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THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF 1905-06:

THE FEJÉRVÁRY GOVERNMENT AND THE LAST CHANCE FOR REFORM

by

WILMER HOWARD PAINE JR.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

1972

Approved by

Peter Wagner

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We have carefully read the dissertation entitled The Hungarian Constitutional Crisis of 1905-06; The Fejervary Government and the Last Chance for Reform. submitted by Wilmer H. Paine Jr. in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and recommend its acceptance. In support of this recommendation we present the following joint statement of evaluation to be filed with the dissertation.

The Hungarian Constitutional Crisis of 1905-06 has world-wide significance. It produced the first effective Yugoslav movement leading to the establishment of a Yugoslav state; it brought, for the first time since 1867, ruler and nation in the arena, and while the king prevailed it became clear that very fundamental differences separated him from his subjects. The results of this realization were electoral reform, the much too rapid annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary, the painful negotiations of 1907-08 leading to the conviction of many that the Habsburg state will not survive either the death of Francis-Joseph of the next round of negotiations in 1917.

In spite of its significance, the Crisis has never been the subject of a monograph in a western language, and even the Hungarians have not written about it since the early 1920s. In addressing himself to the investigation of this important event, Mr. Paine used materials available in the Hoover Library, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, read the newspapers of Vienna and Budapest, and used several thousands frames of microfilm in German and Hungarian of documents ordered from the Austrian and Hungarian national archives. He also studied Hungarian Constitutional Theory, so important in the arguments of 1905-06 and applied to the events his legal findings.

The result of Mr. Paine's efforts was more than satisfactory. We have submitted his work to Dr. Péter Hanák of Budapest who is Hungary's major expert on the subject. He reported: "Mr. Paine has not only exhausted the relevant materials, but was also able to come up with new and relevant interpretations of the Constitutional Crisis that represent a serious contribution to our knowledge of the events."

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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Abendblatt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ger.</td>
<td>German</td>
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<tr>
<td>GM</td>
<td>Gemeinsame Ministerrath Konferenz. (HHSA, Ministerium des Äusseren, Politisches Archiv.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHSA</td>
<td>Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Morgenblatt</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>Neue Freie Presse, Vienna.</td>
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<tr>
<td>O.L.</td>
<td>Országos Levélár [National Archives], Budapest.</td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td>Pester Lloyd, Budapest.</td>
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<td>Ruman.</td>
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CHAPTER 1

PROBLEMS OF THE AUSGLEICH

The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, popularly known by its German name as the "Ausgleich," restored the legal sovereignty which Hungary had not enjoyed since the sixteenth century, except for a few months during the revolutionary period of 1848-49. The Ausgleich gave to Hungary full autonomy in her internal affairs under the Crown of Saint Stephen. Hungary was bound to the other lands of the Habsburg Monarch not by a mere "personal union," but rather by a "real union," because not only the person of the Monarch was held in common, but certain specified functions of state were to be exercised jointly: foreign affairs and military affairs.¹

¹The Austrian Ausgleich Law of December 21, 1867 (Reichsgesetzblatt 141) and the Hungarian Ausgleich Law (Statute 1867:XII) are not identical, and the differences sometimes led to contradiction. The two laws can be found in a convenient form in Der Österreichisch-Ungarische Ausgleich von 1867: Seine Grundlagen und Auswirkungen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1968). The appendix gives the text of the Austrian law, then the Hungarian law in Hungarian with parallel German translation, and finally the two laws printed in parallel columns arranged by subject.


The centennial of the Ausgleich has seen several collections of essays
Now in control of her own affairs, Hungary faced the problems of creating an apparatus for governing a modern state. The result was a confusion of concepts borrowed from English parliamentary custom (badly misunderstood), the romantic idealism of the Vormärz reform era and the liberal legislation of 1848, and the idolization of the national state. All of this was grafted onto a society which was still almost entirely agrarian and still semifeudal. The feudal privileges of the nobility had been abolished in 1848 along with serfdom, but no middle class or bourgeoisie in the Western sense had taken its place. Instead, the new middle class was recruited from the old class of lower nobility, and these persons found their way not into business or industry, as did the Western bourgeoisie, but instead into the civil service. The result was that no liberal, bourgeois ethic ever developed strong roots in Hungary. In its place there developed the glorification of the "historic" Hungarian "Nation."

Because Hungary's autonomy was limited to internal affairs, the nation's political life was turned inward and backward in time. With few exceptions, Hungarian politicians were little interested in foreign affairs.

---

and the power constellation of the European states. When they did concern
themselves with questions of foreign affairs, their understanding suffered
from naivete and an exaggerated sense of Hungary's significance. Thus in
the first few years of the Twentieth Century, when the European powers
were engaged in an arms race, Hungary's political leaders chose to postpone
necessary rearmament and expanded military training while seeking political
advantages which were of only secondary importance.

Political life in Hungary was almost entirely in the hands of the
lesser nobility, the "Gentry." This group, as a class, had found it in-
creasingly difficult to compete in an agrarian economy dominated by huge
estates producing for a foreign market. Kálmán Tisza, Prime Minister from
1875 to 1890, saved many of these families from financial ruin by providing
his own followers which political positions in the county and local govern-
ments. Tisza's political power depended upon the loyalty of these officials,
and with their help his Liberal Party dominated Hungarian political life,
without serious challenge, for a generation. Yet the Liberal Party never

---

3Reinert-Tárnoky, "Innenpolitik," 228. The apparent exception, Count
István Tisza, is hailed as a visionary in European power politics, yet he
showed little of this concern before the outbreak of the war in 1914. A
number of Hungarians made outstanding careers in the Austro-Hungarian diplo-
matic service, but in this way they became "Austro-Hungarians" and generally
avoided any part in the internal Hungarian political scene. Unavailable to
me was the recent study on this subject by James A. Treichel, "Hungarians
in Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Service," unpublished dissertation, George-
town University, 1971.

One notices a certain unreality in the Hungarian discussions of the
value of the supposed friendship of the German Emperor for Hungary.
had a broad following. It was not sufficiently "nationalistic" to attract
the masses in an age of nationalist fervor, and it was bound to too many
special interests. The Liberal Party, which took its name from the economic
ideals of the English party of that name, became in fact a conservative
party.

The Liberal Party was never without an "opposition," but never in the
fifty years of Dualist Hungary was the opposition able to offer any better
alternative to the policies of the dominant Liberal Party. The influence
of the opposition was totally negative, and for this reason Hungarian
political life never developed any healthy sense of shared responsibility.

The desperate feeling of frustration manifested in Hungarian political
life arose out of a recognition of numerical weakness. The 19.3 million
inhabitants of the Hungarian Kingdom represented 41% of the population of
the entire Dual Monarchy. Yet the Magyars, those persons who spoke Magyar
as a mother-tongue (or were so classified by the census taker) numbered
only 8.65 million or 45.4% of the population of the Hungarian half of the
Monarchy. Subtracting the autonomous Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia, the

4 Robert A. Kann, "Hungarian Jewry during Austria-Hungary's Constitu-
tional Period (1867-1918)," Jewish Social Studies, VII (1945), 360-63.

5 Figures taken from the 1900 Hungarian census, summarized in Kann,
The Multinational Empire, II, 299-307. Figures do not include Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which did not become part of the Habsburg Monarchy until 1908.

6 On the autonomous status of Croatia within the Hungarian kingdom,
see below, Chapter 9B, "The Resolution of Fiume."
Magyars comprised only 51.4% of the inhabitants of Hungary proper. Thus they were a bare majority even in their own homeland. The Magyar people, the Magyar race, language, and culture, were in danger of drowning in a great Slavic Sea.

Hungary's continued existence as a nation was thought to rest on one of two policies. First, Hungary might ally herself with the House of Habsburg and enjoy the security of belonging to a large empire, sharing a powerful army for defense against outside enemies and a large economic area enabling her economy to grow. The Habsburg alliance—acceptance of Dualism as the best possible course—gave to the ruling Magyar oligarchy virtual freedom of action in internal affairs, including the freedom to Magyarize the national minorities. The second alternative for Hungary was to win over the national minorities as partners. A Hungary of nearly twenty million citizens united in defense of her national liberties, it was argued, could regain her national independence from the House of Habsburg and free herself from Habsburg-German military alliances. An independent Hungary would have no ambitions against any of her neighbors, and could live in peace with no need of entangling military alliances. Such a free state would be a source of attraction for the other oppressed peoples of the Balkans.

These two courses were usually considered alternatives. Today it can be argued that the preservation of Hungary and of Austria-Hungary required both the willingness of the Magyars to continue a union with the entire Habsburg Monarchy, and the acceptance of the nationalities as full partners. Yet at the time these two courses seemed mutually contradictory. In fact,
Hungary's leaders never committed themselves wholeheartedly to either course. It is to some extent the result of their shortsighted failure that Hungary today is a tiny, semi-independent state.

The Liberal Party under the two Tiszas chose the first alternative. They allied Hungary to the House of Habsburg in accordance with the 1867 Ausgleich, yet they knew how to use the Dualist system to guarantee that Hungarian interests were not harmed so long as the Dualist structure and the prerogatives of the Monarch were not touched. Their system treated the nationalities with a mild paternalism, usually avoiding forced Magyarization, but never acknowledged the nationalities as equal partners within the Hungarian state, which was by definition the land of the Magyars.

The Independence Party, which grew out of the ideals of the lost revolution of 1848-49, traditionally supported the second alternative. They stood for national independence and for democracy. Liberation of the national minorities was long a part of their program for gaining national independence. By the turn of the century, however, a combination of economic frustration, nationalist jingoism, and political opportunism had driven into the Independence Party a new group of aristocratic landowners and certain representatives of the manufacturing and banking interests. With the ascendance of this new element, the democratic traditions of the old Independence Party were temporarily eclipsed. Only after the Independence Party collapsed in 1909 and split into two new parties did the old democratic wing re-emerge under Gyula Justh and later Count Mihály Károlyi.

In the meantime, for about a decade most Hungarian politicians, in the Independence Party and in several splinter groups which broke away from the
Liberal Party, all lost sight of both of these alternatives. Intoxicated by a vision of a Greater Hungary, they rejected the interdependence with Austria insisting upon an independent economy and a separate army. But at the same time they forgot their need for allies from the national minorities. The years 1906-09, when Hungary was governed by the Coalition of these two groups, are remembered as the period of the most ruthless and shortsighted oppression of the nationalities in Hungary.

But beyond this, the Independence Party and its aristocratic allies in the Coalition committed a third sin, the one sin for which statesmen cannot be forgiven. They destroyed the respect for the legal order. Through the years of obstructionism (1897-1904) they turned the hallowed halls of Parliament into a circus comedy act, the laughing stock of Europe. Parliament was rendered ineffective, and was once even physically ransacked, in the name of parliamentarism. The "National Resistance" conducted against the Fejérváry government went even further, calling upon local officials and private citizens to disobey the laws of the land--in the name of the highest patriotism. The bonds of society were destroyed in the name of defense of the constitution.

The political struggles in Hungary in the last two decades before the First World War seem to us exceptionally sterile, naive, and petty. Political life was without purpose or principle, because only a small part of the country's population took part in it. Only a few hundred families controlled the political system. They either held the important positions--in Parliament, the courts, the state and county administration--or else selected those who did. Beyond these few families, there was still
only a relatively small part of the population who had any part in the political process. The political life was reserved almost exclusively for Magyars, and for a few non-Magyars, mostly Jews, who had been assimilated. The non-Magyars, the "nationalities," were effectively excluded from the political process. Only token numbers from their ranks held civil service positions or were even able to exercise the right to vote. As a result, the non-Magyars showed little interest in the political process which had so little to offer them. Only in the course of the 1905 crisis, which threatened to overturn the existing political system, did the Romanians, Croats, and German "Schwaben" of the Banat region, all experience a political awakening.

While the plight of the non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary is well known, particularly because of the arguments presented after the First World War to the treaty-makers, the plight of the Magyar peasant and laboring classes is not. But the political system was just as effective in excluding representatives from the lower classes, or those who would support their interests. Hungary is the only major European country in which not a single member of a Marxist Socialist party sat in parliament before 1918. (In 1905 two deputies were elected under the name "Independent Socialist Party," but they were neither radical nor socialist, and soon became indistinguishable from the other ultranationalist deputies in the Coalition.)

The position of the Magyar peasant in the political system was slightly different from that of his non-Magyar counterpart, in that he could be persuaded that he was a member of the Magyar "Nation," hence the politicians with their impassioned appeals and crazy antics were working for his interests. He would be free when "Austrian oppression" was ended.
When we look more closely at these forgotten masses in Hungary, the peasants in the fields, the small tradesmen in the villages, or the industrial workers in the cities, we can then see how unreal it was to claim for Hungary the position of a great nation. By all statistical comparisons, Hungary ranks as one of the most backward countries of Europe. Whether we consider illiteracy, public health, housing conditions in the villages and in the cities, or yields per acre--all these comparisons illustrate Hungary's weakness in human resources. We cannot blame the Hungarians for their poverty and backwardness. But we can hold the nation's self-appointed leaders responsible for chasing the illusion of great power status and ignoring, often purposely ignoring, the fundamental needs of their people. The constitutional crisis of 1905 illustrates all too clearly the way in which the political leaders closed their eyes to the plight of their own people, and diluted the democratic ideal of universal manhood suffrage to serve their own narrow class interests.
CHAPTER 2
THE GROWTH OF THE OPPOSITION IN HUNGARY, 1897-1904

A. Economic Agreements with Austria, 1897-1902

Austria and Hungary were joined not only by the constitutional provisions pertaining to foreign and military affairs. The lands of the Habsburg Monarchy--Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia-Herzegovina\(^1\)--represented in the fullest sense an economic union.\(^2\) Goods from outside were subject to a common tariff (customs union), while within the Monarchy goods, capital and labor\(^3\) moved freely. Moreover, there was a common currency (currency union) issued by a single joint agency, the Austro-Hungarian Bank.

Before examining the difficulties plaguing the economic union of the Dual Monarchy, it should be pointed out that this represents perhaps the only significant attempt at economic integration of separate states in the half-century before the First World War. The Austro-Hungarian economic union began (1867) just as the German Zollverein was dissolved in the creation of the German Empire (1871). If the Austro-Hungarian union was less successful than the Zollverein, it is in large measure because it was more

\(^1\)Liechtenstein was a member of the customs union since 1852, and most of her tariff matters were managed by Austrian authorities.


\(^3\)The free movement of labor does not appear to have been studied in depth. Journeymen's certificates issued in one country were fully recognized by the other country, as provided for in the Tariff and Trade Agreements between the two countries. The 1907 Trade Treaty dropped this provision.
ambitious, for more factors were held in common, the economic and industrial development of Europe was at a much more advanced stage, and within the Dual Monarchy there was a far stronger resistance to economic interdependence because it tended to weaken political independence.

Ever since the reign of Maria Theresa, Hungary had been separated from the other Habsburg Crownlands by a customs barrier, which had clearly hindered the development of Hungarian industry and had forced most import and export business into Austrian hands. This situation was changed only in 1850 after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, when the customs barrier was removed, permitting goods to travel freely throughout all parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. For the first time the Habsburg lands presented a unified economic area. There was a uniform currency, "indirect taxes" and state monopolies on salt and tobacco were regulated in a uniform manner, as were such matters as weights and measures, patents, railroads, and river and coastal shipping. Austrian industrial products were provided with a large home market, while Hungarian agricultural products enjoyed an increasing demand from the growing laboring in the industrial towns of the Austrian Crownlands. At the same time Hungarian industry, starting from much more primitive beginnings, found conditions favorable for its first stage of

development. Yet whatever the economic effects of the economic unification, it was created as a result of the suppression of the Hungarian War of Independence, and this fact linked in the minds of many Hungarians with Habsburg absolutism. Even though the Hungarians traditionally favored free trade, and prior to 1848 had often pleaded for the customs barrier to be removed, it later became politically necessary for the Independence Party to demand an independent customs area.

The statesmen who created the Ausgleich were concerned primarily with guaranteeing Hungary's political sovereignty; economic matters were given relatively little attention in the Ausgleich legislation. Public opinion in Hungary still favored free trade, and the Hungarian negotiators feared that the forces in Austria calling for protective tariffs might win the upper hand, causing imported industrial products to become more expensive. For this reason the Hungarians favored maintaining the customs union with Austria, yet they turned down an Austrian suggestion for a common Tariff Parliament (on the example of the German Zollverein) on constitutional grounds. As a result of these considerations, the economic relations between the two countries were not considered "joint affairs," but instead were to be "regulated upon uniform principles to be agreed upon from time

5Hungarian historians have generally ignored the favorable economic development in Hungary during this period, concerned as they are to portray the political evils of neo-absolutism. For a favorable account, see László Révész, "Die Bedeutung des Neoabsolutismus für Ungarn," Der Donaurain, XIV (1969), 142-59.


to time."8

Most parties to the 1867 agreement probably assumed that the continued existence of the economic union was not in doubt, but that only its terms would be re-negotiated from time to time. In fact the Hungarian statute 1867:XVI, enacted at the same time as the Ausgleich Law, expressly called for the continued common customs area.9 However, when a new Tariff and Trade Agreement was negotiated between the two countries every ten years—the so-called "economic Ausgleich"—it became increasingly difficult to reach an agreement which all sides considered equitable. The growing complexity of economic relations made agreement more difficult, while at the same time it became more essential for business to be freed from a major disruption and uncertainty every ten years. The difficulties were not made any easier by the pride of the Hungarians, who were perhaps overly sensitive to any question which might appear not to give Hungary her full recognition as a sovereign power. The Austrian negotiators, on the other hand, perhaps felt that the Hungarians had already been given so much leeway that any further claims were dangerous "concessions." These attitudes probably led to honest misunderstandings in negotiating the first three Tariff and Trade Agreements. By the time the fourth Agreement was negotiated in 1897, the Hungarian opposition had learned that this could be used effectively as a political issue to embarrass the government.

In the year 1896 Hungary celebrated her Millenium. To add dignity to the national celebration, the opposition parties offered to observe a year-long political truce, known by the medieval Latin name "Treuga Dei," the "Truce of God." In 1897 the opposition returned with renewed vigor to

attack the government of Baron Dezső Bánffy, which was then concerned
with the renewal of the Tariff and Trade Agreement with Austria, the
"economic Ausgleich." The existing agreement was due to expire on the last
day of 1897. Bánffy and Finance Minister László Lukács negotiated a new
agreement with the Austrian Prime Minister Count Casimir Badeni, but before
the new Ausgleich could be ratified by either parliament, the Badeni govern-
ment was forced out of office in November 1897 as a result to the language
ordinances for Bohemia.

The Hungarian Independence Party immediately claimed that the expira-
tion of the agreement on December 31, 1897, would mean the end of the customs
union and with the first day of 1898 an independent Hungarian customs area
would come into existence. The Liberal Party feared that an independent
customs area would signify an economic catastrophe for Hungary, yet they
never questioned the legal interpretation of the Independence Party. To
counteract this eventuality, Bánffy introduced a bill in November 1897 to
extend the old economic agreement for one year if no new agreement had been
completed by the end of the year. Count Albert Apponyi, by instinct on the
side of greater national independence, was aware that the transition to
economic independence was a serious step and would require lengthy prepara-
tion, and for this reason he and his National Party sided with the govern-
ment. The bill was passed and became Hungarian statute 1898:I.10

The negotiations continued during 1898 with the new Austrian govern-
ment under Count Leo Thun. The result was agreement on the so-called "Ischl
Clause," which provided that the existing economic union (negotiated in
1887) would continue in force indefinitely until Hungarian law provided some

other stipulation. This strange agreement—which a modern Hungarian historian claims was patently illegal 11—allowed business in the two countries to continue, but gave to Hungary the right to cancel at any time. From now on pessimists in Austria called the Habsburg Monarchy a "Monarchie auf Kundigung." The Apponyi group was opposed to another extension of the old Ausgleich. Bánffy managed to force the Ischl Clause through the Hungarian Parliament despite the opposition, and it was then promulgated in Austria by imperial decree under the emergency powers known as "Paragraph 14."

Bánffy's action preserved the Ausgleich but led to mounting antagonism against him. The opposition parties renewed their tactics of obstruction in October, 1898, ostensibly against Bánffy's press bill. They managed to block passage of an annual budget and recruit bill, so that on January 1, 1899, Hungary found herself in an "ex-lex" condition, a Hungarian Latinism meaning that the government had no authorization to draft recruits, collect taxes, or to spend money. At this time István Tisza, the son of the old Prime Minister, stepped forward and proposed a policy he was later to carry through with determination. He was convinced that the obstruction of the business of Parliament was so great a danger to parliamentarism that he wanted to break the opposition by force, if necessary by violating the House rules of parliamentary procedure. On December 7, 1898, he persuaded a majority of the Hungarian House of Representatives, 234 deputies, to state in writing that they intended to vote for the government's budget bill, and only the obstruction of the opposition parties had prevented them. Tisza's

tactic can probably be defended as an emergency procedure, but the Hungarian political mentality placed such a high value on the freedom of speech in Parliament that it could tolerate obstruction even when the legitimate needs of the state were unfulfilled. Thirty-two "dissidents," led by Count Gyula Andrássy, Jr., deserted the Liberal Party in protest against Tisza's maneuver, calling it an illegal act. Then the opposition played its last card and declared that the King would have violated his coronation oath to uphold the Hungarian constitution if taxes were collected and recruits inducted during an "ex-lex" period. This was a strong argument, and because no one on the government side challenged this legal interpretation, the argument was to be used again. The opposition tactic worked, for Kálman Széll was called for an audience with the King in January 1899, and it was obvious to everyone that Bánffy was on the way out.\(^\text{12}\)

In February 1899 the government bought peace with the opposition. The opposition agreed to end its obstruction and allow the budget and recruit bills to be passed in return for Bánffy's resignation as Prime Minister and a few minor legislative reforms. At the same time a group of deputies belonging to the National Party, led by Count Albert Apponyi, crossed over from the opposition and joined the government Liberal Party. This gave added strength to the new government of Kálman Széll, but the advantage may have been more than offset by the difficulty Széll was to have controlling the personal ambitions of his new party members.\(^\text{13}\)

During the truce negotiations with the government, the opposition had been primarily interested, aside from certain guarantees pertaining to


\(^{13}\)Gratz, *A Dualizmus Kora*, I, 400-02.
"clean" elections, to make a legal claim for the establishment of an independent customs area without contradicting the 1867 Ausgleich Law. The new Prime Minister Széll found a satisfactory compromise solution in the so-called "Széll-Formula," which was enacted as Hungarian statute 1899:XXX. This act declared that since the Tariff and Trade Agreement negotiated by Bánffy and Badeni in 1897 had not been ratified by the Austrian Parliament, Austria and Hungary were from now on independent customs areas de jure, while de facto they would remain as one so long as both maintained identical customs laws.

The Széll act also placed limitations on foreign commercial treaties. No new treaties were to be concluded with foreign powers extending beyond the year 1907, in order to leave open the possibility of an economic separation between Austria and Hungary by that time.14

The Széll government (26 February 1899-16 June 1903) can be considered a success in several ways. It eased the persecution of the nationalities and restrictions on the labor unions which had been imposed by the Bánffy government. The electoral law was reformed, and in the elections of October 1901 the Liberal Party again gained seats, although when one keeps in mind the conditions under which Hungarian elections were conducted, it will be understood that election returns were not much indication of the popularity of the Széll government or of pro-Ausgleich sentiment. In the economic sphere, Széll successfully completed negotiations for a new Tariff and Trade Agreement with the Austrian government of Prime Minister Ernst

14Ibid., I, 368; Theodor von Sosnosky, Die Politik im Habsburgerreich; Randglossen zur Zeitgeschichte (2 vols.; Berlin, 1912-13), II, 124-25; Fink, Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 59-60. Each interprets this statute somewhat differently.
von Koerber, gaining more for Hungary than the Austrians had wanted to give, yet in the face of an opposition at home which wanted to prevent any Ausgleich at all. Yet the new Ausgleich, signed on New Year's Eve, 1902, hence known as the "Sylvester-Ausgleich" or the "Széll-Koerber Ausgleich," was never ratified by the Hungarian Parliament. The Hungarian opposition, with only a small number of deputies in Parliament, had been able through obstruction, clever propaganda and novel constitutional interpretations, to extort economic blackmail from the far richer Austria. If Széll managed to hold the economic union together for four years, it was clear that the issue would be raised again whenever there was a new opportunity. 15

B. The Army Bill and its Consequences, 1902-1904

The opposition chose to make its next stand on the question of army command language. The army had long represented a source of conflict between the two halves of the Monarchy. Hungarians had made known their desires for a national army long before 1848-49, but it was the events of those years, when the army of the King of Hungary was defeated by the army of the Austrian Emperor, which became the emotional source of Hungarian revulsion to the imperial army. It was the imperial army which in 1849 executed thirteen Hungarian revolutionary generals at Arad, and which governed Hungary during the subsequent years of occupation.

During the negotiations leading to the Ausgleich in 1867 the Hungarians again demanded a separate Hungarian army, but in the course of the talks it became clear that while this question could not be resolved, the more important constitutional settlement could be agreed upon. For this reason the military compromise was not worked out in detail at that time, leaving unresolved issues to arise repeatedly in the age of Dualism. 16

Paragraph 11 of the Hungarian Ausgleich Law made mention of a "Hungarian army" in an ambiguous sense.

In consequence of the constitutional sovereign rights of His Majesty, in reference to military affairs, all that which has reference to the united command, management, and internal organization of the United Army, and also of the Hungarian Army as a

complementary part of the United Army, is recognized as subject to the orders of His Majesty.

The following paragraph, however, reserved to Hungary the right to grant recruits, determine the length of service, and to provide for the maintenance of the "Hungarian army." 17 The details were worked out in the military legislation of the following year. 18 Under this legislation (Hungarian statute 1868:XL, and the corresponding act in Austria) all male citizens were subject to a twelve-year military obligation. Those recruits selected for the joint army usually served three years on active duty, and were then placed in the reserves. Another portion of recruits went into the "national guard" units, i.e., the Austrian Landwehr or the Hungarian Honvéd, for a period of two years active duty and eight years in the reserves. Although the national guard units were organized on the same pattern as the joint army and recognized the Emperor-King as Commander-in-Chief, they were largely independent of the Joint War Ministry. They were under the administration of an Austrian and a Hungarian defense ministry, and only in command matters were they a part of the total military force of the Dual Monarchy.

Those groups in Hungary desiring greater national autonomy were aware of Hungary's weak position so long as she must depend upon a military force over which Hungary had little or no control. For this reason they emphasized the role of the Honvéd, in which they saw the seeds of a truly national army. Honvéd units carried Hungarian flags and were commanded and instructed in the Magyar language (except in Croatia, where the Croat language was used). The Honvéd officers were either Hungarian officers


18 Rothenberg, "The Habsburg Army and the Nationality Problem," 76.
transferred from the joint army or old officers who had served in the Hungarian army of 1848-49. Under these circumstances the Honvéd units were not the training ground for that loyalty to the Austrian Emperor which the Hungarians found so galling in the joint army, but were rather an expression of Hungarian national feeling. The Hungarian Parliament never hesitated to grant to the Honvéd all the funds and recruits it requested, while at the same time often raised strenuous opposition to nominal increases in the appropriations and recruit levies for the joint army. For the same reason the Joint War Ministry refused to grant to the Honvéd its own artillery and service units, insisting that the national guards were not first-line troops, but second-line support troops. No one wanted ever to risk another situation like that of 1848, when the two armies of His Majesty had fought against each other.

While the Hungarians wanted a national, patriotic army subject to the control of their own government and parliament, Franz Joseph was adamant in his insistence that the command and control of the army was his prerogative alone, and was not to be shared. If the army controversies were sometimes focused on apparently trivial matters, such as the language of some sixty command phrases, the constitutional power struggle behind these surface questions was not trivial. Franz Joseph saw in the unitary command structure of his army the fundamental safeguard of the unity of his dominions. On matters which threatened the unity of the army he was unwilling to retreat an inch.

Artillery and service units for the Honvéd were finally authorized in 1912, but had not yet been brought into existence at the outbreak of the war.
The Hungarians had several grievances against the joint army. Some of these grievances were completely justified, and although they could not have been alleviated immediately, in the course of time much could have been done to reduce them. One major problem was the result of the shortage of Hungarian officers. The officer's career was not attractive to a great many Magyar youths, partly because the officer (or reserve officer) was not awarded the same high social status as his counterpart in Germany, and partly perhaps as a result of the odium of 1849. Those Magyar youths who were attracted to the officer's career were often anxious to transfer to the Honvéd as soon as possible—thus leading to a further shortage of Hungarian officers in the joint army. This explains the need for assigning many Austrian officers—most often Germans or Czechs—to Hungarian units. The "foreign" officers usually had no knowledge of the Hungarian language or of Hungarian traditions, and all too frequently made public their contempt for all things Hungarian. Clashes between army officers and the civilian populace were frequent enough to indicate a deep-seated antagonism. Foreign troops are always a source of friction, but a firm policy on the part of the high command could have done much to keep such outbursts to a minimum. On the other hand, the Hungarian Independence Party made use of any incidents for their own propaganda.

The next phase of the Hungarian obstruction began on October 16, 1902, when Baron Géza Fejérváry, who had served as Minister of Defense in every

government since 1884, presented a new recruit bill. Normally the number of men to be inducted annually was set every ten years, in agreement with Austria. The recruit law of 1889 had expired in 1899, but because of the interruptions in the negotiations with Austria it was not then possible to introduce a new ten-year recruit bill. Instead, the terms of the old law had been extended one year at a time. Now at last a new recruit bill was presented to the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments which called for increasing the annual recruit levy for the joint army from 103,000 to 125,000. Hungary's share of the recruit levy rose from 42,711 to 53,438. The Hungarian Honvéd was to be increased from 12,500 recruits to 15,500 per year. In addition, 6000 supplementary reservists, men who were liable for military service but were normally passed over in the draft calls, were to be called to active duty in order to maintain the peacetime strength of the joint army in proportion to the increased population of the Dual Monarchy. Hungary's share of this increase was 2,565 men. In all, therefore, Hungary was asked to provide an additional 16,292 recruits per year.

The census of 1900 had shown a large population increase, with the result that ever larger numbers of young men went directly into the inactive reserves. No one, it seems, doubted the need for a larger army, nor Hungary's ability to provide more recruits. The new army bill also provided for

21 The political events of the years 1902-05 are described in Gratz, A Dualizmus Kora, II, 1-61; May, Hapsburg Monarchy, 343-61; Sosnosky, Politik, II, 173-91; Henry Wickham Steed, "At the Parting of the Ways," (3-part article on the background of the Hungarian crisis), The Times (London) [hereafter abbreviated Times], 1905, Oct. 5, 6, 7; The Annual Register; A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for the Year 1903 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904); Ibid., for 1904; István Döményos, A magyar parlamenti ellenzékek történetéből 1901-94 [On the History of the Hungarian Parliamentary Opposition, 1901-04] (Budapest: Akadémia, 1963); and Bertalan Lányi, Die Regierung Fejérváry ... in regierungspolitischer und verfassungsrechtlicher Beleuchtung (Berlin: Puttkammer und Mühlbrecht, 1909), 4-14.
funds for modernizing the equipment of the armed forces, including new
siege howitzers, modern ships for the navy, and better barracks. The Honvéd,
the darling of the nationalists in Parliament, was to receive new NCO schools,
hospitals, and other provisions tending to make it a more self-sustaining
military force. 22

The Independence Party, which had lost seats in the 1901 elections,
sensed in the army bill an issue with which to regain their popularity.
Another reason why they chose this moment to raise an issue of fundamental
importance is suggested in the statement of one of the party's leaders,
Béla Barabás, on July 17, 1903, who pointed out that "Franz Joseph is ad-
vanced in years, and we must use these years to take advantage of his
respect for the law and his oath. Every Hungarian knows that hard times
are in store for our country." 23 The heir-apparent, Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, was known to be no friend of Hungarian separatist ambitions.
This fact explains the sense of haste with which the Hungarians plunged
into a long and intense constitutional struggle seeking to diminish the
powers of the Crown.

The Independence Party threatened to obstruct all parliamentary
business unless certain far-reaching changes were made in the military
establishment to give due recognition to the sovereignty of the Hungarian
state. The party's demands were specified by Lajos Holló on January 27,
1903.

1. Only Hungarian officers to serve in Hungarian regiments, and all

22 Gratz, A Dualizmus Kora, II, 5-6; The Annual Register, 1903, p. 296.

23 Schulthess, Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1903, vol. XLIV, 205,
quoted in Rudolf Kiszling, Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este: Leben,
Pläne und Wirken am Schicksalsweg der Donaumonarchie (Graz and Cologne:
H. Böhlau Nachf., 1953), 81-82.
officers assigned to these regiments required to know the Magyar state language.

2. The Magyar language to become the language of command and service for Hungarian regiments of the joint army.

3. Troops in Hungarian regiments to carry only Hungarian emblems and flags, rather than the imperial insignia.

4. Members of the Hungarian army to take an oath to defend the Hungarian Constitution.

5. The period of active service to be reduced from three years to two.


7. Hungarian troops to be stationed only on Hungarian soil in peacetime.\textsuperscript{24}

These were popular measures, and the Independence Party was immediately catapulted into an advantageous position. The proposals were highly popular among almost all Magyars, and even the national minorities found some of them attractive. The period of active service had been reduced from three years to two in Germany and France some years ago, and this measure was of course popular with all nationalities and classes in Hungary. (By the time the measure was adopted in Austria-Hungary in 1912, the other European nations had increased their military service again.)

The demands were opposed by the Sovereign, by the military authorities and by the Hungarian government, because of the fear that these measures would lead to the establishment of a separate Hungarian army, which would be the first step toward a disintegration of the Monarchy. The most

\textsuperscript{24} Dolmányos, \textit{Ellenzék}, 176.
serious single item involved the "language of command and service."

Commanding an army in the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was difficult because of the severe language problem. "Service language" was the language used by the officers of a unit to communicate with one another and with their NCO's. Since most of the regular officers spoke German or a recognizable version of it as a professional language, service language was most often the German language. Service language could not, of course, be altered simply by decree, since it was necessary for the men to understand the language they used. The language used by the enlisted men among themselves, and for instruction within the unit, was called "regimental language." Where 20% of the troops in a regiment claimed the same mother tongue, that language was considered to be a regimental language, in which it was permissible for a soldier to report to an officer, for example. An officer was required to know one of the regimental languages of his unit. As a result, many of the 47 Hungarian infantry regiments of the joint army had two or even three regimental languages, and many officers could not converse with all the men of their unit. "Language of command" refers to some ninety phrases like "Forward March," "Cease Firing," and the like. Every recruit of the joint army throughout the Monarchy learned these same phrases in German. (The infantrist learned only 54 of them; the rest were technical commands applicable only to the artillery or other special branch.) The military authorities insisted that these command words must be identical for all troops, so that in the confusion of battle any officer could rally any group of soldiers and lead them. The command words thus represented the ultimate link of unity throughout the entire army. If the
Hungarian regiments of the joint army were commanded in the Magyar language, the command unity of the army would be broken. Moreover, if the Hungarians were granted their own language, the Czechs and Croats could raise good legal arguments for demanding their own command language, leading to chaos. (The language unity was already broken by allowing the Honvéd troops to be commanded in Hungarian.)

Franz Joseph insisted that the question of command language fell within his competence as commander-in-chief, as defined in Para. 11 of the Hungarian Ausgleich Law. The opposition insisted that Para. 12 of the same law gave to the legislature the right to determine the "conditions of service" of the Hungarian troops. They added weight to their demand for Magyar language of command by preventing any business in the lower House of Parliament.

The Independence Party was joined in the obstruction by the Catholic Peoples Party, who supported the Ausgleich and the House of Habsburg, but wanted the repeal of the church legislation of 1894-95 which they felt had been forced upon them by a Calvinist Liberal Party. The obstructionists also enjoyed the tacit support of a number of members of the governing Liberal Party who were in sympathy with the military demands. Count Albert Apponyi had merged his National Party into the Liberal Party in 1899, but his followers still expressed their support for a separate national army.

Prime Minister Széll tried to meet the obstruction with compromise. He won the passage of a four-month budget and recruit levy, but when this expired on May 1, 1903, Hungary again entered an "ex-lex" period. Széll

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25 Count Tisza explains the army language question in detail in NFP, 1905, July 17A. 73 of the 90 command phrases are listed in NFP, July 20M. See also "Zur Kommandosprache des k.u.k. Heeres, von einem militärischen Fachmann," NFP, May 24M, and "Regiments-und Kommandosprache," NFP, July 6M.
next tried to fight the obstructing deputies with "passive resistance," hoping to tire them out by giving them unlimited permission to debate, but this tactic failed and Széll was forced to resign on July 16. Franz Joseph first commissioned Count István Tisza to form a government, but Tisza was unable to win the support of the majority Liberal Party because he proposed to use forceful measures to end the obstruction. Instead, Count Károly Khuen-Héderváry, the long-time Ban of Croatia, was appointed Prime Minister on June 27. Defense Minister Baron Géza Fejérváry, now seventy years old, was dropped from the post he had held for nineteen years. General Fejérváry, after fifty-two years of military service which had earned him the highest recognition, including the Maria Theresa Cross awarded for unusual bravery under fire in the Battle of Solferino in 1859, was appointed Commander of the Royal Hungarian Personal Guard, a newly-formed formation for ceremonial functions at the Budapest palace. With this purely honorary duty, Baron Fejérváry looked forward to a quiet and respected life in retirement. This was not to be the case.

On June 23, before his appointment, the new Prime Minister had made an agreement with the opposition Independence Party. He agreed to drop Baron Fejérváry from the cabinet and to remove the military bill from the calendar if in return the opposition permitted budget and recruit bills to pass. After taking office, however, he indicated that he had set aside the military bill only for the time being. The opposition considered the compromise at an end and resumed obstruction, forcing Khuen-Héderváry to submit his resignation on August 10. With no likelihood now that a recruit levy could be passed before October 1, the Hungarian Defense Minister ordered the third-year troops in the Hungarian units, whose term of active service would normally have expired on September 30, to remain on active duty for an in-
definite period of time in order to maintain the peacetime strength of the armed forces. Another decree invited draft-eligible young men to volunteer for active duty on October 1, to relieve the men whose term had expired.

To emphasize the gravity of the situation, Franz Joseph came to Budapest on August 19 to seek the opinion of fifteen leading Hungarian statesmen who were committed to preserving the 1867 Ausgleich system. His consultations were interrupted by the visit of King Edward VII to Budapest, but by the first of September it was clear that there was no one able to take over the government under the existing conditions with any hope of success. Franz Joseph was losing patience, and decided to speak firmly. At the conclusion of extensive cavalry maneuvers at the obscure Galician village Chjopý on September 16, the Emperor issued an order of the day to the troops to which he added an unusual political message.

The more surely founded my favorable judgment of the military value, the self-sacrificing readiness in service, and the single-minded cooperation of all portions of my total forces of defense, so much the more must and will I hold fast to their existing and well-tried organization. My army in particular must know that I will never relinquish the rights and privileges guaranteed to its highest war lord—my army whose stout bonds of union are threatened by one-sided aspirations misapprehensive of the high mission the army has to fulfill for the weal of both states of the Monarchy. Common and unitary as it is now shall my army remain, the strong power to defend the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy against every foe.

True to its oath, my whole defensive force will continue to tread the path of earnest fulfillment which respects every national characteristic and solves all antitheses by utilizing the special qualities of every ethnic group (Volkstamm) for the welfare of the great whole.26

26 The Order of Chjopý is written in a convoluted style which is obscure in the original German, and impossible to translate satisfactorily. I have followed the translation by Steed with only a slight change, simply because I cannot improve upon it. (Times, 1903, Sept. 18.) Portions of the text are published in May, Hapsburg Monarchy, 352-53; Sosnosky, Politik, 11, 179; and Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte: Das Leben des Generalstabschefs Grafen Beck (Zurich, Vienna: Amalthea Verlag, 1930), 403.
The Order of Chlópy was received with jubilation in Austria, but the Hungarians considered it an insult, because they felt it treated the Hungarian Nation as only one of the various "ethnic groups" within the Monarchy. Franz Joseph may have been taken aback by the intense opposition his statement aroused among all political factions in Hungary. In a move to soothe injured feelings, he wrote to Prime Minister Khuen-Héderváry on September 22. He stressed that the sovereign rights guaranteed him in Paragraph 11 of the Ausgleich Law would remain unchanged and he would pass them on to his successor undiminished. If the Hungarian Parliament guarded these rights, not only would they provide a base for the Monarchy as a great power, but for the security of their own homeland and nation (saját hazája és nemzete). He was unable to concede anything which would lead ultimately to weakening the two states, hence he could not agree to transform the army in a manner endangering the integrity of the Hungarian lands. On the other hand, he did not rule out the possibility of certain justifiable changes in the administration of the armed forces. At the end of the letter he reappointed Khuen-Héderváry as Prime Minister and commissioned him to express to the Hungarian nation his regret that the Chlópy order had caused such distress, as though the King had aimed at injuring the legal rights or statehood of Hungary.

On the following day Khuen-Héderváry published the King's letter before a meeting of the Liberal Party, which then adopted Count Andrássy's resolution declaring that further discussion of the Chlópy order was unnecessary. That was not the end of the matter, however. When the reappointed cabinet

appeared in Parliament on September 24, Ferenc Kossuth, president of the Independence Party, protested a recent statement by the Austrian Prime Minister Koerber which defended the unity of the army in language similar to that of the Chlöpy order. The House agreed that Koerber's remarks were an improper interference in Hungary's affairs. The Liberal Party, in a conference on September 28, empowered the Prime Minister to make a statement to this effect before the House, which he delivered on the twenty-ninth. Kossuth, however, insisted that the Prime Minister's statement was not strong enough, and moved that the House schedule a debate on the question. Many Liberal Party members voted with Kossuth, leaving the government in a minority. Khuen-Héderváry again submitted his resignation, which the King accepted on October 6.

Franz Joseph's conciliatory letter of September 22 had given the Khuen-Héderváry government only one additional week of life. Now the lines were drawn. At Chlöpy the Sovereign had made his position clear in unequivocal terms. The Independence Party clung just as firmly to their demands, which enjoyed wide popularity even among members of the Liberal Party. No budget bill had been passed for the current year, and no recruits could be called up. The Hungarian recruits due to be released on October 1 were held on active duty, often at considerable personal hardship, while the Austrian recruits were replaced by a new levy as usual. Despite the insistence of Franz Joseph, there was now a legal distinction between the Austrian and Hungarian portions of the joint army. And the backlog of pending legislation which the Hungarian Parliament could not take up included such essentials as the "Széll-Koerber Ausgleich" concerning economic relations with Austria.

Emotions were kept at a pitch when on October 6, the anniversary of
the execution of the thirteen revolutionary generals at Arad in 1849, a wreath was placed on the Kossuth monument at Szeged allegedly in the name of the time-expired troops of the local barracks. Troops were ordered to remove the wreath, while the civil authorities instructed the police to protect it. In the ensuing struggle between soldiers and civilians, two persons were wounded. 28

In the meantime an attempt was underway to clarify the confused question of military demands. At its conference on September 28 the Liberal Party had appointed a Committee of Nine to study the question and make recommendations. Kálmán Széll was elected chairman of the committee, while the two most powerful members were Count Tisza and Count Albert Apponyi. The Committee completed its report on October 18 and recommended certain modifications which they believed would offer the maximum expression of the national spirit of the Hungarian regiments of the joint army, while still compatible with the rights of the Sovereign as Commander-in-Chief as outlined in the Ausgleich Law. 29 The Committee of Nine recommended modifying military emblems to show the status of Hungary within the Dual Monarchy. The Military Law Code should be completed and placed in effect as soon as possible, and the Magyar language should be used in courts-martial. The Hungarian Defense Minister rather than the Joint War Minister should have the final jurisdiction in questions of promotion. Hungarian military commands and Hungarian civil authorities should correspond in the Magyar language. Hungarian troops should be commanded by Hungarian officers as far as possible. In order to enable Hungarian troops to be commanded by Hungarian officers as far as possible, officers of Hungarian citizenship


29 Dolmányos, Ellenzék, 263.
should be transferred to Hungarian units, and cadet schools in Hungary
should be expanded to provide more officers for both the joint army and
the Honvéd. The period of active service should be reduced to two years.
Perhaps the most important statements in the report were the last two:

8. The party holds fast to the standpoint that the King has the
right to maintain the language of command and of service of the
Hungarian army—which constitutes a complementary part of the
whole army—on the basis of the constitutional prerogatives
recognized as belonging to the Crown in Paragraph 11 of the Statute
1867:XII.

The political responsibility of the ministry extends hereto
(the constitutional prerogatives of the Crown) as also to every act
of the Crown, and the legal influence of the Parliament, like every
constitutional right, remains untouched in this respect also.

This state of things can only be altered jointly by the Crown
and the Parliament.

9. While laying stress upon the rights of the nation, the
Liberal Party does not include in its program the question of the
language of command and of service, since the party considers this
to be unnecessary for weighty political reasons which affect the
great interests of the nation.30

The search for a new Prime Minister was delayed pending the report of
the Committee of Nine. Tisza, László Lukács, and Andrássy were all con-
sidered for the post. Franz Joseph requested certain modifications sug-
gested to him by Lukács, but on Oct. 22 the Committee of Nine refused to
make any amendments. On October 26 Franz Joseph commissioned Count Tisza
to form a government. Tisza asked the Committee to make two minor amend-
ments to their report, which they accepted on October 30. Even Count
Apponyi, who was known to favor a separate Hungarian army in principle,
agreed to the amendment, though insisting upon his freedom of action.

With agreement on military policy now reached within the Liberal Party,
Tisza was able to form a cabinet on October 31, which was appointed on

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30 The text of the report is given in The Times, 1903, Oct. 30; Sosnosky,
Politiok, II, 182-84; and in J. Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, I,
749-51. Kun gives also extensive documentation of the series of negotia-
tions leading up to the final report, I, 737-52.
November 3. The new government included only those persons loyal to Tisza, excluding persons from the Apponyi and Széll-Andrássy wings of the Liberal Party. László Lukács retained his old portfolio as Minister of Finance, and Brigadier General Sándor Nyiri became Minister of Defence.

Count Andrásy's faction of the Liberal Party began to grow restless after being excluded by Tisza, but did nothing for the moment. Count Apponyi resigned as Speaker of the House and was replaced by a Tisza man, Dezső Perczel. Apponyi remained in the Liberal Party until March 11, 1904, when he led his agrarian followers out of the party and re-formed his old National Party. Baron Bánffy decided the time was ripe for him to move also. After stepping down as Prime Minister in 1899 he had been appointed chief Hungarian Court Marshall at Vienna. He grew impatient in this purely ceremonial position and itched to get back into politics. With the appointment of Tisza on November 3, 1903, the rifts within the Liberal Party became more and more visible, and on November 22 Bánffy organized his own New Party. The New Party stood for economic independence from Austria along with certain other token concessions to Hungary's nationalist pride, while maintaining the 1867 Ausgleich. Until Bánffy was elected to Parliament in a by-election in May 1904, the party claimed only one deputy, János Hock, another deserter from the Liberal Party.

With the appointment of the Tisza government, Franz Joseph had given his approval to the Committee of Nine report, which included a constitu-


32 On the formation and program of the New Party, see J. Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, II, 120, 591; and Gyula Méréi, Magyar politikai partprogrammok (1867-1914) [Hungarian Party Platforms] (Budapest, 1934), 72-79.

János Hock (1859-1936), president of the National Council in the revolutionary democratic republic under Count Mihály Károlyi, 1918-19.
tional interpretation of the Ausgleich legislation. The new interpretation did not go as far as some Hungarians wished, but it appeared to many Austrians as a dangerous concession weakening the bonds uniting the lands of the Monarchy. The new interpretation caused much discussion. Tisza told a Liberal Party conference that while the Ausgleich of 1867 was a Hungarian statute and consequently subject to revision or repeal, it was also in virtue of its contents a common institution concerning Austria also, and for this reason could only be modified by parallel action of the two states. While this fairly reasonable interpretation angered some Hungarians, including Count Apponyi of Tisza's own party, who thought it weakened Hungary's constitutional position, it aroused some Austrians for the opposite reason. The Austrian Prime Minister Koerber told the Reichsrat on November 17 that Austrian consent would be necessary to alter the Ausgleich. Tisza replied in a speech before the Hungarian Parliament on the following day in which he dismissed Koerber's view of Hungarian constitutional law as the "dillettante opinion of a distinguished foreigner." 33 This political duel of words between the two prime ministers, which amused the newspaper readers of Europe, earned for Tisza much more ill-will in Austria, particularly in the circle of the heir-apparent Franz Ferdinand, than it gained for him among the sensitive Magyar nationalists.

By threatening drastic measures to break the obstruction in Parliament, the new Prime Minister was able in December 1903 to reach a compromise with Ferenc Kossuth, who agreed that the Independence Party would cease obstruct-

33 Tisza used the English phrase "distinguished foreigner." On this incident, see May, Hapsburg Monarchy, 355; Annual Register, 1903, p. 299; J. Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, II, 95-101; Kiszling, Franz Ferdinand, 82; Times, 1903, Nov. 19, 20; and Pester Lloyd (hereafter abbreviated PL), 1926, Oct. 31, Nov. 4, and Dec. 5.
ing to allow budget and recruit bills to pass, while in return the govern-
ment would immediately begin to prepare a suffrage reform bill. The Catholic
Peoples Party continued obstruction, however, even though their founder,
Count János Zichy, resigned as president of the party in protest. Due to
the obstruction the bills could not be passed before the end of the year.
Since new recruits could not be drafted, reservists were called to active
duty on January 1 to allow the third-year activists, who had served three
months beyond their normal service time, to return home.

On March 10, 1904, Tisza proposed a one-year suspension of the rules of
procedure for the House of Representatives, which would have given the
Speaker vast powers to speed up debate and would allow voting by a show of
hands. The rules of procedure were badly in need of reform, for they gave
the Speaker little power to prevent endless time-consuming motions by a
handful of obstructing deputies. Yet Tisza's reforms, many people felt,
would surrender the rights of the nation expressed in its Parliament to the
arbitrary and absolute control of the Prime Minister and his Speaker of
the House. Under the threat of Tisza's "Guillotine Motion," the opposition
offered to compromise. After first persuading the Peoples Party to cease
obstruction, the old historian Kálmán Thaly, speaking for the Independence
Party in the absence of Ferenc Kossuth, made a dramatic scene in Parliament
on March 11. In return for dropping the rules change, the opposition
allowed the recruit bill to pass, in order to let the time-expired men and
the reservists to return home. A budget bill for the first six months of
1904 was allowed to pass, along with an indemnity for government expendi-
tures during the last eight months of 1903. Tisza's prestige was greatly
enhanced by this success. In April he used the armed forces to break up
the railroad strike, finally calling to active duty those strikers subject
to military service and returning them to work under military discipline. Parliament began serious work for the first time in nearly two years, and before the summer recess an education bill and a suffrage reform bill were debated.

The political truce was disturbed when on May 19 the Austro-Hungarian Delegations were presented with a military budget bill calling not for the expected appropriation of 15 or 20 million crowns, but for 88 million crowns for the joint army and 75 million for the navy. On top of this there was to be a loan of 450 million crowns to be repaid over the next twenty years, which would replace much of the Monarchy's outdated military equipment. The opposition parties felt the truce had been betrayed, and the press began openly speaking of renewed obstruction.34

Tisza knew all along that the obstruction was not dead, and the problem would have to be dealt with sooner or later. On October 4, 1904, shortly before Parliament reopened after summer recess, Tisza sent an open letter to his constituents in the village of Ugra.35 In the "Ugra letter" he announced that the time had come to revise the House procedures and to put an end to the threat of obstruction by a minority of deputies. The "Ugra letter" was a declaration of war, and the opposition understood it so. Shortly thereafter the House adopted by a large majority a Tisza-backed motion to refer the revision of the House procedures to a committee. But Count Apponyi, speaking on behalf of the "united opposition," argued that even if such a change in the procedures were adopted he would not respect it, for it would be illegal and the King would not sanction it

34 Times, 1904, May 16; Annual Register, 1904, pp. 297-300.
lest he violate his Coronation Oath. Apponyi's strange argument meant that the Hungarian Parliament lacked competence to reform its own procedures, yet it made a great impression on the opposition. The legislative committee adopted a bill introduced by the Liberal Party deputy Baron Gábor Dánriel, patterned along the lines of the "Guillotine motion" proposed by Tisza in March. The Dánriel bill, subsequently known as the "Lex Dánriel," was introduced to the House on November 15, but the opposition made so much noise that orderly debate was impossible. When the House met again on November 18, the obstruction was renewed. Finally the Speaker of the House, Dezső Perczel, took out his handkerchief. It was a prearranged signal, and the other Liberal Party deputies "voted" by waving their own handkerchiefs. Perczel declared that the "Lex Dánriel" had been adopted by majority vote. Pandemonium broke loose, the Speaker announced a three-week recess, and the session was adjourned.

By passage of the "Lex Dánriel" Tisza had perpetrated an undisguised coup. It may have been necessary, it may even have been defensible on technically legal grounds, but it served to unite Tisza's enemies. On that same day, Count Andrássy led twenty aristocrats out of the Liberal Party, who for the time being took the name "Dissidents." Later that evening a "Coalition" was formed of all the opposition parties: the Independence Party, the Catholic Peoples Party, Bánffy's New Party, and Apponyi's National Party. Andrássy's Dissidents remained technically outside the Coalition, but from the beginning they played leading roles in it. Ferenc Kossuth of the Independence Party was elected president of the Coalition, and an eighteen-member "Steering Committee" (Verzérlő Bizottság) was chosen, borrowing a name from the eighteenth-century wars against the Habsburgs under Ferenc Rákóczi. Count János Zichy, former president of the Peoples
Party, showed his displeasure with the new anti-Tisza combination by resigning from the party he had founded. 36

Tisza had recessed Parliament for three weeks to allow tempers to cool. On December 13, the day Parliament was due to reopen, the Coalition deputies arrived an hour early and physically destroyed all the furniture and woodwork in the House chamber, and then posed for press photographers sitting on the ruins, with Baron Bánffy, a former Prime Minister, in the center. Naturally the House could not hold a session on that day. On December 16 Prime Minister Tisza announced that new elections would be held in February to allow the nation to decide between the Coalition and the government, between the destruction of the House and the change in parliamentary procedure. The Coalition replied that it was illegal to dismiss Parliament while the country was in an "ex-lex" period, obscuring the fact that they were responsible for not allowing budget and recruit bills to be passed. The House met three more times before the end of the year, but no business could be conducted because of the obstruction of the Coalition. Finally, on January 3, 1905, Tisza dissolved Parliament and scheduled new elections, amid charges from the Coalition that he had violated the constitution by dismissing Parliament during an "ex-lex" period. 37

Immediately after the dissolution of Parliament on January 3, Apponyi led his National Party into a merger with the Independence Party. 38


37 Sosnosky, Politik, II, 205-06; Neue Freie Presse (Vienna) [hereafter abbreviated NFP], 1905, Jan. 3A [Abendblatt].

38 NFP, 1905, Jan. 3M [Morgenblatt], 4M.
The mildly leftist Independence Party now acquired a conservative wing of aristocratic landowners. The two wings could henceforth agree only upon more and more extravagant nationalist demands. Ferenc Kossuth, the modestly gifted son of a great father, was president of his party and of the Coalition only because of his name, not because he represented the real leadership. Kossuth was to have severe difficulty in holding together his diverse party and attempting to hold them to reason.

With the dissolution of Parliament the deputies lost their parliamentary immunity. The Budapest police immediately issued warrants for the arrest of thirty-nine former deputies for their part in destroying the House of Representatives on December 13. After the Coalition won the election a few weeks later, the charges against these persons had to be dropped. 39

39NFP, 1905, Jan. 6M, Sept. 15A.
C. The Election of January 1905

The parliamentary election of January 1905 illustrated all the faults of the Hungarian electoral system. To become a registered voter, a male citizen, twenty years of age, had to prove that his annual tax payments were above a certain minimum, or "census," but the census was different in each district. In the non-Magyar districts the census was set at a relatively low level, to insure that all the available Magyars would be permitted to vote. The non-Magyars could be kept from the polls by other means. But in the purely Magyar districts in the center of the country the census was high, so that the mass of the Magyar peasantry was disenfranchised.

On the other hand, those persons engaged in certain intellectual professions—lawyers, teachers, government officials and the like—were enfranchised regardless of the tax they paid. This provision worked to the ad-

40 The Hungarian electoral system was established by the Law 1874:33, a detailed statute of 121 articles, which superceded the Hungarian Law 1848:5 and the Transylvanian Law 1848:2. The most important provisions of the Electoral Law of 1874 (Paragraphs 1-13) are given in English translation in Walter Fairleigh Dodd, Modern Constitutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909), I, 106-11. The mechanics of the election procedure are outlined by Albert Apponyi, "The Hungarian Constitution," in Hungary of Today, ed. Percy Alden (London: Eveleigh Nash; New York: Brentano's, 1909), 160-65; Apponyi, intending to give the English-speaking reader a favorable impression of Hungarian democracy, cannot conceal the obvious opportunities for abuse.

The best description of the system in practice is still Robert W. Seton-Watson, Corruption and Reform in Hungary: A Study of Electoral Practice (London, 1911; German edition, Ungarische Wahlen: Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Korruption, Leipzig, 1912), based on the author's observation of the election of 1910 in company with Edmund Steinacker. There is a good brief account in Sosnosky, Politik, I, 261-72, which, significantly, draws heavily upon the revelations of Seton-Watson.

On the 1905 election, see the background articles in NFP, 1905, Jan. 23A and 26M, and Times, Jan. 27.

41 In a speech before a conference on suffrage, March 19, 1910, János Baross stated that the tax census was as low as 86 Kreutzer in some communities of Szilágy County, while in the Alföld it was 80 Crowns. Nemzeti Választójogi Naggyülés [National Congress on Suffrage] (Budapest: Stephaneum Nyomda, 1910), 6. In his program address on October 28, 1905, Prime Minister Fejérváry said the extremes ranged between 60 Heller and 120 Crowns. Lányi, Regierung, 128.
vantage of the Magyar and Magyarized intelligentsia and to the detriment of the nationalities.\textsuperscript{42} The complexity of the legal requirements, together with the arbitrary practices of local officials--some not actually illegal--resulted in a most uneven distribution of electors. A few extreme examples will illustrate this. The city of Maros-Vásárhely, with 17,715 inhabitants, 90.7% Magyars, had 1496 electors, or 8.4% of the total population. The county of Bésterce-Naszód, with 117,649 inhabitants, of whom 7% were Magyars, had 2,947 electors, or 2.5% of the total population. Each of these areas elected two deputies to Parliament. Seven constituencies, including four in the city of Budapest, had more than 7000 electors, while one district, Szék, had only 182.\textsuperscript{43}

The second inequity was in the territorial boundaries of electoral districts. This so-called "electoral geometry" was gerrymandering on a grand scale. The significance of this becomes obvious when one realizes that there was only one polling place in each district. It often happened that a voter lived fifty kilometers or more from the polling place--and might have to travel an even greater distance to exercise his vote--since districts were not laid out with ease of rail and road travel in mind.\textsuperscript{44}

The system was designed to discourage the national minorities from voting.

\textsuperscript{42} In 1902, 94,399 persons out of an electorate of 970,841 were entitled to vote because of their profession. (Statesman's Yearbook, 1903, p. 428.) In addition, 32,712 persons (in 1905) were entitled to vote by right of inheritance, since they or their ancestors had been entitled to vote prior to 1848. (Seton-Watson, Ungarische Wahlen, 4.)

\textsuperscript{43} Seton-Watson, Ungarische Wahlen, 4-8 and 207-08; statistics refer to the election of May 1906.

\textsuperscript{44} From the polling place at Naszód [Ruman.: Nasaud], Transylvania, to the furthest point in the district was 80 km.; there was no train connection. Sosnosky, Politik, I, 265; cf. Seton-Watson, Ungarische Wahlen, 9-10.
The polling place was usually located in a Magyar village at one end of a minority district. On election day, minority voters might discover that the train was not running, or that a bridge was temporarily closed for repairs. An election in winter—and the 1905 election was held in bitterly cold weather—only intensified these difficulties.

A third injustice was found at the polling place itself. The most obvious evil was the practice of open voting with the voter casting his ballot by announcing his choice in a loud voice to all in attendance. The polling place was often set up on the estate of the largest landlord of the district, and the landlord stood by while his tenants cast their votes. Where this was not sufficient pressure to insure the election of the "proper" candidate, other arbitrary measures were used. If a minority voter, for example, did not sign his name exactly as it was recorded in the registration book, his vote was voided. Since the registration book carried his name in Magyarized form, it was easy to make a mistake. The voter had to remember to write Károly, not Karl or Carol or Karel, and above all he had to remember that the Magyars place the family name before the given name.

Thirty minutes after the last voter had presented himself, the polls could be declared closed, but they were kept open as long as voters continued to appear. Often in rural districts the election could be completed by mid-morning and results telegraphed to Budapest. At the other extreme, in the Budapest district of Terézváros the polls remained open for forty hours in 1905, while voters stood in line in the cold for two nights.

Finally, the Democratic Party candidate, Vilmos Vázsonyi defeated the Liberal, Károly Hieronymi, with 3980 votes to 3801.\footnote{NFP, 1905, Jan. 28M.}
In the 1905 election, as usual, regular army troops, reinforced by battalions brought in from the Austrian side of the border, were stationed in the villages. This act was not necessarily a measure of repression in itself, but also protection for the voters. A voter who had to travel some distance to the polling place might be away from home overnight; he could return to find that a mob inspired by the opposite party had vandalized his home. However, it does not require much imagination to see that troops might also influence the vote.

The Hungarian electoral system, which had all the evils of the "rotten boroughs" of eighteenth-century England, or of the southern part of the United States in more recent times, accomplished its purposes. It prevented the national minorities and the peasantry from voting, and it insured that the Liberal Party under Kálmán Tisza and his successors would maintain a comfortable margin over any opposition. The system permitted the opposition to elect enough deputies from Magyar counties to maintain the appearance of a parliamentary system, but in the minority areas the government, with the help of local officials (who owed their jobs to the good-will of the Prime Minister), could guarantee the election of its candidates.

By the beginning of the twentieth century not only the nationalities but even a number of Magyars were calling for reform of the worst abuses. In 1905 the Independence Party campaigned on a platform that included universal suffrage, but after they had won the election they retreated from their promise. Those small fringe parties--the socialist and nationality parties which rarely elected a single deputy--all called for extensive reforms. The most basic changes proposed included:

46 NFP, 1905, Jan. 26M.

47 From the election platforms of the Rumanian National Committee and the Radical Serb Party, NFP, 1905, Jan. 11A.
1. Universal suffrage for all males of age.  
2. Secret ballot.  
3. Polling places in each village.  
4. Redistricting, to provide districts of more compact size.  
5. Nationalities to be given representation in proportion to their population.  

The Social Democrats included these and further demands:  
6. Election to be held on a legal holiday.  
7. Parliamentary elections every two years (rather than five years).  
8. Every voter to be eligible to run for office.  
9. Women's suffrage.  

Some of these proposals from the political fringe unexpectedly became the focus of political controversy among the major parties during the summer and fall of 1905, after the Fejérváry government embraced the cause of universal suffrage.  

The election campaign of January 1905 aroused political passions to an unprecedented degree. Never before had Hungary's voteless masses taken such an active part in campaign demonstrations and rallies. There were numerous reports of electoral disturbances, usually involving Independence Party mobs attacking Liberal Party supporters. Several of these clashes were exceptionally violent, many people were severely injured and several persons were

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48 Some groups coupled the demand for universal suffrage with raising the voting age from twenty-one to twenty-four years, to insure a more mature electorate.  
49 Platform of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, NFP, 1905, Jan. 6M.
Opponents of universal suffrage claimed that the entire population had taken part in this election by means of the pressure brought to bear on the voters; therefore, universal suffrage was not necessary.

The Independence Party used its propaganda skill very effectively. For example, a landowner might call his peasants together and introduce them to the Independence Party candidate with the words, "If this man is elected, there will be no tax collection in February." The peasants did not understand that there could not be any tax collection in February in any case, since the budget for 1905 had not been sanctioned by the last Parliament, and the new Parliament would not meet in time to pass a budget bill by February.

No one knew how to predict the outcome of the election. The Coalition leaders seemed most worried lest they lose too many seats. Henry Wickham-Steed, the correspondent for the London Times, was probably as well-informed as anyone when he estimated that the Liberal Party would return at least 220 deputies, a sizeable loss but still a working majority. Steed was with Tisza on the evening of January 26, when the election returns began to show an overwhelming Coalition victory.

50 See Times, 1905, Jan. 24 and 27; NFP, 1905, Jan. 24M and 26A. NFP seems to have refrained from emphasizing the violence. Seton-Watson noted that in its coverage of the 1896 election, NFP stressed only those acts of violence involving the anti-Semitic Peoples Party. (Seton-Watson, Ungarische Wahlen, 11n.)


52 NFP, 1905, Jan. 19M, 23A.

53 See Steed's reports in The Times, 1905, Jan. 27 and 28, and his memoirs Through Thirty Years (1892-1922): A Personal Narrative (New York, 1925), I, 222. Elections were held in 379 out of 413 districts on January 26, the rest on subsequent days. The profile of the new House became clear in the early hours of January 27.
had held about 130 seats; the election gave them 231 seats, an absolute majority. The Independence Party had become the largest single party. The results were:

**Coalition:**
- Independence Party: 166
- New Party (Bánffy): 13
- Clerical Peoples Party (Zichy): 25
- Dissidents (Andrássy faction; later called Constitution Party): 27

**Liberal Party:** 159

**Others:**
- Rumanian National Party: 8
- Slovaks: 2
- Democratic Party: 2
- Reorganized Social Democrats: 2
- No party allegiance: 9

The Liberal Party, for the first time since it was founded under Kálmán Tisza in 1875, had lost control of the government. For the first and only time in Hungary's history, a government had been turned out of office in a general election. The Liberal Party did not survive its defeat. After struggling for more than a year to keep the party alive, Tisza dissolved it in May 1906.

The small parties at the end of the list require a short word of explanation. The Democratic Party, led by Vilmos Vázsonyi, soon joined the Coalition, and Vázsonyi became a member of the Coalition Steering Committee. The Reorganized Social Democrats were a peasant party which had broken with the Social Democrats because the main party had shown no interest for the peasants. One of their two deputies, Vilmos Mezőfi, actively sided with the Independence Party in the support of nationalist, not peasant, interests.

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After the party disintegrated in the spring of 1906, the other deputy, András Áchim, organized a true peasant movement.

The nationality parties were completely opposed to the Liberal Party and the minority policy it represented. This threw them for a time to the side of the Independence Party, whose democratic platform attracted them. In the Fall of 1905 when the Independence Party retreated from its support of universal suffrage, the nationality parties broke with it. The Rumanian National Party was reorganized in 1905 after some twenty years of inactivity. They elected Aurel Novacu, Ștefan Ciceo-Pop and Aurel Vlad, all of whom were to play leading roles in the Rumanian movement in Hungary. The great Slovak leader Milan Hodža, later Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic, was first elected to the Hungarian Parliament in 1905, although he had to run in a Slovene district in the Bácska region of southern Hungary.

Among those elected with no party allegiance were several persons, including former Prime Minister Kálmán Széll, who had bolted from the Liberal Party in opposition to Tisza but had not joined Andrássy's Dissidents. Also elected without party was Count János Zichy, one of the founders and former president of the Peoples Party, who resigned when that party joined in the obstruction in Parliament. Both Széll and János Zichy managed to remain sufficiently neutral during the ensuing crisis to be considered as mediators or as possible Prime Ministers in a compromise cabinet.

How are we to explain the sudden, unpredictable landslide victory of the Coalition? The traditional explanations show how the Coalition united

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55 The Peoples Party was almost exclusively the property of the Zichy family, but eventually several members of the family left that party for different reasons. In the course of the 1905 crisis Counts Nándor (Ferdinand) Zichy, Wladimir Zichy, and Jenő (Eugene) Zichy all found their way into the Independence Party.
all the dissatisfied elements in one joint attack against the Liberal Party. A large part of the aristocracy was attracted to the Coalition by Andrassy, the Catholic clergy by the Peoples Party. The Gentry—-the lesser nobility who made up most of the bureaucracy—-were attracted by the "patriotic" character of the national demands. Many of these voters would never have voted for an Independence Party candidate under normal circumstances, but had always supported the party of the government and the King out of a sense of duty. But now, when the great and respected figures of Hungarian political life—-above all, Count Andrássy—-were all allied with the extremists like Lengyel, Polónyi and Ugron, the voters turned against Tisza, "the creature of Vienna." 56

Marxist historians have emphasized the revolutionary feelings in Hungary at this time and the sympathy aroused by the news of revolution in

Russia. The Russian revolution certainly had its impact upon Hungary, but it is difficult to measure its influence on the political developments. The Hungarian election was held only four days after "Bloody Sunday" in St. Petersburg, and the events in Russia were widely publicized in Hungary. The Independence Party saw the Habsburg army as an instrument of an absolute monarch and wanted to replace it with a national, people's army. The news that the army of another absolute ruler had fired on unarmed citizens could only have intensified Hungarian feelings on the military question, and the Coalition propagandists were ready to capitalize on these emotions. For example, on the day before the election, opposition newspapers reprinted an article—obviously a fabrication—that had supposedly first appeared in the Kurier Lwowski, claiming that Austria-Hungary had offered troops to the

57 Most of this literature was published at the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the 1905 Russian revolution—i.e., before de-Stalinization—and sought to establish the existence of a long-standing friendship between the peoples of Russia and those of the Peoples Republics. The most valuable of these articles is Péter Hanák, "L'influence de la révolution russe de 1905 en Hongrie," Acta Historica IV (1956), 279-317. Hanák's article is a translation of a paper first published in Magyar Történelmi Kongresszus, 1953 Június 6-13 [Hungarian Historians' Congress] (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1954), 349-68. Another worthwhile contribution is Gyula Földessy, "Ady és az 1905-ös orosz forradalom [Ady and the 1905 Russian Revolution]," published in the same volume, pp. 403-08.

A further sampling of this literature will show that its purpose is largely commemorative: István Dolmános, "Haladó magyar-orosz művelődési kapcsolatok a századforduló idején [Progressive Magyar-Russian cultural relations around the turn of the century]," in Endre Kovács, ed., Magyar-Orosz történelmi kapcsolatok [Magyar-Russian Historical Relations] (Budapest, 1956), 238-91; Ferenc Mucsi, Az első orosz forradalom és a magyar munkásmozgalom [The First Russian Revolution and the Hungarian Labor Movement] (Budapest: Szikra, 1956); "Celostátní konference k výročí první ruské revoluce v letech 1905-1907 [International conference on the influence of the Russian revolution in the years 1905-07]," Sovětská historie (Prague), V (1955), no. 6, entire issue.
Tsar to put down the uprising.  

The Tisza-apologists maintain that Tisza was determined to allow the nation to express its true will in regard to the parliamentary obstruction, and that consequently, for once the government exerted no repressive influence on the voters at all.  Indeed, both during the election campaign and afterward, Tisza denied that the election was a mandate for the national demands, such as army command language and economic separation, but saw it only as a referendum on the "Lex Dániel." It is not idle to speculate that perhaps Tisza deliberately allowed the Coalition to win the election in order to force them to assume responsibility. How else can we explain why Tisza, a forceful, domineering personality, resigned himself to political exile for the next four years? He refrained from taking an active part in the crisis from February 1905 to April 1906, allowing the Fejérváry government to flounder without any assistance from him or his followers. After the Coalition cabinet was formed under Wekerle in April 1906, Tisza dissolved the Liberal Party and returned to his estate in Bihar County for

58 NFP, 1905, Jan. 26 M.

59 For example, Gustav Erényi, Graf Stefan Tisza, ein Staatsmann und Märtyrer (Vienna and Leipzig, 1935), 122-23. For a similar viewpoint from a source less friendly to Tisza, see "Ungarische Wahlpraxis" (von einem alten Parlamentarier), in Seton-Watson, Ungarische Wahlen, 39.

60 Summaries of Tisza's campaign speeches, NFP, 1905, Jan. 9 A, 16A; Tisza's article in Az Újság, 1905, July 13, analyzing the election campaign, reprinted in NFP, July 13 A. On this question cf. Times, 1905, Feb. 25.

61 "I am still unchanged in my conviction that a Coalition government on the basis of the concessions already made by Your Majesty is relatively the best way to awaken this poor, blinded people from their delusion, because their regime would experience such a dismal fate." Report of Prime Minister István Tisza to Franz Joseph, Geszt, April 24, 1905 (O.L., Kabinett-Archiv, Geheime Akten, Nachlass Daruváry, Carton no. 25). This letter is published in József Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, III, 621-22. This statement may reflect Tisza's rationalization after losing the election.
four years, earning for himself the nickname "the Hermit of Geszt." Had he perhaps tricked the opposition forces into a position which he knew would eventually destroy them? After the election the introspective Andrassy contemplated his sweeping victory and warned, "La mariée est trop belle." Truly, there was trouble ahead.

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CHAPTER 3

SPRING 1905: THE SEARCH FOR A GOVERNMENT

On Wednesday, February 1, after the extent of the Liberal Party's defeat became clear, Prime Minister Tisza travelled to Vienna and submitted the resignation of his government. Franz Joseph instructed the outgoing cabinet to remain in office on a temporary "caretaker" basis until a new government could be appointed. At Tisza's suggestion, the King called Count Gyula Andrásy for an audience on February 3. Andrásy was not named Prime Minister-designate, but was charged, as "homo regius," to negotiate with the various political figures about the formation of a new government.¹

The Coalition had been formed originally only for the duration of the election campaign, for the purpose of overthrowing Tisza's Liberal Party. The parties had campaigned on their separate platforms, and the only issue uniting them was the charge that Tisza had acted illegally threatening the constitution. The electoral victory took the Coalition leaders totally by surprise and found them unprepared to present a program of government. Now, if they wanted to continue the alliance, the various parties had to agree on a common program.

The Independence Party stood for a separate Hungarian army to replace the joint army, a separate Hungarian customs area and national bank, and for universal suffrage. For years their members had supported these demands safe in the knowledge that so long as their party remained in the minority, they would not have to accept responsibility for any part of these programs.

¹_NFP, 1905, Feb. 2M, 4M._
Now that they had won an election, a split began to show in their ranks. Some members of the party—-the "right wing" of medium landowners and industrialists led by Apponyi—began to admit, at least privately, that they were afraid of economic separation and universal suffrage.

The "67-based" parties in the Coalition, which represented in large part the aristocratic, agrarian interests, were also against universal suffrage, divided on the question of economic separation, and were not in favor of a separate Hungarian army, either. Yet the newly victorious Coalition had to give the voters more than a duplicate copy of the programs of the Liberal Party. Even if the 67-based parties were not in favor of a separate Hungarian army, they could join the Independence Party in demanding that the "national character" of the regiments raised in Hungary be strengthened. Thus the shaky Coalition was held together by the demand for Magyar language of service and command in the Hungarian regiments of the joint army. On this issue, on which Franz Joseph had expressed himself decisively in the Army Order of Chlópy in 1903, the Coalition fought for fourteen months "for the defense of the nation's highest interests," only to surrender ultimately in order to enjoy the fruits of power and prevent the introduction of universal suffrage.

Andrássy returned to Vienna to confer with Franz Joseph on February 9, and persuaded the King to receive Ferenc Kossuth in order to demonstrate that he was not opposed in principle to appointing a government which included the Independence Party. No one in either half of the Monarchy could fail to grasp the drama of the situation. Lajos Kossuth had led the Hungarian nation in deposing Franz Joseph as Apostolic King of Hungary in 1849 and the establishing of an independent republic. Now his son, Ferenc Kossuth, as president of the largest party in the Hungarian Parliament and pledged to restore the nation's independence, was to be received by the same
Apostolic Majesty. Though a large number of Kossuth's supporters wanted to accompany him to Vienna in a mass demonstration, Kossuth insisted on travelling with little fanfare, befitting the dignity of a potential cabinet minister. When he arrived at the Hofburg on Sunday morning, February 12, he found a Hungarian palace guard unit on duty. The Palace Marshall of the Day greeted him in Hungarian. When he entered Franz Joseph's study, the King welcomed him in Hungarian, after which they conferred for nearly an hour, entirely in French. During his entire visit to the Hofburg, Kossuth heard not one word of German! Later he issued a press release in French.3

Other favors were being extended to the Coalition in military affairs. On February 13 it was announced that henceforth the Hungarian Defense Ministry would correspond in the Hungarian language with the Joint War Ministry in Vienna and with all commands of the joint army, unless the urgency of the subject would cause a serious delay in translating. The Hungarian Defense Ministry was to be considered a civil organ of the Hungarian state rather than an arm of the imperial war machine.4

When Andrásy left for Vienna to report to Franz Joseph on February 18, there were rumors that he had found a "formula" to solve the military stalemate. After gaining the King's approval, he laid a plan before the Coalition Steering Committee on February 21. The Steering Committee on that date gave its tentative approval to the formation of a four-month transitional govern-

2 NFP, 1905, Feb. 11M; PL, Feb. 14M.

3 NFP, 1905, Feb. 12M, 13A, 15A. Kossuth was received in a similar manner in April 1906, after being appointed Minister of Finance. Many Austrian centralists, such as Sosnosky, considered the ostentatious courtesy shown to separatist Magyars to be a shameful demonstration of imperial weakness. (Sosnosky, Politik, II, 140-41.)

4 PL, 1905, Feb. 14M.
ment and agreed to pass a four-month budget bill on condition that a su-
frage reform measure be introduced. They were willing, moreover, to approve
a four-month normal recruit quota—that is, without the increased numbers of
troops requested by the Joint War Ministry—after the suffrage reform was
completed. The new cabinet was to have only administrative, not political
functions, and would be politically colorless, drawn mainly from the ranks
of the Dissidents. Darányi, Széll and Wekerle were rumored to be in line to
become Prime Minister. These men were all former cabinet ministers whom
Franz Joseph had learned to respect; they had all left the Liberal Party,
but significantly neither Wekerle nor Darányi now held a seat in Parliament.
(Four months later, when the Coalition branded the Fejérváry government as
illegal and unconstitutional, one of their arguments was that the members
of the cabinet were not members of Parliament.)

A four-month budget authorization would only have postponed the
- cr i s i s until May 1, but it would have bought a little time. In agreeing
to such a makeshift solution, Franz Joseph may have been influenced by
Wekerle, who had advised him to put off making any binding concessions.

Andrássy had been trying other combinations, also. The leaders of the
Liberal Party revealed on February 22 that he had asked for their support
to pass a recruit bill if the opposition remained firm. Andrássy may have
been sounding out the possibility of forming a new coalition of all the '67-
based parties under his own leadership, or, to put it differently, he hoped

6 Franz Joseph received Wekerle on February 16 (NFP, 1905, Feb. 16M,
16A); Wekerle told Baernreither of their conversation on Sept. 12, 1905
(Baernreither, Verfall, 160-61).
7 NFP, 1905, Feb. 23M.
to draw some of the Liberal Party members over to his side. By betraying Andrássy's confidence, Tisza may have intended to compromise him in the eyes of his Coalition allies. In this he succeeded only too well. The Coalition dropped the plan of a four-month transition government coupled with suffrage reform, and assumed a rigid position. When Andrássy reported to Franz Joseph on February 24, he said he could form a government only on the basis of an independent customs area and Magyar command language. Franz Joseph was willing for Hungary to establish her own customs area, but not until the end of 1917, after the expiration of the foreign commercial treaties now being negotiated. The old Monarch would not budge on the question of command language. Andrássy said that in this case he was unable to form a government, and asked to be relieved as "homo regius." On this request the King made no immediate decision, and Andrássy's personal status remained for the time being as unclear as the general situation.  

Why was Andrássy unable to form a government? Various answers have been suggested, and they serve as clues to the later stages of the crisis. Some authors have blamed Andrássy directly, implying that he could have formed a government on Franz Joseph's terms if he had wanted to, but that

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8 NFP, 1905, Feb. 25M, 25A; PL, Feb. 24A. In the light of later constitutional arguments on the powers of the legislature, it is interesting to note Steed's dispatch in The Times on Feb. 25: "According to information from a trustworthy quarter, the Crown today raised in regard to Count Andrássy's request upon the military demands of the Independence Party the objection that these demands were unconstitutional, since the election had not turned upon the question of separating the Hungarian army from the Austrian army, but solely upon Count Tisza's campaign against parliamentary obstruction. The demand, therefore, could not be taken into consideration." The story is interesting, but not plausible. Steed had been in Vienna only two years and still thought as an Englishman. An English sovereign, as Steed well knew, would certainly have to consider the will of the electorate. Franz Joseph had sound reasons, backed up by statutory laws, to consider the demand for Magyar command language to be unconstitutional, and did not have to consider whether the voters had given Parliament a mandate on the issue.
he was unwilling except on the basis of the command words and expected 
Franz Joseph to give in. There can be no doubt that Andrásy wanted to 
become Prime Minister himself and to insure his own popularity with the 
parliamentary majority. Giving in on the Hungarian command words at this 
time would have destroyed his influence in the Coalition. Another explana-
tion points to the split within the Independence Party, between those with 
wealth and title who would likely receive posts in the new government, 
and the rustic back-benchers who had no hope of receiving political spoils 
and insisted all the more strongly on forcing the King to grant some valu-
able concession. But one very important factor must not be overlooked. 
Several aristocratic Coalition leaders--primarily Count Apponyi, Baron 
Bánffy, and Count Andrásy--were intensely jealous of each other's politi-
cal ambitions. They saw in the radically changed political situation in 
Hungary a chance to create a new popular following. The old Tisza machine 
was dying, if not yet dead. Whoever became the acknowledged leader of a 
new machine might expect to control Hungary for a long time to come. As 
these rivals sought to outbid each other for the favor of the back-benchers 
and the rural voters, they caused the Coalition's demands to become more 
 extreme and more rigid.

The first Andrásy mission had ended without result, and the King re-
sumed the initiative. On Tisza's advice, he held personal interviews with a 
number of Coalition leaders. Gyula Justh (Independence Party) created the

9 Gratz, A Dualizmus Kora, II, 62; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 128; Lánya, 
Regierung, 16; and Göncöl, Életrajz, 75. Lánya and Kristóffy were members 
of the Fejérváry government, while Gratz and "Göncöl" (psn. for the 
journalist Zoltán Ambrus) were protégés of Count Tisza. All tend to justify 
their own positions by accusing Andrásy.

10 MFP, 1905, Feb. 25M.

11 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 128.
greatest stir when he appeared at the Hofburg on March 4 in a coach driven by a Hungarian hussar in uniform. As the newly-elected Speaker of the House, Justh was entitled to a uniformed driver, whom he brought with him from Budapest.\(^\text{12}\) When Franz Joseph asked Justh if the Independence Party would continue to press for a separate Hungarian army, even if he were to give in on the question of Hungarian command words, Justh answered, "Jawohl, Majestät." The old Kaiser was shocked by such straightforward disrespect, which he considered "republican" behavior.\(^\text{13}\)

These interviews with the Coalition leaders rather upset the old Monarch, instead of pointing the way out of the stalemate. The Liberal Party considered the possibility of naming a Prime Minister from their own ranks, and waiting to see what fate such a cabinet might have in Parliament. Count Tisza was growing weary of the strain; he was suffering from migrain headaches and hoped to go to a sanitorium after the crisis was over. On March 16, Tisza reported to the King on the situation. Later that day a Crown Council was held, at which Franz Joseph agreed to travel to Budapest to take a personal hand in the Hungarian crisis.\(^\text{14}\)

The King and his entourage moved into the Buda Palace on Sunday, March 19. During the next two days there were renewed attempts to create a "colorless administrative cabinet" along the lines suggested in February. According to the informed rumors appearing in the press, Andrásy, Wekerle and Széll were not being considered this time, but those who were mentioned

12\(^\text{NFP, 1905, March 5M.}\)

13\(^\text{Baernreither, Verfall, 160-61; Justh denied this version of the conversation, NFP, 1905, Oct. 3M.}\)

as candidates for Prime Minister were Count János Zichy, Lajos Láng, Count István Burián, and Count Róbert Zselénsky. Expected to receive portfolios in the new government were Count Khuen-Héderváry and Baron Ernő Dánél. Except for Count Zichy, these men were all one-time protégés of Kálmán Tisza and former cabinet ministers who had bolted from the Liberal Party in opposition to Count István Tisza. Technically, they were all "Dissidents," but neither committed to Andrásy nor serious rivals of the ambitious Coalition leaders. However, the formation of a cabinet hinged not on personalities but on political objectives. When the Coalition Steering Committee met on the afternoon of March 21, Andrásy reported that Franz Joseph was willing to leave the economic question to be settled by agreement between the two governments, but considered the Committee of Nine program to be the ultimate concession in military affairs. Once again the Coalition refused to form a government without Hungarian command language. With this, Andrásy declared his commission was at an end.

Franz Joseph finished his first week in Budapest with a busy round of conferences and gala dinners, but he was discouraged. On Sunday, March 26, he found time to write to Frau Schratt that he did not know how soon he could return to Vienna, "since the crisis here sees no solution; I stand firmly on my principles; the people are confused, scatter-brained and frivolous, and there is a deplorable shortage of competent and half-way courageous men."

The following week brought a new approach. Count László Szögyény-Marich, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, was called to Budapest to act as negotiator for the King. Szögyény spent four days in Budapest and

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15 NFP, 1905, March 20A, 21M, 21A, 22M; PL, Mar. 22M, 22A.
16 Franz Joseph I, Briefe, 454-55.
managed to get talks started again. On March 30, General Heinrich von Pitreich, Joint Minister of War, and Admiral Rudolf Count Montecuccoli, Chief of Naval Affairs, came to Budapest to take part in discussions with the Coalition on military questions. By the time Szögyény left Budapest on Thursday night, March 30, the press was predicting that a new government would be appointed before the end of the week. 17

The Szögyény compromise provided for a new government to be selected from the Coalition, with Laszló Lukács to become Prime Minister. The question of command language would be deferred for two years. Work would begin immediately to redesign military flags and emblems to emphasize Hungary's position within the Dual Monarchy. This had been included in the Committee of Nine Program, but the work had not yet begun. The most important discussions centered on reducing military expenses by spreading them over a longer period of time. According to one plan, the issuing of the loan of 450 million crowns for armaments, ratified by the Delegations in June 1904, would be postponed for two years. Later General Pitreich agreed to reduce the amount of the loan to 311 million crowns, an amount he considered an absolute minimum. At the same time, however, the annual joint military budget would be reduced by 27 million crowns; this annual saving would not only pay the interest, but amortize the entire loan within twenty-five years. Even without the 27 million crown reduction in the budget, Hungary's share of the 311 million crown loan would be 106 million, requiring but 4.3 million crowns interest annually. (Count Tisza later blamed the Coalition for prolonging the crisis, saying that the Hungarian command language was not really an important issue to them, and they had brought the nation to the verge of anarchy for the sake of a mere four

17 NFP, 1905, March 26M, 30M, 30A, 31M.
million crowns.\textsuperscript{18}

The Szögyény compromise was the closest approach to a settlement so far. Agreement was never again in sight until April 1906, when the Coalition suddenly capitulated. Although the individual leaders of the Coalition had agreed to each point, the Szögyény plan was turned down when the Coalition met on the morning of April 3. Once again, in an open meeting, the Coalition leaders could not disavow Hungarian command language, not even to postpone the question for two years. Franz Joseph returned to Vienna on the following day, while the Coalition leaders loudly accused everyone but themselves for the breakdown. Kossuth charged that the military authorities had not waited for the Hungarian Parliament to authorize the funds, but had already placed orders or signed contracts for all but 81 million of the 450 million crown loan. The military officials insisted that only 53 million had actually been spent—though they had earlier mentioned 76 million already disbursed or contracted.\textsuperscript{19}

Every attempt to end the crisis so far had come from the side of the King. The Coalition had only rejected proposals; they had made none of their own. During the next few weeks the initiative to make peace or to renew the attack was in the hands of Parliament. Parliament had first opened on February 17. After routine tasks of organization, it recessed for four weeks to await the appointment of a government. It reassembled on April 4, the same day the King left Budapest. In its first significant action, the House of Representatives repealed the "Lex Dániel," the change in the rules.

\textsuperscript{18} Lacking any protocols of these negotiations, I have pieced together this account from incomplete and often conflicting newspaper reports and memoirs. \textit{NFP}, 1905, April 3A, 4M; \textit{Times}, April 3. Tisza's account of the negotiations in \textit{Az Ujság}, reprinted \textit{NFP}, 1905, July 15A; Tisza's viewpoint is repeated by Lányi, \textit{Regierung}, 15. See also Gratz, \textit{A Dualizmus Kora}, II, 62.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Times}, 1905, April 3, 4, and 6.
of procedure enacted on November 18. Only eighty-six members of the Liberal Party had the courage to vote against repeal. In an article in Budapest on the following day, April 8, Kossuth urged the disunited Liberal Party to "dissolve itself and cease to exist as a political factor that supports the constantly negative royal power against the nation and its aspirations." 21

On April 13, a resolution, "Address to the Throne," was introduced before the House. After Parliament returned from a two-week Easter recess, the resolution was brought onto the floor and with slight amendments was passed on May 12. 22 In its form it was a petition to the King in the name of "the members of Parliament for Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia assembled in the Diet," though the Liberal Party, recognizing it to be strictly a Coalition document, refrained from debating it and abstained from voting. 23 The "Address," written by Count Apponyi and introduced by Count Tivadar Batthyány (Independence Party), was the first positive statement of the Coalition's political goals and purported to outline the conditions under which they were willing to assume power. Yet on close examination its statements become quite ambiguous.

They [the Coalition deputies] all desire parliamentary reform including the extension of the suffrage, the constituencies to be classified in conformity to the interests of the nation. . . . The parties now commanding a majority are agreed in endeavoring to secure the establishment of economic independence, including

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20 Times, 1905, April 7, 8.

21 NFP, 1905, April 9M.

22 On the "Address to the Throne" see NFP, 1905, March 18M and May 4M; Times, April 4, May 6, May 13.

23 The forty Croatian deputies voted only on matters which concerned Croatia; the official parliamentary record does not indicate whether or not they took part in the vote on the "Address."
a separate customs area and an autonomous credit system, to be introduced after necessary preparations and under satisfactory terms.

The same parties also agree in demanding that the national character of the Hungarian army--the complement of the whole (common) army--find expression in the language and emblems used by the same. This last demand is shared by those too who avow as their final aim the most extreme condition, viz: --an independent Hungarian army; for, in the arrangement that may at the present moment, by mutual understanding, be carried out, they see the indispensable preliminary of the full realization of their program, and so can or rather are bound to support the same without having to give up or suspend the smallest particle of their principles. On the other hand those who did not press the arrangement in question have arrived at the conclusion that, without such reforms, the present serious crisis could not be terminated in any way that would satisfy the demands of constitutionalism: that Parliament could not count on doing uninterrupted work; and that the essential requirements of the army could not be provided for.

A ministry which took all these points into consideration could construct a plan of action, on the basis of which the support of Parliament could be obtained. . . .

We therefore with patriotic anxiety but with loyal confidence again beg your Majesty . . . to nominate a responsible ministry which commands the confidence of Parliament and by its program may secure the support of the same.24

The "Address to the Throne," though it sounded very modest and reasonable, did not really offer any new basis for forming a program of government. It called for an "extension of the suffrage," which might mean anything; the "interests of the nation" were to be preserved, probably by gerrymandering the constituencies to prevent the nationalities from electing their own deputies. Franz Joseph had already consented to economic independence for Hungary after 1917. He admitted--much to the displeasure of most Austrian businessmen--that this program was entirely constitutional

24 English text of the "Address" in Arthur B. Yolland, ed., The Hungarian Diet of 1905 (Budapest: Franklin Society, 1905), 5-9. Yolland's translation is complete except for the omission of part of the sentence concerning economic independence (the second sentence given here), which I have filled in. Complete text in the published parliamentary records: Hungary, Országosgyűlés, 1905-, Képviselőhazának Irományai [Documents of the House of Representatives], no. 19 (April 12, 1905).
within the terms of the Austrian and Hungarian Ausgleich laws. The cumbersome language about "necessary preparations" and "satisfactory terms" betrays the disunity within the Coalition about the desirability of economic separation. The lengthy statement about the diverse opinions on the army question sounds like an apology. The most important and most equivocal phrase is the demand "that the national character of the Hungarian army... find expression in the language and emblems used by the same." This might be interpreted as a call for a separate Hungarian army, or it might mean a demand for Magyar language of command in the Hungarian regiments of the joint army, or merely the extension of Magyar as regimental language. Again it might mean no more than support for the program of the Liberal Party's Committee of Nine.  

Simultaneously with the "Address to the Throne," the parliamentary majority had been considering impeaching Prime Minister Tisza for signing the commercial treaty with Germany. They were afraid to push impeachment proceedings for fear the Liberal Party would turn to obstruction—a reversal of roles—and for the time being they seemed content to let the idea remain an unused threat.  

The political stalemate was affecting personal emotions. On May 5, while Tisza was speaking before the House, he was interrupted and insulted by Miklós Pozsgay, a more disreputable Independence Party deputy. Tisza sent Count István Keglevich to Pozsgay as his second "to demand satisfaction." Pozsgay declined the honor on the grounds that Tisza had "hither-

25Lányi, Regierung, 352-53. The Coalition never received a direct answer to the "Address" in the form of a royal letter and attributed this discourtesy to the ill-will of the King or the bad counsel of his ministers. Prime Minister Fejérváry defended the King in the session of September 15. See below, p. 180.

26Times, 1905, April 13; NFP, May 13M, 16A, 17M, and 23M.
to allowed similar interruptions to pass unnoticed.”

But tempers remained short, and three weeks later when Count Keglevich challenged a heckler, a duel actually took place and Count Keglevich was killed. Although the immediate dispute was personal, party antagonisms were responsible for the tragic outcome.

By this time several months had elapsed, no budget or recruit bills had been passed, and no government had been appointed which could bring such a bill before Parliament. The Tisza cabinet was still in office as a caretaker government, and negotiations for selecting a cabinet from the ranks of the Coalition had broken down completely. Count Tisza and his cabinet were growing increasingly impatient to be relieved from their posts. The ministers and the entire Liberal Party were in an awkward position, not free to engage in political maneuvering as long as their official duties required them to retain a neutral stance. The Coalition was already talking of impeaching Tisza for performing, without parliamentary sanction, acts which he considered essential. The animosity felt for Tisza personally made it impossible for him to carry out the function of liaison between King and Parliament. The Coalition was anxious to be rid of Tisza, because even as a caretaker Prime Minister he had the power to appoint his friends to government positions.

The only answer seemed to be for the King to relieve the Tisza government and appoint a temporary government made up of persons outside of Parliament and independent of any party. Such a cabinet would have the authority to carry on routine government business, to lay before Parlia-

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27 Times, 1905, May 6 and 7; NFP, May 6M.

28 NFP, 1905, May 29A, 30M, and 31A.

29 NFP, 1905, Feb. 23M; Lányi, Regierung, 17.
ment the necessary budget and recruit bills, and to mediate with the Coalition to find a basis whereby a permanent government could be formed from the majority. A non-parliamentary government was unprecedented, it would probably not be popular, and its chances of success were uncertain, but to allow the present stalemate to continue was intolerable.

On May 7, Count Tisza conferred with the King in Vienna and asked to be relieved. He also talked with Baron István Burián, the Joint Minister of Finance, and urged him to assume the responsibility of a temporary government. Two days later the Liberal Party adopted a resolution asking the King to relieve the Tisza government. On May 12, Parliament passed the "Address to the Throne," which left no hope for the formation of a Coalition government under terms acceptable to the King. 30

Yet Franz Joseph was still unwilling to appoint a non-parliamentary government until he had made one more attempt to work directly with the Coalition. Accordingly, Baron Burián was appointed special negotiator for the Crown and spent four days in Budapest conferring with Coalition leaders. Since Andrássy was at home attending his brother's funeral, Kossuth acted as chief negotiator for the Coalition. On May 19, Burián had a long interview with Kossuth and probably offered him the post of

30NFP, 1905, May 8A, 10M; Times, May 9, May 11; Lányi, Regierung, 18.
Prime Minister. Burián also talked with Darányi and Baron Bánffy; Count Apponyi left Budapest to avoid meeting him. Burián was not empowered to offer Kossuth any new language concessions, but he could offer a speedy solution to the question of military emblems and regimental colors and a speedup in introducing Hungarian language into military courts. In the economic sphere, Kossuth was offered the possibility of a separate customs area in the future provided the economic agreement of December 31, 1902, between Austria and Hungary (the Széll-Koerber Ausgleich or "Sylvester Ausgleich") was ratified by the Hungarian Parliament and the subsequent commercial treaties with Italy and Germany accepted without change. This was the same package offered every other Coalition negotiator, unless there were some slight differences in detail which were not reported. A Coalition government under Kossuth was promised an entirely free hand in Hungarian internal affairs, but the increases in the size of the standing army and the military expenses would have to be accepted.

What these terms actually meant—if in fact Kossuth was offered the government on these terms—was that Kossuth would have to accept the mili-

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31 According to The Times, 1905, May 20. Lányi, Regierung, 16, and Kristóffy, Kálvária, 128, also say that Kossuth was offered the government but do not say when this occurred of what the conditions were. NFP did not mention the possibility of a Kossuth government at this time, but reported rather that Kossuth was acting for the Coalition in Andrassy's absence.

Kossuth was reported to have said on a later occasion that he had once spent an entire day in the saddle until Apponyi bucked him off. Kossuth's remark, if genuine, probably refers to the talks with Burián on May 19 and 20, and suggests a plausible reason why the talks were unsuccessful. For more on this topic, see below, pp. 184-85.

The Coalition deliberately ignored the constitutional issue raised by the appointment of Burián as mediator. As a Joint Minister he was forbidden by law to exert any influence upon the internal affairs of either state. (NFP, 1905, May 20A.)

tary increases and the commercial treaties, postponing economic separation until 1917. He was asked to agree to the Liberal Party's Committee of Nine program, dropping the question of command language, and accepting the full 450 million crown loan. The Szögyény compromise had offered the Coalition more. Burián probably believed that Kossuth was willing to pay this price to become Prime Minister, and that his Independence Party would rather back him than Andrásy. It was a good gamble, and Kossuth began to act like a Prime Minister-designate by moving to withdraw impeachment proceedings against Tisza.\(^{33}\)

Burián's efforts were frustrated when the Coalition Steering Committee, on May 21, refused to endorse Kossuth as its Premier-designate and appointed Count Andrásy as its representative to the Crown. Most members of the Independence Party were willing to accept a Liberal Party program as a price for forming a government, but, once again, it was Count Apponyi and the aristocrats from the '67-based parties who demanded much more. The outcome was predictable. In a forty-five minute audience on May 24, Andrásy again refused to form a government without Hungarian command language, and this Franz Joseph refused to grant. The only alternative was the appointment of a non-parliamentary, non-partisan government.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{33}\) NFP, 1905, May 23M.

\(^{34}\) Times, 1905, May 22, 23, 24, 25; NFP, May 21M, 22A, 23M, 25M.
CHAPTER 4

THE FEJÉRVÁRY GOVERNMENT

A. The New Cabinet

The formation of a "colorless business cabinet" proved to be no easy task. Lieutenant General Baron Géza Fejérváry agreed to return from retirement to become Prime Minister. When his appointment was announced on May 28, Steed reported in The Times: "His acceptance is little short of heroic, for he knows himself to be sacrificing his brilliant past and comfortable present, and to be condemning himself to spend the remaining years of his life as an object of execration."\(^1\) The prophecy proved to be no exaggeration. The old general probably felt it to be his duty to obey His Majesty, whatever the personal cost.

Filling the other cabinet posts took longer than had been expected. Several times the press reported that the formation of a government was imminent, only to announce another postponement.\(^2\) Gyula Justh later claimed that forty-two persons had been offered cabinet posts before eight accepted.\(^3\) A few days before the new government was officially announced,

\(^1\) *Times*, 1905, May 29.

\(^2\) *NFP*, 1905, May 30M, 31M; June 5A, 6A, 7M, 13A, 14M.

\(^3\) Justh's speech at Battonya, Sept. 3, 1905, reported in *NFP*, 1905, Sept. 4M and *Times*, Sept. 5. Justh was in champagne spirits at the time, and said some rather inelegant things about the Fejérváry government, so his statement may be questioned. In a report dated May 28, 1905, Fejérváry indicated that he had already offered cabinet posts to fifteen persons. (O.L., Kabinetts-Archiv, Geheime Akten, Nachlass Daruváry, Carton no. 25: "Bildung des Kabinetts Baron Fejérváry.")
one of the Budapest newspapers anticipated the appointment with the headline "The Bodyguards are Coming." The name stuck, and the government of Lt. Gen. Fejérvary, Commander of the Royal Hungarian Personal Guard, was to be known to history as the "Darabont kormány," the government of the bodyguards. 4

On Sunday, June 18, 1905, Franz Joseph relieved the Tisza government and appointed the cabinet of Baron Fejérváry, charging them to strive to create a basis of understanding whereby a majority cabinet could be formed. 5 The King was in Budapest for the funeral of Archduke Joseph, and took this opportunity to receive the new government in the Budapest Palace for the installation ceremony. 6 The members of the new cabinet were:

Prime Minister: Baron Géza Fejérváry
Justice: Bertalan Lányi
Commerce: László Vörös
Interior: József Kristóffy
Defense: Ferenc Bihar
Education: György Lukács
Agriculture: Endre György
Minister without portfolio for Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia: István Kovácsévics 7

4 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 134.

5 Text of the Crown letter appointing Prime Minister Fejérváry reprinted in Lányi, Regierung, 18-19. At the same time, Baron Fejérváry was appointed a life member of the House of Magnates. (Hungary, Országggyűlés, 1905-, Főrendiházának Irományai [Documents of the House of Magnates], I, 101.)

6 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 134.

7 Although his Croat name was probably Stjepan Kovačević, his name appears in all Hungarian documents, even in his own hand, in the Magyarized form which I have used here. I have attempted to use the native names of all other non-Magyar citizens of Hungary.
Baron Fejérváry himself assumed the position of Minister a latere (responsible for liaison with the Monarch and the Vienna Court), and assumed provisory leadership of the Finance Ministry. The real work of the Finance Ministry was conducted by the exceptionally capable State Secretary, Sándor Popovics, who was thus spared the political odium attached to the Fejérváry government.

Except for the Prime Minister, the members of the cabinet were not well known. None had ever held a cabinet post before, and none would again. Most had served in lower positions in government ministries. Vörös was a former State Secretary in the Commerce Ministry, and Field Marshall Lieutenant Bihar had held an equivalent position in the Defense Ministry. Kristóffy, Lukács and Kovácssevics had served as lord lieutenants at the county level. György Lukács, at forty the youngest cabinet member, had the best-known name, for he was the nephew and brother-in-law of László Lukács, the longtime Finance Minister.\(^8\)

Most of the members of the Fejérváry cabinet confined themselves strictly to the responsibilities of their own departments. Only Kristóffy and Lányi stand out from the rest because of the parts they played in the political struggle. Bertalan Lányi, fifty-four years old, a former judge, had served since 1891 in the Codification Section of the Justice Ministry. The revision of the Civil Law Code was largely his work. In January 1905 he had resigned his civil service post and was elected to Parliament for the Liberal Party from his home town, Liptó St. Miklós [Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš,

\(^8\)NFP, 1905, June 14th, gives thumbnail sketches of each of the new ministers. See also Kristóffy, Kálvária, 134-36.

György Lukács, 1865-19??, Minister of Education 1905-06, and thereafter frequently elected to Parliament until the 1920's, should not be confused with the great Marxist thinker of the same name, 1885-1971, Minister of Education under Béla Kun in 1919 and again under Imre Nagy in October 1956.
Slovakia]. The only member of the cabinet who was a member of Parliament at the time of his appointment, he immediately resigned his seat and his membership in the Liberal Party, since the government was to be non-partisan and non-parliamentary. Lánya was a dedicated and very capable constitutional lawyer, devoted to justice perhaps more firmly than many of his fellow jurists. He insisted that the Fejérváry government must act entirely within the existing statutes and more than once threatened to resign if the government committed any illegal act. At the same time he took it upon himself to defend the actions of the government against the charges that it was unconstitutional and illegal. It was perhaps both Lánya's strength and his weakness that he was too correct and logical a scholar to combat emotional, irrational arguments effectively, and too correct a constitutionalist to condone a violation of even an unjust constitution. 9

József Kristóffy is the person best-remembered for his association with the 1905 crisis, especially because he became the champion of universal suffrage. It is well known that by 1907, after the Coalition had come to power, Kristóffy was the principal advisor on Hungarian affairs to the heir-apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 10 Upon his coronation as King of Hungary, Franz Ferdinand would have been required to take an oath to uphold

9 Lánya is given a complimentary appraisal in Kristóffy, Kálvária, 135.

the Hungarian constitution. Under Kristóffy's advice he considered postponing his coronation until he had modified the constitution, introducing universal suffrage by decree. Franz Ferdinand may even have kept Kristóffy in mind as a future Prime Minister. There are some suggestions, however, that Kristóffy was already known as a protégé of the Archduke before entering the cabinet. The archduke's influence was suspected behind Kristóffy's plan to destroy the Magyar oligarchy by winning the support of the disenfranchised lower classes and nationalities. Because of his espousal of universal suffrage Kristóffy was hailed by some Austrian liberals as a political genius. Almost all Magyar politicians, from Tisza to the left wing of the Independence Party, hated him because his suffrage scheme would have destroyed the entire political system as they knew it. In his capacity as Interior Minister, Kristóffy bore the responsibility for most of the repressive police measures which the Fejérváry government found necessary to preserve order in the county towns. To the end of his life Kristóffy was accused of having plotted to destroy the ancient constitution, first while in office and later in conjunction with the "Magyar-hating" Franz Ferdinand. His enemies called him power-hungry, unscrupulous, and stupid. He was not a political genius, and his own ego sometimes distorted his perspective, but the fact that his enemies found him so dangerous shows that he was of more than modest ability.

The new government was scheduled to make its first appearance before Parliament on June 21. Yet even before the government could be introduced, Tisza had abandoned it and the Coalition had decided on a head-on confrontation. At a meeting of the Liberal Party deputies on June 20, Tisza said

11 The published scholarship on Franz Ferdinand has concentrated on the period after 1906, by which time the Archduke began openly to exert an influence in public affairs. The "Franz Ferdinand Nachlass" deserves to be studied for insight into the Hungarian crisis of 1905.
the individual members of the cabinet deserved sympathy and respect for
the sacrifice they were making for the good of the country, yet the Liberal
Party could not lend its political support to a non-parliamentary govern-
ment. Tisza's speech in fact opened the way for the Liberal Party to ab-
stain in a vote of no-confidence; privately he seems to have persuaded his
party that it would be foolish to vote against the cabinet until there was
a chance of a better government being formed. 12

Tisza's rejection of the government may have taken some people by
surprise. It was Tisza, after all, who had proposed the Fejérváry govern-
ment in the first place. Moreover, although the Fejérváry government was
"outside the political parties" in name, it was clear from the circum-
stances that the new government upheld the same "1867 basis" as Tisza's Lib-
eral Party, and was in fact made up of persons associated with that party.

Kristóffy sees in Tisza's action a devious political trick. He
claims that Tisza was acting on the assumption that any negotiations be-
tween the Coalition and a temporary, non-parliamentary government would
quickly lead to failure, and in the long run Tisza's party would be asked
to take over the government again. Tisza nominated Baron Fejérváry to the
post of Prime Minister because he knew that the old general would offend
everyone with his abrupt military manner, and so every attempt to come to an
agreement whereby the Coalition could come to power would be frustrated.
Here, Kristóffy boasts, Tisza miscalculated, for eventually the Fejérváry
government did find a way to end the crisis and bring the Coalition to

12 Excerpts from Tisza's speech, NFP, 1905, June 21M, and Lányi,
power. Yet Tisza's position is not hard to understand. He was now leader of a minority party in Parliament. If he had supported the government, he would have lost his freedom of maneuver and might also have lost control of many of his party members who were influenced by the Coalition's claim that the new government was illegal. Furthermore, the Fejerváry government could not fulfill its mission unless it rid itself of the suspicion that it was only the same Tisza-Liberal Party in disguise.

Moderate voices within the Coalition seemed at first inclined to accept the new government with a wait-and-see attitude. The Coalition appeared willing to receive the government with "dignified restraint" and to register the royal rescript appointing it. Count Apponyi was probably responsible for changing this attitude. On June 20, the Coalition issued a statement which not only expressed its lack of confidence in the government but branded the appointment of a non-parliamentary government as illegal and vowed that the Coalition would not consider any bill or motion which such a government introduced. At the same time, preparations were begun for "passive resistance."\(^{14}\)

13 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 138. Times, 1905, Sept. 5, suggests that Fejerváry had an abrasive personality unsuited for the role of peacemaker. This characteristic is not mentioned, favorably or unfavorably, in most of the other literature.


14 Steed's dispatch in The Times, 1905, June 20 (dateline Vienna, June 19) stressed Apponyi's influence. On June 21 (Vienna, June 20) Steed first mentioned "passive resistance." We do not know how reliable his sources of information were. NFP, June 21M, reported that the Coalition was planning their strategy in case Parliament were recessed, but the nature of their action was secret.

The Coalition resolution was published in the semi-official newspaper Magyar Nemzet, and reprinted in Lányi, Regierung, 22.
To declare a royally appointed government to be illegal was a serious escalation of the political tension. The declaration placed the Coalition out on a limb from which they could not easily retreat without losing face. The legal aspects of this question will be discussed in the following chapter, but we can note here that Count Apponyi had made it impossible for any "moderate" member of the Coalition to negotiate with the Fejérváry government without being accused of treason. Kristóffy, one of our most important sources here, maintains that when Tisza rejected the government, the Coalition was forced to out-bid him and was pushed to the more extreme course of "national resistance." Kristóffy has allowed his personal feelings against Tisza to cloud his memory. The Coalition resolution branding the government as illegal was published before Tisza's speech of the same day. The initiative for escalating the political tension seems to have come from Count Apponyi, who forced Tisza to distance himself from a government of questionable legality.

15 Kristóffy, Káldvári, 138-39.
B. The Parliamentary Session of June 21

The Fejerváry government was introduced before the House of Representatives on the morning of June 21. The government expected a motion of no-confidence. Although no such motion had ever been brought before the House before, the House rules of procedure provided that it be referred to committee and debated in normal fashion. The government hoped in this way to gain enough time to persuade Parliament to pass the necessary budget and recruit bills.

An uneasy hush descended upon the House as the cabinet members walked in and took their seats on the platform. Prime Minister Fejerváry approached the podium. Before he could begin his speech, the first insult was shouted from a back row. In a moment the entire Coalition side of the House was in commotion, screaming and shouting. The Liberal Party deputies sat motionless. General Fejerváry, not one to flinch in the face of enemy fire, proceeded to read his speech. He explained the purpose of his government, assuring that the government would remain in office no longer than absolutely necessary. In the meantime Parliament had to pass the essential budget and recruit bills. He pointed out that there were several hundred thousand persons unemployed, yet until a budget bill was passed the government could begin no public works program. Until a recruit bill was passed it would be necessary to hold reservists on active duty, thus jeopardizing the subsistence of working class families and encouraging emigration.

16 The official record of the session of June 21, 1905, is published in: Hungary, Országgyűlés, 1905-, Képviselőházának Naplója [Minutes of the House of Representatives; hereafter Kép. Napló], 1, 459-76. The session is also described in the following: Lányi, Regierung, 22-30; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 139-43; NFP, 1905, June 21A, 22H; Times, June 22.

17 Lányi, Regierung, 22-23.
All the time while the Prime Minister was reading his speech, the tumult from the Coalition side continued. The Speaker, Gyula Justh, failed to bring the House to order. 18

In concluding his speech, Fejérváry referred to several bills which he wished to introduce at once for immediate consideration of the House: a budget bill for the first ten months of 1905, a recruit bill, and an authorization to grant state financial assistance to towns and villages. Speaker Justh, however, ruled that these bills could not be introduced until the business on the day's agenda had first been concluded. Fejérváry realized that Justh intended to entertain the motion of no-confidence at once, and to forestall this, he asked to read a royal rescript. The House divined that the royal letter was an order proroguing Parliament. Another tumult began, amid shouts of "Rogue!" Justh again ruled that the House could not depart from the agenda except by special vote. Fejérváry reminded the House that by the tradition of centuries, the King could be heard in Parliament at any time.

A debate ensued over the question of procedure. Tisza defended Fejérváry's standpoint, while Kossuth stated that ministers could not exercise their functions until Parliament had registered the rescript of their appointment. Andrássy begged the Speaker to allow the King to be heard, and inveighed against those who had brought the King to this humiliating position. Géza Polónyi, one of the Independence Party obstructionists, supported Justh. The House then voted. Only Andrássy and two friends, Darányi and Wlassics, voted with the Liberal Party minority in favor of

18 The stenographic record of the session shows that Justh called the House to order five times during Fejérváry's speech, and on one occasion reprimanded the House at length (Képz. Napló, I, 461-63). Newspaper accounts indicate that his control over the tumult was quite weak, however.
permitting the royal letter to be read.

The refusal of the Speaker to allow Fejérváry to introduce legislative bills before the House was more than discourteous, but was probably not illegal. However, the refusal of the House to hear the royal manifesto was clearly illegal. According to Hungarian law the King had the right to dismiss or prorogue Parliament at any time. 19 From this moment, therefore, the House was in rebellion against the King, and all subsequent proceedings could be considered illegal and invalid. 20 For this reason the entire cabinet walked out of the chamber amid the screams and jeers of the Coalition members. One Independence Party deputy, Miklós Pozsgay, spit upon each minister. 21 Justh rebuked not Pozsgay, but Fejérváry, for having criticized a decision of the House.

After the government had left, Ferenc Kossuth introduced a motion which stated that

as the character of the Fejérváry cabinet . . . does not conform to the requirements of a parliamentary government, the Lower House can show no confidence towards the said cabinet. 22

Aurel Novacu seconded the motion on behalf of the Rumanian National Party.

(The Rumanians, although not a part of the Coalition, were still cooperating with it. In a few weeks the course of events was to turn them permanently

19 His Majesty shall have the right to extend or to adjourn the assembled annual session and even to dissolve the Diet before the explanation of five years, and in such a case to order a new election of representatives; but in the latter case His Majesty shall order the meeting of the new Diet in such a manner that it shall assemble within three months after the dissolution of the former Diet." Hungarian Statute 1848:IV, as amended; English translation in Dodd, Modern Constitutions, I, 98.

20 Lányi, Regierung, 32.

21 NFP, 1905, June 23M; Kristóffy, Kályvária, 139-40.

22 English translation of Kossuth's motion in Yolland, Diet, 10.
against the Coalition.) Tisza said that his party could not support a
cabinet that did not have the backing of a majority, but he disapproved of
the conduct of the majority. Tisza was carefully straddling the fence to
avert a split within his own party. The vote was taken, and Kossuth's
no-confidence motion passed by a two-thirds majority. 23 Only then was the
Royal rescript read, proroguing Parliament until September 15.

After the Royal order had been read, the only legally defensible course
was for the House to adjourn. The Liberal Party, but for two members, left
the chamber. 24 Yet Speaker Justh did not close the session, but allowed
Baron Dezső Bánffy to introduce a resolution, which began:

The Lower House declares the prorogation of Parliament by Royal
rescript, which has evidently been effected with the object of
overriding the constitutional authority of the national assembly
and the legal declaration of the national will, to be unconsti-
tutional. Consequently it declares the cabinet's remaining in
office to be unconstitutional as having consciously set itself
in opposition to the will of the nation. The House declares
further that the cardinal item of our constitution, which for-
bids the levying of taxes and the conscription of recruits not
voted by Parliament, must in the face of such an unconstitutional
in cabinet be most strictly enforced. 25

The Bánffy Resolution was greeted with loud shouts of approval and was
passed unanimously. The House adjourned with cries of "Long live

23 The vote count is not recorded in the official record. Times,
1905, June 22, speaks of a two-thirds majority. This probably means that
the Liberal Party abstained; see above, pp. 75-76.

24 One of the two Liberal Party deserters was József Vészi. (NFP, 1905,
June 23.) Kristóffy, Káliária, 140, mistakenly says the Liberal Party
left at the same time as the cabinet.

25 An abridged English text of the Bánffy Resolution is given in Yolland,
Dict, 10-14; complete text in German, Lányi, Regierung, 27-30.
Bánffy told Kristóffy some years later that the resolution was drafted
by Andrassy and Apponyi and adopted by the Coalition Steering Committee,
but no one wanted to assume responsibility for it. Finally Andrassy nomi-
nated Bánffy. (Kristóffy, Káliária, 141.)
If there had been any doubt about the intentions of the Coalition leaders up to this point, it was now removed. In an attempt to placate the Coalition, the Crown had removed the hated Tisza cabinet and appointed a neutral, non-parliamentary government whose only purpose was to smooth the way for the Coalition to come to power. Yet before the new government had performed a single official act, the Coalition, in its statement published June 20, had called the appointment of a non-parliamentary government illegal. This meant that not the government, but the King had acted illegally by appointing such a cabinet, though in its later statements the Coalition insisted that they blamed not Franz Joseph but his self-seeking advisors. Next, the Kossuth motion had declared that the government was non-parliamentary (which it was) and thus could not enjoy the confidence of the House. This only meant that the government could not command a majority, which in itself denoted nothing illegal. The Bánffy Resolution went far beyond this and called the act of proroguing Parliament (for which the King himself was ultimately responsible) to be unconstitutional. It further said that it was unconstitutional for the government to remain in office (presumably after the motion of no-confidence). Yet although less than an hour had elapsed since the confidence motion had been introduced before Parliament, in which time the cabinet

26 Not in the official record, but reported in most eyewitness accounts (NFP, 1905, June 21A, and Times, June 22).

The Norwegian Diet had voted on June 7 to end Norway's personal union with the Swedish Crown, and many Hungarians claimed to see a parallel case in their own country. On the Hungarian view of the Norwegian situation, see Steed's appraisal, Times, 1905, June 9 and 12.

27 In defending their conduct of June 21, Coalition legalists tried to establish that "non-parliamentary" and "unconstitutional" are synonyms. See below, Chapter 5.
could not possibly have met, decided to resign, and sent a request to Vienna, the Bánffy Resolution called for an all-out struggle against the government. It ordered the county and city administrations to perform "passive resistance" by refusing to collect state taxes or enlist recruits.

One could perhaps argue that Parliament should have the opportunity to express itself on the new government before being prorogued, and that the decision of the House to proceed to the no-confidence motion, though in violation of the Statute 1848:IV, was perhaps excusable. In defense of the government it can be countered that Parliament would not have been prorogued if Fejérváry had been allowed to submit the necessary routine bills; and that, if afterward the House had rejected the government, the bills would have become a dead issue anyway. But allowing Fejérváry to introduce legislation would have implied the validity of his appointment. The Kossuth motion, though harmless in appearance, was part of the strategy used by the Coalition not to allow the House to recognize the legality of the government for even a moment.

The "Proclamation of National Resistance" amounted to "open parliamentary rebellion directed personally against the King," not only against his government. The members of the Coalition not only refused to govern, they refused to allow anyone else to govern; they not only refused to pass the routine budget and recruit bills, but now they enlisted the local officials in their fight in order to paralyze the government. They risked throwing the nation into total anarchy for the sake of the Hungarian command words. The proclamation clearly possessed no legal validity, since it had been introduced and passed after the session was legally closed, but it nevertheless made a great impact at home and abroad. Justh ordered

28 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 141.
it to be printed and officially distributed to county and city governments, where it was duly registered as law. On the same evening, the Coalition Steering Committee met and resolved to remain operational during the recess. They set themselves up, in effect, as a counter-government.

At five o'clock on the afternoon of June 21, the new government was presented to the House of Magnates. The Upper House adopted a resolution declaring its lack of confidence in the new government, but expressly recognizing the validity of its appointment.

The Liberal Party met that evening and declared that to dismiss Parliament at a time when the essential budget and recruit bills had not been passed was contrary to the parliamentary system of government, and for this action they condemned the government in the strongest terms. Yet they affirmed the King's right to recess Parliament. Tisza's party was in an uncomfortable position: in January, Tisza had dismissed Parliament and called for new elections at a time when the budget and recruit authorizations had not been passed and the outlook for passage seemed hopeless. Six months later, in December, 1905, even the Liberal Party was to join in branding the Fejérváry government unconstitutional because it repeatedly prorogued Parliament.

\[29\] Ibid., 142; Lányi, Regierung, 40.

\[30\] Lányi, Regierung, 30.


\[32\] Text of Liberal Party resolution and speech by Tisza, Lányi, Regierung, 31-32.
C. A Conference with Coalition Leaders, July 1

After the dramatic scene in Parliament, the cabinet met on June 22 to decide what to do next. A majority of the ministers was first inclined to ignore the vote of no-confidence, since it had no legal validity, and to attempt to negotiate with the Coalition over the formation of a majority government, according to the terms of their appointment. But Justice Minister Lányi convinced them that it would be more effective for the entire cabinet to offer to resign, since there was now no hope of any fruitful negotiation with the Coalition, and their resignation would free the King to deal directly with the Coalition without having to defend the legality of a non-parliamentary government. On the following day, Prime Minister Fejérváry presented their resignations to the King at his summer retreat at Bruck an der Leitha. Franz Joseph refused their resignations and ordered them to initiate peace negotiations with the Coalition in accordance with their original appointment. 33

In accordance with these new instructions, Baron Fejérváry invited the leaders of the Coalition to a conference at the Prime Minister's Palace on Saturday afternoon, July 1. As the five leaders arrived—Andrássy, Apponyi, Bánffy, Kossuth and Aladár Zichy—they had an argument on the sidewalk over which of them took precedence. Count Apponyi insisted upon the leadership

33 Lányi, Regierung, 33; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 144-45. The government tried at first to hide its indecision from the public. On June 22, Fejérváry declared emphatically that his government would not think of resigning (Times, 1905, June 23). On the following day the press reported unconfirmed rumors "that Fejérváry had offered his resignation, which was not accepted" (Times, June 24; cf. NFP, June 23M, 23A), but this fact was not officially confirmed until June 25 (Times, June 27).

Kristóffy, in retrospect (1926), believes it might have been better if the King had accepted their resignations at this juncture and re-appointed them merely as a caretaker government. In this way, normal government business would not have come to a standstill while the King was negotiating directly with the Coalition. (Kálvária, 144-45.) Kristóffy seems to have forgotten what he knew instinctively in 1905: that the Coalition would not negotiate at all until their power was broken.
of the group, even though Kossuth was chairman of the Coalition. 34

The Coalition spokesmen refused to listen to Fejérváry in his capacity as Prime Minister, but only as a private person. Fejérváry took no notice of this, except to point out that his government, while indeed unparliamentary, was not unconstitutional. He proceeded at once to the subject at hand. Turning to the Coalition's demands as expressed in the "Address to the Throne," he pointed out that Franz Joseph had already agreed to allow the Hungarian Parliament to make all the economic and administrative changes mentioned in the first part of the "Address." Only the demands in the military sphere were still in question, yet even here the differences of opinion were too slight to prevent the formation of a majority government. The King had already promised in 1903 that military emblems might be redesigned to show the Hungarian coat of arms as an equal and separate entity; this promise was repeated in the program of the Committee of Nine, approved in 1904. Now, Fejérváry announced, the King was willing to extend this modification to include emblems used in foreign affairs, so that the Hungarian coat of arms would henceforth appear at Austro-Hungarian embassies and consulates throughout the world.

The remaining demands all pertained to the "national character of the army." Franz Joseph had already agreed to the following demands:

1. The use of the Hungarian language in military courts. The only delay, Fejérváry explained, was in the shortage of Hungarian-speaking

34 Kristóffy, Kárvária, 145. The meeting of July 1, is described in Lányi. Regierung, 33-39; Kristóffy, Kárvária, 145-46; NFP, 1905, July 2M, 3A, 5M, and 6M; and Times, July 5.

Most accounts mention only the five Coalition leaders and Fejérváry as present at the meeting. In fact, István Rakovszky (Peoples Party) and Ignác Darányi (Dissident) were also present. Kálmán Thaly (Independence Party) was invited but did not attend. (Budapesti Hírlap, 1905, July 2, cited in J. Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, III, 625-26.)
officers. At present there were only six high-ranking military auditors who spoke Hungarian; it was not possible simply to promote inexperienced officers to high rank.

2. The use of Hungarian language in correspondence between military and civilian authorities in Hungary. This demand had been agreed to by the Committee of Nine, and was placed in effect by the Hungarian Defense Minister in 1904.

3. The use of the Hungarian language in officers' schools located in Hungary.

4. That all officers with Hungarian citizenship serving in regiments outside of Hungary be transferred to Hungarian regiments. This was being done, Fejérváry asserted, but he added that it was in Hungary's best interests to allow some Hungarian officers to serve in certain posts in Austria, such as staff colleges and high commands.

In addition to these concessions already made, Fejérváry announced that the King had now agreed to allow the knowledge of Hungarian, rather than mother tongue, to determine the regimental language. Since obligatory Hungarian instruction in elementary schools would soon convert every regiment

35"It was an interesting symptom of this supra-national solidarity [of the officer corps] that when in 1903 the Hungarian government, under pressure of the nationalist opposition, was successful in gaining from the Emperor the privilege for officers of Hungarian citizenship to be transferred into Hungarian regiments, more than a thousand officers of this category (belonging to the various nationalities) tried to gain Austrian citizenship in order to avoid the change because they feared that growing Hungarian nationalism would put them in an awkward situation from the point of view of their own nations." Jászi, Dissolution, 144. Cf. Paul Samassa, Der Völkerstreit im Habsburgerstaat (Leipzig, 1910), 91-92.

36In August the Grazer Tagespost announced that the Joint War Ministry had agreed to establish a war college in Budapest. (NFP, 1905, August 20.)
to the Hungarian language, and since all Austrian officers remaining with Hungarian regiments would be required to learn Hungarian in order to be promoted, this would guarantee that the Hungarian character of the army would be enhanced.

Only on the command words\textsuperscript{37} would the King make no concession. Fejérváry explained that a demand for Hungarian command words could not be justified on any legal grounds. Moreover, if the Hungarians were granted command words in their language, then the Poles and Czechs would make the same demand, and this could only lead to chaos in the defense of a multilingual state like Austria-Hungary.\textsuperscript{38} Even if the seventy or eighty command words were converted to Hungarian, they would not be an effective instrument of Magyarization, whereas the use of Hungarian as regimental language would be. England still used French words in her parliamentary functions, Fejérváry noted, yet no one considered this an insult to the English nation. Franz Joseph had already granted nine-tenths of the Coalition's demands, and had accepted the spirit of them, the Prime Minister concluded, and the other one-tenth was not important; it was certainly not worth a political struggle that would endanger the nation.

Although Franz Joseph had earlier insisted that he considered the

\textsuperscript{37}From the context it is clear that Fejérváry was referring to both command and service language.

\textsuperscript{38}Fejérváry did not openly suggest that the Croats might demand their own command language, but the hint was clear to his audience. Only three days later, \textit{Budapesti Hírlap} published an article by Nikola Tomašić, former minister for Croatia in the Khuen-Héderváry and Tisza cabinets and now president of the Croatian National Party and a deputy in the Budapest Parliament, who said that if the Hungarians were granted Magyar command language in their regiments of the joint army, the Croats would have every right to their own language. "The Hungarian politicians know this, and if they deny it they are deliberately misleading the nation." (Reported in \textit{NFP}, 1905, July 5A.) A few days later, István Kovácsévics, Minister for Croatia in the Fejérváry government, publicly defended the same viewpoint. (\textit{NFP}, July 14M.) See below, p. 215.
Committee of Nine program to be the ultimate concession in military affairs, Fejérváry was now offering the Coalition leaders a package going far beyond it. Under the current regulations, men were grouped in regiments according to mother-tongue; where as many as twenty per cent of the men in a regiment spoke the mother tongue, that language was considered a "regimental language," that is, permissible for reporting to the commanding officer and in other official use within the unit. (An officer assigned to the unit was required to learn one of the regimental languages.) The result was that among the forty-seven infantry regiments located in Hungary, only five were purely Magyar whereas thirty-seven were nationally mixed. Among these latter, in sixteen Magyars constituted the majority, in two they were even, but in nineteen they were in a minority. Besides, there were five regiments in which the Magyars were scarcely represented. 39

Fejérváry was now offering to have regimental language determined according to knowledge of Hungarian. It would be unlikely that twenty per cent of the men in a regiment would not know sufficient Hungarian to use the language if so required, especially if compulsory Hungarian instruction in the schools were energetically enforced. 40 The Fejérváry proposal was a practical package which was to lead, within a very few years, to a completely Magyarized army--Hungarian as the language of regiments, NCO schools, officer schools, military courts--an army which in turn would be an effect-

39 Jászi, Dissolution, 144, translation of Sosnosky, Politik, II, 204, from information compiled by A. L. Hickmann, Die Nationalitatenvorhältnisse im Mannschaftsstande der k. u. k. gemeinsamen Armee (Vienna: Freytag u. Berndt, 1904). Steed says in The Times, 1905, Oct. 5, that there were Magyar majorities in 18 of the 47 Hungarian infantry regiments of the joint army, while the proportion of Magyars in the 16 Hussar regiments was higher. Somewhat different figures are found in other sources, but the differences are not large.

40 "Regiments- und Kommandosprache," NFP, 1905, July 6M.
ive instrument in Magyarizing the civilian population. Fejérváry was following an old government tradition of appeasing the opposition at the expense of the national minorities.

The Coalition leaders could not have failed to understand the importance of the new concessions; in comparison, the seventy command words were insignificant. Their refusal, once again, to discuss any proposal without the command words shows that "the struggle for the Magyar command words was not fought on behalf of the people or the nation, but to increase the prestige and power of the aristocracy." The Monarch had already conceded enough to make a separate Hungarian army a realizable fact, and hence a positive threat to the continuation of the political union of the two countries. The command words served only as a symbol of his sovereignty, and the Coalition wanted to rob him of that, too.

After Fejérváry had finished his talk, the Coalition leaders one by one refused to discuss the proposals further, and lamely excused themselves. Kossuth said that further negotiations were useless, since Fejérváry had brought no new message from the King. Bánffy said the Coalition could not back down from its program. Aladár Zichy maintained that he was still in the '67 camp, but that statements such as those made by the Prime Minister were driving the entire nation into the camp of the Independence Party. Kossuth and Apponyi lamented that the unconstitutionality of the government prevented any further negotiation.

Whatever

*Although the Fejérváry government is remembered as the champion of universal suffrage, the school decrees of August 15, 1905, pertaining to compulsory Magyar language instruction, reveal the government as no friend of the nationalities. See below, pp. 147-50.*

*Kristóffy, Kálvária, 155.*

*NFP, 1905, July 2M. Kristóffy, Kálvária, 146, believes that Kossuth was ready to make peace "at any price."*
their private opinions, these men chanted the same line in public.

After the others had departed, István Rakovszky (People's Party), Andrássy and Ignác Darányi (both Dissidents) had a half-hour conference alone with Fejérváry. This meeting probably shows that some of the pro-'67 members of the Coalition were truly worried about the direction things were taking, yet couldn't say so publicly. Rakovszky's presence strengthened rumors that the People's Party was about to leave the Coalition.⁴⁴

After the conference on July 1, the summer heat wave drove most political figures out of Budapest to the comfort of their estates or to fashionable resorts. No new attempt to solve the crisis was to be expected until the end of the summer and the reopening of Parliament on September 15. In the meantime Fejérváry's ministers had to carry on the day-to-day responsibilities of government.

Immediately after the closing of Parliament on June 21, as the wheat harvest was due to begin, strikes broke out among the harvesters in southern Transdanubia. The strike movement rapidly assumed massive proportions, becoming a threat to law and order and a potential threat to the economy of the entire nation dependent as it was upon agricultural exports. The strikes took place almost entirely on the estates of the largest landowners, and aristocratic families with names like Esterházy, Zichy, Batthyány and Apponyi were faced with serious losses if the crop was not harvested in time. These same great families who had just urged the nation to resist the government now turned to the "illegal" government for help. The Fejérváry government reacted as any other Hungarian government would have

⁴⁴NFP, 1905, July 1A, 2M.
done under the circumstances and sent gendarmes and regular infantry troops into the fields against the strikers. In early July a strike broke out in the coal mines belonging to the Danube Steam Ship Navigation Company in Pécs [Fünfkirchen]. Though there was little violence, the government sent in several companies of infantry and a squadron of cavalry to help persuade the miners to return to work. The Coalition never questioned the constitutionality of this governmental action.

The Hungarian budget for 1905 had never been passed, but the Tisza government had continued to pay necessary state bills trusting that eventually a budget would be passed authorizing these payments retroactively. The precedent for this procedure had been set by the government of Baron Bánffy which had continued to meet normal expenses when the country had first gone into an "ex-lex" period in 1899. Prime Ministers Khuen-Héderváry and Tisza had done the same in 1903-04. The Fejérváry government had no choice but to continue this policy. It was a risky policy, if


46 On the Pécs miners' strike, see NFP, 1905, June 27M, 28M, 28A, July 1. Hungarian grain production for 1905 was high, and most of the losses due to the poor crops in 1904 were recovered. This suggests that the impact of the strike movement was not serious. See the statistical tables published by Scott Eddie, "Agricultural Production and Output per Worker in Hungary, 1870-1913," Journal of Economic History, XXVIII (1968), 197-222.

47 Lányi defends the legality of the government's expenditures during an "ex-lex" period, Regierung, 535-65.
a necessary one, because the Fejérváry government, unlike previous
governments in similar situations, ran a real risk of being impeached
by the House of Representatives for making unauthorized payments. The
situation had its comic side, however. The Budapest Polyclinic Society
received an annual subvention from the state, but it had not been paid
for 1905, lacking an appropriation. The Minister of the Interior was pre-
vailed upon to make an exception for this needy charity, and the receipt
was signed by the president of the Society, Count Albert Apponyi! (In
effect, Count Apponyi became an accomplice of the Fejérváry government
by knowingly accepting unauthorized funds.)

The next problem, one that faced the government almost immediately
upon taking office, was the question of the Hungarian contribution to joint
Austro-Hungarian expenses. Payments to the Joint Ministry of Finance
were made on January 1 and July 1. The joint budget for 1905 had been
passed by the Delegations, chosen from the two parliaments, but the
Deputations, representing the two governments, had not agreed on the quota.
To break the deadlock Franz Joseph, on June 26, 1904, had ordered the
quota continued for one year at the old rate: 65.6%:34.4%. In 1905,
neither Delegations nor Deputations had been chosen. The Hungarian govern-
ment had no authority to make the payment due on July 1, but they decided
not to ask the Monarch to fix the quota, but to pay the Hungarian quota
"automatically" on July 1 at the old rate, subject to subsequent ratifica-
tion by Parliament. This course was agreed to jointly by the Austrian and
Hungarian governments on June 27. The immediate problem was solved, but
the longer range question, what would happen after December 31, remained to

48 NFP, 1905, July 24.

49 In accordance with Para. 3 of the Austrian Ausgleich law, and Para.
21 of the Hungarian law.
be faced. Unless the Delegations could meet, there would be no common budget at all. In Austria, payments could always be authorized by a decree of the Emperor under the famous Paragraph 14; in Hungary there was no emergency clause, and the government would have to make payments on its own authority.

Several other problems demanded immediate attention. The Fejér-váry government had to defend itself against charges that it was illegal. The passive resistance of local officials had to be countered. And above all, a new issue had to be found which was strong enough to break the deadlock over military command language. The government found this issue in the proposal to introduce universal suffrage. To these problems we will now turn.

CHAPTER 5
THE LEGALITY OF THE FEJÉRVÁRY GOVERNMENT

The Bánffy Resolution of June 21 declared the Fejérváry government to be illegal and unconstitutional, and on these grounds issued the call for national resistance. The government insisted from the beginning that it was a legally constituted and constitutional ministry, and its instructions must be obeyed. The main responsibility for defending the government's legal position fell upon Justice Minister Bertalan Lányi. Only four days after the Bánffy Resolution, on June 25, Lányi addressed the Budapest State Prosecutors and demonstrated that the government was legal. He declared that as Minister of Justice he would insist that the prosecutors enforce the law according to his instructions. Shortly afterward, on July 6 and July 8, Lányi made speeches to the voters in Liptó St. Miklós, where he was running for re-election to the parliamentary seat he had just vacated, and presented similar arguments.1

Lányi pointed out that the Hungarian Law 1848:III 2 provided for an independent, responsible Hungarian ministry. It was the right of the Crown to appoint the ministers. There was no legal requirement that the government be "parliamentary," that is, that the members of the cabinet also

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1 Excerpts of these speeches in Lányi, Regierung, 54-56, and NFP, 1905, July 6M, 7M, and 8M. Count Tisza defended the legality of the government with essentially the same arguments in an article in Az Ujság, 1905, July 21; excerpts reprinted in NFP, July 21A, and in Lányi, Regierung, 395-99.

2 An English translation of this statute is found in Dodd, Modern Constitutions, I, 93-97.
be members of Parliament. This had been the custom so far, but there had been exceptions. The Law 1848:III spoke of a "responsible ministry," stated that "each member of the ministry shall be responsible for all his official actions," and provided for impeachment by the House of Representa-
tives, but nowhere did Hungarian law mention a "parliamentary ministry."
Yet Hungary did have a parliamentary system of government. This meant that Parliament, or more particularly, the House of Representatives, had the right to refuse to grant the funds and army recruits requested by a ministry, and thus making it impossible for the ministry to carry out its functions, might force it to leave office. But such a decision of Parliament was a political act. A no-confidence vote by Parliament did not in any way alter the legality of the ministry which had been duly appointed by the King. The ministerial responsibility described in the Law 1848:III was legal responsibility, not political responsibility. Without the support of a majority of the House of Representatives, it became politically impossible for a government to initiate legislation and otherwise exercise leadership in the affairs of the nation, but if such a government remained in office for a period of time without the support of a majority it had not thereby bro-
ken any law for which the members could be prosecuted. A government would not normally attempt to hold office without the support of a majority in the House of Representatives, but a government, such as the Fejérváry government, which had been formed solely as a transition government in order to bring about the creation of a ministry from the majority of Parlia-
ment, could legally accept the responsibility for carrying on the necessary administration in accordance with the existing laws. Such a government was unparliamentary, but nonetheless a legal and constitutional one.

Count Gyula Andrássy replied to Lányi's arguments in two widely dis-
cussed articles in *Budapesti Hírlap*. In the first article, July 22,\(^3\) Andrásy expressed his embarrassment at having to teach elementary principles of Hungarian constitutional law to Lányi, a learned jurist and Hungarian cabinet minister. It was a shame, he said, that those who were defending the rights of the parliamentary majority only a few months ago were now denying these same principles.

Andrássy maintained—without offering any proof—that the laws of 1848 established not only the juridical responsibility of a ministry, but the political responsibility as well. The laws of 1848 expressly introduced the English parliamentary system of government whereby a government cannot remain in office against the will of the majority of the Lower House of Parliament. This was the intention of the legislators who enacted the laws of 1848. The Statute 1848:III stated that the ministry was responsible for each of its acts, and then named certain specific misdeeds for which the ministers might be impeached. Andrássy concluded from this that the general responsibility included political responsibility. The resort to impeachment was an extreme measure and even this could not effectively guarantee that ministers would be held accountable because the King could always protect ministers faithful to him by exercising the royal pardon. From 1848 up to the present day every Hungarian ministry had called itself a parliamentary government, and every government which had found itself in a minority had resigned.

\(^3\)Andrássy, "A kormány törvényessége [The Legality of the Ministry]," *Budapesti Hírlap*, 1905, July 22; slightly condensed in *NFP*, July 22A. See also Lányi, *Regierung*, 57-58. Andrássy had told the Coalition Steering Committee on June 2 that the new unparliamentary government then being formed was "not necessarily unconstitutional." (*NFP*, 1905, June 3M.)
In the last two statements Count Andrásy was very clearly in error, and was refuted by an unnamed "Hungarian politician from Budapest" in the Neue Freie Presse on the following day. The King could not simply pardon ministers who had been impeached by the Hungarian Parliament because Paragraph 35 of that same Statute 1848:III stated: "With respect to a convicted minister, royal pardon may be granted only in case of a general amnesty." Furthermore, it was not true that every government which had found itself in a minority had resigned. From 1867 to 1905 the party in power had never once lost an election. Ministries had been formed and had fallen from power as a result of decisions reached in the Liberal Party Club. Only once, in the case of the government of Prime Minister Khuen-Héderváry in 1903, had an adverse vote in the House of Representatives caused a ministry to resign from office.

In the meantime, Andrásy's second article had appeared. This time he claimed that even if the 1848 laws had not made a parliamentary government obligatory, it would still not be permissible for a Hungarian ministry to remain in office against the will of the majority of the Lower House. If this was not stated explicitly in the text of the laws, it was established by right of custom. The King had sworn in his Coronation Oath to uphold the legal customs of the nation. Everyone knew that in England the parliamentary system was based on custom rather than law, but what English politician would dare violate the parliamentary form of government on the grounds that he was not violating any laws? A parliamentary majority, Andrásy continued, was not obligated to take over the government on the basis of a program which it considered harmful to the nation. Such a

4 NFP, 1905, July 23M.
5 Budapesti Hírlap, 1905, July 23; NFP, July 24A.
principle would mean that the government was merely the tool of an absolute monarch. The parliamentary system instead made it the duty of the King to bow to the will of the majority. At most one could speak of compromise, but it contradicted the concept of compromise to insist that Parliament must always bow to the will of the king. Andrásy concluded with the words, "The Hungarian state can be governed only on a parliamentary basis. The present ministry is not parliamentary, therefore it is not a legal ministry. We must work with all permissible means to make the position of the present ministry untenable." Evidently Andrásy was mixing principles of constitutional law with expedient political phrases of the moment.

Lányi replied in Pester Lloyd on July 25. Since Andrásy claimed—without any evidence—that the laws of 1848 had introduced the English parliamentary system into Hungary, Lányi turned to an examination of the English system as described by the prominent English constitutional jurist, Albert Venn Dicey. One of Dicey's great contributions to the understanding of the English system of government was to make clear the difference between constitutional law—formally enacted statutes—on the one hand, and parliamentary convention on the other. Dicey used as an example the fact that there is no law requiring a British Prime Minister to resign after losing a vote of confidence in the House of Commons. If he fails to do so, he may commit a political blunder by making his party less popular at the polls, but he is not legally required to resign. Dicey gave several examples of British cabinets which have remained in office, some for a considerable length of time, after losing a vote of confidence in the House of Commons, or even

after losing a majority in an election. 7

Lánya used Dicey's argument to refute Andrásy. Lánya agreed that a successful ministry could govern only with the backing of a majority in Parliament, but the Fejérváry government, as a transitional government whose only goal was to restore the harmony between Crown and Parliament, was performing a patriotic duty by remaining in office. In any case, the lack of parliamentary backing did not in any sense affect the legality of the ministry properly appointed by the Crown.

Andrássy still did not admit defeat. In two articles in Budapesti Hírlap on August 12 and 13, he claimed that the parliamentary system which in England rested on convention had been made mandatory in Hungary by the introduction of the 1848 laws, and he offered newly discovered evidence for this remarkable viewpoint. His evidence is, not surprisingly, not very convincing. 8

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By a remarkable coincidence the same question of constitutional procedure was at that very moment being debated in England. In the House of Commons on the evening of July 20, 1905—-or rather in the wee hours of the following morning—the Balfour government was defeated, 199 votes to 196, on an amendment to the budget bill for Ireland. Late in the evening, after a number of Government members had gone home, some thirty opposition members arrived to take their seats, making the narrow defeat of the government


possible.

On the following Monday, July 24, Prime Minister Balfour announced to a packed House that his government would neither resign nor dissolve Parliament. He denied that the British constitutional practice required him to take either of these steps, and cited several precedents of governments which had lost important votes in the House of Commons, or had lost a number of seats in by-elections, which had neither resigned from office nor dissolved Parliament. In the subsequent debate, the opposition speakers, including Lloyd-George and Winston Churchill, attacked Balfour's position as unconstitutional, and the Irish leader, John Edward Redmond, urged the opposition to turn to obstruction to make it impossible for the government to remain in office. The thrust of their argument was that the government had not only lost the confidence of the House, but had lost the confidence of the nation as well. In repeated by-elections government candidates had been defeated, and the Prime Minister was now unwilling to dissolve Parliament and appeal to the nation because he knew his party would be defeated.  

Although the opposition was itching for a contest at the polls, Balfour knew that there was no way for them to force him either to resign or to dissolve Parliament at the moment, as long as he held a comfortable margin of seventy votes in the House. The government had been defeated only on a minor item. The opposition could not win a vote of censure against the government, and in fact withdrew such a motion rather than bring it to a vote. True, government candidates had been defeated in by-elections, but any government which has been in office for several years loses seats.

The House of Commons proceedings are reported in detail in The Times, 1905, July 25. The official record is condensed and less interesting: Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 4th ser., vol. CL, col. 49-118.
"The most pedantic among the framers of constitutions has never proposed that the government of the whole British Empire should be made dependent upon isolated elections at Little Pedlington or Eatanswill," wrote Dicey shortly afterward. 10 Though his sympathies were with the opposition, Dicey upheld the position of the Prime Minister that there is no law which requires a government to resign after losing a vote of confidence, but that failure to do so may be a grave political error in certain circumstances.

The House of Commons debate echoes several arguments which were current in Hungary at the time. It is entirely possible that Lányi or Andrassy read the debate in the London Times, or a news report of it in a local paper. Yet there is no evidence from the writings of Andrassy or Lányi or of the other commentators on this question, either in the summer of 1905 or later, that they were aware of the simultaneous English

debate. The Hungarian jurists seem to have limited their research on English constitutional practice to the Hungarian translation of Dicey (1902) and older German translations of other English jurists.  

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The Andrássy-Lányi debate in the summer of 1905 ended with an air of incompleteness. Rereading it today, one gains the impression that neither side has presented all the evidence. The reason for this lies in the immature development of Hungarian constitutional scholarship. This debate represents virtually original research into an unexplored subject on the part of those who conducted it.

A one-sided view of Hungary's "constitutionalism," created during the period of neo-absolutism, 1849-1867, and carefully fostered throughout the

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11 In further discussions of this question, Győző Concha, "Jogi intézménye a parlamenti kormány? [Is Parliamentary Government a Legal Institution?]," *Budapesti Szemle*, CXXIV, no. 348 (Dec. 1905), 402-43, defended the constitutionality of the Fejérváry government, citing English and French parliamentary practice. Gyula Kautz, "A parlamentarizmus és különösen a parlamentáris kormányzat [Parliamentarism and especially the Parliamentary Cabinet System]," *Budapesti Szemle*, CXXV, nos. 349 and 350 (Jan.-Feb. 1906), 40-85, 213-48, went so far as to contend that Hungary did not have a parliamentary system of government, because she lacked the two-party system essential to it; the Hungarian system could be labeled constitutional, but not parliamentary. Béla Tillman elaborated upon Andrássy's arguments in *Elrendeli-e az 1848:III. t.-cikk a parlamenti kormányz? [Did Statute 1848:III Establish Parliamentary Government?],* with a foreword by Count Gyula Andrássy (Budapest: Grill, 1906). Lányi reviewed the question at great length in his book in 1909: *Regierung*, pp. 233-478. The essential points of controversy were reviewed by Gustav Steinbach, who contended that the English examples had no relevance in Hungary, but found that the Fejérváry government was indeed legal under Hungarian law. "Gesetzliche und parlamentarische Regierung in Ungarn," *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts*, L (1907), 168-82.
last third of the century, had become dominant in the schools and even in the law faculties of the universities. It required an exceptionally keen mind and strong will to resist its seductive appeal. This then-prevailing school taught that Hungary's "thousand year constitution" represented an unbroken tradition of limited monarchy, and that the Magyars had always been governed in accordance with laws they themselves had freely enacted through their representatives in the Diet. The years of neo-absolutism (1849-1867), in which the constitution was out of force, represented an illegal interruption which in no way disturbed the validity of the ancient constitutional tradition. The Ausgleich of 1867 restored the legal continuity of the constitution, expressly recognizing the validity of the legislation enacted in the revolutionary year 1848.

The doctrinaire constitutionalism emphasized the struggle of the "Nation," represented in the Diet, versus the King, particularly the kings of the Habsburg dynasty. This reasoning was developed into some very democratic-sounding principles: the will of the "Nation" was supreme; Parliament expressed the will of the "Nation"; hence, the supremacy of Parliament over the royal prerogative. Yet the "Nation" was so defined as to exclude a majority of Hungarian citizens.\(^\text{12}\) The King was not considered a part of the "Nation," and, consequently, all political questions came to be

\(^\text{12}\) Originally the term "Hungarian Nation" had referred to the Magyar conquerors of the Danube Basin. In modern times the term referred to the nobility. The petty nobility or "Gentry," no matter how poor, took part in the county assembly and administration, while the wealthy Gentry and titled aristocracy managed the country on the national level. The other inhabitants of the country were not citizens and had no voice in the conduct of the country's affairs.

This condition was changed by the legislation of 1848, which made all the native inhabitants of Hungary citizens but did not allow all to participate in the conduct of the country's affairs. The property requirement to vote or hold public office eliminated the great mass of agricultural workers, peasants holding tiny plots, urban laborers, and all but a few persons among the national minorities. Thus Parliament continued to represent only the privileged few.
viewed as resistance of a free people to a foreign, absolute monarch. Had the "Hungarian Nation" included both the people, represented in Parliament, and the King, it would have seemed only natural to acknowledge him as one factor in the law-making process. The Magyars jealously turned their eyes to England, where the King had not exercised his right of veto for two centuries, ignoring wide differences in historical and legal circumstances which destroyed any real basis for comparison.

The fiction that Parliament represented the "will of the Nation" was carefully preserved by the oligarchy which controlled Hungarian political life for half a century. Count Tisza derived from it his belief in the sanctity of the majority of the House of Representatives. He was trapped by his convictions in 1905. After using force to prevent a minority opposition from tyrannizing the majority, he found himself defending the rights of a new Coalition majority, even though he considered their demands unconstitutional. To the end of his life Tisza would never admit that the Lower House did not represent the will of the Hungarian "Nation," though he was perfectly willing to see the House elected with the aid of the most naked and capricious governmental influence. Count Andrássy placed the will of the Nation supreme, when he told his Constitution Party:

It does less harm to the authority of a constitutional king for him to consider the just desires of a constitutional body and reach an agreement, than for him to place himself above the law to justify his own personal viewpoint. It cannot reduce the authority of a constitutional prince to concede to constitutional influences and to refrain from doing what he has the power but not the right to do— even if he were

13 Lánya, Regierung, 276-78.

14 The royal veto has not been exercised in Britain since the accession of the House of Hanover, though the Crown has never relinquished the right to use it. The veto power has been exercised in the colonies and dominions even in recent times, however. (Dicey, Introduction (10th ed.), 114-19, 440.)
willing to rule permanently against the will of his nation. It can by no means harm a king to satisfy his own people. . . . The damage that the present course of action has already done to the principle of authority is frightening, and only a change of direction can save what is left to be saved.\textsuperscript{15}

Andrássy was not only insinuating that Franz Joseph had perfidious intentions of violating Hungary's constitution by force, but he implied that a constitutional monarch had no rights of his own. Such impudent language can hardly be reconciled with the principle of monarchy. It did not seem to occur to Andrássy that he and his allies were the ones responsible for destroying the principle of authority in Hungary.

The Hungarian constitutionalism prevailing at the turn of the century was a negative doctrine, seeking only to limit the authority of the King. Little attention had been paid to the rights of the King, or to the way the various elements of the state--King, ministry, the two Houses of Parliament, the state administration, and the counties--were supposed to interact for the common good. Out of the constitutional crisis of 1905-06 arose a sizeable body of literature--some of it growing directly out of Lányi's debate with Andrássy--which sought to correct the former unbalanced viewpoint. The new school aroused a storm of protest in the decade prior to the outbreak of the war, yet after the years of war and revolution many of its followers were politically discredited and their work could be officially ignored, so that the old ultra-nationalist interpretation of Hungary's consti-

\textsuperscript{15} Andrássy's New Year's address to the Constitution Party, NFP, 1906, Jan. 2H.
tutional history could remain unchallenged.16

In the absence of a developed body of sound scholarship, constitutional questions were most often answered by the short-range political advantage of the moment. This led, naturally, to strange contradictions. For example, the Coalition charged in January, 1905, that Tisza acted unconstitutionally by dissolving Parliament and ordering new elections during an "ex-lex" period, when funds and recruits had not been authorized. After the elections Andrássy warned them to forget this argument, since it would imply that the recent elections and the new Coalition majority were illegal.17 After the Fejérváry government had prorogued Parliament on June 21, Apponyi argued that a recess during an "ex-lex" period was worse than a dissolution, since the latter could at least be justified as an appeal to the nation (in

16 Harold Steinacker, "Über Stand und Aufgabe der ungarischen Verfassungs-
geschichte," first published in Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 1907; reprinted most recently, with a discussion of the newest scholarship on the subject, in Steinacker's Austro-Hungarica: Ausgewählte Aufsätze und Vorträge zur Geschichte Ungarns und der österreichisch-
ungarischen Monarchie (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1963), pp. 1-74. This article began as a book review, but went on to expose the favorite myths of Hungarian historiography. In its updated form, it remains perhaps the best discussion of the question available in a Western language.

Steinacker has been received by most Hungarians with utter silence. Only a few have honored him with a denunciation. Gyula Székfu, Der Staat Ungarn: eine Geschichtsstudie (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1918), pp. 197-98, claims Steinacker is ignorant of his subject. Székfu also calls Steinacker an Austrian, even though he was a German-speaking Hungarian citizen by birth. See also the unsigned attack, "Nyilt levél Steinacker Harold úrhoz [An Open Letter to Mr. Harold Steinacker]," Századok, XLIX (1915), 220-22.

Henrik Marczali, Ungarische Verfassungsgeschichte (Tübingen, 1910), and his Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht (Tübingen, 1911), were attempts to remove historical distortion. The latter was bitterly attacked by Edmund Polner, "Ein ungarisches Staatsrecht," Ungarische Rundschau, 1 (1912), 483-
525. The leftist historian Pál Szende went so far as to remove the halo from István Werbözy, the sixteenth-century father of Hungarian jurisprudence; see Zoltán Horváth, Die Jahrhundertwende in Ungarn: Geschichte der zweiten Reformgeneration (1898-1914) (Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 1966), 298-99.

17 NFP, 1905, June 3M.
other words, the enemy was now Fejérváry, not Tisza).\textsuperscript{18} A much more fundamental contradiction is seen in the circumstances under which the Coalition finally took office in April 1906, which represent a total retreat from "parliamentary" government. "Never before... had the political direction of a government been so completely dictated from above and then adopted--with joy--by the parliamentary majority."\textsuperscript{19}

The Coalition could have made the more practical argument that by proroguing Parliament, the Fejérváry government was preventing the House from voting impeachment, thereby circumventing the constitution. Tisza joined the Coalition in making this charge after the Fejérváry government prorogued Parliament for a fourth time on December 19. But this charge clearly could not have been made on June 21, before the government had taken any action for which it could be held responsible. By raising the question of unconstitutionality for trivial reasons and immediately calling on the nation to disobey the government, the Coalition was guilty of irresponsibly leading the land toward anarchy and thereby forced the government to take strong measures to preserve order. The changed circumstances weakened the impact of a later charge of unconstitutionality, though it was perhaps theoretically defensible.

Andrássy's articles in \textit{Budapesti Hírlap} are the nearest thing to a sound legal argument the Coalition was able to produce. The other Coalition publicists merely stated that the Fejérváry government was illegal, without attempting to prove it, and then drew the conclusion that it was the duty of every citizen to resist this government in order to defend the "ancient Hungarian constitution" from the encroachments of absolutism.

\textsuperscript{18}NFP, 1905, August 1M.

\textsuperscript{19}Lányi, \textit{Regierung}, 369.
The Fejérváry government can perhaps be criticized for failing to counter Andrassy's specious arguments more energetically, but in the summer of 1905 arguments were not won by rational discourse but by emotional catchwords. Lányi, the scholar, could not hold his own against the skilled demagogues on the other side who had at their disposal more newspapers--and more readers--to spread the exciting doctrine of National Resistance. Under the circumstances it is perhaps remarkable that the government retained the support of as many citizens and state officials as it did.
CHAPTER 6

NATIONAL RESISTANCE

The events of the past decade, in our own country and abroad, have made us well aware of the difficulties inherent in large-scale civil disobedience. After the initial exhilaration begins to fade, participants soon lose their discipline while their original search for justice hardens to blind self-righteousness. The Hungarian national resistance suffered the same fate.

The Bánffy Resolution of June 21 called the county governments to passive resistance and ordered them to withhold taxes and recruits from the central government. The right of resistance was an old and sacred element in Hungarian constitutional history, developed over centuries during which the country was ruled by foreign kings. In the Golden Bull of 1222 King Andrew II agreed that "if we or any of our successors ever wish to revoke this concession in any way, bishops, lords and nobles, each and every one, both now and in the future have our authority to resist and contradict us and our successors without taint of any infidelity." ¹ The right of armed resistance (jus resistendi), found in numerous medieval charters, probably had little practical effect, since the weak could hardly act alone, while if the magnates united against the King they were usually not content with the

¹James C. Holt, Magna Carta (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 66. Some Hungarian constitutional historians, anxious to emphasize any similarity between English and Hungarian institutions, have tried to establish that the Golden Bull of 1222 was patterned after the Magna Carta of 1215. See the discussion of this question in Holt, pp. 66-68, and the literature cited there.
repeal of an unjust decree, but rather deposed the king. Yet the right of resistance was recognized in the Hungarian coronation oath until the Diet, in gratitude to Leopold I for liberating the country from Turkish occupation, agreed in the statute 1687:IV to give up the right of armed resistance and granted to the male line of the House of Habsburg the hereditary right of succession.

Yet the nation retained other means by which to resist unlawful encroachments of the royal government. The rights of the nation were defended by the counties, which developed as autonomous political units. Until 1848 members of the Hungarian Diet were elected by the county assemblies and were required to vote strictly in accordance with instructions sent from these local bodies. Counties had the right to protest directly to the King against illegal or harmful ordinances. Royal decrees and acts of the Diet were not valid until registered by the county authorities, and hence by quietly shelving unwanted ordinances, the counties could frustrate royal authority. Statutes of 1723 and 1729 expressly authorized counties "to lay aside respectfully" any orders of the central government, the King, or the Diet, if they considered them contrary to the constitution. Moreover, the counties had the right to deny to the king taxes and troops if they were not granted by the Diet. The statute 1504:I (to which the Bánffy Resolution refers) included the provision that any county official who collected any tax

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2 Akos von Timon, Ungarische Verfassungs- und Rechtsgeschichte mit Bezug auf die Rechtsentwicklung der westlichen Staaten (Berlin, 1904), 124-25.

3 Marczali, Ungarische Verfassungsgeschichte, 88, 93-94; Marczali, Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht, 14.

4 William Sólyom-Fekete, "The Hungarian Constitutional Compact of 1867," Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress, XXIV (1967), 294. This procedure was used against decrees of Maria Theresa. (Marczali, Ungarische Verfassungsgeschichte, 101.)
tributionem or subsidium) which had not been granted freely by the assembled representatives of the entire nation, would be cast out of the ranks of the nobility (which at that time would have been tantamount to enserfment). Over the centuries the counties had repeatedly exercised their right to withhold illegal tax revenues, most recently in the period 1812-1825 when no Diet was called, and again in 1859-1860 during the struggle to restore the Constitution after the defeat of 1849.

With the Ausgleich of 1867 the independence of the Hungarian state was assured, and the autonomous powers of local governments were no longer needed as a defense against illegal encroachments of royal authority. Yet so great was the traditional suspicion of a central authority that Parliament was hesitant to destroy the independence of the counties in the interest of a more efficient centralized administration. Kálmán Tisza, Prime Minister from 1875 to 1890, knew how to insure that officials loyal to him retained the control of the counties, and in this way made the centralization of the administration politically unnecessary. Instead, the legislation of the Tisza years went half way, ending some obsolete practices yet leaving con-

5 Lányi, Regierung, 543-45, shows that the intent of this statute when it was enacted in the sixteenth century was not to curb royal authority, but rather to guard against tax farmers who collected more revenue than had been authorized, pocketing the difference. For this reason Lányi maintains the statute is no longer valid, a view upheld by Prime Minister Wekerle in a debate before the House, June 1, 1908 (quoted in Lányi, pp. 561-65).

6 Examples of county resistance in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and early seventeenth centuries are given in Timon, Ungarische Verfassungs- und Rechtsgeschichte, 702-06. For resistance against Joseph II, see Marczali, Ungarische Verfassungsgeschichte, 113-16; and for the period 1812-25, ibid., 127-28, and Marczali, Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht, 20.

In 1604 Zemplén County, a Protestant area, withheld tax revenues not because the taxes had not been properly granted, but because an article concerning religion had been inserted into the legislation for that year without the sanction of the Diet. (Timon, p. 703n.)
siderable power at the county level. In 1876 the counties were given new
boundaries and made more uniform in size. Some tiny counties and enclaves
were eliminated. There remained sixty-three counties, twenty-four cities,
plus Budapest and Fiume, all of which had independent administrations. The
counties and independent cities, known collectively as "municipalities,"
had identical or comparable forms of government and the same rights and
responsibilities. Finally the statute 1886:XXI codified the system of
municipal government but left the major share of administering and enforc-
ing the laws of the state in the hands of officials elected by the county
assemblies.

The highest officer in the county (not of the county) was the lord
lieutenant (Hung.: főispán, Ger.: Obergespan). 7 He was appointed by the
King upon the nomination of the Minister of the Interior. His position
was political, and he submitted his resignation if the government that nomi-
nated him resigned. His duties were largely ceremonial, yet he had the duty,
as representative of the King and his government, to insure that county or-
dinances were in compliance with the law. In certain cases of emergency the
lord lieutenant could exercise wide-ranging powers.

The county assembly (Hung.: Közgyűles, Ger.: Munizipal-Ausschuss or
Kongregation) numbered between 120 and 600 members, depending upon the popu-
lation of the county. Half its members were elected, the other half com-
prised the highest taxpayers of the county. In compiling the list of the

7There are no American equivalents to the Hungarian főispán and
alispán. They are translated as "lord lieutenant" and "sheriff" by most
English-language writers because they correspond somewhat to these officials
in the English county system.
The German terms, "Obergespan" and "Vizegespan," are somewhat mis-
leading as they imply that one is the assistant of the other. In fact
the two officials had quite different functions and different bases of
power.
highest taxpayers, the tax payments of certain professional persons were counted as double. The county assembly was therefore the stronghold of the large and medium landowners and of the conservative, nationalist provincial intellectuals. The voice of the smallholders and landless agricultural laborers could hardly be heard at the county level as long as this system was maintained. The county assembly had the power to enact ordinances and was required to approve the annual budget. It elected all county officials, who served six-year terms.

The chief executive of the county was the sheriff (Hung.: alispán, Ger.: Vizegespan). Most of the routine decisions of government were made either by the sheriff, or in matters which exceeded his authority alone, by the administrative committee (Hung.: közigazgatási bizottság, Ger.: Verwaltungsausschuss), composed of the lord lieutenant, ten members of the county assembly elected by that body, and ten officials, including the sheriff, county clerk (főjegyző), county attorney, county prosecutor, school inspector, county medical officer, and royal finance director.

The administration of state functions was placed in the hands of persons responsible solely to the county assemblies as a defense against a hypothetical tyranny of the central government, but the effect was to create a far greater tyranny of local jealousies, family rivalries, and the economic interests of the largest taxpayers. Any county official, to take an example, who tried rigorously to enforce the existing laws concerning working hours and conditions of apprentices, or sanitation of housing for migrant farm laborers, would simply not be re-elected when his term was over.

The arbitrary and harsh tyranny of Hungarian county officials, who were often petty gods in their own districts, has been generally underemphasized in Western literature on Hungary, and when it is described at all it is usually seen as mistreatment of the national minorities. In fact the
system was just as brutal in its mistreatment of Magyar peasants. For years there were plans to require county officials to be appointed by the government and to create a uniformly administered civil service, but no government was strong enough to push such a controversial measure through Parliament. The emotional upsurge of "national resistance" to the Fejérváry government strengthened the supporters of the county system, and the civil service bill was temporarily shelved. The Lukács and Tisza governments prepared a bill in 1913 calling for county officials to be appointed by the state, but the bill was never passed.

The Bánffy Resolution reminded local authorities of "their traditional duties in defense of the constitution," referring to the relevant paragraphs

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8 The corruption of the county officials is, of course, a standard motif in Hungarian literature. To name only one example, George Faludy, *My Happy Days in Hell* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1962), 19-33, recalls his childhood memories of the crude omnipotence of county officials, and the day of reckoning when the government fell in 1905.

9 The system of local and county administration and the problems connected with that system are rarely discussed in the historical literature available in Western languages, although "administrative reform" was an ubiquitous topic in the Hungarian magazine and pamphlet literature in the decade before the First World War. There is a short statement of the problem in Ilona Reinert-Tárnoky, "Die ungarische Innenpolitik und das Agrarproblem in der Zeit des Dualismus," *Südost-Forschungen*, XXIII (1964), 232-36. Károly Eszlary, *Histoire des institutions publiques hongroises* (4 vols., Paris, 1959-68), IV, 107-15, despite his title devotes only a few pages to county administration in which he fails to give any useful description of the system or assess its problems; more disappointing than the author's outdated anti-Semitism is his outdated scholarship and disregard for factual accuracy.

Turning to contemporary literature we find a few useful studies. Emil Reich, *The Magyar County: A Study in the Comparative History of Municipal Institutions* (London, 1893), *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, New Series, Vol. VII, pp. 37-53, gives an exaggerated comparison between English and Hungarian institutions typical of the literature of that period, but nevertheless offers a usable introduction to the subject. For a thorough study of the legal basis of county administration it is necessary to see both Heinrich Marczali, *Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht* (Tübingen, 1911) and the companion volume by Dezső Márkus, *Ungarisches Verwaltungsrecht* (Tübingen, 1912).
of the statutes 1504:1 and 1886:XXI. The latter required county officials
to carry out all instructions of the ministry except the actual collection
of taxes and drafting of recruits not sanctioned by Parliament, though the
officials were obligated to take any preliminary measures ordered by
the government in these two matters. 10 Since no budget or recruit bills
for 1905 had been passed, the Fejerváry government had no right whatever
to collect taxes or draft recruits by force, or to order the county author-
ities to do so. Nor did the government ever claim this right. Instead,
the struggle between the government and the resisting counties and cities
focused on the right of the King, through his government, to call up
reservists in peacetime, and the right of the government to accept military
volunteers and to receive tax money paid voluntarily.

Soon after June 21, in compliance with the Bánffy Resolution,
the administrative councils of a number of counties and cities resolved
not to carry out the orders of the government. To counter this threat
to its authority, the government issued on July 12 a "Warning Order"
to the municipalities. In a conciliatory tone, the "Warning Order"
repeated the arguments showing that the government was a legal one,
and pointed out that the Fejerváry government had not created the pre-
sent conflict but was only attempting to solve it. Yet it was the
duty of the government and of every citizen to avert a complete break-
down of authority. Citizens who voluntarily paid their taxes or
enlisted for military service were performing a high patriotic service.
The statement closed with a warning that the government would annul the
illegal ordinances of the municipalities if they persisted in resisting the

10 Márkus, Ungarisches Verwaltungsrecht, 116.
legitimate demands of the state.  

The author of this warning was not a member of the Fejérváry government, but Károly Eötvös, the Vice President of the Coalition Steering Committee and a member of Bánffy's New Party! He and some other Coalition leaders, including Ignác Darányi and Count János Hadik of the Dissidents and Count Aladár Zichy of the Clerical Peoples Party, were frightened by the growing threat of anarchy and were urging moderation. At a meeting of the Coalition Steering Committee on July 14 Eötvös urged his colleagues not to drive the country to revolution. He felt the county officials should not refuse to accept voluntary tax payments. Eötvös and the moderates were overruled

11 Text, NFP, 1905, July 14M; Lányi, Regierung, 42-45; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 153-55; J. Horváth, Ellenállás, 8-10. An unofficial warning had already been published in Magyar Nemzet on July 8; text, NFP, July 9M.

12 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 155. Károly Eötvös (1842-1916, not related to the family of barons of the same name) began his political career in the Deák Party, but by 1878 made his way to the Independence Party. In 1883 he successfully defended Jews accused of a ritual blood murder of Christian children in the infamous Tiszaezlár trial. His courageous defense of an unpopular cause earned him great popularity in Europe but cost him his bid for reelection to Parliament in the following year. He was elected to the leadership of the Independence Party in 1892, but soon resigned his position because of his liberal church policy. He objected to the obstructionist tactics used by members of his party against Bánffy, because he saw that the constitution was threatened by this kind of lawlessness. Left with little influence in the Independence Party, he helped his old friend Bánffy organize the New Party in 1904. A capable and prolific writer of both fiction and political essays, Eötvös wrote many of the speeches and pamphlets which appeared in Bánffy's name. Eötvös followed Bánffy out of the Coalition in March 1906, and after the New Party disbanded he made his way to Andrássy's Constitution Party and finally in 1910 to the newly organized National Labor Party of Tisza and Khuen-Héderváry.

His frequent shifts of political party may appear to mark him as an opportunist. At the same time he was one of the few statesmen of his time who was capable enough to stand alone without the support of his cronies, and who stood for principles more fundamental than those which divided Hungarian politics into 1848 vs. 1867.

13 NFP, 1905, July 15M, 16M, 18M.
on July 18 when the Steering Committee issued its own order to the munici-
palities, refuting the government's "Warning Order" and ordering the counties
and cities to continue passive resistance. For the first time the Coalition
Steering Committee actually assumed the functions of a counter-govern-
ment.

On the same day the government showed its own firmness when Interior
Minister Kristóffy annulled a local ordinance for the first time. The city
of Budapest had been the scene of extensive debate on passive resistance.
A number of important political figures were members of the city assembly
and administrative committee, and the legal debate in the capital assumed
a far greater sophistication than in the rural areas. The city's policy
had been reversed several times. First city officials were instructed not
to accept voluntary tax payments, then were told that they might. Finally
on July 14 the policy was reversed once again, and voluntary taxes were not
to be received. Kristóffy annulled this ordinance on July 18. Budapest
was the seat of many of the largest banks, financial institutions and busi-
ness corporations, whose tax revenues were considerable. Many of these
institutions and businesses preferred to make tax payments on time rather
than to be required later to pay a large sum for back taxes plus interest.
For this reason, Kristóffy chose Budapest as his first target, though the
rapidity of the government's move aroused some surprise. On July 24
Kristóffy annulled a similar ordinance of Pest County, and, within the next

14 Text, NFP, 1905, July 19M; Lányi, Regierung, 45-50; Kristóffy,
Kálvária, 155-56; portions quoted in Times, July 19.
few days, the ordinances of several other counties and cities.\textsuperscript{15} Before examining the annulment of municipal ordinances, we must first consider the question of military recruitment.

The annual levy of recruits normally reported for active duty on October 1, and were discharged on about October 1 of the third year of service. During the late summer and fall, reservists were called in for two-week training periods. As soon as the Fejérváry government was appointed, the Defense Ministry began to notify reservists to report for routine training. But as the crisis continued, it became more and more likely that no recruit bill could be passed in time to call up men by October 1. In this case, supplementary reserves would have to be called to active duty for extended periods of time to maintain the strength of the standing army. The supplementary reserves were men who were liable for military service but who, because the annual draft quota did not take all the men eligible, did not serve three years on active duty but passed at once into the reserve. They received some basic military training during fall training maneuvers. If reservists were to be ordered to active duty, simple justice would indicate that these men who had not yet served should be called

up before the regular reserves who had already completed three years of service. 16

Municipal authorities were at first undecided on what course to take regarding the call-up of reservists. Some counties resolved immediately not to deliver any call-up notices to reservists. Zemplén County, where Count Andrásy was a member of the administrative committee, accepted his suggestion that the county would deliver notices for reservists calling up for summer training, but not to supplementary reservists called up for an indefinite period, since calling up these men would be a deliberate attempt to circumvent passive resistance. Andrásy's distinction was ingenious, as the law recognized no difference between these two instances. 17

County officials were also undecided how to handle volunteers. Many young men, considering that sooner or later a recruit bill would be passed and they would eventually be called up, preferred to volunteer rather than delay the inevitable disruption in their lives. 18 Pest County took the ambiguous position that voluntary tax payments would not be accepted, but volunteers could enlist in the Honvéd between August 19 and September 16.


17 On the legal questions regarding calling up reservists, see Lányi, Regierung, 565-73, and Lajos Tihanyi, "A magyar országgyûlés ujoncsmegszavazási joga [The right of the Hungarian Parliament to authorize recruits]," Athenaeum, XV (1906), 94-100, 217-33, 342-50, 401-08.

18 Kristóffy, Kárvária, 151-52.
The county officials were not yet willing to push resistance to the limit. The city of Budapest took a similar position at first, but on August 18 decided not to give enlistment certificates to men wishing to volunteer.\textsuperscript{19}

Defense Minister Bihar promptly met these challenges with new directives. On July 21 a decree modified the statute 1889:IV by permitting volunteers to be enlisted by the commandants of military districts rather than by county officials.\textsuperscript{20} An order of July 30 concerned the call-up of reservists for training. Some county and local officials had refused to forward orders to reservists. Another legal means of notification was to post a public announcement, but villages and towns refused to post these orders at the Town Hall. By the new decree, orders would be posted by the Gendarmerie, a state police force under the control of the Interior Minister.\textsuperscript{21} The Defense Ministry tried sending call-up notices to reservists by mail directly, without the assistance of county and local authorities, but the post office returned many notices because of incomplete addresses. The Ministry then tried sending registered letters with return receipts. According to one report about 30\% of the notices sent out to reservists in Slovakia through the post office in Pozsony \[\text{Ger.}: \text{Pressburg}; \text{Bratislava, Slovakia}\] were returned marked "Addresssee moved to America."\textsuperscript{22}

The resistance to calling up reservists for two-week training periods caused only slight inconvenience to the government at this time, aside from the serious challenge to the government's authority. Yet both the government and the Coalition knew that any precedents established on this question

\textsuperscript{19} NFP, 1905, Aug. 19M.


\textsuperscript{21} NFP, 1905, Aug. 1A, 2M, 2A; J. Horváth, \textit{Ellenállás}, 15.

\textsuperscript{22} NFP, 1905, Aug. 13M, 19M.
would become crucial if the supplementary reservists were later called to extended active duty, and for this reason both sides stood firm on this relatively minor issue.

The loss of tax revenues was a more serious cause for concern, though it did not have the immediate paralyzing effect upon government operations that some persons had predicted. Revenues were already down in the first half of 1905, before the Fejérváry government was appointed, compared to the corresponding period of 1904. But tax income in 1904 was abnormally high, since it included back taxes from the "ex-lex" period of 1903. After only two months of passive resistance it was noticed that virtually the only state taxes paid were real estate taxes, while the poor had practically ceased paying taxes. Resistance to tax payments cut both ways, and taxpayers not only stopped paying state taxes but cut off revenue to cities and counties as well. The city of Sopron [Ödenburg] had to borrow 50,000 crowns by the end of September. The Coalition press fostered rumors that the government was on the edge of bankruptcy, and claimed, for example, that troops of the common army were to be paid in scrip, not cash. The government denied these rumors and sought to restore confidence, but at the same time expenditures were cut to the bone so that interest and principal payments on state bonds were made promptly and the credit of the state was

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24 NFP, 1905, Sept. 5M.

25 NFP, 1905, July 28M, Sept. 29M.

26 NFP, 1905, July 27A; see similar rumors July 2M, and a deliberate attempt to misquote Dr. Wekerle regarding approaching financial chaos, July 25A, 26M, 26A.
not endangered.\textsuperscript{27}

Statute 1886:XXI, which regulated municipal governments, retained some of the traditional measures by which counties in the past had resisted illegal acts of the central government. As already mentioned, municipalities were not required to collect taxes or draft recruits not sanctioned by Parliament (Para. 20). In most other matters, if the county sheriff or assembly considered a ministerial decree to be inappropriate because of local circumstances, the county could postpone executing the order and request the minister to reconsider his decree. If the minister insisted that his order was to be followed nevertheless, the county was required to obey, but after the order had been carried out the county could again lodge a protest with the entire ministry, which had final jurisdiction in the question (Para. 19). Beyond this, the county could petition to Parliament if it considered the order illegal, but the order was still to be carried out until Parliament decided otherwise.\textsuperscript{28}

There was a certain injustice in a procedure that gave the ministry the final decision concerning the legality of its own acts. This situation was remedied by the statute 1907:LX, which gave to the Royal Court of Administration the final decision in disputes between the government and the municipalities. This statute, one of several laws passed by the Coalition government as so-called "constitutional guarantees," was hailed as strengthening the counties against the government and making a future "illegal" royal government impossible. Lányi, on the other hand, felt that the new law would strengthen the position of the government in any future

\textsuperscript{27}Promemoria über die Staats-finanzverhältnisse Ungarns Jänner 1906."

\textsuperscript{28}Márkus, Ungarisches Verwaltungsrecht, 115-16, 305-06; Magyar Nemzet, 1905, Aug. 14, reported in NFP, Aug. 15th.
conflict with the counties, since the Court could be expected to rule on the basis of law and not political emotion, and would render a final decision in only a few days. Never again could a government be disregarded for months simply because its political opponents claimed it was illegal, without regard to the law in the case. 29

There was a disagreement within the Fejérváry cabinet over how to proceed against the resisting counties. Some ministers believed that the resistance would collapse immediately if the government used troops to require obedience to its orders. Kristóffy believed the only successful way was to act entirely within the framework of the existing laws, meeting each illegal resolution of the counties as a separate case and following all the legal steps to annul it. A majority of the ministers, he tells us, feared that this time-consuming process would permit the spirit of resistance to grip the country. When he found himself outvoted on so basic a matter of policy, he submitted his resignation. Three days later Fejérváry informed him that the ministers had changed their minds and accepted his point of view. 30

The Fejérváry government had probably agreed by the time of its cabinet meeting of July 12 on the main points of its future policy, to proceed entirely within the existing statutes without the unwarranted use of troops and to announce a program of universal suffrage. 31 The government's

29 Lányi, Regierung, 467-76. For a description of the statute 1907: LX and its effect in practice, see Markus, Ungarisches Verwaltungsrecht, 62-65 and 115-16. The "constitutional guarantees" are also discussed by Gustav Steinbach, "Staatsrechtliche Wandlungen in Ungarn," Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts, II (1908), 317-33.

30 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 156-58. Yet on p. 170 Kristóffy tells us he resigned over the question of the Agricultural Laborers' Organization. All of this must have happened during the first week of July. See below, p. 140 n. 18.

31 On the dating of these decisions, see below, p. 139 n. 16.
"Warning Order" was dated July 12 and released on the following day. Of the Coalition papers only Pesti Napló admitted that the government had the right to annul county ordinances. Pesti Hírlap viewed Fejérváry as an Imperial Commissar of a foreign power; Budapesti Napló predicted that the municipalities would ignore any annulment orders and cause the government to use force, whereby the onus for breaking the peace would fall on the government. On July 18, after only one month in office, Kristóffy carried out his threat and issued his first annulment order, overruling the city of Budapest. A few days later the government tried once again to explain, through the pages of the semi-official Magyar Nemzet, that a municipality did not have final judgment over a government decree, and that after the county had protested twice the right to resist was exhausted.

Passive resistance began as a local matter, and each of the various counties and towns devised its own methods of resistance. Some counties refused to accept any voluntary tax payments, some urged citizens to place the money in their own savings accounts, while others accepted the funds but placed them in special accounts instead of forwarding them to the state treasury. On August 10 the Coalition Steering Committee issued a new instruction to the municipalities, suggesting a more uniform set of procedures. Henceforth counties would not refuse voluntary taxes, but instead of forwarding these funds to the state treasury, they would place them in special savings accounts. The funds might be advanced to the state treasury later, after the "ex-lex" period had ended, or could be used to support county officials who might be suspended by the Fejérváry government.

32 NFP, 1905, July 14M, 14A.
33 NFP, 1905, July 22M.
34 Text, NFP, 1905, Aug. 11A, and Lányi, Regierung, 65-70.
Fejérváry government never claimed the right to collect taxes, but it claimed legal ownership to these funds which had been paid voluntarily by taxpayers with the intention of supporting the state. Because the government was determined to use only legal procedures, each separate case had to be taken to court, and it was late in the fall before the first cases involving ownership of these special funds or suspension of county officials were tried in court. By that time the picture had changed radically and new forms of resistance had become far more serious.

As the resistance continued through August and September, a number of resisting counties decided to uphold their resolutions of passive resistance even though Kristóffy had annulled them. But the government won in a few counties, where a strong lord lieutenant, or in a few cases a strong sheriff, stood firm in the face of a hostile county assembly. A few counties agreed to accept Kristóffy’s annulment orders and decided to forward voluntary tax payments and to enlist voluntary recruits. By the first week of September the Coalition feared that other counties would follow this example and the resistance movement would fail. 35 Instead, the force of events caused the Fejérváry government to resign on September 12, and a month elapsed before the government was reappointed and renewed the struggle against the resisting counties. In that time the resistance hardened.

The proclamation of national resistance transferred the revolt to the counties, and county officials suffered while the members of Parliament went unscathed. 36 County officials were caught in a dilemma. If they followed the instructions of their county assemblies they risked suspension by the Fejérváry government with loss of pay, rank and pension rights. Yet those

35 NFP, 1905, Aug. 11M, 11A, 22M, Sept. 1M, 1A, 21M.

36 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 142-43.
who obeyed the government despite orders of the counties risked reprisals if the Coalition eventually came to power. It is difficult to estimate which group suffered greater hardship. A number of wealthy persons pledged large sums of money to support those officials who were suspended by the Fejér váry government, but much of this money was never paid, and the Coalition Government did not always restore the losses suffered by its supporters at the hands of the Fejér váry government. 37

Transferring the defense of the nation from the Parliament Building to the county court houses reinforced the pseudo-democratic doctrines preached by the Coalition. The great struggle left the confused notion in many minds that Hungary was in truth not a kingdom but a republic, and the will of the "nation" was sovereign. It became the duty of a royal government to oppose this contention with an even more democratic proposal.

37 Lányi, Regierung, 447-49.
CHAPTER 7

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

A. Kristóffy and the Socialists

The demand for universal suffrage in Hungary is indelibly associated with the name of József Kristóffy. As Fejérváry's Minister of the Interior, Kristóffy sponsored the plan to use universal suffrage as a weapon to break the power of the Coalition. In his memoirs he insists that the plan was his idea alone, and he denies that anyone else, either in Hungary or in Vienna, had suggested it to him. József Vészi, who in 1905 was a Liberal Party deputy and editor of Budapesti Napló, claimed many years later that Kristóffy had only borrowed a plan that he had drafted a month earlier.

1 Kristóffy, Kályvária, 180-81.

2 József Vészi, "Wie das allgemeine Wahlrecht mit königlicher Genehmigung Franz Josephs an die Spitze des Regierungsprogramms Baron Fejérváry's gelangte," PL, 1932, Jan. 6H, 10M (two parts); see also Vészi, "Auseinandersetzung mit einem Toten," PL, Jan. 12M. Kálmán Széll told Baernreither on Nov. 30, 1905, that Vészi, not Kristóffy, was the author of the entire suffrage plan. (Baernreither, Verfall, 164.) Széll was so bitter against Fejérváry, Kristóffy, Vészi, and universal suffrage at this time that the conversation must be taken with some reservation.

József Vészi (1858-1937) was editor of Budapesti Napló until he resigned his position in October 1905 to become Press Officer for the Fejérváry government. He was one of the two Liberal Party deputies who did not walk out of the parliamentary session on June 21; Vészi stayed, voted for the Bánffy Resolution, and resigned from the Liberal Party on the following day. (NFP, 1905, June 23M.) Following the Fejérváry period, Vészi worked with a number of Budapest newspapers, finally as editor of the prestigious Pester Lloyd, the German-language Budapest daily, after the war. Kristóffy, who had been a schoolmate of Vészi in Arad, describes him favorably. (Kályvária, 280-81.) There is also considerable biographical information on Vészi in the Jubilee issue of Pester Lloyd, May 27, 1928 and the days immediately following.
It is difficult to accept Vészi's claim that Franz Joseph had already approved of the universal suffrage plan even before Fejérváry's government took office. As to the authorship of the plan, Kristóffy admits that Vészi independently submitted a similar plan to Prime Minister Fejérváry at about the same time. It is true that Vészi was one of the strongest supporters of the suffrage campaign, first through his newspaper and later as Press Officer for the Fejérváry government. But whoever first thought of it, Kristóffy is the statesman who brought the suffrage question to the forefront of public attention and kept it there for a decade.

The idea first occurred to him, Kristóffy tells us, when a delegation of Social Democrats asked for an interview with him in early July. They wanted to protest excessive police repression in connection with the miners' strike at Pécs and to speak in favor of universal suffrage.3 This first contact grew into a full political alliance between the Fejérváry

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3 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 186. As usual, Kristóffy is not satisfied with one explanation and proceeds to tell us about his almost mystical experience of the previous day, when the prophetic words of the long-dead Kálmán Tisza came to him--on a small piece of paper he found while cleaning out his wallet! (Ibid., 182-86.)
government and the Social Democratic labor movement.  

Because of the lower level of industrial development, the labor movement in Hungary developed more slowly than in Western countries. Not until the beginning of the twentieth century did the movement begin to expand rapidly in size and importance. From about 10,000 union members in the entire country in early 1902, organized labor increased to 53,000 by the end of 1904. Some 28,000 of these workers were centered in Budapest, where they comprised about 30% of the entire industrial labor force. The following description of the Hungarian labor movement and the Social Democratic Party is drawn mainly from information in Mucsi, Paktum, Chap. I, and Tibor Erényi, "Die Hauptrichtungen der Entwicklung der Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Ungarn. (1868-1904)," Studia Historica, XXV (1960). A general description of the party in the early twentieth century is given by Rudolf L. Tőkes, Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic [Hoover Institution Publications] (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), Chap. I. G. D. H. Cole gives a straightforward description of social conditions in Hungary in this period, but his account of the Social Democratic Party and other reform groups is unreliable: The Second International, 1889-1914 [A History of Socialist Thought, Vol. III Part II] (London: Macmillan & Co., 1960), Chap. XIII.


remaining 25,000 represented less than 8% of the labor force outside the capital. The greater part of organized workers came from the large factories, but an increasing number came from small shops as well. The rapid expansion continued, and by the end of 1906 union membership reached 150,000.

Because labor unions in Hungary were forbidden to engage in political activity, the Social Democratic Party was established as a separate organization. The separation was merely formal, and officers of party and union, on both local and national levels, were often the same persons. Party leaders were elected by the unions and were paid with union funds. The Social Democratic Party was a Marxist party, and followed the examples set by the German and Austrian parties. Although preaching class struggle and revolution, the Hungarian party leaders, like their comrades Bernstein and Kautsky in Germany and Bauer and Renner in Austria, were generally content to work for practical non-revolutionary reforms within the existing society. Striking workers wanted higher wages and better working conditions from their employers, while the party leaders worked by political agitation for the right to assemble and organize and for universal suffrage. They believed that through the ballot box they could obtain by parliamentary means the political and economic reforms they sought, once they gained the right to vote. The existing labor unions were craft unions and drew mainly from the class of skilled laborers, men who were generally unwilling to risk an all-out struggle for ill-defined or abstract goals. Prior to 1907 or 1908, the party took little interest in organizing women workers, youth (unskilled laborers and apprentices), workers in small shops, or the national minorities. And work among the most revolutionary class in the country, the landless agricultural laborers, had been almost
completely ignored.

Because the Social Democrats neglected the agricultural laborers, two splinter groups broke off from the main party to work in this area. In 1897 István Várkonyi organized the Independent Socialist Party. Even after the extensive agricultural strikes of that year were suppressed by troops with wholesale arrests and bloodshed, the party remained in existence into the early years of the twentieth century, active in parts of Csongrád, Békés and Bács counties in the Danube-Tisza region. The party espoused a mystical-anarchist philosophy akin to that of Tolstoy. The authorities found it rather harmless and tolerated it. In 1905 the party sponsored a few demonstrations in support of universal suffrage.\(^5\)

A more serious movement was the Reorganized Social Democratic Party, founded in 1900 by Vilmos Mezőfi. The parent Social Democratic Party held to the official socialist doctrine which called for collectivization of the fields as well as the factories. Mezőfi knew that this approach would only repel the peasants, who demanded nothing so much as land of their own. Yet Mezőfi never developed any very far-reaching program for breaking up the large estates into small peasant plots. His party colleague, András Áchim, himself a successful medium farmer, urged land reform. The party attracted agricultural laborers and dwarfholders and some medium landlords. In January 1905 both Mezőfi and Áchim won seats in Parliament. There they took an ambitious stand, supporting the national demands and the Coalition, while at the same time speaking in favor of universal suffrage until the Coalition decided firmly against it. Áchim organized a Hungarian

Independent Socialist Peasant Party in 1908, the forerunner of the Smallholders Party. After Áchim was assassinated in 1911, József Kristóffy was elected in the name of the Peasant Party to fill his seat in Parliament, but the party collapsed without Áchim's leadership.6

The Social Democratic party in Hungary, as in other countries in the age of nationalism, was unable to reconcile its internationalism with healthy patriotism. The party advertised itself as an international party. It took no stand on the national demands because they were looked upon as irrelevant to the workers. In this way they exposed themselves to the charge of being unpatriotic, or even traitors to the nation. They accepted this charge; for them, the nation was identified with the ruling classes. Socialists refused even to sing the National Anthem. The appeal to national pride thus became the exclusive property of the chauvinistic pseudo-patriots, and the Social Democrats were unwelcome precisely among those unorganized workers where they needed to do their most important work. The miners, railroad workers and city tram workers fought bitter wage strikes in 1904 and 1905, but they would have nothing to do with the Socialist unions, and did not join in the movement for universal suffrage.7 Yet at the same time the Hungarian Social Democrats remained too insensitive to the just complaints of the national minorities to gain any support from this large discontented group.


7 Z. Horváth, Jahrhundertwende, 224-27.
The growing unrest in Hungary in the first few years of the century can be measured in the rapid expansion of union membership and in the increasing labor agitation. The number of strikes recorded in large factories increased from 4 in 1900 to 19 in 1901, to 32 in 1902. In 1903 and 1904 there was a nation-wide wave of strikes. In 1904, 325 strikes involved 31,000 workers; nineteen of these strikes extended throughout an entire trade. The increased labor agitation was accompanied by defensive measured on the part of industrialists, who resorted to lock-outs and blacklists and urged the government to take stronger action. The party-union leaders feared a return of the repressive measures used against the labor movement under the Bánffy government (1895-1899) and tried to bring the strike movement under control. In December 1904 a national congress of trade unions met in Budapest and ruled that no local trade union could call a strike without the prior approval of the central organization of that union and of the Labor Union Council. Any local engaging in an unauthorized strike would receive no financial support. The party-union leaders tried to focus their strength to gain improved working conditions and the introduction of universal suffrage. 8

In the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Social Democrats, in Hungary as throughout Europe, were compelled to reassess the question of revolutionary vs. evolutionary socialism. At the party congress in Budapest, April 23-25, 1905, a small group of radical party members led by Ervin Szabó attacked the party leaders and their policies. Szabó opposed the organization of the party as a disciplined worker army led by a trained elite of officers, and proposed changes in the party structure to

make it more responsive to the individual worker and local organization. Behind these proposals for a more democratic party structure lay an entirely different conception of socialism. Szabó feared that by working through the parliamentary political process, socialism was being duped into accepting bourgeois ethics. He believed, instead, in achieving socialism through the economic struggle of strikes and agitation for higher wages, shorter working hours and better working conditions. He favored a more revolutionary program, and more emphasis upon organizing all discontented groups, including the agricultural laborers and national minorities. He was convinced that the party was mistaken to direct its entire effort toward gaining political rights such as organization, assembly, and suffrage. The Szabó group was badly misunderstood by the delegates to the congress and their proposals were voted down. This radical minority had little effect upon the party until late in the World War.

During the election campaign of January 1905 the Social Democratic Party campaigned actively for universal suffrage. They ran a number of candidates for Parliament, despite the overwhelming odds that none would be elected. The party had a more significant effect in influencing other candidates, especially those of the Independence Party, to take an open stand in support of universal suffrage. The Social Democrats lent their support to those candidates and withdrew their own opposing candidates. After the election the party resolved to turn to mass strikes if the Coalition failed to introduce universal suffrage as many of its candidates had pledged. Throughout the spring the party press reminded its allies

9 Mucsi, Paktum, 28-35; Süle, Sozialdemokratie, especially pp. 99-111.
10 NFP, 1905, Feb 13A; MMTVD, III, 253.
within the Coalition of their promises to support universal suffrage, and
the party resolved at its national congress in April to be prepared for a
general strike if necessary in support of suffrage reform. When the Coa-
lation's "Address to the Throne" was adopted on May 12 with only a token
reference to the suffrage question, the Social Democrats felt they had been
betrayed. Népszava pointed out on June 3 that of the 413 deputies, 223, or
sixteen more than a majority, had spoken in favor of universal suffrage.
Kossuth told reporters that he had only "supported" universal suffrage
but had not "promised" it. 11 After this rebuff the Socialist leaders
conferred with Bánffy in early June, offering to support the national
demands if universal suffrage were included in the demands. Bánffy was
sympathetic, but he said the Independence Party opposed universal suffrage
and would not consent to including it in the national demands. 12 Frustrated
in these efforts, the Social Democratic leaders were looking for a new
direction when Kristóffy presented them with an unexpected opportunity.

Some preliminary discussions must have taken place between Kristóffy
and the Socialist leaders Adolf Goldner and Ernő Garami on the subject of
suffrage reform as early as the first week of July. 13 Before he could take

11 "... csak hirdette, de nem ígérete." Quoted in Mucsi, Paktum, 45.

12 Mucsi, Paktum, 24-27, 44-45.

13 In his memoirs Kristóffy seems unwilling to accept responsibility
for initiating contact with the Socialists. Party historian Ferenc Mucsi
is unable to pinpoint the first feelers, but concludes "the negotiations
were probably initiated by Kristóffy." (Mucsi, Paktum, 50.) The memoirs
of Social Democratic leaders on the whole tell us very little about dis-
cussions behind the scenes, tending instead to emphasize the unity of
party leadership. (See Sülle, Sozialdemokratie, page x.)

Dr. Adolf Goldner (1864-1930), physician with the Laborers' Medical
Insurance Fund and a member of the party directorate.
Ernő Garami (1876-1935), member of the party directorate and editor
of the party's official newspaper, Népszava, later served as Commerce
Minister in the Károlyi government, Oct. 1918.
a public stand on a question with such far-reaching implications, Kristóffy had first to obtain the permission of the Prime Minister and the King. After consulting with Károly Hieronymi, and at his suggestion, Kristóffy drafted a memorandum to His Majesty defending his reasons for proposing universal suffrage.

Kristóffy pointed out that all political power in Hungary was in the hands of a small oligarchy of aristocracy, middle nobility, high-ranking clergy, and a privileged layer of the bourgeoisie. These few hundred families dominated Parliament, the county assemblies, the press and public opinion. The stale constitutional debates were of interest only to this small group, and were a direct result of a system which ignored the needs of the people. The national demands were intended only to divert attention from the suppression of the people's interests. Universal suffrage would sweep away this oligarchy opposed to the Crown, and would eliminate the constitutional struggle, enabling the legislature to act constructively.

Moreover, universal suffrage would win over new supporters for the Monarchy. The Social Democrats in Hungary had never attacked the Monarchy or the monarchial principle. On the contrary, the attacks on the Monarch had always come from the Coalition. The examples of Bernstein in Germany and Millerand in France showed that socialists in other countries had become

14 Károly Hieronymi (1836-1911) had a long career of state service, and was Interior Minister under Wekerle (1892-95) and Commerce Minister under Tisza (1903-05). In the January elections he lost his seat to Vázsonyi. Not a puppet of Tisza, he remained in the Liberal Party until Tisza denounced universal suffrage in October, at which time he openly voiced his support for universal suffrage and joined Kristóffy's Progressive Party, the only prominent politician to do so. Returning to Tisza's reorganized National labor Party in 1910, he spent the last year of his life as Commerce Minister under Khuem-Héderváry. Kristóffy had a high opinion of him and called him the only "Europäer" among the Magyar politicians. (Kristóffy, Kálvária, 187.)

15 The text of the memorandum is given in Kristóffy, Kálvária, 187-95. It is dated "July, 1905."
respectable and were not dangerous. Kristóffy predicted that the Social Democrats would win only a few seats in a new Hungarian Parliament elected by universal suffrage. Even after a generation of universal suffrage in Germany, the Social Democrats held only about seventy seats. But universal suffrage would destroy the old polarization between 1848 and 1867 and create a new political alignment of Progressive versus Conservative, thereby bringing peace between the Crown and the nation for a long time to come. Universal suffrage was not a threat to the Crown, but offered positive benefits to both Crown and nation.

When his memorandum was ready, Kristóffy showed it to Prime Minister Fejérváry, who took it with him when he conferred with the King at Bad Ischl on the following day. László Lukács, Finance Minister under Count Tisza and a person in whom Franz Joseph had especial confidence, was also summering at Ischl. He was called in for consultation and expressed his approval of Kristóffy's plan. Fejérváry returned to Budapest on Monday evening, July 10, bringing the King's answer: Kristóffy might announce his support of universal suffrage but only on his own initiative, as a "trial balloon." In other words, if the move did not have the desired effect Kristóffy could be dropped from the cabinet without embarrassment

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16. Mucsi is apparently in error when he estimates that Kristóffy's plan did not reach Franz Joseph earlier than July 12. (Mucsi, Pakrumb, p. 52 n. 7.) Baron Fejérváry left Budapest for Ischl on Friday evening and had an audience with the King on Saturday afternoon, July 8. He left Ischl Sunday evening without seeing Franz Joseph again, and after a stopover in Vienna arrived in Budapest Monday evening, July 10. (NFP, 1905, July 7A, 10A, 11M.) Fejérváry presided over a cabinet meeting in Budapest on July 12. (O.L., Ministertanács Jegyzőkönyve [Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting] July 12, 1905.) Immediately after Fejérváry's audience with Franz Joseph on July 8, the Austrian Prime Minister Baron Paul Gautsch announced plans to go to Ischl "to oppose a decision of the Monarch regarding Hungary." (Reported in Politik, Vienna, July 10; NFP, 1905, July 11M, 12A.) Gautsch conferred with the Emperor on Thursday morning, July 13 (NFP, July 14M).
to Franz Joseph.\textsuperscript{17}

With this authorization, Kristóffy immediately notified the Socialists. His earlier talks with Goldner and Garami were expanded into an unwritten agreement of "pact." Once the government announced publicly that it favored universal suffrage, the Social Democratic Party would organize nation-wide agitation in its support. Kristóffy delivered some practical assistance to the party as collateral to the agreement. He promised that the charter for the Agricultural Laborers' Organization, a new Social Democratic subsidiary, would be ratified, and promised further to remove restrictions against the party in organizing and holding meetings.\textsuperscript{18}

In accordance with this promise, he promptly repealed the decree restricting socialist organizations issued by Tisza a year earlier. He also promised to expose a paid police informer in the ranks of the Social Democratic Party, and advanced a large sum of money to the party

\textsuperscript{17}Kristóffy, Kárvária, 1967-97; Mucsi, Paktum, 53.

\textsuperscript{18}Assembly and organization were not constitutional rights in Hungary, but required advance permission from the police authorities, who often denied requests for the most arbitrary reasons. Kristóffy told the Socialists that he had already ratified the charter of the Agricultural Laborers' Organization "in principle," but ran into "serious difficulties" when Fejérváry himself opposed ratification. (Widespread harvesters' strikes were underway at the time.) Only after Kristóffy offered his resignation, which Franz Joseph rejected, was the charter ratified. (Kristóffy, Kárvária, 170; Mucsi, Paktum, 51.) Yet in another place Kristóffy tells us that he offered his resignation when the majority of the ministers voted to use force against the resisting counties. (Ibid., p. 157; see above, p. 125.) According to his own account, then, Kristóffy was extremely busy during the first week of July. We have only his account of any disagreements within the cabinet during this period.
leaders. 19

On Thursday afternoon, July 27, Kristóffy received a delegation of fifty Socialist leaders in the reception hall of the Interior Ministry. Their spokesman, Dezső Bokányi, described the worsening economic plight of the workers and complained of the repressive action of the authorities against them, as evidenced in the Pécs strike. He said the workers wanted only to help themselves, but to do this they needed the right to meet and to organize, and above all, they needed universal suffrage.

Kristóffy, emphasizing that he was speaking as an individual and not as a spokesman for the government, replied,

After long worry and reflection I have become convinced that the nation can be saved from its present lamentable situation only by an intensive social and economic policy, because only such a policy can end the deep social discontent and eliminate from our public life the destructive constitutional struggle which upsets the normal functioning of government. This regenerative social and economic policy, in my view, cannot be implemented by half measures, but only by a parliamentary reform based on a law of universal suffrage and secret ballot—because only such a radical reform can open the doors of Parliament to those who are not interested in the unfortunate constitutional struggle but wish instead to help solve the nation's problems. 20

19 On the origin and terms of the pact, see Mucsi, Paktum, 50-52, and the memoirs of a member of the directorate of the Social Democratic Party at that time, Manó Buchinger, Küzdelem a Szocializmusért: Emlékek és élmények [Struggle for Socialism: memoirs and experiences] (Budapest: Népszava Könyvkiadó, 1946), I, 143 and 147-49.

Mucsi has found a memorandum written by Buchinger, which shows that Kristóffy gave Goldner 50,000 forints (i.e., 100,000 crowns). (Párttörténeti Intézet Archivum [Archives of the Institute for Party History, Budapest]: H-b-116; cf. Mucsi, Paktum, 51.) Buchinger does not mention funds in his account of the pact.

20 Mucsi, Paktum, 55-56; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 197; MMTVI, III, 353-55; Lányi, Regierung, 103; NFP, 1905, July 28M. The complete text of Kristóffy's speech is published in his Választójogi Beszédek [Speeches on Suffrage] (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1911), 1-10.
B. The Reaction to the Suffrage Plan

Kristóffy's public endorsement of universal suffrage took the Coalition by surprise. Some Coalition leaders, Bánffy, Ugron and Vázsonyi in particular, had been elected on a platform which included suffrage, and they urged the Coalition to accept universal suffrage and pre-empt the government program. Ugron and Vázsonyi believed that universal suffrage would strengthen Hungarian patriotism among the disenfranchised and bring new classes over to the side of the national demands. Béla Barabás, Vice President of the Independence Party, told a Social Democratic audience a few days later that the Independence Party (not the Coalition) should take over the government and introduce universal suffrage. His statement suggested that there was friction within both the Independence Party and the Coalition over the suffrage question.

But most Coalition leaders were quick to fend off any threat to the supremacy of the national demands. The large landowners especially feared universal suffrage, and those agrarians whom Apponyi had led into the Independence Party were decisive in determining the policy of the party and the Coalition. On Sunday, July 30, Kossuth published an article in Budapest declaring that the Coalition would stand so long as it held to principles—implying that there was no need to add suffrage reform to those principles.

21 Kristóffy, Kárvária, 198-99; Mucsi, Paktum, 57; Vázsonyi's article in Budapesti Napló, reported in NFP, 1905, Sept. 4M.

22 NFP, 1905, Aug. 5A.

23 Mucsi, Paktum, 57.

24 Reported in NFP, 1905, July 31A.
Those who could not ignore suffrage reform turned their attack upon Kristóffy personally, claiming he was insincere and was using universal suffrage only as a political trick. The Liberal Party had long opposed universal suffrage, and Kristóffy, they said, had never contradicted his party's platform. In fact, they claimed to have evidence that Kristóffy had openly opposed universal suffrage as recently as the election campaign of January 1905.²⁵ It became accepted as fact by all shades of opinion hostile to the Fejérváry government that Kristóffy had been until recently an opponent of universal suffrage.²⁶ Kristóffy claimed, on the contrary, that he had supported universal suffrage as a Liberal Party deputy and had made a major speech on the subject.²⁷ Népszava even dug up a statement of Kristóffy's in an obscure monthly magazine two years earlier:

The cause of our present political and economic situation in many respects is that mature classes of the population are excluded from representation in Parliament. For this reason I believe in the extension of universal suffrage on the broadest basis, possibly so that all those who bear any portion at


²⁶ For example, the President of the Academy of Sciences, Győző Concha, in a non-polemical study, "A Választójog reformja [Reform of the Suffrage]" Jogállam, V (1906), 641-42.

Kálmán Széll, who claimed that the suffrage idea was not Kristóffy's but Vészti's, made the same attack on Vészti's motives. Vészti was formerly a disciple of Széll's, and once, with Széll's permission, gave a violent speech against universal suffrage. (Széll's conversation with Baernreither, Nov. 30, 1905: Baernreither, Verfall, 164.) I cannot identify any such speech by Vészti.

²⁷ Kristóffy, in an interview in Neues Pester Journal, reported in NFP, 1905, July 29A. I cannot identify Kristóffy's speech; it was not made in Parliament.
all of the common tax burden should possess the right to vote. 28

The Coalition Steering Committee could not ignore the suffrage question when they met on August 10, but they tried to avoid taking a stand on it. Buried in their lengthy statement on passive resistance was a brief reference to suffrage reform, denying that the Coalition had promised universal suffrage in the recent elections. The parties had campaigned on their own platforms, and only the Independence Party and Bánffy's New Party had called for universal suffrage, with certain restrictions. The only platform binding on the Coalition was expressed in the "Address to the Throne," which had been accepted unanimously by all Coalition deputies, and which called for an extension of the suffrage. When and if the question of universal suffrage arose in the future, the individual parties, not the Coalition, would decide their own positions on it. After thus carefully straddling the fence, the Coalition statement went on to condemn the government for misusing a great reform idea as a cheap political tactic. 29

On the following day Ferenc Kossuth told an audience that when all of the national demands had been won, then his party would introduce universal suffrage.

It is the conviction of our party that we must not compromise the national character of the Hungarian state in any way.

28 Jövendő, June 7, 1903, reprinted in Népszava, 1905, July 27; quoted in Mucsi, Paktum, p. 55 n. 13. Although Kristófify's limitation would have caused the suffrage to be less than truly "universal," very few adult males would have been excluded.

29 See above, p. 126; Lányi, Regierung, 104-05; Mucsi, Paktum, 57-58; and Kristóffy, Kályária, 199-200. For the complete text of the Coalition statement, NFP, 1905, Aug. 11A, and Lányi, ibid., 65-70.
The Hungarian state must remain Hungarian. We will never do anything to change the Hungarian state into a cosmopolitan one.\textsuperscript{30}

Count Apponyi also placed the national demands above universal suffrage. In a major speech in Sopron [Ödenburg] on August 21, amid the heckling of Social Democrats, he claimed that the Independence Party wanted universal suffrage and would introduce it after the national demands were met, but in such a way that the unity and national character of the state would not be harmed.\textsuperscript{31}

These attacks betray the fear that universal suffrage would give a majority to the national minorities and undermine the Magyar character of the state. Even Bánffy, who said that he favored universal suffrage, seems actually to have meant by this a lowering of the census, but not its elimination altogether, and a literacy requirement in the Hungarian language.\textsuperscript{32} Kristóffy proposed a literacy requirement which could be met in any of the languages native to the country.\textsuperscript{33} He told a reporter he agreed with Tisza (!) who had said recently that the citizen's highest right, the right to vote, should not be curbed by nationality considerations, for this was inconsistent with the principle of equality of all citizens be-

\textsuperscript{30}NFP, 1905, Aug. 12M.

\textsuperscript{31}NFP, 1905, Aug. 21A; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 200-01; Mucsi, Paktum, 57, 76.


\textsuperscript{33}Technically, Kristóffy's plan did not call for truly "universal" suffrage, since there was an "intelligence census." The literacy requirement, however, was consistent with the equal rights of all citizens. It is this plan which was called "universal suffrage" at the time, and is so used in this study.
fore the law. Kristóffy cited statistics to defend himself against charges that he was betraying the national interest. The illiteracy rate was high in Hungary, but it was higher among the nationalities than among Magyars. According to the latest data there were 970,841 electors in Hungary, of whom 56.2% were Magyars and 11.2% were Rumanians. If all literate males 20 years old were given the vote, there would be 2,904,207 electors, 61.5% Magyars and only 7.4% Rumanians. Raising the age limit to 24 years would have little effect: 2,621,894 electors, 61.4% Magyars and 7.2% Rumanians. Kristóffy was of course oversimplifying the question in his public statements. In the long run, the standard of living and the literacy rate of the nationalities could be expected to rise, and after a decade or two the nationalities would have almost as many literate adults as the Magyars. Kristóffy hoped that with the aid of universal suffrage the electorate would mature in this time and turn from the nationality struggle to issues of social and economic policy. In the meantime, to preserve the Magyar character of the country, the Fejérváry government embarked on a little-publicized effort to insure the supremacy of the Hungarian language. Prime Minister Fejérváry had already indicated on July 1 his

34 NFP, 1905, Aug. 12A.

35 Kristóffy's interview published in Magyar Nemzet, reported in NFP, 1905, Aug. 16M; cf. NFP, Aug. 12A. In his speech at Németh-Bogdán on Sept. 9, Kristóffy said there were now 1,048,976 electors; his percentages remained the same. (Kristóffy, Kályvári, 229-30.) Perhaps he had corrected an earlier estimate. Both sets of figures, which refer to Hungary proper (without Croatia), are repeated in the contemporary literature. The figures were compiled in the Interior Ministry on Kristóffy's order. He was the first person ever to propose a suffrage reform in Hungary who had the statistical data at hand to prove what the effect of the change would be.

36 Kristóffy, Kályvári, 192. This same argument was used in support of universal suffrage in Austria, though few placed much hope in it. William A. Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), 30-31, 105-08.
willingness to expand the use of Hungarian as regimential language. Now the government turned to the question of Hungarian language instruction in the schools.

The 1900 census had revealed that more than 40% of the population, or 82.2% of the non-Magyars, spoke no Hungarian. This information led many Magyars to conclude that after a quarter of a century the School Act of 1879 had failed and new measures were needed. The Education Minister in the government of István Tisza, Albert Berzeviczy, had prepared a new education bill in 1904, but the bill was never handled in Parliament and was dropped when the Tisza government fell. The Fejérváry government revived the bill, and on August 17, 1905, some of its provisions were promulgated by two decrees of the Education Minister, György Lukács. One ordinance prescribed measures for enforcing the obligatory instruction of Hungarian language in elementary schools. Some 90% of the elementary schools of the nationalities were operated by various churches, and they were usually unable to operate without state subsidy. The first new measure tried to enforce the requirement that a competent instructor teach the Hungarian language, and provided for a state subsidy if the church officials could not afford to pay for a qualified teacher. The nationalities naturally feared both state control and forced Magyarization. The other decree, which the nationalities found even more objectionable, pertained to normal schools. It required all entering teacher candidates to pass a state examination in the Hungarian language. Opponents feared that minority candidates would be forced to spend so much additional time learning Hungarian that they would be less well prepared in their other subjects, with the result that the better-prepared Magyar candidates would soon re-
place teachers from the nationalities.37

There is some evidence of disagreement within the cabinet regarding the wisdom of the measure. Education Minister Lukács wanted to take a strong line, while Prime Minister Fejérváry warned at a cabinet meeting on August 13 that the government needed the support of the nationalities.38 Fejérváry was even quoted publicly on the subject:

... even the most important demand of the Coalition—the introduction of Hungarian command language—is inevitable, if changes are made concerning regimental language as the Prime Minister has already proposed. Some things simply cannot be forced. If the past thousand years haven't succeeded in Magyarizing the nationalities, then open force will be even less successful.39

This showed remarkable candor for a Hungarian Prime Minister. Fejérváry's position seems to have been overruled at a cabinet meeting on August 16, and the school ordinances were issued on the following day.


Considerable contemporary documentation on the Berzeviczy and Lukács school policies is published in Gábor Kemény, Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában [Documents on the Nationality Question in Hungary in the Age of Dualism] (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó), Vol. IV (1966), 348-468; the text of the two Lukács decrees is given here, pp. 443-51.

38 NFP, 1905, Aug. 10A, 18N.

39 NFP, 1905, Aug. 14A.
The nationalities protested against the new school policy, especially the Rumanians and the Transylvanian Saxons, politically the strongest of the national minorities. The Saxons, who since 1903 were in a coalition with Tisza's Liberal Party, had previously threatened to desert the party if the Tisza government introduced the Berzeviczy school bill. In response to the Lukács decrees they called for an end of the old political game whereby military demands were repeatedly bought off by greater Magyarization in elementary schools. The administrative committee of Hermannstadt, where the Saxons were in control, adopted the resistance tactics of the Coalition and passed a resolution declaring Lukács' school decrees to be illegal. When the lord lieutenant insisted that the orders must still be carried out, all ten of the elected members of the committee, eight Saxons and two Rumanians, resigned. The Transylvanian Landes-Konsistorium then appealed directly to the King, complaining that Lukács had extended his power into an area where only the legislature had competence. Lukács defended himself against these charges by stressing the advantages of free education made possible by the state subsidies. He insisted that he had only brotherly love for the nationalities.

40 NFP, 1905, May 7M; Schmidt, Beiträge, 89.
41 NFP, 1905, Aug. 24A; cf. June 28M, Nov. 24M.
42 The name of the city was officially changed to Nagyszeben by the Hungarian government in 1898, but the city refused to recognize the change and continued to use the historic name. Today it is Sibiu, Rumania.
43 NFP, 1905, Oct. 10A.
44 Text of the petition, PL, 1905, Oct. 28M. Most such petitions which did not have the approval of the Hungarian government were returned unopened by Court officials.
45 NFP, 1905, Nov. 13A, Dec. 10M.
The Berzeviczy school bill, with modifications proposed by Lukács, was adopted with only slight changes by Count Apponyi, Education Minister in the Coalition government. The notorious "Lex Apponyi" of 1907 was in fact a child of the Tisza and Fejérváry governments. While loudly damning every action of his predecessor, Apponyi quietly left the Lukács decrees in force.46 In adopting this policy of Magyarization the Fejérváry government unnecessarily earned the animosity of the nationalities, instead of winning their support with universal suffrage. Only because the Apponyi laws of 1907 went so much farther did the nationalities usually fail to mention the Lukács decrees in their later attacks on Magyar nationality policy. Yet the school decrees also failed to win friends among the Coalition, whose press obscured the acts of the Fejérváry government by insisting that the government was illegal and worked against the "national interest."47 For these reasons the contribution of the Fejérváry government to the worsening nationality problem has been generally overlooked.


47 See the commentary on Lukács' speech in the House of Magnates session of Sept. 13, in NFP, 1905, Sept. 16N.
C. The Suffrage Campaign

In his first memorandum, Kristóffy had only outlined the general impact of a program of universal suffrage. After the initial reaction to the suffrage proposal had been assessed, Kristóffy prepared a second memorandum for Franz Joseph, mapping out in detail what moves the government was to make next.48

When Parliament reassembled on September 15, Prime Minister Fejérváry would announce that since his government had been unable to fulfill its mission because of the negative attitude of the majority, it would now attempt to reach a parliamentary solution in a new way. He would outline a reform program based on universal, secret suffrage, but explain at the same time that since it would require some time to prepare a suffrage bill, Parliament would be prorogued again until December 15. In this way, Fejérváry would not only strengthen the image of the government in the eyes of the public, but would also give a plausible reason for recessing Parliament. After the recess the Prime

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48 The memorandum is dated "August, 1905." Text in Kristóffy, Kárvária, 204-07, summarized in Mucsi, Paktum, 68-69.
Minister would ask the Coalition to form a government on a program of universal suffrage. If they refused, they would be discredited before the nation.

For the next three months there would be intense agitation for universal suffrage. When Parliament reopened in December, the nation would be at the boiling point. The government would present its suffrage bill to Parliament. At that time perhaps the Coalition, under the pressure of public opinion and joined by some deputies from the remnant of the Liberal Party, would pass the bill. In this case the parliamentary deadlock would have been broken and the conflict would be removed to the House of Magnates. It was more likely that the Coalition would reject any bill introduced by a government they considered illegal and unconstitutional. This would mean the end of the Coalition, Kristóffy predicted, because the Independence Party could no longer remain in league with the clerical and feudal parties in defense of a manifestly anti-democratic platform.

Early in January the government would dissolve Parliament and prepare for new elections to be held either in the spring or fall of 1906, depending on public response. The government would present a broad platform
including economic independence from Austria and new economic and social programs. The people would have to decide if the command language was more important to them than justice, work and bread. Possibly then the present electorate, under the pressure of mob terrorism, might elect a new parliamentary majority supporting universal suffrage. If the traditional ruling classes still received a majority, Kristóffy assured the King that he would then be justified in introducing universal suffrage by decree without violating his coronation oath to uphold the Hungarian constitution, because it would be within the spirit of the constitution to give rights to the people. This course of action would in any case be less dangerous, he said, than attempting to govern through an absolutist regime.

The course of action outlined by Kristóffy's second memorandum was finally adopted after several delays, and an attempt was made to put the plan into action. If the plan was not as successful as Kristóffy predicted, it was only partly because the Coalition was able to muster a stronger resistance than Kristóffy or anyone else had reckoned with. The decisive reason for the failure of the plan was that it required Franz Joseph's unwavering support if it was to succeed. Franz Joseph never accepted the universal suffrage idea completely, and when he eventually found a way to make an acceptable compromise with the Coalition oligarchy and pay only lip service to suffrage reform, he accepted the agreement. At one level, the history of the Fejerváry government is the story of this royal sell-out. From the viewpoint of Marxist historians, it is the story of the tactical error of the Social Democratic Party in allying itself with the Crown rather than following independent revolutionary tactics.

At a Joint Ministerial Council held at Bad Ischl on August 22, with
Franz Joseph presiding, Baron Fejérváry reviewed the alternatives open to the Hungarian government, concluding that a program of universal suffrage was the only acceptable course. He then explained how his government intended to launch a suffrage campaign, following the timetable worked out by Kristóffy, and reinforced by a broad legislative program. Economic relations between the two states were to be modified to give Hungary greater autonomy. There were to be extensive domestic reforms, including a progressive income tax, a homestead law to guarantee smallholders, settlement of the right to land organizations, a reorganization of the elementary school system, and reform of the civil service. The proposals of the Committee of Nine were to be implemented. Fejérváry guaranteed that his plan would produce a favorable majority in Parliament after new elections.

The Austrian Prime Minister Baron Gautsch and the Joint Foreign Minister Count Goluchowski both objected to the changes in the economic relations between the two states, but Franz Joseph ruled that the two parliaments would have to decide these questions. Gautsch expressed serious reservations regarding universal suffrage. If the Hungarian government were to propose universal suffrage, it would lead to the same demand in Austria. Gautsch was convinced that Austria was not yet ready for it, and the Austrian government would have to refuse the demand. This might lead to unrest in Austria comparable to that already existing in Hungary, and Gautsch doubted that the armed forces could maintain public order. He wondered if separation of the two states might not be the lesser evil.

Gautsch probably said this to frighten Franz Joseph. 50

Fejérváry admitted that his suffrage reform would have an impact on Austria, but only a strong measure like this could drive the divisive elements from the Hungarian Parliament. Moreover, the socialists were not as dangerous as many people believed. They would prove cooperative, as had the socialists in France and Germany. Gołębiowski disagreed, citing the domestic discord in France, where the government was "more or less in the hands of the socialists" as a result of universal suffrage. Franz Joseph added that many people believed Bismarck's greatest mistake was in the introduction of universal suffrage for the German Reichstag elections.

Baron Burián, the Joint Finance Minister (Fejérváry's son-in-law), defended Fejérváry's plan. Suffrage reform was overdue in Hungary, and the question would not disappear even if the government rejected it. Hungarian socialists were not like those of other countries, for they were not "turbulent," and they were in agreement with many conservative elements in demanding suffrage reform. Since there was to be a literacy requirement, the plan did not really provide for universal suffrage, but rather an extension of the suffrage.

Franz Joseph agreed with Burián that suffrage reform was not a concession to socialist principles, and criticized Kristóffy for failing to understand this. 51 Gautsch said he was not opposed to an extension of the suffrage, but was against universal suffrage.

The meeting provided a lengthy discussion of the alternatives, but

50 Mucsi, Paktum, 69.

51 Coalition papers had already rumored that Franz Joseph was unhappy with Kristóffy's relations with the Social Democrats, NFP, 1905, Aug. 15M; cf. Sieghart, Die Letzten Jahrzehnte, 218, and Jenks, Austrian Electoral Reform, p. 42 n. 43.
ended without a conclusive decision. Fejérváry would not receive a final decision on his plan until September 9 or 10, when Franz Joseph returned from army maneuvers in Bohemia. Baron Gautsch was obviously still opposed to the suffrage plan. Perhaps at the instigation of Gautsch, rumors of what had transpired at Ischl began to appear in the press.  

In the meantime Kristóffy and his allies had built up extensive agitation for universal suffrage. On Sunday afternoon, July 30, the Social Democrats held a mass meeting in the Városliget Park in Budapest. The main speaker, Dezső Bokányi, challenged the Coalition to drop the military demands and assume the government with a program of universal suffrage.  

On the following day the party directorate resolved to hold a major rally each weekend in Budapest, and scheduled local rallies in most of the major provincial towns, to climax in a mass demonstration march past the Parliament Building on September 15. On the morning of September 2, Budapest citizens found placards pasted on walls all over the city quoting earlier speeches of Count Albert Apponyi in support of universal suffrage. Social Democrats were active as hecklers at Coalition rallies and even

52 The official communique issued after the conference said very little. (Reuters dispatch, Times, 1905, Aug. 23.) Within a week, NFP could report some quite accurate rumors of what had occurred. (NFP, 1905, Sept. 1M; cf. Times, Sept. 5.) See also the Hungarian government's statement in the semi-official Magyar Nemzet, Aug. 25 (portions quoted in NFP, Aug. 26M, and Times, Aug. 26).

53 NFP, 1905, July 31A; Mucsi, Paktum, 62.

54 Mucsi, Paktum, 62-63.

55 NFP, 1905, Sept. 3M; Times, Sept. 5.
broke up numerous assemblies. Kristóffy also brought together other allies. A blue-ribbon group of intellectuals gave the movement a more respectable appearance with the formation of the Universal Suffrage League.

56 NFP, 1905, Aug. 21A, Sept. 4A; Mucsi, Paktum, 76.

57 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 278-81; MMTVD, III, 360-61; Mucsi, Paktum, 74-76; NFP, 1905, Sept. 8N. See Steed's appraisal of the entire suffrage movement, Times, 1905, Aug. 29 and Sept. 5.
D. Gautoch and the Coalition Unite

While Kristóffy's suffrage campaign was gaining momentum, the Coalition was using all its energy to combat it. Someone from the Coalition--it wasn't immediately known who--approached the Austrian Prime Minister, Baron Gautsch, and suggested that the Coalition was ready to make a compromise with the King in order to halt the suffrage campaign. Gautsch passed this information on to Franz Joseph, along with his own strong objections to universal suffrage. 58 Franz Joseph interpreted this report to mean that the Coalition had been softened by the mere threat of universal suffrage, and he inclined to reject Kristóffy's elaborate suffrage plan. When Fejérváry learned what was happening he hurried to Ischl, where he conferred with the King for three hours on September 1. Franz Joseph ordered the two governments to consult directly, so on September 2 Fejérváry and Kristóffy met with Gautsch for an hour in Vienna. 59

Gautsch demanded that the word "universal" be omitted from the

58 The "alliance" between the Hungarian Coalition and the Austrian Prime Minister has not been documented, but the circumstances made it apparent to the public by September 12 (see below). Kristóffy states categorically that the two were in alliance (Kálvária, 209, 215-16). The most direct public evidence of the alliance is Baernreither's diary entry of a conversation with Baron Zsigmond Kornfeld in Budapest, Sept. 6, 1905. Kornfeld, director of the Hungarian General Credit Bank (Magyar Általános Hitelbank), served as economic advisor to Bánffy and Kossuth and was probably well-informed on confidential Coalition maneuvers. Kornfeld "hinted that it is now being made clear to the Kaiser how dangerous this course of action is." Baernreither, Verfall, 153.

59 NFP, 1905, Sept. 2M, 2A; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 209-12; Mucsi, Paktum, 68-69; Gratz, A dualizmus kora, II, 95.
Hungarian suffrage proposal, and insisted that some financial qualification be included. Kristóffy replied that the suffrage program was in fact neither "universal" nor "direct." These words merely formed a slogan to combat the appeal of the command language. The twenty-four year age limit and literacy requirements already eliminated 1 1/4 million from voting. The value of the plan lay in breaking the influence which the two main opponents of the dynasty, the large landowning aristocracy and the "chauvinistic Jewry," exercised over elections. The dwarfisholders with their one or two holds would support the King. Kristóffy claimed that the government's proposal was in effect anti-socialist, and estimated that the socialists would receive only one or two mandates under the new program.

After the discussion with Gautsch, Fejérváry and Kristóffy prepared a report for the King in which they agreed to limit the suffrage even further by adding a property requirement, but they insisted that the slogan "universal suffrage" had to remain. They indicated that they would resign if the King did not authorize them to present the suffrage bill to Parliament on September 15 as a government program. The decision awaited Franz Joseph's return from maneuvers on September 9.

The Coalition continued its pressure by making plans to impeach the Fejérváry cabinet ministers. The idea of impeachment was discussed when the Coalition Steering Committee met on August 10, but no action was taken then because Andrássy and Bánffy were absent. Andrássy's articles of August 12

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60 Kristóffy, Káluária, 212-15. The report bears the date "August, 1905," but the text suggests that it was written after the meeting with Gautsch on September 2. It may have been discussed at the meeting of the Hungarian cabinet on September 6 (though it is not mentioned in the extant minutes of that meeting), and was probably the basis of discussion at the Crown Council in Vienna on Sept. 10, for which no minutes have been found.
and 13 gave strength to the idea. When the Steering Committee met again on September 5, Bánffy's motion to impeach was adopted, and Géza Polónyi was authorized to draw up the charges.

Paragraphs 32-36 of the Hungarian statute 1848:III provided for the impeachment of ministers. The House of Representatives had the power to impeach by majority vote. A jury of twelve persons selected from the House of Magnates would then try the case in open court. Impeachment had been mentioned several times against other governments in the past, but this was the first time it had a serious chance of succeeding. The most serious charge that could be made against the Fejérváry government was the mis-handling of public funds without parliamentary sanction. Yet Prime Ministers Bánffy, Széll, Khuen-Héderváry and István Tisza had all spent funds during an "ex-lex" period, and no one had tried to impeach them. Pester Lloyd expressed doubt that a House of Magnates jury would convict the Fejérváry government. Others predicted that the government would try to prorogue Parliament again before an impeachment motion could be made.

The Coalition's apparent alliance with Gautsch prompted Kristóffy to make a major public plea on behalf of universal suffrage. Running for a seat in Parliament in an off-election, he spoke before the voters in Németbogsán [Boksánbanya; Bocşa Montana, Rumania], a small industrial town,

61 NFP, 1905, Aug. 13M, 15M. On Andrássy's articles, see Chapter 5, above.

62 NFP, 1905, Sept. 5A, 6M. Bánffy's papers had been strongly urging impeachment; NFP, Sept. 2A.

63 For an English translation of this statute, see Dodd, Modern Constitutions, I, 93-97.

64 NFP, 1905, Sept. 6M, 6A.
on Saturday, September 9. In this speech he made public for the first time some of the detailed statistics he had already sent to the King. He stressed that the interests of the people were not at all identical with the interests of the "Nation," and showed that the bourgeois class was the most underrepresented, and therefore had the most reason to back universal suffrage. He warned of the growing danger of agricultural strikes unless a sweeping social program improved the desperate plight of the agricultural laborers.  

Kristóffy's speech did not have the desired impact because of developments elsewhere. On the following afternoon, Sunday, September 10, a Crown Council was held in Vienna, with only Franz Joseph, Foreign Minister GoJuchowski, and the two Prime Ministers, Gautsch and Fejérváry, in attendance. Gautsch and GoJuchowski both strongly opposed the introduction of universal suffrage in Hungary. The old monarch wavered.  

General Fejérváry took the night train to Budapest, arriving Monday morning in time to attend a memorial mass for the late Empress Elisabeth. He then held a short cabinet meeting, and by 2 p.m. was back on the train for Vienna. The seventy-two year old general was able to maintain a most strenuous schedule without faltering. The cabinet probably agreed to substitute a statement by the government supporting universal suffrage in lieu of the elaborate suffrage bill prepared by Kristóffy. If the King refused to sanction even this weakened suffrage endorsement, the cabinet ministers authorized Fejérváry to submit their resignations. On Tuesday Franz Joseph

65 The complete text of Kristóffy's speech is found in Kristóffy, Kálvária, 22-33, and in his Valasztójogi beszédék, 11-56; German text, NFP, 1905, Sept. 10M; summarized, Lányi, Repierung, 105-09. Cf. Times, Sept. 11.

66 NFP, 1905, Sept. 10M, 11A. Cf. Baernreither, Verfall, 172-73; Baernreither spoke with Gautsch on that day, and both were strongly opposed to universal suffrage. The minutes of this Crown Council were not located in Vienna and may no longer exist.
held long talks with Gautsch, Gołuchowski and Fejérváry. He was confused by Gautsch's dire warnings of the effect of universal suffrage upon Austria, the reported readiness of the Coalition to cooperate, and their simultaneous preparations to impeach a royal government. That afternoon, when the King was still unwilling to approve of universal suffrage, Prime Minister Fejérváry offered the resignation of his cabinet, which the King accepted. 67

Immediately after the Crown Council on Sunday afternoon the press began to speculate about what had occurred. It was soon apparent that it was Gautsch who had offered the strongest opposition to Fejérváry's suffrage plan. 68 Such interference in the internal affairs of Hungary would normally have called down upon his head the combined fury of all factions in Hungary. But on this occasion the Coalition press seemed quite satisfied, remarking that Hungary was now in a position where she needed the "good services" of whomever might be able to offer them. 69 Bánffy's Pesti Hírlap asked mockingly, would Franz Joseph pay any attention to an Austrian statesman on a strictly Hungarian question? Other Budapest papers were not so friendly, asking just who was master in Hungary? Hazánk, organ

67 NFP, 1905, Sept. 12M, 12A, 13M; Times, Sept. 9, 11, 12, 13. Two members of the Austrian cabinet, Education Minister Wilhelm v. Hartel and Commerce Minister Baron Guido v. Call, resigned on the day before Fejérváry, but their resignations do not appear to have been in any way related to events in Hungary. NFP, 1905, Sept. 12M.


69 Budapesti Hírlap, Sept. 12, and Alkotmány, Sept. 12, both cited in Mucsi, Paktuim, 69 and n.
of the large landowners, blamed Franz Joseph and said the incident justified the Coalition and proved that Hungary's autonomy was only nominal.  

The Liberal Party was incensed. Tisza addressed the party on September 14:

If it proves true that [Gautsch and Gołęchowski] intervened in a purely Hungarian affair where they had no authority, then our party will have to raise a most decided condemnation and protest. The moment the independence of Hungary's national political life is destroyed, we would have no further reason nor possibility to support the 1867 Ausgleich.

A large part of the Austrian press was even more outraged against Gautsch. The Christian Socialist paper Reichspost took great pleasure in paraphrasing the Koerber-Tisza exchange of 1903:

The most improbable thing... happened yesterday. The Magyar supremacy, which a Hungarian general and premier, with most noble loyalty, sought to terminate in the interest of the Empire, was rescued by a "distinguished foreigner," Baron Gautsch.

The Neue Freie Presse was caught in a dilemma. Serving as a mouthpiece for the Austrian Prime Minister, the paper had to deny suffrage reform and facts which were becoming ever more obvious. A lead editorial said:

Naturally we do not mean to deny that in this Hungarian question the Joint Foreign Minister and the Austrian Prime Minister cast their votes. Presented with a question by his Hungarian government as unusual and difficult as any he had ever faced, the Emperor certainly needed to listen to the advice of other statesmen who could judge more impartially than the Hungarian Prime Minister, who is personally abused by the Coalition in every conceivable way.

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70 Review of the Hungarian press comments, NFP, 1905, Sept. 12M. NFP's selection is limited, citing neither statements favorable to Gautsch nor those most violently against him.

71 NFP, 1905, Sept. 15M; cf. Times, Sept. 15.

To whom could the Kaiser turn, if not to his other advisors? This does not force one to the conclusion that the Hungarians have drawn, that there has been Austrian influence, or the prevalence of Austrian or any other non-Hungarian interest in this Hungarian question. The interest of Austria is so remotely and indirectly touched by Fejérváry's project that the Hungarians should believe the Austrian Prime Minister [ who explains that] when the Emperor asked his opinion of the Fejérváry proposals, he considered them exclusively from the Hungarian viewpoint, whether or not they were capable of leading the way out of the Crisis.  

Steed was overly optimistic when he suggested, "If in fact Gautsch has toppled the Hungarian Premier, it may become impossible for any Hungarian government to avoid a strong universal suffrage proposal."  

The Coalition had been busy with their own plans and negotiations on several fronts for the past few weeks, and now felt rather sure that they would get their way when Parliament reassembled on September 15. They had successfully stalled the threat of universal suffrage. When the Steering Committee met on September 5, it appointed a subcommittee to study the suffrage question, yet this subcommittee postponed its meeting several times as the news from Vienna sounded more and more promising. Bánffy and three members of the Independence Party, Kossuth, Batthyány and János Tóth, met with Garami and other Social Democrats on September 12 or shortly before, and tried to lure them away from the Fejérváry government. The Steering Committee lost all interest in the suffrage question when it became clear that Gautsch was proving so helpful to them, and finally issued a statement on September 13, after the Fejérváry government had resigned,  

73 *NFP*, 1905, Sept. 13M.  
74 *Times*, Sept. 13, 1905.  
75 *NFP*, 1905, Sept. 6M, 9M, 12M, 14M.  
76 Mucsi, Paktum, 69-70. Az Ujság mentioned such conversations on September 13; the Socialist paper *Nepszava* denied them on the following day.
essentially reiterating their stand of August 11 which had left the
question of suffrage reform up to the individual parties. Bánffy, still
keeping in touch with the Socialists, tried to persuade the individual
parties of the advantages of an alliance with the Socialists, but the
parties, confident that the Fejérváry government had collapsed, turned a
deaf ear to universal suffrage. And by this time Bánffy had personal
worries weighing more heavily on his mind than suffrage reform, as we shall
soon see.

The Coalition members spent Thursday, September 14, meeting as
separate parties preparing for their triumph when Parliament opened on
the following day. The Independence Party adopted Polónyi's eight-page
statement of charges against the government. Kossuth wondered out loud if
the resignation of the Fejérváry government were not just a trick to avoid
impeachment proceedings. The Coalition was also encouraged by reports, as
yet unconfirmed, that the King would invite Kossuth, Andrássy, Zichy and
Bánffy to Vienna in the next few days. They could afford to ignore the
news that Kristóffy was elected to Parliament unanimously by the voters of
Nómetbogsán that morning. And though the papers reported that four separate
bills calling for universal suffrage had been submitted to Parliament, this
news seemed irrelevant.

Gautsch and his allies had toppled the Fejérváry government and
stalled the campaign for universal suffrage. A month of confusion and in-
decision was to elapse before the Fejérváry government and universal suffrage

77 NFP, 1905, Sept. 14A; Lányi, Regierung, 109.
78 Mucsi, Paktum, 70; Independence Party statement rejecting universal
79 NFP, 1905, Sept. 13M, 14M, 14A, 15M.
were again given royal sanction on October 16. By that time the suffrage movement had lost much momentum in Hungary while all along it had been picking up force in Austria.
E. Baron Bánffy and the "Zeysig" Scandal

Throughout the summer Baron Bánffy appeared as a growing independent political force. Bánffy—the former Prime Minister who had led the destruction of the House of Representatives on December 13 and had introduced the notorious resolution calling for passive resistance on June 21—this same Bánffy began to talk and act like a statesman.

Though Bánffy sometimes acted like an irresponsible hot-head, he was also a clever politician. He had weighed the situation and believed there was a large body of uncommitted persons looking for a leader. Almost every day brought news that another parliamentary deputy or lord lieutenant had resigned from the Liberal Party. The Tisza machine appeared broken, and Tisza seemed neither able nor willing to hold his "Mamelukes" together. Bánffy decided the was was open to form an entirely new party (not necessarily his own New Party), a merger of all the '67-based factions, with himself as boss. This would mean a union of all the members of the rapidly disintegrating Liberal Party, the Andrássy "Dissidents," his own New Party, and the Clerical Peoples Party, who could perhaps be held together by a program of national concessions while maintaining the 1867 Ausgleich.

The party relationships were indeed confused, and it is no wonder that deserters from the Liberal Party did not know which way to turn. The Dissidents, comprising the cream of the old Liberal Party, were a faction Count Andrássy had led out of the party in November 1904. They had won twenty-seven seats in the January elections but did not formally organize
themselves into a party until May 5. The Dissidents insisted they were
not members of the Coalition, although they cooperated with it fully, three
of their members—Count Andrásy, Count János Hadik and Ignác Darányi—were
members of the Coalition Steering Committee, and Andrásy was a chief
spokesman for the entire Coalition. Some of the new deserters from the
Liberal Party immediately joined another party, while others remained
temporarily with no party affiliation, unsure of which way to turn. They
were '67ers by conviction, but they were also afraid of the political
revenge which would follow if the Coalition came to power.

On August 2 the Liberal Party experienced a small revolt when twenty-
three members met to consider whether to dissolve the Liberal Party or to
resign and join the Dissidents. The strongest member of the group was
Prof. Ferenc Nagy, a former State Secretary in the Commerce Ministry
under the government of Kálmán Széll. Nagy, once a member of Apponyi's
National Party, had followed Apponyi into the Liberal Party but had not
followed him out again. Now he wanted to bring the Liberal Party into the
Coalition as a stabilizing force. Despite Tisza's efforts to hold his
party together, most of the twenty-three did leave the Liberal Party

80 NFP, 1905, May 6M.
81 See NFP, 1905, Nov. 19M.
82 NFP, 1905, July 29A. Ferenc Nagy (1852-1927), an outstanding jurist,
was Hungarian representative at the Hague Tribunal before the First World
War. During the war State Secretary in the Ministry of Food Supplies, and
under the Károlyi government 1918-19 Minister of this department. Révai
83 Tisza, "To the Members of the Liberal Party," Az Újság, Aug. 8,
reported in NFP, Aug. 8A; see also an article by "An old supporter of the
Deák Party," Az Újság, Aug. 9, reported in NFP, Aug. 9A. At about the same
time there were rumors that a new "Middle Party" would be formed under
Károly Hieronymi; NFP, Aug. 3M.
shortly afterward, and on September 14 these "New Dissidents" decided in order to give each member full freedom of conscience they would not form a party, but merely a club, with Nagy as president. Finally, after the party positions had begun to harden, the Old Dissidents and the New Dissidents merged on November 18 to form the Constitution Party, with Darányi as president and Nagy as vice president.  

Into this confused situation stepped Bánffy with a carefully planned campaign and an attractive platform. He called for the Coalition to shift its emphasis from the military demands to economic independence. A separate customs area would lead in the long run to separation of the army anyway. The Coalition should insist that Hungarian regiments should be supplied entirely from Hungarian factories, and demand the extension of the Magyar language in civil affairs and schools. Bánffy favored a broad extension of the suffrage, but coupled with a knowledge of the Hungarian national language. He appealed to all the diverse groups wishing to maintain the 1867 Ausgleich, warning that in another election the Independence Party might win an absolute majority. The '67-based parties could not desert the Coalition without betraying their recent electoral allies. Moreover, without the Independence Party, which had by now grown to 180 seats, the '67-based parties would command a majority of only thirty votes, not enough to accommodate differences among themselves. Therefore it was up to the Liberal Party to join the Coalition and steer it in a '67 direction, which Bánffy thought the Independence Party would be willing to follow.


85 NFP, 1905, June 19A, July 26A, 28M, 29A; see the lead editorial criticizing Bánffy's platform, NFP, Sunday, July 30M.
Bánffy began an intensive publicity campaign. His plan for rallying the '67-based parties was heralded in his own newspaper, Pestis Hírlap, and reinforced by his articles published in the papers of the other parties. He organized affiliates of the New Party in Debrecen, Kolozsvár, Dezs [Ger.: Deés; Dej, Rumania] and Budapest, and embarked on a widespread speaking schedule managing to make a major new address every Saturday in time to make headlines in Sunday morning papers throughout Hungary and Austria. The Neue Freie Presse, for example, which saw in Bánffy the most likely chance for preserving the Ausgleich, devoted a lot of attention to him, and beginning July 26 carried a major story on him almost every day for several weeks.

To gain control of all the pro-Ausgleich forces, Bánffy would first have to win Andrássy's support. Andrássy first showed little desire even to talk with Bánffy, and when at last they met on August 4 he was noticeably cool. Yet it was probably a victory for Bánffy that the "New Dissidents" remained uncommitted and did not at once join Andrássy's "Old Dissidents." It was also a favorable sign when on August 23, some seven hundred Budapest voters resigned from the Liberal Party and endorsed a program remarkably similar to Bánffy's, though they also remained without any party affiliation for the time being.

Bánffy also attracted attention by raising new popular issues. On August 15 his paper, Pestis Hírlap, was the first to propose a new law restricting the King's right to recess Parliament during an "ex-lex" period. His papers also strongly urged the impeachment of the Fejérváry

86 NFP, 1905, July 6A, 10A, 31A, Aug. 2M.
87 NFP, 1905, July 27M, 28A, 31A, Aug. 5M, 6M.
88 NFP, 1905, Aug. 24M.
government. At the same time, Bánffy had been seen several times in Vienna, and there were rumors—many of which Bánffy denied—that he had negotiated with Joint War Minister Pitreich regarding a solution to the military question. He had already talked with State Secretary József Tarkovich, Fejérváry’s personal representative, on a plan to reassign men to regiments so that every regiment would contain at least twenty percent Magyars, and hence include Magyar regimental language. Bánffy hoped to solve the military stalemate by letting Parliament declare it had the right to regulate command language, without making any changes for the time being. Attempting to champion every popular cause at once, Bánffy spoke out openly in favor of universal suffrage, for all who could read and write in Hungarian, and he continued his efforts to win over the Social Democrats. As September 15 and the reopening of Parliament grew nearer, Bánffy appeared to be a very formidable political force indeed. The Coalition had adopted his resolution to prepare impeachment charges against the government, and the resignation of the government indicated that somebody—probably Bánffy—had been successfully pulling strings in Vienna. His downfall was sudden and unexpected.

About the middle of August a small pamphlet was published in Berlin entitled Die ungarische Krise und die Hohenzollern, under the nom

89 NFP, 1905, Aug. 16M, Sept. 2A, 6M.
90 NFP, 1905, Aug. 19M, 24M, 26M.
91 NFP, 1905, Aug. 10M, 11M.
The pamphlet advocated partition of Austria-Hungary in the interest of European peace. It was the responsibility of the Hohenzollerns to prevent the creation of a federalist Slav state, and to make Hungary an independent great power in the Balkans. To accomplish this, the German Empire should absorb most of Austria, giving to Hungary, under a Hohenzollern king, Galicia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and all the Balkan territory she could conquer as far as Salonika.

For a German citizen to propose that his sovereign should destroy his ally was extremely discourteous, at the very least. If the author were a subject of Franz Joseph calling for a foreign power to dethrone the Habsburg dynasty, this was certainly treason. The text of the pamphlet suggested that its author was intimately informed on Hungarian affairs and was decided favorable to the Coalition, distorting a few facts to make the Coalition appear more attractive. The author seemed to go out of the way to compliment Baron Bánffy.

The "Zeysig" pamphlet quickly attracted the attention of police investigators and newspaper reporters in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. It

Hans von Bülow, Entgegnung auf "Die ungarische Krise und die Hohenzollern" von Prof. J. A. von Zeysig (Vienna, 1905), sheds no light on the "Zeysig" case. Bülow refers to "Zeysig" only in the title, and does not seem to be aware who the true author was, although he refers to events as late as the Five Minute Audience of Sept. 23, by which time the "Zeysig" case was common knowledge. Much of Bülow's pamphlet is simply a repetition of his pamphlet published the previous May, Die ungarische Krise und die beiden Parlamente (Vienna: Karl Mitschke, 1905), from which "Zeysig" may have taken his title.

For example, the Coalition is said to support universal suffrage. ("Zeysig," p. 8.)

The Bánffy Resolution of June 21 is called "one of the most beautiful documents of statesmanlike moderation, for even at this difficult and critical moment he codified the rights of the nation honorably, without bitterness and rancor." ("Zeysig," p. 10.)
soon came to light that the manuscript had been sent to Berlin by mail from Budapest. The identity of the author was not immediately made certain, but on August 20 the Liberal Party's paper, Az Ujság, pointed a finger at Julian Weiss, editor of Bánffy's Pesti Hírlap. Az Ujság had named the wrong man, but the right newspaper. On Monday, September 11, Budapest police arrested a reporter for Pesti Hírlap, one Árpád Zigány, and charged him with the authorship of the pamphlet. Dr. Zigány, who claimed the title of "Professor" from the University of Milan, had once been sentenced to two years in prison, and there was presently a case pending against him for forgery. On the following day, Tuesday, László Lakatos, another reporter for Pesti Hírlap, testified in the police investigations against Zigány, and implicated Baron Bánffy and József Dénes, a railroad official and confidant of Bánffy's. On Wednesday Julian Weiss was called to testify, but was cleared. The international implications of the case were underlined when the German Ambassador, Count Carl von Wedel, spent a lengthy visit with Prime Minister Fejérváry in Vienna on Tuesday, September 12, and a Budapest police official was said to be on his way to Berlin.

The new evidence proved to be a serious embarrassment for Bánffy. Just at the crucial moment when the Coalition had succeeded in forcing the Fejérváry government from office, and just when Bánffy was trying to win over the Socialists by persuading the Coalition to endorse universal suffrage, his personal credibility was threatened. On Tuesday, after Lakatos


had accused him, Bánffy gave his "word of honor" to his own party that he was not involved in the "Zeysig" case, and on the following day he tried to assure the Coalition Steering Committee. Few people were entirely convinced by his word of honor.  

The "Zeysig" affair was political dynamite. On September 14, key-witness Lakatos revealed that a journalist Tarján had offered him four thousand crowns if he would testify that Baron Bánffy was the author. On September 18 the Budapest police officials arrested Zigány's defense lawyer, Dr. Elemér Halmay, claiming he had prior knowledge of the pamphlet. He was released later that day when it became clear that he was innocent, but some two hundred lawyers of the Budapest Bar Association met and condemned the police detective Vészy and Police Chief Béla Rudnay for over-reacting to an unfounded rumor and intimidating the defense. Rudnay had already revealed himself as a loyal servant of the Fejérváry government, while the president of the Bar Association was Károly Eötvös, a respected member of the Coalition Steering Committee and a close friend of Bánffy.

On the next day there was talk of a letter written by Bánffy to Zigány which, it was said, clearly proved Bánffy's complicity. Bánffy was furious, and threatened to sue Police Chief Rudnay and the newspaper that carried the story. Then he calmed down and agreed to waive his parliamentary immunity and testify, in return for seeing the letter, which he showed to the press. The letter was dated August 16, and in it Bánffy advised Zigány that a Hungarian edition of the pamphlet was not necessary,

99 NFP, 1905, Sept. 15M.
100 NFP, 1905, Sept. 18A, 19M.
since it had already had the desired effect with the proper people. Bánffy explained that the letter meant nothing, it was merely a reply to a note he had found in his mail when he returned to Budapest. He had read the "Zeysig" pamphlet, did not like it, and told Zigány so, and also advised against some of Zigány's other radical suggestions. Nevertheless, Bánffy was embarrassed. He left for Vienna half a day earlier than the other Coalition leaders, ostensibly for talks with Goluchowski and Pitreich before the audience with Franz Joseph on September 23. He was probably avoiding the questions of his Coalition allies.

The pre-trial investigation lasted until November 2. It revealed that József Dénes, a confidant of Bánffy's, had been asked in July to translate Zigány's manuscript into German. Dénes ran out of time and offered the job to Sándor Baneth, a young Hungarian working in Berlin at the time. Dénes travelled to Berlin to pay Baneth two hundred marks. Baron Bánffy was interrogated as a witness for nearly an hour on October 28. He left the police station "most upset" and gave no comment to the press. The investigation had shown that Bánffy had himself been in Berlin during July. The press had assumed he was in Vienna, and Bánffy had used various ruses to keep the press and the police off the trail.

Árpád Zigány, József Dénes, and Sándor Baneth were all indicted for high treason and lese majesty and bound over to the criminal court. The trial was held on November 24 and 25. The jury deliberated for an hour,

101 NFP, 1905, Sept. 20M, 20A, 21M.
102 NFP, 1905, Sept. 22M. See below, p. 187.
103 NFP, 1905, Sept. 22M, Oct. 19M, 22M, 28A; PL, Nov. 2M.
104 The transcript of the trial is published in PL, 1905, Nov. 24A, 25M, 25A, 26M, and in NFP, same dates. The liberal reform legislation of March 1848 provided for trial by jury for all press offenses; most other criminal cases were decided by a panel of judges.
and found all three not guilty. This was one of the first political cases the Fejérváry government had brought to trial, and they were to find it hard to find a jury willing to convict. Later that evening an anonymous pamphlet appeared on the streets of Budapest entitled "Baron Bánffy's Word of Honor." 105

After the "Zeysig" trial, Bánffy's influence seemed broken, and he no longer played any decisive role in the Coalition. On March 5, a month before the Coalition government was formed, Bánffy resigned from the Coalition, and thereafter seems to have had little influence in Hungarian politics, though he remained politically active. Yet though he could be ruthless and unscrupulous at times, Bánffy seems to have been a likeable old scoundrel. His friends—and they were many, in both parts of the Monarchy—were willing to overlook his leading role in destroying the Parliament Building on December 13, 1904, and his sponsoring the infamous Bánffy Resolution of June 21, 1905. The "Zeysig" scandal was apparently never again mentioned. Bánffy was remembered as the Hungarian Prime Minister who had defended Dualism by forcing through the military bills and extending the economic Ausgleich of 1898-99. It was not important that he had suppressed the socialists, the peasantry, and the national minorities. Franz Joseph had called him dependable. 106

Kristóffy, who entered Parliament in 1896 as a follower of Bánffy, seems to single out Bánffy from the other Coalition leaders and treats him more kindly. He makes no mention of the "Zeysig" case. After Bánffy's


death on May 23, 1911, Eduard Treumund wrote an obituary in the *Österreichische Rundschau* which failed to mention Bánffy's scandalous behavior and says, "After the Five Minute Audience of September 23, Bánffy resigned from the Coalition."\(^{107}\) Although the sentence is true in a literal sense, it overlooks the fact that Bánffy clung to the Coalition for another six months before resigning in March 1906. So it is that Bánffy has become known to history in a protected light.

Árpád Zigány went on to make something of a name for himself as a novelist and translator of literary works.\(^{108}\) He enters our story once again. In the introduction to his memoirs, dated May 1926, Kristóffy expresses his thanks to the editor who helped in publishing his book, "my faithful old colleague, Dr. Árpád Zigány."\(^{109}\)

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109 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 4. Sceptics might take this to be corroboration of rumors current at the time of the "Zeysig" scandal, that Kristóffy himself had instigated the affair. Cf. NFP, 1906, April 20M.
CHAPTER 8

FROM "RED FRIDAY" TO THE "FIVE MINUTE AUDIENCE"

September 15, 1905, is known in the annals of the Hungarian labor movement as "Red Friday." On that day Hungarian labor conducted its first general strike, and for the first time demonstrated its strength to the rest of the nation—and to its own members.

Early that morning factories remained idle, most shops were closed, and although the tram workers had decided not to join the general strike, traffic was nearly paralyzed. From the far parts of the city thousands upon thousands of marchers converged on the Parliament Building, kept in perfect order by their parade marshalls. Most of the marchers wore red badges on their hats. Some carried red flags, while others carried signs with slogans such as, "Whoever can be a good soldier can be a good voter, too!" Few policemen were in sight throughout the city, but more than a thousand policemen had cordoned off the plaza in front of the Parliament Building, and 150 mounted policemen waited nearby. The Budapest garrison, reinforced by additional troops brought in from outside the city, remained on alert in their barracks nearby. The government tolerated and even supported the demonstration, but, lest the marchers get out of hand,

1The mass demonstration on Sept. 15 is described in detail in Mucsi, Paktum, 81-85, and NFP, 1905, Sept. 15A. See also Buchtiger, Küzdelem, I, 156-62; Kristóffy, Kályária, 244-46; and MMTVD, III, 357-69.

2Mucsi, Paktum, 81, says two companies of the Sopron [Ödenburg] Honvéd infantry regiment had been brought to Budapest. NFP, 1905, Sept. 15A, says two regiments had been brought in.
it kept its armed forces ready. They were not needed.

At 8:30 in the morning, Mezőfi and Áchim led a delegation of Reorganized Social Democrats into the Parliament Building, where they presented to the Speaker of the House, Gyula Justh, a petition calling for universal suffrage signed, they said, by 500,000 persons. 3 Half an hour later, József Vészí brought to Justh a delegation of fifty Social Democrats led by Goldner and Carami, who also delivered a petition. While the deputies were assembling inside the Parliament Building, the proletarian army was forming in ranks outside. A hundred thousand workers 4 sang the "Workers' Marseillaise" and heard the Social Democratic Party leaders call for an all-out strike campaign until universal suffrage had been won. After about an hour the demonstrators marched away, and by the time Parliament adjourned, traffic had returned to normal in the city.

Speaker Justh complained that the government was leaving the deputies unprotected at the mercy of the mob outside, and asked for police protection. Budapest Police Chief Béla Rudnay insisted that it was illegal for policemen to enter the Parliament Building. It was the responsibility of Parliament to provide for its own internal security. 5 (Five months later the government did see fit to send policemen--and infantry--into the Parlia-

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3 The petition is no longer in existence. (Mucsi, Paktum, p. 82 and n. 76.) It seems unlikely that Mezőfi's little party, having no clear political objectives, was sufficiently well organized to collect half a million signatures.

4 The Social Democratic paper Népszava claimed more than 100,000 marchers, while other newspaper estimates of the crowd range between 20,000 and 80,000. Buchinger's memoirs say "100,000 to 150,000," but here as elsewhere his memory is probably faulty. (Buchinger, Küzdelem, I, 156.) Mucsi has dis-
discovered perhaps the best objective estimate: the party prepared 100,000 red badges, and after the supply gave out several entire groups did not receive them. (Mucsi, Paktum, p. 225 n. 73.)

5 NFP, 1905, Sept. 15A.
ment Building, and at that time each side found arguments to support an opposite legal position.)

The House of Representatives convened at 10:30. After the resignation of the cabinet was officially announced, Prime Minister Fejérváry reported that the King hoped soon to appoint a government from the majority parties, and then read a rescript proroguing Parliament, until October 10.

Ferenc Kossuth complained that the King had never replied to the "Address to the Throne" sent last May, and moved that the House adopt a resolution protesting the new recess of Parliament and reaffirming its resolution of June 21. Count Tisza objected, claiming that debate was not permissible after a royal rescript had been read proroguing Parliament. Tisza's statement caused an uproar recalling the debate on the same question during the session of June 21. Fejérváry explained that the King had replied to the "Address" in effect by three times sending a homo regius to negotiate with the Coalition in the hope of establishing a majority government. Moreover, the royal rescript appointing Fejérváry Prime Minister, in which the King expressed his desire to appoint a majority government, was in fact addressed to the entire nation. The House greeted this excuse with derision.

When it appeared that Kossuth's motion was going to be debated despite the fact that Parliament had been ordered to recess, Fejérváry and his cabinet walked out of the Chamber, followed by Tisza and his party. Mezőfi introduced a counter resolution calling for the House to take no notice of

Fejérváry probably did not really believe his own statement. At Ischl on August 22 he had pointed out that the "Address" was still unanswered, and suggested that one course open to Franz Joseph was to send an official reply to the Coalition, pleading for mutual understanding. (HHSA, GM, Aug. 22, 1905, pp. 159-62.)
the recess order and to remain in session. After a few other persons had spoken, the vote was taken and Kossuth's resolution was overwhelmingly adopted, leaving Mezőfi's motion a dead issue. The House then adjourned.

On the same afternoon the government appeared before the House of Magnates, which was then also prorogued until October 10. Here also the government encountered strong opposition, but the House of Magnates operated in a cooler atmosphere, with the result that for the first time a fairly rational debate took place between the cabinet and members of Parliament regarding the legality of the Fejérváry government vs. the validity of the Coalition's demands. Count Aurél Dessewffy called the government's plan to introduce universal suffrage an alliance with demagogry, which would overthrow the foundations of the state. Baron Dezső Prónay, Count Győző Széchényi and Count Nándor Zichy also spoke for the Coalition. Prime Minister Fejérváry and the Ministers Lányi, György and Lukács defended the government and its program. This was the first and only time of the new ministers, except the Prime Minister, had an opportunity to speak before either house of Parliament. After the discussion the Magnates passed a resolution expressing their regret over the situation, and adjourned.

At the Crown Council at Ischl on August 22 it had been the unanimous opinion that under no circumstances could the House be permitted to defy a royal rescript and remain in session. (HHSA, GH, Aug. 22, 1905, pp. 172-75.) The resignation of the Fejérváry government and the Coalition's optimism that they would soon come to power lessened the danger of such defiance, and it is not known what instructions, if any, were issued to meet this eventuality. It is possible that the police and military forces were held in readiness for more than one reason.

The session of the House is described in Lányi, Regierung, 78-79; NFP, 1905, Sept. 15A; Mucsi, Paktum, 83-84; and Képv. Napló, II, 3-11.

Kristóffy, Kálvária, 246, reminds us that Count Dessewffy helped depose King Charles in 1918, and calls him a great demagogue himself.

The session of the House of Magnates is described in Lányi, Regierung, 80-85; NFP, 1905, Sept. 16M; and Förend. Napló, I, 33-46.
Throughout the country, in villages and towns, demonstrations were held on "Red Friday" in support of universal suffrage. Not all of these demonstrations were organized by the Social Democrats, for Várkonyi's Independent Socialists and other groups also took part.\footnote{Mucsi, Paktum, 84-85.}

September 15 passed with none of the violence that had been feared taking place either in the streets or in the halls of Parliament. Fejérváry's speech in the House of Representatives was received with relatively little disturbance, indeed almost courteously by the standards of the Hungarian Parliament. The House ignored Mezőfi's motion to refuse to adjourn. Impeachment was not even mentioned, nor did anyone complain that the government prorogued Parliament only as a trick to frustrate any attempt to impeach them. Why was the Coalition so restrained? Was it their satisfaction at having toppled Fejérváry? Did they have secret information that they would soon be appointed to form a government? Or did the masses outside the building cause the Coalition members to realize the limited base of their own popularity?\footnote{See the lead editorial, NFP, 1905, Sept. 16M.} The next few days were filled with speculations about supposed secret negotiations going on between the Coalition and their allies in Vienna.

The circumstances indicate that talks of some kind had taken place between representatives of the Coalition and either Gauthsch or Gołuchowski, or both of them. Otherwise it is impossible to explain what moved Franz Joseph to reject Kristóffy's suffrage plan and accept the resignation of the Fejérváry government if no better alternative was in sight. These talks were probably not committed to paper, for to this day no one has produced any documentary evidence showing who had negotiated with whom, what plan
had been discussed, or what reason there was to expect Franz Joseph to agree to it. Even the positive statements of persons close to the events, such as Kristóffy, turn out upon close examination to be nothing more than a repetition of rumors then current in the press. In the absence of any firm evidence, it is necessary to examine some of these rumors.

One such story involved Professor Ludwig Stein, a professor of philosophy at the University of Bern and a man of some note in the academic world. A Hungarian by birth, Professor Stein owned an estate in Hungary to which he returned every year. He had been in Budapest to attend the International Anti-Alcoholism Conference on September 12, and at that time he apparently talked with Apponyi, Kossuth, Bánffy and other Coalition leaders and proposed to them a compromise plan: a Coalition government would take office and be empowered to declare in Parliament that His Majesty would be willing, if the military strength of the army permitted it, to grant the wishes of the nation concerning the use of Hungarian language in the army. This interpretation would also be written into the Coronation Oath. Stein's proposal was only a slight concession beyond Paragraph 8 of the Committee of Nine program, except for tying it to the Coronation Oath. The plan was passed via Gołąchowski to Franz Joseph, who refused to bind his successor in this way.

Az Újság pointed out on September 16 that Andrásy and Gołąchowski were old family friends, and claimed that the two had been working out an agreement, with Bánffy as their intermediary. This would explain Bánffy's mys-

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13 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 209, 215-16, states categorically that Gauthsch and the Coalition were in alliance, but gives no evidence to support this claim. See above, p. 158, and Times, 1905, Sept. 18.

terious travels during the past few weeks. According to their plan, said Az Újság, Parliament would be diverted from the question of military rights to the larger question of the powers of the King. This diversion into larger constitutional issues would gain time during which Parliament could attend to the necessary administrative and financial affairs and ratify the outstanding customs treaties. The question of the customs union would not be raised until after these treaties were ratified, thus guaranteeing ten quiet years. It is a commentary on the strange political mentality of the times that one expected to buy a temporary peace by raising ever more important constitutional issues.

No one was convinced when all such rumors of secret negotiations were denied by Andrásy and Bánffy personally and by the Coalition as a whole. The stories themselves, though they may contain some threads of truth, remain implausible, because they contain nothing which Franz Joseph could consider a satisfactory defense of the royal prerogative, and hence they do not explain why the old Monarch would have preferred these meager promises over the plan, admittedly bold and risky, of Kristóffy and Fejérváry. Another clue to the question of secret negotiations between a member of the Coalition and Gołuchowski first came to light several years later, when Gyula Miklós, a former Lord Lieutenant of Borsod County, published an account of an interview in Kossuth's apartment in Budapest on a Thursday in September 1905. In the presence of Károly Eötvös, Miklós told Kossuth that he

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15 Bánffy's proposal of a new law forbidding the King to suspend Parliament during an "ex-lex" period was consistent with this plan. See above, pp. 170-71.

16 Reported in NFP, 1905, Sept. 17M.

17 Times, 1905, Sept. 18; NFP, Sept. 17M, 18A, 19M.
had been authorized by Fejérváry and Göyuchowski to inquire if Kossuth were willing to become Prime Minister on the condition of dropping all military demands. Kossuth, laying his hand on his bad leg, replied, "Once before I spent an entire day in the saddle, until Apponyi bucked me off. This time I'll be careful to stay in the saddle!" He promised Miklós that he would travel to Vienna on the following Sunday to talk with Göyuchowski. On the appointed day, however, he sent Göyuchowski a telegram, saying only that he was unwell and could not make the trip.  

If Miklós' memory is accurate, we can probably place his offer to Kossuth on Thursday, September 14, one day before the opening of Parliament; Kossuth was expected in Vienna on Sunday, September 17. For several days, then, Franz Joseph had hopes of solving the crisis in a satisfactory manner, pushing Apponyi and Bánffy aside. These hopes were dashed when someone, acting behind the scenes, once again pushed Kossuth from the saddle. On September 20 Zoltán Lengyel, of the radical wing of the Independence Party, published an article in Független Magyarország entitled "We will not Compromise," in which he insisted that the Coalition would never back down. Let His Majesty abdicate instead if he wants a settlement. Did Lengyel hope with this strong language to cut the ground out from under any compromise made by the Coalition's aristocrats behind the backs of the radicals, or was he denouncing Kossuth's attempt to drop the military demands?

Now that the King had relieved the Fejérváry government of responsibility the next move was up to him, and he had to act before Parliament

18 Miklós, Kossuth and Eötvös each recalled the incident in PL, 1909, Apr. 1N, 2M, 4M. Though they were in mutually hostile political camps at the time, the accounts of Miklós and Eötvös agree on essentials, while Kossuth claims not to remember the meeting very clearly. See above, p. 69.

19 Times; 1905, Sept. 21; NFP, Sept. 20A.
reopened on October 10. Three courses of action were open to him: he could appoint another Prime Minister with a new program in the hope of forming a new majority in Parliament, or he could appoint another homo regius to negotiate with the Coalition leaders, or he could invite the Coalition leaders to Vienna for direct talks. Although the Fejérváry-Kristóffy suffrage plan had been an attempt to create a program which could attract a new majority, some believed that this course of action might be tried again with a less radical platform. The Neue Freie Presse believed that Count János Zichy would be chosen for this task. A few days later the speculation was that a homo regius would be appointed to negotiate with the Coalition, and László Lukács, Wekerle, and Baron Burián were mentioned as the most likely candidates. Az Ujság, however, showed considerable insight when it predicted that Wekerle would not be chosen for the thankless task of mediator, because Franz Joseph would prefer to hold him in reserve for more important work at a more opportune time.

Franz Joseph was trying to decide what course to take. On Monday, September 18, he talked with Baron Fejérváry for an hour and received his report on the events of the previous Friday. On Tuesday the Kaiser was in Bad Gastein for the ceremonies opening the new railroad line through the Tauern Tunnel. There he spoke with Dr. Julius Sylvester, a member of the Austrian Reichsrat (German Peoples Party) who had called for Austria to go it alone without Hungary. Franz Joseph seemed unusually disturbed. He did not mention the new railroad, but his thoughts were only on the

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20 NFP, 1905, Sept. 16M, 16A.
21 NFP, 1905, Sept. 20M; Times, Sept. 19.
22 NFP, 1905, Sept. 18A, 19M.
Hungarian crisis. "You must help me, you must support me," he told Sylvester. "I shall never consent to dividing the army."  

By Tuesday evening the decision had been made. Franz Joseph would meet with the leaders of all the Coalition parties directly. Perhaps he was moved to take this unprecedented course only after the failure of the Kossuth talks had shown that the Coalition still expected him to back down on the question of military language. On Wednesday the presidents of the four Coalition parties, Kossuth, Andrassy, Bánffy and Aladár Zichy, received invitations to appear for an audience in the Hofburg in Vienna on Saturday morning, September 23. Count Apponyi, although he was considered the "soul" of the Coalition, did not receive an invitation, since he was officially only an ordinary member of the Independence Party. He was hurt that he had been excluded, while Bánffy, under suspicion of treasonable complicity with the "Zeysig" pamphlet, was invited. When Apponyi made his feelings known to his contacts in Vienna, he, too, received an invitation. Thursday night the Coalition Steering Committee met and expressed confidence in its leaders, but gave them no new instructions. Their resolution made no mention of command language. Immediately after the meeting Thursday night, Bánffy took the night train to Vienna, travelling a day ahead of his four colleagues. It was explained publicly that Bánffy was to have talks with Goluchowski and Pitreich before the royal audience on Saturday morning, but it may be that Bánffy was embarrassed by the revelations made earlier in the week in the "Zeysig" investigation and preferred to avoid sensitive questions from his fellow politicians. Again on Saturday morning, Bánffy went directly to the Hofburg, while

\[\text{NFP, 1905, Sept. 21M, 22M, 23A; Times, Sept. 22. For another expression of Franz Joseph's depression, see his letters to Frau Schratt on Sept. 26 and Oct. 2. (Franz Joseph I, Briefe, 460-61.)}\]
the other four conferred together at the Hotel Bristol and left together
for their appointment.24

On Saturday morning, September 23, at precisely 11 o'clock, the
carriages of the Hungarian Coalition leaders drove up in front of the Hof-
burg. The five politicians were at once ushered into the Monarch's confer-
ence room. Instead of finding table and chairs prepared for a conference,
they found that the chairs had been placed out of the way against the wall,
and a podium was placed in one corner of the room. In a moment Franz Joseph
appeared and stood behind the podium, and after a few introductory words in
German, read a prepared statement in Hungarian, outlining his conditions
for appointing a Coalition government.

1. The military questions, in so far as they affect the language
of command and service, in regard to which any yielding is and
remains absolutely excluded, are to be eliminated from the program.

2. The bases of the pragmatic community [between Hungary and Austria]
remain completely untouched as regards both the army and foreign
representation.

3. A revision of the 1867 basis, in so far as it may concern
economic or other questions affecting the relationship between
Austria and Hungary, cannot take place one-sidedly between the
Crown and the Hungarian nation, but can only be effected by means
of a compromise, subject to royal sanction, between the two
states of the Monarchy with the help of their governments and of
parliamentary deputations appointed ad hoc.

4. The obligation must be entered into that the needs of the state,
I.e., the budget, the ordinary contingent of recruits, and the
commercial treaties, shall be voted, and that the Delegations and
the quota deputations shall be elected.

24 NFP, 1905, Sept. 21M, 22M, 22A, 23A; Times, Sept. 22, 23; Lányi,
Regierung, 85.
5. The obligation must be entered into that funds must be voted to cover those military demands of which the last Delegations sanctioned the installments for the years 1904 and 1905, and that a defense bill based on the two years' service system shall be adopted.25

Franz Joseph then handed the paper to the President of the Coalition, Ferenc Kossuth, with the request that the Coalition leaders would discuss the details of their assumption of office with Count Gołuchowski, not in his capacity as Joint Foreign Minister but as special representative of the Crown. As the King turned to leave the room, the Hungarians, who had not yet even been asked to sit down, were dumbfounded. Bánffy found his voice and asked, "Your Majesty orders us, then, to give our answer to Count Gołuchowski?"

"Yes, but the terms remain unchanged," said the Monarch, and left the room.

The crowd in the street, who had just seen the Hungarian leaders enter the palace, were startled to see them enter their carriages and drive away. Someone looked at the clock and noticed that only five minutes had elapsed. The interview of September 23, 1905, is remembered as the "Five Minute Audience."26

The Coalition leaders drove at once to their hotel and held a hurried conference. At noon they all appeared at the Foreign Office and presented Count Gołuchowski with the following declaration:

25 I have slightly amended Steed's translation, Times, 1905, Sept. 25, corrected Sept. 28. A German text of the King's conditions is reprinted in Sosnosky, Politik, II, 192-93, and Lányi, Regierung, 85-86; cf. NFP, Sept. 23A.

26 Times, 1905, Sept. 25; NFP, Sept. 23A; Bánffy's personal account of the details of the meeting is given in NFP, Sept. 30M.
The representatives of the majority of the Hungarian Parliament are not in a position to accept the proposals of the Crown, since these proposals are contrary to the conviction of the majority and are not in harmony with the views of the people who returned the representatives to Parliament. If, however, the Crown is nevertheless inclined to treat with the majority concerning Hungarian affairs, this can only be done through a person possessing Hungarian citizenship, since none but a Hungarian can intervene in Hungarian affairs.  

By two o'clock the Coalition leaders were packed and ready to leave Vienna. They had come to Vienna expecting to receive Franz Joseph's surrender. Instead, they had been publicly embarrassed, and they needed some way to save face. Ferenc Kossuth had been scheduled to speak at a ceremony unveiling a statue of his father in Makó on Sunday afternoon, but had found it necessary to decline the invitation at the last minute when he received the invitation to Vienna. Now all five Coalition leaders resolved to travel to Makó and turn the occasion into a major political demonstration. But just before the Hungarians left for the train station, a representative of the Hungarian Chancery in Vienna, Géza Daruváry, appeared at their hotel and informed them that Franz Joseph had appointed Count Béla Cziráky, Chief Marshall of the Court, to negotiate with them as homo regius. Count Cziráky had been notified, and the five Coalition leaders were requested to wait for him to return from Sopron. The Coalition leaders hesitated. This might be a chance to save something out of the debacle. Yes, they would wait.  

Count Cziráky returned to Vienna at 7 o'clock Sunday morning and was received by Franz Joseph almost immediately. At 10 o'clock he conferred

27 *Times*, 1905, Sept. 25.

28 *NFP*, 1905, Sept. 24; *Times*, Sept. 25. The Vienna *Vaterland* reported that Andrásy and Kossuth, separately, had lengthy visits with Gołuchowski on Saturday afternoon. (*NFP*, Sept. 25A.)
with the Coalition leaders, but he brought only the same terms that Franz Joseph had stated the day before. "The terms remain unchanged." After an hour Cziráky left to inform the King of their discussion. Kossuth, who was no longer interested in further talk now that the King was making the rules, insisted he would have to take the 3 o'clock train back to Budapest, and Cziráky promised to give him a reply by 2:30. Instead, Count Cziráky and Count Czuczwowski were both tied up in conference with Franz Joseph from 2:30 to 3, and by the time Count Cziráky returned to the Hotel Bristol at 3:15, the Coalition leaders had left. Communication between the Coalition and the Crown was broken off. 29

Why did the Five Minute Audience end in such a fiasco? No one has yet offered a thoroughly satisfactory explanation of how the misunderstanding arose. 30 Both sides expected the other to back down. Franz Joseph had made clear his position on the military demands in the Order of Chököy, through Prime Minister Tisza and Prime Minister Fejérváry, and via one

29 NFP, 1905, Sept. 25A; Times, Sept. 25. There were confused reports that Count Cziráky had gone from the Hotel Bristol to the Vienna suburb of Waidlingen to confer with Count Apponyi, who was visiting his family there after the others had returned to Budapest. If that were true, the negotiations could be considered not formally at an end. (NFP, Sept. 25A, 26H.)

30 The least satisfactory explanation is that offered by Sieghart: "What appeared to them as intransigence or arrogance [Unversöhnlichkeit oder Hochmut] was only an expression of the sudden embarrassment of the Kaiser, who due to the customary monarchial reserve [Abstand], found no occasion to express himself, and thus broke off." (Rudolf Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte, 215.)

Another interesting, but unsatisfactory, explanation is found in a letter of János Sándor to Tisza on Jan. 8, 1906. "[László] Lukács mentioned concerning Sept. 23 that the King himself feels hurt and offended by these events because he wanted to negotiate with them and to treat them politely. This is shown by the [phrasing] of the points to be discussed, especially Point 3, which was included in the manner exactly corresponding to Kossuth's views. The reason why he did not go into details with them was that he could not run the risk of so many people falling on him in an attempt to negate his intention by [twisting] his words." J. Kun, ed., Tisza KöviseiBeszédei, III, 699n.
homo regius after another. Andrásy, who had served as homo regius, knew exactly the King's standpoint and had communicated it to the Coalition. But he also led the Coalition to believe that Franz Joseph would give in if pressured at the right point. 31 The King had given them several indications that he was anxious to make peace. He had relieved the Fejérváry government and invited the Coalition leaders to Vienna. It was known privately that he was unhappy with Kristóffy's pact with the Socialists. The Coalition leaders came to Vienna expecting to find him ready to compromise on the military language question.

Franz Joseph, on the other hand, believed that the mere threat of universal suffrage was enough to cause the Coalition to come to terms. He was not warm to the idea of universal suffrage—despite what many persons claimed in later years—and Gautsch's predictions of dire consequences for Austria caused him to have second thoughts about following the advice of an adventurer like Kristóffy. Moreover, it is important to remember that Franz Joseph almost never 32 acted on his own without advisors, though it is not always clear just whose advice he was following. Someone had given him erroneous information about the intentions of the Coalition. The answer to the confused state of affairs seems to lie in Baron Bánffy's mysterious contacts with Prime Minister Gautsch and Foreign Minister Gołębiowski. As Steed reported,

It is no secret that for some weeks Baron Bánffy has been running to and fro between Budapest and Vienna to negotiate semi-officially with the King's entourage on behalf of the Coalition, and it is equally well known that the Coalition let it be understood that if the Fejérváry government were removed and its terrible program of universal suffrage dis-

31 Gőncöl, Életrajz, 75.

32 It appears that Franz Joseph acted alone on Nov. 3, when he decided to introduce universal suffrage in Austria. See below, pp. 230-31.
avowed; the Coalition would be ready to take office on acceptable terms. 33

Yet Steed misunderstood the full significance of Bánffy's activity. Bánffy was not only negotiating semi-officially for the Coalition, but for himself as well. It seems most likely that it was Bánffy, greedy to become Prime Minister once again, who had led the Coalition to believe one thing and had told Gautsch and Goľuchowski something else. Bánffy was thus trying to act on behalf of both the Coalition and the Crown, without being fully honest with either side.

In this light the full significance of the "Zeysig" affair becomes clear. On September 12, on the same day that the Fejérváry government was relieved, the police investigation acting under orders of Interior Minister Kristóffy mentioned Bánffy's name for the first time. In this way Kristóffy was able to reveal to unsuspecting members of the Coalition just how extensive Bánffy's undercover activities were. Prosecution of the "Zeysig" pamphlet was not important in itself, but was used in an attempt to sow mistrust within the Coalition and cause it to break up. This eventually happened in March 1906, when Bánffy resigned from the Coalition and those parties remaining in the Coalition came to terms with the Monarch shortly afterward.

The question still remains why Franz Joseph decided to appoint Goľuchowski as his special representative. The Coalition had two good legal grounds to reject him, for he was not a Hungarian citizen, and as a Joint Minister he was not permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of either state. According to press reports from Budapest, it had been known privately for some time that Goľuchowski was to be appointed homo

regius, even though it was believed that many Hungarians would have been angry with the Coalition leaders if they had negotiated with him. If this is true, why did the Five Minute Audience take the Coalition leaders, especially Bánffy, by surprise? Furthermore, on the day before the Five Minute Audience Steed reported rumors that GoIuchowski would soon be dismissed as a first peace offering to the Coalition. How had GoIuchowski offended the Coalition before the Five Minute Audience? It would seem that the Coalition leaders were willing to allow outsiders to interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary when it was convenient to them. The Coalition papers had said as much. Andrássy, Bánffy and the others had been working privately through GoIuchowski while refusing to have any dealings with the "illegal" Fejérváry government. But GoIuchowski had misread the situation and the Coalition's confidence in him. Perhaps GoIuchowski had recommended himself as homo regius, and persuaded Franz Joseph that, according to Bánffy, the Coalition leaders were ready to reach an agreement with him. Joint War Minister Pitreich may have shared this optimism, for when a reporter brought him the news of the Five Minute Audience, Pitreich did not believe it. One suspects that if Franz Joseph had offered a compromise on the military language question, the Coalition leaders would have found a legal excuse for negotiating with GoIuchowski.

34 Note that this is not precisely the position to which GoIuchowski was appointed; he was named "special representative of His Majesty."

35 NFP, 1905, Sept. 23A.


37 Lányi, Regierung, 88.

38 NFP, 1905, Sept. 25A.
Instead, they made an issue of negotiating with a foreigner to hide their embarrassment when Franz Joseph handed them an ultimatum, and broke off all further contact for the time being.

Thousands of persons gathered at the station to greet the Coalition leaders when they returned to Budapest Sunday night. The heroes were escorted through the streets to the sound of crowds singing the "Kossuth Song," while some students shouted "Down with the Camarilla! Down with Vienna! Long live the revolution!" A few Socialists in the crowd sang the "Marseillaise" and shouted "Kossuth resign!" which led to an exchange of blows. But feelings were too much aroused to be dissipated in one night. On the following night a crowd of students staged a torchlight parade to Independence Party headquarters. While Apponyi and Kossuth spoke from the balcony, several hundred Socialists interrupted with shouts for universal suffrage. A street fight followed. Another mob held a demonstration in front of the extremist Independence Party paper Független Magyarország. The police protected the windows in front of the Social Democratic newspaper Népszava.

On Wednesday night, September 27, the police were no longer able to hold the combatants apart. Nationalist students and Socialist workers clashed in front of the Independence Party headquarters, using fists and knives. When mounted policemen attempted to break up the fight, the Coalition mob attacked them with cries of "Down with the Tisza Hussars!" Socialists fired pistols in the air, and one student had a large piece of flesh cut out of his foot. Five persons were hospitalized, and an estimated

39 NFP, 1905, Sept. 25A.
40 NFP, 1905, Sept. 26M.
forty persons were injured. A steelworker later died of injuries received on that night. On Thursday afternoon a large crowd of nationalist students were prevented from assaulting three Socialist students, but later the nationalist group demanded that the Socialists be expelled from the university, or else they would remove them. 41

All shades of opinion in Hungary were outraged by the Five Minute Audience. Franz Joseph's statement was made to look even more like an ultimatum by the fact that the court published an official text of the King's demands only half an hour later. Some felt it was a worse insult to the nation than the Order of ChIoby two years earlier. Even Pester Lloyd, normally a staunch defender of the Habsburg dynasty and the Dualist system, was enraged by the appointment of Count Gołuchowski as homo regius, and insisted that only the Hungarian Parliament, acting alone, could change the Ausgleich law. In an article in Budapesti Napló, József Vészi said that Gautsch and Gołuchowski would have to change their minds if they believed they could withhold both universal suffrage and Hungarian command language from the Hungarian people. "Auf Wiedersehen, meine Herren, in the camp of universal suffrage." 42 Baron Gautsch was to join the universal suffrage camp sooner than anyone could have predicted.

The Coalition Steering Committee met on Monday, September 25, and issued a statement damning those persons who had advised the King so badly. Since Franz Joseph's program meant such a dangerous violation of the Hungarian Constitution, they said, the Coalition called for all deputies to join them on October 3 in a discussion of the defense of the Constitution.

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41 NFP, 1905, Sept. 28M, 28A, 20M; Times, Sept. 28 (Reuters dispatch); Mucsi, Paktum, 92-93.

42 NFP, 1905, Sept. 24M, 25A.
The semi-official *Magyar Nemzet* denied that either Fejérváry or Tisza had advised Franz Joseph.\(^4^3\) Two days later Géza Polónyi expressed another widely held belief that Franz Joseph's intransigence could be traced to the influence of Kaiser Wilhelm and pointed to Franz Joseph's recent interview with the German Ambassador Count Carl von Wedel. It became necessary for an "authoritative source" in Berlin to deny any German influence in the internal affairs of Austria-Hungary.\(^4^4\)

The recent developments aroused opposition and dismay not only in the Hungarian half of the Monarchy. The Austrian Social Democrats planned to introduce a resolution before the Reichsrat condemning Gautsch for intervening in Hungarian affairs. A party conference in Vienna on September 22 declared Gautsch to be an "enemy of the people" and pledged to topple his government and to agitate for universal suffrage.\(^4^5\) The Christian Socialist Party was even stronger in its attack. At a party conference at Eggenburg, the Vienna mayor Karl Lueger declared:


\(^4^4\) NFP, 1905, Sept. 28M, 29M, Oct. 4A; 1906, Jan. 5M. There was widespread belief in Hungary that Kaiser Wilhelm was putting pressure on Franz Joseph, arguing that with a divided army Austria-Hungary would be a far less satisfactory ally. Henry Wickham-Steed, the London *Times* correspondent in Vienna, also tended to see German influence everywhere. Steed's Germanophobia is evident in his dispatches as well as in his memoirs written after the war, *Through Thirty Years*. So far, neither the maze of memoir literature, nor the official German Foreign Office publication, *Die Grosse Politik*, nor the more recently published secret papers of Baron von Holstein of the German Foreign Office, *Die geheimen Papiere Friedrich von Holsteins*, give any firm evidence of direct German influence in the Austro-Hungarian crisis during these years, though there may have been subtle pressures which escaped documentation.

We will not tolerate in any case for the Magyars to be supported in their [separatist] efforts by an Austrian minister. We insist that [Austria] will not make even the slightest concession more to Hungary, either in the military or in the economic sphere: otherwise we will refuse to grant the state a single farthing or a single recruit.

The party then adopted a resolution to this effect. The proponents of a centralist empire were borrowing the tactic of "passive resistance" for their own ends.

When the Austrian Reichsrat convened on September 26, Prime Minister Gautsch found it necessary to answer the charges that he had interfered in the internal affairs of Hungary:

I naturally hold firmly to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Hungary, just as I would have to resist if Hungary were to interfere in any way with our internal affairs. This is not to say that there cannot be situations in which the voice of the Austrian Prime Minister must and shall be heard. In such situations which affect the major interests entrusted to me, I am both justified and obligated to express myself, and I will not allow anyone to deny me this right. Gautsch's words sounded like a denial, an apology, and a confession at the same time. They did not satisfy his enemies. Austrians and Hungarians alike considered the speech to be proof of Gautsch's complicity in Hungarian affairs. When he insisted that reforms must be made in a legal manner, some took this to mean that the Fejérváry government had intended to introduce universal suffrage by decree, and that Gautsch had opposed this action. When Gautsch implied further in his speech that

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46 NFP, 1905, Sept. 18A; the Eggenburg resolution is discussed in Sassmann, "Der Kampf um das allgemeine Wahlrecht," 129-31.

47 Gautsch's speech is given in full, NFP, 1905, Sept. 26A; summarized in Jenks, Austrian Electoral Reform, 32-33.

48 NFP, 1905, Sept. 27A, 28M.

49 Times, 1905, Sept. 27.
he intended to ignore electoral reform in Austria and concentrate on the
nationality question, the various reform groups in the Austrian Reichsrat
joined forces to compel a vote on the suffrage question. The universal
suffrage campaign was underway in Austria, despite Gautsch's efforts to
stiffle it. 50

Somewhat half-heartedly, Franz Joseph had permitted a member of the
Hungarian cabinet to bring up the question of universal suffrage. He
hoped that the mere mention of this dangerous subject would bring the Coa-
lation to its senses. At the same time he kept other measures in readi-
ness. Now the inoculation which had failed in Hungary had caused a fever
to break out in Austria. Even the Austrian Reichsrat, which had been
ineffective for several years, was reasserting itself as a force, de-
manding universal suffrage and a strong resistance to further concessions
to Magyar separatism. The intensity of the new political demands in
Austria was now to figure as one important factor to persuade the Monarch
to embrace the plan for universal suffrage in Hungary.

Jenks, Austrian Electoral Reform, 33-40. Jenks' study is the
standard work in English on the 1905-07 suffrage movement in Austria.
There are several newer studies in other languages, some of which offer
new details, without affecting the validity of Jenks' work. Johannes
Sassmann, "Der Kampf um das allgemeine Wahlrecht und die Christlichsoziale
Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölker-
staat, Vol. 1: Das Ringen um die supranationale Integration der
zisleithanischen Arbeiterbewegung, 1867-1907 (Vienna: Europa Verlag,
1963), 341-449; and the published doctoral dissertation of Éva Somogyi,
Választójog és parlamentarizmus Ausztriában (1861-1907) [Suffrage and
parliamentarism in Austria], in the series Ertékezések a Történeti
Macmillan, 1956), Part 2, 578ff., is not entirely reliable. Interesting
documentation is offered in Victor Adler, Briefwechsel mit August Bebel
und Karl Kautsky, ed. Friedrich Adler (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volks-
buchhandlung, 1954).
CHAPTER 9

THE ROAD TO CONFRONTATION

A. Invasion or Suffrage Reform?

The first few days of October found both halves of the Monarchy in the throes of political turmoil. In the Austrian Reichsrat on September 26, after Gautsch’s speech, four separate motions were introduced calling for immediate consideration of a universal suffrage bill. The suffrage question was debated until October 5. When it came to a vote on October 6, 155 deputies voted in favor, 114 against, with many abstaining. Because the motions called for immediate action ahead of the bills introduced by the government, the question required a two-thirds majority and hence failed to pass. Nevertheless, universal suffrage had found a large number of supporters even in the face of the determined opposition of Prime Minister Gautsch, and it was clear that the issue was not dead.\(^1\)

In the Hungarian dilemma, the next move was up to Franz Joseph. The Coalition leaders had made it painfully clear that they were not ready to agree to any terms acceptable to the King. This left him with the choice of reappointing the Fejérváry government and backing their program of universal suffrage, or of finding someone else who was willing to take over their thankless task with a less radical platform. Day after day he conferred with various advisors, while struggling to reach a decision.

On Wednesday, September 27, he received Count Cziráky and heard the final

\(^1\)Jenks, Austrian Electoral Reform, 33-40.
report on the break-down of negotiations following the Five Minute Audience. That afternoon he talked with Fejér váry. On the following morning, September 28, he had a long talk with Gausch, and in the afternoon held a "limited Crown Council," at which only Franz Joseph, Fejér váry, Goluchowski, and Pitreich were present. Fejér váry was not given royal sanction for his suffrage program, but Franz Joseph decided to seek the advice of Count Albin Csáky, President of the Hungarian House of Magnates, whose opinion the King valued highly. Count Csáky came to Vienna on September 30, and expressed his favor of universal suffrage if it could be shown that it would not disadvantage the Hungarian nation.²

Strengthened by Csáky's conditional support of universal suffrage, Franz Joseph called Fejér váry and Kristóffy to Vienna on October 3. This was the first time Kristóffy had been singled out for a special audience with the Monarch. Franz Joseph listened carefully for two hours while Kristóffy read his proposed suffrage bill. The King was beginning to look with favor on the plan. That evening, while boarding the train for Budapest, Kristóffy was stopped by a courier with word that His Majesty wished to see him again on the following day. On October 4, Kristóffy offered the King two alternatives: either buy a temporary peace with the present Parliament by conceding to the military demands, or try suffrage reform. Faced with these alternatives, Franz Joseph replied, "Gewiss, lieber zur Wahlreform."³ The decision had been made.

Kristóffy, who described this audience in his memoirs written in 1926,

²NFP, 1905, Sept. 27A, 28M, 28A, 29M, 30M, 30A, Oct. 1M, 3M; Times, Sept. 29, 30, Oct. 3. The minutes of this limited Crown Council were not located in Vienna.
³NFP, 1905, Oct. 4M, 5M; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 255-57; Mucsi, Paktum, 97.
carefully avoids any hint that Franz Joseph may have been considering a third alternative: an invasion of Hungary by the Austrian units of the joint army. Although there were a few rumors of military plans in the press at the time, the Hungarian government and the Joint War Ministry routinely denied them and they did not seem to arouse much excitement. 4 The first solid information on any such plan was published in 1930, when the military historian Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau published his biography of the Chief of the General Staff, Count Friedrich Beck-Rzikowsky. He stated, in a single sentence, that in August 1905 the Operations Bureau of the General Staff, under Beck's direction, drew up "War Plan U" (for Ungarn). There follows a brief outline of how the various columns would advance into Hungary from Galicia, Croatia and Vienna, and the statement that Beck showed the plan to the Emperor. Nothing more. Since then several writers have mentioned "War Plan U" on the basis of these few lines, without questioning whether such a plan really existed, how detailed it was, and whether it was drawn up at the command of the Emperor or merely on the

4See NFP, 1905, Aug. 26M, Sept. 12A, 13M; Times, Aug. 26. Although the Neue Freie Presse and The Times may both have tried to play down any such alarming rumors, there is an intriguing letter to the editor in The Times on Oct. 5, the day after Kristóffy's decisive audience with Franz Joseph, signed "Viator." This letter is almost certainly the first published report on the situation in Austria-Hungary by Robert W. Seton-Watson, who later wrote under the pseudonym "Scotus Viator." According to the writer, the Magyars believe "that it is the deliberate intention of the Court to provoke a revolution in Budapest, in order that the Imperial army may be called in to crush what, in the view of the Hofburg, has become an intolerable source of weakness to the Monarchy. . . . The project, moreover, is not so suicidal as it may seem. The races of the Cis-Leithanian Monarchy have no love for the Magyars, who are hated by their Slav subjects in the south, as in 1848. Even among certain classes of the Magyars themselves, moreover--notably the aristocracy and the clergy--dymastic feeling is strong, and it is a moot point whether the Magyar officers in the Imperial army would violate their oath to their Sovereign in order to defend a constitution, the democratic tendencies of which vast numbers must disapprove."
initiative of ambitious officers of the General Staff. 5

Only recently the plan has been discovered in the military archives in Vienna. It has been discussed and portions of it published by Dr. Kurt Pebb and Professor Gunther E. Rothenberg. 6 On the basis of their discovery, the legend of "War Plan U" can perhaps be pinned down. As early as February 1904 Field Marshall Moritz Auffenberg wrote a seventy-page study of the possibility of a military solution to the Hungarian question. Although his plan was not seriously considered at the time, it remained in the files of the General Staff and served as a basis for the later "War Plan U" in the summer of 1905. In March 1912, however, Auffenberg's complicity in a plan to invade Hungary became known in the Hungarian press, causing him serious embarrassment as a commander in the World War.

The Operations Bureau of the General Staff apparently began work on a plan for military intervention in Hungary almost simultaneously with the appointment of the Fejérváry government. A preliminary study by Lieutenant Colonel Artur Edler von Mecenseffy was completed on July 19, and a complete "Studie U" was ready by August 13. This plan, of 114 manuscript pages, was far more detailed than the routine staff exercises conducted every year for a hypothetical war against Germany, Italy or Russia. Hungarian units of the joint army were classified as "reliable," "questionable," or "unreliable," depending upon their proportion of Magyar troops

5 Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte: Das Leben des Generalstabchefs Grafen Beck (Zürich, Vienna: Amalthea Verlag, 1930), 406. This statement is repeated to Egon Caesar Conte Corti and Hans Sokol, Der alte Kaiser (Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Styria, 1955), 299; Allmayer-Beck, Ministerpräsident Baron Beck (1956), 169; and Allmayer-Beck, "Der Ausgleich von 1867 und die k.u.k. bewaffnete Macht" (1967), 123.

to non-Magyars. All units of the Honvéd were considered "unreliable" for the purposes of the plan. As an added safety margin, however, even the units of the joint army considered "reliable" were not to be assigned any military role in the operation, but would be ordered to remain in their barracks. The actual occupation would be performed by Austrian and Croatian units of the joint army, who would advance into the country from three directions.

It is not made clear who authorized this study. It was probably drawn up on the authority of the Chief of the General Staff, Count Beck, although the Emperor must have been informed that the General Staff was working on the plan. The question of a military solutions to the Hungarian question was brought up at the Crown Council at Ischl on August 22. Fejérváry was strongly against any attempt to establish a military government in Hungary, because he believed it could not succeed. Because of the deep-seated antipathy of the Hungarians to absolutism in the light of their experience of 1849-60, he believed it would be impossible to find civil servants willing to serve under a military regime. He said his government would not approve any such undertaking. Joint War Minister Pitreich and Foreign Minister Gołuchowski were not quite as skeptical and thought the question should at least be discussed as one alternative. The minutes of the meeting are ambiguous, but it appears that the Crown Council adjourned without making any firm decision on this question, although the military authorities were permitted to take some preliminary steps leaving "War Plan U" open as one option. For example, some "reliable" Hungarian troops were to be transferred from Vienna to Budapest under the guise of routine guard duty.  

7 HSHA, GM, Aug. 22, 1905, pp. 163, 210-12, 222-27.
Though we have no minutes of the Crown Council held in Vienna on September 10, it is not likely that the military solution was considered then because there were encouraging signs that the Coalition was ready to compromise. During the remainder of September the military authorities were busy with autumn manoeuvres and, in Austria, with the details of discharging one levy of recruits and inducting a new levy into active service. (In Hungary, where no recruit bill had been passed, the third-year recruits were retained on active duty.) We know of no further military planning until October 8, when each of the corps commanders of the joint army was handed a sealed packet, which was to be opened only upon a special coded telegraphic instruction from Vienna. These packets contained the secret orders for placing "War Plan U" into action. On October 12 couriers retrieved the unopened orders, which were then officially destroyed.\(^8\)

By distributing "War Plan U" on October 8, the General Staff may have been merely completing their preliminary steps, giving the Emperor one more option. Or they may have been prompted to go beyond the preliminary stages because of the visibly worsening situation. Since the Five Minute Audience on September 23 the clamor in Hungary, Austria, and Croatia had become deafening. A decision would have to be made soon, possibly in connection with the meeting of the Hungarian Parliament on October 10. But the generals may have been acting without their Commander-in-Chief. Franz Joseph's decision on October 4 to back Kristóffy's program for universal suffrage probably removed the "War Plan U" from the range of options. The General Staff may not have realized this for several days, and then hastily re-

\(^8\) Peball and Rothenberg, "Der Fall 'U'," 85-86. The original copy was not deposited in the War Archives until some years after the First World War.
tried their secret orders.\footnote{The only evidence against this assumption is an order to General Kloubčar, Commandant of the Honvéd, placing him under the command of the Budapest 4th Army Corps, to whom he would have been subject only in time of war. This order is included in the "War Plan U" papers and is published by Pebbey and Rothenberg, "Der Fall 'U'," 119-20. The order is signed by Franz Joseph and dated Bad Ischl, October 8, 1905. Since this order only fulfills a decision of the Crown Council at Bad Ischl on Aug. 22, preparing for several eventualities, I suspect that the order was prepared and signed by Franz Joseph long before Oct. 8 and the date was filled in by another hand at a later date.}

Franz Joseph agreed to try Kristóffy's approach, not because he really wanted to liberate the masses, or even because he would have preferred to deal with them rather than with the incessantly demanding Magyar aristocrats, but because he believed that this threat alone was strong enough to frighten the Coalition eventually into surrendering before the suffrage reform was actually accomplished. In this his prediction was correct. Kristóffy, on the other hand, hoped actually to accomplish the reform and thereby destroy the old political alignments and create a new base of power for himself. In this respect both Kristóffy and the King were courting the oppressed classes and nationalities for their own ends.

All along, Franz Joseph had tried to leave several options open. After the Crown Council at Bad Ischl on August 22, Kristóffy proceeded to push his campaign for universal suffrage, the General Staff continued their preparations for a military solution, while Gauthsch and Gołuchowski made their own attempt to negotiate with the Coalition leaders. The negotiations with the Coalition broke down completely after the Five Minute Audience. By the morning of October 4, when Kristóffy had his important audience with the King, several things had occurred which ruled out the military solution, even if Franz Joseph had ever seriously considered it. On October 3, Count Tisza ended his benevolent neutrality toward the Fejérváry government and violently attacked universal suffrage and Kristóffy personally. This
threatened to deprive the government of the support of county and local officials from the Liberal Party, who up to now had continued to serve loyally under Fejérváry. If these officials were now expected to desert the Fejérváry government, the prospect of a military government became even dimmer, since it could expect to find no experienced bureaucrats to assist it. The Fejérváry government was left with only one direction to turn: to the disenfranchised masses.

At the same time, the demand for universal suffrage was gaining strength in Austria, where the Reichsrat was at that moment in the midst of a feverish debate on the question. Franz Joseph may have had to consider the possibility that, regardless of his decision on Hungary, universal suffrage would become an unavoidable necessity in Austria. Perhaps the better tactic would be for the Sovereign to lead this popular demand. At the same time, the Austrian Reichsrat was stiffening its resistance to Hungarian demands. From all sides there were calls for revising the Ausgleich, and for the first time there were serious voices in Austria contemplating separation

There has been much speculation on Franz Joseph's decision to support universal suffrage, but most of it concerns his decision concerning Austria, made on November 3, after the events in Russia had made it unavoidable. The decision on October 4, concerning Hungary, would seem to have been the more decisive, yet it has been hardly examined.

Baron Beck, the Austrian Prime Minister who completed the suffrage reform bill, believed that the Kaiser was genuinely in favor of giving rights to the people. Max Vladimir Freiherr v. Beck, "Der Kaiser und die Wahlreform," in Eduard von Steinitz, ed., Erinnerungen an Franz Joseph I. (Berlin, 1931), 203.

Other contemporary observers and later scholars have emphasized the Emperor's ability to yield gracefully to political necessity. See the able discussion of the question in Éva Somogyi, Választójog, 128-33; and Jenks, Electoral Reform, p. 42n. Also: Baernreither, Verfall, 168-73; Corti, Der alte Kaiser, 302-303; Sieghart, Die Letzten Jahrzehnte, 83-84, 218-20; Karl Tschupnik, Franz Joseph I.: Der Untergang eines Reiches (Hellerau bei Dresden, 1928), 492-95; and Richard Charnatz, Österreichs Russere und innere Politik von 1895 bis 1914 (Leipzig, Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1915), 73.
from Hungary. In order to hold his shaky Monarchy together, Franz Joseph had to consider allying himself with his people—at least temporarily—rather than depending on his army.

The final consideration was the news from Croatia. At a meeting at Fiume [Rijeka] on October 3, political leaders of Croat nationality from Croatia, Istria and Dalmatia offered their support to the Hungarian Coalition in return for the reincorporation of Dalmatia into Croatia. As soon as the news of this resolution was known in Vienna, it was clear that the entire South Slav question had now become involved with the Hungarian question. Whatever else it might mean, it was not now safe to draw all the troops out of Croatia and Dalmatia for an invasion of Hungary, when these troops might be needed to preserve order at home. In any case the Croat troops could no longer be considered "reliable" under the new political circumstances. With his options removed one by one, Franz Joseph found himself on October 4 with no satisfactory choice but to accept Kristóffy's plan to campaign for universal suffrage. We will now turn to a closer examination of some of the factors that influenced his decision.

See the discussion of economic relations between Austria and Hungary, Chapter 10-C, "The Commercial Treaties."

The Resolution of Fiume is dated October 4, and was first reported in the evening edition of the Vienna papers on that date. (NFP, 1905, Oct. 4A.) Yet in a dispatch dated Vienna, Oct. 4, Steed reported that the resolution was adopted "last night." (Times, Oct. 6.) Kemény, Iratok, IV, 626n., also dates the resolution on Oct. 3. Probably a preliminary version of the resolution was presented to the delegates on the evening of Oct. 3, and this news may have reached Franz Joseph by the morning of Oct. 4.

On the other hand, József Kun places Franz Joseph's final decision to back universal suffrage on Oct. 6, though he gives no reason for this date. (J. Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, III, 682n.) If this is true, the Sovereign certainly acted with the knowledge of the Resolution of Fiume, and probably after the Austrian Reichsrat voted for universal suffrage on Oct. 6. There is no doubt that he had already reached a decision before the orders for "War Plan U" were distributed on Oct. 8.
B. The Resolution of Fiume

The Resolution of Fiume [Rijeka, Yugoslavia] signed on October 4, 1905, turned attention to the entire South Slav Question, which was inevitably interlaced with the Hungarian Crisis.

The Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868, known by its Croatian name Nagodba, gave to Croatia an autonomous position within the lands of the Hungarian Crown. The Croatian Diet, or Sabor, had legislative competence for internal Croatian affairs, and sent forty of its members to the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest, where they had a voice and a vote in matters of joint interest to Hungary and Croatia. Although there was and remains some difference of opinion whether the Nagodba was harmful to Croatian interests, there is no denying that Hungary had violated it at will. The law gave the Croats little power to protect themselves. The members of the Sabor were elected by one of the most restricted franchise laws in Europe, far more limited even than that of Hungary. Only about 2% of the population was allowed to vote, and of these voters more than half were government officials, whose vote could be coerced by the government. Even "joint officials," for example Magyar railroad employees stationed in Croatia, were allowed to vote in Croatian elections even if they retained their right to vote at home.\(^{13}\) The government, therefore, could generally count on a favorable majority in the Sabor. Furthermore, the Sabor had little power to resist Magyar encroachments. The most serious complaint was that the Sabor had no power to examine the financial records of the Croatian government, which were kept by the Finance Ministry in Budapest. The Ban of Croatia, or chief executive, was appointed by the Crown upon the nomination

of the Hungarian Prime Minister. The Ban could communicate with the Sovereign on Croatian affairs only through the Minister for Croatia, a member of the Hungarian cabinet. Thus in any dispute between Hungary and Croatia, the Ban would invariably support the Hungarian side.  

To these legal deficiencies must be added the Hungarian system of ruling Croatia, best exemplified by the long term of Count Károly Khuen-Héderváry, who served as Ban from 1883 to 1903. Through the broad powers of the Ban to appoint and dismiss lower government officials, only persons properly subservient to Magyar interests remained in government positions. By open fraud and police repression he maintained the power of the National Party, made up of Magyarized Croats or "Magyarones." He carefully gave some favors to the Serb minority in Croatia in order to foster jealousy between Serbs and Croats and to prevent the two nationalities from joining against him. For nearly two decades Khuen-Héderváry managed to keep his opposition divided, discouraged, and disorganized. When a new and determined Croat leadership emerged, it appeared first of all not in Croatia but among the Croats in neighboring Dalmatia.

The Nagodba of 1868 refers to the Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia as forming one state community with Hungary. The ancient territories of Croatia and Slavonia did form part of Hungary, and Croatia-Slavonia, or Croatia for short, were governed as one autonomous region in accordance with the Nagodba. Dalmatia, on the other hand, had in fact been governed by Vienna since the French were driven out in 1815. The Austrian

14 Ibid., 74-79.

Ausgleich legislation of December 21, 1867, held that Dalmatia was an integral part of Austria, and provided for Dalmatia to send nine deputies to the Reichsrat in Vienna.\textsuperscript{16} The Nagodba, on the other hand, pledged to reunite Dalmatia to the Triune Kingdom under the Hungarian Crown. Franz Joseph signed all of this legislation despite its inherent contradictions.\textsuperscript{17} Although Dalmatia was economically as backward a region as any in the Monarchy, the province did enjoy far greater freedom than Croatia, and largely for this reason the new direction in Croatian political life was initiated largely by Dalmatian Croats. In 1903 a new group of leaders emerged, of whom the Dalmatian politician Franjo Supilo became the dominant figure, who sought to unite the political forces of Serbs and Croats in Dalmatia and Croatia.\textsuperscript{18}

The Croats were Roman Catholics and wrote their language with the Latin alphabet. Most of the Croat people had been in contact with the Germanic, West European civilization for a thousand years. Their Serb cousins spoke a similar Slavic dialect (or group of dialects) and used the Cyrillic alphabet. The Serbs were Orthodox Christians, and they had spent the last thousand years in close contact with or under the rule of the Byzantine and Ottoman Turkish Empires. If the two groups could put aside their religious and cultural differences, they were sufficiently similar that they might learn to consider themselves one people. Croats comprised a majority of the population in Croatia and Dalmatia, while a smaller number lived along the Adriatic coast in the Austrian province of Istria.

\textsuperscript{16} The Austrian suffrage reform of 1906 raised the number of Dalmatian deputies to eleven.

\textsuperscript{17} O'Connell, "Croatian Politics," 4-5.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 22.
The Serbs formed a sizeable minority in both Croatia and Dalmatia, while other Serbs lived in a compactly settled region in the southern part of Hungary proper. Moreover, both Serbs and Croats comprised the population of the former Turkish territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been placed under Austro-Hungarian administration by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, but was a part of neither Austria nor Hungary. Looking southward beyond the frontiers of Austria-Hungary, Serb peoples lived in the independent Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro and in the Turkish territories of Macedonia. Thus any movement towards Serb and Croat brotherhood or toward a change in the constitutional position of Croatia, Dalmatia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina within the Habsburg Monarchy, raised questions affecting the entire Balkan situation.

In February 1903, while negotiations were underway to revise the financial agreement between Hungary and Croatia, the Hungarian delegation abruptly rejected all Croatian proposals. This led to protest rallies in Zagreb[Agram] and other cities throughout Croatia, followed by rioting and finally bloodshed. Ban Khuen-Héderváry called in troops to restore order and made wholesale arrests. The disorder led to wild rumors in Dalmatia that certain Croat leaders were to be hanged. Thirty Croat delegates from the Diets of the Austrian provinces Dalmatia and Istria sought an audience with Franz Joseph to speak on behalf of their co-nationals in Croatia. The Sovereign, who was residing in the Budapest Palace at the time, probably following the counsel of his Hungarian advisors, refused to receive them. This rebuff convinced some Croat leaders in Croatia.

19 There was also a Moslem population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but these people were not Turks but Serbo-Croats by race and language.

and Dalmatia that the Sovereign would continue his policy of neglecting their interests, and it was hopeless to look any longer to the Vienna Court for help and justice. Instead, they began to make plans to act on their own, and looked around for allies elsewhere. This new independent direction in Croatian politics, known as the "New Course," was evolved between 1903 and the summer of 1905, and found its first public expression in the Resolution of Fiume in October 1905, which called among other things for an alliance with the Hungarian Coalition.

In the meantime several events had altered the situation in the South Slav lands. The assassination of King Alexander Obrenović of Serbia on June 11, 1903, brought to power a new group of statesmen who were resolved to end that country's dependence upon Austria. The war with Japan and revolution at home had removed Russia's influence in the Balkans for the time being, some believed for fifty years to come. These events caused the South Slavic peoples, Serbs and Croats, within and without the Monarchy, to think of acting on their own. The Hungarian Crisis gave Count Khuen-Héderváry a chance to escape from the messy situation in Croatia, and on June 27, 1903, he was appointed Prime Minister of Hungary in the hope that the same firm methods used successfully in Croatia could tame the Hungarian Opposition. The Hungarian Independence Party found that the unsavory record of the Khuen-Héderváry regime in Croatia provided them with ample ammunition to use against the new Prime Minister. The Kossuthists began to champion the cause of justice for Croatia. At the same time, the Croat leaders saw the necessity of using the confusion created by the Hungarian Crisis to their own advantage.  

The sponsors of the New Course embarked on a startling change of direction when they decided to ally themselves with their old oppressors, the Magyars. Though traditionally the Croats were among the most loyal defenders of the House of Habsburg, some now believed that the Vienna court would give way once again to the Hungarian demands. "Better at any rate, they argued, to help the Magyars at their need, and thus win the right to share the spoils of victory, than to commit themselves on the side of Austria and then to be left a prey to the incensed Magyars."\(^{22}\) Croatian support of the Coalition would expose Vienna to attack from two sides, through the Dalmatian deputies in the Austrian Reichsrat. Furthermore, the Hungarian crisis might well lead to a revision of the Ausgleich, presenting an opportunity to unite Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia and alter the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{23}\)

The ultimate goal of the New Course politicians was the creation of an independent South Slav state. Their immediate, practical objectives, however, were to gain control of the government in Croatia in order to secure civil liberties and to bring Hungary to honor the provisions of the Nagodba, with perhaps revision of the Nagodba, especially regarding financial matters. For Dalmatia, they hoped by playing Vienna against Budapest to gain some long-overdue improvement in the depressed economic level and the use of Serbo-Croatian as the official language for internal affairs of the province.\(^{24}\)

The Magyarones in Croatia, represented by the National Party led by Khuen-Héderváry's old friend Nikola Tomašić, declared themselves on the side

\(^{22}\) Seton-Watson, *Southern Slav Question*, 145.


of Vienna, that is, on the side of Prime Ministers Tisza and Fejérvary in Hungary, and against the New Course politicians in Croatia. Yet they could not remain unaffected by the new ideas forming in Croatia. In March 1905, while serving as Minister for Croatian Affairs in Tisza's cabinet, Tomašić denied that Croatia had any right to demand Croatian command language, but later while still holding his cabinet position he came out in favor of Croatian command language in a speech before the Hungarian Parliament on May 5. In July he spoke out strongly, calling for Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia to seek their own common interest, not that of Vienna or Budapest. On May 9, 1905, during the debate on the "Address to the Throne," Géza Josipović spoke a few words in Croatian, and though Croatian deputies had the right to use their own language in the Hungarian Parliament, the incident caused a tumult. The Ban of Croatia, Count Teodor Pejačević, and later Fejérvary's Minister for Croatia, István Kovácsevics, both spoke out in favor of Croatian command language. It is difficult to know whether statements of this kind were made in response to the new sympathies in Croatia, or at the behest of the Hungarian government in order to frighten the Coalition with the implications of their separatist theories.

The driving force behind the New Course was Frizzo Supilo, a Dalmatian who published the newspaper Novi List in the Hungarian (Croatian) city of Fiume. Supilo had probably made contact with the Hungarian Coalition early in the Spring of 1905. In April he traveled to Belgrade, where he spoke with Prime Minister Nikola Pašić of Serbia (Radical Party) and with Ljuba

27 NFP, 1905, May 4M, 9A, July 14M.
Stojanović of the opposition Independent Radical Party, who was to succeed Pašić as Prime Minister on May 16. Pašić gave Supilo little satisfaction, as he was unwilling to risk official Austro-Hungarian displeasure by openly taking sides in the internal political dispute of a foreign country. Stojanović was more friendly, and returned Supilo's visit in Fiume a few weeks later. Supilo's reception by both major parties in Belgrad persuaded the two rival Serb parties in Croatia (Serb Radical Party and Serb Independent Party) to end their feuding and join the New Course. Supilo may also have initiated contact at this time between the Hungarian Coalition and Belgrad, which so far had been too cautious to receive the Hungarians. After Stojanović became Prime Minister of Serbia, Supilo sent him a message of congratulations (carried by a mutual friend, as Supilo was certain that the postal authorities were reading his mail), and asked if he were now in a position to support further cooperation. The "pertinent people," he said, were ready to cooperate with Serbian politicians in Belgrad—almost certainly a reference to the Hungarian Coalition. 28

The French Charge d'Affaires in Belgrad reported that on about July 14 certain unnamed Hungarian parliamentary deputies spent a "mysterious three hours" in Belgrad, seeking the support of the Serbian government in case of a conflict with Austria. They promised that Hungary would oppose any extension of Austro-Hungarian power into the Sanjak of Novibazar, and suggested that at a future date Hungary would be in a position to offer Serbia considerable advantages at the cost of Bosnia. The Serbians remained skeptical.

They insisted that the talks must remain of a private character, and were unwilling to compromise themselves by favoring either Hungary or Austria.\textsuperscript{29}

The Hungarian Coalition was apparently as undecided in its approach to the Croatian question as were the Croatian Magyarones, and during the summer there were occasional contradictory reports. An Independence Party spokesman, Sándor Pápay, demanded before a Serb audience in southern Hungary that the Serb counties should be ceded from Croatia and incorporated into Hungary proper. This was hardly tactful if the party was trying at the same time to court the favor of Croatian leaders.\textsuperscript{30} On the weekend of September 8-10, during the feverish days leading up to the opening of Parliament, Speaker of the House Gyula Justh of the Independence Party made a strange visit to Zagreb. The press suspected the trip was important and gave it considerable, if contradictory, coverage. The Croatian "opposition" leaders, that is, Supilo and his New Course supporters, refused to meet Justh. Instead, he had several friendly talks with prominent leaders of the National Party, including the former ministers Tomašić and Géza Josipović.\textsuperscript{31} The National Party, which still held tight control over Croatia, was supposed to be on the side of Fejérváry. Perhaps Tomašić and his lieutenants believed, as did many people at that time, that the Fejérváry government was about to collapse and the Coalition would come to power, and it was time for the Croats to come to an understanding with the new masters in Budapest. Supilo and company, on the other hand, probably did

\textsuperscript{29} Reports of M. de Fontenay, French Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrad, to Foreign Minister Rouvier, July 24 and August 9, 1905. \textit{Documents Diplomatiques Françaises}, 2d Series, Vol. VII, nos. 256 and 332.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Zastava}, Serb newspaper in Újvidék [Novi Sad], reported in \textit{NFP}, 1905, July 5A.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{NFP}, 1905, Sept. 9A, 10M, 11A, 14M.
not want to talk to a victorious Hungarian Coalition, but only to Hungarians who needed Croatian support and were willing to offer something in return. Only after the Five Minute Audience of September 23 and the Resolution of Fiume, October 4, did the Coalition leaders openly try to woo the supporters of the New Course.

On October 2, 1905, forty Croat parliamentary deputies from Croatia, Dalmatia and Istria, met in Fiume to plan a joint action. There on the evening of October 3 they adopted a resolution by which they pledged themselves "to fight side by side with the Magyar nation for the fulfillment of all constitutional rights and liberties, in the conviction that the said rights and liberties will be of advantage to the Croatian and Hungarian nations and lay the foundations for lasting understanding between the two nations." The condition for Croatian support of Hungary was the "speediest reincorporation of Dalmatia in the Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia." The reincorporation of Dalmatia made it necessary that an end be made "to the present intolerable parliamentary and constitutional political conditions in Croatia and Slavonia, and that such conditions shall be introduced which correspond to the needs of civilized nations and the claims of constitution and liberty. . . ." The resolution then enumerated six specific demands:

1. Electoral reform.

2. Freedom of the press, with jury trials for press and political offenses.

3. Freedom of assembly and association.

4. Judicial independence, the guarantee to every judge that he cannot be held responsible for his judicial acts.

5. Establishment of a higher court of appeal to protect the interests and political rights of citizens against the arbitrary action of the authorities.
6. Establishment of a special tribunal having disciplinary responsibility over all public servants who violate the law. 32

The Resolution of Fiume was followed by the Resolution of Zara [Zadar] on October 17, in which representatives of the Serb parties of Croatia and Dalmatia promised to support the same aims as the Croat Resolutionists. Specifically, they promised to support the Hungarian Coalition if the Hungarians in return guaranteed to respect the autonomy of Croatia and to recognize the "national cultural existence and development" of the non-Magyars of Hungary. The Serbs also promised to support the reincorporation of Dalmatia with Croatia if the Croats gave "a binding recognition of the equality of the Serb and Croat peoples." 33

The new principle of Serb and Croat brotherhood was quickly extended into the area of practical politics. On the Dalmatian side, the Croatian Party and the National Serb Party of Dalmatia met together in Zara on November 14, and agreed to work for the use of the Serb and Croat languages by government officials in Dalmatia and to insure that school children should learn both Cyrillic and Latin alphabets as well as the principal events of

32 The complete English text of the resolution is given in Seton-Watson, Southern Slav Question, 393-94; the quoted passages are given with a somewhat smoother translation in O'Connell, "Croatian Politics," 72-73.

It may be noted that demands 2, 4, 5, and 6 pertained to provisions already in effect in Hungary. Suffrage reform was of course a topic of the day in all parts of the Monarchy. For my reasons for dating the resolution on Oct. 3 rather than Oct. 4, see above, p 208 n. 12.

Serb and Croat history. In Croatia, the two Serb parties and several Croat opposition parties joined in December to form a Croato-Serb Coalition.

The sudden awakening of the South Slavs of the Monarchy had an immediate effect upon the Hungarian crisis. For centuries the Croats of the Military border had provided the most loyal troops to defend the House of Habsburg. The Vienna court had taken for granted that the Croats were dependable and had ignored their grievances. The Croats could not be taken for granted any longer. The Resolution of Fiume probably influenced Franz Joseph's decision on October 4 to support universal suffrage in Hungary, as we have already seen. Kristóffy claims that only the intervention of the King prevented the Hungarian State Prosecutor from arresting the Croatian Resolutionists. Instead, the Hungarian government tried to reassure the Croats. When Prime Minister Fejérváry revealed his legislative program on October 28 he promised that Hungary's relations with Croatia would be based on the principle of brotherhood, and hinted at a possible improvement of Croatia's disadvantageous financial position, though without saying anything.

34 Text of this resolution in Seton-Watson, Southern Slav Question, 396-97; see O'Connell, "Croatian Politics," 78-81. Serbo-Croat was recognized as an official language in Dalmatia in 1912. (M. Gross, "Über die nationale Frage," 224.) The Resolution of Fiume either encouraged other latent expressions of South Slav nationalism, or else awakened the interest of the press to this area of the Monarchy. In mid-October there were several reports that Franciscan priests in Dalmatia were conducting the Mass in an ancient Slavonic Glagolitic text, despite threats that the Pope would excommunicate them if they continued. (NFP, 1905, Oct. 14M, 17A.) Use of the Glagolitic liturgy was part of the "Illyrian" program of Bishop Joseph George Strossmayer (1815-April 10, 1905). Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) was sympathetic to the Glagolitic rite, hoping it might play a part in winning the Balkan peoples to Catholicism. Pius X (1903-14) restricted its use. (Seton-Watson, Question, 118-28.)

35 O'Connell, "Croatian Politics," 23.

36 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 371-72.
specific.\textsuperscript{37} When a Joint Ministerial Council met in Vienna on November 25 to discuss the possibility of immediately constructing a railroad to connect Dalmatia with the rest of the Monarchy, the press saw at once that the ministers were reacting to the Resolution of Fiume.\textsuperscript{38}

The Coalition leaders were caught in an embarrassing position. They had assumed that they could ignore the Croats just as any other national minority. Only that week they had been warned by Lajos Mocsáry not to ignore the nationalities. Mocsáry, one of the few remaining politicians old enough to have fought for Hungarian independence in 1848, had maintained contact with Lajos Kossuth after Kossuth went into exile. In the late 1880's Mocsáry defended Kossuth's policy of equality for the nationalities and opposed Magyarization. For this he was expelled from the Independence Party, which called itself a Kossuthist party. After this Mocsáry gradually lost influence and ceased to take part in public affairs. At the end of September 1905 he broke his long silence to urge the Coalition to enlist the nationalities as allies in a joint fight for national independence. The Magyar command words were not important enough to fight for, he said, and only alienated the national minorities. But if the nationalities were to join with the Coalition, together they could demonstrate to Vienna, and to all of Europe, the strength of a united Hungary. When no Coalition newspaper would publish Mocsáry's ideas,

\textsuperscript{37} Lányi, \textit{Regierung}, 143-44.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{NFP}, 1905, Nov. 26th.
he issued a small pamphlet.  

Immediately after snubbing Mocsáry's advice on nationality policy, the Coalition had to turn around and welcome the unexpected support from the South Slav politicians. Three days after the Resolution of Fiume, Kossuth wired a greeting to the Croat delegates:

We greet our Croatian and Dalmatian brothers and remind the Croats that we have always shared with them the rights which we have won for ourselves, and that on the contrary they have always been oppressed by Austria. May God bring back Dalmatia through Croatia to the Crown of St. Stephen! We await you in love and full hope.

Here was at least an implied promise to grant to the Croats their own military language if the Magyars won this concession for themselves. Further exchanges of greetings made this explicit. By October 15 Kossuth wrote to the Croat leader, Dr. Pero Čingrija, that the Coalition Steering Committee had appointed a subcommittee to meet with a delegation of the Croatian-Dalmatian delegates. On October 25, Kossuth was in Fiume for preliminary talks. For several months, however, the talks did not get beyond the planning states and the two committees never sat down together.

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40 Egyetértés, 1905, Oct. 7; Kemény, Iratok, IV, 631; Seton-Watson, Southern Slav Question, 148. (Seton-Watson incorrectly dates this letter October 15.)

On January 22, 1906, the Coalition's subcommittee for Croatian affairs—Kossuth, Apponyi, Andrásy, Batthyány and Géza Polónyi—finally met and discussed the Fiume Resolution. They instructed Kossuth to communicate with Dr. Čingrija to set a date for the subcommittee to meet with Croat and Dalmatian delegates in Fiume. It was soon announced that the meeting had been scheduled for February 4, and that Kossuth, Bátfy and Polónyi would attend. The crucial turn in the negotiations between the Coalition and the Crown caused the February 4 meeting to be postponed until February 19. Frano Supilo and Richard Zanella, a Croat deputy to the Hungarian Parliament from Fiume, met in Budapest with Kossuth and Polónyi on February 11 to discuss the agenda for the forthcoming meeting. The Fejérváry government may have deliberately selected February 19 for calling Parliament into session in order to conflict with this meeting. The Croatian and Dalmatian delegates met in Fiume on February 19 as planned, without the Hungarians, but the meeting broke up without result. The meeting with the Hungarians was again postponed until February 28, and Supilo went to Budapest on February 22 with a new proposed agenda. Kossuth, however, postponed the conference until after new elections could be held in Hungary—which meant indefinitely. The honeymoon between the "New Course" politicians in Croatia and the Hungarian Coalition was at an end.

42 NFP, 1906, Jan. 23M, 24M.
C. The Second Fejérváry Government

After Kristóffy's audience with the King on October 4, rumors began to circulate that the Fejérváry government would soon be reappointed, but for several days there was no official announcement to confirm this speculation. The appointment was not made until after Parliament met on October 10, for there was not enough time for a new government to attend to all the details necessary to prepare a suffrage bill by that time. When Parliament convened on that day, the government did not appear, but a royal rescript was read proroguing Parliament once again, this time until December 19. Andrássy, on behalf of the Coalition, delivered a long attack on the government for failing to appear and personally deliver the adjournment order. Once again the Coalition introduced a resolution attacking the government and reaffirming the Bánffy Resolution of June 21. Once again Count Tisza denied the right of Parliament to consider a resolution after the adjournment order had been read, though he agreed the members might make remarks. Once again Tisza led his Liberal Party out of the Chamber when the majority insisted upon illegally passing a resolution. Later in the day the House of Magnates passed a resolution expressing regret that Parliament had been repeatedly recessed, and hope that conditions would soon improve.

On October 16 Fejérváry was reappointed Prime Minister, and on

44 NFP, 1905, Oct. 7A.
45 English text of Andrássy's speech, Yolland, Diet, 15-31. The government replied with a statement that there was no reason for them to be present on that day, because they had resigned and no new government had been appointed to replace them. (Lányi, Regierung, 100.) The session of the House is described in NFP, 1905, Oct. 10A; Lányi, Regierung, 97-101; and Képv. Napló, II, 12-23.
46 Lányi, Regierung, 99.
October 18 the cabinet was reappointed. The new government was named not as a caretaker government, as before, but as a government with a legislative program including universal suffrage. This implied, said the semi-official *Magyar Nemzet*, that the Coalition was no longer considered a satisfactory basis from which to form a government.

Only one new face appeared in the new government. Arthur Feilitzsch, a Tisza supporter and Vice President of the House of Representatives until he was defeated in the election in January 1905, replaced Endre György as Minister of Agriculture. Kristóffy explains that György had been opposed to universal suffrage from the beginning and left the government at the first opportunity. György's friend István Bernát offered another explanation in an obituary article in 1929:

> Endre György was the only one who took seriously the temporary nature of the assignment and was not willing to extend it; who in the moment when a peaceful settlement proved impossible, said farewell to his remaining more obliging colleagues. Consequently, he did not partake of the customary honors [of a retiring cabinet minister]. On the contrary, the King made him feel strongly that he had fallen from favor.

And so a quarter of a century later men still felt the stigma attached to the "illegal" Fejér váry government. Yet György, alone among the Fejér váry

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48 *Magyar Nemzet*, 1905, Oct. 17, reported in *NFP*, Oct. 18A.


ministers, seems to have made his peace with the Coalition. 51

The universal suffrage campaign in Hungary had been bogged down since Franz Joseph dismissed the Fejérváry government on September 12. Now after more than a month, the lost momentum had to be regained. The new government program was unveiled on Saturday afternoon, October 28, when Prime Minister Fejérváry, announcing himself as a candidate for a vacant seat in Parliament, invited the voters of the Budapest second district to a reception at his official residence. There he read a lengthy statement of his government’s objectives, calling for universal suffrage reinforced by reforms in every sphere of government activity. For the first time, Fejérváry himself endorsed universal suffrage. The government’s program included a land policy to enable peasants to obtain long-term leases. There were to be large-scale public works, including housing for industrial laborers, regulation of rivers and construction of canals. Public health measures would be vastly extended, increasing the numbers civil service doctors and raising their salaries. Primary school education was to be universal, compulsory, and free, with due consideration given to both the Hungarian state language and the languages of the nationalities; teachers’ salaries were to be increased. Direct and excise taxes would be reformed, and a progressive income tax introduced. The criminal law code would be revised, reducing the punishments prescribed for certain infractions affecting only the poor. New legislation would regulate the relation of employee to employer, and of

51See, for example, a pro-Coalition work on Hungary edited by the English Liberal Party M. P. Percy Alden in 1909. Most of the chapters were written by members of the Coalition cabinet: Wekerle, Apponyi, Kossuth, et al., but the chapter on agriculture was written by ”Andrew György.” György gives his express approval of Darányi’s Agricultural Laborers’ Act and Apponyi’s school laws, among the most notorious legislation of the Coalition period. Nowhere does the book mention György’s affiliation with the Fejérváry government. (Percy Alden, ed., Hungary of Today, 259-84.)
buyer to seller, protecting the consumer against fraud. A new civil service code would bring county officials under a uniform set of state regulations, enabling officials to act independently of local pressures. 52

Fejérváry's vast program of public works has been likened to "Josephinism," the revolution from above that the Habsburg lands experienced in the age of enlightened absolutism under Joseph II. 53 Pester Lloyd labeled the program "state socialism," and called the whole plan a phantasy: it was simply not possible for one government to accomplish so many vast changes. Yet it would open the eyes of the masses that there were many political goals far more important than military command language. 54 The Neue Freie Presse said the program contained a lot of democracy, but it was like a brand new uniform, without a wrinkle. 55 In a speech in Szeged on October 29 Baron Bánffy claimed that Fejérváry's program contained nothing but promises, yet he added that his own New Party already promised this much and more. The nation should not accept as gifts what it could justly demand for itself, he said. Bánffy was in favor of universal suffrage, but Hungary must not give up the national demands. 56

At the same time the government continued to search for allies for its

52 The text of Fejérváry's address is given in Lányi, Regierung, 118-46; NFP, 1905, Oct. 29M; and in PL, Oct. 28A.

53 Mucsí, Paktum, 102. Fejérváry's legislative program included many ideas taken over from earlier governments, but now for the first time worked out in detail. Later governments, especially the Coalition government under Wekerle, enacted some of these measures almost unchanged. (Lányi, Regierung, 151.)

54 PL, 1905, Oct. 29M.

55 NFP, 1905, Oct. 29M.

56 NFP, 1905, Oct. 30A; Lányi, Regierung, 146-47. Bánffy was closely interrogated by the police on Oct. 28 about his mysterious travels to Berlin in connection with the "Zeysig" pamphlet. His Szeged speech on the following day served to recapture favorable headlines.
program. The Social Democrats could be counted on to continue their campaign for universal suffrage, although Népszava announced that the party would end its attack on the Coalition as soon as the Coalition endorsed universal suffrage. On the day after Fejérváry unveiled his program, the Social Democrats sponsored a mass rally in the Városliget, attended by tens of thousands of persons. The assembly adopted a resolution presented by Dezső Bokányi calling for widespread agitation on behalf of universal suffrage. The resolution was followed by immediate action. During November and December rallies were held in some thirty or forty towns each weekend. The party also conducted an effective pamphlet campaign, publishing, for example, statements of support from such well-known foreign Socialists as Jean Jaurès and August Bebel.

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57 Népszava, 1905, Oct. 4, quoted in NFP, Oct. 4A, and in Mucsi, Paktum, 96.
58 NFP, 1905, Oct. 30A; Mucsi, Paktum, 108-09.
59 For example, on Sunday, Nov. 5, 15,000 Social Democrats demonstrated in Budapest for universal suffrage, conducting a march through the city which resulted in several arrests. NFP, 1905, Nov. 6A.
60 Mucsi, Paktum, 108-22, 152-57; Süle, Sozialdemokratie, 117-24; the text of Bebel's and Jaurès' letters is given (in Hungarian) in NMTVĐ, III, 379-82.

In July 1899 the French Socialist Alexandre Millerand accepted a post as cabinet minister in the French government. The stir created throughout the Social Democratic movement was officially resolved by the International Congress in Amsterdam, August 1904, which condemned Social Democratic support of bourgeois parties. Bebel and the German party had led the fight for this orthodox position, while Jaurès had unsuccessfully defended Millerand and a more flexible policy. See James Joll, The Second International 1889-1914 (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), Chapter IV, "Reformism and Revisionism," pp. 77-105.

When both Bebel and Jaurès gave their approval to the Hungarian Socialists' campaign for universal suffrage, the pact with Kristóffy received in effect the highest official sanction, removing any doubts of the party rank-and-file as to the wisdom of this course. The left wing of the Hungarian party was weakened during the winter of 1905-06, for Ervin Szabó was ill and out of the country during part of this time and Miksa Groszmann was in prison.
The government also enlisted the support of the progressive, democratic forces within the bourgeoisie. The prestigious Sociological Society gave active and wholehearted support to the universal suffrage campaign, even while maintaining its distance from the government. Kristóffy also tried to enlist the support of the Free Masons. The work of all these various groups was coordinated by Kristóffy's Universal Suffrage League.\footnote{\textit{Paktum}, 116-17; \textit{Sozialdemokratie}, 121; \textit{Z. Horváth}, \textit{Jahrhundertwende}, 240.}

The government hoped with its program to gain a sizeable parliamentary following. The support of an adequate minority could have protected the government from surprise attacks while the suffrage bill was under consideration in Parliament. With this in mind, the government began immediately after the publication of Fejérváry's program to organize its own Progressive Party.\footnote{\textit{Pl.}, 1905, Oct. 29M, Nov. 5M; \textit{NFP}, Oct. 29M; \textit{Lányi}, \textit{Regierung}, 147, 157-59.}

Events were moving rapidly. The reappointment of Prime Minister Fejérváry on October 16 and the unveiling of his vast legislative program on October 28 showed that the King of Hungary had sanctioned universal suffrage. The Emperor of Austria still seemed to be against it. The Austrian Social Democrats kept up their suffrage campaign. On October 31, in the course of a Socialist Party congress in Vienna, the Reichsrat deputy Dr. Wilhelm Ellenbogen was reading a report on "The Austrian Crisis and the Franchise," when he was interrupted and handed a telegram. He immediately read the sensational news to the delegates: Tsar Nicholas II had issued a manifesto calling for a Duma to be elected by universal suffrage! The implication was immediately clear. If the most reactionary monarch in
Europe could grant his subjects universal suffrage, Emperor Franz Joseph could hardly hold back, especially if it meant alienating his millions of Slav subjects who could look to the example of their Russian kinsmen. The Socialist congress immediately broke into singing revolutionary songs, and unanimously passed a resolution calling for a total effort in behalf of universal suffrage to be conducted by the deputies in the Reichsrat, by the workers in the street, and if necessary, by a general strike. That night the Viennese workers filled the Ringstrasse in an orderly demonstration. The following day was a holiday, All Saints Day, and the Social Democrats held mass meetings in several cities, the largest in Prague. Things got cut of hand when police tried to block a giant parade in Vienna on November 2, and nearly a hundred persons were injured. This led in turn to several days of counter-demonstrations throughout the country to protest the "bloodbath." The situation became especially critical in Prague on November 4, 5 and 6, where police were stoned, barricades were erected, and the authorities requested permission to invoke martial law and asked for the garrison to be reinforced. 63

The public disorder that Gautsch so much feared had now come to pass. But it was the Emperor who acted to calm the disorders. On November 3 he summoned Gautsch and informed him that universal suffrage was to be introduced in Austria as well as in Hungary. On this rare occasion he told his minister what he wanted without asking his advice. Gautsch at once made

his Sovereign's wish his own. When he went to GoJuchowski and told him the news, GoJuchowski was so surprised by his sudden change of heart that he thought at first Gautsch had lost his mind. On the following day, November 4, the semi-official Wiener Abendpost announced that the ministry intended to consider at once the possibility of a direct, universal and equal franchise. The outlook for the success of universal suffrage in Austria looked good. When the Reichstag opened on November 28 and Gautsch announced that the government intended to present a franchise bill in January based on universal suffrage, the outcome was no longer in doubt. Only the details remained to be determined. While Gautsch addressed the Reichsrat a quarter of a million workers were marching past the Parliament Building in a five-hour demonstration for universal suffrage, the largest mass demonstration ever held in Vienna. More than one hundred thousand persons demonstrated in Prague, and demonstrations were held in nearly every city of Austria. But while the Austrian half of the Monarchy was caught up in the excitement of the suffrage campaign, universal suffrage and the Fejervary government were in serious trouble in Hungary.

The Fejervary government received a rude shock in early October when it was denounced by Count Tisza. Throughout the summer and early fall, Tisza had treated the Fejervary government with benevolent neglect. He refused the government any direct support, but he defended the King's right to appoint the government and his right to prorogue Parliament. To have done more would not only have jeopardized the neutral, non-partisan position of the government, but would also have driven more wavering members

64 Jenks, Austrian Electoral Reform, 41-45; Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte, 83; Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, I, 372; Charmatz, Österreichs äussere und innere Politik, 73-74. The text of the Wiener Abendpost article is reprinted in NFP, 1905, Nov. 5M, and condensed in Bruegel, Geschichte der Österreichischen Sozialdemokratie, IV, 360.
away from the Liberal Party. When Tisza turned openly against the Fejérváry government in October, his reversal had a profound effect upon the subsequent development of the crisis.

Tisza probably learned through confidential contacts in Vienna that Franz Joseph was inclined to reappoint the Fejérváry government on a program of universal suffrage. On October 3, the day on which Kristóffy first outlined his plan to the King, Tisza published the first of three articles on universal suffrage in Az Ujság. It was well-known that Tisza opposed universal suffrage, and favored at most a gradual extension of the suffrage. The new articles were surprising instead for their vehement tone. Tisza attacked Kristóffy personally as a fanatic, blinded by a single slogan. Parliamentary obstruction would not be ended by universal suffrage; on the contrary, obstruction was everywhere the tool of the lowest classes. The interest of the people would be best served by bringing more serious, better educated elements into Parliament. Tisza continued by challenging Kristóffy's statistics. In the speech at Németbogsán on September 9, Kristóffy had claimed that universal suffrage (with a literacy requirement) would increase the percentage of Magyar voters. Tisza maintained that though this might be true, it would lead to a serious loss of Magyar seats in Parliament because the nationalities would gain a majority in 150 to 200 individual electoral districts.

Kristóffy challenged all of Tisza's points. He maintained that ob-

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65 Joint War Minister Pitreisch was one person who kept Tisza abreast of confidential developments at Court. A portion of the Tisza-Pitreisch correspondence during Feb. and March 1906 is printed in J. Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, III, 796-98.

66 Tisza's articles in Az Ujság, 1905, Oct. 3, 4, 5, summarized in NFP, Oct. 3A, 4A, 5A.
struction could only be successful in states with a narrowly limited electorate. In the German Reichstag, for example, which was elected on the basis of universal manhood suffrage, the attempt by the Socialists to obstruct the proceedings had been defeated in a single night. Kristóffy showed further that at present there were 189 electoral districts where the Magyar voters were in a minority, while under his proposed reform only 170 districts would possess a Magyar minority. Neither Tisza nor Kristóffy mentioned the ruthless county political system under which only ten non-Magyars could be elected to Parliament, even though Magyars were in a minority in 189 districts. Nor did either one mention the prospect that within a few years, if not immediately, a Parliament elected by universal suffrage would probably destroy the corrupt county system.

Tisza's tactics up to this time were intended to deter Liberal Party members from deserting to the Coalition because they sympathized with the national demands. Now that the government planned to organize its own Progressive Party, Tisza faced the possibility that many of his remaining members would desert because of their sympathy with the Fejérváry program. Indeed, a number of prominent Liberal Party deputies had privately promised Fejérváry their support in advance. There were rumors that Tisza was considering forming a new party. Instead, he held his party together by persuasion at a party conference on October 30, two days after Fejérváry announced his program. Tisza told his audience that the government did not have the means to carry out its vast program, and hence was insincere, deliberately attempting to incite the lower classes with vapid promises. He offered a resolution pledging the Liberal Party to support a gradual

67 Interview with Kristóffy, Az Ujság, 1905, Oct. 7, reprinted in NFP, Oct. 7M. Slightly different figures are given in Kristóffy, Kálvária, 299.
extension of the suffrage. Although some of the Liberal Party members probably voted for Tisza's resolution while intending to resign from the party afterward, Tisza had impressed his colleagues with the futility of climbing out on a limb to support a government whose future was so uncertain. 68

Kristóffy immediately took the offensive against Tisza. In an interview in Magyar Nemzet on the following day, October 31, he claimed that a new conservative party had just been formed, though it still called itself by its old name, Liberal Party. Tisza's opposition to universal suffrage, he said, early gave the party a conservative direction. This served to illustrate the truth of Kristóffy's prediction that the universal suffrage issue would bring about a new alignment of political forces in Hungary. 69

Tisza replied with a letter to Az Ujság, personally attacking Kristóffy and Géza Gajáry, who had just deserted to the Progressive Party. 70 It was apparent that no one who deserted Tisza would ever again regain his favor. Tisza showed that he was still the master of Hungarian politics by holding his party together, with the strong assistance of László Lukács, in the face of the attractions from both the Coalition and the Fejérváry program. Although eventually some twenty-five deputies joined the Progressive Party, none of them, except Károly Hieronymi, were persons of any prominence. Within a few weeks after its founding, the Progressive Party


69 Interview with Kristóffy, Magyar Nemzet, 1905, Oct. 31, reprinted in NFP, Nov. 1M.

70 Az Ujság, 1905, Nov. 4, reprinted NFP, Nov. 4M.
was forgotten and never mentioned again. 71

Tisza's attack left the Fejérváry government isolated just as it began its most serious struggle. The most important effect was in the counties, where a number of local officials of the Liberal Party had continued to serve loyally under Fejérváry. When Tisza denounced the government these officials resigned, leaving the Fejérváry government without allies at the local level, so that the counties began to turn from passive to active resistance. 72

For the first few months the Coalition had resisted the Fejérváry government with little more than legalistic technicalities. After the government was reappointed the Coalition turned to the most violent methods, openly encouraging mob violence, as if to dare the government to intervene with troops and thereby demonstrate that the regime of General Fejérváry was an ill-disguised military dictatorship. Several reasons can be suggested for this far stronger resistance. First, the Coalition leaders, expecting to come to power, were suddenly humiliated at the Five Minute Audience. Next, they realized that the "second Fejérváry government" was not a caretaker government, but was entrusted to present a legislative program which would have overturned the political system and endangered the future of all the established parties. Yet the Coalition saw several signs that they were stronger than ever. They saw Count Tisza end his benevolent neutrality and turn against the government, leaving the Coalition a free hand in the counties. In the Resolution of Fiume and the subsequent events, the South Slavs had thrown their support to the Hungarian Coalition. This increased

71 J. Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, III, 746n.
72 Lányi, Regierung, 157-59; Mucsi, Paktum, 104; Kristóffy, Kalvária, 276.
the widespread clamor for a revision of the Ausgleich, a question which the Magyars could almost certainly play to advantage. As long as they believed they held all these cards, they were not going to consider submitting to the conditions laid down by the King.
D. Passive Resistance Becomes Active

As soon as Franz Joseph reached a decision to reappoint the Fejérváry government, the government began to take legal steps against the growing breakdown of authority. The first serious problem was that of recruits for the army. As no recruit bill had been passed for 1905, the government had no authority to draft the new levy of recruits, who normally would have reported for active duty on October 1. The government urged young men to volunteer, and the call seems to have been particularly successful in some counties of Transylvania, where both Saxons and Rumanians were opposed to the Coalition. In Szászváros, Transylvania [Ger.: Broos; Rum.: Orăști], 600 Rumanian and Saxon men volunteered, filling the quota for Hunyad County. Yet since in most communities the Coalition could bring social pressure to bear against the families of men who volunteered in support of the "illegal" government, the number of volunteers was not nearly enough to maintain peacetime strength.

The King, as Commander in Chief, had the authority in cases of emergency, specified in the Hungarian statutes 1888:XVIII and 1889:VI, to hold on active duty or to call up the first-year class of the regular reserve, or the first three year classes of the supplementary reserve. The third-year activist, i.e., those men who normally would have been released from active duty during September 1905, had been ordered to

73 NFP, 1905, Sept. 29M.
74 NFP, 1905, Sept. 30M.
remain on extended active duty for an unspecified period of time. When
on October 10 Parliament was prorogued until December 19, there was no
chance that a recruit bill could be passed in time to take effect before
the first of the year. Consequently, on October 10, after Parliament was
recessed, the Hungarian Defense Minister ordered the third-year activists
to remain on active duty until December 31. 75 This decision solved the
immediate problem, but there was still no likelihood that a recruit bill
would be passed by the first of the year, and a more permanent solution
had to be found. The simplest solution would have been to extend the time
of the third-year men for a full year, until September 1906, yet it was
unfair to require one group of men to bear the burden of the entire
reserve. Instead, on November 14 the supplementary reservists were
ordered to report for active duty at the first of the year, enabling the
third-year activists to be released by December 31. 76

These decisions did not solve all the problems facing the High
Command. Reservists could not legally be ordered to active duty outside
the country in peacetime, so they could not serve as replacements in the
Hungarian regiments stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, the
inexperienced new men could not be depended upon to handle the horses of
the cavalry regiments with the necessary skill. In both cases it was
necessary to transfer infantrymen still on active duty to these other
assignments, and to form the new reservists into training regiments.
The third-year troops were offered an opportunity to extend their service

75 NFP, 1905, Oct. 10A.
76 NFP, 1905, Oct. 20A, Nov. 14A, 18A, Dec. 3M, 20M; Lányi, Regierung,
156. In Croatia military orders were delivered by district officials, as
was customary, but in Hungary proper they were sent through the Post Office
to avoid the resistance of local officials. NFP, Nov. 18A; cf. Dec. 7M.
for one additional year in return for being excused from all future Autumn Maneuvers after they returned to civilian life. These changes inevitably diminished the combat-readiness of the army, yet under the circumstances there was no other way the government could legally maintain the troop strength of the army.77

The Coalition did not wait for Fejérváry to announce his program before launching a counterattack. On October 23 the Steering Committee issued a new resolution, which argued that the re-appointment of the government did not in any way alter its status as unparliamentary and unconstitutional, and called on county officials to continue their resistance to the government.78 Prime Minister Fejérváry replied immediately with a warning issued October 25 to the county governments. According to Paragraph 20 of the Statute 1886:XXI, local authorities were required to accept voluntary enlistees and voluntary tax payments, and must forward the money to the state treasury. The Prime Minister would insist that these provisions be carried out, and hinted that failure to comply would compel the government to take stronger measures.79

The Coalition's new attack on the legality of the government shifted the burden of the resistance from parliamentary deputies to local officials. The first indication of the new phase of the struggle

77 HHSA, GM, Aug. 22, 1905, pp. 214-27; NFP, 1905, Sept. 30M, Oct. 20A, Dec. 19M. Unconfirmed rumors circulated repeatedly that Joint War Minister Pitrech had asked to resign because he could not be responsible for the preparedness of the army. Die Zeit, 1905, Nov. 25, reported in PL, Nov. 26M; again in NFP, 1906, Feb. 6M.


was given on October 31, when Interior Minister Kristóffy moved against Maros-Torda County, which had refused to forward voluntary tax payments to the state treasury, and suspended József Kőrössy from his office as justice of the peace and charged him with criminal disrespect against Prime Minister Fejérváry. Kőrössy refused to give up his office, and announced he would bow only to force. The county sheriff, Albert Farkas, refused to acknowledge the suspension of one of his officials, while the lord lieutenant insisted on the legality of the suspension but did nothing for the moment, hoping to avoid a show of force. This little incident suggested that the Coalition was ready to provoke the government to reveal itself as a military regime, which by itself might frighten away much of its remaining support.

Soon after the government was reappointed, it began to assign its own men to replace lord lieutenants who proved unreliable or resigned in response to Tisza's change of position. The county authorities first turned to delaying tactics, questioning the authority of newly appointed lord lieutenants. These officers were appointed by the Crown upon nomination by the government, and the appointment was countersigned by the Minister of the Interior. The Coalition questioned the validity of appointments made through an "illegal" government. Next the county authorities tried to prevent newly-appointed lord lieutenants from taking the oath of office. The first serious clash occurred in Kolozsvár [Ger.: Klausenburg; Rum.: Cluj] at the installation of Count László Teleki as lord lieutenant of Kolozs County on November 3. Count Teleki appeared at the meeting of the county assembly for a few moments and

managed to read his oath of office, while all the time ducking rotten eggs, ink bottles, and even chairs. In the following days the scene repeated itself in other counties. Sometimes the violence of the county assemblymen or of a threatening crowd outside the courthouse prevented a lord lieutenant from entering the building. Lord lieutenants were obliged to provide themselves with escorts of gendarmes and even soldiers. In some cases the sheriff ordered the courthouse to be locked, requiring the new lord lieutenant to have the lock broken open, a procedure the opposition threatened to challenge in court. Often only two or three members of the county assembly appeared at a session called by the lord lieutenant, who then took his oath before these few witnesses and a county clerk, who could be ordered to take minutes of the proceedings. The lord lieutenants appointed by the Fejérváry government attempted only to insure that their appointment was entered into the records of the county. The government did not require these officials to remain in the county and attempt to force their will upon a hostile administration.

The Coalition maintained that the lord lieutenant was required by law to take an oath before the county assembly to uphold the laws of the nation and the county. If he failed to take the oath there was no guarantee that he would act constitutionally, and thus, they argued, he held no authority until he had taken the oath. Ferenz Keleti defended the government's viewpoint, contending that the lord lieutenant held his power as soon as he was appointed by the King, so long as the appointment was made in accordance with the Statute 1848:III. The oath of office was a guarantee of his fulfilling his duties, but it was not the basis of his authority. To hinder the lord lieutenant from taking his oath did

82 NFP, 1905, Nov. 4M; J. Horváth, Ellenállás, 236-39.
not reduce his authority, while it did constitute a criminal act against royal authority. 83

The Coalition soon found an even more effective weapon to use against the government: social boycott. The dubious credit for originating the idea goes perhaps to Barna Buza, parliamentary deputy from Zemplén County. 84 It was first practiced on November 17, when the new lord lieutenant of Zemplén County, Margrave Alfréd Pallavicini, paid his first visit to the county seat, Sátoraljaújhely. There the citizens had been instructed to deny him any social contact, even to refuse him food and shelter. Pallavicini found no taxi and had to walk from the station into town. He saw no policemen in the streets, and the few persons he saw in doorways held large clubs in their hands. Fortunately he had brought an escort of gendarmes with him. The officials at the courthouse refused to take notice of him except to obey an order given specifically under threat of arrest. Margrave Pallavicini took the oath of office on November 27 under the protection of some 150 gendarmes and a troop of hussars. 85

Social boycott was also used against any local citizen who aided the royal officials. County assemblymen who attended the installation of a lord lieutenant against the will of the local Committee of Public Safety were subjected to the boycott. The government had to station units of gendarmes or soldiers to protect their homes, and in some cases their families could obtain no food except through military assistance. 86

83 Dr. Franz Keleti, "Die Eidesablegung des Obergespans," PL, 1905, Nov. 30M.


85 NFP, 1905, Nov. 21M; J. Horváth, Ellenállás, 441-45.

86 See the example of this described in NFP, 1906, Feb. 7M.
The bitterness of the social boycott was illustrated when Count László Teleki, who had withstood physical attack during his installation as lord lieutenant of Kolozs County, resigned on December 2 because his son was given the boycott treatment by his schoolmates. Within a few weeks the intensity of the resistance had driven most of the newly appointed lord lieutenants to resign. The government lost the prestige lent it by men of the caliber of Count Teleki, Count Sándor Széchenyi (Tolna County), and István Tahy (Pest County). Hereafter Kristóffy had to turn to ambitious lower officials, police officers, and even journalists to fill the highest positions in the counties, which lowered the government in the eyes of the public.

In many counties various "Committees of Public Safety" or "Welfare Committees" were organized to coordinate the resistance movement. These groups were in fact vigilante organizations, which were often able to bring pressure to bear on county officials who were slow to support the resistance, and to organize mob demonstrations whenever needed. On November 15, Interior Minister Kristóffy declared the so-called "Welfare Committee" of Pest County to be dissolved, on the grounds that it was hindering the regular conduct of government business. The law gave the Interior Minister wide powers over organizations and public meetings. These powers had often been used arbitrarily in the past to frustrate organizations of socialists or national minorities. When the same powers were used against Coalition organizations (for sound reasons), they com-

87 *NFP*, 1905, Dec. 3M.
88 J. Horváth, *Ellenállás*, 33-34.
89 Lánýi, *Regierung*, 160; *NFP*, 1905, Nov. 15M, 16M.
plained bitterly of despotist oppression, and often simply ignored or circumvented such orders. On November 26 Baron Dezső Prónay, president of the Pest County Welfare Committee, held a meeting at the Hotel Royal to coordinate the work of welfare committees throughout the country. Budapest Police Captain Szirmay arrived with orders to disband the meeting, but Prónay insisted that the hotel room was his private dwelling and those present were his guests at a private party. Szirmay apologized and left.90 The government had only limited success against recalcitrant officials. On November 15 the Acting Sheriff of Pest County, Ágoston Fazekas, who had refused to forward voluntary taxes to the state treasury, was suspended from his position and criminal proceedings were initiated against him.91 Within a few days similar criminal charges had been brought against a number of high county officials. By mid-December, however, the first of these cases were argued in court, and juries failed to convict in a single instance.92 The government continued to press charges, but the futility of winning a conviction made it appear to the public that the government was merely using the state prosecutor to harrass its enemies. The public had long since lost interest in the legal arguments made in defense of an "unconstitutional" government. When finally in early January the government won its first important case and Ágoston Fazekas was sentenced to two months in prison, the state of lawlessness in the country was so advanced that the conviction made no impression.93

90 Lányi, Regierung, 161n; PL, 1905, Nov. 27A; NFP, Nov. 27A; J. Horváth, Ellenállás, 40-42.
91 Lányi, Regierung, 160; NFP, 1905, Nov. 16M.
92 Endre Rakovszky, sheriff of Abauj-Torda County, was the first to be tried; he was found not guilty on December 9. (PL, 1905, Nov. 28M; NFP, Nov. 27A, Dec. 10M.) Gyula Doku, sheriff of Zemplén County, was found not guilty on Dec. 13. (NFP, Dec. 14M.)
93 NFP, 1906, Jan. 4A, 5M.
The suspension of state subsidies to the rebellious counties promised in the long run to be a most effective weapon to break national resistance. Many of the resisting counties had only limited taxable wealth and regularly received subsidies from the state treasury. On November 18 Kristóffy cut off state subsidies to twelve counties which had refused to forward voluntary tax payments to the state treasury and refused to enlist voluntary recruits.\textsuperscript{94} Even the \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, which normally sympathized with the government, claimed in the beginning that the counties had a clear legal right to these funds and predicted that the Administrative Court would uphold the claims of the counties.\textsuperscript{95} In the meantime the counties met expenses by using the voluntary tax funds at their disposal. The cutoff of funds to the resisting counties did not have a decisive effect for two or three months, but it immediately opened a new rift in the ranks of the Coalition. Károly Eötvös stated openly:

\begin{quote}
It is a patriotic duty to deliver voluntary tax funds to the state, for these taxes do not belong to an individual, not to the minister, but to the country. The country cannot and must not be placed in danger.\textsuperscript{96}
\end{quote}

The Bánffy-faction was feeling more and more uncomfortable within the Coalition.

The reappointed Fejérváry government had been met with increasingly violent opposition. The government's attempt to overcome the resistance only increased the spirit of rebellion. Student disorders in November led

\textsuperscript{94}Lánya, \textit{Regierung}, 160; NFP, 1905, Nov. 19M. 
\textsuperscript{95}NFP, 1905, Nov. 19M. Similar opinions were expressed by Ferenc Kossuth in \textit{Budapest}, Nov. 23 (reported in NFP, Nov. 23A), and by Kálmán Széll, Nov. 30, in a conversation with Baernreither (\textit{Baernreither, Verfall}, 163-64). 
\textsuperscript{96}NFP, 1905, Nov. 24M.
to the closing of Budapest University for a week. 97 At Pécs [Fünfkirchen] on November 12, Count Apponyi was nearly prevented from giving a speech when Socialists threw stones at his railroad car and attacked a detachment of hussars with sticks and pistols, leaving a total of thirty-six persons wounded. 98 The sense of anarchy was growing. By the end of November it had become clear that the government had lost control of many county governments, but it still had the support of the workers in Budapest and control of the financial and military organs of the state. Neither side could force the other to submit, but neither side was ready to compromise. The outlook for a settlement was not good.

97 NFP, 1905, Nov. 13A, 14M, 16A. On the background of the university disorders see Mucsi, Paktum, 118-19, and NFP, Oct. 11M, Nov. 12M.

98 NFP, 1905, Nov. 13A.

99 See the editorial comments, NFP, 1905, Nov. 27A and Dec. 3M.
CHAPTER 10
THE END OF THE CRISIS

A. Growing Anarchy:
The Printers’ Strike and its Consequences

In early October, Kristóffy had persuaded the King that there was a good chance that when Parliament convened in December a majority could be won over to pass a universal suffrage bill. If that failed, Parliament could be dissolved and new elections held in which, Kristóffy predicted, universal suffrage would be the major campaign issue and might very well gain the support of a majority of the new legislature.

By early November Kristóffy was forced to admit that his prediction had been too optimistic. The intensity of the opposition had exceeded his worst expectations. Kristóffy placed most of the blame for the increased strength of the opposition upon the sudden reversal of Count Tisza. Kristóffy had expected a sizeable number of Liberal Party deputies to desert Tisza and come over to the side of universal suffrage and Kristóffy’s Progressive Party. Tisza had persuaded most of them not to. At the same time Tisza’s attack against Kristóffy caused a number of local officials loyal to the Liberal Party to resign and abandon the counties to the forces of national resistance. The Fejérváry government thus found itself in the middle, fighting against two hostile camps, with few allies of its own. Even the Budapest state police and the gendarmerie, the forces directly under the command of the Interior Minister,
though they obeyed government orders with a remarkable degree of loyalty, were losing their control of the situation simply out of fatigue.¹

The Fejérváry government was acutely aware of the dangerous state of lawlessness in the country. On November 11, Fejérváry submitted to the King a report written by Kristóffy, which warned that the government would soon be unable to function and the Crown would have to decide whether to give in to the desires of the Coalition or to give the government emergency powers. The government asked for instructions.² When this memorandum received no reply, Kristóffy wrote another memorandum on November 25, which Fejérváry again delivered to the King in person.³ This time the Prime Minister insisted that if a reply were not received by December 1, the entire cabinet would resign. Again the Monarch made no decision. Prime Minister Fejérváry submitted the resignation of his ministers on December 2, but Franz Joseph took no action on their request since there was no one to replace them.⁴

During the first days of December the question of the newspaper press overshadowed all other political considerations. The government had been hindered from the very beginning by its inability to find a fair hearing in the press, and by the irresponsible agitation on the part

¹Kristóffy, Kálvária, 315.
²Text in Kristóffy, Kálvária, 288-94.
³Ibid., pp. 308-15.
⁴See the resume of the entire situation in Lányi, Regierung, 162-65.
of the Coalition newspapers. Particularly obnoxious were the "boulevard" papers which depended upon sidewalk newsvendors for their sales. These papers used highly emotional and misleading headlines in large print to catch the eyes of potential customers, with the effect of arousing the emotions of the public against the government for imagined misdeeds. As soon as the government was reappointed on October 16, it began to crack down on the irresponsible press. Within the first week the State Prosecutor ordered the Budapest police to confiscate Egyetértés once and Független Magyarország twice, on grounds of lese majesty. Press confiscations soon became a daily routine. Because of the long delays in processing each case and bringing it to trial, and because the government could win a conviction in only about 30% of the cases, confiscation soon appeared.

To gain a better press image for itself the Fejérváry government in October appointed József Vészí to the post of press spokesman. (See NFP, 1905, Oct. 24M, and Vészí's own recollections in PL, 1932, Jan. 10M; cf. above, p. 129 n. 2.) Vészí had to give up his position as editor of Budapesti Napló, in the columns of which he had for some time championed universal suffrage and other progressive causes. Many of the young generation of radical reform journalists and poets, such as Endre Ady, got a start while writing for Vészí's paper. After Vészí's departure the paper soon lost any special significance it had once held. For the role of Budapesti Napló to the young radicals, see Géza Lengyel, Magyar újságmágnások [Hungarian Newspaper Magnates], Irodalomtörténeti Füzetek: No. 41 (Budapest, 1963), 124-88; László Gerb, A munkásügy irodalmunkban 1832-1907: Tanulmányok [Labor Affairs in Our Literature, 1832-1907: Essays], Irodalomtörténeti Füzetek: No. 34 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1961), 147-74; and Z. Horváth, Jahrhundertwende, 162 and passim.

NFP, 1905, Oct. 21A, 29M.
to be nothing more than unwarranted government harassment. The Coalition claimed that the Liberal Party press was never confiscated, even when their papers contained the text of the same speech or article which in a Coalition paper was grounds for prosecution.\(^7\) In his memorandum of November 25 Kristóffy asked the King specifically for authority to use extraordinary measures against the press. As long as the government was limited to using routine trial procedures it could not effectively bring the press under control. The Social Democrats meanwhile turned to direct action.

On December 3 the Budapest Typesetters Union voted to strike against the Coalition newspapers until they agreed to end their opposition to universal suffrage and to stop printing insults and lies against the

\(^7\)This accusation is made by Mangold, *Geschichte*, 28-33. Although we know of cases when the Liberal Party's *Az Újság* was confiscated, Mangold's charge may be essentially correct.

Moritz Szatmáry, parliamentary deputy and General Secretary of the Budapest Journalist Club, wrote an open letter in *Budapest* to his fellow-journalist, József Vészi, protesting press censorship. *NFP*, 1905, Nov. 2A.
working class. The strike began on Monday morning, December 4. On Monday and Tuesday evenings large crowds of workers gathered to demonstrate against the Coalition and proceeded to march on the editorial offices of the Coalition papers, breaking out windows. The demonstrations became increasingly violent. Newspaper writers exchanged revolver salvos with the demonstrators, while mounted policemen charged into the crowd with drawn sabers. Budapest was given its first good look at the nature of the proletarian revolution, and found it to be an uncomfortable contrast to the disciplined order of "Red Friday." By Wednesday, December 6, the strike had virtually shut down the Coalition press in Budapest, except for a few papers which managed to publish editions of only a few pages using smaller printing shops. Coalition papers were also shut down in several large towns. On that evening the most important papers agreed to the strikers' demands and promised publicly that they would not repeat their insults and fabrications against the laboring class. On Wednesday evening, after the strike was over, a large crowd gathered for a victory march through the city but was turned back by police. The four-year-old daughter of Count Tivadar Batthyány, a member of the Coalition Steering Committee, became separated from her nurse in the midst of this crowd of rough working people, and for several hours the authorities feared for her safety. A coachman brought the tiny countess home late in the evening, unharmed, but her misadventure underlined the danger in the situation.

The printers' strike had gained its limited objectives. It had

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8 On the strike, see Mucsi, Paktum, 122-29; PL, 1905, Dec. 5M; and NFP, 1905, Dec. 5M, 6M, 6A, 7M.

9 NFP, 1905, Dec. 7M, 7A.
accomplished more in two days to tone down the Coalition press than Kristóffy had been able to do by confiscation. It had demonstrated to the labor leaders the effectiveness of a political strike. Plans to broaden the attack to a general strike on behalf of universal suffrage were laid aside when the Coalition press came to terms. The strike naturally frightened the better classes. Predictably, the Coalition blamed the government, accusing Budapest Police Chief Béla Rudnay and his chief, Interior Minister Kristóffy, of instigating the strike as an excuse to curb the freedom of the press.  

When the Budapest City Council met on December 6, three motions were introduced from the Coalition members, calling for an investigation into charges that the police did not perform their duty in preserving order, calling for a Citizens' Guard to be organized because the police were unable to protect life and property, and calling upon the city to submit a report to the King on the anarchist movement. Behind the familiar political accusations one can detect in these motions a new sense of fear of the proletarian revolution. Vice-Mayor Gyula Rózsavölgyi defended the work of Police Chief Rudnay, and insisted that the police would call in military assistance if needed. On the same day the government placed the 38th Infantry Regiment (Budapest) on battle alert.

The printers' strike may have given the government a welcome excuse to introduce new procedures regarding military assistance to civil author-

10 Lányi, Regierung, 155n.; NFP, 1905, Dec. 6M.

11 NFP, 1905, Dec. 6M, 7M. On Dec. 20 the Budapest City Council decided to initiate a disciplinary investigation against Rudnay for police negligence on Dec. 4, but the motion to establish a Citizens' Guard was defeated. NFP, 1905, Dec. 21M.
ities. There were already persistent rumors that a Budapest Honvéd regiment was being converted into a four-company riot battalion, to be used by the government to reinforce the Gendarmerie. On December 8 Defense Minister Bihar issued instructions allowing local military commanders to communicate directly with civilian authorities in their areas, by-passing the usual chain of command. This measure was intended to eliminate the delay when lord lieutenants requested military assistance. The purpose of the new procedure became clear on the following day when Kristóffy gave extraordinary powers to the lord lieutenants of twenty-two counties, giving them immediate authority over county officials in matters pertaining to voluntary tax receipts and voluntary enlistments. Local officials were now to take orders directly from the lord lieutenant rather than from the sheriff or county assembly.

Soon after Budapest returned to normal following the printers' strike, there were strange reports of armed insurrection among the Romanians in Transylvania. The Romanians turned against the Coalition in the course of the summer of 1905 when the Coalition rejected universal suffrage and showed itself even more chauvinistic toward the nationalities than the old Liberal Party regime. Several Rumanian political leaders urged their followers to pay taxes voluntarily and to enlist. Passive

12 NFP, 1905, Nov. 23A. The government had officially denied such rumors in the past (NFP, July 20A, 21M), but plans were already well-developed when the question was discussed at Ischl on August 22. (HHSAC, GM, Aug. 22, 1905, pp. 218-20.)

13 PL, 1905, Dec. 9M; this question was also discussed at Ischl on Aug. 22.

14 NFP, 1905, Dec. 10M.

resistance, they argued, was intended to weaken the Crown so that the Coalition could use even stronger measures of Magyarization. But at the same time the Rumanians were also incensed at the Lukács school decrees, which they saw as evidence that the Fejérváry government was sacrificing the nationalities to win over the Coalition. Aurel Vlad and other Rumanian politicians worked diligently throughout Transylvania to unite the Rumanian element into a strong political force. The Coalition, perhaps afraid that universal suffrage might be introduced after all, was also busy in Transylvania, bringing pressure to bear on voters and making them swear to vote only for a Magyar candidate in the next election. Kristóffy issued a decree ordering the Transylvanian county authorities to prevent these practices by force if necessary, but it is doubtful whether the officials paid any attention to his decree.

The tension in Transylvania reached a crisis state in mid-December when there were reports of widespread "unrest" in Arad and Hunyad Counties involving Rumanian peasants against the Magyars. The nature of this unrest was not described in the press, which gave instead detailed reports of military action taken to counter the agitation. A company of infantry was sent to Nagy Halmágy, and gendarmes were sent to other villages. Police confiscated two hundred Werndl rifles, and railroad personnel were issued pistols. Kristóffy claims that there were plans at that time

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16 NFP, 1905, Sept. 20A, 29M, Oct. 21M.
17 PL, 1905, Oct. 31M; NFP, Oct. 31A, Nov. 6A.
18 NFP, 1905, Nov. 6A, 12M.
among the Transylvanian Rumanian leaders for a "putsch," and that they were supported from the Rumanian Kingdom by money, propaganda leaflets and "secret agitators." His agents, he says, had to crush the plot secretly in order to avoid an international incident. The unrest in Transylvania probably arose in response to the extremely tense internal situation in Hungary. We do not know whether, or to what extent, it was supported by the Rumanian government or by persons in the Rumanian Kingdom, but Rumania was cautious to avoid being openly compromised. The Transylvanian "unrest" appears to have been all smoke and no fire, and it is not entirely unthinkable that the entire incident was manufactured by Kristóffy to try out the new methods of military assistance to civil authorities.

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20 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 372. The nationality deputies in Parliament denied that any unrest existed in Transylvania, and the Independence Party was inclined to agree, yet took no action on the question. NFP, 1905, Dec. 19M.
B. The Lukács Negotiations

The printers' strike created new pressures to settle the crisis. Gyula Kautz, a Liberal Party member of the House of Magnates and a noted jurist, published a proposal on December 6, at the height of the strike violence, suggesting a path to a peaceful settlement of the constitutional struggle. Noting that the Statute §38:III provided for the establishment of a National Council which had never been created, Kautz suggested that Franz Joseph should now call a national conference of leading political figures, such as the presidents of both houses of Parliament, past prime ministers and other persons of similar prestige. The conference would be consultative only, but might serve to create the direct channel of communication between the Crown and the Nation that was now lacking. The long political crisis was revealing the inadequacies of Hungary's political institutions, and to some persons the answer seemed to lie in constitutional novelties.21

The Coalition was especially afraid that the printer's strike might grow into a general strike in support of universal suffrage. On December 4, László Lukács took the initiative to arrange a secret

21 Julius Kautz, "Ein Wort zur Entwirrung," PL, 1905, Dec. 6M; cf. NFP, Dec. 6M.

Along much the same line of thought, Ferenc Kossuth suggested some time later that the office of Palatine should be reinstated. The Palatine, usually a member of the royal family, had acted in earlier centuries as a viceroy and representative of the Crown when the King was out of the country. Paragraph 2 of the Statute §67:VII suspended this office until a special law should bring it into conformity with the independent and responsible Hungarian ministry. Kautz' proposal was more practical than Kossuth's, since it required no enabling legislation. (Kossuth's article in Magyarország, reported in NFP, 1906, Jan. 20M.)
meeting with Kossuth, Apponyi and Andrassy, and found them unusually responsive. László Lukács, who had served as Finance Minister in several recent governments, was in favor of universal suffrage, but had stood by Tisza and urged the Liberal Party members not to desert to Kristóffy's Progressive Party. He therefore spoke to the Coalition leaders not as a spokesman for the Fejerváry government. Officially, he was acting only in a private capacity, but it was an open secret that he had the encouragement of both Fejerváry and Franz Joseph to try to reopen the negotiations that had remained broken off since the Five Minute Audience on September 23. After the talks between Lukács and the Coalition leaders were underway, Lukács was repeatedly received by both the Prime Minister and the King, so that it was certain that any compromise plan worked out by Lukács would receive the Monarch's immediate and serious attention.

Under the encouragement of Lukács, a select group of Coalition leaders made a list of conditions under which they would agree to form a government. Included in the new list of "demands" were a number of items that the King had already agreed to in the Committee of Nine report in 1903, such as modification of the flags and emblems carried by Hungarian regiments and the use of Magyar language in courts-martial. Franz Joseph had also indicated his willingness to discuss the establishment of a separate Hungarian national bank, and parity in diplomatic
and consular representation, so long as these questions were settled in agreement with the Austrian government. The Coalition this time did not insist upon an independent customs area, but instead Hungary was to sign foreign treaties in her own name, and in the future the "Tariff and Trade Agreement" between Austria and Hungary was to be called a "Tariff and Trade Treaty." All of these points were by this time open to discussion and the Coalition could not expect any resistance to them from His Majesty, so long as the military issues were settled satisfactorily. They were included rather as window dressing, to make it appear that the Coalition had wrested from the Monarch concessions that had already been granted to earlier governments. On the most important question, however, the Coalition list showed a subtle shift. Instead of "command language," the Coalition now demanded the use of Magyar as "language of communication" from officers downward. This new phrase showed that the Coalition leaders were backing down from their earlier hard line. The new conditions were forwarded to Franz Joseph on December 13, and on the following day the King authorized Count Andrássy to negotiate directly with Joint War Minister Pitreich to define the permissible limits of "language of communication." Andrásy, however, delayed meeting with Pitreich until January 7, by which time the crisis had reached an entirely new phase. 22

22 The terms of the Lukács negotiations are described in NFP, 1906, Feb. 11M, 16M; Lányi, Regierung, 168-84; and Mucsi, Faktum, 129-35 and 147-48. Mucsi follows Lányi's account; yet Lányi appears to follow the explanation offered in the unsigned NFP articles, rather than his own first-hand knowledge. Just as with the negotiations in the Spring of 1905, the details deserve to be checked in the archives in Vienna and Budapest. See above, p. 63 n. 18.
The Coalition had entered into negotiations with Lukács largely under the pressure of the printers' strike. For a few days there were several indications that the Coalition was trying to back down. On December 6 the Budapest City Council voted to petition Parliament to introduce universal suffrage.\(^{23}\) A few days later the Independence Party unanimously adopted Apponyi's motion to place universal suffrage at the top of the party's priorities, though without reducing the insistence upon the National Demands.\(^{24}\) The motion may have been only an empty gesture, but Baron Ivor Kaas of the clerical Peoples Party took it so seriously that he resigned from the Coalition Steering Committee in protest.\(^{25}\) Once the Coalition had entered into negotiations, however, they had forced upon the government the obligation to continue them. Thus although only a few days ago the Coalition members had felt themselves in a weaker position, they now had a lever to pressure the government.

Parliament was due to meet again on December 19, and since there seemed to be no possibility that a budget and recruit bill could be passed at that time, the nation would begin another year in an "ex-lex" condition. The Statutes 1848:IV and 1867:X gave the King the right to prorogue or dissolve Parliament, but stated that if the King dismissed Parliament before the budget and recruit bills were passed, "the Diet must be convened before the end of the year and within sufficient time for the

\(^{23}\) NFP, 1905, Dec. 7M.

\(^{24}\) NFP, 1905, Dec. 12M; Mucsi, Paktum, 132.

\(^{25}\) NFP, 1905, Dec. 13M; shortly afterward János Molnár was chosen to replace him. (NFP, Dec. 16M.) The Peoples Party also accused Kossuth of being a Free Mason (NFP, Dec. 13A). This was their standard accusation when they were angry. Earlier they had made the charge against Education Minister György Lukács, and then retracted it (NFP, Nov. 4M).
official accounts and the estimates for the succeeding year to be con-
sidered therein before the close of the year." The only precedent ser-
vling to define this statute occurred in January 1905, when Tisza dissolved
Parliament in an ex-lex period. The Coalition had branded the action il-
legal at the time and campaigned against Tisza with this charge, but after
winning the election most of the Coalition members had decided that dis-
missing Parliament and calling for new elections could be justified in
this case since the Crown had appealed to the Nation.27

Aware of this precedent, the government had no desire simply to
prorogue Parliament once again. In his memorandum to Franz Joseph on
November 25 Kristóffy had asked the King to dissolve Parliament. In a
subsequent memorandum and in an audience a few days later, he considered
the possibility of three repeated elections, preventing Parliament from
sitting until a favorable majority could be produced, and he requested
that Franz Joseph somehow provide fifty million crowns that Kristóffy
felt would be necessary to conduct a successful election campaign.28 The
Coalition did not want Parliament to be dissolved, however. They were
afraid of facing a new election campaign at this time, especially a cam-
paign fought on the question of universal suffrage. The aristocratic
parties were especially wary of new elections, since they would probably
result in an absolute majority for the Independence Party, making the other

26 Hungarian Statute 1867:X, which replaces Paragraph 6 of 1848:IV; English translation in Dodd, Modern Constitutions, I, 98-99.

27 See above, pp. 40, 108.

28 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 316-23. Kristóffy provides no date for the third memorandum or for the audience with Franz Joseph. It must have occurred before November 30, however.
parties in the Coalition expendable. The Coalition may also have feared that if Parliament were dissolved the government would not call new elections right away, but initiate authoritarian rule.

Although the Fejérváry ministers felt that it would be illegal to recess Parliament on December 19, László Lukács insisted that the new peace feeler must be explored completely, and urged the King to postpone dissolving Parliament in order to give the negotiations more time. Lukács was supported by Széll and by Tisza, who was secretly received by Franz Joseph on December 7. On December 10 Prime Minister Fejérváry wrote to Lukács, proposing an agreement with the Coalition. In order to allow time for the negotiations in progress to develop, the government was willing merely to recess Parliament on December 19 rather than dissolve it, if the Coalition for its part would agree not to brand the recess a flagrant violation of the Constitution. At the time Fejérváry made this offer, there seemed to be a good possibility that a new government might have taken office even before December 19. The Coalition accepted the agreement and then promptly broke their side of it. Once he had the assurance that Parliament would not be dissolved, Andrassy delayed his trip to Vienna to negotiate with Pitreich.

If the Coalition interpreted Fejérváry's offer as a sign of weakness, they may have been reinforced in this estimation by another factor. On December 9 the Social Democrats, who had just forced the Coalition to submit, made a conciliatory gesture. In an editorial in Népszava, the

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29 NFP, 1905, Dec. 21M; 1906, Jan. 13M. Tisza was seen in Vienna on December 7. (NFP, 1905, Dec. 8M.)

30 Text of Fejérváry's letter to Lukács is given in Lányi, Regierung, 170-71. See Mucsi, Paktum, 130-31, and Kristóffy, Kálvária, 294-95. In his letter Fejérváry insisted that he would not consider a recess illegal, yet since his letter was written to be shown to the Coalition leaders, it probably does not reveal his real thoughts on the question.
party suggested that it would not insist on truly "universal" suffrage, if the Coalition were willing to grant an extension of the suffrage "at least as broad as that proposed by Minister Kristóffy." Ambiguous as this sounds, the hint was clear that the Socialists would not fight to the end with a general strike if the Coalition included a literacy require-
ment in the Magyar language. With these two assurances in their pockets, the Coalition needed merely to keep up the appearance of negotiating until December 19. Yet when a false rumor was spread that the government might not recess Parliament after all, but would appear in Parliament and intro-
duce bills, the Coalition considered this a violation of the agreement. They considered the government honor-bound by the agreement, even if they could violate it as they wished.  

The session of December 19 brought several surprises. Kálmán Széll, who had been elected without party, appeared in Parliament for the first time since his election in January. Speaker Gyula Justh opened the ses-

31 Mucsi, Paktum, 131-34.

32 Lányi, Regierung, 172; NFP, 1905, Dec. 19M.
came forward and supported the attack upon the government, and announced that the Liberal Party would join the Coalition in protesting a new recess, because this was a breech of law and thus altered the previous legality of the government in the eyes of his party. Tisza shook hands with his recent enemies Andrásy and Apponyi, and upon this note of harmony the House voted unanimously. Only the nationality delegates had left the chamber before the vote. The House then adjourned.  

That afternoon the House of Magnates, which had previously avoided strong measures, adopted an identical resolution.  

Immediately after Parliament adjourned, the government published the text of Kristóffy's proposed suffrage bill. In a few short, unambiguous paragraphs it spelled out procedures which would have done much to eliminate the election abuses in Hungary. Kristóffy's bill did not touch upon the question of redistricting. Previous legislation had merely assigned a certain number of deputies to each county or independent city, leaving it to government decree to define the boundaries of each district within a county. The question of redistricting would certainly have needed settling before any Parliament would have passed a new suffrage bill, but Kristoffy's bill placed the most glaring abuses into the public view.

33 The session of Dec. 19 is described in NFP, 1905, Dec. 19A. Tisza's speech before the Liberal Party on the evening before, justifying the party's change of position, is described in NFP, Dec. 19M.

34 The House of Magnates session is described in NFP, 1905, Dec. 20M.

35 Kristóffy's suffrage bill is given in German text in NFP, 1905, Dec. 19A (the bill) and 20M (supporting arguments); also in Lányi, Regierung, 191–93. Hungarian text in Kristóffy, Kályaria, 296–98, and in his Választói jogi beszédek, 333–36. Kristóffy's bill was published at the direct request of the King. Although Franz Joseph still appeared hesitant to use forceful measures against the Coalition, the suffrage plan remained as a potential threat. See Fejérváry's letter to Kristóffy, Dec. 15, in Kristóffy, Kályaria, 296.

36 See the editorial comment, NFP, 1905, Dec. 19A.
The Coalition had tricked the government into a seriously embarrassing position. The recess of Parliament was widely considered to be a gross violation of the Constitution, and the Coalition spread this accusation, despite the fact that the recess had been previously agreed upon, and despite the fact that the most likely alternative was to dismiss Parliament without new elections, an even more serious violation of the Constitution. Even Széll and Tisza, who had advised Franz Joseph to recess Parliament, now joined in branding the action as grossly illegal.

Several previously staunch supporters of the Fejérváry government now resigned, including the son of the Prime Minister, Baron Imre Fejérváry, lord lieutenant of Saranya County. Late in the evening of December 19 the Hungarian cabinet met. Defense Minister Bihar and Education Minister György Lukács were especially outspoken in their belief that the recess was illegal, and they wished to resign. On the following afternoon in Vienna Baron Fejérváry submitted the resignation of his entire cabinet. Franz Joseph's answer was published on the twenty-first: despite their repeated offers to resign, he could not accept the resignation of the cabinet at this time. This answer left the door open for talks with the Coalition leaders, but at the same time left the government with full powers to use force to maintain order.

Throughout January there were repeated negotiations and rumors of negotiations, between the Coalition and László Lukács, between Andrásy and Vienna, and among various factions within the Coalition. It is not possible, and probably not useful, to trace all the various proposals and conferences, all of which remained secret at the time. The explanation

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37 NFP, 1905, Dec. 20A.

to all the accusations and countercharges made by all sides after the negotiations broke down in early February is probably this: Andrásy and a few of his friends, such as Apponyi, Kossuth, Bánffy, and other persons of high rank who were likely to receive cabinet positions, realized that Franz Joseph would not back down on the question of command language, and were willing to accept more modest terms in order to come to power. This was probably the basis of the proposals first discussed with László Lukács in December, and for Andrásy's secret talks with Pitreich in Vienna on January 7 or 8. In order to encourage this direction of development, László Lukács suggested alternative proposals, calling for a more intensive development of the Honvéd. When the Coalition Steering Committee met on January 29 and it became known that some Coalition leaders were ready to drop the demand for Hungarian command language, the hard liners became alarmed. Gábor Ugron, leader of the militant faction of the Independence Party, resigned from the Steering Committee on January 30, publicly charging that the Coalition leaders were abdicating the rights of the nation. With the conciliatory spirit destroyed, the Steering Committee proceeded to adopt an intransigent position.

The new Coalition resolution, obviously written more with an eye to future publication than to placate the King, called for a new Coalition government to pass a suffrage bill "on a broad basis," after which new elections would be held to allow the entire nation to express its will on the question of command language. This proposal was of course totally unacceptable to the King. Aside from the question of allowing the Coalition government first to write its own suffrage law and then hold elections under its own supervision, a procedure which left no remote possibility that the Coalition's proposal could lose, the King could not permit a matter which he considered a Crown right to be made the subject of
a plebiscite. The Coalition proposal also took a hard line on the questions of military emblems and economic relations with Austria and foreign countries, leaving no room for compromise. Franz Joseph rejected the Coalition's proposal in writing on February 4, whereupon the Coalition passed a new resolution justifying their position, and then decided to publish some—but not all—of the documents of the recent negotiations, careful not to reveal that Andrássy had been willing to drop the demand for Magyar command language. 39

The position of Andrássy is once again the key to understanding why the Lukács talks could begin at all, and why the talks broke down so completely. Andrássy has been aptly labeled the "oracle" of Hungarian politics. 40 He tried to absolve himself of all responsibility for the failure of the talks by insisting that he was only the impartial "interpreter" of the Coalition's proposals. (Andrássy's party still maintained that they were not "members" of the Coalition, though this was only a convenient fiction; in fact, Andrássy and his party had been at the center of Coalition policies ever since the Coalition was formed in December 1904.) In a speech to the Constitution Party on February 10, Andrássy tried to wriggle out of accusations that he had proposed for the King to submit his crown rights to the will of the voters. 41 But through the mist of incomplete press reports, partially published documents, recriminations and self-justification, one cannot avoid the obvious conclusion: Andrássy was trying to make himself Prime Minister, and to do this he was willing to

39 NFP, 1906, Feb. 6M, 7M; Lányi, Regierung, 178-81.

40 Loránt Hegedüs, Két Andrássy és két Tisza [Two Andrássys and two Tiszas] (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1937), passim.

41 NFP, 1906, Feb. 11M; for statements of Kossuth and Apponyi, and other commentary on the talks see NFP, Feb. 8M, 10M, and Lányi, Regierung, 177-86.
try to deceive certain factions of the Coalition, and even to trick Franz Joseph into conceding more than he intended. Franz Joseph was an old man, seventy-five years old, but unfortunately for Andrássy, he was not easily tricked. The Hungarian "oracle" was unable to be all things to all men.

The question remains why the Independence Party, the largest party in Parliament, continued to rely upon Andrássy as its negotiator. The reasons are twofold. First, Andrássy was a known quantity to Franz Joseph, who would rather work through a prominent aristocratic statesman, the son of an even greater statesman of the previous generation, than to turn to a commoner like Kossuth, whose very name recalled the great anti-Habsburg leader of the last generation. Nor could Franz Joseph turn to mercurial temperaments like Apponyi, Bánffy, or Aladár Zichy. The other reason is that the Coalition had no real principles to unite them, nor were they united behind one great charismatic leader. Kossuth was president of the Coalition and of the Independence Party because of his name, not because he was the real leader. Apponyi was the strong leader of a faction, but could not unite the entire Coalition any more than could Ugron. Andrássy became the spokesman for the Coalition largely through forfeit.

The breakdown in the negotiations left everyone exhausted. From Vienna, Joint War Minister Pitreich wrote to Count Tisza on February 11, "I can say with a clear conscience that I . . . tried to be an 'honest broker.' The final statement of the Coalition shows quite clearly that
there was no possibility of reaching a satisfactory agreement." While
everyone concerned was publishing statements to show his own innocence,
Bánffy claimed that he had offered a peace proposal which the Fejérváry
government had ignored. Bánffy's plan would have dropped the demand for
Magyar command language and placed all possible emphasis upon an independ-
dent economic area. The government replied that they had examined Bánffy's
proposal with interest. Bánffy's party, however, held only thirteen seats
in Parliament, and his plan would therefore have required the full support
of the Independence Party. Bánffy had claimed that he had this support,
but Ferenc Kossuth confessed that he know nothing of any such plan. Bán-
ffy, the government statement pointed out, was in fact working for the
same goals as the government—dropping the demand for command language,
and passage of the customs treaties; yet Bánffy claimed that the govern-
ment was trampling upon the constitution. Bánffy was growing angry with
the Coalition for continuing to insist upon the command words when, he
felt, the economic advantages were more important and more easily attain-
able. The government statement emphasizing his differences with the Coali-
tion probably embarrassed him and hastened his departure.

The disunity within the Coalition was becoming more and more ob-

42 J. Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, III, 769-70n. Other
persons were also mentioned in the discussions behind the scenes. In a
letter to Frau Schratt on Feb. 6, Franz Joseph mentioned the efforts of
Eduard Palmer (1838-1914), general director of the Alpine Montangesell-
schaft. (Franz Joseph, Briefe, 463.) Rumors alternately asserted and
denied the influence of Archduke Joseph, husband of the Emperor's grand-
daughter Austgust, Prinzessin von Bayern. (NFP, 1906, Jan. 5M, 27M, 28M.)
Archduke Joseph (1872-1962) represented the royal family in Budapest, where
he held the rank of colonel in the 1st Honvéd Hussar Regiment.

43 NFP, 1906, Feb. 16M; Lányi, Regierung, 188-90. For earlier re-
ports of Bánffy's disagreements with the Coalition, see NFP, Jan. 30A,
Feb. 1A.
vious. Baron Ivor Kaas resigned from the Steering Committee on December 12 when the Independence Party approved of universal suffrage, though his Peoples Party remained in the Coalition. On January 30 Gábor Ugron resigned from the Steering Committee when some members expressed a willingness to give up the Magyar command words. Now Bánffy was angry because the economic demands were not given priority. Bánffy remained in the Coalition for a few more weeks, but was already on the way out. The Coalition was beginning to break up. Back home in the counties, the spirit of national resistance was being broken by the government's strong measures. Before looking at this question, we must first consider the foreign commercial treaties.
C. The Commercial Treaties

Since the day it was first appointed, the Fejérváry government was faced with the controversial and most vital question of the foreign trade treaties. The existing commercial treaties with Germany, Italy, Belgium, Russia and Serbia were all due to expire on February 28, 1906. The treaties with Switzerland and Bulgaria expired on December 31, 1905, but all parties were willing to grant a provisional extension of the existing treaties for two months, so that on March 1, 1906, a complete new tariff system could come into effect in Central Europe, due to last until the end of 1917.

Austria-Hungary had to accomplish a lot of work before March 1, 1906. The German treaty, which was the key to Austria-Hungary's entire foreign trade picture, had already been negotiated in the Spring of 1904, but negotiations with most of the other countries had yet to be started. Furthermore, the new treaty system would require Austria-Hungary to update her own tariff schedules and enact a new tariff law, which had to be passed by both parliaments.

The ratification of the German treaty was of decisive importance to the Hungarian Coalition, because once Austria-Hungary had entered into a commercial agreement with her largest trading partner, Hungary could not subsequently declare herself an independent customs area without raising serious questions of treaty violation. Germany would not be obliged to grant to a separate Hungarian trade area the same terms she had given to Austria-Hungary, and Hungary might find herself alone in the international trading community until new treaties were negotiated in 1917.
For all practical purposes, therefore, once the German treaty went into effect on March 1, 1906, the economic union between Austria and Hungary was assured until 1917. If the Coalition wanted economic independence, the treaty must be blocked, and there was no time to lose.

On the whole, both Austria and Hungary profitted from the economic union. Hungary's agricultural exports, the most important of which was wheat, were gradually driven out of the West European markets by the German protective tariffs and by cheaper products from the United States. The protective tariff on manufactured goods kept German goods at a disadvantage in Austria-Hungary. The result was that Hungary's agricultural products found a protected market in the industrialized portions of Austria, while Austrian manufactures enjoyed the same favors in Hungary. While certain Hungarian industries suffered from the competition of stronger Austrian concerns, most Hungarian industries probably profitted from the economic union. Many Hungarian industries complemented, rather than competed with, Austrian industries, and a number of Hungarian manufacturing concerns were subsidiaries of Austrian companies. The Hungarian steel industry could not possibly keep up with the rapidly rising demand, so that imported steel from Austria and Germany would not be a serious competitor for years to come. While Hungary could not erect any protective tariff against Austrian manufactured goods, the government had developed a number of ways to protect native industries by special tax subsidies, preferential railroad freight rates, and by guaranteeing to Hungarian factories a certain percentage of all military purchases. As a result, Hungary's economy was largely integrated with that of Austria, and all but a few companies or individuals would have suffered from a separation from Austria. Almost

In Hungary, the man on the street--the village street--probably understood little of the complexities of international tariff agreements. But the small independent farmer, unlike the large landowner, was not dependent upon the foreign market to sell his farm products. The smallholder, the agricultural laborer, and the urban factory worker were all aware that the manufactured goods they bought, or were unable to buy because of their high cost, were often made in Austria. It was easy to convince them that if only Hungary had an independent customs area and could erect a tariff to keep out Austrian goods, Hungarian factories could produce the same goods more cheaply. The shopkeeper could likewise place the blame for all his business problems on "Austria"--Viennese banks, Bohemian textiles, or whatever. The demand for an independent customs area was therefore not based on economic data, but almost entirely upon
political emotions. Almost every Hungarian economist or financier of stature—including Sándor Matilekovits, Frígyes Fellner, Lajos Láng, or Sándor Wekerle—saw the impracticality of establishing a customs line between Hungary and Austria. It is especially interesting to consider the position of József Szterényi, long a member of the Independence Party, who as an official in the Commerce Ministry had established the system of state support for Hungarian industry. Szterényi was as much opposed to economic separation as anyone. Even those political leaders who favored an independent customs area, such as Bánffy, realized that the change would require several years of preparation, or else the Hungarian economy might suffer a shock from which it might not recover. They favored ratification of the German treaty and the extension of the economic union with Austria until 1917, in order to give Hungary ten years to prepare for the transition to an independent economic area. But to make the German treaty palatable to the voters, Bánffy and the other Coalition leaders demanded certain changes to insure that Hungary’s independence received proper recognition. They wanted the previous “Tariff and Trade Agreement” between Austria and Hungary, due to expire in 1907, to be renewed as a “Tariff and Trade Treaty.” The Austro-Hungarian

45 One of the main supporters of economic separation from Austria seems to have been Baron Zsigmond Kornfeld, director of the (Rothschild) Magyar Általános Hitelbank, who kept out of the public eye but had considerable influence behind the scenes. (See Baernreither’s conversation with Kornfeld, July 3, 1905, in Baernreither, Verfall, 147-48, 159.) Though a member of Andrássy’s party, Kornfeld was economic advisor to Apponyi and Kossuth, neither of whom had much understanding of economic policy. Kossuth’s frequent declarations on economics were usually unclear, including arguments on both sides of the question. See, for example, his article in Budapest, summarized in NFP, 1905, July 24A, or his ”victory” speech to his party after the renewal of the Austro-Hungarian customs agreement, NFP, 1907, Oct. 7M.

46 Szterényi was elevated by the Fejérváry government to the rank of State Secretary in July 1905, partly in a move to placate the Independence Party. See the article on him in NFP, 1905, July 22M, and Baernreither, Verfall, 157-59.
"Autonomous Customs Tariff" should be changed to separate, but identical, tariff schedules for Austria and Hungary. Goods would still pass freely between the two countries on the basis of reciprocity. Finally, they demanded that all foreign commercial treaties should be concluded by Hungary as a separate state, not by Austria-Hungary as a single power, and that where the official text of a treaty was not French, a Hungarian-language text should be included as one of the official texts of the treaty.

In Austrian business circles, the prospect of economic separation, or even preparation for eventual separation later, was looked upon with the greatest uneasiness. The viewpoint was well expressed by Max Vladimir Beck in a memorandum to Archduke Franz Ferdinand in August 1903.

Even the complete division of the armed forces into an Austrian and a Hungarian army, as regrettable as such a step would be, would not have such rapid consequences as a complete economic separation would cause.

Economic separation was considered tantamount to destroying the Monarchy. By 1905, however, a new impatience with the insatiable Hungarian demands began to be voiced in Austria. Austrians had long felt that Hungary refused to pay her fair share of the common expenses, and extracted financial advantages as the price for retreating from excessive political demands. When the last economic agreement had been made between the two countries in 1897-99, the Austrian Reichsrat was powerless in the face of the obstruction by nationality groups, and there was no alternative.

but for the Emperor to enact by decree in Austria the terms offered by
the Hungarians. Now, said the Austrian statesmen, the Austrian Reichsrat
was functioning, and Austria could dictate terms to Hungary on an econ-
omic agreement. Economic separation would injure both Austria and Hungary,
but Austria, as the stronger partner, could better afford to go it alone
than Hungary. Better to face Hungary now with an ultimatum: either agree
to a long-term customs union of twenty to thirty years, or else let the
customs union end with the expiration of the current agreement on December
31, 1907. To give Hungary ten years to prepare for customs separation
in 1917, as the Emperor seemed willing to do, was for Austria to surren-
der without using her most effective weapon.

In March 1905, on the motion of Dr. Julius von Derschatta (German
Peoples Party), a special committee was appointed in the Austrian Reichs-
rat to study all aspects of the relationship with Hungary. Popularly
known as the "Derschatta Committee," it examined methods by which Austria
could apply pressure to persuade Hungary to accept a long-term economic
agreement. But it also considered if it might be cheaper for Austria to
go it alone and demand economic separation now, rather than pay "black-
mail" to the Hungarians as a price for maintaining the customs union for
another ten years. Some of the members of the German Peoples Party were
openly advocating economic separation from Hungary.48 On July 4, the
Pan-German deputies Schönerer and Stein introduced a bill in the Reichs-
rat calling for immediate preparation for separation from Hungary.49 And
with quite different motives, the Christian Socialists threatened at

48 NFP, 1905, Mar. 15, Apr. 23M; Somogyi, Választójog, 112n.
See above, p. 186.

49 NFP, 1905, July 5M.
their conference at Eggenburg on September 17 to separate. Their interest was to preserve the Habsburg Monarchy at all costs; if it was necessary to cut off Hungary in order to hold the rest together, then this price should be paid.50

The commercial treaties confronted the Fejérváry government with a complex and controversial question. At first the government concluded that the temporary nature of its appointment did not give it the authority to make binding decisions affecting long-range policy. Consequently the government agreed to allow the officials of the Austrian government and of the joint ministries to begin negotiating the outstanding treaties in the absence of Hungarian representatives, with the understanding that Hungary might adhere to them "when she thinks fit."51 The Austrian government proceeded in July to lay the German treaty before the Reichsrat, which promptly ratified it.52 In the long run, the Fejérváry government could not avoid making economic decisions which would bind a future government. On September 1, 1905, Austria-Hungary gave the required six-month notice to Italy ending their provisional commercial arrangements in order for a new treaty, yet to be negotiated, to go into effect on the following March 1. It was clear to observers at the time that the Fejérváry government had given its approval to this act at the Crown Council held on August 22. For the first time the government had gone beyond its original intention by taking a step which established long-range policy.53

50 Sassmann, "Der Kampf um das allgemeine Wahlrecht," 127-29.
51 Times, 1905, June 27; NFP, June 25A.
52 Ratified by the Abgeordnetenhaus on July 6, and the Herrenhaus on July 14. (Times, 1905, July 8; NFP, July 7M, 15M.)
It proved impossible to negotiate commercial treaties with foreign countries in the absence of Hungarian representatives, and negotiations were broken off with Switzerland, Belgium, Russia, and the Balkan States. In the meantime Germany concluded favorable treaties with these states which were often prejudicial to Austria-Hungary. Finally Fejerváry was convinced that even the enemies of his government were agreed on the necessity to continue trade talks. On September 22—the day before the Five Minute Audience—it was announced that negotiations with Switzerland would begin again on October 12, and with the other countries as soon thereafter as possible. Hungary would be represented by economic experts appointed either by the Fejerváry government or by a new government, if one could be formed in time. After the Five Minute Audience ended in a fiasco, the Fejerváry government had to continue to act alone.

To gain favor for the passage of the German treaty and the other agreements which he considered so essential, Fejerváry borrowed some of the economic proposals of the Coalition, hoping to make the total package more attractive. At the Crown Council at Ischl on August 22, and again at a Joint Ministerial Conference in Vienna on October 16, Fejerváry asked that the "Tariff and Trade Agreement" be replaced by a customs treaty between Austria and Hungary as two separate customs areas. The two states would guarantee to each other free trade. A customs line would be erected at the border between Austria and Hungary, but would affect only articles subject to excise taxes. Austria and Hungary would enact separate but identical customs tariffs on foreign imports. In this way Hungary would become de jure an independent customs area, a major concession to the

54 NFP, 1905, Sept. 22M.
Coalition, while de facto the customs union (or more precisely, a free trade area) would be preserved.

In the controversial Point 3 of the conditions given to the Coalition leaders at the Five Minute Audience, September 23, Franz Joseph said:

A revision of the 1867 basis, in so far as it may concern economic or other questions affecting the relationship between Austria and Hungary, cannot take place one-sidedly between the Crown and the Hungarian nation, but can only be effected by means of a compromise, subject to royal sanction, between the two states of the Monarchy with the help of their governments and of parliamentary deputations appointed ad hoc.

At the conference on October 16, Gautsch raised strong objections to Fejér-váry's proposals. Gautsch was not only concerned about the technical difficulties of collecting excise taxes at the border, but he was afraid of the strong voices in the Austrian Reichsrat demanding economic separation from Hungary immediately. Gautsch insisted that the Hungarian government should avoid saying definitely that the customs union would come to an end in 1917. In the face of Gautsch's determined opposition, and considering Franz Joseph's statement of September 23, Fejér-váry allowed his proposals to be dropped.

Fejér-váry had also asked for the foreign commercial treaties to be concluded in the name of Austria and Hungary separately, rather than Austria-Hungary as a single power. Foreign Minister Gołębiowski informed the conference on October 16 that it was not possible to modify the German treaty, since it had already been ratified by the German Reichstag. Any modification in the treaty at this stage would require that it be resubmitted to the Reichstag, and there was good reason to believe that the treaty could not be ratified again without considerable change made at the expense of Austria and Hungary. Gołębiowski warned further that if new treaties were written in the name of two states, as long as the German
treaty remained in effect, foreign governments would raise the question as to who in the Monarchy had the power to make treaties. Faced with these strong arguments of international law, Fejérváry again allowed his proposals to be dropped. In their place he offered the Austrian government a far-reaching promise. The Fejérváry government would attempt to introduce the German treaty before the Hungarian Parliament, regardless of its chances of passage. But if it was not possible to submit the treaty to Parliament, the government would allow it to go into effect on March 1 subject to retroactive ratification by Parliament. Thus on October 16, the first day of his re-appointment with full powers, and even before his cabinet ministers had been formally re-appointed, Prime Minister Fejérváry committed his government in principle to ratify the treaty by decree.

The Coalition was divided on the customs issue. The agrarians were almost unanimous in favoring the customs union with Austria and the ratification of the German treaty. They were represented in the Coalition by the Peoples Party and Andrássy's Constitution Party. Both of these parties used their influence to soften the Coalition's stand on the customs issue without allowing their insistence to break up the Coalition. Count Apponyi had led some of the agrarians who did not like Andrássy into the Independence Party, which, officially at least, stood for economic separation. The Coalition received unexpected help out of this dilemma on December 31, when the Fejérváry government announced that it would allow the commercial treaties with Germany and the other states to go into effect in any way possible, and that if they were not ratified before March 1, the govern-

56 Göncöl, Eletrajz, 55. There had been repeated evidence in the press that the Coalition leaders desired the extension of the Austro-Hungarian customs area. See, for example, Times, 1905, Apr. 13, May 9, and Kossuth's article in Budapest, "Die grosse Gefahr und die grosse Gewissheit," reprinted in NFP, 1905, July 24A.
ment would allow their provisions to go into effect by ministerial order. This announcement allowed the commercial interests in Hungary to breathe easier, but at the same time it took the pressure off the Coalition leaders. They needed only to wait until March 1, and the treaties would go into effect as they wished, but they need take no responsibility for them. The government’s announcement practically assured that there could be no solution to the political crisis until after March 1, and the Lukács talks, which were then still underway, were doomed to failure.

At a Joint Ministerial Conference in Vienna on January 10, 1906, it was decided that the Hungarian government should simply issue the appropriate new instructions to Hungarian customs officials regarding imports from Germany. This procedure avoided the appearance of illegality that would have occurred if the government had ratified the treaty on its own authority, and left open the possibility that Parliament might still ratify the treaty on time if the Coalition formed a government before the first of March. Pester Lloyd defended the government’s decision to go ahead, for it said that otherwise the reliability of Hungary and Austria-Hungary as treaty-making powers would be in doubt. The Coalition Steering Committee on January 14 protested against treaties negotiated in the name of the Hungarian nation, when the legislature was not free to influence them but was later obligated by them. Bánffy’s New Party resolved on January 25 to ratify the commercial treaties only with a clause enabling the creation of an independent Hungarian economic area within the time period of the treaties.

57 Magyar Nemzet, reported in NFP, 1905, Dec. 31M.
58 Lányi, Regierung, 115n.; Göncöl, Életrajz, 82; NFP, 1906, Jan. 2M.
59 NFP, 1906, Jan. 11M, 12M, 26M; Times, Jan. 12; Göncöl, Életrajz, 82.
Kossuth, alone among the Coalition leaders, saw that the most important question was the dangerous constitutional precedent established by allowing the treaties to come into force without the consent of Parliament. On February 2, at the time when the Coalition was torn over whether or not to drop the military demands, Kossuth published an article in Magyarország urging moderation. Though he did not recommend openly that the military demands should be dropped, he suggested that the military question was less important than the question of ratifying the treaties. Though president of his party and of the Coalition, Kossuth was not a forceful leader and his call for reason was ignored.

The secret preparations for a customs union between Serbia and Bulgaria became known in late December 1905, when the Bulgarian government laid the treaty before the Diet. This immediately caused alarm in Austria-Hungary. Land-locked Serbia, whose economy had previously been at the mercy of the Habsburg Monarchy, was threatening to go her own way. A joint ministerial council met in Vienna twice to consider the question, on January 10 and again on January 16. Foreign Minister GoIuchowski claimed that under the most-favored-nation clause guaranteed in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, Austria-Hungary could claim any special privileges granted to Bulgaria, and he demanded that Serbia amend the Bulgarian treaty to conform with Austria-Hungary's wishes. When Serbia refused, GoIuchowski instructed Fejérváry on January 23 to close the border to Serbian livestock.

60 Kossuth's article reprinted, "Unsere Lage," NFP, 1906, Feb. 3M.
Most Hungarian agrarians, unhappy with Serbian competition for Austrian markets, welcomed the strong stand taken by the Foreign Office against Serbia. Kossuth took the opposite standpoint. Hungary, he wrote, welcomes the economic liberation of the smaller Balkan states. Hungary wishes only friendship with the Balkan peoples, and has no ambitions against them. Kossuth's article led to a friendly exchange of telegrams with Serbian leaders. Kossuth was trying to continue the overtures made earlier by the Coalition to the Serbian government. The Coalition, in so far as it had any foreign policy at all, was interested in more than the friendship of their Balkan neighbors. They hoped also to weaken the Triple Alliance, which they felt subjected Hungary to the interests of the German Empire. Despite several such gestures, nothing came of the Coalition's experiments in foreign affairs.

After the breakdown of the Lukács talks on February 4 it was obvious that Parliament would soon be dissolved, and probably before the last third of February, in order to give the government time to prepare and publish the new tariff instructions. By February 13 it was known that Parliament, which had been prorogued until March 1, would be called back into session on February 19 and dissolved. This date may have been selected deliberately in order to make it impossible for the Hungarian Coalition leaders to meet with the Croato-Serb coalition in Fiume.

62 Kossuth's article in Budapest, reprinted in NFP, 1906, Jan. 18A; see also "Die ungarische Koalition und Serben," NFP, Jan. 25M.
64 NFP, 1906, Feb. 8A, 13M. See above, p. 223.
D. Breaking National Resistance

Throughout October and November the counties had openly defied the government by any means possible, from legal arguments and court appeals to mob violence. The government had defended its legal position and used all the powers at its disposal to preserve order, but at best the result was a stalemate. In January the violence of the national resistance reached a new level of lawlessness, causing the government to use emergency measures to restore order. Slowly, throughout the spring, the national resistance was broken completely and the Coalition eventually found itself with no strong allies in the counties.

The most dramatic turn in events occurred on January 2, when Gustáv Kovács, a former civil servant who had just been appointed lord lieutenant of Debrecen and of Haidu County, arrived in Debrecen for the first time. He was not on a state visit, but came in a private capacity to look over the situation. When his train arrived in the station he saw a large mob on the platform waiting for him, so he decided not to get off. Then a group of mobsters went through the train, searching each car until they found him. They forced him off the train, placed him on a peasant cart and drove him through the city. Kovács was badly beaten and his clothes partly torn from his body. Though he begged for mercy, he found none. Nowhere were any policemen or any city officials to be seen. Although the crowd drove the cart past the police station, the police officials later claimed they heard no disturbance. Finally Kovács, by this time semi-conscious, was taken to an office and ordered to sign a statement of resignation. When he refused, he was beaten again. When he regained consciousness, he signed the paper and was allowed to take the next train back to Budapest, still half-dressed and bleeding from several cuts about the head and body.
The Debrecen outrage attracted the attention of Europe. The British Foreign Office allegedly took this as decisive evidence that the Dual Monarchy was about to disintegrate. The Fejérváry government immediately resolved to take decisive military steps to restore order in Debrecen. On the next morning Budapest Police Commissioner Dezső Boda arrived in Debrecen with the title of "government commissar." Several battalions of infantry and several cavalry squadrons, from both the joint army and the Honvéd, were stationed in Debrecen under the direct orders of Government Commissar Boda. He immediately suspended city police chief Gyula Végh, replacing him with János Tóth, a police captain from Budapest. Seven persons were arrested for assault, including a lawyer, a bank director and a newspaper editor. In the Great Reformed Church, where the dethronement of the House of Habsburg was proclaimed in 1849, the unrepentant citizens of Debrecen held a service of thanksgiving for success in preventing the new lord lieutenant from taking office. When Kovács' head wounds were still infected after twenty days, the charges against his attackers were raised to aggravated assault, a more serious charge. Kovács insisted that his resignation was void, as it had been signed under duress. He never returned to Debrecen. The government relieved him as lord lieutenant in the middle of February, but he remained under a doctor's care.

On January 6 another government commissar was sent to Ung County and the city of Ungvár, to assist the lord lieutenant Zsigmond Bernáth. Bernáth

Kristóffy says that Robert W. Seton-Watson told him this in later years. Kristóffy, Kálvária, 306.


had first arrived in Ungvár on December 29 to be installed as lord lieutenant, but a crowd physically prevented the installation ceremony and the gendarmes present were not able to maintain order. Bernáth was pelted with snowballs and rocks, and was carried in effigy on a rendering wagon bearing the sign, "Here lies Zsigmond Bernáth, Traitor." On January 6 Kristóffy sent Károly Búth as government commissar to Ungvár with several companies of infantry and a troop of hussars. The local police chief was suspended and replaced by a captain from the Budapest police force. These extraordinary officials and the troops were removed on February 6, when Commissar Búth assured the Interior Minister that the local government could maintain order, but Búth stayed on as commissar. 68

Soon there were frequent reports of lord lieutenants taking strong action and arresting county officials who physically disturbed the peace or who attended meetings of the county assembly called without the permission of the lord lieutenant. Several lord lieutenants were installed under the protection of large escorts of gendarmes and soldiers. 69

On January 4 the Fejérváry government won an important victory when the Budapest Criminal Court sentenced the acting sheriff of Pest County, Ágoston Fazekas, to two months in prison for disobeying a direct order of the lord lieutenant, István Tahy, on November 6. After failing to win a conviction in the "Zeysig" case on November 28, or in the prosecution of the sheriffs of Abauj-Torda and Zemplén counties in December, at last the government had won an important court test. The Fazekas case, because it was tried in Budapest, gained special social significance. The defense attorney for

68 NFP, 1906, Jan. 7M, 8A, Fe. 7M; J. Horváth, Ellenállás, 413-26.
69 NFP, 1906, Jan. 11M, 16M, 18A, 26M, 30M.
Fazekas was Géza Polónyi. After the trial Baron Ivor Kaas shook Fazekas' hand and said, "We shall meet in prison."\textsuperscript{70} (After the Coalition came to power, an appeals court overturned Fazekas' conviction.)\textsuperscript{71} A few weeks later the government again won a major legal decision when the Supreme Court for Administrative Affairs, under the presidency of Sándor Wekerle, refused to hear appeals by counties whose subsidies had been cut off, ruling that the Minister of the Interior, not the court, had the power to decide the matter.\textsuperscript{72} The courts in Hungary remained free of government interference under the Fejérváry regime. Where they succumbed to pressure or to the passions of the moment, they sided with the national resistance, even in several important instances where the weight of legal evidence was on the side of the government.\textsuperscript{73} It is important to remember, in the face of later Coalition charges that the Fejérváry government represented lawless "absolutism," that the highest courts of the land several times confirmed that the government was acting lawfully to uphold the power of the state in unusually trying circumstances.

By stopping financial subsidies to the rebelling counties, Kristóffy struck a fatal blow to national resistance. At first the counties were not seriously affected. They proceeded to pay their officials out of the voluntary tax funds they had collected and refused to forward to the state treasury. But after two or three months these funds were exhausted, and the local officials, whose salaries were not paid, soon began to lose their

\textsuperscript{70} NFP, 1906, Jan. 4A, 5M; see above, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{71} Mangold, Geschichte, 66-67.

\textsuperscript{72} NFP, 1906, Feb. 1M.

\textsuperscript{73} NFP, 1906, Feb. 4M, 14M; Lányi, Regierung, 200n.
enthusiasm for national resistance. The Committee of Public Safety in Zemplén County, for example, had decided in November that each member would contribute an amount equal to twenty-five percent of his taxes to a special fund to support local officials who might be suspended for their part in national resistance. When the county's subsidy was cut off, this money was needed in January, but no one was willing to pay this voluntary tax. By mid-January the Welfare Committees of Szolnok County and the city of Kecskemét had released their officials from the duty to resist the government, and officials in other counties were asking to be released.  

A number of Coalition voices began to express hopelessness in the situation, where the uncontrolled lawlessness in the counties was met by open military force, where the local officials were suffering loss of income and financial ruin, and the great men of the Coalition could not agree among themselves what goals they were fighting for. Yet the Coalition leaders could not betray any sign of weakness while negotiations were still in progress. When the Coalition Steering Committee discussed the plight of local officials on January 12, some members expressed sympathy for their dilemma, and Kossuth persuaded them that the Steering Committee should release officials from their duty to resist the government. Andrassy vetoed the suggestion, and the matter was dropped. Instead, the Steering Committee considered a plan to raise six million crowns, enough to finance aid to local officials not only for the current year, but for the following year as well.  

Kristóffy, Kálvária, 325-26, 331-32.

NFP, 1906, Jan. 8A, 10M, 17M, 19M.

NFP, 1906, Jan. 7M, 13M, 17A, 18M, 19M, 24M; Lányi, Regierung, 197-99, 618-20n.; and J. Horváth, Ellenállás, 47-58. Horváth, secretary of the Coalition's subcommittee on passive resistance, gives some interesting details of the subcommittee's discussions, but does not reveal the part played by Andrassy in the final decision.
The Coalition tried to excite flagging interest in national resistance. At one point Lajos Holló went so far as to call for a boycott of state enterprises in order to deny income to the government. Boycott beer and tobacco, send post cards rather than letters, and ride third class if it is necessary to ride the train at all, he urged. Along the same line, the Coalition tried to turn the plight of the army reservists into a patriotic question. A meeting was called for January 26 to discuss this matter, to which the leaders of all parties were invited. Nikola Tomašić of the Croatian National Party, and Baron Frigyes Podmaniczky, president of the Liberal Party, refused to attend. Podmaniczky said that the Coalition had treated the Liberal Party all along as a band of traitors, but now wanted to cooperate when it involved financial contributions. On the whole, the information about the plight of the reservists, even the report presented by the Coalition's own subcommittee, suggests that their situation was not as serious as had been pictured. Only 30,000 reservists had been called to active duty, and most of them were in the 23-24 year old group, men who had not yet started families. A number of men who were called up were immediately furloughed because they had families to support.

On January 12 Franz Joseph made public a communiqué directing Fejérváry "to restore and maintain order and respect for law in the country." A semi-official explanation of this directive suggested that the King would consider making peace with the Coalition only when order had been restored

77 Lajos Holló, article in Magyarország, reported in NFP, 1906, Feb. 14M; May, Hapsburg Monarchy, 360.
78 NFP, 1905, Dec. 30M; 1906, Jan. 22A, 24M.
in the entire country. This was a clear warning at a time when there was still considerable optimism that the Lukács talks might produce satisfactory results. Despite the optimism, the Lukács negotiations could hardly have produced an acceptable compromise in January. The King could not appoint a Coalition government at a time when the country was in a state of lawlessness, for this would give the impression that he was giving in under pressure. The Coalition was divided as to the value of the Magyar command words, the wisdom of continuing national resistance, and the necessity of ratifying the commercial treaties. The only possible course for the Coalition, to avoid splitting up into its separate and mutually contradictory components, was to stand firm on its announced principles at least until the Fejérváry government had taken the responsibility for bringing the new German trade treaty into force.

After negotiations with the Coalition broke down at the end of January, there was no course open to the government but to dissolve Parliament. It had proven impossible to form a government from the majority of the current Parliament, and as long as the deputies retained their mandates they were immune from criminal prosecution. The only question remaining was whether new elections should be called or not. Already in his memorandum of November 25 Kristóffy had asked the King to dissolve Parliament without holding new elections at once, arguing that it might be some time before sufficient calm could be restored in the country to permit the excitement of an election campaign. The unrest throughout the country finally persuaded Franz Joseph to dissolve Parliament without announcing a date for new

79 NFP, 1906, Jan. 12A, 13M.
80 NFP, 1906, Jan. 2M, 8A.
elections. The law required that if Parliament were dissolved before the end of a legislative period, the King must call new elections within three months, but the government could argue that the King was not required to announce the date for new elections immediately.

There was a real doubt in the minds of the government members whether the Coalition would recognize the legality of a dissolution at this time, under conditions of "ex-lex" and from an "unconstitutional" government. Already when Parliament met on December 19 there were some voices in the Coalition urging that Parliament should refuse to accept a new recess, but should remain in session. A strong military force was kept in readiness in case Parliament failed to recess as ordered. In January, Géza Polónyi began to collect signatures to support an Independence Party resolution calling upon Parliament to remain in session if it were ordered to recess again on March 1. Kossuth, president of his party, asked him to cease, but Polónyi refused. This time the government considered it absolutely necessary to make a show of force, to avoid any possibility that Parliament might refuse to acknowledge a dissolution order. There must be no grounds to doubt that Parliament was in fact dissolved, that deputies were no longer protected by parliamentary immunity, and that the King had the authority to order a dissolution and the power to enforce his order. Troops from the Honvéd were to be used, rather than from the joint army, to remove any doubt that the King of Hungary, not the Austrian Emperor, was commanding Hungarian troops.

81 NFP, 1906, Jan. 24A.
82 NFP, 1905, Dec. 18A; Mucsi, Paktum, 235 n. 21.
83 NFP, 1906, Jan. 17M.
84 Lányi, Regierung, 203-05; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 327.
To protect the Fejérváry government from the responsibility for using military force against Parliament, Franz Joseph appointed Honvéd Brigadier General Sándor Nyiri, who had succeeded Fejérváry as Defense Minister in the Tisza government 1903-05, to the post of Plenipotentiary Royal Commissar for Hungary, and endowed him with the authority to take all measures necessary to dissolve Parliament. General Nyiri's appointment was published on February 15, along with an order summoning Parliament into session on February 19, ahead of the March 1 date announced when Parliament was pro-rogued on December 19. General Nyiri, at 52 one of the youngest generals in the Dual Monarchy, assumed his duties as royal commissar on February 17 and took up residence in the royal palace in Buda.

It is necessary at this point to discuss the position of "government commissars" and "royal commissars." Both kinds of commissars were appointed in Hungary in the Spring of 1906. After the Debrecen outrage on January 2, the Fejérváry government appointed no more lord lieutenants to rebellious counties, but sent government commissars into the counties with wider powers. When even these officials failed to command the necessary

85 On the same day Franz Joseph signed an order suspending József Márkus from his post as lord mayor of Budapest, and appointing Budapest police chief Béla Rudnay as royal commissar for the city. This appointment was not published until February 20, to allow the city leaders one more chance to turn over their tax receipts voluntarily. (NFP, 1906, Feb. 16M, 20M).

86 The Hungarian word biztos (probably from the adjective biztos, "safe, secure," hence, "one who makes secure") and the German equivalent Kommissär are both listed with dictionary translations into English as "commissioner, commissary, commissar." "Commissary" is a term not frequently used in English. "Commissioner" suggests in American usage a member of a regularly constituted organ of government, such as the Interstate Commerce Commissión, etc. "Commissar" is most often used in English to denote an official in the Soviet Union who is invested with exceptional and arbitrary powers. I have chosen to use this term for the Hungarian officials discussed here, because of their exceptional authority.
authority, royal commissars, appointed by the King and invested with even broader powers, were sent into several counties.

The most authoritative writer on Hungarian administration, Dezső Márkus, nowhere mentions the term "government commissar," though he seems to include them in his discussion of "royal commissars." The legal distinction appears to lie mainly in the extent of their powers. Royal commissars had been used in Hungary for centuries, both as representatives of the Crown on ceremonial occasions when the King could not appear in person, and to perform special administrative tasks. The appointment of these officers was continued under the new constitutional system established by the Ausgleich. Commissars were regularly sent to plenary sessions of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Hungary. On several occasions government commissars had been sent into rebellious counties to enforce the orders of the government. It was customary, though apparently not mandatory, to inform Parliament of these appointments. Only the signatures of the King and the ministry were required. On other occasions royal commissars had been specifically empowered by statute to exercise certain powers.

Royal commissars, authorized by Parliament, were sent to Szeged in 1868 when the city was endangered by bandits, and again in 1879 when the city was badly damaged by the flooding of the Tisza River. A royal commissar was sent to the Military Border in 1873 to supervise the incorporation of this

87This discussion of royal commissars and government commissars is based primarily upon the information in Márkus, Ungarisches Verwaltungsrecht, 17-21. See also NFP, 1906, Jan. 4M, 5M, Feb. 14M, Mar. 18M; J. Kun, ed., Tisza Képviselőházi Beszédei, III, 780n.; Lányi, Regierung, 584-624; and Mangold, Geschichte, 46-52.
territory into the civilian government of Hungary.88

Prior to January 1905 no Parliament had ever been dissolved before the end of the regular legislative period (three years; after 1886, five years). Parliament was always dissolved by a royal throne address, which Franz Joseph usually delivered in the palace in Buda. Once, when Franz Joseph was unable to appear in person, Prime Minister Baron Béla Wenckheim was appointed royal commissar and read the address on behalf of His Majesty on May 24, 1875. Thus the Fejérváry government had a precedent for dissolving Parliament by means of a royal commissar appointed purely for a ceremonial function. This served partially to mask the breach of precedent made by using armed force. Only once again did a royal commissar ever address the Hungarian Parliament, when on March 22, 1910, Archduke Joseph acted in this capacity to read the opening throne address.

Franz Joseph looked forward to the forceful dissolution of Parliament with some trepidation. On February 17 he wrote to Frau Schratt that he was glad Archduke Joseph and Archduchess Auguste were not now in Budapest, "because Parliament will be dissolved day after tomorrow, and perhaps things will get a bit lively. All attempts at an agreement have been frustrated; nothing can be done by peaceful means and it is now time to get serious. Bad times are ahead."89

88 Dezsö Márkus argued that Hungarian law did not recognize the appointment of commissars not specifically created by statute, except for purely ceremonial occasions. He admitted, though, that in cases of emergency the government might send special agents, authorizing them to use all the powers of the various ministers together; such commissars were limited in their authority by the power of the government that created them. The legislature might subsequently indemnify the government for using extralegal methods in an emergency, which is not the same as making those acts legal. Márkus, though not a friend of the Fejérváry government, pointed out that Parliament subsequently indemnified the Fejérváry government for its actions. (Verwaltungsrecht, 21.)

89 Franz Joseph I, Briefe, 463-64.
On Monday morning, February 19, the Parliament Building was heavily guarded by troops—police, mounted policemen, and several battalions of infantry and hussars from both the joint army and the Honvéd. A force of gendarmes was stationed inside the parliamentary chamber. Speaker of the House Gyula Justh was sick in bed, and in his stead István Rakovszky presided. He refused to read the two royal letters, one appointing Nyiri as Plenipotentiary Royal Commissar, and the other dissolving Parliament, on the grounds that Hungarian law did not recognize a royal commissar and because Nyiri and his agents were under military, not civil authority. Rakovszky announced that he was returning the two letters to Nyiri unopened. Thereupon the House resolved to meet again on February 21, deliberately ignoring the dissolution order. After a few more remarks the session was adjourned, and the deputies began to leave the chamber, some pausing to talk and others mingling in the corridors with guests who had come down from the gallery.

There is no agreement as to what happened next. According to the report circulated by the Coalition, Colonel Győző Fabritius, commandant of the First Honvéd Infantry Regiment, appeared in the chamber accompanied by a force of police and infantry, who proceeded, with bayonets fixed, to clear the chamber and the gallery of the remaining spectators. Thereupon Colonel Fabritius mounted the podium and read to an empty chamber the royal letters which Rakovszky had refused to read to the assembled deputies. Since no deputy or clerk was present, these letters did not become part of the official parliamentary protocols. The forcible entry of troops into

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the Parliament building, apparently without any provocation, caused great
dismay throughout the country and considerable comment abroad. Even the
correspondent for the Neue Freie Presse, who had remained objective or even
pro-government up to this point, became emotional in expressing his distress
over this unjustified act of violence against the sanctity of the legis-
lature. On the following day the government published the "official"
transcript of the episode. According to this account Colonel Fabritius was
fully justified in clearing the chamber with troops. He had first entered
the chamber while the deputies were departing, and mounted the podium and
began to read the royal letters. Some thirty or forty deputies, joined
by spectators in the gallery, shouted disturbances making it impossible
for him to read. Only after he had repeatedly ordered them to leave did
he have these people forcibly ejected. 91 The House of Magnates met on the
same morning. There the royal letters were read, and the Magnates adjourned
without incident. Thereupon the entire Parliament Building was evacuated
and locked.

Even though Fabritius had read the royal proclamation in the House
chamber, a small faction from the left wing of the Coalition insisted that
the dissolution of Parliament was illegal, and announced that they would
meet again on Wednesday in accordance with the decision of the House.
Nyiri's commission lasted as long as this threat existed, and a small de-

91 NFP, 1906, Feb. 19A, 20A. Some accounts claim that the troops
under the command of Colonel Fabritius were of Rumanian nationality, im-
plying that Rumanian troops could be trusted to violate the Hungarian
chamber while Magyar troops could not. (Hisp, Hapsburg Monarchy, 359-60.)
The troops who entered the Parliament Building were the 1st Honvéd Infantry
Regiment, stationed in Budapest, but I have found no contemporary state-
ment as to their nationality. The earliest such allegation to my knowledge
is by the Pan-German Paul Samassa, Völkerstreit im Habsburgerstaat (1910),
89, who says the troops were Rumanians.
tachment of troops remained on duty for two or three days in front of the Parliament Building to prevent such a meeting. Nyiri was received by the King on February 22 and relieved. 92

Following the dissolution of Parliament there were rowdy demonstrations in Budapest for several evenings. The English journalist W. B. Forster Bovill was slightly wounded by a sabre during one demonstration in the Elizabeth Ring. During this period of excitement all the political parties resolved that former deputies would meet with the voters in their districts on Sunday, February 25, and stage a series of mass protest demonstrations against the government's absolutism. The Interior Minister ordered, however, that while it was traditional and proper for a deputy to give a final report to the voters who had sent him to Parliament, these meetings must not be allowed to disturb the peace. Consequently, open air meetings were prohibited. The day passed without any disturbance. 94

On the following day the government ordered the confiscation of seven newspapers which had carried a speech by Géza Polónyi which was considered insulting to the King. At the same time Kristóffy issued a permanent prohibition against hawking newspapers on the street. 95 The Coalition

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93 NFP, 1906, Feb. 22M. In the midst of the excitement in Hungary, the Austrian government published the text of their universal suffrage bill on Feb. 23. (NFP, Feb. 23A.)
95 On the background of the newspaper prohibition, see NFP, 1906, Feb. 27A. See also Mangold, Geschichte, 28-33, and above, pp. 248-50.

The government confiscated not only Coalition publications. On March 3 the Court of Investigation ordered the confiscation of a book which had just been published, Alexander v. Popovici, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Österreich, on the grounds of lèse majesty and inciting to illegal acts. Kristóffy immediately proceeded with the confiscation. This incident may have caused embarrassment in later years when both Popovici and Kristóffy were in the "workshop" of the heir-apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. (NFP, Mar. 4M.)
claimed that Kristóffy was destroying the livelihood of many needy persons who had no other work but selling newspapers, but as so often, the Coalition seems to have had real sympathy only for a good political argument. Shortly afterward it was revealed that Kristóffy had sent 5000 crowns to the Budapest police to help support the needy newspaper sellers. Polónyi was interrogated by police regarding his speech. He demanded parliamentary immunity, insisting that Parliament had not been legally dissolved. The courts had already decided the question in favor of the government, however. On February 20 the Supreme Court heard an appeal challenging the election of Aladár Somogyi to Parliament in a by-election. The court refused to consider the case and ruled the question moot, since Parliament was now dissolved. Polónyi's protest fell on deaf ears, and the state prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against him for treason and lèse majesty. When Polónyi was appointed Justice Minister in April, the treason charges against him were still pending until he, with his new authority, ordered the state prosecutor to drop them. This story made an unpleasant foretaste of the nature of justice in Hungary under the Coalition government.

Once Parliament was dissolved, there was no constitutionally authorized voice to oppose the measures of the government. Individual political personages, from both the Coalition and the Liberal Party, could lament the situation, but they found they had less and less influence over the country,

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96 _NFP_, 1906, Mar. 8M.
97 _NFP_, 1906, Feb. 20M, 20A; Lányi, _Regierung_, 210n.
98 _NFP_, 1906, Feb. 26A, Mar. 1M, 10M.
99 _NFP_, 1906, Apr. 10A.
while the government's decisive use of force and the suspension of subsidies were increasingly successful in bringing local organs of government into compliance. The Coalition did not end its propaganda for national resistance, but the bragadoccio of the Coalition leaders sounded more and more hollow. Some of these statements of national solidarity reached the level of musical comedy. On the evening of March 8, at a party given by Countess Ilona Batthyány (née Andrassy), Countess Aurél Dessewffy urged the ladies present to support the local officials threatened with loss of income because of their support for passive resistance. Thereupon she took off an expensive pearl necklace and donated it to the cause. Many of the ladies present gave earrings, brooches, and rings. These same aristocratic ladies were also linked with the "tulip movement" which began to blossom a few days later. Small metal lapel emblems in the form of a tulip were sold on the streets to represent support for Hungarian industry and an independent Hungarian economy. Persons wearing the tulip pledged themselves to "buy Hungarian" and to boycott goods made in Austria. The tulip craze stirred the imagination of polite society for several weeks. The symbol was said to have been taken from the Eötvös novel The Village Notary, but some claimed that it was an ancient Hungarian symbol. The clerical Alkotmány declared that the tulip was an antisemitic symbol, and used the occasion to launch into a violent diatribe against Jews. Hungarian fashion designers rushed to produce dresses with tulip motifs. Budapest authorities refused to grant a license for noted actresses to sell the tulip pins on the fashionable boulevards. Someone even began selling olive branches as a counter-symbol. The little game was soon over when it was discovered that the tulip pins were manufactured in Austria, but in the meantime some enter-

100 NFP, 1906, Mar. 10M.
prising salesman had recovered a good return on his investment.\footnote{101}

The Hungarian protest movement even reached the shores of the New World. On Sunday, March 11, mass meetings were held in several cities in the United States. Hungarian-Americans met in New York's Grand Central Palace to protest the attempt of the House of Habsburg to deprive the Magyars of their constitutional rights and liberties. In addition to Béla Perczel, whose brother had been Speaker of the Hungarian House of Representatives and a loyal supporter of Tisza, the speakers included a United States Congressman from New York, Henry M. Goldfogle, who probably had no idea why the House of Habsburg found it necessary to threaten the constitutional rights and liberties of the Magyars.\footnote{102}

In the weeks following the dissolution of Parliament on February 19, national resistance ground to a halt and almost ceased completely. County after county voted to release officials from the duty to resist, and agreed to turn the receipts over to the state treasury. In counties which held out longer than the others, royal commissars were appointed. The central government suspended the autonomy of several counties and took over their administration directly. By the first of April the government was in control of local organs of government almost everywhere. What is perhaps more important, and more surprising, the Hungarian people took the authoritarian actions of the government calmly. Many people did not approve of the steps taken by the government, but the spirit of revolution, which had blazed so


\footnote{102}{\textit{New York Times}, 1906, March 12, p. 18. Throughout 1905 and 1906 the \textit{New York Times} mentioned Austria-Hungary only a few times, and almost every dispatch concerned the Hungarian crisis, written from a pro-Coalition standpoint.}
high in the fall, had burned itself out by spring. In county after county, local officials accepted their responsibility to uphold the existing laws, and as they did the government was able to remove the troops and commissars. But conditions in Hungary were still not "normal," and it remained to be seen if the country would remain calm if elections were not held within the legally required period and the government lost the last claim to constitutionality.
E. The Coalition Comes to Terms

The royal rescript dissolving Parliament of February 19 had made no mention of new elections. Hungarian law permitted the King to dissolve Parliament at any time, but stipulated that a new Parliament must be elected in time to convene within three months. The government had defended the dissolution with the argument that it was not necessary to announce a date for new elections at the time of dissolution. However, the latest legal date for new elections was April 11. There was great fear on all sides that the government might not be able to hold elections so soon, considering the extremely tense situation in the country. To the Hungarian mentality, any attempt of a government to remain in office without a parliament was absolutism by definition, regardless of the reason. Yet at the same time among all the '67-based forces, within the government, in the Coalition, and in the Liberal Party, there was an even greater fear that elections now could only produce an overwhelming majority for the Independence Party which demanded an end of the Ausgleich and a change to a personal union with Austria. It was clear on all sides that if the government delayed elections beyond the legal deadline that this alleged violation of the constitution would so arouse public unrest that elections would be impossible for several months.

With this grim prospect following the dissolution of Parliament, the various political factions indulged in the luxury of mutual recrimination. Count Tisza said some unkind things about the Fejérváry government in a public statement on February 21, but he saved his strongest
vituperation for his old rival Count Andrásy, whom he blamed for allowing a situation to develop which could almost certainly lead only to the destruction of the 1867-based system which Andrásy professed to defend. Count Andrásy replied on February 28 in an open letter to his constituents, in which he accused the Fejérváry government of attempting to smuggle in absolute rule in their mania for power, and likened the current situation in Hungary to that in Russia. An unofficial government spokesman replied in kind. These and other attacks caused a lot of comment, but their chief significance lay in the complete political bankruptcy they betrayed. No one could suggest a way out of the mess. Ferenc Kossuth claimed on February 20 that he had known all along that the national demands were unattainable at this time, and only time could tell if the great struggle for the nation's rights had been worth it. Kossuth's statement made Baron Bánffy angry. Why had Kossuth led his party, the Coalition, and the nation into a life-and-death struggle, sacrificing the jobs and security of hundreds of local officials, if he had known all along the fight would be unsuccessful? Bánffy's demands had been attainable, he insisted. He wanted to win for the nation economic independence, which the King could not legally deny them, as a price for preserving the Dualist constitutional system. Now the economic union with Austria was in effect extended another ten years by the German treaty which had been placed in force without the consent of Parliament. If the self-seeking Coalition leaders had not been

103 NFP, 1906, Feb. 21M, 23M, Mar. 9M.
104 NFP, 1906, Feb. 28M, Mar. 3A; Lányi, Regierung, 186n.
105 NFP, 1906, Mar. 1M, 4M; Lányi, Regierung, 186n.
so blind and had listened to Bánffy, things would now be different. After he had repeated these arguments in the press two or three times, on March 6 he announced his resignation from the Coalition. He made no immediate plans for his party, but within a few days most of the twelve former deputies from his party had crossed over to the Independence Party.

In the absence of any information about new elections, rumors were rife. Optimists tried to find reasons for believing that elections would be held in April after all. Franz Joseph would not violate his coronation oath. Talks were in progress. Yet repeatedly, official government statements denied that elections were planned, because of the probability of widespread unrest throughout the country. There were even rumors that Franz Joseph had asked the Pope for a dispensation releasing him from the obligations of his coronation oath. Budapesti Hírláp, Andrássy's paper, published an interview with Pope Pius X and with the Vatican Secretary of State, Merry del Val, both of whom allegedly argued that the Hungarians were at fault and it was Franz Joseph who protected the constitution. The official Observatore Romano found it necessary to deny all these rumors; there had been no interviews.

Meanwhile the government continued to act firmly against illegal acts committed by the Coalition and its sympathizers. On March 16 the Coalition Steering Committee claimed that the commercial treaties which

106 NFP, 1906, Feb. 23A, Mar. 3M, 6M, 16A; Lányi, Regierung, 188-90n., 222.

107 NFP, 1906, Mar. 5A, 7M, 9M, 12A, 14M, 19A. Bánffy and about half a dozen followers were elected to Parliament in 1906, but Bánffy never again had any particular political significance.


109 NFP, 1906, Mar. 13M, 19A, 21M.
were not ratified by Parliament were invalid, and urged banking institutions not to recognize the tariff regulations they contained. On the following day the government ordered the Coalition Steering Committee dissolved. Opponents ridiculed this measure, claiming that the only effect would be that henceforth the members would have dinner together more often. Later it was argued that the same outlawed Coalition was invited to Vienna to take over the government. These objections miss the point of the measure. The government did not dissolve a dinner party or outlaw the leaders of legitimate political parties. Instead, they removed the power of the Steering Committee to act as a counter-government. Henceforth their open proclamations to the nation could be banned and the papers forbidden to publish their statements. The government also disbanded several private social clubs which expelled members for political reasons. Kristóffy and his spokesmen pointed out that the charters of these social clubs did not permit them to engage in political activity. The government exercised its power to revoke the charters of these organizations and confiscate their assets. Hungarian governments had used these powers arbitrarily in the past against the organizations of the nationalities and the agricultural laborers, but when the same regulations were properly enforced against respectable organizations like the "Sas" Club in Budapest, it aroused a great deal of protest.

More serious news involved military preparations. Plans were made


for routine maneuvers of reservists to be held as scheduled between April 23 and May 5, only a few days after the deadline for elections was passed. There were repeated rumors, repeatedly denied, that reserve officers were being ordered to take a new oath, pledging their loyalty in case the conflict were to continue. There was another rumor that the state printing office had prepared thousands of placards ordering all reservists to report within twenty-four hours, which were to be published on further notice. There is reason to believe that many of these reports were deliberately fostered rumors designed to exaggerate the intention of the government to stay in power by force even in conflict with the constitution. Count Andrásy reaped some political gain when he resigned his reserve commission in a Honvéd hussar regiment. 112

Finally, as the deadline for elections grew nearer, Commerce Minister Vörös issued a decree on March 26 permitting the postal authorities to confiscate mail up to three days addressed to "persons suspected of criminal acts." The government explained that this was not a new measure, for it had been authorized by a law enacted in 1896. Once again the Coalition complained bitterly that the government was persecuting them as political criminals under measures intended for common criminals. 113 These authoritarian steps on the part of the Fejérváry government, taken in the last days in office, are given wide space in every anti-government

113 NFP, 1906, Mar. 27M, 28M.
account of the period. The actions of the government may have been regrettable, but once again the only thing unusual about them was the prominence of the persons against whom they were directed. If we grant that the government had the obligation to defend the power of the state, these procedures can be justified in the emergency situation.

On March 7 there were some changes in the cabinet. Baron Fejérváry was relieved of responsibility for the Finance Ministry, which was taken over by Ferenc Hegedüs, a judge on the Supreme Court for Administrative Affairs. Field Marshall Lieutenant Béla Pap replaced Ferenc Bihar as Defense Minister, and Gyula Tost relieved György Lukács as Minister of Education. These changes were probably related to a growing disagreement within the cabinet. Some of the ministers were afraid of holding elections in April, because of the likelihood of severe electoral violence and the probability of an Independence Party victory, which would only complicate any possibility for a solution. Yet they were aware that to postpone the elections would be considered such a severe violation of the constitution that elections would not be possible for several months. Lánya and Kristóffy were known to be in favor of elections within the legal time period, regardless of the consequences, and it was understood that they would resign from the cabinet if elections were not held. Kristóffy had argued from the beginning that the King had the power to dissolve parliament repeatedly and call new elections if the majority was unworkable. He had also argued that it would not be a violation of the spirit of the constitution for the King to introduce universal

114 NFP, 1906, Mar. 2M, 2A, 7A; Kristóffy, Kárvária, 343-44; Lánya, Regierung, 219.
suffrage by decree, if the Parliament were unwilling to take the responsibility for extending rights to the people. But he was unwilling to remain in office if elections were ignored. 115

As the situation continued and it appeared unavoidable that elections must be postponed, Kristóffy made plans to resign from the government and form a new "Citizens' Party." Fejérváry was expected to assume responsibility for the Interior Ministry. 116 For Lányi another course was planned. The position of President of the Supreme Court (Royal Curia) had been vacant for some time, but the Fejérváry government had hesitated to fill such an important vacancy involving lifetime tenure. Now that it appeared likely that the Fejérváry government would have to have to remain indefinitely, there was no reason to leave this important position vacant. Lányi was eminently qualified for the post. As Justice Minister he had earned the grudging approval of his enemies by his careful selection of judicial appointments. Franz Joseph gladly agreed to appoint him to head the Supreme Court. Lányi resigned as Justice Minister on April 2 and was replaced on April 5 by Gusztáv Gegus from the State Prosecutor's office. Lányi was to be sworn in as President of the Supreme Court on Saturday, April 7, but an unexpected turn of events intervened. 117

116 NFP, 1906, Mar. 29A, 31A, Apr. 3M.
117 NFP, 1906, Apr. 3M, 4M, 4A, 5A, 6A.
As early as March 13 there were rumors involving Sándor Wekerle as a possible leader of a Coalition ministry. At that time there were official denials that Wekerle was in contact with the government. On March 27 the Hungarian cabinet held an unusual meeting in Vienna in the presence of Franz Joseph. The government probably advised against holding elections, but Franz Joseph withheld his decision until he could talk with Kálmán Széll, Wekerle, and Count Albin Csáky. On the following day the four Coalition leaders--Kossuth, Apponyi, Andrássy and Aladár Zichy--conferred. On March 30 Széll was seen in Vienna, and there were rumors of a proposed Széll government, which was supported by the signatures of 173 former deputies, mostly from the Independence Party. Széll insisted that he was in Vienna on private business, selling lumber. None of these reports were really evidence that anything serious was afoot. The first genuine hint that something was happening came on April 4, when Fejérváry, who was briefly in Budapest, conferred with Kossuth in the home of Béla Barabás, vice president of the Independence Party. Fejérváry immediately returned to Vienna. When questioned by reporters, Kossuth, looking quite pleased, answered that he was pessimistic. On the following day, April 5, the Coalition leaders were invited to Vienna to confer with the King. By Sunday afternoon, April 8, the negotiations were completed successfully and a Coalition government under Sándor Wekerle was appointed. How did this sudden solution come about?

118 NFP, 1906, Mar. 13M, 14M.
119 NFP, 1906, Mar. 27M, 27A, 28M.
120 NFP, 1906, Mar. 28A, 30M, 30A.
121 NFP, 1906, Apr. 4A.
The talks between the government and the Coalition which led to the final agreement were brought about by a political journalist, Károly Méray-Horváth, who on his own initiative served as go-between for the two sides. Méray-Horváth was a friend of Oskar Jászi and with him a member of the Sociological Society, a group of progressive thinkers in Hungary who followed the Social Darwinist school of Herbert Spencer. They considered politics to be a natural science, in which a given political factor had a predictable effect upon society. It was only necessary for them, as sociologists, to determine the biological laws of society in order to understand how to insure a healthy society. Méray-Horváth expressed this biological interpretation of human society in a book entitled "The Physiology of World History," which he published in 1902. From these assumptions the members of the Sociological Society concluded that the only solution to the country's social problems was to end the sterile constitutional debates by introducing universal suffrage. Thus they had assisted in the campaign for universal suffrage even though they were not otherwise sympathetic to the Fejérváry government.

122 Károly Méray-Horváth, Die Physiologie unserer Weltgeschichte und der kommende Tag; die Grundlagen der Soziologie (Budapest, 1902).

123 Many writers make some mention of the Sociological Society as an extremely important group in pre-war Hungary. The most important member of the organization, Oskár Jászi, as been the subject of several studies in Hungary since 1960, while the group as a whole is only beginning to be examined in depth, with several studies now in progress in Hungary and in the West. The only lengthy discussion of the group in a Western language is in Z. Horváth, Jahrhundertwende, 117-36, 240-45, 284-301, 354-68. Cf. above, p. 229.
Kristóffy had been a friend of Méray's for a number of years, even since Méray was editor of an Independence Party newspaper in Arad while Kristóffy edited a Liberal Party paper in nearby Csanád. Méray had first tried to use his journalistic talents to break the deadlock in January 1906, while the Lukács negotiations were still in progress. Méray noticed that Count Apponyi in a speech at Nagy Bánja on January 8 had endorsed universal suffrage. After travelling to Vienna to obtain the express permission of Prime Minister Fejérváry, Méray published an interview with Kristóffy promising that as soon as the Coalition adopted universal suffrage in their program, the Fejérváry government could go. Méray then invited Apponyi to comment on Kristóffy's statement, but Apponyi refused to take the bait, and the matter was forgotten in the confusion of words. Méray still hoped to end the crisis. After the dissolution of Parliament, while the political leaders were busy accusing one another and creative thinking was neglected, Méray published a little pamphlet on March 3 addressed to "The Leader of the Nation, Ferenc Kossuth," urging him for the good of the country to form a government on a platform of universal suffrage. The pamphlet apparently had little effect, for few Coalition members ever saw it.

Méray realized that under the present circumstances, negotiations were impossible because members of the government and the Coalition could not afford to be seen together. He also believed that Fejérváry would be

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unsympathetic to any proposal for a government selected from the Independence Party. Yet any Coalition government created on the basis of a universal suffrage platform would have to come from the Independence Party. The aristocrats around Count Andrassy could never support universal suffrage. Most of the Independence Party supported it, however, and even Count Apponyi had said he favored universal suffrage, most recently in his speech at Jászberény on March 11. Even if Apponyi were insincere, he would find it easier to save face as a price for coming to power.

With these thoughts in mind, Méray approached Béla Barabás, an old schoolmate from Arad and now vice president of the Independence Party. Méray suggested that while Fejerváry was unsympathetic to an Independence Party government, Commerce Minister László Vörös might be agreeable to the idea. Moreover, Kossuth and the Independence Party might be willing to support a government led by Vörös. Although he had served as a major advisor within the Fejerváry government, as part of the "inner cabinet" which included Fejerváry, Kristóffy and Lánya, Vörös had avoided publicity and was consequently less objectionable to the Independence Party members. Méray suggested a new cabinet with Vörös as Prime Minister and Commerce Minister. Vörös would nominate the Interior and Education Ministers from persons supporting the 1867 Ausgleich and universal suffrage. It was implied that these persons would come from the Progressive Party, the Fejerváry-Kristóffy group, though this was not stated in so many words. The Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and Justice would go to Kossuth and persons nominated by him. The Ministers of Defense, Croatian Affairs,

Béla Barabás (1855-1934) served for a number of years as vice president of the Independence Party. Minister of Education in the provisional Hungarian government in Arad in 1919, he was later a leading politician of the Hungarian minority in Rumania.
and Minister a latere would not be selected on the basis of political party because of the less political nature of their functions. The new government would restore constitutional government (apparently this meant that it would not govern without elections or without the support of Parliament). New elections would be announced before April 11. The government would present to the new Parliament a bill calling for universal suffrage. After the bill was passed, the government would resign and new elections would be held.

Since Méray did not know Kossuth, Barabás presented the plan to him while Méray discussed it with Vörös. Both men agreed to the terms. Méray does not say exactly when this occurred, but it must have been around the middle of March. On the following day Kossuth showed the plan to the Coalition leaders. Apponyi found the terms acceptable, but Andrássy objected to forming a cabinet in conjunction with members of the Fejérváry government. Kossuth won him over by pointing out that they could get along with Vörös, who in any case was preferable to Wekerle, who would probably be appointed if the choice were left up to Franz Joseph.

Méray informed Vörös that the terms were acceptable to the Coalition leaders. Days went by, but Vörös sent no reply. Finally after a week Méray called on Vörös at the Commerce Ministry, only to be told that the plan had been dropped. It is not clear what went wrong. Kristóffy, writing in 1926, implies that Fejérváry was unwilling to back Vörös as Prime Minister. Méray, writing in October 1906, says definitely that Vörös failed to notify Fejérváry or the other cabinet ministers of the terms already accepted by the Coalition. Méray blamed himself for allowing this misunderstanding to arise. 127 Perhaps Vörös was afraid of giving

the impression that he had bargained on his own behalf behind the backs of Fejérváry and his colleagues. Whatever the reason, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the subsequent history of Hungary would have been quite different had Vörös become Prime Minister in a cabinet including three persons from the Progressive Party and three from the Independence Party.

Now time was running out before the deadline for elections. On Monday afternoon, April 2, Méray called on Kristóffy and discovered to his amazement that Kristóffy had never heard of the agreement already worked out between Vörös and Kossuth. Kristóffy wasted no time. By 7 p.m. that same evening Méray brought Béla Barabás to Kristóffy's apartment. Barabás assured Kristóffy that the Coalition was still ready to accept the previous terms, including a cabinet of three persons from the Progressive Party. In return, Kristóffy agreed not to accept a cabinet post for himself. At 8 p.m. Fejérváry was notified; at 9 p.m. a telegram was sent to Vienna. Next morning Fejérváry and Kristóffy took the early train to Vienna.

On Wednesday, Fejérváry returned briefly to Budapest to talk with Kossuth, and hurried back to Vienna. On Thursday morning, April 5, the Coalition Steering Committee met in Kossuth's apartment in Budapest to prepare to form a cabinet.128

In the meantime, on April 5, Géza Polónyi appeared in Vienna. He had been sent by Kossuth to negotiate with Fejérváry on behalf of the Coalition. He was not loathe to work for himself as well. Polónyi was a member of the militant left wing of the Independence Party, but shared none of the love of basic individual liberties shared by many persons in that group. Most accounts agree in calling him unscrupulous, and his later career seems to confirm this judgement. The terms of the agreement

128 Méray, "A politikai hiba," 26-28; Kristóffy, Kálvária, 346-50; Lányi, Regierung, 224; NFP, 1906, Apr. 3A, 4A.
under discussion called for three members of the cabinet to be chosen from persons supporting both the 1867 Ausgleich and universal suffrage. This presumably meant the Progressive Party. Polónyi asked Fejérváry if the Peoples Party and the Constitution Party were excluded from taking part in the new government. Fejérváry said they were not excluded, so long as they pledged to support universal suffrage. This changed the entire combination. Instead of a coalition between the Progressive Party and the Independence Party under the leadership of Vörös, Fejérváry's answer now opened the door for the old Andrássy-Zichy-Apponyi coalition, under a Prime Minister to be appointed by the Crown—Sándor Wekerle. Once again, Méray explains that Fejérváry did not know that the Coalition had already agreed to accept Vörös; Kristóffy blames Fejérváry for giving in just when total victory was in sight. 129

The rest was predictable. Later that same day Andrássy and Zichy both announced that they favored universal suffrage. The Coalition leaders were invited to Vienna to form a government. In the most important of the negotiations, the Coalition agreed to drop the military demands completely, to pass the overdue budget and recruit bills, to ratify the foreign commercial treaties and the new tariff schedule, and to indemnify the Tisza and Fejérváry governments for their official acts. The new government was to prepare a suffrage bill "at least as broad as that planned by the present government." After the passage of the suffrage bill, the government would call new elections and resign. The weakness in this agreement was that there was no time limit for submitting the suffrage bill, and most importantly, at the request of the Coalition leaders the terms of the pact were not published. Thus the

Coalition could give the impression that they had won a victory by coming to power, obscuring the extent of their surrender on all points. They surrendered because they were afraid of genuine universal suffrage and wanted to get the solution of this question into their own hands in order to scuttle it. This is exactly what they did once they were in power.

Once the principles had been agreed upon, it was relatively easy to agree on personalities. Sándor Wekerle was selected as Prime Minister, despite an attempt by Andrássy to block him. Wekerle also took over the Finance Ministry. From the Constitution Party, Andrássy became Interior Minister and Ignác Darányi, Minister of Agriculture. The Independence Party supplied Kossuth, Commerce Minister; Géza Polónyi, Justice; and Count Apponyi, Education. Count Aladár Zichy of the Peoples Party assumed the less political post of Minister a latere. General Lajos Jekelfalussy became Defense Minister, and Géza Josipović, Minister for Croatian Affairs.

The Coalition leaders insisted strongly that Lányi's nomination to the Presidency of the Supreme Court be withdrawn. Lányi thus passed out of the picture without any recognition for his long and capable service as Justice Minister. When the outgoing cabinet members were received by the King, Gusztáv Gegus received the honor, even though he had been appointed Justice Minister only two days ago and had never even left Vienna to take up his new duties. The Fejerváry ministers were given tokens of His Majesty's special recognition, but they returned to Hungary to face the ostracism of their compatriots. None of them ever held a

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130 On the terms of the April Pact, see Lányi, Regierung, 228-30 and 474-75. The text of the pact was first published by Géza Polónyi in a speech in Parliament on Dec. 11, 1908, after he had been forced to leave the cabinet as a result of a financial and moral scandal. His speech is given in PL, 1908, Dec. 11A, 12M.

131 See Andrássy's admission, p. 321, below.
government post again. 132

The local officials who had loyally served the government and the King fared even worse. They would have been protected if the new government had included an Interior Minister from the Progressive Party, as originally proposed. Under Andrásy, they found no protection. The officials dismissed by Kristóffy were reinstated in their old posts, and Kristóffy's officials, in many cases, lost their jobs and their pension rights. This was another cost of Fejérváry's misunderstanding of the Vörös agreement.

The Wekerle government was appointed on Sunday, April 8. On the following day the new government issued instructions for new elections to be held at the end of the month. Although elections were not held by the legal deadline of April 11, everyone tacitly accepted the circumstances and claimed that the constitution had been properly defended. Yet it was the Coalition, not the Fejérváry government, which received the credit for upholding the constitution. This was not only untrue, but also unjust to the Fejérváry ministers and their supporters. It helped to perpetuate a mistaken concept of the nature of Hungarian constitutionalism.

132 Kristóffy, Kálvária, 373.
CHAPTER 11
THE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS

The Fejérváry government maintained order in Hungary in the face of passive and active resistance that at times came close to open rebellion. The government preserved a respect for law in the face of seductive but erroneous constitutional theories, and despite the temptation to use extra-legal means in an emergency. The enemies of the government can point to unfortunate excesses committed in the name of the government by its over-zealous agents in certain counties, but these excesses probably illustrate the brutality of the Hungarian county system rather than the malevolent intentions of Baron Fejérváry and his ministers.¹ Yet these are essentially negative accomplishments. A government must maintain order to survive, but if it does no more than this it is a police system. The art of government consists of more than this.

When the Fejérváry government was first appointed, it was charged with creating a basis whereby a majority government could be appointed. After ten months the government was able to split the Coalition and force them to give up their excessive demands, whereupon a majority government was appointed. The government successfully defended the Dualist system, repulsing an attack on the unity of the army, hence against the unity of the Monarchy. The demand for a separate Hungarian army could not be

seriously raised again until the spring of 1918.\(^2\)

But the Fejérváry government must be judged on more than this. By hoisting the standard of universal suffrage, the government raised the expectations of the underprivileged masses in Hungary that social justice could be found within the Habsburg state. Because the Fejérváry government promised so much more than any other government in the entire half century of Dualist Hungary, its failure—if failure it was—deserves to be judged all the more harshly.

Perhaps the failure to bring about universal suffrage is not the fault of the Fejérváry ministers. One could argue in their defense that they brought the Wekerle government into existence with the express promise to introduce a universal suffrage bill. Keeping the promise secret, and making Count Andrássy, as Interior Minister, responsible for preparing the suffrage bill had the effect of scuttling the bill, but these mistakes should probably be blamed on the fatigued old Sovereign, who needed rest more than he needed democracy. Franz Joseph could still hold firm when he needed to, and at times he could act decisively on his own, as he did in the Five Minute Audience or when he ordered Gautsch to prepare a universal suffrage bill for Austria. But as he grew older he was occasionally weakened by sickness or fatigue. In the April Pact he preserved his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Having won on the issue most important to him, he could be satisfied with a token concession to universal suffrage.

How sincere was the Fejérváry government in its attempt to introduce universal suffrage? Was the suffrage issue only a gigantic deception?

Prime Minister Fejérváry probably considered it only a tactic. A lifelong career officer, from a family of army officers, he seemed uncomfortable in his new role of a populist leader. Kristóffy was genuine in his desire to introduce universal suffrage, less because of his interest in the lower classes than because he hoped to overturn the political domination of a few wealthy families and create a new political system in which he, despite his modest beginnings, would have a chance to take a leading position. But neither Kristóffy nor his colleagues were able to accept the national minorities as fully equal citizens. The Lukács school decrees and the suppression of the mysterious Rumanian "unrest" were elements of this policy. Kristóffy knew that the aroused public opinion of even persons unable to vote could be a strong political force, but the Fejérváry government was never able to gain the confidence of the nationalities.

It is difficult to say much in favor of the Coalition. In the light of the experience of the twentieth century and the evils committed in the name of nationalism, the historian cannot be very sympathetic with the "national demands" of the Hungarian Coalition, especially when those demands could be fulfilled only at the expense of demands just as legitimate made by the other nationalities in Hungary. When the historian is not a Magyar, it is even more difficult for him to feel sympathy for the "national demands."

Yet even if we attempt to assess the Coalition's success in the light of its own objectives, we must still be critical. Even if we were to accept the policy of Magyarization as necessary for the survival of the Magyar nation, the Hungarian command words would have been an ineffective method for accomplishing this. The Coalition staked too much on an issue
that was too small, and so jeopardized their own political futures, the stability of the state, and the very principle of parliamentary government.

Maybe the principle of command language was more important than simply the Magyarization of the nationalities and the establishment of a separate Hungarian army. Was the real issue to bring under legislative control the untouchable royal prerogatives, control of the armed forces and foreign policy? Such a struggle might be worthy of our sympathy. But if this was ever the objective of the Coalition leaders, they quickly lost sight of it. The results of their activity served rather to reduce the power, as well as the dignity, of Parliament. By agreeing to the program of the Committee of Nine in 1903, Franz Joseph acknowledged that his powers were shared with the legislature. The Coalition chose to fight beyond this, using the insignificant issue of command language to fight for supremacy of the legislature over the Crown. The effect instead was to secure the supremacy of the Crown.

The Coalition leaders refused to accept the responsibility for governing, forcing the King to continue the necessary functions of government without Parliament. They forced the government to place the foreign commercial treaties into operation without the consent of Parliament. The lesson to be learned from this experience was that Parliament was far less important than its members claimed. By setting themselves up as a counter-government, and simultaneously refusing to acknowledge the legitimate powers of the Monarch, the Coalition leaders created confusion in the minds of many persons as to where the legitimate sovereignty lay. A few Coalition leaders sometimes warned against these dangers: Kossuth, Eötvös, and occasionally Bánffy. But none of them saw these dangers clearly enough, and had they insisted upon reason they would
have lost their influence within the Coalition. None of them was willing to stand alone against the Coalition, until Bánffy resigned at the very end. If Count Apponyi perhaps deserves the blame for the intransigent position on the command language, Count Andrásy is even more to be blamed for allowing Apponyi to get away with it. If Andrásy had once admitted openly that he did not believe in the demand for Hungarian command language, he might have lost his influence within the Coalition, but he would also have destroyed the Coalition and ended the sterile constitutional struggle. Andrásy revealed his weak will and confusion of principles in a speech in Parliament on January 27, 1912.

I absolutely never wanted to take part in the Coalition, because I considered it a mistake. But when I saw that without me there was no possibility of a settlement, when I saw that the struggle would continue with disastrous consequences, then under this pressure I considered it to be a conscientious duty to join this criminal pact, in order to avoid permanent chaos and catastrophe. I did not wish to take part in the government, but I was talked into it. . . . Because if we had not taken over the government, universal, equal suffrage on the basis of secret ballot would have come about. This would have endangered the nation. We took over the government to avert this danger. (Catcalls from the left.)

The moral bankruptcy of the Coalition is further suggested by the fact that none of the Coalition leaders describe their side of the issue in their memoirs. Count Apponyi’s memoirs, published in several editions and in several languages, either ignore the 1905-06 constitutional crisis, or else skip over twenty-five years of his life without a word. Count Mihály Károly, who served as an unimportant Independence

3 Hegedüs, Két Andrásy és két Tisza, 287; cf. also NEP, 1912, Jan. 28M. It is easy to ridicule Andrásy. The only serious defense of him I know of is by Ilona Reinert-Tárnoky: "It meant a loss for Hungarian politics that Andrásy was pushed into the background. He was far superior to Tisza in political instinct, versatility and discrimination, yet he could not match Tisza’s will power and his skill in manipulating political forces." (Reinert-Tárnoky, "Ungarische Innenpolitik," 230.

4 Albert Apponyi, Lebenserinnerungen eines Staatsmannes; aus 40 Jahren
Party deputy in 1905, denies that he was in Parliament at the time.\(^5\) Count Andrásy talks against both sides of the question without giving a hint where he stood.\(^6\) And Count Batthyány lies.\(^7\) The minutes and correspondence of the Coalition Steering Committee, which acted for nearly sixteen months as a counter-government, have never been found, and were probably destroyed.\(^8\) The Coalition leaders were apparently not very proud of themselves.

The bankruptcy of the Coalition was further illustrated after they came to power. In the elections of May 1906 the Independence Party won 253 seats, a comfortable majority. Yet the leadership of the government was in the hands of the trusted '67-based politicians. Wekerle joined


\(^6\) Gyula Andrásy, jr., Diplomacy and the War (London, 1921), 208.

\(^7\) Tivadar Batthyány, Für Ungarn, gegen Hohenzollern (Zürich, 1930), 37-38.

\(^8\) Interview with Dr. Péter Hanák, May, 1971.
the Constitution Party, taking the leadership of that group away from Andrássy. The Constitution Party, which claimed the Prime Ministership and three cabinet positions, held only 88 seats; the Peoples Party, with one cabinet member, held 33 seats. Yet the center of power was not in Parliament, but in the ministers appointed by the King.

The new government obediently pushed through Parliament the long overdue budget and recruit bills, the increased military expenses and recruit levies, and the ratification of the foreign commercial treaties. They voted an indemnity for the expenses and other government actions of the Tisza and Fejérváry governments. An economic agreement was reached with Austria in October 1907, extending the customs union until 1917. However, this time the pact was called a "Tariff and Trade Treaty" instead of a "Tariff and Trade Agreement," as previously. The Independence Party celebrated this concession to Hungarian independence as a great victory, though Hungary paid for it by an increase in her share of the joint expenses from 34.2% to 36.4%.

Because the Coalition parties disagreed on far more issues than united them, they could undertake no significant social legislation. Because of their pact with the King, they could not touch the Dualist system. This left them free to unite on only three issues: Magyarization of the nationalities, repression of the agricultural laborers, and humiliating the Fejérváry ministers. For this reason the Coalition government is best remembered for the Apponyi School Laws (1907:XXVII and related

9 May, Hapsburg Monarchy, 361; NFP, 1907, Oct. 7M, 8M. Ludwig Bittner, "Die Beurkundung der Verträge zwischen Österreich und Ungarn seit 1867," Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, Ergänzungsbänd XI (1929), 800-806, shows that the previous "Tariff and Trade Agreements" were identical to international treaties both in their form and in the method of ratification.
statutes) that alienated the nationalities, the Agricultural Laborers Act, or "Whipping Law," and Kossuth's Railway Act. The Railway Act made Hungarian the official language for the lines through Croatia to Fiume, even though this was a transparent violation of the Nagodba. The Croats' brief courtship with the Coalition expressed in the Resolution of Fiume was now forever at an end, and the South Slavs of the Monarchy looked more and more to the Kingdom of Serbia.

The Coalition considered the "Constitutional Guarantees" among their most important legislation. These changes in local administration, which gave more power to the counties and free cities, were intended to make it easier for the local governments to resist the central government and make a repetition of the Fejérváry government impossible. Andrássy had first proposed this legislation in the winter of 1905-06. The matter was agreed to in principle in the Pact of April 1906, and Franz Joseph promised it in his Throne Address upon opening Parliament on May 22, 1906. When Archduke Franz Ferdinand protested, the bills were postponed, but the question came up again during the negotiation of the economic Ausgleich in 1907. Franz Ferdinand feared that these measures would make it impossible for him to carry out his reforms in Hungary when he came to the throne. Conversations with Andrássy brought about some changes in the bills, but Franz Ferdinand was far from satisfied. When the Constitutional Guarantees became law in October 1907, they were celebrated as a national victory in Hungary. Franz Ferdinand, on the other hand, claimed the concessions had been wrested from Franz Joseph in a moment of weakness while he was ill with bronchitis. The Archduke therefore made a formal statement, under
oath before witnesses, in which he declared

that I consider this law as having been extorted from His Majesty, my most gracious Sovereign, and I do not consider it as having been enacted in a legal manner. ¹⁰

Tisza planned to place the county governments under state control in 1913, but this legislation was not enacted prior to the fall of the Dual Monarchy.

The powerlessness of the Hungarian Parliament was shown most dramatically in early 1909. At that time the Coalition was coming apart, and the only thing to unite them was their mutual hatred of the Fejérváry government. A parliamentary committee had finally completed auditing the expenditures of the Fejérváry government and reported some financial irregularities. The most glaring case was the report that Commerce Minister Vörös had ordered 200,000 crowns taken from the account of the Hungarian State Railways and placed under his personal control. This money was then allegedly given to various Hungarian, Austrian and foreign newspapers to persuade them to write more favorably about the Fejérváry government. Vörös had defended this action at the time on the grounds that the money was simply to buy advertising space for the Hungarian State Railways. ¹¹ We may want to doubt the accuracy of these charges, since they were made by a parliamentary committee which was far from impartial. The various newspapers which were supposed to have received huge sums of this bribe money denied it, of course, and the money does not appear to have


¹¹ PL, 1909, Feb. 10M, Mar. 18M, 19M.
toned down their editorial policy to any extent. Yet even if the facts are true, we may ask if Vörös had acted any less properly with public funds than many another Hungarian minister. Financial scandals were frequent in Hungary, but as long as the Liberal Party remained in power it was less likely that the opposition would discover a bribery case.

A number of parliamentary deputies wanted to impeach Vörös for mishandling public funds. They argued that the indemnity promised to the Fejérváry ministers had been for political responsibility only. Vörös was charged with criminal misuse of funds, and should still be held liable. György Nagy, an Independence Party deputy, insisted that the nation had never agreed not to impeach the Fejérváry ministers, and if the present government had relinquished the rights of the nation, they should also be impeached.\textsuperscript{12} Nagy's argument has merit. But the Parliament discovered that they had no power to impeach if it was against the will of the government. Parliament had to be content with adopting a resolution censuring by name each person who had held a cabinet post in the Fejérváry government.\textsuperscript{13}

Looking beyond Hungary to the entire Habsburg Monarchy, the 1905 crisis in Hungary illustrated to many persons the weakness of the Ausgleich system, but also the possibility of maintaining the Monarchy as a viable power if essential constitutional changes were made in time. The year 1905 saw an unprecedented interest in political questions. Literary magazines suddenly turned to discussions of constitutional issues. 1905 and 1906 saw the publication of a number of proposals for reforming the

\textsuperscript{12} PL, 1909, Mar. 19M.

\textsuperscript{13} PL, 1909, Mar. 1SM; Kristóffy, Kővária, 365-68; Mangold, Geschichte, 33-39. Kristóffy even requested to be impeached, so that he could prove his innocence in open court. PL, 1909, Mar. 7M.
dualist system or replacing it with a new structure for the Empire. Books by Karl Renner, Aurel Popovici, Gustav Strakosch-Grassman and others of this kind are familiar to students of the Habsburg Monarchy. 1905 saw several groups awake from their slumber and begin to plan their own destinies: the "New Course" in Croatia, the Rumanian National Party in Transylvania, the German-speaking "Schwaben" in southern Hungary. The Social Democratic Parties in both Austria and Hungary took on new importance in that year, and the Czechs in Austria and the Slovaks in Hungary demanded a separate status within their respective Socialist organizations. Significant in all of this activity is the fact that all of these groups sought to achieve their goals within the political process, and within the Habsburg Monarchy. It seemed likely that the long-overdue changes would be made, and that the dissatisfied peoples might find a future in the Monarchy at last.

After the appointment of the Wekerle government there followed a period of restrained optimism. Universal suffrage was enacted in Austria by the end of 1906. It was known that the Hungarian government had agreed to introduce universal suffrage, even though the government chose not to publicize the fact. But the optimism slowly evaporated as it became clear that things were going to continue as before. The fate of suffrage reform in Hungary was one symptom that the system was not going to be changed. After procrastinating as long as he could, Interior Minister Andrassy finally presented a suffrage bill to Parliament in November 1908, but his bill had no resemblance to that proposed by Kristofy three years earlier. Andassy's bill not only continued the practice of open voting, but it provided for a complex system of plural voting based on property and education. Under this plan, 217,791 persons would receive three votes,
and 863, 267 persons two votes each, while 1,270,924 illiterate persons would not vote directly, but every ten persons in this category would chose one elector to vote for them. Yet Andrásy's bill was still too radical for the Hungarian Parliament and it was withdrawn by the government in early 1909.

The Coalition could no longer agree on a program of government and soon split apart. Tisza returned to the political arena in 1910 and founded a new party on the ruins of the old Liberal Party, called the National Labor Party. Though Khuen-Héderváry became Prime Minister, Tisza was the real power. As Speaker of the House in 1912, Tisza brought policemen into the parliamentary chamber and had obstructionist deputies forcibly removed. Tisza ended the obstruction in Parliament once and for all, but he did not seem to realize that he had also destroyed the last semblance of parliamentary and constitutional government in Hungary. Tisza became Prime Minister again in 1913, and ruled Hungary with an iron hand as long as Franz Joseph lived.

By this time all optimism had long since vanished. The Annexation Crisis of 1908-09, the Zagreb treason trial and the Friedjung trial in 1909, were all signs of a lack of leadership at the top. The good will, the restrained optimism, and the hope that reforms could still be made—all this had vanished as time passed and things did not get better.

Perhaps even if universal suffrage had been introduced in Hungary in


1906 things might not have gotten any better. Possibly—very likely—
1906 was already too late to "save" the Monarchy. But in 1905 and 1906
there was still hope. There were promises that changes would be made.
These promises were not kept. In this sense, then, the era of the Fejér-
váry government marks the last chance for reform.
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