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UMI
THE LLOYD GEORGE GOVERNMENT
AND THE ANGLO-IRISH WAR
1919-1921
by
MARTIN FREDERICK SEEDORF
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
1974
Approved by
Giovanni Costigan
(Chairman of Supervisory Committee)
Department
HISTORY
(Departmental Faculty sponsoring candidate)
Date
June 12, 1974
We have carefully read the dissertation entitled _The Lloyd George Government and the Anglo-Irish War, 1919-1921_ submitted by Martin Frederick Seedorf in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and recommend its acceptance. In support of this recommendation we present the following joint statement of evaluation to be filed with the dissertation.

This dissertation attempts to contribute to the fuller understanding of Anglo-Irish relations at a critical period in the early twentieth century. The decisions made by and influences exerted on the Lloyd George Government and its Irish Administration during the Anglo-Irish War, 1919-1921, are examined in detail. Despite some overlapping of the recent book by D. G. Boyce, _Englishmen and Irish Troubles_ (1972), this study documents more fully the formulation of a limited war policy in late 1919 and 1920 and its subsequent reversal in June, 1921. Boyce's book, which appeared after the research for this dissertation had been completed, is primarily concerned with public opinion. The present dissertation also establishes the central, though not always active, role of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, as well as the influence of Cabinet Ministers, British officials in Ireland, and of the opposition.

In establishing his thesis the writer has made extensive use of the minutes and conclusions, memoranda, and committee reports found in the Cabinet Records; Dublin Castle and Irish Office papers in the Colonial Office Records; and the Strickland Report in the War Office Records which is published in full for the first time. Particular use has also been made of the Lloyd George and Bonar Law Papers at the Beaverbrook Library, of the Sir John Anderson Papers located in the Colonial Office Records, and the recently published diary of Thomas Jones (_Whitehall Diary_, 3 Volumes, 1969-71). Jones' diary, the only source systematically to reveal the positions and influence of Cabinet Ministers, is used here for the first time in conjunction with Cabinet papers of which Boyce made only brief use.

In addition, extensive use has been made of Parliamentary Debates, Parliamentary Papers, and of British and Irish newspapers located in the British Museum at Colindale.

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In addition, I express my appreciation to the Library Staff, Graduate School, and History Department of the University of Washington for their assistance.

Finally, I thank my student colleagues in Modern English history, my wife, Rita, and my professor at the University, Dr. Giovanni Costigan, whose guidance was invaluable, for their encouragement and assistance.
NOTE

Union, Home Rule, Dominion Home Rule and Dominion status, and Independence may prove difficult for the reader who is unversed in Anglo-Irish relations. As I have not attempted to define them in the dissertation itself, I shall do so here in this brief note.

"Union" describes the relationship between Britain and Ireland between 1800 and 1922. The Act of Union of 1800 formally dissolved the Irish Parliament and completely incorporated Ireland into the United Kingdom; Irish representation thus being removed from Dublin to the Parliament at Westminster. "Unionists", defenders of Union with Britain and antagonistic to its alteration, comprised two groups primarily in the early twentieth century: those in Ulster (Northern Ireland today) and the Conservative Party in Britain.

"Home Rule" refers to the compromise between Union and complete Independence and to the movement which dominated Anglo-Irish politics from the 1870's until 1916. Championed by the Irish Parliamentary Party (I.P.P.)—also known as the Home Rule or Nationalist Party—Home Rule called for devolution upon Ireland of local control in domestic matters. Trade, finance, defense, and foreign policy would all have been retained by the British Government. The conference of this measure on Ireland was attempted in 1885, 1893, 1912-14, 1916, and again in 1920. Each time it failed as a solution.

"Dominion Home Rule" and "Dominion" status are much the same though they do differ in degree. Dominion Home Rule was suggested during the Anglo-Irish War, 1919-1921, as a compromise between Home
Rule and complete Independence. It differed from the Dominion status of Canada and Australia in that Ireland would have been subject to British defense and foreign policy though largely in control of her own trade and finances. The Dominion status which was finally conferred upon Southern Ireland in the form of the Irish Free State by the treaty of 1921 freed Ireland in these latter respects as well. The Free State took its place in the Commonwealth in 1922, as a self-governing Dominion.

"Independence —complete separation from British domination—had long been advanced by the extreme nationalist Fenian movement (Irish Republican Brotherhood). By the end of World War I it was supported by the Irish Volunteers (later called the Irish Republican Army) and the Sinn Fein Party as well. While this demand was compromised by the 1921 treaty, it was eventually achieved in the Acts of 1937 and 1949 which established Eire, the Irish Republic.
TARA IS GRASS

The world hath conquered, the world hath scattered like dust
Alexander, Caesar, and all that shared their sway—
Tara is grass, and behold how Troy lieth low—
And even the English, perchance their hour will come.

—From 18th Cent. Gaelic/Trans. by P. Pearse

If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign
troop was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms,
ever-never-never.

—Chatham: Speech in 1777

'The Irish Question,' wrote Lord Rosebery, 'has not passed
into history because it has never passed out of politics.'

—New York Times, 23 November 1920

The Irish Question is customarily spoken of in the past tense
and it is true that the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 marked the
ending of an age. But the legacies and the burdens of the
past remained to influence and shape the future. In history
there are no endings and no beginnings. In 1921 Ireland stood
on the threshold of a new era, Anglo-Irish relations entered
a new phase, but the past remained to encourage, to influence,
and, most of all, to warn.

—Nicholas Mansergh, 1964

(Students of politics today)...do not realize the extent to which
the Irish problem cast its sombre shadow over Westminster.

—Geoffrey Shakespeare, 1949
THE PEA AND THE THIMBLES.

*See the Catholic Herald, 2 July 1921, p. 7.
CHAPTER I

GOVERNMENT POLICY
AND
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE
(JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1919)

In viewing Anglo-Irish relations for 1919 one gets the impression of being witness to the not-so-quiet pause before the brutal storm. It was in this seeming calm that Ireland renewed her protest in arms against the seven and a half century domination of Britain. The Anglo-Irish War—lasting two and a half years from January of 1919 until July, 1921—marked the end of Irish subjection and likewise served as a warning of the eventual collapse of British and Western imperialism throughout the world.

1. The Irish Protest
(January-September, 1919)

Coincidentally, the declaration of independence and the first bloodshed occurred simultaneously on 21 January 1919 and marked the beginning of Ireland's war for independence. In the General or 'Victory' Election in December, 1918, Lloyd George and the Coalition Government won the largest majority in British history. That election brought also the victory of Sinn Fein in Ireland and the demise of the old Home Rule Party. Sinn Fein won 73\(^1\) of 105 Irish seats at Westminster while the Home Rulers secured merely six.\(^2\) The Unionists acquired 26.

On January 7, the Sinn Fein representatives, in order to

---
\(^1\)Sixty-nine Sinn Feiners captured 73 constituencies as some were elected to two different seats.

\(^2\)Four of these were in Ulster constituencies covered by an agreement with Sinn Fein.
carry out their mandate from the Irish people, gathered at the Mansion House, Dublin, calling themselves Dail Eireann (the Assembly of Ireland). Actually, Sinn Fein, while gaining 69% of the Irish representation at Westminster, received only 47% of the popular vote with just 69% of the qualified voters casting ballots. In spite of the questionable mandate for Sinn Fein, Edgar Holt's suggestion that a majority of the people still would have been satisfied with Home Rule seems most unlikely. The profound dissatisfaction with the Nationalist Party is revealed by their loss of 62 pre-election seats. The 'blank check' given them in the days of Parnell was now cancelled, leaving Sinn Fein alone in control.

Of the Sinn Feiners elected only 27 were available to attend the first assembly because many were in English gaols. To the British, recently victorious in the World War, this suggestion of independence was an affront because "it was not her Empire but the Empires of her enemies to which self-determination was proposed." The British authorities, however, did not proclaim the Assembly illegal until September, 1919.

The Dail's declaration of independence on the twenty-first of January declared "foreign government in Ireland to be an invasion of our national right" and demanded that England evacuate the

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4Holt, p. 168

country.\textsuperscript{6} The Irish deputies were fully aware of the grave implications of their act,\textsuperscript{7} an act as momentous for Ireland as the American Declaration of Independence had been for the U.S.A. 150 years earlier. The Dail was much ridiculed for declaring openly what could have been left unsaid. Critics contended that this action created a 'straight-jacket' preventing Ireland from accepting less than a Republic. This challenging declaration might not have been made had the Dail been controlled by Eamon DeValera and Arthur Griffith. Unfortunately, English prisons held these men, leaving the Assembly in the hands of the more extreme men like Cathal Brugha and other militants.\textsuperscript{8} By not going to Westminster, the Sinn Fein M.P.s deprived themselves of a forum from which they could have presented their case and aroused English as well as world opinion. Obstructionist tactics by Sinn Fein could have proven most embarrassing in Parliament, and the absence of their Irish colleagues must have been very satisfying to the British Coalition Government.

By opening hostilities on the 21st of January, the Irish chose an alternative method to publicize their oppression. The beginning of the conflict occurred at Soloheadbeg, Co. Tipperary, where Dan Breen, Sean Tracy, and seven other Volunteers waylaid a small R.I.C. convoy to obtain explosives for assembling grenades. Two men were killed during this operation—the first time police-


\textsuperscript{8}Eoin Neeson, \textit{The Life and Death of Michael Collins} (Cork, 1968), p. 37.
men had been killed since the Easter Rising of 1916. The Dail had given no authority for this ambush, which was both deplored and denounced by Irish public opinion\(^9\)—in fact the Dail did not assume responsibility for I.R.A. activity until March, 1921. Incidents of this type, termed 'outrages' by the British Government, eventually came to be regarded by the Irish people as acts of heroism and were to become more frequent with the passage of time. While not condoning violence as a way of life, more and more Irishmen came to recognize it as the only effective means for securing their long-awaited independence.\(^10\)

When these things were happening in Ireland, Prime Minister Lloyd George was in France attending the Paris Peace Conference. His chief concerns were peacemaking and the reconstruction of Europe rather than police action and internal strife in Ireland. Peace and reconstruction occupied most of his time during the first six months of 1919 and continued to concern him through 1922. This situation, along with the indefinite postponement of Home Rule, left Britain without an Irish policy.\(^11\)

The repercussions of war were not confined to the Continent. At home Great Britain had to demobilize three and a half million men from the armed services and munitions industry,\(^12\) reconvert

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its vast war machinery to the tasks of a peacetime economy, and deal with the problems of industrial strife. With Lloyd George's attention directed toward these complex issues, it was difficult for him to consider the Irish problem for some months after the armistice, "and yet all the time the situation in Ireland was growing more critical."  

When the Premier's attention finally focused on the Irish problem in late 1919, the makeup of his coalition was of primary importance. It consisted of 484 M.P.'s, 338 of them Conservatives. The new Cabinet had been introduced on January 10, but did not itself become operative until October.  

Most of its members were retained from the war period. For Ireland Viscount French remained Viceroy (Lord Lieutenant); Ian Macpherson being appointed Chief Secretary. Both were in the Cabinet simultaneously, the only time in history for an Irish Viceroy. The retention of Viscount French predicted a hesitant policy toward Ireland—in fact, later events show that, other than military rule, there was no policy.  

The Premier continued the old War Cabinet in early 1919, though it seldom met. Besides himself it included the Unionists

\[13\] McDowell, p. 192.

\[14\] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Series V, vol. 112 (1919), p. vii. The Cabinet formed in January, 1919, but inoperative until October, consisted of 12 Unionists, seven Liberals, one No Affiliation, and one Labourite. In all, during 1919-21, there were 16 Unionists, 11 Liberals, one No Affiliation, and one Labourite in the Government (see Appendix I), Taylor, English History, 1914-45, pp. 130, 646.

\[15\] Macardle, p. 272.
Curzon, Austen Chamberlain and Bonar Law, and G. N. Barnes of the Labour Party. Lloyd George chiefly concerned himself with the problems of Europe and peace, leaving domestic affairs, including Ireland, to Bonar Law. The latter retained this responsibility after the Paris Peace Conference. A glance at the party affiliation of the Cabinet reveals that, were the prestige of the Prime Minister to wane, the Unionists were dominant.

Both the Prime Minister and his second-in-command Bonar Law, leader of the Unionists, were aware of the changing developments in Ireland and in English attitudes toward Union as a result of the World War. In their joint manifesto of 28 November 1918, they acknowledged the gravity of the situation and vowed to explore all "practical paths for peace." They were aware that there could be no harmony within the Empire without a solution to the Irish Question, which could hardly involve either the coercion of Ulster by Southern Ireland or the severance of Ireland from Britain. In this manifesto the Unionist Party formally accepted Home Rule for the first time in its 30 year history. The statement, while ignoring Ireland's growing demands for separation, afforded Britain some room to navigate. Unfortunately, neither Lloyd George nor his aide gave much consideration to their statement until late 1919. Had Lloyd George boldly offered Dominion status early in 1919—

16 Taylor, English History, 1914-45, p. 130; Debates, Commons, 112 (1919), p. VII.


18 Ibid., p. 398.

the eventual basis of settlement in 1921—he would have at least demonstrated his sincerity and enlisted both American and Dominion enthusiasm. In mid-January, 1919, Lord Haldane had suggested an offer of Dominion Home Rule to Viscount French, but the Soloheadbeg incident and the complete opposition of Walter Long convinced him to continue a military solution. Long was a former Chief Secretary for Ireland and a leading Unionist in the Government. The situation in January led Dublin Castle to press the Government for more tanks and machine guns.

The predominantly Conservative House of Commons assembled at Westminster on 4 February with the benches of the old Irish Parliamentary Party practically empty. Only a few veteran Home Rulers were now left. One of them, Joseph Devlin, M.P. from W. Belfast and the most rational critic of Irish policy, inquired on 12 February about the intentions of the government regarding Ireland. Predictably the question was evaded. Lloyd George still believed Home Rule to be the solution to the Irish problem, but conditions as they then existed in Ireland prevented his implementing it.

Throughout February the British Government was pressured to

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22 Debates, Commons, 112 (12 February 1919), col. 146.

release Sinn Fein prisoners still held in England. Since their internment in May, 1918, the Irish had protested incessantly, and there was now pressure from within the English Government. Reports from Reading Gaol showed difficulty in containing Sinn Feiners there, while on the third of February DeValera escaped from Lincoln Gaol. On February 4th Edward Shortt, Home Secretary and formerly Irish Chief Secretary, sent three telegrams to the new Chief Secretary, Ian Macpherson, urging the release of all Irish prisoners. Macpherson agreed that the Government ought not detain anyone without trial, but he was strongly opposed by the War Secretary, Winston Churchill.\textsuperscript{24} The Viceroy also pressed for their release, but the War Cabinet worried lest such a concession be taken as a sign of weakness.\textsuperscript{25} However, on 4 March the Government decided on the gradual release of all Sinn Feiners interned in England,\textsuperscript{26} a decision which was announced in the Commons on March 6.

On April 1st the Dail gathered for its second session and proclaimed DeValera Prionh-Aire (translated Premier-Minister or President) and on April 8 he was re-elected President of Sinn Fein.\textsuperscript{27} His new Ministry included Arthur Griffith for Home Affairs, Michael Collins for Finance, and Cathal Brugha for Defense. This Ministry began immediately to follow "its declared intention of

\begin{itemize}
\item[24]Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cabinet Records, War Cabinet Minute 526/3, 4 February 1919 (Cab. 23/9).
\item[25]Ibid., 527/2, 5 February 1919 (Cab. 23/9).
\item[26]Ibid., 541/4, 4 March 1919 (Cab. 23/9).
\end{itemize}
taking over the administration of Ireland from the British authorities—28—an intention which had been primary to Sinn Fein since its founding by Griffith in 1905. They established arbitration courts and land banks, a Labour Department to settle industrial disputes, and attempted to capture city and county government councils. Collins floated a loan by advertising in newspapers and periodicals for subscriptions. Many newspapers, including the Cork Examiner and Griffith's Nationality, were suppressed by the English, but Collins continued advertising through other papers and new journals.

The Royal Irish Constabulary was of great concern to the Dail. This body, once admired by most Irishmen for its courage and fairness now found itself in direct conflict with Sinn Fein. It had become the right arm of England. The Dail, while not desiring to terrorize the R.I.C., wanted to boycott and ostracize them from society and thereby "frustrate their efforts as the eyes and ears of the enemy." 29

On April 3 the House of Commons held a debate in which T. P. O'Connor, an Irish Nationalist from the Scotland Division of Liverpool, declared: "we have no government...we have on one side, widespread disturbance—on the other, severe repression." 30 He asked the Government if they had any control over Ireland except

28 Holt, p. 177.


30 Debates, Commons, 114, (3 April 1919), col. 1440.
by military power. His point, while exaggerating the extent of disturbance at this time, was relevant.

The Government's reply to O'Connor was typical of official procrastination. Macpherson acknowledged Sinn Fein's growing command of public opinion, stating that it made it increasingly difficult "for the Imperial Government to explore practical pathways toward solution." Rather than a willingness to negotiate with Sinn Fein, he displayed determination to maintain law and order. On 14 April in a letter to Lloyd George Macpherson reiterated his view, and the next day Bonar Law defended Macpherson's statement as the official government policy. The Labour M.P., Jack Jones, astutely summarized the situation. "It is a poor thing... that the Government of this great Empire have nothing to offer Ireland than less brains and more bullets."

At Knocklong Station on May 13, several Volunteers, while rescuing a comrade-at-arms, killed an R.I.C. sergeant and a constable. The coroner's jury, composed of Irishmen, found the assailants innocent and actually "blamed the Government for exposing the police to danger." In spite of denunciation by the Church, the public horror at Soloheadbeg was not repeated at

31 Ibid., col. 1453
32 Ibid., cols. 1543-44.
33 London, Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers, Macpherson to Lloyd George, 14 April 1919 (L.G.P./F/46/1/2).
34 Debates, Commons, 114 (15 April 1919), col. 2713.
35 Ibid., (3 April 1919), col. 1547.
36 Younger, p. 82.
Knockalong. People had begun to take a different look at the exploits of the Volunteers, regarding these young men not as murderers but rather as patriots concerned with freedom. 37

A debate on the "Condition of Ireland" took place in the house on 14 May, 1919. T. P. O'Connor, with Vernon Hartshorn of the Labour Party, pressed the Irish Secretary about his policy. O'Connor reiterated that Britain must make up its mind whether it was to be "self-government...or militarism in Ireland." 38 Hartshorn chastised the Government for alienating the Irish people and arousing international suspicion of British concern for small nations. 39 Macpherson again defended police action in the name of law and order and stated, "We are not going to bargain with Sinn Fein because they have defied us.... Unless constitutionalism is revived, we can have no parley with Sinn Fein, which endeavors to destroy our empire." 40

The shootings at Soloheadbeg and Knockalong, together with those in early 1919 at Westport and Limerick, further convinced Dublin Castle of the gravity of the situation. Instead of pressing for reconciliation, French and Macpherson suggested tightening military policy and suppressing Sinn Fein, the Irish Volunteers and other extreme nationalist organizations. 41 On 31 May, however,

37 Ibid.
38 Debates, Commons, 115 (14 May 1919), 1726.
39 Ibid., col. 1692.
40 Ibid., cols. 1730-31.
41 Minute by French and Macpherson, 15 May 1919 (L.G.P./F/180/3/2).
Macpherson displayed hesitation saying he now wanted to wait until the right moment to suppress these groups. Both he and French realized suppression could lead to further 'outrages' but believed it the only method to quell insurrection. The talk of suppression disturbed three Coalition Liberals—H.A.L. Fisher, Edward Shortt, and Christopher Addison—but the Cabinet was prevented from dealing with the situation on May 23rd by the Prime Minister's absence.

The British attitude in May, 1919, was what it continued to be throughout the war—Ireland must accept a solution of British making. With the situation quickly leading to war, and neither Sinn Fein nor the British Cabinet showing any inclination toward compromise, the only hope for peaceful solution lay in the Irish appeal to the Paris Peace Conference. The problem of Anglo-Irish relations now had not only a local significance, but European and even global ramifications.

The possibility of a clash between the U. S. and Great Britain over Ireland was quite real. President Woodrow Wilson had felt much pressure from vociferous Irish-Americans and needed the support of their Senators for ratification of the peace settlement and the League of Nations. He had already championed the rights

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43 French to Macpherson, 16 May 1919 (L.G.P./F/46/2/4).
44 Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 87; III, 13.
of all nations for self-determination in his Fourteen Points, and the Irish were but one of many nationalities—including Jews, Poles, Georgians, Syrians, Indians, Indochinese, Czechoslovakians, Koreans, Egyptians and Lebanese—claiming self-determination. Unfortunately, they belonged to a victorious Empire and not to one which had vanquished.

With regard to Ireland, Lloyd George was never in a mood to heed American advice, yet already in 1918 American public opinion had influenced him to offer Home Rule. As early as 4 March 1919 the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution, 261 votes to 41, calling on the Paris Conference to hear Irish claims for self-determination. The Senate arrived at the same verdict on 6 June with only one dissenting vote.

In May the issue surfaced with the arrival in Dublin of three Irish-Americans. Hoping to allay the growing American prejudice against Britain, Lloyd George had reluctantly agreed to their visit. The event was embarrassing both to the Prime Minister and the President. A report was issued by the trio calling for Irish self-determination and criticizing the British for its "zoolike treatment" of political offenders and violation of human rights. On June 11, these three Americans met Wilson

47 W. C. Minute 385, 6 April 1918 (Cab. 23/6/f. 16-17); Ward, p. 173.


50 Ward, p. 181.
in Paris and pressed him to agree to an Irish hearing at the peace conference. It was Wilson's belief that the League of Nations would hear and solve injustices beyond the scope of peace conferences, including Paris. This belief provided him with a reason for refusing the demands of this "potent domestic pressure group in order to avoid a serious collision with Great Britain over an issue which, at least legally, was a purely domestic British problem."\(^{51}\) Lloyd George's passing the burden of decision to the American President was an example of his political acuity.\(^{52}\)

While the decision to exclude Ireland from the conference was beneficial to the Anglo-American relations in Paris, in the long run it led to disaster. The refusal dealt Irish aspirations for a peaceful settlement a staggering blow and marked another step toward war. The President had declined to assist the newly proclaimed Republic, but the Irish-Americans had not. In order to strengthen financial and popular support for Ireland, DeValera crossed the Atlantic, spending 18 months in the United States—from 17 June 1919 until Christmas Eve, 1920.

The British Cabinet was informed by their Embassy in Washington of DeValera's illegal presence in America and of the warm reception accorded him there. A message from R. C. Lindsay of the Embassy staff in Washington to Lord Curzon reported a mass meeting in Chicago on 7 June which displayed unprecedented hostility toward Britain, almost to the degree of "hysterical fanat-

\(^{51}\)Tillman, pp. 197, 200.

\(^{52}\)Mansergh, p. 281.
icism." But by 26 June and 15 July he reported that anti-British feelings and interest in DeValera were both waning. It is curious that Lindsay's report of decreasing American animosity synchronized with the buildup of British militarism in Ireland. While Ireland carried her case to Paris and America, Britain was carrying supplies across the Irish Sea to the Army of Occupation.

During the summer months, members of the press from Britain and elsewhere flocked to Ireland. They witnessed a situation which reminded them of recent war years on the Continent as soldiers with fixed bayonets, wearing trench helmets, paraded the streets; a machine gun post commanded Liberty Hall; military cordons with armoured lorries surrounding whole districts of Dublin while the police and military carried out raids. They saw, in June, the Dublin quays 'jammed with tanks, armoured cars, guns, motor lorries, and thousands of troops as if the port was a base of a formidable expeditionary force.'

Hugh Martin in a series of articles in London's Daily News brought the point home to England. On 14 May he wrote, "Government by tanks is only a temporary expedient, and the policy of drift cannot be indefinitely prolonged...in the end we shall have to give up the hypocrisy of pretending concern about freedom in Czechoslovakia or the infamy of stamping on freedom in Ireland." Revelations like these undoubtedly hurt British foreign relations.

53 R.C. Lindsay to Curzon, 9 June 1919 (L.G.P./F/46/1/8).
54 Telegrams from Lindsay, 26 June and 15 July 1919 (Cab. 27/69).
55 Freeman's Journal, 10 June 1919.
56 Daily News, 14 May 1919. Most of the newspaper sources which are cited without page numbers have been gathered from the Lloyd George Papers. There are nine boxes of press cuttings on Ireland (see L.G.P./H/210-18).
In July, 1919, South Africa's leader, Field Marshal Smuts, went so far as to say: "Unless the Irish Question is settled on the great principles which form the basis of this Empire, this Empire must cease to exist." 57

On July 21, the Prime Minister made one of his rare appearances in the House of Commons since the War. His policy toward Ireland was again criticized by Joseph Devlin who called it a "flat negation of all their war aims." 58 When queried by Devlin about the application of self-government to Ireland, the Prime Minister declared the problem was not whether Lloyd George was ready but whether Ireland was ready to agree. He asserted that he had previously tried to apply self-government but that it had invariably been blocked by division in Ireland. "I shall be perfectly prepared to apply [Wilson's principles]...to Ireland," he said, "if they are applied to the whole of Ireland," 59 but he refused to coerce Ulster into an all-Ireland Parliament. He further stated that he would be willing to grant Home Rule to the South if she so desired. 60 While getting Irishmen to agree to a solution was an insurmountable problem, Lloyd George's statement ignored Home Rule's stunning defeat in the 1918 election. It was now unacceptable to all factions.

The Freeman's Journal, not an extreme Irish nationalist paper, observed "if England can hold her own in this country—

58 Freeman's Journal, 22 July 1919, p. 4.
59 Debates, Commons, 118, (21 July 1919), col. 1052.
60 Ibid., col. 1096.
and the Prime Minister does not deny it—only by the power of her bayonets, bombs, and tanks, her rule is as much an outrage as was German occupation of Belgium."\textsuperscript{61} Even the Times of Lord Northcliffe, which was unfriendly to Sinn Fein, stressed on June 16 the urgency of a settlement, and on the twenty-fourth criticized Lloyd George's disappointing performance in the Commons.\textsuperscript{62} Realizing the problem was quite different from that in 1914, the Times called for a "broader and more statesmanlike" offer to be substituted for the "dead, unburied, and un lamented measure."\textsuperscript{63} It envisioned an elastic federal scheme granting immediate devolution of legislative power to two Irish states—one North and one South—along with an All-Ireland Parliament. This plan gave both states equal representation in the Irish Parliament with the hope it might eventually perform the tasks of a central body within an Irish Federation.

The British Government continued to procrastinate, and an offer of settlement was not forthcoming until December. The Times' solution was unrealistic because a federal scheme uniting Ireland was as inapplicable in 1919 as was Home Rule. Since 1916 the South had gravitated toward greater separation and little short of a Republic was satisfactory there. On the other hand, Ulster's bitterness in 1914 was not lessened by the growing demand for independence in the South.

By the late summer of 1919 British civil administration had

\textsuperscript{61}Freeman's Journal, 22 July 1919, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{62}Times, 24 July 1919.
\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.
collapsed in most parts of Ireland. Courts, banks, and local
government were all passing under the control of Sinn Fein. The
Frenchman, M. Godlet, wrote of this period: "the British Admin-
istration could no longer succeed in governing Ireland, it could
only prevent her governing herself."\textsuperscript{64}

Besides assuming most of the administration in the 26 Southern
counties, the Republicans developed a program of guerrilla warfare
against Britain's army of occupation. This campaign was taken
under the leadership of Michael Collins and Cathal Brugha.
Collins was not only Finance Minister and Director of Intelli-
gence, but also Director of Organization of the Irish Volunteers
(soon to become the Irish Republican Army) and a member of the
Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Along with
DeValera's absence, his significant position in these important
organizations, enabled him to dominate the Republican movement;
and without his efforts the Irish struggle would probably have
collapsed.\textsuperscript{65} In an effort to obtain arms and ammunition, attacks
were concentrated on police barracks and patrols. Such action
forced the R.I.C. in 1919 and early 1920 to evacuate many of its
barracks in remote indefensible regions.\textsuperscript{66} These evacuations
showed that popular opinion favored the I.R.A. and it was in
these remote areas that Collins' guerrillas were most free to

\textsuperscript{64}Macardle, p. 301.

\textsuperscript{65}Neeson, p. 144; O'Hegarty, p. 737.

\textsuperscript{66}Holt, p. 187; Charles C. Tansill, America and the Irish
Bulletin, 23-24 June 1921, p. 3, estimated the evacuation of
500 of these posts in early 1920.
maneuver.

The British government found it incredible that the gunmen had the support of the people. It continued to believe Irishmen were terrorized by the I.R.A. 'murder gang'. Throughout the first eight months of 1919 the Irish Secretary maintained that the gunmen were murdering and massacring innocent men "wholesale in every direction."67 The truth was rather less extreme. From 1 January until 9 August, 1919, only thirty-six representatives of the Crown were attacked in Ireland with just seven killed and 24 injured.68 Four police barracks and 46 other dwellings had also been attacked.

The assault at Fermoy, County Cork, on 7 September "set the pattern in yet another way for the guerrilla war."69 The men of Liam Lynch's Second Cork Brigade, dressed in civilian clothes, were able to launch a surprise attack on the police and escape undetected. The coroner's jury meeting the next day to consider the death of the policeman killed at Fermoy returned the same verdict as that at Knocklong almost four months earlier, finding that the policeman was not wilfully murdered.

While the Fermoy incident set the stage for two years of guerrilla warfare, it also marked the next day the beginning of reprisals which made the Black and Tans notorious in 1920. The jury verdict had aroused the anger of 200 soldiers stationed nearby

67Debates, Commons 119 (14 August 1919), col. 1729.
68Ibid., cols. 1665-66.
69Holt, p. 188; also see Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin, 1954), p. 50.
and in revenge they wrecked the shops of Fermoy, inflicting damage estimated at £3,000. Fermoy established the pattern of attack and reprisal familiar for the next two years.

2. Coercion and Appeasement  
(September-December, 1919)

The British Government had repeatedly mistaken the Republican Movement for nothing more than a murder gang. The Fermoy episode and the events of the first eight months of 1919 convinced England that violence must be countered with violence. On September 10 the British officially suppressed Dail Eireann and Sinn Fein; the Irish Volunteers, and other extreme nationalist organizations eventually suffered the same fate. 70 Neither Irish nor British subjects were surprised.

The Prime Minister had stated in the House of Commons on 7 August that "force alone cannot be the last word," 71 yet on the 23rd of August his friend Harold Spender reported that Lloyd George's attitude was "entirely hopeless" because he seemed to have "surrendered to the most extreme anti-Irish hatred." 72 The Premier's contradictory statements and apparent volte-face on Irish affairs reinforced the conviction of many that Lloyd George was vindictive, inconsistent and opportunistic. A hostile biographer, Donald McCormick, regards him as an unprincipled opportunist whose somersault "turned on the Irish nation with a savagery and

70 Macardle, pp. 308, 317.
71 Debates, Commons, 119 (7 August 1919), col. 653.
72 Harold Spender to C. P. Scott, 23 August 1919, in Scott, p. 377.
venom unparalleled since Cromwell" in revenge for Ireland's opposition to conscription.\(^{73}\) He further shows that Lloyd George did not support Irish Home Rulers in the 1918 election.

The Prime Minister was often inconsistent and opportunistic, even revengeful, but his position on Ireland was not as mercurial as McCormick suggests. It was the Irish Question which had altered and Lloyd George refused to compromise. Having been to Ireland only once, in 1907, and never having been an avid Home Ruler like Gladstone, he could not contemplate Ireland's complete separation from the United Kingdom. Rather, he had lukewarmly assented to the principle of Home Rule for Ireland as well as for Scotland and his native Wales—a principle designed to strengthen the United Kingdom.\(^{74}\) Wales, however, was Protestant and Non-conformist and did not consider complete separation, while Ireland, predominantly Roman Catholic, did.\(^{75}\) Also, the demand for Home Rule in Wales was not a truly national goal. "Far more fundamental than the desire for governmental devolution was the power of nonconformity" and the demand to be an equal within the United Kingdom.\(^{76}\) Lloyd George, who was a product of late nineteenth


\(^{76}\)Kenneth O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922 (Cardiff, 1963), pp. 305-06.
century Wales and only a quasi-Home Ruler before becoming premier, now faced an Irish insurrection. His decision to proscribe the Irish Dail was based—as was his policy throughout the entire Anglo-Irish war—on his belief that the answer was force. His advisors—militarists and conservatives—continually bolstered this opinion. It was their great fear that the Empire would collapse, as Henry Wilson reminded them in a letter predicting crises in Egypt, Mesopotamia and India. 77 A successful Irish revolution would set a perilous precedent.

"Had England been prepared to enter into peaceful rivalry with the Dail Eireann for the allegiance of Irishmen no doubt the Dail Eireann would have been happy to compete." 78 wrote Frank Pakenham, a contemporary historian. It was the goal of the Dail and of Sinn Fein to prevent English rule by passive resistance and control of local government. 79 It was, however, unlikely that the I.R.A. would have been satisfied with conciliatory measures until Britain had withdrawn her soldiery. Some members of the Government, along with the Daily News at the time, maintained that such action by Britain would have ensured civil war between Unionists and Republicans, a belief also held by the journalist Richard Bennett in his important book, The Black and Tans. 80 But Southern Unionists in Ireland, led by Lord Middleton, had broken

77 Sir Henry Wilson to L. G., 7 August 1919 (L.G.P./F/47/8/33).

78 Pakenham, p. 37.

79 O'Hegarty, p. 735.

away from the North setting up their own organization in January of 1919.\textsuperscript{81} A withdrawal of British troops northward would have secured Ulster and prevented civil war. This seemingly simple solution, since it implied separation for the South, was impossible for Lloyd George. He had repeatedly declared against a Republic and was dependent on a Unionist dominated coalition.

The suppression of the Dail in September directed the attention of the Irish people wholly toward the militant I.R.A. It meant that the Irish Assembly would lead a "furtive and precarious existence, meeting irregularly in secret sessions."\textsuperscript{82} The Anglo-Irish conflict was increasingly becoming a war, though never officially declared. Eventually it would be a three-faceted contest—"a war between the British Secret Service and the Collins (intelligence) network in Dublin, a war of harassment and reprisal in the country and a war of propaganda."\textsuperscript{83}

Both the conservative \textit{Daily Telegraph} and Lloyd George's own \textit{Daily Chronicle} congratulated the government on the strong line it had taken while the majority of the liberal press, especially \textit{The Daily News}, \textit{Times}, and \textit{Manchester Guardian}, were more realistic and critical.\textsuperscript{84} Instead of speaking of the reign of terrorism in Ireland, the \textit{Daily News} headlined "The Tragedy of Ireland" recalling

\begin{footnotes}{
\textsuperscript{81}Jones, \textit{Whitehall Diary}, III, 9.

\textsuperscript{82}Giovanni Costigan, "The Anglo-Irish Conflict, 1919-1922", \textit{University Review} (Dublin, Spring, 1968), 70; also see Figgis, p. 261.

\textsuperscript{83}Younger, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{84}Daily Telegraph, 12 September 1919; Daily Chronicle, 13 September 1919; Times, 10 September 1919; Manchester Guardian, 3 July and 5 September 1919.
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Ireland's appeal for Home Rule made throughout the war, and asserting that it was "on the Ministers themselves in the last resort that the guilt for every drop of blood shed in Ireland must rest." George V—after the September events at Fermoy—expressed his concern lest Britain drift into an impossible situation. "His Majesty asks," wrote his personal secretary to Bonar Law on 11 September, "what does his Government intend to do towards further protecting the lives of unoffending people in Ireland—and in order to introduce into Parliament measures for the Government of the country?"

Bonar Law replied briefly that the Government would continue its present policy, maintaining order in Ireland. In this opinion he was reinforced by letters sent by the Viceroy and Chief Secretary. French believed that Sinn Fein's influence was waning, while Macpherson felt it was impossible to get Sinn Fein to negotiate on any basis other than complete separation. Both blamed the Birrell-Asquith administration for the grave situation and defended the suppression of the Dail. The British leaders undoubtedly recalled that the Hardinge Commission in 1916 had stated: "The Irish people are easily led and it is therefore incumbent on

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86Lord Stamfordham to Bonar Law, 11 September 1919 (B.L.P./98/2/8).
88LoiJ French to Bonar Law, 13 September 1919 (B.L.P./98/2/11).
89Macpherson to Bonar Law, 13 September 1919 (B.L.P./98/2/12).
the Government to nip lawlessness in the bud." 90

The War Cabinet gathered at 10 Downing Street on September 25. The Viceroy was aware of the gravity of the Irish situation and produced a 'Joint Memorandum' prepared by himself and Macpherson, 91 which explained that the extreme section, especially the I.R.B., had broken away from the rest of Sinn Fein. 92 The Irish Government requested a free hand to deal with the problem. French and Macpherson failed to see it was their action—not the extremists—which would ensure the success of the I.R.A. and I.R.B. The most significant of the measures requested were:

1. Improvements of the secret service.
2. Extension of the powers of the Executive (Irish) under Section 14(b) of the Defense of the Realm Act so as to enable arrests to be made on suspicion only.
4. Encouragement of the R.I.C. and D.M.P. (Dublin Metropolitan Police) by advancing £10 per man until passage of the "Constabulary and Police (Irish) Bill".
5. An increase in the numbers of the "G" Division (Intelligence) of the D.M.P.
6. An increase in the size of the R.I.C. as the military is reduced. 93

Of these six measures all but the second were later approved. 94 Likewise, DeValera was banned from re-entering the country. 95

91 W. C. Minute, 624/2, 25 September 1919 (Cab. 23/12/f. 16).
93 Ibid.
94 W. C. Minute 628/4, 7 October 1919 (Cab. 23/12/f. 28).
memo by Walter Long, one of the staunchest Unionists in the Government, was also presented. It called for a public statement that the government would no longer "tolerate existing crime and lawlessness."  

It was not only desire for an end to the violence which motivated the British Ministers to offer a solution. Public opinion in America and the Dominions and impending activation of the Home Rule Act passed in 1914 were also catalysts. That act had been suspended on 18 September 1914 for the duration of the war and was to become operative eight months after the ratification of the peace treaties. The Irish Parliament was to be summoned not later than four months after the activation of the measure.

The War Cabinet decided to block the 1914 Act because it was not acceptable to anyone in Ireland. They recognized the necessity of dealing with the problem in the coming session of Parliament. On October 7 they considered three alternative proposals, including both a Federal and a Home Rule scheme by Walter Long and another Home Rule measure by Curzon. Long was selected to chair a Cabinet Committee on Ireland to determine the effect of the alternative policies on Ireland, Great Britain, and abroad. This committee contained six Unionists, including Long, Birkenhead, and the Viceroy, and four liberals of whom H. A. L. Fisher and the

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97 Ibid., G. T. 8210, 18 September 1919 (Cab.24/89/f.19).
98 W. C. Minute 624/2, 25 September 1919 (Cab.23/12/f.16).
99 Ibid., 628/4, 7 October 1919 (Cab.23/12/f.27).
Chief Secretary were the most prominent. Lloyd George definitely favored the introduction of a new Home Rule bill at this time, Bonar Law told Balfour. He, himself, however, had reservations and recognized it would meet with opposition.

Public opinion was especially important for the British Cabinet between the October 7 and November 11 meetings on Ireland. Viscount Grey, the former Foreign Secretary—undoubtedly hopeful for a reduction of the more than $4 billion war debt owed the United States—wrote the Prime Minister on October 6 and expressed the importance of a concession to Ireland to calm American opinion, three summaries of which were circulated to the Committee on Ireland by the Foreign Office. One, entitled "American Opinion on the Irish Question", blamed the Hearst newspapers for fanning the flames and arousing American opinion. It also felt that a settlement which could command reasonable support in Ireland would be favorably received by most Americans. The second report on "American Press Opinion..." stressed the hostility of most U. S. newspapers to Britain because of Ireland. The hostile papers included the influential New York American, New York World, Chicago Tribune, San Francisco Chronicle, Boston Pilot and the

100 Ibid.; Annual Register (London, 1919-21), 1919, p. 122 (see Appendix II).

101 Bonar Law to Balfour, 9 October 1919 (B.L.P./101/3/159).

102 During the month of October Lloyd George convened a full Cabinet of Ministers discarding the old War Cabinet.

103 Viscount Grey to L. G., 6 October 1919 (L.G.P./F/60/3/7); W. C. Paper G. T. 8387 (Cab.24/90/f.416).

104 Cabinet Committee on Ireland, 18 October 1919 (Cab.27/69).
Catholic press of the U.S.A. Their consensus was a compromise settlement approximating Dominion Home Rule, provided it was enacted swiftly and without serious bloodshed. These compilations by the British Embassy in Washington clearly illustrate the concern of British officials with American opinion. Unfortunately Lloyd George and his ministers disregarded this advice for more than a year.

The Cabinet was also aware of pro-Irish feelings in the Dominions, especially in Canada and Australia, both of which had many citizens of Irish descent. The Foreign Office reported that Canada, where each province had a great deal of autonomy, had declared itself for Irish self-government as early as 1882. In 1903 the Legislative Assembly of Quebec had passed a similar resolution. The Australian Parliament also had a tradition favoring Home Rule. Of less than five million whites in Australia nearly one million were Catholic, led by the anti-British Archbishop Mannix.

Two further reports reveal that the British failed to recognize that Irish opinion had swung over to the extremists as the last hope for Irish freedom. This support, moreover, was given not because of I.R.A. terrorism but because Britain had escalated the conflict. The former report stated that priests had little say in Irish political matters and were merely swimming with the


106 An undated memorandum, probably October 1919 (Cab. 24/92/f.501); Extract from a report by the Inspector-General of the R.I.C., 18 November 1919 (L.G.P./F/46/1/17).

current in order to retain their remaining influence. It described the I.R.A. armament as motley, indicating that force would bring Sinn Fein to accept Home Rule. The memorandum continued, saying that Irish labour was almost entirely Sinn Fein because Bolshevik doctrines had affected the working population. Britain habitually looked abroad for the source of Irish disaffection, failing to see that it resulted from her own oppression. During the World War, England feared a German-Irish collaboration and Russian influence in the postwar years. These convictions prevented Britain from realizing that a friendly Irish Republic posed no threat. Rather, they envisioned a tough policy aimed at the murderous gunmen to free moderates in Ireland from their clutch and enable them to conclude a Home Rule settlement with England.

While the Cabinet Committee was debating the nature of the offer to be made to Ireland and weighing public opinion at home and abroad, Dublin Castle continued to build its military strength. As early as 17 May 1919, General Sir Frederick Shaw indicated he would need an additional 10,000 reinforcements if general rebellion broke out. Churchill, the War Secretary, reported in the Commons on 18 December that British occupation had increased to 43,000 at an estimated cost of £860,000 monthly. British forces had numbered only 25,000 during the First World War, yet by July 1921 there were plans for 70,000 and more—approximating in size

108 General Shaw to French, 17 May 1919 (L.G.P./F/46/1/5).
109 Debates, Commons, 122 (18 December 1919), cols. 680-81.
110 Ibid., 125 (12 February 1920), col. 235; also see p. 220. of this dissertation.
the British Expeditionary Force of 1914.

Britain's efforts to crush the Sinn Fein rebellion went beyond military suppression of extreme organizations. The Government admitted trying at least 369 civilians by court-martial during the three years prior to 30 September 1919 and suppressing 43 newspapers since May, 1916. On December 15 the Nationalist Freeman's Journal was physically suspended by the removal of part of the press machinery.

In the Commons on November 25 the Prime Minister skillfully evaded an accusation that over 10,000 private homes had been searched in Ireland during the past year. Dorothy Macardle, using Sinn Fein's Irish Bulletin along with other Irish newspapers as her sources, estimated there had been 12,589 raids by Crown forces in the years 1917-19 while a compilation in the Irish Bulletin on 23-24 June 1921 suggests 13,782 for the year 1919 alone. In addition to searches and raids there had been lootings in Cork, Athlone and Kinsdale. The very troops which had sacked Fermoy in September looted the principal shops of Cork's main street on November 10. Another action was the arrest in 1918

111 Ibid., 5 November 1919, col. 1497.
112 Ibid., 30 October 1919, cols. 862-63.
113 Annual Register, 1919, p. 146.
114 Debates, Commons, 122 (25 November 1919), col. 554.
116 Owen, p. 561.
and 1919 of 17 Irish M.P.s elected to Westminster,\(^{117}\) while later in 1919 there were further arrests and deportings from Ireland.\(^{118}\)

It is difficult to determine the number of politically motivated Irish disturbances for 1919. The records of the Judicial Division of the Chief Secretary's Office show that there were 3600 indictable offenses committed in Ireland in 1919 with 176 involving firearms.\(^{119}\) Of the 176, seventy involved firing at persons and 106 at dwellings. Both the total offenses and the shootings were double the average number before 1918. From the War Office, Churchill reported 1500 political offenses including 18 killings and 77 armed attacks in Ireland between May and December, 1919.\(^{120}\) To his figure of 18 killings the two policemen killed at Soloheadbeg in January must be added. Of the 20 Crown servants murdered during 1919, seventeen were policemen and one a uniformed soldier.\(^{121}\) The largest number of attacks occurred in Munster.

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\(^{117}\) Debates, Commons, 121 (13 November 1919), cols. 498-99. Fifteen Irish M.P.s were arrested during the period, two of them twice.

\(^{118}\) Annual Register, 1919, p. 146.

\(^{119}\) Great Britain, Public Record Office, Colonial Office Records (C.O. 903/19/5). The records of Dublin Castle and the Irish Office (London) are now part of the records of the Colonial Office.

\(^{120}\) Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath, 1918-28 (New York, 1929), p. 297; Robert Rhodes James, Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900-1939 (New York, 1970), p. 140; The 1500 political outrages is perhaps a crude estimate. Dublin Castle attributed a total of 1089 outrages to Sinn Fein for a longer period from 1 January 1919 to 29 March 1920 (see Dublin Castle, List of Sinn Fein Outrages, 31 March 1920, L.G.P./F/19/2/9).

followed by those in the Dublin area. Considering that a state of war existed, the lives lost seemed insignificant during this year. The period, however, included the attempted assassination of Lord French as he was returning by train from a visit to Boyle in Co. Roscommon. His car had met him at Ashtown Station and before he had reached his lodge in Phoenix Park, Collins' men attacked the auto, using bombs and guns. The Viceroy barely escaped with his life.

On November 11 the Cabinet reassembled to consider the "First Report of the Cabinet Committee on Ireland", which had recommended that Britain immediately grant 'states rights' to the two parts of Ireland with a connecting link between to assist them to achieve unity on any basis short of complete separation. The Cabinet agreed to produce a bill and on 26 November decided to proceed with haste. Here the effect of public opinion on the Cabinet and the advice of statesmen like Grey, a temporary Ambassador to Washington in 1919, and journalists like Lord Riddell is noticeable. On December 3 the Cabinet decided that Ulster would be offered a local Parliament and not be allowed to select union with the United Kingdom. It was based on the Cabinet's desire to place Ireland in a position whereby unification would be easier.

122 Cabinet Conclusion 5/19/2, 11 November 1919 (Cab.23/18/f.35); Cabinet Paper (C.P.) 56, 4 November 1919 (Cab.24/92/£338-44).

123 Cab. Concl. 9/19/5, 26 November 1919 (Cab.23/18/£.93); C.P. 137, 17 November 1919 (Cab.24/93/£.166).


125 Cab. Concl. 10/19/2, 3 December 1919 (Cab.23/18/£.110).
when sought by both sides. Arthur Balfour alone opposed the Cabinet on this issue stressing that unification was impossible. He felt that a strong measure of Dominion Home Rule should be granted to the South with Ulster permanently separated and linked to the United Kingdom. From the vantage point of fifty years this solution appears not unwise.

On December 15 the Cabinet decided that the Prime Minister should make a statement prior to the introduction of the Bill to enable its easy modification. The Ministers also discussed an interesting proposal by Ulster's Sir James Craig to establish a boundary commission to define the Ulster border precisely as had been the practice at the Paris Peace Conference. The Government decided to consider the commission as an alternative but was otherwise committed to an Ulster consisting of six counties. Both Sir James O'Connor, a Southern Unionist Judge, and Craig influenced this decision.

As Lloyd George was preparing for his long-awaited statement on December 22nd, his feeling was one of gloom because he realized the futility of his eleventh-hour proposal. The lengthy speech he made in the Commons stressed the necessity of reaching a settle-

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126 Ibid., 12/19/10, 10 December 1919 (Cab.23/18/f.154).
128 Cab. Concl. 14/19/1, 15 December 1919 (Cab.23/18/f.203).
129 Ibid., 16/19/5, 19 December 1919 (Cab.23/18/f.247).
130 Ibid.
131 Scott, Political Diaries (20 December 1919), p. 380.
Ireland had "never been so alienated from British rule," yet the security of the Empire prevented his granting a Republic. In summary, he proposed self-government subject to three main considerations. First, Ireland was to remain an integral part of the United Kingdom; secondly, she would receive Home Rule in domestic affairs; and lastly, there would be two Parliaments—one North and one South—the former necessitated by Ulster's homogeneous population which was alien to the South.

The Act of Parliament would also create a Council of Ireland to serve as a link between the two parts. Each of the two legislatures was to be allotted twenty representatives. The Cabinet had preferred an Ulster consisting of six counties but the exact size was not yet determined. Four proposals were set down for consideration.

1. The Province of Ulster (nine counties).
2. Those counties included by county option.
4. An artificial homogeneous North-Eastern area based on the six counties but excluding solid Catholic areas within those counties and including solid Protestant areas from coterminous counties outside.

The remainder of the proposition lists the respective powers accorded to each of the legislative bodies, those reserved for the Imperial Parliament, and those to be transferred to an Irish Parliament in the event of unification. Unfortunately for Ireland and also for Britain, Lloyd George's offer of appeasement in the wee

132 Debates, Commons, 123 (22 December 1919), cols. 1174-77.
133 Ibid., col. 1175; Hubert Hull Memorandum, 4 February 1920 (L.G.P./FA80/5/1).
hours of 1919 was too little and too late!

3. Home Rule and The Press  
(December, 1919)

The tardy offer by the Prime Minister was both hailed and denounced as a Unionist measure. Generally, it can be said that it was welcomed by the English and criticized by the Irish.

It did represent a Unionist departure from Home Rule opposition.\textsuperscript{134} Although Unionists held six of the 10 positions on the Committee on Ireland, the four Liberals on it were not without influence. They included Macpherson, the Irish Secretary, and H. A. L. Fisher who did considerable work on the measure after November 30th.\textsuperscript{135} Though Lloyd George had largely absented himself from Irish discussions in 1919, he was strongly against Irish secession. There is no evidence, whatever, suggesting that Lloyd George would have granted greater independence to Ireland had he been free of Unionist control.

The offer had both positive and negative aspects. It was futile to offer the South of Ireland Home Rule, since it had ceased to be relevant after 1916. Though it was an honest effort made in the hope of settlement, not to divide and rule, Lloyd George's skepticism suggests it was aimed primarily at mollifying American and other critical opinion.\textsuperscript{136} Besides Sinn Fein, the Southern


\textsuperscript{136} Ward, p. 227; Scott, p. 380.
Unionists and remnants of the old Nationalist Home Rule Party voiced their rejection. The Council of Ireland concept was equally untenable because the South would not have accepted the equal status it gave to the smaller Northern state.

The only realistic section of the proposal was partition by which the North would achieve separate status. Partition was inevitable! The Ulster Crisis of 1912-14 had convinced Lloyd George of Ulster's willingness to fight Home Rule and hence the necessity of partition. No doubt his own nonconformist background helped him appreciate Ulster's anxiety. For three centuries the North-East corner of Ireland had developed along different lines from the rest. Ulster had religious, ethnic, and economic roots of her own which have persisted to the present day as testified by present civil strife.

The Home Rule offer was greeted enthusiastically in Britain in December 1919 and early January 1920. Of twenty-one British newspapers, seventeen warmly applauded the measure. They were influential London dailies like The Telegraph, Mail, Chronicle, Evening Standard, Globe (no longer Conservative), Westminster Gazette, Times, and the weekly Observer. The Times gave the Prime Minister the warmest reception of all. This is not surprising when one recalls that its plan for Federal Home Rule on 24 July was a measure strikingly similar to his. Also, during December,

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138 L.G. to R. J. Lynn, 5 June 1916 (L.G.P./D/14/2/13).
139 Today's Summary of the Press, 23 December 1919 (L.G.P./H/211/2).
1919, the *Times* had published a series of eight articles on "The State of Ireland" calling for a radical change of policy and transference of responsibility for government to Ireland.\(^{40}\) Evidently the Lloyd George measure was liberal enough to satisfy the wishes of the British press of the time.

In the Midlands, the *Birmingham Post*, *Yorkshire Post*, *Bradford Observer*, and even the liberal *Manchester Guardian* hailed the measure. The *Guardian* felt the proposed solution as an honest attempt to follow the middle path and suggested constructive rather than destructive criticism to improve the Bill.\(^{41}\) Welsh papers, while not optimistic, were favorable to Home Rule. Both the *South Wales Daily Post* and *The Cardiff Times* were friendly to the Lloyd George proposal. Scottish newspapers, *The Evening News* of Glasgow and *The Scotsman* reflected viewpoints similar to those of Wales. The High Tory Catholic Paper, *The Tablet*, had previously criticized Lloyd George's sense of proportion for championing the rights of other small nations while ignoring Ireland. It now welcomed his measure for its boldness and generosity.\(^{42}\)

There were three critical English papers and one, *The Daily News*, was lukewarm. The pro-Sinn Fein Catholic *Herald*, criticized the Government for not granting justice to Ireland. It declared that Britain had nothing to fear from an independent Ireland because "justice dispels fear."\(^{43}\) Apart from this, the most searing attack

\(^{40}\) *Times*, 9-23 December 1919.

\(^{41}\) *Manchester Guardian*, 23 December 1919.

\(^{42}\) *Tablet*, 3 January 1920, p. 4.

\(^{43}\) *Catholic Herald*, 23 December 1919, p. 5.
came from the Labourite Daily Herald which characterized Lloyd George's speech as a "pitiful bit of rhetoric" because it was pusilannious not to allow Ireland any real independence. It called on the Government to alter the Empire to a commonwealth and demonstrate to Ireland the benefit of a British affiliation. The right-wing Morning Post of London was the only prominent Unionist paper in England to criticize the measure. Its arguments against the Lloyd George proposal, much like criticism from the Labour side, explained the impossibility of its acceptance. But unlike the Labour paper, its solution was repression and maintenance of the Union by force. The general approval of the British press was undoubtedly satisfying to the Prime Minister. Unfortunately, when the Irish rejected the proposal, he felt few restraints keeping him from his policy of coercion.

Irish newspapers were almost unanimous in their denunciation of a Fourth Home Rule Bill. Of major papers, only those in Ulster were even dubious. The Belfast Telegraph, while definitely Unionist, advised its readers to suspend judgment and place their faith in Sir Edward Carson, long-time Ulster leader. Carson had consistently defended Unionism for the North and had declared himself against separation from Britain again in July and December of 1919.

144 Daily Herald, 23 December 1919, p. 5.
145 Ibid., 31 December 1919, p. 4.
146 Morning Post, 23 December 1919; 29 December 1919, p. 4.
147 Belfast Telegraph, 23 December 1919, p. 3.
The reaction in the South of Ireland was very different. On December 22 Lloyd George had compared his position to that of the Northern States and President Lincoln preventing Confederate secession in the American Civil War.\textsuperscript{149} Sinn Fein's \textit{Irish Bulletin} answered the Prime Minister's parallel with one of its own, stating:

\begin{quote}
We do not attempt secession. Nations cannot secede from a rule they have never accepted. We have never accepted yours and never will. Lincoln's reputation is safe from your comparison. He fought to abolish slavery, you fight to maintain it.... Nevertheless, we accept your challenge and will fight you 'with the same determination, with the same resolve' as the American States put into the fight for their freedom against your Empire.\textsuperscript{150}
\end{quote}

Sinn Fein's comparison was more valid than Lloyd George's and was echoed by the Nationalist \textit{Freeman's Journal}. It called the proposed settlement a "political cynic's bad joke at the expense of a nation...(he had) thrown into chaos."\textsuperscript{151} The Southern Unionist \textit{Irish Times} criticized the measure for its acceptance of partition, and especially for the destruction of the Southern Unionist position in the South.\textsuperscript{152} Even John Dillon, the Home Rule leader, recognized that the Bill provided no real basis for settlement.\textsuperscript{153}

It is clear that Lloyd George and his secretarial staff were concerned about the reaction in both Ireland and Britain. A summary describing the reactions of the press as well as a vast

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} \textit{Debates}, Commons, 123 (22 December 1919), col. 1174.
\item \textsuperscript{150} \textit{Irish Bulletin}, 4 March 1920, quoted in Macardle, p. 322.
\item \textsuperscript{151} \textit{Freeman's Journal}, 23 December 1919.
\item \textsuperscript{152} \textit{Irish Times}, 23 December 1919, p. 4.
\end{itemize}
collection of press cuttings are contained in his private papers. While he had delegated authority regarding Ireland in 1919 to Bonar Law, the Irish Government and the Committee on Ireland, as Prime Minister he himself still remained primarily responsible for Britain's Irish policy and the beginning of the Anglo-Irish War.

154 "Today's Summary of the Press", 23 December 1919 (L.G.P./H/211/2).
CHAPTER TWO

NEW TACTICS FOR AN OLD POLICY
(JANUARY TO JULY, 1920)

Lloyd George's policy of combined coercion and appeasement continued through the Summer of 1920, even though its failure had been evident since January. To the Irish Home Rule was more unacceptable than at any prior time and Crown forces appeared impotent to deal with the I.R.A. Yet Lloyd George was determined to enact Home Rule and reassert his authority in Ireland by force. To assure the success of his policy and the defeat of Sinn Fein, the first Black and Tans were introduced into the police force and a new administration was set up at Dublin Castle in the spring of 1920.

1. The Coming of the Black and Tans
(January-March, 1920)

The Annual Register for 1920 records that "throughout the year the State of Ireland was completely deplorable and caused far more anxiety than had ever been known in the history of that unfortunate country."\(^1\) It attributed this condition to Sinn Fein's making government by Britain impossible but failed to note the moral and political justification of the Irish struggle for freedom.

Sinn Fein's victory at the polls in late 1918, the lack of public support for Crown forces throughout 1919, and the repudiation of Home Rule by all Irish parties and by most of the Irish press in December, 1919, displayed the bankruptcy of British official policy. Membership in Sinn Fein clubs throughout Ireland

\(^1\)Annual Register, 1920, p. 9.
had almost doubled during 1918 and 1919—from 66,270 to 118,649
a sizeable number of political activists for a land with only four
million people. Even the church entered the revolutionary period
1919-23 "passively, if not actively associated with the revolu-
tionary cause." This support resulted more from the influence of
young Republican priests than from the desire of the Hierarchy to
preserve its influence in Irish society.

Local elections held on 15 January 1920 again proved Sinn
Fein the major political force in Ireland—despite its failure to
capture a majority of the votes cast—as one hundred seventy-two
of 206 county councils and 11 of the 12 cities and boroughs returned
Sinn Fein majorities. In the southern three provinces, Republicans
—Sinn Fein and Irish labor—commanded a clear majority while
Unionists narrowly held the nine county province of Ulster. Sinn
Fein's success was due primarily to its superior enthusiasm and
organization and to the disunity of opposition.

Even more significant than popular support was the activity
of the Republican Army. On 20 January the I.R.A. killed a con-
stable in a barracks attack just outside Thurles, Co. Tipperary.
The R.I.C. responded for the first time that year in what was a

2Dublin Castle, List of Sinn Fein membership, 1917-19 (C.O.
903/19/5).

3David W. Miller, "The Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, 1898-

4Ibid., p. 90.

5Macardle, pp. 326-27; Hugh Martin, Ireland in Insurrection

6Martin, pp. 215-17.
minor reprisal. The next day Collins' men killed the Deputy Commissioner of the D.M.P., W.C.F. Redmond. Dublin Castle promptly offered £10,000 reward for information leading to the conviction of police murderers. The Irish public remained unwilling to testify in court about these attacks. Rather than being terrorized by the I.R.A. as Edgar Holt is inclined to believe,\(^7\) their attitude reflected the pervading apathy to British rule. Sinn Fein's program of violence remained the only viable alternative. As even Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Fein's original policy of passive resistance and General Shaw, British Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, agreed: "Britain yielded nothing except at gunpoint."\(^8\)

Dublin Castle retaliated against Sinn Fein's resistance and control of local government with more than 10,000 raids in the six months prior to 31 May 1920.\(^9\) Yet Macpherson, the Irish Secretary, while acknowledging these raids as attempts to capture leaders of the I.R.A., stated in the Commons that their number were grossly exaggerated.\(^10\) In the beginning stages of the war—from January of 1919 until March of 1920—Richard Bennett calculated more than 20,000 raids by Crown forces and 429 proclamations suppressing Irish newspapers and the right of assembly.\(^11\) His little book, The Black

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\(^7\)Holt, p. 197.

\(^8\)Younger, p. 92; C.P. 1131, Report by General Shaw, 25 March 1920 (Cab.24/104/ff.142-43).

\(^9\)Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 21; Dorothy Macardle, using the Irish press, determined more than 5000 raids and 500 arrests in January and February alone (see Macardle, p. 330).

\(^10\)Debates, Commons, 125 (12 February 1920), col. 198.

\(^11\)Bennett, p. 25; the 13,782 raids suggested for 1919 by the Irish Bulletin plus 5000 in January-February, 1920, by Macardle approximate this figure (see pp. 30 and above).
and Tans, a good account of the military side of the war, accepts many of the figures earlier provided by the Irish press.

The proscribing of county fairs and markets in Tipperary and the attempt to seize funds supporting the Republican Government from Irish banks were other aspects of British suppression. The cancelling of fairs, instead of limiting the movement of Sinn Fein, raised living costs and further aggravated feeling against the British regime.¹² The application of a curfew in Dublin on 23 February also did nothing to improve the situation.

Parliament reassembled on 10 February to hear the King's opening message. After the address the various problems facing Britain were discussed both by government and opposition. On the subject of Ireland, opponents asked the government for broadmindedness and generosity. Lord Hugh Cecil, now an independent Conservative critical of the Lloyd George Coalition, called for an Irish convention to arrange a settlement¹³ and William Adamson, Labour Party leader in the Commons until 1921, suggested that the government immediately withdraw its entire force from Ireland.¹⁴ There were also strong elements which backed the Prime Minister's Irish policy and some even pressed him to take even firmer action.

The Prime Minister answered his critics with the same line he had used in his statement in the Commons on December 22. A Republic was impossible, and because of the disunity in Ireland his bill remained the only alternative. He challenged his opponents to

¹²Macardle, p. 332.
¹³Debates, Commons, 125 (10 February 1920), col. 51.
¹⁴Ibid., cols. 19-21.
offer a better plan:

There are murders in Ireland, there are assassinations of a most cowardly and despicable character.... Are we to leave the assassins in charge? Are we to withdraw our protection? What is the proposal?\(^{15}\)

Such a challenge was a favorite tactic of Lloyd George—throughout the Anglo-Irish war and indeed throughout his entire career—to confound his enemies and sidetrack the real issue.\(^{16}\) Not once did he indicate that withdrawal from the South would mean peace because it would have been peace under an Irish Republican Government. Separation was unacceptable to Lloyd George who again, on 29 March, compared the Irish situation to the American Civil War. To him, DeValera was Jefferson Davis.\(^{17}\) His close friend and official biographer, Malcolm Thomson, has stated that Lloyd George was obsessed with the belief—however inaccurate—that his Irish policy paralleled that of Lincoln.\(^{18}\) Regarding Ireland, he chose to ignore his liberal policy in Europe the year before whereby Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other nations had received their independence at the Paris Peace Conference. This double standard, leaving Ireland to remain the only unfree white nation in the world, was pointed out in both the Catholic Herald and the Daily Herald.\(^{19}\)

As the Prime Minister and his colleagues were determined to

\(^{15}\text{Ibid.}, \text{col. 38.}\)

\(^{16}\text{Frances (Stevenson) Lloyd George, "Introduction" to Thomson, p. 13.}\)

\(^{17}\text{Debates, Commons, 127 (31 March 1920), col. 1332.}\)

\(^{18}\text{Thomson, p. 315.}\)

\(^{19}\text{Catholic Herald, 20 March 1920, p. 4; Daily Herald, 11 February 1920.}\)
proceed with the Fourth Home Rule Bill it was introduced in the Commons on February 25th. Presented as the "Bill for the Better Government of Ireland," it came to be known throughout Ireland as the 'Partition Bill'. The Daily Herald, the most unrelentingly critical English Daily, more appropriately entitled it, "A bill for the lesser misgovernment of Ireland." Even the Lord Justice of Ireland, Sir James O'Connor, whose advice contributed to the shaping of the Bill, concluded in December, 1919, that it was unworkable. The Bill granted Home Rule to six of Ulster's nine counties. That decision had been made by the Cabinet on February 24th. Walter Long, Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Ireland and Arthur Balfour were instrumental in this Cabinet decision, even though the Committee on Ireland had voted for the traditional nine county area. By limiting the north to six counties, only 70,000 of 890,000 Protestants would be excluded. Also the Ulster Unionist Council accepted the six county arrangement in March. It had been supported by Craig on 19 December 1919 and Carson gave his assent to the Bill on March 31st during the second reading in the Commons.

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20 Daily Herald, 11 February 1920.
21 O'Connor to Macpherson, forwarded to the Prime Minister on 29 December 1919 (L.G.P./F/46/1/18).
22 Cab. Concl., 24 February 1920 (Cab.23/30).
23 Memorandum by Walter Long, 3 February 1920 (L.G.P./F/34/1/6); Balfour to L.G., 10 and 19 February 1920 (Cab.24/98/ff.291-93); Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 104-106.
24 Macardle, p. 339.
25 Cab. Concl. 16/19/5, 19 December 1919 (Cab.23/18/ff.247).
26 Annual Register, 1920, p. 35; Times, 2 April 1920.
The measure was preferable to the 1914 Act and Ulster no longer had the complete support of English Unionists who—since 1918—had backed Home Rule. By not supporting Ulster in 1919-20 as they had in 1921-14, "Conservatives had succeeded in reconciling Ulster's position with general Irish policy until (peace) negotiations began" in 1921.27 In the intervening period of one year, however, the majority of Conservatives like Walter Long remained firmly opposed to a Dominion grant to the South.28 This had been suggested by ex-Prime Minister Asquith in January and February 1920.29

Two murders in March raised the level of violence established the year before. On March 19 Tomas MacCurtain, Lord Mayor of Cork and an I.R.A. commandant, was murdered at home by police in disguise. While the evidence proving R.I.C. guilt is circumstantial, responsible historians have remained convinced. The British Government, though not involved in the killing, became accessories to it by protecting those responsible.30 Allen Bell, Dublin Castle's agent involved in the confiscation of Sinn Fein funds from Dublin banks, was killed on March 27. Collins' men, unprepared to forfeit their crucial funds, shot him in daylight on a crowded Dunleary (Dun Laoghaire) tram. Although citizens had been delighted to testify against the R.I.C. in the MacCurtain case, no one displayed any


28Memorandum by Walter Long, C.I. 87, 29 September 1920 (Cab. 27/70/ff.234-36); also see the same as L.G.P./F/34/1/46.


30Younger, p. 89.
concern for the elderly Bell.⁵¹ These shootings in March, together with the arrival of police reinforcements and a new administration in the Spring of 1920, mark the turning point between the beginning of the Anglo-Irish War (January, 1919-March, 1920) and actual war itself (Summer, 1920-Summer, 1921). For the Irish people it was a war for liberation, while for Britain it was war to recover the authority which had been lost.

The reinforcement of the R.I.C. was simply insufficient to carry out British policy, and new tools were needed to force Ireland to accept Lloyd George's solution. R.I.C. strength had slipped below 9,700, though the prewar level had averaged well above 10,000.⁵² The first new recruits arrived on 25 March 1920. They were not convicts from English prisons, as is popularly believed in Ireland, but it is hard to take literally Churchill's assertion that they were selected on account of "their intelligence, their characters, and their record in the war."⁵³ A prominent Irish magistrate referred to them as desperadoes of the vilest type and as "a bunch of gorillas", with "India-rubber-looking faces, large ears, big fat lips" and the "blank uncanny expression of the cretin."⁵⁴

Aside from biased descriptions, many of the Black and Tans, as they were notoriously known, were in fact experienced veterans

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⁵¹Holt, p. 200.

⁵²Ibid.; Richard Hawkins, "Dublin Castle and the Royal Irish Constabulary, 1916-22", in Williams, The Irish Struggle, pp. 167-81, suggests the R.I.C. was 1200-1500 men below normal strength.

⁵³Churchill, p. 300. See, for a more objective view, Bennett, pp. 37-38.

recently demobilized after serving on the Western Front.\textsuperscript{35}

As a result of having demobilized two million men from the armed services, more than another million from the munitions industry, and reconverting to a peacetime economy, unemployment inevitably resulted. It is not strange that these unemployed 'war heroes' volunteered—or that they were hired by British authorities—for Ireland where they could earn a regulation 10 shillings per day (about $2.50), a tidy sum for those depressed times.\textsuperscript{36} Because there was a shortage of the regular dark-green R.I.C. uniform, the new recruits were outfitted with surplus khaki uniforms, black belts, and dark-green R.I.C. caps.\textsuperscript{37} This color combination led to their being equated with a pack of local hounds in Southern Ireland called Black and Tans. The name continued even after they were clothed in normal dress.

Between January 1 and May 31, 1920, approximately 1500 of the first recruits were sent to Ireland;\textsuperscript{38} those arriving immediately after March 25 were clothed in the Black and Tan uniform. Reinforcements were even heavier from the Summer of 1920 until that of 1921. These ex-soldiers came from a variety of ordinary backgrounds—including dockers, farm workers, students, and clerical workers. One historian has speculated that their ordinary pity and honour had been dried up by their long merciless ordeal in the trenches.\textsuperscript{39} The brutal impact of war on men's more primitive instincts was earlier observed by

\textsuperscript{35}Younger, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{36}Pakenham, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{37}James, Churchill, p. 141.

\textsuperscript{38}Holt, p. 202.

\textsuperscript{39}Younger, p. 95; Martin, p. 61.
Dorothy Macardle in her study, The Irish Republic. The effect of the war on men was widespread and not confined to low-mental or criminal types.

The arrival of the first new recruits prompted the I.R.A. to issue warnings on the danger of joining the R.I.C.: 'Spies and Informers Beware' and 'Join the R.A.F. and See the World—Join the R.I.C. and See the Next'. They aimed at discouraging the new recruits in the same manner used against the R.I.C. in 1919. Later in 1920 and in 1921, these threats were "used time and again by the Tans" to draw attention away from their own excessive measures." Like the old R.I.C., the Black and Tans soon found themselves inadequate to deal with the irregular tactics of Republican forces. They were experienced only in the trench combat of the First World War and lacked the special training needed to cope with new hit-and-run guerrilla methods. Likewise the country was solidly opposed to their arrival. Frustrated and poorly disciplined by their R.I.C. leaders, they turned to Irish stout and wine to escape their troubles, and increasingly they reacted to Sinn Fein attacks with reprisals against Irish civilians and property.

Sinn Fein, which maintained absolute sobriety, "had been gathering strength rapidly" and Irish sympathy, while not un-

40 Macardle, p. 340.
41 Younger, p. 92.
42 Martin, p. 61; Drunkenness is admitted by the Cabinet on 29 December 1920 and 15 February 1921—see Cab. Concl. 79A/20 (Cab. 23/23/f.341) and Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 53.
43 Anderson to Greenwood, 20 July 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/14).
animous, favored the I.R.A. over the British. The coming of the Tans and the resulting campaign of reprisals assured the I.R.A. of complete popular support and served only to "increase the bitterness of the struggle." As always in the history of Anglo-Irish relations, the English Government underrated the national spirit of the Irish.

2. Greenwood and the New Administration
(April-May, 1920)

Accompanying the first Black and Tans to Ireland in the spring of 1920 was a new Chief Secretary and administration at Dublin Castle. While Lloyd George was confident that a new show of force would bring down the Republic and force Ireland to accept his solution, it is improbable, as Younger says, "that he ever imagined the trouble building up into a war." The sparse attention given by him to Ireland in 1919 and early 1920—outside of the Fourth Home Rule Bill—is evident upon examining the Parliamentary Debates for the House of Commons, the Cabinet Papers and his own personal papers. Even the coming of the Tans and the new administration are not discussed by the Cabinet. His full attention was not directed there until late July of 1920 when he realized that current police action was insufficient to deal with Ireland.


45 Terence De Vere White, "Arthur Griffith", in O'Brien, p. 69.

46 Younger, p. 87.

Lt. Col. Sir Hamar Greenwood, Britain's last Irish Chief Secretary from 1920 until 1922, was appointed in April but did not arrive in Ireland until May 6.\textsuperscript{48} As early as 30 December 1919 he had indicated his desire to serve in Lloyd George's Government\textsuperscript{49} Macpherson, retiring on April 1st, had been one of the chief makers of Irish policy in 1919 but the continual threat of assassination and the pressure of office caused him great anxiety\textsuperscript{50} Greenwood's selection as his successor, it seems, resulted because no one else wanted the position. It would have meant jeopardizing a political future by accepting an office long considered the graveyard of political aspirants. As the historian Wheeler-Bennett pointed out, congratulations upon appointment as Chief Secretary were often accompanied by "expressions of sympathy and regret."\textsuperscript{51}

Greenwood had served briefly as Under-Secretary at the Home office and Ireland was his first opportunity for a Cabinet post. Though a Liberal M.P. and supposed Home Ruler since 1906, he was against Irish separation. In fact, he had been noted for his speeches on Imperial Defense. Like Lloyd George, he was of Welsh


\textsuperscript{49} Greenwood to L.G., 30 December 1919 (L.G.P./F/95/1/62).

\textsuperscript{50} Owen, p. 564; Sir Henry Robinson, \textit{Memories Wise and Otherwise} (New York, 1923), pp. 274-76. Robinson was the last Vice-President of the Local Government Board of Ireland and served in Ireland between 1898 and 1922.

parentage, though born in Canada where he had practiced law. Not unimportant in his background was his training in the Canadian Militia and his experience in the First World War as a Service Battalion commander and War Office administrator.

His "fearless outlook" upon difficulty and danger has been recorded in contrast to Macpherson's anxiety by both the Times and his contemporary C.J.C. Street. Richard Bennett has described him as possessing "the assurance of the fairground barker he had once been." But Greenwood's lack of fear was not the result of intelligence and understanding, though his brother-in-law L.S. Amery and the historian Robert Blake believed it was, so much as that of a man lacking judgment and moral conviction. His tendencies to lie for reasons of state and to believe in its justification illustrate this fact and will be discussed later, particularly in chapter three.

The coming of Greenwood and the Tans was quickly celebrated in local poems throughout Ireland. Small boys were heard chanting one of these in Dublin:

Said L. G. to Macpherson, 'I'll give you the sack
To manage old Ireland you haven't the knack.
I'll send Greenwood over, he's a much stronger man,
And we'll fill up the Green Isle with the bold

52 Times, 3 April 1920; Street, The Administration of Ireland, 1920, p. 82.
53 Bennett, p. 31.
54 Amery, II, 228; Blake, 419.
Black and Tan.'
He sent them all over to pillage and loot,
To burn down the houses and inmates to shoot;
'To reconquer Ireland,' says he, 'is my plan,
With Macready and Co. and the bold Black and Tan.'

Prior to the appointment of Greenwood, General Sir Nevil
Macready, Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, had been
selected as Commander-in-Chief of British forces in Ireland. He
succeeded General Sir Frederick Shaw on March 23 and arrived in
Ireland on the 14th of April. Shaw, who recognized the strength
of Sinn Fein, had wanted martial law applied to the whole of Ire-
land; a measure Lloyd George and his colleagues were unwilling to
take. They believed that police action alone would be sufficient
to contain the rebels. Evidently, Lloyd George had planned for
some time to replace Shaw but not with Sir William Robertson, as
Churchill had suggested. Macready accepted the post reluctantly.
His distaste for Irish politics stemmed from his command in Belfast
during the 1914 Home Rule crisis. Lord French, his old chief in
the First World War, and Walter Long persuaded him to take the job.
Unlike his predecessor, Shaw, and Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson,
C.I.G.S., Macready did not view martial law as the only solution of
the Irish problem, and his recognition of the political argument

55Macready, II, 483.
56Debates, Commons, 127 (29 March 1920), col. 870. For a
description of Macready see Concise D.N.B., II, 287.
57C.P. 1131, Reports by General Shaw, 25 and 27 March 1920
(Cab.24/104/ff.142-43).
58Churchill to L.G., 11 November 1919 (L.G.P./F/9/1/44) and
29 Feb. 1920 (L.G.P./F/9/2/10); Stephan Roskill, Hankey, Man of
59Macready, II, 425.
against such a measure made him more acceptable than the hardliner Shaw. Also, his dual experience in police and military work seemed to give him special qualification for total command in Ireland. Unfortunately for him and for Britain, he was never placed in effective control of the police.

Arriving in Ireland ahead of Greenwood, Macready observed the chaotic situation in the Castle's administration. Eighty Irishmen held at Mountjoy Prison had gone on strike to protest their being denied established privileges. Irish Labour went on general strike on April 12 to support the prisoners and along with vast Irish crowds demonstrated their united opposition to British rule. The former Chief Secretary, Macpherson, though often absent from Dublin had never allowed Under-Secretary James MacMahon, a Roman Catholic, any authority. Much of the trouble resulted from the fact that power had been centralized in the hands of the Assistant Under-Secretary, Sir John Taylor. Concerned with the critical situation, Macready discussed it with the Lord Lieutenant and several civil servants and obtained permission to ask London for a small committee to reorganize the Irish Administration. In the interim, Lord French released the prisoners and the strike was cancelled. MacMahon took control of the Irish Government and Taylor went on leave, being replaced permanently in May.

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60 Memo by Macready, 24 May 1920, forwarded with a letter to Miss Stevenson, 25 May 1920 (L.G.P./F/36/2/14).

61 Bennett, p. 34; Sir John Anderson also describes the chaotic situation at Dublin Castle in a letter to Greenwood, 20 July 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/14).

62 Macready, II, 449.
Greenwood arrived in Dublin on May 6. He had said he was coming to Ireland as a friend to bring peace, but it was to be peace on England's terms. With him came Sir Warren Fisher, Alfred W. Cope and two civil servants. Fisher, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, came in response to Macready’s request for a thorough investigation. His report recommended a thorough overhauls of Dublin Castle machinery and resulted in the official appointments of Sir John Anderson—who had arrived in Dublin on May 22—as Under-Secretary and Cope as Assistant Under-Secretary.  

Anderson, later Viscount Waverley and a Cabinet minister of Churchill's during the Second World War, was one of the truly great civil servants of the twentieth century. He came to Dublin from the Chairmanship of the Board of Inland Revenue. His new position as Under-Secretary was most difficult. The machinery of the Castle had not been improved since the 1916 rising, and the influence of Taylor had only worsened matters. To complicate the situation further, Anderson was to share office with James MacMahon, retained from the previous administration. "This dichotomy of rule might well have been the source of difficulty and discord had it not been for the good sense of the two men." MacMahon provided a vast knowledge of Ireland, and Anderson the administrative and financial expertise. Anderson, though often away in London, deputized in the administration for Greenwood and withstood the many pressures—

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63 Anderson to Greenwood, 10 July 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/14); Macready, II, 456-57.
64 Robinson, pp. 292-93; Holt, p. 204.
65 Wheeler-Bennett, p. 59.
British and Irish—with "courage and infinite patience."66

'Andy' Cope likewise came to Dublin Castle with considerable background. His selection as Taylor's replacement was a fortunate one since he was to play a significant part in bringing about the truce in July, 1921. Earlier, he had been a detective in the Department of Customs and Excise working under cover in drinking establishments in London's West End as well as in dives in the East End67. It was at the Ministry of Pensions, however, that Cope came to the eye of the Prime Minister, with whom he shared many of the same devious attributes. His undercover work, administrative background, and participation on Fisher's committee examining the Irish administration, made him the likely candidate for the post. In theory, Cope was Assistant Under-Secretary, but in reality he was Lloyd George's "personal and secret envoy for the purpose of establishing contact with the Sinn Fein leaders with a view to negotiating peace."68 The Prime Minister—with Cope in the role of peacemaker—readied himself for the eventual task of peace by compromise.

There were still other changes at the Castle besides those already mentioned. Mark Sturgis came as the other Assistant Under-Secretary, but in petto so as not to hinder Cope's efforts. Sturgis was effectively used by Anderson as intelligence liaison between himself and the Viceroy's aide, Richard Wyndham-Quin (later Lord Dunraven).69 William E. Wylie became the legal advisor to Dublin

66 Robinson, p. 293.
68 Wheeler-Bennett, p. 60; Bennett, p. 132.
69 Ibid.; also see Who Was Who (1941-50), p. 460.
Castle during 1919-20 and Judge of the Supreme Court of Jurisdiction of Ireland for the years 1920-24. His moderate and liberal views placed him in a position where he was moved to uphold the law on one hand while hating the repressive policies on the other. He faced this difficult task with great courage. His integrity, "shrewd awareness of the currents of Irish life," and accomplishments as a great horseman probably saved his life from I.R.A. assassins, later enabling him to become Judge of the High Court of the Irish Free State, 1924-35. A number of other officials came, including London journalist Basil Clarke to combat Sinn Fein propaganda as the Castle's Director of Information (propaganda).

In April General Macready had urged Lord French to appoint an official to control all police in Ireland and work with both the military and the Chief Secretary's office. Sir Joseph Byrne, Inspector-General of the R.I.C., was removed from his position for apparent opposition to the new counter-terror tactics of the Government. Major-General Hugh H. Tudor, veteran of the Boer and Great Wars, was eventually chosen 'Police Advisor' over all police in Ireland: the D.M.P., old R.I.C., and the Black and Tans. Sir Henry Robinson has described him as a "most intrepid and resourceful soldier," yet his subordinate, Brigadier-General Frank Crozier, claims he was a poor choice to deal with police difficulties because

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70 McDowell, The Irish Convention, p. 210. Irishmen have shown great respect for accomplished horsemen (see Wheeler-Bennett, p. 61).
71 Macready, II, 453.
72 Macardle, p. 340.
73 Robinson, p. 299.
because of his kindly disposition. His appointment was much influenced by his close friendship with Churchill who headed the War Office. Accompanying Tudor was his Deputy and Chief of Military and Police Intelligence in Ireland, Brigadier-General Ormonde de L'Epee Winter.

The new Irish Government under Greenwood certainly contained men of greater reputation than that under Macpherson. Sir Henry Robinson's description of them as "some of the brightest ornaments of the English Civil Service and the Army" especially applies to Anderson and Cope, while Greenwood as well as Macready and Tudor were well-known in political circles.

In the Commons on the third of May, Lord Robert Cecil asked the Government who was responsible for government in Ireland, the Lord Lieutenant or Chief Secretary? Edward Shortt, Home Secretary and a former Chief Secretary, answered for the Government. He stated that both were responsible jointly and both belonged to the Cabinet. In theory, the Viceroy was Chief Executive of Ireland but since the union with Britain in 1800 his position had become an anomaly, real power being invested in the Chief Secretary. With Lord French's accession as Viceroy that office assumed greater influence in 1918 and early 1919, but effective control still re-

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75 Macready, II, 459.
76 Robinson, p. 292.
77 Debates, Commons, 128 (3 May 1920), col. 1701.
mained with the Chief Secretary. Greenwood's arrival along with his new staff left little doubt as to who was in command. Through all of these changes, however, French was retained as Viceroy.

With the regular attendance of the Chief Secretary in Parliament in London, responsibility devolved upon the Under-Secretary. In Greenwood's absence, Anderson effectively managed Dublin Castle.79 His team of civil servants, while of a diverse character, was loyal to him and to each other. Wheeler-Bennett has described them well:

Anderson, the personification of a senior Civil Servant.... Yet, when open, conveying something of reserve, something of humour...; Andy Cope, the fiery democrat, consumed with a deathless hatred of militarism and a passionate desire for peace, unorthodox...temperamental...; and then Mark Sturgis...the looker-on who sees most of the game, the secret chronicler of those Castle days...detached...more cognizant of the great world outside....80

These new Dublin Castle officials along with Greenwood, Macready and Tudor, had none of the narrow prejudices of the Anglo-Irish bureaucracy which had previously controlled the Irish Administration, but neither were they inhibited from implementing Lloyd George's policy of force.81 The coming of the Tans and the new leadership on the one hand and Cope's arrival on the other represent an intensified effort on the part of the Lloyd George Government to carry out its avowed policy of coercion and appeasement established in late 1919. The newcomers represented not a new policy but rather new tools and tactics as is indicated by the lack of attention

79Wheeler-Bennett, p. 62.
80Ibid., p. 61.
81Bennett, p. 38.
given to them by the British Cabinet.

3. Britain's New Irish Tactics
(April-June, 1920)

Lloyd George's new subordinates in Ireland faced a difficult task in suppressing Sinn Fein. Despite official suppression of extreme Republican organizations and a stepped-up campaign by police in early 1920, the previous administration had failed miserably. In the beginning stages of the war—from January, 1919, through March, 1920—there had been only 36 murders, 81 attempted murders, 32 other assaults, 54 firings into dwellings, 150 cases of incendiarism and injury to property, and 426 raids for arms, ammunition and explosives, totaling 1089 offenses by Sinn Fein. The number of Sinn Fein offenses was small when compared to the 20,000 raids by British Forces listed earlier for the same period—two hundred ten of which resulted in arrests. These raids by Sinn Fein were largely tactical and had no appreciable effect on the civilian population while raids by the British were general and caused great disruption of normal life. It is no surprise that the people preferred Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. Terrorization came not from Irish extremists, but rather from British attempts at suppression. Yet throughout 1920, Greenwood and other British officials maintained that the Irish people were terrorized by the 'gunmen' or 'murder gang'.

On Easter Sunday, 1920, Michael Collins ingeniously organized

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82 Dublin Castle, List of Sinn Fein Outrages, 31 March 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/9).

83 Debates, Commons, 128 (26 April 1920), col. 864.
the burning of approximately 100 British revenue offices throughout Ireland. This strategy shocked the authorities. They had anticipated some type of rising commemorating Easter, 1916. The Annual Register recorded that "Dublin became like a beleaguered city with a cordon of soldiers all round it, while through the streets motor lorries were seen hurrying to and fro laden with troops in full battle equipment."84 On April 5th, two days after Collins' successful exploit, the Mountjoy Prison strike began. A week later the Irish Labour Party and Trades Union Congress called a general strike.

In the Commons, J. R. Clynes of the Labour Party criticized Government policy stating that the House would be indignant if conditions in Ireland existed elsewhere, while Sir Donald MacLean of the Opposition Liberals warned that it would be folly to think the military could crush the national spirit of the Irish.85 Later in the month, Sinn Feiners detained in London's Wormwood Scrubs Prison also went on hunger-strike, demanding treatment as political prisoners instead of common felons. Though he and Cabinet Assistant Secretary, Tom Jones, had misgivings, Bonar Law defended the holding of these prisoners without trial.86 The grounds for this defense was that they were enemies and, because of Sinn Fein's alleged terrorism, testimony from the Irish citizenry was impossible to obtain. The government used this line frequently in 1920 refusing to admit popular support for the Republic. The demands of the London prisoners were supported

84 Annual Register, 1920, p. 45.
85 Debates, Commons, 127 (13 April 1920), cols. 1546 and 1554.
86 Cab. Conc1. 20/20/1, 15 April 1920 (Cab.23/21/f.13); Debates Commons, 128 (26 April 1920), cols. 986-87; Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 15-16.
by 48,000 Liverpool dockers who threatened a sympathetic strike. Liverpool, long a haven for the poverty-stricken Irish, was one of the most pro-Irish areas in Britain. Thomas Johnson, Acting Secretary of the Irish Labour Party and Trades Union Congress, summed up the feeling of Irish Labourers both in Ireland and Britain, stating that "the only alternative to absolute self-determination in Ireland is the extermination of the people."\(^8^7\) The consistent support of Sinn Fein by Irish Labour in 1919 and 1920 illustrated that Republicanism was the demand of more than a few extremists as Bonar Law had maintained.

The Viceroy finally decided to treat Sinn Feiners as political prisoners, paroling those on hunger-strike who had not yet been tried. Bonar Law wrote to Lloyd George, who was away from London at the time, explaining he feared their dying one by one.\(^8^8\) Irish hunger-striking, modeled after the British feminist movement prior to the World War, presented the Government with a real dilemma. It was forced either to release the strikers or to let them die—neither course of action being acceptable. Later in the year, British policy left hunger-strikers to bear the consequences of their action.

In his letter to the Prime Minister on 23 April, Bonar Law also had explained the worsening situation in Ireland. Lord French was quickly summoned to London to confer with the Cabinet. On the twenty-sixth and again on the 30th, French told the Prime

\(^8^7\) Bennett, p. 36.

\(^8^8\) Bonar Law to L.G., 23 April 1920 (L.G.P./F/31/1/25); also see Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 112-13.
Minister that he must choose between war and truce. The situation had worsened and the 'murder party' which now controlled Sinn Fein could be driven out only by force. The Chief Secretary, Greenwood, urged that motor and armoured cars be increased to defeat the conspiracy. The Prime Minister answered his colleagues saying that while he would not declare war against rebels,

Disorder must be put down at whatever cost. If there were a truce it would be an admission that we were beaten and it might lead to our having to give up Ireland...Home Rule would be an utter failure unless and until order were restored."

Besides being pressed by French and Greenwood, Lloyd George and the Cabinet were also being pressured by a Southern Irish Unionist deputation. Bonar Law circulated a memo to his colleagues on April 29 stating he had received the delegation on April 26. Enclosed with the memo was a statement by these Unionists suggesting that the revolutionary movement in Ireland was more than just political. Rather, it contained three movements working in unison—the politically-oriented Sinn Fein employing the quasi-military tactics of the I.R.A., a striking industrial labour organization, and the militant agrarian movement. This combination was regarded by the conservative deputation as a result, not of aspiration for Irish freedom, but rather of a Bolshevik organization bolstered by foreign funds. They recommended a firm and consistent policy to

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89 Cab. Conc1. 23/20A, 26 April 1920 (Cab.23/21/ff.59-62); Roskill, p. 153.

90 Cab. Conc1. 23/20A (f.62).

91 C.P. 1195, 29 April 1920 (Cab.26/104/f.450).

92 Ibid., ff. 451-56.
restore order. Time has proved their theory misconceived regarding Irish Republicanism, for the history of the past 50 years shows socialism to be a weak force in Ireland as compared with nationalism. The twentieth century has been for Ireland and Afro-Asia what the nineteenth was for Europe—a period of intensified national feeling.

A Conference of Ministers met at 10 Downing Street on 11 May 1920 at 11:30 a.m. \(^93\) Bonar Law was in the Chair, the others present being Austen Chamberlain, Birkenhead, Churchill, H. A. L. Fisher, Worthington-Evans, Shortt and Walter Long. Before them was a statement prepared in four parts showing further police and military requirements. Needed were eight more battalions of troops, 643 of the 749 allotted signal personnel, 234 of 427 required mechanical transports and, finally, a police official to supervise both the R.I.C. and D.M.P. It was suggested that the post go to Sir Edward Bulfin, an Irishman, but as was earlier mentioned it went to General Tudor. The statement also called for the establishment of an intelligence branch or secret service in Ireland. To head this branch, General Ormonde Winter was selected.

General Macready briefed the conference on the situation in Ireland and requirements necessary to control the prevailing disorder. The conference then concluded that all needs be promptly met with the supply of transports, enabling greater mobility, being most urgent. It also decided that a 'Special Emergency Gendarmerie'—Churchill's idea—be established as a branch of the R.I.C. These

conclusions were considered by the Cabinet chaired by Bonar Law on May 19. The Prime Minister, who was ill during the middle of May, was kept informed by Law, who was in favor of raising the eight battalions of ex-servicemen suggested by Macready and the Irish Executive.

The same day, Churchill circulated to the Cabinet a War Office memorandum entitled the "Formation of a Special Force for Service in Ireland." This report by Macready's War Office Committee declined to recommend the special 8000 man 'Corps of Gendarmerie' to assist the R.I.C. because it would have been impossible to recruit these units in less than a year. Also, the problem of discipline within the R.I.C. was recognized. Instead, the Macready committee desired a special enlistment of ex-war veterans between ages 26 and 35 to serve in eight garrison battalions to be administered by the War Office and not the R.I.C. There were to be 35 officers for each Battalion with non-commissioned officers 10% above normal.

At noon and again in the late afternoon on May 21st, the Cabinet met and for the time being accepted the Macready Report. Realizing their plans would be criticized by the Opposition, they determined to proceed hastily with them, believing the Irish situation required prompt action. It was also important, they decided, that

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94 Cab. Concl. 29/20/13, 19 May 1920 (Cab. 23/21/f.123).
95 Bonar Law to L.G., 6 May 1920 (B.L.P./102/5/16) and L.G. to Bonar Law, 6 May 1920 (L.G.P./F/31/1/27).
97 C.P. 1317, 19 May 1920 (Cab. 24/106/ff.46-46A).
98 Cab. Concl. 30/20/4, 21 May 1920 (Cab. 23/21/f.158).
enlistment be restricted to Great Britain omitting loyal Irishmen. Bonar Law had some reservations about the Irish Executive "not carefully thinking out what they are doing" and expressed them in a letter to Greenwood which was forwarded to Lloyd George on 22 May 1920.\textsuperscript{99} The Prime Minister's secretary returned Bonar's letter with Lloyd George's approval for it to be sent on May 24.\textsuperscript{100} In his diary on the 28th of May 1920, Sir Henry Wilson further shows that Churchill as well as Lloyd George was now against sending the eight battalions to the military.\textsuperscript{101} This hesitation was not only a result of their past Liberal orientation but also of a reluctance to involve England in another full-scale war.

Lloyd George, now desiring alternative plans to further strengthen forces in Ireland, determined to continue with his Home Rule Bill, but seemed bewildered with Irish matters and with the views of Dublin Castle prosecutor Wylie.\textsuperscript{102} Wylie felt the Home Rule Bill had little chance for success. Bonar Law also had little hope for the Bill,\textsuperscript{103} but likewise rejected conferring Dominion status on Ireland.\textsuperscript{104}

\textbf{The Daily News}, getting wind of Cabinet deliberations, warned on 20 May that "the reconquest of Ireland, if attempted, is likely  

\begin{itemize}
\item[99] Bonar Law to L.G., 22 May 1920 (B.L.P./103/3/18).
\item[100] L.G. to Bonar Law, 24 May 1920 (B.L.P./103/3/18).
\item[102] Scott, p. 384; L.G. to Bonar Law, 6 May 1920 (L.G.P./F/ 31/1/27).
\item[103] Bonar Law to L.G., 6 May 1920 (B.L.P./102/5/16).
\item[104] \textit{Ibid.}, 7 May 1920 (B.L.P./103/4/1).
\end{itemize}
to wear an ugly complexion."\(^\text{105}\) The \textit{Daily Herald}, \textit{Catholic Herald}, \textit{Manchester Guardian}, and \textit{Times} were also critical of the government and its policy of force coupled with an offer of Home Rule. The Irish press continued its criticism of British policy, a policy described earlier by the \textit{Freeman's Journal} as "dangerous trifling."\(^\text{106}\) On the other hand the Government still received support from conservative papers like the \textit{Observer} and the High Tory Roman Catholic \textit{Tablet}, which as late as 24 July 1920 viewed the Government's Bill as the only solution.\(^\text{107}\)

The question remains why Lloyd George continued to push the unacceptable Bill when faced with mounting opposition in the press and confronted by doubts within his own Government. Why did he not expand Home Rule to Dominion status at the time he was escalating the war effort? It is probably because he was not yet seriously concerned with Ireland, as suggested by his repeated absence from meetings on Irish policy. Also, it was his belief that the reinforcement of the police force in Ireland would bring the Irish to accept his offer of Home Rule, while such a token gesture would propitiate British and American opinion. It is no accident that Parliament debated the Fourth Home Rule Bill throughout the American election campaign from February until November of 1920. The concern with American feelings is also evident in the papers of the British

\(^{106}\) \textit{Freeman's Journal}, 11 February 1920, p. 2.  
\(^{107}\) \textit{Tablet}, 24 July 1920, p. 104.
Foreign Office. The United States Senate had again passed a resolution during the "Treaty of Versailles Debates" in March, 1920, expressing sympathy for the Irish cause. Also, DeValera was still active in America securing financial and moral support for the Republic; and Irish propaganda increased considerably before the political conventions of the Summer of 1920. Sir Auckland Geddes, British Ambassador to Washington, encouraged the Prime Minister to reply openly to such propaganda, but Lloyd George and the Foreign Office wisely refrained from interfering. Had they done so they would have projected the Anglo-Irish War directly into the presidential campaign of 1920. Yet, while Irish-American influence on Anglo-American relations was greatly minimized, it did limit Lloyd George's freedom in his attempt to end the Irish War of Independence.

Events in Ireland in the late Spring show continued popular support for the separatist cause. On May 20 dockworkers refused to unload British munition ships anchored in Dublin. Shortly after, railwaymen went on strike against the British military effort. These activities by the Irish transport workers—continuing for

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109 Mansergh, p. 282.


112 Hachey, p. 106.
seven months from May until December, 1920—represent an intensification of the passive resistance begun by Sinn Fein and the Dail Ministry in 1919. By the early Summer of 1920 Sinn Fein's local government, police, and arbitration courts were operating effectively. 113 The local elections in early June, 1920, confirmed national support for the Republican movement. 114 Every county and rural district council in the South (Leinster, Munster, and Connaught) solidly supported Sinn Fein.

Lloyd George's concern over the worsening situation now reached a peak. A Conference of Ministers assembling on 28 May summoned the Chief Secretary, Viceroy, and Commander-in-Chief of British forces in Ireland to London. 115

Meeting directly with his ministers on May 31st, the Prime Minister welcomed their arrival stating: "I am happy to see you all back alive." 116 This meeting was the most notable one since the fall of 1919. In it Greenwood and French stressed the importance of stamping out the campaign of terror which prevailed in Dublin and much of the South. Lloyd George, with his ministers concurring, opposed martial law but to secure the bulk of moderate Irish support for Britain, Irish citizens must also be brought to feel the weight of the conflict. This could be accomplished by

113 Macardle, pp. 348-49; Pakenham, pp. 39-40.
114 Pakenham, pp. 39-40; Anderson to Greenwood, 20 July 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/14).
increasing the people's financial burden by curtailing payments to Local Irish Government, Post Office and Railroad. Lloyd George also stated he was not against hangings or the blockading of Ireland. The Cabinet was indecisive about sending a special military force to Ireland, but only H. A. L. Fisher clearly saw this to be a "most unappetizing prospect." Also, in a paper handed to Lloyd George a few days before, Lord Hankey had concluded that Churchill's proposal to use bombing for control of civil disturbances throughout the Empire was unpromising, though aircraft could assist the mobility of ground forces.117

The Committee on Ireland had also met on May 31st. It recommended that the existing powers of court martial under the Defense of the Realm Act be extended to include capital punishment in all cases where civil courts had the power to pronounce the death sentence.118

The Cabinet met in early June to discuss both the meeting with Dublin Castle officials and that of the Irish Committee on May 31st. On June 2 it decided to draft a bill giving a three man Special Tribunal (with a judge as president) the power to inflict the death penalty without a jury or the right of appeal; however, it declined to limit railway and postal communications in nonaffected areas because they would serve mainly to punish the innocent.119

On June 7 Lloyd George told the Cabinet that a public statement

117Hankey to L.G., 28 May 1920 (L.G.P./F/24/2/37); also see Roskill, p. 169.
119Cab. Conc1. 31/20/3, 2 June 1920 (Cab.23/21/f.166).
explaining the changes for Ireland would be beneficial. The Cabinet then agreed to a general statement implying that changes in the Irish Administration, reinforcement of British police and increases in the military had been made in order to combat murder. But as later events and Sir Henry Wilson's diaries show, the government reverting back to the idea of a 'gendarmerie' reinforcing the R.I.C. led to more Black and Tans and ultimately the Auxiliary Force in late July, 1920.

The Prime Minister explained the new measures to the Commons on June 7 and 10 and announced the appointments of Anderson, Cope, and Tudor. Though still involved in the affairs of Europe and the Middle East and faced with growing depression and labour unrest at home, Lloyd George was now devoting more time to the 'troubles' in Ireland. The Cabinet decisions on June 2 and 7 and a statement by his once close friend, C. P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, show that his preoccupation was now primarily with repression rather than with negotiation.

4. A Policy of War or of Appeasement?
(June-July, 1920)

In 1919, T. P. O'Connor, popularly known as 'Father of the House of Commons', and one of the few surviving Home Rulers, wrote:

120 Ibid., 33/20/2, 7 June 1920 (Cab. 23/21/f.166).
122 Debates, Commons, 130 (7 and 10 June 1920), cols. 33 and 619.
123 L.G. to Carson, 18 June 1920 (L.G.P./F/6/3/23).
124 Scott, Political Diaries (4 June 1920), pp. 385-86.
"Lloyd George insists on ignoring the Irish Question as much as he can and will not touch it...until he is forced to do so." There is great truth in this statement, because the Prime Minister did not give full attention to the war in Ireland until late July, 1920—and even then not continually. The irony here is that the Irish problem might well have been solved before 1916 if Lloyd George and his predecessors had acted intelligently. Even in 1919 a withdrawal Northward into Ulster by British forces would have secured Northern exclusion. As it happened, Britain drifted into the decision to counter force with force—or, rather, with terror.

That Lloyd George came to consider Irish matters more closely in the Summer of 1920 was result of the success of Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. in waging their war of liberation. He became increasingly preoccupied with repression. The appeasement part of the policy had been temporarily shelved in early June, 1920. On June 11 the Cabinet examined a suspensive clause to the Fourth Government of Ireland Bill enabling it to be cancelled in the event of the Southern Parliament's failure to function.

By July of 1920 the transition to actual war was complete. It lasted for one year until the truce was arranged in July, 1921. In it the I.R.A. became "one of the most efficient underground Armies the world has ever seen."

126 James, Churchill, p. 141; Times, 26 July 1920.
127 Cab. Concl. 35/20/1, 11 June 1920 (Can.23/21/f.235); C.P. 1438, 10 June 1920 (Cab.24/107/ff.134-36).
128 Neeson, p. 15.
officials to overrate its strength. Lord French estimated it at 100,000; Macpherson stated in March of 1920 that it consisted of 200,000 men; and even General Macready at one time believed the I.R.A. had a 20 to 1 superiority.\(^{129}\) Ironically, these statements were made simultaneously and by the same men who dismissed the I.R.A. as a 'murder gang' or a small group of 'assassins'. According to Michael Collins, the Republican Army numbered only 15,000 with only 3,000 effectives at any one time:\(^{130}\) "Sheltered in their cottages, or hidden in dug-outs in the hills...(They) operated in small, flying columns of 15 to 30 men."\(^{131}\) They were also organized into companies, battalions, and brigades, and at the time of the truce even into divisions. While the latter grouping looks impressive on paper and in number, it was never in effective operation. The typical encounter by these columns—which may have lasted several hours—probably would have gone unmentioned in a conventional war. The number killed was seldom as many as ten.

Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. had the sympathy of "nearly the whole of Southern Ireland,"\(^{132}\) including a vast percentage of Irish youth. This support—coupled with their resolute idealism, mobility, and knowledge of the countryside—determined their success. Moving unnoticed along the back roads, usually in darkness or in civilian clothing—they came upon Crown forces by surprise. While they utilized violent methods, one historian has convincingly argued that they were

\(^{129}\) philips, p. 186: Pakenham, pp. 45-46.

\(^{130}\) Bennett, p. 23.

\(^{131}\) Owen, p. 564.

\(^{132}\) Pakenham, p. 46.
"selective and purposeful—not random and aimless as were the Black and Tans." These guerrilla tactics were "the only practical way for a small nation limited in resources and population to fight a war of liberation against a world power." They were not the mistaken methods of 1916 when the Irish Volunteers fought on the defensive against a superior British force. Since the proscription of the Dail in September, 1919, the Republican Army had become the only viable authority in Ireland. Being the first of the partisan armies of the twentieth century, the I.R.A. became the prototype for similar resistance movements during the Second World War in France, Norway, Greece, and Yugoslavia; and, in recent times, in India, Israel, Algeria, Cyprus, and Southeast Asia. The "pattern of guerrilla warfare blueprinted by the Irish Republican Army" was adopted in all of these suppressed areas.

Even British tactics were unconventional. British soldiers displayed restraint, but police showed little respect for the rules of war according to the Hague Convention. They persisted in mistreating prisoners, terrorizing civilians, and destroying property. By the Summer of 1920 British forces in Ireland totaled nearly

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133 Costigan, "The Anglo-Irish Conflict", p. 78.


136 Neeson, p. 22.

137 Pakenham, p. 35.
Typical attacks by the I.R.A. in July resulted in the death of an R.I.C. sergeant at Bandon on his way to mass and of Col. G. B. V. Smyth, Divisional Inspector of the R.I.C. Smyth had previously advised his force to shoot any suspicious persons: "The more you shoot the better I will like it, and I assure you no policeman will get into trouble for shooting any man." There were two surprises also: first, Brigadier-General C. Lucus, fishing near Fermoy, was captured by the I.R.A. late in June; and secondly, on the 28th in the Punjab in India, a sizeable number of the Connaught Rangers mutinied displaying support for the Irish cause.

In early June Lloyd George had announced to the Commons that the Black and Tans and soldiers were in Ireland to restore order and protect the innocent population. On the 22nd of July Greenwood insisted that there was no coercion in Ireland; British forces being there only for protection. The Cabinet Papers cited for late May and early June, however, have shown British officials were planning even greater coercion. In later June and in July, 1920, twenty towns were wrecked unnecessarily—some of them twice—by British police, particularly the Black and Tans.

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138 Macready's figure of 40,000 (Vol. II, p. 533) is low while that of 60,000 given by Holt (p. 207) is simply too high. The later number was not reached until the spring of 1921 (see p. 217 of this dissertation).

139 Younger, p. 97.

140 Beaslaí, II, 32; also see Sam Pollack, Mutiny For Cause (London, 1969).

141 Debates, Commons, 132 (22 July 1920), col. 742.

142 Beaslaí, II, 40-41.
1 January 1919 and 31 July 1920, according to British sources, Republicans had killed 81 Crown servants and wounded 144—the majority being police.\textsuperscript{143} While there is no complete record of the casualties suffered by the I.R.A. during the same period, the Irish Bulletin lists 18 killings and 172 woundings of Irish citizens by the British in the first six months of 1920, and also 16,494 armed raids on private dwellings by the Crown for the same period.\textsuperscript{144}

The war in Ireland caused the Lloyd George Government great concern throughout July, 1920. Again uncertain—as they were throughout 1919—of the appropriate course of action, the Government formed an Irish Situation Committee chaired by Walter Long.\textsuperscript{145} It was decided that the Chief Secretary would provide the committee with weekly reports. Well ahead of Cabinet thinking, Thomas Jones, close friend of the Prime Minister and Assistant Cabinet Secretary, sounded Irish feelings regarding a Dominion settlement—perhaps on suggestion of Lloyd George—and he found some indication that it would be acquiesced in by most of Sinn Fein, but not officially accepted.\textsuperscript{146} On June 30 the Cabinet discussed the draft of the "Dominion of Ireland Bill" which was to be introduced into the House of Lords the next day by the Southern

\textsuperscript{143}See Appendix IV.
\textsuperscript{144}Irish Bulletin, 23-24 June 1921, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{145}C.P. 1553, 30 June 1920 (Cab.24/108/f.205).
\textsuperscript{146}Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 115; III, 23-25.
Unionist, Lord Monteagle. The Cabinet wanted to delay it pending the Commons' discussion of the Home Rule Bill. Originally, Lord Chancellor Birkenhead had suggested that the Cabinet discuss the measure. However, on July 1, he attacked the Bill in the Lords because it abrogated much of the power of Westminster.

One of the Chief supporters of a Dominion settlement was Under-Secretary, John Anderson. He and his Dublin Castle colleagues believed it might avoid a military solution. Undoubtedly, this view reflected basic courage, good sense, and a bureaucratic preference for peaceful settlement. Included in his personal papers in the Public Record Office are an undated leader from the Irish Times—probably from the early Summer—calling for a new broader offer of settlement, and a letter from Sir James O'Connor on 13 June 1920 reporting his conversations with James MacNeill, brother of the prominent Sinn Feiner, Eoin MacNeill. O'Connor believed that a Dominion settlement could be reached. Anderson also received a copy of a resolution passed by the Trades Union Congress on 13 July and a letter telling him that a T.U.C. deputation was meeting

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147 "Dominion of Ireland Bill", House of Lords, (Cab.24/108/f.151).
148 Cab. Concl. 38/20/5, 30 June 1920 (Cab.23/21/f.297).
149 C.P. 1539, Claud Schuster to Lord Hankey, 25 June 1920 (Cab.24/108/f.150).
151 Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 59-60.
152 Undated Irish Times leader, 1920, deposited with Sir John Anderson Papers (J.A.P. in C.O. 904/188/1).
153 Sir James O'Connor to Anderson, 13 July 1920 (J.A.P./C.O. 904/188/1).
with the Prime Minister on 22 July. The resolution called for "an Irish Parliament, with full Dominion powers in all Irish affairs, ...adequate protection for the interest of Minorities," and withdrawal of all troops from Ireland.

While Dublin Castle desired appeasement, militarists like Sir Henry Wilson advocated martial law. On July 12, he told the War Secretary, Churchill, that Britain would either have to apply strong measures or withdraw from Ireland. The latter, he believed, would mean the end of the Empire. Concerned with the legality of martial law, Greenwood wrote the Judge Advocate General at the War Office, F. Cassell, who replied on July 19 that its application would be perfectly legal. He added, however, that political ramifications should be weighed.

In the Commons the same day, Bonar Law indicated that although the Government was examining its policy it would steer a middle course. Martial law was unsatisfactory for handling the situation Anderson wrote Greenwood on July 20 suggesting immediate action and urged the government to declare openly a policy which would appeal to moderates in Ireland. His suggestions for immediate action were extension of court-martial to encompass all offenses of a

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154 E. Evans to Anderson, 20 July 1920 (J.A.P./C.O.904/88/1).
155 T.U.C. Resolution, 13 July 1920 (J.A.P./C.O.904/188/1).
156 Sir Henry Wilson's Diaries (12 July 1920) in Callwell, II, 252.
157 C.P. 1622, 19 July 1920 (Cab.24/109ff.313-17).
159 Anderson to Greenwood, 20 July 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/14).
criminal nature and the settlement of the Irish Railway strike.

General Macready also recognized that coercion—including police action and the imprisonment of Sinn Feiners—and the present Home Rule Bill were insufficient. Sinn Fein had the support of town "loafers and hangers-about" who used to inform to the R.I.C., but there were now also many informers within the R.I.C.\footnote{Macready to Greenwood, 17 July 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/12).} While believing "the country might be cowed into quiescence" by martial law, he recognized that he lacked the troops to enforce it, and that it would be opposed by the British public.\footnote{Ibid.; also see Macready, II, 479.} Macready agreed with Anderson that the Special Tribunal of judges should be replaced by extending the powers of court-martial and that the railway strike be ended.\footnote{Letter initialled N.F.W.F. to the P.M., 21 July 1920 (J.A.P./C.O.904/188/1); also see Macready to Miss Stevenson, 18 June 1920 (L.G.P./F/36/2/15).}

The turning point in Britain's Irish policy came in late July, 1920, when the Lloyd George Government came gradually to realize the trials and failure of present police action. The catalyst was the report of the fourth meeting of the Irish Situation Committee which declared on July 22 that "the moment has arrived for the Government actively to assume the offensive in its Irish policy, and to come to grips with Sinn Fein."\footnote{C.P. 1672, 22 July 1920 (Cab.24/109/f.358).} Their decision was influenced by a number of reports which indicated Sinn Fein's success
in administering the country. The report further stated that most of its members favored an immediate introduction of martial law. The offensive should first be aimed at curtailing railroads, post offices, Sinn Fein courts, and some pension payments. At 11:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. on the twenty-third, the Lloyd George Cabinet conferred with officials of the Irish Government in the first truly complete discussion of the Anglo-Irish War. The Government faced a "puzzling and distressing dilemma," Austen Chamberlain wrote in his diary on July 24. There had been great pressure on the Government to expand the Home Rule Bill to full Dominion status and likewise to proclaim martial law throughout Southern Ireland. The Government's choice was clearly appeasement or war.

164 See the account by a friend of Walter Long, 1 July 1920, in possession of the Irish Situation Committee (see Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 24-25).

CHAPTER THREE

BRITAIN'S NEW POLICY OF WAR
(JULY-DECEMBER, 1920)

The Lloyd George Government had delayed its formulation of an Irish policy until late 1919 when it decided upon combined coercion and Home Rule. Gradually, after vacillating so long between appeasement and force, Lloyd George yielded in late July, 1920, to the united pressure of the Chief Secretary, the military and the Coalition Unionists for a policy of limited war. Yet, under the guise of police action and restoring order in Ireland, British officials made their final effort to deny that war did exist.

1. The Restoration of Order in Ireland?
(July-September, 1920)

Recommendation by the Irish Situation Committee on July 22 for martial law in Ireland brought Lloyd George and his Ministers to reconsider their dual policy.\(^1\) A conference of seemingly shaken Cabinet members and British officials in Ireland convened on July 23 to consider the Irish situation and the alternatives before them.\(^2\) This first full debate of Irish policy by the Cabinet and its Irish Government was also the first consideration of a Dominion solution. Present from the Cabinet were the Prime Minister, Bonar Law, Balfour, Curzon, Fisher, A. Chamberlain, Birkenhead, Churchill, Chief Secretary Greenwood, and the Viceroy, Viscount French. Irish Government

\(^1\)C.P. 1672, 22 July 1920 (Cab. 24/109/f.358).

\(^2\)C.P. 1693, 23 July 1920 (Cab. 24/109/ff.445-65); also see Cab. Concl. 51/20/Ap. III (Cab. 23/22/f.172). Another vital source for this debate is Tom Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 118 and especially Volume III, 25-31, for information not contained in official papers.
officials in attendance were Generals Macready and Tudor together with Wylie, Anderson, MacMahon, Cope, and the Irish Attorney-General, Denis Henry. Col. Sir James Craig, an Ulster leader who was Parliamentary and Financial Secretary for the Admiralty, was also present.

W. E. Wylie, Dublin Castle legal advisor and former Unionist, explained to the conference that British rule in Ireland—police, courts, local government, etc.—had almost ceased to function. He suggested two alternatives—martial law or negotiation with Sinn Fein. The former would postpone a solution of the problem while the latter—if initiated by Britain—could lead to peace with a friendly Ireland operating within the Empire. Wylie emphasized that Sinn Fein was not an organization of criminals but, rather, a truly national movement.

General Tudor, also much concerned with the situation, again recommended that police be employed as a military force, that passports be required for persons entering Ireland, and that I.D. cards be given only to loyal citizens. Disagreeing with Wylie, he felt that with increased police support he could control the situation. He suggested augmenting the police with 500 ex-officers and ex-soldiers—one of the proposals which subsequently led to the raising of the Auxiliary Division sent to Ireland in late July through the Fall of 1920.

The recent conversations with Cardinal Logue were next discussed by Andrew Cope. The Cardinal believed that crime in Ireland was caused by opposition to British policy and he urged Britain to offer Dominion Home Rule. Like Wylie, Cope stressed that a suppression policy would inevitably boomerang and aggravate the problem. This
wise counsel was agreed to by both of the Irish Under-Secretaries, Anderson and MacMahon. Lloyd George questioned Wylie whether "such inconveniences as had been suggested by General Tudor would create the desired atmosphere" necessary for reaching an agreement with Sinn Fein. Wylie countered that suppression would only increase Irish hostility. He felt that a new Bill—rather than the old one amended—granting Dominion status to the South and keeping the six Northern counties under the control of Westminster would have the greatest chance for success. He wisely predicted further civil strife in Ulster if Protestants there were given responsibility for law and order. Sir James Craig opposed these suggested changes but agreed with Wylie that repression in the South would fail.

General Macready, and surprisingly the Chief Secretary, recognized the validity of Dublin Castle's argument that coercion would not solve the Irish political problem. The former was also aware of Sinn Fein's increased power—a fact impressed on him by General Sir E. P. Strickland, commanding the British Sixth Division at Cork. However, if coercion was to be continued, four measures would be necessary:

(a) For the existing law there should be substituted courts-martial for every sort of offense, with the power of the death penalty.
(b) It was necessary to have power to seize members of the Irish Republican Army, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Dail Eireann and the Women's Corps....
(c) Measures were required to deal with the Irish Press....
(d) Measures to deal with persons coming into Ireland from the United States.

Ibid., f. 453.

Throughout late July and much of August, 1920, the old hatred between Catholic and Protestant re-surfaced (see pp.105-106 of this chapter).

While the Castle's 'experts' had asked for negotiations along Dominion lines, all of them agreed the Irish administration needed strengthening and that courts-martial be substituted for civil justice. The majority of the Cabinet—including Fisher, Balfour, and Churchill—were not yet ready to offer Dominion Home Rule. They wanted to continue with the present Home Rule Bill. Churchill especially wanted to "raise the temperature of the conflict to a real issue and shock, and trial of strength... in the hope that there would be a chance of settlement on wider lines." Pressure could be directly placed on the people through control of railroad and postal facilities.

Lloyd George also wanted to proceed with his present Home Rule Bill rather than make any radical changes or new proposals; and he desired to keep the views of the 'experts' at Dublin Castle from the public. By implementing Home Rule in the North, including responsibility for police, seven battalions of troops and 2000-3000 police would be available for service in the South. He recognized Ulster's right to separate treatment—a factor which Coalition Unionists would not have allowed him to forget. His inclination—in spite of recognizing the strong advice for negotiation from four important Dublin Castle officials—was still to use force to suppress the demand in the South for an Irish nation. Lloyd George favored this alternative even though he, Bonar Law, Lord Curzon, and

6 Ibid., p. 28.
7 C.P. 1693, f. 461.
Austen Chamberlain had each previously considered negotiating with Sinn Fein along Dominion lines. Curzon's statement regarding the prospect of further repression was appropriate: "...there would be no real attempt to settle the Irish Question for (another) six months."  

Along with Tudor, Birkenhead, Churchill and Long pressed Lloyd George and the Cabinet for more militant measures. Throughout 1920 these three—the Lord Chancellor, War Secretary and the staunchly Unionist chairman of the Cabinet's Irish Situation Committee and the Committee on Ireland—argued for a hard line against Sinn Fein. They were joined by Sir Henry Wilson and Col. Wilfred Ashley who were for even stronger measures. Wilson, an illustrious Irish Unionist and outstanding military administrator, was fanatic in his opposition to Irish separation. Ashley, a member of Parliament, was one of the first to firmly suggest in the Commons that martial law be extended to Ireland. His attitude was "it was no use talking conciliation with the Sinn Feiners and the assassins. When a wounded tiger is attacking you, it is no use offering bread and milk, you have to shoot him with a rifle and shoot him very quickly."  

Immediately following the Minister's conference on July 23rd,

9Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 118; and III, 25-30; Petrie, p. 150.
10Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 29.
11Ibid., I, 118; III, 27-29.
12Callwell, II, 350-52.
13Debates, Commons, 130 (22 June 1920), col. 2110.
14Ibid., col. 2108.
Assistant Cabinet Secretary, Tom Jones, submitted a Dominion proposal to Lloyd George. Along with the Dublin Castle men he was the first in official circles to firmly oppose force and press for negotiation. His wisdom resulted from his experience in Ireland some years before and from his knowledge of history and political economy.15 Also, as a Welshman he stated: "I was able...to assess in some measure the magnitude of Anglo-Saxon blunders in dealing with Ireland. It is a melancholy story and one from which the English not unnaturally turn their eyes."16 Being Welsh, he was able to speak frankly and yet remain intimate with the Prime Minister17—a situation which helped Lloyd George resist the pressure for all-out war. In late 1921 it also helped him to secure a peaceful settlement. Jones' proposal was as follows:

24 July T. J. to the P. M.

1. It is clear from what was said at yesterday's Conferences:
   (a) That the Police are rapidly deteriorating and can only be reinforced from England.
   (b) That the Army will not endure a much greater strain upon it.
   (c) That repression, however drastic, will still leave the Irish problem unsolved. All the men on the spot (except possibly Tudor) agree on this point.

2. I am assured privately that:
   (a) The present Army in Ireland under a policy of 'thorough' will 'bend' and probably 'break'.
   (b) If the Ulster Volunteers are recognized Macready will resign.
   (c) The Ulster Volunteers anyway would not fight outside Ulster and that they would need many months to be brought into efficient condition.

15Middlemas, in Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, xvii.
16Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, xvii-xviii.
17Roskill, pp. 198, 253.
3. Two policies are open to the Government:
(a) The rigorous application of force by means of courts-martial, the suspension of civil government, the stoppage of trains and motors, the withholding of pensions and generally the infliction of a rapidly increasing paralysis upon the country.
(b) An immediate attempt to conclude a pact with the leaders, Sinn Fein and the revolutionists.

4. Is a compromise on the following lines possible? That, after further immediate enquiries as suggested by the experts, you should make a speech, very soon,
(a) Describing the condition of Ireland as put to us by Wylie, the fighting of Irishmen with one another in Belfast, the impossibility of allowing this sort of thing to go on; the determination of the Government to put an end to it by Martial Law and the most determined use of all the forces available. This will inevitably involve suffering, starvation, death to large numbers of innocent Irishmen, women, and children now the victims of terrorism.
(b) Before resorting to this final course you announce that the Government make one more appeal and offer. The Government will grant Dominion Home Rule (Fiscal autonomy but not defense or ports) to the South and West with self-determination for Ulster provided the leaders (Query the '75') agree to accept this as a final settlement, and undertake suppression of outrage and murder. A time limit for reply would be given. Failing a satisfactory reply the Government would have no alternative but force.

5. The advantage of this course is that it gives you a chance of carrying public opinion in this country (and abroad) with you. To enforce the Churchill policy right away would be disastrous because of its repercussion at home. There is widespread sympathy with Dominion Home Rule as a solution.... To go ahead without some interval and offer of this kind would lead to violent opposition at home....

6. Throughout the consideration of policy the industrial situation here must be borne in mind....

The '75' referred to in '4b' above were those Sinn Fein M.P.s who had been legally elected to the British Parliament at Westminster

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18Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 31-32.
in 1918. The fear of industrial strife mentioned last was based on the opposition of the Labour Party and trade unions to the Government's Irish policy.

While Lloyd George indicated no known reaction to the Assistant Secretary's proposal, he undoubtedly thought it over carefully retaining the basic ideas for later use.

On July 24, the Chief Secretary circulated a memo covering a draft Bill which provided for the immediate extension of courts-martial jurisdiction. Greenwood emphasized that "throughout the greater part of Ireland criminal justice can no longer be administered by the ordinary process of trial by judge and jury...there is no alternative but to have recourse to military tribunals." He recommended extending and adapting the 'Defense of the Realm' provisions presently used in Ireland in order to restore peace. Two other memos were sent to the Cabinet by Arthur Balfour, now Lord President of the Council, and Walter Long. They believed that the advice for an Irish Dominion advanced the previous day by Wylie was unsound. Actually, it was similar to a suggestion made by Balfour himself in late 1919, but he now felt the time had passed for denying Ulster its own Government. He also suggested it would be folly for the present Home Rule Bill to be offered to Sinn Fein as an installment laying the basis for further negotiation of a settlement. That would only encourage further agitation.

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Sir John Anderson, with the Chief Secretary's consent, commented on Balfour's memorandum on July 25.22 The alternatives before the Cabinet were martial law or some form of Dominion settlement. Anderson believed that such a settlement—with safeguards for Ulster—would secure popular support in Ireland. With approval by the Irish people, law could be re-established. On the 26th Macready outlined the military situation in Ireland and the prospects for the coming Winter.23 His picture was as dismal as that given a few days prior. He clearly recognized the chief difficulty of all commanders who attempted to defeat guerrilla armies—as was later to be proved by events in Algeria and Indochina—that of having a sufficiently large number of troops to enable maximum dispersion so as to cover all areas, while affording enough concentration to allow comfort, training, leave, and rest. Macready stated it was necessary for Britain to have an even greater concentration during the Winter. Actually, in 1920, Britain had more than a four to one edge in total personnel over the I.R.A.24 While Macready urged strengthening the military, he—unlike many other supporters of the war policy—understood it would not solve the political question.25

22C.P. 1689, 25 July 1920 (Cab.24/109/f.438); also see J.A.P. /C.O. 904/188/1).

23C.P. 1750, 26 July 1920 (Cab.24/110/f.263).

24British forces totaled nearly 50,000 in the Summer of 1920 while the I.R.A. had 15,000, of which only 3,000 were effectives (see pp.74-76). Actual British combat strength was only one division of c. 15,000 men (see Macready, II, 480), plus the active sector of the R.I.C.

25C.P. 1750, f. 263.
Conference of Ministers on July 26. While several members of the Cabinet absent on the twenty-third were now present, Birkenhead, French, Macready, Tudor and Wylie were not. The preoccupation with force clearly indicates the Ministers had decided on this alternative before their arrival. The conclusions of the conference entirely omit any mention of the Dominion offer. The Chief Secretary's draft Bill to extend court-martial jurisdiction in Ireland and supersede present legal authority was considered in detail. It was also to replace another draft Bill which would implement the Special Tribunal agreed to by the Cabinet on June 2nd, but subsequently opposed by both Anderson and Macready. While the Ministers were agreeable to Greenwood's Bill, they recognized the gravity of "handing over the whole administration of justice to the military...."  

The conference agreed that the Chief Secretary should produce a new Bill extending the "Defense of the Realm Regulations" to cover all crimes, but with the provision that punishment be the same as that assigned by civilian law. The Bill was to be general and to incorporate features of both Greenwood's draft Bill (C.P. 1682) and that of the "Criminal Injuries (Ireland's) Bill" which had recently been introduced in the Commons. The later Bill provided for cutting off all grants to Irish Local Government authorities who refused to have their accounts audited and to abide

by British regulations.\textsuperscript{29} Specific enactments under this measure were to be made by Orders in Council. The conference also decided to have Sir Eric Geddes, the Minister of Transport, inform Irish Railway authorities that the Government would no longer tolerate refusals to move British traffic\textsuperscript{30}—a step long urged by General Macready. Though Lloyd George was not yet ready to follow Sir Henry Wilson, Ashley, or the Long committee and apply martial law, his policy of increased military force now fell just short of it. It was not the middle course suggested by Bonar Law in the Commons in mid-July, 1920, or that followed from late 1919 through July of 1920. Four Dublin Castle officials and Tom Jones opposed the new policy; and there was doubt within the Cabinet. Sections of the British press also supported a Dominion settlement, especially the \textit{Times} which called on the Government to enlarge its offer on July 26.\textsuperscript{31} In spite of some doubt and of some opposition within the Cabinet, there was sufficient agreement for the new policy.

Besides introducing a Bill in the Commons on August 2 for the 'Restoration of Order in Ireland', the Government began to assemble a small paramilitary corps of ex-British officers for Irish service on July 27. Recruitment of police in Ireland itself had virtually ceased and there were widespread resignations. The idea of an Auxiliary Division of R.I.C. as well as more Black and Tans originated with the suggestion by Churchill, Macready and the Irish

\textsuperscript{29}C.P. 1590, "Criminal Injuries (Ireland) Act", 9 July 1920 (Cab.24/109/f.339).

\textsuperscript{30}Cab. Concl. 51/20/Ap. IV/4(f.179); Jones \textit{Whitehall Diary}, III, 32-33.

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Times}, 26 July 1920.
Executive in May, 1920, for a 'Special Emergency Gendarmerie' to further reinforce the R.I.C.\textsuperscript{32} and ultimately resulted from the reluctance of Lloyd George and Churchill in the late May to send instead a 'Special Force' of eight garrison battalions to the Army, thereby emphasizing a military solution.\textsuperscript{33} The actual proposal appeared in the July, 1920, issue of the \textit{Constabulary Gazette} when General Tudor recommended the inauguration of such a force and authority for its formation was given on July 10th.\textsuperscript{34} At the 23rd of July conference, Tudor had urged further reinforcement of the R.I.C., including an augmentation of 500 ex-officers and ex-soldiers.\textsuperscript{35} He maintained—in spite of police failure during the past year and a half—that, if supported and reinforced, they might operate as an effective military body. His advice, as shown earlier, was was heeded by Cabinet members, especially by Lloyd George, Greenwood, Churchill and Walter Long.

Misnamed a division, their greatest number was little more than 1500.\textsuperscript{36} Their uniform consisted of dark-blue clothing and dark-green Glencarry caps or Tam O'Shanter to distinguish them

\textsuperscript{32} Cab. Concl. 29/20/Ap. II, Conf. of Min., 11 May 1920 (Cab. 23/21/f.141); Bonar Law to L.G. 11 May 1920 (B.L.P./103/4/3).


\textsuperscript{35} C.P. 1693 (ff.448-49).

\textsuperscript{36} Greenwood's "Weekly Survey" lists Auxiliary strength on 22 May 1921 at 1,508—see C.P. 2977, 24 May 1921 (Cab.24/123/f.487).
from the Black and Tans who now wore the normal R.I.C. uniform.\textsuperscript{37} The Auxies were well paid for the troubled year of 1920, receiving £1 per day, double that of the Tans. They were all ex-officers with the rank of police sergeant and were organized into companies or shock forces of 100 men for action in areas with the greatest I.R.A. activity. They were branded mercenaries by the Irish people—a label which also could be given to other ex-British officers who went to Mexico to fight with, rather than against, revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{38}

The Auxies—or Cadets as they were also known—have been described as a "tough, hard-bitten corps, who reacted to the Sinn Fein terror by determining to make their own counter-terror even more formidable."\textsuperscript{39} But in accepting this statement one cannot forget that violent tactics by the I.R.A. were first a result of British political—and at times social and economic—oppression. Though they did employ terroristic methods, the Auxies treated Irish girls with respect and there were few cases of rape. Their commander, Brigadier-General Frank P. Crozier—a Unionist, brought up in Ireland—had served in the First World War with General Tudor.\textsuperscript{40} He was also a veteran of the 1919-20 War of Intervention against the Bolsheviks in Lithuania and Poland.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, he was a likely candidate to form the Auxiliary Force in the Summer and Fall of 1920. His statement

\textsuperscript{37} General Macready had urged this in August, 1920, to prevent his soldiers from being linked with reprisals (see Gleason, p. 96).

\textsuperscript{38} Gleason, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{39} Holt, p. 212.

\textsuperscript{40} Crozier, \textit{Impressions and Recollections}, p. 251.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Who Was Who: 1929-40} (1941), p. 313.
that Tudor told him the "new organization was being camouflaged" as R.I.C. instead of being openly admitted as a military force seems plausible. Lloyd George and most of his Ministers were reluctant to acknowledge that they were waging war in Ireland for fear of alienating British and American opinion.

In the Fall of 1920 the Auxiliaries took the initiative against the I.R.A. The first 500 arrived in late July and soon became a "familiar sight in Dublin, whirling around in Crosley tenders, raiding homes and offices...." It was at night, especially, that the Irish people most feared their terrifying knock on the door. The Weekly Summary, a propaganda sheet published by Dublin Castle to strengthen the nerve of the police, had repeatedly called Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. 'murderers'. On 27 August it printed the following editorial presumably to incite Crown forces to greater violence and hatred at the time the first four Auxie companies were being sent to Kilkenny, Cork, and Galway:

They did not wait for the usual uniform,
They came at once.
They were wanted badly, and the R.I.C.
Welcomed them.
They know what danger is.
They have looked death in the eyes before,
And did not flinch.
They will not flinch now.
They will go with the job—the job of making Ireland once again safe for the law-abiding,
AND AN APPROPRIATE HELL FOR THOSE WHOSE TRADE
IS AGITATION AND WHOSE METHOD IS MURDER.

It was only a short time later that Black and Tans and Auxies

42 Crozier, Impressions and Recollections, p. 251.
43 Cab. Concl. 48/20/5, 13 August 1920 (Cab. 23/22/f.116).
44 Beaslaí, II, 28.
retaliated with reprisals on an unprecedented scale.

Along with these quasi-military changes in the Irish police, the military was reorganized to carry out the more vigorous measures sanctioned by the Cabinet.\textsuperscript{46} Macready, however, explained that his army was still more impressive on paper than in reality, having the equivalent of only one full strength combat division and many numerically weak infantry battalions.\textsuperscript{47} This weakness is further evident in the correspondence between Lloyd George and his Secretary for India, Montagu, regarding the transfer of company and battalion grade officers from India to Macready's Irish command.\textsuperscript{48} The only officer strength was at the divisional level and the bulk of the soldiers in Ireland were evidently administrative and supportive rather than combat soldiers. This made it still more difficult to deal with the guerrilla I.R.A. In fact, the forces of Britain throughout the Empire at this time were stretched to their limit.\textsuperscript{49}

The Prime Minister, Bonar Law, and Greenwood were further urged to war by a deputation of Conservative members of both Houses of Parliament on July 29. The right-wing Unionist Group asked Lloyd

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{46}] The reorganization was as follows: 1st Division (Belfast) consisted of seven battalions organized into two brigades (Belfast and Londonderry), 5th Division (Curragh) of seven battalions and four cavalry regiments in three brigades (two at Galway and one at Athlone), 6th Division (Cork) of 16 battalions and two cavalry regiments in four brigades (Limerick, Kerry, Cork, and Fermoy), and the Dublin District Command of 10 battalions and one cavalry regiment in two brigades (see Macready, II, 479-80).
\item[\textsuperscript{47}] Macready, II, 480.
\item[\textsuperscript{48}] Montagu to L.G., 29 June 1920 and L.G. to Montagu, 30 June 1920 (L.G.P./F/40/3/11 and 12); Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 27.
\item[\textsuperscript{49}] Sir Henry Wilson's Diaries (15 July 1920), in Callwell, II, 253.
\end{itemize}
George to restore order in Ireland prior to negotiating a settlement to safeguard the Empire. The Duke of Northumberland spoke first explaining that Ireland was the "Achilles heel of England" and the Empire, and that the present trouble in Ireland resulted from an international Bolshevik conspiracy. He was joined by Sir Edward Carson who declared to openly sympathetic colleagues, that the worldwide conspiracy which was assisting Ireland was "not pro-Irish but...anti-British going to the very root and existence of the British Empire." The deputation also feared the support of national movements in Egypt and India by left-wing groups in Britain, Europe, and America. They believed that the fall of Ireland—an island of geographical necessity to Britain—would expose England to grave danger of invasion and set off nationalist and socialist revolutions throughout the Empire. Their fears have had their counterpart in America which committed a force of more than half a million in the late 1960's to save Southeast Asia—and ultimately America itself—from the same Communist conspiracy.

Lloyd George responded to the deputation that "we really do not need convincing that we should not tolerate an independent Republic in Ireland", but the roots of the matter "are deeper than the shallow soil of Bolshevism." He recognized that successive move-

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50 Report of Proceedings, Deputation to the Prime Minister from the Houses of Lords and Commons, 29 July 1920 (L.G.P./F/225/10).

51 Ibid.
ments demanding freedom had arisen in Irish history, but to him a Republic was intolerable. To suppress Sinn Fein and secure order he was introducing a "very drastic Bill" in the Commons.

The Cabinet convened on August 2 to review the conclusions of the conference of July 23 and the draft of the Bill for restoring order in Ireland. The Cabinet concluded they should obtain a list of barristers who were willing to participate in court-martials involving a capital charge. They approved the introduction of the Bill in the Commons with unlimited court-martial power, including the right of the Judge to try civil cases without a jury if none were available, and the power to move Irish prisoners to Britain. While the Cabinet was in London finalizing their plans for the new policy, Wylie was composing a short letter to Anderson in the Law Room at Dublin Castle. He still felt that coercion was futile, especially without an offer of Dominion Home Rule. In another letter to Sir John on the 3rd of August he reiterated his belief that Sinn Fein would accept such a solution and said, "the present is the golden moment for settling the Irish Question." Wylie's solution would have granted full self-government to Ireland—save for defense and excluding Ulster, which would have remained totally inside the United Kingdom. While this was the most sensible solution to the Irish problem as is evident from history and also the pre-

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52 Cab. Conc1. 44/20/2, 2 August 1920 (Cab. 23/22).

53 C.P. 1709, Memorandum to the "Restoration of Order in Ireland Bill" (Cab. 24/110/ff.27-28).

54 Wylie to Anderson, 2 August 1920 (J.A.P./C.O.904/188/1); also see L.G.P./F/19/2/17.

55 Ibid., 3 August 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/18).
sent civil disorder in Northern Ireland, it is doubtful that Sinn Fein as a whole or the I.R.A. would have agreed to it at this time. Still, his suggestions would have made the path to settlement less difficult.

A deputation representing 140 Southern Irish business and professional men from Cork and Dublin—at least half of them Unionists who had opposed Sinn Fein—called on the Prime Minister, Bonar Law, Long and Greenwood on the morning of 4 August 1920. The deputation consisted of 12 men, including three very prominent Southern Unionists—industrialist Sir Stanley Harrington, Judge Richard Beamish, and the lawyer Andrew Jamieson—as well as the Secretary of the Irish Peace Conference, Captain Henry Harrison, a well-known Dominion advocate. These Southern Irishmen called on Lloyd George to substitute Dominion status for the present Bill believing it would be acceptable to the majority of Irishmen. Their attitude was greatly changed from that of the earlier Southern Unionists delegation which had met with the Prime Minister on 26 April 1920. Lloyd George questioned them carefully and remarked: "I want to see a Sinn Feiner on the bridge, or someone who can speak for Ireland."

The deputation returned later that day for further discussion. In addition to those present for the Government that morning, A. Chamberlain and Sir John Anderson were in attendance. The Irishmen

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56 Proceedings, Deputation to the Prime Minister of Southern Irish Business and Professional Men, 4 August 1920 (L.G.P./F/230/5/Part I); also see L.G.P./F/182/1/21 which is a minute of the deputation proceedings (it should be dated 5 August 1920 and not for 1921).

57 Ibid., Part II.
explained that they had been opposed to a Dominion solution which involved the partition of Ireland but thought a settlement could be arranged if Britain first declared its willingness to grant Dominion status to the South. A Constituent Assembly could be convened to work out an all-Ireland solution with Ulster free to exclude herself. Bonar Law queried whether Sinn Fein would attend such an assembly and Chamberlain asked if the South would honor the solution if Ulster chose exclusion. Lloyd George told the group that their presence was the "first message of hope" and he told them to gather Irish moderate opinion together and return to talk with him at that time.

The plea for a grant of Dominion status was joined by the normally conservative County Deputy Lieutenants and Justices of the Peace.\textsuperscript{58} Resolutions in Queens (Leix) Co. for Dominion Home Rule on August 7 were forwarded to Lloyd George by Greenwood from the Irish Office in London.\textsuperscript{59} Greenwood also stated in the Commons that 556 R.I.C. constables and 313 county magistrates had resigned during the Summer of 1920.\textsuperscript{60} In a letter to Anderson on August 10, Tom Jones, the Assistant Cabinet Secretary and personal friend of Lloyd George, wrote that he had recently spoken with Captain Harrison of the Irish Peace Conference, the editors of the nationalist \textit{Freeman's Journal} and the Unionist \textit{Irish Times}, and Erskine Childers, and Englishman and former Home Ruler who later served Sinn Fein as

\begin{footnotes}
\item[58] McDowell, \textit{The Irish Convention}, p. 211.
\item[59] Queens County Resolutions, 7 August 1920, forwarded to L. G. on 8 August 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/19).
\item[60] Debates, Commons, 133 (9 August 1920), col. 24.
\end{footnotes}
as Director of the Dail Publicity Department and editor of the Irish Bulletin. All felt that a change in attitude must first be shown by Britain, as a result of which Lloyd George would "live in Ireland as the greatest statesman England had had." 61 Childers, who was as uncompromising as any Irish Sinn Feiner, felt that "any bonafide scheme of real self-determination would be earnestly considered if offered frankly to the Dail Eireann." 62

All of these last minute appeals to negotiate with Sinn Fein were futile. The Government had moved quickly and the "Restoration of Order in Ireland Bill"—which was an inappropriately entitled as that for the 'Better Government of Ireland' introduced earlier in the year—was formally debated in the Commons on August 5 and 6. It was immediately passed. Bonar Law defended the Bill stating: "I do not believe for a moment that these murders have any sympathy in the great mass of the Irish people. The position would be hopeless if they had. I do not believe it. It is due to a system of terrorism." 63 The statement directly contradicted what Dublin Castle had told him and Lloyd George less than two weeks before. 64 Greenwood defended the Government's plan to hold secret court-martials without juries for the more effective "protection of life and property and the primary rights of citizenship." 65 Lloyd George

61 Jones to Anderson, extract from a letter commenting on the Irish situation, 10 August 1920 (J.A.P./C.O.904/188/1).
62 Ibid.
63 Debates, Commons, 132 (5 August 1920), cols. 2694-95.
64 C.P. 1693, ff. 445-65.
65 Debates, Commons, 132 (5 August 1920) cols. 2728-2734.
was more astute than his colleagues, however, and asked who in Ireland could speak on behalf of those desiring Dominion Home Rule. The war had driven many old Nationalists and Dominion Home Rulers to Sinn Fein and it was primarily Unionists like Harrington, Jamieson, and Beamish who now wanted a Dominion settlement. The premier saw clearly that moderates were not yet organized, yet he passed up the opportunity to make their position more firm—nearly a year before the 1921 truce. Lloyd George likewise erred in thinking war could defeat Sinn Fein and the I.R.A.

The "Restoration of Order in Ireland Act" received Royal Assent on August 9 and became law. But the Cabinet which assembled on 13 August still doubted whether the Act would be successful. Fearing that Irish opinion might be alienated by the new measures, they encouraged the Prime Minister to restate the Government's policy at the time of the Commons' adjournment. While there was considerable doubt within the Cabinet about the policy of increased force, there was no majority for negotiating a settlement with Sinn Fein as Richard Bennett has suggested. Only Tom Jones and the four officials at Dublin Castle had firmly pressed for that course of action. The gulf between the Cabinet and Sinn Fein or between Home Rule and Republic was still unbridgeable. It took another year of war to bring them to compromise and arrive at

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66 Ibid., cols. 2618-19, 2744-47.
67 Cab. Concl. 48/20/5, 13 August 1920 (Cab.23/22/f.116).
68 Ibid., 48/20/Ap. (f.117a); also see Debates, Commons, 133 (16 August 1920), col. 694.
69 Bennett, pp. 62, 71, 80.
a Dominion solution.

Throughout August and September the Lloyd George Coalition—besides waging war against the I.R.A.—faced three additional problems. They were the continued demand for an offer of Dominion status, the hunger-strike of Terence MacSwiney, Lord Mayor of Cork, which had now achieved world attention, and the civil and religious strife in Northern Ireland.

On August 24 the Irish Peace Conference chaired by Sir Nugent Everard was held in Dublin. This representative assembly, a serious attempt by moderate Irishmen to arrive at a solution of the Irish problem, was gathered through newspaper advertisement. Their four resolutions called for MacSwiney's release, ending coercion, full national self-government without coercing Ulster, and the creation by Britain of a suitable atmosphere for appeasement. Harrison, the Conference Secretary, sent these resolutions to Lucerne, Switzerland, where Lloyd George was on holiday. He stressed the urgency of releasing MacSwiney and wondered why telegrams sent by the Peace Conference on August 24, 25 and 28 had gone unanswered. He also urged Anderson on September 1 to prevent the Lord Mayor's death. MacSwiney, who had been arrested on August 12, was among the first Sinn Feiners to be tried under the new Act. A member of the Dail as well as a teacher and Commandant of the I.R.A.'s First

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70 Street, The Administration of Ireland, 1920, pp. 122-23.
71 Resolutions, Irish Peace Conference, 24 August 1920 (L.G.P. /F/95/2/37).
72 Harrison to L.G., 31 August 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/37).
73 Harrison to Anderson, 1 September 1920 (J.A.P./C.O.904/188/1).
Cork Brigade, he had been elected Lord Mayor of Cork after the murder of MacCurtain earlier that year.

MacSwiney's case had been discussed by the Cabinet on August 25, including its effect on public opinion, the press, the Labour Party, and the Irish Peace Conference. The prison doctor's diagnosis stated that "what had hitherto been latent had become active tuberculosis." Balfour maintained that MacSwiney could not legally be released and in the absence of Macready and the Irish Executive the Cabinet postponed a decision. In a letter to Lord Stamfordham, the private secretary to King George V, Bonar Law stated that Churchill, Balfour and Shortt had preferred to discuss the matter with Macready before reaching a decision. This was fortunate because the vacationing Premier had written a letter to MacSwiney's sister—which was released to the evening newspapers by her—denying the release. The announcement of two contradictory decisions by Lloyd George and the Cabinet would have had a disastrous effect on public opinion, which was quite sympathetic to the Lord Mayor. That Lloyd George did not consult his own Cabinet before sending the letter is an indication of his becoming increasingly careless—perhaps even autocratic—and also his disregard for formal methods of Government.

74 Cab. Concl. 49A/20, 25 August 1920 (Cab.23/22/f/143-44).
75 Ibid.
76 Bonar Law to Stamfordham, 26 August 1920 (B.L.P./101/4/83).
77 Stamfordham was amused by these Lloyd Georgian methods—see Stamfordham to Bonar Law, 30 August 1920 (B.L.P./99/4/22); also see Costigan, "Lloyd George", Makers of Modern England (New York, 1967), pp. 222-23.
The Cabinet decided on September 2 to continue making hunger-strikers bear the consequences of their acts in spite of the publicity given MacSwiney.78 A letter to Bonar Law shows that Lloyd George had been motivated against release out of fear that it would have a negative impact on police in Ireland.79 The same letter also shows that his interest had again shifted from primary concern with Ireland to British domestic problems such as labor strikes and depression, and also to the threat from the Labour Party to his own political power. The Cabinet's concern with Ireland may have again lessened for they were unaware at the time of their decision that 14 of the hunger-strikers at Cork had not even been convicted.80

The six Northeastern counties of Ulster had been relatively calm since the outbreak of war in 1914. Even 1919 and early 1920—with the prospect of Home Rule—found the North quiescent. But in late July and August of 1920 the ancient hatred between Catholics and Protestants again re-surfaced. The 'Belfast Pogrom' lasted several weeks and included numerous riots, the expulsion of 5,000 Catholics from the Belfast shipyards, the murder of R.I.C. District Inspector Swanzy, and the evacuation of the entire Catholic populations from Banbridge and Lisburn.81 The trouble largely resulted from Ulster's fear that her Protestant heritage was threatened by

79 L.G. to Bonar Law, 4 September 1920 (L.G.P./F/31/1/44).
81 Macardle, pp. 384-86.
the triple alliance of Sinn Fein, the Irish Labour movement, and Catholicism. 82

A Conference of Ministers discussed the situation in Ulster on both September 2 and 8. They decided to have the Chief Secretary and the Commissioner of Police organize a body of special constables for service in the North, 83 a step which had been suggested by Sir James Craig on September 2nd 84 and discussed briefly by the Government on July 23. Conceived as the U.V.F. (Ulster Volunteer Force) they soon became the hated 'B' Specials. It was also decided that an Assistant Under-Secretary should be appointed for the six Northern counties. 85 Sir Ernest Clarke took up this post on September 16. 86

In late July and August, 1920 British policy changed from one of police coercion coupled with Home Rule to one of limited war using paramilitary police, a reorganized military force, and military courts—a situation Bonar Law seemed to recognize. 87 It

82 Bennett, p. 58.


86 Bennett, p. 75.

87 Referring to the "Restoration of Order in Ireland Bill", Bonar Law stated: "This Bill is Martial Law so far as it can be enforced." (Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 34). The editor of Jones' diary, Keith Middlemas, has viewed the "Restoration of Order in Ireland Act" as "the fullest extent of the old policy of 'Thorough', of seeing the troubles in Ireland through with combined force and appeasement, instead of being the actual beginning of a new policy of limited war. (See Middlemas in Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 39). The evidence as I have shown points the opposite way. The later proclamation on December 10, 1921, and extension on January 4, 1921, of martial law in Ireland are not the turning points in Britain's Irish policy but rather the intensification of a more aggressive posture begun in late July, 1920.
was this new aggressive policy and its accompanying reprisals, along with MacSwiney's hunger-strike and DeValera's work in America, which brought Ireland to the attention of the world "more, perhaps, than at any other previous time in her history." 88

2. Reprisals and the British Government  
(September-November, 1920)

The coming of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries to Ireland in 1920 ushered in the worst campaign of terror known there since 1798. Unofficial yet systematic reprisals were carried out by these forces in the Fall of 1920, many at the slightest provocation. The killing of a single policeman often resulted in the destruction of nearby creameries and shops—even of entire villages and large sections of towns. Balbriggan, Croke Park, and Cork are especially remembered in this phase of the Anglo-Irish War. The destruction which resulted from reprisals had not only focused world attention on Ireland, but left little question as to popular support for Sinn Fein.

Prior to the Fall of 1920 there had been numerous reprisals but none on a large scale. Troops had sacked the shops of Fermoy in the war's first reprisal in September, 1919, and the R.I.C. had damaged Thurles in January, 1920. The intrepid correspondent for London's Daily News, Hugh Martin, spent three months in Ireland (August-November, 1920) attempting to report the truth to Britain. Using his own observations in Ireland in addition to Irish newspapers and Sinn Fein's Irish Bulletin, he listed three reprisals by Crown forces in 1919, 26 for the first six months of 1920, and

88Macardle, p. 382.
more than twenty each for July, August and September, 1920.89 One of these, Fermoy, had been raided by the military on the eve of 27 June 1920, yet—by the 20th of July—the military could report little progress with its investigation.90 In another retaliation on the night of July 17, Black and Tans had shot up the City of Cork, in response to the murder of Col. Smyth by the I.R.A. As a result, a curfew was proclaimed in Cork between 10a.m. and 3 p.m.

In spite of a number of small reprisals in late 1919 and the first half of 1920, the Government maintained that "the first so-called reprisal had not taken place until the 20th July...when a considerable part of Tuam, Co. Galway, was destroyed."91 The town had been raided by Black and Tans after an I.R.A. ambush had killed two policemen the previous day. British officials were slow to acknowledge the Tuam reprisal, and two weeks later the Irish Attorney-General, Denis Henry, stated he did not yet have sufficient information to comment on the event.92

The 'Sack of Balbriggan' on 20 September 1920 was correctly

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89Irish Bulletin, quoted in Martin, pp. 180-85. Martin writes that while this source is the official Sinn Fein organ, 'a reference to the files of the Irish press will show that the list has simply been compiled from reports published in those newspapers... the extent of the damage has been overstated in a good many cases .... Apart from this, the list may be taken as accurate" (see Martin, p. 179). The one thing Martin overlooked is that the Irish Bulletin often used the date of its source by mistake instead of the actual day the reprisal took place. Historians accept Martin today as an impartial and reliable source (For example, see Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, p. 58).

90Major-General Rycroft to the Urban District Council, Fermoy, 20 July 1920 in C.P. 1708, 29 July 1920 (Cab. 24/110/f.26).

91Memo on Reprisals by E. Evans, mid-October, 1920 (L.G.P./F/ 180/3/7). This document has been incorrectly dated for mid-October, 1919.

92Debates, Commons, 132 (5 August 1920), col. 2616.
admitted by the British Cabinet to be the first large-scale reprisal by Crown forces.\textsuperscript{93} R.I.C. Head Constable Burke had been shot earlier that day by the I.R.A. and—on learning of the killing—Black and Tans responded by partially burning the little town and killing two supposed I.R.A. men. The destruction included four pubs, a hosiery factory, and 19 private dwellings.\textsuperscript{94} Another 30 houses were slightly damaged. Most historians agree today that the reprisal was premeditated and not spontaneous.

The reprisal at Balbriggan was an evil omen. Within a week there were further retaliations at Milltown Malby, Lahinch, Ennistymon, Trim, and Mallow in response to the murder of 13 and wounding of seven policemen.\textsuperscript{95} A reprisal at Tubbercurry on the 30th by 16 Black and Tans—following the murder of R.I.C. Inspector Brady—rounded out September, 1920.

At times, British reprisals resulted from great provocation, though usually they did not. The attacks by the I.R.A. were directed specifically toward achieving independence and making British rule impossible. Reprisals by British forces, especially the Black and Tans, were indiscriminate—resulting from personal frustration and hatred—yet partially camouflaged by the Government's 'restoration of order' tactics. British policy—first of coercion and later of limited war—along with these unauthorized

\textsuperscript{93} Cab. Concl. 53A/20, Conf. of Min., 1 October 1920 (Cab. 23/22/£.252).

\textsuperscript{94} Bennett, pp. 76-77.

\textsuperscript{95} Daily Mail, 30 September 1920.
reprisals escalated the violence on both sides. By the close of September, 1920, the Black and Tans were being condemned by much of the influential British press. 96

Throughout 1919-20, the I.R.A. had discouraged Irishmen from belonging to the R.I.C. in a number of slogans. In the early Fall, Black and Tans sought to stop Irish support for the guerrillas with unofficial and possibly unauthorized warnings of their own.

**DROGHEDA BEWARE**

If in the vicinity a policeman is shot, five of the leading Sinn Feiners will be shot.

It is not coercion—it is an eye for eye.

...Remember Balbriggan.

(By Order) Black and Tans. 97

The growing number and size of reprisals in the early Fall not only provoked criticism in the press but also from military men. Sir Henry Wilson wrote in his diary on 29 September 1920:

I had 1½ hours this evening with Lloyd George and Bonar Law. I told them what I thought of reprisals by the "Black and Tans", and how this must lead to chaos and ruin. Lloyd George danced about and was angry, but I never budged. I pointed out that these reprisals were carried out without anyone being responsible; men were murdered, houses burnt, villages wrecked...I said that this was due to want of discipline, and this must be stopped. It was the business of the Government to govern. If these men ought to be murdered, then the Government should murder them. Lloyd George danced at all this, said no Government could possibly take this responsibility... 98

Challenged by Wilson and troubled by reprisals—especially Balbriggan—Lloyd George again focused squarely on the Irish War. In


97 Bennett, pp. 81–82.

the conference which assembled on October 1, the Chief Secretary was confident the tide was turning against Sinn Fein and that order would soon be restored.\textsuperscript{99} The problem of reprisals was discussed and it was stated that Dublin Castle had issued "appropriate orders to the military and to the police." On August 18, General Macready had warned his command that anyone caught looting or involved in reprisals would face harsh disciplinary measures.\textsuperscript{100} The conference agreed confidently that they would be able to stop incendiary reprisals but felt they could not guarantee "occasional and sporadic incidents...would not occur...from small, isolated detachments"\textsuperscript{101} of police witnessing their comrades' murder. Also discussed was the official control of reprisals by martial law suggested by General Macready on September 27.\textsuperscript{102} There was, however, agreement that even "unauthorized reprisals had...a visible effect both in enabling the Executive to obtain information about ambushes and pilots, and in driving a wedge between the moderates and the extremists in the Sinn Fein camp."\textsuperscript{103} Believing that reprisals were having a

\textsuperscript{99} Cab. Concl. 53A/20, Conf. of Min., 1 October 1920 (Cab.23/22/ff.251-55); Greenwood to Miss Stevenson, 29 September 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/21).

\textsuperscript{100} Memo on Reprisals by E. Evans, mid-October, 1920 (L.G.P./F/180/3/7).

\textsuperscript{101} Cab. Concl. 53A/20 (f.252).

\textsuperscript{102} Memorandum by Macready, 27 September 1920, mentioned in another Macready Memorandum to the C.I.G.S., 17 October 1920 (L.G.P./F/180/5/16).

\textsuperscript{103} Cab. Concl. 53A/20 (ff.252-53). This belief was likely influenced by the same Macready memo on September 27 and it is clearly stated in that sent on October 17 (see L.G.P./F/180/5/16). Richard Bennett is all too quick to believe that Greenwood detested these reprisals (see Bennett, p. 83).
productive impact, the government seems to have hesitated again—not between appeasement and force, but on whether to officially condemn reprisals.

A number of other proposals were discussed at the October 1st conference including the use of plain clothes policemen, control of motor vehicles to prevent the escape of Sinn Fein assassins, and extension of compensation to the R.I.C. for their service. Lloyd George declared his complete support for the Irish Executive in their difficult task—one which had been defined in the Weekly Summary as making Ireland 'AN APPROPRIATE HELL' for rebels. It was also decided that Lloyd George would receive a deputation from the Dublin Conference on Conciliation in mid-October, but only after the Cabinet had reviewed its policy. The ministers also agreed with Greenwood's September 25th memorandum\(^{104}\) that pressure should be brought on Irish Railway Companies that still refused to move British traffic. Greenwood and Sir Eric Geddes, Minister of Transport, were to work out the precise Government policy.

A Conference of Ministers gathered on October 13 and—though "many of them wanted to give way on Ireland"—decided no major changes would be made in the Fourth Home Rule Bill.\(^{105}\) Lloyd George and the majority, failing to recognize that even Southern Unionists were now for Dominion Home Rule, believed the Bill would receive the support of Irish moderates. The Premier thought that any major concession at that time would be unwise. He was still unwilling to grant financial autonomy and spoke of justice not only for Ireland


but also for England, Scotland, and Wales "who had made greater
sacrifices in the (world) war than Ireland". He wanted to with-
hold financial concessions until the opportune moment when he might
obtain other compromises from Sinn Fein. These were not mentioned
but undoubtedly entailed recognition of the Crown and membership in
the Empire. Lloyd George was also determined that Sinn Fein must
step forward first and then he would bargain. His position had
not changed—despite two months of reprisals—from that of late
July 1920.

The Ministers reassembled on the 17th and discussed both
reprisals and demands for an Irish settlement. On the 18th they
discussed Lord Crewe's requested debate on reprisals in the House of
Lords and agreed that—unless "undertaken by the Government itself"
—requests for enquiries into reprisals in both the Commons and
the Lords would be refused.

The Commons reconvened in October after two months recess. On
the 20th Arthur Henderson of the Labour Party proposed a vote of
censure of the Government for "the present state of lawlessness in
Ireland and the lack of discipline in the armed forces of the Crown",
and called for an investigation of reprisals like Balbriggan which
he thought disgraceful and humiliating. It was voted down by the
Commons which—as a result of the First World War—was now composed

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predominantly of prosperous conservative businessmen. Greenwood had the effrontery to answer Henderson that most English newspapers doubted the Black and Tans' responsibility for Balbriggan—though later that day he admitted their responsibility.\textsuperscript{110} Maintaining that his police were combating "crime of a most hideous and revolting nature", the Chief Secretary justified brutal retaliation on civilians by Crown forces.\textsuperscript{111}

In April, 1920, Greenwood had succeeded MacPherson as Irish Chief Secretary. He quickly became notorious for lies, denials, and evasions, believing he could say anything to defend Britain against the "deliberate, organized, highly-paid conspiracy" of murderers who were out "to smash the British Empire."\textsuperscript{112} Sir Hamar has been caricatured in Ireland by the phrase "to tell a Greenwood" and by Lord Hugh Cecil who sarcastically observed,"It seems to be agreed that there are no such things as reprisals, but they are having a good effect."\textsuperscript{113} The latter comment resulted from Cecil's having witnessed the contradictory performance of Greenwood and the Government. On the 26th of July the Chief Secretary explained that

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Ibid.}, cols. 925-35, 942-45.

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Ibid.}, col. 937.

\textsuperscript{112}\textit{Ibid.}, col. 934. The Chief Secretary evidently did not know that the I.R.A. consisted of unpaid amateurs—excepting certain members of the Irish Intelligence, the A.S.U. (see Gleason, pp. 117, 142).

\textsuperscript{113}Holt, p. 205; Bennett, p. 89.
"the suggestion that reprisals form a part of the policy is a suggestion not founded on fact",\textsuperscript{114} yet a few months later he said, "I am admitting what is called a reprisal."\textsuperscript{115} Throughout 1920 he maintained that the Government thoroughly disapproved of reprisals. Nevertheless, he continued to prevaricate with statements such as "I want no reprisals...but those men, who are members of the I.R.A., pledged to defy the Government and assassinate Crown officers, have no right to complain of reprisals."\textsuperscript{116} Throughout 1920 the British Government had maintained that it did not want to interfere with normal social and economic life in Ireland, yet on October 20 Greenwood stated, "I would rather see every railroad in Ireland shut down for one hundred years than yield one inch to the claim of the I.R.A."\textsuperscript{117}

The question arises why a British Cabinet member would act thus. The answer is threefold. First, Greenwood—like many politicians, believed completely that his actions were justified in the service of Britain and the Empire. The second consideration is that the contradictory statements by the Chief Secretary reflect the vacillation in the Cabinet between allowing or completely stopping the reprisals on noncombatants and their property. The Conference of Ministers of 1 October clearly

\textsuperscript{114}Debates, Commons, 132 (26 July 1920), col. 1121.  
\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., 133 (20 October 1920), col. 945.  
\textsuperscript{116}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{117}Ibid., col. 941.
felt they were having a productive impact. Thirdly, Greenwood seems to have been a man of questionable integrity.

While Greenwood was the main champion of the Government's Irish policy in the Commons, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, and Denis Henry also were at times. On the 20th of October the Prime Minister stated that his Carnarvon speech on the 9th—which refused Ireland full Dominion Home Rule and claimed "we have murder by the throat"—represented his real position. The latter boast was repeated by Lloyd George at the Guildhall Banquet on November 9—though the activity of the I.R.A. in late November proved him wrong. While somewhat troubled by reprisals, the British Government's concern was not as great as it had been in late July, 1920, when the I.R.A. had rendered British authority impossible. The feeling within the Cabinet was that reprisals had had a productive impact and that the I.R.A. was on the run. Also, there was some feeling among Government officials that harsh reprimands would have a disastrous effect on the police and troops. Concern with reprisals

118 Cab. Concl. 53A/20, Conf. of Min., 1 October 1920 (Cab. 23/22/ff. 252-53).

119 See Chapter II, p. 53.

120 Debates, Commons, 133 (20 October 1920), col. 929.

121 W. S. Churchill, p. 289.

122 See Macready's attitude on 17 October 1920 (L.G.P./F/180/5/16) and in September, 1920, in a statement to the U.S. Associated Press correspondent (Martin, p. 187). Lloyd George held a similar belief on 4 September 1920 regarding the release of MacSwiney (L.G.P. /F/31/1/34).
resulted probably out of fear of alienating public opinion—particularly American—rather than from any moral regard for innocent Irishmen. A report from New York on October 25 explained that American correspondents were making the most of the reprisals as they see them stressing "the ruffianly aspect of the Black and Tans." Still, it was believed that the statements by Lloyd George at Carnarvon and Greenwood in the Commons were well received in America.

The Lloyd George Government—with its somewhat ambivalent attitude toward reprisals—made only a token gesture to stop them. Instead, as Lord Hankey revealed, the Ministers merely looked the other way and left the Chief Secretary to answer for them in the Commons. While Greenwood had denied Cabinet approval of reprisals on October 20th, during the following month some of the worst reprisals in Irish history occurred in response to increased killing by the I.R.A. These included the destruction of towns like Tralee and Granard and the systematic burning of farms near Roscommon along with some 20 creameries, thus helping to ruin the life work of Sir Horace Plunkett. It was at Tralee, Co. Kerry, in early November, 1920—just after the reprisal there on October 30—that Hugh Martin had to conceal his identity from the Auxiliaries.


124 Lord Hankey Diaries (26 September 1920), cited in Roskill, II, 196. Hankey states the Government "More or less winked" at reprisals.

125 Martin, pp. 66-82, 106; Bennett, pp. 91-93, 95. The destruction of creameries during 1919-21 was a severe blow to the future development of the Irish economy which had only emerged from British oppression and feudal landlordism a few decades before (see the Irish Independent, 28 March and 5, 10, 12, and 17 April 1922).
who had sworn to kill him for his criticisms in the Daily News. Besides killing and burning, Black and Tans and Auxiliaries wantonly shot and decapitated farm animals, bombed the salmon river of Lt. Commander Kenworthy, M.P., and sheared the hair of girls in Co. Kerry.

Such activity—along with still more outrageous acts like the cutting out the tongue, the nose, and the heart, and bashing in the skulls of people—was rarely glimpsed by the British people or by the Cabinet itself. Lloyd George and his ministers never really understood what was happening in Ireland, though had they visited the Green Isle their impressions might have been quite different. With the war in Ireland as with that later in Vietnam, the real picture was seldom seen by ordinary people, and only known because of the efforts of liberal reporters like Martin, H. W. Nevinson, and the Manchester Guardian's A. P. Wadsworth. C. P. Scott, Guardian editor, was particularly severe in condemning British reprisals. The activity of such men was instrumental in arousing public concern and, thus, in stopping Britain's reign of terror in Ireland.

Criticism also came from three unrelenting and intelligent M.P.'s who opposed Lloyd George's policy of force in general and reprisals in particular. The trio consisted of two veteran Home

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126 Martin, p. 143.
127 Ibid., pp. 122, 129-32.
128 Pakenham, p. 51.
129 Holt, p. 224.
130 See the Debates for the House of Commons between 1919 and 1921.
Rulers who had managed to keep their seats in spite of the Sinn Fein tide—Joseph Devlin and T. P. O'Connor. The former was the most rational critic while the latter was more emotional. The third critic, Lt. Commander Kenworthy, an Irish landowner as well as an M.P., was the most unyielding of all, persistently questioning Government falsehoods, denials, and evasions.

While these men inquired into violence by Crown forces, the die-hards pressed the Government to take even firmer action. To the latter the British Government usually responded that they were making arrests under the 'Defense of the Realm' and 'Restoration of Order in Ireland' Acts.

At the October 1st Conference of Ministers Lloyd George had declared his complete support for the Chief Secretary and the Irish Executive. Yet Greenwood had already been evasive about reprisals and had refused to publish a monthly statement listing outrages by the occupation forces similar to that kept for Sinn Fein. Throughout 1920 he continued with his denials and contradictions. Greenwood's attitude, condoned by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, was that almost any act was legitimate against the 'gang of terrorists'. He said:

Where an ambush is possible and suspect, the police and the military do fire a few rounds along the hedge or behind the wall, to make certain they are not being ambushed. That is legitimate self-protection....There is nothing indiscriminate about it. It is carefully planned and, as far as I know, no innocent person has ever suffered death or injury because of it.

131 Debates, Commons, 131 (15 July 1920), cols. 2622-23.
132 Ibid., 133 (20 October 1920), col. 942.
Ten days later this attempted justification of Black and Tan methods was belied by Ellen Quinn's death in Kiltartan, Co. Galway—a pregnant woman sitting innocently along the side of a road with her child in her arms—and the murder of eight year old Annie O'Neill.\textsuperscript{133} The Chief Secretary's comment about the former killing was "it may be that the wounding resulted from a shot fired in anticipation of an ambush in the neighborhood."\textsuperscript{134} He also denied the destruction of creameries and the beatings of Irish civilians by Black and Tans, suggesting that Sinn Feiners committed these acts while wearing stolen British uniforms and that photos of these floggings had been retouched.\textsuperscript{135} On October 27 he told Devlin: "I am not aware of any assassination of innocent civilians, except those who assassinate innocent policemen", and on November 4 denied that Hugh Martin's life had been threatened.\textsuperscript{136} He also denied that the Black and Tans were anything but normal R.I.C. recruits.\textsuperscript{137}

At the end of October two momentous events took place—the death of MacSwiney and the hanging of eighteen year old Kevin Barry. The Lord Mayor died in London on October 25 at 5 p.m.

\textsuperscript{133}Pakenham, pp. 52-53.

\textsuperscript{134}Debates, Commons, 134 (4 November 1920), col. 551.


\textsuperscript{136}Ibid., 27 October 1920, col. 1736; 134 (4 November 1920), col. 547.

\textsuperscript{137}Ibid., 133 (25 October 1920), col. 1332; 136 (22 December 1920), cols. 1726-27.
—after a 74 day hunger strike of a heart attack which resulted after scurvy had set in.138 Barry, a student at the National University, had been arrested for his involvement in an I.R.A. attack and sentenced to hang in Mountjoy Jail, Dublin—though it had not been proved that he had ever killed anyone. Devlin, at the last minute, appealed for commutation of the sentence on grounds of Barry's youth but the Cabinet stated it could not reverse the death penalty.139 The execution of Barry and the death of MacSwiney profoundly moved the Irish nation and had a significant impact on British and world opinion. Had both Irish and British leaders been willing, this might have been an opportunity for peace.

Faced with growing opposition to his Irish policy in early November, 1920, Lloyd George and his Cabinet reviewed the minutes of the conferences held on October 13, 17, 18, and 28.140 There was also great pressure within the Government, not only from Walter Long and Sir Henry Wilson but from General Macready as well, for proclaiming martial law throughout Ireland. Long re-emphasized his position on November 2 and gave his full support for the Macready memorandums of September 27 and October 17.141 In the October 17 memo to the C.I.G.S., Sir Henry Wilson, Macready stressed the importance of minimizing reprisals by either declaring martial law or

140 Ibid., 59/20/7, 3 November 1920 (Cab.23/23/ff.8).
141 Long to L.G., 2 November 1920 (L.G.P./F/180/5/16).
at least by making reprisals official.¹⁴² Official reprisals would
be ordered only by General Officers of the Army and the County level
Police Inspectors. Such a policy would enable them to control the
situation within weeks. The Macready memorandums were also impor-
tant in convincing Cabinet Ministers—particularly Lloyd George and
Greenwood—that reprisals were having a positive impact in Ireland
and that it was impossible to accurately allot the responsibility
for them.

The War Secretary, Churchill, now also pressed by Macready for
martial law, circulated a memorandum on November 3rd. He had con-
sistently supported the Black and Tans whose freedom of action he
compared with "the Chicago or New York police...in dealing with
armed gangs" and the policy of police counterterror, but opposed
martial law.¹⁴³ Of the militarists like Wilson who demanded complete
martial law for Ireland, he later stated: "I never received any
practical or useful advice on this subject from those quarters."¹⁴⁴
Now, in his memorandum he suggested a step just short of full martial
law—the strict organization of a system of 'authorized reprisals'.

I do not consider that the present Government
attitude on reprisals can be maintained much
longer. It is not fair on the troops, it is
not fair on the officers who command them.
Although the spirit of the Army is absolutely
loyal and very hostile to the Irish rebels,
there is no doubt that service is intensely
unpopular....

It is for consideration whether a policy of

¹⁴² Macready memo to the C.I.G.S., 17 October 1920 (L.G.P./F/
180/5/16).


¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 288.
reprisals within strict limits and under strict control in certain districts, in which it should be declared that conditions approximating to war exist, would not be right at the present time. It is thought by many that such a policy would be less discreditable and more effective than what is now going on....

I ask that this matter shall be formally and definitely considered by the Cabinet....

Churchill also supported the implementation of identity card and passport systems—as had been suggested by General Tudor on July 23—and improvement of controls on the importation of weapons and explosives into Ireland.

Churchill's proposals were considered at a Conference of Ministers assembled on November 10, and attended by the Prime Minister, Bonar Law, A. Chamberlain, Churchill, Shortt, and Fisher—and Greenwood and Denis Henry for the Irish Executive. The Conference directed the Chief Secretary to look thoroughly into the proposals for I.D. cards and passports and also to "do all in his power to prevent houses and creameries being burned by the R.I.C. and the troops as reprisals."

In the absence of the British Attorney-General, Sir Gordon Hewart, the conference agreed "that the moment was not opportune to come to a decision with regard to the question of organized reprisals."

Hewart, who was in Paris, had advised the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, by telephone that cards and passports could be implemented under the 'Defense of the Realm Acts', but new

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145 Memorandum by Churchill, 3 November 1920 (Cab.23/23/f.84).
146 Cab. Concl. 59A/20, Conf. of Min., 10 November 1920 (Cab. 23/23/ff.82-83).
147 Ibid., f. 83.
legislation would be necessary to sanction 'authorized reprisals'.
Also, the Lloyd George Government was confident that Sinn Fein
would soon collapse.\textsuperscript{148} The Prime Minister had done very little
to restrict reprisals and privately explained to Sir Henry Wilson
that he would "shoulder the responsibility" for them after the
American elections were over.\textsuperscript{149} It was also out of concern over
American opinion that Lloyd George had persisted with his Home Rule
Bill. In the United States in 1920 there were a considerable number
of Americans of at least partial Irish descent.\textsuperscript{150} The Bill was
passed in the Commons on 11 November 1920 and Birkenhead subse-
quently steered it through the Lords.\textsuperscript{151} While the Bill was easily
agreed to by Coalition Unionists who formed a majority in Parlia-
ment and the Cabinet, the Lloyd George Liberals were also for the
Bill and recognized Ulster's right to separate treatment. In fact,
the Bill was a product of the Coalition effort to compromise.

The confidence shown by the ministers in conference in early
November was also displayed in the Commons. Lloyd George declared
that "we are breaking up this conspiracy...(the) men who are suffer-
ing in Ireland are the men engaged in murderous conspiracy."\textsuperscript{152}
Both he and Greenwood were evasive when asked for impartial enquiries

\textsuperscript{148}Sir Henry Wilson's Diaries (10 November 1920), in Callwell, II, 268.
\textsuperscript{149}Ibid., (14 October 1920), in Callwell, II, 265.
\textsuperscript{150}Street, The Administration of Ireland, 1920, p. 362, suggests
the number at 20 million. Conservative estimates place the number
at 8,500,000 (see O'Connor, II, 366).
\textsuperscript{151}Debates, Commons, 134 (11 November 1920), cols. 1463-64;
Birkenhead, p. 364.
\textsuperscript{152}Ibid., 8 November 1920, cols. 828-29.
into Government policy. Greenwood had again maintained on November 3 that the British policy was to protect innocent Irishmen and investigate every alleged reprisal, yet the next day he condoned the burning of houses, buildings, and creameries. 153 He gave his support to military courts which were in operation, believing completely in the military's shining integrity. 154 While confident of victory, the Ministers realized that the support being given to Sinn Fein in Britain by newspapers and a growing number of men of influence was significant. As with American opinion later about Vietnam—it made "the destruction of the morale of the forces of disorder...a slower and more difficult", 155 if not impossible process.

Sir Henry Wilson and later the English writer Richard Bennett maintained there were many—even a majority—within the Cabinet for settling with Sinn Fein. The Cabinet Records do not show this—though they do reveal reservations about increased coercion and the policy of war. It must further be remembered that the majority in the Cabinet were Unionists. Later, in 1922, they deserted Lloyd George largely over the Irish settlement reached on 6 December 1921. One of them, Walter Long, headed both Cabinet committees on Ireland. Still, there is no doubt that Lloyd George—working in conjunction with Bonar Law, Greenwood, Churchill, Macready, and sometimes Long—now dominated Irish policy. He had consistently resisted the hardline extremists while bringing along the doubters. Only Greenwood's chief

153 Ibid., 3 and 4 November 1920, cols. 177, 711-12.
154 Ibid., 4 November 1920, cols. 711, 718; 11 November 1920, col. 1345.
155 Extract from Irish Situation Report for the week ending 13 November 1920 (L.G.P./F/180/5/15).
subordinates at Dublin Castle and Tom Jones had firmly opposed the war policy.

Back in September, H. A. L. Fisher, the President of the Board of Education and member of both Irish committees, explained to Lloyd George that he now favored a grant of fiscal autonomy to both parts of Ireland and emphasized the positive impact it would have on American and British liberal opinion,156 and even Walter Long was prepared to make some financial concessions.157 Also, Jan Smuts, the South African leader who had left the War Cabinet at the end of 1918, offered to arrange a truce with Sinn Fein.158 His experience as a guerrilla in the Boer War and in the settlement which had resulted in the Union of South Africa made him the prime mediator for arranging such a truce.

In a letter to the Times on October 4, former Prime Minister Asquith reiterated his proposal of January, 1920, to grant full Dominion status to Ireland.159 Such proposals were denounced throughout 1919 and most of 1920 by Lloyd George as insanity and pure nonsense. He had opposed them at Carnarvon on 9 October and in the Commons on November 11. Asquith was joined in his pleas by many Labourites and also by such former Liberal colleagues of both himself and Lloyd George as Lord Haldane, Lord Grey, and Sir John Simon.

156Fisher to L.G., 11 September 1920 (L.G.P./F/16/7/59); also see Fisher, pp. 126-27. Fisher had once said that Ireland was "the least enviable of all my cabinet tasks" (p. 123).


158Cab. Concl. 53/20/9, 30 September 1920 (Cab.23/22/f.21).

159Times, 4 October 1920.
Haldane had written the following to a friend in Dublin in October, 1920:

L. G. used to storm at us constantly during the war for being too late, but if ever any Government has been too late it is the Coalition over Ireland.... The root of the trouble is that L. G. has never taken the trouble to get to know the men who could form a Government for Southern Ireland. If he had done so he would have found out, as we know, that they are not murderers, but that they have a very clear idea of the minimum which they can accept. The policy of the Coalition has driven away their followers into the ranks of the wild men, and things must, I fear, become worse before they can become better.160

Asquith and Simon agreed that reprisals were acts of "blind and indiscriminate vengeance."161 Though the Liberal Party had split in 1916, the Black and Tan war seemed proof of Lloyd George's "unfitness ever again to belong in their company."162

The British Government was also pressured in early October by Lord Middleton, the most prominent Southern Unionist, and George Cockerill, M.P. from Reigate, to convene a Conference of Plenipotentiaries representing Britain and all Irish parties to work out a settlement. Cockerill pointed out that it would receive the support of influential men of all Irish parties, including Arthur Griffith.163 Both Bonar Law and Lloyd George felt there was no chance for negotiation until Sinn Fein realized that it could not

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160 Haldane to Mrs. Green, October, 1920, cited in Sommer, p. 376.


163 Cockerill to Greenwood, 30 October 1920, and Memorandum, 29 October 1920 (J.A.P./C.O. 904/188/1).
have a Republic. 164 Joseph Devlin also wrote Lloyd George on November 1, pointing out that "the appointment of 'special' constables in Belfast will be an outrage so indefensible that I fear to think of what the consequences will be." 165 He also forwarded a letter to the Premier from the Bishop of Ardagh, Dr. F. I. Hoare. The Bishop explained that there had been no murder or destruction in Longford until the arrival of the Black and Tans. 166

Edwin S. Montagu, who as India Secretary feared the growing nationalism of Gandhi and his Congress movement in India, submitted a memo on 10 November. Like Fisher in September, he now favored a grant of fiscal autonomy and explained that it was compatible with the safety of the Empire. 167 He also criticized Lloyd George and Greenwood for not stopping the Black and Tans' outrage. Fisher, who was away in Paris, again wrote that he was shocked by the Irish situation and the reprisals by police. "The only result of them will be to induce Englishmen to say that if we can only govern Ireland by such means as these, we had better not govern Ireland at all. It is clear that this too is the Sinn Fein calculation." 168 He emphasized that "the note of conciliation" should be "struck again and again. We cannot strike it too often." The moderate Irish Peace Conference, which resulted from the Premier's invitation

164 Bonar Law to L.G., 7 October 1920 (B.L.P/103/4/8).
165 Devlin to L.G., 1 November 1920 (L.G.P./F/15/1/1).
166 Bishop of Ardagh to Devlin, 5 November 1920, forwarded to L.G. on 8 November 1920 (L.G.P./F/15/1/2).
167 C.P. 2084, 10 November 1920 (Cab.24/114/ff.466-66a).
168 Fisher to L.G., 16 November 1920 (L.G.P./F/16/7/61).
on 4 August, asked Lloyd George whether he was still interested in hearing its position. It urged him to convene an Irish Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution along Dominion lines.

The attitude of Lloyd George to these pressures for appeasement is explicit in a reply to the Irish Peace Conference on 17 November. The extreme party, he wrote, "dominates the situation in Ireland, and so long as that party attempts to gain its ends by murder and assassination, the Government must take the sternest counter-measures in defense of the law and its guardians, and real progress towards a settlement is well-nigh impossible." Because he believed he was winning the war of terror, he ignored the fact that conciliation might have led to restored order. British confidence was also evident in Greenwood's glowing report to the Cabinet that same day. The Chief Secretary cited as evidence a recent tour of Ireland by General Tudor, the call for police protection by some citizens in the town of Ballybunion, and the seeming abatement of the railway strike and of activity by Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. While Lloyd George ignored the pressure for negotiation, he likewise resisted martial law, believing his present policy would defeat the guerrillas. Also, he wanted his policy to appear a mere police action quelling a rebellion of extremists rather than admit he was actually at war. The reluctance to call a spade a

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171 Cab. Concl. 61/20/2, 17 November 1920 (Cab.23/23/f.93).
172 Debates, Commons, 134 (15 November 1920), cols. 1503-04.
spade—or a war a war—was also present at the Pentagon and State Department in the early stages of the Vietnam War. Yet in the Commons in early November, Lloyd George carelessly referred to reprisals as "unfortunate incidents that always happen in war."173

Only a few days prior, Greenwood had declared, "War it will be until assassination stops."174

While Lloyd George was overly confident of victory, in the first half of November, 1920, British forces were making the war more difficult for the I.R.A. General Macready and Sir Ormonde Winter had urged the establishment of a new intelligence unit and it had been proposed in the Cabinet on 1 October that "some of the Police...be put into plain clothes, since at present they were recognized a long distance off"175—a factor which made escape much easier. The Intelligence Division at Dublin Castle was composed of censorship, propaganda, and public information branches, the latter being the largest.176

The new intelligence group eventually consisted of a number of men with experience in clandestine activity in Egypt and Russia.177 Known as Winter's 'Squads' and the 'Cairo Gang', they operated at night and alone carried out more than 6,311 raids between October, 1920, and July, 1921.178 Though wearing civilian clothes, they were as obvious in Dublin—especially to I.R.A.

173Ibid., 8 November 1920, col. 829; Times, 9 November 1920.
174Ibid., 4 November 1920, col. 721.
175Cab. Concl. 53A/20, 1 October 1920 (Cab.23/22/f.253).
176Dublin Castle, Intelligence Division diagram (C.0.904/168).
177Gleason, pp. 112-13.
178Ibid., p. 102.
Intelligence, the Active Service Units (A.S.U.)—as an Irishman was in London. These raids in October and November, 1920, posed a real threat to the guerrilla movement and almost resulted in the capture of Collins himself.

Recognizing that the Irish guerrilla campaign might be ended overnight, Collins determined to destroy British Intelligence first. Fourteen British officers, including eleven intelligence agents, were murdered simultaneously on the morning of Sunday, November 21st—as Dubliners prepared to attend mass—in the "most vital action in the whole history of the Irish War of Independence." This 'Bloody Sunday' attack virtually saved the I.R.A. and the Sinn Fein movement while largely destroying the British spy system. Lord Riddell, who was with the Prime Minister when he received the news, has written that Lloyd George was "much concerned" though he acted "as if nothing had happened." Though concerned, he was also disgusted with Black and Tan activity as is evident in a letter the next day to P. Moylett. "They got what they deserved, beaten by counter-jumpers."

In the afternoon of the fourteen killings, Black and Tans deliberately opened fire in reprisal on a crowd of approximately 5,000 people watching football in Dublin's Croke Park—killing 14 and wounding 62. That the Tans shot first is substantiated by Major E. L. Mills whose report was subsequently ignored by British

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179 Ibid., pp. 132, 173, 179.
180 Riddell, p. 250.
182 Gleason, p. 138.
That evening "stark mad Auxiliaries"—more than a little inebriated—killed Collins' right-hand men Dick McKee and Peadar Clancy after torturing and bayonetting them in the Castle. Churchill's account of 'Bloody Sunday' in The Aftermath mentions only the fourteen murders that morning entirely omitting the British retaliation. Sir Henry Wilson, who was most shocked by events that day, had recorded that the Cabinet did not feel the need to meet, yet by the end of the month the Lloyd George Government was preparing to introduce martial law in the southernmost part of Ireland and also seriously exploring all avenues toward peace.

Cabinet members, concerned about their own protection and that of Government buildings in London, especially the House of Commons, found it "desirable to close all galleries to which the public have access." Along with St. Loe Strachey, the editor of the conservative Spectator, they extended support to Greenwood and congratulated him on his speech in the Commons the previous day. In response to Asquith's proposed censure of the Government, Greenwood had defended his Irish policy and his Weekly Summary stating the need to

184 Gleason, p. 149; also see the beating of Ernie O'Malley in his Army Without Banners, pp. 288-95.
destroy the assassins "to make it possible for public opinion to
become articulate." 189 He viewed Sinn Feiners and the I.R.A. as
strange animals apart from the Irish masses. Later in the 1960s,
some Americans were to hold the same opinion about the Viet
Cong. Greenwood also had the gall to say there was "no case
in the history of our Empire, with all its stress and strain"
where discipline had been "so sternly maintained under such fright-
ful provocation." 190 Responsibility for reprisals rested "entirely
with those assassins whose existence is a constant menace...." 191
Like Churchill, he chose to forget Croke Park—at least he never
questioned the indiscriminate shooting into a crowd of spectators—
and emphasized the murder of the British. 192 On the 24th, Lloyd
George had shown he was still determined to defeat the I.R.A.
first, yet by the end of the month he was exploring all stops toward
peace. 193

Frank Pakenham observed long ago that the shootings at Croke
Park and elsewhere were part of a general policy of 'unauthorized
reprisals'—of allowing the police a free hand in Ireland. 194 His
statement comes very close to the truth, since British officials—
other than the military—made only token gestures to stop them.
Yet reprisals directly violated the Hague Conventions of 1899 and

189 Debates, Commons, 135 (24 November 1920), cols. 505, 511.
190 Ibid., col. 502.
191 Ibid., 23 November 1920, col. 201.
192 Ibid., col. 502; 22 November 1920, col. 34.
193 Ibid., col. 623; 29 November 1920, col. 1417.
194 Pakenham, p. 36.
1907 as did torture and execution. By displaying ambivalence and hesitation—and at times even approval—the Lloyd George Government allowed a 'reign of terror' to flourish in Ireland in 1920 and 1921. With their atrocities, the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries "carved for themselves a hated and rightful place in the world of horror beside the Gestapo... (and) OGPU."  


I.R.A. action in late November, 1920, proved that the British still did not have 'murder by the throat'. The killing of fourteen British officers on 'Bloody Sunday' and eighteen Auxiliaries at Kilmichael on November 28 brought the Lloyd George Government to extend martial law to Ireland, but also to explore the possibility of peace. The Prime Minister and Cabinet—who had resisted both peace moves and proposals for martial law throughout 1920—now recognized that the I.R.A. was still not defeated.

Responding to the increased I.R.A. activity in late November, British forces murdered Father Griffin in Galway and attempted to drown Bishop Fogarty at Killaloe by throwing him in a sack into the River Shannon. In the Commons, Greenwood and Denis Henry were both

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195Hague Convention, Section II, Art. 23, b, c, g; Section III, Art. 47; cited in Costigan, "The Anglo-Irish Conflict", pp. 82-83.

196Macready, II, 523-4.


198Crozier, Ireland Forever, p. 107.
evasive regarding these reprisals.¹⁹⁹ The Kilmichael attack by the thirty-six man flying column of Tom Barry's Third Cork Brigade—directed at British terrorism in the West Cork area—clearly showed that the Auxiliaries were not invincible.²⁰⁰ It also showed the I.R.A. could mount a sizeable military operation. The accusation that the I.R.A. mutilated the bodies of the Auxies at Kilmichael was denied by Commandant Barry and no photographs of the allegedly mutilated bodies were ever produced by the British.²⁰¹ The I.R.A. also brought the war to England in late November with the burning of fifteen Liverpool warehouses.

The Kilmichael ambush directly led the Government to apply martial law "in such particular areas" of Ireland deemed necessary by the Prime Minister.²⁰² In granting this, the Cabinet stressed that the area should be so large that experienced officers alone would be entrusted with its enforcement. The next day Lloyd George read to the Cabinet a letter from Sir Hamar Greenwood describing a discussion between himself and General Sir Hugh Jeudwine, Acting Commander-in-Chief during Macready's absence.²⁰³ General Jeudwine

¹⁹⁹ Debates, Commons, 135 (29 November and 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 December 1920), cols. 912-13, 1239-40, 1414-15, 1423-24, 1758-59, 2085, 2391.

²⁰⁰ Gleason, pp. 81-82.

²⁰¹ Tom Barry, Guerrilla Days in Ireland (Dublin, 1949), pp. 49-51.

²⁰² Cab. Concl. 65A/20, Conf. of Min., 1 December 1920 (Cab.23/23/ff.159-60).

²⁰³ Ibid., 65B/20, Conf. of Min., 2 December 1920 (Cab.23/23/f.162); Greenwood to L.G., 1 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/23).
favored martial law in the Cork military district and explained that necessary preparations had already been taken. General Strickland, Commanding the Cork and Munster area, was coming to Dublin to determine the precise area, day of proclamation, and the exact number of additional personnel and motor transports that would be needed. While Lloyd George was allowing Greenwood and the military to work out the specifications, he made it clear that the proclamation should first be examined by the Cabinet.\(^{204}\)

On December 5, General Jeudwine reported unanimity between himself, General Strickland, and the other Commanding Generals in Ireland. They agreed that martial law should be applied throughout Ireland with special emphasis in the most troubled areas,\(^{205}\) a step long urged by Sir Henry Wilson. The military—and now even Churchill and Macready—saw martial law as the solution to a purely military problem and ignored the complexity of the more important political and religious questions. They wanted four additional infantry battalions, a Press Censor's Office, passport system, register of all persons entering the martial law area, and eventually an I.D. card system. They also called for strict handling of the railroad problem, naval reinforcements along the coast, distribution of photos of known rebel outlaws, immediate internment of 5,000 Sinn Fein and I.R.A. leaders and later perhaps of the rank and file.

These proposals by the military in Ireland came at a time when the Cabinet was yet uncertain whether martial law should be extended

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\(^{204}\) L.G. to Greenwood, 2 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/25).

\(^{205}\) Major-General Jeudwine to Greenwood, 5 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/25).
by district or immediately throughout all Ireland.206 Churchill, Greenwood, and Anderson wanted it to be gradual. Lloyd George, who had recognized that guerrilla war was a severe trial to soldiers' morale, also favored it for only the extreme Southwest where—outside of Dublin—most of the I.R.A. attacks had occurred.207 Macready visited England on the 8th and the next day the Cabinet decided that martial law would be applied to the Southwest Province of Munster (the Counties of Cork, Tipperary, Kerry, and Limerick) other than Clare and Waterford which had been relatively calm.208 It was also decided that it would be extended to other districts should the situation warrant it. Viscount French, the Viceroy, officially proclaimed martial law in the Southwest on 10 December 1920209 and proclamations by the Military Governor-Generals of the districts involved immediately followed.210 The latter included a warning of the death penalty for unauthorized possession of firearms, explosives, and British uniforms.

Simultaneous with preparations for martial law in Ireland, the Lloyd George Coalition examined initiatives for peace. From the first Irish moves for peace in early August until late November, 1920, the British Cabinet had ignored appeasement efforts—including those of the Irish Peace Conference, the Conservative M.P. Lord

206 Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 123; III, 42.
207 Deputation to the Prime Minister from the Houses of Lords and Commons, 29 July 1920 (L.G.P./F/225/10); to Callwell, II, 272.
209 Ibid., 68/20/Ap. III (f.207).
210 Ibid., 68/20/Ap. IV (f.208).
Henry Cavendish-Bentinck's Peace with Ireland Council, the Labour and Opposition Liberal parties, the Anti-Reprisal Association and private efforts by General Cockerill and others. Lloyd George had realized that extremists were not yet willing to compromise their Republican ideals and he was confident of victory. Nevertheless, Andrew Cope—Lloyd George's unofficial peace agent—and Mark Sturgis were active on the fringe of Sinn Fein social groups in the Summer and Autumn of 1920.\(^{211}\) Arthur Griffith, the founder of the original Sinn Fein in 1905 and now the leading Sinn Feiner in DeValera's absence, desired to discuss the possibility of a truce in the early Fall of 1920 and was joined by the rebel leader Michael Collins in November.\(^{212}\) A number of peace emissaries emerged in November—including the Dublin physician Dr. Crofton, General O'Gowan, American journalist John Steele, Dublin businessman P. Moylett, and George Russell (pseudonym 'AE'), the prominent poet and economist\(^{213}\)—but none were successful.

After the Bloody Sunday killings and especially those at Kilmichael, Lloyd George became more serious about peace.\(^{214}\) Momentarily, he was again pursuing a dual policy, not of coercion and appeasement, but as C. P. Scott clearly recognized of war and negotiation.\(^{215}\) The Archbishop of Perth, Western Australia, the

\(^{211}\)Bennett, pp. 62, 132.

\(^{212}\)Wheeler-Bennett, p. 72.

\(^{213}\)J.A.P./C.O.904/188/1/ff.106-07; Bennett, p. 110.

\(^{214}\)Greenwood letter, 2 December 1920 and L.G. to Greenwood, 2 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/24 and 26).

Most Rev. Dr. Patrick Joseph Clune, was sent by Lloyd George to discuss the possibility of a truce with Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith. The former was in hiding but Griffith was detained in Dublin in Mountjoy Gaol. There was agreement between Collins and the Archbishop, and some hope for a truce though war factions in both countries were definitely opposed. Believing the situation had improved and expressing hope for a truce, Clune also thought the Sinn Fein movement was collapsing. It was this belief and not only "the pusillanimity and folly" of moderate Sinn Feiners and Irishmen—like Roger Sweetman, Father Michael O'Flanagan, and the Galway County Council—which again convinced Lloyd George he was winning the war in Ireland. Sweetman, a member of the Dail, had written a letter to the press on November 30 calling for a peace conference. Father O'Flanagan, a Vice President of Sinn Fein but not a member of the Dail Ministry, communicated the following message to Lloyd George in early December:

You state that you are willing to make peace at once without waiting for Christmas. Ireland is also willing. What first steps do you propose?

The Galway County Council had passed a resolution on December 3 which was forwarded to the Prime Minister the next day—criticizing violence on both sides and requesting the Dail and the British Government to name three representatives "to arrange a truce and preliminary

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216 Undated Minute by Greenwood, probably early December, 1920 (L.G.P./F/19/2/31).
217 Beaslai, II, 112.
218 Cab. Concl. 66/20/2, 6 December 1920 (Cab.23/23/f.165).
terms of peace."219 Considering the O'Flanagan and Galway communications on December 6, the Cabinet was uncertain as to whether O'Flanagan spoke for a majority of Sinn Fein, though it did recognize that Galway was the first county council to condemn Sinn Fein's violent actions.220 On December 6, Galway's Urban District Council joined in asking for a truce.221 John Harley Scott, High Sheriff of the Corporation of Cork, along with some of the Catholic Hierarchy in Ireland was also in favor of such a move.222

The Cabinet meeting which had approved the application of martial law to Southwest Ireland on December 9 also sanctioned simultaneous replies by Lloyd George to O'Flanagan and the Galway County Council.223 Both telegrams reiterated previous Irish policy, including the need for restoring order in Ireland and his willingness to allow Irish representatives—other than those "gravely implicated in the commission of crime"—to gather for this purpose.224 The Cabinet decided that Lloyd George should inform the Commons of these replies and also of the martial law proclamations.

In his statement to the House of Commons on 10 December 1920, the Prime Minister again spoke of a dual Government policy—of

219 Galway County Council to L.G., 4 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/58).
220 Cab. Concl. 66/20/2 (ff. 165-66).
221 Galway Urban District Council to L.G., 6 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/58).
222 John Harley Scott to L.G., 7 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/58).
223 Cab. Concl. 68/20/1 and 2, 9 December 1920 (Cab. 23/23/f.203).
continuing the battle against crime while still keeping open the channels for peace. He encouraged constitutionalism among Irishmen but clearly recognized that O'Flanagan did not speak for Sinn Fein, but rather for himself and a small minority. While Lloyd George believed Sinn Fein was weakening, he felt that only immediate martial law would break the movement and end the violence, thereby allowing a peace settlement. This belief had been impressed upon him by his military advisors. Greenwood, who did not favor martial law, did feel that continued repression would be successful. Not only was Lloyd George encouraged by Greenwood and the Generals, he also considered himself largely responsible for the Allied victory over the Germans in the First World War. This factor played no little part in sustaining the Premier's belief that he was defeating the I.R.A., Sinn Fein, and the whole Irish nation. Unfortunately, there followed another six months of war until the Truce in July, 1921.

The Kilmichael ambush had been largely responsible for the proclamation of martial law and for the peace moves by Britain in December, 1920. It was also the underlying factor for a "truly staggering reprisal" on the night of 11-12 December 1920—the burning of the City of Cork. Triggered by an ambush of Auxiliaries earlier that day at Dillon's Cross—within sight of Cork's Victoria Barracks —"K" Company of the Auxies and a small group of R.I.C. recruits (Black and Tans) swept into Cork drinking, looting and burning

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225 Debates, Commons, 135 (10 December 1920), cols. 2601-16.
226 Cab. Concl. 66/20/2, 6 December 1920 (Cab. 23/23/f. 166).
property. 227 This was admitted by the Court of Enquiry which was assembled on 16-21 December by Major-General Sir E. P. Strickland, Commanding the 6th Division (Cork). 228 Widely referred to as 'The Strickland Report', these findings were reached by Lt. Col. F. H. Stapleton, an Army battalion commander who served as President of the Court, Army Majors Parker and Kerans, and R.I.C. District Inspector, James Deignan—who was absent during the first two days. Testimony was taken from 38 witnesses, including 13 military, 11 police and nine civilian persons. 229 A number of Irish civil leaders refused to testify.

The fires which were set by "K" Company included the property of Grant and Co., Cash and Co., the Munster Arcade, and some bicycles in front of the Republican Bicycle Shop. The Court also stated there was circumstantial proof that three members of the R.I.C. were involved in the fire which later broke out at the Cork City Hall. The remainder of the arson was attributed to the fire having spread from the original outbreaks and especially to the local fire brigade's incompetence. The Enquiry failed to note that firemen were prevented from controlling the burning by British forces who "cut the hoses with bayonets" and turned off the water at the hydrant. 230 The Auxies were so proud of their accomplishment that


they later replaced the emblems on their caps with burnt corks.\textsuperscript{231} Besides the premises which were listed in the Strickland Report as having been burned by British forces, nearly the whole of Patrick Street, the city's major business thoroughfare, and the Carnegie Library—located a quarter of a mile away across the River Lee and adjacent to the City Hall—were set on fire as well.\textsuperscript{232}

While complimenting the military for its discipline and efficiency, the Court mildly attributed the outrageous activity of the police to the fact that higher authority had sent ill-disciplined and inexperienced men—the Auxies and R.I.C. recruits—to Ireland, and for barracksigning them separately from their commander,\textsuperscript{233} Lt. Col. Latimer. The findings failed to blame the military authorities who technically were in charge of the Cork City curfew between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. According to Brig.-General H. W. Higginson, Commander of the 17th Infantry Brigade they did nothing to prevent the outrage.\textsuperscript{234} Both Higginson and the Court agreed:

\begin{quote}
The situation was unparalleled, Martial Law was not in force; and the alternative of employing armed force by the Military against an armed Auxiliary force of Police would have resulted in conflict.\textsuperscript{235}
\end{quote}

Until the proclamation of martial law in the South the military had no control over the police, and even afterwards police were entirely

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{231}Gleason, p. 94.
\item \textsuperscript{232}Bennett, p. 118; Macardle, p. 416.
\item \textsuperscript{233}Court of Enquiry (W.O. 35/88/Part I).
\item \textsuperscript{234}Remarks of Brig.-Gen. Higginson, 14 December 1920 (W.O. 35/88/Part I) (see Appendix III A); also see Crozier, \textit{Ireland Forever}, p. 109.
\item \textsuperscript{235}Court of Enquiry (W.O. 35/88/Part I).
\end{itemize}
under the control of the military governors.236

The Strickland Report essentially repeated conclusions the court had earlier reached in its Preliminary Opinion on December 14, including the failure to identify specific persons involved in the arson.237 Higginson had also failed to do this. As a result of the Strickland Report and the other investigations into the Cork burning, Generals Macready and Strickland and Under-Secretary Anderson agreed to further investigation by the Court.238 In the second of two letters to Anderson on the 18th of December, Macready explained that the R.I.C. and Auxies who were barracked with soldiers would in the future be subject to the same duties and rules of discipline.239

R.I.C. District Inspector Deignan was the only member of the Court to disagree with the findings. Deignan criticized the other members for blaming higher authority and stated he was not satisfied "that there was any incendiaryism or looting by members of the Regular R.I.C.,"240 which included new recruits or Black and Tans. He was immediately rebuked by his three colleagues.

While the burning was secretly admitted in the Strickland Report, it had been denied in the Commons by Hamar Greenwood, the


237 Preliminary Opinion of the Court, 14 December 1920 (W.O. 35/88/Part I).

238 Ibid., see notes added by Gen. Strickland on 15 December, General Macready on 17 December, and Sir John Anderson on 18 December; also see Macready to Anderson, 18 December 1920 (W.O.35/88/Part I).

239 Macready to Anderson, 18 December 1920 (J.A.P./C.O.904/188/2).

Chief Secretary for Ireland. On December 13th he said there was no evidence that British forces started the fire and even suggested it had been set by Sinn Fein.\textsuperscript{241} This was not the first occasion where he disavowed British arson. Earlier, he had denied incendiary in Tipperary.\textsuperscript{242} For weeks after, Greenwood—and the Irish Attorney-General, Denis Henry—refused to admit British responsibility.\textsuperscript{243} Yet—just before and also after the arson at Cork—the Chief Secretary had defended "legitimate burnings and shootings by forces of the Crown."\textsuperscript{244} An English writer's verdict is that his "lamentable defense of the indefensible did more than anything else to discredit him"\textsuperscript{245} and Lloyd George's Irish policy.

Greenwood's admiration for the police was not shared by General Macready, who was critical of their independence and lack of discipline. With only one reservation—the criticism of higher authority—he agreed with the Court's findings. He dismissed Inspector Deignan's objections as "worthless" and as the result of being "afraid to comment adversely on his own force or superiors."\textsuperscript{246}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{241}] Debates, Commons, 136 (13 December 1920), col. 26.
\item[\textsuperscript{242}] Ibid., 134 (16 November 1920), cols. 1844, 2070; Daily Herald, 19 November 1920, p. 1.
\item[\textsuperscript{243}] Ibid., 15, 16, 21, 22 December 1920, cols. 254, 487-89, 678, 1500, 1724.
\item[\textsuperscript{244}] Ibid., 11 December 1920, col. 176; 13 December 1920, cols. 171-78.
\item[\textsuperscript{245}] Bennett, p. 119.
\item[\textsuperscript{246}] Remarks by the G.O.C.I.C., Ireland (Macready), 24 December 1920 (W.O. 35/88/Part I) (see Appendix III B); telegram from Macready, 23 December 1920 (W.O. 35/88/Part I).
\end{itemize}
The Report of the Enquiry into the Cork burnings was not officially discussed by the Cabinet until December 29th. It was stated that the Auxiliaries had been partly responsible for the arson and that four R.I.C. men had probably been involved in the fire at the Town Hall, but that any publication of the Report "would be disastrous to the Government's whole policy in Ireland." The Chief Secretary—who publicly denied proof of any individual member of the Crown forces being involved in the burning of Cork as late as 16 March 1921—minimized it in the Cabinet. Generals Strickland and Tudor mitigated the deed by recalling the 'massacre at Macroom' (Kilmichael) on November 28. Macready explained that he would tolerate no reprisal within his command but felt such standards were impossible for the Police—who were lacking both in a Code and in officers of standard. Lloyd George endeavored to impress on General Tudor "the importance of preventing such incidents as would add to the difficulties of the Government, and asked that General Tudor...deal strongly with any case of indiscipline." Tudor, however, still believed as late as 15 February that the fire was set at 9:30 p.m. by Sinn Feiners prior to the arrival of "K" Company at 10:00 p.m.

The Cork reprisal had deeply concerned the Under-Secretary, Sir John Anderson, who now questioned the use of Auxiliaries in Ireland.

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248 Debates, Commons, 139 (16 March 1920), col. 1466.
249 Cab. Concl. 79A/20 (f. 341).
250 Cab. Concl. 7/21/A, Conf. of Min., 15 February 1921 (Cab. 23/24/f. 84).
Both Macready and Strickland, however, reassured him of their usefulness. On 14 January 1921 the Chief Secretary read the entire Report of the Court of Enquiry to the Cabinet along with the statements made by Generals Macready, Strickland and Tudor. The Cabinet agreed to announce that the Cork Enquiry justified immediate appointment of a joint military and civilian tribunal under the Barrett Act to conduct a more authoritative investigation. Greenwood, who still publicly denied the Cork burning, surprisingly called for the publication of both the majority and minority parts of the Cork Enquiry, maintaining that to withhold the results and call for further investigation was a "blunder of the first order." He correctly saw that publication would only be "a mild disclosure" with a "damp effect" whereas by refusing "every presumption is against us." This rare display of intelligence by the Chief Secretary was concurred in by Tudor. Both of them wanted to avoid the precedent of an enquiry into every future incident.

In mid-February the question of arson at Cork again stirred up the Cabinet—and the Irish Administration—who decided on 14 February not to establish the new tribunal and to withhold the Strickland Report. The decision was agreed to by Lloyd George, Churchill, Sir Eric Geddes, Balfour, Montagu, Fisher and Greenwood,

251 Macready to Anderson, 1 January 1921 (J.A.P./C.O.940/188/2).
252 Cab. Concl. 2/21/2, 14 January 1921 (Cab. 23/24/f. 12).
253 Greenwood to L.G., 31 January 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/3).
254 Ibid.
255 Cab. Concl. 7/21/3, 14 February 1921 (Cab. 23/24/f. 21).
who had earlier advocated publication of the Report. Only Christopher Addison, the President of the Board for Local Government, still felt there would be "great advantage" in having it published. The Government would report to Parliament—along lines suggested by Montagu, Fisher, and Balfour—that such reports were always confidential though the Government had given this one careful consideration. The Cabinet did conclude that 50 men in "K" Company were seriously guilty of indiscipline—though they could not individually be identified—and that the company should be broken up and its commander suspended.

General Tudor was summoned to confer with Lloyd George and attend the Commons on the afternoon of the 15th. The Premier instructed him to state in the Commons that the Strickland Report was private and that action had been taken to deal with acts of indiscipline at Cork. Tudor explained to Lloyd George that seven or more men in "K" Company were unfit for service and were already being tried by court-martial for crimes alleged at Dunmanway. Another twenty men were being reassigned away from undesirable influences. Tudor defended Col. Latimer's separation from his command on grounds that there had been no office space available. "K" Company was quartered in Cork with the military. Latimer had had his office at the R.I.C. barracks but lived in a nearby hotel.

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256 Jones, III, 50-51.
257 Ibid., p. 50.
258 Ibid., pp. 50-52; Cab. Concl. 7/21/3 (f. 21.).
Lloyd George told Tudor to break up the company, dismiss the undesirables, and—along with Greenwood—wanted Latimer suspended. But by withholding the Strickland Report—a very mild disclosure—the Lloyd George Government only enhanced the critical stand of the opposition.

Eventually—in 1922—the British Government accepted a £3 million ($15 million) liability to the Irish Free State for the burning of Cork and killing of two Irishmen in their homes. Greenwood estimated that 2.8% of the rateable property of the city had been burned—greater destruction in one evening than in the week-long Dublin Rising of 1916. While the British acknowledged responsibility for the Cork reprisal, to this day the Strickland Report has gone unpublished. It is available, however, in the papers of the War Office deposited in the Public Record Office in London.

While the proclamation of martial law and the burning of Cork dominated the Irish scene in December, 1920, and early 1921, peace moves nevertheless continued. On December 13, the Cabinet considered the recent exchanges between the Prime Minister and Archbishop Clune on the one hand and Father O'Flanagan on the other. Lloyd George had told Clune "to impress upon Sinn Fein that it was useless

261 Cab. Concl. 7/21A (f. 85).
262 W.O. 35/88/Part I, Sir Hamar Greenwood is attributed with saying that there were only two copies of the Strickland Report—"one with the P.M. and one Macready has in his safe" (see Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 50). A careful examination of the Cabinet Records and Lloyd George Papers on Ireland, 1916-22, has not located any other copy.
for them to hope to achieve their object by force" and the Archbishop
explained to him in a note that Arthur Griffith and Eoin MacNeill
wanted a month's truce. 263 The Prime Minister told the Cabinet
he would inform Clune that a truce would be agreed to only if
Sinn Fein ceased in using violence and surrendered all arms to
British authorities. Reprisals would then stop and the Dail would
be allowed to assemble—except for certain specified murderers.
Unfortunately, these so-called criminals included the most prominent
Republican leaders, including Michael Collins.

The telegram from O'Flanagan on 13 December replied to Lloyd
George's message earlier in the month. The priest wanted to discuss
the possibility of peace with DeValera and Griffith and asked for
the Premier's cooperation. 264 Lloyd George replied that he would
allow him to see Griffith in jail. 265 On the 17th, however,
O'Flanagan sharply criticized Lloyd George for speaking of peace
while continuing "fiendish attacks" on the Irish people. 266 O'Flana-
gan told the Prime Minister that peace would inevitably follow if
Britain ceased her "attack upon the liberty of the Irish people,
but Lloyd George was fairly convinced that only war would stop the
demand for an Irish Republic. 267

In the Cabinet on December 24, the Prime Minister spoke of his

263 Cab. Conc1. 70/20/2, 13 December 1920 (Cab. 23/23/ff. 221-22).
264 O'Flanagan to L.G., 13 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/64).
265 L.G. to O'Flanagan, 15 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/66).
266 O'Flanagan to L.G., 17 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/69).
267 Ibid., 19 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/71); L.G. to O'Flana-
gan, 18 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/70).
latest conversation with Clune who had found Michael Collins "the only one with whom effective business could be done." Clune explained that the demand for the surrender of arms and the refusal to negotiate with so-called murderers—of whom Collins was the major organizer—were major difficulties in getting a truce. There was strong pressure within the Cabinet, and also from Anderson, Cope, and Sturgis, not to ignore any measure which might lead to peace. The majority, however, refused to suspend the surrender of arms stipulation though they did want Clune to remain in Ireland. They continued to believe that Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. were losing support in Ireland and that a military victory was possible. Further peace moves were suspended until after elections were held implementing the Government of Ireland Act, which had come into effect on 23 December 1920.

Though most of Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. were no more ready to compromise, it was the British—with the burning of Cork, proclamation of martial law, and arms surrender demand—who ended the negotiations. In the long run, however, after another six months of war—the advice of Anderson and his Dublin Castle subordinates was accepted. The truce of July, 1921, contained no demand for arms surrender.

By the end of 1920 there was little question that the war in

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268 Cab. Concl. 77/20/6, 24 December 1920 (Cab. 23/23/f. 319).
269 Ibid.; Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 47.
270 Cab. Concl. 77/20/6 (f. 320); James, p. 143.
271 Cab. Concl. 77/20/6 (f. 320); Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 123.
Ireland was the major issue confronting the Lloyd George Cabinet. On December 29 it agreed to limit its time to the most critical problems facing Britain: Ireland, German Disarmament and Reparations, Unemployment, the Middle East (especially Mesopotamia and Palestine), and Air Estimates.  

That same afternoon a meeting was arranged with Greenwood, French, Anderson and Generals Macready, Boyd, Tudor, Strickland, and Sir Henry Wilson. Besides discussing the burning of Cork as previously mentioned, they considered the general situation in Ireland. The Generals were all still confident of winning and Macready wanted martial law extended to counties Kilkenny, Clare, Waterford, and Wexford. Lloyd George criticized the military, particularly General Boyd, for having Arthur Griffith arrested at the moment when he was attempting to negotiate with him. Important arrests, he said, were to be made only on direct Cabinet authority. The Prime Minister was also concerned about incidents like that at Cork and the murder of Canon Magner which "drove a country like the United States to do something beyond discretion." He was reassured by Macready, Strickland, and Tudor that discipline would be maintained among British forces.

Raising the question of a truce to which he was at least somewhat favorably disposed, Lloyd George asked for comments from British officials in Ireland. General Macready who would have agreed to a truce without arms surrender—and General Boyd both felt it would

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272 Cab. Concl. 79/20/1, 29 December 1920 (Cab. 23/23/f.235).
274 Ibid.
work to Britain's disadvantage. Even Sir John Anderson, who had wanted arms surrender suspended, agreed that a truce would afford Sinn Fein time to reorganize, and it was not clear that the Irish would observe it. However, he believed that the Catholic Hierarchy in the South could help a truce by condemning violations of it. General Tudor and Bonar Law were also afraid that a temporary cessation of hostilities would be used by Sinn Fein. Sir Henry Wilson, who felt a truce would be "fatal", was critical of those who even considered it—namely Lloyd George, Churchill, Fisher, and A. Chamberlain—calling them a "miserable crowd."\textsuperscript{274} The Generals Macready, Strickland, Tudor, Boyd, and Wilson—contended that Ireland would be largely pacified within four to six months. A further extension of the martial law area had been proposed by Macready on the 29th, but the Prime Minister wished to wait and first observe its success in the Cork region. The next day, however, the Cabinet agreed to extend martial law to Clare, Kilkenny, Waterford, and Wexford.\textsuperscript{275} Both Greenwood and Tudor were certain order would be re-established within two months. The Cabinet directed Greenwood to appeal in the 'Weekly Summary' for police discipline and on 4 January 1921 Lord French officially extended martial law to the whole Southwest of Ireland.\textsuperscript{276}

While martial law did not have the negative impact of filling the ranks of the I.R.A., it did strengthen their determination to

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., f. 346; Sir Henry Wilson's Diaries (29 December 1920), in Callwell, II, 274.

\textsuperscript{275} Cab. Concl. 81/20/1 and 2, 30 December 1920 (Cab. 23/23/ff. 368-70).

\textsuperscript{276} Proclamation of Martial Law, 4 January 1921 (C.O.904/168).
continue the struggle. 277 In spite of warnings of failure from Dublin Castle and from Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck's Peace With Ireland Council, 278 the Prime Minister again yielded to militarists and hardliners completing his limited war policy. The hopes placed in martial law proved to be idle. Lloyd George's mistake was that he did not listen for two years to those who had advocated compromise terms which the treaty finally brought. He was himself as much restricted by the 'strait-jacket' of the demand for an Irish Republic as were extremists within Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. This was partly a result of his own miscalculation but also of his simultaneous concern with other problems. On the other hand, Lloyd George had resisted total military control over Ireland. For all its short-sightedness, Lloyd George's makeshift policy—first using Black and Tans and later Auxiliaries and martial law—was not the 'free hand' that was desired by the C.I.G.S., Sir Henry Wilson, or that later used in Europe by the Nazis and in Kenya by the British. 279 The extension of martial law to the whole Southwest of Ireland ended any early hope for peace.

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277 Bennett, p. 134.

278 Peace With Ireland Council, Resolution sent to L.G. on 15 December 1920 (L.G.P./F/95/2/68); Debates, Commons, 136 (16 December 1920), col. 684.

279 Bennett, p. 123.
CHAPTER IV

A REVOLT OF CONSCIENCE:
PUBLIC OPINION IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA
(1920-1921)

Britain's war against Irish republicanism and its accompanying reprisals in the latter part of 1920 turned much of the British press and a large portion of the British people against Lloyd George's handling of the Irish problem. This revulsion, completed by early 1921, and the weariness caused by two and a half years of guerrilla fighting, were two important factors to turn the tide for the Irish and suspend hostilities by the Truce of July, 1921.

1. The Impact of the British and Irish Press

Throughout the last two years of the First World War, and especially in 1919, a growing number of newspapers called upon the Government to grant Ireland self-determination. The belated offer of Home Rule by Lloyd George in December, 1919, had been favorably received by most of the British press though completely opposed by their counterparts in Ireland.¹ In England, only the pro-Sinn Fein Catholic Herald and the Labour Daily Herald were critical of the measure, the latter delivering the most severe attack.² Three newspapers which had criticized Britain's Irish policy throughout 1919—the Daily News, Times, and Manchester Guardian—temporarily moderated their critical posture. The Times and Guardian warmly received the proposed Government of Ireland Bill while the

¹See my more detailed discussion in Chapter I, pp. 35-40.
²Catholic Herald, 23 December 1919, p. 5; Daily Herald, 23 December 1919, p. 5.
Daily News was neutral. Their acceptance no doubt resulted from a belief that Lloyd George would improve and expand the Bill, and thereby gain Irish acceptance. Their hopes were dashed in the first half of 1920 by the Government's refusal to alter the Bill and limit the coercive aspect of its policy. In introducing the Black and Tans and a new Dublin Castle Administration in Ireland in the Spring of 1920, Lloyd George not only failed to bring Sinn Fein to accept Home Rule, but strengthened the opposition the Irish press and people had already shown in December, 1919.

Increasingly, during the Spring of 1920, liberal British dailies—especially the Daily News, Times, Globe and Manchester Guardian—joined with the Daily Herald, Catholic Herald, and a majority of the Irish press in condemning British policy. This growing opposition favored full Dominion status for Ireland.

In late July, 1920, the central question which faced the British Government was whether to offer Ireland a greater measure of self-government—Dominion Home Rule—or to apply a military solution to what had become a full-scale guerrilla war. The old policy of simultaneous coercion and appeasement which had been applied in late 1919 and early 1920 had proved to be inadequate. By choosing limited war disguised as a 'restoration of order in Ireland'—the Lloyd George Government not only strengthened the support of the Irish for the I.R.A., but eventually alienated the

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3 See Chapter I, pp. 36-37.
4 Manchester Guardian, 23 December 1919.
much of the English press.

Influential and objective newspapers, especially the aforementioned, firmly opposed the Cabinet's 'restoration of order' tactics. The Manchester Guardian pressed the Government strongly to pursue a conciliatory policy instead of implementing further militarism. The Times criticized the Coalition Government for its militant policy and also for failing to release the hunger-striking Lord Mayor of Cork, MacSwiney, who was guilty only of being an Irish patriot. It viewed these two aspects of British policy as a "confession of bankruptcy in statesmanship." The Catholic Herald, a persistent critic, pointed out that British policy had been one of "Ulsteria", and that while England did not hesitate to suppress the Irish in the South, extremists in the North—where Ulster was of "English design and manufacture"—were never firmly opposed. British policy during the Ulster Crisis of 1914 seems a fitting example of this contradiction. The Catholic paper continued its support for I.R.A. resistance.

Irish newspapers—except for a few in the North like the Belfast Telegraph—opposed British methods in their homeland. This was clearly indicated to Lloyd George when he received the deputation of Southern Irish businessmen in August, 1920. The leading

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\(^6\) Manchester Guardian, 26 July, 4 and 6 August 1920.

\(^7\) Times, 23 August 1920; also see 30 August and 6, 10 September 1920.

\(^8\) Catholic Herald, 24 July 1920, p. 7.

\(^9\) Ibid., 18 September 1920, p. 6.

\(^10\) Proceedings, Deputation to the Prime Minister of Southern Irish Business and Professional Men, 4 August 1920 (L.G.P./F/230/5/Part I).
Nationalist paper, the Cork Examiner, and the Southern Unionist Irish Times, both favored a Dominion settlement now.\textsuperscript{11} So did the Freeman's Journal and Irish Independent, papers which represented "the popular view without being closely tied to...Sinn Fein."\textsuperscript{12} All papers opposed partition as did Sinn Fein's Irish Bulletin, which still pressed for complete separation. Scottish and Welsh newspapers, including Edinburgh's Scotsman, Glasgow's Evening News, the Cardiff Times, and the South Wales Daily Post remained faithful to Lloyd George's old Home Rule policy. Their sympathy was more with union than separation though they were willing to allow Ireland Home Rule.\textsuperscript{13} Lloyd George's own Daily Chronicle, the moderately conservative London Observer, and the High-Tory Roman Catholic Tablet, a monthly, also continued to support force coupled with the Home Rule offer.\textsuperscript{14} The unionist daily, the Morning Post, however, sharply criticized the Government from the right-wing for failing to enact martial law:

\begin{quote}
    The Government, incorrigible as ever, shirk the only measure that would be effective, and leave to others the difficulties and dangers which they dare not face themselves. No wonder the state of Ireland goes from bad to worse.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

The most outrageous aspect of Britain's limited war policy

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13}For an excellent study of the motives behind this feeling and politics in Wales—which I believe is representative of the entire Protestant 'Celtic fringe'—see Morgan, Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922, pp. 305-06.

\textsuperscript{14}Daily Chronicle, 30 September 1920; Observer, 16 May 1920; 24 July 1920, p. 104.

\textsuperscript{15}Manchester Guardian, 22 September 1920.
was the toleration of 'unauthorized' reprisals and the failure to prevent the deaths of Terence MacSwiney and Kevin Berry. More than anything else, these events changed British and also world opinion.

Total opposition by the *Manchester Guardian*—long an advocate of negotiation—resulted from the 'Sack of Balbriggan' on September 20:

The police reprisals in Balbriggan this morning are indisputably the worst that have yet occurred in Ireland...comparable only to the story of some Belgian village in the early days of the (First World) War.16

Has the Government yet realized the depth of degradation into which it is sinking in Ireland?...these things have got to stop. They stink in the nostrils of the British people. They make us, with perfect and irrefutable justice, the mock and reproach of the world.17

Throughout the Fall of 1920 the *Guardian* continued to chastise Lloyd George for being deaf and blind to British terrorism and indiscipline in Ireland.18 The first photographs of destruction in Balbriggan appeared in the paper on September 23 with further reprisals at Trim, Mallow, Tubercurry, Granard and Cork being depicted during the following three months.19

The *Times*—with most of its more than two hundred articles and editorials on Ireland during 1919-21 written by editor Wickham Steed—labelled Government policy "semi-official lynch laws under

the guise of police efficiency."\(^{20}\) It also asked the Lloyd George Government to break its "precious silence" and declare an official policy regarding reprisals.\(^ {21}\) Likewise, it supported Dominion status for Ireland and the growing public demand for an investigation of reprisals.\(^ {22}\)

Crying out against the "wild scenes of wanton destruction and cold-blooded murder" in Balbriggan by "English recruits to the R.I.C" was the *Daily Herald*.\(^ {23}\) It continued criticism of reprisals and of "Government by Murder", and supported both a British withdrawal and the granting of self-determination to Ireland.\(^ {24}\) Reprisals by British forces, not only at Balbriggan, but at Mallow, Templemore, Tipperary, and Ballyduyer in Co. Kerry as well were specifically mentioned.\(^ {25}\)

Both the *Catholic Herald* and the liberal *Daily News* were totally opposed to Government methods in Ireland. The former wrote on September 25th that Black and Tans "ran amok in Balbriggan" turning that "once peaceful town into a veritable hell"\(^ {26}\) while the latter made the following appraisal:

> Unfortunately, it is easier to make such an inferno as has been created in Ireland than to unmake it...

\(^ {20}\) *Times*, 23 September 1920.


\(^ {26}\) *Catholic Herald*, 25 September 1920, p. 4.
the most serious obstacle to improvement...is the temper which has been aroused on both sides.... The Government have made the position much worse by seeming to palliate 'reprisals' for so long; their miserable apologists, who have openly condoned these outrages...have made it worse still.27

The Daily News went on to say that if any hope remained it was in "the common sense and essential justice of decent British" people, who—as the Times also maintained—had been "undeniably aroused... by what was happening in Ireland."28 It also called for the disbanding of irregulars (Tans and Auxies), reduction of occupation forces, and the concession of Dominion status. The Daily News and its courageous correspondent in Ireland, Hugh Martin, played an important role in exposing British reprisals. Even the Tablet recognized that a Dominion offer would be necessary.29 Thus, by late 1920, much of the influential press in Great Britain realized the need for negotiation and compromise.

In Ireland, the official organ of Sinn Fein, the Irish Bulletin, believed that the reprisals were planned and continued its publicity for total separation for Ireland.30 The majority of the Irish press, however—especially the nationalist Cork Examiner, Irish Independent, and Freeman's Journal, and Dublin's leading Southern Unionist daily, the Irish Times—advocated a Dominion compromise though still critical of British policy.31 The Freeman's Journal published a series of

27Daily News, 1 October 1920.

28Ibid.

29Tablet, 9 October 1920, p. 460 and 6 November 1920, p. 600.


31This is clearly explained to Lloyd George by a deputation of southern Irish businessmen on 4 August 1920 (see L.G.P./F/5/Part I)
articles and editorial poetry condemning the Government's failure to investigate and end reprisals.\textsuperscript{32} Particularly singled out for evasiveness, denial, and lying was the Chief Secretary, Greenwood.

'There is no Government policy of reprisals.'
So Greenwood assures the House of Commons...
Who, now, accepts this lie outside the placemen of the Coalition and their jackals?...
But Greenwood persists.
Evasion is his first line of defense
He has no information of atrocities that have sent a shudder through the civilized world...
Where evasion is not possible the Chief Secretary does not hesitate to defend...
Instead of citizens exercising a right they become a murder-gang laying an ambush...
A woman is shot dead at Gort with an infant in her arms...
Under the Greenwood charter it is possible to decimate a countryside...\textsuperscript{33}

Even the \textit{Irish Times}, while it did not directly condemn the Cabinet, called for an end to both I.R.A. attacks and reprisals by British forces.\textsuperscript{34} However, in the North, the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} remained uncritical of Government policy, including reprisals.

Similarly, the \textit{Cardiff Times} and \textit{Scotsman} supported breaking up the 'murder gang' and also criticized any suggestion of Dominion status for Ireland.\textsuperscript{35} While the \textit{Scotsman} would have preferred that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} \textit{Freeman's Journal}, 5 November 1920, p. 4; 6 November 1920, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, 5 November 1920, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{34} \textit{Irish Times}, 1 October 1920, p. 4; 11 October 1920, p. 4; 3 November 1920, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{35} \textit{Cardiff Times} and \textit{South Wales Weekly News}, 16 October 1920, p. 4; \textit{Scotsman}, 11 October 1920, p. 6 and 21 October 1920, p. 6.
\end{itemize}
there be no reprisals, it maintained:

It is important that the issues should not be obscured by the outcry which is being raised in the Opposition Press... The suppression of the murder gang is the first and paramount duty of the Executive; the control of the police and soldiers and the prevention of reprisals are also a duty, but it cannot be allowed to become the sole and overriding purpose of the Government.36

The Evening News in Glasgow, on the other hand, deplored indiscipline and reprisals, "whatever...the provocation", as the result of the Government's ineffective Irish policy, and demoralizing to British forces.37 While more realistic and critical than other Welsh and Scottish newspapers, it still failed to recognize Ireland's claim to independence. Likewise, Lloyd George's own Daily Chronicle supported his policy.38

The most astonishing response to reprisals came from the conservative Morning Post, which, refusing to admit that indiscriminate acts against civilians were not only immoral but had little direct effect on the I.R.A., self-righteously defended reprisals. The following excerpts illustrate some of their misconceptions:

If there is anything more despicable than the cowardice of the Sinn Fein murderers, it is the hypocritical condemnation by their friends in this country of what are called 'reprisals'... There can be no 'reprisals', as such, in a country without law.39

The best way to stop the reprisals would be for the murderers to cease murdering... What are called

36 Scotsman, 21 October 1920, p. 6.
37 Evening News, 4 October 1920, p. 4.
38 Daily Chronicle, 30 September 1920.
reprisals have done more to discourage the Irish rebels than all the Acts of Parliament together...40 The Morning Post also criticized the Unionist Party, which now conceded Home Rule for Ireland, as being "a priesthood that has forgotten its faith"—the Union, a "cornerstone" of the British Empire and "the safety of this country" (England).41 Likewise, it rebuked British sentimentalism for viewing the Irish conflict in terms of "oppressed people struggling to be free...(from) British misrule" instead of as a "Bolshevist" movement out to smash the Empire.42

Two momentous events took place in late October and early November, 1920, which deeply moved both the Irish and British peoples—the death of hunger-striking Terence MacSwiney and the hanging of young Kevin Barry. By not preventing their deaths the British Cabinet only made martyrs of them and created further opposition to government policy.43 The Freeman's Journal, Irish Times, Manchester Guardian, and Times criticized the Government for allowing them to die.44 The most moving statement on the MacSwiney death came from H. W. Nevinson in the Daily Herald:

And there, under the cedars, we left the mortal body of one whose name will never be forgotten in Irish history, as a symbol of glorious sacrifice, and in our English history will be remembered with bitter shame and indignant humiliation.45

40Ibid., 30 September 1920, p. 6.
41Ibid.
42Ibid., 2 October 1920, p. 4.
43Bennett, pp. 90-91.
44Freeman's Journal, 1 November 1920, p.4 and 2 November 1920, p.4; Manchester Guardian, 26 October 1920; Times, 26 October 1920.
'Bloody Sunday', November 21st, 1920, was one of the most terrible days of the war—the I.R.A. killing 14 British officers in the morning and the Black and Tans responding in reprisal by shooting into a crowd at Croke Park inflicting more than 70 casualties. While most of Britain's liberal press regretted the selective killing by the I.R.A., they were more critical of the indiscriminate firing by British forces. The Manchester Guardian labelled the Croke Park shootings "one of the most awful incidents in the Irish trouble" while the Daily Herald called it "horror" and "the terrible sensation of the day." The Daily News expressed the following bit of wisdom:

We do consider a murder done by an agent of the law ten times worse than any possible crime committed by a private person. The latter may point to a very deplorable state of society; but murder by the police is the dissolution of all society; it means that Government is only a kind of anarchy.

The Freeman's Journal, neglecting the I.R.A. deed earlier that day, called Croke Park "a classic example of a Government reprisal." The opposite can be seen, however, in Ireland's unionist papers—the Irish Times and the Belfast Telegraph. The former condemned the I.R.A.'s killing of the fourteen men believing their work to be...

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45 Daily Herald, 1 November 1920, p. 1.
only administrative and not involving the systematic elimination of prominent I.R.A. officials. The Belfast Telegraph similarly concerned itself with the I.R.A. action assuming that the Black and Tans at Croke Park had been fired upon first.

The conservative London Spectator and Morning Post and the provincial Cardiff Times and South Wales Daily Post were particularly incensed that British forces had been "butchered" in Dublin by organized assassins. This feeling can also be seen after the killing of eighteen Auxiliaries at Kilmainham two weeks later. Evidently, their logic was not as sound as that of the liberal-minded press previously cited. They failed to see that indiscriminate Government killing may be a far worse crime than that committed by private individuals or insurgent movements.

The burning of a large part of Cork's business district on December 11th by British forces was labelled by the Manchester Guardian as "the crowning wickedness of the reprisals campaign." The Times, Daily Herald, and Catholic Herald were shocked and critical as well. Though the British Government first denied responsibility, the Daily Herald claimed there was "abundant evidence that the fires were started by forces of the Crown."

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50 Irish Times, 22 November 1920, p. 4.
51 Belfast Telegraph, 22 November 1920, p. 3.
52 Spectator, 26 November 1920; Morning Post, 25 November 1920, p. 6.
54 Times, 13 December 1920; Daily Herald, 14 December 1920, p. 1; Catholic Herald, 18 December 1920, p. 3.
Ireland, the *Freeman's Journal* pressed for an inquiry into the matter, while the *Irish Times* applauded the Roman Catholic Bishop of Cork, Dr. Cohalan, for condemning both murder and reprisal.\(^{56}\) The criticism which came initially from the press, grew with the reluctance of the Government to shoulder responsibility for what had happened at Cork. Only unionist and conservative papers still showed support for the British policy in Ireland. The *Morning Post* assumed the deed to be the work of Sinn Fein while the *Belfast Telegraph* attempted to draw attention away from the event by condemning the "cowardly bomb attack on a party of Auxiliary Police."\(^{57}\)

The reaction of the Cabinet to the escalation of attacks and reprisals in late 1920 was a renewed effort at simultaneous force and appeasement. This policy—involving the proclamation of martial law—was agreed to only shortly before the terrible event at Cork. The *Daily Herald* called the proclamation of martial law a declaration of war and assailed the Government for demanding an arms surrender as precondition for a truce.\(^{58}\) In short, the Labour newspaper declared that Lloyd George's pronouncement offered "no hope of peace" in Ireland.\(^{59}\) The liberal *Westminster Gazette* called the British regime in Ireland a "system of coercion such as there has not been within living memory."\(^{60}\)

\(^{56}\) *Freeman's Journal*, 17 December 1920, p. 4; *Irish Times*, 14 December 1920, p. 4.

\(^{57}\) *Morning Post*, 13 December 1920, p. 6; *Belfast Telegraph*, 13 December 1920, p. 5.


\(^{60}\) *Westminster Gazette*, 16 December 1920.
While the liberal press had become increasingly opposed to the Government's Irish policy in 1920, it was the failure of Lloyd George to handle reprisals—especially in the three-month period, September 20-December 11, 1920—that accounted for much of its hostility. With the implementation of war measures such as martial law and the failure of peace moves in December, 1920, their revulsion against the Government was completed.

The following prominent newspapers in Britain were solidly opposed to the Government's Irish policy as 1921 began—Daily Herald, Catholic Herald, Manchester Guardian, Times, Daily Mail, Westminster Gazette, Round Table, Daily News, Nation and the Globe. All of them favored a negotiated settlement involving a substantial measure of independence. Their attitude toward Sinn Fein is reflected in the following statement in the Daily Mail: "This is a mature, determined, national, disciplined, and above all, intelligent revolt."61 Also critical of the Government's handling of reprisals was the pro-Government Tablet.62 The number of influential British newspapers supporting the Lloyd George policy was now minimal. They included the Morning Post, Daily Chronicle and some of the provincial press.

The Daily Herald produced the most solid criticism. Its editorial on 29 December 1920 declared Britain totally responsible for the failure of peace negotiations and called for both immediate withdrawal and establishment of a Dublin Constituent Assembly to deter-

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mine Ireland's future. This position formally introduced into the House of Commons on November 11th by the Labour Party—had been published previously in the Daily Herald. The way to "peace and honour", as the publication termed it, had been formalized in the two British Labour Commission Reports on Ireland in 1920 and 1921.

The above theme was continually struck in early 1921. The British Government was blamed for the fighting in Ireland and was called upon to withdraw:

All the suffering and misery, the burnings and murders, are ultimately the result of the British Government's refusal to give the Irish people the elemental rights of self-government. There is not question of divided responsibility as between Ireland and Britain...

The crime against Ireland is the crime of the members of the Government...

The moderate Times wrote sensibly about British policy: "The Government have apparently failed to understand the true proportions of the Irish Question; they have failed also in their conception of it as a problem of domestic policy...The intensified coercion which was expected by its authors to bring peace within a couple of months has proved a far less potent weapon than they hoped.

Criticism over the Cork burning again surfaced as the year

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63 Daily Herald, 29 December 1920, p. 4.
64 Ibid., 12 November 1920, p. 1; 18 November 1920, p. 1.
65 See pp. 172-73 of this chapter.
66 Daily Herald, 22 February 1921, p. 4.
67 Ibid., 26 February 1921, p. 4.
68 Times, 11 February 1921.
1921 began. The failure of the Government to produce the Strickland Report resulted in strong condemnation from a number of the prominent British newspapers, the Manchester Guardian, Times, Daily Herald, and Daily News.\textsuperscript{69} Shortly after the decision to withhold the report, on February 17th, the Times editor Wickham Steed denounced the Government for its "concealment" of the facts of the Cork outrage.\textsuperscript{70}

Influential sections of the British and Irish press continued to clamour for peace negotiations and an end to British repression as Spring, 1921, approached.\textsuperscript{71} This pressure continued up to the proclamation of the truce on July 11, 1921.\textsuperscript{72}

2. The Peace Movement in Britain

Along with the press which served as an educator of the British people regarding the Anglo-Irish War, the 'Peace Movement' was perhaps the next most important instrument in changing the opinion of the people of Great Britain and their government toward greater Irish independence. This 'revolt of conscience' for peace and for granting Ireland her long-awaited freedom—was small at first, but with the passage of time and growing outrage over Britain's war

\textsuperscript{69} Manchester Guardian, 18 and 19 January 1921; Times, 10 January 1921; Daily Herald, 31 December 1921 and 20 January 1921; Daily News, 16 February 1921.

\textsuperscript{70} Times, 17 February 1921.

\textsuperscript{71} See the following for particular comments: Daily Herald, 2 March 1921, p. 4; Catholic Herald, 26 March 1921, p. 4; Daily News, 16 February 1921; Freeman's Journal, 24 March 1921, p. 4 and 28 March 1921, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{72} See Chapter V, pp. 240-241 for information on the press on the eve of the truce.
policy and terror, it grew to include many prominent and influential citizens.

From the beginning the movement was unorganized, including persons from various backgrounds and interests. What united them was their humanitarian outlook and ability to see history in perspective. Support for the denial of Irish political freedom—after the people had struggled so many years for self-government, and at a time when all Europe had attained national independence—asked a great deal of intelligent and liberal men and women. With the increased effort to crush the Irish independence movement, these Britishers determined they would educate and influence the people and government of Britain. The Anglo-Irish War had brought them together in what might loosely be referred to as the 'Peace Movement'.

The collection of personalities who demanded an end to Lloyd George's Irish policy included a combination of six Irish Home Rule M.P.s who survived the victory of Sinn Fein at the polls in late 1918 and who chose to remain in Parliament, the 26 Independent Liberal followers of Asquith who now championed Dominion Home Rule, and the Opposition in Parliament—the 59 Labour Party M.P.s. Though small and impotent within the Commons, the latter criticized the Irish policy of Lloyd George and defended Ireland's right to be free, as is evident from Parliamentary Debates and from the Daily Herald for 1919-21. Arthur Henderson, William Adamson, and J. R. Clynes were M.P.s particularly outspoken for Labour.

73 For an excellent discussion of this subject see D. G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles (London, 1972), pp. 61-82.
Another important activity of the Labour Party included the publications of two Commissions of Inquiry—the first in January 1920 and the other in early 1921. The first reported:

Ireland is suffering today from a malady which has many evil effects, but only one cause. The frustration of national aspirations in social as well as political affairs has produced a feeling of bitter resentment, transmitted from one generation to another against British rule. Nothing...alters this feeling, Ireland is utterly estranged....

Behind the political issue...are large social and economic questions which urgently require treatment...such matters as housing, wages, education, and the development of industry...(but these) cannot be successfully achieved unless and until the political problem is solved....

This outspoken evaluation of the situation was more than a year ahead of official British understanding. Recognizing that unintelligent administration and coercion only served to intensify Irish discontent, the commission recommended that an Irish Constituent Assembly be allowed to establish Dominion self-government.

The second commission was sent to Ireland in late November 1920 and reported its findings to a special conference in London on December 29th. Indicting the British Government for its policy in Ireland, the Report said: "Things are being done in the name of Britain which must make her name stink in the nostrils of the whole world." Published in early 1921, the Report called for a British withdrawal and the establishment of an Irish Assembly to determine

75 Ibid., pp. 3-5, 11.
Liberal opposition came chiefly from M.P.s who did not support the Lloyd George Coalition. They were led by Asquith and Sir John Simon, and included the influential ex-War Secretary, Lord Haldane. These men had suggested Dominion status for Ireland throughout 1920, a suggestion which also had some support within the Cabinet and Irish Administration. Even the Viceroy, French, and his aide, Lord Dunraven, had indicated their willingness to compromise.77

The six Irish Nationalist M.P.s (Home Rulers) who still attended Westminster were particularly helpful in publicizing the terror that resulted from Government policy. Most important among them were the three I wrote about earlier—Devlin, O'Connor, and Kenworthy.78 They were supported by many former colleagues who were no longer M.P.s, including John Dillon, Stephen Gwynn, and Sir Horace Plunkett, now active in the Irish Dominion League.79 As Britain escalated the war, these men were joined in calling for peace and Dominion Home Rule by some of their former Unionist opponents in Ireland, including those business and professional men who had conferred with Lloyd George in August, 1920, and Lord Monteagle, the Southern Unionist leader who now advocated the "Dominion of Ireland Bill".80 The Irish Peace Conference and

77 Manchester Guardian, 27 October and 24 November 1920.
79 Manchester Guardian, 27 October and 24 November 1920.
80 Proceedings, Deputation to the Prime Minister of Southern Irish Business and Professional Men, 4 Aug.1920 L.G.P./F/230/5/Part I); "Dominion of Ireland Bill", House of Lords, (Cab. 24/108/f. 151).
a growing number of nationalists, both in and outside of Sinn Fein, supported this proposal.

Joining this growing protest were several Conservative M.P.s and military men in Britain who opposed the war. Lords Hugh and Robert Cecil, once staunchly Unionist, now favored negotiation, while Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck and a number of other prominent Englishmen formed the Peace with Ireland Council in the Fall of 1920.81 In the formation of this vocal organization Bentinck was assisted by the honorary secretary, Sir Oswald Mosley, M.P., former Conservative and Unionist who crossed the floor of the Commons to the Opposition in October, 1926;82 and who later in the 1930's was the prime mover of Fascism in Britain. Military men directly opposed to Government policy included Generals Sir Hubert Gough of 1914 Curragh fame, Sir Henry Lawson, and George Cockerill.83 That there were numerous British officers advocating peace, and also pressing the Times to expose atrocities in Ireland, is mentioned by editor Wickham Steed in his book, Through Thirty Years.84 In addition, Art O'Brien formed an Irish Self-Determination League of Irish people living in Great Britain to support Sinn Fein.

Besides the politicians and generals already mentioned, and

81 Debates, Commons, 125 (10 February 1920), col. 51; Holt p. 237; Manchester Guardian, 6 October 1920; Daily News, 2 November 1920.


83 Daily Herald, 28 September 1920, p. 4 and 31 December 1920, p. 1; Cockerill to Greenwood, 30 October 1920 (J.A.P./C.O. 904/188/1).

84 Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years (New York, 1924), p. 351.
well-known journalists such as C. P. Scott, H. W. Nevinson, A. P. Wadsworth, and Hugh Martin, the Peace Movement also included many leading clergymen and intellectuals. On 3 December 1920 eight Anglican churchmen called for an investigation of the terror and reprisals and in early April, 1921, twenty prominent churchmen of all denominations urged a policy of conciliation. On January 1st, 1921, a manifesto was issued by 38 members of the arts and professions. Among those signing the latter were writers like Arnold Bennett, Siegfried Sassoon, E. M. Forster, Virginia Woolf, and G. K. Chesterton who wrote a pamphlet, What Are Reprisals?, and scholars such as J. M. Keynes, R. H. Tawney, Arnold Toynbee and H. J. Massingham. At the University of Wales early in 1921, 27 professors and lecturers addressed to their member of parliament a protest against Government policy and actions in Ireland—something of which Lloyd George was well aware. Other prominent authors opposed to British policy included J. L. Hammond, L. T. Hobhouse, Professor C. H. Herford and Harold Spender. Many of these people along with numerous others expressed their concern to the press, especially during the last year of the war. In the eleven month period extending from 15 August 1920 to 11 July 1921, the Times published more than 180 letters to the editor regarding the Irish situation.

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85 Times, 6 April 1920.
86 Manchester Guardian, 3 December 1920 and 1 January 1921.
87 Undated press cutting for early 1921 (see L.G.P./F/182/1/5).
88 Manchester Guardian, 27 March, 1 and 24 November 1920; 4 January 1921.
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It was these aroused and committed individuals—politicians, generals, journalists, clergymen and intellectuals—along with the liberal London press who effectively rallied a large part of the British public to the cause of peace and Irish self-deter-
mination.89 Public opinion in Britain thus was an important factor to contain and later reverse the Irish policy of the Lloyd George Government.

3. Pro-Irish Opinion in America

A number of Anglo-Irish historians have maintained that the revulsion of public opinion in Britain and America turned the tide for the Irish side. British opinion, however, had a direct impact in convincing Lloyd George to seek negotiations whereas public sentiment in America, the Dominions and the World was of an indirect nature. The latter prevented the Prime Minister from declaring an all-out war against the I.R.A. 90

In April, 1918, opinion in the United States had influenced Lloyd George to offer Ireland Home Rule once again, in conjunction with the extension of World War I conscription, and throughout the Fall of 1919 when the 'troubles' were rapidly increasing, the British Government kept a close watch on the press in the United States. 91 The Cabinet's observation revealed the opposition of many important American dailies, including the *New York American*, *New York World*, *Chicago Tribune*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Boston

89Boyce, pp. 51, 61-82. 90McCaffrey, p. 171.

91W. C. Minute 385, 6 April 1918 (Cab.23/6/ff. 16-17); Cabinet Committee on Ireland, 18 October 1919 (Cab. 27/69). Also see pp. 27 and 28 of this dissertation.
Pilot, and also of the Hearst and Catholic press. Most of these newspapers favored a settlement along Dominion lines, a consideration which caused Lloyd George to supplement his policy of force in December, 1919, with another offer of appeasement—the Fourth Home Rule Bill.

While many American newspapers supported the Southern Irish cause, others did not. Most influential among these was the New York Times. Throughout the Irish War it backed the British Home Rule solution. By such an offer Lloyd George was able to keep the official American policy neutral and thereby defuse much potential opposition from the American public.

Irish-Americans, however, kept both the Sinn Fein cause and British terror before the American people in 1920 and 1921. A good deal of their effort resulted in grossly exaggerated propaganda. Illustrative of this were the unimpartial Interim Report and Official Report of Evidence of the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland. The commission of seven persons convened in Washington, D.C. in late November, 1920, and met until 21 January 1921. Their report to the larger Committee of One Hundred on Ireland, while overly unfair to Britain, did bring attention to

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93 Viscount Grey to L.G., 6 October 1919 (L.G.P./F/60/3/7); Riddell, pp. 141-42; Scott, p. 380.
95 Tillman, pp. 197, 200; Mansergh, p. 281.
96 Ward, p. 224.
the terror and reprisals of Crown forces. The potential spreading of this opposition to official United States policy played a vital role in restricting the tactics available to Lloyd George and deprived his Government of the option of a more total war. Official American support for an Irish Republic or an anti-British policy on war debts and naval limitations were not in the interest of Britain.

The alienation of the Dominions—where opinion was favorable toward Irish freedom—would also have been unwise. There the Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, Australia, Mannix, and the Prime Minister of South Africa, Field Marshall Jan C. Smuts, desired a Dominion settlement.

From an intelligent pro-English point of view, the Irish Judge, Sir James O'Connor, expressed the situation well:

...the one bright spot in this murky business was that the great mass of English public opinion was sound. Almost all of the Liberal opinion, all the Labour opinion, and much (should be some) of the decent Conservative opinion were loud in denunciation of the Black and Tan proceedings.  

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98 Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American Relations, 1899-1921, p. 113; also see pp. 27-28, 35 of this dissertation.

99 O'Connor, II, 320.
CHAPTER V

BRITAIN'S IRISH POLICY: WAR AND PEACE
(JANUARY-JULY, 1921)

The decision to extend martial law to the whole Southwest of Ireland and to use "authorized reprisals" in early 1921 prolonged hostilities and characterized the last phase of actual fighting. It marked the completion of the limited war policy earlier agreed to in late July, 1920, and continued until June, 1921, when Lloyd George reversed his policy and sought peace. Within a matter of a few weeks—on July 11th, 1921—the truce was signed.

1. The Policy of Drift: Martial Law in the Southwest (January-April, 1921)

The Anglo-Irish War went into its third year and most destructive period in January, 1921, with the Lloyd George Cabinet embarking on the final six months of a year-long limited war policy. In prior stages the British successively escalated the war and failed to pursue a policy of compromise and negotiation. Each time—between January and December, 1919; January and July, 1920; late July and December 1920—repressive and limited war measures served only to intensify the I.R.A's resolve and to secure greater public support against the Crown forces. In each of the earlier periods the killing and destruction had increased—the last six months being the most violent of all.

Still, the Anglo-Irish War produced a surprisingly low number of casualties—less than 2,000 killed and about 2,000-3,000 wounded when compared to later twentieth century wars of independence,
particularly that in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{1} While the precise numbers are impossible to ascertain—due to omissions in reporting on both sides—it is not so difficult to approximate them. The statistics compiled by Dublin Castle were partially published in 1921 by C. J. C. Street, *The Administration of Ireland, 1920* and were also issued in the Chief Secretary's "Weekly Surveys".\textsuperscript{2} Figures were also compiled by the Irish Nationalist press and most particularly by Sinn Fein's *Irish Bulletin*.\textsuperscript{3}

Dublin Castle listed 81 policemen and soldiers killed and 144 wounded in the beginning stages of the war (1 January 1919-31 July 1920); 155 killed and 243 wounded in the Fall of 1920 (1 August 1920-1 January 1921); 222 killed while 408 were wounded in early 1921 (1 January-21 May).\textsuperscript{4} These figures add up to 458 deaths and 795 wounded among the Crown forces plus those killed and wounded in the fifty days just prior to the signing of the

\textsuperscript{1}Vietnam's population in 1970—North and South—totaled 40 million people while Ireland in 1919-21, and also presently, was just 4 million. Multiplying the killing in Ireland then by 10, a number killed close to 20,000 is arrived at. Also, one might point out that the island of Ireland measures 32,595 square miles, the approximate size of the state of Indiana and about one-fourth the size of the whole of Vietnam. Another factor must be included: technology. Sophisticated weapons, unavailable in 1919-21, have been responsible for the killing of 56,000 Americans alone and a total of over one million combatants and civilians in the Vietnam War.

\textsuperscript{2}See Greenwood's "Weekly Surveys" for necessary computations: C.P. 2399, 27 December 1920 (Cab.24/117/f.478); 22 January 1921 (Cab.24/119/f.216); C.P. 2977, 24 May 1921 (Cab.24/123/f.491); also see Street, *The Administration of Ireland, 1920*, pp. 96-100 for the period August 1, 1920-January 1, 1921, (see Appendix IV).

\textsuperscript{3}Irish Bulletin, 23-24 June 1921, pp. 2, 5-7 (located in L.G.P.7/F/14/6/2). Also see Appendix V.

\textsuperscript{4}See Appendix IV.
truce. In the House of Commons on 14 June, Sir Hamar Greenwood stated that as of 31 May 1921 a total of 475 Crown police and soldiers had been killed—299 of them in the County of Munster.\(^5\) In all probability, the English journalist Richard Bennett is reasonably accurate in stating that 528 Britishers—366 police and 162 soldiers—were killed in two-and-a-half years of war.\(^6\) His estimate of 600 wounded policemen also agrees with those of O'Connor and Greenwood, but his suggestion that 566 soldiers were wounded seems much too large—more than double the Dublin Castle list for May 21st, 1921, with only 50 days remaining in the war.\(^7\) A total of 950 wounded—600 police and about 350 soldiers—seems much more plausible.

Irish casualties are more difficult to determine. General Richard Mulcahy, I.R.A. Chief of Staff, estimated that 750 of his men had been killed between the 1916 Rising and the truce of 1921, the vast majority in the 1919-21 period.\(^8\) Using Irish newspapers and I.R.A. sources, the Irish historian Dorothy Macardle believes that 752 were killed and 866 wounded while Bennett—using the same

\(^5\) *Debates*, Commons, 143 (14 June 1921), col. 2172.

\(^6\) Bennett, p. 180. A. J. P. Taylor suggests about 700 were killed (English History, 1914-1945, p. 155); Sir James O'Connor quotes Hamar Greenwood as stating 566 (Vol. II, p. 329) and the Irish Bulletin lists 481 between January 1, 1920 and June 18, 1921, plus 20 for 1919 totaling 501 (23-24 June, 1921, p. 8).

\(^7\) Bennett, p. 189; O'Connor, II, 329. The Irish Bulletin states that 853 Crown forces were wounded between 1 January 1919 and 13 June 1921 (23-24 June 1921, p. 8).

materials—estimates about 700 and 800 respectively. In addition, Dublin Castle lists 138 civilians killed and 166 wounded during the war, while the Irish Bulletin states that British terror was responsible for the indiscriminate killing of 180 and wounding of 789 Irish citizens between January, 1920, and June, 1921. British and Irish civilian lists undoubtedly duplicate each other to a large degree. Also, Irish lists were more likely to count an individual as a civilian whereas the British more often labelled him as an I.R.A. member.

The appendices dealing with British and Irish violence also record the marked change in hostilities before and after July, 1920. While the I.R.A. did most of its destroying and damaging of vacated R.I.C. barracks before July, 1920, it was after that date as with the loss of lives that the greatest number of violent incidents (e.g. raids on the mails and for arms) took place. Of 5087 raids by the I.R.A. during the war to 21 May, 1921, all but 155 took place after 31 July 1920. Likewise, 5917 of 7686 total outrages occurred during the same period of the war.

The British also increased their violence markedly after July, 1920. Indeed, violence reinforced violence on each side until the spirit of both began to fail. According to the Irish Bulletin, British raids on private homes increasingly rose: 13,782

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10See Appendices IV and V.

11Ibid.
for 1919; 16,494 for January-June, 1920; 32,980 for July-December, 1920; and for the final 1921 period it was impossible to compile a list of repressive measures "upon a scale so universal". The destruction and damaging of shops, creameries, farmhouses and buildings, factories and works, crops, halls and clubs by British forces similarly rose as did arrests, sentences, courts-martial of civilians, deportations, suppression of meetings, markets, and fairs, and even attacks on unarmed people. During the last year of war the destruction of property was most pronounced in the Fall of 1920, whereas violence—physical and psychological—toward individuals was greatest under martial law in 1921.

Though I have found variance between British and Irish statistics, official British statistics appear to be as accurate as possible, as are most of those printed in the Irish Bulletin and Irish press. To illustrate the compatibility of the two sources, the Irish Bulletin of 23-24 June 1921 claimed that 3200 Irishmen were interned without trial. The "Weekly Survey" of the Chief Secretary, for the week ending 23 May 1921, one month prior, listed 3024 interned at that time and 3328 for the two years of war.

The situation in Ireland in the first week of January, 1921, returned to a more violent level after an abnormally quiet Christmas-New Year holiday, and General Macready, sharing none of Greenwood's previous optimism, anticipated an increase in I.R.A.

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12Irish Bulletin, 23-24 June 1921, p. 7 (also see Appendix V).
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
15C.P. 2977, "Weekly Survey", 23 May 1921 (Cab.24/123/f.486).
activity.\textsuperscript{16} In a letter to Under-Secretary Anderson on January 1st, Macready mentioned a conversation he had had with the Judge Advocate General regarding death sentences for persons caught carrying arms. The General's own practice was not to confirm the death sentence without positive knowledge that the individual was known to be "connected with murder and outrage".\textsuperscript{17}

It is interesting to note that as full martial law was being applied in Southwest Ireland to quell I.R.A. disturbances,\textsuperscript{18} the number of Irish attacks increased. General Tom Barry, I.R.A. leader in the Cork area, believed that the imposition of curfew under martial law helped rather than hindered the I.R.A. as they could "attack without fear of shooting our own people".\textsuperscript{19} Also, the restricted freedom of movement by ordinary citizens intensified their dislike of the British. Throughout the war the attempt to suppress Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. worked to the latter's advantage. The suggestion that passive resistance, instead of the selective violence of the I.R.A., might have secured Ireland's independence without bloodshed seems ill-founded.\textsuperscript{20} Both Richard Bennett and Edgar Holt forget that Ireland was different in its relationship to Britain than was India, thousands of miles away and only minimally

\textsuperscript{16}C.P. 2456, "G.O.C.I.C. Report", 8 January 1921 (Cab.24/118/f. 273); C.P. 2399, "Weekly Survey", 27 December 1920 (Cab.24/117/ff. 473-77). Also see Annual Register, 1921, pp. 3 and 6 for a general description.

\textsuperscript{17}Macready to Anderson, 1 January 1921 (J.A.P./C.O.904/168).

\textsuperscript{18}Proclamation of Martial Law, 4 January 1921 (C.O.904/168).

\textsuperscript{19}Barry, pp. 69-70.

\textsuperscript{20}Bennett, p. 154; Holt, p. 257.
Anglicized. A country as close as Ireland and so long dominated by the English would never have been allowed peacefully to separate itself. Also, India in the 1930s and '40s had another advantage—that of not being the first to test the power of the British Empire. Likewise, Government records show that the vast majority of British officials had no desire to see an independent Ireland, whether Republic or Dominion. Only force could rally Irish opinion under the stress of shared danger and bring the British finally to compromise. As Florence O'Donoghue so well states in *No Other Law*: "It was in the combination of a disciplined armed force with an organized public opinion in the political field, working for a common objective, that Ireland found the secret of victory." 

Even more precise was Tom Barry: "...without Dail Eireann there would, most likely, have been no sustained fight, with moral force behind it, in 1920-21, and without the guerrilla warfare of 1920-21 Dail Eireann would have been destroyed and the sacrifices of 1916 (Easter Rising) in vain." Bennett himself explains that the possibility of sniping and ambushes by the I.R.A. demoralized Crown forces as much as anything. 

The success of the 3000 active members of the I.R.A., 310 of which operated in three small Brigades around Cork against a British force of 12,000 Army, Black and Tans, and Auxiliaries—depended on support of the populace for food, intelligence information and shelter, and on the many who waited to join their ranks as rein-

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21 O'Donoghue, p. 16.
22 Barry, p. 11.
23 Bennett, p. 160.
forcements. 24 The Irish intelligence system—created by Michael Collins—became superior to that of the more experienced British and eventually involved friendly workers and spies in the post office, jails, police force, and even in the administration at Dublin Castle. 25 In effect, the I.R.A. was aware of every move of the British. This enabled them to employ an element of surprise in their attacks. These attacks, however, were not just important militarily, but also because they succeeded in provoking the British to resort to indiscriminate killing and destruction. For the I.R.A. to succeed as they did, the war with the British needed to be as long and drawn out as possible, and hence the Irish people had to suffer. The suffering served to increase and, with the help of a well-organized publicity campaign, to turn English public opinion against the government. According to James Gleason, it was Irish publicity and "Childers, more than anybody else, who had ensured that the mass of the English people were informed of the crime committed in their name against the people of Ireland...Collins' genius might have been lost without the support of Childers' propaganda. He knew the English opinion better than any Irishman or other Irish leader." 26 Childers, who had been writing in the Irish Bulletin throughout the war, succeeded Desmond Fitzgerald as Director of Publicity of Sinn Fein and the Dail after Fitzgerald was arrested


26Gleason, pp. 176-77. The effectiveness of Irish publicity is very well set out in a recent book by D.G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, Chapter IV, especially pp. 83-86. Boyce explains that by 1921 more than 2000 copies of the Irish Bulletin were sent daily to the Irish, British and foreign press, and also to leading world figures.
in February, 1921.27 Childers also cooperated with Piaras Beaslai, I.R.A. Director of Publicity and editor of An t-Oglaich, I.R.A. news sheet.28 Neither armed resistance nor organized publicity alone could have been successful; together they prevailed in the end over the power of Britain.

Besides restricting the citizenry with curfews, etc., the British occupying forces undertook two additional tactical measures—the initiation of 30 to 40 mile wide sweeps by cavalry and motor car, and "authorized reprisals" to annihilate both the "flying columns" of the I.R.A. and those of its members who were living among the ordinary population.29 In both of these attempts to deal with guerrilla activity, the British failed because of troop shortages and general lack of popular support. Also, the primitive nature of the hilly Irish countryside—with its poor communications—was ideal for I.R.A. activity. Martial law did, however, limit freedom of movement by the I.R.A.

British tactics often bore more heavily on the Irish people than they did on the I.R.A.—for example, in the case of the Trim looting and Drumcondra murders on 9 February, and in the killing on March 7 of civilians like Mayor Clancy and ex-Mayor O'Callaghan of Limerick in the presence of their wives, along with numerous other misdeeds.30 The hesitation of General Tudor, head of police

28Beaslai, II, 168.
30Bennett, pp. 148, 152; Kee, p. 709.
in Ireland, to punish those responsible for such crimes was at least part of the reason for General Crozier's resignation from command of the Auxiliaries in late February. As Frank Gallagher (pseud. David Hogan) wrote: "Official reprisals did not restrain the Crown forces, but encouraged them...."\(^{31}\) The I.R.A. too was responsible for senseless killings, for example those of Major Compton Smith, Sir Arthur Vicars, and Mrs. Lindsey, but on a much smaller scale than the British. While one can question the morality of any killing, it is easier to condone that committed out of genuine idealism than that practiced in the name of repression. Also, large-scale ambushes—such as that at Crossbarry on March 19 by Tom Barry's 100 man flying column—were usually in accord with the rules of war, whereas much of British action was not. Though some 35 British troops were killed that day, they were the very forces who had been searching for Barry's column.\(^{32}\) A memo also had been circulated to the Sixth Division (Cork) on March 7, clearly specifying the process for rapid trial and execution if necessary of those who "actively opposed the forces of the Crown."\(^{33}\)

Throughout the first quarter of 1921, while these depressing events were occurring, the Cabinet was preoccupied chiefly with matters other than Ireland—excepting of course the Strickland Report which was discussed at length in January and February.\(^{34}\) Thus,


\(^{32}\)Barry, pp. 122-31; Macardle, p. 440.

\(^{33}\)Col. Wroughton, Deputy Adjutant General Staff, Parkgate, Dublin, to Headquarters, 6th Division (Cork), "Trial and Execution of Rebels", 7 March 1921 (S.J.A./C.O.904/188/2).

\(^{34}\)See Chapter III, pp. 146-49.
Irish policy was drifting although there was some minor talk and exchange of information about the situation. When the Clune negotiations failed in late December, 1920, as a result of the demand for an arms surrender, Dublin Castle's three senior officials—Anderson, Cope, and Sturgis—found themselves again in disagreement with their political leader, Greenwood. Nevertheless, and in spite of the Cabinet decision to suspend further peace moves until elections had been held in the North, Cope pursued new negotiations along Dominion lines with Father O'Flanagan and also the Dail Eireann. In a letter and memo to Lloyd George on 26 January 1921, the Chief Secretary cautioned against any premature talks with DeValera should occasion arise, and suggested that talks with O'Flanagan be delayed, in the belief that neither could stop the "murder gang" and that "the tide has turned against Sinn Fein" anyway. Judge James O'Connor acted as intermediary between O'Flanagan on the one hand and Dublin Castle, Carson and Craig, on the other. Not being DeValera's personal representative, however, O'Flanagan found an equal lack of cooperation among the British and Irish and dropped his efforts on March 2nd.

Lloyd George had considered meeting DeValera, who had returned

35 Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 47; Wheeler-Bennett, p. 75.
36 Cab. Concl. 77/20/6, 24 December 1920 (Cab.23/23/f.320).
38 Memorandum and letter from Greenwood to L.G., 26 January 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/2). Macready also felt that martial law was having an impact on I.R.A. activity (see C.P. 2595, "G.O.C.I.C. Report", 12 February 1921, Cab. 24/119/f.573).
to Ireland on December 25, 1920, after 18 months in America, where he collected over £1 million for the Republican loan. Though the British had been against his return, they decided not to arrest him. However, they were going to continue to arrest other accused persons even if he were present. Lloyd George felt that DeValera might be able "to deliver the goods", but was persuaded against meeting him by Bonar Law who believed coercion to be the only answer. Sir John Anderson, dining with Tom Jones on February 15th, again indicated that DeValera wanted to meet with the Prime Minister, but that Bonar Law was even more against conciliation than Carson. Anderson also contrasted the feelings of Generals Tudor and Macready: the former embittered toward the Irish as a result of the killings of his men, while the latter was resolved to curb indiscipline. Macready also wanted to incorporate all police in martial law areas under a senior police official directly responsible to the Military Governor. While Macready felt that this would reduce friction between police and soldiers and thereby increase their effectiveness, his wish was never carried out.

Besides getting word of DeValera's willingness to meet him, Lloyd George received a letter from the Irish leader, dated 12 February 1921, accusing the British of uncivilized warfare against a

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40 Cab. Concl. 74/20/1, 20 December 1920 (Cab. 23/23); Earl of Longford (Frank Pakenham) and T. P. O'Neill, DeValera (London, 1970), p. 115.
41 Ibid., 2/21/2, 14 January 1921 (Cab. 23/24/f.12).
42 Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 130; III, 49-50.
43 Ibid., I, 130; III, 52-53.
44 Macready to Anderson, 14 February 1921 (S.J.A./C.O.904/188/2).
free people and placing primary responsibility for it on the Prime Minister. Lloyd George also received a copy of an unsigned memorandum dated the 12th which recognized the impossibility of a settlement in the South on the basis either of the Home Rule Act of 1920 or of a Republic. It concluded that Sinn Fein was the only party in Ireland with authority to negotiate an agreement and that a majority of Irishmen now desired peace.

While Lloyd George, unwilling to pursue negotiations, had tolerated reprisals in late 1920, he now took careful notice of public opinion and of the growing number of authoritative accounts—by British and Irish alike—of indiscipline within the R.I.C. and auxiliary forces. He was also aware that Oswald Mosley and Lord Cavendish-Bentinck, M.P., leaders of the 'Peace With Ireland' Council, had called in the House of Commons for Greenwood's resignation. The Chief Secretary was the main spokesman for the Government on Ireland from the beginning of the 1921 session of Parliament on 25 February until the truce. Throughout this period he avoided direct answers, denied accusations, and at times even refused comment. On February 21, he had praised the work of the R.I.C., maintaining that progress had been made toward peace in his year in office, and even suggested there was a Soviet-Sinn Fein conspiracy

45 DeValera to L.G., 12 February 1921 (L.G.P./F/14/6/1).
46 Unsigned "memorandum on the present political situation in Southern Ireland", 12 February 1921 (L.G.P./F/181/1/1).
47 L.G. to Greenwood, 25 February 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/4).
48 Debates, Commons, 138 (17 February 1921), col. 239; 139 (17 March 1921), col. 1677.
"to do in the Empire". On May 26 he went so far as to suggest the rebels were committing murder in stolen British uniforms.

The Prime Minister declared in the Commons on February 28, that both the Chief Secretary and Irish policy would remain the same. He also stated: "We must take every means at our disposal to enforce the law, and if it (violence) is to be stopped, then it must be stopped first of all by the people who assassinate the guardians of the law." On March 3rd he skillfully evaded a question by Oswald Mosley as to whether the Cabinet had ever sanctioned a policy of official reprisals. Privately, however, Lloyd George confronted Hamar Greenwood. In his letter on the 25th of February, he warned that violence and indiscipline within the R.I.C. were:

weakening the hands of the executive. If it continues, public opinion, which is already unhappy, will swing round and withdraw its support from the policy which is now being pursued by the Government in Ireland. The result would be disastrous for the alternative is surrender to rebellion...I rely upon you, therefore, to take such drastic steps immediately as will...receive the support of Parliament and public opinion.

This letter shows that Lloyd George had finally recalled the truth of a statement he himself made in 1900 during the Boer War: "In regard to military reprisals, nothing is gained by making a man

49 Ibid., 138 (21 February 1921), cols. 624-28, 639, 647.
50 Ibid., 142 (26 May 1921), col. 284.
51 Ibid., 138 (28 February 1921), col. 1407.
desperate. It is a silly, foolish, iniquitous policy to burn his farm, ruin his property, and bring his family to the grave. It is not a military question at all. It is a question of misunderstanding the ordinary influences that govern human nature." 54 It was most unfortunate, however, that he did not ensure that the police forces were as restrained as the military.

Macready continued to suggest that the military be given more authority to suppress the I.R.A. In his report for the week ending 12 March he outlined the captured yet ambitious I.R.A. plan to isolate the Curragh military facilities in Ireland, credited the guerrilla war chiefly to the efforts of three persons—Brugha, Mulcahy, and Collins—and called for the intensification of the military effort by employing the following measures:

1. First and foremost the capture of the three men mentioned above as the prime movers of the rebellion.
2. By the prosecution for high treason of every member of the Dail.
3. By the control of the hostile press in Ireland.
4. If it were possible, by convincing those politicians and public speakers and press-men who are now encouraging (perhaps unwittingly) the rebels, that every word spoken or written by them only postpones the day when peace and law and order will be restored in Ireland.55

Macready, like Sir Henry Wilson, was coming to feel that the main obstacle to defeating the I.R.A. was Lloyd George himself, who would "neither run a show...nor allow us to run a show."56 Wilson, parti-

cularly, failed to understand that political considerations could not be overlooked. Still, there is truth in his statement as Lloyd George only gave his attention to the distasteful Irish war when forced to.

Next to the Strickland Report, the enquiry into the Mallow incident on 31 January 1921 was most prominent. The killing of Mrs. King, wife of the R.I.C. District Inspector, and the shooting of several railwaymen at the Mallow Railway Station were matters first taken up by the Cabinet on February 15th, also the day of final discussion of the Strickland Report. The Prime Minister told the meeting that he would not at present reply to enquiries in the House, but that Greenwood proposed to send a letter to J. H. Thomas, M.P., informing him that the Government would proceed with an Enquiry. Greenwood told the ministers about two conflicting reports he had received on Mallow—one, that police had returned the fire after being fired upon; the other that wounded men "had been arrested and were being marched off, when the rebels, thinking they were Police, fired on them and killed them". The conference agreed with Greenwood that the first report seemed more probable. The Chief Secretary further explained that a military inquest by three officers had been held in lieu of one by a coroner and, due to the problem of obtaining evidence, found the deceased murdered by some unknown person.

58 Ibid.; Debates, Commons, 138 (17 February 1921), col. 248.
The actual findings of the Court of Enquiry—dated 11 March 1921—were finally reached by Major I. Milton and Captain W. D. Little of the Army and P. Riordan of the R.I.C., the President, Colonel K. R. Cumming having been killed by the I.R.A. on 5 March. Over a period of more than a month, five military, 19 R.I.C., 30 railway employees, and two civilians appeared as witnesses. The findings stated "that although there is no evidence to show who the individuals were who fired such shots...the persons who did so must have been guided by some Person or Persons who had such knowledge." It also found that 'return fire' did unavoidably cause some casualties among railway workers and that allegations made in the House of Commons regarding indiscretion among British forces were unfounded. Richard Bennett, however, believed that the return fire (which damaged the railway station and inflicted casualties on railwaymen) was actually a reprisal. Major General Strickland, commanding the 6th Division, concurred with the findings: "the main allegations have all been completed refuted. It is evident that certain sections of the House of Commons and the press are willing to receive and use information without taking steps to verify the facts." On March 22nd the Cabinet authorized the publication of the Mallow Report—maintaining the event was of a different character than that at Cork, and that the report contained nothing

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60 Findings, Court of Enquiry, 11 March 1921 (L.G.P./F/182/1/2).
61 Ibid.
62 Bennett, p. 139.
63 Remarks by Major-General E. Strickland, commanding 6th Division (Cork), 14 March 1921 (L.G.P./F/182/1/2).
adverse to the British Government. 64

H. A. L. Fisher—perhaps Lloyd George's chief Liberal supporter at least in the early phases of the war 65—suggested again on March 1st that the Cabinet consider the possibility of a truce. Earlier in the Fall of 1920 and again in February, 1921, he had questioned the policy of repression. 66 Now he condemned the military's demand for an arms surrender—which had prevented a truce in December, 1920—and stated that indiscipline must be rooted out of the Auxiliary Force. 67 While Sinn Fein must be convinced that secession is impossible, the Cabinet must demonstrate its seriousness with regard to peace. A truce, he believed, would provide an opportunity for moderation and compromise, make it more difficult for the rebels to resume the fight, and prevent English opinion from swinging over to the Republicans. He also maintained that the death sentence should be used sparingly—only for brutal murder and not for military operations for which imprisonment should be used—as the Irish people had a passion for martyrs. "Let us not feed it," he said, "if a better way can be found." 68

Fisher's plea—while largely ignored—was at least kept in

64 Cab. Concl. 14/21/9, 22 March 1921 (Cab.23/24/f.170).
66 See Chapter III, pp. 126-28; Fisher to L.G., 23 February 1921 (L.G.P./F/16/7/66).
67 C.P. 2656, "Note by the President of the Board of Education", 1 March 1921 (Cab.24/120/ff. 304-08).
68 Ibid.
the recesses of Lloyd George's mind. Liberal Coalitionists—more than anyone else, including the Opposition—kept the Lloyd George Government from being 'diehard' on the issue of Ireland as well as on matters of social reform, India, and free trade.69 In fact, in a letter to Lloyd George on March ninth, the Chief Coalition Whip suggested that "only sheer loyalty" to the Prime Minister restrained many Coalition Liberals from openly opposing his Irish policy.70 Likewise, one of his Carnarvon constituents, Winifred Tennant, a Liberal Woman Organizer for North Wales, criticized his Irish policy as did the 27 faculty members of the University of Wales.71

From the Unionist side, however, on March 8 Lord Midleton informed the Cabinet that no date should be established for effecting the 1920 Government of Ireland Act and that a free election in the South should be postponed until Sinn Fein had been crushed.72 Contrary to what the military and police reported, Midleton asserted that order was not being restored, that things were actually 300 per cent worse. He felt that the only chance for a solution rested with a "small conclave" of Irishmen—commerical men, Catholic clergy and maybe a member of Sinn Fein should be appointed to meet with someone in the Cabinet. As the date for implementing the Act had


70 Frederick Guest, Chief Whip of the Coalition Liberals and after April, 1921, Secretary of the Air, to L.G., 9 March 1921 (L.G.P./F/22/3/6).

71 Winifred Tennant to L.G., 31 March 1921 (L.G.P./F/96/1/15); undated press cutting to early 1921 (L.G.P./F/182/1/5).

72 Cab. Concl. 12/21/9, 8 March 1921 (Cab.23/24/f.152); Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 53-55.
been set for the first week in May, this was subsequently delayed. On March 24th—after consulting both Greenwood and Fisher—the Prime Minister tentatively fixed April 19th and May 4th respectively as the days for setting the 1920 Government of Ireland Act in motion and for convening the Northern and Southern Parliaments. The problem of announcing a truce during elections, or before for negotiations, was set aside until after Easter.

The Annual Register records that "the State of Ireland showed little improvement during April", yet Greenwood's letter of April 6 and the G.O.C.I.C. report for 9 April viewed the I.R.A. as being "on the run", and the situation under martial law as improved. The improvement was attributed both to the pressure of British forces and to the need of men in "Rebel Flying Columns" to return to their deteriorating farms. This note of cautious optimism was tempered by strong representations for military reinforcement in Ireland by both Macready and General Wilson, the former not being sure that he would be successful even with the suggested reinforcements. Macready explained that the heaviest work was in the larger towns—Dublin and Cork—and that the country areas would have

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73 Cab. Concl. 10/21/1, 3 March 1921 (Cab.23/24/f.119); Cab. Concl. 14/21/8, 22 March 1921 (Cab. 23/24/f.169).
74 Cab. Concl. 15/2/1, 24 March 1921 (Cab.23/24/f.192).
75 Annual Register, 1921, p. 38; C.P. 2828, "G.O.C.I.C. Report", 9 April 1921 (Cab.24/122/ff.102-03); C.P. 2872, "G.O.C.I.C. Report", 23 April 1921 (Cab.24/122/ff.368-69); Greenwood to L.G., 6 April 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/8).
76 Memorandum by General Macready, "Reinforcements for the Army in Ireland", 28 March 1921 (S.J.A./C.O. 904/188/2); Sir Henry Wilson's Diaries (31 March and 12 April 1921), in Cailwell, II, 283.
more activity with the coming of Summer weather. He also feared that serious outrages would occur if the Government attempted to hold elections in the South under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. 77

2. Irish Policy Reconsidered
(April-June, 1921)

Though the Cabinet did not officially meet again to discuss Ireland until April 21st—because of the intervening industrial crisis—a subtle change was taking place within that body as some members began to realize that only an all-out war would crush the I.R.A. In fact, by late April 1921, as Churchill wrote in his memoirs, Ireland had become the main preoccupation of the government. 78 Fisher, who had called for a truce in early March, was now joined by two of his Liberal colleagues—Montagu and Addison—and by others outside the Cabinet. Also, the military had revealed that further reinforcements would be necessary.

In response to the Cabinet decision of March 24 to delay discussion of a truce until after Easter, Montagu, the Secretary for India, urged the Prime Minister to consider a truce not only during the coming election in Ireland, but also to negotiate if possible a settlement with the Irish. He maintained:

All that a truce means to my mind is that for the moment you cease your warfare without prejudice to anything else. It is an armistice... If an incident occurs, either side is free to break off negotiations... Therefore, there is no necessity to surrender arms; there is no necessity to remove troops. 79

77 Macready to Greenwood, 19 March 1921 (L.G.P./F/36/2/19).
Montagu to L.G., 4 April 1921 (L.G.P./F/41/1/11).
Dr. Addison prepared a memorandum for the Cabinet on 13 April entitled "The Irish Elections and an offer of a Truce". In it the Minister without Portfolio argued both for announcing a truce during the election period and for a truce offer to reopen negotiations prior to the election. He explained that an unrestricted offer was necessitated by the "really national antagonism of the Irish people", and also by the need to strengthen the Government's position with those of its supporters who felt misgivings about the Irish policy being pursued. He also suggested that a truce might well provide the basis for a conference with Sinn Fein and for setting up a parliament in the South as well as in the North. Montagu promptly circulated a paper in agreement with Addison's memorandum and called for a "truce for negotiations before the appointed day" in which "nobody is withdrawn and nobody is disarmed."

Besides the pressure of these three Coalition Liberals for a truce, Lloyd George had received two letters on 31 March from the Irish Business Men's Conciliation Committee—one expressing a willingness to mediate between the British Cabinet and Dail Eireann in order to arrange a joint conference for peace, the other outlining the qualifications of its six-member Executive Committee.

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80 C.P. 2829, Memorandum by Dr. Addison, 13 April 1921. (Cab. 24/122/ff. 110-13).

81 Addison was dropped as Minister of Health in March, 1921, because of Conservative opposition to his excessive spending on public housing.

82 Paper circulated by E. Montagu, 14 April 1921 (Cab. 24/122/ff. 170-71).

83 Two letters from the Irish Business Men's Conciliation Committee to L.G., 31 March 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/13).
The six were Andrew Jameson, President of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce and Director of the National Bank; Sir William Golding, Sir Walter Nugent, and Sir Stanley Harrington, all three being railway industrialists and bankers; and Charles McGloghlin, President of the Dublin Rotary Club. Jameson and Harrington had also been members of the deputation that had urged the Prime Minister to seek a Dominion settlement on 4 August 1920.\textsuperscript{84} Both Lloyd George and Greenwood were anxious to meet with the businessmen and, especially, with Jameson.\textsuperscript{85}

Another influence on British policy came in the form of a deputation of M.P.s and other important figures who met twice with Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, on 21 March and 15 April. On the former occasion, Birkenhead told them that while he recognized the disaffection of the mass of Irishmen, he nevertheless disapproved of their methods—violence and false propaganda—to achieve a Republic.\textsuperscript{86} In general, the Lord Chancellor defended the actions of British forces but admitted I.R.A. killings were by no means throttled. He also estimated the I.R.A. strength at 30,000 men—which, though much exaggerated, was at least more accurate than earlier estimates. This information about the I.R.A. shows that Cabinet Ministers were beginning to understand the Irish situation better. Birkenhead also stated that an informal unofficial truce

\textsuperscript{84}See Chapter III, pp. 99-100.

\textsuperscript{85}Greenwood to L.G., 17 April 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/15); L.G. to Greenwood, 19 April 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/16).

\textsuperscript{86}C.P. 2807, Deputation to the Lord Chancellor, 21 March 1921, presented for the use of the Cabinet in April, 1921 (Cab.24/122/ff. 24-29).
would make it possible to begin talks with Irish leaders.

On April 15th the deputation returned to the Moses Room in the House of Lords to meet with the Lord Chancellor. In attendance with Birkenhead and Sir John Anderson were such notables as the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Ryland Adkins, J. L. Garvin and General Cockerill. When queried about the degree of conciliation to which the Cabinet was prepared to offer, Birkenhead again defended a firm Irish policy, including "official reprisals" in the martial law area, and stated that the Prime Minister was willing to confer with an accredited Southern Irish spokesman. Evidently he overlooked the fact that in February, 1921, Lloyd George had been persuaded not to meet with DeValera. Likewise, his statement that "ambush without uniform is...murder...and it is so laid down in every (military) manual of every civilized country" missed the point that guerrilla warfare was Ireland's sole alternative to British domination. The Anglo-Irish War was the first 'war of liberation' of the twentieth century. While the Lord Chancellor remained immovable, the two meetings were instrumental in confronting him with opposing views.

Along with the efforts for conciliation by Coalition Liberals, by the deputation of M.P.s to the Lord Chancellor and by Southern Unionists, some twenty leaders of religious denominations in England expressed their desire for a truce in a letter to the Times on April 3rd. Two main drafts of a reply from the Prime Minister

87 C.P. 2883, Deputation to the Lord Chancellor, 15 April 1921, presented for the use of the Cabinet in April 1921 (Cab. 24/122/ff. 418-24).

88 Times, 6 April 1921.
to the Bishop of Chelmsford and his friends are to be found in the Lloyd George Papers and indicate the Prime Minister's attitude. The first, prepared by Greenwood's Irish office, was forwarded to Lloyd George on 8 April. This four page draft emphasized that the Auxiliaries were not an "irregular force" and, while admitting that isolated reprisals had occurred, maintained there had been no official "practice of reprisals". It also repeated an offer to meet with those "who can speak with the full authority of the people of Ireland and are prepared to accept the responsibility of negotiating a settlement." The second draft by Philip Kerr, the Prime Minister's private secretary (1916-21), elaborated on the main points of the first in great detail—being thirteen pages in length. This letter of admission and defense was actually sent on April 19th and subsequently appeared in the press.

The theme of Lloyd George's reply was precisely the same one he used in the Commons on April 28 and earlier in March and April. Maintaining that he would not "surrender to crime", he determined that British forces should press forward under martial law until "the real mind of Ireland" should declare itself and send forth a responsible leader. A Republic was impossible to grant as was a direct meeting with those he called murderers. Also, he

89 Greenwood to L.G. with the enclosed draft of the letter to the Bishop of Chelmsford, 8 April 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/10).

90 L.G. to the Bishop of Chelmsford (second draft by Philip Kerr with alterations by Greenwood), returned to Kerr on 13 April 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/12).

91 Debates, Commons, 141 (28 April 1921), cols. 484-95.

92 Ibid., 139 (23 March 1921), cols. 2675, 2677-78, 2681; 138 (3 March 1921), cols. 1993-97.
was still evasive when questioned about "official reprisals", suggesting that those who used the term should define it. 93

The statements made by Lloyd George in the Commons in March and April square directly with the decision of the Cabinet on April 21st. 94 Referring to the Addison and Montagu memos urging a truce, the ministers decided neither to take the initiative in proposing a truce at that time nor to postpone the elections in the South. The Chief Secretary, however, was instructed to confer with the military and police on the feasibility of a truce during elections and to take measures to ensure a wider dissemination of information at home and abroad regarding Ireland. While the efforts of Coalition Liberals—Fisher, Addison and Montagu—did not produce the cease-fire they desired, they were instrumental in having arms surrender removed as a pre-condition for one. In the Commons on April 21st—as well as earlier on March 3rd, shortly after the presentation of Fisher's Note—Lloyd George dropped this condition and left the door open to an Irish initiative. 95

The Premier followed up the Cabinet's instructions to Greenwood on April 32 with a letter of his own. He reiterated that indiscipline actually helped Sinn Fein to influence public opinion, and proposed that Dublin Castle double its propaganda efforts to ensure that the "ordinary man really grasped our case". 96 Earlier in the

93 Ibid., 17 March 1921, col. 1688.
94 Cab. Concl. 27/21/2, 21 April 1921 (Cab.23/25/F.158).
95 Debates, Commons, 138 (3 March 1921), cols. 1994-97; 140 (21 April 1921), col. 2044.
96 L. G. to Greenwood, 21 April 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/17).
year, Macready had written about the inadequacy of information regarding the killing of soldiers and police. Both recognized that Irish propaganda had been more successful.\textsuperscript{97} The Prime Minister also suggested the value of regular meetings of a "War Cabinet" in Dublin to coordinate the efforts of the Administration—a suggestion that displays the more obstinate and aggressive side of Lloyd George's personality.

Greenwood had already told Basil Clarke that "police reports of ambushes, murders, and other outrages against Loyalists and Crown forces in Ireland should be as vivid, detailed, and as prompt as possible."\textsuperscript{98} Later, in May 1921, he gathered important members of his administration—civil servants, police, and military—to discuss the subject of propaganda.\textsuperscript{99} The discussion as to who should issue communiques, and differentiate in them between troops and police, may be indicative not only of Greenwood's attempt to coordinate his administration along lines suggested by Lloyd George but also of differences that had arisen within the Crown forces themselves. Clarke's job was then specifically limited to providing material for the press, and military sources were directed to forward their information to Clarke through Major Marians. It was also decided that an official photographer, military or otherwise, was to be procured for Clarke's use. It is clear that the Government was now shifting its

\textsuperscript{97}Macready to Anderson, 7 March 1921, forwarded to Miss Stevenson the same day (L.G.P./F/36/2/18).

\textsuperscript{98}Dublin Castle, Directive by Basil Clarke, 6 April 1921 (C.O. 904/168/2).

\textsuperscript{99}Dublin Castle, Notes of a meeting at the Chief Secretary's Lodge on the Subject of Propaganda, 9 May 1921 (C.O. 904/168/2).
emphasis, and the journalist Basil Clarke, from the Public Information Branch of Dublin Castle's Intelligence Division to that of Propaganda. Along with these efforts, the British Government also issued several "Command Papers" in 1921 attempting to discredit Sinn Fein. "Documents Relative to the Sinn Fein Movement" and "Intercourse between Bolshevism and Sinn Fein" suggested simultaneous collaboration with both the German and Russian Governments, but were believed only by those who already believed the worst about the Irish.

When one considers how poorly Britain propagandized when compared to Sinn Fein, one must consider the moral position of each. Here the latter clearly had the advantage. As Lloyd George's reply to the twenty religious leaders of Britain stated: "Crime perpetrated by those responsible for the maintenance of order and right stands in a category by itself...." Just as witnessing the senseless killings of Vietnamese civilians later affected the decency of ordinary Americans, so "reprisals hit Englishmen's sense of justice and fair play...(and) wounded their pride...in their country and in its reputation." Nevertheless, the Cabinet was not yet prepared to give way and reverse its Irish policy. In response to a memo by Sir John Ross, Irish High Court Judge and later Lord Chancellor for Ireland 1921-22,

100 "Documents Relative to the Sinn Fein Movement", Cmd. 1108 (1921); "Intercourse between Bolshevism and Sinn Fein", Cmd. 1326 (1921).

101 Bishop of Chelmsford & c. to L.G., 4 May 1921, quoted in C.J.C. Street, Ireland in 1921 (London, 1922), p. 44.

102 Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, p. 99; also see O'Connor, II, 343.
suggesting that the arrival of the new Viceroy—Viscount FitzAlan (formerly Lord Edmund Talbot)—afforded a chance for conciliation and a truce, Greenwood had replied that it was "an unasked for concession" and that "the onus of asking for a truce should be put on Sinn Fein...when they cease from crime."  

FitzAlan, a Catholic, was sworn in on May 3 as Viceroy for both North and South in the hope that Ireland could somehow be reunited. The Council of Ireland section of the 1920 Act was such a provision and the new Viceroy had not taken part in formulating the policy of suppression. Also, on April 24 Tom Jones wrote Bonar Law in Cannes, where he was resting after the announcement of his resignation from the Cabinet on March 17. Jones indicated that the Cabinet would allow the elections to take place both in North and South and that "the P.M. appears to be as firm against any financial concessions as he was last autumn." Jones shrewdly observed that Lloyd George had a "secret admiration" for Michael Collins and that the latter would one day be canonized in Ireland.

The Cabinet assembled on 27 April and its discussions bear out Jones' letter. It is interesting to point out that no Cabinet Conclusions were kept for this meeting but fortunately Jones' Diary

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103 Memo by J. Ross, 22 April 1921 (L.G.P./F/181/1/3); Memo by Greenwood, n.d. (late April 1921), L.G.P./F/181/1/4.

104 Greenwood to L.G., 3 May 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/4/1); also see Younger, p. 134.

105 Bonar Law resigned on March 17, 1921, because of ill health. His position as head of the Conservative Party and number two man in the Cabinet was filled by Austen Chamberlain.

contains a lengthy discussion. Two main questions were canvassed—that of postponing elections in the South and that of effecting a truce. The overwhelming majority, including Lloyd George, saw no practical advantage in postponing elections in either North or South. If Sinn Fein failed to accept the Southern Parliament, it would be dissolved and Crown Colony Government would come into effect. Coalition Liberals—Fisher, Montagu, Addison, and Short—still desired a truce, as did R. Munro, Secretary of State for Scotland. The Prime Minister opposed an offer of a truce as "bad tactics" but was prepared to say: "We will discuss." Believing there was a "hard side to the Irish nature," he maintained that they must continue to fight as the time was "not ripe for conciliation at this moment." The majority agreed.

Lloyd George's firm attitude was determined by a belief that conciliation would only result in stronger demands by the Irish, and also by the fact that nothing had come of the unofficial negotiations arranged by Cope in February and March. The efforts of Albert Wood, Arthur Vincent, General Crozier, Col. O'Callaghan-Westropp and the Archbishop of Tuam had been no more successful than those of Father O'Flanagan. The Premier believed that De-Valera and Collins were quarrelling and seeking different ends, and that this, along with a kind of innate stubbornness on the part of the Irish, prevented Irish initiatives at the time. This view

107 Ibid., 55-63.
108 Gallagher, pp. 25-29; Greenwood to L.G., 6 April 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/3/8).
109 Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 60.
of Sinn Fein held by the Prime Minister and a majority of his Cabinet continued on well into June, 1921, despite Greenwood and others having acknowledged DeValera "could carry the majority of the I.R.A. with him in the event of a truce." In explaining why Irish initiatives were not forthcoming, it must be remembered that Lloyd George, advised by Bonar Law, had failed to consult with DeValera in February. However, to say that negotiations would have been successful at this time would be problematical. Ireland's advantage lay in the tactics of delay and of securing popular support; to take the initiative for peace would mean a loss. Also, it is clear that DeValera had managed to preserve unity in the Dail and Irish Cabinet throughout the first half of 1921.

The "first step in establishing a contact with the Irish leaders"—which ultimately led to the truce and settlement later in the year—was the visit to Ireland by Lord Derby in April with the full knowledge and support of the Prime Minister. Perhaps the Craig-DeValera meeting on May 5 also played a similar role in opening up closed minds on all sides. While nothing solid could have come out of this meeting, it was well received in Irish newspapers.

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110 Greenwood to L.G., 4 May 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/4/3); Greenwood to L.G., 6 May 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/4/6).
111 Longford (Pakenham), DeValera, pp. 117-22.
112 Ibid., p. 143.
114 Gallagher, p. 33.
115 Freeman's Journal, 6 May 1921; Irish Times, 6 May 1921; Irish Independent, 6 May 1921; also see Greenwood to L.G., 6 May 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/4/6) for comments.
Furthermore, as DeValera upon his return had resumed political leadership in the South, so Sir James Craig had replaced Carson as the Northern leader on 4 February 1921.

Lloyd George was further pressed for conciliation in an interview with New York Governor Glynn on May 5th. The Prime Minister responded to the Governor that matters such as foreign affairs, army and navy and trade must remain with an all-British parliament and that an Irish Republic was out of the question.\footnote{Note of an interview between Governor Glynn and the P.M. at the House of Commons, 5 May 1921 (L.G.P./F/181/1/5).} However, he would welcome DeValera's coming to England for negotiations and in the process would be willing to make very great concessions for the sake of a lasting peace. Lloyd George also received a letter from an aged man, W. Rowntree of Scarborough, asking what he would himself have said about the Irish situation when he "first had political vision."\footnote{W. Rowntree to L.G., 7 May 1921 (L.G.P./F/96/1/7).} Rowntree lamented that his greatest sorrows had been "when Chamberlain (Joseph) and yourself have come to defend Tory decisions against your better minds." Another source of pressure was Professor W. G. S. Adams, founder of the \textit{Political Quarterly}, former secretary to the Prime Minister, and editor of the \textit{War Cabinet Minutes, 1916-18}, who stated that a Dominion settlement was within range if Britain would "treat the financial relations on the basis of a grant from Ireland, not of an assessment...."\footnote{W.G.S. Adams to L.G., 10 May 1921 (L.G.P./F/96/1/32).}

The Foreign Office was also informed by its ambassador to Washington, Sir Auckland Geddes, of the proposals within the United
States Government for "American Relief for Ireland"; and this information was forwarded to the Cabinet on May 9th in a memorandum by Curzon, the Foreign Secretary. Curzon also drafted a telegram of reply to Geddes denying the need for American relief. The next day the Cabinet met and agreed with Curzon.

On the 11th of May the Cabinet again assembled and decided to hold a special meeting the next day to discuss the contents of a truce and the draft of the new viceroy's message. In addition, a telegram was sent to the Chief Secretary who was then in Ireland asking his opinion and that of his advisors on the subject of a truce.

Again on May 12, 1921—as in December and also July, 1920—in the Cabinet the men of force predominated in discussing Irish policy. In fact, as Tom Jones explains:

The P.M. stage-managed the proceedings perfectly. During the reading of the documents from Ireland it was impossible to say to which side he leaned, but it became clear as Balfour proceeded and the P.M. homologated with approving sounds, not words 'porthi' as we say in Welsh.

The advice from Ireland included memoranda from General Macready,

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119 C. P. 2921, Memorandum by Curzon, 9 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/f. 102).
120 C.P. 2921, Draft telegram to A. Geddes (Cab. 24/23/ff. 103-06).
121 Cab. Concl. 36/21/4, 10 May 1921 (Cab. 23/25/f. 244).
122 Ibid., 38/21/9, 11 May 1921 (Cab. 23/25/f. 261).
123 Ibid., also see communications between L.G. and Greenwood, 10-11 May 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/4/8-10).
124 Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 63-70.
125 Ibid., p. 63.
Sir John Anderson, General Ormonde Winter as well as from Greenwood, and also a paper against the truce from Lady Hamar Greenwood. All opposed a truce, though Anderson was in favor of ending hostilities. Nonetheless, this meeting was the beginning of the reversal in Irish policy which took place in late June, 1921, as the substantial split in the Cabinet was revealed. Montagu, Addison, and Fisher who had pressed for a truce for some time were now joined by Churchill and Munro, Liberal Secretary of State for Scotland, though not officially a member of the Cabinet. Churchill had become much more conciliatory since leaving the War Office for the Colonies in February; and his breach with Lloyd George became apparent with the latter's failure to appoint him Chancellor of the Exchequer in March upon Bonar Law's retirement. Churchill now felt a truce would not be a "sign of weakness", but that it would have "considerable effect on British public opinion and British Liberal opinion."

The majority—the Prime Minister, Balfour, Chamberlain, Horne, FitzAlan, Shortt, Curzon, Worthington-Evans, and Denis Henry all opposed the truce. Four of them—three Unionists and one Liberal—had considered conciliation earlier but now backed away. These were Horne, Curzon; the new Conservative leader, Austen Chamberlain; and the Liberal Home Secretary, Shortt. They were undoubtedly affected by the memoranda from Dublin Castle and the military. Chamberlain

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126 See Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, p. 646.
127 James, Churchill, p. 144.
128 Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 69-70.
129 Ibid., p. 70.
states how much he was impressed by Sir John Anderson's letter. Also, the mastery of the meeting by Lloyd George and Balfour is apparent. Lloyd George explained to his ministers that a truce had been opposed by Greenwood, Macready, and two former Chief Secretaries—Balfour and Shortt—and that the Government should wait for the "best opportunity" when guarantees from the Irish were present. The nine-to-five split explained in Jones' diary is substantially in accord with that of H. A. L. Fisher.\textsuperscript{130} The Cabinet was also concerned that day that the public be informed of Government policy.\textsuperscript{131}

Tom Jones again wrote to Bonar Law on 19 May explaining how, despite peace-makers' desires, including those of some young dons at Oxford who suggested that Dominion Premiers act as arbiters of a Dominion solution, "there is no change in the policy of the Government and there is to be no 'sign of weakness'." \textsuperscript{132} The Government proceeded with elections in Ireland. In the South on the 24th of May, Sinn Fein captured 124 of 128 seats in the Dublin Commons while in the North on the 19th Sinn Fein and Nationalists wrestled only 12 of the 52 seats in the Belfast Commons from the Unionists.\textsuperscript{133} Sinn Fein used the election to elect a Second Dail, while the Northern results left little doubt as to the true majority feeling there.

Partition, being inevitable and necessary, was not the result of

\textsuperscript{130}Ibid.; Fisher Diary (12 May 1921), cited in Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{131}Cab. Concl. 39/21/3, 12 May 1921 (Cab.24/25/ff. 265-66).

\textsuperscript{132}Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 71.

\textsuperscript{133}Macardle, pp. 452-54.
a deliberate policy of divide and rule. The doubt as to its necessity by writers such as Denis Gwynn and Capt. Harrison would have been better warranted had they criticized the particulars of partition, rather than the act itself. Both North and South were estranged from each other—religiously, ethnically, and politically—and the events of the World War and Anglo-Irish War had not lessened their feelings. Despite DeValera's appeal for Irish unity during the Northern elections, neither Sinn Fein and the I.R.A., nor Ulster Unionism, placed primary emphasis on unity. Geographical considerations were then pushed out of the way and have not really emerged even in the 1970's. Time and membership in the Common Market, however, may change this in the future.

While the working of the Government of Ireland Act in the North did not encourage a similar response in the South, it did serve to limit the Irish Question to the Anglo-Irish War itself, and this was the question with which English public opinion was primarily concerned. With Ulster fairly well secured, Cabinet ministers now brought their full attention to the war in the South and were thereby afforded more room to experiment. However, while elections were taking place in the South, martial law and reinforcements to the military were being discussed. Experimentation with appeasement still had to await a final consideration of force.

At noon on the twenty-fourth of May, the Cabinet discussed the


135 Address by DeValera before Northern Elections (Cab. 24/123/f. 490); Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, pp. 115-17.
related problems of dispatching troops to Upper Silesia, maintaining order at home in the midst of protracted industrial strife and the pressing need for reinforcement of troops in Ireland. The Cabinet also discussed the immaturity of troops recently sent to Ireland and the possibility of sending some troops from Ireland to Silesia. Worthington-Evans, who succeeded Churchill as Secretary of State for War in February, 1921, was directed to inquire into the situation.

Later that day—a mark of the urgency of the situation—at 5:30 p.m. the Cabinet again met to discuss the military situation in Ireland. A document by Secretary of State for War entitled "Ireland and the General Military Situation" was presented. It stated:

The position of the military forces in Ireland is anything but satisfactory. There is a risk that a position of virtual stalemate may continue throughout the summer and autumn and that winter will be a time of decisive advantage to the rebels.... I am anxious, therefore, to reinforce the troops in Ireland with everything not actually required elsewhere...to break the back of the rebellion during the three months, July, August, and September.

Increased military efforts were to be made after July 14, the final date set for the Southern Parliament to take its oath to the King. Worthington-Evans went on to discuss commitments elsewhere in Great Britain.

136 Cab. Concl. 40/21/2, 24 May 1921 (Cab. 23/25/ff. 280-82).
137 Ibid., 41/21/3, 24 May 1921 (Cab. 23/25/ff. 288-89).
139 This date was changed from July 12th, the day for celebrating the Battle of the Boyne in the North, in order to prevent unnecessary violence from erupting.
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Britain, the Rhine and Upper Silesia, Constantinople, and Israel, Egypt, Palestine and in Mesopotamia and Russia, concluding that 18 infantry battalions and three cavalry regiments would be available for Ireland. He therefore recommended:

1. That the Cabinet now decide that in the event of a ...(Sinn Fein) Government being set up in Southern Ireland, martial law should be proclaimed over the whole of its area.
2. That drives and other similar intensive operations should be inaugurated.
3. That the Navy should blockade the ports and prevent gun-running and movement of Irish Republican Army troops.
4. That the additional forces available should be put under the command of the General Officer Commanding in Ireland.140

The War Secretary also circulated three other memoranda—one by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, and the other two marked "A" and "B" by General Macready. Wilson's memorandum fully agreed with those sent by Macready urging martial law and new reinforcements.141 Memorandum "A" by the Commander-in-Chief, the Forces in Ireland, discussed the possibility of reinforcing the Irish military command with some 20 battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry and also armoured cars, wireless personnel and aeroplanes, should the Cabinet go all-out against the I.R.A.142 Macready again explained the strain upon his troops because of insufficient numbers, and how he would position reinforcements in the event that the Government decided for martial law throughout the 26

140C.P. 2964 (f.427a).

141C.P. 2965, Memorandum by Sir Henry Wilson, 24 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/f. 428); also see Sir Henry Wilson's Diaries (May and June, 1921) in Callwell, II, 289-94.

142Memorandum "A" by General Macready, 23 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/ff. 428-428a).
Southern counties. However, even with these reinforcements, he could not guarantee victory by the end of September. Seven battalions and three cavalry regiments were to be placed in Munster under the 6th Division (Cork), nine battalions posted to the 5th Division (Curragh) and four battalions to the Dublin District Command.

Earlier, on March 28th, the British commander had expressed similar concern. At that time the Army in Ireland had nearly reached its greatest numbers—45,294 out of a provisional establishment of 47,810.143 The police in Ireland were also reaching their peak between late February, 1921, and January, 1922, with approximately a 14,000 man regular force R.I.C. of which some 6,000 were Black and Tans or new recruits, 1500 in the Auxiliary Division of the R.I.C. and 1100 in the Dublin Metropolitan Police.144 Together these forces totaled nearly 62,000 men at the end of March,145 but Macready's memo on March 28th also explained that some 5333 soldiers were to be discharged on March 31st, while another 5715 were not

143 Memorandum by General Macready, "Reinforcements for the Army in Ireland", 28 March 1921 (S.J.A./C.O. 904/188/2).

144 "Weekly Surveys": C.P. 2605, 14 February 1921 (Cab. 24/120/ff. 45-46) and C.P. 3605, 11 January 1922 (Cab. 24/132/ff. 24-25). See Holt (p. 216) and O'Connor (Vol. II, p. 329) for the number of Black and Tans. Bennett's figure of 7000 (p. 15) is a little high. In the Commons' Debates, Sir Hamar Greenwood listed 2193 resignations from the R.I.C. in the 12 months ending 28 February 1921. Assuming most of them were not new recruits and subtracting this total from the 9700 R.I.C. listed by Holt (p. 200) for March, 1920, I calculate the number of Regular R.I.C. at just under 8000 in early 1921.

145 F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (pp. 414-15) comes closest to these figures maintaining that in 1921 there were less than 65,000 forces (15,000 police and 50,000 soldiers) in Ireland. A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (p. 155) also comes fairly close estimating there were 60,000 total forces in Ireland. However, he believed that only 10,000 of them were police.
actually present for duty—being on courses, sick, absent, etc. 146

Macready's second memorandum, labelled "B", was in response
to earlier solicitation of his view on the state of morale within
his command. 147 He explained: "While the rank and file are in no
way discontented, there is a feeling among them that their efforts
and the danger which hourly besets them are not appreciated by
people in Great Britain...." As regards the officers, the strain
upon them from the junior to the highest is incomparably greater
than it would be in time of actual war." Macready's view is indica-
tive of both the military's reluctance to consider guerrilla activity
as being actual war and of the frustration that results from not
being solidly supported by the home population. Such was also to
be the case with regard to the American involvement in Vietnam.
Macready concluded the memo by urging that present fighting must be
ended by October, 1921, or "steps must be taken to relieve practically
the whole of the troops together with the great majority of the
commanders and their staffs."

After considering the memoranda by Worthington-Evans, Sir Henry
Wilson and Macready, the Cabinet concluded that available reinforce-
ments should be sent to Ireland as quickly as possible—for use in
the event that Crown Colony Government was established and the martial
law area extended on July 14. 148 The actual size of the forces was
to be considered by the War and Air Secretaries, first Lord of the

146 S.J.A./C.O. 904/188/2.
147 Memorandum "B" by General Macready, 23 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/ff. 429-50).
Admiralty, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief, the Forces in Ireland, and then forwarded to the Irish Situation Committee, then being reconstituted after having lapsed in August, 1921. The Committee was instructed to consider the extent of martial law in the South while Dublin Castle was told to prepare for both Crown Colony Government and increased martial law. The Cabinet also agreed that—in view of the Craig-DeValera meeting the Prime Minister should explain British policy to Sir James Craig in the hope of avoiding placing the "British Government in the position of having to reject joint proposals made by leaders of two parts of Ireland."149

Guidelines for the talks with Craig were laid down the next day.150 First, there were to be no separate Army, Navy, or Air Force for Ireland, and Irish harbors and creeks were to continue under British authority. Secondly, some Irish contribution toward expenditures of an Imperial nature was essential to help defray the costs of the World War and defense of Ireland in the future. Lastly, custom duties would not be allowed on products originating in Britain. To the conclusions of this meeting, Cabinet Secretary Hankey attached a note on 30 May. The note recorded the dissent of Montagu, Churchill, and Fisher regarding the impossibility of Irish Duties on British goods.151 In the area of defense, however, the trio was in accord with other members.

149Ibid., 41/21/4, 24 May 1921 (Cab. 23/25/f. 289).

150Ibid., 42/21/2, 25 May 1921 (Cab. 23/25/ff. 293-94).

151Note by Hankey, 30 May 1921, attached to Cab. Concl. 42/21/2 (f. 294).
The Irish Situation Committee which was directed by the Cabinet to be reconstituted on May 24th, consisted of Austen Chamberlain in the Chair, Worthington-Evans, Balfour and five Liberals—Shortt, Churchill, Fisher, and Greenwood and Montagu. Meeting on 27 May, it recommended that martial law be proclaimed at once in all 26 Southern counties in July in place of authorized reprisals should the Southern Parliament not function; reinforcement of the military with 16-18 battalions of infantry and two-three cavalry regiments; and cooperation of the Admiralty as well as the Air Force with General Macready, including the possibility of using one or more battalions of Marines. Each infantry battalion and cavalry regiment would consist of 400-600 men or a total reinforcement of slightly more than 10,000 for July, 1921. This would have meant a force of over 70,000 in Ireland by the Summer of 1921, but not quite the approximation of 80,000 suggested by General Macready. It is interesting to note that this force might have reached 150,000 men had negotiations broken down in December, 1921, at the time of the treaty. The Royal Air Force in Ireland was always small, but its use had been suggested by Lord Middleton on 8 March 1921. The Cabinet then decided that the use of aeroplanes would

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152 C.P. 2971, Irish Situation Committee, 25 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/ff. 449). While this document omits India Secretary Montagu’s name, Cab. 41/21/Ap. 26 May 1921 (Cab. 23/25/ff. 291) suggests that he was also a member (see Appendix VI).

153 C.P. 2983, Irish Situation Committee Report, 27 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/ff. 556-60).

154 Macready, II, 562.

155 Ibid.

156 Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 55.
be subject to the Prime Minister's approval.\footnote{157} It is doubtful whether the R.A.F. ever fired a shot during the Anglo-Irish War, but it did cooperate with the Army in communications, searches, and in dropping propaganda leaflets.\footnote{158}

Dr. Christopher Addison, who had increasingly been under fire from Conservatives, particularly in June 1921, circulated a memo at the end of May referring to the "authorized reprisals" and emphasizing that additional forces should use orderly procedures.\footnote{159} That day, another memo entitled "Internment of Irish Rebels", was circulated by Worthington-Evans explaining that Macready had urged accommodations for 2,000 Irish internees to be established in England at the empty Portland Prison since facilities in Ireland were exhausted.\footnote{160} The War Secretary supported this request and declared that internees were not really prisoners of war, but rebels; therefore, they could be interned in a civil prison. By late May 1921, 3,054 persons had been interned out of a total of 3,328 to that date during the conflict,\footnote{161} and Macready obviously had plans for many more.

In late May, as elections in Ireland and the Cabinet decision for reinforcement took place, I.R.A. activity also intensified.

\footnote{157}{Cab. Concl. 15/21/1, 24 March 1921 (Cab. 23/24/f. 193).}
\footnote{158}{Captain J. C. Kelly-Rogers Obe Fraes, "Aviation in Ireland 1784-1922", Eire-Ireland, Vol. I, No. 2 (Summer, 1971), 13-16.}
\footnote{159}{C.P. 2999, Memorandum by Addison, 31 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/ff. 612-13).}
\footnote{160}{C.P. 2996, Memorandum by Worthington-Evans, 31 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/f. 607).}
\footnote{161}{C.P. 2977, G.O.C.I.C. Report, 23 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/f. 486).}
reaching the level of March, 1921. Symbolically if not militarily, its most significant action was the successful burning of the Custon House along the River Liffey—the finest of Dublin's eighteenth century buildings. It burned for more than a week and along with Sinn Fein's election victory served notice to Britain that to continue the reconquering of Ireland would be an ugly ordeal.

The Spring of 1921 saw the reopening of I.R.A. activity in England. In November, 1920, some Liverpool warehouses had been set aflame. Now signal boxes, telephone lines and buildings were destroyed, and the assassination of Cabinet Ministers was considered. That the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues feared for their lives is attested to by such close sources as Lloyd George's private secretary, Frances Stevenson; Sir Henry Robinson, local Government Board of Ireland; and Maurice Hankey, Cabinet Secretary. Both Miss Stevenson and Robinson spoke of the Prime Minister's fright one weekend on discovering some I.R.A. slogans on the grounds of his home at Chequers. Greenwood, however, according to Hankey, was not so nervous over such threats. Their respective reactions may perhaps indicate something of the personality characteristics of the two ministers—the sensitiveness and

162 Ibid., (f. 484).
163 Bennett, pp. 173-76; Holt, pp. 250-52.
164 Younger, p. 135.
166 Roskill, p. 190.
nervous instability of the Prime Minister as contrasted with the insensitive, bull-headed Chief Secretary.

The Cabinet assembled on June 2 to consider the report of the Irish Situation Committee chaired by Chamberlain and the memoranda by Addison and Worthington-Evans. A very large number of ministers—sixteen—were present to stamp their agreement on the committee's report, including martial law in the South, reinforcements as early as possible at the rate of two battalions a week, and Naval and Marine cooperation with the military in Ireland. However, the Cabinet also stipulated that in administering martial law, Macready should remain "under the general directions of the Chief Secretary for Ireland, who, as the minister of the Crown responsible for defending the policy of the Government in Parliament, must approve all Proclamations and Regulations...." The precise language of this understanding was to be arranged by the Irish and War Secretaries. Greenwood was also authorized to demand an immediate end to reprisals in the martial law area now established, and the Cabinet stated that "internees should continue to be interned in Ireland."

The decision to put the military in Ireland under the control of the Chief Secretary instead of bringing all forces—R.I.C. and Auxiliaries—under Macready and the War Office was consistent with Lloyd George's policy throughout, though at variance with the idea of martial law. The policy of force and appeasement, and later even of limited war, always stopped short of full military control, because Lloyd George wanted to be in full control when the moment

should arrive for negotiations. He expressed resentment against Macready's "animus against the police" and stated: "The Irish job was a policeman's job supported by the military and vice-versa."168 Of Sir Henry Wilson, Lloyd George said: "He feels intensely on Ireland and I can never get a sane discussion with him."169 Both Churchill and Greenwood were critical of authorized reprisals. Their concern represents a reversal, as it was Macready who in 1920 and early 1921 was critical of unofficial reprisals by Black and Tans and Auxiliaries.

On 2 June the Cabinet was aware of the question asked by Colonel Guinness in the Commons: "How can you quell a rebellion by burning a farmer's house worth £800 when he can burn a landlord's mansion worth £20,000?"170 While Greenwood, like Lloyd George, was now adamant about the cessation of reprisals, he still had trouble discussing them honestly in the Commons. On 28 April he again defended the discipline of British forces and suggested that until 21 November 1920 there had not been any British indiscipline; however, on 21 February 1921 he had said that reprisals began after Balbriggan, 20 September 1920.171 Similarly, on 26 May and 1 June of 1921, he had difficulty in squarely facing the issue of reprisals, especially when confronted by Commander Kenworthy, 172

168Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 73.

169Ibid. This statement was much kinder than what Wilson privately wrote in his diary about the P.M. and Cabinet: "A truly amazing Cabinet. A more hopeless, ignorant, useless lot of men I have never seen." (See Wilson's Diaries, 31 May 1921, in Callwell, II, 293).

170Debates, Commons, 142 (1 June 1921), col. 1160-65; Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 72.

171Debates, Commons, 141 (28 April 1921), col. 437-38; 138 (21 February 1921), col. 639.

172Ibid., 142 (26 May and 1 June 1921), cols. 285-86, 1187.
the M.P. whom Macready wanted to be "induced to visit Ireland, where he almost certainly would be murdered." It is interesting to note that in the Spring of 1921 when Macready's view was hardening, Greenwood was slowly changing his attitude on reprisals along with Lloyd George. During the last half of 1921 he was to defend an entirely different Irish policy in the Commons—that of conciliation.

3. The Truce: Lloyd George and the Reversal of Policy

"The high-water mark of repression," as Keith Middlemas, editor of Tom Jones' Diary points out, came in the first half of June, 1921—prior to both the Irish Situation Committee meeting on June 15 and the King's speech on the 22nd. While the high point was not reached until June, the beginnings of appeasement date much earlier. The rift in the Cabinet on May 12th is particularly important, but it did not occur until after the frustration of more than a year of actual guerrilla warfare. Until then, peace proposals were regarded as untimely.

The Opposition—Liberals and Laborites—kept their views before the public, and by the Spring of 1921 the revulsion of public opinion in Britain and elsewhere was widespread. Similarly, a loosely-united 'Peace Movement' of educated people was becoming increasingly vocal. Welshmen and Southern Irish businessmen were also urging conciliation on the Prime Minister. Andrew Jameson, Irish Business

173 Macready to Greenwood, 19 March 1921, forwarded to Miss Stevenson, 21 March 1921 (L.G.P./F/362/18).
174 Middlemas in Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 74.
175 See Chapter IV, pp. 155-78.
leader, was instrumental in securing permission from the Dail to show its letters of 6 April and 2 May 1921 to Lloyd George who had asked for them.\footnote{See correspondence between L.G. and Jameson, 10, 12 and 28 May 1921 (L.G.P./F/96/1/33, 54, 39).} Five Coalition Liberals—several of whom had spoken out earlier—now expressed their preference for negotiation, and Greenwood had acknowledged DeValera's ability to lead Sinn Fein. Even Macready and Sir Henry Wilson now expressed doubts as to whether complete martial law in the South would succeed. Wilson explained the need for having English public opinion on the Government's side and for granting a free hand to the commander in Ireland.\footnote{Sir Henry Wilson's Diaries (9 June 1921), in Callwell, II, 295-96.} By June 22 he and Worthington-Evans were dubious about the chance for success.\footnote{Ibid., 22 June 1921, p. 296.} Macready and a number of senior officers in the martial law area were also coming to the conclusion that coercion would fail.\footnote{Macready to Miss Stevenson, 20 June 1921 (L.G.P./F/30/2/18).}

The choice before the Government was clearly to oppose Sinn Fein with all-out force or attempt to negotiate a settlement. This, according to Churchill was the "Irish Spectre—horrid and inexorcizable."\footnote{W. S. Churchill, pp. 289-90.} At the Situation Committee meeting on June 15, Macready stated that "if coercion is to succeed at all it can only succeed by being applied with the utmost thoroughness.... He made no concealment of his own personal belief (shared by John Anderson) that the policy of coercion will not succeed, but will instead
this country in the mire'.... It must be all-out or another policy." If the Cabinet were to go all the way, Macready needed instructions by July 5th in order to implement them on the 14th. Going all-out, however, was not an easy decision for the Committee. Churchill and Montagu had ceased attending and Fisher was absent that day. In addition to Ireland, Churchill still resented having been passed over for the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, while Montagu differed with Lloyd George over the policy toward Greece. In fact, a general plot against the Prime Minister was developing among Churchill, Birkenhead, and Beaverbrook, but it failed to materialize when Bonar Law absolutely refused to oppose Lloyd George. The Cabinet Committee, nevertheless, was willing to go to great lengths.

The intervention on June 14th of Jan C. Smuts, South African leader and former British War Cabinet Minister, changed the entire situation. Calling the Irish situation an "unmeasured calamity" and a "negation of the principles of government which we have professed as the basis of Empire," Smuts believed correctly that a promise of Dominion status by the King in his speech at the opening of the Ulster Parliament would create an atmosphere favorable to peace.

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181 Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 76-77. Official Cabinet Conclusions were not kept for this "secret" meeting (see A. Chamberlain to L.G., 15 June 1921, cited in Lord Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George (New York, 1963), pp. 275-76.

182 Middlemas in Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 76.

183 Beaverbrook, pp. 30-40.

since Ulster had already been excluded.\textsuperscript{185} The earlier suggestion of a Dominion offer by some young Oxford dons may have influenced Smuts to act.\textsuperscript{186} He knew firsthand the trials of guerrilla warfare and recognized that public opinion was ripe for a solution. Also, the South African leaders had been urged to intervene by such prominent Irishmen as Art O'Brien of the Irish Self-Determination League, Tom Casement, Sir Horace Plunkett and Lady Courtneym.\textsuperscript{187} Landing in London on June 11 to attend the Imperial Conference, he dined with the King two days later and found him preoccupied with the forthcoming opening of the Northern Ireland Parliament. George V regarded himself as protector not only of his English subjects but of his Irish ones as well. Regarding the Irish situation, the King's views were expressed in a letter from his personal secretary, Lord Stamfordham, to Greenwood in May, 1921:

\begin{quote}
The king does ask himself and he asks you, if this policy of reprisals is to be continued and, if so, to where will it lead Ireland and us all? It seems to His Majesty that in punishing the guilty we are inflicting punishment - no less severe on the innocent.\textsuperscript{188}
\end{quote}

Smuts had suggested that the King take the opportunity to deliver a speech of reconciliation. Hence he was asked to present the draft "declaration" to the Prime Minister.

Forwarded to Lloyd George, Smuts' cover letter, "a scorching indictment", accompanied a five sentence long draft declaration

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{185}Smuts to L.G., 14 June 1921 (L.G.P./F/49/9/48).
\textsuperscript{186}Middlemas in Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 71.
\textsuperscript{187}Ibid., p. 74; Hancock, Smuts, II, 50-51.
\textsuperscript{188}Nicolson, p. 347.
\end{flushleft}
expressing his political philosophy and experience and calling for reconciliation with Ireland as a whole.\textsuperscript{189} Handled to Sir Edward Grigg, personal secretary to the Prime Minister, it was discussed by the Irish Situation Committee on June 16.\textsuperscript{190} As neither Smuts' draft nor one by Sir James Craig was totally acceptable, Balfour prepared a new one. A meeting at 6:45 p.m. the next day, attended by Lloyd George, Chamberlain, Balfour, Greenwood, Smuts, Grigg and Secretary Hankey, considered new draft speeches by both Balfour and Grigg.\textsuperscript{191} The Prime Minister expressed agreement with the committee recommendation the previous day that the King's Speech should be an "Imperial Message". As the early portion of Grigg's draft contained a personal element "calculated to appeal to Irish sentiment", the meeting agreed it should precede Balfour's, and Grigg retired to redraft another.

With regard to conferring Dominion Home Rule on Ireland, Lloyd George had strong objections because it would enable Southern Ireland to levy customs duties against Britain and have its own Army and Navy. Although Dominion status had been suggested many times and was acceptable to many Englishmen, geographical considerations were still foremost in his mind. The conference agreed to submit Grigg's redraft to the King and propose that instead of the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary accompany him to Northern Ireland as minister in attendance. It also directed the Chief Secretary to notify Craig,

\textsuperscript{189}Hancock, Smuts, II, 52-53; Declaration drafted by Smuts (L.G.P./F/45/9/48).

\textsuperscript{190}Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 75-76.

\textsuperscript{191}Conclusions of a Meeting, 17 June 1921 (L.G.P./F/181/2/2); also see Cab. 27/107.
the Northern Prime Minister, of the decision. It was Craig who had first proposed that the King open the new Parliament in Belfast.192

On the 18th of June Lloyd George went to Windsor to present the new draft to George V. As finally adopted by the Premier—without consulting the entire Cabinet193—the speech was considerably longer than Smuts' declaration, but embodied his original ideas. Along with Smuts, Grigg, and Stamfordham, Wickham Steed of the Times and Lionel Curtis of the Round Table were also instrumental in gaining Lloyd George's approval of the final draft. 194 The King left Holyhead and arrived in Belfast on the 22nd to give the following message:

The eyes of the whole Empire are on Ireland today—that Empire in which so many nations and races have come together.... I speak from a full heart when I pray that my coming to Ireland today may prove to be the first step towards an end of strife amongst her people whatever their race or creed.... It is my earnest desire that in Southern Ireland too, there may...take place a parallel to what is now passing in this Hall....195

The speech was well received and had tremendous impact on public officials and opinion both in Ireland and Britain. As Harold Nicolson writes: "The Cabinet and the public were grateful to the King for having ventured, at so troubled a time, to drive with the Queen beside him through the streets of Belfast."196 Lloyd George, who

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192Craig to L.G., 22 March 1921 (L.G.P./F/11/3/1).
193Scott, Political Diaries (13 July 1921), p. 391.
194Middlemas in Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 77-78.
195Draft of the King's Speech to the Ulster Parliament, 18 June 1921, as approved for submission to the King (L.G.P./F/181/22); also see King’s Speech in C.P. 3351 Revise, 22 June 1921 (Cab. 23/128/ff. 148a-149).
196Nicolson, p. 352.
had objected to Dominion Home Rule on the 17th, congratulated the King on his speech and prepared to consult the Cabinet about negotiations.\textsuperscript{197} Similarly, Birkenhead, who in the Lords had resisted expansion of the 1920 Act only the day before, was now willing to reconsider.\textsuperscript{198} The Cabinet which met on 24 June was almost completely in reverse opinion to that which had met in late May. Several ministers—Greenwood, Chamberlain, Shortt, Worthington-Evans, and Balfour along with Anderson, Cope and Smuts—gathered with Lloyd George early at 4:30 p.m. and the entire Cabinet was summoned for 6 p.m.\textsuperscript{199} The tone of the meeting was conciliatory and the impact of the King's Speech was obvious. Having received reports that DeValera would negotiate, Lloyd George proposed to send invitations to confer both to him and to Sir James Craig, carefully noting that a refusal "would strengthen our position when we come to set up Crown Colony Government and martial law." The letters were being drafted without mention of prescribed terms, including cessation of fighting, and were to be carried to Ireland by Cope. Balfour and Chamberlain were critical of the "gush!" in the letter while Curzon and Montagu felt the "Celtic touch" should be included. Churchill declared: "I am ready to go on with the policy of coercion so long as they challenge us in our vital interests, but I am not prepared to go on with repression if the financial question is the only outstanding one." This view is indicative of the

\textsuperscript{197}C.P. 3331 Revise, The Prime Minister's Message to the King, late June, 1921 (Cab. 23/128/f. 149).

\textsuperscript{198}Birkenhead, p. 352.

\textsuperscript{199}Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 79-81.
majority in the Cabinet who agreed to the Prime Minister sending
the letters at the earliest possible date and announcing the fact
publicly at the opportune time.\textsuperscript{200}

On June 24, two identical letters were sent simultaneously by
Lloyd George to Sir James Craig and Mr. DeValera, "chosen leader
of the great majority in Southern Ireland", inviting them to a
conference in London on the possibility of an Irish settlement.\textsuperscript{201}
Published soon after Cope's arrival in Dublin, these letters aston-
ished World opinion as Lloyd George had continually promised to
hunt down the 'murder gang'.\textsuperscript{202} Largely responsible for the reversal
of policy was Andy Cope, who had not only prepared the way for more
than a year, but had also secured DeValera's immediate release after
his unexpected capture on June 22nd.\textsuperscript{203}

The question immediately arises as to why in June, 1921, Lloyd
George changed his mind and suddenly sought peace.\textsuperscript{204} Four things
are clear. First, the price of military conquest—of 10,000-20,000
and perhaps even 100,000 additional troops—was simply too high a
price to pay, as reservations by Sir Henry Wilson and General Mac-
ready indicated. Secondly, the revulsion of public opinion and the
growth of protest against the Government's Irish policy was substan-

\textsuperscript{200} Cab. Concl. 53/21/1, 24 June 1921 (Cab.23/26/ff. 85-86).

\textsuperscript{201} L.G. to Craig and DeValera, 24 June 1921 (L.G.P./F/11/3/8
L.G.P./F/14/6/3); also see C.P. 3331 Revise.

\textsuperscript{202} Birkenhead, p. 370.

\textsuperscript{203} Wheeler-Bennett, p. 78; Macready II, 492-93.

\textsuperscript{204} See discussion in W.S. Churchill, pp. 290-94; David W. Savage,
"The Parnell of Wales has become the Chamberlain of England: Lloyd
tial, as the Prime Minister had been warned throughout the Spring of 1921 by Coalition Liberals. Thirdly, the support of the Irish people for Sinn Fein was now obvious, as Lionel Curtis and others reminded him. Yet "all of these pressures and tendencies might have remained subliminal but for the spark of an event"—the reception given to the King's speech. 205 This fourth factor, a catalytic one, produced a sudden and almost complete reversal of policy—one not really opposed at this time by Conservatives in the Cabinet. In fact, Birkenhead, Curzon, Horne, Chamberlain, and Balfour had all agreed to the invitation on June 24th. Lloyd George's strength in the Conservative Party lay "at the very top"—a circumstance that was due to his charisma, and at this time he had not yet become a prisoner of the Coalition. 206 Also the Conservative Party, like Lloyd George himself, had transformed its attitude towards Ireland. 207 This resulted not only from new Conservative leadership, but also from the experience of two and a half years of limited war in Ireland. Nevertheless, the reversal of Irish policy would eventually break the coalition and lose Lloyd George the support of conservative members. 208 Of secondary value, but nonetheless important, an offer of appeasement would propitiate opinion in the Dominions and in the United States, with whom Lloyd George was soon to negotiate regarding naval parity. 209


208 See Beaverbrook, pp. 82-123.

By raising the peace hopes of people everywhere, Lloyd George attempted to place responsibility for a breakdown upon the Irish. Sir James Craig replied to Lloyd George on June 26, and on the 28th accepted the invitation to a conference in London. DeValera also replied on the 28th, stating he desired a lasting peace, but could not see it being accomplished if Britain denied Ireland's "essential unity" and right of "national self-determination". Rather than accept the offer by Lloyd George at that time, DeValera invited Craig, the Earl of Midleton, Sir Maurice E. Dockrell, Sir Robert H. Woods and Andrew Jameson to first confer with him in Dublin. While the others accepted the invitation, Craig refused, stating he had already accepted Lloyd George's invitation. DeValera regretfully replied to Craig on the 29th stating that Irish differences should be settled on Irish soil. Both Irish leaders wished to avoid compromising their positions: had Craig gone to Dublin he would in effect have recognized DeValera's claim to be President of the whole of Ireland; and, similarly, if DeValera had accepted Lloyd George's terms as they stood, he would have acknowledged Craig's equality and thus the partition of Ireland.

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210 Craig to L.G., 26 and 28 June 1921 (L.G.P./F/11/3/9 and 10); also see C.P. 3331 Revise.

211 DeValera to L.G., 28 June 1921 (L.G.P./F/14/6/4); also see C.P. 3331 Revise.

212 DeValera to five leading Irishmen, 28 June 1921 (C.P. 3331 Revise).

213 Telegram from Craig to DeValera (C.P. 3331 Revise).

214 DeValera to Craig, 29 June 1921 (C.P. 3331 Revise).

215 Hancock, *Smuts*, II, 55.
Meanwhile, the Cabinet postponed decision about creating a New Defense Force of thirty battalions in the event of hostilities being resumed. They wanted to await DeValera's decision regarding a London conference with the Prime Minister. While waiting, Arthur Griffith, E. J. Duggan, Robert Barton and two other Sinn Feiners were released by the Administration in Ireland as a display of goodwill. In reaching this decision, Sir John Anderson and Smuts had been more instrumental than the Chief Secretary, who was still reluctant to compromise with Sinn Fein.

On July 4th, the Dublin Conference, called by DeValera to discuss Lloyd George's proposal, met with four Unionists in attendance. DeValera explained he could not meet with Craig in London and that any acceptance must be worded "to convey to the whole world that an invitation was accepted by those representing the Irish nation to a conference with those representing the British nation." Lord Midleton suggested a truce as a prerequisite to negotiating a peace and was supported by the other Unionists. They privately believed that after a truce was granted "the general sentiment of the country will make it impossible for Mr. DeValera to get out of negotiating or to order the resumption of hostilities." Midleton regarded DeValera as an "uncompromising fanatic" and forwarded his conclusions about

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216 Cab. Concl. 55/21/2, 29 June 1921 (Cab.23/26/f. 93).
217 Anderson to Greenwood, 30 June 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/5/8); Smuts to L.G., 1 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/45/9/49).
218 Report, dated 25 June 1921, forwarded to Miss Stevenson on 29 June 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/5/7).
219 Memorandum of the Dublin Conference, 4 July 1921, forwarded to the P.M. (L.G.P./F/181/2/3).
220 Ibid.; also see Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 84.
the meeting to Lloyd George.\textsuperscript{221}

Smuts again journeyed to Dublin on 5 July to confer with De-Valera and returned to an Irish Situation Committee Conference on Ireland the next day. Smuts explained to the Cabinet he had told the Irish leaders that a conference without Ulster was the way to reach the settlement and that a refusal to meet with the British leaders would alienate public opinion and thereby place the "onus of failure" on them.\textsuperscript{222} Subsequently, Sinn Fein decided to take the subject up again with Southern Unionists. Smuts further called the Irish leaders "small men, rather like sporadic leaders thrown up in a labour strike", who believed they could still gain a Republic. While they expressed a willingness to limit their demands for a Republic, they would not agree to be bound by limitation under a Dominion solution.

Macready, Tudor and Anderson were also questioned during the Cabinet meeting. Macready explained that—apart from injuring the Intelligence Service and giving the enemy time to regroup—an open and formal truce would not be difficult militarily. Smuts' impression was that the Irish leaders could be placated with phrases and that they should first be allowed to "talk themselves out". Lloyd George subsequently whispered to Balfour: "Like we used to do with Aristide Briand (French Foreign Minister) until he was faint and prostrate."\textsuperscript{223} The committee agreed to meet Southerners, apart

\textsuperscript{221} Dublin Conference, Conclusions by Lord Midleton, 4 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/181/2/3).

\textsuperscript{222} Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 82-85.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., p. 85.
from the Northern leaders, and Lloyd George was to check to see if Craig had any objections. Throughout the recent meetings Balfour had proved to be the most irreconcilable of the ministers.

On July 7th Lloyd George wrote to Midleton—who was to attend another Dublin Conference of Sinn Feiners and Southern Unionists on the 8th—informing him that the British Government would order a cessation of all violence upon receiving word of DeValera’s willingness to confer.224 Midleton also received word from General Macready on the 8th about the specifics of a truce in the event of an agreement.225 These terms had been discussed with General Boyd, commanding the Dublin District, with General Tudor and with Cope. Later that day, a courier returned to Macready with alternatives proposed by DeValera.226 Knowing that Midleton or someone else would cross that evening to England, Macready went directly to the Mansion House Conference. The terms as agreed upon by Macready, Arthur Griffith and DeValera were outlined in a letter from Macready to Midleton.227 DeValera’s long-awaited reply to Lloyd George came on July 8 when he accepted the invitation to meet with the British Prime Minister.228 As Miss Stevenson records in her diary, Macready had also called Lloyd George at Chequers to

224L.G. to Midleton, 7 July 1921 (C.P. 3331 Revise).
225Macready, II, 571.
226Ibid., p. 572.
227Macready to Midleton, 8 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/36/2/20).
228DeValera to L.G., 8 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/14/6/5); also see C.P. 3331 Revise.
inform him of the truce, and on the 9th the specifications were received in London in the form of a telegram. Next day Lloyd George acknowledged DeValera's letter and the Irish leader announced he would arrive in London on the 12th.

On the 9th of July Macready forwarded the amended draft of the truce to the Prime Minister along with enclosures of the original terms sent to Lord Midleton and notes of an interview with Barton and Duggan on the 9th regarding the arrangements of the truce. Barton and Duggan accompanied Cope to see Macready and set the final wording of the document. Cope agreed that Police and Auxiliary recruits were to be kept in England for the present to help reduce tensions. After a number of minor changes in the wording, the terms of the armistice were:

On behalf of the British Army it was agreed:

1. No incoming troops, R.I.C., and Auxiliary Police and munitions except maintenance drafts.
2. No provocative display of troops, armed or unarmed.
3. It is understood that all provisions of this truce apply to the martial law area equally with the rest of Ireland.
4. No pursuit of Irish officers or men, or war material or military stores.
5. No secret agents noting descriptions or movements, and no interference with the movements of Irish persons, military or civil, and no attempts

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229 Stevenson, Lloyd George: A Diary, pp. 226-27.
230 Telegram to Street, 9 July 1921, forwarded to L.G. by Greenwood (L.G.P./F/19/5/12).
231 L.G. to DeValera, 10 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/14/6/6) and Telegram from DeValera to L.G., 10 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/14/6/7).
232 Macready to L.G., 9 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/36/2/20).
233 Notes of Macready's interview with Duggan and Barton, 9 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/36/2/20).
to discover the haunts or habits of Irish officers and men. Note: This supposes the abandonment of curfew restrictions.

6. No pursuit or observance of lines of communication or connection.

On behalf of the Irish Army it is agreed:

(a) Attacks on Crown Forces and civilians to cease.
(b) No provocative display of forces, armed or unarmed.
(c) No interference with Government or private property.
(d) To discountenance and prevent any action likely to cause disturbance of the peace which might necessitate military interference. 234

Sir Hamar Greenwood wrote to Lloyd George on the 9th congratulating him on the success of his Irish policy and explaining that all Ireland, including the Sinn Fein Cabinet, now desired peace. 235

The truce came into effect at 12 noon on 11 July and DeValera arrived in London on the 12th to begin the long process of negotiations. 236 After an exchange of notes, the British Prime Minister and Irish President arranged to meet for the first time alone on the 14th at 4:30 p.m. 237 However, it was another three months when the Irish Conference finally got underway in October and it was not until 6 December 1921 that the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed.

To many it seemed incredible that Sinn Fein should have accepted the truce. However, to have refused would have meant a considerable loss of support from both English and Irish public opinion and

234 Terms of the Armistice, 9 July 1921 (C.P. 3331 Revise).
235 Greenwood to L.G., 9 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/5/13).
236 Ibid., 12 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/19/5/14).
237 L.G. to DeValera, DeValera to L.G., and L.G. to DeValera, 13 July 1921 (L.G.P./F/14/6/8, 9, 10).
similarly of the chance to find a basis for a conference. Also, the I.R.A. was severely strained by the ordeal of two-and-a-half years of war and—considerably short on munitions—it is absolutely clear that they could not have continued guerrilla warfare much longer. While Michael Collins believed destruction would have resulted had the truce failed, Tom Barry maintained that the I.R.A. was stronger on the eve of the truce than at any other time with many volunteers waiting as replacements. Florence O'Donoghue shows that I.R.A. strength on paper had reached 112,650 by July, 1921, though actual strength remained much as before.

British Cabinet ministers for their part could not continue the war without first attempting to appease the Irish. Involvement in an all-out war in Ireland without the support of English opinion would have been suicide, particularly at that late date. The Daily News, the Manchester Guardian, the Times, the Tablet, and the Catholic Herald all favored a cessation of hostilities as did Ireland's Freeman's Journal, the Irish Times and even the Belfast Telegraph. An all-out effort by Britain would have meant an additional 100,000 troops or more and a great increase in equipment and weaponry.

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239 Breen, p. 160.
240 Rex Taylor, p. 110; Barry, pp. 208 and 227.
241 O'Donoghue, p. 334.
242 Daily News, 2 July 1921; Manchester Guardian, 27 June 1921; Times, 23 June 1921; Tablet, 11 June 1921, p. 744; Catholic Herald, 2 July 1921, p. 6; Freeman's Journal, 11 July 1921, p. 4; Irish Times, 11 July 1921, p. 2; and Belfast Telegraph, 9 July 1921, p. 4.
Soldiers had already been fired upon by the I.R.A. Thompson submachine guns at Drumcondra in June. Had the war continued, these weapons would probably have been used by both sides on a wide scale. Also, the annual expenditures in Ireland for military and police alone were between £15 million and £20 million per annum.

Of the more than £100 million cost of administering Ireland, April 1919-June 1921, approximately one-third went for the Crown forces. Still, it is interesting to note that the War Office spent nearly twice as much to maintain British forces in Mesopotamia as it did in Ireland.

The change in England's Irish policy came reluctantly, and only after two-and-a-half years of war. As Lord Macaulay had remarked of an earlier change by England regarding Ireland: "So tardy a repentance deserved no gratitude, and it obtained none." Bonar Law once said: "Good management is the mother of good luck." It was a pity that Lloyd George had not managed the war policy as well as he did the peace policy during the last six months of 1921. While he receives acknowledgment by this writer for ending the Anglo-Irish War, it is not to be construed as implying unqualified congratulation.

---

244 J. Bowyer Bell, "The Thompson Submachine Gun In Ireland, 1921", The Irish Sword, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (Winter, 1967), 107-108.
245 C.P. 2829, 13 April 1921 (Cab. 24/122/£.113) and Debates, Commons, 143 (14 June 1921), col. 1570.
246 Debates, Commons, 143 (14 June 1921), col. 1570.
248 Simon, p. 125.
249 Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 18.
**APPENDIX I**

**Lloyd George Coalition Cabinet**  
(October/November 1919--December 1921)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prime Minister</td>
<td>D. Lloyd George (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lord Chancellor</td>
<td>Lord Birkenhead (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lord President</td>
<td>A.J. Balfour (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lord Privy Seal</td>
<td>A. Bonar Law (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chancellor of the Exchequer</td>
<td>A. Chamberlain (U), March 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Home Secretary</td>
<td>Chamberlain (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Foreign Secretary</td>
<td>Sir R. Horne (U), April 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Colonial Secretary</td>
<td>E. Shortt (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Secretary for War</td>
<td>Earl Curzon (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Secretary for India</td>
<td>Viscount Milner (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. Churchill (L), February 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Worthington-Evans (U), February 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Montagu (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Chief Secretary for Ireland</td>
<td>I. Macpherson (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir H. Greenwood (L), April 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Irish Viceroy</td>
<td>Viscount French (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Viscount Fitzalan (U), April 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. First Lord of the Admiralty</td>
<td>W. Long (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lord Lee (U), April 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Pres. of the Board of Trade</td>
<td>Sir A. Geddes (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir R. Horne (U), March 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stanley Baldwin (U), April 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Minister of Health</td>
<td>C. Addison (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir A. Mond (L), April 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Minister of Agriculture</td>
<td>Lord Lee (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir A. Griffith-Boscawen (U), April 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Pres. of the Board of Educ.</td>
<td>H. A. L. Fisher (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Minister of Munitions</td>
<td>Lord Inverforth (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry abolished, March 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Minister of Labour</td>
<td>Sir R. Horne (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Minister of Transport</td>
<td>T. Macnairasa (L), March 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir E. Geddes (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry dropped form Cabinet, November 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Minister without portfolio</td>
<td>G. Barnes (Lab.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir L. Worthington-Evans (U), April 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Addison (L), March 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry dropped from Cabinet, July 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Attorney General</td>
<td>Sir G. Hevart (L), did not officially enter the Cabinet until November 1921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

October/November 1919  
Unionists (12), Liberals (7), Labour (1), No Affiliation (1)

October/November 1919-December 1921  
Unionists (16), Liberals (11), Labour (1), No Affiliation (1)

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*Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (1970), pp. 160, 646; also see Debates, Commons, 112 (1919), p. vii. I have changed some dates listed in these works when they were in error.*
APPENDIX II*

Cabinet Committee on Ireland
(formed October 7, 1919)

1. First Lord of the Admiralty
   Walter Long (U), Chairman
   Edward Shortt (L)
2. Home Secretary
   Lord Birkenhead (U)
3. Lord Chancellor
   H. A. L. Fisher (L)
4. President of the Board of Education
   Sir L. Worthington-Evans (U)
5. Minister of Pensions
   Sir A. Geddes (U)
6. Minister of Trade
   Sir Robert Horne (U)
7. Minister of Labour
   F. G. Kellaway (L)
8. Deputy Minister of Munitions
   Viscount French (U)
9. Irish Viceroy
   Sir I. Macpherson (L)
10. Chief Secretary for Ireland

Members: Unionists (6), Liberals (4)

*Annual Register, 1919, p. 122; also see W. C. Minute 628/4, 7 October 1919 (Cab. 23/12/f.27). D. G. Boyce, Englishman and Irish Troubles, 1918-22 (1972) suggests that Shortt and Kellaway were not members while Sir Gordon Hewart, Attorney-General, was (see p. 44).
PROCEDINGS of a Court of Enquiry
assembled at Victoria Barracks, Cork

on the 16th December, 1920, and five subsequent days

by order of


Commanding 6th Division.

for the purpose of enquiring into acts of incendiarism and looting
which are reported to have occurred in Cork City on the night of
Dec. 11th/12th, and of recording their opinion as to who were the
perpetrators of the crime, and with whom the responsibility rests.

Evidence to be taken on oath.

PRESIDENT.

Lt. Infy.

MEMBERS

Major W. Parker, R.G.A.
Major H.J.D. Kerans, R.F.A.
District Inspector James Deignan, R.I.C.
[From 16th Dec. 1920].

IN ATTENDANCE.

6th. Division.

The COURT, having assembled pursuant to order, proceed to
take evidence.

*This Report of the Court of Enquiry—the 'Strickland Report'—consists
of two parts: the "Finding" of the majority and the dissenting "Military
Enquiry..." by R.I.C. District Inspector Deignan (see W.O. 35/88/Part I
of the War Office Records in the Public Record Office in London).
1. The Court has taken the evidence of 38 witnesses, (Military, Police and Civilians). Notices to attend the Court of Enquiry were issued against the following:

The Lord Mayor of Cork,
J. J. Walsh, Esq. M.P. for Cork City,
M. Roche, Esq. M.P. for Cork City, (who styles himself Liam DeRoiste, Esq. M.P. for Cork City.)

The attendance of the two first named could not be enforced as their whereabouts are unknown.
The latter declined to attend, and was escorted to the Court by an escort, but he declined to give evidence.

The City Engineer was also warned to attend but his Council refused to allow him to do so.

2. On the night of Dec. 11th, there was an Ambush of a party of the Auxiliary Division R.I.C. at Dillon's Cross, within 200 yards of Victoria Barracks, Cork. This Ambush was laid by the Rebels and resulted in the following casualties—thirteen wounded, of which one subsequently died.

This ambush in the opinion of the Court led up to the subsequent deplorable events of the night in question.

3. The Court having considered the evidence are of opinion both from the evidence of intention and from the evidence as to facts, both direct and circumstantial, that the fires at the premises of Messrs. Grant & Co. and Messrs Cash & Co. and at the Munster Arcade, and also the burning of bicycles outside the Republican Bicycle Shop were caused by the action of men of "K" Company of the Auxiliary Division, R.I.C.

The Court are of opinion that circumstantial, but not conclusive evidence exists that three members of the R.I.C. were implicated in the fire at the City Hall. The destruction by fire of other premises is all attributable to the spread of the conflagration from the primary outbursts. The extent of the subsequent destruction is considered to be largely due to the inadequacy of the Local Fire Brigade both in personnel and material.

P.T.O.
7. It is considered that the disposition and strength of the troops were appropriate to deal with any situation that was likely to arise in Cork on the night in question.

The Military and Regular Police performed their duties efficiently.

An outbreak on the scale of the night in question, in view moreover of the fact that the Company of Auxiliary Police left Barracks under their own Officers, presented the greatest difficulties to the Military Officers concerned, in as much as not only had they to consider the possibilities of rebel action, but because also it must necessarily take some time for them to realize that the majority of the Company of the Auxiliary Police had broken from the control of their own officers. The situation was unparalleled. Martial Law was not in force; and the alternative of employing armed force by the Military against an armed Auxiliary force of Police would have resulted in a conflict.

8. In view of the conduct of the majority of the Company of the Auxiliary Division, a tribute is due to those others who resisted temptation and stood by their own Officers.

9. For your information a Map of the Area concerned is attached.

Dated

Signed at Victoria Barracks, Cork, this 21st. day of December, 1920.

Lt-Col. P.H. Stapleton, C.M.G. President.
1st. Bn. Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire
Lt.Infy.

Major W. Parker, R.G.A.
Major H.J.D. Kerane, R.F.A. Members
With reference to above inquiry I regret to say I am not in agreement with all the findings of the Court.

The Court opened at Victoria Bks., Cork on 16th. instant. I did not join it, as a Member, until 18th. inst. There were 11 witnesses examined during 16th. and 17th. inst.

The rules of evidence were not observed during my time as Member of the Court.

I am not satisfied with any evidence I have heard, or read, that there was any incendiaries or looting by members of the Regular R.I.C. Constabulary.

A witness named Jervois stated emphatically he took five bottles of whiskey from an R.I.C. man who was wearing his Great Coat. He stated the R.I.C. man had the bottles in his pockets, and that there were two quart bottles and three ordinary liqueur bottles. Jervois further states that from the same R.I.C. man he took several armfuls of underclothing &c from under his Great Coat.

All the R.I.C. in Cork on the night in question have been fully accounted for by their officers who were examined and who were prepared to produce further evidence if required.

Owing to the conditions under which "K" Co. Auxiliary Division of R.I.C. had to live in Victoria

P.T.O.
Barracks at Cork, it seemed impossible for Lt. Col. Lattimer, their C.O. to properly or adequately associate with his command, and I think it rather hard to censure him on the matter.

I cannot, under any circumstances, agree to any censure being meted out to the High Authority who, as the finding points out, ordered a unit in so raw a state to an area where active operations might be expected.

21/12/20.

James Deignan, D.I.
R.I.C.

Supplementary.

The remainder of the Court have read the above statement of District Inspector Deignan but are unable to in any way alter or amend their opinion as already expressed. They are satisfied that R.P.124(g) was complied with. They also desire to put on record that a copy of the evidence of the 11 witnesses referred to was handed to District Inspector Deignan, and that he was given opportunity to have recalled any of such witnesses as he desired, but did not take advantage thereof.

Cork.
21-12-20.

F. Stapleton, Lt-Col. President.

W. Parker, Major R.G.A. Members.
H. J. Kerans, Major R.F.A.
Appendix IIIA


I concur in the opinion of the Court. There is definite evidence that burning and looting was carried out by the Auxiliary Police and that R.I.C. were concerned in looting. Civilians also were concerned in looting.

Two or three soldiers who were on duty obtained possession of drink and got drunk. There is no evidence to show that the troops were concerned in either burning or looting; there was no reason for them to have done so as no troops were concerned in the ambush and on former occasions when soldiers have been killed and wounded in the city there has been no retaliation. Certain of the witnesses who were aware in the early hours of the night that the Aux. Police were in the city or out of hand made a serious error in not reporting the matter at once to a responsible officer.

Officers of the Curfew troops did not take a sufficiently serious view of the situation and allowed it to get out of hand. The reason of this undoubtedly is that all ranks have always been told that they are to be careful to keep aloof from any actions of the police in order that the Army may not be mixed up in reprisals by the police. Further as the military had, up to the time of the Proclamation of Martial Law, no control over the Police we have practically never interfered with their actions. Had the O.C. Curfew Troops arrested any of the police there is little doubt that there would have been a fight and considerable bloodshed would have ensued. I personally accept any blame that more drastic methods were not taken in dealing with the situation.

H. W. Higginson

Cork
14.12.20

*See W.O. 39/88/Part I of the War Office Records in the Public Record Office in London.*
I have gone carefully through the whole of these proceedings, and see no reason to differ from the Court on the opinion expressed as to the perpetrators of the burnings that took place in the city of Cork on the night of the 11th-12th December.

The President and Military Members of the Court were drawn from units entirely unconnected with Cork Garrison, and I am satisfied that they carried out a very difficult and delicate investigation with tact, impartiality, and a determination to probe the matter to the utmost without any consideration as to where responsibility for the outrage might eventually be found to rest.

The reflection in the last lines of paragraph 6 may possibly be beyond the reference of the Court seeing that they were unable to take evidence from the Authorities referred to as to the reasons which instigated the despatch of such a hastily raised unit for work in the disturbed area. With this exception, I am in agreement with the opinion that was arrived at and with that expressed by the G.O.C., 6th Division.

It is to be regretted that the Police representative did not see his way to identify himself more closely with the other members of the Court, especially as the proceedings were carried out strictly in accordance with the rules laid down for the conduct of such inquiries.

While regretting that the evidence points clearly to the implication of certain members of "K" Auxiliary Company in the burnings, I am not entirely surprised that it should be so. The disciplinary code common to all Police Forces was never intended to regulate an armed force such as the Auxiliary Companies at present serving in Ireland, and that being so, the most careful selection of Company and Platoon Commanders as men who can be relied upon under any conditions to control the men under their command, is the only means by which the necessary discipline can be enforced in such an organization.

It is to be regretted that the Officer commanding the Company was not in closer touch with his men and did not live with them in barracks, even at some inconvenience to himself. It is only fair to state that other Companies of this Force who have suffered equal and even greater provocation have resisted the temptation to break the bonds of discipline, owing, doubtless, to the fact that their confidence in their officers that justice would eventually be done, enabled them to maintain a reputation worthy of the cause they serve.

Maorandy General
Commanding-in-Chief The Forces in Ireland.

G.H.Q. IRELAND.
PARKGATE, DUBLIN.
28-12-20

*See W.O. 35/88/Part I of the War Office Records in the Public Record Office in London.
APPENDIX IV

List of Irish Violence
(1 Jan. 1919-21 May 1921)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Jan 19-</th>
<th>31 Jul 20</th>
<th>1 Aug 20-</th>
<th>2 Jan 21-</th>
<th>21 May 21</th>
<th>21 May 21</th>
<th>7 Jan 22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courthouses destroyed</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIC Vacated Barracks dest.</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>523</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIC Vacated Barracks dam.</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIC Occupied Barracks dest.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIC Occupied Barracks dam.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>268</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raids on Rails</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>2568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raids on Coastguard Stat. &amp; Lighthouses</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Raids for Arms</td>
<td></td>
<td>2229</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>3162</td>
<td>3237</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policemen Killed</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policemen Wounded</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policemen Fired At., etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers Killed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers Wounded</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>347</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers Fired At., etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians Killed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians Wounded</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>1769</td>
<td>3835</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>7686</td>
<td>9039</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arrests Made For Outrages or Political Offenses
- 1850 1592 -

**This figure includes six Special Constables.
***This figure includes twelve Special Constables.
****This figure omits killings in Ulster's riots from June 1920 until 22 November 1921; twenty were killed in Londonderry and 146 in Belfast.
*****This figure omits those wounded in the Ulster riots.

See Sir Hamar Greenwood's "Weekly Surveys" for necessary computations: C.P. 2399, 27 December 1920 (C.P.24/117/f.478); 22 January 1921 (C.P.24/119/f.216); and C.P. 2977, 24 May 1921 (C.P.24/123/f.491). Also see I.O. (C.J.C. Street), The Administration of Ireland, 1920, pp. 96-100 for the period, August 1, 1920-January 1, 1921. The breakdown of figures other than totals were arrived at by subtracting from official totals.
APPENDIX V*

List of British Violence
(1 Jan. 1919 to 28 May or 18 June 1921)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January-June 1919</th>
<th>July 1920</th>
<th>Dec. 1920</th>
<th>18 June 1921</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indiscriminate murder</strong> of Irish civilians</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*<strong>Indiscriminate wounding</strong> of Irish civilians</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shops dest. &amp; damaged</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creameries dest. &amp; dam.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Factories &amp; Works</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farms Out-blds.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crops dest. &amp; damaged</td>
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<td>Halls &amp; Clubs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private Residences</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Raids on Private</td>
<td>13782</td>
<td>16494</td>
<td>32980</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Homes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrests for Pol. Offen.</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>2457</td>
<td>4830</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sentences for Pol. Off.</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>524</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Courtsmartial of Civilians</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deportation</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>376</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proclamations and Sup-pression of meetings, fairs, markets, etc.</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>(Figures impossible to compute upon so large a scale)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Attacks upon gath-erings of unarmed people</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**These figures omit the killing of members of the I.R.A. Gen. Richard Mulcahy, I.R.A. Chief of Staff, estimated 750 Irishmen died, a number of whom were not even members of the I.R.A. (See O'Connor, II, 329; Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, p. 155). Richard Bennett (pp. 188-89) estimates 700 dead from incomplete press figures, about half of them civilians. Dorothy Macardle estimated 752 killed (p. 461).

***These figures omit the wounding of members of the I.R.A. Bennett estimates 800 Irishmen were wounded (pp. 188-89) while Macardle figures 866 (p. 461). Both writers based their numbers on incomplete press figures.

*Irish Bulletin, 23-24 June 1921, pp. 2, 5-7, deposited in the Lloyd George Papers (L.G.P./F/14/6/2). These numbers vary somewhat from those given by the British for approximate dates, some of them actually being lower than those of the British.
APPENDIX VI*

Cabinet Irish Situation Committee
(formed May 25, 1921)

1. Lord Privy Seal (Chairman)       Austen Chamberlain (U)
   Edward Shortt (L)
2. Home Secretary                  Winston Churchill (L)
3. Colonial Secretary               Sir L. Worthington-Evans (U)
4. War Secretary                   Arthur Balfour (U)
5. Lord President of the Council    H. A. L. Fisher (L)
6. President of the Board of Education Sir Hamar Greenwood (L)
7. Chief Secretary for Ireland       E. Montagu
8. India Secretary

Members: Unionists (3), Liberals (5)

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*C.P. 2971, 25 May 1921 (Cab. 24/123/f.449) lists the first seven members of the committee while Cab. 41/21/Ap., 26 May 1921 (Cab. 23/25/f.291) suggests that the Liberal India Secretary, Montagu, was also a member. However, on 6 July 1921, Churchill was not considered a member of the committee and Montagu was not asked to attend (see Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 85).
PARTITION MAP: NORTHERN IRELAND AND EIRE

Area of Northern Ireland with Catholic and Republican Majority

26 counties of Eire (The Irish Republic)

Area of N. Ireland with Protestant and Unionist majority, but a 25-50% Catholic minority

Area of N. Ireland with a solid Protestant and Unionist majority and less than a 25% Catholic minority
IRELAND in 1921
TOWNS
PHYSICAL MAP OF IRELAND

- Hilly and Mountainous Areas, over 1500 Ft., seldom reaching 3000 Ft.
- Lowland Areas, between sea level and 1500 Ft.
259

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The greatest problem facing historians of the twentieth century as opposed to those of earlier times must certainly be that of selection. In writing about the Anglo-Irish War, 1919-21, the student of history confronts a formidable number of published works—references, documents, newspapers and periodicals, journals, books and articles—in addition to those more recently opened mines of unpublished manuscripts and materials in London at the Public Record Office and at the Beaverbrook Library.

Most important of the newly accessible materials available at the Public Record Office are the Cabinet Records, 1916-22, which are essential to understanding the influences on and the decisions of the Lloyd George Government and its Irish Administration. Those records used in this study include War Cabinet Minutes and Cabinet Conclusions (Cab. 23), War Cabinet and Cabinet Memoranda (Cab. 24), and records of Cabinet Committees on Ireland (Cab. 27). Since the minutes and conclusions only give summaries of decisions and often omit the positions of various Cabinet Ministers, it is necessary to augment basic Cabinet documents with Thomas Jones' recently published Whitehall Diary (3 Vols.), especially Volume III: Ireland, 1918-1925. Jones, Cabinet Assistant Secretary, carefully lays out the positions of various personalities in the Cabinet and more than anyone else reveals the mind of the Prime Minister regarding the Anglo-Irish War.

Along with Whitehall Diary the Lloyd George and Bonar Law Papers at the Beaverbrook Library indicate the attitudes and influences of the many individuals, Cabinet and otherwise, with whom
these two dominate leaders corresponded. Especially important in this regard is the Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1920-22, Sir Hamar Greenwood. The sometimes opposing posture of Irish Under-Secretary, Sir John Anderson, and other figures at Dublin Castle is pointed out not only in Cabinet Records, but also in Colonial Office Records at the P.R.O. See in particular the Sir John Anderson Papers (C.O. 904/188/1-2). In addition, the published diaries, letters, memoirs, and biographies of Sir John Anderson, Bonar Law, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, H. A. L. Fisher, Lord Hankey, King George V, Frances (Stevenson) Lloyd George, General Macready, Lord Riddell, Sir Henry Robinson, C. P. Scott, General Smuts, C. J. C. Street, and Sir Henry Wilson give important details and reflections.

To understand the personality and behavior of Lloyd George one must also look beyond the documents and institutions at the time of his Prime Ministership to his Welsh homeland and to those who have written biographies and essays about him. Prominent among these are works by Giovanni Costigan, Lord Beaverbrook, William George, Thomas Jones, Richard Lloyd George, Frances (Stevenson) Lloyd George, Kenneth O. Morgan, C. L. Mowat, Frank Owen, Albert Sylvester, A. J. P. Taylor, and Malcolm Thomson.

The Strickland Report on the burning of Cork in 1920 and related correspondence, deposited in the War Office Records (W.O. 35/88), was first discussed in my article, "The Lloyd George Government and the Strickland Report on the Burning of Cork, 1920", in Albion: Proceedings of the Conference on British Studies, and is presented in full in Appendix III of this study. Other important published sources include the Parliamentary Debates, especially
for the House of Commons, which have been fully consulted, and Parliamentary Papers, including various Bills, Acts, and Command Papers.

The many newspapers that have been used come primarily from two London libraries—the Colindale Newspaper Library of the British Museum and the Beaverbrook Library. Numerous boxes of press clippings are located at the latter in the Lloyd George Papers, Series H.

Other than Jones' *Whitehall Diary* the most important and recent work of the past decade to deal with England's part in the Anglo-Irish War is D. G. Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles* (1972), a study of the impact of public opinion in Britain. The essays by Boyce, Cuthbert, and Morgan in A. J. P. Taylor, *Lloyd George: Twelve Essays* (1971), also merit attention. Of the older, yet reliable studies of the period, Richard Bennett's *Black and Tans*, Edgar Holt's *Protest in Arms*, W. K. Hancock's *Survey of International Affairs, Vol. I: Problems of Nationality*, Dorothy Macardle's *Irish Republic*, and Frank Pakenham's *Peace By Ordeal* are indispensable. Finally, one of his most stimulating essays in recent years is Giovanni Costigan's "The Anglo-Irish Conflict, 1919-1922", *University Review* (Dublin, 1968), which sets the whole episode in perspective.
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