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History writing and late Muscovite court culture: A study of Andrei Lyzlov's "History of the Scythians"

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History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture:
A Study of Andrei Lyzlov's *History of the Scythians*

by

David H. Das

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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Abstract

History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture:
A Study of Andrei Lyzlov's History of the Scythians

by David H. Das

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This dissertation studies Andrei Lyzlov's History of the Scythians, a work composed in 1692 by a Muscovite nobleman that is part of the late seventeenth century polemical campaign urging war against the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire. The purpose of this dissertation is twofold: to study the impact of European, particularly Polish, models of history writing upon a Muscovite historian and to establish what the History of the Scythians reveals about the values of Lyzlov's audience, the Muscovite political elite. I conclude that Lyzlov imitated the external features of his European models in order to appeal to his audience which was increasingly conversant with products of Polish culture. Lyzlov, however, was not interested in historical method. Lyzlov's positing of fame (slava) as the reward for the participants in military campaigns against the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans reflects a new value among the Muscovite aristocracy. The dissertation concludes by suggesting a link between the rise to prominence of fame and the decline of the traditional system of mestnichestvo.
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INTRODUCTION

The cultural changes initiated by contact with Europe that took place in seventeenth century Muscovy have received little attention since the works of the major pre-revolutionary historians. At the turn of the century, V. O. Kliuchevskii, S. F. Platonov and P. N. Miliukov proposed basically similar views of the "Westernization" of late Muscovite culture which have remained authoritative down to the present.

The process of Westernization according to this model is as follows:¹ the catastrophic events of the Time of Troubles at the very beginning of the seventeenth century forced the Muscovites to seek new ideas from Europe. At first, innovation was limited to the technical and material spheres. This attempt by the guardians of traditional Muscovite cultural life to enjoy the advantages and comforts offered by European technology without accepting the basic principles and precepts of European culture was futile. Gradually the European ideas of rationalism, secularism, and individuality, which entered Muscovy for the most part via Poland and the Ukraine, exercised their powers of attraction. To be sure this deeper process of intellectual Westernization was unplanned and halting and it affected only a small elite who were among the leaders of Muscovite society. But within that group the consequences of Westernization were fateful for Muscovite culture: the beginnings of the emancipation of the individual from the constraints of Orthodoxy and the glimmerings of an independent secular culture. All three historians quite explicitly claim
the seventeenth century to be a transitional era, presaging the period of the Petrine reforms. The seeds of reform were sown in the seventeenth century but the full harvest had to await Peter.

Since the work of Kliuchevskii, Platonov, and Miliukov in establishing the basic features of the seventeenth century cultural change, little has been done either to question or to confirm their basic thesis, particularly with respect to the idea of a transitional period and to the actual impact of European ideas upon traditional Muscovite culture. There have been a few specific attempts to study the European impact upon the writing of poetry and upon portraiture, but these works do not address the larger question of cultural change in late Muscovy. Recent biographies of two of the most enthusiastic proponents of change, Aleksei Mikhailovich and Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn, fail to add anything of substance to the portraits of these figures sketched by Kliuchevskii a century ago.

Muscovite history writing has virtually been ignored as a suitable testing ground for a discussion of the European impact upon Muscovite culture. More than a decade ago Edward Keenan, in discussing the peculiarities of Muscovite historical culture, suggested that until the seventeenth century Muscovy offered the prospect of a "national Christian historiography" that had developed essentially in isolation from foreign influences and that did not possess a generalized conception of history. Muscovy was, in Keenan's view, a culture that "had never seen a history book." The seventeenth century, which witnessed an influx into Muscovy
of European "history books," would seem to offer fertile ground for the study of the European impact upon a relatively static and insular historiographical tradition.5

The History of the Scythians by Andrei Ivanovich Lyzlov might offer a provisional answer of what effect a "history book" -- new methods, models, and forms of history writing -- would have upon Muscovite historiography. Lyzlov made extensive use of European, almost exclusively Polish, histories in compiling the History of the Scythians which he completed in 1692.6 The History of the Scythians is one of the first thematically unified works of history produced in Muscovy. It presents an account of the origins and the history of the Mongols and of their successor states in Eastern Europe and of the origins and history of the Turks (whom Lyzlov considered equally to be successors to the Mongol inheritance) down to 1603.

The History of the Scythians is a part of a general interest in the "Turk" in late seventeenth century Muscovy. In the second half of the seventeenth century Muscovy was formulating an increasingly aggressive foreign policy towards the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Turks. Muscovite turcica took the form of works that provided information, either genuine or apocryphal, about the Turks, that were polemical calls-to-arms, or that were both polemical and informative. Lyzlov’s work fits into the last category: he provides an informative account of the history of the Tatars and the Turks and he is also a proponent of continued military campaigns against the Crimean Khanate and of the eventual
liberation of the Balkans and Constantinople from the Ottomans.

The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold: it will attempt to determine the impact of new models of history writing upon Lyzlov's conception of history and it will attempt to determine what the History of the Scythians reveals about the values of the Muscovite political elite of the final decades of the seventeenth century.

My conclusions with regard to the question of the impact of new historical models are as follows: acquaintance with new types of history writing did not lead Lyzlov to adopt a new historical method. Lyzlov does not appear to have been aware of, or interested in, issues of historical method or ways of historical knowing. However Lyzlov did appropriate both the structure and visible scholarly apparatus of these new models and their rhetorical claims about the task of the historian and the purpose of history. As a result the History of the Scythians appears to be a work quite different from examples of traditional Muscovite history writing.

Lyzlov's imitation of the form of his Western models leads into a discussion of the second theme of the dissertation: what does the History reveal about the values of the late Muscovite court? Lyzlov intended the History as a call-to-arms against the Crimean Tatars and the Turks; he wished to convince the court elite, those who determined the course of Muscovite foreign policy, of the necessity of continued military action on the Southern Frontier. Therefore he cast the History in a form that the elite, within which there was a lively interest in Polish culture, would
readily recognize as the most advanced type of history writing. Lyzlov hoped that the power and the prestige of the Polish models would play a significant role in convincing his audience of the justice of his cause. In addition the content of the History -- the descriptions of the Turks and the Tatars, the edifying exempla of good and bad rule, the account of the origins of Islam, the recounting of Muscovite military successes under Ivan IV -- would also have appealed to the elite and would have established the History as a "good read."

The History also helps illuminate the shift in noble ethos in late seventeenth century Muscovy from an identity based upon the maintenance of honor to one based upon the cultivation of fame. In 1682 after decades of decline the system of mestnichestvo, the system whereby noble rank was calculated according to honor, was abolished. Fame appears to have been considered the new measure of noble prestige and standing. In the History of the Scythians Lyzlov holds out fame as the tangible reward for military prowess and bravery and he hopes that the prospect of fame would encourage the policy makers at court to wage war against the Tatars and the Turks.

Before attempting to discuss these basic claims about Lyzlov and the History, it is necessary to place Lyzlov within the context of late Muscovite cultural life and to place the History within the tradition of Muscovite history writing.

At first glance it appears that little of substance can be gleaned from the laconic service registers of the Muscovite bureaucracy that are
almost the sole source of information about Lyzlov. The family does not appear to have been especially prominent either in court or bureaucratic circles. The Lyzlov family had houses in Moscow and in Putivl' and estates on the southwestern frontier. Lyzlov's father, Ivan Fedorovich, held a number of responsible positions: in 1645 he was in the suite of V. P. Sheremetev who escorted the Danish prince Woldemar from Moscow; during the Thirteen Year War with Poland, in 1658/9 and 1660-1664, he was sent on a number of occasions to Smolensk, Drogobuzh, Viazma, and Briansk to be in charge of raising supplies and building river boats. In 1662 he received the court rank of stripachii. In the early 1670s he was appointed a boiar in the Patriarch's Court and in July 1674 he was appointed head of the Patriarchal Chancellery of Appointments. In 1680 he is mentioned as a sud'ia (judge) in the chancelleries responsible for Kazan and for the regulation of pomest'e (service estates). His final entry in the service record is from 1683 with his appointment as a dumny dvorianin and his reappointment as a Patriarchal boiar.

Andrei Ivanovich Lyzlov appears to have had a less distinguished service career than his father. He first entered military service in 1670 at about the age of fifteen. In the mid-1670s he was appointed stripachii and in 1676 he attained the rank of stol'nik. In 1677-8 he served in V. V. Golitsyn's regiment during the Chyhyryn campaign against the Turks. In 1678-9 he and his father were voevodas of Upper and Lower Lomovye, in the Southeast near Voronezh.

At some point between 1676 and 1680 Lyzlov played an important
role in a curious episode in Muscovite history. The eighteenth century historian, V. N. Tatishchev, relates that Tsar Fedor was persuaded by Simeon Polotskii, the leading court intellectual, to approve a plan whereby the deposed Patriarch Nikon would become the Muscovite "Pope" and would have under his rule four "Patriarchs." The current Patriarch, Ioakhim, would have been demoted to the newly-created (according to the plan) "Patriarchate of Novgorod." Ioakhim consulted with his boyars who then ordered Andrei Lyzlov to write a critique of Semeon’s proposal. Semeon’s plan was never realized although it is not at all clear whether Lyzlov’s counter-proposal which has yet to be unearthed, played a role in its failure.¹⁰

In 1682/3 Lyzlov took part in the pilgrimage of Tsars Ivan and Peter to the Trinity Monastery to honor the memory of its founder Sergius of Radonezh. Lyzlov served in both of Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns (1687 and 1689) as a rotmistr which suggests that he was a competent military officer. In 1688 and 1689 he served both as emissary to the Hetman Mazepa and as Golitsyn’s personal messenger to I. V. Buturlin, the Muscovite voevoda in Kiev.¹¹

In 1695-6 Lyzlov, in the capacity of an officer of the Appointments Chancellery (Razriadny prikaz), was placed in charge of gathering grain from the southern border towns in preparation for Peter’s second campaign against Azov. The final references to Lyzlov in the service register are from 1697 when he reported that he had become seriously ill in the previous year and when he sold the family house in Moscow.¹².
With these entries he falls out of sight.

Lyzlov's historiographical activity was interspersed throughout his service career: in 1682 he completed a translation of sections of Maciej Stryjkowski's *Kronika*; in 1686 he completed a translation of Szymon Starowolski's *Dwor Cesarza Tureckiego*; in 1692 he completed the *History of the Scythians*.

The circumstances of Lyzlov's education are not at all clear. He clearly knew Polish and he may have had a rudimentary knowledge of Latin. However it is not possible to establish where or how he learned these languages. Several scholars have argued convincingly that the "bookish" nature of Lyzlov's Russian and his care in translating Polish verse passages are evidence of a formal education. As will be seen below the opportunity did exist from the mid-1660s for a small number of Muscovite bureaucrats to receive a formal education on the Ukrainian model. But Lyzlov, the relatively minor Muscovite noble who spent his entire career in military and administrative posts, is highly unusual in apparently having received such an education.

In Muscovy in the second half of the seventeenth century the two main sources of knowledge of Polish and Latin (and of European culture in general) were Ukrainian and West-Russian clerics and the Diplomatic Chancellery. The Ukrainian and West-Russian clerics had initially come to Moscow starting in the second quarter of the seventeenth century to take part in the movement of Church Reform. The Muscovite annexation of the Left-Bank Ukraine and military campaigns into Belorussia and
Lithuania brought a new influx of churchmen. These churchmen had been trained for the most part at Orthodox academies in the Ukraine and Belorussia that were modelled upon educational institutions established by the Jesuits in Poland and Lithuania. The Jesuits had founded these institutions as part of their counter-offensive against Protestantism in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; the Orthodox saw their schools as a defense against both Catholicism and Protestantism.

The most prominent of these Orthodox schools, and the training ground for most of the prominent Ukrainian and West-Russian clerics in Moscow, was the Kievan-Mohyla Collegium. Established in 1632, the Collegium was distinguished from the other Orthodox schools, where Greek and Church Slavonic were stressed, by its emphasis upon Latin and Polish. The curriculum started with the elementary study of Latin, Polish, Greek, and Church Slavonic, moved on to the study of Latin and Greek grammar and concluded with the study of poetics and rhetoric in Latin and Polish. Students mastered the rules of elegant composition and declamation in Latin and Polish and they studied secular and biblical history, mythology and geography not as discrete subjects in their own right but as fodder for their rhetorical compositions.

The most prominent of the Ukrainian-educated clerics to come to Moscow was Simeon Polotskii (1629-1680). Born in Polotsk, he studied at the Kievan-Mohyla Collegium from 1637-52. He then studied at the Jesuit Academy in Vilnius. He returned to Polotsk where he taught in the local Orthodox Brotherhood school and in 1656 he was ordained a
monk. He twice caught the attention of the Muscovite tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich: in 1656 he and his pupils declaimed panegyric verse in honor of Aleksei during a royal stop-over in Polotsk; in 1660 Simeon travelled to Moscow where once again in the royal presence he declaimed laudatory verse. In 1663 with the patronage of Paisios Ligarides, the Metropolitan of Gaza, Simeon emigrated to Moscow where he would spend the remainder of his life. He seems to have quickly established himself as the leading court intellectual. In 1665 he started to run an informal school to teach Latin to the clerks of the Privy Chancellery; in 1667 he was assigned as tutor to the heir apparent Aleksei Alekseevich and later became tutor to his siblings, Fedor and Sophia. Their curriculum included Latin, Polish, theology and poetics. Simeon’s literary output was prodigious: he wrote on religious subjects; he composed a verse "Encyclopedia of Knowledge"; he composed a large verse collection commemorating significant events in the life of the royal family; he composed drama and he was the chief preacher at court. His was the most extensive personal library in Moscow with books in Slavonic, Polish, Latin, Greek and other languages and in which theology, philosophy, history, and natural science were well represented.18

Simeon had two important Muscovite pupils: Sil’vester Medvedev19 and Karion Istomin20 who were both from the south Russian town of Kursk. Sil’vester was a bureaucratic clerk in Kursk and in 1665 he was assigned to the Privy Chancellery in Moscow. From there he was sent to Simeon’s school at the Zaikonospasskii Monastery. His program of study
was much broader than the basic instruction in Latin and reflected his teacher's education as he spent three years studying Latin, Polish, rhetoric, poetics, and theology. In the 1670s Silvester took monastic vows at the Molchinskii Monastery in Putivl' and in 1680, upon the death of Semeon, he assumed his role as court poet and as head of the Zaikonospasskii school. He wrote verse and panegyrics in the Polish style, a history of the civil strife of the early years of Sophia's reign, and a number of pamphlets on the theological disputes of the 1680s.

Karion Istomin also studied at the Zaikonospasskii school and took monastic vows. He worked at the Printing Office starting in 1672 and between 1698 and 1701 he was its director. He composed a great deal of verse on the Polish model, compiled primers, an encyclopedia and household manuals. So the Ukrainian churchmen and their formally educated Muscovite pupils were one conduit for the entry of Polish culture into Muscovy.

A second conduit was the practical activity of the Diplomatic Chancellery. The Diplomatic Chancellery was the center of Muscovite contact with Europe. It had a significant complement of translators most of whom were from the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Europe. Its interest in the translation of newsletters and political documents from Europe is well-documented as is its role in the translation of Polish poetry and belles-lettres. One of its chief tasks was to keep abreast of Polish internal affairs and to ferret out any published slights (usually Polish, occasionally Swedish) against the honor of Moscow and its tsars. The
library of the Diplomatic Chancellery had a wide variety of works from Europe encompassing current events, political poetry, military manuals, political tracts, geographies and cookbooks. It had a significant collection of European history books and the chancellery was the main center for the creation of the many translations of European histories that circulated in late seventeenth century Muscovy.\textsuperscript{21}

It is difficult to establish with certainty the cultural impact of the Diplomatic Chancellery. There is evidence that books were borrowed from its collection; the Chancellery staff was frequently ordered to prepare translations for use by the Tsar and his councillors. The extent to which the Diplomatic Chancellery served as an informal school where Muscovite noble servitors could learn a smattering of Polish and Latin and become acquainted with European culture must remain a matter for speculation however.

Certainly the two men who headed the Diplomatic Chancellery from 1671 to 1689 -- A. S. Matveev and V. V. Golitsyn\textsuperscript{22} -- were two of the chief proponents of Westernization in Muscovy. Matveev was married to the daughter of a Russified Scottish family and he was interested in Western music and theater. His library contained books in Polish and Latin, including a number of works of history, but there is no evidence that Matveev could read either Polish or Latin. Matveev did arrange that his son be taught some Latin and Greek by the Moldavian Nikolai Spafarii who was a prominent translator and bureaucrat in the Diplomatic Chancellery.\textsuperscript{23}
V. V. Golitsyn was a more active participant in the introduction of European culture into Muscovy. Golitsyn had a lively interest in European architecture and his stone mansion in Moscow was filled with European furnishings and secular portraits, including one of himself. He is said to have known Latin and perhaps some Greek, Polish and German. His rather substantial library contained a number of books in Polish and Latin, works by Ukrainian churchmen including works by Semeon Polotskii, and a number of history books. Golitsyn's history collection consisted of: an edition of the Sinopsis; a manuscript "History" in Polish; a manuscript Muscovite "Geneaology," a manuscript Muscovite chronicle; a Russian translation of Hiob Ludolf's Historia Aethiopica. A manuscript collection containing translated excerpts from Alessandro Guagnini's Kronika Sarmacyev Europskije (a work which Lyzlov uses to a great degree) was compiled in the Golitsyn household in 1677. A new version of this collection, now expanded to include a copy of Lyzlov's translation of parts of Stryjkowski's Kronika, belonged to F. I. Divov, the son of one of Golitsyn’s servitors.

Golitsyn and Matveev are hardly representative figures of the Muscovite nobility and it is difficult to establish with certainty the level of interest in Western culture among the rest of the political elite. Lazar Baranovych, the pro-Muscovite Arhbishop of Chernigov, wrote to Aleksei Mikhailovich:

I know that...Fedor [Aleksei’s son] reads books not only in our native tongue but also in Polish...I am aware that even your illustrious majesty’s council does not disdain this
language. They also read books of Polish history with enjoyment.\textsuperscript{26} It is open to question how much Baranovych's comment reflects reality and how much it reflects flattery.\textsuperscript{27} The example of Lyzlov, however, reveals that at least one member of the second-rank Muscovite nobility was exposed to and responded creatively to Polish culture.

Lyzlov appears to have had contact with both of these sources of Westernization, yet he does not fit easily into either group. Lyzlov had service and kin ties to V. V. Golitsyn and it is possible that the Polonized atmosphere of Golitsyn's household provided Lyzlov both the inspiration and sources with which he composed the \textit{History of the Scythians}.

It is not possible to link Lyzlov directly with the milieu of Ukrainian educated churchmen, but there is circumstantial evidence of such a connection, in particular his links with the town of Putivl' and with the Patriarchal Court. Paul of Aleppo, who accompanied the Patriarch of Antioch on his journey to Moscow in 1654-6, wrote that "the road to the Muscovite land from all our countries passes through this Putivl' and there is no other way."\textsuperscript{28} Putivl', on the Muscovite-Ukrainian border, was the main border crossing at which the Muscovite government regulated the passage of goods and persons from the Ukraine and points further south. Putivl' was the entry point for the flood of Orthodox, mainly Ukrainian, churchmen who entered Muscovy during the seventeenth century in search of a new home or simply new patrons.\textsuperscript{29} These clerics were often forced to take up temporary residence in Putivl'
while awaiting permission to continue on to Moscow. Many of the émigré clerics settled permanently in the region, and the Molchinskii monastery in Putivl' was a center of this community.\textsuperscript{30}

The Molchinskii monastery appears to have maintained close ties to cultural life in Moscow. A former abbot of the monastery, Sergei, was appointed in 1687 to be the head of the the Printing Court (\textit{Pechatnyi dvor}) -- the office responsible for the supervision of all printing activity.\textsuperscript{31} Both Pavel, Metropolitan of Sarsk, Kozel' and the Don, and Epifanii Slavinetskii, non-native participants in late seventeenth century cultural life, were associated with the monastery.\textsuperscript{32} Sil'vester Medvedev and Karion Istomin spent time at the monastery.\textsuperscript{33}

It would not be out of place to mention that V. V. Golitsyn was frequently in Putivl' on military service.\textsuperscript{34} On one of these occasions, the preparations for the Chyhyryn campaign, Lyzlov presumably would also have been in Putivl'. It is impossible to determine the nature of Lyzlov's connection with Putivl', especially since there is no evidence that Lyzlov ever stayed in the Putivl' family residence, but it is intriguing to speculate on the possibility of valuable cultural contacts.

Lyzlov's ties to the Patriarch's Court are easier to document from the service record. His father had been a Patriarchal boyar and as seen above Lyzlov himself was called upon to defend the Patriarch's interests.\textsuperscript{35} Very little work has been done on the Patriarch's establishment.\textsuperscript{36} However it is clear that many of the leading figures of Muscovite cultural life would have had contact with the Patriarch's Court. Simeon Polotskii,
Sil'vester Medvedev, and Karion Istomin all served in the "Printing Court" which was within the administrative purview of the Patriarch. Karion in particular was close to the last two Muscovite Patriarchs, Ioakhim and Adrian.\footnote{37}

The Patriarch's Court was populated in large part by the emigre clerics who had, presumably, passed through Putivl' on their way to Moscow. In particular the Court served as a clearinghouse for the Orthodox churchmen who left the Balkans in search of Muscovite financial support. Many of these clerics were the most vocal proponents of a Muscovite offensive against the Crimea and against the Turks. Did Lyzlov come into contact with these clerics? The Patriarch's Court was also the center for the composition of a new redaction of the Nikon Chronicle in the 1670s.\footnote{38} It is not clear whether Lyzlov was active in the cultural life of the Patriarchal Court, but once again it is intriguing to speculate on the possibility.

The \textit{History of the Scythians} is one of several Muscovite attempts in the second half of the seventeenth century to respond to the influx of Polish histories. Each of the three traditional genres of Muscovite history writing -- the chronicle, the \textit{Khrongraf}, and the \textit{Stepennaia kniga} (Book of Degrees) -- shows slight evidence of being influenced by Polish histories. The chronicle tradition\footnote{39} had deep roots in Muscovite culture and by the seventeenth century it encompassed a wide variety of forms and content ranging from the personal annalistic entries of a Muscovite bureaucrat to the institutional history of a monastery to the vast
compendium which celebrated Muscovy’s sixteenth century attainment of political and military supremacy in the Northeast. In the final decades of the seventeenth century there was a revival of the Novgorod chronicle tradition with the creation of four major compilations, each of which used material from Polish histories and showed modest signs of imitating the forms of these histories.40

The Khronograf had long been a part of of East Slavic culture in the form of translations of Byzantine world chronicles: compendia of historical information, starting from Creation, ordered roughly according to monarchies (with the focus on the Roman and Byzantine Empires) rather than according to a strictly chronological principle. The first Muscovite Khronograf dates from 1512. Closely based upon its Byzantine models, the 1512 Khronograf is distinguished from them by its inclusion of Rus’ and Muscovite history. The form, style, and method remained unchanged however. The Khronograf became the most popular form of history writing in Muscovy in the seventeenth century and maintained this popularity well into the eighteenth century. The two major redactions of the Khronograf from the second half of the seventeenth century show modest signs of a Polish impact upon form and content.42.

The Stepennaia kniga, which first appeared in the second half of the sixteenth century, was a collection of accounts of the reigns of the Rus’ and Muscovite Grand Princes. The form, the creation of a chain of lives of the Rurikid ruling house, was new. However the Stepennaia kniga did not reflect a new understanding of historical periodization or
method. The *Stepennaia kniga* was basically a collection of hagiographic accounts dedicated to proving the saintliness and the sanctity of the Grand Princes. Like the *Khronograf*, the *Stepennaia kniga* was a very popular form of history writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

A still-born attempt at a new official redaction of the *Stepennaia kniga* is evidence of a new interest in Polish histories. In 1657 Aleksei Mikhailovich created the Recording Chancellery (*Zapisnyi prikaz*) in order to continue the *Stepennaia kniga* into his own reign. The *d'jak* (secretary) in charge, Timofei Kudriavtsev, was given the power to request material from private persons, monasteries, and other chancelleries. The material that Kudriavtsev requested is remarkable for its traditional nature: *Khronografs*, chronicles, accounts of military campaigns, archival material containing the dates of the accession of Grand Princes and Patriarchs. In a report to Aleksei Mikhailovich, Kudriavtsev did express the intention to consult Maciej Stryjkowski's *Kronika* in order to get information on the origins of the Slavic and Rus' peoples. This was the first recorded example in Muscovy of the attempt to use European histories in the "researching" of a specific historical problem. Kudriavtsev's mission was ill-fated however and within two years the chancellery had been disbanded without one line having been written.

The *History of the Scythians* is the first full-fledged Muscovite response to Polish history writing. There are widely differing
interpretations of the place of Lyzlov in Muscovite historical culture. One American scholar has suggested that Lyzlov was little more than a "scissors and paste historian" who edited his Polish sources without adding anything of substance.\textsuperscript{46} The chief Soviet student of Lyzlov by contrast claims that Lyzlov's use of Polish histories shows that he was on the road from a "providentialist" view of history to a "rationalist" one. In her view Lyzlov was interested in "historical method", in creating a "scholarly" and a "secular" work of history.\textsuperscript{47}

My argument is that both of these views are flawed. Lyzlov was certainly much more than a skilled cutter and splicer. However concepts such as "rationalism," "secular," "historical method" and "scholarly history" have no place in the discussion of late Muscovite historical culture.\textsuperscript{48} Lyzlov composed the \textit{History of the Scythians} as a polemic advocating war against the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans. He imitated his Polish models in order to create as authoritative an account as possible so as to convince his audience, the Muscovite political elite. My conclusion is that the \textit{History of the Scythians} does reflect a Polish impact upon Muscovite culture but that this impact is registered not in the realm of historical scholarship but in the realm of the political elite's self-perception and self-definition. The elite found in Polish culture new sources of prestige as fame (\textit{slava}) began to contest family honor (\textit{chest'}) as the most valued commodity among the court elite.

Chapter One will discuss Lyzlov's sources; Chapter Two will look at Lyzlov's purpose; Chapter Three will discuss the structure and the method
of the *History*; Chapter Four will place the *History* within the context of cultural change in late seventeenth century Muscovy.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


2. The best examples are: A. M. Panchenko, Russkaia stikhotvornaia kul’tura XVII veka (Leningrad, 1973); E. S. Ovchinnikova, Portret v russkom iskusstve XVII veka; materialy i issledovaniia (Moscow, 1955).


5. The turbulent events of the Time of Troubles did not occasion a rethinking of the Muscovite past or present. The Time of Troubles gave rise to a number of short tales and accounts that attempted to explain this unprecedented period. Werner Contius has quite convincingly demonstrated that these attempts to describe the Time of Troubles remained within the traditional framework of divine causation and did not seek out new principles of historical explanation. (See: Werner Contius, "Profane Kausalitat oder gotliches Handeln in der Geschichte -- Zum Geschichtsbild in den erzählenden Quellen der Smuta," FzOG, 18[1973]: 169-186; Daniel Rowland, "The Problem of Advice in Muscovite Tales about the Time of Troubles," Russian History, 6[1979]: 259-283.) These tales were self-contained historical accounts and not the open-ended annalistc accounts that characterized so much of Muscovite history writing. Yet the organization of these tales -- the divinely ordered society, the shattering of that order due to human failing, the restoration through divine grace of the status quo ante Time of Troubles -- was an expression of the Muscovite desire to reconstruct completely the situation as it had been prior to the
Time of Troubles. This static view of history precluded any possibility of portraying post-Time of Troubles Muscovy as a changed society.

The tales gave a more detailed and thorough accounting of events than had been the practice in Muscovite history writing to this point. But this concern with detail was a means of highlighting the enormity of the Muscovites’ sins and the sense of the impending Last Judgement. Realistic observation was not a mark of nascent secularization but of the attempt to emphasize the participation of God in human affairs. This historiographical conservatism was to be a constant throughout the seventeenth century.

The Patriarchal Court, long a center of history writing, witnessed in the 1620’s the compilation of the Novyi Letopisets (New Chronicle), a justification of the Romanov accession to the throne in 1613 similar in form to the tales of the Time of Troubles. At mid-century in the Patriarchal Court the Novyi Letopisets was reworked to include new information and retitled, but no innovations were introduced. The continued viability of the Novyi Letopisets was demonstrated in 1686 with the creation of a new redaction in the Diplomatic Chancellery. See: L. V. Cherepnin, "Smota’ i istoriografia XVII veka," Istoriicheskie zapiski, 14(1945): 81-123.

6. I use as my basic text throughout the dissertation the manuscript copy in GIM, Sinodal’noe sobranie, #460 which is the earliest extant manuscript of the History dating from the 1690s. I also examined the following manuscripts: BAN 32.1.36, BAN 31.4.27, BAN Arkhangel’skoe sobranie #506, BAN 19.1.5; GPB Ermitazhnoe sobranie #485, GPB Ermitazhnoe sobranie #407; Wurtemberg Landsbibliothek, Stuttgart, Cod. hist. fol. 440. I also examined the incomplete printed edition (Moscow, 1776) and the complete printed edition (Moscow, 1787). There are no substantive differences between the versions. E. V. Chistiakova, who has examined thirty-two manuscript copies of the History, claims that the manuscript tradition does not reveal significant variant readings. See: E. V. Chistiakov, "Skifskaya istoria’ A. I. Lyzlova i voprosy sostokovedeniia," Ocherki po istorii russkogo sostokovedeniia (Moscow, 1963), sbornik 6, pp.9-11.

7. Striapchii -- one of the four non-boiar court ranks that carried with it ritual functions. The others were: spal’nik, stol’nik, zhilets. See: Robert O. Crummey, Aristocrats and Servitors (Princeton, 1983), pp. 21-2.

8. Dumnyi dvorianin -- the third of the four boiar ranks: boiar, okol’nichii, dumnyi d’iak. Crummey argues that in the second half of the seventeenth century the rank of dumnyi dvorianin became a "catch basin for courtiers and favorites of undistinguished social origin and no special training." Ibid., p.23. Lyzlov’s father would appear to be one of the late seventeenth century dumnyi dvorianin who received his rank the old fashioned way. For I. F. Lyzlov’s biography, see: Chistiakova, "Ob avtore...." and "K biografii...."

9. There is a petition from Lyzlov to Fedor Ivanovich, from no later than June 1677, asking that he be placed in Golitsyn’s regiment since many of
his kin were in that regiment. One can speculate that this suggests a link between Golitsyn and Lyzlov beyond the purely military. See: Chistiakova, "K biografii...." p.293.

10. V. N. Tatishchev, Istoriia Rossiiskia, chast' 1 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1962), p.381 (glava 47, #10). I have been unable to find any confirmation of this incident.


12. On the selling of the house, see: S. K. Bogoiavlenskii, Nauchnoe nasledie (Moscow, 1980), p.209. The rest of the information is from Chistiakova, "K biografii...."

13. His reading knowledge is clear of course from the fact that he used his Polish sources in Polish editions. His two Italian sources were used in Polish translation. See below Chapter One for more on Lyzlov's sources. Lyzlov's possible knowledge of Latin is revealed by his translation of a short Latin passage that appears in Guagnini: S.I., l.1v/Guagnini, p.581. Needless to say he may have consulted someone who knew Latin.


15. On the Kievian-Mohyla Collegium see the issue of Harvard Ukrainian Studies (viii, 1984) that commemorated the 350th anniversary of its founding.

16. The basic works studied for elementary Latin were Cicero and Ovid; with the study of Latin syntax these works were complemented by Catullus, Virgil, and Aesop. The poetics course read Caesar, Sallust, Livy, Curtius, Martial, Virgil and Horace and the Polish Renaissance and Baroque authors Kochanowski and Twardowski. The rhetoric course focused on Cicero and Aristotle's Poetics.


19. For a biography of Sil'vester, see: A. Prozorovskii, Sil'vester Medvedev (Moscow, 1896).
20. For Karion's biography, see: S. N. Brailovskii, "Odin iz pestrykh XVII stoletii," Zapiski imperatorskoj Akademii Nauk, VIII serii, T.5 (St. Petersburg, 1905).


24. Ludolf's work (Frankfurt, 1681) is an account of the history of Ethiopia from its origins into the seventeenth century and provides a description of Ethiopian customs, habits, system of government, and religion. Ludolf (1624-1704) wrote other works on Ethiopia including histories and grammars.

A description of Golitsyn's library is in: Rozysknoy dela o Fedore Shaklovitom i ego soobshchnikakh, T.4 (St. Petersburg, 1893), columns 9, 30-3, 55-8, 99, 160, 215. The presence of these books in Golitsyn's "library" is no indicator that he had read them.

25. TsNB KhGU #168 has an inscription linking a copy of this manuscript to Golitsyn's household in 1677. See: Perepiska Ivana Groznogo s Andreem Kurbiskim (Leningrad, 1979), pp.278-9. TsGADA F.181 #60/82 belonged to Divov. Ibid., p.284.

27. The following chapter will attempt to show that the political elite would have had the opportunity to become acquainted with Polish history writing, in the original and in translation. Chapter Four will discuss how this elite reacted to Polish cultural influences.

28. Путешествие Антиохийского Патриарха Макария в России в половине XVII века, vyp. 2 (Moscow, 1897), p.102. (Book V, Chapter 5)

29. See: K. V. Kharlampovich, Малороссисское влияние на великорусское церковное бытие, T.1 (Kazan, 1914); L. R. Lewitter, "Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia in the Seventeenth Century," SEER, 68(1948) and 69(1949).


32. After their deaths both Pavel and Epifanii were written into the sinodik of the monastery. Both remembered the monastery in their wills. See: V. M. Undol'skii, "Biblioteka Pavla, mitropolita Sarskogo i Podonskogo, i knigi i imushchestva Epifanii Slavinskogo," VMOIDR, 1850, kniga 5, otdel' 3, Smes', pp.73-8.

33. Brailovskii, op.cit., pp.10-11. Sil'vestr and Karion were brothers-in-law. Prozrovskii mentions that a certain "Ivan Fedorovich" was a courier between Medvedev in Putivl' and Moscow in May 1672 (op. cit., p.108). Could this refer to Lyzov's father?

34. Lindsey Hughes, op.cit., pp.10-14.

35. Even if Tatishchev's account is more fantasy than fact, it is revealing that Tatishchev chose Lyzov to be a central figure in his story. It would suggest that Lyzov was a natural figure to put into the role of defender of the Patriarch's interests. A more tenuous link connecting Lyzov with the Patriarch's Court is revealed in the manuscript history of the History of the Scythians. The oldest surviving manuscript is from GIM, Sinodal'noe sobranie (#460, dating from the 1690s), a collection that includes those manuscripts formerly in the Patriarchal collection. Furthermore Novikov, in publishing the first edition of the History of the Scythians in 1776, claims that he used a manuscript from the Patriarchal collection.

36. There does not seem to be any link between the holdings of the Patriarchal library and Lyzov's interests. The library contained the following history books: editions of Zonaras and Cantecuzenos; a Life of Alexander; a Byzantine chronicle down to the reign of Manuel Comnenos; a Greek Khronograf; a book on "Roman and Greek rulers;" editions of Thucydides and Herodotus; a Stepennaja kniga; a Muscovite Khronograf and two Muscovite chronicles. See: VMOIDR, (1853) kniga 15, otdel' 2, Materialy, pp.1-136. Ioakim's library held only one work of history, a
manuscript "Muscovite History." See: "Opisanie patriarshiei biblioteki 1718
goda," Russkii arkhiv (1864), columns 43-6.

37. Brailovskii, op.cit., p.94. Karion also appears to have been acquainted
with V. V. Golitsyn (p.77) and he was the tutor to the ill-fated tsarevich
Aleksei Petrovich (p.75). Ioakhim (Patriarch 1673-1690) had been
Archbishop of Novgorod and Archimandrite of the Chudov monastery, a
center of neo-Byzantine influence in late seventeenth century Muscovy.
Ioakhim is usually placed among the anti-Latinizer, Grecophile party.
However his ties to Karion and the presence of a great number of
"Westernizers" in the Patriarchal establishment suggest that the division of
late Muscovite cultural life into Grecophile and Latinizer stands in need of
revision.

38. B. M. Kloss, Nikonovskii svod i russkie letopisi XVI-XVII vekov

39. For a basic introduction to Russian chronicle writing, see: D. S.
Likhachev, Russkie letopisi i ikh kul'turno-istoricheskoe znachenie (Moscow,
1947).

40. S. N. Azbelev, Novgorodskie letopisi XVII veka, (Novgorod, 1960)
especially pp.88-133.

41. On the Khronograf, see: A. A. Popov, Obzor khronografov russkoi
redaktssii (Moscow, 1869); O. V. Tvorogov, Drevnerusskie khronografi
(Leningrad, 1975).

42. Popov, op.cit.; O. V. Tvorogov, "K istorii zhanra Khronografa," TODRL,
27(1972): 203-226. The 1617 Khronograf redaction borrows some information
from Marcin Bileski's Kronika swiata.

43. On the Steppennaia kniga, see: P. G. Vasenko, Kniga stepennaia
tsarskogo rodoslovia i eia znachenie v drevnorusskoi pis'mennosti (St.
Petersburg, 1904).

44. S. A. Belokurov, "O Zapisnom prikaze," in his Iz dukhovnoi zhizni
moskovskago obshchestva XVII veka, (Moscow, 1902), p.72.

45. For the sorry history of the Zapisnyi prikaz, see: Ibid.

46. Waugh, op. cit., p.211.

47. See Chistiakova's articles: "Ob avtore 'Skifskoi istorii' A. I. Lyzlove,"
Voprosy sotsial'nogo-ekonomicheskoi istorii i istochnikovedeniiia perioda
feodalizma v Rossii (Moscow, 1961): 284-289; "Russkii istorik A. I. Lyzlov
i ego kniga 'Skifskaja istorija'," Vestnik istorii mirovoi kul'tury, 1(1961): 117-
127; "Skifskaja istorii' A. I. Lyzlova i voprosy vostokovedeniiia," Ocherki po

48. The discussion of Muscovite history writing, apart from the stimulating articles of Edward Keenan, has been remarkable for its lack of imagination. S. M. Solov'ev ("Pisateli russkoi istorii XVIII v.," Sobranie sochinenii, [St. Petersburg, ND]) and V. O. Kliuchevskii ("Lektsii po russkoi istoriografii," Sochineniia, T.8, [Moscow, 1955]) commence their studies of Russian historiography in the eighteenth century. Seemingly Kliuchevskii, the great advocate of pre-Petrine Westernization, felt that history writing seriously lagged behind other aspects of culture. K. N. Bestuzhev-Riumin (Russkaiia istoriia, T.1, [St. Petersburg, 1872], pp. 208-246) does discuss the traditional genres of Muscovite history writing but only to show how far they were from "scholarly history." In his view "scholarly history" appeared only after the death of Peter. P. N. Miliukov (Glavnyia techeniia russkoi istoricheskoi mysli, [Moscow, 1898]) sees the full emergence of "scholarly history" only in the first half of the nineteenth century with its roots going back to the Petrine cultural revolution. For Miliukov, pre-Petrine history writing was remarkable for its complete lack of a critical attitude towards sources -- the entire endeavour was "very sad."

A. S. Lappo-Danilevskii ("Ocherk razvitiiia russkoi istoriografii," Istoriicheskii zhurnal, [1920], #6) is the one exception to the pre-revolutionary dismissal of the possibility of significant change in seventeenth century history writing. He argues that the seventeenth century was indeed a time of change in history writing. Up until the seventeenth century history writing, characterized by chronicles, the Khronograf, and the Steppennaia kniga, was constrained by the religious demands of Orthodoxy. The seventeenth century saw a shift in history writing away from providentialism to a more rationalist presentation of causation. However, Lappo-Danilevskii cites as evidence for this falling away of the religious tyranny over Muscovite history writing a work which was written in the Ukraine (the Sinopsis of Innokentii Gizel', published in Kiev, 1674) but which did enjoy a certain popularity in late seventeenth century Muscovy. Lappo-Danilevskii, although unable to cite any Muscovite examples of this shift from providentialism to rationalism, clearly sees this shift as a necessary precondition of the appearance during the Petrine period of a scholarly approach to the past.

Lappo-Danilevskii's adumbration of the seventeenth century as a transitional period in Muscovite history writing was developed more fully in Soviet historiography. N. L. Rubinshtein (Russkaia istoriografiiia, [Moscow, 1941], esp. pp.30-48) argues that the political and socio-economic development of Muscovy in the seventeenth century placed new demands
upon history writing that the traditional genres were incapable of meeting. This was to become the constant refrain of Soviet studies on the topic. The tales of the Time of Troubles were the first sign of this need for new genres: these tales were memoir-like reflections on social and political struggle which were outside the traditional genres. Like Lappo-Danilevskii, Rubinshtein considers the Ukraine as the source of new ideas about history writing. The major works of late seventeenth century history writing (Rubinshtein cites the Sinopsis and Feodosii Sofonovych's Kroinika) show the glimmerings of a scholarly approach to history through the use of margin notes and the citation of conflicting accounts of the same events. Rubinshtein is unable to point to any Muscovite examples of these innovations. His notion of the Ukrainian influence upon Muscovite history writing appears to be limited to a general sense of the growing cultural contact between Kiev and Moscow in the seventeenth century. By the end of the century, in his view, the ground had been prepared for the historiographical innovations under Peter.

M. N. Tikhomirov (Ocherki istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR, T.1, [Moscow, 1955], pp.48-106) was the first to attempt an extensive accounting of the seventeenth century changes in historiography. Apart from the broad categories of socio-economic and political development, Tikhomirov does not attempt to provide any reasons for these changes. Historiographical innovation was apparent from the beginning of the century. The tales of the Time of Troubles were remarkable for their thematic unity, their monograph-like nature, and their attempt to uncover the "reasons" behind events. The 1617 Khronograf represented an advance in that it included information drawn from a Polish history (Marcin Bielski's Kronika swiata) and presented a "sophisticated" portrait of Ivan IV's personality. The second half of the century was characterized by the creation of works whose form was traditional but whose contents were new. Tikhomirov lists a number of these innovative features that he found in the new redactions of the Khronograf and the Stepennaia kniga: the interest in national origins and in linking Muscovite history with the history of other peoples; the widening of historical interests with the use of European histories and geographies; the replacement of the annalistic style of narration by one characterized by thematic unity; the growth of a critical attitude towards sources as evidenced by the use of margin notes; the increasing frequency of authorial intervention and explanation in the narrative; the introduction of primitive linguistic analysis. Tikhomirov admits that the level of history writing was still far from the European standard, but his central theme is that the stage had been set for the Petrine innovation which brought Muscovite history writing into the modern world.

L. V. Cherepnin (Russkaia istoriografiia do XIX veka, [Moscow, 1957], pp.110-137) presents the seventeenth century as an era of transition and bases his argument primarily upon the questions of content and patronage rather than upon questions of form and methodology. Cherepnin focuses mainly upon the tales from the Time of Troubles which, in his view, are innovative due to their concern with the "general questions" of social conflict, peasant war, and foreign intervention; with the development of the idea of
the "unitary Russian land;" and with their interest in the figure of the tsar'.
The seventeenth century was remarkable for the centralization of
historiographical enterprise (the Recording Chancellery) -- an enterprise
organized by the autocracy in order to meet its historiographical needs.
Cherepnin does note some methodological innovation: the concern with
thematic unity; the use of archival material and of eyewitness accounts; the
interest in the role of the individual in history.

D. S. Likhachev ("O letopisnom periode russkoi istoriografii," Voprosy
istorii, 9, [1948], pp.21-40) repeats this theme of the importance of the
institutional foundation of seventeenth century history writing. Likhachev
argues that the traditional forms of history writing were no longer able to
satisfy the "new demands of historical thought" -- that is, the autocracy's
need for a tradition that would affirm and further its position. Likhachev
does not cite new forms or methods of history writing, rather he claims that
the official creation of the Recording Chancellery in and of itself meant a
new stage in the development of Muscovite historical consciousness.

Two more recent Soviet works emphasize the increasing
"secularization" of culture as the chief characteristic of the seventeenth
century's transitional nature. M. A. Alpatov (Russkaia istoricheskaia mysl'
i Zapadnaia Evropa, [Moscow, 1973], pp.382-5) claims that in the
seventeenth century history writing escaped from its "monastic
imprisonment" as it increasingly became the preserve of secular figures. In
Alpatov's view, a series of innovations ensued: providentialism gave way to
rationalism; a sense of historical causation developed; there was a greater
concern with realistic description; European and classical historians were
used; margin notes became common as did primitive linguistic and
palaeographic analysis. The appearance of programmatic statements
regarding the worth of history and the rules of its composition testify to the
historian's increased awareness of the purpose and meaning of his
endeavour.

S. L. Pushkarev (Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia mysl' Rossii. Vtoraja
polovina XVII veka, [Moscow, 1982], pp.218-237) argues from these
programmatic statements about history that the seventeenth century saw
the birth of a desire to understand the historical process and of a theoretical
interest in history. This view of history as the subject of scholarly inquiry,
in Pushkarev's analysis, anticipates the historiographical concerns of the
Petrine period.

The two most fruitful Soviet expressions of the notion of the
transitional period are those of A. N. Robinson and S. L. Peshtich. Robinson
(Istoriografiia slavianskogo Vozrozhdeniia i Paisii Khilendarskii, [Moscow,
1963]) considers Russian history writing within the general context of the
"Slavic Renaissance" which stretched from the sixteenth to the eighteenth
centuries and which extended from Dalmatia to Moscow. Russia participated
in this "Renaissance" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rather
than looking at actual works of history, Robinson focuses on prefaces to
historical works and on programmatic statements about history in order to
determine what the "Slavic Renaissance" meant for Russian historical culture
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Robinson compiles a list of the new historiographical concerns: an awareness of the didactic function of history; the need for history to satisfy the demands of patriotism; the necessity of the historian to curb his passions; the need for a clear and concise account and for thematic unity; the historian's duty to compare sources, to determine the authenticity of sources, and to use non-native sources; the historian must present both civil and ecclesiastical history and account for the origins of rulers and peoples; the deeds and the actions of the ruler must be the focal point of the account. Robinson concludes that the changes in seventeenth century history writing "contained within themselves elements of Humanist influences and the glimmerings of a genuine Renaissance." In the eighteenth century these features were to become markedly stronger and were to form part of a "Russian Renaissance."

In contrast to Robinson's exclusive focus on programmatic statements, S. L. Peshtich (Russkaia istoriografiia XVIII veka, T.1, [Leningrad, 1961]) pays closer attention to the actual practice of history in the seventeenth century. One of Peshtich's major concerns is to counter what he considers to be the overly optimistic accounts of seventeenth century change. Thus he asserts that seventeenth century history writing was characterized by the lack of a systematic criticism of sources and the lack of a "philosophical" understanding of history. Peshtich argues that the chronicle form survived well into the eighteenth century and that some of the features characteristic of the "new history writing" are also to be found in chronicle writing: the widening of the source base to include archival and non-Muscovite material; the attention to chronological and topographical details; the use of margin notes; the rudimentary criticism of sources. Peshtich claims that the new interest in "scholarship" coexisted with the traditional providential view of history. Peshtich adduces this coexistence as evidence for the transitional nature of seventeenth century history writing, as evidence that history writing had taken a step forward. The shift from chronicle to history might be more halting than the others suggested, but the shift did occur. To buttress his argument Peshtich cites the by now familiar litany: the programmatic statements where Peshtich sees significance in the presentation of a "method for historians"; the creation of the Recording Chancellery; the growth in the number of secular writers and in the interest in secular themes.
CHAPTER ONE: LYZLOV'S SOURCES

This chapter will consider the Muscovite and the non-Muscovite sources that Lyzlov used in the composition of the History of the Scythians. Not only will the works and the authors (where possible) be identified, but there will also be an attempt to determine the extent of the dissemination of these works within Muscovite society. Lyzlov's use of margin notes facilitates the identification of his sources and in some instances, moreover, when his margin notes specify chapter and page, it is possible to identify precisely the printed edition of his non-Muscovite sources. Such a precise identification of Lyzlov's Muscovite sources is not possible since they were all in manuscript form, but the basic texts can be established. In order to appreciate Lyzlov's use of these sources, a brief characterization of each is in order.

Lyzlov's main non-Muscovite sources are the four prominent sixteenth century Polish historians Marcin Bielski, Marcin Kromer, Maciej Stryjkowski and Alessandro Guagnini and two sixteenth century Italian historians Cesar Baronio and Giovanni Botero.

Marcin Bielski (1495-1575) did not receive a formal education, but was informally educated at the court of Petr Kmita, the starostwo of Przemysl where a "Renaissance... atmosphere" reigned.1 For much of his early life Bielski was an active soldier participating in campaigns against Wallachia and the Crimean khanate. In the late 1530's-early 1540's
Bielski returned to his native village where he lived out the balance of his life as a country gentleman. It is not clear whether Bielski actually converted to Protestantism, but his writings are characterized by an anti-Catholic sentiment.

His first major work was the *Zywoty filozofow* (1535) which was a translation of a Czech translation of the *Vitae philosophorum et poetorum* of the Augustinian friar Walter Burleigh (1275-1337). The *Vitae* enjoyed great popularity in late medieval Europe and by the sixteenth century it had been published in a number of vernacular editions. The basic theme of the *Vitae* was the moral worth and power of knowledge. This didactic intent is also evident in Bielski’s next work, the *Sprawa rycerska* (1569), that was a history of warfare from antiquity to the contemporary world and was a compilation from classical and medieval sources. The *Sprawa* was not intended to be a practical manual or a history, but rather aimed at instilling within the reader a martial spirit to be directed against the Turks.

This compellatory and didactic intent is also evident in Bielski’s major work, the *Kronika swiata* (*Chronicle of the World*), which Lyzlov used in its third and most complete edition of 1564. Bielski’s chief source was the sixteenth century Protestant universal history of Johannes Naucler; he also consulted the universal histories of Johannes Carion, Hartmann Schedel, and Sabellicus and the *Four Monarchies* of Johannes Sleidanus.

Bielski’s work is ordered according to the scheme of the *Four Monarchies*, Six Ages and Ten Books. Book I, encompassing 5 Ages and
3 Monarchies, extends from Creation to the birth of Christ; Book II covers the period from Christ to 1544; Book III is a translation of Johannes Sleidanus’s account of the reign of Charles V; Book IV treats the history of the Turks and of the Balkan military hero Iskander Bey; Book V is a Cosmography describing Europe, Africa and Asia; Book VI is a history of Hungary from its origins into the sixteenth century; Book VII is a similar history of the Czech kingdom and Book VIII likewise of Poland; Book IX is an account of contemporary Muscovy based largely upon the description of Sigismund Herberstein; Book X is mostly an account of the voyages of discovery to the New World. The Kronika concludes with a description of Paradise, Hell, Lucifer, the Anti-Christ, and Judgement Day.

No Polish editions of the Kronika swiata appear in any sixteenth or seventeenth century Muscovite book collections and the first Russian translation appears in the seventeenth century. It was also used in unattributed fashion by the compiler of the 1617 Khronograf. The information taken from Bielski consisted of information about world geography and events in the classical world. A redaction of the Nikon Chronicle compiled at the Patriarch’s Court in the 1670’s has a margin reference to the published edition of the Kronika swiata.

Bielski’s son Joachim published under his father’s name in 1597 his own composition, the Kronika Polska. The Kronika is a history of Poland from its origins to the death of Stefan Bathory. The Kronika does not appear in Muscovy either in the original or in complete translation.
However a translation of those sections of the Kronika describing the origins of the Slavs and the Rus' was done in late seventeenth century Muscovy.

In contrast to Bielski, Marcin Kromer (1512-1589) received a Humanist education at Krakow, Bologna, and Padua. Kromer was an active polemicist against Protestantism, enjoyed close ties with the Jesuits and, at the end of his life, was Bishop of Warmia. His ecclesiastical career was intertwined with affairs of state as he was a Polish representative at the Habsburg Court (1558-64) and worked in the royal archives. Kromer's oeuvre stretched from elegant translations into Latin of Chrysostom to Counter Reformation polemical literature in Polish to a geographical description of Poland in Latin. Kromer composed one work of history: the De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum libri XXX.

The De origine was published in Basle in 1555; it underwent four more Latin editions in the sixteenth century, one German edition (1562), and one Polish edition (1611). Divided into thirty books and organized for the most part, although not exclusively, by reign, the De origine treats the history of Poland from its origins to the death of King Alexander in 1506. For the narrative up to 1480 Kromer depended primarily upon Jan Dlugosz's Annales Poloniae and Bernard Wapowski's Kronika was the chief source for the post-1480 period. Kromer's purpose in composing the De origine was to provide Poland with a national history of the same calibre as the national histories with which he had become acquainted during his studies in Italy.
Lyzlov most probably used the 1611 Polish edition of Kromer. In the inventories of seventeenth century Muscovite book collections the Polish edition of Kromer is encountered twice -- once in the library of the Diplomatic Chancellery and once in the library of the Verkhniaia tipografia -- and a Latin edition is found in the library of Simeon Polotskii. As far as can be determined, there were no Russian translations of Kromer in the seventeenth century.

Maciej Stryjkowski (1547-ca.1593), like Marcin Bielski, received his education informally at the court of a magnate. Stryjkowski spent much of his early adulthood in military service in Lithuania along the border contested with Muscovy. Military service enabled Stryjkowski to travel extensively throughout Lithuania, Prussia, and Ruthenia. In 1574-5 he was a member of Andrzej Tarnowski's mission to Constantinople. Upon his return he spent the remainder of his life in Lithuania, primarily in the highly cultivated atmosphere of the court of the Lithuanian magnate Jerzy Olelkowicz. Stryjkowski composed a number of panegyrics, political polemics and geographical works, but his most significant composition was the Kronika polska published in 1582 in Konigsberg.

The Kronika is divided into 25 books: Book I treats history from Creation to the post-Babel division of humanity; Books II-IV discuss the origins and early history of the Lithuanians and Slavs; the balance of the Kronika traces the history of Lithuania-Rus' down to 1581. In its focus on Lithuanian history and its glorification of Lithuanian rulers, the Kronika is considered an early expression of Lithuanian patriotism.
Stryjkowski had a traditional view of the purpose of history as "the most refined treasury of human life." For Stryjkowski, the Lithuanian patriot, history preserved the glorious deeds of the past from oblivion.

Stryjkowski's modern biographer has a very optimistic view of the breadth of Stryjkowski's source base, claiming that Stryjkowski was familiar with a wide range of antique, medieval, and early modern histories. Only careful text study can establish the true nature of Stryjkowski's source use, but it does seem indisputable that his main sources are Kromer, Wapowski and Miechowski. Stryjkowski was undoubtedly familiar with some contemporary universal histories. Stryjkowski does interpolate on a number of occasions personal eyewitness descriptions gleaned from his travels throughout Eastern Europe and to Constantinople. Stryjkowski's Kronika struck a resonant chord in late seventeenth century Muscovy. There are only two copies in the inventories of seventeenth century book collections: a copy of the 1582 edition in the library of Semeon Polotskii and a Russian translation in the library of Fedor Alekseevich. However Stryjkowski's impact is evident in the fact that the Kronika underwent two complete translations (1673-9;1688) and two partial translations (1668-70;1682). Moreover, the complete translations survive in a large number of MSS. dating to the seventeenth century. I. I. Golitsyn helped Jacob Sparwenfeld the Swedish ambassador to Moscow obtain a copy of a Russian translation of Stryjkowski. Lyzlov used the 1582 edition of Stryjkowski.

In 1657 Aleksei Mikhailovich ordered the establishment of the
Recording Chancellery (Zapisnyi prikaz) which was to compose a continuation of the Stepennaja kniga from the reign of Fedor Ivanovich down to Aleksei's reign. The diak in charge of the Chancellery, Timofei Kudriavtsev, wrote to Aleksei of his intention to use Stryjkowski's Kronika as a source for the early history of the Slavs. Stryjkowski was already regarded at mid-century by the cultural elite as an authoritative work.

Alessandro Guagnini (1534-1614), a native of Verona, was a military adventurer who sought his fortune in the Polish service. In the late 1550's he entered Polish service as an expert in fortifications and from 1563-81 he commanded the garrison at Vitebsk on the disputed Lithuanian-Muscovite border. In 1581 he went to Sweden where he falls out of history.

Guagnini's only work, the Sarmatiae Europae Descriptio, was first published in Krakow in 1578; the second Latin edition with some additional material was published in Speyer in 1581. In 1611 a Polish edition (Kronika Sarmacyev Europskiyev) was published in Krakow with extensive reworkings and additions. There has been very little work done on Guagnini and as a result many questions about him as a historian remain. Chief among these is the claim that both the Sarmatiae Europae Descriptio and the Kronika Sarmacyev Europskiyev were not his own work but were stolen by Guagnini from Maciej Stryjkowski who served under Guagnini at Vitebsk.

The 1611 edition, which is probably the edition that Lyzlov used, is
divided into ten books. Book I includes an account of the origins of the Sarmatians (the legendary forefathers of the Poles), a history of Poland to 1587 organized by reign, and an administrative-geographical description of Poland; Book II has a similar history and administrative-geographic description of Lithuania; Book III offers a short history of some of the major families of Ruthenia, an administrative-geographical description of Ruthenia, and a description of the non-Ruthenian inhabitants of the territory; Book IV is devoted to an account of the origins of Prussia and its division into twelve princedoms and to an account of the struggle between the Teutonic Knights and the Poles. Book V gives a geographic-administrative description of Livonia, an account of internal strife within the Teutonic Order, and an account of the customs and mores of the inhabitants of Samogitia. Book VI contains a geographic and cultural description of a number of regions ranging from Sweden to Alsace. Book VII deals with Muscovy: a description of geography, customs and religious practices and an extended essay on the rule of Ivan IV. Book VIII is devoted to the various Tatar Khanates with specific reference to their customs and history. Book IX has short geographical and historical accounts of the areas of Southeastern Europe under Turkish rule. Book X has sections on the origins and history of Hungary and the reign of the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf, a geographic and customary description of various Near Eastern regions, and a description of the Ottoman Empire and its conquests. The Kronika ends with a prophecy predicting the defeat of the Turks and a call to Christians to take up arms against the
The issue of Guagnini’s sources has also not been studied at all. Even if one does not accept Radziszewska’s claims regarding Strykowski as the real author, her textual comparisons between Strykowski’s Kronika polska, some of his unpublished manuscripts, and the Kronika Sarmacyev Europskiey suggest that they both used the same sources.¹⁹

The only edition of Guagnini to appear in seventeenth century Muscovite book collections is a copy of the 1611 Polish edition which is found in the library of the Diplomatic Chancellery. Two incomplete translations into Russian of the 1611 edition date from the seventeenth century while there is one complete seventeenth century translation of the 1581 Latin edition.²⁰ Guagnini’s Kronika was one of eight books that a 1653 Muscovite mission to Poland was charged with obtaining. It was described as a "Polish Khronograf which describes Polish and Russian antiquity."²¹ This mission was one in a number of attempts by the Muscovites to discover works containing affronts to the tsars’ honor. Guagnini’s inclusion in this list is testimony to his "name-recognition" in mid-century Muscovy.

Lyzlov’s two other major non-Muscovite sources are products of Counter-Reformation Italy: the Relationi universali of Giovanni Botero and the Annales ecclesiastici of Cesar Baronio. Giovanni Botero (1540-1617) is best known for his work Ragion di Stati (Rome, 1589) which does not appear to have been known in seventeenth century Muscovy. The Relationi universali was first published from 1591-1596. Botero, like
many Counter-Reformation thinkers, does not fit neatly into a single category. He was keenly aware of contemporary political thought and adopted many of these "Renaissance" ideas in the Ragion di Stati. William Bouwsma characterizes the Ragion di Stati as the adaptation of "the political realism of the Renaissance to the ideals and needs of the Catholic Reformation."\textsuperscript{22}

Strictly speaking the Relationi universali is not a historical work but an encyclopedia of the contemporary sixteenth century world with frequent references to historical examples.\textsuperscript{23} The Relationi universali was known in Muscovy through its Polish translation: the Relativ powszechnych which had three seventeenth century editions (1609, 1613, and 1659). The Relativ powszechnych is divided into four parts. Part I gives a historical, customary, and geographical account of the peoples and states of Europe, Asia and Africa. Part II is more of a purely geographical description of various bodies of water and the islands; Part III, essentially a condensed version of the Ragion di Stati, is an analysis of the bases of power and wealth of the major states; Part IV is a description of the major religions of the world from a Counter-Reformation perspective with particular animus directed against Protestantism and Orthodoxy.

Single copies of the 1609 Polish edition are found in the library of the Diplomatic Chancellery and in the library of the Verkhniaia tipografia. Patriarch Adrian (1690-1700) had a Russian translation from 1681 of the 1659 edition as did the library of A. Ia. Dashkov. Sobolevskii
has identified another copy of the 1681 translation dating from the seventeenth century. In 1691 a translation from the 1613 edition of the section dealing with Luther and Calvin was completed by the enigmatic Prince Kropotkin.24 Most probably Lyzlov used the 1609 edition.25

Cesar Baronio (1538-1607) whose career included being Superior of the Oratory, the confessor to Clement VIII, and a Cardinal, was at the heart of the Counter-Reformation Church.26 He was entrusted with the composition of the Annales ecclesiastici (1588-1607) which was intended as the official Catholic response to Matthias Flacius Illyricus's Magdeburg Centuries. The Annales is divided into twelve volumes each containing the history of a century, the Annales extended from the birth of Christ to 1198. Baronio was a relatively sophisticated historian. He conciously used Eusebius as a model; he realized the importance of documentary research, of accurate chronology, and of the use of accounts contemporary to the events described; he made use of archaeological and numismatic sources. Baronio's written source base is much broader than that of any of the historians considered above. He used a broad range of antique, medieval, and early modern histories.27 However Baronio had no interest in philology or textual criticism. The purpose of the Annales was to show the continuous, unbroken link between the Church founded by Christ and the Catholic Church of the sixteenth century. As one scholar has noted: "The Annales ecclesiastici was intended to reveal not so much the history of the Church as, by historical evidence, its constant superiority to history."28
Lyzlov did not use the Latin edition of the Annales, but instead he used a one volume abridged Polish edition published in 1607 -- the Rocznedzieie koscielne od narodzenia pana y boga naszego Jesusa Christusa (Cracow, 1607). The Annales had attained a significant resonance in Counter-Reformation Poland but it suffered two major drawbacks: its size and its Latin. Piotr Skarga, the rector of the Jesuit College at Vilnius and a leader of the Polish Counter-Reformation, created an epitome of the Annales. In 1603 an epitome of the first ten volumes was published; in 1607 an epitome of the entire twelve volumes was published.

The nature of Skarga's abridgement remains to be studied. It is possible however to determine certain additions that Skarga made: at the end of each "century" Skarga provides a table listing the popes, the major teachings and heresies, the Councils, and the major figures of the Church from that particular century. Skarga also provided his own introduction in which he expounded the by now familiar cliches regarding the worth of history writing: to inspire man to do good and to avoid evil.29

The Latin edition of the Annales is listed twice in the library of the Diplomatic Chancellery; it is listed five times in the library of Simeon Polotskii at least one of which is the full Latin edition. A copy of one of the Polish editions is found in the library of Pavel, Metropolitan of Sarsk, Kozelsk and the Don. Afanasii, Archbishop of Khol'mogory, had a manuscript Russian translation (it is not clear of which edition). Sobolevskii lists four manuscripts of complete Russian translations of the
1607 Polish edition and one manuscript of an incomplete translation of that edition; he also lists three manuscripts of partial translations from the Latin edition.\textsuperscript{30}

There are two other non-Muscovite works that Lyzlov uses in a very limited manner. Piotr Skarga is associated with another of Lyzlov's sources as the compiler of the 

\textit{Zywoty swietych}.\textsuperscript{31} This was a compilation created from other collections of saints' lives and Skarga envisioned the 

\textit{Zywoty swietych} as a textbook for use in Jesuit colleges and parish schools. The first edition dates from 1579 and by the mid-seventeenth century it had gone through twelve editions. The \textit{Zywoty swietych} was very much a part of the Counter-Reformation polemical tradition and in it Skarga attempted to demonstrate, by means of the example of Catholic saints, the stability and the tradition of the Church. It has been suggested by Janusz Tazbir that the \textit{Zywoty swietych} contains the seeds of historical criticism in its use of official documentation to attempt to authenticate martyrdoms.\textsuperscript{32} All in all the \textit{Zywoty swietych}, with its broad geographic sweep and didactic character, is not unlike Bielski's \textit{Kronika swiata}.

There is no sure attestation of a copy of the \textit{Zywoty swietych} in seventeenth century Muscovite book collections nor is there any surviving evidence of a translation. It is impossible to determine the exact edition that Lyzlov used.\textsuperscript{33}

The final non-Muscovite work to be considered is the \textit{Kievan Sinopsis} of 1680/81. The \textit{Sinopsis} has been the subject of much debate with
regard to its authorship and purpose, but the most convincing argument to date is that the author was Innokentii Gizel', the archimandrite of the Kiev Caves monastery, and that it was a part of a campaign by the monastery to preserve its autonomy vis a vis the Kiev Metropolitan and the Muscovite Patriarch.\textsuperscript{34} The \textit{Sinopsis} is a history of Kiev and its surrounding area from its origins down to 1677: it puts the founding of Kiev within the context of the origins of the Slavs, has an extensive discussion of the Christianization under Volodymyr and of the struggle between Dmitrii Donskoi and Mamai; the account then returns to the immediate post-Baty period with an account of Kiev's capture by the Lithuanians and its eventual transformation into a Polish \textit{wojewodztwo}. The \textit{Sinopsis} concludes with an account of Kiev's "return" to Tsarist rule and with a description of the Turkish defeat at Chyhyryn in 1677.

The \textit{Sinopsis} was presented by Gizel' to Fedor Alekseevich in 1681 and Gizel's version of early Slavic history would have found a receptive audience at the Muscovite court. Gizel' claimed that the Muscovites were the "Ur-Slavic" people and that the Muscovite Tsars were the natural leaders of the Slavic world.\textsuperscript{35}

The \textit{Sinopsis} was compiled from a number of sources: Stryjkowski's \textit{Kronika} is clearly the main source; Guagnini is used less frequently; Bielski and Krometer are cited indirectly via Stryjkowski. Baronio is cited through the mediation of Zakharii Kopystens'kyi's \textit{Palinodiia}, a Ukrainian anti-Uniate polemical work from the first half of the seventeenth century. The \textit{Sinopsis} also used a number of unidentified Ruthenian and Muscovite
sources.

The 1680/1 edition of the *Sinopsis*, which Lyzlov used, appears in the libraries of Pavel, Metropolitan of Sarsk and the Don, V. V. Golitsyn, and Fedor Alekseevich. Excerpts from the *Sinopsis*, Kromer and Bielski appear in a Muscovite sbornik compiled in the reign of Fedor Alekseevich. The compiler put the excerpts together in order to create a history of the origins of the Muscovites and the Russians. This compilation seems to have been intended for use as a "history book" in Fedor Alekseevich's household.

The study of Lyzlov's Muscovite sources is complicated by the fact that he used manuscript versions of the works. There are no printed editions of Muscovite historical works from the seventeenth century. Lyzlov used a redaction of the *Khronograf* close to that of the 1617 *Khronograf*. Lyzlov used a version of the Stepennaiia kniga that is very similar to the published version in the PSRL but which had been updated through the reign of Fedor Ivanovich.

Lyzlov's account of Ivan IV's conquest of Kazan appears to be based on sources that are very similar to the *History of Kazan* and to the *History of the Grand Prince of Moscow*. Lyzlov's margin notes refer to a "Letopisets Zasekina" for much of his account of the conquest of Kazan. This source has not been discovered, but the information ostensibly taken from this source is very similar to that contained in the *History of Kazan*. The *History of Kazan* is commonly believed to have been composed in the mid-1560s, in Moscow, by a Muscovite who had been
held captive in Kazan from 1531-1551. The work is divided into chapters and recounts the history of Kazan from its founding to its capture by Ivan IV in 1552. The History of Kazan focuses on Kazani-Muscovite military and political relations. The account however is not one of the battle between the good Muscovites and the evil Kazanis, but is one in which both Kazani and Muscovite are capable of bravery and cowardice, generosity and treachery. The earliest copies of the History date from the late sixteenth century and the majority of the copies are from the seventeenth century.41

The History of the Grand Prince of Moscow is commonly attributed to Prince A. M. Kurbskii who, having lost Ivan IV's favor, fled Muscovy for Lithuania in 1564 and engaged in an angry exchange of public letters with Ivan. In 1573 Kurbskii wrote a history of Ivan's reign in which he asks the question: how does a good ruler become a bad ruler? Kurbskii's answer is that Ivan refused to heed the counsel of his good advisors and he depended upon the advice of evil flatterers. For the most part Kurbskii’s account, in which he himself plays a significant role, recounts the Muscovite military campaigns against Kazan, the Crimea, Astrakhan, and Livonia. The History concludes with a listing of the nobles executed by Ivan. The earliest extant copies of Kurbskii's History date from the last third of the seventeenth century and a copy appears to be connected with the household of V. V. Golitsyn.42

The number of original editions and the number of Russian translations of Lyzlov's non-Muscovite sources, the various attempts both
actual and projected at incorporating information from these sources into an original historical account, and the presence of some of the non-Muscovite and Muscovite sources in the libraries of members of the political elite\textsuperscript{43} testify to the fact that these works were not only known but were considered to be authoritative by that elite. To have his sources accepted as authoritative by the Muscovite political elite was of importance to Lyzlov for, as the following chapter will argue, the *History of the Scythians* was a polemic directed at that elite.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


2. The first edition dates from 1551 and the second from 1554.

3. There were three full Russian translations in the seventeenth century. For a discussion of the MSS., see: A. I. Sobolevskii, Perevodnaia literatura Moskovskoi Rusi XIV-XVII vekov, (Saint Petersburg, 1903), pp. 53-6. Sobolevskii and, later, N. A. Kazakova argue for the existence of a late sixteenth century Russian translation of the Kronika świata. Even if such a translation did exist, Bielski’s Kronika did not have any resonance in Muscovy until the second half of the seventeenth century. (Apart from its limited influence on the 1617 Khronograf) See: N. A. Kazakova, Zapadnaia evropa v russkoi pis’mennosti XV-XVII vekov (Leningrad, 1980).


8. Wapowski's Kronika covers Polish history from the pre-Christian era down to 1535. The section of the Kronika which treats the period down to 1380 has not survived. Finkel, op. cit., pp.360ff.

9. Kromer wrote the De origine at the instigation of the Polish king, Sigismund Augustus. See: Henryk Barycz, "Dwie syntezy dziedzow narodowych przed sedem potomnost. Losy 'Historii' Jan Długosza i Marcin


11. My information on Stryjkowski is taken from J. Radziszewska, Maciej Stryjkowski, historyk-poeta z epoki Odrodzenia (Katowice, 1978).


15. S. A. Belokurov, "O Zapisnom prikaze," in Iz dukhovnoi zhizni moskovskago obshchestva XVII v., (Moscow, 1902) p.72.

16. My information on Guagnini is from the Polske biograficzne słownik (Warsaw, ND).

17. See: J. Radziszewska, Maciej Stryjkowski, historyk-poeta z epoki Odrodzenia, (Katowice, 1978), pp.71ff. Radziszewska's claim, buttressed by a short textual comparison, is fairly convincing but further work is necessary.

18. I have not seen the 1611 edition of Guagnini and have used in its place the reprint of this edition (Zbior dziewipisow polskich, vol. ??, Warsaw, 1768). Lyslov's notes refer to a pagination different from that of the reprinted edition.

19. Ibid., pp. 76-8.
20. On the library of the Diplomatic Chancellery, see: Belokurov, op. cit., pp. 38-46. In 1553 a Muscovite embassy to Poland was charged with obtaining five works among which was Guagnini's Kronika. See: ibid., pp. 31-2. On the Guagnini translations, see: Sobolevskii, op. cit., pp. 76-8. It remains to be ascertained how many of the anonymous short pieces that are found in late seventeenth century Muscovite manuscript collections are, in fact, translations of sections of Guagnini. See: Daniel C. Waugh's "Appendix" to E. L. Keenan, The Kurbskii-Groznyi Apocrypha (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 149-51.

21. The other requested works were: Sigismund Herberstein's "Kronograf", in Latin, "in which is described the entire Muscovite state;" the "Orbus Polonus...which contains the entire antiquity of the Russian and Polish princely clans and noble houses;" a Latin edition of Pawel Piasecki's "Kronika...in which is recounted all the years to Wladyslaw IV;" and one of two Polish chronicles -- either the Annales Poloniae of Jan Dlugosz or the Kronika polska of Maciej z Miechowita (whichever was in Polish translation). See: S. A. Belokurov, O bibliotekе..., pp.33-4.

The reference to Herberstein's "Kronograf" was to the Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii of Sigismund Herberstein who travelled to Moscow as the Imperial ambassador in 1517 and 1526. The first edition of the work: Vienna, 1549. It was translated into Italian and German in the sixteenth century and was required reading for subsequent European travellers to Moscow. There is no attested edition of Herberstein in sixteenth and seventeenth century Muscovy. The first Russian translation is in a manuscript from 1748, see: Sigismund Gerbershtein, Zapiski o Moskovie (Moscow, 1888), pp. 377-8.

Pawel Piasecki (1579-1649) was the author of the Chronica gestorum in Europa (Cracow, 1648). He was a bishop and the author of theological works.

Jan Dlugosz (1415-1480), Chancellor to Zbigniew Olesnicki who was Bishop of Cracow and a leading Polish humanist. The Annales Poloniae (a history of Poland from its origins to 1406) was first published in an incomplete edition in 1615; the first complete edition is from 1711. The first Polish translation was not until the nineteenth century.

Maciej z Miechowita (1456-1523) was a member of the Cracow University medical faculty. The reference is probably to his Chronica Polonorum (Cracow, 1519). The first Polish translation dates from the nineteenth century. There is the possibility that the reference is to the Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis (Cracow, 1517), a Polish translation of which dates from 1535.

It is not clear to what work the "Orbus Polonus" refers. Of these five works, the embassy obtained only two: Guagnini and "a description of Poland." (Belokhurov, op. cit., p.34).

On the Muscovite concern with excising offenses to the Tsar's honor from Polish works, see: L. Kubala, "Poselstwo Puszkina w roku 1650" in his Szkice historyczne, Ser. I-II (Warsaw, 1923): 123-152.

23. I have been unable to discover any information on the sources that Botero used in composing the Relazioni universalii.

24. See: Belokurov, op. cit., pp. 38-46, 75-9. On Patriarch Adrian and Dashkov see: O. A. Belobrova, "K istorii patriarkha Adriana," TODRL, 33(1979), pp. 406-414. A. Ia. Dashkov was voevoda and sud'ia in Chernihiv, Vladimir and Astrakhan; from 1683 he was a dumnyi dvorianin and from 1684-86 he was head of the Sysknyi prikaz. He was close to the Likhachevs and the Iazykovs. Belobrova suggests an acquainanceship between Adrian and Dashkov's family. On Prince Kropotkin, see: Pokrovskii, "Bor'ba s protestantskimi ideiami v Petrovskoe vremia i kniaz' Mikhail Kropotkin," Russkii vestnik, CLI(I have not read this article).

25. Lyzlov's margin notes correspond to the 1609 edition. He might have used the 1659 edition (which I have not consulted) if the pagination of the two editions are the same.


27. Ibid., pp. 159-60.


Baronio also had an appeal within the Raskol'. Peshtich claims that the wide circulation of the Annales in manuscript form among the Old Believers led the Petrine government to publish an "official" edition in 1719. There are two instances from the late seventeenth century where Old Believers cite Baronio in their defense. 1) During the interrogation of the pod'iachii Savva Semenov in 1664 the authorities confiscated from him a sbornik of excerpts from the Bible, the Church Fathers, and from Baronio [one excerpt]. The excerpt has the reference "Baronio in the year 369" and then relates Baronio's story from this year of how Gregory of Nanzianus reproached his brother for preferring "learning" over "faith." 2) In the monk Avramii's historical justification of using two fingers, he cites Baronio
for support: "And it is written more widely about this in Baronio, under the year of Our Lord 897." Materialy dlja istorii raskola (Moscow, 1875), I, p.487; VII. p.305.


32. Ibid., p.104.

33. I have used the basic text as it appears in Zywoty swietych Starego i Nowego Zakonu (Krakow, 1933-6). In the library of Evfimii Chudovskii a Polish edition of a "Lives of the Saints" is noted. See: A. E. Viktorov, "Opis' biblioteki literatury ieromonakha Evfimiia," Letopistsy russkoi literatury i drevnosti izdavaemye Nikolaem Tikhonrovym (Moscow, 1863).


35. Ibid., pp.113ff. The 1680/1 edition differed from the two previous editions (1674, 1678) in its additional information and graphic material designed to appeal to Fedor Alekseevich.

36. See: VMOIDR, 1850, pp. 73-8; Zabelin, op. cit., pp. 126-33; Rozvysknye dela o Fedore Shaklovitom i ego soobshchnikakh, (St. Petersburg, 1893), T.4, cols. 9, 30-3, 55-8, 99, 160, 215. The Sinopsis went through two editions in Peter's reign; see: Peshtich, op. cit., p. 69.

37. This is the same sbornik that contains the so-called "Historical Instruction" (Istoricheskoe Uchenie). See below, Chapter Four.

38. Most of Lyzlov's information from the Khronograf is similar to that contained in the 1512 redaction published in the PSRL, T. XXII (St. Petersburg, 1911). However Lyzlov, in his discussion of Islam, has two pieces of information that are not found in the published version but that do appear in the 1617 redaction. See below Chapter Two.

39. The PSRL version ends before the end of Ivan IV's reign. Lyzlov has unattributed information on Muscovite-Crimean relations down through the year 1593 (II.158v-168r). The nature and style of this information are similar to that of the information actually drawn from the Stepennaia kniga. Karamzin claims that Lyzlov used as his source for the 1580 campaign of Devlet Giray against Muscovy (an account for which Lyzlov does not identify the source but which follows excerpts that are identifiable from the Stepennaia kniga) a certain Povest' o boju Voevod Moskovskikh s nevernym Khanom. This account is similar to Lyzlov's account of the campaign, but it is impossible to make a firm statement without a close textual comparison based on an examination of the actual manuscript of the Povest'. See: Istoriaia gosudarstva rossiiskago, T. IX (St. Petersburg, 1892), pp. 77-9, note #391.
40. An Ivan Nikitich Zasekin was an associate of V. V. Golitsyn. See: Solov'ev, op. cit., p.461.

41. The basic study of the Kazanskaia istoria is that by K. G. Kuntsevich, Istoriia o Kazanskom tsarstve ili Kazanskii letopisets. Opyt istoriko-literaturnago issledovaniia (St. Petersburg, 1905). There is also the more recent but flawed work by G. N. Moiseeva, Kazanskaia istoria (Moscow, 1965). Kuntsevich established two basic versions of the History: a version that is a tightly constructed narrative of 100 chapters and a version that in its early sections is similar to the first version but that diverges significantly in later accounts where the narrative is looser and the storyline is not as clear. Kuntsevich (and most later scholars) considered the version with the coherent narrative to be the original account and the more fragmentary narrative to be a later reworking. Edward Keenan ("Coming to Grips With the Kazanskaya istoria," Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, xi[1964-68]: 143-183. has questioned this traditional view and argues that the coherent narrative is in fact a later reworking of the fragmentary account. I will touch upon these issues in greater depth in the Appendices.

Works entitled History of Kazan appear in various book collections in the seventeenth century. Among the most notable is that of Tsar Fedor. (See: Zabelin, op. cit., p.131) It is not clear that these works were in fact similar to the one Lyzlov used or to those reflected in the PSRL edition.

42. A version of the Kurbskii History is found in a manuscript collection compiled in Golitsyn's household in 1677. Other works in this collection include two extracts from Guagnini's Kronika. See: Edward Keenan "Putting Kurbskii in His Place," FzOG, 24(1978): 131-161. Keenan suggests that Kurbskii's History is a late seventeenth century forgery. The relationship between the Kurbskii History and the History of the Scythians will be the subject of one of the Appendices and this relationship suggests that Keenan's heretical views are on the mark.

43. Needless to say the presence of a book in a library does not mean that the owner had read that book or was necessarily even aware of its existence.
CHAPTER TWO: LYZLOV'S PURPOSE

Lyzlov composed the History of the Scythians in response to specific foreign policy considerations of the late 1680s and the early 1690s. The History of the Scythians was a call-to-arms against the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Turks, a call-to-arms in which Lyzlov discusses both why Muscovy should wage war and how that war should be waged. The History is also part of a general late Muscovite interest in themes relating to Turkey, the Tatars and Islam. In fact the History is the fullest Muscovite account of the Turks, Tatars and Islam in the seventeenth century. This chapter will first place the History within the specific context of Muscovite foreign policy of the 1670s through the 1690s and then will place it within the general context of late Muscovite writings about the Tatars, Turks, and Islam.

Lyzlov does not attempt to disguise his polemical intent and there are two explicit statements, both directed at the Muscovite tsars, that urge a war against the Crimean Tatars and the Turks. The first such statement occurs when Lyzlov has summed up the Muscovite conquests of the Golden Horde, of the Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberian khanates, and is making the transition to his account of the Crimean khanate. Lyzlov states:

here there is placed an account of their habitations and their khans and the strength and the state of that country so that our most glorious and most illustrious and most powerful Sovereigns the rulers of the glorious Muscovite monarchy would follow the glorious deeds of their ancestors, the former great Sovereigns and autocrats of the Muscovite tsardom and God permitting to defeat completely the infidel barbarians as quickly as possible...and the uprooting and destruction not only of these
infidel Hagarites but also of that chief Muslim damned snake the Turkish Sultan with his people by the Slav-Russian peoples is foretold in Holy Scripture. May it be in our day. (S.I., ll.123r-123v)

Lyzlov hopes that his History would inspire the present Muscovite rulers to emulate the deeds of their predecessors.

The second occasion is at the very end of the History of the Scythians and although it is not explicitly addressed to the tsars, the message is similar to that of the first passage. Lyzlov cites Guagnini's extended account of Christian suffering under Turkish rule. Lyzlov then offers a Muscovite adaptation of a passage in Guagnini that calls for a campaign against the Turks:

without a doubt it is worth believing that the time when the infidel Ottoman rule [by God's will] will fall is approaching...may that time come during the fortunate reign of our most illustrious and powerful Sovereigns...and then they would be inspired by the Holy Spirit...to prepare countless different weapons and having gathered many Christian troops and having reached accords with the neighboring Christian states to attack the insatiable Muslim dogs... (S.I., ll.302r-302v)

it is not worth doubting that the time is approaching when the Ottoman state, by God's will, will fall...may God permit that during the reign of our most extraordinary Polish King...the Wallachians their pikes, the Spaniards their spears...the Rus their spears, the Slovaks their sabres...the Podolians their spears, and all Christian peoples will take up arms against the Muslim dog... (Guagnini, pp.712-713)

Quite naturally Lyzlov replaces the Polish king with the Muscovite tsars as the focus of his appeal.

In both instances Lyzlov uses the certainty of a Muscovite victory to bolster his claim and to strengthen his argument. In the first instance Holy Scripture prophesies a Muscovite victory and in the second instance
Lyzlov states clearly that God is on the side of the Muscovites. The *History of the Scythians* is structured around the rise and fall of states. Lyzlov presents the rise and fall of the Golden Horde, of the Kazan khanate, and of the Astrakhan khanate. He presents the rise of the Crimean khanate and of the Ottoman Empire and anticipates, as seen in the two passages cited above, their fall. In Lyzlov's presentation Muscovy, and in particular the Muscovite rulers, have played or will play the decisive role in the fall of each of the Tatar states.

Having described the origins and the rise to power of the Golden Horde, Lyzlov then presents its decline. Halfway through the account, prefatory to a description of the intensifying struggle between the Golden Horde and the Appanage principalities, Lyzlov states:

> The Great Horde began to decline...and it was completely defeated and ravaged by the Muscovite great Sovereigns. (S.I., 1.30v)

This theme is continued after an account of the "stand-off" on the Ugra with the statement:

> from this time the Horde fell into final ruin... (S.I., 1.37v)

Lyzlov's implication is that Muscovy was in part responsible for this decline since the Great Horde was "defeated" on the Ugra by Muscovite forces under Ivan III.

Lyzlov repeats this theme at the very end of the account of the Golden Horde:

> the Great Horde began to decline due to ceaseless internal war and strife and moreover from the attacks of Russian troops... (S.I., 1.51r)
The rise and fall of Kazan is presented without any of these direct statements about the role of Muscovy in its defeat. Such statements were completely unnecessary in that the entire account -- from the founding of Kazan to its conquest by Ivan IV -- is devoted to Muscovite-Kazan relations and warfare.

The reasons for the fall of Astrakhan are equally clear, but Lyzlov does provide emphatic statements. As introduction to his short account of the history of Astrakhan and its conquest by Ivan IV, Lyzlov describes Ivan's intentions:

Ioann Vasil'evich...wishing to rule his state in complete peace and calm and to defeat completely the coarse barbarians...learning how the Astrakhan khanate remained in their power...(S.I., l.118r)

At the end of the account of the successful Muscovite military campaign,

Lyzlov states:

and from that time Astrakhan, the ancient Russian possession, returned to the control of the blessed Muscovite autocrats...(l.121r)

Lyzlov summarizes the Muscovite role in the conquest of a number of Tatar khanates at the conclusion of his account of the fall of Astrakhan:

and thus this...tsar...Ioann Vasil'evich...not only captured the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates but also brought the Great Horde...and the ravaged towns and villages along the Volga...into his realm. In addition he captured other Hordes...and the Siberian Khanate itself and made them into his subjects and negated their barbarian cunning and destroyed their pagan...treachery and razed all their pagan towns and settlements...(S.I., ll.122r-122v)

Muscovy in Lyzlov's view was a decisive factor in the fall of the three major
Tatar Khanates and of the other lesser hordes.

In contrast to the khanates mentioned above Lyzlov presents the Crimean khanate and the Ottomans as current threats to Muscovy in the late seventeenth century. Lyzlov's goal in the History of the Scythians was to rouse Muscovy to eliminate these threats. Lyzlov places the passage that called for the destruction of the Crimean khanate immediately after the list of Muscovite military successes against other Tatar khanates. By this juxtaposition Lyzlov seems to be suggesting that this legacy of military success prefigures Muscovite success against the Crimea.

Lyzlov's concern with the Crimea is grounded in the realities of late seventeenth century Muscovite politics, both domestic and foreign. The Muscovite alliance with the Ukrainian Cossacks under Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi in 1654 and the subsequent gradual absorption of the Left Bank Ukraine into the Muscovite state led to a more active Muscovite policy vis a vis the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Turks. The Crimea was a crucial factor in any Muscovite attempt to extend their authority over the Right Bank. Muscovite successes on the Left Bank also meant that Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire were now the main rivals for control of the steppe and the northern littoral of the Black Sea.

In 1672 the Turks launched a major campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in which they captured Kameniec-Podolski and besieged Lvov. Continued Turkish pressure forced the Poles to recognize Turkish suzerainty over much of the Right Bank Ukraine. In response to the Turkish campaign Aleksei Mikhailovich sent envoys to all the major
European capitals in the hope of organizing an alliance against the Ottomans. These efforts were unsuccessful.

In the Spring and Summer of 1676 it was widely believed in Moscow that the Turks were planning a campaign against Kiev. V. V. Golitsyn was sent with an army to Putivl' and the Muscovite commander G. G. Romadonovskii was sent to reinforce Chyhyryn, the capital of the Left Bank. In August 1677 a Crimean-Turkish army besieged Chyhyryn but was repelled. In July 1678 the Turks renewed the campaign and the Muscovite army was forced to withdraw. In December 1678 Muscovite envoys travelled to Constantinople in order to negotiate a peace and three years later in 1681 the Treaty of Bakhchisarai was concluded between Muscovy, the Crimea, and the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683 by a Habsburg-Polish alliance gave new life to plans for a European alliance to drive the Turk out of Europe. In 1683 and 1684 Habsburg and Polish missions to Moscow attempted to convince the Muscovites to join an anti-Turkish alliance and, in particular, to launch a campaign against the Crimean Khanate. The Muscovites were receptive to the idea and in 1684 V. V. Golitsyn requested Patrick Gordon, a Scot in Muscovite military service, to prepare a report on the costs and the benefits of such a campaign. Gordon reported in favor of a campaign. However the Muscovites demanded from the Poles as the price of participation the permanent cession of those territories in the Ukraine which, by the terms of the 1667 Treaty of Andrusovo, they held only temporarily. In 1686 the Poles agreed to these
terms and Muscovy joined the alliance which was now called the Holy
Alliance. In 1687 the Muscovites sent an embassy to Louis XIV to
encourage him to join the alliance and launched the first campaign against
the Crimea.

This first campaign of May 1687 under the leadership V. V. Golitsyn,
the Regent Sophia's most influential adviser, was a failure. The army was
beset by steppe fires and lack of water and turned back while still one
hundred thirty miles from the entrance to the Crimean peninsula. Before
embarking on the campaign Golitsyn had been concerned that both his
absence and the possibility of failure would give his enemies -- those who
rallied around Peter -- a chance to overthrow Sophia. However Peter's
partisans were not yet strong enough to topple Sophia's government and
Sophia created an official version of the campaign that celebrated it as a
military victory.

A second campaign against the Crimea, again under Golitsyn's
leadership, set off in February 1689 and proved to be as futile as the first.
Golitsyn's forces reached the isthmus to the peninsula, but then they
retreated to Moscow. Golitsyn's enemies later claimed that he had been
bribed by the Crimean Khan, but the more probable reasons for his lack of
success was "a combination of bad luck, bad climate, inhospitable
terrain...outmoded military practice...and the lack of cooperation from
Russia's allies."

These two military failures played into the hands of Sophia's enemies
and contributed to her demise. Once again Sophia attempted to portray the
campaign as a Muscovite victory. However shortly after Golitsyn's return Sophia's government fell and Peter's faction came to power. The new government had no desire to continue the war due both to the two failed campaigns and to the increasingly tense Polish-Muscovite relations. Despite the normalization of relations between the two states at the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667) and the subsequent reaffirmations of this treaty, an anti-Polish faction that perceived Poland as Muscovy's natural enemy continued to exist at court. In the 1670s and 1680s this faction had been resistant to any idea of a Muscovite-Polish alliance against the Crimea. This distrust was strengthened by Polish complaints after the first Crimean campaign that the Muscovites had not been serious in their intention from the outset and by rumour of Polish negotiations with the Crimea. In 1690 the Muscovites themselves made overtures to the Crimea about the possibilities of concluding a peace treaty and in early 1692 a Muscovite envoy was sent to the Crimea for further, ultimately fruitless, negotiations.†

These were the circumstances in which Lyzlov composed the History of the Scythians: the legacy of two failed campaigns in which he had participated; the fall of Sophia's government and the execution or exile of her major supporters; the accusations of avarice and cowardice against Golitsyn; the possibility of a rapprochement with the Crimea. The History is very much a response to these, from Lyzlov's point of view, unfortunate circumstances. Lyzlov attempts to shift Muscovite foreign policy from what he perceived as its false course by making the following arguments: the economic benefits from the conquest of the Crimea are great; the Crimean
Khanate is simply an Ottoman pawn; neither Tatar nor Turk can be trusted to abide by the terms of a peace treaty; avarice and dissent are inimical, and bravery is essential, to successful military campaigns.

Lyzlov's interest in the Crimea is evident early in the History of the Scythians, even before he starts his detailed discussion of the history of the khanate. The first reference to the Crimea is after the account of the Mongols' victory on the Kalka and their expansion into the steppe and into the Crimea. Lyzlov's account is based upon Stryjkowski:

The Tatars after that victory destroyed completely the Polovtsian fortresses and towns and settlements and took control of and settled the entire region along the Don and the Meotidis Sea and the Cherson Taurike and near the Pontus Euksiiskii...they left only those towns in the Cherson Taurike itself which were under the control of the Italian Genoese and ruled by the Greek Emperors and even down to today the old fallen walls in the steppe are clear evidence of the towns and fortresses and old stone towers that the Italian Genoese built together with the Polovtsians (S.I., ll.10r-10v)

And the Tatars after this victory destroyed the Polovtsian fortresses and towns and took control of and settled the entire region along the Tanais and the great Meotidis Lake and the Cherson Taurike...and along the Pontus Euxinum...where even today the old fallen walls in the steppe are evidence of the towns, fortresses and old stone towers that the Italian Genuenses built together with the Polovtsians. (Stryjkowski, I, p.231)

Lyzlov adds information to the account about the towns remaining under Genoese and Byzantine control. This additional information reflects his own interest in the Crimea and his desire to engage the readers interest in the Crimea. Lyzlov adds more information in the margin next to this account:
the Grand Prince Vladimir took Kaffa from the Genoese Strii
folio 137 (S.I., l.10v)

The note refers to a passage elsewhere in Stryjkowski describing the
military successes of Vladimir:

And having gathered a great army among the Novgorodians and
the Kievans, he set off for the Taurike...where he captured the
famous city Kapha or Teodosia from the Greeks...(Stryjkowski, I,
p.129)

Lyzlov returns to this theme at the end of the following chapter as
immediately after his account of the settlement of the Golden Horde in
Sarai he recounts again the Tatar expansion into the Crimea:

and they took control of the entire wild field from the Volga to
the Dnieper and across the Dnieper all the way to the Danube
and in the Cherson Taurike...[settled] around Azov, Kafa, Kerch,
Khorsun...and other coastal towns in which the Italian Genoese
lived and which were ruled by the Greek Emperors...(S.I., ll.22r-
22v)

Lyzlov's focus on the urban trading centers of the Crimea and of the Black
Sea littoral is intentional for, as will be discussed below, he counted on the
natural wealth of the region as an incentive for Muscovite military action.

Lyzlov's interest in the natural wealth of the Crimea is evident in the
geographical description which opens his account of the history of the
Khanate. Lyzlov's interest is more than simply the verbatim quotation of
his sources since he constructs from his sources the fullest possible
description of the natural resources of the Crimea and of the steppe. Part
of the geographical description that he draws from Botero introduces this
theme of natural wealth:

the water [in the Sea of Azov]...is very sweet and therefore in
the winter it freezes completely and in the summer an
unbelievable number of fish seeking the sweet water gather 
there and provide for the local inhabitants great recreation and 
profit. Not far from the mouth of the Don...stands the town 
Tana...which has many wharves and a great export trade in 
sturgeon and caviar and in other goods from the local 
areas...(S.I., l.124v-125r/Botero, I, p.163)

Lyzlov then gives a listing of his own devising of the major towns in the 
Crimea:

The towns in the Taurike are the famous and ancient Saldaniaia, 
Kafa, Kerkei'...Krym and the new Perekop...Bakshisarai...and on 
the coast Kerch', Toman', Kozlekarasev, Gorbatek...(S.I., l.125r)

After this listing, Lyzlov returns to the description of the natural 
wealth of the Crimea with another citation from Botero:

that region is full beyond measure of grain and cattle and other 
good products. The local inhabitants get great profit from the 
numerous fish that they catch in the Meotides Lake. They 
export to Constantinople many foodstuffs such as grain, butter, 
dried sturgeon, caviar, and all sorts of salted and dried fish as 
well as all sorts of hides. They also produce a great amount of 
salt. Nemtsy, Genoese and many Greeks live in the ancient 
towns such as Saldaniaia, Kafa and Kherson. Even today in 
these and in other towns there are many famous families 
descended from the nemtsy and the Franks who lived 
there...(S.I., ll.125r-125v)

Lyzlov breaks this theme with an account of the founding of the 
Crimean Khanate, but he then returns to the discussion of natural wealth 
with the description of the natural wealth of the steppe area along the 
Black Sea that was within Crimean control. The account is drawn from 
Guagnini:
The steppe in these areas is very abundant as Guagnini describes...the steppe is so abundant and fertile that it is hardly to be believed for there the grass is as high as sea grass and very soft...in addition in the steppe there is a great number of sarn that is wild goats, stags, deer, wild horses, and small monkeys, boars, deer all of which are gathered in great herds...in addition not far from these places...there is an indescribable multitude of every kind of animal... (S.I., II.127v-128r)

the steppe and the meadows are amazingly abundant, that it is hard to believe: there is great grass like the greatest reeds on the sea;...in the steppe there is a great number of various animals, such as deer, stags, wild horses, boars that gather in herds of three hundred...Not far from these places...there is an island on which there is a great number of various animals. (Guagnini, p.616)

Lyzlov’s construction of the description of the Crimea’s natural wealth and his expansion of Guagnini’s description of that wealth bespeaks more than a passive interest in the topic. It is tempting to argue that the listing of the major towns (slavnnya grady) and the earlier references to Kaffa and the other towns formerly under Genoese control (known in Muscovy for their trading interests) is further evidence of an interest in the economic life of the Crimea.

Lyzlov presents a history of Crimean aggression against Muscovy that discusses both the Crimean depredations against Moscow and the Crimean refusal to abide by treaty obligations. On two occasions Lyzlov treats the existence of Russian prisoners in the Crimea. Lyzlov cites the role of Russian prisoners in teaching the Crimean Tatars to construct houses and to engage in agriculture:

this wild and free people...learned a little about house construction and agriculture from Russian captives...(S.I., l.127r)

Lyzlov returns to this theme in a passage that seems to be based on
Guagnini:

Now however the Crimeans learned agriculture well from the Russian captives, but they themselves do not sow seed but their captives do. All sorts of grain grow in great abundance there. They employ the captives in construction and they sell others to the Turks sending them from Kafa and other coastal towns to Constantinople and to other countries. They ransom others... (S.I., l.134v)

Some captives are turned into servants, and others are sold to the Turks and to other neighboring countries, and some are ransomed... (Guagnini, p.594)

Lyzlov focuses the reader’s attention on the fate of Russian prisoners by expanding upon Guagnini’s account.

Lyzlov’s presentation of Crimean-Muscovite relations is not one of permanent warfare. The first sections of the history of the Crimea treat the alliances between the Crimea and Muscovy. Lyzlov (following the Stepennaia kniga almost exclusively for the history of Crimean-Muscovite relations) relates how in 1483 Mengli Giray, following the advice of Ivan Vasil’evich, sacked Kiev. In 1498, also at the instigation of Ivan, Mengli Giray sent his son to pillage Lithuania. In 1502 Mengli Giray, still in obedience to the Muscovite Grand Prince, defended Muscovy against attack by the Nogai Horde.

His son Mehmed Giray, upon succeeding to the throne, overturned his father’s policy and, in alliance with the Polish king, attacked Muscovy. Mehmed Giray was thrown back with severe losses. This defeat led Mehmed Giray out of fear and cunning to conclude a treaty with Vasilii Ivanovich. As a result Mehmed Giray led a raid upon Poland in 1519.
This peace was shortlived however and Mehmed Giray was soon conspiring with Poland against Muscovy. From this point to the end of the account of the Crimean khanate (Lyzlov carries the account down to the 1590s) the relationship between the Crimea and Muscovy is one of continuous warfare.

It is significant that Lyzlov did not edit those early sections depicting the agreements between Muscovy and the Crimea and thereby present a unbroken line of Muscovite-Crimean antagonism. Lyzlov was attempting to demonstrate the futility of a meaningful peace with the Crimean khanate and that the only possible solution to the Crimean problem was a military one. This notion of peace through strength finds some confirmation in the manner in which Lyzlov closes the chapter on Muscovite-Crimean relations. Lyzlov describes Fedor Ivanovich’s construction of the defense frontier against Crimean attacks and states:

> And from that time to the present there has not been such shameless attacks by the pagans to [the walls of] the Tsar’s city itself as had happened previously. When they do attack however they get no further than the Tula boundaries and this has been the case for the past one or two centuries...(S.I., II.168r-168v)

Lyzlov’s implication is that arms, not treaties, are the means to insure a stable southern frontier.

Lyzlov also addresses the issue of peace treaties with a discussion of the dangers of concluding a separate peace with the Turks. A separate peace allows the Turks to wage war on one front while being assured of peace elsewhere. Lyzlov argues that the Turks were able to recover from defeat in Egypt and to initiate a campaign against Venice by concluding a
treaty with Poland. Lyzlov takes from Bielski the account of the disastrous Turkish campaign against Egypt in 1494. Lyzlov follows this account with a statement of his own devising:

after this defeat the Sultan Baozit, like a cunning fox, began to fear the Christian rulers and therefore... (S.I., 1.249r)

Then, following Kromer and Stryjowski, Lyzlov describes Bayezid's successful conclusion of a peace treaty with the Poles:

he sent important envoys with many gifts to the Polish king Ioann Albricht congratulating him on his accession and wishing to conclude a peace with the Poles. Then the Venetians came urging the Poles to attack the Turks. Because of this the Polish king detained the Turkish envoys for almost a year and then made a treaty with them for three years and, trustingly, he let them go. As soon as Baozit had received a respite from the Christian armies, he waged a great war on the Venetian Republic and sent many troops and captured the Albanian lands and the coastal town Dirkhakh... (S.I., ll.249r-249v)

There he was besieged by Venetian envoys as well as envoys from Baozit...from both sides congratulating him on his accession. Furthermore the Venetians...whose [possession] Albania Baozit at that same time had pillaged, and in addition had captured the coastal town Dyrchach...urged the King to wage war against the Turks...the Turks meanwhile having given splendid gifts... Jan Albricht hesitated for a long time over whether to support Venice or the Turks... after a year he released the Turkish embassy, having concluded a three years treaty with Baozit... (Kromer, p.754)

Then envoys from Venice and from... Baozit came to Albricht wishing him a happy reign on his new throne. The Turks also requested a treaty and brought many gifts. The king was silent for an entire year and then gave the Turks a treaty for three years... (Stryjowski, II, p.295)
Lyzlov changes the order of events in Kromer, which is his basic source, by placing the military campaign against Venice after the conclusion of the Polish-Turkish treaty. Coupled with his own statement that the treaty with Poland "freed" Bayezid from being concerned with Poland, Lyzlov appears to be warning against the dangers of a separate peace: the Polish treaty with the Turks allowed Bayezid, who had originally feared Christian strength, a free hand to start a campaign elsewhere. The chronology of Kromer's account by itself does not permit this sort of conclusion.

Lyzlov repeats this theme of the Turks taking advantage of a separate peace in an interpolation that he makes in an account drawn from Stryjkowski and Kromer:

Baozit, having heard that many neighboring Christian rulers were allying against him, and avoiding like a skilled warrior the possibility of waging war with many [enemies] at the same time, sent envoys to them and concluded a peace with as many as possible. When he had received truces from some of them, then he launched a fierce campaign against the Venetian Republic...(S.I., l.250r)

Biazet, having heard of the joint alliance of so many great monarchs, sent an important embassy to Jan Olbricht asking for peace or a continuation of the truce. He avoided, as a wise and careful warrior, getting involved in many different wars at the same time. Because he had attacked Venice by land and by sea...(Kromer, p.766)

Biazet, having heard of the alliance and the joint action of so many monarchs and princes, sent important envoys to King Jan Albricht asking for peace or for a continuation of the truce. He acted wisely in this, like a smart and careful warrior, not to be involved in many wars at one time, because at that time he attacked Venice by land and by sea...(Stryjkowski, II, p.307)

Lyzlov subtly changes the account in his sources. Both Stryjkowski and
Kromer states that Bayezid wanted peace because he was already involved in a campaign against Venice. Lyzlov changes the chronology: first Bayezid concludes the truces, then he attacks Venice. In this fashion Lyzlov makes explicit the moral of the tale: never conclude a separate peace with the Turks.

The final example of this theme is a bit different in that in this instance the Christian side asks for peace. Lyzlov borrows from Kromer an account of how the Venetians were forced to sue for peace in 1500:

Because of such poverty the Venetians were forced to ask peace of the Sultan. Only with many gifts and difficult conditions could they receive the desired peace... (S.I., l.251r)

Lyzlov once again shows the "danger" of this sort of peace by adding the statement of his own:

And thus Baozit, having concluded a peace with the Venetians, and not wishing to become slothful started a war with other neighboring [states]... (S.I., l.251r-251v)

Lyzlov's account then describes Bayezid's successful campaign in Bosnia.

Lyzlov on one occasion shows how Muscovy was not immune from receiving Turkish offers of a separate peace. The Ottomans are portrayed as paying tribute to Muscovite power and Lyzlov contrasts the Ottoman success against other nations to their fear of Muscovy:

Although the Christians had many renowned victories over the Turks, however most often they themselves were defeated and not only villages or towns but the countries themselves and entire regions came into their [Turkish] control...Makhomet...wanting to be the sole ruler of the entire world and not wanting to have a superior or an equal...(S.I., l.246v)

Wanting to be in friendship with...Ioann Vasil'evich and hearing
of his great fame and bravery and victories over neighboring enemies...he sent envoys to him with many gifts [to discuss] peace and friendship. He did not cease attacking others for in the same year... (S.I., 1.246v)

Simultaneous with their offers of peace to Muscovy, the Turks started a campaign in Southern Italy.

Lyzlov brings home the dangers of a separate peace to the Muscovite reader. Both the examples from European history and the one specific Muscovite example tie back into Lyzlov's presentation of Muscovite-Crimean relations where Lyzlov suggests that the Crimean Tatars do not honor treaties and that war is the only solution.

Lyzlov also emphasizes the establishment of Turkish suzerainty over the Crimea. Lyzlov's account of the establishment of Turkish suzerainty starts with the capture of Kaffa. Lyzlov betrays his interest in this event by bringing three sources -- to which there are references in the margin -- to bear on this account even though much of the information overlaps.
in 6983 the Turkish Sultan Makhomet attacked all Taurike with many troops and besieged the coastal town Kafa which from long ago is called Feodosia and stood on the sea coast...and at the time the Genoese controlled that town and other coastal towns. The Sultan was unable to capture the town by storm but he captured it by gold as he gave a great deal of gold to certain nemetsy in the town who surrendered the town into his hands...(S.I., l.138r)

in 1475 the Turkish Emperor Machomet captured by treachery, giving the corrupt Italian traitors gold, the great and famed town Kapha or Theodosia which stands on the Black Sea in Taurike or Perekop and which at that time the Italian Genoese ruled. (Stryjkowski, II, p.280)

At the same time Machomet sent seventy galleys to the Cherson Taurike and, ordering the Tatars to aid him, besieged by land and sea Kafa or Kafata, a coastal city long ruled by the Genoese and famed as a perfect market. And although the citizens defeated the Tatars, nevertheless in the sixth day the Turks took control of the town through the treachery of the leading Italian citizens... (Kromer, p.721)

In the same year the Turks, through the treachery of the Italians, took Kaffa the city under Genoese rule...

(Guagnini, p.89)

In the margin next to this account of the fall of Kaffa, Lyzlov has notes to all three accounts: "Kromer book 28 folio 549"; "Strii folio 656"; "Gvag on Poland folio 118". This is an instance where Lyzlov uses margin notes in order to focus the reader's attention on a particular event and, thereby, to express his own sense of the significance of the event.7

In Lyzlov's presentation the Turkish capture of Kaffa meant the subjugation of the Crimean Tatars to the Turks with the capture of the
Khan Mengli Giray:

the Crimean khan Mendigirei along with his two brothers were captured by the Turks...(S.I., l.138v/Stryjkowski, II, p.280)

The capture of Kaffa also allowed the Turks to expand their power along the Black Sea littoral. The very beginning of this account of expansion is based upon Kromer and Stryjkowski, but the bulk of it is Lyzlov’s own account of Turkish expansion and fortification:

and from that time the Turkish Sultan ruled that famed Genoese town Kafa and gained possession of other towns in the Taurike as well as the Wallachian Belgrad and Ochakov...(S.I., l.138v)

Having conquered Kafa and in addition having taken fortresses and towns on the coast, the Turkish army sailed to Monkastru or Bialogrod... (Kromer, p.721)

Thus the noble Genoese town Kpha, with other surrounding fortresses, was captured by the Turkish Emperor...And Machomet directly from Kpha advanced on the Wallachian Bialogrod and took it...(Stryjkowski, II, p.280)

Lyzlov then has a long passage of his own devising that describes the Turkish expansion:

then Azov also came under Turkish control from which the pagans got much profit both from the treasure and from the many captives; and from that time in all these coastal towns the Turkish sultan began to station many troops to oversee them and so he fortified them. He lived in Constantinople without the slightest danger since on all the coastal areas on the mouths of the rivers that flowed into the Black Sea from all regions he placed strong towns so that the gates to the sea were closely watched. He strengthened the fortresses with many troops, firearms and every sort of supply that the troops would require for a year...(S.I., ll.138v-139r)

The passage continues on to identify the particular fortresses that the
Turks established along the coast. Lyzlov attributes the construction of fortresses by the Turks to a Turkish fear of Muscovy:

fearing the Muscovite state he constructed fortresses on the Dnieper above Ochakov...the town Kizyrkimen' on the right bank...and on the other bank...the town Shakhirmen' [these fortresses] although not large were made from stone and were very strong...(S.I., l.139r)

the passage from the Don past Azov into the Meotskii Sea...was strongly guarded as above Azov...on both banks of the Don...two towers had been constructed...from them across the entire Don was stretched an iron chain and they were strongly fortified. The pagans constructed all these fortresses due to their great fear of the glorious Muscovite monarchy...(S.I., l.140v)§

Lyzlov's account of the Turkish establishment of a major military presence on the Black Sea directed specifically against Muscovy concludes with a description of the Crimean military obligation to the Sultan. The basic account is Lyzlov's own:

from that time even the Crimean khan with all the Tatars living near those towns and all the others who lived in the steppe became subjects [of the Sultan]. He installed the khans according to his own wishes and thus the khan was obedient to the Sultan. The khan was obliged at the Sultan's behest to bring or to send all or a part of his army to the aid of the Turks in every war even though this was very difficult for them or they did not want to. And they [the Tatars] helped the Turks greatly...(S.I., ll.140v-141r)

Lyzlov then brings in an example from Botero to confirm his account of the Tatar military obligation and to show its worth to the Turks:

death means nothing to them as Botero writes how, when the Turkish Sultan fought Tommubi near Mattaria, the Tatars that the Sultan had with him swam across the great river Nile and greatly helped the Turks in their victory... (S.I., l.141r/Botero, I, p.163)

Lyzlov concludes with an account drawn from Guagnini that describes the
Crimean annual tribute to the Turks:

in addition to accompanying the Turks in war, the Crimean khan...was obliged to give to the Sultan as a sign of tribute three hundred captives per year... (S.I., l.141r/Guagnini, p.615)

Lyzlov has created an account of how the Ottomans established a strong military presence on the northern coast of the Black Sea, in large part by subjugating the traditional Muscovite enemy the Crimean khanate, and how that presence was directed against Muscovy whom they feared.

In contrast to his accounts of the four Tatar khanates which were very much founded on Tatar relations with Muscovy, Lyzlov's description of the rise and expansion of the Ottomans has of necessity a much broader scope. Lyzlov recounts their origins and their expansion and consolidation of power in the Balkans, the Near East, and North Africa. Muscovy is not a prominent actor in any of these events.

However Lyzlov does not abandon the Turks on the Black Sea, but he returns to two of the themes that had been prominent in his discussion of the Crimea: Kaffa and Astrakhan. In order to emphasize the importance of the Turkish capture of Kaffa, he repeats in full in the description of their capture of Kaffa that he has already presented in the history of Crimea.9 Lyzlov also repeats the tale of how the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray and his two brothers were captured by the Turks:

Lyzlov's interest in Kaffa in particular is evident from the very beginning of the History of the Scythians: on l.10v. Lyzlov adds a margin note on Kaffa; on ll.22r-22v Kaffa appears again in his account of the Tatar expansion into the Crimea; Kaffa appears prominently in his account
of the natural wealth drawn from Guagnini; Lyzlov adds Kaffa to the account of Russian prisoners being sold into slavery. Lyzlov is presenting Kaffa as a future object of Muscovite military interest. Kaffa is associated with wealth, Russian captives, Crimean subjugation, and Ottoman expansion -- all good pretexts for a Muscovite campaign against Kaffa that, in Lyzlov's presentation, would clearly put Muscovy at war with the Ottomans.

If Kaffa represents for Lyzlov a future point of Ottoman-Muscovite conflict, then Astrakhan is an example of a past conflict with the Ottomans from which Muscovy had emerged victorious. The Muscovite capture and retention of Astrakhan is a good model for a similar policy towards Kaffa. Lyzlov describes Ivan IV's capture of Astrakhan and the subsequent failed Ottoman attempt at its recapture in 1569 in substantial detail.10 As seen above he makes a reference to this same campaign in his account of the history of the Crimean khanate.

On the two occasions in his account of the Ottomans where Lyzlov does in fact specifically discuss Turkish animosity towards Muscovy, the Turks' objective is Astrakhan. The first describes Selim's motives in attacking Astrakhan:

Then the infidel inflamed by the desire for greater conquest and moreover wishing to revenge himself against the Muscovite...Grand Prince...for the victories and attacks by earlier Muscovite Sovereigns against his kinsmen the Tatar Hordes and for the capture of Kazan...(S.I., 1.272v)

Lyzlov proceeds to discuss the Sultan's attempts to persuade the Polish king to allow him free passage across Polish territory in order to attack
Muscovy. Faced with a Polish refusal, the sultan decides on the fateful campaign against Astrakhan. Lyzlov then gives an extended summary (drawn from Guagnini) of the Turkish defeat in 1569.

The second instance treats a second Turkish campaign against Astrakhan in 1588:

The Turkish Sultan Amurat...possessed by a greed for power and treacherously pretending that he wanted peace with the [Muscovite] Sovereign sent his envoys to Moscow in 6092 hoping that they would inform him of the strength of the Muscovite army and of the Astrakhan fortifications. For shortly thereafter his treachery was revealed as in...6096 the infidel Sultan sent many pashas with a large army to Astrakhan. However having arrived there they did not harm the town, but they themselves were defeated by the difficult journey on which many of them died.... (S.I., 1.280r)

Astrakhan remained in Muscovite hands.

The vicious factional struggles of the final years of Sophia's regency and the unwillingness of Peter's advisers to continue the alliance against the Crimea and the Turks make their mark upon the History of the Scythians. In Lyzlov's estimation both will lead to certain Muscovite defeat.

Lyzlov is concerned with the deleterious effect of internal strife. The nature of Lyzlov's interest in this topic is best expressed by a story that he relates in his account of the Golden Horde. Lyzlov relates that in 1448 a certain Edigei became khan and then Lyzlov departs on an extended digression about Edigei the source of which is not clear. Lyzlov describes how Edigei feared for the unity of his realm after his death and therefore he called together his thirty sons. He gave to each of them a single arrow and asked each to break his arrow -- this they accomplished easily. He
then called for another set of thirty arrows which he bound together into one bundle and which he gave to each son in turn to attempt to break. Of course not one of the sons was able to break the bundle. Edigei then gave the moral of the lesson:

if you divide the khanate and each of you lives as a separate ruler, then neighboring rulers could destroy you in the same manner that the arrows were broken and all will die. If however you keep counsel amongst yourselves and stand together against enemies, then hardly anyone will be able to conquer you...(S.I., ll.33v-34r)

The sons all swore to work as one after their father’s death, but as Lyzlov recounts the reality was quite different:

his children shortly after his death started to fight amongst themselves and all were destroyed...(S.I., l.34r)

This theme of strength through unity and weakness through internal strife is repeated throughout the History of the Scythians.

The overwhelming majority of Lyzlov’s statements on internal strife treats it as a prime cause of Christian defeats. Lyzlov attributes early Turkish successes against Byzantium to the lack of unity among the Greeks:

the Infidels attacked and conquered the Eastern part of the Greek Empire due to the lack of agreement and the internal strife among the Greek Emperors and moreover among the inhabitants of the entire state...(S.I., ll.188r-188v)

The Saracens were able to take Jerusalem for the first time due to Christian disunity:

and they captured the holy city of Jerusalem and it remained in their control at a time when the Greek Emperors fought amongst themselves and spilled the blood of their people...and were not able to repel the attack...(S.I., l.189v)
Lyzlov continues his discussion of internal strife among the Crusaders by appending to a passage drawn from Bielski, which describes the lack of unity among the Crusader factions, a lament of his own over the consequences of such factionalism:

there were two leaders of the Christian troops. One was Gvidon who was the Emperor of Jerusalem, the other was Raimunt who called himself the Governor of Jerusalem. He rebelled against Gvidon and requested help from Saladin, the Babylonian or Egyptian Sultan. O the evil envy into which senselessness leads Christian rulers. The disease of envy had to be cured by the snake's poison as the Infidel labored with all his might that the Christians, fighting amongst themselves, would exhaust themselves... (S.I., l.192r)

Raymundus... was the Governor of the Kingdom of Jerusalem...
[AFTER THE DEATH OF BALDWIN AND WILHELM, THE KINGS OF JERUSALEM] the Christian lords... elected... Gvidon... King of Jerusalem... Raymund, informed of this, was an opponent of Gvidon and fled to Zoldan for better defense. Zoldan promised to help him. (Bielski, ll.179r-179v)

Lyzlov's account, following that of Bielski, continues on to describe how Saladin played off the rival Crusader rulers against each other and was thereby able to capture Jerusalem.

Lyzlov's critique of internal strife appears in his description of the gradual disintegration of the Byzantine Empire. Lyzlov's account reads:

Siria also was in Hagarite possession and they had many other regions in their control such as Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary and the Greek Emperors controlled only Constantinople with small adjoining regions and nothing in the eastern regions... even in this small territory the Greek Emperors created internal strife, one forcing the other from the throne and bringing the scepter of the Greek Empire to its final death... (S.I., ll.194r-194v)
Lyzlov continues with the passage describing the greed and rapacity of the Byzantine rulers.

Lyzlov suggests a connection between Mehmed’s decision to attack Wallachia, soon after his capture of Constantinople, and his perception of the lack of unity within the Christian camp:

The Sultan Makhomet, learning of the lack of unity among the Christian armies, did not abandon his plans for in the third year after the capture of...Constantinople...he sent a large army to the Wallachian land...(S.I., l.238r)

At the very end of the History of the Scythians, in his summation of the Turkish successes, Lyzlov has a number of statements about the lack of Christian unity. Right before the geographical description of the extent of Turkish possessions Lyzlov states that Turkish success could be attributed to a lack of unity among the Christians:

the insatiable...Turkish Sultans with their military plans and their ceaseless desire for war...brought under their control...extensive regions and states, great islands, and very strong towns...due to the lack of agreement, the dissolute behaviour, and the sloth of the Christian rulers...(S.I., l.299r)

After the geographic description of the Turkish possessions Lyzlov cites a passage from Guagnini which again points to Christian internal strife as allowing Turkish expansion:

all this [the Turkish conquests] is under the control of the pagan Infidel due to the lack of agreement among the Christians...(S.I., II.299v-300r/Guagnini, p.637)

Following this excerpt Lyzlov quotes two extended verse sections from Guagnini that describe Christian suffering under Turkish rule. In citing one poem Lyzlov replaces one of the lines in Guagnini’s version with a line
of his own that repeats the theme of defeat due to lack of unity:

Where is the Hungarian Kingdom, that golden apple? Which formerly flourished and lies in the swamp? Where are the Hungarian peoples? Where are the Moldavians who border on Poland? All lie in a treacherous peace as in a trap. (Guagnini, p. 710)

[Emphasis added]

On two occasions Lyzlov contrasts the lack of unity among the Christians to the unity among the Turks. Following Bielski Lyzlov had described the mobilization of a joint Christian force in 1464 at the urging of Pius II. Upon Pius’s death, however, the force disbanded:

Pope Pius II died of the plague in... Ancona... and all the troops disbanded, each to his own country. Makhomet, as the single ruler, attended to his affairs... (S.I., 1.240v)

The Pope Eneas Silwius died of the plague in Ancona and all the Christians dispersed thereafter, the Crusaders as well as the servitors... (Bielski, 1.255v)

This statement is followed by an account drawn from Kromer that describes Mehmed’s campaign against Bosnia. Lyzlov’s addition makes the contrast is clear: Mehmed, the single ruler, is able to accomplish what the Christian forces, each with their own leader and without any sense of common unity, could not.

In his account of Selim’s accession to the throne in 1512 Lyzlov, following Bielski, describes how Selim eliminated all possible opposition to his rule. As in the above account, Lyzlov adds a statement that reveals his concern with internal strife:
the Sultan Selim killed his father and brother and nephews...and was ruler of the Turks without opposition. And no longer having internal strife, he expanded into neighboring countries... (S.I., p.259r)

Zelimus having killed his father, brother, and nephews... (Bielski, p.254r)

Lyzlov does not add a moral statement about Selim's murder of his relatives. Rather he is more concerned with demonstrating that the lack of internal strife (domovnia voiny) permitted the Turks to expand their power. This discussion of the benefits of unity was directed at a Muscovite foreign policy which, in Lyzlov's view, suffered from internal strife and which was on the verge of abandoning its Christian allies.11

Equally shameful and dangerous to Lyzlov's mind is the unwillingness to mobilize a nation's resources to provide for its self-defense. Lyzlov highlights four specific occasions where avarice led to defeat. The first is the tale of the Caliph who was starved to death in Susa by an early Mongol khan. The khan locked the Caliph in a tower along with the wealth which he had not used for the defense of his realm. Lyzlov first draws the account from Botero:

he [the khan] ordered that the Baghdad Caliph Mustiatsen be starved to death amidst the wealth that he had collected... (S.I., l.8r/Botero, III, p.129)

Lyzlov then brings in Guagnini to make explicit the moral of the tale:

the Polish historian Aleksandr Gvagnin... recounts how Alliaus the Tatar Khan... captured Susa... and there starved to death the ruler of that town the Caliph having imprisoned him in a tower that the Caliph had filled with gold and silver and precious things, saying to him: If you had distributed this treasure to your troops, then you and the town and the people could have defended yourselves fully... (S.I., l.8r/Guagnini, p.699)12
The second example of this concern is Lyzlov's account of the fall of Kaffa to the Turks. As seen above Lyzlov gives two full accounts of this story which are almost identical in order to emphasize the Turkish conquest of the northern coast of the Black Sea. But Lyzlov did not need to repeat the tale of the traitors who betrayed the city into the hands of the Turks:

he was unable to capture the town by storm, but he captured it by gold for he gave a great deal of gold to certain nemtsy in the town who surrendered the town into his hands...all the nemtsy traitors who had surrendered Kafa were taken to Constantinople where they died in prison...(S.I., ll.138r-138v)

since he was unable to accomplish it by force he accomplished it by gold for the leading citizens of the town were bought by gold...these traitors who had surrendered Kafa were captured and put in prison [where] they died...(S.I., l.243r)

Lyzlov could easily have expressed his interest in the fall of Kaffa without repeating the tale in such detail. However Lyzlov was equally concerned with focusing the reader's attention upon the action of the traitors who sold the city for gold and upon their punishment by the Sultan.

This same theme appears in Lyzlov's account of the fall of Constantinople. At the beginning of his extended account of the battle for the city Lyzlov gives a prose rendering of a section of a poem in Guagnini.

This section highlights Christian miserliness:

they [the Christian rulers] allowed this glorious...kingdom to fall, they did not want to avoid such an evil by giving aid. The Greeks themselves completely lost their reason and chose to die together with their treasure, burying it in the ground, than to spend it on defense and to keep their wives and children and similar possessions in freedom... (S.I., l.212v/Guagnini, pp.706-7)

Lyzlov returns to this theme at the end of his account of the fall of the
city. Again through a prose rendering of a section of verse in Guagnini,

Lyzlov describes the Sultan's outrage at Christian greed:

As soon as the Sultan Makhomet had taken the city he ordered
the inhabitants to bring all their treasure to one place. When
it had been brought, Makhomet was amazed at the great
amount that exceeded all his expectations and in amazement he
said: O you senseless people! Where is your former reason for
with this treasure you could not just repel but also conquer not
only me but anyone at all. Because of this you, the destroyers
of your fatherland, do not deserve to live any longer and
therefore, giving the sign, he ordered all the noble born and
leading men to be killed, saving only the simple people and
women and children...(S.I., ll.236v-237r/Guagnini, p.709)

Lyzlov consciously chooses to bracket his account of the fall of
Constantinople with this account of the fatal consequences of Christian
greed.

The final example of Lyzlov's interest in this theme is his account of
the Turkish capture of Jassy in 1460. The basic account is from
Stryjowski to whom Lyzlov refers in the margin, but he also has a margin
reference to Botero to confirm the account:
[the Sultan] himself attacked...the Kingdom of Bosnia and captured many towns filled with riches and the king of that kingdom by the name of Stefan. He brought him [Stefan] to the town of Iassy and, having tied him to a stake before the town, he ordered that he be shot at with arrows. He scolded him for preferring to die with his gold and silver, of which there was a great deal in his captured treasury, than to use it to defend himself and his state. Then having skinned him, he ordered that the skin be filled with gold coins from the treasury...(S.I., II.238v-239r)

they conquered the Bosnia kingdom with great wealth and strong towns and, having captured their king Stefan at the main town Jajcy, Machomet...ordered him tied to a stake and shot at from bows. Then he was skinned and the skin was filled with gold coins from the treasure reproaching him for his sloth and baseness as he preferred to die with the gold and silver, of which there was a great deal in his treasury, rather than to use it to defend himself and his subjects. (Stryjkowski, II, p.266)

Among those fortresses the main town is Jayca...Stephan (the last Bosnian Lord) was dethroned...by Amurat...who, when he had captured Stephan, ordered him tied to a stake by the shoulders and shot at. He [the Sultan] reproached him that begrudging his treasure, he chose to lose the Kingdom. (Botero, I, pp.132-133)

The notes in the margin read: "Boter part 1 folio 132"; "Strii 19 folio 644."

Lyzlov’s use of Botero to confirm the account in Stryjkowski -- Lyzlov does not introduce any new information from Botero’s account -- is a mark of Lyzlov’s interest in the theme of Christian greed as the cause of military defeat.13

There are three instances where Lyzlov in a passage of his own devising offers avarice as a reason for a Christian defeat. Lyzlov reworks Baronio’s account of the aftermath of the Crusader capture of Jerusalem in
1100 in order to focus on avarice:

in the year 6608 [the Christians] liberated Jerusalem from the Turks and the Hagarites and in many places they enjoyed illustrious victories over the Turks. However they themselves were consumed by the passion to acquire wealth and doing nothing good but inciting only discord and civil strife they gave the Turks and Saracens no little opportunity to attack them...(S.I., 1.190r)

on the eighth day the city was surrendered to us...and it had been decided who would control the city, but some loving their homeland and their kin wanted to return home...(Baronio, XII, 1100)

Lyzlov immediately follows this account with the account of the recapture of Jerusalem by the Saracens in 1113. Clearly in his mind avarice created dissension within the Crusader ranks which in turn led to the fall of Jerusalem. Baronio's account has no description of avarice and the dissension among the Crusaders is presented in a neutral manner. His account of the fall of Jerusalem in 1113 appears significantly later than the passage cited above and is not directly tied to the dissension of 1100.

The second instance is Lyzlov's assertion that Byzantine greed permitted the Turks the opportunity to start their war of attrition against the Empire. In a passage of his own devising Lyzlov states:

the rulers and nobles of the Greek Empire were predatory, unjust and had a insatiable desire for money, pillaging and ravaging their subjects, that it was hardly possible to say which was more burdensome, Turkish captivity or their force and pillaging...Ottoman, having seen this, collected an army from all his subjects and attacked the Greek Empire...(S.I., 1.194v)

The third instance follows Lyzlov's account, drawn from Botero, of how the Genoese helped the Turks to cross the Hellespont in return for
money in 1363. After this account Lyzlov laments:

O the evil of the love of money that they delighted in such a small profit and they themselves suffered great evil from [the Turks]...(S.L., l.197r)

The Genoese thereby helped the Turks to establish themselves on the European mainland.

It is not too far-fetched to suggest that with these tales of avarice Lyzlov was criticizing those who opposed Golitsyn's campaigns and who appeared in the early 1690s to be seeking a modus vivendi with the Tatars and the Turks. If disunity and avarice are vices to be avoided, then bravery is a virtue that the Muscovites must cultivate.

Lyzlov's discussion of bravery looks both at examples of Turkish and Tatar courage and at examples of Christian courage. Lyzlov not only relates the many Tatar and Turkish conquests -- concrete examples of their military prowess -- but he also makes specific comments of his own devising about their courage in battle. The first such comment appears in the section on the Scythian ancestors of the Tatars and the Turks. After a long description of the habits and mores of the Scythians (drawn verbatim from Guagnini) Lyzlov provides his own transition into a discussion of the Amazons (the wives of the Scythians) which is also drawn from Guagnini:

Not only were they so accomplished in bravery and in military matters, but...(S.L., l.3v)

Lyzlov's extended account of Crimean Tatar military habits (ll.130v-134r) is drawn primarily from Guagnini with some information taken from Botero and it provides a positive view of Tatar bravery and fortitude.
Lyzlov adds information of his own to this account that repeats this basic theme:

Brave and bold, each dying for the other, they fight with the enemy to the final end. Even if the enemy unhorses him, cuts him badly, turns him into a defenseless warrior and takes away his weapons and he is barely alive from all the wounds, however he will fight to the last breath with arms and legs and teeth and with every means possible. He is most to be feared when he appears to be dying for seeing that he cannot escape the death before him, he thinks only about how to take the enemy with him... (S.I., 1.133v)

At the conclusion of this passage Lyzlov returns to where he had left off in Guagnini. By adding this passage Lyzlov is emphasizing the military courage of the Crimean Tatars.

At the beginning of his account of the history of the Crimean khanate Lyzlov makes a general statement of his own tying the Crimean expansion to their military prowess:

the Tatars arriving there with Edega... moreover interested in military deeds they attacked and pillaged the adjoining territories of their neighbors... (S.I., 1.137r)

Lyzlov then proceeds to an account of these Crimean military successes.

The subordination of the Crimean Tatars to the Turks and the required military service that the Tatars owed the Sultan was described above. At the end of this passage on Crimean military service, Lyzlov explains that the Crimean Tatars were useful to the Sultan precisely because of their military prowess:

and they [the Tatars] were of great help to the Turks for on campaigns the Turks, as settled people who like order, had settled encampments. The Tatars, an unsettled people, were ceaselessly around their encampments defending them from, and frequently chasing off, the enemy. For as was said above in
battle the Tatars are extremely courageous and daring...(S.I., ll.140v-141r)

Lyzlov then gives a concrete example of Crimean bravery in the passage drawn from Botero that was cited above. The passage starts with a tribute to Tatar bravery ("death means nothing to them") and then describes the Tatar role in Selim's victory on the Nile.

Lyzlov then turns to a description of the military prowess of the Turks. In a manner similar to his discussion of the Crimean Tatars, Lyzlov starts his account of the rise of the Turks with a reference to their military prowess:

And having described the Turks and their settlements, we will continue the history of the growth of the power of the Turkish people in military matters...(S.I., ll.185v-186r)

Lyzlov repeats this theme shortly thereafter on two occasions:

and from then the Turkish name began to be famed for they were drawn to military deeds and they served neighboring monarchs as mercenaries...(S.I., 1.186v)

Then over time they gained strength in military prowess...(S.I., 187v)

Lyzlov also offers a description of Turkish military bravery and endurance similar to that which he had offered for the Crimean Tatars. In this instance Lyzlov's interest in this theme is evinced not by the interpolation of a passage of his own devising, but by his editing of a section in Bielski. Bielski cites at length a speech by the Sultan Mehmed to his troops before a major campaign against a Christian alliance in 1464. In the speech Mehmed contrasts Turkish bravery to Christian cowardice, criticizes the Christians for their constant attempts to find excuses for
defeat, and speaks to the campaign at hand. Lyzlov excerpts the sections that contrast Turkish bravery to Christian cowardice:

The Sultan Makhomet...having gathered his leading soldiers told them to remain armed and ready against the [Christian] attack. He praised them and their ancestors. He added that the great number of the Christian army was nothing for they know themselves the habits of that people to be morose, weak, cowardly, lazy, extraordinarily sluggishly, used to luxury, that they cannot sleep without a pillow and that they cannot be happy without amusements. In addition they cannot take counsel without drinking strong drinks and they fight only with words and not deeds. They do not know military order, they have horses only for the hunt and those among them who want to have warhorses have to capture them from us. They are not able to bear hunger, cold, heat, labor and taunts. They campaign with their women, they sit and lie haughtily, they march fervently but they fight without passion. All this you, my troops, do not possess. You do not spare your life, you are not afraid of wounds, you sleep little and without pillows. You make do with few comforts, you overcome misfortune, the ground is your table, bed and stool. You do not object to that which is difficult and burdensome, but you consider it easy and pleasant... (S.I., ll.239v-240v/Bielski, 1.255r)

By his editing of Bielski's passage Lyzlov focuses the reader's attention on the contrast between Christian and Turkish behaviour and seems to suggest that Christians might do well to follow the Turkish model.  

Lyzlov's criticism is veiled in moral exempla because of the uncertainties of political life in the early 1690s. Golitsyn's faction had been defeated, Golitsyn himself had been exiled, and several of his main supporters had been executed. Since Lyzlov's goal was to persuade and to convince his audience of the justice of his cause, it would not have been politic to make specific accusations. Far better for the reader to draw his own conclusions from the examples of a more distant and a non-Muscovite past.
Lyzlov's call-to-arms against the Tatars and the Turks and particularly his claim that Turkish defeat had been prophesied would have been familiar to his Muscovite audience. To be sure the History of the Scythians is the most complete Muscovite work advocating war against the Tatars and the Turks, but Lyzlov was writing for an audience to whom this information would have been familiar.\textsuperscript{16}

The Turks were a focal point of prophetic literature in late seventeenth century Muscovy. Daniel Waugh has pointed to a series of translated prophecies that originated in the milieu of the Diplomatic Chancellery.\textsuperscript{17} The book production activity of the Diplomatic Chancellery provides further examples of the care and expense which were devoted to the production of prophetic works. In 1672-3 Nikolai Spafarii and Peter Dolgovo translated Paisios Ligarides's Khrismologion. The Khrismologion contained an account and a discussion of Daniel's prophecy on the dream of Nebuchadnezzar, an historical account ordered according to the Four Monarchies -- Babylon, Persia, Macedon, and Rome, and various prophecies on the fall of the Turks and tales about the Anti-Christ. Spafarii succeeded in translating only the account and interpretation of Daniel's dream and the history of the Four Monarchies. At the end of Spafarii's translation there is an address to Aleksei Mikhailovich in which he is prophesied to be the destroyer of the Turks.\textsuperscript{18}

In 1672 there was a commission for the composition by Spafarii and Dolgovo of an illustrated version of the Book of the Sybils. The Sybilline prophecies divided world history into Four Monarchies and Ten Generations
and one of its central themes was that of the Final Age. Spafarii glossed the prophecy of one of the Sybils to foretell the Muscovite defeat of the Turk.19

A notable example of prophecy directed to the tsar is Simeon Polotskii's address to Aleksei Mikhailovich on the occasion of the birth of Peter where Polotskii predicts that Peter will liberate Constantinople and destroy the Turks:

The present month of May announced a great joy:
That the tsarevich Petr is born to us.
Yesterday the most glorious Tsargrad was captured by the Turks:
Now its most glorious liberation is announced.
The Conqueror appears and wants revenge.
To liberate that Imperial city now...
Now is born to us an Orthodox tsarevich,
The Muscovite Grand Prince Petr Alekseevich;
He will strive to cover You with piety,
And to uproot the entire Muslim abomination....20

That signs and visions were taken seriously within the ruling circles is confirmed by the fact that in December 1672 Aleksei Mikhailovich met with his boiars to discuss the meaning of a comet that had appeared over Hungary in the fall. The Rector of the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium had been consulted and had interpreted the comet as a forecast of an alliance between Muscovy, Poland, and the Habsburgs and of a complete Muscovite victory over the Turks.21

The Muscovite tsars down through Peter were subject to intensive lobbying in favor of war against Turkey by representatives of the Balkan Orthodox communities and by Ukrainian clerics. The Balkan churchmen
were among the most fervent proponents of the idea of Moscow as "Third Rome" and of the project of the imminent Muscovite reconquest of Constantinople for Orthodoxy. The Greek Innokentii Likhudius, appointed as the Muscovite envoy to Venice, wrote in a letter of 1688 to V. V. Golitsyn of the alleged Venetian desire to see the Muscovite tsar on the throne of Constantinople:

Many of the high officials of this Republic have asked me whether the Great and most Sovereign Moscow tsars wished to be crowned on the throne of Constantinople. I...answered them...'Truly they wish this.' And they told me that no more appropriate time than the present could ever be found...and if the Great Moscow tsars will be rulers of Constantinople possessing, by God's aid, great strength the like of which no other monarchs of the world possess, the Turk will never be able to approach the boundaries...."22

This "response" undoubtedly reflects Likhudius's own politics rather than the hard-headed analysis of Venetian politicians. In 1688 Isaiah, the Archimandrite of the Pavlov Monastery at Athos, brought to Muscovy letters from the former Patriarch of Constantinople Dionysius, from the Wallachian Voevoda Shcherban, and from the Serbian Archbishop Arsenii. In his letter Dionysius writes that "every Orthodox king and prince have together risen against the Antichrist", but that Muscovy "sleeps." In his precis of the letters delivered to the Diplomatic Chancellery, Isaiah describes the internal problems of the Ottomans and that "in the past one thousand years there had not been a more appropriate time to destroy the Muslims completely."23 The Imperial ambassador to Moscow in 1684 told the Muscovites that: "Now is a convenient time to continue the route to the waters of the Euxine Sea...The hour has struck to go into the
Crimea...."24

Iurii Krizhanich, the Croat resident for many years in Muscovy, was an adherent of war against the Crimea. Krizhanich claimed that past wars with Poland-Lithuania had been "unprofitable." War against the Tatars however (and here Krizhanich's argument is strikingly close to Lyzlov's argument from history) had led to conquests in Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia. Krizhanich further claims that "the Northern countries are cold, marshy, infertile...there is little profit in conquering them." In contrast (and here again the argument is similar to Lyzlov's): "The Crimea, however, and the Nogai lands are full of God's gifts of all varieties."25

The Ukrainian cleric Ioanniki Haliatovs'kyi, Archimandrite of the Elets Monastery in Chernigov, wrote two works (Alkoran and Labedz) that by their description appear to be very similar to the History of the Scythians. Haliatovs'kyi's works are polemics urging war against the Turks and the Tatars and his sources include Stryjkowski, Skarga's edition of Baronio, Guagnini, Botero, and Bielski. In 1683 he sent two presentation copies of Alkoran to Tsars Ivan and Peter and they were quickly translated into Russian in the Diplomatic Chancellery.26

A Muscovite example of a call-to-arms against the Tatars and the Turks is the speech of the Archimandrite of the Novospasskii Monastery, Ignatii Rimskii-Korsakov, to the Muscovite officer corps on the eve of the 1687 Crimean campaign. Lyzlov was probably in the audience. Ignatii speaks in terms quite similar to those used by Lyzlov. He reminds the officers of their obligations to their fellow Slavs and claims that only
military victory could bring a lasting peace. He cites various prophecies, dating back to the Metropolitan Peter, that predicted Muscovite victory over the Tatars. He cites, albeit in a much more developed form than does Lyzlov, the prophecy of Methodius of Patras that the Russian people would free Constantinople from Turkish subjugation. Ignatii cites examples of brave warriors who campaigned against the Tatars and hopes that the warriors in his audience "would be envious of the brave deeds of your ancestors" and that they would attempt "to emulate" these deeds. In particular Ignatii cites the example of Ivan IV who annexed to Muscovy the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberian khanates.27

Lyzlov shares a common language with Ignatii and, to a lesser extent, with the other polemicists cited above. However Ignatii's Slovo and Lyzlov's History are markedly different. Ignatii's Slovo was delivered orally to the Muscovite officer corps on the square in front of the Cathedral of the Dormition while Lyzlov's History was a written work with pretensions to erudition and scholarship.28 The following chapter will discuss how and why Lyzlov chose to cast in a scholarly form his contribution to the debate over the Crimea.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. The following chapter will discuss how Lyzlov believed that reality confirmed prophecy. This belief in historical events confirming prophecy is also evident in the conclusion to the account of the fall of Constantinople to the Turks. Lyzlov concludes this account by consciously returning (having interrupted his borrowing from the Khroneograf in order to cite information from Kromer and Stryjkowski) to the Khroneograf account of prophecy fulfilled and prophecy awaiting fulfillment:
   all that had been forecast by [the prophecies of] Emperor Leo the Wise and Bishop Methodius of Patras and also by the visions had come about...but also the final [prophecies] of these most wise men will be realized for they write that the Russian people will destroy the Ishmaelites...and will rule [in Constantinople]. (S.I., I.237v)
   Prophecy dictated both temporary defeat and final triumph.

2. In the 1640s the Muscovites had discussed the possibility of an offensive alliance with the Poles against the Crimean Khanate. This was a part of Wladyslaw IV’s larger plan of an alliance against the Ottomans. The Muscovites were not at all interested in antagonizing the Turks, as witnessed by their refusal to support the Don Cossacks who had captured Azov in 1657, but they were willing to countenance a war against the Crimea. A Russo-Polish defensive alliance in case of a Crimean attack was concluded in 1647. See: L. V. Zaborovskii, “Krymskii vopros vo vneshnei politiki Rossii i Rechi Pospolitoi v 40-kh - seredine 50-kh godov XVII v.,” in Rossiia, Pol’sha i Prichernomor’e v XV-XVII vv. (Moscow, 1979): 263-275.


5. In his account of the fall of Kazan Lyzlov has a similar description of natural wealth:
   in addition a countless multitude of herds of different livestock and of great profit and moreover [similar herds] of various beasts are found in that land for there live fine maartens, foxes, squirrels, elk, deer and other beasts... (S.I., I.92v)
   Stryjkowski also has a similar description in an account of the Lithuanian Grand Prince Gedimin’s hunting in a region filled with:
hare, foxes, maarten and other small beasts and birds...(I, p.369). These descriptions of natural wealth -- of "El Dorado" -- appear to be more cliche than realistic description. They certainly are not a "mercantilist" description of a region's natural resources. Indeed these descriptions (Guagnini's included) seem to have more in common with the XIII century description of Rus' in the Slovo o pogibeli russkoi zemli than they have with seventeenth century accounts of natural economy:

O, brightest of the bright and most pleasing, Rus' land! Wondrous with many beauties: many lakes...rivers and springs...mountains...wild beasts, various birds...(Pamiatniki literaturny drevnei Rusi, XIII vek, Moscow, 1981, p.130)

A seventeenth century Muscovite translation of Mercator (GPB, Q.XVII.28) has the following description of Muscovy's wealth:

beavers and deer, bears, wolves, wild goats, boars, foxes, maartens, hare and others...(I.419v)

I have not checked the original but the similarities between the accounts of Lyzlov and the translated Mercator are striking.

Herberstein's Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii has the following description of the wealth of the Muscovite North:

there is a great multitude...of various beasts such as for example sables, maarten, beaver, ermine., squirrel...white bears, wolves, hares...(Zapiski o Moskovii, (Moscow, 1988) p.157.

The interrelationship between these descriptions of natural wealth cries out for further study.

6. In his account of the Mongol occupation, based primarily on the Stepennaia kniga, it does seem that Lyzlov edits the Stepennaia kniga account in order to provide as flattering an account as possible of the Russian princes. For example: on l.22r he edits from the tale of Fedor Rostislavich the information that puts the Tatars in an human light (S.K., IX, 18); on l.22v he omits the information that the bad rule of Alexander Nevskii's brother prompted the Tatars to intervene in princely politics (S.K., VIII, 5); on l.23r he omits the information that the Mongols exempted the Church from taxation (S.K., VIII, 7); on l.23v he omits the information about internecine princely strife and how the Mongols were called upon to settle disputes (S.K., IX, 9). I am aware of the possibility that Lyzlov could have used a version of the Stepennaia kniga that already had these readings and that they do not reflect Lyzlov's editorial hand.

There is a citation from Guagnini intermixed with the information drawn from the Stepennaia kniga where Lyzlov clearly did attempt to omit information "damaging" to the Russian princes. Guagnini describes a princes' request of the Khan Narus: "all the Rus' princes assembled...and requested of him that each of them be allowed to rule securely in his own principality." (Guagnini, p.587) Lyzlov changes this excerpt to read: "all the Russian princes gathered and requested of him that they be allowed to rule in their own principedom without the Tatar overseers." (S.I., l.25r) Lyzlov
changes the request for Tatar protection (presumably against their fellow princes) to a request for "independence."
Lyzlov could easily have omitted any reference to Crimean-Muscovite alliances (especially against a fellow Christian nation, Poland). That Lyzlov chose not to do so represents, I would argue, a conscious choice on his part.

7. Lyzlov’s use of margin notes will be discussed in the following chapter.

8. Azov and the Turkish fortresses along the Dnieper were crucial to the control of the Crimea. For the Muscovite understanding of this, see Lindsey Hughes, *Sophia*, p.207

9. The repeated account is on ll.242v-243r. Compare to the first account on l.138r. Lyzlov again uses confirmation notes to focus the reader’s attention on the account.

10. As seen in the previous chapter Lyzlov goes out of his way to present the account of the 1569 campaign. He states how: "there is nothing about this in the Russian histories, but the foreign [histories] are not silent and describe..." (S.I., l.121r) He then proceeds to edit Guagnini’s extended and disorganized account of the campaign into a well-organized and focussed account.

11. There are only two instances in the History where the Christians (specifically the Muscovites) are able to take advantage of disunity within the enemy camp. See: 1.26v; 1.51r.


13. All four examples of Christian greed are accompanied by the enemy teaching the Christians a lesson by pointing out the proper moral course of conduct. This is another example (along with Mehmed’s speech to his troops) of the Tatars/Turks being presented as the moral superiors of the Christians.

A related story is Lyzlov’s presentation (drawn from Kromer and Stryjkowski) of the traitor who betrayed to the Turks the secret passage into Constantinople. Mehmed, upon hearing that the traitor had enjoyed the Emperor’s favor, ordered him to be put to death as punishment for his treachery. (See: 1.236v)

14. The theme of the Infidel being used as a mirror in which Christian weaknesses are reflected is a common theme in much of the literature about the Turks and Islam in medieval and early modern Europe. Here Lyzlov uses the Turks and Tatars as exemplars of proper behaviour.
15. Lyzlov’s presentation of the dangers of internal strife, of avarice, and of a separate peace and his emphasis upon the necessity of bravery is strikingly similar to the terms in which Patrick Gordon cast his 1684 discussion of the reasons for prosecuting a war against the Crimea. Gordon speaks of precisely these issues. See the excerpts from Gordon’s Diary published in I. P. Sakharov (ed), Zapiski russikh liudei (Newtonville, 1980): 98-102.

16. Much of Lyzlov’s information about the Tatars, Turks and Islam is also found in separate translations that seem to have circulated independently in Muscovy. Lyzlov’s account is from Book X, Part 3 of Guagnini’s Kronika. This section of Guagnini also circulated as a separate translation: the pamphlet is titled Povest’ o Turkakh and is found in GBL, Rumiantsev muzei, 457; GPB, Q.IV.126. See: Waugh, op. cit., Volume 1, pp.182-3; Volume 2, pp. 553-74) A translation of this section from Guagnini is also found combined with a translation of the section from Baronio on Muhammad (a section that Lyzlov also used). This combination circulated as a separate pamphlet (O turkakh, otkupu proizydosha i o prokliatotl izheuchitele ikh Magomete. It is found in: GBL, Rogozhskii Cemetary, #384; GPB, Solovki Monastery, #322(490); GPB, Q.I.244. See: Ibid., pp.175-6, 530-550).

The basic source of Muscovite knowledge about Muhammad appears to have been Bielski’s Kronika swiata. Bielski’s information first entered Muscovy via the 1617 Khrongraf and continued in later seventeenth century redactions of the Khronggraf. Lyzlov used both the account in the Khrongraf and in the Kronika swiata in compiling his account of Muhammad and Islam. Lyzlov uses the Khrongraf account of Muhammad for the information about the three rivers in Paradise and for his account of the origins of the Islamic prohibition against wine. None of Lyzlov’s other sources has the information on the rivers in Paradise so it seems probable that the Khrongraf was the source. (See: Ibid., p.602; Lyzlov, ll.174r.) Lyzlov’s account of the prohibition against wine is close to that contained in Guagnini, but the embroidery of the tale shows clearly that he took the account from the Khrongraf. (Ibid., p.599; Lyzlov, ll.173r-173v.)

A second extract from Bielski appears in both the Khrongraf tradition and in the form of a separate tale (the "Tale about the City of Medina"). Lyzlov and the Tale share some of the information from Bielski. (For example: Muhammad’s alleged trickery in attracting doves to his ear and then claiming that the Holy Spirit was talking to him.) Guagnini’s account of the failed Turkish attack on Astrakhan also circulated separately in a Russian translation. Lyzlov used this same section of Guagnini as the basis for his account of the 1569 campaign.

There are several sources of information on Islam and Muhammad that Lyzlov did not use. Simeon Polotskii completed translations of the information in Peter Alphonse and Vincent of Beauvais. Vincent’s account treats Muhammad and Islam in a detail that is unmatched in seventeenth century Muscovy. Polotskii’s accounts had little or no resonance in Muscovy.
Lyzlov does not make use of the material on Islam in the Almanac of Voight which does not differ from Lyzlov's information.


18. The prophecy reads in part: "we always...pray to God to allow...Aleksei Mikhailovich...to defeat and to conquer...the most abominable Muslim race...and all the people say it will be it will be." Cited from GPB, F.I.281, l.340v.

19. Pushkarev, op. cit., p.192: "the two-headed eagle from the North will defeat all you Muhammedan pagans and armed with the Cross of the Heavens will recapture our lands."

20. I. Tatarskii, Simeon Polotskii (ego zhizn' i deiatel'nost'), (Moscow, 1886) p.126.


22. O'Brien, op. cit., p.104. An early example of these appeals is that of Patriarch Paisos of Jerusalem to Aleksei Mikhailovich during Paisos's trip to Moscow in 1649. See: Longworth, op. cit., p.58.


24. O'Brien, op. cit., p.94. The language of these statements is similar to the language of the the final passages of the History where Lyzlov states that the fall of the Turk is approaching and many wish "that that time might come during the fortunate reign...of our Sovereigns." (l.302r) Crucial to Muscovite success is for Moscow "to conclude agreements with neighboring Christian states...." (l.302v)

25. Ibid., p.93.

26. The Alkoran was translated in 1684 by the noted Ukrainian translator in the Diplomatic Chancellery, St. Gadzelowski. Labeled had been translated in Moscow in 1683. A copy of a translation of the Alkoran is found in the library of V. V. Golitsyn. Labeled was translated in 1683 by the translator "Mr. B 1503" who in 1671 had translated Polish facceve. A second translation was dedicated to Peter. I have not compared either Alkoran or Labeled (The Swan) to the History of the Scythians as I do not have access to either work. Haliatovs'kyi was a well-known figure in Muscovy for his

27. Bogdanov, Slovo, p.140. For a short biography of Ignatii, see: A. P. Bogdanov and E. V. Chistiakova, Da budet potomkam iavleno..., (Moscow, 1988): 86-103. Ignatii also kept the faith after Sophia's fall and in 1690 in a work presented to the tsars Ivan and Peter (the Istoricheskoie izuchenie) he argues for a renewal of the war, that the Turks are the real enemy, and that it is necessary to maintain the European alliance. Ignatii also compiled a chronicle compilation recounting the history of the Muscovite struggle with the Crimea that was continued later by Karion Istonin. Ignatii possessed a copy of the History of the Scythians. See: Ibid., p. 100.

28. The Slovo was in fact reworked for presentation to the two tsars and to Sophia. The reworking consisted mainly of adding panegyrics to the royal family. The content of the sermon was not changed. Bogdanov, "Slovo...", pp.134-5.
CHAPTER THREE: LYZLOV'S METHODOLOGY

The purpose of the History of the Scythians was to convince. An important element of Lyzlov's attempt at persuasion was the imitation of structural and methodological features of his Polish sources. In late seventeenth century Muscovy Polish history writing was becoming increasingly well known to some members of the court elite. It is arguably the case that the popularity of these works meant that they were considered to be particularly erudite and authoritative.¹ Lyzlov was counting upon the popularity of his Polish sources — their name recognition and the authority that they commanded — to help convince his audience.

This chapter will first discuss the structure and the method of the History and then in the light of this discussion will dispute the claims of those who argue that Lyzlov is a "modern" historian.

Lyzlov takes the overall structure of the History of the Scythians from those sections of Guagnini's Kronika which discussed the Tatars and the Turks amd with which therefore he was most familiar. A comparison of the structure of Books 8-10 of Guagnini's Kronika with that of The History of the Scythians reveals the extent to which Lyzlov used Guagnini as a model:
Lyzlov:
I, 1 - I, 3:
Scythia:
geographic description
origins of Scythians
history of Amazons
Mongol invasion
Bulgars, Polovtsy, Pechenegs

II, 1 - II, 3:
Baty's invasion
Rise and Fall of the Golden Horde

III, 1 - III, 5:
Rise and Fall of the Kazan Khanate

III, 6:
Muscovite Conquest of Kazan

IV, 1-3:
Geographic description of Crimea
Habits and Customs of the Tatars
History of the Crimean Khanate

Guagnini:
VIII, 1:
Scythia:
geographic description
origins of Scythians
history of Amazons
Mongol invasion
Baty and immediate heirs

VIII, 2:
Habits and Customs of the Tatars

Short description and history of Kazan and other Tatar Hordes

VIII, 3:
Ivan IV's campaign against Astrakhan

Short description and history of Crimean Khanate and of other Tatar Hordes

(IX - part of X:
Description of different regions of Europe and Asia)

IX:
X (balance):
Description of Islam

IV, 5:
History of the Turks

The History of the Scythians is also "framed" by Guagnini's Kronika as Lyzlov opens the History with a verbatim citation from the beginning of VIII, 1 and closes the History with a citation from the closing passages of
Book X. Both accounts open with a description of the origins of the Scythians:

Diodorus Siculus...relates that the Scythians had their origins from their first prince Skif who was born from the union of Jov and a Virgin who was human down to the waist, but the rest of her was similar to a serpent... (S.I., l.1v)

Diodorus Siculus...finds the origins of the Scythians from Scythia...and starts his account in this manner: the first prince Skifia was born from Jov and a Virgin, who to her waist was human, and the rest of her was similar to a serpent.... (Guagnini, p.581)

Both accounts close with a plea for divine aid against the Turks:

they rejoice in hope and await help and freedom as the Jews who due to their sins were led into captivity and when having done penance and having pleaded for God's mercy then the all merciful God sent them relief and restored them to freedom. Thus the Christians under the pagan yoke have cried out and we will soon be sent help from on high. Thus we beseech Him with firm pleas and unshakeable faith that he give us Christ the Lord in our lifetime. (S.I., ll.302v-303r)

our poor Christians hopefully await help against their enemies...And like the Jews who because of their sins were sent into captivity, but then admitting and doing penance for their misdeeds, the Lord God sent them relief and restored them to freedom. Thus we, from the first to the last, appeal for swift aid from heaven. May He give us from His mercy the Holy Trinity, one God, of the Father, the Son, and of the Holy Spirit AMEN. (Guagnini, p.713)

The close parallels between the structures of the two works (the description of the habits and customs of the Tatars is the only section that is "out of place"; otherwise there is a remarkable similarity in the order of information) and the near identity of the opening and closing passages suggest that Lyzlov consciously looked to Guagnini's Kronika as his model.

The division of the History into Part (Chast’) and Chapter (Glava) also comes from Lyzlov's Polish models. The History is divided into four
parts, the first two of which consist of three chapters each and the latter
two of which consist of six chapters each. Previous forms of history writing
in Muscovy -- the Khronograf, the History of Kazan -- had been divided into
chapters, but neither of these forms had this two-tiered division into Part
and Chapter. Either Guagnini's Kronika or Stryjkowski's Kronika would
have served Lyzlov as a model. Guagnini's work is divided into ten
"Books", each of which is divided into "Parts." Stryjkowski's work is
divided into twenty-four "Books" each of which is divided into "Sections."
Lyzlov seems to have borrowed the form from the Polish models even if he
does use the labels of "Part" and "Chapter."

Lyzlov borrowed his use of chapter headings from his Polish models.
The Khronograf tradition and the History of Kazan do have short, laconic
chapter headings, but these are markedly different from the more detailed
headings in Lyzlov's History. Lyzlov copies outright some of Guagnini's
"Part" headings:

On the naming of Scythia and its
boundaries and on the Scythian
Mongails or Mungals people and
about other [peoples] and about
the Amazons their brave wives
and why the Tatars are so called
and which Tatars invaded Europe
(Heading to I,1)

Which people were in those
regions from which the Tatars
expelled them and conquered
themselves (Heading to I,3)

A description of the two parts of
Scythia, the origins of the Tatars;
History of the Amazons; and
about the Tatar invasion of
Europe. And which people lived
previously in the lands where the
Tatars live today. (Guagnini,
p.581)
About the faith and the habits of the Tatars in time of war and in time of peace (Heading to IV,2) Different Tatars Hordes and Kingdoms. First: about the customs and the life of the Tatars (Guagnini, p.589)

Lyzlov uses these examples from Guagnini as models for the creation of his own chapter headings. For example, the heading to I,2 echoes that of I,1:

When and why the Tatars left their native lands and invaded Europe, and about their battles with the Polovtsians and with the Russians and about the Tatar destruction of the Polovtsian towns.

The heading to IV,4 echoes that of IV,2:

About the false Hagarite prophet Makhomet and about his false religion.

The other chapter headings also imitate Guagnini's headings, be they purely descriptive headings (IV,2) or headings which pose questions (I,1).

Another example of Lyzlov's reference to his Polish models is the imitation of the regnal headings and summation statements that Bielski uses in his account of Ottoman history. Bielski's account of the Ottomans, from Osman to Suleiman the Magnificent, is divided into the reigns of the Sultans. Each reign is given a separate section with a heading. Lyzlov imitates this form:

Arkhan the second Turkish Sultan (S.I., l.195r)²

Bielski's account of the Ottomans ends with the reign of Suleiman, but Lyzlov accounts from his other sources for the reigns of three later Sultans. It is a measure of the hold that Bielski's model had upon Lyzlov that he continued the practice of giving each Sultan a separate heading and section even though he was not citing Bielski as a source.³ Bielski often has a
statement at the end of a reign that gives the date of death and/or the length of the reign and Lyzlov also copies this. For example, his account of Osman's death reads:

he died in 6836 having been on the Turkish throne for 28 years....(S.I., l.195r)

So Lyzlov takes both the overall structure of the History of the Scythians and various elements of internal organization directly from his Polish sources.5

Lyzlov also imitated the method of his Polish sources and this chapter will look at three types of methodological borrowings: attempts at historical explanation; the resolution of historical disputes; the use of evidence and of sources.

HISTORICAL EXPLANATION

The first feature of Lyzlov's methodology that will be discussed is what can broadly be described as his attempts at historical explanation. On two occasions Lyzlov poses basic questions in the chapter headings and then proceeds to address the questions in the text. The first example is Lyzlov's discussion of why the Tatars are so named. In the heading to Part I, Chapter 1, Lyzlov asks the question: "why the Tatars are so named."(S.I., l.iiir) In the text itself Lyzlov offers several explanations, all of which are drawn from his Polish sources:
the Tatars are named from the river Tatar or from the great numbers of their peoples which they themselves prefer or that he lesser half of Scythia, on the Asian Sea, is called Great Tatary.... (S.I., ll.2r-2v)

The Tatars are so named either from the river Tatar, or from their homeland, or from the great number of their people which they themselves claim...(Stryjkowski, I, pp.229-230)

the Tatars...having settled a state...which contains...the lesser half of the land that is not on the Asia Sea. (Botero, I, p.165)

This is the extent of Lyzlov's discussion as he does not attempt to resolve the issue.6

Lyzlov's second positing of an historical question is to establish the reasons behind the Tatar invasion of Europe. In the heading to Part I, Chapter 2, Lyzlov asks the question: "Under what circumstances did the Tatars abandon their homelands and come to Europe"(l.1r). In the text itself, at the very beginning of the chapter, Lyzlov rephrases the question: "writers give different accounts of the reason or the cause of their exodus from their [native] lands and their arrival in these countries...."(l.7v)

Lyzlov gives two possible answers: the first is from Botero who describes how the Tatars were subject to a certain Unkham who, afraid of their power, sent them off to foreign wars. Faced with this fate, the Tatars took matters into their own hands:

they gathered together and decided to leave their native land and this they did....(S.I, ll.7r-7v)

they resolved to leave their native land; and they achieved this..... (Botero, III, p.83)

The second solution is from Guagnini who cites Herberstein's account of how a certain Gideon informed the Tatars of the impending end of the
world:

and he advised them...to collect the world's treasure and wealth which was to be destroyed together with the world. They agreed to this and left Tatary with an inumerable multitude...
(S.I., 1.8v)

advising them...to gather the world's treasure and wealth which must be destroyed together with the world. They agreed to this and [left] Tatary with an inumerable multitude...(Guagnini, p.585)

As in the first example Lyzlov leaves the matter hanging and does not decide upon an explanation.

The depth of Lyzlov's interest in and his awareness of providing an explanation, from the evidence of these two examples, is questionable. In the second example Lyzlov's posing of the question about the reasons for the Mongol invasion is taken directly from Guagnini:

the reason or cause of their exodus from their [native] lands and their arrival in these countries...(S.I., 1.7v)

However as to the reason for their exodus from these lands and their arrival in our Sarmatian lands... (Guagnini, p.585)

The actual question about the naming of the Tatars ("and why the Tatars are so named") is of Lyzlov's own devising, but it does have a model in Stryjkowski. In the heading to Book IV, Part 2 Stryjkowski has: "on the origins...of the Rus people...and why they are called Slavs." (I, p.95)7

So on both occasions, after having raised an "explanatory" question, Lyzlov does not attempt to resolve it nor does he consciously attempt to discuss the differing explanations that he presents. He simply leaves the issues hanging. These are two examples of where Lyzlov follows a Polish model without any interest in the content.
There are three instances in the text where Lyzlov, in contrast to the above two, actually provides an explanation. In the three instances Lyzlov attempts to account for a seeming inconsistency in his account -- to fill in lacunae left by his sources. The first occurs in his account of the splitting up of the Volga Bulgars. From Stryjkowski, Lyzlov related how many Volga Bulgars migrated to the area around the Danube. Lyzlov was then forced to account for the fact that the remaining peoples in the Volga region are differently named in the Muscovite and the Polish sources: the Muscovite sources call them "Lower Bolgars" and the Polish sources call them the "Trans-Volga Horde." Lyzlov offers the following solution:

[the Bulgars] remaining in their native lands merged with the Tatar peoples who lived near them. The Tatars who were called the Trans-Volga Horde...lived below the Bulgar borders...and because of their proximity to the remaining Upper Bulgars they developed the same character as this wild people. All the Russian chronicles call them Lower Bolgars...and foreign historians call this country the Trans-Volga Horde....(S.I., l.12r)

Lyzlov's second attempt at explanation is similar to the first. Having cited a long excerpt from Stryjkowski on the Polovtsy and the Pechenegs, Lyzlov is faced with the apparent dilemma of claiming that both the Pechenegs/Polovtsy and the Bulgars lived in the same area:

Here the reader perhaps has doubts as to how an historian can place in one area two peoples, the Bolgars and the Polovtsians. (S.I., l.13v)

Lyzlov offers two possible solutions:

it is possible to conjecture either that the Bolgars first lived in these areas and then the Polovtsians and the Pechenegs arrived...from beyond the Dnieper; or that the steppe is [so] extensive...that one people that is the Polovtsians and the Pechenegs lived in the steppe and the other that is the Bolgars
lived...along the sea... (S.I., l.13v)

Lyzlov partially confirms one of these solutions by citing Stryjowski:

For the Polovtsians for the most part... lived in tents in the steppe....(S.I., l.13v)
For the Polovtsians...for the most part lived in tents in the steppe....
(Stryjowski, I, p.169)

The third instance is Lyzlov's attempt to resolve the question of the fate of the Pechenegs, Polovtsy, Bulgars, and the Trans-Volga Horde after their defeat by the Mongols. Part I of the *History of the Scythians* had been given over in large measure to a discussion of these peoples. With Baty's invasion Lyzlov's attention shifts completely to the Mongols, but Lyzlov clearly feels the need to account for his earlier subjects. None of his sources have any information whatsoever. Lyzlov offers the following solution:

[Baty] evicted the Polovtsians and the Pechenegs, but combined the Trans-Volga Tatars and the remaining Bulgars, as related to his people, into one [with the Mongols]...and thus he increased his military forces....(S.I., ll.14v-15r)

In all three instances Lyzlov creates solutions that are not based on information from his sources, but that are products of "commonsense" reasoning. The geographic and moral proximity of the Bulgars and the Trans-Volga Horde "explains" how the two designations essentially describe the same area. In the second example Lyzlov is on firmer ground in that Stryjowski claims that the Polovtsy and the Pechenegs lived in tents. However there is no apparent basis for the claim that the Bulgars lived along the seacoast and there is equally no reason for Lyzlov to reject the possibility of the two peoples living in the same area but at different times.
Finally there is no compelling reason for Lyzlov’s claim that the Bulgars and the Trans-Volga Horde were forcibly coopted by Baty into the Mongols. In all three instances Lyzlov provides commonsense extrapolations which make his account more unified and consistent, but for which there is not a necessary reason.⁸

The majority of Lyzlov’s attempts at explanation are based on the cliches of motivation that are commonly found in traditional Muscovite history writing. Lyzlov cites as motivating factors: the love of power;⁹ the desire for revenge;¹⁰ insatiability,¹¹ pride;¹² a war-like nature;¹³ anger at treachery, hatred, the desire to spill Christian blood, the love of wealth.¹⁴

A number of Lyzlov’s attempts at explanation are rooted in references to divine causation and intervention. Lyzlov retains from his sources accounts of divine intervention.¹⁵ Lyzlov also adds statements of divine intervention and causation to the account. For example in his summation of the fall of the Golden Horde, Lyzlov writes that prior to the fall of the Horde:

God permitted it that the Russian people were not only in great disarray and captivity but simply speaking they did not dare to act on their own without Muslim permission.... (S.I., 1.51v)¹⁶

Related to a firm belief in the active hand of God in history is Lyzlov’s belief in the efficacy of prophecy. On a number of occasions Lyzlov argues that events confirm prophecy. Lyzlov’s account of the failed Crimean attack on Moscow in the 1520s also features visions in a prominent role and, as in the above account, gives authority to the vision. During the siege there were a number of visions of divine aid. Lyzlov
relates the vision of a young woman (taken from the Stepennaia kniga) at
the end of which he states that the young woman related the vision to her
confessor and "thereby this true (nelozhnoe) story spread...." (S.I., 1.147r)\textsuperscript{17}

In the account of the fall of Kazan. Lyzlov introduces a series of
visions with what appears to be a statement of his own devising:

This campaign of the pious tsar' with the Christian troops was
not contrary to the will of God and not without the most
glorious visions. The true evidence of this is contained in many
trustworthy Russian histories. The pious Tsar himself saw
some of them and others I learned from the true testimony of
trustworthy men....(S.I., 1.95v)

After his account of the various visions during the siege, Lyzlov offers this
concluding remark:

These and many other signs in clear nocturnal visions from God
announced to men of pure conscience the capture of the Muslim
town....(S.I., 1.98r)\textsuperscript{18}

Two features of these accounts are worthy of comment. The first is the
claim that the visions were "true" (nelozhnoe). To Lyzlov's mind visions are
one among many types of evidence and are to be judged according to the
rules of evidence. Visions are real historical facts. The second is the claim
that the visions "announced" the fall of Kazan; they anticipated future
events. As will be discussed below, this idea of events confirming prophecy
is prominent in the History of the Scythians.

Lyzlov adds a prophetic interpretation of his own devising to an
account of an earthquake that struck Constantinople in 1508. The basic
account is from Stryjkowski:
in the year 7017 there was a great and terrifying earthquake in Thrace, Greece, Bosnia and Dalmatia. Even in Constantinople the quake was such that all the stone buildings shook greatly.... (S.I., 1.252r)

In that year a great and terrible earthquake occurred in Thrace, Greece, Bosnia, Dalmatia and Italy. In Constantinople nearly all the buildings shook....(Stryjkowski, II, p.357)

Lyzlov adds the following interpretation of this "sign":

This announced the freeing from Turkish control of the Christian territories and the death of [the Sultan] Baozit himself....(S.I., 1.252r)

Lyzlov expected prophecy and signs to be confirmed by actual events. Prophecy and signs were not symbolic, but were an integral part of historical reality.

Lyzlov’s strong interest in the issues of divine intervention and prophecy point to a lack of concern with, and awareness of, what the modern historian would call historical explanation. As seen above, on only two occasions -- the reason for the Mongol invasion and the reason for the naming of the Tatars -- does Lyzlov appear to pose historical questions. Lyzlov’s positing the question of why the Mongols invaded and of why the Tatars are so named are direct citations from a Polish model.

In both instances, having posed the question, Lyzlov does not attempt to resolve it. He poses the question about the reasons for the Mongol invasion in the heading to Part I, Chapter 2 and in the text itself. In the text, directly after posing the question, he gives Botero’s view of the issue. A substantial digression follows (the discussion of the papal embassy to the Mongols and the attempt to identify the Khan) and Lyzlov then gives Herberstein’s view (via Guagnini). This excerpt from Guagnini is without
introduction and at no point in the balance of the chapter does Lyzlov restate, address himself to, or attempt to resolve the question posed at the outset.

The reasons for the naming of the Tatars also appears in the chapter heading, but in contrast to the above example the question is not posed in the text. In the text Lyzlov, without introduction, offers conflicting reasons for the naming of the Tatars (drawn directly from Polish sources) and does not attempt to resolve them.

The three other attempts at the historical explanation of larger issues -- all three treating the movement of peoples -- are no more indicative of an awareness of historical causation. The three are based on commonsensical suppositions and are aimed at the elimination of any apparent inconsistency. That these five examples all occur within the first fifteen folios of the History of the Scythians, while there was ample opportunity to pose similar questions in the remainder of the work, further suggests Lyzlov's basic lack of interest in these issues.

HISTORICAL DISPUTES

Historical disputes appear throughout the History of the Scythians. A "historical dispute" is an instance when Lyzlov presents a disagreement between two (or more) of his sources about a certain fact or event. Occasionally Lyzlov attempts to resolve the dispute, but more often than not he leaves the dispute unresolved. This section will first look at those
disputes that Lyzov attempts to resolve and, in so doing, will attempt to establish Lyzov's criteria for dispute resolution. This section will then look at the unresolved disputes and then will discuss what the presentation of disputes reveals about Lyzov as the critical historian.

The first dispute that Lyzov resolves is the controversy over the dating of Baty's campaign into Hungary. Lyzov presents the issue as a dispute between Kromer, Dlugosz and Miechowski on the one hand and Guagnini on the other:

in the year from the birth of Christ 1241 as the Polish chroniclers Kromer, Dlugosh, Mekhovskii agree upon... Aleksandr Gvagnin... claims that it was during the reign... of Boleslav the Shy... he writes that his reign began in... 1243 and thus by his evidence the Tatar invasion was two years later...
(S.I., ll.18v-19r)

Lyzov resolves the issue in two ways:

however he [Guagnini] alone is not sufficient against the evidence of the three above-mentioned trustworthy and old chroniclers. (S.I., l.19r)

Guagnini loses in the numbers game as he is one against the testimony of three. Guagnini also does not carry the weight of these three whom Lyzov describes as "old" (starykh) and "trustworthy" (vernykh). Both of these adjectives endow the three historians with an authority that Guagnini, who is not described at all, does not enjoy.

The second resolved dispute is over the date of the Turkish conversion to Islam. Lyzov cites Stryjkowski's claim that the Turks converted to Islam under Osman:
in the year 1300...some historians write that Otoman together with the Saracens converted to Muhammed's law... (S.I., l.193v)

In the same year 1300...Ottoman...was chosen as the Turkish Emperor who then, having converted to Muhammed's law together with the Turks and the Saracens... (Stryjkowski, I, p.342)

However Lyzlov then makes the statement:

but this is not so as was more clearly from Baronio and Botero recounted above...(S.I., l.193v)

The reference to the previous citation from Botero is to a statement in the midst of a long section on the spread of Islam after Muhammed's death:

Today the sects of the Infidel Makhomet are stronger and more numerous due to the strength of the people [nations] that adhere to them rather than due to its own strength. There are four leading peoples, the Arabs, the Persians, the Tatars and the Turks...(S.I., l.179r/Botero, IV, p.149)

The date of the conversion is not at all clear from this general statement.

The reference to Baronio, however, does provide Lyzlov with a firm date:

they [the Turks] accepted the law of the false prophet Makhomet as Boroni recounts in the year...632 or a bit later...(S.I., l.187v/Baronio, VII, 632)

Lyzlov's terms "more clearly" (iavstvennee) and "as recounted above" (vyshe sego iziavisia) are the keys to his argument. Baronio and Stryjkowski have conflicting dates and there is no apparent reason to choose between the two. Lyzlov brings in Botero in order to confirm Baronio even though there is no date in Botero's account: "iavstvennee" renders Baronio and Botero authoritative. The statement "vyshe sego iziavisia" caps the argument -- that the evidence which contradicts Stryjkowski's assertion had already
been stated serves to heighten the suspect nature of Stryjkowski’s claim.

The third dispute is similar to the second. Lyzlov cites an excerpt from Bielski which claims that the Turks got their name when they conquered Thrace:

Belskoi writes that the Turks were so named at the time that they captured Thrace.... (S.I., l.193v)

And when they captured Thrace they were called by the Thracians Trucy, transposing the two letters thus Turks [Turcy]. (Bielski, l.239v)

Lyzlov then disputes Bielski’s claim:

but this is not true at all for the Turks were named many hundreds of years before this as was clearly recounted above and will be restated below... (S.I., l.193v)

Lyzlov’s references to previous statements in the History of the Scythians seem to be to l.185r where he cites both Baronio and Kromer:

in the year...567...during the reign of Justinian...his voevoda...defended the Danube region against the Avars who had settled there fleeing their neighbors the Turks.... (S.I., l.185r/Baronio, VI, 566)

Kromer writes that the Turks, a Tatar people and inhabitants of the Caucasus...expanded their state in the year...(S.I., l.185r/Kromer, pp.72-3)

Lyzlov continues his account to state that Bielski himself provided evidence that contradicted his initial assertion:

however this historian himself contradicts this, citing the evidence of another historian ....(S.I., l.193v)

Others write that the Turks were named from the Teukry who were at Troy during the war with the Greeks. However Silwius denies this recounting that the Teukry were Italians from Crete...who had fled Troy. (Bielski, l.239v)

Once again Lyzlov’s choice of language is important: the statement ‘not
true at all" (nito istinna) places Bielski beyond the pale immediately.
Similarly the claim that in an earlier section of the History of the
Scythians Lyzlov had "clearly" (iavno) presented a differing account conveys
the impression of an issue already decided. That Bielski himself provided
evidence that contradicted his first suggestion serves further to undermine
his credibility.

There are two moments in the History of the Scythians where there
is a glimmer of a method, but where there is no resolution of the dispute
at all. Lyzlov cites an excerpt from the Khranograf that claims that the
Byzantine Emperor Anastasius concluded a treaty with the Turks in order
to avoid their attacks:

the Turks began to attack neighboring peoples about which the
Russian Khranograf without the slightest evidence begins the
account of the reign of Anastasius stating that the Turks had
captured the Eastern region and had concluded a peace with
Emperor Anastasius... (S.I., l.186r/ Khranograf, p.291)

Lyzlov's use of the phrase "without the slightest evidence" (krome vsiakikh
svidetelstv) suggests in his mind the importance of supporting evidence.

Lyzlov contrasts to the Khranograf the account in Baronio:

Baronio, who recounts everything that took place in the reigns
of the Greek Emperors, has nothing about this. He only writes
that Emperor Anastasius lost most of his army in Persia and
was ransomed from these wild peoples for gold.... (S.I.,
l.186r/Baronio, VI, 592)

Where Lyzlov casts doubt upon the Khranograf's account, he endows
Baronio's version with greater authority by establishing him as the
authority for Byzantine history. However he does not explicitly accept
Baronio's version over that of the Khranograf.
The other dispute is equally ill-defined. Lyzlov cites Kromer on how
the Byzantine Emperor Manuel was taken captive by the Turks in 1171:

The historian Kromer recounts that in 6679 the Greek Emperor
Manuil engaged the Turks in battle in Eastern Asia [Anatolia]
and was defeated by them and he himself was taken prisoner.
Then, having concluded a peace, he was released....(S.I.,
l.191v/Kromer, p.187)

Lyzlov then makes a statement about the lack of confirmation in the
sources and then cites the seemingly contradictory account of Bielski:

there is nothing about this in other histories. Bielski says
about this only that in the above mentioned year Emperor
Manuil aided the Christian troops in the Holy Land against
Saladin.... (S.I., l.191v/Bielski, l.179r)

Kromer's and Bielski's accounts are mutually contradictory and are both
equally unconfirmed. Lyzlov has enough information to dispute Kromer's
account but not enough to suggest an alternative.\textsuperscript{19}

The majority of historical disputes in the \textit{History of the Scythians}
exhibit neither method nor resolution\textsuperscript{20} as Lyzlov presents the contradictory
accounts and then leaves the issue hanging. An example of this is the
dispute over the date and the circumstances of the death of Ahmed, Khan
of the Golden Horde. Lyzlov first cites the account from a source similar to
the \textit{Kazanskaia istoriia} which claims that during Akhmed's flight from the
Ugra, Akhmed crossed the Volga:

There he was killed by his brother-in-law Iamtemir
Murza...(S.I., l.37v)

Lyzlov opposes to this the account drawn from the \textit{Stepennaia kniga}:

The \textit{Stepennaia kniga} recounts that in the second year after his
appearance on the Ugra the Nogai khan Ivan attacked him and
[killed] Akhmad....(S.I., l.37v/S.K., XV, 16)
Lyzlov makes no attempt to resolve the issue and he simply states:

But whether this way or that, from that time on the Horde fell into final ruin. (S.I., 1.37v)²¹

This interest in historical disputes was a new phenomenon in Muscovite history writing, appearing neither in the chronicle nor the Khronograf traditions. However there is little rhyme or reason to the types of issues that Lyzlov presents in dispute form. Five treat chronology; five deal with the circumstances of death (how, by whom, where, if at all); two deal with captive monarchs, two with Turko-Christian relations; one deals with an embassy and one with the boundaries of Scythia. There is no real pattern to the subjects and a number of them -- how many sons were captured? was Amurat killed by a sword or by a spear? -- border on the trivial. Lyzlov certainly was not disputing major issues of substance.

It is fair to question whether Lyzlov had any sense of historical priorities or historical discrimination. It seems that the identification of the type of weapon used to kill Amurat was, in his mind, of the same importance as the dating of Amurat's death or as the reasons for the Mongol invasion of Europe. Lyzlov makes no attempt at all even to suggest an awareness of levels of historical significance.

Lyzlov does not have a set method of resolution. On two occasions the resolution seems to be dependent upon numbers; other resolutions appear dependent upon appeals to authority either through the characterization of works or through reference to earlier passages in the History of the Scythians. The basic conclusion is that Lyzlov did not have
a historical method as witnessed by the large number of historical disputes that remained unresolved. A strong case can be made that Lyzlov's use of disputes stemmed not from an inherent interest in questions of new methodology, but from an interest in imitating Polish models.

On two occasions Lyzlov copies a dispute directly from his Polish sources. The excerpt from Guagnini that opens the History of the Scythians features an unresolved dispute on the origins of Skif, the progenitor of the Scythians:

[He] relates that the Scythians had their origins from their first prince Skif who was born from the union of Jov and a Virgin who was human down to her waist and the rest of her was similar to a serpent...Other chroniclers doubt this and say that it is a myth [for mermaids are the only creatures like that] and think that the tale is false or contains fables...Other historians state that Scythia was named after Skif, the son of Hercules... (S.I., l.1v)

Scythia Dux Primus natus fuit ex Jove & Virgine; quae fuit umbelicotenus homo: reliquum vero ejus vipersae speciem refertat...We do not know what sort of beast this is (save for a mermaid), such a story is fabulous, or contains mythology...These words are in accord with other Historians who claim that Scythia is named after Scyth, the son of Hercules...(Guagnini, p.581)

Lyzlov cites an excerpt from Stryjkowski that includes a dispute over the fate of two Rus' princes at the battle on the Kalka:

they [the Tatars] first defeated and scattered the Polovtsians and then easily defeated the Russian troops and captured, according to Mekhovskii, the two princes, Mstislav of Kiev and the prince of Chernihiv, but Bielski writes that they killed [them].... (S.I., l.9v)

and having defeated and scattered the Polovtsians, they then easily defeated the Rus' troops and captured, according to Miechoviosticus, two princes, Mscislaw of Kiev and [the prince] of Chernihiv, but Bielski writes that they killed [them]....(Stryjkowski, I, p.230)
Stryjkowski and Bielski have disputes which Lyzlov does not cite, but which are in sections of those works from which Lyzlov excerpted material and therefore it is fair to assume that Lyzlov would have been aware of the dispute. Stryjkowski cites the dispute over the direction of the comet that "announced" the arrival of the Mongols:

a very great and unusual comet marked...the invasion of the Tatars...the flame turning to the East, towards the Polovtsians and the Rus' principalities, at times also turning to the West. In this Kromer disagrees with Miechowius, for the latter states: Coma in orientem versa apparuit, while the former states supra Polovczos Tanaym ac Russiam girans caudamque in occasum porrigens, and Wapowius and Bielskii follow him; but however it was, nevertheless it gave a clear sign of the invasion of those evil...neighbors. (Stryjkowski, I, p.230)

It is interesting that Stryjkowski has at the end of the account that statement of indecision that Lyzlov used on several occasions cited above.

Bielski, in the above-cited controversy over the naming of the Turks, does himself provide a model for the presentation of a dispute:

and when they conquered Thrace, they were named by the Thracians Trucy; transposing the two letters, thus Turcy. Others write that the Turks are named from the Teutry who were at Troy during the war with the Greeks. But Silwius contradicts this claiming that the Teutry were Italians from Crete...But whatever it may be, the Turks are completely Tatars and they share one language.... (Bielski, I.239v)

Bielski also concludes the dispute with that standard phrase expressing his inability to decide between the conflicting versions.

There are two instances where the Polish models present a dispute and also attempt to resolve the dispute. Lyzlov does excerpt from Bielski the dispute over the place of Amurat's death:
from great anger and shame he became seriously ill and thus died...in a tent beneath the city. Others claim that he was taken still alive to Adrianople and died there... (S.I., l.211v)

Then...he died beneath Kroie in a tent...Wolteranus writes that he was taken still alive to Adrianople and died there; but Maryns, who writes according to his father's memory, is the most accurate. (Bielski, l.251r)

Lyzlov does not relate Bielski's attempt at establishing the correct version with the claim that Maryns using the more immediate source of his father's memory, should be considered the authoritative account.

Lyzlov does not cite a dispute from Kromer over the Turkish capture of Belgrad (the one on the Black Sea) although he does relate the basic account:

and so Makommet...went with his army by sea...to...Monokastrum...the Turks took the city through force. But soon after the departure of the Turks, the Voevoda Stefan recaptured it....(S.I., l.143r-143v)

they sailed to Monkastrum...and took that city through force... as Bernat Wapowski relates. Soon after the departure of the Turks and Tatars, Stephan recaptured it. However, to be sure, Dlugosz, during whose life these events took place, wrote from memory that the Turks only began to advance on the city. (Kromer, p.721)

Lyzlov ignores both the dispute and, more significantly, he also ignores a method of resolution: contemporaneity with an event can make the account more authoritative.

Lyzlov's failure to cite two occasions in which a historical method markedly more sophisticated than any that appears in the History of the Scythians suggests that he was not concerned about, or even aware of, historical methodology. If he had been interested in issues of method, he would undoubtedly have jumped at the opportunity to cite (if not imitate)
these two examples.

USE OF EVIDENCE/SOURCE USE

At only one point does Lyzlov appear to use evidence (other than the citation of one of his sources) to buttress a claim. In describing the settlement of the Golden Horde in Sarai, Lyzlov states:

and from that time a khanate was established there and their khans began to live in Great Sarai...and in Bolgar near the river Volga where there are many old palaces which even today are clear evidence of this... (S.I., 1.22r)

This would appear to be a case in which Lyzlov is using archaeological evidence to support a claim about the past: the decaying palaces are evidence of an earlier settlement.

However again Lyzlov is using a model drawn from a Polish source. Lyzlov earlier in the History of the Scythians described the history of the Polovtsy and their destruction at the hands of the Mongols. After the battle on the Kalka, Lyzlov relates directly from Stryjkowski how the Crimea was occupied by the Mongols and:

there remained only the towns that were in the Kherson Taurik itself, in the possession of the Genoese... and even to today the old, fallen walls of the towns, fortresses, and stone towers especially in Torgovitsa and other similar places...are clear evidence [of these towns]...(S.I., 1.10v)

where and today...the old, fallen walls of the towns, fortresses and old stone towers...especially in Tarhowice etc.,...are evidence [of these towns]....(Stryjkowski, I, p.231)

In both instances Lyzlov uses archaeological remains as "clear evidence"
(javnym svidetelstvom). The parallels are close enough to suggest that
Lyzlov was using on l.22r a model drawn from Stryjkowski and cited earlier
in the History of the Scythians on l.10v. It is safe to claim that Lyzlov, in
writing about the history of the Golden Horde and of the Astrakhan,
Crimean, and Kazan Khanates, never once relied upon any source other
than the written Polish and Muscovite histories and chronicles.22

This inability or the lack of desire to break out of the closed circle of
his texts is also evident in Lyzlov's idea of "research." Research, in this
context, means Lyzlov's attempts to identify further people and regions that
appear in an account that he was excerpting and his citation of a reference
for his information.23

Lyzlov's identification of the kingdom of Tevriz is an illustration of
this. From the Khronograf Lyzlov gets the account of Jani Beg's capture
of Tevriz:

this Khan Zanibek captured the Tevriz Kingdom according to
the Russian chronicles in 6865.... (S.I., l.24v/ Khronograf, p.410)

Lyzlov is clearly unwilling to allow this statement to stand on its own and
he seeks confirmation in Botero of the existence of the Tevriz kingdom:

this Tevriz kingdom could be the region lying beyond Astrakhan
between the Kvalisskii Sea and the Pontus Evskinskii which
Botero calls the region of Georgia....(S.I., 1.24v/Botero, I, pp.193-4)

Similarly Lyzlov attempts to establish the identity of one of
Timurlane's conquests. Lyzlov lists the extent of Timurlane's possessions
and includes one region that is taken from the Khronograf:

and he captured a certain kingdom located on the sea and,
because of the mountains, there is a single approach. But there is a column and iron gates... (S.I., 1.29r/ Khronograf, p.420)

Lyzlov then attempts to identify this unknown region:

one must look in Botero...to locate where this kingdom might be. He describes a certain region called Seruana or Servana, not far from the Caspian Sea...the leading cities of which are Shamakha, Ieres, and Derbent, which stands at the gates to the Caucasus at the head of a narrow route between two mountains fortified by two walls...on them are iron gates which are impassable....(S.I., 1.29r/Botero, I, p.192)

On two occasions Lyzlov is unable to confirm the identity of the subject of an account that he has excerpted. In the account of Baty's campaign against Riazan, Lyzlov (following an unnamed Muscovite source) describes how Baty besieged the town of Kozelets. Lyzlov then inserts the passage:

[It is not known about which Kozelets the old Muscovite chronicles write, either about that which is fifty versts from Koluga and today is called by the similar name Kozels or about the one in Little Russia, sixty versts from Kiev, and even today is called Kozelets]....(S.I., 1.17v)

Nowhere in his sources can Lyzlov find confirmation of which Kozelets it was, so he must leave the question unresolved.

In his account of the fall of Constantinople Lyzlov takes from the Khronograf the account of a Genoese soldier (the prince Giustiniani Longo) who comes to the aid of the Byzantines:

Only one Genoese prince by the name of Zustuni came to help Constantinople....(S.I., 1.217v/ Khronograf, p.447)

Lyzlov then has the statement of his own devising:

[confirmation of this prince, whatever his country or region, cannot be found in foreign histories, but is found only in Russian [histories]. Similarly the country or the region or the
city Zinovii cannot be found in geographers or historians nor can the name of such [a prince] be found in the discussion of other countries. However that prince is greatly famed and brave as this history will discuss below. His name in Russian histories was probably changed due to carelessness or unskilled scribes....][S.I., 1.217v]

Lyzlov is unable to find confirmation of Giustiniani's presence at the siege of Constantinople in any source other than the Kchronograf. However in this instance, because of the subject (the heroic defense against the Turks), Lyzlov is unwilling to deny the reality and he thereby comes up with two scenarios of confirmation: his name is bound at some point to appear in foreign sources; his name has been irrevocably altered by the Muscovite sources.24

Lyzlov's attempts at research highlight his reliance upon a closed circle of texts. Lyzlov's successful forays into research occur when he finds the necessary information in one of his familiar sources. Whenever Lyzlov cannot find the necessary information in one of the Polish sources, he has to admit defeat. He does not have recourse, nor does he suggest the possibility of recourse, to any other sources.

These attempts at research seem in fact to have two sides. On the one hand research is more a matter of confirmation: Lyzlov seeks to buttress the authority of his account by attempting to find confirmation of a seemingly questionable or an unclear fact. He wants the History of the Scythians to be above doubt. On the other hand, confirmation is as much an attempt to demonstrate the "scholarly" nature of the History of the Scythians as it is an attempt at scholarship. Lyzlov is showing off his
knowledge and his use of the sources, thereby hoping to deflect doubt.

Lyzlov’s concern with confirmation is best reflected in his use of margin notes. Lyzlov is one of the first in Muscovite history writing to use the source citation in the margin and he uses margin source citations throughout the work. Lyzlov establishes the basic form of the citation-margin note on the first folio of the History of the Scythians as he places in the margin next to the opening excerpt from Guagnini: "Gvagnin about the Tatars folio 1" (S.I., l.1v). Many of the other citations to both non-Muscovite and Muscovite works are equally as full giving both author, section and page number. At times when the source is mentioned directly in the text, Lyzlov will give only the page citation in the margin. For example Lyzlov has in the text: "Boter describer of the whole world suggests..." and in the margin: "part 1 folio 165" (l.2r). If Lyzlov interrupts an excerpt from a source that received full citation in the margin and then returns to that same cited page later in the account, the margin note might read: "Gvag the same place" (l.5v). These types of notes appear throughout the History of the Scythians and from the manuscript evidence there is every reason to believe that they reflect Lyzlov’s original work and are not later additions. The source of this innovation is undoubtedly Lyzlov’s non-Muscovite sources. Citations in the margin and in the text appear throughout Stryjkowski, Baronio, and Book I of Kromer.

In addition to using margin notes as straightforward citations to the excerpted text, Lyzlov also uses margin notes to confirm accounts. I have been able to identify twenty-four instances where Lyzlov uses the
confirmation notes and they break down into three types: the first is where Lyzlov is clearly using one source, but he also cites in the margin another work which has an identical account; the second is where Lyzlov cites two accounts as the source and it is impossible to establish the primacy of one over the other; the third is where Lyzlov is clearly using one source as the primary account, but where he refers to a second source to confirm a part of that account.

An example of the first is the account of a Tatar attack on Lithuania that is clearly drawn from Stryjkowski but which is also accompanied by a citation to Kromer. In the margin next to the introduction to this account where Stryjkowski is mentioned in the text, Lyzlov has: "folio 648" (a reference to the first edition of Stryjkowski). A bit later in the margin Lyzlov has: "Kromer book 28 folio 529." The texts read:
Strilkovskii writing further states that in...1450...the Trans-Volga Tatars...with their khan Maniak crossed the Don, divided their army into three, and attacked Lithuania, Podolie, and Wallachia. They ravaged Lithuania, Podolie and Volyn, but the Wallachians defeated them thrice and only a few escaped and the khan's son was captured. The khan sent envoys to Stefan threatening him with war if he did not free his son. Stefan, in the presence of the envoys, ordered the son to be cut to pieces and impaled the envoys on stakes except for one whose lips, ears, and nose he ordered to be cut off and he was sent thus to inform the khan [of what happened]...(S.I., ll.35r-35v)

at which time the Trans-Volga Tatars...with their khan Maniak crossed the Dnieper, divided their army into three and one attacked Lithuania, the others Podolie and Wallachia. In Lithuanian, in Podolie...and Volyn they plundered...but in Wallachia they were thrice defeated by the voevoda Stefan and only a few escaped and the eldest son of the khan was captured by the Wallachians. Stephan ordered [him], whose release the Trans-Volga khan requested by sending envoys with threats..., to be cut to pieces before their eyes and impaled 90 envoys on stakes. He sent to Khan Maniak one envoy, having cut off his ears and nose, to inform him of all that had happened with his son and envoys. (Stryjkowski, II, p.271)

The cited page in Kromer reads:

The Trans-Volga Tatars...with their khan Maniak crossed the Dniepr and in three sections invaded Lithuania, Podolie and Wallachia. The Tatars were defeated thrice by the voevoda Stephan and they retreated having lost the khan's son, The khan sent a threatening embassy about his son, but shortly Stephan ordered him to be cut to pieces in front of the 100 envoys and then ordered the envoys impaled on stakes, saving one who, with nose and ears cut off, was sent back to Khan Maniak and ordered to tell him all that had happened. (Kromer, p.695)

An example of the second kind occurs where Lyzlov is describing the Polovtsy's defeat at the hands of the Mongols. Lyzlov had been citing an extended section from Stryjkowski and, although there is not a citation immediately next to this excerpt, the excerpt is clearly from Stryjkowski. Lyzlov does, however, have a reference to Kromer right next to the passage
that appears in all three accounts (the *History of the Scythians*, Stryjowski, and Kromer): "Kromer book 7 folio 167."

Although the Polovtsians bravely fought against them and defeated their army, but because of the Tatar numerical superiority they eventually weakened. Because of this, although the Russians were their chief enemy, they had to out of sheer necessity ask them for help against the Tatars. They told them that what the Tatars do today, they will do to you tomorrow.... (S.I., p.9r)

Although the Polovtsians bravely fought against them and defeated their army, but because of the Tatar numerical superiority they eventually weakened. Because of this although the Russians were their chief enemy, they had out of sheer necessity to ask them for help against the Tatars. They told them that what the Tatars do to us today, they will do to you tomorrow.... (Stryjowski, I, p.230)

And although the Polovtsians were eternal enemies of the Rus’, they were however forced to ask for help from them. (Kromer, p.219)

An example of the third kind is in Lyzlov’s account of a Crimean campaign against Moscow in 1571. Next to the account Lyzlov has two citations: the first refers to Guagnini (the same on Poland folio 150) and the second to Stryjkowski (Stri folio 775). It is impossible to establish which account is primary:
in 7079 he and his army attacked the Russian lands all the way to Moscow. Everywhere they imprisoned and killed many Christians and on Easter Day they came to the tsar's city itself and burned the posad and shed much blood ...(S.I., l.157v)

In that year the Perekop Tatars savagely ravaged the Muscovite lands and on Easter Day the capital city Moscow. They burned the lower fortress, where many people were burned and suffocated...the Tatars withdrew having captured many Muscovites. (Guagnini, p.127)

In that year the Perekop Tatars savagely ravaged the Muscovite lands and on Easter Day the capital city Moscow. They burned the lower fortress to the ground, where many people were burned and suffocated...the Tatars withdrew with great booty and without opposition. (Stryjkowski, II, p.419)

It is difficult to establish from the content of the passages a completely convincing explanation for the use of the confirming notes. Thirteen of the twenty-four instances deal with Turkish or Tatar defeats and one highlights Christian bravery in a losing cause. Two highlight Christian treachery, two highlight Turkish diplomatic embassies, and three treat the battle on the Kalka. There are single notes on the humble origins of Osman, the origins of the Janissaries, and a papal mission to the Crimean khan. The emphasis does indeed appear to be on highlighting Christian successes against the Turks and Tatars and this issue will be discussed in the following chapter on the themes of the History of the Scythians. What is worth noting here is Lyzlov's use of the method itself.

As with the single margin note Lyzlov borrows the "confirmation note" from his Polish sources. The accumulation of margin notes alongside an account is a frequent occurrence in Stryjkowski, Baronio, and Book One of Kromer. Lyzlov's use of these notes does not appear to reflect particular
methodological concerns. Lyzlov does not use these notes to confirm especially speculative or controversial accounts or to confirm certain kinds of data: numbers, locations, dates. Rather, as with the other aspects of his source use that have been discussed above, Lyzlov wants to show the basic agreement between his sources -- to show how they confirm each other. In all twenty-four instances the confirming margin note refers the reader to a non-Muscovite source. The accumulation of foreign sources -- a method which itself is based on a Polish model -- serves to increase the erudition and the authority of the History of the Scythians.

A pronounced feature of the History of the Scythians is Lyzlov's concern with establishing agreement among his sources, with having his sources confirm each other. The use of "confirmation notes" and the attempts at research are clear evidence of this concern. Even Lyzlov's presentation of historical disputes can be seen as reflecting a concern with agreement. The resolved disputes and the unresolved disputes whose presentation Lyzlov concludes with a statement of indecision that is in effect an attempt to establish common ground are clear reflections of this concern. But even Lyzlov's overall concern with presenting disputes shows his awareness of the issue: his interest in agreement is such that he points out the disagreements between his sources whether or not he can resolve them. His pointing out of these few areas where his sources do not agree in fact serves to emphasize the overall agreement between his sources.

The first two parts of the History of the Scythians (with a few outlying exceptions) are characterized by a language of agreement that is
new to Muscovite history writing. With this new language Lyzlov emphasizes the theme of **agreement**:

- Many ancient and modern historians agree on this... (S.I., l.11r)
- The Polish chroniclers... agree on this... (S.I., l.18v)
- the Muscovite *Stepennaia kniga* agrees with this... (S.I., l.51r)
- [which agrees with Boter]... (S.I., l.126v)
- Even the ancient descrier of peoples Boter agrees somewhat with this... (S.I., l.135v)
- as the modern Geograf Ioann Boter agrees with me ... (S.I., l.185v)

Lyzlov also looks to the theme of **support** and **confirmation**:

- Boter supporting this in his renowned books writes... (S.I., l.6r)
- Some confirm that this was the country of Kolchis... (S.I., l.6v)
- which Striikovskii also confirms, writing... (S.I., l.25r)
- which foreign writers also support... (S.I., l.51r)
- here I attempt to cite Ioann Boter as confirmation of the Russian chronicles... (S.I., l.52r)
- this account is confirmed by accounts contained in histories... (S.I., l.184r)
- however the origins and beginning of the Turkish people... is supported by the evidence of many... (S.I., l.185v)

Lyzlov also emphasizes how sources contain supporting **evidence**:

- is clear evidence [of]... (S.I., l.10v)
- the Russian *Stepennaia kniga* attests to this in different places... (S.I., l.12r)
- clear evidence of this... (S.I., l.22r)
- As is attested in the Russian *Stepennaia kniga*... (S.I., l.22v)
as Zhigmunt Gerbershtein attests... (S.I., 1.27v)

here I attempt to cite as evidence...Ioann Boter...(S.I., 1.52r)

the origins and the beginning of the Turkish people from the Scythian people...is supported by the evidence of the many above-mentioned [historians]...(S.I., 1.185v)

in the Russian Khronograf without the slightest evidence...(S.I., 1.186r)

**Doubt** is much less of an issue:

Other chroniclers doubt this...(S.I., 1.1v)\(^3\)

Here doubt may arise in the reader...(S.I., 1.13v)

Here it is doubtful how...(S.I., 1.34v)

Not surprisingly this vocabulary is based upon Polish models,\(^3\) as once again Lyzlov looks to take advantage of the authority that these Polish histories enjoyed in late seventeenth century Muscovy. Yet this vocabulary also reflects how Lyzlov, faced with a multitude of sources, sought to highlight the consensus among his sources and, by extension, it reflects his interest in establishing consensus among his sources.

This interest in agreement and confirmation is subsumed within a larger concern with authority. The creation of an account upon which all sources agreed was the creation of an authoritative account that did not admit dispute. Agreement, however, is not the only source of authority.

Authority also stemmed from Lyzlov's display of his sources. The most obvious example of this is Lyzlov's enthusiastic use of margin notes throughout. For Lyzlov, authority begets authority and the citation of both Muscovite and non-Muscovite authorities in the margin serves to reaffirm
the authority of the *History of the Scythians*.

Another example of Lyzlov's concern with authority is his appropriation of the *persona* of the historian through the borrowing of cliches from his Polish sources. Lyzlov's comments on the historian's task emphasize the labor and the sacrifice involved in being an historian. In his Preface he states that the *History of the Scythians*:

> was compiled and written with diligent labors from various foreign historians and moreover from trustworthy Russian histories and tales BY ANDREI LYZLOV....(S.I., l.ir)

In his introduction to the section on the origins of the Turks, Lyzlov claims:

> Wishing to describe the...origins of the Trukish people, I was forced to read through with great labor and diligence many histories....(S.I., l.184v)

Stryjowski on a number of occasions has similar statements in passages with which Lyzlov would have been familiar. The Title Page to Stryjowski's *Kronika* states that the *Kronika* is:

> adequately written and compiled...from different historians and authors...with great diligence and brief labor...by Maciej...Stryjowski... (Stryjowski, I, p.i)

In the heading of Book IV (the book which discusses the origins of the Slavs and the Rus') Stryjowski states:

> the true and irrefutable origins of all the Slavic peoples was gathered with great diligence and assiduous labor. (Stryjowski, I, p.88)³³

In his description of the Turkish military, Lyzlov interpolates a statement (reproduced in bold below) into the account taken from Botero:
and thus the Turkish sultan went to battle with such equipment, with such a supply of cannon, with such a military array and with everything necessary for bombardment and for battle that it is difficult to describe. And that they thought about nothing else is clear if one looks at the fallen walls destroyed by them wherever they turn their force...(S.I., 1.299r)

for the Turks went to war with such equipment, with an abundance of cannon and different machines, with such a military array and with everything that one needs for warfare and firing. And that they thought about nothing else is obvious if one looks at the ruins that they created wherever they turned their force. (Botero, III, p.173)

Lyzlov's statement about the difficulty of creating an account is not original, but it is taken from a passage in Botero that Lyzlov had cited a few pages earlier:

For the Albanian and Karman and moreover the Nicomaedian and Trebizond forests are so great and dense and filled with trees chosen for the construction of boats that it is difficult to describe...(S.I., 1.296v/Botero, III, p.171)

Lyzlov found a formulaic statement that appealed to him and he was not hesitant to use it again.

In his introduction to his account of Islam Lyzlov explains that he feels it necessary to give a short account of Islam:

This entire history is written...about the Scythian peoples many of whom converted...to the law...of Muhammed...I think it to be necessary to recount something about...Muhammed...(S.I., l.169r)

There is a similar statement of "obligation" at the beginning of Book IV in Stryjkowski:

As I had arrived again at the history of the Rus' people...it seemed to me necessary...to establish...the specific lines [of descent] of the Slavic peoples...(Stryjkowski, I, p.89)
These statements attest to the power of Polish models and the desire to create an impression upon the reader rather than to any sense on Lyzlov's part that the "historian" engages in a methodologically different enterprise than the chronicler.  

The two scholars who have previously studied the History of the Scythians, E. V. Chistiakova and M. N. Speranskii, argue that Lyzlov was concerned with creating a "scholarly" history. E. V. Chistiakova claims that Lyzlov was a transitional historian in the shift from "traditional" to "modern" history writing and that he "abandoned providentialism and moved towards pragmatism with his attempts at a rationalistic explanation of events." In Chistiakova's view, Lyzlov was concerned with the explanation of events and the presentation of conflicting accounts. This chapter has argued that neither of these two characteristics reflect an interest in or an understanding of "a rationalistic explanation of events." Lyzlov's presentation of conflicting accounts reflects an interest in imitating Polish models and Lyzlov certainly did not attempt to develop a methodology of resolving these disputes. Lyzlov's attempts at the explanation of events are either the imitation of the Polish models or the resort to traditional Muscovite cliche. Most of his attempts at explanation are nothing more than the introduction of the two dimensional motivation characteristic of traditional Muscovite history writing.  

M. N. Speranskii had earlier advanced an argument similar to that of Chistiakova. While focussing on changes that Lyzlov made in the Khronograf account of the fall of Constantinople, Speranskii states that
"under Lyzlov's pen the old military povest' turned into a 'scholarly' historical production in the spirit of modern historiography."37 Speranskii claims that this shift was expressed in Lyzlov's interest in explaining events and in creating a more secular tone. Thus Lyzlov interpolated into the Khronograf account of the fall of Constantinople "explanations" from other sources and of his own devising. Lyzlov also weakened the religious cast of the Khronograf account although he did not free himself completely from "the providential-ethical point of view," by deleting most of the religious musings and the texts of the prayers from the Khronograf account.38

Neither of Speranskii's arguments is convincing. What Speranskii sees as Lyzlov's desire to interpolate "rationalistic" explanation into the narrative are in fact indicative rather of Lyzlov's concern (evident throughout the History of the Scythians) to create as full a narrative as possible from all his sources.39 Lyzlov, to be sure, did omit a large number of religious statements and the texts of most of the prayers, but he also retained and added religious material.40

Indeed the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that far from being interested in weakening the religious tone of traditional history writing, Lyzlov was in fact fully immersed in the traditional providential view of history. The notion of "secular explanation" was foreign to him. His interpolation of "reasons" or "motivation" into the account -- lack of unity, anger, the desire for revenge -- served to buttress and not to undermine this providential view.41
It is a mistake to speak of the History of the Scythians in terms of "historical method," "scholarly history," "secular motivation," or "rationalistic explanation." These terms are completely anachronistic in the context of late seventeenth century Muscovy. Lyzlov had no interest in being, nor was he, a pioneer on the road from "providentialism" to "rationalism."

What was of compelling interest to him was the creation of an authoritative account that would convince his audience. The following chapter will discuss the reward that Lyzlov held out to those who were willing to be convinced.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. There is no direct proof of this statement. However the enthusiasm with which members of the political elite -- Tsars Aleksei and Fedor, Sophia, several Golitsyns, Trubetskois and Matveevs to name the most prominent -- embraced aspects of Polish culture suggests that Polish culture enjoyed a cachet that made its products more desirable than those of Muscovite culture.

2. The passage in Bielski reads: "Orchanes son of Othman, the second Turkish king" (Bielski, I.239v).

3. Thus: "Selim 2 the 12th. Turkish Sultan" (S.I., I.271v); "Amurat 3 the 13th. Turkish Sultan" (S.I., I.277v); "Makhomet 3 the 14th. Turkish Sultan" (S.I., I.287v).

4. The passage in Bielski reads: "In the year 1328, upon the completion of 28 years [on the throne] he died...." (Bielski, I.239v)

5. Another (albeit minor) structural borrowing from his Polish sources is Lyzlov's references to elsewhere in the text. These statements range from "as will be shown below" to "as was stated about this above in Part II, Chapter 3 of this History." It is not necessary that Lyzlov look to a model to make these statements (which are new in Muscovite history writing), but compare to statements in Guagnini: "as was discussed in Book 3, in the description of Rus" (p.586); "as was discussed above in the description of Moscow" (p.600); "as was discussed in the first Books" (p.616). These are all pages in Guagnini that Lyzlov cited extensively; therefore he would have been aware of these statements.

6. A striking feature of Book I of Marcin Kromer's Kronika is his philological inquiry into the origins of the name "Slav." Stryjkowski had a much less sophisticated discussion of the same questions as do the Muscovite origins tales that are derivative from Stryjkowski's account. For a further discussion of these origins tales, see Chapter Four.

7. While this page is not cited directly elsewhere in the History of the Scythians, and it is not within a section that Lyzlov cites in the History of the Scythians, Lyzlov was unquestionably familiar with this section since he
translated the first four books of Stryjkowski in 1682. See: A. I. Rogov, Russko-pol'skie sviazi epokhi Vozrozhdeniia (Moscow, 1966), pp.271ff.

8. The balance of Lyzlov's attempts at historical explanation is of a lesser scale in that they attempt to establish an immediate reason or explanation for a specific event and are not aimed at tackling a major problem: Lyzlov adds the Tatar desire to avoid subjection to the Turks to the account taken from Guagnini of the retreat across the steppe from Astrakhan (S.I., l.121v; Guagnini, p.609); Lyzlov adds to an account from Baronio that the frequent turnover of monarchs leads to the fragility of peace treaties (S.I., l.189v); Lyzlov adds to Bielski's account of Suleiman's death the suggestion that he made peace with his neighbors in order to hand over a peaceful kingdom to his son (S.I., l.271r).

9. See: l.24r, l.121r., l.198v., l.255r., l.272v., l.279v., l.240v.

10. See: l.157v, l.259v, l.260r, l.272v.

11. See: l.18v, ll.193v-194r, l.212v, l.244r.

12. See: l.27r, l.237v, l.280v.

13. See: l.242r, ll.251r-251v.

14. See: l.246v, l.255v., ll.142v-143r, l190r.

15. See: l.17r; ll.24r-24v; l.27v; l.28v; l.60v; l.81v; l.103r; ll.145r-145v; l.149r; l.222v; l.224v; l.226r; l.231r.

16. Other similar references to divine intervention occur on: l.15r, l.122v, ll.123r-123v, l.168r, l.188r, l.188v, l.201v, l.205r, l.237v. There is one occasion where Lyzlov de-divinizes the account (taken from the Sinopsis): l.18v.

17. The account is taken from the Stepennaiia kniga but the statement about the subsequent spread of the "true story" appears to be Lyzlov's own addition. Of course, there is always the possibility that the redaction of the Stepennaiia kniga that Lyzlov used contained this phrase.

18. Perhaps both these statements reflect the version of the History of Kazan that Lyzlov was using and are not in fact of his own invention. Nevertheless what is significant here is that Lyzlov has no hesitation in reproducing these statements -- they clearly fit into his view of history.

19. There is one dispute in which Lyzlov demonstrates no sense of method but resolves the issue nonetheless. The dispute is over the proper Western boundary of Scythia. Lyzlov cites Guagnini's claim that the Don is the Western boundary, but then cites (and agrees with) Botero's claim that the Volga is the Western boundary. (S.I., l.2r) There is no "methodological"
reason for this sort of resolution. There is an ideological reason: with the
Don as the Western boundary the heartland of Muscovy is within Scythia
whereas with the Volga as the Western boundary Muscovy is distinctly
separate from Scythia. One of Lyzlov's concerns was to establish Muscovy as
a part of Europe and the Slavs as an European people.

Specifically Lyzlov is arguing against a current in late seventeenth
century Muscovy that considered the Slavs as descendants of the Scythians.
There was a basic tale of the origins of the Slavs/Russians and Moscow that
traced the descent from "Skif" to "Sloven" and "Rus". See: the Khronograf of
1679; the Mazurin Chronicle; separate origins tales (beginning: "v leto ot
sotvoreniiia mira 2244...") in the following 17th. century manuscripts -- GPB,
Pogodin 1559; BAN, Arkh. sob. 198; BAN 34.4.1; BAN 13.2.23; BAN 33.9.7;
BAN 33.14.29; BAN 4.7.7.

20. I am omitting from this discussion the disputes already raised at the
beginning of this chapter with the discussion of "historical explanation": the
naming of the Tatars and the reasons for the Mongol invasion of Europe.
These do not follow the "dispute model" that Lyzlov uses for the following
eamples. Each is an example of an unresolved dispute however.

21. Similar unresolved disputes appear on: ll.137v-138r, l.142r, l.148v-149r,
ll.186v-187r, l.199r, l.202v, l.207r, l.209v, ll.235v-236r, l.248r.

22. Kromer and Stryjkowski on several occasions relate contemporary
experiences to help illuminate the past. See: Kromer, pp.12, 18, 22;
Stryjkowski, I, pp.29-30, 77. Lyzlov does not use these sections in the History
of the Scythians as they discuss the early history of the Slavs. However
Lyzlov was familiar with the examples in Stryjkowski as he had translated
them in 1682 (and he omitted then the example from pp.29-30). It is safe to
assume that with his interest in the early history of the Slavs he would have
been familiar with Book I of Kromer's Kronika.

23. This does not include more common forms of identifications: describing
what is meant by a compass or by cancer; giving fuller or different titles for
rulers; giving alternative descriptions of geographic terms or areas.

24. The Muscovite sources were on firm ground with their account of this
Genoese soldier. Giovanni Giustiniani Longo did come to the aid of
Constantinople and was killed during the siege. See inter alia: Steven

25. A minor variation on the citation-margin note is the margin note within
the text. I have found three instances where Lyzlov puts the note within the
text: "and further in the same account on folio 152 he writes..."(l.6v); "as is
written in the Stepennaja kniga stepen" 11 chapter 6..."(l.24r); "as the historian
Gvagnin writes in the description of Lithuania on folio 92..."(l.148v).
26. All the manuscript evidence suggests that the margin notes are Lyzlov's own and are not later additions. Sin.460 -- the oldest extant MS. -- has the most margin notes of the MSS. that I have examined. Two MSS. from the early eighteenth century -- BAN 32.4.27 and BAN 32.1.36 -- have the least number of omissions (using Sin.460 as the benchmark). The 1787 edition also retains a significant percentage of the notes. Stuttgart 440 from the mid-eighteenth century also retains a significant percentage of the notes. The two MSS. from the second half of the eighteenth century -- Erm.407 and Erm.485 -- have a substantial number of omissions. Sin.460 has by my calculation 518 notes. Using this as a benchmark: BAN 32.4.27 has 40 omissions, BAN 32.1.36 has 65 omissions, 1787 has 30 omissions, Stuttgart has 9 omissions, Erm.407 has 110 omissions, Erm.485 has 476 omissions. Earlier does not always mean closer to the original, but in this case (among these examples) it seems that the margin notes dropped out over time.

The relationships with regard to margin notes contrast markedly with the relationships drawn on the basis of textual variants. From the textual discussion: 1787 and Stuttgart are from different groups; 32.4.27 and 32.1.36 are from different groups.

The mix of groups suggests that it is not the case that the consistency of notes among a certain group of MSS. is evidence simply of common descent from Sin.460 and that there is another group of MSS. descending from an equally old MS. that does not contain margin notes.

Erm.485 is the only MS. that has a serious number of omissions. It is hard to argue that it reflects the rule and that the others are the exception.

There are no alternative notes: the MSS. either have the same note that Sin.460 has or they do not have the note at all. There is no third option.

27. See: ll.21r-21v; ll.35r-35v; 118r-118v; 120v; 137r; 137v; 144r; 145r; 157v; 210v; 238v; 243r-243v; 245v-246r; 249v.

28. See: ll.138r; 238v-239r; 249r; 258r; 9r; 10r; 10r-10v.

29. See: ll.193r; 239r; 137v.

30. This is a translation of Botero's statement: "niektorzy chca iakby to byla owa Kolchis..." (Botero, I, p.141)

31. This statement is a translation of a statement from Guagnini that reads: "Coby to za zwierze bylo...nie czytamy...." (Guagnini, p.584)

32. For models of agreement see: Stryjkowski, I, p.111 ("And on this...they agree with the Greek venerable historians...."); "the ...Rus' chronicles agree on this...."); I, p.110 ("it does not agree with Ezekiel..."); I, p.230 ("on this Cromer does not agree with Miechovius..."). See also Guagnini, p.581 ("These words are in accord with other Historians..."); p.586 ("all Historians agree on this...").

For models of confirmation, see: Stryjkowski, I, p.92 ("This Cromerus also...confirms about Moscow..."); I, p.111 ("And this confirms...").
For models of evidence, see: Stryjkowski, I, p.94 ("Plinius...attests in these clear words."); I, p.102 ("Cromer...attests..."); I, p.105 ("Herodotus...attests..."); I, p.234 ("as Cromer...and Dlugosz...attest..."); II, p.10 ("The Rus' Chronicles...attest about this..."); II, p.313 ("As the Rus' Chroniclers and Miechovius attest..."); II, p.325 ("as this Chronicle attests...").

All these models are from sections which Lyzlov cited or with which he was familiar from his earlier translation.

33. See also the passages in Stryjkowski: I, p.16; I, p.27; I, p.88. These are in sections with which Lyzlov would have been familiar from his 1682 translation.

34. For similar statements by Ignatii Rimskii-Korsakov, see: Bogdanov and Chistiakova, op. cit., p.88.


36. On Chistiakova's discussion of Lyzlov and conflicting authorities, see: Chistiakova, op. cit., p.355.

Chistiakova also claims that Lyzlov's interest in establishing correct dates and genealogy is another example of his modernity. Dates and rulers were certainly not new to Muscovite history writing; they were, and continued to be, the building blocks of any historical narrative. Lyzlov does on occasion attempt with great care to establish a precise date for events (II.8v-9r, I.18v-19r, II.25v-26r, II.36r-38r, I.148v, I.253v, I.261v, II.280r-280v). and to establish a continuous and logical genealogy (II.7v-9r, I.9r, I.14v, II.31r-32v, I.136v, II.141r-142v, II.148v-150v., II.155v-157v). However there is no method of resolution apart from commonsense or the use of one source to complement another. Lyzlov's concern is evidence of the importance to him of dates and rulers; it does not reveal a modern historian at work.

Lyzlov does use on occasion a dating system that is different from the traditional Muscovite calculation of dates from Creation. Lyzlov either uses the birth of Christ, Creation, or a combination of the two as his dating benchmarks. Lyzlov is imitating his Polish models, most notably Stryjkowski (for example: I.8v/Stryjkowski, I.p.230). Lyzlov has no interest in the principles of chronology; rather he is looking to produce an effect.

Chistiakova cites as evidence of Lyzlov's interest in explanation the following: "discussing the kaleidoscopic change of khans in the Horde at the end of the fourteenth century, when several rulers lasted only seven days on the throne, he interrupts Stryjkowski's text and notes in brackets: 'for power obtained evilly usually does not last long.' This phrase allows the possibility to judge the political views of an adherent of strong tsarist authority, obtained not by force and conquest, but by hereditary succession." (Ibid., p.355) The text in the History of the Scythians reads:

But that khan Temiross lasted only seven days in his evilly
obtained power [for power that is obtained in an evil manner usually does not last long].(1.25v)

Chistiakov is simply careless here. The full passage, including the passage in brackets, is from Guagnini:

After the death of Narusz, Chydir [was khan] whose own son Themir Hoscha killed him for the throne, but an evilly obtained kingdom does not last long [and] he reigned for only seven days. (Guagnini, p.587)

The so-called explanation in the brackets is at best a typical piece of medieval moralizing.


38. Ibid., p.220. Speranskii states that Lyzlov still felt the need to include phrases such as: "due to the people's sins;" "by God's will due to the people's sins."

39. See ibid., pp.216-217, for Speranskii's discussion of the interpolations from the Stepennaia kniga. I will focus here on two interpolations that Speranskii sees as attempts by Lyzlov to explain and to clarify events. Speranskii presents the first in the following manner: "Having discussed the construction of a fortress on the Thracian shore, Lyzlov adds of his own: 'In addition they put to sea galleys and ships and katargs with many troops and guns so as not to allow the Greeks free passage by sea.' This is not in the sources, but in this manner Lyzlov explained to himself the reason for the construction of the fortress and the beginning of the blockade. Therefore for him the mention of the Turkish fleet was completely natural." (Ibid., p.217(S.L., 1.213r)) In fact Lyzlov gets this account from Kromer: "in the Propontus region a fortress was established with great rapidity, in addition to which galleys were equipped with men and weapons, thereby hoping to besiege the Greeks and to prevent free passage on the sea." (Kromer, p.588)

Speranskii's second example: "Having stated that the Greeks could not depend upon their own forces in a battle with the Turks, he explains: 'although they had troops, they were few, in addition to which they were inexperienced and unskilled in military affairs.'" (Ibid., p.217(S.L., 1.213v)) Lyzlov draws this account from Bielski in a slightly changed form: "although he had enough men and money but they were inexperienced and cowardly...." (Bielski, 1.251r) Lyzlov changes "enough men" to "they were few" out of editorial choice. The excerpt immediately preceding this (taken from the Stepennaia kniga) had indeed stated that the Greeks could not rely on their own forces, but it had continued (also following the Stepennaia kniga) to give a reason for this: the Greeks had few troops and the Emperor's brothers were absent. In fact, this is evidence of Lyzlov as editor, creating an integrated account and not of Lyzlov as historian, seeking out an explanation.

Lyzlov however retains a number of religious statements, most prominent of which are the passages describing the visions which presaged the fall of the city: 1.226v/p.452; 1.231r/p.456.

Lyzlov also adds religious statements of his own: 1.231r/p.456; 1.231v/p.457; 1.234r/p.458. Significantly Lyzlov concludes his account by placing it within a divine context (apart from the prophecy of Leo and Mefodii mentioned above in this chapter): "and thus the pagan Sultan Makhomet...by God's will...this most glorious city of the East...." (1.236r)

The omissions and additions do not fall into a readily apparent pattern. Whatever Lyzlov's motivation might have been, it is difficult to argue that he was secularizing the account.

41. There is no necessary contradiction between a causation based on divine intervention and a causation based on discrete historical events on the human scale. The latter can easily coexist within the overall framework of the former. See: Contius, op cit.; Antonia Gransden, "Realistic Observation in Twelfth-Century England," Speculum, 47(1972).
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SEARCH FOR FAME

Lyzlov offers fame (slava) as the reward to those who are willing to fight bravely against the Tatars and the Turks and to the monarchs who are willing to commit themselves to such a struggle. Fame as an attribute to be earned and enjoyed in this life was a new feature in Muscovy and it clearly stems from the cultural connection with the Ukraine and Poland. However fame was not simply a literary fashion but indeed became part of a new royal and aristocratic ethos. This chapter will first look at how Lyzlov presents fame in the History of the Scythians and then will attempt to place Lyzlov’s interest in fame within the broader context of a new court ethos.

The account that Lyzlov creates of the reasons for the migration of the Bulgars from the Volga to the Danube revolves around this theme of military prowess as a source of fame. Lyzlov relates that the Bulgars learned how some of their cousin tribes (of the “mostglorious” Slavic peoples) had gained fame through warfare:

and having heard about some of their co-tribes of the Slav people such as the Vandals, Tsymbry, Goths who were spreading the fame of their name and flourishing in military deeds and gaining victories...many historians write about their famous military deeds...(S.I., l.11v)

The Bulgars wanted to imitate their relations:

envious of this many Bolgars left their countries and settlements searching for cooler areas and wishing to gain fame...(S.I., l.11v)

The Bulgars settled on the Danube and in fact gained fame through victories
over the Byzantine Empire.

This specific account of the Bulgars expresses what Lyzlov saw as the overall intention of the History. The Bulgars, hearing of the fame of their cousins, are thereby inspired themselves to seek fame. Lyzlov hoped that the Muscovite reader of this exemplary tale would be inspired to emulate the Bulgars: to use the account of another's successful search for fame as the spur to seek fame oneself.

Lyzlov returns to this theme of the link between military success and fame throughout the History most notably in his discussion of the Turkish rise to power.¹ In his discussion of the early history of the Turks and of their early military campaigns in Syria (drawn from Baronio) Lyzlov adds the following summary statement:

and from then on the Turkish name starts to grow famous...(S.I., l.186v)

In a passage reminiscent of his account of the migration of the Bulgars, Lyzlov describes the reasons for the initial Turkish attack upon Byzantium. Lyzlov relates how the "Hagarites" (Agariany) attacked Syria and captured Jerusalem. Lyzlov then states:

and the Turks, envious of this, wanting to spread their fame and to show their strength... (S.I., l.187v)

The account then continues to describe the successful Turkish campaigns against Byzantium.

Lyzlov's introduction to the section on Osman, the first Ottoman Sultan, opens with the statement that clearly ties military skill to the generation of fame:
In these countries...the Turks lived, wandering here and there, and they spread their fame through military prowess...(S.I., l.193r)

Lyzlov continues in the same vein later in the section:

When Otoman became Sultan of the Turks he greatly spread his fame accomplishing famous deeds and gaining frequent victories over adjoining neighboring peoples and their rulers; from this moreover arose the insatiable desire to gain eternal fame for himself and his people, to expand his power, and to establish a kingdom...(S.I., ll.193v-194r)

Finally at the conclusion of his account of the fall of Constantinople, Lyzlov describes the glory that Mehmed gained with his capture of the city:

And so the infidel Sultan Makhomet...having established...eternal fame for his people conquered the most glorious city in the East and moreover the entire Empire...(S.I., l.236r)

Military prowess and fame are clearly linked in the History of the Scythians: the former generates the latter. Lyzlov seems to be suggesting that Christians in general and Muscovites in particular would do well to emulate these examples of bravery and of fame. Lyzlov’s implication is that the desire for fame was ample motivation for the Muscovites to take up arms against the Tatars and the Turks.²

Fame appears to have been a general concern of Muscovite history writing in the late seventeenth century and there were more specific attempts to link fame with Muscovy. Fame explains Stryjkowski’s popularity in Muscovy: Stryjkowski devotes Book IV, Part 2 to a discussion of the origins of the name "Slav" and determines that it originates from slava (fame). Due to their great military deeds, their "famous" victories, these peoples were called Slavs. In the same section Stryjkowski links fame directly with Muscovy by arguing that Mosoch, the legendary founder of Moscow and
fabricated sixth son of Japhet, was the progenitor of all Slavic peoples. Thus in Stryjkowski’s presentation not only are the Slavs inextricably linked with fame, but the Muscovites are the primary Slavic people.

This linkage of Slavs, war, and fame is also evident in the original origins accounts that were composed in late seventeenth century Muscovy. These tales, based mainly upon the accounts in Stryjkowski and Bielski, emphasize the military prowess of the early Slavs and make a clear link between the Slavs and fame. The origins tale in a late seventeenth century Khronograf interpolates into an account drawn mainly from Bielski the statement that the Slavs were "a famous and brave people" and that they received the name Slav due to their "ancient fame." The origins account in a late seventeenth century Stepennaia kniga offers a condensed version of Stryjkowski’s account of the link of Slav to slava in which the author mentions how the Slavs were named because of their "famous military deeds" and how in commemoration of this Slavic princes named their sons "Svetoslav, Iaroslav...." The Mazurin Chronicle from the final decades of the century has an account of the origins of the Slavs that says nothing at all about the link between Slav and slava; nevertheless the author interpolates into the account a reference to the Slavs as "most famous."

This link between Slav and fame also appears in the very curious origins tale composed in 1699 by Timofei Kamenevich Rvovskii. Timofei’s tale is an example of local patriotism as he attempts to give Mologa an important place in early Russian history. His account is a mixture of excerpts from Polish histories and tales of his own devising. Timofei describes how the
Slavs (or more properly the "Scytho-Muscovite Slavic-Russian" peoples) enjoyed an "inexpressible fame" over all other peoples. Sloven and Rus, the first leaders of this people, were remarkable for their fame and wished that their descendants would inherit this fame. Timofei relates the tale of the ex-Novgorodian slaves who established their fame and honor by dint of their military prowess and how Alexander the Great knew of "our most brave and famous Slavic-Russian and Novgorodian clans."

The link between the origins of Muscovy and fame is also evident in two attempts specifically within court circles to write a national history. The first attempt is the establishment of the Recording Chancellery in 1657 and the charge to the secretary Timofei Kudriavtsev to write a continuation of the Stepennaia kniga. Kudriavtsev's stated intentions show a concern with fame:

> to seek out the origins of the greatly famed Sarmatian, Slavic, Rus peoples and the Muscovite name which was flourishing famously from long ago...And in the Polish chronicle of Matvei Striikovskii...it is written about the Sarmatian, Slavic and Russian peoples and about the most ancient naming of Moscow according to fame....

As described in the Introduction Kudriavtsev's mission was never completed so it is a matter of speculation what this stated intention might have produced.

The second instance is the history of Muscovy that appears to have been intended for use as a "history book" in the household of Fedor Alekseevich. This history consists of two parts: the first is an account drawn from Stryjkowski, Bielski, Kromer, and the Sinopsis of the origins of the
Russians and of Muscovy and the second is a redaction of the Stepennaia kniga from the journey of Andrei along the Dniepr through the reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich.⁹ I will focus on the origins account. The account starts with an almost verbatim translation of Book IV, Part 1 of Stryjkowski's Kronika which is Stryjkowski's opening discussion of the origins of the Slavs. Stryjkowski discusses the difficulty of ascertaining the origins of the Slavs since the early Slavs were attracted to war and not to scholarship and therefore did not create an account of their origins. Stryjkowski wants to spread the knowledge to Slav and non-Slav alike of the "famous ancestors" of the Slavs. The rest of the section from Stryjkowski is given over to a demonstration of the Muscovite/Russian primacy (at the expense of Polish claims) within the Slavic world. The foundation of Stryjkowski's argument is that the "Russacy" had a written language long before the Poles. The discussion moves to the claim that Mosoch, son of Japhet, was the progenitor of all the Slavs. Mosoch gave his name directly to the Muscovites so the latter appear as the Ur-Slavic people. Again in direct rebuttal to Polish claims of uniqueness Stryjkowski claims that Asarmot (from whom the Sarmatians traced their genealogy) was Mosoch's nephew who accompanied him on his travels to the present Slavic heartland -- Asarmot simply gave his name to the Sarmatians who are in fact descendants of Mosoch.

After this excerpt from Stryjkowski there is a short original piece. The author of this piece claims that all peoples want to discover that they descend "from famous progenitors or from brave or from honorable [progenitors]" and that all peoples want "to spread the fame of their origins and roots."¹⁰
However many of these peoples — the Romans, the Greeks, the Turks — revert to myth in order to do so since they cannot find an authentic account. The Muscovites are different, however, since they can find their origins not in "unknown histories" or in "concocted myths", but in Scripture and in the 'trustworthy accounts of ancient and modern writers." The account then cites how all historians, both ancient and modern, agree that Mosokh is the progenitor of all Slavs; the list of historians ranges from Berosius ("the first and the most ancient of all historians") to sixteenth century Polish and German historians.

Three excerpts from Kromer, Bielski, and the Sinopsis follow, all of which are aimed at establishing the identity of Russians and Muscovites. The key problem in claiming that the Muscovites are the Ur-Slavs is that they do not appear in the written record until quite late. The account suggests that the "Russians" are the same as the "Muscovites" and that under Iurii Danilovich Moscow received the "great renown" of the throne of Vladimir and the name Mosoch was revived as the name for the Russian people. From that point on Moscow went "from strength to strength and from fame to fame" to become the highest form of an "autocratic tsardom." The compiler then looks to the Stepennaia kniga to document this process of the growth of Moscow.

There are two examples of the attempt to link the tsar directly with fame: the anonymous "Historical Instruction" and Karion Istomin's Preface to his translation of a book on military science. The "Historical Instruction" appears in the same manuscript collection with the origins tale described
immediately above. The "Historical Instruction" was the first item in this
history book. The first section of the "Historical Instruction" is devoted to
a discussion of what classical authors have said about the uses of history, of
the etymology of the word "history" and of the basic rules that the historian
should follow in composing a history.

The second section is a panegyric to Fedor Alekseevich. Fedor
Alekseevich is called a "new Solomon," who rules his subjects with "truth,
wisdom, and mercy." The author claims that space does not allow him to
describe completely how Fedor Alekseevich worked for his subjects' well-being
but that he would offer a condensed account in the history that follows. Fedor
Alekseevich is praised for his recognition that history was the best way to
spread the fame of both the Russian present and the Russian past. Although
the Russian past was replete with "famous" deeds, these deeds were covered
by the "darkness of forgetting" since the Russian people had been drawn to
war and not to learning. Therefore Fedor Alekseevich had commissioned the
compilation of a history book "from all ancient and modern historians, not only
Slavic and Russian annals, but also Greek, Latin, and Polish...." This history
was to give an account of all events in the Russian "states" -- ecclesiastical,
civil, diplomatic, and military. The author claims that all other nations have
both compiled and published such a history of their state, of their origins and
of their ancestors and that only the Muscovites have failed to do so. The
"Historical Instruction" concludes with the statement that it is time to start
the history itself.

Fedor Alekseevich is portrayed as well aware of the importance of
history and how it could provide both a guide to good rulership and the
prospect of fame (slava).\textsuperscript{17} The historian allows the monarch to be a good
ruler. On three separate occasions the author states how history and the
historian highlight examples of good and bad rule. The first is in the citation
from the Testament of Basil the Macedonian who states:

\begin{quote}
do not hesitate to read ancient histories...gleaning from them both
the good virtues and the evil transgressions...\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

The second is found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’s rule that the key reason
why the historian should remain dispassionate is:

\begin{quote}
so that with syllable and word he might express joy for the good
deeds and express sadness for the bad deeds...\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

The final example is in a citation from Tacitus:

\begin{quote}
virtues should not be passed over in silence, and similarly evil
deeds should be made clear so that those after us find hope in
good deeds and fear in evil deeds...\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

The "Historical Instruction" cites Plato’s comment on how subjects
prosper when either philosophers rule or rulers are philosophers and
immediately after this there is the panegyric to Fedor Alekseevich who is
described as ruling with "truth, wisdom, and mercy." As a model ruler Fedor
Alekseevich recognized the need to have histories written.

Those "famed" (slavnye) monarchs -- Alexander, Augustus \textit{inter alia} -
- who cultivated the writing of history received "renown":

\begin{quote}
the ancient famed emperors...who not only read all the histories
of their ancestors, but who ordered the scholars gathered around
them to compile histories of their ancestors and to describe their
deeds, and in this manner moreover they received great fame both
in military and in civil affairs and were called...great emperors
because of their great deeds...\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}
The suggestion is that Fedor Alekseevich would similarly receive fame both because of his patronage of historians and because of the works that they would produce. The fame of the monarch is closely linked to the fame of his people. Fedor Alekseevich wanted "to spread the fame" not only of the present Russian people but also of their renowned ancestors, to rescue their famous deeds from the abyss of the past. The publication of this history -- the spread of knowledge about Russia to other peoples -- would bring fame to the Muscovite and Russian peoples.

Karion Istonin translated a work on military science by the 1st century AD author Julius Frontinus. Karion translated it from a Polish edition of 1609. He presented it to Tsar Peter in 1692 and in his Preface he points out for Peter the worth of knowledge of the past. Karion cites Stryjkowski for his account of the military deeds of the Slavs and for the claim that they are named Slavs because of their famous military victories. He then ties Stryjkowski's historical account to his specific purpose by asking: "What was the source of the famous victories and conquests?" Karion replies that they came from a knowledge of military affairs and he offers his translation to Peter in the hope that the knowledge therein would be used in the struggle against the "damned Muhammedans."22 Karion's implicit message is that knowledge of the past will bring fame to Peter.

These two appeals that center upon the benefits that history offers to the monarch are a part of the development in Muscovy in the second half of the seventeenth century of a panegyrical literature, much of which revolved around a concern with fame. Quite naturally the majority of this literature
was directed at the monarch.

Simeon Polotskii, trained at the Kievan-Mohyla Collegium in the art of composing laudatory verse, was the prime purveyor of panegyrical literature at the Muscovite court. Polotskii composed a number of tributes to Aleksei Mikhailovich in which fame plays a prominent role. The Rismologion is a collection of panegyrical literature "intended to spread the fame of Russia and of the Russian tsar." In one instance Polotskii writes:

In the entire universe, in all the countries of the world,  
where the sun's light is visible,  
where the sun rises and where it sets,  
every country knows the Tsar's fame

In his New Year's address to Aleksei, Polotskii writes:

I am always ready to serve you  
to lay down my head for your fame

In another address to Aleksei:

Wishing truly for your tsarist rule  
the ability to exist in unobscured fame.

In the Orel Rossiiskoi Polotskii compares Aleksei to the eagle, the heraldic symbol of Russia:

As the entire Horizon, from all ends of the world,  
is filled with the fame from your head.  
Your head reaches to the very heavens,  
the breadth of [your] wings covers the entire world.

In the greetings to Aleksei Mikhailovich on the occasion of the birth of Peter, Polotskii wishes Peter fame:

May bravery, wealth, fame rest on him,  
And on his head place the tsar's crown

In Christmas greetings to the Tsarevich Peter, Polotskii returns to the theme
of Peter as conqueror of the Turks:

the moon of the Turkish power
will be filled up by the light of your fame

Polotskii also warns against the transitory nature of fame:

A good conscience adorns the soul,
and shines better than the most precious stones.
Wealth perishes, and fame is fleeting,
but a good conscience brings eternal happiness

In the Glas poslednii Polotskii claims how the court scholar has a role to play in the spread of the ruler's fame:

Small streams widen the river,
Wise slaves spread the fame of the tsar

Polotskii wrote a play for performance in the Court theatre in the 1670s: "The Tale of the Prodigal Son." For the most part Polotskii faithfully followed the story as presented in Luke, but some of his emendations are telling. Polotskii puts the concern with fame into the Son's mouth. He leaves on his journey "in order to increase the fame of our clan" and with the hope that "due to me the fame of our house will spread" and that "we will not be forgotten to the end of the world." One of the Son's attendants promises him that the appearance of his entourage "will spread your fame everywhere." That Polotskii added the motivation of fame to the traditional tale suggests that fame was an issue which would engage his audience, an audience that would have included leading members of the nobility.

Fedor Alekseevich was also the recipient of panegyrics. Polotskii wrote congratulatory verse on the occasion of his nameday, the day of the Feast of Theodore the Stratilite, in which he expressed his hope that Fedor would
defeat the Turks. He asks that God give Fedor:

fame...when [you] defeat the cruel serpent...
that wants to consume the true believers
and free all from its captivity. 34

Polotskii wrote verses of gratitude to Fedor in response to Fedor’s gift of a new cell:

I am left to you, O tsar full of fame.
As you inherited the kingdom from your father,
So are you the inheritor of all his virtues. 35

Polotskii is the most prominent example of the court panegyrist. This tradition, however, was not limited to Polotskii nor did it disappear with his death.

Sophia was the recipient of laudatory verses. Both Karion Iстomin and Sil’vester Med’vedev wrote similar verses in lobbying for the founding of an institution of higher education. Sil’vestr wrote:

That for this deed...you will receive...
fame throughout the entire world 36

Karion wrote that with the foundation of such an institution:

your fame will be proclaimed everywhere. 37

Sil’vester also wrote a panegyric to Sophia as the introduction to his "Lament on the Death of Fedor Alekseevich" that was composed in 1682. Sil’vester writes that Sophia wanted to emulate "the eternal fame of Alexander the Great." Sil’vester relates the tale of the Emperor Pirro who was called the Eagle and who praised his troops in the following manner: "To you I am the Eagle and I have this fame; your arms, like wings, brought me this honour." Sil’vester then states that Sophia represents the "wings" of the Russian Eagle
that bring it to the heavens by the fame of good deeds.\textsuperscript{38}

The desire to broadcast the monarch's fame abroad is at the root of Polotskii's argument for the virtues of printing:

\begin{quote}
If this is thought to be a loss,
    I promise fame and profit...
Printing will bring this. And it is fitting that
    the fame of Russia spread
Not only by the sword, but also by moveable
    type, through books that will be eternal\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

The interest in broadcasting the ruler's fame abroad appears after the second failed Crimean campaign in 1689. In the attempt to bolster Sophia's increasingly precarious position, her partisans arranged that a portrait of Sophia, in which she is depicted surrounded by Seven Virtues, accompanied by laudatory verse be printed both at home and abroad. F. L. Shaklovtyi, one of Sophia's supporters, argued that the domestic prints would spread Sophia's "fame in the Muscovite state and those prints, published abroad, [would bring] fame to the Great Sovereign in other states."\textsuperscript{40}

Fame appears to have been of interest to the aristocratic participants in the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689. Ignatii Rimskii-Korsakov in his address to the officer corps at the outset of the first campaign claimed that a goal of the war was the preservation of the tsar's "fame and honor" and that the campaign would bring "fame" to the kin of the soldiers.\textsuperscript{41} Upon the conclusion of the campaign the Patriarch Ioakhim sent an epistle to Golitsyn in which he asked Golitsyn to find comfort in the fact that "famous conquerors, great monarchs suffered defeat more than once."\textsuperscript{42} Sophia praised the "famous...victories" of her troops and rewarded them for "the decisive and
famous victory over the pagans."\textsuperscript{43}

There exists a portrait of Golitsyn, produced after the disastrous first campaign, which is accompanied by verse perhaps written by Sil'vester Medvedev. The portrait was clearly an attempt to salvage Golitsyn's reputation as a military leader. Golitsyn is portrayed, according to the Polish style, in a half-portrait and in military dress. The border of the portrait contains his various titles. Beneath the portrait of Golitsyn there is depicted a mounted warrior which was a part of the traditional Golitsyn coat-of-arms.

The verse accompanying the portrait reads:

\begin{quote}
Wherever this chosen warrior rides  
   Many times crowned with the famous honor  
   of such travails and military battle  
These glories [slavy] have run out, ceased forever  
Not you, but the image of the famed prince,  
In every land where it is inscribed  
From now on will shine with fame  
And spread the fame of the Golitsyn's honor everywhere\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

The portrait was part of an official celebration that attempted to portray the campaign as a victory.\textsuperscript{45} Critics of the government used a similar language in dismissing the official version as they claimed that Golitsyn simply "put forth such fame as if the entire Crimean Horde had submitted to the Great Sovereigns..."\textsuperscript{46}

There is an echo of this ironic use of fame, and of the Crimean campaigns themselves, in correspondence from Peter's first campaign against Azov in 1695. Patrick Gordon, Peter's chief military adviser at this juncture, in his diary complained of Muscovite commanders who were unwilling to follow his advice because they feared that "I alone would receive the fame of
success." One of Peter's advisers, T. N. Streshnev, criticized in a letter to Peter the dilatory campaigning of a Muscovite army on the Dnieper by sarcastically stating that "above all they [the commanders] want the same military fame [that came] from the Crimean campaign."  

There also appears to have been an interest in establishing the fame of one's clan. There is an anonymous translation of Justin's Epitome of the Historiae Philippicae of Pompeius Trogus that was presented to I. I. Morozov, the brother of Aleksei Mikhailovich's tutor and close adviser. The Preface to the translation contains many of the same cliches about the uses of history that appear in the "Historical Instruction." The Preface also provides a brief history of the Morozov clan and of the services, both civil and military, that they had rendered to the state. The translator claims that if Pompeius had known of the achievements of the Morozovs, then he would not only have described them himself, but he would have related them to other historians. In particular the translator describes the heroic deeds of Ivan Mikhailovich Krasnoi Morozov and then states:

Your Excellency and Your entire house receives great fame and comfort from such ancestors....  

The Preface describes the service to the state of G. I. Morozov who:

received fame...from his ancestors, but increased it bringing still further proper decoration to the house....  

This emphasis on the fame of one's clan also appears in the Genealogia that was compiled by Ignatii Rimskii-Korskaov in which he traced his family tree directly back to Adam. In particular Ignatii was interested in
establishing links with famous heroes of the classical world and the linch-pin of the Genealogia is proving Hercules to be a direct ancestor of the Rimskii-Korsakovs. Ignatii’s hope is that an awareness of the famous ancestors would inspire their descendants to maintain the clan’s fame. Service to the state was the surest way to attain fame: the intelligent "attain fame with good counsel...and the teaching of virtue..."; the martial attain "frame through bravery and daring." Fame, in Ignatii’s presentation, could be passed from generation to generation and could accumulate within a clan. A clan’s fame could be lost due to a single transgression.\textsuperscript{51}

Karion Istomin occupies an important place in the development of the aristocratic interest in fame. Karion dedicated a collection of verse to V. V. Golitsyn and his wife Evdokia Ivanovna in which he referred to Evdokia Ivanovna as "famous boiarina." In 1692 Karion directed the decoration of the new stone mansions of Iurii and Ivan Trubetskoi. Karion was in charge of choosing the subjects to be depicted on the walls and the accompanying texts. Karion composed verse inscriptions for the formal entryway, the ceilings, the walls and the "beautiful corner" (krasnyi ugor). One of the paintings depicted an eagle with a scroll in its mouth upon which was written:

\begin{quote}
This eagle flies as high
as the famous clan of the Trubetskois appears among the Russians
...it carries proudly the coat-of-arms of the Trubetskois\textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}

Karion's interest in propagating the fame of the Trubetskois and in decorating their new stone mansions expresses well the link between fame and a new type of aristocratic culture that was developing in late seventeenth century Muscovy. The evidence is spotty at best, but a case can be made that
certain members of the political elite displayed their cultural interests as an ad
vertisement of their aristocratic standing. A. S. Matveev had a house full of
German furnishings, and a private theatrical troupe and orchestra on the
Western style. V. V. Golitsyn built a stone mansion in the style of the
Muscovite Baroque in Moscow in the 1680s. The main living quarters
consisted of fifty-three rooms; the house was decorated with murals and
frescoes and portraits of Russian rulers, both past and present. The ceiling
had a fresco of the sun, the planets, and the signs of the zodiac. A portrait
of Golitsyn himself was in one dining room; his son's room had portraits of the
King and Queen of Poland and twelve other portraits. Golitsyn's mansion was
right on the street, not screened from the street by a fence and courtyard as
was the traditional Muscovite style, as if proclaiming its owner's status.

There seems to have been the germ of a new interest in secular
portraiture. Russians abroad were interested in having their portraits done:
the ambassadors Potemkin in Madrid, Chomedan in Florence, and Poroshin in
Berlin. In Moscow a pair of portraits of Mikhail Fedorovich and Aleksei
Mikhailovich on horseback, dating from the late 1670s-early 1680s, reveals an
interest in a more naturalistic depiction of the face. The most fully secular
portrait was done after the Polish model in 1686 and depicts the stol'nik G.
P. Godunov.

There is some evidence of a new interest among the aristocracy in the
creation of a refined lifestyle. V. V. Golitsyn's estate at Medvedkovskoe had
deer on the grounds and ponds with swans. His estate at Cherniaia griaiz' had
a park surrounded by a fence and an aviary that contained peacocks and
cranes. The Austrian diplomat Johann-Georg Korb, who was in Muscovy in 1698, described that during a visit to one of B. A. Golitsyn's country estates after dinner they had a "pleasant conversation in a delightful gazebo that had been constructed in the most charming garden." In Moscow they were invited to Golitsyn's home for "friendly conversation." There the prince "ordered his musicians, Polish by origin, to play various songs for the entertainment of his guests...The prince ordered various sorts of wines to be served in order to show the full power of his wealth." This same Prince Golitsyn is described as having built "palaces worthy of his great clan and had in his service Italian architects...he built two very beautiful churches...as eternal monuments of his fame...." In Mozhaisk Korb described the estate of one boiar Ivanov who "has a fine dacha...in his garden are many flower beds and a forest with skillfully arranged little artificial mounds."

Portraits, stone mansions, concern with interior decoration, formal gardens, and gazebos are signs of an aristocracy that was increasingly interested in a refined style of life, in creating a public image that advertised their status as members of the aristocratic elite. Fame was a part of this new interest in self-presentation: fame was to be displayed and celebrated, to be maintained and increased.

The interest in fame appears to have emerged at the same time as the system of mestnichestvo, the system whereby governmental and military appointments were made on the basis of a calculation of one's honor, was in decline. Mestnichestvo had been fading over the course of the seventeenth century and it was formally abolished in 1682, to be replaced by a system
ostensibly based on merit and ability. At the heart of mestnichestvo was the sense of identity that was produced by the calculation of honor arising from the place of one's clan in the larger system of clans and of one's own position within that clan. With the passing of this system, what was to provide a new sense of identity? I would argue that for the noble elite at court fame became the new measure of prestige. The late seventeenth century witnessed the elitization of noble culture in Muscovy. The traditional system based upon honor had been inclusive: everyone had his/her place and honor. Fame, however, was exclusive and seems to have been the possession of the court elite -- of those few men who ran Muscovite politics.

The early 1680's saw a number of attempts by the leading boiars to institutionalize their position and to create more effective institutions by bypassing the Boiar Duma. The Boiar Duma had been rendered impotent by what Robert Crummey has termed "the inflation of honors," the raising to boiar status of the tsar's favorites, many of whom fulfilled only a ceremonial function. The political elite had already bypassed the Boiar Duma with the establishment of the Raspravnaia palata which became a permanent institution in October 1680 and was to carry out a judicial function at the court and in Moscow in the Tsar's absence. The months leading up to the abolition of mestnichestvo -- itself a project of this elite -- also witnessed the attempt to establish the Otvetnaia palata, whose role was to oversee and decide general military and civil affairs, the plan to distinguish between civil, military and court ranks and to institute a provincial reform similar to the Catherinian gubernia whereby the elite families would run provincial
Muscovy. These attempts to create new avenues for political distinction were carried out by some of the same men who were interested in the new forms of non-political distinction: V. V. Golitsyn; A. T. Likhachev the tutor to Aleksei Alekseevich and the owner of the collection which contained the "Historical Instruction." The search for fame is the most prominent example of this new concern with non-political distinction and self-advertisement. Mestnichestvo was based upon honor which was determined by one's place and rank within a system of families; at birth one acquired the honor that would continue throughout life. Honor did not depend upon the approbation of others. Fame was completely the opposite: it was dependent upon one's reputation, upon how others viewed you. Honor was inherited, fame was sought.

Norbert Elias has traced the emergence of "court society" in Western Europe, a process that started in the early medieval period and culminated in the court of Louis XIV. The central theme of Elias's work was the development of the "noble warrior" into the 'courtier." In Elias's view the development of a court aristocracy was dependent upon the emergence of a centralizing royal court that coopted all possible rivals. This court became the most important social authority and the most important source of models of behaviour. Not only the nobility's political and economic well-being, but its personal identity depended upon the Court. Identity was now the product of the opinion of others: "Social opinion...[became] the foundation of existence." Elias cites the quest for gloire as an example of a 'prestige-fetish"; gloire became an end in itself. Court life was the ceaseless struggle
for status and prestige. The development of a court aristocracy also meant the increasing limitation on access to the Court and the elitization of court society.\textsuperscript{72}

Traditionally the Muscovite Court was concerned exclusively with politics, with the actual daily governance of the realm. The cultural life of the Court -- ceremony, ideology, codes of conduct -- were within the purview of the Church. In the late seventeenth century the monarch, the boiar elite, and the court intellectuals began to form a court culture similar to that described by Elias. The output of the court intellectuals and the translated material from the West provided the Court with new, non-ecclesiastical sources of social authority, models of behaviour, and personal identity.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. Lyzlov also refers on one occasion to the rise of the Crimean khanate in terms of expansion and glory:
   
   and from that time the Perekop, that is the Crimean Horde, begins to grow and become famous. (S.I., 1.30r.)

2. The use of "fame" (slava) in conjunction with military prowess is one use of the word in the History. Lyzlov also applies the term to describe cities and geographic territories which was a common feature of traditional Muscovite history writing. See (I cite only those passages where Lyzlov adds the term to the account drawn from his sources and I omit those numerous passages where the term is within the original account): "the eternal and famous Persian monarchy" (S.I., 1.28v); "the Kazan Khanate is famous" (S.I., 1.52r); "the old famous towns in this Taurike" (S.I., 1.125r); "and there he captured strong towns, famous from long ago" (S.I., 1.195r); "and he captured the famous island...Lesbos" (S.I., 1.238v); "the famous town called Modon" (S.I., 1.250r); "he took under his control the famous Hungarian towns" (S.I., 1.259r); "where are found the famous towns Famagost and Nikosiia" (S.I., 1.272v); "in addition Teflis and Shamakhu and Eres', great and famous towns" (S.I., 1.278v).

   Lyzlov also uses the more traditional and familiar Muscovite term "most glorious" (preslavnyi). On 1.3 he describes Cyrus as "the famous Persian autocrat" (he changes Guagnini's description: "the great Cyrus" p.583). A bit later, however, he describes Cyrus as: "the most glorious Persian autocrat" (1.5v). In his summary of the Trojan wars Lyzlov describes the Greek warrior Pirus: "with the most glorious bogatyri Pirus." (1.5r).

   Lyzlov describes the Slavs: "from the most glorious...Slavic people." (1.11v).

   Lyzlov's other uses of "preslavnyi" are tied to the Muscovite monarchs and Constantinople. His call to arms on 1.123r reads: "that our most glorious of all...Sovereigns and rulers of the most glorious Muscovite monarchy might follow the most glorious deeds." The references to Constantinople: "and the capture of the most glorious Constantinople" (1.213r); "he captured the most glorious...city" (1.236r); "After the capture of that most glorious royal city" (1.237r).

   On one occasion Lyzlov uses "preslavnyi" to describe towns in general: "and thus all these and many other most glorious...lands and towns" (1.195v).

   Overall slava, on the human scale, seems to be used consistently in connection with military prowess. Slava also is used for geographic descriptions. Moscow, its rulers, and Constantinople -- especially marked
entities in Muscovite history writing -- seem to take preslavnyi. The few references to figures from antiquity are mixed.

It is not possible to make at this point any specific statements about the rules for the use of slava in seventeenth century Muscovy. However slava seems to have been endowed in certain contexts with a set of meanings very different from those of the traditional uses of slava and preslavnyi. For example: in the "Tale of the Murder of Michael of Chernigov in the Horde" the author claims that Michael "was seduced by this-worldly glory." PLDR, XIII vek (Moscow, 1981), p.229; in the "New Tale about the Most Glorious Russian Kingdom" the author states that the concern with glory rather than with national defense was partly responsible for Muscovy's travails. PLDR, konets XVI-nachalo XVII vekov (Moscow, 1987), pp. 36, 41, 44; the "Tale of the Life of the Tsar Fedor Ivanovich" states that the tsar's glory is not important. Ibid., p.120; the "Lament on the Captivity and Final Destruction of the Muscovite State" speaks of the fleeting nature of glory. Ibid., pp. 138, 140. The "Tale of Stefan Bathory's Campaign against Pskov" puts the Poles' quest for glory in a completely negative light and contrasts it to the pious Pskovian defense of Orthodoxy. PLDR, Vtoriaa polovina XVI veka (Moscow, 1986), pp. 412, 418, 438, 440, 454, 458, 472.

The Kazanskaia istoria does present slava in a positive light. More work needs to be done on the place of the Kazanskaia istoria in seventeenth century Muscovite culture. Also a comparison of the use of slava in the two basic rejections of the Kazanskaia istoria would perhaps be illuminating since it is the rejection that is commonly considered to be the primary rejection, but which Edward L. Keenan claims is the later reworking, that presents fame in a positive, secular, this-worldly light.

The "Igor' Tale" presents a direct link between fame/glory and military prowess. Again more work needs to be done on a comparison of Kievian and late Muscovite noble culture with the noble culture of "classical" Muscovy.

For a general discussion of these and similar themes in Kievian and Muscovite literature, see: A. S. Orlov, Geroicheskie temy drevnej russkoi literatury (Moscow, 1945); Helen Y. Prochazka, "On Concepts of Patriotism, Loyalty, and Honour in the Old Russian Military Accounts," SEER, 63(1985): 481-497.

3. This explains the four translations of the first four books of Stryjkowski in Muscovy since these are the books that link the Slavs and Muscovy with fame. Lyzlov himself in his introduction to his translation of these books stated that Stryjkowski wrote the work in order "to increase the fame of the Slavic peoples." (GPB, Pogodin 1494, 1.307v) Kromer devotes a part of Book I of his De origine to the debunking of this account. Kromer's critical attitude towards the Slav-fame link may explain why his origins accounts (and for that matter his chronicle) were not translated in Moscow in the seventeenth century.

5. GPB F.IV.221


7. Very little is known about Timofei. He was a deacon of the monastery in Mologa, Iaroslav uezd; he corresponded with Karion Istomin. See: A. Titov, "Timofei Kamenevich Rvovskii," Bibliograficheskie zapiski (1892), #3, pp.174-8. The origins tale appears in F. Giliarov (ed), Predaniiia russkoi nachalnoi letopisi (Moscow, No Date), pp.


9. It appears in GPB, F.IV.159.

10. GPB, F.IV.159, l.13v.

11. Ibid., l.14r.

12. Ibid., l.16r.

13. The relevant passages are: Kromer, Kronika, Book I, pp.11-12; Bielski, Kronika swiata, p.427; Sinopsis, ll. 11r-13r.

14. GPB, F.IV.159, l.18r.

15. The collection belonged to A. T. Likhachev who was "striapchii s kliuchem" in 1675/6 and okol'nichii in 1683. (Crummey, op. cit., p.206) He was tutor to Aleksei Alekseevich and he also appears to have owned a manuscript copy of the 1688 translation of Stryjkowski's Kronika. See: Rogov, op. cit., p.284. Tatishchev claims that Likhachev was tutor to Fedor Alekseevich and he also claims that Likhachev wrote a "Life of Fedor" which he (Tatishchev) consulted but which then disappeared. See: Tatishchev, op. cit., p.85.

16. In fact the "Historical Instruction" says very little about historical method. It does offer an unintegrated compilation of statements by Eustasius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Polybius, and Tacitus about what history should contain. And at first glance it would appear that Lyzlov followed some of the "Historical Instruction"s stricture: the History of the Scythians does include Eustasius’s four elements; Lyzlov does place a premium on "good" and "trustworthy" historians. Lyzlov however was imitating his Polish models in bringing these features to the History of the Scythians. He was not looking at a programmatic statement about history writing as a model. In fact the compiler of the "Historical Instruction" undoubtedly incorporated Eustasius's rules and the references to "trustworthy" sources precisely because they were congruent with what was to be found in the Polish histories.
But there is nothing to suggest that the "Historical Instruction" was a programmatic statement about the theoretical foundations of history writing or about how history differed from chronicles and annals.

17. Juri Krizhanich in the Politika, written during his exile in Tobol'sk, devotes a section to the discussion of "Royal Fame." Krizhanich distinguished between the proper desire for fame (one that is anchored in a concern for the welfare of the people) and the vain desire for fame (one that is founded on personal vanity). For Krizhanich education and the general good are where fame is to be found. Fame through warfare is limited to a small number of exceptional monarchs. Krizhanich's audience is not at all clear so it is impossible to make any generalizations about the resonance of his work among the Muscovite elite. However it is interesting that he was wrestling with the same problems that occupied the elite in Moscow even if he did come to quite different conclusions. Contrast Krizhanich's criticism of war as the route to fame to Lyzlov's identification of the two. For Krizhanich's discussion of fame, see: Iurii Krizhanich, Politika (Moscow, 1965), pp.652-660.


19. Ibid., p. xxxix.

20. Ibid., p. xxxix.

21. Ibid., p. xxxvii.


23. Throughout the seventeenth century Ukrainian churchmen who arrived in Moscow would come armed with panegyrics in honor of the current tsar. The Synopsis fits into this tradition of praise in the hope of generosity. It is not by accident that the Synopsis discusses the relationship between Mosokh, the Slavs, and fame. Feofan Prokopovich and Stefan Javorsky, the leading ideologues of the reign of the mature Peter, fit into this tradition.

The laudatory verse that the students of the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium addressed to Mohyla in 1632 is perhaps a model for much of the panegyric literature addressed to the Muscovite tsars. (See: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, op. cit.)

A Austrian example of verse addressed to the Muscovite is the Genealogia Serenissorum ac Potentissimorum Magnorum Moscoviae Ducum... of Laurentius Churlewich who had been a member of the 1655 Imperial embassy to Moscow. The Genealogia consisted of two parts: an illustrated genealogy of Russian rulers from Vladimir to Aleksei Mikhailovich and an attempt to show how all contemporary European dynasties trace their origin to the Russian ruling house. Under the portrait of Aleksei Mikhailovich in the Genealogia there is the verse:

Hail! long-lived, great Tsar Aleksii,
Defeat the Muslims, o famed Sovereign,
Here fame and praise is to be won,
To now the sun has been in the West: it is moving to the East
The Epilogue of the Genealogia continues this panegyric:
You, O most praiseworthy monarch, live, be healthy, rule, conquer,
and by conquering...the enemies of the Christian faith no one will
ever possess greater fame, honor, greatness, and renown in the
entire world [than you].

See: A. S. Myl'nikov, "'Rodoslovie' Lavrentiia Khurelichia," Pamiatniki

24. V. P. Grebeniuk, "Rifomologion' Simeona Polotskogo" in Simeon Polotskii
i ego knigoizdatel'skaia deiatel'nost (Moscow, 1982), p.308.

25. A. N. Robinson, Bor'ba idei v russkoï literature XVII veka, (Moscow, 1974)
p.138.


28. Ibid., p.139.


32. Grebeniuk, op. cit., p.303. A copy of the Glas poslednyi is found in a
collection compiled at the order of V. V. olitsyn. This collection contains: the
Kurbskii History, a part of the correspondence between Ivan and Kurbskii, and
a section from Guagnini's Kronika.

33. A. S. Demin, Russkaia literatura vtoroi poloviny XVII-nachala XVIII veka
(Moscow, 1977), pp.156-7.

34. Tatarksii, op. cit., p.280.

35. Ibid., p.308.

36. A. M. Panchenko, Russkaia stikhotvornaia kul'tura, (Leningrad, 1973)
p.132.

37. Ibid., p.136.

38. A. P. Bogdanov, "Sil'vestra Medvedeva Panegirik Tsarevne Sof'e 1682g.,"


42. N. G. Ustrialov, Istoriiia tsarstvovaniia Petra Velikago, T.1 (St. Petersburg, 1858), p.205.

43. Ibid., pp. 239, 242.

44. Lindsey A. J. Hughes, Russia and the West, The Life of a Seventeenth Century Westernizer, Prince Vasily Vasil'evich Golitsyn (1643-1714), (Newtonville, 1984). The portrait and the verse are reproduced on the frontispiece of the book.

45. For the details of this celebration, see: Hughes, Sophia, pp. 202-4.


47. Ustrialov, op. cit., T.2, p.239

48. Ibid., p.247.

49. BAN 16.17.30, ll.15r-15v.

50. Ibid., l.18r.

51. Bogdanov and Chistiakov, op. cit., pp.86-102. Ignatii's presentation of slava is in some ways similar to the traditional idea of chest', particularly with reference to accumulation and preservation. More work needs to be done on the relationship between fame and honor in the late seventeenth century.

52. A. P. Bogdanov, "Izvestiia Kariona Istomina o knizhnom chitanii," Pamiatniki kul'tury. Novye otkrytki, Ezhegodnik 1986 (Moscow, 1987): 105-114. Nils Ake Nilsson has pointed to a "gerbomania" (coat-of-arms mania) among the Muscovite aristocracy of the late seventeenth century. The Muscovites created their gerby from models borrowed from Poland. Each of Stryjkowski's books in the Kronika is preceded by a panegyric to a particular nobleman in which references to coats-of-arms are prominent Guagnini devotes ??? sections of his Kronika to the description of coats-of-arms of ???. Ignatii's successful linkage of the Rimskii-Korsakovs with Hercules was based in part on heraldic devices.
53. Matveev was accused of forcibly abducting a Lithuanian musician to be his household organist. See: N. M. Moleva, "Muzyka i zrelishcha v Rossii XVII stoletii," Voprosy istorii (1971), #11: p.152.

54. The boiat Troekurov had a similar stone mansion built at the same time and on the same street as Golitsyn's. See: Istoriia russkogo iskusstva, T.IV, (Moscow, 1959) pp.227-9.

55. Ibid., pp.454-6.

56. Godunov is described by one scholar as "standing proudly, arms akimbo...with a somewhat tired look in his eyes...." Ibid., p.458.

57. There is evidence of a royal interest in a refined style of life, namely the estate at Izmailovo. See: Istoriia Moskvy, T.1, (Moscow, 1952) pp.528-30; J-G. Korb, Dnevnik poezdki v moskovskoe gosudarstvo ...1698g. (St. Petersburg, 1866), p.158.


59. There is also the testimony of the Frenchman Coyet who wrote that Russian nobles "have in their homes Polish musicians who teach them to play different instruments and likewise instruct them in singing." V. K. Nikol' skii, "Boiarskaia popytka," Istoriicheskiiia izvestiia (1917), #2, p.74.

60. Korb, op. cit., pp.40, 70-1, 262.

61. Korb was also invited to the house of Prince Romodanovskii for a display of fireworks. Ibid., p.126. V. N. Vasil'ev (Starinnye feiierverki vRossii [XVII-pervaja chetvert' XVIII veka] (Leningrad, 1960)) claims that Romodanovskii, V. V. Golitsyn and others were especially interested in fireworks (p.14). In 1693 a fireworks display linked Romodanovskii with the image of Hercules. Hercules and fireworks also played a major role in the celebration of the 1696 capture of Azov. (Ibid., pp.15-16).


63. Ibid., p.58.

64. Ibid., p.58.


68. Norbert Elias, The Court Society, (New York, 1983) and Power and Civility (New York, 1982). The development of court society has received little attention by historians except for discussions of the courts of specific monarchs. For the few general studies, see: C. Stephen Jaeger, The Origins of Courtliness (Philadelphia, 1983); Poets and Princepleasers: Literature and the English Court in the Late Middle Ages (Toronto, 1980); V. J. Scattergood and J. W. Sherborne (editors), English Court Culture in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1983); A. G. Dickens, The Courts of Europe (New York, 1977); David Loades, The Tudor Court (Totowa, 1987). Except for Jaeger's work, these treatments do not discuss the development of a court society; they describe that society.

69. Jaeger, op.cit., also makes this claim. He stresses the role of clerics in creating the courtly ethos in medieval European courts. Moral exempla play a particularly important role in this process (pp.227-235).

70. Elias, The Court Society, pp.94-5.

71. Ibid., pp.84-5.

72. Ibid., p.186.
CONCLUSION

There are two basic suppositions that underlie the History of the Scythians: the existence of an elite that was familiar with Polish history writing and the willingness of this elite to act in the hope of gaining fame. The first leads to a consideration of Lyzlov as historian and the second to a consideration of late Muscovite court society.

What did the Muscovites do when they encountered history books for the first time? One Muscovite, A. I. Lyzlov, imitated them. Lyzlov borrowed from his Polish sources those features that were readily visible and apparent. His imitation of the structure of Guagnini's Kronika needs no comment in this regard. The methodological features that he borrowed -- disputes, margin notes, questions -- were precisely those features that would have been fully evident to the untrained eye, a feature that characterized both Lyzlov's audience and Lyzlov himself. Lyzlov had no training as a historian. Certainly he had no formal training in the field and he was not widely read in history. After all there were few history books in Muscovy and even fewer would have been accessible to Lyzlov. There was no reason for him to have recognized Baronio's sophisticated use of written sources, of archaeology, and of numismatics; he would not have appreciated Botero's broad view of states and societies; Kromer's discussion of the origins of the Slavs based on the latest philological method would have been lost on him.\footnote{Lyzlov was not alone in his lack of interest in the methodological achievements of these historians. Even}
the leaders of Muscovite cultural life -- Semeon Polotskii, Sil'vester Medvedev and Karion Istomin among others -- regarded history as the handmaiden of theology, rhetoric and poetics. They had no interest in history as a subject in its own right or as a discipline that possessed its own method and style.

Lyzlov's focus on the externals suggests that the History was meant to be read. It is difficult to determine the extent of literacy in late seventeenth century Muscovy, but the growth of bureaucracy and the spread of non-religious literature surely means the existence at Court of a small elite who could read for "pleasurable or pragmatic purposes." It is fair to state that the late Muscovite court witnessed the rise of "the literacy of recreation." Simeon Polotskii, Sil'vester Medvedev, and Karion Istomin were not working in a vacuum and their literary output found a ready audience at court. Lyzlov wrote for this same audience.

Lyzlov's awareness of writing for a specific audience is revealed in his choice of "Scythians" for the title of the work. In Part I, Chapter 1, through the careful editing and emending of his Polish sources, Lyzlov established his basic contention that the Tatars and the Turks were Scythian peoples. Lyzlov chose the term "Scythian" because of the cultural baggage that accompanied it. The use of the term advertised his link to Polish history writing which introduced the term into Muscovy and placed him on an equal footing with them.

From the Polish histories and from the History of the Scythians itself the reader would have learned that the Scythians had achieved fame through their military prowess: they had defeated Cyrus, Darius, Alexander and
Augustus and their wives (the Amazons) had fought heroically at Troy and had commanded Alexander's respect. Victories, both actual and projected, over the descendants of these famous warriors could only increase the fame of Muscovy and of those individuals who participated in the campaigns. The Muscovite elite was increasingly interested in the presentation of an aristocratic image. An interest in the products of Polish culture and the cultivation of fame became integral and interrelated parts of the creation of an aristocratic persona. The History of the Scythians both charts and furthers this journey of the late Muscovite noble from warrior to courtier.
NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. Nancy Partner (Serious Entertainments, [Chicago, 1977]) addresses this issue of the writing of history without the benefit of a formal education in history. Partner states (p.186): "But casual reading of even the most scrupulously composed history books does not necessarily reveal their secrets, and without any formal or systematic study directed to some procedures and methods of composing history, prospective historians were left very much alone to cope with theory and practice according to their own lights." For Lyzlov "theory" and "practice" was limited to what was immediately visible and obviously novel.

2. See Gary Marker's recent article which suggests that many of the previous estimates of Muscovite literacy have erred on the side of enthusiasm: "Literacy and Literacy Texts in Muscovy: A Reconsideration," Slavic Review, 49(1990): 74-89.


5. See Appendix A for a discussion of Lyzlov's editing in Part I, Chapter 1.

6. Poletskii used the term on occasion (Pushkarev, op. cit., pp. 206, 207, 217). The origins tale, reflected in Popov (pp.442-8), traces Russia's roots to "Skif", the father of "Sloven" and "Rus". See also the bizarre origins account of Timofei Kamenevich Rvovskii.
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APPENDIX A: SCYTHIAN ORIGINS

Lyzlov establishes the Scythian origins of all the Tatar peoples directly at the beginning of the History, in the opening section of I,1, and in order to do so he had to edit and to manipulate his Polish sources.

Part I consists of three chapters which treat the origins of the Scythians and related peoples and the reasons for their irruption into Europe. I,1 starts with verbatim borrowing from Guagnini's own introduction to the Tatars which discusses the conflicting theories on the origins of the Scythians, the existence of an European and an Asian Scythia, and a listing of the peoples of Asian Scythia:

Diodor Siklius a very ancient historian who during the reign of the Emperor Augustus wrote books about the deeds of various peoples relates that the Scythians had their origins from their first prince Skif who was born of the union of Jov and a Virgin who down to her waist was a human but the rest of her was similar to a serpent...the Asian Scythians are very numerous and are called by different names. Some are called Tauros and they live in the Taurus mountains; others are Agatrys and others Essedons...and Massagets....(S.I., 1.1ob-2r)

Diodorus Siculus in Book 2, Part II describing the Sarmatian people makes a reference to and finds the origins of the Scythians from Scythia (from which comes the names of all the Tatars) and he starts his account in this manner: Scytha Dux Primus natus fuit ex Jove & Virgine, quae fuit umbilicotenus homo: reliquum vero ejus vipherae spectem refertat, hanc;q;...the Asian Scythians are very numerous. Some are called Tauros and live near the Taurus mountains, the second are Agatrys...the third are Essedons...the fourth Scythian peoples are the Massagets...(Guagnini, pp. 581-2)

The borrowing is interrupted with the fourth peoples, the Massagets.
Guagnini's account after the Massagets reads:

there is also a fifth people who are called Mingayls... and these are Tatars and not Scythians since they live in Tatary and not in Scythia; there will be more about this below in the discussion of the division between Scythia and Tatary. (Guagnini, p. 582)

Lyzlov skips this section from Guagnini and continues his account with an interpolation from Stryjkowski:

and the Massagets, Arimasps, Sakevs or Sags... (S.I. 1.2) the Scythians are divided into regions or hordes, some are called Arimaspi, others Massagetae, some Sacebi, or Sagae. (Stryjkowski, I, p.232)

Lyzlov's omits the statement by Guagnini because it claims that the Mingayls (Mongols) are not Scythians, but are Tatars, and that Scythia and Tatary are two separate regions. The substitution of the passage from Stryjkowski serves simply to fill a gap by continuing to list the various Scythian peoples. Lyzlov addresses the crucial issue of the identity between Mongols/Scythians and Tatars in the excerpt from Botero that follows.

As a leadin to the excerpt from Botero, Lyzlov cites a short statement from Guagnini regarding the Western boundary of Scythia: "on the West the boundary of Scythia is the river Don." (S.I., l.2/Guagnini, p.581). Lyzlov then suggests that Botero's geographic information is better:
[but Botero, who described the whole world, suggests from the Volga which is more fitting] to the East to the Chinese borders, bordering with India on the South from the Meotis Sea, that is the Sea of Azov, and from the Caspian...To the North all the way to the frozen Scythian Sea. It is divided into four parts. The first contains all the Hordes; the second the Zagatai and all the peoples who live near Ussonte and the Loppo desert; the third contains China and the Chinese part of the above-mentioned desert; the fourth contains countries not well-known to us such as Belgian, Argon, Arsater, Ania. It has been more than five hundred years since the Scythian peoples left their country, called in their tongue Mongal whose inhabitants were called Mingails or Mongails and founded several states [about which see below] and changed their name...(S.I., 1.2r)

It was first called Scythia, but three hundred years ago these Tatars [people who left during the reign of the great Chingis from the corner of Asia called in their language Mongal] having founded a state also changed the name: which contained [excluding the Perekop Tatars about which I'll speak in the proper place] the smaller half of the territory not on the Asia Sea; for it stretches from the Volga to the Chinese and Indian borders and from the Scythian Ocean all the way to the Meotidis Lake, and to the Hircanum Sea. It is divided into four parts. The first contains the Hordes, the second the Zagatai and the other peoples living near Ussonte and the Loppo desert; the third contains China and the Chinese part of the above-mentioned desert; the fourth contains little known regions like Belgian, Argon, Assaret Ania....(Botero, I, p.165)

Botero's account, from which Lyzlov borrows his information, is entitled Tataria. Botero's account starts with the claim that Tataria had originally been called Scythia and that the Tatars had changed the name. The account then proceeds to discuss the four sections of Tataria. Lyzlov rearranges the order of Botero's account. He first describes the geographic location of Scythia/Tataria without referring to the region by name. Then he focuses on the Scythian peoples. Where Botero refers to the Tatars (Tatarowie), Lyzlov has Scythians (skifove narod). Lyzlov is then able to draw the direct connection between the Scythians and the Mongols. Lyzlov
changes the statement in Botero about that section of Asia called "Mongal" to refer to the "Mingails" or "Mongails" who lived there. Lyzlov continues this focus upon the inhabitants of the region, and not upon the region itself, by changing Botero's account regarding the change of name.

Lyzlov's account simply reads that the Tatars changed the name of Scythia to Tartaria and there is no clear statement that the Tatars were indeed Scythians. Lyzlov makes the connection explicit. Lyzlov claims that the Scythians changed their name and not, as in Botero, the name of their habitat. Lyzlov reinforces this point by citing a short passage from Stryjowski which discusses the origin of the name Tatar:

the Tatars are named after the river Tatar or from the great number of their peoples which they themselves prefer... (S.I., 1.2r)

The Scythian people, the Tatars, are named either from the river Tatar, or from their native lands, or from the great number of their peoples which they themselves prefer...(Stryjowski, I, pp. 229-230)

Lyzlov omits from Stryjowski's account the statement "or from their native lands" since this would once again threaten to create a distinction between Tatary and Scythia. Lyzlov now returns to that passage from Botero's account which up to that point he had omitted:

and the smaller half of Scythia which is on the Asian Sea and is not on the Asian Sea...(Botero, I, called Great Tatary...(S.I., 1.2ob) p.165)

Again Lyzlov makes explicit the Scythian connection with the substitution of Scythia (skifii) where Botero has land (ziemie). Lyzlov again makes
explicit the connection between Scythia and Tartaria with his addition immediately following the statement "on the Asia sea": "it [Scythia] is called Great Tatary."

This excursus into the accounts of Botero and Stryjowski enables Lyzlov to return to Guagnini’s account. As seen above Guagnini denied that the Tatars and the Scythians were the same people. Lyzlov however through his editing makes the claim that they are indeed one and the same. Now he is able to return to Guagnini’s account, with a few emendations, without threatening the identity of the Scythians with the Tatars.

Lyzlov starts with a short geographical description of "Great Tartary":

Great Tatary is separated from Scythia by the great and renowned Mount Imaus so that Tatary is on one side and Scythia is on the other where the stone mountains called the Caucasus are located near the Khvalisskii Sea. The great Mount Bykhov is their boundary on the South and East. In Latin Mount Taurus; Noah's Ark first came to rest on it after the Flood...(S.I., I. 2ob)

The great and renowned Mount Imaus divides the Scythian Kingdom from Tatary: on one side is Scythia, on the other Tatary where the Mingayls live. The great Mount Bykow is the boundary on the South and East, called in Latin Mount Taurus, on which Noah's Ark first came to rest after the Flood...(Guagnini, p. 583)

Lyzlov has established that "Tartary" is simply a part of Scythia (the lesser half) so he is willing to discuss it as a separate region -- to discuss what geographic features separate the two. Lyzlov however is not willing to refer to Scythia (in contradistinction to Tatar) as the Scythian Kingdom (Krolestwo Scythivskie) as this would suggest that the two were completely separate entities. Similarly Lyzlov is not willing to include the phrase that
the Mongols live in Tatary and thereby to run the risk of implying that the
Mongols were Tartars and not Scythians.

After this geographic discussion, Lyzlov returns to that section which
he had omitted from his first citation from Guagnini which stated that the
Mongols were Tartars and therefore were not Scythians. Lyzlov uses this
citation to narrow the focus of the discussion from the Scythians/Tatars to
the Mongols.

Historians have written about the renowned deeds of these Mingail
Tatars who lived in the lesser part of Scythia which was called Tatary
after them and how for their strength and intelligence they were
famed throughout the entire world...(S.I., 1.3)

[There is also a fifth people called
the Mingayls, but these live close to
Ormian and from amongst them
came the warlike king Kangwist, a
second Alexander. But these are
Tatars and not Scythians, for they
live in Tatary and not in Scythia;
about which more below in the
discussion of the division of Scythia
from Tatary] Historians have
written about the many renowned
deeds of these Tatar Mongayls: how
they spread their fame throughout
the entire world by their strength
and intelligence...(Guagnini, p. 582)

Lyzlov again omits the first part of the excerpt since it explicitly contradicts
the thesis that he has developed. To reinforce his claim that Tatars,
Scythians, and Mongols were all the same, Lyzlov adds the interpolation:
"[About these Tatar Mongols] who lived in the lesser part of Scythia which
was called Tataria after them...." In fact the Chapter heading of I.1
establishes this identity before Lyzlov engages in his editorial legerdemain.
The heading refers to "the Scythian Mongail or Mingal peoples." (S.I., 1.1r)

The balance of the chapter discusses the early history of the Mongols
and Chapters Two and Three of Part I then treat the history of the Mongol invasion of Eastern Europe. So in the first three folios of the History of the Scythians Lyzlov establishes what is to be the basic theme of the work. Lyzlov can now discuss the various Tatar peoples with whom Muscovy came into contact confident that the theme of Scythian unity holds the work together.

Lyzlov returns explicitly to this theme on five other occasions in the course of the History. All five statements occur at the beginning of discrete sections and appear to be aimed at linking the sections together around the theme of Scythianism. The first appears at the beginning of the discussion of Kazan and attempts to confirm the claim that the Kazanis were Scythians. Lyzlov introduces an excerpt from Botero about the origins of Kazan in the following manner:

the Italian Ioann Boter, chronicler of the entire world, describing Tatary and Scythia... (S.I., 1.52r)

The second statement occurs at the beginning of the account of the history of the Crimean khanate where Lyzlov stresses the Scythian roots of the Crimean Tatars:

That Edega came to Taurik with his Tatars...and he and his successors established their residence in Bakchisarai and they began to call themselves khans following the former khans' title for while still in Scythia the great leader of the Scythian people called himself Unkam or Unkham and all historians and chroniclers have called his successors Kham or Great Khan...(S.I., II.136v-137r)

The third statement is in the introduction to the section on Muhammed and Islam:
This entire history has described and will describe the Scythian peoples many of whom took the law or more accurately the false law or the false faith of Muhammed... (S.I., l.169r)

The fourth occasion is in Lyzlov's account of the origins of the Turks.

Lyzlov first discusses the Turks' origins:

and the origin of the Turkish people... is from the Scythian, that is, the Tatar people.... (S.I., l.185v)

A bit later Lyzlov identifies Osman himself as a Scythian:

I will say a bit about their leader called Otoman; he was from the same Scythian, that is, Tatar people.... (S.I., l.193r)

In four of the five examples Lyzlov reiterates the connection between Tatars and Scythians: the Kazanis, the Crimeans, and the Turks are all Scythians as well as Tatars. In the introduction to the discussion of Islam, Lyzlov stresses that the Scythians are the subject of his work. Lyzlov not only entitles the work the History of the Scythians, thereby claiming at the outset that the Scythians are the unifying theme of his work, but throughout the History he works at making the Scythian theme the glue that binds it together.
NOTES TO APPENDIX A

1. Lyzlov probably misread Botero regarding the location of this area since Botero clearly states that it is that part that is not on the Asian Sea.
APPENDIX B: HISTORY OF KAZAN

The few scholars who have studied the History of the Scythians have asserted that Lyzlov used the Kazanskaia istoriia (History of Kazan) as a source for the history of the Kazan Khanate. Gladkii suggests the Lyzlov used the version of the Kazanskaia istoriia that is reflected in the Moiseeva edition. However no one has yet to study the relationship of Lyzlov's account of Kazan to either of the two main groups of the Kazanskaia istoriia.

The most cursory glance reveals a striking difference in Lyzlov's treatment of the history of the Kazan khanate. Lyzlov's account of the events from the founding of the khanate down to the start of the final Muscovite campaign against Kazan represents a radically abridged version of the Kazanskaia istoriia. Lyzlov's account of the final campaign and of the fall of Kazan, however, is much fuller than the account in the Kazanskaia istoriia as Lyzlov adds to the account information from the Stepennaia kniga, from Botero, and from a source very similar to Kurbshkii's History of the Grand Prince of Moscow. Lyzlov wanted to focus his and his reader's attention on the final battle for Kazan just as he focuses on the Fall of Constantinople. It's clear the Lyzlov used a redaction of the Kazanskaia istoriia close to, but not identical with, Group B.

I will first look at Lyzlov's editing of the Kazanskaia istoriia for the events leading up to the final siege and then will look at Lyzlov's presentation of the fall of Kazan.
It is clear from a comparison of Lyzlov’s account of the events leading up to the final siege with the accounts in Group A and Group B that Lyzlov used a version of the Kazanskaia istoriia that was different from these two groups.

The beginning of Lyzlov’s account of the founding of Kazan is similar to the accounts in both groups:

the pagans evicted from that area all the Russian peoples who lived nearby and within three years laid all to waste and in their place brought in and settled from beyond the Kama wild pagan Bulgar peoples with their princes and elders. (S.I., II. 53r-53v)

Group A
preying upon...peaceful people living near Kazan in adjoining villages, he evicted from those places the local Rus’ and laid waste to the land in three years.
And he brought from beyond the Kama river wild and pagan people - Bulgar chern’ with their princes and their elders... (PSRL, XIX, col.12)

Group B
preying upon...the peaceful Russian people living near Kazan in adjoining villages. And he evicted from those places the local Rus’ and laid waste to the land in three years. And he brought from beyond the Kama a wild and pagan people - Bolgar chern’ with their princes and elders... (PSRL, XIX, col.209-10)

In the passage that follows this, however, it would seem that Lyzlov followed the account in Group A as the accounts follow one another in Group A, but in Group B the accounts come from different places.
in addition other pagan peoples called mountain and meadow cheremis called otiaki - a simple people who were arrivals from the Rostov land fleeing conversion and they settled in the Bulgar settlements. (S.I., 1.53v)

This land was full of such peoples the Cheremis called Otiaki - that is Rostov chern’ who fled Rus’ Christianization to the Bulgar settlements. (PSRL, XIX, col.12)

There were Cheremis called Otiaki - that is Rostov chern’ - who fled there from Rus’ Christianization and settled in the Bulgar settlements. (PSRL, XIX, col.191)

The following passage in Lyzlov, however, seems to be drawn from the Group B:

and Khan Sain joined to Kazan town the Bulgar towns in the region which with all their inhabitants were taken by the Kazan khan. And this was the capital city in place of Briakhimov, the Bulgar city, and soon there a new Horde was founded and is called Sain’s yurt. (S.I., 1.53v)

and they were joined to Kazan. And the Bulgar cities were taken over by the Kazan khan. That was previously the land of the Little Bulgars beyond the Kama, between the great river Volga and the White Volzhka to the Great Nogai Horde. And the Large Bulgars were on the Danube. There was on the Kama an old city by the name of Briakhov, a Bulgar city.... And Kazan was the capital city in place of Briakhov...and from this khan Sain Kazan was founded and called Sain’s Yurt... (PSRL, XIX, col.210)

and Khan Sain joined to Kazan town the Bulgar towns which were captured by the Kazan Khan. And Kazan was the capital city, in the place of Briakhov, the Bulgar city... and by this Khan Sain Kazan was founded and called Sain’s Yurt... (PSRL, XIX, col.12-13)
It seems improbable that Lyzlov edited the account in Group A and came up with an account almost verbatim like that in Group B. That Lyzlov and Group B have Khan Sain as an active agent also suggests that Group B is the source for this account.

Mr. Keenan has discussed the relationship of the two Groups for this passage. He argues convincingly that Group B is primary: that the proper place of the account of the "Otiaki" is its earlier location in Group B (PSRL, XIX, col.191) and that it was omitted from its proper place in Group A (PSRL, XIX, col.3) and later restored to the account but in a different place (Col.12). A case can be made that Lyzlov is using a third version of the Kazanskaia istoriia -- a version that reflects the Group A correction on the "Otiaki" but that in other regards is closer to Group B.

The possibility that Lyzlov had both Groups at his disposal is contradicted by the following evidence:

and forty years after the capture of Kazan by Iurii Dmitrievicha a Izaik Khan Edigei attacked that khan Ulumahmed, he [Edigei] had thirty children from 9 wives ...(S.I., ll.54r-54v)

and thirty years after the capture of Kazan by prince Iurii, the Khan of the Great Golden Horde Ulumahmed fled from that eastern land, with his small druzhina, evicted with his tsaritsas and his children by the Great Edigei the elder, a Zaitsk khan....he [Edigei] had 9 children from 30 wives.... (PSRL, XIX, cols.14,17)

and forty years after the capture of Kazan the khan of the Great Golden Horde Ulumahmed fled from that eastern land, with his small druzhina, evicted with his tsaritsas and his children by the Great Zaitsk prince Edigei the elder....Edigei had thirty sons from his nine wives.... (PSRL, XIX, cols.212-3)
If Lyzlov had both Groups at his disposal, why didn’t he mention the disagreement over the number of years and the number of wives and children? As discussed in Chapter Three Lyzlov seems to have considered the identification of such discrepancies as the mark of the "historian".

In another instance Lyzlov prefers the account in Group A to that in Group B. Lyzlov describes the Muscovite capture of the Kazani royal family and their places of exile:

the Grand Prince imprisoned those who did not wish to convert: khan Alekham and his tsaritsa to Vologda, [his] mother with the two tsarevichs to Beloozero. Khan Alekham and his mother and the tsarevich Malendar died in imprisonment (S.I., 1.57v)

And the Grand Prince imprisoned khan Alekham with his tsaritsa in Vologda, the khan’s mother with the two tsarevichi were imprisoned in Belo ozero. There in imprisonment died the khan and his mother and the khan’s brother, the tsarevich Malendar. (PSRL, XIX, col.227)

The Grand Prince imprisoned the Kazani khan in Belo ozero. There in imprisonment died the khan, his mother, and the khan’s brother the tsarevich Melendar. (PSRL, XIX, col. 21-2)

Clearly Group A is the source for Lyzlov’s information here.

Lyzlov has information peculiar to both Groups. It is possible to argue that he had versions of both Groups at his disposal and that for whatever reasons he chose one version over the other. However this does not seem probable. It is more likely that Lyzlov had a version of the Kazanskaia istoriia that was different from both Groups. This contention is further supported by the information in Lyzlov that is either additional or different in comparison to the two Groups.
Lyzlov provides additional information in the account of the founding of Kazan:

The Russian princes not only did not dare to oppose the Khans but they were required to build the city, sending from their countries artisans and craftsmen.... (S.I., 1.53r)

Khan Sain founded Kazan on that place and not one of our rulers dared to oppose him... (PSRL, XIX, col.209)

Lyzlov provides different information in his account of the negotiations by the discontented Kazanis with the Crimean khan:

they sent some men to the Crimea, to the khan Mahmed Giray and asked him for his younger brother Safagiray.... (S.I., 1.62r)

they sent some men to Mendi Giray and from there brought their khan, asking him for his younger son Sapsirei. (PSRL, XIX, col.31)

they sent some of their men to the Crimea to the khan Mendigirei and from there brought their khan, asking him for his younger son Sapsirei. (PSRL, XIX, col.241)

Lyzlov has a different name for the Crimean khan and has Safagiray as a brother and not as a son.

Lyzlov provides a different account of the flight of Shah Ali from
Kazan. Shah Ali had fled into the steppe and had been given up for dead:

then the news came that the khan was alive and was coming to Moscow as two Nogai Tatars brought the khan from the steppe; there he had been joined by up to 1,000 Russians who lived on the banks of the Volga in order to fish.... (S.I., ll.62r-62v) news came that Shigalee, his good and loyal servant, was alive, travelling close by in the open steppe, naked like a baby and weak from hunger and bringing with him more than 10,000 Russian fishermen who fished on the Volga.... (PSRL, XIX, cols.32-3) news came that the khan Shigalleia, his good and loyal servant, was alive, travelling close by in the steppe, honestly accompanied by a Nagai, weak from hunger and bringing with him more than 10,000 Muscovite fishermen who fished on the Volga.... (PSRL, XIX, col.244)

Lyzlov has a different number of fishermen and a significantly different account of Shah Ali's trip across the steppe. It seems improbable that Lyzlov created his version on the basis of either of the two other accounts.

Lyzlov provides both different and additional information in his account of the 1524 campaign against Kazan:

and more than 40,000 Tatars were killed and trampled. 37 notable princes and murzas were killed and a great murza Aluch was taken to Moscow alive.... (S.I., 1.63r) and 42,000 Kazanis were killed in that battle. (PSRL, XIX, col.35) and 42,000 Kazanis were killed in that battle. (PSRL, XIX, col.250)

It is possible to argue that for some reason Lyzlov rendered 42,000 as "more than 40,000". However he must have had a different source for his account of the 37 notables and Aluch.

Lyzlov has a similar set of differences in his account of the voevodas who took part in the 1530 campaign:
he sent his voevodas
Tsar Shigalei, Prince
Ivan Fedorovich
Bel'skov, Prince Iosif
Rogobuzhskii, Prince
Fedor Obolenskii, Prince
Ivan Ovchinu Obolenskii, Prince
Mikhail Kubenskii, Ivan Khabar
Obraseset Simskii
and others... (S.I., ll. 63v-64r)
The names of the leading voevodas were: prince Ioan Bel'ski, Prince Mikhailo Glinskii, son of Lvov, prince Mikhailo Suzdalskii the stong, prince Osip Dorogobuzhskii, prince Fedor Obolenskii Lopata, prince Ivan Obolenskii Ovchina, prince Mikhailo Kubenskii. There were thirty in all... (PSRL, XIX, col.36)
The names of the leading voevodas were: prince Ivan Bel'ski, prince Mikhailo Glinskii, son of Lvov, prince Mikhailo Suzdalskii Kislyi, prince Iosip Dorogobuzhskii, prince Fedor Obolenskii Lopata, prince Ivan Obolenskii Ovchina, prince Mikhailo Kubenskii and 30 in all. (PSRL, XIX, col.252)

For some reason Lyzlov omits Mikhailo Suzdalskii and Mikhailo Glinskii, but he adds Ivan Khabar Obraseset Simskii. He was probably using a different list.

Later in the same account Lyzlov adds information:

The Kazan khan Safagirei...began to must his troops and evicted many Cheremis, Mordovians and Chuvash and built a strong ostrog around Kazan.... (S.I., 1.64r) The Kazan khan Safa-Girei...ordered [his nobles] to gather in Kazan from their estates and to ready themselves for a siege....He ordered them to evict the Cheremis from the surrounding area and to build an ostrog near the Bulak.... (PSRL, XIX, cols.38-9)
The Kazan khan Sapkirei...ordered [his nobles] to gather in Kazan from their estates and to prepare for a siege....They evicted the numerous local Cheremis and he ordered them to build an ostrog near the Bulak.... (PSRL, XIX, col.252)

Lyzlov's account in general is more condensed than the other accounts.

Why, in that case, would he add the Chuvash and the Mordovians? He
might have been using a different variant in which the Chuvash and the Mordovians appear.

Lyzlov has different information in his account of the battle between the Muscovites and the Kazanis. The Kazani khan fled to the Crimea:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>He fled with</th>
<th>He fled to the</th>
<th>He fled to the</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>everything to his brother</td>
<td>Crimea with his</td>
<td>Crimea with his</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Crimean khan Makhmetgirei</td>
<td>tsaritsas to his</td>
<td>tsaritsas to his</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.I., l. 64v)</td>
<td>brother Sap-Girei,</td>
<td>brother Sapkirei, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Crimean khan.</td>
<td>Crimean khan ....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(PSRL, XIX, cols. 39-</td>
<td>(PSRL, XIX, col.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40)</td>
<td>257)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly Lyzlov was dependent upon another source.

There is a similar lack of agreement over the length of the Kazani persecution of Muscovites:

| The Kazan khanate had carried on with      | How his father and     | And how his father     |
| them, the great-grandfathers, the         | great-grandfather      | and grandfather and    |
| grandfathers and                          | fought with the        | great-grandfather      |
| even the fathers of the Sovereign many    | they were unable to    | fought with them        |
| battles with both                         | conquer Kazan. And     | and were unable to     |
| happy and unhappy                         | Kazan had stood for    | conquer Kazan. And     |
| outcomes for 200                         | many years - about     | many years had         |
| years and more.                           | 300 years - from the   | passed, 300 years,     |
| (S.I., l. 65v)                            | foundation of Kazan    | since the foundation    |
|                                           | by khan Sain....       | of Kazan by khan       |
|                                           | (PSRL, XIX, col.45)    | Sain.... (PSRL, XIX,    |
|                                           |                         | col. 269)              |

Lyzlov has a different number of Kazanis who survive a Muscovite attack in 1548:
The khan sent after them [the Muscovites] 20,000 of his Tatars but these were defeated by the Russian forces and only about 2,000 returned to Kazan. (S.I., 1.67r) He sent after them 20,000 Kazanis,... they [the Muscovites] killed 17,000 of them, captured 2,000, and a 1,000 injured and wounded fled into the forests. (PSRL, XIX, cols. 299-300)

he sent after them 20,000 Kazanis.... they killed 17,000 in all, and captured 2,000, and 1,000 healthy and wounded fled into the forests. (PSRL, XIX, cols. 299-300)

Lyzlov has a different account of how far from Kazan Ivan decided to found Sviazhsk:

the Sovereign was going to Moscow and he went 20 versts from Kazan and came to the river Sviaga ....(S.I., 1.68v) And going along the Volga, along the ice, for 15 versts from Kazan, on the river Sviaga.... (PSRL, XIX, cols.60-1)

And going along the Volga, along the ice, for 15 versts from Kazan, on the river Sviaga.... (PSRL, XIX, col. 303)

Lyzlov adds information to his account of Kazan-Muscovite relations immediately prior to the final campaign:

The khan brought with him to Sviazhsk the Tatars who had been disloyal to him up to 800 honorable murzas and he ordered them executed... (S.I., ll. 71r-71v) When everyone entered the city...the khan ordered that all the Kazanis be imprisoned - rebels, traitors, and oathbreakers ....There was in all together with servants 700 Kazanis. (PSRL, XIX, col.93)

the Khan ordered that...all Kazanis be imprisoned, rebels, traitors, and oathbreakers ....With servants there was in all 500 ....(PSRL, XIX, col. 367)

The differences between Lyzlov's account and the accounts in the two main groups of the Kazanskaia istoriia suggest that Lyzlov was using a version of the Kazanskaia istoriia that is not reflected in any of the published editions.
For the account of the final siege it is clear that Lyzlov's account reflects an account very close to that of Group B. The account in Group A is substantially different from both Lyzlov's account and the Second Group's account. However, the version that Lyzlov used is not one of the published variants of Group B as becomes clear through a comparison of Lyzlov's account with that of the published edition of Group B.

The first difference appears in the account of Ivan's preparation for campaign:

With the tsaritsa and the Grand Princess Anastasiia Romanovna he left according to his tsarist chin many boiars and troops for the defense against any unexpected enemy and he put everything in the hands of his brother Prince Georgii Vasil'evich and he went to his village Kolomenskoe.... (S.I., 1.78r)

He left in Moscow his brother Prince Georgii Vasil'evich and in the tsarist palaces he left his tsaritsa and Grand Princess Anastasiia according to their royal chin and custom; the Tsar himself went from Moscow to Kolomna.... (PSRL, XIX, col. 396)

Where did Lyzlov get the additional information about the troops left in Moscow? What was the source for Kolomenskoe?

Lyzlov's list of the voevodas differs from that of the published version:
Bol'shoi polk:
I. F. Msitislavskii
I. M. Mikhulinskoi
Iu. A. Peninskoi-Obolenskii

Right Wing:
P. N. Shcheniatelyev
A. M. Kurbiskii

Advance Guard:
I. M. Turuntai Pronskoi
D. I. Khilkov

Left Wing:
D. M. Pleshcheev
D. I. Mikhulinskoi

Strozhevoi polk:
V. S. Serebriannoi
D. F. Paletskoi
S. V. Sheremetev

Ertoul:
Iu. I. Shemiakin Pronskoi
F. I. Troekurov
(S.I., ll. 78r-78v)

the Crimean khan Devletgirei was advancing with many troops against the border towns accompanied by an artillery train and janissaries sent to his aid by the Turkish sultan. (S.I., 1.78v)

Right Wing:
P. M. Shcheniatelyev
O. M. Kubrskoi

Advance Guard:
I. I. Turontai Pronskoi
D. I. Khilkov

Left Wing:
D. I. Pleshcheev

Strozhevoi polk:
V. S. Serebriannoi
D. F. Paletskoi
S. V. Sheremetev

Ertoul:
Iu. I. Shemiakin Pronskoi
F. I. Troekurov
(PSRL, XIX, cols. 408-9)

The lists are the same except for the Bol'shoi polk and the Left Wing.

Lyzlov has additional information in his account of Devlet-Giray's diversionary expedition:

the Crimean khan Iskir-kar Devlel-Girei son of Mainsup-kireev was advancing on Riazan with Crimean and Nogai troops and Kazanis from other Hordes and cannons and guns from the Turkish sultan and he was advancing on the Riazan places and on the Tula, Kazelsk, Vorotynskii, Belevskii and Odoevskii borderlands. (PSRL, XIX, col. 397)

Where does Lyzlov get the information about the janissaries?
Lyzlov has a fuller account of the food provided to the Muscovite troops during Lent:

When it was the Fast of the Holy Virgin then there was nothing to eat, neither wild animals nor fowl, only fishes in the water multiplied abundantly.... (S.I., l.81r)

When it was the Fast of the Holy Virgin, then we saw nothing neither fowl nor elk. (PSRL, XIX, col. 407)

Where does Lyzlov get the information about the fishes multiplying?

Lyzlov has a different account of the result of the failed Kazani attempt to prevent the Muscovites from besieging the city:

They rolled up the towers. The infidel however did not waver, but were firm in their intentions not wishing to submit to their final death, but wishing bloodshed.... (S.I., ll. 86r-86v)

They rolled the towers up to the city. Kazanis, on foot and mounted, came from the city.... (PSRL, XIX, col. 417)

By God’s grace the infidel was defeated and turning their backs they fled to the city trampling each other and thus the Christian troops completely besieged the city. (S.I., l. 86v)

they killed many people and they chased the remainder back to the city. (PSRL, XIX, col. 417)

Lyzlov has a different account of Ivan’s attempt to have the Kazanis surrender:

for that reason he sent many captives to the city and many of his advisers to tell the pagans to return to the truth and to submit... (S.I., l.89r)

sending to the city by letter and by releasing many captives ordering them to say.... (PSRL, XIX, col. 418)

Lyzlov has a radically edited version of Ivan’s speech to his troops prior to the battle (in the Kazanskaia istoria the speech runs from column 441 to column 450; in Lyzlov the speech is condensed to fit on l.101r). Yet
Lyzlov has an additional phrase in his condensed version:

remembering the bravery of their ancestors who fought bravely against their enemies and because of this being worthy of crowns from God and flowering with eternal glory as in the time of the battle of Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich with the pagan Mamai and during the time of the battle of Grand Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich Nevskii with the infidel Germans .... (S.I., l.101r)

the example and lesson of your relatives, brave generals of glorious Rus’ who fiercely fought against the godless Hagarites...as victory was given by God to our ancestor Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich who conquered the godless Mamai on the Don.... (PSRL, XIX, col.449)

Where does Lyzlov get the example of Aleksandr Nevskii?

There are differences between the two in the account of the detonation of the mines and the subsequent Muscovite assault:

he ordered all the infantry to advance on the city from all sides except for the mined areas. The troops awaited in readiness the detonation of the mines; the many troops of foot soldiers advanced and they began to fire from many cannon from all sides. (S.I., ll.102r-102v)

The tsar ordered that they advance on the city from all sides. He himself asked for God’s mercy, in order to gain a bloodless victory; he prayed in Church as was his habit and he ordered that a liturgy be sung. (PSRL, XIX, col. 458)

After these passages the two accounts resume skhodstvo for the description of the early stages of the assault. Clearly Lyzlov was using a different source here than the one that is reflected in the published editions.

In his account of the initial Muscovite assault Lyzlov adds the following passage between two excerpts taken from the Kazanskaia istoriia.

Upon the detonation of the mines:

There then was great fear and horror at the event for due to the explosion of so much powder the earth shook in the mined areas as if from a great and unusual shaking; those standing
nearby fell to the earth from terror; when the earth flew high into the air there was fog and darkness for many hours as if the sun had darkened on this day. (S.I., l.102v)

Lyzlov’s addition is from a source other than the published edition.

Lyzlov has a different account of the battle within the city walls:

with God’s help the Christian troops flowed like water into the city and they entered the city over the walls, fighting at close quarters hand to hand and they began to thrust their spears fearlessly. The Muslims fought to preserve themselves, their wives and children and property. The Christians [fought] wishing according to God to destroy completely the enemies of God and of the Orthodox faith. (S.I., l. 104r)

And by God’s mercy they quickly entered the city as much water covers the sea and they pushed the Tatars from all sides to the center of the city fighting and cutting them mercilessly along the streets and palaces and others coming from the caves and the mosques and palaces were cut down and speared like swine and stripped naked. (PSRL, XIX, col.460)

This passage from the Kazanskaia istoriia appears later in Lyzlov’s account (l.105v). However the Kazanskaia istoriia is not the source for Lyzlov’s account of what was at stake for each side.

After an account taken from the Kazanskaia istoriia that described the blood flowing in the streets, Lyzlov adds the following description:

the wounded cried out subject to great fear, suffocating and dying from the unusual closeness; many fell dead on both sides although a hundred times as many pagans; others due to the closeness and smoke from the firing fell in vain and died gasping for breath. (S.I., l.104v)

Lyzlov then has two speeches by Ivan to his troops which are not contained in the Kazanskaia istoriia. They both follow two occasions upon which Lyzlov has edited speeches in the Kazanskaia istoriia (111r/464-6; 112r/466; 112r/468-8). The first additional speech is addressed to the many
Muscovite troops killed in the siege:

Seeing many of his Christian troops killed, with great heartfelt sobbing and shedding many tears he said: O blessed martyrs, the brave conquerers of the enemies of God. Let God free you for your glorious victory and suffering. May your descendants have great joy. May your memory be forever sown with many praises from me and from your descendants. (S.I., l.112r)

The second is much more extensive and is addressed to the survivors of the campaign. In it Ivan praises their bravery by which he gains renown in neighbouring countries (112v). Ivan compares them to the Macedonians and considers them true descendants of Dmitrii Donskoi’s troops. Ivan finishes the speech with the promise of generous reward.

Lyzlov used Group B as his source for much of his account of the siege of Kazan. However there are several instances where the account in Group A is quite close to the information in Lyzlov and Kurbskii (information that is not contained in Group B).

The first is the tying of Kazani prisoners to stakes before the city walls:
When they had brought the captives before the tsar, he ordered that they be led in front of the trenches and tied to stakes so that they could beg and ask their comrades to surrender Kazan to the Christian tsar. Then the tsars' counselors rode around promising them life and freedom both for the captives and for those in the town. They having listened to these words in silence began to shoot from the walls of the fortress not so much at the Christians but at their own men saying that it is better that we see you dead at our own hands than killed by the uncircumcised gaury... (S.I., ll.91r-91v)

And when they brought the prisoners whom they had captured alive to our tsar, he ordered them to be led out in front of the trenches and be tied to stakes so that they might beg and warn their comrades within the fortress to hand over the city of Kazan to the Christian tsar. And our men rode on horseback and warned them promising in the name of the tsar life and freedom, both for the prisoners and for those in the fortress. But having listened to these words in silence, the Tatars began to shoot from the walls of the fortress not so much at our men but at their own men, saying: "It is better that we see you dead by our Muslim hands than killed by the uncircumcised Gaurs." (RIB, col.189)

And all the captured Cheremis were condemned to death, up to 7000: some were placed on stakes near the town, others were suspended upside down by one leg, and others by the neck, some were killed by weapons in order to frighten the Kazanis that having seen the evil-bitter death of their comrades they would be afraid and surrender the town to him and make peace. The dying Cheremis damned the Kazanis: "May you and your wives and children suffer the same bitter death as us..." (PSRL, XIX, col. 131)

Lyzlov and Kurbskii share the same account almost verbatim, however it is interesting that Group A has a related account.

The second is the account of boiling oil used against the Muscovite attackers:
When they fought their way with great difficulty to the walls and towers, then they began to pour boiling liquid on them... (S.I., l.103r)

And when we had fought our way up to the wall with great difficulty, then they began to pour boiling liquid on us... (Kurbskii, col. 195)

and they poured boiling oil and water... on the troops advancing on the walls... (PSRL, XIX, cols. 132-3)

The account in Lyzlov/Kurbskii of the Kazanis placing a curse on the Muscovite forces seems to have an approximate parallel in Group A's account:

they came out on to the city... both very old men and women and they began to shout satanic words, waving their clothes at the Christian army and spinning wildly... (S.I., l.93v)

they came out on to the city... both very old men and women in full view of us and they began to shout satanic words, waving their clothes at our army and turning in an indecent manner... (Kurbskii, cols. 191-2)

they walked along the fortress walls, crying and pitifully sobbing... and mothers wept for their sons, tearing their hair, and baring their breasts, showing their naked nipples and shouting... PSRL, XIX, col.144)

The account in the Kazanskaia istoriia treats the attempt by the Kazani women to force their husbands to submit to the Grand Prince. The basic features -- Kazanis on the walls acting wildly -- are similar however.

Group A also has a description of the tunnels being blown up:

twenty great barrels of powder were placed there and thus the tunnels were blown up... (S.I., l.94v)

and twenty graet barrels of powder were placed: the tower was blown up... (Kurbskii, cols. 192-3)

and in another place, ten sazhens from the Bulak, the tunnel exploded.... (PSRL, XIX, col. 152)

Group A has a much more well-developed response by the Kazanis to Ivan's final offer of peace than does Lyzlov. However the basic theme is
the same:

however the infidel
seeing his final
death did not come
to his senses at all
and did not attend
to the many
convincing words
about mercy but
stood stubbornly in
their intention
blinded by evil....
(S.I., 1.94v)

The Kazanskaia istoriia gives two speeches by the Kazanis expressing their refusal to accept the grand prince’s terms.

There are two short passages in Lyzlov that find their echo in the account of Group A. First there is the description of the Kazani corpses in the city:

their corpses lay on a level with the high tower above the gates.... (S.I., 1.108r)
the great piles of dead Kazanis were level with the city walls...
(PSRL, XIX, col. 161)

Then there is the account of the wealth confiscated by the Muscovite troops:

many notable people were taken alive such as men and the wives of princes and murzins and many maidens. Put briefly all who escaped the slaughter were captives of the Christian army from the great to the small and the countless wealth gathered by them over many years....
(S.I., 1.110r)

In the town the Christians took countless wealth and took captive many princesses and the wives and children of murzins, put briefly, all were captured from the great to the small.
(PSRL, XIX, col. 461)

and they took possession of all the treasure...enriched forever by the Kazani wealth...and they returned to the Russian people all the Russian wealth and every precious item that the Kazanis had over many years gathered from them during raids.
(PSRL, XIX, col. 162)
Lyzlov is clearly dependent upon Group B for the account, but his final statement is strikingly similar to the final statement of the account in Group A.

The passage immediately following also has elements from both Groups:

O a deed worthy of great wonder! O the actions of the most great God...that he allowed the work of almost a lifetime to be completely destroyed in one hour that is such a short time a countless multitude of the Kazani race died. (S.I., ll.110r-110v)

O most glorious miracle! O great mercies of God! That in such a short time a multitude of thousands of Kazanis died! (PSRL, XIX, col.462)

"o that so many people fell in one small hour for this one town!..." (PSRL, XIX, col.168)

The account in Kurbskii/Lyzlov of the attempt by the Kazani women to seduce the Muscovite troops is similar to one found in Group A:
then having taken to the one side the women and children and maidens most beautiful garments embellished with precious gold, there were some thousand of them, and they stood on one side in the above mentioned khan’s court thinking that the Christian army would be seduced by them and their possessions and would spare their lives.... (S.I., l.107v-108r)

Kurbskii and Lyzov provide a motive for the women’s behaviour, but the basic account is common to all three.

Lyzov has information from both Kurbskii and the First Group in his account of the surrender of the khan. In Lyzov’s and Kurbskii’s accounts the Kazanis plead for the life of the khan, while in the account of Group A the Kazani nobles plead for their own lives and that of the khan:
and now we give you our khan alive.  
Take him to your tsar and the rest of us are going to the wide field to drink with you the final cup.  
The pagans gave their khan to the regiment of Dmitrii Palitskii, which was closer than others, along with a certain karach who was the most important of them, by the name of Zeniesh.... (S.I., l.108v)

and now we give you our khan alive; take him to your tsar.  
The rest of us are going to the wide field to drink with you the final cup.  
And they gave their khan to us with a certain karach, who was the most important of them,...this prince's name was Zeniesh.  
(RIB, col.200)

"you cannot kill us, youth. at all O great voevoda...take us alive to the tsar...that one whom you nearly killed is the Kazan khan, and these are the Bogomich priests..."  
they handed him to the custody of the great voevoda prince Dmitrii Paletskii Shchered.... (PSRL, XIX, cols.164, 165)

In place of a conclusion I will simply raise some questions: do Kurbskii, Lyzlov and Group A reflect late reworkings of the history of the siege? is Group B the original off of which each was working? Did Lyzlov have both groups and Kurbskii at his disposal? Was there another source which combined elements of all three that he used? how can one explain the similarities between Kurbskii and Group A (not necessarily the similarities of events, but those of expression)? Appendix C will look at the relationship between Lyzlov and Kurbskii.
NOTES TO APPENDIX B


2. I use the terms (Group A and Group B) that Edward Keenan uses in: "Coming to Grips with the Kazanskaya Istoriya: Some Observations on Old Answers and New Questions," The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, XI(1964-8): 143-183. Keenan argues that Group B reflects the earlier version and Group A the later, more polished version.

3. Ibid., pp.159-161.


5. "Honestly" is rendered as "chestno." In variants M and V of the Second Group the word is "chistom." Thus: the open steppe.
APPENDIX C: THE KURBSKII HISTORY

This Appendix will attempt to highlight the relationship between the Skifskaja istorija and the History of the Grand Prince of Muscovy commonly attributed to Andrei Kurbskii. The traditional assertion is that Lyzlov used Kurbskii’s History in the composition of the Skifskaja istorija and there is indeed strong evidence to support this assertion. In the margin on 1.153v, right at the spot where Lyzlov’s account shifts from dependence upon the Stepennaia kniga to dependence on an account very similar to the Kurbskii History, there is the note: "Kur istorija". This margin note appears in all but two of the manuscript copies of the Skifskaja istorija that I have examined.¹

In Lyzlov’s account of the fall of Kazan there are clear breaks between his use of Kurbskii and his use of the Kazanskaia istorija. This fact and the date of the composition of the Kurbskii History (even if we accept Mr. Keenan’s dating of the Full Version to the 1670’s) preclude any possibility that the author of the Kurbskii History used Lyzlov as a source.

However a case can be made, on the basis of certain inconsistencies and peculiarities in the Lyzlov/Kurbskii relationship, that Lyzlov’s account reflects more faithfully a common third source that each author used in his account of the fall of Kazan. I will simply raise the possibility of such a relationship in this Appendix; a more definite resolution of the question is beyond the confines and abilities of this dissertation.
The Lyzlov/Kurbskii relationship is centered on the account of the fall of Kazan, but there is other information common to both accounts. The order of Kurbskii's narrative is: the fall of Kazan; the Crimean campaign against Muscovy by Devlet Girai in 1555; an account of the Livonian campaign down to 1558; a short account of the capture of Astrakhan; an account of the plague and famine among the Nogais and the Crimean Tatars and short references to the campaigns of Dmitro Wisniewecki and Danilo Adashev against the Crimean Tatars. The order of Lyzlov's narrative is (not following immediately one upon the other): the fall of Kazan; the fall of Astrakhan; the account of Devlet Girai's campaign; the plague and the famine among the Nogais and the Crimean Tatars; a fuller account of the campaigns of Wisniewecki and Adashev. I'll consider the Kurbskii/Lyzlov relationship for each event in turn.

In discussing the fall of Kazan the first type of relationship between Lyzlov and Kurbskii that I'll discuss is that of sequential problems -- those instances where the account in one source makes better logical sense than the corresponding account in the other.

The first such instance is in the account of the interruption of Ivan's preparations for the campaign against Kazan by Devlet Girai's diversionary sortie:
1) The tsar' sent artillery and siege equipment by boat to Sviazhsk.

2) The tsar' went to Trinity Monastery to pray and from there went to Kolomna.

3) News came that Devlet Girai was advancing on the border towns with many troops.

4) Ivan put off his trip to Kazan. He himself, as said previously, was on the Oka at Kolomna. He stationed other troops along the river.

5) The khan, hearing of Ivan's preparations, turned and besieged Tula.

(S.I., ll. 78r-79r)

1) The tsar sent siege equipment by the Volga route.

2) News came that the Perekop khan was advancing on him with many troops.

3) Ivan put off his trip to Kazan. The tsar' himself was on the Oka, at a certain place. He stationed other troops along the river.

4) The khan, hearing of Ivan's preparations, turned and besieged the great, walled city of Tula which is 16 miles from Kolomna where the Christian tsar was staying with his troops.

(RIB, cols. 174-5)

Lyzlov and Kurbskii then have similar accounts of the Muscovite defeat of the khan. There are two possible scenarios here. The first is that Lyzlov is consciously editing Kurbskii's account into a more sequential account. He introduces the account with #1 which could either be from Kurbskii or from the Kazanskaia istoriia. #2 clearly comes from the Kazanskaia istoriia. Lyzlov then follows Kurbskii's account until he reaches the point where Kurbskii states that Ivan stood on the Oka "at a certain place." Here Lyzlov simply inserts Kolomna into the account along with the statement "as said before." When Kurbskii mentions Kolomna by name later in the account, Lyzlov has no need to repeat this information.

The second solution is that Kurbskii's account is a careless rendering of the account reflected in Lyzlov. He fails to establish Ivan's position at
Kolomna -- for some reason he uses "at a certain place" -- and then is forced to bring it in the backdoor in his description of Tula."

The second sequential discrepancy occurs in the account of the Muscovite journey to Murom after the victory at Tula. After the victory:

1) Ivan left Kolomna for Murom on June 4 and arrived in Murom on the 13th.

2) and stayed in Murom for the resting of the troops for a week and on the 20th he left Murom and crossed the Oka.

(R.I., I.80v)

Lyzlov's account is close to that of the Kazanskaia istoriia (PSRL, XIX, col.406) and it occurs at the end of a long section borrowed from the Kazanskaia istoriia. A possible explanation is that Lyzlov chose this account over that of Kurbskii -- that he preferred the precise nature of the account. Another possibility is that the account as in Lyzlov and the KI was also in the common third source and that Kurbskii butchered it: he confused the location of the 8 days rest.

The third discrepancy is in the account of the crossing of the Sura and the advance upon Sviazhsk:
1) they crossed the Sura and were now in enemy territory.

2) They crossed great forests and deep rivers, swampy marshes and sometimes broad fields.

3) There were few inhabited villages since the villages were located near large fortresses -- they were invisible even if you were close by.

4) The local tribes, Hill Cheremis, the Chuvash, the Mordovians, who were previously hostile started to submit to the tsar.

5) They constructed bridges and crossings across rivers evidently happy at the tsar’s arrival for Sviashsk was in their territory. (S.I., 1.81v)

1) When they crossed the Sura

2) the Hill Cheremis, in their tongue the Chuvash, started to meet them in groups of 500 and 1000

3) evidently happy at the tsar’s arrival since the aforementioned city on the Sviaga was in their territory

4) We marched for eight days across the wild fields, swamps and sometimes forests

5) there are very few inhabited villages since they are located near large fortresses and are invisible even to those who go near. (RIB, col.178)

Lyzlov’s account appears to make more sense: as the Muscovites get closer to Sviashsk, they encounter greater numbers of inhabitants who submit to them. In Kurbskii’s account, the Muscovites meet the happy natives at the outset and then, as they draw closer to Sviashsk, the going got tougher and they met fewer people. Is this another instance of Lyzlov making Kurbskii’s account more logical and in so doing he adds information (the fact that they were in enemy territory; the Mordovians and the former hostility; the construction of bridges) and omits information (the eight days travel)? Or did Kurbskii the careless copyist butcher the coherent account of a common source?

The next discrepancy consists of the different placement of similar
statements in Lyzlov and Kurbskii. Lyzlov and Kurbskii have the same account of the besieging of Kazan. Lyzlov describes the initial Muscovite advance on the city and the Kazani resistance. The Kazani are driven back into the city and Lyzlov then states:

then the other voevodas also advanced, encircling the fortress... (S.I., 1.85v)

Lyzlov continues on to relate the disposition of the troops under these voevodas and then states:

and in this manner the numerous regiments encircled the Muslim fortress and settlement and cut off all roads and passages to the fortress so that the pagans could neither leave nor enter. (S.I., 1.86r)

Where Lyzlov has the first statement, after a long passage of agreement between Lyzlov and Kurbskii, Kurbskii reads:

And on that day we surrounded the Muslim city and fortress with Christian regiments and we cut off from all sides the roads and passages to the city: in no way could they either leave or enter the city. (RIB, col.182)

The Lyzlov/Kurbskii agreement resumes and then at the end of his account, where Lyzlov has the second statement, Kurbskii reads:

and in this manner they besieged the Muslim fortress and city. (RIB, col.183)

Is this another instance where Lyzlov created a more effective account from the material in Kurbskii: first he describes how the Muscovite arranged the siege and then he states that they thereby cut off the city completely. Or did Kurbskii carelessly anticipate events by moving part of the concluding statement to a position where it does not ring true?

The next discrepancy occurs in the account of the Muscovite problem
with getting food:

1) The khan saw that the Christian army was exhausted because of the frequent sorties from the forest

2) because of hunger for as I’ve said they did not allow the Christians to eat even dry bread in peace

3) because of the shortage of food for all victuals were bought at great cost.
   (S.I., 1.89v)

(RIB, cols.186-7)

Did Lyzlov clean up Kurbskii’s account and establish a proper parallel between the three causes of discomfort? Or did Kurbskii butcher the completely sensible account reflected in Lyzlov?

There are differences between the two accounts of the transportation of the Holy Cross from Moscow to Kazan:
1) The boyars and voevodas advised the tsar to send for the Life-giving Cross, which always lies by the tsar's crown, in which there was a piece of the wood of the Saviour.

2) When the Life-giving Cross was brought the troops were blessed.

3) And from that time on the pagan curses disappeared.

4) Not only this one miraculous event was accomplished by the power of the Life-giving Cross, but also many other wonders and wondrous visions about which I'll speak later.

(R.I.B., col.192)

Kurbiskii's description of the cross in #s 1 and 2 is tortured. Did Lyzlov clean it up? Did Lyzlov add the visions and wonders to the power of the cross? Or did Kurbiskii mangle the description of the cross twice? Did he omit the reference to the visions and wonders since he has little to say about them later in the account?

The next discrepancy concerns the construction of the siege tower. Lyzlov has this description immediately after the account (which he shares with Kurbiskii) of the establishment of the siege artillery and his account appears to follow that of the Kazanskaia istoriia. Kurbiskii does not have the account of the tower's construction at this point, but he places it later after the account of the destruction of the Kazani water supply.
1) They brought to the trenches both great and middling guns... in addition there were many field guns in the tsar's regiment.

2) Soon thereafter the tsar ordered the construction of a great tower, higher than the city, and with many cannon and guns.

3) The gunners and musketeers were ordered to fire on the city so as not to allow the pagans to come out of their houses.

4) The gunners were so skilled that they could kill a bird on the fly.

Lyzlov's agreement with Kurbskii resumes with a further account of the bombardment of the city -- in Kurbskii this account follows immediately upon #1 above.

Kurbskii's account of the construction of the tower comes much later. Kurbskii and Lyzlov have a similar account of the destruction of the Kazani water supply (discussed below), but then the break occurs. Lyzlov
continues to describe the resolve of the Kazanis in the face of this new calamity and the intensified bombardment by the Muscovites. Kurbskii has a description of the tower and a short, summary account of the destruction wrought by the guns:

In addition we had a tower, extraordinarily large and tall, which was secretly built in two weeks half a mile from the city. One night it was placed near the moat of the city and on it were 10 cannon and fifty muskets; and great damage was caused by it every day both in the town and in the fortress, for up to the capture of the city almost 10,000 Muslim soldiers, apart from women and children, were killed from that tower, both by guns and by raids carried out from it. (RIB, col.193)

There are two possible explanations for the difference. The first is that Lyzlov decided to edit the account in Kurbskii and to put the account of the construction of the tower within the overall context of the positioning of the siege artillery. After this moving of information, Lyzlov then inserts the passage from the KI about the effects of the bombardment and the skill of the gunners. In place of the tower account (as it appears later in Kurbskii) Lyzlov puts an account of his own regarding the heightened resolve of the Kazanis.

The second possible explanation is that originally Kurbskii omitted the account of the tower and then later was forced to make up for this omission (perhaps he was reminded of it by the fact that in the account of the destruction of the water supply the Muscovites destroy a large Kazani tower). Kurbskii then follows this account with a summary similar to that by Lyzlov of the bombardment and adds the detail of the number of deaths.

Lyzlov and Kurbskii have a different order for the Kazani retreat
towards the center of the city:

1) The tsar stood across from the Arskii gates

2) The Tatars on our side barricaded themselves in the khan’s palace

2) As many as could flee abandoned the lower part of the city

3) On the other side, on the side of the Arskii plain, the side where the mines had exploded, the khan and his court fled halfway through the town to the Tezitskii ditch

3) They fought fiercely with the Christians

4) The Tatars fled from the other side, from the hill, and as many of them as were able barricaded themselves in the khan’s palace

4) They fought fiercely with the Christians

5) They abandoned the lower part of the city.

5) For two parts of the city stands on a hill, as on a plain; the third part is low as if in a gulley

6) For two parts of the city stands on a hill, as on a plain; the third part is low as if in a gulley

6) A large ditch runs cutting the town in half from the Bulak wall to the lower part of town.

(RIB, col.196)

(L)yzlov provides a reason for the retreat of the Tatars on the Arskii side: the advance of the tsar. Did he add this to make the account more sequential and to focus attention upon Ivan? Or did Kurbskii, in his desire to deflect attention away from Ivan, omit the references to Ivan and indeed start with a "personalized" account of what occurred on "our" side?

The final example of divergence occurs in the account of the Muscovite booty seekers. Lyzlov and Kurbskii had described earlier how
many of the Muscovites were primarily interested in loot (S.I., ll.104v-105r; RIB, col.196). Both accounts return to this theme but with a different order of account. Lyzlov introduces his account with an excerpt from the KI that describes Ivan’s measures to control looting:

1) But few were afraid of this for the desire for wealth banished fear and shame
2) thereby few Christian troops remained for as has been said most sought booty
3) the brave troops fought ceaselessly
4) the Muslims, themselves witnessing this and said that many went 2 or 3 times with booty back to the trenches
5) they trampled the booty underfoot, calling only for God’s help
6) the Muslims, seeing that few Christians remained, started to press hard....

(RIB, col.197)

(S.I., l.106r)
Lyzlov's is the better narrative. Did he clean up Kurbskii's account while adding information from the KI? Or once again is Kurbskii careless? He starts his account in medias res and then is forced to backtrack and to explain why few Christians remained.

The next set of differences to be noted is where Lyzlov has a fuller account or additional information in contrast to the account in Kurbskii. Here the basic issue is: did Lyzlov elaborate on Kurbskii's account or did Kurbskii edit the fuller account that is reflected in Lyzlov?

The first such difference occurs in the account of the provisioning of the Muscovites after their long, hungry march across the steppe:

1)they had not had food for 9 days
2)but God now provided them with various wild animals and fowl and fish
3)for there are many of them [fish] in those rivers and wild animals in the empty steppe (S.I., 1.81v)

1)we had not had food for 9 days
2)but God now provided us and the army with fish and with various wild animals
3)for in the steppe there are very many fish in the rivers (RIB, cols.177-8)

Is Lyzlov rendering Kurbskii's account more sensible by putting the fish and the game in their proper habitats? This passage in Lyzlov closely follows a similar passage from the KI which describes the food provided to Ivan on his journey across the steppe. Or did Kurbskii carelessly butcher the account reflected in Lyzlov?

A similar difference in the description of animals occurs in the description of the natural abundance of the area around Arskii Gorod:
1) In that land there are great, abundant fields which abound in all kinds of fruit

2) In addition the murza’s palaces are very beautiful and worthy of admiration

3) there are many villages and so many grains that it is hard to believe and it is difficult to relate

4) there are countless herds of different kinds of cattle and great profit from the various beasts in the land

5) for there breed good martens, foxes, squirrels, elk, deer, and other animals useful for clothing and food; a bit further there are many sables and honeys (S.I., 1.92v)

1) in that land there are great, abundant fields which abound in all kinds of fruit

2) In addition the palaces of the princes and the nobility are very beautiful and indeed worthy of admiration

3) there are many villages and so many grains that it is difficult to believe were one to tell of them all?

4) there are countless herds of different kinds of cattle and great profit from the various beasts in the land

5) for there breed costly martens and squirrels and other animals useful for clothing and food; a bit further there are many sables and honeys (RIB, col.190)

Did Lyzlov improve Kurbskii’s list of animals in order to make it more impressive and logical? Lyzlov does use similar descriptions of plenty elsewhere. Or did Kurbskii carelessly render the account in Lyzlov (both #3 and #5)?

Lyzlov has a short bit of additional information in his account of the mining of the Kazani water supply:
1) About 2 weeks prior to the capture of the city, by another mine, their water supply was cut

2) they mined under the large tower and under the tunnels which brought water to the entire city

3) 20 barrels of powder were placed and thus the tunnels were blown up (S.I., 1.94v)

1) About 2-3 weeks prior to the capture of the city, their water supply was cut

2) they mined under the large tower and under the tunnels which brought water to the entire city

3) about 20 barrels of powder were placed and the tower was blown up. (RIB, cols.192-3)

Did Lyzlov, in the interests of creating a comprehensible narrative, replace tower with tunnels -- after all the tunnels, not the tower, supplied the water? Or did he add "tunnels" (see endnote #9) to an imprecise account? Or was Kurbskii careless in his rendering of the account and replace tunnels with tower?

An instance where Kurbskii has additional information is in his descriptions of Tula and Murom:

1) [the khan] turned and besieged Tula.... (S.I., 1.79r)

2) and he set off from Kolomna to Murom.... (S.I., 1.80v)

1) [the khan] turned and besieged the great, walled city of Tula (RIB, col.175)

2) after 8 days he set off with his troops towards Kazan, to the great city called Murom (RIB, col.177)

Did Lyzlov omit the descriptions of Tula and of Murom as unnecessary? Or did Kurbskii add this information in order to demonstrate his "familiarity" with these two places?

Another instance where Lyzlov and Kurbskii have different information is the description of supplies lost by Devlet Girai in his flight:
1) crossing three rivers several guns and supplies sank in the crossings and they abandoned the camels.... (S.I., 1.79v)

1) crossing three rivers he sank several guns and cannonballs and he abandoned powder and camels.... (RIB, col.176)

Why would Lyzlov submerge the cannonballs within the generic term "supplies"? Why would Lyzlov omit the powder but add the information about the crossings?!

The third instance occurs in the account of the march of the right wing of the Muscovite army from Kolomna to the Sura river:

1) [the voevodas] with these troops screened the tsar from the Nogai Tatars (S.I., 1.80v)

1) We screened him with those troops, that were with us, from the Zavolga Tatars
2) (he was afraid lest the Nogai princes attack him without warning) (RIB, col.177)

Why would Lyzlov omit the explanatory statement in Kurbskii? Could it possibly be seen as critical of Ivan and therefore Lyzlov omitted it? Or did Kurbskii add the statement in order to emphasize his service to Ivan?

The two accounts of the continuation of the right wing's journey to the Sura river also have differences:

1) those troops travelling along the right flank of the tsar's forces
2) after about 5 weeks reached the Sura river at the mouth of the Borysh river (S.I., 1.81r)

1) after about 5 weeks, hungry and in great distress,
2) we reached the great Sura river, at the mouth of the Borysh river (RIB, col.177)

Why would Lyzlov omit the detail regarding the troops being hungry and in
distress? Once again to avoid putting Ivan in a bad light? Or does Kurbskii add the information in order to stress the sacrifices that he made? Does Kurbskii describe the Sura as "great" in order to establish greater familiarity with the territory?

There are differences in the two accounts of the provisioning of the troops upon their arrival at the Sura:

1) that day [the troops] ate their fill of dry bread with relish and thanksgiving
2) buying some, borrowing some from friends....
(S.I., ll.81r-81v)

1) that day we ate our fill of dry bread with great relish and thanksgiving
2) buying some at great cost, borrowing some from our fellows -- both friends and comrades
(RIB, col.177)

Why would Lyzlov omit information about the cost and about one of the sources of the dry bread? Or did Kurbskii add the information in order to suggest familiarity with the events?

Lyzlov has additional information in the midst of an account of the first battle with the Kazanis that is otherwise fully skhodno with Kurbskii's account:
1) after three days they began to dig trenches near the city

2) they rolled up towers. The godless did not falter, but stood firm in their intentions [expecting] their final end. They did not want to submit, but rather wanted to shed blood.

3) they [the Muslims] fought fiercely, some fighting from the city, some running out to fight hand to hand

4) they did not wish to allow the Christian troops to besiege the city, to establish towers and siege machinery

5) and many fell on both sides, but more Muslims than Christians. And thus the sign of God's mercy appeared to the Christians and quickened the spirit of bravery in the pious troops

6) and with God's help the pagans were defeated. They turned tail and trampled each other retreating to the city and thus the Christian troops completely surrounded the city

7) and firmly established the trenches and the musketeers with their commanders dug themselves into the earth....

(S.I., II.86r-86v)

Did Lyzlov simply add this information as filler? There does not seem to be any compelling reason for Kurbskii to omit this information.¹²

Lyzlov again appears to have a series of interpolations in the account
of the Muscovite preparations for the campaign against the Kazanis in the Arskii Field. The first difference is in the identification of the voevodas:

1) at the head of this army was placed prince Aleksandr Borisovich Shuiskii Gorbatoi a wise and steadfast soldier and experienced in military matters

1) placing at the head of all the great hetman, the Suzdal prince Aleksandr, called Gorbatiy, a very wise and reliable man, experienced in military matters (RIB, col.187)

2) and Daniil Iur’ev the tsar’s brother-in-law and a wise and experienced warrior and many other voevodas knowledgable of all Muslim tricks and ruses (S.I., ll.90r-90v)

The KI version of this account reads:

the tsar’ sent his voevodas...Oleksandr Borisovich Gorbotyi, prince Semen Ivanovich Mikulinskii, Danil Romanovich Iurev and other voevodas.... (PSRL, XIX, col.421)

Did Lyzlov look to the KI for most of Gorbatiy’s name and look to Kurbskii for the description of his abilities? For some reason he omitted Mikulinskii and Gorbatiy’s other name from the KI account and Gorbatiy’s Suzdal ties from Kurbskii? He added the description of D. R. Iur’ev to the KI account. Or did Kurbskii refer to Gorbatiy as a "Suzdal prince" to suggest familiarity? Did he delete the reference to Iur’ev since later in his account Iur’ev appears as a villain?13

Lyzlov then has two minor additions which help the sequence of the account. The first occurs in his description of the Muscovite strategy:

1) the troops were ordered to hide behind the hills in a hidden place
(S.I., 190v)

1) and he ordered to wait, having hidden all the Christian troops behind the hills
(RIB, col.187)
Lyzlov returns to this detail in his account of the battle:

1) they [the Muslims] began to circle around the trenches and fight, shooting from their bows... some... advanced... as if wishing to swallow up the Christians. Then as I've said the other voevodas came out of the hidden place with many, well organized, chosen troops....
(S.I., ll.90v-91r)

1) they began to circle around the trenches and fight, shooting from their bows... some advanced... as if wishing to swallow up the Christians. Then, as I say, then the hetman came out with the Christian troops in full battle array....
(RIB, col.188)

Did Lyzlov simply add these two references in order to create a better account? It's difficult to conceive of Kurbskii omitting the phrase twice in such a short account.

The third difference appears in the account of the Muscovite entrapment of the Kazanis:

1) When the Muslims saw that they had been tricked, they would have been glad to retreat to the forest, but they were not able to.... (S.I., l.91r)

1) When the Muslims saw, they would have been glad to retreat to the forest, but they were unable to.... (RIB, col.188)

Fennell generously translates Kurbskii's statement "Videvshe she busurmany...." to read: "But when the Muslims saw them...." Did Lyzlov add the specific reference to what the Kazanis in fact saw (that they had been tricked) in order to create a tighter account? Or did Kurbskii omit the phrase?

The fourth difference occurs in the account of the arrival of Gorbatyi's regiment:
1) When the Great Regiment, in which there was the voevoda himself, prince Andrei Borisovich, arrived and the foot regiments approached, surrounding them, then all the pagan regiments fled.... (S.I., I.91r)

1) When the Great Regiment, in which there was the hetman himself, arrived and the foot regiments approached, surrounding them especially from the forest, then all their regiments fled.... (RIB, col.188)

Why would Lyzlov omit the reference to the forest? Did Kurbskii add it to show familiarity with military affairs? Then why did he omit the two references to the "tainoe mesto"?

Lyzlov adds information to the account of the battle that followed:

1) the Christian troops pursued them, attacking and cutting those who were fleeing, and thus the pagans were defeated and their corpses lay for 1 1/2 miles....
(S.I., I.91r) (RIB, col.188)

1) the Christian troops pursued them, fighting them, and a great many Muslim corpses lay for more than 7 verstks....

Is Lyzlov's information simply filler? Certainly it does not add much substance to the account.

There are several differences in the account of the campaign against Arskii Gorod. The first occur in the description of the launching of the campaign:

1) After three days the pious tsar ordered that separate force with the above-named voevodas to attack the abbatis that the pagans had constructed between two swamps on a hill about 10 verstks from the city.
(S.I., I.91v)

1) After three days out tsar ordered the prince Aleksandr Suzdalskii with the same force to attack the abbatis -- a wall which the pagans had erected on a hill between the great swamps about 2 miles from the city.
(RIB, col.189)

Why would Lyzlov omit Gorbatyi's name? Why would he omit the
description of the abbatis (zaseka)? Why does he substitute "two swamps" for "great swamps"? Or does Kurbskii have to specify Gorbatyi as the sole voevoda since he had eliminated the reference to Iur'ev-Zakharin? Did he add the explanation of zaseka for his "Polish audience"?

Lyzlov has an additional description of S. I. Mikulinskii:

1) he assigned another voevoda Prince Semen Ivanovich Mikulinskii, from the house of the Tver grand princes

2) an accomplished man of great bravery and skilled in military matters and having had prior to this many battles with the pagans (S.I., ll.91v-92r)

Did Lyzlov simply add this to emphasize his accomplishments? Why would Kurbskii omit it?^{14}

There are differences in the account of the attack upon the zaseka in the Arskii Field:

1) With God's help the Christians overcame the pagans...the Christians pursued them and crossed over that wall. They sent news about everything to the tsar and there was great joy among the troops besieging the city. The troops spent one night at the wall.... (S.I., 1.92r)

Did Lyzlov eliminate the references to the "entire great force" and to the "seunch"^{15} and then add the information about the joy of the troops?^{16} Is
there any reason for Kurbskii to have eliminated this passage?

Lyzlov has extra information following the account of the successful campaign against Arskii Gorod:

1) all forms of livestock were cheaper in the army -- a cow could be bought for 10 den'gi and a large bull for 10 kopecks

2) soon after the return of that force

3) and from that time the troops in the trenches near the city began to be freer from external attacks by the pagans, since they then did not have to worry about the external Tatar troops, but only fight with those in the city

4) Then after about four days, many Meadow Cheremis gathered and attacked the rear camps....

(S.I., II.92v-93r)

4) Then, after about 4 days, many Meadow Cheremis gathered and attacked out rear camps

(RIB, col.191)

At first glance Kurbskii's account seems to make more sense. The "soon after..." starts a new line of narrative (in the RIB it starts the new paragraph that discusses the attack by the Cheremis). Lyzlov appears to be a bad editor: he starts the passage "soon after..." and then decides to interpolate a non sequitur. He then returns to the passage which should have really followed the "soon after...."

There is another way of looking at this passage however: could the "soon after..." passage actually be the concluding line of the passage describing the cheap livestock? (the prices dropped soon after the return of
the troops) Lyzlov's interpolation would then be the second result of the successful campaign and the new line of narrative would in fact begin with: "Then, after about four days...." In fact three Kurbskii MSS. (Ar., P., Pg.) have the new sentence starting with "then after about four days" and not with "soon after...." So, in fact, Lyzlov's account does make more sense and the "interpolation" fits into the line of narrative: the victory brought both food and security.

Kurbskii has extra information in the account of the initial attack upon the city:

1) When, as was said, the mine detonated, then the Christian troops advanced on the city walls
2) to that great tower which stood on a hill in front of the gates
3) when they were still far from the walls, not one musket nor one arrow was shot at them

(S.I., I.103r)

1) I allocated my 12,000 troops to their various commanders and we advanced on the city walls
3) when we were still far from the walls, not one musket nor one arrow was shot at them
(RIB, col.194)

Why would Lyzlov omit the number of troops and mention of the tower? Or did Kurbskii add this information to suggest familiarity?

Kurbskii provides specific information regarding the number of casualties in the assault:
1) the troops on the lower side of the city suffered greatly from Muslim attack, as from the time that they entered the city many of them had been killed (S.I., l.106v)

1) In our sector many suffered greatly from the Muslim attack - - for from the time we entered the fortress to the time we left it 98 brave men in my regiment were killed, to say nothing of the wounded (RIB, col.197)

Why would Lyzlov omit the references to leaving the fortress, to the specific number 98, and to the wounded? Or is this an attempt by Kurbskii to demonstrate his personal involvement in the attack?

There is a similar difference in the respective accounts of the attempt by the Kazani women in the Khan's palace to distract the Muscovite troops:

1) they took to one side several thousand wives, children and beautiful maidens dressed in beautiful and expensive gold coloured clothes.... (S.I., l.107v)

1) they took to one side their wives and their children clad in their fair multicoloured clothes, some ten thousand in number.... (RIB, col.199)

Why would Lyzlov omit the specific number while adding the references to maidens and to gold? Why would Kurbskii do the reverse?

The final example of difference occurs at the very end of the skhodstvo between Kurbskii and Lyzlov. The account describes the flight of some of the Kazanis from the city and their pursuit by Kurbskii's troops:

1) the first line of pagans moved unhindered across the broad meadow towards the great swamp where horses cannot go. And there, beyond the swamp, is the great forest where many pagans found refuge. (S.I., l.110r)

1) their first line moved unhindered across the broad meadow towards the great swamp where horses cannot go. And there, beyond the swamp, is the great forest. (RIB, col.203)
Lyzlov continues on with a description of the mopping up activity within Kazan. Kurbskii describes the activities of his brother in attacking these fleeing Kazanis and how he drove them back as far as the marsh. At this point Kurbskii’s account of the siege of Kazan ends. Lyzlov’s account makes more sense. He explains the significance of the great forest: it provided the Kazanis with a refuge. In Kurbskii’s account the reference to the great forest is pointless. The forest plays no part in the account of his brother and even that account is left hanging with the statement that the Kazanis were driven back to the marsh: what became of them.

Did Lyzlov add the reference to the Kazanis finding refuge in the forest in order to make Kurbskii’s account more sensible? Or did Kurbskii lose the reference in his haste to wrap up the discussion of Kazan with the description of his brother’s activities?

There is a section of Kurbskii whose relationship to the account in Lyzlov is easier to map if Kurbskii is used as the measure. So in this example the Kurbskii account will be in the left column and Lyzlov’s account will be in the right column. The account describes the preparations for the assault on the city:
1) after 7 weeks of the siege we were told to await dawn, the rising of the sun, to prepare to attack from all sides

2) The following signal was given: when the powder exploded for the wall had been mined a second time with 48 barrels of powder

3) more than half of the infantry was sent to storm the town and a little more than a third remained on the field to protect the tsar

4) We, as ordered, prepared for the attack early. About two hours before dawn I had been sent to attack the lower gates, upstream on the Kazan river, and I had with me 12,000 men.

5) On all four sides mighty and valiant men were drawn up, some of them with large detachments

6) When the Kazan khan and his counsellors learned of this, they too prepared against us as we against them

7) Just before the rising of the sun, or a little after it had begun to appear, the mine exploded and the Christian army attacked the city and fortress from all sides as ordered by the tsar

1) and thus the time passed, from the besieging to the capture of the city 6 weeks (S.I., 1.95v)

2) there were 48 large barrels of powder in the mines (S.I., 1.102r)

3) and having consulted, more than half of the infantry was ordered to be ready for the assault and a little more than a third remained with the cavalry in the field to protect the tsar. Also the cavalry was divided among different regiments. (S.I., 1.99r)

6) The Kazan khan with his chosen [advisors] learned of this and thus began to ready themselves (S.I., 1.100v)

7) the mine exploded... in the first hour of the day... then the Christian troops under their commanders advanced towards the city walls (S.I., ll.102v, 103r)

A concise account in Kurbskii appears in fractured form in Lyzlov. Before
attempting to determine the relationship between the two, it is necessary to look at the gaps in Lyzlov's account and the context in which the information in Lyzlov appears.

After the statement of the length of the siege (the KI has a 7 week siege: "obstoiashe grad sedm' sedmits dnei", PSRL, XIX, col.422) both Lyzlov and the KI start an extended discussion of visions and miraculous events that occurred during the siege (S.I., ll.95v-98v). Lyzlov then edits a much longer account in the KI of Ivan's communication with Moscow (l.98v).

Lyzlov continues to borrow from the KI for the preparations for the assault (Ivan learns that the mines are ready; Ivan consults with his commanders on the order of battle, l.99r). After the account of consultation Lyzlov segues into statement #4 that is similar to Kurbskii and then, with his own information about the cavalry, shifts back to the KI for an account of the disposition of the Muscovite troops (99r-99v). There follows a long skhodstvo with the KI describing the Muscovite religious preparations for battle (99v-100v).

The short skhodstvo with Kurbskii follows (#6) which Lyzlov links with a short account from the KI of the mournful martial music of the Kazanis. Lyzlov's account, drawn from the KI, continues with further religious preparations by the Muscovites (ll.100v-102r). Lyzlov then describes the tsar's orders that the mines be detonated -- an account which combines both the KI and Kurbskii:
1) he sent prince M. I. Vorotynskii to the master who had prepared the mines and ordered him to light the powder in the mines.

2) there were 48 great barrels of powder in the mines.

3) and he ordered the foot soldiers to advance from all sides towards the city except for the mined areas. And thus the many foot regiments advanced and began to attack the city from many guns from all sides. (S.I., l.102r)

This sequence ends with the account of the detonation of the mines which Lyzlov borrows from the KI:

1) At the moment when the deacon, reading the Holy Gospel, said: "there will be one flock and one shepherd", then together with his voice the mine exploded. This was in 7061, the 2nd of October, Sunday, the day of the holy martyrs Cyprian and Justin, in the first hour of the day (S.I., l.102v)

1) The deacon was reading the Holy Gospel and said lastly: "there will be one flock and one shepherd" and together with his voice many parts of the city were blown up by the mine. The mine was detonated in both places on Sunday, in the first hour, the day of the holy martyrs Cyprian and Justin (PSRL, XIX, col.458)

Both Lyzlov and the KI continue to describe the devastation wrought by the mines.

Did Lyzlov rearrange Kurbskii's account by breaking up the order and
by interspersing excerpts from the KI? In so doing he omitted the details about Kurbskii’s own regiment and the reference to the strong and valiant men. Or does Lyzlov’s account (with or without the KI) represent a third source which Kurbskii condensed to create his short account?

There are two occasions where Lyzlov appears to interpolate into the account drawn from Kurbskii very short statements taken from the KI:

| 1)and indeed with cheerful hearts and joy they fought the Muslims  | 1)and indeed with cheerful heart and joy they fought the Muslims  | 1)they broke into the city from all sides  |
| 2)singing as one: O Lord, do not forsake us; grant us your help at this time  | 2)for Orthodox Christianity  | 2)and the Christians sang as one: O Lord, do not forsake us, be our helper  |
| 3)within about a half hour they drove the pagans from the embrasures with arrows and musketfire  | 3)within about a half hour they drove them from the embrasures with arrows and musketfire  | 3)and with such a great noise they advanced in the first hour of the day (PSRL, XIX, col.459)  |
| (S.I., l.103v)  | (RIB, col.195)  |  |
1) and the Christian troops could have quickly defeated them

2) if they had advanced as one

3) but [although] many took part in the assault, few arrived beneath the walls, many fled, lying down, feigning death and injury (S.I., l.103v)

2) and thus they advanced on the city as one, cunningly, like a lion against its prey, as beasts against herds of goats (PSRL, XIX, col.460)

3) but [although] many of us took part in the assault, few arrived beneath the walls, most lay down and feigned death and injury (RIB, col.195)

In both instances did Lyzlov interpolate the short passages, in edited form, into his account from the KI? Or are they such cliches that they both could have been in a third source from which Kurbskii omitted them in constructing his own account?

The account of the storming of the city walls suggests similarities between the accounts in Lyzlov, Kurbskii, and the KI:
1) God helped the pious troops. Strengthened, they boldly advanced against the walls; some climbing by ladders, others by wood, boosting each other up; and others through the openings where the mines had exploded

2) Other brave men cutting and spearing the Muslims [entered] through the embrasures

3) And thus the crusading banners of the Christian troops like clouds were brought to the walls by the Christian troops (S.I., ll.103v-104r)

1) My brother climbed the city wall by ladder and other brave troops were with him

1) When the wall was breached, at that time many troops attacked the city, the crusading banners, inspired by God, with great daring, were brought straightaway like clouds to the city, to the wall... the Christian troops with God's mercy and the Virgin's help overcame the Kazanis and entered the city, some thorough the openings, others climbing by wood and by ladder (PSRL, XIX, col.459)

Did Lyzlov combine the three accounts into one and add information of his own? Or are the three reflective of a common account of the siege of Kazan?

Lyzlov has a fuller account than does Kurbskii of the effect of fresh Muscovite troops upon the struggle and some of his additional information is close to the account in the KI:
1) when so many fresh troops suddenly entered the city clad in shining armor

2) and were crying "O God help us" and fiercely fell upon the Tatars killing them mercilessly

3) and the Kazan khan immediately with all his troops seeing the fresh troops in support was sore afraid and was not able to resist the fierce attack of that Christian force and began to retreat, fighting fiercely nonetheless

4) our troops were found unremittingly and fiercely after them, fighting with them

5) when they had already pushed them back to the mosques which were near the tsar's court

6) then there suddenly came against them with unpleasant gifts

1) and with God's mercy they quickly entered the city as water flows into the sea

2) and they forced the Tatars from all sides to the center of the city, fighting and slashing them mercilessly in the streets and in palaces

3) others, fleeing from caves, mosques, and palaces were cut down and speared like swine and they stripped them naked. Not a single Tatar was able to resist the Christians and who indeed can stand against God?

4) they were forced to the khan's palace. The Tatars stood there and wished to fight a fierce battle

5) then prince M. I. Vorotynskii arrived with countless troops, crying "O God! don't forsake us, help us." And they fell upon the Kazanis evilly cutting them down ....

(PSRL, XIX, col.460)
their abaizes, seyids, and mollas ....
(S.I., ll.106r-106v)

Did Lyzlov add the sections from the KI to Kurbskii's account? Or do the three accounts reflect, to varying degrees, a common third source?

There is a similarly close relationship in the account of the surrender of the Kazani khan:

1) When the Kazanis brought their khan to the tower which is called the Zboilivy Gate, they requested a little time for negotiations....

2) The regiment of Prince Paletskii was closer than the others when they surrendered their khan with a certain karach, who was the most important among them, and with two imeldeshi. The khan's Muslim name was Ediget and the prince's Zeniesh....

(PSRL, XIX, col.461)

Did Lyzlov take the name of the gates and the role of Paletskei from the KI, while omitting the name of the khan? Also omitting the name of the karach? Is Kurbskii's listing of names at the end of the account an attempt at catch-up?

Lyzlov and Kurbskii also share addresses to the reader. The first
comes at the end of the account of the campaign against Arskii Gorod:

1) the Cheremis were pursued for about 15 versts or more; their herds were dispersed, many of them were killed and others were captured alive

2) and I say what a great deal there is to write for to write in order about what happened every day near the city would require an entire book. But here it's worth recalling only briefly...

(K.I., 1.93r)

1) they pursued them for three or four miles, and some they killed and others they captured alive

2) if I were to write in order about what happened every day near the city would require an entire book. But here it's worth recalling briefly...

(RIB, col.191)

Kurbskii and Lyzlov then recall the Kazani curses upon the Muscovite troops.

The examples of the other shared addresses are not as straightforward. Both Kurbskii and Lyzlov recounted the cutting of the Kazani water supply after which Kurbshkii (see above) has the account of the establishment of the siege tower. Kurbshkii then has a short account of the destruction in the city caused by the Muscovite bombardment:

and great destruction was caused in the city and the fortress everyday from the tower; for up to the capture of the city close to ten thousand Muslim soldiers, apart from women and children, were killed from that tower both from the guns and from raids carried out from it. (RIB, col.193)

Lyzlov, in contrast, has a more extended account of the Muscovite bombardment of the city (ll.94v-95v) some of which is similar to the account in the KI (PSRL, XIX, col.422). In the midst of this account Lyzlov has a short address to the reader and he has a longer one at the end of the account. Kurbshkii has his address at the end of the account excerpted
above:

1) but who can relate or write about the many victories and the many travails and the incessant fighting with the pagans and the bravery of the Christian troops ....(S.I., 1.95r)

2) and this effort of the tsar and the Christian troops was not contrary to God’s will and glorious visions as is truthfully witnessed in many trustworthy Russian histories. Some of these the pious tsar himself saw, others were attested by the trustworthy testimony of trustworthy men (S.I., 1.95v)

Lyzlov then has a long series of visions and woundrous occurrences (1.95v-98r) at the end of which he has a statement similar to a statement in Kurbskii that is the continuation of the Kurbskii statement immediately above:

1) As for how it [the tower] was placed in position and in what way various other cunning siege devices were made, I forbear to relate for the sake of the brevity of my story, for in the Russian chronicle book this has been written about at length. We will only recall a little about the taking of the town and will describe it in short, in so far as we can remember it. (RIB, col.193)
1) These and other many signs to worthy men of clear conscience in nocturnal and daytime visions from God announced the taking of the Muslim city and inspired the troops in bravery and daring and, I think, in the avenging of the incalculable and continual shedding of Christian blood and freeing those who still were there alive from their long-lasting slavery.

1) Not only did God grant understanding and the gift of the spirit of bravery, but also He manifested by night to men of merit and of clear conscience certain visions of the taking of the Muslim town, urging the army on to this and, I think, avenging the incalculable and long-lasting shedding of Christiian blood and freeing those Christians who still remained there alive from their long-lasting slavery. (RIB, col.193)

2) The pious tsar learned of all this and he and those with him were joyful and full of hope, assurred by all these miraculous visions and all thought that such a victory of the pious tsar with his Christian troops was the divine will of God. (S.I., 1.98r)

Why are there only night visions in Kurbskii? The accounts of the visions (as recorded in the KI and the *Stepennaia kniga*) occur both at day and at night. A larger question is the relationship between Lyzlov, the KI, and Kurbskii. Did Lyzlov rework Kurbskii's basic account by filling in the details? If so, it is curious that Lyzlov found in the KI the precise sequence that is in Kurbskii: the bombardment, its effects, the visions. Is it reasonable to suggest that Lyzlov deliberately copied the sequence of events from Kurbskii and that he found precisely that sequence in the KI? Or did Kurbskii summarize the account in Lyzlov (an account that was based on something similar to the KI)?

There is an address to the reader in both Kurbskii and Lyzlov.
immediately after the account of the explosion of the mine:

1) Here anyone who has the gift of bravery and courage and wishes to learn of the great triumph and bravery of their ancestors, the sons of the Russian tsardom, how they with God's help captured the ruling city Kazan of that strong Muslim khanate, then I ask you read closely with a calm mind or bend your ear attentively to hear such a history (S.I., l.103r)

Both accounts then discuss the assault on the city (see above). Did Lyzlov drastically expand Kurbskii's address to the reader? Or did Kurbskii attempt to introduce a personal element into the account -- a statement which is followed by Kurbskii's personal account of his role in the assault on the city?

The final address to the reader concerns Kurbskii's attempts to prevent the Kazanis from fleeing into the surrounding countryside:

1) they attacked them, intending to cut them off and to destroy the regiment's order

2) first among them was prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbskoi who first of all cut his way into that Muslim regiment (S.I., l.109v)

1) we attacked them, intending to cut them off and to throw their battle array into disorder

2) I pray that no one should think me mad for praising myself! Indeed I tell the truth and do not conceal the gift of the spirit of bravery bestowed upon me by God; what is more, I had an extremely swift and excellent horse. Before all others I struck my way into the middle of that Muslim army... (RIB, col.202)
Kurbskii continues to relate how he was wounded, but was saved by his armor. Lyzlov omits this passage, but the skhodstvo between Kurbskii and Lyzlov resumes with the account of the actions of the other Muscovites in this action.

Did Lyzlov condense the account in Kurbskii and then omit the juicy details of Kurbskii’s travails? Or did Kurbskii use the statement in Lyzlov as an opportunity to " personalize" his account and to highlight his role in the action?

Kurbskii has an address to the reader which is not in Lyzlov:

1) And then in addition the Kazan khan devised another cunning tactic against the Christian troops

2) Of what kind? Tell me, I beseech you. Of such a kind, in truth. But listen attentively, O weary warrior!

3) He arranged the following plan with the troops whom he had left outside of the city in the forests....

Did Lyzlov omit this "dialogue" since it did not fit into the account? As seen above Lyzlov did include other personal addresses to the reader -- why did he omit this one in particular? Or did Kurbskii add this statement in order to provide a personal dimension to the account?

Kurbskii’s account also contains other statements that suggest personal participation in the siege. The first is his description of Sviazhsk, the fortress that Ivan built on the approaches to Kazan. Kurbskii describes
its construction:

after a year or two he ordered a mighty fair fortress to be built forthwith on the river Sviiaha (RIB, col.174)

In the rest of his references to Sviazhsk, Kurbskii never mentions the fortress by name but simply refers back to its construction:

but although he had already sent a large army to build the fortress (RIB, col.175)

and from there he marched over the steppe for about a month to that above-mentioned new fortress built on the Sviiaha (RIB, col.177)

Lyzlov names the fortress in two places where he and Kurbskii share the same account:

1) for the city Sviazhsk stood in their land (S.I., l.81v)  1) for that above-mentioned fortress on the Sviiaha had been built in their land (RIB, col.178)

2) when the pious tsar with the Christian troops approached the newly constructed fortress Sviazhsk (S.I., l.82r)  2) Now after we had come near the newly built fortress -- in truth it is very fine.... (RIB, col.178)

Lyzlov does not name the fortress in one place:

3) and their was great joy for the safe arrival of the tsar.... and for the founding of that great fortress (S.I., l.82v)  3) and their was great joy for the safe arrival of the tsar.... and for the founding of that great fortress (RIB, col.179)

Did Lyzlov choose to identify the fortress in the first two, but decide to copy Kurbskii in the third instance? Or did Kurbskii envision his lack of naming of Sviazhsk as a sign of familiarity? 17
On two occasions Kurbskii highlights his own memory in an account.

The first occurs in his description of Kazan:

1) on it [the hill] stands the town and the khans palaces and the mosques which are very high, made of stone and where their khans are buried
(S.I., l.84v)

1) On it [the hill] stands the fortress and the khan's palace and the mosques; these are very tall, built of stone, and their dead khans used to be laid there -- there are five of them in number, I recall.
(RIB, col.181)

The second appears in the description of the Muscovite bombardment of the city:

1) there were placed in all the trenches on all sides up to 150 of them [cannon] and the smallest were 1 1/2 sazhens
(S.I., ll.86v-87r)

1) I remember that there were placed in all behind all the trenches on all sides of the town and fortress 150 great and medium [cannon] and the smallest was 1 1/2 sazhens.
(RIB, col.184)

Did Lyzlov omit these references to Kurbskii's memory? Why would he omit the number of the khan's graves? Or did Kurbskii add them in order to suggest an eyewitness quality?

Kurbskii has other similar details that are not reflected in Lyzlov's account:

1) the khan] turned and besieged Tula... (S.I., l.79r)

1) [the khan] turned and besieged the great, walled city Tula...
(RIB, col.175)
2) Having crossed the Mordovian forest in three days they came out onto the great steppe and travelled along the right flank about 5 days journey from the tsar's regiment (S.I., 1.80v)

1) Having crossed the Mordovian forest in three days, they came out onto the great steppe and marched from it on the right hand side, about 5 days ride by horse (RIB, col.177)

3) the troops having been on such a long journey and in such need was very grateful [for the food]. Do not think of satisified throats and favorite drinks for Cheremis bread rather than the costliest breads were to be had.... (S.I., ll.81v-82r)

3) but we were, faint with hunger, grateful [do not even think of Malmsey and favorite drinks with marzipan for tasty Cheremis bread rather than the costliest breads were to be had]..... (RIB, col.178)\(^{18}\)

Why would Lyzlov omit the description of Tula, the qualifying "by horse" and the descriptions of the various drinks and food? Or did Kurbskii add them to suggest familiarity and participation?

There are several instances where it appears that Kurbskii is speaking to his Polish-Lithuanian audience. The first is in the account of the campaign against Arskii Gorod:

1) Furthermore to that above-mentioned great voevoda was attached another voevoda prince Semen Ivanovich Mikulinskii, from the clan of the Tver grand princes (S.I., 1.91v)

1) Furthermore to that above-mentioned hetman was attached another hetman, or in their language great voevoda, with his troops, prince Semen Mikulinskii, from the clan of the Tver grand princes (RIB, col.189)

Kurbskii might simply be explaining to his Polish audience the Russian translation of hetman. It is peculiar that Kurbskii waits until this moment to give the Russian equivalent of hetman as he had used the word previously (RIB, cols.178,187,188).
Kurbskii has a similar translation for *stratilate*:

1) the Leading Regiment came out onto the Arskií field
   (S.I., l.85v)

1) Then the generals *stratilatove* (or in their language: the voevody
   of the regiments) and the Leading Regiment which with
   them marches behind the yartaul came onto the Arskií field
   (RIB, col.182)

Again Kurbskii had used this term previously without translation (see:
RIB, cols.181,182). Kurbskii is also concerned with explaining Muscovite
military tactics (the place of the Leading Regiment) as is witnessed by two
other examples:

1) the Advance Regiment which is called the yartaul....
   (S.I., l.85r)

1) the Advance Regiment -- in that country they are wont to call it the yartaul
   (RIB, col.181)

2) in the right hand were the voevodas prince P. M.
   Shcheniatev, prince A. M.
   Kurbskoi....
   (S.I., l.85v)

2) I and another comrade of mine were entrusted with the command of the Right Wing (or,
   in their language, the Right Hand)....
   (RIB, col.182)

Kurbskii translates a passage for his Polish audience in the account
of the final struggle within the city itself:

1) the Tatars...withdrew halfway through town and stopped at the Tezitskii Ditch....
   (S.I., l.105v)

1) the khan of Kazan, withdrawing with his bodyguard to about halfway through town,
   stopped at the Tezitskii Ditch (in our tongue: Merchants' Ditch)....
   (RIB, col.196)

In his other translations Kurbskii had referred to Russian as: "in their
tongue". In this case, however, he seems to lose his Polish perspective and identifies Russian as "our tongue." Is this the natural confusion of a recent emigre? Or is this the carelessness of someone attempting to create a persona?

Finally Kurbskii draws a parallel between Vilnius and Kazan presumably for the benefit of his Polish-Lithuanian audience:

1)and across, cutting the town roughly in half, from the Bulak wall to the lower part of town, there runs a large ditch. (S.I., 1.105v)

1)and across, cutting the town roughly in half, from the Bulak wall to the lower part of town, there runs a large ditch. The town is large, a little smaller than Vilna. (RIB, col.196)

Did Lyzlov omit this as unimportant? Or did Kurbskii add it to buttress the image of the emigre in Lithuania?

******ASTRAKHAL******

In contrast to the account of the capture of Kazan, Kurbskii has an abbreviated account of the Muscovite capture of Astrakhan in 1554. Lyzlov looks to the Stepenaia kniga for the basic tale of the campaign, but his account shares with Kurbskii's information that is not in any of Lyzlov's other sources.

Lyzlov's account starts with the Stepenaia kniga. From the SK he extracts the historical background to the conflict and then describes the launching of the campaign:
1)(Ivan] sent against Astrakhan khan Emurgei a khan in his service, Derbysh, and with him the voevodas prince Iurii Ivanovich Shemiakin Pronskii whom I mentioned in writing about the taking of Kazan.... (S.I., l.120r)

1)(Ivan] sent against Astrakhan Derbysh, a khan in his service, and with him his voevodas prince Iurii Shemiakin Pronskii and others with many troops. They set off and with God's help they killed many Astrakhan people and took prisoners and captured the city on June 2. (PSRL, XXI, pp.653-4)

Lyzlov breaks off his dependence on the SK here and the information which follows is similar to the account in Kurbskii. The order of the account is slightly different however:

1)and to him [I. I. Pronskii] he attached another voevoda his postelnik Ignatii Veshniakov a brave and skilled man and many others

1)And in those years, or a little before that time, God granted him another khanate, that of Astrakhan, in addition to the khanate of Kazan; and now I shall tell about it in brief. He sent 30,000 troops in galleys along the Volga against the khan of Astrakhan

2)with them he sent up to 30,000 troops with many cannon and other military weapons in boats along the Volga to the very city of Astrakhan

2)over them he placed a general, Iurii by name, from the clan of the Pronsk princes, I mentioned him previously [writing about the capture of Kazan], and to him he attached another man Ignatii, called Veshniakov, his lozhnichii, a man who was indeed brave and distinguished.

3)they arrived in good order and in complete wellbeing before the city and with God's help, without great battles or bloodshed, they killed many people in Astrakhan, took prisoners, and thus they took the city on July 2 7062^15 (S.I., l.120r)

3)And they went and took that Khanate, which lies close to the Caspian Sea (RIB, cols. 237-8)
The conclusion of Lyzlov’s account is closer to the SK than to Kurbiskii although there are similarities:

1) The Khan Emgurchei, forewarned, fled the city to Tiumen (PSRL, XXI, p.654)

1) and the Astrakahn khan hearing of the many Russian troops had fled the city, before the troops arrived, to the Siberian town Tiumen (S.I., l.120r)

Lyzlov and the SK describe the hunt for the khan, the capture of guns and muskets and:

1) they took with other prisoners the wives and children of the khan and they freed Russian prisoners from their many years of slavery

1) and they seized his (the khan’s) wives and children together with his royal treasures

1) they took many prisoners, both male and female, and great tsaritsas, heirs, and tsarevnas and they freed many Russian prisoners

2) and other inhabitants of Astrakhan and the Tatars of the steppe with all their people submitted to the ruling hand of the pious tsar and to the khan Derbysh and the other voevodas of the Sovereign and thus Derbysh and the voevodas fortified the city and then went to the the ruling city with a great victory and with many captives (S.I., l.120v)

2) and all the people in that khanate submitted to him [Ivan] and they returned with a great victory, safe with many troops (RIB, col.238)

2) other Astrakhan princes and ulans and murzas with all the people paid homage to Derbysh and the voevodas and submitted to the Orthodox tsar and grand prince Ivan Vasil’evich and the best people together with the voevodas went to him in Moscow (PSRL, XXI, p.654)
Did Lyzlov combine the two accounts? Did he take the number of troops and the reference to Veshniakov from Kurbskii? In that case why would he omit the reference to the khan's treasure? Or does Kurbskii's account represent a summary of the longer account reflected in Lyzlov?

****CAMPAIGN OF 7063****

Lyzlov's account of Devlet-Girai's campaign of 1555 also has ties to the SK and Kurbskii's account. The account opens with a combination of the two:

1) In the year 7063 news came to the Sovereign in Moscow that khan Devlet Girei with many troops had crossed the straits near Astrakhan and had set off to wage war in the land of the Piatygorskii Cherkass

2) the Sovereign, seeing an appropriate time to revenge the pagan injustices, sent his troops against the Crimea; at their head he placed the voevodas Ivan Bolshogo Vasil'evich Sheremetyev, Lev Andreevich Saltykov, Aleksei Daniilovich Basmanov and others (S.I., 1.151r)

1) Then in that year²⁰, news came to our tsar that the Perekop khan with all his forces had crossed the straits and had set off to wage war in the land of the Piatygorskie Cherkass

2) and because of this our tsar sent troops against the Perekop, about 13,000, and at their head he placed the hetman Ioann Sheremetyev and other commanders with him (RIB, col.220)

1) Then in the year 7063 the Crimean khan Devlet-Girei attacked the Rus borderlands with many forces, hoping to defeat and hold captive Christinity

2) the voevodas of the tsar and grand prince: Ivan Sheremetev, Lev Saltykov, Aleksei Basmanov and others were sent against the Crimean herds (PSRL, XIX, p.654)
At this point Lyzlov and Kurbskii share the same account and the SK drops out except for two excerpts: the account of the Muscovite capture of the Crimean herds (SI, l.151v/PSRL, XXI, p.654) and the description at the very end of the account of the Muscovite regrouping in Tula (S.I., l.152v/PSRL, XXI, p.654). Neither of these are in Kurbskii's account.

Did Lyzlov combine the two accounts? If so, why did he omit the number of troops from Kurbskii's account? This omission especially stands out as Lyzlov carefully relays the number of losses in the Crimean herds in the account that he borrows from the SK.

There is one sequential problem in the Lyzlov/Kurbskii relationship in the account of the 7063 campaign. Both Lyzlov and Kurbskii describe how the Khan turned from his original objective and set off along the road to the Great Ferry and how Ivan Sheremetev informed Ivan of this change.

Lyzlov then has the statement which is not in Kurbskii:

The Sovereign quickly gathered a large force and went to the Oka and, having crossed the river, set off for Tula, intending to make a stand there, awaiting the pagan attack and to do battle with them (S.I., l.151r-151v)

The skhodstvo with Kurbskii resumes where he had left off.

Kurbskii's lack of placement of the tsar plays a role later in the account. Both accounts describe how the khan was defeated and fled back to the Horde. At this point Kurbskii has a passage that is not in Lyzlov:

And all the generals returned safely to out tsar with their troops. Now before our tsar knew about the defeat of his men, he marched quickly and with great eagerness against the khan of Perekop; indeed, when he arrived from Moscow at the Oka river, he did not stop in the place where it had long been the custom for Christian armies facing Tatar khans to stop, but he
crossed the great Oka river and from there went to the town of Tula, intending to fight a great battle with him. (RIB, col.224)

The reason for this passage becomes clear when the *skhodstvo* with Lyzlov resumes immediately after this:

1) When the Sovereign was about halfway from the Oka to Tula, news came to him of the unsuccessful battle; a little while later the fleeing wounded began to appear.... (S.I., 1.152v)

1) But when he had gone about halfway from the Oka to Tula, news came to him that the Christian army had been defeated by the Tatar khan; then about an hour later, some of our wounded soldiers met him. (RIB, col.224)

This instance is similar to the case of Ivan's advance on Kolomna at the beginning of the account of the fall of Kazan. Did Lyzlov, the good editor, interpolate an account of his own devising that showed Ivan setting off for Tula so that the later borrowing from Kurbskii would make sense? Or was Kurbskii careless at the beginning and then he had to play catchup?²¹

There are specific details in Kurbskii's account that are not in Lyzlov's account. Why would Lyzlov omit them? Did Kurbskii add them? The first such detail is the number of troops in the Muscovite army (see above pages 400-401).

There is missing information in Lyzlov's account of the battle:
1) and thus they came together and fought a great battle and very many Tatars were killed (S.I., l.151v-152r)

2) and so in the morning the battle began again and lasted until midday.... (S.I., l.152r)

1) and both armies joined battle on Wednesday at midday, and the battle lasted right until the very night. And on the first day God granted us such good fortune against the Muslims that a large number of them were killed, while there were very few losses among the Christians... (RIB, col.222)

2) and on the next day, Thursday, at daybreak, the battle began again and lasted until midday.... (RIB, col.223)

Why would Lyzlov omit the references to the specific days, to the length of the first battle, to the few Christian losses, to daybreak? Or did Kurbskii add these to suggest familiarity?

There are similar omissions in the further account of the battle:

1) only the khan remained with his janissaries -- he had some with him (S.I., l.152r)

2) but they repulsed him and he retreated from them and he quickly went to the Horde afraid of the troops behind him (S.I., l.152v)

1) the Khan alone remained with his janissaries (for there were with him about 1,000 with muskets and many guns) (RIB, col.223)

2) but they repulsed him, and he withdrew from them before sunset with great losses. And soon he set off for the Horde, afraid of our troops behind him. (RIB, col.224)

Why would Lyzlov omit the references to the number of janissaries and to sunset?

Lyzlov and Kurbskii also have different information about Devlet Girai's campaign. The first of these also includes the SK:
1) he sent 6,000 troops against it [the baggage train] and they overtook and defeated the Tatars there and took the baggage train (S.I., l.151v)

1) he sent about a third of his force against it.... (RIB, col.221)

1) he sent 6,000 troops against the khan's baggage train and captured it.... (PSRL, XXI, p.654)

Did Lyzlov prefer the more specific figure in the SK? Or did Kurbskii consider that the approximation "about a third" lent a familiarity and an immediacy to his account?

There are differences in the two accounts of the manner in which the khan discovered the disposition of the Muscovite troops. Upon his arrival at the Russian borders the khan knew nothing of the Muscovite intentions:

1) he knew nothing for he was not able to capture a prisoner anywhere (S.I., l.151v)

1) he knew nothing for God granted it that he was not able to find a single man, and he was in great difficulty, seeking here and there around the country for a prisoner (RIB, col.222)

2) then he found two fishermen from whom he learned of the troops in his rear (S.I., l.151v)

2) after a while he unfortunately found two: one of them being unable to bear the torture, told him everything.... (RIB, col.222)

Did Lyzlov omit the references to the khan's search and to the torture, but add the detail of the fishermen?

There are similar differences in the next account of the khan discovering information from Muscovite prisoners:
1) and by excessive boldness of our troops several struck their way into the Muslim ranks and of them were taken prisoner two warriors, the sons of honorable fathers (S.I., l.152r)  

1) and with excessive boldness some of our men struck their way into the Muslim ranks and one of them, the son of a distinguished father, was killed, and two noblemen were caught alive (RIB, cols.222-3)

One of the prisoners broke under torture and told the khan of the strength of the Muscovite forces:

1) [one] was frightened of the torture and told the khan about everything that there were few troops in all and of these one half has been sent against your baggage train... (S.I., l.152r)  

1) The khan began to question them with threats and torture... [one] was frightened of the torture and told him about everything: "There are only a few of them, as just over a quarter has been sent against your baggage train." (RIB, col.223)

Did Lyzlov distort the account in Kurbskii in both examples? Why would he omit the reference to the questioning under torture? Why would he change one quarter to one half? Or do they both reflect different reworkings of a common account?

Finally there are passages where Kurbskii has additional information that demonstrates familiarity with the military life. The first type of this information is where Kurbskii describes what he perceives as "habitual behaviour":

1) the treacherous khan did not go to Cherkass but turned his troops and went to pillage the Russian lands, along the route to the Great Ferry... (S.I., l.151r)

1) the khan -- as long as been the custom of Muslim khans, namely to draw their bows in one direction but to shoot in another, that is to say they spread the rumor that they are about to war in one direction and move off in another -- withdrew his troops from the Cherkass land and set off against Rus' along the road called the road to the Great Ferry.... (RIB, cols.220-1)

2) the voevodas, at the headwaters of the Mozh and Kolomok rivers, learned about the khan's baggage train and sent 6,000 troops against it ....they captured up to 60,000 horses.... (S.I., l.151v)

2) Then, learning about the baggage train of the Perekop khan, he sent about a third of the force against it -- it was about half a day's journey away from the route along which Ioan was marching; for it is always the habit of the Perekop khan to leave half the horses of all his army five or six days journey behind, in case they should be needed. (RIB, col.221)

3) at that time the voevoda Ivan Sheremetev was badly wounded and in addition his horse was shot dead beneath him and threw him ....(S.I., l.152r)

3) at that time the hetman himself of the Christian troops was badly wounded, and in addition his horse was shot beneath him, and in addition threw him (as is the habit with wounded horses)... (RIB, col.223)

In Kurbskii's interpolation mentioned above on p.46, where he has to get Ivan from Moscow to Tula, he describes Ivan's journey in the following terms:

    indeed, when he arrived from Moscow at the Oka river, he did not stop in the place where it had long been the custom for Christian armies facing Tatar khans to stop, but he crossed the Oka river.... (RIB, col.224)

The final example of Kurbskii's familiarity is in his above-cited description
of the khan changing direction:

1) but he turned his troops and went to pillage the Russian lands along the road to the Great Ferry which is a day's journey from the Izium road (S.I., 1.151r)

1) he withdrew his troops from the Cherkass land and set off against Rus' along the road called the road to the Great Ferry, which is about a day's journey by horse from the road to Izium-Kurgan... (RIB, col.221)

Why would Lyzlov omit all these references? Or did Kurbskii add them in order to establish his credentials as a sixteenth century Muscovite warrior?

The final section in which there is a significant skhodstvo between the SI and Kurbskii is the account of the pestilence which hit the Nogai and Crimean Tatars and the Muscovite attempt to capitalize on this weakness. Lyzlov introduces the account with the SK's account of the abortive campaign of Devlet Girai in 7064, an account which ends with the statement that there was then a great pestilence in the Crimean Horde. This serves as a segue into the account similar to Kurbskii's of the pestilence among the Nogais. Lyzlov and Kurbskii share the first line of the account but then Lyzlov breaks off to borrow from Guagnini (or so he claims, but I have not been able to identify where in Guagnini this statement is from despite the margin note):

1) in those years and previously a pestilence was sent by God against the Horde of the Nogai Tatars

1) Then in those years a pestilence was sent by God against the Nogai Horde
2) who had been on the far side of the Volga but then had crossed and started to nomadize between the Volga and the Don, close to Astrakhan, which now is called the Nogai ulus (S.I., 1.153v)

2) that is to say against the trans-Volga Tatars (RIB, col.238)

It would make sense to argue that Lyzlov replaced the shorter statement in the Kurbskii account with the fuller statement from Guagnini.

The skhodstvo between the two accounts resumes but there is a difference in the descriptions of the effects of the pestilence:

1) [God] brought them such a very harsh winter that all their livestock died, their herds of horses as well as of other livestock and by the summer they themselves disappeared from hunger for they did not have grain to feed the livestock (S.I., 1.153v)

1) He sent them such a fiercely cold winter that all their cattle died, both their herds of horses as well as of other livestock; and they themselves disappeared by the summer, for they live only by the milk from their various herds of livestock and grain is not even named there. (RIB, col.238)

Neither account is striking for its narrative logic and it is impossible to determine which of the two is primary.

Any differences in the balance of the skhodstvo consist in Kurbskii having statements that are not reflected in Lyzlov's account. Both accounts relate how 10,000 horses died in the Crimea during the pestilence, but Kurbskii introduces this information with the following statement:

Certain eye-witnesses of ours, men who were there at the time, testified that.... (RIB, col.239)

Why would Lyzlov omit this? Did Kurbskii add it for its obvious sense of participation?

Lyzlov also omits some of Kurbskii's invective against the Muslims:
God urged him on... as if showing him with his finger to destroy his enemies and to free many prisoners.... (S.I., 1.154r)

God urged him on... as if showing him with his finger to destroy his ancient enemies, the drinkers of Christian blood (RIB, col.239)

Why would Lyzlov omit this description? Why would Kurbskii feel compelled to add it?

Lyzlov does not have three short sections that Kurbskii does have that are critical of Ivan's behaviour at this time, particularly of his hesitation in taking advantage of the opportunity (cols.239, 240). One could argue that Lyzlov, the good Muscovite, deliberately omitted this criticism. 22

*****FINAL BITS AND PIECES*****

The final section of the Lyzlov/Kurbskii relationship describes the campaign by Dmytro Wisniewacki against the Crimean khanate. Much of Lyzlov's account is taken from the SK, but there are moments where he shares an account with Kurbskii. The account of Wisniewacki's campaign is related to both the SK and to Kurbskii:

1) the Sovereign... sent the above-mentioned troops to the aid of Dmitrii Vyshnevetskii (S.I., 1.154v)

1) he did send some 5,000 troops in all with Dmitrii Vyshnevetskii along the Dniepr to the Perekop Horde (RIB, col.240)

The SK provides the frame for this account in Lyzlov. The mention of the "above-mentioned troops" is a reference to an earlier passage in Lyzlov, partly borrowed from the SK:
1) the pagan Devlet Girai heard that the pious tsar was ready to meet him in battle and he turned and went to Cherkass with his troops. The Sovereign then sent 5,000 troops to pillage the Crimean yurts and when the khan arrived at the river Mius .... (S.I. 1.153r)

2) and thus that force together with Vyshnevetskii and Lithuanian and Cherkass kazaks went along the Dniepr to Aslam Kirmen' .... (S.I., 1.154v)

1) the pagan heard that the pious tsar was ready to meet him in battle and turned and went to Cherkass and when he arrived at the M'nius' river .... (PSRL, XIX, p.663)

2) [the Muscovite] force together with Livonian and Cherkass kazaks went to Islam-Kirmen' .... (PSRL, XXI, p.663)

Lyzlov seems to have culled the number of troops, the reference to Wisniewecki, and the reference to the Dniepr from Kurbskii.

Lyzlov then has an account of this campaign taken from the SK (ll.154v-156r/PSRL, XXI, pp.663-4,672-3). Lyzlov also uses the SK as the source for his account of the campaign of 7068 against the Crimea, but once again there is information that is found only in Lyzlov and Kurbskii:
1) the Sovereign sent to wage war on the Crimean yurts the okol'nichii D. F. Adashev and with him up to 8,000 troops who travelled along the Dniepr to Ochakov and captured a boat there on which there were Turks and Tatars and they killed many and took prisoners and, to the dismay of the Tatars, they came to the sea itself along the Dniepr on small boats to the island of Chiula and with God's help they went by sea for 20 days.... (S.I., l.156r)

1) he sent also by water Danil Adashev with other commanders and 8,000 troops. They sailed along the Dniepr to the sea and, to the surprise of the Tatars, caused great damage in the Horde; they killed the Tatars themselves, took many wives and children prisoner .... (RIB, col.240)

1) by order of the Sovereign tsar and grand prince his troops went by sea to the Crimean ulus and at Ochakov captured a ship and killed Turks and Tatars and took prisoners. They came to Chiula island on the sea and went by sea for 20 days in small boats... (PSRL, XXI, p.673)

Lyzlov then follows the account in the SK (l.l.156r-156v/PSRL, XXI, p.673) until he reaches the conclusion of the account where, once again, there is an overlap between the three:
1) and by God’s design they freely reached the headwaters of the Dniepr safely with the troops and with many captives and they had freed many prisoners long kept in the Hell-like darkness. All the Turks that they had captured at the crossings and on ships were freed in Ochakov. (S.I., l.156v)

1) and they freed many Christians from servitude and they returned home safely. (RIB, col. 240)

1) by God’s design they came from the sea to Ochakov at the mouth of the Dniepr safely with all their troops and with Rus’ and Crimean and Lithuanian prisoners whom they had liberated in the ulusy. The Turks, captured on ship and at the crossings, were freed in Ochakov. (PSRL, XXI, p. 673)

In the introductory section Lyzlov and Kurbskii share the information about Adashev and the number of troops. Do they both reflect a common source? In the concluding section, Kurbskii’s account appears to be a summary of the accounts reflected in Lyzlov and the SK.

Lyzlov then looks to the SK and Stryjkowski for further accounts of the Muscovite campaigns against the Crimea (l.156v-158r). Lyzlov is then dependent upon a source that I have not been able to identify (a later redaction of the SK that includes post-1572 information?). Interspersed in this account of the further Muscovite-Crimean relations are moments of skhodstvo with Kurbskii.

The first such instance occurs in Lyzlov’s account of an undated campaign by Devlet Girei. In Lyzlov the account appears after a description of the Crimean forces gathered by Devlet Girei while in Kurbskii the account appears in the section devoted to Ivan’s persecutions of the boiars and, specifically, to the persecution of M. I. Vorotynskii:
Lyzlov continues to describe the other voevodas and to give a full account of the campaign (ll.158r-159v). During the campaign Devlet Girei threatened to march on Moscow itself and at this point the skhodstvo with Kurbskii picks up where it had left off:

1)that glorious warrior prince M. I. Vorotynskii a strong and brave man and from youth renowned in military matters, with the other voevodas and the troops was not deterred at all by such an attack by the infidels and did not allow them to deploy at all and to war on the wretched Christians.... (S.I., 1.159v)

Lyzlov then continues to give further details of the battle (ll.159v-160r) and on the second day there was a great struggle. Once again the skhodstvo with Kurbskii picks up where it had left off:

1)And he [Vorotynskii], like a strong and brave man, highly skilled in military matters, fought a mighty battle with that powerful Muslim beast; he did not let them deploy and still less war on the wretched Christians.... (Fennell, p.194)
1) On the second day they carried on a fierce battle with the Tatars that lasted for several hours and God helped the Christian troops thanks to the military skill of that keen-witted man and the Muslim regiments fell to the Christian swords.... (S.I., ll.160r-160v)

1) but he fought fiercely with him, and, they say, the battle lasted several days. And God helped the Christians, thanks to the military skill of that keen-witted man, and the Muslim regiments fell at the hands of the Christian troops.... (Fennell, p.194)

Lyzlov then "returns" to his fuller account of the battle. The skhodstvo with Kurbskii resumes again, but this time in a slightly broken up form:

1) Then the Suzdal' warrior by the name of Temir' Alalykin captured the famous bogaty' and great drinker of Christian blood Divei-murza.... (S.I., l.160v)

1) and they say that two sons of the khan were killed and that one was captured alive during the very battle, while the khan himself barely escaped to his horde, running away by night from his mighty Muslim banners and tents. And in that same battle his glorious hetman, the drinker of Christian blood, Divey-mirza, was captured alive .... (Fennell, pp.194-6)

2) In that battle the khan's son was killed as well as Kalgin's son and other renowned murzas and a great many Tatars and a khan's son was taken alive and many renowned murzas and because of this the infidel khan was greatly afraid and in the night of that day he fled in great shame leaving his tents and his great banners.... (S.I., l.161r)

Between #1 and #2 in Kurbskii there is a lengthy account of the military action. Lyzlov, after the skhodstvo, has an account of the mopping up operation by the Muscovites. The final skhodstvo with Kurbskii occurs with the account of the return to Moscow:
1) Then the boiars and voevodas with the army returned to Moscow and arriving with a great victory presented to the tsar all the captives such as the khan’s son and Divei-murza as well as many other murzas and also they brought the great banners and the khan’s tents to the tsar as a sign of the complete victory. (S.I., l.161v)

1) And he [Vorotynskii] sent all of them -- the hetman and the khan’s son as well as the khan’s banner and his tents -- to our coward and runaway... (Fennell, p.196)

This is the final example of skhodstvo between Kurbskii and Lyzlov.

Lyzlov continues to describe Muscovite-Crimean relations down through 1593 (to l.168v).

Was Lyzlov combining two sources -- Kurbskii and a heretofore unidentified source -- to create his account? Or were Kurbskii and Lyzlov both looking to a common third source?

*****Clichés*****

This short section will address the issue of the role of clichés in Muscovite history writing. In my discussion of Lyzlov’s historical "method" in Chapter 4 I pointed to several cliches that Lyzlov used -- these cliches came from his Polish sources. Here I will suggest that Kurbskii and Group A of the Kazanskaia istoriia were equally interested in using cliches and that one of the Polish histories -- Guagnini -- was their chief source.

As pointed out above, on page 15, Kurbskii has a different listing of the supplies that Devlet Girei abandoned in his flight from the Muscovite troops. Lyzlov claims that the khan lost cannon and supplies in his
flight. However there are similarities between Kurbskii’s listing and a list of 
supplies that the Turks took with them on the Astrakhan campaign:

and he sank several cannon and cannon balls and he abandoned 
powder and camels... (RIB, col. 176)  

Then after these people 10 full cannon, with powder and cannon 
balls and other supplies were sent.... (Guagnini, p. 608)

Parts of Kurbskii’s description of his journey across the steppe to 
Sviazhsk are remarkably similar to Guagnini’s account of the Turkish 
journey across the steppe to after their failure ar Astrakhan in 1569:

and after about five weeks in hunger and great distress we reached the Sura river... (RIB, col. 177) 

and others were to die from great hunger and distress ....(Guagnini, p. 609)

travelling then in hunger and distress... (Guagnini, p. 610)

There are a series of references to dry bread and great cost in both 
Kurbskii’s and Lyzlov’s accounts of the travails of the Muscovite troops.

These references appear to have a parallel in Guagnini’s account:

1) And on that day they ate their fill of dry bread with 
relish and thanks buying some, borrowing some... 
(S.I., ll. 81r-81v)  

1) And on that day we ate our fill of dry 
bread with much relish and thanks, 
buying some at great cost, borrowing some 
.... (RIB, col. 177)  

1) Kasha was prepared for those who arrived and 
they were given dry bread which after considerable soaking 
was eaten with great avidity.... (Guagnini, p. 611)
bread and cattle were bought although at very great expense ....(S.I., 1.81v) bread and cattle were bought although at very great expense.... (RIB, col.178)

And there the Turks bought a quintal of dry bread...for 84 gold coins. Ten plant seeds for an aspr, a hundredweight of flour for 20 gold coins...But eventually a quintal of bread was bought even more dearly. (Guagnini, p.610)

the troops were not given their fill of even dry food... (S.I., 1.88v) for all food was bought at very great expense; the troops...were not given their fill of even dry bread.... (RIB, col.187)

The description of the storm in Lyzlov and Kurbskii allegedly caused by Kazani sorcery is suspiciously similar to the description of the storm in Guagnini:

then the wind would rise and clouds would appear even if the day had started very clear, and there would be such a rain as to turn dry places into swamps and fill them with moisture ....(S.I., 1.93v)

then the wind would rise and clouds would appear even if the day had started very clear, and there would be such a rain as to turn dry places into swamps and fill them with moisture.... (RIB, col.192)

That day there was a great wind...after the wind there was a great and extremely cold rain which fell incessantly for three days...in addition the mud was very slippery from the rain. (Guagnini, p.610)

This menage a trois continues as Lyzlov and Kurbskii describe the pestilence that hit the Nogai Horde. Lyzlov and Kurbskii describe the drought and the search for water:
where the rivers had flowed there was not only no water, but digging a great deal they obtained little.... (S.I., 1.153v)  

where the rivers had flowed, there was not only no water, but even if you dug three sazhen into the earth there was barely anything to be found anywhere. (RIB, col.238)  

travelling the entire day to evening there was any water in the Tatar forces. The Turks dug pits, in which they found a little rain water....(Guagnini, p.609)

Kurbskii and Guagnini share similarities that are not in Lyzlov:

for they live only by the milk from their various herds of cattle, and as for corn, there is none of it there. (RIB, col.238)  

the livestock...live on steppe grass, they do not plough or cut hay nor do they know any grain or vegetable...above all they live on milk.... (Guagnini, p.599)  

few Tatars died as they were used to great poverty and in addition they brought many of their cattle with them, off of whose milk they lived. (Guagnini, p.611)

A short reference in Kurbskii to Devlet Girei's capture of some Cossacks echoes a statement in Guagnini's description of the steppe:

[the khan] captured some of our cossacks in the steppes while they were fishing and hunting beavers.... (RIB, col.236)  

There our Cossacks are used to going to shoot game and to ambush Tatars....(Guagnini, p.616)

Guagnini and Group A of the Kazanskaia istoriia also share similar accounts of the sating of thirst during drought in the steppe:

Others licked the dew and in this manner sated their thirst with great difficulty. (PSRL, XIX, col.114)  

Their horses, where there was only grass, satisfied themselves with the dew.... (Guagnini, p.609)

There is a similar parallel in the two accounts of the struggle for water:
only in large rivers and in deep hollows was there a little water which was completely dried up in one hour...[for which] they fought and chased and beat each other; father showed no mercy for son, nor son for father, nor brother for brother. (PSRL, XIX, col.115)

they arrived at a dry well...but there wasn’t any water for the others had drunk it all and the Turks pressed together for the remainder and many among them were killed. (Guagnini, p.609)

Lyzlov, Kurbskii, and this redaction of the Kazanskaia istoria share a common account of the effect of the heat in the steppe:

[God] brought upon them the sun’s heat and dryness and drought so that where rivers flowed not only was there no water.... (S.I., l.153v)

by means of the heat of the sun He brought about drought and a lack of water; where rivers had flowed there was not only no water.... (RIB, col.238)

many people died from the sun’s heat and the lack of water, for all marshes and swamps dried up and the small steppe rivers did not flow along their usual routes, and only in big rivers and deep pools was there some water.... (PSRL, XXI, col.115)

The convoy of the Kurbskii History is of some interest here. Edward Keenan has identified a convoy type the protograph of which was created in the home of V. V. Golitsyn around 1677. This convoy contained, inter alia, a translation from the 1611 edition of Guagnini of Andrzej Taranowski’s account of the 1569 Turkish campaign against Astrakhan. The physical proximity of these two works might be linked to the similarity in content discussed above. A later related version of this convoy includes Lyzlov’s 1682 translation of Stryjowski’s Kronika (Pogodin 1494) -- So both Kurbskii and Lyzlov are tied to the Golitsyn household. The
interrelationship of these and other historical works needs to be studied more closely.
NOTES TO APPENDIX C

1. The MSS. are GPB, Ermitazhnoe sobranie, #485 and BAN 32.13.6. There is no reason to suggest that these MSS. reflect the "ur-text" of the History of the Scythians.

2. The KI account reads: "A prezhde sebe otpustil v sudekh Volgoiu mnogikh voevod i s nim mnogoе mnozhestvo ratnykh liudei, i pushki, i pishchali, i ves' stenobitnoi nariad." (PSRL, XIX, col.409) This is closer to Lyzlov's version than is Kurbskii's: "vypravlia dela velikie stenobitnye rekoiu Volgoiu...."

3. The KI reads: "a sam tsar' gosudar' poide s Moskvy kh Kolomne....Pervo...doncezhe pomolittsa shed k zhivonachaloe Troitse i prepodobnomu Sergiu chiudotvortsu...i kako poide kh Kolomne...." (PSRL, XIX, cols. 396-7)

4. Kurbskii's statement "at a certain place" is puzzling. Without that statement I'd argue that his account could make sense -- the description of Kolomna in relation to Tula is simply a stylistic concern. But why didn't he state that earlier when he had the chance? What is the purpose of the circumlocution?

5. The passage that follows this account in both versions describes how the local tribes helped provision the Muscovite troops with supplies. This would be a logical continuation in Lyzlov's account of the building of bridges etc.. It would not make that sort of sequential sense in Kurbskii who, immediately prior to the account of the provisioning, describes the lack of inhabitants.

6. This account reads: "i pishchu Bogom poslannya dovolno priimakhu ibo mnozhestvo biashe vpoliakh tekh zverei ko iadeniu udobnykh iako losei elenei koz kabanov iprochikh, takozhde otvzdukha ptits premnozhestvo i vvodakh ryb preizobilno biashe ivoistinnu reshchi Bogom poslannyaia pishcha biashe voinstvu ibo sami zverie pribegakhu i ptitsy priletakhu i obretakhisia vpoltsekh mezhdzu voinstvy iako sami vdaushchesia napishchu khristianskomu voinstvu imizhe vse voinstvo dovol'no izobilovashesia."

7. I cite Fennell's translation. The original reads: "voistinnu vere ko ispovedaniiu nepodobno." Is Fennell being too generous to Kurbskii here? Is he filling in a rather large gap?

8. On l.81r Lyzlov has another list of animals of (seemingly) his own devising: "iako losei, elenei, koz, kabanov iprochikh." See above, Chapter 4, for a similar description in his description of Crimea.
9. Lyzlov, following the KI, had described previously the mining of the city walls.

10. In variants Pg. and T. the tower is omitted. The account thus reads: "[it] blew up."

11. A possible solution will be suggested below, p.414.

12. #2 in Lyzlov's account is very similar to a statement later in his account and which does not appear in Kurbskii. The Muscovites blew up the Kazani water supply and then: "however the infidel, seeing his final end...stood firmly in his intention blinded by evil." Is this simply a cliche on Lyzlov's part?

13. In RIB, col.206, Kurbskii portrays Ivan as heeding the bad advice of his brothers-in-law, one of whom appears to have been D. R. Iur'ev-Zakhariin. See: Fennell, p.74, Footnote#1.

14. It could be a copyist's error. Lyzlov's account reads in part: "i vbogatyrsikh veshchekh iskusnago i predsim mnogi brani spoganymi imevshago...." A copyist might have jumped from the first "ago" to the second, omitting the line in between.

15. Fennell (p.50) identifies this as "a Tatar word of obscure origin usually denoting a message."

16. After the account of the fall of Arskii Gorod, both Lyzlov and Kurbskii have a statement regarding the joy of the Muscovite troops: "and then there was great joy among the Christian troops and they proclaimed their thanks to God...." (S.I., l.92v; see also RIB, col.191) Did Lyzlov anticipate this statement by adding it to the earlier account?

17. Sviazhsk is referred to by name in sixteenth century chronicles, so there is no reason to assume that the name itself was a later creation.

18. Compare this to a later section in Kurbskii's History: Tako zhe i vlasteli zemli toia dragotsennyia kolachi so bezchislennymi protory gortan' i chrevo s martsypany natykaiushche, i iakoby v utlye delvy drazhaishie razlic'inye vina bezmerne l'iushche.... (RIB, col.241)

19. In the margin Lyzlov has a reference to Stryjkowski, p.766 (vol.II, p.407 in the Malinowski edition). Stryjkowski has a short, one-sentence account of the victory under the year 1554. The SK does not have a year date.

The MSS. of Lyzlov are split on July and June. BAN 32.4.27, BAN 32.13.6, Erm.485, and BAN 506 have June. The others have July. In the SK redactions, Ch. and D. have July.
20. Kurbskii's chronology is off here as, right before this statement, he had been discussing events that supposedly took place in 1558. What does this show?

21. A possible problem in Kurbskii's account is the statement: "And all the generals returned safely to our tsar with their troops." Yet later in the account Kurbskii describes the wounded Muscovites straggling in. In addition there is a question of when these generals arrived since Ivan found out only later about the Khan's retreat. Wouldn't these generals have told him? Or is Kurbskii simply anticipating later events?

22. Kurbskii's criticism of Ivan's alleged indecision might be seen as the reason why he added the invective against the Tatars: it serves to highlight Ivan's mistakes.

23. I cite Fennell here and below because the RIB for these excerpts is not available to me.
APPENDIX D: BATY’S CAMPAIGN

I have not been able to determine precisely Lyzlov’s source for the account of Baty’s invasion of the Northeast. It seems that Lyzlov’s account is somehow related to the account in the Nikon Chronicle. This claim is based upon the work of John Fennell ("The Tale of Baty’s Invasion of North-East Rus’ and its Reflexion in the Chronicles of the Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries," Russia Mediaevalis, III(1977): 41-78.). Fennell argues that the account of Baty’s invasion in the Nikon Chronicle is different from all the other accounts in two ways. The first is that before the account of the capture of Riazan, the Nikon Chronicle adds a section which contains: the requests by the Riazan princes to the Grand Prince for help, his refusal, the lament over the cowardice of all the Rus’ princes who did not send aid, the account of the battle itself. The second is that the Nikon account adds two towns, Kashin and Kosniatin, to the common list of Suzdalian towns captured by the Mongols (p.74).

Lyzlov does not have the first of these interpolations. However he does have the second:

and then they attacked Iur’ev, some captured Rostov, and others Rostov, Pereslavl’, Kosniatin, Iaroslavl’…and some took Kashin…Iaroslavl’, Kostroma, Gorodets…and others took Iur’ev and Pereslavl’ and Dmitrov and Tver’ and Kashin and Volok and Kosniatin…(PSRL, X, p.109)

Lyzlov has the two marked towns. However his account also lists Kostroma which the Nikon account does not have; the Nikon account has Dmitrov,
Tver and Volok which are not in Lyzlov's account. Why would Lyzlov add the one and omit the others? It makes sense to suggest that Lyzlov was not using the Nikon account specifically.

There is the possibility that Lyzlov deliberately omitted the first Nikon interpolation since it put the Grand Prince in a bad light. I have pointed to other instances where Lyzlov changed the text in order to protect the reputation of the Grand Prince and this may be another example of this.

This concern with protecting the reputation of the Grand Prince might tie into another peculiarity of Lyzlov's account of Baty's invasion. In all of the accounts of the invasion the Grand Prince Iurii Vsevolodovich is the Grand Prince of Vladimir and is resident in Vladimir. Lyzlov, however, at the first reference to Iurii turns him into: "the Grand Prince Iurii Vsevolodovich of Moscow..." (S.I., l.15v). On all other occasions Lyzlov refers to him simply as "Grand Prince Iurii Vsevolodovich" without any reference to Vladimir or any further reference to Moscow. So it would be even more fitting that Lyzlov, writing for the descendants of this "Muscovite" Grand Prince, would not want to sully his reputation.

The "Muscovite" Grand Prince also explains other changes that Lyzlov made in the account which a comparison with the Nikon account makes clear. (I choose the Nikon account since according to Fennell it is no different from the basic account of the tale, apart from the two interpolations mentioned above.)
1) The Tatars advance on Kolomna

2) Iurii Vsevolodovich, unable to resist them because of the lack of troops, withdraws to Valdimir.

3) Iurii leaves his son Vladimir in Moscow.

4) Iurii sends as many troops as possible against the Tatars with his son Vsevolod.

5) Vsevolod's forces are defeated.

6) Moscow is taken; the Grand Prince's son Vladimir is captured.

7) The Tatars advance on Vladimir; Iurii withdraws. (S.I., ll.15v-16r)

Lyzlov's editing has two purposes. The first is that in his view the "Grand Prince of Moscow" must be resident in Moscow. Therefore he had to get him to Vladimir in order to mesh with the Nikon account. In the Nikon account the Grand Prince of Vladimir resides in Vladimir. Thus he adds the information under #2. The second purpose is that Lyzlov adds information about the lack of troops (#2) and sending as many troops as possible (#4) in order to save the Grand Prince's reputation. In neither instance did the Grand Prince simply flee.

So it seems that Lyzlov rewrote the basic account of Baty's invasion from a Muscovite point of view. Of course he might simply be reproducing verbatim a version of the tale that has not come down to us. What is of significance nonetheless is that Lyzlov's version is one favorable to the
"Muscovite" Grand Prince.
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