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PHOTOS AND CAPTIONS: THE POLITICAL USES OF PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC, 1871-1914

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Photos and Captions: The Political Uses of Photography in the Third French Republic, 1871-1914

by

Donald Edward English

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

1981

Approved by

(Chairperson of Supervisory Committee)

Program Authorized to Offer Degree

History

Date 7-21-81
Doctoral Dissertation

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For my parents
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Photographers in France have portrayed since 1839 a myriad of people, places, and events. As a widely popular invention the camera was a potentially powerful means of non-verbal communication to wide audiences. Soon after its invention political groups exploited the medium in deliberate efforts to influence the attitudes and actions of viewers. Photography in the nineteenth century ultimately became a widely used technique for mass persuasion that prefigured more sophisticated techniques of the twentieth century.

This study examines the political uses of photography during the Third French Republic. It focuses particularly on photography dealing with the Paris Commune of 1871, and on the use of photography by organized opponents of the Republic, notably the Bonapartist, the Boulangists, the royalists, the Ligue des Patriotes, and the Ligue antisémite. These right-wing groups were the most prolific users of photography, taking advantage of technological advances in photography to convey their political messages to a wide audience enfranchised by the new republic. The study describes how they used photographs, their objectives in distributing them, and the elementary symbolic messages contained in these images. It also details the reaction of the government to the widespread distribution of political photographs by opponents of the regime. Political photographs alarmed government officials and police, who assumed that the pictures could influence viewers and ultimately could endanger the regime.

The term commonly used to describe the manipulation of media for social or political purposes is propaganda. It is often
narrowly associated with large, blatant, and systematic campaigns directed by elaborate political organizations in order to control the thoughts and actions of individuals. It also frequently is viewed as the dissemination of false or misleading information. In reality few pieces of communication, written or visual, are totally devoid of propaganda content or intention. The French political philosopher Jacques Driencourt went so far as to say that "everything is propaganda."\(^1\) By broadening the definition Driencourt suggests that propaganda is not just a twentieth-century phenomena but has been practiced, consciously and unconsciously, throughout history. Propaganda is the projection or transmission of images, ideas, or information in order actively or passively to influence peoples' attitudes and actions. Nearly every form of communication, whether it be art, music, printed words, or photography, has some persuasive content. Messages through these media nearly always reflect and impart a society's or group's particular social, cultural, economic, or political values.\(^2\)

French officials during the Third Republic defined propaganda in this broader sense. Political propagande referred to all messages that extended the political values of a given political group. These included not only the public rhetoric of political opponents to win popularity but also the political messages that enunciated the ideological foundation of political movements, such as loyalty to a leader, nationalism, patriotism, and antisemitism. Speeches, newspapers, demonstrations, processions, songs, representations of crowns and eagles, flags, slogans, posters, illustrations, and photographs were among the means of communicating these political messages. Photography's political function during the Third Republic was to serve as an instrument of propaganda.

Given the various means of projecting political propaganda
to an audience during the Third Republic, why was photography so important? What made it a significant means of communication? To answer these questions requires a brief examination of photography's history, its appeal, its legal status, and the theories of nineteenth-century social psychologists.

Photography was one of the most popular technical inventions of the nineteenth century. Advances by French and English inventors and scientists during the Second Empire replaced the Daguerreotype and made photography easier and more accessible to a wide public. Louis Daguerre's method had produced a unique, non-reproducible positive image on a metal plate. The new research developed more fully light-sensitive chemical solutions that were capable of reproducing innumerable copies from an original negative image. Consequently, the possibility for mass production of photographs existed, and this in turn created new business opportunities in commercial photography and greater amateur use. A second series of technical and scientific breakthroughs in the 1880s led to the development of smaller, lighter, portable, hand-held cameras that formed an image on film, rather than on bulky glass plates, which had required long exposures and cumbersome development processes. Instantaneous exposure became possible, and the detail and clarity of the image were both improved. Cameras could easily be taken anywhere to capture almost any subject.

With its increasing application in diverse areas photography developed into a considerable industry. By 1892 more than 1,400 professional photographers practiced in Paris. Approximately 2,000 professional photographers earned their livelihoods in the provinces. Nearly 1,000 studios throughout the country employed several thousand technicians and photographers' assistants. The demand for cameras, repairs, film, chemical supplies, paper products, and studio furniture spawned related industries, which grew
in proportion to the increasing popularity of the medium itself. These professionals, plus thousands of amateur photographers, took several hundred thousand photographs each year, which were often sold or traded among friends and acquaintances. To accommodate the increasing interest photographers established local photography societies, which published the latest information on technical developments, photographic processes, and areas of application. By the early 1890s thirty French photography societies published twenty-two journals devoted to professional and amateur photography. By 1906 more than one hundred societies existed, and thirty-nine journals were in circulation.

The publication of photographs in magazines and newspapers further extended the public for pictures and created a new profession, newspaper photographer. Prior to the development of the half-tone process newspaper illustrations usually were composed by hand. Frequently pictures taken by photographers appeared in newspapers after adaptation to a wood block engraving. In the half-tone process, perfected by Frederic E. Ives, an American, in the early 1880s, the photographic image is broken into small dots of varying size, produced by photographing through a fine screen. This dot image is then etched onto a metal plate for printing along with type. The larger dots absorb the most printing ink and produce the shadows of the image, while the smaller dots produce the highlights.

Newspapers were slow to use pictures because the production process was expensive, and the thin newsprint paper in current use could not accommodate the half-tone process. Newspapers in the 1880s and 1890s limited photographs to special editions and Sunday supplements. Le Journal, for example, published the first photo-interview in 1886, when the well-known photographer Nadar interviewed the color theorist Eugene Chevreul on the occasion of his one hundredth birthday. After the turn of the century
photographs appeared more frequently in newspapers, and in 1910 came the first daily newspaper totally illustrated by photography, *Excelsior*. The illustrated weekly news and general interest magazines used thicker paper and integrated photography into their formats much earlier. The largest illustrated weekly, *L'Illustration*, published its first photograph in 1891. The half-tone process also made possible the mass production of photographs on posters, and in leaflets, brochures, and books. Individual photographs no longer necessarily appeared alone but often accompanied printed texts in commercial advertisements, public announcements, and political campaign materials. Thereafter, inexpensive photographs penetrated into the most remote regions of France.

Photography was a potentially powerful communication medium because it attracted viewers' attention and was applied to life in numerous ways. These applications included the use of photography in scientific disciplines, law enforcement, the military, commercial portrait photography, journalism, art, business, and home entertainment. For many people photography was a means of affirming their position in society by sitting for a portrait photograph.

Photography also appealed to a wide audience because it reflected one of the dominant intellectual currents—positivism. Although science had long had an important role in French intellectual life, in the latter half of the nineteenth century it began to crowd abstract philosophy further into the background. Photography flourished in this intellectual milieu because it reflected material values. The photographic image, by recording reality and providing objective evidence of it, reflected the positivist concern to objectify nature as a system of observable phenomena capable of empirical investigation. In the constant search by photographers for new subject matter the camera brought exotic,
far-away places and things nearer and facilitated their investigation. In this manner photography helped to demythologize the world. It was also an example of the material benefits that applied science could bring to mankind.

Photography served the propagandist because it also appealed to that large portion of the French population that could not read fluently or easily. Non-verbal, visual images could reach otherwise inaccessible audiences. While the implementation of the Jules Ferry education laws in the 1880s significantly reduced total illiteracy among French children, reading remained difficult for most. Statistics compiled for married couples and army conscripts at the turn of the century, approximately one generation after the establishment of free, compulsory, primary education, show that approximately 5 percent of the couples, man and wife, who married in 1900 and 4 percent of the conscripts could not read or write. A more significant figure, however, was the percentage of conscripts who had completed the compulsory educational program and received their certificates. Only 1.5 percent of these young men had successfully completed the required seven years of primary education and did not continue on to a secondary education. The vast majority, 92.5 percent, learned basic reading and writing at home or attended only a few years of primary school and did not graduate. Significantly, only 2 percent of the conscripts had completed a primary and a secondary education. Secondary education was not free, and since few scholarships were available and the costs high, it was primarily for upper-class children. France remained a nation of semi-literates, people who rarely had more than a few years of education.

For those who could not read well photographs were an easily understandable medium. The written word was a symbol that acquired meaning only after sometimes difficult cognitive processes of recognition and translation into an idea. From a
photographic image meaning came directly and required less difficult cognitive functions. Furthermore, photography over the years had become known for its objective, true representation of reality. Few viewers knew enough about photographic techniques to recognize anything but blatantly false photographs that had been manufactured in the studio or laboratory. Viewers, therefore, accepted photographs as facts, and they did not often critically examine the image or its content.

The widely accepted belief that propaganda could have a direct effect upon the attitudes and actions of the public furthered photography's political use. Prominent social psychologists, including Gustave LeBon, Gabriel Tarde, and Scipio Sighele, studied the psychology of crowds and public opinion in the aftermath of the Paris Commune of 1871 and popularized an irrationalist view of human nature. LeBon was an especially well-known scholar in the Third Republic who was welcomed in conservative political circles. His book, *Psychologie des foules*, was published in the 1890s after he had completed two decades of research and thought. It became one of the most popular "scientific" works of the late nineteenth century and went through forty-five editions. LeBon concluded that individual personality was built upon a substratum of unconscious, primitive instincts, which are stronger than an individual's rationality. Within a crowd the individual's lower instincts were easily aroused and often led to violent behavior.

LeBon's theories on collective behavior were the product of social and political conditions in France. For LeBon and other social psychologists modern society was the era of crowds. Popular violence during the Paris Commune, the mass demonstrations for General Boulanger in 1888–89, and the antisemitic riots in 1898 were examples of a larger social phenomenon. LeBon agreed with the prominent sociologist Emile Durkheim that the old
close knit communities were being destroyed by industrialization and urbanization, which left few social institutions to provide basic gratifications and focus loyalties for the individual. Modern industrial societies replaced the traditional corporations and institutions of the ancien régime with special interest units such as labor unions, leagues, and political parties. According to LeBon, these institutions increased social problems by appealing to the irrational herd instinct, which they were supposed to suppress. Social conflict, therefore, became a struggle of collective groups, which attempted to harness and to channel the unruly emotional energy of the individual living in a burgeoning mass society.

Within these collective groups individuals were susceptible to the pressure and to the influence of the group leader or of his propaganda. LeBon believed propagandistic images to be one of the most effective methods of influencing these individuals because these mental pictures were fundamental to their thought patterns. He observed, "The imagination of crowds, as with all irrational beings, is profoundly impressionable. The images invoked in their minds by a person, an event, or an accident have all the vivacity of the real things." He continued, "Crowds think only through images. Only these images can terrorize, seduce, and mobilize them into action." The affirmation and constant repetition of images along with other such highly emotional activities as rallies, speeches, demonstrations, and marches galvanized the crowd into a malleable mass capable of extreme actions. Since photographs and illustrations were among the most effective means for stirring the imagination of the crowd when the leader was inactive, these methods of propaganda were powerful instruments for manipulating the social alienation brought about by modern life.

To the astute political propagandist in the Third Republic
who was aware of popular "scientific" conceptions about the irrational nature of the individual in a group and photographic images' status as the rational, objective representation of reality, photography was potentially invaluable. Since ordinary viewers of photographs did not think the camera capable of conveying false or deceptive images, the clever politician could disseminate a variety of emotion-laden photographs with little apprehension of popular protest. Viewers would accept the photographs as reality, and be subtly or overtly influenced by them. Without knowing or recognizing how they were being exploited viewers could be manipulated into behaving in the appropriate political manner.

Legal restrictions on photography prevented political propagandists from disseminating blatantly revolutionary or defamatory pictures. The Decree of April 17, 1852 had required that the distribution or sale of all printed material, including photographs, receive authorization from the Ministry of the Interior and departmental prefects. In July 1861 the law providing for freedom of the press eliminated the requirement for prior authorization, but restrictions remained in force. The law required that each individual photograph sold or distributed include the name and address of its printer, and that two copies of each photograph be deposited at the ministry or with departmental prefects. While many of the hated délits d'opinion from the Law of 1852 were eliminated, several articles of the Law of 1861 limited freedom of expression. Among the more political restrictions were Articles 23 through 27, which prohibited distribution of materials that led to direct provocation of felony crimes, especially murder, theft, and arson, crimes against the security of the state, insults to the president of the republic, provocation to members of the armed forces to desert or to disobey orders, and the publication of false news that led to a public disturbance.
Articles 29 through 37 prohibited the distribution of materials that were defamatory to individuals, including judges, members of the government, and public officials.

Jurisprudence during the Second Empire and the Third Republic also restricted the unauthorized publication, sale, or distribution of portrait photographs. As early as 1867 the noted author Alexander Dumas had won a legal suit against the photographer A. Liébert for the unauthorized sale of his portrait. When technical advances made possible photographic reproductions in newspapers and magazines, the courts ruled that the publisher must receive prior authorization from the subject to publish any individual or group portraits. Finally, in 1902 the Chamber of Deputies extended the Law of 1793 on copyright to photography, prohibiting the burgeoning illustrated press from pirating photographs or publishing pictures without the consent of the photographer or of the sitter.\(^{11}\)

Nor were photographers free to take pictures in public places or near military installations. Prior to December 1891 local police ordinances prohibited photographers without authorization from setting up tripod cameras on the public street. Police feared that photographing would cause a public disturbance and block traffic. Until 1900 special authorization from the departmental prefect was required to use either a tripod or a handheld camera in public parks, gardens, squares, and national monuments.\(^{12}\) Restrictions around military installations were more severe. No photographers were allowed within 10,000 meters of any fort or camp. Taking an unauthorized picture within this distance could result in arrest and trial for espionage. To obtain authorization the photographer had to apply to the army chief of staff with proof of his citizenship and an explanation of the photograph's intended use. The army chief of staff in turn was to base his decision on the \textit{valeur morale} of the intended photographs.\(^{13}\)
These legal restrictions limited the range of subject matter appropriate for political photographs during the Third Republic. The laws help to explain the preponderance of portrait photographs depicting political opponents of the regime and the absence of photographs showing armed resistance to the government or slanderous, grossly distorted portraits of republican officials. Such photographs were clearly illegal. Instead, political propagandists tried to arouse popular feelings and to generate political support through photographs that repetitiously emphasized the prestige, popularity, personal charisma, and political principles of leaders. These photographs generally escaped censorship, except when the government determined that the security of the regime warranted extra legal confiscations. However, French officials kept close watch on the distribution of photographs in the decades after 1870. The F7 series (national security police) in the French National Archives and selected cartons in the Archives of the Préfecture of Police, Paris, contain much of the record of these operations. These archives are my major source of information about actual activities of both political parties and government. They frequently contain the actual photographs collected by police agents during surveillance and censorship activities. They testify to the government's concern and to its recognition of the importance of photographic propaganda during the Third Republic. I supplement these archival sources with an analysis of photograph-illustrated books, magazines, and newspapers published by rightist opponents of the Republic and available at the Bibliothèque nationale and at the Bibliothèque historique de la Ville de Paris.

The following chapters describe how the various political groups used photography during the Third Republic to convey political messages to the French public. Each chapter details the development of photography's political applications, provides
numerous visual examples of photographic propaganda, and describes the government's attempts to minimize the impact that these photographs would have in France.
Notes


8. Ibid., p. 74.


10. LeBon was so convinced of images' persuasive power that he advocated in the 1920s the government ownership of special cinema theaters, which would present propaganda films; see Nye, Crowd Psychology, p. 170.

11. Studies of the legal aspects of photography include Édouard Sauvel, Études de droit sur la photographie (Paris: n.d.); idem., De la Propriété artistique de photographie (Paris: 1897); E. N. Santini, La Photographie devant les Tribunaux (Paris:


13 Victor Riston, *La Photographie et l'espionnage devant la loi* (Paris: 1891), p. 12. Paris was exempted from the minimum distance rule since virtually every location in Paris was within ten kilometers of some type of military installation.
CHAPTER II

PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE PARIS COMMUNE 1871:
PICTURES AND CAPTIONS

The Paris Commune of 1871 provided an occasion for photography to play a new and influential role in French politics. By recording the Communards' activities and the destruction of Paris the camera captured images that were used later for political purposes by both conservative and by pro-Communard sympathizers. The French had long used visual images in their political and ideological struggles. During the French Revolution government-commissioned artists such as David portrayed the glories of the new republic. Others denigrated it. The Napoleonic era, as well as the upheavals of 1830 and 1848, brought an outpouring of propagandistic caricatures, engravings, lithographs, and colored illustrations known as images d'Epinal. The practice continued under the Second Empire, and in that regime photography was added to the list of propaganda media. Portrait photographs of the Bonaparte family and other notables were commonly displayed and sold in Parisian shops, as were photographs of the Crimean and Italian wars. The visual images, including photographs, which depicted the people and events of the Commune were much more numerous, however, and they generated such intense political feelings in France that the French government banned their sale after the Commune.¹

Until recently analysis and interpretation of the visual images made during the Commune have received little attention from historians, and the current interest in the iconography of the upheaval has focused mainly on the symbolic use of caricature and not on photography.² Since the centennial celebration of the
Commune in 1971 several illustrated books on the imagery of the Commune have reproduced photographs of the events but offered only superficial analysis of them. On photography's role during the Commune only a single article appeared, and while it is informative, it is highly polemical. Many historical works on the Commune used photographs as illustrations but did not analyze their symbolic or political content.

Although until very recently historians have not dealt seriously with the visual iconography of the Commune, the Communards themselves considered visual imagery as extremely important. The Federation of Artists, under the leadership of such well-known artists as Gustave Courbet, sought to enlighten the people of France by means of a new revolutionary art. The destruction of the Vendôme Column and the statue of Henri IV, and the burning of some government buildings were symbolic removals of the iconography of the Bourbon and Napoleonic regimes. Numerous illustrated periodicals, newspapers, leaflets, posters, and medallions denigrated the opponents of the Commune while glorifying the men, women, and events in Paris. At the same time the supporters of Versailles portrayed the Communards as murderers, villains, tyrants, and destroyers of France's long and glorious heritage.

The Commune did not have a full-time, official photographer assigned to record the historical events of the upheaval, but several photographers remained in Paris during the siege and made pictures of the barricades and of the men and women who defended them. After the fighting numerous photographers returned to the city and photographed the results of the destruction, including the thousands of corpses collected in temporary morgues. The camera became an eyewitness of the tragedy which occurred in the city, and much of its record survives in museums and libraries in Paris. The French photographer Jean Claude Gautrand observed:
A new population takes possession of Paris, a new ideology inundates the city, whose bourgeois districts are deserted by political emigrants to the interior. Exceptional events unfold in Paris. Photography takes on its new, primordial role as living witness.¹

The examination of these photographs can contribute to greater understanding of the political events of the Commune and its role in French politics during the remaining years of the nineteenth century. The eyewitness photographs captured the spirit of the time: the festival mood of the Parisians and their fierce determination to resist the troops from Versailles. After the fighting, thousands of photographs of Communist leaders and of the destruction in Paris, along with photo-montage images fabricated by Eugene Appert, were sold to people seeking souvenirs of the events. These photographs were often accompanied by highly polemical captions and served therefore not only as records but also as political propaganda, some of which contributed to myths about the political nature of the Commune. An analysis of these images shows how photography was used to reflect partisan political beliefs and contributes to our understanding of how certain perceptions of the Commune were developed and transmitted.

Prior to the disastrous events of 1870-71, Paris was a thriving center for photography. Commercial photographers were numerous and often became wealthy by taking portrait photographs of bourgeois and aristocratic patrons.² Fashionable studios lined the grand boulevards of central Paris. Nadar’s studio was on the Boulevard des Capucines, Disderi lived on the Boulevard des Italiens, and Pierre Petit was on the Place Cadet. These and other photographers took mainly portrait photographs and neglected images of daily life. With the Prussian invasion and the siege of Paris the portrait photographers lost many patrons when thousands of Parisians emigrated to the interior. Many well-known
photographers followed them, returning only when the fighting was over. The portrait photographers Franck and Pierre Petit left Paris and returned after the fall of the Commune. Disderi remained only during the Prussian siege and took several photographs of the city's defenses, soldiers, and artillery positions. Nadar, although in Paris and sympathetic to the political goals of the Commune, played no active role in the Commune's affairs nor did he take any photographs in Paris. His contribution to the Commune came after the fighting, when he concealed the Communist General Bergeret and later transported him to freedom in Belgium. The portrait photographer Étienne Carjat, also sympathetic to the Commune, remained in Paris and contributed poems to the evening paper La Commune but did not take photographs. The photographs which survive today were taken by less well-known or anonymous photographers on whom there is little biographical information. Two who have been identified are Braquehais and Collard. Both remained in Paris and photographed the participants in the upheaval and the barricades. They did not make individual portraits; their works were eyewitness views of the events and group portraits of barricade defenders.

The collection of Commune photographs may be divided into two numerically uneven categories: those taken during the Commune and those taken after the fighting. The number taken during the Commune is small, a circumstance explained by the loss of patrons and the exodus of many photographers from Paris. The Prussian and Versailles sieges also undoubtedly prevented delivery of photographic supplies into Paris for those who remained. A further explanation of the few numbers is that many of the photographers who remained in Paris were activists preoccupied with more pressing business of the Commune. According to the records of the Communard trials, forty photographers were arrested and convicted of participation in the Commune. This number did not
include those photographers killed in action during the fighting.  

One photographer, Francois A. Fougeret, played a leading role in the Communard government and would be deported to New Caledonia for his activities. Fougeret was a small-time professional portrait photographer who had a history of anti-government activities. He took part in the Revolution of 1848 and encouraged his children to participate with him in the Commune. On March 19 he was elected to the Central Committee, which organized the resistance to the Versailles troops. He ordered several battalions to defend the Buttes de Montmartre and on May 2 led the seizure of the Picpus Convent, which had been under surveillance since mid-April. The convent's nuns were sent to Saint-Lazare prison, where they remained until the fighting ended. In 1872 the Fourth Council of War convicted Fougeret of participation in the Communard government and of inciting citizens to resist the Versailles government. He spent seven years in exile on New Caledonia before returning in 1879 under the general amnesty. 

After the fighting, however, numerous photographers descended on Paris to take pictures of the ruins. While no photographs of the actual fighting exist today, images of Communard corpses lying in temporary morgues at Paris and Versailles are common. The photographers of the ruins and corpses were often those who had deserted Paris several months earlier. Adolph Disderi and the portrait photographer Eugene Pirou both took photographs of slain Communards, and such well-known photographers as Pierre Petit, Franck, and Lallier photographed burned-out buildings in Paris. The drawing published in the Illustrated London News on June 24, 1871 (Plate I) mocked the photographer's morbid interest in the ruins. Before the firemen have even extinguished the flames, the photographer with his young assistant is taking views of the buildings. With his camera precariously perched upon the rubble, he not only takes a photograph but also obstructs the path
of the efforts to put out the fires. In the lower right hand corner a homeless mother and child sit in isolation and despair.

The photographer's brazen disregard for the firemen and the homeless mother and child symbolize his insensitivity to the immediate physical and human needs of the time. He is interested only in capturing a marketable image of the ruins. The events in Paris and the destruction of historic buildings generated a demand not only in France but also in the rest of Europe for photographs of the ruins. To those who could not see for themselves, the photographs offered an eyewitness account and souvenirs of the destruction. In both cases photographers sought quickly to fulfil the demand for pictures. By July 2, 1871 Disderi advertised that his collection of photographs was available at all booksellers and photograph shops in Paris. As early as June 17 engravings adapted from photographs taken by Franck showing the ruins were published in L'Illustration. On July 3 Jules Moïnau reported that an English businessman had purchased 50,000 photographs of the toppled Vendôme Column for sale in London. The British entrepreneur wanted photographs of the column before its destruction but received pictures of its ruins.

The numerous collections, albums, and books illustrated with photographs of the ruins fell into two categories: those with both photographs and captions, and those with photographs alone. Those photographs with captions provided unique political propaganda in addition to serving the need for eyewitness accounts and souvenirs. The caption altered the meaning of a photograph by directing the viewer's interpretation of the image. A photograph of a burned-out palace or government building without a caption elicited a broad range of reactions from the viewer depending upon his political opinions and his knowledge of the destroyed buildings. The albums and books with a combination of both captions and photographs were a form of political propaganda.
used by both conservatives and Commune-sympathizers to spread their political opinions. The photographic albums published immediately after the Commune were entirely unfavorable to the Communards. Only later in the century when adverse public opinion had calmed were captioned photographs sympathetic to the Commune published. Among the albums with a conservative bias were Édouard Moreau's Guide-recueil de Paris brulé: Événements de Mai 1871 with photographs by Pierre Petit; Justin Lallier's Album photographique des ruines de Paris; H. de Bleignerie and E. Dangin's Paris incendié 1871: Album historique; and Alfred D'Aunay's Les Ruines de Paris et de ses environs 1870-71 with photographs by A. Liébert. The photograph-illustrated albums more sympathetic to the Commune published at the end of the century included Paris sous la Commune par un témoin fidèle: la photographie; and Armand Dayot's L'Invasion, le siège et la Commune.

The most active identifiable photographers during the Commune were Braquehais and Collard. Biographical information on Braquehais is meager, but his works form the largest collection of photographs taken by a single photographer during the Commune. His album, entitled Paris pendant la Commune, contains ninety-two photographs of the events in Paris, the barricades, and the ruins. Braquehais was a professional photographer. As early as 1854 he earned his living by painting daguerreotypes, and in 1864 he married the daughter of a photographer named A. Gouin. He later took over his father-in-law's business and even won a medal for a photograph he exhibited at the 1867 Exposition. His studio was located on the Boulevard des Italiens, and he practiced his craft there until 1875. Many of his photographs of the Commune have been used to illustrate books on the Commune published in the twentieth century.

The twentieth-century French photographer Jean Claude
Gautrand has described Braquehais as the "first reporter in the history of French photography." He admired him because "Braquehais is one of the first photographers to have taken the camera from the confined atmosphere of the studio in order to project it onto the screen of life: the street. Unconsciously Braquehais opened the door for his followers: all the AtGETS..." Gautrand also praised him because, according to Gautrand, he did not take his photographs for purely commercial reasons like many of the photographers who returned to take pictures of the ruins.

However, Braquehais never revealed his motives for taking his photographs of the Commune. My research of the archives of the Commune failed to uncover any official relationship between Braquehais and the government in Paris. Braquehais himself left no written records, memoirs, or correspondence, and his photographs are uncaptioned. Interpretation of their political significance must rest on the photographs alone. Of his ninety-two photographs one group depicts the destruction of the Vendôme Column, and another shows National Guard members manning a barricade. These photographs are both eyewitness records of the times and group portraits of the participants. They are tangible evidence of the historical event, but they also suggest how the participants felt about their actions. Because the people in these photographs cannot be individually identified, judgments about the participants can be made only on the visual appearance in the photograph.

According to Michel Winock and Jean Pierre Azéma the Communards used symbolic ceremonies to create a collective consciousness in the participants. "It is in the ceremony, as in combat, that a people, shoulder to shoulder, comprehend that an event extends beyond its familiar horizon." The destruction of the Vendôme Column, the burning of the guillotine at the Place Voltaire, and the razing of Thiers' home reflected this need for
public ritual. These ceremonies were exorcisms, a rejection of
the past. However, in the destruction of the past the Communards
were making way for a new future more acceptable to their politi-
cal ideals. The participation in these rituals developed a
sense of common purpose and unity among the Communards, who be-
lieved in widely different political ideologies and were ini-
tially from different occupations and social classes.

Braquehais' photographs of the Vendôme Column suggest this
common purpose and unity in the people who posed around the monu-
ment. For example, the photographs depicting the crowds standing
around the Vendôme Column before and after its destruction
(Plates II, III, IV, V) were group portraits that included
people from several social classes and ages. One can identify
members of the National Guard, men in working class clothes, men
dressed in typical bourgeois top hats and waistcoats, women, and
children. All came to witness the destruction of the monument to
Napoleon, who symbolized the detested Empire. The photographs de-
pict at least a temporary amalgamation of diverse social classes
and age groups into a single popular group.

On the other hand, the photographs reveal more men dressed
in uniforms and workers' clothes than in bourgeois apparel. By
the middle of May, when the column was toppled, much of the origi-
inal middle class support for the Commune had evaporated. As a
result the social composition of the Communards had narrowed
along more rigid class lines.²³ These group portraits suggest
that by May 16 middle class support was still alive. Those
people wearing traditional bourgeois dress in these photographs
represent support of the Commune from among the shopkeepers and
traders, journalists, writers, and intellectuals.

The poses and facial expressions of these people are widely
diverse, reflecting varying individual attitudes of persons in-
volved in the events of March to May 1871. The Commune was a
serious political rebellion that had already resulted in numerous
Plate IV. Braquehais. Vendôme Column after Its Destruction. 1871.
battle deaths before the destruction of the column. Certainly to face death for one's political convictions required serious commitment. At the same time, however, there was a sense of holiday, festival, and celebration in Paris which derived from the new found freedom. Henri Lefebvre described it as the last fête populaire. The British historian Stewart Edwards described it as "not just a ritualistic acting out of repressed desires but the active conquest of urban time and space, a re-structuring of the city." Despite the hardships, the population of the city was tranquil; there was no terror in the streets, and no-one went hungry. One Parisian, Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, observed that the streets were filled with joyous people,

May was resplendent in the Tuileries, the Luxembourg Gardens, and the Champs Élysées. The harvest of flowers littered the Halles. Here and there in the sunlight, thousands of bayonets pass accompanied by the music of victory that one had forgotten. In the distance, the cannon . . . in the evening, the illuminated boulevards, the young ladies, the theaters, the discussion, finally free, the noisy and enchanting cafés, and an air of deliverance.

The group portrait of the Communards posing on the remains of the column (Plate IV) reflects this diversity of attitudes. In the background, standing on the debris, are several joyous and exuberant young National Guards waving at the camera. In the foreground a man dressed in working class clothes shakes hands with a National Guard as if to seal the proud completion of their joint task. The other participants are more subdued and serious, with the exception of the man with the top hat who feigns a pose, perhaps mockingly, of Napoleon I with his hand tucked inside his coat. In Plate V the group posed around the toppled bronze statue of Napoleon were also more serious in their expression than the waving National Guard members in the previous photograph. These men stare solemnly at the camera as if understanding the serious consequences of their actions or perhaps out of respect for the fallen figure of Napoleon.
Braquehais' photographs of the barricades and cannons (Plates VI, VII) include another type of political symbolism. Regardless of the festival atmosphere, Paris still faced an imminent invasion by Versailles troops. Treatment of captured Communards had already indicated that government vengeance on Paris would be severe. Defense of the city was therefore important, and Plates VI and VII show the fierce determination of the Communards to maintain their newly acquired liberty. The men posing next to their cannons and defense works signify the strength and pride in their resistance to Versailles. Their expressions also reflect the serious and grim determination that they have for the approaching battle.

Collard's photographs of the barricades also depict this attitude of pride and strength in the resistance to the invader. Collard, as an official photographer for the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées during the Second Empire, was practiced in taking photographs of man-made structures. His folio in the Département des Estampes et de Photographie at the Bibliothèque nationale contains nine photographs of major barricades among others representing bridges in various stages of completion. Many of them have appeared in twentieth-century books on the insurrection.

Collard's photographs of the barricades surrounding the Place de la Concorde, the Rue Castiglione, and the Rue de Rivoli were also group portraits of the defenders. These barricades were among the best built in the entire improvised fortification of Paris and provided a strong defense of the city. The upright and attentive poses of the soldiers and of Napoleon Gaillard, the chief engineer of barricade construction, indicate that the photographs were planned group portraits. In the view of the barricade at the Rue de Rivoli (Plate VIII), Gaillard stands in the left hand corner in full uniform with hat and sword in his hand. The remaining defenders pose in full uniform and upright
Plate VIII. Collard. Barricade at Rue de Rivoli. 1871.
stances on the barricade. The photographs also document the engineering principles involved in barricade construction and the city's defenses. The composition of the structure in Plate VIII includes an elaborate array of sandbags, bricks, and barrels which are built-up to the side of the Ministry of Marine. In the photograph of the barricade at the junction of the Rue Royale and the Place de la Concorde (Plate IX), Gaillard again poses in front of his edifice while the defenders stand at attention on the fortification. The pose and expression of Gaillard and the defenders show their pride in the construction and their determination to resist the expected assault.

The photographs of Braquehais and Collard were taken before the final semaine sanglante. They served a political purpose for the Communards both before and after the fighting. Shopkeepers, merchants, and photographers either sold or gave these images free to the residents of Paris. Although no official relationship has been discovered between Collard and the Communard government, the formal nature of his works suggests that they were taken for some official purpose or on special request by Gaillard and then perhaps made public by the city government. If distributed before the fighting, the photographs should have been politically inspiring to the viewer because they visually established the public participation in these events. The photographs reinforced the determination of those who participated at the Vendôme Column or on the barricades by presenting to them an image of their freedom, the destruction of hated symbols, and active resistance to Versailles. After the fall of the city the photographs must have been equally valuable to Commune-sympathizers because they represented the brief period of liberation that the Communards had achieved and acted as a reminder for future reference. On the other hand, the images held different political meanings for those who opposed the Paris insurgents or who had
little knowledge of the city's affairs. Since these photographs contained no captions their political interpretation depended upon the existing opinions of the viewers. This issue will be addressed in a later part of this chapter.

After the fighting, photographers returned to Paris to record the damage done to the city. At the same time Eugene Appert began his series his of photo-montage images. Entitled "Crimes of the Commune," this series includes nine fabricated representations of events that occurred during the Commune. These composite photographs were unsympathetic to the Commune and supported conservative political beliefs about the nature of the upheaval. According to Claude Nori, Appert's works were one of the first blatant attempts at using photography for conservative political propaganda. In a more outspoken manner Gautrand observed that these images soothed the consciences of the middle class after the summary execution of thousands of Communards,

... the "Crimes of the Commune" ... will have enormous success with the bloody bourgeoisie trying to find some frivolous justification for the veritable genocide that it had begot.

Eugene Appert left no written records, correspondence, or memoirs. Therefore, there is little biographical information available on him or written documentation concerning his composite photographs. We do know that he was a portrait photographer in Paris during the Second Empire and continued this occupation until the end of the 1880s. His studio was in the Ninth Arrondissement at 24 Rue Taitbout. He advertised himself as portrait photographer of government officials and aristocrats and stamped his portraits with business title "Photographer of the Legislative Corps, the Magistrature, Painter-Photographer of Her Majesty the Queen of Spain, the Grand Duke Constantin, and expert attached to the Tribunal of the Seine."
His photo-montages were a combination of photography and hand composition. From portrait photographs he cut out the heads of leading Communards or victims of the fighting. He then photographed models whom he hired to pose in clothes similar to those worn by the participants in the particular event he wanted to reconstruct. He attached the heads to the bodies and placed the figures in a composition which depicted the scene of the event. The entire composition was then photographed again, reproduced in the thousands, and sold as an original photograph of the event. The quality of the photo-montages varies from composition to composition. The image entitled "The Assassination of Generals Clemont-Thomas and Lecomte" is constructed with such technical skill that one historian hypothesized that the entire scene was a photograph of a theatrical reconstruction of the execution.32 On the other hand, in the photo-montage entitled "The Judgement of the Third Council of War" the edges of the composite photographs are clearly visible.

Appert's experience with making composite photographs did not begin or end with his series on the Commune. During the Second Empire he had fabricated images of the ruling family including a photo-montage of Napoleon III with the Prince Imperial and army generals at the army camp near Chalons. Later he made photo-montages of Thiers on his death bed, as well as numerous images of the Prince Imperial.33 However, the "Crimes of the Commune" was the largest single series and required numerous portraits of the Communards and the victims of the various crimes. Some of these portraits Appert possessed before the fighting began. As a well-known portrait photographer he had taken portraits of some Commune participants before the Franco-Prussian War, and he could have purchased others from fellow photographers or shops. Many Communards were well-known political figures and personalities in Paris before the war, and their pictures were
available for purchase along with those of other celebrities of the Second Empire.

For the remaining images of the Communards, Appert photographed numerous prisoners in the prison at Versailles. Appert was commissioned by judicial authorities to photograph the terrain surrounding the Rue Haxo, where Communards executed many hostages during the final week of the civil war. After completing this task he requested and received permission from the government to take photographs of the Communards held prisoner at Versailles who were responsible for the shootings. While at the prison he took portrait photographs of most of the major leaders of the insurrection. All those who sat before his camera ceded their rights to the portraits and authorized Appert to publish the photographs and pursue any counterfeitters that may try to copy them. In return the Communards received unlimited free copies of their portraits, their comrades' portraits, and reproductions of the composite photographs in which Appert used the portraits. 34 By the first of September 1871, Appert had completed his task and began to make and distribute his photo-montages. The entire series, as well as individual portraits of the Communards, was available to the public before the end of December in a variety of formats including visiting cards, postcards, and large prints.

Each of these images depicts an historical event that occurred during the upheaval. Appert chose, however, to reconstruct only those incidents that portrayed the Communards in the worst possible light. For example, the series shows the Communard executions of General Clement-Thomas and Lecomte, Archbishop Darboy, the Dominicans of Argueil, Gustave Chaudey, and the hostages on the Rue Haxo. Images representing incidents after the fighting include a photo-montage of women prisoners at Versailles and two representations depicting the trial and
execution of Communard leaders. All of these incidents occurred during the upheaval and its aftermath, but Appert's constructions were historically inaccurate and biased.

The "Execution of General Clement-Thomas and Lecomte" (Plate X) depicts the two generals before a National Guard firing squad. General Clement-Thomas stands with his arms to his side while General Lecomte has his arms folded across his chest. Both courageously face their executioners. The firing squad includes several soldiers who are simultaneously aiming at the two generals. Surrounding the firing squad are additional soldiers and civilian onlookers waiting calmly as the execution is about to proceed. Altogether the image presents a well-organized action where each participant coolly acts his role. Neither the firing squad nor the generals appear emotionally moved by the seriousness and tragedy of the situation.

The actual execution was more spontaneous and improvised. The generals were taken from confinement by a group of enraged National Guards and Parisian civilians, hastily lined up against a wall, and shot. Further, Gautrand discovered that the two generals did not stand side by side but were executed separately. Appert's montage gives no suggestion that this execution emerged from a highly tense, emotional, and spontaneous situation after the Versailles government attempted to seize the cannons of the National Guard on Montmartre.

Appert picked only one subject from the weeks between this opening incident and the final week for a photo-montage—Archbishop Darboy sitting in his cell (Plate XI). Arrested on April 4, the Archbishop of Paris was confined to a prison cell until his execution during the last week of the Commune. His arrest was the result of a campaign against clerics suspected of being agents of Versailles. The composite photograph shows the archbishop sitting alone at a table in his cell. The cell door is
Plate XI. Eugene Appert. Archbishop Darboy in His Cell. 1871.
open and Darboy calmly looks out. As in the "Execution of General Clement-Thomas and Lecomte" this photo-montage displays technical skill in the construction of the scene. In both depictions no clear demarcations exist between the combined photographic images or between the photographic images and the background.

The political significance of the representation is in the depiction of the archbishop in a prison cell rather than in a church. The cross motifs on the windows of the prison and on the cell door remind the viewer of the historical Christian tradition of captivity and martyrdom and emphasize the enormity of the Commune's injustice to the prelate.

Appert's next composite picture, "The Assassination of Gustave Chaudey" (Plate XII), depicts the execution of the former editor of the newspaper Le Sisicile on early morning of May 24. Chaudey, a Proudhonian republican, was a deputy-mayor of Paris at the Hôtel de Ville on January 22 when a group of radicals attempted a premature proclamation of the Commune. The attempted coup failed, and several demonstrators were killed in the struggle. Chaudey was later held responsible for the deaths by the Communards. He was arrested and held prisoner until May 23 when Raoul Rigault, the Commune's delegate to the Préfecture of Police, ordered his execution. Rigault, a personal friend of some of the dead victims of the January 22 abortive coup, personally supervised the firing squad. Chaudey went to his death protesting that he was a loyal republican and shouting, "Long live the Republic."36

The faces and figures of both Rigault and Chaudey are photographs. Rigault is on the far right holding a sword at his side, while Chaudey is directly in the center of the scene with his arm raised in protest. Portrait photographs of the two men have been attached to the bodies representing them. The remaining figures are also photographs, but their faces are indistinguishable,
either facing away or at an angle to the viewer. The placement of the figures in the scene, however, makes them appear stiff and unnatural. Furthermore, the figure at the extreme right appears to point his rifle at the back of the officer holding the pistol rather than at the figure of Chaudrey.

The political significance of this photo-montage lies in the protest that Chaudrey makes in his final seconds of life. The scene proclaims that the Communards executed people who shared their ideals as well as those who rejected them. They had no legitimate political beliefs but were simply cold-blooded murderers seeking only revenge.

On May 25 the Communards executed the Archbishop of Paris, the President of the Court of Cassation, the curé of the Church of the Madeleine, and three other priests. Appert reproduced this execution in his photograph entitled "The Execution of Hostages at the Roquette Prison" (Plate XIII). The scene depicts the hostages before the firing squad while Communard leaders observe. The faces of the six hostages are portrait photographs attached to figures in appropriate dress. Among the four Communard leaders on the left side of the composition, only Théophile Ferré's portrait is distinguishable. The remaining figures are taken from photographs of models; no identifiable portraits are among them. The hostages make various gestures as they are about to be shot. Darboy, on the extreme left, appears to hold his arm up as if forgiving the executioners for their crime. The remaining victims offer similar gestures of protest or resignation. The Communard leaders on the left side of the composition stand in positions that reflect their arrogance and boredom over the proceedings. The firing squad is a faceless group taken from photographs of models dressed in National Guard uniforms. As in the previous image, the placement of these figures in the composition makes it appear as if the back row of the
Plate XIII. Eugene Appert. Execution of Hostages at the Roquette Prison. 1871.
firing squad is firing into the front row rather than at the hostages.

This photo-montage, Appert's third depiction of execution by the Commune, also represents the cold-blooded murder of innocent victims. The hostages were all religious figures in Paris except for the president of the French law court. Displaying the Christian virtue of forgiveness before death gives a halo of martyrdom to the victims and makes the crime appear completely immoral. Appert also included Théophile Ferré in the composition despite the fact that Ferré was not present at the execution. Ferré, as second in command at the Préfecture of Police, ordered the execution but remained in his office during the actual event. The placement of Ferré at the scene of the crime makes him more real as the responsible figure who ordered the execution rather than a faceless official who only placed his signature on an order.

On May 26 other clerical figures caught up in the Parisian revolution were victims of another series of shootings. Appert presented this incident in his "Massacre of the Argueil Dominicans" (Plate XIV). This group of Dominican monks and their employees had been arrested on the charge that they had contributed to the loss of a Communnard position during the fighting. On May 25, however, they were released from the prison on the Avenue d'Italie. As the monks left the prison, a group of Communards from the 101st National Guard Division, angered by the execution of prisoners by government troops, opened fire on them killing several.

Appert's photo-montage presents the scene as the monks and their assistants are being shot down in the street. Several of the group lie dead while others attempt to flee. In the background additional clerical figures emerge from the prison entrance. Two soldiers sit at a cafe table drinking wine apparently unmoved by the violence. Like his previous images, this is
CRIMES DE LA COMMUNE

VICTIMES
T. B. Pericot
R. F. Bourdais
R. F. Pruniaux
R. F. Courtelin
R. F. Courcier
R. F. Guillaud
Guillaud (Louis)
Villain (Françoise)
Gren (Alain)
Mazas (Guidin)
Cottin (Théophile)
Montet (Frances)
Cancca (Emile)
Pern (Cherubin)

ÉCHAUFFEMENT DES MASSACRES
L'Abbé Gaspard [name]
Beauvries (Eugene)
Remi (Jean-Baptiste)
Guillaud (Guidin)
Ponnard (Françoise)
Duré (Alain)
Beauz (Simon)

FÉDÉRÉS
L'évêque, maire de l'Argueil
Leroux, procureur de la Cour criminale
Sauvage, colonel du 1er
Brons, capitaine du 1er
Reymond, lieutenant du 1er
Sauvage, gouverneur du fort de Brest
Lamorlot, lieutenant du 1er
Poupin, lieutenant du 1er
Quignon, commandant du 1er
González, lieutenant du 1er
Gouret, âgé de 56 ans
Faivre, âgé de 45 ans
Bouquet, lieutenant du 1er
Quignon, soldat du 1er
Brets, âgé de 46 ans
Ant, âgé de 45 ans

MASSACRE DES DOMINICAIXS D'ARGUEIL

Plate XIV. Eugène Appert. Massacre of the Argueil Dominicans. 1871.
a combination of portrait photographs and photographs of models dressed in clerical garb and National Guard uniforms. The faces of the victims have been grafted on the bodies of the monks and their employees.

Appert again presents premeditated murder of innocent victims. The monks are depicted as defenseless victims attacked by cold-blooded Communards intent upon violent revenge. The apparent lack of interest by the soldiers sitting at the cafe table reflects the Communard callousness to violence and death.

The final hostage execution represented by Appert occurred the evening of May 26 on the Rue Haxo (Plate XV). A group of National Guards under the leadership of the Blanquist Emile Gois took approximately fifty hostages, largely priests and policemen, from the La Roquette prison and marched them to the mayor's office in the 20th arrondissement. When the mayor refused to deal with the unofficial entourage, they marched on to the Rue Haxo collecting numerous bystanders along the route. Despite efforts to release the hostages by such Communard leaders as Varlin, Serailler, and Vallèes, the guardsmen executed their prisoners in the street. 38

Appert's photo-montage depicts the hostages lined up along a wall. The firing squad, including numerous women, faces the hostages with raised weapons. In the background, a woman on a horse signals the order to shoot. Portrait photographs of the victims are attached to bodies representing the hostages. A list at the bottom identifies the victims. The firing squad figures, however, are models whom Appert hired from various theaters in Paris to pose for this photograph. 39 The image erred from historical reality by presenting the simultaneous execution of all the hostages; in fact, the executions took place in three separate episodes. The composition depicts the back rows of the firing squad shooting into the front rows rather than at the hostages. As in
CRIMES DE LA COMMUNE

VICTIMES

Rev. P. Chavannes, famée.
Rev. P. Carcen, Altena.
Rev. P. de Rancé, noble.
Rev. P. Bertrand, Prêtre de Foy.
Rev. P. Turenne, Président de l'Église.
Rev. P. Bossuet, Secrétaire général de l'Église.
Rev. P. Turenne.
Levee d'état, Assasine.
Levee d'état, Vice-président de l'Église.
M. Sauvage, Ministre de l'Intérieur.
M. Jourdan, Vice-président de l'Église.
M. Basset, Comité de Basse.
M. Hervieu, Ministre apostolique.
M. Tebœuf, Aumônier.

M. Desjardins, Directeur de l'École.
M. Desjardins, Directeur du pensionnat.
M. Desjardins, Directeur du pensionnat.
M. Desjardins, Directeur du pensionnat.
M. Desjardins, Directeur de l'École.
M. Desjardins, Directeur de l'École.

ASSASSINAT DE 62 OTAGES

the previous photo-montages, Appert presents the cold-blooded murder of defenseless clergymen and police. Each victim is shown courageously meeting his death, a representation that proclaims the hostages' valor and conviction.

Appert produced another series of photo-montages representing the administration of justice to the Communards. Ignoring the wholesale execution of Communard prisoners without trials during the final week, in these pictures he showed the Communards in prison, before the tribunal, and at court-ordered executions. The first composite photograph, entitled "Interior of the Chan-tiers Prison" (Plate XVI), depicts a large group of women in a prison compound. Portraits for this composition were taken by Appert during his frequent visits to Versailles. The names of prisoners are listed below the picture but they are not correlated with the portraits in the photograph. The well-known revolutionary, Louise Michel, is identifiable on the far right of the composition.

Appert's image, however, was more than a group portrait of women prisoners surrounded by guards. Conservatives saw the female Communard as both a militant woman out to destroy traditional social values and a wild revolutionary carrying a torch and petrol can. They attributed the upheaval to moral decadence resulting from burgeoning urban population, alcohol abuse, and hedonism.

This interpretation of the Commune is reflected in the lower left-hand corner of Appert's photograph. Three women appear to be drinking wine; one even drinks crudely from the bottle. The representation of the open use of alcohol in this way presents an image of vulgar women who were bent upon destroying the social refinements of genteel French society, replacing it with wanton immorality that came from the political and social liberation which the Commune advocated.
Plate XVI. Eugene Appert. Interior of the Chantiers Prison. 1871.
Appert's second image dealing with the justice administered to the Communards is the composite photograph entitled "The Third Council of War at Versailles, the Trial of 17 Principal Members of the Commune" (Plate XVII). The picture presents an intricate combination of figures, including representations of the judges, attorneys, and defendants. The image contains both full figured portraits and portraits of individual faces attached to bodies. The defendants sit in the raised box on the right side of the picture. Observable in the photograph are the portraits of Ferré and Courbet. The lists on the sides of the photograph provide the names of the participants in the court proceedings but do not link them to the portraits in the image.

This photo-montage is less well-constructed than some of Appert's previous works. For example, the figures in the audience are clearly cut out silhouettes positioned in uneven rows with little attempt for harmonization. The same portrait image is repeated in several different places in the audience. The photograph also errs from historical reality in showing Gustave Courbet at the court proceedings. He had escaped to Switzerland, where he died in 1877.

Besides representing the administration of temporal justice, the photo-montage also symbolizes the administration of providential justice. A painting of a crucifix hangs prominently over the judges' benches and signifies the martyred Christ making a final judgement on the godless and murderous Communards.

Appert's final scene is a depiction of the execution of Communard leaders at Satory on November 28, 1871 (Plate XVIII). Condemned by the Third Council of War, these men were the first among twenty-three Communard leaders to be executed in 1871, 1872, and 1873. The victims included Théophile Ferré, Louis Rossel, and Sergeant Bourgeois. Ferré was a follower of August Blanqui and, as second in command of the Préfecture of Police,
Plate XVII. Eugene Appert. Third Council of War at Versailles, the Trial of Seventeen Principal Members of the Commune. 1871.
EXÉCUTION DE ROSSEL, BOURGEOIS, FERRÉ.
dans la plaine de Satory à Versailles
le 15 NOVEMBRE 1871.

Plate XVIII. Eugene Appert. Execution of Rossel, Bourgeois, and Ferré. 1871.
had ordered the execution of Archbishop Darboy. Rossel was an army officer who joined the Commune and led the National Guard against the Versailles forces. Bourgeois was a sergeant in the National Guard who was condemned for his participation in the execution of Generals Clement-Thomas and Lecomte. The photomontage shows the firing squad aiming at the three prisoners. Rossel and Bourgeois are blindfolded; Ferré is not. For this representation Appert again photographed models and placed them in the composition. However, only Ferré's head appears to be a portrait photograph attached to a body. The other two victims have blindfolds, and since Appert did not photograph the actual execution, one may assume that he constructed their portraits by hand.

The picture represents the final and absolute administration of justice to three Communards responsible for some of the least defensible executions. The appearance of clerical figures in the background, however, signifies that priests were still available and present for the victims' last rites even though they had repudiated religion and had executed men of God during the fighting.

While Appert constructed his photomontages, other photographers took pictures of the city's ruins and sold them either individually or in albums. Several albums contained captions or descriptions of the buildings represented in the photographs. Appert gave his images titles and sometimes listed names of people in the photograph, but he never approached the length or detail of the description in albums. Appert's composite photographs provided visual interpretations of the incidents and did not require captions to convey the political message. Later in the century, however, these same photographs were combined with captions prepared by Commune sympathizers to convey a different
political message. These captions will be examined in a later section of this chapter.

Captionless photographs of the ruins in Paris gave a more ambiguous political message. In these images there were no visual indications of who burned the buildings nor under what circumstances the destruction took place. On the other hand, many photographs that appeared in Paris after the fighting had titles attached to them identifying the structure. These titles gave only minimum information to a viewer but provided the context in which a political interpretation could be made. Once the viewer knew that these structures had been destroyed by the Communards, the photograph itself could take on political significance. However, the political interpretation that the viewer gave to the pictures conformed to his pre-existing political biases. Without a caption which directed the viewer's attention toward an issue concerning the destruction of the buildings or the Commune, the viewer was free to see in the photograph what he wished to see. The photographs may have pleased the pro-Commune viewer, for they represented the destruction of the old regime. On the other hand, they may have represented the atrocities of the Commune to those less sympathetic to its political ideology.

Titled photographs did not include only those images portraying the destroyed buildings. For example, Leauttt published an album of sixteen photographs, which included Appert's image of Archbishop Darboy in his cell, Braquehais' photographs of the Vendôme Column, various portraits of Communard leaders, the demolition of the statue of Henri IV, an image of a balloon leaving for the provinces carrying a proclamation of the Commune, and several pictures of the ruins. Leauttt published and sold 200 of these albums. Each photograph had a title which identified the image but gave no further information. This identification was important for understanding the subject of the photograph. For example, the photograph showing the balloon ascending from the
square in front the Hôtel de Ville (Plate XIX) is an image which requires an identifying title to place it within the context of the Commune. With the title "The Last Ballon Leaving for the Provinces Carrying the Proclamation of a Dying Commune" the balloon stands for the last attempt of the Commune to rally support for its cause in the départements. Depending on the political bias of the viewer this scene was either a positive or a negative occurrence.

The photograph titled "The Demolition of the Statue of Henri IV" (Plate XX) without its title is ambiguous in its meaning. This picture portrays a man sitting on a scaffold below the statue of Henri IV that adorned the portal above the entrance to the Hôtel de Ville. From the appearance of the man it is unclear what his intentions are toward the statue, that is, whether he is repairing or cleaning it, installing it, or tearing it down. However, the titles makes it apparent that the worker is destroying it. Again, depending on the political opinion of the viewer this action was viewed as a favorable or unfavorable activity.

On the other hand, the photographs of the barricades at the Avenue Victoria require titles for identification but make a political statement regardless of the titles. These two photographs show the barricade before and after the attack on the position. The before photograph (Plate XXI) presents the National Guard posing proudly on the barricade with cannons. The after photograph (Plate XXII) shows the damage caused to the barricade and surrounding buildings by the fighting. The titles are not necessary because, when placed together, the two photographs present a visual narrative of the events. The only scene missing is the one depicting the actual deaths of the barricade defenders. Viewing the terrible destruction in the second makes it easy for any viewer to imagine the scene during the fighting. However,
Plate XIX. Leautté. The Last Balloon Leaving for the Provinces Carrying the Proclamations of a Dying Commune. 1871.
Démolition de la Statue de Henri IV.

Plate XX. Leautté. Demolition of the Statue of Henri IV.
1871.
without the title the viewer, unless he recognizes the streets and buildings, would not know that these photographs were made during the Commune. Yet the photographs have a larger political significance that do not require a title for identification. The signs of violence are unmistakable, and undoubtedly dozens of men and women died. Without the titles the images take on a meaning that is more universal because the political reasons for the violence may be unknown. What is evident is conflict, destruction, and death. These photographs reflect the inherent passions that lead to such violence or make an anti-war statement by suggesting the terrible costs of war.

Photographs of the ruins accompanied by captions or long descriptions were also available immediately after the fighting. The political message of these photographs was influenced by the words written about the subject of the image. These descriptions provided a context for interpreting the photograph by identifying the building and discussing the events that caused the destruction. Yet the descriptions often included historical anecdotes and politically biased comments about the Communards who burned the buildings. The caption or description conveyed the author's political opinions, and suggested a political interpretation of the photograph itself.\(^4\)\(^5\) A central theme of these captions, descriptions, and photographs was the Communards' lack of patriotism in destroying the historical buildings. This interpretation confounded the Communard claim that the Versailles government's lack of patriotism led to surrender to the Prussian invaders.

For Justin Lallier, in his album entitled *Album photographique des ruines de Paris*, the photographs were a means of calling public attention to the significance of the buildings destroyed during the fighting. He stated,
The sad memory of the Commune was still living and our monuments were still smoking when the publisher, P. Loubère, had the ingenious idea to consecrate the bloody wounds of our great Paris in a collection of twenty photographs.46

His collection contained pictures of the major buildings, including the Tuileries, the Hôtel de Ville, the Ministry of Finance, and the Vendôme Column. Lallier placed the buildings in a historical context by describing their construction and the historical events that occurred in them. In this he implied that the Commune's destruction of the buildings was a destruction and repudiation of France's glorious past.

We are going to outline quickly the history of the monuments reproduced here, beginning with the masterpiece of architecture of which little remains, the Hôtel de Ville. This elegant palace was begun by Boccardo and completed by Androuet du Cerceau. It covers a surface area of 8,850 meters. The profusion of gracious sculptures on the facade and the elegant campanillé made it justly one of the interesting buildings of our capitol. We only remember its splendid celebrations when it was a theater with vast, richly decorated salons.47

Lallier elicited a memory of how the Hôtel de Ville looked before its destruction and recalled its function in the city.

For Moreau and the photographer Pierre Petit the purpose of their album was less to preserve a memory of the buildings before their destruction than to show the crimes that the Communards committed. Moreau stated his purpose,

We hope, through this book, to encourage the public to visit these immense ruins, and to see the results of the terrible events which occurred. In providing the photographs of the monuments and burned buildings we desire to show equally to people who cannot come to Paris, the cruel ravages inflicted on our unfortunate city in these nefarious days of civil war.48

Moreau also provided a before and after photograph of the Hôtel de Ville so that the viewer could compare the damage.
committed by the Communards (Plates XXIII, XXIV). Like Lallier he mourned the loss to the history of art and architecture in France. But, his caption was political in an additional way because it directly placed the responsibility for fire that gutted the building on a political faction within the Commune, the International. By attributing the destruction of Paris to this group, he contributed to the common conservative interpretation that the Commune was the result of a conspiracy by the International to take over the state. Moreau observed:

The most irreparable of all the misfortunes . . . is the burning of the Hôtel de Ville. This monument, whose purpose would seem to have prevented its destruction, did not escape the savage attacks of the incendiaries. On its charred walls one finds the cinders and last remains of the immense and precious civil state archives. This is an irreparable loss for art and society. The incendiaries burned Paris on order of the Committee of Public Safety, but the preconceived plan was not executed in all its horror due to the prompt military operations. The minutes of the International in June, 1870 merits, from this point of view, to be read with attention. One finds there in a letter from Cluseret this significant phrase: "On this day of revolution I affirm to you that Paris will be ours or Paris will no longer exist." For Bleignerie and Dangin the twenty photographs in their album were teaching devices for future generations, providing a moral lesson about the violence of the upheaval. They presented the photographs "in order to damn the terrible days that we have just gone through, to insure that everyone will remember them . . . and to provide future generations with information about the events." For the authors the moral lesson conveyed by the captions and photographs was that the Communards repudiated their country in face of the Prussian enemy.

Bleignerie and Dangin also used historical description of a photograph of the Tuileries ruins to stir indignation against the Communards and to arouse patriotic feelings (Plate XXV).
Plate XXV. H. de Bleigerie and E. Dangin. Ruins of the Tuileries. 1871.
The place of the Kings of France was the first object of their fury. The Tuileries is a monument in which every stone is a part of our history. What punishment, more terrible than the public contempt which currently crushes them, history will inflict upon these incendiaries of the country!53

The photographer A. Liébert provided one hundred photographs of the ruins for a two volume album with captions and descriptions by Alfred d'Aunay. Aunay, a pen name for Alfred Descudier, was former journalist for the conservative newspaper Le Figaro.54 He saw the publication of this series as a means to remind people of the conflict.55 In his caption accompanying a photograph of the destroyed Vendôme Column (Plate XXVI) Aunay emphasized that the destruction of the column provided the Prussians with an additional moral victory. He stated,

Here is the great crime. A day came, whose memory will never be forgotten, when a gang of adventurers calling themselves French tore down a monument made of bronze and glory in the face of the Prussians who still guarded our gates. This monument had responded to our present defeat calmly, contemptuously, impassively, by evoking past glory and serenely promising revenge to come.56

Aunay lamented the loss to French culture and history in his description of the photograph of Thiers' ruined home (Plate XXVII).

There it is with its white, cold, naked, and open walls. If the wretched did not have time to complete their task, they still pillaged it. Ministers, ambassadors of all nations, advisors, secret messages, and officials of the world came through the iron gate of this small house. The entire History of the Consulate and Empire was written there, one of the most colossal books of the nineteenth century. Each day this historian and artist, since Thiers is an artist of great taste, accumulated precious documents and rare curiosities in his home. Even if he succeeds in assembling the remains of this wreckage, he will never be repaid.57

At the same time that these photographs of the Parisian
Plate XXVI. Alfred d'Aunay (Liébert). Ruins of the Vendôme Column. 1871.
Plate XXVII. Alfred d'Aunay (Liébert). Ruins of Thiers' Home. 1871.
ruins were being sold, portrait photographs of Communards also began to appear for sale. These portraits were sold individually and in albums that contained brief biographies to accompany the photographs. The eighty-eight portraits in the *Album photographique des membres de la Commune* were identified by brief handwritten references to birthplace, birthdate, occupation, appearance, and arrest record. On the other hand, Jules Clère's volume of biographical sketches, which has several editions, offered critical judgments of the personality and character of each of the Communard leaders. One edition contained several portrait photographs with the biographical accounts; others, without them.

The critical comments in the text combined with the visual portraits to create a negative impression about the Communards and to convey a political interpretation opposed to the ideology of the revolutionaries. For example, Clère included seventy-nine biographical sketches in his book including one of Théophile Ferré accompanied by a portrait taken by Appert (Plate XXVIII). This portrait shows Ferré with a full black beard, glasses, shock of long black hair, and a serious facial expression. Clère described him as:

*a man with miniscule stature, and a face almost covered with a black beard and sideburns from which emerge two glass lenses covering two deep black pupils. But he is even more odd when he speaks. He raises himself on his feet like an angry rooster and crows. Ferré is twenty-six years old. He is a former clerk for a business man. This is an ignorant and incapable man who is imbued with the ideas of 1793 and who would like to return to these sad days which the horrors of the Commune have surpassed.*

The portrait alone gave the viewer the image of an intense, purposeful, and serious young man. Clère's biographical sketch depicted an ignorant and incapable revolutionary leader.
Plate XXVIII. Eugene Appert. Théophile Ferré. 1871.
The immediate flood of photographs on the Commune came to an end by 1873. Until the passage of the more liberal press law of 1881 publication of most images of the Commune or its participants was illegal. By 1881 the interest in the Commune had waned. Not until 1895 was there another album devoted to the reproduction of photographs dealing with the upheaval. Entitled *Paris sous la Commune par un témoin fidèle: la photographie*, this anonymously published album was a collection of photographs published in twenty-six separate installments that sold for thirty centimes each. Numerous photographs in this album were identical or similar to ones published immediately after the Commune. Each was accompanied by a long caption or description which revealed the political convictions of the author and gave a political meaning to the photographs. Compared with the captions and descriptions of earlier works, the texts of this collection were more sympathetic to the Commune.

In contrast to Aunay's description accompanying the image of Thiers' home, the description of a similar photograph in this collection was favorable toward the Commune. Entitled "The Demolition of Thiers' Home" (Plate XXIX), it shows various National Guard members posing on the debris of the house. On the roof of the house several additional workers pose with hammers and shovels that they have used to knock down the walls. Aunay's caption lamented the loss to French culture of this house and its belongings. The later description, however, emphasized that the action was taken in response to Thiers' order to bombard Paris and that those articles that were culturally valuable would be saved or sold for the national interest.

In response to the tears and to the threats of the bomber Thiers and to the edicts of his accomplice, the rural assembly: 1. All linen will be placed at the disposal of the ambulances, 2. All art objects will be sent to libraries and national museums, 3. The furniture will be sold at public auction, 4. The proceedings of the sale
Plate XXIX. Paris sous la Commune par un témoin fidèle: la photographie. Demolition of Thiers' Home. 1871.
The caption, which was an excerpt from the official proclamation concerning Thiers' home, shifted the responsibility for the destruction of the house to Thiers himself in initiating the attack against Paris.

Two photographs published in this series were taken by Appert, including his photo-montage of women prisoners at Versailles and his portrait of Ferré (see Plates XVI and XXVIII). The captions which accompanied these photographs altered the meaning of the photographs from Appert's original work and from Clère's assessment of Ferré. In contrast to the impression of the vulgar, coarse, women in Appert's image, the captions presented the women as dedicated to honorable political goals.

No government, no revolution did as much to relieve the plight of women, and never were women placed so resolutely at the side of men than in the Commune. The women of Paris joined with much energy and in great numbers this political movement, and even shed their blood in abundance. . . . In September, the prisoners were judged before the Fourth Council of War, which assigned soldiers who had no legal experience to defend the unfortunate women.

The caption made the ragged and unrefined women in the photograph idealists fighting for their social and political rights as women and who lacked even competent attorneys to defend them.

The captions with Ferré's portrait gave Ferré a new identity. Clère had described him as an ignorant and incapable revolutionary. Here he became a committed socialist who lived and died for his beliefs. The description accompanying the photograph included excerpts from testimony from Ferré's trial in 1870 for conspiring against the life of Napoleon III and his letter of defense submitted at his later trial, after the Commune. In the first excerpt he courageously shouted his convictions, "I am a socialist, communist, and atheist! When I am the
strongest, beware." In his letter of defense he reiterated his beliefs and defied those who judged him.

As a member of the Commune I am in the hands of its vanquishers; they want my head, which they are going to take! Never! . . . free I have lived, and I intend to die the same way. I add only one more word: fortune is capricious. I confide to the future the care of my memory and my vengeance.63

Two other photographs and captions were critical of the repression of the Commune and its death toll. The photograph entitled "Prisoners" (Plate XXX) portrays a group of five National Guards lying in a heap at the base of a wall after their execution by Versailles troops. The following caption accompanied the photograph.

This single word evokes the saddest memory of this epoch: the summary executions of prisoners which our sinister photograph evokes. To title this document we include the following phrase from the "Proclamation to the Citizens of Paris" posted on April 6, 1871. "The government of Versailles puts itself above the laws of war and humanity, and force will be used against us. If they continue to massacre even one of our soldiers, we will respond with the execution of an equal number or double number of prisoners."64

This caption placed the responsibility for actions of the Commune on the initial atrocities of the Versailles government.

The Commune was simply reacting to the barbarism of its enemies.

In "A Corner of the Morgue in a Hospital" (Plate XXXI), the caption appeared to appeal to humanity in general by denouncing the wanton killing during the final week.

In all the districts where the battle waged, the dead were counted by the thousands. Many were killed on the barricades, before the wall, and under the entrance gate. Humanity became an empty word. Paris was prey during red week to shells, bullets, cries of agony, and death. Several bodies were carried after the action to hospitals by people who were assigned this task, but most were carried on carts to cemeteries where immense pits had been dug. The dead were arranged symmetrically in these tombs, then covered with a thick layer of lime.65
Plate XXX. Paris sous la Commune par un témoin fidèle: la photographie (Marconi). Prisoners. 1871.
Plate XXI. Paris sous la Commune par un témoin fidèle: la photographie. A Corner of the Morgue in a Hospital. 1871.
However, the photograph depicts the cadavers of Communards dressed in working class clothes rather than in army uniforms, indicating that it was the Versailles troops, not the Communards who were the villains.

This series also published a photograph depicting the children imprisoned at Versailles entitled "The Interior of the Chantiers Prison, Children's Quarters" (Plate XXXII). The photograph shows the children in the compound surrounded by guards. The accompanying caption assailed the Versailles government for its treatment of its young prisoners.

All the children arrested in the streets during the week of May were sent to Versailles and held in a section of the women's prison. The report of Captain Guichard counted 651 child prisoners of whom 47 were thirteen years old, 21 were twelve years old, 4 were ten years old, and 1 was seven years old; but it is certain that the number was much higher than this. The photograph here is without a doubt unique; one feels, in spite of himself, taken by pity by the sight of this spectacle and the memory of the severity with which the government treated these unfortunate children, who were almost all orphans or wards of the Commune.66

In 1901, amidst the controversy over the separation of church and state, a second photograph-illustrated book appeared. Written by Armand Dayot, this album also presented captioned photographs that were sympathetic to the Commune. Dayot was a journalist, art critic, and government official during the Third Republic who held several positions in the Ministry of Fine Arts. His political views were radical republican and anti-clerical.67 He saw his role as an historian "to research without prejudice, in all good conscience, the direct cause of this social catastrophe where France saw its children die by the thousands, and to fix responsibility."68 Yet he interpreted the Commune as a reaction to systematic provocation by the Versailles government. Inspite of this he still deplored the senseless killing on both sides and sought "to evoke in all hearts the love of poor
Plate XXXII. Paris sous la Commune par un témoin fidèle: la photographie. Interior of the Chantiers Prison, Children's Quarters. 1871.
humanity and hate for those who, for the triumph of their appetites and ambition, pitiously exploit man's ignorance, passion, and misery.69

Dayot illustrated his book with numerous photographs that had originally appeared during or immediately after the Commune, including images by Braquehais and Appert. Dayot combined Braquehais' photograph of the Communards standing around the statue of Napoleon from the Vendôme Column (see Plate V) with an excerpt from the Journal officiel de la Commune. This caption justified the destruction of the column as both a patriotic and moral action.

The decree of the Commune which ordered the demolition of the Vendôme Column was carried out yesterday to the acclamation of a large, serious, reflective, and assisting crowd. It was the fall of an odious monument raised to the false glory of a monster's ambition. The first Bonaparte immolated thousands of children in his thirst for domination and slaughtered the Republic after swearing to protect it. . . . The Paris Commune had the duty to demolish this symbol of despotism in order to replenish itself. It proves that the Commune places law above force and prefers justice to murder. . . .70

Dayot expressed his approval of the destruction by placing this caption under the photograph. In doing so he gave the participants in this photograph a moral righteousness which legitimized their action.

Dayot also reproduced Appert's series in his volume. However, he pointed out that these composite photographs did not present an accurate account of the events which they depicted.71 Yet his captions accompanying these photographs altered the meaning of the images, making them more sympathetic to the Commune. For example, the caption with the photograph depicting Darboy in his cell (see Plate XI) placed the responsibility for his imprisonment and execution on Thiers' government. Dayot stated, . . .

It is good to recall here in the interests of history that the exchange of the Archbishop of Paris and lesser echelons
of ecclesiastics was offered to Thiers for the release of Blanqui. . . . Thiers, who wanted to push the insurgents to extreme measures, refused to accept the offer of the unfortunate prelate. . . .

Similarly, he stressed the circumstances surrounding the actual execution of the Archbishop (see Plate XIII). He concluded that Appert's photograph distorted the truth of the incident by presenting Ferré as the leader of the execution. Dayot absolved any individual from moral responsibility for the crime by blaming the executions on the irrationality of the crowd.

If the abominable tragedies of the Roquette and Rue Haxo provoke horror in all hearts where respect for human life reigns, it is with great caution that I place the responsibility for this odious massacre on the blind exasperations of the crowd, so easily cruel, and not on the chiefs. Ferré, who accepted the responsibility for all his actions, nevertheless denied all participation in the Roquette massacre. . . . The photograph belongs to a series where historical truth is sacrificed for the picturesque and fantastic. Ferré did not assist in the execution.

Dayot also attributed the massacre of hostages on the Rue Haxo to the irrational fury of the crowd. To Appert's photo-montage (see Plate XV), he appended the following observation.

At this last hour of the struggle, with Paris burning and blood running in the streets, no sentiment of generosity existed in the crazed and exasperated crowd. . . . The specter hovered over this crazed mob, from which cries of hate, vengeance, and massacre arose. Varlin and a member of the Central Committee from this sector swore at the most violent and strove to save the prisoners. Mounted on a small wall of an enclosure where the victims had been pushed, they waved their red scarves and tried in vain to appease this mob transformed into a herd of ferocious beasts. From then on all attempts at saving the hostages were useless.

This caption was more compatible with Appert's actual photograph than any of Dayot's other captions accompanying Appert's works because the photograph also reflects the vengeance of a nameless and faceless crowd. Appert's photo-montage shows no
single identifiable figure in the crowd but focuses on the victims. Dayot, on the other hand, did not identify the victims nor discuss their courage or fear in facing the firing squad. His intention was to explain the thirst for vengeance in the crowd as the result of executions and reprisals carried out by Versailles troops. The crowd members became less individually responsible for their actions and more the victims of the anger and killing of the final week itself.

Dayot also provided a caption to Appert's photo-montage "The Execution of Gustave Chaudey" (see Plate XII). The picture shows Chaudey protesting his execution. Dayot described the execution and included a quote attributed to Chaudey on March 18, when the Commune was proclaimed.

On March 18, in the offices of Le Siècle, learning of the events on Montmartre, Chaudey had said to Claretie and other journalists: "So much the better! This revolution will oblige us to cut off that stalk of the party which has always carried away the head." Imprudent words! He forgot that the politicians who wanted to eliminate the stalk of the party spoke the same language as those fanatics who wanted to decapitate it.

This caption altered the moral and political meaning of the photograph. Chaudey was no longer a martyr to the republican cause executed by extremists in his own party, but a scheming politician who would have done the same thing to his political adversaries if he had the opportunity.

Although Dayot's book and Paris sous la Commune par un témoin fidèle: la photographie were both more sympathetic to the Commune than previous publications illustrated with photographs, neither book was socialist in its political orientation. Dayot was an officeholder in the Third Republic, and his political extremism went only so far as instigating the erection of monuments to anti-clerical leaders in the highly religious département of
Bretagne. There was no authorship attributed to the other book and no introductory statements about the political beliefs of the anonymous authors. Neither book, however, portrayed the Commune as an embryonic form of a democratic workers' state, as did communist and socialist interpretations of the Commune at the end of the century. Rather these two works reflected the republican position that the Communards committed atrocious crimes in the execution of their hostages, but the Versailles government committed far worse crimes. The books emphasized the human tragedy that surrounded the Commune, the idealism of some of its leaders, the social and political rights that it attempted to win, and the blind passions that overcame members of both sides. This less one-sided interpretation contrasted sharply with the earlier photographs and captions but also reflected the evolution of public opinion of the Commune.

On the other hand, the photographs and captions from earlier versions published immediately after the insurrection reflected the state of public opinion at that time. According to the historian George Tersen, the experiences of the Commune and the memories of these events were transformed into a myth, which took on a quasi-mystical form for the middle and rural classes. This led to a one-sided interpretation, which over-simplified participants and events.

The Communards are no longer men having wives and children, thinking, loving, suffering, and fighting for well-defined goals; they are instead like devils, coming from hell and going everywhere, leaving in their wake theft, ruin, and blood. The Commune, which was essentially a political and social movement, became a sort of apocalypse.77

Among the widely accepted myths were the view of the Commune as treason before the Prussian enemy, as a conspiracy of foreign communist forces under the International, and as a combination of brutal murderers out to destroy the social, religious, and political order.78
The photographs which appeared immediately after the fighting supported these interpretations and provided visual evidence to substantiate it. Appert's photo-montages, for example, depicted only the Communard executions and presented the Communards as cold-blooded murderers. Given the lack of knowledge that the public had about the production of false composite photographs, one historian of the Commune surmised that the public believed that these fabrications were real photographs of the actual events.\(^79\) The remaining captioned photographs which depicted the ruins also contributed to the myths by showing only the destruction attributed to the Communards. These pictures generated such emotional reactions that the French government banned selected images from sale in the months after the fighting. This censorship will be examined in the following chapter, together with an analysis of the Versailles government's attempt to use photographs to identify suspected Communards.
Notes


3. The centenary produced several illustrated books devoted to the imagery of the Commune: Michel Lhospice, La Guerre de 1870 et la Commune en 1000 images (Paris: 1965); Charles Feld and Francois Hincker, Paris au front de l'insurgé. La Commune en images (Paris: 1971); La Commune de Paris 1871 dans le livre et l'image (Brussels: 1971). The single article on photography during the Commune is marked by left-wing political bias: Jean-Claude Gautrand, "Les Photographes et la Commune," Photo-Ciné Revue (February, 1972), pp. 53-63.


6. The Cabinet des Estampes et de Photographie at the Bibliothèque nationale has an especially large collection of photographs in individual albums or folios and within the Collection de Vinck and Collection Histoire de France. The collections at the Bibliothèque historique de la Ville de Paris, the Musée Carnavalet, and the Musée d'Art et d'Histoire de Saint-Denis are also important.


13 Archives nationales (cited hereafter as AN), BB\textsuperscript{24} 754, Demandes des Grâces, Dossier 5544.

14 In advertisement, Le Charivari, July 2, 1871, p. 4.

15 In illustration, L'Illustration, June 17, 1871, pp. 340-41.


17 Braquehais, Paris pendant la Commune (Paris: n.d.). This is an album containing ninety-two photographs located in the Bibliothèque nationale.


19 Soria, La Commune; Bourgin, La Guerre; Bruhat, Dautry, and Tersen, La Commune.


21 Ibid., p. 63.

22 Michel Winock and Jean Pierre Azéma, Les Communaards (Paris: 1964), p. 120.


26 Winock and Azéma, Les Communaards, p. 113.


28 Soria, La Commune; Bourgin, La Guerre; Bruhat, Dautry, and Tersen, La Commune.


31 Œuvre de Eugène Appert (Paris: n.d.). This collection is in the Bibliothèque nationale.

33 Ibid., pp. 59, 417.


37 Ibid., p. 330.


39 Ibid., p. 373.


42 Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: 1977), pp. 106-9. She points out that photographs always have a certain aesthetic appeal in addition to any political message conveyed by the subject matter of the photograph or its caption.


45 Sontag, *On Photography*, p. 108. She observes that even though photographs have an intrinsic aesthetic appeal, captions alter the political meaning of the image.


47 Ibid.


50 Moreau, Guide, p. 69.


52 Ibid., p. 5.

53 Ibid., pp. 5-6.


56 Ibid., p. 5.

57 Ibid.

58 Album photographique des membres de la Commune (n.l., n.d.). This album is located at the Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris, 286/43.

59 Jules Clère, Les Hommes de la Commune. Biographie complète (Paris, 1871), n.p. This album is located at the Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris, 347/10.


61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid. This photograph is attributed to a photographer named Marconi. Although this album presents the photograph as a picture of the massacre of prisoners, the source given in Marconi's folio at the Bibliothèque nationale indicates that the photograph is that of soldiers killed at the battle of Buzenval on January 19, 1871.

65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.


69 Ibid., p. 230.

70 Ibid., p. 281.

71 Ibid., p. 3.

72 Ibid., p. 286.

73 Ibid., p. 311.

74 Ibid., p. 313.

75 Ibid., p. 301.


CHAPTER III

PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE PARIS COMMUNE 1871:
CENSORSHIP AND IDENTIFICATION

The numerous photographs in circulation after the Commune conveyed political messages to the viewer that kept bitter memories alive and slowed the healing of the political wounds of the civil war. The portrait photographs of individual Communards and group portraits of insurgents on the barricades also provided the government with visual evidence about the participants in the events. If widely dispersed, these pictures could be useful in identifying suspected Communards who had escaped the initial roundup of insurgents during the final week of fighting. This chapter deals with the government's involvement in these issues. The first section describes the attempt immediately after the fighting to stop the sale and distribution of photographs related to the Commune. Secondly, it considers the use of photographs by the Versailles government and Paris police for identification purposes. It assesses the effectiveness of this identification method and describes the police system developed to resolve the problem of mistaken identity.

Photographs in circulation immediately after the Commune included portraits of the Communards and their victims, Appert's photo-montages, pictures of the barricades and their defenders, and photographs of the ruins in Paris. They appeared as individual prints, in albums, and in illustrated weekly magazines such as L'Illustration as engravings adapted from photographs. Lithographs, engravings, medallions, and other illustrations of the events and participants also were sold after the fighting. The Paris police reacted to this deluge of images by reviving and
enforcing Article 22 of the Decree of April 17, 1852, which required that all images, including photographs, be authorized by the Ministry of the Interior or departmental Prefect before sale or free distribution. The Government of National Defense had declared the press free on September 10, 1870, but it did not repeal the decree of 1852. Anyone who wanted to print or sell newspapers, books, or illustrations simply registered with the Ministry of the Interior. During the two sieges of Paris the decree had not been enforced, and illustrations, newspapers, books, and other printed materials poured from the presses.

Enforcement of the decree started soon after the fighting ended. Failure to obtain authorization and subsequent sale or distribution of photographs were punishable by a one-month to one-year prison sentence and a one hundred to one thousand franc fine. As early as June 30, 1871, the Prefecture of Police in Paris received a letter from V. Thiery, a merchant of optical goods on the Boulevard de Strasbourg, complaining of the police orders to stop his sale of Communard portrait photographs. Thiery protested that the prohibition would hurt his business, which depended upon the sale of portraits and landscape photographs. He obeyed the order because he did not want to incriminate himself or appear sympathetic to the Commune, but he claimed that seven other merchants in the immediate vicinity to his shop still sold similar portraits, and he objected to discrimination against himself. Thiery provided police with a list of the shops that were engaging in business forbidden to him—several photograph shops, a tobacco shop, a necktie shop, and the bookstore of the newspaper Le Petit Journal. By July 8 the police had ordered them to cease the unauthorized display and sale of Communard portrait photographs.

The Ministry of the Interior followed-up the reinforcement of the decree of 1852 with a new decree on street vendors. It
required all street vendors, hawkers, and travelling peddlers to obtain the ministry's authorization before selling any written or visual products. The authorization was valid only for the department in which it was granted and could be revoked at any time if circumstances demanded. To obtain the authorization the peddler presented a birth certificate and a certificate from the police in his district testifying to his political support for the government and his morality and paid a fee. In its instructions to police the ministry called for strict enforcement of the decree and warned of the likely appearance of seditious materials.

I call your attention to immoral and seditious writings and images which are often the object of the peddling business after troubled times [wrote the minister], you should exercise the most rigorous surveillance at this time; do not limit yourself to requesting the exhibition of the permit, but search the packs, boxes, and wagons of the peddler.4

Illegal sale of the photographs continued despite the decrees. Merchants on the Boulevard Saint-Michel and the Rue de Rivoli openly sold unauthorized photographs until the police ordered them to stop.5 Proceeds from the sale of the pictures made illegal sales worth the risk of potentially heavy fines and prison sentences. The Ministry of the Interior, however, did not deny all requests for authorizations. Selected photographers such as Appert and Pierre Petit received permission to sell their photographs, if they stamped the pictures with their names and addresses. The government then knew exactly who produced the pictures and where the photographers could be found if further control were necessary.

Even the limited freedom in circulation of these photographs led to abuses that eventually resulted in legal suits to halt the sale of certain portraits. In August, 1871, the well-known pianist and composer Henri Dombrowski sued the photographer
Pierre Petit for 100,000 francs damages to his reputation resulting from the sale of his portrait. Petit had taken Dombrowski's portrait before the Commune. After the upheaval Dombrowski found his photograph displayed in several shop windows labelled as the dead Communard General Ladislas Dombrowski and surrounded by portraits of other Communard leaders. Petit sold approximately 200,000 of these photographs to merchants and individuals at one franc apiece, prompting one newspaper reporter to observe:

In fact, the portrait of Dombrowski is so well-known that I am surprised that this pianist-composer has not been arrested on the street as being the Communard general, who mistakenly was thought to have been killed.6

Henri Dombrowski also sued the weekly magazine L'Illustration for 20,000 francs because it published an engraving adapted from this portrait. It also altered the engraving so that Dombrowski appeared in a general's uniform rather than in civilian clothes. Dombrowski sued the author of a book entitled Histoire de la Commune, which included a copy of the engraving from L'Illustration.7

Petit argued in court that he was not responsible for the mistaken identity, the sale of the portrait under the false name, nor the adverse effects to Dombrowski's reputation. It was not his fault, he claimed, if 200,000 people thought that Henri Dombrowski was really the Communard general. The police discovered, however, when an undercover policeman requested a portrait of General Dombrowski at Petit's shop, that Petit was responsible for the false identity. Petit sold the policeman a photograph of the pianist, while selling the identical photograph under the pianist's real name in an album titled Galerie des artistes. The court ruled that Petit owed damages because he willingly sold the portrait to the various merchants and to L'Illustration as a portrait of the general. The court ordered Petit to pay 3,000 francs to Dombrowski and to publish a likeness of the pianist in
two journals with the pianist's real name and an explanation of the mistaken identity. Neither *L'Illustration* nor the author of the book on the Commune was assessed damages because both had bought the portrait in good faith that it was General Dombrowski.  

The potentially large profits from the widespread sale of Communard portraits were evident in a legal suit involving Eugene Appert. Appert had received permission from the government to photograph Communard leaders imprisoned at Versailles. These portraits later provided the heads for Appert's photo-montages but also were sold separately. He registered these pictures with the Ministry of Interior and obtained authorization to sell them. On October 19, 1871, he sued the weekly journal *Le Monde illustré* for publishing twenty-four engraved portraits adapted from his photographs, alleging that the journal had not obtained his permission to publish the pictures. He had invested 8,000 francs in the production of his collection of portraits, and he expected large profits from their sale. The publication of the portraits in *Le Monde illustré*, however, jeopardized this expectation. Appert wanted 50,000 francs compensation for the loss of anticipated profits.  

The attorney for *Le Monde illustré* argued that Appert's photographs were printed and sold widely by other photographers. Therefore, he held, the journal was not responsible for Appert's loss of sales. Moreover, he continued, the publication of the portraits actually benefitted Appert because it provided free publicity for his collection.

The civil court ruled nearly a year later that the journal was innocent of Appert's charges. Evidence presented by the editor of the journal showed that Appert had originally submitted the photographs to *Le Monde illustré* for publication, but owing to a technical mistake his name did not accompany the portraits in the final issue. The journal credited Appert for his works in its next issue but not before the police confiscated the
engravings from the offices and Appert filed suit. The court denied his charge that the publication of the portraits hurt his future sales. Appert had already allowed La Petite Presse to publish similar engravings and had volunteered his portraits to Le Monde illustré. The court reasoned that Appert sought to increase his sales by allowing the journal to advertise the existence of his photographs.  

These two law suits revealed the popularity and wide distribution of portrait photographs but also reflected the abuses that could arise from efforts to capitalize on public demand for the pictures. Soon after the trials the Military Governor of Paris, General Ladmirault, banned unconditionally the sale, exhibition, and peddling of these photographs. Using the power given to him under the state of siege which still officially prevailed in Paris, the general on December 28, 1871, issued a decree that stated,

The exhibition, sale, or peddling of all drawings, photographs, and emblems that disturb the public peace are forbidden. Especially forbidden are portraits of individuals under prosecution or convicted for their participation in the insurrection.

The images that were said to disturb the public peace included scenes depicting the actions by the Commune, its defenders, committee meetings or demonstrations by the Communard government, and all images of the repression by Versailles. Although Appert initially had received authorization to sell his photo-montages, Ladmirault's order reversed this authorization and prevented future sales of these photographs. The only photographs to escape the censorship were "purely artistic" pictures depicting the ruins and fires in Paris. On November 25, 1872, similar orders went to the police in all departments, establishing nationwide censorship of most photographs related to the Commune.

Several months of vigilant enforcement passed before the
police succeeded in stopping the circulation of these images. The dealers were so scattered, and they operated in such unusual ways, that enforcement was difficult. On October 16, 1872, police arrested a grocer named François Morin for selling Appert's photo-montages. He was convicted and fined 100 francs. One year later he requested a reduction of the fine because he had five children to support and could not afford to pay. Investigation then indicated that Morin was an innocent victim of an advertising campaign that used Appert's photographs to attract customers. He sold a brand of tapioca that included these photographs inside the package as a bonus to the purchaser. Morin testified that he ordered the tapioca and not the photographs, although he was aware that some type of photograph was included inside each package. The police investigation showed that Morin did not participate in the Commune or hold any radical political opinions. His request for leniency was granted. The incident indicated the extent of government concern over these photographs and revealed their mass distribution in unexpected commercial ways.\textsuperscript{13}

The harsh penalties for the sale of these photographs were matched by the diligence of the police in enforcing the ministry's order. As late as 1874 the Paris police continued to investigate thoroughly all leads and tips about the sale of the photographs. The police received from a London agent a report of an English dealer purchasing Communard portraits in London and selling them to eager customers in Paris. Although the investigation failed to discover the English merchant, it went on for three months in both Paris and London, a measure of police concern with stopping trade in illegal photographs.\textsuperscript{14}

The censorship of photographs and other visual images depicting the people and events of the Commune reflected the government's fear of their unsettling political effects. But the
portrait photographs appealed to conservatives who opposed the Commune because they provided an additional means for understanding the character and motivation of the revolutionaries. The journalist Ernest Legouvé observed that the attraction of these portraits was more than simple curiosity and frivolous distraction; for many they were clues in a search for the human soul. People were judged solely by their actions, but a criminal was often more or less villainous that his crime. For Legouvé the portrait photograph provided an additional, deeper insight,

... the photograph gives us the relationship and proportion between what a man does and what he really is. The photograph is the last witness, it does not tell us everything but attenuates, rectifies, and completes other testimonies.\textsuperscript{15}

Even those of Appert's images that depicted mainly Communards' crimes came under the government's ban. This censorship of photographs that supported the government's political position testified to the power that the government thought the photographs had on the viewer. The photo-montages provided portraits and recreated events that reminded people of the violence and death associated with the Commune and its repression. One way to veil those memories and to reduce the chances of recurrence of such violence was to ban those images that depicted the deeds and actions regardless of whether they supported the government's position on the Commune.

Only photographs of the ruins taken from a "purely artistic" viewpoint escaped censorship. These pictures were published freely after the decree of December 28, 1871, with captions highly critical of the Communards. These photographs did not "disturb the public peace," as did portraits or Appert's photo-montages. Ladmirault judged that their non-political aesthetic influence outweighed any political feelings which could be generated or reinforced by viewing the ruins. Moreover, neither the
pictures nor their captions posed any threat to the political order.

The Versailles government and the Paris police used photograph as a means of identification of suspected Communards. As early as April 24, 1871, the police in Le Havre requested from Versailles portrait photographs of the major figures in the Paris insurrection so that the police could use them in the surveillance of departing ships. Since numerous Communards were well-known Parisian personalities before the Commune, portrait photographs were not difficult to obtain. By May 19, before the final semaine sanglante, the police had paid more than 1,000 francs for approximately 2,500 portraits of insurgents still in Paris. Immediately after the fighting the police used group portraits of barricade defenders taken during the siege in addition to individual portraits. Copies were sent to police in areas where escaped Communards were thought likely to hide, and to railroad stations, ports, and frontier posts. The police in the largely working-class Nineteenth Arrondissement in northeastern Paris and the Gare du Nord were the first to receive entire collections. By the third week of June the Paris police had spent 3,510 francs for reproductions of these photographs.

Locating a Communard from a photograph was a difficult and time-consuming process. Although many were well-known in Paris before the Commune, positive identification by photograph required adequate resemblance between the portrait and the person's appearance in reality. Disguises such as beards, long hair, glasses, and clothes obscured a figure's appearance in a portrait photograph. A comparison of Gustave Courbet's portrait (Plate XXXIII) with a group portrait surrounding the toppled statue of Napoleon (see Plate V) indicates the problem in establishing a positive identification from a barricade photograph. Jean Claude
Plate XXXIII. Gustave Courbet. ca. 1871.
Gautrand, a photographer and historian of the Commune, identified Courbet in the latter photograph. The alleged Courbet is in the middle of the second row; he wears a full beard and what appears to be a hood. Comparing the portrait of Courbet to this photograph shows only a slight resemblance between the two figures.

Identification of an individual in a barricade photograph was not positive evidence that the individual supported the Commune or fought with the insurgents. Identification mistakes occurred and resulted in disastrous consequences for persons arrested. Adrien Huart satirized this situation in an article published in Le Charivari after the fighting.

As always some imbeciles are caught in the net. Mister X is one of them. He did not even serve in the Communard batalions, but one day he saw a photographer set up his camera before a barricade on the street. He then said to himself "I'm going to have my portrait taken for nothing." He went, changed into his National Guard uniform, and returned to the street. Posing beside a cannon with a ferocious air, he seemed to be saying "Try to take my cannon, you alien species from Versailles!"

The photographer took the picture of the barricade and its defenders. The photograph was excellent. Yesterday three police agents came to Mister X's house with copies of this photograph. "We come to arrest you," they said. "But I have done nothing," replied Mister X. "You defended a barricade, here is your portrait. We followed you for several days and finally identified you," responded the police.

Mister X could do nothing and he even had a copy of this photograph, which he bought for twenty sous, on his fireplace mantle. Today he is at Versailles in the cells of the Orangerie.

In a city the size of Paris matching an unidentified person with an anonymous photograph required time and effort. Yet police made the attempt. In October, 1871, a policeman received from an anonymous man a portrait photograph with the inscription, "portrait of an assassin and incendiary." The sender claimed
that he found the portrait on the Avenue Champs-Élysée. The police took the portrait to the original photographer for identification. The photographer determined that the portrait was taken before the Commune. He refused to pursue the matter further because a complete search of his files would take two weeks, which he could not spare from his business. The police then circulated the photograph to various police stations with no results. After two months they closed the investigation without having identified or located the suspected Communard. 21

In a similar incident a photograph played a part in a hoax upon the Paris police. Four years after the Commune the police received an anonymous letter accompanied by a portrait photograph of a National Guard captain. The portrait, according to the letter, represented an unapprehended Communard leader who still violently opposed the government. The informant offered an address at which the captain worked as a haberdasher and suggested that the man could be easily apprehended. Leaving no stone unturned in the round-up of Communards, the police thoroughly investigated the tip. The inclusion of the photograph in the letter gave the tip legitimacy since the police had both visual evidence and an address for the suspected Communard. The portrait had been made by a Parisian photographer who in 1871 had moved to Mâcon leaving no photographs or negatives to his successor. The address provided by the tip did not house a haberdashery nor did anyone in the vicinity recognize the portrait. After six weeks the police ended the unproductive investigation. 22

Without this photograph the investigation would have ended much earlier and with less fruitless labor. The added incentive provided by the photograph kept the police investigating.

The mass arrests after the Commune also created identification problems. General Appert, Chef de la Justice militaire at Versailles, estimated that 38,000 persons were arrested; the
actual number was probably closer to 50,000. Approximately 28,000 of those arrested were sent to forts, prisons, and islands off the west coast of France, while the rest remained in makeshift prisons at Versailles. Their identification was often difficult because thousands lacked identification papers. Nevertheless, in cases where the prisoners refused to identify themselves and had no official identification papers, judicial officers cross-examined the Communards to determine their identity.

This sudden influx of suspects into custody and the difficulty in establishing the identity of many provided a lesson to government officials for the future. The prison sentences were intended to punish, not to reform; the government did not expect to change the political convictions of the Communards in prison. The Minister of the Navy and Colonies observed,

It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the convictions and decisions of the various tribunals strike at individuals who are alternately free and in prison, and who are repeatedly in revolt against society and its discipline.24

They were likely to reappear in the court system, but without a more effective means of identification they would probably go unrecognized. Those rearrested often used false names and did not carry proper identification papers. To reduce this difficulty in the future the Minister of the Navy and Colonies ordered the maritime prefects, in whose jurisdiction numerous Communards were held prisoner, to photograph all prisoners sentenced to more than six months.25

As early as 1863 the Inspector General of Prisons had proposed the systematic photographing of prisoners. The Minister of the Interior denied the request on the grounds that a prisoner's original sentence did not specify an identification portrait. The appearance of the human face changed so much over
the years, especially with changes in beard and hair, that photographs seemed unlikely to be very useful for identification. The Minister of Interior also feared the misuse of the photographs by irresponsible police agents who would have access to them. 26

To solve the concern over the change of visual appearance, the Minister of the Navy and Colonies in his order to the maritime prefects required two full-face front view portraits of each prisoner's head with trimmed hair and clean-shaven face. One copy remained at the prison; the second went to the ministry. To prevent possible abuses of the photographs the minister ordered that no reproductions of the portraits be made without written approval from the prefect in each case. 27

In February 1872, the Minister of War applied the same system to soldiers convicted of participation in the Commune and sentenced to six months or more in prison. He and the Commandant General of the Department of the Seine-and-Oise recommended to the Minister of the Interior a similar procedure for all convicted Communards. The Inspector General of Prisons also advised a reappraisal of the decision made in 1863 not to employ photography in the prisons. Finally, in April 1872, the Director of Public Security in the Ministry of Interior agreed that the advantages of identification photographs outweighed the objections to them. He observed that the photographic descriptions constituted a precious means of future control of criminals convicted of political sedition. 28 With his approval identification photography became a regular process in all state prisons and local jails.

Throughout the remainder of the decade photographs of incarcerated prisoners accumulated in prison and police offices. By 1881 the Prefecture of Police in Paris had a collection of 50,000 portraits of those jailed in the previous decade. 29 The utility of these photographs for identification and investigation
remained limited. Each prison and police station hired a professional photographer to take the portraits, resulting in a variety of styles attributable to varying equipment, photographic processes, and attitudes about the purpose of the photograph. Commercial photographers were guided by artistic considerations in which they attempted to capture the inner character rather than the physical likeness of the sitter. Fashion and taste also influenced their final product. These factors affected the pose and lighting of the identification portrait. Moreover, artistic attitudes and styles changed over the years, reducing the utility of photographs for comparative purposes.

In 1879 while working as a transcriber at the Prefecture of Police in Paris Alphonse Bertillon recognized the difficulty of using such diverse photographs. He developed a system of identification photography intended to provide uniformity to police photographs. Bertillon first clarified the purpose of this type of photography,

The designated goal is . . . to produce an image with the most physical resemblance to the sitter . . . and one that is easy to recognize and to identify with the original prisoner.30

This goal necessitated a uniform procedure, equipment, lighting, and pose for every judicial identification photograph taken in France. Believing that the nose and ear profiles of an individual changed least in appearance over the years, Bertillon recommended both a full-face front view and a profile view.

A comparison of two photographs of the same prisoner shows the difference between a view taken under Bertillon's system and a commercial photograph typical of those portraits that filled the police files in the 1870s (Plate XXXIV). The left photograph is a profile view taken by police photographers using Bertillon's system. This picture reveals the clear outline of the nose and ear. The right photograph was taken by a commercial photographer
Plate XXXIV. Alphonse Bertillon. Police and Commercial Portraits of a Prisoner. 1890.

Plate XXXV. Alphonse Bertillon. Police Identification Portraits. 1890.
and does not provide a clear view of either feature. Physical resemblance exists between the men in the two photographs, but without other corroborating evidence such as unusual facial features absolute identification is uncertain.

Bertillon's new system, however, was not completely dependable for identification. The resemblance is also slight between two full-faced photographs of the same prisoner taken at different times using Bertillon's system (Plate XXXV). In the left picture the prisoner's long hair and beard cover most of his face and ears. The right view shows the same man without the beard and hair obstructing his features. The physical resemblance between the two exists around the eyes and nose. When only two front-face portraits existed in police files, Bertillon recommended that the police place a paper mask over the beard portion of the face so that just the eyes and nose were revealed. Positive identification from this technique is impossible, however.

The attitude of an individual also affected his police portrait. Although both full-face front and profile poses existed for the young prisoner depicted in Plates XXXVI and XXXVII, the difference between the first and second set of pictures taken six months apart prevents absolute identification. When this adolescent was first arrested, he completely obeyed the instructions of the photographer and neutrally observed the camera. During the six months before his next arrest the young man changed his name, associated with other known criminals, and became psychologically hardened by his life on the street. Before the camera for the second time, he sneered at the photographers, and the front view in Plate XXXVII shows an arrogant and disrespectful expression. A comparison of the two profile views shows marked similarity in the nose outline, but the different facial expressions and hair lengths obscure the resemblance.
Plate XXXVI. Alphonse Bertillon. Police Identification Portraits, Raoul upon His First Arrest. 1890.

Plate XXXVII. Alphonse Bertillon. Police Identification Portraits, Raoul upon His Second Arrest. 1890.
Identifying a living person from a photograph required that the person's facial appearance match his previous appearance when the portrait was taken. Bertillon, however, found that showing a photograph to a prisoner and observing his reactions could provide a useful clue.

Rule without exception: if it is his photograph, the detainee will examine it for a long time to see if it resembles him. If it is not his portrait, the subject will immediately recognize the error and tell you to examine the photograph with more care.33

The use of photographs to identify a suspect circulating unknown in a city also proved unreliable. A policeman comparing a photograph to every stranger on the street raised suspicions among the population. Therefore, the policeman had to memorize the image of the suspect before beginning his search. Mistakes resulted from the non-resemblance of the original photograph to the current appearance of the suspect and from the policeman's inability to recall the face in the portrait with sufficient accuracy. Accurate recollection required special knowledge of human physical traits and features. Bertillon wrote that,

The agent in charge of a mission as difficult as finding and arresting a criminal with the aid of a photograph ought to be able to describe from memory the facial appearance of the one he pursues. This is the best way to prove to his superiors that he has memorized the portrait confided to him.34

Presentation of suspects' photographs to the public resulted in few positive identifications. Opinions often varied among witnesses presented with a portrait photograph of a suspect. To improve the reliability Bertillon suggested placing the suspect's portrait among several others and requesting the witness to choose the correct picture.35

The organization of the photograph collections housed in the police stations and prisons across France hindered the
identification of fugitives rearrested at another date. Each collection was arranged alphabetically by the name of the criminal. In many cases when a suspect was arrested and questioned about his identity he gave an assumed name. The photograph in the collection was useless in this situation as a check on the suspect's previous criminal record or on whether he was wanted elsewhere for another crime.

Bertillon proposed a new organization of the photograph collections to solve this problem. He urged that vital statistics be taken on each person arrested for a crime. These included classifications of sex, height, head size, eye color, skin color, nose size and shape, arm size, torso size, bust size, and foot size. These measurements were unique to mature adults and did not change with age. Copies of an offender's portrait photograph were then placed in files that corresponded with each possible measurement in each classification. For classifications without numerical measurements such as ear, mouth, and nose shape Bertillon made systematic illustrations and descriptions of these features so that the photographs could be placed in the correct category. When the police arrested someone, they measured and photographed the person and then compared the photograph to other portraits filed under the identical measurements. In this manner the police could identify a former convict by features that did not change significantly. The system also offered the possibility of making the thousands of photographs manageable and useful to the police.36

In 1882 the Prefecture of Police in Paris instituted Bertillon's new system. In the first year forty-nine individuals who had given false names upon arrest were discovered to be recidivists. In 1884 the number jumped to 241 and in the third year to 450.37

Although the system proved successful in identifying common
criminals, judicial and police officials showed little interest in it until Bertillon used it to identify an anarchist named Ravachol. In 1884 Ravachol threw a bomb into an apartment building where a procureur of the Republic lived. A crowd apprehended Ravachol and beat him until the police arrived. They moved the disfigured and dazed man to Bertillon's office. After taking his measurements, Bertillon identified him with an earlier photograph in the files and established that Ravachol had been arrested numerous times for revolutionary activities. This identification impressed Bertillon's superiors and firmly established his system in French police work. With the development of this "anthropological" system the identification improved, and photography became an efficient method used by the police to maintain information on and control over the population.
Notes


2 Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris (cited hereafter as APP), BA/365-3, Commune de Paris, June 30, 1871.

3 Ibid., July 8, 1871.

4 APP, BA/1621, Presse et Censure, October 15, 1871.

5 APP, BA/365-4, Commune de Paris, October 23 and 31, 1871.

6 Jules Moïnax, "Revue comique des tribunaux," Le Charivari, August 7, 1871, p. 3.


8 Ibid.


10 Ibid.


12 Recueil officiel des circulaires, p. 289.

13 Archives nationales (cited hereafter as AN), BB H 793, Demandes des Grâces, Dossier 5606.

14 APP, BA/365-5, Commune de Paris, February 9, 1874.


16 APP, BA/364-5, Commune de Paris, April 24, 1871.

17 APP, BA/365-1, Commune de Paris, May 19, 1871.

18 APP, BA/365-2, Commune de Paris, June 19, 1871.


21 APP, BA/365-5, Commune de Paris, October 30, 1871; January 2, 1872.

22 APP, BA/365-5; Commune de Paris, October 11, 1875.


24 AN, F 12708, Photographies des condamnés, August 11, 1871.

25 Ibid.

26 AN, F 12708, Photographies des condamnés, November 30, 1873.

27 AN, F 12708, Photographies des condamnés, August 11, 1871.

28 AN, F 12708, Photographies des condamnés, February 29, 1872; March 30, 1872; April 10, 1872.


30 Alphonse Bertillon, La Photographie judiciaire (Paris: 1890), p. 11.

31 Ibid., p. 31.

32 Ibid., p. 16.

33 Ibid., p. 32.

34 Ibid., p. 37.


36 Bertillon, Une application, passim.

CHAPTER IV

PHOTOGRAPHY AND BONAPARTISM, 1871-1900

Bonapartism became a serious challenge to the newly established Third Republic during the years after Sedan. Propaganda generated interest among old adherents of the Empire and others opposed to the new republic, and photography played a major role in this propaganda, providing widely-circulated pictures of the Emperor and his family. They kept memories of the Empire alive, and together with the written word they were the principal instruments of propaganda used by the Bonapartists to re-establish their political popularity in France.

The Imperial family had long employed printed propaganda for political purposes. Pamphlets, bulletins, circulars, posters, and various visual images were often distributed by Napoleon I and Napoleon III. During the Second Empire Napoleon III frequently sat before the camera alone or with his family, government officials, and military commanders. The resulting photographs appeared for sale along with portraits of members of the Napoleonic nobility, and they adorned shop windows and homes throughout France. After the defeat at Sedan Napoleon III continued this tradition, and photography resumed its primary place in the arsenal of propaganda techniques.

To prepare France for his return Napoleon III, living in exile in England, sent his former "Vice-Emperor," Eugène Rouher, to Paris in August 1871, to re-establish the Imperial party and to initiate activities that would increase support for it. Rouher set up a group of former Bonapartists called the comité comptabilité to coordinate this effort. It included an agency in Paris, at 146 Rue Montmartre, which arranged for the publication and
distribution of photographs, pamphlets, other non-periodical materials, and the Correspondance Mansard, a primitive form of wire service to provincial newspapers. Other sections of the organization were responsible for financing Parisian and departmental newspapers, establishing local Bonapartist committees in towns and villages, and arranging for meetings and demonstrations.

Propaganda by photograph and pamphlet played a large role in the campaign because newspaper circulation failed to meet the propaganda needs. From 1872 to 1876 the circulation of the seven largest Bonapartist Parisian dailies declined everywhere in France, even in areas of the southwest, where Imperial popularity was high. Similarly Napoleon III's goal of establishing a local Bonapartist paper in every department fell short because money was lacking to subsidize them. Although the Correspondance Mansard was inserted in seventy-one newspapers across France, most of these papers were also in the southwest. Photographs and pamphlets helped to fill the gap left by decreasing subscriptions to Parisian newspapers and the limited national circulation of many local Bonapartist papers. Pamphlets, widely distributed to all parts of France, tirelessly blamed the Republic for the huge war indemnity and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. The photographs reminded the viewer of the family's glorious heritage and basic political precepts by presenting the portraits of the Imperial family in artificial scenes accompanied by polemical captions. Both the photographs and the pamphlets were cheap to produce and reached a wider audience than most of the local newspapers.

Propaganda and the other efforts at building grass roots Imperial support initially began to pay off in 1874. In March 1874, over 7,000 supporters travelled to Camden Place, where the Empress moved after Napoleon III's death, to witness the celebration of the Prince Imperial's eighteenth birthday. In thirteen by-elections
held between May 1874 and February 1875, Bonapartist candidates won five and compiled impressive vote totals in five others. This showing of Bonapartist political strength did not go unnoticed by local and national police agents. Police efforts to control the photographic propaganda began in early 1874 and increased as the Bonapartists won their election victories. Photographs of the Imperial family were initially banned in 1872 by the same decree that outlawed photographs of the Commune. The ban included portraits in which members of the Bonaparte family wore Imperial emblems or scenes where they performed acts that depicted or implied Bonapartist political sovereignty in France. Simple portraits of the Imperial family dressed in civilian clothes were not censored, if they did not include the former titles of the fallen family.

In the winter and spring of 1874 police made only scattered attempts to stop obvious and blatant distribution of photographs. Parisian police arrested one man when he delivered an illegal portrait of the Prince Imperial at the office of the Prefect of the Department of the Seine-et-Oise. A police commissioner in the heavily Bonapartist Department of the Charente-Inférieure was fined for distributing portrait photographs to rural policemen. However, enforcement of the censorship was difficult because many of the photographs reached their destination by mail. In January 1874, the Ministry of Interior asked the director of the postal system to take action against portrait photographs of the Prince Imperial that were attached to visiting cards and accompanied by the title of the Bonapartist political organization "Appel au Peuple" or by the slogan "Souveraineté nationale." Many of these were being sent through the mails, but the postal official responded that he lacked authority to seize the letters that contained them. The law required a court order for the seizure of each individual letter. Furthermore, such searches and seizures took time and labor that hindered the movement of the mail.
Censorship enforcement efforts increased after the victories of Bonapartist candidates in the spring elections. The election of Baron de Bourgoing in the Nièvre over Republican and Legitimist candidates inspired judicial and legislative investigations that uncovered confidential information about propaganda methods and party organization. Surveillance, arrests, prosecutions, and fines for illegal sale or free distribution of Imperial portraits mounted throughout the summer and fall. In July the police arrested Eugène Appert for selling an unauthorized photo-montage depicting the celebration of the Prince Imperial's birthday at Camden Place in the previous March (Plate XXXVIII). Police confiscated more than one hundred pictures of different sizes at Appert's studio. Appert claimed before the court that he was ignorant of the requirement for authorization. The court, however, remembering his earlier photo-montages depicting events of the Paris Commune, rejected his argument and fined him 100 francs.

This photo-montage shows the Prince Imperial in front of the Imperial throne reading his address to the visitors who had travelled to England to witness the event. The Empress Eugénie and former Imperial functionaries stand behind the prince, symbolically supporting his actions. The composite photograph also includes a list of names of selected Bonapartists who are depicted in the picture. Appert's portraits are portrait photographs transposed from original photographs and combined with bodies in the composition. The photo-montage shows the Prince Imperial in his new role as leader of the Imperial family. Just sixteen years old when his father died, the Prince Imperial had continued his studies at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich before assuming his political obligations as pretender. To establish his adulthood and legitimacy as head of the family, he had to change his image from that of a "little prince," condemned to an eternal childhood devoid of any substantial political responsibilities.
Plate XXXVIII. Eugene Appert. Majority of the Prince Imperial. 1874.
This composite photograph was intended to provide him with a new role in the eyes of all Bonapartist sympathizers. The Prince Imperial appears as an adult who authoritatively addresses other adult supporters of his father. Appert succeeds in presenting a self-confident, responsible, and assertive image of the new Imperial pretender.

More arrests and fines followed in the provinces. In the summer and fall of 1874 a peddler in Agen and in Amiens a bookseller who managed the local Bonapartist paper received stiff fines for unauthorized distribution of the Prince Imperial’s portraits. The bookseller had requested and received from Rouher 3,500 portraits, which he gave to peasants in the market place on Saturday mornings. He also gave dozens of portraits to friends and associates, including an insurance agent, a former Imperial forest inspector, and the son of a Napoleonic baron, who also distributed the pictures. Each distributor of a photograph was arrested, but only the bookseller suffered a substantial penalty. Despite this crackdown Bonapartist written and photographic materials slipped through the police net. A journalist writing for the republican press in the Department of the Yonne, south of Paris, complained that confiscations in one area simply led to increased distribution in his province, where surveillance was not as rigorous.\footnote{3}

The police then moved to cut the supply of photographs off at its source. This led to the confiscation of a large cache of illegal photographs in Paris in the fall of 1874, followed by the arrest of a photograph merchant named Henri Guerard and a photographer named Vallentin. Guerard was an ardent Bonapartist who had sold Imperial regalia during the Second Empire. After Sedan his business declined until he began distributing Bonapartist propaganda. Earlier in the year he had been arrested and fined for selling portraits and cufflinks decorated with the image of the
Prince Imperial. In September police raided his shop again and confiscated several thousand portrait photographs of the Prince Imperial and 300,000 printed color portraits. Police next descended upon Vallentin's shop and seized several thousand more photographs. Guerard claimed that Alfred Haentjens, a Bonapartist deputy in the National Assembly from the Department of the Sarthe and a founding member of the Bonapartist organization "Appel au Peuple," had ordered 100,000 portrait photographs. He insisted that Haentjens had received authorization for the portraits, but the Ministry of the Interior denied any knowledge of this authorization. Haentjens tried to circumvent the denial by insisting that he had received verbal permission from Marshal MacMahon himself. This alibi also failed. The court fined Guerard 500 francs. Police also destroyed the thousands of confiscated photographs, which hurt the Bonapartist propaganda campaign more than the fine.

Guerard did not learn his lesson from this experience with the authorities. One month later police again arrested him for displaying similar photographs in his shop window. He was fined fifty francs. These confiscations and fines affected his business so much that he had difficulty supporting his family and he, therefore, appealed to the Minister of Justice for a reduction of his fines. Considering Guerard's longstanding support for the Imperial cause and his continued efforts at distributing Bonapartist propaganda, the minister denied his request.

In January 1875, the Court of Cassation in Paris closed an important loophole in the law requiring preliminary authorization for photographs. Strictly interpreted, this law applied to merchants and business people who sold, displayed, or gave away the images but not to private individuals. Numerous distributors of Bonapartist propaganda did not technically come under the law, especially when they claimed that they were simply exchanging the
photographs with friends or acquaintances. The court ruled that all individuals who distributed the photographs in any manner were responsible under the law; they did not have to be distributed on the public streets to be included in the proscription. This ruling extended the requirement for authorization to all photographs sent through the mails to political supporters or simply given away. 14

Government interest in photograph distribution intensified as a result of the investigation into the Nièvre election. To help the investigation police agents raided the Paris office of Mansard, who was acting as the secretary of the central Bonapartist political committee. Mansard mysteriously failed to destroy or remove his correspondence and written records for the office. These documents fell into police hands and gave them confidential information, including records and correspondence on propaganda distribution and observations on the importance of photography as a propaganda tool. Police completed the investigation in December 1874 but filed no formal charges against the Bonapartist party members. None of the evidence proved conclusively that the organization was more than a loose association of Imperial advocates. A legislative investigation followed this judicial investigation, and Orleanist deputy Charles Savary presented the results to the National Assembly in late February 1875. His report included no new information, but it revealed the existence of the chain of technically legal Bonapartist committees and supporters across France and their electoral activities. The report, which was published and sold to the public, included numerous photographs as examples of the Bonapartist propaganda.

A major portion of the report came from the deposition of Léon Renault, Préfet of Police in Paris. Renault reported that in the winter of 1874 photographs superseded pamphlets and brochures in the Bonapartists' paopaganda efforts. The central
committee had discovered that photographs were effective in winning supporters and sustaining interest among Bonapartist sympathizers, and were less costly and less likely to be discovered by police surveillance than any other form of propaganda. Renault submitted a letter written by Franceschini Piétri, Préfet of Police of Paris for a time during the Second Empire, to Mansard on December 19, 1873, to illustrate the Bonapartists' confidence in photography. Piétri wrote,

I believe as you that no propaganda is better than photography or other visual images. Therefore, I hope that the committee will make a new resolution to produce more photographs and a new beautiful chromolithograph portrait; I am certain that they will be a great success.\textsuperscript{15}

Jules Richard, a Bonapartist journalist, also affirmed the photographs' effects on the viewer in his description of Bonapartist political activities during the 1870s. Photographs were, he held,

the most certain means of propaganda, which . . . never failed to be effective in by-elections. . . . I have seen honest voters weep with joy at receiving one of these badly-printed or clumsily-colored portraits, and place them piously in their pocket books like precious objects.\textsuperscript{16}

Starting in late 1873 the central committee ordered two large printings for a total of 400,000 portrait photographs of the Prince Imperial. The committee had further plans for 7,000,000 more photographs for distribution in the general elections of 1875.\textsuperscript{17} These portraits were doubly vulnerable, for they did not receive authorization from the Ministry of Interior, and they included illegal Imperial emblems and insignia. The Bonapartists avoided confiscation by distributing them through the mail to addresses provided by public officials who supported the Bonapartist cause and by political sympathizers who donated their guest lists for various celebrations. Since the police carefully observed the materials of street vendors and peddlers, the Bonapartists avoided
this channel but had their supporters distribute the pictures informally to people they met during the course of the day. Renault considered the propaganda a serious threat.

I repeat, the effect of these images is considerable. The committee members have been so convinced that they have spared nothing in order to develop this propaganda that is easier and more effective in awakening and perpetuating the memories of the Empire.  

Renault presented evidence that the Bonapartists used the photographs to influence groups of military and civilian authorities. The central committee distributed photographs directly to numerous military officers and soldiers, hoping to generate sympathy for the Imperial cause in the army. It also established groups of former officers and mutual aid societies for military officers that acted as front organizations for propaganda distribution. Renault believed, however, that army discipline and devotion to duty limited the influence of the photographs. He was more concerned about the effect of this propaganda on gendarmes, the Garde républicain, his own policemen, and other agents of the public peace. He observed that many members of these groups were former soldiers who had served during the Second Empire and had loyalties to the former officers recruited by the Bonapartists to distribute propaganda. Renault remarked, "Like all good servants they have trouble ending their attitudes of subordination and respect to their former chiefs."

Bonapartists also distributed photographs to convicted Communards in prisons across France. Mansard provided photographs to M. Mascaux, a former member of the International, who was in the Cherche-Midi prison serving a sentence for his participation in the Commune. Mascaux in turn distributed these portraits to fellow prisoners opposed to the Versailles government. Renault also furnished several letters to the special investigative committee showing that Jules Amigues, the leading proponent of
Bonapartist "socialism," arranged for distribution of portrait photographs in prisons where he sought to recruit Communards for the Bonapartist cause and in working class neighborhoods in Paris. 21

Official investigation into Bonapartist activities in the Nièvre election in May, 1874 revealed how the Bonapartists used photographs to influence rural voters. The Bonapartists hired a former local rural policeman named Desbois to give away portraits to people he encountered. Locally known and respected, Desbois walked the roads and visited small villages outside Nevers asking people to vote for the Bonapartist candidate and distributing portraits of the Prince Imperial. He encountered merchants, landowners, peasants, and townspeople who readily accepted the photographs when he insisted that the Prince Imperial had personally given them to him to distribute to his friends.

The investigation into Desbois' activities revealed how seriously police officials considered his distribution of photographs. Every individual whom Desbois talked with was interviewed by police agents. They asked how many photographs Desbois carried, how many he gave away, where he got the pictures, and whom he met. The police determined that the former rural policeman had made numerous contacts in a wide area surrounding Nevers and that his distribution had been favorably received by the people he encountered. Desbois' network of contacts convinced the police that these personal communications from a local Bonapartist supporter and portrait photographs were an effective means for influencing voters in the area. 22

The Bonapartist faced a dilemma as to how to depict the Prince Imperial in photographs distributed to such a politically and socially diverse population. Bonapartism itself was an imprecise ideology, its nominal adherents divided into several political factions and distinct social groups. A conservative element favored a hierarchical society similar to the Ancien Regime,
stressing order and authority. The former "Vice Emperor," Rouher, sought support for the Prince Imperial among the masses of peasants fearful of both an aristocratic reaction and urban revolution. The notables who remembered the last years of the Second Empire preferred a liberal parliamentary regime in which the Emperor shared power with wealthy elites. The Emperor's cousin, Jerome Napoleon, favored an openly anticlerical regime, while former Communards and Jules Amigues pushed for an Imperialist form of socialism. Nationally distributed photographs depicting the Prince Imperial had to present a symbol common to all of the political views, appealing to the entire range of social classes and to various political sympathies without alienating any one group.

Two composite photographs show the Bonapartists' attempts to satisfy a wide variety of real and potential supporters. Plate XXXIX depicts the Prince Imperial holding a tricolor flag topped with an Imperial eagle. He points to an urn that is captioned "Universal Suffrage." Above the urn is the caption "All for the people and by the people." The caption below the entire picture reads "Principle of national sovereignty and the flag that consecrates it." A drawing of the Imperial residence at Camden Place adorns the background. The inclusion of the tricolor flag signifies the Prince Imperial's acceptance of the Republic. However, the Imperial eagle topping the flag staff represents the Bonapartists' desire to mold the Republic to their political ideology. The Prince Imperial's gesture toward the urn indicates his approval of democracy represented by universal suffrage. The majority will expressed through a plebiscite bestowed the national sovereignty on one man, and the figure of the Prince Imperial symbolizes that one individual, who represents the common interests of the entire nation rather than a single political faction.

The second composite photograph (Plate XL) shows the Prince
Plate XXXIX. Maurice Quentin-Bauchart. Principle of National Sovereignty and the Flag that Consecrates It. 1874.
Plate XL. Maurice Quentin-Bauchart. Voice of the People, Voice of God. 1874.
Imperial being carried on a shield by figures representing several different classes and occupations—a soldier, a bourgeois, a worker, and a peasant. The Latin phrase above the figures asserts "Voice of the People, Voice of God," while below a second caption states "All for the People and by the People." The Prince Imperial holds a flag topped by an Imperial eagle, and the statue of Napoleon I atop the Vendôme Column appears in the background. The Prince Imperial's figure and the four men holding the shield are drawings, but the face of the Prince Imperial is a portrait photograph grafted onto the body of the prince. The entire composition had been re-photographed for mass reproduction.

The picture represents the socially diverse support for the heir to the Imperial throne. The two captions signify that the Prince Imperial is no mere party candidate but the choice of the entire nation. The image of Napoleon I in the background reminds the viewer of the glorious tradition of the Imperial family. Together the two photographs represent the appeal of Bonapartism to a widely diverse audience.

Additional portraits of the Prince Imperial presented less blatant political messages. One portrait taken by a photographer in London named Downey (Plate XLI) represents the Prince Imperial in his uniform at the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich. Since the portrait shows the prince in a British school uniform rather than a French uniform and displays no emblems or insignia of sovereignty, it was not banned by the decree of 1872. Although the portrait depicts the Prince Imperial in the uniform of a traditional French adversary, it still shows him to be a handsome, well-built, and impressive figure. The uniform adds a sense of authority and strength to his image. The upright stance, profile, and crossed legs reflect his confidence in himself and his Imperial heritage. To a French viewer the Bonapartists intended that this portrait would symbolize the strong physical and spiritual
Plate XLII. Downey. Prince Imperial at Woolwich. 1874.
qualities of the heir to the Imperial throne.

The judicial and legislative investigations into the election led to the National Assembly's nullification of the Bonapartist victory in the Department of the Nièvre. The government branded the Bonapartists as sinister conspirators clandestinely trying to influence voters with various forms of propaganda. The investigation also targeted the Bonapartists for special attention and surveillance by national and local police agents. The Keeper of the Seals, Armand Dufaure, warned the Imperialists,

... you will never see an indifferent government, without concern, closing its eyes to the activities and projects of the committee of the Appel au Peuple; and it will always be prepared to repress any such activities that imperil society. 23

Government crackdown on unauthorized photographs during the investigations was followed on February 4, 1875, by a ban on almost all photographs of the Prince Imperial. Cornelis de Witt, undersecretary in the Ministry of Interior, ordered Parisian and all departmental prefects to withdraw previous authorization for portraits of the Prince Imperial regardless of whether or not they were simple portraits of the prince in civilian clothes without Imperial emblems. De Witt reasoned that these photographs were political propaganda as much as the illegal portraits. Furthermore, thousands of authorized and unauthorized portraits in circulation confused police agents and hindered enforcement efforts. The order outlawed all sale, free distribution, or display in shop windows, by travelling peddlers, or by private individuals of all portraits of the Prince Imperial save for two portraits taken by the British photography studio of Downey, Williams, and Daniel. 24

Downey's profile view of the Prince Imperial in his Royal Military Academy uniform (Plate XLI) was one of the two portraits to escape the new censorship. This picture had political propaganda appeal despite the Prince Imperial's appearance in a British school uniform. Diplomatic considerations may have spared it
from censorship. The Downey, Williams, and Daniel studio was well-known in London for its portraits of English royalty and aristocrats, and it was the favorite studio of Queen Victoria, who sat for several portraits.\textsuperscript{25}

The enforcement of the new order immediately reduced the number of photographs in circulation. Prior confiscations and police surveillance of Bonapartist photographers in Paris drove the price of the pictures up and resulted in strict rationing, with free distribution only on explicit authorization from Rouher. Jules Richard observed that the photographers who had previously produced the portraits feared the police surveillance so much that they would rather risk printing obscene photographs than portraits of the Prince Imperial.\textsuperscript{26} Some portraits still arrived from British photographers who smuggled them into France via Belgium. However, continued enforcement effectively eliminated this distribution by 1877.

From 1872 to 1875 active Bonapartist propaganda campaigns coincided with increasingly numerous political victories in by-elections across France. By 1876 the electoral victories had subsided, and political support for the Imperial cause was eroding throughout the country. Various factors produced this fall in popularity, but confiscations and censorship of Imperial propaganda made it difficult for the Bonapartists to sustain their earlier level of support and to make new advances in the electoral contests.

In the following years before 1879 the Bonapartists distributed photographs mainly at meetings and dinners where police agents could not confiscate the pictures or arrest the distributors. In May 1878, a Bonapartist banquet held in Paris to celebrate the anniversary of Napoleon I's death was attended by several hundred Imperial followers. Each guest received a small portrait photograph of the Prince Imperial adorned with Imperial
Ardent supporters of the dynasty who did not fear relatively short jail sentences and fines for selling or giving away the portraits also continued to distribute photographs. In January 1879, a Parisian picture frame-maker and a jeweler were arrested and fined 100 francs each, when they intentionally gave photographs to a policeman on the street. The two did not contest their illegal activity but reveled in the glory of actively working for the return of the Empire. The wife of one insisted that the real crime was by the policeman who arrested her husband, not by those working for the Imperial cause.

Despite these activities of committed Bonapartists, large-scale photograph distributions recurred only with the battlefield death of the Prince Imperial on June 1, 1879. Bonapartist political fortunes in France were at a low ebb after the "Seize Mai" Crisis, which solidified the government. The strength of the Republic's institutions made it appear unlikely that the Empire would be restored by either the National Assembly or the army. The Prince Imperial's attempts to reorganize and reinvigorate the party with younger men also met resistance from old Imperialists, who increasingly sided with conservative monarchists in the legislative chambers. The Prince Imperial's hopes, therefore, rested in his regaining popularity for the party by his exploits on the battlefield. His sudden death left the party leaderless but provided the opportunity for propaganda that had not existed since the early years of the decade.

In February 1879 the prince went to Africa to serve in a unit of the British army. On June 1 Zulu warriors attacked his reconnaissance patrol, killing the Prince Imperial and several other soldiers. The news of the Prince Imperial's death reached France in mid-June. Imperialists held memorial masses for the fallen prince throughout France during the summer months. Thousands attended the first masses in Paris, including members of
the Imperial family, former Imperial officials, and Bonapartist followers. These memorial masses became meeting places for political supporters and those who simply wished to show sympathy for the Prince Imperial, and they provided an ideal situation for the distribution of Imperial propaganda, since many people wished to have a memento of the dead prince. Republicans soon complained that the distribution of these materials went beyond simple expressions of sympathy for the Prince Imperial and was in fact an exploitation of his death for political purposes. Henri Aimel observed in the Republican newspaper *L'Intransigeant* that the Bonapartists published long lists of those officials and notables who attended the masses, thus turning the memorials into political events. The masses often became noisy demonstrations that included the distribution of photographic propaganda. Aimel remarked, "In sum, one ought to allow the Bonapartists to honor the body of the last Napoleon, but it is not necessary to tolerate its exploitation."\(^{29}\)

The distribution of portraits continued through June and July 1879. Photograph merchants and Bonapartist newspapers such as *L'Événement* and *Le Figaro* displayed the photographs in shop and office windows, attracting curious crowds. Police in Montpellier observed that these were not simple portraits but showed the Prince Imperial in all the regalia of Imperial power and claimed that they were "designed to propagate the spirit of rebellion and to trouble the public peace."\(^{30}\) Police reaction was swift. They arrested all persons found selling, distributing, or exhibiting the pictures. The memorial masses continued through the autumn, but the photographs disappeared from the church steps and public streets by September.

Those arrested, however, were often poor peddlers and street vendors rather than the Bonapartist officials who had furnished the portraits for distribution. Charles Flot was arrested on
August 8, 1879, for selling the portrait photographs in front of a Parisian church and fined fifty francs. The son of a former police inspector, Flot made his livelihood selling newspapers on the street and earned approximately four francs per day. On this amount he supported his mother and three sisters. Although he did not know the portraits were illegal and had no previous Bonapartist sympathies, the judge reduced his fine only partially when Flot requested leniency on grounds of excessive hardship. Louis Dufour was seventy-four years old supporting his sick wife, his daughter, and his grandchild when police arrested him. In order to teach this street peddler a lesson, the judge fined him twenty-five francs even though Dufour had no record of previous political activities. 31

That summer’s photographs included portraits of the prince and photo-montages depicting his death and the return of his body to England. One widely circulated funeral card (Plate XLII) shows the Prince Imperial wearing the cordon of the Legion of Honor. The card notes his birthdate, the location and date of his death by the "enemy" in Zululand, and a request to pray for him. Underneath this caption is a quotation attributed to the Prince Imperial that gives the portrait a political significance beyond a simple funeral card. It reads,

My last thought will be for my country. It is for her that I would have wanted to die. If I am to die, Father, make it for saving one of my own [a Frenchman]. If I should live let it be in the milieu of the best.

Although the Prince Imperial died defending British colonial interests in Africa, this photograph does not show him in a British uniform but in civilian clothes wearing the emblem of the Legion of Honor. The caption notes the prince's desire to die for France saving one of his fellow countrymen. This implies a rejection of his motivation for fighting for the British and replaces it with a patriotic statement toward his home country.
Plate XLII. To the Memory of the Prince Imperial. 1879.
Neither the caption nor the portrait informs the viewer that the Prince Imperial died in the service of Great Britain. His death becomes a heroic French battlefield death against an enemy of one of France's greatest rivals. This irony went unnoticed because the prince's death conformed to the military tradition of his illustrious family.

Once the body had been returned to England for burial, a photo-montage appeared that depicted the Prince Imperial's body on a gun carriage (Plate XLIII). The caption underneath the picture states, "Death on the field of honor." In his composite photograph the figures in the foreground, including the Prince Imperial, are photographs that have new portrait heads attached to them. The scene depicts the Prince Imperial's removal from the ship returning from Africa and his reception by British military and government officials. The hand-composed figures in the background are British soldiers standing at attention on the dock. The masts of the sailing ships are evident behind the soldiers.

The official reception and the body's display showed to the French the respect that British officials held for his sacrifice. In turn the photograph seeks to elicit feelings of pride and respect from the viewer, who recognizes the Prince Imperial's bravery and devotion to duty.

The second photo-montage (Plate XLIV) is by Eugene Appert and is entitled "Paying Tribute to the Body of the Prince Imperial at the Arsenal of Woolwich." The picture is a combination of portrait photographs of leading Bonapartists placed on figures which surround the body of the Prince Imperial. The prince lies in state in a velvet draped coffin decorated with Imperial emblems. Two of his followers kneel at the coffin base, and one weeps. The remaining figures are positioned haphazardly around them. The list below the photograph identifies the mourners, including Prince Jerome, Prince Victor, and Rouher. The entire scene
Plate XLIII. *Le Vie illustré*. Death on the Field of Honor. 1879.
Plate XLIV. Eugene Appert. Tribute to the Body of the Prince Imperial.
1879.
presents the mourning of the prince's immediate heirs and well-known followed. The crucifix on the wall rests between two Imperial emblems and reminds the viewer of the Prince Imperial's Catholic faith. The gathering itself signifies the broad political support that the Prince Imperial enjoyed among the politically divided Bonapartists in France and the genuine respect that these men felt for the prince's commitment to military duty.

The third photo-montage (Plate XLV) shows the scene of the Prince Imperial's death. He lies in the center of the picture pierced by a lance while Zulu tribesmen surround his body for a final coup de grace. Fallen warriors and another soldier lie beside the prince. The picture is a combination of models dressed in native costume who posed in a studio before a landscape photograph as background. The figure of the Prince Imperial is a composite of a portrait photograph transposed to the body of a soldier in uniform. The entire composition presents the moment after the prince had been killed. It signifies his bravery in attempting to hold off a large number of Zulu warriors. His patrol obviously outnumbered, the Prince Imperial fought to the death.

These photographs, circulating in France during the immediate months after his tragic death, presented a view of the incident that emphasized the glory, honor, and bravery of the Prince Imperial and perpetuated the traditional Napoleonic image of the military leader devoted to his cause. They were the last pictures of the prince and served as political propaganda for the Bonapartists who sought to take advantage of his mission and death. They also set an example of visual propaganda, which influenced the new Bonapartist pretender.

The death of the Prince Imperial left the Bonapartists with Jerome Napoleon, cousin of Napoleon III, as head of the party and
Plate XLV. Death of the Prince Imperial. 1879.
heir to the Imperial dynasty. Known as the Plon Plon, Prince Jerome had long alienated conservative Bonapartists by his acceptance of the Republic and his anti-clerical attitudes. When he openly endorsed the decrees that expelled the Jesuit order in 1880, many Bonapartists abandoned him for his eldest son, Prince Victor. By the mid-1880s there were two Bonapartist parties, but Prince Victor held the allegiance of the larger group. He soon received an annual income from these followers and moved out of his father's house.

As head of this Bonapartist party Prince Victor developed his own propaganda, which depicted him as a worthy successor to Napoleon I. He was only eighteen years old in 1880 and lacked experience in politics and national affairs. Although named as the heir to the throne in the Prince Imperial's will, Prince Victor was young and inexperienced, and this image had to be modified if he were to solidify his position in the political maneuvering with his father. One of his first acts was to sit for new portrait photographs, which made him look more mature and a credible heir to Napoleon I. According to police agents' reports, in the finished portrait he looked the man of maturity, authority, wisdom, and leadership.32

Following the tradition of his illustrious family, Prince Victor in October 1882, voluntarily enlisted in the army. His first propaganda biography, which was published shortly before his entrance into the service, reminded readers that he was continuing the heritage of his great uncle. By enlisting as a common soldier rather than an officer, Prince Victor declared his commitment to equality; he claimed no privilege over other young men serving their country. His biographer observed,

The people will see ... this prince of the blood lost in the ranks, strengthened by the submission to the humble needs of the regiment ... in the same uniform, under the same orders as the young peasants and workers enlisted by the inflexible recruitment law.33
Army service provided Prince Victor with the basic material of his future photographic propaganda. In July 1885, after his discharge the Bonapartists, anticipating the autumn general elections, distributed to rural voters a portrait of Prince Victor in his regimental uniform with his hand crossed on his sword (Plate XLVI). The pose does not suggest the authority or leadership typical of a military officer's official portrait. His expression is that of a common soldier who is fulfilling his duty. It reiterates the impression given in his biography. A Parisian photographer named Silvestre printed twenty thousand of these photographs. Combined with political pamphlets, brochures, and leaflets, these pictures reached numerous voters in southeastern and northern France. Police watched their distribution but made no confiscations or arrests because the press law of 1881 guaranteed free circulation of political propaganda.\textsuperscript{34}

In early January 1885, a Parisian police agent observed that the "personality of Prince Victor is not powerful enough to inspire real and fervent devotion."\textsuperscript{35} Despite this observed deficiency in the pretender, Bonapartist candidates combined with Monarchists to achieve a dramatic electoral reversal of the previous year's decline, winning over two hundred seats out of over four hundred in the National Assembly. Over fifty new Bonapartists entered the chamber. Many factors contributed to the rightist electoral victories, including a worsening economic situation, agitation from die-hard patriotic groups such as the League of Patriots, and a republican school bill that deepened the hatred of Monarchists and clericals for the Republic. The Bonapartists and Monarchists in certain departments joined in an electoral coalition called the "Union des Droits," which concentrated campaign efforts on the Bonapartist or the Monarchist candidates most likely to win in a given district. Prince Victor's photographs contributed to the Bonapartist success by appealing to the
Plate XLVI. Le Quotidien illustré. Prince Victor in an Artillery Soldier's Uniform. 1885.
nationalism in the country and symbolizing the conventional Napoleonic military tradition.

The Republic met the electoral challenge of the Bonapartists and Monarchists by expelling the pretenders and their families from France in June 1886. The expulsion further weakened the Bonapartist party organization, already suffering from the movement of Bonapartists toward the Monarchists. The continued decline of the party contributed to the Bonapartists' decision to join a coalition of Monarchists supporting the electoral campaign of General Boulanger. Both Prince Victor and his father supported Boulanger but for different reasons. Prince Jerome saw Boulanger as a man who would maintain Republican institutions but provide a strong leader at the head of the government. Prince Victor hoped the movement would end in the reestablishment of the Empire. Both men liked Boulanger's military background, favored a central role for the army in national affairs, and shared Boulanger's ardent nationalism. In return the Bonapartists expected Boulanger's support for their candidates in selected departments and access to the general if he succeeded in taking over the government.

After the expulsion of Prince Victor in 1886 and his decision to support Boulanger, Bonapartists in France increased the distribution of the prince's visual propaganda. The photographs kept his image before the French nation and reminded voters of candidates that he supported. Prince Victor replaced his old portrait taken during his army service with a new equestrian portrait taken by a photographer named Sgap (Plate XLVII). This picture depicts Prince Victor on a spirited horse and saluting as he rides. The representation is a photo-montage. The horse and figure of the prince are hand composed; Prince Victor's head is a portrait photograph imposed on the body.

_Le Petit Caporal_ advertised the sale of this portrait in August 1887. The journal declared that Prince Victor's portrait
Plate XLVII. Sgap. Equestrian Portrait of Prince Victor. 1887.
should hang in the foyer of every home. "Under this portrait the veteran will tell his small children about the Imperial epochs, and will instill in the hearts of his children admiration of and attachment to the Napoleonic dynasty." Although Prince Victor had been released from the army five years earlier, the journal insisted on the appropriateness of a military portrait.

Having paid his dues in blood, having served as an artillery man in the Thirty-Second Artillery Regiment, he ought to be presented to the people as a soldier. Therefore, it is in the artillery uniform that his great uncle wore that his Highness is represented giving a military salute. . . . We would like all our friends to use this efficient means of propaganda in order to publicize the descendant of Napoleon to the smallest hamlet.36

In October of 1888 fifty thousand of these photo-montages were printed and given to Bonapartist supporters for distribution.37

This portrait is similar to numerous portraits of General Boulanger circulated between 1887 and 1890. Boulanger repeatedly appeared in uniform on his famous black stallion. Both men's portraits suggest grandeur, authority, and the traditions of the army. Support for Boulanger and the nationalistic and military values common to Bonapartism and Boulangism inspired the equestrian portrait, which was unrepresentative of Prince Victor's civilian status. The resemblance between the two portraits signifies ideological affinity and also agreement on the type of visual image that the two groups wanted to present to French voters.

General Boulanger's flight to Belgium in 1889 ended the Bonapartists' support of the providential man and dashed their political hopes for the immediate future. The support of Boulanger displayed the Bonapartists' recognition that the pretender alone could not seriously contest for political power in France.

Lack of financial resources and political disorganization prevented rapid recovery from the Boulanger debacle. The party had placed all its hopes in Boulanger and neglected the
development of local political organizations that could effectively use propaganda to convince voters of the Republic's shortcomings and the advantages of an Empire. Bonapartist criticism of the Republic changed little over the following years. Prince Victor accepted the existence of the Republic but insisted that, because of its weaknesses, instability, and resistance to change, it required a strong central authority responsible to the democratic majority in the country. He still favored the plebiscite as the method for determining the national will, but his propaganda did not reach enough voters to generate mass support for his cause. When Prince Jerome died in 1891 and left Prince Victor as sole heir to the Imperial dynasty, the prince reprinted copies of his equestrian portrait for distribution. This was the last major circulation of visual propaganda to the countryside for several years. 38

Bonapartist visual propaganda in the following years before the turn of the century relied upon photographs published in books and journal articles, which did not receive wide circulation across France. While other nationalist groups in the 1890s demonstrated in the streets and distributed nationalistic propaganda that vilified the Republic and glorified their leaders, the Bonapartists were less critical and less vocal in their opposition. Their propaganda looked to the past and represented the pretender as the heir of the Napoleonic tradition rather than demeaning the Republic or acclaiming the popularity of their movement.

In 1895 André Martinet published the first biography of Prince Victor since his entry into the army thirteen years earlier. It included only one simple standing portrait photograph of Prince Victor. He was shown in civilian clothes. According to the biography Prince Victor spent most of his days studying economic and social problems, military questions, and the history of the First Empire. Martinet observed,
Far from seeking vain and fugitive popularity in untimely demonstrations, the young prince repudiates the struggle for simple publicity, which reduces the author to the rank of rhetorician. He leads a life of reflection and study in Brussels.

Prince Victor pursued these intellectual interests in his study decorated with numerous relics of the Imperial family. Martinet was, he said, moved upon entering the room,

... no one can enter the study for the first time without feeling a poignant emotion, without being stopped on the threshold by a sort of religious respect.39

This secluded life in a room with almost religious significance provided one image for Prince Victor's photographic propaganda in an article published in Le Quotidien illustré on February 18, 1895. Plate XLVIII shows Prince Victor working at his desk amidst Imperial symbols, including an Imperial eagle and a bust of Napoleon I. The picture signifies the pretender's studious nature and his calm reflection on the Imperial cause. The symbols remind the viewer of the prince's heritage. A second photograph of the study presented a full page image of a hat and coat belonging to Napoleon I, which hung in a showcase with other possessions of the Emperor.

The article also reproduced the photograph of Prince Victor in his artillery uniform taken during his enlistment (see Plate XLVI). The accompanying description of his army life, however, presented Prince Victor as heir to the Emperor and student of military affairs, rather than as a simple soldier fulfilling his duty.

During this year, while earning the respect of his officers and sympathetic acceptance of his comrades, he was a crack soldier giving himself to the noble craft of weaponry. He eagerly studied all the military problems of modern warfare. In considering all these difficult questions, the artillery-man Napoleon showed himself as the worthy descendant of that young artillery officer named Bonaparte.40
Plate XLVIII. *Le Quotidien illustré.* Prince Victor in His Study. 1895.
Since Prince Victor rejected popular demonstrations, and his studious personality and lifestyle provided few themes for dramatic photographic propaganda, he sought to generate support by publishing an illustrated tribute to the Imperial family and its cause. This was a reserved form of visual propaganda that tried to use past loyalties to attach voters to the current Imperial cause. An elaborately illustrated booklet containing twenty illustrations, including sixteen photographs of Napoleon III and his family, appeared in 1896. It opened with a brief poem by Victor Hugo heralding the return of Napoleon I's body after twenty-five years.

Sire, you will return to your capital,
Without alarm, without battle, without strife, without furor,
Pulled by eight horses under the Arc d'Triomphe
Dressed as Emperor!41

The Emperor and his family returned to France in the photographs provided in the booklet.

Several photographs were accompanied by captions that gave a political meaning to the pictures and to events in the family members' lives. Extracts from Napoleon III's proclamation to the army and the nation at the time of his coup d'État of 1851 followed two photographs of the Emperor and Empress in full court dress. A series of seven photographs and two paintings of the Prince Imperial accompanied an extract from his father's speech to the Senate on November 7, 1852, announcing the reestablishment of the hereditary Empire.

The Imperial throne is reestablished.
Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte is Emperor of the French under the name Napoleon III.
The Imperial title is hereditary to the direct and legitimate male descendant of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, in order of prima-geniture and to the perpetual exclusion of women and their descendants.42

The series includes photographs of the Prince Imperial from
childhood to adulthood. Plate XLIX shows the Prince Imperial as a small child wearing a grenadier's uniform, standing beside a miniature rifle, and playing a drum almost as large as he. Additional portraits show the Prince Imperial in 1861, 1866, and 1870 dressed in military uniforms complete with medals and sword. Other photographs include Appert's photo-montage depicting the celebration of the Prince Imperial's eighteenth birthday (see Plate XXXVIII) and a portrait showing the prince wearing the cordon of the Legion of Honor. The entire series and the extract from the proclamation provide a brief visual history of the legitimate heir to the Imperial dynasty. The photographs remind the viewer of the long heritage represented by the Imperial family.

The portrait showing the Prince Imperial in British dress uniform taken on April 4, 1879, just prior to his departure for Africa (Plate L) is accompanied by a letter written by the prince to an anonymous French general explaining his actions.

For a long time I have wanted to leave the gloom of England because, in order to prepare my country for its future destiny, I must give proof of my initiative and energy. Until now the opportunity has been absent, but finally it presents itself and I seize it.

... my decision has not been made lightly. I have weighed the consequences of my departure. Nothing holds me in Europe; the political situation in France requires my abstinence and repose and I will find a preparation for the duties that await me in the future in the rugged test of the African war.\textsuperscript{43}

The combined portrait and text proclaim the Prince Imperial's courage, strength, and determination. It seeks to establish that he entered English service only that he might better serve France in the future.

Plate LI depicts Empress Eugénie in 1880 after the death of her son. She is dressed in black and has a sad, mournful expression. The caption accompanying this photograph, however, is
Plate XLIX. La Famille imperiale. Prince Imperial in a Grenadier's Uniform.
Plate L. *La Famille imperiale*. Prince Imperial in 1879. 1879.
Plate LI. *La Famille impériale.* Empress Eugénie. 1880.
a letter to Prince Murat, in which the Empress criticizes General Trochu for his irresponsible failure to prepare French forces for the defense of Paris during the Franco-Prussian War.

I just read in the Journal officiel the discourse of General Trochu. I do not know if my indignation will be too strong and prevent me from surmounting the disgust I feel for this man who abandoned the Emperor and tried to dishonor me today in the French press.\(^{44}\)

She blamed General Trochu for the loss of the war because he spent his time and energy trying to draw England, Italy, and the United States into the war on France's side, rather than strengthening the army of the provinces and preparing the defenses of Paris. The photograph is a portrait of the Empress mourning her son's death, but in this booklet it takes on different political meaning.\(^{45}\) Her expression reflects her sadness over the loss of the war and over the charge, widespread in France, that she had contributed to the French defeat.

Appert's portrait of Napoleon III after his capture by the Prussians (Plate LII) shows the Emperor seated in civilian clothes with his head propped up by his arm. His facial expression is somber and fatigued. This picture is accompanied by his proclamation to the French on February 8, 1871, when he was still a prisoner of war. He was speaking out, he said, only after peace had been made. No one could accuse him of attempting to save his throne. Yet he advised his fellow countrymen to remember the political principles upon which the Second Empire was founded.

In the solemn circumstances that we find ourselves . . . it is important that France be one in its inspiration, desires, and resolutions. This is a goal to which all good citizens should direct their efforts.

As for myself, bruised by so many injustices and bitter disappointments, I do not come to reclaim the rights that you conferred upon me four times in twenty years. In the presence of the calamities that surround us, there is no place for personal ambition. But so long as the People, regularly
Plate LII. *La Famille impériale*. Napoleon III at Wilhelmshohe. 1871.
reunited in its electoral gatherings, has manifested its will, my duty is to address the Nation as its true representative and to say to it: Everything that is done without your direct participation is illegitimate.

There is only one government born from the sovereignty which raises itself above the egoism of the parties, has the strength to heal the wounds, to reopen your hearts to hope like a secular church, and to restore work, concord, and peace to the heart of the country.46

Even in defeat the Emperor extols the virtues of his regime. The poignant photograph of the man in sorrow makes the appeal more emotional and suggests that his words spring from the depths of his heart and are not simple political rhetoric.

Plate LIII is a photo-montage depicting Napoleon III on his death bed. The demarcation outlining the head of the Emperor against the pillow indicates that the portrait of Napoleon III was cut out from a portrait photograph and imposed on the photograph of the bed. A crucifix and several bouquets of flowers rest on the Emperor's chest. The caption accompanying it is an excerpt from Napoleon III's last will and testament written in 1869:

I recommend my son and my wife to the grand Corps of the state, to the people, and the army. The Empress has all the qualities necessary to conduct the regency and my son shows the disposition and judgement that makes him worthy of his high destiny. He should never forget the motto of the head of our family "Everything for the French people." He should thoroughly read the writings of the prisoner of Saint Helena, study the correspondence of the Emperor, and remember when circumstances permit that the cause of all people is the cause of France.

Power is a heavy burden because one can not always do everything that one would want, and our contemporaries rarely give us justice. In order to accomplish your mission it is necessary to have faith in yourself and consciousness of your duty. It is necessary to think highly of those who love you, serve you, and protect you. It is the soul of my great uncle which has always inspired and sustained me. It will be the same for my son because he will always dignify my name.47
Plate LIII. La Famille imperiale. Napoléon III Lying in State. 1873.
The picture of Napoleon III and his last will and testament remind the viewer of two major concepts of Bonapartist political rhetoric: duty to the people and the heritage of Napoleon I. The cross on the bed recalls the Emperor's support for the Catholic Church and his belief in its religious teachings. The references to his son reflect his desire for his descendants to maintain his political heritage and to be worthy of the name that they inherit.

At the end of the booklet visual reference was finally made to the current pretender to the dynasty. The photograph of Prince Victor (Plate LIV) depicts the prince in civilian clothes with his arms behind his back. The accompanying caption is from a letter addressed to General du Barail on June 11, 1896.

You point out to me several newspaper articles that spoke of fantastic negotiations inducing me to abandon my rights.

Napoleons have only the rights that they get from the People: only the People can invalidate them.

Representing a great cause, I will never abdicate the duties that my name imposes on me. I will patiently submit to bad fortune; I am one of those who resolutely but coldly envisions a better future and my faith remains unflinching.48

The stern, obstinate expression on Prince Victor's face reflects the determination expressed in the letter to continue his struggle to play a significant role in French politics. The booklet, the most profusely illustrated piece of propaganda ever published by the Bonapartists, emphasized the photographs of the family of Napoleon III, not of Prince Victor. The political philosophy displayed in the captions represented ideas developed during the Second Empire or earlier. Prince Victor's single photograph and caption simply affirmed his attempt to continue the Napoleonic tradition. It claimed for him no special political answers in France's current political situation.

The Dreyfus Affair created a political dilemma for the Bonapartists. As the inheritors of the French Revolution, the
Bonapartists supported individual rights under the law for everyone regardless of race or religion. On the other hand, the Imperial cause emphasized the central role of the army in the affairs of the nation. Prince Victor was not anti-Semitic and took the official view that since Napoleon's proclamation in 1804, Jews enjoyed all rights of French citizens. He felt, however, that the army was the object of unjustified attacks and that it could not be held responsible for the conduct of individual officers who fabricated evidence against Dreyfus. The army as an institution still deserved respect and support despite the actions of certain officers. According to Prince Victor, the political divisions in France, however, resulted from the lack of clear and forthright action by the government to end the affair and to reestablish the honor of the army as an institution in the eyes of the public. 49

Prince Victor directed his followers strictly to obey the law in their political activities and to avoid all street demonstrations that could disturb the peace. He depended primarily on tracts and photographs for communication of his ideas. In 1899 two journal articles written by a Bonapartist were published in the weekly illustrated journal La Vie illustrée. Both continued the earlier strategy of publishing photographs that depicted deceased members of the Bonaparte family or Imperial regalia.

The first article, published on the twentieth anniversary of the Prince Imperial's death, described his life and noble battlefield death. 50 The article included nine photographs of the Prince Imperial, including several already circulated in France during the previous years (see Plates XLI, XLIII). Other pictures included four photographs of the prince as a small child with his parents, a portrait of the prince in 1870 dressed in military uniform (Plate LV), and a photograph of the prince in formal dress wearing the cordon of the Legion of Honor (Plate LVI). One month later the same journal printed an article on Prince Victor. The
Plate LV. *La Vie illustrée.* Prince Imperial. 1870.

Plate LVI. *La Vie illustrée.* Prince Imperial Wearing the Cordon of the Legion of Honor. ca. 1877.
author travelled to Brussels to interview the pretender on his birthday about the current crisis over the Dreyfus Affair. Prince Victor observed,

What France needs is the same now as at the beginning of the century, a moderator and peace-maker who can reunite the French in common thought and sentiment around the flag. Parliamentarism through its continued struggles . . . causes only mental divisions, revives old feelings, and incites hatred. But only the people can consecrate and invest this mission in me.51

The article included three photographs, including one small portrait of Prince Victor and two pictures of his office filled with Imperial memorabilia and possessions of Napoleon I.

Together the two articles and the photographs presented the Bonapartist solution to the Dreyfus Affair. Prince Victor rejected the parliamentary system and called for a plebiscite to reestablish a central, authoritarian figure who would unify the country under strong leadership and the army. The political philosophy recalled earlier eras, and the photographs recalled the most illustrious recent member of the family and Napoleon I. The photographic propaganda looked to the past for its imagery rather than stressing Prince Victor as the visual example of a strong figure who could unify the country.

Imperial propaganda changed little over the next decade. Distribution of photographs was rare except for grand occasions such as the marriage of Prince Victor in 1905 to Princess Clementine, the daughter of the King of the Belgians. This photographic propaganda did not alienate large groups of people as did that of extremest right wing groups, but it failed to generate much enthusiasm from the public. The police believed that the Bonapartist propaganda did not emphasize the personality of Prince Victor enough to be truly dangerous. Bonapartist political doctrines had points that could generate wide public interest, but Prince Victor’s colorless personality offered few themes for appealing
photographic propaganda. Nor did the pretender's advisors recommend efforts to modify his image through false or misleading photographs. The Parisian based Bonapartist newspapers that survived into the twentieth century included *Le Petit Caporal*, *La Souveraineté*, and *L'Autorité*, but until 1912 none of them printed photographs. Even then neither Prince Victor nor any deceased member of the Bonaparte family was regularly represented.

Massive and repetitive propaganda efforts by the Bonapartists after Sedan contributed to the party's revival in the 1870s. This propaganda presented elementary symbolism that reminded the viewer of Imperial grandeur and sought to sustain and strengthen old political loyalties. The photographs showed the Prince Imperial most often both as heir to a long tradition of military greatness and as unifier of widely diverse social groups. Through a distribution chain of local Bonapartist notables, former civil servants, and soldiers of the Second Empire, this propaganda reached from Paris to remote villages. In areas where Bonapartists were strong, propaganda efforts were increased in order to support Imperial candidates' election efforts. The secret to successful propaganda, however, is in the sustained and repetitive circulation of such materials over many years. Police agents for the Third Republic recognized the importance of photographs to the Bonapartist cause early in the decade but were moved to end it only after Bonapartist electoral victories in 1874. The ensuing censorship enforcement virtually eliminated the propaganda at the height of its distribution.

The historian John Rothney observed that part of the Bonapartists' failure lay in their inability to attract mass support from peasants who feared both the Republic and the return of the Legitimists. Rural Bonapartist notables then turned from building local political organizations that would produce a groundswell of
support for a plebiscite among the peasantry to supporting Orleanist and Legitimist parliamentary candidates. These notables were less concerned with winning votes from the democratic electorate than securing their own position with fellow conservatives. 54

Censorship of Bonapartist propaganda from 1874 to 1881 contributed to this trend. Bonapartist notables no longer could distribute large amounts of photographs that appealed to an uneducated audience. This affected their political interests and led many to cut their financial contributions to the party. Without money to print photographs and to finance secret distribution efforts, the Bonapartists lost a major political weapon. Faced with losing political influence in their home departments, more notables increasingly turned to alliances with other conservative groups.

In 1881 establishment of freedom of the press ended the government's censorship efforts. By this time, however, the Prince Imperial had died, and political in-fighting over who would control the party hurt its political chances for returning to power. Prince Victor tried to continue the Napoleonic tradition by circulating photographs of himself in military uniform, and political hopes were bright in the elections of 1885. But the Republican government exiled him, and his popularity declined again. Prince Victor continued to use propaganda but his studious personality and calm lifestyle in Brussels did not lend itself to appealing photographic propaganda. The pretender turned to the past for iconographic themes and distributed photographs that depicted his illustrious relatives but made little visual reference to himself. By the beginning of the twentieth century Bonapartist propaganda efforts mirrored the political state of the party. From the hopes of the 1870s the party had slipped to political obscurity. Its photographic propaganda was infrequent and lacked the widespread distribution and visual appeal that could reinvigorate the party.
Notes


3. Ibid., pp. 73-87.

4. Ibid., pp. 134, 142.


6. Archives nationales (cited hereafter as AN), BB30 1123, Colportage et Élections, January 15, 1874; February 14, 1874; March 6, 1874.


8. AN, BB30 112, Colportage et Élections, August 17, 1874; August 24, 1874; November 17, 1874.


10. AN, BB24 811, Demandes des Grâces, Dossier 8969.


13. AN, BB24 811, Demandes des Grâces, Dossier 8969.


19. Ibid., p. 305.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid., pp. 361-70.
24. APP, BA/419, Affaires bonapartistes, March 8, 1875.
25. Ibid., January 6, 1876.
27. APP, BA/510, Réunions bonapartistes, May 6, 1878.
29. APP, BA/1203, Mort du Prince Imperial, June 24, 1879.
30. AN, BB 1123, Colportage et Élections, June 21, 1879.
31. AN, BB 868, Demandes des Grâces, Dossiers 11892, 12409.
32. APP, BA/69, Prince Victor Napoleon, November 30, 1881.
34. AN, B 712852, Propagandes bonapartistes, July 14, 1885; July 30, 1885; August 14, 1885; August 29, 1885.
35. APP, BA/69, Prince Victor Napoleon, January 4, 1885.
36. Ibid., August 11, 1887.
37. APP, BA/70, Prince Victor Napoleon, October 8, 1888; October 22, 1888.
38. Ibid., March 12, 1891.
40 Athos, "Le Prince Victor Napoleon," Le Quotidien illustré, February 18, 1895, p. 5.

42 Tbid., p. 4.
43 Tbid., p. 11.
44 Tbid., p. 13.

45 This photograph has been identified by the Cabinet des Estampes in the Bibliothèque nationale as a photograph of Empress Eugenie in 1880, mourning the death of her son.

47 Tbid., p. 15.
48 Tbid., p. 16.

49 APP, BA/70, Prince Victor Napoleon, January 3, 1899.

50 René de Pont-Jest, "Le Prince Imperial," La Vie illustrée, June 22, 1899, pp. 205-7.


52 AN, F7 12868, Parti plebiscitaire, March 4, 1913.


54 Rothney, Bonapartism, pp. 298-305.
CHAPTER V

PHOTOGRAPHY AND BOULANGISM, 1886-1891

The Boulanger movement has been described as a tragi-comic opera of a charismatic and ambitious army general undone by his own incompetence. Only his personal indecision after his electoral victory in Paris on January 27, 1889, according to this view, kept him from seizing power and saved the Republic. Boulanger fled to Belgium, and the movement quickly withered. According to this interpretation, nostalgia for the Second Empire and a latent Caesarism drove the French to support General Boulanger's quest for power. His followers were from diverse and contradictory groups, and the general alone gave the movement the little unity it ever possessed and its political significance in national affairs. More recently interest has shifted away from the man to the social and economic conditions that spawned his movement, shaped the political nature of the movement, and created the discontents whence issued his wide and enthusiastic popular following. Jacques Néré found that the economic depression of the 1880s created high unemployment in the major industrial cities of the north and in Paris. Those unemployed provided the backbone of Boulanger's following. Placing the movement within the political history of the Third Republic, Frederic Seager showed that left-wing and right-wing support for Boulanger stemmed from their mutual dissatisfaction with the "Opportunist" Republic and their desire for constitutional revision. Zeev Sternhell discovered in Boulangism the origins of the twentieth-century movements that combined socialism and extreme nationalism. Examining the movement for its popular origins, Patrick Hutton found that the Boulangist movement altered politics in France by
integrating a broader range of social groups into the electoral process than ever before, prefiguring mass politics of the twentieth century. \(^2\)

The historian Adrien Dansette observed,

Boulanger was a mythical figure, the fruit of expectation, publicity, and emotion. This was an illusion, of course, from the real man and his movement but at the time the illusion was more important than the truth. \(^3\)

Although political propaganda was not new in the 1880s, the Boulangerists used it more extensively and systematically than any political group before them in the history of France. Their propaganda was a form of political advertising. It created an image of Boulanger that made him larger than life to his followers and helped to generate the enthusiasm with which he was received wherever he traveled in France. It articulated existing social, economic, and political grievances in France of the 1880s and focused on the general the popular will for change. Photographs depicting the general as a strong, authoritarian, and commanding figure, intended to capitalize on the growing popularity of the military and the burgeoning nationalism of the late 1880s. The Boulangerists' techniques anticipated those of twentieth-century political propagandists.

Photography and other forms of visual propaganda had a major part in this effort. Photographs of the general were publicly sold soon after his appointment as the Minister of War in 1886 and freely distributed with more frequency during his electoral bids in 1888. His voluntary exile to Brussels led his partisans to distribute additional photographs to keep his image before the people. Huge sums of money donated by followers financed these efforts. The government reacted by increasing its surveillance of propaganda distribution and by enforcing extra legal censorship regulations. Some of the photographs were used as state's evidence in August 1889 in Boulanger's trial for conspiracy.
against the state. Boulanger also contributed to the development of modern photo-journalism by sitting for the second photo-interview in the history of the French press. The various forms of visual propaganda used by the Boulangists combined with the distribution of thousands of songs, brochures, pamphlets, posters, and books were a significant departure from old style elitist political methods and a step toward modern political campaigning for mass audiences.

George Ernest Boulanger was a career soldier who grew up in western France. Born in Rennes in 1837, the son of an attorney, he attended the Lycée of Nantes, where he was a schoolmate of Georges Clemenceau. At age eighteen he enrolled in the military academy of Saint-Cyr and graduated a year and a half later as a lieutenant. In 1859 his regiment was sent to Italy, where he was wounded in the shoulder at the battle of Turbigo. He received the Legion of Honor for bravery in combat. In 1861 he went to Cochin China with his company and was again wounded in combat. He was soon promoted to captain, and in 1866 he was assigned to Saint-Cyr as an instructor. With the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and given command of a battalion. Leading his men in the battle of Champigny on November 30, 1870, he was wounded for the third time and again was decorated for his bravery under fire. Promoted to general in 1880, he headed in the next year the French delegation to the centennial celebration of the American victory over Cornwallis during the War of Independence. In 1884 he became the military commander in Tunisia, and in 1886, although the youngest general in the army, he was named Minister of War. Boulanger's career through 1887 appeared as a model of devotion to the army and to France.

The general was well aware of his handsome appearance, enjoyed public attention, and was very ambitious. His duties in
Tunisia in 1884 led him into immediate conflict with the French civilian governor, Paul Cambon, over who held the ultimate authority in the colony. The feud spilled over into the Paris press, and nationalist journals accused Cambon of betraying the French national honor by restricting Boulanger's military authority in the colony. This feud lasted until Boulanger became Minister of War.  

Boulanger owed his appointment as Minister of War in 1886 to his boyhood friend Georges Clemenceau. The elections of 1885 returned many new conservative deputies, and the Opportunists republican government to form a majority had to take Radical republicans into the ministry. Boulanger entered as one of three Radicals in the new cabinet. In the past the Ministry of War had not been an office that offered its holder opportunities for political advancement, but Boulanger's actions over the next year placed him to his advantage in the political limelight.

He initiated reforms in the army that won support from nationalists and republicans alike. These reforms were designed to improve the morale of the common soldier by permitting soldiers to wear beards, hitherto a prerogative of officers, improving living quarters and food, allowing non-commissioned officers to live in town with their families, and greeting new conscripts on their arrival at railroad stations with military bands. He advocated other reforms that, although never instituted, did win republican support including the complete elimination of promotion by seniority.

Boulanger's intrusion into civilian affairs made him popular with the working classes. When a bitter coal miners' strike broke out at Decazeville in January 1886, the government sent troops to control the strikers. Questioned in the Chamber about the army's role in the strike, Boulanger replied that the army would keep order but not interfere with the strikers' orderly activities.
On the next July 14 Boulanger led a military review at Longchamps before thousands of Parisians, and the extent of his popular support became evident to opponents and supporters alike.  

French nationalism had been growing in the 1880s and was still largely inspired by the Jacobin left. The tradition of ardent patriotism and blind confidence in the army, however, was increasingly being taken up by the political right. Such organizations as the League of Patriots headed by Paul Déroulède had been founded to instill patriotism among French youth through gymnastic societies based on the German model. General Boulanger reflected this growing nationalism in his militancy towards Germany. He constantly stressed the need for military readiness and made numerous statements interpreted by both French and German officials to indicate that he favored a reconquest of the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

Many moderate and conservative politicians in France were fearful of Boulanger's activities because they felt France would be defeated in a new war with Germany. Boulanger's popularity among a large portion of the French population increased, however, as his rhetoric against Germany became more inflammatory. In April 1887, in the midst of a diplomatic crisis over the arrest of a French frontier official accused by the Germans of spying, Boulanger ordered mobilization of 50,000 French troops along the German border. At this point concerned moderates in the government brought the cabinet down in order to get rid of Boulanger. The new government reassigned Boulanger to an obscure army post in Clermont-Ferrand. In the eyes of his patriotic followers on left and right he was the victim of parliamentary politics and German intimidation. On July 8, 1887, at the Gare du Lyon a farewell demonstration brought thousands of Parisians to the train station, expressing sympathy and support for the general.

In autumn 1887 Boulanger received royalist backing when the,
Comte de Paris abandoned his tepid republicanism and directed his followers to back Boulanger as the one man popular enough to topple the Republic. In return for conservative votes the general would work towards the goal of constitutional revision that the Royalists eagerly wanted. A month later the Wilson Scandal broke. The son-in-law of the President of the Republic, Jules Grévy, was exposed in a scheme to sell Legion of Honor appointments. The President’s party, the Opportunists, appeared to be tainted by corruption, and more conservatives turned to Boulanger to cleanse the country of political abuses.

Although as an army officer he was legally forbidden to run for office, Boulanger entered a series of by-elections, spurred on by the financial support from Royalists, Bonapartists, and various republican followers. His platform, emphasizing the political corruption of the Opportunists, revision of the constitution of 1875, and ardent nationalism was sufficiently vague to satisfy his diverse backers. His public image as the victim of parliamentary politics also contributed to his popular appeal. Boulanger entered seven by-elections in February 1888 alone, attempting to build national support for himself through the piecemeal electoral process. In response the government placed the general in retirement and then discharged him from the army. This freed Boulanger to campaign actively for himself and strengthened his image as the victim of Opportunist politicians.

Over the next year Boulanger entered nine by-elections, a campaign that culminated with his electoral victory in Paris in January 1889. Prior to this he had won elections in both rural agricultural areas and in the industrialized north, including the Departments of the Aisne, the Dordogne, the Nord, the Somme, and the Charente-Inférieur. After his impressive victory in Paris, he started preparations for the fall general elections in hope of turning his popularity into a national mandate. The
government then increased its efforts to discredit Boulanger, to reduce his following, and to prevent his candidacy in the coming elections. Finally, when the government fabricated a case against him for plotting against the state, Boulanger fled to Belgium. Unable to enter the general in multiple elections, the Boulangists ran substitute candidates who lacked Boulanger's personal appeal and political following, and the general elections proved a disappointment for the general's cause. Without a majority in the Chamber to challenge the constitution and with Boulanger in exile, his party rapidly lost support.

The Boulangist movement challenged the traditional method of political campaigning in France of the 70s and 80s. In this political process moderate republicans competed with conservatives favoring a restoration of either the monarchy or the empire for control of the National Assembly. The Constitution of 1875 established a two house legislature with the upper elected through an elaborate system of indirect and runoff elections, which assured its domination by conservatives. Parliamentary politics were the process of balancing the narrow interests of the elected representatives. The Bonapartists had attempted to build an elaborate grass roots political organization and distributed large quantities of propaganda to generate support for a plebiscite, but they were ultimately foiled by the government. Boulangism, however, looked to the First Republic for its model of government. Emphasizing a unicameral legislative system directly responsible to the nation, Boulangists followed in the Jacobin tradition, which offered the little man with no political influence or wealth access to the political process. Although in disagreement among themselves over the actual structure of a new constitution, the Boulangists agreed on the fundamental goal of a more democratic republic.
Much of the political support for the movement, therefore, came from the left, and its leading theorists advocated numerous social and political reforms to satisfy leftist support. Conservative Royalists and Bonapartists, however, also supported the general as the man who could bring down the Republic. They failed to change the leftist orientation of the movement, but provided enough votes in rural districts to elect Boulanger in the by-elections. The movement encompassed a broad range of vague and often conflicting aspirations between politically polarized groups. The general's visual propaganda attempted to appeal to this potentialy mass audience with pictures reflecting political symbols common to all the political factions. In the process the figure of the man himself became so popular that he completely overshadowed the cause which he represented.

Boulanger's first attempt to generate publicity for himself came in the spectacular military parade at Longchamps on July 14, 1886. This was his first public appearance after he had grown his famous blond beard. Several days later the first laudatory biography appeared, and it included an engraved portrait of the general adapted from a photograph. Written by an anonymous author, the biography brought immediate criticism from the press. Francis Magnard, a columnist for Le Figaro, assumed that Boulanger initiated the publication.

No Minister of War has had the bad taste to sell his biography... on the streets. One has accused the Comte de Paris and the Duc d'Aumale of this type of publicity, but even they have never dared to be so open or rash; this exhibition is contrary to the spirit of discretion and solidarity that the army should preserve as its sacred duty. In only a few weeks the biography sold 100,000 copies. Boulanger, however, had not authorized it. His supporters attributed it to enemies trying to create a scandal. His opponents saw it as Boulanger's attempt to increase his popularity. After much
investigation the journalist Charles Chincholle discovered the author and printer of the biography, only to find that they were interested only in personally profiting from the general's popularity not in discrediting him.  

The enormous sales demonstrated the general's popularity and the striking appeal of his visual image to viewers. The journal Le Matin estimated that two-thirds of the sales were owing to the portrait. Immediately after the publication of the biography portrait photographs of Boulanger appeared for sale in Paris. Yet in 1886 Boulanger was not a candidate for political office. These first attempts at written and visual publicity in his favor were largely unauthorized materials published by enterprising businessmen eager to make money from Boulanger's rising popularity. The general made little effort to discourage them, but propaganda by his ardent followers came only after his dismissal as Minister of War in May 1887. By this time, however, his activities as minister were so well-known that enterprising dealers were offering numerous additional portraits for sale on the street. His image was also popular among painters. Many portraits were exhibited at the Salon of 1887, prompting the journal Le Charivari to satirize the exhibition in an article entitled "The One Hundred Portraits of the General." 

Propaganda distribution increased in the summer of 1887 during Boulanger's exile in Clermont-Ferrand. Police reports on the distribution of portrait photographs, colored images, placards, leaflets, and brochures came from all sections of the country. Although the police carefully watched where the materials were sent, they interfered little with their distribution. They did stop circulation of an imitation five franc piece decorated with the bust of Boulanger after 40,000 of the coins had been sold. Government officials were not alone in their concern over the Boulangist propaganda efforts. Boulanger's own followers,
anxious to prevent hostile reactions from the public, oversaw the activities of hired peddlers who sold portrait photographs. One peddler even mistook the Boulangist representative for an undercover police agent when the unidentified man warned the peddler to keep his prices low and not to overcharge the public for the photographs. 16

By winter 1888 Boulangers campaign organization was well-established, and in preparation for the spring by-elections it began distribution of his photographs and other propaganda. Count Arthur Dillon headed the propaganda efforts. Dillon, whose noble origin is obscure, had been a classmate of Boulangers at Saint-Cyr. Before joining Boulangers cause he managed the Société télégraphie Paris-New York, a joint Franco-American cable company, and in the course of his business dealings he visited the United States frequently. In America he observed American advertising techniques and political campaigns, and he subsequently drew on them in his work for Boulangers. Gabriel Terrain, one of Dillons colleagues, who later wrote a critical exposé of the Boulangist campaign, judged Dillon harshly but admired his practical orientation toward politics,

Dillon changed politics by introducing a new process into it. He treated Boulangism as a business. He launched the campaign through a process of publicity and yankee ingenuity never before seen. . . . This very intelligent man had one big weakness, he lacked confidence in the truth. . . . He was chief publicist for the campaign and the inventor and introducer of modern publicity in politics. 17

From his office in Neuilly, Dillon arranged for the production of the visual and written propaganda and set up the organization for its distribution. He hired newspaper hawkers, peddlers, and unemployed journalists to sell or to give away, if necessary, this propaganda in the departments where Boulangers was a candidate. Each distributor received a bundle of materials and
one or two francs per-day salary. If there was a fight with political opponents or trouble with the police, each distributor received reimbursement for the damages to his clothes or person. The public eagerly purchased the material, and the peddler was often allowed to keep some of the extra profits at the end of the day. Portrait photographs and printed images were also distributed freely in copies of Parisian daily newspapers distributed in the provinces and in Boulangerist newspapers, which first appeared in spring of 1888. In Paris members of the League of Patriots and of Boulangerist associations such as the League of Republican Action and the Socialist Federation participated in the distribution efforts. The League of Patriots was especially important because it offered Boulanger a national network with thousands of members in both Paris and the provinces. The league was centrally organized along quasi-military lines, and additionally provided members to cheer at Boulangerist rallies, to agitate at street demonstrations, to register voters, and to guard polling places.

Dillon concentrated the propaganda in those departments that held by-elections during the spring and summer of 1888. He did not, however, neglect to distribute propaganda in other departments. Looking to the future Dillon hoped to prepare the way for an imminent national surge of support carrying Boulanger to power. In late August the Prefect of the Puy-de-Dome in Clermont-Ferrand expressed his serious concern to the Minister of the Interior that the myriad of pictures, songs, and written material was having a serious effect on the unsophisticated population of his department. Residents in the Department of the Nord were inundated twice with massive and widespread propaganda distribution corresponding with their by-elections in April and August. Count Dillon spent over 200,000 francs in the spring campaign and over 230,000 francs for the summer. These large
sums, which came largely from Orleanists such as the Comte de Paris and Duchesse d'Uzès, financed the most intensive propaganda campaign ever mounted to that time in a French by-election. The journal Le Correspondant estimated that by April 15 every peasant house in the department had a portrait of General Boulanger on the wall. 23

Boulangist visual propaganda did not originate in France but often came from Belgium and Germany. Prior to the elections in the Nord thousands of portraits were printed in Brussels and shipped across the border to Tourcoing and Roubaix, and others arrived from Frankfort. Police agents paid particular attention to those pictures that bore no place of publication or printer's identification. According to the Law of July 29, 1881, two copies of each photograph or other printed image sold or distributed in France had to be deposited at the Ministry of Interior with the name and address of the printer. Absence of this information was grounds for confiscation and provided one method for police agents to control the flow of propaganda into the country.

In July 1888, customs agents in Le Havre discovered several cases of portraits of General Boulanger arriving from Lubeck, Germany, destined for a framer in Paris, Joseph Borrel. Borrel conducted a supplementary business in importing photographs and other printed images from foreign dealers and reselling them wholesale to Parisian peddlers. The portraits that he received from Lubeck included no printer identification or address. The police suspected Borrel of being a Boulangist agent and allowed the portraits to proceed to Paris, hoping to learn more about Boulanger's propaganda distribution network. They discovered that the portrait prints were made by a well-known German printer named Gustave Seitz. French diplomatic agents in Germany established that Seitz was a legitimate businessman responding to an order from Borrel. He offered no explanation, however, why he
withheld his name and address from the actual prints, although he knew the requirements of the French law. A second shipment of several thousand more pictures from Seitz arrived in October 1888, prompting the police to arrest Borrel. Soon after that, police officials who had been monitoring the correspondence of Count Dillon reported that Seitz received his orders directly from the chief of the Boulangist propaganda organization.\textsuperscript{24} Production of propaganda materials abroad offered several advantages to the Boulangists. Because it was difficult to trace and required police investigation beyond the usual verification of a printer's local address, police surveillance efforts were less effective. Production of political materials could more readily be kept secret, making police confiscations less likely. French police, furthermore, had no jurisdiction in foreign countries; they could only ask customs agents to stop the materials at the border. Inevitably some materials escaped such regulatory procedures.

Seitz continued to produce thousands of printed portraits for Boulanger's campaign throughout the next year, 1889. Since his identity was no longer secret, he added his name and address to the prints in order to avoid further confiscations. The government sought to counter the effect of the propaganda in other ways. Information about the origin of the materials was furnished to pro-government newspapers, and their stories on Boulanger's foreign propaganda called into question the sincerity of his nationalist attitudes. Readers legitimately asked why Boulanger purchased propaganda depicting his heroic actions in the Franco-Prussian War from a printer in Germany. By 1889 the newspaper \textit{Le XIX\textsuperscript{e} Siècle} reported that Seitz had furnished approximately 1,300,000 portraits to Boulanger. Enemies of the general published a song about the "Portraits of General Boulanger" satirizing the general's discreet but expensive business relationship with Seitz.\textsuperscript{25}
Alarmed by the most intensive propaganda campaign in the history of French by-elections, the government forbade the distribution of certain materials printed in France. On October 27, 1889, the Ministry of Interior directed police officials throughout France to seize two printed pictures of Boulanger, even though they bore the identification of the printer. Plans were prepared for the seizure of fourteen more propaganda drawings and songs representing the general, but the final order was never sent to police officials. 26

The first censored drawing of Boulanger was one accompanying a song entitled the "Ghost of the Chamber." In this representation deputies are shown fleeing an apparition of General Boulanger. The second banned image was printed in Paris by Davy and entitled "With the 'Sweep of the Broom,' all will be cleaned away." In this drawing (Plate LVII) General Boulanger stands on the steps of the Chamber of Deputies holding a sword bearing the words "Voice of the People." Behind him is a mythic figure representing the highest moral values of the French people. This figure stands with crossed arms as if supporting Boulanger's action. On the steps before the general are the figures of the deputies being driven from the chamber. The figure of the Premier of France, Charles Floquet, has fallen on the steps and looks back fearfully at Boulanger. Clemenceau leads the remaining deputies from the building. With the accompanying title, this picture signifies Boulanger's intention to cleanse the French national legislature of the corrupt politicians who drove him from his post as Minister of War and prevented the voice of the people from being heard.

The government ordered the seizure of this print because of its open disrespect for the chamber and deputies. Officials also claimed that the pictures were being distributed in such numbers as to constitute a threat to the peace. 27 Boulangist supporters
Plate LVII. Davy. With the Sweep of the Broom. 1888.
welcomed the censorship. The seizures only made the pictures more popular among the viewers. Those who had not seen the drawings were eager to buy a copy to see why it was so objectionable to the government. Moreover, Boulangerist followers were glad to be able to point to the censorship as another example of corrupt politicians thwarting the will of the people and unjustly victimizing the general. One Boulangerist journalist even went so far to recommend further confiscations, "Seize, Monsieur Floquet, until your bailiff drops dead."28

The government did not censor that part of Boulanger's visual propaganda that was not derogatory to the Republic. Widely distributed color images of Boulanger's life printed by the Pellerin company in Epinal were popular among rural voters throughout France. Plate LVIII is an image d'Epinal that depicts the events of Boulanger's career through 1887. These illustrations show the rise of Boulanger through the grades of the army and stress his devotion to duty and country. The first row of four images presents Boulanger as a young man at Saint-Cyr and his early military service during the war with Italy in 1859. The second row depicts his combat in Cochín China and in the Franco-Prussian War. The third row represents his assignment as the head of the French delegation to the centenary celebration of American independence and his activities as military commander in Tunisia. The final row shows him before the Chamber of Deputies as War Minister declaring that his troops would not fire on the striking miners at Decazeville. It also depicts Boulanger parading before his troops in Clermont-Ferrand after his dismissal as War Minister and two reforms that he implemented in the army. The series recalls the general's honorable career, one in which he was wounded three times for his country. In the world of self-serving politicians his career stood out as an example of honesty, hard work, and sacrifice. The representations of his military exploits and his
Plate LVIII. Pellerin. A Biography of General Boulanger. 1888.
devotion to the welfare of the army and to the nation emphasize his ardent nationalism, which appealed to nationalist voters from both the left and the right.

Boulanger's propaganda did not include photo-montages. The photographs used were largely portraits of the general. One exception was a picture, taken by a photographer named Serni and used to illustrate a lengthy biography of the general, which presented the torn and bloody tunic that Boulanger was wearing when he was wounded at the battle of Turbigo in 1859. His mother had traveled to Italy to attend her wounded son and had collected souvenirs of his combat, including the uniform and the bullets that pierced his shoulder. She carefully laid the tunic away until Serni requested permission to photograph it. An engraving adapted from this photograph soon appeared in the *Histoire du General Boulanger*, a serialized biography of the general, later published as a book of more than three thousand pages. The picture illustrated a discussion of Boulanger's mother's devotion to her son and of her veritable museum of souvenirs of her son's career.29

The publication of the picture generated criticism from Boulanger's opponents, who found the picture of the bloody uniform in poor taste. Rastignac, a journalist for *L'Illustration*, observed that this propaganda had gone beyond the bounds of admiration for the general.

This is astonishing. Admiration is turning into fetishism. There have been many sub-lieutenants who have had their tunics pierced and bloodied. Thousands of officers have received wounds and not died. One can count even more officers who died. But this is the first time that I have seen a tunic of a sub-lieutenant who was only wounded for his country photographed and engraved. Nothing remains to be said. "Boulanger idolatry" is taking on disturbing but amusing proportions.30

The portrait photographs presented Boulanger either in his full dress or in ordinary daily uniform. Although at the time he
was a civilian no longer entitled to wear a uniform, the portraits identified him to those who would not recognize him in civilian clothes, and maintained his link to the military tradition with which his nationalist principles were associated. Plate LIX is a portrait of the general in full dress uniform taken by the Parisian photographer Eugene Pirou. Boulanger appears as an impressive figure resplendent with medals, decorations, and the Legion of Honor. Plate LX is a similar representation by an anonymous photographer with the general's signature under his picture. Plate LXI is a portrait of Boulanger in his regular daily uniform taken by the Parisian photographer Benque, and it, too, bears the general's signature. Although in the last portrait he wears a less impressive uniform, Boulanger's expression conveys a sense of confidence and authority. Together these three widely circulated photographs suggest the honor, strength, and conviction of a military officer and probably enhanced his appeal to ardent nationalists.

The signature below two of these portraits carried symbolic significance. In the late nineteenth century handwriting was still considered an indicator of an individual's inner nature. The combination of a signature with the portrait, it was commonly believed, provided the viewer with greater insight into the values and character of an individual than the portrait or signature alone provided. Charles Chincholle, an ardent Boulangist and columnist for the newspaper Le Figaro, submitted samples of Boulanger's handwriting to a well-known handwriting expert, Doctor Poggi, at the beginning of Boulanger's quest for power. Poggi analyzed the samples for numerous qualities. The results were positive. In the area of intelligence the handwriting indicated an active mind capable of logic, assimilation, and deduction. In the area of the heart the script showed a strong-willed, egotistical, and skeptical man little given to patience with
Plate LIX. Eugene Pirou. General Boulanger. 1888.

Plate LX. General Boulanger. 1888.
Plate LXI. Benque. General Boulanger. 1888.
those he considered in error. Concerning Boulanger's will, Poggi ascertained great powers of energy, strength, determination, ambition, struggle, cold prudence, and calculation. With such admirable qualities of leadership to be seen in his handwriting, Boulanger not surprisingly included his signature on his portrait photographs.

In the autumn of 1888 Boulanger and his partisans turned their attention to the by-election to be held in Paris in January, 1889. He had good reason to be confident, because the Boulangists were well-organized in Paris, and he enjoyed a large following among Parisian workers who found his brand of republicanism appealing. Several local political organizations, including the efficiently organized League of Patriots, were ready to help the general prepare his candidacy.

The Boulangists mounted an intense propaganda campaign. Written tracts and various forms of visual propaganda were posted seemingly in almost every available location. The city looked like an immense mosaic, its walls covered with posters supporting Boulanger or his opponents. One journalist estimated that approximately 273,000 posters had been put up, 50,000 alone on the walls of the Louvre, the Bibliothèque nationale, and the arcades of the Rue de Rivoli. As the election came nearer, however, Parisians found the posters changing overnight. Boulangist followers during the night tore down or posted over the placards of their opponents, only to have their posters removed by their rivals the following evening. Still other forms of publicity were used, including sandwich men who carried Boulanger's manifesto on boards strapped to their backs. Efforts were made to disrupt the opposition's propaganda activities. Boulanger's assistant, George Laguerre, ordered supporters to volunteer as leaflet distributors for the opposing candidate. When they received the materials, they promptly delivered them to Boulanger's
headquarters. Besides posting materials on the city walls, the
general also sent portrait photographs in sealed envelopes to
every voter in his Paris district.

Expenses for the propaganda were large and prompted opposi-
tion newspapers to speculate on who was financing the Boulangerist
campaign. The general's order for 10,000 large portrait photo-
graphs measuring twelve inches by twenty inches cost over 100,000
francs. Total expenses for advertising amounted to 450,000
francs. The bill was covered largely by the generous contribu-
tions of the Duchesse d'Uzès.

Boulanger's efforts proved successful. At the polls he won
over 245,000 votes and outdistanced his closest opponent by almost
100,000 votes. The evening of his electoral victory a huge crowd
gathered outside the restaurant where he was celebrating his vic-
tory. Before midnight chants from the crowd began to exhort the
general to march on the Elysée Palace, where he could culminate
his electoral victory with a coup d'état. A leading historian of
Boulangement, Adrien Dansette, concluded that at this time Boulanger
hesitated and lost his nerve. After seeking the advice of his
mistress, Madame de Bonnemains, he returned to his dinner party,
Dansette maintains, distracted from the demonstration outside and
uninterested in his aides' encouragement to leave for the presi-
dential palace. He missed his opportunity to seize power, and
thereafter he gradually lost his popular following.

Had a coup d'état been planned for this evening, preparations
would have been made to neutralize the police and army, and to oc-
cupy strategic ministries. No indication came from Boulanger or
his top aides before or after the elections that such plans were
made. Boulanger depended on massive propaganda culminating at
the ballot box to bring him to power. His impressive electoral
victories in 1888 and January 1889 demonstrated the effectiveness
of this technique. In preparation for the general elections in
the fall propaganda efforts were stepped up immediately after the election. Rather than staging a coup d'état Boulanger sought to turn the general elections into a popular mandate that would result in his control of the government.

The Opportunists who then controlled the Third Republic recognized the threat implicit in Boulanger's snowballing popularity and took actions to stop it. They first made concessions to Boulanger's royalist supporters, hoping to induce them to stop their financial support to the general. The Duc d'Aumale, a member of the royal family, was permitted to reenter France after three years of exile. Acts of repression against Boulanger, however, soon followed. The Minister of Interior, Ernest Constans, banned all outdoor political demonstrations in Paris. This eliminated an opportunity for vocal Boulangists to stir up trouble and also reassured the more conservative groups in France, who disliked popular demonstrations. The government next sought to eliminate all Boulangist propaganda. The Ministry of Interior secretly ordered the seizure of all "Boulangist writings, brochures, and placards that are peddled at this time in the countryside. The portraits and photographs of General Boulanger are especially included." On March 10 the state brought charges against the League of Patriots for being an unauthorized and illegal secret organization. The action deprived Boulanger of his most well-organized propaganda organization just as the campaign for the general legislative elections began. When the government threatened to bring Boulanger to trial on a fabricated charge of plotting the overthrow of the state, he fled to Belgium.

The government's efforts did not stop the distribution of propaganda, but for a time spurred the Boulangists renewed efforts to keep the general's image and ideas before the public. On March 11 they ordered one million portrait photographs from a Paris photographer named Silvestre. To avoid confiscation of
the pictures the Boulangists constantly shifted the numerous boxes of portraits among several hiding places. Not until April 20 did police finally find and confiscate them. A resident of Neuilly had much earlier reported a mysterious shipment to local police, but the first policeman to hear of it had himself been a Boulangist, and he deliberately withheld the information from his superiors. 41

Police surveillance of Boulanger and Dillon in Brussels revealed that among their first actions after their arrival was establishing contact with a local photographer, Emile Aubry, to arrange for a supply of new portrait photographs to be shipped to France. Aubry was a former Commune and a member of the International who had escaped from Paris in 1871 and took refuge in Brussels. While in Belgium he remained sympathetic to workers' and socialist movements in France but he also ran a lucrative photography business. With the financial assistance of the Belgian government he had perfected over the years a process of photography in which numerous prints could be made from a single photographic negative. 42 The potential of this process for the manufacture of thousands of portrait photographs occurred to Boulanger now that government repression was making business dealings with Parisian photographers more difficult.

Despite the general's absence and the crackdown on propaganda distribution, the Boulangist movement held together. Most importantly conservative supporters such as the Duchesse d'Uzès continued to contribute money to the cause. This enabled the Boulangists to replenish their propaganda coffers, depleted by the police confiscations in Paris and the provinces. Two new photographs exploited Boulanger's exile. These pictures were made in Ostende, Belgium but were sold in Paris as representations of the general's departure from the Continent and arrival in England. Both photographs, however, included background
features of the docks at Ostende.\textsuperscript{43}

Distribution of photographs increased during the summer months prior to the general elections. By mid-summer police were confiscating only large shipments of portraits arriving from outside the country. In late June the Paris police sent orders to its special investigator in Brussels to determine which of the four hundred printers in the city were producing these pictures, information that would facilitate interception of them at the border.\textsuperscript{44} Police officials also closely followed the production of photographs in Paris. Surveillance efforts indicated two printings of several million photographs by Parisian photographers in July and August, but no confiscations were made. Instead the police carefully monitored the storage and dissemination of the photographs to Boulangerist agents who carried them to the countryside.\textsuperscript{45}

The moderation of confiscation from the previous spring was variously motivated. The large quantity of portraits made confiscation from every distributor difficult without raising a public protest against abrogation of the right to distribute propaganda guaranteed by the press law of 1881. The police did not want to enhance Boulanger's image as a victim of unjust persecution by the government. Except in working class quarters in Paris, the government also increasingly found that since his exile Boulanger's popularity was slipping in France. His trial in August by the Senate, sitting as a High Court of Justice, for plotting against the state had tarnished his image. Although the government produced no firm evidence that such a plot existed, the prosecutor, Quesnay de Beaurepaire, raised several issues that cast doubt on the general's character. He accused Boulanger of misusing funds when he was Minister of War and unearthed an old affair between the general and a woman of ill-repute. Quesnay linked Boulanger's propaganda to his plot against the state. "All
the portraits sent into France," he charged, "had one purpose, not
to shed light on the qualities of the general, but without a doubt
to produce demonstrations that would lead to a fatal plebiscite."
Quesnay reported that in three years Boulanger's partisans had
produced forty-five separate portraits, including several in
which he was presented as a savior of the French people equal to
Napoleon I. The production and dissemination of these portraits
constituted a clandestine system of political propaganda.46 After
a week of deliberation the Senate found Boulanger, Dillon, and
Henri Rochefort guilty of conspiring to overthrow the Republic
and sentenced each to deportation to a French penal colony.

The government struck its most important blow against Bou-
langer in the summer of 1889, when it voted the law forbidding
candidates to run for office in more than one district in each
election. The purpose of the law was to prevent Boulanger from
generating a nation-wide popular mandate in his name in the ap-
proaching general elections. Boulanger had planned to enter
about one hundred elections. After his victories he intended to
resign from all but one of the offices and to name followers as
his replacements. The change in the electoral procedure forced
the Boulangists to enter candidates who were unfamiliar to the
voters of the district and who lacked Boulanger's popular appeal.

With Boulanger in Belgium and forbidden to enter more than
one electoral race, the Boulangists faced the problem of how to
best maintain the general's popularity and influence in France.
One method was to increase the number of portrait photographs
distributed in the country. Unhampered by police interference,
the photographs reached the smallest hamlets across France. In
rural areas they were inserted in both Boulangist and local news-
papers and peddled on the streets and in taverns. The police at
Saint-Malo in Brittany estimated that every copy of Le Bonhomme
Breton, a newspaper reaching almost every village in the
department, included a photograph of Boulanger. Directly to the south the Prefect of the Department of Ille-et-Villaine in Rennes observed,

The peddling of photographs of General Boulanger has recommenced with more intensity than ever. . . . The Boulangists prepare and organize themselves, and we are threatened by an election held under the same conditions as that of Paris on January 27.47

Despite strict border inspections, foreign printed photographs continued to enter France illegally, mixed with legitimate printed materials, making interception difficult. In Paris the police found that portraits and other printed materials were carried to the provinces, hidden in the wagon of a Parisian furniture mover who legitimately had occasion to visit rural areas in the course of his business. By August 1889, one journalist observed that not a single village in France was free of Boulangist propaganda. 48

The fall elections proved a major disappointment to Boulanger's followers. Only forty-two among the 576 seats in the Chamber of Deputies went to Boulangists. In Paris they were more successful, capturing eighteen seats among thirty-eight and garnering approximately 50 percent of the popular vote in the department. But in the provinces only twenty-four Boulangists won electoral victories, and these occurred only in those provinces with well-established campaign organizations and candidates familiar to the voters.49 The national propaganda campaign of the summer failed to persuade voters nationwide to support Boulangist candidates running in place of the general. The portrait photographs kept the general's image before the public but did not directly attract voters to the new candidates, who remained faceless stand-ins for the general. The photographs emphasized the image of the general at a time when the success of his cause required the shift of allegiance from the man to his
party. He was faced with the impossible task of directing popular support to his associates while maintaining his own leadership in exile.

The electoral defeat and Boulanger's absence left the Boulangist party in disarray. The general's close adviser, Alfred Naquet, even suggested that a trip to America would actually help the cause, making Boulangism appear more than just the personal crusade of the general. Naquet reasoned that after the Boulangists gained control of the French legislature, Boulanger could return. The general, for his part, insisted on remaining the leader of the party. His leadership, however, was increasingly remote, and if it were not to fade away completely he would have to take decisive and highly visible action. His analysis of his defeat, however, failed to take into account the realities of the party's constituency. Increasingly the Boulangist candidates emphasized left-wing social and economic policies, which won little support among conservatives who had supported the general's campaign for constitutional revision. Frustrated by the general's flight, these conservative followers withdrew their support from Boulangist candidates. The general blindly continued to espouse his conviction that Boulangism should appeal to all groups and promise a republic open to followers on the left and right. In reality the leading Boulangists leaned strongly to the left, and their major support came from working class districts in Paris.50

To reinvigorate Boulangist support in France and reconfirm his leadership Boulanger sat for a photo-interview, which was published in the literary supplement of Le Figaro in November 1889. Only once before had a photo-interview been used in the French press, and this was the first instance of its use for political purposes.51 The interview was conducted by Charles Chincholle, a well-known journalist and Boulanger supporter.
Paul Nadar, the son of the famous portrait photographer Nadar, took the photographs of the general in his hotel room, while Chincholle posed questions and comments. The interview included twenty-four photographs of various sizes covering three pages in the newspaper. These photographs show the general in different poses and gestures corresponding with his particular comments.

Introducing the unusual format of the issue, Chincholle emphasized that *Le Figaro* intended no political endorsement by its decision to interview Boulanger and not some other well-known figure of the time. Boulanger's likeness was widely recognized in France, and he offered a good test of the appeal and effectiveness of the new format. In the era of the new Eiffel Tower, the first telephones, and illuminated fountains, Chincholle explained, the newspaper was following the march of scientific progress, and attempting to modernize and enliven the paper's format. Chincholle, however, was an ardent Boulangist on the conservative *Le Figaro*'s staff. By choosing Boulanger for its first photo-interview, the newspaper, despite its avowal of impartiality, gave the general a valuable forum for the expression of his political ideas at a time when his party most needed publicity.

Boulanger realized the journalistic and political significance of the novel interview. Chincholle inquired if he understood that its experimental nature could lead to public ridicule and charges of political exploitation. Boulanger responded that he welcomed the opportunity.

Ah well, this means nothing to me. I consent to the interview. I have swallowed so many insults that a few more do not frighten me. Besides, it pleases me to collaborate on such a truly original idea and to facilitate the progress of journalism. In spite of the abuses, I would say that the press has served me well and I can refuse it nothing. I ask you only to reflect on the questions that you will pose to me and to state my regards to those of my followers who remain loyal.
Boulanger had nothing to lose and everything to gain by submitting to the interview, since his political fortunes in France had seriously declined.

The first page of the interview (Plate LXII) presents six photographs of Boulanger seated in his hotel suite responding to questions posed to him. The general gestures with his hands in order to emphasize his response. Plate LXIII shows him with his hand pointing upwards as if to establish the conviction of his statement. Accompanying this picture is Boulanger's assessment of the continuing commitment of the Boulangist political crusade.

Boulangism, responded the general, has an enduring life. Believe me. In every campaign there are several battles. One can not win them all. We have lost some surely. But are not our troops strong enough to win others? Those of my friends who have not forgotten our principles or the policies of revisionism have an energy which you should not overlook. They are, in the largest sense of the word, ready for everything. With such men, nothing will abate, and final success is certain. We will have the last word. We can say, moreover, that our defeat is really a victory since the Chamber of Deputies now includes forty-seven Boulangist deputies instead of twelve. There will be more advantages, too, if we do not dwell on our faults and mistakes.54

This attempt to reinterpret the electoral defeat of the previous September reflected the general's concern for those followers who considered Boulangism a lost cause. Le Figaro was a conservative newspaper, read by many Orleanists and Bonapartists who had previously supported the general but withheld their support from Boulangist candidates in the general election. By strongly insisting on the viability of his cause, Boulanger hoped to induce his former followers to return to his side.

With this statement Boulanger stood up and began to pace about the room making additional gestures to reemphasize his point. The six photographs in the left and center columns (Plates LXIV, LXV) show the general standing beside his chair.
The pictures emphasize Boulanger's confidence and conviction concerning his assertion on the future of his political cause. Accompanying this series is his assertion that French newspapers were printing lies about the demise of his political movement. Pointing to the newspaper Boulanger refutes its charge that he and Count Dillon had ended their relationship over a disagreement on the political direction of Boulangism.

Suddenly becoming sensitive to the presence of Nadar, Boulanger turns to his desk, "Wait, I'm going to write. That will make me forget about that devil Nadar who interrupts my attention from time to time." In the second picture on the left column of Plate LXVI Boulanger is writing. He receives assurances that his statement will be published,

What gives me hope is the crumbling of the new chamber from the reciprocal hate of the different factions. Never has a chamber been so battered as this one. After what has occurred since October 7, I can foresee what will happen this winter; such a chamber is not viable.55

Turning back to his desk the general becomes more pensive (Plate LXVII). Leaning his head on his hand Boulanger ponders both his and his country's fate.

We are now in November and the Jersey countryside is still green, and I think of spring. Yesterday I had a dream. Walking down a road I found myself before seven British soldiers who were returning to the Chateau Elizabeth. They recognized me and saluted. And I thought of France. I saluted her. I would have embraced her.56

A tricolor flag hangs from the desk at which Boulanger sits. The photograph and caption represents the general's deep desire to return to his native country and the personal agony that his exile created for him.

The final photograph in the interview (Plate LXVIII) shows the general at his desk shaking hands with the unseen figure of Chincholle. In the accompanying caption Boulanger expresses his

fidelity to his cause once again,

Goodbye, my dear friend. Tell all my followers in France
that here, as in Paris, I am always with them; and although
I am absent, they can count on me. Always.57

The firm handshake symbolized the commitment of Boulanger to his
followers and his intention to continue the struggle for his cause.

Attacks against the photo-interview soon appeared. Several
newspapers claimed that the entire interview was a hoax perpe-
trated by Le Figaro to popularize the dying Boulangist movement
and to increase newspaper sales. The interview occurred accord-
ing to Le Figaro's story in a suite of the Hotel Pomme d'Or on
the island of Jersey, where Boulanger had moved. An examination
of the hotel, however, revealed no rooms identical to the one in
which Boulanger sat for the interview. The interview actually
took place in a suite of the Hotel Mengelle in Brussels. Deceit
over the location led to the speculation that no interview ever
took place, that it was a fabrication by Chincholle in Paris
using old photographs of the general taken during his residence
in Brussels.58

Shortly afterwards several illustrated weekly journals
satirized the interview with caricatures depicting Boulanger in
preposterous or embarrassing poses. "Ne Bougeons Plus" by
Gilbert-Martin in Le Don Quichotte (Plate LXIX) shows the general
posing before a photographer carrying a copy of Le Figaro in his
back pocket. The ten views depict Boulanger exhibiting numerous
poses and gestures, including four that present the general dis-
robing. A verse describing the modeling session accompanies the
illustration.

Tell me, he said, all the poses
So that I can please the women.
God, they have said enough,
I hope they never forget.
Because I owe to them
More than three fourths of my success.
Plate LXIX. *Le Don Quichotte* (Gilbert-Martin). Do Not Move. 1889.
But the coat comes off
And the pants soon follow.
Hold it! Shouts Chicholle, distressed.
That is very nice, I say in all honesty
But Alas! The Figaro counts
Among its subscribers the clergy.

By emphasizing the general's physical attributes and attractions to women, the caricature's caption suggested that his appeal and success with French voters lay in his physical appearance not in his political beliefs. The use of photography to exploit these qualities increased this interest but also offended certain conservative groups such as the clergy.

The caricature by Pepin in Le Grelot (Plate LXX) mimics scenes of the actual photo-interview. Pepin, however, emphasized base daily life routines. He begins with Boulanger welcoming Chincholle and a discussion of the originality of the interview format. In Figure 5 the caricature departs from the original interview when the general admits his physical appeal to women, "Since the young women closed their hearts and purses to me, my partisans have exploded in my hands like an old rifle. Those wretched people." Suddenly Boulanger feels sick to his stomach. The interview continues as Boulanger proceeds to the bathroom. As in Le Figaro's interview the general begins to read and comment upon critical remarks about him in a newspaper. Boulanger, however, is seated on his bathroom stool rather than on a comfortable hotel chair. Pepin parodies the general's incapacity for physical movement at that particular moment with the current inaction of his political movement. "You want to remain a long time like this, my general? Yes, I desire not to budge before my departure for France... France, it is beautiful, even here." As the general gets up, Chincholle throws some money to an organ grinder beneath the window playing one of Boulanger's old campaign songs. In the last caricature Pepin returns to the exact format of Le Figaro's article with the general shaking hands.
Plate LXX. Le Grelot (Pepin). Boulanger in the Intimacy. 1889.
with Chincholle and requesting him to express Boulanger's best wishes and confidence to his loyal followers in France.

To satirize the photo-interview format and to deflate the prestige devoted to Boulanger by this interview, Pepin placed the general in an embarrassing position that is natural but vulgar when the subject of a photograph or caricature. This also made the general appear more as a normal individual than the heroic figure depicted by his visual propaganda.

"Ne Bougeons Plus" by Moloch in La Silhouette (Plate LXXI) presents Boulanger again in ridiculous poses that satirize the photo-interview format and ridicule the general. In the first depiction he falls over in his chair. Accompanying the depiction of an elaborate brace used by photographers to prevent movement by the sitter is a brief verse satirizing the unnatural gestures of the interview.

With a gesture natural
And an air spiritual
Ernest then begins
"One can see well, I think,
That I have prepared nothing
In order to be photographed."

In the third caricature when Boulanger claims that his only wish is to return to France, the camera flash misfires, tumbling the general. Rubbing his backside in the next depiction, Boulanger tries to reinterpret his electoral losses.

I have received numerous kicks in the rear;
But our defeat is really our glory,
It is better than a victory
And to prove it
I'm having myself photographed.

Although directed at disaffected conservatives, Le Figaro's photo-interview contributed little to the general's efforts to recapture these former followers. The demise of conservative support also led to a decrease in the financial contributions
Plate LXXI. *La Silhouette* (Moloch). Do Not Move. 1889.
that had financed the publicity campaigns of earlier eras. During the following months propaganda dissemination slowed. Even his ardent working class support in Paris fell off, when it became apparent that the general would never return to France. In the elections for the Municipal Council of Paris in the spring of 1890 the Boulangist campaign was a failure and only two Boulangist candidates won seats. 61

After these elections Boulanger's fortunes declined at a rapid pace. The revelations by his political colleague, Gabriel Terrail, in *Les Coulisses du boulangisme* detailed the financial contributions of royalists to the general's campaign, which further tarnished his image among his Parisian followers. The exile also took its toll on the general's mental and physical health. His mistress, Madame de Bonnemains, remained one of his sole sources of comfort. When she became ill with tuberculosis, they moved back to Brussels from the damp climate of Jersey. Three months later in July, 1891, she died, leaving Boulanger distraught and depressed. He often remained for days in his house except to visit her grave at Ixelles cemetery. His friends could do nothing to revive his interest in life. Finally on September 30, 1891, he went to the cemetery and at her grave shot himself in the head.

Even in death he received no respect from his opponents. Pepin's caricature of Boulanger's death (Plate LXII) is entitled "The Last Pose" and shows Boulanger at the cemetery about to shoot himself. A photographer in the background takes his picture.

Three months after Boulanger's death the first edition of a photograph-illustrated book on the general's years in exile appeared. Written by his secretary when he was Minister of War, Théodore Cahu, the book detailed the general's political commitment and his misery while living in exile from his beloved homeland. Several photographs exploited the sentimentality of the
Plate LXXII. Le Grelot (Pepin). Last Pose. 1891.

Plate LXXIII. Théodore Cahu (Marius Nérou). General Boulanger the Evening of his Departure for Exile. 1889.
general's departure from France and his yearning to return. The portrait photograph taken by the Parisian photographer Marius Nérou the night of Boulanger's flight from Paris (Plate LXXIII) shows the general in a sad and melancholy mood. The description accompanying the portrait emphasizes the nobility of the general's final days and his sorrow in leaving France.

Very chatty arranging his papers and books on his work table to make them appear more orderly, his face suddenly became pensive. His eyeglasses in his hand, he skimmed through some letters. He lowered his head and Marius took his photograph as he looked up.

He raised his head and his eyes at the same time. His expression had a vague sadness. He appeared to search for something. His thoughts explored the future. All his emotions were revealed in this profound and luminous expression through which at this moment passed an anxious thought.62

The general never forgot his homeland while in exile and constantly looked to the French coast from his residence in Jersey, hoping to catch a glimpse of his country. His physical appearance deteriorated from anguish and sorrow over his exile and the loss of his political fortunes. In Plate LXXIV the general stands on the rocky coast of Jersey and looks toward France. He appears older and greyer for his experiences, and his somber expression indicates his internal grief. The brief dialogue with his mistress which accompanies this photograph clarifies the emotional attachment Boulanger still felt for the country that spurned him.

While Bonny sat looking at the horizon, the general stood motionless contemplating the open sea with his hand over his eyes shielding the sun so he could peer better into the distance. He searched the empty space hoping to discover the coast of France. . . .

Bonny offered him an umbrella. No thanks, he said.

He remained silent for several minutes, completely motionless, and two tears ran down the sides of his cheeks. Bonny saw these tears. At first she dared not interrupt this quiet sweetness, but then suddenly without control
Plate LXXIV. Théodore Cahu. General Boulanger on the Jersey Coast. 1891.
this question came out.  
"You are crying, my general?"
The general put his hand down and extended his arm towards 
the sea and asked, "Do you see there?"
Bonny tried to distinguish the place where the general indicated, but she saw nothing.
"No, I do not see. The brilliance of the sun on the water 
hurts my eyes."
"That is France," responded the general. 63

The photograph showing General Boulanger lying in state
(Plate LXXV) is accompanied by his last will and testament written
the day before his suicide. Although the general appears in
civilian clothes, his testament emphasized his career as a soldier in service to France and the injustice of the French government's treatment of him.

My followers continue to struggle against those who disregard every law and want me to die outside my country. I will die tomorrow. But today I say loudly that I have done nothing wrong. All my life I have done my duty. History will not be hard on me, it will be hard on those who tried to tarnish a loyal soldier with a political judgement. I am pleased to recall here once more that I repeatedly offered to surrender myself as prisoner, if they would give me a trial before a common court, but as always those in power refused, knowing that I would certainly be acquitted. In leaving this life I have only one regret: not to die on the field of battle as a soldier in service to my country. The country will allow one of its children at the time of his death to utter two rallying cries for all those who love our dear country. Long live France! Long live the Republic!64

In death his last photograph became a political statement. Unfairly exiled, he desired only to die for his country. Boulanger's nationalism remained a major unifying theme of his political ideology.

Boulangist propaganda appears rudimentary in comparison with propaganda in the twentieth century, but it was a pioneering step toward modern propaganda campaigns directed as mass political
Plate LXXV. Théodore Cahu. General Boulanger Lying in State. 1891.
audiences in a democratic state. General Boulanger recognized the value of this technique in winning voters to his cause. Reminiscing during his exile he rejected the notion that a candidate's unpopularity would automatically result in political victory for his opponent. He felt that an unpopular politician would lose only in a country where elections depended on a rich upper class who could purchase all the daily journals, books, and other publications that provide political information. The criticism of the politician in these publications would persuade the readers to vote against him. In France the situation was different.

In a democratic country like France the question, in my opinion, cannot even be posed. Among the rural voters, who form the great majority of the electoral body, three-fourths flinch at buying a newspaper and three-fourths of those who do buy newspapers read only the cheap papers that include very little about politics.

The remedy for this situation was the mass distribution of free or low-priced propaganda publications. Various illustrations, including photographs, drawings, and engravings, complementing the written publications were necessary to attract the attention of the voters. Confirmation of the impression provided by the pictures required political tours, banquets, and rallies by the candidate.

Boulanger first observed the importance of political propaganda when he visited the United States in 1881. He discovered that each political party had the same opportunity to achieve victory, but the successful party was the one that used propaganda more effectively. A political party that did not use propaganda because of its confidence in the worth of its cause always lost its advantage with the voters. Boulanger concluded, "... success can be obtained only by a propaganda conducted in a way that strikes at the eyes and ears of the people at every moment."
campaign the results have proven that propaganda was indispen-
sable. In areas where Boulangerists lost he attributed the de-
feat to a lack of propaganda. In May 1888 Boulanger withdrew his
candidacy in the Department of the Charente in favor of Paul
Déroulède. Déroulède had grown up in Angoulême, the chef-lieu of
that department, but had spent many years in Paris as the head
of the League of Patriots. In the interim before the June elec-
tion Boulangerist propaganda reached only half of the department.
In those areas where Déroulède was thoroughly known from the
propaganda, he won; he lost in those areas where the propaganda
failed to penetrate. Although Boulangerist propaganda was dis-
tributed nationally, most went to the north, west, and central
departments that had by-elections in 1888. In these areas
Boulanger or his candidates polled better in both 1888 and in
1889 than in districts which received less propaganda.

Boulanger, however, could not totally rule out the social,
ecological, political, or cultural differences between these re-
gions as a factor in the different electoral results. There were
areas of population such as Pas-de-Calais that received enormous
amounts of propaganda yet did not return large votes for the gen-
eral. Nor did propaganda dissemination prior to the general elec-
tions convince voters to support Boulangerist candidates in the ab-
sence of the general himself. Although its impact is difficult
to measure, at the very least this propaganda familiarized the
rural voters of these departments with Boulanger's image and his
basic political doctrines.

During the electoral campaigns Boulanger's portrait photo-
graphs depicted him in military uniform despite his dismissal from
the army. This appeal to his long and illustrious military career
reminded the voter of his dedication and sacrifices for his coun-
try. The portraits also signified the general's strength of char-
acter, his will to rid France of political corruption, and his
determination to stand up against the growing economic and military strength of Germany. After his departure from France the general turned to the new and unique photo-interview to reach his French audience. Yet *Le Figaro* sought to create confidence in the general with these photographs. The strong, forceful, and confident gestures and appearance of the general reconfirmed the impression made by his earlier portraits. Even after his suicide Boulanger's associates tried to direct French opinion about the general through photographs. His last portraits emphasized his devotion to his country through the visual expression of his grief at being absent from France.

Government and police officials of the Third Republic soon recognized the importance of photographs and other visual propaganda to the Boulangist political campaign. Surveillance of propaganda production and distribution began with Boulanger's first electoral contests. Censorship first occurred in the fall of 1888 and culminated in the months after Boulanger's election in Paris in January 1889, during the general election campaign. Despite freedom to distribute propaganda guaranteed in 1881, police confiscations of photographs continued throughout the spring. They ended only when government efforts to prevent Boulanger's candidacy in multiple districts made his hoped-for electoral plebiscite impossible.

The revision in the electoral procedure made Boulanger's portrait photographs inappropriate. Prior to the summer of 1889 photographs that emphasized the man and his personality were useful because Boulanger was personally entered in the election races. His commanding appearance appealed to the voter and contributed to his electoral success. When Boulanger's candidacy had been withdrawn, little photographic propaganda depicting the new Boulangist candidates was developed or disseminated. The photographs emphasized the general when attention should have shifted to his
replacements. Such photographs would have made the new candidates more familiar to the voters who over the years had developed trust and confidence in the general alone.

Nevertheless, Boulanger's electoral campaigns and the extensive use of all forms of visual and written propaganda marked a significant turn in the political process in France. According to Frederic Seager, the Boulanger affair signified not the political weakness of the Republic but its growing strength. Rejecting revolution or military coup so typical of the political process in nineteenth-century France, Boulanger relied on elections to change the government. He directed his efforts at conservative rural voters and at those urban voters who in the past had supported revolutionary methods. To this end he used photographic propaganda more systematically than ever before, exploiting a new technology to reach and influence the new electorate enfranchised by the democratic state, and called attention to new options for the political process in modern France.
Notes


4 Boulangier's striking appearance resulted in the request that he be the model for a statue commemorating the Yorktown victory. Eric Leguebe, "Quand le Général Boulangier assistant au centenaire de Yorktown," *Le Parisien*, July 9, 1976 (n.p.).


6 Seager, *Boulangier*, pp. 27-34.

7 Ibid., pp. 33-34.

8 Hutton, "Popular Boulangism," p. 86.

9 Ibid., pp. 95-96; Seager, *Boulangier*, pp. 249-57.


12 Archives nationales (hereafter cited as AN), F7 12448, Agissements boulangistes, August 19, 1886.


14 *Le Dossier*, p. 405.

15 AN, F7 12445, Agissements boulangistes, July 20, 1887.

16 AN, F7 12448, Agissements boulangistes, July 29, 1887.
Mermiex (Gabriel Terrail), Les Coulisses du boulangisme (Paris: 1890), pp. 273-75.

Ibid., pp. 278-80.

AN, F 12448, Agissements boulangistes, April 24, 1888.

Archives de la Préfecture de Police (hereafter cited as AFP), BA/1338, Ligue des Patriots, January 27, 1889.

AN, F 12448, Agissements boulangistes, August 29, 1888.

Mermiex, Coulisses, pp. 280-81.

Seager, Boulanger, p. 124.

AN, F 12448, Agissements boulangistes, July 7, 1888; October 18, 1888; October 24, 1888; October 26, 1888.


AN, F 12928, Saisie des dessins, October 27, 1888.

Ibid., October 27, 1888; December 12, 1888.


Le Dossier, pp. 400-1.


Seager, Boulanger, p. 197.


Mermiex, Coulisses, p. 281.

Dansette, Boulangisme, pp. 243-51.

Seager, Boulanger, pp. 206-10.
APP, BA/971, Propagande boulangiste, March 3, 1889.

Ibid., March 11, 1889.

Ibid., April 20, 1889.

APP, BA/971, Propagande boulangiste, April 6, 1889.

AN, F7 12448, Agissements boulangistes, May 11, 1889.

APP, BA/971, Propagande boulangiste, June 29, 1889.

Ibid., July 24, 1889; July 25, 1889; August 8, 1889.


AN, F7 12448, Agissements boulangistes, July 9, 1889.

APP, BA/971, Propagande boulangiste, August 10, 1889; September 2, 1889.

Hutton, "Popular Boulangism," p. 94.

Seager, Boulanger, pp. 241-42.

The first photo-interview in French journalistic history was published in Le Journal in 1886. The photographer Nadar interviewed the scientist Eugene Chevreul on the occasion of Chevreul's one hundredth birthday.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Moloch, "Ne Bougeons plus," La Silhouette, December 1, 1889, p. 1. The last caricature in this series is so unusual that it warrants a brief description and explanation. The female figure appears to assault Boulanger disrespectfully pinching his nose and pushing him to the carpet. The vulgar language in the brief caption below the depiction reflects how insulting Moloch was toward Boulanger.

Helas! The result
Oh naive Ernest,
Eluded your hopes,
Because at present France,
With me, cries out to you:
"Go screw yourself."

Seager, Boulanger, pp. 244-45.


Ibid., pp. 273-74.

Ibid., pp. 352-53.

George E. Boulanger, Mémoires du Général Boulanger (Paris: 1890), pp. 159-60.

Ibid., p. 161.

Ibid., p. 162.

Ibid., p. 163.

Seager, Boulanger, p. 247.
CHAPTER VI

PHOTOGRAPHY, ROYALISM, AND THE ACTION FRANÇAISE, 1883-1914

When he first succeeded Chambord as heir to the throne in 1883, the Comte de Paris received only grudging support from Legitimists. By 1884, however, most royalists had rallied to his support. When the director of the national security police pressed departmental prefects for information on royalist strength and organization in France, their reports indicated that the Comte de Paris had the backing of 148 royalist newspapers in forty-eight departments. Fusion of the Bourbon and Orleanist factions had been accomplished in twenty-four departments, and new royalist organizations had been formed in most of the remaining departments. The royalist party had survived the death of its legitimate heir. The royalists were not a serious threat to the stability of the Third Republic, but the movement could not be ignored by the government. Royalist candidates were often entered in elections, and they frequently garnered a respectable number of votes especially in local elections. They succeeded in electing only forty-five of more than 400 deputies to the chamber in 1881.¹

Prior to 1883 the Comte de Paris had lived quietly with his wife, refraining from any political activity during the previous decade. He was a studious man with many intellectual interests, including the history of the American Civil War and proletarian social and economic problems in the industrialized areas of France. He possessed qualities that made him a suitable pretender to the throne, but he lacked the personal warmth and dynamism necessary to generate a large popular following.²

The count recognized the political strength of the Third
Republic and accepted the electoral process as the only method for restoring the monarchy in France. From 1883 to 1885 he built a coalition of rightist political candidates called the Union des Droits, which included numerous Bonapartists. This loose alliance agreed to run only one candidate in selected departments where the candidacy of two conservatives would split the vote and result in republican victories. The election results of 1885 reversed the trend of previous years, and royalist and Bonapartist candidates garnered over 200 seats in the new legislature. The royalists alone sent over 150 new deputies to Paris.  

As early as February 1884 royalists began to circulate portrait photographs of the Comte de Paris in preparation for the forthcoming elections. Police agents in Cannes reported that the count ordered 30,000 portrait photographs from a local photographer. These portraits were then glued to sheets of paper decorated with allegorical ornaments and historical phrases. In the following weeks photographs of the count were circulated in southern and western France either through distribution to subscribers of local royalist newspapers or to worshipers leaving Sunday mass at local churches. Police in Paris reported in late August another large production of portraits by the printing company and publishing house Goupil. Additional printed illustrations, pamphlets, leaflets, and brochures accompanied the photographs.

The zeal of the monarchist propaganda distributors gave republican officials cause for concern. A royalist, Charles de Montazet from Albi in the Department of the Tarn, boldly wrote to the editor of the L'Union républican du Tarn, the local republican newspaper in his department, openly reporting his activities.

Yes I distribute brochures, portraits, and those terrible images d'Epinal so decried by both Voltaire and your editorials. I will be satisfied only when every voter in my district has a picture in his house of the one man who can
liberate this unfortunate country. Propaganda for the monarchy is now being distributed in every department by a group of honest people representing the Orléanists, the Legitimists, and the Bonapartists. We are serving our country and the truth by representing the Comte de Paris and his family as the glorious servants of the country who alone can restore order, peace and prosperity.3

Plates LXXVI and LXXVII are portrait photographs of the Comte de Paris circulated in France during the royalist campaign for the general elections of 1885. The first photograph is a portrait of the count in civilian clothes taken by a photographer in Toulouse named André Quinsac. The count poses without any symbols linking him to his royal heritage. His signature appears underneath the portrait, identifying the image and also providing a sample of the count’s handwriting for additional insight into his character. In Plate LXXVII the count appears in a similar pose and in civilian clothes. Like the previous photograph this portrait, taken by Pierre Petit in Paris, includes the count’s signature below his image but no identifying symbols. In contrast to Prince Victor’s portrait as a young artillery soldier circulating during this time, the count’s portrait does not suggest the military glory or grandeur of the French monarchy. The count appears as a serious, reflective, and scholarly man proud but undaunted by the majesty of his royal family. In 1885 the count predicted that monarchist and Bonapartist candidates would win a majority of the seats in the chamber. He hoped to use that majority to install himself as the head of a constitutional monarchy much like the July Monarchy under his grandfather, Louis-Philippe. Unlike the late Bourbon heir, the Comte de Chambord, he accepted the constitution of 1875 and did not insist on symbols of the absolute monarchy. His portraits reflect an air of confidence characteristic of a man with royal blood, but they contain no overt symbols that would alienate voters unwilling to return to the past.

Threatened with growing royalist popularity and a large
Plate LXXVI. André Quinsac. Comte de Paris. 1884.

increase in conservative representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, officials of the Third Republic responded with the Law of Exile on June 23, 1886. The Comte de Paris and his family reluctantly moved to England. The banishment, however, spurred the count to greater political activity in order to maintain his image and ideas in France. His stepped-up propaganda included posters of a manifesto protesting his exile, printed images depicting his departure, and portrait photographs. The Minister of the Interior on June 26, 1886, ordered all prefects to confiscate the manifesto, which, the minister feared, might disturb the public peace. In this manifesto the Comte de Paris withdrew his previous support for the Republic and advocated complete restoration of the monarchy. His last statement was warning of the ensuing battle, "The Republic is afraid; by striking at me, it had designated me. I have faith in France, and I shall be ready at the decisive hour." The minister withdrew the order one month later but allowed prefects to continue the confiscations if they believed that the count's propaganda threatened public order.

Republicans assumed that this propaganda would have a powerful effect on the public and pushed for an extension of the censorship to all royalist written and visual materials in circulation. One anonymous journalist in the republican newspaper Le Matin considered the mass distribution of this propaganda as an abuse of the privileges granted in the press law of 1881. He argued that citizens should have the right to make their political opinions known through journals only, rather than through the dissemination of manifestoes, photographs, illustrations, or demonstrations. These expressions of political opinion were actions that could hinder the free access and use of the public streets by other citizens. Propaganda materials also incited violence between advocates of opposing parties and were, therefore, a threat to public order. Far from encroaching on civil liberties, this
form of censorship protected an individual citizen's right not to be endangered by political demonstrations.

Nevertheless, the count's visual propaganda continued in circulation. Surveillance by local police agents indicated that these materials reached even the smallest hamlets in western and southwestern France, where royalist partisans were strong. Among the non-censored materials were portrait photographs of the count distributed earlier in his election campaign and printed illustrations depicting his departure for England. These pictures contained no blatantly revolutionary subject matter and, therefore, the police made no effort to interfere with their distribution. Plate LXXXVIII is a series of five colored illustrations depicting the final activities in France of the count before his departure and the popular response to his exile. The two pictures in the top row show supporters of the count registering their names at his chateau and fishing boats off western France flying flags at half mast in honor of the pretender. The center illustration represents the Comte de Paris at his chateau shaking hands with local residents who have come to express their sorrow at his departure. The bottom row shows the count embracing his daughter, who is ill. Finally a young boy consoles his tearful mother as the ship carrying the count and his family pulls away from the French shore. The young boy states, "Mother, do not cry, he will return." These sentimental images of the count's popular support in France suggest that the royalist cause would soon grow larger and that the people would demand the pretender's return. In fact only scattered popular demonstrations occurred protesting the count's exile.

The Comte de Paris advocated the complete restoration of the monarchy through a direct popular mandate similar to the Bonapartist plebiscite. He expected this mandate to be expressed in the election of royalist candidates to political office. Upon
achieving a majority of those representatives the monarchists would repeal the Law of Exile against the count and reestablish the monarchy.

To accomplish this objective, he realized he must have a political organization in France that could disseminate propaganda on a large scale. A central committee composed of the count's direct representatives was organized in Paris, and it established close working relations with existing provincial royalist committees. Local social and religious organizations with large royalist membership, such as the Cercles Catholiques and the Syndicats agricoles, also joined the monarchists' cause. New organizations were established for the sole purpose of furthering the pretender's cause. The Société de Publicité conservatrice du Département de la Seine was formed in March 1887 and soon had more than 400 members. Its main purpose was the distribution of conservative publicity dedicated to the restoration of the monarchy and the election of royalist candidates. Assessing the national political situation in September 1887, the Paris police judged that the royalists were just as strong as they were in 1885, especially in southwestern departments. If the republicans quarreled among themselves, however, royalists would win more support, the police predicted, by denouncing the republican system as unstable and divisive.

While the Comte de Paris was attempting to further his political cause from exile, General Boulanger was campaigning in France to revise the constitution of 1875. The by-elections in the winter of 1888 proved to the monarchists that Boulanger's popularity exceeded that of the pretender or any other monarchist candidates. When Boulanger declared his intention to revise the constitution, the Comte de Paris entered into secret negotiations with him and agreed to help finance and support his campaign. In return the monarchists expected Boulanger to repeal the Law of
Exile and to pave the way for a return of the monarchy. No written agreements were signed, and the alliance took on a vague character enabling each party to disavow the other. The royalists, however, hoped to use Boulanger as a tool for their own ambitions. When the government disqualified Boulanger from running in multiple districts during the general elections of 1889, the royalists deserted his ranks and refused to vote for his replacements.

From the spring of 1888 to the fall of 1889 the Comte de Paris also ran an election campaign parallel to Boulanger's. Following the example of the Boulangists, the pretender distributed large quantities of propaganda across France in hopes of influencing voters to support local royalist candidates. The first photograph-illustrated biography of the Comte de Paris appeared in 1888. It included a short narrative of his life, a summary of his political beliefs, and portrait photographs of the count and his entire family. His supporters distributed pamphlets, posters, printed illustrations, and portrait photographs. As early as July 1888, however, the government began to confiscate the count's materials.

The first propaganda piece censored by the government was a letter from the Comte de Paris addressed to all communal mayors in France. Eugene Dufeuille, the former editor of the Journal des Débats, who was in charge of royalist propaganda distribution in France, ordered 27,000 of these letters from a local Parisian printer. When police agents raided the printer's shop and Dufeuilles' apartment, they found only 900. Orders went out the same day to postal officials from the Minister of the Interior to intercept letters already in the mail. By the next day more than 5,000 letters were in police hands. Efforts to locate the remaining 20,000 or so continued.

The count's letter was critical of the republican regime but
contained no overt call for revolution. It put forth the advantages of the monarchy and emphasized that the Republic provided few benefits on the local level to the mayors or to inhabitants of small villages in France.

The Republic has not provided the freedom it promised to the Communes. . . . Under a regime that controls the entire budget, the commune no longer has the independence to manage its own money, and parents no longer are the masters of their children's education. On occasion the government will promise to return some liberties to local control. But do not hope to receive them. The first concern of the government is to destroy what local liberties remain.

The Monarchy will guarantee these freedoms. . . . Far from being hostile to communal democracy, the monarchy will safeguard these interests and respect these rights.

The local priest and school teacher will be able to perform their duties, neither the instruments nor the victims of politics.

Finally, the mayors will not hold their offices thanks to political favor, birth, or wealth. Whatever their personal situation, they will serve only by the free choice of their equals.14

In the Chamber of Deputies' debate over the seizure of the pretender's letter the Prime Minister, Charles Floquet, defended the government's policy. He argued that the government's intention was to stop not royalist publicity but clandestine instructions from the count and blatant propaganda. Henceforth the government would confiscate all direct communications from the Comte de Paris to France. These included letters, telegrams, and posters. Journals and newspapers were not included. Floquet reasoned that the Law of Exile in 1886 gave the government the right to exclude both the pretender and his direct communication to the country.15

The distribution of printed visual illustrations and portrait photographs, however, increased while police were preoccupied with
investigating and confiscating other forms of printed materials. These pictures were equally political in meaning, and on October 27, 1888, they, too, came under government censorship. The Minister of the Interior ordered all departmental prefects to seize a colored lithograph printed by Krakow and distributed by the Paris-based royalist publisher Librairie nationale. This illustration (Plate LXXIX) presents the Comte de Paris in military uniform riding a spirited horse before a regiment of French troops. The count waves his hat to the troops, while they stand at attention showing respect for the pretender to the throne. One soldier holds the tricolor flag, which appears at a slightly angled incline as if in salute to the count.

Prefectural reports from all sections of France immediately came streaming into the Ministry of the Interior announcing the confiscation of this illustration or requesting further clarification concerning under what circumstances the image could be seized. This equestrian portrait of the count was only one of five illustrations which the ministry hoped to eliminate. The remaining images were representations of General Boulanger or Prince Victor. Police agents, however, had difficulty sorting the censored images from those still legal. Still other police agents were entering printers' shops in search of the count's portrait, although the minister intended the seizure of only those displayed or sold on the street.16

These confiscations soon led to suits by monarchists against the government for illegal censorship. Eugene Dufeuille filed against the Prefect of Police in Paris for the confiscation from his apartment of the letter to the communal mayors. An attorney from Chambéry, Usannaz-Joris, sued the prefect and postmaster of the Department of the Savoie for the illegal confiscation of this letter in the mails. In Orléans the editor and publisher of the monarchist newspaper, Le Journal du Loiret, George Michau, sued
Plate LXXIX. Krakow. Comte de Paris before French Troops. 1888.
the prefect of the Department of the Loiret for illegal seizure of the lithograph images of the count from a peddler employed by the newspaper. Other law suits were filed in the Departments of the Calvados, the Morbihan, the Lot-et-Garonne, the Charente-inférieure, the Orne, and the Indre-et-Loire.

The government's arguments in defense of the seizures were similar in each case. The attorney representing the prefect in Loiret emphasized the seditious and evil purposes of this equestrian portrait.

What I see in this image is not the count in a noble attitude, saluting the French flag. Instead I see the count trying to make political propaganda. His attitude, which the plaintiff says is "noble and proud," seems to me more "affected." This pretender, far from saluting the French flag, receives an honor which he is not due because the flag actually inclines toward him.17

He argued that these seditious images troubled the public peace and, therefore, warranted seizure. The court ruled against this argument, however, pointing out that the press law of 1881 guaranteed the right to distribute political illustrations. Only materials that provoked crimes or defamed government officials were illegal.

When the argument for seizure of seditious materials proved useless, attorneys representing the government officials turned to three other justifications. They argued first that the defendants were only following orders from the Ministry of the Interior and that the seizures were administrative acts. Therefore, under the law of August 24, 1790, which defined and separated the functions of the judiciary and the administration, the courts had no jurisdiction over the seizures. Secondly, the attorneys argued that their clients were performing an act under Article 10 of the Code for Criminal Investigation. This article gave the government power during times of crisis to perform actions in the
interests of national security for which it could not be held accountable by the courts. Finally, the attorneys argued that their clients were only carrying out the intent of the Law of Exile of 1886. They argued that just as the law banished the pretender from France, so, too, it outlawed his propaganda.

Court rulings in the numerous legal suits began to come out during the winter of 1889. Each lower court ruled that the government officials acted illegally in seizing the propaganda and ordered these officials to return the confiscated materials to the pretender. Three officials, however, appealed their convictions to the Tribunal des Conflits in Paris. This court heard arguments for the defendants in the spring, and in March, 1889 it ruled that the confiscations of these materials were by their very nature police actions and not administrative acts. Therefore, the argument that the courts had no jurisdiction in these cases was invalid. Secondly, the seizures of these materials on the public streets was a violation of the press law of 1881. Article 10 of the Code for Criminal Investigation referred only to periods of crisis such as times of war or siege, and since France was not in such a crisis, extraordinary measures to protect the security of the nation were unnecessary. The court further ruled that

the confiscation does not change its nature because it was ordered by the Minister of the Interior for a political reason, or because the measure was approved by the Chamber; these circumstances do not give it the character of an administrative act or a governmental act under Article 10 of the Code for Criminal Investigation.

Finally, the court ruled that

if the government has the duty to assure the security of the Republic and to repress every enterprise taken against the Republic by the members of the former ruling families, it is invested in this regard with only the powers that the law gives to it.
Since the law of exile did not explicitly ban political propaganda by the pretenders, the government could not use this law to justify its seizures. After this ruling was handed down, the Minister of the Interior withdrew his order to confiscate the materials and instructed his prefects to return the count's portraits and letters to the royalists from whom they were taken.

Government censorship only hampered distribution of monarchist propaganda. Uncensored material, including portrait photographs of the count and his son, still circulated in the countryside. Despite the court ruling in March, however, police reports showed less visual propaganda in circulation during the summer and fall of 1889 than before the government began its censorship efforts. The police were often slow to return confiscated materials, including those seized by mistake. Gaston de Witt Regardebos, an active monarchist in Trouville, filed suit against the prefect of the Department of the Calvados after police agents searched his house for the equestrian portraits and instead confiscated thousands of portrait photographs of the Comte de Paris. The local court ruled against the prefect, but Regardebos did not receive his photographs until several weeks later. Still other prefects continued to confiscate the pictures secretly despite instructions from the ministry on March 30, 1889, to stop the seizures. As late as October 29, 1889, the prefect of the Department of the Seine-et-Oise reported that his sub-prefect was still ordering the confiscation of the count's equestrian portraits.

Although ultimately overturned by the French courts, the government's censorship of royalist visual and written propaganda during 1888 and 1889 served several purposes. It decreased royalist propaganda during the period of by-elections when conservative popularity was growing. In conjunction with General Boulanger these royalist candidates sought to enter the chamber and to revise the constitution, and their propaganda would have helped
to advertise their political ideas and to popularize the image of
their leader. In confiscating these materials the government
eliminated one of the royalists' most important weapon. Gov-
ernment officials gambled that the seizures would not generate
greater sympathy for the royalist cause. The confiscation of
this visual and written propaganda was a way to intimidate polit-
ical opponents and to reduce the likelihood of royalist electoral
success. The government hoped that the rising tide of royalist
popularity would subside during the period before the courts
freed the propaganda for further distribution. Nor did the gov-
ernment concern itself with the overexuberance of police agents
in confiscating photographs that were not included in the initial
ban. Although the minister withdrew the order when a high court
in Paris upheld earlier provincial court rulings, further confis-
cations continued into the autumn during the campaign for the
general elections of 1889. Both Boulanger and his royalist col-
laborators failed to win a majority in the chamber, giving the
government's highly illegal censorship an air of apparent suc-
cess and setting a precedent for future government seizures.

The election of only sixteen monarchists in the general elec-
tions of 1889 created a need for dramatic action by the pretender
to reinvigorate his cause. Boulanger, faced with the same need
to reconfirm his principles and leadership, sat for the unique
photo-interview published in Le Figaro. The Comte de Paris, how-
ever, made a grandiose and symbolic move. He gave permission for
his son, Philippe Duc d'Orléans, secretly to enter France and to
present himself at the army recruitment office in Paris for in-
duction into the army. Philippe travelled in disguise on the
train from Brussels to Paris and appeared before the recruitment
officer on February 7, 1890. Just twenty years old, the duke
wanted to join other young Frenchmen in fulfilling the army serv-
ice required by law. The recruitment officer was surprised by
the duke's appearance and sent him to the mayor's office. Uncertain what action to take, the mayor referred him to the Minister of War, who promptly ordered the arrest of the duke for breaking the Law of Exile. The duke was confined in the Conciergerie until his trial before the Tribunal de la Seine on February 12: The court found him guilty of illegal entry into France and sentenced him to two years in prison. He served four months before his release.

The Duc d'Orléans' escapade and trial generated extensive news coverage in both the republican and royalist press. The event also offered the opportunity for royalists in France to start a massive propaganda campaign acclaiming the duke for his patriotic decision to reenter France and to serve in the army. For the next seven months thousands of photographs, printed illustrations, leaflets, posters, and brochures examining the duke's life and political beliefs circulated in all regions of France. Police agents kept close watch over the distribution of propaganda and regularly reported their findings to the Ministry of the Interior. No confiscations were made since the court rulings of March 27, 1889, explicitly established the illegality of such actions. The minister also recognized that such drastic action was unnecessary. No national elections hung in the balance that spring. Departmental prefects also reported mixed effects from the propaganda in royalist regions. The prefect of the Department of the Gironde reported that portrait photographs of the Duke had been sent to all municipal councillors in the entire department regardless of their political affiliations. He feared the photographs' effects and advised that their distribution was serious enough to warrant confiscation. The prefects in the nearby departments of the Lot and Lot-et-Garonne, however, reported no adverse effects, while police agents in Vannes and Clermont-Ferrand also saw no overt effect on the population in their towns.
In Paris, where the duke was held prisoner, propaganda distribution and political street demonstrations were frequent. One republican journalist writing for Le XIXe Siècle likened the situation to Boulanger's political campaign in Paris a year earlier.

There is the same profusion of portraits and the same avalanche of visiting cards. But these are not banal cards on which a servant scribbles an address. They have an air of personal friendship and affection. The card is dated by hand from the Conciergerie and the handwritten expression "thank you" makes a good impression. 22

Plate LXXX is a visiting card portrait of the Duc d'Orléans circulated during his confinement in the Conciergerie. The duke sat for the portrait before his arrest in Paris, but the photograph was distributed in mass only after his sentencing. The portrait shows the young man in civilian clothes leaning on an arm rest. Below the portrait is his signature, the date, and his place of imprisonment. This picture shows a young and innocent looking man. Yet the name of the Conciergerie makes apparent that he is actually in prison.

Plate LXXXI is a similar portrait photograph of the duke made by the photographer Walery. It also appeared as an engraving adapted from this photograph during the duke's propaganda campaign in the spring and summer of 1890. The photograph again shows the young prince in civilian clothes, holding a cane and top hat. Frequently two statements by the duke accompanied the portrait. The first was a letter to the Minister of War requesting his induction into the army.

I presented myself today at the recruiting office for draft registration and to fulfill my three years of service like every other good Frenchman.

From the recruiting office I was sent to the mayor's office and then to the Ministry of War.

I have been able to obtain no solution. Thus I ask one from you. I do not intend in prolonging my presence in
Plate LXXX. Duc d'Orléans. 1890.

Plate LXXI. Walery. Duc d'Orléans. 1890.
Paris to give pretexts for any demonstration.

I do not deny that the law of exile prevents my becoming an officer in the French army, but I believe, Mister Minister, that it does not prevent me from serving as a simple soldier; this is the great honor that I seek and the one on which I await your prompt, fair, and patriotic response.

The second statement was an excerpt from the duke's trial for illegally entering the country.

I came to France to serve as a simple soldier. I did not intend to engage in politics, that is the realm of my father, to whom I am a respectful, humble, and loyal servant. I did not go to the Chamber of Deputies but to the recruiting office. I knew what I was exposing myself to. But that did not stop me.

I love my country. Is that a fault? I wanted to serve France in an army regiment. Is that a crime? No.

Therefore, I am not guilty. Therefore, I have no need to be defended. I cordially thank my lawyers for their devotion and desire to defend me.

I learned in exile to honor the courts of my country. I will respect its laws. But if I am found guilty, I am certain of a favorable judgement from two hundred thousand conscripts my age and every other brave person. I am certain that they will acquit me.

These portraits and the accompanying statements were distributed throughout France during the next several months. The duke appealed to the growing nationalist sentiment in the country, reflected earlier in Boulangism. As a young Frenchman he wanted, he claimed, only to be like his fellows and to serve his country, but his appearance at the recruitment office, coming as a time when royalist political fortunes were declining, was not an unpatriotic act. The barrage of propaganda that followed it indicated that the monarchists wanted to reap political benefits from the duke's imprisonment. Yet the general indifference of the French population to his confinement and to the propaganda
demonstrated to the monarchists that reawakening a popular desire for restoration of the monarchy required more than a well-advertised gesture.

When the duke was released from prison, he and his father travelled to the United States. The Comte de Paris had served with Union forces during the American Civil War, and during his journey he renewed many old friendships made in the 60s. While touring the battlefield at Gettysburg he and his son sat for a photograph with Union generals who had fought in the battle. Plate LXXXII shows the Comte de Paris with his son seated in the center of the front row. The statue of a Union soldier towers above the officers. This photograph appeared in a short book describing the count's travels in the United States, which was distributed in France in 1891. The description accompanying this group portrait emphasized the count's warm reception by the American generals and by the crowd attending a memorial celebration of the battle. The inclusion of the count in the group portrait reminds the viewer of his contribution to the Union war effort but also reflects the count's nationalism. The battlefield group portrait under the monument of a Union soldier suggests the count's commitment to military strength, authority, and national integrity. In reality the count was not present at the Battle of Gettysburg and seemed to have spent as much time enjoying Washington high society as on the battlefield.

This picture was among the last photographs of the Comte de Paris circulated in France before his death in 1894. Its significance, together with the earlier portrait of the Duc d'Orléans, lay in its emphasis on nationalism. Royalist propaganda increasingly was exhibiting patriotic and nationalistic images and captions to regenerate popular support for its movement. Nationalistic sentiments, moreover, were among the few emotions powerful enough to reverse monarchist political fortunes. Nationalism and
Plate LXXXII. Comte de Paris Visits the Battlefield at Gettysburg. 1891.
the nationalistic overtones of the Dreyfus Affair, exploited by a revived and more active propaganda organization, provided the means for royalism to rebound from its political decline.

Between the Duc d'Orléans' first political act in 1890 and his becoming heir to the French throne in 1894, his prospects had evolved with changing political and social conditions in France. Monarchist deputies still sat in the chamber but in fewer number than in previous years. Pope Leo XIII's recommendation to accept the Republic led to a ralliement of many monarchists, who abandoned the pretender in favor of a conservative republic. The duke still hoped monarchists would be elected to the chamber, but his father's earlier policies had turned royalism away from moderate parliamentarism. The duke now openly advocated the elimination of the Republic and a restoration either by a plebiscite or by a vote of the chamber. While the monarchist political base was shrinking numerically, it was broadening socially. The duke retained considerable strength among provincial nobility and rural conservatives but also found increasing support among the urban lower middle class or petty bourgeoisie, which perceived a threat to its position from left-wing political movements, Jewish financiers and merchants, and German militarism. The Comte de Paris' former alliance with Boulanger also brought additional political support now that the general was dead and his party fragmented among ultra nationalist and antisemitic leagues. These right-wing groups favored active political demonstrations and street agitation as a means of further popularizing their political cause.

The duke initiated changes in the political organization and activities of the monarchist party to harness this more complex social and political support. In 1894 he sanctioned the Jeunesse royaliste, a royalist youth organization that placed greater
emphasis on political activism than the old royalist committees of his father. The organization evolved from a group of young men from the aristocracy and liberal professions who had met in Paris to discuss political issues, and, when the duke became the pretender, linked themselves to the royalist cause. The attendance at the first national conference was mainly from Paris, but also represented were the departments of the Bouches-du-Rhône, the Lot, the Gironde, the Loire-inférieur, the Allier, the Aube, the Mayenne, and the Vendée. The national conference set as priorities for the organization propaganda distribution and recruitment, especially in Paris. The personality of the new pretender appealed to these younger royalists. The duke was a handsome and dashing man who excelled at big game hunting and exploring. Since he had spent most of his adolescent years in exile, he was free from many of the personal alliances or party quarrels that had haunted his father. A more active and intense personality than his father, the duke supported his young followers who were willing to work harder and more openly for his restoration than any previous partisans.

The Jeunesse royaliste sought members among the lower middle class and working classes in the major French cities by stressing the duke's new approach to politics. When interviewed by a reporter from the republican newspaper L'Événement in 1896, a Parisian vice-president of the organization explained the pretender's appeal,

The Duc d'Orléans is showing himself to be a man who resolutely rejects laggards. He wants to march with his century. Today the task of our committees is becoming greatly simplified. The people appreciate action and are no longer deceived by pretty words. What developed for Boulanger can also occur for the duke if he wants it.

Jean Jaurès, the independent socialist leader, accurately predicted the pretender's methods in an article for the newspaper Le
Matin. He observed that older monarchists in France were increasingly more concerned with guarding their wealth and position than with restoring the monarchy. Therefore, Jaurès concluded, the duke had to use more active political methods to reawaken the party and to generate political support. 27

The duke's new politics did not include running for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. When encouraged to run for an open seat in Brest, he refused with the explanation that he had a much larger vision of his political future. With each legislative vacancy he would prod public opinion by threats of his candidacy. He was awaiting a period of general chaos created by a political crisis. He would then enter his name in numerous elections as a symbol of national unity. The Republic would declare his candidacy illegal. This action, he believed, would reveal the Republic as the enemy of national unity. Police officials concluded that through active propaganda during the crisis the duke hoped to generate a revolutionary situation in which the people would demand his return. 28

In preparation for the ultimate return of the duke and the Jeunesse royaliste attempted to stir up pro-royalist feelings with a constant barrage of propaganda. Although the duke headed one of the wealthiest families in France, fund-raising for propaganda proved to be difficult. Many of the contributors to his father's cause now refused to give money to him, and his inheritance from his father was smaller than expected. Nevertheless, the Jeunesse royaliste collected 300,000 francs from these sources in 1896 for propaganda and maintained roughly that budget for the next several years. 29

In the spring of 1895 this money financed a massive nationwide distribution of portrait photographs of the duke. These photographs (Plate LXXXIII) were small, visiting-card size portraits of the duke, approximately three by two inches. The back
Plate LXXXIII. Duc d'Orléans. 1895.
side was covered with glue so that the entire photograph becomes a small sticker that could be readily posted. The portrait shows the duke as a young man with a full beard and in civilian clothes. Underneath his picture is the brief caption, "Vive le Duc d'Orléans." Plate LXXIV shows the same photograph attached to a leaflet entitled "The Duc d'Orléans, Head of the House of France." This leaflet appeals to the burgeoning nationalism by listing the long and heroic heritage of the current pretender and by stating his major policies.

Police reports about these portrait stickers began to arrive at the Ministry of the Interior in May, 1895. Usually at night members of the Jeunesse royaliste stuck the small portraits on walls and buildings where the public would easily see them. In the following months the stickers appeared on shop windows, train stations, public urinals, churches, government offices, and homes of political opponents or government officials. Police efforts to prevent the postings were often futile because the stickers were so small that they could be easily posted without attracting much attention. When officials found the stickers, police officers were ordered to remove them before they caught the public eye.

Royalists lauded the new propaganda postings as the beginning of a campaign to reestablish the political influence of the pretender. One journalist writing for the royalist newspaper Revue de l'Ouest judged that the photographs might not have immediate effect but would prepare the public for the future,

We must not delude ourselves about the weaknesses of the current regime, and while the cries "Vive le Duc d'Orléans" and these photographs on the walls may be without immediate political influence, no one can say what influence they will have on the politics of tomorrow.30

Republican officials immediately reacted to the photographs. Since the portraits contained no identification or address of the printer and had not been deposited with the Ministry of the
Plate LXXXIV. Duc d'Orléans, Chef de la Maison de France. 1895.
Interior or with the department prefects, their posting was illegal. In July monarchists began to post the stickers in many eastern departments where royalism was unpopular. Journalists for the Progrès de l'Est and Le Journal de la Meurthe et des Vosges were indignant at the poor manners exhibited by the royalists in this type of political advertising. They considered the small stickers to be a childish display necessitated by the royalists' apprehension of their own political weakness. Yet residents in the small town of Saint-Jean-de-Luz in the southern Department of the Pyrénées-atlantique were impressed by the audacity of the Republic's opponents. The goal of the Jeunesse royaliste was to create an active propaganda campaign that would keep royalist principles and the pretender's image in the minds of the French. The constant barrage of photographs agitated opponents, providing additional publicity for the royalists and giving the impression of greater political importance than the numerical strength of the royalist movement warranted.

Postings of the stickers continued throughout the summer and autumn of 1895 especially in Paris but also in small towns and villages just prior to municipal elections. Police officials were so concerned about the effect of the stickers on the populace that in October, 1899 they ordered the seizure of 200,000 portraits at the printer's shop before they were even distributed. The Comte de Vaux, the monarchist who had purchased the photographs, sued the prefect of police for damages and the restoration of his property. The court ruled nineteen months later that the police confiscation was illegal.

The government's attorney argued in this case that police had learned the 200,000 portraits were going to be posted during the visit of Russian state officials to Paris in October, 1895. The government was anxious to prevent public disorders that the pictures might incite, and the Ministry of the Interior instructed
the police to seize the portraits and the plates used to print them. The government cited Article 10 of the Code for Criminal Investigation, which gave the ministry power to protect national security in times of crisis, and claimed that the courts lacked jurisdiction in the matter, which was solely an administrative act.

The government had used the same defense of its confiscations of monarchist propaganda during the Boulanger crisis. The court ruled against the government in 1897, as it had in 1889. The judge ruled that no state of crisis existed that could warrant such confiscations. The judge was, however, sympathetic to the police cause.

It is regrettable that laws prevent the prefect of police, charged with the duty of defending the public order against all malevolent activities, from intervening except when public disorder is already occurring. Everyone understands the patriotic feelings that motivated his actions, especially when he finds himself helpless in the presence of audacious propaganda. These propaganda distributors disregard the prevailing national sentiment and publicly disseminate their materials, risking protests from a people firmly attached to the republic. 33

Nevertheless, the court ordered the police to return the portraits. Despite police protests that the photographs were illegal because they did not contain the identification of the printer, the judge ruled that the photographs had been confiscated at the printer's shop before their public circulation. Therefore, the police did not know if the printer would have ultimately put his name and address on the portraits and deposited copies at the Ministry of the Interior. The judge inferred, however, that the absence of the printer's name meant that the photographs were to be clandestinely disseminated. He reasoned that since the portraits were useless paper without the printer's identification, the prefect of police must pay only five francs damages to the printer. For the Comte de Vaux's inconvenience during the process he ordered the prefect to pay one franc. 34 The ruling was a legal victory
for the royalists, but the penalty for the government's illegal confiscation was negligible, and it was able to forestall the distribution of thousands of portraits for nearly one year.

The confiscations in Paris did not prevent the monarchists from disseminating these photographs in the provinces. Spurred on by the seizure, royalists increased their distributions in 1896. On January 1, 1896, thousands of portraits were glued to the homes of republican officials in Albi in the Department of the Tarn, prompting immediate action by the police to remove them, while ignoring the opponents of the regime. When Félix Faure, the President of the Republic, travelled to Tours in May he was greeted by a barrage of the stickers, and police confiscated 15,000 of the portraits in Mâmes in early July. Over 200,000 were intercepted in Rouen in August on their way to the Comte de Vaux in Paris. At the end of September Paris police discovered the production of 50,000 more portraits in Paris but did not prevent their posting during the first week of November.35

In that month the Duc d'Orléans married Marie-Dorothee, Archduchess of Austria. Soon after a new propaganda portrait appeared. This portrait (Plate LXXXV) shows the duke and duchess together in profile soon after their marriage. Below the portrait is a series of political quotations taken from their speeches and letters, giving the double portrait a significance beyond the simple portrayal of a young couple. The accompanying quotations emphasized the duke's intention to fulfill his duty as the legitimate ruler of France. The duchess exhorted her friends and followers to pray fervently to God and to work seriously toward her husband's restoration. The portrait suggests that the duke had become a more serious and mature pretender now that he had married into the Austrian imperial family.

By the end of 1897 the leaders of the Jeunesse royaliste had more considerable influence with the pretender. In late autumn
Plate LXXXV. Duc and Duchess d'Orléans. 1896.
Eugene Dufeuille, head of the monarchist party in France since the exile of the Comte de Paris in 1886, resigned. He had represented the politics of moderation and had favored monarchist political alliances with conservative republicans and Bonapartists in the chamber as the best way to improve the monarchist position in France. In contrast, the leaders of the young monarchists such as André Buffet, the Duc de Luynes, and the Comte de Lur-Saluces advocated energetic and active opposition to the Republic so as to jolt monarchism out of its state of inertia. These men were also instrumental in turning monarchism toward antisemitism in 1897. The issue of antisemitism was in the air owing to growing nationalism and the controversy over the Dreyfus Affair, but Luynes and Lur-Saluces also saw it as an issue to distinguish their brand of royalism from the more moderate monarchists who favored a continuation of Dufeuille's policy. Antisemitism was an issue that they thought would halt the erosion of monarchist ideology and the drift toward a policy of concessions to the conservative republicans.\(^{36}\) By 1899 the Jeunesse royaliste had grown from a largely Parisian-based organization of radical monarchists to a national organization responsible for monarchist propaganda dissemination, recruitment, and demonstrations. Police estimated its total numerical strength at 30,000 residing in thirty-three departments and eighteen Parisian arrondissements.\(^{37}\)

Propaganda distribution during 1897 and 1898 continued at a steady but less intense level than in 1896. Police reports were fewer for these two years, but the nature of royalist ideology was further clarified for the country. On September 21, 1898, the Duc d'Orléans openly sided with the anti-Dreyfusards when he issued a manifesto condemning Dreyfus as a traitor and the Republic for its handling of the affair. The Dreyfus Affair had become the most intense political issue in the country, inspiring both Zola's "J'Accuse" and antisemitic riots in January and February 1898.
The political polarization over the issue divided the country and posed a threat to the stability of the regime. Open hostility to the government among large masses of people made the political situation appear ripe for an attempted coup d'état by the royalists.

Edward R. Tannenbaum, historian of the royalist movement, discovered that in October, 1898 the Duc d'Orléans instructed André Buffet, the director of the Duke's political bureau in Paris and of the Jeunesse royaliste, to begin preparations for a coup. Buffet was to use 300,000 francs to incite a general uprising among Catholic labor unions favoring the pretender. In December the duke ordered Buffet to draw up a list of potential ministers for the new government. Rumors were prevalent that such an action was imminent, prompting the government during the first week of February, 1899 to search the offices of royalist newspapers and the homes of leading members of the Jeunesse royaliste in Paris. In the provinces police searched the homes of provincial royalists and confiscated propaganda photographs and journals as evidence of a conspiracy.

The monarchists, however, were not the only right-wing political group planning a coup. Paul Déroulède, head of the Ligue des Patriotes, had planned a similar action for February 23, 1899, during the funeral of President Félix Faure, but, when a monarchist representative approached him about the prospect of working together on the action, he refused. Déroulède was not eager to see the pretender return to France at the expense of his own political movement. The league's plot started as scheduled but failed dismally when the army units under General Roget refused to follow Déroulède and his associates to the Hôtel de Ville. Déroulède was arrested, and the Republic was saved. Later Déroulède charged the monarchists with sabotaging his coup. He had expected General George de Pellieux, a monarchist general,
not General Roget at the head of the troops returning from the funeral. Pellieux had agreed to assist Déroulède but then mysteriously was not leading the troops when Déroulède attempted to divert them toward the Hôtel de Ville. Déroulède charged that the monarchists had influenced Pellieux to withdraw his support and to change the route of his troops during the funeral.\(^{40}\)

The royalist coup never took place, but efforts to capitalize on the social and political unrest in the country continued. Propaganda distribution greatly increased. Police agents learned that 3,000,000 portrait photographs were on route from England to be secretly smuggled into the country. Police seized more than 9,000 buttons decorated with portrait photographs of the duke at the Gare du Nord in Paris. The duke, addressing a group of anti-Dreyfusard deputies at San Remo on February 22, publicly endorsed antisemitism. The royalists provoked a large street demonstration in support of the duke on February 19 in Paris. At two in the afternoon the Comte de Vaux posted a large portrait photograph of the duke on the balcony of his fourth floor apartment on the Rue Royale. By nine that evening a large crowd had gathered shouting "Vive le Roi, à bas Loubet, à bas la République," prompting the police to make arrests. After the failure of Déroulède's action, however, the police assumed that the royalists had collaborated with Déroulède, and they searched the homes and offices of the leading royalists, including André Buffet. At Buffet's apartment they found fifty-three cases of propaganda, including thousands of portrait photographs that had not been found in their search earlier in the month.\(^{41}\)

The propaganda deluge continued throughout the spring and summer of 1899 as the political furor over the Dreyfus Affair grew. The recent turn toward antisemitism, however, had left many old line monarchists such as Dufeuille, the Duc de Broglie, and the Duc de Chartres alienated from the pretender and his young partisans.
Several old-time royalist newspapers including *Le Gaulois* and *Le Soleil* closed their columns to Buffet's virulent propaganda. This encouraged his organization to use other propaganda methods to keep the pretender's message constantly before the public.

Finally in late summer the government arrested André Buffet and members of the Ligue des Patriotes and the Ligue antisémite for conspiring to overthrow the Republic. Buffet's arrest stemmed largely from the increase in royalist propaganda in western France during Dreyfus' retrial at Rennes. At Buffet's trial in October the government presented evidence suggesting a long-term national propaganda campaign designed to undermine citizens' confidence in the Republic and to prepare the way for a restoration of the monarchy. This campaign culminated in August when, the government maintained, the royalists planned to incite large demonstrations in conservative western France, where the Dreyfus retrial was being held. Citing evidence from a police commissioner in Lille, the government prosecutor revealed secret information about Godefroy, the president of the Parisian Jeunesse royaliste, who travelled to Lille to arrange the propaganda campaign. Godefroy received 150,000 portraits of the Duc d'Orléans and then recruited royalists from Lille to distribute these portraits in Rennes and other Breton towns. Royalist leaders assumed that the dissemination of these portraits and the underlying animosity of the conservative residents in these western departments toward Dreyfus would generate mass demonstrations that the royalists could channel into a march on Paris. Plans also existed to recruit military officers and soldiers to join this crowd as it moved toward the capitol. Tight government security in Rennes thwarted this effort.

Nevertheless, the court found Buffet and the others guilty of conspiracy to overthrow the Republic. The leaders were exiled and the Jeunesse royaliste, the Ligue des Patriotes, and the Ligue antisémite were dissolved by government decree.
Before the twentieth century royalist photographs were mainly portraits of the pretenders and their families in civilian dress. Only during the Boulanger affair did the Comte de Paris appear in military uniform. Even during the duke's most active campaigns at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, no photographs depicted him in dress or scenes related to the army. Most photographs showed him in civilian clothes with only brief captions such as "Vive le Roi." Overt symbols of royalty in these photographs were less important than the massive dissemination of the portraits. These large scale distribution efforts kept his image before the public and reminded viewers that he still offered a solution to national crisis and political corruption under the Republic. The sheer audacity of the Jeunesse royaliste in posting stickers of the duke on the homes and offices of republicans also displayed to royalists and non-royalists alike the courage and commitment of the "Jeunesse" in a basically republican France.

The banishment of André Buffet and the dissolution of the Jeunesse royaliste in the winter of 1900 reduced the dissemination of royalist propaganda. The duke turned to the old political committees established by his father. Many leaders of these committees had objected to the tactics employed by the Jeunesse royaliste and welcomed the duke's return to more moderate supporters. He, however, did not change his political beliefs during the early years of the twentieth century. He was still antisemitic, refused to participate in parliamentary politics, and openly urged the restoration of the monarchy through a plebiscite. The urban lower middle classes continued to support the royalist cause. Police estimates of the royalist strength in Paris in 1904, before the pretender's association with the Action française, showed it concentrated in the 15th, 18th, 19th, and 20th arrondissements. The 15th arrondissement was just south of the Eiffel Tower, but the
remaining districts were in the north and northeastern parts of the city, where mainly lower middle class businessmen, shopowners, and workers resided. These districts had also furnished many adherents to the Ligue des Patriotes and the Ligue antisémite.

Monarchist propaganda to these groups took several forms. Portrait photographs of the duke were used rarely. Books, newspapers, and a monthly illustrated magazine, together with the usual gamut of leaflets, brochures, and pamphlets were the most common mediums for publicizing the pretender. These materials were directed mainly at local monarchists or at those who favored a conservative political change in France. The monarchists, for example subsidized the conservative local newspaper Le Clairon de la Villette-Belleville, and distributed it to conservatives and monarchists living in the northeastern part of Paris. Photographic propaganda, however, was disseminated through books illustrated with photographs, the biweekly illustrated magazine entitled Le Panache, and photograph-illustrated leaflets advertised and sold by Le Panache or the monarchist publishing agency in Paris, Librairie nationale, or by the offices of the large monarchist newspapers including Le Gazette de France and Le Gaulois.

As early as 1891 Louis Teste, a long-time supporter of the Comte de Paris, observed that a prince of royal blood could achieve genuine mass popularity if he freed himself from the restrictive social circles of the aristocracy and opened his personal life more to the public. Teste believed that the French in the Third Republic were greatly curious about the private lives of famous people and aristocrats. One way to achieve mass popularity, according to Teste, was to stress the personal, intimate character of the pretender.  

In 1902 the first of three photograph-illustrated books on the private, personal life of the Duc d'Orléans appeared in
France. Written by a close friend of the duke, Louis de Joantho, *Le Yacht royal Maroussia* was a first-hand account by Joantho of the pretender's travels on his yacht. The book was amply illustrated with photographs showing the duke's living quarters on the ship and the various residences in Europe owned by the Orléans family. Portraits of the ship's crew and the royal family completed the volume.

The public received this book with such enthusiasm that Joantho followed it with a more detailed and intimate look at the pretender in 1903. Entitled *En Exil*, this volume included 110 photographs of the duke on his yacht sailing in the Mediterranean. Several photographs were taken by the pretender himself. The newspaper *Le Clairon de la Villette-Belleville* advertised the publication with a brief explanation of its intent,

The prince's character, his mind, his opinions about men and their activities, the spontaneity of his French soul, his anguish over his exile, and his great kindness are observed in numerous ways by this devout royalist who spent four intimate months with the Duc d'Orléans.46

All royalists and all those good Frenchmen who do not adhere formally to the monarchy but still consider it the best system for our country [Joantho wrote], will understand even better through this intimate view of the duke's life that he will be our savior.

Joantho continued by stressing the virtues of the pretender,

Observing people, listening, meditating, and dealing with the inevitable sadness of exile with healthy cheerfulness indicates a powerful and stable soul in the Duc d'Orléans. . . . By showing the duke's handsome physique, maintained by constant exercise, his fitness, vigor, joy, smile, sadness, and the genial manifestations of his good will, we feel that we are recounting the history of another great king, Henri of Navarre.47

The photographs in *En Exile* included portraits of individuals who sailed with the pretender, places at which the ship docked,
and the activities of the duke on board ship. The latter photographs included several of special political significance. One photograph showing the duke and the ship's officers saluting the Tricolor as it was hoisted on the staff signified the duke's continued love for France despite his exile. Plate LXXXVI reproduces two photographs of the Duc d'Orléans using loaded weapons. In the left picture the duke mans a machine gun attached to the rail of his yacht. In the right photograph he shoots his revolver at empty bottles, practicing his marksmanship. These were common activities on his ship. The operation of the machine gun, however, suggests the pretender's interest in modern weapons and his ability to use them. That the yacht was even armed with machine guns testifies to his determination to defend his property and the French flag that flew above it and to his belief in strong military preparations. The French viewer could be confident in the duke's commitment to national security when his private pleasure yacht was so heavily armed. In revealing this small detail of the duke's activities the photograph bolstered his image as an ardent nationalist.

Similarly the photograph that depicts the pretender practicing his marksmanship gives the viewer a small insight into his character. It suggests the pretender's familiarity and genuine interest in guns. As an explorer and big game hunter he had developed the reputation as a fearless and resolute adventurer. His handling of even this small weapon on camera shows that he continues to pursue the hobbies of a vigorous and energetic man who is fit to continue the long and glorious heritage of his royal family.

Plate LXXXVII shows the Duc d'Orléans doing a different kind of shooting. In this picture he takes a photograph of the French coast, using a small hand-held Kodak camera as he cruises along the southern coast. Plate LXXXVIII presents a view of the Iles
let, quarante bouteilles vides. Sans en marquer une seule, le Prince, armé de son revolver, leur coupa successivement le col.

Nous arrivâmes à Bonanza, qui se confond avec San Lucar.
Il n’y avait pas assez d’eau pour franchir la barre. Monseigneur décida qu’on partirait le lendemain, dès la première heure, sans dire pour où.
Le déclin du jour était d’une étrange beauté. Au loin, dans la direction de l’Océan, l’horizon em-pourpré ; près de nous, à droite, à gauche, la grande ligne sombre des pins noirs contrastant avec la ligne des sables aux chauds reflets. Quelques bateaux attendaient comme nous que l’état de la barre permît de gagner la haute mer.

Plate LXXXVI. Louis de Joantho. Duc d’Orléans Manning a Machine Gun; and the Duc d’Orléans, Armed with a Revolver, Shoots at Empty Bottles. 1903.
Plate LXXXVII. Louis de Joantho. Duc d'Orléans Photographing the French Coast. 1903.
d'Hyères taken by the duke. The accompanying description of Plate LXXXVII reflects the duke's profound love for his country.

Let's mention Cape Martin, Monaco, Beaulieu, Nice, and Cannes. There were boat races in the Bay of Cannes. The Prince followed them with his telescope and even tried to photograph the distant spectacle with a powerful camera. When France was in sight, with either his small or large Kodak, the Monseigneur tried to capture from the beaches, hills, islands, and mass of houses lost among the savage rocks the single thing that they could give him: a fugitive impression, a vague line, a white fog jetting its discreet line in the river valley. This was nothing and yet it was everything.

The mass which stands out from the sky in this photograph, is it rock formation or a pine forest? This luminous line that develops, is it just sea or is it just the shore illuminated by the daylight?

I do not know for certain, since the view is unclear, and the distance is great. But I know that it is more than just physical appearances.

I know because I know the man who took these photographs, I had the happiness to be by his side. I know that this is France, and I know that I helped this French prince avidly, feverishly, and sweetly photograph the shores of his country.48

The image of the island off the French coast is little more than a combination of grey masses and sinuous lines. With the accompanying title this photograph becomes a political symbol of the beloved country, which the pretender could only appreciate from a distance or in a photograph. The picture was intended to represent to the French viewer the duke's everlasting emotional attachment to his country.

The success of Joantho's books prompted a third photograph-illustrated biography of the Duc d'Orléans. Written in 1905 by the Comte de Colleville, Le Duc d'Orléans intime provided numerous portraits of the duke in various roles. There was no text explaining or commenting on the pictures, only brief captions
identifying the pretender. Continuing the precedent of the earlier photograph-illustrated books, this one provided the reader with an in-depth view of the complex character of the heir to the throne. By providing a more intimate knowledge of the duke's past and present activities, interests, and political beliefs the author hoped to broaden popular support for him.

Plate LXXXIX shows the duke in his hunting costume, complete with a large shotgun hanging from his shoulder. The Duc d'Orléans was well known for his adventures as a big game hunter, especially in India, where he hunted Bengal tigers. This portrait, however, shows the duke posing before an artificial landscape in the fashionable dress of a nobleman about to participate in the hunt. His upright stance, serious facial expression, and the firm gesture of his hand upon his hip gives him an air of confidence. The shotgun upon his back not only identifies the picture as a hunting portrait but gives the impression of the duke as a bold, brave, and action-oriented man. Plate XC shows the duke in a captain's uniform aboard his yacht the Maroussia. As Joantho revealed in his book, the duke was an avid sailor who regularly cruised to fashionable resorts and exotic lands. In this portrait he appears as a handsome, well-dressed officer in command of his yacht. His relaxed stance gives an air of informality, reflecting a lack of pretension uncharacteristic of the aristocracy. Plate XCI shows the duke sitting in his study. In contrast to earlier portraits he appears here as a serious, hard-working heir to the throne. In comparison to a similar portrait of Prince Victor Napoleon in his study (Plate XLVIII), this depiction of the pretender contains no overt visual references to his illustrious family. The duke quietly pursues his writing. The portrait suggests to the viewer that the duke is a reflective and intelligent man. The three portraits complement the written text, presenting the duke as a multi-faceted person with
Plate LXXXIX. Comte de Colleville. Duc d'Orléans in the Costume of the Chase. 1905.
Plate XC. Comte de Colleville. Duc d'Orléans Aboard His Yacht, Maroussia. 1905.

Plate XCI. Comte de Colleville. Duc d'Orléans in His Study. 1905.
characteristics that qualify him for the French throne: action, courage, intelligence, and good looks.

Joantho followed his photograph-illustrated books with an illustrated magazine, *Le Panache*. First published in 1902 this journal contained articles, photographs, and caricatures, and was published twice a month until 1914. Joantho originally had modest objectives for his new publication,

> We will surprise none of our friends in declaring here that this modest revue has no pretension of becoming an organ of political doctrine, or a forum for the discussion or resolution of large political, economic, or social problems. The single ambition of *Le Panache* is to . . . designate the Prince as the infallible guarantor of our country's renewal, to show his generosity and goodness, to speak the feelings of his heart and the heart of France.49

The photographs published in *Le Panache* were mainly portraits of the Duc d'Orléans, the royal family, and local or national royalist leaders. Additional photographs showed the duke as he travelled throughout the world. Some pictures, however, were overtly political. These photographs either showed royalist demonstrations against the Republic during the enforcement of the law separating church and state or ridiculed royalist opponents. There were also various caricatures satirizing republican officials and French Jews.

When *Le Panache* began publication readers complained that its articles and illustrations were too sophisticated for a popular audience and that they appealed more to an artistic and literary elite. The editors, however, sought a widely diverse audience, including members of the aristocracy, rural gentry, peasantry, urban working classes, and the urban middle classes. By 1904 *Le Panache* had determined that its goal was to make "all Frenchmen into royalists, to strengthen the royalism of those who already believe, and finally to give hope from which will arise zeal, action, and devotion."50 One of its principal means was to print
photographs that would appeal to its diverse readership. The editors realized that not all of those in its audience read well enough to appreciate the ideas in the magazine fully. As one of them explained:

To write is good. One is understood by those who read and reflect. But the great majority do not read because they are little inclined toward the study of political questions, or they lack the necessary intelligence on certain subjects, or because they simply do not have the time.

For these millions of French what can be done? Political illustrations give a brilliant solution to the problem. Two kinds of images are appropriate, those that praise and those that attack. Among the first category one must put the portraits of men that one wants to make popular. Among the second category one must place the caricatures that relate to the regime, its laws, and its government officials.51

Le Panache also began to publish and distribute caricatures, images d'Epinal, posters, brochures, leaflets, songs, and trinkets. Together with the royalist publishing house Librairie nationale, Le Panache offered a full range of written and illustrated materials to all the social classes of France.

To insure the widespread dissemination of these images Le Panache urged its readers in the city to purchase these materials from the journal and either distribute them by hand or mail them to people in the countryside. People in rural areas eagerly read materials that came from the city and attached an additional importance to the images if they were addressed to them personally. This was a form of flattery that increased the chances that the pictures would have a positive effect. Le Panache usually recommended the free distribution of these materials, but it realized that country people often valued something more if they had paid for it. Country people also would examine more carefully illustrations and written materials if they purchased them for a few centimes. Le Panache, therefore, hired peddlers to travel
periodically in rural areas and to sell its pictures, brochures, and leaflets.\textsuperscript{52}

The photographs published in \textit{Le Panache} or furnished by the magazine to readers conformed to its policy of either praising monarchists or attacking opponents. The majority of photographs in the journal during its twelve years were individual or group portrait photographs of monarchists. From 1905 the magazine published regularly on its front page the portrait of a prominent monarchist and followed this with a short biography in the magazine praising the person's contribution to the royalist cause. In 1903 during the controversy over the expulsion of unauthorized orders, however, \textit{Le Panache} published photographs depicting the resistance of ardent Catholics to the decrees issued by the government expelling certain religious orders. In its issue of January 5, 1903, \textit{Le Panache} produced the portraits of eight men and women in Brittany who had gone to jail protesting the dissolution of an order of nuns who taught in their rural school.

On November 5, 1903, the magazine published a second series of photographs, this one depicting the resistance in the village of Marlhes in the Loire region. When the villagers discovered that police agents were coming to evict the brothers teaching at their local school, they barricaded the school entrance and scuffled with the police. Eight of the more energetic women involved in the scuffle were arrested and later sentenced to one month in prison. The series provided by \textit{Le Panache} shows the warm reception these women received after serving their jail sentences. Plate XCII is one of these photographs representing the welcome the women received after attending mass at their local church. Dozens of villagers are grouped around the women at the foot of the church stairs. The women receive congratulations and floral bouquets for their brave resistance to the government in defense of their religion and the right to educate their children as they chose.
Plate XCII. *Le Panache.* Triumphant Exit from the Church at Marhles. 1903.

In this issue *Le Panache* published also three photographs of similar popular resistance in Paris. This activity took place in the heavily nationalist Twentieth Arrondissement at Ménilmontant in eastern Paris. Members of three nationalist and royalist organizations had banded together to construct barricades preventing the police from expelling the Redemptionist monks from the monastery. Plate XCIII shows the men posing during the construction of these barricades, while the two other photographs show the men carrying materials to the monastery's entrance and a priest blessing the final barricade. In these two series depicting popular resistance to the government in both the country and the city, *Le Panache* provides its viewer with visual examples of widespread discontent over the government's decrees. These photographs are group portraits showing the determination of these men and women. As political propaganda they praise their actions and encourage others who view them to resist the religious policy of the Republic.

Many photographs in the magazine focused on the adventures of the Duc d'Orléans. Plate XCIV shows the duke and his associates in Greenland. The duke had sailed in his ship, the Belgica, to the top of the world looking for adventure and furthering the bounds of polar exploration. The top photograph represents the duke and his party standing around a French flag raised on the icecap. The two middle photographs show the duke standing over a dead polar bear which he had shot. The two bottom pictures show the exploration party on the ice. The accompanying descriptions of the pictures stressed the patriotic contributions made by the duke to French national prestige and scientific advancement.

One of our photographs reproduces a particularly impressive scene. On an unknown point in Greenland discovered by His Highness and which will henceforth carry the name Cape Philippe, the Prince made a small landmark out of sediment, snow, and small stones. On this mound the French flag was
Plate XCIV. Le Panache. Duc d'Orléans on the Banks of Greenland. 1906.
planted and champagne bottles were opened to celebrate the taking of this possession. [The article continued], We have a duty to publish these photographs showing the glorious life of Monseigneur Duc d'Orléans. . . . True to his historic role, he is permitted to serve France only outside the country, therefore, he is forced to brave a thousand dangers in extending the scientific patrimony of his country.53

The duke standing over the dead polar bear signifies one of the inherent dangers in exploring polar regions and reflects his courage and competence in overcoming these obstacles. The top photograph depicting the French flag shows that despite twenty years of exile the Duc d'Orléans still sought to advance the national prestige of his country by exploring unknown and dangerous areas.

Caricatures were the most prominent form of illustration attacking opponents, but on occasion Le Panache published photographs critical of its adversaries. Plate XCV shows young Émile Loubet, the son of the President of the Republic, leaving the Church of Saint Philippe of Roule in Paris after his first communion. Published during a period of tension between Church and state, this photograph indicates that the president's family still practiced Catholicism while he participated in efforts to reduce the Catholic Church's role in France. The accompanying description accuses Loubet of hypocrisy,

That hypocrisy is a republican trait is well known, but still it was adroitly practiced. There is not a single honest man, or a single man with good sense who, on seeing Émile Loubet leave the Church of Saint Philippe of Roule after his first communion, does not think about his father who at the same time is probably signing orders to expel the Sisters of the Poor.54

The caption, however, does not identify which of the boys in this photograph is the young Loubet. In the attempt to discredit the President of the Republic Le Panache could have published a photograph of any first communion ceremony in Paris. The political significance, however, lies in the duplicity of a republican
Plate XCV. *Le Panache.* First Communion of Émile Loubet, Son of the President of the Republic. 1903.
official and the royalist revelation of it. Royalists received new visual proof that republicans were self-serving and corrupt. For them, Loubet was insuring his son's eternal salvation through the Catholic Church but at the same time increasing his own temporal power by reducing the Church's role in people's day-to-day affairs.

*Le Panache* also ridiculed the Masonic order in its photographs. In 1910 it published a series of thirty-two postcards illustrated by photographs depicting an initiation ceremony of a new apprentice Mason. These scenes were enacted by actors hired by the magazine to parody the initiation rites. A photographer took pictures of the scenes. *Le Panache* published them and later distributed them with its other propaganda. Plate XCVI shows three photographs and one hand composed postcard from this series. The top right hand picture is a photograph represents a half-dressed initiate at the altar surrounded by Masons who are dressing him in ceremonial garb. The lower left postcard shows the blindfolded initiate with his arms held up by the Mason standing behind him. Other Masons are symbolically striking the initiate's chest with swords. The lower right postcard shows the initiate hitting a stone with a hammer as his initiators observe and salute. *Le Panache* intended these postcards to ridicule the "occult" rituals of the Masonic order. It declared this series as exceptional in its originality and excellent propaganda in a country like France where ridicule is deadly. What is more ridiculous and more grotesque than children indulging in their temples . . . dressing up in carnival-like costumes?55

*Le Panache* not only printed photographs in its pages every two weeks but also sold or gave away unpublished photographs. Among these were the gummed sticker portraits of the Duc d'Orléans like those disseminated by the Jeunesse royaliste earlier. Although the number of these stickers never reached the total
LA PROPAGANDE ANTIMAÇONNIQUE

distributed in Paris or the provinces in the 1890s, the purpose of this type of propaganda remained the same. Le Panache considered stickers a successful form of propaganda that kept the duke's image before the public and upset republican officials:

The gummed portraits of the Duc d'Orléans that we have printed to fill the requests of our subscribers have an enormous effect. Not a day passes that we do not receive letters relating the effect produced in a region. A small village awakes to find its buildings covered with portraits. The authorities become emotional and try to scrape off the stickers, but their efforts are useless. A republican's house is covered with the portraits while he sleeps. He becomes bewildered and angry, but his rage is useless.

And the public regards the portraits with sympathy, telling everyone they meet what they have just seen.56

The portrait stickers were not a complete success, however, unless they contained the identification of the duke below the image. Often peasants in remote rural areas who saw the sticker without the duke's title were unable to recognize the pretender or failed to understand the postings as a political action against the government.57

Still other photographs were attached to leaflets containing quotations from the pretender's writings. Plate XCVII is a portrait photograph of the duke shown within a frame topped with a fleur-de-lis and a crown. Surrounding the portrait are statements about the army, religion, decentralization, the nation, and the people. The duke appealed to a mass audience including the working classes in this statement on the people,

The monarchy will never forget that its first duty is to protect the weak against oppression. Through social and humane legislation for the weak and oppressed . . . through the organization of workers' pensions created with foresight and through worker cooperation political and social problems can be resolved.

The serious expression on the duke's face was to lend credence to
Plate XCVII. Le Panache. Duc d'Orléans. 1905.
his statements and to reassure the viewer that his nationalism, Catholicism, and benevolent intentions toward the poor were sincere.

At the height of the royalist opposition to the separation of Church and state in 1905 the government resumed surreptitious censorship. Police officials secretly confiscated several thousand portraits of the duke when they arrived at the Gare du Nord in Paris from Belgium despite the printer's identification on the photographs. Fearing the effect of these photographs in the forthcoming elections, the government hoped to prevent their circulation in France. Plate XCVIII shows the confiscated portrait taken by the Swedish photographer named Jacobsen. The duke stands in profile, wearing a captain's uniform. No seditious, inflammatory, or critical caption accompanied the portrait.

In past confiscations the police had seized the portraits prior to an election or during a period of political crisis and returned the photographs when the monarchists successfully brought suit against it for illegal censorship. Immediately after this seizure, however, certain newspapers published the story with references to past legal suits that unanimously ended in rulings against the government. A customs agent at the Gare du Nord who had witnessed the police confiscations originally volunteered the story to the socialist daily La Petite République. Royalist and republican newspapers both published stories critical of the government's action. The wrath of the press and the government's fear of an impending scandal moved the police to return the photographs to the royalists without awaiting legal action.

In 1910, after nearly ten years of publication, Le Panache reviewed its goals and accomplishments. Its main objective remained "to lay the foundations for royalist propaganda and to impose it on the population." It sought to disseminate its publications to all social classes from the grand proprietor of
Plate XCVIII. Jacobsen. Duc d'Orléans Aboard the Belgica. 1905.
the aristocracy down to the poorest member of the working class. This broad audience required numerous types of propaganda with varied appeals. The original magazine was matched in 1905 by Le Petit Panache, directed toward the working classes. It was shorter and had simpler articles and more caricatures, appealing to a semi-literate public. The publisher also issued other forms of propaganda, including portrait photographs, posters, and leaflets. Cigarette papers decorated with a portrait photograph of the duke were especially popular with the working classes according to Le Panache. It ignored the possibility that the symbolic act of burning the image of the pretender may have contributed to the cigarette papers' popularity.

Le Panache assumed that propaganda directed toward a working class audience required a special emotional appeal not necessary for the middle or upper classes. Besides having little time or energy to read political literature, the worker was less educated and consequently less rational and more emotional.

Since his intelligence has been less well developed than [that of] members of other social classes, feelings occupy a privileged place. Consequently propaganda destined to the worker should never be dry, nor arid, nor pure reason. They should appeal to the human soul.60

Despite the variety of formats and the sophistication of its psychological appeal, the propaganda produced by Le Panache did not consistently reach a broad popular audience, and the working classes failed to support the pretender en masse. In 1911 Le Panache estimated that approximately 1,200 localities, including cities, towns, and villages, regularly received its materials. Over one million pieces of propaganda had been distributed, reaching approximately three million people.61 In a population of over forty million French, however, the yet unaffected audience remained large, and the task of reaching that audience required additional effort and commitment.
The royalist cause received additional support at the turn of the century when the Action française began to advocate the restoration of the monarchy. Founded during the Dreyfus Affair by Henri Vaugeois, a bourgeois college teacher from Normandy, the Action française originally espoused extreme nationalism and anti-Semitism. In 1901 Charles Maurras turned the movement toward royalism, refined its ideological foundations, and guided the movement for the next four decades. Maurras arrived at royalism in the 1890s through what he considered a thoroughly rational and positivistic analysis of nationalism. For Maurras, man was a weak and vulnerable animal who could survive only in a social unit such as the family. Over the centuries the family provided the necessary protection for man to flourish. France as a nation was historically linked to the monarchy, which served as a symbolic family unit. The king was a father figure, and the French people his children, who required his constant attention and care.

Having similar views the Action française and the monarchist movement moved toward one another in 1905 in an effort to restore the monarchy. The two groups did not enter into a formal alliance, and each maintained its own political organization and propaganda. The royalists had a central political bureau headed by André Buffet and regional committees in all the major towns and departments. The Action française had similar organizational structure, and among its members were many royalists who also belonged to the duke's political committees. The social composition of the two organizations, therefore, was similar, encompassing mainly aristocrats, army officers, intellectuals, clergy, and members of the lower middle class.62

Maurras favored a coup de force to restore the monarchy, but until his movement reached the necessary strength to accomplish this action, organization building, propaganda, demonstrations, and harassment of political opponents were the most common
activities. These activities, according to Maurras, would create a state of mind that would make the ultimate overthrow possible in the future. Under the umbrella of the Ligue d'Action française were numerous subsidiary organizations such as the Étudiants de l'Action française, Dames de l'Action française, Dames royalistes, and the Camelots du Roi. The Camelots du Roi were mainly young men from lower middle class origins who acted as the storm troops of this rightist movement. They were the most active and best organized group in the Action française and often staged street demonstrations, harassed opponents, and distributed propaganda.

Distribution of propaganda was a major activity of each subgroup within the Action française. In 1908 a daily newspaper, L’Action française, was established to serve as a medium for virulent attacks against political opponents and for analysis of the political situation in France. Its editors, Leon Daudet and Charles Maurras, established for the paper a reputation for high literary quality and intellectual content, but the paper's financial situation throughout its history was precarious. Its circulation increased over the years but it never sold enough copies to be economically self-sufficient. Before the First World War, when other dailies began to publish photographs regularly, the Action française remained unillustrated.

To insure the widest possible circulation of its political ideas the Action française developed other forms of propaganda, which members distributed throughout France. During the annual national conference of the Action française and at regional conferences of local chapters, the discussion of how to improve its propaganda campaigns was a major topic. The merits of various propaganda materials, including portrait photographs, posters, brochures, and newspapers were analyzed for their audience appeal. In 1909 at the second annual conference Louis Dimier, an
art historian and general secretary of the Institut de l'Action française, proposed that the Action française publish a volume of portraits depicting the entire history of the royal family. Dimier thought that the volume of royal portraits would serve as a reference book for students of the Institut de l'Action française, which attracted students who found the University of Paris too dominated by liberals and Jewish professors. A study of royal iconography would also interest the art world, he claimed, and would extend the political philosophy of the Action française to a wider public. 63

The next year Dimier published this volume on the French monarchy. Examining the long tradition of the monarchy, he included illustrations of all the French kings, beginning with Clovis, accompanied by brief historical descriptions of their reigns. Photographs of the Comte de Paris and his family, including the Duc d'Orléans, illustrated the sections on the most recent pretenders to the throne. 64

The Action française also had access to photographs published by Le Panache and the Librairie nationale. Its members distributed these portraits with their journals and posters, but the leadership of the Action française still considered the newspaper as the most important method of propaganda because it provided a daily, repetitive political message to the reader. They thought that the constant and redundant information would eventually lead to political conversion among opponents and would reinforce the commitment of partisans. 65 Yet portrait photographs provided an additional insight into the pretender that the barrage of newspaper articles could not match. Charles Maurras wrote and edited many of the Action française's most important political works, but he also recognized the subtle yet important political message exerted on someone who viewed a photograph of the pretender. In 1911 the Action française distributed a
photograph that had been published in both *Le Panache* and in a brochure describing the duke's arctic adventures. Plate XCIX shows the Duc d'Orléans in the stern of a small boat, sitting beside the tricolor. Maurras believed that this photograph contained an important visual message incapable of translation into words:

I have before me an admirable portrait of the King of France, the Duc d'Orléans, Philippe VIII. I know of nothing more beautiful. The photograph was made perhaps between two and four years ago off the coast of Norway. The Prince is alone, seated at the stern of a small boat. To his left, obliquely inclined at half mast, flies the French flag. Whether the brightness of the sunlight on the sea had contracted the muscles of his face, or whether a harsh and sudden sadness is truly crossing his mind; his attitude, the carriage of his head, and his face seem to summarize all the bitterness and sadness of his absence and exile. This, as Vaugeois has said, is the tragedy of his rule. Today I would like to make a million copies of this beautiful image because it would say so many things to the French that words can not say; . . . it would add a moral truth that the analysis of language always translates insufficiently. By the eloquence of this image one sees, feels, touches, and understands Him.66

The Camelots du Roi posted gummed stickers decorated with a portrait photograph of the duke. They considered the stickers as an important and effective propaganda device. Reporting at a regional conference of the Camelots du Roi in Vesoul in the Department of the Haute-Saône one member observed,

Propaganda by gummed stickers is not neglected. We have seen several examples of the unique change or conversion obtained by this form of propaganda, which at first appears rather childish. In general the stickers attract the attention of the public on the street and are appropriate for bringing to mind the great traits of royalism.

Fifteen thousand of these stickers were posted by the confederation of Camelots du Roi in the Departments of the Haute-Saône and the Doubs in 1911.67 Additionally, the Camelots du Roi in these
Plate XCIX. Le Panache. Duc d'Orléans. 1911.
two departments established a local office on a main street in Besançon, where they displayed photographs of royalist leaders and political events.

In the past posting stickers had raised protest, confiscations, and destruction by the government. To combat government harassment and to ensure the legal right of its members to post all types of political literature or photographs, the Action française established a special legal service, which provided information on the legal rights guaranteed under the press law of 1881 and on locations where these materials could not legally be placed. The office encouraged members to seek legal redress if the government or police hampered their efforts. Past court rulings had been favorable, resulting in both legal victories for the Action française and some financial recompense for the plaintiffs.

As the most activist organization in the confederation making up the Action française, the Camelots du Roi soon learned to exploit photo-journalism in French newspapers. Although the Action française was not illustrated, newspapers in France after the turn of the century made increasing use of photographs of events and people. Maurice Pujo, director of the Camelots du Roi, explained,

The only really effective means of making ourselves heard will be by attacking the facade of public order that hides scandals and by creating the timely news item that will bring such scandals into the open.

Violent street demonstrations, agitation, and harassment of political opponents provided the news items for the newspapers when scandals were lacking. The Camelots, therefore, staged actions intended to embarrass their opponents in hopes of receiving photograph coverage by the Parisian dailies.

In 1909 the Camelots harassed the judge of a Parisian police tribunal who had previously sentenced several Camelots to jail for illegal activities. Using the judge's name, the Camelots ordered
a variety of local merchants to deliver their goods and services to the judge's apartment. Over three hundred deliveries were made, ranging from coal to groceries. Services provided by morticians, pedicurists, and piano-tuners were also ordered unknown to the police judge. The Camelots then informed the local newspapers that the judge had ordered all these goods and services but could not pay for them. This created an embarrassing situation for the judge and angered the merchants and delivery men. Plates C and CI reproduce two photographs, published in the Parisian daily Le Matin, of delivery men arriving at the judge's home. The first photograph shows a delivery man gesturing in frustration as the police judge standing next to him hangs his head in shame and embarrassment. Referring to the judge the delivery man states, "I have never seen such a client." The following photograph shows the numerous delivery men carrying their goods to the judge's apartment.

The Camelots planned an even more humiliating incident for Aristide Briand. When he was Minister of the Interior, Briand had ordered police agents to arrest numerous Camelots during their demonstrations against the transfer of Emile Zola's remains to the Pantheon and against the appointment of anti-nationalist or Jewish professors to the faculties of the University of Paris. In the spring of 1909 the police learned that the Camelots were following Briand in order to establish his daily routine. When he left his favorite restaurant one night several Camelots planned to seize him, pin his arms behind his back, and slip on a pair of handcuffs. At the same time other Camelots would knock off the minister's hat and clip his mustache. Another would take the minister's photograph, which the Camelots would furnish to newspapers in Paris. 70

The plan was never carried out, but it inspired an attack on Briand more than a year later, when he was Prime Minister.
Plate C. Le Matin. I Have Never Seen Such a Client. 1909.

At the dedication of a monument to Jules Ferry in the Tuileries Garden Lucien Lacour, a Camelot leader, came up behind Briand and struck him on the head. Lacour was immediately subdued by the police and crowd, but Briand was visibly shaken and lost his hat during the scuffle. Photographers covering the ceremony took several pictures of the incident and its aftermath. Lacour was sentenced to two years in prison, but the Camelots du Roi received enormous publicity, which pleased them and showed opponents that they were fearless in the furthering of their cause. Photographs of the incident soon decorated the local offices of the Action française and appeared in photograph-illustrated magazines and newspapers, attracting attention to the Action française and humiliating a high official of the Republic.71

When Lucien Lacour returned to Paris after serving his sentence, however, no photographs depicting his arrival were published in the French press. Maurice Pujo organized a large reception for Lacour at the Gare de l'Est. Every daily newspaper in Paris sent reporters to cover the event, including eleven photographers. Referring to the photographers Pujo observed, "Lacour and his entourage passed through a maze of incessant magnesium flashes." Yet when the newspapers appeared the next morning not a simple photograph was included. Pujo reasoned that the newspapers did not want to give publicity to the Action française, "Is one going to publish these photographs, which are an irrefutable witness to the importance of an Action française demonstration?" According to Pujo, L'Excelsior and Le Petit Parisien, the largest photograph-illustrated dailies, were the two worst practitioners of this censorship. They not only published no pictures of the event but also underestimated the size of the crowd at the demonstration. Pujo accused their publisher, Jean Dupuy, of intentionally distorting the news by withholding the truth from the public.72
The refusal of the French press to publish these photographs indicated a growing awareness of the Action française's efforts to exploit daily newspapers for its own political purposes. By staging embarrassing incidents against opponents or demonstrating in the streets the Action française had created "newsworthy" events, which usually were published in newspapers with a much larger circulation than its own. The photographs provided visual suggestion of the numerical strength of the movement and intensified the controversy over the disturbances. In the years preceding the First World War, however, the photograph-illustrated press increasingly closed its columns to the activities staged by the Action française. Without the financial resources to print photographs in its own newspaper, the Action française was forced to rely on its old methods of propaganda distribution, which reached fewer citizens than the big circulation dailies.

Government reports on the popular effects of the photographic propaganda over the thirty years from 1883 to 1914 varied in their assessment of its influence from negligible to achieving direct conversion of those who viewed the materials. In their rationale for the distribution of these photographs, however, the royalists differed from their earlier counterparts, the Boulangists. From the Boulangists they learned to barrage the public systematically and unremittingly with millions of photographs in order to keep the pretender's image before the people. After 1886 the royalists sought less to convince republicans to vote for royalists in free elections than to create a general state of mental turbulence that in time of political crisis would lead to a popular demand for the elimination of the Republic or to an actual coup. The issue faced by the Duc d'Orléans and his partisans at the beginning of the twentieth century was how best to use photography to accomplish the royalist political objectives. His
moderate supporters favored the less objectionable photographs typical of *Le Panache*. The duke, however, also sanctioned the activist and often violent methods of the Camelots that exploited the technology of photography in a ruthless way. His support for both policies toward photographic propaganda revealed his uncertainty about the growing potential of photography as a propaganda medium. But more importantly it suggested the overall enthusiasm of royalists to exploit each potential avenue for the pretender's benefit.
Notes


2 Ibid., p. 38.

3 Ibid., p. 40.

4 Archives nationales (hereafter cited as AN), F7 12441, Agissements royalistes, January 23, 1884; February 1, 1884; February 8, 1884; March 6, 1884; March 14, 1884, August 26, 1884.

5 Ibid., March 3, 1884.

6 AN, F7 12435, Demonstrations royalistes, June 26, 1886.

7 Ibid., July 25, 1886.

8 Ibid., June 30, 1886.

9 Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris (hereafter cited as APP), BA/1330, Menées orléanistes, March 8, 1887.

10 Ibid., September 23, 1887.


13 AN, F7 12853, Propagande royaliste, July 7 and 8, 1888.

14 Ibid., July 4, 1888.

15 Ibid., July 18, 1888.

16 Ibid., October 30, 1888.

17 AN, F7 12928, Saisie de propagande, December 12, 1888.


19 AN, F7 12928, Saisie de propagande, March 29, 1889.
21 AN, F7 12441, Agissements royalistes, February 28, 1890; March 8, 1890; March 28, 1890; May 6, 1890; July 15, 1890.
22 APP, BA/1209, Dossier d'Orléans, February 14, 1890.
24 Osgood, Royalism, p. 38.
25 APP, BA/1331, Menées orléanistes, March 19, 1894.
26 APP, BA/1209, Dossier d'Orléans, May 26, 1896.
27 APP, BA/1331, Menées orléanistes, May 20, 1896.
28 APP, BA/1209, Dossier d'Orléans, December 29, 1896.
29 APP, BA/1331, Menées orléanistes, July 20, 1896.
30 AN, F7 12442, Agissements royalistes, June 18, 1895.
31 Ibid., July 3, 1895; July 30, 1895.
32 "Tribunal Civil de la Seine. Deux cent mille portraits de Duc d'Orléans," Gazette des Tribunaux, April 9, 1897, p. 335.
33 Ibid., March 4, 1897, p. 211.
34 Ibid., April 9, 1897, p. 335.
36 APP, BA/1209, Dossier d'Orléans, December 16, 1897.
37 AN, F7 12853, Propagande royaliste, June 28, 1899.
39 AN, F7 12853, Propagande royaliste, February 14, 1899.
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Ibid.


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Congrès royaliste d'Action française tenu à Montpellier (Montpellier: 1909), p. 44.


AN, F 12863, Action française, June 18, 1912.


AN, F 12864, Camelots du Roi, March 22, 1909.


AN, F 12864, Camelots du Roi, January 19, 1912.
CHAPTER VII

PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE DREYFUS AFFAIR, 1898-1900:
THE LIGUE DES PATRIOTES, THE LIGUE ANTI-
SÉMITIQUE, AND THE DREYFUSARDS

From 1896 until the end of the century the Dreyfus Affair virtually dominated the attention of the French. The national crisis over the Affair in 1898-99 polarized society and stimulated the political resurgence of extreme nationalist and anti-Semitic leagues, including the Ligue des Patriotes and the Ligue antisémite. These organizations were authoritarian, militant, and anti-parliamentarian. In their quest for popular support these leagues exploited the current technology of photography, distributing flattering photographs of their leaders carefully designed to appeal to powerful emotions in a wide audience. Dreyfusards, in turn, sought to counter the influence of this propaganda with their own. Political photographs disseminated by both Dreyfusards and their opponents contributed to the crisis atmosphere and helped to shape public attitudes about the political issues and individuals involved.

Paul Déroulède founded the Ligue des Patriotes in 1882 as a gymnastic society to instill patriotism in French youth. He dedicated himself and the organization to the recovery of the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and to constant military readiness in the future. The accomplishment of these goals required national unity. Déroulède proposed to eliminate the divisive elements within society and to strengthen French national pride through education. In 1883 he served on a government commission appointed to promote the establishment of military training programs in schools, and his songs and poems were sung regularly in
the gymnastic clubs and classrooms.

Déroulède's own career provided to French youth an example of dedication to one's country. As a young man he volunteered for an Algerian sharpshooters' regiment to fight in the Franco-Prussian War. At the siege of Sedan he carried his wounded brother through enemy fire to an ambulance station, but he was later captured and held prisoner by the Prussians. He escaped and returned to France to fight with the Army of the Loire. Leon Gambetta promoted Déroulède to lieutenant, and he was seriously wounded in the last days of the war. To recuperate he returned to his home in Angoulême, where he began to write patriotic songs, poems, and short stories that intended to stimulate pride and devotion to the fatherland.¹

By 1889 the Ligue des Patriotes had ceased to be only a network of gymnastic societies for French school children and, numbering close to 100,000 members nationwide, had become an active political organization that supported political candidates. In 1886 Déroulède endorsed General Boulanger's bellicose statements and actions against Germany. He believed that only a strong military figure at the head of the government could recover the lost provinces, and when Boulanger began his electoral campaign in 1888, the league provided the political organization and manpower to distribute Boulangerist propaganda and to stage political demonstrations in the general's favor. When Boulanger became a threat to the government and was forced to flee France, Déroulède's organization was dissolved by the government.

As a partisan of Boulangism, Déroulède had accepted the political and social principles of the movement. In the next decade his political ideas evolved. Much like the royalists and Bonapartists he withdrew his support from the Republic and called for the revision of the Constitution of 1875. He advocated a strong, powerful executive elected by universal suffrage who could
end political machinations in the chamber. The executive would be neither a king nor an emperor but a strong, popular leader capable of unifying the nation behind him in the name of patriotism. No longer would the Chamber of Deputies be the sole embodiment of popular sovereignty, and in cases where the executive and the legislature conflicted the issue would be settled by a plebiscite. This direct democracy would return political power to the people and eliminate corrupt politicians whose first allegiance was to a small constituency or to vested interests.

Déroulède's political principles appealed to the urban lower middle class, those small businessmen who feared the growing militancy of the working class and who were hurt by the growth of industrial capitalism. Déroulède paid lip service to workers' demands, but he fiercely attacked the socialist parties in the 1890s and rejected any radical change in the economic system. He preferred a political solution to the social problem, advocating an executive who could unify various social classes into a nation of patriots. Arbitrary redistribution of wealth was unnecessary in his corporate social system, where each level shared its rightful portion of the national wealth. For Déroulède the parliamentary system alone was at the root of workers' poverty and of the lower middle class's fear of economic disaster. By simplifying the social and economic grievances of these classes into one problem he could offer a single political solution that appealed to a wide audience, who did not understand the complexities of modern society and economics.²

When the crisis over the Dreyfus Affair deepened in 1898, Déroulède reorganized the Ligue des Patriotes in an effort to combat the growing Dreyfusard movement and to reaffirm the honor of the army. By mid-winter 1899 the league had regained the numerical strength that it had when dissolved a decade earlier, between 30,000 and 60,000 members, according to police estimates.
These followers resided mainly in Paris, although a large group did exist in Marseille. Only 8 to 12 percent of the total membership was outside Paris and its immediate suburbs. The political and social profile of the Parisian organization differed from that of the provincial membership. Most provincial members were veterans who belonged to the league as individuals, rather than as members of closely knit organizations. The Parisian league, however, contained an amalgam of old adherents to the Boulangist movement, veterans, and patriots from leftist and republican parties. An historian of the league, Peter M. Rutkoff, compiled a social profile of the Parisian league from membership lists obtained by the police, including arrest records and announcements in the league's newspaper and concluded that the league was basically comprised of lower middle class Parisians. More than 50 percent of his sample were petty bourgeois merchants or artisans; none was a worker. These members lived mainly in the northwestern, northern, northeastern, and eastern sections of the city, in the ninth, eleventh, seventeenth, and eighteenth arrondissements.

The league's tactics during the Dreyfus Affair were direct and often violent actions against the government. Political demonstrations, marches, harassment of political opponents, and ultimately direct overthrow of the government were among the league's goals. Propaganda was a central and important component of Déroulède's overall strategy to bring about political change. Propaganda served as an educational tool, preparing leaguers for the upcoming battle, converting new members, and instilling the patriotic values upon which the new society would be built. For Déroulède patriotism shared common traits with religion, "Patriotism is a religion, having its symbols and ceremonies, like it [patriotism] has its apostles and martyrs." Like religion it could be inculcated into the hearts of every Frenchman, if enough
time and energy were devoted to it.

Déroulède recognized the value of propaganda to the league. It was a primary objective when the league was founded in 1882. Article 2 of the original charter affirmed that propaganda was as important as education,

The league had for its goal the revision of the Treaty of Frankfort and the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine to France; its tasks are propaganda and the development of patriotic education and military training.\(^5\)

Déroulède remarked on the early effectiveness of propaganda,

All this propaganda has not been useless because it has given our societies an enormous extension, and it has veritably forced the government, which at first was indifferent to the movement, to sanction and encourage them.\(^6\)

When the league was reestablished in 1898, the call for propaganda was among the first articles of the new charter. Déroulède in his speeches urged his followers to be active in the distribution of propaganda because it was important for the slow but constant development of deep-seated patriotic values,

In pursuing ardent, active, and tireless propaganda implant your ideas on all fronts. Erase the errors, disseminate the truth! Remake the national conscience and republican soul... poor France is overcome with sadness and exhausted by discouragement.\(^7\)

Among the first large-scale, nationally-distributed propaganda materials was the league's photograph-illustrated poster entitled "Dreyfus Est Un Traître" (Plate CII). Printed in Paris by E. Charaire, more than 136,000 copies of this poster were placarded in towns and villages across France in November 1898.\(^8\) Local police and departmental prefects reported the postings to the Ministry of the Interior but took no actions to prevent them. Since the printer's name and address appeared on the poster and a copy had been deposited with the ministry, the posters were legal. The reports to the minister, furthermore, indicated that
DREYFUS ET UN TRAITRE

Vive la France!
VIVE LA REPUBLIQUE!

VIVE L'ARMEE!
A BAS LES TRAITRES!

Plate CII. E. Charaire. Dreyfus Is a Traitor. 1898.
the poster received mixed reactions from those who viewed it. Most residents in rural areas, even in the eastern departments bordering Germany, were either not interested or examined the poster with only mild curiosity. The police in Marseille reported that the poster attracted much public attention, and the police in Dax, a small town in the Department of the Landes, feared the poster would generate dangerous controversy. In no cases, however, did the poster provoke any demonstrations or public incidents.9

The poster depicts five former ministers of war who had resigned in protest over the government's handling of the Dreyfus Affair. Above each portrait is a brief statement of the military service record of the man. Below each portrait is a quotation from each man concerning Dreyfus' guilt as a traitor. Several slogans accompany the portraits, including "Vive la France," "Vive la République," "Vive l'Armée," and "À Bas les Traîtres." The photographs are formal portraits taken by well-known photographers such as Pierre Petit. Each portrait presents a general in either full dress or regular uniform. Only Godefroy Cavaignac, Minister of War in 1895 and in 1898, was not a career soldier. He appears in civilian dress.

The quotations below the portraits add to the political significance of the poster. The unsmiling, serious expressions on these men's faces emphasize their concern about Dreyfus's guilt. Referring to Dreyfus, General Auguste Mercier had stated in 1894, "Notes that I have in my possession reveal that an officer of the General Staff communicated to a foreign power some documents that he had gained from his position. I arrested him." General Jean Billot had declared in 1896 to the Chamber of Deputies, "From my soul and conscience as a soldier and army commander, Dreyfus is guilty. Dreyfus is a traitor." Cavaignac had testified to the chamber in the summer of 1898, "I am absolutely certain
that Dreyfus is guilty." General Émile Zurlinden, minister in
the autumn of 1898, commented in a letter to the chamber, "After
serious study of the judicial evidence I am convinced that Drey-
fus is guilty." General Charles Chanoine, minister when the pos-
ter was distributed, agreed with his colleagues,

When I speak of this ill-fated affair over which my prede-
cessors have resigned, I declare that I respect the separa-
tion between the political and judicial branches of govern-
ment. . . . But I also have the right to express my opinion.
It conforms to those of my predecessors.

The combination of portraits and opinions from the highest
military leaders in the country were in themselves a defense of
the conviction of Dreyfus and the role of the military in the case.
These portraits show honorable men who had served their country
with distinction. Their belief in Dreyfus' guilt is made more
convincing by the impressive uniforms and distinctive poses.
The portraits reflect the integrity and honor of each minister
and make their statements about Dreyfus seem more truthful.

Street demonstrations and propaganda dissemination by the
league continued through the winter of 1898-99 and culminated
with Déroulède's attempted overthrow of the government during
the funeral of President Félix Faure on February 23, 1899. The
election of Émile Loubet, a known Dreyfusard, to replace Faure
as President of the Republic and the government's review of
Dreyfus' military trial heightened tensions over the affair and
moved some rightist groups to violent protests. Déroulède, who
had long planned to overthrow the government, chose this time to
act. He had developed numerous contacts with anti-Dreyfusard
army officers, who resented the government's decision to review
the first military court's verdict against Dreyfus. He expected
military assistance for his action, although his army collabora-
tors were caught off guard by his haste. On the day of Faure's
funeral Déroulède turned thousands of leaguers into the street
and tried to elicit the support or benevolent neutrality of the general population with a barrage of portrait photographs of his military and political allies. On February 23 his leaguers distributed more than 100,000 posters entitled "Les Amis de la Patrie," which included portrait photographs of Déroulède, Cavaignac, General Édouard Jamont, General Zurlinden, Henri Rochefort, François Coppée, Ernest Judet, and Édouard Drumont.  

The coup miscarried when General George de Pallieux, whom Déroulède had expected to find at the head of a column of troops returning from the funeral, was not in command of the troops that Déroulède tried to divert toward the Hotel de Ville. The general on the scene refused to follow Déroulède, and the police arrested Déroulède and the other major conspirators among the Ligue des Patriotes. Confined in the Prison de la Santé, Déroulède spent his time writing patriotic poems and songs. His trial in the spring proved farcical when the jury returned an innocent verdict despite overwhelming evidence that Déroulède had intended to overthrow the government.

Déroulède's confinement provided an occasion and a new source for photographic propaganda. A photographer was allowed to enter his cell and to take several pictures. Plates CIII and CIV show Déroulède seated at a table in the cell. The first photograph is postcard size and contains only Déroulède's name and the location of his confinement. The second picture is printed on a handbill and includes Déroulède's title as chief of the official political party of the league. Both photographs argue his commitment to his political cause by showing the price he paid for his attempt to overthrow the government. The barren and bleak prison cell provides few luxuries, and yet Déroulède appears quite content to read a book at his table. The representation of his willing sacrifice for his cause is intended to inspire the viewer to follow in his footsteps. The imprisonment of the league's leader
Plate CIII. Paul Déroulède in His Cell at the Prison de la Santé. 1899.

Plate CIV. Paul Déroulède in His Cell at the Prison de la Santé. 1899.
also proclaims the government's fear of this political movement. Déroulède appears as a martyr to the nationalist cause, and the government becomes morally culpable of depriving a patriot of his freedom.

Even before his arrest, the leadership of the Ligue des Patriotes had recognized the need to build Déroulède's image as the leading patriot of France. George Thébault, a former Bonapartist who joined the ranks of the league, remarked at a league meeting,

like Napoleon and Boulanger previously, Déroulède is today popular, but we must make him known as the greatest patriot, to show him as a savior, as a man embodying the highest degree of patriotism.11

An article published in the photograph-illustrated magazine La Vie illustrée during Déroulède's confinement contributed to this development of his public image. Two journalists, Henri de Weindel and Lucien Métivet, founded the magazine in October 1898. They solicited articles on a broad range of topics, including current events and politics. When Déroulède's action against the government was in the news, they published a laudatory biographical article on him. Well-illustrated with photographs, this article was written by one of Déroulède's closest advisors, Henri Galli. Galli was a well-known newspaper editor and an early member of the league. When the government dissolved it in the wake of the Boulanger crisis, he became editor of Rochefort's L'Intransigeant, and when Déroulède reorganized the league during the Dreyfus Affair, he assumed the editorship of its official newspaper, Le Drapeau.

Galli's article in La Vie illustrée provided Déroulède and the league with a wider public than the league's newspaper and propaganda normally reached. This magazine was a nationally circulated general interest publication that did not openly support
any political group. Its readership came mainly from those of the middle class who were interested in photographs of news events, famous people, and political figures of the day. The photographs in the magazine, however, added to its audience those who could not read fluently but who still appreciated the events and people depicted in the photographs. To satisfy the visual interests of the readership Galli included twelve photographs depicting Déroulède at various ages and at his provincial and Parisian residences. The accompanying article described his patriotism, his activities during the Franco-Prussian War, and his attempt to reinstall patriotic values into the French through the Ligue des Patriotes.

Three photographs (Plates CV, CVI, CVII) show Déroulède in military uniform during his service in the army. The first represents Déroulède in the uniform of the Third Zouaves, an Algerian sharpshooters' regiment. The accompanying description proclaimed his patriotism and his eagerness to defend France against the Prussians:

On August 20, 1870, a young man carrying a lieutenant's uniform of the Paris national guard presented himself to Colonel Bocher, commander of the Third Zouaves at Camp Chalons. Fifteen days after the defeat at Froeschviller he requested to enlist in this legendary regiment that was heroic at the Battles of Sebastopol and Palestro.

The colonel sized up six rather frail looking volunteers who stood before him. One gets very tired here, our pack is very heavy, he said.

Less painful than the shame of not fighting when France is invaded, my colonel.

A battalion commander stood near the colonel and without awaiting the response of the colonel said: You come with me, young man, I'll take you in my battalion. I am Commander Hervé. Your name?

Déroulède. 12
Plate CV. La Vie illustrée. Paul Déroulède in the Uniform of the 3rd Zouaves. 1899.
Plate CVI. *La Vie illustrée*. Paul Déroulède as a Lieutenant in the Infantry. 1899.

Plate CVII. *La Vie illustrée*. Paul and André Déroulède in Uniform. 1899.
In Plate CVI Déroulède appears in uniform with a medal for honorable service prominently pinned to his coat. He was captured at Sedan and spent three months as a prisoner of war before escaping to Austria and making his way back to France, where he joined the new army in the Loire Valley. Gambetta promoted him and later decorated him for his bravery under fire. Wounded in action during the last days of the war, he spent several months in recuperation but eventually returned to the army as a twenty-six-year-old lieutenant. Plate CVII shows Déroulède posing in uniform with his brother André. During the siege of Sedan Déroulède braved enemy fire to pull his wounded brother from the field. This photograph the genuine devotion of the brothers, as Paul stands with his arm around his younger brother. The series of portraits signifies Déroulède's dedication to his country during its war with Prussia and suggests to the viewer his sacrifice and commitment.

Galli linked Déroulède to rural France in his narrative and also in two photographs depicting Déroulède at his provincial home in the Department of the Charente-Inférieure. In Plate CVIII Déroulède stands on a small bridge in front of his provincial chateau. Peasant women wash their laundry on the banks of a small stream that flows by the chateau. The accompanying description sentimentally emphasized Déroulède's close emotional attachment to the people and to the land where he was born and raised:

But do not forget, although the largest portion of his partisans are from Paris, Déroulède represents Angoulême in the Chamber of Deputies . . . and he knows how to communicate with both style and conviction in the language which pleases the peasants of his electoral district.

His father's family was originally from Charente; and he loves the land, the home of his ancestors, and the old estate at Angély where as a college student he spent his vacations. He loves this old chateau, where he came after
Plate CVIII. La Vie illustrée. Paul Déroulède at His Chateau. 1899.
the war to rest for several months and to recuperate from a serious wound, and where he retired in 1893 disheartened by politics and by the denial of his dreams. He said, I want to:

Hide like a druid in the depths of the forest  
Sing to the land where the sky makes me live,  
And to the good peasants without whom nothing would live.13

In Plate CIX Déroulède sits amidst the shrubs and trees of the forest quietly reading a book. The accompanying description stressed the therapeutic psychological effect that the land had on Déroulède by providing a refuge from the busy and stressful life of an important politician. Despite his full schedule he still found time to visit and take an interest in his provincial home,

At Angély Déroulède rises early in the morning, examines his estate and vineyards that were ravaged by phylloxera and which he replanted, and interests himself with the work in the field, and on the hot days of summer seeks refuge in the forest with a book in his hand.14

The two photographs reflect Déroulède's provincial heritage and his commitment to the basic rural values that made France worth fighting and dying for.

The league itself also published photograph-illustrated materials. Le Drapeau, however, was unillustrated before Déroulède's abortive coup and only infrequently contained photographs in the following months. On one occasion during Déroulède's trial in the spring of 1899 the newspaper published his portrait and a view of the Conciergerie, accompanied by a brief poem dedicated to his fervent patriotism.15 The league's yearly almanach frequently published photographs of the league's leaders and of its public demonstrations. The almanach of 1899, for example, included numerous portraits of Déroulède that had been published in La Vie illustrée, a reproduction of the poster "Dreyfus Est Un Traître," and several photographs illustrating popular support
Plate CIX. *La Vie illustrée.* Paul Déroulède Reading in the Forest. 1899.
for the league. Plate CX shows Marcel Habert amid a crowd of men, women, and children gathered before the monument to French soldiers who fought at Buzenval during the Franco-Prussian War. Habert, second in command to Déroulède, stands above the crowd making a speech dedicated to the memory of those who had fought and died for their country. The diverse audience attending the ceremonies reflects the broad appeal of the league and the intense patriotism that existed in France. Plate CXI shows Déroulède leading a street march to the Place de la Madeleine on October 25, 1898. Déroulède called the demonstration to protest the chamber's reinvestigation of the Dreyfus case. Plate CXII shows a march held by the league at Bourget on October 30, 1898, in commemoration of the fighting that took place there during the Franco-Prussian War. The French flag is prominently displayed by Déroulède and his associates as they lead the march. These three photographs serve as visual examples of the league's popular support. Rather than fight the republicans in the chamber, Déroulède preferred to generate mass enthusiasm by staging popular street demonstrations resplendent with patriotic symbols and expressions of protest.

Although found innocent and released in June, 1899 after his participation in the abortive coup, Déroulède was rearrested and confined to a cell in the Luxembourg Palace in August. The government accused him of collaborating with members of the Jeunesse royaliste and the Ligue antisémite to overthrow the Republic. The trial began only after completion of the Dreyfus trial at Rennes. Over the next five months attorneys for the government produced an array of evidence. Documents submitted by the prosecution proved that Déroulède's written and visual propaganda, including "Dreyfus Est Un Traître," was designed to generate popular support for the league and to prepare the populace for a change in government. The number of propaganda pieces and the evidence
Plate CX. *Almanach des Patriotes et du Drapeau*. Marcel Habert and the Demonstration at Buzenval. 1899.
Plate CXII. Almanach des Patriotes et du Drapeau. The Flag of the League and the Procession at Bourget. 1899.
of the amount of money spent on the materials bolstered the government's case. 16

During Dreyfus' trial at Rennes the league and other anti-Dreyfusard organizations freely distributed their propaganda in the city and the surrounding area. Public opinion was firmly against Dreyfus. The police estimated only a small portion of the residents in the department were Dreyfusard. These officials feared that the Parisian radicals would try to incite the normally placid population into potentially dangerous demonstrations. Agents from the Ministry of the Interior seized thousands of portraits of the Duc d'Orléans in Lille, forestalling their dispatch to Rennes, but they allowed the Ligue des Patriotes and the Ligue antisémite to distribute their propaganda, since it conformed with legal requirements. The government, moreover, feared that any confiscations in the area would incite the largely anti-Dreyfusard population into potentially dangerous demonstrations or open resistance to the government. Elaborate security precautions, including the occupation of Rennes by several hundred troops, were taken to control any situation. 17

While confined in a small, specially constructed cell in the palace, Déroulède was unable to participate actively in the league's propaganda efforts. Security was strict and he received few visitors. No photographers were allowed in his cell, and no new pictures of the imprisoned martyr of nationalism were made. His followers, however, continued to distribute written materials to remind people of his confinement. In October, 1899 leaguers posted small stickers with the slogan "Vive Déroulède" in every Parisian arrondissement and in numerous provincial departments. Over the next three months several hundred thousand stickers were posted, disturbing police and government officials. The prefect of police for Paris was called to the Elysée Palace and ordered immediately to remove the stickers from public places. Orders
went also to railroad officials, instructing them to remove these nuisances from train cars leaving Paris for the provinces. One observer estimated that over 200,000 of these stickers had been glued on trains departing Paris. Finally police raided the shops of two printers on December 13, 1899, and confiscated 280,000 stickers on the ground that they contained no printer's identification or address.\textsuperscript{18}

The league turned to visual propaganda when the police began to confiscate its small stickers. Photographs depicting Déroulède in his cell at the Prison de la Santé were reprinted and distributed in the early months of 1900. Small gummed portraits were also posted by leaguers. Plate CXIII represents this small portrait, approximately two inches in diameter. Thousands of these portraits appeared in December 1899, prompting a police investigation into their production. The dissemination of these photographs decreased rapidly during the spring, and the police made no seizures.

Found guilty of conspiracy, Déroulède and other major leaders of rightist political groups were exiled, and the Ligue des Patriotes was dissolved for the second time in little more than a decade. Déroulède left France and did not return until pardoned in 1905. With the leadership of the league in exile the movement began to falter. The dependence of the organization on Déroulède's personal control and dominance made his presence indispensable, especially if the movement were to survive its period of involuntary disbandment. No single man could take his place, and propaganda alone failed to hold his partisans faithful to the cause. He still, however, tried to keep his image before the French. Plate CXTIV is a portrait photograph of Déroulède taken by Pierre Petit and first reported by the police in the Department of the Eure in 1902.\textsuperscript{19} It is an early color photograph approximately two feet long and one foot wide. The caption below the
Plate CXIII. Paul. Déroulède. 1899.
Plate CXIV. Pierre Petit. Paul Déroulède. 1900.
portrait reads, "Paul Déroulède. Defender of the People's Rights. Exiled for wanting to give the People the right to elect the President of the Republic."

Despite the circulation of these color portraits, his partisans increasingly turned to other nationalist groups. Déroulède returned to France in 1905 and ran for the Chamber of Deputies in 1906. He lost the election, and over the next several years before his death in 1914, he played only a minor role in French politics. Nationalism, however, continued to grow as the French perceived increasing economic and military threats from Germany. Déroulède may have ceased to be a major political figure, but his belief in the necessity for fervent patriotism was taken up by monarchists and republicans alike.

Antisemitism as an organized movement emerged in France with the publication of Édouard Drumont's book, *La France juive* in 1886. In this book Drumont blamed Jews for France's political, economic, and diplomatic failures, including defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Drumont's attack on French Jews crystallized a latent antisemitism present in many elements of the population, including members of the nobility, army officers, bureaucrats, Catholic clergy, professional men, writers and journalists, and petty bourgeois shopkeepers. All had real or imagined grievances against Jews—some economic, some social, some religious. The socialist movement, prior to the Dreyfus Affair, was strongly antisemitic, seeing Jewish capitalists as a major obstacle to the development of international socialism.20

Among the most virulent antisemites in the era before the Dreyfus Affair was the Marquis de Morès. His combination of antisemitism, nationalism, and economic reform won advocates from the lower middle class who sought relief from the competition of Jewish businessmen but who did not favor the socialist solution
of nationalization of property. Morès' ideas inspired a young man named Jules Guérin, who founded the Ligue antisémite during the crisis over the Dreyfus Affair. Morès died in 1896 but not before establishing antisemitic storm troops known for brutal street fighting and terrorism. Guérin took from Morès a tradition of active street demonstrations, malicious propaganda, and violence against Jews.21

The object of Morès' and Guérin's hatred was a relatively small French Jewish community numbering around 80,000. The Jews were highly visible, since most lived in major cities such as Paris, Marseille, or Lyon. Over 50,000 were in Paris, and that city was the center of Jewish cultural, social, and economic life. The Jewish community ranged from the wealthy banking family of Baron de Rothschild to the humble street vendor. Middle class Jews included merchants, shopkeepers, small-scale manufacturers, civil servants, and professional men. Many from the middle and upper economic groups had assimilated into French society and considered themselves Frenchmen, not Jews. Among the lower classes were thousands of east European immigrants who had fled discrimination and persecution in the 1880s and 1890s in Russia, Poland, and Rumania. They settled mainly in Paris and performed menial labor in small workshops. Others were more fortunate and established small stores or sidewalk stands. Almost all were poor and lived in the first and fourth arrondissements in Paris, which became a miniature ghetto of displaced immigrant Jews. Poorly educated and unable to prosper economically, these Jews stood out as a large mass of foreign and unassimilated people, offensive to French nationalists and antisemites.22

Specific grievances against Jews varied, but antisemitism among the members of the Ligue antisémite was primarily nationalistic and economic. Leaguers resented the influx into the city of foreign immigrants who practiced unusual habits, spoke no
French, and did not mix with other of the city's residents. Economic grievances, however, were directed more against those middle and upper class French Jews who had thoroughly assimilated into French society but were economic competitors of members of the league. The social composition of the league was more heterogeneous than that of the Ligue des Patriotes, but it drew largely from the lower middle class, especially small traders, merchants, lower white collar workers, and artisans. The league also attracted a small membership from the "working class." Geographically the league's membership was concentrated in the northwestern, northern, and northeastern sections of Paris, encompassing the ninth, tenth, eleventh, seventeenth, and eighteenth arrondissements. 23 The short-term economic problems associated with the political crisis over the Dreyfus Affair together with the long-term structural changes in the French economy left many small businessmen and artisans in desperate financial need. The league blamed these ills on Jewish capitalists and politicians. Jewish owners of large department stores and cooperatives, it claimed, prevented small retailers from competing in the market-place. To remedy the situation the league advocated such economic reforms as tax relief, the breakup of large department stores, nationalization of the Bank of France, and decentralization of its control and operations. It also organized a boycott against all Jewish businesses, a boycott that was succeeded by violent attacks against Jewish shops by league members. 24

The growing tension between antisemites and Jews erupted in January and February, 1898 in riots and attacks on Jews in major French cities. They were particularly severe in Paris and Algiers. In several areas the riots were spontaneous reactions to Zola's article "J'Accuse" and the trial of Major Esterhazy. In Paris, however, the Ligue antisémite actively encouraged the riots. Guérin's leaguers attacked Jewish businesses in a
determined effort to eliminate Jewish commerce.25

Guérin presented himself as an example of a small entrepreneur whose businesses failed because of Jewish competition. In truth he was a shady small-time businessman who deceived his partners and creditors for his own advantage. He had a long history of unethical business practices documented by the Paris police. In 1886 he lost a court battle against a former employer who accused him of using stolen trade secrets to establish a company in competition with the employer. Despite losing the court case he never paid the fine. Two years later, after losing several hundred thousand francs as a petroleum importer, he set fire to his office just before payment was due on a large loan. Guérin sought damages from his insurance company, but a police investigation ruled the fire as arson, and the insurance company refused to honor the claim. In 1888 he charged that the French postal system had lost a large check that he had sent to a business partner. The postal system paid Guérin for the lost money but later determined that Guérin had swindled the office. Guérin never paid back the post office. In 1889 he declared bankruptcy and left his creditors with unpaid loans and bills of more than 200,000 francs, and in 1891 another former business partner won a court judgment against him for using the partner's money without his permission.26

When his business ventures proved unsuccessful, Guérin turned to politics and antisemitism. He associated with Drumont and Morès and ran unsuccessfully for municipal council from the nineteenth arrondissement in 1893. After Morès died in 1896 Guérin became more independent from Drumont, establishing the Ligue antisémite in 1897. By 1898 the police estimated that the league had more than 11,000 members. Provincial chapters were formed in Nancy, Marseille, and Lyon. Nancy boasted more than 2,800 adherents and Lyon more than 1,000.27 The league was very much
dependent on Guérin for leadership and direction, much as the Ligue des Patriotes depended on Déroulède. When Guérin was ill or in jail during the autumn of 1899, his league languished, and membership declined.28

The league's tactics against Jews included violent demonstrations and protests, direct attacks on persons and property, and economic boycotts. Guérin did not, however, neglect malicious propaganda. The police reported in 1899 that "He did not want to make the league an instrument of pacific propaganda; nor did he seek to extend his antisemitic ideas through free discussion and persuasion, he wanted violence and revolution."29 Guérin's first lieutenant, Charles Spiard, later reported that Guérin had little respect for the public's intelligence and tried to use propaganda, true or false, to spread his ideas. In the league's newspaper he constantly attacked his opponents and he never replied to criticism. Spiard remarked,

From the first issues he attacked with extreme violence all those whom he believed vulnerable. . . . Guérin always attacked so that he would not have to defend himself, he always slandered those from whom he feared revelations in order to attenuate the effect that these charges would produce on the public. I never saw him respond with serious arguments or undeniable truths to those accusations against him. His principal argument was the falsehood . . . the lie is his right arm, it is his life.30

Guérin was master of modern propaganda techniques and initiated several innovative methods to disseminate his virulent message. Among these was a daily newspaper, l'Anti-juif, first published in the early autumn of 1898 and followed in November by a bi-weekly photograph-illustrated supplement entitled L'Anti-juif illustré. The league also published songs, posters, brochures, and postcards. Guérin took advantage of modern transportation to distribute these materials, touring the countryside in a motorcar loaded with the league's publications, which he
and his associates handed out. He also advertised his ideas in a sports and entertainment magazine devoted to motorcar racing.\textsuperscript{31} Payment for these diverse propaganda materials came mainly from royalist subsidies provided by the Duc d'Orléans and the Jeunesse royaliste. The duke granted Guérin 100,000 francs to begin the publication of the newspaper, and thereafter provided between 20,000 and 30,000 francs each month to finance the league's operations.\textsuperscript{32}

Guérin found photography a useful tool to harass and to ridicule Jews and political opponents. One incident in April, 1898, however, proved a miscalculation. While in Algiers with Drumont, Guérin observed several well-known republicans, including Yves Guyot, embarking on a ship bound for France. According to Guérin, he signaled to his photographer to take a picture of these men, intending to publish the photograph as proof that these republicans had followed him to Algiers as part of their surveillance of antisemitic opponents. A local antsemitite misinterpreted the signal and attacked Guyot and his companions. Disregarding the testimony from Guérin and his photographer, the court ruled that Guérin was guilty of provoking the incident and sentenced him to eight days in jail.\textsuperscript{33}

Photography played a key role in the league's boycott of Jewish businesses in 1898. Guérin published the names and addresses of Jewish stores in L'Antijuif, and at selected stores he positioned photographers to take pictures of those who patronized the businesses. He publicly displayed the portraits in an attempt to intimidate future patrons.

Not everyone was intimidated by Guérin's action. Madame Astie de Valsayre, general secretary for a feminist organization seeking women's suffrage, protested against Guérin's conduct. To save him the effort of taking her photograph, she politely offered one to him,
I would be particularly flattered to be in this gallery of indexed individuals. Fearing that I will be absent when the camera is aimed, I want you to know that my photograph is at your disposition.

In his reply Guérin ridiculed her political convictions and satirized her feminist principles by implying that her photograph served only to entice men:

If my amiable correspondent wants to give me her photograph I will be most agreeable. I will put it appropriately on my desk, and each time that I am in a bad mood about Jews, so dear to Madame Astie de Valsayre, I hope that the view of her delicate features and evangelical sweetness will calm my resentment and make me write that Joseph Reinach is the most charming, handsome, and stylish man. I ask Madame not to forget her seductive proposition, and I hope to have her promised photograph soon. I fear only one thing: losing her portrait some beautiful day. Right now that certainly awaits if one my associates falls suddenly head over heels in love with this friend of Israel.34

Guérin also photographed police spies during the siege of league headquarters in August, 1899. While he and his associates remained in the headquarters, plainclothes police agents took up residence in adjoining buildings and intercepted food and communications from the outside. Guérin took photographs of twelve agents and threatened to give the photographs to revolutionary groups and to organized retaliation against those whose portraits he held.35

When he himself was the object of photographic surveillance, Guérin denied the authenticity of the photograph. Attorneys for the government presented a photograph as evidence in Guérin's trial for conspiracy against the state in October, 1899. The picture showed Guérin in Brussels with André Buffet and the Duc d'Orléans. According to the government it proved Guérin's association with the royalists and his complicity in their conspiracy. He claimed the photograph was a fabrication. Maurice Ledet, a journalist for the league, explained how such a photograph could be made,
It is possible to take an agent with grey hair, another with a blond beard who vaguely resembles the Duc d'Orléans, and put them in a scene with a third person who is in the background. The photographer takes a picture showing the face of the first, but the others keep their backs turned or are almost hidden; after some retouching the apparent trio of d'Orléans, Guérin, and Buffet will be positive proof of guilt. 36

First published in November 1898, L'Antijuif illustré was the main instrument of the league's antisemitic visual propaganda. This illustrated supplement appeared separately twice a month until January 1899, when it was distributed with L'Antijuif. It printed illustrations and photographs of the major antisemitic leaders in Europe and the principal activities of the league. The hand-composed illustrations were often violent. One drawing, entitled "If the Jews bring war, before leaving, death to the traitors," depicted Frenchmen shooting Jews before departing for the frontier. 37 The violent illustrations and photographs proved popular among viewers, the circulation of the supplement increased over the next several months. Only 20,000 copies of the first issue were printed, but when it joined the larger newspaper the press run was raised to 150,000. The royalist subsidies kept the newspaper solvent and enabled Guérin to maintain this production level. 38

In May, 1899 L'Antijuif published a series of photographs showing Drumont in Algiers. 39 The series, taken by a league photographer named Leroux, was intended to demonstrate mass enthusiasm for this antisemitic leader. Drumont was the elected deputy from Algiers in the Chamber of Deputies. Plate CXV shows Drumont arriving at the dock. His shop lies in the background, prominently displaying the French flag. Drumont is almost hidden by the sea of Algerian antisemites who came to welcome him.

While in Algeria Drumont visited Max Regis in the fortress at Sidi-Ferruch. Regis, a local antisemitic leader, had helped to
inspire the violent and destructive riots of January, 1898. In November, 1898 he had won election as mayor of Algiers, but when he discriminated against Jews, the Governor of Algeria relieved him of his post. He was eventually convicted and imprisoned for planning an attack on the Jewish quarter of Algiers. Regis, nevertheless, maintained a large popular following. Plate CXVI shows two carriages filled with people travelling to Sidi-Ferruch to visit him. The French flag is conspicuously displayed, and the local antisemites enjoy the trip as if on a holiday excursion. In Plate CXVII a large crowd of partisans gathered in front of the prison to protest against Regis' incarceration. Plate CXVIII shows Drumont and the Mayor of Algiers leaving the fort after having visited Regis. Plate CIX represents the crowd, restrained by soldiers, awaiting Drumont near the fort.

These photographs were intended to convince viewers that Drumont and Regis enjoyed popular support in Algiers. The pictures were not false, composite images but legitimate photographs that represented large crowds demonstrating in favor of these two antisemitic leaders. Although many antisemites in Algiers were Arabs, the French flag in the photographs signifies the nationalistic belief that Jews were unwelcome foreigners in both France and her colonies. The enthusiastic reception and the popular exodus to Sidi-Ferruch provides an example to Parisian antisemites and could encourage their participation in similar activities. The photographs also reveal the effect that demagogues like Drumont and Regis could have on people who held grievances against Jews.

These photographs appeared also in La Vie illustrée. This magazine provided publicity for nationalist and antisemitic groups without specifically endorsing their political views. The publication of the photographs gave a significance to Drumont's
Plate CXVI. L'Antijuif (Leroux). Excursion to Sidi-Ferruch. 1899.
Plate CXVII. *L'Antijuif* (Leroux). Crowd before the Fort at Sidi-Ferruch. 1899.
Plate CXVIII. *L'Antijuif* (Leroux). Drumont and the Mayor of Algiers Leaving the Fort. 1899.
Plate CXIX. *L'Antijuif* (Leroux). Crowd Awaiting Drumont at the Fort. 1899.
visit to Max Regis that it otherwise would have lacked. Leon Gressel, author of the photograph-illustrated article, wrote,

Observing the photographs that we produce here will show to our readers the utmost importance of these demonstrations. Rarely have we gazed upon such considerable crowd activity and swarming on the streets. 40

By providing greater exposure La Vie illustrée extended the antisemites' popular audience beyond the limited circulation of L'Antijuif. Its coverage legitimized antisemitism as a news-worthy movement and encouraged future antisemitic activities solely for publicity.

In the summer of 1899 Guérin's photographic propaganda became more vicious. He attacked both Jews and gentile republican leaders who supported a new trial for Dreyfus. He directly accused Clemenceau of murder and Joseph Reinach, a well-known Jewish deputy, of corruption. In 1890 Reinach's uncle, Baron Jacques de Reinach, had been implicated in the Panama scandal charged with having bribed republican deputies, including Clemenceau, to vote for a loan to a company that planned a canal across the isthmus. The company collapsed, and numerous shareholders lost substantial sums of money. Drumont led the attacks against the baron, who, in 1892, at the height of the scandal, committed suicide. Seven years later Guérin published a photograph of what he claimed was the baron's cadaver with the accompanying caption "Von Reinach assassiné par Clemenceau" (Plate CXX). This photograph shows the body in a coffin. The clear mark of a deep wound is evident on the man's face. In the accompanying description Guérin claimed that this photograph proved Clemenceau was the assassin and that Joseph Reinach covered up the murder to avoid a national scandal. Guérin assumed that the photograph plus his explanation would convince his audience. He asserted that the photograph came from an official investigation into the baron's death. While officials ruled no foul play, Guérin judged otherwise:
Plate CXX. *L'Antijuif*. Von Reinach Assassinated By Clemenceau. 1899.
But since everything can be resolved through investigation, we sought absolute and final proof of Jew von Reinach's assassination by his accomplices. The definitive proof that we have recovered is the photograph of the cadaver exhumed from the cemetery at Nivilliers. This is the photograph that we faithfully reproduce today... which gives the rigorous details of the official photograph taken by the investigators...

Von Reinach has been photographed in his double coffin. One sees very distinctly the oak basket and the lead casing that contain the body of the Jew. The head of the dead man proves that a crime was committed. The horrible wound literally cuts the head in two. The face is swollen and the wound is gaping.

The hand that made this blow has not yet been apprehended. The family declared that Von Reinach did not commit suicide. However, the German Jewish baron died a violent death. If he did not kill himself, who assassinated him in order to eliminate an embarrassing witness?

To this question, we respond categorically: the one who killed Von Reinach is the man who was at his side during his last living day. It is that bandit Clemenceau.41

The veracity of this photograph is open to question. It is unlikely that Guérin obtained an official photograph seven years after the baron's death. While the facial features of the body resemble the baron, the positioning of the cadaver in the coffin is not realistic. The body is tightly fitted into a small casket, while the left shoulder and arm appear to protrude. Nor would a wealthy baron be buried in such a simple coffin. Nevertheless, for viewers these details become insignificant because Guérin's assertion that Reinach died a violent death is substantiated by the signs of violence on the figure's face. Since few readers of L'Antijuif had ever personally seen the baron or even his photograph, a false or retouched photograph would go unrecognized. The publication of the photograph made Guérin's accusation seem more legitimate.

When police arrived at the league's headquarters on August
14, 1899, with his arrest warrant for conspiracy to overthrow the Republic, Guérin and several associates barricaded the entrance and refused to surrender. For six weeks police laid siege to the building. Government officials refused to use force against Guérin because they feared it would worsen an already tense political situation in Paris. Fear of an imminent coup had prompted the government's decision to arrest Guérin and numerous other rightists. Guérin was informed of the government's intentions, and he stocked his headquarters with provisions and arms in preparation for his resistance.

Guérin's motives for embarking on such hopeless and futile resistance to the government were twofold. He ambitiously hoped at first that his action would lead to a general uprising in Paris, which would provide an excuse for the army to take over the city. Since the army was largely anti-Dreyfusard, he hoped that, once in control, the military would usher in a new regime. The siege on Rue Chabrol also coincided with royalist plans to mount open resistance to the government in western France. Financed by the royalists, Guérin's Parisian rebellion was part of a broad attack against the Republic during the Dreyfus trial in Rennes.

Guérin's second objective was to create a public diversion from the Dreyfus trial. He assumed that Dreyfus would be found innocent and that the army would be further dishonored. His resistance focused popular attention on an alternative act against the government, showing to the public that political opposition was still possible. Guérin looked to the future and hoped to generate further political support for the league in the coming years. From this perspective the resistance was a publicity event designed to attract attention to the league. By the second week press coverage made the stand-off at "Fort Chabrol" known to the entire country.
The photograph-illustrated magazines *La Vie illustrée, Le Monde illustré*, and *L'Illustration* fully covered the six weeks of the siege. Their photographers recorded the activities of the crowds surrounding the building, the police, and the besieged occupants. For the first few weeks the atmosphere on the street was tense. Crowds of Parisian antisemites congregated in front of "Fort Chabrol" to express their support for Guérin. Plate CXXI depicts a street brawl on Rue Chabrol during the first week. Several hundred people surround the individuals in the scuffle. The reporter for *Le Monde illustré* sensed an anxious air of expectation among those in the neighborhood.

An excited and restless crowd gathered around the small building that housed the Grand Occident of France. One has the feeling that action will not be long in coming, and that a solution will soon be produced.44

Altercations between the police and antisemites also occurred when the police agents prevented Guérin's sympathizers from hurling food onto the roof of the building.

Recognizing the near riotous conditions around "Fort Chabrol," the police blockaded the street and prohibited anyone from approaching the besieged building. Rue Chabrol took on the appearance of a military camp with heavily armed policemen stationed in the street twenty-four hours a day. Plate CXXII shows a police barricade at one entrance to the street. The government was determined to forestall disorder in the streets and dozens of policemen kept onlookers and sympathizers from the scene during the remainder of the siege.

Journalists and photographers were forbidden to enter the restricted area. This hindrance to the newsmen led to more imaginative methods of gaining access to the events both inside and outside the headquarters. Guérin and his associates recognized that for the resistance to have maximum political effect
Plate CXXI. *Le Monde illustré.* A Brawl on the Rue Chabrol. 1899.
Plate CXXII. *La Vie illustrée*. A Barrier at the Corner of Rue Chabrol and Rue d'Hauteville. 1899.
on the public they must receive constant coverage from the press. Photographers, on orders from their editors to bring back newsworthy pictures of the scene, took their cameras and equipment onto the roofs of adjacent buildings. From this aerial vantage they photographed the events on the street and the movements of the leaguers on the roof of "Fort Chabrol." Plate CXXIII depicts Charles Spiard and an unnamed leaguer on the roof observing the activities of the police below. Spiard at first suspected photographers in the next building of being plain clothes police agents, but once they were identified, he willingly posed for the press photographers. The police also recognized the exploitation of the photographic press by Guérin and his fellow occupants, and on August 29 the police began to stop all photographers from entering apartment buildings adjacent to "Fort Chabrol."¹⁴⁵

Photographers circumvented the police restrictions. Plate CXXIV shows Guérin seated on the roof. Guérin's relaxed pose reflects the stalemate between the police and the league and suggests Guérin's confidence that his resistance would succeed in attracting public attention to his cause. The description accompanying this photograph emphasized the air of self-assurance exhibited by Guérin to the outside world,

If the example of Guérin is followed by everyone served with an arrest warrant, Paris will resemble the towns of the American south, where the residents sit on terraces which dominate their homes, enjoying a little cool breeze. ⁴⁶

While reporters published stories of a positive and self-confident Guérin, one journalist reported, perhaps apocryphally, that Guérin refused to allow Jewish photographers to take his portrait. How Guérin identified a Jewish photographer from the others was a mystery. According to the journalist when a Jewish photographer sought his portrait, Guérin patiently posed until the photographer was about to push the shutter button. He then purposely moved, blurring the final images. ⁴⁷
Plate CXXIII. La Vie illustrée. Spiard, Lieutenant to Jules Guérin, Observing the Assailants from the Roof of Fort Chabrol. 1899.
Plate CXXIV. *La Vie illustrée*. Jules Guérin Taking in the Fresh Air on the Roof of the Grand Occident. 1899.
Soon after the hungry and fatigued leaguers surrendered to police on September 21, *L'Antijuif* published a series of photograph-illustrated articles that assessed the affair. The photographs were simple pictures of the rooms where the leaguers had lived spartanly for six weeks. No polemical descriptions accompanied the pictures, but the barrenness of the photographs suggested the hardship and sacrifice that the occupants had endured for their cause. According to the author, Maurice Ledet, communication with the outside was Guérin's major concern. News about the political effects of the siege boosted the occupants' morale. Guérin also realized that competition among newspapers and journals for the most compelling photograph or story would keep this channel of communication open until the siege's end. Ledet concluded that police restrictions on photographers stemmed from fear,

Perhaps they feared being caught red-handed committing some deceitful trick that only police spies knew about. Or perhaps they feared that each lens would be an instrument projecting . . . a new means of communication.48

With Guérin in prison after the surrender, leadership of the Ligue antisémite fell to his brother. Louis Guérin held little influence among the membership, and the organization began to drift. Subscriptions for *L'Antijuif* fell, and internal squabble weakened the league. By October 1899 sections of the league were seceding from the main organization.49 Jules Guérin could do little from his prison cell to reinvigorate his organization or to prevent desertion from its ranks. In a last attempt to rekindle interest in the league and to keep his image before the public, Guérin ordered the posting of small portrait photographs. The portrait of Guérin in Plate CXXV is similar to those posted in 1899 by Déroulède and the Duc d'Oriéans. Guérin competed with Déroulède for nationalist and antisemitic partisans, and he only began to post his portrait stickers after Déroulède's followers
Plate CXXV. Jules Guérin, Prisoner of the Jews. 1899.
had initiated their postings. Guérin gave orders, however, that his portrait stickers must be better looking and larger than those of his nationalist rival. In January, 1900 Guérin was found guilty of conspiracy to overthrow the Republic, and he was banished from France. The Ligue antisémite was dissolved by order of the government. In the months after his exile, Guérin's sympathizers disseminated the photographs in mainly the third, fourth, eighteenth, and twentieth arrondissements. Such activities failed to sustain the league's membership, and by October, 1900 the police estimated that only 500 leaguers remained loyal to the outlawed organization. Financial contributions declined to the point where the league could not even pay its bills for photographic propaganda.

The government prohibited photographers from attending the trials of Guérin and Déroulède, as it had done in Dreyfus' trial at Rennes. Employees of the illustrated magazines protested this action because it prevented them from practicing their profession. One photographer for L'Illustration, Edmond Frank, argued that in the past judges had banned photographers from the courtroom because they demeaned the majesty, honor, and solemnity of the proceedings. Yet judges admitted artists, etchers, and caricaturists, who frequently made a mockery of the participants and proceedings. Photographers were discreet and caused little noise or disruption, argued Frank. The final pictures, moreover, were objective depictions of the event and not gross distortions drawn by a politically motivated or unscrupulous artist.

Frank reasoned that judges were concerned with tradition and opposed anything new or different.

In the eyes of enthusiasts for tradition every innovation appears as an audacity, every audacity as a lack of respect, or even as a sacrilege . . . leading to bewilderment and indignation.
Beyond the fear of the new was a fear of the revelations that could come from a photograph.

Such is its power that it holds under its yoke even men of high intelligence and culture; it can provoke in eminent magistrates . . . a sort of superstitious terror. . . . The camera seems to frighten these men as a diabolical instrument which, while recording their images, consumes their intimate personality and steals part of their soul. 52

Frank argued that the presence of a photographer did not harm the prestige of a court proceeding but actually enhanced it. In a trial with political significance, however, the courts preferred minimal publicity. The presence of photographers in the courtroom turned the proceedings into more of a public event, adding an importance to the trial that officials wanted to avoid. Such was the case with the Dreyfus trial. To placate the press the government allowed reporters and artists into the courtroom but prohibited photographers. Pictures of the events at Rennes were taken largely in the courtyard where witnesses and interested individuals met to discuss the trial. Photographs of Dreyfus were rare because he was held in an isolated building off-limits to photographers. The few photographs of the trial itself that exist were secretly snapped by hidden cameras and were frequently of poor quality. 53

To avoid the nuisance created by photographers seeking pictures, police banned photographers from the area around the courtroom. Police provided Madame Dreyfus with special protection because photographers hounded her on visits to her husband. In preparation for the verdict, police and military officials took elaborate security precautions to prevent outbreaks of violence or demonstrations. Hundreds of soldiers and police were stationed in Rennes at the courthouse, on the streets, in the main square, and at the train station. All public contact with the witnesses, judges, and defendant was prohibited. Only
selected journalists were permitted inside the courtroom, and all photographers were excluded from the area.\footnote{54}

Security at the trials of Déroulède and Guérin was equally strict. Carpenters built individual cells in the library of the Luxembourg Palace for the prisoners, while the trial took place in the Senate chambers. Photographers from the illustrated weeklies were prohibited from attending the trial but were allowed to take selected photographs that revealed the security precautions. Plate CXXVI shows the spartan cell where Déroulède was confined. The prisoners had no contact among themselves or with the outside. Originally government officials had intended to build the cells adjacent to the library's windows, but they feared the prisoners could communicate with their supporters in the streets.\footnote{55} Plate CXVII shows construction of a covered crosswalk leading from the prison cells to the courtroom in the palace, which hid the prisoners from photographers. Plate CXXVIII represents a police barrier at the rear entrance of the palace. The series illustrates the government's determination to prevent the kind of publicity that surrounded the Dreyfus trial and the "Fort Chabrol" affair. Restrictions on photographers reduced the likelihood that such exploitation would occur.

Like their opponents, Dreyfusards disseminated photographic propaganda in order to influence popular political attitudes. Among the first materials developed by the broad coalition of intellectuals, republicans, and independent socialists was an illustrated poster entitled "Dreyfus Est Innocent" (Plate CXXIX). Printed by Charaire, this poster was similar to "Dreyfus Est Un Traître" (see Plate CII) distributed by the Ligue des Patriotes. Dreyfusards hoped to reduce the influence of the league's poster with one depicting portraits of well-known Dreyfusards. This poster, however, was printed in fewer numbers and received only
Plate CXXVI. *Le Monde illustré.* Déroulède's Cell. 1899.

Plate CXXVII. *Le Monde illustré.* Construction of Walkway at the Luxembourg Palace. 1899.
Plate CXXVIII. *Le Monde illustré.* Police Barrier at the Luxembourg Palace. 1899.
Plate CXXIX. E. Charaire. Dreyfus Is Innocent. 1899.
limited circulation in Paris and the provinces. It included eleven portrait photographs interspersed among slogans, captions, and quotations. The portraits are Émile Zola, L. Tarieux, August Scheurer-Kestner, George Clemenceau, Jean Jaurès, Francis de Pressensé, Fernand Labori, Bernard Lazare, Joseph Reinach, Yves Guyot, and Lieutenant Colonel Picquart. These men were prominent deputies, authors, journalists, and an officer who spoke out publicly against the miscarriage of justice in the Dreyfus case. As in the league's poster each portrait is accompanied by a brief quotation on Dreyfus' guilt. Picquart's photograph is the largest and is placed in the center, reflecting his importance in reopening the case. Under his portrait is a brief quotation referring to his decision to reveal secret evidence withheld at the original trial, "I would not go to my grave with such a secret."

The entire poster counters the military figures presented in the league's poster by depicting an imposing array of France's most influential and well-respected intellectuals and deputies. The Dreyfusards, however, gave visual emphasis to the portrait of Picquart, the one army officer both believed an injustice had been committed and stood up for his convictions. Combined with the slogans "Vive l'Armée," and "À Bas les Traîtres," these portraits show that the Dreyfusards sought not to destroy the military but to strengthen it by introducing justice for the individual into its system.

The objective of Les Défenseurs de la Justice, a collection of more than 150 portrait photographs of leading Dreyfusards, published by P. V. Stock during the Dreyfus Affair, was to enlighten those people who had been misled by the anti-Dreyfusard press. The anonymous author assumed that the photographs and captions would convince the viewer that Dreyfusards were calm, reasonable people who were defending the highest moral virtues.
of justice and truth. Dreyfusards were not fanatics bent upon destroying the institutional foundations of the French state as their had critics claimed:

This album makes those people misled by the daily press reflect. Looking at the images causes great mental strain comparable to reading an article filled with logical and demonstrative arguments. Although they had no way to judge . . ., the readers of the popular press have fallen into the hands of dishonest speculators. In this volume they will see the portraits of a disparate group with diverse intellects and contradictory opinions . . . Perhaps then the viewer will come to know the true beauty and value of being a thinker. Is it possible, they will say, that these diverse men are not all bandits, fools, or fanatics. We have been misled. 57

If the book failed in its mission to convert anti-Dreyfusards, the author sarcastically saw it providing evidence for the police:

But beyond this objective, this album is also a token for the police of tomorrow. At the hour of triumphant fanaticism and reaction satiated with vengeance, this list will serve the police. They will find, among other useful information, the exact descriptions of French republicans, honest men who can be arrested and delivered to the executioner. When the reactionary Terror returns, Bertillon will not need to photograph the victims. . . . Here is the first cartload. 58

Among the numerous portraits were photographs of politicians, journalists, and intellectuals. The entire staff of the Dreyfusard newspapers, including the socialist La Petite République, were depicted. Well-known Dreyfusards received full-page portraits and brief captions. Plate CXXX is the portrait of Emile Zola taken by Nadar that also appears on the poster "Dreyfus Est Innocent." Zola's stern expression is matched by a brief quotation from Une Compagne, published in 1882, expressing his ardent conviction to speak out.

To feel the constant and irresistible necessity to cry out loudly what one thinks . . . this has been my passion; I
am still very bloody from it, but I love it and if I want anything, it is this alone.\textsuperscript{59}

Picquart's portrait (Plate CXXXI) is identical to the one on the "Dreyfus Est Innocent" poster. Accompanying his portrait is a brief quotation from the journalist S\text{\`e}verine, lauding his strength of character.

We wanted a hero \ldots yes this is a hero in every sense of the word, a man who honors humanity and who seems to come from the pages of Plutarch. But despite everything \ldots Picquart remains steadfast and impassive before the most unjust, violent, and cruel attacks.\textsuperscript{60}

While the portraits and captions of Zola and Picquart emphasize their personal strength of conviction, the portrait and caption of S\text{\`e}verine reflects the Dreyfusard quest for uplifting spiritual values. S\text{\`e}verine was a well-known journalist who advocated women's rights. To her opponents she was a wild-eyed radical who sought the destruction of French society. Plate CXXXII shows her in the forest reclining against a tree in a delicately flowered dress. Her expression is easy and calm as if she contemplates the beauties of nature and the spiritual certainties of the universe. The accompanying caption establishes the image of the dawn of a new day when idealism would reign:

Have you, in a forest filled with anxiety and gloom just before dawn \ldots seen the trembling day break, effaced and numb like a wet turtledove? Above the attentive silence it was nothing at first, only a paleness, a milky line, an alabaster reflection under a veil of shadows. \ldots But the glimmer does not remain, it grows, encompassing the sky. Things become more distinct, a whisper falls from the peaks revealing the earth. Delivered from its nocturnal bereavement, the land awakes fresh, childish, with the infancy of the day. Then suddenly the first arrow darts vibrantly from the golden arc. An immense hosanna resounds, translating the joy of feelings and the soul before the liberating light; the divine fights against doubt, treachery, and terror. \ldots Here is the day.\textsuperscript{61}

With this description S\text{\`e}verine's portrait transcends the image as
Plate CXXXI. *Les Défenseurs de la justice.* Leutnant-Colonel Picquet. 1899.
Plate CXXXII. *Les Defenseurs de la Justice.* Séverine. 1899.
a destroyer given to her by opponents. She becomes the symbol of spirituality, justice, truth, and light. Her beauty and innocence reflect the dawning of a new day, signifying the clarity that light sheds on the complexities of the Dreyfus Affair.

Not all Dreyfusard photographs were so uplifting. They also used pictures to ridicule opponents. In January, 1899 the Dreyfusard newspaper *Le Siècle* published an illustrated supplement that included eighteen photographs. These pictures were composite photographs that depicted anti-Dreyfusards in improbable scenes. The supplement, entitled "Les Mensonges de la photographie," was published in response to an anti-Dreyfusard newspaper's claim that it held an original photograph that proved Picquat's disloyalty. That newspaper, *Le Jour*, had maintained that it received the photograph taken by a secret army agent of the French General Staff. It supposedly revealed Picquat in Karlsruhe, Germany with the German agent, Colonel Schwarzkoppen. According to *Le Jour*, this photograph proved that Picquat's role in the Dreyfus case was only part of a German scheme to discredit and weaken the French military. *Le Jour* promised to publish the photograph, but it never appeared in print. Picquat later sued the newspaper, claiming the photograph was a forgery. Before the court, attorneys for *Le Jour* pleaded that the photograph was top secret and could not be exhibited. In its supplement *Le Siècle* insisted that the picture did not exist, and that the whole story was an underhanded attempt to discredit Picquat.

*Le Siècle* satirized the secrecy of the General Staff and its surreptitious attempts to compromise Picquat:

If the General Staff had diligent photographers attached to its office, so does the Syndicate, and it is their work that we present to the readers today. Because our photographers are royally paid (the checks are signed by Mr. Syndicate himself), they go to all lengths. They bribe porters in order to penetrate into intimate locations, they force doors in order to surprise famous men in their bedrooms...; they
break into armories for serious documentation. Good intentions excuse the crime. . . . Here is their work. Judge and compare. 63

Plate CXXXIII is the first page of this three-page supplement. The top row of photographs shows Yves Guyot and Jules Meline, juxtaposed despite their personal animosity toward each other. The center picture is a portrait of Major Esterhazy accompanied by a derogatory caption about his desire to return to Paris at the head of an army. The far right composite photograph combines the Jewish deputy Joseph Reinach with the notorious antisemite, Edouard Drumont. The bottom row shows a member of the General Staff, General Davoust, with his hand affectionately on the shoulder of Zola. The center photograph depicts Cavaignac and Major Henry, while the final photograph juxtaposes the two royalists, Duchess d'Uzès and Arthur Meyer. The final two pages provide twelve additional photographs depicting unusual combinations or satirical scenes.

Plate CXXXIV is a particularly malicious photograph representing Cavaignac as a barber about to shave Major Henry. Henry had cut his throat with a razor while awaiting trial for his forgery of documents against Dreyfus. In this photograph Cavaignac appears ready to cut Henry's throat. The photograph implies that an anti-Dreyfusard murdered Henry to prevent his trial and the ultimate revelation of how and why he forged the documents. Such a trial possibly would have revealed complicity by high officials in the Ministry of War or the General Staff.

Plate CXXXV represents Arthur Meyer standing behind the chair of Duchess d'Uzès. Meyer was the editor of the royalist daily newspaper, Le Gaulois. As a Jew he was attacked by antisemites but, nevertheless, he upheld the anti-Dreyfusard cause sanctioned by the Duc d'Orléans. During the affair he converted to Catholicism, rather than be associated with Jews. The duchess was an ardent royalist and anti-Dreyfusard who had contributed
Plate CXXXIII. Le Siècle. The Dreams of Photography. 1899.
Plate CXXXIV. Le Siècle. Lets Go There. 1899.

large sums of money to Boulanger's campaign. In the short caption under the portrait the duchess responds to Meyer,

Although it is a little too expensive for me, I still want to be part of the adventure, but find me someone who has the physique like the Other, the deceased, the suicide of Ixelles.

The caption implied a conspiracy among the royalists to overthrow the Republic. The duchess preferred a military man who was as handsome as the deceased Boulanger.

This composite portrait inspired an immediate lawsuit by the duchess against *Le Siècle*. She requested damages and a public retraction for defamation of her character and reputation. Attorneys for *Le Siècle* argued in court that the photographs in the supplement were intended to provide a lesson to the public. *Le Siècle* wanted to show how the public could interpret imaginary composite photographs as reality. The newspaper hoped that such revelations would prevent the publication of similar photographs in newspapers such as *Le Jour*. As proof of this intention, the attorneys pointed out that the original title of the supplement, "Les Mensonges de la photographie," clearly indicated to the public that these photographs were false. Since the readers knew the photographs were imaginary, the pictures could not be defamatory. 64

The Civil Tribunal of the Seine ruled against *Le Siècle* in August 1899. It found that the newspaper had received no prior authorization from the duchess to publish her portrait. The photograph, furthermore, was defamatory.

It suffices to simply cast your eyes on the publication [the court ruled] in order to recognize its injurious and defamatory character . . . the bringing together of strange people in a unique group and in familiar poses is alone offensive.

The short verse below the portrait aggravated the insult by implying a scandalous deal to support another Boulanger. Nor did
Le Siècle's intention to provide a public lesson on false, composite photographs give it the right to ridicule the duchess. Evidence existed, moreover, that the newspaper sought not a public lesson but increased newspaper sales and profits. According to the court, the newspaper made no attempt to withdraw the supplement from circulation but encouraged the sale in an effort to "excite public curiosity." The court ordered Le Siècle to pay 5,000 francs in damages to the duchess and to stop all sales of the supplement. Additionally, Le Siècle was to publish the court's decision in this case at its own expense in ten newspapers chosen by the duchess.

The publication of photographs in newspapers, magazines, and books opened new possibilities for political propagandists. Both Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards attempted to influence public opinion with these new techniques. In the past the government had confiscated individual political photographs that it judged politically dangerous. Photograph-illustrated newspapers and magazines, however, were legal. Illegal censorship or seizure of anti-Dreyfusard publication, moreover, threatened to generate additional political support for these groups. Jules Guérin clearly understood the political potential of these publications. He and his colleagues resisted so long at "Fort Chabrol" in part because they were receiving coverage by photographers and reporters from the press. The siege became a public expression of political resistance and entered rapidly into the political folklore of Paris. Not long after the siege ended, a journalist from the newspaper L'Éclair reported that photographs of the siege had been submitted to the Musée Carnavalet for its collection on the history of Paris.

Government regulation of press photography required a fresh approach. Controlling press access to the scene of a newsworthy
event at first proved successful. Photographers were effectively prohibited from attending the trials of Dreyfus, Déroulède, and Guérin. Public demonstrations, ceremonies, and marches, however, were impossible to close off from the press or the public. Access to the events on the Rue Chabrol could only be partially restricted, and photographers hungry for pictures often eluded police agents. A more successful technique was applied to the anti-Dreyfusards themselves. The Duchessé d'Uzès' suit against Le Siècle showed that defamatory photographs could be removed from circulation by the courts. It was difficult and time-consuming, however, to prove that portraits were slanderous. Potentially dangerous political photographs, moreover, did not necessarily contain libelous portraits of individuals. Photographs of mass demonstrations, protests, and marches were equally effective for conveying a political message to the viewer. Technical developments in photo-journalism expanded the appeal, audience, and potential influence of the press. To counter its political exploitation required methods that were not apparent nor easy to implement.
Notes


2. Ibid., pp. 62-64.


6. Ibid.


9. Archives nationales (hereafter cited as AN), F7 12463, Propagande antisémétique, November 8 through November 30, 1898.

10. AN, F7 12452, Ligue des Patriotes, February 23, 1899; F7 12870, Ligue des Patriotes, Rapports de Police, February 23, 1899.

11. Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris (hereafter cited as APP), BA/103a, Paul Déroulède, December 30, 1898.


13. Ibid., p. 269.

14. Ibid.


AN, F7 12464, Affaire Dreyfus, June 24, July 4, July 6, 1899.

AN, BB 2109, Correspondance de la division criminelles du Ministère de la Justice, December 27, 1899; APP, BA/1034, Paul Déroulède, October-December 1899.

AN, F7 12454, Propagande nationaliste, March 26, 1903.


Tbid., p. 34.


APP, BA/1108, Ligue antisémite, February 1899.

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APP, BA/1104, Ligue antisémite, May 6, 1899.

Tbid.; Sternhell, La Droite, pp. 226-27.
33. APP, BA/1105, Jules Guérin, April 23, 1898.


36. APP, BA/1105, Jules Guérin, October 13, 1899.

37. APP, BA/1104, Ligue antisémite, October 13, 1898.

38. Ibid., January 30, 1899.


45. APP, BA/1109, Affaire Fort Chabrol, August 29, 1899.


49. APP, BA/1108, Jules Guérin, October 11, 15, 28, 1899.

50. APP, BA/1034, Paul Déroulède, November 22, 1899.

51. APP, BA/1108, Jules Guérin, October 11, 1900; BA/1105, Jules Guérin, April 16, 1900.

Photographs of the Dreyfus trial appeared in several illustrated weekly journals during the summer and autumn of 1899, including *Le Monde illustré*, *La Vie illustrée*, *L'Illustration*, *L'Univers illustré*, and *L'Instantané*. Two books providing photographs of the trial are Louis Rogès, *Cinq semaines à Rennes. Deux cents photographies de Gerschel* (Paris: 1899); and Dreyfus. *Nearly 100 Photographs of Actors and Scenes in the Drama of Disgrace* (London: 1899).

AN, F 12464, Affaire Dreyfus, July 4, 1899; September 7, 1899.


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APP, BA/1108, Ligue antisémite, October 31, 1899.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Photographs had been used for political purposes before the early decades of the Third Republic, but in these decades politicians and political organizations turned more and more to photography as they sought effective means of reaching masses of voters. Improvements in technology made possible both mass production of individual photographs and the reproduction of photographs in newspapers. Costs dropped dramatically, bringing photographic propaganda within the means of all but the most impecunious political groups. The cost-cutting advances came soon after the adoption of universal manhood suffrage in 1870 had brought millions of semi-literate citizens into the electorate. Photography—cheap, simple, easily understood—soon became a principal instrument of political persuasion.

The photographs and captions discussed in this dissertation were to nineteenth-century French propagandists more than direct, objective representations of people, places, and events. They were images that suggested to the viewer abstract concepts supportive of various movements' political philosophies or damaging to opponents. Several common themes can be discerned in them. The most common theme was that of heroes or martyrs. Political leaders and aspirants were commonly portrayed in these roles. For example, in his "Lives of the Commune" Appert portrayed Generals Clement-Thomas and Lecomte, the Archbishop of Paris, and several other victims of the violence in an attempt to acclaim their sacrifices. Bonapartists circulated flattering portrait photographs of the Prince Imperial as the glorious heir to Napoleon I, and after his death while fighting for British
imperial interests in Africa, they presented him as a French national martyr. General Boulanger was presented as a strong, commanding, heroic figure, who could lead France back to international prominence. After his exile Boulangist photographs presented the general as a martyr emotionally distraught at the prospect of living outside his beloved country. The Comte de Paris and the Duc d'Orléans were also exiles, and their supporters distributed photographs and captions suggesting the princes' love for France and their determination to serve their country in exile. Déroulède's followers distributed photographs of their leader in jail, while Guérin's photographs presented him as a martyr for his cause against French Jews.

The depiction of conflict, struggle, and resistance was another popular theme. Portraits of barricade-defenders during the Paris Commune and the city's ruins were used to suggest a conflict between good and evil. During the 1870s conservatives interpreted these pictures as depictions of the evil destroyers of French civilization, while at the turn of the century these same photographs were used to represent the Communards as out-numbered resisters to the overpowering force of the vindictive Versailles government. Photographs of the "Fort Chabrol" Affair and of the barricades erected in 1905 by royalists and nationalists in Paris during the tension over the expulsion of unauthorized religious orders represented the struggles over nationalism, antisemitism, and local autonomy. Photographs of the peasant women in western France, who went to jail for resisting police efforts to close their local schools in 1903, encouraged the viewer to follow their example. These photographs simultaneously depicted heroes and martyrs, represented the struggle between antagonistic forces, and simplified complex and ambiguous political issues, providing easily comprehensible messages for the viewer.
Related to the photographs depicting conflict were photographs showing the appropriate rewards and punishments for the participants in these political conflicts. For example, Appert depicted the application of justice against the Communards. Nationalist opponents of the regime were ultimately unsuccessful in their struggle to overthrow the Republic, but they frequently rewarded themselves and won new adherents by using photographs that gave the impression that there was overwhelming popular support for their cause. The Ligue des Patriotes and the Ligue antisémite were the two political groups that most commonly used this technique.

The presentation of unique or surprising evidence against an opponent was a less common theme, but it was an effective way to attract the attention of the viewer. The two most prominent examples were the "revelation" of Clemenceau as the murderer of Baron Reinach in L'Antijuif and the purported portrait in Le Panache of young Émile Loubet attending his first communion. Both photographs suggested to the viewer that republicans were hypocrites, who thought only of their personal interests. The press law of 1881, which forbade defamation of character in the press, reduced the occurrence of false, slanderous, and grossly distorted photographs of political opponents. The Duchesse d'Uzès, for example, successfully sued Le Siècle for defamation of character, after it published a series of composite photographs entitled "The Dreams of Photography."

Determining the direct persuasive effect of these photographs on nineteenth-century French viewers' behavior is, at best, a difficult endeavor, and the results inspire little confidence. Reliable sources are limited. Few photographers' memoirs, letters, or written records exist in French libraries and archives. Written appraisals by leading members of the political groups of photography's political significance and impact are also rare.
Archival reports of government surveillance and censorship reveal that the republican officials recognized the importance of this propaganda medium on the public, but reports on the effects of these photographs are mixed. Police agents and prefects in some instances reported that the photographs actually created public disturbances, but they also frequently reported to the Ministry of the Interior that the photographs appeared to have no effect upon the viewers' behavior. Attribution of a change in someone's behavior to the viewing of a photograph cannot be made without direct evidence of a new behavior or explicit admission by the viewer of such an effect, and even that would not be conclusive.

Recent twentieth-century social and psychological research on the influence of mass media on individual behavior is inconclusive. Sociologists have long stressed the dominant influence of social and cultural norms on individual acts, but recent research on the impact of the visual media, especially television, has raised doubt and controversy. One school of thought is convinced that television provokes aggressive behavior, while another argues for television's cathartic effect on aggression.\(^1\) Jacques Ellul, an internationally respected expert on propaganda, argues that persuasive effects of media on behavior are often latent and occur over a long course of time. Short-term experiments that test for the persuasive effects of propaganda on a small group or on the individual, moreover, inevitably are unable to duplicate a real life situation, where the immediate social and psychological context gives importance and immediacy to propaganda.\(^2\)

The power of photographs in shaping viewers' values and attitudes over the long term can be more reasonably judged. The photographs distributed by various political groups in the Third Republic still exist today. The researcher can examine these
pictures and can define the political messages that the photographs presumably conveyed to the viewers. These political messages contributed to the nineteenth-century French viewers' political opinions by providing them with political information, which they could not experience first hand. The photograph played a role in the development of what the viewers knew about the world around them. From this information the viewers developed their political attitudes about political issues. The more photographs depicting the portraits of political leaders, the more salient these men and issues became in viewers' minds.\textsuperscript{3}

The art historian and critic, Susan Sontag, observed that in the nineteenth century a photograph of a subject conferred importance upon that subject beyond its normal, everyday value.\textsuperscript{4} The complex public appeal of photography, discussed in the introduction, provided even more prestige to the object of the image. A person who sat for a photograph obviously was aware of the impressive technological developments of the time and in step with the march of progress. Similarly, a photograph of an event made it more important to the public because the photograph gave the event enduring life. Although the event faded into history, its image remained to be viewed again and again. This kept the event more clearly in the memory of the public and reduced the likelihood that its significance would diminish with the passage of time.

The knowledge derived from a photograph, however, was limited. According to Sontag, photographs present a nominalist view of social reality, which consists of small infinite units.

Through photographs, the world becomes a series of unrelated, freestanding particles; and history, past and present, a set of anecdotes and faits divers. . . . It is a view of the world which denies interconnectedness, continuity, but which confers on each moment the character of a mystery.\textsuperscript{5}
Therefore, information provided by the photograph inevitably simplified complex people, events, and issues, which evolved and became comprehensible only over time. For a political propagandist, however, this was beneficial to his task. The propagandist wanted to avoid complex issues, which a semi-literate mass public could not understand. The photographic image provided a small amount of political information, which did not confuse the viewer with the extreme complexity of modern politics, economics, and society. Repetitious distribution of identical or similar photographs made these simple symbolic messages clear to the viewers and helped to shape their limited sense of what was important in their lives.

The introduction of political photography also affected the way politics in nineteenth-century France was conducted. Election campaigns became the occasion for the dissemination of massive quantities of photographs and other propaganda materials. During periods of economic or political crisis opponents of the regime increased the tension and dissatisfaction of the people through their use of photographs. Such activities were the beginnings of propaganda techniques, that were systematized and increased in the twentieth century. With the development of press photography political opponents created "media events," which exploited the press for political purposes. The press covered these incidents as newsworthy events and in so doing provided free publicity for the political ideas of many opponents of the Third Republic. Photography made possible the extension of political issues to a broader public, but it also encouraged and made possible new methods for manipulating political issues and public opinion.

This dissertation has focused on essentially right-wing political opponents to the Third Republic. These rightists used photography as an instrument of modern mass communications, and
it contributed to the development of mass politics in an era when the individual was experiencing the disruption and confusion associated with the disappearance of traditional ways of life and the onset of modernization. Examination of socialist, Communist, and anarchist photographic propaganda to see if these political groups used photography in the same manner as their adversaries on the right is a promising project for further research. In addition, while opponents of the regime were circulating their photographs, republican officials distributed photographs intended to nurture satisfaction with the status quo. A comparison of these photographs with rightists' and leftists' political photographs would provide a comprehensive view of the political function of photography in the late nineteenth century. It would contribute to our understanding of this crucial period of French history, and it would provide greater insight into a popular, non-print, visual medium that occupied the attention of modern society before the development of the cinema and the television.
Notes


3This "agenda-setting" function of mass media on the political cognitions of the public is an area of increasing research by mass communications specialists. See Lee B. Becker, Maxwell E. McCombs, and Jack M. McLeod, "The Development of Political Cognitions," in Political Communication Issues and Strategies for Research, ed. Steven H. Chaffee (Beverly Hills, CA: 1975), pp. 21-63.


5Ibid., pp. 22-23.

6My research revealed less use of photographic propaganda by leftists than by rightists during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Leftist opponents of the government were slow to recognize and exploit the medium until the first decades of the twentieth century, when, for example, the socialist newspapers L'Humanité and La Petite République regularly began to publish photographs depicting poverty, strikes, and party members. In contrast to their rightist adversaries, leftists only infrequently distributed portrait photographs representing their leaders. At this time I can only speculate about the explanation for this lack of interest in photography. Certainly the leftist political groups knew about photography and had enough money to produce the relatively inexpensive photographs. Perhaps the leftists found it difficult to represent their political principles, such as internationalism, humanity, and socialism, in photographs. Perhaps they shunned portraits of their leaders because they preferred not to emphasize the individual at the expense of the popular movement. Nevertheless, few photographs of leftist popular support, such as demonstrations, marches, or rallies, exist in comparison to their rightist opponents during the 1890s and the early 1900s. These issues and questions require further research and clarification.
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APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

September 4, 1870  French army surrenders to Prussians at Sedan
                  Napoleon III captured

March 18, 1871    Execution of General Lecomte and Clément-
                  Thomas
                  Paris Commune declared

March 19, 1871    Napoleon III leaves Wilhelmshoele for
                  England

May 16, 1871      Destruction of the Vendôme Column in Paris

May 22-29, 1871   Semaine sanglante in Paris

May 24, 1871      Execution of hostages, including the Arch-
                  bishop of Paris

May 26, 1871      Execution of hostages on the Rue Haxo, Paris

November 28, 1871 Executions of Ferré, Rossel, and Bourgeois

January 9, 1873   Death of Napoleon III. Prince Imperial be-
                  comes heir to the imperial throne

March 16, 1874    Prince Imperial celebrates eighteenth birth-
                  day

May, 1874         Bonapartist candidate wins election to the
                  Chamber from Department of the Nièvre, prompting
                  investigation into Bonapartist electoral activities
                  and nullification of the electoral victory

1875              Republican Constitution of 1875 passed in
                  the Chamber

May–June, 1877    Seize Mai crisis confirms the strength of
                  republican parliamentary institutions
June 1, 1879  
Death of the Prince Imperial in battle with natives in Africa. Prince Jerome Napoleon (cousin of Napoleon III) becomes heir to the imperial throne

1879-1886  
Implementation of Ferry Laws on education

May 18, 1882  
Paul Déroulède establishes the Ligue des Patriotes

August 24, 1883  
Death of the Comte de Chambord, last Bourbon heir to the royal throne. The Comte de Paris becomes the Orléanist pretender

1885  
Monarchist and Bonapartist electoral victories

January 7, 1886  
Boulanger becomes Minister of War

June 23, 1886  
Law of Exile banishes all members of the royal and imperial families from France

May 17, 1887  
Boulanger relieved as Minister of War

April 15, 1888  
Boulanger wins election in the Department of the Nord

January 27, 1889  
Boulanger wins election in Paris

March 16, 1889  
Ligue des Patriotes declared an illegal secret organization and dissolved by the government

April 1, 1889  
Boulanger flees to Brussels

March 17, 1891  
Death of Prince Jerome Napoleon. His son, Prince Victor, becomes heir to the imperial throne

September 30, 1891  
Boulanger commits suicide in Brussels

May, 1892  
Pope Leo XIII counsels French Catholics to accept the Third Republic. Period of ralliement of monarchists to the Republic ensues

September 8, 1894  
Death of the Comte de Paris. His son, the Duc d'Orléans, becomes the Orléanist pretender to the throne
October 15, 1894  Captain Alfred Dreyfus arrested for treason

December 22, 1894  Dreyfus found guilty by a military court and sentenced to Devil's Island for life

August, 1896  Lieutenant-Colonel Picquet discovers that Major Esterhazy, not Dreyfus, is the traitor, and he informs the General Staff

October 26, 1896  Picquet is ordered to duty in North Africa.

October-December, 1896  Major Henry falsifies documents to prove Dreyfus' guilt

January, 1897  Jules Guérin establishes the Ligue antisémite

July, 1897  Picquet turns his information over to Auguste Scheurer-Kestner, Vice President of the Senate. Scheurer-Kestner begins informal investigation

December 2, 1897  Esterhazy demands a court-martial trial in order to clear his name

January 11, 1898  Esterhazy is acquitted by military court

January 13, 1898  Zola writes "J'Accuse" in the newspaper L'Aurore

January-February, 1898  Antisemitic riots in France and Algeria

February 23, 1898  Zola sentenced to one year in prison

February 26, 1898  Picquet dismissed from the army

June 20, 1898  Henri Vaugeois establishes the Action française

July 19, 1898  Zola flees to London

August 13, 1898  Henry's forgeries are discovered

August 31, 1898  Henry commits suicide in prison while awaiting trial for his forgeries

September 1, 1898  Esterhazy flees France
September 21, 1898  Duc d'Orléans issues a proclamation supporting the Anti-Dreyfusard cause

December 29, 1898  Déroulède officially reestablishes the Ligue des Partiotes

February 16, 1899  Death of Félix Faure, President of the Republic

February 23, 1898  Déroulède's attempt to overthrow the Republic fails

May, 1899  Court of Cassation begins investigation of Dreyfus case

June 3, 1899  Court of Cassation sets aside the 1894 decision condemning Dreyfus

August-September, 1899  Dreyfus retried in Rennes by a military court. Police besiege "Fort Chabrol," headquarters of the Ligue antisémite

September 9, 1899  Dreyfus recondemned by the military court

September 19, 1899  Dreyfus is pardoned

January, 1900  Déroulède, Guérin, and Buffet found guilty of conspiracy to overthrow the Republic and exiled from France. Ligue des Patriotes, Ligue antisémite, and Jeunesse royaliste dissolved

1901  Law of Associations requires state authorization of religious organizations

October 20, 1902  First issue of Le Panache

1905  Action française openly advocates the restoration of the monarchy

December, 1905  Official separation of Church and state

July 12, 1906  By unanimous vote the Court of Cassation sets aside the Rennes court-martial judgment against Dreyfus and orders his rehabilitation into the army

1908  Formation of the Camelots du Roi
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June, 1908</td>
<td>Camelots du Roi protest the transfer of Zola's remains to the Pantheon</td>
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<td>December 6-9, 1909</td>
<td>Camelots du Roi protest the appointment of a Jew to a deanship at the University of Paris</td>
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<td>November, 1910</td>
<td>Lucien Lacour attacks Prime Minister Briand. The Duc d'Orléans objects to the violent tactics but continues to support the Action française</td>
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<td>June, 1911</td>
<td>Action française begins to moderate its criticism of the Republic as international crises with Germany increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>August, 1914</td>
<td>Action française supports the Union Sacrée</td>
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VITA

Donald E. English was born in Billings, Montana on September 16, 1949. He graduated from Fort Morgan, Colorado High School in 1967. He attended the University of California, Los Angeles, graduating Summa Cum Laude in 1971. He received his Masters Degree in History from the University of Vermont in 1973, and his Doctorate in European History from the University of Washington in 1981.