat and rice and in a system of cash-cropping such things as orchard crops (fruit, dates, etc.), sugar cane, and rice; in manufacturing it resulted in increased production of luxury cloth items for state uses (tīrāz, silk, etc.). The more stable grain crop production allowed accessible surpluses to go to and possibly increase the marginal agriculture/pastoral nomad population. Since this population was politically discrete from the settled lowlands and potentially predatory, their increase fueled social instability and thus created administrative problems. Cash-cropping led to a cash surplus and increased tax income, which instead of being reinvested in agricultural upkeep, went into textile manufacturing or was drawn off to Baghdad. Cash cropping, increased cash surpluses, and increased production of luxury items may have led to increased coin production (specifically gold and silver coinage) to facilitate trade and to allow for a more liquid and/or secure means of cash surplus storage. Administrative problems combined to make tax or revenue farming attractive to the central administration. Tax farming eventually led to a decrease in the tax revenues remitted to the central administration and to greater provincial independence (or decentralization). The decreased tax
revenue, which should have been reinvested in agricultural and manufacturing upkeep, was not sufficient to provide for that upkeep in addition to the revenues required by the central and the local administration, both of which had prior call on taxes. Since revenue was not sufficient for upkeep of the agricultural and manufacturing systems, this led to environmental degradation and eventually to more social instability.

The reality is not so neat as the model, of course. In addition to increased pastoralism in the marginal areas, population growth among the lowland agriculturalists also undoubtedly contributed to environmental degradation, and there is the unstated factor that cash surplus led to increased wealth on the part of certain segments of the community and thus contributed to social instability. Such "models" of imperial dynamics, it must be recognized, are merely attempts at historical description, and they possess a few truly explanatory elements or significant cross-cultural applications. Diener and Robkin, Dunnell, and Wenkel are among the many anthropologists who have called attention to the fact that "explanations" of historical developments like that presented in Figure 53

are in essence functional arguments, and as such, possess no powers of prediction or evolutionary explanation in terms of general principles.

Nevertheless, if it ever is to be possible to interpret history in terms of a comparative, generalizing, essentially explanatory approach, a body of organized data will be required. My objective here has been to create such a body of data for one particularly important place and time and to interpret these data in the broadest possible context now possible. For, as Robert McC. Adams has noted for Mesopotamia,

To a degree not widely enough understood, the study of the immensely long and rich past of Mesopotamia is still in a relatively early state of development . . . . [B]oth archaeological and archival sources for the most part provide little more than narrow beams of light with which somehow we seek to illuminate an immense dark room. To speak of general explanation in anything other than a very loose, informal sense when even the most prominent, enduring contours within that room remain so indistinct and subject to dispute would be to misapply the basic precepts of the search for historical causality.¹

¹Adams, Heartland, p. xvii.
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APPENDIX I

CATALOGUE OF COINS MINTED IN KHUZESTAN FROM A.H. 70 to A.H. 733

This appendix comprises all the coins known to have been minted in Khuzestan between the years A.H. 70 and A.H. 733. Although the focus of this dissertation is the fourth and fifth centuries hijri, coins of earlier and later periods have been recorded here to facilitate comparison.
Key to Appendix I

Name at left margin is mint-name.

All years are hijrī.

The first and second lines for each mint comprise gold issues.

The third and fourth lines for each mint comprise silver issues.

The fifth line for each mint comprises copper issues.

X = caliphal coin

Numbers between the years 320 and 410 refer to the following Buyid rulers:

1=Muṣḥiz al-Dawlah
2=Imād al-Dawlah
3=Izz al-Dawlah
4=Ādud al-Dawlah
5=Sharaf al-Dawlah
6=Šāṃṣām al-Dawlah
7=Bahā al-Dawlah
8 and 10=Rukn al-Dawlah
9=Tāj al-Dawlah
B=Buyid coin, not identified further

Numbers between the years 448 and 523 refer to the following Seljuq rulers:

1=Tughrīl Beg
2=Alp Arslān
3=Malikshāh
5=Barkyarūq
7=Muḥammad
8=Sanjar
5/B=Barkyarūq & Bursuq
S=Seljuq coin, not identified further

In the year 320, A=Amīd al-Dawlah.

In the years 373 and 374, M=MuṢayyid al-Dawlah.

In the year 374, F=Fakhr al-Dawlah.

In the years 390 through 405, H=Hasanwayhid.

In the years after 660, I=Ilkhanid.

In the year 700, M=Muzaffarid.

In the years after 660, U=Uljaytu.
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<th>Suq Muraqqa</th>
<th>Abarqubad</th>
<th>Surraq</th>
<th>Manadhim</th>
<th>Nahr Tira</th>
<th>Ram Hurmuz</th>
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Various Cultivars: grape, melon, squash, etc.
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APPENDIX II

TRANSLATIONS

In order to allow historians and archaeologists not familiar with Arabic and Persian to have access to the information in the medieval Islamic geographies in a more precise and detailed form than is currently available, I have here provided translations of some of the most important works.

This Appendix is certainly not exhaustive. Many works, such as the *Mujam al-Buldān*, were not translated simply because of space considerations. Those works that were translated, for the most part, were chosen because they represent firsthand, contemporary observations.¹ The only geography that did not fit this criterion was Abū al-Fidā'ī's *Taqwīm al-Buldān*, which was included because it incorporated so many now-lost works.

The arrangement of this Appendix is by town, using the Arabic alphabet. Within each town-heading the passages are arranged chronologically.

The following sources were used (here also arranged chronologically):

¹Both Ibn Hawqal's *Surat* and Iṣṭakhri's *Masālik* were translated. However, they are so similar that in this Appendix Ibn Hawqal was only cited when he differed substantially from Iṣṭakhri.
Ibn al-Faqîh
(d. 290/903)

Ištâkhri
(written ca. 318/930-321/933)


Ibn Hawqal
(written 366/977)

Maqdisî
(written before 391/1000)

Nâşir-i Khusraw
(written ca. 437/1045-444/1052)

Ibn al-Balkhî
(written before 510/1116)

Abû al-Fidâ
(written 722/1321)

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1This work, and the Kitâb al-Aqââlîm, are simply different editions of Ištâkhri's Masâlik. When these two works differ from the de Goeje version, I have so noted in the footnotes, using the abbreviations "Ištâkhri (Cairo)" and "Ištâkhri (Gotha)," respectively.
Ibn Hawqal, p. 252. [It is mentioned as a town in Khuzestan, near Aidaj.]

Arrajan
ارجاح

Ibn al-Faqih, p. 199. Arrajan is among the things built by Qubadh ibn Firuz, because when he reclaimed power from his brother JamASF he attacked Rum [Byzantium] and conquered two cities from among the cities of al-Jazirah.\(^1\) And he ordered and there was built a city between the boundaries of Fars and al-Ahwaz that was called "Barqubadh"\(^2\) and it is what is called Arrajan. Its districts are one district and added to it were [parts of] the countrysides of the district of Ram Hurmuz, the district of Sabur, the district of Ardishir Khurrah, and the district of Isbahan . . . .

In Arrajan there is a large bridge (cantarah),

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\(^1\) Al-Jazirah is the area in Mesopotamia between the Tigris and the Euphrates.

\(^2\) This name could come from the Persian "bar", which means "fruit" or "result" (i.e., "result of Qubadh's efforts"), or from the Arabic "barr," meaning "land" of Qubadh. It is vocalized as bar.
whose length is more than three hundred dhīrā'ī, made of stone, on the Wadi Arrajan. Among the wonders of Arrajan is a cave in the mountains, from which gushes forth water that changes and becomes white asphalt (mūniya') and this is the white asphalt.² And hanging on the entrance to the cave is an iron gate that opens that entrance a single day from year to year in the presence of the shaykhs and the righteous ones (al-sulahā') of the people of that village. Then a man disrobes and enters [the cave] and gathers what is there into a bottle (gārūrah). For what is gathered in all the year is (in amount) 100 mithqals, which increases or decreases,³ except that it decreases that which increases over 100 mithqals. Then the door is sealed and bolted until the next time.

Maqdisī, p. 52. [Towns that belong to] Arrajan: Qustan, Daryan, Mihruban, Jannabah, Siniz, Bila Sabur, Hinduwan.

Nāṣir-i Khusraw, p. 164. Arrajan [elsewhere in the Safarnāmah "Arraghan"] is a large city, in which 20,000 people live.

¹Probably about 240 meters long (cf. the measurements for the Shadurvan, under "Tustar" in this Appendix).

²The change from indefinite to definite here probably signifies that this is the (famous) white asphalt.

³Probably meaning "more or less."
On its east side is a river that comes from the mountains and runs to its north side. Four large streams divide and run through the city, so that they power many water-wheels and flow around the city. At the end of the city they have made orchards (bāghā) and gardens (bustānhā) and there are date palms, oranges (narānj), citrons (turānj), and many olives.

The city is so constructed that often buildings on top of the ground have parts underground as well. And in every place, in basements and cellars, water flows; and in summer the people of this city are comfortable because of this underground water.

Here most religions are represented. Here the Mu’tazilites have an Imam, whom they call Abū Sa’id al-Basrī (Bū Sa’id Baṣrī) and who is an eloquent man. He practices mathematics and lawsuits. I spoke with him, and we questioned and answered each other and we listened to each other, talking about speech, math, and other things.

Ibn al-Balkhi, p. 121. Arrajan is of the districts (a‘māl) of Pars, but when Bā Kālījār [Abū Kālinjār, the Buyid ruler] withdrew Arrajan had its own āmil, the vizier Abū La‘lā by name [who] united with Hizārāsp and gave him Arrajan. And since Hizārāsp had Khuzistan as a tax
farm (damān) from the beginning of this victorious dynasty\(^1\) (may God secure it!), Arrajan became
corporated in those districts.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 318. Arrajan is in the ıklim of Khuzistan and,
it is said, in the ıklim of Fars. It is in the third
p. 319 ıklim. According to Ibn Hawqāl, "Arrajan is at the end
of the Fars boundary in respect to Khuzistan, and it is
between Fars and Khuzistan," (he says) "and it is a big
city filled with good things and in it are date palms and
many olive trees. It is on an inland, riverine, highland
plateau, and it is one day's journey from the river."
And it says in al-Lubāb,\(^2\) "and Arrajan is in the
districts of al-Ahwaz in the land of Khuzistan," (it
says) "and it is also called Arraghan with a Persian
ghayn." It says in al-\(^3\)Azīzī,\(^3\) "and Arrajan is the
first of the cities of Fars and it is a glorious city.
It has districts\(^4\) and valuable products, and it is
plentiful in olive trees."

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\(^1\)Ibn al-Balkhī here is referring to the Seljuqs.

\(^2\)Ibn al-Athīr's Kitāb al-Lubāb (see Appendix III).

\(^3\)I.e., the Kitāb al-\(^3\)Azīzī by Ibn Sa'īd.

\(^4\)I.e., dependencies, as did Ahwaz.
Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as "a famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]¹

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 92. In the region (nāhiyah) of Asak bordering the land of Fars, they have a mountain in which burns a fire that never rises to the surface. From it is seen a glow by night and smoke by day. It is on the border of Khuzestan and resembles what I suppose to be a spring of oil (naft) or asphalt (ziff) or something else in which fire is active. And fire existed in it in former times, but however much the fire rose, it never burned up. So I believe, without seeing a sign of this and not hearing it, saying [only] "I suppose."²

¹Iṣṭakhrī seems to propose a three-tiered classification of cities in Khuzestan (see Figure 21): the first tier comprises those towns that are the capital cities of administrative districts; the second, cities with subsidiary districts; and third, "famous, well-known" cities. These distinctions are noted here.

²Ibn Hawqal, p. 255, has a slightly different rendition of this passage: In the region of Asak, bordering the land of Fars, they have a mountain in which fire burns by night and which spews smoke by day. [The fire] never rises to the surface. It is like the volcano that is in the region of Sicily in the middle of the sea, whose form [is like] this form . . . and
Istakhrī, p. 94. As for Asak, it is a village (qiryah) that has no minbar,¹ and around it are many date palms. And in it² was the battle of the Azarīqah, and they say that forty Heretics (al-shurāh) killed about 2,000 men from al-Basrah whom they had pursued. And from it is Arrajani³ grape-syrup (al-dawshāb al-arrajānī), which they transport to the remotest parts of the world.

p. 95 [It is] a village on the road to al-Basrah.

al-Ahwaz
الإهواز

Ibn al-Faqih, p. 198. Ardashīr ibn Bābak built the city of

p. 199 Suq al-Ahwaz. From the city of Suq al-Ahwaz to the city of Arrajān, the first of the administrative districts

they say that it is a spring of sulfur or oil, in which fire is active and which it consisted of in former times. But however much the fire rose, it never burned up. And I saw all the fires in Sicily and did not witness those from nearby, rather I [only] relate [this account], on which there is some reckoning and suspicion of untruth.

¹A minbar is the raised place in a mosque whence the khutbah is given, and it is used in this case to indicate that this town had no mosque.

²Ibn Hawqal, pp. 257-258, has a slightly different version: The Azarīqah had a battle in which forty of the Heretics killed almost 2,000 men from the army camp, whom they had pursued from al-Basrah and annihilated.

³Ibn Hawqal, p. 258, has a slightly different version: Asaki grape-syrup, which is transported to al-ʿIraq, is famous for its goodness, and is better than all the syrup from al-Rijānī [sic (Arrajān)] or others.
(Cemāl) of Fars, from this way, is 31 farsangs.

Ištakhrī, p. 88. And as for what are located in [Khuzestan] in the way of cities (mudun), there are districts (kuwar), among which is al-Ahwaz, and its name [was] Hurmuzshahr. And it is the large district to which the rest of the districts are linked... it is [also] the name of a city.3

Maqdisī, p. 7. In speaking of al-Ahwaz, we have said4 that its mosque has no sanctity (hurmah) for this reason—that the mosque is always filled with sly scoundrels

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1Except where noted, Ištakhrī, Ibn Hawqal, Maqdisī, and Abū al-Fidā all refer to this town as al-Ahwaz, not Suq al-Ahwaz.

2Meaning that Ahwaz was the central administrative district to which the rest of the districts reported. Since the verb used is "yansubu Qilayha," this may also be translated as "from which the other districts take their name," a reference to the fact that the entire region of Khuzestan was often called "al-Ahwaz" (see Ibn Khurdādhbih, al-Masālik, p. 42; Maqdisī, Absān, p. 404; or Mustawfi, Nuzhat al-Qulūb, p. 108).

3Ibn Hawqal, p. 252, adds, "... and now most of it lies in ruins and its people have moved away, and the city of CAskar Mukram has become greater than it in population." This passage is often cited to show that either the region or the city of al-Ahwaz was in ruins by the mid-fourth/tenth century. However, this passage comes from the Paris manuscript of the Surat and, like other passages of the Paris manuscript (as Kramers notes in his introduction to the work, p. vi), may date to the sixth/twelfth century. Since most other fourth/tenth century geographies do not mention the ruin of Ahwaz and supposed rise of CAskar Mukram, the later date for this passage may be appropriate.

4See below, Maqdisī, p. 410.
(al-shuttār), rabble (al-sūqah), and fools (al-juhhal), who rendezvous and assemble there. It is never empty of those who [only] sit by while the people are performing religious obligations. It is the house of beggars (al-shuhhādhīn) and the center of the sinful (al-fāṣiqīn).

p. 51

[Towns that belong to] al-Ahwaz: Nahr Tira, Juzdak, Biruh, Suq al-Arba'ī, Hisn Mahdi, Basiyan, Shurab, Bandam,1 Dawraq, Khan Tawq, Sanah,2 Manadhir al-Sughra.3

p. 406

As for al-Ahwaz, when Sābūr built it in two parts,4 he called one of them by the name of God5 (to Him belongs glory and power!) and the other by his own name, then joined the two with one name and called it Hurmuzd

1Also given as Mandam.

2Also given as Wasnah.

3The reader will notice that Maqdisī often lists the towns that belong to the administrative districts twice, once early in the Ahsan (ca. pp. 51-52) and once in the section on Khuzestan (ca. pp. 402-414), and that these lists often do not correspond exactly to each other. I can only surmise that these two sections were written at different times, and that Maqdisi did not compare the two.

4That is, on either side of the river.

5Although the word Maqdisī used here was "Allah," he of course meant that Sabur called it by the name of his Zoroastrian god, Ahura Mazda.
Arawishir.¹ Then its name was shortened to Darawashir, then the Arabs called it al-Ahwaz. It is a district in which is included what has become ruined and destroyed of the ancient districts. And they are Manadhîr al-Kubra, Nahr Tira, and a village (balad) we traversed passed by [while travelling] on the Rayan River (fī nahr al-rayān).² And I saw a wondrous structure (bināʾan ājīban), and I heard that it was from the Dijlah [the Tigris] to the Khuzistan River.³ Then I said to the gādi of the Khuzi while I was with him in the boat, "What befell it?" He said, "al-Mubarqa⁴ settled there when the Zanj answered his call, for they answered him and then made it as you see." "And," he said, "it was more splendid than al-Basrah. And they say that until today people dig up wealth (amwāl) from it, which they accumulate and turn in for gold and other things."

¹Probably a mis-reading for Hurmuz-Ardashir, which then would make Ardashir (Sābūʾ's father) the founder of this city.

²Although rayān means "well-watered" or "well-irrigated," here it seems to be a proper name, since it is in construct and not used as an adjective.

³The Karun River. The meaning of this sentence is probably that similar ruins could be found all across the desert, to the Dijlah.

⁴Al-Mubarqa was the "Veiled One," the leader of the Zanj rebellion in the third/ninth century.
And those of the cities of al-Ahwaz that I know are Nahr Tira, Manadhir al-Kubra, Manadhir al-Sughra, Juzdak, Bayruh [Biruh?], Suq al-Arba\textsuperscript{c}, Hisn Mahdi, Basiyan, Shurab, Bandam, al-Dawraq,\textsuperscript{1} Wasnah, and Jubba.\textsuperscript{2}

Ahwaz is the ugly, stinking, narrow metropolis of the clime.\textsuperscript{3}

It has no religion, no noble principles,\textsuperscript{a}
No religious jurists, no wise reciters,\textsuperscript{a}
No time when it is pleasant, and no pure heart.\textsuperscript{a}
The stranger becomes sick with confusion there.\textsuperscript{a}
The resident has no comfortable living there.\textsuperscript{a}
[Only] bed-bugs, fleas, and great afflictions.\textsuperscript{a}
Drought by night and by day the heat of the sandstorm.
They never watch to the North,
[Rather] they fear the South.\textsuperscript{4}
[They have] scorpions and vipers and scalding water.\textsuperscript{a}

\textsuperscript{1}Later (Ahsan, p. 52) Maqdisi lists al-Dawraq as having its own dependent cities.

\textsuperscript{2}Later (Ahsan, p. 52) Maqdisi lists Jubba as a dependent city of al-Dawraq.

\textsuperscript{3}This passage (with letters \textit{supra}) is in \textit{saj}\textsuperscript{c}. The letters refer to the rhyme scheme. The lines are arranged in this way to make the poetical nature of this piece easier to see.

\textsuperscript{4}Maqdisi may be trying to imply here a lack of intelligence on the part of the Khuzestanis—-the nomads often raided from the north (from the Zagros Mountains), while their southern flank was somewhat protected by the desert and the Gulf.
Evil, oppression, and misfortune established themselves
    in the wickedness of the metropolis.⁹
Fruits from distant places are sold there.⁹
And flour is imported from afar.⁹
The Sawad is dry,⁹
The mountains austere,⁹
The markets filthy,⁹
And the soil briny.⁹
Their Quran readers have no goodness,⁹
Nor their mosques sanctity.⁹
Their land has no leader,⁹
And their faqih no court.⁹
The people are competitive and fanatic,⁹
With quarrels and inconstancy.⁹
You see the people of the land in two groups,⁹
Representative of two factions,⁹
So that one is the storehouse of al-Basrah,
[The other] the dump of Fars and Isfahan.
In it are good markets,⁹
And clean breads,⁹
And things to eat with bread.
In it are collected silks and brocades,
And wares and goods are brought there.
It is a place of aid and a pleasant sight for traders,⁹
With watering places amply provided for every traveller.¹
And its name is great in the climes and metropolises.¹
Their winter is good,
As is the autumn, except for the flies,⁰
The spring as well, except for the fleas like jackals.⁰
Nevertheless, it is generous with clothes to those without families.⁰

It has two sides, like al-Ramlah,¹ so that the mosque and most of the suqs are on the Farsi side [i.e., the east bank] while the Iraqi side [the west bank] is an island, in back of which is the pier of the river, just as we mentioned in Fustat in Egypt. Between the two [sides] is the bridge Hinduwan, [made] of baked brick (al-ajurr), on which is an excellent mosque that overlooks the river. ²Ağud al-Dawlah destroyed [the bridge] and rebuilt it as a magnificent structure with the mosque added to it. The people insisted on calling it the Hinduwan Bridge. On that river are a number of water-wheels that are turned by water and called "Persian wheels" (al-nawā'īr). Then the water flows

¹Al-Ramlah is a city in Palestine.
in elevated ducts (qanān) to reservoirs in the city and some of it flows to the gardens. The pier (al-cumūd) spreads out along the back of the island within shouting distance of the wondrous Shadurvan,\(^1\) which was built of boulders and through which the water penetrates.\(^2\) And there are water-springs and wondrous things. The Shadurvan holds back the water and divides it into three rivers which spread out to their landed estates (diyā\(^C\)) and irrigate their fields. And they say that if it weren't for the Shadurvan, al-Ahwaz would not have become inhabited. And I did not make use of its rivers.\(^3\)

In the Shadurvan are gates which open if the water increases, so that al-Ahwaz does not become flooded. And you can hear the water falling with a sound that makes sleep impossible most of the year. The river's swelling comes in winter, because the water comes from rain, not from [melting] snow.

The Masruqan River breaks up below the city so that it dries out most of the year, and the water goes underground at a place they call al-Dawraq.

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\(^1\)Here and below Maqdisī obviously means the Hinduwan, since the Shadurvan is the bridge at Tustar.

\(^2\)This refers to the fact that the water runs through its many arches.

\(^3\)Meaning Maqdisī travelled by land in this area.
330

Because of these rivers, al-Ahwaz is pleasant, and boats go and come and ferry just as in Baghdad. The rivers become divided above the city and rejoin below it at a place called Karashinan.\(^1\) And from there you can go by boat to al-Basrah. And they have wondrous mills (ṭawāḥīn) on the water.

p. 412 The Sawad of al-Ahwaz is more populous than Suq al-Arba\(^2\) and what is included in that region.

Abu al-Fida, p. 316. Al-Ahwaz is the chief city of the iqālīm of p. 317 al-Ahwaz, in the third iqālīm. And al-Ahwaz is a district in the districts of Khuzistan. Al-Ahwaz is also called Hurmuz-Shahr, and it is in the largest of the districts of Khuzistan. And it says in al-Lubāb, "and they also call it Suq al-Ahwaz." It says in al-Mushtarik,\(^2\) "and Suq al-Ahwaz is the city of al-Ahwaz and it is Khuzistan and much of it is in ruins." It says in al-Ẓazzī, "and from it to the city of Isfahan is eighty farsangs."

Aidaj

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and also a district]

\(^1\)This might better be read as Khan Shinan.

\(^2\)Kitab Mushtarik wad'an wa al-Mukhtalif saq'an, by Yāqūt, composed in 623/1226 (see Appendix III).
Maqdisī, p. 414. Īdaj is the most splendid city of the district, and its sultan established himself [there].\textsuperscript{1} It is like Asadavadh, [but] in the middle of the mountains. Much snow falls here.\textsuperscript{2} Their drinking water is from a spring in the "Sulayman Gorge," their fields are watered by rainwater, and they have other water. It is plentiful in watermelons and resources, and it is in a valley.\textsuperscript{3}

Basiyan

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]

p. 95 [On the road to Basrah, Basiyan is] ... a city of medium size. A river divides its cultivated area, whereupon it is in two parts.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 312. Ibn Hawqal says, "it is an average city in the middle of which the river divides." And from it to Hisn Mahdi is two days' journey, and one travels

\textsuperscript{1}Presumably meaning that the local ruler had gained some independence in Aidaj by the late fourth/tenth century.

\textsuperscript{2}The Berlin manuscript of the Ahsan inserts here, "which is taken to al-Ahwaz and [other] regions."

\textsuperscript{3}Though the text reads, "wa hiyya fi hūdah," it is probably better read as "wa hiyya fi huwwāh," meaning "it is in a chasm," or in this case, "in a valley."
between the two by way of water—as one does from al-Dawraq to Basiyan—and all this is on the Tustar River [the Karun].

Birdhawn

Išṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]

Basinna

Išṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]

p. 93 And in Basinna are made curtains (al-sutūr) which are transported to the remotest parts of the world. Written on them is "made in Basinna." And in Birdhawn and Kaliwan and other cities are made curtains upon which are written "Basinna," and they are fraudulently sold as curtains of Basinna. But the [true] origin is Basinna.

Maqdisī, p. 408. Basinna is small, yet populous. Its men and its women weave carpets (ammāt) and spin wool. They have a river they call the Dijlah, in which are seven mills

\[1\text{See also below, under "Basinna."} \]
on boats, and they have a fine mosque at the gate of the city from the direction of the river. The river is an arrow's shot from the city and on it are two reinforced forts, between which is where the Ṣād is celebrated.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 313. It says in al-ʿAzīzī, "and from it to al-Sus is seven farsangs."

Bīlād-i Shāpūr

Ibn al-Balkhī, p. 147. Bilad-i Shapur is between Pars [Fars] and Khuzistan. It is a ruined (kharāb) region, and in ancient times it was a harsh, severe (sakht) place, but now it is in ruins. It is a temperate, warm zone, and it has flowing waters.

Bayan

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 88. [It is mentioned as part of the southern boundary of Khuzestān] where the Dijlah meets Bayan.

p. 89  [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]
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p. 95  [It is on the road to Basrah] and it has a minbar, and here you reach the outer limits of Khuzistan. And Bayan is on the Dijlah.

Bayrut

Maqdisī, p. 408. Bayrut is large, and in it are many date palms. They call it "Little Basrah," and they say it was the chief city of a district in the past. I saw it from afar as I was travelling from al-Bidhan [al-Birdhawn] on my way to Basīnna.

Tustar

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as an administrative district (1st tier) and as the name of a city.]
Ištakhī, p. 89. The largest river [of Khuzestan] is the River of Tustar,\(^1\) and this is the river on which Sābūr the King\(^2\) built the Shadurvan\(^3\) at the gate of Tustar, so that its water is raised to the terrain of the city, because Tustar is on a place raised from the [surrounding] land. This river flows from beyond \(^4\)Askar Mukram to al-Ahwaz, where it ends in the River of al-Sidrah\(^4\) [which flows] to Hisn Mahdi and falls into the sea.

Ištakhī, p. 92. As for the special things [of Khuzestan], among them are in Tustar the Shadurvan [sic], which

\(^1\)The Karun River.

\(^2\)By this designation, Ištakhī avoids committing himself to ascribing this work to either Sabur I or Sabur II (see Chapter III).

\(^3\)The famous stone and iron bridge (see Chapter II). Though Ibn Hawqal, p. 250, incorrectly on his map placed the Shadurvan at al-Ahwaz, in his description (p. 252) he correctly placed it at Tustar.

\(^4\)The "Lotus-tree" River? Istakhri may have been making a play on words here, saying "\(\text{yintahī ilā nābī al-sidrah,}\) referring to the sidrat al-muntahā\(^1\), the lotus tree in Seventh Heaven, or "the highest, ultimate goal." It may also refer to a town, though I have found no other mention of a town named Sidrah in Khuzestan.
Şabur built and fortified, and it is among the more wondrous of structures. It reached my ears that its length was almost a mile.\(^1\) It was built of stone completely\(^2\) so that the water returned in it (turāji\(^{c}\) u al-mā' u fihi)\(^3\) and was elevated to the gate of Tustar.

Ištakhrī, p. 92. As for Tustar, in it they make dibāj (brocade), which is transported to the world, and the kiswa of Mecca\(^4\) is made from the dibāj. And in it the Sultan has a tirāz [factory].

Ibn Hawqal, p. 256. In Tustar dibāj is made, which is transported to all the remotest parts of the world. And the kiswa of the Ka'bah for the Bayt al-Ḥaram used to be there, until the Sultan became poor and mercy alighted up on him, whereupon his religious duty ceased for him. And all the rulers of al-Ṣiraq had tirāz [factories].

\(^{1}\)A mile (mīl) equals 4,000 dhirā⁻² (cubits). One dhirā⁻² Baghdādī or dhirā⁻² balādī equals .80 m, and one dhirā⁻² halābī equals .68 m (both measures are used in Iraq). The Shadurvan's length may therefore have been between 2720 and 3200 m.

\(^{2}\)Ibn Hawqal, p. 255: "It was made of stones fitted tightly together and all of it was paved with flagstones."

\(^{3}\)Meaning "so that the water was backed up in it."

\(^{4}\)The kiswa of Mecca is the gold-embroidered curtain hung around the Ka'bah every year.
in Tustar and a representative, who made for him what he desired.

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 95. [on the road to Wasīṭ].

Maqdisī, p. 51. I have not seen any town at all that belonged to Tustar.

Maqdisī, p. 405. As for Tustar, it is a district plentiful in fruits (al-fawākhīh), grapes, and citrons, and most of the fruits (al-thimār) are transported to al-Ahwaz and al-Basrah. After searching, I didn't see one city that belonged to it, and because of this, we offer a plea in its classification, for we mentioned [p. 404]\(^1\) that it varies from our rule, which is that every capital must have cities, just as every leader must have an army. And it is said, "But you disagreed with what was said about Sarakhs." And the reply is, "Sarakhs was not called a district, and this is called a district, and names in this classification belong to the rulers."

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\(^1\)On page 404, Maqdisī said that formerly this whole area was called Ahwaz and its seven districts, but that it shouldn't be referred to as this, since some of the districts were, during his time, in ruins; but that since this is how it is still referred to by the rulers, this is the classification he will follow. So it is with Tustar—even though to Maqdisī it was not really a "district," since it was only one city with no dependencies. But since it still enjoyed this administrative classification, he reported it as this. Cf. his explanation on geographical taxonomy, page 47 of the Aṣān.
There is not in the clime a more pleasant, better, or more splendid [place] than Tustar, around which flows the river, and which is encircled by gardens and date palms. It is a mine [where] everyone is proficient at making brocade (dibāj) and cotton. It brings together contrasts, * excels in countryside, and is famous for its people.\(^1\)

Here, it is said, is a garden where pigs graze. You don't question the fruits and the resources. And truly I found it pleasant and good. You see regular, even markets and many specialties, which are brought to it from the East and the West. And they have cold water that flows under the ground so that most of [the buildings] are agreeable when the heat they have is strong. And their bridge is long and there is no other way\(^2\) than this. Often one gets lost in its strange markets, and on the other side is a small building.\(^3\) Their cemetery

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\(^1\)This line is in saj\(^c\). There was a famous family with the nisbah of al-Shushtarī (see B. M. Add. 23, 534), to which he may be referring here.

\(^2\)Presumably "in and out of the city," or "from one side of the city to the other."

\(^3\)Meaning "on the other side of the river are small buildings"?
is in the middle of the city¹ and their mosque in the middle of the markets in the cloth merchants' (al-bazzāzīn) area. And at the gate of the city is another cloth market, and at the bridge, situated a little ways off from it, are the cloth-fullers (al-qassārūn). And whoever wants to go by boat to al-Askar must walk about a farsang. And it has villages² without minbars. *

The Constantinople manuscript of the Ahsan had an alternate rendition of the above passage (within asterisks):

... contrasts. [In] its gardens are citrons, fine pomegranates, grapes, superior pears, and fresh dates. It is the garden-spot of Khuzistan and [focal-point of trade] with Fars and Khorasan. Its brocades are transported to Egypt and Syria, and its people live in comfort. In the summer it has cold water in qanats under the ground so that most of [the buildings] are agreeable when the heat there is strong. Information about the

¹Not as unusual a phenomenon as it sounds: cemeteries in this part of Iran are often placed on the highest ground, in some places to avoid the raised water table, in others to avoid taking cultivable land out of production. And the highest ground in Tustar was probably the remnants of the Parthian-Sassanian occupation in the middle of the city.

²After "villages" it reads "yā laka min quran," which is probably a copyist's insertion.
The qanats is scarce. The river is around it like a trench, and the bridge from the direction of Jundi-Sabur is long and [made?] of ships. And on that side is a small building. The mosque is in the middle of the city in the cloth merchants area, and at the gate of the city there is also a cloth market. Encircled by the city are splendid villages without minbars.

Ibn al-Balkhi, p. 63. The traces of Shāpūr [ibn Ardashīr] in the building [Cimārat] of the world are many ... in a tradition (bi-rivāyati) they say he built the Shadurvan of Shustar, but the truth of the matter is that Shapur Dhu al-Aktāf built it ... .

And of the traces [of Shāpūr Dhū al-Aktāf] in the building of the world ... are the Shadurvan of Shushtar.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 314. Tustar is in the iqlim of al-Ahwaz, in the third iqlim, and Tustar is generally called Shushtar and

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1Since the sentence says "bihā," the hā could refer either to the qanats or to Tustar itself.

2Meaning probably "on the north side of the city."

3Shapur I.

4Shapur II.
it has a large river by which it is known and Sābūr
the King built in it a great dam, whose capacity is
almost 4,000 cubits, in order to raise the water to the
city to the height of the land. It says in the Lubāb
"and it is a city in the districts of al-Ahwaz in
Khuzistan" (it says) "and in it is the tomb of al-
Barāʿi ibn Malik (may God be pleased with him)." It
says in al-ʿAzīzīf, "and Tustar is in the middle of the
country and from it to Jundi-Sabur is eight farsangs
and there are not in the land of al-Ahwaz [people of]
quality, except in Tustar, for in it its tribes have
[people of] quality."
And it is said that on the
face of the earth there is no city older than
Tustar.

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1 That is, the Nahr-i Tustar, or the Karun River.

2 That is, in the middle of Khuzestān.

3 Meaning, even its nomadic tribes (usually considered
barbarians by Arab historians) have good qualities.

4 Probably a saying Abū al-Fidā should have mentioned
under Sus. This seems to be a classic example of mistaken
identity: Sus is a very old Biblical city, said to have been
built by a grandson of Adam, and it is mentioned in the stories
of Esther and Daniel. Tustar is more recent, dating at least
to Seleucid times (ca. 300 B.C.). See G. LeRider, Suse sous
les Seleucids et les Parthes. Mémoires de la Mission
Archéologique en Iran, Tome XXXVIII (Paris: Paul Geunther,
1965), p. 279. The confusion between the two cities often
arises because of their Persian names: Shush (for al-Sus)
and Shushtar (for Tustar).
Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and district (2nd tier)]. Jubba is a city and broad countryside interwoven with the cultivation of date palms and sugar cane. And from it came Abū Ǧalī al-Jubbāʾī, the Muʿtazilite Imam of his age.

Maqṭūsī, p. 412. Jubba is a vast district (Camal wāsi) with populous villages, rivers, and date palms. Abū Ǧalī, head of the Muʿtazilites, was from it.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 314. Jubba is in the iqīlīm of Khuzistan, in the third iqīlīm, and Jubba is a city with the abundant date palms and sugar cane, and Abū Ǧalī al-Jubbāʾī came from it. It says in the Mushtarik, "Jubba is a district and a town in the limits of Khuzistan," (it says) "and Jubba also is a village in the limits of al-Nahrawan."

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1Iṣṭakhrī (Gotha, p. 54) adds, "and other things."

2Ibn Hawqal, p. 257, adds, "and the leader of the theologians."

3A district in Iraq.
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Jurkhan
جرخان

Abū al-Fidā, p. 311. Jurkhan is in the districts of al-Ahwaz, it says in al-Lubāb, "and it is a village near al-Sus in the districts of al-Ahwaz."

Jundi-Sabur
جندی سابور

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as an administrative district (1st tier) and also the name of a city.]

p. 93 And Jundi-Sabur is a fertile city abounding in good things. And in it are date palms and many crops (zurūʿ) and water. And Yaʿqūb ibn al-Layth the Saffarid took up quarters here because of its fertility and its conjunction of many provisions. He died here, and here is his grave.

p. 96 [It is on the road to Wasit.]


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1Iṣṭakhrī (Gotha, p. 54) reads "and fruits."

2Iṣṭakhrī (Gotha, p. 54) reads "its conjunction of many cities." Iṣṭakhrī (Cairo, p. 65, n. 3) reads "its conjunction of large cities."
Mqdisī, p. 405. As for Jundi-Sabur, it is a district that Sābūr ibn Fāris [sic] caused to be populated and assigned to himself (adāfahā ʿilā nafspīh).¹ It adjoins the borders of al-Jibal and is pleasant (maẓīhah). And it is said that it was the center (markāz) of kings in olden days. Much sugar is refined there. Among its cities are al-Diz,² al-Runash, Bayuh, Qadibin, and al-Lur.

p. 408 Jundi-Sabur was a great, populous, major city and an ancient city, and it was the capital of the clime. Now it is in disorder. Of it the Kurds have taken possession; manifest are corruption and oppression.³ Nevertheless, it is plentiful with sugar, and I heard them say that most of the sugar of Khorasan and al-Jibal are from here. They are people of the Sunnah, and they have two rivers, tīrāz factories, great landed estates p. 409 (diyā⁴) and fields of rice, al-rakhs,⁵ and resources.

And in it are jurists and prosperous people (mayāsīr).

¹Probably both in the sense of "named after himself" and "used for his own."

²Undoubtedly the modern town of Dizful. Al-Runash must be nearby, since at times the Sassanian bridge at Dizful is referred to as Qaṣr (or Qantarah) al-Runash.

³This line is in saj⁵.

⁴Al-rakhs could be a type of soft, supple cloth, or it could be a low-quality grain.
The waters [of Khuzestan] are even, except the water of Jundi-Sabur, which is rough, but wholesome.¹

Ibn al-Balkhī, p. 63. The traces of Shāpur [ibn Ardashīr—Shāpur I] in the building of the world are many, and he built these cities: ... Jundi-Shapur-i Khuzistan, whose original name is Andyushapur, and Andyu is the Pahlavi name of Antakiyah [Antioch], meaning this small town (shahrak) is the Antioch of Shapur. And the Arabs have changed the word for that and write Jundi-Shapur [sic].²

[Bahram ibn Bahram ibn Hurmuz] reigned from there.

[Bahram ibn Bahram ibn Bahram ibn Hurmuz] during his reign was established at Jundi-Sabur.

[Narsī ibn Bahram ibn Bahram ibn Hurmuz] during his reign was established at Jundi-Sabur.

Shāpur Dhū al-Aktāf [Shapur II] was established at Istakhr in Pars and Jundi-Shapur in Khuzistan.

¹This refers to the water of the Siah Mansur, which passes by Jundi-Sabur on the west. It is a seasonal stream in a gravel bank, which makes the flow "rough" but the water clean.

²The Arabs, of course, would not have written it this way, since their alphabet does not contain a "p."
Abū al-Fidā', p. 314. Jundi-Sabur is in the iqlim of al-Ahwaz, p. 315 in the third iqlim, and Jundi-Sabur is an excellent, very productive city in which is the tomb of the king Ya'qūb al-Saffār. It says in the Lubāb 'and Jundi-Sabur is a famous city of Khuzistan.' Ibn Hawqal says 'it is abundant in good things and in it are date palms and many fields and water.' It says in al-ʿAzīzī 'and from it to Tustar is eight farsangs and from Jundi-Sabur to the city of al-Sus is six farsangs.'

Hīṣn Mahdī

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city" (i.e., 3rd tier, no district)].

p. 90 The water of Khuzistan from al-Ahwaz, al-Dawraq, Tustar, and other nearby places, all of it comes together at Hīṣn Mahdī. There it becomes a big river\(^1\) and plentiful and reaches the land, then it ends at the sea.

p. 94. The water of Khuzistan comes together at Hīṣn Mahdī and is connected to the sea. And it widens here so that the rising and ebbing [of the tide]

\(^1\)Ibn Hawqal, p. 253, reads, "there it overflows . . . and reaches the land for one farsang around," meaning that it forms a sort of tidal estuary here.
end at its outermost point, expanding so that it is like the sea.\(^1\)

p. 95 [It is on the road to Basrah] and it has a minbar.

Maqdisī, p. 412. Hisn Mahdi is populous (Cāmirah) and the rivers of the clime (all of them) come together in it, then flow into the Gulf. In it is a fort which Mahdī\(^2\) built. It is a seaport because of its proximity to the Gulf. And there on the bank are hospices (rabātāt) and worshippers at the large mosque. In it the roads come together.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 316. Hisn Mahdi is in the iqlīm of al-Ahwaz, p. 317 in the third iqlīm. Ibn Hawqal says "the water of Khuzistan from al-Ahwaz and al-Dawraq and Tustar and elsewhere where it passes near these places, all of it comes together at Hisn Mahdi and issues forth there a great river, and it broadens out and ends in the sea." It says in al-CAzīzī, "and from Hisn Mahdi to al-Ubullah is eleven farsangs and from al-Ubullah to al-Basrah is four farsangs" (it says) "and from Hisn Mahdi to Suq al-Arba\(^\circ\)a'i is sixteen farsangs."

\(^1\)Ibn Hawqal, p. 257, reads, "And consequently the winds blow violently here and cause suffering and disorder, and it increases to a farsang."

\(^2\)Elsewhere this person has been identified with al-Mahdī, the father of Hārūn al-Rashīd.
Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and district (2nd tier)]. And al-Bunyan borders al-Sardan\(^1\) in the land of Fars and [borders] Isbahan. And its weather is the weather of the cold lands (al-sūrūd). And there is not in Khuzestan any countryside near the cold lands except for al-Bunyan.

Hawmat al-Zutt

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and district (2nd tier)]. Hawmat al-Zutt and al-Khabaran, and the two are one.

And al-Zutt and al-Khabaran, they are two prosperous districts on two neighboring rivers.

Ibn Hawqal, p. 257. And al-Zutt and al-Jayizan are two neighboring districts with plentiful revenues.

\(^{1}\)al-Sardan, the proper name of the western area of Fars, probably comes from the Persian word for cold (sard), which was then made plural (+ān). The word then seems to have passed into Arabic, but with a sad, as in the second use.

\(^{2}\)De Goeje (in notes to Istakhri, p. 89) said two manuscripts gave it without dots and others as Jayiran (the same as Jurkhan?). Istakhri (Gotha, p. 51) reads, "al-Jabaran." Ibn Hawqal, p. 252, reads "al-Jayizan."
Abū al-Fidā, p. 312. Ibn Hawqal says, "it is a prosperous, very hot village." It says in al-ʿAzīzī, "and from Rustaq al-Zut [i.e., Hawmat al-Zutt] to the city of Arrajan is twelve farsangs."

al-Khabaran

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and district (2nd tier)]. Hawmat al-Zutt and al-Khabaran, and the two are one.

Khan Mardawayh

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 95. [It is mentioned as a caravanserai for travellers on the road to Basrah between al-Dawraq and Basiyan.]¹

Dastwa

Abū al-Fidā, p. 312. Dastwa is also a village in the land of ah-Ahwaz.

¹Ibn Hawqal, p. 258, calls it Khan Mardawayh.
Iṣṭakhrī, p. 95. [It is a large city on the road to Basrah.]

Ibn Hawqal, p. 258. [It is a populous city on the road to Basrah.]

Maqdisī, p. 52. [Towns that belong to] al-Dawraq: Azam, Jubba, Miraqiyan, Mirathiyan.

p. 406 As for al-Dawraq, it is a district that borders al-CIraq at the corner (Calā al-qurnah). Among its cities are Azar, Ajam, Bakhsabadh, al-Diz, Andībar, Miraqiyan, Mirathiyan.

p. 412 Al-Dawraq is a populous capital city (qaṣābah) on the river at the farthest point from al-CIraq. It has a wide countryside (rustaq), a large suq, specialties, and well-located resources. It is a source of tent-cloth (al-khaysh). It is smaller than al-Sus and its suq has diverse parts (mutashaʿib). Its mosque is on its outskirts. Their drinking water is from the river. The Hajj pilgrims of Fars and Kirman proceed straight for it.

1See also "Surraq."
Abū al-Fidā, p. 316. Al-Dawraq is in the iqīm of al-Ahwaz, in the third iqīm. It says in the Mushtarik, "and al-Dawraq is a city in the boundaries of Khuzistan."

Ibn Hawqal says, "and it is a large city." It says in al-ʿAzīzī, "and from the city of al-Dawraq to the city of Basiyan is ten farsangs," (it says) "and from the city of al-Dawraq to Arrajan is eighteen farsangs."

Dirā
دیراء

Ibn Hawqal, p. 251. [It is mentioned as a town in Khuzestan, near Asak.]

Ram Hurmuz
رام هرمز

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as an administrative district (1st tier) and also the name of a city.]

p. 93 And in Ram Hurmuz are clothes of silk (abrīsam), which are transported to many places. And it is said that Mānī was killed and crucified in [Ram Hurmuz] and it is said that he departed life in a prison of

1See also Zaydan.

2Mānī was the Zoroastrian prophet who found favor with Shapur I.
Bahram, who cut off his head and made a public demonstration of his killing.\(^2\)

p. 95 [It is on the road to Wasit.]

Maqdisi, p. 52. Towns that belong to Ram Hurmuz: Sanbil, Idhaj (Aidaj), Tiram, Bazank,\(^3\) Ladh, Gharwah, Bafaj, Kuzuk.

Maqdisi, p. 407. As for Ram Hurmuz, it is a pleasant, prosperous district that borders Fars. The mountains have many date palms, olives, and grain \((al\)-hubūb\). It was not its fortune to have level ground, except an insignificant amount, and there are no fields for sugar cane in it. The rivers of the clime do not reach it, and they have one isolated river. Among its cities are Sanbil, Idhaj (Aidaj), Tiram, Bazank, Ladh, Gharwah (or Ghuruh ?), Babaj, Kuzuk, Kalluhanna, Jalilat, Jabaliyat.

p. 413 Ram Hurmuz is a great capital city \((qasabah)\) in

\(^1\)Although it is generally accepted that Mānī was killed by Bahram I (ca. A.D. 272), a different method is usually cited: it is reported that Bahram I had Mani flayed alive, then had his skin stuffed with straw and displayed on the gates at Jundi-Sabur (See G. Rawlinson, The Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy, vol. 1 (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1875), pp. 103-104; or Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. "Mani" or "Gondeshapur" (Jundi-Sabur)).

\(^2\)Iṣṭakhrī (Gotha, p. 54) added, "... and among the cities of Khuzistan, Ram Hurmuz also combines in it date palms, walnuts, and dates, and no other place has such citrons."

\(^3\)Also given (p. 52) as Badhank.
which are prosperous markets, many resources, and a magnificent mosque. It has markets of extraordinary goodness, built by Ṭādur al-Dawlah. I have not seen more wonderful [markets] than these in cleanliness and beauty. They are embellished, colorful,1 tiled, and shaded, and set in them are little alleyways that are closed every night. The cloth merchants, perfume-sellers, and the reed-mat makers (al-hassārūn) live there. And in the cloth market are beautiful fulled cloths (qayāsīr). Their drinking water is from a river, wells, the river [sic], and rainwater.2 Date palms and gardens surround it, and it has a library (dār kutub) like that of al-Basrah. Ibn Sawwār occupied both of these libraries, and each of the two has a fee for whoever intends to use them and needs a reader or copies. But the magazine of al-Basrah is larger and more thriving and has a greater number of books—and this one (the library in Basrah) never has a shaykh who studies Muʿtazilite doctrine in it!3 They celebrate

1Reading burqishat here, instead of burrugat as in the Ahsan.
2The Ahsan has bil-nuwab, meaning nuwab al-matār (periods of rain).
the CId on the outskirts of the village, between the buildings. It is a valuable village, except that on summer nights they need netting because of the multitude of insects (al-buqq).

Its outskirts have been reduced, and the Sultan seized its estates (diyaC). I came to see its chief, p. 414 Abū al-Hasan ibn Zakarīya', who had resided in Palestine for a long time. And he said, "I regretted leaving that area and my return to a land where I saw nothing that pleased my eye." And when he was there, he pleaded and sought to be given an amount of sustenance from his estate that had been taken from him, but he was not given anything.

The roads there are difficult, and the Arabs surround it. And you see spoiled natures and uncivilized leaders.1 The water [of this clime] does not freeze (lā yatajallīdu), except in the Sawad of Ram Hurmuz.

Ibn al-Balkhī, p. 64. Of the time Hurmuz ibn Shāpūr ibn Ardashīr lived, many good traces can be found and [above] all his works is Ram Hurmuz in Khuzistan.

Abu al-Fida', p. 318. Ram Hurmuz is in the iqīm of al-Ahwaz, p. 319 in the third iqīm. It says in the Lubāb, "Ram Hurmuz is one of the districts of al-Ahwaz in the land of

1The underlined sentence is in sajC.
Khuzistan." And it is said that Sulaymān al-Fārisī (may God be pleased with him) was from it, and a group of distinguished men\(^1\) trace their name to it. And it says in ʿal-ʿAzīzī, "and between it and Suq al-Ahwaz is nineteen farsangs, and from Ram Hormuz to Rustaq al-Zutt is seven farsangs."

Rishahr

Ibn al-Balkhī, p. 149. Rishahr is a small city (shahrakī) beside the sea, near the fort of Amīr Farāmarz ibn Ḥidāb. Its weather is of the warm zone type, to the extent that people there, in the summer especially (because of the dryness) take ballūt.\(^2\) If they don't, they become sick from the intensity that thirst and heat make there. And their shirts on their bodies increase and become long. And because of the putrefication of the air and the unwholesomeness of the water, no people except those of that province (vilāyat) can be there in summer, except in Diz Kilat and other forts that belong to Amīr Faramarz and are there. And from there comes nothing but goods of the sea that they bring from ships, and fish, dates

\(^1\)Again, a reference to the Ram Hormuzi family.

\(^2\)Ballūt is germander, a diuretic herb.
and Rishahri linen (*kattān*). The people there engage in much sea trade, and the dervishes are not strong or meddlesome, rather they are humble. *It is on the border between Arrajan and Khuzistan and its people are peaceful and keep to themselves and [have experienced] the bruises of fate and successive oppressions. And some of the region is more habitable than the city.*¹ It has many regions and a mosque and a minbar.

Abū al-Fīḍa, p. 313. It is a village in the *iqlīm* of Khuzistan.

Zaydan

Zaydan

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 95. [It is a village on the road to Basrah, between Asak and al-Dawraq.]²

Surraq

Surraq

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as an administrative district (1st tier)] whose city is al-Dawraq,³ and it is known

¹Only of one of the two manuscripts of the *Fārsnāmah* has this passage between the asterisks.

²This village is called Dira in Ibn Hawqal, p. 258.

³Ibn al-Athīr (al-Kāmil, IX, p. 572) implied that both Surraq and Dawraq were cities when he wrote that a group of Kurds and Arabs "met between Surraq and Dawraq."
as Dawraq al-Fars.

Sulaymanan
صلی امان

Iṣṭakhri, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]

al-Sus
السوس

Iṣṭakhri, p. 89. [It is mentioned as an administrative district (1st tier) and also as the name of a city.]

It reached my ears that they have in al-Sus (and God knows best) a sarcophagus, which existed in the days of Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī. They say that in it is the great Daniel the prophet (peace be upon him). And People of the Book used to circulate around it in their meetings and ask blessings from it and prayed to it for rain if they were suffering from a drought. Abū Mūsā took it and went to the river at the gate of al-Sus. He divided [the river], making a bay, and

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2Since al-Sus was the city of Esther and home to a large Jewish community, I assume Iṣṭakhri is referring to Jews here. Nearby towns such as Jundi-Sabur and Ivan-i Karkhah did have important Christian populations, however, so that the reference may refer to them.
put in it three graves lined with baked brick, and in one of the graves he buried the sarcophagus. He secured each one, then released the water so that the large increase in the river overcame the surface of these graves and the river flowed over them, to this very day. And he who descends to the bottom of the water shall find these graves.

p. 93 As for al-Sus, silk (al-khazūz)\(^2\) is made in it, and it is transported to the remotest parts of the world (al-āfāq). And in al-Sus a kind of citron is a tasty melon [shaped] like a foot and its toes.\(^3\) I have never seen the like of it in the citron lands.

p. 93 In al-Sus the Sultan has a tirāz factory.

p. 96 [It is on the road to Wasit.]


p. 405 As for al-Sus, it is a district from the borders of al-\(^3\)Iraq to the borders of al-Jibal, in which are

\(^1\)Ibn Hawqal, p. 255, substituted, "the great amount of wet earth covered the surface of these graves . . . ."

\(^2\)Ibn Hawqal, p. 256, has "heavy silk."

\(^3\)Ibn Hawqal, p. 256, reads, " . . . and except in Egypt, there is no thing so rare."

\(^4\)Elsewhere given as Birdhawn.
fields (mazāri) of rice and sugar cane, which they refine into much sugar. Among its cities are Basinna, Mattuth, Bayrut, al-Bidhan, Qaryat al-Raml, Karkhah.

Al-Sus is a good, populous major city (qasabah). And they\(^1\) have in good things means of sustenance (raqabah). In [al-Sus] are splendid markets, good breads, and flowing water that revolves around the milling places. It has excellent baths, inexpensive sweetmeats, clean landed estates (diya), many livestock (na\(\text{C}am\)), good arable land (sawâd), and marvelous sugar cane; and learning, the Quran, hadith, literature, the Sunnah, and community; and a mosque which is well-proportioned with round columns, but its people are Hanbalites.

And in the summer it is not good. Then you see houses of fornication appearing at the gates of the mosque--then you don't see esteem for their readers nor for their shaykhs, nor stature for their reciters (mudhakkarin), nor responsibility. They trifle away their time with dancing, and the majority of them are friendly. The city is in ruins and the people live in the outskirts (al-rabadh). It was invulnerable on remarkably high ground, until the armies of \(\text{C}Umar\) completely destroyed and razed it.

\(^1\)"Lahum," the hum presumably referring to the inhabitants of al-Sus.
The grave of Daniel is in the river behind the
city, and on the bank of the river opposite the grave
is a fine mosque. The grave is not apparent, rather
it is submerged in the water, and it has a lock of
Daniel's] hair.

The weather of al-Sus is unhealthful, in the same
measure [of that] of the vicinity of the Dijlah in
Baghdad, but that is healthier.

Ibn al-Balkhī, p. 72. [Ibn al-Balkhi attributes the (re-)building of al-Sus (here "Shush") to Shāpūr Dhū
al-Aktāf.]

Abū al-Fidā, p. 314. It is in the ḵūṭ of Khuzistan and in
Rasm al-Māʾmūrī [it says] in Fars. [It is] in the
third ḵūṭ. And al-Sus is a city of Khuzistan, and
it has gardens (bāsātīn) and in them are citrons
(turanj) like al-asābī. And in al-Mushtarik it
says, "it is an old village in Khuzistan in which is
the tomb of Danyal the prophet," (it says) "and al-Sus
also is the name of al-Aqsa, a village of the Maghrib,

1 Yaʿqūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī's Rasm al-Māʾmūrī min al-Ard, written before 260/874. The Rasm al-Māʾmūr may have been taken
from Ptolemy's Geography (see Appendix III).

2 Like "fingers," as Ḩalīlī, p. 93, mentioned.
and al-Sus also is a village in al-Afriqiyya and that is al-Sus al-Adna, and between it and al-Sus al-Aqsa is a trip of three months." They also say "al-Susah" with ta marbutah.¹

Suq al- Arbā'Ca
سوق الأرباء

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]

Maqdisī, p. 412. Suq al-Arba'Ca is on a branch of this river [the Karun] with two sides. Between them is a bridge made of wood, under which ships pass. The ČIraqi side [the west bank] is more populous and has the mosque.

Abū al-Fidā', p. 312. It is in the land of al-Ahwaz. It says in al-Mushtarak, "Suq al-Arba'Ca is a village within the borders of Khuzistan." From Suq al-Arba'Ca to ČAskar Mukram is six farsangs.

¹Mustawfī (in the Nuzhat al-Qulūb, p. 74) referred to al-Sus as "ČArūj" (or "ČArūh") and "Jabalīq." But these two names correspond to a Sassanian site called Susan, in the mountains north of Aida (see Figure II.1). Since Susan is also believed by its populace to contain the tomb of Daniel, it is easy to see how the confusion arose. Later scholars also missed this distinction, cf. G. Rawlinson, in the Journal of the Royal Geographic Society, 1939, ix, pp. 83-88.
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Suq Sanbil
سوق سنبيل

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and a district (2nd tier).]

p. 94 As for Sanbil, it is a district that borders Fars, and it was joined to Fars from the days of Muḥammad ibn Wāṣil to the last days of al-Sijziyah, then it converted to Khuzistan.

p. 95 [It is on the road to Wasit.]

Abū al-Fidā, p. 312. It is of this land [of al-Ahwaz]. Ibn Hawqal says, "it is an unhealthy village that belongs to Fars." It says in al-ʿAzīzī, "between it and Arrajan is four farsangs."

al-Saymarah
الصمرة

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 88. [It is mentioned as part of the northern border of Khuzestan.]

Abū al-Fidā, p. 311. [It is mentioned (as al-Saymar) as being included in the northern boundaries of Khuzestan.]
Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and a district (2nd tier).]

p. 94 And in al-Tib they make trouser cords (tikak) that resemble the Armenian. Scarcely do they make in any place in Islam after al-Arminiyah better than this, to my knowledge.

p. 96 [It is on the road to Wasit] and here you meet the district of Wasit.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 314. It is in the iqīm of Khuzistan, in the p. 315 third iqīm. It says in al-Mushtarik, "and Tib is a town (baldah) between Wasit and al-Ahwaz," (it says) "and in it are wondrous things (cājē'ib)" but it doesn't mention what they are. And it says in

1Ibn Hawqal, p. 257, adds, "or more splendid."

2Iṣṭakhrī (Gotha, p. 55) adds, "except what they relate about Tus, where they make them better than the ones made in al-Tib."

3Ibn Hawqal, p. 257, adds, "And though what was used in Sijilmasah was of its kind, it did not reach its value, nor approximate it, nor come close to it in excellence. And al-Tib is pleasant (tayyibah), average city in which are made robes (al-aksiyāh) and clothes of camel's hair (al-barrakānāt)." By using the work "tayyibah" to describe al-Tib, Ibn Hawqal is indulging in a pun. And since "barak" in Persian means a woven cloth of camel's hair, I assume that is Ibn Hawqal's meaning here. Serjeant, Islamic Textiles, p. 36, says barrakānāt are "black mantles."
al-Lubāb, "and al-Tib is a town between Wasit and the districts (kuwar) of al-Ahwaz," and nothing is added to that.

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 88. [It is mentioned as a part of the southern border of Khuzestan.]

Maqdisī, p. 53. [Maqdisi lists Ābbadan as one of the cities belonging to Basrah.]

p. 412 Among the people there are those who put Ābbadan in this [Khuzestan] district, but rather it is of al-Irāq.

Nāṣir-i Khusraw, p. 161. And Ābbadan is situated on the bank of the sea (dārva) like an island,¹ [around] which the river (shatt) becomes two branches, so that one cannot go to Ābbadan from any side except by passing over water. And the southern edge of Ābbadan itself is the surrounding sea, whose water reaches to the walls of Ābbadan when the tide is in, and when the tide is out,

¹This is one of the few geographies to depict Ābbadan as an island (cf. Adams, Heartland, p. 15). Most other geographers (e.g., Ibn Hawqal, Iṣṭakhrī) do not depict Ābbadan as an island, rather they show it as a port on the sea.
the water is less than two farsangs away. And a group [of his travelling companions] bought reed mats (hası̂r) from CAbbadan, and [another] group bought edible things. The next day, early in the morning, they sailed a ship on the sea and we set out from the north side and went ten farsangs. Here they drank the sea water, and it was pleasant. ¹

CAskar Mukram

Işı̂khrî, p. 89. [It is mentioned as an administrative district (1st tier) and also the name of a city.]

p. 89 In the region of Tustar flows the Masruqan River until it leads to CAskar Mukram² below al-Ahwaz.³ Its end is at al-Ahwaz: it does not go beyond it. And when it leads to CAskar Mukram there is on it a large bridge that is like twenty ships⁴ and great ships pass

¹This probably connotes that the water was not brackish or salty.

²Ibn Hawqal, p. 252, adds, "and it breaks [CAskar Mukram] in two." I.e., the river flows through the city.

³"Below" here refers to the direction on his map, corresponding to "north."

⁴I.e., the length of twenty ships.
under it.\textsuperscript{1} And I myself rode on the river from Askar Mukram to al-Ahwaz and the distance was eight farsangs.\textsuperscript{2} We travelled by water six farsangs, then we left [the water] and travelled in the middle of the river. The rest of this river to al-Ahwaz is a dry road.\textsuperscript{3} And not a bit of this water is squandered; rather, fields of sugar cane are watered by it, as well as many times more than that of date palms and seed crops. And there is not in all of Khuzistan, or in the whole of its inhabited places, an area more cultivated or more abundant than [the area near] the Masruqan.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[1] Ibn Hawqal, p. 253, inserts here, "and on the Masruqan River in the middle of Askar Mukram there is an excellent bridge, reinforced with gypsum and baked brick, and very broad. And on this bridge are a suq, shops, and a pristine, excellent mosque." Kramers (in his introduction to the \textit{Surat}, p. vi, notes that this was added by a sixth/twelfth century hand, and it may be a confusion with the more famous Shadurvan Bridge at Tustar.
\item[2] Ibn Hawqal, p. 253, says "ten farsangs."
\item[3] Ibn Hawqal, p. 253, inserts here, "this is because at the end of the month, when the moon is at its least part, there is a decrease in water from the fullness of the river, by the ebb and flow, which decrease and increase by the increments of the moon." While the tides may in fact have been partly responsible for this dry bed, they are not the only (or perhaps even the main) reason: many streams in Khuzestan today (e.g., the Ouj-i Rud and the Siah Mansur) simply die out downstream during the dry season (April-October), when it is possible to walk for miles in their gravel beds.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
called al-ṭinn. And they say that if one eats that soil and then drinks water from the Masruqan, the heat will not overcome him.

p. 91
And most of what is in [Khuzestan] of sugar is by the Masruqan, and all² of it lies in ⁴Askar Mukram. And there is not much sugar in the canes at ⁴Askar Mukram, and it is that way in Tustar and al-Sus. While in other places sugar and reeds are made from [the cane], [in ⁴Askar Mukram] it is for food without making sugar from it.³

p. 92
In ⁴Askar Mukram they have a type of scorpion, as slight as the petal of the Silphium plant (al-'anjudhān), which they call al-jārārah, and from whose sting one seldom escapes.⁴ It is more deadly than most snakes.

¹"Edible earth" was actually a luxury commodity in medieval Islam. Bosworth (The Ghaznavids, p. 153), for example, lists it as an important export of Khorasan. It may have resembled truffles, and may have even have been something of a carry-over from former Zoroastrian beliefs in the power of the four elements (earth, fire, air, and water).

²Ibn Hawqal, p. 254, adds, "and most of it lies in ⁴Askar Mukram, and there is not much sugar in the canes at al-⁴Askar, and not at Tustar, and most of it at al-Sus and in the rest of the places is taken for food from the canes, which meets and goes beyond their needs."

³I.e., this sugar is not refined--the people simply chew the stalks.

⁴Ibn Hawqal, p. 256, adds, ". . . once it has wounded. It is more deadly than some deadly vipers, and it accomplishes [its purpose] through venom."
p. 95  .  .  .  [It is on the road to Wasit.]

p. 96  And from al-Askar to Wasit there is a shorter road than [the one previously mentioned], and it does not enter Tustar.

Maqdisī, p. 51. [Towns that belong to] al-Askar: Jubak, Zaydan, Suq al-Thalatha', Hubak, Dhu Qurtum.

p. 405  As for al-Askar, it is an important district which is divided and enclosed by three rivers and in which is the countryside (rustaq) of al-Mashruqan [sic]. Among the cities belonging to it are Jubak,1 Zaydan,2 Suq al-Thalatha', Hubak, Dhu Qurtum, Birjan,3 and Khan4 Tawq. Al-Askar's market day is Friday, and then there is a market each day in the city with the name of that day.5

1Also given as Junak and Khunak.

2Also given as Zandan and Randan. The editor mentions that in the map of al-Maqdisī (which was not included in the published edition) there is a town between Dawraq and Asak called Diwa or Dira (as there is on Ibn Hawqal's map, Figure 25).

3Also given as Yirjan and without points. Qudama, Kitāb al-Kharaj, p. 226, mentions al-Birjan as being either the last station (on the trade route) in the districts of al-Ahwaz or the first station in Arrajan.

4Also given as Khawr.

5Meaning Suq al-ArbaCa (a nearby town) has a market day on Wednesday, Suq al-Thalatha' has one on Tuesday, etc.
Al-Askar: Al-Hajjāj ibn Yūsif had a slave whose name was Mukram, who led his army to this place and found it agreeable to him. He gathered the people around it and it became populated and was called Askar Mukram. One doesn't see among the Persians any place cleaner than this chief city. Its good results are [seen in] the magnificence of the markets, the multitude of resources, the cheapness of sweetmeats, and the goodness of the breads. They have many specialties and stores. They have discerning, judicious people, most of whom are ulamā', whom you see studying in the mosque till the early morning. However, they have made themselves hateful to the people by their scholastic theology, and they diverge from the rest of Islam in Mu'tazilism, so that the reciters (mudhakkirūn) and the common people criticize them. And in it is an illness whose medicine is sins—like a lie that kills by poison—for the deviant [from Islam] has no place in it.¹

I entered it at the morning prayer and left it at the prayer at sunset. It has two sides, the more populous of the two borders al-'Iraq. In it is a mosque and most of the markets, and between the two sides are

¹This underlined passage is a rhetorical diatribe, written in saj, against the Mu'tazilite views that were strong in this area (see under "Jubba" and "Ram Hurnuz").
two bridges [made] of ships. The rest of the cities are on the rivers and in them are many čirāz factories, especially in al-Mashruqan [sic] (and you are not advised what al-Mashruqan is).\(^1\) It is more fitting that Khan Tawq be among the cities of al-Ahwaz.\(^2\)

Abū al-Fidā, p. 316. It is in the iqālām of al-Ahwaz, in the p. 317 third iqālām. From all al-ČAzīzī, "and ČAskar Mukram is a new city, and it was a village where Makram ibn al-Fuzr, one of the Banī Jučūnah, quartered his soldiers. It was there that Khurdādh ibn Bārs executed al-Hajjāj ibn Yusif al-Thaqafī for heresy. Makram alighted in the aforementioned village and stayed there awhile and caused buildings to be built there, then increased [the number of] buildings in it, and it was called ČAskar Mukram. And in ČAskar Mukram are the famous small, lethal scorpions. It says in al-ČAzīzī, "and from ČAskar Mukram to Tustar is eight farsangs, and there is not in al-Ahwaz a new city except ČAskar Mukram." And from ČAskar Mukram to Suq al-ArbaČa'i is six farsangs.

\(^1\)This is obviously a copyist's note that mistakenly made its way into the text.

\(^2\)Khan Tawq is listed as one of ČAskar Mukram's cities above.
Maqdisī, p. 414. And Ghuruh is among the aforementioned [towns] of the district, as we mentioned.\footnote{1}

\textbf{Qurqub}

\textbf{Iṣṭakhrī}, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]

p. 93 And in Qurqub [they make] al-Susanjird,\footnote{2} which they transport to the remotest parts of the world. And in it and in al-Sus the Sultan has tīrāz factories.

p. 96 [It is on the road to Wasit.]

Abū al-Fīdā, p. 314. It is in the iqlīm of al-Ahwaz and, it is said, in [the iqlīm of] al-\textsuperscript{C}Iraq, in the third iqlīm. And Qurqub is a famous city. And it says in al-Lubāb, "and Qurqub is a city near al-Tib and between Wasit and the districts of al-Ahwaz." And it says in al-\textsuperscript{C}Azīzī, "and from Qurqub to the city of al-Tib it is seven farsangs and it is ten farsangs from Qurqub to the city of al-Sus."

\footnote{1}See under "Ram Hurmuz" (this Appendix), Maqdisī, pp. 52 and 407.

\footnote{2}Although Susan[\textsuperscript{g}]ir should be the name of a modern town in this area, the reference here is to a type of cloth.
Iṣṭakhrī, p. 88. [It is mentioned as part of the northern border of Khuzestan.]

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]

Maqdisī, p. 408. Karkhāh is a small, pleasant, populous city, whose market day is Sunday. They drink from the river, and on it is a fortress. The city has many gardens.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 311. [It is mentioned as being included in the northern borders of Khuzestan.]

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and a district (2nd tier).]

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1Iṣṭakhrī refers to this city as "Karkha," and alternate readings are given (p. 88): al-Karhāh, al-Karj, Karkhāh, Karjāh, al-Karkhāh, and Karkh.

2This undoubtedly refers to the Sassanian walled city of Ivan-i Karkhāh, some of whose fortifications were still over several meters high in recent times.

3See also under "Basinna."
Maqdisī, p. 414. Kuzuk is also montane. The grape is not discontinued there, and it is plentiful with violets, and the sweet basil (*al-rihan*) is good.

Ladh

Maqdisī, p. 414. And Ladh is a montane [village] also.

*Iṣṭakhrī*, p. 88. [It is mentioned as part of the northern border of Khuzestan.]

p. 88 And they say that al-Lur was in Khuzistan, and then was transferred to [the administrative jurisdiction] of al-Jibal.

p. 94 Al-Lur is a land which the climate of the mountains

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¹Maqdisī refers here to the previous city he discussed, Idaj (*Aidaja*).

²This probably means that they continued to grow grapes for wine in this area.

³As was Ghuruh, the previous village Maqdisī mentioned in this passage.

⁴Ibn Hawqāl, p. 249, adds, "and its districts."
has made fruitful, for the most part. And it was in Khuzistan, except when it was assigned to the districts of the mountains (al-jabal).¹

Maqdisī, p. 409. Al-Lur is on the borders of al-Jibal, and it is said that it is adjoined to this clime [Khuzestan] from it [al-Jibal]. In it are many tirāz factories, but its sugar is not good quality.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 312. And it is a fruitful land² and most of it is mountains. It is contiguous with Khuzistan, but separate from it. Ibn Hawqal says, "most of the land of the Lur is mountains and it is older than Khuzistan."
The Lur Mountains are between Tustar and Isfahan, and this mountain range stretches on in length for about six days' [journey]. And in it is a great [number] of Kurds³ and (in it) they have [their own] kings. In the Rustāq-i Khūzistān it says, "and in my opinion, the

¹Ibn Hawqal, p. 257, and Iṣṭakhrī (Cairo, p. 65) both read, "the districts of Jibal." Ibn Hawqal also adds (p. 257), "And it has desert (bādiyāh), clime (iqālim), and countrysides (rasāṭlāq), over most of which are the Kurds. And in its nearby areas it is fertile, and in the adjacent areas it is cool."

²Abū al-Fidā refers to this area as "Bilad al-Lur."

³The word "al-Akrād" is often used in medieval times not to designate the ethnic Kurds, but non-specifically as a synonym for nomads.
mountain area in which it lies is called Luristan, whence [came] Ammar ibn Muhammad al-Luri who related the story of "al-Jawzah wa al-Mawzah" and the series on "al-Tabassum wa al-Dahk."

Mattuth

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a "famous, well-known city," i.e., 3rd tier, no district.]

Abū al-Fidā, p. 313. It is [one] of the famous cities of Khuzistan. It says in al-Lubāb, "it is between Qurqub and al-Ahwaz." It says in al-ĆAzīzī, "between Mattuth and al-Sus it is nine farsangs."

Manadhīr al-Sughra

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and a district (2nd tier).]

Manadhīr al-Kubra.

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and a district (2nd tier).]

p. 95 As for Manadhīr al-Kubra and Manadhīr al-Sughra,
they are two districts cultivated with date palms and crops, and they have great revenues.

Mihruban

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 88. And between the borders of al-Fars and the borders of Isfahan is the River Tab, and it is the border until Mihruban.¹ Then the border proceeds between al-Dawraq and Mihruban on the ground² until the sea.

Nāšir-i Khusraw, p. 163. Mihruban is a large city, situated on the edge of the sea, on the east side, and it has a large bazaar and a good mosque. But its water comes from rain—other than rain water, it has no wells or qanats (karizī) to give it sweet water.³ They have pools (hawdha) and tanks (äbgīrhā) so that they are never in danger of lacking water.

They have built there three large caravanserais, each one of which is like a fortress, fortified and [walled] high. I saw written over the minbar in the Friday mosque the name of Ya'aqub-i Layth, [so] I asked

¹A variant reading of Mihruban is given (in the notes to the text, on p. 88) of "Mahi Ruyan," or "fish growing" in Persian. One wonders if this name has an economic basis.

²That is, the border here is a land border, not the river.

³As opposed to salt water.
one of them, "Why is that?" He said, "Until Ya\textsuperscript{c}qūb-i Layth conquered this city, and afterward, no amir ruled Khurasan with such power."\textsuperscript{1}

And on the day I arrived there, this city fell into the hands of the sons of Abu Kalinjar, who was the ruler (mālik) of Pars. They took all the foodstuffs (khwārbar)—meaning everything there was to eat (ma'kūl) in this town—from towns and provinces, so that nothing remained there but fish . . . .

I stayed in the city of Mihruban because, as I said, the roads were unsafe because of the fighting and the hostilities between the sons of Abū Kālinjār. Every person suffered, and every estate was disturbed. They said there was a great, learned man in Arraghan [Arrajan], whom they called Shaykh Sādīd Muḥammad ibn Abd al-Mālik. When I heard these words I was so wearied of staying in that city that I wrote him a letter and told him of my plight and beseeched him to take me from this city to a safe place.

The third day after I had sent the letter, I saw thirty men on foot, all with armor. They approached me and said, "The Shaykh sent us, to go to Arraghan in your service." And they courageously took us to Arraghan.

\textsuperscript{1}I assume that Khorasan is invoked here to show the extent of Ya\textsuperscript{c}qūb's power.
Ibn al-Balkhī, p. 150. Mihruban and its region: Mihruban is a city (shahrī) beside the sea, such that waves of the sea hit the side of the city. Its weather is warm, putreficacious, and unwholesome—worse than that of Rishahr. But there is a sea lane and whoever goes from Pars to Khuzistan [goes] by sea, and he who goes from Basrah or Khuzistan by sea, for all of them the path is here. And the ships that come from the sea to go to these districts (āqāmāl) come from Mihruban, where more than ships enter.¹

And it has no fruit except dates, and its sheep are more plentiful than its goats. They breed kids such that they say in Basrah a kid reached 80 to 100 ratl² and more. There is so much flax and linen that it grows everyplace. It has a mosque and minbar, and the people there are humble.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 316. It is in the iqlim of Khuzistan and, it is p. 317 said, in the iqlim of Fars, in the third iqlim. Mihruban is a small city and it is a port for Arrajan and the area it rules. After Mihruban, the sea goes to the east to Shiniz. Ibn Hawqal counts it among the towns of Fars,

¹That is, traffic enters by land as well.

²A ratl is a weight ranging from ca. 450 grams in Egypt to 3.2 kilograms in Syria.
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and similarly Ibn Sā'īd in al-ʿAzīzī says, "and the city of Mihruban is on the sea."

Mirathiyan
میراثیان

Maqdisī, p. 412. Mirathiyan has two sides and prosperous markets. Each side has a mosque.

Miraqiyan
میراکیان

Maqdisī, p. 412. Miraqiyan has a wide countryside along the river, to which the ebb and flow [ocean tides] reach. In it are many villages and precious handicrafts.

Nahr Tira
نهر تیرا

Iṣṭakhrī, p. 89. [It is mentioned as a city and a district (2nd tier).]

p. 93 And in Nahr Tira are clothes that resemble the clothes of Baghdad, and they transport them to Baghdad and sell them fraudulently as Baghdadi, and this

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1The Constantinople manuscript of the Aḥsan reads "al-Basiyan" here.

2Amirah is usually translated in this Appendix as "populous," but here it is probably better read as "prosperous."
[practice] is curtailed in Baghdad.

Abū al-Fidā, p. 3176. It is in the limits of the ilām of al-Ahwaz, in the third ilām. In al-Mustārīk it says, "Nahr Tira is a village in the limits of al-Ahwaz." It has a mention in al-Futūh and in Akhbār al-Khawārij. Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Nahr Tīrī, who died in 289 [902], gave it its name. Ibn Hawqal says, "Baghdadhi clothes are made in it and taken to Baghdad, then are sold fraudulently as true Baghdad robes."

This is the intention in the poem:

The common people start a journey
With Ahwaz as the goal,
[And arrive in] Nahr Tira,
Since the Arabs don't know the difference.

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1The text reads "tuγsarū bi-Baghdād"—meaning "bleached in Baghdad"? Ibn Hawqal adds (p. 257), "and they are transported legally to all the remotest parts of the world. For they are not suspected and they are of good quality." Instead of "legally," Ibn Hawqal has "jihāzān" ("as provisions"), but given the next sentence, "jiwāzān" is probably a better reading.

2The Futūh al-Buldān by Baladhurī (see Appendix III).
APPENDIX III

THE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS OF VARIOUS DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

This appendix comprises the information on which Figures 9, 10, and 18 are based. As mentioned in Chapter III, it is necessary first to understand the relationships between the various authors' works before one can make a critical judgement about the usefulness of these works.

This appendix is not exhaustive in that it only lists the works I consulted for this dissertation and it does not list all the works an author may have drawn on—it lists only those works that later authors mentioned as having drawn on or works that I have compared and found too similar for coincidence.

In the appendix, the numbers following a colon correspond to the numbers to the left of the titles and represent the fact that the later authors utilized in some manner the earlier work. The parentheses around certain titles indicate that these works are now lost, and in many cases we only know of them because they are cited in the later works. The names of the authors are given in full, because later authors often referred to earlier ones by only their kunyah (e.g., Yāqūt usually referred to Ṭabarī as Abū
Jaʿfar. The names in capitals represent the manner in which these authors are usually referred to today. Titles followed by an asterisk are available only in manuscript form, all other works in this appendix have been edited and published.

It is not meant to be implied that all the works listed under "Seljuq Histories" were written under the Seljuqs. Rather, these are works that either concentrate on Seljuq history or were drawn on by or drew on the works that did.
1. (Khudānāmah) (Māliknāmah) (in Pahlavi, translated into Arabic by IBN AL-MUQAFFA' (d. c. 139/756) as (Siyār Muluk al-Ć Ajam): drew on Sassanian histories.

2. Ta'rikh (in Arabic) by Aḥmad ibn Isḥāq ibn Jaʿfar AL-YAĆ QUBĪ (d. 284/897): #1; doesn't cite his sources, probably various local hadith-tellers.

3. Ta'rikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk (in Arabic) by Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Jarīr AL-ṬABARĪ (d. 310/923): #1, travelled and incorporated local traditions; used the hadith collections by Muḥammad ibn Cūmar al-Wāqidī, Saif ibn Cūmar, and Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq, among others.

4. Murūj al-Dhahab (in Arabic) by Abū al-Hasan CĀLI ibn al-Ḥusayn AL-MASĆ ŪDĪ (d. 345/956): #1; #2 (or common source).

5. Tarjamah-i Ta'rikh-i Tabarī (in Persian) by Abū CĀLI Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad AL-BAL'AMI (written in 352/963): this is a translation of #3, but with additional information and a pro-Persian bias.

6. Tawārīkh sinī muluk al-Cārid wa al-Anbiyā' (in Arabic) by Abū al-Ḥasan (CĀLI) HAMZAH ibn al-Ḥasan (Ḥusayn) AL-ISFAHĀNĪ (d. 360/970): personal observation (?).
7. **Tajārib al-Umam** (in Arabic) by Abū ʿAlī Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb (ibn) MISKAωAYH (d. 421/1030): #2; Miskawayh was a disciple of Aḥmad ibn Kāmil, who was a disciple of Ṭabarī and who taught him #3; the chronicles of Thabit ibn Sinan (to 361/971); Rūdhrāwarī (#9) says Miskawayh copied al-Tājī by Abū Ishaq Ibrahīm ibn Hilāl al-Ṣābi (grandfather of #8).

8. **Taʿrīkh** (in Arabic) by Abū al-Ḥusayn HILĀL ibn al-Muḥassan ibn Ibrahīm al-Ṣābī al-Kātib (d. 448/1055): took up history of Thabit ibn Sinan (see #7) and continued it from 361/971 onwards; undoubtably also knew his grandfather's al-Tājī (see #7).

9. **Dhayl Tajārib al-Umam** (in Arabic) by Abū Shujāʾ Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn Zahrī al-Dīn AL-RŪDHRĀWARĪ (d. 488/1095): this is a continuation of #7; this may be an abridgement of part of #8.

10. **Fārsnāmah** (in Persian) by IBN AL-BALKHĪ (written before 510/1116): #6; used an abridgement of #3 (but critically); some common source with the Shāhnāmah.

11. **al-Muntazam** (in Arabic) by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Abū al-Farash IBN AL-JAWSĪ (d. in 597/1200): based on court records (?).
12. al-Kāmil fī al-Taʾrīkh (in Arabic) by Abū al-Ḥasan Ālī ibn Abī al-Karam Athīr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ābī al-Karīm Īzz al-Dīn Muḥammad IBN AL-ȬATHĪR (d. 630/1233): #3 (for the first three centuries of Islam—but used critically); #7; either #8 or #9.

13. Mirʿāt al-Zamān fī Taʾrīkh al-Aʾyān (in Arabic) by Shams al-Dīn Abū al-Muẓaffar Yūsīf ibn Qīsīlgū ibn Ālī SĪBT IBN AL-JAWZĪ (d. 654/1257): #11 (by his grandfather); #12; #8; the history of Ibrāhīm al-Sāḥīb (see #7); Īmād al-Dīn's Nuṣrat al-Faṭrah (#7 on Seljuq Histories list); many others.


15. Īyūn al-Tawārīkh (in Arabic) by MUḤAMMAD IBN SHĀKIR al-Kutubī (written in 760/1359, d. 764/1363): probably knew #12; relies heavily on #11, but appears to contain much original information.
1. (Maliknâmah) (Khudânâmah). (Originally in Pahlavi, translated into Arabic by IBN AL-MUQAFFA' (d. c. 139/756) as (Siyâr Muluk al-Çajam)).

2. Zayn al-Akhbâr (in Persian) by Abû Sa'îd ÇAbd al-Çayy ibn Dahhâk ibn Ma'amûd GARDÎZÎ (d. after 440/1050): from personal observation and #14 from Geographies Table.

3. Ta'rîkh-i Bayhaqî (in Persian) by Abû al-Fadîl Mu'ammad ibn Hûsâyin BAYHAQÎ (d. 470/1077): from personal observation (in the form of diaries) and court records (Ghaznavid).


5. (Ta'rîkh-i Âl-i Saljûq) (in Persian) by ABû TÂHIR KHATûNÎ (probably written in the mid 6th/12th century): from personal observation (?)


8. **Saljūqnāmah** (in Persian) by Ẓahīr al-Dīn NĪSHĀPŪRĪ (d. c. 582/1186): #3 for early Seljuq history; #5 for reigns of Ūghrīl, Alp Arslān, and Malikshāh; #6; probably #4; and personal observation.


10. **Zubdat al-Tawārīkh** (in Arabic) by same author as #9: may be abridgement of #7, or #7 may just be one of the sources used.

11. **Dhayl-i Saljūqnāmah** (in Persian) by Abū Ḥāmid MUḤAMMAD IBN IBRAHĪM (written in 599/1202): a disjointed account, probably used some of same sources as #12.

12. **Rāḥat al-Sudūr wa Āyat al-Sūrūr** (in Persian) by Muḥammad ibn ĖALĪ ibn Sulaymān AL-RĀWANĪ (written c. 600/1203): #6; #8 (or perhaps common source); #1; original material on last Seljuqs.

13. **Zubdat al-Nuṣrah wa nukhbat al-ʻUṣrah** (in Arabic) by Abū Ibrahīm Fakhr al-Dīn al-Fatḥ ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Fatḥ Qiwām al-Dīn AL-BUNDĀRĪ al-Iṣfahānī (written in 623/1226, d. after 639/1242): this is an abridgement of #7; may also have used #4.
14. **al-.join urudah fi al-hikayat al-saljukiyah** (in Persian) by Muammad ibn Muammad ibn Muammad ibn `Abd All`ah IBN AL-NIZ`AM AL-HUSAYNI al-YazdI (written in 711/1311-1312): #12; #8; original material; (this may be an abridgement of #12).

15. **Jami` al-tawarikh** (in Persian) by RASHID AL-DIN Faql All`ah (d. 718/1318): #8; #11; #12; Kit`ab al-yamini by al-`Utbi; #12 from the "Histories" table; and some information from contemporary informants.


18. **Zubdat al-tawarikh** (in Persian) by `Abd All`ah ibn Lu`if All`ah Khwaft, known as HAFIZ-I ABRU (d. 833/1430): #8; #11; work was commissioned as a re-edition and supplement to #15.

19. **Tadhkirat al-shushar`a** (in Persian) by DAWLAT SHAH SAMARQANDI (written in 892/1487, d. 896 or 900/1490 or 1494): #5.

20. **Rawdat al-safa`** (in Persian) by MIR-KHWAND (written in 900/1495, d. 903/1498): #1; #12.
21. **Habīb al-Siyyār** (in Persian) by **Khwānd-Mīr** (written in 930/1524, d. 942/1536): #12; (since this author was the grandson of Mīr-Khwānd (#20), it may be assumed that he also was familiar with #20).
1. Geography (in Greek) by HERMES.

2. Geography (in Greek) by MARINUS of Tyre (d. c. A.D. 150).

3. (a) Geography (in Greek) by Claudius PTOLEMY (d. c. A.D. 165); Ptolemy is known to have taken over some of the work left unfinished by Marinus (see #2) at his death and completed it.
   (b) Məskūn al-Ard.
   (c) Almagest.

4. al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik (in Arabic) by Abū al-Qāsim ʔUbayd Allāh ibn ʔAbd Allāh IBN KHURDĀDHBIH (written c. 232/846): though this may not contain information directly from #3, Ibn Khurdādhbih is known to have translated various works of Ptolemy from Greek into Arabic; probably also used some Pahlavi work.

5. Şurat al-Ard (in Arabic) by Muḥammad ibn Mūsā AL-KHWĀRIZMĪ (d. after 232/847): this is a translation and adaptation of #3a, with contemporary data incorporated; since al-Khwārizmī also knew Persian and Indian treatises on astronomy, it is likely that some information from these is incorporated as well.
6. Akhbār al-Sind wa al-Hind (in Arabic) by SULAYMĀN "the Merchant" (fl. 236/850): personal account of the sea route from Siraf to China and India.

7. al-Fusūl al-Thalāthīn (in Arabic) by Āḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Kathīr AL-FARGHĀNĪ (d. after 247/861): this is a treatise on astronomy, based on Greek principles.

8. (Kitāb al-Amshār wa ʿAjāʿib al-Buldān) (in Arabic) by Āmr ibn Bahr al-Baṣrī AL-ḤĀHZĪ (d. 255/868): personal observation (?)

9. (Rasm al-Maʿmūr min al-Ard) (in Arabic) by Yaʿqūb ibn Ishāq al-KINDĪ (d. 260/874): #3a; also drew on Greek, Persian, and Indian sources.

10 (a).
   (Kitab al-Ulūf fi al-Hayākil wa al-Bunyān al-ʿAzĪm) (in Arabic) by ʿABŪ MAʿSHĀR Jaʿfar ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-BALKHĪ (d. 272/886): probably based on Persian, Greek, and Indian sources.

10 (b).
   al-Mudkhal al-Kabīr ʿIlā ʿIlm al-Nujūm (in Arabic): #3c.

11. Futūḥ al-Buldān (in Arabic) by Āḥmad ibn Yaʿqūb ibn Jabir al-BALADHURI (d. c. 279/892): used hadīth collections (Mādāʾinī); personal observations and local traditions.
12. Kitāb al-Buldān (in Arabic) by Aḥmad ibn Isḥāq ibn Ja'far AL-YA'QUBĪ (d. 284/897): based mainly on personal travels.

13. (al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik) (in Arabic) by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib AL-SARAKHSĪ (d. 286/899): #3a; since al-Sarakhsi was a pupil of al-Kindī, he undoubtedly knew #9.

14. (Kitāb al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik) (in Arabic) by Abū Ĥabd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad AL-JAYHĀNĪ (d. after 295/907): used the original, larger version of #4.

15. Mukhtaṣar Kitāb al-Buldān (in Arabic) by Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad IBN AL-FAQĪH al-ḤamadānĪ (d. 290/903): #4 or a common source; #6 (for India and China); #8; said to be an abridgement of #14.


17. (Suwar al-Aqālīm) (in Arabic) by ABŪ ZAYD Aḥmad ibn Sahīl AL-BALKHĪ (written in 308/921, d. 322/934): mostly based on personal travels, but since he was a student of al-Kindī, he was undoubtedly familiar with #9.

18. Kitāb al-Kharāj (in Arabic) by Abū al-Farḥ QUDĀMAH ibn Ja'far al-Kātib al-BaghdādĪ (written in 316/928, d. 337/948): #3a; #2; also based on official records.
19. *al-Zā ji al-Kabīr* (in Arabic) by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Jabir AL-BATTANĪ (d. 317/929): #3a; #3c; #5.

20. *al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik* (in Arabic) by Abū Ishaq Ibrahīm ibn Muḥammad AL-IṢṬAḴRĪ al-Fārisī (written 318-321/930-933): this is an enlarged version of #17, supplemented with information from the author's own travels.

21. *(Kitāb) CAjāʿib al-Buldān* (in Arabic) by Abū Dulāf Misʿar ibn AL-MUḤALHIL (written c. 331/942): based on author's travels through China, Central Asia, and India.


23. *al-Nawāḥī wa al-Āfāq wa al-Akhlāq al-Buldān* (in Arabic) by Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad IBN ABĪ CĀWĪN al-Kātīb (written before the mid 4th/10th century): personal observation (?)..

24. *Murūj al-Dhahab* (in Arabic) by Abū al-Ḥasan CĀLĪ ibn al-Ḥusayn AL-MASŪDĪ (d. 345/956): used #4 and #14 heavily; also used #18; #9; #13; #3b; #7; #10a; #10b; #8; #23; #3a; #3c; #3a (in Arabic translation); #2 (in Arabic translation); #1; #19; and based on personal travels and government records.
25. Kitāb al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik (in Arabic) by Abū al-Qāsim Muḥammad IBN HAWQAL (written in 366/977): relied heavily on #20 (or #17?); supplemented by #14; #4; #18; and personal travels.

26. Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam (in Persian) no author known (written in 372/982; used the original, larger version of #4; #20; #14; and perhaps #2 from the Seljuq Histories Table (Zayn al-Akhbār).

27. Ahsan al-Taqāṣīm fi Maṣrifat al-Aqālīm (in Arabic) by Shams al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Abī Bakr al-Banānī al-Shāmī AL-MAQDISĪ (d. after 391/1000): utilized #17; supplemented by #14; #15; #4; #8; #18; personal travels.

28. Safarnāmah (in Persian) by NĀṢIR-I KHUSRAW (d. 452/1060): this is a description of his personal observations while making the Hajj in 437-444/1045-1052.

29. al-Qanūn al-Masūdī (in Arabic) by Abū al-Riṣān Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh AL-BIRUNĪ (d. 440/1048): #3a; #2; #14; also based on some personal travels (but not to Khuzistan) and various Indian astronomers.

30. Fārsnāmah (in Persian) by IBN AL-BALKHĪ (written before 510/1116): the geographical part may include information from #25; based mainly on personal observations.
31. **Mujam al-Buldān** (in Arabic) by Ibn Abd Allāh Yāqūt al-Rūmī al-Ḥamawī (written 621/1224): based partly on personal travels throughout the Mediterranean and northern Iran; also on #21; #11; #15; #27; #29; either (or both) #17 or #20; (too many sources to name, e.g., Ibn al-Muqaffa', Hamzah al-Isfahānī, al-Jahshiyārī).

32. **Kitāb al-Mushtarak wa al-Mukhtalif saq'ān** (in Arabic) by Yāqūt (same author as #31): excerpted from #31.

33. **Kitāb al-Lubāb** (in Arabic) by Abū al-Ḥasan Ālī ibn Abī al-Karam Athīr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Āabd al-Karīm Īzz al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Al-Āthīr (by same author as that of #11: *Histories--al-Kāmil fī al-Ta'rīkh*) (d. 630/1232): this is an abbreviation of the *Kitāb al-Ansāb* by Abu Sa'ūd al-Tamīmī al-Samā'īnī (d. 562/1167).

34. **Taqwīm al-Buldān** (in Arabic) by Īmād al-Dīn Abū Al-Fīdā'ī (written in 722/1321, d. 732/1331): #20; #29; #25; #11; #9; #33; #32; too many sources to name, e.g., the Akhbar al-Khawārij, al-Azīzi by Ibn Sa'd, Rustāq-i Khūzistān, the anonymous *Kitāb al-Atwāl*, and many more.

35. **Nuzhat al-Qulūb** (in Persian) by Ḥamd Allāh ibn Abī Bakr ibn Abī Ḥamd ibn Naṣr al-Muṣtafī al-Qazvīnī (d. after 740/1340): #4; #31; #30; #17; taken almost verbatim from various earlier regional accounts, rearranged here.
36. *Jughrāfiyā-i Hāfiz-i Abrū* (in Persian) by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Luṭf Allāh Khwāfī, known as ḤĀFĪZ-I ABRŪ (d. 833/1430): for information on Fars used #30; #25; for Khuzestan looks like original material.

37. *Nova Asiae descriptio geographica cum introducione historia* (in Latin, with parts in Persian, Arabic, and Ottoman Turkish) by L. WARNER (d. A.D. 1665): looks like a compilation of information from many different sources (e.g., #11; #27; #34; #35, al-Maḏārif by Ibn Qutaybah).