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Simplicius as a Source for and an Interpreter of Parmenides

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Simplicius as a Source for and an
Interpreter of Parmenides

by

Bruce Millard Perry

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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Special Abbreviations

N.B. The abbreviations of L'Année Philologique are used for periodicals wherever possible.


CAG  Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Berlin Academy (Berlin, 1882-1907).


Introduction

Simplicius, a Neoplatonist of the sixth century, wrote learned commentaries on several works by Aristotle. His commentary on *Physics* I is of fundamental importance for the history of ancient philosophy because it contains extensive quotations from the major Presocratics. Simplicius's paramount concern here is to demonstrate the harmony of doctrines, both physical and metaphysical, propounded by the Presocratics. To this end he elaborates an interpretation of many of them, quoting freely from their works and commenting on passages which are crucial for his interpretation. By a singular fate, however, all but Simplicius's actual quotations have been ignored or haphazardly treated. Part of this neglect is due to the emergence of the *Vorsokratiker* of Diels-Kranz as the standard source for the Presocratics. All the fragments have been collected in the B sections, while only select testimonia are presented in the A sections. Since the testimonia are largely limited to early sources, namely Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus (via the doxographical tradition), late authors like Simplicius are poorly represented. Although the *Vorsokratiker* is not an exhaustive collection of Presocratic material, it is widely held to obviate the need to revert to the original sources. Those passages which it does not contain have
by and large been neglected.

That Simplicius is a late Neoplatonist, and a mere commentator at that, has contributed even more to the neglect of him as an interpreter of the Presocratics. In the nineteenth century the stock of Neoplatonism, particularly of later Neoplatonism, was low among historians of ancient philosophy. The most influential of them, Eduard Zeller, passed the following verdict:

However much we may admire the last revival of antique thought in the philosophic system of Plotinus, it nevertheless bears the stamp of a non-Greek nature and traces of decadence which become more numerous and more pronounced in his successors. In the hands of Iamblichus and Proclus philosophy was petrified into scholasticism, the characteristic of which is that it no longer sought to supersede mythical ideas by rational thought, but saw its task in supporting the traditional religion and in presenting it as intellectually comprehensible. Here knowledge is replaced by revelation in ecstasy. After Greek philosophy had performed this self-castration it sank exhausted into the arms of religion; as Proclus expresses it in one of his hymns to the gods:

"And so let me anchor, weary one, in the haven of piety."

The primitive state of Neoplatonic scholarship then made such simplistic assessments possible. Presumptive judgements against the Neoplatonists, however, insured their continued obscurity. While the past fifty years have seen a renaissance in Neoplatonic studies, acceptance of Neoplatonism as serious philosophy has not been universal. The reasons are complex and cannot be fully pursued here. One of the most persistent sources for censure is the attempt, so characteristic of late Neoplatonism, to harmonize
the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. Since it is assumed that both philosophers are in reality articulating Neoplatonic doctrines, apparent differences or contradictions between them are readily resolved. This harmonization appears to be predicated on wholesale anachronism and revisionism. Further, it calls into question the acumen of the Neoplatonists; are they so philosophically myopic in other matters? Because Simplicius attempts an even more ambitious scheme, to include all the Presocratics as well, his interpretations of them have been dismissed as patent anachronisms. Tarán, for example, rejects Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides on the following grounds:

This Neoplatonism presupposes post-Parmenidean philosophic conceptions which cannot be ascribed to Parmenides as they are by Simplicius, whose interpretation of Parmenides is sufficiently discredited in any case by the very Parmenidean fragments which he has preserved for us.

Finally, Simplicius shares the fate common to many commentators, that he is considered wholly or largely derivative. The commentator's task is by nature the codification of accepted doctrine, not innovation or significant modification. One expects to find in Simplicius standard Neoplatonic doctrines as propounded by Proclus. Simplicius's numerous, apparently precise quotations of ancient authors, most notably the Presocratics, have rendered his works little more than quarries, as it were of invaluable information; the Neoplatonic rubble is first cleared away before the finer stone can be worked.
Granted that Simplicius has been ignored as an interpreter of the Presocratics, the question arises whether this makes any substantial difference for Presocratic scholarship. After all, the fragments which he quotes seem to render his own remarks otiose; what new light can Simplicius shed on authors who have already been extensively, not to say exhaustively, examined? It has been claimed that the study of Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides would in all likelihood yield more information concerning Neoplatonism than Parmenides himself.

Simplicius's interpretations might then appear to merit antiquarian interest at best. Their importance for the study of the Presocratics, however, has been unduly minimized. In the first place, it is bad methodology to reject a priori any testimonium from the principal source of a given author, particularly of one whose work survives only in fragments. Secondly, his interpretations cannot be divorced from his quotations, because they condition both what he quotes and how accurately he quotes it. If, for example, one could prove that he misrepresents or grossly misunderstands a Presocratic, his quotations would be properly suspect. Although meter might provide a safeguard for the fragments of Empedocles and Parmenides, there would be no guarantee that lines were not wrenched from context, transposed, omitted, or even recombined to yield the sense which Simplicius thinks appropriate. Prose authors might be altered even more. Even if Simplicius does not tamper with his material, a 'quotation'
intended merely to capture the gist of a doctrine, or even an innocent lapsus memoriae or lapsus calami on his part might give rise to a bogus fragment\(^{10}\). Regardless of the merits of his interpretations, the reliability of Simplicius as a source for the Presocratics cannot be established independently of his interpretations.

Thirdly, an examination of the focus of Simplicius's interpretations is of value (admittedly in a negative way) in placing his quotations in proper perspective. If Simplicius's interests are exclusively or predominantly epistemological, that he does not mention nor quote passages relating to ethics need not mirror the importance of ethics for a given Presocratic. The same principle no doubt determines why he does not treat some Presocratics at all.

Fourthly and lastly, Simplicius's interpretations are intrinsically valuable for Presocratic scholarship. Even a cursory glance at his commentaries reveals that he neither on the one hand a religious humbug, incapable of independent rational thought, nor on the other a revisionistic blunderer. If anything, his interpretations of the Presocratics are models of philology; both in scope and in detail they are unique in antiquity. Moreover, he had at his disposal and clearly read with care complete works of many of the Presocratics. While Simplicius employs Neoplatonic conceptions to explicate the Presocratics, it is unclear why he is any more guilty of revisionism on this score than are
modern scholars who read twentieth century philosophical conceptions into the Presocratics. By rejecting Simplicius's interpretations for the reason that they presuppose Neoplatonic conceptions, Presocratic scholarship does itself a great disservice.

A systematic study of Simplicius's interpretations of all the Presocratics is not feasible here. Conversely, a survey or sketch of all these interpretations would not reveal his modus operandi. It seems more advisable therefore to examine a single Presocratic in detail; the results of such an examination could well be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the rest of the Presocratics he treats. I have chosen to study his interpretation of Parmenides because he is perhaps the most important, if also the most problematic, of the Presocratics. Simplicius quotes 101 out of the 154 extant Greek verses of Parmenides, and devotes considerable space in his commentary on Physics I, augmented by several passages from his De Caelo commentary, to interpreting Parmenides. There is thus considerable material for study.

Because Simplicius's interpretation does not arise ex nihilo, some consideration must be taken of the formative influences on and the possible sources for his interpretation. More specifically, Simplicius rejects the criticisms of Parmenides by Plato in the Sophist and by Aristotle in the Physics and argues that his own interpretation silences both criticisms. Chapter I comprises a sketch of Parmenides's influence on Plato (Republic V 476e6-
480a13), and an examination of Plato's criticism in the Sophist (244b6-245e2). Similarly, Chapter II considers Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides in Metaphysics A (986b27-987a2) and Physics I (184b15-187a11). The other possible influences or sources are considered in Chapter III: the doxographical tradition, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and the Neoplatonists.

The large amount of material on Parmenides in Simplicius necessitates a division into manageable topics or sections. While such a division is by nature arbitrary, the nine sections I have decided upon in Chapter IV represent reasonably discrete subjects:

I. Biographical Information; II. Obscurity of Doctrine, Poetry; III. Overall Discussions of Parmenides; IV. The Aletheia; V. The Doxa; VI. Parmenides's Argument for the Unity of Being; VII. Plato on Parmenides; VIII. Aristotle on Parmenides; IX. Others on Parmenides. Each section contains at least two parts: a detailed list of the relevant passages (A), and a summary of their contents (B). For the first five sections commentary is provided (C); particularly detailed commentary is devoted to the Aletheia (IV) and the Doxa (V). A summary of Simplicius's interpretation is found at the beginning of Chapter IV, and a set of conclusions follows Chapter IV.

Appendix A contains English translations of all the passages which bear on Parmenides in Simplicius. A detailed list of Simplicius's quotations from Parmenides forms Appendix B. The verses with variant readings from CAG VII and IX are collected in
Appendix C. Appendix D is a skeletal Index Locorum.

Two additional points deserve notice. While I have consulted a number of modern works on Parmenides, I have consciously avoided adopting ready-made an interpretation of Parmenides against which to measure that of Simplicius. Likewise, I have shunned, as far as possible, the temptation to inject my own thoughts concerning Parmenides into this study. For better or worse, Simplicius's interpretation deserves to be presented in its own right. Secondly, W.K.C. Guthrie's translation of Parmenides are adopted throughout; all deviations will be noted.
Notes to the Introduction

1 Simplicius’s commentaries on Aristotle are found in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CAG), Berlin Academy, vols. VII-XI. VII = in De Caelo, ed. I.L. Heiberg, 1894; VIII = in Categorias, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, 1907; IX = in Physicorum Libros I-IV, ed. H. Diels, 1882; X = in Physicorum Libros V-VIII, ed. H. Diels, 1895; XI = in De Anima, ed. H. Hayduck, 1882. (The authorship of this De Anima commentary is disputed.) Simplicius also wrote a commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus; the standard edition of this is in Theophrasti Characteres, ed. F. Dübner (Paris, 1840). It is soon to appear newly edited and translated in the Budé series by I. Hadot.


4 The most prominent reason is that Neoplatonism embodies the dogmatic metaphysics that has been assailed since Kant. Against the background of logical positivism and interest in natural language, the abstruse speculations of the Neoplatonists appear quixotic.


Zeller next relates the weaknesses of Simplicius as a philosopher, pp. 910-914.

Tarán, p. 295.

The condition of the texts which Simplicius had at his disposal and the manuscript tradition of his commentaries further complicate the picture. On the latter see A.H. Coxon, "The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius's Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics I-IV*," *CQ* N.S. 18 (1968), 70-75.
Chapter I: Plato and Parmenides

One of the central theses in Plato is the being-seeming antithesis, which is closely bound up with both his epistemology and ontology. The obvious precursor for the antithesis, at any rate, is Parmenides, who rigidly distinguishes being from seeming or opinion in his poem. In the persona of Socrates Plato speaks reverentially of Parmenides in the *Theaetetus* (183e3-184a1) and *Sophist* (217c2-7); the Parmenides is further testimony to his indebtedness\(^1\). A complete treatment of the relation between the two philosophers is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a rough sketch is indispensable for understanding the interpretations of Parmenides by Aristotle and Simplicius\(^2\). Two passages, *Republic* V 476e6-480a13 and *Sophist* 244b6-245e5, have been selected for this purpose.

In *Republic* V Socrates proposes that for the ideal state to be realized its rulers must be philosophers (473c11-e5); he undertakes to define the philosopher and thereby demonstrate his unique qualifications for ruling (474b4-c3). There ensues a section of etymology, in which the name 'lovers of spectacle' (οὐλοφθόμοις) is shown to apply fitly to the other classes of the state, while 'lover of wisdom' (οὐλόκοσμος) is the proper term
for the philosopher-ruler (474c8-476c1). After he shows that the philosopher lives wide awake and the lover of spectacle in a dream, Socrates advances an argument to convince the latter of his error (476c8-e2). Glaucoun, answering for the lover of spectacle, readily grants two points to Socrates: that he who knows knows something (ὅ γνωσθεῖ ηγεῖ τι 476e9), and that what he knows is something that is and not something that is not (ὅν 477a1). The reason given for the latter concession appears to be borrowed from Parmenides:

πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὑπὲρ γε τις γνωσθεῖν; (477a1)

οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τὸ γε μὴ ἐδώ (οὐ γὰρ ἄνωστον).

(B 2.7; cf. B 8.8-9)

Glaucoun next admits that the fully existent is fully knowable and the utterly non-existent utterly unknowable:

τὸ μὴν πᾶντελῶς ὃν πᾶντελῶς γνωστὸν, μὴ ὑπὲρ δὲ μηδὲν πάντῃ ἀγνωστὸν. (477a3-4)

There are parallels for this also in Parmenides, although they are not as clear as the previous:

ἡ δὲ ᾧς οὐκ ἔστι τε καὶ ᾧς χρῶν ἔστι μὴ εἶναι

τὴν δὲ τὸν ἄναρχον πάνωσθεν ἐμεν ἀπαθῶν. (B 2.5-6)²

Parmenides nowhere qualifies either being or non-being with such terms as πᾶντελῶς or εἶλμονεῖς, but he seems to be talking about absolutes and Plato clearly takes him to be doing so.⁴

The admission here, however, does not strictly follow. It also raises prima facie the possibility that there is something knowable in some less than absolute way; the faculty argument that
follows (477c1-d5) will collapse if this holds good. It can also be objected that levels of being are what the argument is to demonstrate, not assume as hypotheses. A partial reply is that the admission is intuitively appealing, for it rests upon the proportion:

\[ \tau \delta \div \gamma \nu \sigma o \tau o n : \tau \ \omicron \tau e \nu \lambda \varsigma \div \omicron \tau e \nu \lambda \varsigma \gamma \nu \sigma o \tau o n \]

Secondly, the introduction of qualifiers serves to improve on the formulation of the argument. Lastly, the divided line of Book VI (esp. 511d6-e4) differentiates two kinds of knowledge (\( \nu \sigma o i \varsigma - \delta i \alpha \nu o i a \)) and opinion (\( \pi \sigma \tau i \varsigma - \epsilon \iota \nu \sigma o i a \)), each of which shares in truth (or being) in descending order. The seemingly loose phraseology here may foreshadow the subsequent distinctions. A corollary is derived from this admission; if anything can both be and not be, it would be situated intermediate between absolute being and non-being (477a6-8). Further, since knowledge is set over being and nescience necessarily (\( \epsilon \xi \\omicron \alpha \alpha \nu o i \varsigma \)) over non-being, one must consider whether some sort of intermediate cognition is set over the hypothesized intermediate 'being' (477a9-b1). It is to be noted that no 'absolute' qualifiers are used though required, and that \( \alpha \nu o i a / \alpha \nu o i a \) is considered as a faculty.

Socrates and Glaucón next consider \( \delta \epsilon \kappa \alpha a \). It is admitted to be something (\( \epsilon \iota \nu o i \ \tau i \ 477b2 \))\(^6\), and since it is a faculty different from knowledge, it is set over something different from the object of knowledge (477b2-9). Socrates anticipates the outcome of the faculty argument (478a6):
but realizes that this argument must first be expanded (477b11-12).

Faculties (δυνάμεις) are stated to form a class of existent things in virtue of which we are able to do what we are able (to do):

αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεως ὁ δυνάμεως. (477c1-2)

Sight and hearing are cited as examples. Faculties are distinguished from one another in two ways: that over which they are set, and what they affect as to their objects:

δυνάμεως δ' εἰς ἑκατον μόνον βλέπω ἐφ' ὑε ἑστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀπεργαζόμενος, καὶ ταύτη ἑκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκέλευο. (477e9-d2)

'Hearing', for example, is the name given to the faculty which is set over audible things and produces our hearing them (or, is that in virtue of which we are able to hear what is audible). An additional concession by Glauccon allows the faculty argument to work, that both knowledge (477b7-8) and opinion (477e1-3) are faculties. It was previously allowed that knowledge and opinion were different (477b5-9); Socrates mentions this at 477e4-5. The reason for this agreement, however, was they are different faculties. (One suspects circular reasoning here.) At any rate, Glauccon states that they differ in that knowledge is infallible (τὸ δὲ ἁκωμάκροτον) but opinion is not (τὸ μὴ ἁκωμάκροτον) (477e6-7). The faculty argument is strengthened by the assertion of an in-
dependent reason for their difference. Socrates concludes that since each is a different faculty, each is by nature set over a different object (478a3-4). With a slight change in phrasing, the anticipatory remark of Socrates at 477b10-11 is reasserted on the strength of the definition of a faculty:

\[\textit{ἐπιστήμη μὲν γι' ποι ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπνεῖ, τὸ ὕπνον γάρ μακα ὅς ἔχει;} \]

(478a6)

Likewise, \textit{δόξα} is admitted as having the capacity to produce opining (δόξα 478a8-9). The obvious question is what is it that opinion is set over? The first possibility considered is that it produces opining with respect to the same objects as knowledge does knowing. In consequence, the two faculties will have the same objects (478a10-11). Glaucon replies that this is impossible, and in so doing clearly states the steps in the argument (477a12-b2). To recapitulate, the argument runs:

1) one and only one faculty is set over one and only one (type or class of) object

2) both opinion and knowledge are faculties

3) opinion and knowledge are different

4) therefore, they are not set over one and the same object (or, the same thing cannot be both knowable and opinable).

On the basis of this argument, since what is knowable is being, what is opinable is something other than being. The next candidate considered is non-being or what is not (τὸ μὴ ὅν 478b6). This proves to be impossible; the object of opinion must be some one thing (ἐν γέ τι 478b10), but non-being is 'not one thing' but
rather 'nothing at all' (μηδὲν 478b12). The object of opinion is neither being nor non-being, which are apprehended by knowledge and nescience respectively.

A reductio argument to locate both opinion and its object follows. First, it is stated that it does not fall outside of knowledge and nescience, since it then must either surpass the former in clarity or the latter in obscurity (478c10-12). Since it seems to be darker than knowledge yet brighter than nescience, it properly belongs between (μεταξὺ) them (478c13-d4). Socrates reminds Glaucon of the earlier hypothesis (477a6-b1), that if anything appeared both to be and not be, it would be situated between absolute being and non-being; and it would be the object neither of nescience nor knowledge, but rather the intermediate cognitive faculty (478d5-10). The argument to this point has shown that opinion is intermediate between them. The intermediate object remains to be discovered:

ἐκεῖνο δὲ λείπειν' ἂν ἦμιν εὑρεῖν, ὡς δέομε, τὸ ἀκατέργατον μεταξὺ, τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ συνειδήσεωι εἰληφθέντι ὅρθως ἄν προσαγορεύθηκεν, ἵνα, ἐὰν τούτω, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἴη ἐν δίκῃ προσαγορεύθηκεν, τοῖς μὲν ἄριστοι τὰ ἄριστα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξὺ τὸ μεταξὺ ἀποδίδοντες. (478d1-5)

Glaucon, proxy for the lover of spectacle who admits only particulars and not universals, grants that some particular beautiful thing will also appear ugly, and similarly with something just or holy (478e7-479b2). This point is abruptly introduced and quickly accepted, perhaps because it is commonplace in Plato.
Similar pairs are mentioned in the *Theaetetus*, for example:

\[ \ldots \ \text{ἄλλα ἄν ὃς μέγα προσαγορεύεται, καὶ σμικρὸν πανεῖ-}
\[ \ldots \ \text{ται καὶ ἄν βάρυ, θάνατον, συμπεπάντα τε οὕτως, ὃς μακρὸνς}
\[ \ldots \ \text{δυνά 
\[ \ldots \ \text{ἐνός μὴ 
\[ \ldots \ \text{τίνος μὴ 
\[ (152d4-6)\]

In the present case the lover of spectacle is brought over to admit that every particular *is* as much as *is not*, although the precise nature of the 'is' in either case cannot be known with certainty:

\[ \text{kai oúte eínaí oúte mi éínaí oúdein oútein dunamein pugíssai, oúte amóterea oúte oúdeteron. (479c3-5)} \]

There appear to be four propositions here: 1) x is; 2) x is not; 3) x both is and is not; 4) x neither is nor is not. Of a 'heavy' thing we cannot know with certainty that 1) it is (heavy), or 2) it is not (heavy), for under suitable circumstances it will appear to be the opposite of what it is said to be, and neither designation is correct. The conjoint statements, that 3) it is both (heavy) and is not (heavy), and 4) it is neither (heavy) nor is not (heavy), apply similarly. A 'heavy' thing will not seem both heavy and not heavy to the same person at the same time in the same way, still less neither heavy nor not heavy. The phrase παγίως νόησαι is crucial here, for things over which opinion is set cannot be certainly known or else they will be the objects of knowledge. This argument from opposites shows that opinables (δοξούμε) do belong intermediate between being and non-being (479c6-d10); this conclusion was already deduced from the faculty argument. It is worthy of note that the light and darkness
imagery used in locating opinion is employed also for its objects.\textsuperscript{12}

The proposed discovery of what shares in being and non-being (478e1-5, note ἐφεξῆς) is concluded at 479d3-5:


The objects commonly apprehended by the many 'tumble about' somewhere intermediate between absolute being and non-being. \text{By previous agreement (478e3-5), if anything of this nature should come to light it would properly be called δοξατόν rather than γνωτόν, because it wanders in the intermediate region and is apprehended by the intermediate faculty:}

\begin{equation}
\text{τῇ μεταξύ δυνάμει τῷ μεταξὺ πλοιητὸν ἀληθήμενον.}\textsuperscript{13}
\end{equation}

The argument has thus proven that the lovers of spectacle have opinion only, philosophers knowledge; the former should be called 'lovers of opinion' (φιλόδοξοι) (479e1-480a13).

Aside from the possible circular reasoning mentioned previously, the faculty argument is open to two serious objections. The first is that two faculties may well apprehend the same object. It is true that one sees visible things and hears audible things, and that these are in a sense different. Yet it is not true that different ontological levels enter in here, since one can see and hear one and the same airplane passing overhead; for the faculty argument to work there can be no overlap of objects. Secondly, nescience (ἀγνωσία) has to be granted full status
as a faculty; otherwise opinion will not be an intermediate fac-
culty (cf. 479d8). Plato seems aware of the problems that arise
from making it a real faculty, since he frequently uses the phrase
ἐξ ἀνάγκης to justify setting nescience over non-being. An ap-
plication of the formula for a faculty brings out the difficulties:

1) ἐπιστήμη ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὶ πέριμεν, γνώσις ὡς ἔχει τὸ ὅν.

2) ἄγνωστα ἐπὶ τῷ μῇ ὑπὶ πέριμεν, ἄγνωστα ὡς ἔχει τὸ
μῇ ὅν.14

Little if any sense can be wrenched from 2), especially in light
of the assertion that that which is not is nothing at all (478b6),
and is presumably not an object at all.

These difficulties aside, it is clear that Plato adopts the
Parmenidean dictum that only being can be known, while what is not
is utterly unknowable. It is probable that he also has Parmenides
in mind when he locates opinion in the mid-ground. The goddess
advised Parmenides not to travel the way on which mortals wander
(πλάττονται), since they confuse being and non-being:

οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ σῶς εἰσὶν τῶν νεώμυται
κοῦ ταύτων, πάντων δὲ παλιντροπὸς ἐστὶ κέλευθος.
(8 6.8-9)15

Although their interpretation is debated, the concluding verses
of the proem are arguably evidence that Parmenides allows some
sort of existence to the content of mortal opinions:

ἡδὲ βοηθῶν δόξας, ταῖς σῶς ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθῆς.
ἀλλ' ἐκείς καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
χρὴν δοκίμως εἰσαι, διὰ παντὸς πάντα περίπτων.
(8 1.30-32)16
While in Republic V Plato is content to use ready-made the Parmenidean injunctions about being and non-being, in the Sophist he investigates what being and non-being are and attacks Parmenides on two counts (244b6–245e5). In fact, the program of much of the dialogue as announced by the Eleatic Stranger is explicitly anti-Parmenidean:

Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγιάλων ἠμὶν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασιλεύσειν, καὶ βιῶσει τὸ τε μὴ δὲν ὡς ἔστι κατὰ τί καὶ τὸ δὲν ἀν πάλιν ὡς σύκο ἔστι πη. (241d5–7) \(^{17}\)

An analysis of the entire dialogue is out of the question here, but a brief summary of how Plato demonstrates that non-being is and conversely that being is not will prove useful for understanding the criticisms he levels at Parmenides and Simplicius's replies.

At 251d6–259e6 Plato proves the need for and demonstrates the mechanism of a communion or interweaving of Forms (κοινωνία, συμπλοκή ἐλέους) \(^{18}\). Only the five greatest kinds of Forms are considered; being (τὸ δὲν), sameness (ταὐτός), otherness (ὁτέρος), motion (κίνοσις), and rest (στάσις). All five, not to mention the other Forms, share or partake of one another, although not all do so with all. True to the workings of participation in the earlier dialogues, for a thing (including Forms) to have the property \(x\) it must share in \(x\)-ness \(^{19}\). It is sufficient to consider the Form of motion to illustrate Plato's method, since this is the Form he treats most fully (255a11–256d9). Motion is other
than rest (i.e. shares in otherness with respect to rest) and so is not rest (οὐ στᾶνε ἐστίν). It also is (ἐστι, ὁ) in virtue of its participating in being (διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ οὐνομ). It shares in otherness with respect to sameness and therefore is not the same (as sameness) (οὐ τοῦτον ἐστιν), but shares in sameness with respect to itself and 'really is' the same (ἡν τοῦτον); that is, motion is motion. Lastly, it shares in otherness with respect to being, even though it does share in being, and both is not and is (ὅτι καὶ ἐστιν καὶ ὁ). The equivalence of 'is other than' (ἐτέρου) with 'is not' (οὐκ ἐστιν, ὁ) is crucial in this passage and in the dialogue as a whole. It allows Plato to speak meaningfully of non-being, for everything except being itself is non-being, and even being itself 'is not' in that it shares in otherness with respect to everything else. Parmenides had asserted that what is not will never be:

οὐ γὰρ μὴν τοῦτο ἔστι τῆς μη ἔστιν.

(B 7.1) 20

Plato does him one better by showing that what is 'is not' as well (258d5-e3). Plato, however, admits that the non-being he discusses is not the contradictoriness of Parmenidean being. Earlier in the dialogue he rehearses the Parmenidean arguments for its being inexpressible and unthinkable 21. At the same time, Plato's Form of being has striking similarities with Parmenides's one being. It is par excellence, since it alone shares in sameness with respect to itself, and is one. It too is eternal, uncreated,
indestructible, and motionless (in the physical sense). The principal difference is that it does not exhaust the ontological possibilities of the universe. More to the point, the properties being has it has in virtue of participating in other Forms. Other things partake of it as well, and since they also partake of otherness and sameness, there is a plurality of discrete existents.

Set against this background the passage 244b6-24535 makes good sense. For convenience, the first criticism will be called the linguistic argument (244b6-d13), the second the part-whole argument (244d14-245e5). The linguistic argument is to hold good for all extreme monists:

ποτα των ἐν το πεν λεγόντων ἃρ' ὡν πειστέον εἰς ὑλάνιν τι ποτε λέγουσι τό ἐν; (244b6-7)

These monists admit to two statements: 1) that they say that only one thing is or exists (ἐν πού φατε μόνον εῖναι; 244b9-10); and 2) that being is something (ἐν καλεῖτέ τι 244b12). A question arises from the apparent inconsistency between 1) and 2):

Πάσης ὁπερ ἐν, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς προσχάμενοι δυοῖν ὑλάνιν, ἡ ποτὰ; (244c1-2)

If the monists agree that they are using two names for the same thing, they make a mockery of a rigid monism:

tο τε δύο ὑλάμενα διαλογίζεται εἶναι μηδὲν δέμενον πλήν ἐν καταγελαστὸν που. (244c8-9)

On the other hand, for them even to allow someone to say that a name is something would be inexplicable (λόγον οὐκ ᾗν ἔχον 244d1). Two possibilities are considered: 1) if one assumes that a name
is other than that of which it is the name, he is in a sense speaking of two things (ὅσον λέγει τιν哐 244d3-4); 2) if one assumes that the name is the same as the thing (ταύτὸν αὐτῷ 244d6), then either a) he will be forced to say that it is not the name of anything at all (244d6-7), or b) if he says that it is the name of something, the name will merely be the name of a name and of nothing else (244d7-9). The illustration of 2b) at 244c11-12, however, contains a textual corruption. A reconstruction is possible, if offered with diffidence. The general assumption is that the name (somehow) is the same as the one thing. A very strict interpretation of ταύτὸν (2a) rules out the possibility of a name existing at all, because the name alone would exist and would not be a name in the ordinary sense. Now 2b) appears to allow that this name somehow names itself:

               συμβάλεται τὸ ὄνομα ὄνοματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ ὀφεένος ὁν. (244d8-9)

Further, by 1) the monist cannot hold that there are two names, and any emendation of 244d11-12 should reflect this. A tentative suggestion is:

               καὶ τὸ ἐν ὃν ὄνομα ὅν καὶ τοῦ ὄνοματος αὖ ὁ τὸ ἐν ὅν.

"That is, 'the one being' being a name, and 'the one being' (a name) of the name." It is tempting to argue that Plato here blurs a use-mention distinction to allow the monists a single word, but 2a) patently outlaws the use of a word, and the name to be mentioned is not a name anyway. But, as Cornford notes, the point
of the passage is made even by omitting 244d11-12 altogether. The linguistic argument turns on the impossibility of discourse in a radical monism. The best a monist of this sort can muster is a single name, and even that is not a name in any ordinary sense. Seligman thinks that in 244b6-d13, "Plato has produced only a dubious ad hominem argument against the Parmenidean notion [of being]," in that he tries to force Parmenides's own notion of being upon names. On the contrary the argument is telling; Parmenides's insistence on only one thing can fairly be turned against his use of language. Further, Plato here appears to attack the Parmenidean verse he quotes in the Theaetetus (180e1):

† οἶνον ἀκίνητον τελέσει τῷ παντὶ ὅνομ' εἶναι †.

It is true that Plato relies on a referential theory of language here; it might be possible to undermine his attack by asking him to what "or", "but", and so forth refer. The onus, nevertheless, rests on Parmenides to explain what sense is to be attached to all but one of the words which he uses.

The part–whole argument, on the other hand, is not so telling. Bluck to the contrary, this argument is not a simple continuation of the linguistic argument, but rather a separate attack on the monists' claim of unity for their one entity. To illustrate the monistic claim that the one being is the whole (244d15) Parmenides is cited:

Εἰ τούτων ἐνός ἐστιν, ἀπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,

Πάντων οὖν εὐκύκλου αὐτῆς ἐναλλήλου δήμῳ
μεσοδεν ίσοπολες πάντη· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μείζον
οὔτε τι βαλότερον πελέναι χρείαν ἐστὶ τῇ ἢ τῇ.
(244e2-5; Β 8.43-45)

This comparison of being to a sphere is taken in a literal sense:

τοιούτων γε ὃν τὸ μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἐχεῖ, ταύτα δὲ
ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρος ἐχεῖν· ἢ πῶς; (244e6-7)

The balance of the part-whole argument hinges on this literalism.

Before further comment, it will be well to spell out the argument:

1) being is a whole
   1a) being is either a whole of parts or unity itself
   1b) according to Parmenides it is a whole of parts
   1c) therefore it is not unity itself
   1d) therefore there is more than one thing, and being is
       no longer one

2) being is not a whole
   2a) assume that wholeness itself exists
   2b) therefore there are two things that are, and since
       being lacks what is lacks itself, and is not being
   2c) assume that wholeness itself does not exist
   2d) for a thing to be or to come to be, it must do so as
       a whole — that is as a definite quantity
   2e) therefore being does not exist nor come to be

Equally absurd conclusions result for the monists whether they
assert or deny that being is a whole; wholeness is meaningless for
them. Several points are worthy of note in this argument. The
first is that the monists are allowed two and only two types of
wholeness; that which consists of parts and unity itself. If
another candidate can be discovered, the argument will collapse.
Secondly, it is incredible that Parmenides's simile is treated as a statement of fact. Thirdly, Plato injects his own theory of Forms by the use of such terms as 'wholeness itself' and 'unity itself'; besides, ex hypothesi Parmenides cannot grant existence to anything but being. The argument does make one important point, that a concept as fundamental as being carries in its train a retinue of interrelated concepts. Number and wholeness do enter into Parmenides's account of being, and recourse to a distinction between 'natural' and 'logical' properties will not alleviate the problem. The part-whole argument is as much an argument for the Forms as it is a serious criticism of Parmenides. For Plato discourse (λόγος) is based on the interrelatedness of concepts. Both the linguistic and part-whole arguments are designed to bring out the absurdities inherent in denying or neglecting this interrelatedness; they demonstrate a fortiori the plurality of concepts or Forms. Although the part-whole argument is not convincing, Aristotle also criticizes Parmenides on his claim that being is one along similar lines (Physics 185a20–186a3, esp. 185b11–16, 186a32–b14).

This overview of Plato's treatment of Parmenides is sufficient to show the degree to which Parmenides influenced him. The Parmenidean dictum that only what is can be known and conversely what is (absolutely) not cannot remains intact in Plato's system. Plato replaces the absolute unity of being and the preclusion of
plurality at all ontological levels which he finds in Parmenides by an interweaving of distinct Forms and participation of particulars in Forms. Lastly, each of the Platonic Forms retains the features of Parmenidean being.
Notes to Chapter I

1. The *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* passages are both reminiscences of the alleged meeting of Socrates and Parmenides, described in the *Parmenides*. Tarán (pp. 3-5), among others, does not think that the meeting ever occurred. These references to the *Parmenides* are hints from Plato that familiarity with this dialogue is a prerequisite for the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*.

2. Chapter II takes up Aristotle's critique of Parmenides, particularly in Physics I.2-3. This passage from the *Sophist* appears frequently in Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides.

3. Parmenides clearly conjoins being with knowing:

   τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι. (B 3)

   ταύτων δὲ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεχὲν ἐστὶ νόημα·
   οὖ γὰρ ἄνευ τού ἐόντος, ἐν ὃ πεπατικόμενον ἐστὶν,
   εὑρίσκει τὸ νοεῖν. (B 8.34-36)

   but does not use a term for 'absolute' with either (but cf. B 8.11).


5. The negative proportion is similar:

   τὸ μὴ δὲν ἡ ἄγνωστον :: τὸ μὴ δὲν ἀγνώστον.

6. It is interesting to speculate whether ἄγνωστα itself is something that exists in the truest sense and is knowable, or in an intermediate and opinable way.

7. In the next lines Socrates more fully brings out the principle that if a faculty is set over x and produces some effect in regard to it, it is one (and the same) faculty x₁, while that which is set over some y is a different, i.e. y₁ faculty:

   καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργα-
   ζωμένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλὸν, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἐτέρῳ καὶ ἐτέρου
\( \text{ἀπεργαζόμενη ἄλλην. (477d2-5)} \)

8 J. Adam (\textit{The Republic of Plato} [Cambridge, 1969], I. pp. 342) does not comment on the syntax of the infinitive in the formula (e.g. \textit{γνῶσις 477b10}). There may be an ellipsis of a phrase such as: \textit{καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ δύναμις ἡ δυνάμεως}. This, or its equivalent, is represented in the phrase \textit{δ ἀπεργάζεται} of 477dl. Two points in the formula are interesting. The first is that Plato is relatively free with his terminology in this passage. Examples are the synonymous uses of \textit{ἐπιστήμη} with \textit{γνῶσις} and of \textit{ἀγνοεῖ} with \textit{ἀγνοεῖται}. Further, there are three apparently equivalent constructions with \textit{ἐπι} '(set) over': 1) with \textit{ἐπιτί}; 2) with \textit{τέτοιο}; and 3) with \textit{πέρικεν}. Secondly, knowledge is properly set over what is knowable (\textit{τὸ γνωστὸν}) not what is or exists (\textit{τὸ ὅν}). It was argued that only what is knowable (476e10), but this established that being is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being known. However, by the faculty argument, if knowledge is one faculty and has one and only one object, being and being known are identical.

9 F.M. Cornford (\textit{Plato's Theory of Knowledge} [London, 1935], pp. 36-39) notes that this passage and \textit{Republic} 477A ff. are versions of a Heraclitean-cum-Protagorean 'inseparability of opposites' doctrine, and deals with Plato's relation to this doctrine. There are some important differences despite the parallels. In the \textit{Theaetetus} 'becoming' and 'passing away' replace 'being' and 'non-being' for particulars. Secondly, the \textit{Theaetetus} here deals with perception (\textit{αἴσθησις}), while the \textit{Republic} opinion (\textit{δόξα}).

10 This is J. Adam's interpretation (\textit{The Republic of Plato}, I. p. 343 n 17).

11 The claim that a heavy thing will also appear light is expanded in \textit{Theaetetus} 152e6-187a6, where the thesis under consideration is whether knowledge is simply perception. One example given is that the same wind will appear cold to \textit{x} but warm to \textit{y} (152b2-10). To \textit{y} the wind will not be cold while to \textit{x} it will not be warm, and to neither will it appear both warm and cold or neither warm nor cold. It is therefore not a matter of certain knowledge what the wind really is.

12 J. Adam (\textit{The Republic of Plato}, I. 341 n 18) notes that these terms, \textit{αἰσθησις} - \textit{δόξα}, are fully explained at 508 D ff., where the relation between truth and light is first introduced.

There is no verb ὀγνυώμενος in Greek, but an infinitival form of it has been invented here to avoid adding still more negatives to the sentence. Another liberty taken is the combination of two formulas into one:

οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὅντι πέσακε, γνῶσις ὡς ἄρτη τὸ ὅν;

ἐπιστήμη μὲν γέ ποι ἐπὶ τῷ ὅντι, τὸ ὅν γνῶσις ὡς ἐκεῖ;

There are some interpreters who think that this way of mortals represents a third way of inquiry and a truly 'real' mode of existence. For a criticism of this view see Tarán, pp. 228-230 esp. p 61.

A.P.D. Mourelatos (The Route of Parmenides [New Haven and London, 1970]) devotes an entire chapter to the interpretation of these two lines, and deals with all the relevant bibliography, (Chapter 8, pp. 194-221).

βασανίζειν . . . βιάζομαι appears to allude to the practice of torturing slaves to procure information. Cf. Aristophanes Ranae 616-629, Antiphon 2.4.8 (cf. 5.3.6), and LSJ s.v. βασανίζοις II and βασανος III. βιάζομαι (LSJ s.v. II) regularly means 'overpowering by force', 'use force upon'. If this allusion is correct, the sentence should be translated, 'We will have to put the statement of father Parmenides on the rack and force it to confess that . . . '. Cornford (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 214 n 2) notes that, 'βιάζομαι may allude to Parmenides' own word ἐμίθῳ (ἐμίθως) in the lines quoted above [B 7.1-2]'; cf. also B 7.3 βιάζομαι.


A qualification is in order here. The Forms participate with one another as equally 'real' entities (as opposed to a Form and a particular); this allows reciprocal-participation.

The quotation of the same lines (B 7.1-2) at 237a8-9 and 258d2-3 is a clear stylistic device, which serves to frame the whole discussion of Parmenides.
Plato's version is more clearly articulated than Parmenides', although he uses nearly identical vocabulary throughout. Compare 237b7-239c8 with B 2.5-8 and B 8.8-9, 15-18.

L. Campbell (The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato [Oxford, 1867], p. 111 n 10) considers five different emendations and concludes that, "none of the emendations hitherto made are satisfactory". The emendation offered here differs from the five he mentions in that only one 'word' is used. Cornford (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 222 n 1) follows Campbell's lead and is ready to omit this and the preceding remark of Theaetetus.

Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 222 n 1.


R. Bluck, Plato's Sophist: A Commentary (Manchester, 1975), p. 73. Although the argument does not consider the word or name (ὅλος) "whole", it does not simply fit another, superfluous name back into the linguistic argument. Further, Bluck is incorrect to deny that, "the Eleatic Visitor (EV) is talking about Unity, Wholeness, an Being", ibidem. At 245a5-6 the EV uses the phrase ἀυτό το ὑπ, and at 245a9 τὸ ὀλίγος ὑπ. Similarly, the EV speaks of ἀυτό το ὑπ at 245c2 and of το ὑπ passim.

The phrase 'lacks itself' is found in two forms; ἐνεῖκε το ὑπ ἀυτοῦ (253c2-3) and ἐπεφύγετον ἀυτοῦ (245c5). The former is probably a reference to Parmenides B 8.33: [το ὑπ] ἐπεφύγετον ὑπ ἐπεφύγετο (ἐπεφύγετο in several manuscripts of Simplicius).

I follow Cornford (Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 222-223) in viewing the argument as a series of paradoxes, but differ from him in many details. Seligman (Being and Not-Being, pp. 26-27) is even more hostile to the part-whole argument than to the linguistic argument.

In fairness to Seligman (Being and Not-Being, p. 25), it should be noted that he brackets the qualifiers 'logical' and 'natural'. It is unclear that this makes a substantial difference for Plato, who holds that sameness and otherness are not
intrinsic logical properties of things, but rather are properties whose acquisition is identical with that of shortness, tallness, whiteness, etc.

Plato sometimes does less than full justice to his opponent's position; e.g. Thrasydamus's claim that the advantage of the stronger is justice (Republic I) and Protagoras's claim that man is the measure of all things (Theaetetus).

Chapter II: Aristotle and Parmenides

Aristotle does not share Plato's high regard for Parmenides. He credits him with only slightly more insight than the 'rather naive' (ἀγρούκότερος) Xenophanes and Melissus:

Παρμενίδης δὲ μᾶλλον βλέπων έωικέ που λέγειν.

But Parmenides perhaps seems in places to speak with more insight.¹

As with many of his predecessors' views, Aristotle dismisses Parmenides's conception of being outright. Moreover, in the major passage in which Aristotle attacks Parmenides it is the refutation itself, not Parmenides's positive doctrines, which is of philosophical interest². Aristotle's attack is thought to be cogent by Charlton and others³. Simplicius, however, defends Parmenides against Aristotle, largely because the Parmenidean one being fits well in Neoplatonic metaphysics. Therefore, in this chapter Aristotle's attack will be considered in some detail in order both to elucidate Aristotle's arguments and to set the stage for Simplicius's replies.

In his précis of philosophy in Metaphysics A, Aristotle first treats Melissus and Parmenides as material monists (984b1-8). But as if to distinguish them from the latter, he sets out their views proper after his discussion of the Pythagoreans (986b18-987a2). They generated the universe from a single, immaterial
principle — number (985b23-986b18). Strictly speaking the
Eleatics denied generation altogether, but their one principle,
especially that of Parmenides, is more conceptual than material.\textsuperscript{4}

Aristotle's summary of Parmenides is as follows:

For, claiming that, besides the existent, nothing non-existent exists, he thinks that of necessity one thing exists, viz. the existent and nothing else (on this we have spoken more clearly in our work on nature), but being forced to follow the observed facts, and supposing the existence of that which is one in definition, but more than one according to sensations, he now posits two causes and principles, calling them hot and cold, i.e. fire and earth; and of these he ranges the hot with the existent, and the other with the non-existent.\textsuperscript{5}

In the Doxa Parmenides does not range the hot with being and the cold with non-being, nor call his principles hot and cold. It seems unlikely that after having discredited non-being in the first part of his poem, Parmenides would grant it equal footing with being in the second part\textsuperscript{6}. Aristotle here adumbrates the argument Parmenides allegedly makes for the unity of being; since only being exists, it must necessarily be one. The same argument is attributed to him in the Physics and rejected as invalid.

The most interesting point in Aristotle's summary is that he takes both the Aletheia and the Doxa as referring to the material world (cf. 984a27-b4). His rejection of Parmenides and Melissus as physicists both here (986b10-17) and in the Physics (184b25-185a5, 18-20) is based on this understanding.

In a scheme reminiscent of the Sophist, Aristotle sets out
an analytical division of his predecessors in the Physics according to the number and type of principles they held. He states that the question of how many things there are (τὸ ὅν) is equivalent to the question of how many first principles or elements there are. Since previous thinkers were in fact seeking for the ultimate entities in the world, they too were searching for first principles (184b22-25).

Aristotle next contends that the Eleatics, Parmenides and Melissus, lie wholly outside the ken of physics and that they construct merely eristic arguments for their doctrines. Nevertheless, the refutation of their doctrine brings out problems of interest both to physics and philosophy (185a7-20). Aristotle means to reject Parmenides and Melissus on the grounds that their one principle is not subject to motion (ὁμόνοια). They are relegated to a non-physical science or one common to all sciences. The second of Aristotle's contentions, that they are merely eristic in their arguments, is treated in subsequent chapters by Aristotle.

Beginning his refutation on a facetious note, (ὁχὶ ὅ ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅ

On the uses of 'being' see Metaphysics Δ 1017a7-b9. Since his categorial scheme is to include everything that exists, Aristotle first considers whether Parmenides and Melissus assign everything to a single category or to one single item of one category:

Do they mean that all things 'are' substance or quanti-
tries or qualities? And further, are all things one substance — one man, one horse, or one soul.

They cannot allow that there be more than one category on pain of allowing a plurality of existent things (185a27-29). The second part of the disjunct is not considered, presumably because it would be absurd for the Eleatics to say that everything is one horse or the like. Aristotle next considers what will result if they embrace a non-substance category. This move will prove unsuccessful because substance alone is capable of separate existence (χαρακτόρον), while everything else is said of it as subject (185a29-32). To illustrate his contention he considers Melissus's claim that being is infinite. Since this can only be true per accidens of a substance, there must be two entities not one at issue. The final possibility, that everything is substance, is not in itself objectionable, except that one cannot in any way qualify it once all the other categories are denied. Hence Melissus cannot properly assert that being is infinite, nor presumably Parmenides that it is finite. This argument against the Eleatics parallels that of Plato in the Sophist; their one being is shown to be a thoroughly empty concept.

Aristotle next treats of the uses of 'one' (όν): it is either 1) that which is continuous (τὸ συνεχές), or 2) that which is indivisible (τὸ ἀδιαιρέτου), or 3) those things whose essential definition (ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τι ἣν εἶναι) is one and the same (185b5-9). Now the Eleatics cannot opt for 1), since that which is con-
tinuous is infinitely divisible and its unity is in reality a plurality (πολλὰ τῷ Ἔν) (185b9-10). What is continuous is infinitely divisibly potentially; the Eleatics have a legitimate quarrel with this notion. Furthermore, Parmenides explicitly states that being is one, continuous, and indivisible (ἐν, συν-
εχές Β 8.6, σύν 
διαίρετον Β 8.22); this claim is a contradiction in terms for Aristotle (cf. in Phys 86.19-87.18). At any rate, before considering 2) Aristotle introduces the question of the unity of a whole as against its parts. Its appearance in this passage points to the part-whole argument of the Sophist. 

The second use of 'one', that of indivisibility, precludes the existence of either quality or quantity; the Eleatics will not be able to maintain that being is either finite or infinite (185b 16-19). Aristotle does not explain why this should be so, but the definition of quantity in Metaphysics A 1020a7, which has as its definiens 'that which is divisible into subsistents' (ποιόν διαίρετον εἰς ἕσωμάρχοντα) makes half the claim apparent. Charlton thinks that the denial of quality to being (or the universe) is directed against Parmenides's use of hot and cold as principles in the Doxa. It seems more likely that the denial is either directed at the qualities of Parmenides's being in the Aletheia, e.g. ὁμοιότητος (Β 8.26) and ὁμορροχία (Β 8.27), or is merely another step in the overall reductio argument that Aristotle constructs to drive home the incoherence of the Eleatic conception of being.
The third and final use of 'one', that of unity of definition, will prove uncongenial to the Eleatic position as well. Aristotle states that if everything there is (τὰ όντα) is one in definition, then the Eleatics will embrace a Herclitean doctrine of synonymy (185b19-25). To assert that everything is one will be convertible salva veritate with the assertion that everything is nothing. As maintained in the linguistic argument of the Sophist, the Eleatics are being charged with making significant speech impossible\(^{14}\). The balance of the paragraph takes up the question of how one thing can also be many, the difficulties this seeming puzzle provided to post-Eleatic philosophers, and finally Aristotle's own solution to the question\(^{15}\).

To sum up, Aristotle attempts to make sense of the claim that being is one by considering the possible uses of 'being' and 'one'. The result of this procedure is a reductio ad absurdum for the Eleatic claim; no use of either term will prove viable for their fundamental claim and any ancillary claims, e.g. that being is finite. Eleatic being will prove at best a marginal concept, since it will resist all attempts at analysis and qualification. To assess Aristotle's critique to this point is difficult. He in effect forces the Eleatic conception of being into his own ontological scheme with predictably unhappy results. In a sense he has done no more than to illustrate the incompatibility or incommensurability of the two systems. Secondly, it is possible to break the back of the reductio argument by offering dif-
ferent uses of both 'being' and 'one' which justify the Eleatic claim. There is, however, much to be said in Aristotle's defense. His analysis of the words 'being' and 'one' can be seen as a legitimate attempt to make sense of the opaque claim that being is one. That is, it may be true that the Eleatics use both terms in odd and incomprehensible ways. Secondly, while distortions and misunderstanding are the inevitable result of Aristotle's attempt to explain or understand his predecessors in light of his own system, it does not follow that he acts out of malice\(^1\). Lastly, the philosophical absurdities he imputes to the Eleatics are richly deserved if they in fact maintained that the universe is one and motionless.

While in the first part of his attack Aristotle attempts to show the absurdity of the claim that all things are one, in the second he takes aim at the arguments which the Eleatics use to arrive at their erroneous conclusion (185a20-186a3; 186a3-187a11). Melissus is charged with an illicit conversion and with falsely inferring that if being is one it must therefore not be subject to motion (186a10-13). Aristotle's attack on Parmenides parallels that on Melissus, but is developed at greater length and complexity. He begins by setting out two grounds on which to refute Parmenides: 1) that he falsely assumes that 'being' is used in only one way, and 2) that the conclusion of his syllogism does not follow (186a23-25). Actually, both 1) and 2) are sides of the same coin, for the falseness of one of the premisses ensures the
unsoundness of the whole syllogism. In his attack on Parmenides's syllogism Aristotle substitutes 'white' for 'being', presumably to show that the fallacy is formal:

If we take only white things, and if white has a single meaning, none the less what is white will be many and not one. For what is white will not be one either in the sense that it is continuous or in the sense that it must be defined in only one way.\(^17\)

The syllogism at issue in Aristotle's counterexample is difficult to make out. A possible version runs:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Tō πᾶν (ἐστι) λευκὸν} & \quad \text{Everything is white} \\
\text{Tō λευκὸν (ἐστι) ἐν} & \quad \text{White is one (only)} \\
\text{Tō πᾶν (ἐστι) ἐν} & \quad \text{Everything is one.}\(^18\)
\end{align*}
\]

The major premiss, that white is one, is false according to Aristotle, and therefore the conclusion that everything is one does not follow. Moreover, white is not one either in continuity or in definition. It is not stated why the former is not true, but brief consideration of this point will throw light on the whole criticism. The continuous is defined as 'that which has by its own nature one movement and cannot have any other', the paradigmatic case of which is a straight line (cf. Metaphysics Δ 1016a5-6). 'White' is not a candidate for having a natural movement. To maintain that it does is to commit a category blunder; substances move or change, not the properties that inhere in them.\(^19\)

Implicit in Aristotle's denial of continuity is his pluralistic categorial scheme, which figures in his denial of definitional unity as well. The argument for the latter is:

'Whiteness' will be different from 'what has white-
ness'. Nor does this mean that there is anything that can exist separately, over and above what is white. For 'whiteness' and 'that which is white' differ in definition, not in the sense that they are things which can exist apart from each other. But Parmenides had not come in sight of this distinction. 20

To paraphrase, even if one assumes that everything is white, and hence that nothing except white exists, it is still not true that everything is one. White considered by itself is a color, and its (essential) definition will differ from that of the substance in which it is present. Both, however, will be one (concrete) thing and be called 'white' 21.

Several objections to Aristotle's critique in this part are in order. First, the substitution of 'white' for 'being' makes 'being' a mere quality and commits Parmenides to subsistent entities of which existence is an accidental attribute 22. Secondly, although it is debated what Parmenides's argument for the unity of being is, there is nothing in the poem that closely resembles Aristotle's version 23. Thirdly, Aristotle's charge that Parmenides assumes that 'being' is said in only one way is obscure. He here assumes (for argument's sake) that this being is a quality, and then proceeds to show how qualities require substances for them to be in. Substance is then tried as a candidate but ultimately rejected. Aristotle appears to be constructing yet another reductio; a bare substance will defy qualification, while no non-substance can exist independently of substance. There is no need to specify either of the two kinds, since both are vulnerable to
the argument. Lastly, Aristotle does not consider the possibility that Parmenidean being is somehow one in kind. A partial explanation is that elsewhere he explicitly denies that being is a genus.

Aristotle’s critique is not cogent. His first charge, that Parmenides committed a logical fallacy, is simply incorrect, for there is no reason to assume that his argument was such as Aristotle alleges. Secondly, his reductio arguments hinge on his own metaphysical scheme and on his assumption that Parmenidean being is or refers to physical being. In the remainder of his treatment of Parmenides, however, Aristotle attempts to make sense of his claim along less partisan lines.

His first attempt to rehabilitate Parmenides’s claim is to insist that 'being' signify not merely one thing, but rather both 'real being' (ὅν ὁνύ) and 'real unity' (ὅν ὁνύ (186a32–34). He clearly is speaking of essential being and unity; otherwise Parmenides will be speaking of accidental being and unity. That of which being is an accident will be something non-existent (τι οὐκ ὁνύ), since it is other than being (ὥτερον τοῦ ὁνύ). Therefore both the 'being' and the 'one' of Parmenides will be non-existent and his whole claim meaningless.

The lines that follow are difficult:

Hence 'substance' will not be a predicate of anything else. For the subject cannot be a being, unless 'being' means several things, in such a way that each is something. But ex hypothesi 'being' means only one thing.
The point seems to be that if only real being is allowed, this cannot be anything in particular. The conclusion of the argument, that real being will not belong to anything other than itself, is meant to be a blow against Parmenides. That is, he will not be able to claim that his being is one or finite.

Aristotle next considers whether everything is an accident of 'real being', since the converse had unfortunate consequences (186b4-14). He resorts to his earlier example of 'being' being white, wherein 'white' is truly predicated of everything there is. If 'real being' is also white but white is not a truly existent thing, white will be non-existent on the principle enunciated above. Furthermore, its non-being or non-existence will not be qualified non-being (τι μὴ ὄν) but rather absolute non-being (δια τιμὶ μὴ ὄν) (186b8-10). Aristotle here turns the tables on Parmenides, who had asserted that only being existed and that that which differed from it existed in no way at all. To put the matter in Aristotelian terms. while it is true that white (and other non-substances) is an accident of something, it is no less truly existent than that in which it occurs. If it is true that being is white, then being is no more being than non-being (186b4-6). Since this is patently absurd, one must either deny altogether that being is white (and everything else), or else allow that white also signifies being and admit a plurality of significations of being. The section concludes with a condensed version of the same argument directed against magnitude; Parmenides's claim that being
is finite is at issue.\textsuperscript{29}

Parmenides is forced to allow different significations of being in order to justify his claims for the unity, finiteness, and the like of being. While the whole is of a piece with his earlier critique, Aristotle does not explicitly, at any rate, employ his own terminology or categoriology. Ross to the contrary, \( \tau \delta \theta \iota \kappa \lambda \nu \) is not a mere synonym of \( \omega \kappa \omega \iota \alpha \). After allowing Parmenides the vague, nearly Platonic 'real being', Aristotle shows that this too will defy qualification unless there are other things that 'truly are'. The positive lesson here is that all metaphysical schemes must be pluralistic; this lesson is an \emph{a fortiori} argument for Aristotle's own scheme.

In the final section of his critique, Aristotle argues that from the point of view of definition (\( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \zeta \)) being must also be \textit{multiform}.\textsuperscript{31} The connection of this section with the preceding is clear; definitions are paradigmatic instances of essential being. For Aristotle a definition provides the essence (\( \tau \theta \tau \iota \iota \nu \varepsilon \iota \omicron \omega \omicron \omicron \upsilon \) of a thing (cf. 185b8-9). Since a properly formed definition consists of two parts, a genus and \textit{differentia}, one is committed to pluralism on at least the linguistic level if one adopts the Aristotelian version of a definition. Aristotle considers the case of 'man' (\( \delta \omega \theta \iota \iota \alpha \omicron \iota \omicron \omicron \zeta \))\textsuperscript{32}. If one assumes that this is something that really is, it must also be true that 'animal' (\( \tau \delta \zeta \omicron \alpha \omicron \nu \) and 'biped' (\( \tau \delta \iota \pi \omicron \alpha \omicron \nu \) really exist (186b15-16). The alternative is to assume that both are accidents of 'man' or of
something else. An accident is either 1) that which is capable of being present or not, or 2) that in which is present the definition of what it is present in. Examples of both are offered: 'to be seated' (τὸ Ἀποθέωμα) can be true or false of some subject, while in 'snubness' (τὸ σαμόν) the definition of nose is present. A caveat is appended to 2): in the definition of all those things which are in the definitorial account or are the elements out of which it consists the definition of the 'whole' is not present. The 'whole' in this case is the definiendum, thought of as having the elements of its definition as parts. The definition of 'man' is not present in 'biped', nor 'pale man' in 'pale'. Aristotle returns to the hypothesis that 'biped' is an accident of 'man'. If this is true, then 'biped' may either be present or not in man, or the definition of 'man' will be present in the definition of 'biped'. As for the former, one would in effect be maintaining that man could either be a biped or not; this is clearly erroneous. But it is equally mistaken to include the definition of 'man' in 'biped', for the opposite is the case. The other half of the disjunct, that 'biped' and 'animal' are accidents of something other than man, also leads to an absurdity. If both are accidents and not truly existent, then 'man' will have the same status; there will have to be some fourth thing which has as three concomitant attributes 'man', 'biped', and 'animal'. Aristotle has demonstrated the need for a plurality of truly existent things on the basis of another reductio argument.
In the present version he has shown that one cannot define some truly existent thing without positing the existence of at least two other things. The reply to this argument is straightforward. To use Aristotle's own example, it is not obvious that 'animal' is a truly existent thing in the same way as 'man' is, or better this particular man. Further, the ontological status of differentiae is debated. Aristotle also seems to be headed towards an infinite regress.

Aristotle concludes his critique by considering whether one can maintain that the universe (τὸ πᾶν) consists of 'indivisibles', if as in the present case what really exists is not an accident of anything yet is said to be composed of both things that are said of it (186b33-35). In addition to its straightforward meaning, 'indivisibles' (ἀδιαιρέτα) refers back to the beginning of the whole section, where the program of demonstrating the divisibility or analyzability of being is set forth (186b14). Of greater importance, though, are two concluding remarks which round off the whole treatment of the Eleatics. The first is:

But obviously it is not true that if being means one thing, and cannot at the same time mean the contradictory of this, there will be nothing which is not, for even what is cannot be without qualification, there is no reason why it should be a particular not-being.

Aristotle apparently means that even on the assumption that everything exists in the fullest or truest way, there will still be a perfectly sensible way in which non-being will exist; thus, this chair is not this table. There is no commitment here to abso-
lute non-being, although there is to a plurality of distinct entities. The ἔτερον doctrine of the Sophist, which lurks in the background here, is later exploited to account for change in terms of form and absence, the latter often being spoken of as non-being (cf. 190a21-26, 191b13-21). The second remark is another criticism of the Eleatic claim that 'being' must be one only:

To say that all things will be one, if there is nothing besides Being itself, is absurd. For who understands 'being itself' to be anything but a particular substance?37

The notion of being itself or 'real being' can only be comprehended if it can be described as some specific thing. But once one allows some second thing distinct from being itself, a radical monism is impossible to maintain.

In sum, when Aristotle argues strictly from his own metaphysical presuppositions, his criticisms of Parmenides are not telling. In the second section of his critique, however, he formulates a more cogent attack, and one which parallels that of Plato in the Sophist. Aristotle finds the notion of absolute non-being no less abhorrent than did Parmenides, but makes a case for a non-absolute variety of it, namely a plurality of truly existent though distinct things (191b13-14). He argues that rigid adherence to being as a single indivisible unity is absurd, for one could never speak meaningfully of it.
Notes to Chapter II


2 *Physics* 185a17-20. The Eleatics are attacked *en masse* at 185a20-186a3; Melissus is treated in 184a2-44, Parmenides in 186a 22-187a11.


4 In Metaphysics A 986b18-21 Aristotle states that Parmenides's one being is one in definition - *form* (ὡς τὸν λόγον), while Melissus's is one in matter (ὡς τὴν ὕλην); cf. 986b31-33.


6 Aristotle may have B 8.53-54 in mind. Cf. Tarán, pp. 217-220.

7 Compare 184b15-22 with Sophist 242c8-243a1. Further, at Theaetetus 180e1-5 Melissus and Parmenides as champions of motionlessness are opposed to all the other Presocratics, who are partisans of flux.


10. Parmenides's contention that being is finite is explicitly controverted in the discussion of 'one', 185b17-18.

11. Wicksteed and Cornford (The Physics: with an English Translation, 2 vols., The Loeb Classical Library, [London and Cambridge, 1957], I. p. 28), refer to this passage as an "admittedly irrelevant digression" which anticipates the discussion in IV.iii. In the Sophist the dilemma that Parmenides is presented with is whether he can maintain that his being can be one if it is a whole, for a whole is a whole of parts, 244d14-245b10.

12. Ross n οόξε πολν, p. 469. As for the remaining half, Ross is probably correct in stating that a bare point or number does not have qualities.


14. Although in the Sophist the criticism centers on the ontological status of 'names', the upshot seems to be that there could be a string of meaningless names of the one bogus name, 244d11.

15. 185b25-186a3 and Ross's notes, pp. 469-470.


18. This version draws heavily on Ross n 23-32, p. 473. To make it work, however, one has to replace ομαλόνοντος by (εστι), or the major and minor premisses will be incompatible. Secondly, while Aristotle uses the plural μονα τα λεγω, the singular is required if the syllogism is to be well-formed. Thirdly, το θαν may mean 'everything' or 'the universe'. The advantage of this version is that when 'being' is resubstituted for 'white' a plausible argument emerges:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{το θαν (εστι)} & \text{ δον} & \text{Everything (or the universe) exists} \\
\text{το δο (εστι)} & \text{ δον} & \text{Existence is one} \\
\text{το ταθ (εστι)} & \text{ δον} & \text{Everything (or the universe) is one.}
\end{align*}
\]

19. Unless the white moves per accidens.

21. Ross (n 29, p. 474) distinguishes between the color white and the thing that takes on the color white.


23. It is unclear that Parmenides has an 'argument' proper for the unity of being, let alone a syllogism; cf. section VI of Chapter IV. If anything, he argues that being is one and continuous, a position which Aristotle rejects out of hand. Cf. Tarán, pp. 175-201, on the interpretation of Β 8.6 ἔν, ζυγωκές.

24. Ross discusses this omission under the treatment of 'one' n 8b7-9, p. 468. He thinks that unity in kind (or genus) implies numerical difference among the exemplifications of the one kind, while the Eleatics insisted on a numerical identity.

25. Several of the most important passages are: *Posterior Analytics* 92bl4, *Metaphysics* Β 998b22, and Η 1024b25.

26. The phrase ξέροι τοῦ ὄντος and the notion that what is other than being is non-being must draw on the *Sophist* 255D.


28. That is, although substance is the favored and logically prior category in Aristotle's scheme, the remaining categories really exist with a different account of being for each.

29. Ross fleshes out this argument in Β 11-14, pp. 475-476.

30. Ross, Β 14, p. 477. He follows Alexander and Simplicius in this; cf. in *Phys* 129.32-131.29.

32. 186b15 ff. Though 'man' is a substance, in theory the same argument would work for 'white', since color would not be an accidental property of white.

33. 186b17. This argument continues on till 186b33; a close paraphrase follows.

34. The second example is unclear; one would not define 'pale' nor 'pale man' in terms of one another on any scheme.


Chapter III: Parmenides in the Later Philosophical Tradition

Between Aristotle and Simplicius nearly a millennium elapsed, during which Parmenides fared no better than other Presocratics. Except for the quotation of the proem by Sextus\(^1\), a handful of quotations and secondary accounts of his doctrines are to gleaned from the extant philosophical literature up to Simplicius. Moreover, a large number of the latter are derived from Theophrastus's Φυσική Ασκησις, often from second or third hand abridgments of it\(^2\). The accounts of Presocratic causes preserved from this work repeat the accounts of Aristotle, and therefore do not constitute an independent source for the Presocratics\(^3\). It is necessary to determine the ancient communis opinio about Parmenides, for it is against this background that Simplicius's contribution both as a source and an interpreter is to be viewed.

In order to carry out this plan, all passages that treat of Parmenides must be located and then assessed in light of the contexts in which they appear, including at least some consideration of the authors' philosophical presuppositions\(^4\). The first step has been carried out by Hermann Diels, who collected much of the material relating to the Presocratics\(^5\). The second has not yet received its due, with the exception of the studies of Aristotle's and Theophrastus's treatment of the Presocratics\(^6\). The tendency to date has been
to read *in vacuo* the fragments and *testimonia*, often truncated and wrenched from context. In the case of actual quotation, the *ipsissima verba* are unquestionably of more value than any surrounding exegetical material for the reconstruction of a given work. For paraphrases or extended critiques such a mechanical separation will not do. Here careful examination is required to elicit useful information. Further, the role a Presocratic plays in later Greek philosophy is not a piece of antiquarianism; the *testimonia* of later authors are often the only source for doctrines of the Presocratics. The large amount of material, however, precludes for the present study a treatment of all the passages relating to Parmenides. Instead, only those passages which treat of the *Aletheia* will be considered. Thus biographical information, the proem, and the *Doxa* will be omitted from consideration unless light is shed on the first part of the poem. Finally, it is necessary to backtrack and treat those passages in Plato and Aristotle which have not yet been discussed, both for completeness' sake and in order to show how important the views of these two philosophers were for later interpretations of Parmenides.

The most striking feature of Plato's references to Parmenides is that none even hints at the existence of the second half of his poem; Parmenides is par excellence the philosopher of being. Indeed, he and the other Eleatics are distinguished from the other Presocratics who espouse a theory of flux (οἱ ῥέοντες); the former are partisans of cosmic stability (οἱ τὸ οὐλο στασιῶτα) (*Theaetetus* 181a4–b4; cf. 152e2–8). While there are slight differences in phraseology,
Parmenides's one, motionless being is everywhere stated to be the whole of reality\(^8\). Aside from the short quotation in the *Symposium*, all the explicit references concern the meeting between Socrates and Parmenides, which forms the body of the *Parmenides*\(^9\). That this meeting as reported ever occurred was doubted by Athenaeus, and his judgement is correct\(^10\). Though fictional, the meeting does represent Plato's conscious debt to Parmenides, a debt which led him to equate with parricide a refutation of Parmenides's prohibition about the inquiry into non-being\(^11\). However, the dialogue, especially the second part, is enigmatic. It literally bristles with 'one' and 'being', but there seems to be no way to separate out the Parmenidean elements from those of Zeno or Plato himself. In view of these considerations, it is advisable to leave the dialogue out of account, however large it figures in an assessment of Parmenides's influence on Plato.

There remains to consider one passage that has received little attention from modern commentators\(^12\). As a preface to his cosmogony, Timaeus argues that because the world has come to be and cannot be said to be in the fullest sense, it cannot be the object of knowledge, but only of opinion or belief. The language of his argument is redolent of the *Republic* passage previously examined:

That which is apprehensible by thought with a rational account is the thing that is always unchangeably real; whereas that which is the object of belief together with unreasoning sensation is the thing that becomes and passes away, but never has real being.\(^13\)

Such being the case, he concludes that his story is only likely, as is fit for mortal man:
If we can furnish accounts no less likely than any other, we must be content, remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human, and consequently it is fitting that we should, in these matters, accept the likely story and look for nothing further.\textsuperscript{14}

More important than the faint verbal echoes in the passage is the fact that fundamental doctrines are the point of departure for the entire dialogue. The study of this changing world inhabited by men can have at best probability, both on Parmenides's and Plato's account. The differences between the two are no less profound. Plato's realm of being and knowledge, the Forms, is both pluralistic and is the paradigm of this sublunar realm; Parmenides's one being has no analog in the world of mortals. In sum, Parmenides's doctrines exerted a marked, though not restrictive, force on Plato throughout his philosophical career\textsuperscript{15}.

Parmenides is referred to explicitly by Aristotle more frequently than by Plato, although his importance for Aristotle is undeniably less\textsuperscript{16}. Two obvious reasons account for this disparity. While treating a subject, Aristotle frequently reviews the opinions of his predecessors to see if they have anything of value to contribute; the majority of his references fall into this category (cf. \textit{Metaphysics} A, \textit{Physics} I). Secondly, since the Presocratics offered Aristotle a host of straw-men for his doctrines, there was no better foil for his pluralistic conception of being than Parmenides and the other Eleatics\textsuperscript{17}. Although his criticisms of his predecessors are at times demonstrably false, what he has to say about Parmenides is crucial because he, unlike Plato, mentions both parts of the poem and attempts to reconcile them. To be sure, some of his statements
about Parmenides cannot be reconciled, but they cannot be dismissed out of hand; they are decisive for later, especially Theophrastean-based reports, and interpretations about Parmenides. In this section, then, the inquiry will be restricted to Aristotle's critique of Parmenides's conception of and arguments for his one being, as well as his attempts to reconcile the two parts of the poem.  

Both the Protrepticus and On Philosophy related histories of the development of philosophy that seem to have been the raw material for the scheme of Metaphysics. To the latter dialogue has been assigned a report by Sextus that Aristotle called Parmenides and Melissus 'stationers of nature and non-physicists' (σταθεροὶ τῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀμφύσικος κέλυφος). The only other mention of Parmenides in the supposed fragments of the dialogues is found in the Sophist, where he is said not to have been without experience in dialectic, since his friend Zeno was its originator. Although a dialogue is presumably not at issue, Philoponus's report that Aristotle devoted a separated work to Parmenides, if true, would point to yet another lost work.

Aristotle's other references to Parmenides will be considered in two groups. The first consists of expositions and refutations of the arguments which Parmenides advanced in behalf of his one being. In De Generatione et Corruptione 325a2–23 the Eleatic arguments against motion and plurality are set forth at some length.

The Eleatics deny that void (tò ἄνελλον) exists, because this is non-being, and they conclude that it necessarily follows that what is or rather being (tò ὁμοιότατον) is one and not subject to motion. For void
is required both for motion and to separate objects from one another. Further, what is, or rather the universe (τὸ πᾶν), must be continuous and indivisible; otherwise it will be many and the void will reappear. Swayed by these arguments the Eleatics disdainfully transcend perception as a valid means of knowledge and obey the dictates of reason. Aristotle thinks that while these conclusions seemingly follow from their arguments, they so fly in the face of experience that to embrace them is akin to madness (325a7-23). A passage in De Caelo (298b14-24) is similar. Here the followers of Parmenides and Melissus are said to abolish generation and destruction altogether, because things that are only seem to us to come into being and pass away. In these two passages, then, Aristotle provisionally accepts as valid the arguments the Eleatics offer for denying plurality or motion in this world. In both stress is laid upon the sovereignty of reason and the concomitant denial of perception or seeming as valid means of knowledge. Further, Aristotle clearly takes them to be speaking of the physical world.

In the eleventh άποστασις of Metaphysics B (1001a4-b25) Aristotle takes up the question of whether or not 'being' and 'one' are to count as the substances of things, and whether each respectively is only being itself and unity itself, or rather that some different nature is in question. If one admits that there is a being itself and unity itself, being and unity will be their respective substances, for they are said of everything that is or is one. But the admission that there is a being itself and a unity itself will force one to accept Parmenides's conclusion, that all
things are one and that this is being. What is different from being does not exist, and so being alone exists. Plato is clearly Aristotle's target here. Parmenides's argument is valid only on the assumption that there is some one 'being'; Aristotle explicitly denies this both here and in other passages (e.g. Physics 186b1-35). Further, Aristotle elsewhere denies that being and one are proper universals at all (Metaphysics B 998b21-22). What is important for the present inquiry is that Aristotle does not deny the validity of Parmenides's argument, but rather allows it to stand as the necessary and undesirable consequence for Plato's conception of being.

Near the end of Physics I Aristotle recapitulates his critique of his predecessors' views on change, and the doctrine of Parmenides is brought up three times (191a23-192b4). In the first, coming to be and passing away of what is are denied, because what comes to be must come to be either from being or non-being. Both alternatives are impossible; for what already is is and does not come to be, while nothing can come to be from non-being (191a28-31). Those who argue in this way generalize their conclusion so as to deny multiplicity as well. Aristotle then shows how his accidental-essential distinction when applied to 'being' will allow one to speak meaningfully of 'coming to be from non-being' (191a31-33). He asserts that it was ignorance of this distinction that led some of his predecessors to deny that anything comes to be and therefore to abolish all coming to be; Parmenides, although unnamed, is one these (191b10-13). He goes on to state that his potentiality-actuality distinction, as applied to that which underlies the change, solves
the difficulties that compelled his predecessors to deny palpable fact; for they turned away from the way of coming to be, passing away, and all change (ἐξατράπτουσιν τῆς ὅδοι τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ Ὄσον καὶ ὅλος μεταβολήν)\(^{30}\). The language here is Parmenidean\(^{31}\).

In the third passage he says that later philosophers agreed with Parmenides that nothing comes from non-being simpliciter, but were unable to grasp the true nature of the substrate in change (191b36-192a1). In all these passages Parmenides's argument is refuted in one of two ways; either the potentiality-actuality or accidental-essential distinction when applied to being will ensure the meaning-fullness of 'non-being'. In the refutation of Parmenides early on in the Physics the semantic multivocity of 'being' was at stake, but only as applied to the categorial implications of existential claims\(^{32}\). A reference to this sort of refutation occurs in the Sophistical Refutations. Aristotle here states that some people refute (λύουσιν) the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by asserting that 'one' and 'being' are used not in one but in many ways\(^{33}\).

The second group consists of Aristotle's remarks about the relation of the two parts of the poem. As previously remarked, in Metaphysics A Parmenides is said to have grasped a conceptual unity of being, but to have been compelled to account for the plurality of the sensible world\(^{34}\). This he did by introducing two principles or causes, hot and cold, which he called fire and earth, ranging the former with being and the latter with non-being\(^{35}\). In De Generatione et Corruptione 318b6-7 Aristotle sketches how fire and earth might come to be and pass away into each other, and refers to Parmenides's
analogous scheme. His poles of change were two, being and non-being, which he called fire and earth. It is clear from the context that non-being in this case is not of the absolute sort, but rather relative to the other pole of change, viz. being.

From the preceding review it is clear that Aristotle is not consistent. He presents several disparate versions of Parmenides's argument and allows sometimes that it is valid, yet refutes it in other places. Likewise, he waives on the relation of the two parts of the poem, and the precise nature of the two principles, light and night, of the Doxa\(^{36}\). The role Parmenides and the Eleatics played in the history of philosophy is also variously related. For example, in the Metaphysics their doctrine is treated as a correction of early monism, while in the Physics it is held responsible for the misconceptions about being and non-being that plagued philosophy until Aristotle resolved them. It might be added that Aristotle nowhere mentions Parmenides's basic reason for rejecting non-being: that it is both unutterable and unthinkable. This omission is striking in light of Plato's obsession with the relation between being and knowledge and their opposites\(^{37}\).

Although it forms part of the Aristotelian corpus, De Xenophane, Melisso, et Gorgia is thought to be a later Peripatetic\(^{38}\). Parmenides is mentioned in it twice, and in both passages his contention that the one being is finite is cited to refute the opposite contention of both Melissus and Xenophanes (976a6-10, 978b8-10). Melissus is criticized for arguing that because the whole of being is uncreated it must also be infinite. Parmenides, on the other hand, held that
everything (τὸ πᾶν) was one and uncreated but was finite. Two verses from Parmenides (B 8.43–44) are quoted as proof; the *Sophist* is the source for the quotation. The author of the work may well have the *Physics* in mind as well, for there Aristotle contrasts Parmenides and Melissus on the same score and finds the view of Parmenides superior. Xenophanes is reputed to have held that god was infinite though one, and Parmenides's one being is for the sake of argument equated with god to demonstrate how an uncreated unity can be finite; the same lines from Parmenides are quoted. Neither reference is of great significance as regards Parmenides, except perhaps to show that his sphere-simile was familiar.

Theophrastus's account of Parmenides is based on two, inconsistent passages in *Metaphysics*. Parmenides is credited with a two-fold philosophy; the one in accordance with truth, the other with opinion or seeming. Moreover, in the former the universe (τὸ πᾶν) is one, eternal, uncreated, and spherical. In the latter the common view of how things come to be is accounted for by the use of fire and earth as efficient and material causes. Lastly, Parmenides's argument for the unity of being is:

τὸ πάν τὸ δὲ ὄν ὁχὸν, τὸ ὄν ὄν οὐδεν, ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸ ὄν.

That which is besides being is non-being; non-being is nothing; therefore being is one.

Though dependent on Aristotle, Theophrastus differs from him in making a rigid division between the two parts of the poem, the second of which does not, in his opinion, represent Parmenides's own doctrine. In the doxographical tradition this division, τὰ πρῶ
οὐκείως versus τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, is frequently mentioned. Finally, Theophrastus apparently takes Parmenides to be speaking of the physical world.\(^47\)

The extent of Theophrastus's influence is evident in those doxographers who made direct use of his Φυσικὸν Δόξαν.\(^48\) Hippolytus says that Parmenides was one of the Φυσικοί and implies that the second part of his poem represents his own doctrine: οὐκ ἄλλος ἐκ-φεύγων τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν.\(^49\). He supplies more details about Parmenides's universe (τὸ τῶν) than are found in the scant remains of Theophrastus's account, but is otherwise wholly in accord with him.\(^50\)

Diogenes Laertius relates that according to Theophrastus Parmenides had a two-fold philosophy, and he quotes several verses from the poem to corroborate this report (IX 21-23; B 1.28-30). He adds that Parmenides makes reason (ὅ λόγος) the criterion because the senses are inaccurate; one again he quotes Parmenides to support his claim (IX 22; B 7.3-5). His other remarks are addressed to biographical matters and the Doxa. In addition to Theophrastus he cites five sources for his account of Parmenides.\(^51\)

In his review of the theology of previous thinkers in De Natura Deorum I, Cicero has nothing to say about the goddess of the first part. Philodemus, who may have been Cicero's source, states that Parmenides and Melissus maintain that the universe is one and that the senses are false.\(^52\)

Pseudo-Plutarch's Stomateis preserves the fullest and most faithful account of all those works which are based immediately upon Theophrastus (DG 580.20-581.4). Thus Parmenides declares that in
truth the universe is eternal and motionless, while coming to be is merely a mistaken notion, and he banishes the senses from (the realm) of truth\textsuperscript{53}. Pseudo-Plutarch also sets forth Parmenides's argument as follows: if there is anything besides being it is non-being; non-being does not exist at all; therefore being is uncreated. This version of the argument is garbled, or strictly speaking ill-formed, but its premisses are identical to those set out by Theophrastus\textsuperscript{54}.

All the other doxographers made use of the \textit{Vetusta Placita}, a Stoic compilation from Theophrastus's work, or of an epitome of this compilation by Aetius, the \textit{Placita Philosophorum}. None of the reports preserved from the \textit{Vetusta Placita} deals with the first part of Parmenides's poem; in what follows the reports from the \textit{Placita} will be considered\textsuperscript{55}. Stobaeus and Pseudo-Plutarch are the principle sources for the \textit{Placita}, although chance citations in other doxographers are of value\textsuperscript{56}. Theodoretus, for example, reports that Parmenides followed his teacher Xenophanes in holding that the universe was one, spherical, finite, unborn, eternal, and wholly motionless; he cites a verse from Parmenides as proof\textsuperscript{57}.

The majority of Stobaeus's reports about Parmenides are about the \textit{Doxa}, while some of those which relate to the \textit{Aletheia} are suspect. He reports that Parmenides thought that god was the motionless, infinite, and spherical (\textit{DG} 303b17-18). Likewise, he includes Parmenides among those philosophers who hold that there is one world; it is possible that in the \textit{Doxa} Parmenides stated that there was only one world, but it is more likely that Aetius extrapolated this from the first part of the poem\textsuperscript{58}. On more solid ground is Stobaeus's
report that Parmenides and Melissus did away with coming to be and passing away because they believed that the universe was motionless (DG 320b17-19). His inclusion of Parmenides among a host of philosophers who think the senses are false may be derived from either or both parts of the poem 59. Lastly, the same three verses of Parmenides which Plato quotes in the Sophist appear in Stobaeus 60.

All the other references to Parmenides in the doxographical tradition are from Pseudo-Plutarch or works derived from it. However, Stobaeus did less abridging than did Pseudo-Plutarch, and little additional information is to be got from the latter. The only report he offers of the Aletheia is that Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno did away with coming to be and passing away because they believed that the universe was motionless 61.

Eusebius made use not only of the Placita and Epitome of Pseudo-Plutarch, but also of Plato, Aristocles, and others in his treatment of the Presocratics 62. His noteworthy reports are: 1) that Parmenides thought that the universe was one, uncreated, motionless, and had a spherical shape; 2) that he and Xenophanes did away with perception and thought that one should trust reason alone; 3) and that they thought that being was one, that the other [viz. non-being] did not exist, and that nothing came to be, passed away, or moved at all 63.

Galen has a single report concerning the Aletheia: that Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno denied coming to be and passing away, since they supposed that the universe was motionless (DG 619.21-22= 320a11-13).
Hermias reports that Parmenides held that being (ἡ οὐσία) was one, eternal, infinite, motionless and like in all directions\(^\text{64}\).

A distinct group of Parmenides interpreters consists of Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus, who are independent of the Peripatetic interpretation, antedate Neoplatonism, and seem to have his complete poem in their possession. Plutarch treats of Parmenides in the course of his reply to an attack by Colotes, an Epicurean, against all non-Epicurean philosophers on the grounds that they make life impossible (adv Colotem 1107E, 1113E-1114F). Although Colotes's work does not survive, his criticisms of Parmenides can be made out from Plutarch's replies. Parmenides allegedly 1) uttered shameless sophistries and 2) denied the existence of the physical world by embracing the one being\(^\text{65}\). From 1) Colotes argued that Parmenides justified all sorts of immoral behavior and thereby made the good or happy life impossible; from 2) that life as we know it is impossible. Plutarch replies to 1) by denying that Parmenides declared a moral holiday as the result of his arguments. The reply to 2) has two parts, the first of which is a *tu quoque* argument; the Epicureans say that everything is atoms and void, but the latter is nothing, and the former will be the only thing there is, as Parmenides's one being is (1114A-B). In the second, a more substantial argument, which is based on Plutarch's reconstruction of Parmenides's doctrines, is set out. Parmenides, he claims, anticipated Plato and Socrates in seeing that nature has two parts, one of opinion (τὸ δόξατον), the other of intellection or thought (τὸ νοητόν) (1114C). He did not
abolish either nature (ῥώας), but attributed to each what is fitting; in fact, Parmenides provides an exhaustive account (διάλεκτος) of the opinable or physical world on the basis of two elements, light (τὸ λαμπρόν) and dark (τὸ σκότεινον) (1114D; B-C). Plutarch goes on to demonstrate how Colotes misunderstood what Parmenides meant by his one being, and that acceptance of this does not necessitate rejection of the perceptible, physical world. Plutarch states that the one being is like itself and persistent in being, that the intelligible part falls under the category of the one being, and that Parmenides call this part 'being' because it is eternal and indestructible, and 'one' because of its homogeneity and inability to admit of difference (1114C-D). Lastly, he quotes several verses from Parmenides to show that truth belongs to the unchanging, intelligible part, while mortal opinions belong to the other (1114E).

That Plutarch interprets Parmenides as a precursor to Plato is perhaps predictable, but his quotations from and close adherence to what Parmenides says makes his interpretation more than mere cant. Unlike the Peripatetic interpreters, Plutarch dwells on the cognitive aspect of Parmenides's doctrines and ignores its purely ontological features, especially the argument for the unity of being. It is to Plutarch's advantage in his refutation of Colotes to stress Parmenides's acceptance of the physical world as no less real than that of being, and to gloss over the relation between the two parts of nature. It does not follow, however, that Plutarch manufactured his account for the occasion. For a Platonist the being-seeming dualism lies at the very heart of reality, and Parmenides can fairly
be said to have anticipated such a doctrine. Plutarch's willingness to read Plato back into Parmenides tends to vitiate his interpretation. Granted that Parmenides grasped a distinction between perception and knowledge and their objects, it does not follow that he granted full reality to the pereceptible order. Plato holds that the world of seeming is a shadowy image of the world of being, but the two 'worlds' in Parmenides appear to be totally discontinuous. Parmenides's distinguishing between the two was drawn on by Plato, who articulated their natures and unified them through his degrees of reality doctrine. Plutarch is correct in seeing Parmenides as laying the foundations of Platonism, but his claim that much of the superstructure is Parmenidean as well is disputable.

Sextus Empiricus, a Sceptic of the second century A.D., quotes most of the proem (B 1.1-30) and interprets it allegorically; he has little to say on either the Aletheia or Doxa. On the basis of a three-fold division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, he ranges Parmenides among the physicists while granting him some claim to logic as well (adv Math VII.2-5, 16-24, P. II.13). Parmenides, Melissus, and unspecified others differ from the majority of physicists insofar as they deny that motion exists; Sextus's version of the argument for the denial of motion is Zenonean, not Parmenidean. Consonant with the physicists, however, is his rejection of the testimony of the senses in favor or reason as the sole guarantor of truth (adv Math VII.89). Sextus undertakes to answer the question of whether there is a criterion of truth and argues that all the physicists from Thales onward asserted that reason, not
sensation, was the criterion (adv Math VII.27, ff., P. I.21). It is largely because Parmenides is the best witness for this position that his proem is quoted in extenso, whereas the other physicists are cited far more briefly \(^{68}\). At any rate, Parmenides rejected both opiniative reason (ὁ ὁσιότατος λόγος), which his acquaintance Xenophanes had accepted, and sensation as the criterion, and in their stead posited scientific reason (ὁ ἑπιστημονικὸς λόγος); the proem is here quoted (adv Math VII.111). Sextus interprets the chariot journey as an allegory of philosophical investigation, wherein the sovereignty of reason over sensation and opinion is affirmed \(^{69}\). The details of this interpretation need not be pursued, although it is noteworthy that Sextus says that Parmenides's 'unshaken heart of rich-persuading truth' is the unmoving (ἄμετωχώνητον) foundation of knowledge, while mortal opinions are unstable (ἀσέβεστον) (adv Math VII.114). Like Plutarch, to a degree at least, Sextus does not treat of the ontological aspect of Parmenides's thought, nor even mention the unity of being. He differs sharply in seeing Parmenides as altogether denying reality or truth to the Doxa. Although the task at hand calls only for evidence that as a physicist Parmenides discarded both sensation and opinion for reason, it is still remarkable that his one being is nowhere mentioned \(^{70}\). Finally, Sextus's account is similar to that of Diogenes Laertius: both argue that for Parmenides reason is the criterion (of what Diogenes does not say), that sensation is unreliable, and quote from the proem for proof of their claims \(^{71}\).
Plotinus's interpretation of Parmenides and other Presocratics is analogous to that of Aristotle, in that both see the ancients as groping for their own systems. That is, in Aristotle the Presocratics are portrayed as aetiological, while in Plotinus as vaguely grasping some one or two of the hypostases\(^72\). Plotinus denies any originality for his own doctrines, affirming that they were previously, though not explicitly, stated and that Plato's writings are proof of their ancient heritage\(^73\). Even before Plato, Parmenides was coming to grips with Plotinian doctrines insofar as he attempted to identify being (τὸ ὑέν) with intellect (νοος) and to locate the former in the non-perceptible order (V.1.8.14-18; B 3 = 17-18).\(^74\) Saying that being was motionless (σκιά) he was merely removing all corporeal motion from it to insure that it remain as it is; he likened it to a sphere's mass because it contains everything, including thought or intellection (τὸ νοεῖν), within itself (V.1.8.18-22; B 8.26 = 18, B 8.43 = 20). By calling being 'one' (ἐν) he incurred censure, because this 'one' is in fact a plurality (V.1.8.22-23; B 8.6 = 22). Parmenides of Plato's dialogue of the same name sets the matter straight; nonetheless, Parmenides was in accord with the three hypostases (V.1.8.23-27).

From Plotinus's account several observations are in order. To use Plotinian terminology, Parmenides apprehended the difference between the third hypostasis, that of soul or the physical world, and the second, that of intellect, to which belong 'being', 'intellecting', 'sameness', 'difference', and other forms; he erred in making a strict unity of the second (V.1.4.34-43). Secondly, Plotinus
interprets 'motionless' to exclude merely corporeal motion, because for him thought requires some motion or activity\textsuperscript{75}. Thirdly, he does not take 'mass of a sphere' literally; by this simile Parmenides only meant to indicate that being was all embracing\textsuperscript{76}. Finally, Plotinus states that Parmenides's claim that being is one drew criticism; by whom he does say, although Plato would seem to be the most likely candidate\textsuperscript{77}.

Although Proclus frequently comments on and quotes from Parmenides, in the main depends upon Syrian, his teacher, and Plato for his interpretation\textsuperscript{78}. Moreover, the Parmenides as interpreted by Syrian is his single most important source\textsuperscript{79}. It should be stressed that Proclus's interpretation is not consistent, and at times contradicts Parmenides's own words.

According to Proclus Syrian understood the Parmenides to be a serious attempt on Plato's part to examine (metaphysically) the whole of reality as a product of the One\textsuperscript{80}. The great respect shown Parmenides by Plato, evident in several dialogues, explains his taking the lead in the Parmenides, since he had himself had investigated 'what really is'\textsuperscript{81}. (In similar fashion, the physicist Timaeus is the central character in Plato's eponymously named dialogue on the physical world.)\textsuperscript{82} Now, Parmenides's one being serves as the starting point for, not the content of, the first hypothesis, which is about the One\textsuperscript{83}. However, since Parmenides was aware of this 'one', discussed the seonce 'one' in the first part of his poem, and the third implicitly in the second, his role in the dialogue is unexceptionable\textsuperscript{84}. More specifically, in the first part he investi-
gated 'real being', the highest level of which ('being itself') he properly called 'one', since the One first manifests itself in or through this (in Parm 708.7-10, 1084.24-26, PT I 47.5). He also recognized that the noetic order was pluralistic and issued forth from this being itself; most of his critics failed to note this. Proclus even identifies Parmenides (presumably the dialogic charac-
er) with the stability (μονή) of the One, Zeno with the issuing forth (πρόοδος) of this into a plurality, and Socrates with the (intel-
lect's) turning back (ἐπιστροφή) the second upon the first (in Parm 712.32-713.5). As for the Doxa, Proclus does little more than men-
tion that Parmenides discoursed about the pluralistic, perceptible or opinable order in it.

The details of Proclus's interpretation are difficult to sort out. He expressly states that Parmenides, following a Pythagorean tradition, differentiated between a noetic and perceptible order; the two parts of his work, τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, treat of each order respectively. Further, while it is obvious that Parmenides posited a plurality in the perceptible order, it is clear that he did the same in the noetic order. The reasons for this claim, which Proclus finds clear, are in fact debatable. There seem to be four more or less distinct reasons. The first is that Proclus claims that Parmenides's predication of so many things of his one being proves that he was aware of its plurality. The second, adumbrated above, is Proclus's reading the doctrines of the Parmenides back into Parmenides. Since Plato formulates a three-
fold world order and accurately presents Parmenides's own doctrines
there, one can conclude that he too 'saw' this three-fold order\textsuperscript{90}. Proclus does insist that Parmenides failed to see that his being was not one in the absolute sense, although he had true unity in sight\textsuperscript{91}. Thirdly, Proclus quotes several verses from the \textit{Aletheia} to demonstrate that Parmenides was talking about 'many' and not 'one'; several of these quotations can scarcely bear the interpretation Proclus puts upon them\textsuperscript{92}. Since the majority of these quotations center on the sphere-simile of Parmenides, the \textit{Sophist}, particularly the part-whole argument, is the fourth source for Proclus's claim\textsuperscript{93}. Proclus quotes both criticisms in \textit{Plato's Theology}, and takes them not as a demonstration of Parmenides's error about the one, but rather as corroboration that Parmenides was actually talking about a derivative (\textit{πεμονωμός}) one (III.20 pp. 69.16-71.6).

There is no need to criticize or catalogue the inconsistencies of this interpretation, although a few remarks are in order. Despite Proclus's superzealousness in admitting Parmenides into the Neoplatonic fold, that there is a legitimate philosophical genealogy that runs from Parmenides to Neoplatonism is undeniable. There are clear dangers in reading too much of the history of Greek idealism into Parmenides, but no less clear dangers attend on ignoring the familial resemblances altogether. Secondly, the reputed 'Pythagorean connection' of Parmenides is not first found in Proclus, since it appears early in the doxographical tradition\textsuperscript{94}. Proclus gives an explanation of what the Pythagorean features in Parmenides are, not merely the bald statement that there are such.

Ammonius mentions Parmenides three times in his commentary on
De Interpretatione (CAG IV.5): 9.13, 133.18, 133.18 (28 A 30 = 133.16-23), 136.24. In the first, Parmenides's statement that being is one (ἐν εἷς τὸ δὲ) is cited as an example of an absurd supposition. The other two treat of Parmenides's timeless and unchanging 'is'; both are based on B 8.5, which Ammonius misquotes in 136.24-25. In the former, Parmenides is credited with having anticipated both Plato and Aristotle in declaring that among the gods there is neither time nor change. Ammonius states in the second that Parmenides declares that timeless being or 'is' (ἐστὶ) belongs to everything intelligible. The phrase ὁ μέγας Παρμενίδης (136.24-25), which appears in Sophist 237a4-5, is also found in Proclus, Damascius, and Simplicius.

Damascius mentions Parmenides some seven times in his Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis. Of importance for Simplicius's interpretation is Damascius's contention that Parmenidean being, which is a radical unity (I.131.3-6), is situated between the One and the pluralistic stage in intellect; it precedes all distinction (I.131.10-11) and issuing forth (I.67.21-26). Like Proclus (in Parm 1078.13-26), he takes Plato's criticism in Sophist 245a1-9, that Parmenidean being is not true unity, to mean that Parmenidean being is not the One, but rather has 'one' as an attribute (I.131.8-11).
Notes to Chapter III

1 Sextus Empiricus, *Adv Math* VII.111-114; cf. Tarán, pp. 17-31, on Sextus's allegorical interpretation. The remark of Plato (Sophist 242d4-5) that the Eleatic tribe began with Xenophanes or even someone earlier was taken up by Aristotle (Metaphysics A 986b21) and made history by Theophrastus; see J.B. McDiarmid, "Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes," *HSCP* 61 (1953), 119-120.


3 McDiarmid, pp. 129-133.

4 Harold Cherniss stresses the importance of examining Presocratic material in context, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore, 1935), pp. xi-xii.

5 Fuller references are to be found in his *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*, Vol. III Fasc. I of *Poetarum Graecorum Fragmenta*, ed. by Willamowitz-Moellendorff (Berlin, 1901) than in DK. His *Doxographi Graeci* contains the extant parts of Theophrastus's *Ἀπολογία τῶν Δῶρων* and all accounts deriving from it. But even the great Hermann Diels nods; according to J.H. Waszink he overlooked a reference in Tertullian to Parmenides's conception of sleep, Quinti Septimi Florenti *Tertulliani De Anima* (Amsterdam, 1947), 43.2, n ad loc. p. 462.

6 Cherniss for Aristotle, McDiarmid for Theophrastus.

7 The quotation of B 13 in *Symposium* is from the second part, but is not so noted by Plato. Further, in *Republic* V 476e7-480a13 and *Timaeus* 27d5-29e3 Parmenides's insistence that only being can be the object of knowledge, while the world of mortals is only a matter of opinion or seeming, is taken as axiomatic, but without mention of Parmenides.

8 Plato uses either τὸ νῦν, τῶν, or τὰ τῶν as synonymous with Parmenidean being:
75

Parmenides 128a8-b1  ὅπερ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι ἐν φής εἶναι τὸ πᾶν (cf. De Caelo 298b17-18)

Theaetetus 180e1-4  † ὅλον ἀκαίνητον τελέσει τῷ πάντι δύοι' εἶναι †... ὡς ἐν τῷ πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχειν χάραν ἐν ἕν κινεῖται.

Theaetetus 183a2-5  οὐ δὲ οὕτως λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν ... ἢ ἐν δυτικα Παρμενίδην

Sophist 242d4-6  τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικῶν ἔδνος ... ... ὡς ἐνός δυνός τῶν πάντων καλούμενον ...

Sophist 244b6-7  παρὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ πᾶν λεγοῦντων ὧν ὑπὲρ τὸν λέγουσι τὸ δυν.

9 In the Symposium (178b4-c2) Parmenides is cited along with Hesiod as authorities for Eros’s having been the first born of the gods; the same collocation is found in Aristotle (Metaphysics A 984b25-31), Plutarch (Amatorius 756F-757A), Stobaeus (Eclogae I.9.5-6), and Sextus (adv Math IX.7). However, Sextus follows Aristotle in interpreting Eros as an efficient cause. As for the meeting described in the Parmenides, the references are remarkably consonant in detail:

Parmenides 127b1-3  τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὐ μᾶλα ἢδη πρεσβύτητι εἶναι, σφῶρα ποιών, καλὸν δὲ κάγαθὸν

Parmenides 127c4-5  Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφῶρα νέον

Theaetetus 183a5-184a1  Παρμενίδης δὲ μοι φαίνεται ... συμπροσέχειγα γὰρ ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ πάννυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτητι

Sophist 217c4-6  οἷον ποτὲ καὶ Παρμενίδη χομένῳ ... λόγους παγκόσμιου παρεγενόμενον ἐγὼ νέος δὲ, ἐκείνου μᾶλλα δὴ τότε δυνός πρεσβύτου.


11 This is put in the mouth of the Eleatic Stranger (Sophist 241d3), who refers to Parmenides in fatherly terms twice (241d5, 242a1-2) and as 'great' once (237a4-5). The identity of the Stranger, who is announced to be of the school of Parmenides and Zeno (216a2-4), is un-
clear; similar sentiments are voiced by Socrates in the *Theaetetus* (183e4–6). Both the Stranger and Parmenides merit Homeric praise from Plato.

12 *Timaeus* 27d5–29d3; cf. 51d2–52d1. F.M. Cornford (Plato's *Cosmology* [London, 1937], pp. 28–30) notes that Plato's use of the word εἶναι "has a history going back to Parmenides and Xenophanes, and even Hesiod", and refers to B 8.60. He is content to refer the distinction between being/knowing — becoming/opinion to *Republic* VI (the divided line). A.E. Taylor (A *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* [Oxford, 1928], pp. 61–75) also sees the *Republic* (V 477 ff.) at issue, but nowhere mentions Parmenides.


14 29c7–d3. Translation from F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, p. 23. He notes that τὸν εἰλικτὸν μύδουν is similar to B 8.60 τὸν σοὶ ἐγὼ διάνοιξον πέντε φωτίζω and that B 8.61 ὡς οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃ τῆς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάβον could "possibly be assimilated to λόγους μηδέννος ἢ τούτον εἰλικτόν", p. 30 n 1. The phrase ψωσιν ἀνθρωπόν makes this a strong possibility.

15 The possibility that the Parmenidean elements in Plato's thought are by the time of the *Republic*, let alone the *Timaeus*, no longer felt as such but as wholly Platonic cannot be dismissed. Still, three late dialogues of critical import for Plato explicitly take up Parmenides's doctrines: the *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, and *Sophist*.

16 Bonitz (Index Aristotelicus [Berlin, 1870], 569b15–18) lists twenty-one passages in which Parmenides appears, and two possible references. Of the twenty-one six do not mention Parmenides by name, but all are securely attributed. In addition, there are two references to Parmenides in Pseudo-Aristotle *De Xenophane, Melisso, et Gorgia*.

17 As shown in Chapter II (pp. 35–36), Aristotle took Parmenides to task for assuming a single use of 'being' (*Physics* 185a20–b5, 186a24–25). To this passage should be added *Sophistical Refutations* 182b22–27 and especially *Metaphysics* N 1088b3 ff..

18 The two most important passages for Aristotle's interpretation of Parmenides are treated in Chapter II: *Metaphysics* A 986b17–987a2 (pp. 33–34) and *Physics* 184b25–187a11 (pp. 34–47).

128-138.

20. This fragment is so assigned by Ross, who follows Walzer: Aristotle's Fragmenta Selecta OCT (Oxford, 1958), ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ 9 (W 9), p. 77.


22. Mario Untersteiner (Parmenide: Testimoniae e Frammenti [Florence, 1958], p. 49 (pp. 221, 222-223)) briefly discusses the contrary views on this subject.

23. This version of the argument is by far the closest approximation to that of Parmenides in that here being is one because it is continuous and indivisible (a5-12); cf. B 8.22-25. However, the equation of non-being with void (τὸ κενὸν a3-4) suggests that Aristotle has Melissus rather than Parmenides in mind; cf. 30 B 7.7-10.

24. Κνυθηθαίοι 5' οὐκ ὄν δύνασθαι μὴ δύνασθαι κενοῦ κενοφρισμένου (a4-5); it is not clear that qualitative change requires void also.


26. 298b14-24. The phrase ὅλως ἀνειλον γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν (b15) reappears with slight variations in Aristotle and in other authors: Physics 191b12-13, Metaphysics A 984a31-b1, and e.g. Aeitus I.24 (DG 320all-13, b17-19). Cf. in Cael 556.3-560.10 and section V for a full treatment of this passage.


28. Besides the phrase αὐτὸ δὲν (a27), Plato is mentioned at a9.

29. However, at Metaphysics N 1088b35 ff. Aristotle says that Plato's refutation of Parmenides's dictum (οὐ γὰρ μὴντε τοῦτο ἄμεθ, εἶναι μὴ ἕστα στ. 7.1 = 1089a4 = Sophist 237a8, 258d2) was predicated on an old-fashioned misunderstanding. That is, the proof that non-being 'is' will only suffice to account for a plurality in number.

30. 191b31-33. Ross's interpretation is here followed, p. 496, n 31.
Cf. 28 B 6.4–9, where the goddess prevents Parmenides from following the way that erring mortals tread. However, at the beginning of this section (191a24–27) Aristotle uses identical language (ἐξετάσας οὖν ὁ θόν τις ἡ ἀλήθης οὗτος) to describe his predecessors' failure to make out the true nature of the substrate in change, a failure which led some of them to deny change altogether. The way they turned away from was that of Aristotle's philosophy.

185a20 ff., and Chapter II, pp. 35–36.

182b22–27. It is surprising that Aristotle refers to 'those who refute . . .' while he belongs to that group.


Aristotle usually presents Parmenides's principles as material causes; De Generatione et Corruptione 328b33–329a1, 330b7–15, 318a35–b7, and Physics 188a20–21, b33. In Metaphysics A 984b1–8 Parmenides is mentioned as perhaps having made out the efficient cause, and this for him would be fire.

However, in De Generatione et Corruptione 318b18–28 Aristotle sets forth the opinion of most people concerning coming to be; they equate being with what can be perceived, non-being with what cannot on the assumption that what is knowable is, but what is unknowable is not (for they think that sensation has the force of reason), (διδόσα τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμην θύ, τὸ δ' ἐγνώσεων μὴ δύ). He then contrasts this opinion with the truth (ματὰ ὤνος καὶ ματὰ ἀλήθειαν ἄλλης). At the least the passage has some verbal and conceptual affinities with Parmenides; it is possible that Parmenides is actually being paraphrased here. (He is mentioned several paragraphs above (318b7).) Cherniss, p. 116, deals with this passage but does not mention any similarities with Parmenides.

DK I.116 n 28.

978b8–10; cf. Sophist 244e4–5 and e6.

Physics 207a15–17. Aristotle equates the one being with τὸ ὑλόν, the whole of reality. Aristotle also quotes part of the same lines from Parmenides which are found in the Sophist and in the passage under consideration, μεσσοῦ οὐκομένες (Β 8.44).
Metaphysics A 987b21-25 may be the source here.

984b1-18 and 986b18-987a2, on which see McDiarmid, pp. 120-123.

Diogenes Laertius IX.22 (= DG 483.4). Alexander speaks of Parmenides as having travelled on two ways, the one in accordance with truth, the other opinion (in Metaphysica 31.7-14 = DG 482.8-13).

Alexander in Metaphysica (CAG I) 31.7-11 = DG 482.8-11: ὁς ἄδικον ἐστὶ τὸ πᾶν... ἐν τῷ πᾶν καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ σαμωσειδές ὑπολαμβάνειν.


Alexander in Metaphysica (= DG 482.10-12); cf. McDiarmid, pp. 121-122. At Metaphysics A 986b18-987a2 Aristotle states that the two-fold nature of Parmenides's philosophy arises from a distinction between reason or definition and perception, not truth and opinion.

Alexander in Metaphysica 31.7-14 (= DG 482.5-13) twice speaks of τὸ πᾶν.

A helpful schematization of the doxographers is to be found in W. Capelle, Die Vorsokratiker. Die Fragmente und Quellenbericht (Leipzig, 1935), foldout ad fin.

DG 553.5-7. The title φιλοκράτις is a virtual synonym for 'Presocratic'.

DG 564.19-25. The additional details are that the universe is: 1) like (ὁμοίοιον), not having space in it (cf. B 8.29-30 and Theaetetus 180e3-4); 2) motionless (ὁμίνητον); and 3) finite/limited (τετελεσμένον). The first two adjectives are found in Parmenides: 1) = B 8.22, 2) = B 8.26, 38. The third is not found, although a similar word (τετελεσμένον B 8.42) does appear.

He cites two works of Theophrastus, Ἁ Ἐπιστῶμ (IX.21) and τὰ Φυσικά (IX.22). The other five are: Sotion (IX.21), Timon (IX.23), Favorinus (IX.23 bis), Callimachus (IX.23), and Speusippus (IX.23). Though not mentioned Apollodorus is his source for the chronological data in IX.23. That Diogenes cites all these sources makes it impossible to determine from which he draws his quotations from Parmenides. Theophrastus may be the source for the quotations, since he
is the last one mentioned before the quotations.


53 DG 580.22-23, DG 581.1-2. Pseudo-Plutarch quotes a verse which is not found in any of the other immediately Theophrastean accounts to support his claim that Parmenides held that the universe was eternal and motionless: μόνον μουσώνης τε καὶ ἀπειμένης ή' ἀγένητον (DG 580.24 = B 8.4*).

54 DG 580.22-23; see LSR s.v. ὁλος, η, συν II.2.

55 Strictly speaking, Philoponus does use the Vetusta Placita, but his reports about Parmenides in in Phys do not draw on this work.

56 Diels prints in parallel columns the Epitome of Pseudo-Plutarch and Book I of Stobaeus's Eclogae in DG 268-444. See DG 141.2 for a comparison of passages relating to Parmenides in the doxographical tradition.

57 DG 284 bt 12-13. The attribution to Xenophanes of the unity and so forth of the universe is suspicious, although a glance at DG 140 shows that this attribution is universal in the tradition. The verse is: οὗλον μουσώνης τε καὶ ἀπειμένης ή' ἀγένητον (= B 8.4*). Theodoretus states that "some say that this verse is his". Cf. Pseudo-Plutarch DG 580.24.

58 DG 327b6-9. Theodoretus has a slightly different list here, but Parmenides is included (DG 327 bt). In light of DG 332.1-3 this extrapolation seems likely: Ξενοφάνης Παρμενίδης Μέλισσος ἀγένητον καὶ ἀδιάλογον καὶ ἀδιάφαρτον τὸν κόσμον.

59 DG 396b13-16. Diogenes also says that for Parmenides the senses were inaccurate (IX.22), and quotes B 7.3-5 as proof. Theodoretus (DG 170) says that Parmenides tried to corroborate Xenophanes's statement and thus showed that the criterion of the senses was false and in no way approached the truth: Ψευδής δὲ ἀπέσηκε τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὸ κριτήριον ἡκιστα λέγων ἐργινετικαῖα τοῦτο τῆς ἀληθείας.

60 DG 311 b26 n. Diels is unsure whether these verses were taken from the Placita or not (DG 313 bt n). That they are found in Plato, Aristotle, the compiler of De Xenophane, Melissos, et Gorgias, and Proclus makes it likely that they are stock lines or clichés.
D G 320all-13. With the exception of the mention of Zeno (11), this report is identical with Stobaeus’s (D G 320b17-19).

D G 169-174. He quotes long passages from the Theaetetus (152 d7-153a3 = PE XIII.4.1-2; 179a1-181a3 = PE XIII.4.3-7) and the Sophist (242c4-243a4 = PE XII.4.7-8, 245e6-246c4 = PE XIII.4.9-11) to illustrate how Plato traduced his predecessors. (PE = Praeparatio Evangelica, Vol. II of Eusebius Caesariensis Opera, ed. W. Dindorf [Leipzig, 1867]).

PE: 1) = XIV.3.9 (DG 169-170); 2) = XIV.2.5 καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνελώντας and XIV.16.13 οἷς δὴ τὰς ἀνυπομέν. . . διὸ μοῦ δεῖν πιστεύειν τῷ λόγῳ (cf. n 25 above) and XIV.17.1 (for which Eusebius relies on Aristocles’s On Philosophy); 3) = XIV.17.1 δέν χεῖσθαι οὐδὲν γε τὸ ὅν ἐν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἔτερον μὴ εἶναι, μηδὲ γεννᾶσθαι τι μηδὲ φθείρεσθαι, μηδὲ κυνείονται τὸ παράπον.

Irriso Gentilium Philosopherum 6 = DG 652.29-31. It is not clear which source in the doxographical tradition Hermias used, although the similarity of some of his remarks with those of Pseudo-Justinianus would point to Pseudo-Plutarch’s Epitome (DG 259-263).

Adv Col 1113F: οἱ μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν φησιν αἰσθήματα λέγειν ὁ Κολύτης: 1114D: ἀπλῶς φησὶν τάντα ἀναφεύγειν τῷ ἐν ὑποτίθεοθι τῶν Παρμενίδην.

Adv Col 1114E-F: ἢν οὖν ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὅντος τό ἐν εἰπ. λόγος οὐκ ἀναφεύγεις τῶν πολλῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν, ολλά δὴ καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ νοητόν διαφοράς.

Adv Math X.45-47; cf. n 4 above. In P. III.65 Sextus uses a similar pun: αἱ ἀνωτάτῳ περὶ κυνήσεως στάσεις.

Philolaus 3 lines (Adv Math VII.92); Pythagoreans 3 (VII.94 bis, 109); Xenophanes 4 (110); Parmenides 36 (111); Empedocles 3 (121), 3 (123), 2 (124), 7 (125) 20 total; Heraclitus approximately 12 ‘lines’ (123); Democritus approximately 15 lines (135-137), 8 (139-140), 3 (117) 24 total; Anaxagoras approximately 2 lines (140).

Adv Math VII.112-115. Tarán, pp. 17-31, rejects this allegorical explanation of the proem, and summarizes attempts by scholars to interpret is; he also argues against Sextus’s having a source for his interpretation, pp. 18-20.

Ontological considerations may have been omitted here because they are treated at length in the section on Gorgias, Adv Math VII.
65-89, especially 65-76.

71 DL IX.22.10-11: κριτήριον δὲ τὸν λόγον εἶπε· τὰς τε αἰσθήσεις μὴ ἀκομφές ὑπάρχειν. adv Math VII.111: τὸν δὲ ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τούτῃ τὸν ἀδιάπατον, ὑπέθετο κριτήριον, ἀποκτεὶ καὶ τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πίστεως (cf. 114 end). DL IX.22.6-8 = B 1,28-30, 13-15 = B 7.3-5; adv Math VII.111 = B 1.1-30, B 8.1-2; VII.112-4 is a recapitulation of phrases or lines from 111. That there are similarities is clear, but how one is to account for them is not. There are at least three possibilities: 1) that they arrived at their versions independently; 2) that Diogenes used Sextus's account; or 3) that they shared a common source. 1) seems the least likely, since both authors are noted for their lack of originality; but Tarán, pp. 18-20, argues for Sextus's allegorical interpretation being his own creation. 2) is possible both on chronological grounds and because Diogenes twice mentions Sextus (IX.87, 116); the difficulty here is that Sextus is not mentioned in Diogenes's treatment of Parmenides. 3) is, by default, the most likely. A possible common source is Sotion, who in turn made use of the Φοσσων Αδεσω: whether they followed him on Parmenides is questionable. For Sotion in Diogenes, see I.1, 7, 98; II.12, 74, 85; V.79, 86; VI.26, 80; VII.183; IX.5, 18, 20, nb 21, 110, 112, 115; X.1, 4. For Sotion in Sextus see adv Math VII.5.

72 For Aristotle see Metaphysics A 983b ff., and Cherniss, pp. 218-288. Plotinus discusses Parmenides at V.1.8 and mentions him in passing in VI.6.18.42-43. He cites several verses of Parmenides without mentioning their author; see Index Fontium in Plotini Opera III, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwzyzer (Paris/Brussels/Leiden, 1973), p. 448. Plotinus distinguishes between the historical Parmenides, who was still searching for the Plotinian system (so the conative imperfects ἔπτετο (14), συνήγε (17), ἐτίητο (17), and εἰσχεν (23)) and his dialogic counterpart in Plato (23-24) who clearly made it out.
H.-R. Schwzyzer ("Plotinos" RE I.41, col. 572) thinks that Plotinus did not read the Presocratics.

73 V.1.8.10-14. E.R. Dodds ("The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the neoplatonic 'one'," Co 27 (1928), 129-142, esp. 132-133) has shown that Plotinus drew on the Parmenides of Plato for his doctrine of the One. In this section, Plotinus quotes from or refers to two Platonic epistles (2 and 6), the Phaedo, Timaeus, Republic, and the Parmenides as evidence (μπορουμενος 12); cf. notes ad loc. in Plotini Opera, ed. by Henry-Schwzyzer OCT, vol. 2, pp. 197-198.

74 This same verse (B 3), with minor modifications, is cited in two other passages, I.4.10.6 and III.8.8.8. Of the first A.H. Armstrong (Plotinus, The Loeb Classical Library [London and Cambridge, 1966], vol. 1, pp. 198-199 n 1) states, "what Parmenides may actually
have meant by these lines is irrelevant here", and refers to V.1.8. 17.

75 V.1.4.35-37: δει δὲ καὶ κύνησιν λαβεῖν καὶ στάσιν. καὶ κύνησιν μὲν, εἰ νοεῖ . . . . Further, sameness and difference are necessary conditions for thought, V.1.4.33-34, 37-41.

76 V.1.8.18-22. Plotinus's interpretation of the sphere-simile may be a direct criticism of Plato's literal-mindedness in Sophist 24432-245d11, esp. 244e2-8.

77 As noted above (n 73), Plato is in evidence throughout the passage, and his distinction between these 'ones' in the Parmenides is mentioned directly after this criticism is noted.

78 Many of Proclus's extant works are commentaries on Platonic dialogues (see L.J. Rosán, The Philosophy of Proclus: The Final Phase of Ancient Thought [New York, 1949], pp. 36-59). It seems that the high regard in which Parmenides was held by Plato (a matter which he mentions often) is used by Proclus to justify making Parmenides into a Neoplatonist.

It is possible that Proclus drew on the doxographical tradition. A verbal parallel between in Tim I.345.23-346.1 (λέγει δ' οὖν καὶ οὖς δ' οὖς καὶ διαφοράς ἐς διαφοράς πράξεις, οὖς καὶ μὴ οὖς, διαφοράς εἶναι τὰς γνώσεις) and DL IX.22 (= DC 483.3-4) (διαφοράς τ' ἔσσε τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφία συμφωνεῖν τὴν μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ δόξαν) may not be wholly fortuitous; both quote from the end of B 1 to corroborate their claims. Further, both mention the sillographer, Timon, who composed verses about both Parmenides and Zeno (IX.5, cf. 23; in Parm 632.18, 638.25).

79 Strictly speaking, Syrian's interpretation, at least for the analysis into nine-hypothesis, is indebted to other exeges, including Plotinus; see PT I. LXXV-LXXXIX, esp. LXXXVIII. At one point, however, Proclus states that he is following Syrian, who 'speaks with the greatest degree of truth' (in Parm 1033.20).

Proclus does not always distinguish among the three 'Parmenides' in his works; these are, P = the historical Parmenides (whom he sometimes refers to as the 'Parmenides in verse'), P2 = the character in the dialogue, and P3 = the dialogue itself. Since Proclus denies that P1 is being parodied in P3 as P2, but rather insists that P2 faithfully reflects the doctrines of P1 and that P3 is a serious work, there is ample room for confusion. Cousin's edition of in Parm has a very brief index which only refers to Parmenides's poem; it is quite possible that I have missed a reference to P1, though it is likely that all the major references have been located.

Parmenides's one being, which was equated with the (unified) intelligible order, was presumably discussed at some length in the
commentary on the second hypothesis (142b5-155d1; see PT I. LXIX, CLXXVIII, pp. 46-59, III.XL-I; further III.LXXVIII-XCIV and IV. XLIV-LXIII on Damascius's interpretation of the second hypothesis), but since this does not survive, recourse must be had to references in the commentary on the first hypothesis and other works by Proclus. There are some scholia on the second hypothesis (in Parm 1257-1287), but no clear mention of P1 is found in them.

80 The purpose or goal (σκόπος, Βούλησις) of the Parmenides is examined at length at in Parm 630.15-640.19; Syrian's views appear at 640.20-645.9. A recapitulation of both is found in PT I.8-12, esp. 9-11, pp. 30-58. Further, Syrian's (and other nameless interpreters') interpretation of P1's role in the dialogue appears at in Parm 1032.15-1036.23.


82 in Tim I.13-4-14.3, especially 13.11-14, where Proclus says that the Parmenides and Timaeus are properly named after the men who investigated these two parts of reality: Τιμάω τε γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῷ γένεια περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ἐγέρατο φύσεως, καὶ Παρμενίδης δὲ περὶ τῶν όντως οὕτως.

83 in Parm 639.38-640.16. Proclus dwells on the fact that the first hypothesis is framed in a negative or apophatic mode and this is fitting for a transcendent One. At 1032.15-1036.15 Proclus, following Syrian, argues that Parmenides's one being is an assumption or hypothesis used to arrive at the unhypothesized One (this dialectical technique is ascribed to the Republic (VI 510B, according to Cousin)). The one being is closest to the One, and therefore affords the most economical hypothesis for arriving at the One; once this is reached, the generation of the whole of reality can proceed, the remaining eight hypotheses dealing with successively lower rungs on the ontic ladder. The second hypothesis, which deals with the noetic or intelligible realm (PT I; summary of Chapter 12, CLXXVIII-IX), is framed in a positive or assertoric mode; Parmenides asserted many things of his one, which is not the true One but a derivative 'one' (in Parm 1079.5-14).

84 That is, he was aware of all three 'ones'; see in Parm 1034. 37-1035.5. That he was aware of the first, or 'unshared' one is related at in Parm 1079.7-9, and at 1033.9-18 Proclus mentions (in his survey of various opinions about Parmenides in the Parmenides) the possibility that Parmenides actually talked about this One with Zeno, insofar as it could be verbalized at all, in conversations
that were not written down. As for the second, see in Parm 710.11-16 and 704.6-18. The third 'one' is not ascribed to the Doxa by Proclus, but since it represents the hypostasis of soul for Proclus and is the subject of the third hypothesis of the Parmenides on his account, the ascription is not unwarranted; see PT I p. 49.5-7.

85 in Parm 708.7-709.6. Parmenides, according to Proclus, saw that being itself was removed from all things and was the most sublime of things that are, although he did not fail to notice that the intelligible order was pluralistic; Proclus quotes B 8.25, 5.1-2, and B 8.44 as proof. He concludes that Parmenides observed that the whole noetic realm issued forth from the one being, and that it derives its unity from or around it. Proclus is clearly working the sphere-simile hard (708.20-29, 36-40). Furthermore, Parmenides gave being the honorary title 'one', not because he failed to see that being is many, but rather to indicate the unity of derivation of 'all things that are' from being itself (708.40-709.6). For the widespread failure to see this, see in Parm 710.15-26, 711.13-16, and especially 721.33-723.11, 20-724.12.

86 His references to the Doxa are found at: in Parm 723.15-20, 1024.10-12, in Tim I.252.-4, 345.12-346.3 (cf. II.69.20-27).

87 in Parm 1024.10-12. Here Parmenides is cited with other philosophers who have, as it were, public and private doctrines (6-12); he is mentioned here after, but not with the Pythagoreans (7). Empedocles is said to be a Pythagorean as well (723.15-20); he like Parmenides thought that the whole noetic order was a sphere (22-26). See in Tim II.69.20-27, where Empedocles's 'two-fold' sphere has both a noetic and perceptible part (cf. in Tim I.251.33-252.4).

88 in Parm 723.15-20. The clarity is mentioned at 709.2-3.

89 in Parm 1077.23-1079, 1084.24-30; cf. 1134.20-1135.5. This claim on Proclus's part is integral to his interpretation of the role which P² plays in P³; viz. that he is not being parodied, but rather has his doctrines accurately reported and incorporated into the dialogue, especially in the second hypothesis.

90 This reading back of (a Neoplatonic) Plato into Parmenides must have gradually developed out of Plotinus's remarks on Parmenides in Enneads V.1.8 and his conception of the Parmenides; see PT I.LXXV-LXXXIX and in Parm 1032.15-1033.20.

91 in Parm 1079.7-9: ἀπεκφάνετο δ' εἰς τὸ ἐν ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ μόνον καὶ οἷς ἄξις πεπονάσθη τὸ ἐν.
92. In Parm 708.12-20:

1) ἐστὶ γὰρ ἔντι πελάτες (8 8.25)

2) ἔστιν δὲ μοὶ ἐστὶν ὑποδέχεται ἡμέρα, τὸ δὲ γὰρ πάλιν ἔστιν ἔνθες (8 5.1-2)

3) μεσοδέχεται ἀποκλεῖς (8 8.44)

These three lines are quoted as proof that Parmenides actually posited a plurality in the noetic or intelligible order. 1) is not convincing, particularly in light of Plotinus's having quoted it to demonstrate the opposite thesis, VI.4.4.23-26. Proclus apparently takes 2) to be referring to the sphere-simile of which 3) is a partial quotation. Further, at in Parm 1084.24-36 Proclus maintains that Parmenides portrayed 'real' being as a sphere, and that this is appropriate since the sphere and the intellect are properly intelligible, whereas the monad and perceptible order are 'spherical' in only an analogical way.

93. Proclus is fond of this simile. It appears at in Parm 665.28-29, 708.12-20, 1084.26-29, 1129.31-32, in Tim II.69.20-21, and PT II.20 p. 70.6-10 (Proclus here quotes B 8.43-45 apud Plato's Sophist), and IV.38 p. 110.20. He takes the sphere to represent the whole (πᾶν) noetic order as a sum (ὅλον) of parts; he concludes from the simile and the critique arising from it by the Eleatic Stranger that Parmenides was aware that this order is pluralistic (see in Parm 1078.21-1079.26).

94. DL IX.21 (Sotion). See in Parm 619.4-10 (28 A 4).

95. See H. Diels, Philosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta, p. 65 n 5.

96. De Providentia 2.16, in Parm 689.8; Dubitationes et Solutiones I.214.3; in Phys 650.14.

97. Αριστοτέλη καὶ λύσεις περὶ τῶν πρῶτων ἁρχῶν εἰς τὸν Παρμενίδην, ed. C.A. Ruelle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1889): I.16.6, 67.24, 131.8; II.146.5-6. Ruelle also lists as Loci non reperti I.214.3, 274.21, 275.20. Damascius 'quotes' the following verses: B 4.2 (= I.67.23), B 8.24 (= II.146.5), B 8.25 (= I.131.7); B 8.48-49 may be intended in I.214.3.
Chapter IV: Simplicius on Parmenides

Simplicius’s overall view of the role which the Presocratics play in the history of Greek philosophy must be considered in order that due weight be given to his comments on Parmenides. A brief summary of his interpretation of Parmenides will follow. The remainder of the chapter takes up all the passages in Simplicius which treat of Parmenides. These passages have been translated (Appendix A) and parcelled into nine sections: I. Biographical Information; II. Obscurity of Doctrine, Poetry; III. Overall Discussions of Parmenides; IV. The Aletheia; V. The Doxa; VI. Parmenides’s Argument for the Unity of Being; VII. Plato on Parmenides; VIII. Aristotle on Parmenides; IX. Others on Parmenides. For all nine sections a detailed list of passages and a summary of their contents are provided. Commentary is provided for the first five. Appendix B contains a list of the verses of Parmenides quoted by Simplicius, and Appendix C contains the verses proper with variant readings from CAG VII and IX. Appendix D is an abbreviated Index Locrum.

In the course of his elucidation of Aristotle’s analytical scheme of the principles of the physicists, Simplicius digresses somewhat to demonstrate that for all their seeming diversity those who investigate physics do not contradict one another (in Phys 28.32–37.9). Simplicius’s immediate concern is to silence certain unnamed Christians who criticize physicists on this score, but he subse-
quently uses part of this demonstration to answer Aristotle and Plato on Parmenides. The general scheme of this harmonization is diairetic; that is, he introduces several distinctions which explode any prima facie contradictions (in Phys 30.13-14, 36.15-20). The most important of these is the distinction he draws between those who explained all things on the basis of material or elemental principles alone with those who distinguished physical from metaphysical phenomena and ascribed distinct principles to each order (in Phys 6.31-7.15, 21.13-19). For example, although Thales and Parmenides each has a different 'one cause of things', they do not contradict one another because each is concerned with a different order of reality (in Phys 36.8-15). Further, the Eleatics, or more properly Parmenides and Melissus, do not deny change in the physical world when they deny it in the metaphysical order; on the contrary, they are in accord with all the other physicists on this point (in Phys 36.20-25).

Four questions remain to be resolved: how to reconcile the evident differences as to the number and kind of principles adduced for physics proper; similarly with the principles of metaphysics; what is the precise relation between these two sets; and finally how to account for the widespread failure to see the distinction which Simplicius draws. The last has a straightforward, if unsatisfactory, answer. The riddling nature (αὐνοματώδης) of the expressions of the Eleatics, Pythagoreans, and others misled most people (in Phys 7.1-3, 21.14-19). He also maintains that Aristotle and Plato at times set
forth only the apparent meanings of Presocratic doctrines on behalf of those who, because of their superficial understanding, were misled by the obscurity of the Presocratics (in Phys 21.19-20, 37.6-7, in Cael 557.19-20).

As for the principles of physics, Simplicius distinguishes between those who employed only material or elemental principles and those who used non-elemental principles as well (in Phys 7.19-27, 36.15-19). This distinction appears to be based on a Peripatetic contrast between principles or causes proper, namely the efficient and final, and the subsidiary causes, matter and form (in Phys 3.15-19; cf. 1.12, 7.10-15, 259.1-15). Simplicius gives it a Neoplatonic twist by ascribing the first two to the noetic order, the second pair to the phenomenal. Within the class of material or elemental principles he makes a distinction between the proximate (προσχεκές) and the more fundamental (ἀρχαλοδέσποτον); the former are, e.g. fire, air, and water, the latter form-matter and geometrical figures (in Phys 7.19-27, 36.15-17). Further, of those who embraced proximate principles some had a partial, others a more comprehensive view. Thus Heraclitus championed fire as the one principle, while Empedocles identified all four elements (in Phys 36.8-20). Simplicius also asserts that the physicists are in fundamental agreement with Aristotle on the nature of change; that there is some material substrate which underlies some polar opposites of change (in Phys 36.20-24, 188.13-16; 188b30-189a1). Simplicius in sum attempts to 'distinguish' away seeming contradictions as well as point out
common grounds among the physicists.

The two remaining questions can be treated summarily at present, for both will reappear in the course of Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides. It has already been noted that the two metaphysical principles are the efficient and final causes, although the paradigmatic cause of Plato constitutes a third. Simplicius allows a heterogenous group of entities to be efficient causes and to operate over different domains. Anaxagoras's νοῦς is an efficient cause which operates both in the noetic and phenomenal orders, although in the former par excellence (in Phys 7.3-10, 34.18-35.21, 156.13-157.16). Empedocles' νεῖκος and Φιλότητις are both efficient causes which operate in both orders (in Phys 31.18-34.17). Parmenides's οίκου is the efficient cause of the phenomenal order, its status in the noetic left unspecified (in Phys 31.10-17, 34.12-17, 39.12-20). Plato's divine intellect is the efficient cause of the phenomenal order, and its goodness is the final cause also (in Phys 7.17-19).

Although Aristotle makes nature itself an efficient cause, it is so only proximately; in the end it is parasitic upon his unmoved mover (in Phys 8.6-9).

Simplicius argues at length that Parmenides's one being as the intelligible is the final cause (in Phys 142.28-148.24). Moreover, Aristotle's prime or unmoved mover, which Simplicius takes as both the efficient and final cause par excellence, is based on this one being (in Phys 87.7-17; cf. 8.6-9).

Several observations are in order. The first is that Simplici-
cius in effect fuses the Peripatetic with the Neoplatonic version of the history of philosophy to produce his own account (in Phys 6.31-8.15; cf. Metaphysics A 981b17 ff.). Aristotle’s scheme of the inexorable discovery of the four causes, begun by his predecessors and culminating in his own philosophy, is the basis of subsequent Peripatetic accounts (Chapter III, pp. 61-65). The Neoplatonic version is parallel, in that a rather haphazard discovery of the three hypostases is assumed; Plato, however, marks the culmination of this process (in Phys 7.11-15). Simplicius apparently holds that the discovery of material or elemental causes belies an awareness of the third hypostasis, or phenomenal world. The discovery of the metaphysical causes is tantamount to an awareness of the second, possibly the first, hypostasis. He credits Plato with the full discovery and articulation of all four Aristotelian causes, the realization that the two sets belong to the different orders, and with introducing the paradigmatic cause into the noetic order (in Phys 7.11-15). Aristotle is consigned to a minor role. His contribution lies in advances in logic, which enabled him to formulate more cogent proofs than his predecessors (in Phys 7.16-8.15).

Throughout his commentary on Physics I Simplicius appears untroubled by several differences or contradictions which do not yield to his method of reconciliation, as well as by what is a strained notion of what constitutes a full-blooded contradiction. That is, what does Simplicius think the truth about physics is? Paradoxical as it may sound, the answer is that he thinks that there is no ul-
timate or absolutely certain truth to physics. Following a doctrine of the *Timaeus* (27c8–d2, 59c5–7), he holds that the best one can do is produce a likely account (εἰσωτολογία) (in *Phys* 18.29–34). If there is no objective standard of truth, once absolute logical contradictions are eliminated, the disparate accounts that remain are equally valid.

Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides centers on the cardinal distinction stated above: that he distinguished the noetic from the phenomenal order and treated each in the *Aletheia* and *Doxa* respectively. Moreover, the majority of Simplicius's comments and quotations are designed to prove that in the *Aletheia* Parmenides was speaking of the metaphysical or noetic order exclusively. The felt need for this proof arises primarily from Aristotle's criticism of Parmenides in *Physics* I. This criticism consists of two parts: that Parmenides's denial of the physical world is patently absurd, and that his doctrine of the unity of being is incoherent. Simplicius replies that Parmenides did not deny the physical order or world of change, but rather formulated an account of nature that accords, even prefigures that of Aristotle. Further, since Aristotle seemingly denied the reality of the noetic order, he failed to appreciate Parmenides's articulation of that order. His first cause or unmoved mover in fact is derived from Parmenides's one being.

Not only did Parmenides conceive of the noetic order, but appreheended it in its most sublime manifestation, the intelligible
(τὸ νοητὸν) or final cause. He speaks in the *Aletheia* of the συνημένη νοητῇ ἕως, the absolute unity of the noetic order prior to its being parcelled into (logically) discrete entities in the intellectual stage (τὸ νοερόν). It represents the stage where νοῦς and its content or object (τὸ νοητὸν) are identical. That Parmenides apprehended this stage of the noetic order serves as the cornerstone of Simplicius's reply to Plato's criticism in the *Sophist*. These would have force if Parmenides had been speaking about the differentiated or intellectual stage, which corresponds to the Forms.

Parmenides was to some extent aware of the first hypostasis as well.

In the *Doxa* Parmenides set forth as elemental principles fire and night, and as efficient cause or principle the ὀὐλίμων. Simplicius has little to say about the status of the ὀὐλίμων. His conviction that Parmenides discussed the two parts of Platonic reality in the two parts of his poem makes the relation of the two parts a non-problem for him.

Lastly, Simplicius maintains that despite their criticisms, both Plato and Aristotle were aware of the profundity of Parmenides's thought.
I. Biographical Information.

A. Passages.

**in Phys**  7.1  Tr. p. 278
**in Phys**  22.24 - 25  Tr. p. 282

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<tr>
<th>DK</th>
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<tr>
<td>22.24 - 25</td>
<td>482.7, 14</td>
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<td>22.26 - 30</td>
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<td>28 A 20</td>
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**in Phys**  28.4 - 6  Tr. p. 285

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**in Phys**  99.13 - 14  Tr. p. 329

**in Cael**  556.25 - 30  Tr. p. 398

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**in Cat**  4.2  Tr. p. 407


**in Phys**  99.9 - 10

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B. Summary, Comments.

Simplicius by and large omits biographical details for all the
Presocratics, and culls most of his information about Parmenides from
Theophrastus's Φιλοσοφῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου via Alexander (see DC 102-118, esp.
113). Insofar as he undertakes to harmonize the doctrines of the
physicists, detailed life histories would be otiose. Moreover,
this harmonization rests ultimately on the assumption that the
doctrines of Neoplatonism are truths, the apprehension of which
transcends temporal and geographical boundaries. All the same there
is one striking omission.1

The biographical information Simplicius does relate is: 1) that
Parmenides was the son of Pyres, and was from Elea (in Phys 22.24-
25, in Cat 4.2); 2) that he was the pupil of Xenophanes of Colophon
(in Phys 7.1, 22.27-29); 3) Empedocles of Acrages emulated him and
was his disciple (in Phys 25.20-21); 4) Leucippus partook of his
(and Xenophanes's) philosophy, but adopted a contrary doctrine (in
Phys 28.4-6); 5) Zeno was Parmenides's companion (in Phys 99.13-14);
(Simplicius frequently refers to or quotes from the introductory
portion of the Parmenides, where Zeno is portrayed as coming to
Parmenides's aid against scoffing objectors (in Phys 99.9-10, 102.28-
31, 134.4-9, 138.19-22, 24-25, 141.8-11).); 6) he entitled his work

C. Commentary.

in Phys 7.1. This is the converse of in Phys 22.27-29. In section
II the riddling nature (ἀνώτατον 7.3) of Parmenides's philosophy
will be discussed.

_in Phys_ 22.24 - 25. The full name, Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης, is attested elsewhere in the doxographical tradition: _DG_ 284^bt_13, 590.

18. Cf. 28 A 2 (Suidas).

_in Phys_ 27 - 29. That Parmenides was Xenophanes's pupil or companion, is found in the doxographical tradition at: _DG_ 284^bt_13, 482.14, 580.5, 601.8 (problematic); cf. 28 A 2. See _DG_ 141-2 for a conspectus of these and other passages relating to Parmenides. (The whole tradition probably is based mediately on _Metaphysics_ A 986b22 (= 28 A 6) and ultimately on _Sophist_ 242d4–6.

_in Phys_ 25.20 - 21. Diels allows (_DG_ 477.18 n) that the report that Empedocles was the emulator of Parmenides derives from Theophrastus, on the basis of Diogenes Laertius VII.55 = 28 A 9. He thinks that the mention of Empedocles's following the Pythagoreans is not by Theophrastus, but rather by Simplicius himself. If he is the source, he implicitly denies the 'Pythagorean connection' of Parmenides which Proclus maintains.

_in Phys_ 28.4 - 6. Diels (67 A 8 n 34) sees this 'participating' (κοινωνίας) as occurring through the intermediacy of Zeno, the reputed teacher of Leucippus. Cf. Diogenes Laertius IX.30 = 28 A 8.

_in Phys_ 99.13 - 14. In addition to (or more appropriately in de-
dependence on) Plato's Parmenides Zeno's relation to Parmenides is variously related; cf. 29 A 1, 2, 4, 7, 10. In the doxographical tradition he is not explicitly stated as being Parmenides's pupil or successor; the tradition on his successor is inconsistent (DG 581.5-6, 590.20-23, 601.8-9).
II. Obscurity of Doctrine, Poetry.

A. Passages.

\textit{in Phys} 7.3 \hspace{2cm} \textit{Tr.} p. 278
\textit{in Phys} 21.19 \hspace{2cm} \textit{Tr.} p. 280
\textit{in Phys} 36.30 - 31 \hspace{1cm} \textit{Tr.} p. 292
\hspace{2.7cm} \textit{28 A 9}

\textit{in Phys} 120.27 - 29 \hspace{2cm} \textit{Tr.} p. 345
\textit{in Phys} 144.26 - 27 \hspace{2cm} \textit{Tr.} p. 370
\hspace{2.7cm} \textit{28 A 21}

\textit{in Phys} 146.29 - 147.1 \hspace{1cm} \textit{Tr.} p. 371
\hspace{2.7cm} \textit{28 A 20}

\textit{in Cael} 558.17 - 19 \hspace{2cm} \textit{Tr.} p. 400

Related Passages.

\textit{in Phys} 30.4
31.3
116.7
117.2
(140.23)
146.6

B. Summary, Comments.

Simplicius adduces the obscurity or riddling nature of the expressions of the ancients in order to harmonize all those who investigated nature and to neutralize the criticism by Plato and Aristotle
of various Presocratics. In addition he takes an antiquarian de-
light in quoting from the Presocratics in order to counteract the
widespread ignorance of and misunderstandings about them that arise,
in part, from this obscurity. In the case of Parmenides, largely
because he employed a poetic medium, reports of obscurity go back
to Plutarch (see 28 A 13-21). It is possible that Simplicius draws
on some of these reports, those of Proclus being likely candidates,
but the evidence is slender.

More particularly, Simplicius holds that: 1) the ancients were
accustomed to express themselves in a riddling way (in Phys 36.30-
33); 2) the Pythagoreans, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles, and
Anaxagoras distinguished the physical from the metaphysical, but
their obscure or riddling speech misleads most people that they did
so (in Phys 7.3, 21.18-19); 3) Parmenides expressed his doctrines
less clearly than did Melissus, who wrote in prose (in Cael 558.17-
19; cf. in Phys 31.3-7); 4) Aristotle and Plato sometimes refute
only seeming absurdities or the apparent meaning in their predeces-
sors' doctrines on behalf of those of ordinary or superficial under-
standing (in Phys 21.20, 36.28-37.2, 6; in Cael 557.19-20); 5) in
some cases their apparent refutations are merely clarifications of
what was obscurely stated (in Phys 37.3-4); 6) Parmenides's simile
of the well-rounded sphere is not to be literally interpreted, but
rather ascribed to poetic fiction (in Phys 146.29-147.1); 7) the
terseness (βροχυλογία) of the ancients, and of Parmenides in partic-
ular, did not accommodate the formulation of such a distinction as
that between substance and accident, but does not rule out their
having been aware of the distinction itself (in Phys 120.27-29).

C. Commentary.

_in Phys_ 7.3. αἰνηγαμώδης. The adverbial form is used at _in Phys_
36.30; cf. 8.9-11.

_in Phys_ 21.18 - 19. Empedocles and Anaxagoras are omitted in a
similar passage in _in Phys_ 7.3. The word ἀκροατικά (cf. _in Phys_ 37.3-
4 for its adverbial counterpart) may be a reminiscence of Proclus
_in Tim_ I.345.12 ὁ δὲ τε παραμενών, καίτοι διὰ ποίησιν ἀκρατικὸν ὄν.

_in Phys_ 36.30 - 31. Cf. note to 7.3 above. Simplicius refers to
the Presocratics (or more properly the 'Preplatonics') by both the
phrases οἱ ἀκροατοί and οἱ παλαιοί (cf. _in Phys_ 120.29 for the former).
As Diels notes (n 31), Simplicius erroneously applies what Plato
says about Heraclitus to Parmenides (36.31-32).

_in Phys_ 37.3 - 4. Cf. note to 21.18-19 above. Plato and Aristotle
are the ὁτοί in 37.2. Simplicius is trying to explain away the
seeming refutation by them of the Presocratics on several grounds,
one of which is that they are in reality clarifying what is unclear-
ly stated. Another is that that they fasten on the apparent meaning
of their doctrines on behalf of the superficial (36.28-30, 37.6,
21.20).
in Phys 120.27 - 29. The rule (καὶ αὐτὸν 27, καὶ ἄλλων 28) which Simplicius mentions is that on the basis of the substance-accident distinction a thing can be both one and many simultaneously. At 20-27 he argues that Parmenides was (implicitly) aware of such a distinction with respect to his one being. This is in answer to Eudemus, who claims that Parmenides was misled because he was unaware of this sort of distinction, of ambiguity, and of syllogistic thought (120.6-11; cf. 115.16-116.4 for a fuller quotation).

in Phys 144.26 - 27. Simplicius speaks of Parmenides’s verses in several other passages (in Phys 30.4, 31.13, 116.7, 117.2, (140.3), 146.6). Parmenides is sometimes distinguished from the Platonic dialogue named after him by Proclus, Damascius, and Ammonius as 'the Parmenides in verse' (e.g. ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσεν Παρμενίδης Dubit. et Sol. I.131.8); further in Damascius II.146.5-6. For Proclus cf. in Parm 665.18, 1129.36, 1177.12-13, PT I.9. p 37.6. For Ammonius cf. in De Interpretatione 133.18-19. Simplicius uses the same phrase, ὁ μέγας Παρμενίδης (in Phys 650.14), that is found in Proclus (De Providentia 4.16), Damascius (Dubit. et Sol. I.214.3 and perhaps I.24. 14-15), and Plato (Sophist 237a4-5).

in Phys 146.29 - 147.1. That the sphere-simile is not to be taken literally is directed at Plato, who in the Sophist (244e2-245e2) does so. At in Phys 51.21-53.7 Simplicius applies Aristotle’s disparaging remark about Melissus, that when one absurdity is granted
others necessarily follow, to Plato's literal interpretation of these lines.

_in Cael_ 558.17 - 19. Simplicius states that Melissus, since he wrote in prose, set forth the distinction between being proper and 'seeming' being more clearly than Parmenides. Cf. 559.12-13, section V, and _in Phys_ 31.3-7.
III. Overall Discussions of Parmenides.

A. Passages.

*in Phys* 28.32 - 31.17  Tr. pp. 286-289

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<td>31.13 - 17</td>
<td>B 12.2-6</td>
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*in Phys* 37.12 - 40.21  Tr. pp. 294-298

| 38.30 - 39.9 | B 8.50-59 | 38.28 - 39.9 = 234.18-20 |
| 39.14-16 | B 12.1-3 | 39.12-16 = 242.5-7 |
| 39.27 - 40.1 | B 8.26-28 |
| 40.3-6 | B 8.30-33 |

*in Phys* 37.12-15, 22-38.1 = Alexander *in Physica* (185b15-16)

38.20-24  Cf. *DG* 482 n 10 (fr. 6)

40.12-15  = 30 B 7.7

40.18-21  = 30 B 7.7-9
B. Summary, Comments.

The two continuous passages listed above are treated separately from the following sections largely for convenience's sake. Once the overall scheme of Simplicius's interpretation is set forth, his remarks on specific topics may be better understood. In addition, both passages are found early in Book I, and those which follow by and large corroborate or supplement these.

Simplicius maintains that in the *Aletheia* Parmenides discourses about intelligible being as the final cause or principle of all existent things, while in the *Doxa* he sets forth two opposite, materio-elemental principles, light and night, and an efficient cause, the divinity, for things that come to be. Moreover, Alexander to the contrary, the *Doxa* is not totally false; since it treats of what is opinable, it lacks the absolute certainty and truth that attach to what is noetic. As part of his plan to harmonize all the physicists Simplicius asserts that in the *Doxa* Parmenides's account of change is in accord with that of Aristotle and everyone else.

To reconcile the seemingly contradictory statements of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus on the intelligible principle, he introduces two distinctions: that Xenophanes apprehended the One, Parmenides the intelligible; that since Melissus's claim that the one being is infinite applies to time only, he is in accord with Parmenides on its being finite.

Simplicius does not dwell on the relation between the *Aletheia* and the *Doxa*. Like Plutarch, he simply finds the Platonic analysis
of reality into what is perceptible and what is noetic articulated in Parmenides². Of Neoplatonic origin is the further tripartite subdivision of the noetic order; the equation of Parmenides's one being with the first of these, the intelligible (τὸ ὑοτόν), appears to be Proclus's contribution³.

C. Commentary.

28.32-29.5. οὐ ... συμφέρονταί. It is likely that Philoponus is the target of these disparaging remarks (cf. Index Nominum s.v. 'Ioannes Philoponus' CAG X pp. 1447-1448, CAG VII p. 771). Simplicius censures him for fastening upon the contradictory statements of ancient philosophers concerning the heavens (in Cael. 139.27-140.3; cf. 136.26-27, in Phys 640.12-14). On Simplicius's contempt for Christians cf. in Cael. 370.31-371.4.

29.5-6. καὶ ... διεξέχθησαν. Parmenides is included among those who distinguished physics from metaphysics and ascribed different principles to each order (cf. in Phys 6.31-7.3, 21.15-19). Simplicius sometimes says that Parmenides was investigating the principle or cause of the noetic order proper (as here and at in Phys 29.18), or of all being (in Phys 38.12, 45.28-32, 87.8-9, 144.12, 147.13), sometimes the noetic order itself, whether in its unified, intelligible stage (in Phys 34.18 ff, 38.11-12, 136.28-29) or in contradiction to the perceptible order (in Phys 22.25-26, 31.17, 36.15, 38.19, 39.25-26, 78.1-2,11,24,28, 79.11-12,24-25, 80.3, 87.8-
9,17-18, 100.22-23, 162.12). There is no contradiction here, for a Neoplatonist at any rate, since the final cause of the noetic order is the same for the perceptible.

29.6-30.14. ὃς . . . λέγουσι. Simplicius undertakes to reconcile the doctrines of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus. He first argues for the correctness of the view that the intelligible principle is one and finite (in definition) (29.8-12). Thereupon, two alleged differences or contradictions are set out and resolved: 1) that Xenophanes clearly stated that his principle or god was beyond all contrariety, including that of finite-infinite and of motion-rest, while Parmenides, who states that the one being is finite and at rest, did not fully apprehend its transcendent nature (29.12-18); 2) Parmenides says that this cause is one and finite, Melissus one and infinite (29.7-8, 29.12-30.13). Simplicius sees no contradiction in 1) because the two are not talking about the same thing: Xenophanes apprehended the One, Parmenides the intelligible. Since both Parmenides and Melissus speak of what is infinite in time, there is no contradiction in 2) either.

29.8-12. ἀόρατη . . . ὑπείληπεν. That the intelligible principle must be one, Simplicius draws from [Aristotle] De Melisse, Xenophane, et Gorgia (22.31 and note); that it must be finite/limited (in definition) he derives from Parmenides. This sentence (τὸ τῆς . . .) is a gloss on B 8.42-43 (cf. in Phys 147.12-14) and B 8.29-33 (cf.
in Phys 30.6-10, 40.3-6). Aristotle may also have influenced Simplicius on the latter point; cf. Physics 206b33-207a25 esp. 207a14-17, and in Phys 502.2-12.

29.12-18. πάλην . . . ειλαμι. This confusing passage differentiates Xenophanes from Parmenides, but at the same time records their common grounds. Simplicius gives two irreconcilable versions of Xenophanes's principle; both appear to rest on Theophrastus's authority. One is that it is motionless and finite (28.7-8, 29.7-9, cf. DG 483.11-15 (fr. 8)). The second is that it transcends all contrariety; it is neither in motion nor at rest, nor infinite nor finite (22.26-30, 23.4-14, 29.12-14, cf. DG 480.4-481.13 (fr. 5)). In the present passage Simplicius adopts the latter to argue that Xenophanes's principle is the One. The first hypothesis of the Parmenides is, for Neoplatonists, about the One (cf. Chapter III pp. 70-71). The intelligible principle of Parmenides, on the other hand, is one and beyond change; Simplicius equates it with the intelligible, not the One (in Phys 147.6-16). The harmony, then, between Parmenides and Xenophanes is that they both have a single, intelligible principle as the final cause of all existence. Simplicius also seems to imply that since Parmenides's principle is finite not as a body is but in definition, he does not contradict Xenophanes's assertion that the principle transcends (corporeal) finiteness and infinity.
29.15. τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὁμολογεῖ is a gloss on B 8.29 (= in Phys 30.6); the same gloss appears at 143.14–15 (cf. 17) and 144.22.

Proclus quotes this line three times (in Parm 1134.22, 1152.29, 1177.5) and paraphrases it once (in Parm 639.29–30). The gloss itself may come ultimately from Plato's Laws 898a8, which Proclus quotes as part of a discussion on the sphericity of the Νοῦς (in Tim I.69.16–17; cf. 20–21).

29.16–17. ὁμολογεῖ is a quote from 29.18 (= B 8.38*), and μόνον a gloss on οὗτοι of 29.18 also. As for πᾶντων ἔξερχομένων, Proclus uses the same phrase of Parmenides's being at in Parm 708.9.

29.19. Melissus's observation that the intelligible principle is not subject to change (ὦμεταβάλλετον) agrees with that of Parmenides (29.15–18) and perhaps Xenophanes (29.13; cf. note to 29.12–18).

29.19–28. Μέλισσος . . . ὁμολογεῖτο. Simplicius argues that Melissus declared that the intelligible principle was infinite in virtue of the inexhaustibility of its essence or the infinity of its potentiality; both of these turn out to be temporal in nature (29.26–28). That is, Melissus speaks of what is infinite in time, and in almost the same words as does Parmenides (29.28–30.5). The phrase κατὰ τὸ ἀπειρόν τῆς δυνάμεως and the balance of the passage is found nearly verbatim in Philoponus in Phys 22.24–30, esp. 20–21 εἰς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῆς δυνάμεως.
29.28-30.5. τὸ . . . ωτοῖ. Simplicius quotes B 8.3-5 to prove that Parmenides and Melissus agree that the one being is infinite in time; there are numerous verbal correspondences between 29.22-26 (30 B 7.7) and 30.1-3 (B 8.3-5). Simplicius glosses ἀνέλειπτουν 30.1 by ἀνέλειπτουν 30.4, and (so it seems) ἀτέλεστον 30.2 by ἄπειρου 30.4.

30.5-13. τὴν . . . ὑπον. Simplicius, quoting B 8.29-33, returns to his earlier statements about the nature of limit or telos. 30.11-13 gloss B 8.29-33 (30.6-10), especially the last two lines. More specifically, he glosses οὐκ ἐπιθετεῖς 30.10 by ἀνεμεθεῖς 30.11; he further glosses ἀνεμεθεῖς by τέλειον 30.11, then concludes on the basis of etymology that τέλειον = ἔχει τέλος = οὐκ ἄτελεστον 30.9. And as it has a τέλος 30.12 it also has a limit πέρας and boundary ὕπον 30.12-13. Cf. 29.8-9, 40.2-8.

30.13-14. οὕτως . . . λέγουσι. This statement of harmony among Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus is the leading principle for all Simplicius's harmonizations; there can only be contradiction (or 'substantial' disagreement) when the same subject is at issue.

30.14-31.17. μετελεῖν . . . δηλοτέρω. Having demonstrated the harmony among the Eleatics on the noetic front, Simplicius proceeds to harmonize Parmenides with all the physicists. He further harmonizes the Eleatics, more particularly Parmenides, with Empedocles (31.18-
34.17) and Anaxagoras (34.18-35.21) as having apprehended the noetic order (cf. 36.15).

30.14-19. μετελθὸν . . . ὁμοίων. Simplicius quotes B 8.50-52 (= 30.17-19) as proof that, after discussing the intelligibles in the Aletheia, Parmenides proceeded to the perceptibles in the Doxa (see also 38.24-39.12, fortasse 80.3-4, 146.26-27, 179.29-33). That the first part of Parmenides's poem is about the noetic order, the second the perceptible or opinable is found in Proclus (in Parm 723.17-19, 1024.10-12) and Plutarch (adv Colotem 1113F-1114F). Philoponus also makes this distinction (in Phys 22.2-21); their teacher, Ammonius, is a likely common source.

30.20-31.2. τῶν . . . τε. That Parmenides posited a pair of primary, opposite principles of things that come to be proves his agreement with all the physicists, including Aristotle (cf. 31.9-10). Simplicius offers four alternative sets of designations for this primary pair. Three are based on the verses he quotes here, B 8.53-59 (= 30.23-31.2): light (φῶς) and darkness (σκότος) = φωλογός οἰδέριου πῦρ (B 8.56) and νύχτι άδεια (B 8.59); dense (πυκνόν) and rare (ἄραλώ) = πυκνόν (B 8.59) and ἀραλών (B 8.57); same (τὸ τὸν) and other (ἐτερον) = τωτὸν (B 8.57) and ἐτερο (B 8.58). Simplicius takes the fourth, earth (γῆ) and fire (πῦρ), either from Aristotle (cf. in Phys 146.28-29, 179.31-33, and Cherniss, p. 48 n 192), or Theophrastus (via Alexander) (cf. 38.22-24, 25.15-16); cf. also
274.24. Simplicius is clearly wrong to identify 'same and other' as Parmenides's principles; they belong to both principles, not one each. On the principles, cf. commentary to in Phys 179.27-180.13, section V.

31.3-7. καὶ ἐκάτερα." This scholion is probably not, Stein pace (cf. note ad 3), by Melissus.

31.7-10. οὕτω . . . ἐναντία. στοιχεῖον (11), according to Simplicius, is not exactly Aristotle's material cause, but rather a fusion of this with the formal cause (cf. in Phys 7.20-27). Simplicius insists that Parmenides clearly assumed two opposite elemental principles, presumably as substrata, to account for coming to be. In 31.8-10 καὶ . . . ἀπωκαλύπτοντας he glosses B 8.54 (= 30.24); 'those who do not observe or who do not clearly bring to light the opposition of the elements that comprise coming-to-be err'. Moreover, he says, Aristotle himself follows Parmenides in positing opposites as principles (31.9-10). (Diels writes ὅσον ἐγὼ for ὅσον ἐγὼ (31.8); 'Parmenides recognized that the one being was two'. This makes little sense. Further, Simplicius is here contrasting the first portion of the poem (πρώτου), in which being was shown to be one, with the second part, in which two principles are set forth. I have adopted the reading of all the manuscripts.)

31.10-17. καὶ ποιητικὸν . . . θηλυτέρω. The positing of an effi-
cient cause marks Parmenides (and others) off from those physicists who did not transcend elemental or subsidiary causes in their accounts of nature (cf. in Phys 6.32-7.6, 36.18). Simplicius's mention of an efficient cause distinct from the two elemental causes or principles looks ahead to the following passage (38.18-39.20), in which he criticizes Alexander for not having observed this. It is not clear to what Simplicius refers in his distinction between what is corporeal and incorporeal in coming-to-be (31.11-12). He may be distinguishing 'male' and 'female' (B 12.5-6), which are corporeal, from 'intercourse' and 'childbirth' (B 12.4), which he may view as incorporeal processes. Since Simplicius does not identify the αλογονήτα of B 12.2 (sc. στοιχεῖα 'bands'), it is unlikely that they are what he means by corporeal or incorporeal.

37.12-40.21. This passage takes up Alexander's interpretation of Parmenides, especially the Doxa. Since Alexander closely follows Theophrastus, Simplicius's rejection of his interpretation holds good for the whole doxographical tradition. Alexander states that in the Doxa Parmenides, producing an account of nature in accord with popular opinion and appearances, no longer said that being was one and uncreated, but rather posited earth and fire as principles of things that come to be, earth as matter and fire as an efficient cause; and he called fire 'light' and earth 'darkness' (38.20-24). Simplicius recognizes some ambiguity in the phrase 'in accord with popular opinion and appearances'; if a) Alexander understands it in
the way that Parmenides intends, then there is no difficulty (38.24-
26). But if b) Alexander understands by it that the account is
wholly false, then he is wrong (38.27-28). Regardless of this am-
biguity, Simplicius rejects c) Alexander's equation of fire or light
with the efficient cause (38.27-28). Simplicius treats of b) in
38.28-39.12 and c) in 39.12-20. In 39.21-40.9 he recapitulates that
Parmenides dealt with the noetic order in the Aletheia and did not
mean that the physical world had the attributes of the noetic. Me-
lissus is dealt with in 40.9-20.

37.12-38.18. Ὄ... ζητοῦν. Simplicius quotes extensively from
Alexander's commentary on 185b15-16 and finds fault with everything
he has to say. He censures Alexander in particular for not ob-
serving that both Parmenides and Melissus posited that the principle
of being is one and motionless, not the whole of the physical world.
Simplicius describes this principle as 'real, unified, and intel-
ligible being' (38.11-13)

38.18-20. ὑμολογεῖ ... λέγειν. With the exception of ὧπερ τὸν ἑστὶ
περί τοῦ νοητοῦ ὄντος, which is Simplicius's own comment, this
sentence merely expands a clause from Alexander, οὔτε ... ἀγενητόν
(38.21-22).

38.20-24. "κατὰ ... σκότως." Alexander draws on Theophrastus
here; cf. DG 482 n 10 (fr. 6).
38.26. δοξατών τὸ αἰσθητὸν καλῶν. Parmenides does not use δοξατών in any extant fragment. Simplicius is apparently glossing δόξας of B 8.51 (=38.31), unless he simply uses δοξατών as synonymous with ἀπαθητόν of B 8.52 (= 38.32); cf. 39.10.

39.12-13. μετ’...οὕτως refers to to 38.20-21 κατὰ ...φυσιολογόν, or more generally to the whole of the Doxa. Ψευδείς πάντη is picked up by Ψευδή ἀπλῶς 39.10.

38.27-28. καὶ ...οἴεται. Simplicius exposes Alexander's error in equating light or fire with an efficient cause in 39.12-20.

39.28-29. συμπληρώσας...παρεθέμην. Simplicius insists that in the Aletheia Parmenides is talking about the intelligible or intelligiblebeing. τοῦ νοητοῦ echoes νόημα of B 8.50 (= 38.30). ἀπερ ...refers to 30.17-19, 24-31.2.

39.10-12. δοξατών ...ἔπεπεπωκότα. On the basis of the passage just quoted (B 8.50-61 = 38.30-39.9), Simplicius concludes that the account Parmenides offers of mortal opinions is not totally false, but rather lacks certain truth. Now Alexander had not said that this account was totally false (38.20-24). Simplicius takes this as a possible, even likely, interpretation of his remarks (38.26-27), perhaps to have a 'straw-man' argument for his own interpretation (but cf. 39.20-21). As mentioned above, δοξατών does not
appear in the quotation, although ἀπαθλόν does (B 8.52 = 38.32). τῆς νοητῆς ἀληθείας echoes νόημα ἀμοίρα ἀληθείας of B 8.50-51 (= 38.31-32). On the other hand, τὸ ... αἰσθητὸν does not match anything in the quotation, although B 8.51-52 (= 38.31-32) and B 8.60-61 (= 39.8-9) are probably being referred to; Simplicius takes it for granted that Parmenides distinguished the phenomenal from the noetic.

39.12-13. μετ' ... οὖν. Simplicius points out that Parmenides's εἰκόνα is an efficient cause distinct from the two elements not only to repudiate Alexander's assertion that fire is the efficient cause (38.22-23), but also to bolster his own contention that the more discerning physicists had metaphysical principles.

39.13. τὸ ποιητικὸν. Besides identifying her with an efficient cause, Simplicius has little to say about the εἰκόνα. In the lines that follow her 'efficient' functions over the heavens (39.14-16), the gods (17-19), and animate life (19-20) are indicated.


39.20-21. ὁλλὰ ... ἀναγινώσκω. Cf. 36.24-25, 144.25-29.

39.20-40. εἰκόνας ... -νεῖται. Simplicius attempts to vindici-
cate Parmenides's argument for the motionlessness of being. Although it properly applies to the noetic order, the argument would also hold good for the physical world; a strict unity in the latter would make motion impossible too. Simplicius's intention is to refute Alexander's assertion (or rather interpretation of Aristotle) that it is incredible that the whole of being be one and motionless (37.30-32); if it is one, it must be unchanging also.


40.2. τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὁμοησίας. Simplicius understands B 8.32-33 (= 40.5-6) to be the reason or justification for all of B 8.26-31 (= 39.27-40.4, omitting B 8.29).

40.7-9. ὃς . . . δεῖται. These lines are a paraphrase of B 8.32-33 (= 40.5-6); cf. 30.9-13 and notes. Simplicius has no difficulty in understanding the last half of B 8.33, although Diels daggers it. He understands μὴ ἐόν not as a protasis with the supplied predicate ἐπιθετεῖς, but rather as τὸ μὴ ἐόν. Further, he supplies the correlatives ὃς . . . οὕτως, whereas Parmenides has only δὲ. Simplicius glosses several words in B 8.32-33: ἡπτὸς ἰδεῖτο by ἐνδεῖς πάντων, οὐκ ἐπιθετεῖς by ἀνενθεῖς, and οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον by τέλειον.
IV. The Aletheia.

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B. Summary, Comments.

The fundamental distinction which Simplicius draws between the two parts of Parmenides's poem was set forth in the preceding section; namely, that the *Aletheia* deals with the intelligible order or 'real' being, while the *Doxa* is about the physical world or 'perceptible' being (cf. in *Cael* 556.13-14; 557.23-24). In this section those passages which deal predominantly with the *Aletheia* are examined; in addition, there are several miscellaneous passages which defy treatment elsewhere. Further, the numerous related passages listed above are, by and large, brief mentions, some not even by Simplicius, of doctrines that are found in the first part of the poem. A rough division of these is as follows: 1) that Parmenides holds that being (τὸ ὄν = ἡ ἀφοχή, τὸ πάντα, πάντα) is one (ἐν, motionless (ἀκίνητον), finite (πεπερασμένον), and uncreated (ἀγένητον) = in *Phys* 21.29-30; 22.9-12, 23-25; 28.7-8; 29.7-8; 31.7; 37.22-24, 30-31; 38.5, 13-17, 19-22; 39.21-22; 40.2-9; 41.12; 45.26-27; 46.3-4, 13-27; 47.1-2; 48.1-2; 51.12-14; 52.8-9; 53.10, 27; 71.7-8; 72.27-29; 75.24-26; 77.3-6; 82.11-12; 87.4-5; 88.31; 99.10; 102.30; 107.25-27; 115.16-
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17; 124.34; 126.4-5, 16-19; 127.10, 29; 131.33-34; 136.28-29; 138.21; 141.11; 179.29-30; 236.6-7; 243.5-14; 244.16; 502.3-8; 1195.13-14; in Cael 140.3-5; 556.1-6; 559.15; 560.1; 672.29-30; 2) that Parmenides distinguished the noetic from the phenomenal order = in Phys 7.1-3; 21.15-19; 36.15; in Cael 558.28-30; 557.20-23; 558.14-17; 3) that in the Aletheia Parmenides was speaking of 'real', 'intel-
ligible', or 'absolute' being (τὸ ὄντος ὄν, τὸ νοητὸν ὄν, τὸ ὀφθαλκὸς ὄν) = in Phys 22.25-26; 29.5-6; 38.11-13, 19, 28-29; (39.11) 39.25-
26; 45.30-31; 1195.16; in Cael 556.15-16; 558.12-13. Cf. Index
Nominum s.v. Παρμενίδης CAG X (pp. 1449-1450) and CAG VII (p.772)
for more detailed divisions.

Of the passages under direct consideration, in Phys 142.28-32
is by far the most important, and is without question the single
most important passage in Simplicius concerning Parmenides. Sim-
plicius reviews his statements on Parmenides's one being, presents
a lengthy argument for equating this with the intelligible (τὸ
νοητὸν), and quotes most of the Aletheia (B 8.1-52 = in Phys 145.1-
146.25) to substantiate this argument; see the detailed summary
below. In in Phys 77.9-80.18, 162.11-12, and in Cael 136.18-137.12
(contra Philoponus) Simplicius takes up Parmenides's proof that
being is uncreated (ἄγεννητον) in B 8.3-14; this is an important
'sign' which Simplicius employs in in Phys 142.31-36. (In in Phys
79.12-80.18 Simplicius also defends Parmenides's (and Melissus's )
claim that being is motionless (ἀκίνητον) against Alexander.) Sim-
plicius does little more than mention that Parmenides did 'philoso-
phize about the truth' \(\text{ἐπιὶ ὁληθείας}\) in \textit{Phys} 40.23-41.9, contrary to Alexander's insinuation that he did not. In \textit{Phys} 100. 21-28 he mentions that Parmenides may have been aware of the One. In \textit{Phys} 114.25-115.9 he rehearses Aristotle's claim that Parmenides's being is one and finite. Lastly, in \textit{Phys} 120.18-19 he argues that Parmenides was aware of the 'one-many' distinction, since he predicated so many things of his one being.

A brief discussion is in order concerning what Simplicius means by 'the intelligible' \(\text{τὸ οὐσίαν}\); he equates Parmenides's one being with it \textit{(in Phys} 144.12), but in his discussions of Parmenides provides scant information about it\(^{1}\). The intelligible is the first of the three stages or orders \(\text{τὰ πρὸς Γ} \) in the noetic order \(\text{cf. in Phys} \ 88.11-22\); it is the apex \(\text{τὸ ὕπαρχον in Phys} \ 88.13\), that which remains \(\text{τὸ μένου in Phys} \ 147.9\), which combines within itself in an absolute unity all the discrete parts of the intellectual \(\text{τὸ ὕπαρχον}\), the third stage of the noetic order \(\text{in Phys} \ 88.17-22\). Above all, the intelligible is the final cause of all existence \(\text{in Phys} \ 38.11-13, \ 45.32, \ 87.7-18\). Proclus had set forth the triadic structure of the noetic order, which he says is the content of the second hypothesis of the \textit{Parmenides}; this in turn is about Parmenides's one being \(\text{cf. Chapter III, pp. 70-72, and in Phys} \ 88.11-13, \ 31-33\). Although his debt is clear, Simplicius differs from Proclus in denying that Parmenides had any awareness of the two subsequent stages of this order and their creation through emanation \(\text{πρόσοδος and ἐπιστροφή}; \text{cf. in Phys} \ 147.9-12\); \textit{cf. in Parm
708.7-709.6, esp. 708.21-29. Likewise, he is hesitant to ascribe to Parmenides awareness of the One (in Phys 100.21-22, 147.12-16), while Proclus states that he had this in view (in Parm 1079.7-9).

C. Commentary.

In Phys 40.23 - 41.9. Simplicius briefly digresses (41.1-8) from his own paraphrase of Alexander's interpretation of 184b16-17 to take up Parmenides's defense. In 40.23-41.1 Alexander holds that Aristotle places Parmenides and Melissus, the 'akinetic monists', in contradistinction to the physicists ( φυσικοί) or 'kinetic monists or pluralists', since the former abolish nature ( φύσις) and because people are accustomed to name philosophers after the branch of philosophy that is their sole or chief concern (cf. in Categories 3.30-4.9). Simplicius agrees to his contradistinction (cf. in Phys 40.24-25, 14.2-5; see further 22.3-5, 23.21-22, 148.29), but rejects Alexander's later ( ὑστερον) statement that 'it is Aristotle's custom to call those who philosophize about the truth "physicists"' (3-4). Simplicius evidently feels that Alexander is saying that for Aristotle (as opposed to the unspecified subject of ἐλέεσθαι in 40.28) Parmenides (and Melissus) does not 'philosophize about the truth', since he does not call him a physicist. He asks how anyone failed to know that Parmenides 'philosophized about the truth' (5-7), and quotes B 8.50-51 (= 41.8-9) to refute this second statement of Alexander. Περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ( ἐφιλοσοφεῖ) (41.6; cf. 41.4) is a prose paraphrase of ἀφηγεῖ τῆς ἀληθείας of B 8.51. Simplicius also quotes
quotes these lines at *in Phys* 30.17-18 (cf. 15-16), 38.31-32 (cf. 39.11-12), 146.23-24, and *in Cael* 558.5-6 (cf. 557.23-24). At 30.17 and 146.23 the present *παύω* appear, elsewhere the future *παύσω*.

Simplicius does not, it appears, quote this later statement by Alexander in his commentary. Diels cites no reference in his notes here, and his list of citations from Alexander (*Index Nominum s.v.* pp. 1437-1439) contains no parallel citations. Further, in none of the commentary on lemmata containing either *ἀλήθεια* (188b30 (187.31-188.10), 191a25 (235.12-236.12 cf. below), 263a18 (1288.33-1291.24)) or *φυσικοί* (184b17 (40.23-42.5), 186a20 (113.22-114.22), 187a12 (148.26-153.24), 187a28 (161.23-163.28), 205a5 (479.30-481.34)) is such a statement to be found. (See Ross's *Index Verborum* to his *Physics OCT* edition.) It may be that by 'later' Simplicius simply means 'later in the same passage', since he paraphrases Alexander here. On the other hand, at *in Phys* 458.19-459.16 (esp. 458.19-21, 459.9-11) Simplicius offers Aristotle's definition of *φυσικοί*: those who are engaged in the physical part of philosophy, and particularly those who employ (a) material cause(s). Further, 458.19-21 is highly reminiscent of, if no less contradictory to, *in Phys* 40.28-41.3-4; again Alexander's statement is not to be found (he is mentioned at 459.5). The other references to *φυσικοί* and *ἀλήθεια* in Diels (*Index Nominum s.v.* p. 1455, 1371 respectively) do not contain Alexander's statement. (At 191a24 Aristotle uses the phrase *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τῆν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τήν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων*. This may have been Alexander's source.)
**in Phys** 77.9 – 80.18. This passage presents Alexander's own two objections to the doctrines of Parmenides and Melissus, and Simplicius's replies to these objections. Aristotle's analysis of the uses of 'being' (185a20-b5), which forms part of Alexander's objections, was set forth in 71.19-77.8. This passage is an important part of Simplicius's interpretations of Parmenides, because it details his claim that Parmenides's one being is 'real', 'proper', or 'absolute' being; both of his replies to Alexander are based on this claim. It also well exemplifies Simplicius's interpretative technique of quoting and glossing the _ipsissima verba_ of the ancients to discredit refutations by later philosophers as being based on ignorance or on a superficial understanding of the ancients. In section IX all of Simplicius's criticisms of Alexander (concerning Parmenides) are collected.

At the outset Simplicius announces that he will show how Alexander's refutations have only apparent but no real force against the doctrines of the ancients (77.9-11). He concludes the passage on the same note: that Alexander's careless reading of the ancients led him to formulate irrelevant refutations (80.15-19). The rest of the passage falls into two unequal parts, each treating one of Alexander's objections. The first objection is that not only does 'eternal being' alone exist, as Parmenides and Melissus would have it, but even things which come to be and perish also exist (77.11-79.12). Simplicius answers that these things do in a sense 'exist', but not in the fullest and most proper sense, which applies to real
being alone. In the second, Alexander rejects Parmenides's and Melissus's argument that being is motionless (79.12-80.14). Simplicius replies that this argument is valid for absolute being, but not for the qualified being which Alexander champions.

77.21 – 27. Simplicius's general argument (κοινός . . . ὁ λόγος 22) is that both that which has x-ness or is x without qualification is properly (καρφός 24) said to be 'x', and that which has x-ness or is x in some degree or other is said to be 'x', but only in a general and loose way (ὀλοσχερός καὶ καταχωρητικός 25); cf. in Phys 147.2-9 and notes. His answer to Alexander is that since what comes to be and perishes in a sense is (ἐστί, ὃν), it is called 'being, existent' (ὁν) in the second way only. Parmenidean being, on the other hand, is 'being' proper, since it exists without qualification; that which comes to be and perishes possesses non-being. (This argument appears to be based on Republic V 476d5 – 480a13; 478e1–5 is quoted below in the note to 78.28–29. Although Simplicius does not mention this passage here, he quotes from it earlier in the commentary; 476d8–9 = 13.2–3, 479d7–8 = 13.4–5. Simplicius's claim that that which comes to be and perishes has even more non-being than being (77.33, 79.6, 9) verges on the rhetorical.)

77.26-27. οὖν . . . τὸν. Although Diels does not so note it, the phrase τὸ κατὰ πάντα ὃν ὁμοὶ τὸν is a gloss on B 8.5 (= 78.14). In Phys 143.11-18 provides strong evidence for this; in 16-17 Simplicius glosses B 8.5 (= 13) by τὸ ὁμοὶ τὸν .
77.30. 'ἐν ταύτῃ μένων', as Diels notes, is a reminiscence of B 8.29 (= in Phys 30.6*, 143.15, 146.2) ταύτην τ’ ἐν ταύτῃ τε μένον καθ’ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται. Proclus uses a similar gloss of this line: πώς δὲ χρόνου μετέχων τὸ αἰώνιον; οἱ τοιούτοι γὰρ τὸ κατὰ Παρμενίδην ἐν δὲ, ταύτι τὸν ἐν ταύτῃ μένον, ὡς αὐτὸς φησιν (in Parm 639.28-30; B 8.29-32 is quoted at 1134.22-25, B 8.29 at 1152.29, 1177.5).

77.31 - 33. ἢν ... τοῦ δύνατος. The source here is probably Cratylus 402a8-10: δέγει πως ἡ ἡγιάζωσι ήτα "πάντα ἄρχει καὶ οὐδὲν μένει" καὶ ποταμοῦ βοῆ ἀπεικόσι τὰ δύνα λέγει ὡς "δίς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν ὀλι ἐν ἐμβαίνει." (= 22 A 6). In his note to 77.31 Diels refers to fr. 41 of Bywater; in DK this fragment is reassigned to both 22 B 12 and 22 B 91; cf. 22 B 49a. On ἤνιξατο (23) see section II, pp. 98-102.

77.34. τὸ ... σημεῖα. γὰρ picks up the discussion that precedes the parenthetical remarks on Heraclitus, and in particular ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ ὀφθαλμώσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχει μηδεποτε 'ἐν ταύτῃ μένον' (29-30). ( Cf. 77.12, 79.5 for similar uses of ἐν 'subject to', and LSJ s.v. II.1, p. 552.) The argument is that the 'being' which is subject to coming to be and perishing and which also has non-being is properly called 'coming to be and perishing'; Parmenidean being, since it has different signs or marks, is properly called 'being' (cf. 79.8-10). In in Phys 143.29-144.1 and 148.5-6 Simplicius insists that Parmenidean being has no non-being at all. σημεῖα is a
gloss on σήματι (a) 'marks, signs' of B 8.2 (= 78.9); cf. 78.11, 79.11, 142.32.

77.34 - 78.1. μώλλον...ἀποδεικνυμένον. The genitive plurals seem to refer not to the 'signs' of 34, but more generally to 'things'. For τὸ κυρίως δὲ cf. 78.11, 24, 79.12, 24-25. Simplicius says that it is better (μώλλον) (presumably than to paraphrase Parmenides) to listen to (ἀκούειν) his very words, and at 80.16-17 censures Alexander for 'rather aridly and carelessly listening to' (ἀκούειν) the doctrines of the ancients.

78.2. μεμιμάεσθαι... νοητῷ is a free paraphrase of the following two verses B 6.8-9 (= 78.3-4): ἐν τῷ νοητῷ is Simplicius's own addition, based on his claim that Parmenidean being is the intelligible (cf. in Phys 144.12, 147.7). The unflattering description of (the way of) mortals in B 6.4-7 (= in Phys 117.8-11) justifies Simplicius's use of μεμιμάεσθαι 'censured' here. He uses the same verb in 117.3 in his paraphrase of B 6.1-9 (= 117.4-6, 8-13): μεμιμάεσθαι τοῖς εἰς ταύτο συμάγουσι τὰ ἀντικείμενα. τὸ δὲ is a gloss on τὸ πέλειν, τὸ μὴ δὲν on οὐκ εἴναι of B 6.8 (= 78.3). συμμέρουσι 'bring together, combine' is, by process of elimination, a gloss on (οἷς)...ταύτων νεκρόμεσθαι 1 κοῦ ταύτων B 6.8-9 (= 78.3-4). In 77.21-33 (esp. 23, 24, 26) Simplicius argues that being (proper) in no way possesses its opposite, non-being; mortals thus err in 'combining' them.
78.3-4 = B 6.8-9 (= in Phys 117.12-13).

78.5 καὶ ... ζητοῦσις is a close paraphrase of the following verse B 7.2 (= 78.6). ἀποστρέψας 'having turned away from' is a gloss on (σῦ) ... ἐξορευτὴν τὸν λόγον "keep thy thought from". Simplicius renders τῆς τοῦ ... ὅσον διξήσοις "this way of inquiry" by τῆς ὅσον τῆς τοῦ μὴ ὅν ζητοῦσις 'the way that inquires into non-being'; he supplies τοῦ μὴ ὅν from B 7.1 (= in Phys 135.21, 143.31, 244.1) καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὅτι τὸν ὅν τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι μὴ ὅτια. Cf. in Phys 650.9-14.

78.6 = B 7.2 (= in Phys 135.22, 144.1, 244.2, 650.13).

78.7. Φορ Επάγειν 'to add, conclude' as a preface to quotations, cf. in Phys 38.29, 40.2, 79.31, 80.11.

78.8 - 10 = B 8.1-3 (= in Phys 142.34-36, 145.1-3); 78.12 = 30.1.

78.11. Simplicius sandwiches this comment between the two halves of B 8.3. λοιπὸν here must mean "next, thereupon"; Diels (Index Verorum s.v. p. 1405) renders λοιπὸν as "porro", and lists several occurrences, the present one not included. LSJ, on the other hand, has no such entry: cf. λοιπός, ἂν, ὅν p. 1060, note esp. 4-5. For τὸ κυρίως ὅν cf. note to 77.34-78.1. (τά) ... σημεῖα 'signs, marks' is a gloss on σήματι' (α) of B 8.2 (= 78.9); cf. also 77.34, 79.10, 142.32. These signs are related in the following twelve verses.
78.12 - 23 = Β 8.3-14 (= *in Phys* 145.3-14). 78.12 = 30.1.

78.24 - 29. ταῦτα...ὑψέστηκε. Simplicius paraphrases the verses of Parmenides just quoted, Β 8.3-14. Cf. *in Phys* 162.11-17 for a similar paraphrase of Β 8.6-10 (= 162.18-22).

78.24 ταῦτα...ἀποδεικνυον is a near verbatim repetition of 78.1 τῶν...ἀποδεικνυμένων. A similar bracketing of a quotation is to be found at *in Phys* 144.26 and 146.26.

78.24 - 25. ὅτι ἀγένητον τοῦτο τὸ ὅν. ἀγένητον is a quotation from Β 8.3 (= 78.12). τοῦτο τὸ ὅν (i.e. τὸ κυρίος ὅν cf. 24) may well be a gloss on ὅν, also of Β 8.3. Simplicius does not in his paraphrase of this argument or proof mention 'indestructible' (ἀνωτέρως Β 8.3); but cf. 79.30-31, 143.31-36 (Β 8.1-3 = 143.34-36). At 77.27 and 79.8-10 he treats 'what comes to be' (τὸ γενόμενον) and 'what perishes' (τὸ οφελομένον) together (cf. 77.17, 18 for Alexander's identical treatment). Simplicius, following Parmenides, it seems, thinks that they are sides of the same coin, and that what is said *contra* 'coming to be' applies equally to 'perishing'.

78.25. οὔτε...ὅν. For another paraphrase of this half of the disjunct, similar in language and identical in order, cf. *in Phys* 162.12-13 μήτε...ὅν). ἐποδρόξε θείον is echoed by ἐποδρόξε θείον of 78.28, which has no correspondence in Parmenides.
78.25-26. οὔτε...μὴ ὄν. Cf. in Phys 162.13-14 and notes.
The first clause is taken directly from B 8.7 (= 78.16) οὔτε ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος. The second is more loosely based
on B 8.8-9 (= 78.9-10) οὔ γάρ...ἐστιν. That is, since non-being cannot be spoken or
thought of, it does not exist; cf. B 2.3-8 (= in Phys 116.28-117.1)
and 116.26-27. Simplicius may also have τοῦ μηδενός of B 8.10 (=
78.19), which clearly is (τοῦ) μὴ ἐόντος, in mind. (οὔτε is Diels's
emendation for οὔτε DEF, οὐ a; based on in Phys 162.14 οὔτεν is possi-
ble.)

78.26-27. καὶ...ἐγένετο; Cf. in Phys 162.16-17 and notes.
This is a loose paraphrase of B 8.9-10 (= 78.18-19) τί δ' ἂν...φῶν; Simplicius retains the question form of the original, but uses
'and why' (καὶ διὰ τί δὴ) for 'what need' (τί...καὶ χρέος).
Further, τότε does not correspond to anything in the original, nor
does ἀλλά μὴ. πρότερον ἢ ὑστερον is a prose version of ὑστερον ἢ
πρῶτον. Lastly, ἐγένετο is perhaps a gloss on (ἔρχεται)...ἀφικ-
νομον φῶν. (In in Phys 162.16-17 Simplicius states that this argu-
ment applies to 'from non-being', whereas here he offers no such
qualification.)

78.27-28. ἀλλ'...γίνεται. Diels apparently thinks that this
is gloss on B 8.12 (= 78.21), for he allows that on the basis of
78.27 one might read ἐκ τοῦ ἐόντος; cf. note to 78.21 and Tarán, pp.
97-101. It is more likely that it is a gloss on B 8.11 (= 78.20)
οὔτως ἢ πάμπων πέλεναι χρεών ἦστι ἢ οὐχί. That is, Simplicius
takes the verse to be ruling out any tertium quid between absolute being and absolute non-being. He concludes that being cannot come from this tertium quid, although that which comes to be does. Alexander is the target of these remarks: cf. 77.12-13 μὴ εἶναι ... ὅντα and 77.20-21 καὶ ὃ ... τούτο ...

79.28 -29. οὐ γάρ ... ἡρέστηκε. Of this last phrase Tarán, pp. 97-98, says (of Diels): "ἵν [for B 8.12] he did not understand in the Neoplatonic sense, (obvious from the last part of the paraphrase), but as ὑπωσκιµοτε." It is unclear what is peculiarly Neoplatonic about this use of the word; cf. LSJ s.v. τῆ esp. II.3, p. 1399; cf. also in Phys 1.21-22, 242.28 - 243.3. Secondly, at 79.5 Simplicius uses the phrase ὑπωσκιµοτα ; cf. further 77.22.

Thirdly and lastly, the distinction Simplicius draws between absolute (i.e. Formal) being and qualified (i.e. phenomenal) being and their respective names, and on which he banks in his paraphrase of Parmenides, is Platonic. Cf. Republic 478a1-5: ἐσείνο δὴ λείπων ἀν ἡμῖν εὑρείν, ὡς ἔσκε, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχων, τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὀδότερον εἰλικρινὲς ὁρῶς ἀν προσαγορεύομενον, ἵνα, ἐὰν ωμῇ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἐν δίκη προσαγορεύωμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις τὰ ἄκρα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξῆ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀποδιδόντες. Cf. also 478b1-21, d5-9. For τὸ ἀϊλος ὅν (28) cf. 79.24, 26.

79.1 - 4 = Timaeus 37e4-38a1. (Burnet does not list ἀναφέροντες (79.1) in his apparatus.) Note that τὴν ἀϊλουν οὐσίαν (79.2) is the
same phrase Alexander uses at 77.13.

79.8. οὐ πολλοὶ δείχνει τοὺς λόγους. Cf. in *Phys* 140.27 καὶ τί δεῖ πολλα λεγεῖν . . .

79.10 - 11. οὗτε . . . κυρίως δὲν. As Diels notes, the quotation is from *Physics* 186a33-34. Simplicius elsewhere holds that by τὸ ὀτέρ δὲν means (an) individual substance; in *Phys* 131.12-26, 132.16 (cf. also 129.32-131.11).

79.9 - 10. οὗτε . . . οἰκείους τοῦ Ὑντος παραπλοῦθησεν. Cf. in *Phys* 78.11, 80.16-17.

79.12 - 22. Although Alexander here criticizes the followers of both Parmenides and Melissus for demonstrating that being is motionless, the demonstration sketched by Simplicius in 13-16 applies more to Melissus than to Parmenides, cf. 80.4-14. But cf. in *Phys* 39.21-40.9 (section III, pp. 115-116); Melissus's denial of motion is also discusses at 40.9-21.

79.16. ἀφθαρτοῦ δὲ τὸ δὲν. Cf. 79.30-31 ὥσπερ ἀγένητοι καὶ ἀφθαρτοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ δὲν. ἀφθαρτοῦ is Simplicius's gloss on ἀωκλεθρον of B 8.3 (= 78.12); cf. in *Phys* 142.32-36.

79.16 - 22. Alexander's argument, which is clear with the possible
exception of 79.20 ἀλλὰ . . . τὴν δὲ, is as follows. If there were only essential change, Parmenides and Melissus would still be wrong to deny change of their 'being' on the grounds that what undergoes this change changes into nothing. But in fact that which changes essentially changes into what it was not. If, however, something were to change into nothing, this change would not be of the essential sort. But since there are other kinds of change, e.g. qualitative, this change into nothing could be subsumed under one of these kinds. Consequently, their denial of any change is groundless. Alexander clearly assumes that in non-essential change there is change without qualification into nothing; e.g. when Socrates removes his cloak, the attribute 'cloak wearing' of Socrates simply vanishes; cf. *Physics* 191b13-17. (In 79.27-29 Simplicius argues that Parmenidean being, since it has no accidents and is not an accident of anything, could hardly undergo qualitative change). As noted above, there is some difficulty in construing 79.20, but Simplicius's reformulation of this in 79.23-24 makes Alexander's meaning clear.

79.25 - 27. εἰ μὲν . . . γένοιτο; Simplicius replies to Alexander that 'qualified' being (τοιούθεν οὐ) can and in fact does change in the essential way into some other 'qualified' being, whereas absolute being (ἀλλὰ οὐ) could not give rise to anything. Simplicius here does not spell out his argument, but later does when he presents Melissus's argument that, if void does not exist, being cannot with-
draw into it by locomotion (80.4–14).

79.27 - 29. πῶς . . . ἑξον. Simplicius here answers Alexander's charge that qualitative change for Parmenides's and Melissus's being is possible (79.21). The whole phrase τὸ ἁπλὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἄκαθότως ἑξον is a paraphrase of B 8.29 (= in Phys 30.6, 143.15, 146.2); cf. 29.15, 143.14, 17, 144.21, 22 (ἅπλα, however, does not occur in these other cases). Cf. Republic V 479a2–3,37–8, Laws X 898a8–9 (and Proclus in Tim II.69.16–18). The remaining two lines (28–29) are based on Simplicius's identification of ὑπερ ὑν (186a33 cf. 79.11), Aristotle's description of Parmenidean being, with (an) individual substance which possesses no (accidental ?) attributes; cf. in Phys 131.11–12, 32 – 132.4, and 82.16–19.

79.29 - 31. καλῶς . . . ἐπήγαγεν. Simplicius refers to his quotation of B 8. 3–14 (= 78.12–23) in the words διὰ τῶν πρώτων εἰρημένων. Simplicius here adds that Parmenides demonstrated that being is 'imperishable' (ἀθανάτων) in those verses; in his paraphrase of B 8.3–14 in 78.24–29 he only mentions that Parmenides proves (ἀποδείκνυσιν) that being is uncreated (ἀγένητον); cf. esp 78.24–25. At any rate, διὰ ἁγένητον καὶ ἀθανάτων ἐστι τὸ ὑν is a close paraphrase of B 8.3 (= 78.12); cf. in Phys 142.32–33. Simplicius carefully notes the order of the verses which he quotes: προδείκνυσι . . . [Β 8.3-14] . . . ἐπήγαγεν [Β 8.26-28]. For ἐπήγαγε cf. note to 78.7.
Scaliger's emendation of τῆλε (B 8.28) for τηλε is universally accepted; cf. note to 80.2.

80.3 - 4. ἐξοδ... τὸ νοητὸν ὑν. Simplicius claims that it is also clear (ὁδὸν) from the preceding verses (B 8.26-28) that Parmenides knows that perceptible being and intelligible are different. (καὶ 'also' refers to the fact that it is clear that Parmenides’s being proper is uncreated or ungenerated and imperishable.) This claim is based on B 8.27-28 ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὀλέθρος | τῆλε μάλ' ἐπιλάχθησαν. That is, Simplicius concludes that coming to be and perishing are banished from the order of intelligible to the order of perceptible being "in which there are coming to be and perishing" (ἐν ὧ γένεσις καὶ ὀλέθρος 3). Simplicius frequently states that in the Doxa Parmenides deals with the physical world, which is subject to change and is perceptible; cf. in Phys 7.1-3, 30.15, 20, 38.24-26, 39.10-12, 142.31-33, 146.27-28, 147.27-30. γένεσις καὶ ὀλέθρος (80.3) is a quotation from B 8.27 (= 80.1). For τὸ νοητὸν ὑν cf. in Phys 39.26.

80.7 - 14. Simplicius quotes Melissus B 7.7, 9-10 and briefly paraphrases B 7.8 (= 80.10-11); at in Phys 111.19-112.15 he quotes all of 30 B 7.1-10 (30 B 7.7-10 = 112.6-15); cf. also in Phys 40.12-21. Simplicius’s paraphrase of 30 B 7.8 in 80.10-11 is both accurate and illustrates his care in preserving the order of the material he
80.15 - 17. ταῦτα . . . δοξιμάτων. Cf. in Phys 36.24-25, 39.20-21; further, 29.3-5, 37.6-7, 90.20-22. Simplicius has little good to say of Alexander throughout the commentary, despite his heavy reliance on him (see Index Nominum s.v. pp. 1437-1439). For a particularly wry criticism, see 329.14-20. At in Phys 258.16-17, when agreeing with him, Simplicius refers to Alexander as τοῦ γνωσωτάτου τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἔξηγητών.

80.17 - 18. δόν . . . τὸ πρῶτον. Simplicius also asserts that Aristotle's first cause (cf. Metaphysics Α (esp. 6-10), e.g. 1069a33, 1071b2-5, 1073a3-5, 23-25) is indebted to Parmenides at in Phys 87.7-16 (note ἀκριβῆτον 11) and 148.19-22.

in Phys 100.21 - 28. In the course of discussing Plato's resolution of the 'one-many' dilemma (99.32-102.24; cf. 185b25), Simplicius briefly mentions Parmenides (100.22-23). The immediately preceding context is that Plato resolves the dilemma for the intellectual order by demonstrating that the Forms share or participate in one another. This mutual participation gives rise to a composite unity (Ἐν τι ολοῦ), but since each considered by itself 'is not' the others, there is also plurality (100.15-21). Simplicius concurs on the second point: "For in reality, where there is otherness, there is also non-being" (21-22). He then argues that both Parmenides
and Plato were aware of this principle; the former abolishes non-being to prove the unity of real being, while the latter introduces non-being into both the intellectual and perceptible orders to demonstrate plurality (22-26). That Parmenides was aware of this principle is highly dubious; cf. note to 100.22-23.

This passage is also of interest because Simplicius mentions the One in conjunction with Parmenides here; there is only one other such mention in the commentary (in Phys 147.12-16).

The present passage is sandwiched between quotes from the Sophist (251a8-c6) and the Parmenides (129c4-e4). Simplicius asserts that Plato resolves the one-many dilemma for the intellectual order in the former, for the perceptible in the latter dialogue (cf. esp. 101.10-24).

100.21 - 22. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, ὅπου πλῆθος, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. Cf. in Phys 143.27-28, 147.22-27 (esp. 25-27).

100.22 - 26. οὗ καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδης . . . καὶ ὁ Πλάτων . . . παραδείσωτ. Simplicius asserts that the preceding principle (cf. note above to 100.21-22) lies back of Parmenides’s rejection of and Plato’s introduction of non-being. What is not clear is whether he thinks that Parmenides consciously used this principle or merely that his rejection of non-being (which can be seen as forming the counterpositive of the principle) is tantamount to an acceptance of it.
100.22 - 23. ὁ Παρμενίδης . . . τὸ μὴ ὄν. Simplicius apparently refers to the transition from B 7 to B 8, that is from the path that inquires into non-being to the acceptance of the path of being, which he mentions at in Phys 78.5-23 (B 7.2 = 78.6, B 8.1-14 = 78.8-10, 12-23; cf. in Phys 243.31-244.1). However, the explicit reason Parmenides's goddess offers for rejecting the path of non-being is not that it introduces plurality, but rather that it is unknowable and inexpressible; cf. B 2.5-8 (= in Phys 116.30-117.1). (At 78.2 ff Simplicius treats B 7.2 as if it referred to the path of non-being and not the path of mortals of B 6, which represents a confusion of the paths of being and non-being, after which he quotes it.)

100.22. ὁ Παρμενίδης . . . τὸ ὄντως ὄν. Cf. in Phys 138.20-22, 24-25, and 126.3-7 (Adrastus). On τὸ ὄντως ὄν cf. in Phys 22.24-26, esp. 26 περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος, 38.11, 162.12. Plato uses ὄντως with participial forms of εἶναι; cf. Phaedrus 247c7-e2, Sophist 266e1, Republic 597d2, Timaeus 28a3-4. A close parallel to the present usage is Timaeus 52c5-6; there are echoes of Parmenides throughout 51c2-52a4.

100.22 - 23. τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ ύπέρ τὸ ὄν. Cf. in Phys 147.12-16. 'That which is beyond being' is the One (cf. 147.14 ὁ κύριος ὄν). In both passages Simplicius tentatively (τάχα) ascribes awareness of the One to Parmenides.
100.23. ἄνευ τοῦ μὴ δν. See in Phys 243.31-244.2 (ἐβ. 7.1-2 = 244.1-2).


in Phys 114.25 - 115.9. Simplicius sets out in general terms the points of similarity and difference between Parmenides and Melissus (114.25-115.1), and relates how Aristotle's refutation of both reflects these (115.1-9). Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides (cf. 186a22) occupies the next thirty-four pages of Simplicius's commentary (114.25 -148.24; cf. 187al1). A full commentary on this passage is not necessary, because Simplicius states nothing about Parmenides that is not already found in the Physics and the details of Aristotle's refutation and of Parmenides's arguments will emerge in subsequent passages.

Of doctrinal interest is Simplicius's report that Parmenides holds that being is one and motionless (τὸ ἐν εἶναι τὸ δν καὶ ἀκι- νητον 114.26-27, 115.3; cf. 184b16, 184b25-185a1) and finite (πά- μενιδὴν δὲ πεπερασμένον 114.27-28, τοῦ δὲ πεπερασμένον λέγοντος τὸ δν 115.8; cf. 185b17-18, 207a15-17).
Simplicius also sets forth the logical or syllogistic mistakes which Parmenides and Melissus make in common. At 114.28-29 he states that both 1) propound an argument in an invalid syllogistic manner (τὸ τε ἀσυλλογιστικός ἐρώτημα) and 2) assume false premises (τὸ ἐφευρέτις λαμβάνειν προτάσεις); cf. 185a8-10, 186a6-7, 24-26. Cf. section VI.

Philoponus's commentary (61.23-62.3) on 186a22 is strikingly similar to that of Simplicius; Alexander may well be their common source.

In Phys 120.20 – 29. Simplicius here refutes one of the charges brought by Eudemus against Parmenides: that he did not distinguish between essential and accidental predication (οὐτε τὸ χωδ' αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός 120.9-11; at in Phys 115.16-116.4 Simplicius quotes this passage in full from Eudemus's Physica fr. 43 (W)). Aristotle also denies that Parmenides 'saw' this distinction: ἄλλα τοῦτο Παρμενίδης οὕτω συνεύρα (186a31-32)⁴. Simplicius allows that some of the 'pre-Platonics' (cf. 120.9, 12), namely the Megarians, were ignorant of this distinction (12-20), but insists that Parmenides was aware of it, because he predicated so many things of his 'one' (20-24; B 8.4* = 23). He justifies this distinction for Parmenides's one being along purely Neoplatonic lines (24-27); the relation of these remarks to the foregoing is obscure. Lastly, Simplicius argues that Parmenides did not actually produce this distinction in the form of a rule, for such a rule was not appropriate to the terseness (βασικολογία) of the ancients (28-29).
In the discussion that follows (120.29-121.25) Simplicius imputes to Aristotle a failure to discern the same distinction in his refutation of Parmenides (186a25-32). Aristotle, he claims, failed to distinguish whiteness (λευκότης) from that which possesses whiteness (τὸ λευκόν) in his counter-example of 'white' (τὸ λευκόν) to Parmenides (120.29-121.9); cf. section VIII. Simplicius holds that Aristotle's counter-example will hold good only if there is one thing in existence (cf. 120.26-30) which admits of different accounts or definitions; namely, the accounts of its substratum or substance and its accident(s); cf. 119.22-27. However, Simplicius argues that there is no one thing, not even the name, in the example of 'white', since the substratum is not itself 'white', but only the conjoint product substratum plus accident, whiteness, is white. He accuses Aristotle of a circular argument.

120.20 - 21. ὡς . . . δῆλον. Simplicius pointedly answers Aristotle's assertion in 186a31-32 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο Παρμενίδης οὕτω συνεώρα, and that of Eudemus, ἀ . . . διαφωτίσθησαι (120.8-10).

120.20. μέντοι Παρμενίδης μᾶλλον πάντων. πάντων "all" refers to all philosophers prior to Plato; cf. 120.9-10 οὔτε . . . ἔλεγεν ὁδεῖς, ἀλλὰ Πλάτων πρῶτος and 12 οὶ δὲ πρῶτον (both quotations from Eudemus). In 12-20 Simplicius offers the Megarian philosophers as examples of this error; the adversative force of μέντοι is directed against them.
120.21 - 22. εἰπερ ἐν λέγων τοιοῦτα κατηγόρει αὐτοῦ. This is the reason or proof which Simplicius gives for Parmenides's awareness of the distinction between essential and accidental predication (cf. 18-20). That is, since Parmenides speaks of his 'one' as a 'many', he is implicitly aware of this distinction; otherwise he would not have predicated anything, except perhaps itself, of it. In 27-29 Simplicius admits that Parmenides did not formulate a rule to this effect.

120.23 = B 8.4*. ἁγένητον appears here instead of ἀτέλεστον; cf. in Phys 30.2, 78.13, 145.4. Simplicius probably (mis) quotes this line from memory; it is possible that one of the many works at his disposal, e.g. Alexander's commentary, is his source for this version of the line; cf. DK.

120.24. All but one of the predicates in this line appear in Parmenides. ἁγένητον is found in B 8.26 (= in Phys 39.27, 79.23, 145.27; cf. 143.8-11) and in B 8.38 (= in Phys 29.18*, 87.1, 143.10*, 146.11). ἀἰών 'eternal' does not appear in the extant fragments, although it may be intended as a paraphrase of B 8.3 ὡς ἁγένητον ἑν καὶ ἀτέλεστον ἐστιν (= in Phys 30.1, 78.10, 12, 142.36, 145.5); cf. B 8.21 (= in Phys 145.22, in Cael 559.17) and B 8.27 (= in Phys 39.28, 80.1, 145.28). ἀδιαλητὸν is a gloss of ὡδὲ διαλητῶν ἐστιν B 8.22 (in Phys 86.24, 143.3, 145.23; cf. 143.1-2). Lastly, μορία ἀλλὰ 'countless other things' (cf. τοιοῦτα 21) is an exaggeration,
although Parmenides does predicate other things of it as well; cf. in Phys 147.14-15.

120.24 -27. ἀπερ . . ἀνάφερομεν. Cf. in Phys 38.11-13, 147.10-12, 148.9-11. As mentioned above (note to 120.29) this passage is purely Neoplatonic. Simplicius argues that the predication of many, separate attributes to the one (being) does not thereby make a plurality of this one (being), because these attributes or predicates were originally one and were separated off by a single cause. (To venture a paraphrase, all things are 'essentially' one, but are only 'accidentally' many because of emanation.) It is far from clear, however, whether these remarks are merely parenthetical, or are intended to convey Parmenides's awareness that his being gives rise to a plurality, or even some middle-ground between these extremes. Since Simplicius is in general hesitant to credit Parmenides with the actual articulation of full-fledged Neoplatonic doctrines, but rather harmonizes or assimilates what he says into such doctrines, the proper interpretation lies nearer the first named extreme than the second.

Proclus, on the other hand, unequivocally asserts that Parmenides was aware of the plurality of the noetic order, and further that this plurality proceeded from his one being. Cf. in Parm 708.7-709.6, esp. 708.11-19: οὐχ ὡς ἄγνωστον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νοητῶν· αὐτὸς ᾧ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ φάσι· ἦσον γὰρ ἑντὶ πελάζει καὶ πάλιν· ὣς τοῦ δὲ μοι ἐστιν ὁ ὀποθεθεὶν ἰδεῖμαι,
tòthi γάρ πάλιν ἢξομαι αδύνας || καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις. || Μεσοδέουν ἰσοπαλές. || and 70836-40 οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδης || ἐκ τε τοῦ ἐνός ὅντος οἷδε τὸ πλῆθος τὸ νοητὸν προϊόν καὶ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὅντων τὸ ὡν ἐν ἰδρυμένον, περὶ δὲ τὸ τῶν νοητῶν πλῆθος τὴν || ξένωσιν ἔχει.

120.27 – 29. τὸν . . . βραχυλογίας. On κανόνα (27) and κανονικόν (28) cf. 120.3-6; the rule in question is the distinction between essential and accidental predication (cf. 120.9-10, 18-20). For βραχυλογία cf. section II pp. 98-102. In the first sentence τὸν . . . ἐξήνεγκεν, Simplicius provides a negative testimonium, as it were, that nowhere in Parmenides is such a rule to be found (cf. in Phys 140.21-23).

in Phys 142.28 – 148.24. This is the longest continuous passage in Simplicius, or in any other ancient author, concerning Parmenides, or more particularly his doctrine of the the one being. It contains a quotation of most of fragment 8 (B 8.1-52 = 145.1-52 - 146.25) and comments and glosses on many lines in this fragment. At the outset, Simplicius gives two reasons for setting out this doctrine at the conclusion of the discussion of Parmenides in the Physics (187a11): to show how this is consistent with his own previous remarks concerning it (142.29-30; cf. 144.25-28), and to inquire into the reasons for its having occasioned refutations (142.30-31), especially by Plato and Aristotle (147.16-17).
Strictly speaking, the first is treated in 142.31-147.16, the latter at 147.16-148.24, but there are overlaps.

The first (142.31-147.16) constitutes an argument by Simplicius for equating Parmenides's one being with the intelligible (τὸ νοητὸν). Within it three parts are to be distinguished: a) a reply to (among others) Plato (142.31-144.1), b) a reply to Aristotle (144.2-11), and c) the actual identification of the one being with the intelligible (144.11-147.16). Neither reply is so designated by Simplicius, but that they are to be taken as such is clear. In a) Simplicius attempts to locate the one being, beginning with the lowest rung on the (Neoplatonic) ontic ladder, corporeal objects, and concluding with the intellectual; none of these proves a viable candidate. By implication no refutation or objection directed against Parmenides based on an equation of his one being with any of these entities has any force. Since Simplicius later states that Plato constructed his refutation on the basis of the intellectual (147.17-20), that he has him in mind here is clear. In b) Simplicius undertakes to show that Parmenides's one being is neither a common property or universal nor an individual substance; Aristotle is the target here. Two points deserve notice in c) The first is Simplicius's rejection of a literal interpretation of the sphere-simile (146.21-147.2); both Plato and Proclus so interpret it. Secondly, Simplicius admits that some of what Parmenides says about his one being, if heard in isolation, could be taken to apply to the soul or intellect (147.2-6) or the One (147.12-14). This
admission forms part of his larger scheme of harmonization, and more particularly makes the equation of the former by Aristotle and the latter by Plato with Parmenides's one being to some degree explicable.

In similar fashion, three claims are to be discerned in the second part: 2) that Plato's refutation is based on the intellectual (147.17-148.6); b) that Aristotle's whole dichotomous division applies properly to the world of coming to be, not to the intelligible (148.7-11); and c) an attempt to show that both Plato and Aristotle respected and depended heavily on Parmenides, and that their refutations are not of an ad hominem nature (148.11-23).

142.28. The limit (πέρας) here refers to Aristotle's critique of Parmenides, which ends at 187a11. Cf. in Cael 672.24-25 for the same use of πέρας.

142.29 - 31. ἡμῖν ἡ ἐπιστήσεως. Simplicius offers two reasons for his treatment of Parmenides's doctrine of the one being: 1) to demonstrate how it is consistent with his preceding remarks (τοῖς προκειμένοις and cf. 144.27-28), and 2) to examine why refutations were directed against it. He deals with 1) in 142.31-147.16, and with 2) in 147.16-148.24; both parts are complementary. Simplicius is concerned explicitly with the refutations of Plato and Aristotle in 2); Eudemus (as a witness for others' views) is mentioned in 1) (143.5), as is Zeno (144.15). Simplicius's refutation of Alexander at in Phys 77.11-79.2 is echoed in 142.30-36.
142.31 - 144.1. ὁτι...νόμια. This is a continuous argument. Simplicius here demonstrates what Parmenides's one being cannot be, by attempting to identify it with all possible candidates in the whole of reality. He begins by considering physical objects (142.31-143.3) then proceeds 'upwards', Neoplatonically speaking, to the heavens (143.4-8), the soul and hypostasis of Soul in general (143.8-18), and concludes with the intellectual (143.18-144.1). The two remaining candidates, the intelligible and the One are taken up shortly; the former at 144.11-147.12, the latter 147.12-16. Since his search up to and including the intellectual is unsuccessful, Simplicius implicitly rejects all interpretations that identify Parmenides's one being with any of these. Plato, who argues against Parmenides's one being on the basis of the intellectual (cf. 147.17-21), is the principle target of the argument, although materialist interpreters of Parmenides do not escape its force either.

142.31 - 36. ὁτι...ἐστιν. Simplicius quotes Parmenides B 8.1-3 (= 142.34-36) to prove that his one being is not something which comes to be and perishes. τὸ σχήματον...ἐν (32) is a gloss on σχήματ' (35 = B 8.2), as is αἰσθητον (33; cf. DK I 223.27 (Plutarch)) on ὀνόματος (36 = B 8.3); ἁγένητον is a quotation (36 = B 8.3); cf. 144.17-18, 147.3-4. This part of Simplicius's argument is a restatement of his refutation of Alexander (in Phys 77.11-79.12).

143.1 - 3. οὐ ... ὅμοιον. The tacit assumption of this argument is that everything corporeal is divisible. Parmenides himself makes no such argument, although Simplicius is correct to claim that such is his intent. ἀδιαίρετον (1) is a gloss on οὐδὲ διαίρετον (3 = B 8.22); cf. 144.20-21, 142.8-11.

143.4 - 8. ἢτ' ... ἀκεφθετάτη. Simplicius's claim that what Parmenides says about his one being is not appropriate to the heavens relies both on the previous argument (143.1-3), that the one being is not corporeal, and because the heavens are a sphere, not like a sphere, which is a physical thing anyway. Eudemus is cited as the source for the report that some understand the sphere-simile to indicate the heavens (5); the immediate source, however, is Alexander, who reports that Eudemus said this if the first book of his Physica; Simplicius says that he was unable to locate this statement there (in Phys 133.21-29). ἀδιαίρετος (7) refers back to 143.3 (= B 8.22) and 143.1. ὅμοιος (7) is apparently a gloss on ἐναλήγμα (6 = B 8.43), while the single word σφαίρα (7) is used for the phrase σφαίρης ... ὑπερ (6 = B 8.43). ὑπερ may lie behind the phrase ἢ τὸν φυσικὸν ἀκεφθετάτη (8); cf. in Phys 231.33.

143.8 - 11. ὅτι ... ἐχώνης. Having ruled out any form of corporeal existence for Parmenides's one being (142.31-143.8), Simplicius rejects next animate or 'souled' (ψυχικὸν) existence. The reason he offers is that the one being is motionless, while even
the Eleatics agree that animate existence/substance involves motion; cf. *DK* A 46, B 16. ὕληντον (9) is a quotation from B 8.38* (= 143.10); cf. *in Phys* 29.18, 87.1, and 146.11. Cf. also 144.21, 147.4.

143.11 - 18. λέγει . . . ὑπόστασις forms a conclusion to the previous arguments (142.31-143.11). Not only can Parmenides's one being not be equated with any particular thing in the physical world, it in fact transcends the whole hypostasis of soul. Simplicius bases this claim on two verses of Parmenides, B 8.5 (= 143.13) and B 8.29 (= 143.15), which he abbreviates respectively to ὄμοι πᾶν 'all together' (17) and κατὰ τἀυτὰ 'in the same condition' (17). Further, ὄμοι πᾶν εἶναι (12) is an indirect quotation of B 8.5, while κατὰ τἀυτὰ καὶ ὄμοιος ἔχειν is a paraphrase of B 8.29; cf. *Sophist* 249b12 for the latter. The argument here, which Simplicius does not elaborate, runs roughly as follows. Since the being in question is 'all together' and 'in the same condition', these attributes are essential (κατὰ ὄμοιον 16); if they were accidental, then this being might not 'be' in some place or respect. (At *in Phys* 79.27 he denies that Parmenides's being is or possesses an accident.) Further, they hold with respect to both potentiality and actuality (16). At *in Phys* 29.15-18 Simplicius maintains that Parmenides sees that the one being's 'in the same condition' transcends all change and perhaps both actuality and potentiality. Here he says that this distinction clearly holds for being; the sense must be that the two attributes are to be viewed with respect to the actuality-potentiality distinction, and that from such a vantage
transcend the physical world, for nothing physical has these attributes. (Ultimately on the One properly transcends this and all other distinctions, as Xenophanes observed (in Phys 29.12-14).) At 148.21-22 Simplicius says that Parmenides observed that in his one being substance, potentiality, and actuality are one, not that it transcends them.

Simplicius brings up both attributes several times in the balance of the passage (i.e. up to 148.24). For ὄμοι τὰν cf. 144.19-20, 147.13-14 (and in Phys 77.27), and for ὅτα τοῦτα 79.27-28, 144.21-22, 147.4-5, 8-9 (and 77.30).

Proclus quotes or paraphrases B 8.29 four times in in Parm (639.29-30, 1134.23, 1152.29, and 1177.5). He quotes B 8.5 once in the same work (665.26). Philoponus also (mis) quotes B 8.5 (in Phys 65.9; he mentions ὄμοι τὰν at 65.12) as a verse that allows one to grasp Parmenides's conception of being (65.4-6). He also quotes B 8.4 (= 65.7) and B 8.25 (= 65.11), which are also quoted both by Proclus (in Parm 1152.27; 665.24, 708.13 respectively) and Simplicius (in Phys 30.2, 78.13, 120.23, 145.4, in Cael 557.18; in Phys 86.22, 87.23, 145.26 respectively).

143.18 - 144.1. ἐπεξετάσθη . . . νόημα. Simplicius argues against equating Parmenides's one being with the intellectual (τὸ νοερόν); Plato's critique of Parmenides in the Sophist is under attack, despite there being no actual mention of the dialogue here (but cf. 147.17-148.6). There are two arguments, both of which are predicated
on the fact that the intellectual involves plurality, while the one
being is an absolute unity. The first runs: the intellectual exists
by virtue of separation from and turning back upon the intelligible,
whereas in Parmenides’s one being there is no distinction at all
among the intelligible (τὸ νοητὸν), the intellect (νοῦς), and intel-
lecting (νοεῖν) (143.18-25; see notes below). In the second argument
Simplicius states that the intellectual is divided into Forms (εἴδη)
and that where there is division there is also otherness (ἑτερότης),
which ushers in non-being, but that Parmenides completely banished
non-being from his one being (143.26-144.1).

143.18 - 19. τὸ μὲν ... ὑπέστη provides a definition of the
intellectual, whose terms Parmenides’s one being does not meet (20-
25). διάφορος is nearly synonymous with πρόοδος; see 147.9-10 for
the verbal counterpart.

143.20. τὸ ... δηλονότι. The Greek may be corrupt. ταύτὸν εἶναι
[ἐκαυ] νοεῖν τε καὶ νοητὸν is a quotation—gloss of B 8.34-36 (= 143.22-25; that νοητὸν is a gloss on οὐκεκέν ἐστι νόμιμα B 8.34 (= 143.22) 144.22-44 makes likely (cf. also in Phys 87.11-12). Assuming
that εἶναι does double-duty, I translate the whole sentence as
follows: 'but he [Parmenides] says that it is the same for being
and intellect -- that is to say clearly is what is intelligible
and intellect, when he writes'. A partial remedy is to omit καὶ
νοητὸν καὶ νοῦν, which is deleted by E.
43.22 – 25 = B 8.34-36; cf. in Phys 87.14-16, 146.7-9. The intruded gloss τούτοις τοῦ νοητοῦ (23) may be a reminiscence of 87.17.

143.26 – 144.1. έτι . . . νόμιμα. Simplicius takes up the second argument for rejecting the intellectual order as being Parmenides's one being. The first argument centered on the plurality that is inherent in the divided (διαφαίνομενον) intellectual order; the second takes up one of the products of the division, the Form of otherness (ήτερότης). Since otherness ushers in (qualified or relative) non-being, Simplicius argues that to equate the intellectual with the one being flies in the face of Parmenides's explicit denial that the one being has non-being; cf. in Phys 100.21-23, 650.8-14. This argument is recapitulated at 147.22-27. (Simplicius argues that Parmenides does posit non-being in the perceptible order, 144.27-30.)

143.26 – 27. Εἴδη are the Platonic Forms, of which otherness (ήτερότης) is one of the five greatest kinds set out in the Sophist. Simplicius here draws on the Neoplatonic doctrine that the Forms are part of the second hypostasis in its divided aspect to turn the tables on Plato.

143.28 – 144.1. These lines are a succinct refutation of Plato's critique of Parmenides in the Sophist. The equation non-being = other is set out at Sophist 255b8-258e5; the two verses quoted here by Simplicius, B 7.1-2 (= 143.31-144.1), bracket the whole critique.
of Parmenides in the *Sophist* (237a8-9 - 258d1-2); see Chapter I, p. 21. (At 148.3-5 Simplicius says that the demonstration of non-being among the Forms is no great feat.) ὁ δὲ ... ἐξορύξει (29-30) is a paraphrase of B 7.1-2; cf. 144.20. These lines have a parallel in 'Simplicius's' commentary on *De Anima* (260.23-24):

'just as Parmenides says that non-being is nowhere to be seen among the intelligibles'. The non-being in question, however, is of the absolute sort (*in Anima* 260.26-36), not of the qualified sort (= 'other'), set forth in the *Sophist*, which really is found among the intelligibles; cf. *in Phys* 243.31-33.

144.2 - 11. ἀλλ' ... κυνῆσθαι. Simplicius abruptly shifts from Plato's critique of Parmenides to Aristotle's. As discussed in Chapter II, pp.35-39, Aristotle's basic critique is a *reductio* argument based on a dichotomous division (cf. 148.4-11), the full scheme of which is:

```
being is used
  /    \                      /
A in only one way  B in many ways
  /\                    /\  
I substance     II accident (= non-substance)
   /\               /\         
a) universal  b) particular a) universal  b) particular
```

Simplicius takes up only segment I here, since he readily concedes to Aristotle that B by definition introduces plurality (148.7-8), while he discredits II at 143.16. He further divides Ia) into a universal as a pure mental abstraction (144.2-4), or as immanent in
real objects (4-8). Citing some of the same signs of the one being he used in his reply to Plato, Simplicius concludes that the one being cannot fall anywhere under I. Aristotle viewed the absurdities that arose for Parmenides, no matter into what slot in the scheme his one being was put, as proof of the absurdity of his basic doctrine. Simplicius argues that these absurdities tell against Aristotle's interpretation, since the whole (dichotomous) division applies only the perceptible order (144.5-7, 9-11); by implication his interpretation is subject to the refutations produced above against equating the one being with this order (142.31-143.18).

144.2. [κοινότητα]. This is not Aristotle's normal term for 'universal'; according to Bonitz (Index Aristotelicus) 400a11-13, this word appears only in the Ethics and Politics and in the sense of 'community', 'communality'. However, its collocation with διακόοραί 'differentiae' shortly below (144.6) and at in Phys 18.7-8 ensures that it means 'universal' in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. 'genus' or less likely 'species'.

144.2 - 4. οὔτε . . . οὕτη). ἀγέννητος (3-4) and ἀλεξίδρος (4) are taken directly from B 8.3 (= 142.36); cf. 142.32-33. ἀγέννητος is directed against ὑστερογενή (2) "of later creation" (literally "of later origin" LSJ s.v. p. 1906). At in Phys 490.31-491.2 the complex κοινότης ὑστερογενῆς is defined as a common property or univer-
sal abstracted from (concrete) objects by our minds; this definition fits well with the present context. In addition, the mention of a common property in objects (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς 490.34) accords with the following section, 144.4-8. The former is distinguished from the 'distinct' (τὸ ἔξωσιμωτέρον), which is the Form or universal in the intellectual order, from which the given common property in the perceptible order is derived.

Incidentally, Simplicius attributes the word ὑπεροικεῖσθαι in this sense to Aristotle (in Phys 491.1); according to Bonitz (Index Aristotelicus) 807a49-55, however, this word is found once outside the biological works in a similar meaning (Metaphysics N 1091 a33), but never in conjunction with κοινότης.

144.4 - 8. ἀλλ' . . . νοητὸν. Simplicius rejects the equation of the one being with a universal immanent in things for two reasons: it would then be perceptible and fall within the purview of the second half of the poem (5-6); and it would be different (ἀλλὰ) with respect to its differentiae, and thus it would fail to satisfy two of the conditions or 'signs' which Parmenides prescribes for it, namely, that it be all together and embrace both intellect and the intelligible (6-8).

144.4 - 5. ἢ ἐν τοῖς παράγωγοι ἐστὶ κοινότης; Cf. in Phys 490.34-491.1 τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπεστάλατο κοινότητα and note to 144.2-4.
144.5 - 6. αἰσθητῇ . . . λέγει. The *Doxa* is treated in section V. This contention is elaborated in *in Phys* 30.14-31.17 and 38.28-39.20; cf. also 146.26-29.

144.6 - 7. καὶ ἄλλη . . . τὸ μὴ ὄν. The argument is dense. Simplicius tacitly assumes that a universal in the perceptible order depends upon one in the intellectual order (cf. *in Phys* 490.31-491.2). The former is subject to otherness and, by extension, non-being; so the former is *a fortiori* "already subject" (ἡδη πεποιθέναι 6) to them also. Thus the perceptible universal will be manifest in objects in a different way (ἄλλη) for each species its subsumes; that is, it will be delimited by the *differentia(e)* that determine each species. Consequently, this universal will not be 'all together', as Simplicius states in 7-8, and since it is 'other' it will not 'be'.

144.7 - 8. τῶς . . . νοητῶν; Two 'signs' of the one being, which Simplicius mentioned above (143.11-13, 20-25), are brought to bear against equating it with a universal in things: 'is all together now' and 'contains within itself the intellect and the intelligible'. The first of these, τὸ νῦν εἶναι ὅμοιον τῶν (7-8), is an indirect quotation of B 8.5, while τὸ συνηομέναι ἐν ἑαυτῇ τῶν νοηῶν καὶ τὸ νοητῶν (8) is a paraphrase of B 8.34-36. As mentioned in the note to 144.6-7, the first sign is directed specifically against the universal's being different (ἄλλη) with respect to its *differentiae*. 
not to mention its particulars. The second speaks to the external, concrete existence of this universal; by definition, this is distinct from a percipient subject.

144.8 - 9. ἀλλ᾽... ἀπέχει; Simplicius takes up individual substance as a candidate for the one being, and rejects it as being even more discordant (9), presumably that a universal with respect to the signs which Parmenides himself provides for his one being. οὐσίαν... τὴν ἄτομον (8-9) refers to Physics 185a23-25: πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἕνα ἢ ἔποιον ἕνα ἢ ψυχήν μίαν; cf. in Phys 72.9-10.

144.9 - 11. καὶ... κυνηγεῖ. Simplicius lists without further comment attributes of individual substance as his refutation. Each of these fails to answer to the signs of Parmenides’s one being related and discussed in 142.31-144.8. The parallels are as follows:

9 ἕνεκτή ἀγένητον Ὁ 8.3 (= 142.36). Cf. 142.31-33

10 ἐπερότητι διευλημένη Cf. 143.27-144.1 (Β 7.1-2 = 143.31-144.1); perhaps ἐπεί νῦν ἐστιν ὁμοίῳ τὰν Ὁ 8.5 (= 143.13); cf. 143.11-12, 17-18.

ἔνυλος 143.1-3, σωματικόν (1); Ὁ 8.22 = 143.3

αἰσθητή Cf. 144.5-6; 143.16-18

10 - 11 ἄλλη παρὰ τὸ εἰσειθενχὸς Cf. 144.6-8, in which Ὁ 8.5 (= 143.13) and Ὁ 8.34-36 (= 143.22-25) appear
144.11 - 147.6. λείπεται . . . έδροσθαλ. Having completed his own reductio argument for equating the one being with any of the fore-going candidates (142.31-144.11), Simplicius concludes that the one being must be the remaining candidate, the intelligible (τὸ νοητὸν; this whole section is proof of this equation. (The One, which is also a possible candidate, is treated at the end of this section, 147.15-16.)

This section falls into three parts; 1) the equation proper, including the quotation of B 8.1-52 (144.11-146.29); 2) a discussion of some possible ambiguities in what Parmenides said (146.29-147.12); a brief discussion, or rather suggestion, of Parmenides's awareness of the One (147.12-16).

144.11. λείπεται οὖν refers to the whole of 142.31-144.11.

144.12. τὸ νοητὸν πάντων αίτιον 'the intelligible as cause of all things. Simplicius uses a similar phrase of Parmenides's (and others') one being at in Phys 29.5: τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς 'of the intelligible and primary first principle'.
144.12 - 13. ἐν ὧ . . . ἡμαιέως. Cf. in Phys 38.11-13, 136.28, 143.26-27, 147.11, and 148.5-6, 20 for similar formulations. See also 28 A 34 (I.223.28 (Plutarch)).

144.14. ἐν ὧ . . . ἐστί. This clause is directed specifically against the second criticism of Parmenides by Plato in the Sophist (244e2-245d11), that his one being is only derivatively one, not unity itself, since it is a whole of parts. Simplicius argues that in Parmenides's one being there is no difference whatsoever between being (itself) and unity (itself); cf. 144.15-16. Proclus equates the one being with being itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν in Parm 708.7-29), not the intelligible, which on Simplicius's view contains this. Cf. Chapter III, pp. 70-72.

144.14 - 16. διὸ . . . συνωστώτως is an embellished paraphrase of a quotation from Eudemus's Physica; cf. in Phys 97.12-13 and 138.32-33.

144.16 - 25. τούτῳ . . . ὑπερβολή. The stated conclusions (τὰ εἰρημένα συμπεράντωσι) refer to 142.31-144.11, although two refer to even earlier discussions, as noted below; all are recapitulated in the following lines, 17-25.

144.17 - 18. τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀμφεδρὸν is a quotation from B 8.3 (= 145.3); cf. also 142.31-36.
144.18. τὸ ὀλύκηρον μονογενὲς. Diels is correct to see this as a paraphrase of B 8.4 (= 145.4) οἴκλον μονογενὲς. Simplicius does not discuss this sign or conclusion in 142.31-144.11, but does quote B 8.4 at in Phys 30.2, 78.13, in Cael 557.18.

144.18 - 19. τῷ ... διαφρίσθως is a comment on μονογενὲς 'unique' of 18. That is, Simplicius argues that the 'being which is prior to all separation' (cf. 143.18-19, 26-27) must be 'unique', and not some second or secondary thing (δεύτερου).

144.19 - 20. τὸ ὁμοῦ πάν is a quotation from B 8.5 (= 145.5); cf. above 143.11-18.

144.20 τὸ μηδαμῇ χάρους ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ μὴ ὅν is a paraphrase of B 7.1-2 (= 143.31-144.1), particularly B 7.1 οὗ γὰρ μῆποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ἑόντα. Cf. 143.29-30.

144.20 - 21. τὸ ὀδηγοῦσιν is a gloss on B 8.22 (= 143.3, 145.23) οὐδὲ διαξαςετὸν ἐστὶν. Cf. 143.1-3.

144.21 ἀνίνητον is a quotation from B 8.38 (= 143.10, 146.11).

144.21 κατὰ ... κινήσεως is Simplicius's own addition to the foregoing two signs, 'indivisible' and 'unchanging'. Cf. in Phys 29.15-16 for 'change' (μεταβολή), as well as 143.9-11; 143.1-3 for 'division'.
144.21 - 22. τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὅσσον 
ὄν is a paraphrase of
Β 8.29 (= 143.15; cf. 30.6, 146.2). Cf. 143.14-18.

144.22. πέρατι τῶν πάντων ἐστάναι. Diels is probably correct to
suggest πέρας τι 'a certain limit' for πέρατι 'at the limit'. How-
ever, his referring this phrase to Β 8.29 (= 146.2-4) is not cor-
rect; his supplementary reference to Β 8.42 (= 146.15), πεῖρας πύ-
των, is the proper one; cf. 147.14-15.

144.22 - 25. εἶ . . . ὑπερβολή. These two sentences are difficult.
Simplicius has Β 8.34-36 in mind as proof that Parmenides's one
being is the intelligible (τὸ νοητὸν); if this is identical with
intellecting (τὸ νοεῖν) their unity would be inexpressible. It is
unclear how literally he employs these verses. It seems safe to see
οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ νοεῖν (23) as a paraphrase of Β 8.34 οὐνεκέν ἐστὶ νόημα.
(οὐ ἔνεκα 'for the sake of', 'for the purpose of', 'the final cause
of which' may well not be what Parmenides meant; DK (I.238.34 and
note), following Praenkel, renders it by "that" (dass).) τοῦτο (12)
refers to τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ (144.14), and Simplicius may take Β 8.35-36 as
evidence for equating the one being with 'that for the sake of which
there is intellecting'; cf. in Phys 87.12-18. Once he makes this
equation, he deduces that the one being is the intelligible by means
of a premiss which is his own: τοῦ γὰρ νοητοῦ ἐνεκα καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ
ὁ νοῦς 'for both intellect and intellect are for the sake of the
intelligible' (144.23-24). The protasis εἶ . . . νοητὸν (24-25) is
a paraphrase cum-gloss of B 8.34 (with τὸ νοητὸν substituted for ὁ νοηκόν ἐστι νόημα on the basis of 144.22-24), and part of B 8.29 (τούτὸν τ' ἐν τούτῳ). The apodosis, ἐπιλεγμένος . . . ὑπερβολή (25), is Simplicius's own addition, and is Neoplatonic.

144.25 - 27. καὶ εἰ τῷ μὴ δοκῶ γλυκορός, ἡδέως ἢν . . . παραγράφομεν closely parallels καὶ εἰ μὴ δοκῶ τισι τῶν ἐντευξομένων γλυκορός μετά- 

144.26. τὰ . . . Παρμενίδου is repeated verbatim at 146.26 after the quotation of B 8.1-52.

144.27 - 28. διὰ τὲ τὴν πίστιν τῶν ὑπ' ἑκατῶν λεγομένων refers back in particular to 142.29-144.25 and more generally to all of his remarks about Parmenides up to 142.29. Further, the corroboration or proof (πίστις) of his claims based on Parmenides's own words stands in direct opposition to the unquestioning reliance on mere summaries, which Simplicius censures in his Christian antagonists (cf. in Phys 28.32-29.3).

144.28. διὰ τὴν σπάνιν τοῦ Παρμενίδειου συγγράμματος. That Simplicius quotes from this rare work in order to counteract the wide-
spread ignorance of this and of other ancient writings in his time, cf. in Phys 39.20-21: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα [τὰ ἕτη τοῦ Παρμενίδου (cf. 38.29-29. 20)] μὲν διὰ τὴν πολλὴν νῦν ἄγνοιαν τῶν παλαιῶν γραμμάτων μηκύνειν ἀναγκάζομαι. Cf. in Phys 36.24-25.

144.29. τὰ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὑπὸτος ἀναίρεσιν. At in Phys 243.32-33 Simplicius states that Parmenides tried to abolish (absolute) non-being (ἀναίρετο τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ 32) in B 7.1-2 (= 244.1-2). Similarly, at in Phys 78.5-10 he states that after Parmenides has turned away from the way that investigates non-being (78.5; B 7.1 = 78.6), he concludes that only the way of being remains (78.7; B 8.1-3 = 78.8-10). Simplicius leaves no clue as to how many verse elapse before Parmenides draws this conclusion. Cf. in Phys 143.29-144.1 and 650.11-14.

145.1 - 146.25 = B 8.1-52.

146.26. τὰ . . . Παρμενίδου appears verbatim at 144.26 to describe B 8.1-52 (= 145.1-146.25).

146.26 - 27. μεθ' ἄ . . . διαλέγεται. On this transition from the one being (or the truth or the intelligible) to the opinables (or opinion/seeming or the perceptibles) cf. in Phys 30.14-16, 39.25-39.16, 179.33-180.12. As mentioned previously (note to 38.26 Section III), it is unclear whether Parmenides himself used δοξάσων 'opinable' to describe either his account of mortal opinions or the ob-
jects/contents of these opinions. That opinion is about the opinable is etymologically correct; by using this word, however, Simplicius begs the question whether Parmenides used or even could have used it in its full-blown (Neo-) Platonic sense.

146.27. ἄλλας ἀκός. These principles, fire and earth, are different (ἄλλας) from the one being, which as the intelligible is the final cause or principle of both the noetic and perceptible orders; cf. in Phys 29.5-6 and note, and 144.10. In section V the Doxa and its principles will be taken up.

146.27 - 29. ἕν ... ὑπὶν. The quotation, "ἕν ... ὑπὶν" 28-29, is as Simplicius states, from a later passage in the Physics, 188 a20-22. Although this passage is not treated as a lemma, it is quoted with additions, apparently from Alexander, at in Phys 179.31-33; cf. also in Phys 25.15-16, 30.21-22, 38.22-24 (Alexander from Theophrastus's Physicorum Opiniones fr. 6), 274.24.

146.29 - 147.1. εἰ ... πλάκωματος. Although these lines have been discussed in section II, several additional remarks are in order.

146.30 = B 8.43. Simplicius explicitly rejects as absurd Plato's literal interpretation of the sphere-simile (= B 8.43-45) in the Sophist 244e2-7, and by implication Proclus's also, at in Phys 52.21-53.7; he is content to ascribe it to poetic license (146.31-147.2). Simplicius quotes from this simile frequently: in Phys 107.26,
126.22-23, 133.27 (apud Eudemus), 137.16-17, 143.6, 146.16-18; at 52.23, 26-28 and 89.22-24 he quotes the verses apud Plato's Sophist (244e3-5), and an 502.6-7 part of Β 8.44 apud Physics 207a17. Proclus is also fond of these lines and in accord with Plato interprets them literally; see note 93 p. 86.

147.1 - 2. τι . . . ἄγωγάδεον"; Simplicius quotes from Orpheus also at in Phys 33.16, 528.14, 641.32, and 643.30-31. DK does not include ωὲν ἄγωγάδεον among the fragments of Orpheus but does refer to Kern fr. 70.2; cf. 28 A 20 (I.221.9).

147.2 - 16. καὶ . . . ἅρκοθα. Simplicius recapitulates his argument that the one being is the intelligible (142.31 ff.) by dispelling possible ambiguities in what Parmenides said (147.2-3). He allows that one could understand some of Parmenides's words, if taken singly and in some secondary sense, to apply to soul or intellect (3-12) or even the One (12-16); but properly understood, his statements about the one being can only apply to the intelligible. In addition to driving home this argument and thereby convincing any remaining sceptics, this section serves to explain, in part, Aristotle's and Plato's interpretations and refutations of Parmenides's one being. To Simplicius's mind Aristotle equates the one being with soul (cf. 148.7-11), Plato the intellect (cf. 147.17-21). At in Phys 36.28-30 (cf. notes in III and also 37.6-7) Simplicius claims that Aristotle and Plato the apparent meaning in the predecessors'
doctrines on behalf of those of superficial understanding (τῶν ἐπικολοκτητῶν ἄφορομένων οὗτοι κηδόμενοι 28-29); here he offers concrete examples of sources for such misunderstandings.

147.2 - 3. ὅλος χρεότερου λεγόμενα is contrasted with εἰλικρινῶς ἄφορομένα in 147.5. Further, ὅλος χρεότερως λεγόμενον is contrasted with τὸν κυρίον καὶ πάντως λεγόμενον at in Phys 569.2-4; cf. also 113.7 (and 5). The meaning is 'rather roughly, generally, vaguely stated'. Diels (Index Verborum s.v. p. 1410) lists also 16.17, 17.15, 39 (not 29), 208.31, 265.5, 428.23; in these passages the meanings are 'general', 'universal', and 'confused'.

147.3 - 4. ἀγένητον καὶ ἀκωλῆθον is quoted from B 8.3 (= 142.36, 145.3). Simplicius mentioned this sign twice before: 142.32-33, 144.17-18; cf. 144.3-4.

147.4 - 5. ἀγένητον καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ μένου is a conflation of two signs. ἀγένητον is a quoted from B 8.38 (= 146.11, 143.10*); cf. 143.9-11, 144.21. ἐν ταύτῃ μένου is quoted from B 8.29 (= 143.15, 146.2); cf. 143.14-18, 144.21-22.

147.6 - 7. οὖν . . . παράξενη. In 147.4-5 Simplicius allows that 'uncreated and imperishable' are appropriate to soul and intellect. here he takes up only 'uncreated', arguing that the soul and intellect are produced or derived (παράξενη) from the intelligible, even
though they are in a sense 'uncreated'. He presumably means that they are not created in the way things in the perceptible order are, namely in time and space; their creation occurs in logical time and space. (Simplicius uses ὁν not only with the present indicative (as here), but also with the future indicative and optative (cf. Index Verborum s.v. p. 1372).)

147.7-10. καὶ . . . αὐτό. Simplicius takes up the second and third signs, ὁμόνητον καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μένον, mentioned in 147.4-5; ὁμόνητον is quoted from B 8.38 (= 146.11), ἐν τούτῳ μένον from B 8.29 (= 146.2). He offers a definition of ὁμόνητον 'motionless' in the clause ἐν ὕ . . . διακέραται (7-8) 'that in which actual motion is not even discerned', but is content with the tautology that 'remaining the same' applies properly to that which remains (8-9) for the second sign. In 9-10, ψυχή . . . αὐτό, Simplicius states that the soul and intellect issued forth from and turned back upon what remains; the conclusion to be drawn is that the two signs of 7-9 cannot properly apply to soul or intellect; cf. 147.5. ψυχή δὲ (cf. 147.6) may be an intrusion into the text. At 143.8-11 Simplicius maintains that soul is not 'motionless', and that 'remaining in the same condition' transcends soul, and in 147.4-5 says that these two signs apply to intellect. It remains true, however, that soul does emanate from that which remains.

147.10-12. ἔδωκ . . . προέλθουσε is an expansion on the preceding
sentence (9-10); cf. 144.11-14 and in Phys 88.5-8.

147.12 - 16. ως . . . ἵνα τὸν οὐΟτα. Simplicius considers the possibility that Parmenides's one being is the One, for some its signs might be taken to apply to this (12-14). He rejects this identification by suggesting that since Parmenides did not call it simply 'one' but 'one being' and other things as well, he may be indicating that the One is situated above it (14-16). The argument here is that some of what Parmenides says admits of ambiguity, but a careful reading of his words makes clear his meaning; cf. 147.2-5. This section completes the search begun in 142.31 to locate the one being by process of elimination; all candidates fail to meet the signs which Parmenides provides for it except the intelligible.

147.13. ὃς πάντων αὐτοῦ. At in Phys 29.5-6 Simplicius states that Parmenides (and Xenophanes and Melissus) were discoursing about 'the intelligible and primary principle' (περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρῶτης ἀφοροθῆς). Shortly after (29.13-18) he adds the qualification that in effect Xenophanes was discoursing about the One proper, but that Parmenides observed some features in his one which can be applied to the One. In the present passage (147.12-16) the same point is more clearly made: that some of what Parmenides said may be taken, even properly so, to apply to the One or the first cause par excellence. The signs, however, in the earlier passage (29.5 ff.) are not found here.
147.13 - 14. ὁμοῦ τὸ πᾶν is quoted from B 8.5 (= 145.5); a more literal quotation could be produced by transposing τὸ with πᾶν or omitting it altogether with D. At 143.17-18 Simplicius states that ὁμοῦ πᾶν 'all together' transcends the hypostasis of soul; here (12-14) he allows that since Parmenides's being is 'one' and 'all together' it might seem (ὅως) that he was speaking of the One, which also transcends soul. πεῖρος πάλιν 'outermost limit', quoted from B 8.42 (= 146.15), is a second possibly ambiguous sign; it is not mentioned elsewhere by Simplicius. He takes the phrase πεῖρος πάλιν as predicate to 'the one being'; cf. 147.15. Tarán, on the other hand, takes it as predicate to a supplied ἐστὶ 'there is', and translates the clause, "But since there is a furthest limit," p. 86 (he has no note on this verse in his commentary). DK also takes it so: "Aber da eine letzte Grenze vorhanden" (I.238). ἐν in 13 may be a quotation, although Diels does not so punctuate it, from B 8.6 (= 145.6).

147.14 - 16. εἰ... Ἰσραήλ. Simplicius argues against equating the one being with the One, but does allow that Parmenides might have been aware of the latter's transcendent status. The reason he gives is that the One is inexpressible (ἀγρογτον 16) but Parmenides gives his being such attributes as 'one', 'unique', 'limit', and 'limited'; cf. also in Phys 120.20-28. Even the name 'one' should not be given to the One; cf. in Phys 88.31-33.
147.14. ἐν ὧν does not appear as a phrase in the extant verses of Parmenides, although at Ἐ 8.6 (= 145.6) Parmenides does say that being (ἐόν from Ἐ 8.4 = 145.4) is 'one' ἐν.

147.15. μονογενής is a prose rendition of μονογενής of Ἐ 8.4 (= 145.4); cf. 144.18. Simplicius also quotes Ἐ 8.4 at in Phys 30.2, 78.13, and 120.23*, and in Cael 557.18*.

147.15. πέρας μέν "τετελεσμένον" ἔσ. Ἐ 8.42 (= 146.15) is quoted in part here; πέρας is a prose version of πείρας. Since in 147.14 Simplicius seems to take πείρας πῦλον (Ἐ 8.42) as the predicate of τὸ ἑόν, he allows that one might be led to conclude that the One is at issue; here he argues that this 'limit' is also 'limited', which is an impossible attribute for the One.

147.15 - 16. τάχα . . . Ἀριστοφάνης. Here, as at in Phys 29.15-18 and 100.22-23, Simplicius tentatively ascribes to Parmenides awareness of the One. At in Phys 88.31-33 he states that in the Parmenides Plato accepts Parmenides's one being and from it discovers what is beyond it (τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐμείνο); one can infer that Parmenides himself did not or was not able to do so. Simplicius holds nearly the opposite opinion from Proclus on Parmenides's awareness of the One; see Chapter III, pp. 70-71 and note 84 (p. 84). However, Simplicius follows Proclus's interpretation of the Parmenides and of Parmenides's role therein; see Chapter III, p. 70.
147.16 - 148.24. τὰς ... ἕπεμβάλλουντες. Simplicius considers the second issue of the whole passage (142.28-148.24), how or why do both Plato and Aristotle refute Parmenides's doctrine of the one being; compare 142.30-3 with 147.16-17. This issue is all the more urgent now that Simplicius has shown that the one being can only be the intelligible (142.31-147.16). He feels the need to explain how Plato and Aristotle could have criticized so sublime an entity as the intelligible (cf. in Phys 88.22-23). The explanation he offers is that both misidentified the one being and that their refutations are not directed therefore against the intelligible; he argues that both make use of the intelligible in their own philosophies (147.17-22). This section falls into three parts: 1) Plato's refutation (147.17-148.7); 2) Aristotle's refutation (7-11); 3) a defense or apology of both refutations (11-22).

147.16 - 17. τὰς ... Παρμενίδην. At 142.30-31 Simplicius states that he is going to investigate why or against what the refutations of the one being arise; here he specifies that Plato and Aristotle are the authors of these refutations.

147.17 - 148.6. ἦ ... δύνας. Plato's refutation of Parmenides's one being is here examined, albeit in a disjointed manner. A paraphrase, it is hoped, will bring out its underlying structure. Simplicius states that Plato tries to refute Parmenides on two counts: 1) that he, Parmenides, says that being is one; and 2) that he ut-
terly abolishes non-being (147.17-19). Simplicius discredits the attack on 1) (147.21-22) and 2) (147.22-148.6) by claiming that Plato's refutation is based on the intellectual order, which (by definition) is pluralistic and includes non-being (147.19-27, 148.3-5), whereas Parmenides's one being is the intelligible, which neither is pluralistic nor includes non-being (148.5-6). He also attempts on independent grounds to reject 2); that is, that Parmenides did not utterly abolish non-being. He argues that Parmenides allows qualified non-being to reside among the opinables (147.27-30), and only abolishes absolute non-being (147.31). Interspersed in this argument is some polemic directed against Plato. In 148.3-5, for example, Simplicius deprecates Plato's proof (ἐπιστῆμα) that qualified non-being is found among the Forms (cf. 147.22-25), and in 147.27-148.3 he argues that both Parmenides and Plato agree both on qualified and absolute non-being; cf. section VII. At in Phys 86. 30-90.22 Plato's refutation is discussed and quoted in toto; Sophist 244b6-245e5 = 89.5-90.20.

147.18 - 19. διχως . . . το μη δον. Both grounds come from the Sophist. The first, that Parmenides's claim that being is one (το εν λεγειν το δον 18) is open to objection, is found at 244b6-245e2. Plato formulates both a linguistic (244b6-d13) and a part-whole argument (244d14-245e2) argument against this claim; cf. Chapter I pp. 20-26. The second, that Parmenides utterly abolished non-being (το τελεως οναιτειν το μη δον 18-19), is at issue throughout 237a3-
258e5, and specifically refuted at 241d5-258e5 (note 258c6-35); cf. notes to 143.28-144.1 above.

147.19-20. ἀπὸ τοῦ νοεροῦ καὶ διακριθεὶσου διανόησιν τὴν ἀντιλογίαν πεποίηται: 'he [Plato] makes his refutation on the basis of the intellectual and (or 'i.e.')) separated order'. At 143.18-144.1 (cf. notes above) Simplicius argues that Parmenides's one being cannot be the intellectual.

147.20-21. ἐν φ... ἐν... Simplicius maintains that Parmenides's one being is the intelligible, 'in which there is a single nature of both one and being' (ἐν φιλοσοφία τοῦ ἕνος καὶ τοῦ ἕντος) at 144.11-14; cf. notes above. On this and the preceding clause, (19-20) cf. in Phys 136.27-31. See further Chapter III, p. 73.

147.21. τὰ μέρη ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου is directed against the part–whole argument of the Sophist (244d14–245e2). As Simplicius states in the following sentence (21-22; cf. also in Phys 51.21–53.7), Plato argues on the basis of parts (ἐν τούτων) distinct or separate from their whole that the one being is not one by many; cf. Chapter I pp. 24–26, and in Phys 88.33–89.5. Simplicius holds that the separation of parts from the whole (in this case the intelligible) is a feature of the intellectual order and consequently does not apply to Parmenides's one being. Plato's argument rests on his literal interpretation of the sphere-simile, B 8.43–45 (= Sophist 244e3–5; cf.
147.21. ἐκ τούτων refers to the parts (τὰ μέρη) of 21. Cf. Sophist 244e6-7: τοιούτοις γε τὸ ὄν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει, ταύτα δὲ ἔχειν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέσον ἔχειν, and 245b1 τὸ δὲ γε τοιούτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὃν συμπεριέται τῷ [ὄλω] λόγῳ.

147.22 - 148.6. τὸ ... ὅντος. Parmenides’s alleged absolute rejection of non-being (144.18-19) is considered. As noted above (to 147.17-148.6) several arguments are interwoven throughout. Simplicius is particularly concerned to prove that Parmenides only banished absolute non-being (147.31), while allowing qualified non-being a place among the opinables (147.27-28).

147.22 - 23. τὸ ... ἐπεροτητὸς. Cf. 143.27-28 and Sophist 258d5-e3.

147.23 - 25. δι’ ἦν ... ἔστι. Cf. Sophist 255e3-6, 258d5-e3, 259a4-b6, and Chapter I, pp. 20-22; further, in Phys 136.21-23.

147.25 - 27. καὶ ... διαστατικῶς. τούτο picks up τὸ μὴ δῦν (22) 'non-being'; ὅπως ... ἐπεροτητὸς is a near verbatim repetition of 143.27-28; cf. also in Phys 100.21-22. The next two clauses specify the loci (note ἐξεῖ πάντως 147.25) and modes of being of non-be-
ing; it is found among the intellectual(s) as a Form (i.e. otherness) (26-27), and among the perceptibles separately (διατηρώμενος) (27). That is, the separation and otherness which usher in or are equivalent to non-being, are realized as logically discrete Forms in the intellectual, and as physically discrete objects in the perceptible order. Simplicius is hammering home his contention that non-being has no place at all in the intelligible, which is totally devoid of separation.

147.27 – 30. τοῦτο ... ἡγούμενος. Simplicius argues that Parmenides himself posits qualified non-being among the opinables; this is to show that Parmenides, Plato to the contrary, did not absolutely abolish non-being (147.18-19). However, Simplicius argues more from doctrines set out by Plato in the Sophist than from Parmenides himself (cf. in Phys 137.10-20) Since Parmenides calls his ordering of mortal opinions 'deceptive' (ἀπατηλόν), and since deception (ἀπατη) involves qualified non-being, Parmenides therefore 'manifestly allows' this kind of non-being among the opinables. Compare ὅπου ... ἡγούμενος (147.29-30) with Sophist 260c3-6: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὅντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτ' ἔστι ποὺ τὸ ψεύδος ἐν διανοίᾳ τῇ καὶ λόγος γιγνόμενον. - οὕτως. - ὅντος δὲ γε ψεύδους ἔστιν ἀπάτη: and 240e10-241a1 καὶ λόγος οίμαι ψευθής οὕτω κατὰ ταύτα νομισθήσεται τὰ τὰ ὅντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὅντα εἶναι. (Cf. B 6.8-9 for this last phrase.)

At 240d1 ἀπατῶν and ἀπατητική are used of the sophist and his
art respectively.

147.28. ἐν τοῖς δοξωτοῖς. As mentioned previously (notes to 38.26, 39.10 section III), it is unclear that Parmenides himself used the word 'opinable' (δοξωτόν). Here (cf. 147.27) as in in Phys 38.26 it is simply synonymous with 'perceptible' (αἰσθητόν).

147.28 -29. ἀπατηλόν ... δόξα is a close paraphrase of B 8.51-52 (= 146.24-25); it might even be termed a 'prose' translation of these verses. ἀπατηλόν, κόσμον, and δόξα are quoted directly; ἐπών and βοστεῖος are prose equivalents of ἐπέων and βοστεῖας: but on the latter cf. in Phys 30.18, 38.34.

147.29 - 30. ὅπως ... ἡγούμενος. Cf. note to 142.27 above. Simplicius's argument is etymological: ἀπατή (29) and ἀπατηλόν (30) pick up ἀπατηλόν (B 8.52 = 146.25) of Parmenides (147.28). It is conceivable that Plato's doctrine of falsehood or false statement in the Sophist draws, in some degree, from Parmenides. Cf. note to 147.27-30 above.

147.31 - 148.3. τὸ ... λέγομεν". Simplicius argues that far from refuting Parmenides for abolishing absolute non-being, Plato is wholly in accord with him (cf. 148.18-19). Conversely, in 147.27-30 he argues that they also agree in not abolishing qualified non-being.
147.31. τὸ μὲντοι παντελῶς μὴ ὄν ὁμο ὁ Παρμενίδης μόνος ἀναμεῖ. Cf. in Phys 243.32 ὁ μὲν Παρμενίδης εἶς τὸ ἀτέλὲς μὴ ὄν ἀποβλέπων ἀναμεῖ τὸ μὴ ὄν. Cf. also note to 148.3-6 below.

147.30 – 148.3. ἄλλα . . . λέγομεν". Simplicius's proof for his contention that Plato as well as Parmenides did away with absolute non-being is Sophist 258e6-8 (= 147.32-148.3; 258d7-259a4 = in Phys 238.24-239.3). At in Phys 135.18-136.10 Sophist 258c6-259b6 is quoted to refute Alexander's claim that Plato introduces absolute non-being (cf. in Phys 135.15-17, 136.31-32; and below 10-12). (258e 6-7 (= in Phys 136.12-13) is singled out as evidence sufficient to refute Alexander.) Parmenides's injunction about non-being, B 7.1-2, is quoted at Sophist 258d2-3 (= in Phys 258d2-3) to iterate its groundlessness. At in Phys 78.5 Simplicius paraphrases B 7.2 (= 78. 6) thus: καὶ Παρμενίδης ἀποστέλλει τῆς ὄσος τῆς τὸ μὴ ὄν ζητοῦσιν. In the present passage, the phrase which introduces the quotation is similar: ὁ Πλάτων, ὡς γε καὶ τὴν ζήτησιν ἀποκεύεται τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ (31-32). Simplicius's contention that there is agreement between Plato and Parmenides on absolute non-being is slightly ironic.

148.3 - 6. καὶ . . . ὀντος. In the foregoing (147.17-148.3) Simplicius has distinguished three varieties of non-being: 1) absolute non-being (147.3); 2) qualified non-being in the intellectual (147. 26-27); and 3) qualified non-being in the perceptible order (147.31-148.3). He argues that although Plato and Parmenides concur in
abolishing 1) (147.31-148.3), since Parmenides allows 3) (147.27-30), he does not absolutely abolish non-being (cf. 147.18-19). (Simplicius mentions Plato's position on 3) at in Phys 100.23-26.) In the present passage Simplicius contends that Plato's proof of the existence of 2) is 'nothing extraordinary' (οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν) (3-5). That 2) is not found in the intelligible at all is stated in 5-6.

148.4 - 5. οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. That this demonstration is 'nothing surprising' may be based solely on the Neoplatonic tenet that the intellectual order is pluralistic and admits of otherness (cf. 147.10-12, 25-27 where Simplicius states that this is 'clear' (δῆλον). On the other hand, Simplicius's reply to Plato may be of a more general nature: that his refutation is circular. Since Plato assumes the existence of five kinds in the Sophist, including otherness, his proof of the plurality of 'being' or 'what is' and of the existence of non-being (= other) is a trivial consequence. At any rate, this somewhat sarcastic remark about Plato's refutation of Parmenides has a close parallel at in Phys 52.21-53.7, especially 53.6-7 οὐδὲν ἑξωμολόν.

148.4 - 5. ἐν . . . ἐπιδεῖξαι. Cf. 147.22-24 (τὸ . . . ἔστι.). Cf. further in Phys 244.3-5, 245.31-246.2.

148.5 - 6. ἐν . . . ὄντως. Simplicius repeats, in expanded form, 144.19-20: τούτω [τῷ ἐν ὄντως] δὲ καὶ τό ὁμοί πάν καὶ τό μηδομηχάραν
The latter 'conclusion' is based on B 7.1-2 (= 143.31-144.1), which Simplicius similarly paraphrases at 143.29-30 and 243.31-33; B 7.2 is paraphrased at *in Phys* 78.5, 650.11-12, 14; cf. 100.22. ὅλοτελής "quite complete" (*LSJ* s.v. p. 1219) does not appear in Parmenides, but Simplicius uses it to describe the intelligible here and at *in Phys* 650.5-6, 1155.7. It may be a gloss on τετελεσμένον B 8.42 (= 146.15); cf. 147.15 and especially *in Phys* 29.10-12. For νοητόν cf. e.g. *in Phys* 80.4, 144.12, 23. Οn πάντα δύνατα πρὸς ὑπαμένως cf. 144.12-14, 147.10-12, and 88.5-8.

148.7 - 11. ὁ . . . προειλημμένης. Simplicius now takes up Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides; cf. 142.30-31, 147.16-17. He discounts it as being based on a (dichotomous) division, which applies to the world of becoming and not to the intelligible. A fuller discussion of this refutation appears at *in Phys* 71.26-73.4 (at 73.2-4 Simplicius states that his account for the most part follows that of Porphyry); cf. also 88.11-29. Simplicius's reply to both Plato and Aristotle is that they misidentified the one being; the former with the intellect, the latter soul (cf. 147.2-12).


148.7 - 9. ἦ . . . συμβεβηκὼς is a paraphrase of Physics 185a21-b5.
Only the phrase πολλοχῶς λέγεται τὸ δὲ is quoted from Aristotle.

148.9 -11. καὶ ... προειλημμένης. Simplicius argues that if this division/separation into substance and accident become manifest in the world of coming to be, that is because it is precontained in the intellectual division as an effect. Consequently, it (or its products) has nothing to do with the intelligible. Simplicius may have, for οὐκ ἢ (8) at any rate, 144.2-11 (especially 8-11) in mind. Further, since one of the signs of the one being is its being indivisible (B 8.22 = 145.3), a refutation based on division belies ignorance on the part of its author. For the second clause, τῦς ... προειλημμένης, cf. in Phys 88.20-22, 24-29, and 137.27-30.

148.11 - 24. μηδεὶς ... ἐπεμβάλλοντες. Simplicius concludes the whole passage (142.28 ff) with a defense of Plato's and Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides (11-22), and an apology for his own metaphysical excursus (22-24). Simplicius does not so much defend these refutations, which he rejects in 147.16 - 148.11, as offer mitigating circumstances for their evaluation. He maintains that both Plato and Aristotle set forth the 'misunderstandings' of their predecessors in a generous way (11-13), and also testify to Parmenides's wisdom (13-17). In 17-22 he finds a consensus among the three on the one being; he makes no mention of a conscious debt of the two to Parmenides, but rather implies that they are ultimately in accord with him despite their misguided refutations. Cf. in Phys 36.25-
37.9.

148.11 - 13. μηδεὶς . . . προσακοστέλλουσιν. Simplicius's claim that both Plato and Aristotle are 'generous' in their criticisms of the conceptions of others is questionable. Plato, for example, is fairly contemptuous of Thrasymachus in Republic I. Similarly, Aristotle accuses Anaxagoras of not understanding his own words in De Generatione et Corruptione 314a13 (which Simplicius quotes at in Phys 163.12-13), and uses the terms ἄγροικότερος (Metaphysics A 986b27) and φορτικός (Physics 185a10-11) of Melissus; cf. note to 148.16-17 below.


148.12 - 13. τὰς γενησομένας παρακώσις defies translation. παρακώσις and its derivatives in this work (in Phys 700.20, 821.28, 1177.18; Index Verborum s.v. p. 1414) mean 'to be mistaken', 'to misunderstand'; but to speak of 'setting forth one's future misunderstandings' is in comprehensible. The simplest remedy is to emend γενησομένας to γενομένας: 'the misunderstandings of old'; cf. in Phys 36.25-28.

148.14 - 16. ο . . . παρακίδους. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus and Parmenides respectively.
quoted from Theaetetus 183e8: καί μοι ἐμάλιν βάδος τι ἔχειν πιστάταις γενναίον. (As Diels notes (ad in Phys 36.31), Simplicius apparently confuses this quotation with one made concerning Heraclitus.) καὶ διδάσκαλον . . . παραδίδους (15-16) is a general reference to the Parmenides, although the 'training' (γυμνασία 135d7) may be intended. Further, at in Phys 88.31-33 Simplicius states that in the Parmenides Plato uses Parmenides's doctrine of the one being to discover the One and therefrom relates the orders of the one (cf. note to 148.17-18 below). He is in accord with Proclus's interpretation of Parmenides's one being in the Parmenides; cf. in Parm 1033.22-1036.23 and Chapter III, p. 70.

148.16 - 17. ὅ δὲ . . . ἀντιδιαστέλλων. As is the case with Plato (14-16), Simplicius cites two examples of Aristotle's awareness of Parmenides's wisdom. The first, ὅ . . . ὑπονοοῦν (16), contains in που βλέπειν a truncated quotation from Metaphysics A 986b26-28 (i.e. ἀλλαχοῦ): οἱ μὲν δὲ καὶ πάθην ὡς ὀντες μικρὸν ἀγροικὸτερον, ἐνοφάνης καὶ Μέλισσος. Parmenides δὲ μᾶλλον βλέπων ἐνικε που λέγειν (cf. Physics 186a31-31). Cf. in Phys 37.1-2. The second, πρὸς . . . ἀντιδιαστέλλων (17) refers to Physics 184b16-17. Simplicius follows Alexander in seeing Aristotle here contrasting Parmenides and Melissus with the physicists; cf. in Phys 40.23-25 (and Diels' note), 41.2-3, 148.29-149.2.

148.17 - 22. ἐπεὶ . . . δεσμύμενος. Simplicius sets out the agree-
ment among Plato, Aristotle, and Parmenides on the one being. However he does not state how this agreement serves to reveal Plato's and Aristotle's awareness of Parmenides's wisdom, nor again whether this agreement is fortuitous or belies a (conscious ?) debt of the two to Parmenides. A possible explanation is that Plato and Aristotle, by independently adopting the one being, ultimately testify to Parmenides's profundity. At in Phys 87.7-88.30, however, Simplicius states that both take over Parmenides's doctrine, not that they arrive at it independently. Cf. sections VII, VIII, and IX.

148.17 - 18. ὁ Πλάτων . . . ἄνωθεν. Simplicius appears to have the second hypothesis of the Parmenides (142b1-155e3, esp. 142c9-143a2) in mind; cf. in Phys 87.24-88.11, 30-33, and Chapter III, pp. 70-71. He may simply intend 128a8-b1, in which Parmenides is explicitly praised both for his doctrine and his proofs thereof; there is no explicit praise in the second hypothesis.

148.19 - 20. ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ . . ΠΟΛΥΜΟΡΦΩΝΗ. The reference is to Metaphysics Δ 1069a1-1076a4, especially 1071b3-1076a4, where Aristotle argues for the existence of a single, immaterial, imperishable substance which is the unmoved mover (i.e. final cause) of the whole universe, and which is the content of its own thought. οὗτό (19) refers to this entity; cf. in Phys 87.7-18. The quotation, οἷς ἄγαθόν πολυμορφών (148.20 = 87.10), is proximately from Metaphysics Δ 1076a4 and ultimately from Iliad 2.204; cf.
Politics 1292a13-15.

148.20. πρότερον ούτοι seems to indicate that Parmenides's anticipation of Aristotle in equating νοῦς with νοεῖν (20--22) is purely chronological, since there is no mention of direct or conscious influence. At in Phys 87.11-18, however, Simplicius states that Aristotle took (λαθών 13) this doctrine from both Plato and Parmenides.

148.21 – 22. οτι .. θεοκάμενος refers to Aristotle alone. In addition to the equation here of intellect and intelligible, ταύτων ἐκεῖ νοῦς καὶ νοητῶν (cf. in Phys 87.11-18, 144.25, De Anima 430a2-8, and Metaphysics Δ 1072b20-21, 1074b33-35, 1075a3-5), the other terms of the equation, έσωτερικά καὶ δύναμις καὶ ένέργεια, are clearly Aristotelian. Simplicius is also claiming that in the unmoved mover of Metaphysics Δ all these entities are one; cf. e.g. 1071b2-3, 12-15, 1072a3-10. Cf. in Phys 29.15-18.

148.22 – 24. ὀλλὰ .. ἔπεμψάλοντες. For similar apologies cf. in Phys 39.20-21, 88.11-12, and 90.20-22. The proverb quoted here, ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσωμάτων πῆδαν 'to leap beyond the bounds', is found at Cratylus 413a7-b1: δοκῶ τε ἢση μακράτερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐρωτῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσωμάτων ἄλλεσθαι.
in Phys 162.11 - 22. καὶ γὰρ . . . φῶν; Simplicius takes up Parmenides's proof that real being is uncreated (ἀγέννητον), and in particular his denial and reason for denying that being comes to be from non-being (13-22; B 8.6-10 = 162.18-22). This passage occurs in the larger context of a discussion of Anaxagoras's doctrine of the homoiomeria (cf. 186a27-31). Closely following Aristotle (cf. 187a27-29), Simplicius says that one of the two reasons why Anaxagoras was led to this doctrine was his acceptance of the 'doctrine common to the physicists', nihil ex nihil (162.7-11; the second reason is set out in 163.31 ff.). Simplicius thinks that this doctrine or axiom (cf. 24, 26) is not the common property of the physicists alone, for both Parmenides and Melissus make use of it (11-24). Simplicius here treats of Parmenides to criticize or correct Aristotle (and Alexander cf. in Phys 40.23-41.9), who sets them in contradistinction to the physicists (184b16-17), for his implicit denial that this doctrine is common to the 'anti-physicists' also.

162.11 - 23. καὶ γὰρ καὶ Παρμενίως . . . καὶ Μέλισσος δὲ. Cf. in Phys 87.5-6 for an almost identical construction. A good case can be made for understanding the passage as a criticism of Aristotle. Aristotle does contrast Οἱ φιλοσοφοὶ with Parmenides and Melissus at 184b16-17, and in his discussion of Anaxagoras here uses the expressions: τὴν κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φιλοσοφῶν (187a27-28) and περὶ τῶν ὀμογνωμονοῦν τῆς δόξης ἀπαντῶς Οἱ περὶ φύσεως (187a34-35); cf. notes to in Phys 41.5-9. Further, Simplicius asserts that Parme-
nides was the first ancient on record to propound this argument or doctrine of nihil ex nihilō (in Cael 136.30-137.6; B 8.6-9 = 137.3-6). If Ilsetraut Hadot is correct to claim that Simplicius's in Cael antedates his in Phys, it is difficult to avoid finding an ironic criticism of Aristotle here. At in Phys 162.23-24 Simplicius uses the phrase [Μέλισσος] τῷ κοινῷ τούτῳ χρησάμενος ἀξιώματι with τὴν κοινὴν τῶν φυσικῶν in mind; cf. in Phys 103.13-15. At in Phys 162.2-6 Simplicius asserts that Aristotle discusses Anaxagoras after those who say that being is one, because their doctrine, which in effect does away with nature (γόοιν ἀναλείπειν 5), seems the more absurd. Consequently, that the absurd, anti-physicists Parmenides and Melissus employ this axiom of the physicists is a pointed criticism of Aristotle.

162.11 - 17. καὶ γὰρ . . . οὗτοι. Simplicius presents Parmenides's argument or proof in B 8.6-10 (= 162.18-22) that (real) being is uncreated in the following order: 1) that it does not come to be from being (μὴ τε . . . ὄν 12-13); 2) that it does not come from non-being (μὴ τε . . . ἐστι 13-14); 3) an additional argument for 2) (τὴν . . οὗτος 14-17). The same order is found in in Phys 78.24-27, which paraphrases B 8.3-14 (= 78.12-23), a fuller quotation of the argument that (real) being is uncreated; cf. 79.29-80.4 and in Cael 136.30-137.6.

162.12. ὦτι ἀγένητον τὸ ὄντως ὃν ἔδειξε. Cf. in Phys 78.24-25,
79.29-30, in Cael 136.32-137.2. Of the various signs or marks of being which Parmenides relates (cf. B 8.2-3), Simplicius makes much of its being uncreated (ἀγένητον B 8.3); cf. in Phys 28.7, 30.4, 78.24-25, 79.29-30, 142.32, 144.32, 144.3-4, 9, 17, 147.16, in Cael 136.32-137.2. In addition to quoting ἀγένητον (12) from B 8.3 (= in Phys 145.3), Simplicius here paraphrases B 8.6-7 (= 162.18-19) τίνα... αὐξηθέν. On τὸ ὄντως ὅν cf. note to in Phys 100.22 above.

162.12-13. μὴ... ὅν). There is nothing in the extant fragments of Parmenides, and particularly in B 8.6-10, which corresponds to this half of the disjunct (cf. note to 162.11-17 above). The order of the paraphrase, however, might argue for its 'original' being in or between B 8.6-7 (= 162.6-7), for οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος of B 8.7, which has no correlative in B 8.6-10, is clearly paraphrased at 162.13 μὴτ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντως: cf. in Phys 78.25-26. Diels posits a lacuna after αὐξηθέν, which he supplies as follows: < οὔτ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐόντος ἐγέντ' ὅν· ἄλλο γὰρ ὃν πρὶν ἐπην· > οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντως. (Kranz, however, thinks that B 8.6-7 'self-evidently' sets forth coming to be and growth from being DK I.235 note to line 8.)\footnote{Taran emends B 8.12 to get the positive half of the disjunct, pp. 82, 95-102.}

162.13 - 14. μὴτ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντως repeats nearly verbatim B 8.7 = 162.19. Cf. in Phys 78.25-26 οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντως and B 8.12 (= 78.21).
162.13 - 14. δει γὰρ ἐκ τινος γίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὁν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ.

The first clause, which is explained in what follows (14-17), does not have a parallel in Parmenides (cf. in Phys 78.25-26 where only the second clause, in a slightly different form, appears). The second clause is not a close paraphrase of B 8.7-9 (cf. B 2.5-8 = in Phys 116.30-117.1), but does reflect other statements by Parmenides. That non-being, or its way of inquiry, is nothing both B 6.2 (= in Phys 117.5) μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἐστι and B 8.10 (= 162.22) τὸν μηδὲνος, which Simplicius apparently equates with non-being in 15-16, make clear. Cf. in Phys 78.26 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐστι τὸ μὴ ὁν.

162.14 - 15. τὴν . . . προσέθηκεν. Simplicius begins his explanation of δει γὰρ ἐκ τινος γίνεσθαι of 162.13, but more importantly sets out the claim that Parmenides added the reason for the 'absolute necessity' (δειν πάντως) of the axiom nihil ex nihilo, or rather its corollary that if anything comes to be it comes from being. Simplicius mentions Parmenides (and Melissus) in the passage to prove his accord with the physicists on this axiom (cf. note to 162.11-22); that Parmenides actually formulated a reason for its operation is the heart of the proof. Accordingly, Simplicius shifts from 'real' being, a merely putative candidate for come to be, to the more general 'everything that comes to be' (τὸ γίνεσθαι); ὅλως γὰρ in the following sentence (15) emphasizes this shift. He assumes that the non-being in question is of the absolute variety, for he argues that Parmenides allowed qualified non-being among the
in Phys 147.27-30); cf. in Phys 78.28-29. \( \text{προσέθηκεν} \) 'added' is apparently to be taken in its literal sense; after rejecting 'from non-being' in B 8.7-9 (= 162.19-21), Parmenides added a reason in B 8.9-10 (= 162.21-22).

162.15 - 17. άλως . . . ὑστερον; is a free paraphrase of B 8.9-10 (= 21-22) τί δ' ἄν . . . φῶν; Simplicius adds άλως γάρ 'for in short, in general' (cf. LSJ s.v. \( \text{άλως} \) III.2 p. 1218) to generalize B 8.9-10 from a statement about 'real' being to 'whatever comes to be' τὸ \( \gammaινόμενον \) (15), which is to be supplied as the subject of \( \text{έγένετο} \) (16) and as subject-accusative to \( \gammaενέσθαι \) (16). Further, \( \text{άλως} \) picks up \( θείν τὸν τόκος \) of 14. In \( \text{εἰ} \ \text{ἐκ τοῦ μὴ \( \text{δύνατος} \) Simplicius draws either on \( \text{οὔτ' \ εἰκ } \ \text{μὴ} \ \text{ἐντὸς} \ (B 8.7 = 162.19) \) or \( \text{τοῦ μηδενός} \) (B 8.10 = 162.22) to construct a protasis (εἰ) for the apodosis in B 8.9-10 ἄν . . . άφοεν . . . ; \( \text{έγένετο} \) is to be supplied by ellipsis from \( \text{ὅτε} \ \text{έγένετο} \) (16). \( \text{τίς} \ \text{ἡ \( \text{άπωκλήσως} \) is a gloss on τί . . . άφοεν} \) (and perhaps including άφοεν) of B 8.9; at in Phys 78.26 the paraphrase of these lines begins with διὰ τί δὴ alone. To judge from LSJ (s.v. p. 202), \( \text{άπωκλήσως} \) must mean 'choice by lot or chance, unreasonable choice' (the adverbial phrase \( \text{κατ' \ άπωκλήσωσιν} \ "without reason, at random, fortuitously" attested in Galen et al. conveys the sense required here); cf. in Phys 649.10 for the same phrase \( \text{τίς} \ \text{ἡ \( \text{άπωκλήσως} \.} \) (Diels, Index Verborum p. 1377, lists only 649.10 not the present passage for \( \text{άπωκλήσως} \); he also cites the verb \( \text{άπωκλήσωσι} \) med. 923.7 (\( \text{άπωκλήσωσι} \), the form in question,
seems in fact to have a passive sense). τοῦ τότε γενέσθαι, ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἄλλα μὴ is Simplicius's addition; cf. in Phys 78.26-27. γενέσθαι may, however, be a gloss on ἀρξάμενον φῦν of B 8.10 (= 162.22). Finally, πρῶτερον ἢ ὑστερον is the inverse of the poetic hysteron proteron of ὑστερον ἢ πρῶτερον B 8.10 (= 22), πρῶτερον being substituted for πρῶτερον: cf. in Phys 78.27.

in Cael 136.18 - 137.12. εἰ . . . τὸ δὲν; Simplicius refutes Philoponus's claim that the ancients thought that there was coming to be from non-being, and that non-being therefore exists (136.18-20, 27-29). He mentions Parmenides as the first to have propounded the antithetical theses that nothing comes to be from non-being (136.32-137.2), and as proof quotes B 8.6-9 (= 137.3-6); cf. in Phys 77.9-29, 162.11-22. A second point of interest is that Simplicius here censures Philoponus, as he did Alexander (in Phys 80.15-17), for failing to read the ancients with sufficient care.

136.18 - 26. "εἰ . . . παρῆκα" is quoted from Philoponus's work VI Libri τῶν πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (περὶ ἀμφιβολίας κοσμοῦ); cf. Index Nominum s.v. Ioannes Philoponus p. 771 and in Diels (in Phys) pp. 1447-1448. Simplicius's contempt for Philoponus, whom he does not deign to call by his proper name (cf. Indices mentioned above), takes on a nearly comical tone in in Cael 119.12-13 φέρε, τὸν μέγιστον Ἰρακλέα παρακαλέσαντες συνεργὸν ἐπὶ τὴν
κάθαρσιν τῆς κόπρου τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ καταβαινώ-
μεν and again in 135.31-136.1 ὅποτε καὶ νῦν οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως
tὸ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους σαφηνίσαι προθέμενος
eἰς τὴν Ἀὐγέου κόπρον ἐμπέπτωνα.

136.26 - 27. ἐν . . . ἀρκικῶς. Although Simplicius sets forth a
disjunction here, it is clear that he endorses the second half; cf.
in Phys 38.24-28 (esp. 24, 26) and 79.5-12 (esp. 5, 7), both conser-
ving Alexander. The second half ἡ σύντος φαίνεται τῶν ἀρχαίων λόγων
ἀσυνέταις ἀρκικῶς is similar to in Phys 80.16-17 Ἀλέξανδρος ἔπρο-
tερον καὶ ἀφέρετον τῶν παλαιῶν ἀκούειν δοξάτων.

136.29 - 32. ἀλλ' . . . ἀδόρανειαν. Simplicius twice states the
principle nihil ex nilio; cf. in Phys 162.10, 27 and the quotation
of Physics at in Cael 137.7-11. The phrase (διὰ) τὴν τοῦ μὴ σύντος
ἀδόρανειαν 'the non-efficiency of non-being' (cf. LSJ s.v. ἀδόρανεια
II p. 24) has a parallel in in Phys 815.23-24; it may echo B 8.8-9
(= 137.5-6). Simplicius mentions an efficient cause (ποιητικὸν ἀττλὸν)
(136.31 -32) to confute Philoponus's claim that there is creation
ex nilio by God (137.16-20).

136.32 - 137.2. καὶ γὰρ . . . γέγραψε. Simplicius takes B 8.6-9 as
proving that Parmenides argued against 'from non-being' only. In
his paraphrase of B 8.6-10 (= in Phys 162.18-22) in 162.11-15 and of
B 8.3-14 (= in Phys 78.12-23) in 78.24-29 he speaks of 'from being'
only. (On the other hand, Aristotle's version of the dilemma below (137.7-11) contains both halves.) In both passages from in Phys Simplicius speaks of Parmenides's 'real' being (162.12) or 'being proper' (78.11, 24), while he adds no such qualification here.


At in Phys 162.11-28 Simplicius does not state the relative chronology of the philosophers whom he mentions as being aware of or formulating this 'principle', the physicists, Parmenides, Melissus, and Anaxagoras (in order). Here he ascribes to Parmenides priority only in 'report/hearsay' (cf. LSJ s.v. ὁμοῖος I p. 51), not in time.

On the phrase πρῶτος . . ἔσμεν cf. in Phys 785.14.

137.1 - 2. ἐν τοῖς ἐπεξει περὶ τοῦ ἀγένητον εἶναι τὸ δὲν. Cf. in Phys 78.24-25, 79.29-31, 142.32-33, 162.12. (τοῦ) ἀγένητον εἶναι τὸ δὲν is a partial gloss on B 8.3 (= in Phys 30.1, 78.12, 142.36, 145.3), which Simplicius does not quote in in Cael.

137.3 - 6 = B 8.6-9 (= in Phys 78.15, 145.6-9, 162.18-21).

137.6 - 11 = Physics 191a27-31.
V. The Doxa.

A. Passages.

\textbf{in Phys} 25.14 - 16 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Tr. p. 284}

\textbf{Verses DK 28} \hspace{1em} \textbf{DK I}

25.15 - 16 \hspace{1em} 222.34-36

(A 34)

\textbf{in Phys} 30.14 - 31.17 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Tr. pp. 288-289}

30.17-19 \hspace{1em} B 8.50-52 \hspace{1em} 30.14 - 31.2 \hspace{1em} 234.20-25

30.23 - 31.2 \hspace{1em} B 8.53-59

31.13-17 \hspace{1em} B 12.2-6 \hspace{1em} 31.10 - 17 \hspace{1em} 242.7-9

\textbf{in Phys} 34.12 - 17 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Tr. p. 291}

34.14 - 16 \hspace{1em} 242.10-11

\textbf{in Phys} 38.20 - 39.20 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Tr. pp. 295-297}

38.30 - 39.9 \hspace{1em} B 8.50-51 \hspace{1em} 38.28 - 39.9 \hspace{1em} 234.18-20

39.10 - 12 \hspace{1em} 223.32-34

(A 34)

39.14-16 \hspace{1em} B 12.1-3 \hspace{1em} 39.12 \hspace{1em} 242.5-7

39.18 \hspace{1em} B 13.1 \hspace{1em} 39.18 - 20 \hspace{1em} 243.12-15

\textbf{in Phys} 80.3 - 4 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Tr. pp. 317-318}

\textbf{in Phys} 87.5 - 6 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Tr. p. 321}

\textbf{in Phys} 146.26 - 29 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Tr. p. 371}

147.28 - 29 \hspace{1em} 234.25-26

\textbf{in Phys} 179.29 - 180.13 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Tr. p. 378}

180.1-7 \hspace{1em} B 8.53-59 \hspace{1em} 179.31 - 180.7 \hspace{1em} 234.26-29

180.9-12 \hspace{1em} B 9.1-4 \hspace{1em} 180.8 - 13 \hspace{1em} 240.7-9

\textbf{in Phys} 274.20 - 26 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Tr. p. 388}
B. Summary, Comments.

Simplicius remarks on and quotes from the Doxa in order to justify two basic claims he makes concerning Parmenides: that the Aletheia and the Doxa each treat of a different order of reality, the noetic and phenomenal, and that his physical doctrines are in harmony with the other ancient physiologists (οἱ παλαιοὶ φύσιολόγοι in Phys 188.13). In in Cael 556.3-560.10 Simplicius argues at length that the Aletheia treats of intelligible, real being (τὸ
νοητον και δυνας δι 558.19), whereas the Doxa concerns perceptible, created, 'seeming' being (αισθητου, γινομενου, δοξου δι 557.22-23); cf. in Phys 30.14-16, 38.19-20, 80.3-4. Moreover, in this part Parmenides accounts for the creation (γενομεν) of the entire cosmos, from the heavenly bodies down to the parts of animals (in Cael 559.20-27; cf. in Phys 31.10-12). Simplicius also claims that Parmenides posits both (qualified) non-being (in Phys 147.27) and bodies (in Phys 87.5-6) in the perceptible order. Simplicius synonymously calls that which constitutes this order 'perceptible' (αισθητον), 'created' (γενομενον, γινομενον), 'opinable' (δοξομενον), and 'deceptive' (απαστηλον): see in Phys 30.15, 20, 87.5, 144.5, 146.27, 147.27-30, in Cael 557.22, 24, 558.4, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16, 559.18, 20, 26.

The second claim contains two parts. Parmenides posits a pair of opposite, elemental (στοιχειωμενον) principles, variously described as hot-cold (θερμον - ψυχρον), fire-earth (πυρ - γη), or light-night/darkness (ασω - ν ο / σκοτος); in Phys 25.14-16, 30.20-22, 31.7-9, 39.12, 179.31-33, 180.13, 274.24, in Cael 691.5-6. Simplicius follows Aristotle in claiming that the physiologists agree that the principles of physical objects are opposites; cf. 188a19-27, and in Phys 31.9-10, 34.12-14, 36.15-20. Secondly, Parmenides, along with the more discerning of the ancient philosophers (in Phys 7.1-3, 21.15-19, 36.18-20), posits an efficient cause, the divinity (δαιμων), for all coming to be; in Phys 31.10-12, 34.14-16, 38.27-39.20, in Cael 559.20-27.

Simplicius's treatment of the Doxa is perfunctory, relative to
that of the Aletheia. He quotes less extensively and frequently from the former than the latter, and shows no interest in the actual workings of Parmenides's physical scheme. The principle reason for this neglect is Simplicius's Neoplatonic bias for the noetic as against the perceptible world; see in Phys 4.17-5.25 (esp. 5.10-20), where he argues that the study of physics is a propaedeutic for metaphysics (see also in Phys 148.22-24). A secondary reason is to be attributed to the crudeness of Parmenides's physical doctrines. His elements or elemental principles are only proximate (προονεξης), while Democritus, the Pythagoreans, and others formulate yet more fundamental (ἀρχαὶ δέσποται) elements (in Phys 35.22-36.7, 15-20).

C. Commentary.
in Phys 25.14 - 16. τῶν . . . σωτος. Simplicius quotes mediately from Theophrastus's Physicorum Opiniones (fr. 3 DG 477.12-14 = 25. 14-16; fr. 3 DG 477.12-478.15 = 25.14-26.4). Diels maintains that Simplicius never saw the Physicorum Opiniones, but quotes or excerpts from Alexander's excerpts (DG 102-118 esp. 112-113). Since he has numerous other commentaries at his disposal, it is likely that Simplicius sometimes quotes Theophrastus through some other intermediary; cf. in Phys 188.30-34 and Philoponus in Phys 125.27-28. Cf. in Phys 38.18 (= 71.6) and fr. 6 DG 482m²21.

25.16. ἐν τοῖς ποδίς δόξαν. Cf. in Phys 38.20-24 (Alexander) = 71. 6-8, 179.30-31; Philoponus in Phys 55.29-30, 110.2-3, 116.18-19, 126.1.


in Phys 34.12 - 17. πλήν . . . ἐθεόσατο. At the conclusion of his discussion of Empedocles (31.18-34.12), Simplicius states that he and Parmenides are in accord both on the opposition of elemental principles and that there is at least one efficient cause but that, while Parmenides posits a single efficient cause, Empedocles posits opposition in his efficient causes as well (34.12-17). This statement is intended to strengthen the claim in in Phys 28.32-29.5, that the seemingly contradictory opinions of the ancients on the principles of nature may be harmonized; cf. in Phys 36.15-20 and 188a19-27. (He makes a similar claim concerning the metaphysical side as well; cf. in Phys 29.5-8, 34.26-27, 36.15-20.) Simplicius here recapitulates his discussion of the Doxa in in Phys 30.14-31.17, and will revert to these same points in 38.24-39.20 (contra Alexander). See Section III, pp. 103-116, for these two passages.

34.12 - 13. πλὴν καὶ οὗτος [Ἐμπεδόκλης]. Cf. in Phys 31.18-34.12, esp. 31.29 and Diels's note.

34.13. οὐδὲν ἐνάντιον Παρμενίδη καὶ Μέλίσσω φθέγγεται. Cf. in Phys
29.4, 30.13-14, 36.15-20. The agreement, or rather lack of contradiction, among Empedocles, Parmenides, and Melissus is on the intelligible or noetic order, particularly in its unified stage (in Phys 29.5-8, 31.18-19, 21-22); between Empedocles and Parmenides it is on the perceptible order as well (in Phys 30.14-31.23, 34.14). See pp. 87-92.

34.14. τὴν τε στοιχειώδη ἄντισεσιν ὡς καὶ Παρμενίδης ἔθεσαν. Cf. in Phys 30.20, 31.7. Simplicius maintains that Empedocles locates the opposition (ἐναντίον) among his four elements in the principles, i.e. efficient causes, Love and Strife, rather than in these material principles themselves (31.29-31).


34.15. ἐν κοινῷ. Simplicius may mean that Parmenides's divinity combines the functions of unification (σύγκρισις) and separation (διάλυσις), which have distinct agents in Empedocles's Φιλία and Νεῖκος: cf. in Phys 31.21-23, 32.2-3, 157.25-27, 161.13-20.

34.15 - 16. τὴν ἐν μέσῳ πάντων ἱδρυμένην καὶ πόσῃς γενέσεως αὐτῶν δαίμονα is a close paraphrase of Β 12.3-4 (= in Phys 31.14-15; Β 12.4 = 39.16); cf. the similar paraphrase at in Phys 31.10-12. ἐν μέσῳ . . . δαίμονα is a quotation, in oratio obliqua, of Β 12.3
εν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων. πάντας γενέσεως αίτιαν is based on B 12.4
πάντα γὰρ τούτου τόκου καὶ μικρὸς ἀρχη.

34.16 - 17. οὖτος . . . ἐσθάλτο. Cf. in Phys 31.20-21, 30-31.

in Phys 179.27 - 180.13. Simplicius does little more than expand
Aristotle's statement in 188a20-22 that even Parmenides, one of the
akinetic monists, made hot and cold, which he called fire and earth,
a pair of opposite principles. He adds that Parmenides also called
these principles light (φῶς) and night (νύξ) or darkness (σκότος)
and introduced them in the Doxa not the Aletheia (179.31-33). B 8.
53-59 (= 180.1-7) and B 9.1-4 (= 180.9-12) are quoted, and B 9.4 is
paraphrased (13) to corroborate Aristotle's statement.

In στοιχεῖονες (179.28) 'elemental' Simplicius echoes the dis-
tinction he first draws in in Phys 6.35-7.19 that physiologists pro-
per inquire into elemental principles, metaphysicians final and
efficient causes; cf. pp. 87-92. Simplicius's perfunctory treat-
ment of Parmenides's principles here is largely due to his fuller
other hand, the Neoplatonic predilection for the noetic over the
perceptible is reflected in his genuine interest in the Aletheia and
relative neglect of the Doxa; cf. in Phys 39.20-21, 148.122-24 (and
5.10-20).

179.27 - 29. σείκουσα . . . διασκορπίσαι is, with the exception of
δηλοντί . . . στοιχειώσεις, a summary of 188a19-26; that is, that Aristotle here sets forth the agreement of all the physicists in making their principles opposites. In 188b26-189a1 Aristotle states the differences among them, which Simplicius here mentions; cf. in Phys 187.31-190.20, esp. 188.13-16.

179.27 - 28. δηλοντι τῶν φυσικῶν πραγμάτων αἱ στοιχειώσεις is a parenthetical remark, which assumes Simplicius's distinction between the principles of physics, the 'elemental' principles or subsidiary causes, and those of metaphysics, the causes proper, the efficient and final; cf. in Phys 3.13-18, 6.31-7.17, 179.12-14, and pp. 87-92. Simplicius states that Parmenides's principles are elemental or elements at in Phys 30.20, 31.7, 34.14, 39.12. On this construction with δηλοντι cf. in Phys 143.20.

179.29 - 30. οἱ ἐν τῷ θάνατου λέγοντες is a slightly rephrased version of 188a19-20: οἱ τε λέγοντες ὅτι ἐν τῷ θάνατῳ μὴ κυνούμενον.

179.30 - 31. ὡσερ . . . ἀρχάς. Simplicius freely recasts 188a19 τὰ κατὰ ἀρχάς ποιοῦν, adding the clause ὡσερ Παρμενίδης perhaps to emphasize that Parmenides is an a kinetic monist.

Simplicius sometimes refers instead to τὰ δόξατα, the objects that constitute this part; cf. in Phys 87.5, 146.26-27, 147.28, and Republic V 478e3-5.

179.32. ταύτα δὲ προσαγορεύει πῦρ καὶ γῆν = 188a21-22. Cf Metaphysics A 986b33-34 and in Phys 146.28-30 for this and the preceding sentence.

179.32 – 33. καὶ φῶς καὶ νύκτα ήτοι σκότος is Simplicius's own addition. In the quotations which follow, φῶς 'light' is mentioned in B 9.1, 3 (= 180.9, 11) and νύξ 'night' in B 8.59 (= 180.7) and B 9.4 (= 180.11); σκότος 'darkness' does not appear in the extant fragments of Parmenides. Moreover, Parmenides does not speak of the hot (Θείμιδ) an cold (Ψυχρόν) as principles, nor call the latter 'earth' (γῆ), although he does speak of fire (πῦρ) at B 8.56 (= 180.4). Cf. in Phys 25.14-16 (from Theophrastus via Alexander) 30.20-22, 38.20-24 (Theophrastus via Alexander) (cf. 71.6-8), 274.24.


180.8. καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα πάλιν. Cf. in Phys 39.12. It is unclear how many verses omits; at in Phys 43.19 μετ' ὀλίγα represents a jump.
of 40 lines of an OCT text; 43.15-19 = 52α1-6, 43.19-20 = 53b4-5 (Timaeus).


180.13. εἰ δὲ μηδετέρῳ μέτα μηδέν is a paraphrase of B 9.4 (= 180.12) ἐπει οὐδετέρῳ μέτα μηδέν.

180.13. καὶ . . . δηλοῦται. Simplicius is content to cite B 9.4 alone as proof that Parmenides has a pair of opposite principles; his paraphrase is far from clear. However, at in Phys 30.14-31.2, 7-10 (cf. 38.28-39.13) he discusses B 8.53-59 (= 30.23-31.2) at greater length.

in Phys 188.27 – 189.1. καὶ τὸ . . . φύσιν. Aristotle maintains that his predecessors in physics agree that its elements or principles are opposites, but differ in that some assume as elements things which are more knowable in perception and posterior in nature, while others things more knowable in reason and prior by nature (188a26-33). He cites the proponents of hot and cold and the proponents of moist and dry as examples of the former, and the proponents of even and odd and the proponents of Love and Strife of the latter (188b33-36). Simplicius notes (what is already clear from 188b35-36) that Aristotle described hot and cold and moist and dry to things posterior <by nature> (28), and then identifies the proponents of each
pair: Parmenides and Anaximenes respectively (188.28-199.1). He
cites Alexander as attributing the second pair either to Parmenides
or Empedocles (29-31), but finds Porphyry's attribution to Anaxime-
nes more appropriate (31-32).

188.27. τὸ δὲ θέρμων καὶ ψυχῶν καὶ τυρών καὶ ἔρων: cf. 188b33.
Aristotle uses the plural ol: cf. in Cael 691.5-6 and note.

188.27 - 28. ὡς . . . ἀπένειμε. Cf. 188b31-33, 35-36.

188.28 - 29. τὸν . . . φωσί. Cf. 188.30 and 189.29-30. Cf. 188a20-
22, Metaphysics A 987b33-34, and in Phys 179.31-32.

188.32. † 'Ἀναξιμένην. Simplicius, or a later scribe, misreads
Anaximenes for Xenophanes (in Porphyry); cf. Philoponus in Phys
125.27-28.

189.1 = 21 B 29.

in Phys 274.20 - 26. ὡς . . . 'Ἀριστοτέλης. In 193a9-28 Aris-
totle sets forth as one of the meanings or uses of 'nature' (φύσις)
the material substrate of a thing (cf. esp. 193a28-30). He cites
those who state that some one or more of the simple bodies (cf.
192a10-12) is or are the 'nature' of all things to corroborate this
meaning or use (193a21-23). Simplicius here identifies the pro-
ponents of these simple bodies, and adds Parmenides as someone who embraced more than one, fire and earth.

274.23. ως Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ γῆν. Cf. in Phys 25.15-16, 30.21, 179.30. Aristotle uses οἱ in 193a21-23 where the singular is in several instances required; cf. 188b33 and note to in Phys 188.27 above and to in Cæl 691.5-6 below.

in Cæl 556.3 – 560.10. Simplicius argues at some length against Aristotle's etiology of the error which led both Parmenides and Melissus to deny altogether that there is coming to be (γένεσις) and perishing (φαντασμοῖς) cf. 298b14-24. (Simplicius is particularly concerned with 298b21-24, which he discusses in 557.1-560.10). Aristotle argues that Parmenides and Melissus assumed that nothing besides perceptible substance existed, but since they also understood the need for uncreated (ἄγενεσία) and motionless (μοσχώδες) objects for there to be knowledge, they concluded that what is perceptible is uncreated and motionless (298b21-24); cf. Alexander's succinct version of this argument in 560.5-10. Simplicius replies with some vehemence to Aristotle. He first asserts that Parmenides and Melissus in fact posited a two-fold reality (ὑπούργους), one part of which is real, intelligible being, the other is the perceptible order, which is subject to coming to be, and which they call 'seeming being' (557.20-23). He then quotes B 1.28-32 (= 557.25-558.2), B 8.50-52 (= 558.5-7), and B 19.1-3 (= 558.9-11) to prove this assertion for
Parmenides; he concludes with two, pointed rhetorical questions directed at Aristotle in 298b21-24 (558.12-17; note ἡν όν ... , ἡν δὲ ... (12-13), and similarly ἡν όν ὑν τις ... 559.14 (after the quotation from Melissus)). Melissus is treated in the same fashion in 558.17-559.13; 30 B 8 = 558.14-27. He next argues that Parmenides and Melissus did in fact abolish coming to be (γένεσις) from 'real' being, but clearly posit it for what is perceptible (559.14-27); he quotes B 8.21 (= 559.17) and B 11.1-4 (= 559.22-25) for these contentions respectively (30 B 8(3) = 559.19-20 is quoted for the latter only.) Simplicius concludes that Parmenides scarcely failed to know that he was created (γένητος) or that he had two feet when he stated that being is one (559.27-560.1); Aristotle's refutation of only the apparent meaning in Parmenides is ultimately to be rejected in favor of his more favorable verdict in Metaphysics A 986b27-28 (560.1-4; cf. 557.1-2, 19-20).

This passage falls into three parts: 1) 556.3-30 a gloss or paraphrase of 298b14-20 (and the discussion of γενεσις in 298b8-299a1); 2) 557.1-560.4 is Simplicius's reply especially to 298b21-24, excepting 557.10-18, a clumsy attempt on his part to justify Aristotle's refutation (30 B 6 = 557.16-17, 28 B 8* = 557.18); 3) 560.5-10 Alexander's version of the argument in 298b21-24.

In addition to the quotation of three fragments from Parmenides not found in in Phys (B 1.28-32 = 557.25-558.2, B 11.1-4 = 559.22-25, B 19.1-3 = 558.9-11), there are several points of interest in this passage. One is the pointed, nearly trenchant criticism of
Aristotle in 557.1-560.4. Secondly, there are numerous close parallels with remarks on Parmenides in in Phys. Lastly, the epistemological aspect of Parmenides's thought, i.e. 556.4, 15-18, 557.4-6, mentioned here on Aristotle's authority (298b22-23), receives more attention here than in in Phys.

556.3 – 30. Τετροχιν . . . ἑπιγράψειν. In this section three parts are to be distinguished: 1) an overview of Aristotle's four-fold précis of his predecessors' views on coming to be (γένεσις) and perishing (φθορά) in 298b6-289a1 (556.3-12); 2) a discussion of Parmenides's and Melissus's view, the first of the four, based on Aristotle's remarks in 298b14-20 (556.12-24); 3) a discussion of why Parmenides and Melissus should even be called 'physicists' (556.24-30). Simplicius provides a nearly word for word gloss of 298b14-20 in 1) and 2) (and cf. 298b21-24 in 557.2-6, 8-10).

556.3 – 12. Τετροχιν . . . ἡμένα. Simplicius summarizes Aristotle's discussion of his predecessors' opinions on coming to be in 298b6-299a1 (cf. also in Cael 672.28-32). The four views, or rather their advocates, are as follows:

1) Parmenides and Melissus 556.3-6 298b14-24 cf. 556.12-24, 557.1-560.10, 560.13
2) Hesiod 556.6-8 298b24-29 cf. 560.13-27
3) Heraclitus 556.9-10 298b29-33 cf. 561.1-25
4) Plato/Academics 556.10-12 298b33-299a1 cf. 561.26-580.16
In his summary, Simplicius ignores 'passing away' (φθορά, φθείρεσθαι), despite Aristotle's frequent (but not invariable) use of it in his précis.

556.3 - 6. καὶ γὰρ . . . λέγειν. Simplicius closely follows Aristotle's phraseology in 3-4: οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅλως ἀνείλον γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν (298b14-5) is rendered by καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν τελέως τὴν γένεσιν ἀναμορφῶσι (3-4)(cf. 560.13, 672.29); οὔθεν γὰρ οὔτε γίγνεσθαι φασίν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων (298b15-16) by πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἁγένητα λέγοντες (4). In 4-6 Simplicius is less literal: διὰ τὸ τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ φθορτῶν μὴ εἴναι γνωσιν ἢ ἐπὶ ἄλλων αὐτῶν (4-5) is loosely based on 298b22-23 τοιαύτας δὲ τινας νοήσαι πρῶτοι φύσεις [sc. ἁγένητος καὶ ἁμυνήτος cf. 298b19], εἰπέρ ἔσται τις γνώσις ἢ φρόνησις (cf. 556.17-18) and on 298b29-30 (on the 'Heracliteans') οὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίγνεσθαι φασὶν καὶ δεῖν, εἴναι δὲ παγίως οὔθεν (cf. Republic V 479c3-6); ὡς Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος ἐδόκοιν λέγειν (5-6) on 298b17 οἴον οἱ περὶ Μέλισσον τε καὶ Παρμενίδην [sc. φασίν from 298b16] (but cf. 12).

556.6 - 8. ὡς . . . γένετ. Cf. 560.16-18 for a more intelligible version of the same point. (556.8 = 560.18 = Theogony 116.)

556.12 - 24. πρῶτος . . . πράγματα. In the course of fleshing out Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides's and Melissus's opinion on coming to be, Simplicius quotes all of 298b14-20 phrase by phrase,
adding to each his own exegetical remarks.

556.12 - 14. τοὺς . . . ἡμῖν. τοὺς περὶ Μέλισσον καὶ Παρμενίδην (12) picks up οἱ περὶ Μέλισσον τε καὶ Παρμενίδην (298b17), and (τὸ) ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν (14) is quoted from 298b16; Simplicius adds what intervenes. That Melissus does not in reality totally deny the existence of coming to be will be argued in 557.20-23 and especially in 558.17-559.12, 18-20 (but cf. note 9). Similarly, Parmenides's denial of coming to be only with respect to truth, not opinion/seeing (Παρμενίδης δὲ οὐ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ πρὸς δόξαν 13-14), is discussed in 557.20-558.17, 559.14-560.1. Moreover, as B 1.28-32 (= 557.25-558.2), B 8.50-52 (= 558.5-7), and B 19.1-3 (= 558.9-11) make clear, Simplicius here alludes to the two parts of Parmenides's poem. In in Phys Simplicius mentions both parts of the poem (e.g. 30.14-16, 38.19, 24-25, (39.10-12), 179.31-33) and says that Parmenides did allow coming to be in the second part (cf. 25.15-16, 30.20, 31.10-12), but nowhere mentions that Melissus had a similar 'two-fold reality' (cf. 7.1-3, 21.15-19). At any rate, by the phrase ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προσέπεσε τὸ . . . ἡμῖν he means that Aristotle's awareness of the qualification stated in 13-14 lies behind his addition in 298b16 'but only seems to us' (ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν). οἱ περὶ Μέλισσον τε καὶ Παρμενίδην (298b17) is no more strict than οἱ περὶ ἡμῖν (298b28).

556.15. οὗτοι δὲ, φησὶ, κἂν τὰ ἄλλα λέγωσι καλὸς is a close para-
phrase of 298b17-18 οὖς, εἰ καὶ τάλλα λέγουσι καλῶς.

556.15 - 18. τὰ γὰρ . . . ἀεὶ. Simplicius spells out the preceding clause (15); his remarks go far beyond what Aristotle intended (especially in 15-17 τὰ . . . ἐξέφημεν). τὰ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄντος καὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐκείως καλῶς τῷ ὀντὶ καὶ θεῖῳ (15-16): Simplicius strongly endorses Aristotle's 'well' (καλῶς 298b18), even adding 'and divinely'. Cf. in Phys 29.5-7: καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς διελέχθησαν, ὡς Θεοκάνθας τε καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσας 36.15 οὕτως οὖν οἱ μὲν εἰς νοητῶν [sc. διάκωσιν ἄφοροντες 15]: 38.11-13 τὸ γὰρ ὄντως οὐ τὸ ἥκατεν, ὡς άρχη καὶ αἰτία τῶν πολλῶν καὶ διακοιμημένων ἐστίν οὐχ ὡς στοιχειώδης ἄλλ' ὡς προαγωγὸς ἐκείων, ἐν δὲ ἐλεγον (cf. 38.4); cf. also 144.11-14.

556.16 - 17. ἐνοχαί τε καὶ ἐπωμένοις ἐξέφημεν is an expansion of 298b22-23 νοήσαι πρῶτοι.

556.17 - 18. καὶ τὸ . . . ἀεὶ is a loose paraphrase of 298b22-23 τοιαύτας . . . ὄργνης: cf. 557.3-6. In τῶν ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ κυβέρνησι ὄντων he plays on ἁγένητα καὶ ὄλυς ἁμίνητα of 298b19. The phrase ἄτε ἰεύνων ἀεὶ is Simplicius's addition, based on the Heraclitean doctrine of flux (ἤεὶν) alluded to in 298b30; cf. further Metaphysics A 987a32-b1, especially ταῖς Ἑρακλείτειοις δόξαις ὡς ἄτιτον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ἰεύνων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὕτως (a32-34). (In what follows (987b1-14) Aristotle credits Plato with
arriving at the Forms by synthesizing these Heraclitean doctrines with Socrates's search for definitions; Parmenides and Melissus are not mentioned as predecessors.)


556.19. αὐτούς περὶ τά ὑπέρ τὴν φύσιν φιλοσοφοῦντας is an addition by Simplicius; cf. 556.28-29 and in Phys 7.1-3, 21.17-19, 22.25-26, 37.4-6, 39.21-22. It is, however, based on Aristotle's statement in 298b20; cf. note to 556.21-22 below.

556.19 - 20. τὸ γάρ εἶναι ὀτρα τῶν ὀντων ἀγένητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα = 298b19.

556.20 - 21. ὡπερ ἀπεδείκνυον ἐκεῖνοι. Simplicius argues throughout this passage (e.g. 556.28-30, 557.20-22, 558.14-17) that Parmenides and Melissus only deny coming to be and motion in the intelligible order.

556.21 - 22. ἐτέρως ... ἔχοισις is a recasting and expansion of 298b20 μᾶλλον ... σκέψεως. In τὴς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας explains προτέρως ὣ 'prior to'. and further defines 'inquiry into nature' (τὴς φυσικῆς σκέψεως) in the phrase τῆς περὶ τὰ κινούμενα ἔχοισις.
Aristotle makes the same point in *Physics* 184b25-185a3, esp. a2-3: ὁλί' ὅτου ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἡ παραὶ Κολυνῆς.

556.22 - 23. εἰπερ ἡ φύσις ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. Simplicius's explanation of the preceding phrase (22) draws on *Physics* 200b12-13: ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις μὲν ἐστὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς. Cf. 191b21 254b17, and *in Phys* 46.13-16 (Alexander).


556.24 - 30. καὶ . . . ἐπιγράφειν is a digression, based on Aristotle's statement in 298b17-18 that Parmenides and Melissus do not speak as physicists (οὐ φυσικῶς . . . λέγειν). Simplicius also draws on Alexander's remarks on these lines in 560.7-10, and perhaps on Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides and Melissus in *Physics* 184b 25-185a20 (esp. 185a17-19). Simplicius argues etymologically; both Parmenides and Melissus entitled their works 'On Nature' (Περὶ φύσεως), and because they did discuss 'natural phenomena' (τὰ φυσικά) as well as metaphysics (τὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς φύσεως), they can properly be called 'physicists' (φυσικοί). Simplicius answers a possible objec-
556.25 - 26. ἡ δὲ ... Παρμενίδης. In in Phys Simplicius states that Melissus entitled his work 'On Nature' or 'On Being' (70.15-17, 71.8-10); cf. in Cael 557.10-11.² He does not report this of Parmenides.

556.27. κοινὸν ... δύσμα. Cf. in Categories 25.16-17: καθὸ Πλάτωνα μὲν καλοὶς, άνευ γὰρ δὲ κοινὸς ὁμόμοιος κεχορύβδαι φαμέν.

556.28 - 29. καὶ μὲντοι ... διελέγοντο. Cf. in Phys 7.1-3: ὁ τούτου ὀμοιότης Παρμενίδης ... περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν φύσεων, and 21.17-18: οὐ διαφορίζοντες τὰ φυσικὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσεων, οι δὲ κρίνοντες μὲν, ἄστερ ... Παρμενίδης.

557.1 - 560.4. ἀλλ' ... νομιστέον. Simplicius sets forth (557.1-18) and then refutes Aristotle's explanation of how Parmenides and Melissus were led to deny coming to be and motion among perceptible objects in 298b21-24 (557.11-560.4). Aristotle's explanation, or rather argument, is as follows: 1) Parmenides and Melissus assumed that only perceptible substance (ἡ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσία) exists; 2) but they intuited the need for uncreated and motionless objects if there is to be knowledge; 3) they concluded that perceptible substance(s) is uncreated and motionless (cf. Alexander's version of this argument in 560.5-10). Simplicius agrees to 2) (557.4-7) but objects to 1) and 3) (cf. 557.1-2). That is, he argues that Parmenides and Melissus by no means assumed that perceptible substance
alone exists (558.12, 559.14); rather, they clearly distinguished the intelligible from the perceptible (557.20-22, 558.14-17). Moreover, he denies Aristotle's claim that Parmenides and Melissus assumed that the perceptible alone 'exists' or 'is'; they do not say that it 'exists' or 'is' but only 'seems to exist' or 'seems to be' (557.22-23, 558.16-17, 559.12-13). Lastly, he denies that they transferred (μετηνέκισαν) the properties of what is intelligible to what is perceptible (558.13-14). They abolish coming to be (γένεσις) only in the intelligible (559.14-18), not in the perceptible (559.17-560.1).

Simplicius stops short of a blanket condemnation of Aristotle's argument. As is his custom, Aristotle merely objects to the outward expression of what is said in order that the most superficial might not be misled (557.19-20); his true view of Parmenides is to be found in Metaphysics A, where he credits him with more insight (560.1-4). Despite this effort to avoid direct criticism of Aristotle, Simplicius betrays a polemical attitude in 557.1-2, 558.12-14, and 559.14, 27-560.1.

557.1 - 2. ἄλλα . . . ἀληθεύεται ἥν. Simplicius prefaced his discussion of 298b21-24, which he paraphrases in 557.2-10 and attacks in 557.19-560.4. The harsh and false critique by Aristotle of Parmenides here is to be contrasted with his generous critique spoken of in in Phys 148.11-13.
557.2 – 3. ἐκεῖνοι . . . εἶναι is a close paraphrase of 298b21-22. Simplicius replaces the articular infinitive (τὸ . . . ὑπολαμβάνειν) introduced by the preposition διὰ by γάρ with the participle ὑπολαμβάνοντες, and μηδὲν by οὐδὲν. Excepting the addition of ἐν ὑποστάσει 'in real existence', everything else is repeated verbatim. In the critique that follows (557.19 ff.), Simplicius pointedly refers to these lines twice (558.12, 559.14).

557.3 – 5. πρῶτοι . . . φύσεις. Simplicius paraphrases 298b22 with more latitude than he does the preceding clause. He replaces the simple infinitive νοθεύει, which depends on πρῶτοι, by the compound participial form ἐννοοῦσαντες. (Since Simplicius retains the μὲν . . . δέ construction of the original, it is likely that he takes νοθεύει (with subject nominative) to depend on 298b21 διὰ τὸ: the γάρ of his paraphrase is presumably to be taken with both clauses.) ὅτι ἀλλάζει . . . εἶναι is not entirely without warrant inserted, both for the sense and to retain the accusative case of φύσεις etc. in the original. In ἀλλάζειν Simplicius explains what Aristotle means by τοιαύτας 'of this sort'; he draws on 298b19.

557.5. εἶπερ ἔστι γνώσεις ἐπιστημονικῇ is a paraphrase of 298b23: εἶπερ ἔσται τις γνώσεις ἡ φρόνησις. Simplicius shifts the future ἔσται to the present ἔστι, drops τις and ἡ φρόνησις altogether, and adds ἐπιστημονικῇ. It may be that Alexander's use of ἐπιστήμη (560.6) lies behind this addition; cf. 556.17.
557.5 - 6. τῶν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἰδέων οὗ τὴν ἐσθήτημι. Cf. 556.4, 17-18 and notes above. Simplicius deduces this principle from 298b22-23 τοιαύτας . . . φρονήσεις, and takes the Heraclitean flux (δεῖν) from 298b29-33 (esp. 30). It is likely that Simplicius also draws on Theaetetus 181a3bl, where Plato contrasts Parmenides and Melissus, the 'stationers of the whole universe' (οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασινοῦτας a6-7), with the Heracliteans (cf. 179e2-4), whom he calls 'the fluxers' (οἱ δέσποτες a4).

557.6 - 7. καὶ λέγει . . . εἶναι. To corroborate the principle he enunciates in 557.5-6 (cf. note above) Simplicius cites the Parmenides. Only the phrase οὐδὲ ὅτι τρέφει τις τὴν διάνοιαν ἔσχει is a quotation (135b8); Burnet does not list τις in his apparatus. Cf. Proclus in Parm 980.3-6. The remainder is a free rendition of 135b8-11 μὴ ἔσον ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἂν ἴναι. Simplicius seems to quote from memory.

557.8 - 9. ταῦτα . . . λόγους. After a brief digression (557.5-7) Simplicius completes his paraphrase of 298b23-24: οὕτω μετήνεγκας ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν λόγους. The paraphrase is faithful and improves on its laconic original. Simplicius renders οὕτω by ταῦτα οὗν ἐννοούσως: cf. 557.3-4 and 298b22. μετήνεγκας ἐπὶ is quoted verbatim. He paraphrases ταῦτα by τὰ αἴσθητά καὶ γεννήτα: αἰσθητά is justified by 298b21, γεννήτα is more loosely based on 298b19-20. τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν λόγους is expanded into τοὺς τοὺς νοητοὺς καὶ ἀνυνήτους.
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ἐμαμαζόντας λόγους. τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἀκινήτοις is parallel with τὰ αἰσθήματα καὶ γενήτα: cf. 557.21-22. Aristotle does not speak of τὰ νοητὰ in 298b14-24, but does mention ἀκίνητα in 298b19. Simplicius refers to his paraphrase of these lines in 558.13-14.

557.9 - 10. εἶ γε... λέγουσι. Simplicius adds his reservations about the validity of Aristotle's etiology of Parmenides's and Melissus's unconditional abolition of coming to be in 298b21-24, especially their alleged superimposition of the intelligible onto the perceptible (298b23); cf. 557.1-2. Simplicius will later argue that Parmenides and Melissus distinguished the intelligible from the perceptible (557.20-23, 558.3-4, 13-17) and did not superimpose the former onto the latter (558.13-14). Further, they located coming to be in the perceptible order (557.22, 23-24, 559.18-27).

557.10 - 18. καὶ... ἀγένητον is a forced attempt to justify Aristotle's claim in 298b21-22 that Parmenides and Melissus assumed that nothing exists besides the substance of perceptible things; in 557.19-20 Simplicius abandons the attempt. Since nearly all of this passage is devoted to Melissus (10-17), it does not require detailed comment. Simplicius cites Parmenides as concurring with Melissus that being is one, and that there is nothing besides this (17); he quotes Β 8.4* (= 557.18) as proof. Simplicius ends the verse with ἀγένητον here and at in Phys 120.23. At in Phys 30.2, 78.13, 145.4 he writes ἀτέλεστον. Since the two ἀγένητον readings occur when
the verse is quoted in isolation, while ἀτέλεστον appears in longer quotations, it is reasonable to ascribe ἀγένητον either to a quotation by memory or to one of the texts Simplicius has at his command. Further, since Plutarch, Pseudo-Plutarch, Clement, and Philoponous also end the verse with ἀγένητον, the cliché version may well have had this form.

557.19 - 20. ἀλλ' . . . παραλογίζεται. In several other passages Aristotle is said to object to the apparent meaning in what his predecessors say (ἐπαινεῖν τὸ φαινόμενον τοῦ λόγου); 140.6-9, 141.8-11, 563.26-27, in Phys 21.19-20, 36.28-31, 37.6. (Cf. LSJ s.v. ὑπαντάω II.2 p. 1582.) In all these passages, with the exception of in Cael 563.26-27, Simplicius further claims that Aristotle does this on behalf of the (more) superficial (ἐπιπλοκος); see sections VIII and X. For the present it should be stated that Simplicius nowhere says why Aristotle would pander to a superficial audience. One suspects that Simplicius's motive in formulating this claim is to avoid direct criticism of Aristotle; at 560.1-4 he asserts that Aristotle's remarks in Metaphysics A 986b27-28 represent his true view of Parmenides (cf. in Phys 37.1-2, 148.16-17). (Cf. in Categories 435.20-27, esp. 24-25: ἰνα δὲ μὴ τολμησόν τις ἡγηταί με λίαν, "ἄφαντος γαρωμένον Διός πρὸς ὀρνικα θείον" κατὰ Πίνδαρον (Olympian 2.87); as Kalbfleisch notes, in in Cael 42.17 Simplicius quotes this line (with ὀρνίνα for ὀρνικα) to compare Philoponus with Aristotle.)
Simplicius’s use of πρεπούν with an articular infinitive in the genitive has no parallel in LSJ (s.v. pp. 1490-1491), although this verb often takes the genitive (A II.2, B 2). In a similar context he uses ὑπάντησεν with ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐκ . . . τονόσεθαι (140.6-9).

557.20 – 23. οἱ . . . δοξοῦν δὲν. Simplicius refutes Aristotle’s explanation of Parmenides’s and Melissus’s error in 298b21-24 (cf. 557.-10 and note) on two counts: 1) that Parmenides and Melissus posited that reality has two parts, namely the intelligible (τὸ νοητὸν) and perceptible (τὸ αἰσθητὸν) orders (20-22); and 2) that far from assuming that the perceptible order alone exists (δὲν), they grant it only seeming existence or being (δοξοῦν δὲν) (22-23). Simplicius quotes from Parmenides (B 1.28-32, B 8.50-52, B 19.1-3) and Melissus (B 8) in 557.25-559.14 to corroborate both counts. The phrase τὴν τοῦ γινομένου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ anticipates his argument in 559.14-560.1, that Parmenides and Melissus do not totally abolish coming to be (γένεσις cf. 298bl4-15), but rather incorporate it into the perceptible order.

557.20 – 22. οἱ . . . αἰσθητοῦ. In in Phys Simplicius frequently states or argues that Parmenides distinguished between intelligible being or being proper and perceptible being, in which coming to be is found; cf. 7.1-3, 21.15-19, 39.10-12, 80.3-4, 179.29-33. However, in that commentary he nowhere makes the same claim for Melissus, whom he treats exclusively as a metaphysician. By way of con-
trast, Xenophanes is mentioned as having made this distinction (7. 1-3, 21.15-19), but his physical doctrines are nowhere discussed. (Simplicius follows Theophrastus in making Xenophanes Parmenides's teacher (7.1-3, 22.26-30); he may simply be crediting the teacher with his pupil's doctrines.)

557.22 - 23. ὅπερ οὖν ἦσσου καλεῖν ὄν ἀτυλός, ἀλλὰ δοκοῦν ὄν. Cf. 558.16-17, 559.12-13, in Phys 38.24-26, 39.10-12, 77.26-31, 78.28-29, 79.8-12, 26-29. Simplicius has τὰ δοκοῦντα (B 1.31 = 558.1), δόξας (B 1.27 = 557.27, B 8.51 = 558.6), κατὰ δόξαν ἐσστὶ (B 19.1 = 559.9), and perhaps even δοκίμας εἶναι (B 1.32 = 558.2) in mind for Parmenides (but cf. note to 558.16-17 below). Melissus actually uses the phrase δοκεῖν εἶναι at B 8(3) (= 559.4) and B 8(5) (= 559.).

557.23 - 24. διὸ περὶ τὸ ὄν ἀλήθειαν εἶναι φησι, περὶ δὲ τὸ γινόμενον δόξαν. In two of the following quotations (B 1.28-32, B 8.50-52) Parmenides explicitly contrasts 'truth' with 'seeming/opinion'. Cf. in Phys 30.14-16, 38.17-20, 24-26, 39.10-12, 146.26-29, 179.29-33. (The reading φησι (DEc) is preferable to φησι (Ab), which Heiberg adopts. In the first place, the following sentence (24) is clumsy as the text stands; one would expect Παρμενίδης φησι (23) and e.g. λέγει γάρ in 24. Secondly, in 557.21 and 22 the plural forms ὑπετίθεντο and ἦσσον are used. At the least, Heiberg ought to have put a full stop after δοκοῦν ὄν (23) if he adopts this shift of number. Thirdly, Melissus does speak of truth in conjunction with
being: τοῦ γὰρ ἐόντος ἀληθινοῦ ἀρείουν (B 8(5) = 559.10 cf. 9), and opinion/seeming with coming to be: διωκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ τε θερμὸν ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι (B 8(3) = 558.29; cf. 559.19). Lastly, in 559.14-21 Simplicius twice uses the plural first to indicate agreement between the two, then states what each individually says. In support of Heiberg, however, is 556.13-14. He generally follows A (cf. Praefatio p. V), but at 557.21 he prefers DE(F) over Ab twice.


558.3 – 4. ἀλλὰ . . . ἐπήγαγεν. Cf. the similar introductions to or comments on B 8.50 ff. in in Phys 30.14-16, esp. 38.28-29, 146.23-25, 179.32. On τὸ ὄντως δὲ used of Parmenidean being cf. 557.21, 558.21, in Phys 38.11, 162.12, and note to 29.5.

558.5 – 7 = B 8.50-52 (= in Phys 30.17-19, 38.30-32, 146.23-25; B 850-51 = 41.8-9).

558.8. παραδοὺς δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν διαφωνίαν ἐπήγαγε πάλιν. Cf. 557.15-16. Simplicius frequently uses forms of παραδίδωμι in conjunction with quotations; cf. 559.27, in Phys 31.12, 32.12, 33.6, 78.11, 157.27, and note to in Phys 100.23-26. διαφωνίας (8 cf. 16) seems to paraphrase κόσμον of B 8.52 (= 558.7); it may be that Parmenides looks ahead in his exemplar of Parmenides to B 8.60 (= in Phys 39.8) διάκοσμον. On the other hand, Simplicius frequently
uses διακόσμησις: see Indices CAG VII, X; he offers a brief de-

558.9 - 11 = B 19.1-3.

558.12. τῶς οὖν τὸ αἰσθητὸν μόνον εἶναι Παρμενίδης ὑπελάμβανεν.
Simplicius reformulates 298b21-22 as a pointed rhetorical question;
he repeats this question at 559.14 after the quotation from Melis-
sus, and similarly renders 298b23-24 in 558.13-14. Cf. 557.2-3 for
Simplicius's paraphrase of 298b21-22, and 557.20-21 for his insis-
tence that Parmenides and Melissus posited not one but rather two
orders of reality.

558.12 - 13. ὁ περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ τοιαύτα φιλοσοφήσας, ἀπερ νῦν
περιττὸν ἐστὶ παραγράφειν. It is surprising that Simplicius does
not quote more from the Aletheia than B 8.4* (= 557.18) and B 8.21
(= 559.17) in this section, for his contention that Parmenides dis-
coursed about 'real' or 'intelligible' being in this part is largely
unsupported (cf. 556.13, 28-29, 557.20-22, 24, 558.14-15, 559.15-
17, in Phys 144.25-28).

For Simplicius's equation of Parmenidean being with the intel-
ligible (being) (τοῦ νοητοῦ (ὅν)) cf. 557.21-22, in Phys 29.5-6,
38.19, 28-29, 39.11, 25-26, 80.3-4, 144.12. On ἀπερ (13) cf. LSJ
(s.v. ἀπερ I.1 p. 1262) and Denniston (Greek Particles p. 490 (3));
cf. 557.1, 22, 560.1.

558.14 - 17. ὣ χαρίς ... καλεῖν. For a similar use of the article cf. 558.12-13 and in Phys 143.7-8. (558.12-13 is identical in structure to 14-17, the anaphoric ἡμᾶς stressing this identity.) χαρίς μὲν ... χαρίς εἶ echoes 557.20-22.

558.14 - 15. τὴν ἐκκαὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ ὅντως ὅντος παραβολής. Simplicius in this section quotes B 8.4* (= 557.18) and B 8.21 (= 559.17) from the Aletheia, and only the first mentions the unity of being (cf. note to 558.12-13). Cf. 557.14, 15, 17-18, 560.1. On τὸ νοητὸν δὲν and τὸ ὅντως δὲν cf. 557.21-22, 558.3, 12-13, 559.15. (καὶ (15) is epexegetical here.)

558.16 - 17. καὶ μηδὲ ἀξίων τῷ τοῦ ὅντως ὄνοματο τὸ αἰσθητῶν καλεῖν recalls 557.22-23 τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ... δοκοῦν δὲν: cf. 557.14-15. Simplicius has the various derivatives of δοκεῖν that occur in the preceding quotations in mind: δόξας (B 1.30 = 557.27, B 8.51 = 558.6), τὰ δοξοῦντα (B 1.31 = 558.1), κατὰ δοξαν ἔφυ (B 19.1 = 558.9); cf. note to 557.23. δοκίμως εἶναι resembles the name Parmenides reputedly gives to the perceptible, δοκοῦν δὲν / δοκεῖν εἶναι (cf. also 559.13). According to the Indices (CAG VII, VIII, X) there is one instance of a form of δοκιμως in Simplicius (in Categorias 15.27: καὶ
... δοκιμωτέρα 'more appropriate, proper'); no conclusion on what he takes δοκιμως here to mean is possible. Cf. Tarán, pp. 210-216.

558.17 - 19. ἀλλὰ ... ὑποτέχ. That Parmenides did not express himself as clearly as Melissus, who wrote in prose (ὡς καταλογάδην γράφας 17), see section II, pp. 98-102.

558.21 - 559.12 = 30 B 8.

559.12 - 13. σαμας ... εἶναι. Cf. 557.22-23, 558.16-18. The reason (ἀίτια) Melissus adduces for denying that what is perceptible 'exists', but only 'seems to exist' is that it fails to meet the stringent conditions of 'true existence'; cf. 30 B 8(2) (= 558.22-23), (5-6) (= 559.8-12). Simplicius makes a similar claim for Parmenides at in Phys 38.24-39.12, namely that what is perceptible is ' opinable, subject to opinion' (δοξαστὸν).

559.14. τῶς ... εἶναι is a rhetorical paraphrase of 298b21-22; cf. 557.12, 13-14 and notes. Simplicius ironically makes Aristotle the subject (τις) of ὑπολαβοι: Melissus and Parmenides are the subject of ὑπολαμβάνειν in 298b22.

559.14 - 27. ἀλλὰ ... παραδεδωκαν. Simplicius now refutes the conclusion of the argument in 298b21-24 (cf. 557.1-9), Aristotle's contention in 298b14-15 that Parmenides and Melissus totally abolish
coming to be (γένεσις) (cf. 556.1-2, 560.13, 672.28-30). To this point Simplicius has argued that Parmenides and Melissus distinguished (even by name) the two parts of reality, and did not superimpose the noetic onto the perceptible part to the exclusion of the latter. Here he adds (ολλά καὶ 'moreover') that they abolish coming to be from the noetic order (14-18) but allow it in the perceptible (18-27); this distinction flows from that made in 557.20-22 (cf. in Phys 80.3-4). The quotations from Parmenides and Melissus in 17-25 all contain some form of γύγνεσις: Simplicius's literal-mindedness is nowhere better exemplified.


559.18. καὶ Μέλισσος ὃς Ἀριστοτέλης. Simplicius refers in a general way to all of Melissus's work up to B 8; cf. 556.13, 558.17-21, esp. 19-20 εἰπὼν γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὅτι ἐν ἑστὶ καὶ ἄγεννητον . . . .

30 B 1 (= in Phys 162.24-26) and B 2 (= in Phys 109.20-25 and 29.22-26) are arguments for the uncreatedness of being.
559.18. τῶν μέντοι αἰσθητῶν γένεσιν αοιδός λέγειν. Cf. 557.22 τὴν δὲ τοῦ γυνομένου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, in Phys 80.3-4.

559.19 - 20. Μέλλοντος ... γίνεσθαι". Cf. B 8(3) (= 558.29-559.5).

559.20 - 21. Παρμενίδης δὲ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀοιδοῦ θησαυρὸς λέγειν. Stein emends ἀθοῦθα to ἀθόμενος (cf. apparatus). DK (I.241) apparently takes ἀθοῦθα λέγειν together as a paraphrase of Parmenides: "Ich will zu reden beginnen, wie die Erde". In his PGF (p. 69) Diels notes of B 11.1: "orditur cosmologiam; initio ἀθομενος e Simpl. supplias". Tarán quotes only 559.22-25 without commenting on 20-21 (pp. 165-166). (I suspect that behind ἀθοῦθα λέγειν lies e.g. λέγω | ἀθομενὴ πῶς . . . (cf. in Phys 31.8 πεπλανηθασι δὲ φησιν = πεπλανημένοι εἰς τὸν B 8.54 (= 30.24)); the goddess still speaks. At any rate, the phrase ἀθοῦθα φησι λέγειν is meaningless as it stands; perhaps λέγειν should be changed to λέγων (cf. in Phys 39.17.).


559.26 - 27. καὶ τῶν . . . παραδεξάμενοι. Cf. in Phys 31.10-17, 39.12-20, Plutarch adv Col 1114B-C (= DK I.241.8-11). DK I.242.4 and Diels (PGF, p. 69) read παραδεξάομαι (DEc) without mentioning the alternative παραδεξάμενοι (Ab), which Heiberg adopts. Guthrie (II p. 60 n 2) notes these alternative readings but indicates no preference
In his discussion of Melissus, however, he argues against there being a 'seeming' part of Melissus's work (II p. 102 and n. 2); this argument would support the singular, παράδιδωσι. Furthermore, Melissus's alleged statement of coming to be for what is perceptible (559.18) is set out in the μέν clause of 19-20 and is based solely on B 8. It seems more natural to take γιγαν (21) and παραδίδωσι (27) as coordinate (i.e. καί 26) and subsumed under the οἴ clause, which concerns Parmenides only.

559.27 - 560.4. δὴλον . . . νομιστέων. Simplicius concludes his rejection of Aristotle's argument in 298b21-24 (557.1-559.27) by claiming that common sense dictates that Parmenides did not wholly abolish coming to be (and perishing) (559.27-560.1), and that Aristotle corrects his refutation here of what is merely the surface meaning of Parmenides in Metaphysics A 987b27-28, where he says that 'Parmenides has more insight' (1-4).

559.27 - 560.1. δὴλον . . . τὸ ὄν. Simplicius appeals to common sense in his claim that it is clear (δὴλον) that Parmenides did not fail to recognize that he was created (γεννητός) or that he had two feet when he said that being was one and uncreated. Cf. in Phys 45.29-31 for the second half of this claim. Aristotle, on the other hand, describes both Parmenides and Melissus as 'madmen' precisely because they ignore the dictates of common sense (De Generatione et Corruptione 325a4-24); cf. section VIII, in Phys 77.9-
560.1 - 4. ἄλλ' ... νομιστέον. In in Phys Simplicius twice cites this statement of Aristotle (Metaphysics A 986b27-28) as his final judgement on Parmenides (37.2, 148.15). It is striking that Simplicius does not accurately quote this short clause in any of the passages. One suspects that his imprecision in this regard 'improves' Aristotle's actual words into forthright praise; cf. section VIII. τοῦ τοῦ ψαλλόμενου ἔλεγχον recapitulates 557.19-20 (cf. 1 ἐξελέγχων): πρὸς τὸ ψαλλόμενον . . . ὑπήντησε.

560.5 - 10. ὅ . . . ψόσων. Simplicius adds without further comment Alexander's paraphrase of 298b14-24, esp. 21-24. Insofar as Alexander wholly concurs with Aristotle, he can be seen as being implicitly attacked by Simplicius here.


in Cael 691.4 - 7. τὸ δὲ . . . ἀποδοσύνας. Aristotle contends that none of his predecessors had given an account of both absolute and relative weight and lightness (308a7-13, 308a34-b3). He objects against the monists that they can only account for the relatively heavy and light (309b29-b32; cf. 690.20-21, 26-691.4). Con-
versely, he objects that those who posit a single pair of material opposites can only account for the absolutely heavy and light (309b 34-310a3; cf. 691.18-692.6). Simplicius cites Parmenides as a possible target of this second objection.

VI. Parmenides's Argument for the Unity of Being.

A. Passages.

\textbf{in Phys} 51.8 - 27 \quad \text{Tr. pp. 303-304}

\textbf{in Phys} 102.20 - 103.12 \quad \text{Tr. pp. 332-333}

\textbf{in Phys} 114.25 - 115.9 \quad \text{Tr. p. 335}

\textbf{in Phys} 115.11 - 118.25 \quad \text{Tr. pp. 336-341}

\textbf{Verses DK 28} \quad \textbf{DK I}

\begin{align*}
115.11 - 116.4 &= 222.34-223.9 \\
(A \ 28) \\
116.28 - 117.1 &= B \ 2.3-8 \\
116.25 - 117.1 &= 231.3-6 \\
117.4-6 &= B \ 6.1-3 \\
117.2 - 13 &= 232.14-17 \\
117.8-13 &= B \ 6.4-9 \\
\textbf{in Phys} 118.27 - 121.25 &= \text{Tr. pp. 342-346} \\
120.23 &= B \ 8.4^* \\
\textbf{in Phys} 125.33 - 126.13 &= \text{Tr. p. 349} \\
\textbf{in Phys} 133.31 - 134.18 &= \text{Tr. pp. 356-357} \\
\textbf{in Phys} 235.12 - 236.12 &= \text{Tr. pp. 380-381} \\
\textbf{in Phys} 242.17 - 244.21 &= \text{Tr. pp. 383-386} \\
244.1-2 &= B \ 7.1-2 \\
\textbf{in Phys} 649.35 - 650.13 &= \text{Tr. p. 390} \\
650.13 &= B \ 7.1-2
\end{align*}

Related Passages.

\textbf{in Phys} 52.8-10

71.26-31
B. Summary, Comments.

The passages in this section deal with the argument which Parmenides allegedly formulated to prove his doctrine that being is one; this doctrine is treated as the conclusion of a syllogism. Objections to and refutations of the doctrine proper, however, will be treated in the following sections. This dual treatment follows Aristotle's own procedure. According to Simplicius, he first produces a general objection to the doctrine, then refutes (a fortiori) the argument that establishes it (in Phys 51.10-17, 102.20-103.12, 114.25-115.9). The general objection is that the doctrine is contradicted by our experience; nature is instinct with motion and plural-
ity (in Phys 51.10-17, 53.10-16, 71.19-73.4). Aristotle argues against Parmenides (and Melissus) that being neither is nor signifies one thing from his own pluralistic scheme of the Categories (cf. in Phys 72.4-10, 117.15-17). Simplicius will counter that the division (διάδεσις) found in the perceptible order, on which Aristotle bases his refutation, does not apply to the radical unity of the intelligible, which is Parmenidean being (in Phys 71.32-72.1, 148.7-11).

Aristotle makes a two-fold objection to the argument: that it assumes false premisses, and that it is formally invalid (186a23-28). Since he does not explicitly state what the argument is (cf. in Phys 116.18-20), Simplicius relates versions by Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Porphyry, as well as the one which he takes Aristotle to mean (in Phys 115.11-116.24; for Aristotle cf. 187a4-5, Metaphysics A 986b28-30). Throughout the commentary Simplicius adopts the version by Theophrastus:

1) τὸ παρὰ τὸ ὑπὸ οὐκ ὅν What is besides being is non-being
2) τὸ οὐκ ὅν οὔδὲν Non-being is nothing
3) ὅν ἀρα τὸ ὅν Therefore being is one.

(in Phys 103.8-11, 115.11-13, 117.28-118.5, 134.9-12; cf. Alexander in Priora Analytica (CAG II.1) 346.17-21, 357.1-5). Porphyry's version differs from this in that he infers from 1) and 2) that 3a) being alone exists (τὸ ὅν ἀρα μόνον ἐστὶν), and from this 'deduces' by way of equivocation 3) (in Phys 116.10-11). For the major premiss (2)) Eudemus substitutes 2a): being is used in one way only (τὸ ὅν λέγεται μονομοιοῦσα) (in Phys 115.13-14). The version Simplicius ascribes to Aristotle is: 1a) if being signifies one thing, and 2b)
the contradictory proposition is not possible, then 3b) nothing will exist except being (in Phys 116.19-24; cf. 187a4-5). Simplicius apparently thinks that all these versions are mutually compatible (in Phys 116.21, 26-27). At any rate, he quotes B 2.3-8 (= in Phys 116.28-117.1) to corroborate 1a)/2a) and 1) + 2)\(^1\), and B 6.1-9 (= in Phys 116.28-117.1) to corroborate 2b).

Aristotle's objection to the premisses is that they assume that being is used in only one way, whereas it is used in the (ten) ways described in the Categories (in Phys 117.14-17, 118.5-7, 133.31-134.1). Simplicius applies this objection to both premisses of the Theophrastean version. Since 'being' or 'existent' (tò óv) is used in many ways, it is not true that what is besides some variety of being is 'non-being' or 'non-existent' in the absolute sense (in Phys 117.17-28). If, however, one sets forth the minor premiss on the assumption that 'being' signifies more than one thing, the major premiss, that non-being is nothing, is false. If a thing is a non-substance, it is not nothing at all, but rather a quality, quantity, and the like (in Phys 117.28-118.3).

Regardless of their truth values, these premisses do not yield the conclusion which Parmenides draws, that being is one; rather, that what is besides being is nothing (in Phys 118.3-5, 134.1-2). Parmenides's argument is less crude than that of Melissus since his premisses are well-formed and yield a conclusion (in Phys 103.8-12). Aristotle (and Eudemus) further argues that even if Parmenides's assumption that being signifies one thing were true, his deduction
that being is one in number still does not follow (in Phys 118.7-121.5 (cf. 131.33-35); cf. 125.33-126.24 for a similar argument by Adrastus). In the first place, a thing can be spoken of 'in one way only' as a genus or species; in either case plurality is introduced. If everything were white, it would not follow that everything would be one; for snow, swans, and white lead are not numerically one (in Phys 118.7-119.16). Secondly, even in the case of a single white thing, a logical distinction has to made between the substrate which possesses the color and the color so possessed. Thus, plurality is a feature even of what is numerically one (in Phys 119.16-120.29). Simplicius argues against this second point in in Phys 120.29-121.25.

In two passages Simplicius relates that Plato agrees to Parmenides's minor premiss, that what is besides being is non-being (in Phys 134.14-18, 244.3-14). He adds the qualification that both have absolute or unqualified being in mind, for in the Sophist Plato clearly denies the major premiss by introducing qualified or relative non-being (in Phys 135.15-136.19, 147.31-148.6 (cf. 236.3-6), 242.17-244.21 (esp. 243.13-244.21); cf. 649.35-650.14; cf. Sophist 258c6-259b6). Simplicius quotes B 7.1-2 in several passages to prove that Parmenides had absolute being and non-being in mind (in Phys 78.6, 135.21-22, 143.31-144.1, 244.1-2, 650.13).

Zeno's argument from dichotomy is on several occasions mentioned as proving Parmenides's argument, by showing the absurdities that result from the antithetical thesis that being is many (in Phys 102.28-31, 134.2-12, 138.18-28, 141.8-11; cf. Parmenides 128a2-e4).
Simplicius rejects Porphyry's contention that this argument from
dichotomy belongs to Parmenides himself (in Phys 139.24-140.27).

Lastly, although Simplicius does not state what he thinks of
Parmenides's argument, it is likely that he concurs with Aristotle
and others that it does not yield the conclusion which Parmenides
draws. In the first place, he adopts the Theophrastean version of
the argument, in which the conclusion patently does not follow from
the premises. Secondly, Eudemus censures the Presocratics in ge-
neral, and Parmenides in particular, for three shortcomings: 1) no
knowledge of equivocity or ambiguity; 2) a failure to distinguish
between substance and accident; and 3) no use of logic or syllogis-
tic in their demonstrations (in Phys 115.25-116.4; cf. 120.5-12).
Simplicius replies only to 2) (in Phys 120.20-27). His silence on
1) and 3) is, of course, not conclusive of itself. Simplicius
clearly accepts Parmenides's doctrine, but need not adopt the ar-
gument he adduced to prove it. Insofar as Simplicius equates Par-
menidean being with the intelligible, he can argue that both pre-
misses, contra Aristotle, are true. The intelligible does not ad-
mit of 'used in many ways' nor of difference.
VII. Plato on Parmenides.

A. Passages.

in Phys 7.10 - 11 Tr. pp. 278-279
7.1-9 = Eudemus Physica fr. 31 (W) p. 22.4-13

in Phys 36.25 - 37.9 Tr. pp. 292-293
36.31-32 Cf. DL II.22 and IX.22

in Phys 52.21 - 53.7 Tr. pp. 305-306
52.25 - 53.5 = Sophist 244e1-245a6

in Phys 78.24 - 79.12 Tr. pp. 315-316
79.1-4 = Timaeus 37e4-38a2

in Phys 87.24 - 90.22 Tr. pp. 322-326
87.25 - 88.4 = Parmenides 142d9-143a3
89.5 - 90.20 = Sophist 244a6-245e5

in Phys 99.7 - 10 Tr. p. 329
Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d6

in Phys 99.32 - 101.24 Tr.* pp. 330, 331
100.3 - 15 = Sophist 251a8-c6
100.29 - 101.10 = Parmenides 129c4-e4

in Phys 102.28 - 31 Tr. p. 332
Cf. Parmenides 128a4-e4

in Phys 115.25 - 116.1 Tr. p. 336
115.11 - 116.5 = Eudemus Physica fr. 43 (W) pp. 28.24-29.15

in Phys 120.6 - 10 Tr. p. 344
120.6 - 12 = Eudemus Physica fr. 43 (W) p. 29.8-14

in Phys 134.2 - 18 Tr. pp. 356-357
Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d2, Sophist 250c3 ff.

in Phys 135.15 - 136.32  Tr. pp. 358-360
   135.18 - 136.10 = Sophist 258c6-259b6
   136.11 - 16 = Cf. Sophist 257b3-259a4

in Phys 136.33 - 137.20  Tr. pp. 361-362
   137.1 = Timaeus 27d6-28a1
   137.12 - 20 = Cf. Sophist 244e2 ff.

in Phys 138.18 - 28  Tr.* p. 363
   Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d6

in Phys 141.8 - 11  Tr. p. 366
   Cf. Parmenides 128c5-d6

in Phys 143.11 - 144.1  Tr. pp. 367-368
   Cf. Sophist 258c6 ff.

in Phys 146.29 - 147.2  Tr. p. 371
   Cf. Sophist 244e2-245e5

in Phys 147.16 - 148.6  Tr. pp. 372-373
   147.32 - 148.3 = Sophist 258e6-259a4

in Phys 148.11 - 18  Tr. p. 374
   148.14 = Cf. Theaetetus 184a1

in Phys 242.17 - 244.21  Tr. pp. 383-386
   242.28 - 243.3 = Eudemus Physica fr. 37b (W) p. 27.18-24
   243.18 - 20 = Sophist 245d12-e2

in Phys 650.6 - 14  Tr. p. 390
   Cf. Sophist 237a4-b3, 258c6-259a4
in Cael 139.27 - 140.9 Tr. pp. 395-396
Cf. Sophist 251b5-c6

in Cael 557.3 - 10 Tr. pp. 398-399
557.6 - 7 Cf. Parmenides 135b8-c1

in De Anima 260.23 - 25 Tr. p. 408
Cf. Sophist 258c6 ff.

Related Passages.

in Phys 77.31-33 Cf. Cratylus 402a8-10

in Phys 148.22-24 Cf. Cratylus 413a7-b1

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in Phys 52.23 = B 8.43 Cf. Sophist 244e2 ff.
52.26 - 28 = B 8.43-45 = Sophist 244e3-5
89.22 - 24 = B 8.43-45 = Sophist 244e3-5
135.21 - 22 = B 7.1-2 = Sophist 258d2-3
137.16 - 17 = B 8.43-45 Cf. Sophist 244e2 ff.
143.31 - 144.1 = B 7.1-2 Cf. Sophist 258c6 ff.
146.30 = B 8.43 Cf. Sophist 244e2 ff.
650.13 = B 7.2 Cf. Sophist 258c6 ff.

B. Summary, Comments.

Most of Simplicius's mentions of or quotations from Plato in conjunction with Parmenides center on his criticisms of Parmenides
in Sophist 244b6-24535 and 258c6-259b1. He quotes the former in toto at in Phys 89.5-90.20, and less extensively at in Phys 52.25-53.5 and 243.18-20. Similarly, the latter is quoted in toto at in Phys 135.18-136.10, piecemeal in 136.12-17; cf. in Phys 243.26-31 (= 258all-b7). Simplicius's isolated quotations of B 8.43-45 (= Sophist 244e3-5) and B 7.1-2 (= Sophist 258d2-3) appear to be based on Plato rather than on his manuscript of Parmenides (see Appendix B, Conclusion

Simplicius rejects Plato's criticism of Parmenides in Sophist 244B ff. for two reasons: 1) that it is based on too literal an interpretation of the sphere-simile of B 8.43-45 (in Phys 52.21-53.7, 146.29-147.2; cf. 87.32-88.8); and 2) that it in effect equates Parmenides's one being with the intellectual (τὸ νοερὸν), which both is pluralistic and admits of non-being qua otherness (in Phys 143.11-28, 147.17-21). His rejection of Plato's criticism in 258C ff. is closely allied with 2): Parmenides's one being admits of no non-being, not even that relative to 'other' (in Phys 143.28-144.1, 18-20, 147.21-148.6, 650.9-14). He further argues that Plato accepts Parmenides's doctrine that absolute non-being is nothing at all (in Phys 136.10-27, 31-32, 147.31-148.3, 244.7-8), and that the minor premiss of his syllogism, that what is besides being is non-being, is true (in Phys 134.14-17, 243.22-24, 244.10-11; cf. in De Anima 260.23-35).

Simplicius palliates his refutation of Plato on Parmenides on the following grounds: 1) that Plato recognized the profundity of
Parmenides's thought and did not refute him out of mere disputatiousness (in \textit{Phys} 36.31-32, 88.30-31, 148.11-16); 2) that some of his refutations are undertaken on behalf of the philosophically superficial (in \textit{Phys} 36.25-31, 37.6-7); 3) that he adopted and clarified Eleatic doctrines (in \textit{Phys} 7.1-19; cf. 37.3-4); 4) that Parmenides's one being is the both the starting point for discovering the One (in \textit{Phys} 88.31-34) and the subject of the second hypothesis (in \textit{Phys} 148.17-18) in the \textit{Parmenides}.

Simplicius follows Plato in seeing Zeno's arguments as coming to the aid of Parmenides; he frequently refers or alludes to \textit{Parmenides} 128a4-d6 (esp. c5-d6); \textit{Phys} 99.7-10, 102.28-31, 134.2-8, 138.17-28, 141.18-11. Simplicius also quotes from \textit{Parmenides} 135b8-cl to corroborate Aristotle's claim in \textit{De Caelo} 298b22-23 that Parmenides (and Melissus) saw the need for uncreated and motionless entities for there to be knowledge (in \textit{Cael} 557.6-7).

Several of his quotations from and allusions to Plato are used to refute or attack other philosophers. Thus, in \textit{Phys} 79.1-4 (= \textit{Timaeus} 37e4-39a2) and 135.15-136.10 (= \textit{Sophist} 258c6-259b6) Alexander is the target. Similarly, Porphyry is being attacked in \textit{Phys} 136.33-137.20 (137.1 = \textit{Timaeus} 27d6-28a1; 137.4-7 = \textit{Sophist} 248e6-249a1; 137.12-20 = \textit{Sophist} 244e2 ff.). In his bitter reply to Philoponus in \textit{Cael} 139.27-140.9, Simplicius alludes to \textit{Sophist} 251b5-c6 (cf. in \textit{Phys} 100.1-15 = 251b8-c6).

Simplicius appears to draw on the \textit{Cratylus} in \textit{Phys} 77.31-33 (cf. 402a8-10) and \textit{Phys} 148.22-24 (cf. 413a7-b1).
Lastly, Simplicius quotes Eudemus as saying that Plato first introduced ambiguity (τὸ σωκόν), the failure to recognize which led Parmenides and other Presocratics astray (in Phys 115.25-116.1, 120. 6-10, 242.30-243.3; frr. 37b, 43 (W)).
VIII. Aristotle on Parmenides.

A. Passages.

| in Phys | 6.31 - 8.15 | Tr.* pp. 278-279 |
| in Phys | 31.9 - 10  | Tr. p. 289 |
| in Phys | 36.15 - 31 | Tr. p. 292 |
| in Phys | 37.1 - 7   | Tr. pp. 292-293 |
| in Phys | 38.1 - 11  | Tr. p. 295 |
| in Phys | 45.26 - 46.8 | Tr. p. 301 |
| in Phys | 79.8 - 12  | Tr. p. 316 |
| in Phys | 80.17 - 18 | Tr. p. 318 |
| in Phys | 86.19 - 87.23 | Tr. pp. 321-322 |

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| 86.22 | 8.25 |
| 86.24 | 8.22 |
| 86.27 - 28 | 6.1-2 |
| 86.31 - 87.1 | 8.36-38 |
| 87.14 - 16 | 8.34-36 |
| 87.23 | 8.25 |

| in Phys | 120.29 - 121.9 | Tr. pp. 345-346 |
| in Phys | 144.2 - 11  | Tr. pp. 368-369 |
| in Phys | 146.26 - 29 | Tr. p. 371 |
| in Phys | 147.16 - 17 | Tr. p. 372 |
| in Phys | 148.7 - 20  | Tr. pp. 373-374 |
| in Phys | 179.27 - 180.13 | Tr. p. 378 |

| 180.1 - 7 | 8.53-59 |
B. Summary, Comments.

The list of passages above does not pretend to be exhaustive; with some exceptions, everything Simplicius has to say about Parmenides has some connection with Aristotle's treatment of him in both the Physics and De Caelo. Many references to Parmenides in in Phys and in Cael are in fact mere expansions or glosses on lemmata (cf. e.g. in Phys 70.1-3 and 185a17-19). The two most important passages for understanding what Simplicius thinks of Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides are in Phys 86.19-87.23 and in Cael 556.3-560.10 (see pp. 205-228).

Because Simplicius attempts to harmonize all ancient Greek philosophers from Thales to Aristotle (in Phys 6.31-8.15, 28.32-36.20), he must somehow defuse Aristotle's explicit criticisms and refutations of his predecessors (in Phys 36.25-28; cf. 147.17, 148.7-9). He employs two lines of argument to this end: 1) that some of Aristotle's refutations are not in fact refutations; 2) that
Aristotle does not necessarily endorse the refutations he formulates. Simplicius subsumes three claims under 1): a) that sometimes Aristotle (and Plato) is merely supplying something omitted in what his predecessors said; b) sometimes he clarifies what was obscurely stated; and c) sometimes he is drawing a distinction (in Phys 37.1-6). Complementary to these claims is Simplicius's assertion that the ancients were accustomed to express themselves in a riddling way (in Phys 36.30-31, section II).

As for 2), Simplicius argues on four grounds: a) that some of Aristotle's refutations are undertaken on behalf of the (philosophically) superficial (cf. e.g. in Phys 36.28-30, in Cael 140.3-9); b) that Aristotle is in fact in accord with his predecessors (in Phys 36.20-24); c) that he sometimes borrows doctrines or concepts from them (in Phys 7.10-27); d) as in the case of Parmenides, Aristotle testifies to the profundity of some of his predecessors (in Phys 37 1-2; cf. 161.23-162.2).

For Parmenides, at any rate, Simplicius provides few examples of 1a) and 1b). Aristotle's criticism of the logical fallacies in Parmenides's argument for the unity of being (Physics 186a22-32) appears to fall under one of these headings; cf. in Phys 8.9-15 and section VI. As for 1c), Simplicius maintains that Aristotle is aware of the fact that Parmenides's one being is a metaphysical principle of being, not the whole of physical being (in Phys 38.1-11, 45.26-46.8, 79.8-12, 1195.6-11).

Simplicius makes the most out of the least convincing of his
claims (2a)), that Aristotle refutes Parmenides for the benefit of a superficial audience (cf. *in Cael* 557.19-20). Predicated on this claim, it seems, is his rejection of Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides along categorial lines in *Physics* I and of his argument in *De Caelo* 298b14-24 that Parmenides denied coming to be and motion in the physical world. Simplicius holds that Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides in the *Physics* is based on a dichotomous division which presupposes Aristotle's own categorial scheme (*in Phys* 148.7-9; cf. 71.19-73.4). He maintains that Aristotle attempts to identify Parmenidean being with individual substance (*in Phys* 79.10-11, 131.12-133.29, 144.8-10) and to force Parmenides's 'one' into one of its Aristotelian meanings (*in Phys* 86.19-87.19). Both attempts are misguided because Parmenides's one being transcends the physical order, which does contain substances and concrete 'ones' (*in Phys* 142.31-144.11, 148.9-11); that Aristotle knows better is confirmed by 1c); cf. *in Phys* 21.15-20, 40.23-41.9. Simplicius makes the same argument in *in Cael* 556.3-560.4; when Parmenides speaks of uncreated and motionless being, he speaks of what is intelligible, for in the *Doxa* he clearly allows both creation (γένεσις) and motion. Moreover, Aristotle's 'superficial' refutation belies his awareness of this distinction (*in Cael* 557.9-10, 559.27-560.4). (Although Simplicius frequently invokes this principle of 'refutation on behalf of the superficial', I have not been able to locate a justification on his part for its application. There is nothing in the *Physics* or *De Caelo* to suggest that Aristotle addresses his remarks to the undiscerning.)
Simplicius uses Aristotle's own statement in *Physics* 188b30-189a1 to justify his claim that the Presocratics are basically in accord both among one another and with Aristotle himself (2b) on physical (and metaphysical) doctrines (in *Phys* 36.20-24, 179.27-29, 188.14-190.20). More particularly, that Parmenides embraced a pair of opposite, material principles (in *Phys* 30.14-31.10, 34.10-12, 179.29-180.13) and an efficient cause (in *Phys* 31.10-17, 34.13-17, 39.12-20; cf. *Metaphysics* A 984a25-4b, 20-31) reveals that his agreement with Aristotle (in *Phys* 6.31-8.6 (but *nb* 8.1-2), 36.15-24).

Simplicius maintains (2c)) that Aristotle is indebted to Parmenides both for the insight that opposite principles are required for change (in *Phys* 31.9-10; cf. 2b) above) and for his unmoved mover as final cause of all existence (in *Phys* 80.15-17, 87.7-17, 144.22-25, 148.19-20 (cf. 8.6-10). On the latter cf. *Metaphysics* A 6-10, esp. 1076a4 (= in *Phys* 87.10, 148.20).

Lastly, Simplicius holds that (2d)) Aristotle was aware of Parmenides's profundity (in *Phys* 37.1-2, 148.11-16, in *Cael* 559.27-560.3) and does not refute him out of disputatiousness (in *Phys* 148.11-13); cf. *Metaphysics* A 986b27-28 (= in *Phys* 37.2, 148.16, in *Cael* 560.2-3). (Despite his attempts to reconcile Aristotle and Parmenides, Simplicius at times argues with some vehemence against Aristotle's criticisms of Parmenides; in *Phys* 120.29-121.9, in *Cael* 557.1-560.1.)
IX. Others on Parmenides.

Adrastus.

A. Passages.

in Phys 124.33 - 125.5, 33 - 136.13 Tr. p. 349

B. Comments, Notes.

Simplicius offers a long excerpt and quotation from Adrastus on τὸ ὁμό ὡν 186a32-b12 (in Phys 122.33-136.13); Simplicius does not indicate which work of Adrastus's he consults. See Index Nominum s.v. p. 1437.

Alexander. Commentarius in Physica, Commentarius in De Caelo.

A. Passages.

in Phys 37.12 - 40.21 Tr. pp. 294-298

1 lemma = 184b15-16

38.20 - 24 Cf. Theophrasti Physicorum Opiniones fr. 6 DG 482 n 10

Cf. III, pp. 112-116.

in Phys 40.23 - 41.9 Tr. p. 300

1 lemma = 184b16-18

41.8 - 9 = B 8.50-51

Cf. IV, pp. 123-124.

in Phys 45.15 - 46.4 Tr. p. 301

1 lemma = 184b22-25

in Phys 51.21 - 27 Tr. pp. 303-304

1 lemma = 185a5-10

in Phys 71.4 - 8 Tr. p. 308
lemma = 185a17-19
Cf. 38.20-22

in Phys 77.9 - 80.18  Tr. pp. 314-318
lemma = 185a20-25
Cf. IV, pp. 125-137

in Phys 135.15 - 136.32  Tr. pp. 358-360
lemma = 187a1-11
135.17 - 136.10 = Sophist 258c6-259b6
Cf. 137.7-20

in Phys 141.8 - 11  Tr. p. 366
lemma = 187a1-11

in Cael 560.5 - 10  Tr. p. 402
lemma = 298b14-24
Cf. V, p. 228.

B. Summary, Comments.

Simplicius frequently cites Alexander, more often than not in order to dispute his interpretation (cf. Index Nominum s.v. "Αλέξαν-
δρος ὁ "Ἀρρενίους CAG VII pp. 766-767, CAG X pp. 1437-1439). He attempts to refute Alexander on Parmenides in two extended passages which have been treated in some detail: in Phys 37.12-40.9 (pp. 112-
116), 77.9-80.18 (pp. 125-137).


A. Passages.

in Phys 7.10 - 19  Tr. pp. 278-279
fr. 31 = p. 22.4-13

in Phys 99.7 - 16 Tr. p. 329
fr. 37a = p. 27.7-15

in Phys 115.11 - 116.5 Tr. p. 336
fr. 43 = pp. 28.24-29.15
Cf. 243.2-3

in Phys 120.6 - 12 Tr. p. 344
fr. 43 = p. 29.8-14
Cf. 121.9-17

in Phys 133.21 - 29 Tr. p. 355
fr. 44 = p. 29.16-24
133.27 = B 8.44 (cf. 143.6)

in Phys 143.1 - 8 Tr. p. 367
fr. 45 = pp. 29.25-30.8
143.3 = B 8.22
143.6 = B 8.43

Related Passages.

in Phys 97.9 - 13
138.30 - 33
144.14 - 16

Cf. fr. 37a p. 25.19-23; 33a, 33b p.23.3-9.

B. Summary, Comments.

The only significant passage in which Simplicius mentions Eudemus, in Phys 120.20-29, is treated in IV, pp. 141-145.
Philoponus. VI Librorum πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (περὶ ἀμφιβάλτητος κόσμου).

A. Passages.

in Cael 136.18 - 137.12  Tr. pp. 393-394

137.2 - 6  = B 8.6-9
137.7 - 11  = Physics 191a27-31

Cf. IV, pp. 191-193.

in Cael 139.23 - 140.9  Tr. pp. 395-396

Cf. Sophist 251b5-d6

B. Summary, Comments.

The second passage lends weight to Philoponus's being the target
in in Phys 28.32-29.5 (- 36.20); cf. in Phys 640.12-18.

Simplicius frequently cites, and invariably attacks, Philoponus:

1447-1448. Philoponus is not explicitly mentioned in in Phys I -
VII or in in Cael I.6 - IV.

Philoponus's treatment of Parmenides, especially in his com-
mentary on the Physics (CAG XVI-XVII), deserves special study.


A. Passages.

in Phys 92.29 - 93.5, 26-29  Tr. p. 328

1 lemma  = 185b25-27

Cf. 92.25-29

in Phys 116.6 - 18  Tr. p. 337

1 lemma  = 186a19-22
in Phys 136.33 - 137.20 Tr. pp. 361-362

 lemma = 187al-11

 137.16-17 = B 8.43-44

Cf. Sophist 244e2 ff.

in Phys 139.24 - 141.11 Tr. pp. 364-366

 lemma = 187al-11

B. Summary, Comments.

Only two of the passages listed above are of importance for Parmenides, 116.6-18 and 139.24-141.11. In the former Porphyry offers a version of Parmenides's argument for the unity of being, which Simplicius apparently approves of; cf. VI, p. 232. Porphyry's contention in the latter, that Parmenides used an argument from dichotomy, is forcefully rejected by Simplicius; cf. VI, pp. 234-235.

Theophrastus. Physicorum Opinionum.

A. Passages

in Phys 22.26 - 23.20 Tr.* p. 282

 fr. 5 DG 480.4-481.13

in Phys 25.14 - 26.4 Tr.* p. 284

 fr. 3 DG 477.13-478.15

in Phys 28.4 - 31 Tr.* p. 285

 fr. 8 DG 483.11-484.18

in Phys 38.18 - 24 Tr. pp. 295-296

 fr. 6 DG 482 n 10
\textit{in Phys} 71.6 - 8 (= 38.20-22) \quad \text{Tr. p. 308}

Cf. fr. 6 \textit{DG} 482 n 10

\textit{in Phys} 115.11 - 13 \quad \text{Tr. p. 336}

fr. 7 \textit{DG} 483.8-10

Cf. 103.8-11, 117.28-118.5 (cf. \textit{DG} 483 n 8), 134.9-12 (cf. \textit{DG} 483 n 8)

\textbf{B. Comments.}

Notes to Chapter IV

Notes to Section I.

1 In addition to such details being extraneous to the task at hand, Simplicius may omit them for the reason that they were readily available in summary form (which, incidentally, he detests); in Phys 28.33–34. He explicitly denies that his précis of the physicists is chronological at in Phys 28.30–31.

The striking omission is that Simplicius does not state any student-teacher relation or the like between Parmenides and Melissus, although he regularly treats them together throughout in Phys and in Cael. He follows Aristotle and perhaps eventually Plato (Theaetetus 180ε2, 183ε3) in treating them together.

Notes to Section II.


2 See note on 21.18–19. This passage is the only parallel to be found. Proclus stress here (= 28 A 17) and at in Parm 665.12 (= 28 A 18) that despite Parmenides's use of poetry what he says is clear.

Notes to Section III.

1 The first passage (28.32–31.17) is Simplicius's first full statement of Parmenides's philosophy. The second (38.12–40.21) is a recapitulation of the first, designed as a reply to Alexander's interpretation of Parmenides.

2 ad Col 1113F–1114F; cf. Chapter III, pp. 66–68. Simplicius quotes from Plutarch once (in Phys 8.20–30; 21–29 = Alexander 7.7 (668B)), but there is nothing in his interpretation of Parmenides that directly comes from Plutarch. The general lines of interpretation are the same.
3 Cf. Chapter III, pp. 70-72. It is quite possible that one of Proclus’s Neoplatonic predecessors is the author of this thesis.

Notes to Section IV.

1 In addition to the passages in this section, the information he does provide about Parmenides’s one being is to be found at: in Phys 22.25-26, 31.18-19, 36.15, 38.11-13, 19, 39.11, 45.31-32, 87.8-9, 136.28-31. See also section VIII.

2 Simplicius here takes ψωμοί (21) to refer to the 'kinetic monists' only (ιέως 22), apparently taking 184b16-17 literally; cf. in Cael 561.2. Elsewhere he calls the 'kinetic pluralists' ψωμοί also.

3 Diels’s Indices (I–IV, pp. 1369–1455) are incomplete and often erroneous; he does not always list parallel passages in his apparatus.

4 This agreement between Aristotle and Eudemus lends credence to Simplicius's claim that Eudemus follows Aristotle in everything: καὶ ὁ Εὐδημὸς δὲ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει πώς να καταφυλακῇ (in Phys 133.21-22).

5 Simplicius does not state what the upshot of this error was for the Megarians. It may be that they, like the Eretrians, denied predication altogether and contented themselves with tautologies (cf. in Phys 91.28-31). The argument in 120.21-24 and Sophist 251b5-1c1, if Antisthenes is the target (see Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 245), would support such an interpretation. Simplicius does not mention them again in his commentary. See Metaphysics Θ 1046b29 for the Megarians, and Δ 1024b32–34, Η 1043b23–28, and Topics 104b20–21 for Antisthenes. See further "Megariker" RE Supplementband V coll. 707-724, esp. 723.25 ff. (Kurt von Fritz).

6 Ilsetraut Hadot (Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Héroclès et Simplicius [Paris, 1978], pp. 27-32, esp. 27-28) argues that the 'autocitations' of Simplicius in in Phys to in Cael establish a relative chronology between the two works. The case is more complicated than this. It is true that there is a significant number of such authentic citations; Diels (Index Nominum s.v. Simplicius, p. 1454) lists 1118.3, 1146.27, 1169.7, 1178.36, 1330.2, 1335.1 (all references to in Cael I). As Diels notes (ibidem), all these citations involve Philoponus; the earliest explicit reference to Philoponus in in Phys is 1117.15 (see Index Nominum s.v., p. 1447). The autocitations allow the inference that in Phys VIII (1117–1366) post-
dates in Cael I. The relative chronology of in Phys I - VII and in Cael (I ?) may well be the opposite of what Hadot holds, especially if Simplicius's silence on Philoponus in the former is contrasted with his frequent (and usually bitter) references to him in the latter (see Index Nominum s.v. Ioannes Philoponus, p. 771; all references are in Book I (I-364) only). Only a determination of why Philoponus is mentioned where he would settle the issue. (Diels' Indices are not complete; Heiberg's may be also.)

7 Diels (Paramenides Lehrgedicht [Berlin, 1897], p. 77) thinks that this 'line' was already absent from Simplicius's manuscript of Parmenides. He maintains that Simplicius's paraphrase reflects his own elaboration of the suppressed premisses of the syllogism, not Parmenides's text.

Notes to Section V.

1 In Physics 185a17-19 Aristotle states that, although Parmenides and Melissus do not speak about nature (φύσις), they nevertheless do raise 'natural problems/dilemmas' (μονωτικά ἀπορίας) and therefore are of philosophical interest; see also 184b16-17. In On Philosophy Aristotle called them 'non-naturalists' (ἄληθικοι) (fr. 9 (W 9) Ross OCT, p. 77).

2 In Phys 70.15-17 εἴτερ, ὡς καὶ πρότερον ἠκούσα, τὸ Μέλισσος καὶ τὴν ἐψηφοσύνην ὅπως ἐποιήσατο τοῦ συγγραμματος Περί φύσεως ἢ Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος (cf. also in Phys 71.8-10). Simplicius does not mention this earlier in in Phys; in 34.12 he refers to in Cael (528-529, according to Diels). The priority of in Cael to in Phys I - VII seems likely (cf. note 6 above). Diels lists neither reference in his Indices.

3 According to Diels (PGF, p. 65 n v 4 (B 8)). All the authors he cites quote the line in isolation: Plutarch (adv Col 1114C), Pseudo-Plutarch (Stromateis 5), Clement (Stromateis V 14, 15; according to Ioannes Raeder (Theodorei Graecarum Affectionum Curatio [Leipzig, 1904], p. 65) this = PE XIII 13.39, 1.8.5 = Theodoretus Peri 'Aσθήνης Β 108)), Philoponus (in Phys 65.7); add also Proclus in Parm 1152.25. (It is possible that this line appeared in this form in Theophrastus.) These authors cite the first part of the line in various forms: e.g. μονον μουσογενές (Plutarch) σύλωσις (Proclus).

4 Aristotle's statement in 298b16 ἄλλα μόνον δοκεῖν ἦμῖν is ignored throughout Simplicius's discussion in 557.1-560.4.
5 On δυτικήν υπόστασιν . . . αἰσθητοῦ (557.21-22) cf. 608.30-609.1, in Phys 157.5-7, 160.22-23, 26-27.

6 Simplicius's interpretation parallels that of Plutarch (adv Col 1114B-F). The present contention (558.14-17 esp. 16-17) has a remarkable correspondence in Plutarch: ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὄντως ὄντι προσήκει διαμένειν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, ταύτα [αἰσθητά καὶ δοξαστὰ] δὲ νῦν μὲν ἐστι, νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν, ἔξισται δὲ οὐκ ἦν καὶ μεταλάμαται τὴν φύσιν, ἔτερος ἤτοι μᾶλλον ἡ τῆς ἐκείνου τοῦ ὄντος ἄλλοις ἔκτοθαί προσμορίας (1114 E).

7 Guthrie bases his contention on Simplicius: "Melissus appears to have confined himself to discussion of reality and the folly of trusting the senses, without adding any description of the 'seeming' world corresponding to the second part of Parmenides's poem. Simplicius, who clearly possessed the works of both philosophers, writes: "Melissus simply says that there is no becoming at all, whereas Parmenides says that there is in seeming though not in truth." In 556.12-14 Simplicius probably follows, even quotes, Alexander (cf. 556.23-24 and 560.5-10), for he argues throughout this passage that Melissus (as well as Parmenides) does not totally abolish coming to be, but rather allows it in the perceptible order (556.28-30, 557.20-23, 559.18-20; cf. 560.13).

Notes to Section VI.

1 τὴν μὲν τὸ 'παρὰ τὸ ὅν οὐκ ὅν καὶ οὐδὲν' λέγουσι. (in Phys 116.26).

Notes to Section VIII.

1 In what follows an attempt is made to sort out Simplicius's scattered remarks relating to harmonizing Aristotle and Parmenides. The arrangement of the arguments and claims is not Simplicius's own.
Conclusion

A clear picture of Simplicius as a source for and an interpreter of Parmenides has emerged from the preceding chapters, despite the complexity of issues and numerous insoluble problems raised concerning both Parmenides in his own right and the role which he plays throughout Greek philosophy. Definitive treatment of Simplicius on Parmenides would require detailed study of his interpretations of all the Presocratics he cites, fuller examination of the Neoplatonic sources for his interpretation, and finally a comprehensive account of Simplicius as a philosopher. It is hoped that the conclusions which follow throw into relief the more salient features of Simplicius's treatment of Parmenides.

I. Simplicius as a Source for Parmenides.

Simplicius's longer quotations from Parmenides are as a rule accurate; his manuscript of Parmenides was excellent (Diels, Parmenides Lehrgedicht, p. 26), although it was not wholly free of error (cf. in Phys 30.27 = 39.5 = 180.5 (B 8.57)). (Simplicius's longer quotations from Plato confirm accuracy of his longer quotations from Parmenides and other Presocratics; see in Phys 89.5-90.20 = Sophist 244b6-245a6 (nb παραγόμενοι 89.5) and Loci Platonici (in Phys 1456-1457).) His quotation of B 8.1-52 at in Phys 145.1-146.25, for example, is evidently from his manuscript (in Phys 144.25-26; nb
Further, the care with which he cites the context of his quotations makes secure the ordering of many fragments (cf. *in Phys* 77.34–78.33). The shorter, especially isolated quotations are more likely to be inaccurate. These appear to fall into three groups: 1) those from memory, i.e. tag-lines and clichés; 2) those based on a more immediate consultation of the text of Parmenides, particularly of lines which he quotes more than once; 3) those from some other written source at his disposal. An example of 1) is B 8.43–45 (*in Phys* 126.22–23, 137.16–17), of 2) B 8.50–51 (*in Phys* 41.8–9; cf. 38.30–31), and of 3) B 8.43 (*in Phys* 52.23; B 8.43–45 sometimes the provenance of a quotation cannot be determined; cf. *in Cael* 137.3–6.

His short, isolated quotations of lines should therefore be accepted with reservation; cf. *in Phys* 120.23 = *in Cael* 557.18 = *in Phys* 30.2, 78.13, 145.5 (B 8.4). A striking example is:

οἷον, ὁμισθητον τελέσθει, τῷ πῶντ' άνω έλευς,

which Simplicius quotes twice (*in Phys* 29.18, 143.10). Cornford ("A new fragment of Parmenides," CR 49 (1935), 122–123) and Guthrie (p. 40 n v 38) take this to be a genuine quotation. Diels's contention that Simplicius is quoting from memory a garbled version of B 8.38 at *Theaetetus* 180e1 rather than from his manuscript, is more likely correct (*in Phys Praefatio* X, notes to 29.18, 143.10; cf. 87.1, 146.11). In the first place, Simplicius quotes freely from Plato throughout his commentaries (see *Loci Platonici*, *in Phys* pp. 1456–1457). Next, he quotes B 7.1–2 (*in Phys* 135.21–22) and
B 8.43–45 (in Phys 52.26–28, 89.22–24) apud Plato's Sophist, and apparently quotes Plato’s version of the former (i.e. with ὅντα) at in Phys 143.31–144.1, 244.1–2. Leaving out of account B 7.1(-2), Simplicius’s quotations from Parmenides contain 33 instances of the participial form of εἶναι from the following verses: B 2.7; B 6.1; B 8.3, 7, 12, 19, 24, 25, 32, 33, 35, 37, 46, 47; but cf. B 1.32, B 8.56 (Appendices B and C). In three instances the form ὅντα is found instead of ἕοντα: in Phys 145.7 (B 8.7), 145.12 (B 8.12), 146.6 (B 8.33). While all three occur in the long quotation of B 8.1–52 (in Phys 145.1–146.25), the reading ἕοντα, which is required by the meter, is attested in other quotations of these lines: B 8.7 = in Phys 78.16, 162.19, in Cael 137.4; B 8.12 = in Phys 78.21; B 8.33 = in Phys 31.10, 40.6. On the other hand, all three occurrences of B 7.1 have ὅντα alone, and are found either in a quotation from the Sophist (in Phys 135.21) or in contexts in which Simplicius has the Sophist in mind (in Phys 143.31, 244.1). The likelihood is great that Simplicius follows Plato rather than the manuscript for his version of B 7.1 —2; that ἕοντα is the correct reading is confirmed by Aristotle, Metaphysics Ν 1089a4.

One might argue that Simplicius independently confirms rather than reproduces Plato’s quotation in Theaetetus 180e1. Given, however, that the verse as quoted is nearly meaningless and that a verse that closely resembles it and is meaningful is attested (in Phys 87.1, 146.11 (B 8.38)), doubts as to the authenticity of the alleged fragment are inescapable. Guthrie's objection that in neither passage is a direct reference to the Theaetetus is to be
found is not telling. As mentioned above, Simplicius quotes several verses of Parmenides apud Plato. (It is likely that B 13 (in Phys 39.18) is a cliché verse, hallowed by Plato's quotation of it in the Symposium (cf. DK 28 B 13). As Simplicius ran over the Doxa, he may have selected this verse for quotation because he was familiar with it.) In addition, there are numerous references, direct and indirect, to Plato in Simplicius as in all Neoplatonists; cf. Loci Platonici, in Phys 1456-1457, in which three references to the Theaetetus are found. Thirdly, Simplicius is much concerned throughout his commentary on Physics I with Plato's treatment of Parmenides. Lastly, shortly after one of the quotations of the alleged fragment (in Phys 143.10), Simplicius paraphrases Plato's praise of Parmenides in Theaetetus 184a1 (in Phys 148.14-15; cf. 36.31); cf. PE XIV.4.6.

Simplicius's perfunctory treatment of the Doxa is the most striking feature of his treatment of Parmenides. He quotes only 29 verses from the Doxa; the longest of these quotations includes the transition from the Aletheia as well (B 8.50-16 = in Phys 38.30-39). If Diels's estimate that only ten percent of the Doxa survives, Simplicius's quotations (out of the total 43 extant lines) from this part must have been highly selective. Examination of his treatment of the Doxa reveals that Simplicius had no interest in the actual workings of Parmenides's physical scheme (cf. e.g. in Phys 39.12-21). His quotations are intended solely to prove the following contentions:
1) that Parmenides did not deny the reality of the physi-world, but rather granted it 'seeming' being (τὸ δῶμεν ὁν): in Phys 38.26-39.12, in Cael 557.20-558.17.

2) that Parmenides did not deny that coming to be (γένεσις) was part of the physical world: in Cael 559.14-560.14 (note that each quotation contains a form of γένεσις), cf. in Phys 45.29-32.

3) that Parmenides adduced light-night/fire-earth/hot-cold as opposite, elemental principles to account for physical objects: in Phys 30.20-31.10 (cf. 147.26-29), 179.29-180.14.

4) that the ἅλκων mentioned in B 12.3 is Parmenides's efficient cause of the physical world, particularly of all coming to be: in Phys 31.10-17 (cf. 34.12-17), 39.12-20.

In his insistence that Parmenides presents a serious account of the physical world in the Doxa Simplicius is not breaking new ground. Among the Neoplatonists, Plotinus, Proclus, and Philoponus maintain the same thesis; the Platonist Plutarch anticipates this line of argument (Chapter III, pp. 65-67, 69-72). Simplicius is also in harmony with these philosophers in asserting that Parmenides had physical doctrines without elaborating on what they were. As a rule, the doxographical tradition is more illuminating on his physical doctrines that are Plutarch and the Neoplatonists.

Simplicius's relative neglect of the Doxa is in part due to his predilection for the noetic over the phenomenal. The principal benefit, he asserts, of the study of physics is that it prepares one for metaphysics (in Phys 4.17-5.26; cf. 18.24-34). A more decisive factor, however, is that on Simplicius's own version of the history of physics Parmenides's doctrines are primitive. He maintains that Parmenides and other early Presocratics championed some one or more
of the proximate elements, i.e. fire earth, etc., as the stuff of things (in Phys 36.8-20). Consequently, they did not achieve a complete insight into all four proximate elements, let alone make a more fundamental analysis of physical objects into form-matter, geometrical figures, or numbers (in Phys 7.19-27). It is with Parmenides's metaphysical advances that Simplicius is predominantly concerned.

II. Simplicius as an Interpreter of Parmenides.

A. The Interpretation Proper.

Simplicius is concerned in much of his commentary on Physics I with demonstrating the harmony of doctrines, both physical and metaphysical, among the Presocratics (in Phys 28.32-37.9). His history of Presocratic philosophy is a Neoplatonic reworking of Aristotle's account in Metaphysics A; the four Aristotelian causes are correlated with the hypostases of Neoplatonism (in Phys 6.31-8.15). He takes the formal and material causes to be physical and to apply properly to the hypostasis of soul. The efficient and final causes are metaphysical and pertain to the hypostasis of intellect or the One. Simplicius divides the Presocratics into two camps; those who employed physical causes only, and those who employed metaphysical causes as well. Most of the Presocratics were content to accept one or more proximate elements, i.e. fire, water, etc., as the stuff of physical objects. The Pythagoreans anticipated first Plato then Aristotle in analyzing physical objects into still more fundamental
causes or principles. Simplicius maintains that there is no contradiction between the proponents of proximate, elemental causes and the proponents of more fundamental causes; both are concerned with physical causes. The former simply have a cruder, less powerful theory of physics. Some of the cruder physicists, however, formulated metaphysical causes as well; namely, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Parmenides. Simplicius devotes considerable space to identifying the efficient and final causes in these philosophers (cf. in Phys 31.10–35.21). He does not attempt to demonstrate that all of the metaphysically perspicuous Presocratics embraced the same principles. Rather, they are in harmony insofar as they articulate, consciously or not, at least one efficient and final cause.

On this scheme Parmenides is both a crude physicist and a profound metaphysician. Simplicius insists that he did not deny the reality of the physical world. In the Doxa he set forth a pair of opposite, elemental causes, light–night/fire–earth/hot–cold, to explain the nature of physical objects. So far as he observed that physical causes had to be opposites to make change possible, Parmenides is in accord with both other Presocratics and Aristotle himself. Simplicius also identifies the ἄλημα of the Doxa (B 12.3) as Parmenides's efficient cause. Beyond the identification of this divinity with an efficient cause, Simplicius has little to say on the ἄλημα.

Simplicius spares no effort in identifying the one being of the Aletheia with the final cause. He insists that the signs of this, which are related in B 8.2 ff., force one to equate it with the
intelligible (τὸ νοητὸν) (in Phys 142.28–147.16). The intelligible, according to Simplicius, is the first stage (μορφή) of emanation in the hypostasis of intellect. In it there is a radical unity of 'one' and of 'being', as well as of thought and its content; it is also uncreated, motionless, finite, and eternal. Above all, the intelligible is the final cause of all existent things. Simplicius does not state that Parmenides himself was aware that qua the intelligible his one being was the cause of all being, physical and metaphysical. He asserts that Parmenides saw that his one being was the final cause of thinking, not of existence. The signs of the one being are Simplicius's justification for equating it with the intelligible, which according to Neoplatonic metaphysics is a final cause.

Simplicius has an ulterior motive in drawing this equation: to refute the criticisms of Parmenides by both Plato and Aristotle. He maintains that Aristotle misidentified Parmenides's one being with individual substance, Plato with the differentiated stage of intellect, the intellectual (τὸ νοερόν) or Forms (in Phys 147.16–148.11). Careful attention to Parmenides's own words, however, proves that he had in mind an entity yet more abstract than either of these two. Simplicius concludes that the intelligible better accords with the signs of being which Parmenides himself relates.

B. Method.

Simplicius's method throughout Physics I is to document by quotation, typically accompanied by a gloss or paraphrase, any point
he makes concerning Parmenides. He takes an antiquarian delight in quoting from the ancients (in Phys 29.3-5, 39.20-21). In several passages he states that facile criticisms of the Presocratics are easily refuted by consulting their ipsissima verba (in Phys 80.15-17, in Cael 136.26-30). A paradigm of this method is found at in Phys 77.1-79.12, where he refutes one of Alexander's criticisms of Parmenides.

Simplicius's glosses and paraphrases of lines from Parmenides reveal that he read the text with care; cf. in Phys 40.2-8. His interpretation of certain words or phrases are of course open to question (οὐ νεκὼν Β 8.4 = τινος ἐνεκὼ in Phys 87.17), but there is only one clear case of Simplicius's having misunderstood Parmenides (in Phys 30.21-22 τῶν τῶν καὶ ἔτακτον for Β 8.57-61 (= 30.27-31.2)).

Simplicius's paraphrases are generally faithful and insightful, but must be used with caution. Consider the paraphrase of Β 8.3-14 at in Phys 78.24-29. This begins with the positive half of the disjunct 'from being', although Simplicius's text has nothing of the sort. Diels holds that the paraphrase reflects Simplicius's desire to spell out in full syllogistic form Parmenides's argument rather than Parmenides's text (Parmenides Lehrgedicht, p. 77). He himself emends Β 8.7-8 to supply this half of the disjunct, but holds that the line he supplies was absent from Simplicius's exemplar. Whether the emendation is correct is moot; his remarks on Simplicius's paraphrase and exemplar are correct. In the first place, Simplicius follows Aristotle's own order of this syllogism; cf. Physics 191a27-31, in Phys 162.11-14, in Cael 136.26-137.11 (ib 137.7-11 = Physics
191a27-31). Secondly, the lines in question, B 8.7-8, occur in four
different passages in two different works (cf. Appendix B). It is
highly unlikely that the same haplographic error could have occurred
in all four passages.

His longer paraphrases thus have limited if any evidentiary
value for the text of Parmenides. On the other hand, his glosses do
reflect the text he possessed; cf. in Phys 78.5, 147.27-29.

C. Sources.

Omitting the obvious cases in which a source is named, it is
difficult to determine when Simplicius draws on a particular source.
Even when a possible or probable source can be documented, it does
not follow that Simplicius actually consulted it. Conversely, the
apparent absence of a source may be misleading. Simplicius had at
his disposal a considerable library on ancient philosophy, and may
well have used works that are not extant. In addition, since he was
part of a long teacher-student transmission of philosophical doctrine,
the influence of oral doctrines cannot be dismissed.

1). Overall Interpretation. The thesis that Parmenides treated
of phenomenal or 'seeming' being in the Doxa but of noetic or 'real'
being in the Aletheia is explicitly maintained by Proclus and
implicitly by Plotinus (Chapter III, pp. 69-72). That Philoponus
holds the same position may point to Ammonius, their common teacher,
as Simplicius's immediate source (Philoponus in Phys CAG XVI 21.22-
22.23). There are several, striking parallels between Plutarch's
interpretation of Parmenides (Adv Col 1113F-1114F) and that of Simplicius, but no evidence of any direct influence. Given that both, in effect, make a Platonist out of Parmenides, such parallels are perhaps to be expected.

2). The Aletheia. Simplicius's identification of the one being as the final cause of all existence is probably indebted to Proclus (cf. Chapter III, pp. 70-71). His insistence that the one being is a radical, undifferentiated unity of 'one' and 'being' apparently draws on Damascius (cf. Chapter III, p. 73). It is intended to refute Plato's criticism of Parmenides in the Sophist (cf. in Phys 147.17-148.6), and by implication Proclus's contention that Parmenides's being is not really one.


D. An Assessment.

1) Weaknesses. The principal weakness of Simplicius's interpretation is also one of its strengths: literalism. He is content to cite single lines or signs from the poem to prove his contentions.
While he cannot be accused of quoting in a misleadingly selective way (in Phys 144.25-28), some of the signs he cites have at best an etymological connection with their Neoplatonic counterparts. For example, Simplicius takes μένον (B 8.38) to justify his equation of Parmenides's one being with the intelligible because of the 'remainingness' (μενή) of the latter (cf. in Phys 147.2-10). Again, Simplicius takes Parmenides's νοείν 'thinking, intuiting' (B 8.34, 6) as a sign that Parmenides somehow had νοος 'intellect' in the Neoplatonic sense in mind (in Phys 143.18-21, 144.22-25). Not all of these correspondences are purely verbal (in Phys 142.31-36).

A second point on which Simplicius is sure to find censure is his readiness to read too much Platonism back into Parmenides. No one doubts that Parmenides had a significant influence of Plato, but few find in Parmenides fully articulated Platonic doctrines. Even those who allow that Parmenides was trying to come to grips with the physical world in its own right in the Doxa would not argue that he granted this world 'seeming' being in the Platonic sense (cf. Republic V 479c6-d10, Timaeus 27e5-28a4, in Cael 557.20-24). By making Parmenides a Platonist, Simplicius resolves with one stroke the issue of the relation between the two parts of the poem; they simply treat of the two orders or aspects of Platonic reality.

Finally, Simplicius makes no attempt to assess the doctrines of Parmenides (or other Presocratics) in their historical context (cf. in Phys 28.30-31 and DG 104 n 4). He is simply one of the ancients (οἱ δὲ ρητοὶ) who express their doctrines enigmatically (in Phys 7.1-3, 120.27-29). Simplicius believes that careful read-
ing of Parmenides shows that he was articulating Neoplatonic doctrines (cf. in Phys 77.34-79.10). He is, however, silent as to whether Parmenides was consciously articulating such doctrines or not.

2) Strengths. Simplicius's interpretation of Parmenides is the longest, most elaborate, and above all the most carefully documented treatment of Parmenides in antiquity. Unlike more original philosophers, Simplicius had a keen interest in what Parmenides and other Presocratics actually said, not merely in the philosophical implications for his own system. Some of what he says is patently false, some dubiously applied to Neoplatonic ends. However, his philosophical presuppositions should be viewed as biases to be corrected for, not as grounds for rejecting his interpretation out of hand. By the same logic, one should also reject Aristotle's interpretation out of hand because it relies on Peripatetic doctrines.

Apart from helpful glosses on or paraphrases of particular verses, Simplicius's interpretation repays consideration as an eloquent case for reading Parmenides along Platonic lines. Simplicius and other Neoplatonists may go too far in welcoming Parmenides into the Neoplatonic fold, but it cannot be denied that Parmenides had a decisive influence on Plato and ipso facto the Neoplatonists. Whether the Neoplatonists correctly assessed this influence I cannot say; only a definitive treatment of Parmenides's influence on Plato, if that were itself possible, would yield a clear-cut answer. In the words of E.R.Dodds ("The Parmenides of
Plato and the origin of the neoplatonic 'One'," CO (1928), 134),
"what is sauce for all the Neoplatonic and medieval geese should
also be sauce for their parent, the great Platonic gander".
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Appendix A: Translations

in Phys  6.31 - 7.19

But once I have added still a few more remarks I shall turn to
the text. For of those who engaged in philosophy prior to Plato,
those who follow Thales, Anaximander, and the like, insofar as then
for the first time philosophy arose in Greece after the flood and the
acquisition of the necessities [of life]¹, seeking the causes of things
that come into being in nature, insofar as they began from the bottom
up, observed and revealed the material and elemental principles in an
undiscriminating fashion, since they reveal [them] as the principles
of things that are. Xenophanes of Colophon, his student Parmenides,
and the Pythagoreans propounded a most complete philosophy both about
physical and metaphysical matters, but in a way that was riddling.
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae established mind as as efficient cause, but
in his causal accounts made the slightest use of it, as Socrates
charged in the Phaedo². But perhaps this is nothing strange. For
Timaeus, both in his own right and as the character portrayed by
Plato, even though first positing an efficient, paradigmatic, and
final cause of things that come to be, nevertheless produced his ac-
count of corporeal causes on the basis of plane figures and shapes
and in a word on the nature of elements. Except that Plato, who
clarified the doctrines of both the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, both
praised, as is fit, metaphysical phenomena and distinguished the
elemental principles [found] among physical and created things from all the other [principles], and was himself the first to have named such principles elements, as Eudemus relates. And in virtue of his own examination he differentiated the efficient cause, the final cause, and in addition to this the paradigmatic cause, the Forms. (Moreover, by using the same conceptions Aristotle later discovered matter, and similarly form.) He establishes the divine intellect as an efficient cause and as a final cause its goodness, in virtue of which he modeled the whole perceptible order after its intelligible exemplar.

Notes to in Phys 6.31 - 7.19


2 97b8 ff.

3 7.10-19 = fr. 31 (W) p. 22.4-13.

4 Cf. Timaeus 29d7 ff.
All the physicists, agreeing that there are principles of natural phenomena, are inquiring into the principle of being. For those who as philosophers investigated the principles were inquiring into them as principles of things that are: some in an undiscriminating way, not distinguishing physical from metaphysical phenomena; while others did distinguish, as for example the Pythagoreans, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Eudemos, and Anaxagoras, they went unnoticed by most people because of their obscurity. Therefore Aristotle too refutes the apparent meaning [of their statements], coming to the aid of those of superficial understanding. That there are principles at all is demonstrated along with [the determination] that they are of such and such a kind or of such and such a number. Accordingly, on the assumption that principles exist, having shown that the knowledge of principles is necessary and having related in what manner one arrives at them, he thinks it reasonable not to reveal his own opinion on principles before examining the doctrines of his predecessors.

Having assumed as an axiom of division "the principle is one or more than one" (for because of the axiom of contradiction it is necessary that it be one or not one, and if not one, many) "and if one" he says "it is necessary that this" again "be either motionless or in motion" he thereupon subsumes the previously established doctrines under the segments of the division. For either it is one and motionless, as Parmenides and Melissus seemed to say, or one and in motion, just as the physicists [said]. "If more than one either finite" in
number "or infinite, and if" on the one hand "finite either two or three or" limited with respect to "some other number". And "if infinite" either of the same kind or opposite in kinds. And since it if possible to divide those who say [that the principle is] one into [proponents of] 'finite' and 'infinite', and those who say [that the principle is] more than one into [proponents of] 'in motion' or 'motionless', Alexander says "he arranged what is more appropriate under each segment of the division". For 'to be in motion or not' is more appropriate to a single principle, but 'to be finite or infinite' to more than one principle. It should be known that when he has proceeded to his remarks about them, after his refutation of Parmenides and Melissus, discussing the so-called 'physicists', he made the following division: either they say that being or rather the element is one or many; one, if it is some one of the three elements or what is intermediate; one and many, as for example Anaxagoras and Empedocles [say] -- he ranges Democritus with them because he speaks of the void and atoms.

It is necessary to note that there is a difference between what is infinite and finite in number, which was appropriate to those who say that the principles are more than one, and the infinite and finite in magnitude, which he himself examines in his remarks about Melissus and Parmenides and which is appropriate to Anaximander and Anaximenes, who posited an element that was one but infinite in magnitude. Both 'in motion' and 'motionless' are for division's sake appropriate to both those who say that there is one principle and
and those who say that there are more than one principle. So for example even Eudemus says "if the principles exist, they are either in motion or motionless"\(^4\). But Aristotle omitted this division because a doctrine that states that the principles are more than one and motionless did not even arise. He seems to have passed over for the present the finite and infinite as regards a single [principle] out of brevity; yet in his remarks about Parmenides, as I mentioned, and Melissus, he examines these matters as well\(^5\). Perhaps it is better, once we have encompassed all the doctrines on the basis of a more complete division, to return to Aristotle's statements.

Therefore it is necessary that the principle either be one or not one, and this is the same as saying more than one, and if one either motionless or in motion. And if it is motionless it is either infinite, as Melissus of Samos seems to say, or finite, as Parmenides, the son of Pyres, [seems to say]; these men do not talk about a physical element, but rather about real being. Theophrastus says that Xenophanes of Colophon, the teacher of Parmenides, posits that the principle, or rather being, is one and all and is neither finite nor infinite, nor in motion nor at rest; he agrees that the mention of his doctrine belongs to some other inquiry than that into physics\(^6\).

Notes to \textit{in Phys} 21.13 - 22.30

\(^1\) Cf. 185b15-25.

\(^2\) Cf. 184b22-23.
3 Cf. 187a12 ff..

4 22.13 – 16 = fr. 33a (W) p. 23.3–6; cf. in Phys 42.13–15.

5 Cf. 185a20 ff..

6 Physicorum Opiniones fr. 5 DG 480.4–8.
Of those who say that there are more than one [principle], some posited principles that are finite, others infinite in number. Of the proponents of the finite, some [posited] two, as for example Parmenides fire and earth (or rather light and darkness) in the *Doxa*, or the Stoics god and matter -- evidently not speaking of God as an element, but rather the former as the active principle, the latter the passive. Some three, as for example Aristotle matter and the opposites. Some four, as for example Empedocles of Acragas, who was born not much later than Anaxagoras, and who was the follower and disciple of Parmenides, and even more the Pythagoreans.

Notes to *in Phys* 25.14 – 21

Leucippus of Elea or Miletus (for both localities are related about him) partook of Parmenides's philosophy, but did not travel down the same road as did Parmenides and Xenophanes concerning things that are, but rather the opposite, it seems. For they make the universe one and motionless and uncreated and finite, and agree not even to inquire into non-being. He, one the other hand, posited atoms as infinite and ever-moving elements and that the number of shapes among them is infinite, because nothing has more of one quality than another. That is, he observes that there is unceasing coming to be and change among things that are. Furthermore, [he maintains] that being exists no more than non-being, and that both are equally causes of things that come to be.

Notes to in Phys 28.4 - 13

1 Theophrasti Physicorum Opiniones fr. 8 DG 483.11-21.
Those who hear so great a disagreement must not believe that it represents contradictions among past philosophers. This is precisely what some, who chance upon historical lists only and understand nothing of what is said, attempt to reproach them for — despite the fact that they themselves are torn asunder by countless schisms not concerning the principles of physics (for they do not understand even a dream of these things) but rather concerning the overthrow of the majesty of god. Perhaps there is nothing wrong in my digressing somewhat in order to demonstrate to those with a rather greater desire for knowledge, how despite the apparent disagreement concerning their doctrines on the principles, the ancients are nevertheless in harmonious agreement. For some discoursed about the intelligible and first principle, as for example Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus; Xenophanes and Parmenides say that it is finite. For [they hold that] it is necessary that the one exist prior to the many, and that that which is the cause of the boundary and limit for all things be defined with respect to the finite rather than infinity, and that that which is in every respect perfect, which has its appropriate perfection, be finite, and more than all things be a perfection, since it is also a principle. Except that Xenophanes posits it as a cause of all things, supreme over all things, and as transcending motion and rest and all pairs of opposites, as Plato also does in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. Parmenides, seeing clearly that 'its being in the same condition' also transcends all change, and perhaps
both potentiality and actuality, proclaims it as motionless and alone as transcending all things,

It is alone, unmoved; therefore all things are a name.\(^2\)

Melissus himself also similarly observed its immutability, but declared that because of the inexhaustibility of its essence and the infinity of its power that it is infinite, just as it is also un-created; his demonstration concerning its infinity, which was generated in accord with this conception, makes [this] clear. For he says,

Since it did not become, it is and always was and always will be, and has neither beginning nor end but is infinite. For if it came to be, it would have a beginning (having come into being, it must have become at some time) and an end (for having come to be, it would at some time have ceased); but since it neither began nor ended, it always was and always will be and has no beginning nor end [but is infinite].\(^3\)

So then, as Melissus contemplated that which is without a beginning or end in time and is always existent, he declared that it is infinite. And Parmenides too corroborates him on this sort of thing, since he says in roughly the same words,

That since it exists it is unborn and imperishable, whole, unique, immovable and without end. It was not in the past, nor yet shall it be, since it now is all together. (B 8.3-5)

So then he too says that as it is uninterrupted and as it is un-created it is also infinite. And he made clear the conception of limit in these verses,

Remaining the same in the same place it rests by itself and so remains firmly where it is; for powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds of a chain that hems it around, because it is not allowed that what is should be incomplete; for it is not lacking, but by not being it would lack everything. (B 8.29-33)
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For if it is being and not non-being, it is non-lacking, and as non-lacking it is perfect, and being perfect it has a perfection and is not non-perfect, and as it has a perfection it has a limit and boundary. Thus then there is no disagreement among the conceptions of these men when they speak about the same thing. And when Parmenides moves on from the intelligibles to the perceptibles, or as he himself says from truth to seeming, when he says,

Here I cease the trustworthy account and thought concerning truth. From this point learn the opinions of mortals, listening to the deceitful pattern of my words. (B 8.50-52)

he himself also posited the primary opposition as elemental principles of things that come to be, which he calls light and darkness <or> fire and earth or dense and rare or the same and different, saying immediately after the verses just quoted,

They made up their minds to name two forms, of which it is not right to name one (it is in this that they have gone astray); and they adjudged them contrary in form and assigned marks apart from each other; on the one hand flaming heavenly Fire, very rare and light, in every direction the same as itself, but not the same as the other; and also that other, separate, the very opposite, blind Night, a dense and heavy form (B 8.53-59)

But above all there is inserted between the lines a brief statement in prose, as if Parmenides's own, which is as follows:

On the one side is the rare, hot, light, soft and the light; on the other, which is the dense side, are named the cold, darkness, hard, and heavy; for these were, each set of them, separated off so as to be distinct.

Thus he clearly assumed two opposite elements; consequently, he earlier discerned that being is one, and he says that those men go astray who do not observe or do not clearly reveal the opposition of
elements that produce coming to be. Aristotle too, following this point, posited opposites as principles. And Parmenides clearly propounded an efficient cause not only of bodies involved in coming to be, but also of immaterial things which bring to completion coming to be, when he says,

Those next to them with Night, but a due portion of flame is injected. And in the middle of these is the goddess who steers all things. For she it is who has charge of all the concerns of loathed birth and of union, sending female to mingle with male, and again conversely male to female. (B 12.2–6)

Notes to *in Phys* 28.32 – 31.17

129.11. Diels’s suggestion of ὀρχήν for ὀρχή is here adopted.

2DK takes this to be a garbled version of B 8.38,

οὐκ ὠρχήνητον τ’ ἐμέναι· τῷ πάντι Ὀνοματι ἔσται

So as to be whole and unmoved. Therefore all things must be a name.

Guthrie (p. 40 n v 38) thinks that it is separate fragment, but does not offer a translation. I have altered his rendition of B 8.38 to conform with Simplicius’s text. Cf. pp. 258–260.


4DK (B 8.33) ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδεεύεται· [ἡ] ἔστι δὲ ἐν ποιήσει ἐξεῖτο. Guthrie (p. 34) retains the negative and adopts ἐπιδεεύεται (DE) for ἐπιδεεύεται.

5Cf. *in Phys* 180.5 and translation.

6Reading διέγομ (31.8); Diels emends this to δό διέγομ. See commentary to 31.7–10, p. 110.
7DK (B 12.4) πάντα γὰρ τὸν στυγερὸν τόκου καὶ μέξιος ἀνακεῖ.
in Phys  34.12 – 17

Except that he [Empedocles] too utters nothing contrary to Parmenides and Melissus, but he clearly saw the opposition of elements, as Parmenides did also. The latter posits the divinity situated in the middle of all things and the cause of all coming to be as a single efficient cause; but he clearly saw the opposition in the efficient causes as well.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae seems to have observed that the difference among all the kinds is threefold; one is combined with respect to the intelligible unity, since he says, "All things were together, infinite both in number and smallness"\footnote{1}. And again he says,

Before they were separated, since all things were together nor even any colour could be discerned. That was prevented by the mixture of all things -- the wet and the dry, the hot and the cold, the bright and the dark, since there was much earth in it and an infinite number of seeds in no way resembling each other. And since this is so, we must suppose that all things are in the whole.\footnote{2}

And this whole (\textit{οὐκόσας}) would be the one being of Parmenides.

Notes to \textit{in Phys}  34.12 – 17

\footnote{1}{59 B 1 (\textit{DK} II.32.11-12). Translation from Guthrie, II p. 294.}

\footnote{2}{59 B 4 (\textit{DK} II.34.17-35-35.2, 3-5). Translation from Guthrie, II pp. 294-295; last sentence supplemented from Kirk and Raven (\textit{The Presocratic Philosophers} [Cambridge, 1971]) p. 369.}
Some have the intelligible, others the perceptible order in view; others investigate proximate, others more fundamental elements of bodies; some apprehend the nature of the elements in a rather partial, others in a more complete way; some investigate the elements only, others all the causes and subsidiary causes. Thus then, those who study nature assert things that are different, but by no means contradictory, if one is able to make the proper distinctions. Aristotle himself, who seems to point out their disagreements, will shortly say,

The differ, however, from one another in that some assume contraries which are more primary, others contraries which are less so; some those more knowable in the order of explanation, others more familiar to sense. Hence [he says] their principles are in one sense the same, in another different.¹

But I have been compelled to dwell on these matters at rather great length because of those who readily accuse the ancients of [mutual] disagreement. And since we shall hear Aristotle himself refuting the doctrines of his philosophical predecessors, and even before Aristotle Plato manifestly does this, and before both of them Parmenides and Xenophanes, we should understand that out of their concern for those of rather superficial comprehension they [Aristotle and Plato] refute what is apparently absurd in their statements, since the ancients were wont to declare their opinions in a riddling way. Plato clearly marvels at Parmenides on this score, whom he seems to refute, although he says that his thought requires a deep-sea diver². Aristotle also manifestly suspects the depth of his wisdom, since
he says, "Parmenides seems in places to speak <with more insight>". So then in these ways they appear to be making refutations: sometimes they are filling in what was omitted; sometimes they are clarifying what was stated unclearly; sometimes they discern that what is said in regard to what is intelligible is not appropriate to what is physical, as in the case of those who say that being in one and motionless; sometimes they set forth the facile interpretations of those who are rather superficial. And in this work I shall myself attempt to note Aristotle's refutation of each. But we must take up Aristotle's text again and describe distinctly what he says in it.

Notes to \textit{in Phys} 36.15 - 37.9

\footnote{\textit{Physics} 188b30-33, 36-37. Translation from R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, \textit{Physica}, p. 228 (McKeon).}

\footnote{See Diels's note \textit{ad loc.} (36.31).}

\footnote{\textit{Metaphysics} A 986b27-28. Translation from W.D. Ross, \textit{Metaphysica}, p. 699 (McKeon).}
in Phys 37.12 - 40.21

Alexander says,

Having said that one must begin from what is more knowable to us, he [Aristotle] acts in this manner also; for he began from a dichotomy that is complete, clear, and obvious to all. For what is more clear than the proposition of contradictories, which states 'one or not one, i.e. more than one'?

Now the statement that he began from a clear dichotomy is well taken; however, Aristotle did not exactly say that one must proceed from what is obvious to unobvious principles. For those obvious things are compound and more knowable in perception and are spoken of as whole, although they contain things that are more particular and unobvious. He will refute the false opinions concerning the principles on the basis of things that are perceptible, at any rate, and knowable to us, as we shall learn, and will confirm the true ones.

Alexander says,

He [Aristotle] did not say 'as for example Parmenides and Melissus' on the assumption that Parmenides and Melissus posit a single principle and assert that it is motionless. For they did not posit a principle at all; for they said that the universe is one -- this conflicts with the assertion that a principle exists. For those who posit a principle agree that what exists is more than one thing, since they introduce along with the principle those things of which it is the principle. But having stated the first dichotomy 'the principle is one or more than one', as regards one branch of what falls under the dichotomous division he in turn employs the dichotomy 'if the principle is one, it [is] either motionless or in motion'. Since the statement that there is one, motionless principle is incredible, he set it forth with an explanation. For it is no less incredible, nay it is even more incredible, than that [statement just cited] to maintain that the universe in one and motionless -- nevertheless [this idea] has as its proponents Parmenides and Melissus. For even if this is not exactly the same as that, nevertheless it concurs with it.
This then is what Alexander says in his own words; yet the explanation of one incredible position by one yet more incredible was not, I suppose, characteristic of Aristotle's great intellect. However, by no means does he [Aristotle] make mention of the doctrine of Parmenides and Melissus as a different, incredible doctrine above and beyond that which states that the principle is one and motionless (for he refutes them for saying this); rather Aristotle prudently accepted this as [the doctrine] of these men.

A similar inquiry [he says] is made by those who inquire into the number of existents; for they inquire whether the ultimate constituents of existing things are one or many.

Therefore he supposes that these men examine philosophically a principle of existent things; and he marked off a segment of the dichotomous division for them, when he posited that the principle is one and motionless. For they were saying that real being, the unified, which is a principle and cause of the many, discrete [existents] -- not as an element of but rather as producing them -- is one being. And in turn having divided the other segment which states that the principle is one by a [logically] necessary dichotomy which states that the one principle is motionless or in motion, and taking up 'motionless', he refutes those who say that being is one and motionless on the very counts on which one ought to have refuted those who say that the principle is one and motionless; for even if they use other words, nevertheless they too are saying and investigating the same things. Alexander agrees that in the Aletheia, which is about intelligible being, Parmenides says that being is one, motionless,
and uncreated,

but when formulating an account of the physical world in accord with popular opinion and appearances [he says] no longer saying that being is either one or uncreated, he posited fire and earth as principles of things that come to be; positing earth as matter, fire as an efficient cause; and he calls [he says] fire light and earth darkness.\(^3\)

If Alexander had understood 'in accord with popular opinion and appearances' in the way that Parmenides intends, it would be well. But if he supposes that those accounts are totally false and if he believes that light or fire is an efficient cause, his supposition is incorrect. For after he has completed his account concerning the intelligible, Parmenides adds these [verses] which I have already quoted [in Phys 30.17-31.2]:

Here I cease my trustworthy account and thought\(^4\) concerning truth. From this point learn the opinions of mortals, listening to the deceitful pattern of my words. They made up their minds to name two forms, of which it is not right to name one (it is in this that they have gone astray); and they adjudged them contrary in form and assigned marks apart from each other; on the one hand flaming heavenly Fire, very rare and light, in every direction the same as itself\(^5\) but not the same as the other; and also that other, separate, the very opposite, blind Night, a dense and heavy form. This whole likely-seeming ordering I tell thee, that no judgment of mortals may outrun thee.

(B 8.50-61)

Therefore he calls this account opinable and deceptive, not as absolutely false, but as falling from the intelligible truth into the apparent and perceptible, the seeming. And somewhat later, speaking again about the two elements, he introduces the efficient cause also, saying:

The narrower [sc. bands] were filled with unmixed Fire, those next to them with Night, but a due portion of flame
is injected. And in the middle of these is the goddess who steers all things. (B 12.1-3)

And he says that she is also the cause of the gods, when he says,

First of all gods she devised Eros (B 13)

and so forth. And he says that she sometimes sends souls from the visible to the invisible, and sometimes vice versa. I am compelled to dwell on these matters at length because of the ignorance of the writings of the ancients that is so widespread at present. And since they say that being is one, they would appropriately say that it is also motionless, if they were discoursing about physical phenomena. For that in respect to which the motion [occurs] would be introduced along with the motion, whether in respect of quality, quantity, or anything else, and space would also be introduced, if the motion were of the physical sort, as it is different from what moves. But Parmenides, who speaks about intelligible being, says:

But unmoved in the grip of mighty bonds
it is without beginning or ceasing, since coming to be
and ceasing have been driven afar off, and true conviction has rejected them. (B 8.26-28)

And he adduces the cause of its lack of motion:

And so remains where it is; for powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds of a chain that hems it all around, because it is not allowed that what is should be incomplete; for it is not lacking, but by not being it would lack everything. (B 8.26-28)

For as non-being lacks all things, he says, so being is non-lacking and perfect. But that which moves lacks that through which the motion takes place; therefore being does not move. Melissus also proved, again in virtue of the same conception, that it is motionless because
if being should move it is necessary that there be something void of being to which it will withdraw; he first proved that void does not exist. And he speaks as follows in his own work:

Nor is there any void, for void is nothing, and nothing cannot be. Nor does it [sc. what is] move, for it has no place to which it can withdraw, but is full. If there were void it would withdraw to the void; but since there is no void, it has nowhere to withdraw to.  

Therefore, since it is full it does not move — not because motion through a plenum is impossible, as Alexander understood Melissus's statement — but rather because being itself is full, on the grounds that nothing else exists besides it. At any rate, Melissus says:

The decision to be made about full and not full is this: if a thing has room for something else, and takes it in, it is not full; but if it does not have room to take it in, it is full. Now it must be full if there is no void, and if it is full it does not move.  

Notes to in Phys 37.12 — 40.21

1Cf. Physics 186a12-16, b15-16 (lemma).


3Cf. DG 482 n 10, fr. 6.

4B 8.50. Simplicius here has the future περιέξω here and at in Phys 41.8 (DEP³), and in Cael 558.5; the present περιέω appears at in Phys 30.17 and 41.8 (aF). DK adopts the present.


6DK, following Scaliger, reads τήλε for τῆς (B 8.28).

8 30 B 7.7 (DK I.272.3-8). Translation from Guthrie, II p. 104.

9 30 B 7.9-10 (DK I.272.11-273.3). Translation from Guthrie, II p. 104.
Once he has set forth those who say that being or rather the principle is motionless, he proceeds to the other segment, and says "or in motion, as for example the physicists", setting those who say [it is] motionless in contradistinction to the physicists, since those who abolish motion are not physicists at all -- this he will immediately clarify and prove; for if nature (φύσις) is a principle of motion, how could one who abolishes nature itself be a physicist? People are accustomed to name those who pursued some part of philosophy, whether exclusively or for the most part, from that [part]; for example, they called Socrates an ethicist, but those who follow Thales, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and the like physicists.\(^2\)

In this passage too I reject Alexander's interpretation; [since] he first says that he [Aristotle] set the physicists in contradistinction to those who say that [being is] one and motionless, but subsequently that it is Aristotle's custom to call those who philosophically investigated the truth 'physicists', since the goal of physics is not action but rather knowledge. For who was unaware that Parmenides also, in contradistinction to whom he [Alexander] says are set the physicists, was philosophically investigating the truth, since he clearly says,

> Here I cease the trustworthy account and thought\(^3\) concerning truth? (B 8.50-51)

Notes to *in Phys* 40.23 - 41.9

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1 Cf. 184b16-17

2 As Diels notes (ad 40.23), Simplicius excerpted Alexander in 40.23-41.1.

3 Cf. note 4 to translation of *in Phys* 37.12-40.12, p. 298.
But since Parmenides and Melissus were inquiring whether being is one or many, and if one whether motionless or in motion, these men also, Aristotle says, were not, as one might suppose, inquiring into things that are, but rather into the principle of things that are, prudently accepting this as their doctrine. For he would never have believed that they failed to recognize the plurality among things that are or that they had two feet; rather, their argument was about real being and being proper, which is the principle and cause of all existent things whatsoever. And for this reason also he immediately takes up the doctrine of Parmenides and Melissus [as a doctrine] of those investigate being. For if they should be inquiring whether being or even a principle is one or many, their inquiry is the same, even if they use different words. At any rate, what is stated in reference to those who say that being is one could be stated also in reference to those who say that the principle is one.

Notes to *in Phys* 45.26 - 46.4


2Cf. 184b25 ff..
in Phys 46.25-28

And taking up the first segments of his division (and these are whether the principle is one and motionless\(^1\)), he finds as proponents of this doctrine Parmenides and Melissus, who say that being is one, positing being in place of the principle.

Notes to in Phys 46.25-28

\(^1\)Cf. 184b15-16.
in Phys 51.8 - 27\textsuperscript{1}

Even if one should out of contentiousness attempt to formulate a fallacious syllogism, if he should construct the syllogism from premisses which are probable, the deception must be refuted, even if not for its/his own sake, at least for the sake of an ordinary audience. But if the premisses should not even have probability, but should be brought forth only in an eristic fashion, its refutation is more appropriate for the learned than laymen. Accordingly, if the argument of Parmenides and Melissus both does away with the principles of physics and establishes something incredible and incongruous, since it says that being is one; and if in the process of establishing what it intends through a syllogism it not only assumes false premisses but even combines them in an invalid syllogistic manner; for all these reasons it would not merit refutation, and least of all from the physicist, whose principles it abolishes. Since the syllogism, or rather anything that is composite, has two defects — one relative to those things of which it is composed, the other to their combination — he censures both [defects] in these arguments. For the premisses have been falsely assumed, and the manner in which they have been combined vis-à-vis the syllogistic figure is erroneous and belongs to those [figures] which do not necessarily yield a conclusion,

Alexander, however, says that Aristotle means these things in the following way:

Since the thesis of Heraclitus and one such as 'if one should say that being is a single man' are incredible,
the argument of both Parmenides and Melissus is eristic, i.e. sophistical, in terms of proof, and 'belongs to those [positions] made for argument's sake', i.e. to those not attested by the facts about which they speak, but rather by what is both false and idle.

Notes to *in Phys* 51.8 - 27

1 Cf. 185a5-10.
He [Aristotle] says, "the argument of Melissus is cruder" because he not only said that being is one and motionless, as does Parmenides, but in addition to this he also posited that it is infinite; so then having argued against them on common grounds he concluded; "Melissus says that being is infinite. Being therefore has some quantity". It is crude then, because although it introduced quantity, which must be in a subject, it nevertheless posited that being is one. He said "it offers no difficulty" because it is easily resolved and does not cause difficulty because it is superficial. For a shrewd argument is both that which has a bite and causes a difficulty, as in stated in the *Sophistical Refutations*. "But when one absurdity is granted", he says, "the others follow." For indeed it [being] must be both motionless, if it is one and one in such a way that it alone exists; for if it moves it will possess both motion and change and the 'whence whither', or else from one condition to another, or else from one place to another, or in some other way. And it must also be infinite; for if it has a limit, it will possess both the limit and the thing limited. Accordingly then Plato also, because Parmenides says that being is a whole and like a sphere,

> on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere,

(B 8.43)

demonstrates that it [being] is not one, because it has a center, extremities, and parts. And the following is written in the *Sophist*:

> Then if it is a whole — as indeed Parmenides says;
on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equal everyway from the centre; for it may not be at all greater or smaller in this direction or in that.

(B 8.43-45)

If the real is like that it has a middle and extremities, and consequently it must have parts, must it not? -- It must. -- Well, if a thing is divided into parts, there is nothing against its having the property of unity as applied to the aggregate of all the parts and being in that way <one>, as being a sum or whole. -- Of course. -- On the other hand the thing which has these properties cannot be just Unity itself, can it?3

"It is nothing difficult", he [Aristotle] says, but the other absurdities must follow from the positing of one absurdity. Surely because it is nothing difficulty to see how the other absurdities follow from the granting of one absurdity.

Notes to *in Phys* 52.8 - 53.7

1Cf. 185a10-12.

2185a32-33.

3Cf. 182b32-183a13.

4Guthrie renders σφαῖρας in B 8.43 by "ball" (p. 43); "sphere" fits the present context better.

in Phys 70.3 - 5

Having offered several reasons why the discussion of Parmenides and Melissus is not appropriate for the physicist, but intending to refute it, he explained first that he is not producing its refutation to no purpose.

Notes to in Phys 70.3 - 5

1 Cf. 185a17-20.
in Phys 71.4 - 8

But how does Alexander here say that they did not speak about

nature at all, even though he previously says in his own words that,

Parmenides, when formulating an account of the physical

world in accord with popular opinion and appearances,

no longer saying that being is one or uncreated, posited

fire and earth as principles of things that come to be?²

Notes to in Phys 71.4 - 8

¹Cf. 185a17-20.

²Cf. in Phys 38.20-22, DG 482 n 10 (fr. 6).
in Phys 71.19 - 73.4

He who contradicts a doctrine makes his attack in two ways; for he either refutes the arguments which establish it, or fashions a general refutation of it. But he who refutes the arguments alone has not yet refuted the doctrine; for what if there are other arguments that establish it which are more powerful than those refuted? On the other hand, those who do not bring objections against the arguments which establish [it], but rather against the doctrine itself and make a general refutation of it, firmly refute the doctrine, but leave behind difficulties if they do not also refute the arguments themselves which establish [the doctrine]. Wherefore, since he has undertaken to refute the argument of Melissus and Parmenides, Aristotle first fashions a general objection to it — that being is not one if one should understand [this] in the ordinary way — making his refutation on the basis of dichotomous division; the by refuting their arguments as well — if one should accept them [the arguments] as establishing some such one being. His attack, which originates from the distinction among things that are, proves to be dialectical; for it is possible for those who employ dialectic to establish the principles of the sciences. And the whole treatment is as follows. Whereas they say that being is one, and each of them — 'being' and 'one' — is said in many ways, they must be separately distinguished. Accordingly, since being has been shown to be used in ten ways, either as substance, quality, quantity, or some other of the ten categories, do those who say that being is one say that it
is one in name only, but many in fact, so that all things are said to be substance . . . 2 there being ten that belong to things, or more [than ten compounded] from them (for let this also be added to the dichotomous division), or even one in fact, i.e. (a) substance, quality, quantity, so that all things are one substance in number? For if they could say [one] in genus or species, it is clear that they will be many in number. Accordingly, if they say that it is one in this manner, "as for example, one man or one horse or one soul or quality" [it is] not [one] in genus (for there would again be many), but rather [is] "this one, e.g. white [thing] or hot [thing] or something else of the remaining sort of things". For all these modes of interpretation both greatly differ from one another and are all of them impossible. For if what is called 'being' is one in name only, but in fact is substance, quality, quantity, and all the other kinds or some of those [compounded] from them, whether they are separate from one another or exist with one another, what is will be many. But if all things are some one of the ten kinds, e.g. substance, or quality or quantity, and for this reason are one — because all things are subsumed under one of the ten kinds — "whether substance exists or not" an absurdity will follow. For if, as naturally occurs when substance subsists beforehand, one of these things chances [to be] around it, again being is not one, but rather both substance and quality or whichever of the ten they posit being to be; but if substance does not exist, this too is impossible; for none of the other kinds can exist apart from substance, because substance
underlies the other kinds and they have their being in it. For let
this be added in this manner also. However, as regards Melissus and
Parmenides, even if being should be posited to be quality, and even
if substance (for the argument will be common in the case of this
also), since the one says that being is infinite, the other finite,
quantity will immediately be introduced as well. "For 'infinite'"
and 'finite' "belongs to the category of quantity", and it is not
possible that either substance or quality or affection be infinite
or finite, "unless per accidens", if they should at the same time be
quantities also. "For the account of the infinite" and of the
finite "makes use of the category of quantity, not substance nor
even quality". But I, following Porphyry in the main, have thus
produced both the dichotomous division of Aristotle and the objection
with respect to each segment of the division.

Notes to in Phys 71.19 - 73.4

1 Cf. 185a15-b5.

2 Diels proposes the following emendation for this lacuna (72.2);
η ποιά τὰ πάντα η ποιά τὰ πάντα -- "or all things [are said to be]
quantities or all things [are said to be] qualities".
in Phys 75.21 - 26

That some suspicion has arisen that being is a different kind than substance is confirmed by his statement that Melissus says that being is infinite, which is a characteristic peculiar to quantity. And he refutes those who say that being is something other than quantity, as not concurring with Parmenides and Melissus, the former positing being as finite, the latter as infinite.

Notes to in Phys 75.21 - 26

1 Cf. 185a32-33.
in Phys 77.3 - 6

For it is necessary that one posit being as either finite or infinite, and in each case it is necessary to say that being is a quantity, and he [Aristotle] adduces Melissus as a witness for this supposition; and he subsequently puts Parmenides in the same camp.

Notes to in Phys 77.3 - 6

1Cf. 185a32-33, b17-18.
in Phys 77.9 - 80.18

Since Alexander of Aphrodisias deems it worthy to refute those who say that being is one with his own arguments, let us briefly consider both how he seems to speak well and how the philosophy of the ancients remains unfuted. He says:

For to those who say that everything else that is involved in coming to be <and perishing> does not exist on the grounds that they at one time are but at another are not, but that only eternal being exists since it does not share in non-being at all, one must first reply on the basis of manifest facts and of common sense and usage. Secondly, if they deny that things exist because they come to be and perish [one must reply that,] since both that which comes to be comes to be something that is and that which perishes perishes from what is, both that which comes to be and that which perishes would be among things that are. For it is not the case that they do not exist unless they exist in the way eternal things do. Indeed if they do not exist because they perish, when are not perishing and so far as they are not perishing, that far and at that time they would exist.¹

Let us make a general statement against these remarks and their like. Just as we call 'white' both that which is in any way colored by whiteness, even if it is mixed together with its opposite, and also that which is not mixed with its opposite, and similarly with 'beautiful'; and just as each of these terms is used in the strict sense of that which is purely of this or that sort and is used in a general and loose way of that which is mixed with its opposite, so 'being' could be used in the strict sense of that which 'in all respects is all together' [cf. B 8.5]. But that which comes to be and perishes does not yet exist prior to its coming to be, and no longer exists after it has perished. And even when this seems to 'be', since while it is coming to be and perishing it never possesses being by
'remaining in the same' [cf. B 8.29], even then it would not properly be called 'being' but rather 'coming to be and perishing' because of the continuous flux which changes all things. This Heraclitus hinted at in his statement 'one could not step into the same river twice'\(^2\), likening coming to be, which has more non-being than being, to the constant flow of a river; for being, as Parmenides says, has other signs. But it is better to hear just what he states and proves concerning being proper. For having censured those who combine being and non-being in the intelligible:

Who believe that to be and not to be are the same and not the same (B 6.8-9)

and having turned away from the way that investigates non-being:

But do thou keep thy thought from this way of inquiry (B 7.2)

he concludes:

One way alone is yet left to tell of, namely that 'It is'. On this way are marks in plenty, (B 8.1-3)

and he then relates the signs of being proper:

that since it exists it is unborn and imperishable, whole unique, immovable, and without end.\(^3\)

It was not in the past, nor yet shall it be, since it now is, all together, one and continuous. For what birth of it wilt thou seek? I shall not allow thee to say or think 'from what is not', for it is not to be said or thought that 'it is not'. And what need would have prompted it to grow later or sooner, beginning from nothing? Thus it must either fully be or else not be. Nor will the force of evidence suffer anything besides itself to arise from what is not.\(^4\) Therefore Justice does not relax her fetters and allow it to come into being or perish. (B 8.3-14)

By saying this about being proper he clearly proves that this being
is uncreated; for neither [does it come to be] from being, for no other being preexisted; nor from non-being, for non-being is nothing at all. And indeed why then, but not sooner or later did it come to be? Nor again from that which in one way is but in another is not, in the way that that which comes to be comes to be; for that which in one way is, but in another is not, could not exist prior to absolute being, but exists subsequent to it. Indeed Plato's Timaeus says:

> and 'was' and 'shall be' are forms of time that have come to be; we are wrong to transfer them unthinkingly to eternal being. We say that it was and is and shall be; but 'is' alone really belongs to it and describes it truly; 'was' and 'shall be' are properly used of becoming which proceeds in time.\(^5\)

Therefore, if Alexander means to prove that things which are in the process of coming to be exist in some manner or other and for this reason are loosely called 'being' -- even if they are mixed together with more non-being -- and rests content with the popular use of the word, there will be no need for lengthy comment. On the other hand, if he thinks that that which comes to be and perishes, that in which there is more non-being than being, is 'being' proper, he neither followed the signs of being which Parmenides gave, nor does he notice that Aristotle rightly called Parmenidean [being] "just being", i.e. being proper.\(^6\)

And Alexander also censures those who follow Parmenides and Melissus because they prove that being is motionless because that which moves appears to depart from that in which it is; accordingly, if being should also move, it would depart from that in which it is; but it is in being. And that which departs from being perishes; but
being is imperishable. He [Alexander] says:

Now if there were only essential motion (κίνησις), which one should more properly call 'change' (μεταβολή) but not motion, perhaps these [remarks] of theirs would be stated with good reason. Yet not even that which changes essentially changes without qualification into not being; but rather into not being that which it was, but something else; but if at all, that which essentially changes without qualification does not [undergo] this [qualified sort of change]. But since there is more than one [kind of] change, of which qualitative change is not of the essential sort, their fear is void and groundless.⁷

Indeed it is surprising that he himself having agreed that "that which changes essentially not [in] this [qualified way] but without qualification" would perish into non-being, finds fault with those who say that if absolute being and being proper should change, it perishes. For if it were of this sort of being and if it departed from this sort of being, there would be nothing to prevent it from changing <into> something else of this sort. But since it is absolute being, what could come into being by departing from this? And how could that being change which 'being always the same in this manner' [cf. B 8.29], which is neither itself an accident of anything else nor has anything else as an accident, but is itself that being which really is? Accordingly, after having first proved by means of the verses quoted above that being is uncreated, Parmenides properly concluded:

But unmoved, in the grip of mighty bonds, it is without beginning or ceasing, since coming to be and perishing have been driven afar off. (B 8.26–28)

From this it is also clear that he knows that perceptible being, in which there is coming to be and perishing, and intelligible being
are different. Melissus also proves that being is motionless, by first removing void, i.e. non-being, from being. For, he says, if being were to move there would be something void of being into which being would move. But it [void] does not exist; for being is full.

And he writes as follows:

Nor is there any void, for void is nothing, and nothing cannot be. Nor does [sc. what is] move, for it has no place to which it can withdraw, but is full. If there were void, it would withdraw to the void; but since there is no void, it has nowhere to withdraw to.¹⁰

And then having shown that it is neither dense nor light¹⁰, he concludes:

The decision to be made about full and not full is this: if a thing has room for something else, and takes it in, it is not full; but if it does not have room to take it in, it is full. Now it must be full if there is no void, and if it is full it does not move.¹¹

Well then, I have been compelled to dwell on these matters at rather great length, because Alexander, the more legitimate of Aristotle's commentators, understands the doctrines of the ancients in a rather arid and careless way, even though Aristotle followed these doctrines and himself demonstrated that the first [cause] is motionless¹².

Notes to in Phys 77.9 – 80.18

¹I have omitted ὁμοι (77.12) to produce a continuous quotation.

²Cf. 22 B 91, Cratylus 402a8-10.

³Simplicius here (78.13) and at 30.2 and 145.4 has ἀτέλεστον "without end", but ἀνέγνωτον "unborn, uncreated" at 120.23 and in Cael 557.18 (B 8.4). DK adopts the former.
Kersten emends this line (B 8.12) to yield the positive half of the disjunct 'from being': ἐκ τοῦ ἐόντος (n ad 78.21). DK, however, retains the negative μὴ.

Timaeus 37e4–38a2. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 98.

Cf. 186a33–34.

I have omitted ὡς φησιν (79.22) to produce a continuous quotation.

On τῆλε for τῆς (B 8.28) cf. note 6 to translation of in Phys 37.12–40.21, p. 298.


Cf. 30 B 7.8.


If being is one and indivisible as a monad or point, things that are will have neither any quality (for quality is distinguished by bodies, and especially by physical bodies) nor quantity; for the indivisible is a limit of body. Therefore being is neither infinite, just as Melissus says, nor finite, as Parmenides thinks. For truly, everything finite or infinite has some quantity, but nothing indivisible in number or in magnitude has quantity; "for limit (τὸ πέρας) is indivisible, not what is limited/finite (τὸ πεπερασμένον)". In this passage also Aristotle deemed this signification of 'indivisible' alone worthy of refutation, because the rest are easily disposed of. And he argued against this [signification] not as against a token used as a probable argument, as his commentators take it, but rather as against the very sort of thing which the followers of Parmenides themselves would have posited — that which is without both quantity and quality.

Notes to in Phys 82.8 – 19

1Cf. 185b16–19.

2For this meaning of σιμεῖον see LSJ s.v. II.3, p. 1593.
in Phys  86.19 - 90.22

I marvel that Aristotle has directed his refutation against those significations of 'one' which Parmenides himself says belong to the one being. For he proclaims that it is continuous (συνεχές),

therefore it is all continuous, for what is is close to what is (B 8.25)

and it is indivisible (ἀδιαίρετον),

since it all equally is. (B 8.22)

Moreover, Parmenides says that the account of being is 'one and the same for all' in these verses:

What can be spoken and thought of must be, for it is possible for it to be, but impossible for nothing to be. (B 6.1-2)

Therefore, if whatever one may say or think is being, the account of being for all will be one,

Nothing exists or can exist apart from what is, since Fate has fettered it so as to be whole and unmoved. Therefore all things must be a name. (B 8.36-38)

And these men [Parmenides and Melissus] would admit what Aristotle deduces as absurd for these suppositions, if one should attend to them prudently. For their one being, since it is indivisible, will not be finite or infinite as [will] a body; indeed, Parmenides includes bodies among the opinables, and Melissus says,

and being one it must have no body. If it had thickness, it would have parts, and would no longer be one.²

Therefore the indivisible will also have limit, not as a limit of
body, but rather as an end and principle of all existent things, and in that very unconditional way in which Aristotle himself says that the intellect or rather the first cause if both one, proclaiming that "the rule of many is not good"\(^3\), and without parts, by showing that it is motionless and an end of all things, and this he gets not from Plato only, but also from Parmenides, who says:

> What can be thought [apprehended] and the thought that 'it is' are the same; for without what is, in which [i.e., in dependence on, or in respect of which] it is expressed [or revealed], thou shalt not find thought. (B 8.34–36)

For intellecting, being its end, exists for the sake of the intel-ligible, that is to say being\(^4\). But Aristotle deduced absurdities by assuming both 'the part' and 'the whole' and 'the continuous' as applying to a body. If they [these terms ?] should be understood according to their sense [in Aristotle ?], they would admit that both 'the possession of parts' would have a place in being, since he [Parmenides] says it is whole,

> whole, unique, (B 8.4)

as well as 'its being infinitely divisible in respect of its contin-

> Therefore it is all continuous, for what is is close to what is. (B 8.22)

Plato's Parmenides more clearly admitted this absurdity concerning the one being when he says in the second hypothesis:

> Again, take each of these two parts of the One Being -- its unity and its being: unity can never be lacking to the part 'being', nor being to the part 'unity'. Thus each of the two parts, in its turn, will possess both unity and being; any part proves to consist of at least two parts, and so on forever by the same reasoning:
whatever part we arrive at always possesses these two parts, for a 'one' always has being, and a 'being' always has unity. Hence any part always proves to be two and can never be one. In this way, then, what is 'One Being' must be unlimited in multitude.  

Yet the fact that all things there [in the intelligible] have one and the same account of being and are the same as one another is no absurdity at all. For if it is the cause of all things and is all things before all things, it is clear that in it are precontained all things encompassed by a single unity -- that of the one being, owing to which each [thing] is all things when undivided into parts. And this is Aristotle's opinion also, who says that the first intellect is the cause of all things, and who speaks of a two-fold order, the one relative to the cause, the other to the effect. And lest I seem to some chance readers to be changing course without offering sufficient proof, I would say that Aristotle himself is aware of the third order of the one being of the Parmenides and is thus alluding to it. The summit is unified indivisibly; the intermediate by loosing its unity into a continuity becomes a whole and parts (wherefore Aristotle placed the dilemma concerning the whole in his discussion of 'continuous'). The third, producing in a unified way the separation of the Forms, displayed beforehand in itself all things causally, but because the separation is intelligible all things are governed by the unity of the one being, and whatever one considers as separated, by holding onto this discovers the intelligible unity of the one being; when separation becomes manifest causally, the infinite procession of the parts of coming to be from that source
obtains as its share uninterrupted pluralization. How then, someone might say, does Aristotle appear to argue against these divine doctrines? Surely because what is adduced for an investigation of nature appears to deviate from the truth. For the perceptible segment (διαμετωπόμενος) does not admit of the intelligible unity; nor is it the case that, just as unified existence among the intelligibles causally encompasses its pluralized separation -- so that one can observe it [the perfect unity of the One] there [in the noetic order], one can see among the perceptibles the perfect unity of the One. Consequently, 'indivisible', 'continuous' and 'communality with respect to one account' here [in the perceptible order] are not appropriate to the One.

And that his critique of Parmenides does not arise out of disputatiousness, Plato himself makes clear: in the Parmenides he agrees to Parmenides's one being and on the basis of this discovers what is beyond it, which he does not think fit to even call 'one', and relates the orders of the one that follow this; and in the Sophist he clearly refutes him for saying that being is one, on the one hand by separating 'one' from 'being' as transcending 'being', and on the other hand by showing that in the first place 'being' is unified in respect to its participation in 'one', but subsequently is divided and made a plurality by otherness. And perhaps there is nothing wrong in quoting what Plato says in the Sophist for the sake of establishing his conceptions at the outset:

Again there are those who say that the All is one thing. Must we not do our best to find out what they mean by
'reality'? -- Surely. -- Let them this answer this question, then: 'You say, we understand, that there is only one thing?' 'We do', they will reply, won't they? -- Yes. -- 'And there is something to which you give the name real?' -- 'Is it the same thing as that to which you give the name one? Are you applying two names to the same thing, or what do you mean?' -- What will their next answer be? -- Obviously, Theaetetus, it is not so very easy for one who has laid down their fundamental assertion to answer this question or any other. -- How so? -- In the first place, it is surely absurd for him to admit the existence of two names, when he has laid down that there is no more than one thing. -- Of course. -- And further, it is equally absurd to allow anyone to assert that a name can have any existence, when that would be inexplicable. -- How is it inexplicable? -- If, on the one hand, he assumes that the name is different from the thing, he is surely speaking of two things. -- Yes. -- Whereas, if he assumes that the name is the same as the thing, either he will have to say it is not the name of anything, or if he says it is the name of something, it will follow that the name is merely a name of a name and of nothing else whatsoever. -- That is so. -- . . . -- Necessarily. -- And what of 'the whole'? Will they say that this is other than their 'one real thing' or the same? -- Certainly that it is the same. In fact they do say so. -- Then if if is a whole -- as indeed Parmenides says:

Everyway like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, evenly balanced from the midst in every direction; for there must not be something more nor something less here than here, (B 8.43-45)

if the real is like that, it has a middle and extremities, and consequently it must have parts, must it not? -- It must. -- Well, if a thing is divided into parts, there is nothing against its having the property of unity as applied to the aggregate of all the parts and being in that way one, as being a sum or whole. -- Of course. On the other hand, the thing which has these properties cannot be just Unity itself, can it? -- Why not? -- Surely Unity in the true sense and rightly defined must be altogether without parts. -- Yes, it must. -- Whereas a thing such as we described, consisting of several parts, will not answer to that definition. -- I see. -- Then, (A) is the Real one and whole in the sense that it has the property of unity, or (B) are we to say that the Real is not a whole at all? -- That is a hard choice. -- Quite true. For if (A) the real has the property of being in a sense
one, it will evidently not be the same thing as Unity, and so all things will be more than one. -- Yes. -- And again (B) if the Real is not a whole by virtue of its having this property of unity, while (a) at the same time Wholeness itself is real, it follows that the Real falls short of itself. -- Certainly. -- So, on this line of argument too, the Real will be deprived of reality and will not be a thing that is. -- Yes. -- And further, once more all things will be more than one, since Reality on the one side and Wholeness on the other have now each a distinct nature. -- Yes. -- But if, (b) on the other hand, there is no such thing as Wholeness at all, not only are the same things true of the Real, but also that, besides not being a thing that really is, it could never even become such. -- Why not?. -- Whenever a thing comes into being, at that moment if has come to be as whole; accordingly, if you do not reckon unity or wholeness among real things, you have no right to speak of either being or coming into being as having any existence. -- That seems perfectly true. -- And further, what is not a whole cannot have any definite number either; for if a thing has a definite number, it must amount to that number, whatever it may be, as a whole. -- Assuredly. -- And countless other difficulties, each involved in measureless perplexity, will arise, if you say that the real is either two things or only one. -- That is plain enough from those we have had a glimpse of now. One leads to another, and each carries us further into a wilderness of doubt about every theory as it is mentioned.\footnote{9}

But even if these matters afforded a rather long digression, let them have gratified our desire for them; nevertheless we must go on to what follows.

Notes to in Phys 86.19 - 90.22

1Cf. 185b2-25.


3Metaphysics A 1076a4.

4The text is surely corrupt (87.17); Simplicius holds that the
intelligible is the final cause of intellecting, not vice versa (cf. in Phys 144.22-25). The simplest remedy is to read τέλος ὑπό τος for τέλος ὑπό.

\[5\] Parmenides 142d9-143a3. Translation from Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, pp. 138-139.

\[6\] Cf. in Phys 136.27-31.

\[7\] On γλύκως cf. in Phys 144.26. Paul Shorey, Plato: The Republic, vol. 2 p. 17 n g (VI 488a2), writes: "The word γλύκως is untranslatable, and often misunderstood. In 553 C it means "stingily"; in Cratyl. 414 C it is used of a strained etymology, and so in 435 C, usually misunderstood; in Crito 53 E of clinging to life; cf. Phaedo 117 A; in Plutarch De Is. et Osir. 28 of a strained allegory and ibid. 75 of a strained resemblance; in Aristoph. Peace 482 of a dog."

\[8\] Cf. Parmenides 137a7 ff., and Proclus in Parm 1032.15-1036.15.

\[9\] Sophist 244a6-245e5. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 221-227.
Therefore he [Porphyry] says:

Once he has fully treated the difficulties that he has brought forth against each of the significations of 'one', he adds another difficulty that was directed against himself. For someone would say, 'you have brought forth difficulties by assuming that 'one' and 'being' are used in many ways; but if this is not so, perhaps you would not have brought forth these difficulties.' Against them he has produced a reply that at the same time is powerful and has not been noticed by his commentators, when he says that if being is not posited as being used in ten ways, not only will the followers of Parmenides and Melissus, but all the others as well will be thrown into confusion.

Therefore there is great confusion facing not only the followers of Parmenides, but all those without exception who assumed that being is synonymous — i.e. they assume that it is one, but cannot reserve for it the pure conception of 'one'.

Notes to *in Phys* 92.29 — 93.5; 93.26 — 29

Wherefore Zeno's argument here seems to be a different one than that preserved in his book, which Plato himself mentions in the Parmenides. For there he shows that many do not exist, coming to Parmenides's aid, who says that being is one, from the opposite direction. But here, as Eudemus says, he did away with the one (for he speaks of the point as the one), and agrees that the many exist. Yet Alexander thinks that in this passage also Eudemus mentions Zeno as doing away with the many. He says:

For as Eudemus relates, Zeno the pupil of Parmenides, attempted to show that what is cannot be many because there is nothing that is one among the things that are, but the many is a plurality of henads.

Notes to *in Phys* 99.7 - 16.

1 Cf. 185b25. 99.7-16 = Eudemus *Physica* fr. 43 (W) p. 27.7-15.

2 Cf. *Parmenides* 128a4-d6.
in Phys 100.21 - 28

For in reality, where there is plurality, non-being is also there. So it is that Parmenides himself, intending to show that real being and perhaps even what is beyond being is one, first did away with non-being; and Plato, intending to show that non-being is found among the things that are, and not only in the perceptible [order] but in the intellectual [order] as well, first relates the separation and plurality of the Forms; in the Parmenides saying that the dilemma which states 'how is the same thing, which belongs to the perceptibles, one and many' has nothing serious to it, he removes it by saying that it is one in virtue of its participation in the one, but many in virtue of its participation in the many.¹

Notes to in Phys 100.21 - 28

¹129c4–e4, quoted below at in Phys 100.29 - 101.10.
Therefore of this difficulty, how the same thing is one and many, we have solutions in Plato also; one being stated in the Sophist as to the intellectual Forms — i.e. that they are one in virtue of their reciprocal participation (and all the more [in virtue of] the sameness and unity in virtue of which each not only shares in the rest nor is merely the same as them, but rather all are, each one of them, unified with respect to themselves — the very thing Socrates in the Parmenides wishes to be demonstrated), but many when each is considered in virtue of its own individuating property. But we have a different solution in the Parmenides as to the perceptibles, in virtue of the participation of the paradigms of both the one and the many in the same thing.

Notes to in Phys 101.16 — 24

1 251a8-c6; cf. in Phys 99.32-100.26, 101.13-16.

2 The clause ἄλλ' ... πάντα (20-21) may well be corrupt.

3 127b7-c1, d6-130a2.

4 129c4-e4; cf. in Phys 100.26-101.13.
Having first undertaken the general refutation of the hypothesis, in order that it might not seem to be refuted owing to the weakness of the arguments in support of it, he [Aristotle] will next proceed to refute the arguments themselves on which they [Parmenides and Melissus] relied when they declared that being is one, and he does so not to corroborate their doctrine but rather to reassure those who must be puzzled by their arguments. For if it is the case that both in a general way a doctrine is refuted and the arguments which establish it could be exploded, the contradictory proposition will thereupon be undeniably corroborated. For if of contradictory propositions there is a direct refutation [of one], this is indirectly a proof [of the other] of the contradictories. Therefore, when the claim that being is one is refuted, the claim that it is many is established. Thus Socrates was aware that Zeno's argument, because it proves that many absurdities follow for those who say that there are many existent things, comes to the aid of Parmenides, who says that being is one. It is not difficult to refute their arguments, he says, because he will show that both the premises and the figures of their combination are syllogistically invalid. And he finds more fault with Melissus's argument, as was said before, either because in addition to everything else he says that being is infinite, or because he seems to assume false premises and to combine them in an invalid syllogistic form, when he says if what has come to be has a beginning, that which has not come to be does not have a beginning,
although it is necessary for one who makes a refutation on the basis of the consequent to say 'that which does not have a beginning does not come to be'; for in this way the second mood of the hypothetical syllogism yields a conclusion. Parmenides sets his premisses in order, but does not deduce the conclusion which follows from his premisses, but something else, since he says 'what is besides being is non-being, non-being is nothing', and does not conclude 'what is besides being is nothing' -- which does follow -- but rather 'therefore being is one'. But these things will be examined later.

Notes to in Phys 102.20 - 103.12

1 Cf. 186a4-13.

2 Cf. in Phys 71.19-31.

3 προηγομένη (26) should probably be emended to προηγομένης: cf. LSJ s.v. Ί, p. 1480.

4 Parmenides 128a4-e4.
Indeed for all these reasons it seems improper to assume that everything that has come to be has a beginning of the thing. Therefore the minor premiss, which states 'yet that which has come to be has a beginning', is not true, and the premiss that is generated by conversion, which states 'that which has not come to be does not have a beginning', not only seems to be generated wrongly from the conclusion, but also in itself seems to be false, if someone should assume a beginning of the thing and not of time. For the sun, moon, heavens, and the whole universe itself, though created in time, nevertheless have as a beginning that of the thing, because they are finite. Parmenides also, declaring that being is uncreated, makes it equal everyway from the centre. (B 8.44)

This sort of thing, being finite, has as a beginning that of the thing. Therefore both premisses are false; the figure itself has been shown to be syllogistically invalid.

Notes to in Phys 107.16 – 28

1Cf. 186a13-16.

2Cf. in Phys 105.18-20.
Both in doctrine and in mode of establishing their doctrine some things are common to Parmenides and Melissus, but some things are specifically different. Common in doctrine is that being is one and motionless, but specifically different is that Melissus says that being is infinite, Parmenides finite. Common again to them in mode of establishing [their doctrine] is that they propound [their argument] in an invalid syllogistic manner and that they assume false premises. But specifically different are the premises themselves which each of them employed; for both do not fashion their demonstrations by means of the same [premises]. Some parts of the refutation directed against them will be developed in the same manner, but others in a way different for each. For everything that was stated as abolishing in a general way the claim that being is one is said in common against both. For example, that for both the argument fails, and that it assumes what is false and that it does not follow; for this above all is adduced with respect to a common refutation [of their arguments]. But everything said against the premises which are unique to each comes to bear against each in a specifically different way. And insofar as they differ in doctrine, since the one says that being is infinite, the other finite, in this respect also the refutations [against them] must prove to be different.

Notes to \textit{in Phys} 114.25 - 115.9

\footnote{Cf. 186a22-24.}
As Alexander relates, Theophrastus sets out Parmenides's argument in the first book of his *History of Physics* as follows: "that which is besides being is non-being; non-being is nothing; therefore being is one"; but Eudemus in this way: "that which is besides being is non-being; moreover being is used in only one way; therefore being is one". If Eudemus in so clear a manner wrote this in some other work I cannot say; but in his *Physics* he writes the following about Parmenides, from which it is perhaps possible to conclude what was stated [by Alexander]:

But Parmenides does not seem to show that being is one, even if one should grant him that being is used in only one way, except as that which is predicated of each thing in the category of substance, as for example 'man' of men. That is, when the accounts are given of each thing the account of being will be one and the same in all, as for example [the account] of animal in animals. And just as if all existent things were beautiful and one cannot find anything that is not beautiful, everything will be beautiful, yet what is beautiful is not one but rather many things (for color, occupation, and anything at all will be beautiful), in this way also all things will be existent, but not one nor even the same; for water is one thing, fire another. Someone might then wonder at Parmenides's having followed arguments that are unworthy of credibility and being deceived by such things as were not yet at that time clarified (for no one spoke of 'in many ways', but Plato was the first to introduce ambiguity, or of *per se* and *per accidens*); but he appears to have been deceived by them. These things, as well as syllogistic, were clearly observed on the basis of arguments and counter-arguments; for they would not be agreed to, unless it should appear necessary; but earlier [philosophers] made their declarations without benefit of logical demonstrations.

Developing his remarks about Parmenides to this point, he went on to Anaxagoras.
And Porphyry himself also, partly from Parmenides's verses, as I think, partly from the statements of Aristotle and [from] those statements which one who wants to set forth Parmenides's doctrine in a persuasive way might make, writes as follows. And his account is as follows:

If there were anything besides white it is non-white, and if there is anything besides good it is non-good, and if there is anything besides being it is non-being. But non-being is nothing; therefore being alone exists; therefore being is one. For even if things that exist are not one but many, they will differ from one another either in being or in not being; but they could not differ in either being (for they are like in respect to being itself, and things that are like are not in fact different or other qua like, and things which are not other are one), or in not being; for things that differ must already exist, but things that do not exist do not differ at all from one another; therefore if he says that the alleged many cannot differ either in being or in not being and so be other than one another, it is clear that all things will be one, and that this is both uncreated and imperishable. 4

However, Aristotle in what follows seems to state Parmenides's argument in roughly this manner:

If being signifies one thing and the contradictory proposition is not simultaneously possible, nothing will exist except being. 5

But Aristotle also understands the same thing as the preceding philosophers. For if being signifies one thing, that which is besides this is non-being, and is nothing. And if the contradictory proposition is not also co-present, so that both what is and what is not are the same thing, it is clear that that which is besides being will be non-being and non-being is nothing.

And if anyone is eager to hear Parmenides himself stating these premisses, he will find the one that says 'what is besides being is
non-being and nothing', which is equivalent to that which says 'being is used in only one way', in these verses:

The one, that it is and that it is impossible for it not to be, is the path of Persuasion (for she attends on Truth). The other, that it is not, and that it must necessarily not be, that I declare is a wholly indiscernible track; for thou couldst not know what is not -- that is impossible -- nor declare it. (B 2.3-8)

And that the contradictory proposition is not also true, he states by means of those verses in which he censures those who equate contradictories. For having said,

for it is possible for it to be, but impossible for nothing to be. This I bid thee consider, for this way of inquiry is the first from which <I hold thee back>, (B 6.1-3)

<he concludes>

But also from this one, on which mortals, knowing nothing, wander two-headed; for helplessness in their own breasts guides their erring mind. They are borne along, both deaf and blind, mazed, hordes with no judgment, who believe that to be and not be are the same and not the same, and the path of everything is one that turns back upon itself. (B 6.4-9)

Aristotle first refutes the falsity of the premisses of this argument, and then its invalid syllogistic form. That is, when he says that it is false because it assumes that being is used in only one way, while it is used in many ways -- in as many ways as have been demonstrated in the Categories. For the claim 'if something exists besides being, that does not exist', if being were used in only one way, perhaps this would be properly said; but in the case of things used in many ways no longer [is it properly said]. E.g. if someone should say: if something exists besides the crab, this is not a crab. For we
shall ask 'besides what sort of crab'? For besides the aquatic crab is the heavenly crab [i.e. Cancer] or the crab of bronze; that is, a crab besides the heavenly [crab] is not prevented from being another kind of crab. Similarly also, if something besides being exists, as for example besides substance, that is not substance, yet is not prevented from being quality or quantity, and if [there is] something besides quality, it is not quality, [but is not prevented from being] substance or quantity. And in this way there is nothing to prevent things that exist from being many, even being itself [from] being non-being, but not contradictories. And the premiss is absurd in another way. For the claim 'if anything besides being exists, it is non-being' is appropriate for those who also grant at the same time that the same thing is something and is not [something else]; but this is absurd in the case of what is said per se. If anyone should bring forth the first premiss in this way, on the grounds that being is used in many ways, this will be true, yet what follows immediately after it [will] no longer [be] true, which states 'non-being is nothing'. For this is equal to the claim 'that which is besides substance is nothing', yet there are many things which are not substances. Well then, in this way the premisses on Theophrastus's version are refuted as being false; [and they are refuted] as not yielding a conclusion because the conclusion that is deduced as a consequence was 'that which is besides being is nothing'. But he [Parmenides] concluded 'therefore being is one'. Even if someone posits that being is used in one way only, as Eudemus mentions, he
too assumes a falsehood; for being is not [used] in one way only, if in fact [it is used] in ten ways. Secondly, not even on this assumption does it follow that being is one. Even if someone posits that nothing besides substance exists, nothing prevents substances from existing yet being more than one; this point Eudemus made clear in his statement, "not even if one should grant him that being is used in only one way"\(^8\), and the following statement, "and just as if all things that exist were beautiful and one can find nothing that is not beautiful, everything will be beautiful, yet what is beautiful is not one but rather many [things] (for color, occupation, and anything at all will be beautiful)"\(^9\), and \(<\text{Eudemus}>\) demonstrated the same thing in the case of \(<\text{existent}>\), "thus indeed all things will be existent, but not one nor even the same thing"\(^10\). And the conclusion which states 'therefore being is one' is false and is not derived from what is assumed. For even if being [is used] in only one way, being is not \textit{ipso facto} one; for it is used in only one way both in regard to genus and species; in either way [there are] many [existent things]. And what Eudemus stated in the example of what is beautiful will result "that everything will be beautiful, yet what is beautiful is not one"\(^11\) in number; for things that are one in account are not \textit{ipso facto} also one in number. Aristotle concluded the same things in the case of what is white. If someone should say that [Parmenides] concluded that being is not one in number, but rather in species or in genus, he immediately agrees that [Parmenides] says that things that exist are more than one in number; things that are one in genus are
also more than one in account. And if they [Parmenides and Melissus] say that being is one in this way, how will they still assert that it is motionless because it is one?

Notes to in Phys 115.11 - 118.25

1Cf. 186a23-27.

2DG 483.8-10, fr. 7.

3115.11-116.5 = Eudemus Physica fr. 43 (W) pp. 28.24-29.15; cf. notes 7-11 below.

4Commentarius in Physica; cf. Index Nominum s.v. p. 1453.

5187a4-5; cf. Metaphysics A 986b26-30.

6Simplicius has the nominative ὑψηλῆ here (B 2.4); DK, following Bywater's emendation, adopts the dative, as does Guthrie.

7Cf. in Phys 115.17-18.

8118.10 = 115.17-18.

9118.11-13 = 115.21-23.

10118.14-15 = 115.23-24. τὸ . . . Ἀριστοτέλης (13-14) is out of place here; cf. 118.20-21 and 186a26-27. The emendation offered here is conservative; more radical surgery is probably in order.

11118.19 = 115.22.
in Phys 118.27 - 121.25\(^1\)

Even if someone grants him \([\text{Parmenides}],\) he \([\text{Eudemus}]\) says\(^2\), that being is not used in many ways but rather in one way only, so that the premiss which states 'that which is besides being is non-being' is true, and being should signify one thing, not even on this assumption is being deduced as being one in number. For what is deduced is that 'what is besides being is nothing if not one'. If someone wishes to deduce the converse of this, as following what is deduced, which is what Parmenides seems to do, since the conversion occurs with opposition, the deduction will be 'the one therefore is being'. For if the consequence were 'that which is besides being, i.e. non-being is not one', there arises by conversion 'the one therefore is being'; but this is different from 'being is one or one is being'. He himself \([\text{Aristotle}]\) demonstratess in the case of what is white now its inconclusiveness, by assuming that being is an accident, but shortly afterwards by assuming that being is a substance, and showing in each case that being cannot be one. For if only what is white and nothing else should exist, so that everything that is besides what is white is non-existent and what is non-existent is nothing, not even on this assumption is what is white proved to be one in number, but if at all, \([\text{it is one}]\) either in genus or species, which is also more than one. But that it cannot be one in number he proves by mentioning the previously assumed distinction of this sort of 'one'\(^3\). For if it were one in number, it would be one either as a continuum or as indivisible, or as the same in account. But it is
necessary that it neither be one as a continuum; for when these 
premisses are assumed, that which is white can be more than one and 
discrete. For snow, a swan, and white lead are by no means a single 
white thing in virtue of continuity, but rather are discrete. Yet 
even if someone grants that it is continuous, what is continuous has 
been shown to be many in virtue of division. And on other grounds as 
well, even if someone grants that what is white is continuous, it 
will not be one in account; for each white thing when considered in-
dividually is divided into the substrate, which is called 'white' by 
sharing in whiteness, and into the color itself in which it shares. 
For indeed this white is said both to be white and to be a species of 
whiteness. And the account of each will be unique, of the one as 
substrate, as for example of the swan that it is such and such an 
animal of white color, but of the other as of a substrate or in a 
substrate, for in either case what is accidental is being stated by 
him -- that it is a piercing color of vision. Therefore what is 
white will be more than one, even if the premiss which states 'besides 
what is white is nothing' remains true; for the account of each is 
different, even though both are called 'white'. And it is necessary 
that we not be troubled lest we be compelled, by saying that the 
accident is different in account in comparison with the substrate, 
to grant him [Aristotle] that the actual existence of the substrate 
is separable. For it is not necessary that those things whose ac-
count is different also be separated from one another in actual exis-
tence. For indeed things which subsist with one another have unique
accounts and admit of a unique support of soul, as for example a
surface and a solid body. For nor even insofar as it is separable
does it in this respect have a unique account. "And this," he says,
Parmenides was not yet able to see" — that it is possible that
things that are one in actual existence have different accounts and
in this respect are more than one. And it was in no way surprising
that systematic rules of accounts had not yet been distinguished,
but were subsequently detected from things themselves and were thus
brought forth as contributing to greater precision; as even Eudemus
attests, when he says:

Someone might then wonder at Parmenides's following argu-
ments that are unworthy of credibility and being deceived
by such things as were not yet at that time clarified (for
no one spoke of 'in many ways', but Plato was the first
to introduce ambiguity, or of per se and per accidens);
but he appears to have been deceived by them. These
things, as well as syllogistic, were observed on the
basis of arguments and counter-arguments. For they would
not be agreed to, unless it should appear necessary; but
earlier [philosophers] made their declarations without
benefit of logical demonstrations.4

Owing to their ignorance of these matters even the so-called Megarian
philosophers, assuming as a (self-) evident premiss that those
things whose accounts differ are different, and that things that are
different are separate from one another, seemed to prove that each
man is separate from himself. For since there is one account of
Socrates as musical, and another of Socrates as pale, even Socrates
himself would be separated from himself. It is clear that with
respect to the substrate, in virtue of which Socrates exists, he is
the same, but with respect to his accidents he is different; there-
fore he is both one and many in the one respect or the other. That Parmenides least of all failed to know of this sort of distinction is clear, if while saying [that being is] one he predicated so many things of it. For it is

whole, unique, immovable and without end (B 8.4)

and motionless, eternal, indivisible, and countless other things, which owing to the undiscriminated unity there [in the noetic order] of these things that are predicated of it were all one, since all were separated off after it by a single cause, from which we ascribe to that the distinct categories. Parmenides did not, however, produce the rule itself; nor was this rule appropriate to the terseness of the ancients. But Aristotle in a rather forced way meant to prove that even in the case of that which is the same in actual existence, as in the case of white body, that what is white is more than one thing in account, both that as substrate and as that in a substrate. Yet these things do not even have the same name. For the substrate is not white nor even said to be [white] per se, except when it is taken in conjunction with whiteness; thus if at all, the same name occurs in different accounts, not of the substrate and of what is in the substrate, but of their product, because we call both that which shares along with its participation and the color itself which it shares in 'white'. But if one carefully distinguishes, these things do not even have the same name; for there is 'white' and 'whiteness', and 'quale' and 'quality'. Wherefore we define whiteness as a piercing color of vision, but white as a body sharing
in whiteness. Having understood these things, as it seems, Eudemus
did not prove in a forced way the difference of accounts in the case
of one and the same thing in actual existence, but rather made his
demonstration in the case of what is beautiful as something common,
which is appropriate to things which differ in account, so that once
again what seems to be one is this in terms of the common property,
but many in accounts. And he writes as follows:

And just as if all things that exist were beautiful and
one cannot find anything which is not beautiful, every-
thing will be beautiful, yet what is beautiful is not
one but many things (for this color will be beautiful,
and this occupation, whatever it is), in this way also
all things will be existent, but not one nor even the
same; for water is one thing, fire another.\(^6\)

Perhaps Aristotle rejected this mode of demonstration because if
being had been posited as a single, common thing, whether as a genus
or species, or a homonymous term, more that one thing would immediate-
ly be introduced therewith. For that which is common must be common
to more than one thing. Wherefore, positing it as one in number,
since this sort of 'one' is one either as a continuum or as the same
in account, or as indivisible, he proved that it is neither \([one]\) as
a continuum nor as the same in account, but the claim \('[one] as
indivisible' he omitted to set aright as evidently absurd, on the
grounds that that which is indivisible is posited as a limit of body\(^7\).

Notes to \textit{in Phys} 118.27 - 121.25

\(^1\)Cf. 185a25-32.

\(^2\)Cf. 115.16-18 and note 3 to translation of \textit{in Phys} 115.11-
118.25, p. 341.

3 Cf. 185b5-25.

4 120.6-12 = 115.25-116.4; cf. note 3 to translation of *in Phys* 115.11-118.25, p. 341. Diels suggestion that οὖν ἄν should be restored after μὲν οὖν in *in Phys* 115.25 = *in Phys* 120.6 is probably correct (*in ad* 115.25).

5 Here (120.23) and at *in Cael* 558.17 Simplicius (mis)quotes this verse with ἀγένητον "uncreated, unborn", while at *in Phys* 30.2, 78.13, and 145.4 ἀπέλευσαν "without end" appears; the latter is adopted by *DK*.

6 121.13-17 = 115.21-23; cf. note 3 to translation of *in Phys* 115.11-118.25, p. 341.

7 Cf. 185b16-19, *in Phys* 87.4-16.
It is possible that both the preceding remarks and these are said not with regard to Parmenides alone, but to Melissus as well. For, whereas of things that are some exist as accidents, but others as substrata, of which the accidents are accidents, and these things are not only not identical with one another but are in some sense opposites, both that which subsists in itself and that which has its existence in something else, it is necessary that each of them [Parmenides and Melissus] say that being is either what is accidental or what is the substratum of this.

Notes to *in Phys* 121.28 - 122.5

\[1\] Cf. 186a32-34.
On the basis of these distinctions, it is clear that if being is one, as the followers of Parmenides say, there will be nothing else of which this is an accident, but of whatever thing it is predicated, that must immediately be called both 'real being' and 'real unity', just as if being itself is predicated of itself. For if being shall be spoken of something else not in this way but rather as an accident, that thing will be something different from being and for his reason [will] simultaneously [be] 'being' and 'non-being' — this is absurd.

If then these things are impossible and 'real being' is something existent, as is assumed, it is necessary that both what is accidental to it and 'real being' be existent, if nothing else exists besides 'real being'. Therefore being signifies more than one thing, and no longer the one being but what is accidental to substance as well. And by these remarks Aristotle seems to me to be pointing out to Parmenides that although he means to abolish non-being and for this reason posits that being is one on the grounds that what is besides being is nothing, he not only introduces qualified non-being by his hypothesis, by even proves that being itself is non-being. This was already proved by Plato in the Sophist, as was that being is one but not many. For being is neither motion nor rest nor the other kinds. Yet Aristotle [proves it] because he will show that for those who say that being is one it is not only qualified non-being but also absolute non-being. The fact that by first assuming that being is a substance he proves once again that it is not an accident in the phrase "for the accident" and what follows produced a great deal of obscurity as far as his text goes.

Notes to in Phys 124.33 - 125.5; 125.33 - 126.13

1 Cf. 186a32-b12. Both passages are quotations from Adrastus (de Ὑπερ Ὀντι); cf. Index Nominum s.v. p. 1437 and in Phys 122.33.

2 Cf. e.g. Sophist 258d5-259b6.
Next he show that it is necessary to say that the one being is neither finite nor infinite, replying to Parmenides and Melissus together. For if, he says, being is one, "it will not even have any magnitude". If it does not have magnitude, it is clear that it will neither be finite nor infinite; but Parmenides seems directly to predicate magnitude of it, since it is a whole and has parts, when he says,

on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded ball, equal from the center. (8.43-44)

Accordingly, it is clear that if it is one, it will not have magnitude, if 'one' is not many nor possesses many, while that which has magnitude has parts; that which has parts has many and is many, because the existence of each of the parts is different; and those things whose existence is different differ from one another and are many.

Notes to in Phys 126.16 - 27

1 Cf. 186b12-15 and Sophist 244e2 ff.
But perhaps Aristotle does not impute to them this absurdity, which the majority of his commentators think he does, that being could not have magnitude, even though they say that it is infinite or finite (for he did not fail to recognize that they intended and proved that it is without parts and is indivisible), but rather that if being is posited as one only, nothing among things that are will have magnitude, nor even a whole and parts. This is quite contrary to manifest facts, because the perceptibles and all physical bodies have magnitude.

Notes to *in Phys* 127.8 – 14

\(^1\)Cf. 186b12-14.
Alexander says,

Having shown that accidents are ushered in along with real being, he now shows that even if it be granted to them [Parmenides and Melissus] that real being alone exists because this exists in the strict sense, while its accidents exist in a different manner, in this way too being itself will not be one but there will be many real beings; for the division of it as magnitude, which he mentioned, will proceed into many real beings. It is necessary too that it be divided with respect to its account, i.e. its definition, into many real beings. Accordingly, having shown that with respect to magnitude and to the division of it into parts being proves to be more than one and different in species, if the account of each of the parts is different, he thereupon added division with respect to definition.

Now in these remarks Alexander has made his explanation on the assumption that Aristotle had demonstrated that real being has magnitude, although he says the opposite: "being, if it is real being, will not even have magnitude." Consequently, perhaps when positing that the assumption of these men [Parmenides and Melissus] is that being is one, he abolishes on the basis of this that it is finite or infinite or

on every side, like the mass of well-rounded ball"\(^2\)

(8.43)

as Parmenides says; for since things of this sort are (a) magnitude and discrete, they are many and not one. And because of the fact that even this real being, which they posit as being one, is divided with respect to its definition into real beings, he proves that it cannot be one; therefore he is fashioning a refutation which leaves them no way out, which might be rendered in the following syllogism, in accordance with the so-called 'conversion by negation': 'If being
is one, it does not have magnitude, because it is not divided. If it
is divided, as is clear with respect to its definition, it cannot be
one.'

Notes to  in Phys 127.12 - 128.2

1 Cf. 186b14-35.

2 Simplicius clearly exchanges μεσοθέων "from the center" from
B 8.44 for πάντοθέων "on every side" of B 8.43; cf.  in Phys 89.22-23
(apud Plato).
For one who maintains that there is only one thing, [doing so] on the assumption that it is one in number, would not say that this is one genus, because genus immediately ushers in with itself a plurality of species and individuals. But someone might say, 'On what basis is it clear that Parmenides spoke of 'one in number'?'. But it is clear on the basis of the fact that he [Aristotle] did not speak of real being as a genus, but rather as a substance. For he shows that it is not an accident because what is accidental is predicated of a substrate — which in fact is a substance subsisting in its own right and not requiring anything else to exist. But genus itself also belongs to things [said] of a substrate; therefore real being could not be a genus, if he clearly set '[said] of a subject' in contradistinction to it.

Notes to *in Phys* 131.31 — 132.5

\(^1\)Cf. 186b14-25.
Eudemus also, who follows Aristotle in everything, did not understand 'real being' (τὸ ἀλήθειαν) as 'genus'. Indeed, in the first book of his Physics, when he speaks about Parmenides, he writes the following (as Alexander says; for I did not find this statement in Eudemus's book):

So then, he would not say [it is] what is common. For neither were such things yet the subject of inquiry, but subsequently proceeded from arguments, nor would they admit of what he attributes to being. For how will this be "from the centre equal" (B 8.44) and the like. But, it is said, almost all of these statements are appropriate to the heavens.

Notes to in Phys 133.21 – 29

1 Cf. 186b14–35. 133.21–29 = Eudemus Physica fr. 44 (W) p. 29.16–24.
Having himself refuted Parmenides's argument on the grounds that it both assumes false premisses (and the premiss was that being is said in only one way or rather 'what is besides being is non-being' or 'non-being is nothing', for these are equivalent) and makes a syllogistically invalid deduction (for the conclusion that is drawn does not follow), he [Aristotle] says, "some yielded to both arguments" both that of Zeno who wished to come to the aid of Parmenides's argument against those who try to make fun of it by showing that his supposition, that there is a One, leads to many absurdities and contradictions by showing that, on a thorough examination, their own supposition that there is a plurality leads to even more absurd consequences than the hypothesis of the One.

For Zeno himself in Plato's Parmenides manifestly bears witness for this argument; for Parmenides's argument is that the one being is all things, if being signifies one thing. For what is besides it will be nothing. And as Theophrastus adduced [it]: "That which is besides being is non-being. Non-being is nothing." And he says that some people yielded to this argument. And to yield to an argument is to agree to the premisses which establish it or to the whole complex. Accordingly, it is said that Plato yielded to the premiss which states 'what is besides being is non-being' (for he says that motion, rest, sameness, and otherness are other than being in the Sophist), but does not further agree that non-being is nothing; for truly he says that things that are other than being, even if they are not being,
nevertheless exist, and in this way introduces non-being.

Notes to *in Phys* 133.31 – 134.18

1 Cf. 187al-11.


3 *Parmenides* 128d4-6; Simplicius adds ἢ λέγουσα (134.7) as a gloss on ἢ ἔρως (omitting the simple ἢ) and replaces ἢ by ἦς. Translation from Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, p. 67. In the following sentence, Simplicius ascribed this quotation to Zeno in the *Parmenides*.

4 *DG* 483.10 (fr. 7); cf. *in Phys* 115.11-13.

5 258b8-e2.

6 *Sophist* 258e6-259b6; cf. *in Phys* 135.15-136.10.
But as regards Alexander it is sufficient to quote Plato's statement, which Alexander himself mentioned, which clearly shows, I think, that Plato did not introduce absolute non-being, but rather qualified non-being. The statement is as follows:

You see, then, that in our disobedience to Parmenides we have trespassed far beyond the limits of his prohibition. -- In what way? -- In pushing forward our quest, we have shown him results in a field which he forbade us even to explore. -- How? -- He says, you remember,

Never shall this be proved, that things that are not, are; but keep back thy thought from this way of inquiry.

(B 7.1–2)

Yes, he does say that. -- Whereas we have not merely shown that things that are not, are, but we have brought to light the real character of 'not-being'. We have shown that the nature of the Different has existence and is parcelled out over the whole field of existent things with reference to one another; and of every part of it that is set in contrast to 'that which is' we have dared to say that precisely that is really 'that which is not'. -- Yes, sir, and I think that what we have said is perfectly true. -- Then let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent that we mean by 'what is not', when we make bold to say that 'what is not' exists. So far as any contrary of the existent is concerned, we have long ago said good-bye to the question whether there is such a thing or not and whether any account can be given of it or none whatsoever. But with respect to the 'what-is-not' that we have now asserted to exist, an opponent must either convince us that our account is wrong by refuting it, or, so long as he proves unable to do that, he must accept our statements:

that the Kinds blend with one another;

that Existence and Difference pervade them all, and pervade one another;

that Difference (or the Different), by partaking of Existence, is by virtue of that participation, but on the other hand is not that Existence of which it partakes, but is different; and since it is differ-
ent from Existence (or an existent), quite clearly it must be possible that it should be a thing that is not;

and again, Existence, having a part in Difference, will be different from all the rest of the Kinds; and because it is different from them all, it is not any one of them nor yet all the others put together, but is only itself; with the consequence, again indubitable, that Existence is not myriads upon myriads of things, and that all the other Kinds in the same way, whether taken severally or all together, in many respects are and in many respects are not.3

On the basis of this statement Alexander thought that Plato introduced absolute non-being because he assumed that being when considered as a genus is absolute being. And it was enough for him to listen to Plato's own statement, "Let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent we mean by 'what is not', when we make bold to say"4, and that each of them exists in virtue of its participation in being, yet is not Existence5. And before this statement he evidently made clear what variety of non-being he does introduce, when he said,

When we speak of 'that which is not', it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists, but only something that is different.6

And it was also enough for him to have listened to what was stated concerning absolute non-being and the opposite of being, because Plato rejected any discussion of it whatsoever. Even he who says that it exists and even he who says that it does not exist are open to objection. It is not safe to say anything at all about it. It is necessary to understand that the being Plato speaks of is that which is considered with respect to the bare individuating property itself of being, which is set in contradistinction to both the other
genera and to non-being; indeed he says that this, but not absolute being, which combines within itself all the genera, is a genus; of that, absolute non-being would be the opposite, if in fact it is possible to speak of 'begin the opposite of' with respect to it. But this sort of being could not be a genus, because genera are opposed by virtue of their mutual distinction. And these [genera] are described as already being discriminated, in virtue of their single individuating property, from the intelligible unity, in which all things are one, as Parmenides says, and first descended into the intellectual division, divided into parts that are not parts, and into the perceptible segment, and intermediately between these [two] into the coherence of soul. Therefore Plato is far from introducing absolute non-being as the opposite of absolute being.

Notes to \textit{in Phys} 135.15 - 136.32

\footnote{1}{Cf. 187al-11.}

\footnote{2}{Cf. \textit{in Phys} 134.13-32.}

\footnote{3}{\textit{Sophist} 258c6-259b6. Translation from Cornford, \textit{Plato's Theory of Knowledge}, pp. 294-296.}


\footnote{5}{Simplicius here (136.14; cf. 3-4) glosses \textit{Sophist} 259a4-8.}

\footnote{6}{\textit{Sophist} 257b3-4. Translation from Cornford, \textit{Plato's Theory of Knowledge}, p. 290. In 136.17-20 Simplicius alludes to \textit{Sophist} 237b 7-239c7. (Addendum, tr. of 136.21-22: "So it was enough [for him to hear] what I said as well as these things.")}
Porphyry has well observed that Plato does not introduce absolute non-being; but his statement that [Plato] in the Sophist relates that created being is non-being, about which he says in the Timaeus, "and what is that which is <always> becoming and is never real?"\(^2\), seems to me to be worthy of attention. For Plato does not seem to discover non-being in the separation of the perceptibles, but rather in the separation of the intellectual Forms. For when would he say about emmattered and perceptible things the following:

But tell me, in heaven's name; are we really to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul, understanding have no place in that which is perfectly real -- that it has neither life nor thought, but stands immutable in solemn aloofness, devoid of intelligence?\(^3\)

I maintain against Alexander and Porphyry together that Aristotle would not censure Plato for introducing as being absolute non-being, since he so clearly states that qualified being exists. Nevertheless, he would not be arguing against Plato in these remarks on the grounds that his fear was groundless, that, if what is besides being is non-being, all things would be one, and for this reason introduces non-being. For it is not in virtue of his introduction of non-being that Plato proves that there are many existent things, but rather he showed this -- that 'one' is one thing, 'being' another -- making his proof from the fact that it is of whole limb,

on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded ball, equal from the centre.\(^4\) (E 8.43-44)

And non-being was needed † because he calls the sophist 'a maker of
images', and an image contains some falsehood, and falsehood does not exist unless non-being exists. For he who states a falsehood either says that what is is not or that what is not is.

Notes to in Phys 136.33 - 137.20

1Cf. 187a1-11.


3Sophist 248e6-249a2. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 241.

4Cf. Sophist 244e2-245e5.

5Cf. Sophist 239c9 ff.
Who [Zeno] on the contrary writes many critiques in the course of his abolishing the claim that there are many, in order that by abolishing the many the claim that all things are one might be firmly established, which is the very thing Parmenides himself maintained. Secondly, he [Alexander] ought to state what purpose is served by the mention of Zeno's argument and of those who vainly yielded to it, just as those who yielded to Parmenides's argument, but the purpose of those who introduce non-being is clear; for it is in order that it be proved that there many existent things, which is what Parmenides did not maintain.

Notes to in Phys 138.20 – 25

1Cf. 187a1-3.

Porphyry, however, says that the argument from dichotomy also belongs to Parmenides, who attempts to show on the basis of it that being is one. And he writes as follows:

And Parmenides had another argument, which supposed that on the basis of dichotomy it shows that being is one only and without parts and indivisible. For if it should be divisible, let it be divided into two, and then let each of the parts be divided in two, and if this takes place without end it is clear that either some least and indivisible magnitudes, though infinite in number, will remain; or it will vanish and will no longer be resolved into anything, and will be composed of nothing; but these things are absurd. Therefore it will not be divided, but will remain one. For indeed, since it is 'like in every direction' (πολύτοις ὀρισμοῖς), if it is divisible, it will be divisible in every direction equally, but not [divisible] in one part, but not in another. Let it be divided in every direction; consequently, it is clear once again that nothing will remain, but it will vanish, and if it will be composed, it will again be composed of nothing. For if anything will remain, it will no longer prove to have been divided in every direction. Therefore, on the basis of these considerations also it is clear that being will be indivisible, without parts, and one. Those who follow Xenocrates agreed that the first conclusion, i.e. that if being is one it will also be indivisible, remains, yet not that being is indivisible. Wherefore again [they say that] being is by no means one only, but rather many. Yet it is not infinitely divisible, but comes to an end at some indivisible entities. Yet these are not indivisible as being without parts and being ultimate, but rather as being divisible in number and matter and having parts, but indivisible in form and primary — [Xenocrates] by positing that there are certain primary indivisible lines, and that plane figures and primary solids are [composed] of them. So then Xenocrates believes that the dilemma that one faces from dichotomy and generally from infinite cutting and division is resolved by his having introduced indivisible lines and having produced absolutely indivisible magnitudes, by avoiding the argument: 'if being is divisible, it is resolved into non-being and is bereft of those indivisible lines of which, if they remain uncuttable and indivisible, things are composed'.

\[^1\]

\[^2\]
In these statements of Porphyry, that the mention of the argument from dichotomy, which introduces that which is indivisible and one because of the absurdity that follows from division, is apropos, it were well. But it is worthy of note whether the argument belongs to Parmenides and not to Zeno, as Alexander also thinks. For neither is anything of this sort said in Parmenides's verses, but the vast majority of historical accounts attribute the dilemma from dichotomy to Zeno. And above all, in the discussion about motion it is mentioned as belonging to Zeno\(^3\).

And what need is there to waste words, since it is in fact related in Zeno's own work? For showing again that if many exist, the same things are finite and infinite, Zeno writes the following in his own words:

If there is a plurality, things must be just as many as they are, no more and no less. And if they are just as many as they are, they must be limited. If there is plurality, the things that are are infinite; for there will always be other things between the things that are, and yet others between those others. And so the things that are are infinite.\(^4\)

And in this way he proved numerical infinity on the basis of dichotomy. As for infinity in magnitude, [he previously demonstrated it] in virtue of the same dialectical reasoning. For having first shown, If what is had no size, it would not even be,

he concludes,

For if it is, each thing must have a certain size and bulk, and one part of it must be at a certain distance from another part; and the same argument holds about the part in front of it — it too will have some size, and some part of it will be in front. And it is the same thing to say this once and to go on saying it indefi-
initely; for no such part of it will be the last, nor will one part ever be unrelated to another. So if there is a plurality, things must be both small and great; so small as to have no size at all, so great as to be infinite.\(^3\)

Perhaps, then, the argument from dichotomy does belong to Zeno, as Alexander maintains; not, however, because he abolishes the one, but far more the many -- because contradictions follow for those who posit them [the many] -- and in this way corroborates Parmenides's argument, which states that being is one\(^6\).

Notes to *in Phys* 139.24 - 141.11

1Cf. 187al-3.

2*Commentarius in Physica*; see *Index Nominum s.v.* p. 1453. Several parenthetical uses of ὑπολογεῖ have been omitted to produce a continuous translation (139.27, 29; 140.5).

3Cf. 239b9 ff..

429 B 3 (DK I.257.9-258.5). Translation from Kirk and Raven, p. 288.


But since we have already come to the end of the arguments against Parmenides, it were well both to track down Parmenides's own doctrine about the one being [to show] that it is in accord with my previous remarks, and to examine what the refutations are directed against. Well then, that Parmenides does not posit the one being as one of the things that come to be and perish, one of its signs, which states that it is 'uncreated and indestructible', makes clear, when he says,

One way alone is yet left to tell of, namely that 'It is'. On this way are marks in plenty that since it exists it is unborn and imperishable. (B 8.1-3)

And he does not maintain that the one being is corporeal at all, since he says it is indivisible, when he says,

Nor is it divisible, since it all equally is. (B 8.22)

Therefore, what he says is not appropriate to the heavens at all, as Eudemus¹ says some people understood by

on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere.² (B 8.43)

For the heavens are not indivisible; nor again are they like a sphere, but they are the most exact sphere among physical things. And that Parmenides says that the one being is not animate either, his statement that it is motionless makes clear,

It is alone, unmoved; therefore all things are a name.³ since animate substance has motion even according to the Eleatics. And he says that being is 'all together',
since it now is all together (B 8.5)

and that it is always the same,

Remaining the same in the same place it rests by itself.
(B 8.39)

And it evidently is both 'all together' and 'the same' both with respect to its substance and to potentiality and actuality, which transcend the hypostasis of soul. Perhaps he does not even say that it is intellectual at all; for the intellectual subsists by virtue of its separation from the intelligible and its turning back upon the intelligible, and he says that the one being is the same for being and intellecting -- that is to say clearly is what is intelligible and intellect4 -- when he writes,

What can be thought [apprehended] and the thought that 'it is' are the same. For without that which is (i.e. the intelligible) in which [i.e. in dependence on, or in respect of which] it is expressed, thou shalt not find thought. (B 8.34-36)

Furthermore, the intellectual is divided into Forms, since the intelligible contains beforehand in a unity the separation of the Forms. And where there is division, there also is otherness; and where this exists, there too non-being appears. For that which is other is not otherness itself, but Parmenides totally demarcates non-being from his one being.

For this shall never prevail, that things that are not are, but do thou keep thy thought from this way of inquiry.5 (B 7.1-2).

Nor again does he maintain that the one being is a common property, either that which exists in our minds as a secondary creation (for that is neither 'uncreated' nor 'indestructible'), nor again is it
the common property in objects; for that is perceptible and belongs to the opinable and deceptive, about which he speaks later, and is other because of its differentiae, so that it has otherness and non-being as attributes. And how could 'all together' or 'combines within itself the intellect and the intelligible' be true of this? But surely does he not say that the one being is individual substance, or is this even more discordant? For individual substance is distinguished by otherness, and is emmattered, perceptible, and other because of its accident(s). And it also is divisible and involved in motion. Accordingly, it remains that the intelligible — as cause of all things, through which both the intellect and intellecting exist, in which all things are conjointly and as a unity precon-tained in virtue of a single unity — this is the Parmenidean being, in which there is a single nature of both 'one' and 'being'. For which reason Zeno said that, if anyone should show him 'one', he would himself supply 'being', not because he did not understand 'one', but rather because it subsists along with being. All of the con-clusions which I have stated are appropriate to this one being; for the 'uncreated' is also 'indestructible' and the complete is 'unique'. For in reality, that which precedes all separation could not be a second thing along with something else. And appropriate to this are both 'all together' and 'non-being has no place in it anywhere' and further 'indivisible' and 'motionless' with respect to every kind of division and motion, and both the 'being always the same' and 'standing <as a limit> of all things'. And if this is the final cause of
intellecting, it is clear that it is the intelligible; for the intelligible is the final cause of both intellect and intellecting. And if intellecting and the intelligible are 'the same in the same', the preeminence of their unity would be ineffable. And lest I seem to anyone to be going too far, I would gladly append Parmenides's verses about the one being, nor are there many, to these notes, both because they corroborate what I maintain and because Parmenides's writings are scarce. What follows the abolition of non-being is as follows:

One way alone is yet left to tell of, namely that 'It is'. On this are marks in plenty that since it exists it is unborn and imperishable, whole, unique, immovable, and without end. It was not in the past, nor yet shall it be, since it now is all together, one and continuous. For what birth of it wilt thou seek? How and from what did it grow? I shall not allow thee to say or think 'from what is not', for it is not to be said or thought that 'it is not'. And what need would have prompted it to grow later or sooner, beginning from nothing. Thus it must either fully be or else not be. Nor will the force of evidence suffer anything besides itself to arise from what is not. Therefore Justice does not relax with her fetters and allow it to come into being or perish, but holds it fast. The verdict on this lies here; It is or it is not. But this verdict has already been given, as it had to be, that the one path should be left alone as unthinkable, unnamed, for it is no true path, and that the other exists and is real. How could what is afterwards perish? And how could it come into being? For if it came into being, it is not, nor yet if it is going to be at some future time. Thus becoming is extinguished, and perishing not to be heard of. Nor is it divisible, since it all equally is. It does not exist more fully in one direction, which would prevent it from holding together, nor more weakly in another, but all is full of what is. Therefore it is all continuous, for what is is close to what is. But unmoved, in the grip of might bonds, it is without beginning or ceasing, since coming into being and perishing have been driven afar off and true con-
viction has rejected them. Remaining the same in the same place it rests by itself and so remains firmly where it is; for powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds of a chain that hems it all around, because it is not allowed that what is should be incomplete; for it is not lacking, but by not being it would lack everything. What can be thought [apprehended] and the thought that 'it is' are the same; for without that which is, in which [i.e. on dependence on or in respect of which] it is expressed [or revealed], thou shalt not find thought. Nothing exists or can exist apart from what is, since Fate has fettered it so as to be whole and unmoved. Therefore all things must be a name which mortals have laid down [or agreed upon] believing them to be true [real]: coming into being and perishing, being and not being, change of place and alteration of bright colour. But since there is a furthest limit, it is complete on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded ball, equal in every way from the centre; for it may not be greater or smaller in this direction or in that; for neither is there what is not, which might stop it from reaching its like, nor is it possible that what is should be here more, and here less, since it is all inviolate; for equal on sides to itself, it meets its limits uniformly. Here I cease the trustworthy account and thought concerning truth. From this point learn the opinions of mortals, listening to the deceitful pattern of my words. (B 8.1-52)

These then are Parmenides's verses about the one being. After them he then discourses about the opinables, positing different principles in them. Aristotle too makes mention of them later on when he says, "for Parmenides also makes hot and cold principles, and he calls them fire and earth." And if he says that the one being is like the mass of a well-rounded ball, (B 8.43) do not be surprised; it is because of his poetry that he makes use of a mythical fiction. How then did this statement differ from Orpheus's "silver-white egg". It is clear that used in a general way some his expressions are also appropriate to other things that follow it [the one being]; as for instance 'uncreated and indestruc-
tible' is appropriate to both the soul and the intellect, and 'motionless and remaining the same' is appropriate to the intellect; but all [of these] when taken together and in their pure meaning befit that [the one being]. For even if the soul and intellect are uncreated in one sense, still they are derived from the intelligible. And the motionless is properly that in which not even actual motion is discerned, and 'remaining the same' is strictly appropriate to 'what remains'. But the soul and the much-prized intellect issued forth from that which remains and turn back toward it. And it is clear that as many things as are said to belong to it are precontained in it as a unity, but as separately, and as is evident by definition, issued forth from it after it. And accordingly, it seems to be related by Parmenides as a first cause, since it is one 'all together', and the 'last limit'. But if he did not say it was simply 'one', but 'one being', and 'unique' and 'limit' and 'limited', perhaps he is indicating that the ineffable cause of all things is situated above it. How is it then that both Plato and Aristotle manifestly direct refutations against Parmenides? Refuting him on two counts, both for saying that being is one and for utterly abolishing non-being, Plato makes his refutation on the basis of the intellectual and separated order, wherein 'being' was separated from 'one' and both did not remain one, and the parts [were separated] from the whole. For from these [parts] Plato demonstrated that what exists is not one but more than one; and he demonstrated [the existence of] non-being from the otherness that is found among the
separate Forms; owing to which 'being' in that realm, when grasped according to a single individuating property, is being, but is not motion or rest. And each of the others is what it is, but is not the others. And it is clear that that [non-being] is certainly there, where both separation and otherness were manifested, among what is intellectual as a Form and among the perceptibles as spatial separation. Parmenides himself manifestly allows this non-being among the opinables, since he calls the ordering of words concerning mortal opinions 'deceptive'; and where there is deceit, there is non-being. For he is deceived who thinks that what is not is or that what is is not. Yet Parmenides is not alone in abolishing absolute non-being, but Plato does also, since he shuns the inquiry itself into it, when he says:

Then let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent that we mean by 'what is not', when we make bold to say that 'what is not' exists. So far as any contrary of the existent is concerned, we have long ago said good-bye to the question whether there is such a thing or not and whether any account can be given of it or none whatsoever. But with respect to the 'what-is-not' that we have now asserted to exist, an opponent must either convince us that our account is wrong by refuting it, or, so long as he proves unable to do that, he must accept our statements.17

It is in no way surprising to demonstrate [that] this sort of non-being [is found] in this sort of being, which is demarcated with respect to a single individuating property, although not even this sort of non-being has a place in the being which is intelligible, wholly-complete, and is all things before all things as a unity18. Aristotle, however, producing his refutation on the basis of dicho-
tomy, either, he says, 'being' is used in many ways and thus it will be many, or in one way only, and [it is] either substance or accident\textsuperscript{19}. And it is clear that none of these things is appropriate to the intelligible, since this division is manifest in [the realm of] coming to be, and if at all, it is causally precontained in the intellectual division. But let no one censure Plato and Aristotle for refuting the conceptions of other men. For they are benevolent in the way they set forth earlier\textsuperscript{20} misunderstandings; since the fact that they think that Parmenides is wise, Plato makes clear by testifying to the "altogether noble depth" of the man's intelligence\textsuperscript{21}, and by relating him as Socrates's teacher of the most sublime knowledge\textsuperscript{22}, and Aristotle by elsewhere supposing that he "in some places has insight"\textsuperscript{23}, and by putting him in contradistinction to the physicists\textsuperscript{24}. Whereas Plato spoke of this one being in his \textit{Parmenides}\textsuperscript{25}, proclaiming its preeminence, as did Aristotle in the \textit{Metaphysics}, contending that it is one and shouting "the rule of many is not good"\textsuperscript{26} -- before him he [Parmenides] proclaimed its unity and well observed that there intellect, intelligible, substance, potentiality, and actuality are the same. But enough of these matters lest we seem to someone "to leap beyond the furrows", as the saying goes\textsuperscript{27}, by inserting the most sublime elements of first philosophy into a work on nature.

Notes to \textit{in Phys} 142.28 -- 148.24

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. \textit{in Phys} 133.21-29.
2 Cf. note 4 to translation of *Phys* 52.8-53.7, p. 306.

3 Cf. note 2 to translation of *Phys* 28.32-31.17, p. 289.

4 The text here (143.20-21) is probably corrupt.

5 Cf. *Sophist* 258d1 ff.


7 Diels’s suggestion of πέρας τι for πέρατι is here adopted; cf. note ad 144.22.


9 Guthrie (pp. 26-27), following DK, adopts πέρατον for Simplicius’s πέρατον (B 8.14).

10 Guthrie (pp. 26-27), following DK and others, reads ἐπείτ' ὀπλοῦτο ἐόν for Simplicius’s ἐπείτα πέλοι τὸ ἐόν (B 8.19).

11 Cf. note 6 to translation of *Phys* 37.12-40.21, p. 298.

12 Cf. note 4 to translation of *Phys* 28.32-31.17, p. 289.

13 Guthrie (pp. 39-40) thinks that the verse (B 8.36) is probably corrupt and adopts the reading of DK.

14 Guthrie (pp. 43-44) adopts οὖν ἐόν of the Aldine (and DK) for οὖτ' ἐόν in Simplicius (B 8.46).

15 188a20-22.

16 Omitting τὸ with D (note ad 147.14).


18 Cf. *Phys* 88.5-8.
19 Cf. 185a20-187a11.

20 Emending the meaningless γενομένας (148.12) to γενομένας: cf. in Phys 36.25-27.

21 Theaetetus 184a1.

22 This appears to be a general reference to the Parmenides.


24 Cf. 184b15-18, in Phys 41.5-6, 148.26-149.2.

25 128a8-b1. Simplicius may have the whole second hypothesis (142b1-155e3) in mind.

26 Metaphysics Α 1076a4.

27 Cf. Cratylus 413a7-b1.
Parmenides, too, demonstrated that real being is uncreated since it neither comes to be from being (for there was nothing existent before it) nor from non-being; for it must come to be from something; but non-being is nothing. And the cause of the absolute necessity of what comes to being to come from being Parmenides set forth in a wondrous way. For in short, he says, if [it comes to be] from non-being, what is the arbitrary selection\(^2\) for its having come to be then when it did come to be, but not sooner or later? And he writes as follows:

For what birth of it wilt thou seek? How and from what did it grow? I shall not allow thee to say or to think 'from what is not', for it is not to be said or thought that 'it is not'. And what need would have prompted it to grow later or sooner, beginning from nothing? (B 8.6-10)

Notes to *in Phys* 162.11 - 22

\(^1\) Cf. 187a26-29

\(^2\) τίς ἓν ἀποκλήσσων. *LSJ s.v.* II, p. 202, translates this phrase "what is there unreasonable in . . . "; the sense here is nearly the opposite, e.g. "it is absurd that . . . ". 
in Phys 179.27 - 180.13

And he [Aristotle] proves that the principles are opposites -- evidently the elemental [principles] of physical objects -- first on the basis of the agreement among nearly all the physicists on this point, even if they disagree on everything else. For indeed those who say that being is one and motionless, as for example Parmenides, they too make the principles of physical objects opposites. "For indeed" he "makes hot and cold principles" in the Doxa. "And he calls them fire and earth" and light and night or darkness. For he says after the Aletheia:

They made up their minds to name two forms, of which it is not right to name one (it is in this that they have gone astray); and they adjudged them contrary in form and assigned marks apart from each other; on the one hand flaming heavenly Fire, very rare and light, in every direction the same as itself, but not the same as the other; and also that other, separate, the very opposite, blind Night, a dense and heavy form.  

(8 8.53-59)

And shortly afterwards again:

Then since all things have been named Light and Night, and the names appropriate to their powers assigned to these and those, everything is full alike of Light and obscure Night, both equal, since there is nothing that shares in neither.  (8 9.1-4)

And if nothing does not share in neither, it is clear that they both are principles and that they are opposites.

Notes to in Phys 179.27 - 180.13

1Cf. 188a19-22.

2Guthrie (p. 51) brackets ἔπιστη in B 8.57.
And Parmenides says that hot and cold [are principles more knowable by sense], but Alexander says that either it was he, who spoke of hot and cold, who said that they were moist and dry, or else it was Empedocles, who in addition to Love and Strife posited the four elements as principles.

Notes to \textit{in Phys} 188.28 - 31

\footnote{Cf. 188b30-189a7.}
That he rightly placed absence in addition to matter among the principles he demonstrates from the fact that some ancient philosophers, who did not understand it [absence], abolished coming to be and perishing, since they were defeated by one dilemma, and encountered other absurdities. And by first in philosophy he does not mean only those who preceded in time, but rather those who in the first instance investigated truth. He does not now speak of all of them, but rather of as many as tried to abolish coming to be. They are divided into two, or rather three camps. For some of them said that what exists is one and uncreated; others said that there are many existent things, but that they remain in existence when separated out -- abolishing coming to be, as for example Anaximander and Anaxagoras; some produced coming to be by the combination and separation of the primary elements, as for example Democritus and Empedocles. For coming to be does not exist, he says,

but only mingling and separation of what is mingled.

These men abolished coming to be, he says, constrained by a dilemma, which they could not resolve. It is resolved by positing those kinds of physical principles which we have posited. And when he has first set out the dilemma, having been thrust away by which from the way that leads to the truth they tried to abolish coming to be, and the absurdity that follows from the dilemma, he thereupon adds its solution. And the dilemma is as follows: it is necessary that what comes to be come to be from either being or non-being; if both are impos-
sible, coming to be could not exist; it is clear that both are im-
possible; for neither does being come to be from being (for being
already exists prior to its having come to be), nor from non-being
(for there must be something from which [it came into being]), and in
a word non-being is nothing. The dilemma is of this sort. He adds
the immediate consequence:

So too they exaggerated the consequence of this, and went
so far as to deny even the existence of a plurality of
things, maintaining that only Being itself is. Such then
was their opinion, and such the reason for its adoption.⁴

Defeated by the dilemma, as some seem, into which the concept of
being and non-being had led them, which realizes that being proper
and non-being proper alone exist and do not exist⁵, the dilemma pro-
gressed to its seeming conclusion⁶. And this is that being is one,
as Melissus and Parmenides said, who say that what is besides being
is non-being. For if existents should be more than one, it is clear
that they both differ from one another and that their difference will
exist besides being; and if there should be anything besides what is,
it will either be existent or non-existent. But it is impossible
either that what is besides being be existent or that what is non-
existent exist. He deduced that the claim that being is one is more
absurd than the claim that coming to be does not exist, and that
this had occurred to them because of their dilemma⁷.

Notes to in Phys 235.12 - 236.12

⁴ Cf. 191a23-34.
2 Empedocles, 31 B 8.3. Translation from Guthrie, p. 140.

3 Simplicius, along with EJ, has ὑποτάκτης for the ὑποτάκτης 'inexperience' (of FIVPT) adopted by Ross in 191a26-27.


6 The reading of a τῇ ὑποτάκτῃ προκήλθεν is preferable; "and in their dilemma advanced to the seeming conclusion".

7 The Greek is obscure here (236.11-12).
in Phys 242.17 - 244.21

Whether the nature of absence is [the nature] of matter, which
had it been seen would have resolved every dilemma; or [the nature]
of per se and per accidens and of 'in potentiality' and 'in actual-
ity'; or [the nature] of both taken together (for the one [exists] in
virtue of the other); this nature, he [Aristotle] says, some did not
grasp at all — all those who make being one or all those who say
that all things exist beforehand in actuality, and without exception
all those who abolish coming to be — while some grasped it "but not
sufficiently". Indeed he seems to say these things in reference
to Plato. For he himself, saying in the Timaeus that matter is not
a thing that actually exists, when he says that what underlies the
Forms could not be
duly prepared unless it is free from all those characters
which it is to receive from elsewhere,
seems to have grasped in some way or other both matter and absence/
lack (στέρησις); for that which is naturally disposed to receive or
not, but does not possess, could properly be said 'to lack' (ἐστερη-
σθαι). Plato is manifestly the first to have distinguished both
'in potentiality and in actuality' and 'per se and per accidens',
and 'in one way being, but in another non-being', as was stated
before. Indeed, in addition to the rest [of these distinctions]
Plato precisely defined things that are used in many ways, as even
Eudemus in his Physics testifies when he says, "For Plato, by intro-
ducing ambiguity, resolved many dilemmas concerning things". For
these reasons, then, Plato could have grasped this sort of nature.
But he does not seem to have sufficiently grasped it in two ways, one of which is the extent to which he agrees to Parmenides's statement that being is one. For to this extent he produces coming to be out of absolute non-being and \textit{qua} non-being. For it is not possible, if being is one, that there is something else that is existent \textit{per se}, but is non-existent \textit{per accidens}, and is existent in potentiality, but is non-existent in actuality, from which things that come to be will exist. For everything that is not that simply does not exist. For that which is besides being is non-being; non-being is nothing; that alone is being; therefore by approving of Parmenides's statement that being is one, [Plato] himself produces coming to be out of absolute non-being.

Thus do nearly all of the commentators explain the text on the assumption that Plato agrees to Parmenides's statement that being is one. And this surprises me: for in the \textit{Sophist} he clearly objected to Parmenides's statement, which states that being is one, with a host of criticisms; the criticisms were previously stated in the objections to Parmenides\textsuperscript{6}, but to refresh out memory let us now set forth their conclusion, which is as follows:

\begin{quote}
And countless other difficulties, each involved in measureless perplexity, will arise, if you say that the real is either two things or only one.\textsuperscript{7}
\end{quote}

However, Aristotle by no means said that they agree that \textit{something} without qualification comes to be from non-being, insofar as they agree that Parmenides speaks correctly. Accordingly, perhaps he is censuring him [Plato] for admitting the minor premiss of Parmenides,
which states that 'what is besides being is non-being', and on the
basis of this agrees that non-being exists. For he says that that
which is other than beautiful, since it is besides what is beautiful,
is non-beautiful, and that that which is other than large, since it
is besides what is large, is non-large, and adding other [examples]
of this sort concludes:

So, it seems, when a part of the nature of the Different
and a part of the nature of the Existent (Existence) are
set in contrast to one another, the contrast is, if it be
permissible to say so, so much a reality as Existence it-
self; it does not mean what is contrary to 'existent',
but only what is different from the Existent. -- That is
quite clear. -- What name are we to give it, then? --
Obviously this is just that 'what-is-not' which we were
seeking for the sake of the Sophist. 8

It is clear that Parmenides had absolute non-being in sight when he
abolished non-being, since he says,

For this shall never prevail, that things that are not
are, but do thou keep thy thought from this way of in-
quiry. 9 (B 7.1-2)

Plato, however, agreed to the minor premiss, looking to that non-
being which is due to otherness, but he objected to the major premiss,
which states that 'non-being is nothing'. But if this should be so,
Aristotle would not now be censuring Plato for saying that coming to
be [arises] from absolute non-being, since he agrees that "Parmenides
speaks correctly". But neither does Plato concur that absolute non-
being exists, nor much less Parmenides. But perhaps we are being
too forceful in our assertion that Plato approves of Parmenides's
statement that non-being exists. For even if he concurs with the
minor premiss, which states that 'what is besides being is non-be-
ing', yet it is not as if Parmenides posits non-being. For he concludes that non-being is nothing. And in short, since he refutes Parmenides on the grounds that he indiscriminately abolises non-being, he himself introduced non-being in the Sophist. Consequently, lest the commentators be making their explanations in an irrelevant way, perhaps let us say that Aristotle here has referred to what Plato says in the dialogue Parmenides, where Plato seems to marvel at Parmenides's assumption and demonstration that being is one. It is clear that he proves that this being is really many, by carefully examining it with respect to one or the other orders. But I have written these things dizzy with consternation; if anyone should account in a less forced way [for] how Plato says that coming to be [arises] from non-being, because he agrees that "Parmenides speaks well", he prevails as a friend, not a foe.

Notes to in Phys 242.17 - 244.21

1 Cf. 191b35-192a2.

2 Cf. 191b33-34.

3 50d6-e1. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 186.

4 in Phys 239.3-5.


6 in Phys 88.30-90.20.

7 245d12-e2. Translation from Cornford, Plato's Theory of
Knowledge, p. 227.


10 Cf. 128a8 ff..
Therefore Antiphon seemed in a general way to call the substrate 'nature' (ἡ φύσις), while each of the rest also called whatever he said was the primary substrate 'the nature' of things that are; whether this was one, as for instance Thales said water [was the primary substrate], Anaximenes air, Heraclitus fire, or more than one, as for example Parmenides fire and earth, or the four, as for example Empedocles. But no one said that earth alone [was the primary substrate], but Aristotle inserted this as well out of analogy with the rest.

Notes to in Phys 274.20 - 26

1 Cf. 193a9-28.
If whatever is whole and perfect is finite, Parmenides made a better declaration than Melissus about being. For Melissus, having said that it is infinite, also says that it is whole. On the other hand, Parmenides, saying that it is a whole, as "from the centre equal" (B 8.43) makes clear, (for that which has a center and stands at an interval equal from it in every direction assuredly has an extremity also); saying then that it is a whole he properly says that it is finite also. But Melissus combines what is contradictory. For if what is infinite is a whole, and what is whole finite, what is infinite would be finite. Therefore, he who says that what is infinite is a whole and a sum interweaves things that are not by nature to be interwoven; for there is a proverb said of these things.

Notes to in Phys 502.3 - 12

1 Cf. 206b33-207a18.
And that this argument, which introduces void on the basis of motion, was ancient is confirmed by that fact that Melissus, employing as obvious the hypothetical syllogism which states 'if being moves, it moves through void', and then assuming in addition that 'however, void does not exist', concludes 'therefore being does not move'. That Melissus propounds the argument in approximately this way is clear. But he propounds it not concerning corporeal nor even particularized being, but rather about intelligible and quite-complete [being]. For he maintains that this is one and motionless, proving 'motionless', I believe, because it is all things and there is nothing besides it, towards which it will depart through void; for the void is not there [in intelligible being], and perhaps not even otherness, if it is all things. Non-being does not have a place in absolute being. For even if otherness is there, due to which the Forms are separated from one another, nevertheless otherness too is an existent thing. The void does not have a place in absolute being, just as non-being too does not.

But do thou keep thy thought from this way of inquiry, the great Parmenides says.

Notes to in Phys 649.35 - 650.14

1 Cf. 213b4-15.

2 Cf. 30 B 7.7 (DK I.272.3-273.3).
Thirdly, [he concludes] that he who says that all things are at rest not only abolishes nature and things in nature, nor even makes an attack against the physicist alone, but also against all the crafts and the applied sciences -- evidently those which operate with motion; for theoretical knowledge requires some physical motion. Wherefore, having said "against all the sciences" he added "so to speak". And he opposes "all the opinions" of physicists or even of all men "because they all employ motion". And one must observe from this passage also, so I suppose, that Aristotle by no means believes that those who follow Parmenides and Melissus hold the opinion that the whole of being is motionless, but rather only real and intelligible being.

Notes to in Phys 1195.6 - 15

\(^1\)Cf. 252a32-b2.
If someone says that all these matters also are connected with bodies, nevertheless the discussion concerning space, time, and void would fall outside of things of this sort; likewise too that [discussion] concerning what is not physical but raises physical questions -- concerning which he spoke in the first book of the *Physics* in his discussion of Parmenides and Melissus. At the same time the holders of the theory of which we are speaking do incidentally raise physical questions, though Nature is not their subject; therefore, the discussion of these matters also falls somewhat outside of bodies.

Notes to *in Cael* 7.20 - 26

1 Cf. 268a1-6.

2 184b25-187a11.

For if something should come to be, they say, from absolute non-being, it will result that non-being exists; for it has changed into being. But if someone says that things that come to be come to be from non-being in the way that a ship does from [planks] of wood, i.e. from non-being itself as the substrate for what comes to be and changing into it, it will in truth result that non-being exists. But I do not suppose that anyone so lacks wits that he posits that there is coming to be from non-being in this manner, but rather insofar as each of the things that come to be comes to be though in no way existing prior, it was brought forth into being. ¹

Indeed, either I totally fail to understand what he is saying in these remarks or else he manifestly understands the statements of the ancients in a non-sensical way. For neither did anyone try to reduce the claim that there is coming to be from non-being to this absurdity — that non-being exists, but rather into the claim that nothing can come to be from non-being because non-being is inefficient. For believing that what comes to be comes to be both from a substrate, as it were, and because of an efficient cause, they properly said that nothing comes to be from non-being as an element or as from an efficient cause. For indeed Parmenides, the first of whom we know by report to propound this argument in his verses about the uncreatedness of being, writes the following:

> For what birth of it wilt thou seek?  
> How and from what did it grow? I shall not allow thee to say or think 'from what is not', for it is not to be said or thought 'it is not'. (B 8.6-9)

And Aristotle also sets forth the dilemma as follows:

> So they say that none of the things that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, because what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible. For what is cannot come to
be (because it is already), and from what is not nothing could have come to be (because something must be present as a substratum). 2

Who then is the man who reduces [their claim] into this absurdity -- that non-being changes into being?

Notes to in Cael 136.18 – 137.12

1 Johannes Philoponus, from VI Librorum τῶν πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (περὶ ἀιώνιτημα κόσμου); cf. Index Nominum s.v. p. 771. Several parenthetical uses of ὄνειρα have been omitted to produce a continuous quotation (in Cael 136.20, 23).

in Cael 139.23 - 140.9

Whereas this man\(^1\), having defeated, as he supposes, the more powerful of Aristotle's statements concerning the uncreatedness of the universe, immediately undertakes to shake the credibility of the common beliefs and perception of men as well, come let us consider his preparations against these statements also. Now since Aristotle states that all men, whether Greek or barbarian, allot the upper place to the deity, because the immortal is linked with the immortal\(^2\), but shortly afterwards relating the opinions of his predecessors concerning the composition of the universe and saying,

That the world was generated all are agreed, but, generation over, some say that it is eternal, others say that it is destructible \(<\text{like any other natural formation.}\>\> Others again, with Empedocles of Acragas and Heraclitus of Ephesus, believe that there is alteration in the destructive process, which takes place now this direction, now that, and continues without end,\(^3\) this man believes a feast has been set for himself in that he [Aristotle], using the testimony of the common man, shortly afterwards introduces famous philosophers as offering contradictory testimony on the heavens\(^4\). Yet, if with regard to the claim that what exists is one he had both cited the common assumption that maintains that what exists is more than one and had undertaken to correct the doctrine of Parmenides and Melissus, it would be wholly, I think, characteristic of the dull-witted to say that believing the common assumption to be true he objected to the outward expressions of these men lest those men, who pay rather superficial attention to their doctrines and who are unable to grasp their profundity, not be
confounded in the face of the parts of their doctrines that are so clear.

Notes to in Cael 139.23 - 140.9

1 Johannes Philoponus, from VI Librorum τῶν πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (περὶ άιδιότητος κόσμου); cf. Index Nominum s.v. p. 771.


3 279b12-17 (the text quoted here (139.31-34) is a truncated version of this). Translation from J.L. Stocks, De Caelo, p. 419 (McKeon).

4 Cf. Sophist 251b5-c6.
He [Aristotle] divided the opinions about coming to be in a four-fold manner: 1) some totally do away with coming to be, saying that all things that are are uncreated because there is no knowledge of things that are created and perishable, since they are always in flux, as Parmenides and Melissus seemed to say; 2) some, in direct opposition to them, as for example Hesiod, who says that even the very first of things [that are] according to him came to be:

Verily Chaos came to be first of all; (Theogony 116)

3) some say that everything else comes to be, but they say that the one, common underlying thing alone is uncreated, from which everything else comes to be, as for example Heraclitus; 4) some say that no body is uncreated, but that all things come to be, by composition from plane figures. He first discusses those who follow Melissus and Parmenides. The former says that there is no coming to be at all, but Parmenides says that there is none in truth but there is in seeming. For this reason he [Aristotle] added "but only seem to us". "And these men," he says, "even if they say everything else well" -- for in reality 'well' and divinely they understood matters relating to the one being and the intelligible nature and also revealed to their followers that there cannot be knowledge of things that are subject to coming to be and motion, insofar as they are always in flux -- "still it is necessary to believe that they do not speak as physicists at any rate" since their philosophy is concerned with metaphysical things. "For the claim that some of the things that
are uncreated and wholly without motion" — which is precisely what they were trying to prove — "belongs to another [inquiry]", first philosophy, to prove and not "to the inquiry into nature", because nature is a principle of motion, and by abolishing motion they abolish both nature and natural objects. And yet someone might say, 'what is there to prevent them from not being called 'physicists' nor again being refuted as physicists?' Is it because both Melissus and Parmenides entitled their works On Nature? But this would not be sufficient; for indeed the word 'nature' was common, insofar as people venture to speak even of 'god's nature' and we speak of 'the nature of things that are'; and moreover they did not in these works discourse about metaphysics only, but about physics also, and perhaps for this reason did not avoid using the title On Nature. No, the point on which Aristotle censures them, when he confutes the cause of their error, would be really harsh, if in fact it were true. For these men he says supposing that nothing else besides the substance of the perceptibles is found in actual existence, but being the first to understand that there must be some such uncreated and motionless natures, if in fact there is scientific thought — for of things that are always in flux there is no knowledge, and even in Plato Parmenides says, 'nor will someone have a place to direct his thoughts to unless eternal Forms are posited to exist' — having understood these things then they transferred to things that are perceptible and created these statements which are appropriate to things that are intelligible and motionless, if in fact undertaking
to speak about nature the say what is appropriate to these other things. And if Melissus did use the title On Nature or On Being, it is clear that he believed that nature was being and that things that are are things in nature, i.e. the perceptibles. And perhaps in this way Aristotle said they assume that nothing else besides the substance of perceptible things -- when they say that being is one; for since what is perceptible clearly seems to be, if being is one, there would be nothing else besides this. And Melissus says:

To be <infinite> it must be one; for it there were two, they could not be infinite but would have limits in relation to [or be limited] by one another,3

and Parmenides:

whole, unique, immovable, and without end.4 (B 8.4)

But Aristotle, as is his custom, even in the present case has attacked the apparent meaning in statements, taking thought that the more superficial not be fallaciously misled; but those men posited a two-fold reality -- the one of being, the intelligible, and the other of what comes to be, the perceptible, which they did not deem worthy to call 'being' without qualification, but rather 'seeming being'; wherefore he says that truth is concerned with being, but seeming with what comes to be. At any rate Parmenides says:

It is meet for thee to learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth and also what seems to mortals, in which there is no true conviction. Nevertheless these things too shalt thou learn, namely that what seems had assuredly to exist, being indeed everything.5 (B 1.28-32)

Further, once he has completed the account about real being and on the point of giving an explanation concerning the perceptibles, he
Here I cease the trustworthy account and thought concerning truth. From this point learn the opinions of mortals, listening to the deceitful pattern of my words. (B 8.50-52)

And having related the ordering of the perceptibles he again added:

Thus in appearance these things came into being and now are and having matured will come to an end in the future; and for them men have assigned a name to distinguish each one. (B 19.1-3)

How then did Parmenides assume that only perceptibles exist? (It is superfluous to quote here the sort of arguments he made in his discussion of the intelligible.) And how did he transfer things that are appropriate to the intelligibles to the perceptibles -- who separately related the unity of intelligible and real being, and separately [related] the ordering of the perceptibles in a clear manner and does not deem it worthy to call what is perceptible by the name 'being'? Moreover, Melissus, since he wrote in prose, still more clearly set forth his own opinion on these matters, both throughout his philosophy, but most of all in these statements; for having said about being that it is one, uncreated, and motionless, and separated by no void, but is wholly full of itself, concludes:

This argument, then, is the greatest proof that it is one alone; but the following are proofs of it also. If there were a plurality, things would have to be of the same kind as I say that the one is. For if there is earth and water, and air and fire, and iron and gold, and if one thing is living and another dead, and if things are black and white and all that men say they really are -- if that is so, and if we see and hear aright, each one of these must be such as we first decided, and they cannot be changed or altered, but each must be always just as it is. But, as it is, we say that we see and hear and understand aright, and yet we believe that what
is warm becomes cold, and that what is cold warm; that what is hard turns soft, and what is soft hard; that what is living dies, and that things are born from what lives not; and that all those things are changed, and that what they were and what they are now are in no way alike. We think that iron, which is hard, is rubbed away by contact with the finger; and so with gold and stone and everything that we fancy to be strong, and that earth and stone are made out of water; so that it turns out that we neither see nor know realities. Now these things do not agree with one another. We said that there were many things that were eternal and had forms and strengths of their own, and yet we fancy that they all suffer alteration, and that they change from what we see each time. It is clear, then, that we did not see aright after all, nor are we right in believing that all these things are many. They would not change if they were real, but each thing would be just what we believed it to be; for nothing is stronger than true reality. But if it has changed, what is has passed away and what is has come into being. So then, if there were a plurality, things would have to be of just the same nature as the one.

This man, then, clearly even stated the reason why they say that perceptibles do not exist, but only seem to exist. How then could someone suppose that they believe that what is perceptible alone exists? But they also abolish coming to be from real being; for of this both Parmenides said:

Thus becoming is extinguished, and perishing not to be heard of, (B 8.21)

and Melissus as Parmenides; however, they clearly speak of coming to be for the perceptibles, Melissus in these words, "what is warm becomes cold" and what follows . . . "earth and stone are made out of water"8, and with regard to the perceptibles Parmenides says that they had a beginning, for he says9,

How earth and sun and moon and aither common to all and the Milky Way and highest Olympus and the hot force of the stars started to come into being, (B 11.1-4)
and he relates the coming to be of things that come into being and pass away down to the parts of animals. And it is clear that Parmenides did not fail to know that he was created, just as he by no means [failed to know] that he had two feet when he said that being is one. But what Aristotle stated well in the *Metaphysics*, "Parmenides seems perhaps <to speak> with rather more insight," we certainly must believe that Aristotle added after his refutation of the apparent meaning.

Alexander says that these men employ the following syllogism: things that are perceptible alone exist; there is knowledge of existent things; those things of which there is knowledge are motionless; therefore things that are perceptible are motionless. And following this argument, he says, they transferred what is truly said of motionless substances to things that are perceptible — unsoundly. Wherefore, it turned out that by speaking about things in nature not as scientists of nature they abolished nature.

Notes to *in Cael* 556.3 - 560.10

1Cf. 298b14-24.

2Cf. *Parmenides* 135b8-cl.

330 B 6. Translation from Guthrie, p. 106.

4Cf. note 5 to translation of *in Phys* 118.27-121.25, p. 347.

5Guthrie (p. 9) adopts the reading πέρι δ' ου for because it is better attested in the manuscripts of Simplicius (B 1.32). *DK*, however, retains πέρι ου of A; "passing through".
6 Cf. note 4 to translation of *Phys* 37.12-40.21, p. 298.

7 30 B 8. Translation from Kirk and Raven, pp. 304-305.

8 30 B 8.3. Translation from Kirk and Raven, p. 305.


10 Reading παραστάσις (559.27) with DEc.

Perhaps he omitted the other doctrines for the present because he produced a long discussion concerning them in the *Physics*.

Perhaps what is said with respect to other conceptions of Parmenides and Hesiod did not require a substantial reply; of the physicists one spoke of water, another air, another fire, another what is intermediate.

Notes to *in Cael* 562.6 - 10

1 Cf. 298b24-299a2.

2 Cf. 187a12 ff..
This then is the end of the third book of the treatise De Caelo; let the following be a succinct summary of it. Since he has undertaken to discuss the simple bodies in the whole universe, once he has offered an account of the cyclophoric and eternal body throughout the first two books of his treatise, in this [book] he teaches about things which have rectilinear motion and are created. He first inquires whether coming to be exists or not, for some totally abolished coming to be by saying that being is uncreated, as for example Parmenides and Melissus. But some said there is coming to be for all things without exception, as for example Hesiod; and some [say that there is coming to be] for all bodies, as for example those who fashion bodies out of plane figures.

Notes to De Caelo

1Cf. 298b14-24.
And the statement "or more than one but only opposites" can comprise both those who speak of the void and the full, and of those who speak of fire and earth, as for example Parmenides, and those who speak of the dense and the rare, and those who explain coming to be by means of the multitude and fewness of plane figures.

Notes to in Cael 691.4 - 7

1 Cf. 309b29-310a3.
in Categories 3.30 - 4.9

Well then the schools of philosophy are named in seven ways:
1) from him who established the school, e.g. the Pythagoreans and Platonists; 2) from the native land of the leader of the school, e.g. those [named] from [the native land of] Aristippus are Cyrenaics, those from Euclides Megarians, and those from Xenophanes and Parmenides Eleatics; 3) from the locale in which they pursued the study of philosophy, e.g. the Academics and Stoics; 4) from an incidental activity, e.g. the Peripatetics; 5) from their judgement as regards philosophy, e.g. those [named] from Pyrrho are 'Withholders' ('Εκκριτικοί); 6) from the goal they propose of their philosophy, e.g. the Epicureans [are named] Hedonists; 7) from their form of life, e.g. the Cynics ['Canines']. For the goal at which they aim and the form of their lifestyle are different; for the Epicureans were not hunting after pleasure through pleasure, but rather most of all through exertions and self-control.
And it is well that he [Aristotle] did not take up negation anywhere in these remarks but only assertion, because, just as Parmenides says that non-being is not be observed anywhere among the intelligibles, so too the most sublime substance of the soul and the activity which exists in virtue of its substance, being full of themselves, do not afford space for non-being.

Notes to *in De Anima* 260.21 – 26

1Cf. 430b26–29.
Appendix B: Simplicius's Quotations from Parmenides

The order and line numbers of the fragments are those of DK. Unless marked in Cael, all references are to in Phys. (A = Aristotle Physics; E = Eudemus Physica; P = Plato Sophist; on B 8.38 see pp. 259-260.)

B 1
25
26
27 in Cael
28 557.25
29 557.26
30 557.27
31 558.1
32 558.2

B 2
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3 116.28
4 116.29
5 116.30
6 116.31
7 116.32
8 117.1
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Appendix C:

Verses of Parmenides, with variant readings, quoted by Simplicius, as reported in CAG VII, IX.

For the sigla see CAG VII pp. V-X, XIV; CAG IX pp. V-IX, XII-XXII. Emendations by Diels's and Heiberg's predecessors, e.g. Stein and Karsten, are not presented here. Unless marked in Cael, all references are to in Phys.

B 1.28 - 32

in Cael

557.25 χρεώ δὲ σε πάντα πυθόσαι,

557.26 ἡμὲν ἀλήθειας εὐθυκλεός ἄτρεμης ἦτορ

557.27 ἤδε βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνι πίστις ἀληθῆς·

558.1 ὁλ' ἐπιθής καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα

558.2 χρὴν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ πάντος πάντα περὶντα.

25 χρεώδες ἑπαντά Α

26 ἡμὲν D: εἰ μὲν ΑΕ εὐθυκλεός DE:

εὐθυκλεός Α

27 ἢδὲ ἢ δὲ E: εἰ δὲ E2

1 μαθήσοντα DE: μαθήσοντα Α: μαθήσομαι Φc

2 χρὴν DE: χρὴν A: χρὴ c εἶναι ABDEF:

σὲ ἑναὶ c περὶντα Α: περὶ δυντα DEF
417

Β 2.3 – 8

116.28 ἦ μὲν ὅπως ἦτο τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἦτο μὴ εἶναι
116.29 πειδοῦχος ἦτο λέγετος (ἀληθείᾳ γὰρ ὁμηρεῖ)
116.30 ἦ δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἦτο τε καὶ ὡς χρείαν ἦτο μὴ εἶναι
116.31 τὴν δὴ τοι τράχω παντευθέα δὲμεν ἀτατικόν.
116.32 οὗτε γὰρ ἃν γνοίης τὸ γε μὴ ἔδω (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν)
117.1 οὗτε φάσαις.

28 ἦμεν α
31 παντευθέα δὲ aEF (cf. Hom.γ 88): παραπέφεκα D: δὲμεν αΕ
32 δὲ om. F ἀνυστόν λιβρι cf. 31 B 12.2

Β 6.1 – 2

86.27 χρῆ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἔδω δὲμεν τι ἢν ἦτο τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι,
86.28 μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἦτον.
27 τε νοεῖν λιβρι τε οὐ F: τὸ δὲν aDE
28 μηδέν δὲ λιβρι

117.4 ἦτο γὰρ εἶναι,
117.5 μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἦτο, τὰ γ' ἐγὼ φανερωθαί ἀνυγα,

5 μηδὲν δ' α: μὴ δὲ οἷς D: μὴ δεόν δ' E:
μὴ δὲ οἷς Ε: δέμεν DEF: εἶναι α
τὰ γ' ἐγὼ D: τὰ γε F: τοῦ ἐγὼ E: τὰ σε a
B 6.3 - 7

117.6 πρώτης γάρ σ' άρ' ὅσον ταύτης διζήσιος <εἰργα>,
117.8 αὐτῷ ἐπείτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν ὦ βροτοί εἰδότες οὐδέν
117.9 πλάττονται δίκρανοι· ἄμυξανίη γάρ ἐν αὐτών
117.10 στήθεσιν ἵθελει πλαγιτόν νόσυν. οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται
117.11 καρποὶ ὅμοιος τυφλοὶ τε τεθησίτες ἀρωτα φίλα,

6 δ' DEF: om. a post διζήσιος supplevit
Diels εἰργα, ἐπάγει: εἰργε νόμια ἐπάγει sup-
plevit a ex 78.6
9 πλάττονται DEF: πλάζονται a ἄμυξανίη D
10 πλαγιτῶν DF1 νόσου νόμον E
11 ὅμοιος EF te om. F

B 6.8 - 9

78.3 οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταύτων νενόμισται
78.4 κοῦ ταύτων,
4 κοῦλ καὶ οὐ

117.12 οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταύτων νενόμισται
117.13 κοῦ ταύτων, πάντων δὲ παλιντροπὸς ἔστι πέλευσις.

B 7.1

135.21 οὐ γάρ μηποτε τοῦτο δαμή εἶναι μὴ δοντα,
21 apud Sophist 258d2 τοῦτο δαμὴ εἶναι μὴ δοντα
E: τοῦτο μηδεμία εἶναι μὴ δοντα D: in lac. om F:
tόγε μὴ ὁν οίδον τε εἶναι a Parmenidí dandum
μὴ ἔόντα (Diels)

143.31  οὗ γὰρ μὴποτε τοῦτο δαμὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα,

31  τοῦτο δαμὴ Δ: τοῦτου εὐδαμή (οὐδαμὴ F) αF

244.1  οὗ γὰρ μὴποτε τοῦτο δαμὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.

1  τοῦτο δαμὴ E: τοῦτο μηδαμή D: τοῦτο εὐδαμή

F: τόγε μηδαμή α ὄντι α

B 7.2

78.6  ἄλλα οὗ τήδε' ἄφ' ὄσοι διζήσιος εἰργε νόημα,

6  ἄλλα οὗ om. (lac. X litt. rel.) F λέγων post

σι add. α τήδε' ἄφ' ὄσοι ADF: τήδε' ἄφ'

ὀσοί E διζήσιως E

135.22  ἄλλα οὗ τήδε' ἄφ' ὄσοι διζήσιος εἰργε νόημα.

22  apud Sophist 238d3

144.1  ἄλλα οὗ τήδε' ἄφ' ὄσοι διζήσιος εἰργε νόημα.

1  εἰς γε νόημα E post νόημα habet οὗ γὰρ ἄνευ

τοῦ ἔόντος τούτεστι τοῦ νοητοῦ F

244.2  ἄλλα οὗ τήδε' ἄφ' ὄσοι διζήσιος εἰργε νόημα.

650.13  ἄλλα οὗ τήδε' ἄφ' ὄσοι διζήσιος εἰργε νόημα,

13  διζήσιως F εἰργε a et si silentio fides EF

B 8.1

78.8  μοῦνος δ' ἔτι μῆδος ὄσοιο

8  μοῦνος ΔE: μόνος αF δ' ἔτι a: δὲ τι DEF

142.34  μόνος δ' ἔτι μῆδος ὄσοιο
145.1 μόνον δ' ετὶ μόδος ἐδοιο
1 μόνον DE: μόνος aF δὲ τι

B 8.2

78.9 λείπεται, ὡς ἐστὶ. ταύτῃ δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔσοι
9 ἐπίσημα τ' D ἔσοι a

142.35 λείπεται ὡς ἐστὶ. ταύτῃ δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔσοι
35 ἔσοι a

145.2 λείπεται, ὡς ἐστὶ. ταύτῃ δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔσοι
2 ἔσοι a

B 8.3

30.1 ὡς ἀγένητον ἕων καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν,
a ἀγένητον ἔστι ἕων F

78.10 πολλὰ μύλα·

78.12 ὡς ἀγένητον ἕων καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν,
12 ἔστιν F: ἐν ἔστιν aDE

142.36 πολλὰ μύλ', ὡς ἀγένητον ἕων καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν.

145.3 πολλὰ μύλ', ὡς ἀγένητον ἕων καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν,

B 8.4

30.2 ὁμοιομυνεότας τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἢ στ' ἀτέλεστον,
2 μουσογενεῖς DE τε ομ. aF ἢ στ' ἀτέλεστον
aDE: ἢ δ' ἀτέλεστ' (ἀτέλεστον) B: ἢ ἀτέλεστον F

78.13 ὁμοιομυνεότας τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἢ στ' ἀτέλεστον,
13 τε ομ. α ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον D: ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον F:
   ή δι' ἀτέλεστον E: ἡδ' ἀτέλευτον a

120.23 οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ' ἀγένητον
23 μουνογενές D ἡδ' aF: ἡδέ D: ἡ δέ E

145.4 οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον.
   4 μουνογενές E

in Cael

557.18 οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ' ἀγένητον.
   18 μουνογενές ADEF

B 8.5

30.3 οὖδὲ ποτ' ἢν οὖδ' ἐσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοί πάν.
   3 οὖδὲ ἐσται E νῦν EEa: νῦν aD: οὖν F

78.14 οὖδὲ ποτ' ἢν οὖδ' ἐσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοί πάν
143.13 ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοί πάν,
145.5 οὖδὲ ποτ' ἢν οὖδ' ἐσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοί πάν

B 8.6

78.15 ἐν συνεχέσ: τίνα γὰρ γέννην διηθεσαί αὐτοῦ;
   15 διηθετεῖ τι F

145.6 ἐν συνεχέσ: τίνα γὰρ γέννην διηθεσαί αὐτοῦ;
   6 γενεθήν D διηθεσαί a: διηθετεῖ τι F: διηθεσθε
   ut vid. E (vox obl. in D)

162.18 τίνα γὰρ γέννην διηθεσαί αὐτοῦ;
   18 διηθεσθεῖ
in Cael
137.3 τίνα γάρ γένναν διξήσεις αὑτοῦ;
 A
3 διξήσεις

B 8.7
78.16 τῇ πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὕτ' ἐκ μὴ ἔντος εἶστω
16 ἔντος E: δῦντος aDF
145.7 τῇ πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὕτ' ἐκ μὴ δυντος εἶσα
 F
162.19 τῇ πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὕτ' ἐκ μὴ ἔντος εἶσα
19 δυντος a ἐςα F

in Cael
137.4 τῇ πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὕτ' ἐκ μὴ ἔντος εἶσα
4 οὕτε DE δυντος AB ἐςα D: ἐκεῖνου AB:
 ἐςα Ee

B 8.8
78.17 φάσθαι στ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν. οὗ γὰρ φατόν οὐδὲ νοητὸν
17 οὐ librī
145.8 φάσθαι στ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν. οὗ γὰρ φατόν οὐδὲ νοητὸν
162.20 φάσθαι στ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν. οὗ γὰρ φατόν οὐδὲ νοητὸν
20 στ' a: οὐ DEF

in Cael
137.5 φάσθαι στ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν. οὗ γὰρ φατόν οὐδὲ νοητὸν
5 στ' c: οὐ DE: & AB οὕτε c οὐλ οὐδὲ AB
B 8.9

78.18 ἐστὶν διὸς οὐκ ἔστι. τί δὲν μὴν καὶ χρέος ἄροιεν
145.9 ἐστὶν διὸς οὐκ ἔστι. τί δὲν μὴν καὶ χρέος ἄροιεν
162.21 ἐστὶν διὸς οὐκ ἔστι. τί δὲν μὴν καὶ χρέος ἄροιεν
21 οὐκ ἔστιν D

in Cael

137.6 ἐστὶν διὸς οὐκ ἔστι.

6 ad ὅπως mg. ἀλλὰς ὃ (?) ὅπως οὐκ ἔστιν E²

ἔστιν ἁπτ. seq. ras. 1 litt. E: comp. A

B 8.10

78.19 οὗτοι καὶ πρόσθεν τοῦ μηθενὸς ἀρξάμενον φῶς;
19 φῶν E: φῶ (ie. φωέν) F: φῶναι D: φῶναι a

145.10 οὗτοι καὶ πρόσθεν τοῦ μηθενὸς ἀρξάμενον φῶς;
10 μηθεμένος D αὐξάμενον E φῶν E: φῶν D:

φῶ (sequitum spatiu III litt.) F: φῶναι A

162.22 οὗτοι καὶ πρόσθεν τοῦ μηθενὸς ἀρξάμενον φῶς;
22 ἡθενὸς E φῶν DEF: φῶναι a

B 8.11

78.20 οὕτως ἃ πάμπιν πέλεναι χρεών ἐστὶν ἢ οὐχί,
20 πέλεναι sic librī οὐχί sic librī

145.11 οὕτως ἃ πάμπιν πέλεναι χρεών ἐστὶν ἢ οὐχί.
11 πέλεναι sic πέλαινε D
οὐδὲ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ἑώντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἴσχύς
21 ἐκ μὴ ὄντος DE: ἐκ γε μὴ ὄντος aF: ἐκ πη ἑώντος
ex Simplicii paraphrasi vn. 27 efficias
ἐφίσει aE

γίνεσθαι τι παρ' αὐτῷ. τοῦ εἶνεκεν οὕτε γενέοθαι
22 γίνεσθαι] γενέοθαι a

γίνεσθαι τι παρ' αὐτῷ. τοῦ εἶνεκεν οὕτε γενέοθαι
13 γίνεσθαι DF

οὕτ' ὄλλοθαὶ ἄνηκε δίκη χαλάσσα αἰεδησιν.
23 οὕτ' ὄπολεόθαι coniecit Diels Herm. XV 162
πέδησιν EF Bergk: πέδησι aD: πέδησιν vulgo
145.14 οὕτ' ὄλλοθαὶ ἄνηκε δίκη χαλάσσα αἰεδησιν,
14 ὄλλοθαὶ E

Ἁ 8.15 - 20

ἀλλ' ἔχει.

ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῶ ἰδίᾳ ἐνεστὶν.
145.17 ἔστιν ἡ οὐκ ἔστιν· νάκριται δ' οὖν ἄπερ ἀνάγκη,
145.18. τὴν μὲν ἐὰν ἁνόητον, ἁνόνιμον (οὗ γὰρ ἄληθῆς ἢστὶν ὅδος), τὴν δὲ ἄπειτα πέλειν καὶ ἐπίτημον εἶναι.
145.19. πῶς δὲ ἢ πῶς ἢ ἃ πεῖτα πέλει τὸ ἐὰν, πῶς δὲ ἢ πῶς ἢ γένοιτο; εἰ γὰρ ἤγεντ' οὐκ ἢ ἐστ' οὐδ' εἰ ποτὲ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι.
145.20. νὴς EF ἢ δὲ κρίσις ——— ἐνεστὶν Simplicii esse vidit Stein in Symbola philol. p. 787 ἐνεστὶν EF: ἢστι aD
145.21. ἐςτὶν (ante ἢ) om. F
145.22. ἁνόητον F: ἁνόητον aDE
145.23. πέλειτο F καὶ aF: καὶ DE eι γὰρ ἤγεντ' EF: eι γὰρ ἤγετ' D: eι γε γένοιτ' a οὐκ ἢ ἐστ' a: οὐκ ἢ ἐστὶν DF: om. E

B 8.21

145.22. τῶς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέβεβαι καὶ ἀπιστος διεβρικός.
22. τῶς D ἀπέβηκαν a ἀπιστος F: ἀπιστος DE: ἀπιστος a

in Caesal

559.17. γένεσις μὲν ἀπέβεβαι καὶ ἀπιστος διεβρικός.
17. ἀπεβαβαζη E: corr. E2 ἀπιστος A: ἀπιστος DE

B 8.22

86.24. ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἢστιν ὅμοιον.
143.3. οὐδὲ διαμετέχον ἢστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἢστιν ὅμοιον.
145.23. οὐδὲ διαμετέχον ἢστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἢστιν ὅμοιον.
23. διαμετέχον F
145.24 οὔδε τι τῇ μᾶλλον, τό κεν εἰργοι μὴν συνέχεσθαι,
145.25 οὔδε τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ' ἐμπεδον ἐστὶν ἄντος.
24 τῇ: τὴν Ἑ
25 δ' ἐμπεδον DEF: δὲ πλέον F: δὲ πλέον a

86.22 τῷ ξυνεκες πάν ἐστιν: ἐδώς γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
22 τῷ aF: τὸ DE
87.23 τῷ ξυνεκες πάν ἐστιν: ἐδώς γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
23 τῷ aF: τὸ DE
145.26 τῷ ξυνεκες πάν ἐστιν: ἐδώς γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
26 ξυνεκες Ἑ

39.27 αὐτόρ αἰνητον, ωρι, μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
27 ἀπαρο DE ἐμπείρου Ἑa
79.32 αὐτόρ αἰνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
145.27 αὐτόρ αἰνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
27 αἰνητον D

39.28 ἐστὶν ἀναρχον ἀπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ δλεθρος
80.1 ἐστὶν ἀναρχον ἀπαύστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ δλεθρος.
1 αναρχον καὶ ἀπαυστον aF
145.28 ἐστὶν ἀναρχον, ἀπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ δλεθρος
40.1 τὴς μαλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἀπείρα δὲ πίστις ὀληθῆς.
1 τὴς (τῇ δὲ Ε') libri constanter: restituit
2 τῆς Scaliger

80.2 τὴς μαλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν.
2 ἐπλάγχθησαν Ε

146.1 τὴς μαλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἀπείρα δὲ πίστις ὀληθῆς.
1 ἐπλάγχθησαν α: ἐπλάγχθησαν DEF

B 8.29
30.6 ταύτων τ' ἐν ταύτῳ τ' ἐν ταύτῳ τ' ἐν μένον καθ' ἑαυτό <τε> κεῖται.
6 ταύτων τ' ἐν Ε²: ταύτων τε ὑν ἐν αDF: ταύτων
tε ὑν καὶ ἐν E τε μένον aΕ²F: μένον καὶ
DE ἑαυτό (om. te) hic omnes libri

143.15 ταύτων ὑν ἐν ταύτῃ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται.
15 τῇ πρώτῃ μένον E τε κεῖται DE κεῖται a
et primum F qui iterum τε κεῖται correctum in
tε κεῖται

146.2 ταύτων τ' ἐν ταύτῳ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται.

B 8.30
30.7 οὕτω εἰμεθεν αὐθι μένει· κρατηρὶ γὰρ ἀνάγιη
7 αὐθις Εα

40.3 οὕτως εἰμεθεν αὐθι μένει· κρατηρὶ γὰρ ἀνάγιη
146.3 χοῦτως εἰμεθεν αὐθι μένει· κρατηρὶ γὰρ ἀνάγιη
3 χοῦτως DF: οὕχ οὕτως Ε: οὕτως a ut alias
30.8 πειρατός ἐν δεσμοίσιν ἔχει, τὸ μὲν ἀμφίς ἔργει,
     ἐξούν ἐὰν τέ μὲν hic liber amphiç (sic)
     εἰργεῖ ἐὰν.

40.4 πειρατός ἐν δεσμοίσιν ἔχει, τὸ μὲν ἀμφίς ἔργει,

146.4 πειρατός ἐν δεσμοίσιν ἔχει, τὸ μὲν ἀμφίς ἔργει,

4 τὸ μὲν DEF: τέ μὲν α.

B 8.32

30.9 οὕνεκεν οὖν ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι.
     ἀτελεύτητον τ' ἐὸν D: ἀτελεύτητον τ' ἐὸν E:
     τεῦν F

40.5 οὕνεκεν οὖν ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι.
     τ' ἐὸν D(?): et E

146.5 οὕνεκεν οὖν ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι.

B 8.33

30.10 ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιθεως: ἄ μὴ ἐὸν δὲ δὲν παντὸς ἔθειτο.
     ἐπιθεως DE μὴ ἐὸν κτλ. legit Simplicius cf.
     Stein ad h. v. p. 790 5ε DEF: γὰρ αF
     πάντως αD

40.6 ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιθεως: ἄ μὴ ἐὸν δὲ δὲν παντὸς ἔθειτο.

146.5 ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιθεως, μὴ δὲν δ' ἀν παντὸς ἔθειτο.
87.14  ταύτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκέν ἐστὶ νόημα.
14 οὐνεκέν E: οὗ ἐνεκα D: οὗ ἐνεκέν aF

143.22  ταύτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκέν ἐστὶ νόημα.
22 οὐνεκέν F: οὗ ἐνεκέν aDE

146.7  ταύτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκέν ἐστὶ νόημα.
7 οὐνεκέν E: οὐνεκέν DF: οὗ ἐνεκέν a

87.15  οὐ γὰρ ἀνευ τοῦ ἑόντος, ἐν ὃ πεφατισμένον ἐστιν,
15 πεφατισμένον DE

143.23  οὐ γὰρ ἀνευ τοῦ ἑόντος (τούτος τοῦ νοητοῦ), ἐν ὃ
23 πεφατισμένον D

146.8  οὐ γὰρ ἀνευ τοῦ ἑόντος, ἐν ὃ πεφατισμένον ἐστιν,

86.31  οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσται [πάρεξ]
31 γὰρ ἐστιν corruptum cf. 146.9

87.16  εὐφήσεις τὸ νοεῖν.
143.25  εὐφήσεις τὸ νοεῖν.
146.9  εὐφήσεις τὸ νοεῖν. οὐδ' ἐι χρόνος ἐστιν ἡ ἐσται
9 ἐσται] ἐστιν D
86.32 ἄλλο πάρεξ τού ἑόντος, ἑπεὶ τὸ γε μοῦρ' ἐπέδησεν
32 πάρεξ et post ἄλλο et ante ponunt DEF
146.10 ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἑόντος. ἑπεὶ τὸ γε μοῦρ' ἐπέδησεν

B 8.38
29.18* οἶον, ἄκινητον τελέσθη, τῷ πάντ' ὄνυμ' εἶναι.
18 οἶον libri. παντὶ ὄνυμα hic libri: πᾶν ὄνυμ' a
87.1 οἶον, ἄκινητόν τ' ἐμεναι· τῷ πάντ' ὄνυμ' ἔσται.
1 οἶον[1] ὄλον D τ' super add. D ἐμεναι libri τῷ πάντ' ὄνυμ' ἔσται a: τῷ πάντ' ὄνυμα ἔσται F: τῷ πάντ' ὄνυμα ἔσται E: τῷ πάντ' ὄνυμα ἔσται D
143.10* οἶον, ἄκινητον τελέσθη· τῷ πάντ' ὄνυμα εἶναι,
10 οἶον libri πάντ' scripsit Diels: πάντη
ADF: παντί E εἶναι om. aD
146.11 οἶον ἄκινητον τ' ἐμεναι. τῷ πάντ' ἡ ὄνυμα ἔσται
11 ἐμεναι a: ἐμεναι EF: ἐμενε D πάντ' ὄνυμα ἔσται DEF: πᾶν ὄνυμ' ἔστιν a

B 8.39 - 42
146.12 ἄρα βροτοὶ κατέδευτο πεποίθότες εἶναι ὀληθῇ,
146.13 γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ἐλλοθήσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ ὀλοθ:,
146.14 καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χρόνον ἀμείβειν.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πείρας πάματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί
12 ὁσα D
15 πείρας EF

B 8.43
52.23 πάντοθεν εὐκάλυπτος σφαίρης ἐναλίγκην ὑγκρ.
52.26 πάντοθεν εὐκάλυπτος σφαίρης ἐναλίγκην ὑγκρ.
26 apud Sophist σφαίρης aEF: σφαίρας D ἐναλίγκην F
89.22 πάντοθεν εὐκάλυπτος σφαίρης ἐναλίγκην ὑγκρ.
22 apud Sophist

126.22 πάντοθεν εὐκάλυπτος σφαίρης ἐναλίγκην ὑγκρ.
22 πάντοτε sic D
127.31 μεσόδενεν εὐκάλυπτος σφαίρης ἐναλίγκην ὑγκρ.
31 μεσόδενεν D
137.16 πάντοθεν εὐκάλυπτος σφαίρης ἐναλίγκην ὑγκρ.
143.6 πάντοθεν εὐκάλυπτος σφαίρης ἐναλίγκην ὑγκρ.
146.16 πάντοθεν, ἐυκάλυπτος σφαίρης ἐναλίγκην ὑγκρ.
146.30 εὐκάλυπτος σφαίρης ἐναλίγκην ὑγκρ.
30 ὑγκρ om. DE

B 8.44
52.27 μεσόδενεν ἴσοπαλές πάντη· τὸ γὰρ οὐτε τι μείζον
27 apud Sophist μεσόδενεν D γὰρ om. a
οὖκ ἐτι D

89.23 μεσοδθεν ἱσοπαλῆς πάντη· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
   23 apud Sophist τὸ γὰρ EF: τὸ γὰρ ad

107.26 μεσοδθεν ἱσοπαλῆς πάντη
   26 μέσοθθεν a: μέσοθθεν DEF

126.23 μεσοδθεν ἱσοπαλῆς.
   23 μεσοθθεν

133.27 μεσοδθεν ἱσοπαλῆς
   27 apud Eudemus μεσοθθεν DF ἱσοπαλῆς E

137.17 μεσοδθεν ἱσοπαλῆς.
   17 μεσοθθεν D

146.17 μεσοδθεν ἱσοπαλῆς πάντη· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
   17 τὸ γὰρ om. F

502.6–7 μεσοθθεν ἱσοπαλῆς

Β 8.45

52.28 οὔτε τι θαλότερον πελέαν χρεῶν έστι τῇ ἢ τῇ,
   28 apud Sophist θαλότερον (inter β et α una
   ε έ σι littera era) D πελέαν E F: πέλαινε D:
   πελέαν a τῇ (spatium IV litt.) η (spatium
   III litt.) τοιοῦτον F

89.24 οὔτε τι θαλότερον πελέαν χρεῶν έστι τῇ ἢ τῇ,
   24 apud Sophist ἢ τῇ] αὐτῇ E

146.18 οὔτε τι θαλότερον πελέαν χρεῶν έστι τῇ ἢ τῇ.
   18 χρεῶν E έστι πῇ (?)
146.19 οὗτε γὰρ οὕτι ἐδών ἐστὶ, τὸ κεῖν παῦρι μὴν ἱκνείσθαι
146.20 εἰς ὅμων, οὕτι ἐδών ἐστιν ὡς εἰς κεῖν ἓοντος
146.21 τῇ μᾶλλον τῇ δὲ ἱκοσον, ἔπει πέν ἐστιν ἵσυλον·
146.22 ἵ οἱ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἱκον, ὡμὼς ἐν πείρασι κύρει.

19 οὗτε ἐδών D: οὗτε δὲν EF: οὐκ ἐδῶν recte a  
παῦρι DEF: παὐρ ἡ κυνείσθαι F
20 εἰς ὅμων E: εἰς ὅμων AD: om. F οὗτε δὲν  
libri κεῖν Karsten: καὶ ἐν DEF: κεῖνον a
22 οἱ γὰρ DEF: ἢ γὰρ a: conicit Diels εἰ γὰρ  
vel ἢ γὰρ ἰσονάκος F κύρει Stein:  
kύρει aEF: κυροὶ D

8.50

30.17 ἐν τῷ σοι παῦρ πιστῶν λόγον ἥδε νότημα
38.30 ἐν τῷ σοι παῦρω πιστῶν λόγον ἥδε νότημα
30 παῦρω DEEF: παῦρω a ἡ δὲ E^a
41.8 ἐν τῷ σοι παῦρω πιστῶν λόγον ἥδε νότημα
8 σοι παῦρω DEFa: σοι παῦρ aF
146.23 ἐν τῷ σοι παῦρω πιστῶν λόγον ἥδε νότημα

in Cael

558.5 ἐν τῷ σοι παῦρω πιστῶν λόγον ἥδε νότημα

8.51

30.18 ἀμφις ἀλθειῆς, δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείους
18 ἀμφις F: ἀμφι aDE
38.31 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείας, δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείους
41.9 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείας;
146.24 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείας· δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
24 βροτείους cf. 147.29

in Cael
558.6 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείας, δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας.

B 8.52
30.19 μανθανε, κόσμου ἐμὸν ἐπέων ἀπατηλῶν ὁμοίων,
19 ἀπατηλῶν sed. corr. F¹
38.32 μανθανε, κόσμου ἐμὸν ἐπέων ἀπατηλῶν ὁμοίων.
32 ἀπατηλῶν Ea
146.25 μανθανε, κόσμου ἐμὸν ἐπέων ἀπατηλῶν ὁμοίων.
in Cael
558.7 μανθανε κόσμου ἐμὸν ἐπέων ἀπατηλῶν ὁμοίων.
7 ἀπατηλῶν E

B 8.53
30.23 μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνάμας ὁμομάζειν,
39.1 μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνάμας ὁμομάζειν.
1 γνάμας DEFF: γνάμας a
180.1 μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνάμας ὁμομάζειν,
1 γνάμας aF¹: γνάμας DEF²
τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἐστίν, ἐν ὧν πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν·

τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἐστίν, ἐν ὧν πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν·

τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἐστίν, ἐν ὧν πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν·

ἀντίλα δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο

ἀντίλα δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο

ἀντίλα δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο

χωρίς ἀπ' ἄλληλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ

χωρίς ἀπ' ἄλληλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ

χωρίς ἀπ' ἄλληλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ

ὁπλον ἔ τοι μέγ' ἄραυὸν ἐλαφρόν, ἐκατον πάντοτε τωτῶν,

ὁπλον ἔ τοι μέγ' ἄραυὸν ἐλαφρόν, ἐκατον πάντοτε τωτῶν,

ὁπλον ἔ τοι μέγ' ἄραυὸν ἐλαφρόν, ἐκατον πάντοτε τωτῶν,
δι ν μέγ' ἀραιόν ἐλαφρόν  a F

180.5 ἦπιον † ἀραιόν ἐλαφρόν ἐαυτῷ πάντοσε ταύτων,
5 ἦπιον αفى (i.e. ἀραιοῦ) E: ἦπιον ἀφ DF: ἦπιον ἐστὶν α

B 8.58

31.1 τῷ δ' ἔτερῳ μὴ ταύτων· ἀτὰρ κἀνεῖνο κατ' αὐτό
1 κατ' αὐτόν ταυτία F: κατὰ ταύτο τάνκαντία DE:
κατ' αὐτὸ τάνκαντία α

39.6 τῷ δ' ἔτερῳ μὴ ταύτων· ἀτὰρ κἀνεῖνο κατ' αὐτό
6 κατ' αὐτό: ταυτία (sic) Eᵃ: κατ' αὐτὸ duorum
litterarum spatium) τάντια F: κατὰ ταύτο
tάνκαντία DE

180.6 τῷ δ' ἔτερῳ μὴ ταύτων· ἀτὰρ κἀνεῖνο κατ' αὐτό
6 κατ' αὐτό aF: κατὰ ταυτὸ DE

B 8.59

31.2 τάντια, νῦκτ' ἀδαί, πυκνὸν δέμας ἐμβολίδες τε.
2 νῦκτ' ἀδαί πυκνὸν E: νῦκτ' ἀδαί ἤ πυκνὸν D:
νυκτάδα ἤ (ἠδὲ α) πυκνὸν a F

39.7 τάντια νῦκτ' ἀδαί πυκνὸν δέμας ἐμβολίδες τε.
7 νῦκτ' ἀδαί Eᵃ: νυκτάδα ἤ D: νυκτάδ' ἀδαί E:
νυκτάδα, ἤ F: νυκτάδα ἤδὲ α πυκνὸν a

180.7 τάντια νῦκτ' ἀδαί πυκνὸν δέμας ἐμβολίδες τε.
7 τάντια E: τάνκαντία DF: ἀντία α νυκτάδα ἤ
437

aF: νύκτα δ' ἄδαθ ἐF

B 8.60 - 61

39.8 τὸν σοι ἐγὼ διάφορον ἑυκότα πάντα φατίζω,
39.9 ὡς οὖ μὴ ποτὲ τίς σε βροτῶν γυμνὴ παρελάσῃ.
8 διαφόρον DE
9 παρελάσῃ aF: παρελάσῃ DE

B 9.1 - 4

180.9 αὕτη εἰς τόπον πάντα φάσις καὶ νός ὁνόμασται
180.10 καὶ τὰ κατὰ σφετέρας δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοιοῦ τοι καὶ τοῖς
180.11 πᾶν πλέον ἐστὶν ὁμοί φάσις καὶ νυκτὸς ἀράντων
180.12 ὢς τινὶ ἀμφοτέροις, ἐπεὶ συνετέχω μὲτὰ μηδέν.
9 ὁνόμασται aF: ὁνόμασται DEF2
10 τὰ (post καὶ) om. E
12 ὡς D

B 11.1 - 4
in Cael

559.22 πῶς γαῖα καὶ ἔλιος ἄλλη θελήνη
559.23 αἰθήρ τε θεὸς γάλα τ' οὐράνιον καὶ Ἄλαμπος
559.24 ἔσχατος ἥ' ἀστρῶν θεμὸν μένος ἀρμήθησαν
559.25 γίνεσθαι,
24 θερμῶν DE
25 γίνεσθαι DE: γίνεσθαι AF
В 12.1

39.14 αἱ γὰρ στελνότεραι πλήντο πυρὸς ἀφότητοι

14 πλήντο scripsit Diels: πυρντο (sine acc.) E²:

πύρντο D¹: πύρντο D²E: om. F spatio rel.:

πυρντο a ἀφότητος DE²: ἀφότητος EF:

ἀφότητοι a: corr. Stein

В 12.2

31.13 αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτὸς, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵπται αἰσχ.

39.15 αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτὸς, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵπται αἰσχ.

15 δὲ (post metá) om. D¹: τε D² ἵπται aDEF:

οἶτεται E²

В 12.3

31.14 ἐὰν δὲ μεσὴ τούτων δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾶ.

14 δαίμονι πάντα F

39.16 ἐὰν δὲ μεσὴ τούτων δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾶ.

16 ἢ πάντα D

В 12.4 - 6

31.15 † πάντα γὰρ στυγεροῦ τόκου καὶ μίξιος ἀρχεῖ

31.16 πέμπουσ' ἀρσεν θῆλυ μιγὲν τὸ τ' ἐναντίον αἴθης

31.17 ἀρσεν θηλυτέρω.

15 ἀρχεῖ DE: ἀρχῇ aF

16 μιγὲν· τότ' (τότε DE) libri aώτης F
B 13.1

39.18 πρῶτιστον μὲν ἐρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων
18 μητίσατο DE

B 19.1 - 3

in Cael

558.9 οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἐπὶ τάδε καὶ νυν ἔσω
558.10 καὶ μετέπειτ’ ἀπὸ τούτῳ τελευτήσου τραφέντα·
558.11 τοὺς δ’ οὖν’ ἀνθρώπου κατέθεντο ἐπίσημον ἑνάστη.

9 ἐρωτά δὲ DE: corr. E2 καὶ νῦν ADEF:

νῦν τε c

11 ἐπίσημον ἑνάστη DE: ἑνάστη ἐπίσημον AF
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